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Allison \n\nEmile Benoit \nKenneth E. Boulding \nJohn H. Cumberland \nRobert T. Crow \nDarwin W. Daicoff \nB. Curtis Eaton \nAmitai Etzioni \nLawrence R. Klein \nKei Mori \nBernard Udis \nMurray L. Weidenbaum \n\n\nPrepared for the \n\nUNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAuthors: \n\n\nGraham T. Allison, Associate Professor of Politics, \n\nKennedy School of Government, Harvard University \n\nEmile Benoit, Professor of International Business, \nColumbia University \n\nKenneth E. Boulding, Professor of Economics, \n\nUniversity of Colorado \n\nJohn H. Cumberland, Professor of Economics, \n\nUniversity of Maryland \n\nRobert T. Crow, Associate Professor of Economics, \n\nState University of New York, Buffalo \n\nDarwin W. Daicoff, Professor of Economics \nUniversity of Kansas \n\nB. Curtis Eaton, Assistant Professor of Economics, \nUniversity of British Columbia \n\nAmitai Etzioni, Professor and Chairman of Department \nof Sociology, Columbia University \n\nLawrence R. Klein, Benjamin Franklin Professor of \nEconomics, University of Pennsylvania \n\nKei Mori, Professor of Economics, Keio University \n(Tokyo) \n\nBernard Udis, Professor of Economics, University of \nColorado \n\nMurray L. Weidenbaum, Professor of Economics, Washington \nUniversity, St. Louis (on leave), Assistant \n\nSecretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy \n\nAdvisory Board : \n\nJulius Margolis, Director, Fels Institute of Local \n\nand State Government, University of Pennsylvania \n\nRichard R. Nelson, Professor of Economics, Yale \nUniversity \n\nJoseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, \nBrookings Institution \n\nAdam Yarmolinsky, Professor of Law, Harvard University \n\n\n111 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nSTATEMENT OF ATTRIBUTION AND DISCLAIMER \n\n\nThis report was prepared under a contract with the \nUnited States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. \nThe judgments expressed in this report are those \nof the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the \nviews of the United States Arms Control and Dis\xc2\xac \narmament Agency or any other department or agency \nof the United States Government. \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n\nPage \n\nI. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY - Bernard Udis 1 \n\nIntroduction 1 \n\nFuture Military Budgets and Their \nEconomic Consequences 5 \n\nReview of Findings 13 \n\nPolicy Alternatives and Their Implications 33 \n\nII. THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF THE MILITARY EFFORT - \n\nBernard Udis and Murray L. Weidenbaum 43 \n\nOverall Military Spending 43 \n\nGeographical Distribution 44 \n\nIndustrial Distribution 45 \n\nCharacteristics of Defense Manpower 47 \n\nResearch and Development and Military \nSpending 49 \n\nMilitary Programs and Social and \nTechnological Innovation 51 \n\nA Comparison of the Vietnam and Korean \nMobilizations 54 \n\nSome Possible Long-Run Consequences of \nMilitary Spending 57 \n\nTables 60 \n\nIII. THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON AGGREGATE \n\nECONOMIC ACTIVITY - AN ECONOMETRIC \n\nANALYSIS - Lawrence R. Klein and Kei Mori 93 \n\nThe Meaning and Uses of an Econometric \nModel 94 \n\nThe Econometrics of Disarmament-Control \nSolution 98 \n\nThe Econometrics of Disarmament-Post \nVietnam Solutions 102 \n\nSome Caveats and Conclusions 118 \n\nIV. DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPACT OF REDUCED \n\nMILITARY EXPENDITURES ON INDUSTRIES, \n\nREGIONS AND COMMUNITIES - John H. \n\nCumberland 121 \n\nIdentification, Measurement and \nProjection of Regional Economic Impacts 121 \n\n\nv. \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) \n\n\nPage \n\n\nThe Nature of Regional Impacts 121 \n\nSelected Problems in the Identifica\xc2\xac \ntion, Measurement and Projection of \nRegional Economic Impacts 128 \n\nRecent Contributions to Impact \nAnalysis 120 \n\nDimensions of the Impacts: Some \nEmpirical Projections 142 \n\nEvaluation of the Regional Projections 205 \nImproving Future Regional Economic \nProjections 207 \n\nExisting Programs and Recommendations for \nAlleviating Regional Economic Impacts from \nReductions in Defense Expenditures 210 \n\nPolicy Considerations in the Allocation of \nResources Released from Military Use 215 \n\nAppendix A 220 \n\nAppendix B 231 \n\n\nMILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THE ECONOMIC GROWTH \n\n\nOF THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR - Robert T. Crow 282 \n\nIntroduction 282 \n\nA Note of Caution 284 \n\nMilitary Spending Alternatives 285 \n\nThe Northern Region 287 \n\nThe Central Region 292 \n\nThe Southern Region 298 \n\nA Summary of the Results 303 \n\n\nTHE COMMUNITY IMPACT OF MILITARY \nINSTALLATIONS - Darwin W. Daicoff \nIntroduction \nGeneral Discussion \nExtant Installations \nCurtailed Installations \nConclusion \n\nPolicy Recommendations \n\n\n304 \n\n304 \n\n306 \n\n307 \n310 \n\n322 \n\n323 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) \n\nPage \n\n\nVII. THE ADJUSTMENT OF DOD CIVILIAN AND 325 \n\nMILITARY PERSONNEL - Darwin W. Daicoff \nIntroduction 325 \n\nCivilian 327 \n\nMilitary 331 \n\nThe Pentagon\'s Effort 335 \n\nConclusion 336 \n\nAppendix 337 \n\nPolicy Recommendations 341 \n\nVIIL THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE DEFENSE MASS-LAYOFF - \n\nB. Curtis Eaton 342 \n\nContract Termination or Cancellation 342 \n\nSeverity of the Transition 345 \n\nThe Identification of Vulnerable \nIndividuals and Groups 350 \n\nAdjustment Processes 360 \n\nRemedial Measures 366 \n\nResearch Needs 378 \n\nPolicy Conclusions 379 \n\nIX. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IMPACT OF A VIETNAM \n\nDISENGAGEMENT - Emile Benoit 381 \n\nPreliminary Reservations 381 \n\nThe Nature of the Balance of Payments \nImpacts of the War 383 \n\nThe Peak Year of Vietnam Costs 384 \n\nThe Rise in U.S. Overseas Defense \nExpenditures and Related Aid 384 \n\nStructural Impacts of Higher Defense \nProcurement 391 \n\nThe Import Bulge from Excess Demand 393 \n\nFeedback Effects 394 \n\nThe Balance of Payments Impact of a \nVietnam Withdrawal 396 \n\n\nw w \n\nvil \n\n\n/ \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) \n\nPage \n\nX. THE IMPACT OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY ON THE \n\nSTRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY - \n\nKenneth E. Boulding 399 \n\nXI. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESOURCE TRANSFERS - \n\nDarwin W. Daicoff 434 \n\nIntroduction 434 \n\nThe Issue 433 \n\nThe Alternatives 438 \n\nFiscal Policy Lags 444 \n\nFederal Grants and State Spending 447 \n\nConclusion 450 \n\nXII. INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO MILITARY \n\nEXPENDITURES - Murray L. Weidenbaum 451 \n\nIntroduction 451 \n\nResponses to Prior Cutbacks 456 \n\nContingency Planning in the Defense \nIndustry 458 \n\nNon-Military Diversification 458 \n\nAlternative Methods of Diversification 463 \n\nEvaluating the Obstacles to Diversifi\xc2\xac \ncation 468 \n\nAnother Approach: Public Sector Markets 474 \nDefense Companies and Public Sector \nMarkets 476 \n\nGovernment Assistance Alternatives 487 \n\nXIII. ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS \n\nAFFECTING SHIFTS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES - \n\nGraham T. Allison 492 \n\nIntroduction 492 \n\nAn Organizational Process Framework 500 \n\nPotential Non-Military Uses of the \nMilitary 522 \n\nStrategies for Minimizing \nOrganizational Impediments 538 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 4 \n\nviii. \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ni \n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) \n\n\nPage \n\n\nXIV. SOCIETAL TURNABILITY: A THEORETICAL \n\n\nTREATMENT - Amitai Etzioni 547 \n\nIntroduction 547 \n\nThe Role of Consensus-Building 549 \n\nControl 560 \n\nThe Turn-Around Options 568 \n\n\nix. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nOVERVIEW AND SUMMARY \n\n\nBernard UdjLs \n\n\nI.1 INTRODUCTION \n\nThe purpose of this study is to review the likely impact of reduced \nmilitary expenditures on the economy of the United States and to \nidentify some of the more pressing problems which may be encountered in \nthe shift of resources from military to non-military uses. Reduced \nmilitary spending has been assumed to result from some agreement limit\xc2\xac \ning strategic weapons as well as from a cessation of hostilities in\xc2\xac \nvolving U.S. troops in Indo-China. \n\nThis effort was conceived by ACDA as a "comprehensive review of the \ndomestic economic impacts of reduced military spending.\xe2\x80\x9d Past research \nin the subject area was to be carefully reviewed to identify existing \ngaps in data or analysis and to ascertain whether earlier conclusions \nand policies were still valid. The study then inventoried the existing \nstate-of-the-art available to understand the nature of the adjustment \nprocess to reduced military spending. This state-of-the-art capability \nhas been demonstrated by detailed application of advanced econometric \ntechniques (models) in an effort to determine the size and nature of the \nadjustment problems which the U.S. would likely encounter in moving to \nlower levels of defense spending. An increased military budget was also \nincorporated into the study for purposes of comparative analysis and to \nhighlight the different adjustment problems which such a change in the \ndirection of defense spending might entail. \n\nThe apparent correlation between rising defense spending and falling \nunemployment rates during the early years of World War II has suggested \nto some that a cause and effect relation may be inferred. The fact that \nequivalent increases in aggregate demand arising out of enlarged govern\xc2\xac \nment spending on civilian purposes or from increases in private-sector \nspending would have been as effective or even more effective than \nmilitary spending in reducing unemployment seems to have been lost on \nsome portions of the population. At the apocryphal level, one hears \nof lapel buttons appearing in West Coast defense plants bearing the ad\xc2\xac \nmonition "Don\xe2\x80\x99t bite the War that feeds you!" The view is somewhat more \n\n\n1 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nfully documented in public opinion surveys.^ \n\nIf such a belief is widely held, it will constitute an obstacle to \narms reduction which might at some time be deemed desirable on political \nand strategic grounds. One purpose of this study is to help marshall \nthe facts for a full and impartial analysis of the implications of re\xc2\xac \nduced military expenditures. \n\nWhile the general conclusions of the analyses reported here suggest \na relatively easy transition problem, they should be interpreted care\xc2\xac \nfully. Examination of projected employment and unemployment data for \nregions reveals that particular areas whose economies have become \nheavily dependent upon military expenditures will indeed face serious \nproblems. Advance planning and intelligent cooperation by all the \nparties involved will be required to alleviate and possibly to prevent \nsuch conditions from developing. Similarly, the various compensatory \npolicies assumed in the econometric models will also require advance \nplanning for their successful implementation. They are not automatic \nand will require explicit action by policy makers including steps to \nimprove data collection. No useful purpose would be served by glossing \nover such qualifications. Given these qualifications, however, it re\xc2\xac \nmains true that the economy of the United States possesses sufficient \nvitality and flexibility to absorb such reduced military spending as is \nassumed in this study without serious dislocations. \n\nThis report is, of course, not the first to explore this area or to \nreach these conclusions. Similar opinions have been voiced by various \npanels of experts during the past decade.^ Most recently, a cabinet \n\n\nFor example a Gallup survey in May 1964 asked people if they \nthought drastic reductions in military spending would lead to a serious \ndepression. Of the 3522 respondents, 30 percent foresaw a depression, \n48 percent saw no depression and the remaining 22 percent had no\' opin\xc2\xac \nion. Age seems to be a critical variable since the percentage seeing \na depression resulting from reduced military spending increased stead\xc2\xac \nily with the age of the respondent. This suggests an echo effect \nfrom the days of the Great Depression. \n\n2 \n\nSee for example, Economic Impacts of Disarmament: A Report of \nthe Panel on Economic Impacts of Disarmament , U.S. Arms Control and \nDisarmament Agency Publication No. 2 (Washington: Government Printing \nOffice, January, 1962); The Economic and Social Consequences of Dis\xc2\xac \narmament: U.S. Reply to the Inquiry of the Secretary-General of the \nUnited Nations, with Revised Statistical Tables . U.S. Arms Control and \n\n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ncoordinating committee concluded that "the cost of war has been a load \nfor the economy to carry-not a supporting \xe2\x80\x99prop*. Prosperity has not \ndepended on the defense buildup and will not need high military spending \nto support it in peacetime." \n\nThe field of economic adjustment resulting from changes in defense \nspending has experienced cycles of popularity. The decade of the 1960 f s \nsaw the appearance of numerous studies of the consequences of reduced \nmilitary spending. Interestingly, the literature of mobilization grew \nmuch more rapidly than that of demobilization during the prior decade.^ \nThis probably reflected the concern that the Korean conflict might be \nthe first exchange of World War III. The early 1960\'s saw the publica\xc2\xac \ntion of the report on Economic Adjustments to Disarmament sponsored by \nthe Cente^ for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of \nMichigan. A committee established by President Johnson in late 1963 \nto study economic impact problems reported in the summer of 1965, just \nas the Vietnam engagement began its escalation. It concluded, among \nother things, that "neither the shifts from one kind of defense spending \nto another... nor the resumption of the gradual shift away from defense \n\n2 \n\n(Cont.) Disarmament Agency Publication 21 (Washington: Government \nPrinting Office, June, 1964). Also of interest is the parent document; \nsee Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament: Replies of Govern- \nments and Communications of International Organizations, The Report of \nthe Secretary General Transmitting the Study of His Consultative Group , \nVolume II (New York: United Nations, 1962). \n\n3 \n\nCabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End \nof Vietnam Hostilities, "Report to the President," in Economic Report of \nthe President Transmitted to the Congress January, 1969 (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1969), pp. 187-211, especially p. 187. \n\n4 \n\nSee Lester V. Chandler and Donald H. Wallace (eds.), Economic \nMobilization and Stabilization (New York: Henry Holt, 1951); Albert G. \nHart, Defense Without Inflation (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, \n1951); Albert G. Hart and E. Cary Brown, Financing Defense: Federal Tax \nand Expenditure Policies (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1951); \nAlbert G. Hart, Defense and the Dollar: Federal Credit and Monetary \nPolicies (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953); Donald H. Wallace, \nEconomic Controls and Defense (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, \n1953); Tibor Scitovsky, et al . , Mobilizing Resources for War (New York: \nMcGraw-Hill, 1951). \n\nc \n\nEmile Benoit and Kenneth E. Boulding (eds.), Disarmament and the \nEconomy (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\npresents major problems for an economy. Even general and complete dis\xc2\xac \narmament would post no insuperable problems; indeed, it would mainly \nafford opportunities for a better life for our citizens."^ Later that \nsummer a conference in Oslo, Norway was convened to consider economic \naspects of world disarmament and interdependence and the papers pre\xc2\xac \nsented have since been published.7 \n\nThe present study differs somewhat from those referred to above \nin its concern with distinguishing the known from the unknown in the \nadjustment process in order to identify profitable areas for further \ninvestigation. The inclusion of material on the long term structural \nshifts in the American economy which are possibly traceable to the \nsecular rise in military spending, and the explicit treatment of the \norganizational and administrative issues influencing the governments \nability to smoothly shift resources also differentiate it from most \nother treatments of the impact of changes in military spending. \n\nNo study of this subject would be complete without an expression \nof gratitude to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency \nfor its active role in the sponsorship of research in this area. Our \nknowledge of the economic impact of military spending and the reduction \nin such spending has grown impressively .during recent years as a \nresult of the research program of the Agency. Whether the level of \nconcern be with the individual, the coramonity, the area, the industry, \nor the nati.on, the researcher finds the fundamental work frequently \ndone under the sponsorship of ACDA. In this, as in all other such \nworks, however, it should be emphasized that the views expressed are \nthose of the authors and not those of the Agency. \n\n\n\nReport of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense an d \nDisarmament (Washington: Government Printing Off-frp 1965), p. 1. \n\nEmile Benoit (ed.), Disarmament and World Economic Interdependpnrp \n(New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). ---- c -\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1.2 FUTURE MILITARY BUDGETS AND THEIR ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES \n1.2.1 Military Spending in the Next Few Years \n\nOne of the early tasks of the study group was to agree upon the \nsize of possible post-Vietnam defense budgets. Questions of the over\xc2\xac \nall size of a hypothetical defense budget, its composition, and the \nlength of the time period over which the adjustment was seen as \noccurring were all important components. In the absence of official \ngovernment estimates it was necessary to arrive at illustrative \n\nmilitary budgets which would be plausible in terms of their overall \nmagnitudes and in the relationship between their components. \n\nThere was no shortage of alternative military budgets for the post- \nVietnam period from which to choose. A systematic review of these hypo\xc2\xac \nthetical defense budgets was difficult however, since underlying assump\xc2\xac \ntions about military and political developments and expected rates of \nprice inflation were not always made explicit. Another frequently \nvoiced but unquantifiable variable was the attitude of the new President \ntoward expected recommendations for additional defense spending from his \nmilitary advisers. Finally, most of the scenarios were structured in \nterms of developments expected at certain specified time periods after \na cease fire in Vietnam with none foreseeing the particular form of \nwithdrawal and replacement now known as "Vietnamization.\xe2\x80\x9d Many of these \nprojections fell in a range of $61 to $78 billion for FY 1972. \n\nTypically, these forecasts dealt almost exclusively with the \nexpected reduced costs of the Vietnam operation. There was an equally \nbewildering array of positions on the strategic forces. The Preparedness \nInvestigating Sub-committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee spoke \nof the need for "prompt decisions... for the deployment of additonal and \nmore modern weapon systems and improvements to existing weapon \n\n\nA representative group of these projections would include the \nfollowing: Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress \n\nFebruary, 1968 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 90; \n"Report to the President from the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on \nEconomic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities," Economic Report \nof the President Transmitted to the Congress, January, 1969 (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1969), pp. 181-211, especially p. 199; \nGilbert Burck, "How Big a \'Peace Dividend 1 ?", Fortune , Vol. LXXVII, No. \n\n6 (June 1, 1968), pp. 86-89, 156-157, especially p. 87; Committee for \nEconomic Development, The National Economy and the Vietnam War (New \nYork: The Committee, April, 1968), p. 44; Chamber of Commerce of the \nUnited States, After Vietnam (Washington: The Chamber, March, 1968), \np. 1; George L. Perry, "The Post-Vietnam Budget Outlook," National City \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nsystems...\xe2\x80\x9d The Committee recommended development of a new long range \nstrategic bomber and a speed up in research and development work on an \nadvanced ICBM. \n\n\nA group of market analysts and planners assembled in 1968 under \nthe auspices of the Electronics Industries Association predicted high \nlevels of American military spending. They assumed that \'\'during the \n1970\'s the nuclear stalemate, Chinese nuclear potential, and the Commu\xc2\xac \nnists 1 exploitation of \'wars of national liberation\' will require the \nU.S. to maintain an adequate and effective tactical capability while, \nupdating the strategic force."10 By way of contrast, Carl Kaysen writ\xc2\xac \ning at the same time advocated a sharply reduced defense budget. \nAssuming a strategic arms freeze he presented a total military budget \nof $50 billion (in 1969 prices) for the unspecified post-Vietnam year \nof 197X based upon a manpower cutback to a total force of about 2.2 \nto 2.4 million men, the level prevailing in the last quarter of \ncalendar year 1950.^ This position was sharply challenged by a RAND \nCorporation analyst who argued that the analysis failed to incorporate \n"modernization/jijflation" and in fact, required an "implicit free: \nupon all arms.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n\nze \n\n\n8 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n(cont.) Bank of Minneapolis, October 14, 1968, p. 5; Otto \n\nEckstein, "Choices Ahead," Remarks delivered to the 10th Annual Fore\xc2\xac \ncasting Conference of the American Statistical Association, New York \nChapter, April 26, 1968, p. 4; Otto Eckstein, "The Outlook for the \nFederal Budget Through 1975," Remarks presented at the 11th Annual \nMeeting of the National Association of Business Economists, Chicago, \nIllinois, September 25, 1969, p. 9; and Juan Cameron, "The Case for \nCutting Defense Spending," Fortune , Vol. LXXX, No. 2 (August 1, 1969), \npp. 69-73, 160-162; especially p. 70. \n\n9 \n\n\nU.S. Congress, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Committee on \nArmed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Investigation \nof the Preparedness Program: Status of U.S. Strategic Power (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1968), pp. 21 and 23. \n\nElectronics Industries Association, The Post-Vietnam Defense and \nSpace Market Environment (Washington: The Association, 1968), Vol. 1, \np. 4. \n\n11 Carl Kaysen, "Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms \nControl," in Kermit Gordon (ed.), Agenda For The Nation (Washington: \n\nThe Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 549-584, especially pp. 581-582. \n\n12 \n\nMalcolm W. Hoag, A New Administration Faces National Security \nIssues: Constraints and Budgetary Options (Santa Monica: The RAND \nCorporation, November, 1968, P-3959), pp. 21-26, especially p. 25. \n\n\n6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe problem of attempting to project the impact on the military \nbudget resulting from an agreement with the Soviet Union limiting \nstrategic weapons is highly complex. Despite popular views to the con\xc2\xac \ntrary, strategic arms limitations might result in a higher rather than \na lower level of military expenditures for at least two reasons. First, \nwhile the major goal would be to curb the nuclear arms race this goal \nwould have to be consistent with the objectives of preventing accidents, \nerrors of interpretation, and in general achieving a strategic weapons \nmix which would be "stabilizing." These goals could conceivably require \nincreased expenditures. Second, some analysts point out that a serious \nrestriction on strategic weapons could lead to military requests for \ncompensatory increases in non-strategic foj^es to prevent a net diminu\xc2\xac \ntion in our military strength and posture. \n\nEqually plausible and no less complex is the counter argument that \na necessary pre-condition for a serious agreement on the limitation of \nstrategic arms would be a climate of mutual trust and friendship of such \nmagnitude as to bring about not only an agreement on strategic arms, but \non the entire level of military forces. If one accepts this reasoning \nthe total reduction in military spending which could result from such an \nagreement might be some multiple of the initial reduction in spending \non strategic weapons rather than simply some fraction of the amount cur\xc2\xac \nrently being spent on our strategic forces.^ \n\nShortly after taking office President Nixon ordered a detailed \nstudy of American global military and foreign policy. His conclusions \non "the state of the world" were made public in a February 1970 report \nin which he announced a shift in contingency planning from 2h simul\xc2\xac \ntaneous military operations to lh. Under circumstances of redefined \n\n13 \n\nFor an incisive discussion of thd*se problems, see Thomas C. \nSchelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: \nTwentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 120-125; also Thomas C. Schelling, \n"Arms Control Will Not Cut Defense Costs," Harvard Business Review , Vol. \n39, No. 2 (March-April, 1961), pp. 6-14, 156-158. The importance of \nstabilized deterrence in disarmament situations is discussed in Thomas \nC. Schelling, "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament," Foreign \nAffairs , Vol. 40, No. 3 (April, 1962), pp. 393-406. \n\nl4 The cost assigned to the core strategic forces program in the \nmilitary budget was at $8.6 billion in FY 1969 and in the two Nixon Ad\xc2\xac \nministration successor budgets has fallen to $7.5 and $8.0 billion, \nrespectively. \n\n^Richard Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970\xe2\x80\x99s: A \nNew Strategy for Peace," A Report by the President to the Congress, \nFebruary 18, 1970, pp. 97-98, processed. \n\n\n7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nnational strategic interests and commitments appreciable changes in the \nmilitary force structure are conceivable. It thus became necessary to \nselect a range of alternative which would reflect as realistically as* \npossible the alternative levels of military budgets which might accom\xc2\xac \npany the changed global posture of the United States. \n\nProfessor William W. Kaufmann was conducting precisely such a study \nat the Brookings Institution and permitted us to utilize his military \nbudget estimates for FY 1972. Kaufmann*s alternative post-Vietnam \ndefense budgets are reporduced in Table 1 and their underlying assump\xc2\xac \ntions appear in Exhibit 1.^ Professors Klein and Cumberland were \nassigned the task of analyzing these figures on military spending with \ntheir respective models to determine their likely economic impact. \n\nTheir results are summarized below. \n\n\nCharles L. Sc\'hultze has recently published a careful study of the \nforce structures and military budgets which might be envisioned in the \nperiod to FY 1975. His essay clearly illustrates the myriad of elements \nand assumptions which enter into military budget projection and includes \na lucid example of the budgetary consequences of alternative force \nstructures. See his Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget \n(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 17-54, especially \np. 28, Table 2-5. \n\n^The Kaufmann defense budgets are presented in terms of estimated \n1972 dollars. The defense budget is estimated to have experienced a \n20 percent inflation between fiscal years 1965 and 1972, reflecting \ngeneral inflation in the economy and appreciable pay increases awarded \nto Federal military and civilian personnel as part of the program to \nalign Federal employee compensation more closely to the levels of the \nprivate sector. Such calculations are inherently imprecise given the \nrapidity with which military programs and procurements change. \n\n\n8 \n\n\n\n\n\nSample Post-Vietnam Defense Budgets \n(1972 Prices - billions of dollars) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nCO \n\nw \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nCO \n\no \n\n00 \n\nCJ /-V \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC*S LO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\no ^ \n\nPn \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nW \n\nCO \n\n$5 \n\n\nCJ \n\nO \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\nw \n\nH \n\n\nO \n\nC \n\n\nM Q \n\nCJ \n\ny--\\ \n\n.-1 JZ \n\nM \n\nCO \n\nhJ <2 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nv \xe2\x80\x94 \' \n\nW \n\n\n\nM \n\no \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\noo \n\no \n\n\non \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCN \n\n \n\nm \n\nuo \n\nm \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n,_3 \n\nCx3 \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nw \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nVO \n\n\nPh \n\no \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\npj \n\npH \n\npc; \n\nCN \n\nin \n\nON \n\nCN \n\nrH \n\nvD \n\n\n2 \n\no \n\nV-/ \n\nt\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nrH \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nw \n\n\nPh \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\np-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncj \n\nM \n\no \n\nw \n\nH \n\n2 \n\nH \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nw \n\nCJ /\xe2\x80\x94s \nP^ rH \nO ^ \nPH \n\n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCN \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nr^. \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n \n\n\n\nCN \n\n \n\nUO \n\nvO \n\n\nON \n\n\nH \n\n\n0) \n\nXJ \n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\nW \n\n\no \n\n(1) \n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\nto \n\nO \n\n\ne \n\nc \n\n \n\n6 \n\nH \n\nrH \n\n*H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\n4-1 \n\nH -H \n\nu \n\n\nPQ \n\n3 \n\nU \n\n0 \n\nrH \n\nVO \n\ncd \n\nCd \xc2\xabH \n\ncd \n\nO \n\n\ne \n\n \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\xc2\xa3 CD \n\nS \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nPn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n-M \n\n<1) \n\nCO \n\niH \n\n4-j \n\n4-\xc2\xbb CO \n\n4-> \n\nU \n\nO \n\nc \n\n0) \n\nJ-i \n\ncd \n\n\nC \n\nco cd \n\nCO \n\n0) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\nPQ \n\n>4 \n\nM \n\nO PQ \n\nO \n\na \n\nW \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nPH \n\n(X, \n\n\nC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nH \n\nrH \n\n\nCN \n\n\nCO \n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x99 \no e \n\n\nCM \n\n\ncry \n\n\nCNl \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\ncry \n\n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n-CO- \n\n\n00 \n\n0 \n\n O \n\nI o \n\np \n\nCD O \nO *H \nPM 0 \nO \n\nCU C \n\n> O \n\no \n\n\no \n\np \n\n00 \n\nP3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n43 \n\nCO \xe2\x80\xa2 \ncd ON \nP2 r- \n\n^ rH \nI \n\n00 \n\np \nP \ncd \nPM \n\n\nCO \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP \n\nPM \n\n\n0 \n\nO \n\nC \n\nO \n\nO \n\nPd \n\n\ncd \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP \n\ncd \n\n55 \n\n\nCM \n\n\ncn \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nP Pd \n\n\nON \n\nCl \n\nNO \n\ncd \n\nT3 \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\nc p \n\nC \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nP P3 \n\ncd \n\n\nP \n\n\nCU -H \n\n\nCU \n\nCM \n\n\nP o \n\np \n\nCJ \n\na \n\n\nH \xe2\x96\xban \n\ncu \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n3 \n\n\n\n0( \n\nip \n\nco \n\n\n\n\'d \n\n

\n\ncu \n\nCJ \n\n\n\nCO \n\n43 \n\nCU \n\nTJ \n\n\n0 CO \n\nH \n\ng \n\nCJ \n\n\ncd cu \n\n\n3 \n\ncd \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H p \n\nr P \n\n\n3 >N \n\nrH 00 \n\nP \n\nCU \n\nrH \n\nC/3 P \n\nrH CJ \n\nCJ \n\n> \n\nrH \n\n\n*H O \n\n \n\n \n\nrH \n\n\n\nP \n\nB \n\no \n\no \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n \n\n\noo \n\nvo \n\n\no \n\n\nw \n\nH \n\nW \n\nO \n\nQ \n\nG> \n\nPQ \n\n\nPi \n\na \n\no \n\ncj \n\n\nOf \n\na \n\no \n\no \n\nG \n\n\nP \n\na \n\no \n\no \n\n\nH \n\nW \n\nO \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nM \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\nPQ \n\na \n\no \n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\nCM \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nm \n\noo \n\no \n\n\nm \n\nr^. \n\no \n\n\nm \n\nco \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n5^2 \n\nm \n\n\nON \n\n$ \n\nvO \n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94I \n\nm \n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\no \n\n\nco \n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n\na) \n\n\'3 \n\n\n( 1 ) \n\nT) \n\n\nP \n\nO \n\n\np \n\nO \n\n\n3 \n\nP \n\n \n\nQ \n\no \n\nGD \n\n\n14 \n\n\nGNP and Defense Expenditures in billions of 1972 dollars and Unemployment Rates in percent \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUniversity of Maryland Projections of Unemployment Rates \nand GNP Under Five Alternative Defense Budgets, Fiscal Year 1972 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n&^S \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nnO \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nb \n\nr^\xc2\xbb \n\no\\ \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nNO \n\non \n\n\no \n\nu \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nH \n\n\n \n\n\n\nW \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\\o \n\n\nON \n\nCD \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nPQ \n\nB \n\n\nnO \n\nCO \n\n\nQ \n\nnO \n\nON \n\n\n\no \n\n\no \n\n\n\nG \n\n\niH \n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\nH \n\nW \n\nO \n\nO \n\nG> \n\nPQ \n\n\nH \n\nW \n\nO \n\nQ \n\nto \n\nPQ \n\n\nCM \n\n6 \n\no \n\no \n\n\nON \n\n\n \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nNO \n\n\n7% \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nCD \n\n \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nW \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nnO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCL \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\ne \n\nCO \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\nr^- \n\n\nG \n\n\n\xc2\xabH \n\n\nCl \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co\xc2\xac \n\n\n\n6 \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n6-2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nin \n\n\nr^. \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\nCL \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nB \n\nCM \n\nnO \n\nvO \n\nW \n\nB \n\no \n\nON \n\nco \n\no \n\n<* \n\nNO \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\nON \n\n\no \n\n\nO \n\n\nQ \n\nCJ \n\n\no \n\n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\n\nCD \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO\xc2\xac \n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co\xc2\xac \n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nco \n\nG \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nJ-t \n\no \n\n\n\n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\n\nG \n\nu \n\na> \n\n\n\nG \n\nu \n\n(U \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0u> \n\nOh \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n4J \n\n0-4 \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n<9 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncd \n\n\nXJ \n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n05 \n\n\n\nX? \n\nrH \n\n05 \n\n\nG \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\nG \n\ncd \n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\ntO \n\n\nQ) \n\n\xc2\xa35 \n\nO \n\n\n\na) \n\n\xc2\xa35 \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\nCl \n\n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\n(X \n\n\n \n\n\nG \n\n\nP) \n\no \n\nCD \n\n\n\nQ \n\no \n\nGD \n\n\ncd \n\n\n15 \n\n\nGNP and Defense Expenditures in billions of 1972 dollars and Unemployment Rates in percent \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nuniformly decline. This point deserves emphasis as it demonstrates \nthat there is nothing unique about the capacity of military spending to \ngenerate jobs. Tax cuts and monetary ease to encourage private spend\xc2\xac \ning or government expenditures on civilian programs are also equipped \nto do the job. \n\nBoth models show GNP in excess of $1 trillion and unemployment \nrates which, even under the most challenging assumptions (an uncompen\xc2\xac \nsated cut in military expenditures to $42.2 billion) do not rise above \n6.8 percent. This was the average national unemployment rate in 1958, \nand is close to the 1961 level of 6.7 percent. While both of these \nwere years of recession, they are not considered to have been years of \nnational crisis. These findings suggest that the U.S. economy could \nadjust to cuts in defense expenditures far greater than those expected, \neven in the absence of offsetting expenditure increases with unemploy\xc2\xac \nment rates during the transition period which could generally be \nconsidered tolerable. The likely application of monetary, fiscal and \nother compenstory policies could be expected to reduce these unemploy\xc2\xac \nment rates even further. For purposes of perspective. Table 4 presents \nmonthly unemployment rates for the period since 1948. \n\nExtended discussions of characteristics of the models and \nmethodologies used appear in the Klein and Cumberland chapters. How\xc2\xac \never, it should be noted here that the two models are independent and \ndifferent in design from one another. In addition, the Klein results \nwhich appear in Table 2 were generated in the fall of 1970 and hence \nreflect more recent developments than does the Maryland model which was \nrun in the summer of 1970, using somewhat earlier data. Therefore, the \nreader should be cautioned against the risks of a direct comparison of \nthe two sets of results. \n\nThis might also be an appropriate point to note the difference \nbetween prediction (or projection) and forecasting.20 Prediction may \nbe viewed as a "conditional statement of what will happen, assuming \nthe validity of a relevant set of scientific laws and given observa\xc2\xac \ntions which define the initial or exogeneous conditions under which \nthese laws are expected to operate in a given instance. A ceteris \n\n\nThere is a risk of semantic confusion in these terms. Some \nwould distinguish between "prediction" and "projection" and reserve \nthe latter term to indicate the conditional form. Regardless of \nterminology, the crucial difference resides in the presence or absence \nof the conditional statement. \n\n\n16 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUnemployment Rate - All Civilian Workers \n(Seasonally Adjusted) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n0\xc2\xa3 \n\n> \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\n4 \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nM3 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\nn- \n\nUN \n\n3m. \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n \n\nvO \n\nin \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\nm3 \n\nft \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n> \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nft \n\nm3 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nn. \n\njm. \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nm3 \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nU0 \n\nM3 \n\n<3 \n\nUO \n\nvO \n\nin \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\nm3 \n\nm3 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\no \n\njm. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOn \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nn* \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nUO \n\n3m \n\n3m \n\nrH \n\nuo \n\nm3 \n\nuo \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n3m. \n\no \n\nCO \n\n3m \n\nm3 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\nm3 \n\nvO \n\nuo \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nUN \n\nuo \n\nUO \n\nm3 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no. \n\na) \n\noo \n\nft \n\nvO \n\nm3 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nM3 \n\nrH \n\nin \n\nuo \n\nn- \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nn- \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\n<3- \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\n<3- \n\nCO \n\nm3 \n\n3m \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\nVO \n\nm \n\nUO \n\nU0 \n\nm3 \n\nco \n\noc \n\n3 \n\nON \n\nft \n\n00 \n\nn \n\nrH \n\n>3- \n\nim. \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm3 \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\n\nm3 \n\no \n\nm3 \n\nco \n\n \n\nCO \n\nVO \n\nin \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nU0 \n\n<3 \n\n<3 \n\nM3 \n\n3m \n\nuo \n\nUO \n\nvO \n\nUN \n\nuo \n\nUO \n\nm3 \n\nCO \n\nnt \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nuo \n\no \n\no \n\nuo \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nM3 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nuo \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n\nCO \n\nVO \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nU0 \n\n<3 \n\n<3 \n\nM3 \n\n3m \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\n\nUN \n\nUO \n\nUO \n\nM3 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\non \n\nCO \n\noo \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n3m \n\nON \n\n3m \n\nO \n\nON \n\nM3 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\no \n\nvO \n\n3m \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<5 \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nM3 \n\n<3 \n\nCO \n\n\nuo \n\nU0 \n\n3m. \n\nUO \n\nuo \n\nUO \n\nm3 \n\nCO \n\nMar. \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nM3 \n\nCO \n\nVO \n\no- \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n3m \n\n\nvO \n\nm3 \n\nON \n\nvO \n\n\n<3 \n\n3m \n\n00 \n\nM3 \n\nuo \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nin \n\nm3 \n\n<3 \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nU0 \n\nUN \n\nvO \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\nM3 \n\nco \n\nJQ \n\n00 \n\nr-* \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n< \n\non \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nr- \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nQ \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n> \n\n00 \n\n\nm \n\n00 \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n2 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nCSJ \n\nX> \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n\nex \n\nO \n\nX> \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n \n\nI-". \n\nm \n\no \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*-> \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nON \n\n1^. \n\n<1- \n\nn* \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n00 \n\nON \n\no \n\n\nvO \n\nx> \n\nX> \n\nr^. \n\n\non \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n*H \n\nrH \n\n\nT3 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nco \n\noq \n\n\nG \n\ng \n\nG \n\nW \n\nX) \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n& \n\n\nCM \n\n0 \n\nW \n\n\n"G \n\nG \n\nG \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\ncu \n\n\nCJN \n\nvO \n\non \n\n\nG \nG \nG \nG \nX> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb d) \nCO pL| \n\no ^ \n\n\nG 00 \nCO \n\n*H \xe2\x80\xa2 \nG O \nG 52 \nG \n\nCO \xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nm \n\nG pH \n\no \n\nX> \xe2\x80\xa2 \nG \nX) \n\nIG \n\no \n\nG \nG \n0) \n\nG fX \nG \n\nPQ G \nO \n\n* rQ \n\nG G \nO rH \nXI \n\nG CD \nrH X \nG \n4-( \n\nO \n\n\nO \n\n> \n\n\nG \n\no \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nG \nG \nS \n\nG \n\nG _ \n\nG PG \nCU \n\nG >, G \nG \nO \nG \n\n\ncn c \n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n& 2 \n\n\nco \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nTJ \n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\n\nW \n\nU \n\nG> \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n18 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nparibus Mother things being equal] clause is always an implicit part \nof the prediction. n In contrast, forecasts are essentially uncon\xc2\xac \nditional and issue at best only in part from a set of specified laws.^ 2 \nThe models which have been used by Professors Klein and Cumberland are \ncarefully based upon certain assumed interrelationships among many \neconomic variables. They should be interpreted as \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99logically possible \npathways to hypothetical futures.\xe2\x80\x9d 23 \n\nIn any event, it would be a gross distortion to view the con\xc2\xac \nditional predictions contained in the Klein and Cumberland chapters as \nattempts at pinpoint accuracy in predicting, say, a particular unem\xc2\xac \nployment rate at a particular point in time. Rather they are attenpts \nto determine the nature and o;:der of magnitude of the adjustment \nproblems which the nation and various of its regions are likely to \nencounter under certain assumed military budgets of varying size and \ncomposition. \n\n\n1.3.2 Impact on the Balance of Payments \n\nProfessor Benoit concludes that the consequences of peace in \nVietnam for the Balance of Payments will be more important than those \nlikely to follow some form of strategic arms limitation. His estimate \nof the peak Vietnam impact on the U.S. Balance of Payments is approxi\xc2\xac \nmately $5.3 billion. He cautions however that the internal linking of \npayment flows in the Balance of Payments makes it unlikely that other \nmajor flows would in fact have remained unaffected if one main flow \nhad been different from what it actually was. However, $5.3 billion is \nlikely to be a maximum impact. The Balance of Payments implications \nof a Vietnam withdrawal are unlikely to be symmetrical with those of \nthe buildup phase. The reason is that deterioration of the Balance \nof Payments which has been attributed to the war is not necessarily \neliminable by ending the war. This is because defense prices move up \nwith a ratchet-like character, going up far more readily than down; \nand even if U.S. forces are completely withdrawn from Indochina, other \nAmerican commitments in the Pacific area will remain. Also U.S. \nforces are likely to stay in Europe for some time. \n\n\n21 0tis Dudley Duncan, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Social Forecasting: The State of the \nArt.\xe2\x80\x9d The Public Interest , No. 17 (Fall, 1969), pp. 88-118, especially \npp. 107-108. \n\n22 Ibid. , p. 108. \n\n23 Ibid., p. 115. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe timing of such defense cutbacks as occur in Asia will be as \nimportant as their magnitude for Balance of Payments impact. If the \nprocess is sufficiently slow it could be more than offset by some of \nthe rising trends in price levels. Another consideration is the pos\xc2\xac \nsibility that Vietnam cutbacks may be partly offset by rising foreign \naid requirements. Of course, the harmful effects of such a program on \nthe Balance of Payments could be somewhat mitigated by tying the aid to \npurchases in the United States. Finally, of critical importance in \nevaluating the impact of new defense programs on the Balance of Pay\xc2\xac \nments will be the nature of these new programs and how closely they \nresemble those that were experienced during the Vietnam conflict. For \nexample, while domestic defense procurement cuts into our export \npotential to some extent, it is cheaper in terms of the Balance of \nPayments than maintaining U.S. troops abroad. Even if large military \nexpenditures occur primarily at home but contribute to continued \ninflationary pressures, this will worsen our export balance. \n\nThe single most important conclusion is that Balance of Payments \nconstraints on domestic adjustment policy will be greatly weakened by \nthe end of the war. \n\n\n1.3.3 Impact on Regions, States, and Metropolitan Areas \n\n\nThe regional disaggregation follows the procedures of Professor \nCurtis C. Harris, Jr. of the University of Maryland. The details of \nthe methodology appear in Professor Cumberland\'s paper. \n\nFor reasons of both budget constraints and display space limita\xc2\xac \ntions, only three of the five Kaufmann alternative defense budget \nassumptions for 1972 were applied to the regions. The Budget A ($42.2 \nbillion) and Budget D ($70.5 billion) assumptions were dropped for \npurposes of regional analysis. However, the uncompensated and compen\xc2\xac \nsated versions of each of the three remaining budget assumptions were \nincluded in both state and SMSA tables. \n\n\nStates experiencing a seven percent unemployment rate or more \nunder the uncompensated versions of the defense budget numbered three \nin the Budget B ($59.4 billion) assumption, three in the Budget C \n($67.6 billion) assumption and two in Budget E ($93.6 billion). If \nthe cutoff is dropped from seven to five percent unemployment, the \nnumber of states grows to 18, 13 and three respectively. When compen \nsatory programs are added to the model, the numbers with 5% or more \ndecline to 11 for Budget B and 10 for Budget C. The Budget E is so \n\n\n20 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nlarge that compensations really mean anti-inflationary policy, hence \nthe number of states expected to show unemployment in excess of five \npercent rises from three to thirteen when compensation is included. \n\nIn all cases, however, the states which appear most often with rela\xc2\xac \ntively high unemployment rates are Alaska, New Mexico, Nevada, Wyoming \nand Hawaii. \n\nAccording to the projections of the Harris model, only seven of \nthe 219 SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s show levels of unemployment in excess of 10 percent of \nthe labor force. The top five with unemployment usually are Lawton, \nOklahoma; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Salinas-Monterey, California; \nDuluth-Superior, Minnesota-Wisconsin; and San Diego, California. In \nthe absence of compensations under the lowest defense budget, Budget \nB ($59.4 billion), Brockton, Massachusetts and Johnstown, Pennsylvania \nalso register over 10 percent unemployment. By way of balance, however, \nit should be pointed out that there are a number of SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s that will \nquite likely experience labor shortages, even in the presence of re\xc2\xac \nduced military budgets. Among these are Flint, Ann Arbor, Saginaw, and \nLansing, Michigan; Jersey City, New Jersey; Erie, Pennsylvania; and \nNew Haven-Waterbury-Meriden, Connecticut. These estimates suggest \nthat the severity of the impact of defense cutbacks will probably vary \nwidely between the various metropolitan areas of the nation depending \non their industrial mix and other factors. Even within individual \nstates the unemployment rates vary widely between metropolitan areas. \nWhile special assistance may be needed for some areas with especially \nserious unemployment problems, it is likely that most of the nation\xe2\x80\x99s \nSMSA\xe2\x80\x99s could adapt to lower levels of defense expenditures with \nrelative ec.se and that many of them would actually experience labor \nshortages. > \n\nProfessor Cumberland\xe2\x80\x99s paper also includes estimates of employ\xc2\xac \nment in twenty major industry groups for each state under each of the \nthree defense budget assumptions. \n\nThe foregoing analysis of regional impact was based upon the \ninterindustry models of Professors Almon and Harris of the University \nof Maryland. - In recent years some work has been done on applying \neconometric models similar to the Wharton model of Professor Klein to \nsubnational regions. Dr. Robert Crow of Mathematics, Inc. has experi\xc2\xac \nmented with this type of analysis in the Northeastern Corridor region \nof the United States and his findings appear as a portion of this \nreport. Dr. Crow\xe2\x80\x99s work was done some time before the completion of \nthe total report and as a consequence, includes assumptions about the \ntiming of the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and of the expira\xc2\xac \ntion of the surtax which have proven to be incorrect. Resource and \n\n\n21 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ntime limitations prevented him from updating his study but in view of \nthe uniqueness of his approach and its usefulness as an example of a \nstate-of-the-art application, it has been included in this report. \n\n1.3.4 Military Base Closings \n\nOne particular aspect of regional impact which has been a common \nsubject of concern during the last decade is that dealing with military \nbase closings. Professor Daicoff has participated in several ACDA- \nsponsored studies of this topic and prepared a general synthesis for \nthis project. When a defense facility represents a large part of an \narea\xe2\x80\x99s economy, its reduction or closure may cause an appreciable \nimpact. In the great majority of cases, however, the transition is \nsmoother than anticipated and communities often find themselves better \noff with a more diversified and civilian-oriented set of replacement \nemployers. Some communities have benefited from inheriting useful \npieces of social overhead capital such as airfields. \n\nOf particular importance in explaining these findings of limited \nimpact are the consumption spending habits of servicemen as between \npost exchange or base commissary and community. The extent of on-base \nhousing is also a factor. Finally, the fact that the jobs that disap\xc2\xac \npear often had been filled with dependents of servicemen means that \nthe labor force often shrinks with the job openings leaving fewer \npersons unemployed than might otherwise be the case. The DOD Office \nof Economic Adjustment has developed an expertise which is available \nto communities facing the base closing experience. In addition, the \nHomeowners Assistance Program is designed to provide aid in one of \nthe more troublesome aspects of the process\xe2\x80\x94protection of the home- \nowner\xe2\x80\x99s equity in the case of transfer. \n\n1.3.3 Impact on Individuals \n\nProfessors Eaton and Daicoff have examined the transition pro\xc2\xac \nblems of those individuals directly employed by primary defense \nproducers and by the military. \n\nProfessor Eaton analyzed studies of six major contract termina\xc2\xac \ntions or cancellations. These involved the cancellation of the Dyna- \nSoar project with Boeing in December, 1963 at the Seattle facility; \nthe completion of work on the Titan Missile by the Martin Company in \nDenver in 1964; the cessation of F-105 aircraft production at Repub\xc2\xac \nlic\xe2\x80\x99s Long Island plant in 1964-1964; the Falcon missile termination \nat Hughes Aircraft in Tucson in 1963-1964; and in the San Francisco \nBay area in March of 1965. \n\n\n22 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nOne of the important conclusions is that while such layoffs can \nappear as only small ripples in a large community, they can cause \nsevere personal hardship for the individuals concerned. Wh^le most of \nthe studies agreed that such personal and job-related characteristics \nas age, sex, education and sk:.ll level were important in the reemploy\xc2\xac \nment experience, statistically they were able to explain only a small \npart of the variation between individuals in the reemployment experi\xc2\xac \nence. The findings indicate that a synthesis of personal characteris\xc2\xac \ntics and labor market variables such as size, structure and tightness \npredicts the reemployment experience more successfully. \n\nEngineers had a less severe reemployment experience than did \nsocial science and business degree holders. A larger proportion of \nnon-engineers than engineers made a shift to non-defense work. \n\nEngineers who did transfer to non-defense work had no more severe a \nreemployment experience than did non-engineers in similar transfers. \n\nWhile the majority of defense occupations surveyed had counterparts \nfor which the employment outlook was good, geographic or industrial \nchange was often required. When once again employed, most of the \ndisplaced workers experienced a decline in salary. \n\nDrawing upon cases observed during the last decade Professor Daicoff \nhas reviewed the adjustment process of DOD civilian and military person\xc2\xac \nnel to reductions in military spending. He notes the general need for \nincreased geographic mobility and an expansion in vocational training to \nease transfers. Daicoff estimates that perhaps 150,000 additional \ncivilian employees were added to the payroll of the Defense Department \nduring the Vietnam buildup and anticipates that this number will serve \na 5 a minimum for personnel reductions resulting directly from the end of \nthe war. During the past decade various DOD manpower and assistance \nprograms helped to ease the adjustment process. The assistance programs \nincluded the following elements: \n\n1. The establishment of the Automated Priority Placement System; \n\n2. The payment of moving or relocation costs associated with the \nacceptance of a new DOD position; \n\n3. An income protection guarantee which assured employees that their \nexisting rate of pay would be maintained for a two-year period if \nthey remained DOD employees; \n\n4. The provision of retraining service in cases where warranted; and \n\n5. The provision of severance pay for those workers who resigned \nfrom their Federal jobs. The DOD also provided each affected employee \nfactual information permitting him to match his geographical and \noccupational preferences against employment opportunities within the \nDefense Department. \n\n\n23 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nBetween November, 1964, and July, 1967, 48,484 DOD civilian per\xc2\xac \nsonnel were affected by the closure of DOD installations. Of this \nnumber, 32,418 were placed in other federal government jobs and 16,066 \nwere released from Federal employment. Thus, approximately one-third \nof the employees chose to accept private employment rather than to \ncontinue their Federal careers. This relatively high rate of separation \noccurred despite considerable efforts expended in offering alternative \nFederal opportunities. Some of the factors contributing to this high \nseparation rate were the following: \n\n1. The expanding economy provided many job opportunities in the \nlocal communities thus eliminating the need to move from the area; \n\n2. Certain classes of workers such as women, who may be secondary \nwage earners, older people near retirement, and younger workers \nless committed to career channels, are less likely to make a physi\xc2\xac \ncal move in order to find new employment within the government ser\xc2\xac \nvice. On the other hand, more skilled primary wage earners seem \nmore willing to move appreciable distances in order to maintain \ntheir career status. \n\nGeneralizations from this experience should be made with care. For \none thing, during the 1964-1967 period DOD was increasing its total em\xc2\xac \nployment due to the expansion of activities associated with Vietnam. Thus, \nFederal jobs offered to the affected DOD civilian employees came from: \n\n1. Expanded DOD employment due to the Vietnam war and \n\n2. Normal replacement of approximately 5 percent of Federal \ncivilian employees each year. \n\nThe end of the Vietnam hostilities or an arms limitation agreement \nwill probably have varying results. It is likely that DOD \ntotal employment will be falling at such a time and while Federal \noffset programs may require additional personnel, such increases will \nnot necessarily match the reduction in DOD employment either in \nnumbers or skills. Second, there is a possibility that the reduction \nr3ce c ^ DOD personnel after the Vietnam hostilities are over would be \nmore rapid than the very slow rates which characterized closures of \nmajor installations in the mid 1960\'s. Under these circumstances the \n\nneed to maintain a high level of employment nationally becomes very \ngreat. \n\nV.i.en one turns to the analysis of military personnel and their \nadjustment after the end of the Vietnam war or an arms limitation agree\xc2\xac \nment, the situation becomes considerably more complex than that of DOD \ncivilian personnel. The Vietnam buildup increased the armed services \nfrom 2.7 million in 1965 to 3.5 million in 1968. The end of Vietnam \nfighting may possibly reduce the size of the armed forces by perhaps \n\n24 \n\n\n\n\n! \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n800,000 men. Coupled with the normal retirement rate of approximately \n60,000 to 65,000 a year, this will add to the pressures upon the \nabsorptive capacity of the civilian labor market. The timing of the \ndemobilization and the pattern of entry into the labor market by ex- \nservicemen will be very important here. While perhaps 800,000 men \nmay ultimately be entering the civilian labor market, from one-fourth \nto one third of them may be expected to seek further education or \ntraining. If the remaining approximate 600,000 who are discharged \nleave the service over an 18-24 month period, the phase-out will be \ngradua^. enough to permit a smooth transition. Even so, there may still \nbe serious structural difficulties. Important here is the question of \nthe adequacy of training which the military dischargee and retiree \nhas received prior to his moving into the civilian economy. Aside from \nthe question of skill transferability as such, there is the further one \nof where the veterans decide to locate and how their preferences com\xc2\xac \npare to the availability of job openings. \n\nMilitary retirees also constitute a class that needs attention. \n\nThe typical military retiree leaves the service with approximately \none-half of his productive life ahead of him. Thus, the possibility of \na second career is high. Present patterns indicate a tendency for \nmilitary retirees to be rather immobile and geographically concentra\xc2\xac \nted. ^ Unlike the enlisted separatee, the retiree appears to be \nhighly self-reliant in job seeking and is not likely to experience \nserious adjustment difficulties. For the average separatee vocational \nand educational training seem to be the major determinants of the ease of \ntransition to the civilian economy. Experience under the GI Bills \nof World War II and Korea should provide useful experience in designing \nan effective training system. Professor Daicoff discusses some of the \nelements involved in training and the transferability of skills. It \nhas been estimated that 80 percent of military jobs held by enlisted \nmen correspond to only about 10 percent of those held by male civilian \nworkers/^ Under these circumstances pre-separation training of en\xc2\xac \nlisted men could play a major role in easing the transition. Presum\xc2\xac \nably, Project Transition, which began in late 1967, was designed to \naccomplish this purpose. Professor Daicoff ends his paper with an \nextended discussion of experience thus far with Project Transition. \n\nThis program is also examined by Professors Allison and Etzioni. \n\n\n^Albert D. Biderman, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Sequels to a Military Career: The Retired \nMilitary Professional,\xe2\x80\x9d in Morris Janowitz (ed.) The New Military : \nChanging Patterns of Organization (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, \n1964), pp. 287-336; especially pp. 299-301. \n\n2 \'Harold Wool, The Military Specialist: Skilled Manpower for the \nArmed Forces (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 55. \n\n\n25 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1.3.6 Industrial Diversification Efforts \n\nProfessor Weidenbaum writing before becoming Assistant Secretary \nof the Treasury for Economic Policy, reviewed the post World War II \nand post Korea experiences of firms attempting to diversify into non\xc2\xac \nmilitary areas. Perhaps one of the most difficult problems is the \nfact that many top management officials do not take seriously the \neventuality of disarmament or even major cuts in the military budget. \n\nAt the end of World War II, the older and more established firms \nreconverted to civilian markets with little difficulty. The more \nspecialized defense contractors, particularly those in the aircraft \nindustry which had grown from job-shop operations in the pre-war period \nto gianthood during the war, faced a real loss of markets. There were \nmany attempts at conversion but most of them failed. In the 1946-1948 \nperiod the major aircraft firms, for example, had sales of only one- \ntenth their former levels and in many cases experienced large losses. \n\nMost of these diversification efforts were abandoned and Korea brought \nthe focus back to military production. After the end of the war in \nKorea, major diversification efforts were directed at close adaptations \nof military work. For example, there was the shift of aircraft firms \ninto civilian aircraft markets. There was also some effort to diversify \ninto industrial markets that were closely related to defense such as \nproduction of nuclear reactors, industrial electronics, etc. Never\xc2\xac \ntheless, most of the non-governmental sales of the major aircraft com\xc2\xac \npanies in the mid-fifties consisted of aircraft to the civilian airlines. \n\nIn the late fifties and early sixties attention focused on expanding \nmilitary sales and sales to the space program. The 1963-1964 \ncutbacks in military procurement (especially missiles) produced a new \nneed to consider diversification toward the non-military markets. The \ndirection chosen however was largely toward the civilian public sector. \nExperience with NASA had indicated that the firms * major skill was not \nso much in fabricating light metal (which had dominated thinking after \nWorld War II) but rather a capability in systems management. The effort \ntherefore was to convince non-military government units that they should \nexplore the systems approach to civilian-oriented problems. \n\nOf late, alternative methods of diversification have followed the \nfollowing lines: 1) mergers with other companies in defense and high \ntechnology industrial markets, 2) licensing by-products of military \nproduct lines to established commercial firms, 3) joint ventures with \nforeign firms usually in technical areas, 4) creation of by-product \nexploration groups based on internal inventions, and 5) permitting \nmilitary divisions to develop non-military products during slack times. \nThe particular route chosen often varies with the size of the firm \ninvolved. \n\n\n26 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIn evaluating obstacles to diversification it should be noted first \nthat within the military and high technology government markets, diversi\xc2\xac \nfication has been markedly successful. One need only think r* the \ntransition from aircraft to missiles to space systems. Nevertheless, \ncommercial experience has been rather unsuccessful. Two major problems \nappear to be a lack of management motivation resulting from a prefer\xc2\xac \nence for the lower risks of military production coupled with a \nskepticism that the military market will shrink seriously, and the lack \nof required capability. The major defense firms often have low \ncapitalization, little commercial marketing capacity, and limited \nexperience in producing high volume output at low unit cost. Also the \nadministrative structures of these firms are frequently geared to the \nunique reporting and control requirements of government purchasing \nwith emphasis upon very high quality standards and a relatively small \nnumber of units of output. Professor Weidenbaum feels that firms with \nthis background in the weapons systems environment lack a cost conscious \norientation. Apparently firms operating in both military and civilian \nmarkets have engaged in very little transfer of personnel between \nproduct lines or product ideas from government to commercial work \nwithin the firm. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nBy way of contrast, the lack of a vast distribution network or mass \nproduction experience is hardly a drawback for government orders. The \nspecialized defense contractors have strong engineering design and \ndevelopment capability and large aggregations of scientists, engineers, \nand supporting technicians. They can work with exotic materials at \nclose tolerances. These components have been successfully welded \ntogether by executives skilled in systems management. For such firms \nthinking about diversification efforts has tended to be limited to a \nsearch for new high technology markets within the public sector. \n\nParticularly within the aerospace complex what is revealed is devel\xc2\xac \nopment of a highly unique capability to manage the enormous problems \nof military and space systems work. The point which is still moot is \nwhether this particular organizational structure will be equally effi\xc2\xac \ncient in dealing with civilian problems. It may be that some new kind \nof organization, perhaps of mixed public-private form like Comsat will \nhave to be developed to meet these new needs. \n\n1.3.7 Impact on Governments \n\nProfessor Allison, drawing upon the literature of organizational \ntheory and behavior, attempts to develop a framework for understanding \nthe organizational process, particularly the gap between analytic \nalternatives and actual outcomes. \n\n\n27 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nAfter datailing the principles underlying the behavior of organiza\xc2\xac \ntions, Professor Allison presents an analysis of how organizational \nchange can be effected. Most of his examples are drawn from recent real \nworld experiences. \n\nAfter establishing the framework for his analysis, Professor Allison \nconsiders various potential non-military uses of existing military \nfacilities. In particular, he concentrates upon the manpower area in\xc2\xac \nvestigating Projects 100,000 and Transition and provides suggestions for \ntheir improvement. \n\nIn the final section of his paper he considers various strategies \nwhich might be used to minimize organizational impediments in attaining \ndesired objectives and draws upon the particular experience of the \nIsraeli Defense Forces. \n\nProfessor Allison is somewhat more optimistic than Professor \nEtzioni concerning the capability of the military establishment to help \nsolve certain problems in the civilian sector. \n\nProfessor Etzioni views the problems that society may encounter \nas it attempts to effect a significant shift of resources from military \nuses to civilian end purposes. He notes that serious shifts in resource \nallocation require determined leadership and a strong consensus on the \npart of the population. His paper is devoted to an exploration of the \nforces and factors which will enhance or detract from the smoothness of \nthe shift to domestic missions after the war is over. \n\nHe begins by indicating that on occasion the values and indeed the \nmemories held by particular elites and interest groups in society must \nbe changed. While concluding that the U.S. is not run by one elite or \nclass but rather a plurality of interest groups, Professor Etzioni notes \nthe need to gain consensus among these groups in order to successfully \nlaunch and conduct new programs. Such an effort of course must overcome \nthe fact that the interest groups themselves contest for power while some \nsegments of society play only a minor role in the legal process (the poor, \nethnic minorities, farmworkers, etc.). While most interest groups would \nagree on the desirability of an early end to the war there is no similar \nunanimity of feeling on the alternative uses of such peace dividend as \nmay be forthcoming. \n\nProfessor Etzioni concentrates on some of the problems likely to be \nencountered in shifting functions which are now conducted within the \nmilitary establishment. In considering the re-definition of missions, he \nargues against the assignment of military units to civilian domestic \nfunctions. While conceding that they may be useful in the areas where the \n\n\n28 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nspecific activity is similar (such as the use of the military air trans\xc2\xac \nport service for domestic emergencies) he feels that the risk of their \ndoing things in an arbitrary and \'\xe2\x80\x99military\'\xe2\x80\x99 way overcomes this advantage. \n\nHe attributes the apparent capability of the military to successfully \ncut red tape in particular areas where civilian efforts have been frus\xc2\xac \ntrated (experiments with new forms of housing construction, hospital de\xc2\xac \nsign, etc.) to the relatively low level of such efforts and points out \nthat if the military tried to widely undertake civilian operations in a \nmanner violative of such civilian norms as building codes, etc., civilian \ninterest groups involved would seriously oppose the program. Generally, \nhe advocates turning resources over to civilian agencies to undertake \ndomestic missions rather than using military units for these missions. \n\nEtzioni views executives as compliance specialists. He feels that \nthe scope of their transferability hinges on the similarity of compliance \nstructures. Executives can cross many administrative barriers while hold\xc2\xac \ning to the same type of compliance structure. He then applies this \nanalytic framework to a comparison of the relative transferability to \ncivilian functions of both combat and noncombat officers. \n\nPeacetime conversion may require that large-scale units be broken \nup. Etzioni feels that this is more likely to be successful than the \noverall shift of units intact. There are several reasons for this. They \ngrow out of the several levels of difference between military and civil\xc2\xac \nian operations. Military operations tend to have a high ideological \ncontent. In addition, orientation to the nature of the needs of the client \nvary between military and civilian areas because the military clients \ntend to be few, large and to have rather clearly identifiable needs and \npreferences while civilian clients tend to be numerous, relatively small \nand with needs and preferences more difficult to forecast. Also, the \nmilitary generally deals with a hostile environment. One exception \nhere used to be the key congressional committees which tended to be quite \nfavorably disposed to military budget requests. \n\nProfessor Etzioni concludes by considering in some detail the possi\xc2\xac \nbility of shifting the systems analysis approach from the military to \ncivilian agencies of government. In terms of the characteristics which \nhe sees as important in the application of systems analysis, Etzioni \nfeels that it is more successfully accomplished where mass aggregate \ntechnological systems with many units are involved as well as non-human \nelements. He feels that these conditions are more frequently encountered \nin military than in civilian environments. Nevertheless, even in domestic \ncircumstances, systems analysis may offer a powerful heuristic device \nsince it develops a sense of the factors involved and their possible \ninterrelationships. It also enables one to call attention to alternative \npossibilities and to focus clearly upon all assumptions. On the other \n\n\n29 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n* \n\n\nhand, it is dangerous in rigid application and Etzioni feels that in \nterms of the quality of the data and theory presently available, civilian \nagencies will find it more difficult to apply than the military. \n\nThe President has requested that Congress consider some new form \nof inter-governmental revenue transfers and Professor Diacoff has analyzed \n\n% ( ~ m \n\nsome of the issues involved in this area. If some form of revenue \nsharing does in fact develop, it will clearly have an impact on govern\xc2\xac \nments and Daicoff feels that this is more likely to occur as a result \nof broad shifts in defense spending rather than as a short term conse\xc2\xac \nquence of peace in Vietnam. The arguments in favor of revenue sharing \ninclude the following: \n\n1. Potential growth in revenues at full employment will present \nus with a choice between increased government expenditures and/or tax \nreductions. Growing tax receipts at the federal level will provide re\xc2\xac \nsources for transfer to lower levels of government; \n\n2. General dissatisfaction exists with the present state of local \ntax sources in terms of the well-known deficiencies of property, sales, \nand excise taxes; \n\n3. Distortions inherent in the present system lead to geographic \nraisallocation of resources; \n\n4. The low income elasticity of local tax revenues inhibits these \ntaxes from growing as rapidly as income grows; \n\n5. Projected continuing deficits in state and local budgets; \n\n6 . The growing reluctance of the citizenry to approve tax increases \nor bond issues to finance local civil government needs; and \n\n7. As a consequence of the other points, the increasing rate of de\xc2\xac \nparture from office of effective mayors and governors. \n\nThere are a number of alternative approaches which may be taken to \nimprove the fiscal position of state and local governments. These in\xc2\xac \nvolve changes in: \n\n1. Debt policy which might facilitate state and local borrowing; \n\n2. Expenditure policy wherein the federal government would itself \nundertake to fund more of the activities of state and local govern\xc2\xac \nmental units; and \n\n3. Revenue policy, which would either permit state and local taxes \nto increase in like amount as federal taxes are reduced or provide \nfederal tax credits for state and local government income taxes. \n\nProfessor Daicoff discusses some of the difficulties which may be \nencountered in fiscal policy due to lags between the adoption of pro\xc2\xac \ngrams and their impact on the economy and how revenue sharing would bear \nupon fiscal policy lags. He concludes that the transfer of resources \nfrom Federal to state and local governmental units is a desirable policy. \n\n\n30 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1.3.8 Long Run Impact on National Income Shares \n\nProfessor Boulding has examined the behavior of the national income \naccounts between 1929 and 1969. The concept of gross capacity product \nwas utilized as a base rather than gross national product. Gross \ncapacity product may be defined as what the gross national product would \nhave been if all resources had been fully utilized. \n\nPerhaps the single most important and in a sense surprising find\xc2\xac \ning is the sharp decline in the role of personal consumption expendi\xc2\xac \ntures. They dropped from 72.6 percent of gross capacity product in \n1929 to 59.8 percent in 1969. During the same period while defense \nexpenditures increased from 0.6 percent to 8.2 percent of capacity \nproduct, Federal, state and local civilian government expenditures grew \nfrom 7.4 to 13.0 percent. Between the same two years, gross private \ndomestic investment dropped 0.7 percent and net exports by 0.8 percent. \nThus it is basically the American consumer who has paid for the in\xc2\xac \ncreasing share of governmental activities, both military and civilian, \nduring this forty-year period. \n\n\nOver the same interval, Federal civilian government purchases in\xc2\xac \ncreased from 0.6 percent to 2.4 percent of capacity product while state \nand local government units increased their share from 6.8 to 10.6 percent. \n\nWithin the household sector consumption expenditures also have \nfollowed interesting patterns. The share of durable goods has increased \nfrom 8.7 to 9.3 percent of capacity product. This basically reflects \nan increase in the automobile component of durable goods consumption. \nNon-durable goods during the same period declined from 35.4 to 25.3 \npercent and services from 28.5 to 25.2 percent. Within the non-durable \ncategory, food and clothing expenditures, excluding alcoholic beverages, \ndropped sharply from 27.1 to 17.7 percent of capacity product. Gasoline \nand oil on the other hand have increased very slightly from 1.7 to 2.2 \npercent of capacity product, notwithstanding the enormous increase in the \nrole of the automobile in this period. Major components of services, \nhousing, housing operations, transportation, and other services are all \ndown, with housing leading the decline from 10.8 to 8.7 percent of \ncapacity product. \n\nWhen the analysis is shifted to the various sources of personal in\xc2\xac \ncome the growing corporatization of the American economy is obvious with \nan increase in the compensation of employees from 48.1 to 58.6 percent \nof capacity product, while supplements to wages and salaries grew from \n\n\n31 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\njust under one percent to 5.5 percent. The shares of business and pro\xc2\xac \nfessional income plus the income of farm proprietors which together \nconstitute the unincorporated sector of the economy declined from 14.3 \nperceint to 6.9 percent. Rental income of persons, net interest, and \ndividends also declined appreciably in the interval. Payment to old \nage and survivors disability insurance funds grew from zero to 3.4 \npercent. Despite the large numbers of citizens serving in the armed \nforces during this period, veterans benefits did not change much, going \nfrom 0.6 percent in 1929 to 0.9 in 1969. Corporate profits were down \nfrom 9.9 to 9.2 percent and personal savings up from 4 percent to 4.9 \npercent. Once again the consumer ! s heavy burden is indicated by the \ngrowth of personal tax and nontax payments from 2.4 to 12.2 percent. \n\n\n\n\n\nWhen shorter term periods are examined, certain changes appear. \n\nFor example, during the Second World War the expansion in the national \ndefense area came largely at the expense of gross private domestic in\xc2\xac \nvestment and the expenditures of civil government. Also, the decline \nin the relative importance of defense expenditures between 1955 and \n1965 was largely compensated by an increase in civil government functions. \n\n\nIn earlier periods when the erroneous belief was fairly widespread \nthat the American economy required military expenditures to remain \nprosperous, there was a belief that such military expenditures were \nlargely costless since the resources going into them would otherwise, \nit was believed, have been unemployed. Interestingly, now with people \nsomewhat better informed about the ability of the American economy to \nprosper without military spending the real costs of such expenditures \nare becoming much more obvious, forcing a concern with questions of \nchoice and priorities. The period during which a variety of needs could \nbe met by resources being freed from the agricultural sector is over and \nthe largest remaining eligible area to be tapped would appear to be \nnational defense spending. \n\n\n32 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1.4 POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS \n\nIn his January 1967 Economic Report , President Johnson instructed \nthe various Federal Agencies to step up and integrate their \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99planning \nfor peace." At the same time he listed six possible courses of action \nfor study requesting the relevant agency heads: \n\n\xe2\x80\x9d\xe2\x80\x94to consider possibilities and priorities for tax reduction; \n\nM \xe2\x80\x94to prepare, with the Federal Reserve Board, plans for quick \nadjustments of monetary and financial policies; \n\n"\xe2\x80\x94to determine which high priority programs can be quickly \nexpanded; \n\n"\xe2\x80\x94to determine priorities for the longer range expansion of pro\xc2\xac \ngrams to meet the needs of the American people, both through new and \nexisting programs; \n\n"\xe2\x80\x94to study and evaluate the future direction of Federal financial \nsupport to our states and local governments; \n\n\xe2\x80\x9d\xe2\x80\x94to examine ways in which the transition to peace can be smoothed \nfor the workers, companies, and communities now engaged in supplying our \ndefense needs, and the men released from our armed forces. \n\nThis list highlights the interrelations between short-run questions \nof stability during the transition from war to peace and more fundamental \nunderlying issues of social and economic policy. Ultimately, resources \nfreed from defense uses will be distributed between public and private \nuses in accordance with the desires of the voting public. This formu\xc2\xac \nlation of the problem is too simple, however, since there are not simply \nhomogeneous choices available labeled public and private. Within each \nbroad class, there exist many additional competing programs and uses for \nsuch resources as may be made availabe by reduced military spending. The \nspecific form taken by tax reduction measures, for example, will depend \nupon the sector to be stimulated, business investment or household con\xc2\xac \nsumption. Competing theories of economic growth as well as of practical \npolitics underlie such a choice. Within the public sector, agreement is \nfar from unanimous on the priorities to be assigned to health, education, \nhousing, transportation, etc. Here also, broad category designations \nveil the differences. Is a massive upgrading in elementary school \neducation at the lower grade levels more important than bringing under\xc2\xac \nprivileged youth into the colleges and universities? What of vocational \neducation and junior colleges? \n\nThese are, of course, not new problems that arise directly out of \ndemobilization. However, the belief that appreciable quantities of funds \n\n-oZ \n\nEconomic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress \nJanuary, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 24. \n\n\n33 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nwill soon be available resulting from disengagement in Vietnam and some \nstrategic arms limitation agreement understandably stimulates the com\xc2\xac \npetition for such funds among new claimant candidates. The situation is \nreminiscent of the famous statement attributed to Willie Sutton. In \nreponse to the query why a man of his talents robbed banks he responded \nn ...because that f s where the money is." The same point is stressed by \nKenneth Boulding in his paper where he notes the close of the era when \nnew programs could be funded by resources made available by the high and \ncontinuous productivity gains in agriculture. \n\nIn deciding matters of social choice the skills of the economist \nprovide only limited assistance. They can prove useful, however, in \nproviding knowledge about the consequences of alternative choices\xe2\x80\x94their \nlikely costs, benefits and related effects\xe2\x80\x94so that the process of choice \nmay be better informed. Weidenbaum has arrayed a range of options in \nmatrix form which conveniently portrays the more important alternatives \nopen in each of President Johnson\xe2\x80\x99s categories of action and the policy \nissues which they pose. His matrix is reproduced as Table 5. \n\nIf the decision process is to be responsive to the impact of \nchanges in defense spending critical problems of timing and information \nwill have to be dealt with. Policy must be established within the con\xc2\xac \ntext of the existing state of affairs in the economy at large. It is \nnow painfully clear that the likely reaction to a given reduction in \nmilitary spending will vary with the rate of change in other kinds of \nspending then under way. A cut in defense spending would be a welcome \nrelief from an over-employed inflation-ridden economy or an added \nproblem to an economy already moving into recession. At the time of \nthis writing the West Coast centers of the aerospace industry have been \nexperiencing widely publicized distress under the combined burdens of \nreduced military and space orders and an appreciable decline in civilian \naircraft production resulting from a failure of civilian airline traffic \nto reach expected levels .^ In the state of Washington the important \n\n\n27 \n\nA close examination of the composition of employment and recent \nunemployment in the West Coast aerospace industry suggests that the \nproblem is not long term and structural in nature. The Federal Reserve \nBank of San Francisco reports that most of the industry\xe2\x80\x99s recent layoffs \n(70 percent in California and 57 percent in Washington) have been among \nblue collar, production line workers. The Bank also states that the \ngreater relative reduction in white-collar jobs in Washington\xe2\x80\x99s aerospace \nlayoffs reflects the buildup of technical and professional staffs by \nemployers in that state between 1965 and 1967 in the (largely unsuccess\xc2\xac \nful) attempt to acquire new military and space contracts. See Donald \nSnodgrass, "Aerospace in the Doldrums," Federal Reserve Bank of San \nFrancisco Monthly Review , July, 1970, pp. 148-150~ \n\n\n34 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nALTERNATIVE POST-VIETNAM ADJUSTMENT ACTIONS \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-3 \n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n3 \n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nO \n\ncd \n\n\nCD \n\n$ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c\\ \n\n\n\n\n\nS \n\n4-J \n\n\n\nCO \n\ncj \n\n\n<4-1 \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nCD \n\n6 \n\n\no \n\n3 \n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCO \n\n\n \n\np \n\n\n4-1 \n\n4-1 \n\n3 \n\n\n4H \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n1 \n\n\n\ncd \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\no \n\n\ncd \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n00 \n\n3 \n\nX) \n\n4-J \n\n1\xe2\x80\x94! \n\n3 \n\n\n\nE \n\n3 \n\nB \n\n\nN \n\nP \n\nB \n\n3 \n\no \n\n3 \n\n4-J \n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n*lH \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\na) \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\ncd \n\n\nCD \n\n\ni \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\nt\xc2\xbb \n\n"3 \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\nU \n\n44 \n\na \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n4J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n1 \n\n\n\ncd \n\nrH \n\n44 \n\n*H \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\na) \n\nto \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\n \n\nrH \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n3 \n\nCD \n\n4-J \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\no \n\n*H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\nP \n\n\n\ncj \n\ncd \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nPm \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\n\n4-1 \n\na \n\n\n4J \n\n3 \n\n00 \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nB \n\nX) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\na \n\ncd \n\nP- \n\no \n\n\n(X \n\n3 \n\nCD \n\na \n\n4-J \n\no \n\no \n\n\n.p \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\no \n\na \n\nX \n\no \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCD \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\n\n4-J \n\n3 \n\nx \n\nP \n\np \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nCD \n\n00 \n\n\n-a \n\na \n\nCD \n\n\n00 \n\n> \n\no \n\nPm \n\np< \n\ncd \n\nB \n\nPm \n\n3 \n\ncd \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\nE \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n4-1 \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nE \n\nCD \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\ni \n\n \n\no \n\nCD \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\ni \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n0\\ \n\n\nO \n\n\nPu \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nCD \n\n\noo \n\n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nCJ \n\n3 \n\n\nPu \n\n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\nP \n\n4-J \n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nCJ \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\n\nO \n\n\n3 \n\n\nP \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n#\\ \n\np \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\np \n\n3 \n\nCJ \n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\nO \n\n\nP \n\n \n\nCD \n\nE \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nP \n\np \n\n3 \n\n \n\na \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n4-J \n\ncd \n\n3 \n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\nH \n\n* \n\nto \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n3 \n\n\nrH \n\n\ncd \n\n>4 \n\n4 \n\noo \n\nCO \n\no \n\nX5 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\nCJ \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\xc2\xabd \n\n\nCO \n\nE \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\nCJ \n\no \n\ncd \n\nCD \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\na) \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nO \n\n\ncd \n\n>4 \n\n>4 \n\n\n3 \n\nPm \n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nP \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\na> \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n>4 \n\nCD \n\ncd \n\n#N \n\nJ4 \n\nE \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*4 \n\n\n\n\nE \n\n\n3 \n\nX> \n\n\nCD \n\na \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n00 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nCD \n\nX} \n\n\nCO \n\n4-J \n\ncd \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\no \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\nX \n\nE \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n44 \n\n4-J \n\np \n\n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\ncd \n\n\nCD \n\n\nE \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\np \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n3 \n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 \n\ncd \n\n\nO \n\nCD \n\n44 \n\nCO \n\n\n\npH \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n4-1 \n\na \n\n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n< \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n#\\ \n\n\n\nCD \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n\nc* \n\nE \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\nE \n\n\nX \n\n\n4-> \n\n3 \n\n\n"3 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n4-1 \n\n\nP \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\n3 \n\n> \n\nr-H \n\n44 \n\n\ni \n\n\n(J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n3 \n\n\n4-J \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n00 \n\no \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\nCD \n\n\n3 \n\n\nO \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n\ncd \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na. 3 \n\n\nX \n\n\n*3 \n\nX) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nPi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\nO \n\n44 \n\n> \n\n\xc2\xabN \n\n\n\n> \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nCD \n\nCD \n\n4-1 \n\n\nE \n\n4-1 \n\nCD \n\ncd \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\nCJ \n\n3 \n\n00 rH \n\n\n3 \n\n\n? \n\n\n\nCO \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\na \n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nP \n\n4-1 \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94> \n\nCJ \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n3" \n\ncd \n\nCJ \n\ncd \n\nO \n\ncd \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\ng \n\n3 \n\nto \n\n3 \n\nuS \n\n\no \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nJ3 \n\nCD \n\np \n\n3 \n\no \n\n-3 \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nP \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n4 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nM \n\nM \n\nC-J \n\nP \n\n4-J \n\nM \n\nrH \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\nCJ \n\n33 \n\n44 \n\npH \n\n-3 \n\nPd \n\n\nX~S \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/\'\xe2\x80\x9cN \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/-N \n\n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\ntO \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nO \n\n44 \n\n\n3 \n\np \n\n\ntO \n\n3 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nP \n\nO \n\nX Ph CO \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\na \n\n3 \n\n\no \n\n*H \n\n3 44 \n\n3 \n\nE \n\n\nX \n\nE \n\n\n00 \n\n44 \n\n3 rH 3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nw \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\n3 3 \n\nft 4 \n\nP \n\n3 \n\n\nP \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\n3 \n\n5>> *rH E \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nE \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nE \n\n3 \n\n-3 \n\nP O 44 \n\nw \n\nt> \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n> \n\n3 \n\nCJ \n\n3 \n\n3 3 co \n\n\nO \n\nP \n\nOh \n\nO \n\nP \n\n\nPd \n\n44 3 3 \n\nX) \n\nO \n\n00 \n\n1 \n\no \n\nOO \n\n\n\n3 3 *o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\no \n\n00 \n\n\no \n\n\nX \n\n3 *H X) \n\na \n\n3 \n\np \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\np \n\n\n3 \n\nO pH < \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\npH \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nPh \n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nPd \n\n\n\nkJ \n\n\n\n\n35 \n\n\nFederal Aid to 1) Expansion of existing program grants 1) Choice of program areas \n\nState and Local 2) Initiation of new grant programs to support \n\nGovernments 3) Block grants, with few strings 2) Decision as to which level \n\nof government makes the \n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 5 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<13 \n\n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n3-4 \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nJ-i \n\nO \n\n3-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n03 \n\nB \n\n<13 \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nx \n\n\n.G \n\nO \n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 ( \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-4 \n\n\n* \n\n\n\nAJ \n\n0) \n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nu \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n\n\n03 \n\nX \n\no \n\ne \n\n\no \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\nC0 \n\nS \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nS \n\n03 \n\no \n\nc \n\n\n\n>-i \n\n03 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nco \n\n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\nO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-4 \n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\no \n\n\n\nO \n\n\no \n\n4-i \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\n3 \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nO \n\nG \n\n03 \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\nCO \n\n>4 \n\nU \n\nCO \n\n\nX \n\n<0 \n\n\n\n\n> \n\nG \n\nc \n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n>s \n\ng \n\n4-J \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\ncO \n\n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n03 \n\n\n4-J \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24H \n\n\npt \n\n* \n\nV4 \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nK \n\nG \n\n03 \n\n>> \n\nc \n\nc \n\nCO \n\nn3 \n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nCO \n\n03 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nu \n\nO \n\n<13 \n\n3 \n\n03 \n\nc0 \n\n\n03 \n\n4-1 \n\n\n*H \n\n\nH \n\n\n6 \n\nO \n\n4-J \n\nCJ \n\ncO \n\nG- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-> \n\n4-J \n\nI\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\nCO \n\n4-J \n\n3-1 \n\no \n\no \n\nV4 \n\n<4-4 \n\nG \n\nCO \n\ncO \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n05 \n\n<13 \n\nQ>* r\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-J \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nU \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nDU \n\nU \n\n03 \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-1 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nG \n\nC3 \n\n3 \n\na \n\n\n4 \n\n0) \n\nCO \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n3-i \n\n\n\nH \n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-4 \n\n\n\nw \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n4-J \n\n\nH \n\n\ns \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\nJ3 \n\n\n00 G \n\nE \n\n\n\n\nC CO \n\n4-i \n\n\nQ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H E5 \n\nCO \n\n\n< \n\n\n4J 03 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO 03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r-) \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\n\n\n> \n\nX 03 \n\nCO \n\n\nJ2J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) 4-J \n\n\n\n^4 \n\n4-i \n\nCO \n\nu \n\nCQ \n\nW \n\ncO \n\nC 00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\nhH \n\nC \n\nO 0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-4 \n\ncO \n\n> \n\nG \n\n}-< \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n34 \n\n1 \n\n03 \n\n03 00 \n\nC3 \n\n00 \n\nH \n\n4-i \n\nO 00 \n\n03 \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nC <0 \n\na \n\n3-4 \n\nO \n\n< \n\n<0 \n\nCO \n\na. \n\n04 \n\n\n*H 03 \n\n\n\n\n\nX G \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-1 \n\n4-i \n\nW \n\n\n03 CO \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\n\n3-4 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-4 \n\n\nH \n\n< \n\nIZ \n\nPd \n\nw \n\nH \n\nX \n\n< \n\n\nCO 03 C 0) \n\nB a> o c \n\nu cO 3-4 -h -i \n\n3-4 \n\n\n\n3-i \n\n03 \n\nO \n\n03 \n\n\nO \n\n4J \n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\nOO \n\n03 \n\n\ncO \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n> \n\n03 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-i \n\n\nCO \n\n#\\ \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\n4-J \n\n03 \n\nCO \n\nQ. \n\n\n\n<4-1 \n\n03 \n\nB \n\n\nTO \n\n0) \n\n34 \n\nO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\n< \n\nCJ \n\n\n< \n\n\n\n\n\n36 \n\n\nSOURCE: Murray L. Weidenbaum, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Peace in Vietnam: Possible Economic Impacts and the Business \nResponse," a paper commissioned by the Committee on the Economic Impact of Peace \nin Vietnam, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, September, 1967, p. 14, processed. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nlumber and plywood industry is also suffering from the steep fall in the \nhousing industry, largely induced by the tight money policy component of \nthe anti-inflationary program. Apparently, the contribution of reduced \n\n\nmilitary orders in Washington accounts for only a minor part of the \nstate s problem with "more than 90% of Boeing\xe2\x80\x99s business in the state... \nnondefense. However, the unfortunate concatenation of circumstances \nin that state illustrates the point. \n\n\nThe need for timely information on changes in defense spending by \nthe central budget and economic policy staffs was dramatized by its \nabsence during the critical months of the Vietnam buildup in late 1965 \nand early 1966. The situation has since been somewhat improved but many \nof our subsequent difficulties in anti-inflationary policy may be traced \nto that period. ^9 \n\nt \n\nThe timing challenge to stabilization policy was also illustrated \nby the rather extended interval required for the recent surtax to make \nits influence felt on the price indexes. Such lags in the impact of \nintended Federal action strongly suggest the need to anticipate desirable \nchanges as far in advance as possible. This observation applies with \nequal force on the side of offsets to falling defense spending. The \nliterature on economic adjustment has seen more attention to the topic \nof lags in recent years. From the viewpoint of economic policy, it is \nnot only important that the Federal offset programs be planned well in \nadvance of their need but that such programs be devised with a full \nunderstanding of their particular lag structure^ and of their unique \n\n28 \n\nAlbert R. Hunt, "Senator Jackson Gets Help from GOP Rivals in \nWashington Race," The Wall Street Journal , September 15, 1970, pp. 1, 27. \n\n29 \n\nSee Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Indicators of Military Demand," 1967 \nProceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section , American \nStatistical Association , pp. 208-211. For a useful discussion of the \nproblem of data needs see also Roger E. Bolton, "Statistics on Industrial \nand Regional Defense Impact," 1967 Proceedings of the Business Statistics \nSection, American Statistical Associatior , pp. 200-207. \n\n30 \n\nFor a study of this problem see Earl W. Adams, Jr. and Michael H. \nSpiro, The Timing of the Impact of Government Expenditures . This soon \nto be released study performed for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament \nAgency compared inside (legislative-institutional) and outside lags (from \nobligation of funds to economic impact) encountered in such offset pro\xc2\xac \ngrams as highway construction, space and oceanography, and urban mass \ntransit. The important finding that inside lags (both legislative and \nadministrative) are the "major culprit" in causing lengthy delays (p. 21) \nreinforces our conviction that the study of economic impact has for too \nlong paid inadequate attention to the organizational considerations \ndealt with in the Allison and Etzioni papers in this volume. \n\n\n37 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nresource requirements. Ideally, from the viewpoint of offset programs \ndesigned to absorb resources freed from defense uses in the shortest \npossible interval, policy makers should know the location, number and \ntype of persons being released from military uses, and the same infor\xc2\xac \nmation about the needs of particular offset programs and the approximate \ntime lags required before the new programs can be started. \n\nAt the present time our information requirements are far from this \nlevel of adequacy. One of the most serious deficiencies remains our \ninability to trace prime contract awards down through the various levels \nof subcontracts. Such a capability to know who and where are the sup\xc2\xac \npliers below the prime contractor level is a prerequisite to pinpointing \nthe effects of changes in particular weapons systems. A similar lack of \ninformation limits our capability to accurately foresee the impact of \nvarious compensatory government spending programs. Professor Galbraith \nhas commented that it is a matter of no great concern which government \nprograms replace strategic weaponry provided they are "roughly equivalent \nin scale and technical complexity." 11 This may be true but we know very \nlittle about the characteristics of such offset programs. Oceanography \nand urban transit are unlikely to have the same economic impact. Partic\xc2\xac \nular government programs may come closer to absorbing the kind of \nresources liberated by reduced military spending than do others. Such \ninformation would be very valuable in transition planning. Other criteria \nmust, of course, be considered. The program which comes closest to \nbeing a good substitute for high technology weapons production in terms \nof skill transfers, etc. may not be the highest priority program on the \npolicymaker\'s list. Nevertheless, this type of information would contri\xc2\xac \nbute much to more rational decisions. \n\n1.4.1 Policy Recommendations \n\nVarious recommendations appear throughout this report which have an \nimportant bearing on public policy. For the convenience of the reader \nthey have been brought together in this section and organized under four \nmajor headings: policies designed to aid the adjustment of individual \ndefense workers and of major defense contractors, to encourage the use \nof military resources for social needs, and to aid the adjustment and \ndevelopment of affected regions of the country. \n\n1.4.1.1 Adjustment of Individual Defense Workers \n\nThe following recommendations are designed to help ease the transi\xc2\xac \ntion of displaced defense workers: \n\n\n31 \n\nJohn Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton \nMifflin Company, 1966), p. 346. "" \n\n\n38 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\\ \n\n1) Greater reliance and support should be given to the M tent inter\xc2\xac \nview process run by the affected company or as an on-site program cf the \nEmployment Service. \n\n2) The Computerized Job Bank and matching programs should be ex\xc2\xac \npanded and include special consideration of the defense industry occupa\xc2\xac \ntional structure. \n\n3) A minimum of 6 weeks* advance notice of contract cancellation \n\nor termination should be given to workers to prepare for a smooth transi\xc2\xac \ntion. \n\n4) A public insurance plan is needed to give homeowners liquidity \nof equity and protection against erosion of value. This plan will \neliminate a major impediment to mobility. \n\n5) The \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99experimental lab?r mobility" projects of the U.S. Depart\xc2\xac \nment of Labor should be expanded to include laid-off defense workers. \n\nThese projects include assumption by the government of relocation \ncosts including travel expenses for an interview with a prospective \nemployer. \n\n6) Pilot retraining projects for laid-off defense workers which \nemphasize on-the-job-training as opposed to classroom training should be \nexpanded. \n\n7) The social security laws should be revised to provide early \nretirement at no penalty for laid-off defense workers. \n\n8) The conflicts between regulations governing unemployment in\xc2\xac \nsurance eligibility and provisions for severance pay should be eliminated. \nThese conflicts\' exist in 22 states and serve to reduce income to the \nlaid-off worker. \n\n9) Similar conflicts (in # 25 states) between the unemployment in\xc2\xac \nsurance system and retraining programs should also be eliminated. These \nconflicts serve to discourage retraining. \n\n1.4.1.2 Assistance to Firms Losing Large Volumes of Military Orders \n\nTo aid individual firms in applying their capabilities in non\xc2\xac \nmilitary areas, the Federal government could: \n\n1) Subsidize non-military research and development. This might be \ndone by \n\na. providing a tax rebate for commercial R & D similar \n\nto the tax credit for investment in producers* durable equipment. \n\nb. the establishment of some form of joint industry-government \n\nfinancing of commercial R & D efforts with repayment of the govern\xc2\xac \nment share if profitable operations result. \n\n\n39 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nc. providing long-term loans and loan guarantees and the \n\nleasing of idle government owned plant and equipment for non\xc2\xac \ndefense R & D work. \n\nd. providing technical assistance to discover non-military \n\napplications for surplus scientific and engineering skills. \n\n2) Increase its nondefense procurement programs in ways designed \nto utilize defense-oriented skills in meeting public sector requirements \nin nondefense areas. \n\n3) Permit defense contractors to charge some commercial product \nplanning as an allowable cost on defense contracts. \n\n1.4.1.3 Alternative Uses of Military Resources for Social Needs \n\nThe following recommendations should help guide the transfer of \nmilitary resources to social needs: \n\n1) Perhaps the Armed Services can offer a more benign socialization \nexperience for ghetto residents by actively recruiting individuals from \ndisadvantaged backgrounds, treating them "no different from anyone else," \nand persuading them that they can do a job for which they will be \nrewarded. Various training/career inducements utilizing the large scale \nmilitary vocational education system can be used to attract prospective \nenlistees. \n\n2) Project Transition should be expanded and deepened to provide \nsoon-to-be-discharged servicemen with marketable skills. Training under \nProject Transition should be made available to servicemen on overseas \nassignment to correct the present inhibiting requirement that limits \neligibility to military personnel with six months of remaining service \ntime. Many returning veterans are discharged within a short time after \ntheir return to the United States and thereby are not able to benefit \nfrom the program. The bottleneck in the construction industry might be \neased by increasing the number of servicemen receiving training in the \nbuilding trade occupations. \n\n3) The large scale vocational education system operating in the \nmilitary should become the focus of a major research venture to test the \neffectiveness of various teaching techniques with servicemen of diverse \nbackgrounds. The results should be widely disseminated for the benefit \nof civilian education. \n\n4) Information on the location of job opportunities should be pro\xc2\xac \nvided to servicemen soon-to-be-discharged to prevent their congregating \nin a few already overcrowded urban areas. \n\n5) The criteria for Federal contract placement might be broadened \nto allow weight to be given to societal benefits resulting from employ- \n\n\n40 \n\n\n\n\n\\ \n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nment growth in the ghettos and other areas of underprivileged manpower. \n\ni \n\n6) A special program to recruit from depressed regions and urban \nghettos to fill the many civilian jobs in DOD not requiring managerial \nor high skills should be considered. \n\n7) When military bases or other facilities are to be closed, \nadequate notice should be provided to all concerned to plan for the ad\xc2\xac \njustment. Studies suggest that one year between notification and \nclosure is an optimal time period. \n\n8) Surplus military scientists and technicians might be transferred \nto a new \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99think tank\xe2\x80\x9d concerned with the solution of domestic problems. \nIts work should be closely integrated with a new government agency con\xc2\xac \ncerned with the coordination of civilian problems. The provision and \ndelivery of health care in the United States has come under severe \ncriticism and the military medical system should be utilized as a pool \nfor experimentation and innovation with approaches and techniques. \n\nHousing and public order are also critical areas where the military \nexperience might be examined for feasibility of transfer to the civilian \nsector. The transfer of concepts such as systems analysis to domestic \nmissions should be carefully considered. Such transfers must be under\xc2\xac \ntaken with full awareness that civilian systems are often more decentral\xc2\xac \nized, pluralistic and less technological than their military counter\xc2\xac \nparts , and hence do not lend themselves as easily to this approach to \nproblem solving. \n\n9) In instances where military units can be used directly to \nhandle clearly identifiable civilian needs, simple unit transfer may \nsuffice. Such a case might be the transfer of a military hospital unit \nto a State Department of Public Health. In such cases, a military- \ncivilian matching center could be useful. It is more likely, however, \nthat major modifications of the military unit will be necessary. The \nreassignment of entire professional teams or laboratories may facilitate \na quick transition but contains the danger of retention of ingrained \n"military\xe2\x80\x9d approaches which may be undesirable. Ideally, ex-military \nteams of professionals or individuals should be transferred in small \nnumbers at a time to allow the established receiving civilian units to \nabscrb the newcomers. \n\n1.4.1.4 Regional Adjustment and Development \n\nA high priority use for funds and resources released from military \npurposes is in the area of regional and urban problems. A prerequisite \nto effective long-range action here is the formulation of a national \npolicy for guiding regional and urban development. The types of issues \nwhich such a policy would have to consider are discussed in the \nCumberland paper. In addition, however, there are challenging short- \n\n\n41 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nterm problems which hinder the attainment of a smooth transition for \ncommunities and regions particularly vulnerable to cutbacks in military \nspending. Five general policy recommendations have previously been \nadvanced by the National Planning Association and warrant repetition; \n\n1) A clear statement by the Federal government on the necessity \nfor arms reduction planning should be made to combat scepticism concern\xc2\xac \ning its likelihood. \n\n2) The Federal government should underscore its committment to \nthe maintenance of high levels of employment and purchasing power as \nrequired under the Employment Act of 1946. In addition, it should \nclarify the degree of its obligation to assist individual firms and \nspecific regions of the country. \n\n3) Both national and regional policies of the Federal government \nadopted to meet the impact problems of arms reduction should be blended \nwith other policies to promote economic growth and to aid in readjust\xc2\xac \nment to other dislocations. Thus, attention should be focused on the \nalleviation of distress, regardless of its particular cause. \n\n4) A reexamination of manpower and unemployment assistance policies \nshould be conducted with respect to their adequacy in (a) aiding the \nadjustment process and (b) mitigating distress situations prior to \nlonger run adjustment. \n\n5) More careful advance planning by all levels of government and \ninterested private groups is necessary to enable vulnerable communities \nto make a successful and rapid transition. \n\n\n42 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTHE MANY DIMENSIONS OF THE MILITARY EFFORT \nBernard Udis and Murray L. Weidenbaum \n\nII.1 OVERALL MILITARY SPENDING \n\nAn effort to evaluate the economic importance of national spending \nfor military purposes must grapple with the issue of the appropriate \nbackdrop against which the defense budget should be measured. The \nbroadest and most widely used measure of military spending is the Office \nof Business Economics (OBE) series on Federal Government Purchases of \nGoods and Services for national defense. Essentially it consists of the \ncosts of the military functions of the Department of Defense and military \nassistance to other nations. Table 1 shows the long term behavior of \nthis series since 1939 in absolute form and also as a percent of all \nFederal purchases of goods and services, of purchases of goods and \nservices at all government levels (Federal, State, and Local), and of \nGross National Product. \n\n* \n\nRapid growth of GNP, of the civilian expenditures of the Federal \nGovernment and of state and local governments has brought down the share \nof GNP and of all government purchases of goods and services going to \nmilitary purposes to 8.5 and 37.1 percent, respectively, in 1969. Despite \nrecent declines from the cold war highs of the 1950\'s, the relative \nmagnitude of military purchases remains striking. Over three fourths \nof all Federal purchases of goods and services and almost 45 percent of \nFederal budge\xc2\xa3 outlays (Table 2) have gone for defense purposes in \nrecent years. \n\nThe secular increase in the Federal Government\'s concern with defense \nmatters is brought home dramatically by an examination of changes over \nthe past three decades. As shown in Table 1 the share of Federal outlays \non goods and services for defense during the 1960\'s (79.3%) was remark\xc2\xac \nably close to its level during the 1940\'s (79.8%). It is, however, down \nfrom the 86.3% of the cold war years of 1950-1959. Similarly, Federal \nbudgetary outlays for defense averaged 45.6% during the 1960\'s, down from \nthe 57.9% in the 1950-1959 period and 55.2% during the 1940\'s. Despite \nthe recent trend downward, it remains true that military outlays account \nfor a massive portion of Federal expenditures. \n\nTo state that the military outlays of the United States have been \nand are large by various of these measures is not to state a judgment \nabout their appropriaten ess or adequacy. This vital topic is not one of \n\n^The apparent discrepancy between these two series is attributable \nto the fact that the Federal Budget includes sizeable interest, trans\xc2\xac \nfer, and subsidy payments in addition to purchases of goods and services. \n\n43 \n\n\n/ \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe concerns of this study and hence it would t^e inappropriate for the \npresent writers to enter into this debate now. \n\nII.2 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION \n\nThe distribution of military contract awards among the various re\xc2\xac \ngions of the country is quite uneven and changes over time. These points \nare illustrated in Table 3. Since the Korean War (FY 1952) , the value \nof prime defense contracts awarded has dropped from 25 percent to 17-18 \npercent in the Middle Atlantic states; dropped from 27 percent to 12 \npercent in the East North Central region; and climbed sharply in the \nSouth, particularly in the South Central area, rising there from 6 per\xc2\xac \ncent to over 15 percent. The share of the Pacific Coast states, plus \nAlaska and Hawaii, almost 22 percent, is somewhat above the 1952 level \nof 18 percent but some six points below the cold war year of 1962, largely \nreflecting sharp drops in California and Washington. \n\nPart of the shifts may be due to regional specialization in parti\xc2\xac \ncular military goods, the importance of which will vary with different \nstrategic programs and their coneommitant procurement mixes. Thus, \nfrom 68 to 75 percent of all tank-automotive contracts have been awarded \nin the East North Central region in recent years (see Table 4). That \nthis is not a complete explanation is evident from the appreciable re\xc2\xac \ngional shifts within the various classes of military equipment shown in \nTable 4. Of particular interest is the gain in the share of aircraft \nprime contracts awarded in the South Central region\xe2\x80\x94from 7.5 in FY 1962 \nto approximately 25 percent. The same region also showed an impressive \ngain in ammunition prime contracts and a jump to near dominance in ship\xc2\xac \nbuilding in FY 1970 countering the declines in the shares of the New \nEngland and Pacific Coast states. Indeed, the South seems impervious \nto cycles in either the size or composition of defense spending having \nsteadily increased its relative standing as a defense producing region \nfrom the Korean War through the Cold War and Vietnam (see Table 3). \n\nAnother measure of regional variation in the importance of defense \noperations is found in the "defense dependency" ratio , the ratio of \ndefense-generated employment to the total work force. Table 5 presents \nsuch ratios for both civilian and military personnel, by state, for \nDecember of 1965, 1966, and 1967. The civilian ratio tends to be more \nstable. Eight states have had civilian ratios of 5 percent or more at \neach reported point in time. In declining order of their most recent \n\n2 \n\nThe charges that present military expenditures are excessive due to \nwaste in weapons acquisition or because of exaggerated concern over the \nthreat posed to the security of the United States by foreign powers are \nlegion. For a balanced reply which stresses the ravages of inflation and \nfrequent pay increases into our true military strength, see Robert C. \n\nMoot, "Address to the 1970 Graduating Class of the Army Comptrollership \nSchool, Syracuse University, July 31, 1970," processed. \n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nranking, they are: Alaska (10.1), Utah (9.2), Hawaii (8.8), Virginia \n(8.5), Connecticut (7.6), Maryland (6.6), New Hampshire (6.6), and \nCalifornia (6.3). The ratio for the nation was 3.6. The importance \nof defense expenditures for such metropolitan areas as Washington, D.C., \nBoston, Wichita, Cape Kennedy, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Huntsville is \nwell known, and, when induced employment effects are considered, it has \nbeen estimated that in some areas almost 50 percent of local jobs can \nbe traced to defense-related expenditures. \n\nII.3 INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION \n\n\nOnly a relatively small number of industries (largely durable goods \nproducers such as aircraft, electronics, motor vehicles, petroleum re\xc2\xac \nfining, chemicals, rubber, and construction) are heavily involved in \ndefense work, and only a few of their constituent companies account for \nthe larger part of defense contracts. Military contracts doubtless \nbecome more widely diffused through companies, industries, and regions \nwhen the various levels of subcontracting are considered. From FY 1960 \nto 1965 the estimated share of military prime contract awards performed \nin the United States which were subcontracted fell from 45.4 percent to \n\n33.7 percent. The post 1965 years of the Vietnam enlargement saw a re\xc2\xac \ncovery in the subcontracted share to 39.9 percent in FY 1969, followed \nby a dip to 38.3 percent in FY 1970.\xe2\x80\x9c* Of all subcontract awards in FY \n1967, 43.3 percent went to small business firms. This was a recent high \npoint and the small business share of subcontracts.has fallen back to \n\n36.7 percent in FY 1970, the lowest since FY 1959. \n\n\n3 \n\nSee Charles Tiebout, "The Regional Impact of Defense Expenditures: \nIts Measurement and Problems o.f Adjustment," in U.S. Congress, 88th Con\xc2\xac \ngress, 1st Session, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Sub\xc2\xac \ncommittee on Employment and Manpower, Nation\'s Manpower Revolution, Part \n7 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 2516-2523. \n\n^Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Defense Expenditures and the Domestic Econo\xc2\xac \nmy," in Stephen Enke (ed.), Defense Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: \nPrentice-Hall, 1967), p. 322. \n\n^Office of the Secretary of Defense, Directorate for Information \nOperations, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments or \nCommitments, July 1969-June 1970 (Washington: Department of Defense, \n1970), pp. 12-13, and 57, Tables 3 and 18. \n\n6 Ibid., p. 57, Table 18. Generally, a small business concern is one \nthat is independently owned and operated, is not dominant in its field \nof operations, and with its affiliates does not employ more than a \nspecified number of employees (usually not more than 500, 750 or 1000) \ndepending on the type of product called for by the contract. \n\n\n45 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThere is some evidence that in recent years the concentration among \nprime contractors has lessened somewhat. Table 6 indicates a drop in the \nshare of military prime contract awards accounted for by the top one \nhundred companies from three-fourths in FY 1961 to 64-68 percent in recent \nyears. This move toward deconcentration may well be a temporary phenomenor \nreflecting the peculiar needs of the Vietnam conflict. \n\n\nThere is limited turnover among the top 100 defense contractors and \nthirty-eight firms have been on the list every year since fiscal 1959. \nSix firms (Lockheed, North American, General Dynamics, General Electric, \nATuT, and United Aricraft) have been among the top ten defense contrac\xc2\xac \ntors every year between 1959 and 1970. Sperry Rand, Boeing, and General \nMotors join the list of annual repeaters when it is expanded to take in \nthe top twenty firms. Other occasional visitors to the top twenty group \ninclude Avco, Bendix, Grumman Aircraft, General Tire, Hughes, RCA, \nWestinghouse, IBM, Textron, Honeywell, Ford, LTV, Olin Mathieson, Kaiser, \nThiokol, and IT&T. The high concentration among aerospace and electron\xc2\xac \nics specialists is apparent. \n\n\nThe low turnover among the leading military producers reflects the \nbarriers to both entry into and exit from the defense market. Particular \nly in aerospace and electronics,entry is limited to those firms possess\xc2\xac \ning the scientific and engineering skills required to design and manu\xc2\xac \nfacture modem weapons systems. Exit barriers may be inferred from the \nrelatively unsuccessful attempts of these firms to penetrate civilian \nmarkets. It should be noted, however, that the list of the top 100 \nDefense Contractors is a better indicator of Defense Department depen\xc2\xac \ndency on particular firms than of the reverse relationship. While a \ncomplete analysis is difficult due to data limitations it is clear that \nthe military work performed by many firms among the top 100 accounts for \na relatively small share of their total sales. While there is a fair \ndegree of overlap between the top 100 defense contractors and, say, the \nFortune 500, it does not appear that the giants of American corporations \ndepend heavily upon defense business. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThe defense program relies heavily upon unique and special purpose \nresources. Weidenbaum told a Congressional committee in 1963 that at \nleast 80 percent of the military equipment at the beginning of World War \nI consisted of standard peacetime goods which were the product of normal \n\n\nJohn S. Gilmore and Dean C. Coddington, Defense Industry Diversifi\xc2\xac \ncation , U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 30 (Washing\xc2\xac \nton: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 42-53; and Murray L. \nWeidenbaum and A. Bruce Rozet, Potential Industrial Adjustments to Shifts \nin Defense Spending (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, \n1963), pp. 25-37. See also the Weidenbaum chapter in this study. \n\n\n46 \n\n\nf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\npeacetime production lines. He estimated the special-purpose proportion \nas up to almost 50 percent in 1941 and to about 90 percent in 1963. 8 \n\nAs has been emphasized by Cherington and Galbraith, the procurement \nof sophisticated weapons systems takes place in a rarified atmosphere in \nwhich the distinction between buyer and seller becomes blurred due to \nthe interdependence of the organizations, the growing commonality of goals, \nand the daily intermingling of personnel from both groups over extended \nperiods of time. 9 Thus, with the exception of relatively standardized \nitems with close civilian counterparts such as food, clothing, housing, \netc., the majority of our military expenditures are made in an environ\xc2\xac \nment far removed from the presumed "arms-1ength" dealings of the market. 1 \nPurchases of such specialized items as aircraft (including assemblies, \nengines, and other aircraft equipment and supplies), missile and space \nsystems, ships, and electronics and communication equipment were account\xc2\xac \ning for about two-thirds of the net value of military prime contract \nawards in the first half of the past decade. Only with the immediate \npressures of the Vietnam War to field a large force equipped with con\xc2\xac \nventional weapons has the share dipped below 60 percent in fiscal years \n1966-1969. The burgeoning post-1965 growth in contract awards for com\xc2\xac \nbat vehicles, weapons, ammunition, textiles and clothing, military \nbuilding supplies and transportation equipment is shown in Table 7. \n\nII.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSE MANPOWER \n\nThe skills and training of persons employed in defense-related in\xc2\xac \ndustries are strikingly different from those of the overall labor force. \n\n\nMurray L. Weidenbaum, M The Transferability of Defense Industry \nResources to Civilian Uses," in U.S. Congress, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, \nSenate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment \nand Manpower, Convertibility of Space and Defense Resources to Civilian \nNeeds \xe2\x80\xa2 A Search for New Employment Potentials (Washington: Government \n\nPrinting Office, 1964), pp. 848-855, especially pp. 850-851. \na \n\nPaul W. Cherington, "The Interaction of Government and Contractor \nOrganizations in Weapons Acquisition" in Richard A. Tybout (ed.), \nEconomics of Research and Development (Columbus: Ohio State University \nPress, 1965), pp. 327-343. \n\n^John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton \nMifflin Company, 1966), pp. 317-323. \n\n11 A detailed treatment of the structure of the defense industry is \nbeyond the scope of this study. The standard reference remains Merton \nJ. