A WORD FOR THE COMMON WEAL TENDING Towards the Begetting and Continuing, a right Understanding and good Opinion between the PARLIAMENT and the PEOPLE. AND Towards the laying a firm foundation of constant Peace and good will towards each other. By Isaac Penington, Esquire. O how pleasant and profitable might a new kind of War be (after this bitter old-fashioned one) between Parliament and People, if each would contest by stratagems of love tenderness, sweetness, and righteousness, to conquer the hearts of each other, wherein both their strengths lie, more than in any outward visible force or power, that either can lay hold on. LONDON, Printed by Charles Sumptner Anno Dom. 1650. To the PRESENT PARLIAMENT MIserable must the state of this Creation needs be, while calamities are daily growing on every part of it, and the remedies desired and sought for, to redress them, are so far from true and sound curing, that they also come to be reckoned among the number of calamities. This Nation was very sick; a Parliament much desired to cure it, many hopes and expectations fastened upon their endeavours, but now most men are grown sick both of the Physician and the cure. How fare there is just occasion hereof given concerns you nearly to consider, who are not to mind your own wills or ends, but the desires and welfares of those who have entrusted you: How fare there is unjust offence taken, behoves them throughly to scan who are severe Judges of your actions, lest they themselves prove guilty of that towards you which they charge you with, and obstruct you in the prosecution of that, which if once effected, might be both for their own and others good. It is no delight to me to open my mouth against any much less against those who should deserve, and have honour. I could please myself rather in apologizing for; then in accusing, though generally I find the state of man to be such, that much may be said against him little for him. But I may not use many words; There are only two considerations I would at present propose to your view, the one whereof is of somewhat a large nature the other refers to your late erected Government. That which refers to your Government is this. Ye have made a change in the form of Government, putting a new image and superscription upon it, which is like to be of great concernment one way or other, but which way it will be, is yet somewhat doubtful; and it may not be unworthy of you, to bethink yourselves, what security ye can give the people (who cannot but desire it) that this new mould of Government shall not be found as burdensome and oppressive to them as the foregoeing was complained to be. If ye can demonstrate that it is more capable of bounds, and that ye also are more careful to provide due bounds for it, this may yield some satisfaction to that reason which makes the enquiry: But if ye lay the stress upon the goodness of the Persons ye employ, this may neither prove so satisfactory at present, nor so safe for the future, as some perhaps expect it should and will. The other relates to afear which hath lain long upon my spirit concerning some things which to my observation seemed likely to eat out the benefit of this present Parliament, and to swallow up its credit with the people. The things I have been jealous of in this respect are chief these three. Multitude of affairs, Prolixity in your motions, and want of an orderly Government of your own body, which may occasion both the former: want of a right rule to square and order yourselves in your proceed may easily draw many things upon you which might be better managed by other hands, and may likewise retard your dispatch in what ye set about. Ye have fallen into that calamity which jethro forewarned Moses of, namely of tiring out both yourselves and the People: ye complain of your work, and they still complain of their burdens: your work still grows upon you and their burdens still lie upon them: the cost, the attendance the seeking, the waiting for relief will eat out the sweetness of it, if it should come at last. How can the People be pleased, while things are thus? How can ye be pleased with yourselves while ye act thus? How can it but pierce your Ears and hearts to hear Persons groan and complain under those afflictions, which your consciences cannot but tell you, ye ought to ease them of? Give me leave to speak plainly, I cannot but think that if ye had been in a right way, your work had been done long before now; but in the way ye have been in, and (as fare as I can see) yet are in, there appears no likelihood of a desired end. How long will it be ere ye can come to particular businesses? how long must ye needs be in dispatching them? And how fast will both they, and more public business grow upon you? I leave these things to your consideration, longing to see the time that the people may have just cause to be satisfied with your transactions, and that they may be satisfied with that cause. This is the present (though faint) desire of him who would rejoice to serve you or his Country in such a way, as he might be free from any snare or temptation to serve himself. ISAAC PENNINGTON. To the People of this rent and tattered NATION. Dear Countrymen, IF my well-wishes towards