A DEFENCE OF THE Duke of Buckingham's BOOK OF RELIGION & WORSHIP, FROM THE Exceptions of a Nameless AUTHOR. By the PENSILVANIAN.  Deceit is in the Heart of them that Imagine Evil; But to the Councillors of Peace is Joy. Prov. 12. 
London, Printed for A. Banks, in the Year 1685.   

To the READER.  
IT pleased me so well to see any thing in Defence of RELIGION, under the Name of the Duke of Buckingham, that I was quite of another mind to the Gentleman that troubled himself with an Answer; And thought if he had said less to his Point, it showed, to his greatest Honour, by his own Sense, the force of his Convictions, and how little served him to the Belief of a Deity.  
That so much Wit and Quality, that have made so great a Figure in the world, should give this Onset to Atheism, that had so long stolen the Credit of both, to giver herself Value with Men of Highest Rank, might have escaped a Reprimand from the Deist or Christian; And This was enough to send the Atheist a Challenge.  
That his Discourse was not laboured with Repetitious Thought, nor writ in the Language of the Schools, is owing to his better genius, and more sensible Education. It needs no Apology, and is its own Encomium; To be sure it is like Himself, and That is an Original.  
In this Evening of his Time, I heartily wish him the Felicity of living the irreprovable Life of his Admired Instinct, especially, since be Believes it is not out of his Power, and that such extraordinary Rewards follow it. And This will add a Demonstration to his Probabilities for Religion.  
I would then press the Nobility and Gentry of England, to the Imitation of so Illustrious an Example, and that those Virtues might be recovered, that once made the Discipline of their Ancestors so much the Honour of their King, the Safety of their Country, and the just Fear and Admiration of all Foreigners.  
For the Person that undertook to Answer the Duke's Discourse, in my Opinion, he has, with the Duke, abused his Time; As all do, that, Mistake. Write loosely, beg the Question, pervert the Sense; And, to Crown their Work, Contradict themselves.  
Hear the Noble Peer this Friendship, and his Essay may Challenge it for a Duty: But I am particularly Interested in a Reply, by a Reflection the Author gives me in his Answer. 'Twere Justice to vindicate a less Man, when assaulted in my Name. But there is another Reason; His Arguments were too low an Entertainment for the Duke, and therefore fit for a man of my inferior Talents. While I Reprehend his Performance, I must not be too confident in my own, especially when I have not his Six Hours Haste to offer in excuse of myself; For, to my Dulness I must own, it has cost me the best part of Six Days, and therefore time for me to rest. Such as it is, Friendly Reader, Take, Read, and Judge. I am no Sceptic, for I believe what I Write. If I err, I am to be informed: The way, must be Reason, as it is with all reasonable Men, and as I profess myself such, so from them I expect, the Mercy that all Men need, and desire, when it comes to their turn to be where I am, I mean, upon the Stage of Censure, Farewell,  
Just Reader, Thine of long standing, W.P.   

A DEFENCE, etc.  
HIs first Paragraph contains his wonder, that the D. should espouse the Cause of Whiggism in her old age, when a cast Mistress, and scorned of all. And all that know the D● humour, would wonder too, if the thing were true; and if not, the wonder turns upon the man's Confidence. It has been the D's fault to love fresher game; But This is as much below his Wit, as the other against his Inclination. But if the story could be true, I am not of the Answerer's mind; it was not his Pity but Policy to entertain her; perhaps, to know the secrets of his Great Peer, p. 1. for so Cecil served Essex.  
But what is Whiggism? He tells us very briefly; 'tis Toleration & Persecution; and that these Qualities made her so amiable to the Associating Lords. How this affects the D. that was not of their knot, is un-accountable, and how those L ds. loved the persecuting part of her, is as hard to understand; unless he means it of the Exclusion, and prosecution of the Popish Plot; and if that be it, He does ill to rail at the Rom. Cath. and their Religion too, p. 15.21. as able to ruin the whole Earth, and lay the foundation of eternal mischiefs to mankind. But if Toleration be a part of Whiggism, it may touch the D. in general: Only in this the man is mistaken, she came not last to his hands▪ he was the first of all the Peers of England that had her: And his credit be it spoken, in This he is constant, and more the same George D. of B. than this Author fancies him, p. 8.  
But must the D's Book of the weightiest matters; be disgraced with Whiggism? Is it Whiggish to assert a God, his Providence o● the world, the Immortality of the Soul, the Duty of Divine Adoration, Freedom of our Wills from Absolute Predestination, the Unreasonableness of one man's forcing another man's Conscience in Religion, the necessity of good Works, and Rewards and Punishments▪  
Must so Noble a Design be blasted with so odious a Name? And his Essay Branded without Distinction? Don't we all know that the State Dissenter was esteemed the Whig, and the great Offence of Whiggism the Interruption of the Line? Which must be the Persecuting part of Whiggism in this man's account, or none, And can the Duke be guilty of this, for writing a Discourse against Persecution of any Body for Religion? If Indulgence be Whiggism, let him remember who it was that lately wanted it. And if Persecution be Whiggism too, who it is that he makes whigs now: Himself a great one to be sure, page 28, 29, & 30. In the mean time, the Duke of Buckingham it seems, Has entered the Lists, is become a Champion, and a Glorious Protector of Whiggism, alias, Toleration of Dissenting Christians; A greater Honour, I think he could hardly have done him: And in this I am of his mind.  
His second Paragraph begins with a question every body may Answer, to wit, If it was not boldly done of him to Answer a Peer of his High Rank, pag. 2. And for my part, I think so, and something worse; considering the Abuse, Slightness, Untruth and Contradiction with which he has performed it. For the Duke cannot think it ill done of him to Answer, but to Answer ill, no body can think well done, and that's his Case▪  
But to fight this Noble Peer with Success, he unhappily tells us, He has armed himself with an Invulnerable Conscience; And I am afraid so, because he shows himself Insensible of his Injustice and Indecency to a Peer, that himself says, Is of the Highest Rate, in the beginning of his Answer, and flies to the Penal Laws to support himself at the latter end of it.  
But he would have us believe, His Nature and Education are more soft and obliging; and if we may trust him, it is pity his Religion should have spoiled him, or that a man should be the worse for that which should have made him better.  
He says, Though in approaching so near his Grace, he cannot be procul a Jove, he will be sure to be procul a Fulmine. This I presume was to pass for Wit, but he is somewhat unlucky in it, and either jeers the Duke, or Himself; For this is to tell us the Duke's Arguments have no force; or if they have, he has wit enough to keep out of their way. I might add a third, perhaps he presumes upon his Goodness, which I perceive is more than Jupiter himself must hope for in some Country's, from the Malitia of the Pulpit. But now I think of it, who knows but he meant Scandalum Magnatum, and that by concealing his Name, he should escape the Thunderbolt; lest that might happen to turn the Wine of his Hopes into the Vinegar of Despairs; his own sweet Metaphor.  
