THE Bounds & bonds OF public Obedience OR, A Vindication of our lawful submission to the present Government, or to a government supposed unlawful, but commanding lawful things. Likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemn League and Covenant. In all which a Reply is made to the three Answers of the two Demurrers, and to the Author of the grand Case of Conscience, who profess themselves impassionate Presbyterians.  
London printed for John Wright at the King's Head in the Old-bailey, 1649,   

THE Bounds and Bonds OF public obedience, OR A vindication of our lawful submission to the present Government, or to a Government supposed unlawful, but commanding lawful things.  
I know not by what fate or misfortune it comes to pass, 
whence the difficulty of persuading civil truth.  that in the disquisition of a truth (though a simple uniform thing) yet the contests about it, are usually infinite, and it is as difficult a thing to disincumber it feom errors, as it is a good field from weeds and brambles; which when the country man hath burnt to ashes, and thinks he hath quite destroyed, the next year to his astonishment he sees them return more numerous than before. Surely our unhappiness in the E●adication of civil errors is, that we speak more to the affections then to the judgement, and therefore offer passion in stead of reason, or make one but the counterfeit of the other, or else not affecting one another's persons, we fling headily into opposite paths or principles, in which not treading together at first, we cannot possibly meet together at last, and in this aberration we lose both truth and ourselves.  
Thus we find it in these three several answers to the first Treatise, in which (and the unhappilier, to give foundation to practicable errors) they at the very entry of the controversy mistake principles, in jure publico, in the riginall of Magistracy and Government, in the nature of possession, prescription, right of extreme necessity, of assertory & promissory Oaths, &c. things which were otherways stated and proved in that discourse to which they have been referred; I should not so disertly tell these tripartite answerers, that they do suponere quodlibet, ut Probetur quidlibet, were it not but that I see them so Majesterially peremptory to prescribe to others, and to necessitate us into action of the greatest prejudice that may be betwixt man & man; that I find one of them give such a loss to his passion, that it carries him into direct Blasphemy, 
●irst Demur.  advising that a Committee might treat with God, yea sentence the blessed Trinity. Lastly because all the world knows they give that obedience which to attain public desolation they will not allow toothers; wherefore as the subtleties of the vop●●rs are so fine and delicate, that they pass upwards on every hand about us imperciptibly till at last we hear them over our heads formed into Thunder, Lightning and Tempests, even so the fumes of these private men's Passions pass so subtly through their soft words, that if we who converse with them, be not maturely advisd of them, their insinuation will draw us into fire and flame, into blood and desolation, into the Calamities of a war, which perhaps may end as distantly from our and their now Covenant intentions as the two former have already done.  
The Question which was first asserted stands still unshaken and almost untouched, and in all th●se answers it is evidently granted, That we of the people may lawfully give obedience to an unlawful power; 
Demur. p 6. case of Con. p. 3.7. ●  this only is denied, That it may be not with an acknowledgement of their authority and right, which is very uncasuistly and unconscientiously inserted here, because that is not the people's present case, but the governors, these only asserting that, contenting themselves with simple obedience from us.  
The first Argument of the first Demurrer is formed against the incapacity of the persons governing, 
Pag. 2.  and it runs thus:  
Ob. That which is now termed a Parliament, is neither formally, materially, nor effectually a Parliament, such as is requisite for this Kingdom, either according to the mind of God, or the necessities of the State. First, because the change which is made in it, is not made by those who first constituted it, unless it be by conquest. The modern model contains not the whole, nor the major part of the peoplee Secondly, the alteration is made by the Commons only, the Nobility as illustrior pars populi, appeared not in it.  
Ans. Though this Argument (with the rest) relates more to the Commanders then to the obeyers, 
The end of Magistracy, subsevient to the end of our being.  (of whom our controversy only is) and that we of the People have a right to do lawful things, though there were no Magistrate lawful or unlawful to oversee us, yet I shall not stop at these advantages, but oppose to the main of this Argument, the main of our Creation and conservation. For we have nothing else to do in the world, but to praise God and love our neighbour. The circumstance of the Magistrate is only to be an encouragement of this, and to see that it be done with security: and if he do this (whatever he be) we are beholding to him, and should praise God for him, and then why not obey him?  
Though this were granted, That one Magistrate was unjustly ejected by another, and one government by another, yet that relates only to those who cooperated in it whilst it was doing. How can such a supposed guilt in them, be in any part continued upon, and ascribed to us of the low rank of the people? or now especially that we come into it after it is done, and after we are under the full possession of a present Power? People by the effects of it, sustain punishment enough if they lose a good Magistracy, must they likewise be punished because it is lost, though they were no con-cause of it?  
The author of the Grand Case of Conscience, p. 10. infers Yes, and therefore makes our new commotions necessary: because we can do nothing just in a State, where, (through the defect of a legal Magistracy) we can have no justice, yea though the things we do be in themselves just. For (quoth he) judgement is then only just, when it is exercised by the higher Powers, the legal Magistracy of that kingdom, where it is acted.  
I answer, things are considerable, only so far as they may reach the ends for which they are. 
All justice or just things relate not essentially to the legal Magistrate.  The end of every Magistrate is to see justice executed in case it be violated: justo enim non ponitur lex. The end of justice is to be a measure of equity, that is, of equality. Justice or the proportion of equality is either comutative or distributive. But neither of these relate so essentially to the legal Magistrate, that nothing may be done truly and conscientiously just, without he cooperate in it. As for commutative equality, if Titius lend Sempronius ten bushels of such a quantity, which bushels have the public mark upon them, and Sempronius pay him ten other every way of the same equality, 
Of commutative justice Vid. p. 26.35.  but that there wants the former mark, or that the said bushels have another mark, will you say Sempronius hath not intrinsically done Titius justice, or hath not justly satisfied him in his quantity? especially if in the mean time no more of that former mark can be had? As for distributive justice, we know that St. Paul advised the Corinthians to avoid the jegall Magistracy and the judgement of the higher powers of that country, 
1 Cor. 6. of distributive justice.  and rather to end things by arbitrement among themselves, which had been an advice unjust, and to the scandal of Christianity, if things in themselves just might not be done but by the justice of the legal Magistrate. This therefore is but according to an old axiom of justice, Provisio hominis tollit provisionem legis.  
Thus much I have thought fit to answer in general to this objection; 
This present Parliament is effectually a Parliament.  but now more particularly I answer to its terms. And first, why is not this effectually a Parliament, seeing it is the supreme present power of the whole Nation, no part excluded? 
Vid p. 18.  which in this controversy is the very term of the question. I hope he means no criticism by the word Parliament; if he doth, it signifies only a public speaking or consulting together for the public. Moreover, the author would be (I am sure) much perplexed, if I should ask him, how he knoweth so indubitably that this is not a Parliament or supreme Power requisite for this kingdom, according to the mind of God? He must pardon us if we think forms no more than persons are to last here always; or that the changes which have been, and still are to be of both, must never be done but according to the customary formalities of a quiet people, but rather according to the extreme necessity of a State. For if he ask me, what it is that forms in-organizd people into a Government, 
Necessity above forms of, Government.  of what sort soever? I answer, Necessity. If, what makes or takes away a Law in a Government established? I answer, Necessity. If, what takes away a Government itself? I answer, according to himself. page 2. that which first gave it being, viz. Necessity. Of which there are several degrees; for in a peaceable State a word may take away that which in a disturbed State must be taken away by the Sword: after which it is but equal that he who gives the last blow, should in that quarrel give the last word, and leave us to a peremptory obedience, unless we would have no quarter in the world, or be like the old servati in bello, who were sold, confined to chains all their lives, or condemned to dig perpetually in mines; All which it seems this author would have the conclusion of this argument, or else we are more beholding to the charity of enemies, then to his. If we will not be persuaded by the state's arguments, yet let us hear what Grotius, among others, determined long ago, for all the world in this case. If a King have but part of a supreme power (which consists in making and taking away laws, in laying universal Taxes) and the People or Senate have the other, the King may be forcibly opposed if he invade that part which is not his, because for so much he hath no right nor power. This is to hold, although such a King have the Militia alone; for that (in his hand) relates only to foreign war, it being unconceivable how they who share in supreme. Rights, can be exempt from a right of defending them. When war shall happen betwixt such fundamental and supreme parties, the King may lose all his share by the right of War. Lib. 1. c. 4.§ 13. de Jubel. & pa.] Which Right of war betwixt those who divide a whole kingdom, if it end clearly to the Reduction of one party, is not called so properly conquest as victory. 
The difference betwixt conquest & victory  This author uses the name of the first only for the hatred every one bears to it, because it swallows the rights and persons of the whole; Whereas victory relates only to a part of either, as beginning and ending in civil wars, where disputes of Right arise betwixt those of the same Jurisdiction and Country, and of the same Common Law.  
But we have Arguments more authentic than these, to show that such changes may be according to the mind of God; and the Demurrer all his life will never prove the contrary, Dan. 4.31, 32. 
Vid. p. 33.  God's power is an everlasting power, and his kingdom is from heneration to generation; All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing, and according to his will he worketh in the army of Heaven, and in the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, nor say unto him what dost thou? That is, God as universal Lord, and King of Kings, governs both Angels, men, and devils, and all must submit to him, because of his supreme irresistibility. Psalm. 75.7. God is the judge, he maketh low, and he maketh high. It must be confessed that by him Princes reign; but our author had rather perpetually embroil our bodies and souls, then clearly say, by whom it is that Princes cease to reign. For than this controversy would easily he reconc●l'd, and we as easily one to another.  
we have shown how the reason of Constituting, 
Object.  and of changing Governments, is still one and the same, viz. supreme Necessity: But the Demurrer objects that our change hath not been done by the same order of persons, who were in the old, viz. By major part of Lords, and major part of the Commons.  
Although he is again besides the state of the Question, showing only how they who are the supreme Power of the Land, 
Answer.  ought not to command us, rather than that we may not obey them in lawful things; yet I shall here make another sort of reply, which will be very short to those who profess themselves Presbyterians, that is, originally Parliamentarians.  
Kingdoms which are supreme in themselves, 
The State of Kingdoms as separated, and as mixed in themselves.  and communicate not in one another's laws, are all of them Iure Gentium, in a state of War, unless they be mutually bound by Leagues to the contrary; which Leagues if they come to be broken, usually have the conditions of Invasion annexed, and the time and places nominated for beginning it; and because there is nothing any longer due by Law, or League from the party injured, where now the Sword is only to end the controversy, therefore what ever shall be acquired in this state of things from the party injuring, rightly changes all Titles in Iure publico, and in the right of governing what is acquired; but in one and the same kingdom, where the supremacy of Power and Right lies divided (as Grotius page 7. states it) there, 
Of the Ri●ht of War betwixt fundamental Parties.  if they differ fundamentally, denying one another's Rights and Powers, they are then immediately in the same state of War with those other separate Kingdoms; here only is the difference, that these in their Concurrence and Constitution, making but one, have none of those ordinary Cautions, as Leagues have for their Right of invading one another by the way of war: a circumstance no more necessary betwixt them, then that in the marriage of two persons, a Lawyer should come after the Minister hath conjoined them, and tell them in what cases they may again proceed to Divorce, and after their Divorce, what kind of marriages they should make next. Even so war is supposed in that case, as well as Divorce in this; But because War begins there where Law ends, and reciprocally, and hath nothing but necessity for its equity, and that all the degrees of necessity cannot at first be foreseen, nor where security may at the end of all be presumed off, therefore there neither is, nor ever was any fixed rule in any country, what people should be bound to do at the end of a a War. I hope the Presbyterians neither of England, nor Scotland intend to deny what all the world knows, that they concluded the King under the necessity of war, as well as others who conjoined with them, and having stated his case there, they of the kirk long ago frankly declared, that he not satisfying for the blood of three Kingdoms, was not to touch the sceptre any more, but as Mr. Hinderson applied in his Newcastle Conference the 4th. of Hester 14. 
page 9  That if his Majesty reform not according to their way, he and no less than his fathes' House were to perish: by which what could he and they understand less, then change of Government? a thing, why now so horrid for the other party to think on, seeing they gave first intimation of it? They jointly declared, that the King was not to judge any thing for himself, nor upon what terms his readmittance to simple liberty could stand with their security;* for, his war when it ended (as they said who imprisoned him) continued the same necessity upon them, which made them take arms at the beginning. Therefore they themselves concluded, that nothing could be changed in the King's concernment, according to the old form and constitution of the Kingdom, which relates to a time of Peace, and not to a time of War.  
But the Nobility whom he here styles, illustrior pars populi, concurred not to this change; therefore it is formally and fundamentally unlawful.  
In the first place, 
Of the House of Lords.  I understand not, and I believe the Lords do as little, what he means by putting them into such improper Latin. For they always understand themselves to be rather of the two Comites Regis, then partem populi; and therefore as if they were an integrant part of the kingdom, formed to themselves a separated House, a Jurisdiction over the people, & lay as a bar betwixt the King and them; whether that power of theirs had any congruity with the other supreme and Legislative rights of the people or no, is not now the question, but rather this, Whether according to their mutual engagements, their rights of a separated house were rightly lost to the House of Commons, or no?  
This is by them affirmed, and the state of Venice as profound Platonists deny the other; for otherwise Noble men would be as difficulty reformed as Kings, and therefore they rarely confer illustrious Titles of Nobility on any but those who are in illustrious Offices, things separable from persons, by which means all Offices with them are questionable: But to return, that which according to themselves thus excluded the King, by the same logic excluded the Lords; and if they either directly or indirectly concurred to the ruin of the rest of the kingdom, than the argument runs strong, that the House of Commons were bound to preserve it, and that the rest rightly owe their whole protection under God to them▪ But because I will suppose nothing here, the argument of matter of fact must judge one as well as the other.  
Wherefore if any will ask whether there was not a war undertaken last year very eminently dangerous to the whole Parliament and their Party; the Army, and Country Committees, and that by the contrivance of the royal Party here, the Scots Nation in the North, Ormond in Ireland, it will be past denying; Likewise whether the House of Lords in that extremity declared with the Commons that the Scots were Enemies to the kingdom, or upon the first or second request gave their Concurrence for Counties to arm themselves for their defence; The ●oyce of all parties must needs say no: So that, that House undertook to act a part as dangerous to the rest of the Parliament, as they did, who were actually in arms against their party everywhere. And how then should they expect to bestill necessary to them, and to their securities, who had put them into such apparent extremity and necessities? As for the exclusion of some Members of the house of Commons, 
Of Secluded Members.  I hope the sincere Presbyterians wonder not at that act, because the Kirk and State of Scotland was preserved by such an act last year, and by the concourrence of the same means which did this here. Yea though they who from thence invaded our Nation, declared as much for the Covenant and Presbytery as the kirk itself, save only that the kirk had the good luck to speak the last word.  
They who sit at top in the State are tanquam in nubibus, to the eyes of us of the People. We know not how they manage their Counsels, nor contrive their tran●actions, that is best determined by and amongst themselves. It is enough for us if they be of a number competent to act; and be persons who enter by virtue of free Election, and s●t in the legal place. For in a case where five are chosen to a businesses, and that any three of them are to be of the Qu●rum, though two of them be never so accidentally or violently detained, yet what the other three do is to all intents and purposes valid, which is the present case. By this gentleman's favour, 
The negative when prevalent in equal partnarship.  we have an axiom of Law, which saith that in Partner-ship or Society (as the civil Law calls it) when matter of extreme prejudice is agitated betwixt those who are of equal contribution either of Art or money, then Potior est conditio negantis: nothing ought in this case to be concluded against the negatives, though fewer in number, which was the Parliaments case when after the equal provocations of a Prince by war and imprisonment some of the same House thought he might have been securely readmitted into the Government again, and others thought it evidently dangerous. In this case the difference was as it were legal betwixt the Members, but not to be decided any way but by force, there being no other tribunal to judge them, and their house might not judge of it, because there they were parties and judges, a thing allowed nowhere; 
Whither the transactions of the legal number of the house be invaled, when any members are forced away?  and if otherwise, than the major part might legally vote the other out of the house at pleasure. But what was at last determined by any number above forty with the speaker in the legal place, seems not out of form to us of the people; which was the case of the House of Lords when most of them & many of the Commons at the beginning of the first War, fled to the King under pretence of force from Westm. Yea when the five members were forced from sitting, yet the rest of the House sat and acted without them, and voted a Committee, Ian. 5. To sit in London, and there to take into consideration the breach of privileges, the safety of the King and kingdom, and preservation of Ireland, which was accordingly done by virtue of those Votes, made when Members were thus forced away. All our scruples therefore are concerning things to us practicably lawful or unlawful in themselves, 
Of the present consent of the Major part of the People.   
As for the will of the Major part of the people, how will the Demurrer prove that they had not rather obey this present Power, then seek to be rid of it by the hazards and calamities of another War? They usually look after nothing but their Rents, Markets, and reasonable subsistences, they are the luxurious and ambitious part only which pretends to new troubles. The people's question thereof is not how the change was made, but an sit whether it be so changed or no? For if according to its formality that be not rightly done; it concerneth not their consciences no more than the Thunder or lightning over their heads doth, which are things totally out of their power, much less may they lawfully desolate Neighbours for them.  