you might take effect, ye should soon be happy: if I might but have my will, there should neither will nor power be left any where to hurt you. I delight not to see cause of complaining, or to hear complaints, whether justly or unjustly uttered: joy, peace, rest, content within in every spirit, and good will towards all abroad, would make the prospect of affairs somewhat more pleasant to me, then as yet it is. We are now entangled in misery: after all our running from it we are become involved in it. We can neither endure our sickness nor our cure. We are so divided into parties, that the whole is only liable to ruin, but cannot be saved. one sort cannot be pleased unless an other be crushed. Our desires hopes, endeavours ends, are various and contrary, and so are our welfares; so that which way so ever you turn the scale a considerable part sinks, groans, and complains of oppression & hardship which it suffers by the ease and exaltation of other parts [What is there no common good wherein I and others may meet? can I not be happy unless I sit on a throne and others lie as slaves underneath me? must my reason be every one's rule, or I become their enemy? surely methinks both that variety and contrariety that is amongst us, might be better ordered: true wisdom could so dispose of it, as it should no longer thus harshly jar, but make up a sweet harmony. But this is the great unrighteousness in man, he thinks himself can never be dealt gently enough with but he would have force used towards others; he may be led by reason, but others that descent from his reason, are obstinate, and necessity requires the use of compulsion towards such: and oh how just is it, that every man, in his turn and season, should meet with that force, with that oppression, which he in his desire reason, and judgement, hath measured out to others? Thou complainest of unrighteousness abroad, but how little dost thou think of that root of unrighteousness that is in thyself which if it had the same dunging & watering in thee, as it hath in others would soon be as fertile if not more, yea doth already bear too much fruit in thee? Tell me truly, Art not thou unrighteous in judging others for unrighteousness? art not thou unwilling to give them their due allowances, to hear what might be spoken in their just defence? dost thou not deal thus with the present powers? wouldst thou be content to be dealt so with, if thou wert in their stead? Art not thou too forward to accuse, to prosecute, to condemn, but to backward to entertain what may be spoken by way of justification or excuse? Thou perhaps expectest to see the judgement of God overtake them for their unrighteousness, and dost thou think to escape judgement thyself, who judgest them so unrighteously? How canst thou expect God should make them just towards thee in their actings when thou art so unjust towards them in thy interpretation of their actings? Oh how vain is man become, sowing the seeds of misery to himself and others, and yet complaining if he miss of happiness: every man desires happiness, and thinks the way he walks in leads to it, and wonders if he meet not with it so soon as his expectations persuade him he shall, & is ready to blame others for the protraction or diversion of that good he expected: but little does man think when he reaps misery, that it was wrapped up and lay hid in that seed which he himself did sow! what will be the issue of these things? Me thinks I see man undermining himself, and a power 'bove him, wearying him out of his old sanctuary, under which he hath still been sheltering himself, which is, the honesty the integrity of his own heart, which when it is opened he will find to be some other geuss thing▪ then he took it for; and then he will become more of justifying himself, and condemning others, than hitherto he hath been. A thorough sight of the strength and power of that within in himself, whereof it is but some appearances abroad in others that he is so fierce and vehement against, will quickly silence him, & make him tender towards others for his own sake; and yet when he is brought to his low ebb, he may be nearer that happiness he longs for, than he is ware of: which that we may all meet with, after all these calamities and miseries, which we have felt, and still fear, is the desire of him, who would feign become love to all, and enjoy love in all. ISAAC PENNINGTON. A WORD FOR THE COMMON WEAL TENDING Towards the Begetting and Continuing, a right Understanding and good Opinion between the PARLIAMENT and the PEOPLE. I Suppose it cannot be unknown to any, who have taken the least notice of the late transactions in this shattered Nation, what a sharp and bitter conflict there hath been in the bowels of it, for the recovery of those rights and liberties, which were bleeding to death, and had almost given up the Ghost. And it concerns every one; after all this cost and travail, through so many storms and tempests, to contribute his utmost vigilance and industry, for bringing the ship with its burden into a safe Harbour, that every one may at length be fully possessed of that, which he hath run through so many hazards and difficulties to attain. This lies much upon all, though most upon those who