He ends this Paragraph p. 4. with be▪ speaking his own Impunity, And professing a profound Veneration for his Grace's High Character. He more than once labours to persuade the Duke to let him abuse him Gratis: To be sure, I shan't oppose the Charity, but advise him to prove himself the better Christian by exercising it. But methinks it shows the man's Fear, and That, his Gild, as his Hope, the Duke's Goodness, and his diffidence in the Invulnerableness of his own Conscience. He would have something else to trust too.  
It is an odd thing to bespeak a man's Sanctuary where he intends the wrong, and presume upon the Goodness of the Person to abuse him safely. He profoundly respects the Duke, and yet makes him to keep, and be the Champion of Whiggism; and then too, When every Body else for fear or shame has forsaken her. I will end with this, That he that Entitles a Man to the Sin, does his best to Entitle him to the Punishment too: Which in my Judgement shows a wild and an ill Conscience in the Answerer.  
His third Paragraph p. 4. Declares, His own belief is unavoidable, and his Book, That they that don't avoid their own beliefs, to believe as he believes, are justly punishable; and why? Because he believes as the Church believes, that is by Law Established. Here's the reason of his Creed: And they that offer to have any better, are dangerous to the Government, p. 19, 22, and 23. I think I don't wrong him with Consequences; the places import as much. There is little else in this Paragraph, but that he has a mind to show his Affectation and Ignorence of French, by Opinionatre, instead of Opiniatrelé, and cautions us to take head of him, for he does not know, But he may be Mad before he has done, at least freakish and unruly. He would place it to the Infection of the Duke's Wit; but his Book proves he has escaped the Contagion.  
But in his fourth Paragraph, p. 5, & 6. It wants, Temperamentum ad pondus. If so, it shows the man Lightheaded; for that which has pondus, will not be taken with that which has none. All true Wit has weight; for Wit is an apt and strong expression of a thing, such as strikes our Understanding Truly and Lively. I should take his Praise and Pleasure to be the best Argument in his Book against the Duke, but that they are Dissembled. 'Tis a kind of a Civil way of taking leave, to be Rude, (all Abuse is such:) For to tell us, of his Graces Facetious Pen, taking Air, Pleasant and Witty Reasonings; In fine, The Tarantula of his Paper (which is a Fly, that makes Foulkes Dance and Caper,) as if the Duke had written a Farce, is Idle. It may be the Encomium of a Play, but it makes an ill Character for a Religious Essay.  
But this sticks in his Stomach too, That Noble Cavaliers should trouble their Heads with Religion; And who knows but he has reason, for 'twere the way to make Chaplains necessarily Learned, or unnecessary and useless to their Masters. He wonders as much at Noble Cavaliers writing of Religion, as to see a Blue Apron Knight correcting Euclids Elements. And yet I think they use to wear Green ones that Teach them. I thought he would allow it to Nobles after Mechanics; But this shows he is of the Tribe of—, and has no Charity for those that han't enough to believe in Verbum Ministri. I expect in the next Book, the Gentleman will plead his Charter against such Interlopers. But the Duke hates Ingrocers, and is too Old to mend: 'Tis Labour lost; He is and will be the same D. of Buckingham he was forty years ago, in the Point Controverted. Arguments drawn from Selfish Topics and Private Interests, move slowly with men of large and Generous Minds.  
This is worse by half then Praying in Latin▪ (which he is against, p. 15▪) if I were to be Judge; For men may learn that, but our Nobility must not meddle in Religion, though it seems They helped to make ●is. However, he graciously allows this Noble Peers Notions to be fine, and many of them Natural and True, yet in a breath His conceptions are greatly to the Disadvantage of Religion, And why? Because the Duke (poor man) had not attended their Consequences; which, of things Natural and True, I had always thought there had been no danger.  
He concludes with a Story of an Airy Gentleman of his Acquaintance (for he's of that Element) that being pressed with the Consequences of his odd Opinions, would cry, A Pox upon Consequences, I hate these Consequences: Who the Story belongs to, the Reader must judge: But if the Answerer be not more Inconsequent than the Duke; I will share in the Blame, that for all him, had no share in the fault.  
In his next Period pag. 6, 7. he looks like a man of the White Apron; and I think it as Lawful for a Blue one to talk of Euclids Elements, as for that to meddle with Religion; and of the two, that spots least: He says, He will not read us an Anatomical Lecture upon his Grace's Paper, nor curiously dissect every Nerve and Muscle. This is be like to excuse both his Skill and Courseness; he was for shorter work, though it savoured somewhat more of the Butcher. From hence he shifts Callings and turns Cook, Cousen-german to t'other; and without so much as washing his Hands, falls to talk of Hashing of Books, and serving them up with Limon and Anchovies. Men use the Metaphors of their Calling and Genius; but he shows ill Judgement: For an Ass in a Chair were as true Painting, as this Wit: That Sauce in my Opinion had done much better with a Calves-Head. And now he Promises us his matter in a lump, and to say true, it looks as if it came out of the Mine of Confusion, Gross enough.  
He first salutes the Duke's Method to confute the Atheist, p. 8. and will not have the Mutation of things in the World a reason against the Eternity of it, no more than the Dukes to render him not the same George Duke of Buckingham he was forty year ago. But in this the Gentleman is short, and beside the Cushion: For though I fancy the Duke would say him many kind things to be the same he was forty years ago, yet because he is the same Personality under mutations; to conclude, the World may be Eternal notwithstanding its proper Revolutions, is a mighty Nonsequitur. For it is to say, because a thing is, it must always be. I should rather think, that because the Duke is a Being of time, and once was not, and again will not be that George D. of Buckingham he is, and therefore he suffers those mutations, we see him under: It is a good Argument, that the Revolutions we daily see the World subject to, makes it, at least probable, that it is a Being of Time, that once was not, and again will not be the World it is.  
In Truth, there is no Parity in his allution, and therefore his Argument is fallacious; for how does this follow, that the World may be Eternal for all its Changes, because George D. of B. is the same he was forty years since, notwithstanding his Bodily Mutations. I must return him his Compliment, which he, with less reason makes the Duke, that his Argument is not too Logical. A thing's being the same, does not necessarily conclude it never had a beginning, and to be sure its Mutation, be it but of Accidents only, does not make its Eternity more credible.  
If the Duke were Eternal, for all his Change, it were a good Argument that the World might be so too, under all its Revolutions; But that the Duke's being that Individual he was forty years ago, for all his Mutations of Body, should prove the World Eternal, notwithstanding the changes of it, is as un-accountable as his poison of Wit, p. 4.  
I take it to be a better way of Arguing, that if the Duke was Born, grows old, and must die, though He be the same D. of B. he was forty years ago, the World, that feeds him, had a beginning, grows old, and will have an end, though it be the same in nature that it was five thousand years ago. And of this the daily mutation we see it subject to, are almost a Demonstration.  
