THE ENGLISH LAWYER.  
DESCRIBING A Method for the managing of the Laws of this Land.  
And expressing the best qualities requisite in the 

Student  
Practizer  
Judges and Fathers   of the same.  
Written by the Reverend and Learned Sir JOHN DODERIDGE Knight, one of the justices of the King's Bench, lately deceased.  
LONDON, Printed by the Assigns of I MORE Esq. MDCXXXI.   

The Printers to the READER.  
THE later part of this Volume was heretofore obscurely printed by an imperfect Copy from a then unknown Author, under the Title of The Lawyer's light: We now reimprint it in fair light, by the Authors own Copy, written (for the most part) with his own hand; we vouch his name and entitle it, as he himself did, The English Lawyer: The other part hereof, which was not formerly printed, we now also put forth according to the Authors own Copy, and place it, as he did, in the foremost rank; There are other parts also (which are expressed on the next leaf) requisite to the making up of the whole intended work; but because they are not made, or not found as yet, they can be but desired until some happy hand shall either find or finish the rest of this good work, whose worth will recommend itself upon the reading.   

This Whole Treatise is divided into three Parts.  
The first concerning the Student: And that also divided into three distinct Sections.  
THE first Section containeth a disquisition with what Natural gifts and faculties the Student of the Law aught to be furnished withal.  
The second Section containeth what acquired Qualities are required in the Student as well touching the Virtue's intellectual, and the liberal Sciences, wherein the Student should be informed; and other Knowledges necessary for the rectifying of his understanding, as also touching the Moral virtues for direction of his Conversation.  
The third Section containeth the best manner and Method that may be used for the most delightful and most useful study of Law, and whereby most profit may be gotten in profoundness of judgement in the knowledge of our English Laws.  
The second Treatise touching the Counsellor or Practizer of the Laws, is also subdivided into three principal Parts or Sections.  
THe First concerneth his Private Counsel given at home in his Chamber to his Client, which is one part of his duty Consulendo, by way of Counsel.  
The Second Part or Section concerneth the drawing of Assurances and Conveyances, which are of sundry sorts; which is his duty Cavendo, by way of Caution.  
The Third Part or Section concerneth his Plead for his Client; And that is threefold: In point of Law: In Argument of Demurrers: In matter of fact, as in giving or delivering of Evidence. And the Patronage of Causes in Courts of equity: all which are his duties Agendo, by way of public Action.  
In the Third Treatise concerning a judge, are contained these particulars, in two general parts divided: first, his Preparation in his person, Secondly, his Practice.  
IN his Preparation, or consideration of his Person, the qualities required in an upright judge are these: first, that he be Religious, according to the Counsel of jethro unto Moses, Provide men fearing God. 2 Chron. 19.7. Exodus 18.21.22.23.  
Secondly, They aught to be men of Courage. Provide thee among all the People men of Courage. Deut. 1.17.  
Thirdly, They aught to be men of Integrity, Just men, dealing truly: They shall be just, if first they hate Covetousness, so will they not be corrupted, For rewards and gifts do blind the eyes of the wise; Exod. 23.8. Deut. 16.19. Ecclus. 20.28. 2 Chron. 19.7. Secondly, if they have no respect of persons. Leu. 19.15. Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.7. Thirdly, if they be free from passions and perturbations of the mind, as anger, favour, desire of revenge, etc.  
Fourthly, judges aught to be wife, men able to discern circumstances, and to foreknow the mischiefs and inconveniences that may ensue of inconsiderate judgements. Deut. 1.13.  
Fiftly, judges aught to be learned, especially in the Laws, Be ye learned that judge the earth.  
The Second Part, which is the Practice of the judge, generally considered is twofold, first either Sedentary, in the Court wherein he sitteth: or Itinerate, in the Circuit wherein he rideth.   

THE CONTENTS.  

Chap: 1 OF Nature, of Art, of Exercise. Pag. 1  
Chap: 2 Of sharpness of wit and judgement. Pag. 4  
Chap: 3. Of Memory. Pag. 12  
Chap: 4. Of ready speech. Pag. 24  
Chap: 5. That liberal Arts are requisite in a Lawyer. Pag. 27  
Sundry Objections answered.  
Chap: 6. That skill in the Latin tongue and the four parts of Grammar is requisite in a Lawyer. Pag. 39  
And sundry objections answered.  
Chap: 7. Of Logic, the necessity thereof in a Lawyer proved. Pag. 55  
By testimonies of Heathen and Divine Authors.  
By reasons drawn from the most parts of Logic, as, from the consideration  
Of derivations of words.  
Of definitions & descriptions.  
Of divisions.  
With instances out of the common Laws.  
As also from the consideration  
Of oppesites.  
Of Negatives.  
Of priority.  
Of the whole and his parts.  
Of the four causes, material, formal, efficient, final.  
Exemplified with instances out of the Laws, being parts of Logic furthering the knowledge of definition and division.  
By places out of Law Books where the use of Logic hath either been required, admitted, or practised.    

THE ENGLISH LAWYER.  

CAP. I  
FOrasmuch as the Exercise of all such as enterprise the Profession, and do intermeddle with the Knowledge of the Laws of this Realm, consisteth, 1, either in the obtaining, study, or specusation thereof. 2, Or in the practice, prosecution, or direction. 3, Or in the full and final decision and determination of causes therein called into question: behooveful it were (as me seemeth) for such as have already entertained a love to that faculty, and covet to contemplate with their inward eye the express and perfect Image of an English Lawyer, to view each of these in their particular charge and duty, and therewithal to consider what things were requisite, and what course were most convenient to be holden for the better and more full accomplishment of that which is, and must be expected. And as the persons whom our speech concerneth, and whose charge we have here briefly touched, are three in number, The Student, the Practizer, and the judge: (For as touching the Pronothory or Clark, and the Attorney, they are rather Ministers to follow others, than Managers to direct:) So will the matters incident to every of their duties yield us a threefold Treatise, and give us large scope of Discourse in the prosecuting of such things as are requisite and incident unto the same.  
And first as touching the Student, & his speculative search of our English Laws (which is his endeavour and study) as it is in order foremost, and by Nature the ground of the proceed of both the other, being that indeed without the which the rest cannot subfist. Reason in this point requireth, that due consideration, and careful forethought should be had for the obtaining and trial of those things which are esteemed as Viatica necessaria, needful implements behooveful in the person of him that shall undertake to deal therewith. Authors which have written Institutions for the better information and direction of the learner, have required at the hands of such their Auditors and followers as were to be instructed; these three things, Nature, Art, and Exercise or Use, each of which they would so have, & indeed so aught to be linked to other, that seldom hath been found perfection in any one person in whom all these three have not been conjoined: For Nature (though of herself excellent) yet without Art or Exercise is as the Gold in the dross, or as the precious stone taken out of the bowels of the earth, rude, and unpolished: Art without Nature, bore, barren, and defective (as being indeed nothing else but an observation of Nature) And both without Exercise, void of fruit: Nature resembleth the soil; Art or Method whereby we are directed, the Husbandman; Precepts or Institutions in the Science which we mean to profess, are as the seeds, which industry and exercise do bring unto growth, ripeness & perfection: so that Sane Beatus, dijsque acceptus est, cui Deus ista omnia tribuit. But sithence that division which consisteth of two parts is holden most Artficiall, all these three (as me seemeth) may aptly be drawn and reduced into two original Branches. The one concerning the Qualities wherewith it is convenient our Student should be adorned before his intended enterprise attempted, and with the which he might be ready furnished to set upon the same. The other discovering the manner, method, and direction of the course of our study once entered, the means of furtherance thereof, and how, and in what manner to hold on therein without intermission until the wished fruit, and expected end shall be obtained.  
In the former we shall include Nature and such other habiliments as shall be required for the full furnishing and adorning thereof.  
In the latter, Art, Exercise, and other incidents and adherents unto the same.  
Concerning therefore the consideration of those former qualities that are to be before had, and obtained, Philosophers led by the rule of reason have distinguished the transitory gifts that God hath bestowed on us in this life, to be either Bona animi, bona corporis, or bona fortunae. Qualities either resident in us, or external benefits bestowed upon us. Those which are inherent in us, concern either our minds or our bodies, which good gifts of our minds are either Natural given by God unto us, without our labour bred together with us, and within us from our Cradles, growing and increasing with our age, as first sharpness, pregnancy, and dexterity of wit: Secondly, Sound and exquisite memory: Thirdly, ready, copious, and sweet delivery of our words. Or gotten and gained by long industry and travel, grown to a perfect habit, either first illuminating our knowledges, as the Sciences Liberal, and other the speculative virtues of the mind: Or else secondly directing our lives and conversations as the virtues Moral reposed in our wills.   

CAP. II.  
TO discourse therefore of these particulars (I mean principally the gifts of the mind) in such order as is before specified. The first and chiefest Natural gift is sharpness, and dexterity of wit, the excellency whereof surpassing all praise, needeth no commendation, being the thing indeed without which nothing can be throughly fifted as it should be, or sufficiently set forth as it aught: but to speak more particularly thereof, and for the purpose in hand, none can well deny that do consider the depth of knowledge reposed in the Laws of this Realm: none I say can deny, which do consider how many cases of much conformity, and resemblance do daily happen, wherein nevertheless dexterity of wit upon some circumstance of matter, espieth a difference: None can deny, which do consider that many in the Patronage and defence of causes, are oftentimes pressed upon the sudden, presently to reply to the adversaries unexpected objections, (which effect Promptness and readiness of wit only worketh:) but that the excellency and dexterity thereof were almost alone sufficient to make a ready and pressed Lawyer; for it behooveth the Lawyer with a quick conceit to comprehend the cause of his Client once opened, throughly to understand the drifts of his Adversaries reasons at the first urged, readily both to invent, and fitly to apply his provided proofs and arguments to the point in question: all which are the effects of an excellent wit, and with the which we do so much desire our learned Lawyer should be adorned.  
The consideration therefore of wit, or of the light of humane understanding which Almighty God hath given unto man, whereby he excelleth all other living creatures, may be considered of us by the view of two several faculties, or sundry operations of our mind; the one for distinction sake may be called Apprehension, and the other judgement (not that the mind is divers, or manifold, but that these are the diverse affections, and proper passions of one and the self same cause.) The first is the quick, speedy, and lively vigour, the ready ability of our understanding, and as it were the hand by which our mind taketh hold of the knowledge of things proposed, being indeed the very same the Latins call Ingenij acumen. The other (before called judgement) is the faculty whereby we do as it were give sentence of the thing conceived, and censure our own understanding concerning the same. And as unto the first may be attributed (as the true ensign and peculiar quality thereof) Sharpness; So from the other, which is judgement, in like manner followeth (the proper quality wherewith it is invested) Soundness; of which it is evident (to speak briefly) that the one is the sharpness of conceit, the other is the soundness of conceit; resembling and alluding to that Philosophical distinction, Intellectus agens, and intellectus passibilis, scu possibilis. And as these operations of the mind are in duty several; so are they for the most part sunderly and severally distributed by God unto men; not that the one can be wholly, and alone without the other, but that the excellency of the one is seldom settled, and contained in one person with the excellency of the other, whereof daily observation may yield abundant examples.  
The judgement of Plato touching his two Disciples, Aristotle and Theophrastus, was grounded upon the diversity of their natural gifts, in this respect the one surmounted in sharpness of understanding, namely Aristotle; The other (though that way inferior) yet every way comparable in sharpness of judgement.  
There lived at one time in the Commonweal of Athens two notable Orators, Demosthenes and Demades: the one through his care, premeditation, and soundness of judgement, by speech to please the humour of the people, was a man renowned. The other, namely Demades for his quickness of wit, and ready utterance upon the sudden, most excellent.  
There were likewise wont to come into the Counsel Chamber of the said City, at one the selfsame season, two famous Counfellors, Aristides for his sound counsel greatly esteemed, and Themistocles for his sharp and witty policies highly regarded. At one time there were in the field two famous Captains, each against other in a quarrel, which concerned either the flourishing, or the downfall of both their States and Commonweals, Hannibal the Carthaginian, and Quint us Fabius Maximus the Roman, in which their conflicts the Carthaginian was not more commended for inventing a Stratagem, wherein he excelled, then was the Roman reverenced for stayed and advised judgement in preventing the same, wherein he surpassed: The one of them was not more wilily, than the other wary; But thus much of the Heathen. In the Church of God, and as concerning the writings of ancient Latin Doctors, there is found in the style of Augustine an excellent and peculiar sharpness: In the books of Ambrose & Jerome a plain, full, and familiar soundness, and Bernard addeth to both a delectable sweetness. Among the Schoolmen, who racked reason as fare as it would reach, one man in one age for his sharpness of wit was called Subtilis Doctor; and another near the same time for his soundness of judgement, Doctor Angelicus. But to come to the Laws of the Land, and to exemplifie our discourse in our own faculty (purposely refraining to speak or publish the excellent gifts of many famous men now living in this profession) let us call to our considerations two notable Ornaments of one Bench or Court, of one time, of reverend remembrance, and now both deceased, Sr Anthony Browne, and Sr james Dyer Knights: both having been Chief in their places of justice. In the one did shine an incomparable sharpness of wit, and in the other was found in a manner an irrefragrable soundness of judgement. But to leave examples, and to descend to a subdivision, we are to note, that sharpness of wit is again observed by two properties, that is to say, Quickness of capacity, and readiness of discourse, for Ingenij acumen non solùm concipit, sed discutit. And yet these qualities are likewise by God oftentimes sunderly disposed; for some men there are which can of themselves soon conceive any difficulty by others proposed in speech or writing; but they are not also endowed with the narall gift of promptness of discourse and argument; And, some others on the contrary are excellently gifted for Oratory or discussion, but defective, and come fare short of others in the former property, I mean, in mental conception.  
And yet though a Student of the Law be by nature unfurnished with these gifts of the mind aforesaid, he must not be disheartened, but rather encouraged; which encouragement may take good ground;  
First, upon consideration with himself, that seldom is seen such excellency of quick capacity in any one person unmated with the blemish of ranging lightness and instability: That the more fertile the soil is, the more prove it is to bear and bring forth (without painful manurance) unprofitable, and sometime most noisome weeds; that as wax is apt to receive whatsoever impression, so is it apt easily again to lose it, and to be new framed into whatsoever fashion; where on the contrary part the form which is engraven in Marble is as hardly worn out as it was with much labour imprinted: for quick wits (saith one) are apt to take, unapt to keep, soon hot, soon cold, more apt to enter speedily, then able to pierce fare, like edges of sharp tools, soon turned; For we may find true by experience, that among a number of quick wits in youth, few be found in the end either very fortunate for themselves, or very profitable to serve the Commonwealth; such was Hermogenes the rhetorician, who (as it is written) being in manner a Child but eighteen years old, compiled an excellent Treatise of Rhetoric savouring more of judgement than is commonly found in that age; but afterward attaining to the years of 28. he became mad and utterly forgot all things.  
Secondly, the minds of Students are encouraged, and their wits consequetly increased, as well by due commendation given them for their good endeavour, as also by commemoration of the utility, profit, and excellency of the things they covet to obtain. Touching the first of these well saith Aristotle, Adolescentiam gloriae studio duci. Wherhfore to be short, and to speak of this in a word, what a spur Praise is to prick forth the mind in every good attempt, is seen and perceived even in bruit beasts. The Hound hunteth best when he is encouraged with the cry of the Huntsman; that Hawk is made more eager to pursue her prey, to whom the Falconer hath used to impart some part of the prey taken: But what course or tenor aught to be holden herein, Plutarch giveth good instruction: Cum exultant animi, reprehensionibus ad pudorem redigantur; cum dejecti sunt, rursus laudibus erigantur.  
Touching the second, which is the commemoration of the thing coveted: true it is, that the consideration of the excellency thereof is a most wonderful provocation to set forwards the due means with all industry which serve for the obtaining of the same, which for as much as in the tract we have in hand, is the exact knowledge of the Law, a brief narration of the necessity and utility thereof is able sufficiently to vanquish all tediousness of study, and all irksomeness to be endured and borne in the obtaining thereof: So that although (by the way, and nothing out of the way) apt occasion be here offered to speak in the commendation of the Law, surpassing all praise that my poor ability can bestow upon it, yet let it suffice somewhat to have said herein, and nevertheless no more than another hath spoken in the like kind many hundred years ago; jurisprudentia sine. controversia, & magna est, & latè patet, & ad multos pertinet, & summo in honore semper fuit, & clarissimi Cives ei study, & semper praefuerunt, & etiam hodiè praesunt.   

CAP. III.  
THe next natural gift to be considered of, is Soundness of Memory, which is the receptacle wherein is reposed and laid up whatsoever things the Understanding hath apprehended and judged worthy of receipt or entertainment: for what doth it profit with great labour, dexterity, and industry to get together, when the thing gotten is not carefully kept and preserved, but loosely let go, or negligently lost? What booteth it to read much, which is weariness to the flesh; to meditate often, which is a burden to the mind; to learn daily with increase of knowledge, when as the matter learned is to seek, at that time especially when we have most need of the use thereof? Memory therefore is the Chest of an inestimable treasure, given from God for the preservation of all kind of knowledge: it is as Plutarch saith, the store-house of all our understanding; and as Plato saith, Mater Musarum, the Mother of the Muses: as Aristotle saith, it is the guide of our experience, and the groundwork of all our wisdom, for that forepassed experiences called to remembrance do engender advised circumspection, and are able to direct all our future achievements through the consideration of forepast events. Tully saith it is Signatarum rerum in ment vestigium, the character of things imprinted in our mind. S. Augustine (as it seemeth) ravished with the contemplation of this wonderful faculty, useth these words thereof, Omnia recipit recolenda cum opus est, & retractanda grandis memoriae recessus, ac nescio quid secreti, atque ineffabilis sinus ejus, cum omnia suis quaeque foribus intrant adeam, & in eam reponuntur: Memory is a store-house infinitely capable, and can never be overfilled, wherein by the most cunning Workmaster of Nature are hoarded up all kinds of acts and accidents that either the outward senses have perceived, or the inward understanding conceived; wherein things of like kind and quality, as in a large treasury, are orderly composed and laid up together by themselves in certain, sure, and seposed cells, from thence tob e drawn and deduced wheresoever fit and apt occasion is offered; which Art of Memory doth manifest by this or the like instances ensuing: for when we do call to mind any one particular, the same so remembered doth for the most part bring to light his like, so that we do remember the one by the commemoration oftentimes of the other: of the which one hath written very well in this manner; In memoriaomnia ita collocata & ordinata sunt, ut unumquodque separatim, & cuncta confertim, & singula ordinatim exposcere & digerere valeamus. The truth is, that some things there are which we can remember easily and with great facility, some other things with more difficulty, as hoarded up in the bottom of that Chest, and do require more search (as the rumaging of wares in the bulk of a ship) to be unladen and brought to light; some things do offer themselves, and some other things after long seeking are hardly found: And thus much may here suffice to have been written concerning the effects of humane Memory.  
But for the better and deeper discovery of the nature thereof, (for then we shall the better address ourselves to the use of Memory, when we do truly comprehend the kinds, causes, and nature of the same) we are to conceive that the learned who have written hereof have observed a double faculty of Memory; the one concerning things comprehended by the outward senses, and therefore called by them Memory Sensative: The other concerning things conceived by the Understanding and Power of wit, and therefore called Intellective Memory. The first, namely Sensative Memory is common to Man and many other living Creatures, resulting from the sense: Hence it is that the Horse knoweth and remembreth theway wherein he hath been of ten travailed, veiled, many times better than his Rider; The Dog after many year's absence can call to memory his Master, and by fawning upon him renew his old acquaintance: The fowls of the air, how fare so ever they fly can readily return to their Nests, by Memory of the place where their young are reposed: The Bee can resort to his own Hive, and in the Hive to his proper hole; and the little Ant retire to her Den whence she first issued, neither foregoing nor forgetting it at her return, with innumerable occurrences of like nature, all which are effected by the Art and operation of Memory Sensative.  
Memory Intellective followeth the use of reason and therefore is found in no other Creature than Man, which is endued with the faculty of reason. And whether, and in what manner this kind of Memory doth differ from the Understanding itself, I do remit to the Philosophers, to the contemplation of whose learned discourses I do commit the curious desire of the Reader that seeketh farther satisfaction herein.  
But to proceed: as there is a twofold Memory, Sensative and Intellective, as hath been said, so is there also a double operation of the Memory Intellective: The one is called Actus memorandi, the other Actus reminiscendi. The first of these is the representation of things past, as if they were still present, representing the Image of things forepast in the same manner as if they were now actually & really present. Actus reminiscendi is as it were akinde of discourse of Memory; for as before was said of understanding, that there is one operation to conceive and comprehend, and another operation to infer, collect and discourse thereupon, and to draw conclusions from a thing conceived to another thing concealed, and to extract out of things known the knowledge of things unknown, so is it likewise in these operations of Memory, the one doth remember the other, viz. Actus reminiscendi, out of one thing remembered discovereth another thing in manner lost and forgotten: so that the one draweth the other as the several links of a Chain draw and depend one upon another: Examples will make it manifest. If a man do relate unto me a matter done in time forepast in his and my presence, and with our privities, if I do remember the same, and thereby do acknowledge the thing to be true, for that the same is now represented unto me by the Act of Memory, as if it were really present, this is called Actus memorandi: But if I have forgotten it, and he bring me in mind of it by quickening and reviving my Memory by the circumstances of time, place, company, or such like other occurrences, and by that means at length I come to repair that decay of Memory, this is called Actus reminiscendi; so that the last mentioned operation may aptly be called the Discourse of Memory.  
The objects of Memory are things passed, 
Objects of Memory.  as aristotle recounteth, Memoria est rerum praeteritarum. And as hope is of things to come, sense and understanding of things that are present; so Memory is employed and worketh upon things past: And thus much shortly by the way of a Philosophical discourse (rudi Minerva) touching Memory.  
Nour that out of these things thus known we may make some use for the better establishing and increase of the student's Memory, and to teach as it were a true Art Memorative, not out of foreign precepts, or by the help of Imaginary places, but out of the nature of Memory itself, which may be tanquam vivida praecepta; I shall exhibit to your consideration some few remarkable circumstances, and so much the rather, by how much the more this faculty (although excellent in itself) yet is the sooner lost, and with the loss thereof, it maketh all our studies but lost labours. For true it it is, and too true which Seneca affirmeth, speaking of Memory, Res est ex omnibus partibus animi maximè delicata, & fragilis, in quam primum senectus incurrit: The most delicate and frail part of our Mind, the which old Age doth first assault. And as Pliny saith, Nec quicquam aquè fragile in hominum vita, morborum & casus injurias, atque etiam metus sentiens; Nothing so fading in all Man's life, subject to decay by the injuries of sickness, chances and fears: therefore for the better accomplishment of our intended purposes; let us first consider the instrument or organ, which the qualities or faculties of the mind or soul do work withal in this life, which is the body; for the body is vehiculum animae, the chariot, waggon, or ship of the soul, if not the sepulchre thereof, as Plato affirmed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the aptness of the instrument is a great furtherance to the sacility of the workmanship, and to the beauty of the work. Man's body being composed of elemental qualities requireth in the perfection thereof a temperature of humours, which also consisteth in the temperate disposition of heat and moisture, for that in humido, & calido consistit vita, and hereby it is made a more apt instrument and organ for the operation of the powers of the soul, and so consequently of Memory, natural moisture must not abound as in children, whose memory is therefore in tender years most commonly not of the best. And again, natural moisture must not on the other side be almost in a manner exhausted, as in old men, whose Memory is therefore worn, but it must hold the golden means, for fluid things are apt to receive but cannot long retain any impression, by reason of overmuch moisture, which makes the impression lose, and at length utterly lost; And aride and drythings can receive no impression for want of moisture, the one receiveth but retaineth not, the other receiveth not at all; wherefore as this golden means must be preserved in the temperature of moisture, so must it be held indifferent between cold and heat, nothing so hurtful to Memory as overmuch cold, nothing more harmful to Memory then overmuch heat, the which how to mitigate in the disposition of the body I leave to Physicians by medicine and diet; and therefore I resort to precepts agreeable and correspondent to the nature of Memory without medicine.  
First therefore, whosoever desireth to remember that science, faculty or proposition which he learneth or readeth, let him be well assured that he first throughly understand and apprehended the same with some kind of delight, for no man did ever remember that perfectly, which he understood not throughly; in as much as the well understanding is the Character, and seal of the thing understood, which the Memory receiveth imprinted in her. Things are then said to be throughly understood, when the effects are known by their cause, tùm enim scimus, cùm per causas cognoscimus, as saith aristotle; or when the cause is known by the effects, when the reasons thereof are throughly apprehended, and the consequents truly discerned, namely, when the judicial part of our understanding resteth satisfied, and giveth a sentence within ourself, that it doth fully comprehend. This perfect understanding must be joined (as I said) with delight, which dilateth the vital spirits, and quickeneth Memory; whereas things conceived in contrary passions can hardly be retained long through the perturbations occasioned thereby.  
Understanding with delight is drawn from the excellency of the knowledge apprchended, from the rareness, strangeness, or else of the good conformity and coherence thereof, with other things, or out of a natural inclination we have thereunto; For it is true, Quae magna aestimamus magis memoriae infigimus, therefore first covet to understand well and with delight, and you shall remember the better.  
The next precept is, often to meditate upon the thing so understood with a diligent disquisition and search through all the parts thereof, for whatsoever is by perfect understanding imprinted in the Memory, the same is more deeply engraven by meditation therein; and as spice swallowed doth neither give taste to the tongue, nor heat to the stomach, but when it is first broken and chewed in the mouth; so, much reading doth not increase learning except it be whetted and sharpened with meditation, which is the chewing of the cud after the mind's repast. And hereof it is that Aristotle affirmeth that meditatio confirmat memoriam, and hence springeth the Proverb, that it hath been seldom seen that ever an old man forgot that place where he had hidden his gold, for where our treasure is, there is our heart and meditation also.  
The third consideration is to use and keep a method, and to analyze the matter with all his parts and incidents which we do desire to remember, a course which notably establisheth, confirmeth, and strengtheneth Memory. For in as much as Method consisteth much of division, that saying is very true which the gloss hath observed, and Bracton out of the same transumed, Divisio sive partitio triplicem operatur effectum; primò enim animum legentis incitat, secundò mentem intelligentiae praeparat, & tertiò memoriam artificiosè reformat.  
The fourth consideration or precept is, to eschew and avoid the troubling and encumbering the Mind at one time with sundry different and uncohaerent matters, except it be done with much moderation, and at set times and hours, for recreation only, and for the reviving of our understanding with variety, when it beginneth otherwise to be weakened, dulled or cloyed: so shall our Memory not be pestered with manifold impressions; for when it seeketh to apprehended the one, it often and most commonly doth loose the other, according to the usual and true saying, Plurimis intentus minus est ad singula sensus.  
The fift precept is daily to exercise memory, that is, daily to commit things to the faithful custody of our Memory, and after a time passed, most curiously and carefully to recall the same to an account thereof, and to tender back again the things so received. And this kind of exercise maketh Memory very ready, and doth much increase the same; For Quintilian hath very well noted of Memory, that Nihil aequè augetur cura, vel negligentia intercidit; Nothing is so much increased by diligence and care had thereof as Memory, and then the same nothing sooner lost by negligence thereof. As touching a true use hereof, we are to consider a distinction of things to be remembered; for either we do desire to remember the matter or substance only which in all kind of learning is to be observed, or else we also desire to commit to Memory the frame and compact of the words also, as when we do covet a penned Oration, set Sermon or Speech.  
As touching the first, as the morning is a fit time to study, so is it also to commit matters of substance to Memory; for as the Memory is said to be Musarum Mater, so is Aurora Musarum amica, for then are our bodies discharged of all superfluous burdens that may hinder our studies and meditations, and our spirits are more quick after their received rest.  
As concerning the second, many do not unfruitfully commit their penned orations, set speeches, laboured Sermons, and such like which they covet verbally to pronounce, to Memory in the evening, being silent and quiet, and to give it harbour and lodging with them overnight, that they may more readily recount the same in the morning. And thus much touching these few, short, easy and familiar precepts. and observations touching that operation which we have called Actus Memorandi.  
Now as touching the other called Actus reminiscendi, the same is incited by diverse circumstances, as of the place, whereof Aristotle saith, à locis videntur reminisci aliquando; So likewise of the persons, times, the meanner of doing, or as some other memorable accidents subject to the sense, not ordinary or accustomed, do occasion: for things strange and unfrequented are best held in Memory, because they were first received of the Memory with admiration, as a new welcome guest into an Inn or lodging, about the entertainment and good usage of whom there is ordinarily most care and industry bestowed and conferred; And therefore no doubt, and upon this reason, those things which children do first apprehended with an admiration and delight, they do retain best and hold when they come to age. To these considerations there are those which do add the precepts of Art Memorative, so often treated of by such as have written of Oratory, by appointing certain places, conceived and imagined unto themselves, which being carefully disposed in convenient order, they do fix thereupon those things which they would remember in apprehension, and by consideration thereof do call to mind such forepast matters in due and direct order, and so with much facility do and can recount the same, upon which places so in their imagination fixed and apt for the matter in hand, it behooveth that they cast their careful consideration and frequent meditation.   

CAP. FOUR  
THe third gift given from God by the course of nature unto Mankind, wherewith the Student of the Laws aught to be adorned, is a prompt and ready delivery by way of speech, of those things which are conceived in the mind, which is as it were the hand that doth communicate the former gifts spoken of, and participate unto others; and is that which the excellent Roman Orator affirmeth to be been constitutae Civitatis quasi Alumna quaedam, I mean not an elaborate curiosity of words, or an affectation of phrase, which is practised by none, and wherewith none are moved, but such as are of vulgar judgement. But that I mean which the same Author commendeth, Ea dicendi facultas quae est plena dignitatis, grandis verbis, sapiens sententijs, accommodata causae, genere toto gravis: for of him that is adorned therewith saith he, hujus enim est in dando consilio de maximis rebus cum dignitate explicata sententia, ejusdem etiam languentis populi incitatio & effrenati moderatio: That kind of eloquence which is full of dignity, ever worth hearing, in speech pure without affectation, sententious and discreet, apt, answerable and agreeable to the matter in hand, and throughout beautified with gravity: Of this required quality let us also consider some advertisements (as we have done of the former).  
Elocution doth consist of three things, first, 
Eloquntion.  of the voice as the instrument, 2, the words that are the subject; 3, the manner of doing, which is the form of delivery. In the voice are required two principal qualities, soundness and sweetness: this thing the same Orator expresseth thus, Cum orationis judicem vocem habeamus, in voce autem duo sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis sit, utrumque omnino à natura petendum est, verum alterum exercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio praeesse loquentium & leviter: litterae neque oppressae sint ne aut obscurum, neque nimium expressae ut putidum: In the words two things are required, purity and property;  
First purity, that is, that neither the words be old or outworn, neither new-fangled or affected, in the which none solumrusticam asperitatèm, sed etiam peregrinam insolentiam fugere discamus, that we may learn to eschew not only forlorn rusticity, but all new affected outlandish vanity.  
Secondly, property, that is, they are to be made apt for the matter in hand, having few translations, Metaphors or borrowed speeches, but where they are needful and do illustrate.  
In the third, the manner of composition of the speech and delivery, there are also two things considerable; first, perpetuity, secondly, exornation.  
Our speech is made perspicuous if our words and sentences be not doubtful in the composition, if they be free from Amphibology and ambiguous reference, if they be clear of idle Tautology and vain repetition, if our periods and clauses be not over long, nor interlaced with too many Parentheses; Lastly, if the copiousness and superabundance of words unnecessary hinder not the apprehension of the hearer, a salt whereinto many fall, that nevertheless do think they do exceeding well.  
Secondly, exornation is to be performed by amplifications, extenuations, and such other Rhetorical precepts as that Art teacheth, unto the which for this point I do refer you; only here giving you this caution, that the exornation exceed not the quality of the cause, ne materiam superet opus, for as it is vain to overguilde excellent Marble with gold, so gold beseemeth not every material; And many things shall and must pass the Lawyer's pen and speech, which are facundiae 〈◊〉 capacia cum sint tantum comenta doceri. And having thus much said of these three gifts which proceed from God by the gift of nature, I will conclude with that saying of Tully which doth comprehend all three, Aniini & ingenij celeres ●idem motus esse debent, qui ad excogitandum acuti, ad explicandum ornandumque sint uberes, & ad memori●●●●r● & diuturni.   

CAP. V  
THus with as convenient brevity and perspicuity as I could have I declared those natural abilities that I wish him that shall undertake the study of the Law to be furnished withal. There doth now farther remain a consideration of those qualities that are acquired by industry, and not engrafted by nature, wherewith it will (doubtless) be behooufull also, that our student should be adorned, Those acquired qualities whereof I speak, are of two sorts, some of them perfecting our understanding, and enriching our knowledge, and others rectifying our wills, and directing our behaviours and manners. Of the first kind are the Virtue's Intellectual. Of the second sort are the Virtue's Moral.  
First of all therefore let us speak in order of those Intellectual Virtues; And let us a little fall into dispute, whether any other knowledge be needful for a Lawyer, save only that of his self profession, I mean the knowledge of the Law; And if there be any of those intellectual endowments necessary, Than, which and how many of them are needful, and in what sense, measure and understanding they be conceived and adjudged so to be behooveful.  
Some men there are which think that a Lawyer should not need much to be troubled with any other learning then that which is their own, 
Ob. prima.  whose reasons and motives thereunto, let us propose and thoroughly weigh and examine the same, so that as well such as are of the one part, as of the contrary, may be thereby the better called into consideration.  
Their first reason is drawn from experience; 
Ra. prima ab experientia.  for it hath often happened and appeared in every age (say they) that there have been many excellent Lawyers within this land, of deep judgement, great understanding, profound knowledge in their profession, of ready and apt elocution, and yet no scholars at all; utterly ignorant of any other additional erudition, than their homebred natural gifts. These men have been famous in their times, have undergone great affairs, as well in the Courts of our Sovereigns, as in the Tribunals, wherein they have been worthily placed, and also generally in the greatest business of the Kingdom and Common wealth; so that the number of these men from time to time have not been few. Therefore if the knowledge of the Law may be gotten without other learning, what need then to bestow time in the obtaining of those Arts, when as the Grammar School yields as apt Plants for this profession, as the University.  
Secondly, 
Ra. seenuda à subjecto juris.  they say that the knowledge of the Law is affirmed to be Rerum divinarum humanarumque Scientia, it dorh contain the knowledge of all divine & humane things; & therefore he that hath obtained that knowledge, hath therein comprised, included, and contained all other knowledges, and need not to busy himself farther with the search of any other, as having obtained the knowledge of the Law, which is truly styled The Science of Sciences; for the knowledge of the Law is as large, and as ample as the material subject, and the matters and causes whereof it treateth, whereof contention or strife may grow, orupon which they may be grounded: for the end and final scope of the Law is, ut sopiantur jurgia; so ample is this subject, as all those things whereof men may have property or possession, or whereupon or concerning which injuries and wrongs may be offered or inferred.  
Thirdly, they say that we should consider, 
Ra. tertia ducitur à diuturnitate juris.  that Ars est longa, vit a brevis, the study of the Law is, multorum annorum opus, it is the work of many years, the attaining whereof will waste the greatest part of the verdour and vigour of our youth, and therefore the sooner we do apply ourselves unto the study of the Law, it will be the better for our ease; for in a long journey, he that hath found out the shortest way, with much ease and in less time cometh to his journeys end. And to conclude with the Orator's words; Is autem concludatur in ijs quae sunt in usu Civitatum vulgari ac forensi, remotisque caeteris studijs quamvis ea sint ampla atque praclara. In hoc une opere (ut ita dicam) noctes atque dies urgeatur, (What he saith of his Orator, these men apply to the student of our Law) Let therefore our student of the Law be concluded and compassed within the bounds of his own profession, and exercised in things of vulgar and ordinary use in civil causes, and all other foreign studies being relinquished, let him be night and day employed in this sole work. These and the like are the allegations and arguments of those men that remove the knowledge of all foreign Arts and Sciences liberal from the student of the Law.  
But, what of the other part may be said, what reason may be produced and verified, and how these objections may be answered, let us observe; leaving all other particular enforcement to their proper and peculiar places.  
First therefore, 
Resp. ad primano object.  that is very true which hath been affirmed, Many excellent men there have been, that by their gifts alone which nature hath bestowed upon them without other addition of Art or learning, have attained to a profound and deep knowledge of the Laws of this land. But to conclude thereof, that all other men may be so exquisite by their example without farther help and furniture than their own, were much like to him that would affirm, because some men by their strength have travailed a long journey on foot, therefore no other man for that purpose should need the help of an horse; But if those men of such natural vigour in their foot-journey had led (as the Proverbial speech is) their horse in their hand, that is, had been assisted with the helps of other learning, they had been much more excellent, and attained that knowledge with more facility and certainty, for their gold oar coming out of their natural Mine, and of their home-brood, was not sufficiently cleared of his dross; Their speeches have wanted perspicuity and brevity, their arguments although deeply learned and full of excellent matter, yet have oftentimes been tedious, confused and perplexed, and their opinions wavering and unsettled, and could not neatly, and expeditely deliver themselves; because some men are by nature skilful Prainters, Carvers, or excellent in any manual occupation (as some there are) therefore none should Apprentices to those trades were a wonderful absurd allegation: Men are musical by nature, many have good voices which Art cannot yield, therefore artificial Music (which is the perfection of the natural) should be banished, were a strange illation? Although a man may go alone, yet he were unwise to refuse the help of a staff where occasion required the use, and opportunity offered itself. It hath been said by us in the former part where occasion was offered, that Art truly used is the perfection of nature; Art hath also natural grounds, and was invented for Nature's furtherance; For man's wisdom devised means out of frequent use and long experience, to ripen nature's operations, by precepts; and precepts laid together have engendered Arts. Men naturally can number, yet they have devised many ways, by cipher, by Counters, and by other forms to assist nature, and to deal with sundry forms by the exercise of Arithmetic, the Art of numbering, and to bring to pass strange effects far beyond the ability, nay to the marvel and astonishment of men only helped by the power of nature. Surely sometimes such circumstances have happened (if not often) to those men of such excellent gifts natural without other learning, wherein they have for want of good literature so much been misled, that they have at unawares bewrayed themselves, ignorant even in trivial things, and exposed themselves to no small scorn and obloquy.  
This hath been anciently observed, and is obvious every day: but because I will launce no new sore, I will set down what the Roman Orator observed, speaking of such natural excellent men of his time, let me therefore use his words; Quid ergo hoc fieri turpius aut dici potest, quam qui hanc personam susceperit ut amicorum controversias causasque tueatur, laborantibus succurrat, aegris mediatur, afflictos excitet, it a labi, ut alijs miserandus, alijs irridendus esse videatur. What can be more unseemly either to be done, or to be spoken, them that he which sustaineth & hath taken upon him that person, as to defend the causes and controversies of his friends, to secure the oppressed, to relieve the grieved, to raise the afflicted (which are the properties as well belonging to the Lawyer, as to the Orator) so much in small and trivial things to err and be deceived, that some should hold him worthy to be pitied, and others make him the subject of derision; And hence is it that in our own times so fare this matter hath been urged, that in scorn some have called the crew of unlearned Lawyers, Doctum quoddam genus indoctorum hominum: But to return that reproach from whence it sprang, to the honour of the study of our Laws be it spoken, that the Profession of our Laws hath now, and formerly hath had great numbers of students that have had as long, and as ample institution in those sciences called liberal, as any of them. And if I might remember old Originals from the time of the Norman Conquest, until the latter days of King Henry the third, as well the judges itinerate through the Counties, as those that were sedentary in the King's high Courts of justice (which then for the most part followed his person) were men excellently skilled in all general good learning, as do witness the works of that worthy judge Henry de Bracton, 
Henry de Bracton, Io: Britton Bish. of Hereford, Martin de Patchull Deane of Paul's.  and john Britton sometimes a learned Bishop of Hereford, skilful in the Laws of this Realm, who writ a treatise by commandment, and writ of King Edward the first, as an Institution to the study of the laws of this Realm, serving that time. So also was Martin de Patchull sometimes Deane of Paul's in London, of whom the said Bracton maketh honourable mention, together with diverse other noted men of rare learning, not only in the Laws of this Realm, but in all foreign knowledge fit for their places. And these men exercised judicial functions in the Temporal Courts of this Realm, whereof our records being & vetustatis & veritatis vestigia, the lively representations of time and truth, and reputed the Treasures of the Kingdom, do yield plentiful restimony. What should I farther commemorate the names, and revive the memories of our worthy Ancestors, 
Herle, Bereford, Thorpe, Finden, Belknapp tempore R. Ed. 3.  Herle, Bereford, Thorpe, Finden, Belknap, flourishing in the victorious times of King Edward the third? Whose deep, short, subtle, pithy and learned Law-arguments; argue moreover thus much, that they were sufficiently furnished in that School-learning, which in those times was in most esteem. Let me not here forget or passover in silence those excellent judges in the reign of King Henry the sixth, Newton, Prisott, Fortescue, 
Newton, Prisot, Fortescue, tempore H. 6.  which man last named, was first Chancellor to the Prince, and after chief justice of the King's Bench, and was excellently learned in Divinity, Philosophy, Law both Ecclesiastical, and the Laws of this Realm, as the little Treatise written by him in the praise of our Laws, in the Latin tongue, and some other Manuscripts I have seen of his work of a higher subject, do evidently declare. But I will repress myself, resting in this place upon that which now is already spoken, leaving other particularities until we come to determine of other peculiar Sciences.  
To the second objection it may well be affirmed, 
Resp. ad sec. ob.  that the knowledge of the Law is truly styled, Rerum divinarum humanarumque Scientia; and worthily imputed to be the Science of Sciences; and that therein lies hid the knowledge almost of every other learned science: But yet I pray consider, that those foreign knowledges, are not inherent or inbred in the Laws, but rather as a borrowed light not found there, but brought thither, and learned elsewhere by them that have adorned and polished the studies of the Laws. For since the material subject of the Law is so ample (as indeed it is) containing all things that may be controverted. The study of the Laws than must of necessity stretch out her hand, and crave to be helped and assisted almost of all other Sciences Therefore this objection may well be inverted against them that do urge the same, and proveth rather that the Professor of the Laws should be furnished with the knowledge of all good literature of most of the Sciences liberal; for if a man may observe the use of those sciences to lie hidden in the Law, who then may better use them or observe them, than he which is already surnished with them. And if the knowledge of the Law, do receive ornament by those eruditions (as I think no man can deny) it shall be very expedient and well befitting the student of the Laws, to have first familiarity and acquaintance with them, and to be instructed in the same.  
But it may be objected, that the Lawyer shall not need the knowledge of those Arts himself, but when opportunity shall be offered, and when question shall arise, wherein the Lawyer shall stand in need of resolution of any of those Sciences, he may confer, and be informed by the Professors of the same, to his good satisfaction, although himself be not expert therein. Many times there have been (and may be hereafter) Appeals of Maim brought by such parties as in private fight and otherwise by violence have received maim, that is, mutilation and loss of a member of his body ferviceable for offence or defence against those parties that so have hurt them, and many times question & debate ariseth, whether the hurt so received, be to be adjudged a Maim, yea or not? So that the judges are oftentimes enforced to confer with Chyrurgians for their suffrage and resolution; will you therefore require your judges, Professors and students of the Law to be also Surgeons, or skilful in the Art of Chirurgery? that were altogether uncomely.  
This objection is easily answered and avoided, 
Resp.  for first there is a great difference in this respect between manual. Arts and occupations wrought by the dexterity of the hand, and those that are sciences and virtues intellectual adorning the Mind, as are the Liberal.  
The Laws of this Realm do appoint no other trial of a Maim, 
Maim.  than the view of the judge, for a Maim is such as for the most part is visible and subject unto since; And therefore if upon some doubt or occasion conceived, by reason of the view, the judges do desire the conference of expert Chyrurgians for the better satisfaction of their conscience. This is no matter of necessity to import the judges, but matter of discretion only, in not being too precipitate, but rather mature in their judgement, as they aught; and to show themselves rather willing to go onward with others, then to run alone of themselves. And herein the judges are not tied to the opinion of the Chirurgeon, otherwise than he findeth the same to be conformable and grounded upon such good and apparent reason as may yield full satisfaction and contentment: But when the question shall be moved which. shall require information of any learned science which is gotten by discourse of reason; Although in those cases the laudable courses have ever been in our Courts of justice, to hear the Professors of those sciences to dispute and debate the matter controverted before our Tribunal and judgement seats, yet no man can deny, but it is better to draw one draught out of the pure fountain itself, then to quench out thirst out of derived streams, for Dulcius ex ipso fonte bibuntur aqua. For in every Science which doth depend upon discourse of reason, there are many fundamental Maxims and Principals not to be changed in any future resolution, but rather to be received as guides to direct, which at the first will seem harsh to such as have not been enured unto them, and therefore it were perilous to the judge and Professor of the Laws, and he shall not be able either to receive to himself, or to give to others satisfaction, except he can by his proper knowledge discern of the controversy. For we surely know Non ex relatis aliorum, sed cum per causas cognoscimus, and if we have knowledge in those sciences ourselves, we shall the better apprehended and understand the reasons of those matters so disclosed by debate: And thus I leave the second objection.  
To the third, 
Resp adtertiam Object.  last, and main objection, this may be produced for an answer, that though true it be Vita brevis est, ars longa, our life is short and full of calamities, and learning is a long time in getting, yet may we not in respect of short life shut up all our endeavours for fear of an end; for therefore the Period of our life is sealed up from man's knowledge, first for that we should be always ready when we are called hence; Secondly, for that the fear of a known death should not daunt or interrupt our endeavours; Likewise the verdure of our younger years is best employed and spent in obtaining of those sciences, for then are we most apt thereunto. And as the study and practice of Moral Philosophy (as Art doth witness) is not fittest for men over young; so likewise the study of the Law which hath his foundation in Moral Philosophy (both having one end general, namely, the rectifying of our manners) doth require some maturity of years, and not to be set upon by infants in years, judgement, and carriage. And so likewise shall we find in a long journey, that the fairest way is better although so me what farther about, than a shorter rough way, hard to find and difficult to keep; and in the end also to answer that close or upshot drawn from Tully's Orator; I would you should likewise remember for conclusion of this question that which he affirmeth, Non enim Causidicum nescio quem, nec proclamatorem aut rabulam hoc sermone nostro conquirimus, sed eum virum qui primùm sit ejus Artis Antistes, etc. We seek not hereby to institute I know not what manner of vulgar professor of the Laws, no common blatterer or temerist, but that man which may prove in the end an excellent and chief Pillar, prop and Ornament of his profession.   