Ob.  But he hath found one firm axiom, That when part of any thing is cut off, the whole qua tale is destroyed quià dum cessat forma, cessat formatum; ergo the late force on the Parliament hath made this no Parliament.  

Answ.  I wish he had taken the pains to give either a distinction or an instance in his axiom, or have drawn up his inference into a syllogism; for I fear we shall find wide impertinence in the first, and a gross non sequitur, in the last as he hath ordered it. The question disputed here is not whither the denominated Parliament now sitting at Westminster be a Parliament according to the old form and composure of Parliament or no, but whither that Parliament now sitting at Westminster, be the supreme power of the kingdom or no, and to be obeyed in lawful things. His Argument runs thus;  
The surpeme power of the kingdom consists in a Parliament of King, Lords and Commons.  
But at Westminster there is not a Parliament consisting of King, Lords and Commons.  
Ergo at Westminster, there is no true Parliament at all nam dum cessat forma, cessat formatum.  
I thought he had been so good a Logician, as to have understood that the conclusion of his syllogism ought to have been contradictory to the question, from which it is as distant as if he would have concluded that two and three make five, which is very true, but how is it any thing to the purpose?  

Whither the present power be the suprem?  However I will do him the favour to deny his Major— For we speak of powers which now are, and he himself hath all along condoled the e●ection of the King, and of house of Lords, as things which are not. Sed non entium nultae sunt affectiones; & so consequently they who are now nothing, make nothing now at Westminster, or anywhere else. But doth it follow however, that there can not be now any supreme power at Westminster? at all If he had proved this, 
Whither it be a Parliament?  he had proved something. But pe●●aps the very word Parliament poses him, or else he would thereby impose on others. I must confess words are dangerous, when they are not fully explained: and possibly the King mistook himself very much upon the very Alphabet and word of his Title, supposing he could not be named King, unless he were ab●olute, as he observed other Kings were; whereas by our constitution he was but one of three, who concurred to the making and abrogating a Law, and it belonged to the Commons alone, to lay an universal tax; so that he was in most things rather Prince by office, than King by power, in tanto, non in toto. Even so the word Parliament, as it hath been popularly understood, signifies the assembly of several houses, deliberating and concluding what was judged for the good of the public.  
But it is a contradiction to say a Parliament cannot at all be truly so called, unless so understood; we know there are eight Parliaments in France, which are not of such a constitution, though of the same Denomination. And if several persons plenipotentiarily deputed to conclude for the public good of the people, sit now at Westminster, and that the other concurrent powers be civilly dead; why may not we congruously enough still call them a Parliament? His axiom therefore serves only against himself, and the true English of dum cessat form● cessat formatum; is this, That seeing the old form of this state, as it was in the supremacy of King's Lords and Commons▪ hath in that relation ceased to be, and is civilly dead, not being able any longer to act any thing; and that a civil body as well a natural, cannot live without a head one day; it follows then by this position, that the regal Government is gone, and that we are in the state of a republic; no other power now informing or actuating us, besides that which pretends to such a state; and where I pray you is that to be found now, but at Westminster.  
In the next place he offers a case, If the King, when he came to accuse the five Members, 
Object.  had detained all but forty and the Speaker; and had forced them to Vote, that the whole Legislative power resided in himself; would we have deemed this a valid Vote? Especially seeing some Votes since this Session were adjudged Null, because the House was under a force. By which it seems (quoth he) that with some new veritas non est perpetua; and Duo dum faciunt idem, non estidem.  

Ans.  To the first I answer positively, That such a Vote attained by the King, had been no ways duly valid.  

The case of the Kings coming to the house of Commons not parallel.  But what is this to the purpose? For the question should have been after the King had detained such a Vote, and had got us all into his full possession, whether we of the people might have obeyed him ever after in lawful things.  
Secondly, if he would have the people understand this case to be parallel, to the late exclusion of the Members, he prevaricates grossly again; For he supposes the very forty in the House, with the King, to have been under a force; whereas in the Parliaments late case, none but those who were out of the House, were under restraint; the former were supposed to be forced to a particular Vote, the latter were kept from Voting at all: Besides they who de facto Voted in the House, have publicly declared that they passed their Votes, with all wonted freedom, and were rescued as it were from an overawing power, which concludes against his Argument abundantly. As in this Argument he hath done truth little service; so he hath (by his mistake) done Kingly Government less. For if Princes who have us in their full possession, may be obeyed in no lawful things, after they acquire an addition of some other powers unlawful; then he would dislove most of their Governments, and have absolved us from Allegiance to King Charles long before this Parliament began; by which sort of arguing the royalists I see will have no great prize this Gentleman.  
But the Parliament hath already declared the Votes made under a force are null; This Vote I suppose he means past, after boys and apprentices of the town, 
The case of the apprentices entering and forcing the house not parallel.  had entered the House, and made the Speaker propound, and the Members Vote what they pleased. Here indeed there were forced Votes; But surely this proves not, that they who Voted, when the Members were last excluded, Voted in that manner. Besides the Parliament which knows better than we of the people, what their own disorders within their House are, are only fit to Vote, what Votes have been forced upon them, and they since that time have declared, they never transacted things with greater freedom and less overawing. From whence I easily see that his axioms will serve him nothing at all. For we acknowledge Veritatem esse perpetuam, 
The Parl. votes against force, still observed & are the same still.  if we speak of natural and mathematical truths, where there is no medium proportionis, to vary the thing; as, all number are even or odd; because there is no middle number, so all lines are either crooked or straight: But moral & civil things are always in change, because human actions are invested with such an infinity of circumstances and accidents; 
why actions of Government must change.  for which reason Duo dum faciunt idem non est idem; For no two men in the world can act the same thing in all the same circumstances: Thus we hear that Omnis des●nitio in jure est periculosa; and summum jus aliquando sit summa miuria, which cannot be but in regard of those various accidents which perplex our actions, and make them like that famous flower the marvel of Peru, which changes the colour of it's Leaves every day. His last axiom, That no man ought to take advantage of his own wrongful act or of another's: is impertinent and no way beloning to us of the people. If he intends it to the present governors, he had best to take heed again, that he determine not against several lines of our Kings: For the clearing of whose titles after usurpations, the Judges were ancienty sore put to it, 
How wrong hath been fitted for a title. 〈…〉 Bac. H. 7.  to make this one axiom for all. That the imposition of the crown takes away all defects, and stops in blood. And if this be true, than we and our forefathers for the most part, have liveed ●nder no better Titles then Plenary possession, to which they submitted, either because they knew no better Titles, or could have none of better to command them, or because they were resolved they might lawfully submit in lawful things, which therefore as it now seems, is not so much our present question as our present passion.  
Two principal inconveniences he finds in this present Government, and by the goodness of the fruit he hopes he may judge of the Tree. where I must again admonish him, that the civil fruit of a Government is alike in all Governments, especially as to the Meum and Tuum of a people besides, if the tree and the fruits here were alike, than a good axiom were spoled; Malus homo potest esse bonus civis, & bonus magistratus, A man bad to himself, may be a good Magistrate and a good commonwealth's man. His first inconvenience is,  

Ob.  That we have now made the basis of the State, a quicksand; and it stands like Nebuchadnezar's Image, upon a mixed footing, part iron, part clay.  
I answer, that it stands not now on so mixed a footing as before; For the concurrence of King, Lords, and Commons, for the product of a supreme act, was a mixture of things very heterogeneous, to enter into one and the same composition: By reason whereof, supremacy confined as it were on a Battable ground; and if we will believe Persidents, King sometimes gained upon the other two, sometimes the Lords topped both, and now all is more united than ever in the sole suffrage of the people.  