For all the Productions of the World Die, and all that are nourished of it End: It can neither give nor feed a life beyond Time. And that itself should yet be Immortal, that neither makes nor keeps any thing else so, is against that parity of Reason, which we observe about all other things, and cannot refuse here. All Productions are of the nature of the thing Producing: And tho' it may reasonably be ordained by some Superior Being, to entertain & nourish many Generations of Mankind, 'tis Incomprehensible that itself should be Eternal, whose Nature & Powers we see so short & finite by the Revolutions and Mortality of the Creatures they exert and feed. Plain it is, upon our notion of Creation, this Dilemma vanishes, but upon Production, it will remain.  
If it should be objected: But the World out lives Man, and the Creatures it produces; and if the absurdity of the World's being Eternal, is taken from its Productions not being like itself, why does not the World, such as it is, produce or feed a life as durable as its own? I answer, that it differs mightily, Men beget lives longer and shorter than their own, are they not therefore Mortal? or did they not beget them? It is one thing to talk of Mortal Production out of an Eternal Being, and another thing to say that a Temporal Being should produce or nourish another less durable than itself: Besides, the Objection granting the Question of the In-eternity of the World, it is easy to conceive that the Supreme Agent, whose Wisdom and Power made it, contrived that excellent Fabric, House or Stage of Life, more durable than that of any Man or Age, to entertain so many Generations of Mankind, as he designed to inhabit and subsist in it. It lies much in the Frame and Constitution of the Subject. Men make Clocks that go a Week, a Month, a Year, Seven years, and are outlived by the works of their own hands. They may allow it to those of the Supreem Agent to survive them, without the necessity of their being Eternal.  
But, Argumentum ad hominem, the World cannot to him be mutable and Eternal; For 'tis plain, that he allows Impassibility (which he knows, with Philosophers, takes with it immutability) to be an Attribute of God, and that God only is Eternal, p. 9 Now I cannot apprehend why he refuses Mutability to be an Argument against Eternity, or how the World may be Eternal tho' Mutable, when he argues that God is only Impassable or Immutable, because he is Eternal. Let him have a care of his Airy Gentleman's Fate, p. 6. And yet if he be as much a School-man as he would have us believe, he must know that the Argument the Duke has advanced against the Atheists, is Celebrated by the Schools. And tho' the Apostles Testimony is a begging of the question to an Atheist, 'tis doubtless Orthodox with this Person; and he tells us, That the things that are seen, are Temporal, and the fashion of this World passeth away.  
But for all this he fancies the Duke has done little, and that he could do wonders against the Atheist, and therefore, If he were to discourse him, he would press him with this Dilemma. If the World be Eternal, it must be the cause of its own existence, p. 9 And this he urges without mercy upon his Atheist, and runs through all the Consequences of it, with as much confidence and vanity as if he had first obliged the World with the knowledge of the secret; and when all is done, it is better said by the Duke, and with less exception, in the main question, p. 5. And to say true, it grows upon every Common in the Country. But with his leave, I take the Duke's Argument of the In-eternity of the World, from the Mutability of it, to be much the better of the two; for the absurbity of any thing being the Cause or Effect of its own existence, which this man says is the consequence of the World's being Eternal, being perhaps as applicable to one Eternal as another, is no credit to his better way of Discoursing an Atheist, and proving a Deity. For a thing to be the Cause or Effect of itself, is, in my poor Opinion, not too Logical and I am afraid, too near a Kin to Nonsense. His making the Duke to hint at nothing else in proof of a God, is disingenuous; for there is one thing mentioned, he takes no notice of, p. 5. For, says the Duke, Whether the World has been Created out of nothing is not material to our purpose, because if a Supreme Intelligent Agent, has framed the World to be what it is, and has made us to be what we are, we ought as much to stand in awe of it, as if it had made both Us and the World out of nothing. Which plainly imports thus much; That though the matter of the World were Eternal, that Being whose Wisdom and Power, disposed and framed it into the Glorious and Regular thing we all see it is, show him to be what we call God, and Us that we should fear Him; which is best done by a sober and regular life, because that is most suitable to the Law of our Nature, and consequently the mind of the great Workman.  
The Built and Skill then of the World, thus proving the Supreme Intelligence, and at the same time, that he is the object of the Adoration of his Creatures, we are naturally brought to the Duke's next point, too weakly opposed by his unweary Answerer, viz. That Man only of all other Creatures, having had conceptions, at least suspicions of a Deity and another World; It is probable there is something nearer a Kin to the Nature of God in Man, than in any other Animal whatsoever, and that Instinct of a Deity ought to be our Guide and Director in choosing the best way for our Religious Worship of God. This is the passage the Gentleman falls upon, and tells us p. 11, 12. That that is as fair a Plea for the Alcoron; as the New Testament for Pythagoras' Golden Verses, as St. Paul's Epistles. But which way, he leaves us to guests? And yet we shall not guests to say that Pythagoras' Golden Verses are much nearer a Kin to St. Paul's Epistles, than the Alcoron to the New Testament. For the one has great and excellent Truths, without Imposture; the other not. And tho' less Nobly descended, and of inferior Authority, so far as they are right, it is no dishonour to St. Paul's Epistles, that Pythagoras writ Truth, nor to the Instinct that his Verses are so far approved by it. And if this Gentleman would but allow the Duke the Law, which is yet less than the courtesy of the Learned, he knows how Fruitful the Doctrine of Ideas is to the defence of the Duke's Instinct.  
To say true, it were enough to refer the Reader to the Duke's Paper, and that of his Answerer. The natural, plain, and easy Deduction of the one from p. 11. to p. 19 the Disingenuous Citation, Pervertion and confusion of the other throughout, will make him think I might have spared myself the pains of following him here. But that it may appear, beyond all doubt, let us hear him at large how well he grounds his Exceptions.  
He says, if he be not mistaken, (and that is modestly conditioned,) his Grace must mean Humane Reason, not regulated by any Public and Politic Reason of a Community, but as every private Man's Reason dictates to him. And that then the Duke has this Consequence, That it is one of the greatest crimes a Man can be guilty of, to force us to act or sin against that Instinct of Religion, and something akin to the Sin against the H. Ghost. For this Doctrine, thus hash'd & dressed by himself, he is angry with me; And but that his Grace is no Minor, he should suspect the Pensilvanian had Tutored him with his Quakeristical Doctrine; Mighty civil to the Duke, and very just to Me. I am sorry the Duke pays so dear for my acquaintance, and that I cannot have the Honour to have such a Pupil without a Jeer upon His. The Man might have named me plainer if he had pleased, without fear of the fatal and murdering blow of Scandalum Magnatum, though not without great Scandal. But in this we are both Debtors to his singular Goodness, that whosoever got the Child, he resolves to be Gossip; and for that purpose has provided four Names, which are these four ensuing Consequences.  
First, that Reason is the Sole guide of every Man's Religion, tho' neither Sole nor Reason are any terms of the Duke's Doctrine, and that the D. excuses the omission of Scripture because of the qualifications of the Men his Discourse was designed too, that he might come close to their own Natures and not beg the Question. But in its due place he recommends Christanity as the best Religion, p. 18. and then to be sure he cannot neglect the Scripture.  