CAP. VI  
HAving hitherunto proceeded in the general, 
The necessity of the Latin Tongue in a Student of the Law.  it shall be now requisite to descend to particulars. And fitst of all to consider, whether the knowledge of the Latin Tongue, and the use of Grammar, tending to the obtaining of the same, be necessary for a Lawyer: not proposing it by way of doubt, question, or difficulty, that it should need any large dispute, but by way of manifestation and disquisition only; for there is no man (as I suppose) that can or will deny, but that the knowledge of the Latin tongue is right necessary for our English Lawyer: which may be, made apparent by many evident and eminent arguments and allegations, easily to be produced for that purpose.  
First of all, 
Ra. prima.  many of our old Statutes, and ancient positive Laws were written and form in the Latin tongue, and so do still rest and remain in our Records and Books; as that Act called Magna Charta, 
Magna Charta.  The great Charter of England, great indeed, not in respect of mould, but matter, not great in quantity, but in weight and worth: Containing many the fundamental points of our Laws, bought with the blood of our Nobility and English Ancestors, in those troublesome times of King john, and Henry his son. And although many of the Constitutions contained in that Charter, first introduced in part by King Henry the first, (then called for his learning Henry le beu Clarke, 
Hen. 1. ) coming in and putting by his elder brother Robert of Normandy, and as it were by restitution and renovation of the old Laws of Edward the Confessor King before the Conquest, and in tract of time sought to be infringed, yet nevertheless not without trouble it was afterward again both revived & enlarged first by another Charter of King john, and lastly by King Henry the third his son in Parliament established, and sundry times afterwards by succeeding Parliaments, also confirmed and commanded to be put in due execution.  
In like manner these several Laws of note, 
Stat. Marton 20. H. 3. Marlebridge Gloneester.  as the Statute made at Marton Abbey in Surrey: That also made at Marlebridge, that likewise at Gloucester, and sundry others were all originally framed in the Latin tongue in the reign of the said Henry the third: Also the Acts made in the first, 
Westm. 1. Westm. 2. Westm. 3.  certain in the second, and the Acts made in the third Parliaments all holden at Westminster in the reign of that victorious and renowued Prince King Edward after the Conquest surnamed the first, compiled by Parliament for the good government of this Kingdom, were written also in the Latin tongue.  
Secondly, 
Treatises of Law in the Latin Tongue. Ra. Glanvill. Ended his days at Ptolomais in the holy Land.  many learned Writers have composed diverse excellent Treatises of the Laws of this Realm, in the Latin tongue, as namely, that ancient Treatise composed by Ranulphus de Glanvilla, a learned judge of this Land, who is said to have gone in person with King Richard the first into the holy Land, and to have ended his days at Ptolomais then called Acon or Acres a Maritine Town of that Country.  
I will here adjoin the learned Treatise (and as the times then stood) I might well call and affirm the eloquent Treatise of the Common Laws framed by Henry de Bracton a most learned judge of this Land, 
Hen. de Bracton.  living in the latter and of the reign of King Henry the third, and in the entrance of King Edward the first his regiment: This Treatise is replenished with many excellent sentences, fitly and aptly composed in Latin; and by the reading of this worthy work, the student shall truly understand not only the conformity our Nationall Laws then had with the Civil, Cannon, or Ecclesiastical Laws, but also shall well perceive what the Common Law of this our Country was before the making of diverse Statutes which have altered the same, whereby great light may be had, and a great help obtained for the better understanding and true interpretation of the same.  
Likewise, there is a learned Treatise composed by a learned yet unknown Author whiles he was a Prisoner in the Fleet, and therefore the said work or tract is called Fleta, 
Fleta.  in the time as it seemeth of King Edward the first, and although there do now remain but a few Manuscript copies thereof, as having been never imprinted, yet is it worthy to see the light, and for the furtherance of the studentof the Laws to be divulged, and this also was written in the Latin tongue: I might remember two Treatises, the greater, and the lesser, gathered by Radulphus de Hingham, 
Ra. Hinghan.  sometime Chief justice of the Common Pleas, whose monument yet remaineth in the Cathedral Church, of Saint Paul in London, and written in Latin, but in corrupt language as the times then afforded.  
But passing over many other in silence, I will conclude with that little Treatise made de laudibus legum Angliae, in praise and commendations of the Laws of this Land by comparison with the foreign Laws of some other Countries devised and written in the Latin tongue by that sincere and most learned judge, Sir john Fortescue Knight, 
Io. Fortescue.  thereby to incite by many arguments the Prince, son and heir to King Henry the sixth, to the knowledge of the Laws of this Country: it seemeth by many passages of this Treatise, that the same was contrived in the Kingdom of France, during such time as the Queen with her said son the Prince remained there to solicit aid for her husband. This Author at the writing of this Treatise was as it seemeth Chancellor to the Prince, and afterward Chief justice of the King's Bench: This little work is well worthy the perusal, plentifully showing the learning of the Author in Divinity, Philosophy, and other good literature, besides the knowledge of the Laws of this Realm, a man I say who for the fidelity he bore to his Master, tasted of the tempest then stirred in the end of his time, having had both his rising and his ruin in that fatal fall of his Lord.  
Thirdly, 
Writs aught to be framed in true and congruous Latin.  all the forms of writs are and aught to be framed in the Latin tongue, and if they do contain false Latin, they are abateable, and to be defeated, and the party plaintiff who pursued the same, shall be driven to purchase a better writ, and to begin a new. For the better understanding whereof, let me observe something of the nature of Writs.  
A Writ is the commandment of the King, 
Definition of a Writ.  form in Latin, directed either to some Minister of his Courts; or sometime to the party Defendant, at the pursuit of the Plaintiff, for the better administration of justice. This Description concerneth all manner of writs, which as touching their form, are short and brief; and therefore in Latin are called Brevia, in French Briefs for their shortness in English Writs, 
The Etymology.  for that they are Mandates in writing. The latin Etymology of the name, Bracton yields thus: Brevia dicuntur (per modum Regula juris) quia rem quae est & intentionem Petentis brevitur enarrat: And yet aught they not through brevity to be obscure, but clear and in a compendious manner to comprehend the matter therein contained: They aught to be form in words, proper & perspicuous, free of ambiguity, no preposterous order, no doubtful reference, no idle repetition, no omission of needful matter, and aught to be form in apt, true, and congruous Latin.  
Writs are in sundry manners divided, 
Division.  (1) sometime in respect of their matter; (2) sometime in respect of their form; (3) sometime in respect of the efficient cause; (4) and sometime again in respect of their final cause.  
In respect of their matter, all Writs are of three kinds, that is, (1) Original, (2) Mean Process, (3) judicial.  
An Original Writ is the Commandment of the King, 
Defin: An original Writ, quid?  form in Latin, issuing out of the Chancery, sealed with the great Seal of England, containing the cause of suit directed to a Minister of the Court to compel the defendant to appear and answer at a day prefixed for the return thereof.  
The Original Writ is the foundation of the suit, 
Etymology.  and therefore is called original, for that it is the first writ sued forth at the beginning of the suit, to bring the defendant in Court to answer.  
In respect of their matter, 
Divisio in materiam & formam.  they are divided thus; They are either (1) Real, (2) Personal, (3) Mixed, or (4) neither, as the Appeal.  
In respect of their form, they are either of a settled and composed form, and therefore called formata: or without a settled form, but do vary according to the circumstance of the cause, and called by Bracton, Brevia Magistralia; the other Brevia de cursu.  
In respect of their efficient cause all these Original Writs do issue, as hath been said, 
Cause efficiens.  out of the Chancery, which is the shop and forge wherein for the most part they are framed. The Magisteriall Briefs, because they vary with the case, require a Master's hand to compose them in respect of skill. But the other De cursu, Writs of course, because they have a settled form prescribed in an ancient book therefore called the Register of Writs, and vary not but in mutatis mutandis: they are written by a society of Clerks of the Chancery called therefore Cursitors: 
Cursitors, unde dicitur.  But I purpose not here to make a full and liberal discourse of writs, this alone may suffice in this place, and for the matter in hand.  
Fourthly, it is manifest, that all the returns of Writs, all manner of proceed, all Counts or Declarations of the Plaintiffs or Demaundants, all Pleas, defends or exceptions of the Defendants or Tenants, either to the jurisdiction of the Court, or to abate the writ, or in bar of the Action all replications thereunto by the Plaintiff and demandant, all rejoinders or surrejoynders, all issues taken, all verdicts, demurrers, continuances and entries of the judgements of the Court in sundry forms, according to the several nature of the writs and actions in controversy: Likewise all the proceed in criminal causes and Pleas of the Crown which concern life or member by way of indictment or presentment, the Arraignment, Trial, and judgements thereupon had, are entered, written, and engrossed in the Latin tongue; And therefore without the knowledge of this language, the student of the Laws, the Practizer, and the judge must of necessity walk through a vale of darkness and palpable ignorance in the superlative.  
By this which hath been already affirmed may easily be conceived, that Grammar being the first Liberal Sciences is very behooufull & needful for a Lawyer, as by sundry instances may be made manifest in every part thereof. Grammar hath been divided into these four parts; Orthographia, Etymologia, Syntaxis, and Prosodia.  
In Orthography, 
Orthogra. phia.  which concerns true writing, we are taught that from the knitting together of Letters are made syllables, of syllables significative words. These words are twofold, Primitive, which were composed at the first to denote and signify this or that thing, and words derivatives drawn from those Primitives, which in writing aught to contain the radical letters of those Primitives, that thereby may be discovered and discerned i'th' root and of spring from whence they were drawn and deduced.  
First therefore, as touching letters and syllables, sometime a letter is omitted which maketh the word written, no latin at all,  
In a Scine fac: the writ was abated for want of a letter, for the writ was ex insinatione, 
24. E. 3.7.  which is no latin, whereas it should have been ex insinuatione. So in a praecipe quod reddat, the words were praecipe quod reddat haeri; 
41. E. 3.21.  where it wanted a syllable and should have been haeredi, and this writ was abated. And sometimes for placing one letter for another, as in a writ of waste, the same was ad destrictionem, whereas it should have been ad destructionem. So likewise an Indictment of Burglary was avoided, for that it was Burgaliter, 
Cook 2 part. lib. 3.  whereas it should have been burglariter, although no perfect, yet allowed Lawyers Latin, and an artificial word, a word of Art.  
The second was of Grammar called Etimologia, 
Etimologia.  hath two parts, for it doth not only concern the derivation of words, but also the forming of words in all the principle parts of speech, as of the Nouns, Pronouns, Participles, in number, case, gender, termination, declination, & such like; but also of verbs in declination, mood, tense, number, person, and such like, and in these things also the Laws of this Realm require congruity to be observed, according to the rules of Grammar. The writ was hos breve, where it should have been hoc breve, and therefore was abated, and could not be amended; one case for another.  
In a Praecipe quod reddat, the writ was quas, where it should have been quod, one gender for another, and therefore was abated. In a writ of juris utrum, 
12. H. 4.10. Fitz n. br. 466.  the writ was sit where it should have been sint, one number for another, with divers others, such like examples.  
The third part of Grammar is Syntaxis or Composition of speech, 
Syntaxis.  and hath these parts (1) the conformity between the verb and the casual word; (2) between the substantive and the adjective; (3) between the Antecedent and the Relative which part hath sundry examples in the Law, and would be tedious to remember.  
These things notwithstanding, 
Ob. prima.  there do remain certain objections to be cleared; for first it may be objected that in the Courts of justice, the Clerks in the entering and enrolling of their Records, form up their words in a short kind of writing by certain abreviations, by which are known the words intended; And therefore in this course which is most usual there can be but a slender observation of true Orthography.  
To this I answer, 
Resp.  that among all the Cursitors and Prothonotories, and all other Clerks in our Courts, there is observed a brief and short kind of writing for the better dispatch of an infinite mass of business in that kind, and heap of writings which they termly undergo, yet the same is not voluntary, or at pleasure, or as every man will or shall device, fashion, or frame unto himself, but such only vulgar, and well known both among themselves, as all other that intermeddle therewith, which tract of time hath made familiar from age to age by expert observation. 
4. H. 6.16.  And here may I remember that almost every of our Courts of justice hath his several set form of handwriting, as the Chancery hand, conveyed in a fair form of letter, little inferior to the print; and the Court hand somewhat distinguished in form of letters from the ordinary secrerary or set hand used among the vulgar, which our Ancestors at first invented, and ever since to great purpose have practised, thereby giving the greater impression, so that it may remain legible to posterity many hundred years, as by our ancient Records, and many Monuments of Antiquity yet remaining of ancient occurrences before the Norman Conquest is evidently declared.  
Secondly may be objected, 
Ob. seounder.  that since the time that the Latin tongue was vulgarly used among the Romans, and other the Nations, that they subdued to that Empire (for they much endeavoured the propagation of their language) sundry new things have been invented, whereof those ancient people had either no intelligence, or no use, and therefore where such things do occur, there do want words proper and peculiar in the Latin tongue to denote the same, and men must of necessity be enforced either to use barbarous words fare from the purity of the Latin speech, or to invent new to express their meaning.  
For satisfaction and full declaration whereof, 
Resp.  we are to consider that usually in course of Law sour kind of words are carried under the colour of latin in Law proceed; as first, the true native and proper latin word if they be found for the present purpose, whereof our judges have ever been careful, 
Coke lib. 10. fol. 133.  as by their sundry conferences with Grammarians, and men learned concerning thetrue and natural signification of Latin words almost every was extant in our books do declare.  
Secondly, there are words of Art in the laws, as in other faculties.  
And thirdly, certain other words drawn from the ancient Idiom and language of our predecessors, the former Inhabitants of this Land, vulgarly and sufficiently known, which receiving latin forms pass in our Laws, as felonia, felonice, Murdrum, Burglaria, Warrantia, Esnitia, pars mulier, pro sobole ex legitima uxore nata, with many others of like derivation, as mesuadgium for an house, toftum for a decayed house, gardinum for a garden, bruera for furse or heath, maromium for timber, ●●stardus, for nothus, a base borne child, and the like.  
And fourthly, for new invented things not known to the Ancients, new words likewise have had their original, as Bombardum or tormentum for a gun, Pulvis tormentarius, for gunpowder, Stapedia for a stirrup, velvettum for velvet, and many of such like making, whereunto for better understanding we do permit the English usual words to be adjoined in our latin plead.  
Lastly, 
Obaertia.  there remaineth this scruple, where it hath been affirmed, that there is much respect had of the true propriety of latin words, it seemeth nothing less, for these for●●s are conceived in a base style fare removed from purity of speech so that the professors of Law within this land can challenge no great commendation in this kind.  
To this is answered, 
Resp.  that the Laws of this Land neither do, nor desire to affect Eloquence in the Latin tongue, for we have no use of the speech thereof in our arguments, for as much as the Statute made 36. E. 3. cap. 15. 
36. E. 3. 1●.  hath ordained that all plead, and all arguments and disputations of Law should thenceforth be performed in the English tongue, whereas formerly as it seemeth it was put in ure in the French, remaining until that time, as a badge of the Norman Captivity, whereof there is now no use but in the arraigning of an Assize, and an Appeal, and such French Arguments as are used for exercise in the Houses, and Societies of Court and Chancery. Nevertheless the former usage hath still remained, that is, that all proceed judicial should be entered and enroled in the Latin tongue, so that the Latin serveth to convey to posterity our Memorials and Records, and not our debate and speech: The Antiquity whereof, whether it first grew in respect of the use thereof, retained among all Nations subject to that Empire upon like occasion even unto this day; or whether for the Majesty of that language wherein all Arts of literature are still promulged, or whether it may be reached unto the Roman Conquest of this Land, who long held it under their government, and reduced many parts thereof into Provinces, endeavouring (as their manner was) to propagate their language as largely as their Empire; or whether it happened in respect our Ancestors the Britons with good affection embraced that language, as Tacitus reporteth, I do surcease in this place to determine.  
But for farther satisfaction in this point, the Entries and enrolments of our Writs, Pleas, and all other our Law proceed are neither base, abject, or horrid, as hath been imported; for our Original Writs of set form are from ancient memory, have ever been preserved in the book called the Register, from the which our Clerks may not swerve, to avoid the infinite variety of forms which might otherwise ensue, and were first conceived and devised in as proper Latin, as the times wherein they were first invented, and the matter itself was able to bear. And as touching the other mentioned proceed entered in the Latin tongue, although not eloquent, yet satis laudato forensi stilo, as in any other Kingdom perspicuous and significant.  
Let not the same therefore be a blemish to our Laws, which hath invaded almost all other Sciences; for what horrid and incompt words hath Logic and Phiolsophy endured, introduced by their Dunces devices, as Ens, entitas, quidditas, causalitas, with a multitude of others impertinent to be remembered? with what improper terms and barbarous speeches have the Schoolmen daubed Divinity? What hath been in this kind brought in upon the pure and clear fountains of the Digests of the Civil Laws? which being compiled out of sundry most excellent sentences, drawn out of the works and passages of the ancient Roman Lawyers, do retain the same purity and conformity of a clean and neat style, as though all had been penned by one man; and yet are in a manner defiled by the Feudary Tenurist writers of the middle age in their Glosses and Commentaries, as those learned Lawyers of this latter age Alciatus, Budaeus, Cujacius, and the rest have undergone an Herculean labour to cleanse the same.  
But to conclude this matter; the Students of our Laws, and the professors thereof may well defend themselves by the testimony and authority of the best Writers in this behalf: For first of all Aristotle himself giveth warrant, 
Arist. in Catego. Relationis.  Quod nova vocabula sunt facienda cùm ad res explicandas nullae suppetunt voces: And herein they may be bold to stand to the judgement of Tully himself who affirmeth, Omne quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclarè dici videtur: istiusmodi autem res dicere ornatè velle, puerile est; planè autem & perspicuè posse docti & intelligentis est viri. And I know no cause why we may not say the same of our Lawyer which he affirmeth in that Book of the Philosopher, Philosophum si afferat eloquentiam non esse aspernendum, si non habeat non esse ab eo admodum flagitandum, dum tamen complectatur verbis quod vult, & dicat planè ut intelligatur. And so let me say, if our Lawyer or Pronotorie in drawing up his plead can use a good phrase and pure Latin, I will never blame him, if not, I will not expect it at his hands, so that that which he hath drawn be congrue, plain, famiiar, sensible, and easy to be understood.  
Thus have we produced two of the best Authors for our defence, the one for wit and knowledge the world's wonder; The other for eloquent and excellent speech in his native language the chiefest ornament. It shall suffice to conclude with a sentence of a Christian Father inferior in humane learning to neither of them, whose speech because it is excellently to the purpose, I cannot let pass; Bonorum ingeniorum insignis est indoles, in verbis verum amare non verba; Quid enim prodest clavis aurea, si, quod volumus aperire, non potest? aut quid obest lignea, si hoc potest? quando nihil quaerimus nisi patere quod clausum est? It is an excellent Argument of the best wits, not to hunt count and filled words, but in words to embrace the truth, for what profiteth a Golden key, if it cannot open, and what hurt is it to use a wooden key, if it will open, when there is no other end of both, but to open that which was shut.   