Object.  Toleration is the next inconvenience, it being but equitable, That if we think it lawful to force people to submit to the Orders of the State, the same people be compelled to adhere to an established confession of faith in Religion. For it is presumed that Obedience is fully as due to God as to man.  
I answer, the Christian Religion is not tolerated amongst us, it is enjoined, as much as one man can pass it upon another; 
Of toleration.  For, the final penalty of neglecting it here is not to be required of us mutually in this life.  
Secondly, The confessions of faith, which he would have men forced too, are (as I conceive he means) but logical deductions out of Scripture, Ergo not indubitably, true enough to be by force obtruded on men's faiths; It is not enough to say here, that they who compile them verily believe them true, and intend not to deceive, which is all that can be said. For than they do no more but quote themselves, and we are taught that it is a Popish opinion to believe any company of men are infallible, in what they purpose: wherefore the Magistrate can do no more safely, then recommend not force, their notions and logic on the people. But in a case of meum and tuum, or in a moral thing he may be more peremptory than in a divine, because those things are certainlyer known to us as men, than what is of divine revelation and inference.  
He fears that by an obedience to an unlawful power, 
Ob.  he may assert its unlawfulness; and should our servants rise against us, and command us by threats to perform a lawful Act, which is but transient we might yield to avoid their force: But if they should affirm that the Government of the family were theirs by right, and that they intended to perpetuate it over us; we should think it a great sin to betray that place and power wherein God hath naturally and morally placed us.  
This indeed is a very fine subtlety to end in nothing: 
Ans.  and I am sure what ever the basis of the State be, 
The magistrate in a state, not as a Father of a Family.  the Basis of his Argument is put on a quicksand. For if he intend truth thereby, he should have proved this main thing; That the former Magistrate was our natural parent, and that we all derive from him, as from a Genarcha, which being so evidently false, is as ill supposed. For in this confusion of Families in the world, in which the original Families are lost; we owe no natural duty to any, but to those from whose blood we derive.  
Secondly, Though it were true, that the chief Magistrate were our natural Parent, yet it follows not, but there may be a case wherein he might be refrained from Government; the law supposes many, which is sufficient to oppose this gentleman's single judgement; And if he be indeed a Presbyterian, he hath already concluded as much in the last King's case, by concurring to invest his person with the accidents of war, in detaining him prisoner at Holmby, and Newcastle &c.  
Thirdly, I understand not what he means by God's placing a Magistrate morally over us. For God he is our Divine and supreme Magistrate; our Parent is our natural and domestik Magistrate, and those who command the State wherein we are, are our civil public subordinate Magistrates under God; and every particular man who is arrived to the maturity of reason, is, (if any such be) his own moral or private Magistrate. For the principle of a human or moral action, is a mind acting freely according to virtue, and those laws which are written within us. But if by a moral Magistrate, he means such a one only, as is seated over us, and hath a care that we live conformably to virtue, and honesty in relation to others; then it follows, that whoever hath the capacity so to hold inspection over us, is a sufficient Magistrate; but that can only be he under whose full possession we actually are. Moreover he is to know again, that States cannot look so strictly after virtue, as after public quiet. For moral virtue is a private thing, and by reason of the free concurrence of the will, cannot be discovered certainly, but by those who are able to look within a man: 
why states cannot look so strictly after virtue, as after public quiet  But that which is ad alterum, and concerns rather wrong, then right, belongs to the political Magistrate, as a thing which cannot without confusion have redress otherways. For the chief convenience of a State, is, that people might be kept from inconvenience, or incommoding one another; and that they may be conserved in a liberty to do other good things according to Piety and honesty: So that he who doth things in themselves good, though under an unlawful civil Magistrate, doth not by those acts assert any Magistrates right; but his only who originally gave Law and Rules for those internal acts, and that is God's right alone.  
Lastly, whereas in this argument, he saith a Father of a family so abused should in his required submission, 
O●.  sin, if he betrayed his place and power which God had naturally given him. I answer that there is a difference betwixt betraying a place so given, and losing it by force (which indeed is his first supposition) The one cannot be done without sin, because it is done voluntarily and totally by himself, but it is not our sin if we be forced out of a place; to which we are compelled by a principle without us, and totally besides our power.  
But there is a lawfuller power visible enough to religious eyes, 
Ob.  though for the present in an eclipse, and suspended. It is not lawful for a man to marry another woman whilst his own wife is in a sound, or for a woman to marry another man, whilst her husband is in captivity or restraint, and willing to come to her if he might.  
To this I answer; 
Ans. Of the eclipse suspension and extinction of supreme powers.  First, How knows he certainly that the other power is only in an eclipse or suspended? or if it be only in an eclipse, doth it follow that we of the People might not do lawful Actions by the supplement of other lights, whilst we cannot have that of the Sun? Must we all that while cease to be men for the absence of that which we cannot help? The Presybterian party would not have that understood so; when the King was in prison at Holmby. There be no more suns in the world but one, but there are many Magistrates, and such who give better light one than the other, for which reason God first chose not Monarchy for the Jews, certainly in an eclipse, the Sun is never out of his natural orb, though his light and influence may be suspended and intercepted from us, but when a Prince is in a foreign Country, and lives under the laws of another Magistracy, and that all laws and di stributions of Justice and Magistracy in the Country he pretends to, are made without him and against him, will you according to the laws of Nature, Nations, or Policy, say he alone, and in that condition, is the supreme power or Authority of that Country, or rather that we of the People do nothing but sin in his absence, though we do things in themselves lawful? If you will ask how he came to be out of his orb or Country,? 
The union of people to a GoVernment not like a marriage.  I am sure it was against the advice either of Presbyterian or Independent. It is easily granted, That a man may not marry another woman, so soon as his wife falls into a swound. But you must again be reminded that the nature of Marriage and of Government differ extremely there, where you suppose them most to agree. For Marriage is not always necessary to every particular man. But the public body of a people cannot be without Government one day, no more than a man can be without a Head, because a smalltime serves to the ruin of a man. Secondly, to take this or that woman to wife, is a thing of free choice; but it is not so always with the People in relation to Kings, who have many of them committed great Rapes upon them, as I believe this Gentleman will acknowledge.  

Obj.  A Woman may not marry another Husband, whilst her first is in Captivity, and willing to come to her if he might.  

Ans. A King of England, why not as a husband to the people of England.  These cases of Marriage still makes a very bad parallel with our present case. For first, we have been taught by all parties in this war, that a King of England is not as a Husband to the People of England. For a Husband is he who alone makes and abrogates the Laws of his own Family, as a right of his propriety, which a King of England could not do alone in this state. Secondly, where was this Prince ever Crowned by which this Author means solemnly married to this state? where was the benedictio sacra, the anointing or the Oath of Contract taken by him? I am sure the Covenant hath made no provision for him.  
To this purpose is that Argument in the grand case of Conscience, 
Ob.  [viz.] The Apostle commands Wives to submit to their Husbands, surely quà Husbands, not quà men But sheuld a stranger come to another's Wife and ca●l himself Husband (having before either imprisoned or slain the right full Husband) and require submission, surely though she might he forced, yet it were a sin to submit to him thus as a husband.  
I answer, 
Answ.  to submit in Adultery is a plain sin; but for a Woman to submit in lawful things to the power of a stranger is no sin, though he please to call himself her Husband, or exercise the Government of the Family. There is the same mistake of Husband here, as in the former, so that the Argument built thereupon, of itself falls to the ground. But if by this he means that in matter of supreme Command, we of the People may not obey any but the Husband or the King, 
Of taking away the King's life.  why then did the Presbyterian party for so many years oppose, and not totally submit to their now supposed Husband? Why did they Commissionate so many thousand Men, who by accidents of war had the power, though not the chance to kill him? Nay in the Parliaments case it was always conjointly argued by them, that it was he the Husband, that would have killed them the supposed Wife, for which reason the kirk of Scotland long ago sent him a bill of Divorce, unless he satisfied for the blood of three Kingdoms. Which of the two parties it was that at last killed him, belongs not much to the satisfaction of us the people, though here questioned because those parties as tot hat act differed no more (if he will further argue it) then dim n●tio and obtruncatio capitis do, for they who after a long war, and by long imprisonment despoiled him of that regal power (here so much argued for) did according to the term of the civil Law, diminuere caput Regis, and they who in consequence of his civil Death, took away his natural life, did obtrune are Caput Regis. If he had been killed in an action of war before, should the soldier, or he who gave the soldier commission have answered for his life? As for the submission of a Wife to a stranger as to her Husband, which is indeed a sin, I earnestly pray the Author seriously to consider, whether he can excuse us and all our forefathers from sin, ever since this kingdom long ago fell under the power of an usurping king, if this his way of arguing be true?  
As for the second Demurrer, I consider he hath given account to another very worthy Pen, which hath left little for my gleaning in such a field; however I shall see what hath escaped his hand, that the world may witness at last, that truth hath lovers, as well as error and passion have Champions.  
This Author and the grand case of Conscience begin with St. Paul Ro. 13. 
Ob.  That we must submit to higher powers, not that we may lawfully submit, and that not for wrath only, but for Conscience sake, which is of things necessary, not of things lawful: Wherefore (say they) it is ill said that we may lawfully submit in lawful things, obedience as a matter of Conscience being a thing necessary.  

Ans. Of obedience for wrath, and for conscience sake.  I grant it either in lawful or necessary things, when obedience is required from those who actually have the whole Sepremacy of power in themselves. If I hold this lawful, and he hold it necessary, we are not contrary; He only makes what I allow more allowable. But the reason wherefore the Apostle requires obedience to such, Not only for wrath (which is only in regard of the power which they who are supreme have to destroy us) but for Conscience sake is, 
Tyrants in titles from whom.  lest by our resisting them we unnecessarily disturb and draw calamity on others, and likewise in regard of their Authority from God, Tyrants even in title not arriving to the great Dominions of the Earth, without God's secret order, God having clearly stated the Government of the world for ever in himself as his chief Prerogative, he not being known or feared any way so much as by Dominio n, which made St. Augus. in C. Dei. rightly say, Potestates omnes sunt a Deo, non omnes voluntates, so that the reason wherefore God permits sometimes such Princes to attain to these powers, is the same wherefore he permits Devils in his Government of the world, a Nimrod, or a Pharaoh, a Caesar, or a Herod, an Antichrist or a Turk, who as bad, and as usurping as they are, and seem to us in exercising so severe, though so secret a part of God's Justice, yet fulfil several prophecies, which shows they come not to what they are, merely by human contrivance by chance or accident.  
The grand case of Conscience. P. 3. distinguisheth betwixt Authority or Power, and Rulers deputed to the exercise of that Authority. The first is by God's positive Ordinance, the other bu● by his permission.  
Here he grants enough as to our case, 
Of our lawful submission to a Magistrate who rules by God's permissive will  which is of obedience, for if he can assure me that it is consonant to God's permissive will that such persons be my Magistrates, I am well satisfied then, that God's will is, I must be their Subject, God's free admission of one being the necessary exclusion of all the rest, so that subjection is not a thing now of my choice, but of my necessity.  
But the Demurrer, P. 3. would know what difference there is in popular obedience to lawful powers, 
Ob.  and unlawful powers, if obedience be necessary to both.  
I answer, 
Ans. Obedience necessary to lawful and unlawful powers how different.  If the powers here supposed by him agree equally in their supremacy, and absoluteness, and differ only as one is got lawfully, the other unlawfully, than the difference of our obedience to either, is only in the difference of things commanded, as they are either lawful or unlawful; neither can the Author (now arguing so much for a lawful power) conscientiously tell us, that the lawfulness of the civil power commanding can make our obedience necessary to an unlawful thing commanded; but rather that it makes that power then become to us in some manner unlawful, and worse to us of the People, then if we were under the absolute command of an unlawful power which exacts nothing but lawful things. The knot of this point lies here, Whither a civil circumstance (such as is the Magistrate either lawful or unlawful) can vitiate an Act of moral duty? I believe his distinction P. 2. of a Government constituted or constituting, 
How we may have a right to take what another may not have aright to give.  serves nothing for the discovery of a supreme lawful power in itself. For I hold that whatever was once a sin may always be called a sin, though with rooting or without rooting. Not but that God and we may make good use of other men's bad actions if they be such, for which reason poor beggars may in their extremities receive necessary alms from those who came to their estates by wrong and oppression; the receipt whereof they do not justify the Title of such Estates, much less do we justify the unlawful Title of a supreme Magistrate, 
The difference betwixt private Title and public.  from whose care we receive necessary protection. I say much less, because cases of Estates are juris privati and have Courts to judge of them, but the other is so much juris publici, that there is no mortal Court to judge of it, for which reason how will these Authors (what governors soever they desire) evidently prove that they originally had lawful Titles, or that they at first did not forcibly take the people to themselves, but that the people voluntarily resigned themselves to them which was not in Nimrod's Case. 
Of possession.  From whence this may be inferred to the satisfaction of the grand case of Conscience, p. 3. That, if he had that desired governor, yet according to himself he would not own him long, because he were not sure to have in him a supreme power, such as the Apostle, Ro. 13. in his sense understands necessary for the kingdom of England. But in our sense of plenary possession, which was the case of the Apostles time, we can easily see first, how our present power is the higher (the whole kingdom now receiving all law protection and subordinate Magistracy, from them) and how they may be in lawful things obeyed according to the same Apostle; and to the duty of our Creation and being in this world.  
The case of conscience p. 3. acknowledgeth that a Government may be altered; 
Object.  but it must be done still by the higher powers, whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered, as to a continued for me▪ But it is a sin if a party forcibly lay the higher powers low, and exact obedience as to the legal authority.  
I thought that he who in his sense understood the Covenant in terminis eternal, 
Answer.  would not have allowed a change of Government here; no more than he might allow the Scots (though upon never so much reason to themselves) to change their Doctrine or discipline; because we swore during all our lives, to preserve that which was established among them, at the time of our swearing. But I now see we may well distinguish betwixt the Covenant itself, and some Covenanters, the Covenant being as open for one change, as for the other.  
Secondly, 
Of supreme powers altering themselves by joint concurrence.  If a Government though never so reasonably reformed or altered, be never in any lawful things to be obeyed, (Terms which he did ill to leave out of his Argument) unless by the concurrence of all the higher powers; then farewell all the old consequences of Solis populi suprema lex, and the Presbyterians form●. Arms are unjustifiable. How corrupt and tyrannical are most of the Governments of the world, and yet how many of those supreme powers hath he observed to reform themselves? or diminish any thing in themselves, to alter for the better? although the taking away of something in a Government, may be as necessary, as continuing any old or new thing in it. Certainly these Authors have read but few of jonases, who voluntarily renounce themselves to settle a Tempest.  
Thirdly, 
How separately  Our Alteration was made by the present supreme power of the people: and the reason wherefore both Houses laid the exercise of regal power aside for some years, made the Commons as they have agrued it, lay it aside for altogether. viz. Salus populi suprema lex; The laying of it aside for some years is argument enough to us of the people; that it might be laid aside for more years, and that one King might be laid aside as well as another. For to us it seems effectually all one, Non esse & non operari, for a thing not to be at all, and in this world to do nothing at all. If they sinned who did this, is that any thing to any but themselves? It is an axiom of good Law Noxa sequitur caput. Thus whilst his Argument should have been against our lawful obedience, it is against their exacting it, as to the legal authority, which yet is grossly false; for they exact it not as to the old legal authority, but as to the present supreme power of the people, Non nomine Regis, sed nominepopuli: And yet in one good sense it may be still called the same legal Authority, because we have still under it the same laws for our properties as before, and continued in life by them, as our lives themselves are.  