His Second consequence he pin's upon the Duke, is as just as the former. That Divine Revelation is not necessary to Salvation; when it is evidently the meaning of that part of the Duke's Discourse, that People use the Light that God has given them to choose themselves a Religion by, and recommends the Christian for the best. Is it the way to deny revealed Religion to press men to choose, with the best Skill they have, the Christian, that is the truest Revelation. Certainly this Man must be beside himself a little, or He could hardly be so much beside the matter.  
His Third Consequence is yet more disingenuous than the other; for he makes the Duke to say, That it is a most horrid Sin to lead Men out of the Errors Natural Religion, and bare Reason of necessity lead men's to, whose very Essay was on purpose to lead Natural Men by the way of first Principles to embrace revealed Religion. But is it, in good earnest▪ a Sin to lead Men out of Errors, because it is a Sin to force Men against their Consciences? what Man can have a happier Talent than this: The very gift of Consequences. To shift Force for Lead, and Conscience for Error, shows His to be invulnerable with a Witness. In one he forges, & begs the Question in the other: No Man could be more dextrous at it: doubtless he will in a while be as much out of humour with Consequences, as his Airy Gallant; for no Man can make worse. I must not persuade a Man, because I must not F●●ce him; I must not Led a Man, because I must not drag and whip him; In fine, I must not Inform a Man, because I must not knock him on the head. If this be the Gentleman's Leading. I shall have a care how I take him for a Guide. There's a sort of Men, whose Mercies are Cruelties, and who with all their pretence to Revealed Religion, have not the Justice & Mercy of a poor benighted Pagan.  
His Last Consequence he draws from the Duke's Position and Deductions, is this, That Men who believe a God, and follow the Dictates of Reason in his Worship, may be Saved in any, in all Religions, provided they know no better.  
But how this Consequence can with any Justice be charged upon the Duke, that so expressly, p. 18. prefers the Christian Religion, is past my Skill. For unless he will make the Duke, to say that no Religion is necessary to Salvation, when he writes to persuade People to have one, he must confess he makes the Christian to be It, because he recommends That to our Belief and Practice; confirming it to himself from the agreeableness of its Doctrine with what he is prompted by his Pious Instinct to believe to be true. Can a Man then say with any Conscience that is Just, that the D. of B. thinks Men may be Saved in any and in all Religions, when he first, makes Religion necessary, and then tells us that in his Conscience he believes the Christian to be the true: As if his business had been to Profane, and not advance the True Religion.  
And I cannot but wonder how this wild conception came in his head, so disagreeable to the Duke's Reason, Instinct and Deductions. If he had said, in any, or all Persuasions, he had Magnified the Duke's Charity, with this distinction, that Men of Sincerity in all Persuasions may be Saved, and not that Men may shift Persuasions for Interest, and yet go to Heaven: tho' if it were so, perhaps this Doctor might have the better of the two by the Notion; Hypocrisy being none of the Dukes Vice. But to say that men may be Saved in any, or in all Religions, is somewhat harsh upon the Duke; and yet if in all these Religions, a Man must be, a Man that believes in God, and lives Virtuously, and in modes of Worship, knows no better, than the Tradition of his Fathers, it is hard to Damn him; And this Gentleman must produce better Authorties for his Severity, before it will have credit with Men of Sense and Bowels,  
Now though this does not touch the Duke's Discourse any more than his Charity, to admit that a Dissenter, a Roman Catholic, a Jew, a Turk, an Indian may be saved, let us see how well it may be supported. St. Peter seems to have been of this Man's mind in the Preamble to the Story of Cornelius, Act. 10. till better taught: and who knows what this man may be in time. Of a truth I perceive (says Peter) that God is no respecter of Persons, but in every Nation he that feareth him, and worketh Righteousness, is accepted of him. This was a Gentile, a Roman, neither Jew nor Christian, yet Devout, a Just man, one Fearing God; And as such, with all, of all Nations of the same Quality, declared by this great Apostle, accepted with God: So that it seems here is (greatly doubtless against this Gentleman's mind) some acceptance for the poor Men of the Duke's Instinct. Well, but let us suppose them to be Comparatively Benighted, was not Cornelius so too? Yet we see the consequence, He was accepted as he was; and why, but because sincere, and he knew no better? He stood the fairer for revealed Religion; this prepared him for it: Nay, we are told by the same unquestionable Authority, That in the times of Ignorance, God winked. And such to be sure he thinks theirs are, and I think are like to be, for all him: For if I mistake not, the man is for the Promise at Home, let what will betid them Abroad. If he can but sit under his Own Vine here, let the Roar, the Devil take the Turk and all the rest for him. Extraordinary Itinerary Calls are ceased; for there's extraordinary Pains and Perils in the case, and though he may love Souls well, yet who shall Pay him.  
Well, but if God Winks at the Ignorant, must this Man be so prying? And if the Judge of the whole Earth will not be strict, Ought He to turn Inquisitor? Or must it be an heinous Error because He says it, That Men that Fear God, and follow the Dictates of Reason in any Religion, and know no better, may be Saved? Most unjust then is his Clamour, against the Divinity of Calvinists, as Inhuman, p. 4. That Damns men, p. 13. for not being better than they know how to be.  
But the Man builds the things he destroys; For he more than any body believes one of these three things; First, That there is no such thing as Salvation, or that men may be Saved in the Religion as it is by Law Established in all Country's, Or that men are bound to submit to the Religion Established by Law, let the Issue in t'other World be what it will: For that Power he gives absolutely into the Magistrate's Hand; And who can be Judge upon him? The English of all which I take to be this, that men may be of any or all Religions, but not in the same Country, for fear of Suffering for it; but, cum furis Romae Romano vivete more. One after another, at Rome a Papist, at London a Protestant, at Constantinople a Mahometan. This Principle, so naturally his own, is the consequence of his Malice upon the Duke; for he would have the D's deduction of the Reasonableness of men's choosing their Religion by the direction of that which in themselves is nearest akin to the Nature of God, to imply, that for all that, Men may be of any, and of all Religions; a pretty way to shift with all Winds, and Sail the Compass round: But in this he has more than avenged the Duke's quarrel upon himself; for he cannot make himself more ridiculous then in attempting to make the Duke so unreasonable.  
And he is just as fair to Reason as he has been to the Duke. For if he says true, A man may follow the Dictates of it, and be of all Religions too: Such a Gipsy is Reason with him. And if you ask him, why Reason is so prostitute a thing, that nothing comes amiss to her; His Answer is extraordinary, For (says he) it can never lead men to the knowledge of the Belief of a Trinity, the Incarnation, Death, Passion, Resurrection, Ascention, or Divinity of Christ. Ergo what? Ergo, It will bow to any else, though it be never so Idle and Extravagant. Is not this sad work for a Doctor.  