have most power and advantages in their hands to effect it. That which will accomplish all, is a righteous administration of Government; whereby our rights and privileges are both preserved and increased, where need is; and whatsoever any man in reason can desire, this will supply him with. For the effecting of this, these three things are requisite. Good Laws, proper hands duly to execute them, and an exact Rule or way, whereby those hands may be guided unto a due and speedy execution of those Laws. The Laws are the proper bounds of right and liberty, whereby every man is determined what he shall enjoy for his own particular, and what he shall be engaged to act for the public welfare. These must be certain and suited to the state of the Nation, else there is a foundation of injustice, slavery, and misery laid at the bottom of all, which it will be very hard to build righteousness and liberty upon. And these Laws should be clear and easy to be known, else any man may easily be prone to run into dangers unawares, or to miss of that remedy which is by the Law provided for him, in case of injury done him: for want of this, Laws may easily become snares to them whom they should preserve from being ensnared, and advantages to the crafty to perplex and crush the more simple and plainehearted, whom they should be a fence to, against the crafty. Execution is the life of the Law. It is not the Law barely that affrights or encourages, but the execution of it: and our defect and complaint hath been more concerning the Non-execution of the Laws we had, then of the Non-addition of the Laws we wanted. Therefore so soon as we are fitted with laws, it is in the next place to be throughly weighed what hands are most fit and proper for the due and faithful execution of these laws, without which, the framing of the best laws that can be imagined, is to little purpose. Now that which will make the execution most certain, is a clear Rule prescribed to them who are to execute, whereby they may be rightly guided in the administration, and left, as little as may be, to determine or order things according to their own present apprehensions and judgements, lest at that backdoor, arbitrary Government (which is the foundation of Tyranny) on a sudden creep in. This would be carefully looked to at the beginning, while things are in constitution, and may more easily be moulded, then afie: things are settled. For how can it be expected, but man who hath the same corruption in him with others to draw him aside, temptations above others unto it, and advantages of security beyond others (as authority, power and greatness do always afford) I say how can it be expected, but man in this state should step out of the way, unless he have firm and fixed bounds to keep him in his proper compass. Surely the people are bound, in respect to their own safety, and the good of those they employ in so great a matter as government is, not only to provide good laws for themselves to be governed by but also due bounds for them to keep within, who are to act in the execution of the Laws. And it may be worthy the consideration, whether the late King were sufficiently furnished in this respect and if he were left too much to his own liberty, and thereby somewhat occasioned to miscarry, what may free us from this danger for the future. There is no such great matter in the change of Government, as many conceive (who pierce not into the true causes of things, but are ready to fly out upon that which stands most in their eye) every Government having its advantage as well as its disadvantage; but the goodness and safety of every government lies in that well ordering and well bounding of it for speedy and due administration of the Laws. And upon this ground it seemeth to me improper for Parliaments to intermeddle with matters of Government, further than to settle it in fit hands, and within just bounds: because they are entrusted with an arbitrary power, which is absolutely necessary to the work whereunto they are called; they are to redress things at present for which there is as yet no Law, and to provide future remedies for things amiss, which the Law did not foresee. Now this is exceeding useful to the People, and necessary for the People in such cases; but if this power shall be drawn out into acts of Government; so far as it is so drawn out, the people are governed arbitrarily by an Arbitrary power, which power the people did put into their hands, not to make use of to this end, but to enable them to prevent in any whatsoever. The power they are entrusted with, is an extraordinary power for extraordinary ends and purposes, to which safely and swiftly applied, it will produce excellent effects; but if extended too far, and to cases for which it was not appointed nor is proper, it will prove as great a mischief as it was hoped to be a remedy; for the greatest power being misapplyed, having nothing to check it▪ must needs be the greatest oppression. A Parliament may far more easily err in Government, than a King or ordinary Council; for they have, or should have their rule to act by; but a Parliament act, by mere supremacy, by power paramount, and from their determinations, there is no orderly appeal: what