CAP. VII.  
THe next succeeding Science Liberal is Logic, 
Logic.  and therefore order doth require we should here also make inquiry whether the Art of Logic be necessary for the attaining to the knowledge of the Law. The question hath been diversely debated by sundry of Aristotle's Interpreters, and such as have written of that Science both touching the peculiar instance or Hypothesis; as also more at large in the general Thesis, namely, whether Logic be necessary for the better obtaining of other learned Sciences. In handling of this debate, we will hold our former proposed course, and first of all let us object against the necessity thereof.  
Experience is a sure foundation: 
Ra. prima.  many excellent Lawyers both in the civil Laws of the Empire, the Cannon Laws of the Church, and the Common Laws of the Land have not been skilful in Logic, and therefore Logic is not necessary for the knowledge of the Laws.  
Law Arguments are deduced more from authority then reason, 
Ra. seeunda.  for the English Lawyer in arguments requireth most the strength of Cases apt to the purpose, and Precedents of former time, then discourse of reason; and therefore Logic which respecteth only the inference and discourse of reason, is not so needful for a Lawyer.  
The Laws deal with particular in stances, 
Ra. tertia.  and individual Cases, where the sundry circumstances accompanying the fact, make manifest difference, inter aequum & iniquum; justum & injustum; whereas Logic dealeth not with universalities abstracted from the particulars, and exempt from their circumstances, and therefore Logic not necessary for a Lawyer.  
A great part of Logic doth treat of Propositions, 
Ra. quarta.  and the framing of Syllogisms, but the Lawyer doth not argue syllogistically, and therefore needeth no Logic.  
Man is a living creature, 
Ra. quinta.  by nature reasonable, and can by the gift of nature alone, apprehended, understand, infer, collect, discourse, reason, prove, disprove, order, and dispose things conceived, and truly judge of them; and therefore where these things are by nature, what necessity is there to learn them by Art? for sicut pupillae inest visus, it a animae Intellectus; Arist. 1. Ethic. cap. 6. And again the same writer, homines à natura Dialecticos & Rhetoricos esse; Aristot. 1. Rhet. ad Theodoctum, & 1. Elenchorum. Every faculty and discipline of itself hath a distinct and peculiar manner of proceeding, and therefore a special Logic must be framed for the study of the Law if any be necessary at all, for the general Logic will not suffice.  
The full handling of this question will give occasion of a large discourse, and incite us to set out and declare the principal parts of Logic, and the true use thereof in the knowledge of the Laws; wherefore jest our speech thorough multiplicity of matter might be confuse, we will hold this order:  
First, we shall endvour to produce the testimonies of most approved Authors of the part affirmative, wherein they have delivered the necessity or profitable use of Logic.  
Secondly, we shall undertake by reasons drawn from the most parts of Logic, to prove the necessity, at jest the utility thereof.  
Thirdly, we shall propound those places out of our own Books of the Common Laws of this Land, where the use of Logic hath either been acquired, admitted, or practised.  
Than handling that part of Logic which concerneth Method, we will dispute whether the knowledge of the Law may be brought into a Method yea or not?  
Than we shall consider the state of this main question according to the different opinions of such as have written thereof.  
And lastly, Answer the arguments and objections at the first proposed on the contrary part.  
As touching the first of these; 
Ra. prima.  although Logic was not brought to perfection in Plato's time, yet is the same greatly commended by him in some places of his works, as in Phardro & Parminide. In Phaedro after some use of Logical division expressed, Socrates falleth into a wonderful commendation of Logic. jamblicus in his Epistle to Sopratus affirmeth, That nulla scientia Philosophiae absque Dialectica ratione compararipotest.  
How necessary the use of Logic is for the obtaining of other knowledges of other sciences, is made known by explicating the parts thereof in diverse passages by Aristotle himself as 1. Poster. cap. 2. 1. Topic. cap. 2. and in Elenchis sophisticis, cap. 3. and in sundry other places of his works, and in 4. Metaph. textu 8. he showeth, that the ancient Philosophers fell into many errors through the ignorance of Logic.  
Marcus Tullius Cicero the great Roman Orator in many places of his works extolleth the necessity and use of Logic. In his Tusculane Questions thus, That it is the Art quae rem definite, genera dispertit, sequentia adjungit, perfecta concludi●, vera & falsa dijudicat, ex qua cùm summa utilitas existit ad res ponderandas, tum maxime ingenua dilectatio & digna sapientia: Logic is an Art that defineth and setteth forth the nature of things, it divideth the general into its particular parts, it showeth the necessary coherence and dependency of the consequent deduced from the antecedent, it discerneth between truth and falsehood, out of which ariseth as well an excellent profitable use in the search of things, as also an ingenuous delight a worthy wisdom.  
In his Book de Finibus, he calleth Logic the ●●le of knowledge, Quae quasi delapsa de cal● sit ad cognitionem omnium, ad quam omnia judicia rerum dirigantur: qua servata, nunquam ullius oratione victi, sententia desistamus: A rule of knowledge I say sent or slidden down from heaven for the obtaining of the knowledge of all things, by which all judgements are directed, and which rule being truly observed, we can never by whatsoever powerful speech of any, be vanquished or diverted from apprehended truth, and a settled judgement. To the like effect he affirmeth by the example of Servius Sulpitius a famous Roman Lawyer who was juris consultorum eloquentissimus, & eloquentium juris consultissimus; That Logic is an Art Quae docet rem universam tribuere, in parts, latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, ambiguum, primùm videre, deinde distinguere, postremò habere regulam qua vera & falsa dijudicarentur, & quae (quibus propositis) essent, quaeque non essent consequentia. He saith, That this Sulpitius; Ad ea quae confusè ab alijs aut responsa aut actasunt, disertè & respondisse & egisse; quòd is ad juris civilis cognitionem Dialecticam omnium artium maximam quasi lucem attulerat.  
Thus much out of the ancient Heathen; Let us now descend unto the Fathers of the Church: Origen in his second Homily upon Exodus hath these words, Eruditio ista (speaking of Logic) ad omnem pervenit sensum, & per eam quisque meditatus & fotus, ad divinorum intelligentiam paratior venit.  
Clemens Alexandrinus thus, Dialectica velut manuducit ad veram aeternamque scientiam, & ad cognitionem supremae veritatis.  
Saint Jerome thus; Verè quicquid perversorum dogmatum est, & putatur esse robustum in terrena sapientia, hoc Dialecticae arte subvertitur, & instar incendij in cinerem favillasque dissolvitur.  
Saint Augustine is also evident in many places as li. 2. de ordine. Ad religionis Christianae cognitionem nemo aspirare dehet sine Dialectica. And again, lib. 2. de Doctrina Christiana: Disputationis disciplina, ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in literis sanctis sunt penetranda & dissolvenda plurimum valet! tantùm ibi cavendum est, libido rixandi, & puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi. And in sundry other parts of his works, as lib. 1. contra Crescomum Grammaticum; and lib. 3. contra Academ: And he hath defined Logic to be Ars artium, Scientia scientiarum, qua aperta omnes aliae aperiuntur, & qua clausa, omnes aliae clauduntur.  
By these Fathers of the Church, it may appear how needful they held Logic to be for the knowledge of Divinity.  
The Interpreters of Aristotle, and the Writers of latter time pleno intonant ore.  
Avicenna in his Treatise of Logic, Cap. 2. Natura & prima inchoatio hominis, non fuit sufficiens ad verum cognoscendum, fuit ergo opus aliqua arte. per quam, modum procedendi in cognition haberemus, ut tali modo perspecto, postea ad rerum speculationem accederemus, haec autem ars fuit Logica, seu Dialectica, quae modum universalem tradit, rem quamlibet speculando.  
Aquinas saith it is, Scientia rationalis, actuum rationis directiva.  
Albertus' magnus likewise: Logica est quae à Phantasiis, quae videntur & non sunt, liberat; errores damnat, falsitates ostendit, & lumen rectum in omni opere contemplationis praebet.  
I will conclude with that which Barth. Kickerman: hath in Gym. Logico, lib. 1. Logic saith he, amongst other things promiseth, Tria maxima bona, Veritatem, perspicuitatem, & ordinem, quibus nihile est in humanis rebus, aut sublimius, aut pulchrius.  
But it will here be objected, 
Ob.  That I have strayed from the question, which is, whether Logic be necessary for the obtaining of the knowledge of the Law?  
To the which I answer; 
Resp.  That otherwise those Writers have laboured in vain, who have published the Art of Logic adapted for the Civil and Common Laws, some in part as the Topics, or places of invention legal; as Tullij Topica, ad Trebatium a Roman Lawyer: Claudius Cantiuncula, Nicholaus Everarde, in their books entitled Topica legalia, Hottaman and others.  
And some others the Precepts of the whole Art, as Christopherus Hegendorphinus, johannes Thomas Fregius: Petrus Gambraeus, and others, as Apellus, Bellonus, Oldendorpius, Nevisanus, Grammara, etc. And how the same shall be needful to the Common Law; That which we are further to declare will better manifest.  
Concerning the Third proposed matter, These may be the reasons following to prove Logic necessary or at lest behooufull to the study of the Law.  
The Art of Logic is the Art of reasoning, 
Ra. prima.  Ars argumentandi, as one of the properties thereof, teaching to found out truth by argument and disputation. But the Common Law of this Land (which is often styled in our Books by the name of common reason) is deduced from principles evident and known, for the decision of such things as are drawn into doubt, and are unknown. The precepts thereof are taught by Logic in the books of Demonstration and Topicke parts of the Art of Logic; and therefore is Logic necessary for the obtaining of the knowledge of the Law, especially for that all points debated or controverted in our Law, are either matters in fact, and so triable by a jury: or doubts in law, determinable by disputation and argument.  
Again, 
Ra. secunda.  Logic teacheth a man to collect the Axioms, principles, grounds and rules observed in that Art which he studieth, and being so collected aptly to dispose the same, which yields diversity of matter, and ready furniture for disputation: but those things are very necessary to be observed in the study of the Law, therefore is Logic a very necessary science for the obtaining thereof in this respect.  
Our Lawyer in his Law-arguments, 
Ra. tertia.  the better to demonstrate and strengthen his opinion is driven not only to define or describe the thing disputed of, but to divide the same into parts, to distinguish the diverse significations of the words, but also to search and indigate the difference of matters and cases proposed: all which the Art of Logic professeth to teach; and therefore Logic is necessary.  
Every man in his Argument aught to covet to be understood of them that hear him; 
Rae. quarta.  for to what end else should he speak.  
But a man is best understood when in obscure matter he doth propose first, the most general propositions, of easy apprehension, and out of them deduce others, and so to combine and knit all together, as all the parts in orderly disposition may cohere, of which result those three excellent things, Brevity, Perspicuity, and Verity, all which Logic promiseth; and therefore is Logic necessary.  
When a doubtful question is proposed, 
Ra. quinta.  the truth is found out by Argument, debate, and discourse of reason on both parts, as in all our law-arguments appeateth; and therefore such debate and conflict of reason is said to be the flail whereby the corn is severed from the stubble, truth is tried from falsehood (for there can be but one truth;) and therefore when there is diversity of opinion, the truth can rest only but of one part, and the others must be deceived thorough the deceit of a faulty form of their manner of reasoning.  
But Logic teacheth a man to know the fallacies of deceitful and imperfect Arguments, and to resolve them into better forms, or to disclose their imperfection; Ergo,  
Every Artificer is made more expedite when he is furnished with apt instruments prepared to his hand, 
Ra sixta.  Sed sciendi instrumenta sunt formae discerendi. The Instruments of knowledge are the forms of discourse; therefore our understanding which is the Artificer, is made more ready, when it hath right and fit grounds of argument reduced and prepared, which Logic provideth, Ergo;  
To obtain the knowledge of any Science two things are required, 
Ra. septima.  first, the certain dependency and coherence of the parts of the matter to be known, and secondly, the aptness of the instrument whereby we do apprehended and know the same. The first of these doth result on the necessary consequence, that is, between the causes and their effects; the latter dependeth of the knowledge of that discourse of reason and argument which is used in the apprehension of Science, and giveth satisfaction and assuredness of truth to the learner. And these things doth Logic minister unto us; Ergo.  
It is the saying of Aristotle, 
Ra. octav.  Scire arbitramur cum cognoscimus rem ex sua causa, & quod alitèr se habere non potest. Than we are assured to know when the effect is known by his true cause, whose consequence cannot sail: but these things we learn by those Arguments which we call Demonstrations, which Logic informeth us in. And therefore Aristotle truly observed, 2. Metaph. cap. 3. Est impedimentum ad scientias capessandas non prius tenere modum sciendi. Where his Commentator Averois, and the most of his Interpreters do understand per modum sciendi, the Art of Logic.  
These things considered and laid together, it will not be hard or difficult, to answer the Reasons shortly of the opposite part.  
As to the first: Experience indeed is a sure soundation, 
Resp. ad primam object.  and many excellent Lawyers have been without Logic: But yet if Logic had been joined to their Law, they would have been better strengthened in their knowledge, and more perspicuous in the delivery thereof.  
To the second: 
Resp. ad sec. ob.  Law-arguments are often drawn out of Authorities: but Authorities prove two manner of ways; 1, sometime directly, and then is Authority called an inartificial Argument: 2, but most commonly, by inference and consequence, which Logic directeth.  
To the third: Laws deal with particular Cases, 
Resp. ad t●rtiam Object.  Logic with universal Precepts. But when particular Causes are brought to argument, they are drawn to more general Theses and Propositions.  
To the fourth: 
Resp. ad quar Object.  it is true that the Lawyer doth not argue syllogistically concise, and yet many times with a Syllogism at large.  
To the fifth Objection: Reason is natural, but yet it is polished by Art, and therefore best by the Art of Reason, which is Logic:  
It resteth now then, 
Res. ad quint. object.  that we examine Logic by his parts, and try the use, utility, or necessity thereof by examples out of our Laws.  
Amongst sundry definitions or descriptions of Logic, 
Logica quid?  this is one vulgarly received, Dialectica est recte definiendi, dividendi, & argumentandi ars: An Art teaching the true means of right Definition, Division, and Argument. We will distinguish therefore these into parts, and speak first and formerly of Definition.  
But before we define what Definition is, 
Definitio quid?  because there is an ambiguity, and duplicity of the signification thereof, we should first distinguish the same. There is therefore Duplex Definitio. 1, Nominis: 2, Rei. Definitio Nominis est qua vocis significatio explicatur. The reason is added; Sunt enim verba notae aut signa rerum. And this also is twofold: The first called commonly Etymology, of the Greek words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: whereby is imparted the property, weight, and signification, or Emphasis of the word: and the reasons drawn therefrom are called in our books, Arguments, ex vi verbi. Thus Tully in his Topickes, and the Latins after him, have called Notations, a notatione; Or, 
Etimologia quid?  Etymology est cum vox ex suae origine explicatur.  
The second kind is called Antilexis; and is cum vox ignotior vel obscurior voce notiore vel clariore idem significante declaratur. And of both these we have plentiful examples.  
Etimologies of the first kind, which are most effectual, are diversely deduced; sometimes from the matter, sometimes from the scope or end, sometimes from the effect, sometimes from the properties, sometimes from the object, & sometimes from the opposite.  
From the scope or end we have sundry examples; 
9 & 10. Eliz 267. b. n. Dyer.  as a College is in Latin called Collegium, a cohabitatione, & quia simul colliguntur.  
So likewise we call him an Executor of a last Will and Testament, 
Com. Pl. 2.280. b.  of executing and performing the will of the dead; not that he always doth so, but that in respect of his power and duty he is bound so to do.  
So a judgement or Sentence of a Court is called juditium quasi juris dictum, The final saying, 
Coke lib. 10.42. a.  judgement and doom of the Law. For that every judgement is taken and received for law, until it be reversed for error; for that is the scope and end of the Law.  
Likewise a Preband is called Praebenda, 
Coke lib. 3. fo. 75.  a praebendo auxilium & consilium Episcopo: for to that end were Prebends ordained in Cathedral Churches, that the Prebendaries thereof should be Assistants and of Counsel to the Bishop in his Episcopal function.  
Likewise saith Bracton, Rex dicitur a regendo, 
Lib. 3. cap. 9 Lib. 1. cap. 8. Bracton.  non a regnando.  
And the French word Verdict used in our Law for the resolution of those that are impanelled to try matters in fact, est quasi vere dictum, as the saying of truth; and so to be received without contradiction until it be defeated by an attaint.  
Sometimes Etimologies are drawn from the effect or operation: whereof Bracton saith well, 
Bract. lib. 3. cap. 1.  That an Action or Suit in law may well be called an Action, quum agitur de injuria: for it is a complaint of an injury received.  
So Damnum, 
Coke li. 10. ca 116.117.  Damage (saith one) is derived a demendo, cum diminutione res deterior fit.  
A Confirmation is so called, 
Littl. con. cas. 520.  as Littleton affirmeth, & idem est quod firmum facere, of the operation it hath to make stable or firm a former Grant.  
So is a Surrender, 
14. H. 7.  Quia sursum'redditio, and of the two French words suise & render, or yielding up of an estate again to the Lessor or his assignee to the immediate Reversion from which it was derived.  
To like purpose a Writ is called in Latin Breve, and in French a Brief, 
Bract. 112.413.  for the brevity of it, and for that, (as Bracton saith) rem quae est & intentionem petentis breviter enarrat.  
So, a Fine, whereby lands or inheritances are conveyed in Courts of Record by concord and agreement of the parties, in respect of their operation, scope, and strength to make peace, and settle the Inheritance: 
Glanvil.  Of which Glanvil the most ancient writer now extant of our Law, giveth an intimation when he writeth, Dicitur talis concordia finalis, quia finem imponit negotio, adeo ut neutra pars litigantium ab eo poterit recedere. Which is also affirmed by the Statute of 21. 
21. Ed. 1.  Ed. 1. de finibus levandis, where the words are, Quia Fines in curia nostra levati, finem litibus debent imponere: & idco Fines dicuntur maximè.  
So we say that the foundation of a College, 
Coke li. 10. fo. 26.  Hospital, or such like is called fundatio, quasi fundi datio, vel fundamenti locatio.  
Likewise a Villeine, a man of servile or base degree is called in our Law in Latin servus; for as Bracton saith, dicitur servus à servando, non à serviendo, 
Bracton li. 1. ca 60. pa. 3.  antiquitùs enim solent Principes captivos vendere, & ideo eos servare & non occidere. And in English we call him Villeine à villa, from a Country Farm, whereunto they were deputed to do service, as our Villains regardant to Manors were, as old Records and Authors affirm, glebae ascriptitiae, tied to the Turf: Or rather of the word vilis of his condition vile and base. And the woman Villeine as Littleton saith, is called a Neefe, quasi nativa: The making free of both which, or their Enfranchisement, is called in Latin, Manumissio, à manu mittere, quod idem est quod vel extra manum aut potestatem ponere vel dimittere; For manus in the Law Metaphorically signifieth either power or possession, alluding to the old Ceremony used in the enfranchisement of Bondmen, whereof Isiodorus speaketh, manumitti servus dicebatur, cum Dominus ejus, aut caput ejusdem servi, aut aliud membrum tenens, dicebat, Hunc hominem liberum esse volo, & remittebat eum è manu. The ancient form and Ceremony thereof among our Ancestors the Saxons was in this manner: Si quis velit servum suum liberum facere, 
Lambert. APXAIONOMIA. fo. 126.  tradat eum vicecomiti per manum dextram in pleno Comitatu, & quietum illum clamare debet à jugo servitutis suae per manumissionem, & ostendat ei liber as portas & vias, & tradat ei libera arma, scilicet lanceam & gladium & deinde liber homo efficitur.  
So the word Remitter, which is an ancient term of the Law as Littleton saith of the word (mitter, or rather of the French word remitter to restore) and importeth a restitution of possession unto a man's ancient right. 
Litt. li. 3. cap. 12. Remitter. P. Com. 139. ca P. Weston.   
Likewise Mortmain which is a gift of Land of other hereditaments to a Corporation, which hath a perpetual succession, and therefore never like to return to the Lord by Escheat or Donor by Reverter. And therefore as one saith, it seemeth to be taken into a dead or dying man's hand which holdeth fast whatsoever it claspeth. Or as the Frudists affirm; 
Pol. Virgil. lib. 17.  In mortuam manum vocarunt, quod res sic datae tanquam mortuae, usui illorum mortalium in perpetuum ademptae essent: or else as another of the contrary: 
Hottomanus de verbis Feudalibus.  Quia possessio quasi immortalis est, quia nunquam heredem, vel successorem, vel possessorem habere desinit.  
So we call a Rent paid yearly for Land or other things Redditus, à reddendo, because it is yearly yielded or restored for the Lands, etc. Or rather as some will à redeundo, because it doth return to the Lessor or Donor for the issues and profits of the Land: And in English it is called a Rent of the French word Rentor to rate or Assess at a price. 
Coke lib. 10. f. 28. a.   
As concerning these Derivations or Etymologies drawn from the final cause or effect, I was not minded curiously to distinguish, for that in these things which do depend of humane Acts, wherein the final cause and effect is all one; for that the operation is attempted and achieved for the effects sake.  
But to proceed; Sometimes also Etymologies are drawn from the form or manner of doing or working.  
So we call a Common, to be a right whereby we take some kind of profit in the land, or soil, or inheritance of another, together in Common with the Owner or others, which Bracton expresseth by way of Etymology thus: 
Bract. lib. 4. c. 33. f. 223.13. H. 8.16. a.  Comunia ex virtute vocabuli componitur ex una & cum (& subintelligitur alio) Quia comunia est in alieno & una cum alio & in fundo proprio, quia nemini seruit suus fundus proprius.  
Likewise we call certain Lands Copyholds of the form and manner of Tenure, because the Tenants thereof do hold the same per copiam rotuli Curiae Domini, they have no other evidence or writing of their Tenure; but the Copy of the roll of the Lords Court.  
But of these we have said sufficient, let us now speak of the other kind which is called Antilexis, when an obscure word is explained by another more familiar or better known: This is performed when an English word is expounded by a Latin word, or in any other language from whence the word was first derived.  
As administration of goods of an Intestate is said to be ordinatio seu dispositio, 1. 
Lambert's justice li. 1. ca 17.22. b. Ass. pla. 6. P. 6.  Eliz. Dyer. 166. b.  
An Assault upon a man's person by another, is so called of the Latin word assultus and doth import the offer of any hurtful blow or fearful speech.  
An arrest is said to be the restraint of a man's liberty by power or colour of a lawful Warrant, derived as some think from the French word arrester to stay, 
Lamb. justice. li. 1. cap. 16.  or else fare fetched from the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Decree or sentence of the Court.  
So nomen à noscendo, quia notitiam fcit, whereupon saith Bracton, 
Bract lib. 4. ca 20. f. 188.  Ideò imposita sunt nomina ut demonstrent voluntatem dicentis, & utimur not is in vocis ministerio. So that we may easily observe; That many of these of this latter kind are mere Dorivations, 
17. E. 4. so. 2.  as Contract à contrahendo, Deodand, quasi Deo dandum, id est, id est, in eleemosynas erogandum, Divortium à divertando, Duress ex duritia, of strait imprisonment or hard entreaty. Larceny, id est, latrocinium, homicidium ab homine & cadio. 
Lamb. Iust. Bract. lib. 3.120. b.  Parapherna, id est, praeter dotem, and signifieth mundum muliebrem: Peace à vocabulo latino Pax: Lamb. justice, lib. 1. cap. 2. f. 67.  
A Court of Pypowder, a Court belonging and incident to Markets and fairs, 
12. E. 4.9. Lamb. de curijs.  to yield justice to the buyers and sellers coming thither, which because they are most frequented in Summer, the word was given of the dusty feet of the comers.  
A Presentment which is presented by an Inquest containing some crime or neusance, whereof they had to inquire, is derived of the French word, presenter.  
Records are so said of the verb Recordor to remember, 
Lamb. Iust. lib. 1. ca 13.  because they are Remembrances, & vetustatis & veritatis vestigia, the lively representations both of former time and truth: Reversion of the word Reverterr, or as terra revertens. 
Coke lib. 2. fo. 5.   
An estate Tail, of the French word tailor, to dock, or cut, limit or appoint in certainty, 
Littl. l. 1. c. 2.  and many such like, whereon I need not to insist.  
Sometime the Derivation of the word is deduced from some ancient word in old time used although now antiquated and grown out of use, and yet nevertheless such as giveth light to the present knowledge of the word, as Constable an ancient Officer of this Kingdom, 
Lamb. de Constables.  derived of two old Saxon words, Kinning which signifieth King, and stable, stability, 
cing.  as the stability of the King and Kingdom; So the word Farm in one signification importeth Lands, or other inheritances, holden for a yearly rent, quasi feormian, 
Feormian.  which is an old Saxon word, signifying to feed, or tender victual; for that in ancient time they rendered victual for the most part, and not money. 
Lambert in Archion●mia   
So warrantisure, of the old word which signifieth to defend or acquit, for so saith Bracton, Warrantizare nihil aliud est quam defendere, 
Bracton li. 5. fo. 350. b. Paragraph. 2.  & acquietare tenentem, qui warrentum vocavit in seisina sua.  
So Gavellkinde, a custom whereby every son or heir male inheriteth a portion alike in his Ancestors estate, and is derived of two old Saxon words gife eal cyn, that is, given to all the kin; 
gife call cyn.  Quasi omnibus cognatione proximis data hereditas.  
So Guilda Mercatoria, 
Lam. Arch. Coke li. 10. fo. 30.  an ancient word found in old Charters and monuments, and signifies contuberrimum: or a Corporation of Merchants.  
So Steward derived of two old words, Steed and Ward, 
Coke lib. 9 fo. 45.  and is as much to say, as a man appointed in my steed or place.  
So the word Wythernam, yet much in use, drawn from two old and ontworne Saxon words Whither, 
pyþorn; oer & Nâm. Lam. Arch.  alterum, & Nam, pignus; quasi alter a pignoris oblatio.  
Sometimes Derivations are made of some old words, whereof the use from which the Derivation was made, is now utterly changed, as socagium, id est, servitium socae, id est, carucae, for that the word soca was used for a plough. But this service was after by general consent of Lord and Tenant, redeemed by payment of a yearly rent, and yet the signification remaining still, as Landlord given to plough the Lords Land, although the use of that service be abrogated; except upon Creation of the Tenure, it should be reserved and so renewed.  
So saith one, the houses of the devoted religious were called Monasteria, of the solitude or solitary life there led, which in latter days was nothing less, 
Clandius Cautiun. de lo. legal.  Quia pleraque monasterianil minus sunt quaem solitudines.  
Sundry other Derivations there are, which are but only allusions strained and framed by the wit and industry of man, rather than from the native signification of the word, and therefore of less regard and moment, as testamentum, quasi testatio mentis, first devised by Servius Sulpitius the old Roman Lawyer, 
Aul. Gelius lib. 6. ca 12.  and used in our books, although impeached by Aulus Gellius in that age, or shortly after as a strain of wit, and not out of any true denomination of the word.  
So likewise of that strain is agreamentum, 
Com. Fogoss. 17. Bract. lib. 1. ca 3.  which one would frame as aggregatio mentium.  
So aequitas, quasi aequalitas, quiae est rerum convenientia, qua in paribus causis paria desiderat jura & omnia benè coaequiperat.  
So have they derived selony, 
Lambert. Coke l. 4.124 Lam. Iust. l 1 ca 20. Coke li. 4.37.  quasi felleo animo factum; so another deriveth Robbery of the word robe. And another terra, à terendo, quia vomere teritur, and many such like, with the which I will not meddle.  
There rests a few words of the use of these Etymologres, Notations, and allusions, and so an end.  
Etymologies if they be rightly used and frawne from the final cause or from the effect, do not only yield an Argument of good consequence, but also offer much illustration and delight; And therefore it is well observed by one, 
Clau. Camiuneula. de loc. legal.  That Etymologia est resolutio vocis in verum & proprium effectum, & verbi veritatem notificat, & obid, eam Cicero veriloquium appellat: And hence grew among the Grecians that usual speech of the which Isiodore speaketh, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to learn aright it is principally necessary to search out the signification of the word.  
First therefore, we are for the right use of them to observe; That these derivations are not to be observed in every word; For there are and must be in every language many primitives which have their native significations according to the imposers pleasure, for that of the Poet is to purpose; 
Multarenascentur, quae nunc cecidere, cadentque  
Quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus,  
Quem penes ar bitrium est, & mos & norma loquendi.   
They are Derivative words which out of compositon may bear interpretations.  
Secondly, Arguments from Etymology are not to be used at all times and upon all occasions, but rarely, and where necessity doth require the same, or delight, or apt consequence doth offer fit occasion; 
Clau. Cant.  and therefore saith one, Etymologia usum habet necessarium, quoties interpretatione res de qua quaeritur eget.  
Thirdly, that your allusions be such, non abhorrentes ab ipso vocabulo, sed à sono vocis provenientes: not harshly or hardly drawn or wrung out, but answerable to the sound oh fhte word, and application to the sense.  
It is not my purpose to set forth here when arguments and reasons drawn from Etymologies, do hold their consequence, and when not, for therein the student of the Law must be formerly instructed by the Precepts of the Art of Logic; for this place will not permit the same, jest I should treat of Arguments before I come to Argument. But let me not here forget that Etymologies are most used by the Authors of our Laws in their Treatises and Tracts which are of Simplicis Thematis.  
Having done with the derivation of words, we come now to the explication of the nature of the thing by definition.  
Definition itself is thus defined, 
Definitio quid?  Definitio est oratio, quae quid sit, de quo agitur, ostendit brevissime. It is a Proposition which doth express the nature of the thing shortly. 
Aristo. 1. Post. 2. Post. c. 10.  And therefore Aristotle saith aptly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: or as in another place to the like effect: Definitio est oratio, quae quid est significans. And therefore it is truly said of another, That Fons totius explicationis est vera Definitio; nullus enim rem melius noscere videtur, quam qui quid eam sit aperte possit explicare. 
Kickerns.  A true Definition is the fountain of explication: for no man knoweth any thing better than he which can aptly and briefly express the nature thereof, and what it is.  
Of Definitions there by two kinds: the one perfect and absolute; the other less perfect. The perfect Definition is that which doth consist Ex proximo genere, & vera differentia; as that whereby they do define a man to be a living creature mortal endued with reason, the Genus whereof is a living creature mortal; which our English tongue cannot well express in one word, as it is by the Latin word Animal. But because this word is general to many other living creatures beside, endued with sense, therefore that perfect difference, endued with reason, rationale, is adjoined, whereby man is distinguished from all other things. For although Angels be endued with reason, yet are they not animalia, and there is nothing which may be called animal rationale but man alone. This rule I here remember, Quod genus & differentia ex Pradicamento sumantur.  
But these things I leave to the Logicke-schoole: And for that our dull understanding can hardly discern the true essential difference of things, we are driven, and especially in accidental matters, to express by their properties, parts, causes, or accidents; which a Logical writer hath well conceived in these words, Cùm certum sit, hominem internas rerum formas perfectè non cognoscere, ideo loco differentiarum seu formarum, propria accidentia tanquam, scilicet, senfibus viciniora in definitione sumimus. Another in this manner, Nwivorei majori laboramus inopia quam differentiarum. And another, Laboramus plerumque vel maximè omnibus è rebus verarum differentiarum penuria, quaeque hic ut in rebus caeteris pro veris habeamus, quae proximè veris videntur accedere. Therefore the imperfect Definition, which is called a description; is thus set forth:  
Definitio imperfecta est definiti per terminos minus essentiales explicatio. Of this there are, as some do teach, these kinds; Causalis, Partialis, & Accidentalis. Others somewhat more fully thus, Imperfect à definitio sive descriptio, est principalis vel minus principalis. Principalis, definitum explicat genere & accidentibus, vel causis, vel effectibus proprijs, vel partibus. And therefore that which is given of them ex causis, is called causans, and is nothing else but Oratio rei proprias causas manifestans: so that they do affirm, That such descriptions are causal, and given per materiam & formam to be essential.  
Descriptio, or Definitio minus principalis, which is, ex accidentibus, and therefore called accidentalis, est definiti ex merè conting entibus terminis, vel etiam externis explicatio, sive generis accurata assignatione. And here I think it not amiss to observe some rules for good definition or description. And therefore.  
First, every good definition or description aught to contain two principal parts: 1, That which is general, and therefore called Genus, wherein the thing defined hath community with other things: And 2, that which may more particularly express the nature thereof, to distinguish the thing defined from all other things loco differentiae. And therefore saith Tully ad Trebatum, Sic veteres praecipiunt, cum sumpser is ea quae sunt rei quam definire velis cum alijs commania, usque eo persequi dum proprium efficiatur, quod nullam in aliam rem transferri potest. Another setteth the same down in this manner: Primò quaerendum est Genus, deinde dividendum donec tandem veniatur ad eam orationem quae cum definito convenit.  
Some men there are, which though they extol the true definition (where it may be had) before the description, as it deserveth; yet hold they the description more familiar, and apt to teach, than the former, whereof Lodovicus Vives writeth thus; The perfect Definition (saith he) Verior quidem est, sed tamen obscurior: hinc fit, ut essentiales definitiones parùm doceant mentem hominis non exactè docti, cui quidem longè ●tilior fuerit descriptio ab externis accidentibus, quae sensu possint percipi. And again, essentiales, & exactissimae definitiones parùm nos docent, & idcirco apud authores bonos sunt rarae. For (saith one) Desinitio essentiam, descriptio intelligentiam rei claudit.  
Authors have given certain rules also appliable to both these kinds, which I may not let pass: because in this place they stand (as I conceive) to good purpose. Whereof the first is thus: Removeri debet à definitione omnis ambiguitas, & omnis obscuritas, quae fit duabus causis: primò, ex translatione Tropi, & Metaphora: secundo, ex insolentia vocis, omnis vox inusitata est obscura. To this effect hath Aristotle these words, Oportet eum qui definite, maximè omnium clarissima interpretatione uti: siquidem cognoscendi & intelligendi causa traditur. Wherhfore the first rule as you see, 
Arist. Top. 6. ca 1.  ut clarior sit definitio, & debet dari per notiora: for that Definitio prolata sensui discentis notior & magis obvia esse debet.  
The second rule is, That every good Definition debet reciprocari cum definito, it aught to be reciprocal and convertible with the thing defined or described. For the better understanding whereof, it is to be observed, that every thing needeth not a definition or description: for particular and individual things subject to sense, need no definition or description: for that Definitio debet esse de universalibus. 
9 Metaph. ca 6.  And hereupon Aristotle affirmeth, Omne quod definitur est species. And although there be five universalities or predictables as they term them, as Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, & Accidens, yet are there but four Pradicata Topica, for species is the thing defined, and wherein, and whereby the rest are verified. And again, Definitio est de rebus compositis à natura & finitis.  
The third rule is as a consequent of the former, Nihil habeat superfluum aut diminutum Definitio: for if the definition or description be convertible, and reciprocal with the thing defined, or described (as it aught) it cannot have either superfluity or defect; this Precept I thought necessary in this place, because the student might be the better informed to frame his Definition or description.  
Let me here say a word of the efficacy and use of definitions and descriptions; And after shall I endeavour to yield some examples out of our Laws: A Definition is said to be one of the Instruments of knowledge, and that two manner of ways; Primo in ordine ad definitum, whereby the thing defined or described is known, not by discourse of reason but in a manner by contemplation intuitive, resembling the Angel's knowledge; and therefore it is said well by a Writer, Definitio est intuitiva cognitio; 
Kickerm. Arist. 8. Topic. ca 3.  And hence it is that Aristotle so highly in many places of his works commendeth the same Difficilis est omnis disputatio, nisi id de quo ea instituitur rectè ab initio defineatur. And again in the same place, Omnis quaestio de qua disputare difficile est vel definitionem requirit, vel distinctionem nomine. And in the fourth book of his Physics, Text. 31. Arist. setteth forth the effect of a Definition, Quod per eam omnia dubia solvi possint & debeant.  
Whereupon one writer groweth so confident that he thinketh, that out of a full definition of a Marriage, and of an Oath, all controversies concerning either of them may be fully decided; these be his words: Hujus utilitatis duo exempla sunt valdè conspicua, 
Strigellius.  unum in doctrina de conjugio, alterum in disputatione de juramento, omnes quaestiones de his materijs facilius & certius possunt explicari. And therefore Tully in his Offices would have every orderly treatise a definitione proficisci. 
De officijs lib. 1.   
Secondly, a Definition is an Instrument of knowledge, In ordine ad demonstrationem, ad sciendam conclusionem, 
Sungletius l. 2. lo. in prooem.  hoc est, ad proprietatem demonstrandam passionem de subjecto. But of this more hereafter, when we shall speak of Arguments necessary, which are called Demonstrations.  
Let us now exemplify what we have said, by instances drawn out of the Common Laws of this Land.  
If I would define or describe a Feoffment, I must first seek out a General or Genus; 
Feoffment, quid?  as thus, A Feoffment is a conveyance, but because there be sundry other conveyances, I must proceed further to distinguish the same from all other conveyances; and therefore I add and say, A Feoffment is a conveyance which passeth an estate in Fee-simple by Livery of Seisin; And hereby I have distinguished it from all conveyances of record, and conveyances that enure by way of grant; But because likewise Leases for life are likewise passed by Livery of seisin; and likewise a gift in Tail, passeth by Livery and seisin, I have added the last compliment and full difference in these words, in fee simple. Wherefore in every feoffment two things are of necessary regard; First, that it is performed by Livery of seisin. And secondly, that it passeth an estate in Fee simple: for Lands given in tail and executed by a Livery, we do not call a Feoffment, but a gift in Tail.  
If I should define or describe a fine, 
Fine, quid?  whereby Lands, and other hereditaments are conveyed, I would thus describe the same.  
A fine is a conveyance of Record by Concord between the parties upon licence obtained in a suit depending between them in the King's Court of Common Pleas. Where a Conveyance is the General or Genus, The words (of Record) make a difference from other conveyances passed in the Country in Pais. And because there are also some other Conveyances of Record, there is added further the essential difference, which is the form of a Fine, namely, the concord upon licence obtained; for otherwise such concord cannot be admitted in an action depending between them: for without Action, there can be no Fine, which action or suit, must concern Lands or Hereditaments, whereof the fine is levied, or upon an action of Covenant to levy such fine; And this suit must be depending: And next of all is added the King's Court, for such fines as by Custom may be levied in Courts of ancient Demesne, or the like if any be, are not true fines, but similitudinary only.  
Lastly is added the King's Court of Common Pleas, for that in ancient times, before the Court of Common Pleas was erected, fines were levied, (as among the old Records thereof appeareth) in any of the King's great Courts of Law; But after the erection of the said Court, because fines are levied upon Original Writs that are Common Pleas, and therefore only to be dealt withal in that Court, fines are and aught to be levied in that Court only.  
I may describe a fine shorter thus out of Glanvills' words;  
Finis est amicablilis compositio & finalis Concordia, ex licentia terminans loquelas motos in Curia: for his very words are these: Contingit autem aliquando loquelas motas in Curia Domini Regis per amicablilem compositionem & finalem Concordiam terminari, sed ex licentia Regis vel ejus justiciariorum.  
These like Concord's have been in use in the Civil Laws, and are called by them Transactions; whereof they say thus, Transactiones sunt de eis quae in controversia sunt, à lite futura aut pendente ad certam compositionem reducuntur, dando aliquid vel accipiendo.  
Or shorter thus; Transactio est de re dubia & lite ancipite ne dum ad finem ducta, non gratuita pactio.  
Where note that it may well be said nongratuita Pactio, because in the end of the concord of the fine, which is the form thereof, there is contained a certain sum oh money under this form, Et pro hoc fine habendo, etc. I. S. the cognizee dedit 20. li. sterlinguorum. So likewise there is money paid unto the King which is called the King's Silver, pro licentia concordandi.  
Thus much have I add out of the Civil Law, That the Student might as well in this, as in many other Titles of the Law observe the great conformity that is between the Common Law of the Land, and the Civil Law of the Empire.  
If I should define Homage, I may say, 
Homagium quid?  That Homage is a service corporal of most reverence done by the Tenant unto his Lord, whereby he doth acknowledge himself to become his man, and to do him all earthly honour.  
Where Service is the Genus, or most general word, limited by the word corporal, to distinguish from other services not corporal, for, that it is to be done by the Tenant himself in person and by none other to the Lord: All those words that follow in the said description are added in stead of the difference drawn from the form and manner of the performance of the said Service.  
Bracton hath a larger description hereof, taken from the effects proceeding on both sides, thus; Homagium est juris vinculum, quo quis tenetur & astringitur ad warrantizanduns, defendendum, & acquietandum tenentem suum in sesina sua, versus omnes per certum servitium in donatione nominatum & expressum, & etiam vice versa; Quo tenens re obligatur & astringitur ad fidem domino suo servandum, & servitium debitum faciendum. And after setteth down the form and manner of doing thereof. The Feudists in the Civil Law, do tender it shorter thus, Homagium seu hominium (haec enim vox communior est) est venerat io (si vim verbistrictè consideramus) cùm se eo nomine hominem, id est, Cliented ipsius fore profitetur.  
if likewise I should yield a general description of an estate in Dower, 
Estate in Dower, quid?  which might agreed to all the several kinds of Dower by Littleton, I would describe it thus:  
An estate in Dower is an estate of Freehold during the life of a lawful wife, appointed out of an inheritance whereof she is dowable, which estate beginneth upon and after the death of her husband for her maintenance.  
The General of this description is an estate of Freehold during the life of a lawful wife. There is added, appointed, for that an estate in dower is appointed two manner of ways; First, either by act of Law, as a gife of the Law upon a lawful marriage, as is the Estate in Dower at Common Law, of the third part to be assigned by meats, and bounds by the Law, and general custom of the Realm: Or else of more, as of the moiety, etc. according to the custom of the particular place.  
It is said moreover, lawful wife, for except the wife be a lawful wife, and the marriage a lawful marriage, Dower cannot be had, for the estate in Dower is in regard of the marriage.  
The second way, That Dower is appointed, 
2. Way.  is by act of the party, and that is, either at the marriage at the Church door, when they come to be married, and therefore called Dower ad ostium Ecclesiae; or by consent of the Father, or other Ancestor of the husband, and therefore commonly called Dower ex assensu Patris, etc. But both these Dowers are almost worn out of use.  
These words (afterthe death of her husband, for her maintenance,) do contain the sinal cause and purpose wherefore it was put in use.  
Dower by the course of the common Law, which is the most usual kind of Dower, may in this manner be described.  
An estate in Dower by the course of the Common Law, is an estate of Freehold for the life of a lawful wife, of the third part of all those inheritances dowable, whereof the husband was feised of an estate of inheritance, during the Coverture, given by the Law to be complete after the death of the husband, for her maintenance.  
This description is drawn from all the causes: the Material cause is set forth unto us by the persons; the husband and wife, the form is the estate of freehold for the life of the lawful wife. The efficient causes are, The Act of the Law, and likewise the seisin of the husband during the Coverture; and lastly, to be complete after the death of her husband; And the final cause in these words, for her maintenance.  
So that by lawful marriage the estate in Dower hath commencement by the seisin of the husband during the Coverture it hath his progression; and by the death of the husband his consummation, and accomplishment, whreeof ensue the three main bars to be pleaded by the Tenant of the land in a writ of dower. 
3. Bars.   
The first against the marriage, ne unques loyalment accoople, which plea is triable by the Ordinary.  
Against the Seisin, ne unques seize, etc. tryable by a Iury.  
And against the consummation, that the husband is yet living, which is triable only by proofs of witnesses.  
Although the Civil Law do call that Portion which is brought by the wife, or given with the wife in marriage (which we commonly call the marriage portion) Does, her Dower: And they call the estate in Dower, Donatio propter nuptias, yet have they this agreement or conformity, quod neuter sine matrimonio esse potest.  
And because we have had occasion to skpeake of marriage, let us here define or describle the same, 
Bract. lib. 4. f. 298. b. Lib. 5. f. 420.  Bracton out of the Common Law thus describeth it, Matrimonium est conjunctio viri & mulier is individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens.  
Britton thus: Matrimony est affemblie, the home & de feme, 
Brittion 246.  a lour deux volunts, per jointure de St. Eglise, per demurrer ensemble come un chaire à touts lour vies sans espoier de departure.  
The Civil Law hath it in this manner: 
Institu. de Patria: Potest.  Matrimonium est divini & humani juris communicatio, inter virum & faemina●●, individuam vitae consuetudinem continens.  
The definition of Marriage which Strigellius so much commendeth, whereby all the difficulties that fall in debate concerning Marriage, may be (as he thinketh) cetermined, is in this manner conceived.  
Conjugium est unius maris & unius foeminae, 
Kickerm.  legitima & indissolubilis copulatio, à Deo instituta in Paradiso, ut intelligamus Deum esse castum & castitatis amantem, ut ei in castitate serviamus, & ut hoc modo & non alitèr propagetur genus humanum.  
A Rent may be thus described: 
Rent. quid?  A rent is a Revenue issuing out of lands or other manual hereditaments, and wherewith the same is charged for a time of continuance.  
So that the genus is Revenue, and the material subject that supporteth the charge, is manual hereditaments, as land and such like, for out of no other hereditament can a rent be properly reserved or granted: and the peculiar difference is wherewith the same is charged, for a Rent is a charge, and wheresoever the land be conveyed, tranfit cum suo onere, it goeth with his charge.  
So that a certain sum of money, or other things valuable (for a rent may be reserved or granted of other things than money) are the matter de qua; Land, or other manual hereditaments the matter ex qua, or extra quam: The reservation or the grant, the efficient cause: The final cause might also have been expressed, but when the definition is otherwise plain, it needeth not.  
The Civil Law by this word Redditus, 
Le. 5. §. non possim. ff. de rebus ●orum.  or Reditus, understandeth generally Quicquid ex re aliqua obvenit aut redit.  
And because a Rend service hath his original by way of reservation, let us here see what a Reservation is.  
A Reservation is an agreement between the Lord and Tenant, 
Reservation quid?  or the Lessor and Lessee, that the Lord or Lessor shall receive at times appointed a certain sum of money or other thing appointed to be paid for the thing demised or granted. 
Com. Browning 140. b. 35. H. 8.57. a   
A Relief, 
Relief quid?  called in Latin Relevium; The Feudists describe or define thus: Relevium dicitur honorarium, quod novus vassallus Patrono introitus causa largitur, quasi morte alterius vassalli, vel alio quo casu feudum ceciderit quod jam à novo sublevetur, veteres introitum appellabant.  
Of a Relief Bracton hath these words, 
Bracton. lib. 2 fo. 83.  Oportet statim quod tenementum, quod fuit in manibus antecessorum, & haereditas quae jacens fuit per eorum decessum relevetur in manus haeredum, & propter talem relevationem facienda erit ab haeredibus quaedam praestatio quae dicitur Relevium. Out of which words of his, a description of a relief may thus be framed:  
Relevium est quaedam Praestatio, facta ab haeredibus post mortem antecessoris ad relevandam haereditatem per eorum mortem jacentem.  
Where he seemeth to use haereditas jacens for land, etc. descended to the heir before his entry, as the Civilians likewise take the same. 
judgement quid?   
A judgement is the determination of a cause in controversy by a person thereunto appointed.  
This Description is general, and comprehendeth all manner of judgements whatsoever: The Civilians do thus tender the same: judicium est actus legitimus, quo judex de causa proposita cognoscit, & secundum aequum & bonum pronunciat. Wherein they note to be three degrees: First, the Cognizance or power to judge. Secondly, that this judgement be public or published. Thirdly, that it be just and right. This connexion they yield to be thus; Siquidem in nullo controversiarum genere prodest causam differri ad judicem, nisi cognoscatur de ea, sic nihil profuerit esse cognitum nisi pronuncietur; denique, pronunciatum inutile erit nisi ex bono & aequo procedat.  
There are sundry kinds of judgements, sometimes diversified in respect of place, sometimes in respect of the person that judgeth, sometime in respect of the manner of proceeding. In respect of the place, as in a Court of justice, and then every judgement is said to be the Act of the Court: sometimes judgement given out of Court, as upon the voluntary submission of the parties in controversy, as an award or arbitrament: with the descriptions of which I will end this part of our discourse touching Definitions and Descriptions.  
An Arbitrament, which is also called an award, 
Arbitrament quid?  is a judgement or Determination which one or more do make at the request of two parties at the lest, for or concerning debt, trespass, or other controversy had between the said parties.  
The Civil Law yields it thus: Arbitrium est arbitri sententia, five judicium inter controvertentes, privato concensu, non antem publica interveniente authoritate.  
But to the intent the Student may know how to collect a definition or description of any legal part or title out of his books of Report, I will leave him here a description of an Award or Arbitrament, where every part is drawn and deduced out of sundry Law Cases here and there seattred, which I have gathered as sundry dispersed stones into one building.  
An Arbitrament is a judgement, 8. E. 4.1. a. 8. E. 4.10. a. 21. E. 4.39. a. given by such person or persons as are elected by the parties to the controversies, 9 E. 4.43. b. 16. E. 4.9. a. for the pacifying of the said controversy, 8. E. 4.10. a. 19 H. 6.37. b. Askew; according to the compromise and submission, 19 E. 4.1. a. and agreeable to reason and good conscience.  
All which words composing the said description, are deduced and drawn out of the books cited, and only by me laid together, and what is done here concerning an Arbitrament (of which hereafter I shall make a larger discourse) may be likewise performed in sundry other Titles.  
There resteth an Objection to be removed; 
Ob.  it is said by the ancient Roman Lawyer jabolenus, Omnis desinitio in jure Civili periculosa est, parum est enim ut non subverti possit: To define in Law is dissicult, and the sundry circumstances of things be so many, and so full of variety, as the definition or description is happily made if it stand or remain unimpeached.  
To this I give answer, 
Resp.  That all this is in a manner true; but let us remember, Difficilia quae pulchra, and use so much the more care and diligence in the composition of the same. Albeit the Interpreters do understand him to mean by a Definition in that place, no other thing than a Rule or Ground in Law, yet nevertheless both are necessarily attempted and performed sufficiently: For otherwise the knowledge of the Law would be but an incertain, inconstant, and tumultuary knowledge (if that may be called knowledge at all, but grounded upon wavering opinions,) but the knowledge of the Law is not such, as shall be evidently made manifest when we come to dispute, whether the Law may be reduced into a method or no.  
Thus much of Definitions and Descriptions, there followeth in order the consideration of Divisions.  
Some there are which to avoid confusion because they conceit the word Division to contain several significations not reducible under an univocal head, 
Divisio, quid  they have therefore even divided Division itself, in bringing in the consideration of the name into his sundry significations, which they call divisio nominis, and which they describe thus:  
Divisio nominis est oratio qua vox in sua significata distinguitur.  
But because that were somewhat improper, and that more fit place will be found hereafter in the second part of this Treatise to handle the same, I will deal only with those Divisions that are of the thing, Divisionis rei, Divisions of material parts.  
Divisio rei, & totius per partes resolutio, and it is either Principalis, vel minùs Principalis.  
Principalis est qua totum propriè & principaliter dividitur; & est vel generis in species, quae est divisio totius universalis, vel est totius essentialis, in suas partes essentiales, ut homo dividitur in corpus & animam; vel est divisio totius integralis, in suas parts integrals. So that of this kind of division as you see there are three sorts.  
Divisio generis est qua genus dividitur in suas species: and this kind of division is called of some Divisio totius subordinantis.  
And so Ius, as it signifieth the law, is divided by Bracton in Publicum & Privatum, and of this kind of division we have examples in the Law; as Littleton when he divideth an estate of Inheritance into an estate of Fee Simple, and an Estate Tail: when he divideth an estate of Freehold into an estate of Inheritance, or an estate for life: So likewise he divideth an estate for life, either for the life of the party, Ou pur auter vie: an estate for life of the party is either by act of Law, as that of Tenant in Dower, Tenant by the Courtesy, and Tenant apres possibility of issue extinct.  
By act of the party, as the general estate for life, which hath his original by Demise and limitation of the party.  
Of this kind of division speaketh Melancton.  
Divisio, generis in species est omnium praestantissima & in omnibus artibus communissima.  
And here some do require Cum differentiae exactae haberi possint per duas tantùm dividatur, quae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicitur.  
And of this also they have made these three observations: 