But if the Dictates of Reason will fall in with any Religion, they may embrace the Christian as well as another, and then he's gone again. He will certainly hate Consequences too, when he has but thought of his own, that so inevitably attended his Conceptions to the disadvantage of Religion. But the Duke's Instinct, or that which God has placed in our Hearts, so near akin to the Nature of God, he says, must be Reason, and that Reason he makes an arrant Strumpet; for he assures us, She is a Prolific Parent of Idolatry, Superstition, Will-Worship, and a thousand Absurdities more in Religion, and quotes All Times, Places, and Ages for proof, p. 14. But as it happens, names not one of them to the point asserted.  
Now the little skill I have in Books, tells me quite other things to the Tale of this Answerer: That Superstition and Idolatry are the most Unreasonable things in the World, that They could never Bribe Her in any Time, and till Sensuality had Darkened and Over-laid men's Reason, It was impossible for Superstition and Idolatry to obtain that Empire, that in Prejudice of Reason, they have at any time got upon the belief of any part of Mankind. And if we will be just to Ethnic Ages, we find men among them of extraordinary Light; That, As having no Law, became a Law unto themselves, and that were of the Uncircumcision that kept the Law, as the Apostle of the Gentiles speaks. Such was Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Xenocrates, Plotin, Antipater, Zeno, Epicteius, Seneca, Plutarch, Cato, Cicero and others. And to be free with the Duke's Undertaker, I take old Plutarch to be much a better Christian, who calls this Instinct, The everlasting foundation of Virtue. A Law written, not in Pillars of Wood or Stone, but in the Hearts of men. But that he may meet with some Rebuke; for much is owing him on this account; I shall take upon me to examine his Imputations, be it upon this Instinct, or be that, Reason, I will not quarrel the word.  
I do say then, that He must either deny that God hath placed any such thing in man, to distinguish him from other Animals; or if that be true, He is to choose his Religion without consulting it. If the first, he makes us all Beasts and himself an Atheist; if the last, our Religion is in▪ evident, we know not what, for we are not to take the Judgement of the Divine Gift in our Election: What a Religion must that be? If his Argument were true, here would be indeed as fair a Plea for the Alcoran as the New Testament. But it were Blasphemous so to speak of the Duke's Instinct For it is that Notion of God which is innate, and as it were congeneal to Us: We bring it with us into the World. The peculiar Seal and Mark of Divinity: A kind of counter▪ part of himself in Man; his Picture in little: The Attributes that are Infinite in Him, being here Epitomised and Resembled in Man, that by It He may have a right knowledge of his Cretor, and sense of his Duty. Antiquity offers a cloud of Witnesses both Pagan and Christian. Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen exceed. But the opposition is too mean to draw out so great an Artillery; It will be time enough when a greater force appears to assault so venerable a Truth: And in the mean time I will attend him in his Exceptions, such as they are. But perhaps he will excuse himself, because he does not certainly know what the Duke means by that part of Us which is nearest a kin to the Nature of God. For he says. If he be not mistaken, it must be Reason. But if I be not mistaken, he had better have known first, and not have drawn positive Conclusions from doubted Premises. But suppose the Duke understands Reason by that Instinct, rather than a Divine Gift to guide our Reason and Understanding; will Reason plead the cause of the Alcoran as soon as that of the New Testament? What has God done then to make us Reasonable? I had thought that the New Testament had been a more reasonable Book, and that God Almighty had not made Man so deceivable a Creature, or framed him with such false Intellects; and submitted him to such dangerous Errors. And though he might have made him Feeble, yet not so squint-eyed or tender-sighted that he could not see strait, or tell colours, or distinguish an Alcoran from the New Testament.  
I pray, is the Alcoran as credible as Christ's Sermons upon the Mount, to the Multitude, to his Disciples? Wherein we find the most excellent Morality, Piety, and Purity of Discipline; so suitable to our Understandings, that they seem to answer the Perfection of Reason? I know he will tell us he means it of Revealed Religion, as he does, p. 13. Reason (says he) can never lead us to the knowledge of the belief of the Trinity, Resurrection, Ascention, or Divinity of the Son of God. To be led to the knowledge of the belief of any thing, is oddly said; but let it pass: However, there is a difference between Miracles and Fables; Arrant Poperies and Fictions; so ill counterfeited too, that a man of small sight must needs discern them.  
Tradition, and prejudiced Education indeed give credit often to such things; but Reason does not choose, but is overborne: Besides, we have as good Authority for our Saviour's Miracles, as for any thing we did not see: Of Mahomet's we have not the like; And this is further to be said, if Reason cannot work them, it never opposed them: On the contrary, it leads us to believe them, and Revealed Religion for their sakes; For a man must be a Hogg to oppose himself to so overcoming an Evidence, in lieu of a man that is led by Reason.  
It seems to me as if this Gentleman dare not venture his Religion with Reason, that opposes Reason to Religion. The New Testament is so far from refusing Reason any share in our Christianity, that it is made a Duty to us to give a Reason of our Christian Hope, 1 Pet. 3.15. And it were absurd to give a Reason for that which a man Receives without Reason, and is impossible to Receive by it, or for Reason to apprehend; and if it could, it judges so ill, that it will as soon prostrate itself to the Alcoran as to the New Testament.  
But this is not all the Duke's fault, perhaps he would go a great way to yield him his point, if he did but mean Political Reason, or Reason regulated by a Community. This he explains, p. 19 For his Community is the Government: But had not this been a fine Receipt to keep Christianity out of all Countries? For had this reason of Community prevailed, there had been neither Christians nor Protestants. Without Racking a Syllable of his excellent Argument; I think I may say, it pleads as much for the Alcoran as the New Testament, and more in Turkey; For if the Political Reason of the Community of a Country is still to conclude those that dwell in it; Turks, must be Turks, Infidels, must be Infidels, Idolators, must be Idolators still: In which also I perceive he is a Republican, after all his Railing at Commonwealthsmen: for the Community over all Causes, with him, Judges. I don't know but it may run as far as Exclusion too: To be sure it would, if all had agreed; for all measures of Right or Wrong, True or False, are by my Man humbly submitted to the Political Reason of the Community; What is this but to say; that every Religion is best where it is Established, though the most disagreeing among themselves, and any or all of them with the True?  
Nor is this the extent of the Duke's Error, He is not only for Reason, guiding and choosing, but he would have every private man's Reason Dictate for himself. This is a Pestiferous Doctrine in the Answerers' account; and yet should a man choose without himself, for himself, he must certainly be beside himself. Who should choose for a man but himself, if he must answer for himself? It would certainly be most unreasonable to judge a man for a thing he is not allowed the liberty of his choice in: Nor do I think a man can have any Reason to render for his Religion, that receives his Religion without the suffrage of his own Reason.  
Has our Body's Eyes, and our Souls none? Shall our Temporal part act upon sight, and our Eternal upon Trust, and That not of God, but of Man? That when the poor Labourer will be Judge of his pay, and not trust his very Minister about the currentness of a Groat, we should be left without distinction about that Treasure, which is of Eternal moment to us: Surely then, Understandings are of no use in Heaven: But I know not how to believe it. To be a Child in Malice is excellent; But under favour, in Understanding, not. To trust out our Souls upon Humane Sayso's, is to go into Coats again; And to be sure, a Child's Coat, is a Fools, upon a man's Back. Let them wear Bibs that Slabber, and the Blind follow the Dog and the Bell. In Religion, Authority concludes Minors; but Conviction determines Men.  