Ob.  Case of Cons. p. 3. it is objected that this principle of obeying those only who are in plenary possession of all supreme power, is fit only to destroy States: for than should none govern any longer than their swords and strengths could bear them up.  

Ans.  I conceive (according to what is already proved) that nothing can befound, either more consonant to Christian charity, or to the preservation of States, than this our principle of obedience; besides he knows no kingdom in the world, 
Demur p. 8.  where people do not obey upon this same plenary possession; Allegiance always relating to protection. And if according to his consequence, 
Of non obedience.  we should suspend all obedience till we have infallibly found out that Per●on who derives a known and an undubitable right from him who was the first in compact (because according to these Authors intermediate intrusions, are violations of rights, and may not be obeyed even in things lawful) than I pray you of what can we resolve less, then certainly to extirpate one another? which will come to pass ere we find what we search for in such a blind scuffle; and for fear of doing a lawful thing under the inspection of one, who is supposed to have done another thing unlawfully, must we resolve of doing all unlawful things by war ourselves, and desert unnecessarily, the cares of Wife and Children, of Church and Neighbour? For nonobedience in a State is but a Chimaera, neutrality, a State without relation; there is no subsistence for it in any State, and unless you will allow me to concur with others, and under others in lawful things, I must leave the world; my subsistence being only in a conjunction with others here in this jurisdiction.  
The two Demurrers p. 3. & p. 7. 
Ob.  Except against this our present obedience, because the present powers is yet new: neither is there a total cessation of all hopes of recovery.  
Philosophers hold that the Definition of a man belongs to an infant, 
Ans.  as well as to one of many years. Because after the Organization of the parts, 
What time makes a form Government.  he is informed with the same principle of life and reason, as a grown man is; and having the same form, is the same thing. Even so the present power hath possessed all the parts of this kingdom gives them life in the administration of public justice and protection, which are the soul of a State, and the power which preceded this, what did it infuse more vital than this? And now that that is taken away, if this other did not presently enter into its place; the commonwealth were dead, and each man were left in his naturals, to subsist of himself, and to cast how he could in such a state of war, defend himself from all the rest of the world, every man in this State having an equal right to every thing.  
Wherefore let every man, especially, they who would inform consciences, take heed of affecting popular revenge, which must also reach themselves at last: for when they have once frighted people from lawful actions, what can they th●n commit but the un'awfull? Into what an unhappy transport are we fallen, that such a principle should be derived from our Church, the very Papists being ever ready to obey in things lawful, though the State seemed to them unlawful. These will judge better of the State now then of the Church, the one inviting and encouraging us to lawful things, the other deterring us from them. But to return to the Argument; I have already showed, that new or old powers, never can signify good or bad powers. The uncertain hopes of recovering in the future, proves that the thing is certainly lost for the present, and it is our obedience at this time which this Q●estion relates to However the King of Portugals acquisition, or Usurpation was presently acknowledged by our King and others, although the King of Spain then had and still hath great hopes of recovering it, he being always Hannibal ad portas, and never removing out of his own Dominion into another foreign Magistracy.  

Obj.  The first Demurrer p. 7. conc●ives our present condition like that of Israel, betwixt David and Absalon, at which time (quoth he) the people had grievously sinned, had they rendrd obedience to Absaloms' commands and substitutes, so long as David was living. 
Ans.   

Our condition different from Israel's betwixt David and Absalon.  This is very true, but far from the purpose. For Absalon was not a fundamental legislative party in the state of Israel, as the House of Commons lately was, and so could not pretend such a right of war. Secondly David had his Army hard by in the same kingdom with Absalon. We have none here but the Parliaments, all the King's forces and adherents being dissipated. Thirdly the Israelites scruples are supposed during the time of war in Israel, our after the War is ended. But if he mean by this fallacious parallel, that the Israelites ought not to have opposed David at all in the way of war, then how will he salve the scruples of his own breast, who promoted the course of War as well as others against the King?  
The Author of the grand case of Conscience is very ingenuous in his contest with his adversary to form a syllogism with four terms, and their be able to find them out, and to answer the fallacy: so that whilst he wrestles thus stoutly with himself, he can have but a fair fall in his own shadow, to prevent which I shall take the pains to part them both. His syllogism (as he imputes it to his Adversary) is p. 4.5.  
If the people of the Roman Empire did submit to the power of Claudius and Nero, who by force were put upon them, than the people of England may lawfully submit to a change of Government though believed unlawful.  
But they did submit. Ergo those of England may.  
Here he excepts against the equality of inference made betwixt those whose persons were without due Title forced upon people, but still in the same Government; and those persons who without right of Title force themselves upon, us now in another Government,  
But what if the syllogism be indeed and virtually only this?  
If the people of the Roman Empire were required by the Apostle to continue obedience to Claudius and Nero, than the people of England may lawfully continue obedience to their present governors.  
But those might, Ergo these may.  
His distinction of persons intruding wrongfully into the same Government, 
Obedience to false governors in the right or wrong Government varies not the sin of obedience.  and into a different Government according to his former position satisfies not conscience in either, because both are supposed unlawful and differ only secundum m●jus & minus quae non var●ant speciem so that if obedience were not a sin in one, it is not a sin in the other. If he say, obedience to intruders into the same Government is not a sin, than he hath dispatched all controversy concerning the exclusion of the King's Line, and that the parliamens' fault as to him was that they rather changed the Government than the governors, which he acknowledgeth more plainly P. 5. where speaking concerning the persons coming to power, he saith it is not material who puts them in, nor what men are put into powers ordained by God. 
Wherein Caesar's case & the Parl. disagree  But to come nearer to the point, he cannot say that of the usurping Caesars, which may be said of the Parliament. For these are the representers of the people of England, and were lawfully a third part of the supreme power before the change of Government. Caesar had no part of supreme right, but what he rather usurped then acquired by any decision of right, or fundamental legislative controversy betwixt the Senate and him. To say as the Demurrer, p. 4. That Caesar had gotten the consent of the Senate, and added compact to his conquest, is absurd, unless he means he had gotten the Senate so into his power, that he had them in a condition of Quarter; 
Wherein Caesar's case & the Parl. agree, as to justify our obedience.  in which case as the Law saith principum rogamina sunt mandata, without doubt if the people's submission to Caesar were lawful upon his changing a republic into a monarchy, after the Senate had for bad the approach of his Army, and that he had expelled many members from the Senate, why may not a lawfuller obedience be given to those of a Senate itself, who have changed Monarchy into a republic? These two changes are so far alike, that they frustrate this author's distinction of persons intruding unlawfully into the same, and into a different Government.  

Obj.  He follows his objection still, p. 5. arguing that though people did de facto, obey such false possessors, and usurpers, yet that proves not the lawfulness of our obedience, name a facto ad jus non valet consequentia; their submission should have been proved legal.  

Ans.  If he hath a quarrel to us for our peaceableness, yet why should he quarrel with St. Paul?  
He bade the Romans submit in the same kind; and unless we had Prophets on purpose to tell governors, as well as us of the People, who must always succeed according to the mind of God, than the state of the world, the nature of politic justic● of society and Religion is such that we may & aught to submit in obedience to those who plenarily possess, protect and command us lawful things. Surely he did not consider his axiom well, For a facto ad jus valet consequentia, from fact we infer many civil rights, as custom and prescription, &c.  
Neither is it necessary to prove their submission legal, is it be proved absolutely necessary and equitable.  
And yet we conceive another case (besides that before mentioned) wherein this submission to a new power may be called legal. 
In what sen●● the present submission 〈◊〉 legal.  For the end of all law and Government is to preserve our persons and estates; and they who are in supremacy of power, have power to preserve or destroy both if they please; and therefore have as great a power over our laws, which are less, than our lives. So soon as one supreme power is expelled by another, law, life, and estate fall all into the hands of the succeeding power; and what it doth not actually take away, stands in effect as deriving from it; and if that supreme power make a sanction for our obedience to it (as always is immediately done) than we may say our submission is legal, or else the supreme power cannot make a law.  
To that argument where we assert, that the Authority which excluds all other Authorities must be obeyed, or else all authority falls to the ground; The grand case of Cons. answers obliquely still, That notwithstaning, such authority can never illegally get the legal p●wer; nor can it exclude others from their authority. In which answer he plainly contradicts himself, p. 7. For Caesar's power was (according to himself) legal, and yet got by a Circumstance very illegal; the Senate being empty, and intimidated, and not so much in their own, as in his power.  
This argument is so far from concerning us, 
Of the 〈◊〉 evidence of 〈◊〉 ri●●ts, to as to satisfy con●●●e●ce for actions of w●r u●on them.  that it is directed only against those Princes who ab origin, drive from illegal acquisitions. Of which he will do well to speak largelyer, when he can assure my conscience by infallible evidence of right, that I may safely swear or destroy men upon it, that there was ever such a man in England as William the conqueror, or any other ancient King, from whom Titles are said to be derived, either legally or illegally: This is a proposition, which I believe he in the midst of his peremptorines was not aware off, no more than I now doubt in whose hands the present possession of the Kingdom; is for which reason they assert their Authority, and it is his part to show how infallibly it appears to be another's by indubitable right ab origine. But because it is argued that in the disquisition of a right Title, none are so blind as the people (who among other burdens have the imposition of other men's judgements cast upon them) therefore an usurped Title to them is true enough to exact obedience.  

Ob.  Hence the grand case of Cons. answers, p. 10. That then by the rule of contraries it follows, That when titles are visibly unlawful, people are disengaged from obedience to them.  
To this I reply, that this answer is nothing but a mere repetition of the question, 
Ans.  and hath no medium of proof annexed to it; the very question being this conclusion, viz. Whether obedience be lawful to Titles visibly unlawful?  
Secondly, It hath been shown, that nonobedience and subsistence in a state are incompatible; every man in a state stands in a Relation, and must either command or obey; and owes something to him, by whose care he● sleeps quietly in his Bed.  
Thirdly, If by disengagement from obeying a lawful Title, he means that we may choose whither we will obey or no, than though disengaged, we ma● obey.  
These answers help us half way over the next difficulty.  

Object. Demn. p. 5.  We may not any way affirm the right of the usurper, or deny interpretatively the just title of the heir, without the guilt of treachery, lying and falseness, if not of vow-breaking, In suffering a thief to take my purse, I cannot help it; If I must part with that or my life, I choose to lose my Purse; not for fear lest I break the fifth or eight commandment, but lest I break the sixt, in being guilty of self murder; yet rather than say he hath authority to take it, I must lose my life. In point of protection among thieves, I may desire some to preserve me from others, yet may I not say their robbery is just, or join or ply with them in robbing others.  
To say no more of the certain evidence, 
Ans. Obedience some times asserts not a Title but power.  and of the indubitableness of ancient original Titles (which is here the main of the Argument) I answer that simple obedience to an established usurper, doth not always interpretatively affirm his right, or deny another's, but affirms rather the irresistibility of the possessors present power. God is the supreme magistrate of all the world, and by reason of his Omnipotent presence everywhere, we cannot exclude him from the cognizance of, or right to any of our Actions; but our earthly Magistrates may fall into such circumstances, that they may have neither personal or virtual presence with us, and therefore may be said to be civilly dead, according to the former axiom, Idem est non esse & non operari, to do nothing and be nothing is to us the same thing, motion being the chief evidence of life.  
In his case of the thief, I desire any man to consider whether (as he hath put it) he hath not clearly broken one commandment, besides those which he hath named, viz. the third, because it is an untruth to say the Parliament requires not obedience from any of us, unless we all acknowledge the lawfulness of their authority, which is the second false supposition here.  
When Officers gather Taxes for the State, they have no commission to demand our Declarations of the state's authority first, but only to receive the money Taxed, which this Author knows is a truth known to every one. 
They who obey a wrong authority r●bbe not the ri●h●●.  As for the people's conjoining and complying with the State to rob another, by obeying to the prejudice of another; he must mean it in a Robbery either of power, or of Riches. For power, the people aim not at it, their condition always is l●rge who ever sits at top. And for getting by the war, I hope the Presbyterian party which had the authorising of Taxes, as well as others, knows as well as the people themselves, that this is a gross prevarication. Last of all there is difference betwixt willing compliance, and necessary subjectiion, which is the people's case.  