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An \nEconomic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business \nAdministration, 1962). A more recent treatment is found in William L. \nBaldwin, The Structure of the Defense Market, 1955-1964 (Durham, N.C.: \nDuke University Press, 1967). \n\n\n47 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\nIn FY 1968 defense generated employment was estimated at 4.7 million or \n6.1% of total employment. As shown in Table 8, the labor force in \ndefense-related employment is generally more skilled than is the overall \nlabor force. Somewhat more than one-fifth of defense workers in fiscal \n1968 were in the skilled craftsman category compared with only 13.2 per\xc2\xac \ncent in the general labor force. Semiskilled workers and professionals \nemployed in defense industries accounted for 26.4 and 14.4 percent of the \ntotal compared with 18.4 and 12.8 percent, respectively, in the overall \nlabor force. The share of clerical employment in defense industries was \nsomewhat higher while that of service and sales workers were appreciably \nlower than in the general labor force. \n\n\n\n\n\nIn particular occupations defense employment represents very large \nproportions of those employed; for example an estimated 59 percent of \nall aeronautical engineers, 54 percent of airplane mechanics, 38 percent \nof non-professor physicists, and 22 percent of electrical engineers. \nDefense work also contributes significantly to the demand for electricians \nand the various metal trades workers. \n\nWhen one turns to military personnel it becomes more difficult to \nmake occupational comparisons which focus upon skill requirements be\xc2\xac \ncause few military jobs have direct civilian counterparts. \n\nLevels of educational attainment are available and may provide a \nrough proxy for skill. The proportion of military personnel and of those \nin the civilian labor force with high school and college degrees is shown \nfor selected years in Table 9. The difference in high school completion \nbetween the two groups is striking. In recent years four-fifths of en\xc2\xac \nlisted military personnel had four years of high school compared with \nonly about a third of the civilian male labor force. While the mean age \nof servicemen is doubtless lower than that of the civilian labor force \nwhich would permit the general trend toward more years of schooling to \nregister its influence more clearly in the military, the relatively high \nselection standard of the armed services is obvious. Skewness toward \nthe younger ages among military personnel and variable deferment \npolicies on college students makes it more difficult to interpret the \ndata on college graduates. Nevertheless, appreciable reductions in \n\n\nThe source of all FY 1968 occupational data in this section is Max \nA. Rutzick, "Skills and Location of Defense-Related Workers," Monthly \nLabor Review, Vol. 93, No. 2 (February, 1970), pp. 11-16. \n\n13 \n\nWool has estimated that 80 percent of military jobs held by en\xc2\xac \nlisted men correspond to only about 10 percent of those held by male \ncivilian workers. See Harold Wool, The Military Specialist: Skilled \nManpower for the Armed Services (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, \n1968), p. 55. \n\n\ni \n\n\n48 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nmilitary spending and in the size of the armed forces will free better \neducated and more highly skilled persons for work in civilian oriented \npursuits. \n\nWhether these persons will have a relatively easy time in trans\xc2\xac \nferring to civilian oriented employment will depend upon the degree of \ntransferability of their skills and their individual flexibility. As \nhas sometimes been noted, however, the wider availability of such people \nwith "desirable\xe2\x80\x9d traits and characteristics as viewed by employers may \nonly serve to worsen the job outlook for disadvantaged workers lacking \nsuch skills and training. The issue relates to jjje dependence upon \ncredentials as job prerequisites in our society. Clearly, the adjust\xc2\xac \nment problems of all groups will be less difficult in an environment \nof high aggregate demand. \n\nII.5 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY SPENDING \n\nWhile most of the research and development activities in the United \nStates are supported by the Federal government, the proportion of the \ntotal funded by the government has been declining since the mid-1960 ! s. \nThe federally-supported share of totaJ^R & D has fallen from about two- \nthirds in 1964 to 55 percent in 1970. As in prior years, the bulk of \nFederal support in 1970 (82 percent), will come from the Department of \nDefense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and \nthe Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). While still large, this share is \ndown almost ten percentage points from the 91 percenj^of total Federal \nsupport which these three agencies provided in 1960. This shift re\xc2\xac \nflects the sharp decline in the NASA research budget and the continued \ngrowth in the research activities of the Department of Health, Education \nand Welfare (HEW). (See Table 10) One consequence of this shift is the \nswing from research involving machinery and systems to more socially \noriented study. \n\n\n^ See Ivar Berg, Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery \n(New York: Praeger, 1970); and M. J. Bowman, "Educational Shortage and \nExcess,\xe2\x80\x9d The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. \n\nXXIX, No. 4 (November, 1963), pp. 446-461, especially pp. 459-460. See \nalso Daniel E. Diamond and Hrach Bedrosian, Industry Hiring Requirements \nand the Employment of Disadvantaged Groups (New York: New York University \nSchool of Commerce, 1970). \n\n15, \'Science Resources Studies Highlights,\xe2\x80\x9d August 14, 1970, Washington, \nNational Science Foundation, NSF 70-28, p. 1. \n\n16 Ibid., p. 2. \n\n\n49 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe Department of Defense has been described as our "real National \nScience Foundation." In FY 1970 it is expected to provide 49.4 per\xc2\xac \ncent ($7.8 billion) of total Federal obligations for R & D. While down \nsignificantly from its four-fifthjglevel in the early 1950 \'s and the \n70-75 percent range of 1956-1960, it still is a major patron of science \nand development. When the FY 1970 obligations are broken down into basic \nresearch, applied research, and development, the DOD supj^rt shares be\xc2\xac \ncome approximately 11, 36, and 62 percent, respectively. \n\n\nTable 11 shows the relative decline in military R & D spending \nsince the intensification of Vietnam hostilities and the shifts in its \nregional distribution. Table 12 reflects a similar slowdown in total \nFederal R & D expenditures. The recent pressures on the DOD to postpone \nproduction until weapons have been more thoroughly tested, the need to \nremedy deficiencies in weapon systems unearthed during the Vietnam \nfighting, the need for more advanced inspection techniques that might \ngrow out of the SALT proceedings, and normal modernization requirements \nall suggest that increased military R & D may be anticipated. Research \nspending in the civilian area has also bean restrained during the war \nand will lil;ely grow too. In any event, those sections of the country \nwith a comparative advantage in research capabilities will directly \nbenefit from enlarged research budgets. The FY 1970 data in Table 11 \nsuggest that longer term shifts may be underway in the location of mili\xc2\xac \ntary R & D with Alaska and Hawaii and the states of the West North Cen\xc2\xac \ntral region gaining and those of the Mountain region lagging. \n\nThere seems little reason to fear that a reduction in the role of \nthe Pentagon will lead to a gap in R & D expenditures which will be \ndifficult to fill. Although advocates of particular research programs \nwill have to face increasingly sophisticated review boards. Federal \nsupport of science is likely to be a fixture on the American scene in \nthe foreseeable future. \n\nIndeed, a cooling off in the rate of growth of military R & D \nmay have a salutary effect on civilian research. Nelson has suggested \nthat the substitution problem may result in an overstatement of the \n\n17 Michael D. Reagan, "Science and Politics-Emerging Tensions," \npaper prepared for delivery at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American \nPolitical Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September 8-12 \n1970, p. 10. \n\n18 \n\nComputed from data in National Science Foundation, Federal Funds \nfor Research t Development, and Other Scientific Activities^, Fiscal Years \n\n1968, 1969, and 1970 , Vol. XVIII (Washington: Government Printing Office \n\nAugust, 1969), pp. 248-249. * \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0^NSF 70-28, op. cit., p. 1. \n\n\n50 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n20 \n\nreal impact of military R & D. That is, military support of research \nmay be a substitute for, rather than an addition to non-defense support. \nIf this is, in fact, the case, then a withdrawal of DOD research support \nmay result in more R & D spending by private firms or other government \nagencies. In addition, it is possible that the high level of military \nR & D in recent years has retarded the growth of civilian R & D by \nbidding up salaries and by absorbing the top science and engineering \ngraduates, significantly reducing both the quantity and quality of the \nresearch effort in civilian laboratories. \n\nII. 6 MILITARY PROGRAMS AND SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION \n\nThe DOD may be likened to the perennial iceberg in terms of its \nmany little-known functions. Particularly when coupled with heavy \nreliance upon the draft as a source of military manpower needs, the \nmilitary establishment has an impressive but largely unmeasured capacity \nas an engine of social change. The first major application of Federal \npower to combat racial discrimination was President Truman\xe2\x80\x99s desegrega\xc2\xac \ntion of the Armed Services twenty years ago. Defense Secretary McNamara \nsupported open housing by declaring as off limits those private off base \nhousing units whose owners refused to rent to Negro servicemen. \n\nEx-Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford intensified the open-housing \ndrive and, in additon initiated broad socio-economic programs in three \nother areas, as follows: \n\n1. Research is being conducted in new building materials and \nproduction techniques aimed at lowering housing costs. \n\n2. Hospital automation in the military is being intensively \nexplored to develop lower cost medical care. \n\n3. New educational techniques are being developed for training \ndisadvantaged young men. Under Project 100,000, that number of \nmen is taken into the military annually who normally would not \nqualify for military service. They are given special teaching \n\nto help them qualify for and successfully complet^basic training \nand, if possible acquire simple technical skills. There is also \nProject Transition which is designed to provide job skills for \n\n\n20 Richard R. Nelson, "The Impact of Arms Reduction on Research and \nDevelopment," The American Economic Review , Vol. LIII, No. 2 (May, 1963), \npp. 435-446; especially p. 436. \n\n21 Ibid., p. 445. \n\n22 \n\n"Pentagon Widens \'Do-Gooder\' Role," Business Week , No. 2041 (Oc\xc2\xac \ntober 12, 1968), pp. 79-80. \n\n\n51 \n\n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nsoon-to-be-discharged servicemen \n\n\n23 \n\n\n\nSocial scientists who have noted the use of the armed forces as a \ntraining and socializing device in the emerging countries have all but \nignored the process in the United States. Clifford focused attention \nupon this role by revealing in a speech that he was calling for a series \nof proposals from his top assistants "on how we may assist in alleviating \nsome of our most pressing domestic problems and how thg^Department of \nDefense should best organize itself for this purpose." He explicitly \nraised the question of whether, in awarding contracts, the Pentagon \nshould consider "not only whether the best weapon can be purchased for \nthe cheapest price, but also whether the measuremen^of social utility \nshould be included in the contract award decision?" The Republican \nAdministration appears to have continued some of these efforts. In \nApril, 1969, Secretary of Defense Laird announced the establishment of \na Domestic Action Council "composed of high level officials from the \nOffice of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Military \nServices to insure a widespread, coordinated approach to the Depart\xc2\xac \nment\'s domestic action programs." Among other functions it was to pro\xc2\xac \nvide communication with the Presidents Urban Affairs Council. Secretary \n\n\n\n\nLaird emphasized six general areas in which he felt the DOD could help \nresolve domestic problems: procurement (contract set asides for areas \nof concentrated unemployment), manpower (various training programs for \nservicemen and disadvantaged civilians), knowledge transfer (technological \nspillover), assets (disposal of surplus property), community relations, \nand discrimination (various policies to insure equal rights for service\xc2\xac \nmen) . \n\n\n\n\nAn interagency study group has been established to encourage co\xc2\xac \noperation between military and civilian departments in research on common \n\n23 \n\nFor a rather favorable report on Project Transition see "Making \nCivilians Out of Soldiers," Business Week , No. 2143 (September 26, 1970), \npp. 68-70. \n\n24 \n\nPossible exceptions are the current Twentieth Centiiry Fund study \nof the impact of the military on American society, directed by Adam \nYarmolinsky of Harvard Law School, and the work of the Inter-University \nSeminar on Armed Forces and Society at the University of Chicago under \nthe direction of the sociologist, Morris Janowitz. \n\n25 \n\nSpeech by Clark M. Clifford to the National Security Industrial \nAssociation on September 26, 1968, Washington, D.C. \n\n26 Ibid. \n\n27 \n\n"Address by Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense at Commencement \nExercises, St. Leo College, St. Leo, Florida, April 26, 1969," Department \nof Defense News Release No. 321-69, pp. 4 and 5. \n\n\n52 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nproblem areas. Subcommittees were set up to consider housing, solid \nwaste disposal, indicators of civil disorders, law enforcement and \ncriminal justice, labor, and rehabilitation of criminals. In March 1969, \nthe sixteen DOD-supported Federal Contract Research Centers (RAND, RAC, \nIDA, Mitre Corp. , etc.) were encouraged to devote up to about 20 percent \nof their annual work to non-DOD agencies and Secretary Laird invited the \nheads of civilian departments and agencies to consider utilizing their \nservices. \n\nIt is logical to ask why the Defense Department has undertaken these \ntasks. After all, other agencies are charged with area redevelopment, \nhousing, health, and job training. The Defense Department has argued \nthat its various programs have been designed to assist men in uniform \nand that any by-product consequences are incidental. Nevertheless, the \nimpacts of such programs have-been appreciable and, in some cases, more \nsuccessful than programs of the other agencies with specific responsi\xc2\xac \nbilities in these substantive areas. \n\nPerhaps the answer lies in the relative magnitude of the efforts \nwhich have been mounted, but what this tells us is that national defense \nhas been a much more successful rallying cry for increased appropriations \nthan area development and a variety of social welfare programs. Perhaps \nsome comprehensive form of national service \xc2\xa3gn do a more effective job \nof education and training than the military. Several halting efforts \nhave been made during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, but they \nhave failed to spark widespread Congressional support. Unless increased \nsupport can be developed for these functions to be made the specific \nresponsibility of civilian agencies, there is the possibility that a \nreduction in the role of the Pentagon will result in their disappearance \nin the interstices. There is some evidence that this process may have \nbegun. For example, during 1969 Senator Mike Mansfield provided an \namendment to the defense procurement bill designed to reduce DOD support \nof basic scientific research and to shift the funds to the appropriate \ncivilian agencies. Recently $8.8 million was cut from the military \nbudget and Senator Mansfield attempted to transfer that amount to the \nbudget of the National Science F^^ndation. The proposal was defeated \nin the House of Representatives. The unanswered question is whether \nthis action will result in a net reduction of that amount in Federal \nsupport for scientific research. \n\n^For a recent analysis of the national service alternative see \nDonald J. Eberly (ed.). National Service: A Report of a Conference \n(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968). See also Morris Janowitz, \n\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99American Democracy and Military Service,\xe2\x80\x9d Trans-action , Vol. IV, No. 54 \n(March, 1967), pp. 5-11, 57-59. \n\n^Behavior Today, Vol. 1, No. 10 (July 6, 1970), p. 60. \n\n\n/ \n\n\n53 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThere is no a priori reason why such functions cannot be performed \nunder the aegis of a civilian agency. Indeed, they may be pressed more \nforcefully by agencies which consider them to be primary missions, \nrather than appendages to the basic military mission. The Columbia \nUniversity sociologist, Amitai Etzioni has proposed the establishment \nof a domestic agency to encourage technological development. Such \nefforts, thus far at least, have received little support in Congress. \n\n\nII.7 A COMPARISON OF THE VIETNAM AND KOREAN MOBILIZATIONS \n\nBy almost any measure, the military buildup resulting from the Viet\xc2\xac \nnam hostilities has been smaller than that which occurred during the \nKorean War. Examination of the relevant periods in Table 13 shows much \nlarger numbers of men inducted in the first period. The highest month \nfor military inductions during the Korean War was January, 1951 when \n87,053 men were called. By comparison, during the Vietnam hostilities \nthe record month was October, 1966 when 49,481 men were drafted. Fur\xc2\xac \nther, selective service had to begin from a skeleton organization in \nthe summer of 1950 as no men were inducted into the armed forces from \nJuly, 1949 to August, 1950. In the five months between August, 1950 \nand the end of the year, almost 220,000 men were drafte^ yielding the \nsecond largest monthly average in the 1950-1969 period. \n\nThe same rapid and heavy shift to military operations during the \nKorean War vis-a-vis the present hostilities is shown in Table 14. The \nannual rate of Federal purchases of goods and services for national de\xc2\xac \nfense increased 41 percent between the fourth quarter of calendar 1950 \nand the first quarter of calendar 1951. During the present hostilities \nthe largest rate of increase was 8.2 percent between the second and \nthird quarters of 1966. \n\nTable 15 indicates that military manpower jumped by almost 30 per\xc2\xac \ncent between the second and third quarters of calendar 1950 compared to \nthe maximum of 4.9 percent between the third and fourth quarters of \ncalendar 1965. A similar pattern in the growth of civilian employment \nin the Defense Department is shown in Table 16. \n\nAs a result of the more rapid pace of mobilization, the impact on \nprice levels was larger and more rapid. Price behavior in the two \nperiods may be traced by comparing the implicit price deflators for \n\n\nAmitai Etzioni, "Agency for Technological Development for Domestic \nPrograms," Science, Vol. 164 (April 4, 1969), pp. 43-50. \n\n31 \n\nAnnual Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1967 , pp. 85- \n86; Semi-Annual Report of the Director of Sele ctive Service, for the \n\nPeriod July 1 to December 31, 1967 , p. 37, and Selective Service System, \nSelective Service News , Vol. XX, No. 3 (March, 1970), p. 2. \n\n\n\n54 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nvarious components of Gross National Product by quarters for the 1950- \n1954 and 1965-1970 periods. The comparison is striking. The fighting \nbegan in late June of 1950 and the peak quarterly rate of price advance \n(3.03%) was registered shortly thereafter, between the fourth quarter \nof 1950 and the first quarter\'; of 1951. The next highest rate of price \ngain was only 1.28% and was recorded between the third and fourth \nquarters of 1951. In the successive twelve quarters to the end of 1954 \nthe rate of price change was zero twice, marginally negative twice, and \ndid not exceed 1.24%. The sharp climb in early 1951 was paced by price \nincreases in consumer goods. During the same period, the prices of goods \nand services purchases by the Federal government increased by only 0.13%. \n\nThe Vietnam hostilities began to escalate in August of 1965. As \nshown in the tables previously referred to, the military buildup was \nmore gradual than at the start of the Korean War. The rate of price \nadvance was also more moderate and did not reach 1% until the interval \nbetween the second and third quarters of 1967. However, after that it \ndid not climb by less than 0.9% in any interquarter period and consis\xc2\xac \ntently attained or exceeded 1% per quarter from the spring of 1968 \nthrough the early fall of 1970. The peak interquarter gain was \nnot attained until early 1970 and at that time the gain in consumer \nprices was lagging far behind that for government purchases. In fact \nthis pattern has been typical through much of the period. \n\nThere were of course important differences in policy. A price- \nwage freeze order was issued on January 25, 1951 and even before that \nsome halting efforts at stabilization had begun. The Korean stabili\xc2\xac \nzation program has generally been judged as much less satisfactory than \nthat of World War II. Perhaps more important in moderating the in\xc2\xac \nflationary pace of prices were t^ three major pieces of tax-raising \nlegislation passed in 1950-1951. The delays in requesting and in \nattaining tax increases during the Vietnam conflict stand out in com- . \nparison. Okun has recently presented a detailed account of this period.~ \nIn any event the inflationary pressures were permitted to go unchecked \n\n32 See Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of Labor \nRelations (Homewood, Illinois * Richard D. Irwin, 5th Edition, 1965), \npp. 569-577. \n\n33 Arthur M. Okun, The Political Economy of Prosperity (Washington: \nThe Brookings Institution, 1970), p. 65. \n\n3 ^Ibid., pp. 62-99. For a review of monetary policy during the \nsame period see Darryl R. Francis, "Let\'s Not Retreat in the Fight \nAgainst Inflation, 1 * Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review , Vol. 52, \nNo. 5 (May, 1970), pp. 7-11. \n\n\n55 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n] \n\n\nlonger in the present situation and the tax surcharge which was finally \nadopted was short-lived and mild. \n\n\n\nThe higher level of military preparedness from which we began in \nthe Vietnam conflict made it unlikely that the wrenching adjustments \nof the Korean mobilization would be repeated, and it is not unlikely \nthat the demobilization after Vietnam will also be smooth. Our ex\xc2\xac \nperience with the management of fiscal and monetary policy has grown \nin the interim, and we should be better able to handle the short-term \nproblems of transition. In part the conventional nature of the present \nbuildup will probably ease the problem since most of the military pro\xc2\xac \ncurement has been in industries where civilian markets exist, and where \nconversion to servicing such markets should present no great problem. \n\nAn obvious exception will be ammunition plants which have been started \nvirtually from scratch in areas relatively remote from urban industrial \ncomplexes. A special DOD study examined 292 l^or market areas where \ndefense dependency was considered significant. Twenty-five of them \nregistered a defense dependency ratio of 15 percent or more, and of \nthese communities, fifteen were in the "under 25,000 labor force size \nclass." The communities with the highest dependency ratios were \ntypically dominated by ammunition production. \n\nA recent study for the Arms Control Agency of an ammunition plant \nin Kansas indicated the work force was relatively uneducatg<^, unskilled, \nand drawn from the lower-paid segments of the labor force. An impor\xc2\xac \ntant finding was that in many cases, employment at the plant yielded \nsubstantially higher earnings which "meant t^g difference between a \ncomfortable standard of living and poverty." To the extent that these \nfindings of defense worker characteristics may be generalized, they \nsuggest that the burden of adjustment to reduced military spending after \n\n\nVernon M. Buehler, "Economic Impact of Defense Programs," in U.S. \nCongress, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Joint Economic Committee, Economic \nEffect of Vietnam Spending, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing \nOffice, 1967), pp. 870-888. The measure of significant dependence on \ndefense in a labor market was more than 500 defense-generated workers or \na defense dependency rate in excess of five percent. \n\n36 Ibid ., pp. 878-879. \n\n37 \n\nBruce W. Macy, Robert E. Roberts and Patricia Quinlan, Ammunition \nProduction for Vietnam: Impact on Southeast Kansas ,(Washington! Govern- \nment Printing Office, ACDA/E-142, February 12,1970), pp. 7-8. \n\nOQ \n\nIbid., p. 8. \n\n\n56 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\npeace in Vietnam may fall disproportionately upon minority and other \ndisadvantaged workers. However, the fact that many firms currently \nengaged in defense production do have alternative civilian markets sug\xc2\xac \ngests that they may be more responsive to expansionary fiscal and mone- \ntary policies than would the major aerospace firms, for example. \n\nA least as a first approximation, one may speculate that regions \nwhich have benefited most from the Vietnam buildup will be the most \nvulnerable to an economic decline after its cessation. This will be \neven more likely if emphasis shifts from the general purpose forces \nback to the strategic. Table 17 suggests that such a shift away from \ngeneral purpose forces and toward the strategic has already begun. \n\nII.8 SOME POSSIBLE LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY SPENDING \n\n\nThe close dealings between the government and its major defense \ncontractors noted above have been seen ^ some observers as an important \nstep toward rational economic planning. Others have viewed the same \nphenomenon as a distinctly unfavorable development. H. L. Nieburg speaks \nof \xe2\x80\x9d... increasingly irrelevant and meaningless slogans that ignore the \nreal issues of monitoring the partnership between government and industry, \nof reforming the gravitation of policy making to the private government \nof industrial organizations whose internal processes are still beyond \nthe pale of the Constitution... M and notes that "...strictures of old \nvalue systems cannot comprehend Nationalization* by govemmen^contract\xe2\x80\x94 \nby indirect subsidies, by fiscal management and pump priming." \n\n\nWalter Adams, noting that the bulk of defense and space contracts \nare awarded on a negotiated rather than a competitive bid basis, and "as \nmuch the result of political as economic bargaining," describes a con\xc2\xac \nversion process whereby the private contractor has been transformed \ninto a "quasi-governmental, mercantilist corporation, maintained in a \nprivileged position by \xe2\x80\x99royal* franchise." His list of abuses of this \nentrenched position, citing highlights from a lg\xc2\xa35 report of the \nComptroller-General, reads like a horror story. \n\nTq \n\nAndrew Shonfield, Modem Capitalism: The Changing Balance of \nPublic and Private Power (New York and London: Oxford University Press, \n1965), pp. 341-346, and Galbraith, op.cit ., pp. 314-324, 361-368. \n\n^\xc2\xb0H. L. Nieburg, "Social Control of Innovation,\'* American Economic \nReview , Vol. LVIII, No. 2 (May, 1968), pp. 666-677, especially 672-673. \n\n^Walter Adams, "The Military-Industrial Complex and the New \nIndustrial State," American Economic Review , Vol. LVIII, No. 2 (May, \n1968), pp. 652-665, especially 656-657. \n\n\n57 \n\n\ni \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nProfessor Adams attempts to distinguish his position from J. K. \nGalbraith*s by explicitly rejecting any \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99technological determinism" and \nby considering the incestuous nature of the military procurement process \n"...a political problem of governmental creation, protection, and sub\xc2\xac \nsidization of private privilege.Presumably any reduction in govern\xc2\xac \nment defense expenditures would help slow down, if not reverse, this \ntrend toward a position of privilege for the avaricious. \n\nMurray L. Weidenbaum has expressed a somewhat different concern. \nRather than private influence in public decision-making his concern is \nwith "public assumption of, or active participation in, private decision\xc2\xac \nmaking.\xe2\x80\x9d^ sees the procurement of sophisticated weaponry as a pro\xc2\xac \ncess which is enervating in nature and a threat to the survival capabili-^ \nties of the contractor firms. The key aspects of the process are public \ndetermination of what products the contractor firms will produce; gov\xc2\xac \nernment provision of the bulk of the plant, equipment, and working \ncapital used by the contractor firm; and a pervasive assumption of inter\xc2\xac \nnal decision-making functions within the contractor firm by the Federal \ngovernment.^ Here, reduced military spending might weaken this un\xc2\xac \nhealthy dependence upon the government and give these firms a new lease \non a healthy independent existence. \n\nWriting elsewhere in this volume, M. L. Weidenbaum notes the lack of \nsuccess of diversification efforts of the major defense contractors and \ntheir incapacity to market effectively their product in a competitive \nenvironment or to produce in large volume at low cost. This is relevant \nto their capacity to provide answers to a host of social and environ\xc2\xac \nmental problems currently plaguing modem society. The aerospace in\xc2\xac \ndustry has spoken confidently of its unique ability to unleash the same \nsophisticated techniques of problem-solving on various urban problems \nwhich have successfully produced a Polaris missile or a Mach 5 aircraft. \nSome skeptics are unconvinced. It is likely that a real systems break \noccurs when one shifts from physical to social systems which makes more \n\n\n^Ibid. # p. 664. \n\n43 \n\nMurray L. Weidenbaum, "Arms and the American Economy: A Domestic \nConvergence Hypothesis," American Economic Review , Vol. LVIII, No. 2 \n(May, 1968), pp. 428-437, especially p. 428. \n\n^Ibid., p. 664. \n\n\nSee, for example, the prepared statement of Lockheed Aircraft \nCorporation in U.S. Congress, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Commit\xc2\xac \ntee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, \nNation\xe2\x80\x99s Manpower Revolution, Hearings, Part 9 (Washington: Government \nPrinting Office, 1964), pp. 3049-3054. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ndifficult the effective transfer of skills between the two. Efforts at \nsuch transfer are underway and it will be some time before final judg\xc2\xac \nments can be safely make. As W. M. Capron has noted, however, imaginative \nchanges will be necessary on the demand side of those markets as well \nas among the vendors of these services, if successful applications of \nthese techniques to civilian problem areas is likely to occur. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n^William M. Capron, "Discussion" of Weidenbaum paper ( op.cit. ), \nAmerican Economic Review , Vol. LVIII, No. 2 (May, 1968), pp. 438-442, \nespecially p. 440. \n\n\n59 \n\n\n\n\nFEDERAL PURCHASES OF GOODS AND SERVICES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE IN BILLIONS \nOF CURRENT DOLLARS AND AS A PERCENT OF VARIOUS AGGREGATES, 1939-1969 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nCO \n\nw Pm \nCO o \n\n\ng \n\nZD \n\nPu \n\n\nCO \n\nW \n\n\nS \n\n\nt/J \nw co \n\n\nCJ \n\nM \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nw \n\nCO \n\n\nw \n\n\nw \n\nco \n\nw \n\nCm co \nW < \nQ \n\n\na \n\nW W \n\n\nH \n\n\nO \n\n\nI \n\n\nCO \n\nQ \n\nO \n\nO \n\nO \n\nCm \n\nO \n\n\n> \n\no \n\no \n\nhJ \n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\nU Pm \nCO O \n\n\nO \n\n\nUS \n\nw o \n\nCM \n\n\nEd \nco \nS3 \nW \nPm CO \nW *< \nQ \n\n\nCO \nCO C4 \nW CJ \nCO M \n\n< > w \n\nCE P3 CO \n\nq pa \n\nco \n\n\xc2\xa3> Pm \n\nCM pa \n\na* \n\n\npa o \n\nQ O \n\npa \n\nCm Pm \n\nO \n\n\n*5 \n\nO \n\nPm \n\n\n\n\nOOsfOOOO\'NH^COON CO NvOfO^fiO^\'J^OHvD CO \n\n\nNcooco-tvooNHcncn on \nr\xc2\xab*r\xc2\xab\'*.r^r\'**r^.p\xc2\xab\xc2\xab.r\xc2\xab.aooooo r>\xc2\xbb \n\n\ninmoNOor^vomcooNvo vo \n\noooooo\xc2\xab\xc2\xaboooooooon 00 \n\n\n\n\nrHONCMr^vOONUOrH^rH in *0\\vOrH \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nvOinsj\'0\xc2\xabo\xc2\xbbHooincO\'d* \n\n\nOMONvOm^ncMHO \nvOvOvAvOn0sOvOv0n0vO \nOn On On On On O\' #n On On On \nHHHHHHHHHH \n\n\nON \n\nVO \n\nON \n\nH \n\nI \n\nO \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n\n0) \n\n00 \n\n \n\ncn w \nw h w \n\n\n\n w \n\nW CO \n\nw o <1 \n\n\nd \n\nONOOOOmHvO \n\nvO\'Pr^ooaxONONONooco \n\n\n4^ \n\nCM On CO * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 r\\ \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nM \n\nfH Cl, \n\nOt \n\n1 \n\noo m a \n\no d \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\nd \n\nON CO o \n\na) cd \n\ni-"- cm \n\nrH \n\n r>- \n\nCO \n\nCv rH \n\nd \n\nO \n\ncd \n\nC- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nM \n\nON Cl- \n\n \n\nm 4-\xc2\xbb \n\na) o \n\nd \n\no \n\n rH \n\no \n\no o \n\n*H \n\npi \n\no > \n\nP \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 #s \n\na \n\nd co \n\no \n\nO CO \n\no \n\n4-J Q) \n\nw \n\noo d \n\n\nd *H \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H CO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nx d \n\n\nCO PQ \n\n\ncd \n\nu \n\na) \n\n<; \n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nr^- \n\nm \n\n\nr^. \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4-J \n\n& \n\n4-> \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nON \n\n\nCO \n\nr^- \n\nON \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nu \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nON \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nrH \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4H \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n4-4 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nd \n\nSo \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n6 Xi \n\nu \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n61 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nC\\l \n\nw \n\n.J \n\noq \n\n< \n\nH \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\n2: \n\no \n\n\xc2\xab M \n\n\nQ \n\ntil \n\n\nH \n\n< \n\n\nPh 25 \n\n\n0} cd \n\n/\xe2\x80\xa2"~N /\'\xe2\x80\x9cN \n\ncm co \n\n\n3 \n\nH \n\nO \n\nH \n\nP-4 \n\no \n\n6>2 \n\n\nc/3 \n\n<3 \n\n*-J \n\nH \n\nZ) \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nvt \n\n\nCO \n\nr^coCTN m \n\n\nOOCMHMO^NNON O- \n\nm m vo vo - \n\n0- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n52 \n\nCO \n\nP5 \n\n\nH \n\n\'w\' \n\n\'\xe2\x80\x94\' \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n< \n\n<3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n25 \n\n25 \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nM3 \n\nrH \n\n*n \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nO\' \n\n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nr-. \n\no \n\no \n\nrH \n\nM3 \n\n3- \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nO \n\nM3 \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n25 \n\n\n25 \n\n\n00 \n\n00 \n\noo \n\n\nm \n\n \xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\nCO \n\nw \n\n\no \n\no-. \n\nco \n\n\n4-> \n\nCO \n\nw \n\n\n0\\COtNMDin \n\n<3 \n\n\nON \n\nm \n\nco \n\nrH \n\nI \n\no \n\nm \n\n\nON \n\n00 \n\nO\'* \n\nM3 \n\nin \n\n-cr \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\nON \n\nuo \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nin \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nos \n\nON \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\niH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n.H \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n0) \n\n\noc \n\ncd \n\n \n\n<3 \n\n\n62 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n< \n\nH \n\nO \n\nH \n\nX \n\nO \n\n\n\nw \n\n\n/*N \n\nCO \n\n\n03 \n\n25 \n\n\n3 \n\nw \n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\nw \n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nQ \n\nO \n\n4J \n\n\nM \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nH \n\nO \n\n< \n\nCJ \n\na \n\n2 \n\n\n\'w\' \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\nM \n\nPm \n\n04 \n\nE-* \n\n\nW \n\n< \n\n\n25 \n\n\ns \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCO \n\n\n3 \n\nH \n\n3> \n\nO \n\nX \n\nc \n\nH \n\nO \n\nH \n\n\nOOHCOvOvOvOCMsvooC \n\nONvor^HOMnnn^ \n\nONNfOHCNvDHO\'Ost \n\n\nr"\xc2\xbb \n\n \n\n< \n\n\nas \n\nco \n\nOs \n\n\nx o \n3 \n\n\nO \n\n25 \n\n\nX \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\ne \n\nc \n\nX \n\n0) \n\n> \n\n\n4-J 4-1 \n\n\xc2\xb0 \xc2\xb0 . \n\nX X \xe2\x80\x9c \xe2\x80\xa2* \nCOO \n r\xe2\x80\x94 \no Os \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO CD \n\nO \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO r-i \n\no \n\n4-J \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nx \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nin \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nf\xe2\x80\x94i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 cO \n\n\n4-J \n\nQ \n\ncO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n\n(D \n\nOn \n\nO \n\nm \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nCsl \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\n\n>\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\nr*. \n\n1^- \n\n \n\no \n\n4-J \n\n#- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n60 \n\n4-i \n\n3 \n\nN \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 O- \n\n60 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-i \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H CO \n\n3 \n\nO \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*\xe2\x80\x9c5 \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco a, \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDs \n\nCO \n\n6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\'\xc2\xab-\xe2\x9c\x93 *T3 \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\nCM \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOn CO \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n4-J \n\n\nsO \n\nas \n\n\nco \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nCO \n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\nT> \n\n0) \n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\no \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-i \n\nX. CO \n\nX \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\n\nOs \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n60 \n\n\nsO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* *H \n\n#k \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nas \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nX \n\n\nCD \n\n\n3 \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOs CO \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n4-4 \n\nX \n\n\n\nr>. \n\nOn \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nsO \n\non \n\n\nsO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\noo \n\n4-i \n\nX *H \n\nsO \n\no \n\nO \n\n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\nX \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2V \n\n\nMi \n\nX \n\n\nCD \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\non \n\nCO \n\nOs \n\no \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2vJ- \n\nCO \n\ncn \n\no \n\noo \n\n4-i \n\nCO \n\n#k \n\nX \n\ncO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nsO \n\non \n\nON \n\nf"- \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nO rH \n\nO \n\n\nCD \n\n3 \n\nQ) \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H CO \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nCD \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-4 O \n\n4-1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\ne \n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n4-4 -H \n\n4-1 \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\n> \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nOn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n> \nx \n3 \n \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\nQ \n\nX \n\n\nON \n\n\nCO \n\n\nc0 \n\n\n3 \n\n*\xe2\x80\x9c) \n\n\ncO \n\n\nX \n\nCD \n\nrH \n\nCD \n\nX) \n\nCO \n\n\nCD \n\n4-> \n\nCO \n\ne \n\n\nCO \n\nCD \n\n\nO \n\nX \n\nas \n\n\nco \n\n \n\n\n63 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPrime Defense Contract Awards, by Area \n(percentage distribution of dollar volume) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr-. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nCM \n\n\nON \n\n\no \n\nm \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n3- \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nON \n\n\nm \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\n\n>-\xc2\xbb \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nO \n\n\n\nPu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH CM \nCQ nO \n\n\n6^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n? ON \n\n\nOn \n\nr">. \n\nNO \n\n\nNO \n\nr>- \n\nCO \n\n \n\nw \n\n55 \n\n\nd co \n\nCO \n\n\nu \n\n\nfX, \n\n\n\n \n\na \n\nVi \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nU \n\nG \n\na \n\na) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nMl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab \n\n\n\nGO \n\n\n\n\na \n\nMi \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n* \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nd \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nMl \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nVi \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n* \n\no \n\n\nS \n\n0 \n\n\n\nCU \n\nMl \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nG \n\n\nX 3 \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\n4 : \n\nd \n\nMi \n\n\nd \n\nG \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nX \n\nPo \n\ne* \n\n\nMl \n\n0 \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n43 CO \n\ncd \n\nQ \n\nCd \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\n3 \n\ng \n\n\n\nCd \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nMl G \n\nrH \n\n\npH G \n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\n\n44 \n\n\nPM \n\nO \n\nd \n\nMl \n\nCO \n\n43 \n\n\n.X \n\n\nO \n\n\nO \n\n \n\n\n6 \n\nP 35 \n\n4-1 \n\n\nO Ml \n\n\nVI \n\nd *H \n\n\nG \n\n> \n\na\\ \n\nCU \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\na) \n\nO \n\nS GO \n\n* \n\nMl \n\nVi \n\nrH \n\n0 \n\nV) \n\n\nG \n\n43 \n\nG \n\nX> \n\nz \n\nVi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd> \n\nG \n\n1 \n\n*H \n\nPM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nVl \n\nH \n\nG G \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* *H \n\na \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n44 \n\n\nd \n\nG \n\n\nMJ G \n\n*S \n\nd \xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nG > \n\na \n\n* \n\n\nvO \n\nVM \n\n>1 \n\n0 \n\n\nG \n\nMl Ml \n\nCm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H cd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCT> \n\nO \n\nM \n\nMl \n\nCM \n\nd \n\n*H *H \n\n\nco jx \n\nGO Ml \n\nC 0 \n\no \n\nG \n\ni \xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\nG \n\ngo m \n\nG \n\ng d \n\n\nG co \n\nVi CO \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\na \n\n\nG \n\nMl \n\nC \n\nCTv \n\n\nB 33 \n\ncu \n\no cd \n\nO 4 \n\npH \n\n\nDC \n\nG \n\n&\xe2\x80\xa2 td \n\n9 \xc2\xab \n\n\nG *H \n\n\ncu \xc2\xa3 \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nA \n\n\nGh \n\nB 4-1 \n\n6 \n\na #> \n\nG G \n\n* \n\n5 S G \n\nMl \n\npH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\nM \n\n0 \n\ncd \n\nO -H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H *H \n\nG \n\n33 \n\nCO \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n33 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 *H M \n\nVl GO \n\nd \n\n* \n\n\nO \n\n\nO \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nO \n\n43 G \n\n\na) \n\nss \n\n\nco \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\nG \n\nCO \n\n43 \n\nCJ \n\n G *H \n\n\xc2\xabh \xc2\xbb GO \nCO *H \xe2\x80\xa2 \nd 43 G \n\nd o \n\n\xc2\xa32 \n\n\no u cd \n\n\n4M \n\nM \n\n\nMl \nO \nCO \n\ng \nd \ncd c \n\n\nPH \n\n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n1 \n\n\n> CO \n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n** d \ncd o \nc -i \n\n\no Po \n\nrH V ^ \nO Cd O \nCd Cd 3 \n\n44 \n\nX c \n\nO 44 Qj \n\n\nCd X3 \nX) d \nG G \n> \n\na) cd \n\nCO \n* cd \ncd t\xe2\x80\x94( \nd \nGO \n\n\nVl CO \nO *H \n44 Pm \n\n\na) \n\nMl \n\ncd \n\n4 -J \n\n\ng \n\n44 \n\ncd \nu \no \n\nM CO \n\no \n\n0) XJ \nVi d \n\xe2\x80\xa2H cd \nO \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nO \n\nc 3 \n\na \n\n\n\nd \n\n04 \n\n\n* \n\nd \n\n0k \n\nO \n\n!\xc2\xa3 \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nCSI \n\n\nCM 43 \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*H \n\n\n\nMl \n\n0 \n\n\n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\nM \n\n1 \n\n\nG \n\nCd \n\nMl \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nr\xc2\xbb \n\n\n43 \n\n43 \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n\n>4 \n\nG \n\ntH \n\na \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nd \n\n\n0k \n\nO \n\nG \n\n\nB \n\n\n#1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nG \n\nM \n\nG \n\nMl \n\nVi \n\n0k \n\nG \n\nG \n\nTJ \n\nG \n\nG \n\nP 3 \n\nG \n\n44 \n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nB \n\nVi \n\n\xc2\xae \n\nG \n\n\n5 Z \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nMl \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nM \n\n5 \n\n44 \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nCM \n\nd \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nrX \n\nG \n\nd \n\nd \n\nX \n\n\n\nG \n\n>> \n\nd \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nMl \n\n0k \n\nd \n\n5 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n* \n\nQ \n\n43 \n\nG \n\n44 \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nvO \n\n44 \n\n\n*H \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nQ \n\nrH \n\n44 \n\nH \n\nO \n\nd \n\n\n\n44 \n\nG \n\nO \n\n0k \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG \n\nVi \n\n00 \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nVl \n\n\nX) \n\n0 \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\n\nVl \n\nG \n\ny\xe2\x80\x94s \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nd \n\n0k \n\n43 \n\n#\\ \n\nu \n\n \n\n4-1 \n\n\nMl \n\n\nVi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nMl \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nVi \n\nG \n\n\nVi \n\n\nMl \n\nPm \n\n0 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\nG \n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\nVi \n\nU \n\n#1 \n\nG \n\nO \n\nVi \n\n\nG \n\n44 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr^ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0k \n\nd \n\nG \n\nG \n\n0 \n\n\nG \n\npH \n\nO \n\n0 \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nrH \n\n0 \n\nVi \n\n\nO \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCTN \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\n*H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n(H \n\nM \n\nCO \n\nS \n\n43 \n\nB \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n<3 \n\n\nVi \n\nMl \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nvO \n\n\nt \xe2\x80\x944 \n\nG \n\nMl \n\nMl \n\n3 c \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nMl \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCd \n\n0k \n\nMl \n\n\nMJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\nO \n\nCTv \n\nG \n\n05 \n\nd \n\nO \n\nd \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nu \n\n43 \n\nd \n\n\n\nG \n\nMl \n\nd \n\nO \n\nMJ \n\n0k \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nCJ \n\n> \n\nG \n\nG \n\n0 \n\n23 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nG \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nd \n\n0k \n\n\nVi \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\nO \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\nO \n\nd \n\n0 \n\n\nG \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\n23 \n\niH \n\nG \n\nG \n\nd \n\nO \n\nG \n\nB \n\n0k \n\n\nCO \n\nPM \n\n\nG \n\nVi \n\n\nd \n\nC \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n< \n\nH \n\nd \n\nC \n\nG \n\nVi \n\nMl \n\nG \n\nXJ \n\n\n\nV \n\nPM \n\nG \n\nd \n\n0 \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU \n\nVi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nMi \n\nVl \n\nG \n\nd \n\nV \n\n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n> \n\nO \n\nMl \n\nMl \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\n\n\nN \n\n4-1 \n\n\nd \n\nG \n\nd \n\nG \n\nG \n\n0k \n\nr\xc2\xa3 \n\n44 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n*H \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nPM \n\nG \n\n\n43 \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\nB \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nG \n\n\n\nM> \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nrH \n\n\nVl \n\nr \xe2\x80\x941 \n\n43 \n\nCd \n\nG \n\n44 \n\nd \n\nO \n\nd \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\nd \n\nO \n\nu \n\n\nMl \n\n\nG \n\n\n> \n\nG \n\nG \n\n*k \n\n\nG \n\n\nW \n\n\ntH \n\n\n\n\n43 \n\n\n43 \n\n\nMl \n\n4-1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nf 5 ^ \n\n00 \n\nV \n\nPQ \n\nd \n\n\nG \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nMl \n\nMl \n\n\nMl \n\n\nMl \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\nU \n\nd \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nG \n\n> \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\nd \n\nO \n\n4 H \n\nG \n\n\n44 \n\nG \n\n44 \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2> \n\nd \n\nB \n\ntH \n\nMl \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n0 \n\n\n0 \n\n\n0 \n\nG \n\nO \n\nMl \n\n43 \n\nG \n\nX> \n\nG \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nU \n\nG \n\nZ \n\n\nX \n\nW \n\nz \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\na \n\nPM \n\n\n*H \n\nG \n\nu \n\nVl \n\nO \n\nU \n\nCM \n\nd \n\nX \n\nMl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nG \n\n\nu \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nw \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n5 \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n44 \n\nd \n\nG \n\na \n\nG \n\n43 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nV 4 \n\nCO \n\n< \n\n0 \n\na \n\nCM \n\nPM \n\n\n/-\xe2\x96\xa0\xe2\x96\xa0* *H 0 - \n> On \n\\D M H \nCTv G \npH CO * \nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94| vO \nN (6 d\\ \nCM U H \n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP U *\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na) co oo \n\njo h vo \ne M on \n \n\n\no \n\nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nPm \n\nVi \n\nO \n\n44 \n\ncd \n\nM> \n\ncd \n\nQ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H O \nB T) M \n\no g g \nd d i \no o B \na *h o \nw co o \nCO \n\n0) rl H \n\nrH B O \n\n\nH C Vl \nGOG \n\nu \'i \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\nVi \n\nd \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n65 \n\n\n\n\n\nMilitary Prime Contract Awards of $10,000 or More for Major Military \n\nHard Goods \xe2\x80\x94 by Geographic Region \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\no \n\n1 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n6-2 \n\no \n\nr- \n\nrH \n\nc- \n\nsO \n\nCM \n\nr- \n\nO O \n\n\n6-2 \n\nO \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nSO \n\nso \n\nrH \n\no \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\nOS \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94i \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nos \n\no \n\nn \n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\npt-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOs \n\nS-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n5-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns\xc2\xa3> \n\nO \n\n\nrH \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCO \n\no \n\ni"- os \n\n\nO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nsO \n\n\nOn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2K \n\nrH \n\no \n\nin \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nOs \n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nO rH \n\n\nO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nOS \n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nrH \n\n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nU0 \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n5-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n5-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns\xc2\xa3> \n\nO \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nn* \n\n00 <3" \n\n\nO \n\nr-. \n\nrH \n\no \n\nO \n\n\nOs \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nO\' \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt-H \n\no \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nos \n\nO \n\nso \n\no o \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n<* \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nUO \n\n\n>* \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n6-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n6-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 sO \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nsO \n\no \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\nOS o \n\n\nO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nin \n\nr-^ \n\nCM \n\nOS \n\nOS \n\n\ncd os \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHC \n\n4-i t-H \n\nO \n\nm \n\nCnI \n\nO \n\nos \n\nO \n\nrH \n\no o \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nO \n\n<1- \n\nCM \n\nOs \n\nCO \n\nso \n\nCM \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nU0 \n\n\nH \xc2\xa3 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ne \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPi sO \n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n5-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 sD \n\no \n\nOs \n\nuo \n\nrH \n\n<1- \n\nOS \n\no \n\nCO os \n\n\nO \n\ni"- \n\nrH \n\nr-. \n\nn \n\n00 \n\nO \n\nuo \n\nr- \n\n\nO O\'* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHC \n\nM i\xe2\x80\x94 \n\no \n\no \n\no- \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\nrH CM \n\n\nO \n\nOs \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n-a- \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nVO \n\n00 \n\n\n\nO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94I \n\n\nO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4M PM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4J m \n\n6-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n6-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG o> \n\nO \n\nc*. \n\nCN \n\nin \n\nOs \n\nM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPm Pm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2< \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n6-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n6-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nsD \n\no \n\nr-. \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nUO \n\nSO O \n\n\nO \n\no \n\nsO \n\noo \n\noo \n\nOs \n\nCO \n\nOS \n\nr- \n\n\nOs \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHC \n\nrH \n\no \n\n00 \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nr-. \n\nO CM \n\n\no \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\noo \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nco \n\n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nCnI \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\no \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nuo \n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nid id \n\n\ncd id \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nV-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC/D \n\n\n\nu \n\nV4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nX) \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n2 \n\n\no \n\n4J \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\nT3 \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nG \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\nw \n\nH3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\no \n\n\n\nG \n\no \n\n\n\nG \n\n4-4 \n\n0) \n\n"\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\n\n\nG \n\nu \n\nG \n\n& \n\nCX \n\n\np-t \n\n00 rH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\n4-1 \n\n*H \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nw \n\nC/D \n\n00 rH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\n4-4 \n\n*H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n< \n\nG \n\nu \n\n2 \n\n2 \n\nrH \n\nG \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nhJ \n\n\nC \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n2 \n\n2 \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nCd \n\nH \n\nu \n\n\nw \n\nw \n\n<2 \n\n\n\n4J \n\nCD \n\n4-* \n\n44 \n\n\n\nIH \n\nW \n\nw \n\n<2 \n\n\n\n4J \n\nd> \n\n4-4 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\ncd \n\nu \n\n\nl \n\n4-> \n\nu \n\n<2 \n\nU \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\nCO \n\nCd \n\nC/D \n\nCJ \n\n\n1 \n\n4-1 \n\n4J \n\n<2 \n\nU \n\nG \n\nO \n\no \n\n0) \n\nP4 \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n3 \n\nCJ \n\ncd \n\n2 \n\nC/D \n\n<2 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nT3 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n3 \n\nU \n\n0> \n\nM \n\nM \n\nd> \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\ncd \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\n\nM \n\nPX \n\n\n*H \n\ncd \n\nd) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nP-. \n\no \n\n<2 \n\n<2 \n\n2 \n\n2 \n\nw \n\n22 \n\ncn \n\nCO \n\n2 \n\nPP \n\n<2 \n\n\n2 \n\nm \n\n2 \n\n2 \n\nw \n\n\nin \n\nC/D \n\n2 \n\n\nI \n\n\n66 \n\n\nPacific \nAlaska & \nHawaii \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 4 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\no \n\nH \n\nI \n\n\nu \n\nPut \n\n\nO \n\nU \n\n\ncd cd \n\nU 4J \n\n\no \n\n8*1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nCM \n\no \n\nm \n\nON \n\nm \n\nON \n\nU0 \n\nuo \n\nCM \n\nON \n\non \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\nNO \n\no \n\n00 \n\nO \n\no 1 \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\nCM \n\no \n\nNO \n\n\no \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\non \n\n8 * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\no \n\nm \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\no \n\nrH \n\nOl \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\no \n\nOn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nm \n\nON \n\n. \n\nrH \n\nUO \n\nNO \n\no \n\nI- 1 \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\n\nNO \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nE \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n8 * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n8 * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\no \n\nCM \n\n. \n\n8 * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n8 * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\nNO \n\nm \n\n\nU0 \n\n\nO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nr-. \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n* \n\no \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\nuo \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\n\nr-. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nE \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\ns* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n8 * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNO \n\no \n\nNO \n\nn* \n\n* \n\nON \n\n\n00 \n\n\no \n\nuo \n\nO \n\noo \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nl/N \n\nto \n\nNO \n\nO \n\n00 \n\n\n\nm \n\n\nd \n\no \n\nON \n\nr>- \n\no \n\nin \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\niH \n\n\nO \n\n\n\nNO \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nE \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd cd \nm u \n\n4-5 4-5 \n\n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\nXJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\na \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\no \n\n\n\nc \n\n4-5 \n\n<0 \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nw \n\nd \n\n4-1 \n\ncu \n\n0\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\ncd \n\nC \n\nu \n\nu \n\n4-5 \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n> \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nCJ> \n\nu \n\n4-1 \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\ncd \n\n\n\nC \n\nU \n\nd \n\n\n*4J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n5H \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\n\n\nc \n\nU \n\nd \n\n\n^3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nB \n\nCu \n\n\n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\n4-5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\n4-5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n\nd \n\n4-5 \n\nz \n\nz \n\nrH \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\no \n\nd \n\n4-5 \n\n2 \n\nz \n\nrH \n\nC \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\nCO \n\nw \n\n<3 \n\n\n\n4-5 \n\nQ) \n\n4-5 \n\nIH \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ni a \n\nW \n\n<3 \n\n\n\n4-5 \n\nCU \n\n4-5 \n\nMH \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\ncd \n\nCU \n\n\n1 \n\n4-5 \n\n4-5 \n\n<3 \n\nO \n\nd \n\n*H \n\n(0 \n\ncd \n\n& o \n\n\nl \n\n4-5 \n\n4-5 \n\n<3 \n\nU \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\no \n\no \n\n0) \n\nIH \n\n\nT3 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n0 \n\nO \n\ncd \n\nz \n\nZ H \n\nS \n\nTJ \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\nd \n\nO \n\ncd \n\nZ \n\nu \n\n(U \n\nu \n\nz \n\n3- \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\n\no \n\no \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nCM \n\noo \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\non \n\nrH \n\nO \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n<* \n\nCO \n\no \n\nOs \n\no \n\no \n\n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\n\nO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nE \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nsv\xc2\xb0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns-s \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVO \n\nin \n\n\n\nvD \n\no \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nMO \n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nS\'S \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvD \n\nO \n\nm \n\nvO \n\no \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\n00 \n\nr- \n\no \n\nO \n\nm \n\no \n\nr-- \n\nOS \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nOn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\noo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2K \n\n\npH \n\no \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nP-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ne \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nvjD \n\nsc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\noo vo \n\no \n\nrH \n\nco \n\nin \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nr- \n\no \n\nOs \n\no \n\nO \n\non \n\nVO \n\n\n \n\n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n$ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nO \n\nCO \n\npH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nOs \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\no \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n*<}\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\no \n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nr>. \n\nC\'- \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n4J \n\nu \n\n. \n\n\nCM \n\nco \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nE \n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNO \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nin \n\nst \n\nNO \n\n\nOn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nSt \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nE \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNO \n\nO \n\nON \n\nm \n\nco \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\nr- \n\nON \n\nMf \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nco \n\nr". \n\nO Ml* \n\nco \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\no \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nE \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNO \n\no \n\n*H \n\nco \n\nr>* \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\nco \n\no \n\nin \n\nco \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nco \n\nr-s \n\nON \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\ncm \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nVI \n\n\xc2\xa33 \n\n\nm \n\nNO \n\n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\nmoNnooHoonn \n\n\nHO\\O\'O ^ \nM \n\n \n\ncd \n\n\nCO \n\nv\xc2\xbb \nu cd \nCO 0) \n\n\nu \n\nO iH \n4-i td \n\no \n\n05 CO \n4-> \xc2\xabH \n\ncd b \n\nu \n\nQ \nu \no \n0 ) \n\nVl \n\n\n0 ) \n\n4J \n\n\n\nd) \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 4J \n\nOn \n\n/S \n\n\no \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\nQ co \n\nrH \n\nOn \n\n\n4-J \n\n\nVi \n\n\n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nNO \n\n\n\n\nQ) \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* *d \n\n\nOn \n\n\n\n\n(U \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd) d \n\nn- \n\niH \n\n\nVi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco TO \n\nCM \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n5^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\nSf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nXi \n\n\nto \n\n\n\nhi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nCD \n\no \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n4-J \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nE-\xc2\xb0 \n\n\nO \n\n\nTO \n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\n8H> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\no \n\n\n> \n\n\n\nNO \n\n\n\nO \n\nvO \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\n\n\n00 \n\nst \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94j \n\n\nTO co \n\nd) \n\nV \n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J T) \n\nco \n\n\n\nVi \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nO \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\nrH \n\nn- \n\nCM \n\n\nd) Vi \n\nd \n\nOn \n\n\nTO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nco \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nM TO \n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \xc2\xa3 \n\n44 \n\nON \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\npt\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd) 4 \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n(U o \n\n44 \n\nh \n\n\nd) \n\n\n\nnO \n\n\n\nO \n\nm \n\nnO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nsl- \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\njd TO \n\nO \n\n1 \n\n\n-d \n\n\n\nOn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-> U \n\n\nr>. \n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\no \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nNO \n\nm \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\nNO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n44 d \n\nd \n\nON \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nE \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xb0<3 \n\nd) \n\n0 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nNO \n\nd) \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n25 \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd) \n\n4-J \n\n>4 \n\n1 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nTO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO dJ \n\nVi \n\nh \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\nH \n\n\n\nVl \n\nVi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 0 \n\nTO \n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nJ5 \n\n\no \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n44 *H \n\na \n\nVi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nTJ \n\n\n\nCO \n\n<3 \n\n\nTJ \n\n*H \n\nPS \n\nPS \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n44 Vl \n\nd) \n\no \n\nPV \n\nw \n\na \n\no \n\n\ncj \n\nU \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\ng \n\n4-1 \n\n \n\nd) \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n4H \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n00 \n\ncd \n\nO \n\no \n\n\n\n1 \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n<3 \n\nCJ \n\nPS \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rl \n\nCO \n\nTO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nd)S \n\nw \n\nCJ \n\n\n> \n\nTl \n\nCO \n\n(0 \n\n\n\nd \n\nCJ \n\nTO \n\ntd \n\nh> \n\n\n\n\n\nVi \n\nd) \n\nVs \n\ntd \n\n\n\nd) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nTO \n\nd> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\nTO \n\nh \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nPH \n\ncj \n\n<3| \n\n\n\n25 \n\n2 \n\nW \n\n5 \n\nCO \n\nC/3 \n\nX \n\nPH \n\n<3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\no \n\na. \n\nco \n\nCD \n\nVi \n\nU \n\nO \n\no \n\n0 ) \n\n-d \n\n4J \n\nT3 \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n\no \n\nr>. \n\nON \n\n\no \n\nco \n\nVi \n\no) \n\nrO \n\nO \n\nu \n\nCJ \n\no \n\n\no \n\nr^. \n\non \n\n\nE \n\n00 \n\nNO \n\nOn \n\n\nst \n\ni \n\nCO \n\n\na \n\ncv \n\n\nr*E \n\n\nNO \n\nI \n\nm \n\n\nPu \n\nPU \n\n\nco \n\nCJ \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\ncd \n\nCJ \n\no \n\n\nTJ \n\na) \n\n14-1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nd \n\n\n*0 \n\nd) \n\ng \n\nO \n\n4-1 \n\nVi \n\n0 ) \n\na \n\nd) \n\nrO \n\n\nco \n\nco \n\nd) \n\nkJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2K \n\n\n69 \n\n\nthan 0.05% \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDefense Dependency Ratio, by State, Selected Years \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nM \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nr"\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nuo \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\np vO \na) on \n\nCM \n\n\n m \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n. \n\n\nS vo \nCD On \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nCO \n\nr^. \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nO rH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO 0) \n\xe2\x80\xa2H G \n4-\xc2\xbb a \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n?0 O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nP5 CO \n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nV4 \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSn 0) \n\n,0 vO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\no \n\nin \n\nrH \n\n \nQ *H \n\nVh \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xabH \n\noo \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\noo \n\n\nCD ON \nCJ rH \nCD \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nm \n\nco \n\nvo \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nco \n\nco \n\nr*v \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n/ * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nw \n\nH \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n\nUH \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n3 \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\ng \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\n4-J \n\ncd \n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nu \n\n\nU \n\nu \n\no \n\nB \n\ncd \n\ng \n\nCO \n\no \n\ncd \n\nCJ \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\n\no \n\ng \n\nmh \n\nu \n\nCD \n\n;* \n\nU \n\nuo \n\nco \n\nN \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\ng \n\ncd \n\nU \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\niH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\ng \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nH \n\nrH \n\nH \n\nu \n\ncd \n\no \n\no \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rl \n\n\n<3 \n\n< \n\n< \n\nCJ \n\nu \n\nCJ \n\nQ \n\nQ \n\n\nCO \n\ncO cO *rH cd \n\n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\no \n\n(3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\ng \n\ncd \n\n\ncd \n\nU \n\nu \n\nCd \n\nUS \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncd \n\nCO \n\nO \n\no \n\n& \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\n\'d \n\n\nG \n\nrH \n\nQ> \n\ncd \n\nT) \n\nrH \n\nG \n\no \n\ncd \n\nPm \n\nO \n\nEC \n\nM \n\nHH \n\nM \n\nM \n\n\n\n70 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 5 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nO <0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h a \n\nu c \n\n\n$ 2 \n\nCC CO \n\nu \n\n>% a \n\nO (V \n\nd \n\n<0 Sn \n73 M \nC CO \na) vi \nOu *h \n\na> h \n\n\xc2\xb0s \n\n\n0) \n\n,0 \n\n6 vo \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nr** \n\nm \n\no \n\nON \n\no \n\nrH \n\nON \n\n\nO \n\nco \n\nm \n\n0) ON \n\n\nco \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\no \n\no \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nm \n\nm \n\nO \n\nto \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVi \n\n0) \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0g \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nO \n\no \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nON \n\n\nO \n\n<* \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nm \n\n0) \n\no \n\nON \n\nH \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nrH \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\no \n\nm \n\nm \n\no \n\n0) \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\na> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i \n\n1965 \n\n\nO \n\niH \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n\nm \n\nvO \n\n \nQ *H \nCJ \n\n\nM \n \n\n1965 \n\nCO \n\no \n\nVO \n\n00 \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\nvO \n\n\nvo \n\nCO \n\nC\'. \n\nCO \n\nm \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\no \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nin \n\nco \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nO \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\nV\xc2\xbb \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\nVI \n\n< \n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\nH \n\n\nto \n\n\n\nto \n\nCO \n\nJn \n\nd \n\n\n73 \n\nd \n\n\n\ntO \n\n\nd \n\nx \n\n\nO \n\n*H \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\nd \n\n(0 \n\na) \n\nrH \n\ncO \n\n\nv> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rl \n\nd \n\n>N \n\nto \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nco \n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncO \n\n\n9* \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n^5 \n\nCO \n\ncO \n\nco \n\no \n\nCO \n\nVi \n\ncO \n\n\n\na \n\nVi \n\nX \n\nVi \n\nO \n\nQ \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nto \n\nd \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n(0 \n\n(0 \n\nO \n\n\n\n*H \n\n \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\ns \n\nu \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n(U \n\n4) \n\n \n\n42 \n\nvO \n\n<5- \n\nas \n\nrH \n\nsO \n\nOs \n\nON \n\nvO \n\no \n\nn- \n\noo \n\nas \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nr^- \n\n \nO -H \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\nft) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n42 \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n \n\nCO \n\n(ft \n\n(ft \n\nft) \n\nft \n\nft \n\nCJ \n\nQ \n\nCO \n\nto \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n52 \n\nft) \n\n42 \n\n42 \n\nft) \n\nd \n\nTJ \n\nft \n\nft \n\nqj \n\nd \n\nO \n\n23 \n\nd \n\n\n \n\n\nCO \n\n\ngo \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\n\nd \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\nGO \n\na \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n42 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n:s \n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nGO \n\nft \n\n\n4-1 \n\n(0 \n\nft) \n\nIS \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nC \n\nO \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n\nGO \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nco \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaJ \n\nO \n\nH \n\n\n72 \n\n\nSOURCE: Roger Riefler and Paul B. Downing, "Regional Effect of Defense Effort on Employment," \nMonthly Labor Review , Vol.91, No. 7 (July, 1968), pp. 1-8; and an undated release of the \nOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis, Economic and Resource \nAnalysis entitled "Defense Generated Employment, December, 1967." \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPercent of United States Military Prime Contracts Awarded to the Major Defense Contractors \n\n($10,000 or More) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1 \n\nO \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\no \n\n00 \n\n\nm \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCO \n\nNO \n\n00 \n\nr"- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nON \n\nm \n\nco \n\nco \n\nco \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\no \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nro \n\nNO \n\nCO \n\nON \n\n1 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nMf \n\nrH \n\n\n\nNO \n\n\nON \n\nvO \n\nm \n\n*3* \n\nMl- \n\nON \n\n\nON \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nMf \n\nrH \n\n\n\nNO \n\n1 rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni *8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nin \n\nMl- \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCM \n\no \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nin \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nNO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPh \n\nON \n\n\nMl- \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\no \n\nNO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nMf \n\nrH \n\n\n\nNO \n\n\n- \n\no \n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n\nI s -* \n\n\nrH \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nO \n\nin \n\nOn \n\nCM \n\n\nnO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nON \n\nNO \n\nm \n\nin \n\n>3- \n\nCO \n\nMf \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nMf \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nMf \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n\nn- \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nfl) \n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*\xc2\xbbH \n\n0 CO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H T) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nM M \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 Oh \n\nPh CO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n4H % o \n\nCO \n\nP \n\nU \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\ni \n\n1 \n\nrH \n\n1 \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\nNO \n\n1 \n\nP5 \n\nPQ\' CJ \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nMf \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nr- \n\nrH \n\n\np \n\no \n\nfl) \n\nQ) \n\n\no \n\no \n\n*\xc2\xa7 \n\nco \n\n\nfl) \n<1) \n\n\no \n\nCJ \n\n\ne \n\no \n\na \n\no \n\no \n\nw \n\n4J \n\ncj \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\no \n\n\na \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nfl) \n\nP \n\n00 \n\na \n\no \n\no \n\nHP \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nON \n\n\np \n\n0 \n\na) \n\nod \n\nco \n\nP \n\n$ \n\nH \n\n4-1 \n\nM \n\n0) \n\naj \n\no \n\nu \n\nPH \n\nT3 \n\nC \n\ncO \n\n\ns \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\nM \n\no \n\no \n\nu \n\npH \n\n4-J \n\nc \n\na> \n\n0 \n\n\na> \n\n> \n\no \n\no \n\n\n0 \n\nO \n\np \n\no \n\no \n\nw \n\n\n4-> \n\na \n\n(0 \n\n\nu \n\nfl) \n\n\n(0 \n\nCO * \nP ^ \na) on \n\n4-1 nO \n \n\n\n0) \n\no \n\n\nu \n\n0) \n\n\n4H \n4H \nO rH \n\nP \n\n00 PQ \nP \n\n\nU \n\nP \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nU \n\nPh \n\n\nU \n\nP \n\n<0 \n\n0 \n\n\npN \n\nu \n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\na \n\nM \n\n\ng \n\n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 0 \n\na *h \n\nCL H \nPh \n\n\nU \n\nO \n\n4-1 \n\nP \n\n\nM \n\nO \n\n4-H \n\n0) \n\n4-J \n\ncO \n\nu \n\no \n\n4-J \n\nO \n\n44 P \nON O \nvO \xe2\x80\xa2> \n\nON Q> \'\'\xe2\x80\x9cN \nrH g M \n\n3 0) \n\n\nu o \n\n0 ) > \n\n*0 M \n0) CO \nO \n\n\na) \nco \nfl \na) \n\n0) 4H \n> 0 ) \nO Q \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 rQ \na a) \no o \n4J c \noo ^ \nC o \np \n\n\n& \n\n\nCM \n\n\nO \n\nu \n\n4-J \n\n9* \n\xc2\xbbH 0 \nrH O \nO CJ \nQ ^ \n\n\n4-J \nrH CO \n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 00 \nO CH \n525 CO \nrH \n\n\n0) \n\nCO \n\nCl \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n<0 no \n\n4H CJ \n\n\np \n\n0) \n\n\n0) \n\no \n\no \n\nM \n\nOh \n\n\n* \n\n> \n\nJp \n\nP \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 O \n\n(0 \n\no \n\nCO \n\n< \n\nTt \n\n> \n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\no \n\ncd \n\n\nP \n\nH \n\nV4 ON \n\n(U \n\n\n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n0) \n\nCd rH \n\nu \n\np \n\n\nu \n\n\na \n\na \n\n00 *rl \n\n\no \n\nON \n\n0) \n\nQ) r. \n\nP \n\n\nco \n\n4-J \n\nrH \n\np$ \n\nQ U \n\no \n\n>> \n\nM \n\nO \n\n1 \n\n\nfl) \n\no \n\n0 \n\nP \n\ncd \n\n\nco \n\nr rO \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nrH \n\n0) \n\nr 0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\np \n\nU \n\n4-J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO fl) \n\nCO \n\no \n\nP \n\nP \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCJ \n\nr^- > \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n0) \n\no \n\no* \n\ncd \n\nON o \n\n\nw \n\n3J \n\nCJ \n\nCL \n\nCL rH JZ5 \n\n\nW \n\nCJ \n\n\nO \n\nco \n\n\n73 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n4i \n\no \n\nN\xc2\xab0>0 \n\n\nao \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \n\n^H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\n \n\n\n\n\n$ \n\no \n\nH \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nr* \n\n>4 \n\nN \n\n0< N \n\nCM \n\ns\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\nAt \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O rH \n\n\nAt \n\nXI \n\n\ntA \n\n\n\n\n\nCA \n\nO\' \n\ntn \n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n \n\nr \n\nat \n\nr \n\n* \n\n01 \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nOk \n\nr \n\n\xc2\xabk \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0k \n\n\n* \n\nr \n\n4k \n\n41 \n\nA \n\nat \n\n4k \n\n41 \n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\nao \n\n\nm o \n\n4A \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\nCl \n\n\nIA 00 \n\nrH \n\n\ntA \n\no \n\nr- \n\nf^. \n\nao \n\nAt \n\n\nCA \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\nAt \n\nO\' \n\nm o \n\nS3 \n\nCA \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n. \n\n\nCM \n\n\n8 \n\nCM \n\ni r\\ \n\n\nsO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nat ca so \n\nO\' \n\nO\' \n\n\n\n\n\n4 \n\n<\xe2\x80\x9csl \n\nO\' \n\n-t \'O \n\n>4 \n\n\nO\' \n\nO\' \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xbbA \n\n\n\n\n\n\nsO \n\n\n\nAt \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n41 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n41 \n\n41 \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncn \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nw \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\nsO \n\nCA \n\noo \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nr- \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nH \n\n\nrH \n\nr-a \n\n \n\noH \n\n\nCM \n\nx> \n\n\nc \n\n4A \n\n\nr. O \n\no \n\ntn \n\nSO \n\noo \n\nn- \n\n \n\nao \n\nCM \n\n4A \n\nCA \n\nm \n\nCA \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\no \n\nAt \n\n\no \n\nx> \n\n*H \n\nr-* \n\nin \n\nCA \n\ntA \n\nx> \n\nCM \n\ns \n\n\n\n+4 \n\nrH \n\nO\' \n\nCM \n\n \n\nOh \n\n* \n\n* \n\n\nat \n\n4> \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4k \n\n\n\n\n\n\nr \n\n4k \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n-4 \n\nsr \n\nrH \n\n\n*A \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\n\xc2\xabo \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nr-. \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO H \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n5 \xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xa9 4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nS \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \nO H \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\naH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nV> 44 \n\n.\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\nas \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n1 \n\n\n\n4J \n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n3 \n\n\nsO \n\no \n\no \n\nlA \n\n>4 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\nlA \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\noo \n\no \n\ntn \n\nfA \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\n\nsr \n\nsr \n\nsr \n\nCA \n\nCM \n\n\nO\' \n\nCA \n\nr-k \n\n\xc2\xb0 & \n\naH \n\n\nO\' \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4 \n\n4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4 \n\na \n\n6 \n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n<9 \n\nsr \n\nCM \n\nr*< \n\nSO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nAt \n\nrH \n\n\nCA \n\nCA \n\n\n.0 \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nx> \n\n\nsr \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nr-k \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x96\xa03 2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n<44 \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n o \n\n\nH \n\n>* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< u \n\n\xc2\xabi \n\no \n\n\n\n4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nat \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n\nO \n\nao \n\no \n\n>o \n\nr- \n\nIA \n\n\xc2\xabA \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\ntA \n\no \n\nsO \n\nCA \n\nin \n\nm oo \n\nO\' \n\ns\xc2\xbb \n\nn- \n\nCA \n\nO\' \n\n\noo \n\nO\' \n\n*-* 0- \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\n\n\nsr \n\no \n\ntn \n\n-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\nlA \n\nO\' \n\nrH \n\nO\' \n\nAt \n\n\n8 \n\n\nAs O \n\nrx \n\n-1 o \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\nrH \n\ntA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nc- \n\noo \n\nCM \n\nU \n\nU \n\n4-4 \n\nu \n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n00 \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\'\xc2\xa3> \n\nsO \n\nSO \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nrH \n\na \xe2\x80\x9e \n\n\n4 \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\n\nao \n\nfM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n \n\n\n* \n\n* \n\n\n<* \n\nat \n\n>\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4t \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nu \xc2\xab \n\n2 \n\nB \n\n\n\nm \n\nCA \n\nrH \n\n\nvO \n\nrH \n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nw. \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSt 86 M \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab/> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 O \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xabH M \n\nT3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nW ft. \nft. \n\nS \n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n^ g \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n2 \n\n\n*H \n\n<9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nat ^ \n\nCM \n\n4J \n\nN \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* 8 \n\n\n\nSO \n\no \n\nO \n\nr- \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nrst \n\n\nIA \n\nAt \n\nO\' \n\no \n\nr\xc2\xab4 \n\ns\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nlA \n\n\ns\xc2\xbb \n\n00 \n\n>\xc2\xbb \n\n\nCA \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\nCM \n\n \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nXt \n\n\nsr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n<\xc2\xa3> \n\nCM \n\nrH 3 \n\nw \n\n\n\n<4-1 \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nsO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCA \n\n3d \xc2\xb0 \n\n\n\nV. \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nx o \n\nH \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt- \n\n3 \n\n\nat \n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nkl ft. \n\no \n\n\n\n\n4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n>. \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\n\'O \n\n \n\n\n\nUo \n\nH \n\n \n\nat \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm \n\n\nr \n\nat \n\n01 \n\na\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4k \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4k \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\nc & \n\n9 O \nU U \nO O- \n\n\nH \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ns \n\n\nOv \n\nr*. \n\noo \n\nnr \n\ncm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nn \n\nv> \n\n\nH \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\nH \n\nO \n\n8 \n\n\nS \n\nH \n\n8 \n\n\nr> \n\n \n\n\nN \n\nO \n\n\n* \n\ncA \n\nO \n\ncA \n\nA \n\n\xc2\xabA \n\nH \n\n\ncA \n\n \n\n\nO \n\nH \n\n\nCA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n^ m ca \n\n\n*C ^ O\' \nCM NO H \nH n H \n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb * \nH \xc2\xab7\xc2\xbb \n\nN O\' \xc2\xbb0 \nO \xc2\xa9 *H \n\n\n^ N H lA H \n\n\nm ia \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nIT) ^ \n\n\nOn IA \nCD tO \nCJ\\ CA \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nCA rH \n\na* co \n\n^ lA \n\n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\n\nnoOOOONH \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \ni-tHHinn \n\n\neo-9<-* \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 (S 9v \n\n\nO\' \n\ns* \n\n\nO\' \n\xc2\xa9 \nsr I-* \n* * \n\nsO \xc2\xa9 \n\xc2\xa9 0 \n\n%T\\ \n\n> \n\nn \n\n8 \n\n\nCM \n\n\no \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\n* \n\n%\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n* \n\n* \n\nft \n\nto \n\no \n\nr-> \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\nvD \n\nsr \n\nca \n\n\nca \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n>C \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nh>d\'ONinin^)N\xc2\xab\'0 (M/i>o \n\nO\'Hr\'ffi\'CON\'Or\'N^Nifl \n\n\xc2\xabno>OH5iniflHOHO>oo \n\n\n\xc2\xab n O\' n \nNNO \n\nid H H \n\n\nOlHHlANNlftN \n\nftOn#N\xc2\xabmo \n\nOl H H H O\' -O \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x9c< \xc2\xa9 \n\n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nft \n\nN \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n* \n\nIA \n\n*H \n\n \n\n\nCH O (O \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\\C n n m \n\n\nT- \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\nD \n\n \n\nO\' \n\nro cn \n\nr> \n\nSO 00 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nun \n\nm \n\nro \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n\nO -* \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nr-H \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nr> \n\n\xc2\xa9 CM \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\ncn \n\nO\' \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\nO\' \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\no s\xc2\xbb \n\nr-^ \n\nO\' \n\nO O\' \n\nvO \n\ns\xc2\xa3> \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\n\nH \n\n\nr** \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\nt-d \n\nCM \xc2\xabH \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nCM \n\n\nso \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2> \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n* \n\nft \n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n<\xc2\xbb, \n\nft \n\nr>* \n\nvD \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nf". \n\nsO \n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6n \n\nCO \n\np-Y \n\nlA \n\n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n-* \n\n\nCD \n\ntA \n\n\nrH \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nr* \n\n \n\n\nO\' \n\n\nso O\' SO \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\n8 \n\nrd \n\nrH \n\nsO \n\nsO \n\nCM \n\n\nO\' \n\n>n \n\n \n\nH \n\nr> \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nCD \n\n\'X> \n\n\n\n\nf* \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nsD \n\nCA \n\nrH \n\n\n\'ONH\'ONO \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\nH CO \n\n\nin oo o s < o \n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \nc o n -o n \n\n\nOffl n O\' H \xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \nNOCOWO"\xc2\xbb \n00 CO O 00 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xbbo \n\n\nHO O 00 N H \n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 O O\' \n\'O^OH\'JS \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O (M >-C -T H O \n\n\nsr \n\nCO \n\n\ncO \n\nco \n\nco \n\n\n\xc2\xab H >C O N H \n\xc2\xab*\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \nH n H O\' CM \n\n\nCM OO O LO O O\' \nco CO O\' CO CS \xc2\xa9 \nsr r-. ps no io ro \n\n\nO H n ie(MNMOO>\xc2\xbbN \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nii >j h n x co -\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb oo \n\n\nNO\'JOON\'OOONNO\'^S \nCO CO H VC N O \xc2\xa9 H \xc2\xa9 00 pO O O \n0\'0\'COOcrtN#OOP*^0\'\'\xc2\xbb \n\n\nO\' \n\na \n\n\nN H sO pj O\' pp \nCM 00 \xc2\xa9 co cO CM \nco O\' CO 00 00 \n\xc2\xbb \n\nCM \n\n\nvO O \xe2\x80\xa2-< c~~ C\'\' \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 *\xc2\xa3 \n\nCM CO o \n\n\nOOCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0ss \n\n> l \n\n4J O \n\n<0 u \n\nI & \n\n<3 J \n\n\n\nU U 9 \xc2\xab ft \na _ r-c >> q \xc2\xaboo \n\n13 i -J I .* e- S S \n\nS o i b u c, \xc2\xab u g \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \xc2\xa9 S vC rl 1 \xe2\x80\xa2 B \n\nQ\xc2\xa3Oi*fctd \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nTD \n\nM \n\nCO \n\niJ \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nCl \n\n4J \n\nc \n\no \n\no \n\nG \n\nB \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nJ-t \n\nCl, \n\nH \n\nc< \n\nCO \n\ni-i \n\n\nu on \n0) \n\no \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n(X \n\nr^ \n\ncn \xc2\xab \n\n4H \n\xe2\x80\xa2 M \nG M \nCO \n\nC G \nCO iH \n<4-1 X \n(0 CO \n\na h \n\n\no ^ \n\no \n\n4-i f\'- \nG O\' \n0 ) i-c \n\nB \n\n4-1 Cl \nM 0) \nCO X \n(X O \n\n<0 4-1 \n\nQ O \n\nO \n\n.. o \nG cn \nO w \n\n4-1 \n\n60 O \n\nC \n\nX O\' \nX X \nco \n\nCO >4 \nS ft- \n^ I \n00 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H n vO \n\nm \n\nV- \n\n<0 \n\nC/3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\nI >* \nCN ft- \n\xe2\x96\xa0H X \ny O\' ^ \nm h o \n\n\nx - \n\nM \nM M \nO X \n\nCt-4 \n\n<0 \n\n<0 X \nM XI \nCO CO \n\n\nC \n\n<0 \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\n\nON \n\no \n\nO \n\nm \n\n\nO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCN \n\ncn \n\n-4 \n\nCM \n\nin \n\nMt \n\nm \n\nCN \n\nON \n\nf\'\' \n\n. \n\n\nO\' \n\no \n\nsr \n\nCN \n\ncn \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\n-4 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nCN \n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\nCN \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nCN \n\nfH \n\nCN \n\nX X \n\no \n\no \n\n\n-4 \n\n\n\no \n\n\n00 \n\nX) \n\n\nx \n\ncn \n\n>. \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCN \n\nON \n\nX \n\ncn \n\nX \n\nO\' \n\nrH \n\nOn \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n \n\nCu \n\n\nG \n\nON \n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nfH \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n60 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nC \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-< \n\n4-4 \n\n\nCu \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nN \n\na \n\nG \n\n\n\nV- \n\na. \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 x \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-4 \n\nco \n\n\n\nCO \n\n<0 \n\na. \n\n\n\n5* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncr x \n\n\n4.4 \n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 0k \n\n\n0) \n\na \n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nW a \n\n\nc \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n4-1 \n\nft- \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\nVI \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncu \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na- \n\n4-4 \n\n \n\n\nG \n\nV \n\na. \n\n\n< \n\n4 \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n4 \n\n3 \n\n\na \n\n4-4 \n\n\n \n\nrH \n\na \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\nm \n\no \n\nG \n\nG \n\nC \n\no \n\nON \n\n\xc2\xabH \n\n\nad \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\n-0 \n\nV4 \n\no \n\n*H \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nc \n\nG \n\na. \n\n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n60 \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n*H \n\nO \n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCu \n\nfH \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\nN C \n\n\nX \n\no \n\nCO \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nj= \n\n\n\n\n4-4 \n\n\na \n\no \n\nP6 \n\nX \n\n\ncn \n\n\nU \n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa23 \n\n\n*1 \n\nH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n0) H \n\nw \n\nfr \n\n(U \n\nl-l \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nfH \n\ncu \n\ncn \n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ri \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nB \n\n<4-4 \n\n ON \n Pk \n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n* \n\nC CO \nd) d) \n\n\nCO \n\nPrT \n\nOrH \n\nrH \n\n\nCO \n\n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\no \n\nOn \n\nON \n\nOV \n\no \n\nCO \n\nON \n\no \n\nCM \n\nM \n\n\nVO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nhJ cj \n\nvO \n\n\n. \n\nON \n\n00 \n\n1". \n\np^ \n\nCO \n\no \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\n\no \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nd \xc2\xa7 \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nr"\xc2\xbb \n\n00 \n\nOV \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPh \n\nW \n\n55 \n\nW \n\nO \n\nM \n\nS \n\n< \n\n\no \n\nM \n\nW \n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\n25 \n\nO \n\n\n\nS\'o \n\no \n\nW \n\nw c \n\nw \n\nO \n\n0) \n\n\n<\xc2\xa3 \n\nrH 00 \n\n\nPu \n\n05 \n\n25 \n\n\nPn o \n\nO \n\n\n. \n\nON \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nO \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nVO \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\niH \n\n\no \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n00 \n\np^ \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\nVO \n\nOn \n\nCM \n\n\n \n\nVO \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nin \n\nin \n\nin \n\nm \n\nOn \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nOn \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n79 \n\n\n1952 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n73 \n\na) \n\n3 \n\ns \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nG \n\nO \n\na \n\n\nca \n\nK-J \n\nPQ \n\n \n\n\nm \n\nos \n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\nos \n\n\nM \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nMl \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nc \n\n \n\n73 \n\n< \n\n\n\nf\xe2\x80\x941 \n\ncO \n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\n\nMl \n\nO \n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n73 \n\n4-1 \n\nm \n\n3 \n\ncO \n\nOs \n\nCm \n\n53 \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCO \n\nJO \n\n\nCO \n\nMl \n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\n73 \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\n0 \n\n \n\n\nCO \n\n* o \n3 co \no \n\xe2\x80\xa2H Cm \n\n4-1 \n\ncfl \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n\nT3 \n3 \n3 *H \nO \nCm \n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\n3 \n\nCJ \n\n3 \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\no \n\na \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-> \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n2 \n\nMl \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n-3 \n\n\n4-1 \n\n3 \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\n\n3 \n\n73 \n\nT3 \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n0 \n\n\nO \n\n* \n\nMi \n\n4J \n\n4-1 \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n73 \n\n0 \n\n3 \n\na \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\n3 \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94i \n\n& \n\n3 \n\n0 \n\n> \n\no \n\n3 \n\no \n\nQ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nca \n\n\ncj \n\n\nca \n\n\n3) \n\n\nO \n\n\nco \n\n\n\n80 \n\n\ni--969,_Vo 1\xc2\xab_XVII (Washington: Government Printing Office, August, 1968), pp. 216- \n\n\n\n\n\nResearch, Development, Testing and Evaluation Contracts as a Percentage \nof Defense Prime Contracts by Region, Fiscal Years 1962 - 1970 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nON \n\nVO \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\noo \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\noo \n\nON \n\n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\no \n\nON \n\nn- \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0$ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nvO \n\n\nCM \n\nON \n\n \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nvO \n\no \n\nON \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n \n\nQ) \n\n*H \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCd \n\n\n0) \n\n\na \n\nO \n\nu \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\nHO \n\nCO \n\n\n\ng \n\nu \n\n\n\n$ \n\n\nId \n\ng \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nA \n\ncd \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n<3 \n\nu \n\nCd \n\n4-J \n\nu \n\nu \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nC/3 \n\nrH \n\n<3 \n\nu \n\nu \n\n4-J \n\na) \n\nG \n\n\nt-3 \n\nfn \n\n\n00 \n\n\no \n\no \n\n<3 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\n\nTJ \n\ng \n\n4 \n\nu \n\ncd \n\no \n\n(U \n\n4-4 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xab \n\n0) \n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nO \n\nu \n\nCO \n\no \n\n*H \n\n4-J \n\n\no \n\n\na) \n\n\nV4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*H \n\nQ) \n\nO \n\n4-J \n\n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2N \n\n4-1 \n\n0) \n\nC/3 \n\nCO \n\n\nc \n\nno \n\na) \n\na \n\n4-1 \n\ncd \n\na) \n\n\nQ \n\nc \n\n\no \n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nOt \n\n\na) \n\n\nu \n\n\ncd \n\n> \n\n4-J \n\nA \n\nQ) \n\n\nu \n\nCO \n\na \n\nTJ \n\na) \n\nM \n\nC/3 \n\ncd \n\n\n5 \n\na) <: \n\nA \n\n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\no \n\n4-J \n\nid \n\nO \n\nJ4 \n\n\n4-J \n\n<1) \n\nG \n\no \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\x98H \n\nU \n\n4H \n\n\n44 \n\n0) \n\nO \n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP4 \n\ncd \n\n4-J \n\n& \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nr d \n\n4-J \n\n\n*H \n\n0 rH \n\no \n\n*H \n\nM \n\n\n44 \n\n0 \\ \n\nTJ \n\nCO \n\n \n\nO \n\n\n3 -H \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncx \n\nst \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\npH \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\njg \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\nI \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na* \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nst \n\nNO \n\n\n\n\n\n\ni r \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n- \n\n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nr>. \n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \xe2\x80\x941 \n\nst \n\nSt \n\nst \n\n-t \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nbC \n\no \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\npH \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n,G \n\no \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\no \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\xc2\xbbt \n\n*t \n\nSt \n\nst \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO\xc2\xac \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na> \n\nON \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\nQ) \n\n\n\n\n\noc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCX \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\nG \n\no \n\nNO \n\nSt \n\npH \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\nst \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n6 \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\nx: \n\no \n\n+ \n\ni \n\n+ \n\n1 \n\npH \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\nr- \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nSt \n\nO \n\nr*. \n\nCM \n\nON \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nSt \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n. \n\nSt \n\no \n\nm \n\nG \n\n1 \n\no \n\nCM \n\nO \n\n^5 G \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\n1 \n\n\npH \n\nCM \n\ncd \n\nNO \n\nm \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n6 \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n.G \n\nO \n\n1 \n\ni \n\ni \n\n1 \n\nO \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\n*H \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0< \n\nst \n\nSt \n\no \n\nON \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nSt \n\nr^. \n\nON \n\nSt \n\nCM \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\niH \n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94I \n\nSt \n\nst \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 t \n\na> \n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\n> \n\n4J \n\nM \n\nM \n\nHH \n\n> \n\nM \n\n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\nU \n\n\nM \n\nM \n\nw \n\ncd \n\n\n\nM \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n85 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 14 (continued) \n\n\n* \n\n\n) \n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n0( \n\nm \n\nrs \n\nrs \n\noo \n\ns* c \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\nnO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n43 \n\nu \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n\nrs \n\nON \n\noo \n\nO \n\nrs \n\nNO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nON \n\nH \n\nm \n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94t \n\nnO \n\nrs \n\nrs \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO- \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\no> \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n4) \n\n\n\n\n44 \n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\n> \n\n44 \n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\n\nW \n\nM \n\nM \n\nH \n\n\nM \n\nM \n\ncd \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n \n\n0) 03 \n& CO \nO \n\na >> \n\nC rH \nCO rH \n\xc2\xa3 CO \n\nc \n\nAJ O \nC CO \n\na> co \nS \n\nco \n\n3 \n\na) \n\n4-4 \n\na> \n\nQ \n\n\nco \n\n00 \n\nUO \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nUO \n\no \n\nO \n\non \n\nm \n\nUO \n\nm \n\n>3- \n\nrH \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nuo \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n+ \n\ni \n\ni \n\n1 \n\njc \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nr>- \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nO \n\nON \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nin \n\nuo \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\nr^. \n\nr^. \n\nON \n\nvO \n\noo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\nuo \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\ncO \n\nCM \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\nX \n\n+ \n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nVO \n\nU0 \n\nm \n\nvO \n\n\nr*- \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nco \n\n\n*H \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\n\nON \n\n\n00 \n\nOC \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\n1 \n\no \n\nON \n\n\ncO \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nX \n\n\n\n+ \n\n+ \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\'tf \n\no \n\nON \n\nr- \n\nm \n\nr>- \n\nvD \n\n00 \n\nuo \n\nON \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\nr-. \n\nuo \n\nst \n\nI s *- \n\nON \n\nCM \n\no \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nst \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nvO \n\nSt \n\nON \n\nON \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\np-. \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nSt \n\nSt \n\nSt \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nco \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\nI \n\n\no \n\n\n0) \nool \nX g \n<0 \n43 \n\n\nSt \n\nco \n\nr- \n\no \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n\nr-. \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nVO \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nVO \n\nVO \n\nvO \n\nst \n\nON \n\no \n\nON \n\nVO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nst \n\nm \n\n-O\' \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nco \n\nco \n\nt \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\n> \n\nG \n\n\nM \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaH \n\nM \n\nG \n\n\nM \n\nH \n\n*H \n\n3 \n\nO\' \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nHH \n\n\n\no \n\nCM \n\n+ \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n+ \n\n\nvO \n\n\nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nI \n\n\nio \n\nu \n\nto \n\ng \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n8 \n\n\n<1) \n\nU \n\na \n\nco \n\na> \n\nu \n\no \n\ng \n\n0) \n\nTJ \n\n\n88 \n\n\nSOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Defense Indicators \nSeries ES4, No. 68-3 (August, 1968), p. 34 and No. 70-11(November, 1970), p. 2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDefense Department Manpower, Civilian, End of Period \n(not seasonally adjusted, in thousands) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nd) \n\ntn \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nOG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\nif* C5 \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n00 \n\nf". \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\nC \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n+ \n\n4* \n\n1 \n\n+ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n00 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n \n\nu \n\nM \n\nM \n\nM \n\ncO \n\n\nIH \n\nw \n\nw \n\nCO \n\n\nIH \n\nM \n\nII \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n0 \n\nO\' \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n89 \n\n\n/ \n\n\n1180 0.0 1167 -1.1 \n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 16 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nOC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0k \n\nCM \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nc0 \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n1 \n\n. 1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nJG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nDu \n\ne> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n0k \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n/"~N \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nis \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nON \n\nrs \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n\'4\' \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nM \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\no \n\nrs \n\nrs \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\non \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0. \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\no- \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCO \n\nN-/ \n\n\xc2\xab0 \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\n+ \n\ncO \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nx: \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\ncj \n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na> \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncj \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nis. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\nO \n\no \n\nst \n\nsr \n\nON \n\n\n\n4-> \n\nO \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nco \n\n\nCM \n\nON \n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n55 \n\nON \n\no \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\ncO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nCO \n\na> \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\ntH \n\n \n\n#N \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n/-N \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n(0 \n\nVO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nm \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\nm \n\nrs \n\nON \n\nrs \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n\nCJ \n\n#v \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nst \n\nm \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nst \n\nON \n\nvO \n\n\n\n4J \n\nOn \n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\nO \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n4-1 \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4H \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n< \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n6 \n\n4H \n\n\'-z \n\na> \n\n\nON \n\nSt \n\nis \n\na> \n\nSt \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\noc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nM \n\n1 \n\nd \n\nI \n\no \n\nO \n\no \n\nfr* c \n\no \n\nSt \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ncO \n\n1 \n\n+ \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nCu vO \n\nrC \n\n\n\n\n\n-d \n\n\n\n\n\n\n(1) \n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSo \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nCO \n\n55 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n<0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2N \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncO \n\nSt \n\nst \n\nON \n\no \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nis \n\nVO \n\nCO \n\n6 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nVO \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nis \n\nis \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nw \n\nON \n\no \n\no \n\nO \n\no \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\na) \n\nTJ \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n<0 \n\n(1) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPu \n\n4-> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\nw \n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\nu \n\nW \n\nM \n\nM \n\n> \n\nU \n\n(H \n\nW \n\nH \n\n> \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nM \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaH \n\nCO \n\n\nM \n\nM \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nZD \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nM \n\n\nJX \n\no \n\n\nO\' \n\n\n\n\n\nO\' \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n90 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTotal Defense Expenditures Distributed According to Strategic or General Purpose Nature \n\n(billions of current dollars and percentage of total) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\nOS \n\nco \n\nrx \n\nrx. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nos \n\n00 \n\nHi- \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2sj- \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrx \n\nCM \n\nrx \n\n\n \n\ni \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nrx \n\nco \n\nO \n\nOs \n\nrH \n\nrx \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nos \n\nrx. \n\nOs \n\nix \n\nCM \n\nrx \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrx \n\nCM \n\nix \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\nos \n\n00 \n\nso \n\n\nrx \n\nco \n\nVO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOs \n\n00 \n\no \n\nOs \n\nco \n\nSO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nrx \n\nCM \n\nCx \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nrx \n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nVO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOS \n\nSO \n\nO \n\nrx \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nso \n\nrx \n\nCM \n\nrx \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\nrx \n\nrx \n\nrx \n\n\nO \n\no \n\nVO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nos \n\n\n00 \n\nco \n\no \n\no \n\nr-t \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrx \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\nVO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nSO \n\n<* \n\nSO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOS \n\n \n\n\n\n8Hi \n\n\nin \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nso \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nos \n\nSJ* \n\nm \n\nOS \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nco \n\n\nCM \n\nrx \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO- \n\n\n\n\n\n\nOS \n\nrx \n\nso \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOs \n\nvO \n\n \n\nc\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nC0 \n\n\n\n1 0) \n\n\n\n1 ..., e^. \n\nAn econometric system is necessarily stochastic. There are omitted \nvariables, approximate relationships, and random disturbances from \n\noutside. \n\n\n95 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIf we have estimates of the parameters of the f^ - functions on \nthe basis of historical sample data, we can use the system \n\n\n\n\nf. = 0 \n1 \n\n\ni \xe2\x96\xa0 1,2, .. .n \n\n\n\n\nfor estimating each y^, given ^ and for period t. We set \n\nthe errors equal to zero for these applications of the model because \n\nthat is their average value. If we have any special, non-statistical \n\nknowledge about the appropriate values for particular random disturbances \n\n(e. ) other than zero in any particular period, we occasionally use such \nit 5 \n\nvalues instead of assuming that all the e^ vanish. Also, it should \n\nbe pointed out that values of y. , may be assumed to be given only \n\ni j \n\nat the beginning of an application, for such lag values are developed \nin successive time periods as future inputs on the basis of the dynamic \nevolution of the model; therefore we merely assume that initial values \nof y are given, together with values of the x over the whole \n\nl, t\xe2\x80\x94j it \n\nperiod of application. \n\n\nSpecific economic policies are defined in terms of given sequences of \nvalues for x^ t over a period of application. Policies may also be \ndescribed in terms of values for some parameters of the f^ - functions, \nnamely, those that are subject to direct control of public authorities. \nThes^e include such things as tax rates, reserve requirements against \nbank deposits, tariffs, exchange rates, social insurance benefit rates, \netc. The major policy decisions represented by the exogenous variables, \nx^ t , are government expenditure levels (by type), open market operations, \n\nthe discount rate, transfer payments, public employment levels, etc. \n\nThe usual procedure for studying economic policies of impact effects \nof major events is to develop two or more dynamic solutions to an \nequation system. One solution is called the control solution, and the \nothers are disturbed solutions. The control solution is a base-line \ncalculation, used as a reference position, usually representing the best \nconsidered judgement about input values for x. t and policy parameters. \n\nThe disturbed solution gives the time path of the economy in its \nvarious dimensions as a result of altering policy or other inputs. \n\nThese alterations may be complicated in that they assume many things to \nchange simultaneously at particular time points. A comparison of a \n\n\nTo cope with the problems of data revision that are constantly \noccurring in the realm of social statistics, we re-estimate our models \nfrom time to time. For interim purposes, between data revision periods, \nwe often assign non-zero values to the e^ . \n\n\n96 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ndisturbed with a control solution is a generalization of the concept \nof a multiplier in which the change in one solution (y^ \xe2\x80\x94 y9^_) is \n\n\nd it: \n\ncompared with the associated change in one input (x. - ), where \n\nj ^ j1 \n\n\nmultiplier = \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\ny it - \n\n\nit \n\n\nc \n\nX,. ~ X \xe2\x80\x984- \njt Jt \n\n\nThe new approach is a generalization not only in the sense that the \n\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99package\xe2\x80\x9d of changes can be made more complicated, but also in the \nsense that the change process can be followed through time. We, therer \nfore, have dynamic multipliers or their generalized equivalents. \n\n\nIn using the Wharton-EFU Model in the present studies of disarmament, \nwe try to translate reductions of military expenditures and personnel \ninto combined, balanced changes in a number of exogenous variables over \nthe forecast horizon of the solution. Government purchase of goods and \nservices for defense, government wage payments, and the military labor \nforce are all explicit model variables. In addition, we consider \nvarious compensatory programs in the civilian sector of the economy \nand these are represented by corresponding changes in nonmilitary expend\xc2\xac \nitures, tax rates (parameters of "legal restrictions"), and instruments \nof monetary policy\xe2\x80\x94unborrowed reserves of the banking system and the \nFederal Reserve discount rate. \n\nMuch attention centers on the solutions for total production and \nunemployment in the economy when various disarmament programs are \nfollowed. Although the Model is highly interrelated and cannot be \nreadily described in all 70-equation detail, the major lines of \ncausation for the determination of production and employment can be \nindicated. The equations of the Model build up total demand for goods \nand services in the economy from relationships of consumption, capital \nformation, public expenditures and net exports. This buildup of \ndemand must be simultaneously supported by a flow of aggregate income. \nThese balancing flows of total demand and income determine aggregate \nproduction, known as Gross National Product (GNP). To meet this level, \nof GNP, an aggregate labor input is required which yields the required \nemployment figure. Against the level of employment required, we con\xc2\xac \nsider the labor force available. Labor force, itself, varies with the \nstate of the economy in the Model. Labor force minus employment gives \nunemployment, as one of the identities or definitional equations of the \nsystem. Labor force and employment must include farm workers, farm oper\xc2\xac \nators, other self employed persons, government civilian employees, and \nmilitary personneL It is evident that demobilization policies that \naccompany disarmament programs leave many servicemen in the labor force. \n\n\nt \n\n\n97 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nswitching them from a military to a civilian category, without immedi\xc2\xac \nately placing them all in civilian jobs. This is the crux of the un\xc2\xac \nemployment problem in our calculations. There is a further impact on \nproduction and indirect effects on employment. These, too, are. allow- \ned for in the Model solution. \n\nThe Model makes direct calculations of labor force and employment. \nUnemployment is a residual estimate. It is also quite small, something \nunder 10 percent. These two features of the unemployment statistics, \nits residual character and its small size, introduce uncertainty into \nits estimation. Errors in labor force and in employment projections \nmay be reinforcing and cause unemployment projections to be less reliable \nthan many other economic magnitudes. When compared to its small size, \nthe errors may appear to be large. \n\nThe Model generates solutions for other variables besides measures \nof aggregate economic activity. It produces estimates of price levels, \ninterest rates, and wage rates. \n\n\nIII.2 THE ECONOMETRICS OF DISARMAMENT-CONTROL SOLUTION \n\nFirst we must describe our control solution. It is the September, \n\n1970, control solution of the Wharton-EFU Model, extended beyond the \nusual cut-off period of 8 quarters, to go through the calendar year, \n\n1972. It is thus a 10 quarter projection. In this solution we have \nassumed that the war in Vietnam continues indefinitely but at a slacken\xc2\xac \ned pace as far as U.S. military expenditures and armed forces are con\xc2\xac \ncerned. It represents, essentially, a policy of "Vietnamization." \n\nWe have allowed for the 1970 pay increase of government employees, but \notherwise assumed that recent declines in defense expenditures will \n\ncontinue until the armed forces decline from the present level of 3.14 \nmillion men to 2.7 million by the end of 19^2. State and local govern- \xe2\x80\x9d \n\nment expenditures are assumed to rise first by $2.0 billion per quarter, \nincreasing to $3.4 billion per quarter, then falling back to $2.5 \nbillion pqr quarter. Federal civilian expenditures are also assumed \nto rise gradually, in addition to the pay increases. Additional pay \nincreases are built into the assumed path of government expenditures. \nFederal, state, and local. Total expenditures in current and constant \ndollars are shown quarterly over the solution period in Table 1. \n\nWorld trade is projected smoothly and steadily upward, but at a \nslower rate than in recent years. Farm income is assumed to decline \nslightly during the latter half of 1970 and then remain level for the \nrest of the projection period. The major unusual assumptions that must \nbe built into the control solution and the related disarmament simulations \nof the Model are those associated with initial conditions at the time \n\n\n98 \n\n\n\n\n\nControl Solution with Major Assumptions \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nco \n\nO \n\non \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nO \n\nm \n\n*H \n\n\n. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nrH \n\nst \n\nm \n\nH \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nts. \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nst \n\n\nTO \n\nm \n\non \n\nT\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nm \n\nst \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nrs. \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nON \n\n00 \n\n\nr*s \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nst \n\n\nCM \n\nst \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nO \n\nrs \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nO \n\no \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\n. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nrH \n\nst \n\nst \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nrs- \n\nrs \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nst \n\n\nCM \n\nst \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nst \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nrs \n\nSt \n\nSt \n\nO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nO \n\nsi\xc2\xac \n\nSt \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nr-s \n\nrs. \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nSt \n\n\nCM \n\nSt \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\nO ON \n\nrs vo \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nrs \n\nvO \n\n\n# \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no \n\nm co \n\nO ON \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\nON \n\nrs \n\nrs cm \n\nCM rH \n\nSt \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n \n\nrH CM \n\n \n\nrH \n\n \n\n\n \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\na\\ \n\nrH \n\nCD \n\nQ) 4-1 \n\nU OX \n\nd cd \n\nM \n\n\n\nU \n\nC \n\nd \n\n\n\n*H \n\ncd \n\n6^ \n\nu \n\nH \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n \n\n53 \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nX \n\nT3 \n\nrH \n\n-2 \n\na) \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\na \n\nN-X \n\n>\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\nD \n\nH \n\n\n\n-u \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xa3 8 \n\nO \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nvO \n\n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n4.52 \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\n8.10 \n\n4J \n\ncn cd \nCU Hi \n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nVO \n\n\nst \n\nis cu \na) co \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nvO \n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nSt \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nco a) \na) o5 \n05 \n\nrH \nTd cd \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\nst \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\n\nrs \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) M \n> a) \nO TJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHi a) \n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\nHi Ph \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nVO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU \n\nvO \n\n\nSt \n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\nVO \n\n00 \n\n\nrH \n\n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nrs \n\n\nrH \n\n\n>s d) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH rH \n*H rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd Hi \nCU 4-1 \n\nCO \n\n\nSt \n\n\n00 \n\nvo \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nst \n\nT) d \n\xe2\x80\xa2H O \nO \n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\n\nvo \n\nm \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n0) \n\njd a) \n\ni 1 n \n\nrH \n\n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nrs \n\n\nrH \n\n\n4J JO \n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0CO* \n\n\n\n\n5n O \n-o H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT> Tl \n\ncu ^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd 0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*h d \n\nIH CD \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nll \n\n\n\n\n(U CO \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\nnd cd \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0u \n\n4-> \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nare \n\nare \n\n\n\no \n\na \n\nTl \n\n/S> \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nT3 \n\nd \n\nT3 \n\n00 \n\nV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCO to \n\na) cu \n\xc2\xa3: \n\n\n\nO \n\nU \n\nO \n\nM \n\nm \n\nON \n\na) \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\n\n\nPH \n\nPH \n\nrH \n\n4-> \n\nON \n\n\n \n(U Hi \n^ CU \nO CO \n\n{a fll \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2d \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\n05 \n\nW \n\n/s \n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nu \n\no \n\n\'w\' \n\n92 \n\n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\na \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\na> \n\nCU \n\nT> \n\nO \n\n\n4J \n\n4-> \n\no \n\nP \n\nr 0 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nd \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n>s \n\nd \n\n* \n\nrn vu \ntj \n\n\n4J \n\nCD \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\nCU \n\n\nA \n\n0 \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n0 \n\nO \n\n-a \n\nJO \xc2\xbb \n\n\xc2\xabH \n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\nr^ \n\nr^. \n\nCM \n\nd* \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\n42 \n\n44 \n\nO \n\na) \n\ntH \n\na) \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nu \n\nOu \n\n3 \n\no \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nr^. \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nrH \n\no \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nr->- \n\nCO \n\nOn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n. \n\n\no \n\nr>* \n\nr^- \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n-d- \n\n\nCO \n\nVO rH \n\n\nvo \n\n\n\n\non \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nT3 \n\nS \n\n3 \n\n\ng \n\n8 \n\n\nCO \n\nU \n\n3 \n\n\no \n\nT) \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0u \n\n3 \n\na) \n\nM \n\nin \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\ntH \n\no \n\n\nm \n\nO \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nvo \n\no \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nIM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nr^\xc2\xbb \n\nm \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nvo \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nOn \n\nr^. \n\no \n\n\nr^. \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n<3- \n\n\nCO \n\nm rH \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nON \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\na) \n\n\na) \n\nr*H \n\n\xe2\x96\xa08 \n\nH \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n42 \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\nO \n\n\nON \n\n\ntH \n\ntH CO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO- \n\n\n \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO- \n\n\n-co- \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n*r-) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/*N \n\n\n\n\ntH \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nTJ \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntH \n\no \n\n\n\n\ntH \n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntH \n\no \n\n\n\n44 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n44 \n\nO \n\ntH \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n42 \n\n\n\na \n\nO \n\nTJ \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94N \n\n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nP \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n-d \n\neg \n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n/-N \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n* 3 \n\n\n00 \n\nVH \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n0 \n\nO \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\n\nU \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\'O \n\neg \n\n\ntH \n\n\nO \n\nJh \n\n\n> \n\nU \n\n\n\ntH \n\nV4 \n\nON \n\n3 m \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 9 \n\nPH \n\n3 \n\n\n\nU \n\na \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\nH \n\n3 \n\n\nU \n\nH \n\n\n\nPH \n\nCH \n\ntH \n\n44 a\\ \n\n\n/-N \n\n\n\na) \n\na) \n\na) \n\n3 \n\no \n\n\ntH \n\nrH \n\nVH \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 tH \n\n\n\ntH \n\n3 \n\n\n\n44 \n\n04 \n\n44 \n\nQ \n\n\ntH \n\ntH \n\n\n3 \n\nT) \n\n\n\n73 73 \n\n4h \n\n03 ^ \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\ntH \n\n\n\nu \n\nK \n\n3 \n\nU \n\nhJ \n\n\nH \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n8 \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nw \n\nQ \n\na) \n\n\n\n42 \n\nTd \n\n44 \n\nPd \n\nU \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n44 O \n\nNH \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n0) \n\n3 \n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\'O \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\no \n\ntH 3 \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n3 X \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\n3 \n\n\nG \n\nO\' \n\n44 \n\n\na) \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n*3 \n\n\n0 \n\n\n*H \n\nH \n\n3 \n\n3 3 \n\nXJ \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\n\n3 \n\nPH \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n73 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\no \n\n\n44 \n\n44 \n\nO \n\n0 TJ \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2d \n\nH \n\n-3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n44 \n\n!* \n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 a \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n*H \n\n5n 3 \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n25 \n\ntH \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\n3 \n\ns \n\nO \n\ntH \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\nO \n\noo 3 \n\nO \n\n55 \n\n23 \n\ntH \n\nO H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\n3 \n\n44 \n\nt \n\nS3 \n\n3 \n\nH \n\n(1) \n\n44 \n\no \n\nO \n\n\n9 \n\nM \n\nX \n\nm h \n\n*H \n\n\n\ntH \n\ntH \n\nrH \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nU \n\n44 \n\n42 \n\n3 \n\nH \n\nH \n\n\no \n\ntH \n\nON \n\n44 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n*H \n\n04 3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nu \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n3 \n\nrH 0 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n42 \n\n0 O \n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\ntH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n> \n\n55 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n42 \n\n\'O \n\n\' tH \n\ntH \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n3 *H \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\nU \n\nrH \n\n\n% \n\n3 \n\nS \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nO \n\ntH \n\ntH \n\n\n3 tH \n\nO \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n3 \n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n5 \n\nM \n\npH \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n5o (X, \n\nPQ \n\n55 \n\na \n\nTJ \n\n\n\n100 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe projections are being prepared (September, 1970). The control \nsolution was started from a situation in which a major strike was in \nforce (General Motors Corp.) that has a clearly discernible influence \non economic performance. Some dimensions of a 6-week strike are pro\xc2\xac \ngrammed into these solutions causing a drop in purchases of autos and \nparts and nonmanufacturing inventories in the fourth quarter of 1970, \nfollowed by significant catch-up buying and re-stocking in the first \nhalf of 1971. In addition, the possible consequences of a steel labor \nsettlement in summer, 1971, are programmed to allow for hedge buying \nof inventories during the first two quarters of 1971. This gives an \ninitial "down-up\xe2\x80\x9d movement to the economy that is independent of the \nfocus of this particular paper. The Model solutions return to standard \ngrowth paths by the end of 1971 after the effects of these two labor \ndisturbances are worked off. \n\nThe control solution reflects the policies that were instituted in \n1969 to slow down the economy and bring about a recovery later in 1970, \nwith the above mentioned strike interruption. Right or wrong as a \nprediction of the precise course that the economy will follow until \nthe end of 1972, it provides what seems to be a reasonable control \nsolution for the present study. It is a solution that assumes a con\xc2\xac \ntinuation of the war with reduced level of military expenditures and \nmanpower requirements. It does not assume a static military budget, \nbut one that is capable of supporting a limited war effort and contem\xc2\xac \nplates little general disarmament. Various peace and disarmament \npolicies, as well as an escalation type budget will be compared with \nthis solution.^ The time path of the control solution in terms of lead\xc2\xac \ning variables is given in Table 1. \n\nWhile the control solution consists of values for more than 75 \ndifferent variables, the selected ones summarized here give the flavor \nof the projected course of the economy over the next years. The \nstated objective of slowing down economic expansion through fiscal \nand monetary control, which took effect in mid-1969, produced a decline \nin real GNP for 1969.4 and a recovery or flattening out in 1970.2. \n\nFrom this point onwards, the economic expansion is projected to gain \nmomentum again apart from labor troubles, but with declining real value \nof military expenditures and a lower military force. The unemployment \nrate is driven above 5 percent and then declines again. The rate of \n\n\n^Editor\'s Note: Annual rates of change of particular series have \nbeen treated as continuous rates in this paper. Hence, they will not \nin general be the average of .the quarterly rates. This also accounts \nfor the slight variation between the military budget models of Professor \nW. W. Kaufmann described in.the Overview and Summary and those used in \n\nthis chapter. \n\n\n101 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n. \n\ninflation, measured by the GN7 deflator, shows some response to the de\xc2\xac \nflationary policies and gradually declines. While prices are not \nconstant by 1971-1972, they are estimated to grow at a much smaller \nrate than at present. The strict monetary policy of 1969 causing high \ninterest rates has been relaxed in this solution and interest rates \ngradually come down. The budget deficit of 1968 was turned into a \nsurplus for 1969 by fiscal policy, but turned negative again in 1970 \nand remains negative in the control solution. Net exports of goods \nand services, which fell below $2.0 billion (current prices) in the \nfirst half of 1969, recovered to values in excess of $4.0 billion by \nmid-1970 and remain firm with improvement throughout the solution \nperiod. \n\n\nIII.3 THE ECONOMETRICS OF DISARMAMENT-POST VIETNAM SOLUTIONS \n\nCase 1. Budget D. In the midst of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, \ndefense budgets and implied manpower programs are fairly well fixed for \nthe last two quarters of 1970 and the first two quarters of 1971. We \nassume that the control solution patterns for exogenous inputs are given \nfor that period and that an acceleration of disengagement follows, \nstarting in 1971.3. This could be associated with a cessation of \nhostilities. \n\nWhereas the control solution projects a decline in defense spending \nto $74.0 billion in 1972.4, the Budget D case brings this total down to \n$70.4 billion. The size of the armed forces is not changed from the \nfigure of 2.7 million men assumed for the control solution; so the lower \nspending total implies a different mix between men and material. \n\nFederal civilian spending and spending by state and local governments \nare fixed at the control solution values. The changes then are in \nmilitary spending, alone. The monetary policy set for the control \nsolution seems to be appropriate here. \n\nThe acceleration of cutbacks in defense spending under this case, \nraise unemployment somewhat in 1972, after some improvement in 1971. \n\nAt the end of the solution, unemployment stands near 4.5 percent. Some \ndetails of the calculation are given in Table 2. \n\nAn appropriate fiscal offset to compensate for the cutback in \nmilitary expenditures would seem to be increased Federal civilian spend\xc2\xac \ning, reaching an increment of $4.3 billion over the control solution \nlead by 1972.4. This adds almost $1.0 billion to the Federal deficit, \nbut moderates the rise in unemployment in 1972. The compensated pro\xc2\xac \ngram adds very little to the inflation rate according to the Model \nsolution. The compensated levels of nondefense spending and results \nfor a few leading variables are given in Table 2. \n\n\n102 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nro \n\nX \n\nON \n\n\nCM \n\n\nr^ \n\non \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\no \n\n\nOn \n\nrH \n\nVO \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\n<3- \n\nrH \n\nON \n\n\nin \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nO \n\n\noo \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\no \n\no \n\nO \n\n\noo \n\noo \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nLO \n\n\nCO \n\n\nn- \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n-- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nn- \n\n\n\no \n\nX \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nmi- \n\no \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nMl" \n\nCM \n\nMi- \n\nr>- \n\noo \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\nMf \n\nCM \n\n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n\nco \n\n\nr^\xc2\xbb \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nin \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nO \n\nr>. \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nCM \n\nco \n\n3 on \nX X \n0 \nX \n\n\nHO \n\na \n\na) \n\n\nx \n\n\nCO \n\n\nr"\xc2\xbb \n\non \n\n\n\nvO \n\n\n- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\n \n\no \n\nx \n\nX \n\n3 \n\ncr \n\nw \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 00 - \n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n-co- \n\n\nco\xc2\xac \n\n\nco \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\n-co\xc2\xac \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n/-N \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n/"N \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n4J \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\n\no \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n0 \n\no \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\no \n\na \n\n\'d \n\n\no \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\nHO \n\no \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nHO \n\nHO \n\noo \n\nV-/ \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\nHO \n\nHO \n\n00 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX \n\n03 \n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\nm \n\n.. \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\nu \n\nCN \n\n3 \n\n00 \n\n\nHO \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nON \n\n^ oo \n\n\nH3 \n\n\nx \n\n0-i \n\np-( \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nin \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\nP-. \n\nX \n\nm \n\n\n3 \n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nON \n\n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n3 On \n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n4-4 \n\nP5 \n\nrH \n\n\nCh 44 \n\n3 \n\no \n\n\n<\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nx x \n\n/-s \n\n\n3 \n\nx \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\nv-/ \n\n\nX \n\n03 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\no \n\n3 v\xe2\x80\x94\' \n\n\n>< \n\nX \n\ncd \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n4-> \n\n\n\nw \n\nQ \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nW \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nHO \n\nHO \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\n\nHO \n\nO\' \n\nX \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n03 \n\nHO \n\n4-J \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nHO 3 \n\nHO \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\n4-1 \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\na \n\nHO \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\ncd \n\nP*4 \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nO \n\n3 HO \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nPh \n\nH3 \n\ncd \n\nCd \n\n*H \n\nin \n\n3 \n\n03 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n>N 3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nq \n\n23 \n\n25 \n\nrH \n\no \n\nH \n\nX \n\na \n\nO \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n4-J \n\nS3 \n\n25 \n\nX \n\nO H \n\nX \n\na \n\nX \n\nft \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n3 \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nS^ \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\n9- \n\n<13 \n\n\nX \n\n4-J \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nCX 3 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nx \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\na \n\nO \n\nH3 \n\n03 \n\n3 \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\na o \n\nHO \n\n3 \n\nX \n\ncd \n\no \n\no \n\n\n03 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n> \n\nS3 \n\no \n\nC/5 \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n3 X \n\n3 \n\n> \n\no \n\n0) \n\nx \n\nX \n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\nO \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n3 X \n\nO \n\nQ \n\n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nO \n\n\nS3 \n\nCH \n\nX \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\nX O-i \n\nX \n\nc-5 \n\n\n\ned \n\n\n103 \n\n\nAll dollar figures are in billions of current dollars, except where otherwise noted. \n\n\n\n\n\nTable 2 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\nfs. \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\ncn \n\n\nSt \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\nNO \n\n00 \n\nst \n\nSt \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n00 \n\nr^- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n# \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\no \n\nMD \n\nSt \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nr>. \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\nrH \n\nrs \n\n?H \n\n\no \n\nr>. \n\n\nSt \n\n\nis* \n\nCM \n\nSt \n\nst \n\no \n\n00 \n\n\nSt \n\n\nCO \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nr-* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nr-- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\n00 \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nm \n\nON \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nm \n\no \n\nCM \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nr>. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nrs. \n\no \n\nSt \n\no \n\nI"-. \n\nrH \n\nr^ \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nst \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nn- \n\n00 \n\n\n\nst \n\n\n\nCM \n\nsr \n\nCO \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nON \n\no \n\nr- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nSt \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nm \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nm \n\nVO \n\nON \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nSt \n\nSt \n\nO \n\n|s\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\nM3 \n\n00 \n\n1^. \n\nr>\xc2\xbb \n\nIS. \n\nSt \n\no \n\nis. \n\nON \n\nh- \n\n\nNO \n\n\nst \n\n\nr-*. \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nr^ \n\nvO \n\n\nSt \n\n\nCM \n\nON \n\nO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nI-\'- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\n00 \n\n\nrH \n\n\nst \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\nNO \n\nON \n\no \n\nm \n\nst \n\nON \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nNO \n\nON \n\nNO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n*d \n\nm \n\nin \n\nm \n\nON \n\n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nSt \n\n\nON \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nON \n\nfs. \n\n00 \n\nr>. \n\n0) \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nT3 \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nOn \n\nhi \n\no \n\ni". \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n0) \n\no \n\nr>. \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n/*\\ \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nu \n\n4J \n\no \n\no \n\n\n0 ) \n\n\n\n\n\nHi \n\nHi \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n*d \xe2\x9c\x93-n O \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\no \n\n*d \n\nO \n\n\nU \n\n\n\n3 \n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n*d \n\n*d \n\n00 w \n\n\n\nHi \n\n\n\n\n\nTJ \n\nTJ \n\n00 \n\n\n\nHi \n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na) \n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nm \n\n6-5 .. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nU \n\nu \n\nOn \n\nS3 \n\n55 \n\nrH \n\nO M \n\n\na \n\nVi \n\nCO \n\n\n\nrH rH \n\n\n>s \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nd \n\n03 \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH cL \n\n03 \n\n\nc \n\n4-1 \n\nX! \n\n \n\n55 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\no \n\nw \n\n03 *H \n\nd \n\n> \n\no \n\n0) \n\nu \n\nu \n\nd \n\n\no \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n\nd d \n\no \n\nQ \n\n\n>4 \n\no \n\no \n\n\nPH \n\nPQ \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\nS3 PV, \n\nPQ \n\no \n\n\n\n104 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThis modest amount of added civilian spending can be accommodated by \nundertaking small scale urban, transport, or anti-pollution programs. \n\nIf these are carried out in the private sector, with government financ\xc2\xac \ning, we simply have an increase in government expenditures, with no \naccompanying increase in government wage payments. This is the way the \ncompensatory alternative is programmed into the model. \n\nCase 2. Budget C : The major escalation of the war in Vietnam began in \n1965; thus a return to the 1965 fiscal year defense budget, inflated for \n1972 price levels, and pay increases that have occurred since 1965 pro\xc2\xac \nvide a case of moderate scale disarmament. A target military budget of \nthe last prewar size for 1972.4, together with an assumption of a \ncease fire from the end of fiscal year 1971 provide the main charac\xc2\xac \nteristics of this case. \n\nThe defense spending target of $67.9 billion for 1972.4 is just $2.5 \nbillion under the spending figure for the previous Budget D case. With \nthis comparatively small additional cutback in defense spending, we have \nnot altered the pattern used in the previous case for the size of the \narmed forces. It is programmed to fall gradually to 2.7 million men by \n1972.4. \n\nThe main results for Budget C are only slightly different from those \nof Budget D because the only changes in exogenous inputs are those for \nadditional defense spending cuts that grow to a maximum of $2.5 billion. \nTable 3 gives the leading calculations for Case 2. \n\nThe compensated version of this case programs an increment to non\xc2\xac \nmilitary Federal spending that grows over time and reaches a figure of \n$6.0 billion by 1972.4. This raises the estimate of constant dollar \nGIP by more than $7.0 billion and shaves more than a half point from the \nprojected unemployment rate in 1972.4. \n\nCase 3 Budget B: This de-escalation is deeper than that implied by \nthe inflated budget for FY 1965 (Budget C). This program rests on \ndeferral cf SAFEGUARD, and MINUTEMAN III, cessation ot further expendi\xc2\xac \ntures on theater nuclear forces, modernization of forces, and salvage \nof higher-value Vietnam surpluses. In this case we program the demobil \nization of and additional 200,000 men, and cut military expenditures \n$11 billion (current prices) below the Budget D Solution. To compen \nsate for this substantial amount of disarmament, we introduce an easier \nmonetary policy, civilian expenditure offsets that reach $6.5 billion, \nand a five percent income tax cut at the end of F* 19/i. \n\nThe easier monetary policy is represented by faster cuts in the dis\xc2\xac \ncount rate and more open market operations. These stimulative policies \nare manifested in the solution by lower interest rates and higher levels \n\n\n105 \n\n\n\n\n\nTable 3 \n\nBudget C Solution - Defense Expenditures \nEqual to $67.9 billion (1972 dollars) by 1972.4 \n\nand Quarter 1970.3 1970.4 1971.1 1971.2 1971.3 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ncn \n\n\nON \n\n* \n\nCNJ \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\ncn \n\nm \n\n\ncn \n\n\nCN \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nr*. \n\n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n<* \n\np^ \n\n\n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\n\nm \n\ncn \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\nvO \n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\ncn \n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\ncn \n\n\ncn \n\n\n. \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n vO \n\ns \n\n\n00 \n\nO \n\nCM \n\n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n... \n\no \n\n. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncn \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nm \n\ncn o on \n\nCJ \n\ncn \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nm \n\n00 \n\ncn \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\ncn \n\n\n\nCM CM rH \n\n\noo \n\nCM \n\n\ncn \n\n\nCM \n\nON \n\nP- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH CM \n\n\nON \n\nP^ \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n-co- \n\n\nCO \n\nu \n\ncd \n\n\n44 44 \n\no o \n\n3 P \n\n03 03 \n\no o \nu u \nCH cu \n\n\no \n\nT3 ^ \n\n00 \n\nuo \n\nON 23 \nO \nO \n\n\nPM Cd rH \n\ncd \n\nCD 4-4 \n4-4 O \n\ncd H \n\n44 \n\n\nd) \n\n-d \n\n44 \n\n\n44 44 \n\ncd cd \n\nZ 23 \n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\nd \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\no \n\n\nO CO \n\n\nCO CO \nCO CO \n\no o \n\nM V4 \n\no o \n\n\n*H D-. \n-Q 0 \n\n\'W\' Q) \n\n\nX \n\nCD 03 \n03 rH \nd CD \nM *H \n>4 \n \n\no \n\no \n\n\nCD \n\n03 \n\nd) \n\nPm \n\n\nV4 \n\nd) \n\njd \n\n\n03 \n\nCD \n\n4-4 \n\no \n\nd \n\n\nCD \n\nCO \n\n\n2 \n\n\nCD \n\nx: \n\n44 \n\no \n\n\n44 \n\n04 \n\n \n\nNO \n\nvO \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nON \n\n- \n\n\nrH \n\nr^- \n\nn* \n\nr^ \n\nCO \n\noc \n\nvO \n\no \n\n\nrH \n\nr"* \n\nCO \n\nr^. \n\nON \n\n\n\n-d- \n\n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n00 \n\n\nv^\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\nCO \n\nON \n\no \n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCN \n\nrH \n\nr>. \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nt\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nVO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nn. \n\n\n00 \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nCN \n\nCO \n\nCN \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nCN \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n00 \n\n<1- \n\no \n\n\n00 \n\nr^ \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nCN \n\n\n<3" \n\nrH \n\n\nCN \n\nn- \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\n\n\'d- \n\n\nvO \n\nCN \n\n- \n\n\ntH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCN \n\nO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCN \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCN \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCN \n\n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCN \n\nOn \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\nv* \n\nON \n\n\nCO \n\nON \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCN \n\n\n00 \n\niH \n\nm \n\no \n\n\nON \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\nvO \n\nVO \n\n\no \n\n\nrH \n\n\nn* \n\n\nvO \n\nvO \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\nco \n\n\n\nVO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nON \n\nc \n\nr\xc2\xbb \n\nG \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n\nn* \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCN \n\no \n\nON \n\nCD \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCN \n\nCTJ \n\no \n\nr^- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\no \n\nrH \n\na \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\ng \n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\'\xe2\x80\xa2d- \n\n\nrO \n\n\nd \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCN \n\no \n\nin \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nm \n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nVO \n\no \n\nco \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\nrH \n\n\nCN \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nVO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\no \n\nm \n\nON \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\nr>. \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCN \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n>d- \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCN \n\n\nON \n\n\nO \n\nr>- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCN \n\n\no \n\ni-"- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co- \n\nCO- \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0co- \n\n-CO- \n\n-CO- \n\n-CO- \n\n\n-co- \n\nCO- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/*\\ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCTJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n4J \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n\no \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nx> \n\n/-\xe2\x80\x9cN \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\nXJ \n\n\no \n\n\nU \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n** \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n5-5 \n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nXJ \n\nxj \n\n00 \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\nXJ \n\nX) \n\n00 \n\nv-/ \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd) \n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\nin \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nU \n\nM \n\nON \n\na; \n\n00 \n\nXJ \n\nco \n\n\nrH \n\n\nu \n\nH \n\nON \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n\nXJ \n\n\nU \n\nCH \n\ncu \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nm \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\npL, \n\n0-4 \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nin \n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nON \n\nG \n\n0) \n\nrH \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nON \n\n\nG \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n4-4 \n\noc \n\nrH \xe2\x9c\x93\xe2\x80\x94v \n\nG. 4-1 \n\nG \n\no \n\n\n*3 \n\nrH \n\n44 \n\noi \n\nrH \n\n\na \n\nG \n\nu \n\nCTJ \n\nCTJ \n\no \n\n\n5^5 \n\nX \n\n0) \n\nJ-4 \n\nhJ \n\n\nG \n\no \n\n\nv-^ \n\n5^5 \n\nX \n\n\nCTJ \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\n4-J \n\nv-/ \n\nW \n\nQ \n\nG \n\n\n\nc \n\nG \n\n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\nV-/ \n\nw \n\nG \n\n3 \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\n\nXJ \n\nxj \n\n\no \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nc \n\n\n\nXJ \n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n*H \n\nG \n\n\na) x) \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n*H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nXJ \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n\nX) rH \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO-i \n\nG \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\n4-4 \n\no \n\ne \n\nXJ \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nJH \n\nXJ \n\nCTJ \n\nCTJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG G \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n*H \n\n>> \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\ng \n\n5Z \n\nJ3 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nM -H \n\ns \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\n53 \n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nw \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\nH \n\nCTJ \n\n\n\n-H \n\nrH \n\n>< \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\nGr \n\nG \n\n\n4-1 \n\n-G \n\nG \n\nH \n\nco \n\nw \n\n*H \n\na. \n\nG \n\n\n\nrC \n\nu \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nrO \n\nS \n\na xj \n\nG \n\nG \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n4-1 \n\n\nco \n\nCO \n\nrQ \n\n& \n\na \n\nXJ \n\nG \n\n4-4 \n\nCTJ \n\no \n\no \n\n\nG \n\n*H G \n\n> \n\n2 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n> \n\nO \n\nG \n\n*4 \n\nu \n\n\nG \n\nJ-i O \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nM \n\n\nc \n\nV4 \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n>* \n\no \n\no \n\n\nG3 \n\nCH CO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\nD \n\ncu \n\nCO \n\nc3 \n\n\n\n107 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nof capital formation. The calculations are also done without fiscal \nor monetary compensation. \n\nFrom the viewpoint of an advocate of disarmament, the compensated \nversion of Budget B represents a low defense budget, large-scale demobil\xc2\xac \nization, and a balanced civilian program. As in the previous case, the \ncivilian offset expenditures are assumed to occur in the private sector, \nbut spent by government. The civilian offsets are balanced between the \nfiscal activities of spending and tax remission and also between fiscal \nand monetary measures. The latter stimulate the economy by stimulating \nprivate fixed capital formation. The projected time paths of the same \nfour variables presented for the other solutions together with government \nexpenditure assumptions are given in Table 4. Unemployment is not at a \nlong run equilibrium level (under 4 percent) by the end of 1972, but it \ncomes down to 4.5 percent under the stimulus of compensatory policy and \nis improving as the calculation ends. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\nCase 4. Budget E : This is an altogether different type of assumption \nand solution pattern. The war is assumed to be terminated but military \nexpenditures are increased rather than reduced. ABM and new warfare \nsystems are included in the budget. The inputs allow for an expansion \nof outlay for R & D, intelligence, and communications. Although the \nair, sea, and ground war in Vietnam is concluded in this program, the \nsize of the military establishment is gradually restored to its recent \npeak value of 3.5 million men. \n\nThe additional expenditures more than cover the reductions associated \nwith Vietnam peace. As a result, the total military budget is fixed at \n$93.0 billion (current prices) by the end of 1972. This is about $13 \nbillion above the highest defense outlays during the War. It is also \nassumed that civilian programs are not cut back from the levels used in \nthe control solution. In total, this case provides for a large, growing \npublic sector. \n\nIt is unlikely that an extreme policy like this would be uncompen\xc2\xac \nsated, but the appropriate compensatory policies in this case are tighter \nmonetary policies and lower civilian spending by the Federal government. \nThe discount rate is kept high\xe2\x80\x94at 5% percent from the end of 1970\xe2\x80\x94and \nnonborrowed reserves are kept below the values attained in the control \nsolution. Income tax rates are increased by 5 percent after July 1, \n\n1971. \n\nThis solution has higher interest rates, higher prices, and lower \nunemployment. It also generates more real GNP. It is not a situation \nof intense inflation, however, because it comes during a period that has \na substantial }, cooling-of f\xe2\x80\x9d phase at the beginning. It does, however. \n\n\n108 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n. \n\nm \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\no \n\nm \n\nm \n\no \n\nOn \n\noo \n\no \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nd- \n\nCM \n\n<3- \n\nr>H \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\nr-. \n\nco \n\nm \n\n\nco \n\n\n\nCsl \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\non \n\nO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n>CJ- \n\nO \n\niH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n-d- \n\nr^. \n\no \n\nm \n\n\nX \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0) \n\n> \n\no \n\n\nG \n\n \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n-C \n\nS \n\nX \n\nCM \n\na> \n\no \n\nX \n\na) \n\n\n\na) \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n& \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nx \n\nG \n\n\nw \n\nrH \n\n-d- \n\n\nVO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nco \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\ntH \n\n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\no \n\no \n\nX \n\nd- \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\nCO- \n\nco- \n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\nCO- CO- CO- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co- \n\nO \n\n\nCD \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nPQ \n\nx \n\nG \n\n00 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nPQ \n\n\non \n\nm \n\n \n\no \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\na 4 \n\nw \n\n\nx \n\ng \n\n4-J \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO\' \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n0) \n\ntH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n-O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x94s \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n/T^S. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n/-\xe2\x80\x94 s \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n\no \n\n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\no \n\n\nW \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\n4-J \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\n\n\na \n\no \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\no \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nH \n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n& \n\nO \n\n\n\nCO \n\nX \n\no \n\no \n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\nin \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n:z \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nx \n\nON \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n\nX \n\nCO \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nON \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n\nX \n\nw \n\n\n0 \n\n\n> \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\ncu \n\nX \n\nX \n\nm \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\nPM \n\nPM \n\nX \n\nX \n\nm \n\n\nc \n\n\n<-3 \n\nO \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nON \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nON \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\n\na \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\nPd \n\nX \n\n/ - N \n\nPL X \n\nG \n\no \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n/~-N \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nC \n\nX \n\nCO \n\n\ncd \n\nG \n\no \n\n\nv-/ \n\n6^ \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaJ \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\no \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\n\nV\xe2\x80\x94/ \n\nfx3 \n\na \n\nG \n\n\n\nC \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\n\n\'w\' \n\nw \n\nG \n\nH \n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nG \n\nO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nC \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nto \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\no \n\n0 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nPm \n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\n0 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nPm \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\no \n\ncd \n\nid \n\nX \n\n>\xc2\xbb \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nSn \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\n5s \n\n53 \n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nJZ \n\nJZ \n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\n0 \n\nX \n\nO \n\no \n\nO \n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\n\n>* \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nO \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n>* \n\nC \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nPM \n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nPu \n\nCD \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n-G \n\nG \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\ncu \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\n-G \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n,o \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nco \n\nco \n\n40 \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nO \n\nX \n\no \n\n< \n\no \n\no \n\n\nQ) \n\nX \n\nc \n\n> \n\n2 \n\no \n\nCD \n\n\no \n\no \n\nS-4 \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n> \n\nO \n\nPM \n\nO \n\nQ \n\n40 \n\nG \n\nx \n\nx \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nQ \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nO \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nGJ \n\nP4 \n\nPQ \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\nto \n\nCM \n\nPQ \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\n109 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ni \n\n\nnO \n\n\nst \n\nro \n\nrH \n\nst \n\nCM \n\nis \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nIS \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nst \n\nm \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nON \n\nNO \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nst \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nrs \n\nON \n\nrs \n\nro \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n- \n\n \n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\nst (Tv \n\n\nNO \n\n\n00 \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nm \n\noo \n\n\nNO \n\nCM \n\no \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n00 \n\n03 \n\nrs \n\nIS \n\nn \n\nON \n\nrs \n\n\nON \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nin \n\nCNj \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nin \n\n\nro \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n4-J \n\no \n\nrs \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nCd \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nB \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\nro \n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nro \n\no \n\nSt \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nOn \n\n\nro \n\nCO \n\nON \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n00 \n\n\nrs \n\n\xc2\xabH \n\nm \n\nON \n\nrs \n\n\noo \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nin \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nst \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nro \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nrs \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nfH \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) CO \n\nO 4-J \n\n\n0) G \n\nK 00. \n\n\n\n\n\n/S \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/S. \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nS\' \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n*d \n\n0) \n\n>N \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nu \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nG \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n/S \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\nC0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nr-I \n\n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\nu \n\nO \n\n\no \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n4-> \n\n4-J \n\no \n\n\nO \n\n\n00 \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nd \n\n/s \n\nrH \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nu \n\nd \n\n/S \n\nrH \n\n\nH \n\nG \n\n4J \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nG \n\n\n6^ \n\n\n\nG \n\n00 \n\nG \n\nH \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n00 \n\nv-x \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n00 \n\nw \n\n\n\n4-J \n\na \n\nO \n\n\n/TN \n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n23 \n\n00 \n\n\n00 \n\n\nU \n\nU \n\nON \n\nd) \n\n00 \n\n\nd \n\nCO \n\n\niH \n\n\nM \n\n\nON \n\n0) \n\n00 \n\n\n*d \n\nw \n\n\na \n\nN-/ \n\n> \n\nu \n\na \n\na \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nin \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\ncd \n\n\na \n\na \n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\nin \n\n\nG \n\noS \n\no \n\n\n0-1 \n\nN \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\nG \n\nM \n\nG \n\n\ng \n\n2 \n\n23 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nM \n\n*H \n\n0 \n\no \n\nu \n\n00 \n\n4-J \n\n53 \n\nz \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nM \n\n\nB \n\n14 \n\nO \n\nO \n\nO \n\no \n\nCCS \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n>-< \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n00 \n\n4-J \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nG \n\n0) \n\nCO \n\na \n\no \n\nu \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\n00 \n\n\nH \n\n4-J \n\nx: \n\ncd \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP\xc2\xab \n\n00 \n\n\nH \n\n-G \n\n>-l \n\nu \n\nCO \n\nu \n\nM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX) \n\nS \n\nO \n\nd \n\n00 \n\nid \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n-Q \n\nB \n\nO \n\nT0 \n\n0) \n\n4J \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n00 \n\no \n\no \n\ns-/ \n\n00 \n\n*\xc2\xbbH \n\nG \n\n> \n\n!z \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\no \n\nN-/ \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n> \n\no \n\na \n\nCJ \n\nQ \n\nn \n\n00 \n\nu \n\n\n\nG \n\nU \n\nO \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x96\xa0 \nrj \n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\nG0 \n\na \n\nPQ \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\nEG \n\na \n\na \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n110 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nco \n\n\np^. \n\n\nON \n\n\nvO \n\no \n\no \n\nco \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\no \n\nOv \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nMfr \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nin \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\no \n\nMf \n\no \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nMf \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\nMf rH \n\n- \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nMf \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nMf \n\nCM \n\n\n\nov \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H ,0 \nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 -^v \n3 05 \n\na, u \nx 3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\nW rH \n\n- \n\nVO \n\nO \n\nMl" \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\nCM \n\nMf \n\n\nOs \n\nm \n\nr-\'. \n\n\nvO \n\n\nO *H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n*H rH \n\no \n\n3> \n\nCO \n\n\nvO \n\nm \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nOs \n\n\nCO \n\n\nvO \n\nm \n\nin \n\n00 \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nOs \n\nm \n\n\n\nU rH \n\nr>. \n\n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\noo \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\n3 iH \n\nos \n\n\nOS \n\n\nO- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nOv \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nrH JCi \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0cry \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPA \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nOO o \n\n\n\n\n\n>r\\ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nZ~\\ \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\ng \n\n\n\n\n\n-d 4-> \n\n\n\n\n\n05 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nW \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n3 \n\nPo \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nHi \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\neq rH \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nPH \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n-s \n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\n05 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntH \n\n\no \n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\na 4 \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\n3 \n\n03 \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nw \n\n\n\no \n\na \n\n03 \n\n/*\\ \n\nrH \n\n\nHi \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\no \n\n03 \n\n\nrH \n\n\nHi \n\na \n\n4-J \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n31 \n\nTJ \n\n00 \n\n\'w\' \n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n00 \n\ns-^ \n\n\n\n4-J \n\nPH \n\nO \n\n\nZ\xe2\x80\x94S \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n*H \n\n \n\n\n\nu \n\n\nPH \n\nPH \n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\nm \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nPH \n\nPH \n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\nm \n\n\n3 \n\n\nod \n\nO \n\n\nHi \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nos \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nos \n\n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\n$ \n\nrH \n\nz-\\ \n\np. \n\n4-4 \n\n3 \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n4-4 \n\nerf \n\nrH \n\nz\xe2\x80\x94n \n\nP 4 \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n4-J \n\n3 \n\n\n\n1-4 \n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nO \n\n\n^-z \n\n\n\n0) \n\nU \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaJ \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nHi \n\n3 \n\nW \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n4-J \n\n\nN-Z \n\nw \n\nQ \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n4-J \n\nX \n\nVwZ \n\nW \n\n3 \n\nH \n\n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\no \n\nO \n\n03 \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\ntj \n\no3 \n\n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nO\' \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n0) \n\n3 \n\n\'O \n\n4-1 \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n03 \n\n4-J \n\njv \n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\ng \n\nT3 \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\npH \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n\n4-J \n\n4-1 \n\n0 \n\nP \n\n03 \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n(J4 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n*H \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\na) \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\nHi \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n2 \n\nz \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\nO \n\nHi \n\n3 \n\n4-> \n\n\nZ \n\n5S \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\nHi \n\nO \n\nO \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n>4 \n\n3 \n\n*H \n\n3 \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\na \n\na \n\nHi \n\n\n\n\n05 \n\n05 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nph \n\na; \n\n\nC \n\n4J \n\nJC \n\n3 \n\nH \n\n\nw \n\nw \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\n3 \n\n\nHi \n\n-3 \n\nHi \n\n\n3 \n\nHi \n\n\n\nhi \n\n\n0) \n\n05 \n\n,Q \n\ng \n\no \n\n"d \n\n05 \n\n3 \n\n4-J \n\n4-> \n\n\n\n05 \n\n0) \n\n^5 \n\ng \n\nO \n\n03 \n\n3 \n\n4-J \n\n3 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n\'-Z \n\n05 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n> \n\n5S \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\n3 \n\n*H \n\n3 \n\n> \n\no \n\nPH \n\nCJ \n\nQ \n\nrO \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nH \n\nM \n\n\n3 \n\n}-4 \n\nO \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nHi \n\n\n3 \n\nHi \n\nO \n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n>4 \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n\nP \n\nph \n\nCQ \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\nD \n\nPH \n\nCQ \n\nc3 \n\n\n\n\n\n35 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n111 \n\n\nAll dollar figures are in billions of current dollars, except where otherwise noted. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nCM \n\non \n\n\nH \n\nm \n\n\nst ON \n\no vo in co \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nCM CM CM \no st \n00 rH \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nst \n\n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nm \n\no \n\nm \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nst \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\nSt \n\niH \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nON \n\n\nst \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\n"3- \n\n\nVO \n\nON \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nON \n\no \n\nm \n\nO \n\n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nON \n\n\niH \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nco \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nr>. \n\nin \n\no \n\nn* \n\nrH \n\nON \n\n\nSt \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n>t \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\nSt \n\n\nCM \n\nco \n\nst \n\n\nCO \n\nON \n\n*H \n\nn- \n\n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVO \n\n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nON \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nVO \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\nvO \n\n\nON \n\nCM \n\no \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nm \n\no \n\n\nO \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nON \n\ni"- \n\n\nst \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nSt \n\n\nCO \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr>. \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\niH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nON \n\no \n\nm \n\nON \n\nr>. \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nst \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nO \n\no \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nin \n\nst \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nnO \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nVO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nst \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nvo \n\n\nvO \n\nm \n\no \n\n\na) \n\nr** \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nst \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCO \n\nON \n\nu \n\nO \n\nn* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nnO O \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\n<0 \n\nCO \n\nd \n\na) \n\nQJ \n\nw \n\no \n\no \n\nB \n\n\na) \n\nn \n\ncd \n\ns \n\n \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n4~t \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\nco \n\nM \n\ncd \n\n\nco \n\nVi \n\ncd \n\n\na) \n\no \n\ncS \n\nno \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n\nco \n\nu \n\na \n\n\nV) \n\na) \n\nu cd \n\n3 P-. \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n4J \n\no \n\nO \n\n\na) \n\n\n\n\nH \n\n4J \n\nO \n\n\nO \n\na) \n\nno \n\nid \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\nu \n\nTJ \n\nX-N O \n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nno \n\n\nrH \n\nVi \n\nd \n\n4J \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n^ rH \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nfi\'S \n\n\nd \n\nQ) \n\nd \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\nT> \n\n00 \n\nv-/ \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\nT) \n\nno \n\noo \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\nCL \n\no \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\no \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nai \n\na* \n\nrH \n\nh m \n\n\nd d \n\n\ncd \n\n\nP* \n\npu. \n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\nin \n\nd \n\n% \n\n\no \n\n\nu \n\na) \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb d \n\na> \n\na) d \n\n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n>> \n\nd 25 \n\nO \n\ncn \n\n\no \n\no \n\nv-/ \n\n<0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h d \n\n> \n\no \n\nPh \n\nCJ \n\nQ \n\n43 \n\na) \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\nd Vi \n\nO \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\nM \n\nVi \n\n\nd \n\nVi O \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n>* \n\no \n\no \n\n\n33 P-. \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\nf \n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\n\nCV pq \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n112 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nhave many of the related economic characteristics of 1968-1969, when \nthe pressures of the War economy were being felt the most. \n\nCase 5. Budget A : This is the solution that many pacifically-oriented \npeople would like to see. It is at a polar extreme from the stance of \nBudget E. Although the minimal case may not be considered realistic, \nit is worthwhile going through some of the relevant calculations and \nanalysis to see what the implications are. \n\nThe principal ingredient for this case is a substantial level of \ndisarmament that would bring defense outlays down to $42.2 billion by \nthe end of 1972. This reduces the current dollar value of defense \nexpenditures to nearly 50 percent of its peak level during the Vietnam \nWar. A disarmament of this magnitude would have to come about as a \nresult of new progress in disarmament talks. It is one of the situations \nthat would free large resources for spending on the domestic environment. \n\nAfter the end of the present fiscal year in 1971.2, the pattern of \ndefense expenditure cutback is more rapid than in the Budget B solution. \nAlthough, military expenditures are assumed to be cut back faster than \nin the Budget B Case, the number of men in the forces are not reduced \nmore rapidly until 1972.2. They are considered to be at bottom when \nthey reach 2.3 million men. \n\nTo give a uniform treatment to each case, we have simulated this big \ndisarmament pattern with and without compensatory economic policies. \n\nThe more reasonable solution, however, is with compensation, which takes \nthe form of public civilian expenditure offsets of $11 billion, a tax \ncut of 10 percent, a discount rate cut to a new level of 5.0 percent \nand an increase in unborrowed reserves above the control pattern. The \neasier monetary policies are the same as those used to compensate the \nBudget B Case, but there is so much more slack in the Federal govern\xc2\xac \nment\'s budget with the larger disarmament that more socially significant \nexpenditures can be allocated to the civilian sector. The compensatory \nsolution has other Federal government expenditures rising by an increment \nthat is almost twice as large as in the Budget B Case; correspondingly \nthe rate of tax reduction is also doubled. \n\nNaturally, if disarmament were large and no public offsets were \ninitiated, unemployment would rise to the worst heights among all the \nsolutions calculated in this study. At the end of 1972, the uncompen\xc2\xac \nsated solution places unemployment at a position of more than 7 percent \nand on a rising trend. This is clearly unacceptable, but the offset \ncase is much more desirable as an alternative. The unemployment rate \nappears to be stabilized in the neighborhood of 5.4 percent, and the \nnew budgetary picture of the consolidated government accounts shows \na deficit of only $1.0 billion at the end of 1972. Additional stimuli \n\n\n113 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nOn \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nno \n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nI s *. \n\n\nHO \n\nrH \n\nno \n\nr* \n\nst \n\nVO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nst \n\nno \n\nO \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nXJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nr* \n\nSt \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nO \n\nno \n\nrH \n\n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nSt \n\nst \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nuO \n\no \n\nXi \n\n\nO\'. \n\nCO \n\n*3- \n\n\nCO \n\n\nI s *. \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nsr \n\nno \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\nON \n\nO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n>\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCM \n\no \n\nr* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nI s * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni-H \n\n\nr*\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nps \n\n\nCM \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\nno \n\nrH \n\nno \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\no \n\nSt \n\no \n\nrH \n\nno \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\nr* \n\nno \n\nst \n\nu \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nrH \n\nst \n\nCM \n\nSt \n\nr*. \n\n00 \n\nco \n\nno \n\n00 \n\nr*. \n\nSt \n\nCM \n\nsr \n\nr-* \n\noo \n\nno \n\nO \n\nO \n\nno \n\nON \n\n45 \n\n\nI s * \n\nCO \n\nuO \n\n\nco \n\n\nr* \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nno \n\n\nco \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nst \n\n\nCM \n\nXI \n\n\nON \n\no \n\nr* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nr*. \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nXi \n\nG \n\n\n. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nst \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n43 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nst \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n43 \n\n\nSt \n\n\n\n\nO \n\noo \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nCM \n\no \n\nr* \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nno \n\nCM \n\nI s *. \n\nn \n\nr-* \n\nno \n\n\nco i"* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n# \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nXI \n\nG On \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\no \n\nst \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nst \n\nst \n\nno \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nst \n\nVO \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nuO \n\n00 \n\ncx \n\nM rH \n\nr>. \n\nrH \n\nst \n\n\nCO \n\n\nr-* \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nst \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nst \n\n\nCM \n\nG \n\n3 \n\nON \n\no \n\nr* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nI s * \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nxi \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n*H 43 \nXI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n#v \n\nG CO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\na- \n\nXi \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nXi \n\nG \n\n\nw \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94! \n\nst \n\n\nVO \n\nuO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nin \n\nco \n\nI s *. \n\nSt \n\n\nvO \n\nn \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nst \n\nCO \n\nno \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nO \n\nXJ \n\nst \n\nCM \n\nno \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\n\nst \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nst \n\nCM \n\nno \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\n\nSt \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nno \n\n00 \n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\nXJ \n\nr* \n\nG \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\nr* \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nXJ \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nXJ \n\n\nG \n\n\nON \n\nx) \n\nON \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nG \n\nON \n\nr-* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nXI. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nXI \n\nvO \n\n4H \n\nr*. \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nON \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nQ \n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nXi \n\n*H \n\n\nVS \n\n\nCX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nXi \n\n43 \n\ni \n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n& \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 o \n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nno \n\n\nCJ \n\nH \n\nG \n\nO \n\nCO \n\na \n\nSt \n\noo \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nSt \n\no \n\nOn \n\nI s * \n\nvO \n\no \n\nst \n\n00 \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nSt \n\n\nON \n\nm \n\nI s * \n\nI s * \n\nVO \n\n\n\nO \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n<_> \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1X1 \n\n\n*H \n\niH \n\no \n\n33 \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nno \n\nno \n\n00 \n\nno \n\nCO \n\no \n\nON \n\n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nno \n\nno \n\n00 \n\n\nco \n\nno \n\nON \n\nUO \n\n\nO \n\n\nXi \n\nrH \n\nr*. \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nON \n\n\nON \n\nr>* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nOn \n\nI s * \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n43 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\ncry \n\ncry \n\n\n\n\ncry cry cry \n\ncry \n\n\ncry \n\ncry \n\n\n\n\nXI \n\ncry \n\n-CO- \n\ncry \n\n\n-co- \n\nO \n\n\nC/3 CM \n* \n\n<\xc2\xa3 CM \nST \nXJ \n\nG \n\n00 O \nXJ x\xc2\xbb \n3 \n\nCQ rH \n\n\n(0 \n\nXi \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\nXi \n\ng \n\n\nO) \n\no \n\nG \n\nPi \n\nX) \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n-u \nG \n\nco S \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94\\ \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n/*N \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nCO \n\nXT \n\n\nXI \n\nxi \n\no \n\no \n\nG \n\n\nX) \n\nXJ \n\no \n\no \n\nG \n\nW \n\n\nO \n\nCJ \n\nXJ \n\n/S rH \n\nU \n\n\no \n\nO \n\nXJ \n\n/-s rH \n\nU \n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n8 s ? \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n6 s ? \n\n3 \n\n\n\nXJ \n\nXJ \n\nOO \n\nvs \n\nXI \n\n\nXJ \n\nXJ \n\n00 \n\n\nXI \n\n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nLTV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*H \n\nG \n\no \n\no \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*H \n\n\n\nXi \n\nXi \n\nON \n\nG 00 \n\nX) \n\nCO \n\nXi \n\nXi \n\nON \n\nG 00 \n\nXJ \n\n\nXi \n\nPm \n\nPm \n\nrH \n\nxi no \n\nG \n\nG \n\nPm \n\nPm \n\nrH \n\nXi no \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\nG On \n\nG \n\nG rH rH \n\n\n\n\nG ON \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nM \n\nG \n\nxj \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\nTJ \n\nG \n\n(U \n\n\nG \n\n\nxj \n\nG \n\n\ncx o \n\nX 53 \n\n\nX \n\nG \n\nH \n\n(0 \n\nG 8M\xc2\xbb a) \n\na \n\n\nx> \n\nu \n\nG \n\n3 \n\nO\' \n\nXJ \n\nG \n\nG \n\nXi \n\nG \n\nG \n\n>* \n\n\nG G \nG G \nO O \n\n\nG G \n\n2S JZ \n\nCO co \nCO CO \n\no o \n\nM Xi \n\no o \n\n\no \n\n\n8 s ? \n\n\na- \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nco \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\nxj \nG \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n>3 \n\nrH O \n\xc2\xabH rH \n*H {3* \n\nx> a \n\nss 2 O CO \n\n\ncS \n\n\nG G \n\nZ 25 \n\nCO CO \nCO CO \n\no o \n\nM Xi \n\no e> \n\n\n*H J>> \nrH o \nrH rH \niH CX \n\n43 a \n\nss q) \n\nG \n\n33 \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nXJ \n*H C \nU O \nPm PQ \n\n\nG - \nG \' \n\n\nG \nXi O \nG CO \n\n\nXi \n\nW 4 HI \n\n> o cx \no \n\n\nu \n\no \n\nCX \n\nH \n\nO \n\n\n> \n\nu \n\nG G \n\nG G \n\nPi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*-* XJ \n\nG G \n\n\ntH \n\n\nO \nO \nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H _ \nu Q 43 \nG \n3) \n\n\no \n\nH \n\nO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n43 \n\n\nG \n\nXt \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nXi \n\n3 \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nXi \n\nG \n\n\nO \n\nXJ \n\n\nG \n\n\n114 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n0- co \n\n\n\nCM \n\no \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\nuo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nVO \n\n\nr*v \n\no \n\nr^\xc2\xbb \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nr*-. \n\n\n*- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nf~i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nO \n\nm \n\no \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n<* \n\nKj- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n- \n\nON \n\nrH \n\no \n\nrH \n\n. \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOO \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nSi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\nMf \n\no \n\nCM \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\no \n\nm \n\nO \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\ntt \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrQ \n\nrH \n\nd> \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nin \n\nOn \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\nr- \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nH \n\nON \n\n\nO \n\nr^. \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nco- \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO- \n\n-co- \n\n\n\n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x94v \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\niH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n4-4 \n\nO \n\n\no \n\no> \n\n\n\n\na \n\nO \n\nT) \n\n\nrH \n\nu \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT) \n\nT3 \n\n00 \n\n\'w\' \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*H \n\n\n\n\nCD \n\nON \n\n(1) 03 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nu \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n*4-4 \n\nOd \n\nrH \n\nCU <4H \n\nCD \n\no \n\nu \n\nCD \n\n\nO \n\n\n\' i3^2 \n\nX <13 \n\nu \n\nH \n\ntt) \n\nd \n\n\n\n4-4 \n\nv-x \n\nW P \n\n03 \n\n\n3 \n\no \n\nO \n\n03 \n\nd \n\nX \n\n\nnO \n\nno \n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H \n\nd \n\ncu \n\na) t) \n\n4-4 rH \n\n03 \n\nd \n\n\n4-1 \n\n4H \n\no \n\nS \n\n\'O rH \n\nd h \n\n0 O \n\nU \n\n03 \n\nCti \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n>< \n\nd *h \n\n03 \n\n4-4 \n\n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\na \n\na) \n\nH 4-4 \n\nx: \n\nCD \n\nu \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\nS \n\na no \n\n03 CD \n\n4-1 \n\n4-4 \n\ncD \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\'_\' \n\n0) \n\n*H d \n\n> 53 \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\na* u u Guo q \n\n>\xc2\xab O O ID Ph PQ U \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n-. \n\nm \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\n\n-* \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\n\nin \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nco \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0co- \n\n\nCO- \n\n\nCO- \n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\nco- \n\nCO- \n\nco- \n\n\nCO- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 ) \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n, \n\n\no \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nP^ \n\n\n0 ) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nno \n\n03 \n\nPo \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nH \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\nCD \n\nd \n\nPH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\xe2\x9c\x93\xe2\x80\x94N \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n4 -J \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\n0 ) \n\nno \n\ncD \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nu \n\nno \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94\\ \n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nU \n\n \n\n\n\nPH \n\nCm \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nm \n\n\nd \n\n\n< 4 ) \n\nO \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nON \n\n\n03 \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nIH \n\nPS \n\nrH \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94N \n\npH \n\nCD \n\nX \n\nd \n\n4-4 \n\nCO \n\n\n\ncD \n\nN \n\nd \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\nd \n\nU \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n4J \n\n\nT* \n\n53 \n\nrH \n\no \n\ntH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\nU \n\nO \n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n>* \n\nd \n\n03 \n\nCO \n\nCH \n\no \n\nu \n\nH \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n<13 \n\n\nH \n\nrC \n\nH \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nJ-4 \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n0 \n\na \n\nno \n\n03 \n\n4-1 \n\n03 \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\n\no \n\no \n\nV-r \n\n0) \n\n*H \n\nd \n\n> \n\nO \n\nPH \n\no \n\nQ \n\nJO \n\n\n\nH \n\nu \n\n\nd \n\nM \n\no \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\n\nPH \n\nPO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\np \n\n\n115 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTable 7 \n\nBudget A Solution with Strong Compensation a \n\nDefense Expenditures Equal to $42.2 billion (1972 dollars) by 1972.4 \n\n& Quarter 1970.3 1970.4 1971.1 1971.2 1971.3 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nin \n\n\nNO \n\n\n\n\n\nnO \n\nH \n\n00 \n\nnO \n\noo \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\noo \n\nrH \n\nMl- \n\n00 \n\nn* \n\nr- \n\nr- \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nnO \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nr\xc2\xbb. \n\n00 \n\nnr \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nco \n\nrH \n\nn- \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nn- \n\nNO \n\nnO \n\nnO \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\nco \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nON \n\n\n\n\nnr \n\nfH \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nON \n\niH \n\nC". \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nON \n\nH \n\nON \n\nnr \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nm \n\ntH \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nnr \n\nin \n\n00 \n\nOn \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nnr \n\nCO \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\nr>- \n\nm \n\no \n\niH \n\no \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nco \n\nnT \n\nr-. \n\nco \n\n00 \n\nr-. \n\nin \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n\nco \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nnr \n\nCO \n\n\nH \n\n00 \n\n\nH \n\n\nnT \n\no \n\nco \n\nCO \n\no \n\nr^. \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nON \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\niH \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nnr \n\n\nnO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\nnO \n\n00 \n\nn- \n\nnO \n\nO \n\nr-- \n\n00 \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nm \n\nin \n\nH \n\nin \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\niH \n\n\nnO \n\n00 \n\nnr \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\nr>* \n\nON \n\nNO \n\n00 \n\nnr \n\nrH \n\nnr \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nnT \n\nCM \n\nn- \n\nON \n\n00 \n\n\nnr \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nr^. \n\n\nH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nON \n\no \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr". \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nH \n\nNO \n\no \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nNO \n\nm \n\no \n\nCM \n\nH \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nNO \n\n00 \n\nnr \n\nNO \n\n00 \n\noo \n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nn- \n\nnr \n\nON \n\nr". \n\nm \n\nnr \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\niH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nI"- \n\n00 \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nco \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nr- \n\n\nH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nON \n\no \n\ni"*. \n\n\ntH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nNO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\nnr \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nON \n\nin \n\nrn. \n\n\nnr \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nnr \n\ni"- \n\n\nON \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nNO \n\nm \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nON \n\n\nH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nr^. \n\n\nrH \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nco \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\n\nn- \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nn- \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nON \n\no \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n-CO- \n\n\n4J \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co- \n\n\n-co- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co- \n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co- \n\n-co \n\n-CO \n\n\nu \n\ncd \n\nQJ \n\n>* \n\n\n4-1 \n\nU \n\nG \n\nX \n\no \n\nu \n\nPu \n\n\ncd \n\ng \n\no \n\nH \n\nu \n\ncd \n\n53 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n4J \n\n(J \n\nG \n\nX \n\no \n\nU \n\nPU \n\n\nCO \n\nM \n\ncd \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nON \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH M-l \n\ncd o \n\nG \n\no co \n*h a \nH o \nCd H \n2 .H \nrH \nCO *H \nCO \xc2\xa3> \n\no ^ \nu \n\no \n\n\nOJ OO \n4-j m \ncd on \ncG \n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nG \n\na) \n\nS \n\n\nX \n\nOJ \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\nO M \n\n\nCL QJ \n0 O \nQJ *H \nC J-i \n\n\n--\' \n\nx \n\ntH \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nX \nG \no \n\nPU PQ \n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nQJ \n\na \n\na) \n\nc*J \n\nX \n\ns \n\nCO \n\nqj \n\nj-i \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\nG \n\nQJ \n\n& \n\nW \n\n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\nG \n\nJ-i \n\nQJ \n\n> \n\n8 \n\n\ncd \n\nj^ \n\nQJ \n\nX \n\nQJ \n\nPu \n\nU \n\nQJ \n\nJG \n\n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\nto \n\ncd \n\nPU \n\nX \n\n\no \n\n2 \n\n\ncd \n\nH \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nco \n\nJ-I \n\nQJ \n\n\nco \n\ncd \n\n\nCl. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nQJ CO \n\na 4-> \n\nQJ G \n\nPG QJ \n\nCO 0 \n\nxj a) In \n\nG j-i cd \n\nCd 3 PU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntH \n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\niH \n\n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n4-) \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\nQJ \n\nX \n\ncd \n\nX \n\ncd \n\nCO \n\n\nCJ \n\no \n\nX) \n\nN \n\nH \n\n\nJ-i \n\nCJ \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\ncd \n\nH \n\nQJ \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nQJ \n\nG \n\nH \n\n\n> \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nn/ \n\n\n\n4J \n\nCL \n\nO \n\n\nQJ \n\nJ-i \n\n\no \n\no \n\nin \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n53 \n\nQJ \n\n0 \n\nQJ \n\n\nJ-I \n\nJ-I \n\nON \n\nQJ \n\n00 \n\n\nXJ \n\nW \n\n\n0 \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nPU \n\nPU \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nm \n\n\nG \n\n\n<-3 \n\nO \n\nCJ \n\nQJ \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nON \n\n\nQJ \n\ntH \n\n\no \n\nc \n\nCG \n\nJ-i \n\nrH \n\nI\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nlw \n\nw \n\ntH \n\n\na \n\ncd \n\nX \n\nG \n\nM \n\n\nQJ \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\nNw/ \n\nS\'? \n\nX \n\nJ-I \n\ncd \n\nM \n\n\nX) \n\n4J \n\nc \n\nG \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nN-r \n\nw \n\nQJ \n\nH \n\n\nQJ \n\nQJ \n\n>-l \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nQJ \n\n4-> \n\nS \n\ncd \n\nH \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nQJ \n\nQJ \n\nXJ \n\n4-1 \n\nQJ \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\ncd \n\nO \n\nG \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n0 \n\nX) \n\nH \n\nG \n\nFh \n\ncd \n\nCd \n\nj-i \n\nJ-i \n\nO\' \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n>> \n\nG \n\nQJ \n\nQJ \n\n\nC \n\nJ-I \n\no \n\nu \n\n\n53 \n\n53 \n\nrH \n\no \n\nIH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\nJ-i \n\no \n\nO \n\nPU \n\no \n\n\n\n\n*H \n\nt \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\n\nG \n\naj \n\nCO \n\nCL \n\n>-i \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCL \n\nQJ \n\n\nJ-i \n\nx: \n\nJ-I \n\nJ-l \n\no \n\nG \n\nJ-i \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n,3 \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nXJ \n\nQJ \n\n4-1 \n\nQJ \n\no \n\nu \n\n53 \n\ncd \n\no \n\no \n\nV \n\nQJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n> \n\no \n\nCL, \n\no \n\n\n\nQJ \n\nJj \n\nu \n\n\nG \n\nJ-i \n\no \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n>-< \n\no \n\no \n\n\n13 \n\nP-4 \n\nPQ \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nQJ \n\n> \n\nJ-i \n\nQJ \n\nCO \n\noj \n\ncG \n\n\no \n\n>-i \n\nu \n\no \n\nc \n\n53 \n\n\ncd \n\n\n116 \n\n\nAll dollar figures are in billions of current dollars, except where otherwise noted. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ncould well be applied to achieve some faster growth and lower unemploy\xc2\xac \nment without too much pressure on prices or the budget position. \n\nThe main point to be inferred from these extreme calculations is \nthat fairly mild stimuli ought to be able to keep a major recession \nfrom developing and have the economy on a track on which real output \nis steadily growing. When the initial impact occurs, just after a \ntemporary surge of activity programmed into the Control Solution for \nmaking up auto strike losses and hedge buying of steel in early 1971, \nthere is a slowdown and leveling in real GNP for two quarters, but \nrecovery is noticeable. \n\nThe growth rate of real GNP stays well below potential even after \nthe indicated compensation, but the associated rate of inflation is \nsufficiently low and the trade balance is sufficiently strong that \neasier monetary and fiscal policies than those assumed could be con\xc2\xac \ntemplated in order to bring the unemployment rate down another full \npercentage point or more. \n\nWhile the compensation for disarmament under this minimal case is \nreasonable and politically feasible, and produces not too bad an out\xc2\xac \ncome, it is still interesting to ask, what would be required to keep \nthe economy on a full employment growth path while substantial demobil\xc2\xac \nization and military cutbacks are in process? Sufficient but not \nnecessary conditions for a strongly compensated case of Budget A can \nbe worked out in a balanced policy involving some further easing of \nmonetary policy, and additional fiscal stimuli\xe2\x80\x94higher civilian spend\xc2\xac \ning and lower taxes. \n\nKeeping defense spending and the size of the armed forces the same \nas in the other Budget A cases, we have increased unborrowed reserves \nto a figure that reaches $1.0 billion over the previous case (Table 6, \nCompensated), starting with an increment of $0.1 billion in 1970.3 and \ngradually working up to a spread of $1.0 billion. Jn addition, we have \nassumed other (unspecified) actions by the monetary authoritie^ that \nwould lower short term rates by approximately 60 basis points. These \nmonetary actions bring borrowing costs down and raise fixed capital \nformation, both nonresidential and residential. \n\n\nA basis point is a technical financial expression. It is 1/100 \nof an interest rate stated in percent. Thus, if rates fall from 7.8% \nto 7.5%, they fall by 30 basis points (7.8-7.5 = 0.30). \n\n\n117 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe fiscal side of the strongly compensated case consists of two \nparts. There is an increase in civilian expenditures amounting to $10 \nbillion over the previous compensated case by 1972.4 and a cat in taxes \n(corporate and personal) of 10 percent. The tax cuts begin with full \nmeasure in 1971.3 and continue until the end of the calculation in \n1972.4. The expenditure increases begin in 1971.3, but do not reach \ntheir maximum size until 1972.4. \n\nThese policies bring about an infusion of $20 billion more into the \nspending stream, above the previous compensation and are accompanied \nby easier credit terms. In addition, the new civilian expenditures \nare put into a program by government in which more employees are hired \nand paid wages from public funds. This type of expenditure has an \nimmediate impact on total employment. In the previous compensation, \nit was assumed that the added civilian expenditures would be made in \nthe private sector for types of community projects that currently have \nhigh, priority. \n\nTie outcome of this sufficient , super compensation program is highly \nfavorable as far as aggregate economic performance is concerned. The \nunemployment rate is held near 4.0 percent for the entire period of \ndisarmament. The inflation rate is a bit higher than in the lightly \ncompensated case, but not alarmingly so. The major issue is that a \nfull compensation program costs money, and the government deficit is \nmuch larger. The public authorities have to be willing to pay the \nprice of a large deficit if full employment growth is to be obtained. \n\nIt is worth pointing out that the full employment peace budget generates \na deficit that is only slightly more than at the worst of the Vietnamese \nWar. The average deficit for 1971 and 1972 comes to $15 billion for the \nstrong compensated disarmament program, while the deficit in 1967 was \nalmost $14 billion. With higher unemployment, we are likely to experi\xc2\xac \nence a deficit approaching $10 billion in calendar year 1970, and this \nmay grow to a larger figure for fiscal year 1970. ; \n\n\nIII.4 SOME CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS \n\nThe principal conclusion to be drawn from these econometric simulation \ncalculations is that war, peace, disarmament, demobilization, and \nsimilar phenomena have major effects on the U.S. economy, but not so \ngreat that the system is sent into a spiraling movement one way or \nanother between our polar assumptions of Budget E and Budget A. The \nmovements of output, employment, prices, interest rates, and other \nvariables are plausible for the various sets of assumptions and the \n\n\n118 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ndifferences among solutions are all in the right direction. The real \noutput implications of the various solutions are probably the firmest \nfrom a quantitative viewpoint. The amplitude of the price index and \naverage bond yield are modest and may underestimate the pressures of \ninflation or the impact of swings in monetary policy. The unemployment \nrate moves in a narrow range, but this is partly accounted for by com\xc2\xac \npensatory policies. The control solution estimate of the unemployment \nrate is about 0.2 percentage points below the actual estimate for 1970.3; \ntherefore, the projections of increases to a level beneath 6 percent, \nunder all but the worst of circumstances (Budget A - n\xe2\x80\xa2 rH \ntD ^ *H \nPQ JO \n\n\nO O O pH \n\no \n\n00 O \n\nO \n\nm \n\n<* \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\noo \n\nON \n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\nto \n\no \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nn- \n\nO\'* \n\n\n\nm \n\nVO \n\nOn \n\nvO \n\npH \n\noo \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\nrH \n\n \n\n\nCO \n\nW O *H \nC5 fN H \n\n\n\n\nm \n\no> \n\nUO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nuo \n\nO \n\nUO \n\nr". \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nn* \n\nQ i-H \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\n\n\nOn \n\n\npH \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nON \n\njo ^ *H \nPQ JO \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCJ ^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO G \nH \xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\nO \n\nO \n\no \n\nvO \n\nVO \n\nVO \n\nO \n\nON \n\nuo \n\nON \n\nuo \n\nvO \n\no \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nW *h \n\no VO rH \nQ CO- pH \ntD ^ *H \n\n\n\n\non \n\n00 \n\nU0 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nUO \n\npH \n\n\n\nO \n\npH \n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nU \n\n\n4-3 \n\n\n\n\nppj \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\ncj \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nO \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nM \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n$3 \n\n\ng \n\nG \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H CO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n00 \n\nrH \n\no \n\nC0 \n\nH G \n\npH \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCJ \n\npH \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n>s \n\n\nG \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\np> *H \n\nU \n\nG \n\n>s \n\n\n\n\nX \n\ng \n\nO \n\nG \n\n\nCO 4-1 \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nU \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n> \n\nCO \n\nrG \n\n\n00 X \n\nCM \n\n3 \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nG \n\ng \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nG \n\nG G \n\n\nO \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\ncj \n\nPQ \n\n\nH \n\nPm \n\nP3 H \n\n<3 \n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n<1- \n\nuo \n\nvO \n\nr^. \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nON \n\n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\nm \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\npH \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nOn \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n \n\nPm \n\nG \n\nOh \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nc \n\nG \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nc \n\n\nM \n\n\nCO \n\n4-> \n\nG \n\np \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nH \n\no \n\nX) \n\nG \n\nX) \n\nJm \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\npH \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCJ \n\nrH \n\npH \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO \n\n60 \n\nJS \n\nC0 \n\nCJ \n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nU \n\nC \n\nCJ \n\nO \n\n\nV-i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nrC \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n#s \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO \n\nH \n\nG \n\nH \n\n4-3 \n\na \n\n4-3 \n\nCO CO \n\nrO \n\n4-3 \n\nX) \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n4-3 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\n60 g \n\n\nG \n\no \n\nG \n\n4-4 \n\nCM \n\nc \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nw \n\nG \n\nG G \n\n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\n4-3 \n\nG \n\no \n\nG \n\nJ-4 \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nJ-4 4-3 \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaj \n\nCJ \n\n\n33 \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nCJ \n\nCM \n\nPm \n\nPQ \n\nCM \n\nQ M \n\nCO \n\n\nON \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\nuo \n\nvO \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nco \n\n\n145 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nw ^ \n\nVJD 3 \n\nsD \n\nsO \n\nlA \n\n*4- \n\nO Os \n\nrH \n\nsO \n\nr^. \n\no \n\nr\xc2\xbb \n\nsO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n04 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr~- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \xe2\x80\xa2 O \nW n rl \nO Os 3 \nQ 3 \n\n59. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr". \n\nCM \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n00 \n\nsO \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nOH \n\nCO \n\nO\'* \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nr^. \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n330 \n\n35 \n\nv> \n\nCo \n\nSO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n117 \n\n^ w *H \nPQ 45 \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ O \n\nuo a \nH \xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\nO \n\n \n\nJD v *H \nCQ X \n\n rH \n\no \n\n\nO \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\nA. \n\n<* \n\nOS \n\n00 \n\nOs \n\noo \n\nrH \n\nOs \n\n04 \n\nm \n\n rH \nw ^ \n\n45 \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nO \n\n\no \n\no \n\nm \n\nO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nO\'. \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nos \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\n\n3 fH \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n-vJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nd \n\nO \n\n\n3 \n\no \n\n\nO \n\n\nrH \n\nsO \n\nCO \n\nOs \n\nco \n\nOS \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nm \n\nm \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nw \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO\'. \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nOs \n\nCO \n\nMf \n\nco \n\nco \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nr-. \n\nOS \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\n\nsO \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\n\nOs \n\n3 \n\n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\nCO \n\na \n\n \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nS \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nO \n\n\nd \n\n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa23 \n\n\nu \n\n\nx: \n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\nu \n\n45 \n\nd \n\n\n\na* \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nPm \n\n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n<0 \n\n\ncn \n\nO \n\n> \n\n\n03 \n\nw \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nPi \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\nC \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nDm \n\n00 \n\na \n\n\nd \n\n\nU \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n#s \n\n\nd \n\n3 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nhJ \n\n\nCu \n\nu \n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n00 \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nPm \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nZ \n\nd \n\n\n45 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n>-\xc2\xab \n\n<1) \n\na \n\n0) \n\n00 \n\nu \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nPi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nCO \n\n>s \n\nrH \n\n\n\nH \n\n0) \n\nX> 03 \n\nH \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n>> \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nrH \n\nIM \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nXJ \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\na) \n\n\n\nU \n\nd \n\n6 4J \n\na \n\nd \n\n03 \n\nEH \n\nM \n\n\n\n\nco \n\nrH \n\na) \n\nPm \n\nd \n\n4J \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nd \n\n\n\nQ) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 O \n\ncn \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nd> \n\n<: \n\nM \n\n\nd \n\no \n\n\ncj \n\nCJ \n\n3 \n\n\n\nPm \n\nd \n\n3 3 \n\n\nPm \n\nO \n\n3 \n\na \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\ns \n\n3 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\ncn \n\n\n\n! \n\n4-f \n\na, xj \n\nr. \n\n\n3 \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n53 \n\n3 \n\nd \n\nH \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\no \n\nco \n\n#s \n\n3 \n\nd \n\n45 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nd \n\n3 \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\ncn \n\nd \n\nd \n\n3 \n\n\ng \n\no \n\no \n\n* Vm \n\n00 03 \n\n(U \n\nO \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n. \n\n\nd \n\n0) \n\n\nu \n\nd \n\n4-1 \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\nCJ \n\nOO Pm \n\nd 3 \n\n3 \n\nPi \n\n03 \n\nd \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nM \n\nd \n\n\na \n\n\n\nd \n\nu \n\nd \n\n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H O \n\nd \n\nPm \n\nd \n\nX \n\nPi \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\n<0 \n\nx: \n\n0) \n\n3 \n\nco \n\nd \n\n\n \n\nd \n\no \n\nO \n\nd \n\no \n\no \n\na \n\n3 \n\nxs \n\n\nd h \n\nd o \n\nPi \n\n3 \n\n00 \n\nP4 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nMJ- \n\no \n\nm \n\nnO \n\nON \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\nnO \n\nnO \n\nr^. \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nON \n\no \n\n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n \n\nrH co oo . \n\nm \n\no \n\nNO \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nm \n\nCM \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nNO \n\nr>. \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n\nNO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nON \n\nNO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\nNO \n\nON \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nNO \n\nON \n\n\nm \n\n \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\nX) \n\n\n\nXJ \n\n\n03 \n\na) \n\ncd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nrH \n\n\n\n03 \n\nu \n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\nrH \n\n\na \n\n0) \n\ncd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJZ \n\nJZ \n\n03 \n\n\n<2 \n\nC \n\nCL \n\n\n3 \n\n\n4-> \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nu \n\no \n\n\nX \n\niH \n\na \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nW \n\n\n\n\n3-1 \n\n\n03 \n\nu \n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n03 \n\n\n\n-c \n\n<3 \n\n\nX) \n\n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\na) \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\n\n03 \n\nG \n\n\n0 \n\n4-J \n\nXJ \n\n4-> \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nu \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nG \n\ncd \n\nT3 \n\n03 \n\ncd \n\n\ncl \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nC \n\nO \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\ncd \n\no> \n\n\n03 \n\ncd \n\n\nrH \n\nJZ \n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nX) \n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\ncd \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n0 \n\n\n4-1 \n\n3-i \n\n\nCJ \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6rl \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n>N \n\n\ncd \n\nG \n\n\ncr \n\nO \n\n>> \n\nCL \n\n\nCl \n\nH \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nU \n\nu \n\ncd \n\n\na \n\nL \n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nW \n\nCL \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nXJ \n\nX \n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n03 \n\n0 \n\n4-J \n\nCi \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n0 \n\nod \n\nG \n\n03 \n\nCl. \n\nn \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n0) \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\na) \n\nO \n\n03 \n\nO \n\nCL \n\n4= \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\ni \n\ncr \n\n03 \n\n\n03 \n\n\ncd \n\n00 \n\n\n0 \n\nG \n\na \n\nG \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\n\n00 \n\n\nO \n\nC_3 \n\nX \n\nW \n\nrH \n\nXJ \n\nC \n\n\n\na \n\n\nXJ \n\nX> \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nX) \n\no \n\n<3 \n\n*H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\na \n\nG \n\n*H \n\n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nrC \n\nJZ \n\nX> \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\nr-J \n\n\n4-J \n\nCJ \n\nCN \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\nM \n\nHH \n\nC/3 \n\na \n\nG \n\nM \n\n\nx> \n\n\n4-> \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\ncd \n\n42 \n\n\nCi \n\n\nG \n\nu \n\ng \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\na \n\nrH \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\na \n\nG \n\n03 \n\no \n\n03 \n\n4-1 \n\nH \n\n\n03 \n\no \n\n0) \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n03 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nM-l \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa33 \n\ns \n\n& \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nc \n\n\n03 \n\na \n\n3-1 \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\nG \n\nCi \n\n3-4 \n\n3-4 \n\n\ncd \n\n#N \n\n03 \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\nPu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nj-i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4J \n\n03 \n\n4-J \n\na \n\nG \n\n4J \n\n03 \n\n4-1 \n\nCi \n\n3-1 \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n3-1 \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n03 \n\n-G \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nO \n\n03 \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ns \n\nCJ \n\n4-J \n\nCJ \n\nO \n\nU \n\nCL \n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\n4-1 \n\n0 \n\na3 \n\nG \n\no \n\nO \n\niw \n\n\n03 \n\nG \n\n03 \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n03 \n\n4-J \n\n03 \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nCi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n03 \n\na) \n\ncr \n\nCL \n\n0) \n\ncd \n\nn \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nW \n\nC/3 \n\no \n\nw\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nG \n\nO \n\nC/3 \n\nW \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nw \n\nw \n\nO \n\nw \n\nPQ \n\nw \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n<1 \n\nCO \n\na \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n00 \n\nON \n\nO \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n r-\\ \n\nZD *H \nPQ rO \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\n< 3 - \n\n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nMf \n\nCO \n\n\nvO \n\ncr> o \n\nas \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n. \n\n(S \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n00 \n\n. \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nas \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\nH \n\n00 \n\no \n\nuo \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nvD \n\nrH \n\nMf \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n- \n\nCO \n\nas \n\nm \n\no o \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nW \n\nO *H \n\nr^. \n\nvO \n\nas \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nmT \n\nas \n\n\nfH \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\nrH \n\n*3- \n\nfx. \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nOQ \n\n rH \n\nCO \n\n-a- \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nro \n\n \n\n00 \n\n\np \n\no \n\n\n\xc2\xb0vO \n\nH \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nW \n\nO vO *H \n\ng rH \n\nGQ \n\n\n\noo \n\nas \n\nrH O \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nOs \n\nas \n\nSO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\noo o \n\n00 \n\n\nr>. \n\nCO \n\n<* \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nin \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n\nas \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nr**. \n\ncm \n\nrH \n\nVO \n\nin \n\nCM \n\nMf \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nOs \n\nf"* \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCT\xc2\xbb \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nTO \n\nP \n\na \n\n\np \n\no \n\na \n\n\nCM \n\nw \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n< \n\nH \n\n\nPQ /-n \n\na \n\nH O \n\nW \xe2\x80\xa2 *H \n\n\ns \n\n\nCh r\xe2\x80\x94 \nLO r\xe2\x84\xa2 \n\n\nto *H \n\n\xc2\xab^,D \n\n\nCM P \nH \xe2\x80\xa2 O \nW CM *H \nO *3- rH \nQ rH \nt0 w >H \nPQ X> \n\n\n\no>!cocMOcovoinr--coo co vo rH co coo \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\nCM o \n\nO \n\n\nrH \n\nr-. \n\n-d- \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nuo \n\nrH O \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncs| \n\nOs \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n<* \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\n\nP \n\njp \n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\nrH \n\n04 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\nP \n\n\n4-4 \n\nCX \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\np \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\na> \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nP \n\nP \n\n\nP \n\nP \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n \n\n4-1 \n\nH \n\n04 \n\n\n\nw \n\nM \n\nP \n\nP \n\n\nP \n\nu \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nCD \n\nP \n\n\nrH \n\n\np \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n04 \n\nO \n\n\nP \n\no \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n4-1 \n\n\na> \n\n04 \n\nCO \n\nXi \n\nP \n\n\na \n\nP \n\n\nP \n\n\n6 \n\n\xc2\xa3. \n\n\n\na \n\n\np \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncn \n\n\np \n\np \n\nP \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\n\nP \n\nOh \n\n\nw \n\n\no \n\nP \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nTJ \n\nM \n\n\xc2\xabd \n\nO \n\n\n> \n\np \n\nP \n\nW \n\n\nH \n\n\n\np \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na> \n\nM \n\nP \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nU \n\n04 \n\nP \n\n\n\nP \n\n\xe2\x80\x99a \n\n\no \n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nPQ \n\n4-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na) \n\ncd \n\n03 \n\nCD \n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n> \n\np \n\n\nCD \n\n\ncd \n\n4 -> \n\n\nP> \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\nP \n\n4-4 \n\nCD \n\n\nw \n\np \n\nCO \n\nP \n\n\nO \n\nP \n\nu \n\np \n\n\n4-1 \n\ncd \n\n> \n\n\n*H \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\np \n\n4-4 \n\nP \n\nCO \n\no \n\ncd \n\n0 \n\n\nCD \n\nCO \n\n4-4 \n\nO \n\nP \n\ncd \n\n4-4 \n\n\nCO \n\n4-4 \n\np \n\n03 \n\n4-4 \n\n03 \n\ncx \n\ncr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nu \n\no \n\n*5 \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\nCd \n\neP \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nO \n\nP \n\np \n\np \n\na \n\nP \n\nP \n\nP \n\no \n\nw \n\ns \n\nPH \n\nH \n\no \n\n04 \n\nw \n\no \n\n3 : \n\n3 \n\n\n04 \n\nPd \n\ncn \n\nPQ \n\n< \n\n3- \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\no \n\n\n\nOH \n\nco \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\non \n\n\n\n\nr>. \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nO \n\n00 \n\no \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nr- \n\nr>. \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\ncM \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nin \n\n\n\n\n*3* \n\nco \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nCvl \n\n4 \n\no \n\nr\xc2\xbb. \n\non \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nin \n\n\n\n\nn- \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\nco \n\nu \n\ncd \n\n\no \n\nCN] \n\non \n\n\n4-1 \n\no . \n\noo \n\nCD rH \n\nC \xe2\x80\xa2 \nO rH \n\n\no \n\n\n*3- \n\n\nON \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n>3 \n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\nf"* \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n1 \n\ncs \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\na> \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nw \n\n\n\na) \n\nV \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\'O \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncs \n\n\n\nJ-4 \n\nM \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nCL \n\nCL \n\n\nrH \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\n\n(V \n\nCO \n\n0) \n\nr>* \n\nvO \n\n\n> \n\n4J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nON \n\nON \n\n\ncd \n\n4-4 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nu \n\n*H \n\nCL \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nO \n\nO. \n\nc \n\na \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nhH \n\nHH \n\n\nCO \n\n\'O \n\nC/3 \n\nV-/ \n\nV-/ \n\nCD \n\nCO \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n0) \n\ncd \n\n0) \n\nC/3 \n\nC/3 \n\nM \n\na \n\n\no \n\nd \n\nd \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n<3 \n\n< \n\nCL \n\nCO \n\ncs \n\n4H \n\nH \n\nH \n\nB \n\n0 \n\n0) \n\n4-4 \n\nO \n\nO \n\nM \n\nPQ \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nH \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\non \n\nON \n\n\nON \n\n\n\n\nX >N \nrH JD \n\n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nT3 \n\na) \n\nT3 \n\n\nQ) \n\nV-i \n\ncd \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n0) \n\nO \n\nO \n\n>-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n\n00 \n\nCL \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n4H \n\nCM \n\n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nON \n\nC \n\nrH \n\nCL) \n\n\n0 \n\nrH \n\n<1) \n\ncd \n\nU \n\nd \n\nd \n\nu 4 \n\no \n\n(U \n\no \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCL \n\n0) \n\n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nu \n\n4-1 \n\nCL \n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nVO \n\ncs \n\nON \n\nM \n\nrH \n\n\ncd xi \n\n\n149 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 3 \n\n\nAlternative 1972 \n(millions \n\nBudget A ($42.2 billion) \nProcurement \nCompensation \nConstruction \nTotal \n\nBudget B ($59.4 billion) \nProcurement \nCompensation \nConstruction \nTotal \n\nBudget C ($67.6 billion) \nProcurement \nCompensation \nConstruction \nTotal \n\nBudget D ($70.5 billion) \nProcurement \nCompensation \nConstruction \nTotal \n\nBudget E ($93.6 billion) \nProcurement \nCompensation \nConstruction \nTotal \n\nSOURCES: See following page. \n\n\nBudget Components \nof dollars) \n\n1972 Prices \n\n$ 11,793 \n29,522 \n885 \n42,200 \n\n27,814 \n\n30,701 \n\n885 \n\n59,400 \n\n34,836 \n\n31.878 \n885 \n\n67.599 \n\n37,736 \n\n31.879 \n885 \n\n70,500 \n\n56,125 \n\n36,590 \n\n885 \n\n93.600 \n\n\n150 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nDepartment of Defense Estimated Employment by Budget \n\n(Thousands) \n\nBudget A Budget B Budget C Budget D Budget E \n($42.2 ($59.4 ($67.6 ($70.5 ($93.6 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94billion)_ billion) billionl billion) billion) \n\nCivilian 1212.4 1212.4 1212.4 1212.4 1212.4 \n\nMilitary 2300.0 2500.0 2700.0 2700.0 3500.0 \n\nDerivations of Defense Budget Components in Table 3 \n\n\nProcurement - Table 2, Column Totals \n\nCompensation - The sum of \n\nUniformed personnel: estimated employment times \naverage annual payment $5889. \n\nCivilian defense workers: estimated employment \ntimes average annual payment $9285. \n\nPay raise $4.72 billion \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nConstruction - Assumed to be $885 million. \n\n\nSL \n\nIt should be noted that dividing the total military budget into only \nthree categories is a convenience which oversimplifies reality. Given \nthe computational formulae followed, the category labeled "procurement" \nbecomes a residual which encompasses such major items as operation and \nmaintenance, and research, development, test and evaluation as well as \nthe procurement of new military hardware. \n\n^Average compensation was calculated in 1966 prices, based on compen\xc2\xac \nsations in that year, and then inflated by 18%. \n\nc The Construction figure for 1968 was converted to 1966 prices and \nallowed to grow at a rate of 1% per year until 1972 to reflect real \ngrowth in military construction. The result was inflated by 18% to \nyield the 1972 estimated construction figure in 1972 prices. A clerical \nerror was discovered which would raise the value of construction some\xc2\xac \nwhat and thus lower the value of procurement. This would cause a maxi\xc2\xac \nmum error in any defense budget of .011%. \n\nContinued... \n\n\n151 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nSOURCES: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, \nDefense Indicators Series ES4, No. 68-3 (August 1968), pp. 34-35; \nBusiness and Defense Services Administration, Construction Review , \nVol. 16, No. 2 (February, 1970), p. 22, Table A-2; Office of Business \nEconomics, Survey of Current Business , Vol. 50, No. 7 (July, 1970), \np. 35, Table 3.11. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n152 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe estimates for compensation include military and civilian DOD \nemployees, with retirement pay and a pay increase. Military construc\xc2\xac \ntion levels and DOD civilian employment levels were held constant but \nmilitary employment varied with each budget. Subtracting compensa\xc2\xac \ntion and military construction from the deflated Kaufmann totals \nleft a residual which was assumed to represent essentially, military \nprocurement. A key to the classification and definition of the 93 \nproducing industries is given in Table 4. \n\nThese five estimates of defense expenditures are treated as \nexogenous, independent final demand variables in the Almon model. They \nare added to the other final demand variables\xe2\x80\x94government non-defense \nprocurement, foreign trade, consumption, and investment\xe2\x80\x94in order to \nprovide estimates of total final demand for domestic production under \neach of the five defense budget assumptions. \n\nIV.1.4.2.c The National Interindustry Projections \n\nInsertion of these final demand estimates into the model generates \nfor each calendar year from 1966 through 1972 estimates of GNP and its \ncomponents, output and employment by industry, total labor force, and \nthe unemployment rate, for each defense assumption (in billions of 1972 \ndollars).The compensated runs assume that as defense expenditures \nfall, civilian consumption will increase sufficiently to keep the unem\xc2\xac \nployment rate at the full employment level of approximately 3.7 percent. \nIn the uncompensated runs, unemployment is permitted to seek its own \nlevel. For each run of the model using the five different Kaufmann \nassumptions, the economy is assumed to begin with the 1968 level of ex\xc2\xac \npenditures and converge towards the appropriate Kaufmann defense assump\xc2\xac \ntion by 1972. For each defense assumption Lexcept Budget E ($93.6)] the \ncompensated version results in higher consumption, GNP, and employ\xc2\xac \nment, but lower unemployment than does the uncompensated version. Under \nthe extreme Budget E ($93.6) assumption of very high defense expendi\xc2\xac \ntures, the uncompensated unemployment estimate falls to a level of 1.1 \npercent, which would create a highly inflationary environment. There\xc2\xac \nfore, under this assumption, the compensated version assumes an anti- \ninflationary program which reduces consumption by monetary, fiscal, and \nother policies, to bring unemployment back to a more realistic level of \n\n\n20 \n\nThe Budget D ($70.5) model was used to approximate a "normalcy" \ndefense budget. Hence it appears in later tables in only the uncompen\xc2\xac \nsated form. \n\n\n153 \n\n\n\n\nAlmon Interindustry Classification Producing Sectors \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\na> \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\ncu \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\ni-H \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n73 \n\nw \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nG \n\n\n\no \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nw \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n43 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nCU \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nCO \n\n4-> \n\n\nX \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\na \n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nrH \n\n\nc \n\n\n\nX \n\nG \n\nx \n\nX \n\ncu \n\no \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\nx \n\n73 \n\n\n*H \n\n73 \n\ncu \n\nX \n\nCl \n\n3 \n\nx \n\nG \n\nCO \n\ng \n\nx \n\n\nX \n\nO \n\nC! \n\ng \n\np \n\n73 \n\nCU \n\npH \n\nrH \n\n>* \n\no \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCl \n\n4-J \n\no \n\nc \n\n\ncd \n\n\ncj \n\n\n0) \n\nCU \n\ncd \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nx \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n73 \n\no \n\n73 \n\n\n\nH \n\n\nX \n\nCh \n\nG \n\nCH \n\ncd \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nc \n\na) \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n73 \n\nc \n\n\nx \n\n\n4-1 \n\nCd \n\ng \n\nG \n\nx \n\n\n73 \n\nG \n\no \n\n73 \n\np \n\n73 \n\nG \n\n\ncu \n\n\nX \n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\ncd \n\ncj \n\nr-H \n\nCh \n\ng \n\no \n\noo x \n\nCO \n\nH \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nO \n\n\n\no \n\n\ncd \n\ncj \n\nc \n\ncj \n\no \n\n\nCU \n\nX \n\nX \n\nc \n\nX \n\n \n\ncu \n\n0) \n\n(U \n\na \n\nX \n\nX \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\nX \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n73 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\nY \n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\nX \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\ncu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n> \n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCU \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\ncu \n\nX \n\no \n\nO \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nQ \n\nCJ \n\nCJ \n\nPQ \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\nPQ \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nH \n\nCO \n\n\nin \n\nvO \n\n\n00 \n\nas \n\nO \n\nX \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n154 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n4-) \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\nd \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x94l \n\n\n04 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncj \n\n\n0 \n\nXI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nCL. \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xabH \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC \n\n\nE \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\na; \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nV-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\nCO \n\nrfi \n\n44 \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\nX \n\nH \n\n \n\n\nr~- \n\nI"- \n\nr-. \n\nI\'\'. \n\nr- \n\n\nr^ \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nE \n\nCJ \n\n0) \n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nMi \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncO \n\nO \n\n3: \n\n\n44 \n\n-d \n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\nMi \n\n\n\nd \n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nCM \n\n#s \n\n\n04 \n\ncO \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n4H \n\n\nCO \n\n\n0 \n\nE \n\n04 \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nCJ \n\n0) \n\n0) \n\n\nCM \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n0 \n\nd \n\n> \n\n\nX \n\n00 \n\na. \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nMl \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n3 \n\nd \n\nX \n\n\n\n4-) \n\n\n4-J \n\nrd \n\ncO \n\n\ncr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n\n\n04 \n\n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\n> \n\nCO \n\nE \n\nd \n\ncr \n\n\n\ne \n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n04 \n\n\nX \n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n#5 \n\nE \n\n\nd \n\nX \n\nE \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\n\n00 \n\nX \n\nd \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nd \n\nX \n\ncO \n\nX \n\nd \n\n\n\nO \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n04 \n\nX \n\nMi \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nMi \n\na) \n\n\nu \n\n44 \n\n3 \n\nPn \n\nco \n\nX \n\n\n\nMi \n\na \n\ne \n\no \n\ncO \n\nH \n\nM \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n04 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\n04 \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nCm \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nPM \n\nX \n\nd \n\no \n\nco \n\n\n\n1 \n\n4-1 \n\nCM \n\n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nE \n\n\n\nd \n\nc \n\n\nCO \n\n#5 \n\nco \n\nE \n\nX \n\n\n\ng \n\nO \n\no \n\n\n00 \n\n04 \n\n\na \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\n\n3 \n\nE \n\nCJ \n\n00 \n\nd \n\nMi \n\nCO \n\ncO \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\n04 \n\nE \n\nM \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nMi \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM \n\nS \n\nd \n\n\nX \n\nM \n\n\ng \n\n0) \n\nCO \n\n44 \n\ns \n\nX \n\nX \n\ns \n\nCO \n\n04 \n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nMi \n\n00 \n\nM \n\nd \n\nX \n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nX \n\n04 \n\na; \n\n44 \n\ncO \n\nd \n\ncO \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n< \n\no \n\nE \n\nE \n\nCO \n\nE \n\ne \n\nCm \n\nCJ \n\nE \n\n\nr^ \n\n00 \n\n05 \n\no \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCsl \n\nCO \n\n- \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nMi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n04 \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nco \n\nX \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nC/5 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n04 \n\nd \n\n\n04 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nCO \n\nw \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\nMi \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n04 \n\nd \n\nX \n\nCM \n\nd \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\nDu \n\n\nCJ \n\no \n\n\nMl \n\n04 \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n04 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n04 \n\n0 \n\n\nMi \n\n\n\nH \n\n\nX \n\nE \n\n\n> \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nd \n\n\n04 \n\n\nCO \n\n\n04 \n\ncO \n\n\n\nM \n\nco \n\nd \n\nd \n\nMi \n\n\nX \n\n\n04 \n\nX \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n04 \n\n04 \n\no \n\ne \n\n04 \n\n\nd \n\n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nC/5 \n\nMi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n> \n\n\nE \n\n\nX \n\nCO \n\ncO \n\n04 \n\ncO \n\n\n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nX \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n> \n\nX \n\nM \n\nE \n\n\nCO \n\nMl \n\n04 \n\nCO \n\nd \n\no \n\n\noa \n\n\nM \n\n04 \n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\n04 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nE \n\nCJ \n\n04 \n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\nE \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\nCO \n\n\n3 \n\n0 \n\nX \n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nX \n\nCM X \n\nX \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n\n04 \n\n04 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\ncO \n\no \n\n> \n\n04 \n\nd \n\nE \n\nMi \n\na \n\n\n> \n\nX \n\nM \n\nd \n\n\n\nCO \n\nMl \n\nE \n\ncO \n\n\n04 \n\no \n\n\ncd \n\nX \n\n04 \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n04 \n\nM \n\n04 \n\n\n\nX \n\n> \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nd \n\nX \n\n04 \n\nC/5 \n\n04 \n\nCO \n\nd \n\no \n\n\n\nH \n\nCM \n\n04 \n\na) \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nE \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nco \n\no \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nC/5 \n\n\ncO \n\n04 \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nE \n\n04 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n#5 \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\ne \n\nCO \n\n04 \n\nO \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\nX \n\n04 \n\n04 \n\nM \n\n04 \n\nd \n\n\nX \n\nd \n\n0 \n\n04 \n\nCJ \n\nMi \n\nMi \n\nMl \n\nd \n\nCJ \n\n04 \n\nX \n\ncO \n\nX \n\na) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n04 \n\n04 \n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nX \n\ncO \n\nf*! \n\nX \n\n04 \n\no \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n0 \n\n04 \n\n04 \n\n04 \n\n0 \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n& \n\n\nPm \n\nE \n\nE \n\nPQ \n\n< \n\n<1 \n\nE \n\nX \n\nE \n\nX \n\nPQ \n\no \n\no \n\nX \n\nCsl \n\nCO \n\n\nm \n\n50 \n\nl"\'- \n\n00 \n\n05 \n\nO \n\nX \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n05 \n\n05 \n\n05 \n\n05 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncr \n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nE \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nrd \n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\ni \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n6 \n\n\n\nE \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nMi \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\ncr \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\ne \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\ncr \n\n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\nE \n\n\n\n04 \n\n04 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nX \n\n\nd \n\n\n\nw \n\n\n\nX \n\n04 \n\n04 \n\nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nX \n\nE \n\nCO \n\nMl \n\n\nMl \n\n\n\n01 \n\n\n\nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\nX \n\n(4 \n\n04 \n\nco \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n-d \n\njc \n\n04 \n\n0 \n\nd \n\nCM \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nE \n\no \n\nCJ \n\nCJ \n\nE \n\nX \n\nCM \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nM \n\ncO \n\ncO \n\nCO \n\n\nrC \n\n< \n\n\nX \n\n04 \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\n\n0) \n\nE \n\nV\xe2\x80\x941 \nr\xc2\xabi-. \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nCJ \n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\n0 \n\nX \n\nw \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\nE \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n04 \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nE \n\nd \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n04 \n\n<-3 \n\n\n\n-d \n\ncO \n\nco \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\ncO \n\nd \n\n00 \n\n3 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\nd \n\n3 \n\nE \n\n\nco \n\nd \n\ncr \n\no \n\nE \n\n\n\nco \n\nM \n\nM \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nX \n\ne \n\nDu \n\ncd \n\n\n\nE \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\nX \n\nMi \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\nE \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nE \n\nd \n\no \n\nI \n\n04 \n\n\n00 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nCM \n\nCJ \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nDu \n\n00 \n\no \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nd \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\n\nX \n\nO \n\n< \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\na \n\n\nX \n\nd \n\nd \n\n-d \n\nX \n\nd \n\nE \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\na \n\n*5 \n\nX \n\n\nE \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\ncO \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nrd \n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\ncO \n\n\na \n\n1 \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\na \n\nCJ \n\nd \n\n04 \n\n01 \n\n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\n04 \n\n\n04 \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n> \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ncO \n\ncO \n\nd \n\n04 \n\nCJ \n\nMi \n\nrd \n\nMi \n\nd \n\nMi \n\nMi \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nM \n\nX \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nX \n\n04 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n04 \n\nu \n\n\ncO \n\nCJ \n\n04 \n\nE \n\nX \n\n> \n\na \n\nCO \n\na \n\nQ \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\no \n\n\nX \n\n04 \n\nd \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nMi \n\n04 \n\n3 \n\n04 \n\nt* \n\n04 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n04 \n\nCM \n\n04 \n\nco \n\nX \n\n04 \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n1 \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\nE \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nE \n\no \n\nC/5 \n\ne \n\nE \n\ne \n\nCJ \n\nW \n\nPQ \n\nE \n\n\nr>- \n\n00 \n\n05 \n\no \n\n1 \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nin \n\n50 \n\n\n00 \n\n05 \n\n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n50 \n\n\n\n155 \n\n\nSOURCE: Clopper Almon, Cost of Capital Variations , University of Maryland Bureau of \n\nBusiness and Economic Research Interindustry Forecasting Project, June 12, 1969. \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n3.7 percent. The industry employment results of running the Kaufmann \ndefense assumptions through the Almon Interindustry model are given \nin Table 5 for the uncompensated versions and in Table 6 for the com\xc2\xac \npensated versions for the year 1972. Similar projections were run for \neach year 1966 through 1971, but are not reproduced here because of \nspace limitations. A summary of the print-out tables is given in \nTable 7. \n\nThe reasonableness of the Almon interindustry projections is \nimportant, since the employment estimates associated with these pro\xc2\xac \njections for each industry are used as the basis for the national \ncontrol totals which, after various adjustments, are then distributed \ngeographically by the regional projections model in order to estimate \nthe regional economic impacts of changing defense expenditures. \n\nIV. 1.4.3 Impacts Upon Regional Economies \n\nIV. 1.-4.3. a The Harris Model \n\n\nIn order to make empirical estimates of the regional impacts of \nassumed changes in defense expenditures for this study, the industry \nemployment estimates generated by special runs of the Almon national \ninterindustry projections model were allocated among states, metropoli\xc2\xac \ntan areas, and counties by a regional model developed by Professor \nCurtis C. Harris, Jr. of the Jniversity of Maryland. ^ \n\n\nThe Harris regional projections model is based upon the use of \nindustry location equations which describe the changing locational \nfactors which affect the geographic distribution of employment in \neach industry over time. An industry location equation is developed \nfor each industry including functional relationships which describe \nits locational shifts in response to shifts of its major supplying and \nselling markets, wage rates, historical trends, and other factors. \n\n\nThe national employment projections, by industry, are treated as \na set of control totals, or requirements to produce the output needed \nto satisfy final demand.The regional model then utilizes the \nindustry location equations to estimate the geographic distributions of \n\n\nFor details, see Curtis C. Harris, Jr., State and County Pro\xc2\xac \njections: A Progress Report of the Regional Forecasting Project, \nOccasional Paper Series, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, \n\nUniversity of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, January, 1969. \n\n22 \n\nIbid., p. 1. \n\n\n156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEstimated 1972 Employment, by Industry, Associated with \n\nAlternative Defense Budgets, without Offset Programs \n\n(thousands) \n\nBUDGET A BUDGET B BUDGET C BUDGET D BUDGET E \n($42.2 ($59.4 ($67.6 ($70.5 ($93.6 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nc \n\n\n00 \n\nSO \n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0vt- \n\n \n\nrH \n\n* \n\nUO \n\nm \n\nin \n\nOs \n\nCM \n\nH \n\no \n\nm \n\no \n\n1ln J \n\no \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nsO \n\nOs \n\nrH \n\n\n\n00 \n\nuo \n\nsO \n\nCO \n\nSO \n\n\n00 \n\nos \n\nTl \n\n\xe2\x80\x94-i \n\ntH \n\nMf \n\nsO \n\nSO \n\nH \n\nuo \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\nr- \n\nCM \n\nOs \n\nm \n\nH \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nri \n\n. \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n<* \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nH \n\n\nCM \n\nuo \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nr-i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n01 \n\n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n01 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-> \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n<3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n04 \n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\nd \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n01 \n\nU \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n01 \n\n\n\n\n<3 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n<3 \n\n00 \n\nC \n\n\nd \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\nN \n\n03 \n\nH \n\n\n\nPm \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nc \n\n\no \n\n\n\n01 \n\nO \n\nO \n\nC/3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nZ \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\nU \n\n\nto \n\n\n\n03 \n\nrH \n\n(3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nc \n\na \n\na \n\n\n\n00 \n\no \n\n04 \n\n04 \n\nQ \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h \n\n01 \n\n00 \n\nz \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H \n\no \n\n(3 \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nZ \n\n\n\nd \n\nlM \n\nZ \n\n0 \n\nd \n\n\nz \n\nz \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n03 \n\nrH \n\n(H \n\nM \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ns \n\n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nd \n\n\n\no \n\nd \n\niH \n\n\nu \n\n\nPo \n\n4J \n\n<3 \n\nH \n\nd \n\n\n01 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nd \n\n(3 \n\na \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\no \n\n\nU \n\ntH \n\nU \n\nU \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n<3 \n\nH \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\na \n\nd \n\n04 \n\n\nz \n\n\n4J \n\n\nu \n\n3 \n\no \n\n<3 \n\nz \n\ntH \n\nd \n\nu \n\nH \n\n(3 \n\nd \n\n04 \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n01 \n\n0) \n\n01 \n\na \n\n\nPm \n\n\nO \n\nU \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\n4-1 \n\nd \n\n\nfn \n\n<3 \n\nd \n\n\n<3 \n\na \n\n(1) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n1 \n\nrH \n\nU \n\n<3 \n\nS \n\n01 \n\nd \n\nd \n\n4-1 \n\n\nd \n\nH \n\n\n> \n\no \n\nV4 \n\n\no \n\na \n\nd \n\n4-> \n\nd \n\n(3 \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\no \n\n00 \n\nM \n\no \n\no \n\nC3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\no \n\nal \n\n\n(3 \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nhJ \n\nCJ \n\nfit \n\n<2 \n\nH \n\nz \n\nCJ \n\n04 \n\nZ \n\nCJ \n\nCJ \n\nZ \n\no \n\nZ \n\nQ \n\nCJ \n\nO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n<1- \n\nUO \n\nsO \n\nn* \n\n00 \n\nOS \n\no \n\nH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n \n\nON \n\n00 \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n \n\no \n\n3 \n\nTO \n\no \n\nu \n\ncu \n\nX \nO \nO \nU -1 \n\nco \n\n3 \n\no \n\n0) \n\n\nd \n\ncd \n\n\n(0 \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n* % H \n\nu \n\ncd \n\nx \n\n \n\nCO \n\n\nJD \n\n00 x \n\nCu \n\n3 \n\ncd \n\ncu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\ncd \n\n3 cd \n\ncu \n\nCO \n\nV \n\nPQ \n\nS \n\nH \n\nCH \n\nc* H \n\n< \n\nON \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n<* \n\nm \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nto \nPi \nr-H a) \nO 4-1 \n\njd co \n\n0) rH \n\nco o \n3 42 \no cu \n\n33 zd \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n#N \n\n\n\n4-> \n\n\n\nH \n\n\nCO \n\n0) \n\n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n\n4-1 \n\nd \n\n\n3 \n\n\nH \n\n4-1 \n\nd) \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nX) \n\n\nd) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\n3 \n\ncd \n\nu \n\no \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n4-1 \n\na; \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n4-> \n\no \n\nd \n\nd \n\ncu \n\nd) \n\ncd \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nd \n\n4J \n\nEh \n\nd \n\ncu \n\nCJ \n\ncd \n\nX) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n\nV4 \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\nd \n\ncd \n\no \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nu \n\no \n\nrH \n\nEh \n\nd \n\nd \n\no \n\n\nd \n\n\nO \n\n\ncd \n\n% H \n\nu \n\nu \n\no \n\nd \n\nX \n\nd) \n\n\nX \n\n\ncd \n\nu \n\n X \nJZ) s \xe2\x80\x94 / X \nPQ X \n\n\no \n\noo \n\nX \n\nUO \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\nm \n\nX \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\nMf \n\nCO \n\nn* \n\nMl- \n\n\nm \n\nX \n\n* \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\n\nrH \n\n \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntd \n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n\nX \n\nc? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nx \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nW \n\nn* \n\n*H \n\n rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n-h \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd) \n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n4-J \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\n\nd) \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\nd \n\n\no \n\n\nd) \n\n\nCJ \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\nX \n\n\nu \n\n\nX \n\n\nd \n\nU \n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n4-> \n\n\no \n\n\nPH \n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2x \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nd) \n\n\nCQ \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\nd> \n\nX \n\nH \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nS \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nd \n\nPH \n\n00 \n\nO \n\n\nd) \n\n\nH \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n#3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nX \n\n\nPH \n\nH \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n>-< \n\n\nd \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\nPH \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n>3 \n\n00 \n\nCl) \n\nd \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n(D \n\n\nH \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n\n\nH \n\nd) \n\nX \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nMH \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\nd \n\ne \n\n4-J \n\nO \n\n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\nd \n\nrH \n\nCD \n\nPH \n\nd \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCD \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n(D \n\n \n\n\n\n*H \n\n00 \n\n\n \n\n\nCO \n\nW \n\nd \n\n\nO* \n\nCD \n\n\nX \n\nS \n\n\nd \n\n00 \n\n\na \n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\n0 \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\npa \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\ncd \n\nTi \n\nCD \n\ncd \n\n\nOh \n\nd \n\n\n\nc \n\nT3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\niH \n\n\nad \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n:s \n\nd \n\no \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\nM \n\nn \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nM \n\n\nT3 \n\n\n4-J \n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\nO \n\n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nM \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nCd \n\ncd \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nd \n\no \n\nd \n\nu \n\nU \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\nP3 \n\nCD \n\nc\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\n0) \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCD \n\nrH \n\n\nCD \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\ncd \n\nPH \n\n0) \n\nX \n\nU \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n0 \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nrH \n\n \n\no \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\no \n\nu \n\nM \n\n00 \n\nu \n\nd \n\no \n\n4-> \n\n4-J \n\nP3 \n\n \n\n00 \n\n05 \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n\nH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\n\nvD \n\n\nO \n\nH \n\nin \n\nCO \n\np \n\nH \n\nn \n\n\nm \n\nvD \n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\nH \n\n\n \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nV4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nC \n\n\n\n\nX) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX) \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n3-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nd. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n*H \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3-4 \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n3-4 \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\n4-> \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\nH \n\nPd \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nX \n\na \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\nco \n\n\n03 \n\ncd \n\n\n\nw \n\n+j \n\n\n\nH \n\no \n\n03 \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n0) \n\nH \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\nX3 \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n3-4 \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n03 \n\na; \n\n\nCO \n\ncd \n\nH \n\n00 \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n03 \n\ncd \n\n\n\nb \n\n\n4-1 \n\n3-1 \n\no \n\nO \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n03 \n\n\n> \n\n4-1 \n\n3-4 \n\nPtf \n\n\n\nX \n\nCu \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n4H \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n3-1 \n\n03 \n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncd \n\n\nX) \n\nO \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n4-4 \n\n\n03 \n\n\nCO \n\nXJ \n\ncd \n\n\nX \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nx \n\n\nd \n\nX \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\ni \n\no\' \n\n0) \n\n\nCO \n\ncd \n\nCH \n\n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nd \n\no \n\nH \n\nCO \n\n\nx> \n\nM \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\nX \n\nw \n\nH \n\nXJ \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\n3-4 \n\nd \n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\no \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nco \n\nX) \n\n\nO \n\n\n4J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nPQ \n\n4-> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\ncd \n\nX) \n\n(U \n\n>-i \n\n\nr\\ \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n4-1 \n\ne \n\n\n03 \n\n\ncd \n\n4-1 \n\n\nX \n\n4-1 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nd \n\n4-1 \n\n03 \n\n\nco \n\n03 \n\nx \n\n\n3-4 \n\nc \n\ncd \n\n4-> \n\nc \n\n\n4-> \n\ncd \n\n> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nd4 \n\n\nG \n\na \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\nH \n\n03 \n\n\nd \n\ncd \n\nco \n\n3-4 \n\na \n\nH \n\na \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\n4-1 \n\n\nB \n\nH \n\ng \n\nH \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncd \n\n03 \n\nCO \n\n\' #\\ \n\nG \n\n\nu \n\n\n03 \n\n** co \n\n0 \n\ncd \n\nB \n\nH \n\na \n\na \n\nd \n\n#1 \n\n3-4 \n\n4J \n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\nW \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nG \n\nu \n\n\nM \n\nCO 0) \n\n\no \n\na \n\n03 \n\n\nC0 \n\nd \n\nO \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\n3-4 \n\n03 \n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4J \n\no \n\no \n\nCJ \n\nC4 \'\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\nX3 \n\nd \n\ns \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\n03 \n\nH \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n> \n\n4-1 \n\na) \n\n4-1 \n\n3-4 \n\n*H G \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\n0 \n\nco \n\nO \n\ncd \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\nx> \n\n03 \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n4-1 \n\n3-4 \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\no \n\nH \n\nrd \n\nC \n\na \n\nCT \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nU \n\n3-4 \n\no \n\ncd \n\nH \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nX2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\no \n\nG \n\nPQ \n\nw \n\n2 \n\nc \n\nCO CJ \n\nM \n\no \n\nw \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nP-. \n\nH \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nw \n\no \n\n\n\nPn \n\n\nX \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n\n05 \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nm \n\nvO \n\np \n\n00 \n\n05 \n\no \n\nH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nvO \n\np \n\np \n\nP \n\np \n\n\np \n\n\np \n\nP \n\np \n\np \n\nP \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\n\n161 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nX) \n\nQJ \n\nP \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-J \n\nd \n\no \n\na \n\n\nm \n\nw \n\nCQ \n\n< \n\nH \n\n\nw \n\n\n d \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\nm \n\nO\' \n\no \n\nO\' \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\nW \n\nCO *H \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nO\' \n\n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nCTn rH \n\n00 \n\nin \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nO\' \n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\nQ rH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\'-r\' *H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\nX> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\no \n\nvD \n\niD \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nm d \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\n. o \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nMO \n\no \n\n\nO\' \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\nW \n\nO *H \n\nO\' \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nm \n\nkD \n\n \n\n\nr^. \n\no \n\nO\' \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nvo d \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\n00 \n\nin \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\nW \n\nr*\'* *H \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\no \n\nm \n\niD \n\nM}- \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nvO rH \n\nI\'\'- \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nO\' \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n rH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHQ \n\nw -H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\nXI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\nco \n\no \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n- \n\nr- \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\nPJ \n\nO\'\' *H \n\nl"" \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n rH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\nxi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n4-1 \n\nd \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n(D \n\no \n\nw \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n> \n\n\nX? \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n4-1 \n\n4-J \n\nQ \n\n\nd \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\nco \n\nU \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nO\' \n\n\nd \n\n<4-4 \n\n\n\n\nQ) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nPi \n\na \n\nd \n\nJ \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nd \n\n\nP \n\n6 \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nPi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\nXJ \n\nX) \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\nH \n\n> \n\n(D \n\nd \n\nw \n\nP4 \n\no \n\n\n> \n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nCO \n\n\noi \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nd \n\no \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nH \n\n\ncd \n\na) \n\n\n\nxj d \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaJ CO \n\n\nu \n\nd \n\nDu \n\n\nQ \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\nco \n\nd o \n\no \n\nd \n\n\nH \n\nB \n\na \n\n\n53 \n\n\nrH \n\n4J \n\nd *h \n\no \n\nX) CO \n\n\n\nd \n\np \n\n\nM \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n4J \n\n\nd -h \n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbbH \n\nCO \n\n\n\nco \n\nX) \n\na) \n\nrH 0 \n\nrH \n\nd n \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nQ \n\n6 \n\nd 4-i \n\nd \n\nDu \n\n4-J \n\nd \n\n4-J \n\nd \n\n\n\nd \n\n6 \n\nCD \n\nU *H \n\nu \n\nd H \n\nV4 \n\nd \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 4-J \n\nd \n\n4-J d \n\no \n\n*H \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nCO \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nP \n\nX> CO \n\nX) \n\nd 4-1 \n\nDu \n\nCO \n\n4-J \n\n*4-4 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nP \n\nB \n\nd d \n\nd \n\n4-J d \n\nB \n\nP \n\nc \n\n*4-4 \n\n\n\nPQ \n\n< \n\n \n\nrH \n\nCQ \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nin \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\nG) \n\n\'w\' \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\nrO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x94S \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nm \n\nO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nm \n\nCQ \n\no \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nin \n\nCM \n\no \n\nO \n\nm \n\nr- \n\no \n\nON \n\n\n\nW \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nx \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nrH \n\nCQ \n\nX \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\nX \n\n\nCD \n\nV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n<3- \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nCQ \n\nin \n\nX \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCO \n\nPQ \n\n\nJO \n\n!\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTD \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n00 \n\nPQ \n\n/-\\ \n\n/\'\xe2\x80\x9cN \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\no \n\n<3* \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nO \n\nCQ \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nin \n\nin \n\nO \n\nCM \n\n<3- \n\nCQ \n\no \n\nX \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nCQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nPh \n\nw \n\nON \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n<3" \n\nx \n\n"H \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCQ \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\no \n\no \n\nCQ \n\nCO \n\no \n\nin \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n X \n\nM* \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nH \n\n\nCQ \n\nin \n\nX \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n< \n\nN \n\n<4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n3 \n\nx> \n\njg \n\n \n\nrH \n\nCQ \n\nI"\'- \n\nX \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\n4_) \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nXJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nxj \n\na) \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\na \n\nX \n\n4_\xc2\xbb \n\nCO \n\nw \n\nG \n\nc \n\nX \n\na) \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\n< \n\n\n\nINDUSTRY \n\n\n\nO \n\nX \n\nPu \n\n>n \n\nX \n\na) \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nO \n\nX \n\n> \n\n\n00 \n\nG \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\nf \n\nCO \n\nT3 \n\nO \n\nO \n\nPj \n\nc \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nx \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n0) \n\n00 \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\nN \n\nx) \n\n(0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nCQ \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nO \n\n\n\nCO \n\nO \n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nE \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX) \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n00 \n\no \n\nCx-I \n\nPX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nE \n\nX \n\nX \n\nO \n\nCD \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\nX3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\ne \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nE \n\nE \n\nX \n\nCJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nT3 \n\n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nj* \n\n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\nX \n\ne \n\n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\nO \n\nc \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n>> \n\nX \n\nG \n\nx \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\no \n\nG \n\nG \n\na \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCX \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n0) \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nG \n\nC \n\nO \n\nG \n\ncx \n\n\nE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nX \n\nG \n\nO \n\n0) \n\nE \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nG \n\nc \n\nCX \n\n\nX) \n\n\n>N \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\npH \n\n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nC \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nOu \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n1 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n<1> \n\ne \n\nCO \n\nC \n\nG \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n> \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\nO \n\nc \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX) \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nx \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nX \n\no \n\nO \n\n \n\n00 \n\no \n\nin \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nON \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2. \n\n X \nXD v ~\' X \nPQ X \n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\nNO \n\nc \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nO \n\no \n\nNO \n\n\n \n\n0) \n\n3 \n\n\nG \n\nCM \n\nG \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\nf-"- \n\nrH \n\n \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nNO \n\n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nPQ \n\n\nX \n\nW \n\nX \n\nPQ \n\nC \n\nH \n\n\n>1 \n\nP5 \n\nH \n\nco \n\nX \n\nQ \n\n25 \n\nX \n\n\nCO \n\n( 1 ) \n\n\nCO \n\n4J \n\no \n\n3 \n\nXJ \n\nO \n\nPh \n\nPh \n\nXJ \n\nO \n\nO \n\nPn \n\nCO \n\nG \n\no \n\nCU \n\ng \n\ncd \n\n\nCO \n\n-< \n\nX> \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\nCU \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n52 \n\n\nXJ \n\nU \n\nO \n\nCJ \n\na) \n\nPh \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nX \n\no \n\nco \n\nH \n\nrH \n\n\n\ncd \n\nrH \n\nCJ \n\no \n\n\n \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nOu \n\n0 \n\ncd \n\nn \n\nU \n\n0) \n\nu \n\nCO \n\nX \n\no \n\na \n\nx \n\nXJ \n\nG \n\ncd \n\nCO \n\n \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nX \n\nPd \n\n\nCO \n\n4J \n\no \n\nG \n\nX) \n\no \n\nu \n\ntu \n\nX) \n\nCJ \n\ncd \n\nu \n\n0) \n\nX) \n\ne \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\nco \n\nV-t \n\ncu \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\n4-> \n\nC! \n\n\nCO \n\nPi \n\n0) \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\n4-1 \n\nCJ \n\no \n\nCJ \n\nCJ \n\n \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nXJ \n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n-l \n\nG \n\nco \n\n* Po \n\n00 \n\nCU \n\nG \n\nG \n\nx> \n\nCU \n\nOh \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nu \n\no \n\nG \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nXJ \n\na \n\nXJ \n\nG \n\nX \n\na) \n\nG \n\nPl4 \n\ncd \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\ncd \n\n< \n\npG \n\nU \n\n\n4-> \n\ncd \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ncd \n\nCU \n\n\n\nG \n\nX) \n\nG \n\n\ncu \n\n\nrH \n\nXJ \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nPh \n\nc \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nX \n\nco \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\ncd \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\nCJ \n\na \n\n\ncd \n\nCU \n\na) \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n* \n\n\nrH \n\no \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncu \n\nCU \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\noo \n\nG \n\nJ-4 \n\n<4-1 \n\na \n\nCU \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\nG \n\nX \n\n4-1 \n\n4-4 \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\ncd \n\nrH \n\nPh \n\ncd \n\nCU \n\no \n\n\nP4 \n\np4 \n\nX \n\nPh \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\np4 \n\npH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n<1- \n\nuo \n\nX \n\nr^. \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n164 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 6 (continued) \n\nBUDGET A BUDGET B BUDGET C BUDGET E \n($42.2 ($59.4 ($67.6 ($93.6 \n\nINDUSTRY billions) billions) billions) billions) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\nrH \n\no \n\no \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nst \n\nst \n\nCM \n\nVO \n\nst \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n04 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nst \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\nst \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nco \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nS3- \n\nS3- \n\nm \n\nOv \n\nS3- \n\n00 \n\nI-\'* \n\nst \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nst \n\nCO \n\no \n\nm \n\nS3- \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nS3- \n\nm \n\no \n\nin \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nn* \n\nrs \n\nm \n\n\n<3- \n\nrH \n\nst \n\nas \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nst \n\nCO \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nn3 \n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc3 \n\n\n3s \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\nCH \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n52 \n\nO \n\nd) \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nVi \n\n\n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\na* \n\n\n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncO \n\nO \n\n0: \n\n\nH \n\nx: \n\n\nw \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nU \n\n\n\nd \n\nCJ \n\nH \n\n\nco \n\n<0 \n\nu \n\n\nVl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nPH \n\n\n\nd) \n\n \n\n \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\nCJ \n\n> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n00 \n\na \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\n\n0) \n\nCJ \n\nu \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n>> \n\nu \n\na \n\nM \n\n\nxi \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\ncO \n\n\nCJ 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nVi \n\n3 \n\neg \n\nP_i \n\n\n4-> \n\nX \n\na \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\nCO \n\nU \n\n> \n\nco \n\nw \n\nd \n\ncr \n\nd) \n\n52 \n\nX \n\n\n\n<0 \n\no \n\n-0 \n\n\n\n\n52 \n\n\n\njo \n\n\nd) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nw \n\nd \n\n\n\no \n\n\n> \n\ncO \n\nrH \n\n52 \n\n4-1 \n\nH \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nx \n\ncc3 \n\ncO \n\n0) \n\n\n\nM \n\nc \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nH \n\nVi \n\n\nnj \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nOh \n\nCj \n\nu \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\na) \n\n\n\n<13 \n\n*H \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nd) \n\nd \n\nd \n\n00 \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nrj \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\nPh \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nPH \n\nT3 \n\nd \n\no \n\ncO \n\nd \n\nT3 \n\nTJ \n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n1 \n\n4-> \n\nPh \n\nn \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n32 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nn4 \n\nd \n\n\nH \n\nT3 \n\nno \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\ne \n\nC \n\n\nCO \n\n\ncO \n\n,d \n\nH \n\n\nx \n\nM \n\nM \n\noj \n\n\nc \n\nd \n\nd \n\n-a \n\n\n0 \n\no \n\nO \n\n* CO \n\n00 \n\n0) \n\n\na \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nu \n\n\n\n\nH \n\ncO \n\nCfl \n\ncO \n\na \n\n\n3 \n\n\nCJ \n\n00 4-1 \n\nc \n\nVi \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nd \n\ncO \n\no \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nu \n\nQ) \n\n\n\n\ncO \n\nVi \n\nd \n\n\n\nd o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nd) \n\nX \n\nVi \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ncO \n\ncO \n\nrtl \n\njC \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nd) \n\n\na) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nM \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h d \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n4J \n\nVi \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nVi \n\nrj \n\n4_J \n\nd) \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd \n\ncu \n\n6 \n\n0) \n\n<3 \n\n4-1 TJ \n\nE \n\nnd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\nd) \n\nX) \n\no3 \n\no \n\ncO \n\no \n\no \n\nDr \n\nd \n\nX \n\n4J \n\nco O \n\ncO \n\nVi \n\n00 \n\nVi \n\nd \n\n4J \n\n4-1 \n\ndJ \n\nd \n\nH \n\nd) \n\nXX \n\nrH \n\n4-> \n\nM \n\no \n\nrH \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n0) \n\na) m \n\nH \n\ncO \n\nd \n\ncO \n\no \n\nis \n\nd) \n\nCV \n\n \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nro \n\nSt \n\nm \n\nvD \n\n\n00 \n\nov \n\nst \n\ns3- \n\n X \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\nXI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\ns \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\ng \n\n\nCO \n\non \n\nOn \n\nX \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\ntH \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x9c\x93 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\n^~N \n\n- \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nQ -o> X \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nG) \n\n\'w\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n<3 \n\n\n/\'-n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nCN \n\ng \n\nr^> \n\nr- \n\n \n\nW \n\nCM \n\n*H \n\nCO \n\n. \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nf". \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nn \n\nX \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n\n\n00 \n\no \n\nQ \n\n \n\niH \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n> \n\n\na, \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\na) \n\n\nG \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nP-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\nG \n\n\n4-J \n\n\nc \n\n\n\nw \n\n\n\nX \n\n\na 4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nw \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntH \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\niH \n\nCJ \n\n0) \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n03 \n\nG \n\nC4 \n\n\n32 \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nps \n\na \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nX \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nCO \n\n\nX \n\n<3 \n\n\nX \n\nG \n\nco \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\na \n\nCJ \n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n00 \n\nCJ \n\n\nC0 \n\nC \n\nB \n\nX \n\nW \n\n\n\nrH \n\na \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nG \n\ncd \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nPh \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nG \n\nCJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\n<-3 \n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nG \n\n\n\nCO \n\nU) \n\n\n\n\n2 \n\nX \n\n4-1 \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n00 \n\nG \n\nC \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\no \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nX \n\na \n\n3 \n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\na 4 \n\no \n\n\n\nX \n\nH \n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nx \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nw \n\na \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nx > \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n\nE \n\n05 \n\nCO \n\nOh \n\nn \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\no \n\na \n\nX \n\nc \n\no \n\n1 \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\ncx \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nC \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nCu \n\nX \n\nG \n\n4-J \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\no \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nX \n\no \n\n<3 \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nCJ \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nPQ \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\nM \n\n\nX \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO X \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nC \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\na \n\na \n\nG \n\nG C \n\nG \n\nX \n\nH \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nCJ \n\nH \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H G \n\n> \n\n4-4 \n\n\nB \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\n<1) \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\nx e \n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nPu \n\nG \n\n* \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n \n\nO \n\nCO \n\na \n\nS \n\nCJ \n\nX X \n\no \n\nCJ \n\na. \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\nG \n\nx G \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nn \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nrH \n\no \n\nrH \n\nG a 4 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\nc \n\ncx \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\nG \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\no \n\nCO \n\nw \n\nX \n\nw \n\nCJ \n\nw \n\nPQ W \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n<3 \n\nCO \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nH \n\nCJ \n\n05 \n\nw \n\n\noxcMcovj-inxr^.00 ONoxcMco^inxr^oooN \nxxxxxxxxx \n\n\n166 \n\n\nUtilities 226.4 228.3 228.8 227.6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nw \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nO \n\nNO \n\nON \n\nU0 \n\nCM \n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\n\nnO \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nO \n\no \n\nUO \n\nuo \n\n \n\nrH \n\n\n\nUO \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nUO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nUO \n\n\n\n\n1\xe2\x80\x94J \n\nN-/ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nNO \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\n/^N \n\nCO \n\nr\xc2\xbb \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n \n\nrH \n\n\nNO \n\n_J \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nZD ^ -H \nCQ J=> \n\n\nT? \n\nd) /-N \n\nd i\xe2\x80\x94I \n\nO ZD \xe2\x80\x99 *H \n\nw PQ XI \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n \n\n4-1 \n\n\nd \n\nu \n\nd \n\n\nd> \n\n03 \n\nd \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\nB \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd> \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n4-1 \n\nCO \n\nw \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nd \n\n\nCO \n\n0) \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\n-4 \n\nH \n\n\nctJ \n\n4-1 \n\nd \n\nerf \n\nT> \n\na \n\na) \n\nd \n\n\n0) \n\no \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nco \n\nd \n\n\ncfl \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nd \n\na) \n\nT) \n\na \n\nd \n\n\nTO 0) \n\ns a \n\n\nd \n\nQ< \n\nd \n\nerf \n\nTO \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\no \n\nCO \n\nH \n\n0) \n\nd4 \n\n\nco \n\nd \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nd \n\nC/3 \n\n\nCO \n\n0) \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nM \n\nd \n\nC/3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nP, \n\na) \n\nerf \n\n \n\nd \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\nd \n\n> \n\no \n\no \n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n> \n\nO \n\no \n\n\nd \n\no \n\no \n\nHJ \n\n\n \n\nd \n\nw \n\nTO \n\nd \n\nco \n\n\nd \n\n> \n\ncO \n\n}-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\n\nco \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nco \n\nrH \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n\n\nd \n\n\nCO \n\nC/3 \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nrN \n\nco \n\nrP \n\nd \n\niH \n\nrH \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nr \n\nco \n\no \n\nw \n\nCO \n\nd) \n\nQ \n\ne \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n4-4 \n\nd \n\nd \n\nH \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\nd \n\nB \n\nCD \n\n<_> \n\n\nd) \n\nV4 \n\nd \n\nU \n\nd \n\nrH \n\nd \n\nrH \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ndJ \n\n4-> \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\nd \n\nd \n\n4-> \n\nCO \n\n4-> \n\nd \n\nT3 \n\nT3 \n\nd \n\na \n\nCO \n\n14-4 \n\nCTJ \n\n\n\ndJ \n\nO \n\nd \n\nd \n\ni \n\nd \n\nd \n\n4-1 \n\ne \n\nd \n\nM-i \n\n& \n\n\nph \n\npd \n\n3S \n\nPQ \n\n< \n\n< \n\ns \n\nPm \n\nC/3 \n\nM \n\nPQ \n\nO \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nuo \n\nNO \n\n\n00 \n\nON \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\noo \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\nON \n\n\n167 \n\n\nuppl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1972 Interindustry Projections for Five Kaufmann Defense Assumptions - Sums \n(values in millions, employment in thousands, unemployment in percentages) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nf \n\n\nw 3 \n\n\nE \n\n8 \n\na \n\n\na \n\nCO \n\n\nco \n\nOn \n\na \n\no \n\no \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n\n*H \n\nB \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\ne> \n\n\xc2\xabk \n\na> \n\no \n\na> \n\nON \n\n\nvO \n\ne \n\nr^ \n\no\\ \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\n00 \n\nE5 \n\nCA \n\nm \n\nON \n\n\n\nU u \n\n\nu \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nOQ \n\n& \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n* \n\no \n\nu \n\n5 \n\n\nco cm \n\n#k \n\nSk \n\nO\' \n\nOx \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nm \n\na* \n\nco \n\nCA \n\nm \n\nax \n\n\nax \n\n*H \n\nsO \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nax \n\n\xc2\xabk \n\nSk \n\nSk \n\no \n\nm \n\n8 \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCO- \n\nNO \n\nOx \n\n\n* s \n\n\nn cb ^ \n\nca ai r\xc2\xbb. \n\nflk Sk Sk \n\nO Ok O \n\nua o\xc2\xbb o\\ \n\n \n\n\nt> \xc2\xae \n\nr-\xc2\xbb on rA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * * \n\nm on m \n\n \n\n\na \n\no \n\n\nV 4) \no \xc2\xae \n\nU 3 \n\nOh \xc2\xabM C \n\nNO 8 <3 \n\nNO \n\nON \n\n\nno r-\' \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nm co \n\xe2\x80\xa2h \nm \n\n\n2 \n\n\noo co \n\nsO \n\nm \n\n\noo \n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\nm \n\na \n\nac \n\nm \n\nr* \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n \n\nO\' 00 On \n\n^ o \n\n\n \n\n\no m \n\nS m cs \n\nrH O\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2k Sk Sk \n\nco r- m \n\nO\' O CM \n\n\n8 \n\nm \n\n\n8 \n\n>0 \n\nr* \n\n\'O \n\n\n8 \n\nCM \n\no \n\nNO \n\n\nr* \n\nnO \n\noT \n\n\nON \n\nm \n\nH \n\ns \n\n \n\n3.9 \n\no \n\nm \n\nH \n\nCO \n\ns \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nco \n\n\nN0 \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nSk \n\nSk \n\nak \n\n\nSk \n\n\xc2\xabk \n\n. \n\n\nr>k \n\nOx \n\n00 \n\n*4- \n\n\n\nn* \n\nNO \n\n\nm \n\nOx \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n\nxO \n\no \n\nOk \n\n00 \n\n\nm \n\nOx \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\nO\' \n\nco \n\n\n8 " \nLA \n\n3 \n\n\nsO 00 \n\na a \n\n3 - \n\nnA \n\n* \n\nP"l \n\n00 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \xc2\xabA \n\nCA \n\nnA \n\n\n3 \n\n\n8 \n\nm \n\nm \n\nCM \n\na \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nlA \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nOX \n\n\nSk \n\n\xc2\xabk \n\nSk \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\n\xc2\xabN| \n\nX* \n\no \n\n* \n\n00 \n\n\nM \n\n\n1! \n\n| f \n\nI <\xc2\xa7 \n\n\n168 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nnational output totals in each industry. Both the national and regional \nmodels contain dynamic elements. In the national model, an industry*s \ninvestment is derived from the evolving output projections of the \nindustry so as to maintain a consistent relationship between capital \nand output. In addition, the technical coefficients in the national \nmodel allow for changes in technology over time. The regional model is \ndynamic in that it can generate projections for a series of time \nperiods recursively, using projections for one period as a basis for \nrevised projections for future periods. \n\nThe national projections are treated as inputs into the regional \nmodel, but a number of adjustments are made in order to match the two \nmodels. First, because the historical, trends in the regional industry \nlocation equations are based upon decennial population census employ\xc2\xac \nment data, the Almon employment projections by industry are adjusted in \norder to conform to the census definitions of employment by industry. \n\nThe difference between the reliability of national and regional \ndata also requires adjustments in the format of the two models. The \nninety-three sectors of the national model are aggregated into fifty \nsectors for the state projections model, since the close agreement \nbetween national interindustry data and state census data begin to \ndecline if the data are disaggregated into more than fifty industries. \nFor the same reason, the 50 industry classification is aggregated to \n20 industries for county and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area \n(SMSA) projections. Therefore, even though projections could have been \nmade in the special runs of the Harris model for this study at the 50 \nindustry level of detail for the states, the 20 industry classifica\xc2\xac \ntion was used, in order to permit direct comparison of SMSA and county \nprojections with state projections. It must also be presumed that \nthe more aggregated 20 industry projections for the states have a \nhigher degree of reliability than would the 50 order projections.