That this Gentleman should pretend to Protestancy, and rail at a man's Judging for himself, is absurd. If the reason of the Community must guide, let him not be so angry with the Romanists for saying, Believe as the Church Believes; when he says, Believe as the State requires: The one presses Conformity as by the Catholic Church Established; the other cries as by Law Established; A Doctrine Calculated to all Meridian's.  
I fear he grants too much for the quarrel, but let Him look to that: For the one presupposes the Holy Ghost to conduct, to justify the determination; The other scorns her words, but won't bate one jot of Conformity. I shall only tell him, that taking the Translation of the Bible to have been an Appeal to the People, made by the first Reformers, against the Church they Dissented from; If as this Man suggests the English of reading it now, be, that we must not make any Judgement to ourselves of what we read, the Appeal cannot be determined, and our Case is not mended; On the contrary, it is made a Temptation of Trouble and Mischief to Us: For, whereas the Inspired Doctor tells us, that in Religious matters, We are to be persuaded in our own Minds That they commended Themselves and Doctrines to men's Consciences, so making Them Judges for Themselves. That Conscience Accuses and Excuses, ay, our own Hearts, that all are to walk as they have Received, and not usurp a Judging Power over our fellow christian's Faith or Liberty; We are told now, that all our Faith and Worship must be submitted to the Political reason of the Community, we are of, hit or miss. I take this to be leaping blind fold into t'other World in matters of Salvation.  
But it may be, he will tell me, that he has nothing to say against Reason considered in its Purity, and undepraved, only, That it cannot lead us to the knowledge of Revealed Religion; and he says as much, p. 13. But this will not do, or else do worse than before; For if by Reason he means a Reasonable Capacity, he does not mean as the Duke means, and says, and then he is mistaken indeed in what his Grace calls that part of us that is nearest a kin to the Nature of God, to wit, His Instinct in Us, and is understood by this Noble Peer to be the Guide and Director of our Understandings in our choice, and, which gives the Rectitude and true Judgement.  
On the other hand, if he understands Reason abstractly, and as the Principle itself; It can no more be depraved, than the Sun darkened by the Mists and Vapours of the Earth. And truly it is just as reasonable to accuse the Law of Moses with the Death of our Saviour, and the Gospel with the Errors and Impieties of Christians, as to charge to the account of Reason all the ill things, that men pretending to it, have committed. And yet to do the worst of them right, the most Idolatrous, Unnatural and Senseless Rites the darkest Ages of the World ever had, they have discharged their Reason, and placed them, in all times, to the unaccountable Tradition and Authority of their Priesthood: Where, 〈◊〉 this time, I will leave them too: Only I must needs say, I wish the Dust this man has so vehemently raised upon Reason, be not to put out our Eyes too, that we may be less Resty, and lead better. For if such men once get us out of our depth, we are gone. Trust thick and threefold. And the more Unintelligable, the more Venerable, this will be the Maxim.  
But if I may, I would wonder for all that, how after all, He can so expressly contradict himself, as p. 14. to allow Reason to Judge, and p. 36. To send his Readers thither to convince others of their Duty both in their Spiritual and Civil Capacity. He must have relented him mightily, or having been in a Fit, is come to himself, or else his own reason has had the wind, and is too many for his Perjudices, or he could not have given himself so quickly so great a Reprimand; But this shows the Nature and Power of Reason, that it will rise to its own Evidence and Vindication, even in the most Unreasonable Men.  
But this Author tells the World, That granting the Duke to have carried his Postulatum of the being of a Supreme and perfect Power, he would have followed his blow at another rate, and sent his Reader another Road, which shows the Duke's little, and his better Skill and Courage; tho' he might have been so modest as to let us have been the Judges of that: He did not catch this of his Grace's Pen. And pray what would he have done? why, after a flood of words (and that is all.) he tells us, That he would have sent them to the Scriptures. And by this, one would think that the Man had never read the Book he pretends to Answer; For that Noble Peer expressly tells us in the beginning of his Discourse, that he has to do with Men that deny their Authority, and therefore to use it to prove what he asserts, were to beg the Question. And I do assure him, so soon as he had Gained the Postulatum of the being a Supreme and perfect Power, he recommends them to the Christian Religion, of which I had always understood till now, the Scriptures had been the Creed.  
Well, but in case of doubtful places he has an Interpreter, a Judge for Him at hand too, and That is the Society of Christians; why could not he as well have said the Church; and then have told us which Church; for there is not one of a dozen that don't allege the Text for their Authority. But to do him Right, he has given us a Rule to know her by; he takes it, (Good Protestant) from Vincentius Lirinensis, and a Golden one it is, he assures us; But for all that, I fancy it has an Iron Rod at the Tail for him.  
'Tis this, Quodubique quod semper, quod ab omnibus, id vere quidem Catholicum est, and that this would have shown the Duke a thousand Errors, p. 15▪ Now, methinks, out of mere pity, I am not willing to allow his Rule; For if I should, first this showing Rule, will infallibly show him, that the Duk●s Instinct and the Pensilvanian's Doctrine, (to his unspeakable grief,) has the hope to be Established by it. For there is nothing more Ancient, more Universal, more constantly credited, at all times, in all places, by all Nations, than a Divine Instinct in the Natures of Men: And then, if this attempt upon the Duke has not been Unreasonable, as to the Pensilvanian, an Honour as much above his hope, as his Adversary's intentions, let Him Judge.  
My second Reason of unwillingness is this, he says, p. 16. This Rule would have taught the Duke to avoid the cruel Divinity of Calvinists which his Grace lashes with so much Truth and Justice: where, besides the nonsense of teaching a Man to dislike a thing, he already is allowed to have lashed with Justice, he confirms the Judgement of his Instinct, by which, he was lead to lash that Doctrine, for a Golden Rule.  
But lastly, as he has Established the thing he would overthrow, so it's to be feared, he has overthrown the thing he would Establish; And would not a well▪ natured Man be sorry for that.  
For most evident it is that the Church of England is not every where, there's for His Vbiques: And some tell us, that She was not always what She is, there's for His Semper: And that every Body is not of Her Communion, this Gentleman's Invectives against Dissenters, iprove the Roman Church, charges Novelty; She flies to Scripture; The Roman Church disputes the Sense, the Church of England appeals to the first Doctors of the Church; the Romanists to the Sense of the Church upon the Doctors. Now says He, The Society of Christians must be Judge. p 15. Not the Few that separate from the Many; For than they will be Judge in their own Cause, and the Dissenters at Home will expect the same Privilege; If the Church they Dissent from, they are gone; If the Scripture, 'tis the Subject to be Judge. This must issue therefore, or in no Judge, or in an External Judge, or in an Internal Judge. If no Judge, we are left without Decision till the last Judgement. If an External Judge, it must either be the Church or Civil Government. If the Church, the Romanists think they carry it. If the Civil Government, to be sure the Church of England has it here. If lastly, an Internal Judge, that every Man should try, fast, and examine for himself, the Duke's Instinct, (much against this Gentleman's mind) will come in for a share in the choice of a Mans own Religion, and that within the Rule too.  