1. Placuit omnem divisionem duabus differentiis è diverso positis perfici deberi.  
2.  it a repugnent istae differentiae ut nequaquam in idem convenire possint.  
3. Postremo, ut quicquid in genere continetur, id totum differentiae explicent.    
Of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so much extolled by Ramus, and too curiously observed by his followers, occasion was taken by Aristotle out of Plato as it seemeth, and appeareth, lib. 1. De partibus animalium, cap. 2. & 3.  
But as touching the same I am of his mind which affirmeth, Nobis sicut primum esset, & voto forsitan optandum, ut legitimis duabus differentiis dividerimus; ita proximum erit ut quibuscunque duabus (tamen sin minus poterimus duabus,) at quot cunque poterimus dividamus, dummodo universam ejus quod dividitur complectamur latitudinem: And although it be true that Peripatetici semper dicotumiam probarunt, tamen non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & absolutè, sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and therefore we may not be tied or restrained to make our division always of two parts; but where that cannot conveniently be brought to pass, we may divide into so many parts as the nature of the thing shall require. And therefore Littleton in his division of Rents, divides them into three kinds; a Rend Service, a Rend Charge, a Rend Sack, which is very good and sufficient.  
And so of a Warranty, where he divideth every Warranty either into a Lineal Warranty, a Collateral Warranty, or a Warranty commencing by disseisiin.  
So likewise every estate in Dower is either by the Law, which is the general Custom of the Realm, and is of the third part; or else by the peculiar custom of the place, as of the moiety in gavelkind, or more or less as the custom of the place shall warrant: or else thirdly, by assignation of the party, and that is twofold, either by the husband himself, ad ostium Ecclesiae, or else by the Ancestor, as Ex assensu patris; or, De la pluis beale, etc.  
So likewise we divide the Material Church or Temple, the place appointed for divine Service into three kinds; a Church Cathedral, which is the seat of the Bishop, and his Chair: secondly, a Church Collegiate or conventual: and thirdly, a Church Parochial.  
So likewise we divide Tithes in this manner: all Tithes are either Pradiall, Personal, or Mixt.  
So a division of four or more parts is to be admitted, if the nature of the thing divided do so require: as Littleton importeth in this division of Actions.  
All Actions are either real Actions, Personal actions or mixed actions; and this Division is ordinary and almost every where in our Books. Littleton seemeth to add a fourth member, when he saith, that when a man releaseth all actions, Real, Personal, and mixed, that this is no Bar in an Appeal, and yet a release of all actions sufficeth; he intimateth thereby that there is an Action, neither Real, Personal or Mixed, and yet an Action, as the Appeal, an Action of Revenge.  
And herein I would not wish; That for Dicotumy sake, the Student should frame Divisions of his own head, and labour to reduce them ad btmembrem Divisionem, as some have done; But accept rather those that are approved of Authors, and generally received in that Art. And herein let me observe by the way that Dicotumia or the twofold division, Si pariat multas subdivisiones, intellectui & memoriae aggerendas est vitiosa.  
Likewise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ubi alterum membrum est positivum, alterum negativum, non est bona.  
In hac divisionis specie observandum est, ne id quod secundum magis & minus dividitur, in species dividi arbitremur.  
And thus much the divisione totius universalis.  
Divisio totius essentialis est qua totum essentiale in suas partes dividitur, ut in materiam & formam, & dicitur divisio totius coordinati.  
Divisio totius integri est qua aliquid in sua membra, seu parts integrales dividitur, & dicitur Partitio; Et est nihil aliud quam membrorum quae ad integritatem totius requiruntur, enumeratio: As when we do divide a house into the soil whereon it standeth, and the edifice and structure thereof.  
So the Author of the Dialogues between the Doctor and the Student divideth the Law in general into the Law of Nature, the Law of Nations, the Law of God, the Law of particular Kingdoms, as the Civil Law, the Law of this Land.  
So also have the Civilians divided their law thus; Ius  est quod legibus Plebiscitis, Senatus consultis, Principum placitis, Magistratuum Edict is Responfisque, Prudentium constat.  
So do we likewise divide the Law of England into the Common Law, and Statute Law.  
So we distinguish and divide a Manor into Demesnes and services.  
And a Rectory into Glebe and Tithes.  
We are now come to the second Principal Branch which is of the less principal Divisions.  
Divisio minus Principalis, est qua dividitur totum impropriè dictum, ut 1. Causa per suos effectus, 2. Effectus per suas causas, 3. Subjectum per sua accidentia, 4. Accidentia per sua subjecta, 5. accidentia per accidentia, 6. res per sua objecta, adjuncta, 7. quando, per circumstantias loci, temporis.  
We often make Divisions in the Law by the causes, 
Common.  as Bracton doth divide a Common thus by the causes: First material, as of those profits whereof Common may be had; as Common of Estovers, to burn in their houses; Common of Pasture, for feed for their Cattles; Common to dig in the soil of another; scilicet, fodiendo, ut lapides, cretam, arenam, turbam, id est, Common of Turbary and such like; and likewise there is a Common of fishing called Common of Piscary.  
In respect of the form and manner, how a Common is divided, thus; Every Common is either, Common appendent, Common appertenant, Common per case de vicinage, or Common in gross.  
In respect of the efficient cause, a Common is divided thus, as all Commons are either by prescription, or else by grant: Commons by prescription are such as Antiquity of time, and long continuance have produced, as Common Appendent, Common per case de vicinage.  
Commons that have had their original by the grant of the Parties are either so granted as that the same is restrained to the beasts pasturing such lands; And so it may be called a Common appertenant, although improperly by Grant; or else a Common in gross, and that in such liberty or manner of restraint of benefit as pleaseth the Grantor to bestow.  
In respect of the circumstance of time, some Commons are for all times of the year, some others for a certain time only.  
In respect of the place, some Commons are in the Waste of the Lord, or by especial grant through all his Land, or in his several, or ubicunque averia sua iverint.  
In Common of Pasture Bracton considereth these things; either the word pasture is taken largely, de omni quod edi poterit, vel pasci, largè sumpto vocabulo, ut si quis habeat in alicujus terra communiam pasturae, scilicet, herbagij, Pessonij, sive glandis, aut nucum, aut quicquid suo nomine Pessonig continetur, item foliorum & frondium.  
So I may divide Conditions annexed to Contracts, or to estates in this manner.  
All Conditions are either conditions in fact, 
Conditions.  or in Law; Conditions in fact are either expressed in words, and so created by words conditional, or else they are employed, namely, conditions by implication.  
Conditions expressed are either possible or impossible to be performed, and then are those conditions voided in Law, for, nemo tenetur ad impossibilia; All possible conditions are such as may be either against the Law, and that either against the Common Law, and then not only the Condition, but the whole Contract is void; But if it be only contrary to a Statute Law which may be dispensed wiathll, than the Condition standeth good; and the party bound thereby is likewise bound to procure a dispensation, and make himself able to perform the same.  
A Condition lawful is either subsequent, or precedent; subsequent Conditions annexed to estates, do either upon performance enlarge the same, or upon breach diminish or make void the same.  
Conditions repugant are such as are limited, repugnant to the premises, as landlord given in Fee-simple by a common person upon a condition that he, nor his heirs should alien. This is a repugnant Condition to the ampleness of the estate, and therefore void.  
In like manner I might divide a Custom by the causes, 
Custom.  as the internal causes are the matter and form; The material parts may be the persons whom the custom concerneth; The place and proceed in Courts of justice; For every Court of justice hath his Customs and courses of proceed sometime different from others.  
In respect of their form, they are either general throughout all the Realm, and so do they constitute that part of the Common Law which is grounded upon the general Custom of the Realm.  
Or else they are particular Customs to certain places, of the which Bracton saith thus; Habent Anglici plurima de consuetudine, quae non habent ex lege, sicut in diversis Comitatibus, Civitatibus, Burgis & Villis, ubi semper erit inquirendum, quae sit loci illius consuetudo, & qualiter utantur consuetudine.  
Every special Custom, as touching the form thereof, because it bindeth as a Law, and is as a peculiar Law of the place, hath two things considerable, First, the place; secondly, the manner and use of it. As concerning the place, every particular custom aught to be bounded within the compass of particular places, as sometime through a whole County or the greatest part thereof, as Gavell kind in Kent: or within a City, Borough or Town, as Borough English: For a particular custom cannot be at large in places uplandish.  
Secondly, as touching the form and manner of use of it, it aught to be reasonable and agreeable to common right without absurdity, 
Littl. l. c. 14. E. 3. f. Barr. 277. 42. E. 3. f. avowry 66. 14. H. 4. f. avow. 60. 2. H. 4.24. b. 5. H. 7.9.  for the which a particular reason may be yielded and given.  
Hence ensueth, That it aught to be without prejudice to any, and not to be injust in itself, 42. E. 3. f. avow. 66. 35. H. 6.29. b. Fitzh. Custom 2.  
Secondly, it aught to be certain, 13. E. 3. f. dum fuit infra aetatem. 3. 22. H. 6.46.47.  
Thirdly, it aught to be alleged in the affirmative; for a negative Allegation is not perfect, 8. H. 6.4. a.  
Efficient causes of a Custom are two; long vi temporis usus, That is, commencement without notice of the original when it begun, which they utter in these words; Temps dont Memorie ne court as Littleton speaketh; and secondly, continuance without notable interruption: 8. H. 6.4. b. 22. E. 4.8. b. 35. H. 6. f. Custom 2. 13. E. 3. f. Prescript, 40. 21. H. 7.20. a. b.  
The final cause is the effect, that it binds like a Law, for, in things of this nature, the final cause and the effect are all one: hereof Bracton speaketh, Consuetudo quando pro lege observatur in partibus ubi fuerit more utentium approbata est vicem legis obtinet. And again, Longaevi temporis usus, non est vilis authoritas, Bracton lib. 1. cap. 3. f. 2. Hence is it said, That a custom aught to be compulsary, 42. E. 3. f. Avow. 665. 5. H 7.9.  
I will here add something out of the Civil and Cannon Laws touching a Custom, whereby the Student may observe the conformity of both studies, and conjoin them if he list together; that one of them may assist, give light, and ornament unto the other.  
First, where it was said, That a General Custom is a parcel of the Laws of the Realm; They likewise affirm, that Consuetudo generalis facit jus common; Clem. Fin. de aetate & qualita: And again, Consuetudo tanti temporis cujus initium non continetur in hominum memoria, habet vim Privilegij Imperialis Le: §: ductus aquae de aqua quotidiana.  
Again, Consuetudo est jus moribus (id est) assiduis actibus introductum. C. Consue. i. Distinctio, voluntas Populi rebus ipsis & factis declarata. Tacitus concensus omnium. Le. de quibus: ff. de legibus. Tacita civium Conventio. Ius scripto non comprehensum.  
For the effect thereof, Consuetudo legem imitatur § ex non scriptis Institutis, de jure naturali gentium & Civili: Legem imitari dixit, id est, tantundem praestare & quasi legem repraesentare Aldobe: ibid.  
Consuetudinis vero officium est primo ut confirmet, deinde ut interpretetur scriptam legem si obscura sit: in Le: minimè Paulus, & Calistratus in leg. de interpretatione, ff. de legibus: with diverse like, too long here to make repetition.  
Sundry other examples of division might be produced out of the Laws of this Ream, which argue the necessary and frequent use of Division; but to omit them jest I should be too tedious, and to leave the student to his own industrious Collection, I will commemorate and insert here some few precepts to be observed in the making of an useful division, and after show the benefit of this knowledge, and so relinquish the same.  
The precepts therefore may be drawn into two heads; The first in respect of the thing to be divided, namely, divisum or dividendum; The second in respect of membra dividentia the parts dividing.  
As touching the things to be divided, it is to be observed, that Division is not always necessary; for some things are so entire as they cannot be divided, as unitas, for if it be divided, it is no more unity, but multiplicity.  
So instance which is neither time past, nor time to come, but only the moment of time present, unto the which the parts of time past and future, are conjoined.  
Many things in their nature are entire in the consideration of our Laws, for Entierty is that quoth in parts dividi non potest, I mean the division of totius integralis, not totius universalis. And therefore Entierties are of two kinds; First, some are such as by nature suffer no division, as the things before spoken of, Unity, Instance, Corporal service, of which it is said, ea quae in parts dividi non possunt, solida à singulis haeredibus debentur, as fealty and such like services, of which nevertheless some certain ones are appointed by Statute, 
2. E. 2. f. avo. 179.  to avoid trouble, to be performed by the eldest coheir, for the rest as Homage.  
Other things are said to be entire, which although they may be divided into parts by their nature, that is, their nature and essence is not repugnant to a Division, yet the Law will permit no division of them by the act of the party, although by act in Law they do abide Division, and such is a Rend Charge, a Warranty, a Condition, etc.  
As touching the parts dividing, or membra dividentia, Reg. 1 the first rule is, that Membra dividentia conveniunt cum toto & sunt toti adaquata, ita ut omnia membra simul sumpta sunt suo diviso aequalia, & quod nihil contineatur sub diviso quod non sub aliquo membro, nec aliquod membrum quod non sit sub diviso.  
The second rule is, Reg. 2 Quod membra dividentia sunt à se invicèm disjuncta, diversa, contradivisa & non subalterna, id est, quod unum in altero non contineatur.  
The third precept is, Reg. 3 Quod singula membra per se sumpta sunt inferiora diviso, contained within the amplitude of the thing divided, the parts being taken singularly and alone.  
The fourth rule is, Reg. 4 That the parts and members dividing be proxima & immediata, next and immediate under that which is divided, and not fetched afar off, 
Arist. 2. Post. cap. 5. & 14.  which precept is taken out of Aristotle, 2. Post. ca 5. & 14.  
The fift rule is, Reg. 5 that Divisio instruatur membris quam per naturam fieri potest paucissimis: The reason whereof is assigned thus, Cum divisio rei manifestandae gratia inventa sit, si multa contineret membra fastidium potius & obscuritatem quàm cognitionem pararet. And therefore it is Plato his Precept in his Politico, Non est tutum, o amice, in minutissima redigere. And therefore Seneca said well, Simile est confuso quicquid in pulverem usque sectum fuerit, nam ut maxima comprehendere, ita in minima deducere difficile est.  
The sixth and last precept is, Reg. 6 Quod membra dividentia quendam ordinem inter se habeant, & quod divisio omni ambiguitate & obscuritate vacet.  
And thus much concerning the Precepts of artificial Division may suffice.  
As touching the use of Division, Plato in his Dialogues, Phedrus and Sophista, falleth into a large praise thereof, and in the person of Socrates affirmeth, Si nactus fuerit Ducem qui recte partiri sciat se ipsius tanquam Dei vestigia sequuturum esse. Whereof also Quintilian hath these words,  vascula or is angusti respuunt superfluam humoris copiam, tamen paulatìm instillando replentur, sic distributio si in parts, accipiuntur faciliùs, ut cibus mansus, citiùs ac faciliùs digeritur.  
Boetius in his book which he wrote the divisione, thus speaketh, Scientia dividendi omnibus studiosis magnum fructum adfert, ut quae facit ut res clarè à nobis tractari queat.  
In a word, the utilities thereof may be reduced thus, 
Arist. 2. Post. Com. 74.  Primò, quòd faciat ad rei cognitionem distinctam & evolatam: Secundò, quòd prosit ad praedicata essentialia vaenanda, id est, ad investigandum genus & differentiam: Tertio, ad recte ordinandas & methodice disponendas disciplinas.  
Another hath these words, Divisio perfecta est principium intelligendi & constituendi rerum & disciplinarum methodos.  
But to leave these Philosophers, and to behold what the Civil Lawyers affirm thereof, and amongst much this may suffice, Per divisionem materia meliùs intelligitur & faciliùs capitur: Le. 1. juncta gloss. ff. de dolo malo. And again, Est autem divisio innumerabilis quasi materiae brevis compositio quae ad multa facit: Gloss. Instit. oblige. §. Olim autem in verbo divisio.  
But to let these also to pass, I will conclude with that of Bracton, although mentioned before, Lib. 1. cap. 1. Divisio sive partitio animum legentis incitat, mentem intelligentiae praeparat, & memoriam artificiosè reformat.  
Thus having in this manner ended with Definition or Description, and with Division in such a summary fashion as I conceived most convenient for the capacity of the Student, and especially how to inform him to make use of these parts as well in the study of the Law, as in any other his studies, leaving the exact knowledge thereof unto the Logic School: I thought it good here to advertise you, that there may be nevertheless observed of this which hath been said concerning the premises, That the knowledge of Definition, Description, and Division, do presuppose the knowledge of the five Predicables handled by Porphyries Institution to Aristotle's Organon, for whatsoever is properly defined, described, or divided, is species, as hath been already said. And the true parts of every perfect Definition are genus and differentia; and of Description, Genus vel aliquod loco generis, Differentia vel aliquod loco differentiae, Proprium & Accidens tanquam partes descriptionis dicuntur.  
Likewise is presupposed the knowledge of the Antepredicaments: for, Aequivocum or Analogon denoting words of many significations, cannot be defined or described so standing, but must first be distinguished into their sundry significations,  certum sit id quod definiatur aut describatur: For nothing indeed may be defined or described, but that which is univocum.  
Also by the knowledge had de nominativis, the thing is known in concreto as well as in abstracto: which is very necessary in Descriptions, and many times in use: As Littleton in the first Chapter of his Book, in his Treatise of Fee simple. But because he writeth a book of Tenors, which is the chief drift of that book, he thought it better to tell you who was a Tenant in Fee simple, than to describe the state alone; for in so doing it was more suitable and answerable to his Treatise in hand, namely, of Tenors and their incidents rather to deal with the Tenant than the estate, yet so as that thereby the estate is likewise sufficiently known. The like he performed in the rest of his Chapters, as of Tenant in Tail, Tenant in Dower, Tenant for Life, and the rest. Also the knowledge of the Predicaments and Post-predicaments is likewise presupposed. And as touching the Predicaments it is evident that the genus or differentia of every thing defined, described or divided, are to be sought in their proper and peculiar Predicaments.  
As concerning the Post-predicaments, how many they are in number, and how many are needful for this knowledge, may well be made manifest by some examples, and the use of them in the Laws.  
Aristotle maketh four kinds of Opposites; first, those that are relatiuè opposita, as the husband and the wife, the father and the son, the master and the servant, 
32. H. 8.3. Dyer.  of which consisteth the estate Economical of every family and household. So likewise the King and his Subjects, the Magistrate and the People, 
4. El. 2.22.1. Dyer.  of which consisteth the estate Political of the Kingdom and Commonwealth. So also the Lord and his Tenant, in whom anciently stood the strength of the Estate: the Lessor and Lessee, Grauntor and Grauntee, Feoffor and Feoffee, Bargainor and Bargainee, Conisor and Conisee, Recoveror and Tenont against whom the recovery was had, and such like, in whom and between whom all Conveyances and Contracts have their being. So likewise in suits real the demandant and the Tenant, in suits personal and mixed the Plaintiff and the Defendant, in an Assize the Plaintiff and Tenant; Actor and Reus in criminal causes: between which persons all suits and proceed in Law are determined.  
These are all relatiuè opposita, and have reference each to other; as one man cannot be properly Plaintiff and Defendant in one and the self fame action; or Actor and Reus, except in some special causes only, as where Interpleader may be admitted, as in a Writ of Detinue, where Garnishment is required, 
3. H. 6.18. 20. H. 6.28. 20. H. 6.29. 22. H. 6.45. a  there the Defendant is become Actor against the Garnishee.  
So in a Quare impedit, where the Defendant maketh Title to have a Writ to the Bishop, the Defendant is become as Actor.  
In a Replevin upon an Avowry made, 
3. H. 6.18. a. 22. H. 6.45. a 22. E. 4 10. a  the Avowant is become Actor.  
So in a Quod ei deforceat, the Demandant or Plaintiff shall defend his estate against such recovery as shall be pleaded against him and become Defendant, and may vouch, Ac si esset tenens in priori brevi, by the Statute of Westm. 2.  
Some resemblance of this is found in the Civil Laws, where it is said, Actor in tribus istis judicigs, familiae oriscundae, communi dividendo, & finium Regundarum, intelligitur, qui ad judicium provocat. Le. 13.14. ff. de judicigs. li. 2. § 3. & Lex. 44. § 5. ff. familiae hieresus. l. 11. infine. ff. de jurisdict. Le. 20. fimium regundarum. Le. 37. in fine. ff. de obligationibus & actionibus.  
TRhe second kind of opposites are those which are contraria, as right and wrong, ignorance and science; and of these some are without any media, and some have their media; and of those that have their media, 
Com. 467. Com. 247.  some are by participation, and some by negation, which the Logic School teacheth more at large.  
The third kind of Opposites are those that are privatiuè opposita, as light and darkness, fight and blindness, which things succeed and deprive one another, where there is a progress from the habit to the privation; but seldom or never any return from the privation to the habit: Villeine and Free are privatives; 
Com. 397. a.  in prison and at large are privativa.  
The fourth and last kind of Opposites are those which in Propositions and Clausesare contradicentia, the one Affirmative and the other Negative; of which express and full affirmatives the Law requireth all issues to be joined tryable by jurors, that they may not be inveigled in the trial of matters in fact.  
Also the Law of England being more precise in the form of pleading than any other foreign Law, to the intent the issue and point that cometh to be tried in matters of fact might be evident and clear to a jury, doth require that all affirmative pleading in Bar or defence, to make it the more perspicuous affirmative, should be averred, that is, an offer made of clear proofs.  
Of Negatives in the Law there are two kinds, as first, mere negations, of which we commonly say, Negativum nihil implicat: and there are also Propositions negative, which do imply an affirmative, and those we call Negative pregnants, which we do refuse in all issues of trials by jurors, except in some cases, where the necessity of the cause doth require the same.  
So moreover, Modi prioris and Modi simul, which Aristotle also handleth as Post-predicaments, are worthy consideration: For the better understanding whereof, note that Aristotle affirmeth that Prius quatuor modis dicitur.  
Primò, id quod secundum tempus est prius, id est, prius tempore: So the law of Nature preceded the law of Nations, and the law of Nations preceded the law of every peculiar people, and so the Common Law of this Land preceded the Statute Law, which as occasion was offered, in every King's reign had his original. So in the making of a Deed, there is writing, sealing, and delivery: the writing goeth before sealing, and the sealing before delivery.  
Secundò, aliquid est prius ordine Naturae. There are many things which are simul tempore, where nevertheless there is a Priority and Posteriority in Nature. As when Tenant for Life doth surrender to the Grauntee of the Reversion, not having attorned to him before, in respect of time the included Attornament and Surrender come together, and are wrought at one instant, and yet the Attornament is first in Nature, and precedeth the Surrender: For the Attornement employed doth first settle the Reversion in the Grauntee, before the Surrender can take place.  
So if Lessee for years and he in the reversion in Fee do join in a Feoffement to a stranger, it is first the surrender of Lessee for years, and after the Feoffement of him in the Reversion in Nature and operation in Law; and they both are yet performed in respect of time simul & semel.  
If a man by his last Will and Testament in the former part thereof, device Lands deviseable, holden in Socage to I.S. in Fee, and afterwards in the latter part of the same will, deviseth a rent out of the same land to Io: Not: in fee, and dieth, by the Devisors death, the whole Testament will take effect at one time But: the Law shall adjudge it first a devise of the rent, and after a devise of the land; for in course of nature he that granteth rend out of land, aught to be owner of the land, and so device the rent, and not first device away the land, and after device the rent; That were no good conformity.  
Tertiò, secundum ordinem Prius dicitur; This is priority according to conformity of order; So in every writ, men are by the rule of the Register in their writs to hold order in their Demands; For preposterous order is disorder, and destroyeth all; for as Bracton saith, 
Bract. 188.35 H. 6.13. b. Bract. 316. f. 400.  there aught to be ordinata dispositio, and this is Bonum ordinis, the good of order; Ordo est cujuslibet rei suo loco concinna digestio.  
Fourthly and lastly, aliquid dicitur prius honore, quod melius est & honorabilius est, id prius est, and this is called Prius dignitate, as a mesuage precedeth in dignity land arable, and land arable pasture; the whole is more than the parts, the husband precedeth the wife, 
3. H. 6.33. 4. H. 6.3.  and so must be placed in all Writs and plead.  
Aristotle according to the opinion of former Philosophers, having set down these four kinds of Priorities, addeth of his own invention a fift, Quae convertuntur secundum essendi consequentiam, & quod alteri quomodo libet causa est prius natura possit. But this seemeth to be but a species of Prius natura spoken of before.  
So also is it de modis simul, for it appeareth by that which hath been said, that quaedam are simul tempore, quorum generatio est in eodem tempore, neutrum enim eorum neque prius, neque posterius est tempore.  
Quaedam sunt simul natura, as are all Relativa and Correlativa, all those that are relatiuè opposita. Again, they are thirdly also simul natura, which are species ejusdem generis; But of this I will surcease, and speak only of some few things that remain, which further the knowledge of Definition and Division.  
For as much as Division is totius in parts distributio, it shall be necessary to consider the nature of the whole, totum est quod ex partibus constat. And some there are which have divided the consideration of the whole into these parts; There is totum universale, 
Coke lib. 11.50. a.  totum essentiale, totum integrale, totum in quantitate, totumin modo, totum in loco, totum in tempore.  
But for these latter four, since they do undergo nomen totius improperly, and are used to draw reasons in Topical inventions, and not useful to Divisions, I let them pass, and shall therefore retain only the usual consideration of the three former.  
Totum universale is that quoth in species subjectius dividi potest, as when a Rent is divided into a Rent-service, a rend Charge, and a rend Sack.  
An estate of Inheritance divided into an estate of Fee simple, and an estate in Tail so that Inheritance is totum universale.  
Totum essentiale is when the whole is divided into the matter and form, Sic itaque materia & forma hic induunt rationem partium; As Man is divided into these essential parts, the body and soul, and of this kind we have no great use in the Law.  
The third is totum integrale, whereof we have more frequent use, when the whole is divided into the integral parts, whereof it consisteth as a Manor into Demesnes and services; a Rectory is divided into Glebe and Tithes; a house into soil and structure as hath appeared before. The Division of totum universale in suas species is Logical or Metaphysical: The Division of totum essentiale in suas partes essentiales is Natural; The Division of totum integrale in suas parts is in manner Artificial or Mechanical; And this difference there is between totum essentiale, and totum integrale, ut si una pars essentialis desit, totum non potest dici mutilum sed planè abolitum: Et ut priores duae Divisiones sumuntur ex substantia; Ita haec Divisio totius integralis sumitur ex quantitate: And therefore totum integrale is twofold, the one I may call totum integrale continuum, and the other totum integrale discretum, even as quantity itself is divided.  
Totum continuum est perfectè dictum, Quia ex partibus substantialibus & quantis per se unitis constat; estque vel homogeneum, vel heterogeneum; homogeneum est quod ex partibus idem nomen cum toto habentibus constat, as all parts of water are water, all parts of bone are bone, all parts of flesh is flesh, every yard of a piece of cloth is cloth. 
1. R. 3. fo. 3.   
Heterogeneum est quod constate ex partibus diver si nominis à toto, ut corpus humanum constans ex capite, thorace, cord, pedibus etc. & ex his partibus quaedam sunt Principales, sine quibus totum non potest manner incolume, ita partes humani corporis constituuntur à medicis cerebrum, 
2 R. 3.2. b.  cor & epur: minùs Principales quae abesse possunt sine totius interitu, ut manus, pes, etc.  
Totum discretum est totum imperfectè dictum, & constat ex aggregatione partium, vel substantialium, vel accidentalium, ex qua aggregatione non oritur totum per se unum; ut in substantialibus, acervus lapidum, grex ovium, etc. And of these we have some few examples in the Law, as the Cart and Oxen or Horses drawing the same, may all be distrained, and the distress not excessive, because they all make but one total: 
8. H. 4.16. Brooke distr. 55.  And so in a Deodand may all be forfeit, because they make but one total, moving to the death. So likewise a Corporation may be called totum integrale discretum ob aggregatum, quod ex mult is personis aggregatis constat. 20. E. 4.3. Broo. distr. 89.12. H. 8.13. b.  
Totum discretum accidentale, sive ex partibus accidentalibus constans, est quod impropriè & planè accidentalitèr totum dicitur; & est cum 1, causatum ex suis causis dividitur; 2, cum subjectum per sua accidentia; 3. cum accidens per sua subjecta; 4, cum accidens per sua accidentia dividitur. And here I leave, for I shun to be over tedious or curious in these things, for that my endeavour is rather diligently to try the use, then curiously to inquire the Art.  
Because we have formerly both defined and divided by the causes, it shall be necessary to say something of them.  
There be four causes of every thing, the material, the formal, and the efficient, and fourthly, the final cause, whereof two are essential as it were, and enter into the composition, as the material and formal, and the two other are the external, the efficient, and the final cause.  
The material cause they have divided into three kinds, although improperly, yet for use sufficiently, 
Materialis causa.  as materia ex qua, materia in qua, and materia circa quam.  
Materia ex qua may be thus defined, materia est quae cum forma constitutit rem, & this regarded as well in things substantial, as accidental, and then hath it also two kinds, materia permanens, which remaineth in the things constituted, as an house made of stones, timber, earth, etc. A garment made of cloth, , linen or silk; A Potter's vessel made of earth, all which as substances do remain in the thing composed.  
Or materia transiens, which is changed in the mixture or composition, as meal and water are the material causes of bread, but transient and changed in the composition.  
In accidental things such as are most Titles or matters of the Law, there is the like composition of matter and form, as by example hereafter is many particular things will be made manifest, as in all your Inheritances or hereditaments, corporal compound.  
And of this kind of material cause, Materia ex qua, there is another Division; for it is either materia remota or propinqua, remote, as a garment of  cloth hath will too be the remote or mediate cause, and  cloth for the propinque and immediate cause.  
Materia in qua, and materia circa quam, are causes improper and seen in accidental things; as materia in qua est subjectum, and materia circa quam est objectum.  
Form or the formal cause is said to be causa unde formatum pendet, 
Formalis.  and is either substantial, as the soul of man, whereby he consisteth, is the form of man, for as Plato said Anima cujusque est quisque, and this cause is thus described, forma est quae dat esse rei, and it is also remota or propinqua.  
The accidental form insubstances is the outer shape and figure of things, which for want of the true knowledge of the inward, we be often compelled to use.  
The accidental form in accidents is Essentia, as forma Reip: est ordo & unio inter Magistratum & subditos certis legibus sancita, whereof result the sundry kinds of Common Wealths.  
There resteth the consideration of the efficient and final causes.  
Causa efficiens est, à qua primò incepit motus & operatio; of these efficient causes some do precede the work, and some do effect the work; Causes efficient which do precede the work. are impulsive causes; the first instigation which move the undertaking of the work: So Cicero pro Milone, Maxima illecebra peccandi impunitatis spes; A great impulsive cause of offence is the hope to escape unpunished.  
So Sallust maketh the immoderate desire of rule and vain glory to be oftentimes the impulsive cause of war, libidinem dominandi causam belli habent, & maximam gloriam in maximo imperio ponunt. These be internal impulsive causes; there are also external; so liberality and beneficence is a great external impulsive cause of benevolence; Qui liberalitate utuntur benevolentiam sibi conciliant: 
Cic. lib. 2. d● Finibus.  So truth speaking is sometimes an impulsive cause of hatred, flattery of friends, veritas odium parit, obsequium amicos.  
Causes that effect the work, are those that are active to perfore the work; Those that are agents in the work are, 1, the necessary or sole cause, 2, the sufficient cause, which also may be sole, but not of necessity required; 3, the coadjivant cause, and fourthly, the instrumental cause.  
Necessaria causa ea vocatur à qua ita procedit effectus, ut non possit posita causa non procedere effectus, nec ab alia causa talis effectus possit provenire.  
So God was the efficient cause, and sole cause in creating of the world; And so the Sun is the sole efficient necessary cause of the day by his light in our Hemispher effecting the same.  
The efficient cause which is called the sufficient is that cause which is able alone to produce the work; but it is not the sole and only cause to produce that effect, for that that effect may as well be produced by another cause as sufficient as the former. As fire is the cause of heat, and sufficient alone to produce heat; and yet heat doth not always proceed from the fire, but from the Sun, from exercise, and sundry other means, so that fire is not necessary and alone required to bring forth heat.  
Coadjuvant causes are those that work to the producing of the effect, but together with some other cause, which is more principal in the operation; So in the obtaining of a victory by battle, the General is not the sole cause, but there do concur the Captains, Centurions, Soldiers, and such like; as Cicero in his Oration pro Marcello, in societatem victoriae cum Caesare venisse Deuces, Centuriones, Milites. So Afranius the Poet speaketh of Wisdom, usus me genuit, Mater peperit Memoria.  
The instrumental causes are the instruments used in the work, Instrumentales causae (saith one) sunt organa per quae est efficax causa Principalis, as Books are the instrumental causes of learning & militum instrumenta sunt arma, to which may be adjoined that cause which they call causa sine qua non, as Medium in visione.  
Causes that follow the work, are called Conservant causes, Polybius yields this example, Duo sunt quibus omnis Resp: servatur, in hosts fortitudo & domi concordia. So in another example, Seneca, Melius beneficijs Imperium custoditur quam armis.  
And of all these efficient causes as touching the manenr of the working, some are causes mediate, or removed, and some are immediate and propinque.  
This may suffice briefly for the knowledge of the nature of the efficient cause, if we add a word of the accidental cause, namely, an accident that happeneth not intended, but casually intervenient, and yields further ance to the effect: Sic piscatio fuit causa fortuita, & per accidents, piscatoribus Milesiis, qurei tripodis inveniendi. And so Cicero lib. 3. de natura Deorum: Phaedro jasoni profuit hostis, 
Cic. l. 3. de natura Deo rum.  qui gladio quo eum petere volebat, vomicamejus apperuit, quam Medici sanare non poterant. And so we see that in the Law a casual chance is the cause of the death of man, although perpetrated by the act of another.  
There followeth the last and final cause, 
Finalis.  and it is that cause Cujus gratia efficiens agit, and it is the fruition of the work, and therefore finis est ipse usus rei, and oftentimes differeth not from the effect itself, revera, sed ratione finis. Finis, saith Aristotle, esT primus in intention, & ultimus in executione: The first thing intended, and the last thing effected.  
The power of the end or final cause is twofold, it is first impulsive to the work; secondly, directive to the means, and therefore it is often called Causa causarum.  
In respect of his impulsive power it may be one re with the essicient, impulsive, inward cause; and it is the same which directeth the means, and giveth name to the action, as Bracton speaketh; Intentio tua, & affectio tua nomen imponit operi tuo. And again, Tolle voluntatem, & omnis actus erit indifferens. And therefore in as much as the final cause directeth the means, Non faciamus malum, ut inde eveniat bonum.  
Cicero most excellently, lib. 2. de natura Deorum, expresseth notably the final causes of all things: Omnia aliorum sunt causa generata, ut fruges atque fructus quos terra gignit, animant ium causa; animantes autem hominum, ut Equus vehendi causa, Bos arandi, venandi & custodiendi Canis, ipse autem Homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum & imitandum. And again the same Author; 
1. Offic.  Homines hominum causa generati, ut ipsi inter se alij alijs prodesse possint. Likewise the same Author doth excellently express the end of government: Moderatori Reip. beata Civium vita proposita est, ut ea nimirum opibus firma, copijs locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit. Of one and the self same thing there may be many final causes, Vnde quidam sunt Principales & ultimi, & alij intermedij, qui quodam modo ad ultimum conducunt.  
Thus much may suffice in the consideration of the causes, and of these things that have been affirmed, The Student may be instructed sufficiently to undergo the first Logical Exercise, which is Tractatio simplicis Thematis, and exercise of wonderful use in the true obtaining of the knowledge 〈◊〉 the Law, and is able to furnish him with copy of matter for Argument in every Case, and upon every sudden occasion, and wherein those things which we have spoken of the causes may be abundantly exemplified.  
There resteth then nothing but to show the manner how it may be performed, and to set foth some examples in the Law of the same: But before I departed from this discourse of the causes, for the better explanation of that which hath been said touching the same, we will add some examples and instances drawn out of the Volumes of the Laws, and out of the Arguments of Cases debated, that thereby our Student may the better understand the use thereof.  
Therefore first of all touching that material cause, Ex qua res constituitur, we may observe in the Law, That in things corporal compound this kind of matter resulteth to be one with the integral parts; as the matter whereof an house is composed are these materials of Stone, Timber, Earth, Lime, and such like, whereof it is framed, and which are the integral parts of this whole.  
So a Manor which is Quiddam totum compositum corporale, consisteth of Demesnes and Services; 
A Manor.  and the Demesnes do contain, land, meadow, pasture, wood, etc. and the services do import not only the rent payable, but the corporal service and attendancy of the Tenants thereof.  
So a Monastery, site, house, 
Monastery. 38. E. 3.21. a Com. 168. b.  and also the lands & possessions belonging thereunto, is included in the general name Monastery, because those import the matter ex qua consistit.  
So the matter of a Park is land enclosed, 
5. E. 4.28. a. Ardun. 10. H. 7.6. a. 10 H. 7.30. a  and the Dear; for the Deer are held as parcel of the Park.  
Of corporal things the matter is also corporal and visible, and are subject to manual tradition and delivery; 
Rent.  as the matter of a Rent is a sum of money, or other corporal thing payable, reserved or granted, as Rent-Corne, and such like.  
The matter of Tithes are things annually produced by way of increase. 
Tithes.   
The matter of an Herriot or Mortuary is the best beast of the owner. 
Herriot.   
The matter of a Corporation consisteth in the bodies natural of the person or persons of which it is combined; 
Corporation.  
Vide 21. E. 4 56. a 63. a. 68 a.  who although they be framed into a politic consideration of perdurance and succession, yet is there in that consideration a respect also had of the body natural.  
Of things incorporeal considered by the Law, the matter or material cause is that which is put into the definition loco generis, in lieu of the general: for true it is that Genus in desinitione vel descriptione supplet vicem materiae, differentia vero formae.  
So we may say that the material of a Fee Simple, 
Fee.  and also of an Estate Taile, is an inheritance, because inheritance is the genus in the definition or description of both of them.  
The matter of Homage is a corporal service. 
Homage. Warranty.   
The matter of Warranty is a Covenant real, whereby the party which made it standeth bound to defend the thing warranted by him, or to yield in value. 
The Law.   
The matter of the Law of England generally taken, ex qua constituitur, is the law of Nature, the law of God, the general Customs of the Realm, Maxims drawn out of the Law of Nature, as the Principles of Reason, primarily or secondarily deduced, Constitutions and Acts of Parliament. Materia circa quam, on which it worketh, are lights & contentiones, casEs of debate daily coming into question touching persons, possessions, and injuries done by word or act.  
In a contract of Sale, 
Sale.  the material causes are the things sold, and the price agreed upon; the form is the manner of the contract, absolute or conditional, perpetual or temporary; the efficient causes, the parties contracting, the buyer and the seller; the end or final cause is to transfer property from the one to the other, to supply each others indigence: the matter ex qua, is either permament or transient, as hath been said: The consideration whereof yields in the Law this fruitful distinction: For if a man take wrongfully the material which was mine, and is permanent, not adding any other thing thereunto, than the form only by alteration thereof, such thing so newly form by an exterior form, notwithstanding still remaineth mine, (as some have held opinion) and may be seized again by me, and I may take it out of his possession as mine own: But they say, if he add some other matter thereunto, as of another man's leather doth make shoes or boots, or of my cloth maketh garments, adding to the accomplishment thereof of his own, he hath thereby altered the property, so that the first owner cannot seize the thing so composed, but is driven to his action to recover his remedy; howbeit by the judgement of the Court in a case of that nature depending, it hath been determined that the first owner might seize the same, notwithstanding such addition. But if the thing be transitory in his nature by the change, as if one take my corn or meal, and maketh thereof bread, I cannot in that case seize the bread, because as the Civil Law speaketh, Haec species facta ex materia aliena, in pristinam formam reduci non potest, ergo ci à quo est facta cedit.  
So some have said, that if a man take my barley, and make thereof malt, because it is changed into another nature the barley cannot be seized by me. But the sure Rule is, 
Regula.  That where the material wrongfully taken away could not at first before any alteration be seized, for that it could not be distinguished from other things of that kind, as corn, money, and such like; there those things cannot be scised by the former owner, because the property of those things cannot be distinguished. For if my money be wrongfully taken away, and he that taketh it do make plate thereof, or do convert my plate into money, I cannot seize the same, for that money is undistinguishable from other money of that coin.  
If a Butcher take wrongfully my Ox, and doth kill it, and bring it into the Market to be sold, I may not seize upon the flesh, for it cannot be known from others of that kind: 
12. H. 8.9. b. 10. a.  By'r if it be found hanging in the skin, where the mark may appear, I may seize the same, although when it was taken from me it had life, and now is dead.  
So if a man cut down my Tree, and square it into a beam of timber, I may seize the same, for he hath neither altered the nature thereof, nor added any thing but exterior form thereunto. But if he lay the beam of timber into the building of a house, I may not seize the same, for being so set it is become parcel of the house, and so in supposition of Law after a sort altered in his nature.  
Again, by consideration of the nature of the matter or material causes of things, the law doth frame sundry differences; as if I deliver unto one a piece of cloth of twenty yards together to keep, and restore it unto me when it shall be demanded, and the party will cut it into several yards and pieces of cloth, he hath not altered the matter thereof, nor diminished the quantity, and yet if he tender the same unto me I am not bound to accept thereof, but may recover my damages for that wrong so offered unto me; for although in matter and substance it be the same, yet it is altered in form, and impaired in the use.  
So if he take my piece of plate, 
18. E. 4.23. a. b. Wreck.  and break it into pieces, etc.  
Likewise the Statute made in the time of King Edward the first concerning Wrecks, hath ordained that if a Ship be wrecked, if any living thing therein escape alive, it shall not be adjudged; but that the Merchandise therein be viewed and preserved for the owner, if he come to challenge the same within a year and a day. But what if in such case the Merchandise be victual, as fresh fish; or fruit, as Oranges and such like, as will not last uncorrupt by the space of a year, if the Sheriff in such case should cell those goods within the year, and be ready to yield the money to the owner, hath he offended that law? Certainly no: for the consideration of the nature and matter of those things in such case causeth the said law to be interpreted contrary to the letter of the law: For the letter of the law commandeth a preservation, and in this case the Sheriff hath done contrary, 
Pl. Com. 465 466. a.  for he hath sold, and yet nevertheless hath justly executed that law.  
Thus you see that the consideration of the matter or material causes whereof the things controverted do consist, hath great use in the decision of law.  
Materia in qua is only subjectum accidentium, and therefore considerable in accidents only, which subsist in their proper subjects, as Knowledge in the Understanding; the Virtue's moral in the Will of man; health, strength, and agility in the Body: And as Materia in qua is said to be subjectum, so is Materia circa quam, objectum, both which are somewhat improperly attributed to the material cause, and are both so evident as I pass them over.  
In consideration of a Monastery, 
Monastery.  the matter in qua, or subject of that Title, is the persons whereof that Corporation consisteth; as the Abbot and his Monks, that is, his Covent; The Prior and his Cofreers'; The matter circa quam is comprised in their possessions.  
In an Arbitrement (of which I shall speak more hereafter) the matter in qua are the parties at strife, 
Arbitrement.  circa quam the thing whereof the controversy riseth, real or personal: The material cause ex qua is most eminent, and most eminent to be found in things corporeal, having of themselves substance; and in things incorporate, that which is loco gener is in descriptione, in both which as there is genus propinquum, and genus remotum, so is there materia remota, & materia propinqua.  
As a Fine whereby lands or hereditaments are conveyed, is said to be a concord, 
Fine.  for the entry thereof is, Est concordia talis; but this is genus remotum, or materia remota: for an Arbitrement is also a Concord, a Contract is a Concord: but to say it is a concord of Record, is to add genus propinquum. And thus much touching the material cause.  
As touching the formal cause, 
The formal cause exemplified.  it is either as hath been said, substantial or accidental: The formal substantial cause in things of life, is that which is the fountain of life and motion: In things which are without life, that are simple and uncompound; it limiteth their bounds, and is the cause of their being: In things that are compound it is the convenient knitting and union of the parts. The formal cause entereth the definition or description loco differentiae, bringing and adding particularity unto the general, until it doth fulfil a perfect definition or description, and therefore as one saith well, dicitur forma à formando: Differentia verò quia differre facit. The form is said to be Modus quidam materiae, quo sibi contingat, ut hujus vel illius specieie capiat nomen: And forma dat esse rei, and that esse is nothing else but existentia formae in materia, eaque plus affert ad essentiam rei quàm materia, est enim ipsamet essentia aut certè praecipua pars essentiae.  
In the Commentaries of Mr. Plowden in the Lord Zouches case, 
Claim.  a claim is thus described; A Claim is a Challenge by a man made of the property or ownership of a thing which he hath not in possession, but is detained from him, where the genus is Challenge, but to express what manner of Challenge, there is added this difference, namely, of the property and ownership of a thing detained, which is loco formae: So three of the causes are comprehended in that definition or descritpion: The material cause de qua, viz. a Challenge, circaquam, of things detained: The formal cause the property of ownership, the efficient cause by a man wronged, only there wanteth the final cause which is twofold, 1, to manifest that property, 2, to reduce the same property back again to him for whom the claim is made.  
In 28. 
Conned. of Oblige.  H. 8.17. a. Dyer. The Condition of an Obligation is thus described: The Condition of an Obligation is an assent of the obligee in defeasance of an obligation made for the advantage of the obligor, where the matter thereof is an assent, the form a defeasance, the efficient cause the obligor and obligee, the sinal cause the advantage of the Obligor.  
A Contract is an agreement between parties concerning goods or lands for money or other recompense, 
Contract. Dr. Stu. c. 24. fo. 103. a.  where the general matter ex qua is the agreement, which is clriesly respected in contracts: the matter circa quam, 
Come Browning & Beston. 141. a.  concerning goods or lands: the form or difference, for money or other recompense, for that maketh it a contract; for the want of recompense causeth it to be but nudum pactum, unde non oritur actio. The causes efficient, 
Com. 141.  the parties contracting; The final cause Bracton doth notably express, 
Bract. lib. 3.8.2. f. 100  Inventae sunt hujusmodi stipulationes & obligationes ad hoc, ut unusquisque habeat, & sibi acquirat quod suum interest.  
In the Reports of my Lord Dyer, 16. El. 336. 
Consideration  b. n. 34. a. A Consideration is thus described; A Consideration is a cause or occasion meritorious requiring mutual recompense in fact or in Law: where the matter is an occasion meritorious, the form mutual recompense, etc. not to trouble ourselves over long in this kind.  
Secondly, in consideration of the formal cause there is to be observed, That when division or distribution is made ex causis, those divisions which doc proceed of the formal cause are most essential, whereof I shall show some few instances or examples.  
Commons being divided according to their material causes, are either Commons of pasture, 
Commons.  Commons Estovers, Common of Turbary, etc. But being divided according to their formal causes; all Commons are either Appendent, Appurtenant, or in gross.  
If you distribute Conditions according to their material causes, 
Conditions.  or things whereof they are, than we say they are conditions real, which are annexed to the estates; There are also conditions personal, annexed to personal contracts, as to Obligations of all kinds, promises, covenants, and other contracts: But being divided according to their form, There we may say, that all conditions are either possible or impossible: and impossible conditions are void in Law: All possible conditions are either lawful or unlawful; and unlawful conditions do make the contract also void, whereas impossible conditions are only void themselves, but the contract standeth single: all lawful conditions are either precedent or subsequent, and all those conditions which are annexed to estates, are either by way of increase of estates, or by way of defeasance of estates.  
All considerations are either executed with a recompense past, 
Consider.  or else executory with a recompense after to be made and performed; And this Division is ex causa formali.  
In as much as the form giveth the essence, it was said of Ulpian the Roman Lawyer, out of the rules of Logic, That mutata forma propè interimitur substantiarei: For so in the former examples we see, that if a man take my Barley and make Malt thereof, it cannot be seized by the former Owner; and yet neither matter, quantity nor outward form is lost, but it is become a thing of another nature and use, because the inward form (to speak as Moral Philosophers) whereof dependeth the use, is changed; for Moral Philosophy doth not so curiously observe the natural causes as Natural Philosophy; but according as to the information of manners: So if a man of any piece of cloth which he had to keep containing 20. yards in one whole piece, will cut the same into 20. several yards and pieces; The matter nor the quantity is not changed, and yet if he will restore the same pieces, it is not lawful restitution, neither am I bound to receive it.  
If a man possessed of 20. packs of Wool, by his last will and Testament device and bequeath all the said Wool unto 1. Style, and after the Testator converteth the same wool into cloth and dieth possessed of the same cloth. 1: Style the Devisee of the Wool shall not have by Law the cloth made of that Wool, for that the form of the Wool is changed, notwithstanding the matter doth remain, and it is turned to a thing of another nature; and the making of the said Wool into cloth by the Testator himself is a countermand of the said last will and Testament. So it is also of things incident, as if the principal thing whereunto another thing is incident, appendent or belonging, be changed in nature, the incident is lost and altered: As if a man have a dwelling house whereunto there is a Common of Estovers belonging (which is wood for firing to be burnt in that house) if this house by casualty of fire or tempest be burned or blown down, or taken down, and a new be built in another place near, or in another form, the Common of Estovers is lost, and not to be used in this new house, for this is not the former house, but another house unto which the said Estovers cannot belong; but if the said first house were not wholly pulled down but repaired, or if another new house be built upon the same foundation, and in the same form with the former; The Common of Estovers remaineth with the new house, for that in judgement of Law is the same house: and such building being upon the former foundation is but a reparation.  
But here a difference is to be observed, that if the thing incident do not belong to the principal thing, as it is in nature a special thing, but in the general; then although the said principal thing be altered in specie, the general remaining, the thing incident shall remain to such general: As if a man have a water-corn-mill, unto the which he hath a Mill-leat or watercourse belonging coming through the land of another man unto the said Mill. Now if he change the nature of the said Corne-mill, unto a fulling-mill, or è converso, wherein both form and final cause, namely the use is altered; it hath been much disputed in our time, whether the said watercourse did lawfully belong unto the said fulling-mill, as it did when it was a Corne-mill? for the owner of the land where through the said stream did run, and diverted the said watercourse, pretending that he might lawfully do the same, for that the owner of the Mill had changed the nature of the Mill; and the prescription to have the said watercourse is thereby altered: But it was adjudged that the said water course did still belong and remain, and so aught unto the fulling-mill, as it had formerly done unto the Corne-mill, for that it did not belong unto the Corne-mill, as specially unto a Corne-mill, but it did belong unto it generally as unto a mill going or driven with water, and not otherwise.  
And thus much may suffice for the consideration of the formal cause, as it is the essential and substantial cause.  
The Law also considereth accidental forms, for the Law prescribeth a form in all abjurations; so likewise the Law prescribeth a form how homage shall be made by the Tenant unto the Lord: And so likewise of Fealty, both which Littleton doth express: The Law prescribeth the form how Battle in a writ of right, and in an Appeal shall be waged and performed: So likewise the Ecclesiastical Laws prescribe forms of Consecrations of Churches, Chappells, etc. of Parsons, Orders, Institutions, Inductions, and such like.  
All Laws do retain some formalities which may not be altered, as in the Common Laws of this Realm, we have our forms of Writs, Plead, Entries of judgements, and sundry other forms and ceremonies ordained, which without great and urgent causes cannot be altered.  
These outward forms are nothing else, as one describeth, then modi quidam rebus agendis praescripti, or as another describeth, Ordinatae series rem ad substantiam deducentes: And concerning these outward forms and solemnities, these rules are observed and prescribed; 1, formae praefinitae omissio reddit actum invallidum: Procurator, Cod: de Procuratore. Le: diligenter in Princip: ff. de mandatis. And again, Qui formam praetermittit jam aliud facere videtur: And thus much concerning the formal cause.  
As touching the efficient cause; 
The efficient cause exemplified.  the impulsive inward causes of all crimes are commonly these, spes lucri, impunitatis, vindictae, malitiae, odij, etc. The outward, the accessary before the fact, which is the abettor and instigator thereunto.  
The sufficient and necessary cause of a Cortract is casent of parties, 
Contract.  for in Contracts the consent is chief to be regarded, as hath been said.  
And in Marriage Consensus, 
Marriage.  & non Concubitus matrimonium facit: C: Nutias, de Regulis juris. And as Bracton, lib. 1. ca 5. ff. 7. allegeth, fit per mutuam utriusque voluntatem.  
In the work there are both principal and coadjuvant causes: 
Appropriaton.  In an Appropriation of a Church the efficient causes are, The Ordinary, the Patron, and the King, and they aught to agreed in the act, & sunt Actores hujus fabulae: The Ordinary, inferior or supreme, for he is the principal Agent therein, because he hath the spiritual jurisdiction; And the Act of the Appropriation is a thing spiritual: And the Ordinary saith, 
Com. 498.  appropriamus, consolidamus, & unimus, as the principal Actor in the cause: The Ordinary may be termed therefore the principal efficient cause, and the other the coadjuvant cause. These the Pope in ancient times as supreme Ordinary then permitted, used to do; and these as supreme Ordinary may the King do, but always with the consent of the Patron, who is a coadjuvant efficient cause: the formal cause is the consolidation of the Incumbency and Patronage into one person capable of spiritual charge: and the final cause to make a perpetual Incumbency.  
The efficient causes of an Acts of Parliament, 
Act of Parliament.  are the assent of the three Estates; namely, first of the King; secondly, of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal; and thirdly, of the Commons; and each without the other cannot perfect this work; and yet until the Royal assent it is but as an Embryo in ventre matris, 4. H. 7.9. b. Com. 79. a. and by the Royal Assent coming last, it taketh life and vigour.  
Writing, sealing, and delivery, 
Deed. Com. 108. b. 22. H. 6.45. b 1. H. 6.4. b. 2. E. 4.3. b.  are the efficient causes of a Deed, all must concur, and each without other is fruitless; but the complemental act which cometh last of all is the delivery, and thereby the Deed receiveth his perfection.  
If diverse come together to do a murder, 
Murder.  although one alone do give the wound whereby death ensueth, yet are they all which are present and consenting to the act, Principals and efficient causes of this murder; he that striketh is the principal agent, and the rest coadjuvant: and yet although one gave the stroke, yet shall it be adjudged in law the stroke of every of them, given by him which gave it, as for himself, and given of the others by him as their minister and instrument, and yet all equal in degree as principals, and not accessaries: 
Com. 98. a.  and yet as you see not equal in degree as efficient causes.  
If a man and a woman be present, 
Ravishment.  with purpose that the man shall by violence carnally know the body of another woman there also present, against her will, and the man doth the fact in the presence of the other woman, she that was so present, as well as the man, shall be a Principal Ravisher; the one, viz. the man, the cause agent, and the other coadjuvant: and so one woman may be a principal to the ravishment of another.  
Livery and seisin is the instrumental efficient cause of the conveyance of a Freehold estate in land, 
Casual.  and sufficient alone to perform the same, and yet is it not the sole cause, for it may be conveyed by other means, as by fine, bargain and sale, by devise, and otherwise.  
There is also an efficient cause casual: 
Casual.  As if a man intent to do an unlawful act, and in doing thereof another hurt ensueth, not intended, but by chance, clean beyond all expectation or desire, yet shall he be said the author of that act not intended, so happening by chance, that did the first act.  
This may suffice to exemplify the cause efficient: 
The final cause exemplified.  There resteth the final cause, of the which I will show some examples, as I have done in the rest. Many arguments are drawn from the final cause, and of much use in the law.  
The end and final cause of the law generally taken, as Bracton well affirmeth, is this, Finis legis est ut sopiantur jurgia, & vitia propulsentur, & ut in regno conservetur pax & justitia. Bracton li. 2. cap. 2.  
The final cause of an action is, as likewise the same Bracton affirmeth,  non liceat unicuique se sine judicio vindicare, & quod sibi ablatum est per judicem reposcat.  
The final cause why also the same aught to be by writ, is, Quòd sine brevi non debet quis experire in judicio, nec mutari potest petentis intentio vel modus petendi. 
Brac. 102. a. Le. de Procura. Attorney.   
The end why Attorneyes are permitted in Court, or a man to answer by Bailie in an Assize, or to pursue or defend by Guardian, is,  qui rebus suis superesse vel nolunt vel non possunt, per alios possint vel agere vel convenire.  
The final cause why an Attorney is required to a Grant, is that the Tenant may know to whom he aught to be attendant to pay his rent, 
31. H. 8. b Attornem. 60 2. E. 6. d. Att. 45.  or to do his service, so that where there is no attendancy required, there needeth no attornement.  
The final scope and end of the Averment of a Pleading, 
Averment.  is to reduce matter traversable to a clear and certain issue: and therefore if the matter pleadable be not answerable or issuable, there needeth no Averment. 36. H. 6.17. b.  
The final cause why Wardship was ordained, 
Wardship.  is,  qui per aetatem se ipsos defendere nequeant, ab aliis defendantur. §. Est autem. Institu. de tutela. Agreeably saith Bracton, Quosdam oportet esse sub tutela & cura aliorum; eò quòd se ipsos regere non norunt.  
The end why writings were made between men in their contracts, 
Bract. lib. 2. cap. 16. b. Le. 4. ff. de pignatoribus. Livery.  was as the same Bracton allegeth, Fiunt aliquando donationes in scriptis, sicut in chartis ob perpetuam memoriam, propter brevem hominum vitam, & ut facilius probari possit donatio.  
So the cause why Livery and Seisin was ordained in the Law, and first invented, was because it is a thing notorious, that the people might take knowledge of the passing of estate of most account, and be the more able to try the same when they should happen to be impanneled on a jury for that purpose.  
It would be over tedious to heap up more examples, which almost are evident in every Title concerning this matter.  
As we do consider the end of things at the Common Law, so also in Statute Laws the end and scope that the makers of such Laws aimed at, is of special regard in the interpretation of those Laws, and often considered by the judges, unto whom power of interpretation and exposition of those Laws is given; as upon perusal of sundry cases grounded upon Statute learning will most evidently appear.  
It often happeneth that the final causes of things are more than one, and sometimes many, and some of them subaltern each to other, and sometimes distinct, whereof ensueth this exception to the general rule, Sublata causa tollitur effectus: For if there be diverse final causes, although the one be taken away, yet the effect remaineth, if one of the causes do remain: As for example, The final causes of marriage are three, Generatio Prolis, Conservatio Domus, Solatio Vitae: and although hope of issue be taken away, 
Marriage.  yet the marriage subsisteth firm.  
The final causes of Arbitriments and Awards are alleged principally to be two; first, 
Arbitrament 19 H. 6.37. b Nedham. 8. E. 4.10. a Laken. 8. E. 4.12. a. Yeluerton.  every Arbitrament is ordained to make a final determination, and to appease the variances, strifes, and debates between the parties reforred unto them.  
Secondly, every Arbitrament is ordained to reduce that which was uncertain, 
6. H. 4.6. a. Hanford. 4. H. 9.17. b. Weston. 10. H. 7.4. a. Aid. 17. E. 3.47. a 21. H. 6.37. b  by the diverse allegations of the parties, to certainty: and every of these aught to concur in every good award.  
So likewise our Books do generally affirm, That in Actions where Aid is grantable to the Tenant or Defendant, that the same is done for two causes; the one for feebleness of estate of him that prayeth Aid; secondly, for the loss or detriment that may come to him of whom the Aid is prayed.  
So the final causes why aid is granted of the King upon prayer thereof, are these, 
2. H. 7.8. a. 4. H. 6.18. b. 9 H. 6.2. a. 3. 22. E. 4.21. a  Quisque auxilium petit à Rege, oportes quod sit per cartam Regis, de dono aut concessione rei petitae, juxta effectum Statuti de B●●amis. Secundò, Vel aliter propter salvationem reversionis Regis, vel alicujus tituli sui, Tertiò, Vel aliter propter debilitatem status sui. Quartò, Vel ubi Rex habere possit detrimentum: And any of these suffice to grant the Aid. 
Confirmation   
The final causes wherefore a confirmation is behooufull, are set out by Bracton to be these: Quando donatio sit tantum bona pro tempore, 
Bract. l. 2. fol. 58.  & potest confirmari ab haeredibus, vel alijs qui jus postea habent. Secundo, Vel quando nunquam absolutè fuit status bonus, sed talis qui potuit evacuari. Tertiò, Vel cum quis rem alienam dederit, confirmatio requirenda fuit veri Possessoris seu Domini.  
There are three final causes of a Warranty of lands, 
Warranty.  etc. First, Vourcher to recover in value, when the Tenant of the Land is impleaded by a stranger: secondly, Rebutter, to repress the party and his heirs that made the Warranty, if they should chance to sue: and the third, Warrantia Chartae, by the judgement; in which Writ the lands shall be bound to a Recovery in value, pro loco & tempore.  
As it was said at the beginning, that the end is always the first thing in intention, and the last in execution, so are there things destinated to their end, and once being applied thereunto do altar their nature and become of another consideration: As in a former proposed example; If a man cut down my Timber Tree, and square it of purpose to make a beam for a house, I that am the true owner may seize the same, notwithstanding it be framed for the building. But if it be laid in the building, it may not be seized by the owner, although the building be not perfected: for now it becometh parcel of the house or building, as hath appeared in the former example. But if a man prepare all materials for building upon his land, and is ready to build therewith, but dyeth before it be erected, those materials shall go unto the Executor or Administrator, and not unto the Heir, who should have had them had they been laid in the building, because they were destinata tantum, quae pro factis non habentur.  
The final cause in all humane actions is of singular regard, for that all things attempted by men have their end; and the utility of the thing is measured by the end thereof; wherefore it is said well by one, Vtile ex fine colligimus; quicquid enim utile est, id alicujus rei consequendae causa utile oportet esse. In laude etiam & vituperatione finem respicimus, cum mult is in rebus non tam referat quid facias, quam ob causam facias, ita ut factum ex fine laudetur vel vituperetur, & homo rectè dicitur potissimam causarum omnium esse finem: And whereof we say vulgarly, Exitus acta probat, finis non pugna coronat. And many times the name and denomination of a thing is drawn from the final cause; 
Fine.  as a Fine used for the assurance of land, dicitur finis, quia finem litibus imponit.  
Sometimes the Laws regard the beginning of anact, Origo rerum attendenda est; sometimes the media or means to attaining it; and sometimes the end for which it is achieved: To enter into discourse whereof in this place would be impertinent: and therefore by way of Law-examples thus much to have said of the causes shall suffice.  
And thus much touching the reasons drawn from sundry parts of the Art of Logic, proving the necessity, or at lest the utility thereof in the studies of the Laws of this Realm. Now resteth that we propound some places out of the books of our Reports of our Common Law decisions and determinations of Cases, where the use of Logic hath either been required or admitted and practised. And although this be evident in the most notable arguments at large in the books of the Law, where sundry reasons drawn from Logical invention and Topicke places do abundantly appear to every one which will or can observe the same; yet in this place I will produce those instances wherein the same are either named and expressed, or admitted and apparently practised.  
Where it is discoursed in the Reports of Sir Edward Coke, which Acts of Parliament are general, which are special; I find observed these words, Statuta generalia, & generale dicitur à genere, speciale dicitur à specie; And which are genus, species, and individuum; know ye that Spiritualty is genus, a Bishopric or Deanary, etc. are species, and the Bishopric of Norwich, the Deanary of Norwich, etc. are individua; sic dicta, quia in parts dividi nequeant: And out of that deduceth he to your understanding what Acts of Parliament are general, and which are special. So there you see two of the most eminent Predicables remembered, Genus & Species, and unto them annexed the Individuum, whereof the Species is affirmed.  
In 11. H. 7.23. a. 
Debt per Obligat.  An Action of debt was brought upon an obligation, where the obligation was endorsed, upon this condition, that if the defendant did make such estate to the plaintiff of certain lands before such a Feast, as the counsel of the plaintiff should advice, than the Obligation should be void, the defendant pleaded, quod consilium querentis, non dedit ei advisamentum, before the said Feast; now whether this plea is sufficient or not, or whether he should say, nullum consilium dedit advisamentum, or that consilium nullum dedit advisamentum; for it seemed that those words consilium non dedit advisamentum, were not general enough, of which opinion there was Bryan; so that admit that the plaintiff had four men of his counsel, and two of them gave counsel, and two of them not; here consilium non dedit advisamentum is true, eò quod duo non dederunt, but that nullum consilium dedit advisamentum, is false apparently, In that case when two of them had given their advice; where he showeth that universalis negativa, and particularis negativa may stand together, for proof whereof he citeth the Sophister's verse, Prae contradic, prae contrar, prae postque subalter:  
Accidents may be considered in abstracto, as they are without subject, 
Coke lib. 10. fo. 31.  and in their own nature of themselves; And also they may be considered in concreto, as they reside and subsist in their proper subject, and these are Logical terms, and yet used in the Law.  
Although the Common Lawyers of this Realm using a continued speech, & non concisis argumentis, yet do they observe very often the forms of Arguments used in the Schools, as Sillogismes, Enthimemes, Inductions, Examples, Sorites, Dilemata, etc. as may be proved by sundry instances: And first of Sillogismes.  
In Shellies' case the third point or question of the case on the part of the plaintiff, was reduced by them that argued of that side into a syllogism thus;  
That which originally vested in the heir and was not in the Ancestor vested in the heir by purchase,  
But the use (spoken of in that case) vested in Richard Shelly (who was brother and heir and was never vested in Edward Shelly the Ancestor,  
Ergo,  
The use vested in Richard Shelly by purchase.  
A man brought an action of trespass against the Executors of his Ancestors, 
20. H. 7. b.  for taking up and carrying away of a Furnace which was fixed and annexed to the Freehold with mortar, and it was held by three of the judges, Read, Fisher, and Kingsmill, that the Action would lie, and that the taking away thereof was wrongful, and their reason is there by the Reporter reduced to a syllogism; in this manner:  
Those things which cannot be forfeited by Outlawry in a personal Action, 
Major.  nor be attached in an Assize, nor distreyned for rent, those things the Executor cannot have,  
But a Furnace fixed, 
Mivor.  a table fixed in the ground with posts, or a pale set in the ground, or bedstead of timber fixed to the ground, doors or windows, or such like fixed to the ground or freehold, cannot be forfeited, nor attached, nor distreyned;  
Ergo,  
The Executors shall not have such things. 
Con:   
Many reasons are proposed in the case of the Postnatis, and Arguments framed and composed Sillogistically in Calvins case, as thus;  
Every one that is an Alien by birth, may be or might have been an enemy by accident, but Calvin could never have been at any time an enemy by any accident, ergo, he cannot be an Alien by birth.  
Whosoever are borne under one natural legiance, due by the law of nature to one Sovereign, are natural borne subjects, but Calvin was borne under one natural legiance, and obedience due by the law of Nature to one Sovereign, Ergo, He is a natural borne subject.  
Whosoever is borne under the King's power and protection is no Alien; but Calvin was borne under the King's power and protection, Ergo;  
Every stranger borne must at the time of his birth be amicus, or inimicus, but Calvin at his birth could not be inimicus, because he was subditus (and amicus properly he cannot be called, for that is proper to an Alien friend that is in league; So Scotia where he was borne cannot properly be called solum amici, Ergo,  
Calvin is no Stranger borne.  
Whatsoever is due by the law of Nature cannot be altered; but legiance and obedience of the subject to the Sovereign is due by the law of nature, ergo, it cannot be altered.  
Whosoever at his birth cannot be an Alien to the King of England cannot be an Alien to any of his Subjects of England: But Calvin at his birth could not be an Alien to the King of England, Ergo, He could be no Alien to any of the subjects of England. Coke li. 7.24. b. 25. a.  
And thus much may suffice for example only to point out the continual and frequent use of Sillogisticall dispure in our plead and Law-Arguments.  
I will next proceed to treat of the choice and election of Propositions and Principles; and likewise to exemplify the same by sundry examples out of the books of the Common Law, whereby our Student may be the better furnished and adapted with matter fit for Argumentation.   