^ \n\nAlso, both for reasons of budget constraints and display space \nlimitations, only three of the five Kaufmann defense budget assumptions \n\n\n21 \n\nAdditional details concerning the regional projections model \nand discussion of work in progress to extend the model may be found in \n\nCurtis C. Harris, Jr., op cit . , and in a forthcoming article by the \nsame author, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Forecasting the Location of Industries" presented before \nthe Southeastern Regional Science Association Meetings, University of \nNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, April 18, 1969. \n\n\n169 \n\n\n/ \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nused in the national model were used in the regional model. The Budget D \n($70.5) and Budget A ($42.2) assumptions were dropped. However, both \nuncompensated and compensated versions of each of the three remaining \nbudgets were included. \n\nThe figures in Table 7 are those generated by the Almon national \nmodel. As already noted above, the Harris model was used to develop \nregional impact data for defense budgets B, C, and E ($59.4; $67.6; and \n$93.6 bil., respectively). There are certain conceptual and computa\xc2\xac \ntional differences between the Almon and Harris models which lead to \nsome divergence in national employment totals and unemployment rates. \n\nFor the purposes of this paper the Almon results will be reported as \nnational findings. The Harris results are internally consistent, how\xc2\xac \never, and the sum of the regional data equal the corresponding Harris \nnational totals. The above noted differences in approach lead to con\xc2\xac \nsistent differences in the two sets of national results as illustrated \nin Table 8. \n\n\nIV.1.4.3.b Impacts Upon States \n\nThe estimates of the impact on employment of possible changes in \nthe size and composition of defense expenditures in each state are \nshown in Table 9. Estimates for the United States total are included \nto provide a basis for comparison. \n\nTable 9 shows for each state the estimated total employment and \nrate of unemployment for 1972 under the three alternative assumptions \nconcerning the size and composition of defense expenditures. Actual \nemployment figures for 1965 are also included in order to indicate \nemployment levels in each state before the major buildup for the \nVietnam military effort. Two sets of employment estimates are given \nunder each expenditure assumption, one assuming constant consumer \nexpenditures with no compensatory increase in household spending as \ndefense expenditures are reduced, and the other assuming that compen\xc2\xac \nsating consumer expenditures adjust sufficiently to keep national \nunemployment at a level of 3.7 to 3.9 percent. In the case of each of \nthe three assumptions concerning defense expenditures, the uncompensated \nversion indicates the maximum adjustment which would have to be made by \nthe national and regional economies and the compensated version is \nintended to indicate a more realistic assessment of economic activity \nlevels after some allowance is made for the likely adjustment of public \npolicy. \n\n22 --\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFor purposes of this study the District of Columbia is treated \nas the 51st state. \n\n\n170 \n\n\n\n\n\nComparison of Almon and Harris \n\nEstimates of Employment and Unemployment for Three Defense Budgets \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nu> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nu \n\nu \n\n3 \n\nS3 \n\n\n4-J \n\n3 \n\nd) \n\ng ^ \no \n\nT\xe2\x80\x94 I (D \n\n\ng* \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nZD \n\n\n3 \n\n& \n\n\nuo \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\n4-J 03 \n\n3 T3 \n\no \n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\n3 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ng 3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\nnO \n\n>> 03 \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nO 3 \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nnO \n\noo \n\nrH O \n\n\n* \n\n#> \n\n\nO. JZ \n\nON \n\no \n\no \n\nO \n\nB 4-J \n\nW \n\nc-* \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\noo \n\n\n4J \n\n3 \n\n3 v \n\nB ^ \n\nv -\' \n\no \n\n\n3 \n\n\nd) \n\n3 \n\n!o \n\n\n3 \n\n4-1 \n\n3 \n\nPi \n\n\noo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n<3- CO \n\n\non \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO CO \n\n\n4-1 03 \n\n3 X) \n\nNO \n\n<3- \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n3 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ng 3 \n\nN 03 \n\noo \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nO 3 \n\nm \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nrH O \n\n\n* \n\n#N \n\nr\\ \n\nQ- -C \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nB 4_> \n\nw \n\n00 \n\noo \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nrD \n\n\n3 \n\nTJ \n\n\no \n\n3 \n\n\nO \n\nd) \n\n\n*H \n\n4-J \n\nXJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-J \n\nx> \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n03 \n\n4-J \n\nrH \n\nw \n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nJO \n\n3 \n\n03 \n\nJO \n\n3 \n\n03 \n\n\no< \n\n3 \n\nvO \n\nOr \n\n3 \n\n<1- \n\ng \n\n3 \n\ng \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n& \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\nQ \n\nON \n\no \n\ng \n\n\nO \n\nB \n\nm \n\n3 \n\nO \n\nNO \n\n3 \n\nO \n\n \n\n35 \n\nCJ \n\n \n\n\nCJ \n\nN-J \n\n\n\nN-J \n\n\n\nCQ \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nX) \n\n\n\nXJ \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nPD \n\n\n\nCQ \n\n\n\n\n171 \n\n\nBudget E ($93.6 billion) \n\nUncompensated 86,810.9 1.1 82,857.0 \n\nCompensated 84,515.6 3.7 80,739.0 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nOs \n\n. \n\nO \n\n00 \n\ncn \n\nH \n\nH \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nm \n\nco \n\n\nin \xc2\xbb *H \n\xc2\xab N Irt \n\n\nSO O \nin so \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\ncn \n\n\nn -\xc2\xbb \n\xc2\xab >\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xc2\xab m \n\n\nH H N \n\nr* cn \xc2\xbbn g \n\nCM \n\n\nm CM \n\n\n\nH \n\nCM \n\ncn \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\ncn \n\n3!> \n\n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\nH \n\nO\' \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nO\' \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nH \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0M \n\n\nCM \n\n\ns\xc2\xa9 CM CM \n\nos cn \n\n\nin cm cm \n\ncn cn \n\n\nO H \xc2\xbb \n\n\ncn \n\n\nO\' \n\ncn \n\n\n*n \n\n\ncn cm os \xc2\xbb \n\nOO \n\n-\xc2\xab \n\nOO \n\n(M \n\nCM \n\n~9 \n\nsO \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n%r\\ \n\nO\' \n\no \n\n<0 \n\noo \n\n\nr-4 \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nH \n\n1-4 \n\n\n\n00 \n\ncn cn \n\n\n<*> o ^ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm cn cn \n\n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\n\ncn \n\n\nO\' \n\n\n*S^ \n\n\nO\' \'\xe2\x80\xa2* \nos cn \n\nvO <* \n00 \n\n\nO\' \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xbbH CM \n\nOx m \n\n00 CM CM o \ncn cn \n\n\ncn os \n\n3 \xc2\xa3 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\n\nr~ co *\xc2\xbb \no m \n\n\ncn \n\n\n\nso \n\na \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nO\' \n\ncn \n\nO\' \n\no \n\nOS \n\nCM \n\n\na \n\nCM \n\nSO \n\ncn \n\nH \n\nO \n\n\na \n\no \n\nos \n\n>* \n\n\nSO \n\ncn \n\n4 \n\nO\' \n\n\nrv \n\n\nCM \n\ncn \n\n\nO\' \n\nr-C \n\n\nsO \n\ncn \n\n00 \n\na \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n. so \nsO \n\n\n8 \n\n\nv\xc2\xa9 \n\nCO \n\n\n8 \n\n\nOs \n\nOs \n\n\n3 2 \n\nm cm \n\n\nf> >t H \n\ncn f\xc2\xbb so \n\n"35 \n\n\ns S \n\n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nu \n\n5 \n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0a \n\n3 \n\n\nJ3 \n\na \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\no \n\nM \n\n*C \n\nw \n\n< \n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\no \n\nhi \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa03 4 c- \n\nsM CO sH \n\n\n3 - \n\nI I \n\n\nJf \n\n3 \n\n\n! 11113 i n i \n\nOfciOiaMMMMWM \n\n\n172 \n\n\nLouisiana 1086 1295 4.7 1307 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 9 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nW Z \n\n<0 5 \n\na \n\n03 \n\n0 \n\n\nH \n\nCO \n\no \n\nas \n\nCM \n\nH \n\na \n\n\n03 \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\n\xc2\xbba \n\n30 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\na \n\nlA \n\no \n\nao \n\n\xe2\x9c\x93\xe2\x80\x9cN \n\nc \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nA \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\na \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n0 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na h \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nfH \n\na \n\na \n\n\na \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\nMS \n\nuo \n\nCO \n\nM3 \n\n*A \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nsa \n\no \n\nao \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n03 \n\n \n\na \n\n03 \n\n<* \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nao \n\n8 \n\n*9 \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nao \n\no \n\nCM \n\nJD \n\nST \n\n0 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\na \n\nCM \n\nlA \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\nCM \n\no \n\n03 \n\nas \n\n*A \n\n*9 \n\no \n\nMS \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\na \n\nCM \n\n\n-r \n\n\n\n\'T \n\n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nv> \n\n\xe2\x80\x9cO P* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na\xc2\xbb pq \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n0 \n\n\'T \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\xc2\xbbA \n\no \n\nOn \n\nA \n\n00 \n\neo \n\n00 \n\ns\xc2\xa3> \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\no \n\no \n\n\xc2\xab 35 \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nco \n\nA \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\na \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nMS \n\npi \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n^9 \n\nlA \n\nS3 \n\nc* r> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n8." \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns \n\ng \n\n0 \n\npi \n\ncr> \n\nH \n\nsA \n\n\na> \n\na \n\nm \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nco \n\n8 \n\nO\' \n\no \n\no \n\nlA \n\nrH \n\no \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCP \n\no fU \n\no \n\na \n\nM> \n\no \n\no> \n\nrH \n\n\xc2\xbba \n\na \n\n03 \n\n0 \n\nco \n\nao \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\n8 \n\n0 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\na \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\nc 2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa29 \n\nMS \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\na \n\nCM \n\n%n \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\nCO \n\n03 \n\nCM \n\no \n\n03 \n\noo \n\nm \n\n \n\n9s \n\no \n\nCM \n\no \n\n9s \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n3rt \n\n\no \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n* \n\n-9 \n\nos \n\nrH \n\nao \n\no \n\n*9 \n\nOs \n\n03 \n\n \n\nM\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nCM \n\no \n\n30 \n\nCM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h co \n\n\nCM \n\na \n\n\nsO \n\no \n\n\nO \n\n8 \n\nCO \n\nrs \n\nOS \n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\n>o \n\nPS \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\ns; \n\no \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\n\n9 \n\no \n\n\nCM \n\nST \n\nlA \n\n-T \n\nPI \n\nCM \n\n*A \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n<8 \n\nao \n\nao \n\nCM \n\n30 \n\nCM \n\nco \n\n8 \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n03 \n\nao \n\nvO \n\n\nO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\n*8 \n\n\n\n** \n\n\nrH \n\n\nlA o\\ \nCO N \n\n\ns \n\n>\xc2\xbb \n\n\nm \n\nsT \n\n9s \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\nO \n\nrH \n\no \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n03 \n\n30 \n\nco \n\n0 \n\n03 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nCs \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nA \n\nCM \n\nPI \n\nA \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nPI \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n ^ \n\n\n\xc2\xbb oo < \n\nco sr 0 \n\n\nCM \n\n\n<0 4> O 4 \n\nn oo \n\n\nm \n\n\nO ro \nvO \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\n1/1 \n\n0 \n\n\nIs N N \n\nco co \xc2\xabn \n\n\nci \n\no \n\n<\xc2\xbb \n\n\nco 0 r\xc2\xbb \xc2\xabn \xc2\xae \n\n^ 0 fs 00 O \n\n* \n\ni \n\n\n\n173 \n\n\nSouth Carolina *70 1016 5.6 1025 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n7 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o X \n\n0-4 \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n*-*0 \n\nw a; \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nCA \n\n\nIA \n\n\nn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab \n\n\nCA \n\nvO \n\no \n\na 5 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n4) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\na. \n\nr-4 \n\nO\' \n\nft \n\nm \n\na \n\no \n\no \n\n\no> \n\n\n\nh a. \n\niA \n\nr-4 \n\no \n\na \n\n8 \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nO\' \n\n\nx> \n\n5 2 \n\n\nm \n\nca \n\n<\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nH \n\no \n\nO w \n\n\nH \n\n-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nCM \n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nca \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO\' \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a a. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nat x \n\n\nca \n\nCT\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\n\xc2\xaei \n\no \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nCM \n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\n\n2 \n\n\n\n\nr-t \xc2\xabM \n\n\n\n\nkA \n\n00 \n\nH \n\nM> \n\nCM \n\nkA \n\nO\' \n\nA \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nir\\ \n\nCM \n\n \n\nvO \n\nlA \n\n00 \n\n\nf-4 \n\nCM \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\nCA \n\nCM \n\nO \n\na \n\nO\' \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nA* \n\nO \n\n\nCM \n\nkA \n\nCA \n\n\nH \n\nO\' \n\nCM \n\nkA \n\n*\xc2\xa3> \n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n\n\nvO \n\no \n\ntn \n\nsO \n\nkA \n\nsO \n\n0-4 \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabA \n\nCA \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nlA \n\nr-k \n\nCA \n\nsD \n\n\n<9 \n\nCM \n\na \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nqo \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\n*A \n\nCA \n\nH \n\no \n\nA* \n\noo \n\nO\' \n\na \n\ns \n\n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xbbA \n\nCA \n\n*\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no* \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nlA \n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\nD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n& \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n*2 2 \n\nCA \n\na \n\no \n\nsO \n\nCM \n\n \n\nu z \n\n*A \n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nkA \n\nCM \n\nn \n\nvO \n\nG \n\n<9 5 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO\' o \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU H \n\n4) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 rH \n\nP- \n\nlA \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nO\' \n\n\n e q \n\na\xc2\xab \n\n\n> > \n\n\n8 1 \nI I 5 I \n\n\n174 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe importance of Table 9 is that it presents estimates of how \nthe employment impacts upon the national economy (as shown in the first \nrow) resulting from alternative defense expenditures (as indicated by \nthe column headings) would be distributed among all of the states. \n\nThe lowest of the defense budgets examined is Budget B ($59.4 \nbil.). It assumes a Vietnam settlement, strategic arms limitation, plus \ncuts in other existing programs and is presented here as a hypothetically \nminimum defense budget in order to estimate the maximum regional unem\xc2\xac \nployment impacts that defense cuts of that magnitude might generate. \n\nTable 9 indicates that defense cuts to this level, if not compensated \nby increases in other expenditures, could result in a national unemploy\xc2\xac \nment rate of 4.5 percent. Compensatory spending could reduce this \nunemployment rate to 3.5 percent. However, these unemployment impacts \nare not spread evenly across the nation, but vary widely in their \nimpacts upon different states. Under the uncompensated version, unem\xc2\xac \nployment is estimated to climb as high as 10.7 percent in Alaska, but to \nbe as low as 2,4 percent in the District of Columbia. \n\nAnother low defense budget is Budget C ($67.6 bil.), a 1965 base \ninflated in money terms to reflect approximate 1972 price levels. The \nuncompensated version of this hypothetical budget represents an extreme \nposition in assuming that no increases occur in consumer spending to \ncompensate for reductions in defense expenditures. Even under these \nextreme assumptions, as shown in Table 9, national unemployment rises \nonly to 3.8 percent and this is reduced to 3.6 percent under the more \nrealistic assumption that consumer expenditures rise to absorb \nunemployed resources released by cuts in defense expenditures. The \ncompensated version of this defense budget can thus be regarded as \ngenerating a realistic type of economic adjustment situation for the \nnation and its regions. The entries in Table 9 under Budget C ($67.6 \nbil.) columns provide an estimate of how the impact of this assumed \nreadjustment would affect employment and unemployment in each state. \n\nA summary of this information is shown in Table 10 indicating those \nstates which are estimated to face the greatest unemployment problems \nunder these assumptions about changing defense expenditures, and those \nin which unemployment would be least serious. \n\n\nHeading the list of states estimated to encounter unemployment \nin excess of 5 percent is Alaska with unemployment of 10.5 percent. \n\nAs would be expected, states which are heavily dependent upon military \nexpenditures and which lack highly diversified civilian economies are \n\n\n175 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 10 \n\nState Ranking by Unemployment Impact for Calendar Year 1972 \n[[Estimated under the Defense Budget C ($67.6 billion), Compensated] \n\nFor Selected States \n\nUnemployment Greater than 5.0% Unemployment Less than 3.1% \n\n\nRank \n\nState \n\nPercent \n\nRank \n\nState \n\nPercent \n\n1 \n\nAlaska \n\n10.5 \n\n36 \n\nAlabama \n\n3.0 \n\n2 \n\nNew Mexico \n\n7.9 \n\n37 \n\nOhio \n\n3.0 \n\n3 \n\nNevada \n\n7.1 \n\n38 \n\nMissouri \n\n3.0 \n\n4 \n\nWyoming \n\n6.2 \n\n39 \n\nMaryland \n\n2.9 \n\n5 \n\nHawaii \n\n5.7 \n\n40 \n\nWisconsin \n\n2.9 \n\n6 \n\nNorth Dakota \n\n5.6 \n\n41 \n\nIndiana \n\n2.9 \n\n7 \n\nUtah \n\n5.6 \n\n42 \n\nTennessee \n\n2.8 \n\n8 \n\nCalifornia \n\n5.5 \n\n43 \n\nNew Hampshire \n\n2.7 \n\n9 \n\nSouth Dakota \n\n5.5 \n\n44 \n\nWest Virginia \n\n2.7 \n\n10 \n\nArizona \n\n5.3 \n\n45 \n\nOregon \n\n2.7 \n\n\n\n\n46 \n\nIowa \n\n2.7 \n\n\n\n\n47 \n\nIllinois \n\n2.7 \n\n\n\n\n48 \n\nArkansas \n\n2.7 \n\n\n\n\n49 \n\nNew York \n\n2.6 \n\n\n\n\n50 \n\nPennsylvania \n\n2.5 \n\n\n\n\n51 \n\nDistrict of \n\n2.3 \n\n\n\n\n\nColumbia \n\n\n\n176 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nmost vulnerable to defense cutbacks just as they are the states which \nmost benefit from defense buildups. However, even under the Budget C \n\n($67.6 bil.) assumptions concerning defense cuts, the only states which \nare estimated to face unemployment of 6 percent or more are Alaska, \n\nNew Mexico, Nevada, and Wyoming. States with expected unemployment \nrates of between 5 and 6 percent are Arizona, South Dakota, California, \nUtah, North Dakota, and Hawaii. \n\nAt the other end of the scale are states which are estimated to \nhave minimal problems in adjusting to significant defense expenditure \ncuts. The estimate for the District of Columbia (here treated as a \nstate) is only 2.3 percent unemployment because of stability of \nFederal employment, high labor force participation ratio, absence of \na rural hinterland, and other special factors associated with the \neconomy of the nation\xe2\x80\x99s capital. However, as shown in Table 10 there \nare also 13 states for which the estimated unemployment rate with \ndefense cuts would be less than 3.1 percent: Pennsylvania, New York, \nArkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Oregon, West Virginia, New Hampshire, \nTennessee, Indiana, Wisconsin, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio and Alabama. \n\nIf an unemployment rate of approximately 3.0 percent is assumed \nto be a rate which reflects a minimum feasible level of unemployment, \nthen these estimates suggest that even with significant cuts in defense \nexpenditures, almost one-fourth of the states might face labor \nshortages, because of normal growth in the non-defense sectors of the \neconomy. \n\nThe significance of these estimates is their indication that the \neconomic impact of the assumed defense expenditure reductions would be \ndistributed very unevenly geographically with some states experiencing \nmuch more difficult readjustment problems than others. Moreover, the \nstates having the most severe adjustment problems (e.g., with more than \n6.0 percent unemployment) are small in number and are among the least \npopulated in the nation. However, even in heavily populated states \nwith diversified economies where the overall unemployment impact from \ndecreased defense expenditures is minimal when averaged over the entire \nstate, some small areas within the state may be greatly affected. For \nthis reason, it is important to examine the effects of expenditure \nreduction upon small, sub-state regions. \n\n\n177 \n\n\n) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIV.1.4.3.c Impacts Upon Metropolitan Areas (SMSA\'s) \n\nJust as reliance upon estimates for national averages may mask \nthe economic readjustment problem of particular states and industries \nwithin them, use of state averages may conceal the magnitude of the \neconomic impacts of changing defense expenditures upon smaller areas \nwithin states. The economic adjustment problem ultimately falls upon \nindividuals and firms within specific locations. The unemployment \nresulting from the loss of a contract which might be almost unnoticed \nin a large state could cause severe economic distress in a small local \narea. It is therefore important to be able to estimate economic read\xc2\xac \njustment impacts for small areas, for example, commuting areas within \nwhich displaced workers could seek reemployment without having to change \nresidential location. Unfortunately, however, the smaller the geo\xc2\xac \ngraphic area for which estimates are made, the less reliable projections \nbecome. The combination of urgent need for small area projections and \nthe inverse relationship between size of region and reliability of \nestimates leads to continuing efforts to improve the data and \nmethodology available for regional projections. At the present time, \nthe individual county is the smallest geographic area for which large \nscale economic projections are normally attempted. The regional pro\xc2\xac \njections model developed by Curtis Harris, Jr., which is used in this \nstudy, does permit economic projections to be made for individual \ncounties with estimates of employment for 20 separate industries. \nHowever, these county employment projections are based upon a number of \nassumptions and should be regarded as subject to higher levels of error \nthan projections for larger areas like states and multi-county areas. \n\nAn intermediate geographic area between the state and the small \ncounties is the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, generally refer\xc2\xac \nred to as the SMSA. \xe2\x80\xa2 The SMSA is an important economic unit because it \nusually consists of a metropolitan center with a surrounding residen\xc2\xac \ntial commuting area. Most SMSA\'s include one or more complete \n25 r \n\ncounties. In this study" the impact of assumed changes in defense \nexpenditures on employment has been estimated for each of the 219 \nSMSA\xe2\x80\x99s presented in Table 11. \n\n\nExcept in New England, where the corresponding metropolitan \neconomic areas or corresponding whole county is substituted for the \nSMSA. For a listing and description of all U.S. SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s, see U.S. \nDepartment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates . \nSeries P-25, No. 371, August 14, 1967. \n\n\n178 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nStandard Metropolitan Statlatical Araaa \n\nEmployment Totals Estimated for Alternative Defense Assumptions, 1972 \n\n(employment in thousands) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\noo \n\no \n\nON \n\nCA \n\nH \n\n04 \n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\n*H CO \n\nO*. XA \n\n*H \n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\no \n\no \n\no \n\nr* \n\n00 \n\n\nca \n\nn \n\nS> \n\nH \n\n04 \n\nH \n\nvO \n\n\nXA \n\n\nm \n\nN \n\nCM \n\nPS \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nxa *h \n\no \n\nc* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2e \n\nOx \n\n\nrS \n\nM> \n\nH \n\nca \n\nM) \n\nCS \n\n>o \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nM3 \n\n\xc2\xbbA \n\nxA \n\n*y \n\nO\' \n\n*H \n\n\noo \n\nO* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\nCO \n\nM3 \n\nO\' \n\nfv \n\nO \n\nH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nOx \n\n*y \n\nH \n\nca \n\n\n04 \n\n\n04 \n\nH \n\n04 \n\n\nSS \n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\nH \n\nH \n\n*H \n\n00 \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nH \n\nO *f\\ OO \n\nvO \n\n.0 \n\n.0 \n\n.8 \n\np- O O \n\n.0 \n\n,0 \n\n,5 \n\n2 \n\ni r\\ \n\nCM \n\nsr \n\nm O \n\nrH \n\no \n\n \n\n\nXA \n\nM3 \n\n\n\n04 \n\n04 \n\nxA \n\n00 \n\nH \n\nxa \n\nOx \n\no \n\nN \n\no% \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n04 \n\nO\' \n\n\nr-i \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\n*H \n\nCM \n\n\n\nO* \n\n\n\n\nS> \n\n\nrH \n\nH \n\n*H \n\n00 \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nca \n\no \n\nOx \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\noo \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nca \n\nA \n\nO\' \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nO* \n\nCM \n\no \n\no \n\nu"i \n\nvy \n\no \n\nm \n\n04 \n\n\nca \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n*A \n\ns> \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n*y \n\n\n\nxA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2y \n\nOX \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nXA \n\n\noo \n\nxA \n\nOx \n\nM3 \n\nS \n\n\no \n\n*H \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\nOX \n\n4 \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\nsO \n\n\n\n\n\nr~i \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\np* \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n*y \n\nCA \n\n\xc2\xbbA \n\nvC \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nsr \n\nS> \n\nM3 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\no \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\no \n\nxA \n\nCA \n\nlA \n\nCA \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nM3 \n\nS3 \n\n04 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nM3 \n\n\nxA \n\n \n\n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nOX \n\nrH \n\nS3 \n\niA \n\nrH \n\n00 rS \n\nCM \n\n06 \n\n3 \n\nsr \n\nr~ oo \n\n\nxO \n\n>0 \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\nr^. \n\nm \n\niA \n\nCA \n\nOx \n\n \n\ncn \n\nm \n\n\nm \n\nCM \n\n>e \n\nCA \n\n\nCM XA \n\n3 \n\nM3 \n\n\nrH \n\no \n\n00 o \n\nrH \n\n90 \n\n^y \n\nm \n\n00 \n\noo \n\nHT \n\nXA \n\nin r* \n\nCM \n\ncm \n\nxA xA \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nr\xc2\xbb (~- \n\n\xc2\xabA \n\nxO \n\ns \n\n\nO\' \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO ox \n\nHT \n\nrH CA \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nS3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nP\xc2\xbb O PS rS \nrO \\0 \n\nN N \n\n\no s> S\' \'O \nO O\' -r s> \n\n\n3 \n\n\nn ^ in >o n \n\nm m vO 00 O\' \n\n\nO \xc2\xab tt O N \n\nO\' oo \xc2\xab*\xc2\xbb o \xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nO H \n\n\n8 \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nS \n\n\nS\' 8 \n\n\xc2\xa3 g \n\ne u 5 \n\n\xc2\xbb -HO* \n\n! 5 | I S \n\n. 6 s # sr \n\n\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 i * \n\n11111 \n\n3 3 3 4 3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nZ \n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nP- \n\n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\nw \n\na \n\n* \n\nv \n\n\n2 \n\n\na \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n179 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n*s \xc2\xa3 \n\no< \n\nkO \n\nkO \n\n \n\nfl \n\nU X \n\n* 5 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\n\nSt \n\nCM \n\n<*> \n\non \n\nan \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nrH \n\nkA \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nkTl \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\n*n \n\nkO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\n00 \n\n\nn \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\n5 \n\nv\xc2\xab \n\nS M \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n3 \n\nh \n\no \n\nCM \n\na \n\nCM \n\no \n\n7 \n\nA \n\n7 \n\n<7* \n\nOn \n\na \n\n7 \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n8 \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n8 \n\n70 \n\n57 \n\non \n\nCM \n\n84 \n\nk\xc2\xa9 \n\nkO \n\nIA \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n85 \n\ns \n\ncm \n\noo \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nkO \n\nst \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\nO \n\n3 \n\ns \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\n2 \n\nx> \n\n5 2 \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nCO \n\nCA \n\nH \n\n\nSt \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nlA \n\na \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\nrH \n\n\nu Q \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nk\xc2\xa3> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOk \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\na 2 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\n7 \n\n(A \n\nrH \n\n\nst \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\no \n\n4A \n\nec \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\nrH \n\nn\xc2\xa3> \n\n\nd Q \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCA \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o X \n\nao \n\nCA \n\n00 \n\n\xc2\xabA \n\nm \n\nNO \n\no \n\no \n\nkO \n\na \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\nOk \n\nOk \n\nst \n\na \n\nO\' \n\nrH \n\nCA \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \n\n-7 \n\nCM \n\no \n\no \n\nCD \n\n\nV \xe2\x96\xa1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n4J X \n\nr-t \n\nnO \n\nrH \n\nst \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nOn \n\nkA \n\n7 \n\nST \n\nCM \n\nk\xc2\xa3> \n\n7 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xabA \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nst \n\nsr \n\nA* \n\nkA \n\nOk \n\nCM \n\n*7- \n\nCA \n\nc \n\no \n\nS 13 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na h \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n8. \n\nOk \n\no \n\no \n\na \n\no \n\nnA \n\nOk \n\no \n\n7 \n\n00 \n\no \n\nST \n\nkO \n\nkA \n\no \n\nA \n\n8 \n\n00 \n\nCA \n\nkO \n\nrH \n\nOk \n\nOn \n\nst \n\n \n\n\n\n\nNO \n\no \n\n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nOk \n\nrH \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\n \n\nst \n\no> \n\nOk \n\nCA \n\nCO \n\no \n\n7 \n\ntA \n\nkA \n\no \n\n\no \n\nON \n\n3 \n\nkA \n\no \n\nA- \n\nOk \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nCM \n\nst \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nst \n\nS \n\nkA \n\nkO \n\nkA \n\nCM \n\nNO \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nCH \n\nkA \n\nCM \n\nst \n\nst \n\n7 \n\nAh \n\n\xc2\xbbA \n\nOk \n\nCM \n\nkA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\ni \xc2\xa7 \n\nA* \n\nao \n\nOk \n\nA- \n\nCM \n\n8 \n\nr* \n\nOk \n\nCH \n\n<\xc2\xa9 \n\nOk \n\nm \n\nst \n\n3 \n\nON \n\nk\xc2\xa9 \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\nCA \n\nkA \n\nOk \n\nA \n\nkA \n\nCA \n\nA \n\n\nso o e, \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCA \n\n-7 \n\nco \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xa9 st r-s \n\nN \n\n\no o* \n\n\no o \n\nfi Ok \n\nco \n\n\n\n0 \n\nM \n\n,3 \n\nfi \n\nW \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\ni \n\nM \n\n* \n\n3 \n\n4J \n\no \n\n<2 \n\n4 \n\n5 \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n3 I \n\nU \n\n\nm \n\n3 \n\n\n00 \n\n\nIHi| \n\n(0 M CO \xc2\xab \xc2\xab \n\n\noeo.fi \n\nfi <3 3 O \n\n\xc2\xb0 s. a 3 e \n\n* n \n\n\no a s | 5 3 3 \n\nii ?1111 \n\n\nO -H \n\n\nfca \n\n6 \n\n\n6ouuu\xc2\xabS<3\xc2\xabSu\xc2\xab8 \n\n\n/ \n\n\n180 \n\n\nDallas, Taxaa \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0a \n\n\na \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x96\xa02 cm \n\n3|\xc2\xbb \n\n\nm \n\no\xc2\xbb \n\nV> -V \nw tt \n\nM \xc2\xab \n\n& !m \n\n\nis \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nV \n\n^ u \n\na * \n\no \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H C M \n\n<-\xc2\xbb s \n\n" I \n\nM3 \n\n\nM3 \n\n T\xc2\xbb \nw V \n4J \n\no a \n\nH S \n\nH \xc2\xab N \n\n\no \n\nC \n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\ng: \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H 0 M \n\n3 \n\n\n _ \n\nS3 \n\n\nN \n\n\nO\' \xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nm m \n\xc2\xabh m \n\n\nS O \nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n r-C \n\n\nH \n\no \n\nm \n\nH \n\nCM \n\n\n\nO \n\nm \n\nO\' \n\nm \n\n>9 \n\nH \n\no \n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\ntO \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nr-4 \n\nM3 \n\no \n\n\nco \n\n04 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nsH \n\n\n\n\n\n\noo \n\nCM \n\noo \n\nto \n\nm \n\n*A \n\nM3 \n\n00 \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\nM3 \n\n\xc2\xabo \n\nM3 \n\n\nH \n\n8 \n\nN \n\n\xc2\xab0 \n\naC \n\nlO \n\n\xe2\x96\xa09 \n\no \n\nao \n\noo \n\n\nO\' \n\nO\' \n\nO\' \n\nto \n\no \n\nr- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-e \n\n*\xc2\xbbM \n\n\n*-4 \n\nCM \n\n\n\n9 0 0 0 0 /14 \n\nw mm \n\n\n<9 \xc2\xabn ao \n\nN N \n\n\nvO O \n\n<\xc2\xa3 cm m \n\nCM CM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2tOOOONNOiniAONinOHOO \n\n9 N 9 N H (\xc2\xabl H H \n\n\novcMa3mrMr~c^f^o\'\xc2\xbbHf^inomr^OMm>ooQm.-t \n\nr-\xc2\xbbm mM<\xc2\xbb MM CM CM M CM M CM CM \n\n\n<\xc2\xa3>(90>r\'-ci\'>o0\'ma0\'0\xc2\xab0\'0aoo\'r-* \nm-\xc2\xbbmmcMCMmoommooooO\'\xc2\xbb \n\nMm Id H -J MM \n\n\nO M> \xc2\xab\xc2\xbb CM vO rn \'O \n\nm \xe2\x96\xa0o m m m m m \n\n\nO\' O\' CM \n\nm m m -o \n\n\nOCMinin0\'CMCM0\'C-~in\'\xc2\xbb\'\xc2\xbb0\' M3 0\\CMM>\'\xc2\xbb|M \n\nsOmMCM|MMCMM>9MMmM>9 \n\n\n3 5 \n\n\nopM\'Oommao\'CtMmcoeo^\'O \n^ \xc2\xbbn m \xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x80\x98 ^ ~ \n\n\nm \n\n\ncm cm m oo \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xb0 3 S \n\n\nto \n\n00 \n\noo \n\nM> \n\nM3 \n\noo \n\nr^. \n\nH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nlO \n\no \n\nro \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0O \n\nH \n\nto \n\nto \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM \n\nC* \n\nH \n\nPM \n\no \n\n00 \n\n*\xe2\x80\x9c4 \n\nr* \n\nM \n\n*-4 \n\nPO \n\noo \n\n\nM3 \n\nm \n\nO\' \n\n*o \n\n-a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nPO \n\nCO \n\ntO \n\nm \n\no \n\nao \n\niH \n\nm \n\n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nH \n\n\n\nGO 00 \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb 00 O\' \n\n\nr~ \xc2\xbbn oo cm \n\n\n8 \n\n\n8 S \n\n\nr- M3 o> \n\n>n O M3 \n\nM CM \n\n\nfMmeoo\'M-ocM\'O\'C\'0 \n\n\xc2\xbb** \n\nM3 \n\nCM \n\nto \n\nPO \n\nM3 \n\nCM \n\nr-t \n\n*H \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nM5 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n\nH \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nH \n\n\xc2\xbb-4 \n\nm \n\n8 \n\n>n \n\n\nm \n\nco \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xab-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCN \n\nto \n\nCM \n\nM3 \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nH \n\nm \n\nm \n\nH \n\nCM \n\nto \n\no* \n\nM3 \n\nCM \n\na \n\nm \n\nM3 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrM \n\nCM \n\no \n\nO\' \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nM3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\nCM \n\n8 \n\n35 \n\n8 \n\nIO \n\nCM \n\n8 \n\nM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\nI- f\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb M3 -O \n\n25 " \n\n\noo m _ \n\nO \xc2\xa9 O\' m oo \xe2\x96\xa0o \n\n5? m m \n\n\n\n\nat r* \n\n\nN H \n\n\n\n181 \n\n\nGrand Rapids, Michigan 182 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xa71 \n^ u * \n\n>a \n\nrs \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa243 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\nco \n\n-a \n\no \n\nOs \n\ns\xc2\xa9 \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\n-a \n\ncn \n\no \n\no \n\nn \n\no> \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\nSO \n\n4 \n\nrH \n\nST \n\nr-\xc2\xab \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nH \n\nvo \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n-a \n\nsO \n\nrH \n\np* \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nH \n\nrH \n\nIN \n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xaba \n\nCM \n\nH \n\no S \xe2\x80\x9c* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H C M \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-! & \n\nas \n\n\na \n\nCM \n\no \n\nH \n\nCM \n\n3 \n\nm \n\nOn \n\nco \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nR \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\ners \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrs. \n\nH* \n\nP* \n\n3 U(4 \n\nCO \n\ns/3 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\nr*s \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xa9 \n\nON \n\no \n\n\nwo \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nw0 \n\nr* \n\n00 \n\n\nrH \n\n-a \n\nwo \n\n^ar \n\n<* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24T \n\nCM \n\nrs \n\nc \xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n**H \n\n\nrH \n\nco \n\nco \n\n\n\nrH \n\n \xc2\xa33 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o & \n\n00 \n\n-a \n\nrH \n\no \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nr- \n\n\nco \n\nn \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nC as \xc2\xa9 \nO 8} \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H B M \n\xe2\x80\x94i t) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*i B- \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nCO \n\no \n\nxG \n\nWO \n\nwo \n\nrH \n\nOs \n\np- \n\n00 \n\nwo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa243 \n\nP \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa243 \n\np* \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCM \n\n40 \n\nW0 \n\nrH \n\ns/3 \n\nsi S & \n\nCO \n\nwo \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nao \n\nr-N \n\nwo \n\nwo \n\nWO \n\nCO \n\nOs \n\nCM \n\nwo \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n*sT \n\nr- \n\nR \n\n\'3- \n\nW0 \n\n<5- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\nCM \n\n\no a \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nco \n\nco \n\np* \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 t3 Cu \n\n^ \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\np* \n\nwo \n\n\np* \n\n00 \n\nw0 \n\n\nWO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nfM \n\no \n\no \n\np* \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \xc2\xab z \n\n03 \xc2\xbb \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nwo \n\nCO \n\ncm \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\ns\xc2\xa3> \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n40 \n\nW0 \n\nrH \n\n\nCO \n\nwo \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nrs. \n\nWO \n\nW0 \n\nwo \n\n00 \n\nOs \n\nCM \n\nwo \n\no \n\na \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nl \n\nrH \n\n\nfs. CM Os \n\nrH \n\n00 >\xc2\xa9 \n\nP* \n\no \n\n\xc2\xabo \n\nOx \n\nwo \n\n *Q Qj \n\n0 2 \n\nw \xc2\xab 5s \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n% \n\n\n\n>** \n\n\nrO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\n40 \n\n90 \n\nn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\n\n9 \n\nr> \n\nlA \n\nCO \n\n\n \n\nC* \n\n- \n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\nr- \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n26 \n\nT9I \n\n51 \n\n39 \n\n \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nrH \n\nr- \n\n\nsO \n\noo \n\nM> \n\no \n\nxO \n\nco \n\nrH \n\nsO \n\nCO \n\nxO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nin \n\nn \n\nrH \n\n \n\n \n\noo \n\nm \n\nA- \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nOx \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\ni-M \n\no \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nOO \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nm \n\nr* \n\n*H \n\n\nr-4 \n\n\nm \n\nin \n\nrH \n\nm \n\no \n\nO CM \n\nco \n\nxD ON \n\ni-C \n\n\n\xc2\xbb vr o \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb r\xc2\xbb rx \n\n\nCM 9n\xc2\xa9\xc2\xa9.O,-4r-4\xc2\xbbN* \n\nCOOOiA\'OOOf\'iOu-lty\'CGCSJrHOiO \n\ncm *h \xc2\xbb-t cm <3 m n rt \n\n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n\n\nOx \n\ntrt \n\n*> t) tL \nw \xc2\xbb 8 \n\n\n\nX0 \n\nCM \n\n\noo \n\nrH \n\nin \n\no \n\nrH \n\nx\xc2\xa3> \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nx\xc2\xa9 \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nf^. \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nvy \n\nrH \n\no \n\nxrx \n\nCM \n\nxO \n\nxO \n\nXJ0 \n\n<4 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nCO \n\nn \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n>7 \n\nSf \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*n \n\na* \n\n \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nn \n\nCO \n\n4*3 \n\n25 \n\n158 \n\nCA \n\n9 \n\ns \n\n67 \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nr- \n\n130 \n\nax \n\nOx \n\nCM \n\nce \n\n287 \n\n83 \n\n59 \n\n$ \n\n82 \n\n122 \n\n108 \n\n53 \n\na \n\n477 \n\n26 \n\n506 \n\n695 \n\n157 \n\nCM \n\nHf \n\n83 \n\n\nN \n\n\n\nCNj \n\n\nr-.Qvor^cor\'N\'C^-i \n\n\xc2\xa9x\xc2\xab#iAi/\'xcn>oo* \n\n\niA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A \n\n\n5Q \n\n\n\xc2\xab m \xe2\x80\xa2> h m \xc2\xab n \n\n \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nNO \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\na aj 5 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ U3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2HCH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH a. \n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nCO \n\n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\no \n\n-4- \n\nCM \n\n\nco \n\nCM \n\no \n\no \n\n\xc2\xabA \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\n-4 \n\no \n\nrH \n\nH Q Q, \n\n>3r \n\n1A \n\nCM \n\nin \n\nH \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\nwv \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nA \n\n\n-j- \n\nxO \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\no> \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nn \n\nA \n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\n|C 0 I \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\nr-C \n\n\no \n\nr*. \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\nrH \n\nO\' \n\n\'j \n\n\n00 \n\n\nu fi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa9 cm \xc2\xa9 O \n\n\nVO o \xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\nON vO \n\nO A A \n\n00 \n\nos \n\no o *c o \xc2\xab\xc2\xbb o \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\nr* \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nHf \n\nCO \n\nON \n\nm \n\nvO \n\n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\no \n\n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nNO \n\no \n\n\nH* \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nCO \n\nco \n\nco \n\nin \n\nr*. \n\n\nNi3 \n\nao \n\n00 \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nco \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\nCO \n\nr\xc2\xab- \n\n>0 \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nt \n\n\nm co cm o co \n\nm cm r* o os \n\nCM rH CO \n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\nOn \n\nOn \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nr>\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nco \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\no \n\nco \n\nin \n\nNO \n\n \n\n\no \n\n\n*-H \n\nco \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCO \n\nsO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nco \n\n3 \n\nin \n\nCO \n\nr- \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\xc2\xae \n\nCM \n\nco \n\nm \n\nvO \n\n\n-H \n\n\nrH \n\nco \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n00 \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\nn* \n\nC N \n\n\n>0 \n\na \n\n\nA A \nO\' cs; \n\n\nvO \n\nO\' \n\n\nO A \n\n\nv0 A \n\no a \noo \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xa7 \n\n\n% \n\n00 \n\n*H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2s \n\nX \n\n\nCM \n\na \n\n\noi \n\nw \n\n4i \n\n4 \n\n3 \n\njC \n\nu \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\n9 \n\nu \n\n\nu \n\n0> \n\n\nn. \n\nCO \n\nco \n\n\nm \n\nnO \n\n\nr** \n\nA \n\nA \n\nCO \n\no \n\nA \n\nO *H \n\n3 \n\nin \n\nH \n\no \n\nA \n\nCO \n\nsr \n\nH \n\nO A \n\no \n\nin- \n\n-H \n\nA \n\n\n\nA \n\nIS H \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\nnO \n\n\n4i \n\n9 \n\nU \n\n\ns \xc2\xab \n\n\n2 3 \n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\xc2\xabt \n\n9 \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n00 \n\n\n0 ) \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n> \n\nSt \n\n\n \n\no \n\na \n\n\ne \n\nrH \n\nMH \n\nm \n\nSt \n\no \n\nrH \n\nTJ \n\n!> \n\n\n2 \n\no \n\nas \n\ni \n\no \n\nvi \n\no \n\nVi \n\no \n\nI \n\na \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n3 \n\n2 \n\n\noo \n\na> \n\njt \n\nm \n\n$ \n\n\n> \n\nx \n\no> \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nas \n\n\n3 3 \n\n\n9 \n\n0) \n\nP5 \n\n\nJ l \n\n85 95 \n\n\nV \n\nrH \n\n& \n\n> \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nas \n\n\n\ns \n\nVi \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\n1 i \n\nO <9 \n\n\nnO no \n\nS 2 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xbb \n\nS \n\nVi \n\n41 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\ns \n\na \n\ni \n\n8> \n\n\nHT \n\nA \n\n\nCS \n\ni-4 \n\n00 \n\n\ni-4 A \n\n\nT1 \n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x99ts. \n\n\xc2\xab Q U *r 4 \n\n\nCO \n\n* -3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 - t\xc2\xbb \xc2\xbb \n\na, u \n\n\xc2\xab w O Q O \n\nVl Vi A 1-4 a * M \n\nO 3 -H tv A tO v-4 \n\nA VI A i-4 A M \n\nL. B O \xc2\xab A .C < \n\n. $ k 3 M * - \n\n\xe2\x80\x98 4 2 8 ; n \n\nM vi \xc2\xab \n\noo \n\nvO \n\n>o \n\nm \n\na. \n\n\xc2\xabr> \n\n&* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nm \n\no \n\n \n\nH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nr*\xc2\xbb \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\n\nv \n\ns \n\nn \n\nCM \n\n8 \n\ncn \n\nm \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nGO \n\n\no* \n\n\n\xc2\xabn \n\n\n>\xc2\xbb \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\n\n4A \n\no \n\nOO \n\nr^. \n\no \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\nCM \n\nMD \n\n\no \n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\n\nH \n\n\nO\' \n\nCM \n\ncn \n\nin \n\nK"l \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\no \n\no \n\nin \n\nON \n\n%n \n\nOS \n\nMT \n\no \n\nao \n\nvO \n\no \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\no \n\nm \n\nso \n\nvO \n\n\nH \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nm \n\nc* \n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\ncn \n\n \n\nS5 \n\nO \n\n\nsO \n\n 5 - \n\ncn \n\ncn \n\npH \n\nO\' \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\npH \n\nPM \n\npH \n\ncn \n\ncn \n\nm \n\n\nm \n\nm \n\no \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\npH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\npH \n\n\nn \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nO\' \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCM \n\nNf \n\nsO \n\nO\' \n\nnO \n\n \n\npH \n\nO\' \n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\ncn \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\ncn \n\n~4 \n\nsO \n\nsf \n\nm \n\nm \n\no \n\nm \n\n\nm cn in \n\nO\'. 0\\ M \n\n \n\no \n\na. \n\n\noc \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nU \n\nI \n\na \n\no \n\noo \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nkl \n\no \n\nX> \n\ns \n\n4 J \n\nu \n\no \n\n0. \n\n\nJ4 \n\nO \n\n? \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nI \n\nu \n\no \n\nI \n\nu \n\ni \n\na. \n\ni \n\no \n\nS \n\n-o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nO \n\n>4 \n\n04 \n\n\nT4 \n\n3 \n\n* \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r4 \n\nh \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\no \n\nT3 \n\n\nVi \n\nO \n\n\n\xc2\xa7 8 \n$ . \n4 5 \n\n> JO \n\no \xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xa3 5 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\no \n\nu \n\na \n\n\n41 \n\na \n\nU \n\n3 \n\n\n3 ! 3 \n\n\nM \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n* \n\nA \n\nM \n\n\xc2\xbb4 \n\n4) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n5 \n\n\nU \n\nV* \n\n\nT\xc2\xbb \n\nn \n\nv \n\nx \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\n1 \n\nW 40 O \n<4 O "ri \xc2\xabM \n\n\xc2\xab J h d j \n\nw z H u \n\n2 \n\n\n; . 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2v a \n\n\nA \n\no \n\n\n> \n\nu \n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xabl \n\nV u \n\nm m \n\no \xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xa7 x -H \n\n\ng \n\n60 \n\nV \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\nV> \n\n41 \n\nVI \n\na \n\n2 \n\ni \n\ni \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x9e o y \n\nt2 S3 5 <3 (S \n\n\nu \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0n \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c> \n\n\n*4 -S \n\nh vi a \n\n5 p . 3 3 \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n33 3 \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 H \n\nH \n\n\n\xc2\xab O \nO "H \n\n\n \n\nCM \n\nOV \n\n\nr- \n\no \n\na \n\n\nGO \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\no \n\ny \n\ncn \n\no \n\nrH \n\ns\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\no \n\nm \n\nm \n\ny \n\n\xc2\xabo \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\ncn \n\ny \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n-\xc2\xbb \n\nrH \n\n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\nrH \n\n\n\ni-4 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n<*> \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nr4 \n\n\no* \n\nao cn \n\nO CM \n\nCM \n\no - \n\n \n\nO\' \n\nCM \n\nsO \n\n3 \n\nOs \n\ncn \n\n00 \n\n3 \n\nV0 \n\n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\nH \n\nsO \n\n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\nrH \n\n45 \n\nrH \n\nin \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nHT \n\nr^- \n\ncn \n\nm \n\nsO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\ncn \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nr% \n\nsO \n\nm \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncn \n\n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nuo \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*D \n\nco \n\noo \n\n\nrH \n\n\'\xe2\x80\xa2y \n\n*n \n\n \n\n1^7 \n\nv\xc2\xa9 \n\nrH \n\ny \n\ncn \n\no \n\nrH \n\nsO \n\n\no \n\nm \n\no \n\nm \n\n<* \n\n<* \n\n\n45 \n\ncn \n\n\n\n7 \n\nrH \n\nm \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\ny \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\ncn \n\n-y \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nV\xc2\xa9 \n\ny \n\ncn \n\n\no \n\no \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\no \n\nm \n\nO \n\nm \n\n*y \n\ns\xc2\xa9 \n\ncn \n\n-ar \n\nSO \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nf4 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\ncn \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\n>\xc2\xa9 \n\n\ny \n\n-y \n\nCM \n\ns\xc2\xa9 \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nCM \n\n4> \n\ncn \n\n \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\noo \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\nta \n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\ny \n\nin \n\ncn \n\ncn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa23 \n\n\nco \n\nO \n\nO \n\ny \n\ncn \n\nO \n\no \n\ns\xc2\xa9 \n\ns\xc2\xa9 \n\ns\xc2\xa9 \n\nO \n\nm \n\no \n\ny \n\ny \n\ny \n\n45 \n\nvO \n\ncn \n\ny \n\nN\xc2\xa9 \n\ncn \n\nm \n\nr4 \n\n\n\nsn \n\n.4 \n\n\n\nrH \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n-4 \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\ntn \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nin y *h \n\nH O\' OO \n\ncn \n\n\nOS oo rH m \n\n(J\\ \n\n\n\xc2\xa9s rn o m cm \xc2\xabh m \n\no\xc2\xbb cn s\xc2\xa9 in in H in \n\nCM \n\n\nvO co o cm r* cm \n\noi cm cm m \nu \n\nP c \ne ee \n\n(0 (A \n\n\n03 \n\n5 \n\n\nI ! \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n\n5 2 \n\na i \n\nS u \n\n\xc2\xab Q \n\n\n-3 \n\n03 \n\xc2\xbb4 q \n\no 3 \n\xc2\xab \xc2\xab \nu a. \n\n\n\xc2\xabH 25 \n\xc2\xbb l \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h \xc2\xab \n\n\nJ3 \n\n4J \n\n9 \n\n\n1 \n\ns \n\ns \n\ntrt \n\n\nC \n\no \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nu \n\nv \n\n(S \n\nl \n\n\n3 \n\nS \n\n\nj * * l \n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\n* If} \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb% 44 -q \n\n\ns 2 \n\n\nu \n\na \n\n\nS \n\n\nU \n\no \n& \n\n5 \n> \n\nat \n\n5 \n\nm in in \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h a \nu x \n\n3 S \n\n5 \xc2\xb0 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n>8 \n\ni \n\nI \n\n\xc2\xab 5 8 \n\ns ~ 2 s 9 \n\n| 73 t> T3 -|j \n\n3* \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94I r4 \xc2\xbb4 \n\nCO \n\n?3 \n\n\n9 \n\n3 \n\n\n11!1141 i 13 i \n\n\na. a, a. a. a. \nin m in w m \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nw \n\nu u \n\nto to \n\n\nu \n\n5 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa03 \n\nH \n\n\ndC \n\no \n\n! \n\nt4 \n\n6 \n\ni \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n& \n\ns \n\n\xc2\xab \n\ng \n\na \n\n\nnm \n\nH \n\n\nH H H \n\n\n186 \n\n\nTrenton \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBUDGET B ($59.4 billion) BUDGET C ($67.6 billion) BUDGET E ($93.6 billiou) \n\n1965 Uncompensated Compensated Uncompensated Compensated Uncompensated Compensated \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nm \n\nn* \n\nCO \n\n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nr**- \n\nm \n\n\ncn \n\n\nm \n\n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\n \n\nr>. \n\nnr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nao \n\no \n\n\'\xc2\xa3> \n\no \n\no \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nMf \n\nCM \n\n\nin \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nr4 \n\nm \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nO\' \n\n \n\n*H \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nm \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nP4 \n\n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nnO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nin \n\n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n1^- \n\nm \n\nPM \n\nON \n\ncn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\nn* \n\no \n\nCO \n\ncn \n\ncn \n\nO \n\n\nCSI \n\nCM \n\ncn \n\n\n\n \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nOn \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\ncn \n\n00 \n\n\nrH \n\nO\' \n\nOn \n\n-\xc2\xbb \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM \n\nsr \n\nvO \n\n-\xc2\xab \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\ncn \n\nin \n\ncn \n\n\nCM \n\ncn \n\nri \n\n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n \n\ncn \n\nc \n\no \n\n\nCM \n\nO\' \n\ncn \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\np>* \n\ncn \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nm \n\ncn \n\nCM \n\n-\xc2\xbb \n\nr*\xc2\xbb \n\nm \n\n\nOn \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\nCM \n\nsr \n\nON \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nm \n\nO\' \n\nrH \n\n*> \n\nm \n\nOn \n\n<*\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr- \n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\no \n\nwC* \n\nCM \n\nN> \n\n \n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\ncn \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n43 \n\n*H \n\nCM \n\n03 \n\nH \n\n00 \n\nm \n\no \n\n\nm \n\n4 \n\n4 \n\nSB \n\nI \n\n\n60 \n\na \n\n9 \n\n0 \n\n\n187 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nAs would be expected, the variation in the range of estimated \nunemployment among these 219 smaller regions is wider than among the 51 \nstate areas. Table 12, summarizing the extremes of Table 11, indicates \nthat the SMSA which is estimated to face the highest unemployment rate \nin 1972 as the result of reduced defense expenditures is Lawton, Okla\xc2\xac \nhoma with an unemployment rate between 14.8 and 16.7 percent of its \nlabor force. In addition there are six more SMSA f s which are estimated \nto face unemployment rates in excess of 10 percent of their labor force \neven in the presence of compensatory policies designed to maintain high \nlevels of consumer spending. This is in sharp contrast to the unem\xc2\xac \nployment estimates for states which projected only one state, Alaska, \nhaving unemployment in excess of 10 percent. \n\nThe SMSA f s with projected unemployment rates in excess of ten \npercent are relatively small in total employment except for Albuquerque \nand the California areas of San Diego and Salinas - Monterey. However, \nmany other SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s would face rates of unemployment, under these \nassumptions concerning defense spending, which would be above the \nnational average generated by the respective defense spending assump\xc2\xac \ntion. \n\n\nOffsetting the unemployment in SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s with higher than average \nexpected unemployment under these assumed reductions in defense expen\xc2\xac \nditures is the large number of SMSA\'s with below average projected \nunemployment. The high and low ends of the unemployment scale of Table \n11 are shown in Table 12, which indicates that in the cases of \nreduced military spending identified as Budgets B ($59.4 bil.) and C \n($67.6 bil.), there would be seven and five SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s, respectively, with \nprojected unemployment rates falling below 1.3 percent. \n\n} \n\nThese estimates indicate that the severity of impacts from \nreduced arms expenditures would vary widely among the nation\xe2\x80\x99s metro\xc2\xac \npolitan areas, depending upori their industrial composition and other \nfactors. Even within individual states, the rates of unemployment would \nvary widely between the metropolitan areas of the state. For example, \nin Oklahoma, which contains the SMSA (Lawton) with the highest pro\xc2\xac \njected unemployment rate (from 16.7 to 16.4 percent, depending on the \nassumed cut in military spending), Tulsa is estimated to have one of \nthe lower unemployment rates (2.1 percent) with probable actual labor \n\n\n188 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 12 \n\nStandard Metropolitan Statistical Area \n\nRanking by Unemployment Impact Estimated for Budget B ($59.4 billion), \n\nCompensated Military Budget Assumption, 1972 \n\n\nRank \n\nFor \n\nSMSA \n\nSelected SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s \n\nState \n\nEmployment \n\n(000) \n\nUnemploy\xc2\xac \nment (%) \n\n1 \n\nLawton \n\nOklahoma \n\n43 \n\n16.7 \n\n2 \n\nDuluth-Superior \n\nMinnesota-Wisconsin \n\n88 \n\n12.1 \n\n3 \n\nFayetteville \n\nNorth Carolina \n\n84 \n\n11.8 \n\n4 \n\nSalinas-Monterey \n\nCalifornia \n\n98 \n\n11.5 \n\n5 \n\nSan Diego \n\nCalifornia \n\n480 \n\n10.0 \n\n213 \n\nAnn Arbor \n\nMichigan \n\n91 \n\n1.2 \n\n214 \n\nFlint \n\nMichigan \n\n199 \n\n1.2 \n\n215 \n\nJersey City \n\nNew Jersey \n\n264 \n\n1.2\' \n\n216 \n\nLynchburg \n\nVirginia \n\n59 \n\n1.2 \n\n217 \n\nSaginaw \n\nMichigan \n\n86 \n\n1.2 \n\n218 \n\n/ \n\nNew Haven-Waterbury \nMeriden \n\nConnecticut \n\n313 \n\n1.1 \n\n219 \n\nLansing \n\nMichigan \n\n176 \n\n1.0 \n\n\n189 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 12 (continued) \n\nStandard Metropolitan Statistical Area \n\nRanking by Unemployment Impact Estimated for Budget C ($67.6 billion), \n\nCompensated Military Budget Assumption, 1972 \n\n\n\nFor Selected SMSA\'s \n\n\nRank \n\nSMSA \n\nState \n\nEmployment \n\n(000) \n\nUnemploy\xc2\xac \nment (%) \n\n1 \n\nLawton \n\nOklahoma \n\n44 \n\n16.4 \n\n2 \n\nFayetteville \n\nNorth Carolina \n\n86 \n\n12.0 \n\n3 \n\nSalinas-Monterey \n\nCalifornia \n\n100 \n\n11.6 \n\n4 \n\nDuluth-Superior \n\nMinnesota-Wisconsin \n\n88 \n\n11.5 \n\n5 \n\nSan Diego \n\nCalifornia \n\n491 \n\n10.0 \n\n211 \n\nAnn Arbor \n\nMichigan \n\n91 \n\n1.3 \n\n212 \n\nFlint \n\nMichigan \n\n198 \n\n1.3 \n\n213 \n\nLynchburg \n\nVirginia \n\n59 \n\n1.3 \n\n214 \n\nSaginaw \n\nMichigan \n\n86 \n\n1.3 \n\n215 \n\nErie \n\nPennsylvania \n\n104 \n\n1.2 \n\n216 \n\nJersey City \n\nNew Jersey \n\n264 \n\n1.2 \n\n217 \n\nNew Haven-Waterbury- \nMeriden \n\nConnecticut \n\n314 \n\n1.2 \n\n218 \n\nSpringfield \n\nMissouri \n\n64 \n\n1.2 \n\n219 \n\nLansing \n\nMichigan \n\n175 \n\n1.1 \n\n\n190 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 12 (continued) \n\nStandard Metropolitan Statistical Area \n\nRanking by Unemployment Impact Estimated for Budget E ($93.6 billion) \n\nCompensated Military Budget Assumption, 1972 \n\nFor Selected SMSA\'s \n\n\nRank \n\nSMSA \n\nState \n\nEmployment \n\n(000) \n\nUnemploy\xc2\xac \nment (%) \n\n1 \n\nLawton \n\nOklahoma \n\n49 \n\n14.8 \n\n2 \n\nReno \n\nNevada \n\n45 \n\n14.4 \n\n3 \n\nFayetteville \n\nNorth Carolina \n\n94 \n\n10.9 \n\n4 \n\nSalinas-Monterey \n\nCalifornia \n\n108 \n\n10.9 \n\n5 \n\nDuluth-Superior \n\nMinnesota-Wisconsin \n\n88 \n\n10.5 \n\n6 \n\nAlbuquerque \n\nNew Mexico \n\n118 \n\n10.1 \n\n\n213 \n\nBloomington-Normal \n\nIllinois \n\n40 \n\n. 6 \n\n214 \n\nDes Moines \n\nIowa \n\n120 \n\n.5 \n\n215 \n\nFlint \n\nMichigan \n\n196 \n\n.5 \n\n216 \n\nSt. Joseph \n\nMissouri \n\n33 \n\n.5 \n\n217 \n\nSpringfield \n\nMissouri \n\n63 \n\n.5 \n\n218 \n\nErie \n\nPennsylvania \n\n105 \n\n.4 \n\n219 \n\nNew Haven-Waterbury* \nMeriden \n\nConnecticut \n\n316 \n\n.2 \n\n\n191 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nshortages. Even in California, with metropolitan areas where unemploy\xc2\xac \nment is estimated at 10.0 percent and higher there are areas like San \nJose, where unemployment is estimated at approximately 4.6 percent. \n\nThe lowest unemployment (1.0 percent) is projected for Lansing, Michigan \nwith three other Michigan areas (Ann Arbor, Flint and Saginaw) also \nfalling at the low end of the unemployment scale. Estimated unemploy\xc2\xac \nment for many other SMSA ? s would be below the national average of \napproximately 3.5 percent. Details are given in Table 11. The esti\xc2\xac \nmates are not inconsistent with the view that special transition \nassistance may be needed for some areas with serious unemployment \nproblems. However, the estimates also indicate that most of the SMSA 5 s \nin the nation could easily adapt to lower levels of defense expendi\xc2\xac \ntures, and that many areas would possibly face labor shortages. \n\nIV.1.4.3.d Impacts Upon Countries \n\nThe regional projection model used in this study is based upon \nnational interindustry projection totals of employment which the \nregional model then allocates among 51 states. A second stage of the \nmodel is then used to allocate the state totals to the 219 SMSA\'s of \nthe nation and the 3070 counties or county equivalents of the nation. \nDetailed estimates for the nation, the states, and SMSA f s have been \nincluded in this study, but not all estimates for the counties have \nbeen included, even though they would have been available with very \nlittle additional effort or expense. There are two major reasons for \ntheir omission. First, the amount of space required for presentation \nof estimates for 3070 counties in the detail available would be un\xc2\xac \nmanageable. Secondly, the reliability of the estimates must be pre\xc2\xac \nsumed to be inversely related to the size of the region and amount of \nits economic activity, so that the county estimates were regarded as \nbeing less valid than those for states and for SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s. \n\nHowever, despite this fact, estimates have been included here \nfor some individual counties, namely those 116 SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s which consist of \nsingle counties. The names of these counties are noted in Table 13 and \ndetailed estimates of employment impacts upon them resulting from \nchanging defense expenditures can be found in Table 11. Estimates for \nthese counties are presented in order to include all SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s in the \nstudy; these individual counties are assumed to have sufficiently \nlarge and diversified economies to permit the model to be of interest. \n\n\n192 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 13 \n\nStandard Metropolitan Statistical Areas Consisting of Single Counties \n\n\nSMS A \n\nCOUNTY \n\nSTATE \n\nAlbany \n\nDougherty \n\nGeorgia \n\nAlbuquerque \n\nBernalillo \n\nNew Mexico \n\nAltoona \n\nBlair \n\nPennsylvania \n\nAnaheim-Santa \n\nAna-Garden Grove \n\nOrange \n\nCalifornia \n\nAnderson \n\nMadison \n\nIndiana \n\nAnn Arbor \n\nWashtenaw \n\nMichigan \n\nAsheville \n\nBuncombe \n\nNorth Carolina \n\nAtlantic City \n\nAtlantic \n\nNew Jersey \n\nAustin \n\n} \n\nTravis \n\nTexas \n\nBakersfield \n\nKern \n\nCalifornia \n\nBaton Rouge \n\nEast Baton Rouge \n\nParish \n\nLouisiana \n\nBay City \n\nBay \n\nMichigan \n\nBillings \n\nYellowstone \n\nMontana \n\nBirmingham \n\nJefferson \n\nAlabama \n\nBloomington- \n\nNormal \n\nMcLean \n\nIllinois \n\nBoise City \n\nAda \n\nIdaho \n\n\n193 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 13 (continued) \n\n\nBridgeport, \n\nStamford, Norwalk \n\nFairfield \n\nConnecticut \n\nBrockton \n\nPlymouth \n\nMassachusetts \n\nBrownsville- \nHarlingen- \nSan Benito \n\nCameron \n\nTexas \n\nCanton \n\nStark \n\nOhio \n\nCedar Rapids \n\nLinn \n\nIowa \n\nChampaign-Urbana \n\nChampaign \n\nIllinois \n\nCharleston \n\nKanawha \n\nWest Virginia \n\nColorado Springs \n\nEl Paso \n\nColorado \n\nDecatur \n\nMacon \n\nIllinois \n\nDes Moines \n\nPolk \n\nIowa \n\nDubuque \n\n/Dubuque \n\nIowa \n\nDurham \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nDurham \n\nNorth Carolina \n\nEl Paso \n\nEl Paso \n\nTexas \n\nErie \n\nErie \n\nPennsylvania \n\nEugene \n\nLane \n\nOregon \n\nFayetteville \n\nCumberland \n\nNorth Carolina \n\nFort Lauderdale- \nHollywood \n\nBroward \n\nFlorida \n\nFort Wayne \n\nAllen \n\nIndiana \n\nFresno \n\nFresno \n\nCalifornia \n\n\n194 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABIE 13 (continued) \n\n\nGadsden \n\nGalveston-Texas \n\nCity \n\nGreat Falls \n\nGreen Bay \n\nGreensboro -High \nPoint \n\nHamilton- \n\nMiddleton \n\nHartford, New \nBritain \n\nHonolulu \n\nJackson \n\nJacksonville \n\nJersey City \nKalamazoo \n\nKenosha \n\nLafayette \n\nLafayette-West \n\nLafayette \n\nLake Charles \n\nLancaster \n\nLaredo \n\nLas Vegas \n\n\nEtowah \n\nGalveston \n\nCascade \n\nBrown \n\nGuilford \n\nButler \n\nHartford \n\nHonolulu \n\nJackson \n\nDuval \n\nHudson \n\nKalamazoo \n\nKenosha \n\nLafayette Parish \nTippecanoe \n\nCalcasieu Parish \n\nLancaster \n\nWebb \n\nClark \n\n\nAlabama \n\nTexas \n\nMontana \nWisconsin \nNorth Carolina \n\nOhio \n\nConnecticut \n\nHawaii \n\nMichigan \n\nFlorida \n\nNew Jersey \nMichigan \n\nWisconsin \n\nLouisiana \n\nIndiana \n\nLouisiana \n\nPennsylvania \n\nTexas \n\nNevada \n\n\n195 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 13 (continued) \n\n\nLawton \n\nComanche \n\nOklahoma \n\nLewiston-Auburn \n\nAndroscoggin \n\nMaine \n\nLexington \n\nFayette \n\nKentucky \n\nLima \n\nAllen \n\nOhio \n\nLincoln \n\nLancaster \n\nNebraska \n\nLittle Rock- \n\nNorth Little Rock \n\nPulaski \n\nArkansas \n\nLorain-Elyria \n\nLorain \n\nOhio \n\nLos Angeles-Long \n\nBeach \n\nLos Angeles \n\nCalifornia \n\nLubbock \n\nLubbock \n\nTexas \n\nMcAllen-Pharr- \n\nEdinburg \n\nHidalgo \n\nTexas \n\nMadison \n\nDane \n\nWisconsin \n\nManchester \n\nHillsborough \n\nNew Hampshir \n\nMansfield \n\nRichland \n\nOhio \n\nMiami \n\nDade \n\nFlorida \n\nMidland \n\nMidland \n\nTexas \n\nMonroe \n\nOuachita Parish \n\nLouisiana \n\nMuncie \n\nDelaware \n\nIndiana \n\nMuskegon- \n\nMuskegon \n\nMichigan \n\n\nMuskegon Heights \n\n\n! \n\n\n196 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 13 (continued) \n\n\nNew Bedford, \n\nBristol \n\nMassachusetts \n\nFall River \n\nNew Haven, Water- \n\nNew Haven \n\nConnecticut \n\nbury, Meriden \n\nNew London, Groton, \n\nNew London \n\nConnecticut \n\nNorwich \n\n* \n\n\nOdessa \n\nEctor \n\ni \n\nTexas \n\nOgden \n\nWeber \n\nUtah \n\nOxnard, Ventura \n\nVentura \n\nCalifornia \n\nPhoenix \n\nMaricopa \n\nArizona \n\nPine Bluff \n\nJefferson \n\nArkansas \n\nPittsfield \n\nBerkshire \n\nMassachusetts \n\nPortland \n\nCumberland \n\nMaine \n\nProvo-Orem \n\nUtah \n\nUtah \n\nPueblo \n\nPueblo \n\nColorado \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nRacine \n\nRacine \n\nWisconsin \n\nRaleigh \n\nWake \n\nNorth Carolina \n\nReading \n\nBerks \n\nPennsylvania \n\nReno \n\nWashoe \n\nNevada \n\nSaginaw \n\nSaginaw \n\nMichigan \n\nSalinas-Monterey \n\nMonterey \n\nCalifornia \n\nSt. Joseph \n\nBuchanan \n\nMissouri \n\nSan Angelo \n\nTom Green \n\nTexas \n\n\n197 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nSan Diego \n\nSan Jose \n\nSanta Barbara \n\nSavannah \n\nScranton \n\nSioux Falls \nSpokane \n\nSpringfield \n\nSpringfield \n\nSpringfield \n\nStockton \n\nTacoma \n\nTallahassee \n\nTopeka \n\nTrenton \n\nTucson \n\nTuscaloosa \n\nTyler \n\nWaco \n\nWaterloo \nWest Palm Beach \n\n\nTABLE 13 (continued) \n\nSan Diego \n\nSanta Clara \n\nSanta Barbara \n\nChatham \n\nLackawanna \n\nMinnehaha \n\nSpokane \n\nSangamon \n\nGreene \n\nClark \n\nSan Joaquin \n\nPierce \n\nLeon \n\nShawnee \n\nMercer \n\nPima \n\nTuscaloosa \nSmith \nMcLennan \nBlack Hawk \nPalm Beach \n\n\nCalifornia \n\nCalifornia \n\nCalifornia \n\nGeorgia \n\nPennsylvania \n\nSouth Dakota \nWashington \n\nIllinois \n\nMissouri \n\nOhio \n\nCalifornia \n\nWashington \n\nFlorida \n\nKansas \n\nNew Jersey \n\nArizona \n\nAlabama \n\nTexas \n\nTexas \n\nIowa \n\nFlorida \n\n\n198 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 13 (continued) \n\n\nWilkes-Barre- Luzerne \n\nHazleton \n\nWinston-Salem Forsythe \n\nWorcester, Fitchburg- Worcester \n\nLeominster \n\n\nSOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the \nEstimates, Series P-23, No. 371, August 14 \n\n\nPennsylvania \n\nNorth Carolina \nMassachusetts \n\n\nCensus, Population \n1967, pp. 14-32. \n\n\n199 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nEstimates in the same amount of detail can readily be made for all of \nthe remaining counties in the U.S. If the level of minimal normal \nfrictional unemployment is taken to be somewhere around the 3 percent \nlevel, the estimates here indicate that many of the nation\xe2\x80\x99s SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s \nwould face labor shortages, even with reduced defense expenditures. \n\nThis fact suggests that many policy options are available for assist\xc2\xac \ning areas of high unemployment, by means of improved labor market \ninformation, relocation assistance, and other measures.26 \n\nIV.1,4,3.e Impacts Upon Regional Industries \n\nJust as the problem of the economic impact of changing defense \nexpenditures should not be confined to consideration of an average \neffect upon the total national economy, but should be examined in \nregionally disaggregated terms of impacts upon states and smaller \nregions, consideration at the regional level should not be limited to \nexamination of average effect upon the total region, but should also \nconsider the matter of effects upon regional industries. If the full \nimplications of regional economic impact and possible remedial actions \nare to be realistically appraised, it is important to inquire into \nthe expected ultimate effect of expenditure change upon specific \nindustries within each region, \n\nAs noted above, the national employment control totals used in \nthe regional model are the national industry employment totals adjusted \nto the employment definitions and concepts derived from the census as \nused in the regional model. These adjusted industry employment control \ntotals are given in Table 14 for each of the three defense assumptions \nin the compensated and uncompensated versions. National employment \ntotals and estimated unemployment rates agreeing with the national \ninterindustry estimates are also given. However, unemployment by \nindustry is not estimated, because it is assumed that interindustry \nlabor mobility occurs. \n\nTable 14 also includes columns of first differences as a sensi\xc2\xac \ntivity test of the differences in employment in each industry under \nthe alternative defense assumptions. Column 10 indicates the estimated \nemployment difference in each industry between the two extremes of the \nhigh Budget E ($93.6 bil.) uncompensated assumption and the low Budget B \n($59.4 bil.) uncompensated assumption. Because these are the highest and \n\n\nFor a discussion of adjustment measures, see chapters in this \nreport by Daicoff and Eaton dealing with manpower. \n\n\n200 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xab\'* \xc2\xabti \n\nv \xe2\x80\xa2*?\' \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 sr \n\n\nc \nv t \n\nm \n\nk A \n\nU! 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UJ \xe2\x96\xba- \n\n. J K w \n\nu -1 ^ z \n\ni -\xc2\xbbs or \n\n:iit: \n\no f- u. \n0 uj 0 T \na j u x \n\nMH III \n\nc a xi \n\nOXO! \n\nO \xc2\xabJ < \na. a- u. \n\n\n2 \nS \n\nJ \n\nX If. \xe2\x96\xba \n\n3 JS \n\n"isy \n\n\n5 S\xc2\xa5S \n\nJ1U1c \n\n\n1 ; z 1 \n\n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2e \n\n>- \n\nif \n\nUf \n\n\na. /> \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaa UJ i/I \n3 \nl/l O \n\nUJ UJ r\xe2\x80\x94 ^ A. \n\n-J OOOi \no \xc2\xab < x \na X U U \ni 1 : x < / \nuii. z < uui \n\n> aa < * mm \n\na ia * Ji 5 \xe2\x80\xa2- ui \n\nZ *.X O \xc2\xbb U 2 ZL\xc2\xbb O ! > \n\n\xc2\xbb- ac i/i < 5 *-i < z ex \n\nt *-\xc2\xabajcoi-ac-auj \n\n\xc2\xabfaU3hU.l/l \n\n\nO Ui\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n10 u\xc2\xbb \n\n\nX \n\nI in 2 \nl/l Ui < u. \nZ U \n\n\nS \n\n-t| \n\nJ \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\no \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n< \n\n.J \n\n3 \n\na \n\no \n\na \n\n\nz \n\n2 \n\no \n\nI \n\nI \n\n> \n\n3 \n\n\nUJ \n\nu \n\ns, \n\nu> \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n \n\naa \n\no \n\n\nUJ \n\nK \n\n< \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\njf \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\n>- \n\no \n\nJi \n\n% \n\n\n201 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-I56 \n\n\nlowest budgets considered, respectively, the resulting employment \ndifferences are interpreted as the maximum probable employment differ\xc2\xac \nence to be considered. The Column 10 total indicates a probable overall \nU.S. employment difference between the two of 2,912,000 with individual \n\nindustry differences as indicated .^ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nThese results indicate that the regional model demonstrates \nsensitivity in industry employment levels to extreme variations in \ndefense expenditures. The variation measured in Column 10 is regarded \nas extreme, because the low figures are based upon the assumption that \nno compensatory changes in consumer expenditures occur, while the high \nemployment estimates are based upon the assumption that an inflationary \ndefense budget results in no policy measures to reduce the level of \nconsumer expenditures. However, it should be noted that even the \nuncompensated estimates are partially compensated to the extent that \ndisposable personal income is not allowed to fall below the level which \nresults in 3.7 percent unemployment in the normalcy model. It should \nalso be noted that while in this particular model, offsetting compensa\xc2\xac \ntion for decreased defense expenditures is limited to increases in \nconsumption expenditures, the actual range of available compensatory \nmeasures is much more comprehensive, including increases in other \ngovernment programs, increases in investment, and other measures. These \nalternative measures could have quite different industrial and regional \nimpacts, which require study. \n\nColumn 11 estimates employment differences under slightly less \nextreme assumptions of the same budgets, B ($59.4 bil.) and E ($93.6 \nbil-/, but allowing for partially offsetting compensatory changes in \nconsumption in each case. The national employment differential is \nreduced to 84,000 with industry differentials as indicated. Of interest \nis the fact that employment is projected to be higher under the compen\xc2\xac \nsated version of the smaller defense budget. Column 12 is designed to \nshow an even moie realistic comparison of the compensated versions of \nBudgets E ($93.6 bil.) anci C ($67.6 bil.). This comparison yields a \nnational employment total 97,000 less under the compensated high \ndefense budget than under the low one. It should be noted that under \n\n\nThe negative signs before some of the zero entries in Columns \n10-12 in Table 14 indicate computer estimations of column entry \ndifference which were negative but smaller than the level of signifi\xc2\xac \ncance reported. \n\n\n202 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe last two comparisons, employment adjustments take place between \nindustries, some of which indicate higher employment with a low defense \nbudget than with a higher defense budget, reflecting variations in \nprocurement mix. At the national level these last two comparisons \nmay be interpreted to mean that the Maryland models see compensatory \npolicies of an anti-recessionary nature as having less of an employment \nimpact than those designed to be anti-inflationary. \n\nIn order to permit these employment differential comparisons to \nbe put on a percentage basis. Columns 13, 14 and 15 show the industry \nemployment differentials as a percentage of Column 5, the Budget C ($67.6 \nbil.) employment totals, compensated. These comparisons are shown \nto indicate the possible percentage ranges of employment adjustment by \nindustry. \n\nWhile the 20 industry classification available down to the SMSA \nand county level provides an enormous amount of detailed regional \nindustrial employment estimations, the level of aggregation required \nconceals much of the intra-incustry adjustment which would result from \nchanges in defense expenditures. Many important defense supplying \nindustries are not separately identified, such as electronics, ordnance, \naircraft, and shipbuilding. All of these activities are included as \ncomponents of larger industry classifications. However, as noted \nabove, a more detailed industry classification could have been used \nat the state level, but not at the SMSA or county level. \n\nThe 20 industry classification used in this study does, despite \nits aggregation of important defense supplying activities, indicate a \nwide range of difference in industry response to changing defense \nexpenditures. Table 14 indicates that the largest negative impact, or \ndecline in employment under lower defense budgets would be felt by the \nair-ship-railroad equipment, machinery, and the miscellaneous manu\xc2\xac \nfacturing industries. However, the model indicates that partially \noffsetting large-scale increases in employment, especially under the \ncompensated versions of the assumptions, would occur in the services, \ntrade, finance-insurance-real estate, and other consumer-oriented \nsectors. Other activities, such as chemicals and public utilities, \ndisplay less sensitivity to changing defense budgets. \n\nHowever, since economic impact adjustments ultimately must be \nfaced at their regional level, it is important to trace through the \nnational, regional and industry impacts to the effect upon industries \nwithin each region. Table 15 (Appendix B) therefore, shows estimates \nof the 51 state employment differentials by industry for each defense \n\n\n203 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nbudget assumption compensated and uncompensated.^ As would be expected, \nthe model shows more sensitivity to industry employment differentials \nunder the changing defense assumptions for states than for the nation, \nand greater differentials for SMSA"s than for states. \n\nUnder the most extreme assumptions about sharp cuts in defense \nexpenditures without compensatory consumption changes, employment in the \naircraft (and other transport equipment) industry in defense-oriented \nstates like California would be lower by as much as 88,000 than under \n\na budget like type E ($93.6 bil.). However, under less severe \nassumptions about budget size and compensatory consumption expenditures, \nthe estimated employment differential falls to 65,000, and the loss in \nthe aggregate state employment total for all industries is estimated at \n82,000. Even in a defense-oriented state like California, however, \nthe projections indicate that employment in some industries would \nactually increase as defense budgets are decreased. \n\nConcern has been expressed that employment problems would be \nacute at the SMSA level for some SMSA\xe2\x80\x99s, such as San Diego, which are \nheavily dependent upon military spending,in the event that such spend\xc2\xac \ning is reduced.^ Table 11 indicates that such concern could well be \njustified for San Diego, where unemployment might rise to the 8 or 9 \npercent level, even under defense BudgetE ($93.6 billion). Under lower \nlevels of national defense spending, the unemployment estimate for San \nDiego is in the 10 percent vicinity, whether or not compensatory con\xc2\xac \nsumption increases are assumed. It is not surprising to discover that \nthe smaller the regions examined, the greater is the vulnerability to \ndefense cutbacks. Because defense-related activities are not evenly \ndistributed geographically, finer dimensions of regions can be ex\xc2\xac \npected to reveal greater differences among regions. \n\nThe overall implications of these estimates are consistent with \nthe findings in other studies that, while the U.S. national economy \ncould easily adjust to substantial reductions in military expenditures, \nsome defense-related industries would experience sharp economic impacts, \nand some states and metropolitan areas where these industries are \ndominant would experience economic readjustment problems. However, \nthere is no evidence to suggest that these regional economic adjustment \n\n28 \n\nSimilar estimates for 219 SMSA ! s are available upon request \nfrom the Economics Bureau, U.S. Anas Control and Disarmament Agency. \n\n29 \n\nSee, for example, the Wall Street Journal , November 28, 1967, \nquoting an estimate of an increase in unemployment from 3.7 to 7 per\xc2\xac \ncent in San Diego in the ensuing 18 months. \n\n\n204 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nproblems would be sufficiently widespread- or serious that they could \nnot be dealt with by existing policy measures and others which might be \ndesigned to meet the problem. \n\nIV.1.5 Evaluation of the Regional Projections \n\nThe regional impact estimates in this study have been based upon \ntwo stages of analysis. The first phase required making national \ninterindustry projections of the impacts of alternative defense budgets \nupon national GNP, employment, industry output, and other variables. \n\nIn the second stage of analysis, the national interindustry employment \nestimates from phase one were allocated geographically by a separate \nregional model between states, and the state control totals were then \nallocated among SMSA\'s and counties. \n\nThis procedure has a number of advantages, and some disadvantages. \nA major advantage of this approach is that the national interindustry \nmodel used is capable of analyzing all of the economic impact dimensions \nwhich were described as essential to a full evaluation of the economic \nimpact problem. The national interindustry model takes account not \nonly of direct economic impacts (the defense budget), but also expli\xc2\xac \ncitly computes its effects upon indirect and induced impacts. The \nnational interindustry model is based upon explicit statements of \nstructural relationships in the national economy, and takes account of \ntechnological change over time. It uses dynamic general equilibrium \ntheory to generate disaggregated industry output estimates which are \nconsistently related to GNP accounts. Both the industry estimates and \nthe totals resulting from them appear to respond consistently to \nchanges in assumptions about the size and composition of military ex\xc2\xac \npenditures. These alternative defense expenditures, in turn are \ntreated as part of total final demand, and the model allows for real\xc2\xac \nistic internal adjustment and response to changing final demand \nassumptions. \n\nThus, while the national model shares all of the important advan\xc2\xac \ntages of interindustry models, of which it is a very advanced version, \nit also necessarily shares the well-known shortcomings of these models. \nMost of the structural relationships in the model are based upon the \nassumption of linear, homogeneous production functions. The model \ncannot easily deal with basic economic phenomena such as factor sub\xc2\xac \nstitution and relative price change. The accuracy of interindustry \nprojections is heavily dependent upon the accuracy of final demand \nprojections. However, progress is being made in dealing with these \nproblems, which are of acceptable magnitude, given the other capabili\xc2\xac \nties of the model. \n\n\n205 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe regional model employed for estimating the regional economic \nimpacts of changing defense expenditures has the advantage that it begins \nwith a consistent and reasonable set of detailed estimates of national \neconomic impacts, which it then allocates geographically. The regional \nmodel has the impressive capability of being able to make detailed indus\xc2\xac \ntry employment projections for all 51 states, for all 219 SMSA*s and for \nall 3070 county-type areas in the U.S. The county employment estimates \nwhen summed are equal to the SMSA and state totals, and the state \ntotals add consistently to the U.S. employment totals. \n\nThe geographic allocation of economic impacts in the Harris \nregional model is based upon observed historic trends in industry \nlocation, population changie, migration, and interindustry relationships. \nThe projections derived from it appear to be consistent with general \neconomic theory and regional analysis. The model allows for changes in \npopulation and labor force in response to changes in levels of economic \nactivity and employment opportunity. \n\nHowever, the process of making regional (and national) economic \nprojections is necessarily subject to a multitude of difficulties, and \nthe regional projections derived in this study contain limitations \nwhich must be explicitly examined. Although some of the limitations of \nthe regional projections result from the particular model employed, \nmost of the shortcomings are those which are inherent in any effort to \nmake regional economic projections. \n\nf \n\nFirst, it has already been observed that the probability of error \nin economic projections is inversely related to the size of region. It \nmust be assumed that the probability of error is greater in the county \nand SMSA projections than in the state projections and is greater in \nstate projections than in the national projections. Similarly, though \nthe national interindustry projections are strengthened by disaggregat\xc2\xac \ning into sector detail so that structural relationships may be analyzed, \nthe individual industry projections contain a higher probability of \nerror than do the totals for any region\xe2\x80\x94nation, state, or county. Con\xc2\xac \nsequently, even though the 20 industry level of detail used in the \nregional projections is so aggregative that it masks probable impacts \nof changing defense expenditures, further breakdowns into more detailed \ndefense industry detail, though desirable, would create other kinds of \ndisaggregation problems. \n\nAnother problem with the particular model used is that it does \nnot utilize some of the regional data which are available. It does not \nincorporate information on the geographic distribution of the direct \neffects, or on the initial location of defense expenditures. That is, \n\n\n206 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe spatial distribution of final demand is assumed to be endogenous \nwithin the model, at its present stage of development. Extension of the \nmodel to use the increasing amount of empirically observed data on \ngeographic distribution would be a logical addition to it. Another \nlimitation of the model is its omission of any explicit information on \ninterregional trade coefficients. These data are severely limited in \navailability and reliability. Their systematic collection is a \nnecessary next step in improving the analysis of regional economic \nimpacts of defense expenditures and other programs. \n\nHowever, despite these and other problems, the approach used here \nrepresents important advances in the state of the art and illustrates \nwhat can be achieved with currently available data and operational \nmodels. The Harris regional projections model and others are con\xc2\xac \nstantly being extended and improved. The next section will explore \nsome of the opportunities and problems involved in advancing the quality \nof regional economic projection. \n\nIV.1.6 Improving Future Regional Economic Projections \n\nDespite recent advancements in the field of regional economic \nanalysis and forecasting, it is clear that much improvement is required \nin data, in concepts and in methods. Most of the highest priority \nnational policy issues such as urban problems, regional development, \nand environmental quality, as well as the issue examined here of \nregional impacts of defense spending involve spatial relationships and \nrequire analysis of interregional flows of goods, services and people. \n\nIncreased effort to improve regional economic projections can be \npredicted on the basis of the history of national economic information \nsystems, as well as on the basis of response to growing national needs \nfor regional analysis. The national income accounts system and other \neconomic information systems have consistently moved towards inclusion \nof greater industrial detail, and more detailed geographic breakdown. \n\nThe value of national income data for problems of analysis and policy \nrapidly led to development of personal income data, first for states, \nand then for SMSA\'s and counties. The evolution of national inter\xc2\xac \nindustry models and the growing awareness of their analytic signifi\xc2\xac \ncance suggests that similar models for states, metropolitan regions, \nand smaller regions will evolve as part of the Federal economic infor\xc2\xac \nmation system. The vast amount of effort and expenditure being devoted \nto development of these models by many scattered and uncoordinated \nefforts indicates both the need for such models and suggests that a \ncoordinated Federal effort to develop regional interindustry models \ncould economize on the total amount of resources being devoted to such \nefforts and could improve the quantity and quality of the product. \n\n\n207 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nEvidence of the need for a national (iffort to provide consistent, \naccurate regional interindustry tables is suggested both by the growing \nefforts to develop non-survey methods of producing such tables economi\xc2\xac \ncally, and by the substantial efforts going into the development of \nregional tables by direct survey. Interindustry tables have been \ncompleted, or are under way, for more than 30 individual states and for \nmany sub-state regions.30 The regional interindustry approach to \nregional analysis and forecasting is promising because it does combine \nthe advantages of a disaggregated genera] equilibrium system which can \ncapture all of the direct, indirect, induced, and dynamic elements \nwhich have been identified as inherent in the problem. The development \nand publication of standardized, reliable interindustry tables for \nstates and SMSA ? s by the Federal government would be a logical next \nstep in the evolution of economic information systems which would \nprobably pay their own way in terms of improved information relevant \nto decision making on high priority public policy issues. Centralized \ndesign and data collection for such tables could also lead to the next \nimportant step in the evolution of regional analysis, which is the \nlinking of these regional interindustry tables into interregional \nmodels. These interregional models are essential in order to analyze \nthe basic problem of interregional economic flows, about which so \nlittle is known. Efforts are also necessary to evaluate alternative \nconcepts and models for the analysis of interregional flows. \n\nAdvancement of capabilities for making regional economic analyses \nand fprecasts will require improvements along many paths preferably \nwithin a systems framework so that the information components are \nconsistent with an overall approach designed to achieve its objectives. \nFirst of all, significantly improved data on direct impacts of defense \nand other expenditure programs are needed. Among the important \ncharacteristics of such direct impact expenditure data are that they be \nspecified in disaggregated industry detail according to a consistent \nindustry classification system used in the analytic model, that the \ndata be disaggregated geographically by region, and that they be identi\xc2\xac \nfied in terms of the expenditure program which they support. \n\n\nFor discussion of nonsurvey approaches, see William A. Schaffer \nand Kong Chu, "Nonsurvey Techniques For Constructing Regional Inter\xc2\xac \nindustry Models,*\' Papers, The Regional Science Association , Volume \nTwenty-three, 1969, pp. 83-101. For a recent inventory of regional \ninterindustry models underway and completed, see Phillip J. Borque and \nMillicent Cox, An Inventory of Regional Input-Output Studies in the \nUnited States (Seattle: University of Washington, Graduate School of \nBusiness Administration, Occasional Paper No. 22, 1970). \n\n\n208 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe long-awaited publication by the Office of Business Economics \nof the enlarged OBE Interindustry Sales and Purchases model for 1963^ \nprovides an industry classification system which can be used as a \ncurrent model of industrial disaggregation for a wide range of analytic \npurposes, but which can be aggregated or further disaggregated on the \nbasis of the four-digit SIC classification as needed. \n\nAs indicated, the direct impact data to be used in such models \nshould be disaggregated by industry, region, and program to which they \n\npertain. References above to direct impact data from DOD and 0E0 \n\nindicate that while a vast amount of information is available, it is \n\nnot in a form which is most useful for analytical purposes, nor does \nit appear to have been assembled within any consistent information \nsystem design. Movement towards a systems approach in the Federal \nstatistics establishment could, as a minimum, encourage every agency \nto report its expenditures and budget requests in terms of SIC category, \nlocation of expenditure, and program category. \n\nBecause the DOD budget is the largest Federal expenditure compo\xc2\xac \nnent, particular effort is. needed in overcoming problems in the analysis \nof defense expenditure. Overclassification of expenditure data is a \nmajor problem with DOD statistics, but the publication referred to above \ncontaining prime contract award data for individual firms in minute \ndetail indicates that there is little consistency in reporting proce\xc2\xac \ndures. If it is an important element of national interest to be able \nto analyze the industrial and regional impact of defense policy, \nserious efforts are necessary to obtain consistent DOD expenditure \ninformation by SIC industry, geographic area, and program category, \nto the extent that this can be done without compromising national \nsecurity. \n\nFurther improvements in reporting of DOD expenditure data are \nessential to the assessment of economic impact, particularly in the \narea of consistent reporting of subcontract systems. There is no \nlogical reason why each prime contract should not be assigned a serial \nnumber which could be reassigned with appropriate sub-titling to each \ntier of subcontracting and other inputs so that the total industrial \nand regional purchase patterns for each prime contract could be follow\xc2\xac \ned through consistently. This is well within the capability of computer \ninformation systems and could provide valuable management information \nas well as economic impact data. \n\n\nNational Economics Division, Office of Business Economics, U.S. \nDepartment of Commerce, "Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy: \n1963," Survey of Current Business , Vol. 49, No. 11 (November, 1969), \n\npp. 16-47. \n\n\n209 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nAnother major need which is critical, not only in improving \nregional impact analysis, but also for the advancement of regional \nanalysis in general, is the collection of interregional economic \nflow data. Much more information is needed on the gross as well as \nthe net flow of materials and services from each region to each \nregion by industry classification. The usual dependence upon I. C. C. \nWaybill samples provides only a fraction of the data needed on flows by \nall types of transportation between regions. The Census of Transpor\xc2\xac \ntation offers the best opportunity for obtaining such data, which \nshould be related to a consistent information framework. Only the \ncollection of such data will provide the empirical basis for con\xc2\xac \nstructing truly interregional (as compared with regional) interindustry \nmodels. Interindustry models are not necessarily the only type of \ninterregional models which are potentially useful for exploring spatial \nproblems, and experience is needed with other types of interregional \nmodels. However, the systematic collection of data on interregional \nflows of goods, services, people, and externalities is a necessary \nnext step towards the implementation of the interregional models needed \nfor the improved analysis of problems in post-Vietnam adjustment, urban \nrenewal, regional development, and environmental quality, in all of \nwhich space is a critical dimension. \n\n\nCurrent approaches reported in this study towards construction of \ninterregional interindustry models by means of simulation, scaling and \nother short cuts all indicate the need for such models. The work of the \nIsard group and of the Harvard Economic Research Project, the continued \nrefinement of the Harris regional projections, and the improvement of \nthe QBE regional information system all suggest that the systematic \ncollection of disaggregated interregional interindustry flow data is an \nessential step towards the next generation of advancements in regional \nanalysis. \n\nIV. 2 EXISTING PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALLEVIATING REGIONAL \nECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES \n\n\nIV.2.1 Economic Development Administration \n\nBecause this study and others have indicated that substantial re\xc2\xac \nductions in defense expenditures could have economic impacts that would \nbe particularly severe for some regions and for some activities within \nthese regions, it is important to assess policy measures which are now \navailable to deal with these problems, and alternative policy measures \nwhich might be designed. \n\n\nFor example, the chapter in this study by Robert Crow on the \nNortheast Corridor is a non-interindustry model concerned with the \nregionalization of impacts. \n\n\n210 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nWhile almost all U.S. government programs affect regional \ndevelopment in some way, particular agencies, such as the Economic \nDevelopment Administration (EDA) have been given specific responsi\xc2\xac \nbility for dealing with regional economic development problems. EDA \nis authorized to use a variety of programs for assisting regions which \nexperience high unemployment and low per capita incomes resulting from \nany cause, including reductions in military expenditures. \n\nOne of the most appropriate measures already available for \ndealing with regional dislocation resulting from reductions in defense \nexpenditures is the ?? sudden rise*\' provision of the EDA legislation.^3 \nThis provision is particularly relevant to the defense expenditures \nreduction problem because it permits EDA to designate an area as \neligible for assistance if the loss of a major source of employment \nthreatens to cause an unusual and abrupt rise of unemployment in the \nregion. Therefore if a reduction in defense-related employment occurs \nand it appears likely that there will be problems In adjusting to this \nemployment loss in the region, assistance can be given to the region \nin anticipation of an unemployment increase\xc2\xae \n\nThis is an important provision because it recognizes that while \nmany instances of the loss of a major source of employment can be \nameliorated by the adjustment capabilities of the national and regional \neconomies, some regions are more vulnerable than others and measures \ncan be taken to anticipate sudden rises in unemployment and provide \nregional economic assistance. As of December, 1970, more than 60 areas \nhad been certified as eligible for EDA assistance under the sudden rise \nprovision. While some of these were later removed from the eligibility \nlist it is not known to what extent such removals reflected successful \ncorrective action as compared with the effects of market forces. \n\nThe "sudden rise** provision lends additional importance to pre\xc2\xac \ndictive models for early warning of regional impact of expenditure \nchanges. The Harris model discussed in this study is a promising example \nof such a regional early warning model. Refinements now being added to \nthe model, including more industry detail and regional supply and demand \nfunctions, which should permit closer approximations to interregional \ninterindustry models, should increase its reliability as a forecasting \ndevice. However, the necessity to forecast regional and national final \ndemands will continue to impose a constraint on the reliability of the \noutput and employment forecasts from such models. \n\n\n, 3 Public Worke rs and Economic D evelopment Act of 1965, As Amended , \nTitle IV - Area and District Eligibility, Part A, Redevelopment areas. \nSection 401 (a) (4). \n\n\n211 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIV.2.2 State and Local Governments \n\nIn addition to the Federal government, state governments can also \ntake useful steps in planning for and adapting to economic readjustment \nto changes in defense expenditures. The United States Arms Control and \nDisarmament Agency (ACDA) has played a leading role in identifying \nopportunities for state and local governments to assist in the regional \neconomic adjustment process, and in encouraging them to develop pro\xc2\xac \ngrams and capabilities for meeting such contingencies. As early as \n1964, ACDA contracted with the National Planning Association (NPA) to \nevaluate problems of community adjustment to changes in defense expen\xc2\xac \nditures. Case studies were later published for the Seattle-Tacoma, \nBaltimore, and New London-Groton-Norwich areas.^ On the basis of \nthese case studies, NPA made a number of recommendations concerning \npolicy measures for the Federal government, for state and local govern\xc2\xac \nments, and for business firms and unions in dealing with regional \nadjustment to arms reduction which are still valid. These recom\xc2\xac \nmendations and the general policy conclusions of the NPA study are \ncontained in Appendix A. \n\nMore recently NPA has developed for ACDA a comprehensive com\xc2\xac \nmunity information system designed to assess the potential sensitivity \nof a community to changes in defense activities and to assist local \npolicy-makers* to anticipate and adjust to these changes. \' A large \nbody of literature on the theory and practice of regional economic \nadjustment to changes in defense expenditures is available primarily \nas a result of research supported by ACDA. b \n\n\n34 \n\nNational Planning Association, Community Adjustment to Reduced \nDefense Spending , U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication \nNo. 33 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965). \n\n35 \n\nNational Planning Association, Community Information System: A \nMethod for Evaluation of Community Dislocation Sensitivity and Adjust\xc2\xac \n\nment Potential , Vol. 1, Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma\xc2\xac \nment Agency (Washington: Government Printing Office, ACDA/E-88, 1965). \nVolume VII of this study provides an example of the application of the \ninformation system to San Diego. \n\n36 \n\nU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Economic Impact of \nDefense and Disarmament in the United States," Research supported by \nthe Economics Bureau, ACDA ? Washington, February, 1970, processed. \n\n\n212 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIn addition to Federal efforts, state and local governments have \nbegun to conduct their own studies of regional economic adjustment to \nchanges in defense expenditures. A New York State study has recommended \nthat the Governor appoint committees to plan for post-Vietnam adjust\xc2\xac \nment at the state and local levels for determining priorities and timing \nof capital expenditures and other measures.\' 7 \n\nThe State of Maryland has undertaken a very detailed analysis of \nall available information on the direct effects on employment of \ndefense expenditures in Maryland. The report recognizes the need for \nanalytic models to evaluate the additional -indirect and induced employ\xc2\xac \nment associated with the direct employment from defense expenditures \nand makes a number of policy recommendations. In addition to improved \ndata collection, it recommends analysis of the skill composition of \ndefense employment, the establishment of temporary field employment \noffices at installations scheduled to reduce or close operations, and \nestablishing a priority list of Federal, state and local projects as \nan offset to defense-related employment reductions. \n\nThe Harvard Economic Research Project, which is referred to \nelsewhere in this report, has prepared an excellent study for Massa\xc2\xac \nchusetts of the projected impact of changes in Vietnam expenditures \nupon the economy of Massachusetts.*^ \n\nFollowing the traditional Leontief procedure of developing \nregional interindustry models by distinguishing between national in\xc2\xac \ndustries and local industries, the Harvard group has utilized a multi- \nregional, subnational interindustry model for Massachusetts, using \n1958 national interindustry coefficients and 1967 estimates of final \ndemand under various assumptions about military expenditures. The \nalternative defense expenditure assumptions are: (1) actual 1967 \ngross output by industry, (2) assumption that Vietnam expenditures \ndecrease by 19 billion dollars with no compensatory spending increase \nby government or private sectors, (3) an assumption of a Vietnam \n\n37 - * ~ ~ \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nPost Vietnam Planning Committee, P lans for New York State to \n\nMeet the Economic Consequences of Peace , Report to Governor Nelson A. \n\nRockefeller (Albany, New York: The Committee, December 18, 1968). \n\n38 \n\nJames T. Jordan, National Defense Related Employment in Mary\xc2\xac \nland: 1965-1969 (Baltimore, Maryland: Maryland Department of State \nPlanning, Publication No. 163, May, 1970). \n\n39 \n\nCommonwealth of Massachusetts, Vietnam Economic Reconversion \nfor the Commonwealth of Massachusetts , Department of Commerce and \nDevelopment in cooperation with Governor\xe2\x80\x99s Advisory Committee on \nScience and Technology, Boston, Massachusetts, August 1968-September \n1969. \n\n\n213 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nspending cut of 19 billion dollars with compensatory spending consisting \nof a uniform 3.4 percent increase in private sector spendings, and (4) \ncalculation as in assumption (2) with alternative spending as follows: \n\n(a) a uniform 1.3 percent increase in private sector expenditures, and \n\n(b) an 11.5 billion dollar increase in public civilian sector programs. \n\n\nThe results of the Massachusetts study suggest that this state \nis particularly vulnerable to a decrease in military expenditures. \n\nEven with compensatory increases in private spending or government \nspending, Massachusetts would have a small net decrease in labor \nearnings of nearly 1.5 percent. Using the multiregional model develop\xc2\xac \ned, the study also identifies net declines in other regions such as \nGeorgia, and North and South Carolina; Maryland, Virginia, West \nVirginia, Delaware and the District of Columbia; Florida; Texas; Utah, \nColorado, New Mexico and Arizona; Oregon and Washington; and California \nand Nevada. The study also shows for the 57 industries involved, how \neach would fare under the assumed increases in public civilian sector \nprograms as compared with increases in private consumption. The \nindustries are divided into national, regional, and local industries, \ndepending upon the region for which exports and imports are balanced, \nas between these regions. The results of the model are expressed in \nterms of percentage losses or gains in wages and salaries for each \nof the 57 industries in each of the 17 regions. \n\nDespite the fact that it is based upon 1958 coefficients derived \nfor the national economy and the fact that the division of industries \ninto national, regional, and local is somewhat arbitrary, the Harvard \nEconomic Research Project-Massachusetts model is an impressive and \nsophisticated application of interindustry techniques to the analysis \nof the interregional impact of changing defense expenditures. The \nconclusions drawn from this study are in general consistent with the \nfindings of other investigators. They suggest that while the U.S. \neconomy can absorb anticipated reductions in Vietnam spending without \nunbearable increases in total unemployment, the introduction of offset \nprograms can be helpful in reducing unemployment. Some industries and \nsome regions can be expected to suffer greater losses than the national \naverage, but some can be expected to be less affected. \n\nThe availability of empirically observed interregional, inter\xc2\xac \nindustry flow data would permit significant improvement of such models \nand collection of this kind of data should be given top priority in \nefforts to improve impact analysis. \n\n\n214 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIV. 3 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES \n\nRELEASED FROM MILITARY USE \n\nIV.3.1 Area Development: Urban, Regional and Related \nPrograms \n\nThe projections made in this study indicate that, while the \nnational economy is capable of adjusting even to severe reductions in \ndefense expenditures, some regions and some industries would face \nappreciable economic readjustment problems. It is therefore important \nto develop national policies and programs capable of dealing with \nproblems of regional economic adjustment. Post-Vietnam regional \neconomic adjustment programs can be most effectively handled within the \ncontext of a comprehensive national policy^for coordination of regional \ndevelopment efforts. \n\nIV.3.2 A National Policy for Regional Development, \n\nResource Management, and Environmental Quality \n\nThere are a number of elements which could contribute to the \nestablishment of a strong, positive national policy on regional and \nurban development. An important first step would be to give priority \nto solution of the human problems which result in low productivity. \nMajor emphasis in regional and urban development policies upon educa\xc2\xac \ntion, training, health, family planning, and family assistance would \neventually help assist individuals to achieve the mobility and adapt\xc2\xac \nability needed to respond to changing economic opportunities. The \nproposals for Federal revenue sharing with the states is an important \nmove in this direction. Not every region can hope to achieve levels of \neconomic activity required to support acceptable levels of public \nservices. Federal revenue sharing to improve the quality of human \ncapital in lagging regions could eliminate many of the regional in\xc2\xac \nequities which now exist. u Similarly, sharing of state revenues with \nthe less affluent regions within states could reduce intrastate \ninequities. \n\n\n40 \n\nFor a detailed examination of revenue \non that subject by Darwin Daicoff elsewhere in \n\n\nsharing, see the chapter \nthis study. \n\n\n215 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nExpanded revenue sharing could aIs) help to improve the quality \nof interregional economic competition. States dependent upon industrial \ngrowth to support public sector services devote major efforts to compet\xc2\xac \nitive attraction of industry. This policy can become self-defeating if \nstates grant tax concessions to new industry large enough to cancel the \nfiscal gain which was the original objective. Also, interregional \ncompetition for industrialization induces some states to engage in \ncompetitive relaxation of pollution control standards. Establishment \nof minimum national standards for pollution abatement would put all \nstates on an equal basis in this regard and enable states to compete \nmore constructively for economic development. With revenue sharing and \nstrong Federal pollution control programs, states might then compete \nfor regional development on other bases, such as the quality of public \nservices offered, quality of amenities, and productivity of labor. \n\nInterstate and interregional competition for economic develop\xc2\xac \nment and for support of public services can force regions into mis\xc2\xac \nmanagement of local natural resources. The systematic mismanagement in \nAppalachia of the timber, coal, water, and human resources is a tragic \nexample of the cost of unplanned regional development. A possible \nTnkthOT^for avoiding Tuture~repe fit ions of the Appalachian experience \nwould be to adopt a policy of life-cycle planning in natural resource \nmanagement. This would require that developers of major resource \nsystems prepare and submit prior to the exploration of resources, a \nresponsible life-cycle plan for the exploration, extraction, and \neventual restoration of the area affected. In strip mining, for \nexample, this policy would require that developers prepare and adhere to \nan approved plan to extract the minerals without damage to the sur\xc2\xac \nrounding air, water, or soil, and then restore the surface after removal \nof the resource. This policy would be designed to bring private cost \ninto line with social cost in order to improve resource allocation. \n\nThe adoption of life-cycle planning and more responsible resource \nmanagement policy appears to be particularly urgent as the nation \nembarks upon major programs of natural resource development in the case \nof ocean resources, shale oil recovery, and petroleum production in \nAlaska. The lessons of the Appalachian experience and of the Santa \nBarbara oil spills can be used to prevent mismanagement on a monumental \nscale of these new resource systems. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 r \n\nAnother vital concept which can significantly improve the quality \nof regional, urban, and national economic development planning is the \nconcept of advanced technology assessment and review. While technology \nhas played a vital role in economic development, some technologies \n\n\n216 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nappear to have been introduced on a large scale before they have been \nsufficiently refined and before their full implications for society \nhave been assessed. For example, it might have been desirable to \nspecify more rigorous emission standards for the automobile engine \nbefore it became so widespread. If noise limitations had been estab\xc2\xac \nlished for supersonic transports early in their development, research \nefforts might have discovered more effective noise suppression methods. \nNuclear energy for electric power production is highly promising, but \nfailure to consider the process as a total system before its widespread \nintroduction has created serious problems of increasing exposure to \nradioactivity in the mining of uranium, in the disposal of mine tail\xc2\xac \nings, in the processing and transport of fuel elements, in the power \ngeneration stage, in reprocessing of fuel elements, and in the stor\xc2\xac \nage and disposal of spent fuel. Thermal waste from nuclear power \ngeneration is also a serious and growing environmental problem. Despite \nthe advantages of nuclear energy, those regions in which it has been \nintroduced might be much better off if an independent technology \nassessment agency outside the mission-oriented Atomic Energy Commission \nhad set up total system safeguards and standards before the large scale \nintroduction of atomic energy was permitted. The introduction of DDT \n\nand other environmental chemicals before comprehensive evaluation was \nrequired is another example of the hazards of unevaluated technology. \n\nAs new and more powerful technologies are developed, the importance of \ntechnology assessment and review before introduction becomes more \nurgent and essential. \n\nThe adoption of effective national programs to deal with regional \nand urban poverty, resource management, and environmental quality would \ngo far towards alleviating some of the most urgent problems of regional \ndevelopment. However, even these programs are not likely to add up to \na coherent national policy on regional development unless strong, posi\xc2\xac \ntive national guidelines are established. Traditional programs of \nleaving Federal funds for regional development to be expended on the \nbasis of local decision making are unsatisfactory because of subopti\xc2\xac \nmization, creation of external diseconomies, and because of non\xc2\xac \nproductive methods of interregional competition. \n\nIn order to reorient regional development programs away from \nemphasis upon quantitative growth and towards quality of development, \nit will be necessary to establish strong national guidelines that will \npermit a Federal-state-local system of regional development to function. \nCentralized Federal decision making will be necessary on issues which \naffect the national interest, such as environmental standards, popula\xc2\xac \ntion growth, technology assessment, transportation systems and major \n\n\n217 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nnatural resource systems including estuaries, water sheds, the conti\xc2\xac \nnental shelf, the electric power system, poverty abatement, new towns, \nand similar issues on which subnational decision-making is likely to \nbe suboptimal. \n\nThe traditional approach to regional development in the U.S. \nhas been to encourage each region to compete with all others to \nachieve maximum rates of economic development. This policy, which was \nhighly appropriate and successful under earlier conditions, is becom\xc2\xac \ning obsolete and costly under emerging conditions of rapid population \ngrowth, extensive urbanization, intensive industrialization and the \nadvent of more powerful technologies. The national interest is no \nlonger best served by encouraging maximum growth in every region, \nparticularly along flood plains, in areas of seismic activity, water \nshortage, recurrent fire hazard, unstable soil conditions, or in forms \nwhich jeopardize recreation areas, wilderness areas, water supplies, \nand vulnerable ecologies. National guidelines are necessary both in \norder to prevent economic loss and to protect scarce national resources, \nto minimize external diseconomies, and to maximize external economies. \nTherefore, although the traditional autonomy of local areas in physical \nplanning, zoning, and land use regulation will remain important, with \nthe increase in scale of technology and spread of externalities, it will \nbecome necessary for states to play a larger role in physical planning \nthan they have in the past, ^n order to protect the public interest \nin land use, natural resource management, and environmental protection, \nit will become increasingly important to require state approval of local \ndevelopment plans to assure consistency with broad state development \nobjectives. Similarly, Federal approval of state development plans to \nassure consistency with national guidelines will become increasingly \nessential as a prerequisite to the granting of Federal funds for \nregional development. \n\nIf Federal and state revenue sharing down to the local level \nis adopted, local areas can then be released from the pressures they \nnow feel to accelerate the intensity of growth in order to finance \nlocal public services, regardless of whether they might prefer lower \nintensities of development and rates of growth. With more equitable \nrevenue sharing, local areas could then reallocate some of the dis\xc2\xac \nproportionate and self-defeating efforts going into the competitive \nquest for industrial development and turn their attention to broader \nissues of general regional development and improving the quality of \nlife and environment for their citizens. \n\n\n218 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThere are other important problems of regional development which \nhave not been discussed here, and many areas on which further research \nis required. However, recent developments in regional analysis, in \nprogram planning and budgeting systems, and in the design of social \naccounts support the idea that it is now possible to design a national \npolicy for regional and urban development which would be responsive to \ncurrent priorities and to changing national goals. \n\n\n219 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIV.4 APPENDIX A 41 \n\nGENERAL POLICY CONCLUSIONS FOR \nREGIONAL READJUSTMENT TO ARMS REDUCTION \n\n\nThe study results in this chap ter*"*\xe2\x84\xa2 general conclusions based on \nour research findings and a list of policies and programs offered for \nconsideration by government and private organizations-\xe2\x80\x94are tentative. \nThey are based mainly on an intensive study of three metropolitan \nareas, a review of studies of a number of area dislocation experiences, \nand an analysis of regional economic and defense expenditure trends. \nThey are presented here to suggest where additional thought and re\xc2\xac \nsearch might be concentrated. \n\nOur primary conclusion is that the dislocation caused by arms re\xc2\xac \nduction plans of the size assumed in this study would be manageable \nbut would aggravate the national task of promoting a desirable rate of \neconomic growth. The dislocations for certain regions are likely to \nbe serious. However, under conditions of uninterrupted national \nexpansion of markets, there is reason to believe that business enter\xc2\xac \nprises will offer jobs to most displaced workers. Both with respect to \nthe ability to continue national economic growth and to make needed \nregional adjustments, confidence is justified only if a dynamic policy \nis planned well in advance by government on all levels and by private \nenterprises concerned. Even assuming such advance planning, there will \nremain hardship for some workers, and difficulties for some firms and \nsome communities. Private and public measures to mitigate hardship \nwould be needed. \n\nIn the event of a faster or deeper arms reduction than assumed in \nthis study, a temporary setback in our efforts to maintain economic \ngrowth and purchasing power may occur. This would also aggravate \nregional dislocations and impede the processes of adjustment. It \nshould be emphasized, however, that advance planning by private \nbusiness and by Federal, state and local governments is essential in \nevery case. \n\n\n41 \n\nSource: National Planning Association, U. S. Arms Control and \nDisarmament Agency Publication 33 Community Readjustment to Reduced \nDefense Spending (Washington: Government Printing Office, December, \n1965), pp. 247-259. \n\n\n220 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nGeneral Policy Guidelines \n\nFirst, we found that community leaders and business are, under \npresent world conditions, skeptical about the likelihood of arms re\xc2\xac \nduction and the need for serious planning for adjustments. However, \nto reduce later costs of promoting readjustments and mitigating hard\xc2\xac \nship, advance planning is required. Therefore, a clear statement by \nthe Federal government about the need for planning for arms reduction \nappears desirable, irrespective of its actual probability. \n\nSecond, we found some expression of the attitude that it is the \nduty of the Federal government to assure that markets and jobs are \nprovided to compensate for loss of markets and jobs in case of arms \nreduction. It is desirable that the Federal government also make it \n\nclear that, in the event of arms reduction, it will pursue a policy \n\npromoting growth and maintaining purchasing power for the economy as a \nwhole, as it is required to do under the Employment Act. Such a \n\nstatement should clarify to what extent the Federal government is or \n\nis not obligated to assist individual enterprises and specific regions. \nWa assume that the readjustment of individual enterprises would remain \nprimarily their responsibility but that the Federal government would \nassist communities to the extent that the task of readjustment and \nmitigating hardship exceeds community financial capacity. However, \nin every case, the community would presumably remain primarily res\xc2\xac \nponsible for the planning and the implementation of readjustment \nprograms. \n\nAs a third guideline, both national and regional policies of the \nFederal government designed to meet arms reduction impacts should be \ndovetailed with broad national programs, such as those for maintaining \neconomic growth and purchasing power and expanding education, urban \nredevelopment, the war on poverty, worker assistance, and improved \ninternational relations.^ To achieve this consistency and to meet \nregional problems,, readjustment policies for meeting reductions in \ndefense spending should be blended with policies to promote adequate \neconomic growth and with policies to assist in readjustments for other \ndislocations, such as those resulting from automation. \n\n\n4 *rhe "Ackley Report\'* by a Federal interdepartmental committee \n(the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, \nGardner Ackley, Chairman) has reviewed the implications of disarmament \nfor the economy as a whole. The Economic Impact of Defense and Dis\xc2\xac \narmament (Washington: Government Printing Office, July, 1965). \n\n\n221 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nAs a fourth general policy guideline, any extraordinary Federal \nreadjustment programs should preferably be nondiscriminatory with respect \nto all causes of hardship, whether it be from arms reduction or any \nother situation. This nondiscrimination is important for several \nreasons. First, it would be difficult in a period of significant arms \nreduction impact to identify each affected community, business firm and \ndefense worker. Defense activity in its indirect effects ripples \nthrough the nation*s industrial and regional structure. From the view\xc2\xac \npoint of equity, giving readjustment aid to those directly affected by \narms reduction and not to those indirectly affected or replaced by other \ncauses would be questionable. To try to limit such aid to direct and \nindirect defense-related work would result in a fruitless attempt to \ndefine and identify the groups affected and there would still be unequal \ntreatment of dislocations taking place in nondefense industries. Also, \nlimiting legislation for extraordinary Federal assistance to specific \nregions or a specific time period would not be satisfactory. It is far \npreferable if the Federal government is authorized to establish, pro\xc2\xac \nvide financial or technical aid for, or cooperate with programs for \nextraordinary assistance due to distress, irrespective of the cause \nof distress. \n\nOur research on the three selected areas and review of other case \nstudies of area dislocation suggest that there are now shortcomings in \nthe kinds of assistance available to unemployed workers, e.g,, through \nthe employment service and in unemployment benefits. We recommend a \nre-examination of manpower and unemployment assistance policies from \nthe aspect of their adequacy in 1) facilitating the adjustment process \nand 2) mitigating situations of distress until the adjustment has been \nmade. If the nation is not equipped with better machinery at all levels \nof government for dealing with unemployment dislocations, it may become \nnecessary to adopt less desirable temporary emergency measures assist\xc2\xac \ning individuals especially hard hit by arms reduction. \n\nAs a last general guideline, our studies indicate that there is \na need for more advanced planning to deal with dislocation problems. \n\nThis includes planning by the Federal government, state and local \ngovernment, business, unions, and individual workers. There are \nseveral Federal programs which support planning at the regional level, \nincluding the 701 program of the Housing Act, one percent research \nfunds on Federal facilities, investment programs, and the community and \nregional development programs of the Economic Development Administra\xc2\xac \ntion (EDA). Advance planning may enable many communities to set \nobjectives and to prepare for use of their resources in such a way that \ndefense cutbacks become an opportunity to meet community goals. \n\n\n222 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nPossible Implementation of the. Guidelines \n\nIn the balance of this concluding chapter, policies will be dis\xc2\xac \ncussed which could be adopted to implement the guidelines that have \nbeen suggested in the first part of the chapter. A part of these \nexamples are drawn from previous chapters. These are not definite \nrecommendations by the National Planning Association but rather should \nbe understood as examples to illustrate the general policy implications \nof the guidelines. The specific policies or combination of policies \nthat should be adopted in case of arms reduction depend on the speed \nand severity of arms reduction and especially on the general economic \nconditions prevailing at the time. \n\nA. Procedural Measures for the Federal Governments \n\n\n1. It would be desirable if the Federal government had at its \ndisposal a mechanism by which the national and regional impact of \nspecific arms reduction proposals could be evaluated within a short \nperiod of time. Such a mechanism would be desirable not only for the \ncase of arms reduction but also for program appraisals in general. It \nwould help to appraise the probable effects of increasing .or decreasing \ngovernment programs in the perspective of national and regional economic \nprojections. In the case of arms reduction it would provide estimates \nof the impact on production and employment and test the consistency and \nadequacy of Federal-state expenditure and tax programs with respect \n\nto their potential for offsetting reductions in defense spending. This \nmechanism could best be located in the Executive Office of the President \nand work under direction of the Council of Economic Advisers and the \nBudget Bureau. The office would be a service organization providing \ninformation for all agencies concerned with program development and \nespecially for the officers who have to evaluate program proposals for \nthe President and the Congress. \n\n2. A Manpower Administrator has been appointed in the Department \nof Labor. It would be desirable for the Administration to establish \n\na unit with responsibility for covering manpower readjustment policies \nfor meeting arms reduction problems. The announcement establishing \nthe unit could include a statement of the Federal government\xe2\x80\x99s in\xc2\xac \nterest in developing a coordinated set of Federal-state manpower \npolicies which would aim at developing readjustment capability for \ndefense workers. \n\n3. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency might develop \nguidelines for planning by defense communities. On request of such \ncommunities, the agency might then participate in an advisory capacity \n\n\n223 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nat meetings with communities, unions, and business organizations aimed \nat working up appropriate preparedness plans and policies. \n\nB. Policy Measures of the Fsderal Government \n\ni \n\nIn case of arms reduction the Federal government might speed up \ncertain programs in which it is engaged and possibly select for this \npurpose programs which deserve acceleration because of their intrinsic \nvalue but also because they may promote the use of scientists and \nengineers released from defense work and because they may possibly \ncreate employment opportunities in the areas hit by defense reduction. \nThe list is presented without any judgment about the programs or pro\xc2\xac \ngram combinations which should be accelerated. General tax reduction \nas one of the main offsets for arms reduction is not discussed here \nbecause it has no particular regional aspect. \n\n1. Federal expenditure programs with differential regional indus\xc2\xac \ntrial and occupational impacts (or ones that can be so oriented). \n\na. Space research and technology : A program which requires \nlarge numbers of highly specialized scientists and engineers. There is \nhigh transferability into space activity for many specialized defense \naircraft and missile scientists and engineers. \n\nb. Development of supersonic plane : Program for developing a \nsupersonic plane could provide a limited number of jobs for defense \naircraft scientists and engineers. \n\nc. Oceanographic researc h: Programs for research and explora\xc2\xac \ntion of the oceans and research programs for developing methods for \nfarming the oceans (to obtain food) and for mining the oceans (to \nobtain metals). Many defense firms are already active in these re\xc2\xac \nsearch programs, \n\nd. Desalination research and facilities development : Research \nfor the development of facilities to process water. Methods for pro\xc2\xac \ncessing both salt water and used water within the interior of the \ncountry are needed, \n\ne. Urban and interurban transportation and facilities de\xc2\xac \nvelopment : Federal programs of research and development with state and \nlocal grant provisions to help solve our urban transportation problems \nand speed up interurban travel. Many defense firms consider themselves \ntransportation equipment manufacturers first and defense firms second. \nOur surveys indicated interest by defense firms in this type of \nresearch and development. \n\nf. Research for improvement of housing, rehabilitation \nfacilities and programs : It might be desirable to develop a broad \n\n\n224 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nprogram of researca for development of low income housing, of mechanical \ndevices and of other sorts of aid to mitigate the difficulties of handi\xc2\xac \ncapped and older people in their daily functioning. This research \nmight cover, for example, the development of aids and facilities to \nimprove the mobility in and outside the home of the older person and \nthe physically handicapped. It could include development of special \ntypes of houses. Other groups that could be aided are the mentally \nill and culturally deprived. Programs for these people could be of a \ncomprehensive type to enable them to function as effectively as \npossible. \n\n\ng. Research into the total problem of high density urban \npopulation concentrations: Defense firms with their systems capability \nmight be drawn into the study of the i? total urban problem\xe2\x80\x9d which is a \ncomplex of air pollution, limited land and space, need for green \nspace and quiet, need for improved esthetics in the environment, and \nneed for hospital, medical, educational and recreational facilities. \n\nAt a time when we emphasize meeting human needs and eliminating \npoverty, it may be prudent to develop some means to gauge what human \nneeds are, or should be, in our highly compressed urban environment. \n\nh. International development programs : U. S. participation \nwith individual nations and international organizations in develop\xc2\xac \nment programs. Defense firms with their systems management and \ncomplex problem solving capability might be brought into this program. \n\n2. Federal assistance programs \n\na. Liberalization of unemploypent benefits and enactment of \nFederal minimum standards : Existing state unemployment insurance laws \nvary widely and do not provide even 50 percent of a worker\xe2\x80\x99s wage \n(which was the objective in the 1930\xe2\x80\x99s). Standards of benefits and \nlength of eligibility might be reviewed. \n\nb. Training and education programs for possible development \nby the Office of Education : Programs might include the following: \n\n(1) A program to facilitate the vocational readjustment \nof members of the armed forces who are discharged as a result \nof anas reduction. Handled through Federal-state relation\xc2\xac \nship. \n\n(2) A program for retraining professional workers \n(including former defense managers and technicians). Long \nterm loans covering university costs and family subsistence \ncould be provided. Handled through Federal-state relation\xc2\xac \nship. \n\nc. Retraining program for craftsmen for possible development \nby the Bureau of Apprenticeship, Department of Labor : Subsistence and \n\n\n225 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nretraining payments for a program for retraining craftsmen whose skills \nhave become obsolete could be handled through Federal-state relation\xc2\xac \nship. \n\nd. Expanding operations of the U. S. Employment Service : The \nfollowing might be considered: \n\n(1) Using data processing operations to supply job avail\xc2\xac \nability information on a regional scale; also development of an \nexpanded system for obtaining job vacancy information. \n\n(2) Skill testing and counseling services, particularly to \nhelp the younger and first-job seekers. \n\n(3) Broader training school referral capacity as well as \nincreases in subsistence payments. \n\n(4) Special services for older, unskilled, nonwhite, and \nwomen workers. \n\n(5) Job relocation fund to include job-seeking trips when \ndesirable. \n\n(6) Regular regional seminars on occupational needs for \npersonnel directors of private companies. \n\ne. Development of job transferability information by Bureau \nof Employment Security : System would relate details of skill, mental \nability, and physical ability to jobs defined by such requirements. Aim \nis increased job transferability, and, thereby, mobility. \n\nf. Earlier social security payments : When workers have \nserious deficiencies which make their readjustment and retraining \nhighly improbable, an amended Social Security Act would make it pos\xc2\xac \nsible for these workers to receive social security benefits on certifi\xc2\xac \ncation by the U. S. Employment Service. \n\ng. Home ownership losses : A program to cushion losses result\xc2\xac \ning from selling owner-occupied homes when the owner has to relocate as \na result of unemployment might be developed. Study is needed to develop \na program fair to all dislocated workers. \n\nh. Mortgage forbearance: A program might be developed which \nwould permit mortgage forbearance when workers in a community face sub\xc2\xac \nstantial unemployment. Study is needed to develop an equitable program \nto all concerned. \n\ni. Income tax unemployment relief amendment : Study might be \nundertaken of a plan whereby a worker unemployed for more than three \nmonths may average previous year f s income with current year*s low or \nno income, recompute his tax, and request tax refund. (Certified by \nUSES). \n\n\n226 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nj\xe2\x80\xa2 Contingency authority and contingency appropriations to \nFederal agencies : This would enable the President to speed up specific \nprograms that Federal agencies already have underway. These programs \nwould assist states and localities on a selective basis in the event \nof a serious dislocation impact. Covered under this contingency power \nwould be the professional and craftsmen training programs, suggested \nabove, under the Office of Education and Bureau of Apprenticeship, as \nwell as the existing training programs under the Office of Manpower, \nAutomation and Training. The aid programs of Small Business Adminis\xc2\xac \ntration are other examples of what could be used. \n\nk. Promotion of regLonal planning : Existing programs such as \nthe urban renewal program and those developed under the Economic Deve\xc2\xac \nlopment Administration (EDA) could provide funds for planning, and some \nof these funds might be used by communities preparing for defense cut \nreductions. These funds could be used to set up "pipelines 11 of public \nworks which could be quickly accelerated and to plan for development \nof "social utilities" in the community. Social utilities might include \nparks, libraries, beaches, day care centers, teenage camps, visiting \nnurse and homemaker services and recreation for the elderly. \n\nC. Defense Contract Policy \n\n1. It may be desirable for the Federal government to issue \nguidelines in regard to worker benefit allowances to mitigate worker \nreadjustment difficulties that are allowable under defense contracts. \nThese benefits might include: \n\na. Permitting worker terminal leave pay benefits in defense \ncontracts with the standards recommended by the President for civil \nservice workers as a possible model, \n\nb. Establishing worker training and education program funds. \n\nc. In the case of private pension plans , investigating the \npossibility of full funding of liabilities as a terminal cost for \nDepartment of Defense contracts if vesting is stipulated. \n\n2. It might also be desirable to start a study of liquidation \nprocedures. A technical study group could be established by the \nPresident to recommend procedures for meeting Federal government obli\xc2\xac \ngations to private firms in the event of an arms reduction agreement. \n\nPolicies for Consideration by State and Local Governments \n\nThe policies described below are of a more general nature than \nthose listed for consideration by the Federal government because \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nspecific policy choices at the state and local government level will \nvary greatly depending on area characteristics, institutional make-up \nand many other factors. Policies offered for consideration below \nshould be viewed as possible general approaches to readjustment pro\xc2\xac \nblems at the regional level. \n\nA. Leadership and Guidance Role \n\nState leadership and guidance might assist communities in prepar\xc2\xac \ning for dislocations. It might provide a broader planning base (and \ncould include regional planning), and for the smaller community, it \ncould provide special assistance in coping with severe reduction in \nreceipts from the defense activity which dominates a community. We \nwish to emphasize that local community planning is nonetheless still \ncrucial and will probably determine how successfully the community \nmakes its adjustments. \n\nB. Information Needs \n\n\n1. It would be desirable for state and local governments to com\xc2\xac \npile information on the specific characteristics of defense and non\xc2\xac \ndefense activity and employment in their areas, including state and \nlocal government activity. \n\n2. State and local governments might also investigate what grant \nand loan programs covering many different types of activity (research, \neducation, road building, urban plaining, etc.) are available at the \nFederal level as well as the procedures for developing their own new \nprograms. \n\nG. Policies and Programs \n\n1. It might be desirable for state and local governments to have \na specific organizational unit or assistant responsible for handling \nthe informational, liaison and other tanks in respect to defense spend\xc2\xac \n\ning and possible arms reduction impacts on its area. This function has \noften been lost in broader functions of economic development groups. \n\nThe responsibility for arms reduction work might be lodged in a govern\xc2\xac \nment office or, as in the city of Baltimore, in a public Economic \nDevelopment Commission, which has a subcommittee charged with this \nresponsibility. \n\n2. Coordinator of community and state and Federal grant and local \nprograms . It might be desirable for the community to have a coordina\xc2\xac \ntor as monitor between the planning group which sets the objectives and \n\n\n228 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nprograms and the city departments which are responsible for carrying \nthem out within their jurisdiction. The coordinator\'s responsibilities \nmight include monitoring the status of accelerated public works and \nother special \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x98pipeline*\xe2\x80\x99 programs to insure that they are on a "start- \nup basis with funds available or provisions for obtaining them com\xc2\xac \npleted. The coordinator might work closely with private local develop\xc2\xac \nment groups and unions in working up and carrying out the community \nprograms. \n\n\n3. Use of Federal land, plant or facilities . The community in \nconcert with private local development groups and unions might take \nadvantage of available land, plant, or laboratory facilities to be dis\xc2\xac \nposed of by the Federal government to develop a program for encouraging \nnew enterprises to locate in the community. \n\n4. Unemployment insurance program . Unemployment insurance \nprograms might be reviewed in respect to their adequacy in benefits \nand length of eligibility. \n\n\nPolicies for Consideration of Business Firms and Unions \n\n\nA. Establishment of a Local Development Group \n\nOur brief review of past and recent area dislocation experiences \nsuggests that areas without development groups usually set up such \ngroups on an emergency basis when a shutdown occurs; then they make \nvigorous but emergency efforts to obtain alternative plant activities \nfor the community or state. It might be desirable to have an estab\xc2\xac \nlished development group working within the guidelines of overall \ncommunity objectives. \n\nB. Shift into Nondefense Work Activities by Business Firms \n\nEfforts by defense business firms to shift part of their operations \nto nondefense work might be intensified. Possibilities for nondefense \ngovernment work could be explored with appropriate Federal, state, and \nlocal government agencies. \n\nC. Transfer of Personnel to Other Company Operations \n\nBroader transfer programs might be developed by defense business \nfirms for the shifting of personnel from one division or plant of a \ncompany which is reducing operations or shutting them down to units of \nthe company where there are job openings. The transfer program might \nattempt to cover, where possible, personnel below the top management \nand professional level. \n\n\n229 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nD. Cooperation with Local Manpower Training and Employment Agency \nPrograms \n\nBoth defense business and union cooperation with the U. S. Employ\xc2\xac \nment Service and in support of local manpower training programs to \nfacilitate worker readjustments would be desirable, \n\nE. Retraining and Reeducation Provision by Defense Business Firms \n\nArrangements to permit workers at all occupational levels to \nundertake retraining and reeducation to prepare themselves for possible \njob shifts might be considered by defense business firms. \n\nF. Interunion Cooperation in Worker Transfer \n\nIt would be highly desirable if interunion arrangements could be \ndeveloped to facilitate defense worker transfer from one job to another. \nThis would involve review of problems of transferring, seniority and \nother rights and benefits, \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nG. Treatment of Dislocation Issues in Collective Bargaining \n\nDefense firms and unions might deal with possible dislocation \nproblems, to whatever extent they can* in the collective bargaining \nprocess. Job transfer possibilities to other divisions of a company, \nworker retraining, terminal leave, and pension rights are some of the \nissues that might be discussed. \n\nH. Conversion Seminars \n\nSeminars open to business, unions, and community leaders to discuss \ndislocation problems and solutions would, we believe, prove useful. \n\n\n230 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n~ r. \n\n\xc2\xabiir\xc2\xae *\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\nt \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n \xe2\x80\xa2 \nr \n\n\n*ao;\xc2\xab4 \nA AMA t \n\ni \' \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nr iv \n\n\n\xc2\xab e. \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\xe2\x80\xa2 r. \n\n\n! I i \n\nI > I ! ! \n\nCll\xe2\x80\x98x^A\xc2\xabcr.C9\xc2\xab \n\nA\' ,!\xe2\x80\xa2 AC \xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\xa2\' Ar I r .: \n\nI \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab-> I \n\nI \n\n\n! \n\n\nI \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2| \n\n\nA tfl \n> a \nO \nA \n\nS \n\n\nt \n\n\nr 0 * ir,* c tr a* if \xc2\xbb\xc2\xa3 c r-. \n\n**. \xe2\x80\xa2 C Ai tf **> *4 \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab (V 9 *i \n\n; i a i \n\nI \xe2\x80\xa2 i \xe2\x80\xa2 \' * \n\n\n1 \n\n\n* cr. ci r \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nt tf \xe2\x80\xa2- I \n\nI I \n\n\nAC^hK\'hiAC hA AO AR Cl \n\nI A A^A U If A AiA - | \xc2\xbb \xc2\xbb f\xc2\xbb! \ni t ii*~ r i i \xc2\xbb i t ri \n\nI \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\x98 i , \xc2\xbb. \n\n\nr*i \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n\nA \n\nI \n\n\n\n\nA\' \n\n\na \n\na \n\n91 \n\n7 \n\n\nc\' \n\na| \n\n\ni ^ \n\nH - \n\n=1 i \n\n\ni I \n\n\nis \n\ni. \n\ni *> \n\ns \n\n> JJ \ni **a \n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\ne \n\' S \n\ni* \n\n\nl/> \n\nA \n\n\nC \xe2\x80\xa2> *< A A ** \n\ncor \n\nc r ^ \n\nC C C 9 (V \n\n9 \n\nIV \n\nu * \na \xc2\xa3\' \n\n{jJ w \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\nt \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nl \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n( l \n\nS i \n\n| \n\n1 \n\n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2I \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 * \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na 1 c \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu. \n\n\n\nCA - A \n\nCOR \n\nC 4 A \n\nccer aco \n\nA. \n\ntf \n\n9 \n\nu c \n\n*-\xe2\x96\xa0 \xc2\xab \n\nC tv) \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nI \n\n1 \n\n1 t \n\ni \n\n\xc2\xbbJ. **i \n\ni \n\ntv \n\nT 1 \n\n\n1/ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xa3\xc2\xa3 \n\nc \n\nc \n\nC C 4 C <" \n\nC Cl 9 \n\nci r \n\n~ C C <\xc2\xa3 c \n\n\naaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa* \n\nOiCe\xc2\xaeifHio\xc2\xab(\xc2\xabi*hcchr;cAjMriyl \nIf (tMIAH^ir A A f, f r o J A\' if R : \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- i A A A \n\n\n\xc2\xab m \n\nc- r \n\nr r- \n\n\xc2\xab- r \n\n\n4 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nin r. \n\n9. R> \n\n\n9 \n\nr \n\n\n\xc2\xabr> \n\n> \n\n\n\xc2\xab M \n\nH \xe2\x96\xa0H \n\n3 * \n\n3 \xe2\x80\xa2 5 \nH 5 \n\n\n~ tf (VCC 4> \nif \xc2\xab. \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba C A V 4* AJ ^4* A* O in \xc2\xab A\xc2\xbb aM (\\J tf tf 9 Al H 0 \n\n,W 4 < A \xc2\xab \xc2\xbb^R AARw\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb.s^ IfR 0 A \n\n\xc2\xbb- tv a. a. . R. r-. \n\n, ! - *\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no-tf\xc2\xabVa.C94~C\\lf\'-94- \n\n\xc2\xabn tf m 9 tf cm -4 .r r> \n\n\nNCN\xc2\xab-~rtiClf!R4 \nM\xc2\xabaR> 4 \xe2\x80\xa2 4 \xe2\x80\xa2 4 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab| \n\nJm " - - _ . \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-tfM\xc2\xabtfRr~cir~9r\'*tf\xc2\xaer\xc2\xbb44;<*\xc2\xa9tf9R9i \n\n;T \n\n\nIO \n\nR> \n\n\noc\xc2\xab 40 H*\xc2\xabcoaoooHC ooiunnoo \n\n\nRJ H \n\xc2\xab4 \xc2\xbb4 \n\nI \n\n\n3 V \n\n\naj \n\n\n\ntf A \n\nctr* jhAARMf err^oa^. \n\na r- \n\nA- K! R> \n\nO\' \n\n\nO\' \n\ntf \n\nO\' \n\nn \n\n9 \n\nN 4 OAHrtifl H o< R H -1 \n\n*4 9 \n\nO ^ AJ \n\n-4 \n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\nR \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nA \n\nA W \n\nR) \n\n\ni \n\nR> \n\nAl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 -# \n\nR> \n\ni \n\n\\ \n\n\n\n\nx> \n\nCtfrOf\'CMr^RiA-ifir-r\'-a-aotf \n\n1 \n\n9 R) R) \n\ntf \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n/> \n\no \n\n\n41 \n\ntf \n\nAd X Ah HR h R rtH \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 9 \n\nRV tf Al \n\no \n\ntf \n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\ntf \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\no \n\nr\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n9 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r, \n\n\n^4 \n\n\n\n\nUJ 1 \n\n3 J \n\n(V tf \n\nUJ \n\n\nO H III O \n\n44 UJ, tf \n\n4 - \n\ni \n\nX 4 - OC z , \na x 3 : \n\ntf 3 5 tf tf. \n\n9 \n\n4 - \n\n\nUJ 4 - z \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ UJ \xe2\x96\xba- 3 Z \n\ntf \n\nZ 4 - \n\nJ 4 *4 (/) \n\nJ wool \n\nUJ \n\nUJ O o \nX \xe2\x80\x94.3 \n\n-J Z *-\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nO X 0 Z \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xc2\xab 3 X -J j \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r X U.\' UJ H \n\n! * \n\n\na - \n\nl- y O . 4 - U. 3 \n>- j 3 \xc2\xab um i a \n\nx z c x a -j u x i \n\nI- u 2 *\xe2\x96\xa0* -a\xc2\xab-U>H" \n\n3 a z Z\xe2\x80\x99.o xajH \n\n3 C \xe2\x80\x94 O C \'aJ \xc2\xab 5 x \n\n\nj|s uo. z < \n\nar uf >,M \xc2\xab B \nOZ Z X I \n\n\nU|UI \n\n\n4 * \n\n\'> \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nI \n\n\ni: \n\n\nX; tf tf \n0,1 U Z \n4-\'\xc2\xab tfi\xc2\xab \n\xc2\xa9\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab- 44 OC \n\nr< **\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\nl AZ \ntf UJ 9 \nZu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nJ \n\nJO I \xc2\xbbi *4 \nM<,ZC> \n\xc2\xbb- X \xe2\x80\x94 W -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n3 \xe2\x96\xba- 14. AU \n\n\nO \n\nu! \n\nGl \n\n* \n\n3) \n\n\n$ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\no \n\n5! \n\nX: \n\nui \n\njt \n\n0 \n\nK \n\nO \n\n\n< \n\n& \n\n\n2 uj \n\ni I \n\n\n1 \n\nu \n\n\nX \n\no \n\nCD \n\n< \n\n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24\' \n\nO: \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nu. \n\nX \n\n>- \n\no \n\n-I \n\n\n231 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nALASKA TABLE is (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xab V \xc2\xab\' \n11 \n\nV *tf! \n\n\n*~i ir i \n\n\nc i \n\nO\' l_ | \n\nn?t\\ \n\nu 1 tv, \n\noch ~l \n\nLi 2 \nl.l \n\nU C \n\n*-\xc2\xa9 r- \nc u. i \n\n(L \xe2\x80\xa2">, \n\n\nST \n\nU \n\nc \n\n2 \n\nLi \n\na \n\nu \n\nu. \n\nu. \n\n\n\\r \n\na \n\n\nI \n\na \n\nv. \n\n\n\xc2\xabr \n\nI \n\n*1 \n\n\nl. \n\n\nu. \nX u \nc I- \n*-e \n\n_J \n\nul _ \n\nX * \xc2\xbb \n5 *c \no m o \n\xc2\xa9 \nf \n\ni a \n\ne a \n\n\xc2\xab- c \n\nx s \n\n\nu, \n\nl. \n\n2 \n\nc c \n\n\nHUG. 1 \nW ? , \n\n2 \n\ns $ \n\n4 \n\nO I \n\nL> O \n\nA O \n\n2 \n\n\n\\ \n\noU #^*o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 4 \xc2\xbb \n\nr tv I\xe2\x80\x94 \n\ni \n\n\n4 4 K. K.O C O m. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2I \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \xc2\xabv r \n\nm \xe2\x96\xa0 m\xc2\xbb \n\nI ; I \n\n\n-| \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr> tv ; \xc2\xabv \n\n\n4 tv \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nm i \n\n\nm\'N \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n7 \n\n\n4 j Xf \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nM A \n\ni \n\n\n\n\nr.i* \n\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ntv It* \n\n\ntvn \xc2\xab-\xc2\xab c 4 . \n\n*VVvV \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 ; * \n\n\nr-irc\xe2\x80\x98irc,irir<\xc2\xa3\xc2\xabr<\xc2\xa3\xc2\xab\'4: \n\n\xc2\xbb 4 \xc2\xabA^AC<\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbbAA \n\n! * i\' \n\n \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nc c c c \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nc e\'e c c \n\nc c e c \n\n\xc2\xa9Cm \n\nC m; \n\n\nif \n\nc \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa21 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n; \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc. \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc c c c \n\nc \n\nc c c c e \n\nc c c c \n\nc c c \n\nC r ! \n\n\ntf.\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nill i \n\n* i \xc2\xa7 \n\n\nM \n\nm \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n1 : \n\n* \n\n1 \n\n\nt \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\ni \n\nc c \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\nc. \n\n1 \n\no \xc2\xa9\'c c c \n\ni \n\nc \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9Cm \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\nc \n\nmT \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nc \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni 1 1 1 \n\n1 \n\n(\xe2\x80\xa2III \n\ntill \n\nIII \n\n1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n. 1 \n\n\n\nm in pc \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h G \xe2\x80\xa2-* O C \n\nJ if Ml \xc2\xa9 \n\nc 4 : C \n\n4 : m \n\n\ntc \n\nH \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nK 3 \n\n\ntv \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n; \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIT \n\n\n\n\nmi m \n\n\xc2\xa9jtv \xc2\xa9 o \n\n\xc2\xab-* \n\ni \n\nmi e mi c e \n\n3- if) Ml Ml \n\n\xc2\xa9 41 O\' \n\n1 \xc2\xa9 IT \n\ntv \n\nc- \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm # \n\n4 \n\n \n\ntv \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nSt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nh \xe2\x80\xa2*) lO pO \n\nm \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n. \n\n1 \n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\nm tv \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n1 \n\nMl \xc2\xa9 Ml O C \n\ni \n\ntf if, V mi \xc2\xa9 41 r tv \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nMl C M \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n3 if \xc2\xab \xc2\xab \n\nO 4) \xc2\xa9 \n\n4> 0 \xe2\x96\xa0O \n\nm \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb4 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO-S \n\nfO \n\n\n\n\n-A ^ \n\nA -i \n\no *\xe2\x96\xa0< w \na i- a: \na x 2 \n\nIf UJ 1 \xe2\x80\x9c \nZ K _J \xe2\x96\xba- mi \n\nU O u J 2 \n\nat \xe2\x80\x94 3 \xc2\xab c * \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c heiw : \n\nI- U O *- L. \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 _i O * lii 4 ! 1 \n\nX v O \xc2\xa3 \xc2\xa3L J U 1 \nU Z K \xe2\x80\x94< >-i tjJ \n\ni/l l/l C >\xe2\x80\x94 CE X \n\nD X Z Z j O x O { \n\n\'JOhOOjj\xc2\xab X \n24 t*L\xc2\xbb\'L.*-U.-l \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nA-4 \n\nX \n\nif \n\n\nX U> >- \nDJI \n1 t UJ \n\nI uz \n\nK M.I >M \n\nZ A.X \n\nMl Li\'O \n\nxz;< \n\nCL U Z \n\n\nl/! \xc2\xa9 \nU Li \nJ \n\nU X \n\nM. Ct \n\nr i \nuA \n> \xc2\xbb-\xc2\xab \n\na 5 \n\no i \n\xe2\x96\xba- a \nO \n\nz 4 \n\n\nu\xc2\xbb \n\ntu m \n\na ui \n\nX l/l if) \nKDZ \n\no o o \n\n4 z m. \nL.,LIK \nX a 4 , \xc2\xa9 \n\n2 < UUI \n\n< S H M \n\nX I 2 l~ \nin \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xab-> ut \nU 2 A -I O \n\nm < x\'~ 4 \n\nmi ot \xc2\xa9!\xe2\x96\xba> at \n\n\xc2\xbb,\xe2\x96\xba> yOp- \n\n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nui l- \nLi > uv \n\nO LI \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xa9 O\' \n\n2 X| \n\n1 i/l Z O\' \nUl Li 4 L| \n\n2 U \xc2\xbb \n\nHM JO \n\n1 > Ml UJI \n\n2 tn> Xi \n*- Li *-\xe2\x80\xa2 Xi \n\nli l/l VI \n\na. \n\no \n\nA \n\n\n2 \n\n*: \n\nS: \n\nj! \n\nA\' \n\nX \n\n\n>l \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2M \n\no: \n\n\nLI \n\nO \n\n\nX \n\no \n\ncr \n\n4 \n\n\n> \n\nMl \n\nO \n\n\n232 \n\n\nUwfcMPLOVMFNT KATE 10.7 10.4 JO.4 10.S \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n9*1 \n\n(T \n\n\xc2\xab If \n\n\n\n\nl! \n\n\na \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIf \n\n\n< \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n%9* \n\n\nc \n\n1 \n\n\nIf c \n\n\n\nk> \n\n9*. \n\n\nC> U. \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n?\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 r \n\n\nL \n\nCV \n\n\na. k \n\n\n\nU 12 \n\n\n\nU. U. \n\n\n\niL c \n\n\xe2\x80\x94J \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba e \n\nft \n\n\nC u. \n\ni \n\n\na \n\n999 \n\n\n\n\n\nIf \n\n1 \n\nCV \n\nu \n\n\n\nV \n\nt \n\n\n2 \n\nIf- \n\n\n3 \n\n99 \n\n\nor \n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\nU. \n\n99 \n\n\nb. \n\n\n\nt- \n\n1 \n\n\nc \n\n!V \n\n\n\nw \n\n\nft \n\n\n\nIf. \n\n\n\ne- \n\n9-. \n\nc \n\n*> \n\nft"\' \n\n\nu. \n\n|l \n\n\n\n9-* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n2 \n\nu \n\n0 \n\ne \n\nb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nc \n\n\n\nc.,r. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncv a \n\nl \n\n\n<\xc2\xa3 \xc2\xab \n9 9 \n\nCV 9- \n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xbb-*. \xc2\xae \n\n\xc2\xaba~ \n\ni \n\n\xc2\xae r \n\n9 9 \n\nN CV \n\n\n^ .\xc2\xa3Cvft\xc2\xabiaft 3 ftr-c \n\n\ncv r cv,\xc2\xabv \n\n\n,if \xc2\xbb- 9 \xc2\xabr *- \n\ni yi i \n\n\ncr. \n\n\no r. rvcv \xc2\xaei \n\n* 9 9, \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n9- JT r Oi \n\n\nSI \n\n\nr r \n\n9 9 \n\nI P- \n\n7 \n\n\n9 9 \n\nC 9- \n\nI \n\n\nft : ft \n\n9 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nI\' I \n\n\n3ifctC\\0!9Ce-.-\xc2\xab* cvJif \n\n\xc2\xbb 999 ^ 999999 je \n\nIT 3 CV IO \xc2\xae CV K 3 \xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nI , \n\n\' \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nif \xc2\xab-.cc9|ftsica 3 r.;\xc2\xab \n\n99999999999^9 \n\nI i 1 \n\nc cv c c c cc cc if cr *\xe2\x96\xa0 c e c *- c c ft \n\nI I 1 ; I \xe2\x99\xa6 I I I I I S I I I I, I * I I I I 1 \n\n\nft \n\ni \n\n\nr \n\nI \n\n\nft \n\nl \n\n\nS3 \n\n<\\ \n\nI \n\n\nC 9**CCCCCC9-CC9-CCCrftlfCC \n\nI I I I I e 1 1 1 i I I. I . 1 I I 1 1 1 1 \n\n\nvt \n\nI \n\n\nft \n\nI \n\nI \n\nC \n\n9 \n\n7 \n\n\nr \n\nI \n\n\nc \n\nCV \n\nI \n\n\nft \n\nI \n\n\nJ \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa21 \nc \nr, \n\n\nCV \n\nI * 1 \n\n\nr*i * \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94, 3 \n\n\nif| \n\n** > \n\ncv in 3 \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\na \n\n3 f S \n\no o \n\n\xe2\x80\x94i Uj \n2 \n\n\nc-. i\xc2\xab . ?*\xe2\x96\xa0 o *-\xe2\x80\xa2 a: \n\n rO \xe2\x80\x94H ; ftl A J .M -9 \n\n\ncr. \n\n3 \n\nft- \n\n\nIf \n\nft- \n\nO \n\nCV \n\n\ncr \n\n>0 \n\n\n3 \n\n-n \n\nft \n\n\ncv -o cv 0 \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 cr h j- \n\nCV 0 \n\n3 \n\nft Xf-C \n\nn wo \n\nCV 9^ ft. \n\nCV \n\n0 \n\n \n\n\n\n1 3 \n\n\nm \n\n\n\nCV f> \n\n3 CV -C \n\n0 \n\nft \n\n3 \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nH H \n\nft \n\n0 \n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\ncv \n\n} \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\n\nu. \n\n. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n\nj \n\n1 \n\n\n\na \n\n3 \n\n\na \n\nn \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n1 U 0 \n\nft-* \n\n3 \n\nin \n\n\n\n\n2 \n\n\nt- \n\n\n\nX \n\nV- \n\n* 2 \n\nD \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\n< \n\n\n3 \n\n\n2 f 1 \n\n3 \n\n\nc. \n\nX \n\n3 \xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\nvn C \n\n\xe2\x80\x9ci \n\nui in \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\nu \n\nIf \n\n\nUJ \n\nft X \n\n\xe2\x80\xa23 uJ ft \n\nr z \n\n\nif. \n\nft ! \n\nft- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n2 ft- \n\n\n\n-* I/) \n\n3 \n\n0 \n\n0 0 \n\n\n3 \n\n> in \n\n0 \n\n\nft \n\n0 \n\nUJ 0 u \n\n\n\n2 - 1 \n\nO X \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX ft- \n\n\n\nC 3 \n\n\n\nOI \n\nu~ \n\nQC- \xe2\x96\xba* Z \n\nft -4 \n\n2 ) \n\nX 3 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nb. \n\nui ft \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc\xc2\xa3 U \n\nft. \n\n\n3: \n\n\n_ \xe2\x99\xa6\xe2\x80\x94 ^ \n\nX \n\nU- \n\n: ia \xe2\x96\xba \n\nX ! \n\n\nX < \n\ntr \n\nX \n\n* \n\nX \n\nX \n\nCL \n\nX \n\nft- O c \n\n\nft \n\nu. ^ . j a \n\nuj a \n\n2 \n\n< 0 3 \n\n1 \n\nin z 0 \n\n3 \n\n0 \n\nX, \n\n0 \n\n-j 3 a \n\nUJ \n\n\ni a \xc2\xab ui \n\n> \n\n< \n\n\n-* \n\nin \n\n3 < 3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0I) \n\n2 0 x a \n\n_J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa23 \n\nx 1 0 2 \n\n1 \n\nX \n\n? 2 \n\nft \n\n2 \n\n<-> - . \n\n3 \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n2 \n\n< \n\n0 2 ft- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab4 \n\n*\xc2\xbb* \n\nuJ \xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c *\xe2\x80\x9c* *\xe2\x80\x9c* \n\nx \xc2\xabn \n\n\nin x \n\n\nUJ \n\nft- J c \n\n\n< \n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 1/1 0 \n\n\nX \n\nXi Z T X \n\n0 1 \n\nu \n\n2 X \n\n3 Q 5 \n\n>9-93: \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nJl \n\n\n\nj 2 2 0 \n\nX \n\n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 UJ. 0 \n\nft a \n\nI/I \n\n< X \n\n\n< 2 \n\na > x 1 \n\n0 \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO ft. 3 G \n\nu) \n\n4 \n\n-1 rt \xc2\xa5 J \n\n0 \xc2\xab \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xbb \n\nX 0 \n\n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3-. x- \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\na \n\n>1 \n\n> \n\n< * 3 \xe2\x80\x98X \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nu* \n\nJ 1 i> X \n\nx < \n\nz \n\nH* ^ \n\nX ft 3 \n\nf> U <*] \n\n\n0 \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\nu \n\n\n233 \n\n\nUKCMPLOYMf NT KATE. _ b .8 5 .? S .3 3.7 S .14 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAPKAN5A5 TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n< * \xc2\xabi \n\n\xe2\x80\x9e .ji \n\n* c * \n\nu t \n\nu O. \n\nlu ? l \n\nu u \nu t - \n\xe2\x96\xba tt e \nC U I \na ~| \n\n\nJ * \n\n\nif \n\n\nU \n\nc \n\nC \n\n1 \n\nr \n\nIf \n\nu \n\nw l \n\na \n\n\nu \n\n\nu. \n\n\nU- \n\na \n\n\n1 \n\nc \n\n0 \n\n\nw \n\n\xe2\x96\xba* \n\n\nu \n\n\na \n\n#\xe2\x96\xa0*\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nu \n\nt \n\n\nA \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb\' C \n\n\nMf\'lO If ^ \n\n3 0 - \n\n1 \n\nci\xc2\xab~ h a \n\n<4, x> cjir \n\nC (0 If- \n\nOj \xc2\xab \n\nO). \n\n0 1 \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xa9l \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb* \n\n1 0,- r.\xc2\xab \n\nr 0. \n\nlo- - \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n0. r r. \n\n0 \n\n\n\nIf\' \n\nrr- \n\n\n\nt 1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n0.1 \n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n1. \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\no C 3 a 0 \n\nc 0 \n\n1 \n\nOne \n\nc r \n\n4 \n\nit <\\ *\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nIf \xc2\xab 9 \n\nr c \n\nir \n\n0. \n\nf\' \n\n9 1 \n\n1 0. 0. 3 if \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r r \n\n, a oj \n\n\n\n\nO. 3 9 \n\nf* \n\n\n\ntr \n\n\n\n\n, 1 \n\n\n\n\n\nI* - \n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n*1 \n\n\nf \n\n\' K. C IT \xc2\xbbr \n\n0- 0. \n\n1 \n\nc \\ >L if \n\n0 \n\nc \n\nMf A \n\nO c 0 \n\nOj C \n\nc \n\nIf \n\n1 \n\n* \n\nO\' \n\n3 1 - \xc2\xab \n\n0 0 \n\n0 - 1 \n\nif \n\nK \n\nOOO \n\n- \xc2\xab- 1 \n\n1 M Cl \n\n\n\n\n1 \xc2\xbb 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \xe2\x99\xa6" \n\n\n1 \n\n1 1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 1 \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n0. \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n"l \n\nJ \n\n- c \xc2\xab- c c \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- C \n\nc 0. c \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc c c \n\ntr \xe2\x80\x94 & \n\nc r \n\n* \n\nsr \n\nr: \n\ns \n\n1 \n\n\nj 1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nl \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2l \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n- c \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2- c \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n- c \n\nc 0 c \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc c c \n\nr \xe2\x80\x94 e r \n\nc \n\nIT \n\n\nc \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nO \n\n1, \n\n| \n\n\n: c c c e. c \n\n*-\xc2\xab c \n\nC K C \n\n\n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c c \n\n0 c -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC f \n\n3 \n\n\n1 \n\nr \n\n0. \n\n1 \xe2\x80\xa2 1 < l 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 1 1 \n\nl i 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n*- \n\n\no< \n\n\n\n** c \xe2\x80\x94 ec..-.-\xc2\xabc.c\xc2\xab-ce.-*~cci\xc2\xbb*-if c. c \n\nl i I I I l l. I t l I l I I I. I i I I I \n\n\na \n\n7 \n\n\noi r \' \n\n\ni/ k<\\ \xe2\x80\x94 o <\\ o o. Oj to \xe2\x80\xa2- *- \n\n\noi \n\no \n\nc \n\n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\nc \n\n if) tO Oi \xc2\xabh to OI 30 ) OJ Oi fO \xc2\xab-t \xc2\xa9 Ifl \xe2\x96\xa0>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nw i \xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x80\xa2-w-.r\'C \n\n- - - : o. \n\n\nx. c \n\xe2\x80\xa2 u. \n\nf\' \n\n<0 \n\n\nt \n\n\nIf 1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 CC 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 to a 0 \xc2\xab \n\nir tr oj \n\n3 3 \n\n9 NO o 0 >c \n\nto O\' \n\na \n\n3 \n\nO \n\nA- \n\nO 2 . \n\n3 \n\ntf) 10 \n\nOi \xc2\xbbo \n\n0 , \n\n3 \n\nOI O) O) to \n\n\nO\' \n\nuO \n\nOi \n\n\naJ C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa20 <*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2M \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n2 U \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI \n\n\nOj \n\n\n\n\n7 \xe2\x80\x94 \nC O \n\n\nu. \n\nU.. to \n\n\n^*00000 -< 3 c. 000000 c.^* 0 t \\)00 r- *4 .\xc2\xa3 \n\n, \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xc2\xab -J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n0. \n\na \n\nif- \n\n3^ \n\nK 4 . \n\n0 tr \n\n4 f. 3 O. 3 \n\na \n\nOK \n\nX 3 X \n\n3 a. \n\nfO \n\n\xc2\xab? \n\nC\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\nH rc a. \n\n\'Ni \n\n\n\n>0 \n\nA) \n\n-4 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa00 \n\nOI \n\n3 OJ \n\n\nOJ OJ -0 \n\nH \n\n0 \n\nin \n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xab X \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 - \n\nc \n\n\n\nX 30 * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOj \n\n\n\n5 \xe2\x80\xa2 u \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab 0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nji \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n# \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nA \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nF\' \n\n3 \n\n\n>0 X \n\nJ 1 S A J N J \n\nto 3 \n\nO\' \n\nX to 7 . \n\nrO X \n\nif) \n\nX) \n\nf\xc2\xbb \n\nSO \n\nS 2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\nr. \n\n\nrC \n\nOj \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2M \n\nO) \n\nO) \n\n3 OJ \n\n\nO) OJ tO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9cA \n\nO \n\nIfl \n\nOJ \n\nrM \n\nO O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\nO \n\n1 \n\nr*- \n\n-J U \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nOJ \n\n\n\n7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT _J \n\n\na. \n\ntf. \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \xc2\xab \n\nu 0 \n\n\nuj tn \n\n\nK \n\n\n7 \n\n\nt- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI K \n\nT 7 \n\nO X UJ \n\n\n< \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ. x \n\n^ \xe2\x80\xa2-< \n\nuo 0 \n\n3 to \n\nin \n\n1 - \n\n\nX \n\n\nUj \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nLO \n\nUJ \n\nt- T \n\nUJ UJ F- - \n\n7 \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nV \n\n\nX \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n_) i- \n\n\xc2\xab-\xe2\x80\xa2 to \n\n1 -J \n\n0 0 \n\nO \n\nUJ \n\n> in \n\nc \n\n\n>\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n0 \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n0 \n\nu \n\n_) \n\nz >- \n\nu a \n\n3 X \n\n\xc2\xbb-4 \n\n\n0 u. \n\n_l \n\n\nO \n\nu. \n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\nW \n\n\nor -s \n\n\nU UJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC Oi \n\nX \n\n\nJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n>. ^ \n\nr x \n\nIf \xe2\x96\xba I 1 \n\nX x \n\n\xc2\xab 7 \n\nX \n\nX. \n\nX \n\nz \n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n\nU. O -J X UJ Q. \n\nZ \xc2\xabr \n\nO UJ \n\n1 m \n\nz 0 \n\nUJ \n\n0 \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n\n>- \n\n_) \n\n\n\n2 U < \n\n\xc2\xbb 0. \n\n< Uf > ft \n\n< B \n\nM H \n\nin u \n\n*t U. \n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\nU) \n\nto \n\n\nQC \n\n\n\nt: \n\na \n\n_) u \n\nx 1 \n\nU 2 X \n\nX 1 \n\nZ K \n\nz 0 \n\n\n\n!\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n*-3 M \n\nuJ \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nM Uj \n\nH- \n\n_i \n\n\n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\n0 \n\nx a) \n\n\nwo\xc2\xbb- a \n\ntft < \n\nX -\xe2\x80\xa2 < z OC, \n\n> X \n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n0 \n\n*-* \n\n\n0 \n\naJ < \n\na \n\nX < O <-i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb X \n\nO\'t- \n\nX \xc2\xab- UJ, \n\nM s \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\n\n< \n\nX \n\n0 \n\nu. \n\n\xc2\xbb- lL \n\nJ (V \n\n_> X X < \n\nX t- \n\n0 0 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba* u. Jl| \n\n0 < \n\n\n0 \n\npH \n\n-H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2e \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n\nV \n\n\n234 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMFNT RATE 3.*4 2.5 2.A 2.7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\nc- \n\n1 ! \n\nAA\'CiCO \xc2\xa5. \n\n1 \n\na. c\'o \n\n3 O \xc2\xa9 ft \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xa9\xe2\x80\x98ft. \n\nO ft \n\n1 \n\nIf. \n\nft \xc2\xa9 \n\nc. \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n. \n\n\n\n\n\nIT \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab . \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 % \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n* \n\n\nIT \n\na.\' \n\n\nr j \n\n1 CV ft \n\nr \xc2\xbb ft \n\nft. |K \n\nft; r \n\nft \n\n\n\n\nft \n\nC \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i \n\n\n, \n\nif \n\n9 . \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ir \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\' 1 \n\n3 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\ni \n\n\n| \n\n1 \n\n\nft \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 .* \n\nWl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\nif \n\na a ir \n\n3 ft C \n\ntt C - \n\n0 * \n\n0 \n\nIf \n\nft s \n\n3 v\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nft c \n\nft \n\nc \n\na \n\nft \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*\xe2\x80\x99 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\na. \xc2\xabc \n\n\ncv \n\n1 ft ft \n\n3 <0 ft \n\n1 \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nft If ft \n\n\n9 ~\\ w * \n\nft 3 \n\n& \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\nir x \n\nU \n\n1 \n\nA \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa27 \n\n! \n\nIf \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\ntr, \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n.1 \n\n\n\nQ. \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU \n\nu \n\nU, \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n*\xc2\xbb. \n\nv\xc2\xab" \n\n\xc2\xbbrc \xc2\xab| \xe2\x80\x94 \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc ^ r \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 ftltt \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na <\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIf \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabCiC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO < \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n-c \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nsC \n\na \n\nIf \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\nO \n\nh \n\n\n1 \n\n3 l. I \n\n- i e \n\nf\' a \n\nl a \n\nft \n\nft \n\nft ft \n\n1 1 \n\n\ni ft \n\n\n\nv\xc2\xa3 \n\n1 \n\nc \n\nu \n\ni \n\n\n\ni \n\nl l \n\ni \n\nif \n\nt \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\nft \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n7 \n\n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab*. \n\n\n\n\n\ns \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\nw \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIT \n\n\n\n^ \n\nft \n\nft. \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\nv\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nj \n\nI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n3 -> \n\nft c. \n\nft ft. \n\nIf \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft \n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX ft. ft \n\nft c \n\nx. \n\n3 O \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft \n\nr-i \n\nX \n\n\n\nz a \n\no \n\nS 1 - \n\ni i \n\ni i \n\n1 1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nI 1 1 \n\nft ft \n\nX \n\n1 \n\nc \n\n0 \n\nX \n\nr \n\n\n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\n\nft \n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nUi \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT9 \n\nh 01 \n\n\nft) 3 C \n\nir o \n\n0 ft \n\nX X \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\nft \n\ncc rj \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft c \n\nX \n\nft) \xc2\xa9 \n\n4T \n\ner \n\n3 \n\nft \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xab a \n\nff \n\nfi ft ft \n\nif \n\nif a \n\nft X \n\nft \n\nX \n\n\nft \n\n3 c X \n\nO 0 \n\n3 \n\nft \n\nr \n\nc \n\nft \n\njr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nST \n\nV- \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nft \n\nX \n\nft \xe2\x80\x94. \n\nX 3 \n\nX \n\n3 3 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nC \n\nR \xe2\x80\xa2 C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nft- \n\nft- \n\ntt \n\nft- \n\n\na- \n\n\n4> \n\nm ft o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\nc \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX c. \n\n\n<0ur -h \n\nIt c \n\nft c \n\n\n3 \n\nft! \n\nX \n\nft \n\n3 X! ft \n\n3 \xc2\xabC \n\nft"* \n\nft a \n\nX \n\nft) \n\nC \n\n\nX \n\n\nc s \n\nft \n\na ft. ft. \n\nIf - \n\nX c \n\nft. X \n\ne \n\nX \n\nft- \n\n49 \n\nX C X \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft** \n\nt r . ft- \n\nft \n\nc \n\nC \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- c \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ^ \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n<\\ \n\nV \n\nft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX X \n\nr \n\n3 3 \n\n\nX \n\nK \n\nX \n\nr. \n\n\nX \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\nGC \n\nft^ \n\n\ntt \n\n\nw \n\nz- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n1 \n\n\n\ns \n\n- \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\nu. \n\n\nG S \n\n\xc2\xa9 c \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\no \n\n\nc \n\nG \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\nft! ft \n\nx o \xc2\xa9, \n\n ft J1 Xi O if \xc2\xa9 X \n\nx; \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO ft) ft \n\nX \n\nft \n\nft \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no z \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- 4* \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX X. \n\n\n3 ft. \n\n3 \n\nK* \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J \n\nQ VL O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\n\n\na \n\n\n< \n\n\xc2\xa3 * L \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nfj \n\nI \n\n\n\nu \n\n\xc2\xab r- \n\nxT \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\na \n\nX. 3 tt \n\nS 0 \n\nft O\' \n\nO\' X ft \n\nft \xc2\xa9 \n\ntt \n\nO\' ft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3X0 \n\n%C \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nCD \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU/ C \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 3 \n\n\n\n- X \n\n\nX \n\nft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX X ft \n\n^ *o \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r; \n\n3 \n\nX \n\ntr \n\nS U \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\ntt \n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2x \n\nU. K1 \nZ ~ \n\no c. \n\n\nNHH4HNO X J". \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\na O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<#\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2l \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n0. \n\n\nX ft ft DO \n\nft tt \n\ntt X tt ft o \n\ntt \n\nft ft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xa9 X \n\nX x \xc2\xbb \n\n0\' \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nO\' \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xab 2 \n\n\ntt ft \n\nft X \n\nX tt \n\nft X O X ft \n\nX \n\n3 \xc2\xa9 X \n\nkT \n\no- in O\'. \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n"2 \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no o \n\n\n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nf) \n\nX \n\nft ft) \n\nX X \n\n0 3ft; \n\n- \n\n\nt \n\n3C \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nz _J \n\nr- \xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\nX _J \n\nu \n\nO Oi \n\noJ \n\n> x. \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\no <-> _J \n\nz \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 u a \n\n4 \n\nX - \n\n\no u \n\n_l \n\n\nO: \n\nu \n\nft \n\n\n\nX \n\nTT ^ \n\no a \n\n-1 - X \n\nu. \n\nui ft! \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n10 OI \n\nU, \n\n\n-J \n\n\nz \n\n, \n\n\n\nI- C I \n\n\nX X > X 1 \n\n3 \n\ni tt\' x \n\na: \n\na \n\n1 \n\nz \n\nX \n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\nU c \n\n*- u. \n\nZ) J X UJ Q. \n\nz \n\n- \n\n_l \n\n\xe2\x96\xa03 * LJ \n\ntt 1 \n\na < u > \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n< \n\nIf *-* +* \n\nX UJ tt u. \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n>- \n\n\na \n\nr, x x a. _j \n\n3 X \n\n1 u z X \n\nz \n\n1 Z ft \n\nz \n\nU ft \n\n_J \n\nH* \n\nz \n\n< \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\no z \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- *-* \n\n*-* UJ \n\nr* - - X ift \n\n\nX Z \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUi *\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\nft _J c \n\ntt \n\n< \n\nD. \n\n_J \n\n-i \n\n\nX \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 X C. <" \n\na cl \n\nZ I X O 1 \n\nu \n\nZ Z -1 \n\nQ 1 \n\n> ft UJI \n\nft \n\n-J \n\n\n\na. \n\n\n3 \n\nXZZOX \n\n(3 Z \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 luu *- a \n\nX \n\ntt X ft \n\n< Z \n\nX > t| \n\no \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n\na \n\no ^ \n\nO O uJ \n\n4 Z \n\nxS| \n\n> \n\nW \n\n\nz \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2t z \n\no u. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nLL -J \n\n3. J I X tt \n\nX \n\nft UfjX \n\nh- U. \n\nx o <: \n\n\no \n\n\ntt-4 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\n\n\n\n, \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nCl \n\no \n\no \n\nD \n\n\n235 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCr*L r \'RAr \xc2\xbb0 TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nJ \n\n< tf \xc2\xab \n\nv \xe2\x80\xa2* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n< _\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\x94. \n\nc \n\nw,<- \n\nu! \n\nC- u * \n?\xc2\xa3*l \n\nu. n.; \n\na i- \n\nu r \nu u , \n\nL. U -\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- a ^ \nc u i \na ~ \n\n\ntr \n\nu \n\nc \n\n2 \n\nUJ \n\na \n\nu \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\nI / \n\nor \n\n\ni \n\n?! \n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c \n\n2 \n\no \n* \n\nx a \nc s \n\xe2\x80\x94 c \nx o \n2 \n\n\nu. \nu \nz \xe2\x80\xa2- \ncc. \n\n\n\n^ o ^ \n\nc A \n\n; i \n\nr< tv. \xc2\xab. r a o \n\ntv \n\n*-* 0 \n\n\xc2\xab- X C C 0 \n\n\nc \n\nt\' \n\nX) \n\nA \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nf\\ - L" \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\nIT O\' \n\nK\' \n\n\nx x x x ^ \n\nor \n\nX \n\n9 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nw c a ^ireinr^ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCVi \n\n\nIf h A C O \n\nA) \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n0 \n\nA \n\n<\\J \n\na \n\n0i \xe2\x80\x94 X \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 K. ^ jr \n\na\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCiiro \n\n<\\j \xe2\x80\x94i it a a >n x \xc2\xab- >o if >o vt \n\n\n 3K)}fOiN CM >\xc2\xab lO 0 \xc2\xabf> O\' X \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i fv a X a A IT if) IT. <-> >C ifl vC ifi W \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x944 H H \n\n\nK) \n\nA \n\n(0 \n\n\nX) \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nCS4 \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nur \n\n\no \n\nov \n\n\na \n\n9 \n\n\nCc \n\n\nAAA \n\nA \n\n\n>\xc2\xa3 IO \n\n9 \xc2\xa51 \n\nX \n\nrr \n\nX \n\na \n\nA \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 O\' \n\n\xc2\xbbr c \n\nX 0 C \n\na \n\nX \n\nX \n\nc \n\nc: \n\nO S \n\n9 \n\nA \xe2\x80\xa2-< X. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa5) \n\n\n\nx \n\nA \n\n0 \n\n9 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU. C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-I \n\n\n\nX \n\nHO \n\n\n0 \n\nX \n\n2 O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\nZ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\n\n0. \n0. \n1 . \n\nc \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\no o \n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\nO O O \n\nA \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr) \n\nc: o \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab* \n\nA \n\n\n\nu. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\nz - \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_l \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*=\xc2\xbb \n\n\nf A K. \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nz \n\niJ K. \n\nX \n\nrr \n\nX \n\nI \n\nA \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nX A \n\na \n\n0 I \n\n\nX \n\n\nA \n\nCL \n\nX- X. \n\nAI \n\n"J -\xc2\xab 4) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n\nX \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX X \n\nX \n\nX A \n\nX \n\n9 \n\na- \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nfO \n\n\n0 \n\n9 \n\na C \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0J) \n\n\n\n\nUi \n\n\n\n\nA \n\n\n, \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nUi \n\nX \n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nJLi \n\nX \n\n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\nZ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nA \n\na \n\nz \n\n\n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n< \n\n> \n\n\n\nUI \n\n\nz \n\nUI \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\nZ\' \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\no \n\n2 \n\nX \n\n!\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nA \n\nT \n\nUJ \n\nu. \n\nA \n\n3 \n\nz \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nA \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nz \n\nA \n\n-i \n\nA \n\n\nX \n\nmi \n\n\nu \n\no \n\no \n\n\nUI \n\n\n> \n\nX \n\no \n\n\nAl \n\no \n\n\nUJ \n\n\no \n\ny \n\n_i \n\n\nz \n\n1-4 \n\nu \n\nX \n\n< \n\nX \n\n*\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\no \n\nUJ, \n\n-I \n\n\no. \n\nu \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\na \n\n-I \n\nM \n\nX \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no \n\nu \n\na \n\n\nJ \n\n\n\n~ \n\n\nr- \n\n\n5 \n\n\n2 \n\nr x a \n\nx \n\n1 \n\n\na \n\n \n\n*-\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\n* \n\nM 1-4 \n\n\nX UJ \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nu \n\n\n4-1 \n\nui \n\nB \n\nX \n\n\nO X \n\na \n\n-1 \n\nu \n\nX \n\n1 u z \n\n\nz \n\nX \n\ni \n\nz *- \n\n\nz \n\no \n\n\xc2\xab4 \n\n\n_J \n\nA \n\nf \n\n< \n\nw- \n\nu \n\n\nh- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\n\nUI \n\nA \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\nuJ \n\n\n\n-J \n\no \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n< \n\n5 \n\n\nai \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-< i/) c \n\nr- \n\nX \n\nX \n\nZ X I \n\no \n\n1 \n\nu \n\nz \n\nI JC \n\n1 \n\n> \n\n4-4 \n\nUi \n\nA \n\nmi \n\n\n\nx a \n\nz \n\n2 \n\nA \n\nX \n\nCL \n\n5 \n\nH|*JU \n\nA \n\nX \n\nX \n\n< \n\nX - \n\n< \n\nZ \n\na \n\n> \n\nX \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO \n\nC \n\nUi \n\n< \n\n\na z < \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*+ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\nO A \n\nT \n\n\njj \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\nA \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\n< \n\nX \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\'wL \n\nj \n\na j z \n\nz \n\n< \n\nX \n\nA \n\nJ 3 \n\n\ntk. \n\nX \n\nu \n\n< \n\n\no \n\n\nA \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaM \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n236 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE b.6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONNECTTfMT TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nIT \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*. If \xc2\xab \n\n1 \n\nU \xe2\x80\x98If. \n\nc \n\n\ntv \n\nV\'C \n\n\nw \n\nli - \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n0 w \xc2\xab \nZ\xc2\xa3 1 \n\nU tv \n\na . \n\nUJ 2 \n\n\ntv \n\nU. Ik \n\n\na \n\nU c \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*- 0 H \nCl l \na \n\n\n1 \n\nt/ - \n\nIV \n\nc \n\nU t \n\nc. 1 \n\nz \xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nu \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\nC o A \n\ntv, \n\n\nI 1 \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 A< ^ \xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0* 4 A \xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 C V. C O. \xc2\xab AC 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 #,\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab. \n\n< a a icAf r *-1 *\xe2\x96\xa0 * r r 7. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2t t \xe2\x80\xa2 v. \n\n\n* \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nw \n\nI \n\n\na \n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ni \n\n\nX A C \n<\\ 2 2 \n\n\ncroc i \n\n\ni - l \nl \n\n\nA f A ff \n\nI I I, - \nI \n\n\nl a c c a\'a ^ \n\n\nIT I \nI \n\n\nI I I I I I \n\n\nI A- \n\nX . \n\n\ncc^cc^c-occritcccsro c 4 \n\n- A | | \n\n\' I ( \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94. ecAc-^cr- \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nI \n\nA \n\n\nA. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2I \n\n\n2 \n\nt \n\n\nx e - r* c c e 2 a \xe2\x80\x94 c m \n\n- x \xc2\xbb - \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 i \n\n\n c r- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x96\xa0 I J I I I I H. I I . I I I. Ii I I I - I \' K \n\nI I \n\n\n*4 \n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xa7! \n\n\n,cc \n\na \n\nX ? \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c \n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nI a \n\nc 3 \n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nT U \n\n2 \n\n\nUl \n\nu. \n\nc c \n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\n2 - \nc c \n\n\n\n\n35 a. \n\nQ a c \n\nS \xe2\x80\xa2<-> \n\no \n\nf) \n\n2 \n\n3. \n* 7 \n\nO O \n_i \n\n2 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\nCV ^4 \n\nK. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94* \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\n1 \n\n\n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nO C \n\n0 . \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\nO \n\nO \n\ntr 0 \n\nO ^ \n\nt J \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncoo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nO \n\n-4 0 0 \n\n3 \n\nto \n\n3 \n\n^4 \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\x98I \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ntr \n\n2 \n\na 0 \n\nK# K \n\n\n3 \n\na 2 \n\nc tv \n\n2 3 tV \n\n\n2 \n\nCCKl, \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nJO CM tv \n\n"\xc2\xab tv \n\ntv \n\n\n7 \n\n2. 2 \n\ntv -4 \xe2\x80\x94< \n\nO\' \n\n2 \n\n3 2-4 \n\n2 \n\n2 \n\n*>, \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv -< \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\n\ntv \n\n\nUJ \n\na \n\n\n>- _) \n2 2 \n>- u \n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \nD 2 \nc 2 \n2 < \n\n\n<-> \nD \nO 2 \n2 t- \n\xe2\x80\x94< t/1 \n2 2 \n\xe2\x80\x94 O \n\nr u \n\n\nO \n\na \n\n3. \n\nI/! \n\nA- _J \n\n* = \nC 3 \n\no \n\nT Ul \nc. _i \n\n\no x \n\nO UJ \n\n\nu_ \n\n_l \n\n\xe2\x96\xba4 111 (3 \' \n\n\xc2\xbb- rr 2 \n\nx 2 <-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nJt- I ; \n\na- -4 2 \nZi I \n2 2 _l \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- U. D \n\n< I 2 \nU 2 I \n\xc2\xabUJt- \n2 2 2 \nCD X *-* \n\n< Z X \na. J1 \n\n\n2 2 \n\nM Ui \n\nUUH \nJ u \n\nu a < \n*-* 2 u., \nifi >- 1 ID \n\n\n2 \n\nUJ \n\ni/i 2 \n\nP \n\nUJ *\xe2\x80\x94i \n\n2 <2 \n\no\' UJ \n\n\njauAZ < o \n\nx\'uj > *4 < * a* \n\n02 Ix 1 z \n\n\n-4 ac 21 \n\nX I o 10 \nU/Uhtt l/l \n\nI \xc2\xab o -\xe2\x80\xa2 <-\xc2\xbb \n\nO X X < X \n\n\nUJ \nH \n< \n\nA- \n\nI/! t- \n\nUJ > t/> \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x80\xa2 8 cS \n\n2 2 \n\n1 iflZOl \nAUMIt, \n\n2 O <-< \n\xc2\xab\xc2\xab JO \n\n\nI 2 H- \n\nV 40 \'\xe2\x80\x94* \' - W te\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3T *f_J C \xe2\x80\xa2 > \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb Li \n4 Xim < 2 2 > X \n2 O H 2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb* UJ 2 \n(-u!3uU./\xc2\xbbU< \n\n\nZ \n\nV \n\n>- \n\no \n\n0 \n\na \n\nx \n\nul \n\n-J \n\n< \n\nO \n\n\n2 \n\nO \n\n\n$! \n\n_\xc2\xbb \n\na \n\nx \n\n\ns i \n\n\nz | \n\n\nO \n\na \n\n\n>1 \n\no \n\n\nLu \n\nO \n\na \n\no \n\nu. \n\n2 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n< \n\n\n> \n\nO \n\n\n237 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE 4.b 3.? 3.4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDFlA*AKF TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 I tf \n\n\n* if o i \n\n1 1 \n\nif i \n\n\xc2\xab _ \xe2\x80\x94 i \nC \n\nIT C 1 \nU -i \n\nuu c \n2 Crl \nu. cm \n\nQ K \xe2\x80\x94 \nUJ 2 \n\nu. u. | \n\nU l, \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n*- o r-\' \n\nC Ll I \n\na 3 \n\n\nIf \n\n4 \n\nC \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xab\\ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 cm \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nI \n\nif \n\n\n\xc2\xabr a r a c \n\n\narc \n\n\' 7 \n\n\nA \n\n\ncm cv tr a cm ir ir a if \n: I \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n! \n\nr 3 0 . aa \xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 0 \xe2\x80\x94 c a ir a \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nI r III \xe2\x80\x94 1 - ap. f \n\nl I i lilt- \n\n\nc c c c c c c \n\n\nc c \xe2\x80\x94 c. c \n\nI I \n\n\n4 \n\na c ir. *\xc2\xab\xc2\xab a \n\na \n\nA<(j \n\n: r., \n\n\xc2\xab- \n\n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb *-a r \n\nr \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nA \n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbbl \n\nt \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nr- \n\ni \n\n* <\\ it r* r* \n\nCM \n\nr c| \n\ni ^ \n\n\nr j \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\nt \n\n1 \n\n2 \n4 \n\n3 \n\nA \n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n*r \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nl \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2; \n\n\na \n\nIf \xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xab Af \n\na \n\n-. C j \n\nc \n\n\nC! \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr \n\nA CM \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 | \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 A \n\nr \n\n\n\n\xc2\xabT* \n\n1 \n\ntill \n\n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n11 \n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x9d1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\nc c c \xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\nC CM \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n o \n\ncv \xe2\x80\x94 r k \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\nf \n\nCM \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nIf \n\n\n4 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nCL \xe2\x80\x94 If \n\nr \xe2\x80\xa2 \ncm rr \n\n\nX c. \n\n\nit \n\n0 ^ K*. fV\xc2\xbb CC *-l *\xe2\x96\xa0*\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n \n\nX \'CC \ng \xc2\xbbu \n\nas I\'\xc2\xac \nve \n\nIf \n\na \n\nC X \n\nUJ C \nX la \n\n\n>r, c. r. a- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 c \xe2\x80\x94 ir tf cm \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 CM \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\na if f \n\n\neo ir pm \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\x94 c \xe2\x80\x94 r~ \nCM \xe2\x80\x94I a K 5 \n\n\nIf 3 \n\n\nA-C\'-K\'aAaiff \n\xe2\x80\x94 CM \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\ncrirjcMC\xe2\x80\x94io\xe2\x80\x94if- \nCM \xe2\x80\x94 3 \xc2\xab \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n0 \n\n\nr> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nIT \n\n\nCM \n\nr-. \n\n: \n\n\na- \n\n\n\nK 5 \n\na \n\n\nK> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nit \n\n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\nu. \nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\ncc \n\n\nn \n\n\ne o o o c. \n\n\nOOC.C O O C OOOOC.\xe2\x80\x94I CO \n\n\nCM \xe2\x80\x94i \n\n\nI \n\n\no \n\nI \n\n\n05 _| \n\nw*n x \n\nHao \n\no \xe2\x80\xa2 c_\xc2\xbb \n\xc2\xab O\' \n\nn \n\n\xc2\xabp \n\nx \n\n1 X \n\no c \n_j u \n2 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nu\' c r a \xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 f f A a O\' \n\xe2\x96\xa0M 3 \n\n\na a r \n\n\ncm cc \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 a \n\\l 3 a fO \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\nr. \n\no \n\n\n\n\n>o \n\n4 \n\nCM \n\nIf.\' \n\n\nCM \n\nK) \n\n\n\n\no \n\nCM \n\n\nH \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nKJ ^ \n\nM \n\na \n\nX) \n\nA* \n\n4 rO \n\nCw \n\nAJ \n\n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 A- \n\no \n\nCM \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a. \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n3 \n\nIO \n\n\nO\' \n\n\xc2\xab-* \n\nK) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nfl \n\n\nCNJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nL. \n\nJf \n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nA\xe2\x80\x94C \n\nUJ \n\nIS \n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\nIf \n\n\n\n\n\n\nZ \n\n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nv~ \n\ncc \n\nz \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n< \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n2 \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\n\nif. \n\n5 \n\n"2 \n\nIf If. \n\n\n\nh- \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ\' \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUa \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\nUJ \n\nI- \n\n3 2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n>- \n\n\nX \n\na: \n\n\n\n\n2 \n\ni- \n\n3 \n\nH \n\n\xc2\xbb-< \n\nlA , \n\n\n-J \n\n\no \n\nO O \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> If \n\no \n\n\nV \n\no \n\n\nu; \n\n\n5 \n\no \n\n_J \n\n\n2 \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94< \n\n\nO X \n\n< \n\nX - \n\n\n\n\n\nc uj \n\n3 \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nu. \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n3 \n\n1 ^ \n\nD \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nu. \n\nUJ *- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nO O! \n\na \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\nK- \n\n\n5 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nX t/ \n\n>\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n\nX < \n\n\n\na \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nM \n\nY \n\n\n\n\nu \n\nO \n\n\n\nu. \n\n3 _l \n\nX \n\nUl 0 . \n\nz \n\n< u \n\nId \n\n\ni \n\nIf \n\n2 O \n\nUJ \n\nO \n\nX \n\n5 \n\nV \n\n-j \n\n\n\ncr \n\nuJ \n\n< \n\n1 \n\nX \xc2\xab \n\nUJ \n\n> \n\n\n< \n\n* \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nIf UJ \n\n< U. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \n\ncn \n\nX \n\n\no ar \n\nX \n\n-J \n\nU \n\nT \n\n1 13 \n\n2 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n1 2 \n\nh- \n\n\n\nU \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\nh- \n\n2 \n\n< \n\nH* \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94l \n\n\xc2\xbb-4 \n\nU \n\nk\xe2\x80\x94 M \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\ny> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2yi 3 \n\n*-4 \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n-J c \n\n< \n\n< \n\n\n\nun \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94* \n\ny\xc2\xbb \n\n\nf\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nj: \n\nc \n\n2 X \n\nI \n\no \n\ni \n\no \n\n2 X \n\n-J C \n\n1 \n\n> \n\nr*\xc2\xbbi ^ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nX 1 C \n\nzz \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c9 \n\no \n\nX \n\naa \n\n2 \n\n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\ni/I < X \n\nr -4 \n\n< \n\n2 X \n\n> X \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nJ. \n\n\nc \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n< \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0w \n\nX X \n\n4 \n\no \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab \n\n\nX o \n\nr* \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x96\xba1 \n\nuJ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a \n\n1 - \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x96\xbc \n\n< \n\n* \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na. \n\n-1 \n\nX u \n\nX \n\nX \n\n< \n\nX \n\nf- J \n\n3 I- \n\nUL \n\n-0 \n\no < \n\n\n3 \n\n-4 \n\n-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n238 \n\n\nJUFMPLOrMfNT KATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO^T.^E CPliiMnTA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xabT., \n\n\xc2\xab- If \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nC ti. \xc2\xbb \nC. \xe2\x80\x94. \n\n\nu \n\nU \n\nJL \n\nZ \n\nUi \n\no \n\nu \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c\\ \n\ner \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nI \n\nIf.: \n\n\ncl \xe2\x80\x94 3. \xc2\xab r- \n\xe2\x80\x94. \xe2\x80\x94 cv \xe2\x80\x94 r \n\n\na. \xe2\x80\xa2* 1 \n\n\nI \n\n* \n\n\n\nw c \nu - \n\n9 \n\ncv \n\nu u. cr \n\n3- \n\ncv \n\nr c i \n\n\n\nu cv \nOK\xe2\x80\x94, \nUJ T i \nU U \n\n\n3 \n\nli L- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 OF \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n. r . * \n\nA \xc2\xab A A 3 \n\n\na O \n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \n- I 1 \nI 1 \n\n\nc c c c c \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 c c \xe2\x80\x94 c c \n\n\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nI \n\nei \n\n\nIT \n\n: \n\ncv CL a \n\nC Lh \n\nt \n\nAN \n\n1 \n\nC.I 31 \n\n*4 ^ \n\n\xc2\xab\'* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\nK \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n*L \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 \n\ncv cv \n\ncC cv r \n\n1 \n\n\n\nCV 3 \n\n35 O \n\n\n\nc: \n\n1 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ^ \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni CVi \n\n- \n\n{ \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\ni \n\n\nII \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb! \n\n\n3 \n\nK 3 c \n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xbb r \n\n3 \n\n1 f. \n\nCV\' If \n\nX CV \n\nIT 3 C \n\n\ncv \n\no\' \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 \n\nCV 3 \n\nec \n\n3 C \n\n1 \n\n\n^1 3-4 \n\nCV If \n\n3 N \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCV \n\n\n\n\n\n3 - \n\n\n\nCV \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\nX \n\n0 3 0 \n\n3 \n\nC\\ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\ncv c \n\nC K C \n\nX \n\n3 -\xe2\x80\x98 \n\n3 1 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 A \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nl \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 O\' C\\ \n\nc \n\n- cv \n\n3 \n\nC\\ \n\ncv cv \n\n\n- i r \n\ncv \n\n\nA \n\n\n\n1 1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n1 cv \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\ni i \n\n1 3 \n\n1 \n\n\nC \n\n\n\n\nC \n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJ \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\ncr c cr \n\n\nc cr \n\nc \n\nc* \n\nc c \n\n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 3 \n\ncv \n\n\nCV \n\n3 \n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n1 \n\nt \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\nc c c, \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC \n\nc \n\nc 1 c \n\n\nm \xe2\x80\x94 if cv \n\nCV \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nir \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\\ \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\nK \n\nm \n\nc \n\n\nc \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- A\' \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nc c c c c \n\nI I I I I \n\n\nc c c \n\nI I I \n\n\nC. \xe2\x80\x94 C C C C \xe2\x80\x94 C \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 If \nI I I I I t I I I I t \n\n\ncv \n\nI \n\n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu \nz u. \nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n_J \n\nu _ \n\n\xc2\xa3 . \na ** \n\n3 \xe2\x80\xa2 C \n\n\xc2\xbb r u \nc \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nx a \nc * \n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nX L. \n\n\nCCCOCC-CCeceeCCCCCV\xe2\x80\x94 3 \xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nI I I t I I I I I I I I I -1 I I. I I I I \n\n\nc \n\nI \n\n\nC \xe2\x80\x94 CL X C \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\ncveac.3-, xiT3CV30.3\xc2\xa9k \xe2\x80\x94 cvj \xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 r- a \n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 ir*-CA^ f A - 3 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 3 0 3 CV \n\n\nO \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO \n\nUJ \n\n5 . \n\n\nC \n\n>t_> \n\n\na \n\nz \n\nw \n\nu \n\nz \n\n\nCT \xe2\x80\x94 X X C \xe2\x80\x94 hNC N C \n\n\nX .T. 3 Al Ifl ff S ^ \n\xe2\x80\x94 IT h ON \n\n\n35 \n\nIT \n\n3 \n\n\nC \xe2\x80\x94 X i\xc2\xa3C-hAONC \n\n\nXtf 3 AiflJ\'NOin \n\xe2\x80\x94 f ^ O N \xc2\xab \n\n\nCV \n\nin \n\n3 \n\n\n35 C \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCV \xc2\xabh iTt \n\nO\' 3 \n\n\nCV \n\no \n\n\nc \n\nin \n\n3 \n\n\nU \n\nU \n\n2 *-> \nOC \n\n\n00&OCOC.OOOOOOOOC HO WHO \n\n\nH lO \n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nK ~ , \nM ** f \n\n8 3C \n\nS * u \n\nr. \n\n\n0\xe2\x80\x943. X \xc2\xa9 \xe2\x80\x94 - AON or" X U 3 \n\n\ncv \n\n\ntv XI O\' \n\nr> \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO N- \n\n\nn \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\nCV \n\n0 \n\n\nO CV \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 n \n\n3 \n\n\n* \n\n\n*-4 ^ \n\n\n\nH \n\nH WO \n\nN~ \n\nO 3 ) \n\nX) a* \n\n3 fV \n\nn cr \n\nN- O CVJ \n\nO\' \n\n\n\nO\' \n\nk ?\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\x94t \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3-4 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2~4 \n\n\nif, \n\nO K \n\n3 \n\n3-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94f \n\n\no o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 ^ \xe2\x80\x94k \n\n3 \n\n0 ^ \n\n\n3 \n\n_1 u \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nZ \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n3 \n\nwt\xc2\xbb \n\n-J \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\nX \n\nin \n\n\nu \n\ni \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n3 -* \n\nUJ o \n\n\n\nuj m \n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\nTt \n\nK \n\na: z \n\n\n\nar Uj \n\n\n< \n\n\nUl \n\n\n2 \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nin o \n\nd m \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\nz \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\nin \n\n\naJ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 T \n\n\nUJ UJ \n\nk r \n\nZ \n\nin \n\n*- t \n\nV \n\n\ni \n\nX \n\n\n\n~T \n\nh- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94i i/l \n\n\n_i \n\nu o \n\no \n\nUl \n\n> m. \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nZ \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\nU X \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab X \n\n** \n\n\no uj \n\n_J \n\n\no, \n\nIL \n\n\nY \n\n\n\n\n\ncr -J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nU. UJ \n\nU- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no u \n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nZ X s> \n\n>- \n\nX I \n\nZ X \n\n< y \n\nX \n\nX \n\nz \n\n\xc2\xabT \n\n\nX \n\n\nK \n\nu \n\nc \n\n\nH \n\nU. Z) -i \n\na \n\nuj a \n\nz < \n\nO UJ \n\nt \n\nin z o \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nZ \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\nz> \n\nir uj \n\n3 \n\ni a < \n\nUJ \n\n> *-\xc2\xab \n\n< B \n\n\nin ui 4 u. \n\n\n\n\nro \n\n\nn !1 \n\nc X \n\na. \n\nu \n\nX 1 U \n\nz \n\ni \n\nZ t \n\nZ K \n\nz \n\nu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n-J \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n< \n\n\n3 - O \n\nr \xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-3 \n\n\xc2\xbb-e \n\nUi \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nx in \n\nin \n\no.*-\xc2\xbb \n\nUJ *\xe2\x80\x9c4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 -I c \n\n< \n\n Z \n\nz _\xc2\xbb \n\n3 1 \n\n>HUJ| \n\n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0\xe2\x80\x9c* *v* \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n3 j \n\nz \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 UJ \n\nu \n\nt~ X \n\nin < \n\nz,\xc2\xab \n\n< z \n\nX > z \n\no \n\nD \n\n\n\n\nr \n\nc \n\nc \n\nUJ \n\n\nXXX, \n\n< \n\no - \n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 X \n\n0 ;>- \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUi <\xe2\x80\x9c< *! \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na. \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\nKH \n\nZ J \n\na. \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu. \n\nJ X J \n\nX \n\nz < \n\nX K \n\nJpl-U \n\n<\xc2\xab. \n\n\no \n\na \n\n13 \n\n3 - 4 J \n\nO \n\n\n239 \n\n\nUNEMPlOYHfNT RATE 2 . 1 * 2 -? 2,2 2,3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFLORIHA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab ir \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nv \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xabr \n\n\xe2\x80\x98 c ~ \n\nIf c \nu \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 \nU U c \n7 O I \nU \xe2\x82\xacV \nC h ~ \n\nU z \n\nit u \nU4. *\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\xe2\x80\xa2- ft ft \nC Ik\' i \n\na - \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\no hr 9MOMf rh c. : r. a \n\n\n\xc2\xab> v r. \xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 r \xc2\xab ft \xc2\xab \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 m \n\nir vfl ft \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb!\xe2\x80\xa2- \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 r r \ni \xe2\x80\x94 l \nl \n\n\nIT. ft *1 \n\n-* *o\xe2\x80\x9c! \n\n\nif h \xc2\xab r * if c ft o rc\xc2\xbbc. O \xc2\xabi \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94. ft if c a if **\xe2\x96\xa0 a cLifiraair \n\nfT \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2<*\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2#\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab\xc2\xab\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb \n\n^ Ift \xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb - Iftft-.c i c If ftft- II \nl I I I li I r. i \xe2\x80\xa2 | i \n\n\nccc \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 *i \nl l ft \nK \n\n\nft \n\nI \n\n\n* \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xabl \n\nr \n\nt \n\n\nr* \n\n\no \n\n\na\\ \n\n9 \n\nft \n\na; \n\n\nc \n\n\nvf \n\n\nft \n\nft- \n\nc \n\n3 \n\n\nc \n\nft* \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c 1 \n\nft e \n\n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nC ft \n\nft- \n\nft\xc2\xbb \n\n3 \n\n\ne \n\nft \n\nIt \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n11 \n\nt \n\n* \n\n\n\n\nft- \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\nft- \n\nft* \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nV. \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nA \n\nIf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nit! \n\nW \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4 \n\nit \n\n\nft" \n\nft \n\nc \n\nIf \n\nft- \n\nc \n\n\nft- \n\nft- c \n\na c \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nft cr \n\nIf \n\nft* \n\nC \n\nft \n\n3 \n\nc, \n\nu \n\na \n\nw* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n*ft \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\n\nft 4 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n8 \n\n\n\n1 \n\nc \n\nf\\ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n. \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nC \n\nc \n\nc \n\nft* \n\n3 - C \n\n*- c \n\n3 \n\n0 \n\nft \n\n\nc \n\n3 \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nIf \n\nc \n\nc \n\nft \n\nK \n\nc \n\n\nft \n\n\n1 \n\n* \n\n1 \n\nI \n\n8 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\n- 1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\n8 \n\nr \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft \n\nft \n\nIf \n\nu \n\n! \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\nft* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nk \n\n\n\nc \n\n3 \n\n\nc \n\nft- \n\nft* \n\nc \n\nft c \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nft \n\n\nc. \n\nft ft \n\nft \n\nft* \n\ncr \n\n\nIf \n\n0 \n\n\n2 U \n\nc \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nI \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n- I \n\nft \n\n1 \n\n\nU. \n\n3 " \n\nIf \n\n\nc \n\nft. \n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x99 \n\nr \n\n\ni i \n\n\n340 JiCiCftC ftilfCrw<4iCifer ft o \nft ftif ^-ftft^-ft ciferft \xe2\x80\x94 ccftccc if \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nif ft ft \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\nif \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\nft \n\n\n3 \n\na \n\n\ncc \n\nIf \n\n>c \n\nft \n\n\nu. \n\nli. \n\n2 -* \n\nc. c \n\n\n\xc2\xa9oocoeocoooc oooo-<\xe2\x80\x94icgoo if \xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb ft ft \n\n\nH X Q. \nW 7 \n\n5 * C \n\n\xc2\xa7 * \n\nr-d \n\n**-\xc2\xab \n\n3 \n\nO ft -t \n\n-a 0 \n\nft -0 ft \n\nH \n\nCT> \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n0-3 \n\n\n\n\n\n3\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n3\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nIf. ft) \n\nsC ft \n\nit \n\n3 \n\n3-9 \n\nX \n\ny \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\n\n\nX X \n\nft \n\nfi \n\n0 \n\nft- \n\nonj \n\nK; J\' \n\nf) \n\nSOil \n\n3 ft \n\nk ft if \n\nft \n\nft \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x98 \n\n0 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\nft- \n\nft- \n\nif \n\n\n\nft IT \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 -* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\n\nCC (V 39 \n\n0 0 \n\n~ X ft \n\ncr \n\n0 C \n\n3 \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nrft \n\n\n\n\n\n3-1 \n\n\n-4 \n\n\nfl ft \n\n3 ift \n\nfi \n\n3 \n\n-H \n\n0 \n\nf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\nJ \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\ntU \n\n\nN\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n5 \n\n\nItl \n\nO \n\n\nM \n\nU If \n\n\nft \n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nV- \n\nX \n\n2 \n\n\n~- \n\nX Itl \n\n\n< \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\na. \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nIf) \n\n0 \n\n3 If \n\nif. \n\nft \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nIf \n\n\nit \n\n1\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nr \n\nItl \n\nItl \n\nf- r \n\nz \n\nIf \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\n\n\nz \n\n1- \n\n_i \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n*-* \n\nif \n\n_l \n\n\n0 0 \n\n0 \n\naJ \n\n> If \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\nZ \n\n\n0 \n\nX \n\n< r \n\n** \n\n\nQ UJ \n\n_l \n\n\n*r \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 * \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\nX \n\n-1 \n\n1\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nu. u \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO O \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n1\xe2\x80\x94\' \n\n\nJL \n\n-t \n\n\nX f \n\nft I \n\n1 \n\n3 x \n\n3 \n\nIf X \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba* \n\n\nu \n\n0 \n\n\n1- \n\nu. \n\n3 -1 \n\nX w \n\na \n\nz < \n\nO \n\nJj 1 \n\nif Z 0 \n\nUJ \n\n>- \n\n-j \n\n\n\nX \n\nIt) \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n1 \n\na \xc2\xab* \n\nUJ > \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n< * \n\n\n-* If UJ It \n\n\nX \n\n\nO \n\nX \n\na \n\n_/ \n\nu \n\nX \n\nI CJ \n\n2 \n\nX \n\nX 1 \n\n2 \n\nft z \n\nu \n\n-J \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nu \n\n2 \n\nW-. \n\n\n*\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nl\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \n\n1\xe2\x80\x94 I- \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIf \n\nIf \n\ns \n\n1\xe2\x80\x94 It) *-* \n\n1\xe2\x80\x94 J 0 \n\n< \n\n^1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0M \n\nM\xc2\xbb i/1 \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nZ X \n\nX 0 \n\n1 \n\n0 z \n\nX \n\n_J 3 1 \n\n> -* Itl, \n\nft \n\n3 \n\na z 2 \n\n0 \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n>-t u \n\nU ft \n\nX \n\nIf \xc2\xab \n\nx \n\nft! < Z X > X \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n3-* \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n\n< \n\n3 \n\nX X \n\n< 0 \n\n3-5 \n\n-* a \n\nO ft- X \n\nItl \xe2\x80\x94* X \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x96\xbc \n\n3 \n\ns\xc2\xa3 \n\nu \n\nu. \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\nU. \n\n-1 \n\nX u \n\nX X \n\n\nx \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nu \n\n3 ft It \n\nif U 3 \n\n\n\n\ni\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nz \n\nIt\' \n\n\nUJ \n\nu \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nft \n\n0 \n\n\n0 \n\nIt \n\n\n_J \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n5 \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n#\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nft \n\nz \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n< \n\n\xe2\x80\x94. \n\n_J \n\n_j \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\na \n\n0 \n\nO \n\n\n240 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT rate \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGC0RG1* TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n<- X \xc2\xab \n\nI \n\nV \xc2\xbb*f \n\nc \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ntr c \n\nu \n\nuu \n\nc \n\nx \n\nx a \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 * \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nX U \n\n\nIL \n\nU. \n\nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\n\nh jc a \nW X \ny X C \nfcj \xc2\xbb (_> \n\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\na \n\nc x \n\nU 1 O \n\n2 o \nz \n\n3 \n\n\nu \nu. \nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC X \n\n\n& Ti a. \n\nO i \n\nS 9 O \n\nM J* \xc2\xb0 \n\nXI \n\n\xc2\xabC \n\nX \n\n< y \n\nD O \n\n_l \xc2\xab-J \n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\ntv \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nK 9 \n\n\no- \n\nc x! \n\nc \n\nif C \n\nc c \n\n\xc2\xa9 X \n\n^ O" \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-V \n\n\n^ \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ni 1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\ncv \n\n1 \n\n\n\ni \n\nfv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xab! \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\ntv \n\nc \n\n\n9 \\C \n\n\n\nc, 9 \n\n\nf \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\nc \xc2\xab \n\n9 9 \n\n- X \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 s \n\n\n1 1 \n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n1, \n\ni \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2j \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nCVli \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n*- C \n\n\nC \n\nC if \n\nc \n\nO 9 \n\ntv c \n\nC X \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 tv \n\ni \n\nC X \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\ni 1 \n\n1 \n\nr \n\nI 1 \n\n1 \n\n! ! \n\n1 t \n\nII 1 \n\nt 1 \n\n1 \xc2\xa3 \n\n\n(VI c \n\n0 \n\n9 0 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 tc \n\nK1 \xc2\xa9 C X \n\nCO tv \n\no \n\n\n9 \n\nto \n\nI \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nO 9 \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nK- \n\ntv \n\ntv if \n\n9- \n\nfV C \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xc2\xab K- \n\nc \xc2\xa9 \n\nto \n\nK \n\n\nX \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\nr \n\na \n\n0 \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\no \n\no \n\nO G \n\no o \n\nC \n\nc \n\no \xc2\xa9 \n\no \n\no o \n\n\xc2\xa9 o \n\nO OH \n\nO \n\no o \n\n9 \n\nCJ \n\n9 \n\no \n\n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nif. \n\n9 \n\nlT \n\nIf. 9 \n\nX \n\n\n(V 9 \n\nc \n\nC h- \n\nc r- \n\nr. \n\na x. \n\nX ++\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ntv \n\n\ntv \n\ntv \n\nX) \n\no \n\n\n0 99 1 ** \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2Tj \n\nCJ If \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\n\nK tO \n\nO C" \n\na \n\nX \n\nX \n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n*C\xc2\xbb* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIT \n\nto \n\nIT \n\na \n\no \n\n\nX \n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n, \n\n\n3 \n\n\ne-H \n\n\n\nif \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 If \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 tVJ 9 \n\no \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 r- \n\nx \n\n\xc2\xab X \n\nCD \n\n\n9 \n\nX \n\n<\\l \n\n9 \n\n9 \n\no \n\n\na 9 \n\no\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nCJ (Vi if \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 f?\' \n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nH H \n\nCO to \n\no c- \n\n\xc2\xae \n\nXI \n\nX \n\nO\' \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIT \n\no \n\nto \n\na; \n\no \n\n\na \n\npr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n" \n\nCT \n\n\nv-4 \n\n\n\n\no \n\nH O OiW \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c. \n\no o \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n1. \n\nO \n\no n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-1 ^ \n\no o \n\nX \n\nX) \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0M \n\nH \n\n\n \n\nV/ 1/ \n\n\n\nOg 9 \n\n\nX X \n\n\xc2\xa9 oc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r cr \n\n\xc2\xa9 a- \n\ntt X \n\ntv \n\n3 \n\nc \n\nX \n\n\n-ii \n\n0 \n\n\nT 9 \n\nO\' \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nV \n\n(VI f> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 O\' \n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nH H \n\no to \n\no x> \n\nO\' \n\ns\xc2\xbb \n\n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nir \n\nm \n\nto \n\na. \n\no\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n^4 \n\n\n\n\nj \n\n\n9 9 \n\nifl \n\n\nrsi io \n\nO\' \n\n3 C \n\n0 r- \n\nrO if \n\nx ^ \n\n* XI; \n\ncr \n\no \n\nr- \n\nc- \n\n\n\nL \n\n\n3 ^ \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nrr \n\n(X \n\nCil if. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nOH Q" \n\nl P oH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nX to \n\n\xc2\xa9 X \n\nr- \n\nX \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x949 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nto \n\nto \n\nX \n\n0 s \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2c \n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 9 \n\n\nUJ \n\nOf \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba J \n\nX ~ \n\nt- O \n\nXI \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nZ X \n\nc o \n\nz \xc2\xab \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa29 \n\no \n\nM \n\ne\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu \n\n3? \n\nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 l/l \n\nz z \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 o \nx \xe2\x80\xa2_> \n\n\no -j \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xe2\x80\x94 \na t- \nU X \nX a! \n*\xe2\x80\x94_\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 \nU -I \n\n~ \xe2\x80\x94 z \n\nZ X u. \n\no y- \na u < \n\nx _J vx \n\nM M \n\no *- a \nox\xc2\xae \no u/a \n\n\nuj o \n\nX. z \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 if \n\nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX -J \n\n; i / >\xe2\x96\xa0 \nU 3 _J, X \n\ni a < u \nX I u z \nyt-x- 1 \n\xc2\xae Z X X \nx >~* UJ <_\xc2\xbb \n3 a x < \n-\xc2\xbb x u x \n\n\nS_ if \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94I \n\n3 X \n/O j \nuJ LU 1\xe2\x80\x9c \n_l O \nU X < \n\xe2\x80\x94 XU. \nI \xc2\xbb 3 \n\nuj a. z \n> \xe2\x80\x94 < \n\nX X \nX Lfi \nO I o \nh il/l \nO \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \nI 4 J \n\n\nif \n\nUJ \n\nvA i/I \n3 Z \nO C\' \n\nX - \nUJ *- \nX <1 J- \n\n< U\'Ul \nT* \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Z, 4 - \ni/> 3. \xe2\x80\x94 uj \n2I\'J3 \n\n< X < \nX O \xe2\x96\xba* X \n*- U\xc2\xbb\' 3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\ny- \n\n\nz \n\n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\n\nUJ \n\n- \n\n\nXi \n\nX \n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n> X), \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba, \n\no \n\n\n\no uj\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n-J \n\n\nO\' \n\nu. \n\nt- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX o \n\na \n\n\n-I\' \n\n\nz \n\nat \n\nX; \n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n\nX \n\nu. \n\ni xi \n\nz o- \n\nUJ \n\n6 \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\nif UJ \n\n< u \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\na \n\n>- \n\nz u \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-I 1 \n\n-1 \n\nt- \n\nz \n\na \n\no \n\nW \n\n-JO, \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 Ui| \n\nt~ \n\n-j \n\n\n\na \n\nz a \n\n> X \n\nO\' \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xabi \n\n* \n\n*1 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 Ui \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 at! \n\nH*\' \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nul \n\nu. >/) \n\nu < \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n2 \n\n\n1 \n\n\na \n\no \n\nu \n\n3 \n\n\n241 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n< \n\nc \n\nT \n\n\n\nIT a \n\n\nll \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 IT \n\n< \n\n_ w \n\n\nC \n\nV t \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC \n\nu \xc2\xabr \n\n2 \n\nC 1 \n\nu \n\ntv \n\no \n\nK \n\nu \n\nr \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\nu \n\nu \n\nL \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\no r- \n\nc \n\nk. i \n\n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nx \n\n\nL \n\nc \n\no \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\nr \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nor \n\n\nk. \n\n\nu \n\n\nu \n\ntr \n\n#\xe2\x80\xa2. \n\nl \n\nc \n\ntv \n\nA \n\n\nIf \n\n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\na \n\nu. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nu. \n\nZ U \n\nc - \n\np~ c \n\nui ~ \n\nH IT \n\nW w \n\nS o \n\nif > \n\ng -C \n\n\xe2\x80\x9d r. o \no \na \n\nx a \n\nc > \np- c \n\nT V- \n2 \n\n\nu \n\nu. \n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\n\nO _J \n\ns\xc2\xab \n\nSr-\xe2\x80\x99 1 - \n\nX \n\nA \n\na \n\nc x \nu c \nx c. \n7 \n\n\nu \nz \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nc r. \n\n\nH *\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nId f L \n\na c u \n\nr. \n\nA- \n\na \nx > \no o \n\n_J u \nr \n\n\n\n! \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 it r. ; \xc2\xab. a- \n\nir 0. \n\n: \n\nhojh tir ir \n\n1 \n\na- "W \n\ntv If. \n\nIf \n\nIf. cl \n\n1^ \n\n\noJ \n\n1 \n\n* \n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2| \n\n\n\n^ m if \n\nr t\\ \n\ntv \'If A < ^ \n\n\ntv r \n\nr; \n\ne , \n\ntv \n\nr \n\ntv> \n\n\n\n\n\n1 II \n\n1 \n\n\n\n(h \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1, \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xabi \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nA it tr \' a if \n\nI 1 Cl \n\ntv 0 tv a a c \n\n1 \n\n* r ir \n\nA- 3 \n\n3 \n\ni \n\n* c \n\n3 \n\na. \n\n1 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\ntV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nc \n\nc c c c c \n\nc c \n\nc c c c c c \n\nc c c \n\nc c \n\nc \n\nC 0 \n\nc \n\n* \n\n0 \n\nct \n\n\nv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 1 1 1 1 \n\n1 1 t \n\n1 \n\nt \n\nw~ \n\n(\\ \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\ncce.cc \n\nc c \n\nc c. c. c c c \n\nc c c \n\n^-1 \n\ntv \n\nc c. \n\nX \n\nK \n\nA \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 till \n\n1 1 \n\n1 II 1 1 1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nC c C if c \n\n\nX C - O AO \n\nf~ 3 K5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- r- \n\n0 \n\nCJ X> \n\n3 \n\nA - \n\na \n\nc. \n\ne \n\na. \n\nc. tv \n\n\n\n\n^ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\na x \n\nw \n\nA- \n\n\ntv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nK \n\nx \n\n\nPC \n\n\n\nr c O IT C \n\nA- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nwC-CAC \n\n3 3 A) \n\ntv r- \n\n\nr> lC \n\nC \n\nc \n\ntv \n\ne \n\n0 \n\na- \n\ntv <\\ \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nQ *\xc2\xa3 \n\nA \n\nA- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA- \n\nX \n\n\nK \n\nAV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ne c c e> c \n\ne c \n\n0 . \n\n0 . . \n0 . \n\n0 . \n\nn. \n\n0 . \n\no c c \n\nc o \n\no \n\no o \n\no \n\n\nH \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2f \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nC c c r c \n\n\nlfCr.CA0 \n\n^ 3- PC \n\ntv A- \n\n\nK*/ \n\nX \n\nA- \n\nCT \n\nX \n\nA\xc2\xbb \n\nIT \n\n o o o \n\nO O \n\nc. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\nC. \n\no c- o \n\nc. O \n\n\no o \n\ncv \n\nA~. \n\nA) \n\n\n\na*. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n\nC c c x c; \n\nr- ~ \n\nvC c *- c A 3 \n\n3 3 A: \n\nf r . a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nA- A \n\n(V \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2A^ \n\nff \n\nX \n\n\n% \n\nM M \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xabC 3 \n\nif) \n\n3 \n\nH \n\nCVI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA*. \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n\nPC \n\nX \n\n\na => 3 J"\xc2\xbb \'J \n\nf*** H \n\nJ10H3A* \n\nKi 3 IO \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O A- \n\nO \n\n3 \n\ni \n\nH \n\nA> \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xaba- \n\n(\\ \n\nX 3 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\na \n\n\n\n\nz \n\np- \n\n_j \n\ni- \xc2\xab- \n\nX \n\n-J \n\n\nu \n\n5 \n\nO \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> X \n\no \n\n\nV \n\nO \n\n\n\nv*_\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\no \n\n\n\nz \n\n\nu \n\na \n\n< \n\nx \n\ni-* \n\n\n\n\no ui \n\n-1 \n\n\no \n\nU. \n\nA- \n\n\nX \n\n\nM \n\n\n\na a \n\n-J \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\na \n\nu \n\nUJ \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n3 u \n\na \n\n\n_J \n\n\nz \n\n\nX \n\n\n1 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nX 2 \n\nX X *- \n\nr \n\ni \n\n\na \n\n\xc2\xab y \n\n\na \n\n\na \n\nX \n\n2 \n\na \n\nX \n\nw \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu \n\nc \n\n\nA- U. \n\n3JI \n\nUJ \n\na \n\nz \n\n< \n\nU UJ \n\n\nl \n\nX \n\nz o \n\nUI \n\nO \n\nT \n\nO \n\nX \n\n>* \n\n-J \n\n\n3 \n\nrt \n\nu \n\n< 1 \n\n1 \n\n*-i \n\n< \n\nX \n\n\n\nX UJ \n\n< u. \n\n\nPM \n\nUJ \n\ncr \n\nA \n\nX \n\n\na a \n\na \n\n\no a \n\n1 u z \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nl \n\n2 ,\xc2\xbb- \n\n\nz \n\nu \n\nPM \n\nJ \n\nA- \n\nz \n\n< \n\no \n\nr~ \n\nu \n\n~0 \n\np- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 UJ \n\n1 \xe2\x80\x94 l\xe2\x80\x9c* \n\na \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n3 m \n\nvJ \n\n<-4 \n\nPM \n\n-J o \n\n< \n\n< \n\n\n\n_J \n\nlO \n\n\n\n\nw \n\ni- \n\n00 cc \n\n2 X X \n\no \n\n1 \n\nu \n\n2 \n\nX _l Q \n\n1 \n\n> \n\nPM UJ \n\nA- \n\n_l \n\n\n\na \n\nD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2V\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nrr \n\no \n\nX \n\nCO J \n\n\xc2\xabUJ u \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\nX \n\n< \n\nX \xc2\xab \n\n< \n\nz a \n\n> X \n\no \n\nD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 - \n\n**1 \n\no \n\nJj \n\nH 2 \n\na T < \n\no \n\n\n\na \n\nO A- \n\na \n\n*-* \n\noJ \n\n\xc2\xaba \n\n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c2 \n\n\n\n\n-X. \n\n\nX -J \n\na -\xc2\xbb x \n\nX \n\n< \n\nJL \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nUi3 \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU. \n\nS\\ \n\n< \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n \n\n\nif \n\nto. \n\nfv. \n\nL \n\na \n\n\nu \n\n1 \n\n\n7 \n\nif \n\n\nit. \n\nat \n\nu. \n\n\n\nIL \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu \n\n CV to \n\ncv * o\' \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa5 . \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\n\nto | \n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n! \n\n1 \n\n\' \n\n{ \n\n1 \n\n\n\nII \n\n1 \n\n\n* cv o c c r- \n\n0 3 0 , \n\nK \n\nX X \xc2\xab 3 to 3 \n\nI \n\nir r a r c \n\ncv \n\n_ \n\nn- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n. \n\n\n \n\n\nC \n\na \n\n\nW to. \n\nH* \nto \xc2\xa3\xe2\x80\xa2 \nO < 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c \n^ o \n0 \n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n3 \n\n\nz a \n\nC 3 \n*-C \nX U \n\nz \n\n\natcc^accx a xr^t^^t-xna ff> ir -\xc2\xab ff> cv a. \ncv *- c o sj\xc2\xbb-x-\'(\'rjciK\'ir(\\iMfif \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- cv \xe2\x80\x94 3 3 C i <\\ a \n\n\nCVJ \n\ncv \n\nIT \n\n3 \n\n\nC. \n\nff \n\nc \n\n\n3- 0 \n\na r \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ff \n\n3 \n\n\nff \xc2\xab If i\xc2\xabD\xc2\xbb-or\xc2\xabn.3\xc2\xab \n\ncv \xe2\x80\x94 c o 33 \xc2\xabXM^K 1 r^/rM<\'iirii\' \n\n*- cv \xe2\x80\x94 3 an a. r, at ff \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX \n\nor. 3 X \n\na \n\nX \n\nX5 \n\nCfC \n\ncv rr \n\nIT \n\no c \n\nh- cv ct a \n\nK> \n\n3 \n\na \n\nX \n\n\n* \n\nr- \n\ncd a \n\nX! \n\nCM -\xe2\x80\xa2 O O \n\n\n9 \n\n3 \n\n\nx r- \n\n\xc2\xa5) \xc2\xa5) \n\nIO \n\nC X \n\nIT f- \n\n\xc2\xa5) x. \n\nK* \n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\ncv \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 \n\n\n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n\n\ncv \n\na. \n\ncv cc \n\nX \n\n\nIT \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\nX \n\ncv \n\nxc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\' \n\n3 \n\nCVJ \n\nO 0 \n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nX X \n\nm \xc2\xa5, \n\nKV \n\nO X> \n\nlO \n\nCV X \n\nin \n\n\nH \n\nX \n\nrO \n\n\xc2\xa5i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu. c \n\n\n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n3- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n3 \n\ncv \n\nff \n\ncv ff \n\nX \n\n\nr. \n\nc \n\n\nX \n\ncv \n\nU o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU. \n\n\n\n0. \n2. \nt . \n\no \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nCV to XI \n\no o \n\nr- \n\n ff \n\nc \n\nX \n\n0 \n\nf- 0 \n\nr. cv \n\nX \n\no o f- n- \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n1^ \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xba Vto| \n\nCto \n\noc \n\nCV \n\n\n\'4 \n\nto 3 O\' \n\n\n3 \n\nH \n\nD X \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0v \n\nOl\'l \n\n\xc2\xa5) \n\nX \n\nO 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nX \n\nCVJ \n\n\n\nCV \n\n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94c \n\n\xc2\xa5) \n\n\n3 \n\nCV \n\nCV \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\nir. \n\no \n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\nc x) \xc2\xa5> * \ncv \xe2\x80\x94i c. o \n-< cv \n\n\nin \n\nX. \n\nX r- 3 CVJ to \n\nto \n\nP- 3- \n\nX r\xc2\xbb \n\nX cv \n\nlO to \n\n3 \n\ncr \n\nX \n\nK) \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nto x. If) \xc2\xa5) \xc2\xa5. \n\nCV \n\nO 3 \n\nm x \n\ncv X \n\n\xc2\xa5) 3 \n\nr~ \n\ny \n\nX \n\nlO \n\n\n\nto "0 \n\n3 \n\nCV \n\nn \n\ncv so \n\n-0 , \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nj \n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nb \n\n\nu \n\no \n\n\n>-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ \n\n10 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\ncr \n\nr \n\n\n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n< \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUi \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n~~ \n\nto \n\n\ni/> 6 \n\nD \n\n1010 \n\n\n\nfr\xc2\xac \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nX \n\n\nU UJ \n\nk~ \n\nr z \n\n\n\niz*\' \n\n\nto \n\nV \n\n\nz \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nz \n\nf- \n\n_! \n\n\nh\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n_j \n\n\no o \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> 10 \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\n\nu \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n2 \n\nto \n\n\no a \n\n< \n\nX to \n\n\n\n\n\nO UJ \n\n-J \n\n\no \n\nu. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n5 \n\n-j \n\n\nX \n\nu. \n\nUJ to \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX o \n\na \n\n\n_l \n\n\n\n\n\nr* \n\n~ \n\n\xc2\xa5t. \n\nX \n\n** \n\nZ X \n\n>\xc2\xab \n\nX 1 \n\n\nX < \n\nJ" \n\n\nj: \n\n\nX \n\nz \n\nZ \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nVJ \n\n6 \n\n\n1- \n\nu. \n\n3 J 2 \n\nui a \n\nz \n\n< o \n\nUJ \n\n\ni \n\n10 \n\nZ O\' \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nz \n\no \n\n>* \n\n\n\n5 \n\na: \n\nUi \n\n< \n\nT \n\na. < \n\nw \n\n> \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n* to \n\n\n\n10 UJ \n\n< u. \n\n\nto \n\nUJ \n\nCE \n\n\n\nX 3T \n\na \n\n-J \n\nu \n\na \n\n1 o \n\nz \n\nX \n\nz \n\n1 Z 1 to \n\n\nz \n\nU \n\nc4 \n\n\nto \n\n? \n\n< \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\no \n\nz \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nto \n\niU \n\n\xc2\xbb- to \n\n\nX 10 \n\n\n10 D \n\nM \n\nUJ \n\n#-4 \n\nto \n\n_l C \n\n< \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nD \n\n-J \n\nlH \n\n1-4 \n\n\noi a \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nx> \n\nZ X \n\nI \n\nO 1 \n\nu \n\nZ Z \n\n-j a \n\n1 \n\n> \n\nto UJ, \n\nto \n\n_) \n\n\n\nor \n\nz \n\n7. \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nto U U \n\nt- a \n\nV0 \n\n< X \n\n\n< z a \n\n> X \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nC \n\nto \n\nc \n\no \n\nLaJ \n\n\xc2\xabx \n\n\nar x \n\n< \n\no - \n\nto \n\na o \n\ni- a \n\n\nu- \n\nto X \n\nto \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2y \n\n< \n\nT u \n\nX \n\nr\xc2\xbb \n\nIt \n\n-J \n\n1 UT \n\n* < \n\nX \n\nto u \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1. \n\nL0 \n\no < \n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xbb<\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\no \n\n\n243 \n\n\nUNEMPLOTMFNT RATE i.b 2.* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIDAHO TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\ncv, \n\n \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< \n\nIT \xc2\xab \n\n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xabv \xe2\x80\xa2> r \xc2\xab \n\nCVi cv \n\n1 \n\nCV e- \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\n^-1 \n\ncv r. r \n\n0 . \n\n\n\nCV \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\ni \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n1 \n\n\nCV \n\n\n\n\n\n9/ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2If \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\nc ~ \n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nu \n\n\n\nX \n\ncv O\' r o r \n\nh- cv o a \n\na r- r \n\n\nCV JT \n\niC 3 c \n\nc \n\na \n\nc \n\n\ncv. \n\nu \n\n\na \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\ne \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 0m \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n^ \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 09 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nV \n\nU \xc2\xabC \n\n\n*1 \n\nCV CV! CVi a If \n\n\xc2\xabVl P" \n\n\nIT C f \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa21 ^ \n\ncv a a- \n\nc\xc2\xab \n\n\n\nX! \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-rf \n\n7 \n\nc*e \n\n\n\n\xc2\xabp> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n1 *1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nU \n\ncv \n\n\n\nI ! \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n9 \n\n\na *- ~ \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\nU \n\n\na \n\n- \xc2\xa9 r \xc2\xa3T o \n\ncv \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nr is \n\ncv a it. \n\nV. \n\ntf - \n\nr o \xc2\xab- cv \n\nc \n\n\ntt \n\nS3 \n\ncv \n\nu \n\nL \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr^: \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\no r> \n\n\ne \n\n\xc2\xab - i \xe2\x80\xa2- i \n\nc. cv \n\nCv a \n\nc- 1 * 4 \n\nC. \n\nCV cv \n\n- i *- l \n\nc \n\n\nc. \n\n\nc \n\nU 1 \n\n\n\n- t 9 \n\ns 1 \n\ni l \n\ni - ( \n\n1 \n\nS 9 \n\n9 1 \n\n* r -< \n\n1 \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\na ~ \n\n\n\nt \' \n\n\n\n( \n\n\n\n\nt; \n\n\n\n! \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nV \n\ni-V \n\ncv \n\nc \n\ne c e c e \n\nc c \n\nc c \n\nc c c \n\nc \n\nc cr \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c cv c \n\n\nr \n\n1 / \n\nCV \n\nK- \n\nu \n\ncr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\ni \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 t \n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n9- \n\n! \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n2. \n\nIf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2W \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJ \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n^ \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0> \n\n\nc c c c c \n\nc c \n\nc c \n\nc c c \n\nc \n\nc c \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 r\\ c \n\ncv \n\na \n\n\nCV \n\n\nu \n\na \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n9 \n\n9 9 \n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nt- \n\n< \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\nc \n\nc \n\nvCC c c \n\nc c \n\nc c \n\nc. c c \n\nc \n\nc c \n\nc -\xe2\x96\xa0 c \n\ncv \n\n<\xc2\xa3 \n\nvt \n\nr*, \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 t 1 1 I \n\n9 1 \n\n1 9 \n\nl l l \n\nt \n\n1 9 \n\n9 9 9 9 \n\n9 \n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\nu * \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ^ ... \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU CCCCCCC.C.CCCCCC.CCfC\'CVCC \xe2\x80\x94 vf \xc2\xa9 \n\n2 U 0 I I \xc2\xab \n\nc - \n- c \n-) \n\n\nL\xe2\x80\x98J >\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n8 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c \n\ntr c \n\no \n\n* \n\n\na \n\n\n\nc a to k c c o \n\nJ\xc2\xabC CHMC JC c \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 cv r \n\nKJ \n\n\nr> \n\nu> \n\na x \n\n& \n\ntv \xe2\x80\x94i f> tr \xe2\x80\x94< X) vo \n\nr- \n\na \n\nH \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nUJ O \n\n\n\noooooo-\xc2\xabo \xe2\x80\x94ioo ei \n\nU, fO \n2 \xe2\x96\xba" \nc c \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nK> O \n\nI I \n\n\n_J \nM -J \n\n\nhi ^ * \n\no * \n\nG a C \n\nZ3 \xe2\x80\xa2 V_t \n\ncQ o \n\n\nSi \n\n* \n\n\n1 \ne a \no o \n_j c; \n\n2 \n\n\nCV \n\n\no k 3 cc j 3 a r. k, c ci h k ai^. \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\x94* \n\n\nCVJ \n\n\n3i04 ,f )wOiTJ^i0O(\\jM^4KjHH4 \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\nIT \n\n\nu \n\n*- X \n\n\n\nUJ \n\nu> \n\n9- \n\n\n\n\n\n\nf- \n\n_j \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft (T, \n\n\n\n_J \n\n\nU \n\n5 \n\n\nUf\' \n\n\no \n\nU \n\n_j \n\n\nZ \xc2\xab \n\n\n\n \n\nM \n\n< \n\n* \n\na: \n\n\n\na. \n\n-J \n\nu \n\nX 9 \n\nu \n\nz \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n* \n\nk~ \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb-< \n\nUJ 9- \n\nf \n\n0-m \n\nX \n\n \n\n\n\nM \n\n\nD 9- \n\nX \n\nX 2 \n\n3L \n\nX \n\no \n\n1 \n\nu \n\nZ \n\nD X \n\nz \n\n2 \n\nO \n\nX \n\nCD \n\nX ~ \n\nUJ \n\nCJ 9- \n\ncr \n\n\n\xc2\xab4 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO \n\no \n\nw \n\n< \n\nf X \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xabC \n\no \n\n\n\nZ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2t \n\nT \n\nJ \n\nX \n\nr- \n\n\n-9 U \n\no \n\nX X \n\n< \n\nX \n\n9\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9- \n\n\nz \n\n\n9- \n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUJ \n\nCA \n\n\n9- \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\nCJ \n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\n*. \n\n\ntA \n\n9- \n\nK \n\n\nX! \n\nor \n\nO \n\n\nUJ \n\n> tA \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\nm, \n\n\n\nO U \n\n-J \n\n\no \n\nu \n\nf\' \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nvD O \n\na \n\n\n_* \n\n\n\xc2\xabt a \n\n\n2 \n\nI, \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\n2 \n\nCJ VI \n\n\n1 \n\ntA Z O \n\nut \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\nfi \xc2\xbb-t \n\n\nlA UJ < u. \n\n\nft \n\nu \n\nCD \n\nZ 9- \n\n\n2 \n\n(J \xc2\xbb4 \n\n-J \n\n9- \n\nZi \n\n\nOl- \n\nUJ \n\n" JC, \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\n< \n\n\n_J \n\nX!_l O \n\n1 \n\n> ft UJ \n\n9- \n\n_J \n\n\n\nT-* \n\n< Z \n\nX > * \n\no \n\nD \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC 9- \n\nX \n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nut \xe2\x80\x94 z \n\n9- \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nvJ, 3 \n\n\nu. yj sj \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft \n\nb \n\n1 \n\n\nu \n\n2 U \n\nc \xe2\x96\xba \ny c \n\n_J \n\n\n-o \n\n \n\n\nB3 y \n\n\n>C \n\nft \n\na \n\no s \n\nU- o \n\n2 G \n\n\nU \n\nu \ni \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc c. \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2T \n\n/\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCL \n\n*3 \n\nCO \n\n_iu \n\n\nZ \n\nO \n\n\ni \n\n\nIT* \n\nft* \n\nft \n\na \n\nft \n\n* ft \n\nft. \n\n0 \xc2\xabL \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xabL \n\ntL \n\nc \n\n0 ft. \n\n\n^ c \n\nft c \n\ny \n\nc. \n\ny 1 \n\nCC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab> \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 -M \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft/ \n\n\nft* \n\nft \n\nft \n\nft \n\nft \n\nft ft \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xab\\ 1 \n\nft \n\nft \n\nc \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\nft. \n\n* r \n\n\nc \n\nft \n\n\ny; \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n8 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nft 1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*1 \n\n\n\ni! \n\n\n\nft \n\nft \n\nc \n\n0 \n\nft ft \n\no \n\nft e \n\nr \n\nc \n\n\n\xc2\xabL \n\nif \n\n- y \n\nft O \n\nr \n\nc> \n\nc \n\ny \n\nfV \n\nc \n\n3 \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\nft* \n\n\nlO \n\nft \n\n3 ft \n\nft \n\nft \n\no \n\nft \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\nft- ft- \n\nft \n\ny 3 \n\n\nr- \n\nr. \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xab \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\nft* \n\n8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\ny \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nur \n\nw \n\n_ \n\n3 \n\nCw ^ \n\ntf \n\nC ft \n\nft \n\nit \n\nc \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\nH \n\n\n\ny \n\n\nft* \n\n\nCNj \n\n\nr- \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\n\nft* \n\nft- \n\n3 \n\nO \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n0 \n\ny. \n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr\\ \n\n\n \n\nft* \n\nft* \n\n3 \n\nO \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x9c5 \n\n\\j \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr -4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr. \n\n\ncm \n\nft- \n\nc \n\ncc \n\n\nft* \n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft* \n\ncv \n\n\nft* \n\n\n\nft-* \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nD \n\nft< \n\no \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xa3) \n\nJ\' \n\nlT: \n\n(0 \n\ny \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\nr- \n\ny \n\no y. \n\n\nX CVj \n\nft* \n\nX \n\nft* \n\nCD \n\ny \n\nyl \n\n\xc2\xabBft \n\n\n=f \n\ny \n\n\nft* \n\n\nft- \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nm \n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\nft* \n\nft* \n\n3 \n\nG \n\nX \n\ny \n\nc \n\n=r \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nft^l \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncvj \n\n\n-v; \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\no \n\n33 \n\n\nft* \n\ny \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft* \n\nCVJ \n\n\nft* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\ny \n\n\n\n\n\n>aJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ny \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nft* \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n\n\nft* \n\nb* \n\ny \n\n\n\n\ny \n\n\n\nZ \n\n\ny \n\n\nUI \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94s \n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\n\nu \n\n\nZ \n\nUi \n\ny \n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nN \n\n\n\nVT \n\ns \n\nD \n\ny \n\ny \n\n\n\ny \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUi \n\nG \n\nn \n\n\n\n\ny \n\nUi \n\ny \n\nX \n\n\n\nUi \n\nu \n\ny \n\n\xe2\x80\x94V \n\nz \n\n\n\ny \n\n\ny l \n\n> \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nZ \xe2\x96\xba J \n\nr- \n\n\ny \n\n\n\n-J \n\n\nG \n\n5 \n\no \n\n\n\nUi \n\n\n> y \n\no \n\n\ny \n\n5 \n\n\n\nL*J \n\n\nC O _i \n\n\nZ \n\n\n\n\nu \n\nX \n\n< \n\nX \n\nft* \n\n\n\n\n\nQ u \n\n_) \n\n\nO \n\nu \n\ny \n\n\n% *b\xc2\xbb \n\n\n- ~ - \n\nC \n\na \n\n\n\n\nM \n\nX \n\nU \n\nX \n\nft- \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nO G \n\na \n\n\nG \n\n\nZ \n\n\n\n\nr- r. * \n\nOJ \n\n\nX \n\ny \n\n>* \n\nm \n\n1 \n\n"" \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\ny \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nZ \n\na \n\nX \n\nOJ \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu c. \n\nk- \n\niT \n\n3 \n\n_j \n\nT \n\nu \n\na \n\nz \n\n< \n\nG U \n\n\n8 \n\ny \n\nZ o \n\nUi \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n>- \n\n\n\nt> a: iu \n\n*J \n\ni \n\na \n\n \n\n\n< \n\n< \n\nft* \n\nft* \n\n\ny ui \n\n\xc2\xabt u \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2y \n\nG \n\nCO \n\ny \n\n\n\no \n\nx a -j \n\nU \n\nX \n\n8 \n\no \n\n2 \n\n\nZ \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\nK- \n\n\nz \n\nG \n\nft* \n\nG \n\ny \n\n| \n\n< \n\no \n\n*- \n\nu \n\n-ft \n\nft\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\n\nUi \n\ny \n\n*-* \n\nft* \n\nX \n\ny \n\n\ny \n\n5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nk 1 \n\ny \n\n\n-J c \n\n< \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n-n \n\nft* \n\nft* \n\ny o y \n\ncr \n\nCC. \n\nZ \n\nX \n\nI \n\no \n\ni \n\nG \n\nz \n\nX \n\n-i \n\nA \n\n8 \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 ai \n\ny \n\n-1 \n\n\n\nX \n\n3? \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nZ O x \n\n3D \n\nX \n\n\nu \n\nu y \n\nX \n\ny \n\n X \n\no \n\nD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nT \n\nC \n\n& \n\nft* \n\nOO^I \n\n< \n\n-ft \n\nX \n\nr \n\n< \n\no \n\n\n\nX \n\no \n\nft- \n\na \n\nft* \n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xab X \n\ny \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n< \n\nI \n\nJ X y \n\n\n-J \n\nX O \n\nt \n\nX \n\n 1 \n\n\xc2\xbb\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n< > \n\nZ \n\n-* \n\n\n245 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nINDIANA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\ncv \n\na \n\n\xc2\xa5 \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\xc2\xa5. \n\nr- \xc2\xa5. \n\nc \n\na cv, \n\ncv tn \n\nCV \n\n*Ci C \xc2\xa5. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 0 \n\na \n\nCV \xc2\xabc \n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xa5. \n\nCV \n\n3 \n\n34 \n\n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab m \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2> \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na IT a \n\n\nCV \n\n\ne \n\ncv. \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\na cv \n\ncv. \n\n3 \n\nr c \n\nCV \n\n\nCV \xc2\xa5 \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nc. \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nc \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncv \n\nt \n\nI \n\n\n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\nV *lf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC \n\n\\r t_ \n\n\na \n\na \n\n0 \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nc c \n\n3 \n\nc p- \n\n\xc2\xabt 3 \n\nc \n\nIf \xc2\xbb-\'lf \n\nvC O \n\na \n\n1 \n\nr c \n\n\n\n0 \n\n<2 \n\nu ^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO u c \n\n\n(V \n\n\ncv \n\ncv \n\n3 \n\ni\xc2\xa3M f \n\nMCO \n\n\xc2\xa5. \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0",3 \n\nCV 3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\ncv; \n\n1 \n\n7 C-I \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n** \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2Ti \n\n\n\n\n\nU cv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\na \xe2\x96\xba- ~ \n\n3 r \nu u \nu <_ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nf* \n\nu \n\n< \n\n- \n\n3 - \n\nr \n\nIf 3 \n\n0 \n\n\nif r \n\nCV \n\n1 \n\nC C 3 \n\nr \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n- \n\ncv c ! \n\n3 \n\nC \n\ni \n\ncv, \n\ncv \n\n- e r- \n\n\nt \n\ncv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\n1 CV \n\ncv \n\nCV CV \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nt \n\nr r cv \n\n\n3 - \n\n1 p \n\n3 \n\n1 \n\nfT \n\n1 \n\nc u. 1 \n\n\n\nl \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n< \n\nt \n\n1 cv \n\n1 3 \n\n1 \n\nS i 1 \n\nl 1 \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 r . \n\n1 \n\n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\nc. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nl \n\n\n\nmA \n\n\n\nl \n\n\nIf \n\n\nCV \n\n\nc \n\n\n\xc2\xab3 \n\nc \n\n\n\n3-4 \n\nC \n\ncv \n\ncv c \n\na \n\nu \n\nc \n\n4 - \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\n1 \' \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nc \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n2 \n\nIT \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\nW \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nL. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\n34 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\ncv \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n3 \xc2\xbb \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\ncv \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x9c \n\nr- \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\na \n\n\nvC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab \n\n3 1 \n\nr- \n\nCV \n\na \n\n3 - \n\nu \n\nj t \n\n-3 \n\nIf Ol \n\nC 7 \n\nC N \n\n\na 0 c. \n\n^ u" \n\n3 ^ fO \n\n\xc2\xa5) \n\nr- \n\nX \n\nCO \n\ncv \n\ncr \n\nif \n\n\n \n\nX \n\n-1 \n\n\n0 \n\n0 0 \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> X \n\n\nUi \n\n\nC \n\nu \n\n\n\nz \n\n\n0 \n\na \n\n< \n\nT \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\n\n\n0 3 \n\n\nX \n\n\n34 \n\n-3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n*2 \n\nfX \n\n_J \n\n34 \n\nac \n\nu \n\nU 3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nO O \n\n\nn \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\nz \n\njj \n\n_ \n\nr x >- \n\n4 > \n\n1 \n\n* \n\nX < J~ \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\nH* \n\n\nU \n\n6 \n\n\nH* \n\nu. \n\nO -J - \n\n\n\n\nr \n\nUJ \n\n< \n\n1 \n\na < u \n\n> \n\n34 \n\n4 \n\nV \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xabH \n\n\nX 3 \n\n\xc2\xab u. \n\nX \n\n\nc \n\n3 : \n\nX \n\n_i \n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xbb u ? \n\n\nX \n\ns: \n\n1 Z 3 \n\n\nz \n\nO \n\n34 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nU \n\n-\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n34 \n\n34 \n\n1.1 \n\n3 ^ \n\ncr \n\nX \n\n\nX 2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\n\n3-4 \n\n-J O \n\non \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94< \n\n34 \n\nwO \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na: \n\nX \n\nZ X X \n\n0 \n\n1 \n\n0 \n\nZ T _l Q \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n> \n\n34 y \n\n\nZ \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nX \n\nCD \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 3 0 \n\n*- \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab X \xc2\xab \n\n< \n\nz cr \n\n> X \n\n.J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94- \n\nO \n\n0 \n\nUJ \n\n< \n\n3 a t <* \n\n:> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2~. \n\n34 \n\nX 0 3 \n\nac \n\n34 \n\nUj \n\n3 ai \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\n< \n\n2 \n\nu> \n\n\'X. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n-L \n\njaui \n\nX \n\n< \n\nJC \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 oi ^ \n\n3 \n\nu. \n\noA \n\n0 \xc2\xabt \n\n\nI \n\n\n\n246 \n\n\nOUEMPLOYMtWT HATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n4 If \xc2\xab \n\nI \n\nV \xe2\x80\xa2 If \n\n*e\'- \n\nV c \n\nu ~- \nou \xc2\xabt \n2 Ct \na <\\ \na. *- \xe2\x80\x94t \n\na 2 \xe2\x80\x98 \n\na a \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu. o \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaOf\', \n\nc u. i \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nIf. \n\nIt \n\nC \n\n2 \n\nIf \n\nC \n\nu \n\na \n\nu \n\n\nff \n\nI \n\nIf \n\n\nec \n\ni \n\nc. \n\n\n\nr. \n\nC \n\nf \n\n9 .*. \n\nif 0 \n\nAO X* \n\no \n\nr. \n\n1 ^ \n\n6 \n\n0 \n\nIO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* CL CV vtl \n\no \n\n0 \n\nte \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\' \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 M \n\n- \xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nA \n\n\nCV 1 CV. \n\ni\xc2\xbb- r \n\ntv CV \n\n< r \n\nc \n\n\n\n^ cv \n\n3 r.\' \n\nc \n\nCM \n\ntl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n3 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nA \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nif \n\nC O \n\n3 o \n\na a oi \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\ni" tr \n\n3 \n\n\nif a- \n\nX X \n\ncv a r \n\nI \n\nc. \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 9 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n(V \n\nt \n\n \n\ncl \n\n0 \n\nc \n\nf*\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 % \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr- \n\ni \n\n3 \n\n-i * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2"\xc2\xbb t \n\np c cv \n\np. 1 \n\np \n\nX \n\n \n\n3 \n\nC \n\n\nC \n\no \n\no \n\n\nw \n\na \n\n03 \n\n2 \n\n\nu \n\n2 U \nC <- \nC \na \n\nui _\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nh- \n\nW \n\n3 \xe2\x80\xa2 C \n\n(tl ^ (j \n\nc \n\nIf \n\nz a \ne 3 \n\xe2\x80\xa2- c \n\nI u \n2 \n\n\nU. \n\na * \n\n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \nc c \n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 C. *\xe2\x80\xa2 C C C C\xc2\xbb-C\xc2\xbb-Cr-a-\xc2\xbb-cc 3 AA C.C \n\nI i \xe2\x80\xa2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I \n\n\n \xc2\xae \n\nsD fO \n\nX \n\nOJ \n\nKV \n\nO\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 0"t \n\n3^ \n\nX \n\n#o \n\n, \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n2 \n\n\xc2\xab x c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\ny \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2V w . \n\n<\xc2\xa3 \n\n\na \n\n\nX \n\nX O \n\n\na- a- iO X X PP \n\nX \n\nc \n\n3 \n\nC-3 \xc2\xa9 \n\nX \n\nX X \n\nIT X- \n\n3^ \n\nX- \n\n\no \n\nX \n\ns \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n34 \n\n^ 3^*aaK)>C\xc2\xabs0C\'3Om^O , il\xc2\xab3K\xc2\xbb<2j \xc2\xae \n\n** 3 W3 M h\xc2\xbb \xc2\xbba CV 3\xc2\xab^a- \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nIf \n\nI \n\n\na \n\n\ni \n\n*- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nUl O \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xbaa \n\nat \n\nIf \n\n\nV\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\ni- \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n1- \n\n\xc2\xab Z \n\n1 \n\n\n\na \n\na 1 \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\na \n\n\n2 \n\na \n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n>t \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c aa \n\nI \n\n\nl/l c \n\n\nif if \n\n\n\xc2\xbb~ \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\nV \n\no \n\n4 \n\n\n\n\n\nJh \n\n\nai \n\nt- X \n\n1 \n\n\nu a \n\n\n5o \n\n\nIf \n\n\nt- \n\nV \n\n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nZ \n\nt- \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba* \n\n\xe2\x96\xbat i/I \n\n\n\na \n\nu \n\n\na \n\n\n> if \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\nO \n\n\n\nu. \n\n\nO \n\nu \n\n\n\n2 - \n\n\n\nU X \n\n< \n\nx *->. \n\n\n\n\nQ a \n\nSl \n\n\nO \n\na \n\n1- \n\n\n\n\nM \n\n2\xc2\xbb \n\n\no \n\nX -J \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab X \n\na \n\na po \n\nX \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nX 1 \n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\n\na. \n\nX \n\n2 \n\nC- \n\nX \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu \n\no \n\nt~ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a 3 -) \n\nx a a \n\nZ \n\n< o a \n\n\ni \n\nv/> \n\nz o \n\na \n\nO \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\no \n\nX \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nJ \n\n\n\nX \n\nU) \n\n< \n\ni a \n\n< \n\nUJ \n\n> -a \n\n< \n\nC M HI \n\n\nif a \n\n4 a. \n\n\nHa \n\nUJ \n\n5 \n\n>- \n\nor \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 X \n\na \n\n-1 \n\nu \n\nX 1 \n\no \n\n2 \n\nI \n\nX \n\n1 Z t- \n\n\nz u \n\n*a t \n\na \n\n\nz \n\no \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\no \n\n2 \n\n1\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\no* \n\npa \n\nU t- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2^1 \n\n\nX O\' \n\n\nIf 3; Ha \n\n\nf*4 \n\n\xc2\xbb-4 \n\na o, \n\n4 \n\n4 \n\n\na \n\na \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa23* \n\nl/> \n\no \n\nr- \n\nX \n\nX z \n\nX, \n\nZ O 1 \n\nu \n\nZ I\'J \n\n1 \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaa a \n\n\xc2\xbb~ \n\na \n\n\n\na \n\n2 X \n\n2 \n\n2 \n\no \n\nX \n\nCD \n\nX ~ \n\nai \n\nupii \n\nif \n\n4 X *\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\n4 \n\nZ X \n\n> Si \n\nO\' \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nZj \n\no \n\nM \n\no \n\no \n\nLJ \n\n4 \n\n3 X \n\nr \n\n \n\n> \n\na \n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nJ \n\na \n\n\na \n\nJ X O \n\nX \n\nX -c \n\nX \n\nr- a 3 \n\nH- \n\nOh \n\nif \n\nu<; \n\n\no \n\na \n\nu* \n\na \n\n5 \n\n\n247 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nKENTUCKY TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n< \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r s \n\n\nt \n\n1/* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2if \n\n< \n\nc **\' \n\n\\r v. \n\nU \n\n\nOU.CC \n\n2 \n\nCM \n\nu \n\nA \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU. 2 \n\nb. \n\nli. \n\nU. \n\nV \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nh \n\na r \n\nC \n\nu. i \na ~ \n\n\nw \n\nIT. \n\n00 \n\nU \n\na \n\nl \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\nif \n\nit\xc2\xac \n\n00 \n\ner \n\n\nU- \n\n\nu \n\n0- \n\nu \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\na \n\ni \n\nc. \n\ntv \n\n\nw \n\nA \n\n\nu \n\n\na \n\n0* \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nf- \n\nu \n\n1 \n\n\nu \n2 U \nc A \na c \n\n_J \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 ^ 5 \n\nLiou \n\xc2\xab o \n** \n\nx a \n\nC 2 \n\n\xc2\xab- c \nx u \n2 \n\n\nU. \n\nu \n\n2 a \n\nc c \n\n\nH *- \nWCL 0. \n\nCP \xe2\x99\xa6<-> \nA \nX \n\n* \n\na \nc x \nu. c \n? o \n2 \n3 \n\n\nu. \n\nX A \n\ncc \n\n\nw 3 a \n* c \n\n\n:\xc2\xab x \n~ o \n\n_l u \n2 \n\n\n\nA \n\na a\' \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\n3 if. r. \n\na cl c, \n\n-c r. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nc \n\nIT \n\nC 3 A \n\nA X \n\nG \n\nA \n\n\nA \n\n\nif \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \n\n\' \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb O \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2I \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nA \n\nA \n\nl\\ \n\nr 3 c\\ \n\nA C \n\nA 3 \n\n\n\n\na r r \n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab^r \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n, \' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ; \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nc \n\nX C \n\nf \n\ntv a o \n\n3 0 K \n\n- 0 \n\nIf If \n\n\nX \n\nIf C A \n\nr C \n\nC \n\nA \n\nc. \n\n0 \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nW\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n|f \n\nt\\ \n\n3 If A \n\nIT \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\na o \n\na \n\nC \xe2\x80\xa2- If \n\n4. C . A \n\nc a \n\nc o \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H a C \n\nH- C \n\nX \n\n\na\' \n\nc \n\n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nn i \n\ni \n\n- 1 A \n\nA A X \n\ne c \n\nIf A \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x82\xacV \n\n- 1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 A \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 - \n\n1 A \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\ni \n\n0 \n\ni \n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n^4 \n\n\n\nA \n\na \n\nc - \n\n\n6. A. c \n\nC C tf \n\nc ^ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nc \n\nc \n\n3 A A \n\nC A \n\nc \n\nA \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n1; \n\n\n\n\n<\\ \n\nc tv \n\n\nc cv c \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c c \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- c \n\nc \n\nc \n\nX A 0 \n\n3 X \n\nc \n\nff \n\nX \n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nc c \n\nc \n\nC C C \n\nc c c \n\nc \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nr \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nc \n\nA C A \n\nC X \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nA \n\n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni i \n\n1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 - \n\n1 1 \n\nI t \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nt 1 1 \n\n1 H \n\n\n7 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\nA \n\nG \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nC ^ t* \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c. A \n\nc c \n\nfs. \n\nc \n\nc \n\nx a a \n\n-\xc2\xab G \n\ntc \n\n\nA \n\nX \n\n\nc \n\n1 \n\ni \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n. \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 i \n\n1 \n\nA \n\n1 \n\n00 \n\nr \n\n\n\n\n>D \n\n3 A \n\nIT \n\nWA i \n\nvf Ah \n\na A \n\nIA If \n\n\nmH \n\nX C A \n\n*r K \n\nA \n\nX \n\n0 \n\nc \n\nif \n\na \n\n* \n\n- IT \n\nc\\ \n\nK \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n- \xe2\x80\x94 r- \n\n0 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nlC ^ \n\n*- \n\n\nC 3 C \n\nA X \n\nV \n\n3 \n\nK \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n00 \n\nA \n\n\n\xc2\xab- \n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4 \n\n\n\na \n\n3 3 \n\nIT \n\nA 3 A \n\nv\xc2\xa3 r- io \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 A \n\n3 X A) AJ \n\nC A C \n\n\xc2\xbbo \xc2\xbbr \n\nc \n\nX. \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nX \n\na \n\nU. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 kr \n\n<\\ \n\nr - \n\nn e-4 f*\xc2\xbb \n\n0 - \n\n^ a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n0 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC 3 C \n\nA X \n\n\nA \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC Cv \n\n\n\n<\\ \n\n\n0*0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\no c \n\nC \n\nC G \xc2\xa9 \n\nCOG \n\nG G \n\nc o \n\no \n\nc \n\nO C \xe2\x80\x94i \n\no o \n\nff \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nA \n\n\n\xc2\xabr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nl \n\n\n\n\na \n\n3 3 \n\nir \n\nAJh \n\nl \n\nX a X \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c w \n\ntv If \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\nO\' a a \n\nK*i \xc2\xab-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nA \n\n3 \n\nX. \n\nA \n\n\nIf \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 if \n\na \n\n\n^4 ^4 \n\n\nX 3 \n\n\n\n3 3 3 \n\nA 3 \n\n\nA \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nA \n\n\n\nK*. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 . \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n^ tr. \n\nif. \n\nA 3 A \n\niN if \n\nHi X \n\ntV If \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX Hi CC \n\nn 0 * \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nA \n\n3 \n\nv 3 a \n\n\xc2\xa3A K| \n\n^ >0 \n\n^ (T \n\nr-e \n\n\nN H CC \n\nif \xc2\xae \n\n\n04 \n\n(VJ \n\nX \n\na \n\n** \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H X) \n\n ^ \n\n0 \n\n04 \n\n3 3 3 \n\nA if. \n\no \n\nA \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \xc2\xab-4 \n\n^4 \n\n^4 \n\nA \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nn \n\nUJ \n\nJ \n\n\n\na. \n\nX \n\n\n\n\noJ \n\n\n\nH- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n*-< \n\nw \n\nd> \n\nHi \n\nU X \n\n\n\n\n*- \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nz \n\n\nX UJ \n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n2 \n\nUj \n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ. \n\nX \n\n-h\' \n\nHi \n\nX c \n\n2/ X \n\nX \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\nUi \n\nu> \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nIU \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nUJ UJ \n\nA x> \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\nA \n\nV \n\n\ny \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nz \n\nA \n\n_l \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX \n\n-I \n\nu o \n\no \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> X \n\no \n\n\nV \n\no \n\n\nu_ \n\n\no \n\nu \n\n_l \n\n\nz \n\nHi \n\nO X \n\n< X \n\nHi \n\n\n\n\n\nO Ui \n\n\n\no \n\nUi \n\n\nT \n\n\n\nX \n\nH \n\niD \n\n3 \n\n-J \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nu. UJ \n\nA \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no o \n\na \n\n\n_J \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n1 \n\na. \n\n2 \n\nX X A \n\nZ 1 \n\nx x \n\n Hi \n\n< * \n\nHi \n\nfc-4 \n\n\nX Uj < u. \n\nA \n\nu \n\n \n\n*** \n\nG \n\nA \n\n2 \n\n< \n\nA \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nP-0 \n\nIX \n\nA \xe2\x80\x94| Mi \n\nX X \n\nX \n\n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\nUJ \n\n04 \n\nHi \n\n-J o \n\n< \n\n4 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n(/\xc2\xbb \n\nc \n\nh- \n\nX \n\nXl \n\nZII \n\nO 1 \n\nU Z \n\nz \n\n-1 o \n\n1 \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x96\xba-4 \n\nH* \n\n_J \n\n\n\no \n\nX \n\nz \n\n4_ \n\no \n\nK \n\ns \n\nz \n\nHi uj (J \n\na cr \n\nX < \n\nz \n\n\n< \n\nZ \n\nK \n\n> z \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\n\nHi \n\n3 \n\no u. \n\n< \n\nD \n\nX X 4 \n\nO Hi \n\nA X \n\nO A \n\na: \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nUJ \n\nHi X \n\nh- \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n-0 \n\n \n\nD \n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0_\xc2\xbb X \n\n\no \n\n\n*4 \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n248 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLOUISIANA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nm nr a \nl \n\nir \n\n< _ \xe2\x80\x94 \nc \nV c \nu \xc2\xab- \nc u \xc2\xabr \nzr \xc2\xbb \n\nu O. \nft ft ~ \n\nu r \nu u \nu g \xe2\x80\x94 \n\xe2\x96\xba o ft \nC U I \nQ. *- \n\n\nIT \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\nft. ft. \n\n99 \n\no \n\nc. \n\nft \n\n\n\na ft \n\nIT \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xa3 C. \n\nV, \n\nc \xc2\xabt \n\na \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n0 \n\n\n4T \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\x98 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2< \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\n- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nft. \n\nft \n\nft. \n\nft \n\nft \n\nr. \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nV \n\n\n\xc2\xab~c<\\.-oe:cccc\\c.- \xe2\x80\x94 ece.ircvcc.\xe2\x80\x99i \n\nill i \n\n\ntr \n\ncv \n\n\n>\xc2\xa3 \n\nI \n\n\n\n9- \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb* \n\nc \n\nft \n\n\nc \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nc \n\nC \n\nc \n\n(V c \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nc c \n\ncr \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nV \n\n\nC \n\nX \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\na \n\ntc \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nft- \n\n1 \n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nft \n\n\nc \n\nr \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nK \n\nc \n\nff \n\nK \n\nC\\ c \n\nc \n\nt* \n\n9- \n\nfV c \n\na \n\n0 \n\nX \n\na \n\n\\\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n) \n\nI \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\ni \n\nf I \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nI \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nff \n\nt* \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nw . \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\n\n\n\nCV \n\n\na \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nc \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\no \n\nCv. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nc \n\nX ft- \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\nft \n\n\n9- \n\nC \n\ni. u \n\n0 \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n* \n\ni \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n- 1 \n\n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\ni \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\ni \n\nc \xc2\xab- \n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ne \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\'ft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na. \n\n\na \n\nc \n\nft \n\nIT \n\n^\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\n99 \n\nIT. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\nr. \n\n\nX \n\nft X \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nr \n\nc \n\nx. a \n\n\nr \n\n9-+ \n\nft \n\ncm \n\n> a \n\na \n\nr \n\n\n4 \n\nft \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xab- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nr \n\n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nt- \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n99 \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nX ft \n\nCY \n\n0 \n\ne \n\nX\' \n\nK* \n\n\xc2\xa3 i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr. \n\n\n<\\ <\\ \n\n\nc\\ \n\n0 \n\n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*- \n\nrr \n\n\n9 - \n\n*\xe2\x80\x9c G \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX 0. \n\n\no \n\nft iT \n\nX \n\n\nft \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nft \n\nc \n\nft \n\nft \n\n4J* \n\nft \n\nc a \n\nX \n\nc \n\nX \n\nX, X \n\nr- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nfO \n\ne a \n\n\nK \n\ntr \n\nc \n\n<\\ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n9~ \n\n9~ \n\nft \n\n>r. \n\n\n\nft \n\nx \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX ft \n\nft \n\nft \n\nc \n\nft \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft ft \n\n\nr \n\nc \n\n\n\nT l_> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUl \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\no \n\nc \n\nc \n\no \n\nO \n\nc \n\nc \n\no \n\no c \n\nC. \n\n9* \n\no \n\n-\xc2\xab o \n\no \n\nK\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nfO \n\nfT \n\no \n\nU. \n\nvt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\nt \n\n1 \n\n7 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nz: \n\n\n0 \n\nc \n\n\nc \n\n\ncv \n\nr \n\nft \n\na \n\nX \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\nft a \n\nX \n\nft \n\nc \n\na x \n\nG \n\nX. \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nx a \n\nJ- \n\nPi \n\nX. \n\nX \n\n(M \n\n\n\n99 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n9-4 \n\nt<-, \n\n\nr-4 \n\nft \n\nf) 99 \n\n99 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa23* \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 fO \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nft) \n\nX \n\n\ns \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\nft ft \n\n\nrr. \n\nff \n\n\nrr. \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nft \n\ner \n\nK\' IT \n\nC\' \n\noooft0.o*0ft.3oc:* \n\n\nCM \n\n\na \n\ni \n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\ni \n\n\nCM \n\nI \n\n\nra \xe2\x80\x94\' \nt- i. a. \n\nU1 >- \n\ng -\xc2\xbbc \n\n\xe2\x96\xa03 \n\nS3 C \n.T) \n\n31 > \n\xe2\x96\xa0J O \n\n-J G \n\nz \n\n\nc oj vC r- r. x o ircv\xe2\x80\x94 ^r-j-cocrvLira r~ \n\n<) iTD M \xe2\x80\x94t -o ft ft- X ft ft 3 .0 .O ft O \n\nCM CM CM fO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nJ \n\nIO \n\n\no \n\n3 \n\n\nft- \n\n3 \n\n\n*1 \n\n\n7- J. 3 & ^ ft j x CM ft \xc2\xa3 \\C f*l ft O\' J \xc2\xa3 \n\nCM ft! ftj CM O \n\nI ft tO \n\n\n3 \n\n"ft \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n.*-> \n\n-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n*U \n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nM \n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\n\n\n>aJ \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\nft! \n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\nK \n\n0 \n\nz \n\n\n\nz. \n\ncr \n\nUJ \n\n\n< \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\nZ \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n0. \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX. \n\no \n\n7 \n\nX X \n\n\nh~ \n\n\n\na \n\n\nUl \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\nft \n\nX \n\n\nu. \n\nUl \n\nft \n\nX 2 \n\n\nJ*. \n\nft \n\n\n)- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n^ t- \n\n_J \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n> \xe2\x80\x94 . \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\n\nU \n\no o \n\n\nUJ \n\n> \n\nX\' \n\no \n\n\nft \n\no \n\n\nu. \n\n\nO G> \n\n_) \n\n\nz \n\n\n\nG \n\na \n\n< \n\nX - \n\n\n\nQ \n\nUJ \n\n-J \n\n\nOI \n\nu \n\n\nX \n\n\nM, __ \n\n\no \n\nac \n\n_J \n\n\n\na \n\nu \n\nUJ ft \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nG \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\nf- c \n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nft X \n\ni \n\n. \n\ni \xc2\xab* x \n\n\n2 \n\n\nX, \n\nz \n\nz \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nr- \n\n\nU O \n\n\n1- U. \n\n-j, \n\na uj \n\na \n\nz \n\n \n\n\n\xc2\xab* \n\nS ft *-t \n\n\nX \n\nUl \xc2\xab \n\nu \n\n\nft \n\nUJ \n\nX) \n\nX \n\n\no \n\nx a \n\n_) \n\no \n\nX \n\ni \n\nG \n\nz \n\nX \n\nz \n\n1 Z ft \n\n\nz \n\nG ft \n\n\nG \n\nft \n\n2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nV- \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\nM \n\n-* a \n\nX \n\n\nX X>|ft \n\nUJ \n\nft \n\nft -J \n\nc \n\n< \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\n\nG \n\nv/1 \n\n9* \n\n\nX c. \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nz \n\n2 \n\nX o \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xabJ \n\nZ Z _J o \n\n1 \n\n> ft \n\nUl\xe2\x80\x99 \n\nft \n\n_J \n\n\n\no \n\nX \n\nZ 2 O \n\nx X \n\n2 \n\n\nul \n\nU ft \n\na \n\nX \n\n< S ft \n\n< \n\nZ \n\na > \n\nX \n\nO \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nG O \n\n-J \n\n< \n\nO a \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xabt o \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xbb \n\n\nX O ft \n\n.7 \n\n\nu -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nft \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n-v \n\n< \n\nVL \n\n-> X \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2Jl \n\n-J X \n\nJ \n\nX 1 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nz \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 Ul D \n\n\nLL \n\nX G \n\n\n\no \n\n-4 \n\n-4 \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\na. \n\no \n\nu \n\n\n249 \n\n\nUUEMPLOYMI-NT RATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMAPYLANO TA6LE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n4 ir c \n\nv> \xc2\xabif \n\nU C ; \n\n\xc2\xa5*.? \n\nU A \ntt A- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nuj r \nu u. \n\nU L <* \n\xe2\x96\xba O A \nC U. I \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94i if \n\n\no r.Ac r I C fl AC A o I I It A\xe2\x80\x99 \n\nI I I I I - 9 I I I I I \n\n| \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 i i \n\n\n* \n\nI \n\n\nc \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nt \n\n\nA *\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr i \n\nI \n\n\ne, \n\nt \n\n\nr \n\n* \n\nt \n\n\xc2\xbb; \n\ni \n\nc \n\n\n\n\nml \n\nas ml \n\n%*l \n\n/\xc2\xbb \n\n# \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nA \n\n^CA^-0~C\xc2\xbb-C A \n\nc c \n\nc\\ c \n\n\xc2\xab C \n\nir \n\nK c \n\n- x: \n\nA \n\n1r \n\nIf \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n3\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xab*| \n\n1 \n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\nr \n\nt \n\n\n9 \n\nj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C * \xe2\x80\x94 c cv e \xe2\x80\x94 c c \n\nC A \n\n!\\ C \n\nc c \n\nx \n\n3 K \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c* \n\nc \n\nA \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\n1 \n\n9\xc2\xbb \n\nf \n\n\n\n\ncv \n\n99 \n\n*<- \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nC \n\nc \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94. c \n\nC \n\nc \n\ne \n\nc* \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nK \n\na \n\nc\\ \n\nC \n\nc \n\nIf V \n\nIf. \n\n\nC \n\nr \n\nX \n\na \n\nIf \n\n\ni \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n1 1 \n\n- 1 \n\n9\xe2\x80\x94 \n\ni \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni 8 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nA \n\nx \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbbf \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nc cv \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc. \n\n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xa9 \n\ncv c \n\n\n3 \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nX *f \n\n\n\nC \n\na \n\nA \n\na \n\nc \n\ne \n\ni \n\n8 8 8 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n8 \n\n8 1 \n\n1 I \n\n1 \n\n8 \n\n. 8 \n\n8 \n\n. 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\nr. \n\nCV \n\ns \n\n\xc2\xabp* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n& \n\nlOfd PO 1 H C 94 0 \n\nCM C If \n\nc \n\na x cv if c \n\nX f. \n\nK\xc2\xbb \n\n0 \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nCM \n\n\xc2\xab \n\na. \n\nC f CV f A 3 \n\n\nIf \n\n- \xe2\x80\x94 x \xc2\xab a \nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2Pi \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n^ \n\ni \n\nx \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 x\xc2\xaeeoxin \n, cv cv r \n\nA* \n\nX \n\no \n\nCM \n\n3 \n\nin \n\n^ \xe2\x80\xa2 \nx \xc2\xabr \n\n\no \n\n0. \n\ni. \n\ne. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n1. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n1. \n\nrt O O fi \xc2\xbbC 3 HO \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nX. \n\n\nr \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n* \n\n94 \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n0 \n\nr r. \n\ncm r X \n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0 \xc2\xab w Aa \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2TON \n\nX 0 0 \xe2\x80\x94 A- \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nr \n\nA- \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\na \n\n0 \n\nV \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2?> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O VJ \n\nh n m \xc2\xae \xe2\x80\x94 cm \n\n3 X \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 x \xc2\xa9 > 3 n \n\na \n\n3A \n\n3 \n\nA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\ncv cm p) \n\nX \n\n94 \n\n\nX \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n94 \n\n\n\na \n\ny \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O CV CM \n\nin \n\n^4 *H 94 \n\nO r\\, 30 \n\ncm f o \n\n\xc2\xa3\xc2\xabA*X- \n\nX \n\nCM \n\n3\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\nMU *\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab CM \n\n\no\xe2\x96\xa0 r \n\nCM \n\nHUN \n\nCO 94 fN/ \n\n3 X rtC rt< \n\nx cc \xc2\xa9 x >n \n\nM* \n\no \n\nX \n\nA* \n\n\xc2\xa9 o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM CM if \n\nc \n\nCM \n\n\nX \n\n-J o \n\xe2\x80\x94* \n\na9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n\n\n94 \n\n3 \n\n\nrt \n\n\n\n\n\nU. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 _i \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ If \n\n*- \n\nZ \n\n\nA- \n\n\n\n\n\n\nns k- \n\nar 2 \n\n\nw \n\na uj \n\n3 \n\nUJ \n\n\nZ \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\na r \n\n_/ *H \n\n\nIf. o \n\n3 If if \n\nA- \n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n*1 \n\n*- X \n\n\nUJ UJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba* 3 Z \n\nIf A* \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n?v \n\nJ H \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C/I \n\n\nJ \n\nO O o \n\nUJ > If \n\no \n\n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\ni*i \n\n\nO y \n\nJ \n\n2 - \n\n\no a \n\n3 1 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO UJ \n\n_J \n\n\no \n\nu. \n\n\n2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rtU j \n\n*- 3 X -J \n\n\n-* a \n\nU. UJ A- \n\n* IS (J. \n\n\n\n_J, \n\n\n\n\n\n>- c \n\n1- -X. \n\n3 cc -r \n\n> \n\nr i \n\n3 X < if \n\nx jt! \n\nX \n\n3\xc2\xbb \n\na- \n\nX \n\n\nX\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n!^; o \n\n*- \n\nU. 3 _> 0C UJ 0. \n\nZ 3 VJ UJ \n\n\xc2\xbb if 2 O, \n\nUJ \n\nO \n\nX \n\no \n\n\nv \xe2\x80\xa2*{ \n\n\n3 \xc2\xab \n\nUl < \n\ni a < \n\nw \n\n> >-* \n\n3 M \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nIf UJ 3 U \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ 1 \n\nCO \n\n\n* z \n\n\xe2\x80\xa23 x a \n\n_\xc2\xbb o \n\nC 1 u \n\n2 \n\nX \n\nX 1 2 \xc2\xbb- \n\n2 0" \n\n\nA* \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n\nA- U \n\n2 \n\nw- \n\nrt Xrt \n\nUJ \xe2\x96\xba- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n<\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na i/> \n\nif 3 - \n\nis " " j a \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n3\' \n\n_J \n\n\nl/\xc2\xbb "\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94< \n\ni/J o \n\nA- X \n\ne z x \n\nX \n\nO 1 \n\nOZXJ3 8 > \xe2\x80\x94 UJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n_J \n\n\n\n\n3 Of \n\n\xe2\x80\xa29 \n\nz c \n\nX 3 \n\n* *- UJ \n\ntjHir \n\nIf 3 X \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 2 X > X \n\no \n\n5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n*"4 \n\no \xc2\xa9 \n\nUl 3 \n\n3 \xc2\xa3 X \n\n3 o \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X O i- \n\nx \xe2\x80\x94 uj \xe2\x80\x94 a \n\nA- \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\n2 3 \n\n\nJ H. \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9d u. \n\nJO. \xe2\x80\x98J \n\n2X3 \n\nIrJOt-U.JIU< \n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\na \n\nCj| \n\nVJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n250 \n\n\nUufc\'MPLOYMfNT RATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n1 \n\nIf \n\na \n\na.o c x \n\na \xc2\xab. a ir \n\nk e a. \n\nX c r. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 A \n\nA X \n\nc \n\nA \n\nA\' \n\nc \n\n\n\n^. \n\n0 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 0 0t 0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 e \xc2\xbb \n\n0 9* \n\n* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 * 0 \n\n\xc2\xab 9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab if e \n\n1 \n\ntf \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n4\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\nM \n\nwav \n\ntV. A. If \n\nAAA \n\n\nA \n\na *r \n\n\xc2\xabr; \n\n\ni \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\nr \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n9 \n\n\n\nA 1 \n\n*1 \n\n\n\nlj \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab9 ^ -k- \n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nV c \n\n\na pc. \n\nc \n\na c x \n\nc- r c r \n\na A x \n\nIf (V If \n\nA \n\nA A \n\nr c \n\nc \n\nr \n\nr \n\nA* \n\n\n\nu ^ \n\n49 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 0% \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n% % % \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 # \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na a \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ny L. \xc2\xab \n\nZ Cil \nu tv \n\no- \n\nf\\ n \n\nXI \n\ntv. \xc2\xbbr a \n\nxi r c \n\nV. X IT \n\n\nA \\t 3 \n\nA- \n\n\ni \n\nX \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 If \n\nV\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nir \n\n- X \n\nX A \n\nc \n\nA \n\n\nC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n-o \n\n\xc2\xae X 2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nC \n\n\n49 \n\n9 \n\n9 \n\nG \n\nis *c \n\n*r tj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n*4 \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntJ \n\n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nx a \n\n\n\nX rv .i c \n\nOiiS \n\nCMC \n\ntip, JOMC \n\nX a \n\nA \n\na \n\nx> \n\n\xc2\xab*4 \n\na \n\nw \n\nC 2 \n\nA \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0X* \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nG\xc2\xbb* \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X X A \n\nO* \n\nA \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0 c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\ne. \n\n\na \n\n\n\n1 u. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<**\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\n\n\nH \n\nZ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< \n\nu. \n\n\no o \n\no \n\nc e c \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nCOO \n\nc o c \n\no \n\no o \n\ne o \n\n\xc2\xbb*4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na- \n\no \n\n\nM \n\nu \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n9 \n\ni \n\n\n\n2 *-\xc2\xbb \nC C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ny y \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n|X \xc2\xab*\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ntv c O \n\no X \xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0 P- \n\nc e e \n\nm in a \n\nc \n\nA X \n\nx or. \n\nA \n\nn \n\nIf. \n\nX \n\nA \n\nUJ \n\nvf \n\n\xc2\xabx \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbbs \n\n\n^4 \xc2\xabx4 \n\nif. \n\n\nX \n\n- X \n\nx -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\nA \n\n*M \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nS 5 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC \n\n\na \n\n\n#\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \'\xe2\x80\xa2* O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< \n\nS *u \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nS3 ^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\naw \n\nX \n\ntv c a \n\nO \xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC C \xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX/ un a \n\no \n\nA tC \n\nX \xc2\xab: \n\nX \n\na \n\nX \n\nX \n\ne \n\n\nc X \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2**4 \n\n\n*1 if\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*\xc2\xab \n\nif -X X \n\nvO 4-1 \n\no \n\nA \n\na^ \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nUJ c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\ne \n\n\n3 \n\na \n\n\na y \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na. \n\n\no o o \n\noo o \n\no o o o \n\no o o \n\no e o \n\n\nO \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no o \n\na \n\na \n\nXI \n\n\n\n\nu. \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n? \n\ni \n\ns \n\n\n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \nOC \n\n\nS9 -1 \n\nJr x x \nS? a O \n\n5 \xe2\x80\xa2 y \n\nea O\' \nn \n\n\nci\xc2\xbb ao w j x tv. a \n\na a a a -< a a if a ,o a o vO a o a -< \n\na o \n\n\nf\\JCO>eA \n-\xc2\xab a \xe2\x80\x94< A \xe2\x80\x94 a if a If a .f X A \n\n\nfO \n\no \n\na \n\n\nX \n\na \n\no \n\n\nz \xc2\xbb \n\na o \n\na \n\n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\na \n\n\no y \no a \na. a \na x \n\nif lit \n\nZ a y A \nUJ O U _J \n\n1 *-> 3 \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 15 \n\n3 a C A * \n\na y \xc2\xa9 a \n\na y 2 f U< \n\nx 3 o x a y u \n\n>-> O Z \xe2\x80\x94* *-* \n\nif a \xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x80\xa2 f C A X \n\n3 a z z \xc2\xa9 x cc \n\nC O \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb O 3 uj < \n\nZ 4 1 J IL I- A \n\n\nUJ \xc2\xa9 \n\na z \n\n\nif \n\nUJ \n\n\n*- r \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 i/i \n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 U \n\nX y \xe2\x80\x94 \n:!/>\xe2\x80\xa2: \nu. z -i a Ui \nM1 \n\na i u 2 \n\nU.A \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nX Z X I o \n1 \xc2\xab UJ U K \n\n3 2 X If \n\no \n\n\nA \n\no \n\nX - \n\n\n\nO UJ \n\n-J \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nu. \n\nuJ A \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no y \n\nX\' \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX \xc2\xab X \n\n\na \n\nX \n\n2 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n< uu \n\n\ni tf \n\nz o \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\nV HI M \n\n\nIf UJ \n\n- u. \n\n\nHI \n\nUJ \n\n(\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Z A \n\n\nz o \n\n\ny \n\nA \n\n-H \n\n< \n\nif 3 -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ \n\nH HI \n\nJ o \n\n< \n\n< \n\n3 \n\ny \n\n2 i y 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 > \n\nA Ul \n\nA \n\n_J \n\n\n\n< X *"\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nZ X \n\n> X \n\no \n\n3 \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX C A \n\nX \n\nHI lu \n\nA X \n\nA \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nA o 3 \n\nH- \n\n\xc2\xab* f u < \n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n251 \n\n\nONEMPLOYMFNT rate \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIT) \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nif \n\nu \n\no \n\nZ \n\nu \n\na \n\nUJ \n\nU- \n\nu \n\n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\x94! it, \n\nar vc 1 v \n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2if \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 3 \n\n\nU SCI \nC I \n\ntv \n\n\nz 1 \n\nu. \n\nL \xe2\x80\x94 \n\na ft \n\nU I \n\nCL h \n\n\nin \n\nU \n\nC \n\nz \n\nX \n\ne: \n\nu \n\nx \n\nu \n\n\n~ tv \n\na \xc2\xab- \n\nl \n\nif \n\n\nO\' \n\ni \n\nt\\ \n\n\n\xc2\xab -4 \n\n\ni I \n\nk o \xc2\xbbn 0 cl ir it h ct hC 0 #r: o <\\. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\'\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nj if ft r if ft f I v r a r O \n\ntv \n\nI. \n\n\nt \n\n\n4 i\xc2\xbb" \nm \xe2\x80\xa2 \nt VCV \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- tv \n\n1 I I \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*-\xc2\xbb flC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab* \nl I a \nt \n\n\nr \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCV r - \n\n\nC ft \nft~. OJ \n\n\na a O 40cCr-iJ-ifift\xc2\xabt.C \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nl \n\n\nif \xc2\xabc wr. le- \xc2\xa5~ c i ~ tv tr a ft- \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 k r \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 i l| \n\n\n\xc2\xa5 X \n\nI- \n\nI \n\n\neaftaifcftcc:ifttci\xc2\xbba\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x98\'ctv \n\nc *- \n\n\nTJ \n\n*- c \n\n\nCl \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 J \n\n\nJ \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\n4J \n\nw a. \n\n\n0 \n\nh a \n\nac \n\nO \n\nw x j \n\n\nQ \n\nX * c \n\n\n\n5 mo \n\n\n\nto o \n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\n\na \n\n5 \n\n\ni a \n\nC 5 \n\xe2\x80\x94 c \nx o \n\n\nft \n\n\nin \n\n\nx \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu \n\nft \n\n\n7 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU \n\n\nc c \n\nIf\' \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\nJ \n\n-T \n\nu \n\nJ \n\no \n\n\nft* \n\n4 \n\nH \n\nW \n\ncc a \n\nIf \n\nz \n\n1 / \n\ng \n\n* c \n\nc \n\ncn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\nx \n\nft \n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\nQ \n\nO Z a \nUJ c \n\na o \nz \nd \n\n\nu. \n\nX \xc2\xa5> \n\nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC Cj \n\n\nCCft-rlT-flCiCC-C \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 OCIf \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\nO \n\n1 . 1 1 1 . 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 \n\n1 \n\ntv 1 \n\n1 \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nx- \n\n\n\n-oo \n\n0 \n\nc c. \n\nX If \n\n0 \n\nft- X \n\nc \n\ncr \n\nIf! ft- \n\nm \n\na cc \n\nm \n\na \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94t \n\n\na \n\ntr \n\ntv ff \xc2\xa5 \n\ntv \n\n-\xc2\xa3 tv \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\n<\\ \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nCV \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nt- \n\n- if \n\nif \n\nif \n\n\n\nc: \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\nc\\ \n\n\n\nK \n\n\nK \n\n\nc\\ \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\n\nt* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCv \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\nc\\ \n\n\n\nK\xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\x98 \n\nn a \n\n& \n\nH K* \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r- C \n\ntv \n\nt* \n\nj \n\ntv \n\n- a \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nif \n\nif \n\n3 \n\n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC\\ \n\n\n\nK. \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb<- \n\nIf \n\n\nK. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nIf \n\n\ntv \n\n\n\nOCCOOOOOO\xe2\x80\x94* 00 \xc2\xbbH 0 CC^\xe2\x80\x94Itvioo \n\ntC \n\ntv \n\n\no \n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nr- CC \n\nft- c. \n\nO \n\ntc if. cc \xe2\x80\xa2* cp \n\nX X \n\n\nft- \n\nIf. \n\nir \n\nIT \n\nX \n\nt\\J \n\n\na \n\nKV \n\n-d tv \n\na \xe2\x80\x94> vO \n\n(M \n\nX \n\nif) <\\l \xe2\x80\x94< (E ^ \n\nft- If \n\na \n\nft- \n\no \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xa5 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\na rr \n\n\ntv \n\nif: \n\n\nf*\'. \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nIf \n\n\ntv \n\n\n\n*-> f-- \n\nCC \n\nc \n\no \n\nK-. \xc2\xa9 \n\nft- If \n\nr- ft- \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\na \n\ntC if CC \xc2\xa9 \n\nff \n\na \n\nX \n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\na \n\na \n\no i) N ^ I -VI a il 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-< fV IO \xe2\x80\xa2< 3 Ift) \n\n\n\'IftSOaflOMfO\'MJ\'flft 3 ft- * 3 (M -0 -I \ntv tC 3 K> N 3 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 if) *-i X if) CM \xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x80\xa2 ft- \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbbi ft- \xc2\xbbf a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 cm *o \xe2\x80\xa2* a *o \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n(V \n\nX \n\nIf \n\nft- \n\nO \n\nX \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nX \n\n\n\nrO \n\ntv \n\nX \n\n\nfM \n\n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-< \n\nX \n\nX \n\na \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\'M \n\nX \n\n\nlO \n\na \n\nCM \n\nX \n\n\n(M \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLl. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nJ \n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nIU \n\n\n\n\nft- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\n\nUJ \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nL- \n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\nft* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nft- \n\nT \n\nz \n\n\nD \n\na \n\nXI \n\n\n\n\n4t \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nZ \n\nUi \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG. \n\nX \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\nx. o \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\nft* \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX \n\nX\' \n\nX \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nD \n\n-r \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nI- \n\n\n>- \n\n\nz \n\ncc \n\n\n\n\n2 \n\nft- \n\nj \n\nft- \n\n\nX \n\nj \n\n\nu \n\n5 \n\no \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> \n\nX \n\no \n\n\nV \n\no \n\n\nUi \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\nZ \n\n\no \n\na \n\n< \n\ni \n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nUJ \n\nJ \n\n\no \n\nu. \n\n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nat \n\nj \n\n\nX \n\nll \n\nUJ \n\nl~ \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no \n\no \n\na \n\n\nJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nz \n\nlii \n\nx \n\nX X x \n\nX \n\nl \n\n\nX \n\n4 \n\n\xc2\xab/ \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\nz \n\nz \n\na. \n\ncc \n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nft- \n\nX \n\nDJI \n\nu a \n\nZ \n\n4 \n\nO \n\nUJ \n\n\n1 \n\nX z \n\no \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\nV \n\n-J \n\n\nD \n\nO\xe2\x80\x99 \n\nUJ \n\n< \n\ni \n\n0. 4 UJ \n\n> \n\nM \n\n< \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\n\nX UJ 4 \n\nX \n\n*-4 \n\nXI \n\ntr \n\na \n\n\no \n\na \n\na \n\nJ \n\nu \n\nX \n\n1 0 2 \n\n\nX \n\n3F \n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\nz \n\no \n\nft* \n\n\nJ \n\nft- \n\n2 \n\n< \n\nV\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu \n\nz \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab \n\n\nu) \n\nft- *-t \xc2\xab-i \n\na \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n--- \n\nM \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J \n\na \n\n4 \n\n4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94s \n\n-j \n\ncn \n\n\n\nX \n\no \n\nft- \n\na \n\nx> \n\nZ X X \n\no \n\n1 \n\nU \n\nz \n\nz \n\nJ Q \n\n1 \n\n> \n\nft* \n\nXl \n\nft- \n\nJ \n\n\n\n3> \n\na: \n\nz \n\n2 \n\no \n\nX \n\nCD \n\nz \n\nUJ o \n\ni- \n\na \n\ni/) \n\n4 \n\nz \n\n-> 4 \n\nz \n\nX \n\n> \n\nX \n\nO \n\nD \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nC \n\nc \n\n1-^ \n\no \n\no \n\nu- \n\n< \n\nz \n\nX X 4 \n\no \n\n\n\xc2\xbb-x \n\nX \n\no \n\nr~ \n\nX \n\nft-* \n\nUJ \n\nft* \n\na \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nX \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\n- t r 1 t 9 t 1 t I r \n\n9 \xe2\x80\x99 \xc2\xbb I II \n\n\nr \n\nI \n\n\n1 \n\n\nI \n\n\nw^vCsssiPeiA 3M9 h a id \xc2\xa9 rwocc \n\n* a a if -r / j jiftc \xc2\xabr(\\<\xc2\xabMNe - \n\nA r Tv if \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab if 3 \n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\na \n\nr \n\n\n>c \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\nIf \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nc \n\n\nt \n\n\nr \n\n\n<0 \n\n3 \n\n\n<\xc2\xa3 \n\n\ni r. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nD. \n\n\n\n!\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2.\xc2\xab- C \n\n^4 \n\n\nD. C \n\n>\xc2\xa3 f\\. if \n\n0 \n\n\nc c \n\n\nIT \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 3 \n\n5\xc2\xbb \n\nC \n\nA\' \n\nif \n\nb \n\n\nff \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n: \n\n\n# \n\n\n\n\n\nA \n\n9 \n\nA \n\nIf \n\n\n\nC \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nT \n\n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xabv \n\n\ncj \xc2\xab- cr \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 D. \n\nc \n\nc c \n\n3 \n\n \n\n\nr*. \n\n\ni \n\nt \n\nS 9 * \n\n* \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nt \n\n* \n\nr j ! \n\nD \n\ns \n\n\xc2\xbb, s \n\nt \n\nl \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\ni i \n\nc \n\nif \n\n\nA \n\nu \n\n\nj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\nIT* \xe2\x80\x94 O \n\n*D \n\n\nfv \n\n\nr 3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n0 \n\n<\\ \n\n\nIf \n\nir \n\nF-. \n\ncv c \n\nIT\' \n\nc \n\nC\\J \n\n\n\n* \n\nLl \n\n0 \n\ni \n\n. t \n\n1 5 9 \n\n1 \n\n* \n\nt \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xbb - i \n\n1 \n\n. * \n\n1 s \n\n\ni \n\nA. \n\n1 \n\n0 \n\n\xc2\xab-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n1 \n\n\nc \xe2\x96\xba \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nJ \n\n\n9 \n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nc. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-! \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ne\xe2\x80\x94> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\nO \n\ntt \n\n\n\no \n\nc \n\n \n\n\na *-i \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nif \n\nA \n\n\n5 \n\ncC 3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nn. \n\n\n\n\nIf \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nif \n\ncr \n\n\nIf \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nID \n\n\na \n\n!\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\n\ncc \n\nIT \n\nir \n\n\na \nu \nz \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \nc c \n\nH *-\xc2\xab \n\nwcc a \n\n8 * \nz> \'*\xe2\x96\xa0 c \nea \xc2\xbb0 \na \n\xc2\xa9 \n\nA \n\n\nCOCOOOOOO-<CU~\xc2\xab cmc 0 \xe2\x80\x94 acc in \nid \xc2\xabc ni aj \xc2\xbbD \xc2\xab-*iD.D3AAAiA8C,iDAikr. ai\xc2\xa9\xc2\xabc\xc2\xbb-i \n- (V ID A If \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c if 3 \n\n\na \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\ncv \n\na \n\n*> \n\n3 \n\ntD \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 Al AI ID \n\n\xc2\xab ID ID \n\nS \n\nAI f- \n\nSOlDiAllDAI^\xc2\xae*^ \n\nO \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nAI \n\nID \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ o \n\n\n\nAl K" \n\nAI \n\n\' If) ID 3 \n\nA\' \n\n*e \n\n\nID \n\nID \n\n2 <3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nID \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\n\nID \n\n\n\na \n\nU.I \n\n2 a< \n\nc 2 \n\n\n\xc2\xab-\xc2\xbb0a*0 00-\xc2\xbb4\xc2\xa9lD,a03 \'IOONWOmO \n\n\no- \n\nID \n\n\na a \n\n\n \n\no o \n_l u \n2 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2~4 & \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 If. \n\n^ ^ 4T \n\nA- \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xabc>- a \xc2\xabh id \n-3 IfgtD fU D \xe2\x80\x94I .D :? I \xc2\xab4 A \xc2\xab4 \n\n. ID \xc2\xab \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nID \n\nID \n\nID \n\n\n49 \n\na \n\n\nUJ \n\nX \n\n\nUl \nO J \n\no *- \n\nUJ \xc2\xa9 \n\n1 \n\nTl ^i \n\n\xe2\x96\xba4 UJ \n\nID \n\nUJ \n\na \n\na \n\n2 \n\na i~ \n\na 2 \n\n\nD X \n\nUJ \n\n< \n\na \n\na x \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nID \n\nO 3 \n\nID CD \n\na \n\nX \n\ntf UJ \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94 ~ \n\nUJ \n\njJ 1- \n\n3 2. \n\nif) a \n\na \n\n2 e- -J >- \n\nw 1/9 \n\n\' 3 \n\nt_> \n\n\xc2\xa9 O \n\nUl > ID \n\no \n\nO O -J \n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\no \n\nX \xc2\xab* \n\nX - \n\no a. \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c4 Zi \xc2\xbb- O \n\nX -J \n\n\nx a \n\nUJ \xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xbb( \n\nx \n\na \n\ni-ciui \n\n2 X \n\nif. \xe2\x96\xba X \n\ni ^ \n\nX <, If \n\nX \n\no o \xe2\x96\xba- \n\na DJKUiZ \n\n< U UJ \n\n1 ID 2 O \n\nU \n\na x ui 4 \n\ni a \n\n4 y > \n\n*4 \xc2\xab( \n\nH H,M \n\n9 2 I- \n\nid uj < a \n\n\n^ d. J U \n\nX \xc2\xbb \n\no 2 \n\nX X \n\nz u *\xc2\xab \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xab*4 \xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nw \xe2\x96\xba* \n\n*4. ffi \n\nID \n\niD \n\nUl \xc2\xbb4 *-\xe2\x80\xa2 j o i \n\n4 \n\n\ni/IhmWO I-IX ID Z J\'l O 4 \xc2\xbbJ ZUO I > >-\xe2\x80\xa2 UJl \nDX2ZOXCDX xunJK I i/I < *,\xe2\x96\xba* 4 Z X > X \n3 li C\' O U; 4 13 X X <0""*10l\xc2\xab3fHUMll \n2 4 X .J a \xe2\x80\x94 u. _iXuXX. U<( \n\n\nD \n\na \n\no \n\na \n\n\nUJ \n\nx \n\na \n\n3 \n\nX \n\nX\' \n\ns \n\n=i \n\n4 \n> \nr-* \nO \n\n\nUj \n\no \n\na \n\no \n\na \n\nX \n\no \n\nco \n\n>1 \n\n-J \n\n\n> \n\nu \n\n\n253 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMINNESOTA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1 \n\n\nc \n\nc r \n\nr < tv. ir \n\n\xc2\xab t \n\natv j o \n\na if \n\n*r- tr~ \n\n47 \n\n\n- - \n\ntv c \n\nX \n\nft \n\na \n\n- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba on \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n1 \n\na \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n1 - 1 \n\n \n\nr- \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 if \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xc2\xab*- \n\nf er \n\nc \n\nC \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n\nx a \n\n(V \n\ntv \n\nCT \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nc. \n\n\nX \n\n\nC 3 \n\n\nX cj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nZ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntL \n\n\nc \n\no o \n\nc c o \n\nC \n\no c o o \n\nc o \n\no c \n\no \n\n\no \n\no o \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\nX \n\nO \n\n\nU. \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\nz - \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no _* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nvC \xe2\x96\xa0-\xc2\xbb \n\nX C \n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O X \n\na \n\nO \xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nh- \n\nx a \n\n(V \n\nCT \n\ntv \n\na \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no J \n\n\n\xc2\xabK> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n(V \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r \n\nf- \n\n\nCT \n\nft. \n\n\xc2\xa35 \xc2\xab\xc2\xa3C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nK" \n\n\n\n\nC3 \xe2\x80\xa2(_) \n\n\xc2\xab r~ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\ntV \n\nsC \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n* CV CT \n\nc \n\nCV lO O CT \n\n\xc2\xabC if \n\no a \n\ncv \n\ntv \n\na o \n\nX X \n\nX \n\nCC \n\nCT \n\nX \n\nCT \n\nO X \n\nir \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\n\nCO \n\nnO h \n\nrH \n\n\nX X \n\ntv \n\nCT \n\ntv \n\nCT \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUj C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCo \n\ncv \n\n u \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nK\' \n\n\n\xc2\xab_( \n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nZ> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\no \xe2\x80\x94* \n\no o o \n\no \n\n1. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\no tv \n\nO \n\no \n\nfp \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 iT. \n\no CJ \n\nr- \n\na \n\nCT \n\nCV \n\n\nu \n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\nw- \n\n1 \n\n\nz >- \nc o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n33 -J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r \n\nIf Cl \n\n0 - X 1 \n\n*D \n\n-* O \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0n -i \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O h* \n\n33 \n\nO -1 \n\n\n\nX X \n\nCV \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nCT \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nw s \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\na \n\nr- \n\n\nCT \n\nCV \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\nK1 \n\n\n\n\ng .O \n\nM c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n+ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\'W X -1 \n\nX \n\n\nCT \n\ntv \n\na \n\nCNJ \n\n* ar \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2M O *"* Ct \n\nK) M \n\nrn \n\nN \n\na \n\nX \n\nH \xe2\x80\xa2-* fl \n\nX \n\nr- \n\ntv \n\na: \n\nIP \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCV \n\n\n- \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0X \n\n\nf\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\ntl \n\nX) \n\n_\xc2\xbba \n\nui a \n\nz \n\n< \n\n>* \n\n-J \n\n\nD \n\na ui \n\n< \n\n1 \n\na \n\n< uj \n\n> \n\ntH \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nTt \n\na: \n\n\nx a \n\na \n\n_J \n\nu \n\nX \n\ni \n\nU Z \n\n\nX \n\nJ \n\n1 \n\n\nU \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n-* \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nM t-i \n\nX \n\nyi \n\n\nto \n\nWT \n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\nr- \n\nX \n\n3J \n\nT \n\nX X \n\nc \n\ni \n\nu \n\n2 \n\n3 cr \n\nz \n\n2T \n\no \n\nK \n\ncr. \n\nX \n\nM \n\nUJ u \n\ny~ \n\na \n\ni/i \n\n< \n\n-< \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa21 \n\nO \n\nO uJ \n\n< \n\n\na \n\nX < \n\nO \n\n\n1-4 \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nX \n\n\na. \n\nh- \n\nu. \n\n-J \n\na -j x \n\nX \n\n<* \n\nX \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nxl \n\n\n1\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\nz \n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n< \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUi \n\nyj h* \n\n\nX \n\n\nUi \n\no \n\nZ i/> \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n>- \n\n\nX \n\na \n\nO UJ \n\n> CTI \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\n4-4 \n\nO Ui \n\n_\xc2\xbb \n\n\no \n\nu \n\n4\xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xbb \n\nO O. \n\na \n\n\n-1 \n\n\n< ct a \n\na \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xabz \n\na \n\na \n\nU UI 1 to \n\nz o \n\nUi \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 4-4 to UJ \n\n< u \n\n\n4-1 \n\nUi \n\nCD \n\nz f~ z u \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\n-) \n\n1- \n\nz \n\n<* \n\n^ h y m m \n\n-J o \n\n< \n\n< \n\nX \n\n_l \n\nX J O 1 > \n\nM UJ \n\n1- \n\nJ \n\n\n\nx -* < z a \n\n> X \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nq i- a \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 uj \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 CL \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\no a >- u -0 \n\nu < \n\n\no \n\n-4 \n\n-4 \n\n\n\n\na \n\nO \n\nu \n\n\nI \n\n\n254 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT rate \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nnr \n\ncv. if- at ; cl r- * a \xc2\xab., ,\xc2\xbb y- v. s\xc2\xbb <6 cVj \n\nr tv Vt \n\n>c \n\n4T \n\n\xc2\xbb* \n\nv. \n\n\n\xc2\xab If cl \n\n1 \n\nV. \xe2\x80\xa2 If \n\n\ncv tv if, trts \xc2\xabv i"- \n\n- cv -\xe2\x96\xa0 \xc2\xab- tv r \n\nir e, \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i \n\n* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\ni \n\n<\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0> \n\nr \n\ntv\' \n\n11 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\nc \n\nX c \nu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n4t \n\na c cv o tv \n\ni \n\ni 1 \n\n\xe2\x82\xacV r Ci \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\nf* \n\n4 \n\nar \n\nl \n\nr \n\n\nUti. \xc2\xab \n2C.I \nu. cv \na: \n\n**4 \n\ntv n a \xc2\xbb j c p~. er \n\nl \n\nCSc ^ f>| & \n\n1 \n\n^ N\xe2\x80\x99 \n\nr \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nui Z \n\nU U. \n\nLl O \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xc2\xbbr. ocvG-r-tucvc. \n\no e. Nr->t.~tv\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xbb- c- \n\nUC \n\nc \n\nc \n\nCL \n\n\n*- C f- \n\n\n1 r \xe2\x80\x94 ! \xe2\x80\x94 | c cv cv cv \n\nt C tv tv Cv tV ^ 1 \n\ni i p \n\nfV \n\n\n\xc2\xab\\ \n\n\n\nC k 1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 i t \xc2\xbb ? 1 - \n\nCV i 1 1 1 1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\nc \n\n\n\nCk \xc2\xab \n\nw \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\nt \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\ntv. \n\ntvc \xe2\x80\x94 eci*\' \xe2\x80\x94i e Gtv \n\nctvccccr*- \n\nf c r \n\nX \n\nc \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n\nU a \n\n**\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nt \n\nt \n\n| \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\ni \n\n2 if \n\ni*J w \n\nor \n\nu. \n\nU. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCv \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncvc-ceif-cc tv \n\ncnctccr^ \n\n\nu. sr \n\n*- 1 \n\nc tV \n\n\nt \n\nt \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-C \n\n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nx \n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n# \n\n\nCl \xe2\x80\x94* \n\nc. \n\noeccec-^cci\' - \n\nex\'\xe2\x80\x94.-e c^c \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ca. \n\n\nir \n\ncu \n\nir \n\n\nU. 9 \n\n\n1 \xc2\xab 1 1 I 1 \xc2\xab I I I \n\n1 1 \xe2\x80\xa2 1 1 1 > l \n\n1 t 1 \n\nc\\ \n\nc \n\ntv \n\ncv \n\n\n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\ntvo^-cctv \xe2\x80\x94 cc-> \n\nOC^OGCI^^. \n\nIX o c \n\nc \n\nin \n\na \n\n\n\n2 U \n\no \n\ni t 1 i \xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 l l l i \n\nt ) 1 I. 1 t 1 t \n\nI 1 \n\ntv \n\ncv \n\n\n\nc \xc2\xbb- \nc \n\n_J \n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\nW \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUi ^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\nC \xc2\xablf. CC. \n\nsrir0 \xc2\xabc o \n\no \n\nf- \n\no \n\n\no \n\nc \xc2\xbb \n\nfg \n\nf- \xe2\x80\x94 r tv >c <\\ cv \n\n\xc2\xab ir tv tv tv \n\nj K a \n\nr \n\nc \n\n\ntv \n\n* \n\n*- c \n\n\n\n\n\ne \n\n3 \n\n\n*r \n\n\nx u \n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n\n\n\nZl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\n\n\xc2\xa9OOOOOOOOO \n\noooocooo \n\nOC O \n\neg \n\n\xe2\x80\x99 \n\nX \n\n\nf- \n\nrg \n\n\nHffi c \n\nX. \n\nP\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab \xc2\xbb0 fV v\xc2\xa3 CV CM \n\n-\xc2\xabto (M evj cv \n\nJAM \n\n\ntv \n\ntv \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\nW 3 \n\n\n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\na \n\nSt \n\n\ncc \n\nm \n\no >oo \n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n\n\n\nO \xe2\x80\xa2 i i \n\na * *- \n\xc2\xabI s * \n\n\n- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc ^ o^ytr. ixaiir \n\nj\xc2\xbb \n\n\ne \n\nn \n\nvC \n\nQ X \n\n0 \n\nf- -< fO (\'4 >0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ c \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\xc2\xae \n\nm \n\nI o \n\n\n\n\n\n\ntVJ \n\n1 \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nu. \n\n\n1 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n1 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n1 \n\n0 \n\n<\\l O O \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\n\nu. \n\n!\xc2\xabV \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2< \n\n1 \n\n\n2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c> \nc c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*-\xc2\xab \n\n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 -* c- r, cr-\'CJvC \n\n3 fix -h X if if. \n\nr- t- \n\n\nz \n\n\nK- \n\n\nu> \n\n\n\ncr. i- ct 2 \n\n3 1 UJ < \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n2 \n\nUi \n\nV- \n\n\n\na >\xc2\xab 2 *-* \n\nif. O 3 vA I/) \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\no \n\n< \n\n\n\nX Ik) i- z \n\nuj u; 2 2 vr. \n\nK \n\n>- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x99 ? h j \xc2\xbb- \xe2\x96\xba- i/> \n\n_J U O O uJ \n\n> v/5\' \n\no \n\n\nV \n\no \n\n\n\n\nUJ O O _l 2 \xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU Ct < T \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO UJ \n\n\n\no \n\nu. \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xab* \n\n\n\nx <-> 3 ** o a -J \n\n\xc2\xab X U. UJ l- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO O \n\na. \n\n\n_j \n\n\nz \n\n\n\nX *-CSu.2XX?>- \n\nI i x x < x cr \n\nX: \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\ni \n\nX \n\nu. \n\n\n\nt- O O V\xe2\x80\x94 U. 3 JI \n\nUl CL Z < U UJ * \n\nU1ZO \n\nUI \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n\nV \n\n_J 3 X UI \xc2\xab f Cl. < US \n\nLA UJ < iL \n\n\n*-\xc2\xab \n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n>- \n\n\nx \n\n302 5. JUS toz \n\nX * t Z *- 2 \n\no -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n_j \n\nh- \n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6< \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU2H- \xe2\x80\xa2 UJ \xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nXl/I UV 3 \xe2\x80\x94 UJ \xe2\x80\xa2*\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab JQ \n\nn \n\n< \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nl/t \n\nM M|/l Q f X \xc2\xae Z t\'l \n\nO 1 U 2 * _J Q 1 \n\n> *1 u\xc2\xbbl \n\n*- \n\n-1 \n\n\n\na \n\n\n3 \n\n*2zoxiii"uyi>iri/Ki\xc2\xab I \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ns \n\n\n3 \n\nC \xe2\x80\x94 OOui< 3 ax. \xc2\xab* \n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xab cr o.i- at \xc2\xab \n\nUi "\xc2\xbb X \n\nfr- \n\nX \n\n> \n\n> \n\nU) \n\n\n2 \n\n< ZJH^U. JXU I \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n(J \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMISSOURI TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94* sr, \n\n\xc2\xabB w cc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nI\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nX -i r, \n\n\xc2\xab _J \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nU l \n\n\nU \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\niJ \n\n- \n\nU \n\nI 1 \n\n\n2 \n\nIf \n\n\nL. \n\n\n\nQ \n\n\n\nU. \n\n\n\nu. \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu. \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nc \n\n<\\ \n\n\n\nw \n\n\n4 " \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\na \n\n\nc \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nr- \n\n*- \n\nu \n\nl \n\n\n\nIL \n2 U \n\nc \xc2\xbb~ \n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\nw - \n\n\nc \n\nQ \nX 3 \n\xe2\x80\xa2 C \nK" O \n\no \n\n* \n\n\no \n\n\ncc \n\n\nft x \n\na\'tr. CO K1 O \n\n\xc2\xabt \n\n3 \n\nc \n\nv \n\nr< \n\n>c a \n\n\n\xc2\xab-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nG \n\nft. X \n\nft. \n\n\nX 1 \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft A \n\nft ft \xc2\xbbt 3 ft \n\nft \n\n\n\xc2\xabf \n\nr \n\nc \n\nt \n\n\n\n\nft. \n\n3 \n\nif \n\ne \n\n\n\n4 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv 1 \n\n\n\n^ 4 \' \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n! \n\n\n\na \n\n\nc a \n\nCOCAO \n\n3 C \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nft \n\n0 \n\nc\\ \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nX \n\nx \n\ncv \n\nd \n\npr c \n\nif \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xba \n\ncti \n\n\n(V K \n\nr w 3 c a \n\n\n\n>\xc2\xa3 \n\n\na \n\n9 \n\n\n\n44 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft. \n\nIT \n\n3 \n\nft- \n\n\n\na \n\n\nrl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n9 \n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\'! \n\n\n3 C \n\n1 \n\nC. 3 ft/ 3 C \n\na \n\no \n\n-3 \n\na \n\nft \n\nCf \n\nc \n\nCV \n\na \n\nr\\ \n\nC \n\n- \n\nl \n\nft. c \n\nX \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\nft \n\n9 ft \n\n-> \xe2\x96\xa0 8 1 ft \n\n<\\ \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab- \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0a \n\n\nk \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n1 ft \n\nft \n\n\nC3 x c \n\n- ^ r tv . a- it \n\n\xc2\xab- 3 \n\n\nO vC \n\nsCj O \n\n\n3 \n\n\nr~ \n\n\nX c. \n\nC 3 h- \n\n\xe2\x96\xba C \n\nx o \n\n2 \n\n\njccowirf3c^ti< , irictiOinif,os ec \n\nh - ff K K ff If 4 C\\tf3ffft\xe2\x80\x94 3X3^0 C \n\n\xc2\xab- k tr c\\ a \n\n\n\nu. \n\nu. \n\n2 *- \nc c \n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\xc2\xa9ocoeocoeooo\xe2\x80\x94 coo- \n\nlO \n\nft"^ \n\nto \xc2\xbbo \n\nX ft ft tO \n\nX ft \n\n-< a \n\nX 3 \n\nto \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\nft , \n\nA- \n\nX \n\n\ntf \n\nto \n\nCO \n\n*.C. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n#\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\n\n4\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n>c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*>/ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n3 a \n\np \n\nX \n\nft ip ir. \n\n3 G \n\nx e \n\na \n\n\nfO \n\no \n\nf- o \n\nft ft \n\nG X \n\nP \n\nO\' \n\ncr \n\nfP \n\ncv \n\n\no X \n\n3 \n\nft \n\nft \n\nK5 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*o o \n\nX ft \n\nr\\j \xc2\xbbn \n\nX \n\nft \n\n4\xe2\x80\x944 to \n\n\xc2\xab 3 \n\nto \n\nX. \n\nO\' \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nK\' \n\nfO \n\ncv \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nrO \n\n\n2 V \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x944 \n\na \n\n\n4\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nll \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94* o \n\n\nCJ \n\nO ft4 \n\nO \n\n->4 O \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\no \n\ncv. \n\n\no \n\nr> a \n\ncu vC \n\no o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\na \n\n 0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 a \n\no \n\nr- \n\nft >\xc2\xa3 \n\nX \n\na o \n\n\na \n\nf\'- \n\no \n\nr- Ow \n\nK: \n\no a \n\nX \n\n4-4 \n\nOJ \n\nX \n\no \n\n1-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft *> \n\nV9 \n\nr- \n\nX> \n\n-o -\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o K> \n\nX ft \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xbb a \n\nX 3 \n\nr- to \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nto \n\nto \n\nft \n\no- \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nft \n\n\n3 C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n/O p \n\nO\' \n\n\nft i\xc2\xa3) \n\npi \n\nrO O \n\nft X \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0>i o \n\nh- CC \n\nft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nO\' 3 \n\na \n\nr- \n\no \n\nto \n\nO\' \n\n\n\xc2\xab X \n\nH \n\n\nft \n\nK*> \n\ntr \n\n4-4 \n\n\xc2\xbbo to \n\nX ft \n\nft \n\nfO \n\nX \n\nft \n\n4-r ro \n\nX 3 \n\nX to \n\n3 \n\nO\' \n\nA- \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n>o \n\no \n\nft \n\nO- \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nto \n\n\n-1 u \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-4 \n\n3 \n\n\n*>\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCl \n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n4-4 \n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\n\n\n4-4 \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nK \n\na \n\n2 \n\n\n\n\nO \n\na \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nx o \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUi \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nX \n\n\n\nUJ \n\nUJ \n\nt\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nZ \n\n*- \n\n\nh- \n\n/>\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\n\n\n-J \n\n\nu \n\no \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nO \n\nV \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\n\n\nU \n\na \n\nn \n\nI \n\n\nac \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n*4 \n\nt\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n-1 \n\n\n\nM \n\na \n\nu \n\nUJ \n\n\n.. \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n*7 \n\n3 \n\nu. \n\n\nX if \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n8 \n\ns \n\na \n\n\nH \n\n\nu \n\no \n\n\nH- \n\ntT \n\nD X \n\na uj a \n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2X. \n\nV \n\n_j \n\n\no \n\noc \n\nU \n\n< \n\ni \n\n0. < \n\nu \n\n> \n\n4-4 \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n* \n\nao \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\no \n\nX \n\na \n\n-1 \n\nu \n\na \n\ni \n\nO \n\n2 \n\n\nX \n\nZ \n\nl \n\n;~ \n\nvt 2 \n\nt~ \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n*\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nUJ \n\n\n1\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n*\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nk\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\no \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x96\xa1I \n\nCO \n\nZ X \n\nX \n\no \n\n1 \n\nu \n\n2 \n\nD \n\n2 Z \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nX \n\nQC \n\nX \n\nk-4 \n\nUJ \n\nO t- \n\na \n\nX \n\n\nQ \n\nO \n\n4\xe2\x80\x94 \n\no \n\nc \n\nUJ \n\n\nD \n\nX \n\nI \n\n X \n\no \n\n\nV \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\nO UJ \n\n-J \n\n\no \n\nu. \n\nt- \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nIS \xc2\xabJ. \n\na \n\n\n-J \n\n\n< \n\nur \n\n\na \n\nX \n\nX \n\n2 \n\na \n\na \n\nu \n\nUJ \n\n\n9 X \n\n2 O \n\nUJ \n\nO \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n4 -\xc2\xbb \n\n\nX UJ \n\n< u. \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \n\na \n\nz \n\nH- \n\n\n2 O \n\n\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n_1 \n\n4 - \n\n2 \n\n< \n\nD \n\n4-4 \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n_J Q \n\n< \n\n< \n\nZ> \n\n_j \n\nX \n\n_J Q \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 > \n\nM \n\nt- \n\n-i \n\n\n\nX \n\n4-4 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n2 a \n\n> X \n\no \n\n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\n\na \n\n4-4 ^ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nvj \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU. X \n\no < \n\n\no \n\n4-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCL \n\nu \n\nV) \n\n\n256 \n\n\nUUEMPLOVMf NT RATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWOW TANA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nI \n\nv- \xe2\x80\xa2*r. l \n\n\xc2\xabJV \n\nc \n\ntr, c \n\nu. \xe2\x80\x94 \nc-u.cc \nZjC I, \nu. cv \na \xe2\x80\x94 \nuj 2 , \n\nuu. . \nu. c *~ \n& r^ 1 \nC U I \na \xc2\xab- \n\n\ntf \n\nSi \n\nC \n\n2 \n\nl*J \n\na \n\nu. \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\ntf. \n\ntx. \n\n\nu \n\ntr,! \n\nt \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nu. \nZ Li \no \xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xbb \n>\xe2\x80\x9c c \n\n-J \n\nW _l \n\nf -4 \n\ng\'a \n\np <\xc2\xa3 S \n\n5 \xc2\xabc \n\n\xc2\xab fO \xc2\xa9 \nO\' \n\ntf- \n\nX CL \nC 2 \n\n\xc2\xab C \nX V, \n\nz \n\n\nu. \nu. \nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\n\nu\xc2\xae a \n\n2 s \n\nKiC \n\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xa9 \n\n*0 \n\na \n\na x \n\nUI \xc2\xa9 \n\nX u \nz \n\n\nu. \nz *- \n\no o \n\n\nCO _J \n\nS x \n\nS a \xc2\xa9 \n2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xa9 \n\xc2\xab <7 \n\nf \n\nt* \n\nX \n* X \n\no o \n_1 \xc2\xa9 \nz; \n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\ntr \n\nA \n\nMt\'C h CM CV, is CfCVi \n\ncc a \n\n\xc2\xbbr \xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x9c \xc2\xa9 k- \n\nT- h \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n& i \n\no \n\n\n\nft * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xae \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 9 9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2, \n\n\n\nj \n\n\nft\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xabV \n\nr \xc2\xabv - .r \xc2\xbb \xc2\xabv \xc2\xabv ,r \n\na r \n\n- \n\n\nr \xe2\x80\xa2<\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nsrl \n\n\n\n\nft* \n\ni \n\n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-I \n\n\n\n\ni } \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb i \n\n! 5 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbbj \n\n1 \n\n\nII \n\n\n\n\xc2\xabf \n\na o r Vr* cv. cr \xe2\x80\x94 \n\neo \n\nABA \n\nif \n\n\xc2\xbbc r- \\C \n\nr c\' \n\no \n\ntr \n\nd\'l \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 + * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a. d \n\nV\' \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\n\n\n\nCV, \n\nif cm cm a ir cm \xc2\xbbo \'a- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n- \n\nA /J \n\n\n\n5^, \n\n0-8 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 ,*\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2N \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rt \n\n\n\nw- \n\n\n\n\n1 t \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\ni: \n\n\n\na \n\nOCjfw\xc2\xab\\C ctvor \n\nCV. if \n\nA\' *\xc2\xa3\xe2\x80\xa2 sC \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nAec \n\ni \n\ncs. c \n\ntr- \n\nr- \n\nA- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabA \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 9 9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 . \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nC I 1 \xe2\x80\xa2- 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- fv \n\nAAA \n\nr \n\n^ 9 i- \n\n8 \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 9 \xe2\x80\xa2 8 1, 0 \n\nJ a \n\n- 8 3 \n\n9 \n\n8 8 \n\n\n0 \n\n\nf- 1 \n\n\n\n\n* 1 \n\n* ; \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xc2\xab * \n\n* \xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nj \n\nft \n\no \n\ncv \n\nc \n\nU \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nu \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nu \n\n0 \n\nu \n\n\xc2\xa9 c \n\nc c c \n\nC \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xa9 A \n\n\xc2\xa9 tv \n\n\xc2\xa3 a \n\nfT \n\nM fO \xc2\xabc \n\nO\' ?- \n\nrw \n\nt*- \n\ntvi \n\nsC \n\na- \n\nft-* \n\n\n\n\n\nIf) \xe2\x80\x94 if) \n\nIf. \n\nf- \n\na \n\nt*4 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xabv \n\nf^- \n\n\nCV. \n\n\nCj \n\nooooooooo \n\no o \n\no \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xabHO*4 \n\no \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nry \n\nto \n\nr \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n5 \n\n8 \n\n\nc \n\n(ta-\'Xoo^kf.ofv, \n\nc o \n\nCC >\xc2\xa3 tf) lO \n\nCV( *o >c \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xabCii \n\nDC \n\nI" \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n<\\> \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*4 \n\n\ni/I H tO \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0n \n\nf- \n\na \n\n\nCQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nf\\i \n\n\n1 \n\nCM \n\n\nO\'- \n\nsn\'^ook jsow \n\no o \n\nAX)/ \n\ntO \n\nwon \n\nO\' X) \n\nX) \n\nO\' \n\na j \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* 1 \n\n\nH \n\n\nin \xe2\x99\xa6- if \n\nin \n\nr- \n\na \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nUi \n\nIX \n\n\nV- _J \n\nX X \nt- u \nI/S \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n3 X \n\nc o \nz a \n\n\n3 -i \n\nO Ui <3 \n\nx >- a z \n\nX K X *\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\nl/> U) H> I \n\nZ \xc2\xbb- Jl-Ml/S \n\nC U _J Z *1 \n\xe2\x80\x94< 3- O IX J : \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 Z\xc2\xa3+.ZX>/)>~ \nU O l-u. 3 JQC \n\nD oc ui \xc2\xabc I a \xc2\xab w \noxa-joac 8 \xc2\xa9 z \n\n2*\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 *\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb uj t- \n\n\xc2\xab-\xc2\xbbv/io*-a\xc2\xaezx.x \nzzoxaiMiuu \n-OOj|< 3 X x< \n\n.j x u X \n\n\nX \n\nIf \n\nUI \n\n\nt- \n\n\n\n\n\nUI tf) \n\nt- \n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nX Ui \n\n< \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz: \n\nUJ \n\nLD O \n\n3> trttf \n\nt- \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\no \n\ntil UI \n\nt- 3Z \n\nt/> \n\nt- \n\nV \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n_! \n\nO O O \n\nUI \n\n>tf \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\nu cr \n\n<\xc2\xab X *~ \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 UJ \n\n-1 \n\n\no \n\nu. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a \n\nu. ui \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\na \n\n\n-Jt \n\n\nX 1 \n\nX x *-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab * t-\xc2\xbb,*W \n\nX 1 Z r- \n\n1/1 Ui \n\n< u. \n\n\nM \n\nUI \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nX \n\nZ U \n\nM \n\n-j \n\nf- \n\n5, \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX I/I \n\ni/i 3 \xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\n\xc2\xbbva \n\nJ o \n\n\xc2\xabs \n\n X. \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa21 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xe2\x80\x94< \n\n" a Oii- \n\na \xe2\x80\xa2-. u \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2* Xr \n\n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nX < \n\nX \xe2\x96\xba- \'J 1 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- u.\xc2\xab/) \n\nu < \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\na \n\nU) \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n257 \n\n\nUNEMPLOTMf-NT KATE 4\xc2\xbb& 3\xc2\xab6 . 4,0 3.ft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUFPRAS\xc2\xabA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n-1 \n\nIf. \n\n\n< w \xc2\xabc \n\n1 . \n\n1/1 -If \xe2\x80\x98 \n\xc2\xabc _ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\n\nft \n\nIf c. \n\n\n4 \n\nu. - \n\na \n\n\n0 u. \xc2\xab; \n\nZ c 1 \n\nU ft \n\n\nft \n\n\na ft ~ \n\nu.\' z \nu u \n\nU C. \xe2\x96\xa0\xe2\x80\x94 \nft 0 ft \nC U- I \nCL \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nI i \n\nCO 3 fv (\\ f\'fv o. ft CM\'lf ift?\xe2\x80\x99 Hr t hi \nftjftslf ft ft \n\n\ntt O \xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c r- ft 3 f \n\nI II \n\n\n0 1 \nft \n\nC \n\n\ni \n\n\nt \n\n\nitacffft--\xc2\xabro ft c o o ir \xe2\x80\x94 if 4 ft tt ft c \n\n|ft \xc2\xabV If 3 ft ft\' \n\n\necvevj-- \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94> tv ir ^ ft \n. \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb ft-M rj \n\nit \xe2\x80\xa2 t \n\n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i \n\nftl \n\nft \n\nI \n\n\nIf ft \n\n7 : \n\n\n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nr. \n\nv\xc2\xa3 \n\nft ft \n\n4 K \n\ne s 3 \n\nC. \n\na \n\na \n\nft \n\n\nc \n\nc. \n\nft c \n\n<4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 ft - \n\nt \n\n\n1 ft \n\nft ft \n\nft ( 4 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nr \n\nft \n\nc\\ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n1 ft \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft* \n\n4 \n\n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\n\nI \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nft \n\n1 \n\n\nc \n\n\n1 / \n\n\nc\\ \n\n\n0 \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nCY \n\nC \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nft \n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc* \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nft \n\ntv \n\n4 \n\nu \n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\nt \n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n* \n\n\nt_ \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ne \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\nJ.. \n\nCP** \n\nft \n\nC* \n\n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\ncr \n\nK \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nr \n\n\n4 \n\nc \n\n\nir \n\n0 \n\nK \n\n O C \n\n4 ft \n\nC ft 0 \n\n<" \n\n4 0 \n\ncC 4 \n\nO ft- \n\nr** 0 \n\nr- \n\nIf \n\n4 \n\nir \n\na \n\nc \xc2\xbb \n\nft \n\n4 \n\n\nft \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n4 ) J \n\nC 4 \n\n\nr- \n\nr \xe2\x80\xa2-< \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM \n\nr- \n\n4 \n\n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n4 \n\n\nft \n\ncm \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab (V \n\n\nO \n\nCM \n\n-s 0 ^ \n\na \n\n4 \n\ncm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-1 \n\n\nH H \n\n4 ) \n\n41 \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\nJM \n\nZ \n\n\nUJ \n\nx \n\n\nz \n\no \n\n\n4 \n\n\nu. \n\n_i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb UJ \n\n*- a \nX Z \n\nUJ ft \n\n\n>- _i \nx X \nft- o \n4 \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n3 oc \n.o e> \nz < \n\n\n<_> \nD \nO X \nZ ft- \nft 4 \n\nz z \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 0 ) \n\nX \n\n\nCJ -I \n\nC X \n\no \n\nx u \na _j \n\xe2\x80\x94 \na *- \n\nO X \n\nO UJ \na i- \n\n\nO X \nuj Z \nft- u. \n\n4 I \n\nU X \n\nM l^J \n\nX X \nCD * \n\n< z \n\nx. J \n\n\no \n\nz \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\nT \n\nto \n\n-J \n\nCC s \nZ -I \n\nX X \nI 0 \n\nft- ft \n\nZ X \nft UJ \n\nx r \nx u \n\n\na \n\n4 \n\n\njj \n\n\nw- \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba4 \n\nUJ \n\nIf \n\nft \n\nJ \n\nz \n\n\nft \n\n\n\ncc \n\nUJ \n\n< \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nZ \n\nUJ \n\n4.0 \n\nw\' \n\nIf If \n\nft \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\n0 \n\nIjj U \n\nft \n\nX z \n\n4 \n\ni \n\nV \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n_l \n\nCJ \n\nc 0 \n\nUJ \n\n> 4 \n\n0 \n\n\n>- \n\n0 \n\n14 X \n\n<* \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nQ UJ \n\n_J \n\n\n0 \n\nu. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a \n\nu. \n\nUJ ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n2 CJ \n\nQl \n\n\n_J \n\n\nx 1 \n\n__ \n\nX \xc2\xab* 4 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\na \n\nX \n\nuj a \n\nz \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 UUI \n\n1 \n\n4 Z O \n\nUJ \n\n5 \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n> *-* \n\n< \n\nTt n \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\n4 u \xc2\xabr u. \n\n\n\nU! \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nX \n\n1 Z ft \n\nz \n\nU *-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n-J \n\nK- \n\n2 \n\n< \n\nX 1/1 \n\n\n4 n \n\nu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nH JO \n\n< \n\n<4 \n\nX) \n\n-J \n\n0 1 \n\nu \n\nZ X J Q 1 \n\n> \xc2\xab UJ \n\nft \n\n-j \n\n\n\ni- a \n\nl/l < I -1 \n\n< z \n\na > x \n\n0 \n\nD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nftl \n\na 0 \xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nuJ ft. x \n\nft \n\nX \n\n> \n\n> \n\nx \xc2\xab \n\n\nft u o \n\nr- U. \n\n4 0 < \n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCL \n\nu \n\n0 \n\n\n258 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNPVAOA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab ir e \n\nV \n\nIf \xe2\x80\xa2If, \n\nc \n\nif c \nb 1 \xe2\x96\xa0*! \nU U \xc2\xabJ \nZCH \nc ft if c ft-scrc \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2*\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab \n\xc2\xbb*~ft # a \n\n\n\xc2\xabc rv \nr ,i \n4 \n\n\nt \n\nI \n\n\na o tt < *- \xe2\x80\xa2- ir a o o if ft n c! \nl \n\n\ncv \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n8 I \n\n\nft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nI - \n\nt \n\n\nftlf ft ft\'- I t \n\na I i i i \nt \n\n\nl i ft \n\n\xc2\xabr- \n\nI \n\n\nft \n\n( \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \nIf \nI. \n\n\n<\xc2\xa9 \n\n*1 \n\n\nIf \n\n0 \n\n\nft- \n\n\nir \n\ni \n\n\ni r \nu \nc \nz \n\nUI \n\na \n\nu \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 cv \n\ncr \xc2\xab- \n\nI \n\nif \n\n\na \n\n# \n\nc \n\n\nCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC-CirCft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 III I \n\n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nccccocc-cccccccccft-ft-aci^ r if \xe2\x80\x94 if \n\nI 18 4 I t \n\n\nIf \n\na \n\n\nft- \n\n4 \n\n\nccocccc-cccccccccccft-cn 4 . 2 \n\ni * c \n\n\xc2\xab f U \n\no \n\n\ncoccrc_cccccocccocft-\xc2\xbbcr, cc vC a cv a \n\n4 5 4 4 4 4 1 I 4 I 4 4 4 I I 4 I 4 I 4 I 4 \n\n\nrfiOftoccf-occftiaMir.airc cv *c o cv if \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 J ft r- if \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncv u ev ft- \n\n\nI a \ne 2 \n*- c \ni o \n\n\nar, ^ftccof-cwocMa\'ftomMfo a if r- \xc2\xbbo >o \n\n\xe2\x80\x94- iftc*\xe2\x80\x94eta\xe2\x80\x94*acc\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 if* \n\nCK If CV if \n\n\nu. \n\nu \n\n\nOOOOOCCOOOOOCCOOOOOC.O \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n(M \n\n\nc m \n\n\nc c \n\nft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n\nH \n\nu \n\n\nz u \n\n2 \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt\xe2\x80\x94\' \n\n\n& \n\nftiMMC \n\no \n\no \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2". n ft- \n\nc c \n\nft\' \n\nCC \n\nif \n\nCV cc. \n\nftf ft\' if. \n\n- \n\nH \xc2\xbb c \n\xe2\x80\xa23 * *-\xc2\xbb \ncQ a \n\n\nJfC aCOCf.--OCM4NC f. ffN if \xe2\x80\x94< \n\n\xe2\x80\x94I rf \xe2\x80\x94ft 0 \n\n:o \n\nm \n\ncv \n\na \n\nft\' \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nif \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCV \n\nf> \n\n\ncv \n\nft. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \nO J \n\n\n\n\na \n\nIf \n\n\n\nwd \n\n\n\nft- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \xe2\x96\xba\' \n\nUJ \n\nO I \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nUI \n\nif \n\n\nl~ \n\n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\nUI \n\n\n\n\n\na 4- \n\na \n\nz \n\n\n\na \n\nu. \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUJ \n\n4~ \n\n\n\n\n\na x \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba-ft \n\n\nif O \n\nz> \n\nIf If \n\n\n4- \n\n\ni \n\nz \n\n\nId \n\no \n\n4 \n\n\n\n\nj- \n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nT \n\n\nUJ u \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX z \n\n\nIf \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- 1 \n\n*- \n\n\nT \n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nz - \n\n_j ft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nif \n\n\n_j \n\nUJ \n\no o \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> if \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\nO U \n\n\nz \n\n.-ft \n\n\nU\xc2\xbb X \n\n< \n\nX Ml \n\n\n\n\nO UJ \n\na \n\n\nO \n\nU- \n\nft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX \n\n\nft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n-< o \n\nT \n\n-J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a \n\nu \n\nUJ l-l \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n u \n\na \n\n\na \n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nZ aJ \n\n\nX 1/1 \n\nV \n\nZ 4 \n\n- \n\na \xc2\xab if \n\n\na \n\n\nX \n\nz \n\nz \n\n> \n\nX \n\nUi \n\n\n\n\no o \n\nft- \n\nll \n\nD -J \n\nrr \n\nui a \n\nz \n\n4 U UJ \n\n\n4 \n\nif \n\nz o \n\nUJ \n\no \n\n* \n\no \n\nZ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n-J \n\n\no r. \n\nUJ -ft \n\n\xc2\xabt \n\n\'J H H \n\n\nIf UJ \n\n< u \n\n\nt-ft \n\n\xe2\x80\x9ct! \n\nCt \n\nV \n\na \n\n\nc \n\nx a \n\na o \n\na \n\n4 O \n\n2 \n\nX \n\nz \n\n4 Z: ft- \n\n\nZ \n\nO ft- 1 \n\na \n\n4- \n\nz \n\n4 \n\no \n\nb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCJ \n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\' \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \n\nft- \xe2\x80\x94< \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\na if \n\n\nif X.ft-ft \n\nUJ \n\n*4 \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaH \n\n-J Q \n\n4 \n\n4 \n\nX \n\na \n\na \n\n\n\nh-< \n\nif o \n\nv- a \n\n3 \n\nZ X \n\nX \n\nO 4 \n\nu \n\nZ Z _J o \n\n1 \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\x94ft UJ \n\n4- \n\na \n\n\n\na \n\n3 \n\n3: \n\n2 \n\nz o \n\nX CL \n\n3K \n\n- UJ u \n\n4- X \n\nIf \n\n< z !-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4 \n\nz a \n\n> z \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n\n\nr*\xc2\xab \n\no o \n\nUJ < \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX X \n\n< \n\nQ M \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nX O ft- \n\na \n\nM \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 a \n\nft- \n\na \n\n>. \n\n> \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n>: \n\n-> u. \n\n*- a. \n\n_J \n\na o \n\nX \n\nZ 4 \n\nz \n\n- U 3 - \n\nLL \n\nJ) \n\na 4 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94ft \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nu \n\nu \n\nD \n\n\n259 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nI \n\n\n\na** \n\n\xc2\xab ir (\' \n\n1 \n\nl \n\n\nV \xe2\x80\x98(f \n\xc2\xab _; \xe2\x80\x94 \nC \n\nO\' c \nu \n\n\nuu. c. \n\nZ CM \n\n1 \n\nU CV \n\na a- \n\nUJ z \n\nu. u. \nu. \xc2\xa9 -s \na a \n\nC U 1 \n\n1 \n\n& \xc2\xbb- \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\ni/1 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU \xc2\xab, \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 1 \n\nX If \n\n\nUJ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nor \n\nu. \n\nu ~ \n\nU. a: \n\n*- 1 \n\nC f. \n\n\n*\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb \n\n\nvr \n\na - \n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb ^ \n\nu. $ \n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\n\nL. \n\n\nX ir. \n\n\nc *~ \n\nV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- c \n\n3 \n\n. .J \n\nG \n\nt-4 \n\nto) \n\n4i \n\nc \n\nS c. \n\no \n\no a \n\na \n\nP <\xc2\xa35 \n\niA \n\na *c \n\nff \n\n\na \n\nto) \n\n\n3 \n\nX Cl \n\n2 \n\n\xc2\xa9 3 \n\nH \n\na- c \nX O \n\n\nz \n\nUi \n\nlL \n\ncr \n\nu \n\n*-c \n\nz *- \n\n\no c \n\n\ny \n\na \n\n3 \n\nSl \n\n_i \n\n< \n\nU a* \n\nX \n\n, _ \xc2\xae a \n\n\ns \xc2\xbb \n\nB \n\nu 4. G \n\nS \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xa9 \n\nU. \n\nz \n\n\xc2\xae \xc2\xabc \n\n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\nCl \n\n\nC X \n\nu. c \n\n\nX O \n\n\nz \n\n\n3 \n\n\nu. \n\n\nu. \n\n\nz >- \nc c \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nca \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\n\n\nH X 0. \n\nw X \n\n\n\xc2\xab ao \n\n\n9 \xe2\x80\xa2 u \n\xc2\xa7 0 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0T \n\n\n(A \n\n\nQ. \n\n\n* X \n\no o \n\n_J u \n\n\n2 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nc\'st CVia \n\nc c r, h k r \n\na ix \n\na a- c. \xc2\xa5. y r- ovcv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n1 \n\na if o a \n\naft \xc2\xab \'\xe2\x80\xa2olft \n\n\xc2\xbb*\' \n\n1 \n\nc c \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2^ C O O ^ (V \n\nCIV, \n\nc \n\n- \n\n\n\'I \n\n1 \n\nIV \n\n- \n\nc c c c \n\nC C C C C a \n\n1 \n\nc c \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xab\\ c e c \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC IT \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nj \n\n\n- \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ncv \n\nc \n\nc c c c \ntill \n\ne. e c cow: \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc c \n\n1 1 \n\nC C o: C C C\xc2\xab- \n1 1 9 1 1 1 I \n\nc *\\ \n\n1 1 \n\n7 \n\na \n\n a- \n\na \n\n\xc2\xa5. a \n\na *r \n\noh a \n\nIV \n\nIV \n\nn \n\nkf \n\nr- \n\n\n9~ \n\n\n\nV* \n\n\n\na \n\nif! \n\n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\na vT \n\nIT \n\n\nv\xc2\xbb \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa5. \n\n\xc2\xab \n\ni \n\n\xc2\xa5. \n\n\no o \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\no o \n\no \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9 o \xc2\xa9 o \n\no \n\no \xc2\xa9 \n\nc c \n\nO \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nAM \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nin c aa ichAOAca \n\nIT A~ \n\na ir \xc2\xab \n\na \xc2\xa5. a. A- \n\na \n\na \n\nCA \n\nCC \n\nZ> \n\nV a. K1 \n\nIf) \n\nlO \n\na* <0 if) \n\n(O \n\n\n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\n\nfT \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\xc2\xa5\'. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n5 \n\n0 \n\na a \n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xa9 A* \n\nA* \n\n\xc2\xa9 A\xc2\xbb \xc2\xa9 IV \n\n3 \n\n7 \n\nu \n\n3 \nA \n\n4 \n3 \n\na. A- \n\nm \n\na \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\no \n\nIf) \n\nm \n\n\nv4 \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\nl \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n* \n\n\nm \n\n\no o \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\nO \n\n0. . \n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n0. \n\n1. \n\n\xc2\xa9 o \n\nm \n\nv4 \n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xa5) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\nl \n\n\n\nif \xc2\xa9 a a \xc2\xabt o A- \n\nA- \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xabC \xc2\xa9 Cl) \n\nm a- \n\na m o \n\na a \xe2\x96\xa0-, ,c \n\na \n\n\n0 \n\nac \n\nV \n\nH H \n\n\xc2\xa5) \n\n/> \n\nm \n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 f) if) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nvt \n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\niflOf J \xc2\xaeOAAO tod \n\nm a* a m to a >n \n\n\nH \n\nif) \n\nCl) \n\nX \n\naH \n\n\nif. \n\nm \n\nm \n\n\n\nK"> \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0n \n\nX \n\n\n-n \n\n\nU\xc2\xbb \n\n\n: \n\n\n\n\n\n\nn \n\n-J \n\n\na \n\n01 \n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nAM \n\nu \n\nO M \n\nUJ 01 \n\nA- \n\n* \n\nz \n\n\nA- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa1c \n\n\ngc \n\nZ 3 \n\nX UJ \n\n< \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUi, \n\n\n\n\n\na. \n\nX \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 Lfl O \n\n3 1/1 If! \n\ny \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J\\ \n\n\nUJ \n\nK \n\nX UJ UJ \n\nA- 3 Z \n\n01 \n\nA- \n\nX \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\na \n\n\n\n\nZ A- \n\n-i \n\ntx. \n\n\xe2\x96\xbau \n\nin 3 \n\nwoo \n\nUJ \n\n> 01 \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2y \n\n5 \n\n\nUJ \n\n\no o \n\n-i \n\n\nZ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 u a \n\n< X a. \n\n\nO U! \n\n3 \n\n\nO \n\nUu \n\n\nor \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 - \n\nV \n\no \n\nCC \n\n3 l \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab QC \n\nU. UJ *~ \n\n. \n\n\xc2\xa9 o \n\na \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n3. \n\n\ni- X \n\nZ \n\nto/ \n\n\nX 2) x X | \n\nX X < X \n\nX \n\nx> \n\nX \n\nz \n\na 1 \n\ner \n\n\na- \n\n\nu o \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba*- \n\nu. \n\n3 3 a ui a \n\nz < ou \n\n1 01 \n\nz o \n\nUI \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n*~ \n\n-J \n\n\nd a \n\nUJ \n\n\n1 \n\na. \xc2\xab u > y> \n\n< B a\xc2\xbb m \n\nt/) UJ \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xab Ik \n\n\nau \n\nV \n\nCD \n\nX \n\n\no \n\na a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J \n\nU \n\na \n\n1 u Z X \n\nX 1 Z a- \n\nz u \n\nyt \n\n3 \n\na- \n\n< \n\ny \n\nU \n\nz \n\n*- \n\na. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nUJ \n\nA \xc2\xab at a l/l \n\n01 3 a. UJ \n\nM a\xc2\xab \n\n3 Q \n\n*s \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\nl/) v \n\nHl/lO \n\nA* \n\nX \n\nEl \n\nZ X X O 1 \n\nU Z X 3 O \n\n1 > \n\nat l*J \n\nA- \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 v \n\nX \n\nz \n\nz o \n\nX \n\n2D \n\nX \n\nalliUAX \n\n1/1 < X at < \n\nZ X \n\n> X \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\no \n\na \n\nc c \n\nUJ \n\n< \n\n3 \n\na X 1 < O a. \n\n-t X O 1- X \xe2\x96\xba< w \n\nat X \n\n*- \n\nX \n\n> \n\n> \n\n-V \n\n< \n\nX \n\nu u. \n\n1- \n\nUL \n\n-1 \n\nX 3 X X < \n\nIA03AU.OI \n\nU \xc2\xab \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n260 \n\n\nUI 4 FMPLOTMFNT HATE 3.6 2 .f> 2.9 2.7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBUDGET B BUDGET C BUDGET E PTP^T nTFCFOENC r< S ntFFgpFNCFS AF A \n\nLOw *bo.4 BILLION MPO **7.f, HTLLIPN HTC-H *q^.\xc2\xab RTILTOM PF\xc2\xbbCFNT OF POL . *i \n\nl.NCO\'*-\' CO M H f\'lFt- UMCOMP COMP DJFF UNCOMp (\xe2\x80\x9cOMP PTFF (1-7) (?-\xc2\xab) (*-\xc2\xab>_ U- 7 ) <_?-\xc2\xab) (> \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 i \n\n\nm \n\no \n\nr tv \n\nc. \n\nn e r. \n\nCL \n\n\xc2\xab. (V \n\nIf ft \n\nCL \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O 0 -It. \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nWr <\\l W \n\n3! \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 iV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nto to \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\nto. \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\neft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n1 IV \n\n(ft, \n\n4 IT \xc2\xabv \n\nft \n\nV \n\ntv if \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n\ntv a \n\nr \n\n\no \n\n9 \n\ni, \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n, \xe2\x80\xa2*\' \n\n\ntv \n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n\n\nI \n\nj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 i \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns i \n\n\n\n\n\nIf \n\n\xc2\xab a \n\nIf \n\narc \n\n\n1 \n\nc 1 r \n\n\nIf \n\na \n\nif \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xabf \n\nif tv \n\nH \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\nc \n\n1 \n\nIT \n\n\nIf \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nIV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ^ \n\nAIT dXvr \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xbb \n\ntv \n\ni \n\n\nCL \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n~ a. k> \n\na ft- \n\na ft- \n\nCL \n\nvC \n\nct \n\na \n\n\nn \n\n\na o \n\n^\xe2\x96\xa0v \n\n0 \n\nft- \n\no \n\ntvi \n\n*r \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\nCO \n\na \n\nin \n\n \n\n\nK CV \n\n0 \n\n\n\nft- \n\nft- \n\nc \n\n0 \n\nc \n\nif \n\nft \n\n\n\xc2\xabr- \n\n\n\n\n\nCv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nif \n\na \n\n\nc \n\ntv \n\n\nc \n\ntr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nK \n\nft- \n\n\nr. \n\n\n\n\n^ cc \n\n<0 \xc2\xab \n\ntv tt \n\n-< co if \n\nIT If \n\ne \n\nIf O C \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* cv \n\na \n\no \n\n\na \n\nft- \n\nr- \n\n*ft a \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft- 0 vf \n\nCV if \n\n \n\nvC \n\n3 O\' O \n\ns\xc2\xa3 \n\nC if. \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\nif! \n\nr \n\nIf \n\nin a \n\n\nr \n\nCft cv tv \n\na \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* *o tv \n\noif m \n\ntv if \n\nCT \n\nft- \n\no \n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n\ntr. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nif \xe2\x80\xa2- if \n\na \n\nP \n\ntv \n\n**1 \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nft \n\n\nK. \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2" C ^ h (f \n\ntv tr \n\nc ft- \n\ntc if) fO if \n\n O\' a \n\nO if. \n\na \n\no tr \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nCV \n\na \n\nft \n\na \n\nft-> a vC \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nct) ^ \n\nft O\' \n\nMW JO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* to tv \n\no r> \n\nft? \n\ntv if \n\nto \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\nrv tr \n\nft-1 \n\nS\' \n\nif \n\n\nrft \n\ntv \n\nft-* \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nft \n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC> O \xc2\xabV ^ o Oj U u L/ J) *^1->*W* a. O > i^-ft-4^ \n\nto . \n\nft-\xc2\xbb \n\nML/ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 - / \n\nK) \n\n\nm \n\nm< \n\nm \n\ni \n\n\n\n\ni \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 i ft \n\na cc \n\n3 C \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ft \n\nm* \n\nf e- \n\n\nft/ o \n\no \n\na oc \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6-* \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\nif \n\n(V \n\nm * \n\n0 \n\n-o -\xc2\xab \n\nft T \n\nV \n\nrv a \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab *o \n\nfj \n\nO if) \n\na \n\ncv in \n\nX) \n\nft \n\n3 \n\nn \n\nm* \n\n\n\ncv \n\n\ntr \n\nmH \n\n\nif) m-% \n\nin \n\na \n\nO\' \n\ncv \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nft \n\n\nin \n\n\n\n(O O \n\nft X cv X \n\nC3 0 X \n\nf) O\' \n\nO\' \n\nfit: \n\na f) \n\ntv \n\n3 -1 \n\ntv \n\nft* \n\nC\\J \n\nCO \n\n\nm a \n\n\\\xc2\xa3 H CC H \n\nX O\' -H \n\ntv m \n\no \n\nh n cv \n\nO\' if \n\nin \n\ntv in \n\nm \n\nX \n\na \n\nif \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n\n1 cv \n\n\n \n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nuj r \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n\nUJ UJ \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n7 \n\nH- \n\n_i \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- ft. \n\nif \n\ni \n\n\n-1 \n\nVJ \n\no \n\n\nuj \n\n\n6 \n\nU \n\n\nz \n\nft. \n\n\n\nu a \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2X \n\n\nM \n\n\n\nO X \n\n-J \n\n\n\nft. X \n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n2 \n\nUJ ft \n\nJ. \n\n\\S) \n\n\nX 1 \n\n~ \n\nX \n\n\nft- \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nr Ul \n\nft \n\njitua \n\nz \n\n< \n\n>- \n\n_J \n\n\n3 \n\nor uj \n\n< 1 \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xabx \n\nw \n\n> ft* \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\n\nvD \n\n\nX \n\n-J \n\n-> X \n\n1 \n\nu \n\n2 \n\nI \n\nX \n\nI \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n\nft. ftj \n\nft \n\nft. \n\nM* \n\na in \n\n\ntf \n\n\n\nft-4 \n\ncr \n\nd. \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX H) \n\nz \n\nX \n\nX \n\nO 1 \n\nu \n\nz \n\nD X \n\n\nr; \n\no \n\nX \n\n31 X \n\n0 ^ \n\niiJ <-) ft X \n\nif) \n\n< \n\n\n\nft. O \n\no uj \n\n< D \n\nX I \n\n4 \n\no \n\nft \n\nX \n\n*0 \n\n< \n\nT U \n\nU. \n\nfc\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU -J \n\nX \n\nftk X \n\nX < \n\nX \n\nft \n\n\nu \n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\nz \n\n\nft \n\n\n\xc2\xabt \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUJ \n\nl/v ft \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\nu \n\nZ \\A \n\n. 9 - 1 \n\n>- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nO UJ \n\n> if \n\no \n\n\nft\' \n\no \n\nft \n\nO UJ! \n\n_l \n\n\no \n\nX \n\nft- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n15 O \n\nX \n\n\n-J \n\n\n<\' if X \n\nX \n\nX \n\nz \n\nX \n\nX \n\nU UJ 1 \n\nIf) z o \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x96\xba-\xc2\xab -ft ify < ii \n\n\nft \n\nUJ \n\nCD \n\nZ ft z \n\no *- \n\n_J \n\nft \n\n2 \n\n4 \n\nOift UJ ft \n\n-JO \n\n<. \n\n\xc2\xabt \n\nX) \n\n-J \n\nX\'-j a i \n\n> ft UJ \n\nft \n\n-J \n\n\n\nX ft < z \n\nX > X \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOlft X ft \n\nUJ ft X| \n\nft \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nU O ft U. \n\nJ) u\xc2\xbb <\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nX \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n261 \n\n\nunemployment rate \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNPta Mrvico TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n* H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 : \n\nv \xc2\xbblf \n\n* \xc2\xa3~ \nv t \n\nu \xc2\xab* \n\nb- L. \xc2\xab \n2 C.l, \nit ft. 1 \n\nO - \n\nUJ 2 \n\nb it \nU- b \xe2\x80\x94 \n\'-HI\' \nC b. I \n\na ~ \n\n\nIf. \n\nb \n\nb \n\n2 \n\nb. \n\na \n\nb \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n1/ \n\no \n\n\nc \n\nI \n\nif \n\n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 \n\nI \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\nt \n\n\nb \n2 b \nC \xe2\x80\x94 \n\xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nui \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaft \n\nH \xc2\xa3T \n\ng o. \n\n3 *C \n\xc2\xab OT) G \n\ne \n\n* \n\ni a \ne s \n_c \nX \n\na. \n\n* s \n\no o \n\n_Jb> \n\nz \n\n\n\nr ii *.\xc2\xab. a % \n\nft (ft \n\n\xc2\xab. ft \xc2\xab. \n\n\xc2\xab- If. ft e \n\nr. \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 f* tv \n\nsv \xc2\xabc \n\na \n\n3 \n\n\nO \n\nIT \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n8 \n\n\' \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nft ft ft - *<- r. \n\nft ft \n\na ft a r \n\n\n\nft. r \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO ft lf C \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft If. \n\nC If. o \n\nft c \n\nIft if \n\nZJ \n\n \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\npr_ \n\n\n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na - w it c - \n\nft If. \n\ne n e \n\nft c \n\nift if \n\n3 \n\nif i W \n\nec \n\nc \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nft) ft) \n\n\n\xc2\xab*4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab* \n\n(ft \n\n\nIf) ft \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xae -0 \n\nO\' \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \xc2\xa9 O \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 G \n\nr> c. \n\nO O O \n\no o \n\no o \n\no \n\nH O \xc2\xabH \n\no o \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nO \n\nIO \n\nift \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI \n\n\n\nC \xe2\x80\x94< ft ft c \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft a- \n\nO X O \n\nIf \xc2\xa9 \n\nft if \n\n\n.\xc2\xa3 r- k \n\n\xc2\xa9 o \n\n0 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0v \n\nf\'J ft) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n-4 \n\nftM \n\n\nn ft \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xae f\\> \n\n\nn \n\no \n\ny \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nK-. \n\nrft \n\n\nK) \n\n\nO\' O ft) .\xe2\x80\x9c1 o \n\nft) *r. \n\noil o \n\nfn o \n\nio in \n\na \n\nS i a CM \n\n\xc2\xa9 O\' \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nX) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\nft) ft) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\nftM \n\nftM \n\n\nin \xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x96\xa0 x \n\n\xc2\xa9 CD \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nrt \n\nKi \n\na \n\n\nO\' \n\nft \n\n\n(ft -4 \n\n\nx \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\ni- \n\nv _l \nx 3 \n\xc2\xbb- u \n\ni/i \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 i \n\na. \n\n=1 J \n\nz \xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nifl \n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nUJ o \n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\nH- \n\n\n\n\no \n\n>- \n\nrr z \n\n\n\no \n\nX \n\nb) \n\n\n\n< \n\n\n\nUj \n\n\nZ \n\nUi \n\n\n\na \n\n* \n\n3 \n\n\nif \n\no \n\n3 \n\nIf. \n\na. \n\n\nh- \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nU \n\n\nif, \n\n\nJj \n\ni- X \n\n\nb) \n\nU) \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\n\nwn \n\n\n*- \n\n>- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nz \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n_j \n\nt- \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 m \n\n\n-J \n\n\n\n5 \n\no \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> in \n\no \n\n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nc \n\no \n\n_i \n\n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu \n\na \n\n\xc2\xab \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n\n\n\no UJ \n\n_) \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nbft \n\na \n\nX _\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nX \n\nu \n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ni\xc2\xa3 U \n\nK \n\n\n\n\nH* \n\n\nS \n\nU) \n\nX X \n\nif >- \n\nX \n\ni \n\n\' \n\nX \n\nft O\' \n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n< \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n uj \n\nft u. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\n2 \n\na \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0J \n\nu \n\na e \n\no z \n\n\nz \n\nX \n\n1 \n\nZ 1- \n\n\nz u \n\n4*4 \n\n-J \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nz \n\nft \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n"ft \n\nu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94! M \n\nX \n\ni/i \n\n\nf) \n\n3 \xc2\xab \n\nb) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\ntft \n\n_i a \n\nft \n\nft \n\n3\' \n\n\n\n\nb~ \n\nX \n\nSi Z \n\nX z \n\no \n\ni \n\nu \n\nz \n\nT JO \n\ni \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 UJ \n\nr- \n\n-J \n\n\n\nz \n\no \n\n** \n\nCD \n\nX i- \n\nUi u \xe2\x99\xa6- \n\nX \n\nl/i \n\nft \n\nX -\xc2\xab \n\nft 2 X \n\n> X \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\no \n\nJj \n\nft \n\n3 X \n\nI ft \n\no \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2M \n\nX \n\no *- \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\naJ \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 X \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nu \n\nu. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu. \n\nJ X \n\nu x \n\nX \n\nft \n\nX \n\n>- \n\na 3 \xe2\x96\xba* \n\nu. \n\n\nJ ft \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nU \n\no \n\n\n262 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT hate 8\xc2\xbb0 7 . Q 7,8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nN r si YORK TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab ir \xc2\xab. \ni \n\nIT \xe2\x80\xa2 If \n\n" c ~ \n\nIf C \n\nu \xc2\xae~ \nuu \xc2\xabr \n2 Ol \nu cv \n\nHI\xe2\x80\x94 \nUJ Z \n\nu u \n\n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 IT. \n\n\nC_ \n\n\n\nK \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nq \n\nc \n\nIT \n\nIf \n\nIf \n\n3 K- \n\nr- r- \n\na \n\nvt *\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\nc \n\nw \n\na \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nr^- \n\nCC \n\n\naj \n\n0 \n\n\na \n\na \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa5~ 0. \n\n\nCV \n\nC \n\nif \n\n0 \n\n0 \xc2\xabi \n\n* ^ \n\n0 \n\nc e \n\nif \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nc \n\n0 \n\n\\T \n\n1 r \n\nc \n\na \n\nu \n\nir \n\n A c if if c 30 cKr^i\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x99ir\xc2\xbb-ififfvr\'-rc \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 m \n\n9 ( \n\n\nif! \n\n\no \xe2\x80\x94 i \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 CVCVCViCVlf\'-fCVf\' \n\n\xe2\x96\xbal , \n\n\n, f- fl \xc2\xbbo a o o c** \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2^eoa-coa.r- \nc r r s r \xe2\x80\x94 vc e o f^ith-cve\xe2\x80\x94iff^cvirifir \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 * r \xc2\xbb- K" CV 3 h- f 3 If >t CV \n\n\n3 \n\na \n\n\nif) \n\na \n\nCC \n\na \n\n\nif> \n\n\nO\' \n\n(V \n\n\nu \n\nlL \n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \nc c \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 -u O CJ CV 3 HC|NC 0 N -<00 Jf \xc2\xab-o \n\n\nIf \n\ncv \n\n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nCO \n\n\np\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu" \n\nC, c \n\nir \n\nc \n\n0 \n\nx \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\na \n\n0 \n\nr- \n\ncv \n\nX c \n\nc \n\n0 X 0 \n\n\'C \n\n\nif. \n\n\nif< \n\nX \n\nx a \n\nf; \n\n0 \n\nKi \n\n3 \n\nm \n\n\nf) O \n\n5 \n\n9*4 \n\nvC \n\nf> \n\nc \n\n0 c \n\n\nit CV if) \n\nvT \n\n\n\xc2\xae \n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n\nO\' \n\n5 \n\n\n\nIT \n\n\n\nK \n\ncv \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\nf- \n\ncv \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n3 If f \n\n<\\ \n\n\n0 \n\n0 \n\ncv* \n\n\nit c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab 3\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nr- \n\na \n\n1 \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 u \n\nf\'- \n\nif \n\nV \n\na \n\nO X \n\nU) C \n\n5 C \n\n\nu \n\nu. \n\n\nc c. \n\n\nto \n\n\n3 c if. rteff ic 3r^ac^oNOCif3cvif 3 \n\nOl0l\'13l r )HfiO(J\'Hf;j1OrOvCJ!(\\lJf)3 \nWj CV 3 P~ CV \xe2\x80\xa2- j If f (V \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i O 3 -\xc2\xae \xc2\xab-\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 3 H \xc2\xbb\xc2\xa3 \xc2\xab (t (O \xc2\xab-t \xc2\xab ^ C. CD \n\nCQ \n\n\nX 0. \n\n5 \n\n3 O \n\xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\nc \n\nSt \n\ntfi \n\n0. \n\n* z \n\no o \n\n3 o \n2 \n\n\nM \n\n\nir \n\n0 X \n\nCf \n\nCT \n\na \n\ncv 3 \n\na \n\n0 " \n\n0 \n\nX 0 \n\nc \n\nX \n\nCV X \n\nit. \n\n9*% \n\n3-. \n\nr- \n\nX \n\nX. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa20 \n\n\nrO \n\nAJ \n\nO O O\' \n\n0 \n\nS> if) \n\nX \n\nO\' 0 \n\n|\xc2\xa3> \n\nr\xc2\xab- \n\n\xe2\x96\xa00 0 \n\nX) 3 \n\nO \n\nr- \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n10 \n\n3^ \n\n\nro \n\ncv \n\n3 \n\n\nX \n\ncv \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n3 \n\nif X \n\nCV \n\nc \n\nc \n\nCsJ \n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n^4 \n\nCC \n\n\n\n\xc2\xae \n\n\n\n-J- \n\n0 3 \n\n10 \n\n0 r- \n\nx * \n\n3 CV X \xe2\x80\x94> \n\nCV \n\nf> X O\' O\' \n\nCV X \n\n^ H \n\n>o \n\n*-4 \n\n10 \n\n\nX \n\nO \n\nK~> !<\xe2\x96\xa0. \n\n\n\nX O\' \n\n00 xx \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n3 O X X. \n\nCV K) \n\nIP \n\nO\' \n\nfO \n\n0 \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\n\n\xc2\xabo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-M \n\n3 \n\n0 \n\nM 3 \n\nif) f5 \n\n\n\n0 \n\ncv \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x96\xa00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xbbM \n\n1^ \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr> \n\nUJ \n\nJ \n\n\n\n1 \n\nif \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n9- \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n94 \n\nUJ \xc2\xae \n\n\nM \n\nUJ \n\nIf \n\n\n\nt~ \n\n\n1 \n\n2 \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\na z \n\n\n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n< \n\n\n1 \n\nUJ \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nK \n\n* \xe2\x96\xba-! \n\n\nif O \n\n\nSt If \n\n\n\nt\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nz \n\n\nUJ 1 \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\nif \n\n\nUJ \n\nt~ X \n\n\nU.\' UJ \n\np- \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \' \xe2\x80\x9cT \n\n\n\nif \n\n\nt~ \n\n>- \n\n\nz \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nz \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xbb \n\n_J \xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\xe2\x80\x941 yi \n\n\n_) \n\nu \n\n0 0 \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> If \n\n0 \n\n\nV \n\n0 \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n0 \n\nU \n\n_l \n\n\nz - \n\n\n0 a \n\n< \n\nI - \n\n\n\n\n\nO UJ \n\n_J \n\n\n0 \n\nlL \n\n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba-* \n\n\n\nQ \n\n(X -J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- X \n\nu. \n\nu \xc2\xbb- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n0 0 \n\na. \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\np- \n\n\ni \n\nUJ \n\nX X if \n\n>- \n\nX 1 \n\n\nX < \n\nIf \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nz \n\n\n1 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nU \n\nO \n\n\n)- \n\nU. X) _) \n\nX \n\nuj a \n\n2 \n\nc 0 \n\nUJ \n\n\n9 \n\nif \n\n2 O \n\nUJ \n\nO \n\nZ \n\n0 \n\n>- \n\n-1 \n\n\no a \n\nUJ \n\n< \n\ni a \xc2\xab \n\nUJ \n\n> \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n< \n\n8 -u, \n\nf-4 \n\n\nIf UJ \n\n\xc2\xab U \n\n\n\nu \n\nX \n\n\'X \n\nD \n\n0 \n\n\n\nJ \n\nu \n\nx 1 0 \n\n2 \n\nX \n\nJ \n\n1 z \n\n>- \n\n\nz \n\n0 \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nZ \n\n< \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nu \n\n2 V- \n\n\nM \n\nJl \n\nUJ )\xe2\x80\x9c "\xe2\x84\xa2* \n\nI--I \n\na if \n\n\nif 3\' \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nM \n\nJ Oi \n\n< \n\n< \n\nX! \n\n3 \n\ns/J \n\n9-4 \n\n*-4 \n\nif 0 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX \n\nX z * \n\nX \n\n0 1 \n\nu \n\n2 X \n\nJ 0 \n\n9 \n\n> \n\n\xc2\xbb* UJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n7 \n\nZ \n\nz \n\n0 \n\nX X) \n\n1 *-1 UJ \n\nO \n\n)- X \n\n1/) \n\n3 Z \n\n9*4 \n\n\nZ X \n\n> X \n\nO \n\nX) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nO \n\n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nu> \n\nA \n\nX, X X \n\n\n0 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX 0 \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaM \n\nUl \n\n-1 X \n\n4 " \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\n<* \n\nz \n\n0 \n\nit \n\n\nu. \n\n3 10 \n\nt \n\n* < \n\nX \n\nI\xe2\x80\x94 0 \n\n\nJL \n\nf 0 < \n\n\n0 \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n263 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT rate \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNORTH CAROLINA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ni \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nI \n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n7 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 tv o \n\nc \n\nc to \n\nto X to. \n\nx c \n\nr \n\n\xc2\xa9XX \n\ntv x. \n\nX \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab r\xc2\xab \n\n\ntv \n\n1 #V| \n\n\nr \n\n\xc2\xab tv \n\ntv e \n\nr to \n\n\n\n*0- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\ntv r. x \n\nC \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xabrt. \n\n\nv \xc2\xbb\xc2\xbbr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n \n\na> \n\nk \xe2\x80\xa2*. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ntv \n\n1 tv tv \n\nto IT to \n\n\ntv, 3 \n\n\n\n\nto* \n\ntv a a \n\nr- \n\n\n\n9 \n\nArt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n; to \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\nV- \n\n\nu tv \na v ~ \nkJ 7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 . \n\ni \n\n* c : \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb. \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nu w. \n\n\nto \n\nto c \n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\nc \n\n- X \n\nto a a \n\na to. \n\ntv X X- \n\nc \n\nc X \n\n\nX \n\ntv\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\nIt V. \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 0 0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba o r- \n\n\n1 \n\nto 1 \n\n1 \n\n\n1 to \n\ntv \xc2\xab- to \n\nI c \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\nc \n\n- I \xc2\xbb \n\ni f- \n\n* \n\n\nc \n\nrt \n\nC k 1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 - \n\nfl \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nt \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no \n\n\n& \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\\ \n\n\n\n\n\nsr - \n\n\ntv. \n\nc tv \n\n\n* to <\\ \n\n-c ^ \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nX to Cl \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 3 \n\ntv \n\nc \n\nc \n\nX \n\nk \xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nto- \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nL 1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n2 rf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\nk- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\nU \n\nto - \n\nto- \n\nto \n\nc to- \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\no tv \n\n- c c \n\nc tv \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xab a a \n\n- c \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nf \n\nI \n\na \n\ne \n\nto c \n\n\xc2\xabrt \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\nto* \n\ntv. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabrt \n\n\nr \n\n\xe2\x96\xba 1 \n\nC f. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\na* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\nCl \n\nO\' \' \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n*-c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM - \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n. \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nur\xc2\xae \n\n\ntv \n\nto to \n\nX \n\nc \n\nto C \n\na x \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX a. \n\n(VI c \n\nX \n\nto* \n\nc x a \n\n3 to \n\nr \n\n3 \n\nrr \n\nX- \n\nC3 0 \n\n5*1 \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc~ \n\n\nr- \n\nX to \n\n- rv a \n\n\nc \n\nX \n\n*- \n\nto- \n\nC X \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX C \n\nc \n\nc \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2to \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2to \n\nto- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2to \n\n\n\n\nK \n\nfv \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nc \n\nX \n\n\nC \n\nU * c \n\xc2\xab r \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nX \n\n\ntv \n\ne \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nz a \n\n\nto \n\nto to \n\nto \n\nO 0 m \xc2\xab to K> \n\nX \n\nCJ \n\nto \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n7 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrt\xc2\xbb \n\n\n1 \n\nto r~ \n\nto \n\n\nc \n\non i*\' ^ \n\nX to to. \n\nG \n\nX \n\nto* \n\nv\' C \xc2\xa9 \n\n^ a \n\n/ \n\nto. \n\n3 \n\nc \n\nh c a \n\nto \n\n9 \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \xc2\xab \n\nX to \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 tv to \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nX) \n\nto* \n\nto* \n\n\xe2\x80\x94t X tvt \n\nX f- \n\ne \n\n\nr- \n\nrt* \n\no 3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\n\nto* \n\n\n\na\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\nto to; \n\ntv \n\nc \n\nX \n\n\nrt* \n\n8 *. c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\nX \n\n\ntv \n\n3 \xc2\xbbu \n\xc2\xab to \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nn \n\n\nto \n\nto x> to \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2c. \n\no \xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n(tto i \n\nX to \n\nto> \xc2\xa9 \n\nX \n\nto* \n\n3 \xc2\xab \xc2\xab \n\n3 3 \n\no \n\nX \n\nc \n\ntv \n\nO 1 \n\nto \n\n9 \n\n3 \xc2\xab \n\nX X \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 M to \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 X \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nto* \n\n* \xc2\xa9 tv \xc2\xab f- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xae \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rt \n\nu. c \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\ntort \n\ntoto \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nto to, \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nXI \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n2 <3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv, \n\nX \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\n\nto\xc2\xab \n\nU rt \n\no \n\nrt*\' \n\nf\\j to* \n\nO O to* \n\no o \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\no \n\no \n\nto) x \n\no o \n\no \n\nu- \n\nw \n\nX \n\nto. \n\ntot \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\ntv* \n\n1 \n\n7 *\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nCC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrt* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n- i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncQ \n\ntoe \n\n\nto \n\nto to \n\nto \n\nto \n\nC\\* \n\na r- to. \n\nX x- to. \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nX \n\nto* \n\nc a tv x to \n\nG \n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\nH Z 1 \n\nVt \n\n> \n\nT\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o -o r* -o \n\n\xc2\xab-4 rvj \n\n\nQ \n\nl/> -< \n\nto* \n\n\xe2\x80\x94* X to \n\nx> \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n\nart \n\nui X \n\n\n\nn \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\n\nto* \n\n\n\n\nto to \n\nCM \n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nV \xc2\xbbc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv* \n\nx. \n\n\ntu \n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n3 \n\n3 A f- 3 T O \n\n\xc2\xabC O fVI \n\no e \n\nX \n\nX to \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nu \n\no \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\nu \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nX \n\nto to to \n\n\n2 X \n\n\nto \n\nV \n\n\nX \n\n<\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n2 \n\nV- \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xab \n\nX \n\nto v> \n\n6 \n\nO to \n\n\n> X \n\no \n\n\nV \n\nO \n\nUJ \n\n\nO \n\n\nto \n\n2 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nto X * \n\nI \n\nrtrt \n\n\nQ to \n\nJ \n\n\no \n\nU. \n\nX \n\n\nrtrt \n\nto \n\nart \n\nc X \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 Xu. \n\nto \n\nrt* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no u \n\na \n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\nPto \n\nc \n\n1 \n\n(C \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nXXV \n\nz \xe2\x80\xa2 3 \n\nX \n\n< \xe2\x9c\x93 ar \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nz \n\nX \n\n\n\nKJ \n\no \n\n\n*- U. \n\n3 to X \n\nto a z \n\n\xc2\xab \n\na u l \n\nX \n\nz o \n\nto \n\no \n\n2 \n\no \n\n>- w \n\n\nr> \n\nX \n\nkl < l \n\na \xc2\xab ui \n\n> \xe2\x80\x94 < \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 X to * tot \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nto \n\nEC \n\nx - \n\nO X \n\ni \n\n-J \n\nto X \n\n1 to z \n\nZ X \n\n3 \n\n2 to 2 \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nto \n\nto \n\n2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 u \n\n2 \n\n\ntort \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x99to \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX X \n\nX \n\nX \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 to toi \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nto c \n\n* \n\n* \n\n3 \n\nto \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94> \n\nrt* \n\nX c \n\nrt- \n\nX 11 \n\n2 X Z \n\nO 1 to \n\nz \n\n* to O 1 \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 to \n\nto \n\nto \n\n\n\nD X \n\n2 2 \n\no \n\nM X Z \n\nM to to \n\nto X X \n\n* \n\n* \xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xab 2 X \n\n> X \n\no \n\nz> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n-to \'to \n\n\no \n\nc \n\nu. \n\n* z \n\nXI* \n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\nO to JC \xe2\x80\x94to \n\nto X \n\nto \n\nX \n\n> \n\n> \n\n/ 4 \n\n% \n\nto \n\n4. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nA to \n\n1 to X \n\nX * X \n\nV \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0J 3 to to \n\nXU* \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rt \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n264 \n\n\nUUE*PL0T*FNT KATE 4.f> 3.5 3,8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNOPTH DAKOTA TA3LE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E -156 \n\n\n\n\n\nt <\xc2\xa3 r. a \n\nA Atr N \n\n\'a \n\nct \n\nc \n\n\n\xc2\xabo|r. \n\n\n\xc2\xab. \n\nN \n\nOj \n\nc \n\nr \n\ntt \n\n0.1 \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xabr ir \n\n\nif> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabc\xe2\x80\x98 \n\n\nA \n\ncv \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\na a o_ o. \n\n; \xc2\xbb \n\no \n\n\xc2\xbb*\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\ntl \n\n\no \n\nIT \n\n*o \n\n\ntr \n\n\n\nC\' \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\nkt \xe2\x80\xa2 ** \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nt \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nr \n\nrr o \n\nr. \n\nc \n\no \n\n\nc \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 \n\nr \n\nr 1 \n\nN \n\nu. c \n\n\nK* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- Q \n\nN \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xc2\xbb o \n\n-t \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n(V (V C\\ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r- \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nr o \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\ni \n\ni \n\n1 \n\nr \n\n\n\nr \n\n\nC U \n\n1 \n\n\n, ! \n\nl \n\n\xc2\xab t i i i \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nr. \n\nt \n\n\xc2\xab i i \n\ni \n\n\n\n\nr., \n\n1 \n\n\nCV \n\n\n0. \n\n\xc2\xbb-\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n! \n\n\na \n\n\nOj \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nc c \n\no c c c c \n\nC. \n\nc \n\nc \n\nC \n\nc c c \n\n\nc \n\no \n\nC \n\n\nr \n\n\n\nr. \n\nu \n\na \n\na-> \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCJ \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n2 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n| \n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2W \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\na- \n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\na\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nc c \n\nC C Cl c c \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc c c \n\n\nc \n\no \n\nc \n\ncv \n\n\nN \n\no \n\na \n\nu \n\na \n\n4^ \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x98 \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa21 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa21 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\n\nc: \n\nc c \n\nc, c \n\nc_ c c c c \n\no c \n\nc \n\no \n\nc c c \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\na \n\nO \n\n\ncv \n\n\nN \n\na- \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 1 1 i \n\n1 \n\nt \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nt \n\ni \n\n\n\n\na \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\nc \n\nc c \n\nc c c c. o \n\nG \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\nG C C \n\na-* \n\nc \n\nOJ c \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3. \n\ncr \n\n<\xc2\xa3 \n\n\na \n\no \n\n\n~V \\C \n\n- tr \n\n\nc \n\n\nOl \n\niT \n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC C \n\n\ntO \n\n\noccooooooooooooo\xc2\xbb-to-^oo \n\n\n04 \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nOJ \xc2\xab-i \n\nI \n\n\n03 -I \n\nh e a \n\n\xc2\xa7 ui 2 \n\na c \n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\nCQ 0 \n\ns> \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\na. \n\n* i \n\no o \n_l o \n2 \n\n\nO lT C. X O O C IT C(\\|OONCK-(VK coo a \n\na \xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\x94< a \xe2\x80\x94< a a \n\n\nO\' XI \n\nK1 \n\n\n3 XI 3 O O *0 C. \n\n\noj o oogoocvuncr C\'O\' a \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a a a \n\n\na \n\n04 \n\n\nO\' \n\ntO \n\n(V \n\n\na \n\nO\' \n\n- _J \nX X \n*- u \nm\xc2\xab \n3 a \n\nX. kS \n\nz < \n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nQl \n\nin \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nI-* \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*-4 \n\nUl \n\n\n\n\ncr \n\nH \n\n* \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nin \n\nO \n\n* j \n\n\n\nO\'. \n\n\nUJ \n\nK- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nUl \n\nUl \n\nk\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nZ \n\nN \n\n\nh- \n\nt-t \n\nin \n\n\n\n_j \n\n\nCl \n\n\nc \n\nu \n\n_t \n\n\nz \n\n\n\n\nu \n\nX \n\n< \n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n-j \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nu \n\n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\nll \n\n\nX \n\nV/ \n\n>* \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n. \n\n\nCl \n\no \n\n\n\n\n3 _\xc2\xbb \n\nCC \n\nUl \n\na \n\nz \n\n\n3 X \n\nu < \n\na \n\na \xc2\xab \n\n* \n\n> \n\n\n< \n\no a \n\na \n\n-J \n\nU \n\nX \n\nt \n\nu, \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nuJ \n\n\n\nN-< \n\n* \n\nm \n\n\nM \n\nif) c, \n\nK \n\nX \n\nX \n\n2 X \n\nX \n\no \n\ni \n\nu \n\nA. \n\n-a \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nX \n\n:3 \n\nX \n\na *4 \n\nUJ \n\nCl t- \n\nX \n\nin \n\n\nvO \n\nc \n\nUi \n\n4 i \n\n\n\nr \n\n4 \n\no \n\n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nLL \n\n3 \n\nX u \n\nX \n\nX \n\n< \n\nX \n\n\nl/) \n\nu \n\nin l/l \n\n3 X \nO O \nI ~ \n\nUi H* \n\nX < X \n\n< o u \n* <-<,<-1 \nI Z H \n\nXI 3 \xe2\x80\xa2- Ul \n21 JO \n\n4 X *- < \nX O.N 3C \nK- C* 3 *- \n\n\nUJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n\n\nN \n\nz \n\n\nN \n\n\n<* \n\nUl \n\n\nZ \n\nUl \n\nK \n\nX \n\n\nUl \n\nc \n\nm n \n\n> \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nu > in \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\nQ UJ \n\nJ \n\n\no \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 <3 u \n\na \n\n\nA \n\n\na a \n\nX \n\nZ \n\na \n\nX \n\nI in z o \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n *-i Ul \n\ny- \n\n-J \n\n\n\n2 ac > x \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nV \n\nuj \xe2\x80\xa2-> oc, \n\ny~ \n\n0 . \n\n> \n\n> \n\nU. i/IO \xc2\xab\' \n\n\nO \n\n*-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94a \n\n1 \n\n\nQ. \n\nVJ \n\nU \n\n\n265 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT HATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCMTO TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xbbr m. \n\n8 \n\nX \xe2\x80\xa2W \n\xc2\xabS \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nC \n\n\n>-s r cc c 4 i 4 it cr c iO r c c & \xc2\xab- \xe2\x80\xa2** \xc2\xabc: \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab\\ nnaifAK *-*v4\xc2\xbbr \xc2\xabr \xc2\xab 8 \n\n- # \xc2\xbb A\' \xc2\xbb \n\nI \xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX \n\nc \n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xabf 0 \n\nX \n\ne k \n\nC 3 \n\nO a \n\nX \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb \n\n\n11 \n\nX \n\n\na \n\nr c \n\n\n\nc \n\nC* \n\n\nU \n\n1 \n\n4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2> \n\ntt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nir-\xc2\xbb \n\nU e \n\n\ntv \n\nKJ| \n\ncv \n\nX X \n\nf*- \n\nr \n\ncr \n\nX \n\ntv \n\n\n\xc2\xabF> \n\nv,- \n\ntv \n\n8T \n\n4. \n\nr \n\n\n\nG \n\n* \n\n\nz \n\nC 8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 - \n\n\nf\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n8 \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\na \n\n^ w \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu, Z \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nU \n\n\nX \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n4 \n\nX X \n\ne a \n\nO\' r- \n\n4 \n\n* \n\nc \n\n\ne*- \n\n3 \n\n*r \n\nCV \n\ncv \n\nr c \n\n0 \n\n4\xc2\xbb- \n\nr \n\nK \n\n\nU- x, \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nY \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \xe2\x96\xba \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n1 \n\n<\\ - \n\n* \n\n- \xc2\xab \n\nCt A \n\ntv a \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n0 \n\nr- \n\nK \n\nx. \n\nA \n\n\n\n\n8 A \n\nX \n\n\nc \n\n\n\nc \n\nLt 8 \n\n\n1 t \n\n\nt \n\nI I \n\n8 ^ \n\n8 \n\na \n\n8 \n\n8 \n\nI \n\n8 \n\n8 \n\n8 \n\n1 \n\nK \n\n1 \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n8 \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nir \n\ni \n\n0 \n\ntv \n\nf\\ \n\nc 3 \n\n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 K* \n\nc \n\n3 \n\n\nCV \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nX \n\nX r~ \n\n.- X \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\ntv \n\n\nit \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nK \n\n\n\nV \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncv \n\n! \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xc2\xab. \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n! \n\n\n8 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n! \n\n\n\n7 \n\nur \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nU,\xe2\x80\x99 \n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\xc2\xab*\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\n\n<\\ \n\nC X \n\ntv \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- K* \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nc \n\ne \n\nc <\\ \n\n<: \n\nc e \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c >\xc2\xa3 \n\nA \n\nX \n\ntv \n\n4 \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nCV \n\na \n\ncv r \n\ncr \n\nX \n\n4 \n\nr \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n\nl \n\ni i \n\ni \n\nt i \n\nt i \n\nt u* \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xab-> \n\n4 \n\n8 \n\n8 \n\n8 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\ni i \n\nX \n\na \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nu \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n8 \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nL. \n\n\ncv \n\nC X \n\n \n\n\na \n\na \n\na \n\na \n\nA \n\nc\\ \n\n^ c \n\nX K- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-< \n\n\nC \n\n4 \n\nK \n\nK* \n\nC \n\nX \n\nc \n\n0 A \n\nK \n\nc \n\nK \n\nh\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nX 3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa01 \n\n v-\xc2\xab CD \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\nCv/ \n\nK) CT> \n\nX3 0 \n\ncji m \n\n0 \n\n3 \n\nK1 f\xc2\xab3 \n\n\xc2\xab-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX -8 \n\nO \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\n0 \n\nCV \n\nt- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nW \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xabA" \n\n\n\n\nCV \n\n\n\nX \n\nV- \n\n\n\nA- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX \n\nc \n\nX \n\n\ntt-t \n\nX \n\n8 \n\nX C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4 \n\nc \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2X \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nof \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC. \n\n\n4 \n\n3 C \n\n(VNCI \n\nC <\\I \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X O \n\nY\xe2\x80\x9d. \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nf- \n\nX 0 \n\nCV \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa9 X \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\nX \n\nfr \n\n\nc. s \n\n4 \n\nto \n\n-< <0 \n\n8^ \n\n\n\xc2\xbb 5 0- \n\nX 0 \n\nCV CO \n\nXi \n\nc# \n\nID \n\nfO \n\n\nX \n\n\no -\xc2\xab \n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n4 \n\nA- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-< \n\n\n\ni \n\nrj \n\n*-\xc2\xbb \n\n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nr~ \n\nX \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\n0+ \n\nY) \n\n\n.3 V, \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4 \n\nG \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu. \n\n\n\no ;m \n\n\nO G \n\n0w \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\ncv \n\n*D \n\nX \n\n-v \n\nG \n\no \n\na \n\nK. \n\n80 \n\no \n\nt~ \n\nP \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n\n\nu \n\n*0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n\n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCT) \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n4 IV \n\n\nh r \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 r \n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 c \n\n* V \n\n\xc2\xbb"v \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\ncx \n\n* \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2_/ \n\n\ng r~ \n\n\n._r \n\n\n-\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\nn \n\nW \n\nn \n\n \n\nX X \n\nVI CO \n\n"C \n\n4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n-o \n\nM \n\nX \n\nM \n\nO \n\n4 \n\nO \n\nV \n\nA- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncv \n\nc^i \n\n\nX. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-> \n\n\n\nr- \n\n\n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\ntH \n\n\ncv \n\n\nJ C \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab_> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncr-< \n\n\n\n\ncS \n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nY \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nJ \n\n4 o \n\nC\\i A- "3 \n\no \xe2\x80\xa2-< \n\n^ x> \n\no \n\ncv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-8 \n\nrO \n\nr- \n\n0 \n\n4 \n\nCV A- \n\n0 N \n\nAJ \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n(V \n\nrO \n\n\n< J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nA \n\neg \n\nm o \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0C \xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n(\\J fO \n\nX \n\n4 \n\nY) \n\nK", \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX O \n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n0 \n\nK~. \n\nr- \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0X \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no o \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\nA) \n\n*-\xc2\xab \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2>H \n\n\n\n\n\nr* \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n8 ** \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntx \n\na \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n8\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO tt \n\nUJ \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\ntt \n\nU.\' \n\nX) \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na >- \n\na 2 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n< \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\na x \n\n. \n\n\n\nXI o \n\nX \n\nX 1 . \n\nX8 \n\n\n\nK- \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n8- I \n\n\n\nUJ UJ \n\n8- \n\n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n8- \n\nV \n\n\nX \n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n2 \n\nf\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xa9 8- \n\nX \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\no \n\nO \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> xi \n\no \n\n\n>~ \n\nO \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n2 >- \n\n\n\nu a \n\n< \n\nX \n\ntttt \n\n\n\n\n\nO UJ \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\no \n\nU. \n\n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nX \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\ntt X \n\nu. \n\nUJ \n\n>- \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no o \n\na. \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n* \n\n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 \n\no \n\n2 u. \n\nr x \n\nXI \n\n\nX 1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2X \n\n4 \n\nX \n\n\nor \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nA. \n\nX \n\n2 \n\n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nU \n\no \n\n8- \n\nu. \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 cr \n\nuj a \n\nz \n\n< \n\nU UJ \n\n\n8 \n\nXI \n\nz o \n\nu \n\no \n\nX \n\nO \n\n>~ \n\n\n\nD \n\ny uj \xc2\xabr \n\ni a \n\n< \n\n4! \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2-< \n\n\n9 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba**4 \n\n\nXJ UJ \n\n< u \n\n\ntt \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\na: \n\n\no a \n\na \n\n\xc2\xa9 u \n\na i \n\nu \n\n2 \n\nz \n\nX \n\n1 \n\nZ 8- \n\n\nz \n\na \n\ntt \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\ntt \n\nz \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nU \n\n-*\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nK \n\n\nttx* M \n\nUJ 8- \n\ntt \n\ntt \n\na xi \n\n\nXI \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaM \n\naJ \n\n*\xc2\xab\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xa9 o \n\n< \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nD 1 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\\A \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX \n\n\n8~ a \n\nCC 2 \n\n2 \n\n2 \n\n6 i \n\nu \n\n2 \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa9 O \n\n8 \n\n> \n\ntt txj \n\n8\xc2\xbb- \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\nD a \n\nr \n\n2 \n\no \n\nX 2) \n\nS tt \n\n\nc\xc2\xa9 \n\n*- a \n\nXI \n\n\xc2\xabS \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6\xe2\x80\x94V \n\n\nz a \n\n> \xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94* \n\na \n\no uj \xc2\xabt \n\n^ X \n\nz \n\n\xc2\xab \n\no -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nttH \n\n2 \n\nC 8- \n\n\n\nu \n\n\xc2\xab X \n\ntt \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n2 < \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nIA. \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2 u. \n\n\xc2\xa9 i \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\nX \xc2\xabX \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\'\xc2\xa9 3 \n\ntt \n\nu. \n\nX\xc2\xbb u < \n\n\no \n\n\ntt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nu \n\no \n\n\n266 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT KATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOKI AHO^A TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab ir \n\\r\\ \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabr _ \n\nc \n\nXU \n\n\nu \n\n\n(J u \n\ntt \n\nr c \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nu \n\np \n\na \xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ z \nu u \nu c \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba Q \n\nr- \n\ncu \n\nl \n\na \n\n\ni/ \n\n\nu \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\nL \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nz \n\nIT \n\nUJ \n\n\nCE \n\n\nU \n\n\nu \n\n09 \n\nu \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n1 \n\nc \n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\n\n1 / \n\n\ntt \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nr \n\nli \n\ni \n\n\nu \n2 U \nC \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\nw \n\n\n(\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nw \n\n\n=> \n\nCO \n\n\na \n\nX 5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c \nr u \no \n\n\xc2\xa5\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nx a \n\nC 5 \n\xe2\x80\x94 C \nI \xc2\xab_ \n\nz \n\n\nu \n\nU \n\nz \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 \nc c \n\n\n\n\nU1 \n\n\ntr a \n2 \n\nX C \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 CJ \n\nx \n\n* \n\na \nc i \nx c \ns o \n\nz \n\n\nz *- \n\nc c \n\nP\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nw \n\ng \n\n\nr x \n2 \n\nJ C \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\no \n\nx \n\na \n* x \n\nc o \n_J u \n\nz \n\n\n\nA \n\nCV Jf C \n\n4 a \n\nip> \xc2\xabc ct;x. f- at cv *a c;r. \n\ncH \xc2\xabMC GC \n\nCV X), \n\nc \n\ncv \n\nO\'! \n\nCC \n\n\nIT. \n\n\n* s \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na 9 \n\n4\xc2\xbb<9^90.\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb6 \n\nJ 9 \n\n9 9 9 \n\n9 9 \n\n9 \n\n* 9 \n\n\xc2\xa9. \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab*\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \n\nCV \n\n1 CV CV \n\ntr tr. \n\nCV CV , IS a- \n\n\npor \n\nO \xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\n1 \n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI CV l, \n\n1 \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n1 \n\n\n\nCV \n\n\n\n1 . \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 I \n\n\n\n1 \n\nI \n\nt \n\n\no \n\nC C\xe2\x80\x98 V \n\nCV CC \n\n\xc2\xab iCircccir \n\n\n<\xc2\xa3 cv p\' \n\ntr e \n\n>r \n\ncv \n\nff\' \n\n0 \n\n\nif \n\nv * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 9 \n\n9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x96\xa0 99009 \n\n9 9 \n\n9 \xe2\x80\xa2 9 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n9 \n\n\n\ncv \n\n1 p* cv \n\nit it \n\ncv fc c \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9- \n\nX \n\nKl \n\ncr \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 1 1 \n\n\n\n9- \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJ \n\n0 \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\ncv c c \n\nc c \n\nccc scacv^- \n\nc: C \n\ncv c cv \n\nC K \n\nCv \n\ncc \n\nK-. \n\nif \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 I 1 1 1 1 t \n\n1 1 \n\n,i i i \n\ni - \n\n\n\nn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2"\xc2\xbb \n\n9 -\xc2\xbb r-i C \n\nc c \n\nC C \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c C C r* \n\nc a \n\nC IV P \n\n9 - e \n\ncv \n\nCC \n\nX \n\nK \n\n\no \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xbb. i l \n\nt. 1 \n\ni i l l l. I l l \n\n1 1 \n\nII I \n\ni \n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 X \n\nxx> r- \n\nPL, \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\n(VI Kl K") K"i r, C CM \n\n9-i 0 \n\no x \n\nr, \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n \xc2\xab** \n\n\n0 \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n, \n\n: \n\n\n\n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\ni*- 1 - 1 ~ \n\n<\\J ^ \n\nP WK> S \n\n\nit to \n\nCV X \n\nX \n\nN \n\na \n\n\no \n\nr- \n\nfT \n\nir ^ ^ \n\n\n\xc2\xbb- ft \xe2\x80\x94 cr K) \n\n\nirj- \n\nO It \n\n\n3 \n\n\ncv \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n\n, \n\n\n\xc2\xbb* H \n\n9-4 \n\no \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\n0 H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCV \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n0 0-0 \n\no c \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\no, o \n\n0 0 9-4 \n\no o \n\nCVJ \n\ncv \n\nfO \n\no \n\n\nj: \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\\C h ^ \n\nCs. \n\nP* CV tr. \xc2\xab K, C O\' IT) \n\n\xc2\xab a \n\nr- cv \n\nCM X. \n\n(O \n\n9-9 \n\ncv \n\ncv \n\nX \n\nXI \n\nlO \n\nK) X \xc2\xab \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x941 (T) rt K 1 \n\n\nB \xc2\xab ^ O m \n\ncv \n\nX \n\n\n<} \n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n9\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb ^4 \n\n91 \n\na \n\nX \n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncv \n\n\' \n\n0 \n\n\n\n.T \n\nif\xc2\xabCS \n\n\nhMOHpJCffCV \n\n9-C \n\nCV P~ CVJ \n\nCV X \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\ntr, \n\nX \n\nK 1 \n\nX \n\n\nm \n\nfT ^ \xc2\xabM \n\nH \n\n^ k> -* tr) m \n\nrH \n\n.\xc2\xab PO 1 ^ \n\ncr \n\ncv \n\nX \n\nK> \n\nK 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9- \n\nO\' \n\nX \n\n\no \n\ntr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCV \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H n O \n\no o \n\n0 . \n\n0 . \n\n. u. \n0 . \n0 . \n0 . \n0 . \n0 . \n\no o \n\ncv r< >n \n\no o \n\nO\' \n\nX \n\n\no \n\ncv \n\n\nPO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nH \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\n\n\n,c \n\nX P P- \n\nCv. 9-1 \n\nr- cm kv \xe2\x80\x94 cr c f \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 0 \n\ntr P~ 3 \n\ncv cv \n\nfT \n\no \n\ncv \n\nX \n\n3 \n\ncv \n\nfO \n\nK) J -1 \n\nH \n\n\xc2\xbb-( .-o 0 P- \n\ncr -o \n\n \n\nX \n\n(V \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nK\xe2\x80\x9ci \n\nrt 3 fi \n\n\n^ \xc2\xabT KJ K5 \n\n\xc2\xab~1 \n\na m r- \n\ncr io \n\ne-M \n\nX \n\n9) \n\nrO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xabM H \n\n*H 1 \n\no \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nO _J \n\ni \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n1 \n\no >-< \n\nUJ o \n\nM \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\np- \n\n\nX \n\na z \n\nZJ nr \n\nX \n\n< \n\n\na x \n\n^ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nX O \n\n3 \n\nX X \n\np- \n\nX \n\nU.\xe2\x80\x99 \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94 x \n\nuj uj \n\n\nr z \n\nX \n\n2 P- \n\nJl p- \n\n\xc2\xab-i X \n\n_i \n\nu \n\no o \n\nX \n\nO O \n\n_l \n\nz - \n\no a \n\n< \n\nI - \n\n\n\xc2\xbb-> D \n\nM n \n\nrc u \n\nt-i a \n\nu. \n\nUJ P- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\np- C \n\nX jJ \n\n3 X A \n\n>- z 1 \n\n\nx < x \n\na \n\nu c \n\np- \n\nU. O J K U A \n\nz \n\n< u X \n\n\xe2\x80\x981 \n\n\nxxoxajoa \xe2\x80\xa2 o z x* i z,*- \n-\xc2\xab xc Kxtczyro i uzs j \n\nKffilMUOt-Xl/\'KXw \nnj\xc2\xab3at X \nO U! \no o \n\nX \n\nx z o \nx *- x \nK > * \nUJ \xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xbb QC \nA J < \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nZ \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n_l \n\nI \n\nUJ \n\n\n< \n\np- \n\no \n\n\n< \n\n-J \n\nD \n\na. \n\no \n\na \n\n\nz \n\nx \n\nX \n\n>- \n\no \n\n_J \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\ns $ \n\n\nJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\nu \n\n\nUJ \n\nu \n\nX \n\no \n\nu. \n\nX \n\no \n\n< \n\n-I \n\n\n> \n\nu \n\n\n267 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT hate \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0*\xc2\xabT.0N TABLE IS (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab * * \nst \xc2\xbby \n\nyi\xc2\xa3 i \n\nu *\xe2\x80\xa2 \nuu * \n?c \xe2\x80\xa2 \nu ft \na \xe2\x96\xba ~ \n\nUiZ \nU U \' \n\nu \xc2\xa9 ** \n\xe2\x80\xa2-or \nC U Q \n& \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94I * \n\n\n1 \n\n\nl/> \n\nu \n\nC- \n\nL-\' \n\nc \n\nu \n\nu \n\nu. \n\n\n\xc2\xab/ \n\nor \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 (V \n\n\n* \n\nJ \n\n\nI \n\n^1 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nI \n\nA \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nh - \n\nI \n\n\nr fc \n\nc *- \n*- c \n\n\nUi \xe2\x80\x9c \n\nHS \nui a \n\ng*.! \n\no \n\n\nI c. \n\nc a \n- c \nX \xc2\xa9 \nC \n\n\na \n\nu. \n\nz \n\ncc \n\nV _J \n\nfci\xc2\xa3 a \n\na\xe2\x80\x9c| \n\ns*.\xc2\xa3 \n\nr- \n\n \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xa5\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2)\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr r a a \xe2\x96\xba \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0 \xc2\xa5 f e 1 *-Ar. r e. \n\n<# - \xe2\x80\xa2 ! OS* \n\nI i \n\n\nA \n\n\nC \n\n\nft \n\n5 \n\ni \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 o m 4. \n\n* \n\nr.p\'o \n\nClf \n\ny if c \xc2\xa3 C ft \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\nft\': \n\nc \n\n1 1 \n\n\n4 \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\nft \n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xa9*\xe2\x96\xa0\xe2\x80\xa2 C \n\nCCA \n\nC C IT. \n\nC ft \xc2\xbb- \n\nc c \n\nC 3 ft ft- C fti \n\n \n\no \n\nft- ft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 * \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 r \n\nft" \n\n1/ ft 1 1/ IT \n\n\n\nc \n\n0 \n\nIf) \n\nft \n\nst \n\nA ft \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\ntr ft. if it. \n\n0 \n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nV\xc2\xbb Oft* ON \n\na \n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ntf \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\nO \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 O O \xc2\xa9 O \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\nCO\xc2\xa9 \n\ne o \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xe2\x80\x94 o \xc2\xa9 \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\nft \n\no \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\' \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nt AO ( \n\nAC A \n\nft ft c \n\nIf O f If C \n\n\xc2\xabC ft- \xc2\xabf \xc2\xabC I/. <& \n\nft \n\n\nft) \n\nK \n\nA ft) \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n>r \xc2\xabft w \n\niT ft> If) (T \n\nft \n\nft) \n\nft \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nOP* \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nat \n\n** \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n: \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ^ \n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft i\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb ^ \n\n\xc2\xa51 ft> il iT \n\nft \n\nft> \n\nft \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nfti ft* p- \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xabM \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n1 \n\no o o \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\nQ 3 \n\nO ft ft) \xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\n9 \n\n3 \n\no \n\n#4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n\nHAff l \n\nft \xc2\xa9 ft) \n\nA ft O if O\' 9 \n\nIT \xc2\xa9 \n\n**<&;/ \n\n3 \n\nIT \n\nft \n\n% \n\nV \xc2\xabi \n\n\nH ^ \n\n-ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\ni) A O if \n\nft \n\n-) \n\nft \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nr< p4 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n** \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\n\n\niAy\xc2\xabA3- \n\n\xc2\xbbu ft a /i *>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nun o *\xc2\xbb \nZ O * \nOOaJ \n\n\nUi \n\n-J \n\nw Ui \n*- ft \n\nX - \nUi \xe2\x96\xba* \n\n\nZ \n\n*-* \n\n5 \n\n\no \n\nUi X \n\n*- u. \n< I \nU X \n\xe2\x80\x94 Ui \n\nII \n\nwk *- U. -J \n\n\nX ,/> \n\n*- UJ uA \n\nS/I \xc2\xa7 5 \xc2\xa5 l/< \n\nU Ui *- b 2 \n-j uco \n\xe2\x80\xa2" U X < X \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nV \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab at u. ui *\xc2\xbb \n\n3JXUHLZ \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xbb \xc2\xa9 V\xc2\xabMM \n\nlux :iu \n\nK \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2? 9 yi 0 * \n\n\nUi \n\nu- \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\ni/l \n\nui \n\nX \n\n\n> s/>! \nQ Ui. \nvt. ui \n_ *i \n\xc2\xbb \xc2\xab/> 2 O \n0 Ui \xc2\xab u. \n\nzu- \n\nJ O\' \n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 * sii i? \xe2\x80\xa2 ui h * j o \nzixS * uif,jfi I >~ui \n\nmUUUXS/I<|!m1 \n2 ti-a-uw# \n\n\nI \n\no \n\n^ 3 \n\n\nUi \n\n-J \n\n\ns i \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n\nz \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\no \n\n-I \n\nX \n\nX \n\ns \n\n\n>\' \n\n\xc2\xab4I \n\nu\xc2\xbb \n\n\nu. \n\nu \n\n8 \n\nu. \n\nI \n\n33 \n\n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab* \n\no \n\n\n268 \n\n\nUfiEMPLOYMFHT HATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nH \n\nir \xc2\xabr \n\n\ntr \n\n\nJtl \n\n\ni/*c \n\nU \xe2\x80\x94I \n\nyu< \n\n\nu. \n\ncv \n\na k \n\n\nUJZ \n\n\nU.U. \n\n\nb. c \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- a \n\nft \n\ncu \n\n1 \n\nCL \n\n\n\nIf \n\nJ \n\nu. \n\nff, \n\nc \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\nIf. \n\nu. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94- \n\nK \n\n\nLl \n\n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nli. \n\n \n*- c \n\ni \xc2\xab- \n\n2 \n\n\nu. \n\nu \n\nT \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\no c \n\xe2\x80\x9c I \n\n\n\n\nID \n\n\nlO \n\n\n1 1 i \n\n1 ! t \n\nD\xc2\xabir a3\xc2\xabcoiofO\xc2\xbb^f\\iiDO \xc2\xbbo cm cm ifl \xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n<\xc2\xbb-C ft KiO 3* f- 3 Ct < *\xe2\x96\xa0 D If ft 33 330 0 3 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\nX 3 3 \n\n3 O \n\nX> 3 \n\n-< \n\nO\' \n\no \n\n\nCM \n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-1 \n\n\nCM \n\nX \n\nn \n\nX \n\n3*1 \n\nX X \n\n\nIf \n\nr- \n\n\nf- \n\n3 O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA \n\n\n\no \n\nft- O\' \n\nO 3 CM X ft- CM ft") \n\no \n\nO CM O \n\n-i O\' \n\nO\' fO \n\nX \n\nft- \n\nCM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n1 2 \n\n*-\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX X \n\nCM f- 3 X \n\nX X CO 3 \n\ncv \n\nX 3 3 \n\nIO X \n\nX 3 \n\nH \n\nIO \n\nX \n\n\no \n\nO O \n\n\n\n\n-\xc2\xab \n\n\n \xc2\xab \n\nl/l o \n\nX \n\nD D \n\n\nH \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\nID \n\nX ft- X \n\n; u uJ \n\nV- \n\nO Z\' \n\n\nD \n\nft- \n\ni \n\n>~ \n\n\nX \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\n2-ft- \n\n_J ft- \xe2\x80\x94 vD \n\nX \n\nu \n\no o \n\n\nX \n\n> \n\nD \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\no- y \n\n_l 2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu z \n\nX \n\nx \xe2\x80\x9d, \n\n\n\n9 \n\nui \n\n-J \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\n!t \n\n\n83 \nft- C \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 Q cr\' _i \n* x 2 Z \n\n, m QC \n\n/\xe2\x96\xba X 1 \n\nu \n\n-J M \n\nX <* i/* \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n\ns \n\nQ. \n\nX \n\n*> \n\na \n\nX \n\n*1 \n\n\n\nh- \n\n\n13 O \n\nftiiDjffua \n\nz \n\nX U UJ \n\n\n1 \n\nD 2 \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\nZi \n\nS\' \n\n\n>- \n\ni \n\n\nr> a \n\nUJ < 1 CL \n\n< UJ > ft. \n\n< \n\n\n\nD UJ X \n\nu. \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nO \n\nx a \n\njua i \n\n13 2 I \n\nX \n\n1 2 ft- \n\n\n2 \n\nU \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\ni \n\nJ \n\nft- \n\n\n< \n\n\nK \n\nu \n\n\nh- \n\nQj r\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94> X /! \n\n\nDO"\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n& \n\n\xc2\xbb-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 -J \n\n\n\n* \n\nD \n\n\n\ni/i \n\n\nM \n\nt/l Q \n\nz m z \n\nI|XO 1 \n\nu \n\n2 X _J \n\n5 \n\n1 \n\n> *-\xc2\xab \n\nuj) \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n3 Z \n\n2 TO \n\nXIDIh \n\nu u ft- a \n\n1/1 \n\n< X - \n\n< \n\nZ \n\nX > \n\nat! \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nQ \n\nO \n\nmm \n\no c \n\nUM 03 \n\nX\' < o \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94I \n\nz o *- a \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nl\xc2\xb1) M \n\nz \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\n2 \n\n<1 \n\nr. \n\nU. \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 X J CL \n\na x z x \n\nX \n\nft\xe2\x80\x94 (w\xc2\xbbi O ft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu. \n\nD X \n\n<. \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\na. \n\nU>| \n\no \n\n\n269 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE 3,2 2.4 2,6 2,5 .0 ?.Q \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ni \n\n\nTJ \n\nV \n\n3 \n\na \n\n\na \n\no \n\nu \n\n\n3 \n\na \n\n\nc \n\n7 \n\n_! \n\ni r \n\n\n2 \n\nc \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\xc2\xab ire \n\nl \n\nif \xe2\x80\xa2< \xe2\x80\x98 \n\xc2\xab _ *- \nc \n\nX C ! \n\nit. \xc2\xab- \n\nCJ u \xc2\xab \n\n7 jC\'I \n\nu cv, \n\nCL I- \n\nUl 7 I \n\nU U. \n\nU L \xe2\x80\x94 \n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\xa2Of\' \nC U I \na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nv \n\nu \n\nc \n\n2 \n\nUJ \n\na \n\ni< \n\nit. \n\nu \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\ni \n\nif \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\ni \n\n<\\ \n\n\nif \n\na \n\n\nr- \n\nt \n\n\nu. \n\n2 U \nC \n\n\xe2\x80\x94c \n\n\nu) \n\nH C \n\nw a \n\n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\n0 \n\np \n\nx a \n\ni\xc2\xa3 7 \n\n*- c \nTo \n7 \n\n\nI \n\nU. \n\nu \n\n7 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\ncc \n\n\no \n\nM \n\nS3* \n\nH >cc \n3 \xc2\xbbo \n03 r* \n\n<\xc2\xa3 \n\n* 1 \n\na \nc x \n\nUJ C \nX Lt \n\n\nu \n\nu. \n\n2 ft \n\nCC \n\n\n: \n\n3a| \n\n.0 \n\n* \n\nCl. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 v \n\nOO \n-J u \n7 \n\n\nt \n\na \n\nk p \xc2\xabc n c \n\nr. c cel \n\nA. A \n\na \n\np \n\n * * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nr- t r- , \n\na \n\ncv cv \n\nP f \n\nA \n\n\n\nf f \n\nCVt \n\na r \n\n0 \n\n IT \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2" Cv \n\nr- \n\nw* \n\n\n\ncv \n\nir \n\na \n\nA- \n\n\n\niT \n\ni \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n1 \n\nr 1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nP\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\nrl \n\n! \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\nCV 8-i f If \n\n\nc ait \n\ncv tf \n\nIf \n\nc \n\n0 \n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ne \n\nc \n\ncc.cc \n\nc \n\nc c c \n\nIf c \n\n\ntr \n\nc \n\nc c \n\npA \n\nC \n\n\nc c \n\nP \n\na \n\nif \n\ncv \n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 1 1 \n\ni \n\nI 1 i \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\nI \n\ni 1 \n\n1 \n\nI \n\ni \n\nt f \n\nCV \n\nw~ \n\n- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\nc c \n\nc \n\n\nc \n\nc c e p- \n\nc c \n\ncv \n\nc. \n\nC G *- \n\n. \n\nA" C C \n\nc \n\n\n\n4\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n0 \n\n. 1 \n\n. 1 t. \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\ni.iii \n\nI 1 \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\ni it \n\ni \n\n1 . 1 \n\n7 \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nf \xc2\xbbc \n\na \n\nsC \n\nV* \n\n-A Wf \n\n*r a \n\ncv \n\na: \n\n2T f^t \n\n\na o if \n\nc \n\nA- \n\nA- \n\na \n\ne* \n\n\n\n\na\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n>t \n\n\nir \n\n\nf IT f \n\ns\xc2\xbb \n\nA \n\n\xc2\xabP- \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\na \xc2\xabiCCA-.\xc2\xabAW 3 \n\nio o if \n\na \n\nA \n\n\xc2\xa9 A \n\na \n\nr. \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX) \n\n\n\n\nPC \n\n\n\n\nlO \n\n\n\nN0 \n\n\nf \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nX \n\nX CM \n\nG \n\nX \n\nM \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n0 \n\n\n>A \n\n\na \n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\n\xc2\xab A\xc2\xbb \n\nM \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\nA- CV \n\nc \n\n1C \n\nA \n\n4-^ \n\nX \n\na f) f \n\na \n\nX \n\nO ^ \n\n\xc2\xbbA \n\nIT \n\nA \n\nX \n\na \n\n\nM \n\nP4 \n\nH \n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nif \n\n\nx> \n\nX CM \n\no \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n0 \n\n\nf> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nGOO \n\nc o \n\no \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\n2 \n\n0 \n\nI \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\no \xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xbb \n\nG O \n\nX \n\n<*H \n\nX, \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\x94< X \n\ncr a \n\nPC \n\nf A CL 0 K x c \n\n0 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n-1 \n\n*1 \n\n\nCNi C \n\nX \n\n-t o \n\nX cvi \n\no \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n0 \n\n\nto \n\n\n\na -\xc2\xab occAf-tAcvoto z -o x, ato a axox \n\nA \n\nX \n\npH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nPi \n\nCM X XfIXXCV \n\n0 \n\nX \n\ncm! \n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\nto \n\n0 \n\n\xc2\xbbo \n\n\ncv \n\n\n3 \n\n\nif \n\n\nc \n\n\n3 \n\n\ntO \n\n3 \n\n\na \n\nm \n\n\nu: \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nM \n\nUi o \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\ncr \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\xc2\xab z \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94> \n\nnr \n\n\n\n\na \n\nX \n\n3 *-i \n\n\nX \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nU \n\nA x \n\n\nu \n\nu \n\nA \n\n\n\n\nZ A J \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x80\xa2 X \n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\nu \n\n\nC U J \n\n\n2 \xc2\xab \n\n\no \n\na \n\n< \n\n\nX \n\n\nM \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nr \n\nX _J \n\n\nT ^ \n\nX \n\nu. \n\n\n\n\nf E * \n\nH.. \n\nO X X \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nI \n\n1 \n\n\n\nA \n\n\no o \n\n\nli 3 JOfW \n\na \n\n2 \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n-t \n\n\nDrew \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX \n\n5 \n\neaa j \n\nu \n\nX 1 u \n\n2 \n\n\nX \n\nz \n\nf \n\nu \n\n-i- \n\nA <-l \n\nP-C \n\nU K H \n\n1 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\np4 \n\n*-4 \n\nX O A \n\nX \n\nX Z X \n\nX \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu \n\nD \n\nac \n\n2 \n\nSOX \n\na \n\nf \xe2\x80\x94 u \n\nO A \n\na \n\nX \n\nQ \n\no \n\nt-t \n\nO O aJ \n\n< \n\n5 x x \n\n< \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\x944 \n\n2 < \n\n\'I U It. h \n\nu. \n\nJlU \n\nX \n\nX \n\na \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \n\nA \n\n\nt \n\n\nX \n\nA \n\nz \n\n\nA i \n\n\nUJ \n\n< \n\nUj \n\n\n2 \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\nX A \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\nUJ \n\n\xc2\xabJ \n\nX \n\n2 X A \n\nA \n\n\nz \n\nX \n\ne \n\nO W > X \n\no \n\n\nA \n\no \n\nX \n\nA Q UJ. \n\n-J \n\n\no \n\nu. \n\nUJ \n\na \xe2\x80\xa2 au; \n\na \n\n\n-) \n\n\nX \n\n< X X X\' \n\nz \n\nz \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nU U i X z o \n\nUJ \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\no \n\n* \n\nA \xe2\x80\x94 Xltl \xc2\xablL \n\n\nA \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\n1 \n\n2 A z (J \xc2\xab \n\n-\xc2\xab \n\nA \n\n2 \n\n< \n\nX \n\n3-IJhh JQ \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n< \n\n\nJ \n\n2 \n\n* . J Q 1 > A UJ \n\nA \n\n-J \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nZh<2QC>I \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nO A X a Uj \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 fle \n\nA \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO O A Ul X O 4C \n\n\no \n\n\nA \n\n\n\n\na \n\no \n\nu \n\n\nj \n\n\n270 \n\n\nUWtMPLOTMFNT HATE 5,2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSrttiTH CAROLINA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab V tt \n!\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ntr \xc2\xbbr \na \xc2\xbb \nc i \n\nve\xc2\xac \n\n\nL \n\n\n \n\n\nQ \n\no a \n\na o \n\na u \n\n2 \n\nD \n\n\nU \na \nz *- \n\no c \n\n\na -i \nH "O l \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c J \n2S 3 c \n\xe2\x80\xa23 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab-< \nto O\' \n\nJV \n\n* \n\na \n\nj a \n\no o \n_j o \n\n\n\n(vcn^cir \n\ncc a \n\na C \n\n4 \n\n\xc2\xab. MV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \' *4 \xc2\xab \n\n \n\n*v \n\nr \n\n*r a \n\n\n\n\ntv ir a. \n\n0 i \n\n\n1 \n\n> \n\n\nt\\j \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- tv; tv a \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2** \n\na mv \n\n*r -1 \n\na \n\nM~ <\\. \n\na-\xc2\xbb \n\nN9S \n\nH \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\ncvH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\n1 \n\n\nK \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nT } \n\n\n\nr- \n\ntV 61 0 \n\nC *\xc2\xa3. \n\nw \n\na \n\nC <\\ f\' \n\nvC If C \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nu \n\nc. \n\nK \n\n\nU \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x99\xa6 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 * \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n9 \n\nfill \n\n\ntv \n\nc \n\n-vfA \n\nfV IN fV \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2 * \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nM- \n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n9 \n\n* \xc2\xab \n\n\ns \xc2\xab- e \n\n1 1 1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nM- \n\n1 \n\n\nir \n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\n\nc>. \n\n\ne \xe2\x80\x94 c w \n\nM\' C \n\nc c \n\nCV \n\nc c c \n\nc c c \n\nM - If C \n\nff \n\n\nC \n\nif \n\ncr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\nt \n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n6 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nc - c. a \n\nK \xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\nM- \n\nc c c \n\nc c c \n\nS Ah c \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\ntv \n\nX \n\nr- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n? \n\n\n\ntv \n\n\na \n\n9 \n\nr* \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nl \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\nc c c \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nc c \n\nc c \n\nK \n\nc c \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c c \n\n- c .- c \n\nK \n\n5T \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\nif \n\n*- \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\ntill \n\nt \n\n1 s \n\nI \n\n\xc2\xbb 1 i \n\n1 s 1 \n\nSill \n\nc \n\nM 1 \n\n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n9 \n\n\n\n\n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 c tr \n\nCV- M - 4 \n\nC cr \n\n\nCCr- \n\nc c c- \n\na \xe2\x80\xa2- v\xc2\xa3> c \n\nc \n\nIf \n\na \n\ntv \n\nMV \n\n0 \n\n1 \n\n1 II! \n\nk 1 \n\n1 i \n\nt \n\n1 1 t \n\n1 J 1 \n\ntill \n\n\ntv \n\n9 \n\n1 \n\ntVJ \n\n1 \n\n\nH \n\nru h- if c \n\n\n\xc2\xabt K- \n\nMV \n\nc m- \xc2\xabc c a a \n\nIT C Ifl If \n\nH \n\nif \n\ntvi \n\na \n\nK) \n\nor \n\n\n& *- K \n\n^ - \n\nc. \n\nr \n\nM - \n\n\nM M If If \n\ncr \n\nc\\ \n\na- \n\nf \n\n\n\n\n*\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xba \n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 - 9 \xe2\x80\x94 ^ \n\n\nC \n\na \n\n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xabM- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCv \n\nfv. e it 3 \n\nO C. \n\na mv \n\na \n\nO M\xe2\x80\x99\' M- \n\ne cr u: 0 r~ 0 uv \n\n9*4 \n\nO \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xabVJ \n\n\nr- \n\n3 \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 a \n\nr- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nw r. \n\n\n\nm- r \xc2\xae if \n\ne \n\nIT \n\nr\\ \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\na \n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0* \n\ntv \n\n\nal \n\n\ne \n\nc e e 0 \n\nO O \n\nc 0 \n\nc \n\nO O C \n\n000 \n\nCOCO \n\n0 \n\nCL \n\n\ntv \n\nO \n\nz \n\n\n\n\n, \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n9 \n\n9 \n\n\n\ntv \n\nAt IT, 3 \n\n0 \n\ncr. \xc2\xbbr \n\n\nC M5 ^ \n\na c\xc2\xabc \n\nahoif, \n\ntv \n\nIf \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\nO \n\n\xc2\xae \n\nto \n\na- \n\na \xc2\xbb-< a \n\nh \n\nCM \n\nMV \n\nMV \n\n\nMV MV sC UV \n\nvO \n\nfV! \n\nO \n\nIf \n\ncv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 a- \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nc \n\na \n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\n\na-4 \n\n\n<\\J \n\ntvi \n\n0 \n\nJV \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xabm\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb a\xc2\xab4 \n\n\nO \n\na \n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-4 \n\ncv. \n\n1 \n\nH \n\n\nc \n\nchon \n\n^4 O \n\nO O \n\nc. \n\nO O C \n\nOOO \n\nH M N O \n\n0 \n\nX \n\nr. \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n0*4 \n\n9 \n\nt \n\n\ntv \n\n if \n\n4> \n\n\n0 \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2O \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm -4 \xc2\xab-\xe2\x80\xa2 94 \n\n\n0 \n\nX \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n^4 \n\n\n\n^4 \n\n\nuJ \n\na \n\n\nif \n\n\nuJ \n\nO \xe2\x80\xa2-* uJ \n\na: \xe2\x96\xba- x \na x x \n\n\no \n\nz \n\n\nZ *- -J 9- \xe2\x80\xa2* If \n\n\nO O _l Z \n\xe2\x80\x94 3 \xe2\x80\x94 O tx \n\xe2\x96\xba : j j,: \n\nw> o \n5 or uj \na a u \n\n\n>\xe2\x96\xa0 _i \nx z e \n\n\xe2\x96\xba-UZt- \xe2\x80\x9c* \n\nZ X Z Z O X \na j"O ow \nZ \xc2\xab z u a <- \n\n\nm- a \na l \nu x \n\nv-4 Ui \n\na x \n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nz x \n\n\na x \n\nCL Li \n\n\nif o \nuJ UJ \n_J \n\nu a \n\n-\xc2\xab x \n\nm- X I \n\na uj a \n\n\xc2\xab a if \nx o i \nu \xe2\x96\xba* x \n< o *- \nJ t 4 \n\n\n11 J \n\n\nM- \n\n\n\n\nIf M- \n\n\nz \n\n\nM- \n\n\nUJ \xc2\xab3f \n\n\nUJ \n\n\nz \n\nUj \n\nIf if, *- \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\nO \n\nX Z if 1 - \n\n\n>- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n00 ; UJ > \n\nif \n\n0 \n\n\n>* \n\nO \n\nx H -* \n\nUJ \n\n>- \n\n\n\n\n** X \xc2\xab < Z X > \n\nX \n\nO \n\n5 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX O X \xe2\x80\xa2" UJ *\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nX \n\nM- \n\na \n\n>, \n\n> \n\nM U 3 M ii 1/1 u \n\n<\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 < \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\na \n\nUJ \n\nu\xc2\xbb \n\n\n271 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE 5.b 4.6 S.O 4.A ^.2 6.4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSOUTH Oakota .TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\\ \n\nI \n\n*ti cm. \n%r \xe2\x80\xa2!r \n" c~ \n\nJT C -I \n\nW \xc2\xabv \n\nO I-i \n\nUJ 7 \niL U \n\nu u- \n\n\xe2\x96\xba ft h \n\nCU. I \n\nQ. M \n\n\nIf \n\nu \n\nc \n\n7 \n\nu \n\na \n\nu> \n\nu. \n\nu \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n1 / \n\no \n\n\nI \n\nIf. \n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\ncm. \n\n\nl \n\n\n5\xc2\xae\xc2\xa7: \nS \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 CV \n\ni i n \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\nr \n\n\n\n\' 1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 4 . \n\n\n. J . \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nA\' \n\n\xe2\x96\xba c cc \n\nc e e \n\nc c c \n\n\xc2\xa9;C \n\nC C Cl \n\nC \xc2\xab-\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nC CMI C CM \n\nIf \n\nIf\' \n\nCM \n\nIf \n\n\nl \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n11 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n! \n\n\ni \n\nt \n\n\n\n\' \n\n. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- c c c \n\nc c c \n\nc e e \n\nc c \n\nc c c \n\nc \xe2\x96\xba \n\nc cv \n\nc cv \n\na \n\nf- \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\nI \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\nI \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\nc c c c \n\nc c c \n\nc c c \n\nc c \n\nc c c \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc c \n\nC CM \n\nir \n\n\na \n\nCM \n\n\n1 1 \xc2\xbb 1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n\' V \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba c oc \n\nc c \xc2\xa9 \n\n1 \n\nc \xc2\xa9 o \n\nc e \n\no c \xc2\xa9 \n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xa9 CM \n\nc c \n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2f \n\n\nc \n\n.1 II 1 \n\n1 i 1 \n\nIII \n\n1 1 \n\nII 1, \n\n1 1 \n\nI 1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n. i \n\n\n! \n\n\n\nCC *M \n\nj c r- \n\nc c \n\nA \n\nCM\' If \n\nCC c \n\na f \n\n\n\nJ \n\n\xc2\xa9\xe2\x80\x98 \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nIf \n\nif \n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nf- \n\n\nCM \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\nd \n\n\nCM CM -\xc2\xab \n\nCCA \n\nacr \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xc2\xa9 \n\ncmi n \n\nCM - *3 \n\nCM If \n\nee \xc2\xabi \n\na 4 \n\na \n\nH \n\nif \n\nCM \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nif if \n\nif \n\nCM \n\nr-< \n\nf- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nOi \n\n. \n\n\no o o \xc2\xa9 \n\no \xc2\xa9 o \n\nO \xc2\xa9 O \n\no \xc2\xa9 \n\no o o \n\nO -l \n\nO \xe2\x80\x94 \n\no \xc2\xa9 \n\nCM \n\nH \n\nOn \n\n\nif \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n# \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* A A \xe2\x96\xba \n\n\xc2\xa9 O \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\na \xc2\xa9 If \n\nc \xc2\xa9 \n\ncm a- if \n\nCM 4 \n\nCC CM \n\na \xc2\xbbr \n\nIT \n\na \n\n>r \n\na \n\n\n^ ~4 ~4 \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nJT) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\nif \n\n"M \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nr- \n\n\nCM \n\n\nOJ \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab \n\no o \n\naoio \n\no o \n\ncm i\xc2\xbb n \n\nCM f \xc2\xae <~t \n\na if \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\npO \n\nH \n\n^ e-r \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\na \n\nIf \n\nif \n\n\nCM \n\n\nn \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nc- \n\n\n! cm \n\n\n\nO J \n\n\na \n\nIf UJ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\ni \n\n\n\nO *- lu \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x96\xba. \n\nUJ If \xe2\x80\x98 \xe2\x96\xba- \n\nZ \n\n\ni- \n\n\n\na t- a \n\nz \n\n\na uj < \n\nUj \n\n\nz \n\nUI \n\n\na x ~ \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xab \n\nIf c \n\n3 if vf \xe2\x96\xba- \n\nX \n\n\nUi \n\no \n\n\nUJ *- \n\nT \' \n\nUI UJ \n\ni- ? z if . \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\n\n\nX \n\n2> \n\nJM H \n\nIf \n\n-1 \n\nUCO UJ > If 1 \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba! \n\no \n\nuj o u \n\n-J Z \n\n\na a \n\n4 X - Q UJ\' \n\n_l \n\n\no, \n\nu. \n\nr \xe2\x80\x945 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba< O OC \n\n-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-* X \n\nU.Ut-1 \xe2\x80\xa2 o u, \n\n5. \n\n\n_J : \n\n\nr \xc2\xbb- a \n\n1 Ui 3 \n\nBl/\xc2\xbbM \n\nX 1 \n\nz at 4 If X X \n\nX \n\nz \n\nS\' \n\nX \n\n1 - u o \n\n\xe2\x96\xba* u. \n\n33 J CC \n\nuj a \n\nZ 4 U UJ 1 If z o\' \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n> ^ z>a \n\nUJ 4 1 \n\nOl < UJ \n\n> M \n\n4*i-\xc2\xbb\xc2\xab if UI 4 X 1 \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xc2\xbb \n\nUJ \n\nm \n\na - o a 5. \n\nJUt \n\nl o 2 \n\nX \n\nX 1 Z 1 - z o *- \n\n_j \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nZ \n\n4 \n\nI-UZH \n\n<-> \xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\xa2 UJ \n\ni\xc2\xbb* \n\nX if \n\n1^3 HUiMM JO \n\n4 \n\n4 \n\no \n\n_J \n\n\n\xc2\xbb- ac \xc2\xae \n\nZ XX \n\nO 1 \n\n02!^ J c 1 ^1 iw \n\nM- \n\n_J \n\n\n\n3I2ZO \n\nK\xc2\xae X \n\n\xc2\xab-i lil\'O \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x9c a \n\nlf4X,\xc2\xab42X>X \n\no \n\np \n\n\n. \n\no o \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab o o \n\nUJ 4 S \n\nX X 4 \n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n*-*xoVx<-*tv*-\xc2\xbbX\' \n\n\xe2\x96\xba* \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\nZ < X u u. \n\nl- U. -1 \n\nX U X \n\nX 4 \n\nX l *lJ|3ru,SSo< \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nX \n\nu \n\nU \n\n\n272 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE 6.0 5.3 5.6 5,5 4.4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBUDGET B BUDGET C _ . BUDGET E PTPPrf\xc2\xbbrMr\xc2\xbb"C OTFFFpFHCFS \xc2\xbb? * \n\nLOW *50.\xc2\xab BILLION VEO *67.6 BILLION HTPM PULTON PFOCFMT OF TO* , * \n\n1) w CO mP COMP OjFf. UMCOKP COWp PTFF UNCOMp fOv-P JVjrF (1-7) \xe2\x99\xa6 3-A) _ <5-P> . 0-7) (*-*) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n \n\nx \n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\nt i \n\ni \n\nt \n\n\n- t \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nF \n\n8 \n\n\n\nCV \n\nC CV \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n- X \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC f C - \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*- \n\ne c c \n\n1 \n\np-\xe2\x80\x99 r r \xe2\x80\x94 ct \n\nc \n\nIT \n\nC j \n\nCV \n\n\xc2\xab*\xc2\xbb* \n\n\nI \n\n\nS 1 \n\n1 \n\nt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nt\xc2\xbb-i \n\n11 \n\nCV \n\na \n\nl \n\nCVi \n\nC \n\nc. \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nC C H r- \n\n-1 X C CV \n\nI 1 i 1 I \n\nif \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c c \n\nr \xe2\x80\x94 r c c. \n\nX \n\np- \n\nCU \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n1 \n\n1 s t \n\ntt\xc2\xabt \n\n! \n\nt 1 1 \n\ne s $ i \xe2\x80\x94: \n\n< \n\nX\xe2\x80\x98 \n\nX \n\nCV \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n( \n\n\n\n\nC CV \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nr* lT r n \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 c c \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 e c. \n\np r \xe2\x80\x94 c: \n\nc \n\na \n\nIfl \n\nX \n\nc \n\nt \n\n1 5 t \n\nttii \n\nlilt \n\nt \n\ni.l t \n\n1 \xc2\xbb - S \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nt \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nK: \n\np r. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n(\\i e 3 ioif| c ec c \n\nCL \n\na: if p* \n\ncl cv a C a \n\ne \n\nr \n\nc- \n\nCV \n\n<1C \n\nX \n\np K\' \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 cv r c\\ \n\n& \\T \xe2\x80\x94 \n\no \n\nif \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nx X p a r \n\n\np \n\nir \n\nin \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r- \n\n\n\n\nCV CV CV \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*\xc2\xab \n\n1 \n\n\n\nX)P*X>Cvl\xc2\xbbOlPXa \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nin if if o a \n\no \n\na \n\nx. \n\n N K cr \n\nN O\' f h- r. \'AiT Ci \n\nX \n\nX \n\na \n\nc \n\nIT \n\nX \n\nP fO \n\nn (\\) \xc2\xbb0 (V \n\na a \n\nO\' \n\ntf \n\nX X \xc2\xab. If fV* \n\nK) \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\na \n\np\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCV CV CV \n\nX \n\n \n\n\xc2\xab~i CV >0 CVI \n\na a \n\nO\' \n\n\nx x a f> -v \n\na \n\nr< \n\na \n\np- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCV CV CV \n\nX \n\nCV \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n*-\xc2\xbb \n\na \n\n1 \n\n9*H \n\n\na \n\n1 \n\nf 3, N f) in -f fO lO fl u y \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xae if) p- \n\ncv a r> o a \n\nro \n\np- \n\np* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrO \n\n\nX \n\nK m \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*\xc2\xab CV O CV \n\na, a \n\nct \n\na \xc2\xab-< \n\nX X SC X) CV \n\n \n\nu \n\n\n4 \n\n\n273 \n\n\nvINEMPLOYM\xe2\x82\xacNT RftTE 3.6 2.7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTEXAS TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab tr C \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nIf \xe2\x80\xa2 \nm _ \n\nC \nif t \n\nu \n\nu \n\na *- \nu ? \nu u. \nu u \n\xe2\x96\xba a \nc u- \no. \n\n\n4/\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nU \n\n5 \n\n\xc2\xab. \n\nu. \n\na \n\nw \n\nu \n\nu \n\n\na \n\n\nt \n\ni \n\nv \n\n\nc \n\ni \n\no \n\n\nf- \n\nI \n\n\nu \n\nZ U \n\nc ft \n- c \n\n\nu. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nu. \nz ft \n\nc c \n\n\nu> 3 \n\nSSa \n\n8 * c \n\n\xc2\xa7r: u \n\nf \n\na \no x \nu.- c \n\nX o \n\nz \n\n3 \n\n\nia. \n\nu. \nz ft \n\nc c \n\n\nta \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n{r-S a. \n\nhi x \n\nJJsC \n\n5 \xe2\x80\xa2 o \naa Z \nf) \n\n* \n\n\n\n^ci\'kiuxci \n\n*r \n\nc r \xc2\xbb> A IT \n\nr \n\ne \n\n3 \n\ni \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nr \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n*v \n\n\n\n1 j \n\n\n\n\n( \n\n\nl \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n*<\xc2\xa30< \n\nc \n\nft tf A ft \xe2\x80\x94 tV 3 \n\n3 \n\nft \n\n1 \n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n>3 1 \n\n\ntt \xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n^\xe2\x80\xa21 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n*1 \n\n\n\n\nrA-\xc2\xabtV*-tVif3C \n\n\nifoaftft-cft \n\nO \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xbbr \n\nft \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 *\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n13 1 | - UM \n\n\n1 Alf A ft A \xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0 1 \n\ns \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 A \n\n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\n\n\n\nt till \n\n\nIf 1 I 1 1 i \n\n\ntr. \n\ni \n\n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nI 1 \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ntv. \n\naC \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n1 C \n\n-f \n\nft 3 \xe2\x80\x94 if X if) \xc2\xa9 ft \n\no \n\n3 3 \n\na- \n\nc \n\na \n\na \n\nin \n\na \n\nft tv in ft 3 tv if. \xc2\xae \n\n3 \n\nH3MAJ3D(VI \n\n_H CD ft \n\nH \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xae \n\niD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 tv \n\nr-e \n\na \xe2\x80\x94 c tvi \n\nO\' \n\nf*- \n\nK> \n\nx \n\n\nm \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\x94i \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n^4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xabrg^)\xc2\xbb>OHO\xc2\xabo \n\n\nl<"> \n\n-\xc2\xab a \n\n\n* \n\nt \n\nft \n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n(V \n\n3 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nif oir i* 3 o if, \xc2\xae \n\n3 \n\nA~ 0 \xc2\xa9 if \xe2\x96\xa0 3 in if \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\nft! \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nff. \n\nft \n\nO \n\n\nft "V jf> ft 3 to n _n \n\n\n^r>ftj/)33\xc2\xaeo \n\niO O 3 \n\nftl \n\nO \n\n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xc2\xab H (\\J \n\n\nCV. -< \xc2\xabC (VJ \xc2\xab A- \n\ntn \n\n\n\nPO \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\na \n\nn CA \n\nZ> ft X \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0n cr 3 X< eg ft \xc2\xae \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n3 \n\nlO JM) \n\n\xc2\xae lO ft \n\nft \n\n3 \n\nft \n\nO\' \n\nex \xe2\x80\x94 ft ~\xc2\xabif: ft \n\n3 (V If) /> \n\n3 \xe2\x80\xa2-* m \n\n\nif \n\n3: 3 ft fV \n\n3 0\xc2\xae \n\nX \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\nft \n\n3 O \n\nH H \n\n(VI \n\n\n\n- \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n2 t~ _i \n\nft ft 1/1 \n\n3 \n\nu \n\n2 \n\no ui \n\n> m \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\n5 \n\n\nUi \n\nO y J \n\nz \n\nu> a \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\nft \n\nC Uj \n\n3 \n\n\no \n\nu \n\n\n\n\nC X 3 \n\nft Of \n\nu. \n\nUi \n\nft \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xa9 Ui \n\na \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\ni- C X \n\nuJ Z (T / \n\n\xe2\x96\xba i i \n\n. \n\nX \n\n< if. X \n\nX \n\nX \n\nz \n\na \n\nX \n\n\nA* \n\nu. O \n\nft U. 3 3 \n\na uj a \n\nz \n\n< \n\nU UJ I \n\nin z o \n\nUJ \n\no \n\nX \n\no \n\n\n>* -I \n\n3 a ui \n\n\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\xa2 a < \n\nUi > ft \n\n\n* \n\nft ft l/) \n\nUJ 3 la. \n\n\nft \n\nu \n\nX \n\n\na c o \n\na a 3 \n\nO X 1 <3 Z X \n\nX \n\n1 \n\nZ ft z \n\nUi >-\xc2\xab \n\n3 \n\nft \n\nz \n\n< \n\n\n*- u Z \n\nA\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\nM y H \n\nft X l/l \n\n\nin \n\n3 ft Ui \n\nft J c \n\n< \n\n< \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\nifi *-\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm c i- \n\na x z x \n\nX O 1 \n\nu \n\nz \n\nX J Q I \n\n> ft Ui \n\nft \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n2 x z \n\nz O X \n\nX) X ft u \n\nu ft ac \n\nin \n\n< \n\nI - < 2 \n\na >x \n\no \n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\n\nc o <-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no o u \n\n\xc2\xab 3 a I \n\n< o \xe2\x80\x94 \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94e \n\na \n\nO ft I ft \n\naJ ft X \n\nft \n\na \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\nZ < X \n\nO U. ft \n\nu. j a 3 \n\nX X 4 \n\nX \n\nft \n\nJ 3 >- u. \n\nft 3 3 \n\n\no \n\n\nft \n\n\n*-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nOi \n\nUi \n\n\n274 \n\n\nUU\xe2\x82\xacMPL0r\xc2\xabKNT RATE 5.0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUTAH TABLE 13 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nI \n\n\xc2\xab r c\' \n\nV \xe2\x80\x94If \n\nft>c \nbJ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nuk \n**1 \n\n\nV \n\nb \n\nZ \n\nbl \n\nft \n\nb \n\nb \n\nb \n\n\n\xc2\xabr> \n\n\na> \n\n\n- A \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2- \nI \n\ntr \n\n\nt i , i | \n\n*** " * 1 1 0 a i k c A 4 \n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2*!\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2< \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xab< \nait ftVAif \xc2\xaba Ucev-aer *->\xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xabs..r r. \xe2\x80\xa2> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \'l \xe2\x80\x9d ..c - ir \n\nI I I - I IT l l |! I I I I ft \nII ll \n\n\nI \n\n\nI \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\' \xe2\x80\x94 c \xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xab-\xe2\x96\xa0 c c e c c c \n\n* - I \n\nI \n\n \n\nl \n\n\nw \xe2\x80\x94 \nh tr \n\nUl \n\nV b \nP \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n5 \xe2\x80\x9d \no \n\nft \n\nz \n\nc \n\n\nc. \n\ns \n\nC\' \n\nu \n\n\nc. \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nc \n\nu \n\nr; \n\n\nb \nb \nZ \xe2\x80\x94 \nC C \n\n\nO _J \n\nH \xc2\xa3 \nW \xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n8 b \n\nb \n\nft \n\na \n\nbl \n\n2 \n\n\nc. \n\n}. \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\na. \n\nx \n\nc \n\nu \n\n\n\xc2\xbbr. \n\n\nft o c- \xc2\xab \n\xe2\x80\x94 <\\. \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\nM \n\n\na ac e ftc-ftC \nCM \n\n\nir^-iTftuiftKjr\'ft \n\ncm \xc2\xab-* b f*\xc2\xbb ft \n\n\nft n C O h A AiNwCMOSif ft ft O\' ft) b ft \n^4 A CM C*J b \xe2\x80\xa2-< N O \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIT \n\n1^ \n\nft! \n\nr- \n\nc- \n\nvC \n\n\nrv \n\nft \n\n\n\n& \n\n\n** \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n|J \n\n0 \n\nft \n\nft) \n\nft \n\n\n1- \n\n\n0- \n\n\ncm \n\nI \n\n\neg \n\n\ncC - 1 \n_) \n\nH \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\nwi r a. \n\n\\? * \nG ft o \ns \xe2\x80\xa2 o \n* ft \nS \nft __ \n\n* 9 \n\no o \n-I o \n\n\nft) o c. \xe2\x80\x94 y \nCM -* \n\n\n\xc2\xab\\,i\xc2\xa3A*-OAI\'. NlT \n\'M M *4 \n\n\nit if O ft N ft< \nft \xc2\xbb-4 h* ft \n\n\nJKIOO-NA^AHOMOhiTJ ft O\' CM b O \n\nb \xe2\x80\x94 P- & \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n^ A \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ^ \na 5 \n*- u \n\ni/i \xc2\xab \n\n3 Z \nO b \n2 < \n\n\n\no \n\n-J \n\n\na \n\nft) \n\n\nbl \n\n\no \n\nt-0 \n\naj O \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nM \n\nu \n\nft) \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\na \n\nK- \n\na 2 \n\n3 \n\n% \n\nbl \n\n< \n\n\nz \n\n> \n\n* *-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft) O \n\n\nft) ft) \n\nb \n\n\nft) \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\nUl b \n\nb \n\n3 Z \n\nft) \xe2\x80\x98 \n\nZ \n\n>- _i \n\nK \n\nft* \n\n-1 \n\no \n\nO O \n\nUJ \n\no \n\ny -j \n\n\nz - \n\nu x \n\n< \n\nX \xc2\xab\' \n\n\nb-K \n\n5 _ \n\n\nX _i \n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 a \n\nb \n\nbl \xc2\xbb- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nC 2 \n\nu. \n\nr z fti \n\n>- Z 1 \n\n\nX < ft 1 \n\nX \n\nU \n\nO \n\nK- \n\nb 3 JKUJa \n\nz \n\n~ \n\n< o \n\nX X \n\n\n> Lft \n\nsg \n\nz o \n\nb. \n\n\nOKSItZI, \nO X O X \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab b< \nO UJ < O X X \n\nU. \xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9d UL _l Z J \n\n\nI ?,\xe2\x96\xba* z o -* \n\nl/l \n\nI O Z * - JO I > \xc2\xab bl! \na:ui\xc2\xabX\xc2\xab* \n*-\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0\xe2\x80\x99 x OiK ac\xc2\xabui"*x \n\n\nUl \n\nX \n\nV \n\no \n\na!. \n\nX\' \n\n\n-1 \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\nb- \n\no \n\n\nI \n\nv \n\no \n\n_> \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\n- \n\n\nbJ \n\nU \n\na \n\no \n\nb \n\nZ \n\no \n\n3D \n\n\nZ >i > \n\no \xc2\xab< \nZ u u \n\n\n275 \n\n\nUi\'itMPLOTMhNT KATE b.l 5.(3 i>.^. _S.6 **.0 *>.p \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCf 1 \n\ncm Cj r.\'c. r f r > c if \n\nK \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ft- C.jr. \xe2\x80\x94vt CM *C; \n\n\xc2\xab\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\nlf> \n\nt \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94! \xe2\x80\x94 3 ft - \xc2\xa9 \' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nt \n\n\xc2\xab.\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 ci \nt \n\n\ncm 1 *- cm\'*- r.V. \xc2\xa3> \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\na \n\n\no \n\nx \n\na \n\nu \n\n> \n\n\nu \n\n2 U \n\nc - \n*-c \n\n\nU _i \n\n\n*o \n\nI \n\na \n\nH (t \n\ng 0 \n\ncH \n\n3 * C \nS ft- b \n\nM \n\n6 \n\nO \n\nu \n\no \n\n(ft \n\nX c. \n\n\nC 2 \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nIM \n\n2 CJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nu \n\nU vC \n\n\nCCCCeCCCCCCCCCCe\xe2\x80\x94 CCMCC if \n\ni I I I I I I I I I I I I I I. I I I I. I I \n\n\nf- \xc2\xbb-ft- 3 CM ft- if". 3 CC Otr 3 vC CM CM ft -1 If 0 CO \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCM \xe2\x80\x94 CM ftf n \n\n\nc c \n\nu d \n\nyC a if> \nS 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c vC c \n\ns \xe2\x80\xa2 u \n\nft\' \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xabft \n\nc. \n\nor 3 \n\nuJ C \n\n} o \nz \n\n\nc \n\nI \n\n\nr*- a \n\nft- * \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 3 \n\n\nft\xc2\xabNJNftif\xc2\xbboocK)3>cirMOif)oe*< <\\ cr, \n\ncm \xe2\x80\x94 cm a c\\ a vC \n\n\nOOCGGGOOGC OOOCC COCOOO o c \n\n\nCM \n\n\nIT \n\na \n\n\nIT \n\ncc \n\n\nc o \n\nI I \n\n\nfft \xe2\x80\x94 ft- 3 CM K U*. 3CC.CiC!jCfti!ftlf:ir. C <\xc2\xa3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n_J \n\na \n\nin \n\nUJ \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 UJ o \n\n\nuj in \n\nft- \n\n\n2 \n\n\n*- \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\nft- ^ z \n\n\nX UJ \n\n4 \n\n\nU) \n\n\n2 \n\nui \n\n\n\nIT. \n\na \n\nK _ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nm 5 \n\nx> in in> \n\nft- \n\n\nX \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\nUJ \xe2\x80\x94 X \n\nUJ Ui \n\nft- 3 Z \n\nin \n\nft- \n\n>- \n\n\nX \n\ncr. \n\n\n\n2 ft- \n\n_i \n\nft- in \n\n_j \n\no o o, \n\nUJ \n\n> in \n\no \n\n\n>- \n\no \n\nUJ \n\n\nO MJ \n\n\n2 ft- \n\no x \n\nC X ft* \n\n\nO UJI \no u \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 x; \n\n_i \n\n\no \n\nu. \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\n\n2 X _) \n\nft- X \n\nU. UJ k- \n\ne \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\nt\xe2\x80\x94 2 \n\n3 \n\nu:nr>- \n\nX 1 \n\nz x * J \n\n\n2 X \n\nUi \n\n< 1 1 < UJ \n\n> *- \n\n\xc2\xabc \xc2\xbb * \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\nUJ \xc2\xabC Ml \n\n\ni \n\nCD \n\nX X \n\nC \n\nx a \n\n-J \n\nU X 1 0,2 \n\nX \n\nX 1 2 ft- \n\n2 \n\nO \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n-J \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n4 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 O \n\n2 ft- \n\nft-4 \n\nM U ft ft M \n\nx in \n\nin z \xc2\xab-* \n\noT \n\n\xe2\x96\xba* JQ \n\n< \n\n4 \n\n\n-J. \n\nin \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xbb-4 \n\nvn c \n\nH- \n\nX X Z X X \n\nO 1 \n\nO 2 X _J \n\n> ft- UJ \n\n\n\n\no a \n\n2 \n\nz o \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xae X ft- Ui o \n\xc2\xab r x x < \n\nft- X \n\nin \xc2\xab x \xe2\x80\xa2-* \n\n< 2 \n\nX > X \n\no \n\n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc. o \n\n\no o \n\nUi \n\nO ft* \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- a o, ft- \n\nX ft- \n\nUJ ft- X \n\nft- \n\na \n\n>, \n\n> \n\n2 \xc2\xabS \n\n2 O , U. \n\n\nU. JlOT \n\n\nX ft- oi D ft- U. \n\nm o 4 \n\n\no \n\n\n**< \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nu* \n\nU \n\n\n276 \n\n\nf \n\n\nUNEMPLOTMFNT HATE 4.3 3.? 3,*S 3,2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVTPGXNTA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xab IT \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n1 \n\nV \xe2\x80\xa2 * . \n\n< _J \n\nfc \xe2\x80\x98l \n\nc \n\n1 \n\ny c \n\n\nu \n\n3\xe2\x80\x94- \n\n(J u \n\n\xc2\xabc \n\nz j5 \n\n1 \n\nu \n\ncv \n\na *- \n\n\nU 2 \n\n\nu u \n\n1 \n\nu. c \n\n*- \n\n\xe2\x96\xba* tt \n\ny \n\nc. u \n\ni \n\n\n\ni \n\ny \n\n\nu \n\na \n\nu \n\nl \n\n2 \n\ny \n\nu. \n\n^3 \n\ne \n\n\nu \n\n\nu \n\n3* \n\nu \n\na \n\n*- \n\nl \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xabv \n\n\n\nt~ \n\n\ny \n\n\nc \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n\nu \n\ni \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x96\xa0 ir \n\n\na \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 r \n\n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x96\xa0* c \n\n\n2. u \nc >- \n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2J \nw *- \n\ny \n\nx a \nc i \n\xc2\xbb- c \n\nX CJ \n2 \n\n\nu. \n\nu. \n\n2 *~ \nc c \n\n\nCN \n\ny cvjo \n\nX 0 \n\n\nl \n\nO \n\nd \n\nc- a \n\nr \n\nc.tr \n\nc r. \n\n\xc2\xab r \n\nX. \n\n0 \n\n\ni \n\n49 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xabt \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xc2\xbb * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 * \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 J-m \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 <* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nCN \n\n\nr r \n\nCN \n\n\n. y \n\n^ c \n\ni \n\n\n \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n) \n\ni i \n\n1 t \n\ni \n\n1 t t \n\ni i \n\n- t \n\n\n\ny \n\ny \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n9 \n\n\nI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3* \n\n3 oj y, \xe2\x80\x94 y \n\no x \n\n4J- \n\n\nX a. \n\n3 \n\nr o \n\nCN. X ^ \n\nCNJ \n\na. \n\ny \n\n0 \n\no \n\ny> \n\nX \n\ny \n\nc- y y x \n\n3 CN \n\n\nX \n\nK" \n\nc \n\nX - \n\n- a a \n\nX. \n\ny \n\nCN. \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ny \n\n\nc \n\nCN \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCN \n\ny \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0M \n\n\nooooooooocoooooo*^o\xc2\xaboo \n\ny \n\ny \n\no \n\ny \n\n. \xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n9 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\ncc \n\ny \n\n\no \n\nS \n\n\nce a \n\n5 \nX C \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\nx \n\ny \n\na \na x \n\nu\' c \n\n2 o \n2 \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n139 \n\ny \n\n\n34 \n\n\n\nu \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\n2* \n\n\nV _J \nX 3 \n\xe2\x96\xba- u \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n3 x \n\n2. o \n\nZ \nIS> X \n\n2 *~ \n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 X\xe2\x80\x99 \n2 Z: \n\xe2\x80\x94 D \n\nX -J \n\n\nLJ \nO -J \nO \xe2\x80\x94 \nX t- \n\na x \nuj \n_j \xc2\xbb- \n.j \n\n_ c \n\n2 X UJ \nO K \nX UJ < \ni JU \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 y4 \n\nOhI \nO X C \nO uJ < \nx *- u. \n\n\nUJ o \n\na z \n2> - \nK x \n\xc2\xab-\xe2\x80\xa2 1/1 \n2 *-\xc2\xbb i \n\nX -i \n\nXi X X >\xe2\x80\xa2 \nu. 3-ia \nI CL \nX i \n\nUJ v- \xc2\xab M \n\nX Z X!X \nX \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xab uj u \n3at|< \nJIOI \n\n\n\n\nz> \ni/I c \n\nUJ UJ \n-J \n\nu X \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a \n\nX I \n\nu a \n> *-\xc2\xab \nx \nx x \no I \n\xe2\x96\xba- X \n\no ~ \n\nX \xc2\xab \n\n\nx \n\nUJ 01 \n\na uj \nx y. x \n\nt~ O 2 \nwoo \n< x \xc2\xab \nu. UJ \n\nX\' a \xc2\xabi y \n2 4 O UJ \n\n\xc2\xabr x w,w \nX I z\'t- \n1 /iD" \nu> Z X -I \n1/1 \xc2\xab* X \xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\xe2\x80\xa2i X o *- \nX <- UlD \n\n\nUJ \n\nh- \n\n< \n\n\\r~ \n\ni r \n\nUJ \n\n\na \n\nl \n\n\n> x \n\nO uj\' \n\no o, \n\nX, \n\n. y 2 o! \ny ui < u.! \nZ X ~ \nuJi-ix JO \n3 I > \xe2\x80\xa2* uj. \n\n\xc2\xab Z X > X \nx \xe2\x80\x94> X \nf~ x x (j <| \n\n\nT \nUJ \nX \n>- \no \n\xe2\x80\x94 1 \na \nx \n\nUJ \n\n-j \n\n\nz \n\nu \n\nX \n\n\n2 \n\no \n\n\nX \n\no \n\na \n\n\nu. \n\n\nUJ \n\no \n\nx \n\nc \n\nu \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n4 \n\n_i \n\n\n> \n\n\n277 \n\n\nUI4EMPL0YMFNT RATE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrf^MlW.TOM TASLZ 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xabr\xc2\xab \nv *tr \n\n* r \n\nV c \n\nu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU cv \n\na *- \xe2\x80\xa2*\' \n\nu, z \n\nU Ik \nU \xc2\xa9 - \n\xe2\x96\xba ah \n\n\n\nU \n2 U \nC \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n-c \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\nx a \n\nex \n\n\xc2\xbb- c \nX U \n\nI \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \nu. \nz \xe2\x80\x94 \n\noc \n\n\n\nX \n\n\xc2\xab 2 \n\n\noo \n\n-JVJ \n\n\n\n\nft \xc2\xa9lev If. c \n\nr \xc2\xa9 \n\nft r a \n\nft \xc2\xab ft c r \xc2\xab \n\n99* \n\nc \xc2\xbbv \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nl ^ \n\nr. \n\n\xc2\xb0u \n\nl \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na* \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 *1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\ncv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb ev n r r \n\nft ft \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x82\xacft- CV \n\nm \n\nft \n\n\no! \n\n- \n\n(ft \n\ncvj \n\nI \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n? \n\n\n! \xc2\xbb \n\nr \n\ns \n\n\n\n\n\ncv; \n\n1 \n\nl \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\nir e \xc2\xab a > \n\n\xc2\xab a \n\no - tv \n\nif \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nft -ft ft \n\ncv \n\nft \n\nft \n\nc \n\nCV \n\nft \n\na \n\nft. \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x82\xac \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n1 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ntv \n\n\xe2\x96\xba r ft aa \n\ntv r> \n\n\xc2\xa9 tv \n\xe2\x96\xa0 \xc2\xbb \n\n\ntv \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 cv ft \n\nft \n\n\nh- \n\ncv. \n\n\nft \n\n1 \n\n\n\nl \n\n\nft \n\n>1 \n\n\n\n\n\nft \n\nn \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\nl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nr \n\nc\\. o;*\xc2\xbb e \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nft ft \n\nft ft ^ \n\n\nc \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 cv - \n\no \n\nc \n\n\ne; * \n\nft \n\n\nft \n\nr \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 m \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ni \n\n\xc2\xa9\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 -1 \n\nft r \n\ntv ft 1 \n\n9 \n\nft \n\nft r cv - \n\ni \n\n\nt \n\nft \n\nif \n\n\xc2\xa9- \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ni \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nl 1 \n\n1 - \n\nft \n\nt \n\nl l t l \n\n\n1 \n\n\nft \n\ni \n\n1 \n\nft. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nj \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\ntv \n\n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 c c c \n\n\nc cv c \n\nc \n\n9* \n\nC CC 9 \n\ncv \n\nft. \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\nCV\xe2\x80\x99 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\ni \n\n\nl \n\ni \n\ncv \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft- \n\na \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\nCft^CC \n\n\nC ft c \n\n\n\nC C C ft \n\nft \n\nc \n\n\n\nft \n\nr \n\ntv \n\nft. \n\n** \n\n\n1 \n\n\n. 1 \n\ntv \n\n1 \n\n\n\nft-* \n\n\ntv \n\ntv \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\nl \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_ J T _ \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2l \n\nI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\' \n\ne \n\nc \n\nc \xe2\x80\x94 c c c \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nC. ft c \n\nc \n\ns \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c c cv \n\nc \n\ncv c \n\n999 \n\nft \n\n9 \n\ntvJ \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xabx> \n\ni \n\n1 1 1 i 1 \n\n1 i \n\n1 1 1 \n\ncv \n\n(j \n\ntill \n\nI \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\ncv, \n\n, ft \n\na- \n\n\xc2\xa9\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n1 \xc2\xbb \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\ntve \n\nc c \n\nf\\J \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nc \n\n\nC \n\n*r9 \n\ntv \n\n99 \n\nC \n\nc \n\nft cv \n\n0 \n\n99 \n\nc \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n9" \n\n\n0 \n\n. 1 l \n\nll 1 \n\n1 1 \n\ni. t \n\ni \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n. i \n\nt \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 < \n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\ncv \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\ntv \n\n\n\n\nft ft \n\nft- tv \n\n9* C \n\na- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nI r, \n\na. \n\nCM 0 \n\nft \n\nft, ft Cj \xc2\xa9 \n\nC \n\nft \n\nto \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\ntv \n\nca \n\nft \n\n \n\nft tv tv \n\n\xc2\xab.f^ ft \n\nft \n\n99 \n\ntv \n\n* \n\n9^4 \n\na \n\nft) ft cv \xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xa9 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ft) ft ft \xc2\xae \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ft) ft \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\nft \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\ncv \n\ncv cv \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n99 \n\n99 \n\n\ntv \n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\n\n9*4 \n\nin \n\n\nm4 \n\n\n\nft> \n\n00 \xe2\x80\x94 0 \xc2\xa9 c \xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xa9 000 \xe2\x80\x94oooocv \xe2\x80\x94 \xc2\xa9oo \n\n12. \n\nO \n\n9*4 \n\n94 \n\n1 \n\n99 \n\n\n\nc \n\n\n3 tft - \xc2\xa9 \n\nft \xc2\xa9 \n\nft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na. \n\nft c \n\nft \n\nft. \n\nft \n\n\xc2\xa9 ft, \xe2\x80\x94 tv \n\n0 \n\nft \n\n\nK. \n\nO \n\ntv \n\n\n\nft V \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xa9 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft -4 *0 \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 ft \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n-4 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ft cv -\xc2\xbb ft \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n<0 \n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv tv tv \n\n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n \nx 3 o a \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x9c U X \xe2\x80\x94 \nft \xe2\x80\x94 ft \n3 X 2 X \n\no 3-c \n\n2 \xc2\xab* * j \n\n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nn j \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nft \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n\n0 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ ft \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\na \xe2\x80\x94 \n\na 2 \n\n\n\n3 \n\n2 UJ \n\n\n4 \n\n\n\na. x \n\n5 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nft \xc2\xa9 \n\n3 ft \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6- \n\nt \n\nft \n\nUJ \n\n- X \n\n\n\nUJ UJ \n\n\xc2\xbb- 3 \n\n2 \n\nft \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n-j \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 ft \n\n\n\n-J \n\nu Q \n\nO \n\nUJ \n\n> ft \n\ny \n\n-j \n\n2 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nu a \n\n\xc2\xabf I \n\n99 \n\n\nQ Uj \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 3 \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 5 \n\nU. UJ \n\n3 x \n\nK \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO v> \n\n\nZ U. \n\n- s \n\nft \n\n\nX 1 \n\n\xc2\xab v/ \n\nX \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nu. 3 \n\n-J 2 \n\nuj a. \n\n2 < \n\n0 UJ \n\nT \n\nft z 0 \n\ntx \n\nUJ < \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ^ \n\n\nw \n\n> \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n< X \n\n9*9 99 \n\nft \n\nUJ 4 U \n\ni. \n\n-J 0 \n\n2 1 \n\nu\' \n\n2 \n\nX \n\n* \xc2\xbb \n\n5 K \n\n2 \n\nU \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nUJ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nX ft \n\nft \n\n\niSf 7 \n\nN JO \n\na \n\n*- a \n\na, z \n\nX \n\nX \n\n0 1 \n\nVJ 2 \n\ni -j \n\n>-u \na >1 \n\n0 \n\nx \xc2\xae \n\nI - \n\nW \n\n\nft < \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 < 2 \n\n0 \n\nu < \n\n3 X \n\nX \n\n< \n\n0 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a \n\n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nU - X: \n\nu. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \'V \n\n-\xc2\xbbx a \n\nX \n\nX < \n\nx - \n\nO\' D \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 u. \n\nft VJ < \n\n\nn? \n\n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\ns\' \n\n\nX \n\nUJ \n\n\n~l \n\n< \n\n\n\n278 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT P*TE \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*F\xc2\xab:t viRPJNIA TABLE 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nIf \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab If \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\xc2\xabv \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nU \xe2\x80\xa2 If \n\n\n\nC _ \n\nW \n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\nif i_ \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nL \n\n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no 4. \n\n\n\nCl \n\nz c \n\nn* \n\n\n\nu \n\nCl, \n\n\n\na a- \n\n-_J \n\n\n\nUi z \n\n\n\n\nU U. \n\n\n\nIf \n\nu o \n\n\nr \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 e \n\nA \n\n\n9 \n\nc u \n\n1 \n\n\n\na \n\n0-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nif \n\n\nc. \n\nc \n\nu \n\nc \n\n\n\nu \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\nIf \n\n\n\nUu \n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\xc2\xbb\xc2\xbb>\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nc \n\nu \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\nc \n\nci \n\n\n\n\nWl \n\n\n\nA- \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nIf \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nc \n\nc \n\n\nA \n\n\n* \n\nu \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n%\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\nc \n\n2 \n\nu \n\n0 \n\n1 \n\nC \n\n*\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nw j \n\nc \n\n\n\n\nH - \nW \n\nr a \nr. c \n\n5 * \n\nX 0. \n\nc > \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- c \n\nX o \n\nz \n\n\n> \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xab- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nf- - *c r c\\ \xc2\xabv \n\n\n\xc2\xbbC A AIT 4 hi \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 I *rl \n\ni \' \' \xe2\x80\xa2! \n\n\n^ CN. 3MT fS\xe2\x80\x98 * r - \n\n\nI \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n9 I I \n\n\n- - t \n\nI I \n\n\nI I I I I I \n\n\np~. \n\n9 \n\n\nC \xe2\x80\xa2- C C C CCC \xc2\xab-C^^CCCA\xc2\xbb-3CC \n\n\nI I \n\n\nI I \n\n\nC C. IT \xe2\x80\x94 If \n\n\nC C \n\nI I \n\n\nlet ii f i i, t i > i t i: \xe2\x80\xa2 i t \n\n\nc c \n\n\nCO *- fa C AAlCiifitfJCAANCNfCO \ntt \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 CV \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 <\\ \xe2\x80\x94 <\xc2\xa3 CV \xe2\x80\x94 C \xe2\x80\x94 C C \n\n\nCo *h 3- C CO CM 3 \\C \xe2\x80\x94 A- \nX! \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94a CO \xe2\x80\x94a \xe2\x80\x94 A \xe2\x80\x944 nC Cj \xe2\x80\x94a \xe2\x80\x94a \xe2\x80\x94a O C\' A* X \xe2\x80\x94I X- \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94 IT A- If A. \n\n\n(V H3C\xc2\xabNCiaCJJIfl-AACffAJ?*a \n\xe2\x80\x941 \xe2\x80\x94a CO \xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \xe2\x80\x94a CO \xe2\x80\x94< >0 CM \xe2\x80\x94 0 \xe2\x80\x94 00\' \n\n\nO \n\nA- \n\nX \n\n\nIf \n\nX \n\nA- \n\n\n\xc2\xabC \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94* o \n\nfa \n\n\nu \n\nLl \n\nZ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nC C \n\n\no ooooo oooooo \xe2\x80\x94 ooo\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xaboc,o \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nr) \n\nI \n\n\nA- \n\nI\' \n\n\nO \n\nI \n\n\n\xc2\xaba \n\nH-C \n\n0*0 \n\n\xc2\xa30 J \n\nSI \n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nc\\ fvr\' cc^sC if^U\' \n\no \n\na \n\no o \n\n^ tr \n\n0 \xe2\x80\xa2-\xc2\xbb \n\nf \n\nc \n\n\xe2\x80\x9cU \n\nH H H ^ \'N* #-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nJ) \n\nCJ \n\nH -H \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 o \n\nO\' \n\nA- \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\nIfa \n\nA~ \n\n\nO \n\nIT \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H ^ O \n\nCO \\i \n\nS3 O Si \n\na a si \n\nO A- A> O \n\n\n\n3 \n\nT- \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nA- \n\no \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n< 3- <-* cH \n\n(V H \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2N \n\nC A \xe2\x80\x94 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94< O \n\nO\' \n\naO \n\nA- \n\nCal \n\na \n\no o \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\nn \n\nA- \n\n\nif \n\n-J u \n\nz \n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n, \n\n\n\n\ni \n\ni \n\na \n\n\n\n1 \n\na \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nlu \n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n; \n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\nO _l \n\n\nCL \n\n\n\nUi \n\n\n\n>\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUi o ! \n\nM \n\nU! If \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\nz \n\n\n*-| \n\n\n\n\n\nX *- \n\nX Z 1 \n\n3 \n\na uj 1 \n\n\n< \n\n\n\nUi \n\n\nz \n\nUi \n\n\n\n\na x \n\nD- \n\nui O \n\n3 if cf, \n\n\nt- \n\n\n\nz \n\n\nto \n\nUi \n\n\n\nIf \n\nhj \n\na\xe2\x80\x94 r \n\nUi u \n\n*- 3 Z ! \n\n\nIf \n\n\nb- \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\n\nf \n\nX \n\n\n\nZ !- \n\n_i \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xabM f. \n\n-1 \n\nU o o \n\n\nUJ \n\n\n> If 1 \n\no \n\n\n>1 \n\no \n\n\nUi \n\n\n\nz \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nu x \n\n\xc2\xab X \xe2\x80\x94i \n\n\n\n\nO Ui \n\n\n\no \n\nu. \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 5 \n\n- a \n\nX _i \n\n\xe2\x80\x94> X \n\nU. UJ *\xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no o \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb- c \n\nZ oJ \n\n3 X f? \n\n>- r \xc2\xab \n\n_ X sf \n\n\nX \n\n1 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n*\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\no o \n\nA- \n\nU. 3 _i \n\na u a \n\nZ < OiUi \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIf Z Ol \n\nUI \n\n6 \n\n*1 \n\no \n\n\nV J \n\nZ> X \n\nUi < \n\n1 X \xc2\xab \n\nUi > *1 \n\n<1 1 MH \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nUi < u. \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94a \n\nW| \n\na \n\n\nX - \n\noxo. \n\n_J u \n\nX 1 u \n\n2 X \n\na i \xc2\xa3 a* \n\n\nz \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\x94a \n\n-J \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n<* \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 o \n\nZ A- \n\nM \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nUJ \xe2\x80\x94 M \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 X l/> \n\nm 5 - \n\nit 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n-i c \n\n<4 \n\n< \n\n5 \n\n-i \n\n\nf> \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xc2\xabt/)C \n\n\xc2\xbb- X \n\nX Z X \n\nX O 1 \n\nU Z Z -J \n\n3 \n\n1 \n\n> \n\n\xc2\xab to \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\n-J \n\n\n\n\n3 X \n\nz z o \n\nM CD \n\nThUUKS \n\nIf < X \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n< \n\nz a \n\n> *1 \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n2 o \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 CO \n\nu \xc2\xabt \n\n3 X t, \n\n< o \xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\na-* X 0 , 1 - \n\nX \n\n\nUi \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 a 1 \n\n\nX \n\n> \n\n> \n\n\nz \xc2\xab \n\nt j a. \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 u. \n\nJ1U \n\nIf < \n\n* fub \n\nA*. \n\nJL \n\nf O <1 \n\n\no \n\n\n*-* \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\na \n\nU>, \n\nu \n\n\n279 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT MATE 3,tt 2,f> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWT^CONMN TABU: 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xc2\xab if ft \nI \n\nif \xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xa5. \n\n\n* f \n\n\nIf L \n\n! \n\nu \n\n\nu u. ci \n\n7 C \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 i \n\nu \n\ntv \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\x94* \n\nU- 7 \n\n\nU It \n\n\nIt o \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft o \n\n\nC It \n\nI s \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2ft\' \n\n\nft \n\nif \n\nft\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nu \n\na \n\nt \n\n1 \n\n7 \n\nc \n\nu \n\n\na \n\n\nu \n\n\nu. \n\n*\xe2\x96\xa0* \n\nu \n\ncc \n\n\xe2\x96\xba- \n\nll \n\nc \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xbb- \n\n\n1/ \n\n\n0 \n\n.\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nft \n\nu \n\ni \n\n\nU \ni u \nc \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\xc2\xab- c \n\n\nw \xe2\x80\x94 \n\na \n\nc. \n\nc > \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 c \n\nft o \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\nz a \ne a \n\xe2\x80\xa2- c \nz c \nz \n\n\nu. \n\nu. \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 I \n\xc2\xa5 \n\na. \n\nO X \n\nuj C \n\ns u \n\n\n\npa \n\nH \n\nU) \n\n\npa \n\n\nn a. \n\n\'JL \n\n3 O \n\xe2\x80\xa2 O \n\n\n0 \n\nf> \n\n\n#\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\nft 7 \n\no o \n\n-J u \n\nz \n\n\n\ntv\xc2\xabc in|ft \xc2\xa9if \n\n9 \n\na.\xc2\xab\'\xc2\xbb" \n\ntv tv r:\'>>c \n\nCift \n\n\nCC \n\ntv \xc2\xa3, \n\nIf. \n\n3 \n\na* \n\nft) \n\nc. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr. \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nA AMV. tf e \n\nA \n\nCl ff \n\nft a \n\n\n\nw \n\ntV 3 \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\nI 1 \n\n\nl \n\n* \n\n\n\n\nt\\! \n\n\n\n^ \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\ni; \n\n\n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xab c c e c r- \n\nC \n\n3 X c \n\n0 tv \n\na 3 \n\n1 \n\n\xc2\xa5 \n\n\xc2\xa3 - \n\nc \n\n1 \n\ntv c \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nIf \n\nf \n\nft \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nif- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2*- \n\ntv fti tv, tv, if if \n\nrr \n\ni\xc2\xbb- i"- \n\nft- a \n\n\n\n\ntv If \n\n3 \n\nft. \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2i \n\n| \n\n\n1 *-> \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nft- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \' \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1. \n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\nirc-\'iiC j \n\na \n\ncc ft \n\n\xc2\xa3 \xc2\xa3 \n\nIf \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2"\xc2\xbb \n\ncr \n\nft- cv \n\ntv \n\nt \n\ncv c* \n\n\xc2\xabr \n\na \n\n\xc2\xa3t \n\nft- \n\nft \n\n. . ft . . . \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni a - i - i \n\nci \n\n<\\ <\\ ir \n\n-- ft \n\n\xc2\xa3 ft \n\nft \n\nt\\ \n\n\n\n1 ft-. \n\nr \n\n\n\n\n\nll i \n\n1 \n\nl \xc2\xbb - \n\n1 tv \n\n1 1 \n\nJ \n\ni \n\n1 1 \n\n1 \n\nft- \n\ni \n\n\nr l \n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 : \n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\n\xc2\xbb V . \n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 tV \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\ntV \n\n(V C tv \xe2\x80\x94 C \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \xc2\xbb \n\nft- tv \n\ntv c \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\nc tv \n\nCf \n\na. \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nIf \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\'*i \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nll \n\n1 \n\n\n\nAC A "C " \n\n\n-\xe2\x96\xa0 c a \n\ntv ft \n\nft c \n\nc \n\nc \n\n\xc2\xab ft \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2"* c\\ \n\nc \n\n\nft- \n\nIf \n\n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\ni \n\n\ntv \n\n1 \n\n\nC \n\nc c \xe2\x80\xa2- c c c \n\n\n" C If \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- r \n\nC r- \n\n\nc \n\n\n\ni \n\nc tv \n\nIf \n\nIf \n\n1 \n\n3 \' \n\n\n\xc2\xab- \n\n1 1 1 1 1 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 1 O \n\ni i \n\n- \xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 1 \n\nIf \n\nr \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\nAC A "Cr- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\ntv C If \n\ntv c \n\nIT \n\nG \n\nG \n\na rr \n\ntv \n\n1 \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\n\nc \n\n1 1 \xc2\xab 1 I 1 \n\n) \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\nl. i \n\n1 \n\ni \n\ni i \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n1 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\nit n vO n if, \n\nin \n\nif cr if \n\nIT \n\nft a \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\nCO c \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xa3 ft- \n\n0 \n\nm \n\n\nIf \n\na \n\nft \xc2\xa3 5 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n(V \n\nft- - r- \n\n\nIf 3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2- \n\n\nat if \n\nN \n\nft- \n\nX \n\nft- \n\n\xc2\xa9 \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\ntv \n\ntv \n\nIf \n\ntv \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\ni \n\ni \n\n\n\nMT Ct Af iC \n\n* \n\nft c o \n\nf j If A 0 \n\nft \n\n3- \n\n\xc2\xa3 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 ft- \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nit \n\ntv \n\nft \n\nft- \xc2\xa3 a - \n\ntv \n\nft ft ff \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 3 \n\n\n\nO\' \xc2\xa3 \n\n0 \n\nl/l \xc2\xa9 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\nCT \n\nm \n\n\xc2\xa3 \xc2\xa3 \n\nft \n\n3 \n\na \n\nG \n\nif \n\nft. vO 3- ft* \n\nrvj \n\nft> "ft \xc2\xa31 \n\n^ -H \n\nJi 3 \n\n\nV* \n\na \xc2\xa3 \n\n\xc2\xab m \n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3! \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntv \n\ntv \n\n(V \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ntv \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\nMf N,ft\xc2\xab |\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 O G \n\ntv m if. cc \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\nfTj \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xa3 \xc2\xa3 \n\nCvj \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\nC \n\n3 \n\nft \xc2\xa35 or -ft \n\n \n\n3- -4 if) 4- \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \xc2\xa3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0O \n\n3 \n\nf> \n\n3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\ntv \n\ncv \n\ntv \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ntv \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\nMON Hlf Xl \n\n** \n\n\xc2\xa3 O /> \n\n:u <\\J \n\n!M CO \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\n(V "ft \n\n\xe2\x80\x94\xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xa3 If) \n\nX \n\nft) \n\nX \n\nft) \n\nr-4 \n\nft \xc2\xa33 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCV \n\n"0 "ft If \n\n^ \xe2\x80\x941 \n\nl/l 3 \n\nrH. \n\nH \n\nX \xc2\xa3 \n\n*. \n\nft) \n\n\xc2\xae \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n| \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2v \n\n^J *-\xc2\xbb \no x a. o u a t o z z \nZ ft- "<-- Z 2 \nUiOO \n\n\xc2\xab z - \nu. u *- \n\nX \n\n< \n\n\nz \n\xc2\xab * \nX I \n\n1/1 \n\nu z \n\n1/1 < \n\n"" X \n\nX \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n< /\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nU It) \n\n\n1/1 \n\nUJ \n\n\nz *- z \n\n3 \xe2\x96\xba* U)*\' \nX _l C I \n\ni - < r \n\nO )- X "ft \nO \' O ft- U. \n\n\n> l/l\' \n\nS Ul \nO\' \n\nX \n\nl/VZ O \n\nU) < It \n\nu \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\xe2\x96\xba-< -I o\' \n\n> "ft uJ ft- \n\nX > X o \n\nUJ \xe2\x80\x94 X \xe2\x96\xba- \n\nl/l Oft \n\n\nUj \n\nX \n\nV \n\no \n\ns\' \n\nz \n\nUJ \n\n-I \n\n< \n\n\nz \n\nUJ \n\nX \n\nV, \n\no \n\n_* \n\nZ X \n\n\nI \n\n\nI \n\n\no \n\na \n\no \n\na \n\n\nft \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 \n\no\' \n\n\nUJ \n\nu \n\nx \n\no \n\nu. \n\nX \n\no \n\nn \n\n< \n\n_) \n\n\n>1 \n\n-ft \n\no \n\n\nCV \n\nft \n\nft \n\n\nin \n\n\na \n\ntv \n\n\ntV \n\n\n280 \n\n\nUNEMPLOYMENT RATE 4.1 2.B \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ntHYOVINr- table 15 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\ncv a a x h \n\nr Ae \n\ntt r. cc \xe2\x96\xa0. r. r* c!r \n\n^ G \n\nX A \n\nX. \n\nCl \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n1 \n\n** \n\n4T \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ng \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 . . . ^ \xe2\x96\xa0 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2> \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nx a \n\n1. \n\n\n\xc2\xabv \n\n\xc2\xab- it \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 mm \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x96\xba \n\na r \n\n\n1 \n\nX 1 \n\n\n1 ^ C \n\nC \xc2\xab^C \n\nir \n\nK \n\na. \n\n\n^ \n\n\n1 \n\nt 1 1 \n\n1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 \n\n1 1 \n\ni t \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\n\na \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n, \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\ne \n\nr. c c \n\nc \n\nc c c \n\nc, c c c c c c,c \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 C \n\nc \n\n\nr. \n\nc\\ \n\nw \n\n2 a \nc \xe2\x80\xa2- \n\xc2\xab- c \na \n\n_i \n\n0 \n\n1 \n\nl 1 i \n\n1 \n\n1 1 1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 1 t 1 1 1.1 \n\nt \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb. i \n\n\n. i \n\ni \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\na \n\n\nir \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nl \n\n\nf-> s. \n\ni4 a \n\nX * * \n\n5 \xc2\xbbC \n\n* \n\nx a \ne a \n\n\xe2\x80\x94 c \n\nX <_ \n\n\nf\'-.a)<\\joc..-\xc2\xab \n\n\nm \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94 cr wccncjcaoic a & x. mc>o cr a o eg \n\n\neg \'\\lGO-4\'U:3\xc2\xabHGI*la3\'\'U\'\'g\xc2\xab"*.n cuo <\\j \n\n_ eg CJ in \n\n\neg \n\na \n\n\nx \n\na \n\n>n \n\n\no \n\n~ iT \n\n\nat- \n\n3 \n\n\nV _J \n\nX X \n*- o \n\n1/5 \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n3 X \n3 O \n\n\na \n\nO -J \n\no *-\xe2\x80\xa2 a \n\na \xc2\xbb- x \n\na x 3 \n\n1/ a) \xc2\xbb- \n\n7\xc2\xbb- Jh" \n\nC\\U _l Z \n-4 ~ \xc2\xab O X \n\nC X a = \n\nu o *- a \n\nD r a \xc2\xab* i \n\no x a _\xc2\xbb u x \n\nZ \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 - - Ul \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2-\xe2\x80\xa2 utq i- a i \n\nZ Z O X 3D X \n\nO O U < \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nZOaryi J \n\n\nO \n\n? \n\n\xe2\x96\xba-\xc2\xab \n\nX \n\n1/5 \n\n_) \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0x x >- \n\n3 ja \nX < u \n\xe2\x80\xa2 u z \n\nH- \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nZ X X \nMUiU \n\na x < \n\n\xc2\xa3 o x \n\n\n3 \n\ni/i o \n\na u \na \n\nU X \n\xe2\x80\x94 X \nZ I \na a \n> -\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nx 5 \n\nO I \n\xe2\x96\xba\xe2\x80\x94 X \n\no \xc2\xab* \n\nx < \n\n\n1/5 \n\na \xc2\xab/> \nx a \n3 in iA \n*- O Z 1 \n\nu o o \n\n\xc2\xabt X \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\x94 \n\na a *- \n\nz < u a \n\n< "* *i\xc2\xab \n\nI IZi- \n/i r - \nu z x a \ni/l \xc2\xab x \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nh q; o i- \n\nz>- / 3 \n\n\n> \n\n3 \n\n\na \n\nH- \n<1 \nH* \n\nX. \n\nl/l \n\na \n\nul \n\nX X \n\nI l/l z o \ni/i a < a \nZ u \xc2\xab \na -* *-\xe2\x80\xa2 j o> \n3 i > - a \n\n< Z X > X \n\nx \xe2\x80\xa2* a\xc2\xab a \n\ni> a Jlo \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\\ \n\n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* \n\nu \n\n\nu \n\nX \n\no \n\na \n\nx \n\no \n\nt\xc2\xa3 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\na \n\n> \n\n\n281 \n\n\nUNfcMPLOYMFrtT RATE o.b 6.? 6.2 6,2 4.0. 6,4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nMILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR \n\n\nby \n\nRobert Thomas Crow \n\n\nV.l INTRODUCTION \n\nAny kind of activity undertaken or abandoned by the Federal \ngovernment will have not only a nation-wide impact but, in addition, \nwill probably have a differential impact among the regions of the United \nStates. This is most clear for activities which by their very nature \nare specific to a location, such as a dam on a particular river or a \nhighway connecting a particular pair of cities. It is also true, how\xc2\xac \never, for general levels of defense activity in that military bases \nand firms relying on military procurement are not distributed uniformly \nacross the United States. In view of this, an understanding of how \nmilitary expenditure alternatives are apt to affect regional economic \ngrowth is important for economic policy. As a step toward such an \nunderstanding, three military spending alternatives have been investi\xc2\xac \ngated for their impact upon the three sub-regions of the Northeast \nCorridor. The results of this investigation are presented in this \npaper. \n\n\nThe Northeast Corridor, as the term is used here, consists of \nNew Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut (the \nNorthern sub-region); New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania (the \nCentral sub-region); and Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia \nand Virginia (the Southern sub-region). The model of growth used to \nsimulate the effects of alternative military spending policies is a \nmacroeconomic model of each of these three regions.\' 1 \' The basic out\xc2\xac \nputs of the model are gross regional product by industry of origin, \nby type of expenditure, and by distributive shares. Other outputs are \nemployment, wage rates and population. \n\nThe model consists of forty-three statistically estimated equa\xc2\xac \ntions and eleven identities, estimated from annual data over the time \n\n\nThe model is described in detail in Robert Thomas Crow, An \nEconometric Model of the Northeast Corridor of the United States , \n\nSpringfield, Va., U.S. Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Tech\xc2\xac \nnical Information, 1969. Its geographic dimensions appear in Map 1. \n\n282 \n\n\nf \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nMAP 1 \n\n\nNortheast Corridor States and Subregions \n\n\n\nHampshire \n\n\nNew York \n\n\n\\ d^Rhode \n\nIsland \n\nConnecticut \n\n\nPennsylvania \n\n\naryland \n\n\nDistrict^ \n\nof Columbia \n\n\nu T H E R N \n\n\nVirginia \n\n\n283 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nperiod 1949-1963. The sample consisted of the fifteen time-series \nobservations pooled over the three regions, resulting in forty-five \nobservations for most equations. \n\nThis model was made fully compatible with the Wharton Econo\xc2\xac \nmetric Forecasting Model, which was used to simulate the national impact \nof alternative defense expenditure policies.^ It was necessary to re- \nestimate several of the equations and to convert some of the Wharton \nmodel\'s quarterly output to annual figures in order to be consistent \nwith the annual basis of the Corridor model. In particular, the \nCorridor model used as exogenous variables the Wharton model 1 s fore\xc2\xac \ncasts of Federal civilian and military expenditures, the farm price \nindex, the consumer price index, private GNP, the private wage bill, \n\nGNP, the GNP price-level deflator, and short-run and long-run interest \nrates. For several of these, relationships were estimated to link \nregional to national variables. Most important for this study, re\xc2\xac \nlationships between regional and national military spending were \nestimated for each region, as were relationships for Federal civilian \nspending. These relationships were estimated by taking each type of \nFederal purchase of goods and services in each region as a function \nof the corresponding national variable and a trend variable. \n\nV.2 A NOTE OF CAUTION \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nAll of the caveats of the Klein-Mori report on the results of the \nWharton model also hold true for the Northeast Corridor model, since \nthe results of the Klein-Mori simulations provide its inputs. In \naddition, several areas of weakness in the Northeast Corridor model \nshould be pointed out. First, it was not possible to collect recent \ndata for use in re-estimation of the model. This is also true for \nthe projections of Federal expenditures in the Corridor and projections \nof taxes paid on personal income, two critical exogenous variables. \nParameter estimation was based upon 1949-1963 data. The simulation \nsolution used 1969 data for the exogenous variables and, depending upon \nthe lag structure, data drawn from 1966-1968 for endogenous variables. \nMore recent data used in parameter estimation would have increased \none\xe2\x80\x99s confidence in the results. \n\nSecond, there can be no doubt that regional econometric model\xc2\xac \nbuilding is a much less developed art than is the case for national \n\n\n2 \n\nLawrence R. Klein and Kei Mori, "The Impact of Disarmament on \nAggregate Economic Activity \xe2\x80\x94 An Econometric Analysis," elsewhere in \nthis study. \n\n\n284 \n\n\n1 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nmodels. Inferior data quality, as well as conceptual development, \naccount for this. In particular, the relationships between employ\xc2\xac \nment and the labor force in the Northeast Corridor model need improve\xc2\xac \nment, as does the treatment of migration. \n\nIn spite of these warnings, the model appears to perform well \nenough to provide a fairly firm indication of the results of alternative \nmilitary policies for the Northeast Corridor regions in the next few \nyears: the regions will not grow as fast as the national economy with \n\nany of the options; growth will be rapid but also erratic if military \nspending continues at present rates or increases; reduced military \nspending with fiscal and monetary offsets will tend to make growth \nslower but steadier. \n\nIn the discussion that follows, there will be first a summary of \nthree alternative sets of assumptions on military spending in the post- \nVietnam period. Second, the results of the three alternatives will be \ndiscussed for each of the three regions. Finally, a summary discussion \nis presented. \n\n\nV. 3 MILITARY SPENDING ALTERNATIVES \n\nFor each of the three Northeast Corridor regions, solutions were \nestimated corresponding to the "Control," "Budget B ($59.4)," and \n"Budget E ($93.6)," solutions presented by Klein and Mori. At the \ntime that the Corridor study was begun, the basic working assumption \nwas that the Vietnam war would be ending by early 1970 for all \nalternatives other than those of the Klein-Mori "Extended Control" \nsolution, which assumed that the war would continue indefinitely but \nat a slackened pace. At present, it seems unlikely that the war will \nend for several months. Thus, to the extent that our assumptions were \noverly optimistic, the solutions are already outdated. \n\nNonetheless, they should provide accurate indicators of the gen\xc2\xac \neral directions of change in the national and regional economies even \nif the timing of the changes, and therefore the accuracy of the fore\xc2\xac \ncasts, is incorrect. \n\nV.3.1 The Control Solution \n\n\nThe control solutions serve as a backdrop against which alter\xc2\xac \nnative military spending policies can be compared on the national and \n\n\n3 \n\n\nAll budgets are in billions of 1972 dollars. \n\n\n285 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nregional levels. Briefly stated, the control solutions assume a con\xc2\xac \ntinuation of present trends and policies. These include a gradual \nreduction in defense expenditures, a reduction and then dropping of \nthe income tax surcharge, and a continued tight money policy. These \nassumptions produce a slowdown for the national economy in 1969 and \n1970, with a recovery in late 1970. \n\n\nV.3.2 The Budget B ($59.4) Solution \n\nHaving established the \xe2\x80\x99\'control\'* solutions as standards for com\xc2\xac \nparison, it is possible to examine the implications of what would \nappear to be the extremes of military expenditure policies feasible \nin the 1969-1972 period. The first of these may be regarded as a \n"peace" policy. In this case, the regional solutions are derived \nfrom the national Budget B ($59.4) solution reported by Klein and \nMori. \n\n\nThe national solution assumes a deferral of expenditures on major \nnew weaponry, other equipment cutbacks and the demobilization of one \nmillion men from current levels. In current dollars, the national \nmilitary budget cuts are $20 billion below the present level. It also \nassumes an easier monetary policy, $10 billion in civilian expenditure \noffsets and a dropping of the personal income tax surcharge on January \n1, 1970,^ followed by an additional five percent cut six months later. \n\nV.3.3 The Budget E ($93.6) Solution \n\nAt the opposite extreme from the Budget B ($59.4) solution \nis the Budget E ($93.6) solution. This assumes the end of U. S. \nmilitary involvement in Vietnam, an increase in military expenditures, \nand the same level of Federal civilian purchases of goods and services \nas for the Control solution. The assumption for this solution is that \nthe ABM and other new military hardware systems are initiated and that \nmilitary personnel levels remain at about 3.5 million men. Accompany\xc2\xac \ning this increased level of military purchases of goods and services is \nan assumed continuation of tight money and an extension of the five \npercent income tax surcharge from the beginning of 1970 through the end \nof 1972. \n\n\nEditor\'s note: As previously noted, time and resource limita\xc2\xac \ntions prevented an updating of this study which draws on an early draft \nof the Klein-Mori chapter. \n\n\n286 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nV. 4 THE NORTHERN REGION \n\n\nV.4.1 The Control Solution \n\n\nThe results of the Control solution for the Northern region are \npresented in Table 1. Historically, the Northern region\'s share of \ntotal Federal purchases of goods and services, for both military and \ncivilian purposes, has been declining. This is reflected in the \ncontrol solution by a steady, small decline in military purchases, and \na much larger decline in civilian purchases. (See Figure 1.) Since \nthese are expressed in current dollars, the declines in constant \ndollars are substantial and somewhat more rapid than in the national \nControl solution. This decline in the influence of the Federal govern\xc2\xac \nment in the Northern region is directly reflected in the relatively \nsluggish pace of economic growth predicted t:o occur between 1969 and \n1972. \n\n\nIn each of the years, employment and economic activity in con\xc2\xac \nstant dollars increases. In 1970 economic growth is quite modest but \nnonetheless positive. A sharp recovery is predicted for 1971, almost \nreaching the national rate. Growth in 1972, however, is considerably \nslower, while the growth rate of the national economy increases. \n\nV.4.2 The Budget B ($59.4) Solution \n\nTable 2 presents the results of the Budget B ($59.4) solution. \n\nIn this case, military purchases in current dollars fall drastically, \nand, while civilian purchases rise somewhat in current dollars, they \nshow a decline in real terms. Economic growth is slower, but more \nregular than in the Control solution. The slowdown in the pace of \ngrowth between 1969 and 1970 is much less pronounced. As in the Con\xc2\xac \ntrol solution, the pace of growth is slower than that of the national \neconomy, except for 1970 when the rate of growth of real gross product \nis the same as for the economy as a whole. Unlike the Control solution, \nhowever, the pace does not slacken in 1972. The Budget B ($59.4) \nsolution in both the national and Northern Corridor economies produces \nslower rates of growth in 1971 and 1972; but, compared to the Control \nsolution, the national-Northern Corridor discrepancies in real growth \nare much greater, with the Northern Corridor lagging further behind the \n\nnation as a whole. \n\nV.4.3 The Budget E ($93.6) Solution \n\nThe results of this policy are shown in Table 3. Current dollar \n\n\n237 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nControl Solution - Northern Region \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nNO \n\nrH \n\nO\'. \n\no \n\nin \n\n\n\n\nn- \n\n04 \n\nON \n\no \n\nOn \n\no \n\no \n\nNO \n\nCO \n\n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nr \xe2\x80\x941 \n\nco \n\no \n\no \n\n\no \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nCO \n\no \n\nuo \n\nCO \n\nSN\xc2\xb0 \n\n\nCU \n\nr- \n\n04 \n\no \n\nNO \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n\ncr\\ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94! \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nco \n\n04 \n\nco \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n.d \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xb1_> \n\nON \n\n\nON \n\n\nco \n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nS\'S \n\n\nCu \n\nvO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n04 \n\nUO \n\nNO \n\nON \n\nr- \n\nCD \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\niH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nVO \n\nO\'. \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\nCd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nrH \n\n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n<0 \n\n\nrH \n\n\n* \n\n\no \n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nH \n\n\nif \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n-d \n\n\nd \n\n\na) \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\na) \n\n\nco \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nQJ \n\n\nu \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nu \n\n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x9c\x93-S \n\n\n\nu \n\ncd \n\n/-N \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\no \n\nto \n\nN/ \n\n\no \n\n4M \n\nPm \n\nV-/ \n\n0 \n\n\no \n\ncd \n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\nd \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2u \n\nd \n\n\n0 \n\nH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n4M \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\nM \n\nCO \n\no \n\na \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n*M \n\nd \n\nrH \n\n\n\nd \n\n"d \n\nd \n\nrH \n\no \n\n4H \n\nT3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nto \n\nPm \n\no \n\no \n\ncd \n\n*H \n\n\no \n\n\n\nQ) \n\n\n\nu \n\nd \n\nrH \n\n > \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\nPH \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H M \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\n0) \n\nd \n\n> \n\nd \n\n\n\nrH \n\nu \n\nm d \n\nCO \n\nto \n\no \n\no \n\na) \n\nCO \n\n\n \n\nrH \n\nT3 \n\no \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nC4 \n\nV4 \n\no \n\n\n(D \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\nu \n\n*M \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\na> \n\nu \n\n\nH-l \n\ns \n\nCh \n\ne> \n\ne> \n\nQ \n\nw \n\nPm \n\no \n\n\n288 \n\n\nGross National Product ($ 1958) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFIGURE 1 \n\nThe Northern Region\xe2\x80\x99s Shares of Total Federal Purchases \nof Goods and Services, 1968 - 1972 \n\n\n\n289 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nNO \n\nr^* \n\nON \n\n\n\nr-. \n\n\nCM \n\nm \n\n\n\non \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n-co\xc2\xac \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX) \n\nrH \n\nrn \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\nc-. \n\n\nCU \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\n\nU \n\non \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nG \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nON \n\n\nCM \n\nc a* \n\nNO \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\n00 \n\n\no \n\n\n*H \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCO \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n0) \n\nX) \n\n\n\nPQ Q) \n\n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n4J H \n\n\nX> \n\nO \n\n\n\n0) 3 \n\n\nG \n\n\n00 \n\n\n00 CJ \n\n\nG \n\nCW \n\nin \n\n\nX3 \n\n\n\nO \n\nON \n\n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nN\xc2\xbb^ \n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n42 \n\nU \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nMH \n\na \n\na \n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nM \n\n3 \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n3 \n\nX) \n\n\nH \n\n\nCO \n\nPH \n\no \n\n\nX* \n\n\nCU \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\nPH \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nCO CO \n\n\n\n\n\n42 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H G \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\no \n\nrH U \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H *H \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n> > \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nOh \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H w \n\n-H \n\n\n\n\n\ncj a) \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nPn \n\nCO \n\nCU \n\n\n\n\nu \n\nrH \n\nctf \n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\nCO XJ \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2U \n\nU G \n\nCO \n\n\n\na) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) G \n\nCO \n\n\n\n> \n\nrH \n\nXJ \n\no \n\n\n\na) \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nu \n\n\n\n-i \n\nX! \n\nCh \n\no \n\n\nr*\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nON \n\n3-5 \n\n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n00 \n\nNO \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nin \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\no \n\n6-5 \n\nO \n\nm \n\n00 \n\noo \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nNO \n\n\nrH \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nVO \n\nNO \n\n6-5 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nNO \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nr-. \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\n* \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nXJ \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nu \n\nCJ \n\n00 \n\n\n\nG \n\n\nm \n\n\n\n44 \n\nU \n\nON \n\n\n\nM \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n0) \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n0 \n\n> \n\n\n \n\n\no \n\n\nPH \n\n\'\xe2\x80\x94\' \n\n\no \n\n4H \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2U \n\nG \n\nO \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\na \n\n(H \n\n\nO \n\na \n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\nM \n\n3 \n\nXJ \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nU-f \n\nXJ \n\no \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nu \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nu \n\nph \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nOC \n\nPH \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nG \n\n0 \n\n42 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nPH \n\n-w- \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nO \n\niH \n\nCD \n\nu \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n> \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\nO \n\nO \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\na \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nex \n\nM \n\nO \n\nu \n\n*H \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nH \n\no \n\nQ \n\nw \n\nPH \n\na \n\n\n290 \n\n\nGross National Product ($ 1958) 2.6 1,8 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBudget E ($93.6) Solution - Northern Region \n(billions of current dollars, except where otherwise indicated) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nCM \n\n\nvO \n\n<* \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nI - ". \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nr>. \n\nrH \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nco \n\nO \n\no \n\n\nON \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n<1- \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\nm \n\nn* \n\nf"-. \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\no \n\n\nr->. \n\nO \n\nON \n\nrH \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n9 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nn* \n\nco \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n\nS3- \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nVO \n\nm \n\n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nn- \n\nON \n\nm \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\nON \n\nST \n\nON \n\nm \n\n-4- \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\n\n\nVO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nm \n\nVO \n\no \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\nn. \n\nCO \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nsf \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nd) \n\n\n\n0) \n\nXJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xabd \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nU \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nx> \n\n\n\nQ) \n\nX) \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nCO \n\n\n\n0) \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\no \n\n \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n\no \n\n\nPH \n\n\n\no \n\n \n\nXJ \n\nrH \n\nd \n\n4H \n\nXJ \n\n\nCO \n\nPH \n\no \n\no \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\n0) \n\n\nM \n\nu \n\nd \n\n-H \n\n CO \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na) \n\na) \n\n\na) \n\ncd \n\n0) \n\n\nu \n\nrH > \n\nC*S \n\no4 \n\ncd \n\na \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\nCtf \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\ncd U \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\nu \n\nu \n\nrH \n\nx> \n\no \n\no \n\nto \n\na \n\nM \n\no \n\n(1) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\nm \n\nvO \n\nON 00 \n\nin **\xe2\x96\xa0 rH \n\n\n\nrs \n\no \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nrs \n\nsf \n\n00 \n\nOn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\no \n\n \n\nI\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\' V \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 / l:., \' . r t . \n\n\n\n\nno \n\nrH \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\no \n\nvO \n\nON \n\n^5 \n\n\nQ) \n\nrs \n\nCM \n\nrs \n\nrs \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nSt \n\nU \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\no \n\nst \n\nON \n\nco \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\nSt \n\no \n\n\nrH \n\n\nSt \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-co\xc2\xac \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\nO \n\nst \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nin \n\nO \n\nvO \n\n\n\ne is \n\nrs \n\nSt \n\nON \n\nON \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nOn \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nO 0) \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H jC \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nSt \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nrs x \n\no \n\nrH \n\n00 -U \n\n\nrH \n\n\nSt \n\nON. \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n0) o \n\nCd \n\n\n-CO- \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\no \n\n\na \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH XJ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\no \n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nM 4J \n\n\nU \n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\nnO \n\n\nu c \n\n\n \n\n\na \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\n03 \n\n\'\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x9c\x93 \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\no \n\ncd \n\n\n\na \n\n4H \n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\nrC . \n\n\nH \n\na \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\nH \n\n*rl \n\n\n4H \n\na \n\nU \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a \n\nM- \n\n...\xc2\xbb r , -,.v *VJ-. \n\nO \n\nr O \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nM \n\n0 \n\n...d - \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n... \xc2\xbb>\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n03 \n\nu \n\nd \n\nrH \n\n\n\nd - \n\ntT \n\nnO \n\nrH \n\nd \n\n4H \n\nno \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\noi \n\nP* \n\no \n\nO \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n\n 03 \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n0-\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\nX* \n\n \n\npd \n\nPd \n\ncd \n\ni \n\nu \n\nPd \n\n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n \n\nrH \n\nno \n\nO \n\no \n\n03 \n\n(X \n\nH \n\nO \n\n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\nn ,.V\xc2\xbb \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rl \n\n- a \n\n0) \n\nPi \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xbaJ \n\nX \n\nPH \n\ne> \n\nO \n\nQ \n\nw \n\nPH \n\nO \n\n\nr^. \n\nCM \n\n\n293 \n\n\nGross National Product ($ 1958) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFIGURE 2 \n\nThe Central Region 9 8 Shares of Total Federal Purchases \nof Goods and Services, 1968 - 1972 \n\n\n\n294 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nas a whole. It follows the slowdown predicted for the nation in 1970, \nbut in 1972 the predicted growth rate declines again, while the national \ngrowth rate is predicted to increase. \n\nV.5.2 The Budget B ($59.4) Solution \n\nTable 5 shows the results of the Budget B ($59.4) solution. \n\nAs expected, military purchases in the region fall sharply, by over \n$3 billion in current dollars. Current dollar increases in civilian \npurchases are almost $1 billion, yielding a slight increase in constant \ndollars. This solution yields steady but slow growth throughout the \nsimulation period, with each year\xe2\x80\x99s real growth rate higher than the \nprevious year\xe2\x80\x99s. The growth rate never matches that of the national \neconomy but comes close for 1970. It is interesting to note that for \n1970 the regional growth rate increases in the face of a declining \nrate for the nation. \n\nV.5.3 The Budget E ($93.6) Solution \n\nTable 6 shows the results of the Budget E ($93.6) solution. \n\nFor this solution, both current and constant Federal dollar outlays \nincrease for military purposes and decline for civilian uses. An \ninteresting characteristic of this solution is that the Central \nregion\'s economy is predicted to be virtually stagnant in 1970, but to \nrecover strongly in 1971 and 1972. The growth rate never matches that \nof the national economy, but it comes fairly close in 1971. \n\nV.5.4 Comparison of the Solutions \n\nA comparison of the three solutions shows the Central region \nreacting to military expenditures and associated policies in much the \nsame way as the Northern region. The Budget E ($93.6) option \ngenerates slightly higher growth over the period than does the Control \nsolution, with the Budget B ($59.4) option the lowest of the three. \n\nThe Results with regard to stability differ from those for the Northern \nregion, however, in that the Control solution is predicted to be more \nstable than the Budget E ($93.6) solution. Again, the Budget B \n($59.4) is the most stable of the three, showing a steady increase of \ngrowth throughout the period, varying only from 1.4 to 2.8 percent, \nwhile the Control solution varies from 0.9 to 4.0 percent and the \nBudget E ($93.6) option varies from 0.2 to 4.5 percent. \n\n\n295 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nT3 \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nuo \n\nCM \n\nuo \n\nuo \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nU0 \n\nU0 \n\n\nU0 \n\nCO \n\n\n\nAJ \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n(0 \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nr- \n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAJ \n\n<0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nAJ \n\nON \n\nC-. \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nU0 \n\n* \n\n\n\n\nOn \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nq \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n73 \n\n\nH \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nAJ \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n73 \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\na) \n\n73 \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\nCU \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nd) \n\n\n\n\n\nJ-4 \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n/^s \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\ni_i \n\nH \n\n\n73 \n\no \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nQJ \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nu \n\nCJ \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\n50 \n\no \n\n\nd \n\nUH \n\nUO \n\n\n\nQ) \n\n\nU0 \n\nuo \n\n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\no \n\nON \n\n\n\n\nu \n\nON \n\nON \n\n\n\nMH \n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nu \n\no \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nQD \n\no \n\n\n73 \n\nCO \n\n\n\nd) \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\na) \n\n \n\n \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nV\xe2\x80\x94/ \n\n\nO \n\n\nP-I \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\no \n\nd \n\n\n\no \n\nMH \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n43 \n\nAJ \n\nAJ \n\nd \n\nO \n\na \n\nAJ \n\nAJ \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nMH \n\no \n\nCJ \n\no \n\nM \n\n\no \n\na \n\na \n\n\n\n\xc2\xabH \n\n\nO \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nCO \n\nU \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nd \n\n73 \n\n73 \n\nrH \n\nd \n\n4H \n\n73 \n\n73 \n\n\n\n*H \n\n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nO \n\nd \n\no \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\nXi \n\n\n0) \n\n\nU \n\nU \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd) \n\nu \n\nM \n\n\n\nv\xe2\x80\x94/ \n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\nCU \n\nCU \n\no \n\nrH \n\n5C \n\nCU \n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n43 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n}-\xc2\xbb \n\n*H \n\nd \n\nrH \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nd \n\nd \n\n0) \n\na \n\n43 \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\nCU \n\n\no \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n> CO \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H d> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nQ) \n\nAJ \n\n% \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n0) \n\n \n\na) \n\nd \n\n(D \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nrH > \n\nPd \n\ncd \n\nd \n\na \n\nAJ \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd M \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nAJ \n\nM \n\nrH \n\n73 \n\no \n\no \n\nC0 \n\nCU \n\nH \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\n\n296 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nBudget E ($93.6) Solution - Central Region \n(billions of current dollars, except where otherwise indicated) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\noo \n\n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nm \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xbbn \n\nCM \n\n\n^2 \n\n\ntH \n\nNO \n\n\n\no \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nNO \n\n\nCO \n\nNO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\ntH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\n\nO \n\nON \n\nm \n\n\n^2 \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\nON \n\nOn \n\n\nON \n\nOn \n\n\nCM \n\nNO \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\nON \n\nrH \n\n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nS>2 \n\n\nON \n\nm \n\n\nm \n\nNO \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nin \n\n\n\nNO \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\nON \n\no \n\n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\ntH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\n\n\n\nu \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\n\n\n\n\n\nHi \n\n\n\n\nf> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\nw \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n(D \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n(D \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\niH \n\n\n\n\nTJ \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\nHi \n\no \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nO \n\na\xc2\xbb \n\n\n \n\n\n0 \n\n$ \n\nHi \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\n\'w\' \n\n\no \n\n\nPH \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nG \n\n\n\n\no \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n42 \n\n\n44 \n\n44 \n\na \n\no \n\n0 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n\nIH \n\nO \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nM \n\n\nO \n\no \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nHi \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\nHi \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\nT) \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n4-i \n\nT3 \n\nx) \n\n\n03 \n\nPH \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\n \n\nCO \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\nPH \n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\nU \n\n(D \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nO \n\na \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n0C \n\n00 \n\n44 \n\n\nJn \n\n\n\nCD \n\na> \n\nrO \n\nd) \n\nG \n\n \n\nP*5 \n\nptf \n\ncd \n\n0 \n\nH \n\nPd \n\n25 \n\ng \n\nG \n\ncd \n\nu \n\n\n\nCO \n\n>N \n\nG \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2u \n\nu \n\nCD \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\no \n\n(D \n\nCO \n\nG \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na) \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nPH \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nG \n\n> \n\nrH \n\nT3 \n\n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nPH \n\nHi \n\no \n\nO \n\nQ> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na) \n\n\nH \n\nHi \n\n\' *H \n\nB \n\nCD \n\nHi \n\nHi \n\nhJ \n\n\npH \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nPG \n\nW \n\nPH \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n297 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nV.6 THE SOUTHERN REGION \n\n\nV.6.1 The Control Solution \n\n\nUnder the assumptions of the Control solution, the shares of \nboth civilian and military purchases are projected to remain approxi\xc2\xac \nmately constant. (See Figure 3.) \n\nIn this solution, shown in Table 7, current dollar military \npurchases remain approximately the same, implying some decline in \nconstant dollars. Civilian government purchases, however, increase \nby about 10 percent in current dollars, implying a slight increase in \nconstant dollars. Growth is predicted to be relatively sluggish when \ncompared to the national economy, slowing in 1970 to 0.8 percent and \nthen picking up in 1971 and 1972, but still falling far below national \nrates. \n\nV.6.2 The Budget B ($59.4) Solution \n\nThe results of this solution are shown in Table 8. As would be \nexpected, military purchases of goods and services fall sharply in both \ncurrent and constant dollars. Civilian purchases increase significantly \nin both current and constant dollars, even though their share is ex\xc2\xac \npected to decline. (See Figure 3.) The predicted growth is slow but \nincreasing in both employment and constant dollar gross regional product. \nEach year is predicted to have a more rapid growth rate than the pre\xc2\xac \nvious year, but never as rapid a rate as the national economy. As in \nthe Central region, a slowdown in 1970 is avoided for the Budget B \n($59.4) solution, and for that year regional growth almost matches \nthat of the nation. \n\nV.6.3 The Budget E ($93.6) Solution \n\nIn Table 9, it may be seen that current dollar expenditures \nincrease for both military and civilian expenditures on goods and \nservices. Both types of expenditure would also rise slightly in \nconstant dollars. The growth of output from this solution is positive \nthroughout the period, following the national economy in a slump in \n1970 and recovering strongly in 1971 and 1972, but not nearly as \nstrongly as the national economy. \n\nV.6.4 Comparison of the Solutions \n\nThe Budget E ($93.6) alternative and the Control alternative \n\n\n298 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFIGURE 3 \n\nThe Southern Region\xe2\x80\x99s Share of Total Federal Purchases \nof Goods and Services, 1968 - 1972 \n\n\n5.0% \n\n\n4.0% \n\n\n3.0% \n\n\n\nMilitary \n\n\nBudget E \nBudget B \n\n\nControl \n\n\n1968 \n\n\n1969 \n\n\n1970 \n\n\n1971 \n\n\n1972 \n\n\n299 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nControl Solution - Southern Region \n(billions of current dollars, except where otherwise indicated) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\nco \n\nH \n\nin \n\no \n\n00 \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\no \n\nst \n\nON \n\nON \n\nco \n\n<1- \n\n\nrH \n\nfs. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n. \n\n. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\no \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nvO \n\nON \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n\neM \n\no \n\nO \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nr^. \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\nr- \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nvO \n\no \n\nO \n\nCM \n\n\n\nOn \n\nO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nON \n\nco \n\n \n\n\n\nd> \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nH \n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\nTJ \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nd) \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x94N \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n\n\ncj \n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x94s \n\n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\ncd \n\n4-1 \n\n00 \n\n\n\nd> \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nO \n\nm \n\n\n\nfa \n\nM \n\nm \n\n\nco \n\n\nON \n\n\n\nu \n\nO \n\nON \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2o \n\nCO \n\n\n\na> \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rl \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nd) \n\nCO- \n\n\n0 \n\n& \n\nU \n\n \n\n\no \n\nco \n\n\'\xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x9c\x93 \n\n\no \n\n\nfa \n\n\n\no \n\ncd \n\n\n\na \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\nfa \n\n4-1 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\na \n\no \n\n0 \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa24-) \n\no \n\na \n\nO \n\nM \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nM \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nCO \n\nu \n\nG \n\n\n\nO \n\n\nTJ \n\nrH \n\ncj \n\n4-1 \n\nX) \n\n\nCO \n\nfa \n\nO \n\nO \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\nQ> \n\n\nU \n\nU \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd) \n\nu \n\n\nCO \n\ncj \n\nfa \n\nfa \n\no \n\nrH \n\n0( \n\nfa \n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\na \n\n\n\nfa \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nr-1 \n\nrH \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nd) \n\n0 \n\nfa \n\ncd \n\n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\nfa \n\nV-/ \n\nCJ \n\nC! \n\n\nG \n\n> CO \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nfa \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2h a) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd) \n\n4J \n\nd) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n(J o \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nofl \n\nOC \n\n\n>N \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd> \n\n \n\nfa \n\nfa \n\ncd \n\n\n4J \n\nfa \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\ncd U \n\n\n\nCO \n\nSo \n\nCJ \n\n\nT\xe2\x80\x94 \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nU d> \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nO \n\no \n\nd> \n\nCO \n\n<1> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd) CO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nfa \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCO \n\n> \n\nrH \n\nT) \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nfa \n\nu \n\no \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\nsf \n\nst \n\n\n\'t m \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncm st \n\n\nrH \n\nI s *. \n\nm \n\n00 \n\no \n\nst \n\nrs \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nOn \n\nrH \n\nin \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nOn \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nst \n\nCM \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nSt \n\no \n\nVO \n\nNO \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\n\nNO \n\nO \n\no \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nNO \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\nOn \n\n00 \n\nNO \n\nSt \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHt \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\nJh \n\n\n\nO \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\nHi \n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nu \n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\n"d \n\n\n\nG \n\nTJ \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nT3 \n\no \n\n/TV \n\n\n\nCO \n\nG \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94N \n\n\ng \n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nHi \n\nCJ \n\n00 \n\n\nG \n\n4-! \n\nm \n\n\n\nG \n\n\nm \n\n\n\no \n\nON \n\n\n\n\nHi \n\nON \n\n\nco \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nHi \n\nO \n\nrH \n\n\nTJ \n\nCO \n\n\n\na) \n\nO \n\n*H \n\n\n\no \n\ng \n\n \n\n\nB \n\nS \n\nHi \n\n \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nV-/ \n\n\no \n\n\nPH \n\n\n\no \n\ncd \n\n\n\nu \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\nA \n\nP \n\nP \n\nG \n\nO \n\na \n\nP \n\n\n4H \n\no \n\n CO \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nPH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H G \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nP \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nU O \n\n60 \n\n60 \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n6C \n\n60 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\n\nPtf \n\nG \n\na \n\nP \n\n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xabd \n\ncd Hi \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\nP \n\nu cu \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\no \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nG \n\n*H \n\n0) CO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nPH \n\nrH \n\nU \n\nCD \n\n> \n\nrH \n\nT3 \n\no \n\no \n\nCO \n\nPH \n\nHi \n\nO \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nH \n\nHi \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\na \n\nG \n\nHi \n\nA \n\nA \n\nlit \n\no \n\no \n\nQ \n\nw \n\nPH \n\nO \n\n\n301 \n\n\nGross National Product ($ 1958) \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nr~. \n\nr^. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nuo \n\nSt \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\no \n\nst \n\n\nNO \n\nrH \n\n\n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n00 \n\no \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nst \n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nco \n\nCM \n\no \n\nCM \n\nON \n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nvO \n\n\n44 \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nst \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nSt \n\n\nCO \n\nSt \n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nSt \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO\xc2\xac \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-d \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n60 \n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nCO \n_ * \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPC \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2n \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\nON \n\nvD \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nr- \n\nrH \n\ntH \n\no \n\nO \n\n\xc2\xabn \n\nCM \n\n\n\nvO \n\nIs \n\n0) \n\nON \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n<0 \n\n42 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nst \n\no \n\no \n\nn- \n\nst \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\n42 \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nst \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\no \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n0> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nMl \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-< \n\n\n\n \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nv\xe2\x80\x94\' \n\nT) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\nMi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n> \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nw \n\n44 \n\n\nM \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n(2 \n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2CO- \n\n\nB \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n>s \n\n \n\n \n\n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nv-x \n\n\no \n\n\nCH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2w \n\n\n(2 \n\n\no \n\ncd \n\n\n\na \n\nMS \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n42 \n\n44 \n\n4J \n\nd \n\nO \n\n6 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n\n*H \n\n\nCM \n\nO \n\nO \n\nO \n\nM \n\n\no \n\nO \n\na \n\n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nM\xc2\xab \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nCO \n\nMr \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n2 \n\nTJ \n\nTJ \n\nrH \n\nd \n\nMS \n\n03 \n\n\n\n*H \n\n\nCO \n\nfH \n\no \n\nO \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\n42 \n\n\n CO \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\nP-i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n44 \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\no o \n\n00 \n\n60 \n\nrH \n\nd \n\n6C \n\n60 \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n>N \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\n42 \n\n\ncd \n\n \n\n0\xc2\xa3j \n\nP2 \n\ntd \n\nB \n\n44 \n\npc5 \n\nZ \n\n\n\nCO \n\ncd \n\ncd w \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0u \n\nU 0) \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\nrH \n\nT3 \n\nO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nMi \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\nWhen military activities are sharply curtailed or eliminated, a \nunique situation is created. Through measurements and observations of \n\n\n1 \n\n(Cont.) Local Economic Development After Military Base Closures \n(New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1970); R. A. McAuliffe, The Salina \nStory: Swords into Plowshares (Washington: Office of the Secretary \n\nof Defense, 1966); John David McKittrich, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Redevelopment of an Airbase\xe2\x80\x9d \n(unpublished Master\xe2\x80\x99s thesis, Clemson College, 1968); National Planning \nAssociation, Community Readjustment to Reduced Defense Spending: Case \nStudy of Potential Impact on Seattle-Tacoma, Baltimore and New London- \n\nGroton-Norwich , U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication \nNo. 33 (Washington: Government Printing Office, December, 1965); Kyohei \nSasaki, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Military Expenditures and the Employment Multiplier in Hawaii,\xe2\x80\x9d \nReview of Economics and Statistics , Vol. XLV, No. 3 (August, 1963), \npp. 298-304; Secretary of Defense, Productive Civilian Uses of Former \nDefense Department Installations (Washington: Office of the Secretary \nof Defense, 1964); Secretary of Defense, The Challenge of Change , \n(Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1965); Thomas M. \nSkillman, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99The Economic Impact of Shaw-Sumter County, South Carolina\',\xe2\x80\x99 \n(unpublished Master\'s thesis, Clemson College, 1963); Ian Donald Terner, \nThe Economic Impact of a Military Installation on the Surrounding Area: \n\nA Case Study of Fort Devens and Ayer, Massachusetts (Boston: The Federal \nReserve Bank of Boston, 1965); Claude B. Thompson, "An Economic Apprais\xc2\xac \nal of the Effect of Donaldson Air Force Base upon Greenville, South \nCarolina\xe2\x80\x9d (unpublished Master\xe2\x80\x99s thesis, Clemson College, 1962). \n\n\n305 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe various sectors and of the aggregate, the importance of the instal\xc2\xac \nlation in the local economy can be estimated. These measurements should \nassist in predicting whether a particularclosure will create a serious \neconomic disturbance or whether the community will be able to adjust \nwith a minimum of difficulty. In addition to the usual variables con\xc2\xac \nsidered in economic analysis, community efforts specifically initiated \nto offset the impact of the curtailment in military activity partially \nchange the character of the situation. Thus the scene must be viewed \nwith consideration for the reaction of private economic units as well as \nfor the actions taken by the community to soften the adverse economic \neffects of the curtailment. \n\n\nVI.2 GENERAL DISCUSSION \n\nThe impact of a military base on the surrounding economy is differ\xc2\xac \nent from that of a private industry.^ Because defense installations are \nlargely staffed by military personnel, the workforce for the installa\xc2\xac \ntion is substantially supplied from outside the local community. As has \nlong been the practice, when the usefulness of military personnel has \nceased at one location, they are transferred to another site. It is \nthis transferability of the military population which limits the impact \nof a change in the level of operation of a military installation. \n\nThe payrolls earned by military personnel may, particularly if the \nbase is relatively isolated, have little or no local impact. Installa\xc2\xac \ntions not located near large cities often procure only very small por\xc2\xac \ntions of their supplies and materials in the local area. The presence \nof a base post-exchange and commissary may substantially reduce sales \nof local businesses in similar activities. Because of their social and \neconomic character, employed military dependents tend to be secondary \nwage earners who exhibit a mobility parallel to that of the head of the \nhousehold. These factors help explain the minimal economic consequences \nof many military installations on communities located near them. \n\nIn addition the recent American phenomenon of greater geographic \nmobility of the civilian population has also lessened the impact of the \nchanges in the scope of military facilities. The DOD civilian work \nforce has exhibited a high degree of mobility in connection with the \nrecent changes in the level of civilian employment at certain military \ninstallations. Large scale transfers of employees, through elaborate \ntransfer programs, have been an integral part of the operation. \n\nIn each base closure the particular circumstances which surround \n\n\nLawrence Laben, op. cit. \n\n\n306 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe affected or impacted community influence its economic adjustment. \nThis set of circumstances includes the size, structure, and geographic \nlocation of the community as well as the set of attitudes peculiar to \nthe community. The size and economic diversification are at least in \npart directly related to the community\'s ability to adjust. As might be \nexpected, the larger and more economically diversified the community the \ngreater its stability in the face of fluctuation of exogenous forces \nsuch as changes in military activities. Any impact will also be mag\xc2\xac \nnified if the community is distant from a large metropolitan area. Thus \nthe seriousness of the loss or gain of a number of jobs in a community \n\n\n\nupon the size and situation of the individual com\xc2\xac \n\n\nmunity . \n\n\nLikewise, the type of military installation involved determines the \nmagnitude of the impact. 3 4 For example the inherent differences in input \nrequirements between a Strategic Air Command base and a shipyard dictate \ndifferent demands on the adjacent area. The primary factors influencing \nthis demand are 1) the relative size of the military and the civilian \ncomponents of base personnel and 2) the facilities included at the in\xc2\xac \nstallation. Air Force Bases which are designated as SAC headquarters \ninclude excellent air strips and auxiliary airport facilities. They are \ntypically of only moderate size and are often located near small, some\xc2\xac \nwhat rural communities. By virtue of their function as a primary de\xc2\xac \nfense unit they are staffed by a large number of military personnel and \nonly small numbers of civilian employees. A large proportion of the \nmilitary personnel at such bases are enlisted men. Of these a substan\xc2\xac \ntial percentage have only small families or are unmarried. In contrast \ninstallations such as shipyards are typically of substantial size and \noften within or adjacent to large metropolitan areas. Such installa\xc2\xac \ntions are primarily concerned with production and maintenance and in\xc2\xac \nvolve a large civilian component with a relatively small military com\xc2\xac \nplement. It is these differences that have been shown to account for \nthe variations in the economic relationship among defense installations \nand the communities near them. \n\n\nVI.3 EXTANT INSTALLATIONS \n\n\nA substantial number of studies seek to measure the importance of a \nmilitary installation to a locality. The typical study measures the \n\n\n3 \n\nDarwin W. Daicoff, op. cit. \n\n4 \n\nLawrence Laben, op. cit . \n^University of Kansas, op. cit. \n\n\n307 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\npatterns of personnel spending, housing and local procurement. These \npatterns are then related to the structure of the local economy. By \nstudying an extant installation one is able to measure the actual depen\xc2\xac \ndence of an area on the defense installation. This is worthwhile infor\xc2\xac \nmation, but should not be confused with the findings of studies which \nanalyze the consequences of fluctuations in the activity at an installa\xc2\xac \ntion, for these latter studies quantify the consequences of the fluctua\xc2\xac \ntion. \n\n\nBoth the amount of installation purchases in the area and spending \nof base personnel influence the impact which an installation will have \non the region. It has been found that the spending habits of military \npersonnel are largely a function of their marital status. Though their \nspending pattern approximates that of civilian personnel in most respects, \ntwo factors modify the community impact of the spending. First, most \nmilitary installations provide housing on the base for at least a portion \nof the enlisted men and officers exclusive of the local housing market; \nthis helps to limit the effect of massive and sudden shifts in military \nactivities. Second, much of the purchasing done by military personnel \nwhether housed on the base or in the community is concentrated in the base \ncommissary or the post exchange and base recreation facilities\xe2\x80\x94estimates \nrange between 1/3 and 1/2 of total purchases. Thus, it can be said that \nmilitary personnel have a definite tendency to consume goods and services \nsupplied at their respective base facilities while their counterpart, \nthe civilian employee, is more typically a patron of local stores and \nservice establishments. Thus, the magnitude of the area or regional \neffect due to the existence of a military installation will be a function \nof both the mix and the number of civilian and military personnel. \n\nIt is significant that military families are more important to the \nlocal economy than are bachelors or married men whose families are not \nwith them. Military families tend to live in the community and to spend \nmost of their incomes in the community. Single men usually live on the \nbase; in addition various studies show that they tend to spend mainly on \nthe base or to migrate to nearby large cities. \n\nIn Terner\xe2\x80\x99s review^ of the spending patterns of military personnel \nat Fort Devens, Pease AFB and a number of other bases the following \ngeneralizations were established: \n\n1. Food and housing accounted for almost 60 percent of the budgets \nfor married personnel with only five to six percent allotted for \nentertainment and recreation. \n\n\nIan Donald Terner, pp. 65-66. \n\n\n308 \n\n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n2. By way of contrast, 70 percent of the budgets for single per\xc2\xac \nsonnel was allotted to entertainment, recreation, transpor\xc2\xac \ntation, and savings. This large amount was possible since \nboard and room was almost totally supplied by the military. \n\n3. Married personnel spent nearly 40 percent of their total bud\xc2\xac \ngets at the military installation facilities (commissaries, \netc.) with varying percentages of the total spent in neighbor\xc2\xac \ning communities. \n\n4. The spending of single men could not be grouped as it varied \nboth in type and in the proportion expended on and off base. \nTerner suggests that the spending will be influenced n by the \nrelative offerings of the installation and the town.\'^ Other \nstudies substantiate this argument and further suggest that \nwhen a large city is in the vicinity of the installation the \nbulk of single men\xe2\x80\x99s off-base spending will be concentrated in \nmetropolitan areas. \n\nAs might be expected the relative spending is also somewhat influ\xc2\xac \nenced by the residence of the personnel. Thus the personnel who reside \non or near the installation spend greater proportions of their income \non the base and, conversely, smaller proportions in the community. \n\n\nThough the local purchases of a base constitute a positive economic \nfactor for the community, the bulk of maintainance costs are often ex\xc2\xac \npended outside the immediate vicinity. The proportion of installation \nspending that occurs within the local community is dependent on both the \nrequirements of the base and the facilities of the community. The ex\xc2\xac \ntreme situation occurs when a base has almost every commodity and ser\xc2\xac \nvice purchased from firms located a considerable distance from the base. \nIn this case local procurement adds little or nothing to the locality. \nThere is some evidence to suggest that base construction spending does \nresult in a significant local impact. Still, though not often a major \neconomic addition to the community, the base\xe2\x80\x99s local purchases coupled \nwith the influence of the private purchases made by military personnel \ncan serve to significantly buoy the local economy. \n\n\nIn spite of the increased sales, particularly in the service sec\xc2\xac \ntor, the existence of a military installation has not proven to be a \nspecial impetus to expansion of other economic activity in the region. \n\n\n^Ian Donald Terner, p. 66. \n\ng \n\nDarwin W. Daicoff, op. cit .; and Thomas M. Skillman, op. cit. \n\n\n309 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nRather, it seems to lead to a feeling of complacency in the community \nwhich discourages further efforts to broaden the community f s base. In \naddition, the workforce which would have been available in the area may \nbe comfortably employed by the DOD. Thus the workforce which would be \nrequired to attract new industry is not available. In remote and slow \ngrowing communities the military did provide much needed diversity but \nthe real economic effects of the installation were concentrated in the \nretail trade, personal service, and housing sectors where some local \nemployment was a result of sales to base personnel. \n\nTo some extent the community f s attitude toward the defense estab\xc2\xac \nlishment accounts for the community\'s economic strength. The consen\xc2\xac \nsus of researchers who have looked at this matter is that the existence \nof the installation in the community acts to dampen the community\'s \ninitiative toward seeking new economic growth-producing activities. \nEspecially since the recent well-publicized economy moves by the Pen\xc2\xac \ntagon which resulted in the closing of a number of bases, the attitude \nof the communities near other DOD facilities has not been favorable \ntoward their expansion. The townspeople are somewhat chary of a repe\xc2\xac \ntition of the DOD closures and are thus reluctant to initiate public \nor private investment projects. This has lead to observations that \nthe presence of military activity can serve to dampen community willing\xc2\xac \nness to enter into new economic ventures. This lack of community in\xc2\xac \ncentive toward independent growth is indeed unfortunate since every \ncase study has shown that the success of a community\'s struggle to sur\xc2\xac \nvive the economic impact of the closure of a military installation de\xc2\xac \npends largely on the community\'s ability to grow and diversify on its \nown, exclusive of the military influence. \n\n\nVI.4 CURTAILED INSTALLATIONS \n\nA study of the dependence of a community upon a nearby defense in\xc2\xac \nstallation provides useful information in the event of a base closure. \nFor example, it should provide data on the particular sectors which \nhave been bouyed by military spending. It also may provide a clue as \nto whether the presence of the base has given the community a false \nsense of security. Thus, it is important to examine the pattern of \nclosure, the pattern of reaction, and the pattern of redevelopment. \n\nAs stated at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose here is \nto provide a basis upon which to estimate the local consequences of \ncessation of hostilities in Vietnam and of arms limitation agreements. \nThe DOD Cost Reduction Program has lead to the curtailment of activity \nat a large number of military installations. The parallel is obvious: \na reduction in military spending should again involve base closures. \n\n\n310 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nAn understanding of the economic consequences which have been shown \nto result from previous base closings will have direct relevance to \nthe contemplated reduced military spending. \n\n\nVI.4.1 Pattern of Closure \n\nUnder the DOD closure policies various amounts of lead time were \ngiven, different bases in hopes that this advanced warning would allow \nfor better preparation and planning by the community. The optimum \nlead time appears to be about one year between announcement and actual \nclosure. In cases where much longer lead time was allotted, the re\xc2\xac \nsult was often stagnation of efforts to organize recovery efforts and \nfalse speculation about a possible future for the installation. Though \nthis lead time was designed to facilitate a systematic removal and/or \ndisposal of equipment and facilities to other governmental or private \nsources as well as the transfer of personnel, extended lead time re\xc2\xac \nsulted in thwarted community plans. In most of the cases involving \nexcessive lead time, long before the military evacuated the facilities \nthe community succeeded in arousing interest from private firms re\xc2\xac \ngarding their possible use of the soon-to-be-vacated military facili\xc2\xac \nties. The discrepancy between the timing of the availability of the \nfacilities and of their potential use delayed effective community ef\xc2\xac \nforts to replace the military with civilian economic activity. \n\nBefore considering the community pattern of reaction to the clo\xc2\xac \nsure of the bases, it is advantageous to review the provisions made by \nFederal agencies to promote the smooth transfer of installations from \nmilitary to civilian control. When an installation is closed, the ob\xc2\xac \nject is to convert the entire facility to private or local governmental \nownership as quickly as feasible and yet to protect the Federal invest\xc2\xac \nment in the facility. Though the General Services Administation over\xc2\xac \nsees much of the disposal of surplus military equipment and property, \nthe Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in DOD is charged with facili\xc2\xac \ntating the transfer in areas where the magnitude of the impact is anti\xc2\xac \ncipated to be great. \n\nThe OEA was established in 1961 under the Assistant Secretary for \nInstallations and Logistics of the DOD.^ It aids communities in \n\n\n9 \n\nDarwin W. Daicoff, op. cit. \n\n^Secretary of Defense, Productive Civilian Uses of Former Defense \nDepartment Installations ; and also The Challenge of Change . \n\n\n311 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nplanning for productive and advantageous local usage of the facilities \nfreed by DOD decisions to close or reduce a military installation and \nparticipates with the community from the planning through the actual \ntransfer of the military properties to civilian uses. In addition, \nthe OEA has the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the \nFederal government with those of the affected community. \n\nThe OEA officials work together with representatives from various \nother Federal departments and agencies: The General Services Admini\xc2\xac \nstration; the Departments of Commerce, Labor, Interior, Agriculture, \nand Housing; the Home Finance Agency; and the Small Business Admini\xc2\xac \nstration. This group functions as a part of the Select Advisory Com\xc2\xac \nmittee to the Secretary of Defense and allows for the coordinated and \nintegrated disposition of military properties. It not only functions \nas an avenue for disposition but also as a planning agency to inform \narea planners of the various possibilities which exist and to help the \nlocal communities cut through the red tape involved in such transfers. \nIt is only through such coordinated work between Federal, state, and \nlocal agencies that the transfers can be done economically, efficient\xc2\xac \nly, and most advantageously for the area and for the Federal govern\xc2\xac \nment. \n\n\n11 \n\n\nIn addition, the Inter-Agency Economic Adjustment Committee, \nannounced by President Nixon in March 1970, is charged with bringing \nthe resources of the Federal government to bear on the alleviation, \nof economic difficulties caused by necessary Defense realignments. \n\nThe committee is to assist individuals and communities in cases where \nadverse economic impacts occur as a result of the revision of the \nnation\xe2\x80\x99s military base structure. While it is not yet clear how this \nresponsibility will be discharged; the existence of the committee \nindicates the Federal government\xe2\x80\x99s concern. \n\n\nVI.4.2 Pattern of Reaction \n\nIt is now appropriate to consider the reactions of the various \ncommunities to the closure of nearby military installations. ^ With \n\n\nThis committee is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and is \nmade up of the Secretaries of the Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; La\xc2\xac \nbor; Health, Education, and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; \nTransportation; the Administrator of the General Service Administra\xc2\xac \ntion; and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. \n\n12 \n\nOverall pattern established by Darwin W. Daicoff, "Phase I, \nCommunity Impact and Adjustment." \n\n\n312 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nonly few exceptions such as Donaldson AFB^^ where it was long under\xc2\xac \nstood that closure was imminent, the communities learned of the im\xc2\xac \npending closures through a \xe2\x80\x99\'bombshell" announcement issued by the \nDOD. Before the formal announcement closure decisions were very \nclosely kept secrets; there was little to indicate that any installa\xc2\xac \ntion would be slated for closure. The citizens were psychologically \nunprepared for the announcement of what they immediately perceived as \neconomic disaster. Momentary panic was the typical reaction. \n\nIn an immediate backlash reaction congressmen and city leaders \nmade block appeals to the DOD to rescind the decision. Though a very \nfew of the areas succeeded in securing a modification of the closure \ndecision, it was not in the form of a change in the order to close the \ninstallations but rather to offset the closure by creating new military \nactivities at these installations. In a few cases such as Hunter AFB \nat Savannah, Georgia-^ and Amarillo AFB at Amarillo, Texas,the in\xc2\xac \nstallations were almost immediately assigned a new activity\xe2\x80\x94one often \nrelated to the increase in U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia. \nStill for the great majority of the installations the announcements by \nthe DOD stood firm and without offset. \n\nSoon after the immediate panic subsided, the city leaders began \nto realize the economic potential inherent in the closure. The op\xc2\xac \nportunity to work to secure permanent, private industry in lieu of the \nmore temporary, military installation began to appear bright to city \nleaders. Extensive community campaigns were commonly inaugurated to \nenlist the support of the entire community in a unified effort to \novercome the economic consequences of the loss of this portion of \nthe economic activity and diversification in the community. This \norientation was often a most potent force in the cohesive community \nefforts toward recovery. Soon the community consensus was that what \nhad first been perceived as an ominous threat now was perceived to be \na great aid to the city\'s potential for economic growth. \n\nThis realization usually came at about the same time the final \nadministrative announcement was made concerning the irrevocability of \nthe closures. On community request the OEA entered to work with rep\xc2\xac \nresentatives of the local area to facilitate recovery activities after \nthe decision to discontinue defense activities in a community had been \nmade final. A major step generally involved the formation of a citi\xc2\xac \nzens\' group which was made responsible for the economic adjustment \n\n\n13 \n\n14 \n13 \n\n\nClaude B. Thompson* op. cit. \nUniversity of Kansas , op. cit. \nIbid. \n\n\n313 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nprocesses of the community. An important function of the OEA was to \nestablish liaison between community leaders and the various Federal \nagencies; the citizens 1 group or council was assigned the responsibili\xc2\xac \nty of charting a course of redevelopment for the installation facili\xc2\xac \nties based upon a realistic view of the community 5 s situation. In \naddition the council provided an organization with a legal status such \nthat the Federal agencies had a proper local counterpart with which to \ndeal. \n\n\nVI.4,3 Pattern of Redevelopment \n\nIdeally, a rapid release of the personal property, land and struc\xc2\xac \ntures by the DOD was followed by rapid community actions to put these \nfacilities to productive use, but the process of deciding the future \nof the military properties was 1 often quite involved and required much \ntime. All potential military uses for the defense facility and equip\xc2\xac \nment were considered prior to the closure announcement, but even after \nthe announcement other Federal uses had to be considered. \n\nThe GSA has a critical role in the disposal of military property. \nWhile other executive agencies are determining whether excess property \ncan be appropriately used to fill their needs and thus whether other \nFederal agencies should have the property or whether it should be dis\xc2\xac \nposed of as surplus, GSA inspects the property and arranges for an ap\xc2\xac \npraisal of its value. After the method of disposal has been decided, \nthe appraisal provides a means of determining the basis for negotiated \ntransfers to non-Federal public agencies as well as a guide for evalu\xc2\xac \nating the adequacy of bids received in competitive bid sales offerings. \n\nRegulations governing the disposal of surplus real property pro\xc2\xac \nvide for the sale of the facilities to public organizations for ap\xc2\xac \nproved public uses with discounts from the fair market value of the \nproperty. The discounts for public agencies in acquiring surplus real \nproperty are as follows \n\nPublic Park or Public Recreational Area \n...50 percent of the fair value. \n\nHistoric Monument \n\n...Without monetary consideration. \n\nPublic Health or Educational (particularly those devoted to aca\xc2\xac \ndemic, vocational or professional instruction) \n\n_ ...Up to 100 percent public benefit allowance. \n\n16 \n\nGeneral Services Administration, Disposal of Surplus Real Prop\xc2\xac \nerty (Washington: General Services Administration, 1966). \n\n\n314 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nWildlife Conservation \n\n...Without consideration. \n\nPublic Airport \n\n...Without consideration. \n\nSurplus properties not utilized by public agencies or institutions are \nordinarily offered for sale by GSA on a competitive bid basis. The \nactual operation of the disposal procedure is such that almost all of \nthe facilities come to be owned by approved local agencies for approved \npurposes. Thus the Federal government often does not receive much re\xc2\xac \nnumeration for the assets but does secure a use for the facilities \nconsistent with the objectives of Federal policy. \n\nArrangements for disposition are generally controlled by the \ncommunity under the direction of groups of community leaders which \nworked in cooperation with the OEA. The primary objective of the council \nhas usually been to replace the lost military activity with other ac\xc2\xac \ntivity. In certain cases this end was furthered by the type of \nfacility vacated by the military. Often the newly-vacated facility \nincluded an excellent air strip and auxiliary buildings; in almost \nevery community it was the transfer of these air facilities to muni\xc2\xac \ncipal or local control that offered a great boost to the area by \nproviding a ready-for-use free airport to the city. \n\nOther specialized facilities freed for local public or pri\xc2\xac \nvate use were base hospitals and special classroom areas .