they do but Vote is so, or shall be so, they expect the people are bound to stand to; therefore if they keep not within a clear circumference, within the bounds of clear reason and justice, they do unadvoidably make the people slaves. Remedies of this nature should be very warily used, and very carefully applied to the disease; for as the advantage is great in the right and skilful application, so the danger is as great in the misapplication. Now since I have thus lighted upon so needful a subject, wherewith my mind hath been long full; both for mine own ease, and for public benefit, I intent to vent myself a little further about it. The safety of the People lies in government, for whose welfare it was erected. The safety of Government consists much in the limits set unto it, and the strict observation of those limits; which if it fall short of, it is defective; and cannot attain its end; if it exceed, it proves burdensome and Tyrannous. Take into consideration what Government you will; if it have not limits, or be not well bounded; those who are under it, must needs smart by it, and be entangled in those miseries which Government is appointed to prevent. Now this is it I have much bewailed in mine own thoughts concerning Parliaments (whether justly or no; let the Reader well consider) that they are not well bounded, that the trust which is reposed in them, is not clearly known, either by the People, or perhaps by themselves: but they are left unto, and take unto themselves so much scope, as it is very easy for them to err, almost impossible for them to act aright. Every man that is to do any work, must throughly know his work, his rule whereby he is to do it, and be careful to eye the conformity of the one with the other; if he know not his work, how can he set about it at all? if he know not his rule, how can he set about it a right? how apt will he be to slip into by-actions at least? and this great mischief accompanies it too; he will be apt to think he does every thing a right, and so to justify himself in the most apparent injustice and oppression, as the wit of man is very subtle to do; for though he have a rule, he can bend the rule and make it suit with his own miscarriages, how much more when he thinks himself left at liberty? It is ill trusting unbounded Power any where; it is hard keeping Power upright, though never so well bounded, but unbounded, it is a very sharp tool, and will quickly eat out all, but it's own Sovereignty. Man is very brutish in this respect, not searching into the root and ground of things; but according to sense, flying out upon that which is most obious. If he find himself oppressed, remove but the hand that laid the burden upon him, he presently thinks he is eased for ever; when alas poor fool, he finds by after experience, that the succeeding finger is heavier than the foregoing loins. And how can this be otherwise? you must still set up a greater power to remove a less, else it will not avail to do it; and the greater it is, the weightier strokes can it give, the weightier burdens can it impose; and the more unlimited it is the sooner is it tempted so to do; and the more unsuspicious others are of it, or it is of itself, the more likely is it to do it. So that there is no trusting any man, or any sort of men; they are all of the same make, they have all the same principle to misled them, the same by-ends and interests (the same at bottom, though they appear not the same) to work upon them, one as well as another: and though man, under the sense of fear and danger, may act warily and somewhat righteously; yet let those obstacles be a little removed, you shall see what command self hath over him; it hath the chief command in his heart, and will quickly appear at his finger's ends: He that knows not this by himself, knows little of himself; and he that knows this by himself, and is not willing to be chained up (as a man would chain up a Lion, or a Wolf from doing harm) nourisheth in himself a desire tp be a Tyrant: And people by calling persons to any office, putting them in any trust, investing them with any power in a dark confused way, without clear and distinct limitations, do sow the seed-plors of Tyranny, which by this means they too carelessly sow, and may too soon reap. And if the People of this Nation, have been too negligent of their own security in this respect; let such as are able, and truly love them, not take advantage hereof, but help them out of the mire, by putting them into a way whereby they may do it now, or by doing it to their hand so clearly, so justly, as they may not choose but own it. Yet further. There is great need of some fixed bounds and limits, to be a square or standard to measure the actions of the Parliament by, whereunto the People might have recourse in matters of controversy, between them and the Parliament, or in case of jealousy that they were nor dealt faithfully with. It is a great trust the people have committed to the Parliament, upon the faithful discharge whereof their welfare doth much depend, by whose care they may be set into and preserved in a free and flourishing condition, by whose negligence or devotion, they may easily be impoverished and enslaved. Now in equity, the