Methodus studendi.  
ARistotle in the first book of his Topickes, expressing the means whereby in every faculty or science intellectual resting upon discourse of reason, men might abound in matter apt for argumentation, and might be furnished with copy of reason fit for the proof or disproof of things called into debate, in such the sciences by them professed, expresseth a fourfold observation.  

1. 
Arist. Top. li. 1. cap 12, 13, 14.  Quarum una (as he saith) est in propositionibus eligendis.  
2 Alteza, in distinguendo quot modis quicquid dicatur.  
3 Tertia, in differentijs inveniendis.  
4 Quarta, in similitudinis cognition & scientia.   
All which are notable instruments of knowledge, greatly profitable, yea necessary for the obtaining of all such sciences as do depend upon reason: and so consequently much available to to be observed in the study of the Laws of this Land, which are grounded upon the depth of reason, and invested oftentimes by the name of reason in our Reported Cases, and ruled Authorities of the same. 11. H. 7.24. b. 13. H. 7.23. b. Com. Colth. 270. b. Com. Brown. 140. b. 27. H. 8.10. a. Montague.  
Of which four principles purposing (for direction of study) to say somewhat in order as they are afore proposed, it is to be considered, that the first of them being propositionum electio, containeth the election, choice, observation, and collection of all received principles, propositions, sentences, assertions, axioms, and reasons, importing either certainty of truth, or likelihood of probability. Wherein first Aristotle giveth precepts to collect them, & then after giveth counsel so to digest them, as that they may at all times be ready for our use: Wherhfore hereof intending an ample discourse, it shall be requisite to follow the ordinary and best method by definition, division, and the due speculation of their causes, whereby may be manifested what they are, of how many kinds they are, the diverse manner of collection of them; and lastly, the end, scope, and use whereunto they tend, & the profit ensuing by observation of them.  
That first therefore the names by which in our Law they have usually been called might be made manifest before their nature be discovered; (primò enim de nomine conveniat) it may with little labour easily appear, that sundry are the titles or names given in the Volumes of Reports, and other Writings of the Law unto such propositions, as do remain as reasons of resolved cases.  
Sometimes they have been called grounds; 
Grounds.  So in the 30. H. 8.44. Dyer n. 30. it is said, est une altar ground in tenure in Chief. s. I'll do't estè immediate del Roy; et il convient commencer, et prend son original creation per le Roy mesme, et per nul de ses subjects. So likewise speaks Reed. 5. Hen. 7.23. 
Vide 12. H. 7.13 a. Davers. Com. 121. b. Stamford. Maxims.  b. Est bone Ground in Trespass, discontinuance verse unest discontinuance verse touts, with infinite such other.  
Sometimes they have been called Maxims, for so saith Fortescue in the 34. Hen. 6.33. a. Est un Maxime en nostre Ley, Queen in chescun action personal, le Nonsute del un sera le Nonsute de ambideux, fore prize in tiels cases que sont except per statute.  
Likewise saith Knightley, 29. Hen. 8.38. a. Dyer numero 51. Est une Maxim, Que un action sera touts faits conceive ou le plus meliour trial, et notice del fait poit este conus; et specialment lou de tort est personal, with diverse such like.  
Sometimes they are called Principles, 
Principles.  for so in the 8. Hen. 7.4. a. it is said, that it is un Common Principle, que Terre (s. Estate de frank tenant) ne passans Livery de seisin.  
Likewise saith: Sanders in the Com. Colthurets Case, 28. b. Il ad este tenus come Principle, 
Vide Com. 345. a.  Que quand un fait Livery de seisin que son Livery sera pris plus fort vers luy.  
Sometimes they have been called Eruditions. 
Eruditions. Vide 14. H. 8 28. a. Pollard 24. H. 8.40. Dyer. nu. 66.  In such sort saith Keble, in 11. Hen 7.15. a. Ceo ad este un erudition, Que le partie navera Capias ad satisfaciendum, mes ou Capias gist in l'original. And some in 29. Hen. 8.40. a. Dyer numero 66. saith justices Il est une Common Erudition, 
3. E. 4.7. a. Lit. Vide 33. H. 6.54. a. 44. E. 3.34. b. Laws pofitive.  Que in cel County lou le tort commence, l'action sera porte.  
Moreover, sometimes for their firmness they have been called Laws Positive, for so speaketh Belknap, 2. Rich. 2. Fitzh. Account 45. Il est ley positive, Que home navera damages in breve d'accompt.  
Sometimes they are invested by the title of Law itself; 
Laws.  for in such manner it is said, Tempore Ed. 1. Fitzh. Grant. 41. Lex est, cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, concedere videtur, & id sine quo res esse non potuit. And so Bracton saith, 9 Hen. 6.59. b. jay prise pur ley, Que si home plede un plec & preigne un protestation; et puis son plea est trove encounter luy, 
Vide 9 H. 4.59. b. Paston.  il naver unque advantage de son protestation. Of which manner speech there are manifold examples.  
So that be they named Grounds, Maxims, Principles, Eruditions, Laws Positive, Laws, Rules or Propositions, or by whatsoever other name they be called, let us now seek the nature of them by their Definitions.  
Paulus the ancient Roman Lawyer thus defines a Principle or Rule of Law: 
Lively 1. F. de Reg. juris.  Regula juris, rem quae est, breviter enarrat, etc.  
If we do respect the original thereof together with the effect it yields; 
Com. Colth. 27.  Morgan in the Commentaries of Plawden, thus defineth it: A maxim is the foundation of Law, and the conclusion of reason: for reason is the efficient cause thereof, and Law is the effect that floweth therefrom.  
Such of the Civilians as in the description of a rule of Law, do only respect the manner of the collecting of them from particular cases or circumstances, do thus affirm; 
Prateus de Reg. juris. lib. 6. joach. Hopp. de juris arte. 371. a.  Regula juris est multorum specialium per generalem conclusionem brevis comprehensio. Or as joachimus Hopperus in his first book De juris arte, though disagreeing in words, yet one in sense with the form; Regulae juris sunt quaedam conjectiones tantum, & breviaria ex pluribus speciebus in unum per commune aliquod collecta. Another of them, in this manner; 
Sim. Shared. Lexic. juris Regul.  Regula est sententia generalis, quae ex plurium legum ment à jurisconsultis notata atque animadversa, paucis verbis summam carum consentionem & tanquam harmoniam complectitur.  
Matth. Gribaldus in his first book de ratione studij, 
Matth. Gribald. l. 1. c. 7. de ratione studij juris.  cap. 7. saith, Regulae juris nihil aliud sunt quam breves & compendiosae sententiae, ex pervagatis definitionibus perstrictae, quo & minori labore discantur, & saciliùs diutiusque memoriâ teneantur.  
But binding ourselves to no prescript rules of Art, for the better understanding of the same, we may describe a rule or ground of Law thus:  
A Rule or Principle of the Law of England, 
Definition.  is a Conclusion either of the Law of Nature, or derived from some general custom used within the Realm, containing in a short sum the reason and direction of many particular and special occurrences.   

Notes collected out of Authors.  
REgula juris est plurium compendiosa narratio, 
Paulus lib. ff. de reg. juris.  & quasi causae conjectio.  
Nec absimile est quod Grammatici dicunt, eam esse multorum similium collectionem.  
In summa autem est, 
Ant. Masae de exercitio jurispr. lib. 1.  ac si quis, praedictis cum verbis Archid. dist. 3. & Reg. conjunctis, ita diceret, Quod Regula sit compendiosa definitio; seu cum Quintiliano, Vniversale vel perpetuale praeceptum diversarum rerum, quasi sub unâ eademque causâ cadentium universalitatem complectens.  
Est Regula nihil aliud quàm plurium rerum & specierum in unam quasi summam conjectio. 
joach. Hopp. de juris arte. l. 2. fo. 469. a.   
As touching the Division thereof, we shall better observe how many principles and grounds there be by the due consideration of their causes from whence they spring.  
All causes of every thing are either internal or external.  
Internal are, the causes Material, or Formal.  
Externall are, the causes Efficient and Final.  

De Causis.  
Non solum ea quae insita sunt causae dicuntur, 
Arist. 11. Met. c. 4. To. 23.  sed etiam ea quae extrinsecus sumuntur, ut id quod motum affert & efficiens est.  
Causarum quatuor sunt genera. 
Arist. l. 2. Dem. c. 11. To. 11.   
Vnum est forma atque essentia rei.  
Alterum est in quo inest necessitudo non absoluta, sed ex adjunctione; si alia quaedam sint, haec esse necesse est.  
Tertium genus est id in quo inest rei efficiendae vis primaria.  
Quartum est finis cujus causa aliquid fit.  
Nam ad interrogationem factam per verba, 
Ant. Masae de exercitio jurisperitorum l. 1. p. 38. b.  propter quid sit aliquid, nihil aliud unquam respondetur, quam aliqua ex dictis quatuor causis: Inter quas tamen, finis est potissima, & quasi aliarum causa: Materia enim non esset causa, nisi haberet formam; & forma itidem nisi ab agente introduceretur; Agens quoque non ageret nisi moveretur à fine; finis autem ipse immobilis permanet: Est ergo primum movens, & prima causa, etc.   

Material cause.  
As touching the Material cause, matter, or subject wherein these grounds are conversant, the same are all those things whereof debate may rise between parties judicially: which are as well divine as humane. Insomuch as juris prudentia, 
Bract. lib. 1. cap. 4. §. 4.  or the knowledge of the Law, is Divinarum humarumque rerum scientia. And hence proceedeth it, that all Grounds or Rules of the Law of England in respect of their matter which they do concern are either such as are not restrained to any onproper or peculiar title of the Law, but as occasi, on serveth, are appliable unto every part, title, or tractate of the Law, as by the view and due consideration of examples following may be made manifest; All which, being either conclusions of natural Reason, or drawn and derived from the same, do not only serve as directions and Principles of the Law, but are likewise as Positions and Axioms to be observed throughout all man's life and conversation; having their original from those Arts that are necessary and behooufull for maintenance of humane society.   

Grounds borrowed out of Logic.  
And first of all concerning the Art of Logic; from thence the learned of our Laws have received many principles, as well out of that part which concerneth the Invention of Arguments, as of that which teacheth the disposing, framing, and the judgement of the same.   

From the first part these may serve for example.  

Idem non potest esse agens & patience. 
14 H. 8.31. b 28. H. 8.10. b n. 37. Dyer. Com. 213. b. Com. 323. b. 9 H. 7.24. a. Com. 161. a.   
Omne majus continet in se suum minus.  
Magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum.  
In praesentiamajoris cessat minus.  
Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora?  
Turpis est pars quae cum toto non convenit.  
With many other such like, etc.    

From the judicial parts of Logic, these and divers others.  
Qui negat confusè, negat confusè & distributiuè. 
2. R. 3.7. a.   
But how that saying may be understood, and in what sense it may be intended true, and in what not, peruse the case of 4. H. 7.8. a. touching the travers of a suggestion of breach of the peace: where although the said Rule be not mentioned, yet the meaning thereof, by the case there debated is partly made manifest. Moreover, Brian borroweth the Sophister's verse, and maketh it a Ground to try whether an issue tendered be an express Negative or not, in 11. H. 7.23. a.  
Prae contradic: post contra. Praepostque subalter.  
This likewise is derived thence, Negativum nihil implicat.    

Out of Natural Philosophy, these, with divers others, are deducted, that follow.  

VIs unita fortior. 
Com. 307. a. Com. 72. b. Com. 268. a. Com. 294. a. 8. E. 4.10. a.   
Est naturae vis maxima.  
Vltra posse non est esse.  
Sublata causa tollitur effectus.  
Vltra scire non est posse. With many other of like quality.    

Grounds borrowed out of Moral Philosophy;  
FRom whence, as from a Fountain, all Laws do flow; we do observe these few following for an example; as, 

Qui sentit commodum, 
Com. 244. a. 14. H. 8.6. a. Com. 501. a. 13 H. 8.16. a 14 H. 8.16. a 14. H. 8.8. a. Com. 160. b. Com. 370. b.  sentire debet & onus.  
Volenti non fit injuria.  
Sit utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.  
Fraus & dolus nemini patrocinatur.  
Agentes & consentientes pari poena plectuntur.  
Summum Ius summa Injuria.  
Vix ulla lex fieri potest quae omnibus commoda sit: sed si majori parti prospiciat, utilis est.  
A vero non delinabit justus. 
Com. 48. b.   
Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris. With many more such like.     

Grounds borrowed out of the Civil Law.  
Out of the Civil Laws there are also very many Axioms and Rules, which are likewise borrowed and usually frequented in our Law. For sigh all Laws are derived from the law of Nature, and do concur and agreed in the principles of Nature and Reason: And sith the Civil Laws, being the Laws of the Empire, do bewray the great wisdom whereby the Roman estate, in the time it most flourished, was governed: Sigh likewise the Law of this Land hath always followed best and most approved Reason (which is also a type of humane wisdom) it doth ensue of necessity, that great conformity must be between them. Which conformity may be made apparent partly by these (among some thousand Axioms and Conclusions of Reason) following.  

Qui tacit conscntire videtur. 
Com. 357. b 5. H. 3.222.   
Vigilantibus & non dormientibus Iura subveniunt.  
Quod initio non valet, tractu temporis non convalescit.  
Quando duo Iura in uno concurrunt, 
Com. 168 a.  aequum est ac si esset in duobus.  
In aequali jure, melior est conditio possidentis. 
Com. 296. b. Com. 336. b.   
Optima Legum Interpres est Consuetudo.  
Frustra Legis auxilium petet, qui in Legem peccat.  
Ignorantia facti excusat. 14. H. 1.27. b.  
Modus Legem dat donationi. 
Com. 251. a. Com. 162. b. 1. H. 3.33. b.   
Non est regula quin fallat.  
Modus & conventio vincunt Legem.   
With others in manner infinite, written and published in the Latin tongue.  
In the French also many other grounds there are in our Law, to be found agreeable in sense and meaning to such as are frequent and usual in the Civil Laws, 
L. verum §. tempus: ff. pro hoc. L. sedes de rescript. L. bona fides ff. de Reg. juris.  and there published in the Latin tongue, whereof also these following may serve for example.  

Nul prendra benefit de son tort demesne.  
Nemo ex dolo suo proprio relevetur aut auxilium capiet  
Homo ne sera double charge pro une mesme duty.  
Bona fides non patitur idem ab eodem bis exigi.   
Auxy mult auctorities & voys que home ad a fair un fait, auxy mult auctorities & voys add cesty a qui le fait est fait a ceo dessolver. 1. Hen. 7.16. a.  
Nihil est magis rationi consentaneum quam eodem modo unum quodque dissolvere quo conflatum est. 
L. nihil: ff. de Regul. juris. 13. H. 8.16. a in fine.   
Le Common wealth sera prefer devant private wealth.  
Vtilitas publica privatorum commodis ante-ferenda. L. 1. §. fin. & cap. tol.  
Le ley in chescun act adrespect all comencement. 
Com. 260. a. Hall's case. Com. 259. b. Hall's case.   
Origo rerum attendenda.  
Imagination de mente de fair tort, sans le act fait, nest punishable in nostre Ley.  
Affectus non punitur nisi sequatur effectus. 
Com. 160. b. Throgm. case.  Prateus lib. 3. c. 4.  
Intent direct done plum tossed quam parols.  
Proferentis intentio & voluntas, magis quam verborum locutio examinetur. Prat. lib. 3. cap. 3.  
Quant divers choses sont fait a un mesme instant, 
Com. 504. b.  & l'un ne poet prender effect sans l'auter; le common ley adjudger ceo de preceder & ensuer, que aptment do't preceder & ensuer in feasant l'entent des parties deprender effect.  
Vbi in Instrumento reperitur plures actus successive fuisse celebratos, semper fingitur ille actus praecessisse qui reddit actum validum. Nicholai Everard Topica juris loco 1.  
Non attento ordine verborum, talis ordo presumitur qualis debet esse.  
With many others to like purpose, if place did permit, or cause did require to observe the same: Yea many times when as no Ground or Rule is expressed in our Law, but that we may only collect Cases concurrent upon some Conformity of Reason: We shall found in the Civil Laws a proposition or rule which shall most aptly and most fitly express the same Reason in such shortness of speech, as nothing shall seem more sufficient in that respect. And unto the which Propositions such as are or may be framed by us in the French, cannot in excellency be worthily compared.  

Grounds borrowed out of the Canon Law.  
As touching the Canon Law. Forasmuch as the studies both of the same and of the Civil Law, are in sort conjoined by the professors of both, what may be said of the one, in this respect, may be verified of the other: Which as well by view of the title De Regulis juris in Sexto Decretalium, as also in diverse other titles of the same Law, especially in such as are most usual for matters of debate in this Realm, as are those of Excommunication, Marriage, Divorce, Legacies, Tithes, and such like, will at large appear.   

Grounds derived from Use, Custom, and Conversation of Men.  
Finally, many Grounds and Rules of the Laws of this Realm are derived from Common use, Custom, and Conversation among men, Collected out of the general disposition, nature, and condition of humane kind: Which Grounds are of two natures; The one observed out of humane actions, the other out of usual and ordinary speech.  
Principia externa propriè vocamus ea quae in Communi hominum vita versantur & ab experientibus & prudentibus animadvertuntur. joh. Hopper: de juris arte.  
Haec non tam ex ipsa hominis natura quam foris advenium, debentque non ex ment hominis aut animo, sed ex Communibus vitae moribus longo usu & tractatione colligi. Ibidem. Haec sunt igitur illa quae dico externa Principia, quae ex communibus vitae usibus & moribus diligenter in historia observatis decerpuntur, quaeque non tam ornine describi, & Litter is mandari, quam longa tractatione colligi, & per manus tradi possunt. Ibidem.  
Of the first sort are these, and such like following.  
Home est tenus destre prochein a soy mesme. 
Com. 545. a. Paramour. Manxel. 6. a. b. Com. 261. a. Hall's case. 8. H. 6.19. b. Per Martin.   
Le inclination de touts homes est de faire ou parler choses pour leur gain, & nient pour leur perdie: Et de ceuxque violent gabber, de gabber pur advantage.  
Est le propertie de nature de preserver luy mesme.  
Quant home est party, il ne poet esse judge indifferent a luy mesme.  
With many other of like quality, which the intendment of the Law deriveth and collecteth out of the usual condition, nature, and quality of things upon the probability and likelihood of occurrences often or for the most part happening and falling out.  
Axioms or Propositions of the second sort, 
Proverbial Grounds. Proverbium vulgò interpretatur probatum verbum, cum dicatur quasi Commune omnium verbum. Proverbia verò citata, instar jurium haberi traditum est. L. solent. ff. de officio Procurat. Sim. Shardus Lexicon juris. Com. 280. a. Com. 173. a. Com. 18. b. 29. Eliz. 356. a. 14 H. 8.23 a  are drawn from the phrase of speech, and deduced from the ordinary manner of Conference by talk among men most usual in all places, As are the common and ordinary Proverbs and proverbial Assertions, and such like; the which, as well by reason of their ordinary and often use in talk; as also for their probability and likelihood of truth have been sometime used as Axioms, Principles, and Grounds of the Law; and are to be found confirmed with many Cases, having been used as reasons in the same: Whereof these few ensuing may serve for example.  

Da tua dum tua sunt; post mortem, tunc tua non sunt.  
Qui ambulat intenebris, nescit quò vadit.  
Necessitas non habet Legem.  
As good never the whit, as never the better.  
Let him that is cold blow the coal.  
One to beaten the bush, and another to take the birds.   
With many other such like speeches, which although they are of small moment, being every where ordinary; yet nevertheless for the perspicuity and plainness, they have heretofore, at some times, in Law arguments been used, and fitly applied in debate of Cases (although not ad probandum, yet ad illustrandum) and so likewise may at any time hereafter, upon like occasion offered, without blame be frequented.  
Although these general Positions, Maxims & Rules proposed, and such like, cannot be properly reduced (as aforesaid) under any one peculiar title of the Law, extant in any Abridgement, Table, or directory; yet nevertheless may they be brought under general titles or common places, to be framed of purpose, as hereafter in place more convenient shall be declared.  
And thus much therefore of general Grounds or Maxims.  
Now followeth to speak of such as are to be reduced under one particular title, 
Maxims appliable only to one title.  tractate, or matter of the Law, serving to no other use, but only do concern the said special matter, and cannot be transferred thence, neither may properly serve any other than their native place, unto the which they are wholly and alonely to be referred: As for example,  
Under Grants these.  
Quando aliquis quid concedit, 
T. E. 1. Fitz. Grants. 36. Ass. p. 3.  & id etiam concedere videtur, sine quo res concessa esse non potest.  
Grant sera prise plus fort vers le Grauntour, etc.  
Under Contracts these and such like.  
Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. Com. 5. a. Com. 302. a. Com. 305. a. Com. 321. a.  
Contract ne poit estre, 
17. Ed. 4.1. a.  si ne soit que chescun partic soit agreed.  
Under Prerogative, these and such others.  
Nullum tempus occurrit Regi. Com. 243. a. 261. a. 321. a.  
Le Roy●●● auxy un Prerogative en le forme de brefs port per luy, 
Vide 18. Ed. 3.2. a.  different de ceaux que common person ad, etc.  
Under Deeds these.  
Fiunt aliquando Donationes in scriptis, 
Bract. li. 2. c. 16. f. 33. b. 14. H. 8.22. b Brudnel. Vid. Lit. 183 21. H. 7.37. b.  sicut in chartis, ad perpetuam memoriam, propter brevem hominum vitam, & ut faciliùs probari possit Donatio.  
Chooses incident que per lour mesme ne poient estre grant sans fait, uncore ils passeront oue le principal a qui sont incident sans fait. With diverse other in every title of the Law of like effect.  
These special Grounds are of diverse sorts: 
The diverse kinds of Grounds which do conceme one title.  for some concern the very nature and essence of the title: some the consequents and incidents annexed thereunto. Those which do concern the nature of the thing, do flow from some of the causes thereof, as the Material; the Formal, the Efficient, or the Final. Some from the general notion; others from the special difference; and some do proceed from the effect. Those which do proceed of the consequents, concern either the Incidents inherent and inseparable, or the adjuncts, and such like.  
Which grounds so drawn, if they be orderly disposed with all their subdivisions, and particular Rules, and the same furnished with apt cases, will make a perfect and exact treatise of such matter as concerneth that title, resembling those treatises compiled, by Littleton, Parkins, Stanford, of the Pleas of the Crown, and others of like form.   

Arbitrement.  
But in this place not intending to combine any such Grounds as do concern one title or matter, or thereof to endeavour to draw a type of any perfect treatise, it shall be sufficient at this present, for example only, to express that which is here meant, by the disposing of some few Grounds of the title of Arbitrement, according to the observation above mentioned, that thereby might be conceived, how such like Grounds concerning one title or matter do flow from the causes and consequents of that title, whereunto they are applied; and that a coherency of them might be both found and orderly framed for the more certain obtaining of knowledge in observing this, or the like course to this hereafter following.  
First although we found not an Arbitrement to be defined in any report of our Laws; yet nevertheless rastal in the small treatise of the Terms of the Law, thereof yields this description,  
Arbitrement est un award, 
Arbitrement, quid?  determination, ou judgement, quel pleusieurs font all request de deux parties all meins, pur, & sur ascun debt, trespass, ou altar controversy ewe perenter les dits parties. But more artificially it may be described out of the Civil Law thus:  
Arbitrium est Arbitri sententia sive judicium inter controvertentes; privato consensu, non autem publica interveniente authoritate, datum.  
Out of the books of Reports of the Laws of this Land this full description may be drawn.  
An Award is a judgement 8. E. 4.1. 8. Ed. 4.10. a. 21. Ed. 4.39. a. given by such person or persons as are elected by the parties unto the controversy, 9 Ed. 4.43. b. Fairfax. 16. Ed. 4.9. a. for the ending and pacifying the said controversy. 8. Ed. 4.10. a 19 Hen. 6.37. b. Askewe. according to the compromise and submission. 19 Edw. 4.1. a. and agreeable to reason and good conscience. 19 Hen. 6.37. a.  
Touching the Etymology or notation of the names thereof, it seemeth to be called an Arbitrement, 
The Etymology.  because the judges elected therein, may determine the controversy, not according to the Law, but Ex boni viri Arbitrio. Or else perhaps because the parties to the controversy have submitted themselves to the judgement of the Arbitrators, not by compulsory means, and coercion of the Law, but Ex libero Arbritrio suo, of his own accord. It is called an Award of the French word Agarder, which signifies to decide or judge. It is in the Saxon or old English sometime called a Loveday, for the quiet and tranquillity that should ensue thereof, and for the ending of the cause which is wrought thereby.  
The Material cause whereabout it is conversant, 
The Material cause.  is the controversy, which  
1, First, may be either action, suit, quarrel, ordemand; and the  
2 Second that, concerning duty or demand, either personal, real or mixed, or every of them.  
The Formal cause is, the form and manner of the Award, 
The formal cause.  or the yielding up of their judgement, according to reason, intent and good meaning.  
The Immediate efficient cause, 
The efficient cause.  is the Arbitrator or Arbitrators.  
The Mediate efficient cause, is the compromise or submission, and the parties at variance, being also parties to the submission. Wherhfore for the more brevity we will discourse of every of these last recited, when we shall discover the power of the Arbitrator.  
The final cause, 
The final cause.  is both to appease  
1, First, the debate and variance so risen between the parties, and compromitted; and also to reduce  
2, Secondly, that which was before uncertain, unto a certainty.  
So that by these you see, that those five things which are found to be incident to every Award, viz.  

1 First, matter de controversy.  
2 Submission.  
3 Parties all submission.  
4 Arbitrators, and  
5 Tender sur del judgement, spoken of in 4 Eliz. Dyer 217. a. are here reduced into a methodical consideration of the causes of every Award, seeing indeed, they and no other are the very causes of the same.   
The genus or general notion of the former description, 
Genus.  is, 
Differentia.  that it is a judgement.  
The special difference whereby it is distinguished from other judgements, and expressed in the said description, is, that it is given by judges elected by the parties, and not by coercion of the Law.  
The effect is, 
The effect.  when it concerneth any payment of money, to altar, change, and make the controversy transire in rem judicatam, and thereupon to give action for the sum awarded.  
If it do determine any collateral or other matter than payment of money to be made or done, than it is not compulsary to constrain the parties to perform it; but every of them is restored to his former action. Except the compromise or submission be by deed; and so therein it resteth wholly upon that security by bond, covenant, statute, or recognizance, by the which the parties compromitted themselves.  
The Adjunct, 
The Adjunct.  is the performance thereof and the manner how, which whether the Award be performed or not, it maketh nothing to the nature and substance of the Award itself. But nevertheless such performance of the Award is a requisite consequent annexed to the consideration of the nature of an Award.  
These, the general causes of an Award, thus considered; next followeth the consideration of the grounds that flow from every of them.  
From the Material cause which is the controversy, 
Material cause.  these Grounds or Rules are deduced.  
In Real matters, que concern frank tenement, 
Real Matters  Arbitrement ne lia, le title, ne done ceo. 14. Henr. 4.19. a.  
In matters of Realty, which concern freehold, an Arbitrement doth neither give title, nor bind the right.  
In Real Actions, 
Real Actions. Mixed Actions.  un Arbitrement nest plea.  
In Mixed Actions, Arbitrement nest plea: Si non que le Comprimise soit per fait. 19 Hen. 6.37. b. Newton.  
In Personal Actions sur personal torts, 
Personal Actions.  Arbitrement est plea, comment que le submission ne soit per fait. 14. H. 4.24. b. Ravish guard.  
In controversy concernant le propertie de Real chattels, 
Real Chattels  un Arbitrement transfer property de ceo accordant all agard. 21. H. 7.29. b.  
In Chattels personal, 
Personal Chattels.  Arbitrement transfer property.  
In Personal duty ground sur speciality, 
Personal duty.  Arbitrement nest available. 3. H. 4.1. b. 8. H. 5.3. b.  
In Controversy ground sur matter de Record, 
Matters de Record.  Arbitrement ne sera regard. 6. H. 4.6. a. 8. Hen. 5.3. b. 4. H. 6.17. b.  
Arbitrement do't este de duty nient certain. 
Duty in certain.  6. Hen. 4.6. a. 2. Hen. 5. Fitzh. 23.4. Hen. 6.17. b. 10 Hen. 7.4. a.  
Controversy de dett solement, ne poet este mice en Arbitrement. 45. E. 3.16. a. 2. H. 5. Fitzh. Arbitrement 23.8. H. 5.3. b. 4. H. 6.17. b. 10. H. 7.4. a.  
In Contract de debt oue altar chose mice en compromise Arbitrement sera bone. 
Dett.  2. H. 6. Fitzh. Arbitrement 23.4. H. 6.17. b. 10. H. 7.4. a.  
debt sur Contract sans speciality, 
Dett.  per le resolution de ascuns liure poet este mice en Arbitrement. 45. E. 3.16. a. 6. H. 4.6. a. 4. H. 6.18. a.  
These with diverse other grounds, do proceed, as we have said, from the Material Cause or controversy.  
There resteth now to speak of such as do proceed from the Formal Cause. 
Formal Cause.   
Every Award, as touching the form thereof, aught to have these four qualities.  

1. First, that it be not a thing impossible to be performed by the parties.  
2. Secondly, that it do not ordain matter unlawful to be done.  
3. Thirdly, that the same Award agreed with reason and good meaning.  
4. Fourthly, that it be sensible, full, and perfect in understanding.    