The next point he falls upon, is the Duke's Maxim about Persecution; he does not think it Antichristian at home, but the Duke under a mistake of the Reason, Nature, and necessity of those Humane Laws Dissenters are prosecuted by. p. 17. And upon this he bestows eight Pages, which in a Lump, comes to thus much. That though he allows punishing the Professors of a True Religion, purely for Religion, (living otherwise inoffencively to the Civil Government) is Persecution, and truly Antichristian, which was the Primitive Christians case under the Heathen Emperors of Rome; yet the Laws against Papists and Dissenters are out of a Political, not Religious necessity to secure the Peace and Safety of the Government; And if this be Antichristian, the whole World, all Ages, Times, Governments, and Governors must have been, and are Antichristian, and it turns his Admiration into Wonder, that his Grace should be of this mind that had his share in passing those Laws. I perceive his does▪ ingenuity continues to the Duke. For besides that, he loves Wondering, he might know that the Duke's share was to Vote against them, and so that he did not Espouse Toleration a cast Mistress; The Duke's Discourse relates to Men of conscience, not Rebellion; And to conclude, more or less than the Question contains, is not fair or sound,  
The Duke says, 'tis Antichristian to Persecute: His Answerer says 'Tis truly so of the true Religion; And pray where does the Duke say it, of the false? But I am ready to think that if Persecution in all the World, were stopped, till that were determined, we should at least gain one Age of Peace: And to have any of it before, is, at least in this Author, unaccountable, and a begging of the Question.  
But he would not have Danger ensue to Government, and therefore draws upon the Duke this un-natural Consequence; That the whole World, and all Governments and Governors are Antichristian; whilst that Noble Peer meddles not with Government, nor Solicits freedom for them that disturb it. He declares himself for men's having Liberty to Worship God according to their Persuasion, and the Reason of it. If Men will call Consciene this Plea is no shelter; Currat ●ex. His Argument is safe: the Consequence is the partial application of h●s Answerer. The Duke thinks perhaps, 'twere more easy and Honourable to let ill Men not have that to say against good Government, You trouble us for our Consciences, since in its self, there is no Real and Proper Overt-Act of Sedition, merely in performing a differing sort of Worship; and that there are, or may be Laws enough provided to secure the State from those civil disorders▪ that any such Man might attempt under that pretence. Here, such People would not only justly suffer, but without a cover too: The Disgrace and Odium, in the opinion of all, as well as Penalty, falling only upon the Criminals head. I do with the last duty and defference a Man can bear to his King and Country, Wish and Pray for their Prosperty: I would by no means that any Man should be indulged to their detriment: I should besides my civil obligations, cancel those of Conscience before Almighty God, if I thought it; But I cannot prevail with myself, to believe that the Government may not be safe by some civil Provision, with the most suspected Dissenter: Else 'twere past a scruple with me that his Liberty should at all times purchase the public safety.  
This Gentleman allows all Dissenters may not be Guilty; if so, it must be a dangerous Execution; Especially when the Justice of our humane Laws had rather an hundred Criminals should escape, than that one Innocent should perish. But he says, he has not Momus' s Windows to see, and know them by. I am sure he has too much of his mind, or he had not troubled the World with such a bundle of Exceptions: But if he can't distinguish them, will that excuse his destroying them? I am sorry this Gentleman's Divinity has no more Bowels, nor better sense; for if Mankind be left without the knowledge of Gild from Innocence, They must punish in the lump; They must be unjust.  
This is Judging without Overt acts; by guess and jealousy. A way that may make an Innocent Guilty, and a Guilty Person Innocent. To be cast without Evidence is wrong, and what Witness is there of that which is only in foro Conscientiae? then what Judge? A piece of cruel Enthusiasm. I know not what to call it. Not only Christianity, but Gamaliel; ay, our own Laws would have taught Him a better way of finding out Criminals, yet His excels.  
Well, But the Laws against Papists, (He says) are occasioned from their unchristian Machinations and King-killing Doctrine, able to ruin the whole Earth, and lay the Foundations of Eternal Mischief to Mankind; And for those against Dissenters, They were made, because of their Rebellious, Excluding, Covenanting, Associating, Murdering Principles. p. 15.16.21.22.  
Now though this Man would think it imprudent in me, and I, that it is none of my business, to vindicate the Persons charged from His imputations; yet I have so much Justice, I confess, as not to condemn Parties by Particulars, and Charity as to be satisfied with their solemn disclaiming of such Practices: For I did never love that one Man should have the making of another Man's Faith or Confession, especially if He were His Adversary.  
I must tell Him also, I cannot admire His Wisdom, Manners, or Justice, in his Reflection upon the Roman Catholics, after the assurances that so great an One of their Communion has given Him and His Friends of their Security and protection: For if they are a People able to ruin the whole Earth, and lay the Foundations of Eternal Mischief to Mankind; believe me, England is in an ill pickle, and tho' I am an ill Judge, He has in it put but a Scurvy Compliment upon the King. But if by the King's promise p. 33. He means that the King is to destroy the Men of His own Faith, to support and secure Theirs; I shall only admire, first His understanstanding, and next His Charity.  
For Dissenters, I shall say no more, than that it may be, the Wars made Them, rather than They made the Wars, and that things older than the Act of Oblivion, are in Law, buried by it. And with Submission, this Gentleman's Conscience, for aught I know, might have done as well to let Them alone.  
For the late occasion He takes, let him be just, and He will find the Excluders, almost, every Sunday at their Parish Churches: And if three quarters of them were to Pray for their lives, it may be they could better Read their Clergy, then say their Prayers without the Public Liturgy. What follows? Shall I recriminate the usuage of the late King about the Declaration of Indulgence? And say, that some Men loved Him well for their own ends? And that when they were not humoured exactly, They would pout, slack their Loyalty, and grow passive, let things go as they will for them: A thing almost threatened by this Loyal Gentleman, p. 33. May not this be aggravated, and with as many harsh words, by a Man of words and no Charity? But I would be modest▪ and that not of Prudence, but Choice, for I hope He would give His Replicant the Liberty He expects, and takes with the Great Peer He answers.  
And I must say I cannot but extremely admire, that less than twelve Lines, so softly dropped by the Duke in favour of Liberty of Conscience, should have almost as many leaves of little invectives to answer them. Believe me, it impeaches His pretences to Christianity, and renders Him to have more of the Fire brand than of the Loyal Subject.  
I should end here; but there are two things more I think must be mentioned, that nothing carrying any pretence to Weight may be omitted.  