Obj.  He objects again p. 6. If obedience be necessary than a title once wronged can never be lawfully righted, it will be sin to help the weaker party, or to rescue ourselves from perpetual slavery.  

Ans.  Here he is started suddenly into two other questions. First, how a Title may be recovered? and secondly, How we of the people may rescue ourselves from the slavery of any Titles? These two relate to the future, which is of God's secret disposing; our question is of the present only.  

Of the recovery of dubious Rights, and the benefit which people get by most wars.  But I pray you what do people get when wars for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous? What are the people of France or the people of Spain better for the long and hereditary anger of their two Kings? Or what was the world better for Alexander's Conquering it? The Houses which are burnt, and the millions of bodies left dead in the field, are the peoples; and Princes scorning to derive from them, still trample them to dung. We talk of some Titles wronged, as if their rights were so certain, and so necessary to live under, as God almighty's is, who yet disposes of the changes which are made here among his chief Officers, and not we; Who is it then that can right wronged Titles, but he alone who makes all Titles right?  
To that case where it is argued, that if the Master's mate had thrown him overboard, and by power would suffer no other to guide the Ship but himself, 
Obj.  if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the Ship, the Ship must needs perish and themselves with it; It is answered by the Grand Case of Cons. p. 9 That the case should not have been of a Mate as a partner (which is false) but of a party of the Seamen, who coming to shore should bring the other obeying party to punishment, especially for acknowledging the usurping stearesmans' right, which is still falsely supposed in our case.  
Here I desire this Casuist to pull off his mask and speak plainly, 
Answer. The case of the Master of the Ship thrown over board.  whether he doth not plead for his own punishment, as one who at the beginning of our war principally encouraged us not to be guided by the then pretending Stearesman, whom they of his party said aside, and stear'd a while themselves; the Scots declaring that he was not fit to touch the helm again, till he had satisfied, &c.  
Besides, this is true, that they then required obedience from compounding Royalists, although to them they seemed an unlawful power and Magistracy, as to the dispencing of public and private justice.  
Secondly, the reason wherefore these mariners might not acknowledge him the right master, (as he hath varied the case) is rather because this is in an inferior thing de jure privato, Master and mariners being accountants to the Merchants who have a Court of Justice to judge the fact; but what Court is there in this world to call that power, which here is the supremest to any account?  
Thirdly, he supposes the usurper and the compliers to be brought to account by the others, but not till they come to shore; whereas in our case we can do nothing but in the ship, that is in the commonwealth, when we leave that, we go into another world, our true patria where indeed we do not call one another, but are all called together to an account by our supreme Magistrate, whose sentence we would fain prejudge here by a confusion of the ship in via.  
The grand case of Conscience, p. 9 Adviseth that seeing we are so unsettled, 
Ob.  we should use means for a settlement, though by its procurement we were more unsettled: If a man be at the river's brink he would advise him to keep out of the water, but if at once he leap into the middle of the river, he would persuade him to come to the bank, although he wade through much water to come thither.  

Answ.  I see according to this horrid tenant, that if God (as the Scotch phrase hath it) comes not to the whole length of our desire, 
Whether we be actually in the unsettlement & deeps which he supposes?  than there must be no peace betwixt man and man in this world. Mr. Ste. Martial preached lately, that God was to be thanked for some thing, that Church doors were yet open to those who had a zeal, and a will to congregate, that they were not under their enemy's swords, nor compounding with them; he saw how they might be worse if God should through their peevishness let them see foreign armies at their doors, who have both faces tongues, religions & affections different from ours; and will not care for firing our houses and Churches, or for giving us laws again in an unknown tongue, and perhaps Religion too. Can he think the Notion of our Church government would be a charm to such swords and consciences? Or rather can he assure us of his prophecy here, that if we begin new troubles, we shall certainly have victory? For his argument supposes it must needs end so, and that by his persuasion we shall wade to the bank. If we were indeed in the midst of the water (that is in the midst of war and confusion) then being engaged for life, we might endeavour to wade through, though the stream were running deep with our own and children's innocent bloods, for after all Metaphors, that is the element which he means. Thus in no diseases but those which are supposeddeadly, may we use desperate remedies, such as may endanger the destruction of the whole body; 
When the whole body may be hazarded for a desperate remedy & when not.  But may a man endanger his whole body, when it is not for the cure of himself but of another, and by the killing also of others besides himself, wife and children? I will not name what sort of subtlety this Gentleman hath used in this Argument, nor def●ne with what conscience here he seeks to satisfy another's; For, lest we of the People should bogle at coming on the Stage to Act our late Tragedy over again, he would impose it on our beliefs, that we are still in the middle act of it and that we ought to finish it. It is high time for him to consider whither if we run along with him in this we should not shut up compassion from our Brethren, 
1 Joh. 3.17.  and shut out a great part of our gratitude towards God; although I confess some scars and haltings may remain yet, after the war itself is ended. Methinks he should find every thing both in Nature and Christianity more favourable for our present Peace, then for our third war, especially seeing all our former wars have ended very contrary to the expectation of those who were hottest to begin them. But I consider that passion is the last hold out of which we are beaten, of which the fuller men are, the less do they (through a great judgement on their spirits) perceive into what deformities they do transport them, it being the nature of all intoxications that their defects are better perceived by any, then by those who are oppressed by them.   

THE Second Part, THAT This obedience to the present Government, is not contrary to, but consistent with our Solemn League and Covenant.  
BY these steps we are come at last ad sacras columnas, to those sacred Pillars on which the holy Covenant hangs almost in every Church, as a sanctum aeternitati a law sacred to eternity. The hands which hung it there, have not (they say) power to take it down again. Who therefore may undertake to tell these persons, that they actually are or else may be freed from it, seeing they find themselves obliged if they can, to tie all the world with them in the same sort of knot?  
Here is certainly a zeal● worthy to be ●ixt on that, which should oblige always; and the world must confess that there hath been no public oath taken by any person anywhere; who have been more scrupulously attended not to double with their God in relation to his part in contract. But yet let not these consciences be scandalised if I say it was compild by none but mortal men, taken only by such, and as a promissory oath cannot possibly be free from those exceptions, and accidents wherewith time changes the constitution of all those things, which it doth not absolutely destroy, wherefore upon a sober review of all I doubt not, but as many Oaths and Leagues are transient, 
we are still obliged to many things of the Covenant but not qua league or Covenant.  so to show that this according to its nature, and as it is originally a League or Covenant, that is, as it is a formal compact, relating to the public and united corporation of several Nations and Magistracies (by which each people were united together, and without which neither people were respectively to act any thing separately within and against themselves) I say I doubt not but to show that such a Covenant, upon what hath intervened is expired to us the People of England, and that without any default of ours; And though our Magistrate would give it a new life and obligation; yet to many principal things it can oblige no longer; and for the next we are to consider that though something of our first end in reformation stream through the Covenant; yet its spring head rises higher than it; which end we are in all forms to pursue still, & are now left tied to so much of the Covenant only as we were obliged to for all our days withal our mights and souls, before we took it at all. Lastly, if it were granted, that the Covenant is not expired, yet I shall here show, that our submission to this present government is no way inconsistent with it.  
In which few words, though I have stated the main of its difficulties, yet ere I apply myself to answer objections, I shall briefly premise what I have observed others have omitted, it being hard to find how we may be untied from a thing, till we have found how the knot at first was made.  

Of promissory ●nd assertory oaths.  Whatsoever we can say, affirm or deny, is either assertory or promissory The first relates to the time past or present (is if I affirm Titius to be, or have been at Rome) and therefore upon the very saying or swearing, the whole truth and obligation is fulfilled, and past with the time which accompanied it. 
whither a promissory Oath, which always involves a Tacite condition, be lawful.  The other relates to the time present, as it is then sincerely said or sworn; and to the future for the sincere fulfilling them, which yet is dubious, conditional, and not in our powers; As when Titius promiseth Sempronius 100.l. when his ship returns.  

Ob.  For this reason some say all promissory oaths ace absoutely unlawful, because oaths must be true and certain; but all future effects of things are uncertain.  

Ans.  I answer, that for so much as concerns the form of my Oath here, it is true and certain, that my mind and words went truly together in the act of swearing, and that I will make my deed and words go truly together, when the supposed condition betwixt us (and which, as we mutually consent to, is in neither of our powers at present) shall absolutely come to pass. This was the case of Abraham's servant, when he swore to take a wife for Isaac; a future (in several circumstances) very uncertain, 
Gen. 24.2.34.  both in respect of what might happen to the servant, to Isaac and to the Virgin we know what hapneed to Job's Children and Family through the accident of war, and the malice of the devil; and how Joseph was shuffled away by his own friends and kindred.  
It is not enough to say, such supposed tacit conditions cannot be in oaths; 
Of tacit conditions in oaths concerning things possible.  For first, If such conditions be in promises, and that I may lawfully make a promise to another, than I may lawfully swear a promissory Oath to him, which we see cannot be separated from such conditions as are not, cannot, and need not be expressed betwixt us at the beginning. For (to take away the supposition of fraud betwixt us) we both agree in this that we cannot foresee with what circumstances our futures may be perplexed. Therefore it is sufficient that we swore things not necessary, but possible; such as might happen or not happen, because depending on things which depend not totally on us, nor on our will, but rather mixedly on the wills of others, and on that which to us is change or fortune, For which reason he is not forsworn, who effects not always what he by Oath promiseth, no more than he sins, who always effects not his simple promise.  
Secondly, This tacit condition in a promissory Oath, and in things naturally and morally possible, is proved by the very nature and definition of the Oath. For it is only an attestation, and imprecation of God in such manner, that if the promiser fail, he would have him to whom he promised, understand, that be puts himself under God's severe wrath.  
From hence it is to be noted, 
The obligation of a pact, or promise with an Oath, or without an Oath, is all one  that the bare promise obliged as strictly before he swore, as after he swore; and of the reason is, because he was obliged by nothing, but by that which was in Pact. The investing it with an Oath, or with God's punishment, relates only to the Penalty: so that a promissory Oath signifies no more, than such a penalty upon such a promise: But a penalty (as we know) in law and equity relates only to that which is unlawful, such as is the violation of a Pact.  
The addition of never so many penalties, to a thing in itself unlawful, can never fasten any obligation on me to do it; Nor can several Penalties to an obligation in itself lawful, add anything to the first Ius or right of it, but only to my future fear, lest I do injustice.  
The capital question therefore in these cases will be. What the nature of the things are to which we obliged ourselves at first? For according as they stand or fall, our relations or obligations, to them stand or fall whither we will or no.  
Thirdly, We find such tacit conditions, concealed, and supposed in the oaths of Solomon to Bathsheb●●; 
1 K●ngs 2 20. 21.22. 1 Sam. 25.22 Jo. ●. 10. Gen. 24.2.3.4  of David, concerning Nabals house; of God concerning the destruction of Ninevah, and of Abraham's servant concerning Isaac's wife, &c.  
By a reflection on all this, viz. That seeing there may be a promise, and consequently a promissory Oath; and that the nature and obligation of a promise, and of such an Oath, is one and the same, we have gained a great point, That the Covenant (which is a promissory Oath) is not in its own nature of an eternal obligation, but is involved in tacit conditions and accidents of the world, which may justly encumber us from effecting it, or from being further obliged to it, as well as other promises may, which yet are made bonâfide at the beginning. The difficulty only is to see, whither de facto that hath intervened, which hath now taken away the formal and original obligation, which we of the people had to it at first, by authority of our Magistrate; and so taken away, as we may be secure and out of fear of the penalty, which we then submitted to in it.  
I shall not here make use of what others have laboriously argued; 
Argu.  That the matter of the Covenant is such, as we cannot be obliged to, but let it be as good or as bad as men please to suppose; 
The Covenant a political or State Oath.  I say in the first place, that all the good or bad, was formed into a political Oath, authorized upon two kingdoms, by the sanction of two public Magistracies; who as collaterals obliged themselves to cooperate faithfully together, and obliged those of their distinct Nations, to cooperate respectively and subordinately with them, for attaining a former end in such a way of Reformation, as is therein expressed; but by such means, as they in their public and respective capacities, not we in our particulars should judge most consonate to equity and true to religion. For which reason we happily are pointed at there, 
The subordinate conditions of this Oath.  only in our private places and callings.  
Here therefore there is a relation of several things concurrent, viz. Of two Magistracies united as a means for the easier reaching the end of those respective reformations, which they were obliged to make before they entered in league, and of two people, who by the union of their respective Magistracies, pass (for so much as is therein expressed) into an union one with another, and are to have their private capacities and endeavours managed by them, and never against them by any virtue of this league. Besides it is a considerable circumstance in the Magistrates managing the whole, that states or civil constitutions by reason of the diseases of ambition and avarice, are naturally as much subject to future changes, as any other things are; and without the supposition of tacit conditions, we may as little swear to preserve the State of a public body, as we may swear to preserve the State of our own particular bodies, or as a parent may to preserve his child, which when it shall be taken away by diseases, or by justice, he may be sorry for the loss, but may not justly complain of it. And indeed so it is come to pass without any default in us of the english People, or of our public Magistrate (under whom we were to act in these private places and callings) that neither of us can be said to have laid the Covenant aside, although we could not keep it from expiring; because the failing was in that which was never supposed to be in our powers viz. in many conditional things which camecr osse, and in the breach of fidelity in another collateral and concurring power.  
If you please to object here as an aggravation, 
Ob.  and an incitement for us of the Covenanted people to rise kill and slay, that the Covenant is buried not as a thing really expired and dead, but that the people out of interest must be told so, only because the former Magistracy is really laid aside and changed, which if people should throughly consider, would quickly make them find matter enough in the Covenant to take arms.  
I shall not in the way of answer to this repeat any thing concerning the cause, 
Ans.  the means, and the concurrences to this our present change; every Covenanter both of England and Scotland, knowing well that there was no change of Government here, 
O● change of ●●●●●nment, 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 cause, or as an effect of ●●●hers for●●● breach of Covenant can ●●●her way authorize us to 〈◊〉 against this Government.  till the Covenant was Nationally broke (and so many here were ensnared, both Royalists and Parliamentarians) by the Scots, who thought to have used it for a change of Government, and as a stratagem to give law in another judicatory: Neither shall I argue in this place, how compatible any change may be with a Covenant so conditional, in which Kings as Parties are totally excluded from judging either for themselves or for others, which point shall be further argued at last; But I shall content myself to take what is here granted in the objection, viz. That the Government is really changed; The consequence then to us of the people will be, that seeing by the fourth Article of the Covenant, we may not without apparent breach of it, act the sense of the Covenant, but as we receive it from our respective and supreme judicatory of England only, and that the said Government which it relates to, is confessed to be gone, have you not then clearly confessed that the obligation to act any thing publicly by Covenant is likewise gone? according to an old axiom, Sublato relat● tollitur correlatum.  
If this present Government which we are changed to, 
The Covenant obliges us not against the ●i●th commandment.  and which now protects us, should think fit by the way of Covenant to give a new life, to that remaining part of it, which may be observed, yet you will not allow any obedience to them, though in things never so lawful; Neither will that fourth Article allow me to obey any foreigner, nor those without whose consent the Covenant was made, and consequently without whom it is to be interpreted, as the late Proceedings of the Scots at the Hague plainly show: So that after all this, if I in my private capacity be as you say still indispensibly obliged by it, 
Page 15.  to begin or assist to public troubles, do you not fall into a worser absurdity, and maintain an Oath against the fifth Commandment, or against all Magistracy, which is an impossibility? Nothing ever cautiond in terms more expressly for our duty of making discoveries, 
The Covena●● make 〈◊〉 eac● man a Magistrate.  of bringing to condign punishment, of our supreme respective judicatories and the like then the Covenant did, which are things relating to none but our supreme Magistracy, unless you please plainly to assert another Absurdity, that every single man who hath taken it, is thereby absolved from his Magistrate, and is made one himself to judge of the other, and thereby authorizd not by way of Toleration to profess but to establish what Religion he would, to punish at his own tribunal whom he would, and to reform the state as he would. For he to whom you will allow a capacity of making war, hath also a Capacity of making Peace, and laws for the security of his Peace.  
Thus we see how the Government is changed, and the formal obligation of the Covenant at an end; But what if I should grant you by the way of supposition, that in case both the Covenant and the former Government were standing together in as full force as you desire, and as it was when the Scots first delivered the King up to the Parliament of England? I would then know of you whither if our Parliament had then for reasons best known to themselves (and of which we can never judge competently) declared us of the People, free from any further obligation of the Covenant, might we justly have thought our solemn League at an end, and that we ought to act nothing publicly any longer by it?  
If you will say we should have been still obliged to act upon it, than I ask you again under whom? For I have proved it must be always under a Magistrate, and you have all along proved that it must only be under our lawful Magistrate, how lawful soever the thing be in itself which is commanded, you would not allow the King to be the person to be obeyed, whom you thought fit to keep in an imprisonment. The Parliament (according to our supposition) would not be any longer obliged to it, or be obeyed in it, and the Scots acknowledge themselves in the 4 Article to be the supreme judicatory only of Scotland, and I cannot act publicly by a private Capacity or Magistracy. Ergo in such a case, the Covenant how good soever, had not obliged any longer, nor is it in itself eternal.  