As touching the first.  
1. Arbitrement ne do't este de chose ou matter impossible. 
Impossible.  8. E. 4.1. b. Moyle. 8. E. 4.10. a. Yeluerton. 19 E. 4.1. a. Needle. 9 H. 7.16. b. Keble.  
2. Arbitrement ne doit este de chose encounter ley. 
Encounter Ley.  19 Edw. 4.1. a. Needle. 21. Ed. 4. b. Bridg. 9 Hen. 7.16. a. b. Keble.  
3. Arbitrement ne do't estre unreasonable. 
Unreasonable.  46. E. 3.16. a. 43. E. 3.17. b. 2. H. 5.2. a. 17. E. 4.5. b. 9 H. 7 10. b. Keble. 46. E. 3.17. b. 21. E. 4.40. a. 10. H. 4. Fitzh. Arbitrement.  
This Ground last remembered, being general, containeth therein many special Rules under it; whereof some do follow.  
Arbitrement do't este tiel que les parties poient performer sans le assistance de ascunes auters queux ils ne poient compel a ceo fair & performer. 
Satisfaction sans assistance des auters.  8. Edw. 4.2. a. Illingworth. 17. Edw. 4.15. b. 18. Edw. 4.23. a. Catesby. 19 E. 4.1. b. Brian.  
Mes si les parties ont mean per le ley a compeller tiels estrangers a ceo performer, 
Assistance des auters.  le Agard est assetts bone. 17. E. 4.5. b.  
Arbitrement que le party fair un judicial Act est bone, comment que il ne poiet ceo perform sans assistance del Court. 
judicial Act.  19 H. 6.38. a. Past. Nonsuite. 19 E. 4.1. b. Brian. fine. 12. E. 4.8. a. Retraxit. 22. E. 4.38. a. Retraxit. 5. H. 7.22. a. b. Discon. etc.  
Chascun Arbitrement que ne import satisfaction deal tort que est mice in compromise, 
Satisfaction.  nest bone. 43. E. 3.28. b. Finchd. 46. E. 3.17. b. 2. H. 5.2. a. 45. E. 3.16. a. 19 H. 6.38. a. Past. 22. H. 6.39. a. Port. 30. Hen. 6. Fitzherbert Arbitrement. 27. 9 E. 4.44. a. Chock. 9 H. 7.16. b. 12. H. 7.15. a.  
This Ground is also general: Wherhfore it shall be expedient to divide it by the particular circumstances of cases unto more especial propositions, together with their several exceptions to be set down in manner following.  
Arbitrement in tiel manner, 
Redeliverie des biens.  que pur ceo que un des parties ad les chattels del altar, que il eux redelivera, ceo nest satisfaction. 45. E. 3.16. a. Kirton. 2. Hen. 5.2. a. 12. H. 7.15. a.  
Mes si sur le delivery des biens, 
Redeliverie des biens.  cesty a que sont deliver poet aver ascun benefit, per tiel delivery in satisfaction del tort, donque est le Arbitrement bone. 2. H. 5.2. a. 14. H. 4.14. b. 12. H. 7.15. a. 
Parte del Chose.   
Arbitrement que un partie avera un party del chose compromise, & sur que le controversie fait, & l'auter party est voided. 45. E. 3.16. a. 10. Hen. 4. Fitzh. Arbitrement 19  
Arbitrement que le partie payera part de sa debt, 
Part del Chose. Plus que il doit.  est voided. 45. E. 3.16. a.  
Arbitrement sur matter de debt, sils agard que le parties indebted payera plus que il doit in recompense del dit dett ceo est voided. 9 H. 7.16. b. Keble.  
Arbitrement que cesty que est suppose daver fait trespass, faira de ceo son Ley, & sur ceo sera discharge, 
Gager de Ley  nest satisfaction all altar, & pur ceo nest bone. 46. Ed. 3.17. b.  
Arbitrement que in satisfaction del tort que les parties entermariont, ceo nest bone agard; car nest satisfaction. 
Entermariage.  9 E. 4.44. a. Chock.  
Arbitrement que un des parties que est in arrearages in account accomptera all altar, ceo nest satisfaction. 
Accomptera  30. H. 6. Fitzh. Arbitrement 27.  
Arbitrement que les parties fera act a tiel jour, 
jour pass.  & devant que le agard est perfect, le jour est passe tiel agard nest bone. 8. E. 4.11. a. 8. E. 4.22. a.  
Arbitrement que refer le feasance deal chose ou altar matter a tiel chose que nest in Rerum natura; 
Non in Rerum Natura.  tiel arbitrement est voided. 21. E. 4.40. a. 9 Ed. 4.44. a. 39 H. 6.10. a.  
Having thus shown the Circumstances of certain Arbitrements, which have been taken to be against reason, sounding to no satisfaction, and therefore void: Now resteth to be showed certain circumstances, in Arbitrements agreeable unto reason, and imparting satisfaction, 
Reasonable.  and therefore deemed good.  
Arbitrement do't este equal in respect d'ambideux parties, 
Equal.  & l'un come l'auter sera lie a ceo. 7. H. 6.41. a. Strange. 19 H. 6.38. a. Newton. 20. H. 6.19. a. Newton. 39 H. 6.12. a. Moyle.  
Lou diverse d'une parties & d'auter eux submit all agard, 
Enter ascuns des Parties.  & le Arbitrement est, que l'une de l'une partie payera a un auter de l'auter party tant, sans rien parler des auters; ceo est bone agard, pur ceo que poet este que le auters naveront cause daver ascun chose. 22. E. 4.25. b.  
Arbitrement pur ceo que les torts fait per les parties chescun all altar sont equal que ils seront quit chescun verse lauter; 
Quit.  ceo est bone agard. 19 H. 7.37. b. Newton. 20. H. 6.19. a. Newton. 21. H. 6. Fitz. Arbit. 9  
Arbitrement que une des parties sera quit verse lauter, 
Quit.  & que cesty altar payera ou faira tant pur ceo que son trespas fut le greinder, est bon agard. 10. H. 6.4. a. 20. H. 6.19. a. Newton.  
Arbitrement que l'une done all altar quart de vine, 
Petit Recompense.  ou tiel petit recompence pur satisfaction del tort, est bone agard, 43. E. 3.33. a. 45. E. 3.19. b Belknap. 9 E 4.44. a. Nedham.  
Si le Arbitrement soit, 
Greinder value que le tort.  que un des parties payera greinder sum in value que le tort est que il ad fait, uncore le agard est bone, & ceo gist in discretion des Arbitrators, 8, E, 4, 21, Chock.  
Arbitrement, 
Release.  que chescun release all altar, est bone, 9, E, 4, 44, b, Danby.  
Arbitrement que l'une release tout son droit in tiel terre, 
Release.  est bone satisfaction: Si cesty a que le release sera fait soit in possession del terre, etc. Et ceo appiert per le agard, 9, E, 4, 44, b. 21, E, 4, 40, b.  
Arbitrement que l'une party done all altar tiel chose, 
Donor ceo que il nad.  comment que le party nad tiel chose, uncore est le agardbone, & i'll doit provide ceo, 19, E, 4, 1, a, Needle. 9, Henr: 7, 16, a.  
Arbitrement bone in part, & voided in part, 19, E, 
Bone in parte  4, 1, a.  
Arbitrators poient ordain act deste fait in lour agard pur le melieur security del performance de ceo, 
Security del Agard.  come obligation, 8, H, 6, 18, b, Newton. 19, H, 4, 1, a, Chock.  
Chescune Arbitrement do't este plain & certain en sense, 8, E, 4, 11, a, Pigot. 
Certain.   
Arbitrement est chose entier, 18, E, 4, 23, a, Brian. 
Entire.   
Thus much touching the Matter and Form of Arbitrements and the Axioms, Grounds and Rules deduced from the same: Wherein we have not expressed every Rule that might be found in the books, or collected thence, tending hereunto: Neither are those Axioms or Propositions here put down, furnished with all those cases that might be thereunto applied: For, not intending to express the type of any treatise of this title, but only a methodical Abstract or Directory, that which is here exemplified in part may be sufficient to express our meaning before declared. But to proceed.  
The Efficient Causes, 
Efficient Cause.  and the Rules drawn from the same come next to consideration.  
The first whereof is the Arbitrator: 
johannes Paulus Lancelottus. Arbitrator quid.  Of whom the Author of the Institutions of the Canon Law giveth this description: Arbitri dicuntur proprie, qui (nullam potestatem habentes ex Lege,) consensu Litigantium in judices eliguntur: in quos compromittitur, ut eorum sententiae stetur.  
Out of the books of the Common law, a description of an Arbitrator may be thus collected.  
Vne Arbitratour est judge private, eslew per les parties. 9 Edw. 4.43. b. Fairefax. 16. Edw. 4.9. a. Feneux. 19 Hen. 6.37. b. Askew. pur appeaser les debates enter eux. 8. Edw. 4.10. a. billing. Et de arbitrate & adjudge selonque lour bone intent. 19 H. 6.37. a. Paston.  
Since in the Award itself, the Law requireth such qualities, there hath not been made many nor scarce any question, who may be an Arbitrator, and who not: Neither (considering what hath been said touching the form of an Award) should it be greatly necessary. Therefore we will proceed, respecting in the Arbitrator these three things.  

1. First his Ordinance, from whom it is.  
2. His Authority, what it is.  
3. His Duty, wherein it consisteth.   
Touching his Ordinance, 
Ordinance.  he is ordained by these two things: 

1. First, by the election of the parties. 20. H. 6.41. a.  
2. By his own undertaking of the charge. 8. E. 4.10. a. billing.    
Touching his Authority, 
Authority.  what it is.  

1. First it is derived from the submission, and extendeth no further.  
2. Thereby he is a judge between the parties.  
3, And therefore he cannot transfer his authority over to any other.   
Touching his Duty, it consisteth in these three. 
Duty.   

1, First to hear the grief of the party.  
2, To judge according to equity.  
3, To notify their Award.   
First therefore concerning the election of the Arbitrators by the parties to the Controversy (which aught likewise to be parties to the Submission) there is first of all to be considered, 
Election of the arbitrator.  what persons may by the Law submit themselves to an award made by others, and what persons cannot. 
Queux persons poient eux submitter all agarde. Deputy.   
And therefore,  
Si l'une des parties submit luy a une Arbitrement d'une part, et Depute del altar part in nosme del dit altar party: Arbitrement sur ceo fait per enter eux semble bon. 4. Eliz. 217. a. 60.  
Le Baron poet luy mesme submit all agard pur luy et sa feme pur chattels des queux il ad le disposition in droit, et per reason de sa fem, et ceo Liera la feme. 
Baron & feme.  21. Hen. 7.29. b.  
Si enfant submit luy al une agard, 
Enfant.  il ser a lie de ceo performer cy bien come home de plein age. 13. Hen. 4.12. a. 10 Hen. 6.14. a.  
Si diverse d'une parte ont fait tort a un altar, 
Ascuns' departies.  & cesti a qui le tort est fait, et un de les auters submit eux all agard, de cest agard fait les auters nient parties all submission averon advantage in extinguishment del tort. 7. Hen. 4.31. b. 20. H. 6.12. a. 20. H. 6.41. a.  
Si diverse del une part submit eux mesmes all agard de certain persons, & diverse del altar part: 
joint & several.  Les Arbitratours ont power de fair agarde pur matters enter eux joyntment, & issint pur matter enter eux severalment, 2. Rich. 3.18. b. vide 21. Hen. 7.29. b. Com. Dalton. 289. b.  
Si diverse del une part & de altar submit eux al agard del une, 
Ascunes des parties.  que fait agard perenter ascunes d'une party, & ascunes deal altar party & nemy perenter eux touts, & ne parle rien en son agard des auters, uncore tiel agard est bone, 22. Edw. 4.25. b.  
Thus much touching the parties that do submit themselves unto an Award, and which make an election of the Arbitratours. 
undertaking the award.  Now followeth that somewhat be also said as touching the undertaking of the charge of the said Award.  
Si le Arbritr atour protest, 
Deal parcel.  que il ne voile meddle ave tout ceo que est commit a luy, ou conteyne en le submission, ou sil fait agard tantum del parcel, le agard est bone, 19 Hen. 6.6. b. 39 Hen. 6.11. b. Prisot, count. 4. Eliz. 217.60.7.8. Eliz. 243. b. 52.  
Mes si le submission soit per fait conditionalment que le dit agard soit deliver devant tiel jour: 
Parcel.  une Arbitrement de parcel nest bone, 4. Eliz. 217.60.7.8. Eliz. 243. b. 52.  
Mes uncore, 
Parcel.  si le submission soit que ils estoieront al agard des Arbitratours de tout le chose comprimit ou fait pur ascun parcel de ceo: donque le Arbitrement est bone pur parcel, 39 Hen. 6.11. b.  
And thus much hath been said of the taking upon them of the charge of the Arbitrement.  
Now resteth it likewise to speak of the Authority of the Arbitrators themselves: which is, as before is declared, grounded upon the submission.  
The submission or compromise therefore out of the Civil Law, is thus defined;  
Compromissum est simultanea illa partium promissio, 
Compromise ou submission.  qua sua sponte, ad alicujus boni viri Arbitrium suam remittunt controversiam.  
Submissions are in two manners, either by writing, or by word.  
Those that are by writing, are either by obligation, or by covenant.  
Which obligation is either of Record, as a recognizance, or by deed between the parties.  
And this submission by writing, or by word, is either absolute, or conditional, so that the award be delivered by a certain day, or such like.  
Wherhfore in as much as the authority of the Arbitrator is deduced from the submission, it followeth that,  
Le Arbitrement que est fait de chose nient contain in le submission, est void, 
Nient contain in submission.  7. Hen. 6.40. b. 19 Hen. 6.39. b. Fort. 9 Ed. 4.44. a. Chock. 19 E. 4.1. a. Needle. 7.8. Eliz. 242. b. 52.  
Mes si le submission est de chose personal, 
Nient contain in le submission.  les Arbitrators poient agard, que un des parties fera act que est de chose real in satisfaction der personal tort, 9 Ed. 4.44. a. Brian.  
Si le submission soit de chose real, 
Real.  les Arbitratours poient agard satisfaction deste fait de chose personal, 9 E. 4.44. a. Brian.  
Si les arbitratours agard, 
Estranger.  que un des parties fera act all estranger, come feoffment, ou tiels sembles, tel arbitrement est voided, 22. Hen. 6.46. b. 17. Ed. 4.23, a. Catesby, 19 Ed. 4.1. b. Brian. 5 Hen. 7.22. b.  
Si le submission soit d'une chose, 
Incident.  le Arbitrement poit esse fait de chose incident a ceo. 8 Hen. 6.18. b. 19 Ed. 4.1. a. Chock. ver. 9 Hen. 7.15. b. 16. a.  
Upon this authority given to the Arbitrators by the submission, to deal in manner as aforesaid, in things touching the same submission.  
It ensueth also secondarily, 
judge.  that  
Le Arbitrator est un judge perenter les parties, 19 Hen. 6.37. b. Ascough, 9 Ed. 4.43. b. Fair f. 16. Ed. 4.9. a. jency. Com. Fogasta. 6. a.  
Wherhfore likewise it ensueth that the Arbitrator being a judge cannot transfer that his judicial authority to any other.  
And therefore,  
Si le Arbitrement soit, 
Estranger.  que les parties estoicra all arbitrement d'un estranger; ceo nest bone agard, 47. Ed. 3.21. a. Cont. 8. Ed. 4.10, 11. a.  
Mes si l'estranger ad fait un Arbitrement devant perenter les dits parties, 
Estranger.  le Agard pur estoier a tiel Arbitrement del estranger est bone, 39 Hen. 6, 10. a. 11. a.  
Mes si le Arbitrement soit que les parties performera le Agard d'une auter devant fait perenter mesmes les parties, 
Estranger.  lou in verity nest ascun tel agard: uncore cest Arbitrement est bone prima facie tanque soit monstre que nest tiel agard, 39 Hen. 6.12. a. Prisot.  
Mes uncore si le Arbitrement soit, 
Advice.  que une act limit per le Agard sera fait per le advice & counseil d'une altar person; tiel Agard est bone, 8. Ed. 4.11. a. 14. Ed. 4.1. a. Chock.  
Mes si le Agard soit, 
Advice.  que le act sera fait per le Advice deal arbitrator mesme apres le Agard rendu sur tel Agard nest bone, 19 Ed. 4.1. a. Chock.  
Si les parties eux submit all Agard de certain persons, 
Vmpier.  & s'ils ne poient agree, donque all ordinance d'un altar come umpire; si les Arbitratours font Agard de parcel, le umpier ne fera agard del altar parcel remnant, 39 Hen. 6.10. a. b.  
Mes si le submission soit tiel que le umpier fera Agard del tout ou part, donque il poit fair Agard de cest part, ovesque que les Arbitrators navont meddle, 39 Hen. 6.11. b. Prisot.  
Now as touching the duty of the Arbitratours. 
Duty.  First  
Les duties des parties est a vener devant les Arbitratours & monster lour grieves.  

1 Et le Arbitratour doit eux oir.  
2 Et solonque ceo adjudge, ou autermènt il nest bone judge, 8. Ed. 4.10. a. billing.   
Those which affect the Method of Ramus (that is, to begin with the efficient cause, as here, with arbitrator) rather then that which is usually prosecuted by the Interpreters of Aristotle (namely, to begin first with the matter and form, which we hitherunto have endeavoured to follow) may here add to, the second part of the duty of an Arbitrator (that is, to that which hath been here said of this judicial Authority and judgement) as much as hath been before, first of all, showed by us, touching the Material and Formal causes, and the Grounds and Rules incident thereupon.  
But nevertheless, to proceed with our intended enterprise; touching the third part of the duty of an Arbitrator, viz. the publishing or notifying of his Award; It is to be considered that the publishing or notifying of an Award is either provided for and ordained by the submission itself; or else it is left and permitted to the discretion of the Arbitrator.  
If it be provided for, by the submission; for the most part it is in this manner, that either the same Award made, be notified to the parties, or some of them; & that, either by a certain day or time, or else without limitation of any time.  
As concerning therefore the delivery of the Award, there is to be noted; that where such provision is made of notification by the submission, that then;  
Arbitrement nest Arbitrement devant que il soit pronounce, 
Pronounce.  8. Ed. 4.21. b. Chock.  
Lou per le submission est ordaine ou provide condicionalment, que le agard soit deliver, 
Delivery de Agard.  ceo nest ascun arbitrement in ley devant que il soit deliver in fait, 8. Ed. 4.11 Yeluerton. 8. Ed. 4.21. a. Chock. vide 1. Hen. 7.5. a. 37. Hen. 8. Browne, Conditions, 46.  
Mes si le submission soit que le agard sera delivere all parties, 
Delivery.  etc. devant un jour hoc petentibus, mes nul certaine jour limit quand doit este deliver, les parties doient prender notice deal agard a lour peril, 8. Edw. 4.1. b. 21, etc.  
Si diverse d'un party & diverse de altar party submit eux all Arbitrement de un altar, 
Delivery.  provise, que il soit deliver all parties, ou a un de eux: ne besoign all Arbitrator a deliver ceo a ambideux del un partie ou 〈◊〉 de chacuns party: mes suffist si soit deliver all as●●●●●● dits parties, 4.5. Eliz. 218. b. 5.  
Si le submission soit que le Arbitrement sera deliver devant tiel jour, 
Delivery.  il poet cy bien este deliver per parol come per fait: si non que le submission soit que il sera per fait, 4.5. Eliz. 218. b. 5.  
Si le submission soit que le Arbitrement sera deliver ceo poet este fait in un County, 
County & lieu deal delivery. Temps.  & deliver in altar County, 5. Hen. 7.7. a.  
Si le submission soit per fait, & le temps pas in que le Arbitrement do't este fait, les parties ne poient proroge le temps ouster pur fair le agard sans novel submission a tell intent, 49. Ed. 3.9. a.  
Mes si le submission soit sans fait, 
Temps.  les parties poient proroge le temps que fut done pur fair le agard, 49. Ed. 3.9. Fitzh. agard, 22.  
Si les Arbitrators font lour agard perenter les parties un jour, 
Temps.  ils ne poient fair altar agard perenter les parties un auter jour, comment que le temps don per le submission ne soit expire, 22. Hen. 6.52. a. vide 33. H. 6.28. b.  
Arbitrement ne poet este fait parte a un temps, 
Temps.  & part all altar, comment que soit deins le temps del submission, 39 H. 6.12. a. Danby, 8. Ed. 4.10. b. Fairfax, 19 Ed. 4.1. a. Chock, vide 3. Hen. 4.1. b.  
Mes les Arbitrators poient Common enter eux mesmes, & agreed sur un chose un jour, 
Temps.  & de altar chose altar jour, & in le fine fair une entire agard de tout: Et ceo est bone, 47. Edw. 3.21. a. 39 Hen. 6.12. a. Danby.  
Si Arbitratours agard un chose de une part, 
Temps.  & devant que ils poient agree de lour agard del remnant, le temps done per le submission expire; tout lour agard est void, 39 Hen. 6.12. a. Prisot.  
But if there be by the submission no order taken for the Delivery or Publication of the Award;  
Than  
In honesty & Conscience le Arbitratour est tenus de fair notice all parties de ceo. vide 8. Edw. 4.10. a. billing, 
Notice.  vide 8. Edw. 4.2. a. b. Markham.  
Mes in rigore juris l'arbitrement mesme est intent chose Notorious, 
Notice.  8. Ed. 4.1. b. Chock. 8. Edw. 4.21. b. Chock.  
Et pur ceo.  
Parties all Arbitrement sont tenus de prender notice deal agard a lour peril, 
Notice.  8. Edw. 4.18.21.18. Edw. 4.18. a. 1. Hen. 7.5. a.  
Coment que les Parties ne sont daver Notice done a eux de L'arbitrement, 
Notice.  uncore si les Arbitratours agard que un des parties fera act que depend sur altar primes destre fait del altar party, de ceo il aver notice, 8. Edw. 4.21. b. 20. Edw. 4.8. b. Sulliard.  
Hitherto hath been said of such matters where the Arbitrators have executed their Authority without control of the parties: But if, before any Award made, their Authority shall be lawfully countermanded; Than doth there remain in this place to be considered, 

1, Whether such Countermands be permitted by the Law.  
2, And in what Cases not.  
3, And also in what manner the same is to be done.    
Wherhfore  
Si le submission soit sans fait, 
Countermand.  chescun des parties poit Countermand & discharge les Arbitratours, 49. Ed. 3. vide Fitzherbert Arbitrement 22. 21. Hen. 6.30. a. 28. Hen. 6.6. b. 5. Edw. 4.3. b. 8. Edw. 4.10. b.  
Mes donque les parties doient donor Notice all Arbitratours deal dit discharge, 
Countermand.  8. Edw. 4.10. b. Markham, 8. Edw. 4.12. a. Lakyn.  
Mes si divers d'un part & divers d'auter part eux submit all Arbitrement sans fait, 
Countermand.  un del une parte ne poet discharge le Arbitratour sans les auters son Compagnons de mesme le party, 28. Hen. 6. b.  
Mes si le submission soit per fait un des parties ne poit Countremaund les Arbitratours, 
Countermand.  49. Edw. 3. Fitzh. Arbitrement 22. nient in le liver a large. 5. Edw. 4.3. b. 8. Ed. 4.11. b. Pigott. 
Regulae à sausa finali.   
The last cause of the four before remembered being the Final Cause (that is) the end and scope wherefore men do submit themselves unto the Arbitrement and Award of any person, consisteth upon two things.  
1 Chacun Arbitrement est a fair final determination & de appeaser le strifes, 
Final determination.  debates & variances enter les parties. 19 Hen. 6.37. b. Newton, 8. Edw. 4.10. a. Lakyn. 8. Edw. 4.12. b. Yeluerton.  
2 Chacun Arbitrement est a reducer chose incertain a une certainty, 
A reducer incertainty all certainty.  & nemy a reducer un certainty in altar certainty, 6. Hen. 4.6. a. Hankford. 4. Hen. 6.17. b. Weston. 10. Hen. 7.4. a.  
Thus much hath been said as touching the Causes.  
Now as concerning the Genus or General Notion: In the former definition of an Arbitrement, It is to be considered, That  
Chescun Arbitrement est un judgement, 
judgement.  8. Ed. 4.1. b. Fairefax. 8. Edw. 4.10. a. jeney. 21. Ed. 4.39. a. Vavasour.  
Because the special difference used in the said former definition of an Award, was this, That it was given by judges elected by the parties, and not by compulsary jurisdiction of the Court, thereof ensueth, That  
Il est diversaie ou home est judge per authority del ley, 
Intent deal Arbitrator.  & per Election del party mesme: Car Iudge de Record ne donor judgement verse les parties, si non que ils sont appells devant eux per process del ley: Mes autrement est don arbitrator que est judge per enter les parties, 8. Ed. 4.2. a. Illingsworth.  
Of this also ensueth, that whereas every judgement of Record shall be executed literally, according to the warrant issuing out of the Record, upon and for the executing of the said judgement; Yet nevertheless.  
Chescun Arbitrement doit este expound et intent accordant all intent des Arbitratours, 
Intent.  & nemy Literalment. 17. Edw. 4.3. Brian. 21. Edw. 4.39. a. b. vide 19 Hen. 6.36. b. Markham.  
Mes si l'intent des Arbitratours ne estoit ove la ley: 
Intent,  donque les parties ceo performera accordant eux parols in tiel sense que agreed ove le ley. 21. Edw. 4.39. b. Fairefax.  
The Causes of an Arbitrement being thus deciphered there followeth next the consideration of the effects thereof.  
The Effects of an Arbitrement are these which do ensue.  
Per Arbitrement le Controversy transit in rem judicatam. 
Transition in rem judicatan.  49. Edw. 3.3. a. Hanwer. 20. Hen. 6.41. a. Paston. 9 Edw. 4.51. a. Danby. 6. Hen. 11. b. Hussey. Com. Fogossa, 6. a.  
Et pur ceo  
Lou le party port action pur le tort a luy fait, 
jour de nint venus. purpay le money.  est bone Plea que il eux submit all Arbitrement de tiels; qui agard que il pajera tant &c, mes le jour de payment de ceo nest uncore venu, 6. Hen. 7.11. b. Hussey. 9 Edw. 4.51. a. Chock. 20. Hen. 6.12. b. Newton. 20. Hen. 6.40. a. b. Paston. 28. Hen. 6.12. 5. Ed. 4.7. a. 
jour de payment.   
Mes si le jour de payment soit pass, il doit monstre que il tender les deniers al jour, & que il est uncore priest. 8. Hen. 6.25. b. Martin. 16. Edw. 4.8. b. Pigot. 
Vncore priest   
Car,  
Arbitrement per que les Arbitratours agard, 
Done action.  que un des parties pajera money, done action. 5. Edw. 4.7. a. Chock. 16. Edw. 4.9. a. Pigot. 17. Edw. 4.2. b. Townsend. 17. Edw. 4.8. a. Pigot. Fitzh. Natura brevium 121. g. 6. Hen. 7.11. b. Hussey. 9 E. 4.51. Danby.  
Et si les parties ne perform L'arbitrement, 
Restore all primer action. Restore all primer action.  le parte est restore a son primer action, 49. Ed. 3.3. a.  
Mes uncore est a son Election de aver Brief de debt sur le agard, ou le primer Action, 49. Ed. 3.3. a. 33. Hen. 6.2. b.  
Mes si le payment soit fait, 
Determine.  le primer tort est tout ousterment determine per le agard, 4. Hen. 6.1. a. 8. Hen. 6.25. b. 21. Hen. 7.28. b.  
Ex que ensuit auxy.  
Si les Arbitratours agardant, 
Double Action.  que un des parties pajera tant des deniers, Et chescun de eux est oblige all altar pur estoier all agard le party avera action sur le agard, & auxy sur le fait si agard ne soit perform. 21. E. 4.41. b. 33. Hen. 6.2. b.  
Si le submission soit par paroll, 
Collateral matter.  & Arbitrement soit que un des parties fairont un collateral act, altar que payment des deniers, ceo ne done action, & si ne soit execute in fait et satisfy, le Arbitrement nad ascun effect; Et tel Arbitrement ne determine le primer tort, 19 Hen. 6.38. a. Newton. 20. Hen. 6.19. a. Markham. 5. Edw. 4.7. a. Chock. Com. Fogoss. 11. b.  
Vncore si le submission soit per obligation, 
Collateral matter.  si un Collateral act soit agard deste fait; si ceo ne soit perform, le obligation sera forfeit, 9 Ed. 4.44. a.  
Thus much touching the effects of an Award.  
A Consequent thereof is, the Performance; wherein we are to consider, That  
Les parties doient faire tout ceo que in eux est a ceo perform, 
Performance.  21. Ed. 4.39. b. Fairefax.  
Si per le Arbitrement soit agard que un act sera fait le quel home poit performer, 
Assistance.  in deux manners lun voy per luy mesme, et per l'auter voy il doit aver l'aide d'un altar person: le party doit ceo performer per tell mean, que il solement poit fair sans aid de l'auter, 21. Ed. 4.40. b. Hussey.  
Arbitrement ne doit este fait in part, 
Parte.  et in part ne my, 6. Hen. 7.10. b.  
Mes coment que Arbitrement ne poet este fait per les Arbitratours, 
Parte.  part a une temps, et part a altar temps: uncore ceo poit este perform part a un temps et part all altar, 8. Ed. 4.10. b. Fairefax.  
Les parties averant reasonable temps a eux allowe pur le performer d'un agard, 
Temps.  si nul temps soit limit, 20. Edw. 4.8. b. 21. Ed. 4.41. a. b. etc.  
Si le act que les Arbitratours agard que l'un party performera, 
Primer Act.  ne poit este perform devant altar Act primes fait per l'auter party, si cest partie ne fait le primer act, l'auter est excuse, 5. Edw. 4.7. a.  
Arbitrement que l'un partie pajera money, 
Tout a un temps.  & l'auter fera Release; ceo sera fait a un mesme temps, si ne soit obligation de performer le Agard. 21. H. 7.28. b. Knightly, & Reed.  
Mes si soit Obligation a performer le agard, 
Chacun performe son part.  donque chacun doit perform son part de soubs le peril de L'Obligation, 21. Hen. 7.28. b. Reed.  
Si Obligation soit fait pur estoier all Arbitrement comment que le Arbitrement soit voided in Ley, 
Void award Quaere.  uncore ceo doit este perform, auterment le Obligation sera forfeit 22. Hen. 6.46. b. Port, per Cur.  
Mes si action soit port sur tel voided Agard, 
Voided agard.  le Action ne sera maintain, 22. Hen. 6.46. b. Port.  
Si le matter contenus in le agard, 
Averment.  & le matter contenus in le submission de que les Arbitratours doient agarder, differt in parols, ou in circumstance, les parties all Arbitrement ne seront receive in suit sur ceo de avererrer que tout est une, 7.8. Eliz. 242. b. 52.  
Thus much hath been spoken concerning Arbitrements, their Causes, Effects, and Consequents.  
There resteth to accomplish our intended method, that we add somewhat touching that wherewith an Arbitrement is compared, matched and resembled in the Book Cases.  
Wherhfore know you that,  
Chacun Accord resemble un Arbitrement. 
Paria. Differentia.   
Vncore chacun Accord doit este satisfy ou Recompense; et Accord ne done Action; lou del altar part Arbitrement pur que les parties sont adjudge de paier deniers, done action; & ne besoigne deste plead, execute come devant ad apparus, 6. Hen. 7.11. b. 5. Ed. 4.7. a. 17. Ed. 4.2. b. 17. Ed. 4.8. a. Com. 6. a. Fogossa.  
And thus fare forth for example sake, have we set out these Grounds & Rules of Arbitrements: Whereunto if there were added, in their due places, the residue of the Rules & grounds which may be collected out of the books of the Law concerning the same, and furnishing both these and them with as many Cases as might be applied thereunto; the same Cases being put at large under every of their Rules, to demonstrate that in particular, which the Rule includeth in general, the enterprise would prove (as I think) some show of a Treatise, concerning this Title.  
Which being no hard thing to accomplish, thereby would appear that it were neither impossible neither unprofitable, nor altogether unpleasant, to reduce every title of the Law particularly to a Method; and so consequently, the whole body thereof into a perfect shape, which now seemeth wholly without Conformity, and altogether dismembered.  
Wherhfore now, as touching the Material Cause of Rules and Grounds, thus much said, may suffice.   

Formal Causes and Grounds of the Law.  
THe divisions of grounds of the law, as touching and concerning the form, are in two sorts to be considered. 1, First, the Coherence of the words and the Matter. 2, Secondly, the manner of the Manifestation thereof.  
For the Coherence of the matter and words, there are to be regarded these two qualities: 

1. First, Verity, and  
2. Secondly, Amplitude or Generality.    
Verity of Propositions or Grounds consisteth of two sorts: For they import either a necessary or known truth which cannot be impugned: Or Contingent Verity or Probability, which may sometimes notwithstanding their show of truth, be impeached of falsehood, and so be subject unto many exceptions.  
The former of these are called primary Conclusions of Reason. And the latter Secondary Principles.  
1, Those of the first sort are such general assertions of the Law, as are imprinted in the mind of every Man, and discerned by the light of very Nature itself: which, as most certain and undoubted, need no confirmation or fortification, but of themselves are most sufficiently known to be true and not impugnable: which the Philosophers do call, Primae & per se cognitae; Communes animi Conceptiones & Notitiae, familiar to the conceit of every person.    

Notes Collected touching the Verity of Principles.  
PRincipiorum, 
Arist. lib. 1. Dem. cap. 25 T. 43.  Alia sunt necessaria, Alia in rebus contingentibus cernuntur. Axioma verum, est, quando pronunciat ut Res est.  
Axioma verum est, 
Peter Ramus li. 2. dial. c. 3.  aut 

Contingens.  
Necessitans.    
Necessarium Axioma, 
Peter Ramus ibidem. Arist. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1.  quando semper verum est; nec falsum esse potest. Vnde Aristoteles, Vera quidem sunt & perspicua ea, quae non ab alijs sed à seipsis sidem habent.   

De primis Principijs.  
PRincipia nihil aliud sunt quam Propositiones immediatae.  
Ego propria cujusque generis Principia appello, 
Arist. lib. 1. dem. cap. 8. T. 24.  quae, quod sint, Demonstratione probari non possunt: (Name, quae sit verborum vis & significatio, tum Principiorum, tum eorum quae ex Principijs efficiuntur, intelligendum est) Quod verò ipsa sint Principia, citra demonstrationem ponitur; Reliqua autem Demonstratione concluduntur.  
Prima et principia pro eodem sumo. 
Arist lib. 1. dem. c. 2. T. 5  Est autem Principium demonstrationis Propositio, quae ob id immediata dicitur, quoniam nulla est alia prior per quam ipsa confirmari possit.  
Primaria principia dicuntur universalia quaedam I●ris pronunciata, 
Io. Coras. de Arte juris. lib. cap. 24.  quae omnibus hominibus ita sunt impressa naturaliter & infixa, ut, velut indubitata & notissima, non alia egeant Demonstratione, aut certè levi aliqua probatione Confirmentur.  
Vnde et Communes animi Conceptiones et Notitiae appellantur quod suapte vi & perspicua sit & evidens horum Principiorum veritas & Natura, 
Ibidem.  quasi sine aliqua Dubitatione & Contradictione veluti ab omnibus Concessa, in disputatione sumantur.  
Of which sort for Example are some of them before mentioned, and here again to be remembered in this behalf, in manner following.  
Volenti non fit injuria.  
Omne majus continet in se minus.  
Qui sentit Commodum sentire debet & onus.  
Fraus & dolus nemini patrocinantur.  
With infinite other in universal manner proposed, and with not a few in special set forth; As in Grants, as afore hath been declared.  
Quando aliquis quid concedit, & id etiam concedit sine quo res concessa esse non potest.  
In Testaments.  
Testamentum est morte confirmatum. 
Com. Gri●sbr. 280. b.   
In Rents.  
Chacun Rent est issuant horse de terre.  
With exceeding many other of like nature to be found in every title or tractate of the Law. The manifest truth and great Reason of which said Grounds is evident to every person of any judgement, and need no proof for demonstration and establishing of them.  
2 Secondary Principles, are certain Axioms? Rules, and Grounds of the Law, which are not so well known by the light of Nature, as by other means: and which although they need no great proof to be confirmed; because they comprehend great probability; yet many times are they, at the first show, not yielded unto without due consideration: and are peculiarly known, for the most part, to such only as profess the study and speculation of Laws.  
Probable they are said to be, 
Probabilia sunt quae probant, aut onibus, aut plurimis, aut certe sapientibus atque ijs vel omnibus vel plurimis vel ijs quorum spectata est & perspecta sapientia. Arist. Top. lib. 2. c. 1. Doctor and Student l. 1. c. 5. f. 10. a.  because, although the manifest truth of them be unknown, yet nevertheless they appear to many, and especially to wise men, to be true.  
And of this sort in the Laws of the Realm there are so many found, that some men have affirmed, that all the Law of the Realm is the Law of Reason: because they are derived out of the general Customs, and Maxims, or Principles of the Law of Nature or Primary conclusions.  
And for the knowledge of these Propositions there is a greater difficulty; and therefore therein dependeth much the manner and form of Arguments in the Laws of England.   

Notes collected touching the difference between primary and Secondary Prinples.  
PRincipia immediata quae in demonstrationibus accipiuntur, 
Arist. l. 1. c. 2 T. 5.  in duo genera distribui possunt.  
Vnum eorum quae quanquam demonstrari non possunt, non tamen it a aperta, & per se manifesta sunt, ut necesse sit ante cognita esse ei qui artem aliquam discere velit, quas nos Positiones appellamus.  
Altero genere continentur ea, quaeita sunt per se perspicua, ut non possint non esse, omnibus multò ante cognita, & perspecta quam quicquam doceatur; quae Pronunciata dicuntur.  
To like effect speaketh Aristotle in another place, Ea pro initio & proposito sumenda sunt.  

1 Quae in omnibus.  
2 Velure certe in plurimis rebus inesse videntur.   
The former sort Aristotle seemeth to call, as afore shown, Pronunciata, the other Propositiones.  
And although in the Law of the Realm, they are indifferently called, without distinction, Rules, Principles, Grounds, Maxims, Eruditions, and such like: yet the judgement of Massaeus herein is worthy observation.  
Accursius videtur non parum aberravisse à vero, 
Ant. Massaeus l. 1. de exercitio juris peritorum.  cùm idem significare voluerit Principa, Maximas, & Regulas; cùm (Aristotele auctore) icuiusque scientiae principia sunt quaedam propria, quae quod vera sint non contingit demonstari, & quae per se, & non per alia fidem habent, quoniam nihil prius superiùsque in ea scientia est per quod confirmari explicarique possint.  
Talium autem Principiorum, nonnulla sunt positiones, alia dignitates, sic dictae, ob id quod jure illis fides habenda sit, cùm ea unusquisque audita statim admittit: quale est istud: Totum unumquodlibet majus est aliqua sua parte. Hae rursus appellantur Maximae, Propositiones, & Communes animi conceptiones; quod multorum scilicet intellectu facile percipiantur. Tales autem non sunt Regulae; quae licet sint universalia Praecepta, indigent tamen probatione, & probaripossunt: Nec tamen auditae admittuntur.  
He seemeth to attribute the name of Principles, Axioms, and Maxims to the first sort, and the name of Rules to the second.  
Of the secondary Principles or Rules there are two kinds. Some deduced and drawn from the usual and ordinary disposition of things (as hath been before declared) and by the observation of humane nature dispersed in the minds of men, collected by long observation: Whereof some are altogether upheld in the Law upon common presumption, and intendment: Others do rest upon discourse of Reason deducted in Argument. But of the former, some are such, as although they are but probable, and import no certain truth, and therefore may notwithstanding be sometimes untrue: yet nevertheless for the great likelihood of them in humane actions, and the better to frame a conformity, through the whole body of the Law, the said Laws permit no allegation to impugn them, or any speech or averment to impeach their credit.   

The first sort of Secondary Rules grounded upon entendment.  
OThers there are also that depend upon entendment: But of the former kind, this is one, grounded upon natural affection.  
La ley ne voit presume que ascun voit lede son heir, 
Com. Sharington & Pledal.  ou auter que est prochein de son sanck, mes que il voit plus toft advance luy.  
Which Ground, upon the presumption of natural affection, is not such, as that it soundeth always true; (for in diverse persons nature worketh diversely) Wherhfore although this assertion show how every man should be affected, notwithstanding it is no proof that all men are so affected. And yet nevertheless this strong entendment of Law, doth not permit any thing to impeach the same; and will not suffer any person bound by collateral warranty (the reason whereof floweth herehence) to traverse such affection, although there be never so pregnant proof to encounter the same.   