people are not only allowed, but it behoveth them in point of wisdom, and by that duty of selfe-preservation, which nature teacheth all, to look after the managing of this their trust, to expect an account of it from those who are entrusted by them, to have full satisfaction that it is managed with the best care, speed, and fidelity to their advantage. But how shall the People know this? how shall the People be thus satisfied? is it not fit they should be? If any controversy arise about it, that the people think or say they are not well dealt with, their trust is abused; Power not made use of to preserve them and their liberties, but to enslave them; that the Privileges of Parliament swallow up their Rights and Liberties, which they were ordained to defend. How shall this be decided? how shall it be truly and clearly known whether these things be so, or whether they be unjust reproaches, unless there were some standing Privileges of reason or rules of Law extant, whereto any person doubting might address himself for satisfaction, and whereto their actions should so clearly answer; that it should not need any great depth of reason to discern the justness, plainness, and integrity of them? And it might not be much out of the way to search and inquire, whether this hath not been the bottom root of all our disturbances, the want of some clear and settled Principles for the Parliament to proceed by, or at least the not divulging and making common these Principles? The Parliament were at first looked upon with a loving aspect generally by the people: within a while the King's party falls of, conceiving his trust and interest entrenched upon by them, and still calling for the discovery of those privileges and fundamental Laws; which were pleaded in the behalf of the Parliament. Afterward the Parliament loses more and more, and grows too suddenly to a very low ebb in the eyes of the people: and though occurrences help to raise it again, yet not to its former loveliness; nor so, but that it sinks afterwards again, and its very friends are often divided amongst themselves. How can it be otherwise? how can men but fall out, when occasions of difference are continually arising, and every man is left to his own (perhaps misbyassed) reason and judgement to determine, and has no clear Rule before him, to guide his eye and thoughts by? This made the case between the late King and them, somewhat more difficult, than some have thought. He had a trust committed to him, so had they also: but the bounds of either were not fully cleared, and so they clashed (as powers are very apt to do) and in their clashing, their charge against one another was one and the same. They charged him with violating the Laws, with extending his prerogatives to the hurt of the people, with ruling according to will, etc. He likewise charged them with overturning the Laws, with assuming privileges prejudicial both to him and the People, with entering into an Arbitrary government. So these two great Powers fall out, having no standard to determine these things by, whereby it might appear which were truly guilty, but each justify themselves and condemn the other, according to the ordinary course of man, who is very sensible of the injuries he receives but very insensible of those he does: Nor had the people any standard neither, and so they fell in with either, as their minds lead them, to the ruining & destroying of one another. Now the same case may happen between the people & the Parliament, as hath done between the Parliament and the late King. The people may vote it in their thoughts and minds, that the Parliament do not discharge their trust, that they meddle with that which the people hath not entrusted them with, neglect the doing of that which the people have entrusted them to do, that they elevate their privileges, not in circumstances, but in substantial things, to the prejudice of the people. The Parliament on the contrary, may contend, that they have been faithful, have run great hazards, through their love and faithfulness to the people, have denied themselves more than ever any Parliament hath done, that the people own them a better requital, and aught to allow them power and privileges answerable to the work they employ them about, which in equity would arise far higher than any they make use of. How may this be fairly endod? what shall be done in this case? is there no way of determining this, but by strength and power? shall the people make use of their power (taking their accusation for granted) and rush upon the, Parliament to seek its destruction? or shall the Parliament (being clear in their own eyes, and looked upon with an evil eye by the people) make use of an Army to stop the people's mouths, that they may not dare to mutter any thing against them? were it not better, that some clear Principles of Reason, whereby Parliaments were first founded, might be produced and brought to light, both to square their actions by, and to square men's judgements in the consideration of their actions. So that this might be useful, both in respect of the Parliament and people; for want whereof, the Parliament may have been drawn to do many things, which otherwise they would not have done, if they had clearly seen, they had not been entrusted with them: and the people may have been ensnared to entertain and retain hard thoughts of the Parliament about actions which were regular by undertaken and faithfully managed for the peace and safety of the people. Upon these and such like considerations, I cannot but wish that some such thing might be speedily and effectually done, with equal respect both to the people on the one hand, whose safety and prosperity is mainly to be minded and to the Parliamen-on the other hand, who are so far to be honoured and furnished with power and privileges, as they may best effect and not deviate from the good and prosperity of the people. In order whereunto I am constrained to propound and desire these three ensuing particulars. 