Obj.  You will not deny perhaps but one man may free another from an Oath when it is for the worldly profit of him who pleases to release it, as every man may throw away any thing of his own right; but you will not allow it in Sacred things where God is a Party.  

Ans.  I answer, that though no Parent can dispense his wife or child from the fear of God and the duties they owe to him, 
Num 30. How a superior may free an inferior from ●n Oath even in that which belongs to God.  yet he allowed him to break the child's vow for giving him a sacrifice, and both to be guiltless; and then why may not we be now absolved, if our public Parent judges it not fit that we should be any longer tide formally to a conditional Oath; though it have relation to some sacred things?  
You will say no, because the Parent did not as a party solemnly concur to the child's vow, and having never consented he might the better dissent; but our public Parent did concur at a party to our Oath. The Parliament and People took the Covenant jointly together, and it is said that if the Father hear the vows, and contradicts them not in the same day, than he confirms them, and cannot break them without iniquity,  
To this I reply, First, that v. 16. it is said the child is free after the dissent of the Parent, and that the Parent is charged with whatsoever was amiss in him, which is excuse enough for us of the people. Secondly, the difference is great in a main point of the parallel; because after the concurrence of the Father to the child's vow for sacrificing something to God, that might be completed in the Temple without his further helping it on; but we cannot do any thing in our case without the cooperation of our public Parent all along, neither can he do any thing without the concurrences of many other possible, but uncertain conditions, and if he in effect find those conditions have come contrary to his public endeavours, what may we do? will it be enough for us to rest in having attempted the utmost of our private endeavours with him? or will you authorise every man upon private judgement or interpretation to begin a war in his own sense.  
A League or Pact authorized betwixt private Neighbours over a whole Nation or over part of it, 
The difference btewixt this our league and those of Prince● for authorising war  is not as a League betwixt Prince and Prince: because these have conditions expressed how and when to begin war upon one another in case their Leagues be broken. But there is no such thing expressed in terminis in that Covenant which we have made one with another, and which we made subordinately to our Magistrate: so that if we or the Magistrate fail, we are equally left to God's justice solely and to the forfeiture of our own penalties due to him, and every one is to answer for his own deficiency in his own Station: And being left to ourselves again, we are left to act only so much of our Oath or of the ancient end of it, as we were bound to before we swore: which is a great deal; because we were bound by precept before we were by promise all the days of our lives to do our utmost for the glory of God, and the good of our neighbour.  
Secondly, 
The obligation of the Covenant, how less than the obligation of a ●ra  Princes or States who by the supremacy of their powers, are able to make laws for their separated kingdoms; when they unite their supreme Powers, they are able to make a common Law for all their Kingdoms together, which is called a League or Compact; But a law when it comes to be broken (which is a public thing, and therefore of every man's interest) may be vindicated publicly by war, and by those who have a posse regni. But I cannot say the same may be done for the Covenant, for quo jure can it be done?  
The Scots indeed by one way of arguing make it greater than a Law, and by another make it less; which is when they one while affirm it unalterable and unreformable as a divine text, and another while confess it was not made by the joint concurrence of all those who with them are essential to the making a public Law. I conceive we may safely say it is of a Constitution inferriou● to that of a Law, and therefore its obligation is less, though its penalty be greater to the failers in it. It was made use of, only as a convenient instrument or means, for the better attaining some laws as its end. A Law it was not because it was not made by all the then Legislative powers of the kingdom. For the King's concurrence in England if not in Scotland, was then held requisite for passing a Law and he ever dissented from this Covenant. Half the inferior sort of the People have not any Interest in it, 
War how an unjust penalty for the mere breach of Covenant.  nor have taken it: And not having any obligation to it, how I pray you can they justly be drawn into the Penalty due to it? as they must all be, if a war (which is effectually a penal thing) be begun though by a part of the Nation; for the nature of war is such, that it puts a whole kingdom into imminent danger of desolation, though but begun in a part, and by a party of it.  
Thus far I have endeavoured to show the true fast and loose of all promissory Oaths, and how their obligations cease according to the nature of the things which they are affixed to.  

Object.  The Author of the grand case of Conscience p, 1. Objects, That if inconvenience may break a promise or disengage an Oath, than many may be cheated, and David was much mistaken, Psal. 15.4. Who saith he shall dwell in God's Tabernacle, who sweareth to his own hindrance and changeth not.  

Ans.  I answer, David speaks here of an Oath violated by a change only in the Promiser, 
Of the obligation of such a promise as may be fulfilled solely by the promiser.  who by his Oath hath past a right to another: and therefore can no longer dispose of it again; the party to whom he swore may dispose of it as he pleaseth and may dispense him of it; because no man hath a right to make another man keep his own, longer than he please himself. It is a duty to pay a debt, but not to receive it. Finally, this is nothing to those cases where the change is not in us, but in other persons, and in things which relate principally and conjointly to the fulfilling of the Oath or Promise. For if I promise Titius a sword at such a time, and he then chance to be mad, (an accident not expressed betwixt us at first) am I bound to put it into his hands in this change because I was the first promiser?  
Whereas it is said, that the obligation of somethings end, because they can be no longer kept, 
Ob.  as that of the King's person &c. He ans. p. 11. That if men shall by violence put an end to the thing, that thereby the obligation may end too, that is a breach of Covenant. A woman promiseth to be faithful to her husband so long as he lives; but if she, to marry another, kills him, she breaks her promise.  
I grant it easily that they who use violence to break lawful contracts, 
Answ.  sin grievously; which is a thing now confessed in every Church of Scotland; but what is that to those who use no violence to break them at all; nor can help it when it is done although many be undone by it? 
Of the obligation for preserving the King's person by covenant.  One thing I most earnestly desire to learn in this question propounded (I guess) concerning the King's Death; which was a consequence of the others breach and tamperings. If by the Covenant we were indispensably obliged to preserve his Person, How came it to pass, that we were obliged by the same covenant to wage war against him? I have heard of a distinction betwixt his power and his person, but never of any betwixt his person and himself. So that if the Covenant could have dispensed any soldier of England or Scotland to kill his person by an accident of war (as his life was oft in danger before he came to the Scaffold) his Death had been violent, and the obligation to preserve him had ended, and yet according to this argument the Covenant had not been broken. Why then should these men think the world so dull as not to understand plainly enough, that the Covenant provided for his Death more ways than one? True it is, that the Covenant held out a faint and a conditional preservation of him, and after all no man can sincerely stretch it further: From whence if we will let him judge this one controversy, he hath left it recorded to posterity, in his supposed book Chap. 9 In vain is my person excepted by a parenthesis of words, when so many hands are armed against me with swords: Moreover in His Chap. of the Covenant, he feared it provided for him in a logic too loose and circumstantial. From all which what did he conclude, but that he would not allow of a Covenant-argument for his life?  
I know the answer here is obvious, that bullets were not shot directly against him (as few are against any in a town or in a battle) and that if he would have withdrawn his person, he should have been out of danger; but than I pray you what advantage had he in this by Covenant, more than any common soldier of either side? who when they retire, are equally out of danger, Nay he had less advantage, For by preserving him, they meant keeping him after he was rescued from others, 
How the words of preservation in Covenant, provided more for the King's suffering, than the words of punishment provided for Delinquents sufferings.  and by keeping him they meant not him primarily, but something else, to which all consideration of him was to give way. As for others which were to be brought to punishment, they had some of them leave to go beyond the Seas, others to enjoy liberties at home; and of all the excepted persons, there was never any of them who was here deprived of life, but as our troubles and wars increased, their number (which was strange) lessened even to six or seven at last, and most of those out of the kingdom. I know they have distinctions wherefore so much might be remitted to those, and not to the King, although he had on his behalf the word preservation in the Covenant; but these distinctions are but their strong justifications for that which is the bottom of this argument, if all Covenanters durst speak plainly alike.  

Ob.  He objects. p. 11. That if according to Covenant we should preserve the privileges of Parliament, against a Malignant party that would have taken away but five Members; why not against an heretical party which took away above two hundred?  