Notes touching the Definition, Division, and necessary Consequents of Secondary Principles.  
IVris Praecepta secundaria sunt certa quaedam Axiomata & Definitiones seu Regulae, 
johannes Corasius de juris arte cap. 26. lib. 1.  quae non tam naturâ quam civili aliquâ ratione & authoritate, aut communi mortalium usu per hominum animos diffunduntur.  
Quae etsi plerumque vera sunt, nec valdè egeant demonstratione; non tamen ita, priusquam pressius considerentur ab illis cognoscuntur qui nostrae scientiae dant operam. Quapropter, levialiqua & verisimili ratione, ut ijs assentiantur, opus est.  
See the manner and means how they are inferred by discourse out of the general Customs or Principles of Reason, 
Doctor and Student l. 1. c. 5. fol. 10.  and the example thereof used by the Author of the Dialogues of the Doctor and Student.  
Presumption or Entendment of Law, whereupon certain of the secondary Rules are grounded (as before is showed) are in two sorts: for species praesumptionum sunt duae: una, quae legitimis probationibus regulariter refutari potest, quam communem licebit appellare: 
joach. Hopp. de juris arte lib. 2. fo. 466.  altera, quaereprobari non potest, quae & specialis rectè fortasse dicetur. Certè magno Reip. bono constituuntur hujusmodi praesumptiones: nec potest fieri ut sine praesumptionibus ulla certa jura, aut ullae certae leges describantur. 
Ibidem.   
Secondary Principles are grounded either upon Entendment of Law, of which sort some are such as do admit of no proof to encounter them, and rest upon Entendment, but yet admit proof to the contrary. Or discourse of reason.  
So likewise the Law upon like common presumption conceived of the acts and behaviour of men, intendeth this Principle.  
Nul home sans cause voile fair act a prejudice soy mesme. 
Com. Manxel. 6. a.   
And hereupon the Law presumeth that every assertion and allegation proceeding from any person which soundeth to his prejudice and hurt, is so undoubtedly true, as that there shall not be suffered any travers or denial of the same. Wherhfore if in a Praecipe quod reddat brought of twenty acres of Land against one, and he, before the Statute of Conjunctim feoffatis, had pleaded joint-tenancy with another of deed; or sithence the said Statute, if he had pleaded joint-tenancy by Fine with another; although the Plea be utterly false, yet shall not the demandant have any answer or travers thereunto; because that when the demandant by his Writ hath admitted him Tenant of the whole; and he saith that he was joyntenant with another; this other, if he be false, may stop the Tenant by this Record; To say the contrary of his affirmation, and thereby may gain the Moiety of the land, against him that hath so pleaded: And therefore, for that, that men are not wont to tell untruths in disadvantage of themselves; and that the saying hereof if it were not true, will greatly be to the prejudice and hurt of him that affirmed it; thereupon the Law presumeth, that it was true indeed; and will in no wise admit the travers against the same; or give the demandant ability to impugn it; but hereupon presently, the Writ shall abate, and no maintenance of the writ for the cause aforesaid, shall be allowed.  
In like manner also unto matters of Record the entendment of law doth give an impeachable credit; And hereof also this rule of Law is drawn.  
Matters de Record import in eux (per presumption del ley, 
Com. Ludford. 491. b.  pur leur hautnesse) credit.  
And therefore none shall be permitted to say that the King's Patent under the great Seal was made or delivered at any other time then that wherein it beareth date; Not more than a man may say, That a Recognizance or Statute Marchant or Staple, was acknowledged, or any Writ was purchased at any other time, then that wherein it beareth Date. For an averment that it was antedated, or that it was delivered or acknowledged after the date, is an averment tending to the discredit of the great Seal, or of the justice or Officer of Record which recorded the Recognizance, or the Statute Merchant, or such like.  
In the dealings and affairs of Men, 
Lambers' justice of Peace lib. 1. cap. 13.  one Man may affirm a thing which another may deny. But if a Record once say the word, no man shall be received to aver; speak against it; or impugn the same. Not though such Record contain manifest and known falsehood, tending to the mischief and overthrow of any person. 
38. Ass. 21.   
And therefore whereas certain persons were Outlawed in the King's bench, in the time of Shared justice, and their goods forfeit, and their names likewise certified into the Exchequer with an abstract of their goods, It happened so that the name of one (by misprision of the Clerk) was, among the rest certified likewise into the Exchequer, as outlawed, and that he had goods to the value of six pounds, whereas indeed the same man was not outlawed. And thereupon a writ issued to the Sheriff of that County, where the said good ss were supposed to be, to seize the same to the use of the King, who returned that a Nobleman had seized the same goods; And thereupon issued forth another Writ out of the Exchequer, to 'cause him to answer the same goods so seized by him, who upon the Return of the second Writ, alleged, that the party whose goods he had seized, was not outlawed: And Greene, one of the justices of the King's bench came into the Exchequer with the person who was supposed outlawed, and there testified that he was not outlawed; but shown, that that which was certified, was done altogether by the misprision of the Clerk: Where Skipwith returned him this answer; That although all the justices would now record the contrary, that they could not be permitted, nor any credit might be given thereunto, when as there was a Record extant, and not Reversed, testifying the same Out-lawry: yea, the Law so mightily upholdeth the intended Credit of a Record, that it preferreth the same before the oaths of men, sounding to the contrary, and in respect thereof, will not permit a verdict to be received, which might impeach the same.  
And therefore whereas one brought a Writ of waste, 
9 Hen. 6.56. . b  and assigned the waist in diverse particular things, & moreover in a Message & Tenements in Wood-Church; where among other wastes assigned, the Plaintiff shown, that the Defendant had done and permitted waste in the Hall of the said Message, etc. The Defendant pleaded in this Action, that Woodchurch was a Hamlet of A. and no Town of itself. Which plea includeth a Confession of the waste to have been done in such manner as was declared. And upon this plea, the parties were at issue; with the which the jury were charged: And further it was given them in charge, that if they found that Woodchurch was a Town of itself, and no Hamlet of A: as the Plaintiff had supposed, that then they should assign damages severally for every waste committed. The jury at length found, that Woodchurch was a Hamlet of itself, and assessed damages for certain of the particular wastes supposed severally, as they aught. And as touching the waist supposed to be done in the said Hall, they said there was no such Message. The judges rejected their verdict, because it was contrary to that which was employed by the Plea of the Defendant of Record: and so enforced the jury to give damages for a waist: which (indeed) was not done contrary to the Conscience of the jury; notwithstanding that some of them made protestation, that in so doing they might be perjured: Which wholly was done only to uphold the credit of the Record; and that the verdict (of Record) might not be contrary to that which was employed by the Plea of the parties.  
Moreover, there is a Rule of Law wholly grounded upon Entendment, which is this;  
Livery deal fait sera intent in le lieu ou le date fuit.  
The delivery of a Deed shall be intended to be where it beareth date.  
Which Rule the Law upholdeth for certain truth, (although in very deed it may be at sometimes untrue) And therefore will not permit any proof which may impeach the intended truth of the said proposition. For confirmation whereof, a notable case cited in the 31. Hen. 6. and by way of Argument alleged in Fogassa his Case, 
31. H. 6. Con. Fogassa. 7. b.  may be produced; which was in this manner. An Action of Debt was brought upon a Deed; The Defendant denied the same; whereupon the parties were at issue; and the witnesses produced to prove the Deed were examined, where the Deed was delivered: who answered: At York; which was in another County then where the said Deed bore Date; And hereupon the Defendant demurred: And after upon consideration, judgement was given against the Plaintiff in overthrow of the Action founded upon that Deed; which cannot be intended to be delivered else where then at the place where it beareth Date.  
Many Examples may be further produced to like effect, to prove that diverse Rules there are received in the Law which upon presumption and common Entendment, to eschew some notable mischief or inconvenience, are so holden for Truth, that in no wise they shall be encountered; although indeed, as occasion may fall out, they do contain manifest and apparent falsehood. But these already in that respect alleged may abundantly suffice for example.  
Of like nature also there are in the Law other kind of Rules or principles; 
The second sort of Secondary rules grounded upon entendment  which although, they do concern contingent matters; and therefore may sometimes be impeached, and found untrue; Yet do they carry a kind of Credit also upon presumption or Entendment of Law, although not so vehement as the former.  
Wherhfore although the Law doth receive them Prima fancy, and at the first show, as likely, and giveth credit unto the Assertion contained in them, yet nevertheless doth it admit proof to the contrary, and so suffereth such presumption or Entendment, which upholdeth such Rules, to be impeached, and controlled by a contrary trial by pregnant proof, and so doth permit any averment to be made against the same. For Example: It is a Rule in Law that a Verdict sera intenda touts foits uray tanque il est revers pur ceo que il est issint trove per serement de 12. homes. 
20. H. 7.11. b Coningsby.   
A verdict shall be intended always true, till it be reversed, for that it is so found by the oath of twelve men.  
And hereupon it is agreed for Law, 
5. H. 7.22. b.  That if a judgement be given erroneously, the party grieved thereby shall not only have his writ of Error to redress the same, but also a supersedeas, to Countermand execution thereupon. But if judgement be given upon a verdict, although the same verdict be untrue, and the party grieved do bring his writ of Attaint; Yet nevertheless he shall not in that case have a supersedeas to stay execution, for the intended truth, which the Law supposeth in the said verdict. And yet the Law permitteth the falsehood in verdicts to be laid open, & punisheth them with great severity, 33. Hen. 8.196. Brooks case, 4. Ed. 6. Com. 49.  
If a Writ of Conspiracy be brought against one for that he gave evidence before the justice of Peace at their Sessions, 
20. H. 7.11. b. Coninsby.  concerning the suspicion of a Felony supposed to be done by the Plaintiff, upon which Evidence the Plaintiff was indicted of the said Felony; and after found Not guilty by a jury of twelve Men; It is no plea in this writ of Conspiracy for the Defendant to say, that the Plaintiff was guilty of the Felony, for that were to encounter the verdict; which shall be intended true.  
And although the Law do give Credit to all verdicts, 
Com. Wrotsley. 193. b.  yet doth it not foreclose the party grieved thereby, but permitteth him to impugn it, and to impeach it of falsehood, if he can, by his writ of Attaint.  
Also there is a Rule in the Law, That  
Feesimple ou altar estate certain convey a un scra intent de continuer in le person in que il est repose, touts foits durant mesme l'estate.  
An estate of inheritance or other estate certain conveyed to a man, shall be intended to continued in the person wherein it was reposed always during the continuance of the said estate.  
Although this for Law be Prima fancy intended true; yet nevertheless thereunto this must be added, viz.  
Si ne soit monster comment auterment ceo est divist.  
If it be not showed otherwise how it is divised.  
By thus much said, it is sufficiently made manifest, that some propositions, Rules and Grounds of the Law are intended true; but yet proof is allowed to encounter the same.  
So hitherto hath been spoken of the Verity of Propositions; whereof some are indeed and nature manifest true, and grounded on necessary reason; and other some are true also, but upon matter contingent.  
Contingent verity, was said to be of two kinds. The one grounded on common Presumption and entendment of the Laws, which likewise was subdivided into two branches. Some of them such as do not admit any Contradiction to impugn them; For the certain supposed truth (though indeed not always found in them, yet always deemed by them) alloweth no control; The other sort of Rules resting upon Entendment, are such as are Prima fancy supposed true, but yet no otherwise supposed true then till the contrary be proved, and they impeached of falsehood: Of both which there hath been showed sufficient examples.  
Now therefore in order followeth the second principal part of Contingent Propositions or grounds framed upon observation of Nature, 
The second principal kind of contingent Propositions.  and disposition of things, collected and drawn by discourse of Reason, because it cannot be equally evident to every Man's capacity. And for as much as the said discourse and manner of reasoning, through the weakness of man's understanding, and difficulty of the matter, may fail and be oftentimes deceived in some circumstances which may and daily do occur through the variety of particular matter, which again (in Reason) may offer a contrary resolution; Therefore are those Grounds not universally true, but subject to many and manifold exceptions: And yet nevertheless true in all such Cases as are not comprehended under those Restraints or Exceptions. Of which kind we mentioned some in the beginning; as namely; 

1, Sublata Causa tollitur Effectus.  
2, Qui tacet consentire videtur.  
3, Quod initio non valet, tractu temporis non convalescit.  
4, Quando duo Iura in uno concurrunt, aequum est ●●si esset in diversis.   Every of which with many other of the like nature, though they be of themselves, upon the first view of great Probability; yet nevertheless, being with more earnest consideration pondered, are found not so firm as they seem, but are subject to some controlment, and to be impeached with sundry instances and exceptions. Of such like the number is in manner infinite: at the lest many thousands in our Law, which are published in the French.  
Nest Loyal pur ascun de enter in le terre del altar sans son licence. 
12. H. 8.2. b. Eliot.   
It is not lawful to enter in another man's ground without Licence.  
Descent de Estate d'inheritance in terr, toll le entry de cesty que droit ad.  
The descent of an estate of inheritance in lands taketh away his entry which hath right.  
But these few shall suffiice in this place for an example.  
Wherhfore for as much as the mind of man is beautified with two faculties or powers in quality different, though flowing from that which is in nature indivisible; whereof the one we now call for distinction sake (Capacity) and the other (Discourse.  
By the former of which we apprehended, as with the inward eye, the natural light and resplendency of many Primary Propositions, and known Notions; whose clearness and evidence causeth every one to yield thereto their consent.  
And by the later we do Collect, Reason, Argue, and infer of those former Notions and Resolutions, certain Secondary Propositions, descended and derived from the first, as branches from the Root, or Rivers from the Fountain; which by how much the more they are drawn from their spring, by so much the more (by reason of the variety of interposed circumstances) they are oftentimes obscured and made less clear and evident.  
And sith that every Science is not of like certainty, 
Ethicae ver● supponitur quasi moralis scientiae, quia tractat de moribus. Bracton l. 1. c. 2.4. b. Arist. Ethic. l. 1. c. 3.  by reason of the variable condition of the subject whereupon it is employed; so that rightly of Moral Philosophy (consisting wholly of man's changeable and inconstant conversation, and from whence indeed, the knowledge of all Laws are in a generality derived, and thereto to be referred) said the Philosopher Aristotle right well, in excuse of his purposed Method in the delivery of the same, That Doctrina discernens honesta & turpia, tantis dubitationum fluctibus concutitur, ut multis lege tantum & opinion, non naturâ, constitutum esse jus videatur. It followeth me thinketh, of necessity, that it is scarcely possible to make any secondary Rule of Law, but that it shall fail in some particular case: whence springeth this often used assertion, Non est Regula quin fallat: And therefore the Ordainers and Interpreters of Law, respect rather those things which may often happen; and not every particular circumstance, for the which though they would, they should not be able by any positive Law to make provision.  
By reason whereof they do permit the Rules, Axioms, and Propositions of the common Law, upon discourse & disputation of reason, to be restrained by exceptions; which are grounded upon two causes. The one is Equity: the other is some other Rule or Ground of Law, which seemeth to encounter the Ground or Rule proposed: wherein, for conformities sake, and that no absurdity or contradiction be permitted, certain exceptions are framed, which do not only knit and conjoin one Rule in reason to another, but by means of their equity, temper the rigour of the Law, which upon some certain circumstances in every of the said Rules might happen and fall out: 
Bract. l. 1. c. 5  Et omnia benè coaequiparat, as saith Bracton.  
And therefore the Author of the Dialogues between the Doctor and Student, 
Lib. 1. ca 16.  describeth equity according to this the effect thereof here mentioned: which is, that it is no other thing, but an exception of the Law of God, or of Reason from the general rules of the Law of man, when they by reason of their generality, would in any particular case, judge against the Law of God, or the Law of Reason: The which exception is secretly understood in every general Rule of every positive Law. And a little after, in the same place affirmeth, That equity followeth the Law in all particular cases, where right and justice requireth, notwithstanding that the general Rule of the Law be to the contrary.  
And the exception so framed upon any Rule or Ground to the which it is annexed, doth not impeach the credit of the said Ground; but being included therein, as aforesaid, Format Regulam in omnibus casibus non exceptis.  
But jest some men might think, 
L. quaesit. ff. de fundo instructo.  that whatsoever is spoken in the said Dialogues touching equity, might be only understood of that equity which either enlargeth or restraineth Statute Laws, and of which M. Plowden in his Appendix unto the Argument of the case of Eston and Studd, in his second Commentaries so largely out of Aristotle, and Bracton discourseth. There followeth in the same place of the said Dialogues, and in the chapter next ensuing are proposed two Axioms, Grounds, or Rules, with their exceptions, there put for example, and which do tend to the purpose and proof of that whereof we now speak.  
And because that those said Rules there mentioned are last of all here for example before proposed, it shall be requisite first of all to furnish every of them with examples.  
But yet for the better understanding of that which is behooveful to be known concerning equity in general, we are to note that every Rule with his exceptions or (to speak otherwise in words) every received difference in the Law (being indeed nothing but a Rule or Ground and his exceptions) doth either flow from equity, or else result of the combining of two Rules together, as before hath been declared.  
The use therefore of equity is triple in our Law: 
The triple use of equity in the Laws.  For 

1 Either it keepeth the common Law in conformity by means here mentioned.  
2 Or it expoundeth the Statute Law.  
3 Or thirdly giveth remedy in the Court of Conscience in cases of extremity, which otherwise by the Laws are left unredressed.    
Wherhfore as all men endued with the right use of reason, and conversant in the knowledge of any Law, must of necessity confess, that every Law doth stand upon permanent Rules, as of Iron not to be bend or broken upon this or that occasion, or to be infringed upon this or that occurrence (for else there need no Court of Law, but all should be one with the Court of Conscience, and have their proceed framed according to the Arbitrary conceit of the judge.) So likewise nevertheless, upon every circumstance of time, person, place, and the manner of doing, there falleth out such matter of equity, that if Law should be pursued according to the settled Rules thereof, Summum jus (as Cicero saith) would prove Summa injuria: wherefore Law without equity were rigour. And yet again, of the other side, if all Laws should change and be controlled as often in every case as equity would require, than should there be (as aforesaid) not Law certain. And therefore it standeth with good reason, that the common Law in some cases, should allow and follow equity, as fare forth as the costancy of the Law would permit, and for the better conformity of one Rule thereof with another: which common Law again in other cases should refuse equity for the better avoiding of confusion.   

EQuity therefore in all the use thereof, and in every of the threefold before mentioned observations hath a double Office, Effect, or Function.  
Sometimes it doth amplify.  
Sometimes again (when reason will) it doth diminish or extenuate.  
A description of the former is that which Bracton yields, Aequitas est rerum convenientia quae in paribus causis paria desiderat jura, & omnia bene coaequiparat, & dicitur aequitas quasi aequalitas. 
Lib. 1. c. 4. ¶ 5.   
This enlargeth the common Law; for it teacheth to proceed in the same from one case to another like thereunto; and so to proceed, 
Com. 467.  that Si aliqua nova & inconsueta emerserint, & quae priùs usitata non fuerint in regno; si tamen similia evenerint, per simile judicentur; 
Bracton li. 1. cap. 2. ¶. 7.  cum bona sit occasio à similibus procedere ad similia.  
And therefore these cases differing never so much in circumstance, so that they do concur in reason, should be ruled after one and the self same manner. For, Vbi est eadem ratio, idem jus statuendum est. But hereof we shall hereafter have more ample occasion to speak, when we take in hand the last of Aristotle's before remembered observations; namely Similitudinum collectionem, or cognitionem.  
This equity moreover in Statutes enlargeth the letter to cases not comprehended within the words; if nevertheless they do stand in equal mischief.  
Lastly, in all cases of mischief, for redress whereof Positive Law or ordinary Rules of Law are defective; equity extendeth forth her hand in the Court of Conscience to help therein the said defect of the Laws.  
The second kind of equity doth again of the other side restrain the ample or general rules of the common Laws by ministering exceptions, in like manner as is before remembered.  
And in Statute Law it doth also limit the overlarge letter, drawing it wholly to, and keeping it within the bounds of the intent and meaning of the makers.  
In the Court of Conscience it giveth likewise comfort, considereth all the circumstances of the fact, and is as it were tempered with the sweetness of mercy, and mitigateth the rigour of the common Law; and leaving the inflexible stiff Iron rule, taketh in hand the Leaden Lesbian rule: which being rightly swayed in cases of extremity, and therein, enjoining the common Law of her straight proceeding, issueth this sentence full of comfort to the afflicted, Nullus recedat à Cancellaria sine remedio. 
4. Hen. 7.   
Wherhfore if the same equity be used in such cases only as are of extremity (as indeed it should) it causeth the Chancellor, into whose hand the managing thereof within this Realm is committed to be in high estimation of honour: 
Cicero in Orat. pro Muraena.  so that In ejus sorte juris dicendi gloriam conciliat magnitudo negotij, gratiam aequitatis largitio; in quâ sorte sapiens Praetor offensionnem vitat aequabilitate decernendi; benevolentiam adjungit lenitate audiendi.  
And thus much by the way hath been spoken of equity, upon the occasion of speech of exceptions which do restrain Rules and Axioms, that the original fountain from whence such exceptions do spring, might the better and more manifestly be conceived.  
And therefore thus much thereof sufficeth, reserving the rest to his due and native place.  
Now we will proceed with the first example published in the said Dialogues of the Doctor and Student, concerning the exceptions attributed and annexed unto Maxims, Rules, and Grounds.  
There is (saith he) a general prohibition in the Laws of England; That  
It is not lawful for any man to enter into possession or freehold of another without authority of the owner, or of the Law. 
The first Ground.   
This Ground may be proved by many particular cases and authorities: for the Law of property would that every man's own should be private and peculiar unto himself; and therefore it is said, That  
Nest loyal all un de enter en mon terre sauns mon licence. 
12. H. 8.2. b. eliot. 21. Hen. 7.27. b. Kingsmel. Reed.   
Lou mes beasts sont damage fesant in altar terr, jeo ne puis enter pur eux enchaser horse ains convient a moy primerment à tender amendss.  
If my beasts be damage pheasant in another's ground, I may not enter and drive them out, but I aught first to tender an amendss.  
Si home ad merisme gisant sur la terr d'un altar, 
21. H. 7.13. b. Reed.  il ne poit justifier le entry in le terr a veyer ceo si soit in bon plight.  
If one have his. timber lying on another's ground, he cannot justify his entry to see his timber in good case.  
Si maison soit lease a moy, 
13. H. 7.9. b.  & jeo mit mon biens en ceo, & puis mon lease expire les dits biens estant in le meason, nest loyal pur moy a ore pur enter en le dit meason de eux prender.  
If a house be leased to me wherein I put my goods, where they lie till the lease be expired, I cannot now enter into the house to take them.  
Si jeo mit mon chival in vostre stable & vous ne voiles ceo deliver a moy, 
14. H. 8.1. b. Brudnel.  & jeo enter & enfrend vostre stable, jeo sera puny pur l'entry, & le enfreinder del stable, mes nemy pur le prisel del chival.  
If I put my horse into your stable, and you will not deliver him unto me; if I enter and break your stable, I shall be punished for entering and breaking the stable, but not for taking my horse.  
Si jeo command un a deliver a vous certain beasts que sont en mon Park, 
18. E. 4.25. a  nest loyal pur vous de enter en mon Park, & prender les dits beasts, ovesque cesti que jeo issent command per reason de cest commandement; car vous purra assets bien eux receiver comment que vous demurs horse deal Park.  
If I command one to deliver you certain cattles out of my Park, it is not lawful for you to enter into my Park with him whom I commanded to deliver them: for you may receive them though you stay without the Park.  
Si jeo bail biens all home, 
9 Ed. 4.35. a 21. H. 7.13.  jeo ne puis justifier l'entry en son meason pur prender les biens, car ceo non fut per nul tort que ils viendra la mes per l'act de nous ambideux.  
If I deliver my goods unto a man, I cannot justify the entering into his house to take them, etc.  
Si le vicont ad fierifacias pur levier deniers recovers verse ascun, 
8. Ed. 4.4. a.  uncore si per force de ceo il ne voile enter et debruser le meason de cesti verse que le recovery fuit, il sera de ceo puny pur cest entry en trespass.  
If the Sheriff hath a fierifacias, to jevie money recovered, if by force thereof he enter, and break the house of the debtor, he is subject to an action of trespass.  
Si un Vicar ad offerings in un Chapel de quel Chapel le franktenement est in moy; 
2. H. 4.24. a.  il ne pur ceo justifiera l'entry et debruser de ma Chapel pur eux prender horse.  
If a Priest have offerings in a Chapel, the freehold of which is in me, he cannot justify the entry and breaking the Chapel to take out his offerings.  
Si home esteant in sa Garren demesn springa un Feasant, 
38. E. 3.10. l  et lessa sa falcon vola a ceo que vola in le Garren d'un altar home, & la prist le pheasant, nest loyal pur le owner del falcon, pur enter in le altar Garren, & de la emporter.  
If a man spring a Pheasant in his own Warren, and let his falcon fly at her, and she flies into another's Warren, and there taketh the Pheasant, he that oweth the Hawk cannot enter into the others ground to take her.  
Having proved the former ground with these sufficient former authorities, let us now descend unto the examination of such exceptions of the said proposition, as may exemplify our former speeches, whereof some certain being orderly delivered and confirmed with some authorities of book cases, I hold it sufficient so to make manifest our meaning at this present; leaving a more exact consideration thereof to more fit place and opportunity.  
We are therefore to conceive that there is an infallible rule of Law, That  
Le Common wealth est destre prefer devan ascun private wealth.  
The Common wealth is to be preferred before any private wealth.  
By reason whereof jest contradiction between the said proposed rule and this now in hand should ensue upon some circumstance which may fall out; therefore the said last specified ground, concerning the benefit of the Common wealth, doth minister an exception for the better understanding of the aforesaid rule proposed, namely, That  
Home poit justify son entre en le franktenement ou sur le possession de un auter si soit pur le benefit deal Common wealth. 
The first Exception.   
A man may justify his entry into another's freehold, if it be for the good and benefit of the Common wealth.  
And therefore these cases following depending thereupon are produced to prove and manifest the same.  
Si jeo vine in vostre terre, et occide un Fox, un Grace, ou un Otter, pur cest entry jeo ne sera my puny, pur ceo que sont beasts encounter le Common profit. 
12. Hen. 8.10. a. Brooke.   
If I come into your ground to kill a Fox, Grace, or Otter, for this entry I shall not be punished; for they are beasts against the common profit.  
Pur le Common wealth meason sera plucked down si le prochein meason soit ardent. 
13. Hen. 8.16. b. Shelley.   
For the good of the Commonwealth an house shall be pulled down if the next be fired.  
Et Suburbs deal City seront plucked down in temps de Guerr, pur ceo que ceo est pur le common wealth: 
8. Ed. 4.35. b Littleton.  Et choose que est pur le common wealth chascune poit fair sans aver action.  
And the suburbs of a City shall be razed in the time of war: And that which is for the good and profit of the Common wealth any man may do without danger of another's action.  
Home justifiera son entry in altar terr in temps de Guerr pur fair Bulwark in defence del Realm, 
21. H. 7. b. Kingsmil.  Et ceux choses sont justifiable & loyal pur maintenance del Commonwealth.  
A man may justify his going into another man's ground in time of war to make a Bulwark in defence of the Realm, etc.  
Pur felony, 
13. Ed. 4.9. a  ou pur suspicion de felony home poit debruser meason pur prender le fellow, car il est pur le Commonwealth pur prender eux.  
For felony or suspicion thereof a man may break a house to take the Felon; For it is the good of the Commonwealth, to have him taken: With such like.  
Moreover because there is another Rule of Law, That  
Nul prendra benefit de son torts demesne.  
No man shall take benefit of his own wrong.  
And sometimes it falleth out that men, through malice to have others in danger, would not stick to lay a train to entrap them, to the intent, that they might, by some colour, for their further vexation, prosecute suit against them; To uphold the Conformity of Law: upon those two grounds, that one of them do not encounter the other, there is a second Exception to the former Rule namely, That  
Si home soit le Cause pur que un tortuous Entry est fait sur son Possession, 
The second Exception.  il navera de ceo Remedy: mes le party que ad issent enter, sur le matter disclose poit aid luy mesme & justify tiel Entry.  
If a Man be the cause that a wrongful Act or Entry be made upon his possession, he shall have no remedy for it, but the party who hath entered may disclose the matter to justify his entry.  
Home add un Molyn, 
9 Ed. 4.35. ab.  & l'eaw courge per le terr d'une altar all dit Molyn, le Tenant del terre mice stakes deins le dit eaw sur que il edify un meason, per reason de quel l'eaw ne poit vener cy bien al dit Molin come devant: Le Tenant del Molyn enter en la dit terre, & enrasa les stakes, per que la dit Meison eschew: Et in Trespass pur entry en la dit terr & enraser la meason; tout cest matter pur avoider le dit Nusance fuit plede per le defendant & tenus bon justification.  
A Man hath a Mill, and the water running to it cometh through another's ground, and he fasteneth stakes upon the ground in the water, and buildeth an house; by reason whereof the water cometh not to the Mill, as well as in time past, the Miller entereth unto the others ground and breaketh down the stakes, and thereby the house falleth; If the other bring an Action of trespass against him, for this, he may show that he did it, to avoid wrong done to himself, and justify the deed.  
Home aver pris les beasts de I S. & eux impound in sa terre, & vint un pur Replevy mesme les beasts, 
20. Hen. 6.28. a.  Et pur ceo que cest que ad eux destreine ne voilet suffer les beasts deste Replevy, il ove arks & sagitts, sagitta al cesti que vint pur eux replevy-esteant in le port de mesme le close, lou ills fuere impound, pur que il pur doubt enfreint le close in altar lieu, & enchase horse les avers que fueront impound; Et per cest entry et infriender del Close, le Plaintiff port trespass, Et sur tout cest matter disclose ceo, semble bone justification.  
A man having taken I. S. his goods, and impounded them in his own ground, a Replevin was brought for those Cattles, and he that destrained them would not suffer any Replevin to be made, but standing in the gate of the Close where the Cattles were impounded, shot at him that came to make the Replevin, whereupon the broke the Close in another place, and drew forth the said beasts: For which breaking the Plaintiffs Close, he brought an Action of trespass; but upon this matter disclosed, it was taken for a good justification.  
In travers, 
21. Hen. 6.39. b.  le defendant dit, que pur ceo que le Plaintiff violet aver le defendant in son danger, i'll command un son servant de chaser les beasts de defendant in les blees deal plaintiff mesme, & le defendant cy hasti ment que il avoit notice de ceo, il enter en le dit terre le Plaintiff, 
9 Ed. 4.35. a Littleton.  et eux enchase horse: Et ceo fuit tenus bon Plea nient amountant all general issue.  
In an Action of trespass, the Defendant said, that because the Plaintiff would have the defendant within his danger, he commanded one of his servants to drive the Defendants beasts into the Plaintiffs Corn; And the Defendant as soon as he had notice thereof, entered into the Plaintiffs Close, and drove them out; This was taken for a good Plea, and not amounting to the general issue.  
In travers pur entry in le close, 
37. Hen. 6.37. a.b.  etc. Deal Plaintiff le defendant justifiera, pur ceo que le Defendant fuit Chivanchant en le roial chimin que gisoit pres le meason del Plaintiff, quand il vint la encounter la dit mese, la vient le Plaintiff ove Arke et sagitts et fist un assault sur le defendant, pur que il avoid son Chival, & fua in le dit mese, & ouster in le dit close; Et puis reveint in le dit chimin. Et ceo fuit tenus bon justification, si il voile add a ceo que le Chymin est in mesme le ville que le meason est, ou in quel ville ceo est, & que le huis del meal fut evert altemps: per que le defendant issint dist accordant.  
In an Action of Traverse for entering into the Plaintiffs close, the Defendant justified, for that he riding in the King's high way, which lay near to the Plaintiffs house, the Plaintiff set upon the Defendant, when he came near against the Plaintiffs house, and assaulted him with bow and Arrows; Whereupon he forsook his horse and fled into the house, and so through it into his Close, and after returned into the high way; And this was taken for a good justification, if he had showed further that the high way was in the same town where the house was, and shown in what town the house was, and that the door of the house was open, etc.  
Moreover, where there is a ground or rule of Law, as hath been often before remembered, That  
Quando aliquis quid concedit, & id concedere videtur sine quo res concessa esse non potest.  
Hereof ensueth a third Exception to be annexed unto the said former Ground: in this manner,  
Si home ad interest ou authority derive de ascun person, owner, & possessor deal soil: 
The third Exception.  le quel cesty a que le interest ou authority est done, ne poit accomply sans Entry in la terr ou mease de cesti que issent done lafoy interest ou authority, la son entry est imply in la dit interest ou authority: Et pur tlel cause son entry la sera justifiable.  
Le Abbe de Hyde fait lease d'un ferm rendant Rent a son Monastery de Hyde, 
Com. Kidn. & Brand. 71. a.  tandem le dit Monastery vient al mains le Roy, Hen. 8. per le statute de Dissolutions, que puis ceo grant ouster all estranger: le lessee del dit ferme poit bien venir al dit Monastery la a tender la dit Rent, Et cesti que ad le possession de ceo navera eint travers pur tiel entry.  
Si A: 
Com. Kidw. & Brand. 71. b.  soit tenus a B: in un obligation the 20. l. pur pair a luy 10. l. a tiel jour la intent que nul lieu est expres pur le payment, A: est tenus a querer B. inquocumque lieu que il soit: Et si B: est in son meason demesne, & vient a luy la, & tender le argent, il ne sera trespasser pur le vener la Mes sil ust este in la meason de ascun altar home, la il seroit trespasser all dit home: Mes in l'auter cas intant que il fut assentant que il paiera a luy les dits deniers, & in ceo fut il containe que il fut assentant que il vener a luy pur ceo purpose: il ensuitt ex consequenti que il ne puniera luy pur ceo chose a que luy mesme fut privy & agreement.  
Si jeo enfeoff G. & face litre d'attorney a C. a deliver seisin a G: 
18. E. 4.25. b  pur le veinder sur la terre, et pur l'entry fait per G. de prender la livery, G. ne sera punish in trespass; car il est impossibile que il receivera livery si non il entra in le terre, et il est imply in le fesance del feoffment que il viendra sur la terr de prender Livery.  
Si home moy grant pur fodder in son terre, 
9 Ed. 4.25. a.  & de fair un trenche de tiel font ou spring jusques a mon place, si puis le Pipe est estopp ou enfreint issint que l'eau issue horse, 
13. H. 8.15. b ●●nglefield.  jeo ne poi fodder in son terre pur mender le Pipe, car ceo ne fut grant, a moy, etc. Mes cest opinion fut deny per tout le Court, car fut dit, que il poit enter & fodder pur ceo mender, pur ceo que est incident a tell grant a ceo discoverer & d'amender. 
9 Hen. 6.29. b.   
In travers pur entry en un meason le defendant dit que long temps devant le trespas que A. fut seisi del dit meason in fee, & que ceo est in tiel ville & devisable per testament, per que le dit A devise le dit maison a un fem in tail, & que sil devy sans issue que son Executor ceo vendroit, & fait le defendant son Executor & devy, lafoy fem entermary ove le Plaintiff & puis devy sans issue, pur que le defendant enter sur le poss: le Plaintife a voir, si fut bien repaire alintent de scavoir a quel value le reversion fut a vender, & ceo fut tenus bone justification.  
In Trespass pur Entry in meason & prisel deal bient le defendant dit que le Baron del Plaintiff fut possesses des dits biens & fuit seisy del dit meason in fee, 
2. Hen. 6.15. b. 16. a.  et fait le defendant, & altar says Executours, et devy possesses des dits biens, & le defendant vint al dit meason apres la mort le testator pur administer & trovant huys del dit meason overt il enter & priest les biens, et ceo fut tenus bon Plea per tout le Court.  
By reason also that there is a Rule of Law,  
That  
Le possession del terre de chescun home est subject all jurisdiction deal ley.  
Thereof also this Exception following holdeth likewise place in restraint of the said former general Rule or Ground, that is to say,  
Lou le ley done all ascun authority de enter in altar ter ou sur le possession del altar, il justifiera son entry. 
The fourth Exception.   
Si jeo suy seisi de terre in fee sur bon & indefesible title, 
Com. Manxel 13. a.  et un estranger demand cest terre per precipe verse an altar estranger, & sur ceo le viscount per force del praecipe vient sur la terre ove sommoners, & summon luy vers que le precipe est port, & puis le demandant recover vers luy per default ou per issue try sur certain point, & perforce de Haberi facias seisinam le vic' vient arere & missed cesty que ad recover in seisin; jeo ne puniera le vicont pur le primer vener, ne pur le second vener in le terre, pur ceo que le vicont ne fait riens mes execute le mandement le Roy come il ad in charge, & mon Possession est chargeable a cest jurisdiction del Roy & says ministers.  
Si home fait lease pur vie, 
Littleton Villeinage. Com. Manxel 13. a.  & un villeine purchase le reversion, semble a Litt. que le signior del villain poit maintenant vener all terre et claime mesme le reversion, et per tel clayme le reversion est maintenant in luy, et pur tel vener a le terr et act fait il nest trespassor.  
Si villain purchase advowson plen d'incumbent, 
Com. Manxl 13. a.  le signior del villain poit vener all dit Esglise, et claime le dit advowson, et pur ceo le Incumbent ne punishera luy per tiel vener all dit Esglise.  
In Trespass le defendant plead que il fut seisy del meason et terre et ceo lease all plaintiff pur term de ans, 
11. H. 4.75. b  et que fut certifie que wast fut fait, et il enter in le close & meason pur viewer si waist fut fait, et le huis deal maison fuit overt, & demand judgement, et ceo fut tenus bon bar; a que le Plaintiff replica que il la demur encounter le volunt le Plaintife un jour et un nuict, etc.  
Hitherunto have we expressed certain exceptions of the fore-specified Grounds which are derived from the reason of some other grounds and Rules of the Law, and which reason would should be added, as restraints unto the said former Rule of Law first remembered for conformities sake, and that the Law no way be impeached of contrarieties. Now resteth also that we deliver some few other exceptions unto the said general Rule drawn likewise from the fountain of equity; which are such as do ensue.  
Sigh it were void of all reason and conscience that a man should punish a wrong done unto him, 
Exceptions ministered by equity.  by the which he either sustaineth little or no detriment or damage, or at leastwise more benefit than he sustains prejudice: Therefore this exception unto the said general Rule, is among other likewise allowed for Law. That  
Lou le party sur que possession home fait tortuous entry, 
The fift Exception.  est plus benefit per tiel entry que prejudice, la home bien justifiera la dit tortuous entry.  
Which the cases following do likewise at large sufficiently confirm.  
Si jeo suy in peril deste murder in mon close, 
12. H. 8.2. b. Pollard.  ou in mon meason, il est loial a chescun de enfrender mon meison ou close pur moy aider, et pur ceo que est pur mon benefit.  
Si jeo voy vostre beasts demesne in vostre corn, 
13. H. 8.15. b. Norwich.  et jeo eux enchase horse, jeo ne sera my puny pur ceo que fut pur vostre advantage, et vous aves interest in les beasts. Mes si jeo chase les beasts d'un estranger hors de vostre corn, jeo serra puny pur ceo; car vous puisses aver remepy pur ceo; scil. per distress.  
Si jeo view le Chimney de mon voycin urant pur saver les choses que sont deins son meason, 
21. H. 7.27. b. Palms.  jeo justifiera l'entry in le meason, & deprender les biens que jeo trover dedans pur eux saver.  
In trespass de Parco fracto, 
20. H. 6.37. a  le defendant justify le trespass pur ceo que fut controversy perenter luy, & le seigneur de Huntingdon Plaintiff pur le overture d'un gorce, et pur ceo que le dit seigneur fut in le dit Park hunting, il enter pur les ports esteant overt a monster a luy ses evidences concernant le dit gorce & ceo fut tenus per tout le Court bone justification.  
Again, the like equity doth minister one other exception of the like quality; for it were unconscionable and unreasonable that a man should be punished for a wrongful entry, whereas he is compelled so to do, and cannot without his great prejudice eschew the same: And therefore it is holden for Law, That  
Si home enter sur le possession de un altar, 
The sixth Exception.  leu il ne poit auterment fair sans son grand prejudice, ceo ne sera deem tiel entry de que il sera puny.  
Si home ad Querck crescent in midds de trois maisons, 
13. H. 8.16. b. Browne.  et il decoupe ceo, et le Querck eschuet in terre d'un altar, si il justify in trespass il covient de alleager que il ne auterment puit fair.  
Home de coupa thorns que cress in son terre & ils eschaont inter d'un altar, 
6. Ed. 4.7. b.  & il enter & eux prender horse, sil ne poit in altar manner fair, ceo luy excusera.  
Si home chase avers per le chymin, 
Doctor and Student. ver. 10. Ed. 4.7. b ae. Ed. 4.8. b. 6. Ed. 4.7. b.  et les beasts happont de escaper in les blees de son vicin, & cesty que eux enchase enter freshment in le terr de eux enchaser horse, pur ceo que ils ne ferront ascun damage, il justifiera tiel son entry in trespass.  
And thus much hath been said touching the first Ground proposed in the said Dialogues of the said Doctor and Student, which hath been proved in particular with cases, and thereunto have been annexed certain exceptions which have likewise been fortified with Book Cases, and Authorities, whereby the former assertions have not only been exemplified, but also thereby it doth plainly appear, That almost every disposition in the Laws, de qualitate, or de jure, is in conference of Maxims, and resteth between the Rule and the Exception, which is either ministered by reason of equity, or upon some other Rule or Axiom. So that every difference showed between Cases, is nothing else but the Rule and his exceptions; the effect whereof briefly is set forth by Morgan, who saith: That  
Maxims ne doient este impugn, 
Com. Colth. 27. a  mes touts temps admit; mes les maxims per reason poient este confer & compare l'un ove l'auter, comment que ils ne variont: Ou per reason poit este discuss quel chose est plus prochein all Maxim ou mean perenter les Maxims & quel nemy: mes le Maximes ne unque poient este impeach ne impugn, mes touts dits doient este observe & tenus come firm Principles de eux mesmes.  
For the better understanding whereof, we may note that all matters of debate which may be referred to the controversies or questions de qualitate or de jure, as hath been said, have either commonly a Maxim of the one part, & a Maxim of the other; or several reasons of each part derived from sundry Maxims; or else that there is a Maxim of the one part, and there is equity and reason which doth minister an exception to that Maxim or general Rule: So that all disceptation herein is, as hath been said, in conference or comparing of Maxims and Principles together, discoursing which thing is directly under the reason of the said Maxim; and what matter or circumstance may make a difference, and will be by exception exempted from the same; as more at large hereafter in the declaration of the use of these Maxims may be made manifest and apparent.  
Now resteth moreover to prosecute the second Axiom or Principle proposed in the said Dialogues, namely, that which followeth there in the sevententh chapter of his first book, that is to say:  
It is not lawful for any man to enter upon a descent. 
The second Ground.   
Which ground being expounded by Littleton in his chapter of descents to extend only to descents of an estate of Inheritance and freehold, and not of a reversion or remainder, all which follow after in the said Chapter, are nothing but Cases of Exceptions unto the said Grounds, as it is evident unto every one that considereth the same, and therefore shall it here be needless long to insist thereupon. Nevertheless it shall be expedient to show some exceptions thereunto, especially some certain, of such of them as being exceptions unto the said Rule, are again restrained with other exceptions. Because there is a Rule of Law, That  
Laches ou folly ne sera impute a un enfant de luy prejudice. 
First exception Littleton Garranty 279.   
Therefore jest contrariety might happen in consequence of reason between the said Rule of descents, and this Rule last remembered: there is ministered by the means of this latter Rule, an exception unto the said former ground, namely, That  
If an infant have right of entry, 
Littleton descents cas. 402 20. H. 6.28. b  he may enter upon a descent.  
This exception, although it doth import great probability of truth, yet is the same like unto the Ground in this respect, namely, that it is also subject to be restrained with another exception, viz.  
If an infant, or such privileged or excepted person have a right of entry, and a descent of those lands is had to one that hath a more ancient right; the party having such ancient right shall be remitted: and both the right and entry of the infant taken away.  
And this exception ensueth of another general Rule of Law, which is, That  
An ancient right shall always be preferred before another mean right or title.  
The said exception upon exception, grounded upon the last remembered Rule, may be plainly proved by this case.  
If Tenant in Taile do discontinue and after do disseise his discontinuee, 
11. E. 4.1. b.  and during this disseisin the discontinuee dyeth, his heir within age; and after the Tenant in Tail doth die seized; and this land descendeth unto the issue in tail, the heir of the discontinuee being still within age; This is a remitter, and the entry of the heir of the discontinuee is tolled, notwithstanding that the Ground and Principle is, that the laches of the infant shall not prejudice the infant. And the cause is the ancient right the issue had.  
Moreover the former General Rule touching descents that toll entries, 
The second exception.  hath among other, also this exception.  
A descent had during the Coverture, 
Litt. fol. 59 case 403. 9 H. 7.24. a. 2. Ed. 4.24 a 7. Ed. 4.7. b. 20. H. 6 28. b  shall not toll the entry of the woman or her heirs after the Coverture dissolved.  
But because there is a General Rule of Law, That,  
None shall be favoured in any Act wherein folly may be imputed to him.  
From whence is derived also this more special Rule or Ground.  
Coverture shall not aid a woman where the taking of a Husband which respecteth not her benefit may be imputed to her folly. 
Com. Zouch. 366. a. 42. E. 3.12. b 9 H. 7.24. a.   
Hereof ensueth this exception upon exception to the said former remembered Rule, That  
Where folly may be imputed to the woman for taking of such a Husband as will be heedless of her benefit, 
42. E. 3.12. b 9 H. 7.24. a. Litt. fol. 95. cas. 404.3.4. Ph. Ma. 144. n. 57  there a descent, during the coverture shall bind the woman and her heirs.  
Much more might be said of like effect, but this for example sake shall suffice.  
Now resteth briefly to say something touching the first proposed Latin Rules: 
Com. 72. b. Com. 268. a. Com. 294. a.  Of which the former was this,  
Sublata causa tollitur effectus.  
This Rule is not absolutely true; for the Philosophers from whence it is borrowed, do understand it, De causis internis, non de externis.  
The Civil Lawyers do restrain it in this manner, 
Prataus.  Haec autem Gnosis sine Regula, de causa finali, non de causa impulsiva intelligitur.  
The common Law of the Realm, thus;  
Sublatâ unâ causâ, si alia remanet, non tollitur effectus.  
The second Rule; which was this, Qui tacet, consentire videtur, is verified with this exception.  
Si ad ejus commodum & utilitatem spectat, 
Prataeus l. 7. c. 3. fol. 911.  praesens & tacens pro consentiente habetur.  
The third Rule was this,  
Quod initio non valet, id tractu temporis non convalescit.  
Which Ground may be confirmed with many cases, yet is the same Ground restrained with this exception, because That  
Habet locum in his tantum quae statim debent valere, 
Decius.  & nullam suspensionem habent.  
If a man make a lease for life of land unto I.S. and after doth make a lease for years unto I.N. of the same land to begin presently, 
37. Hen. 8. Brooke. Leases 48. Com. Smith & Stapleton 433. a. Com. Griesbrooke. 422. a.  This lease being made by word is void; for the freehold in the first lease is more worthy, and by law intended to be of longer continuance than the term in the second lease: yet if the first leasee die, or surrender afore the second be expired, the residue of the term is good.  
If the father device his land unto his daughter and Heir apparent, and after leaving his Wife encinct, 
5. Ed. 4.6. Per Billing quod fuit concessum & Abridge per Fitzh. tit. Assi. 27.  or with child with a son, upon the death of the father this devise unto the daughter is voided for that she is his heir; but after, when the son is borne it is good.  
The fourth Rule of the said Latin rules before set down, was this,  
Quando duo jura in uno concurrunt, aequum est acsi esset in duobus.  
This Rule hath exception grounded upon another Rule, that is, That  
Vigilantibus & non dormientibus jura subveniunt. 
Com. 375. b.   
Or to the same effect;  
Vnicuique sua mora nocet.  
And therefore  
In causes de negligence ou laches diverse droits concurrant in un person ne seront deem si come ils fustent in diverse persons. 
Com. Stowell. 372. b.   
Where, if Tenant pur altar vie be, the remainder for life over to another, the remainder in fee to the right heirs of the Tenant pur altar vie, If the said Tenant pur altar vie be disseised, and the disseisor levy a fine with proclamations, and the five y●●●es do pass, and after Cesti que vie dyeth; and after also dyeth he in remainder for life; he which was Tenant pur altar vie, shall not have other five years after the death of the Tenant for life in remainder to pursue his right for the feesimple.  
Upon like reason, if a Bishop be seized of an Advowson in the right of his Bishopric, and the Church become void, and six months do pass; the Bishop shall not have other six months as Ordinary, the same Church being in his Diocese, as he should have if the same Church were of the patronage of another person, although he be in one respect Patron, and in another Ordinary.  
Hitherto we have entertained discourse as touching the verity of Axioms, Rules, and Grounds; which, as hath been showed, is either necessary or contingent.  
Contingent verity was divided into two branches; the one resting upon the entendment of Law; the other being derived from the disposition and nature of humane things, by debate and discourse of reason.  
Of the first sort there are two kinds; for some propositions there are, although of themselves but only probable, yet nevertheless are supposed of such certainty, that no averment shall be received to encounter the same. Other some, although they be by the Law intended true, Prima fancy, yet nevertheless the same Law alloweth an averment, and admitteth proof to impeach the same.  
Those moreover which rest upon discourse, of reason, are subject to diverse exceptions, the material cause whereof is, the infinite variety of circumstances that in all humane actions do happen.  
The form and nature of the exception is perceived and known by this effect following; in that it restraineth the ground unto which it is connexed.  
The efficient causes are two, viz. Equity or some other Ground of the Law importing contrariety. And the end thereof is conformity and coherency of Law agreeable unto justice, whose minister the Law is.  
Moreover as occasion hath been offered in the declaration of the causes from whom Exceptions of Rules do spring, there hath been showed the use of equity in the common Law, Statute Law, and Chancery, by the two effects thereof, application and restraint; the one enlarging, and the other abridging.  
Wherhfore now resteth to speak of the second principal part, concerning the form of Aixomes, namely, generality: The consideration whereof, bringeth to memory, that GOD in his most excellent work of the frame of transitory things, though he hath furnished the world with unspeakable variety, thereby making manifest unto all humane creatures, to their great astonishment, his incomprehensible wisdom, his omnipotent power, and his unsearchable providence, yet being the God of order, not of confusion, hath admitted no infiniteness in nature (howsoever otherwise it seem to our weak capacities) but hath continued the innumerable variety of particular things under certain specialls; those specialls under generals; and those generals again under causes more general, linking and conjoining one thing to another, as by a chain, even until we ascend unto himself, the first, chief and principal cause of all good things. And this is that which Plato out of Homer, was wont to call jupiters' golden chain.  
The eye whereby we do see and view, and the inward hand whereby we do reach and apprehended these things, is man's understanding, which is wholly employed about universality as about his proper object, by means whereof, in all things rational, being discovered by the use of reason, man's understanding for the attaining of knowledge proceedeth from the effect to the cause, and again from the cause to the effect; that is, from the particular to the special, and from the special to the general; and so to the more general, even to a principal and primary position or notion, which needeth no further proof, but is of itself known and apparent. And so again from such chief & primary Principles and propositions to more special and peculiar Assertions, descending even to every particular matter.  
But that, of this which hath been said, some example might be showed, especially in this matter, which we now have in hand, namely, concerning the Grounds & rules of the Law of England; let one of the proposed grounds first before mentioned stand here for an example, viz.  
Nihil est magis rationi consentaneum, quam eodem modo quodque dissolvere quo constatum est.  
This principle being a Rule of Reason containing great probability, and being of the number of those that before we said to have been derived from the observation of the nature of things, which though it be subject to manifold exceptions, yet nevertheless as a general Rule, the same is verified in many special Axioms; and they again diversely subdivided into many more peculiar propositions; as the example of these following may make manifest.  