1. That a true measure of the Parliaments trust from clear Principles of Reason or Law, or both, may be published to open view; whereby every Parliament-man may see what he is to do, what not; and whereby any of the people may see what they are to expect, what not: and these not to be wrested in favour to any party, but according to the state and nature of the thing itself. This might be a foundation of peace and security between them and the People, whereas now they lie under a double blame, both of not having done that they were entrusted to perform and of having set about that they were not entrusted with: the foundation of this controversy between them and the people is deeply laid, however it is suppressed at present from breaking forth. 2 That in the mean time till this can be done, there may be free liberty given to any sort of men (whose spirits are sensible of fundamental dangers, are ready to improve their utmost abilities for public good) to discover any substantial matters amiss in the present proceed, and that a select Committee may be appointed at certain times to hear and consider thereof, in such a way as the persons who shall offer their service herein, may not be tired out with seeking up and down after them, which is a thing much complained of. And I cannot say less of it then that it is a very unkind and injurious dealing with the people, which I should be glad to see regularly amended, for I look upon that kind of amending only as lasting. And if the Parliament would please to think of rectifying things disorderly among themselves, by a righteous rule prescribed unto themselves (which is the way of rectifying things amiss in the great body of the Commonweal, and why should it not be also in the less) they might perhaps act fare more speedily and safely, then otherwise it is possible for them to do. 3. Thas there may be some way thought of, how the work of Parliaments may be dispatched with more speed, and thigns left in an ordinary way of government, that the people may not any longer be frighted with the long continuance of an extraordinary power. Surely Nature doth not only prescribe ends, and suit means to them, but doth wisely order direct, and guide the means unto the end, which if there be a neglect in, the dictate of nature is not understood, or not harkened unto. Nature will not appoint a Parliament to be a remedy against greevances, oppressions, etc. & prescribe them to act in such a way, as the work must necessarily grow faster upon them, than it can be dispatched by them. This is all I intent to express at present, only I should entreat those, who now sit at stern, to be wondrous watchful over themselves, and wary about the managing of affairs, for there is a very severe eye upon them. It is not for nothing that so great ones have been thrown down before them, and they exalted so high, the step is not so vast between the people and them, as was between them and their Predecessors. All the power they have is from the people, and for the people: if they have blamed others for unfaithfulness (and have seen as they say the judgement of God follow it) let them take heed of being unfaithful themselves, if they assume more power or privilege than is committed to them, and allowed them, if they do any other work then what they are entrusted with, they cannot excuse themselves of unfaithfulness: if they throw down one government because of arbitrariness (for that was the original quarrel) and settle another in an arbitrary way, this is not only unfaithfulness, but injustce. Oh when shall this poor oppressed enthralled people be made free! When shall the true foundations of freedom and righteousness be laid! Oh consider what opportunities▪ and advantages ye vow have above any that ever went before you. Do your work throughly, go to the bottom: let not the interest of any sort of men divert you from minding of the good and welfare of the people, whom ye are singly to eye, and not particular persons or interests. If I could speak as I would, I should speak more, not only for the people's sake, but also for yours, who stand on so tickle a point, either to be instruments of woe or welfare, and are very likely to meet with either large blessings, or a swift and sharp visitation. Reader, Notwithstanding the care of the Author, yet the carelessness of the Printer hath committed some Erratta's which thou art desired to correct thyself and candidly to interpret. FINIS.