First, That the reason of the Penal Laws is purely Political and not Spiritual, to obviate the Overtacts, Acts of Treason and Rebellion; for a man may be of any Religion to himself▪ and privately exercise it too, not exceeding such a number above their Families.  
Secondly, That Toleration is the way to overthrow Religion, and with it the Government, especially as now Established; and is a fatal Enemy to Monarchy.  
To the first, I say, Fact must Rule us; I would desire to know if the Act of Uniformity, Printed with the Liturgy, be purely Political and not Spiritual? I hope, without offence I may say, it is not. The Laws of the 23, and 28th. of the Queen, Requiring People to come to Church, will not let People be of any Religion to themselves; for unless they are, at least once a Month at Divine Service, and show, to join in the Publ●ck Worship, by Law Established, he pays twenty Pounds Monthly, and has two Thirds of his Real Estate exposed to Sequestration. And this is done in one place or another every day. So that it is not true in Fact, That People may have any Religion to themselves; because, both those that keep home, and within the number allowed by the Act against Conventicles, and those that exceed it, are notwithstanding presented upon the former Statutes of the Queen; Nay, I have known some persons Prosecuted by them all, at one and the same time.  
And, with all due respect to the Wisdom of our former Legislators, if this Gentleman's gloss be true, I think Improprieties should no more have been Enacted, than Impossibilities or Contradictions. To make a man Dangerous to the State, for not going to Church; or a Breaker of the Peace, for being at a Meeting of a hundred People, when their persons were Naked their Entertainment mere Devotion, and their Behaviour very quiet and Innoffensive, sounds in the use of words, very harsh. It puts me in mind of a Witty Passage of the Lord chancellor Hyde, when the Bill prohibiting the Importation of Irish Cattle was read in the Lords-house, hearing it styled a Nuisance; Pray, (says he) let it for this time be called Adultery, for one word is just as fit as tother. Inadiquate and unsuited Expressions are oftentimes of dangerous consequence. No man knows where the practice may stop. Religion should sweeten and humble the Spirits of men, abate their Passions and excite their Obedience to their Superiors. And it is one of the strangest things in the World that greater numbers may meet on twenty other occasions every day, with less fear of the Breach of the Peace. As that Religion cannot be good that makes any man the worse for having it: So I am not for beheading any thing before it is born, or punishing People for fear of what they may do. I would hope the best, and that if they had that freedom they desire in the exercise of their Religious Persuasion, their Condition would teach their Wit, it were too good to hazard, that if their Duty or Gratitude did not oblige them, their very Interest must; and there is hardly one of them so stupid, as not to understand and pursue the ways that preserve it.  
For that of Colleration, it is my Opinion, he does ill to distinguish it from Liberty of Conscience; For if he mean the same thing, it needed not have had a fresh Head with other Consequences; nor was it requisite that I did further consider it.  
And I am heartily sorry, I must say, that to the end of his Answer he hardly fails of his usual way of Construction: For after having made Toleration as ill a thing as he could, and as such, the Duke to be the Patron of it; He falls on with a whole Volley of hard words, ask the Duke, p. 27, 28, 29▪ If he would give Toleration to a Rebellious, Associating, Sanguinary, Inhuman, Blasphemous, Murdering Conscience, such as that of Calvanists, that Decrees Damnation without free Conditions; Killed his Master, Father and Brother, and that particularly used him so ill. But this is so far from determining, that in ill Language it miserably begs the question, by the reflection of false and Scandalous Consequences, upon what the Duke said in favour of Indulgence.  
Is there no such thing as Conscience, because it may be falsely pretended? Or shall a Sober and Moral Conscience be denied Indulgence, because some or other may, or do misuse it? And that He may have something to think on; I ask if those Calamities were the effects of a Toleration? If so, pray when was there one to do us so much mischief? The difficulty, I know, he will have to find one, makes me ask him another question: If Ease to men in that respect, were not the way of greatest Safety to the Public, at least, fit to be tried. I must say, this Gentleman takes too many things for granted, and needs a very merciful Adversary: One that will do less than not exact the uttermost Farthing, though he himself will reap where he hath not Sown, and Compel Conformity where he cannot convince. The very point, he says, His Grace has with so much Justice lashed the Calvinists for, and that he himself did but just now call Inhuman and Blaspemous.  
Good-Nature with all that little prudence that falls to my share, makes it easier to me to believe that a Christian Toleration were the best way to prevent the Mischiefs that are said to be the effects of it. I say, by all means Secure the Government; But withal, pray let us see if that may not be done, by some other and easier method: It is pity that it should cost the Liberties or Estates of so vast a People as do Dissent, and, I would hope, without so much as an ill Thought to the King or his Government.  
But he is so in love with the Chase, that without any more to do, he sends us to the French King, p. 29. To take measures for England in point of Religion: Which is pretty well for an Englishman and a Protestant, and perhaps a Doctor too. This in any Man had not been well, but in an English Protestant, with his leave, is Impious, since it is to draw that King's Severity into Example, and render it a Prudence to be imitated here. A Notion, he has taught me to call, in him, Atheistical, because it cannot be done by a Protestant, Whose Conscience, as he says, will not let him be of any, and of all Religions. This yields little Consolation to the French Protestants: And if he would but think well upon it, not too much to the English Church; For if he says true, That Lewis the Fourteenth does well to Compel an Union of his Subjects in his own Religion; He has recommended a Policy that goes a great way to discharge the King of His Promise, and make us all of his: I don't know whether Coleman's Letters say so much as this, that were made the Proof of the Plot. This may make Roman Catholics amends for p. 27, 28, 29.  
To Conclude, he is so fond of the Instance, that he Appeals to Crowned-Heads in General; If a Toleration be not Inconsistent with their Safety. A man had need be well assured, at least as far as an Invulnerable Conscience, to try his Appeal, but that I am, and therefore join Issue with him; submitting with all my heart, to their Royal Evidence in the Decision of the Point: But because it requires more Room than agrees with the success of this Reply, in an Age that loves not length; I have chosen to make it a Discourse of itself, and refer him thither: The Title, A Persuasive to Moderation: And shall conclude this with the Wise and Christian Judgement of King CHARLES the First, in His Advice to the late King.  
Take head (says he) of abe●●ng any Factions, your Partial Adhering to any one side, gains you not so great Advantages in some men's Hearts, Who are Prone to be of their King's Religion, as it looseth you in Others; Who think themselves and their Profession, first Despised, and then Persecuted by You. A Christian Toleration often Dissipates their Strength, whom Rougher Opposition Fortifies. This was the Council of a Crowned Head: The Judgement of his Adversity: Always the Soundest: Resentments could not Blind it, nor Revenge of wrongs, Precipitate it. In which, he Acted the Christian Prince, and not the Amilcar.  
Let us then Remember his Council with his Afflictions, and the one the more endear the other to us; lest we despise some of the best Fruit of the Autumn of his Life, to wit, his Wisdom and Goodness, that the Gusts of Time and Troubles he lay under did not shake; and which he has Recommended to us for a Guide in Future Times, to prevent them.  
FINIS.