Ans.  I answer, That when the five Membere were in danger, there was a Session of near all the Lords, and of all the Commons to authorise the People to bring others before them to condign punishment: 
How 〈◊〉 that the excluding member, aught to be brought by 〈◊〉 before the excluded.  But where is there now any Session of a supreme power in this Land, before whom we ought to bring the present Parliament? under what formal supreme Magistracy can we now cooperate or receive public orders, but from them? who have commanded no such thing against themselves. Lastly the Covenant makes not us private men Magistrates, neither doth it authorise us to a war disertly, as to a penalty.  
Certainly he doth not mean that the remaining Members make no house, because there are more now kept out, then are admitted into it. For would not such an Argument clearly determine, that the house of Lords was never a house, since the Major part followed the King, under pretence, that they durst not sit any longer at Westminster? Or else if the ●itting of so many Members as are enough for a legal vote be illegal, after others are forc●t away; How shall we justify that Session with a new speaker, when the rest were forced to the army's protection from the Citizens servants and apprentices, who forced them, and endangered their lives in the House? Or how shall we justify the house of Commons for sitting, when the five Members durst not appear? Though force should not be used without a desperate occasion be given (in which case the preservation of the substance, is always above the consideration of a formality as hath been argued by the Parliament ever since their first wars yet they know few or many sitters in the House, is not a thing of our examination, if they be above forty.  
The second Demurrer p. 6. 
Ob.  Objects that we have sworn by no terror to withdraw ourselves from this blessed union, 
Ans.  but to continuein it all our lives against all opposition. 
The Coveant relates only to a time of u●nion, with and under the magistrate.   
If there were nothing else in the world yet these words sufficiently prove that we are now absolutely absolved from the Covenant; for first, they relate to a State and time of union, in which we were according to the united strengths of two Nations, two Magistracies, and of the respective Magistracies and People here enabled, yea commanded to make great opposition against those who then were actually united in arms against the Parliament. But now that we are supposed by these Authors to be disunited as our enemies are, and that the Magistracy is changed, our state of subordination somewhat varied; 
How the league of national union came to be ended  that the Links of our former chain are broken; and that the Commons act alone without a King, as the Lords & Commons acted before without one, and that the Scotish Nation by their invasion, and their attempting to divide the King from us, and us one from another, by their declaration made preparatorily for division, thereby to favour invasion afterward, have in the face of all the world broken whatever was of national union and Peace, yea and all that which was of confidence betwixt ourselves at home, and (which was yet more horrid) in encouraging one principal Army in Ireland to fall off from the advantages it had against the bloody rebels, to turn their swords against the Parliament itself, only out of a by end of ambition, yea now (that the war being ended) we are to enter into an union of cohabitation or in cooperation (as they have done in Scotland itself) with those who during their united hostilities occasioned our national Union, are we I say after all this, in the self same Union which they at first hoped might have been continued to them & us for all our lives? That Union supposed the war which then was, with the rest, of the circumstances, and if we wish the same effect or Union now, do we not thereby wish the same cause or war again amongst us? as we were to oppose arms to arms, so union to union, and certainly that Union of the Parliaments of both Kingdoms was at an end, ever since the Scotch Army here received their money, and returned, home, leaving the Delinquents of both Nations disunited and clearly reduced to receive condign punishment, (as the Covenant calls it) at the respective judicatories of both Kingdoms; and if it ended not then, yet it could not be consistent with their Declaration and divisions presently after; and if not then, yet I am sure it could not be consistent with their national invasion, and tampering to divide all in England and Ireland, the effect whereof hath been a change of Government here, and hath made them totally distinct foreigners to us.  
The Demurrers premises in this Argument by a new logic, 
Of bringing those who would divide us to condign punishment.  relate only to a State of public union, and his conclusion relates only to a State of public disunion, of the consequences whereof the Covenant saith nothing at all in any Article; It enjoyn●s the bringing of Delinquents to condign punishment, and those private persons likewise among ourselves, who should help on, either divisions amongst us, or the invasion of either Nation first. But whether should they be brought to punishment? The Covenant answers, Either before the respective judicatories of each kingdom (who only have power to judge of what is condign) or before nobody.  
It speaks likewise how we should unitedly venture our lives against the Enemy which then was: 
The meaning of our utmost endeavours, and of all the days of our lives in the Covenant.  it doth not, or at least ought not to swear us to get the better of them for ever, nor that we should in a rout or disunion end our lives against all opposition, and without quarter. If the terms of our utmost endeavours, and all the days of our lives, are to be understood literally, and that we must not survive any violation of the Covenant, then why do these Gentlemen, (who conclude themselves in the State of the Covenant thus understood) think of living till to morrow? The terms of forever, or for all the days of our lives are not in our contracts to be understood naturally, but morally; For we find it plainly in the Judicial law, that after a Jew had taken a servant, and bored a hole through his ear he was (as the Text saith) to serve him for ever, although one of them might poss●bly have died the next day, and both of them after a while might have been made captives to others. The law calls the league of Marriage individua vitae consue●udo, a c●habita●ion for all the days of our lives. For so it should be ex voto contrahenti●m, in the sincere desires of the contractors; Yet we know, one ordinarily dies before the other, and that many conditions may happen to legitimate their divorce afterwards, though the contract was never so religiously made in the presence of almighty God at first.  
The Scots in their late proceedings with their King at the Hague pag. the 6. interpret the words of utmost endeavour, as morally as we do here? For the Commissioners of the Kirk said, they used their utmost endeavours to save the King's life according to Covenant; but how? They answer, that it was in Papers, messages, Declarations, Testimonies, and Protestations only; they name not war, or bloodshed, for they protested against that way last year, as contrary to Covenant, when the Parliament of Scotland invaded us; and I hope for the reputation of the religion they profess, they have not altered their public commentary of that sacred Text contradictorily so soon.  
To conclude, Either we are still in the union of the end of the Covenant, or we are not: If we be in it, than these break the Covenant, by seeking to disunite us: If we be not in it, where then is the Article for our private forming a war upon it? and under whom, if not under our English supreme iudicatory? 
The Covenant how more than broke by the Scots hostility.  and if they call us not out to revenge that which was more than a bare falling off from the Covenant last year amongst ourselves, (when the Scots exercised such high hostilities, and were the first shatterers of all our frame (which otherwise might by God's blessing have cemented again) how durst these private trumpets sound the alarum, and open the wounds of the Nations once more? Though the respective iudicatory of that kingdom now cannot make that which was once done, undone; Yet by the present punishment of the kirk, it is acknowledged that they hold the Covenant to have been more than nationally broken, in regard of the harm and damage which was done to us after it was broken. For there is a great deal of difference betwixt ceasing to help according to a league, and acting hostily contrary to it, especially when no such penalty is in such a league expressed betwixt the parties.  
But you will object, 
Obj.  that if the Covenant were so broken in one or two points by them, yet it doth not follow, that the whole Covenant is broken thereby, and dead in every part.  
I have answered before that we are no longer obliged to any thing in it by the way of League and Covenant; The reason here is, 
Ans. whither the national breaking of one part of the Covenant put an end to the whole.  because here in leagues everything is to be observed con●unctively, otherwise all is broken; which is so true and clear, that if we look upon God's league and Covenant with Israel, we shall find the same thing pronounced there. God said, If ye keep my commandments, I will be your God, and will maintain you in your plenty, and in your Land: Yet he said, that if they broke any one commandment in their part of Covenant, they were guilty of all, and that all should be at an end betwixt them: just as St. John in the conclusion of his Revelation saith, Who ever shall diminish but one word of that book defaceth the whole, and loseth the whole benefit which he might expect thereby in the holy City, by virtue of the second Covenant.  
It is asserted, 
Ob.  that there is no clause in any Oath or Covenant, which in a common sense forbids obedience to a present Government: To this the grand case of Conscience answers, That the Covenant engages to another Government, therefore it forbids obedience to this, and oaths ought to be their own interpreters.  
Here he at first begs the question, whether the Covenant can now engage us or no? 
Ans.  seeing it hath been proved, that that which is now nothing, cannot now engage us to any thing; and conseqently our submitting to, and acting under the present Government, cannot be contrary to Covenant; because things which are contrary one to the other, must have actual being together at the same time. But the very being of this Government, supposes the nullity of the Covenant, whose death (as it was other where contrived before) gave life to that mutation here afterwards.  

The Covenant (of all oaths) interprets itself least, especially in the positive Government, which it would establish, and in Religion.  Secondly, Though the Covenant were still valid and in force, yet when we were sworn to it first, it found us actually out of that Government here pointed at, viz. Of King Lords and Commons. For that is the supreme Government of a Country, which makes a supreme law there: But at that time the supremest human law, which (according to these gentlemen's opinions) was ever made in England or Scotland, or perhaps in all the world, was made without the King in those kingdoms, and against his dissent. For which reason the Covenant engages not so positively for King or Kingly Government, as for the union of the Covenanters in any form and against any opposition; 
Though the Covenant were in Force, yet a change of Government might be consistent with it.  Whereupon the Presbyterians when it was (as most conceived) in their power, to restablish King or Kingly Gove●nment, they omitted both for many days of their lives, without question; because they conceived it not a Government absolutely necessary by Covenant. When D. Hamilton entered England so hostilely for that end, and as he thought by virtue of Covenant, yet he was excommunicated for it by the Oracles of the Covenant.  
Lastly, The reign of the Covenant since the first day of its birth and obligation, was never yet a R●gall reign, no not for one day anywhere; so that the change which is, is not determinately contrary to that principle, out of which (according to the circumstances of security) any Government may be moulded for any place. For which reason if I should grant you that the Covenant were not expired, and had not been so palpably broken, as it was betwixt the Nations; yet Scotland (if they had pleased) might have been governed by a King, and England by a free State, & yet both consonantly enough to Covenant and without any contrariety, because the circumstances of security in one might have been different from the circumstances of security in the other; which though different, might as well have been mutually maintained as their discipline differing from ours might have been preserved by us. From all which it appears, that that Oath is Cloudy in the positive or set Government which we ought to have, and so cannot be justly called its own interpreter, besides a reformation according to the word of God; and the example of the best reformed Churches, supposes such a latitude of logic as would (if all sides should be heard) give us as much exercise as all our wa●res have.  
And certainly the Covenant is alike undefin'd in Religion and in civil Government. 
How the Covenant necessarily points at some change of Government.  For we swore to bring the Church Discipline in the three Kingdoms, to as near a similitude as the constitution of the places would bear, not into the very same; and as for the civil Government, it was to receive its form in the security of that, just as water doth receive not only the figure of the Pot or glass into which it is put, but its conservation from being totally lost and spilled. But how then will you free yourself from this contradiction in asserting that the civil State is unalterable by Covenant, when that of the Church which forms the other is so much alterable? and seeing that of the State receives from this, not only its form and being, but what ever else you alone please to attribute to your security in it? From whence I conclude again, that a change of Government is consistent with Covenant, & that a submission to it in lawful things is much more, and consequently it engages not to any one determinate Government, and so is not against this of ours.  
I believe it hath been a frequent observation of many, who have calmly conversed with our Divines and others zealous for Presbytery, That they have found them little satisfied with that sort of Presbytery, which our Parliament modelled for us of this Nation; as having little affinity with the covenant. My belief is, that they in that discerned not the consequence of their own dissatisfaction. 
Scotch Presbytery fit for any Government but the kingly.  For if their consciences regulated by Covenant, can admit no civil Government, but the Kingly (which they so much argue for here) and if the Covenant and a Scotch Presbytery (whose right they hold to be Divine) be essentially linked together, Then we and they may all of us learn, not only from direct inferences, but from the declared experience of the son, the Father, the Grandfather, and great GrandMother, that is of the three last Scotch Kings and one Queen. That if the Scotch presbytery come out of the Covenant then Kingly government cannot derive from it, because they are jurisdictions incompatible and inconsistent in the same place, and if one can conserve it, then may we say as much of the other. How much Mary Queen of Scotland experienced of this, 
The judgement ●● experience of Mary Queen of Scotland.  let the world judge by that which she wrote both with ink in her Letters, and with her blood on the Scaffold. For how came she to be Beheaded in England, but by Mr. Knox (and the kirks having done little better than) put her into the hands of those who could not keep her long alive with security to themselves? 
Of King James.  King James hath writ and argued largely concerning his dangers & sufferings under it, & it is yet remembered in what Dialect they of the Presbytery were wont to Preach and Pray against him to his face, and he not know how to remedy it, or by what right to top theirs. When he came into England he professed his deliverance from that subjection not of small satisfaction to his mind, and therefore at this di●tance he contrived how to extinguish or check that ●ate there, & after some progress in that work he himself died peaceably in a milder Country, 
Of King Charles Vid. Scotch Declaration, 27 July 1649. p. 14.  But K. Charles with that Crown inherited the consequences of that undertaking, for his first troubles began in the controversy of that Presbytery; and what a preservation he thought the Covenant (from which it seems their Presbytery is so inseparable) might be to him and what his fate was and who helped it on, nay who diverted him from agreement here, all the world knows and in his writings likewise he hath shown to the world that he himself was not ignorant of it; This only is the wonder, that in the midst of this their specious zeal for Kingly Government, 
Of the Prince.  the Covenant should be so silent concerning royal Posterity, or for their succession, in case the Scots or English soldiers had killed the King casually before he had given them the satisfaction which they required, the consideration of all this, with some other lately offered to the young Prince at the Hague, by the Scotch Commissioners, and the satisfaction which they in their late Declaration require from him, as they did from his Father, have questionless made him scruple, so long at his adventure into that Country, though so much invited. For they told him p. 14.15. That for longer than these eight years, 
Vid. Decla. p. 8.10.  yea ever since that Queen Mary, their fundamental privilege hath been to assemble in Parliament; and to conclude there of themselves, either without King or King's Commissioners; and that if his Majesty refuse those their reasonable desires, they shall be constrained in so great an extremity, to do what is incumbent on them, to preserve Religion, 
Scotch proceed, at the Hague with the Prince, p. 14.15  and the Kingdom from ruin. Here they plainly acknowledge, and assume that supreme power and right, which shall be proved here more evidently towards the conclusion.  
But because I intend truth here in the simplicity of my Heart, and no way to swell this Argument, either with passion in myself, or with scandal to any man else therefore I shall sincerely unfold what hath long been a mystery to myself, and for confirmation of what I have asserted here so positively, I shall give the reader the express word of our great English Covenant-champion, and of Master Hinderson especially the Scotch Champion, betwixt whose fingers the Covenant itself was moulded.  
O●●t ●●ind case of Oonscience, p. 14, saith, But they who are now for the right of the Son, and continuance of the Government, are as much against the vices in and about him, as about the Father. And should he do as his Father hath done, they who are now for the performance of this Oath and Covenant, would as truly join against him as against the Father.  
Who can call this regal Language? which yet will be looked on as the English Presbyterian-alarum, though but by one man. He had done well in speaking of the performance of Covenant by us all if he had offered a Catalogue of all that which would fulfil the Covenant in all its terms without any further interpretation; But that which is supposed eternal for time is likewise infinite as to the matter which it may relate to by the application of human logic.  