1 Cesty que est charge per Record doit luy discharger per Record.  
2 Cesty que est charge per fait doit luy mesme discharge per fait, ou per altar matter cy haut.  
3 Cesty que est charge forsque per parol, poet este discharge per parol.   
Of which general Propositions there can be made no better reason than by the commemoration of the said first afore shown general Rule.  
Moreover, the first of the last above remembered comprehendeth under the generality thereof certain other more special Rules:  
As  
In det sur arrerages de accompt que est matter de Record, le party doit discharger luy per matter cy haut, & nemy per specialty, ou fait ou altar matter que nest cy haut. 6. Hen. 4.6. a. 3. Hen. 4.5. a. 11. Hen. 4.79. b. 13. Hen. 4.1. a. 8. Hen. 5.3. b. 3. Hen. 6.55. a. 4. Hen. 6.17. b. 20. Hen. 6.55. b.  
In det sur recovery, home ne sera discharge mes per matter cy haut: ou a tiel effect, 6, Hen. 4.6. a.  
Under the second Rule or Ground before proposed touching a discharge where the party is charged by matter of specialty; those special Rules following are likewise comprehended.  
In nul case home ne poit avoid single obligation, sans altar specialty de auxy haut nature, 1. Hen. 7.14. b. 5. Hen. 7.33. b. 11. Hen. 7.4. b.  
Home que ad enfreint covenant ne pledera matter in discharge de ceo sans fait, 3. Hen. 4.1. b. 1. H. 7.14. b. 21. Hen. 6.31. a.  
Home ne discharger a luy mesme don annuity que charge son person sans specialty, 5. Hen. 7.33. b. 35. H. 8.51. a. Dyer.  
The first rule of these last remembered Grounds, namely, touching obligations, is again divided into diverse particulars; as for example.  
Arbitrement ne dischargera home de un d●ty due per un obligation, 8. H. 7.3. b. 6. H. 4.6. a.  
Si le obligee deliver l'obligation all obliger come acquittance, & puis ceo priest de luy, & commence suit sur ceo, cest delivery ne sera discharge del obligation, 1 Hen. 7.17. a. 33. Hen. 8.51. a. Dyer. 22. H. 652. b.  
The other following concerning indentures of Covenants, may likewise be divided into other more particular assertions: but to avoid tediousness, these already shown abundantly manifest our meaning, and therefore may suffice.  
The use of this kind of observation of the generality of Rules and Propositions is manifold. 
The use of general Rules, and the observations of their specialls.   
First, things proposed in the generality are best known and most familiar to our conceit, sith they be the proper object of our understanding, as before is declared.  
Secondly, they do better adhere and stick in memory, sith Intellective memory is (as the understanding is) employed about universal and general things.  
Thirdly, universal Propositions are the precepts of Art, and therefore they are called perpetual and eternal: for no Art, Science, Method, or certain knowledge can or may consist of particularities: for the orderly proceeding of every Art, Methodically handled, is from the due regard had of the general, to descend unto the specialls contained underneath the same: wherefore it ensueth hereof, that general Propositions are the most speedy instruments of knowledge: for experience, which wholly is gotten by the observation of particular things (being deprived of speculation) is slow, blind, doubtful, and deceivable, and truly called the mistress of fools.   

IF perchance upon occasion of some former speeches here published touching the universality of Grounds, there be demanded this question.  
Why the Laws of England at the first and from time to time, Question. had not been published after this Method of general and special Rules with their exceptions.  
I answer thereunto, Answer 1 that many ancient writers attempted that kind of writing, and accomplished the same according to their several and sundry gifts more or less perfect each than other: as by the treatises of Glanvile, Bracton, Britton, and others appeareth.  
Secondly, I say that forasmuch as daily new questions came in debate whereof before had been no resolution, and wherein many times the lest variety of circumstances doth altar the Law; therefore our Ancestors thought it more convenient, to be rather governed by an unwritten law, not left in any other monument, than in the mind of man; and thence to be deduced by deceptation and discourse of reason: and that when occasion should be offered, and not before.  
Thirdly, it is more convenient and profitable to the state of the common wealth to frame Law upon deliberation and debate of reason, by men skilful and learned in that faculty, when present occasion is offered to use the same, by a case then falling out and requiring judicial determination: for than is it likely, with much more care, industry and diligence to be looked unto; and much more time of deliberation is there taken for the mature decision thereof, then otherwise upon the establishing of any positive Law, might be imparted concerning the same.  
Last of all, sith all good Laws require perspicuity and plainness; and that in generality, for the most part, lurketh obscurity; therefore there is nothing of more force and effect touching the making and framing of a good Law, than the present occasion offered, sith thereby is brought to light, that which otherwise would not as much (many times) as be thought upon, and giveth occasion to dispute that which none would have thought ever should have come in question. And therefore not without due consideration among the Romans, Disputationes fori, and with us Demurrers have ever been allowed as originals of Law.  
As touching the manifestation of Rules, all are affirmative or negative: wherein though the affirmative be, for many causes, the more worthy; yet such negation as implieth affirmation (and therefore called pregnant) is not without some use in the setting down and delivering of exceptions and general Rules. And thus much touching the form of Rules, Grounds, and Axioms.  
The efficient cause of Rules, Grounds, and Axioms is the light of natural reason tried and sifted upon disputation and argument. And hence is it, that the Law (as hath been before declared) is called reason; not for that every man can comprehend the same; but it is artificial reason; the reason of such, as by their wisdom, learning, and long experience are skilful in the affairs of men, and know what is fit and convenient to be held and observed for the appeasing of controversies and debates among men, still having an eye and due regard of justice, and a consideration of the common wealth wherein they live; for well saith Aristotle, 
Arist. l. 3. Pol. c. 7.  Hoc quidem perspicuum est, leges pro ratione Reipub. esse scribendas. And of this reason that we speak of, Tully hath a notable saying. 
Cic. 1. Offic.  Ratio est societatis humanae vinculum, ut oratio, quae dicendo, communicando, disceptando, judicando, conciliat, inter se homines conjungit, & retinet naturali societate. Wherhfore sith the Grounds of Law are the foundation of Law, or at leastwise the Law itself delivered in manner of compendious and short sentences & propositions; that which is the efficient cause of Law, must likewise be the efficient cause of those Rules and Axioms.  
Inasmuch then as Primaria efficiens causa juris, 
johannes Corasius de arte juris lib. 1. cap. 20.  est natura & ratio civilis, ex quibus potissimum leges emanant, & veluti scaturiunt. The same nature and reason are likewise the principal and original efficient cause of the Rules, Axioms, Grounds, and Propositions of the Law; I mean Civilis ratio, that is, reason respecting justice and the Common wealth.  
This reason hath in the written works of the Laws of this Land, either been plainly published and expressed in the books of Law, upon deceptation of cases in debate, and left unto posterity, as the Lights, Rules, and Directions, whereby the said cases so called into question, were at the last decided and determined.  
Or else it is not at all expressly published in words, but left nevertheless employed and included in the cases so decided, and therein doth as it were lie hidden; and yet nevertheless to be easily, with industry collected and inferred upon those Cases decided, and doth necessarily follow upon the resolution of the same, and being thence drawn, may abundantly serve to infinite uses, in the determinating of other doubts, which daily do and may come in debate. Wherhfore sith in the Law (as in other sciences) all arguments and disputation do either consist of express proof and allegation of Authority (which are called inartificial Arguments) or else of application and inference; as well the Rules to be collected upon inference and application of other Cases, are to be regarded and to be produced, as those which are direct authorities. And forasmuch as in very few cases of doubt newly rising in debate, and called into question and controversy, express proof and pregnant authority can be found; the Lawyer is most beholding to Inference and Application, wherewith he is instructed and taught, that Cases different in circumstance, may be nevertheless compared each to other in equality of Reason; so that of like Reason, like Law might be framed. And by how much Application and Inference doth more depend upon wit and Art, than the producing of express Authority; by so much the more it excelleth the same, sith the Allegation of express Authority, resteth wholly upon Industry and Memory in publishing and noting that which he findeth already framed to his hand.  
Express Rules, Axioms, Grounds and Positions of the former sort are published in the books of Law, either in the Latin tongue, as are the former general rules first mentioned, and also so infinite other of that kind; or else in the French; in which tongue the Reports of forepast Cases are published unto the use of posterity, and wherewith the said book of years and terms (almost in every case therein found) are fully furnished. So that all, though it shall be needless to make manifest that by Example, which of itself is evident; yet still to pursue the former Method and order hitherunto observed, we shall easily perceive the same in this short case hereafter expressed.  
Vn home avoit a luy & ses heires le nomination del Clerke d'un Esglise a un Abbe, & le Abbe doit presenter ouster le Clerk nominate all ordinary, or é le Roy ayant les possession del Abbey ad present son Clerke all dit Esglise estant voide sans ascun nomination. Et le opinion del Court fut, que le party que averoit le nomination, avera Quare impedit verse le Incumbent tantum, sans ascun deste nosme Patron: Car le Roy ne poit este sue come disturber: Tamen fut dit que le Roy ne poit este Instrument all ascun home. Et Shelley dit que il est Instrument a chacun home: Car per luy chacun Subject ad justice a luy minister.  
The Principles, Maxims, Rules, or Grounds expressed in plain words in this case, and which are indeed the very reason of the Resolution therein taken are these.  

1 Le Roy ne poit este sue Come disturber.  
2 Lou le Roy present per tort, Quare Impedit sera port verse L'incumbent sole sans ascun deste nosme Patron.  
3 Le Roy ne poit este instrument all ascun home, si come son servant.  
4 Per le Roy chescun subject ad justice a luy minister.  
5 Le Roy est instrument a chacun home pur minister a luy justice.   
So that the Reasons of every Resolution in any bookcase being reduced into short Sentences, Propositions or summary Conclusions are the Grounds, Rules, and Principles that we do mean and speak of in this place.  
Such summary Conclusions, corollaries, Reasons, Grounds, or Propositions therefore as afore declared, are delivered in the books of Reports in two manners.  
Sometimes without any note or mark that they are Grounds or Rules, but only as laid down and dispersed in the Arguments and Resosolutions as short Reasons of the opinion or determination there expressed; as in the last example appeareth.  
Sometimes with a note or mark that they are Grounds, or Rules and Maxims, and are expressly invested with such names, as in the entrance of this treatise hath appeared. And thus much of the Grounds or Propositions expressed in the books.  
Now as touching the second sort, which are to be collected, and inferred out of the Cases left reported, we plainly may perceive the notable use of such collection, in reading advisedly the Commentaries of Mr. Plowden, or other the best books of Reports; or diligently observing any notable Argument made at this day in any the King's Courts in matter of Demurrer, where we may not think that every case cited or alleged out of the books for proof of the Controversy, is therefore alleged because it hath express matter therein published in plain words, and tending to the resolution of the point in question: but at sometimes, and that most commonly, such proof is produced upon inference, and yet nevertheless, sufficiently pregnant to approve the matter whereunto it is rightly applied: which inference and application proceedeth wholly upon collected Rules and Axioms included in the resolution of those Cases produced, although the same be not expressly spoken or published therein.  
Wherhfore notwithstanding the best means of the collection of the said Rules, depending only upon Meditation, and resting wholly upon the sagacity, wit, industry, and judgement of the Student, (because every man's several conceit is in itself sundry) may best be referred unto the student himself: yet nevertheless, shall it not be amiss here to manifest such direction therein as may be observed with some fruit.  
1 First, after the case read, let us consider with ourselves, & meditate in our minds, to what several purposes the same case may be applied, and what matter, or several matters the resolution of the said Case can confirm. Which when we have considered of, it shall be good for our memory to commit them to writing, in manner, and according to this example following; 
33. H. 8.48. b. n. 1. Dyer.   
Fut move si Tenant in tail d'un Manor, a que vilains' sons regardant, en feoft un des vilains d'un acre per cel del Manor, et devy, comment que le Manor descend all issue in tail, uncore il ne poit seiser son villain tanque le acre soit recover.  
Upon meditation had of this case, what it will prove, these Propositions or Rules following may easily be collected.  
1 Lou home ad forsque un action all principal chose lafoy il naver benefit deal accessary, tanque il ad per recovery continued le principal.  
And because here the whole principal is not discontinued, but only one Acre, thereof may be collected,  
That  
2 Regardancy ou Apendancy nest solement all tout le Manor, mes chachun acre deal demeans.  
Moreover, because the principal in this Case, viz. the acre discontinued, cannot be recontinued without suit to be attempted against the Villain, it followeth in Reason, that he shall not be enfranchised thereby: Whence also this Axiom is to be confirmed or proved, That  
3. Necessary suit ewe verse un villeinper le signier ne enfranchise le villain.  
Hereof hath appeared that although none of these Propositions be expressed in the resolution of the said Case, in the book wherein the same is left reported; yet nevertheless are they necessarily employed in the resolution of the said Case, as before hath been declared.  
But if the Case so read doth consist of many points or several questions sunderly debated, every of them may likewise be sunderly and apart considered of, according to the manner before showed.  
A second means, by Inference to collect such Rules and propositions as are before declared, is by way of Argument by Syllogism: For supposing the said Case to be denied to be Law which we have read; let us endeavour to draw the immediate reasons thereof into a Syllogism for confirmation of the same. So that thereby, forasmuch as all Rules out of the Law are of two sorts, that is, either being the Reasons of the Case, or the Case contracted shortly itself, by such manner of Argument, the Mayor, and first Proposition of the said syllogistical Argument, will be the general reason of the said Case: The Minor or second Proposition, will be the particular reason: and the Conclusion will be the contracted case itself: Which also will serve as a secondary Rule to determine other Cases of equal Reason called into controversy. For example herein, we will take the opinion of Hulls in 9 Hen. 4.8. a. in the end of a Case there argued, where he holdeth for clear Law,  
That  
Si un home fait fine pur un trespas dont il fut indite son boache sera estopp a dire que il nest my culpable, 
9 H. 4.8. a.  sil soit eint implead apres.  
But because the same is denied in Hen. 6. wee endeavouring to prove the same by Syllogism, shall not only confirm it, but also exemplify our former speeches.  
Mayor] Nul sera permit a denier cest injury pur que il ad fait satisfaction, ou ad suffer punishment.  
Minor] Mes cesty que ad fait fine pur un offence ad fait ascun satisfaction & in ceo ad este puny.  
Conclusio] Il que ad fait un fine pur une trespas ou altar offence sera estopp a ceo denier apres.  
Every of these propositions be eftsoons confirmed not only with the Case before spoken (for as they do prove the Case, being the immediate Reasons thereof; so are they to be proved again by the Case as by their-effect) but also with sundry other authorities found in the books of like effect.  
A third observation of Propositions and Axioms may be drawn from the consideration of the Titleing words, or words which do yield matter of effect; whereof in the case last remembered are such as do follow; namely;  
Fine, Estoppel, indictment, Non culpable, Party, etc.  
And herein is to be meditated and considered what Rules may be derived and collected out of the said case, and be referred to every of the said Titles; as namely,   

Under Fines.  
1 FIne fait pur un offence prove, cesty que fait le fine voluntarunt, deste culpable del dit offence.  
2 Fine fait per un offence causera cesty que fait le offence que il ne ceo deniera apres.   

Under indictment, these.  
SI home soit convince, d'un offence sur un indictment, que est all suit le Roy, il ne deniera le dit offence, sil soit apres de ceo implede all suit del Party.   

Under Estoppel, these.  
HOme sera estopp per matter de Implication que imply le contrary de son disant de Record.   

Under Non Culpable, these.  
NOn Culpable ne sera plead per ascun lou per implication il ad confess le cause del action.   

Under Party, these.  
SI offence soit commit cy bien al Roy que come all Party condemnation all suit d'un d'eux, aydera l'anter in son suit.  
A fourth manner of observation is to refer unto every Ground or Rule so collected, a Rule, more general, so proceeding from the special Rule unto the general Reason, and from that general Reason unto a more general: As out of the said first Case may be drawn this general Rule.  
Home ne sera permit a denier ceo que devant il ad confess per implication de Record. 
9 H. 4.8. a.   
Under which Ground not only the first proposed Case of 9 Hen. 4.8. a. may be comprehended; and diverse others of like effect and purpose, and which do concur under the said General Rule; As for example.  
He which is arraigned, 
Stamf. 155. a cap. 62. Stamf. 98. b. 22. E. 4.39 b  after he hath pleaded either in Bar or in Abatement of the Appeal whereon he was arraigned, may pled over not guilty to the felony: Except the Bar or Plea do comprehend such matter as doth acknowledge the felony; as a Release or pardon. But if he do pled any such Plea or Bar, viz. Release, or Pardon in in any Appeal or indictment, he cannot pled over Not guilty to the Felony, because thereby he confesseth the Felony by implication.  
If in a Praecipe, 
11. H. 4.69 a Culpepper.  the Tenant say that he is Leassee for life, and pray in aid, the demandant saith he hath fee, which the Tenant denyeth not, and therefore he is owted of the aid: If after he will say he is Tenant for term of life, and vouch, he shall not be thereunto received.  
These Cases with many other may be comprehended under the generality of the last specified Rule, and are one in Reason, not under one immediate Reason, but under this Reason, viz. Home ne serra admit a contradize ceo que il ad confess de Record.  
Moreover there is another Case, one in effect of Reason with the former proposed Case, which because it is nevertheless in circumstance more general, therefore it cannot be comprehended under the last specified Rule, as namely.  
If a man be indicted of Travers, 
7. H. 4.35. b.  and thereupon be found guilty by verdict at the suit of the King; If after, the party against whom the Travers was committed, bring an action for the same Travers; the other shall not plead Not guilty thereunto.  
In the former Grounds, and Cases thereupon, the party was concluded by an employed confession; but in this last Case, he is convinced by an open trial or verdict. And whosoever will comprehend both this and the former Cases under one Ground or Rule, must make the same more general than the former, in this manner.  
Home ne serra permit a denier tiel offence de que il poit este convince per matter de Record.  
And forasmuch as a man may be convinced of anoffence as well by confession, as by verdict; and that as well by implicature confession, as by express confession: Therefore every of the said former Cases may be concluded and comprehended under the ampleness of this last remembered Ground.  
A special Ground may be reduced unto a rule or Proposition general, by seeking the Genus or general Notion of every Titeling word found in the said special Ground, As for example, the said Proposition before remembered, and which hath been exemplified with Cases, was this.  
Home ne serra permit a denier ceo que devant il ad Confess per implication de Record.  
Upon the word (denier) it may be drawn more general, thus;  
Home ne sera permit de contrary son act demesne que devant il ad conuz.  
A more general Reason whereof may again be yielded, thus.  
Seroit inconvenient que le ley alloweroit a dize, & a dedize une mesme chose de Record.  
Upon the word (Confession) these Reasons also may be assigned more general than that first ground.  
Confession de un est le plus pregnant proof que poit este encounter luy.  
A reason hereof: For, Le Confession de chacun que concerne luy mesme sera intend uray. For,  
Nul convoit le offence melious que cesty que ad ceo commit & perpetrat.  
Upon the word (Implication) these general Rules may be proposed.  
Confession per Implication est cy fort encounter le Party come Confession express. For  
Pregnant Implication est equivalent all matter express.  
Upon the word (Record) somewhat likewise may be said of like effect; viz. thus;  
Matter de Record que est grounded sur le act del Party mesme luy issint liera que il ne contra dira ceo apres. For,  
Le credit d'un judicial act ne sera impeach per ascun que est privy a ceo, For,  
Matter de Record est plus haut testimony in ley.  
Under the word (Fine) there was mentioned this Ground or Rule.  
Fine que est fait pur un offence prove home culpable del offence.  
Here hence these Propositions being more general, may be derived.  
Nul per Common presumption voit fair voluntary fine pur le offence de quel il nest culpable.  
A reason whereof may be thus.  
Poena culpam implicat. And Le Consequent imporia son Principal.  
Hereof you see what abundance of Rules and Propositions one Case containeth; and that we may descend from the particular case, to the special Reason, from that to a more general, until we find out the very primary ground of natural reason, from whence all the other are derived.  
Herein this Caution is to be considered and had in mind, that in collection of Grounds and Principles out of any proposed Case, the same may be native, & always appliable & reduceable to the immediate Reason of the said Case, so that in any occasion of Argument, the same Case may be a pregnant and efficient proof thereunto.  
Furthermore collection of Propositions may be drawn and reduced from all the principal places of Logical invention.  

1 As from the Causes unto the Effect.  
2 And contrariwise from the Effects unto their Causes.  
3 So likewise from the Consequent unto the Antecedent.  
4 And from the Antecedent to the Consequent.  
5 Moreover a Pari, as from the Equal or like.  
6 A majori from the more likely unto that which is less probable.  
7 And again, from that which is less Likely or Probable to that which is more Probable.  
8 Finally, from the Contrary to his Contrary: sith that Eadem est ratio & proportio Contrariorum.   
THe reasons and causes wherefore these Propositions, Rules, and Axioms (as hath been declared first in manner as aforesaid) are not only to be considered, observed and collected, but always to be had, and carefully to be kept in memory; and the end and scope whereto they serve and tend, will manifestly appear, as well by the observation of the right use of them, and the manifold utility and great help, which riseth by the daily meditation therein, as likewise by the consideration and amendment of some inconsiderate abuses which have crept into the daily handling of them, both in judicial places abroad, and in private exercises at home.  
The necessary use of them therefore consisteth in two parts.  
1 The one serving to the obtaining of the knowledge of the Law.  
2 The other in use and practice of the Law learned by these Propositions and Rules, reducing them, as occasion serveth, to public and private behoof.  
The first is Speculative.  
This last Practic.  
As touching the first, the profit hence springing may soon be seen and discovered, if we call to our memory, that no manner faculty whatsoever to be learned by the light of Reason, can consist or be comprehended by the capacity of man's understanding, except (as before also in part hath appeared) it be furnished with certain Assertions, Precepts, Rules, and Propositions, and the same adorned with these two qualities, Universality and Verity. And as none may worthily take upon him the name of a Divine, which is ignorant of the Principles of his Science; or any man may well arrogate the title or name of a Philosopher or Physician, who knoweth not the several Rules, whereupon, as upon sundry foundations, the said several faculties are built and erected; so none may be deemed a Lawyer, or admitted, or can give good advice therein, which knoweth not the Precepts whereon his Art dependeth; or hath not read the determination of former doubts left reported in books, being the greatest part of the written Law in this Land; And thence, not collected Conclusions for the decisions of present and future controversies.  
Moreover seeing the Law of this Land is wholly Rational (as hath been said) wherein, as in all other Sciences, the mind of man holdeth and keepeth the former published proceeding, by apprehension and discourse, collecting Primary and Secondary Conclusions and Grounds, it cannot be otherwise, but that the observation of these primary and Secondary Conclusions, must needs be the best, most approved, profitable and speedy means, for the attaining of the right, sound, and infallible knowledge of the said Laws.  
And if there be any way extant, or to be found by man's wisdom, to purge the English Laws, from the great Confusions, tedious and superfluous iterations, with the which the Reports are infested; or quit it of these manifold contrarieties, wherewith it is so greatly overcharged, so that the coherency, constancy, and conformity thereof, is almost utterly lost, and not without some blemish and reproach of our Nation and Commonwealth, in manner clean abolished; Surely, as to me seemeth, there is likelihood by that way and means to bring the same to pass, or by none. For, by Rules and Exceptions, all Sciences are and have been published, put down and delivered: out of Rules and Exceptions, a method is framed, by which means men may view a perfect plot of the coherence of things: Even as in a large spread tree, from the lowest root to the highest branch; from the most ample and highest General, by many degrees of descent, as in a Pedigree or Genealogy, to the lowest special and particular; which are combined together as it were in a consanguinity of blood and concordancy of nature.  
And yet therewithal perusing the particular differences and degrees of distinction between them, in all the course of humane studies, there is none that doth more commend unto your cogitations the wonderful force of man's wisdom, then doth this discourse, which treateth of the Principles, Grounds, Rules and Originals of Law and justice, being the chain of humane society, without the which it cannot consist; and which, besides the exceeding pleasure that the consideration thereof breedeth in the well-affected mind, is able to bring us speedily to ripeness and maturity in that profession. For,  
Principium est dimidium totius, saith Aristotle.  
Short refined Reasons of long perplexed cases, do, through their soundness, satisfy our judgements, through their brevity and shortness, wonderfully delight the mind, through their pithiness, they may be deemed incomparable treasures, yielding a great show of wit, and wonderfully sharpening our understanding, of infinite use, in all humane affairs, containing much worth in few words, no burden to memory, but once obtained, are ever retained.  
Sigh all Sciences do tend to Verity (as hath been before often affirmed) which is the object of the intellectual part of our mind; And sith Verity and Truth cannot be obtained or found without due knowledge of the causes; Tunc enim (as saith the Philosopher) unumquodque scire arbitramur, cum ejus causas & Principia cognoscimus. And not unfitly said the Poet,  
Foelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.  
Than must the right and due observation of these and such like principles containing the Causes of things, be a direction to conduct and lead us to the knowledge of that faculty and science, whereof they are Principles. For from hence all artificial Demonstrations are, and have been drawn and deduced.  
To adhere therefore and wholly to respect particular cases, without any observation of the general Rules and Reasons, and to charge the memory with infinite singularities, is utterly to confounded the same; a labour of unspeakable toil, & wherein we shall never free us from confusion; but engender in ourselves, that wrong opinion which many have (amiss) entertained, that there is nothing certain in our Laws.  
Finally, if the Law be every man's inheritance borne under the same, as notably (besides our own Laws) saith the Prince of Orators, 
M. T. Cicero pro Cecinna.  Tully, Major haereditas venit unicuique nostrum à jure & legibus, quàm ab ijs à quibus illa bona relicta sunt. Nam ut perveniat ad nos fundus, testamento alicujus fieri potest: ut retineamus quod nostrum factum est, sine jure civili fieri non potest. And all men's inheritance shall be certain both for the private repose of the people, and public good and quiet of the Commonwealth. We must needs think the Law of this Land full of defect, except we think and deem it to be (as indeed it is) certain.  
Who then can, without the consideration of these universal Maxims, Propositions, Rules, and Principles, wherein certainty is alone contained, attain unto the certain knowledge thereof? for as it hath been truly published; Principiorum est unumquodque sibi ipsi fides; Insomuch that cum negantibus ea, non est disputandum, 10. Eliz. 27 1. a. Dyer, 26.  
Hitherto hath been spoken what profit the careful consideration and observation of Principles, Rules, and Maxims of the Law of this Realm doth give us, and what assistance we may find therein toward the study and speculation of the same. It resteth therefore now, that somewhat be said of the commodity which may come to him, that shall manage and practise the same Laws, and to what use this observation therein likewise serveth.  
Two kinds of Arguments are noted by Morgan.  
Ily sont deux principall choses sur que Arguments poient este fait, s. nostre Maxims, & reason, 
Com. Colthurst.  le Mere de touts Leyes, etc. I think by the latter of these, the use of Argumentation upon reasons drawn from the logical place of invention, are to be understood; as namely, to argue and reason in cases of debate, from the causes, effects, parts, consequents, mischiefs, and inconveniences, and such like; which aptly may be called natural reason, because all Art therein observed, is but the imitation of nature: which kind or course of Argument is much used in ancient books, when as there were fewest books of reports extant.  
But by the former of these two specified kinds of Arguments, is meant as manifestly appeareth, the help that Grounds and Maxims do yield in that kind. For the understanding therefore of the right use thereof, it behooveth to consider, that the same wholly doth consist in the apt and convenient application of the said Rules, unto such particular cases daily falling in debate, as may be comprehended under the generality of the same Rules, and may in every respect be rightly reduced thereunto; so that the Rule might serve as a well-grounded reason of the matter called in question.  
To this effect the Author of the Dialogues between the Doctor and Student, after he had at large spoken of the credit and supposed certainty of a Principle or Maxim of the Laws of this Land, addeth further that such Maxims be not only holden for Law, but also other cases like unto them, and all things, that necessarily follow upon the same, are to be reduced to the like Law.  
A second use of the observation of principles in Argumentation may be this.  
We are taught (as saith Aristotle) and as likewise hath afore been remembered, by the election of principles to abound in matter sit for Argumentation. Our propositions may be framed as parts of Syllogisms, or as antecedent propositions of Enthymemes, by which form of Arguments, this profit and commodity is reaped, that he which rightly useth the same, in proof or disproof of any proposed matter shall not need to fall into any unnecessay and extravagant matter, or digress from the point that he hath in hand. For if the parts of our argument so to be concluded, do consist of Propositions which are Principles in Law, and be in due and expedient manner framed and combined together, the Conclusion, which is the point in question, will follow, either necessarily or probably, according to the truth of the said propositions, for as we have before shown, that by reducing a Case to a Syllogism, we might find some of the principal reasons and propositions, whereupon the verity of the said case, being the conclusion, dependeth; as trying out the cause by the effect: So of the contrary part, to frame the effect by the cause; the same propositions will, as they confirm one case, so likewise establish all other special cases, which shall happen to concur in equal and like reason, or be reducible to, or under, the generality of the said proposition.  
And although the Lawyer be not tied to this short course of Argument current in schools, yet in whatsoever large discourse of Argument, if this form be respected, though amplified and enlarged with Prosyllogismes, after the manner of Rhetoritians or Orators, it will yield the fruit afore remembered. There are in our books extant of both, as namely, by Conisby, to prove that a man might grant his Lease for years without Deed, useth this plain and express Syllogism; whereof every proposition being a Ground and Principle in the Law, the Conclusion necessarily doth follow. 
14. H. 7.3. b.   
1 Major] Chose que jeo poy prender in lease sans fait poiet passer horse de moy sans fait.  
2 Minor] Et un lease de terre pur term d'anus est bon sans fait.  
3 Conclusio] Ergo per mesme le reason il poit passer horse del Lessee, & ceo sans fait.  
Likewise a question grew whether the heir or executor were to have a furnace fixed unto the soil, 
20. H. 7.13. b  or such chattels as were annexed to the freehold after the death of the Testator, or no; where the Reporter putteth down the opinion of Reed chief justice, Fisher and Kingsmill, that the executors should not have the same under the frame of this form of Syllogism; whereof every proposition is a Rule of Law.  
1 Major] Ceux choses que ne poient este forfeit per utlary in personal action, ne este attach in Assize ne distrain per le signior pur Rent, tiels choses executours naveront.  
2 Minor] Mes un furnace ou table six sur la terre, ou possesses, ou un pale, ou un covering de un lict merisme, ou board annex all franktenant, ou house & fenesters, & auters tiels semblables queux sont annex all franktenement, & sont fait, pur un profit del inheritance, ne poient este forfeit per utlary, ne attach, ne distrain.  
3 Conclusio] Ex consequenti sequitur que executours naveront tiels choses.  
As touching the second sort of Argument by Syllogism, in the Commentaries of Plowden the same is very frequent and usual. And herein to take example out of the first case, because it first cometh to memory; All the said Argument of Griffith in the case of Fogossa, may be reduced into this Syllogism set forth in the entrance thereof.  
Mayor] Chascun agreement covient este perfect, plein & compleite.  
Minor] Et le evidence icy ne prove le agreement deste perfect, ne plain, ne complete, mes plus toft un communication ou parlance que un agreement.  
The conclusion is suppressed, for that it apparently followeth of the premises, until the end of the argument; where at last it is expressed in this manner.  
Conclusio] Et issint le agreement est imperfect a donor action pur le subsidy per que le agreement intent per le statute nest accomply.  
The Mayor Proposition is amplified with this Prosyllogisme.  
Car agreement concernant personal choses, est un mutual assent des parties, & doit este execute ove un recompense, ou auterment doit este cy certain & sufficient que doit donor actio, ou altar remedy pur recompense, & sil issent nest, donque ne sera dit agreement mes plus toft un nude communication.  
And this proposition he prooveth by the cases thereafter by him alleged.  
The Minor proposition of the first Syllogism is there enlarged, where he further addeth.  
Et issint in nostre case entant que estatute de Ann. 1. Regis nunc, cap. 3. etc. until the end of the case.  
The like may be observed in every good and effectual argument; but we stand not upon example.  
A third profit may be considered herein: for many times it falleth out, that we perceive a coherence and likeness between diverse and sundry cases, which therefore we know are appliable to our purpose; and yet nevertheless, except we draw the unity of reason so found and considered in the said cases, unto a short Sentence, Ground, Rule or proposition, wherein they may concur, and do agreed; we shall be driven with long circumlocution and many words, to make manifest our meaning in the allegation of the same, especially if the cases do not concur and agreed in one mediate reason or likeness, but are upon some conformity further off, to be resembled each to other. As for example.  
Le Roy ne poit arrest un home de suspition de treason ou felony, 
1 Hen. 7.4. b.  luy mesme, come un subject poit fair, pur ceo que si il fait tort in ceo pheasant, le party issint injury ne poit aver action envers luy.  
Si home soit in debt a un sur contract sans specialty; 
49. Ed. 3.5. a 50. Assis. p. 1. 9 Eliz. 262.  si apnes cesty a que le det est due soit utlage in action personal, le Roy naver cest dett pur l'utlary a luy forfeit, pur ceo que donque le defendant perderoit le benefit del lay gager que il puis aver in suit de ceo commence verse luy per le Creditor.  
Coment que lestatute de W. 2. cap. 3. done resceit a cesty in le reversion generalment uncore si le tenant pur vie soit lou le Roy ad le reversion; 
25. Ed. 3.48. a. b. Com. Walsingh.  & il estant implede fait default apres default, le Roy ne sera receive come common person seroit. Car, sur le resceit, le demandant doit counter vers cesty que est receive, Mes issent ne poit ascun counter verse le Roy, ne luy sure, mes per petition; Et pur ceo, si le Roy seroit resceive le breve, le demandant abateroit maintenant, & pur cest mischief, all demandant le Roy ne sera resceive: mes son droit sera save per altar mean.  
These three cases greatly do differ both in the circumstance of matter, and in the immediate reasons, and yet nevertheless have some resemblance, and a kind of conformity and likeness, between them each to other.  
1 First they all concern the King.  
2 Secondly the King in every of them is restrained from that power or benefit that his subject hath. For  
1 In the first, he cannot arrest one as his subject may.  
2 In the second he shall loose that debt which his subject, in whose right he claimeth it, should recover.  
3 In the third he shall not be received where the subject might.  
And lastly, in every of these cases, if the King should be admitted to do as a common person might, the subject in suit with him should sustain great prejudice. For  
1 In the first he should not be permitted to punish the injury done to his person.  
2 In the second he should loose the benefit of waging his Law. And  
3 In the third and last have his action debated without his default.  
The likeness of which cases cannot so well be conceived without many words, except we reduce unto some general Axiom the unity and resemblance of reason found in them. And therefore this proposition without more might have sufficed for all.  
Where the subject by reason of some Prerogative, that is in the King, should otherwise be put to a prejudice; there the King shall not be allowed that benefit which every of his subjects by Law enjoyeth.  
In which general Axiom or Rule, a general reason of all the said several Cases doth equally concur.  
By this observation we may reap likewise a fourth commodity, after this manner. All the Reports do consist of particular Cases. Every particular Case hath his several Circumstance. Circumstances are singular, and hardly retained in memory. 
Bracton li. 1. cap. 1. ¶. 3.  For, true is that sentence, which Bracton hath borrowed out of the Civil Law, Omnia habere in memoria, & in nullo errare, divinum est potius quam humanum. Wherhfore when the Case is out of memory, and the circumstances thereof quite forgot, the Reason yet remaineth, and is had in memory. For, Memoria intellectiva est universalium, ut est ipsemet intellectus.  
It is not the Case ruled this way, nor that way, but the reason which maketh Law; 
Math. Gribaldus de ratione studij juris lib. 1. cap. 4.  For, Non quid sit intelligere sufficiat, sed cur sit diligentius inquiratur. So that he which by observation of these Grounds & principles, remembreth but the reason (as he easily may) shall so sufficiently resolve all doubts of like degree, as if he had remembered the express Cases from which the same reason is deduced. Although in argument, I confess, not only the general reasons, but likewise the special Cases are as proofs produced and alleged.  
Lastly, sith the chosen and collected Propositions and principles in manner as aforesaid, for our better use behooveth to be committed to writing; we may easily without great trouble, by disposing of them orderly, frame a Directory, in manner either of a methodical Treatise, or of an Alphabetical Table, fit and convenient both for the speedy finding of that we would seek, and the ready having of that we can wish for, surpassing the benefit of any Abridgement heretofore extant.  
And thus much touching the commodities growing by the consideration and collection of Principles, Rules, Axioms, Grounds & Maxims: and of the scope and end whereunto they tend in managing of our Laws, as well for the behoof of the Student, as for the use of the Practiser. And now remaineth that a few words be said to forewarn both, of certain abuses ordinarily bred herein.  
1 The first Abuse is, that neither the Ground oftentimes produced doth come near the Reason of the Case, in question; nor the Cases alleged to prove and fortify that Ground, do directly confirm the same. A salt very usual in public exercises; and may be redressed, if we do call to mind that any case alleged aught not to be wrested to prove the Rule or Ground alleged; but the Rule, Ground or Principle aught to be the very immediate or secondary reason of the Cases whence it is drawn, and which cases are brought to confirm the same, in such sort, that all the Cases alleged do concur in equality of reason, likeness, and proportion; and in full proof of the Principle so produced. And that the ground or principle be a reason of the question in variance, to subvert or confirm the same. Wherein also let this be weighed, that a few principles cannot sufficiently serve to supply all occasions in that behalf, but the same must be drawn and deduced of all Causes, Titles, and matters in the Law fit for argument and use.  
2 A second principal oversight is this. Many to prove their opinion in the controversy proposed, frame their reason rightly from some notable Ground, and known principle or Rule, which though it be well applied, yet not regarding the manifold Exceptions whereunto the same Principle is subject, they do set it forth so general, that it giveth their adversary some cause of challenge and cavil thereunto, by objecting some instance or cases upon exception of the said Rule: and thereby doth not only seem to enfeeble the same, in showing the fallacies thereof; but sometime in show, weakeneth the whose reason and argument grounded thereupon.  
3 The third abuse of these Principles or Propositions, is, in the too much frequenting and often needless use of them. For sometimes the obscurity of the cause, may require some other manner of argument, drawn from places of invention, which may content and satisfy the mind of the hearers much better. And sometimes the clearness of the matter itself, needeth not such preparation of proof and confirmation of those principles and rules. For than is the most and best of them, when that both propositions and Cases to confirm the same, have great coherence with the question; when both the circumstance of the Case in question, and the cause of doubt, do give occasion to use them; so that which thereby is affirmed, may rightly be reducible to the purpose.  
4 Finanlly, it sometimes falleth out to be a fault overmuch to abound in well doing. Omne nimium vertitur in vitium, saith the Proverb; for sundry times it happeneth, that it is very convenient and direct to the matter to make argument upon a well applied Principle, Rule or Ground, which by men of great learning and reading is sometimes so sufficiently handled, with such abundance and ample furniture of notable and direct Cases, that their endeavour herein deserveth high commendations: yet more convenient were it, that their pains were less. For to what purpose behooveth it, to heap Case upon Case, as it were one on the neck of another, Pelion upon Ossa? whereas many probable reasons, though confirmed with few good Cases, breed greater contentation to the hearer, by reason of the several proof made thereby then many Cases.  
FINIS.