The supreme power in Scotland in whom.  Mr. Hinderson in his Newcastle conference, with the King p. 24.25. saith, That the reforming power is in Kings and Princes, Quibus deficientibus, it comes to the inferior Magistrates, Quibus deficientibus, it descends to the gr●sse of the people, but yet supposing still (as he saith) that they be all of them rightly, informed. For which reason though he concealed it from the King, yet he meant, that the reformation of any of those three powers, according to the Covenant must be judged & reformed afterwards, by some other body of men here not named. For I conceive that he who is ultimately to judge of the Reformation and of its public obligation, judgeth likewise of the reformers themselves though never so high or never so low; and to this strange opinion he would fain entitle two English episcopal Champions Bilson and jewel.  
Here I must confess I was at a stand, concerning the nature and interest of the Covenant, and was sorry to see that I was no plainlier told whether it would carry me (laden with so great a curse) nor where it would set me down. At last I found in the same Author. 32.33. Speaking of the subordination of powers, under which people were finally to obey, That he would not willingly tell his Majesty, whether the Church was subordinate to the civil power, either to King or to Parliament, or to both: For (quoth he) I utterly desol●ima such a headship as the Kings of England have claimed, or such a supremacy as the Houses of Parliament crave, with appeals from ecclesiastial judicature to themselves.  
No man may think but Mr. Henderson meant this for the jurisdiction of England, 
How the Scots state the supremacy of England in Scotland.  as well as of Scotland, for he spoke of Houses of Parliament which were plural in England only; and though it may seem strange at the first view, to hear one say, that the Scotch Nation state the supremacy of England in their Country, or that they endeavour a direct change of Government, here, (which they have indirectly attempted for a long while.) let every man judge not by our subtleties, but by the kirks Declaration, 27 July, 1649, p. 11.12. Their words are, That their King after his Oath of Coronation in Scotland, shall assure them under his hand and seal, to enjoin the solemn League and Covenant, establish and practise the Prerbyteriall Government, Directory, Confession and catechism, as they are approved by the several Assemblies of their kirk and Parliament, in ALL HIS DOMINIONS, and that he shall never endeavour any change thereof.  
No man will say but States like judges ought to act, 
How the Scotch Presbyterians & ours oppose one another.  ex bono & aequo conjunctively. So that though these things which here they would impose upon us perpetually, were never so good, yet they being unequitably derived upon us from their supreme judicatory (in whose possession we are not so fully now, as they were last year in ours) we ought to abominate their design, as much as they might the like obtrusion of their presbytery from hence, without power there to rectify it ever after. For these Presbyterians with us grant▪ That good and lawful things may not be practised under a power unlawful, as they say the Scots would be here.  
However here I at last found who was my supreme right Magistrate in the Kirk● sense, but than I conceived I was in a great snare, because I saw the jus publicum of a kingdom totally though secretly changed. I saw all things of direct religion, and whatsoever related collaterally to its security, lodged there, and by the kirk prejudged from the judgement of all other authorities in Scotland especially. But because religion and its security draws in all human concernments, and that two supreme collateral powers cannot stand in one and the same place, in the same time, for the same person, but for contrary actions, therefore I knew not whither of the two supreme powers the ecclesiastical or the civil I should in this case throw away, 
Two supremacies in the same place, how in●●●sistent.  for they could not in this contest by the judgement of any be both obeyed together; and I stood in a miserable case betwixt a jailor and a devil the kirk giving me to the devil if I obeyed the civil power and the civil power giving me to the jailor if I obeyed the kirk, which was (to speak the truth) the State of the whole kingdom of Scotland last year, betwixt the the kirks excommunication, and the Parliaments Order which authorised Duke Hamiltons expedition, in Vindication of the Covenant here: In which difference we have no reason but to like the effect, however we may dislike such a cause here.  
Wherefore to answer this ●scruple, I positively say, That in whatsoever is of Pact betwixt man and man, or of policy in the Covenant, I ought solely to follow the civil Magistrate, and the Church here ought to follow the Magistrate likewise, as a case relating to the disquits to the wars, and to the recovering the peace of earthly kingdoms: If otherwise, than the civil jurisdiction ought clearly to be managed by the ecclesiastic; which is stated so nowhere (that I know of) but in Romagna and duchy of Ferrara and the other places belonging to the Pope. This I speak not as desirous to detract any thing from the sacred function of the ministry as it contains itself in its own function, no man being able rationally to object any thing wherefore some might not ex Officio, be deputed to excite others to virtue and sanctity of life. But yet who can say they are not subject to the infirmities of ambition, avarice, and severe passions as well as other men? or have not our Antagonists (whether they would or no) observed them in these cases of worldly rights and interests, to have as oppositly, yet as peremtorily differed one from another, as people of any family ever did? The devil not being able to get the Text on his side, by his wiles oft got the commentary, so that we are to be excused, if we hold many things in churchmen, to be but as an Apohrypha at best, which yet for esteem sake is allotted a place before anything else, next after the genuine Text,  
Having thus openly stated the scruples of my own and of many more consciences, and to take off masks not from the faces, but from the consciences of these three, and the multitude of other Scotch Casnists, who have talked so speciously for our Covenant, Vindication of an Heirs just Title, our submitting to it, and joining with others immediately, 
Whether atrue Title doth (according to Covenant) authorize obedience  least right suffer wrong one day; I cannot (I say) but ask the same men plainly; What difference in effect they find●, betwixt the Titles and right of the Prince of Wales, and of the n●w King of Scotland, notwithstanding all their obligation of Covenant, to submit to him as such?  
It is not enough by Covenant to preserve an airy Title only to a Prince, and by the same Covenant, to suspend all the rest of his solid power, and right? certain●ly his royal commands (notwithstanding all this talk) are no more obeyed in Scotland now, than the episcopal commands of our Countryman, the Bishop of C●alcedon are now obeyed in Turkey. 
The King of ● Scotland's present case, & the actual change of Government there by their interpretation of the covenant   
But what hinders him from exercising any Kingly right in Scotland as yet? The Covenant which is not yet satisfied. How is it then, that some of our Presbyterians say, that the same Covenant indispensably opens the door to him here? If the ●ing ask the Scots why they put the Law of the Covenant so to his obedience, 〈◊〉 the first thing which determines all his other rights afterwards? They can only say, that they swore it in his father's reign, and it is now eternal. Though I censure nothing here, yet I cannot but conclude-hence; That they of themselves, as well as our Parliament, have made a Law above all other laws, (and more than a reformable Magna Charta) For the Government of the kingdom which may be exercised according to it, without Kings, and against Kings.  

Against Kings.  The first thing which was ever offered to him from the kingdom of Scotland, was an authority by far transcending his own, viz. that of excommunication. For (as their late proceedings with him at the Hagu● show) he was by that subtlety tried whether he would refuse first to acknowledge James Graham (alias Montrosse) or that great power of the Churches, 
Page 18.  by which he might be awed to greater things afterwards. To back this likewise the Commissioners of the synod said (p. 22) that they negotiated with him in a capacity altogether, 
Page 22.  distinct from the Commissioners of Parliament, as being persons commissioned by the kirk, which is commisioned with a jusdivinum Our Bishops certainly never undertook such a jurisdiction & supremacy, and unless these had witnessed so much of themselves to all the world, no one would believe that in such a poor Country, and so much form of Religion, there could be such high passions of ambition.  
Besides if it be a true rule, That he who is the maker, aught to be the interpreter of a Law, then let all the world observe one thing, That the Kirk having made the Covenant (as the principle of all supreme rights both of State and Religion) than they alone ought to give the interpretation of it from time to time; as they de facto did not only last year, contrary to the interpretation of their own Parliament, but also for many years together have peremptorily pressed it upon ours: So that it makes a fundamental change of Government there, though differently from what our Parliament hath made here, the jus publicum both of Religion and security of State with them, lying in the Covenant, and that lying in the breasts of Churchmen, chosen by one another: and ours lying in the power of Laymen, chosen by the People, and judging by the Common laws of equity and necessity, and of the word of God.  
It were in vain to say the kirk only recommends their interpretation to the State. 
The interpretation of the kirk is not recommendatory to the State  For last year they did it with a Penalty upon the Parliament, their whole Army, and the body of the people which obeyed them; if it be a penalty to be given to the devil, and to be put into a State of eternal death. Wherefore they there are, (or else none are anywhere) the true judges of right, who make themselves judges of wrong and of punishment.  
To conclude how practicable soever the Covenant was at first, 
The conclusion  or how erroneously soever we may now conceive it to be extinct, or to be a principle fitted to justify a change of Kingly Government, which was actually made first of all by it and their Presbytery in Scotland; yet it being originally but a political or condition all Oath, relating to our former Unions when war w●, and to our cooperation under our respective Magistrates only, not in a way contrary to the fifth Commandment; and that all the Magistracy which we enjoy, and by whom we are now fully possessed, if they have not laid it aside, yet call us not out to act the remaining part of it; and that it interprets not itself: so that each private man is not made by it his own Magistrate; and that there is no penal Article in it obliging us private men to pursue a public war upon the Magistrates, or any other men's bare neglect or misinterpreting it to themselves; who therefore can contrary to all this, peremptorily warrant us now, yea necessitate us to begin, or assist to the desolation of war and bloodshed upon it? especially seeing it is made very dubious at least whither we be now tied to it at all or no: Further more how good so ever it was at first, yea though that other Nation had not given it it's mortal wound, when they attempted to give us ours, both in England and in Ireland, (which was the cause of this effect of change of Government here) yet if when it was in force, it should any other way have received a bad tincture of passion or ambitious policy among ourselves, why might it not by our Magistrates order, have been as well carried out of our Churches as the brazen Serpent was out of the Temple, after it was unhappily perverted to its wrong end? If otherwise, and that it must at all hazards be indirectly made a snare to peaceable consciences even after it is extinct (as hath been proved) I shall desire any pious spirit to judge, whither it doth not in such a case deserve much of Campanellas' censure which he gave upon the Spaniards India Treasury, that it was gotten in blood, sails home in a sea of blood, and never rests till it be all laid out in blood.  
The Reader may be pleased to take notice that though these replies for the most part touch but on simple obedience to a Government supposed unlawful, but commanding lawful things, yet they virtually extend to our acting under such a Government. It is to be presumed that our adversaries not contesting profestly what hath been publicly argued in that point, do conceive the difficulties of acting under involved in those of our submission to such a power. The distinction of Active and Passive obedience, is but a nicety, and if one be not a sin, the other is not. They are in a manner the same thing, derive from the same Principle, and differ but gradually, just as the morning and the noon light do, which derive both from the same planet. For he who takes pains to furnish in a ●axe, and he who took pains to execute the office of a Judge or of a Justice of peace in honest things by virtue of Commissions and Orders from the same supreme (but illegal) Magistracy, do both of them what they do, by virtue of the same original submission which is a passive obedience. If this be otherwise, than (according to these author's opinion) we and all our forefathers have sinned, in obeying those actively or passively, who by unjust usurpation have come betwixt us and them, who derive from the first who were in compact, unless the Lapse of time can justify the viciousness of an action (which is impossible) or that we may lawfully obey those who plenarily possess and protect us, and command us lawful things.  
FINIS.   

ERRATA. p. 2. loss, r. loose. imperciptibly r. imperceptibly. insinuation r. insinuations. p. 2. l. 2. may be not r. may not be, beholding r. beholden. p. 6. heneration, r. generation p. 7. but in one, r & in one p. 9 understand, r. understood. offices r. officers. p. 10. a businesses, r. business, p. 11. pretends r. pretend, thereof r. therefore. p. 13. but it is a contradiction r. is it a contradiction. p. 14. for detained r. attained for dislove, r. dissolve. p. 15. best to take heed r. best take heed p. 16. King r. Kings. p. 17. purpose r. propose. p. 19 found r. swound. p. 22. at last r. at least. p. 31. drive r. derive. p. 33. ply, r. comply, for or, r. nor p. 34. large, r. subjection. p. 39 person r. persons next r. rest. p. 4 r. change r. chance. p. 42. true to religion r. to true religion. p48. dispense him of it, r. dispense with him for it.