^ There \nwere actual operating hospitals which became available for immediate \nmunicipal, state or private use. The hospitals were nearly always \nretained in medical or semi-medical uses\xe2\x80\x94that is as a functioning \nhospital, a training hospital or rehabilitation center. Though such \nuse commonly did not impart a particularly great positive economic \nimpact on the city, this re-use can be viewed as a community \nadvantage since the community gained a valuable piece of social over\xc2\xac \nhead capital. \n\nThough not restricted to those buildings specifically design\xc2\xac \ned for academic instruction, a very major portion of the re-use of \nmilitary facilities in almost every area (except installations such \nas Presque Isle AFB where an industrial park was formed) was devoted \nto academic purposes.^-\xc2\xae In conjunction with the educational activity \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0^Secretary of Defense, The Challenge of Change ; and University \n\nof Kansas, op, cit . \n\n1 8 \n\nDarwin W. Daicoff, op, cit . \n\n\n315 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe military quarters were often transferred to dormitory use. Edu\xc2\xac \ncational institutions which located on vacated military bases ranged \nfrom vocational and technical institutes, such as training institutes \nfor state troopers, to junior colleges and satellite campuses of large \nstate universities. Often the type of educational facility was more or \nless tailored to the area so as to meet its special needs; this is \nillustrated by the large number of vocational and technical education \ncenters which were established on the closed military installations. \n\nThe remainder of the properties and lands of the installations \nwere most often sold to private industry. These properties are \ncommonly segmented into easily handled land units which can be used \nseparately or grouped together in large packages as they are needed. \n\nThe structures in these areas can consist of various storage and \nmeeting buildings. In addition large machine shops are often available; \ninstallations such as ship yards contain a large number of such work \nshops. As the process of site selection and the completion of trans\xc2\xac \nfer arrangements are sometimes very time consuming, it is not unusual \nfor the first use of the installation to be a local or state govern\xc2\xac \nmental project such as an airport or school facility with private \nindustry moving in later. Though public agencies can often operate \nwithout a clear deed to the land, private industry is usually delayed \nuntil the entire installation is vacated allowing it to obtain the \nfacilities permanently. \n\nIn all cases the communities which have secured the greatest \namount of re-use of base facilities have taken the greatest strides \ntoward economic recovery. Not only have the economies achieved \nstability but also a more diversified base of activities. Most often \nthe total re-use of the available facilities was accomplished by the \nindividual use of small parts of the facility. Each use was con\xc2\xac \ntracted for by the individual organization in accordance with its own \nparticular set of requirements. In other cases large parts of the \ninstallation were taken over by one firm such as the Boeing Company \nor the American Machine and Foundry Company. In one case the situation \nwas unique; the entire installation facility that formed the former \nPresque Isle AFB\xe2\x80\x94Presque Isle, Maine was converted to the Skyway \nIndustrial Park in a complete utilization of the facility\'s potential. \n\nIn conclusion, re-use of the facilities vacated by the military \nhas often played a most important role in the economic adjustment \n\n\n19 \n\n\nUniversity of Kansas, op. cit . \n\n\n316 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nof a community. In communities where much private and local public \nre-use of military facilities occurred, economic recovery has been more \nrapid than in those where re-use has been minimal. In many cases the \nfirst and predominant re-use was by state and local government agencies. \nMany municipal airport organizations took control of the available \nairstrips and the accompanying facilities, which resulted in a marked \nincrease in the community\xe2\x80\x99s potential for air transportation and air \nf re i&ht and directly created an availability of industrial properties. \n\nIn addition academic re-uses of the facilities were prevelant. Not only \nwere vocational training centers popular, but universities as well \nsought relief from over crowded conditions by establishing satellite \ncampuses. \n\nActual re-use of the available facilities varied from one instal\xc2\xac \nlation to another. The importance of the amount of re\xe2\x80\x94use was largely \na function of the size of the community. In small communities, military \nexpenditure often constituted a major portion of the economic activity. \nWhen the military left, new industrial activity was required to restore \nthe health of the economy. In metropolitan areas the removal of the \nmilitary did not create as severe a vacuum in the economy; thus, re\xc2\xac \nplacements were not as essential for the continued viability of the \ncommunity. \n\nVI.4.4 Other Economic Activity \n\n\nAs an alternative and/or addition to the re-use of base facilities, \nincreased industrial activity outside the military installation also \nproduced the needed upsurge in economic activity. The promotions \naimed at utilizing base facilities and land usually were successful in \nobtaining interest in private industry outside the base, also. In\xc2\xac \nstances such as that in Moses Lake, Washington where some new manu\xc2\xac \nfacturing activity located in the community but no significant re-use of \nthe installation facilities occured were rare. 20 Most often private \nindustrial expansion which occurred off-base was rather more than \nwould have been expected on the basis of pre-closure trends. In \naddition to the coordination of the disposition of the base properties, \nthe citizens\xe2\x80\x99 council often acted in less conventional ways to aid the \ncommunity. York, Pennsylvania near the Naval Operations Plant was \nunique in that the city council was instrumental in the creation of the \nYork County Industrial Development Corporation which acted to offer \nlow-cost finance to aid construction of homes and especially the con\xc2\xac \nstruction of small business facilities. Other cities such as Salina, \n\n\n20 \n\n\nIbid. \n\n\n317 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1 \n\n\nKansas (Schilling AFB) established a local private investment organi\xc2\xac \nzation to finance quasi-public structures such as convention centers. \nThis activity was instrumental in bolstering the confidence of the city; \nthe psychological impact of backing a "community project" often pro\xc2\xac \nvided the incentive for private citizens to make other efforts which \naided in stabilizing the local economy. \n\nVI.4.5 The 1964 Closures \n\n\nFrom the DOD f s initiation of the Cost Reduction Program in early \n1961 through fiscal year 1969 over 1,110 actions have been taken to \nrealign the functions of the nation\xe2\x80\x99s military installations. These \n\nactions have resulted in the release of nearly two million acres of \nland and the elimination of 217,602 DOD jobs. Though these actions have \noccurred throughout the time period since 1961, the largest number \noccurred in 1964-1965. Of these the most significant block of closures \nwere those announced by the DOD on November 18, 1964 affecting 15 \nforeign installations and 80 domestic installations. Though this \nnumber represented only about one percent of the total, the action \naccounted for large portions of the total realignment activity (see \nTable 1). About one third of the total number of job eliminations and \nover a fifth of the total released acres were the direct result of \nthese actions. The DOD estimates that these resulted in an annual \nsaving of $1.7 billion\xe2\x80\x94a figure which represents a quarter of the \ntotal savings realized. \n\nA major study of the realignments dictated by the November 18, \n\n1964 announcement was sponsored by the U. S. Arms Control and Disarma\xc2\xac \nment Agency.^2 in this study selected closures were analyzed in great \ndetail. Since these actions were among the largest, they probably \nproduced the greatest impact; a review of some of the conclusions from \nthis study is quite appropriate and applicable to the analysis of post- \nVietnam adjustment problems: \n\n1. After the Announcement some of the affected areas continued \nto grow while some declined. In those areas where the direct reduction \nof employment due to the installation closure represented five percent \nor more of the community\xe2\x80\x99s population, significant, detrimental \neconomic impact occurred most often. \n\n\nwhile a lack of detailed data prevents a complete analysis of \nthe post 1968 actions, it is known that they have been significant. \n\nFor example, on March 6, 1970 the DOD announced 371 actions designed to \nreduce expenditures by $914 million and expected to eliminate 35,000 \nmilitary and 58,600 civilian positions. \n\n22 \n\nDarwin W. Daicoff, op. cit . \n\n\n318 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 1 \n\nComparison of 1964 Announcement With \nthe Total as of FY 1968 \n\n\n\nNovember 18, 1964 \nAnnouncement 3 \n\nTotal Through \nFY 1968 b \n\n\nNumber of Actions \n\n95 \n\n1,110 \n\n\nJobs Eliminated \n\n63,401 \n\n217,602 \n\n\nAnnual Savings \n\n(millions of dollars) \n\n$477 \n\n$1,700 \n\n\nAcres Released \n\n376,720 \n\n1,849,000 \n\n\n\nSOURCES: ^OD press release on November 18, 1964. \n\n\ndepartment of Defense Cost Reduction Journal , \nVol. V, No. 1, (Winter 1968-1969), p. 63. \n\n\n\n319 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n2. No identifiable pattern of change in employment growth \nrelative to either the magnitude or the timing of the closure was \nevident in any of the communities in which the reduction in employ\xc2\xac \nment was relatively large. \n\n3. An announcement made in a flourish of excitement followed \n\nby a swift pattern of closure seemed to incite the townspeople to unite \nto work for the common goal of recovery from the economic impact of the \nbase closure. \n\n4. The formation of a citizens* committee was valuable to \nappraise and to plan the possible course of action required for the \nplanning of the disposition of the installation; these plans included \nutilization of the properties by both local government and private \nindustry. \n\n5. A pattern of swift closure of installations and the rapid \ntransfer of the operation and ownership of the base from military to \ncivilian hands after the Announcement facilitated the community\xe2\x80\x99s \nefforts to recover from the economic impact of the closure, \n\n6. Success in securing re-use of the facilities was severely \nhandicapped when the military retained control for considerable time \nafter the Announcement. Coupled with Federal inaction, the adminis\xc2\xac \ntrative delay involved in military transfers left the city unable to \nact under its own authority in regard to matters concerning the \ninstallation facilities. \n\n7. Public facilities often provided immediate offsetting activi\xc2\xac \nties for the community. Local, state and Federal programs can be \nutilized; they are especially valuable as they can be pressed into \noperation more quickly than can private enterprise. In future cases \nsuch programs could be planned before the actual closure of the \ninstallation so that new activities could begin immediately upon the \nwithdrawal of military operations. \n\n8. In cases where large air strips were converted to municipal \ncontrol, the increased availability of transportation and freight \nfacilities acted as a positive attraction to private industry. \n\n9. In cases where incentives to new industry (including subsi\xc2\xac \ndies, tax reductions, extension of public utilities, or re-zoning of \nmunicipal areas) were required, community-wide support had to be \nsecured so that these inducements could be offered. This was one of \nthe causes of greater delays in private use of released facilities as \nopposed to public use. \n\n10. Securing new jobs equal to the DOD employment may not fully \ncompensate the loss suffered by the community due to the closure of \nthe military installation. If these replacement jobs are low wage, \n\n\n320 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthere may well be a loss in total income. In a somewhat similar vein, \nif the replacement jobs are "women\xe2\x80\x99s jobs ,\xe2\x80\x99 1 a loss can occur. \n\nFinally the diversification of the community can be reduced. Thus a \ntype of community adjustmen t to the removal of the military installation \noften appeared rather than a community recovery . \n\n1 --. The housing sector presented difficult problems in each of \nthe communities. Vacancies and subsequent deterioration were particu\xc2\xac \nlarly severe for low-cost housing. Because of the depressed condition \nof the housing market, many homeowners who were transferred with the \nmilitary operations were forced to default on their mortgages.23 \n\n12. Relatively little unemployment resulted from the closures \nfor two reasons: a) great efforts were made to effect large scale \ntransfer and relocation of civilian personnel, and b) many local jobs \nwere vacated by DOD personnel and their dependents. Thus employment \nopportunities became available to the small number of local persons who \nbecame unemployed either as a direct, or indirect result of the \nreduction in military activity. With the aid of the DOD\xe2\x80\x99s relocation \nprogram, employment problems were largely self-correcting. \n\n13. The larger metropolitan areas made the transition with \nrelative ease while the economy was kept on a high level. The smaller, \nmore isolated areas had to be backed by a much stronger push from \ncommunity action in order to acquire replacement activities that would \nkeep the economy sufficiently diversified and also maintain community \nemployment at a desirable level. \n\n14. The community reaction to the Announcement constituted a \ndefinite pattern in all cases: 1 ) disbelief, 2 ) efforts to rescind the \ndecision, 3 ) !, open panic, H 4 ) resignation to the inevitable and 5 ) \ndecision that the closure was probably, on balance, advantageous for \n\nf-U ry /> /MTiTf \n\n6W^W44V*Hjf \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n15. If the military retained control of the base long after the \n\nAnnouncement, the reaction included another step (sometimes before and \nsometimes after stage 5): 4a) discontent with planning for the reuse \n\nof base facilities while the facilities were still occupied by the \nmilitary. If the military relinquished control, a final stage \noccurred: 6 ) relative satisfaction after the negotiations ended. \n\n\n23 \n\nEven this effect could be reduced if an appropriation were made \nto implement the DOD Homeowners\xe2\x80\x99 Assistance Program which authorizes \na policy of easing the impact of transfers on the housing market. \n\n\n321 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n/ \n\n\n16. At the date of Announcement the local military authorities \nproduced data on the amount of spending in the communities for base \nprocurement and data on military and civilian payrolls. These were \nused to identify the magnitude of the reduction the community would \nface. In almost no instance, however, were such data available for \nany extended time period. A relatively simple procedure should be \nestablished to develop those data for all military installations so as \nto facilitate analysis of the impact of military activity at the \ncommunity level. \n\n\n\n\n\n17. The general level of economic activity in the nation may well \naccount for a major portion of the success that these communities have \nhad in offsetting the effects of the installation closures. The adjust\xc2\xac \nment experience might have been significantly different had the \nnational economy been less robust. \n\n\nVI.5 CONCLUSION \n\nThe study of the closure of various military installations lead \nto the conclusion that the presence of a defense facility in a com\xc2\xac \nmunity does not necessarily impart a permanent influence on the \ncommunity with which it is associated. While the installation is \nactive, it contributes people, dollars, and activity to the community, \nbut this in itself does not change the community^ potential to carry \non a high level of activity without the defense installation. \n\nSuperficially these conclusions may seem to be in some conflict \nwith the analyses of the impact of the entrance of installations into \nthe economy which indicate that the military installation is an im\xc2\xac \nportant force in the community. This conflict is, however, more ap\xc2\xac \nparent than real as it involves the presupposition that the removal of \nmilitary spending upon which some portion of local economic activity \nhas been dependent will result in a predictable reduction of income \nand employment in that area. Though the immediate decline in the most \nsensitive economic indicators is as predicted, the offsetting economic \nactivities which occur at some time subsequent to the closures often \ncompensate for the demise of the installation. It may be postulated \nthat, if the remainder of the local economy does not expand soon after \nmilitary spending is reduced, the economic effect of the reduction of \nmilitary spending will be severe just as predicted by studies of the \nimpact of extant installations. The usual situation, however, is that \nthe remainder of the local economy does expand. \n\nIt is unreasonable to argue that all of the changes encountered \nby the various sectors of the local economies were the results of the \n\n\n322 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nadvent or curtailment of DOD activity. How any sector would have pro\xc2\xac \ngressed in the absence of military activity cannot be determined, but \nit should be noted that the military activity occurred in the midst of \neconomic circumstances which might have played upon the local economy \nindependently of the change in the level of military activity. \n\nThe system of announcement of closure and the pattern of action \nimmediately after the announcement seem to play an important role in \nthe community*s ability to survive the loss of a heretofore important \neconomic element. ,The announcement and the actual closure of an instal\xc2\xac \nlation should be done quickly and with considerable publicity to assure \nthe positive psychological reaction necessary to inspire cohesive work \nby the community. Swift action to effect closure coupled with \ncommunity planning can be the most important insurance of maximum \nrecovery of the community. \n\nWithout exception the most severely impacted areas are those which \nare somewhat isolated and which are dependent on a restricted economic \nbase. Such communities experience a more rapid reaction to the \naddition of an installation and suffer most seriously when the instal\xc2\xac \nlation is removed as the military is often the primary source of \neconomic diversification. Only when the defense facility represents \na significantly large portion of the area f s economy does there appear \nto be an important impact on the rate of growth in the community. \n\nIt should also be noted that the conclusions of the base closure \nstudies have been conditioned by the rapidly growing national economy \nin a full employment situation. If this robust pattern of economic \nactivity were not present, any detrimental effects which have been \npredicted or observed would most surely have been compounded. \n\nIn any case, the stability and equilibrium achieved by a community \nafter the closure of an installation may contrast with its previous \nlevel of well-being. Much effort, planning, and perhaps some luck are \nrequired for a city to achieve more than the potential it possessed \nbefore the installation was established. \n\nVI.6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS \n\n1. In general, a lead time of approximately one year between \nannouncement and actual base closure should be adopted by DOD. Maxi\xc2\xac \nmum effort should be devoted by DOD to a rapid release of personal \nproperty, land and structures to facilitate their conversion to \nproductive use. \n\n\n323 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n2. To the extent possible the announcement should contain a time \nschedule of the closure. This would be of considerable assistance to \nlocal groups in developing their offset plans. Deviations from the \nschedule should be kept to a minimum so not to create uncertainty and \nto provide an excuse for local inaction. \n\n3. A special group should be established in the General Services \nAdministration which would be charged with: a) rapid determination of \nother possible Federal uses after a base closure announcement, b) ex\xc2\xac \npediting the transfer of Federal assets to state and local governments, \nand c) establishing a clear deed to the property so that disposal to \nprivate industry is made possible. \n\n4. The DOD Homeowners Assistance Program should be implemented \nwith adequate funding which would encourage the transfer of DOD \ncivilian employees and lessen the often serious immediate impact on the \nlocal housing market. \n\n3. A data system should be established for military installations \nby the DOD, so that analysis of the impact of military activity at the \ncommunity level, is facilitated. These data, which should be readily \navailable to the community, should include: a) the dollar amount of \nlocal procurement by type of good or service purchased, the geographic \nlocation of the supplier, and similar data on the purchases made out\xc2\xac \nside regular military procedures\xe2\x80\x94such as those of the base PX and \ncommissary; b) wages paid both military and civilian personnel, as well \nas information regarding the spending of these groups in the community \nand at the military installation; c) information regarding the number \nof jobs held by military personnel and their dependents in the local \ncommunity and on the base. \n\nSuch information would be essential for planning and the development of \nan adequate local offset program. \n\n\n324 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTHE ADJUSTMENT OF DOD CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL \n\n\nDarwin W. Daicoff \n\n\nVII.1 INTRODUCTION \n\nA termination of the Vietnam conflict will have a significant \neffect on DOD civilian and military personnel. In addition some agree\xc2\xac \nment on arms limitation could have similar results. Two of the likely \nresults of the end of the Vietnam hostilities and/or the establishment \nof such an agreement are: 1) the separation of a large number of \nmilitary personnel currently under arms, and 2) the release or relo\xc2\xac \ncation of a significant number of DOD civilian employees. \n\nArms limitation possibilities are quite varied; their economic \nconsequences will depend on 1) the type, 2) the extent, and 3) the \nscheduled time period of the limitation. If the agreement results in \nwidespread and rapid reduction of major armament systems, the impact \non the economy could be significant. \n\nConversely, if the policy changes are conservative or if the \nphase-out time is long, the economic impact could be offset by exist\xc2\xac \ning programs. \n\nPrevious manpower studies have indicated deficiencies which \nimpede the efficient and effective utilization of manpower no longer \nneeded by DOD.* Among the most important are the existence of some \n\n\nAmong the most important of these studies are Atlantic Research \nCorporation, An Analysis of Post-World War II Manpower Research, Policy \nand Program Experience Applicable to Current Manpower Planning for \n\nPeacetime Conversion of Military Manpower to Civilian Occupations \n\n(Alexandria, Virginia: Georgetown Research Project, 1968); Alan E. \nFechter and Bette S. Mahoney, The Economics of Military Retirement , \nInstitute for Defense Analysis, Program Analysis Division (Arlington: \nInstitute for Defense Analysis, 1967); Sidney A. Fine, "A Reexamina\xc2\xac \ntion of Transferability of Skills\xe2\x80\x94Part I," Monthly Labor Review , \n\nVol. 80, No. 7 (July, 1937), pp. 803-810; \xe2\x80\x9cFor Vietnam Veterans, New \nSkills and Better Jobs,\xe2\x80\x9d Nation ? s Business , Vol. 56, No. 10 (October, \n1968), pp. 84-88; Morris Janowitz (ed.), The New Military: Changing \nPatterns of Organization (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964); \n\n\n325 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nimpediments to geographic mobility and the inadequacy of the military \ntransfer system. The economic problems resulting from the separation \nof large numbers of DOD civilian and military personnel could be some\xc2\xac \nwhat mitigated by the adoption or expansion of various manpower \npolicies. Of particular importance are those policies designed to \nincrease the geographic mobility of labor and expand opportunities for \nvocational training. In view of the absence of perfect mobility of \npersonnel and the relative non-transferability of many military skills, \nthe need for public policy becomes evident. In the past, significant \nnumbers of DOD civilian and military personnel have been unable to take \nadvantage of job availabilities in different geographic locations.^ \nFurthermore, it is evident that many retirees and separatees from \nmilitary service are not technically qualified to fill many civilian \njob openings. These problems must be attacked in order to facilitate \nthe transfer of former DOD personnel to non-military tasks in society. \n\n\n^(Cont*) Charles B. Nam, "Impact of the *G. I. Bills * 1 2 on the \nEducational Level of the Male Population," Social Forces , Vol. 43, No. \n\n1 (October, 1964), pp. 26-32; Ronald R. Olsen, "Phase III, DOD Manpower \nImpact and Adjustment," Civilian Manpower and Community Impact Analysis: \nChanges in Status of Military Installations , U.S. Arms Control and Dis\xc2\xac \narmament Agency, ACDA/E-90, April, 1969; Robert Brooks Richardson, "An \nExamination of the Transferability of Certain Military Skills and Ex\xc2\xac \nperience to Civilian Occupations" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, \nDepartment of Economics, Cornell University, 1967); Laure M. Sharp and \nAlbert D. Bidennan, The Employment of Retired Military Personnel (Wash\xc2\xac \nington: Bureau of Social Science Research, 1966); Leslie Fishman, Jay \nAllen, Byron Hunger and Curt Eaton, Reemployment Experiences of Defense \nWorkers: A Statistical Analysis of the Boeing, Martin, and Republic \n\nLayoffs , Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency \n(Washington: Government Printing Office, ACDA/E-113, 1968); U. S. \nDepartment of Labor, Transferring Military Experience to Civilian Jobs: \n\nA Study of Selected Air Force Veterans , Manpower/Automation Research, \nMonograph No. 8 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968); \n\nCabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End of \nVietnam Hostilities, "Report to the President," Economic Report of the \nPresident Transmitted to the Congress January, 1969 (Washington: Govern\xc2\xac \nment Printing Office, 1969), pp. 187-211; Paul A, Weinstein and Eugene \nL. Jurkowitz, "The Military as a Trainer: A Study of Problems in \nMeasuring Crossover," Proceedings of the 2Qth Annual Winter Meeting , \nIndustrial Relations Research Association, 1967 , pp. 277-287; Harold \nWool, ^Military and Civilian Occupational Structures," Monthly Labor \nReview, Vol. 89, No. 1 (January, 1966), pp. 29-33. \n\n2 \n\nAtlantic Research, pp. 1-13. \n\n\n326 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nVII.2 CIVILIAN \n\nSince 1965 civilian employees of the DOD have represented two- \nfifths of the total Federal civilian workforce and more than 1.7 \npercent of total U. S. employment.^ Thus, any sharp change in the \nnumber of lederal defense personnel will have observable consequences \nupon lederal employment levels and on the civilian labor market. \n\nDuring the 1965 escalation of the Vietnam conflict, DOD civilian employ\xc2\xac \nment increased by about 150,000. It would be safe to estimate that the \nend of the Vietnam hostilities could redice DOD civilian employment by \nnot more than 200,000. Any employment reduction resulting from an \nagreement on arms limitation would be in addition to this number of \ndisplaced workers. \n\nA recent study for the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency \nhighlights the effects of the curtailment of military activities on \nthe civilian labor force.The study focused on the impact on more \nthan 80,000 DOD civilian personnel whose jobs were to be eliminated \nor transferred as a result of curtailment actions announced by the \nDOD in November 1964. \n\nThe curtailment actions forced the DOD civilian employees of \nthe affected installations to adjust their employment status in some \nmanner and resulted in a much greater proportion of the employees \nchoosing to end their career with the Federal government than was \nusually the case. Furthermore, closure accelerated the normal rate of \nretirement by two to five times. Though DOD guaranteed all displaced \nworker3 equivalent positions at some location, those who continued \ntheir careers as Federal government employees often had to take \ndifferent types of government jobs if they were not willing to move \nto a new location. Some few accepted lower grade positions within \nthe DOD and many who continued to work for the Federal government \nfound it necessary to relocate. \n\nThe adjustments required of civilian employees took place rather \nrapidly. DOD civilian employees adjusted their employment status at a \n\n\no \n\nCalculated from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical \nAbstract of the United States: 1969 (Washington: Government Printing \nOffice, 1969), Tables 307 and 570, pp. 211 and 396. \n\n4 \n\nRonald R. Olsen, op. cit . \n\n\n327 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\npace much ahead of the actual phase-out or closure of the DOD instal\xc2\xac \nlations. This suggests that while some had an attachment to the local \ncommunity, nearly all career employees preferred some assurance of theii \njob future. More precisely, the employees did not like the uncertainty \nof continuing employment in a position which might be terminated in the \nnear future. The dominating factor which determined the adjustment by \nthe employee was the relative attractiveness of alternative employment \nopportunities whether they existed in the local area or not. Thus, \nstrong economic and social ties did not seem to impede mobility. \n\nDOD manpower and assistance programs eased the process of adjust\xc2\xac \nment. The assistance program included the following operational ele\xc2\xac \nments: 1) the establishment of the Automated Priority Placement \n\nSystem, 2) the payment of the moving or relocation costs associated \nwith the acceptance of a new DOD position, 3) an income protection \nguarantee which assured employees that their existing rate of pay \nwould be maintained for a two-year period if they remained DOD em\xc2\xac \nployees, 4) the provision of retraining services in cases where \nwarranted, and 5) the provision of severance pay for those workers who \nresigned from their Federal jobs. Factual information on employment \nopportunities within the DOD which permitted the matching of geograph\xc2\xac \nical and occupational preferences was provided to each of the workers. \nDespite the fact that the system did not account for a majority of the \nplacements of workers in other Federal jobs, it did play an important \nrole and increased the number of options open to the workers. The \nprovisions for retraining services widened the workers* range of \nemployment opportunities, but these services where not used to any \ngreat extent, indicating some degree of transferability of existing \nskills between Federal employment and private markets. \n\nBetween November 1964 and July 1967, 48,484 DOD civilian \npersonnel were affected by the closure of DOD installations. (See \nTable 1.) Of the total affected, 32,418 were placed in other Federal \ngovernment jobs and 16,066 were released from Federal employment. \nApproximately one-third of the employees chose to accept private em\xc2\xac \nployment opportunities rather than to continue their Federal careers. \nThis high rate of separation occurred despite the considerable effort \nexpended in offering alternative Federal employment. One of the \nimportant factors contributing to this high rate of separation was the \n\n\nThis rate of separation was markedly higher than the normal \nrate of 5.07 percent experienced by all other departments of the \nFederal government between 1962 and 1966. See Ronald R. Olsen. The \nmost recent Federal turnover rate is somewhat higher, but is still \nwell below the one-third rate for private industry. \n\n\n328 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 1 \n\n\nTHE EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL \nAFFECTED BY THE CLOSURE OF 65 DOD INSTALLATIONS, \n\nNOVEMBER 196A TO JULY 1967 \n\n\nNumber \n\nof \n\nPersonnel \n\n\nPercent of \nTotal \nPersonnel \n\n\nPersonnel \n\n48,484 \n\n100.00 \n\nPlacements \n\n32,418 \n\n66.86 \n\nTransferred with Positions \n\n7,310 \n\n15.07 \n\nOther DOD \n\n20,871 \n\n43.05 \n\nOther Federal \n\n2,025 \n\n4.18 \n\nOther \n\n2,213 \n\n4.56 \n\nSeparations \n\n16,066 \n\n33.14 \n\nResignations \n\n4,227 \n\n8.72 \n\nDeclinations of Job Offers \n\n4,627 \n\n9.54 \n\nRetirements \n\n6,535 \n\n13.49 \n\nOther \n\n677 \n\n1.39 \n\n\nSource: \xe2\x80\x9cReports of Civilian Personnel, 1964-1967, rs Office of the \nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), Department of \nDefense, Washington, D.C., undated, processed. \n\n\n329 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nexpanding economy. It provided many job opportunities in the local \ncommunity. This eliminated the necessity of moving from the local \narea and resulted in many individuals choosing to terminate their \nFederal careers and to remain in the same location. The results might \nhave been quite different had local job opportunities been less \nabundant. \n\nThis experience also suggests certain general conclusions regard\xc2\xac \ning the geographic mobility of different groups of workers. Female \nworkers who are secondary wage earners, older workers near retirement \nage, and younger workers less committed to continued Federal employ\xc2\xac \nment are less likely to move to accommodate new employment than are \nolder, more skilled, primary wage earners. Given an acceptable alter\xc2\xac \nnative, these latter workers will be willing to move appreciable \ndistances in order to maintain their career status with the Federal \ngovernment. The "younger** workers most often choose new employment \nin the local community rather than moving to alternative DOD or other \nFederal employment in other localities. \n\nA duplication of such favorable circumstances might not accompany \nthe termination of the Vietnam conflict and/or an agreement on arms \nlimitation. One should note that during the 1964-1967 period the DOD \nwas increasing the number of its employees due to the expansion of \nactivities associated with Vietnam. The Federal jobs that were offered \nto the affected DOD civilian workers thus came from 1) expanded DOD \ncivilian employment because of Vietnam, and 2) normal replacement of \napproximately five percent of Federal civilian employees per year. \n\nThe end of Vietnam hostilities or an arms limitation agreement will \nmost likely be quite different. First, DOD employment will be falling, \nand while other Federal employment may be increasing, such increases \nwill not necessarily match the DOD reduction as there is a poor match \nbetween DOD occupations and those of other Federal agencies. Second, \nthe rate of reduction of DOD personnel after Vietnam is 15kely to be \nmuch more rapid than the very slow rates characteristic of closures of \nsome of the major installations following the 1964 announcement. If, \nin fact, only a limited number of alternative Federal employment \nopportunities will become available, there will be an even greater \nneed for maintaining a rapidly expanding private economy. \n\nIn light of these conditions, particularly the reduction in the \noverall size of the DOD as required by budget cuts, there has been a \nchange in policy. While civilian personnel will continue to receive \nsignificant aid in adjusting to their change in status, the DOD no \nlonger guarantees each affected person another job offer. Even though \nthe guarantee was ended, the remaining assistance is still significant \n\n\n330 \n\n\nv \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nand includes: priority rights to vacancies in other Defense activities, \npriority for reemployment, transportation and travel expenses, infor\xc2\xac \nmation regarding civilian jobs and retraining programs. \n\n\nVII.3 MILITARY \n\nThe analysis of the adjustment of DOC military personnel to the \nend of the Vietnam conflict or an arms limitation agreement is consi\xc2\xac \nderably more complex than that of DQD civilian personnel. For military \npersonnel both geographic mobility and skill transferability require \nattention. The discussion which follows is phrased in terms of an end \nof the Vietnam conflict. The additional consideration of an agreement \non arms limitations would involve greater magnitudes but generally \nequivalent problems. \n\nBefore the escalation of the Vietnamese conflict in 1965, there \nwere 2.7 million members of the armed forces; three years later the \nnumber had increased to 3.5 million. With the end of Vietnam hos\xc2\xac \ntilities it is generally argued that the decrease in the size of the \narmed forces will be approximately 800,000.^ Coupled with the normal \nretirement rate of approximately 60,000-65,000 men per year, this \ncould create pressure upon the absorptive capacity of the civilian \nlabor market. \n\nThe scope of the DOD military manpower adjustment problem will \nbe significantly influenced by the timing of the demobilization and \nthe resultant pattern of entry into the labor market on the part of \nex-servicemen. That is, of some 800,000 men potentially entering the \ncivilian labor market, one-fourth to one-third are expected to seek \nfurther education or training. ; While some of these students will \nseek part time jobs, considerably less than the 800,000 will seek full \ntime employment after their discharge. If one employs the generally \naccepted demobilization scenario,^ it may be assumed that the reduc\xc2\xac \ntion in the size of the armed forces will be accomplished over an 18 \nmonth to two-year period. The phase-out of military personnel over \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCommittee for Economic Development, The National Economy and the \nVietnam War (New York: The Committee, April, 1968), p. 53. \n\n7 \n\nIbid. More recent estimates place the fraction at one-quarter. \n\n8 \n\nCabinet Coordinating Committee, pp. 191-193. \n\n\n331 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthat period and the more gradual entry into the labor market of the \nportion who will seek education or training will work to reduce the \noverall economic impact of the returning servicemen to relatively \nmodest proportions. \n\nEven though the macroeconomic problems of military manpower \nadjustment may be fairly small, there may be more serious structural \ndifficulties. A major problem could arise in connection with the \nadequacy of training which prepares the military dischargee and \nretiree to assume a constructive role in a civilian economy. Beyond \nthe problems of skill transferability, there could be a problem of \nplacing separatees in a location where there are job availabilities. \n\nThe portion of the ex-servicemen who will be seeking civilian employ\xc2\xac \nment soon after their separation from the military will consist \nlargely of unskilled men between 20 and 24 years of age. The unemploy\xc2\xac \nment rate for this group in the civilian economy is currently about one \npercent higher than the average unemployment rate for the entire labor \nforce. Therefore, the termination of the Vietnam conflict would shift \nthe composition of the labor force and more than proportionally add to \nthe unemployment problem of young unskilled males. \n\nVII.3.1 Retirees \n\n\nWith the end of Vietnam hostilities, the rate of retirement from \nmilitary service may be anticipated to increase. Thus the particular \ncharacteristics of these retirees merit consideration to help under\xc2\xac \nstand their influence upon the adjustment process. Military retirement \nprograms are such that career personnel have about one-half of their \nproductive lives at their disposal when they retire\xe2\x80\x94the average age \nat retirement for non-disability retirees is about 45 years. Thus, a \nsecond career for retirees is not simply a possibility, but a reality. \n\nA recent survey of military retirees has shown that they are \nsomewhat immobile and geographically concentrated.^ Large portions \nof the retirees choose California, Florida, and Texas as permanent \nplaces of retirement; the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area is next \nin order of preference. The rationale for the concentration and a \nsubsequent lack of mobility appears to be the strong tendency to \nremain in the area of present or previous residence where the- retiree \nfeels that chances for civilian employment, particularly Federal \nrelated employment, are relatively good, and where the fringe benefits \nof retirees are available. \n\n\n9 \n\n\nLaure M. Sharp and Albert D. Biderman, \n\n\np. 58. \n\n\n332 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nPost-service planning by retirees prior to retirement seemed \nto be positively related to the retiree\'s success in obtaining employ\xc2\xac \nment six to eight months after retirement. One-half of those entering \nnew positions Immediately after separation were those who had planned \nfor employment at least six months prior to separation. The primary \ndifference between the planners and the non-planners according to \nSharp and Biderman occurred six months after retirement when non\xc2\xac \nplanners were usually job-seekers.-^ Richardson argues that officers, \nin contrast to enlisted men, were more likely to have made arrangements \nfor employment prior to separation.Furthermore Sharp and Biderman \nindicate that a large majority of those employed after retirement and \nseparation did not utilize the assistance of an employment service. \n\nVII.3.2 Separatees \n\nThe end of the Vietnam conflict will result in an increase in the \nnumber of separations from active duty for a large number of both \nofficers and enlisted men. Presumably early steps in the demobiliza\xc2\xac \ntion will involve the deactivation of reserve units which were acti\xc2\xac \nvated at the time of the. 1965 buildup. Since the personnel in these \nunits were generally employed when they were called up, it can be \nanticipated that these personnel will generally have little or no \nspecial adjustment problems .^ To a lesser but still substantial ex\xc2\xac \ntent, draftees were also engaged in civilian pursuits\xe2\x80\x94they were \neither at work or in school when they were drafted. Thus, like the \nreservist they should experience less difficulty than terminated career \nmilitary personnel. The serviceman who was unemployed when he was \ninducted may be quite similar to the long term enlistee in that there \nmay be little for him to return to. Of course the draft-induced \nenlistee is more similar to the draftee than to the true enlistee. \n\nThe adjustment problems will thus be particularly difficult for long \nterm enlistees who will be separated at the end of the hostilities. \nHowever this group is more likely to have a military skill which may \nbe marketable. \n\nVocational and educational training seem to be the major deter\xc2\xac \nminants of the ease of transition to the civilian economy for separa\xc2\xac \ntees. It has been shown that the number of college trained individuals \nwas significantly larger due to the financial aid provided by the World \n\n\n10 \n\nIbid ., p. 106. \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0^Robert Brooks Richardson, p. 126. \n\n12 \n\nPaul A. Weinstein and Eugene L. Jurkowitz, p. 14. \n\n\n333 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nWar II and Korean G. I. Bills. 13 Nam claims, however, that the most \nimportant effect of the G, I. Bills has been on the number of persons \nwho took specialized courses, i.e., trade and commercial training. \nConsequently, an increased number of individuals developed new skills \nor improved educational abilities due to the availability of govern\xc2\xac \nment funds. The length of the training provided by the G. I. Bills \nhas been shown to be a considerable influence on the long-run usefulness \nof the training. 1 ^ It was found that 67.3 percent of the G. I.\'s with \nless than six months of training felt that the training received was of \nno significant value in their civilian job performance, while only 11.3 \npercent of those who were trained for 30 months or more reported that \nthe training was of little or no value.There is little to indicate \nthat a six month training program would be of any more value to Vietnam \nveterans than similar programs were for World War II and Korean \nveterans. In lieu of the six month program, an alternative would be \nto instigate a thirty-plus month G. I. Bill for Vietnam veterans. If \nthe previous experience is a valid indication, the problem of adjustment \nfor these individuals would then be largely contained within tolerable \nlimits. A thirty month G. I. vocational training program with adequate \nbenefits would also have the advantage of lengthening the time between \nthe end of hostilities and entrance into the labor market for these \nindividuals. This would further reduce the immediate pressure on the \nlabor market. \n\nOne may ask if it is not possible that in the normal course of \nmilitary training the serviceman does not develop sufficient skills so \nthat his employability is automatically assured after his separation. \nUnfortunately this is not the case. Wool has shown that occupations \nin the military differ drastically from that of corresponding occupa\xc2\xac \ntions in the civilian sector. Eighty percent of the military jobs \nheld by enlisted men correspond to ten percent held by male civilian \nworkers. Civilian occupations which account for 43 percent of the \nmale civilian labor force account for only 7.6 percent of military \nenlisted positions. On the basis of these data Wool argues that a \n\n\n13 \n\nCharles B. Narn, pp. 28-30. \n\n14 \n\nU. S. Congress, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Readjustment \nBenefits: General Survey and Appraisal, A Report on Veterans\xe2\x80\x9d Benefits \n\nin the United States by The Presidents Commission on Veterans 1 \n\nPensions , Staff Report No. IX, Part A, House Committee Print No. 289, \nSeptember 11, 1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), \npp. 87-89. \n\ni5 Ibid. \n\n\n334 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ngreat degree of slippage would be inevitable., ^ One can safely claim \nthat the military does impart valuable skills on its subjects. The lack \nof skill transferability is not a problem solely because of the lack of \nvocational training within the military experience, for it may well be \npostulated that civilian employers do not make a sincere attempt to \nutilize the skills acquired by the serviceman. There are several \napparent reasons for a lack of transfer to a similar civilian job: 1) \nlittle incentive exists because of the relatively low pay scales in \ncivilian occupations where military skills are demanded, 2) employers \ndo not want to hire ex-servicemen whose training is less thorough than \ncivilian training would have been, and 3) the seniority system precludes \nany immediate economic gain for young separatees.1? \n\n\nVII.4 THE PENTAGON\xe2\x80\x99S EFFORT \n\nThe purpose of Project Transition, which began in late 1967, is \nto assure Vietnam veterans an opportunity to make their lives useful \nand productive after separation from the armed forces. Under the pro\xc2\xac \ngram, six months prior to discharge servicemen are offered job counsel\xc2\xac \ning, vocational training, educational opportunities and job placement \nservices. Assistance is theoretically directed toward men who have not \nacquired useful and marketable skills while in the military. Project \nTransition, a voluntary program, works best when it brings servicemen \ninto private company training programs during their after-duty hours. \nWhile action is being taken to make Transition assistance available \noverseas, the Project is far from universal in that presently, training \ncan be obtained only at domestic bases. Military personnel, particu\xc2\xac \nlarly draftees, are typically returned from Vietnam only a few days \nprior to separation; this obviously precludes any participation in the \nprogram for them. \n\nIf the reduction in the number of military personnel after \nVietnam proceeds according to the generally accepted timetable, there \nwill be up to two years training time available. Thus a training \nprogram such as Project Transition could be expanded in time and \nscope so as to ease readjustment problems. \n\nOne DOD program which will soon be functioning warrants mention. \nThe DOD is expanding the centralized referral system used to place DOD \n\n\n"^Harold Wool, p. 32. \n\ni7 Paul A. Weinstein and Eugene L. Jurkowitz, p. 286. \n\n\n335 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ncivilian personnel whose job status is changed to include military \npersonnel. An important part of the program is that the matching of \nDOD personnel skills, etc. will be to available civilian jobs. \n\n\nVII.5 CONCLUSION \n\nRecent studies provide substantial information about the adjust\xc2\xac \nment of DOD civilian workers to a loss of their positions. Given \nsufficient aggregate demand and the availability of a reasonable number \nof alternative Federal employment opportunities, it can be concluded \nthat the adjustment of DOD civilian personnel to the cessation of \nhostilities in Vietnam will present only a modest problem to the U.S. \neconomy. In addition, it may well be postulated that an agreement on \narms limitation would involve a gradual reduction in DOD civilian \npersonnel\xe2\x80\x94gradual enough to create only a minor labor market problem. \n\nFor two reasons the consequences of a reduction in DOD military \npersonnel are likely to be more severe than those which result from \nthe accompanying reduction in DOD civilian workers. First, the \nreduction in military personnel in the two years following a cessation \nof hostilities in Vietnam will probably be almost five times larger \nthan the reduction in the number of civilian workers. Second, military \npersonnel differ in that they are much 1sss likely to have a skill or \nwork experience that makes them readily employable in the civilian \neconomy. While some servicemen receive valuable training in the \nservice, the skills acquired are often highly specialized or not \nsufficient to transfer to civilian jobs. \n\nBecause of these considerations high levels of prosperity in the \neconomy are necessary to ease the post-Vietnam adjustment but not \nsufficient to assure that it will be easy. Veteran\'s benefits have \nalways aided in the transition by providing the opportunity for ex- \nservicemen to obtain skills relevant to civilian jobs. Newer programs \nsuch as Project Transition differ in that training occurs prior to \nseparation. However, it has not yet been demonstrated either that \nthis is the most desirable time to provide such training or that a six \nmonth training period is of adequate length to effectively aid the \nindividual. \n\n\nf \n\n\n336 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nVII.6 APPENDIX 18 \n\nProject Transition was originated in the latter part of 1967 as \na DOD program designed to ease the transition of military personnel to \ncivilian life. The primary objective of the program has been to give \nthe soon-to-be-released serviceman a marketable skill that will lead \nto gainful civilian employment. \n\n\nThe impetus for the program came from President Lyndon Johnson\xe2\x80\x99s \nM anpower Report in 1967. He ordered government agencies to initiate \na full-fledged effort and sought to enlist the aid of private enter\xc2\xac \nprise to ease the transition\xe2\x80\x94especially for those men who had no \ncivilian skills and a low level of educational achievement. To quote \n\nPresident Johnson, We must make military service a path to productive \ncareers."19 \n\nThe first pilot program was established by DOD at Fort Knox, \nKentucky. By January 1968 programs had been established in all five \nbranches of the service. Operations at all 80 major installations in \nthe country were scheduled early in 1968. At that time 11,000 soon- \nto-be-released servicemen were to be participating in Project Transi\xc2\xac \ntion at 280 military bases across the country. By early 1970 the \nprogram had provided educational assistance and training to about \n85,000 servicemen, and counseling to about 520,000. The scope of the \nProject is also indicated by the anticipated level of effort during \nFY 1970\xe2\x80\x94training of more than 50,000 men and counseling 350,000. \n\n\nThe following sources provided the foundation for this survey: \nJohn I. Brook, "Belated Job Program for Vietnam Veterans," Reporter , \nVol. 38, No. 8 (April 18, 1968), pp. 18-21; "Business Helps GI*s Come \nHome," Business Week , No. 2004 (January 27, 1968), pp. 148-150; Depart\xc2\xac \nment of Defense, Counseling in Project Transition (Washington: Govern\xc2\xac \nment Printing Office, August, 1968); "Helping the GI\xe2\x80\x99s Get New Start," \nU, S. News and World Report , Vol. 64, No. 6 (February 5, 1968), pp. \n53-55; Melvin R. Laird, Defense Report, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense \nProgram and Budget, A Statement Before a Joint Session of the Senate \n\nArmed Services and Appropriations Committees, February 20, 1970 \n(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 96-97; Robert S. \nMcNamara, "Social Inequities," Vital Speeches , Vol. 34, No. 4 (Decem\xc2\xac \nber 1, 1967), p. 102; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, \nManpower and Reserve Affairs, The Transition Program (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1968); and * 5 Project Transition," Newsweek, \nVol. 72, No. 18 (October 28, 1968), p. 90. \n\n19 \n\nManpower Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress , \nApril, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. XVII. \n\n\n337 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nPriority for participation in Project Transition is given to \ncertain groups of servicemen. Those disabled in battle rank first, \nfollowed by combat servicemen with no civilian related skill, others \nwith no civilian skills, those who have such a skill but require \nadditional training or upgrading, and finally those who desire a \ncompletely new civilian skill regardless of their current training \nstatus. \n\nProject Transition is a voluntary program for servicemen with \nless than six months of service time remaining and consists of four \nparts: counseling, academic education, vocational education and job \n\nplacement.^0 Within six months of discharge each serviceman is con\xc2\xac \nsulted about his future plans. Those who decide against re-enlisting \nmay volunteer for the Project. The counseling assists the servicemen \nin determining which program will be most beneficial to them. There \nare three educational programs within the Project: 1) civilian \nrelated skills taught in Armed Forces\xe2\x80\x99 schools, 2) classes developed \nand financed by local, state and Federal agencies, and 3) training \ncourses set up by private industry. \n\nThe success of the program depends in large measure on instal\xc2\xac \nlation commanders and Project officers at each base. This is one of \nthe disadvantages of the program\xe2\x80\x99s decentralization. Theoretically a \nsoldier can work half time at his regular army duties and attend \nclasses the remaining portion of the time. He must also be partially \nfreed of his regular military responsibilities in order to participate. \nThis requires the permission of his unit commander; thus the program \ndepends on the flexibility associated with his military responsibility. \nThe servicemen participating in Project Transition have an opportunity \nto learn or upgrade a skill either in a classroom situation or in an \non-the-job training course associated with business. The base Project \nofficers work with the state educational agencies to establish voca\xc2\xac \ntional courses under the authority provided in the Manpower Development \nand Training Act. Originally, vocational courses offered by the Project \nwere in response to needs for industrial electricians, small appliance \n\n\nThe Urban League provides similar services for Negro Vietnam \nveterans, including not only job guidance, but also counseling on \nhousing, medical care, and other readjustment problems. In eight \ncities the League maintains a staff to devote special attention to \nveteran\xe2\x80\x99s problems, and thus offers a source of help to those not \nable to take part in Project Transition. \n\n\n338 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nrepairmen, draftsmen, welders and computer technicians. Currently \nthe course subjects are selected from the list of job vacancies com\xc2\xac \npiled by the U. S. Employment Service. The training emphasis has been \non computer-era skills, but this is not always the case. One service\xc2\xac \nman requested training as a blacksmith and project officials sought out \na local blacksmith who agreed to train him. \n\nAlmost every one of the men who participate in the private \nbusiness training programs is guaranteed a job at some (and often a \nnumber of) locations, but many prefer to find employment on their own \nin other areas of the country. \n\nThe U. S. government has traditionally offered some kind of \ncompensation or assistance to returning veterans, but Project Trans\xc2\xac \nition is unique in several ways. First, servicemen may start counsel\xc2\xac \ning and/or training six months before discharge, and secondly, this \nis the first time that private industry has participated in training \nservicemen for civilian jobs. \n\nThe cooperation of government agencies and various organizations \noutside the 00D is essential to Project Transition: Federal agencies \nwhich work with the Project include Labor, HEW and the Post Office \nDepartment. Labor and HEW have trained 4500 servicemen under the \nManpower Development and Training Program. Through the Project, Civil \nService, offers job training for the Postal Service and will make transi\xc2\xac \ntional appointments with examination requirements waived.21 The Post \nOffice Department has trained more than 30,000 for postal careers. \nFurthermore, the General Services Administration makes its needs known \nto project officials at local bases. State and local agencies have \nalso assisted with training and have offered employment to ex-servicemen. \nState and local police departments are given special permission to \nrecruit on military installations, and more than 1700 have been \ntrained for jobs in local police forces.^2 \n\nDefense officials are convinced that private firms will provide \nmost of the required job openings. Consequently they expect the \nheaviest load in the vocational training area to be carried by private \ncompanies* The Fort Knox pilot program brought soon-to-be-discharged \n\n\n7 1 \n\nThis occurs in the lower five grades of government service for \nmen with less than high school education. The only provision is com\xc2\xac \npletion of secondary schooling on their own time or completion of \ncourses under the GI Bill. \n\n22 \n\nMelvin R. Laird, p, 97. \n\n\n339 \n\n\nt \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nsoldiers together with Humble Oil and Refining Company in a "dealer- \ntraining" program. Fifty companies, all top Defense contractors, were \nsubsequently asked to cooperate in the program, and nearly all agreed \nto establish courses or indicated active interest. \n\nIn the beginning companies were inclined to take only the best \nof prospective trainees. It is hoped that in the future business will \nalso nuike available to servicemen jobs with less demanding require\xc2\xac \nments. Typically, spokesmen for industry argue that there is a two\xc2\xac \nfold purpose for their participation: to expand the trained workforce \nof their industry and to help solve an important national problem. \n\nProject officials are aware that they are not reaching many of \nthe men for whom the program is especially designed. New programs, \nlargely stemming from the recommendations of an interagency task \nforce, have been designed to assist the veteran with his employment \nproblem. Establishment of a "one stop center" in each of 20 major \ncities is to provide the man coming home with personal attention and \ncounsel on all of his benefits. Another program aimed at attracting \nveterans into public service would require appropriations of $50 \nmillion to subsidize training and provide starting salaries for those \nmen willing to become teachers in deprived areas, policemen, firemen, \nhospital workers, or Federal employees in a number of social service \nprograms. \n\nProject Transition is not without drawbacks. Within the design \nof the program, participation is limited to those with only one to \nsix months remaining service time and to servicemen who can get into a \ntraining course. Although mobility is a marked characteristic of \nveterans, the ultimate success of the program depends on the man\'s \nwillingness to go where job availabilities exist. Military sponsor\xc2\xac \nship may have inherent drawbacks; for example, indifference could \nresult if a prospective participant harbors hostilities toward the \nmilitary. The DOD will not ignore its need to stimulate re-enlistment, \ndespite the affirmation from Washington to "think Civilian" and to be \n"flexible" in releasing men for training. While the costs of the \nprogram are small, there are tight budget constraints. Lastly, it is \ndifficult to identify the proper target groups. \n\nStill, this is the type of program that must be undertaken if \nthe difficulties of the transition to the civilian economy that have \nbeen experienced by many ex-servicemen are to be eased. Base command \nders must come to realize that "mission" orientation is not without \ncost, i.e., on-duty time must be made available for civilian training. \nLastly, training opportunities must be broadened, particularly in \n\n\n340 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nredcral agencies, and all those who wish to participate must be given \nthe time off from their military duties to do so. \n\nPresident Nixon recently signed an executive order that will make \nit easier for veterans to acquire Civil Service appointments provided \nthat they are willing to participate simultaneously in an educational \nor on-the\xe2\x80\x94job training program. He has also shown interest in several \nproposals made by the Cabinet Committee on Vietnam Veterans which will \nease the veterans\xe2\x80\x99 adjustment to civilian life. However, at the \npresent time Project Transition remains the major DOD program designed \nto facilitate the productive adjustment of military personnel who are \nno longer needed in the nation\xe2\x80\x99s defense. \n\n\nVII.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS \n\n\nVII.7.1 Civilian \n\nA manpower policy should be adopted that maximizes the job \nopportunities or protects the employment of the DOD civilian worker. \n\nThis should involve providing him with a preference with respect to \navailable public jobs along with job search allowances, retraining \nallowances, etc., as may be required for either public or private \nemployment. \n\nVII.7.2 Military \n\n1) Project Transition now reaches a very small proportion of \neligible servicemen: it should be expanded considerably. One important \naspect of the expansion should involve a change in the procedure which \nreturns a serviceman from overseas only days before his separation\xe2\x80\x94 \nthus excluding him from participation in Transition. \n\n2) While improvements have been made in the educational payments, \nthey are still quite low. They could be increased both in magnitude \nand duration. \n\n3) More attention should be devoted to the veteran following his \ndischarge from the armed services. The state employment service \nshould take an enlarged role in the matching of training programs with \njob opportunities and capabilities of the individual veteran. \n\n\n341 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTHE INDIVIDUAL AND THE DEFENSE MASS-LAYOFF \n\nCurtis Eaton \n\nwith the assistance of Susan Susemihl \n\n\nThe immediate problems of economic transition from war to peace \nare, in a fundamental sense, the adjustment problems which will be en\xc2\xac \ncountered by individuals. It is the individual rather than the firm, \nregion, or industry that is the principal unit of concern. The fact \nthat certain geographic regions and certain industries will face a \nsharp reduction in the demand for the goods they produce as a result \nof an end to the Vietnamese war, for instance, is of particular inter\xc2\xac \nest in locating the individuals likely to be highly vulnerable. \n\nFor analytical purposes three different groups of individuals have \nbeen isolated. First, many individuals involved directly in production \nfor defense will lose their jobs as a result of contract termination or \ncancellation. Included in this group are people working on prime con\xc2\xac \ntracts or subcontracts which might be eliminated as a result of an arms \ncontrol agreement or an end to the war in Vietnam. This chapter deals \nwith the problems of transition that these individuals will face. The \nsecond is the group employed directly by the United States Government. \nThis group consists of military personnel, people employed in the De\xc2\xac \npartment of Defense, and civilian employees of government arsenals. \nFinally, there are undoubtedly a great many individuals in supporting \nindustries who will lose their jobs as an indirect result of the pre\xc2\xac \nsumed changing pattern of defense demand. The problems which certain \nof these groups might expect to encounter and the special programs de\xc2\xac \nsigned to aid their transition to civilian employment are discussed in \nother chapters. \n\n\nVIII.1 CONTRACT TERMINATION OR CANCELLATION \n\nThe contract termination or cancellation problem is not a new \nproblem to defense-dependent industries. In fact, the problem of \ndefense-related mass-layoffs has received a good deal of attention in \nthe years since 1963. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) \nhas totally or partially funded four studies dealing with mass-layoffs \nin the aerospace industry. In December of 1963, the Department of \nDefense (DOD) cancelled a contract with the Boeing Company of Seattle \n\n\n342 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nto design and produce the Dyna-Soar, a manned maneuverable spacecraft. \nAs a result of this contract cancellation, some 5,000 people were dis- \ncharged in the December 1963 \xe2\x80\x94 March 1964 period. A case study of this \nlayoff was conducted by the Washington State Department of Employment \nSecurity. The Martin Company in Denver discharged 4,000 people in the \nfirst 10 months of 1964 as the major Titan missile programs were com- \np eted. The Martin Company itself conducted a case study of the re\xe2\x80\x94 \nemployment experiences of these defense workers. * * 3 4 in the November \n1.63 - December 1964 period. Republic Aviation of Long Island, New \nYork, laid off 10,000 workers as a result of the completion of a con\xc2\xac \ntract to produce the F-105, a fighter-bomber. The New York State De\xc2\xac \npartment of Labor conducted the case study of this layoff. 3 A synthe\xc2\xac \nsis of these three layoff experiences was conducted by a group at the \nUniversity of Colorado under the direction of Leslie Fishman.^ \n\nIn addition to these ACDA sponsored studies, at least three other \nstudies relating to defense layoffs have been conducted. Between \nAugust 1963 and April 1964 the Hughes Aircraft Company of Tucson, \nArizona laid off 2,400 people as production of the Falcon, an air-to- \nair missile, was cancelled. The study of this experience was conducted \nby irevor Bain. Two additional studies have concentrated on the pro\xc2\xac \n\n\nstate of Washington, Employment Security Department, The Dyna- \nSoar Contract Cancellation , U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency \nPublication No. 29 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965). \n\n\nWilbur H. Thompson, James W. Taylor and Leslie Fishman, Martin \nCompany Employees Reemployment Experiences , U.S. Arms Control and Dis\xc2\xac \narmament Agency Publication No. 36 (Washington: Government Printing \nOffice, 1966). \n\n3 . \n\nNew York State Department of Labor, Post Layoff Experiences, Re\xc2\xac \npublic Aviation Workers , U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Pub\xc2\xac \nlication No. 35 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966). \n\n4 - \n\nLeslie Fishman, Jay Allen, Byron Bunger, and Curt Eaton, Re\xc2\xac \nemployment Experiences of Defense Workers: A Statistical Analysis of \nthe Boeing, Martin, and Republic Layoffs , Prepared for the U.S. Arms \nControl and Disarmament Agency (Washington: Government Printing Office, \nACDA/E-113, 1968). \n\n^Trevor Bain, Defense Manpower and Contract Termination (Tucson, \nArizona: University of Arizona, College of Business and Public Adminis\xc2\xac \ntration, Division of Economic and Business Research, September, 1968). \n\n\n343 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nblems encountered by scientists and engineers involved in defense layoffs. \nOne of these studies relates to the reemployment experience of approxi\xc2\xac \nmately 1,200 engineers and scientists who were discharged from companies \nin the San Francisco Bay area during an IB-month period ending in March \nof 1965. The other deals with the transition of 5(j0 scientists and \nengineers laid off by companies in the Boston area. These six defense \nlayoffs comprise the principal source of information on the transition \nexperience of discharged defense workers. The general literature deal-g \ning with the mass-layoff problem will also be called upon where useful. \n\nTables land 2 present souse selected characteristics of these groups \nand the corresponding local labor markets. Table 1 presents comparative \ndata on age, sex, and level of education for each of the six groups. A \ngood deal of variability between groups with respect to these personal \ncharacteristics can be noted. The mass-layoff literature has emphasized \nthe importance of these variables in the reemployment experience. It is \ngenerally thought that advanced age is associated with a severe transi\xc2\xac \ntion, that men fare substantially better in the post-layoff job market \nthan do women, and that high levels of education ease the transition. \n\nOn each of these criteria one would expect the Hughes layoff group to \nhave a difficult reemployment experience. As a group they were relative\xc2\xac \nly old (median age of 44.8 years), only 24.4 percent had obtained educa\xc2\xac \ntion beyond high school and over 25 percent of the group were women. The \nRepublic group was also relatively old (median age of 40.8 years) and \nrelatively poorly educated (21.0 percent beyond high school). At the \nother extreme were the Boston and San Francisco engineers. These groups \nwere clearly highly desirable. More than four fifths of them had gone \nbeyond high school; roughly three fourths had a bachelors degree. The \nBoeing and Martin groups were in an intermediate position. They were \nquite young (median age around 33 years) and a substantial proportion \n(more than 15 percent) had a bachelors degree. \n\n\nR. P. Loomba, A Study of the Reemployment and Unemployment Ex\xc2\xac \nperiences of Scientists and Engineers Laid Off From 62 Aerospace and \nElectronics Firms in the San Francisco Bay Area During 1963-65 (San Jose, \n\nCalifornia: San Jose State College, Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, \nManpower Research Group, February, 1967). \n\n/ Joseph D. Mooney, n An Analysis of Unemployment Among Professional \nEngineers and Scientists, n Industrial and Labor Relations Review , Vol. \n\n19, No. 4 (July, 1966), pp. 517-528, \n\ng \n\nWilliam A. Haber, Louis Ferman and James R. Hudson, The Impact of \nTechnological Change (Kalamazoo, Michigan: The W. E. UpjohrTTnstitute \nfor Employment Research, September, 1963). \n\n\n344 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTable 2 presents information on the size, structure, and tightness \nof the local labor markets associated with these six defense layoffs. \nAgain, there is wide dispersion between groups in these measures. \n\nResearchers in the mass-layoff field have generally failed to con\xc2\xac \nsider the impact of labor market variables on the transition. Hence, \nthe selection of variables to characterize the labor market is based on \nthe author*s intuition and on considerations of availability and com\xc2\xac \nparability of data. The San Francisco, Boston, and Long Island labor \nmarkets each had more than 1,200,000 people in the civilian labor force. \nThe Seattle and Denver labor markets were roughly a third to a half this \nsize and the Tucson market was, relative to the others, quite small, \nhaving less than 100,000 people in the civilian labor force. As this \ninformation would suggest, the layoffs in the three largest markets were \nrelatively insignificant, less than one half of one percent of the \ncivilian labor force. In Denver and Seattle the layoffs represented \nroughly one percent of the civilian labor force and in the Tucson market \nthe figure was 2.5 percent. \n\nThe Seattle labor market was flooded when the layoffs began (7.2 \npercent rate of unemployment), while the Denver market was relatively \ntight with a 3.7 percent unemployment rate. Seattle, Boston, and Long \nIsland employment was weighted heavily toward manufacturing; more than \none person in five was employed in manufacturing in these areas. Tucson \nwas again at the other extreme with only one person in ten employed in \nmanufacturing. \n\nThus, these six defense layoffs occurred in widely dissimilar \nlabor market settings, and the characteristics of the affected workers \nvaried a good deal from group to group. This variability indicates that \nthe results of a survey of these six layoffs will be applicable to a \nwide variety of mass-layoff situations. However, no small communities \nare included in the sample. Tucson, the smallest city in the sample, \nhad a population .of more than 200,000 in 1960. Lack of information \nconcerning the impact of mass-layoffs in small communities represents \na major gap in the body of knowledge about defense layoffs. In addition, \neach of these layoffs involved aerospace firms; this, too, limits the \ngenerality of this survey. \n\nVIII.2 SEVERITY OF THE TRANSITION \n\nThe most notable feature of the mass-layoff transition is the \ngeneral severity of the experience. Table 3 presents two measures re\xc2\xac \nlating to the transition experience of the Boeing, Martin, and Republic \nworkers. Information on these three layoffs was included because of \nthe comparable nature of the data. The first measure is estimated \n\n\n345 \n\n\nAge, Sex, and Level of Education for Six Defense Layoff Groups \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\nbO \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nCQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\nG \n\nrH \n\n \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\n3 \n\nM \n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n&\xe2\x80\xa2$ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-H \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\no \n\nG \n\nPd \n\na. \n\n4-> \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\n\nhi \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4-> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-i \n\n\n\nG \n\nto \n\nOn \n\nON \n\nO \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nG \n\ncO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nM \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n3 \n\n\n\nHI \n\nto \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\n4-4 \n\nCO \n\n\nr\\ \n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n*4 \n\nH \n\n0) \n\nC \n\n\nu \n\nT5 \n\n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n(U \n\nO \n\n> \n\no \n\n\n4-4 \n\nG \n\nn \n\n\nG \n\n60 MD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\n\n4-4 \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x82\xac \n\n3 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nH \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\nON \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nM \n\n\nQ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2< \n\nG \n\no \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCJ \n\n3 \n\n\n3 \n\n\npH \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\nDS \n\n0) \n\n\n4-J \n\n> \n\n\n*H \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nG \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa24 \n\n\ng \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n"3 \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nCJ \n\nPH \n\n.G \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nCU \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCU \n\nPi! \n\nC \n\nO \n\n4-> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n5H rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0> \n\nCO \n\na o \n\nS \n\n\nG \n\nc \n\np \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0i \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nc \n\n(U \n\nHi \n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\nG4 \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nU \n\n3 \n\n\nPQ \n\nO \n\nen? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\ng \n\nw \n\n00 \n\no \n\nG \n\nH \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\nP \n\nM \n\nG \n\nH \n\n\n\n.G \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n,G \n\n4-4 \n\n04 \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nG \n\nw \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\nrO \n\n4-> \n\nd \n\nu \n\n3 \n\nvO \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\n0) \n\n\no \n\nP \n\nG \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n\nP4 \n\ns \n\nO \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nG \n\n3 \n\n3 \n\ncu \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\n\nO \n\n\nO \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\ng \n\n\nCG \n\nO \n\nU \n\nG \n\nCO \n\n4-1 \n\nO \n\nH \n\nG \n\nH \n\n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\no \n\nG\' \n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\nhJ \n\n\xc2\xabH \n\nG \n\n-3 \n\nG \n\n> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n9\xe2\x80\x9c \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\nl \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nG \n\n\nH3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n*H \n\n3 \n\nW \n\nG \n\n\n4-4 \n\nQ \n\n*H \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2Hi \n\n\nIn \n\n\nG \n\n\n0 \n\nCh \n\nW \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nH \n\n\n\ng \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nB \n\nCU \n\nrH \n\nC \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\x9d3 \n\nO \n\n<*. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa23 \n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\nr\xe2\x80\x94T \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\np \n\nA \n\nQ \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n< \n\n\n3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\n3 \n\nCJ \n\nd \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n3 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\nS \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\nw \n\nP \n\n<1 \n\n< \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nu \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nCM \n\no \n\nr-\xc2\xbb \n\nr- \n\nvO \n\no \n\nto \n\n\nCU\' \n\n\n\nrH \n\n*H \n\nN \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nH\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2N \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\nd \n\nvO \n\no \n\nMT \n\nr- \n\nCO \n\no \n\nto \n\na \n\n\ntn \xc2\xbb \n\no \n\nr>. \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\no \n\nto \n\nCU \n\n3 \n\na \n\n\n\n\n \n\nO \n\n3 \n\nt*. \n\nO \n\n\nP \n\n\n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n0 \n\nG \n\n*H \n\n\n\n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n5C \n\nP \n\n\nG \n\n! \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n3 \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\nc \n\nG \n\nf-G \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H \n\nr^- \n\nG \n\n3 \n\n-G \n\n\nv-/ \n\n3 \n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\np \n\n4-1 \n\nrH \n\n\nPQ \n\n4-1 \n\n4-4 \n\n\nHI \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nO\' \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nM0 \n\nO \n\n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\nG \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\nQ \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\n4-4 \n\n44 \n\n4-i \n\nvD \n\n\n\n\nCU \n\n04 \n\n3 \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\n00 \n\nHi \n\n0) \n\nPQ \n\n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nO \n\n14-4 \n\ni \n\nPH \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n<1- \n\nCO \n\n \n\nH \n\nG \n\nO \n\nG \n\nU \n\nG \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n60 \n\nM \n\n3 \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nh4 \n\n<1 \n\nc \n\nO \n\nW \n\n\n\nG \n\n\nW \n\n<5 \n\nM \n\n\n\n\nPQ \n\n\n3 \n\ncO \n\nG \n\n*H \n\nJD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n30 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ncO \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n** \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\n\n* \n\n#* \n\nG \n\ncO \n\nG \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nc \n\nd \n\nu \n\nH4 \n\nH \n\nJd \n\nW \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\no \n\no \n\n0) \n\n\nEm \n\nH \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\n> \n\n00 \n\n\n\nPd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\no \n\n3 \n\n0) \n\no \n\ncO \n\nM \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC/0 \n\nPQ \n\nH \n\na \n\nh4 \n\nco \n\ncO \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n346 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSelected Measures of the Local Labor Market for Six Defense Layoff Groups \n\n\nACBA/E-156 \n\n\n\na; \n\nc \n\n \n\n4H \n\n> \n\n\n-H \n\no \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\no \n\n3 \n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nJ4 \n\no \n\no \n\no \n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\ncd \n\no \n\nU \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n>> \n\n\n46 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCQ \n\nO \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n>-4 \n\nHi \n\n\xe2\x96\xba-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n60 \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nU \n\n(5) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n3 \n\nd \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHi \n\n$ \n\nPH \n\nO \n\nr- \n\nrH \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nHi \n\nu \n\nr \n\n\nto \n\nCM \n\no \n\nlO \n\nrH \n\nMO \n\neD \n\nto \n\nX \n\nH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n44 \n\no \n\no \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n* \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n3 \n\nrH \n\n46 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nCU \n\nto \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\nhJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns \n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0sc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nn\xc2\xbb \n\n60 \n\n60 \n\n42 \n\n60 \n\n\n60 \n\n\n\nu \n\nd \n\nto \n\n\n00 \n\nr>. \n\n00 \n\nr-. \n\n\n\n3 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\n\nH> \n\na \n\no \n\nrH \n\nOs \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nVO \n\nrH \n\n\n\nto \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\n\no \n\nCM \n\n\n\n4-4 \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\ng \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xab \n\ne \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nw \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nL \n\nd \n\n\n60 \n\n60 \n\n42 \n\n60 *H \n\n60 \n\nS \n\nV \n\no \n\nrH \n\n<2 \n\n\nLO \n\nLO \n\nCO iO \n\n-3- \n\n\nCu \n\n\n\n\n\n60 \n\n61) \n\n42 \n\n60 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n60 \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n-K \n\nLO \n\nMf \n\nOv \n\nON \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\ntD \n\nJ4 \n\nQ) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nO \n\nMS\' \n\n00 \n\nv\xc2\xa3) \n\nmj- \n\nO \n\nLO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n46 \n\nu \n\nO\'. \n\nCO \n\nOv \n\nMf \n\nvO \n\no> \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\no \n\nmT \n\n04 \n\n\nMf \n\nCv \n\nCM \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n> \n\nrd \n\npH \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nMS\' \n\nrH \n\n\n \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n46 \n\n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n\n\n60 \n\n\n\n\n \n\n60 \n\n\n60 \n\n\n\n\n\nCt3 \n\nto \n\no \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\n\'w \n\n\nOh \n\nvD \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOh \n\n\nCN \n\nr^ \n\n \n\nm \n\nCNJ \n\n\nOh -. \n\nvO \n\nCNJ \n\nO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n*H \n\n4-4 \n\nrH \n\nOh \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\no \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nS< \n\nMl \n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nw \n\nCM \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\n\nN_/ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI \n\nu \n\nG \n\nCm \n\n\nQ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\nX V \n\nG \n\nO \n\noo \n\nvO \n\nCNJ \n\no \n\n00 \n\nCNJ \n\ncu \n\n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCJ \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nid \n\n\nG G \n\n\ncn \n\ncd \n\n03 \n\nG \n\nU \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 E \n\n\nyj \n\n0} \n\n0) \n\nu \n\no \n\nG \n\n\nE \n\n\n00 \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n44 \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\n^5 \n\n\n\n&\xc2\xbbS \n\n4-4 \n\n*H \n\n\n44 \n\no \n\nCNJ \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\nv-/ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\nOh \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\n\n1 \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\noo \n\nNT \n\n O CO \n\n\nCJ \n\n\no \n\n42 \n\nvO \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\no \n\nCO 14-4 *H \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nz. \n\nCO \n\n\nvD \n\n\nH \n\nCM \n\nO \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\nos \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\no \n\n\n00 \n\n\nn- \n\nCD co \n\n*H Oh \n\n4-4 \n\nX \n\n\nCO \n\nCTv \n\n\n\nCM \n\nO \n\n\nin \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\no \n\n00 \n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n50 \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n- o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\nev \n\n50 rH \n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOh \n\nC h cd \n\n\no \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nev \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\ncd h C \n\nCd rH \n\nPh \n\nH \n\nCD \n\nJ-l \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nB 40 \n\n4-4 CD \n\nX \n\nS \n\n\nCD \n\nO \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n4 C P \n\nCD CO \n\n\nco \n\nCO \n\nPh \n\nPh \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\npH \n\na *h a) \n\n*H *H \n\nM \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nV-/ \n\ncd cd x \n\nM-l \n\nP \n\n\n\nCD \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nW \n\n\nrH B \n\n*H Ph \n\n42 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n42 \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nPQ CO \n\n4-4 \n\n4-4 \n\nOh \n\nCO \n\n4-4 \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n- \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4-4 4-1 \n\nCD O \n\n< \n\n \n\n4-> \n\n> \n\n\ncd \n\no \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\n\nm \n\nOs \n\n \n\nP CD H \n\n4-4 \n\nIS \n\na \n\no \n\na \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD 42 \n\n\n12 \n\n\nw \n\n12 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n^V \n\n\xc2\xa3 CD \n\nCM \n\n (2 \n\n4-\xc2\xbb O \n\n\n\nO \n\nw \n\ncd \n\n\n\nCTv \n\nvO \n\nin \n\nm \n\n-d- \n\nCO \n\n<1- \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n \n\n\n\ncd \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nP \n\n*H \n\nCO x mh \n\ncd + \n\nB \n\n\na \n\no \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0< \n\n\ncd \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n40 \n\nXI \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 42 X \n\ncd ii \n\n42 \n\n\nCD \n\nP \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n0 \n\nBOH \n\nrH \n\n4-4 \n\n\n42 \n\n0 \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nol \n\ncd \n\nCd \xc2\xabH \n\nPH \n\n\n55 \n\n4-4 \n\ncd \n\nCJ \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nf2 42 \n\nCD \n\nCO \n\na \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n>% ^ \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n42 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nJn \n\n\no \n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\npi \n\no \n\nX rH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2M \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n42 \n\nr\\ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nOh CD \n\ncd \n\n22 \n\n\n\n0 \n\nB \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n0 \n\nx S > \n\nC2 rH \n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\no \n\no \n\n\n5-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ng \n\no \n\n0 O CD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H P \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nf2 \n\n\no< \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n0 \n\nCd rH \n\n0 \n\n0 \n\no \n\nOh \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nK-4 \n\nCD H \n\ncd \n\na) \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nCJ \n\n\n>s \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4<5 \n\na \n\n \n\nOS \n\nav \n\nin \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nn* \n\nvO \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\na \n\nw \n\n4-4 (2 \n\nP 4-1 \n\nn \n\nco \n\n(D \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ncd \n\n\nCd rH CD \n\n4-4 \n\nPh \n\no \n\n> \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\nCJ \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nOs \n\nCO \n\no \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\n4-4 \n\n4-4 CD B \n\na cd \n\n\nu \n\n(D \n\nX \n\n0 \n\n\ncd \n\n<1- \n\nOs \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\nr^. \n\n\nvO \n\nin \n\nPO \n\nO \n\nCO > \n\nP 42 \n\nO \n\nPM \n\nX \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nm \n\nin \n\n\'d- \n\n>d- \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n>N rH rH \n\n4-4 \n\nH \n\nM-l \n\nCO \n\n\nX \n\nO \n\ncj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\nx a \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\no \n\nCd \n\nn \n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCd CD B \n\n42 \n\nP \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nco \n\nCD \n\n1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n> \n\nCD 42 CD \n\n50 \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\nCO \n\n42 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n(D \n\na> \n\n4-1 4-4 {2 \n\nCd X \n\na \n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\n4-4 \n\no \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\np2 \n\nCO 0 \n\nrH CD \n\ncd \n\no \n\nCD \n\nU \n\n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nCD \n\n4-4 \n\n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n50 -v >^\\ ADJUSTMENT \n\n\nB SALARIES \n\n\nWAGES \n\n\n100 \n\n\nYEAR \n\n\nSOURCE: Computed from data in Economic Report of the President \n\nTransmitted to the Congress\xe2\x80\x9e February, 1970 (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1970). \n\n423 \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 8 \n\nComponents of National Income Expressed as a Percentage \n\nof Gross National Product \n\n\n\nYEAR \n\n\nSOURCE: Computed from data in Economic Report of the President \n\nTransmitted to the Congress. February, 1970 (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1970). \n\n\n424 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFIGURE 9. \n\nComponents of National Income and National Defense as a Percentage \n\nof National Income \n\n\n\nSOURCE: Computed from data in Economic Report of the President \n\nTransmitted to the Congress, February, 1970 (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1970). \n\n\n425 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nthe Gross National Product, we see that compensation of employees has \nrisen slowly from about 50 percent to 60 percent over these forty years \nand that non-labor income has suffered a slow decline. The impact of \nthe defense industry, however, is difficult to detect; the impact of the \nGreat Depression, of course, is quite noticeable. There is some tendency \nfor compensation of employees to rise proportionally during the years \nof heavy war expenditure, but the tendency is small and may easily be \ndue to other causes. It is certainly not large enough to account for \nthe attitudes of support of the war effort found in the labor movement. \nThe general conclusion is that in regard to distribution, the defense \nindustry does not make very much difference, simply because whatever \nincome is created by it is distributed in much the same way as income \ncreated in the civilian economy. \n\nOne problem of the statistics of distribution is that there is \nreally no good data on distribution after taxes. The national income \nconcept excludes indirect business taxes, largely for statistical con\xc2\xac \nvenience, so that it is not possible, for instance, to take the Net \nNational Product, which is perhaps the most significant from the point \nof view of distribution and allocate it among the various sections, \nbecause we cannot allocate indirect business taxes. The whole income \ndistribution segment of the national accounts is in need of thorough \nrevision, especially to take account of the incidence of taxation on \nthe distribution of income, by both size and functional shares. The \ndistribution of income by size (by percentiles, as in the Lorenz curve) \nis of course another matter altogether and we have very incomplete data \non this. What data we do have suggests that the distribution by size \nis proportionally very constant, that is, as national income rises the \npercentile groups 1 incomes rise in about the same propor Lon so that \nthere has not been very much proportional redistribution of income in \nthe last generation. The impact of the defense industry on the \ndistribution of income by size, however, is largely unknown. There is \nsome evidence that incomes are larger in what might be called the \ntechnologically developed segment of the economy within which the \ndefense industry mainly lies, so that it would not be surprising if an \nincrease in the defense industry led to a certain proportional reduction \nin those segments of the economy in which poverty is mainly found. The \nimpact of the defense industry on poverty, however, is far beyond the \nscope of this paper. \n\nWe have already noted the decline in what might be called "non-labor \nmarket income*\' (that is, Business, Professional and Farm income). This \nhas been fairly steady since the Second World War. It reached a maximum \nof 14.7 percent of the Gross Capacity Product in 1945 and had declined \nto 7.1 percent by 1968. This reflects a fairly radical change in an \nimportant sector of the economy which has received surprisingly little \nattention, mainly perhaps because it has taken place so gradually. \n\n\n426 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nOne of the most striking phenomena in the post-war period has been \nthe stability of Corporate Profits. They disappeared altogether, of \ncourse, in the Great Depression, largely as a result of the disappearance \nof Gross ^Private Domestic Investment and the impact of deflation. In \nthe 1950 s they do exhibit cyclical fluctuation, being low in the years \nof high unemployment. What seems to have happened in the Great \nDepression was a peculiarly slippery dynamic process whereby a decline \nin private investment resulted in a decline in profits, which resulted \nm still further decline in investment, investment decisions being \nclosely related to current profit realizations. In the 1950*s this \nprocess is perceptible, but it never goes very far, and is soon brought \nto an end, as, for instance, in 1954 and 1958. \n\nA very interesting question which emerges out of this kind of data \nis what would happen to the American economy if the general level of \nprivate investment were to decline. This could very well happen some\xc2\xac \ntime in the future. The stability of the American economy in the last \ntwenty years has rested mainly on the fact that total gross private \ndomestic investment as a proportion of the economy has been remarkably \nstable. This stability, however, may be a little precarious. For \nexample, a sudden shock to business confidence, might easily result in \na sharp decline in Gross Private Domestic Investment which would be \nreflected almost immediately in a decline in profits. This, in turn, \nmight produce still further declines in investment similar to the 1929- \n1932 episode. At that time there were no offsets to this decline which \nwas accentuated by falling consumption expenditures. This pattern \nadded to the growing unemployment which gave us the Great Depression. \n\nIn the light of the skills and tools of economic stabilization which \nhave been developed in the last forty years, it is likely that any \nsharp decline in Gross Private Domestic Investment now would be at \nleast offset in part by tax reductions, increasing consumption, and \nby increased government expenditure. These offsets, however, might not \nadequately stem the decline in profits, and hence, the drop in gross \n\nPrivate Domestic Investment might again be cumulative, as it was from \n1929 to 1932. By comparison with this possible situation, the adjust\xc2\xac \nments to almost any foreseeable decline in the defense sector of the \neconomy would seem to be relatively easy, as they would probably not \noccasion any sharp distortion in the distribution of national income \nas between wages and profits. Thus, present techniques of economic \nstabilization are perhaps more adequate to handle various degrees of \ndisarmament than they are to manage sharp declines in domestic invest\xc2\xac \nment . \n\nAnother interesting problem is the impact of national defense ex\xc2\xac \npenditures on State and Local Government. The impact is masked by the \nsecular rise in the proportion of the Gross Capacity Product devoted \nto State and Local Government. This may be in part another "Engel f s \n\n\n427 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\neffect,\xe2\x80\x9d simply because State and Local Governments provide services \nwhich tend to be \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99superior goods,\xe2\x80\x9d that is, which we demand more of as \nincome rises. Figure 10 shows the breakdown of the total percentage \nof the Gross Capacity Product spent on National Defense and State and \nLocal Government among various categories. The squeeze of the Second \nWorld War and the Korean War is very evident. The rise in the fifties \nmay be part of the trend referred to above, and there does seem to be \ncertain plateau in the early sixties at about 10 percent of the total. \n\n\n\na \n\n\nIn Figure 11 the various components of State and Local Government \nexpenditure are expressed as a proportion of the total State and Local \nGovernment expenditure, with the National Defense sector plotted at the \ntop for comparison. The relative stability of the proportions is \nstriking, though it is a little surprising to find a certain squeeze \non Police and General Control. It is surprising at first sight to find \nthat the building of the interstate system in the fifties and sixties \nis so little reflected in the proportion devoted to highways though the \nexplanation is probably to be found in the large proportion of Federal \nfinancing. The long slow rise in the proportion spent in education since \nthe middle thirties naturally reflects both rising demand and, at least \nsince the early fifties, the rising proportion of the population of \nschool age. Figure 12 shows the breakdown of educational expenditure \nas between higher education, public and private, and elementary and \nsecondary education, public and private. The rise in higher education, \nof course, is much more dramatic than the rise in elementary and \nsecondary education. It is clear that the defense industry tends to \nsqueeze State and Local Government in general, but there seems to be \nno clear pattern of how this squeeze is distributed among the various \ncomponents. The problem is compounded by the difficulty of allocating \nFederal grants to state and local government. \n\nIt is not the object of this study to derive exact "coefficients of \nadjustment\xe2\x80\x9d which would show exactly how, say, a 1 percent increase in \n\nnational defense would be distributed in increases and decreases total\xc2\xac \ning 1 percent among all the other components of the economy. Nor can \n\nwe predict with any great confidence what the other components would be, \nfor instance, if the national defense component were reduced, let us say, \nto 4 percent. There are too many degrees of freedom in a system of this \nkind to permit exact predictions. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the \nmain portion of the impact is on Civilian Government seems not unreason\xc2\xac \nable, and the experience of the last fifteen years at least suggests \nthat Civilian Government stands waiting to absorb almost anything that \nis released from National Defense. \n\nDefense does not very much affect the distribution of income and it \nseems to have surprisingly little short-run effect on Household Consump\xc2\xac \ntion or Gross Private Domestic Investment. In the long-run of course. \n\n\n428 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFIGURE 10 \n\nComponents of State and Local Government \n\n\n\nSOURCE: Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on Government Finance, \n\n15th Biennial Edition (New York: The Foundation, 1969), \np. 130. \n\n\n429 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPERCENT _ PERCENT \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFIGURE 11 \n\nComponents of State and Local Government Expenditure \n\n\n\nSOURCE: Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on Government Finance, \n\n15th Biennial Edition (New York: The Foundation, 1969), p. 130. \n\n\n430 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFIGURE 12 \n\nschool Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross Capacity Product \n\n\nf0 % \n\n\n8 \n\n\n7\' \n\n\n\nHIGHER EDUCATION: NonpubSic, noneducational expenditures \nHIGHER EDUCATION: Nonpubtic, educational expenditures \nHIGHER EDUCATION: Public, noneducational expenditures \nHIGHER EDUCATION* Public, educational expenditures \n\nELEMENTARY 8 SECONDARY EDUCATION: Nonpublic \nELEMENTARY S SECONDARY EDUCATION: Public \n\n\n\nYEAR \n\n\nSOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United \n\nStates: 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), \nTable 147, p. 109. \n\n\n431 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe main "victim\xe2\x80\x9d of national defense has been the private civilian \nsector of the economy, particularly as expressed in Household Consump\xc2\xac \ntion. This fact suggests also that there may be considerable resilience \nhere and that resources released from national defense could easily be \nabsorbed by an increase in civilian consumption. This, however, would \ndepend on a vigorous tax reduction policy, much more vigorous than that \npursued in 1964. \n\nThe relation of national defense expenditure to inflation has not \nbeen discussed, mainly because that relation is not at all clear, \nexcept in the extreme case of the Second World War, when the relation \nis all too clear. The relation of inflation to unemployment is an \nextremely complex phenomenon about which we know very little. Whether \nthe national defense sector of the economy has any peculiar impact \nhere we really do not know and it would take a study far beyond the \ndimensions of this one even to begin to find out. The real question is \nwhether the pressure to increase commodity prices and money wages is \npeculiarly strong in the national defense sector. It would not be \nsurprising if it were, simply because of the absence of barriers to \nprice and money wage increases in the sector of the economy in which \nthe product is largely disposed of outside the market. It would be \nsurprising for instance, if cost-plus contracts were not inflationary. \nThis is a question, however, that we must simply lay aside for the \npurposes of this study, important as it is. \n\nEven though there are many unanswered questions, a clear picture \ndoes emerge of an economy which is highly flexible, in which many forms \nof adjustment can take place, and which also, at least in the last \nfifteen or twenty years, has had a quite remarkable proportional \nstability, suggesting that there are cybernetic, that is, automatic \ncontrol mechanisms at work in system maintenance. Two general conclu\xc2\xac \nsions emerge; one economic and one political. The economic conclusion \nis that the American economy could adjust without too much difficulty \nto disarmament down to almost auy level as it has done in the past. \nWhatever the political and international obstacles to disarmament, the \neconomic problem is a very minor element in the total system. The \npolitical implication is that in an economy with approximately full \nemployment scarcity reappears, and that defense has a real cost in \nterms of civilian goods not produced and not enjoyed which will be \nincreasingly apparent in the political pressures. \n\nWe could almost look upon the present period as marking the \npsychological end to the Great Depression, in the sense that a majority \nof people in this country now do not remember it at all and were not \ntraumatized by it. This means however that there is a much greater \npolitical awareness of the alternative costs of the defense industry. \nLarge numbers of people are becoming aware that an increase in the \ndefense industry is a decrease for them and for their interests. The \n\n\n432 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nfeeling that the defense sector was costless, which grew out of the \nexperience of the Great Depression, is now very rapidly passing away. \nFurthermore, now that agriculture is down to 5 percent of the Gross \nNational Product, there are no major sources of labor and other re\xc2\xac \nsources available for transfer except for the defense sector. In the \nlast generation we could expand other segments of the economy easily \nwith the resources released from agriculture. Indeed this is precisely \nwhy we have been able to have this enormous expansion of the defense \nsector without any sharp curtailment of the standard of life. Now, \nhowever, even a continuation of the remarkable increase in productivity \nin agriculture which we have had for the last generation would not \nrelease very large labor supplies. We are likely to have increasingly \npressing demands in the civilian economy, both public and private, and \nthe defense industry is the only place out of which these demands can \nbe satisfied. We may expect therefore a continued and rising internal \npressure for reduction of the defense industry, simply in order to \nrelease resources for other badly needed things. Whether our image of \nthe international system and our national role in it will let us do \nthis, of course, is another question, but the pressures will be there \nand will be very strong. \n\n\n433 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nINTERGOVERNMENTAL RESOURCE TRANSFERS \n\n\nDarwin W. Daicoff \n\n\nXI,1 INTRODUCTION \n\n... * \xe2\x80\xa2 5 r \n\nIt has been generally assumed that the cessation of the Vietnam \nconflict and a limited agreement on the control of strategic weapons \nsystems may result in the release of significant amounts of Federal \nfunds for non\xe2\x80\x94defense purposes. When coupled with the anticipated growth \nin national output, the longer-run potential growth in Federal reve\xc2\xac \nnues becomes even more substantial. While it is possible that all these \nfunds will be used by the Federal government, it is likely that some \nportion of these financial resources will be transferred to state-local \ngovernments. Thus, while the resources will remain committed to the pub\xc2\xac \nlic sector, they will have to be reallocated among levels of government. \n\nThe transfers of resources from the Federal to state and/or local \ngovernments may have only a limited contribution to make to the short \nrun maintenance of full employment following the end of the Vietnam \nhostilities. An optimal public policy aimed at maintaining aggregate \ndemand would include monetary and fiscal policy with minimal time lags \nbetween initiation and economic effects. Because of the accompanying \ntime lags, the provision of additional revenues to state-local govern\xc2\xac \nments may be an inappropriate short-run policy tool. \n\nDeficiencies in the operation of the economy which have their \norigin in structural rigidities may be revealed after the end of the \nconflict. While state-local governments can have an appropriate role \nto perform in correcting these structural problems and while revenue \ntransfers would obviously make it easier for these governments to \nfinance the expenditures which would be required to overcome these \nrigidities, such transfers are not a necessary prerequisite to this \npublic spending. \n\nThe case that can be made for revenue transfers relates to the \n\n\n434 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nprobable consequences of some kinds of arms control which will perhaps \ninvolve, but not be restricted to, agreements on strategic weapons \nsystems. Excess Federal revenues, which may appropriately be shared \nwith other governments, take on real meaning in this setting because \nthey assume a size which makes them worthy of serious consideration. \n\nIf military expenditures are curtailed so as to constitute a decreas\xc2\xac \ning portion of the nation 1 2 s output, the well-publicized economic \ngrowth dividend that can flow to the Federal coffers would become a \nsource of funds that may well be shared with state-local governments. \nThe following analysis is focused on this longer run situation. \n\n\nXI.2 THE ISSUE \n\nIn addition to performing the usual type of adjustment planning. \nPresident Johnson instructed his Cabinet Coordinating Committee on \nEconomic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities to "study and \nevaluate the future direction of Federal financial support to our \nstate and local governments."-*- The Committee followed these instruc\xc2\xac \ntions by making the following statement in its 1969 report \n\nAnother area of mounting public concern is the financial \npressure on State and local governments. As a means of re\xc2\xac \nducing the relative importance of the more onerous State and \nlocal taxes, the Federal Government might adopt some general \nscheme of revenue sharing\xe2\x80\x94such as a return of some personal \ntax revenues to the States (or localities) or a Federal tax \ncredit for State income taxes. Some suggested plans would \ncost $5 to $10 billion a year. A specific but more limited \nproposal along these lines would be the establishment of a \ntrust fund to finance a generalized Model Cities program. \n\nAnother major proposal that has much support is the es\xc2\xac \ntablishment of an Urban Development Bank, which would raise \nits funds in the private capital market. This institution \nwould lend to State and local governments at reduced cost, \nthereby relieving the pressure on the market for tax-exempt \n\n\n1 Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End \nof Vietnam Hostilities, "Report to the President," in Economic Report \nof the President Transmitted to the Congress, January, 1969 (Washington: \nGovernment Printing Office, 1969), p. 187. \n\n2 Ibid., p. 206. \n\n\n435 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nsecurities. It would place only a minimal burden on the \nFederal budget since the interest subsidies would be offset, \nat least in part, by increased Treasury receipts from reduced \nuse of the tax exemption. But the charge against national \nresources\xe2\x80\x94and therefore against the peace-and-growth dividend\xe2\x80\x94 \nwould be substantial, depending upon the extent to which the \nBank finances projects that would not otherwise have been \nundertaken. \n\nThus the Committee*s evaluation of intergovernmental resource \nshifts is limited to a listing of some of the major alternatives\xe2\x80\x94 \nrevenue sharing, tax credits, expanded grants-in-aid, and lending. The \nCommittee stopped considerably short of making definite recommendations \nor even offering criteria by which the alternatives could be judged. \n\nThere are many arguments that have been put forth for a transfer \nof resources from the Federal to state-local governments. These range \nfrom philosophical arguments about the proper nature of fiscal federal\xc2\xac \nism to pragmatic arguments about the financial resources and expenditure \nresponsibilities mismatch. \n\nOne of the most telling arguments relates to the potential \ngrowth in revenues at full-employment. Standard economic analysis calls \nfor a Federal fiscal policy of reduced taxes and/or increased expendi\xc2\xac \ntures to handle the "full-employment surplus.\xe2\x80\x9d While the Kennedy- \nJohnson tax reduction is an example of the former policy, expenditure \nincreases are often argued as being preferable. This is particularly \nthe case for those who follow Galbraith*s argument regarding private \naffluence and public starvation. j While it may be argued that in\xc2\xac \ncreased public spending is desirable as an offset to a potential full- \nemployment surplus, it is unnecessary that all the increased government \nspending be at the Federal level. This is because some of the areas \nmeriting or requiring increased expenditures are those which have \nhistorically been the responsibility of the state-local governments \nand not of the Federal government. Thus, there is justification for \na transfer of financial resources to state-local governments. \n\nDissatisfaction with state-local government tax sources also \nprovides the basis of support for a resource transfer. State and \nlocal revenue structures are largely composed of property, sales, and \nexcise taxes; these tax sources, on the basis of the standard cri\xc2\xac \nteria of a good tax, are inferior to the income tax. Thus, according \nto this argument, any transfer system that directly or indirectly would \nlead to increased reliance on the income tax would be desirable. A \n\n\nJohn K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton \nMifflin, 1960). \n\n\n436 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nseconu argument against tne present state-local revenue system relates \nto oisuoitions which these systems force on the geographic allocation \nof resources, fiscal distortions result in a less than optimal spatial \nresource allocation. The inability of some state-local governments to \nprovide an adequate level of public services without requiring an \nintolerable level of taxation on the taxpayers in those areas consti\xc2\xac \ntutes a third argument some of the low\xe2\x80\x94income states have some of the \nhighest taxes and yet provide the lowest levels of service.^ For \nsome, it is the equalization of the fiscal capacity of state\xe2\x80\x94local \ngovernments which constitutes the major advantage of the revenue \ntransfer. The well-publicized low responsiveness of state-local \nrevenue sources constitutes a fourth area of dissatisfaction. A \nrevenue problem is said to exist since the income elasticity of rev\xc2\xac \nenue is very low, at least low relative to state-local needs. 5 \n\nMost projections of state-local finances estimate a near balance \nbetween expendit ures and revenues through 1975. 6 A recent projection \n\n4 \n\nSelma Mushkin, John Cotton, and Gabrielle Lupo, Functional \nFederalism: Grants-in-Aid and PPB Systems (Washington, D.C.: State- \nLocal Finances Project of the George Washington University, 1968), \nChapter 5. \n\nWhile the income elasticities of state and local tax sources \nhave been variously estimated, it has been found that they are some\xc2\xac \nwhat greater than unity. As a consequence rising levels of income \nautomatically increase the proportion of the nation*s income going to \nstate-local governments. Thus to argue that they have a problem is to \nargue that the increases in income should call for still larger portions \nof that income going to state-local governments than automatically \noccurs. \n\nSelma Mushkin and Gabrielle Lupo, "Is There a Conservative Bias \nin State-Local Sector Expenditure Projections?*\' National Tax Journal , \nVol. XX, No. 3 (September, 1967), pp. 282-291; Tax Foundation, Inc., \nFiscal Outlook for State and Local Government to 1975 (New York: Tax \nFoundation, 1966). This forecast was updated in Elsie M. Watters, \n"Up-dating State-Local Porjections,*\' a paper presented to the National \nAssociation of Tax Administrators in Baltimore, Maryland, June 10, \n\n1968; Lawrence R. Kegan and George P. Roniger, "The Outlook for State \nand Local Finance," Fiscal Issues in the Future of Federalism , (New \nYork: Committee For Economic Development, Supplementary Paper No. 23, \n\n1968), pp. 231-283; U.S. Congress, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. \nEconomic Growth To 1975: Potentials and Problems , Joint Committee \nPrint, Prepared for the Subcommittee on Economic Progress of the Joint \nEconomic Committee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966); \nNational Planning Association, National Economic Projections to 1975- \n1976. National Economic Projections Series No. 65-2 (Washington: \n\nNational Planning Association, August, 1965). \n\n\n437 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nby William Robinson estimated a deficit in 1975 of $S-$16 billion; this \nestimate is consistent with Netzer\xe2\x80\x99s projected $11 billion deficit. \n\nThe major difference among the various projections is often accounted \nfor by the assumption made regarding incieases in the quality of state- \nlocal services. With significant quality improvements, most of the \nstudies would show a large deficit. \n\nBy looking at the political process at the state-local level, \nadditional arguments supporting a resource transfer can be found. \nState-local governments have had considerable difficulties in their \nattempts to obtain sufficient revenue from their own sources; in part \nthis has been due to the reluctance of citizens to approve tax increases \nand/or bond issues. There is ample evidence of the citizens* striking \nout against taxes when they are called on to vote on local issues. The \npublicized departure of many good mayors and governors is in part \nanother manifestation of this fiscal problem. Sometimes the departure \nresults from defeats at the polls after they have acted to solve state \nor local financial problems, but often the superior elected officials \nchoose not to seek reelection because of the frustration associated \nwith their position. \n\n\nXI.3 THE ALTERNATIVES \n\nThere are a number of alternatives available to the Federal \ngovernment which could be used to accomplish the resource transfer to \nstate-local governments. These alternatives involve either Federal \ndebt, expenditure, or revenue policy. The Federal government could \nretire its debt. It could spend more money either directly through its \nown activities or indirectly by giving the money away. Finally, it \ncould change the tax laws so as to secure less Federal tax revenue. \nThese three alternatives are discussed below. \n\n\nWilliam Robinson, "Financing State and Local Governments: The \nOutlook for 1975," a paper presented at the Eleventh Annual Forecasting \nConference, The New York Chapter of the American Statistical Associa\xc2\xac \ntion, April 24, 1969; Dick Netzer, "State-Local Finance in the Next \nDecade, 5 \xe2\x80\x99 U.S. Congress, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Revenue Sharing \nand its Alternatives: What Future for Fiscal Federalism? Vol. Ill: \n\nFederal, State, Local Fiscal Projections, Joint Committee Print, \nPrepared for the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic \nCommittee (Washington: Government Printing Office, July, 1967), pp. \n\n1332-1366. \n\n/ \n\n8 \n\nA Contrary position is expressed in C. Lowell Harriss, Federal \nRevenue Sharing: A New Appraisal , Government Finance Brief, No. 16 \n(New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1969), pp. 5-6. \n\n\n438 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nXI.3.1 Debt Policy \n\nOne use tor the anticipated fiscal dividend would be to retire \npart of the Federal debt. Such a program would ease the pressure in \nthe money market and could result in lower interest rates and a real- \nlocation of investment funds. Lower interest rates should facilitate \nstate\xe2\x80\x94local borrowing and thus improve the immediate ability of state- \nlocal governments to make public investments.^ In addition, the need \nfor state-local expenditures may be reduced if the reallocation of \ninvestment funds results in private spending of sufficient quantity on \nprograms which would have directly involved the state or local govern\xc2\xac \nment. \n\n\nXI. 3.2 Expenditure Policy \n\nAn increase in Federal expenditures could result from the Federal \ngovernment assuming responsibility for a larger share, perhaps all, of \ncertain expenditures of state-local governments. President Nixon*s \nproposals for welfare reform are examples of this sort of realignment \nof expenditure responsibilities. Others have gone much further in this \ndirection. \n\nAn expansion of present grant-in-aid programs could be used to \ntransfer additional Federal funds. Dissatisfaction with grants has \nbecome widespread and the opposition to them has become vocal. This \ndissatisfaction involves a number of facets. At an operational level \nit is argued that 1) the programs are so numerous as to be unnecessarily \nconfusing and 2) they continue long after their primary need is passed. \nMany cases of program delay and uncertainty have occurred, excessive \nadministrative costs have been required, and, particularly with match\xc2\xac \ning grants, distortions in state-local spending have been observed. At \na more philosophical level it has been said that too much power is \nexercised by the Federal government through too much control over \nstate-local governments and that functional Federalism has developed \nand operates so as to undercut elected s.tate-local officials. \n\n\n9 \n\nGeorge Break, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United \nStates (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 149-150. \n\ni0 See Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, remarks delivered at \nthe Annual Abraham Lincoln Association Dinner, Springfield, Illinois, \nFebruary 12, 1969. \n\n\n439 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThese points argue against making significant amounts of \nadditional Federal funds available to the state-local governments \nthrough expanded grant-in-aid programs. On the other hand, a number \nof arguments have been put forth, including the argument that condi\xc2\xac \ntional grants are required to optimize the allocation of resources \nto state-local spending programs with significant external benefits. \n\nThis is not to say that there will not be significant changes in \npresent grants. The present system could change in the direction of \nlarger and broader functional grants ,12 This has clearly been express\xc2\xac \ned in a message to the Congress in which the President stated : \xc2\xb1J \n\nAmong the first major pieces of legislation I asked \nof Congress was authority to make uniform the requirements \nfor participation in many grant-in-aid programs that have \nproliferated in the last five years. If we are granted the \npower to draw these programs together, to group them by \nfunction\xe2\x80\x94setting far more simple regulations\xe2\x80\x94then states \nand communities will participate more and Congress* original \npurposes will be better served. We need that authority now. \n\nThe most important proposal that would result in a transfer of \nresources to state-local governments through adjustments on the expendi\xc2\xac \nture side of the Federal budget involves unconditional grants of the \nHeller-Pechman type, ^ There has been considerable congressional \nsupport for this type of revenue sharing for at least ten years\xe2\x80\x94over \n100 such bills were submitted in the 90th Congress. The most important \n\n\n^^George Break, pp. 62-106; Selma Mushkin, Functional Federalism , \npp. 24-30. \n\n^^For an analysis of the success\'with grant consolidation efforts \nsee William Robinson, \'\xe2\x80\x99Budgeting for Federal-State Programs: Progress \nand Problems, * 1, Tax Policy , Vol. XXXV, No. 11-12 (November-December, \n1968), pp. 8-12. \n\ni 3 \n\nPresidential Message to the Congress on his Legislative \nProgram, October 11, 1969. \n\n^Walter Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (Cambridge: \nHarvard University Press, 1%6); Walter Heller, ,f A Sympathetic Re\xc2\xac \nappraisal of Revenue Sharing,*\xe2\x80\x99 in Walter W. Heller and Richard Ruggles, \net al ,, Revenue Sharing and the. City (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins \nPress, 1968);and Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy (Washington: \n\nThe Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 207 et seq . \n\n\n440 \n\n\n/ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nrecent;^development regarding revenue sharing is President Nixon*s \nbill* This bill is important not because of its innovative features \nbut because it is the first time a President has proposed a specific \nrevenue sharing plan. It is not the purpose of this study to analyze \nall the features of the various revenue sharing bills or even to \nprovide an analysis of any particular bill. What will be done is to \n\npresent some of the major aspects of the most important portions of \nthese bills. \n\nPerhaps the most important feature of revenue sharing is that \nthe funds would be transferred to state-local governments with few or \nno strings. The money would be theirs unconditionally. It is often \nargued that state-local governments will, out of necessity, spend the \nfunds wisely. \n\nThe amount to be distributed is a percentage of total taxable \nincome reported under the Federal individual income tax. This feature \nallows long-term growth in the grants. Some of the proposals would \nrequire that the amount to be shared not decline in any year. A \nnumber of plans call for the percentage to start out rather small and \nto increase to a maximum as large as five percent. The basic alloca\xc2\xac \ntion to each state would be made on the basis of the state*s share of \nthe nation*s population. Often this basic allocation is adjusted for \nstate-local tax effort and measured by taxes as a percentage of per\xc2\xac \nsonal income. Sometimes a further allocation is provided to low- \nincome states. If per capita grants to states are financed from the \nprogressive Federal personal income tax, an equalization of financial \nresources between states occurs; in this sense revenue sharing is \nredistributional. The inclusion of tax effort (because low income \nstates are high effort states) and the special allocation to low- \nincome states carries this redistribution further. Putting tax effort \ninto the allocation formula also has the consequence of encouraging \nthe state-local governments to maintain or even increase their tax \neffort and not use the grant as an excuse for tax reduction. \n\nDetermining how much of the money should stay with the state \ngovernment and how much should pass through the state and on to local \ngovernments ha 3 been one of the major stumbling blocks in the develop\xc2\xac \nment of an acceptable revenue sharing plan. The point at issue \nrelates to developing a system which guarantees that a major portion \nof the funds will reach the large cities, in which a great need can be \n\n\n15 U.S. Congress, 91st Congress, 1st Session H.R. 13982 (also \nS 2948) introduced September 24, 1969. \n\n\n441 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ndemonstrated, and yet maintain a satisfactory level of flexibility. \n\nSome plans have been silent on this matter, others have proposed manda\xc2\xac \ntory percentage pass-throughs, and still others have sought to relate \nthe pass-through to tax collections, inccme, or population. If a pass\xc2\xac \nthrough requirement is present, it must be decided which local govern\xc2\xac \nment is to receive the funds. In order to concentrate the available \nfunds in areas of greatest need and to avoid encouraging governmental \nfragmentation, a lower limit on size of cities or urban counties \n(50,000 population) which would share in the aid is sometimes made \npart of the plan. Eliminating school districts and special authorities \nas recipients is sometimes suggested as a way to avoid fragmentation .U \n\nXI.3.3 Revenue Policy \n\nThe Federal government has a number of ways to reduce its \nrevenues and to transfer the resources which these funds represent to \nstate-local governments. A simple way of changing Federal revenue \ninvolves Federal action but requires that before any transfer occurs \nthe state-local governments must act.^ If the Federal government cuts \nits taxes and the state-local governments raise their taxes in like \namount, the state-local governments could be assured revenue without \nchanging the total dollar burden on the private sector. However, since \nstate-local tax increases would inevitably involve increases in sales \nand/or property taxes, this policy would result in a deterioration in \nthe structure of the over-all tax system. Requiring state-local tax \n\n\nSome argue that states are now giving substantial aid to local \ngovernment, including the major cities, and can be counted on to share \nany new money with local governments. This position is strengthened by \nreference to legislative reapportionment resulting from the one man one \nvote decision. (See the Ecker-Racz portion in Vol. II, U.S. Congress, \nRevenue Sharing , pp. 998-1006. \n\n~^The Administration spokesman who has been closest to the Nixon \nrevenue sharing proposal has included in a list of basic principles on \nthe topic, the \'\xe2\x80\x99Inclusion of all general-purpose local governments, \nregardless of size or location.\'* See Murray L. Weidenbaum, **A Progress \nReport on Revenue Sharing, H remarks before the Chemical Forum, Washing\xc2\xac \nton, D.C., May 18, 1970, p. 2. \n\n\nIt is sometimes proposed that the Federal government give up \nsome revenue sources on the grounds that state or local governments \nwould then use these sources. The history of the Federal government \nrepeal of the electrical energy tax and the reduction of the admissions \ntax, however, indicates that state-local governments cannot be relied \nupon to use the relinquished Federal tax sources. \n\n\n442 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nincreases before financial resources can be reallocated also has the \n\nserious disadvantage of putting political pressure on the elected \nstate-local officials. \n\n\nPartial credits against the Federal personal income tax for income \ntaxes paid to state-local governments is one of the leading alternatives \nto unconditional per capita grants. \n\n\nFor additional revenue to become available with the credit \ndevice, however, it would be necessary for some state-local governments \nto impose a personal income tax and others to increase rates of exist\xc2\xac \ning income taxes. A tax credit (or source-oriented tax sharing) makes \nno contribution to the equalization of fiscal capacity between states. \nibis is because a tax credit does not directly increase the amount of \ntotal public revenues in any state; all that it can do is to reallocate \npublic funds between the governments within each state. Another weak\xc2\xac \nness of the credit method is its lack of encouragement for state-local \ngovernments to maintain tlieir own tax efforts\xe2\x80\x94thus a tax credit may \nlead to a net tax reduction. \n\nIn making its case for tax credits the Advisory Commission on \nIntergovernmental Relations put particular emphasis on 1) enhancing the \nrevenue raising capabilities of state-local governments by partially \nshielding them from the full impact of intergovernmental tax compe\xc2\xac \ntition, 2) shielding Federal policy-makers from constant pressures for \nincreases in the alternative per capita revenue sharing allocations and \n3) improving the quality of the total tax structure by stressing the use \nof income taxes. \n\n\n19 \n\nGeorge Break, pp. 152-153. \n\n2 0 Ibid. , pp. 153. \n\n21 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has \nrecommended a program containing both unconditional revenue sharing and \npartial income tax credits* See testimony of William G. Colman, \nExecutive Director, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, \nU.S. Congress, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Intergovernmental Revenue \nAct of 1969 and Related Legislation, Hearings before the Subcommittee \n\non Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Opera\xc2\xac \n\ntions, U. S. Senate on S.2483 and S.2048, Commencing September 22, 1969 \n(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 76-109. \n\n\n443 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n1 \n\n\nXI.4 FISCAL POLICY LAGS \n\nRevenue sharing has been advocated as an aid in the short-term \nadjustment to reduced defense spending. Others have argued that \nvarious lags preclude a short-run contribution by intergovernmental \nresource transfers. This section examines the evidence on this \nconflict. When most econometric models separately estimate state and \nlocal expenditures, they generally abstract from Federal payments to \nstate-local governments. In the Brookings model state-local govern\xc2\xac \nment expenditures of various kinds are determined on the basis of the \nnation\xe2\x80\x99s income, population, or other national characteristics which \ninfluence the particular expenditure program.^ i n the state-local \ngovernment expenditure equation, Ando, Brown and Adams use dummy \nvariables to allow changes in Federal programs to influence the total \namount of state-local expenditures for a program that receives \nFederal aid. Thus there is a relationship between the Federal sector \nand the state-local sector, but this relationship is restricted to \nchanges in the level of expenditures before and after specific points \nin time\xe2\x80\x94points in time chosen to reflect significant change in \nFederal aid. \n\nThe Federal Reserve\xe2\x80\x94HIT econometric model is one of the few \nwhich treat state-local government expenditures and taxes as endogenous \nvariables, i.e., they are determined within the model and are not \nsimply tacked on to it.^3 Federal grants-in-aid to state-local \ngovernments are employed as independent variables in the separate \nequations used to determine state-local construction expenditures, \nother purchases, compensation of employees, and transfer payments. \n\nThe Thurow model divides state-local expenditures into two parts: \n\n1) employee compensation and 2) purchases of goods and other services. \nFederal grants are predetermined independent variables in the two \nequations which estimate these expenditures.^^ \n\n\n22 \n\nAlbert Ando, E. Cary Brown and Earl W. Adams, Jr., \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Government \nRevenues and Expenditures,\xe2\x80\x9d in James S. Duesenberry, et al. (eds.). The \nBrookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States (Chicago: \n\nRand McNally, 1965), pp. 533-585. \n\n23 \n\n\' Frank de Leeuw and Edward Gramlich, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99The Federal Reserve-MIT \nEconometric Model,\xe2\x80\x9d Federal Reserve Bulletin , Vol. 54, No. 1 (January, \n1968), pp. 11-40; and Edward M. Gramlich, "State and Local Governments \nand Their Budget Constraint,\xe2\x80\x9d International Economic Review , Vol, 10, \n\nNo. 2 (June, 1969) pp. 163-182, \n\n24 \n\nLester C. Thurow, A Fiscal Policy Model of the United States,\xe2\x80\x9d \nSurvey of Current Business , Vol. 49, No. 6 (June, 1969), pp. 45-64. \n\n\n444 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nNot in the Brookings, the Federal Reserve-MIT, or the Thurow \nmodels do the variables which determine state and local expenditures \nhave a lag which exceeds one quarter. Since the Brookings model \nabstracts from the level of government which finances the expenditure, \nno special knowledge is produced by the model about state\xe2\x80\x94local ex\xc2\xac \npenditure lags. For the Federal Reserve-MIT model, where state-local \ngovernments exist separately, in none of the four equations determining \nstate-local expenditures does the Federal grant involve a substantial \nlag. In the compensation of employees and the transfer payments \nequations there is no lag at all. Thus Federal grants in any quarter \nare determinants of these two components of state\xe2\x80\x94local expenditures in \nthat quarter, tor the construction and the other purchases equations, \ncurrent quarter and last previous quarter grants are both independent \nvariables. The Thurow model contains many independent variables with \none year lags; the Federal grant variable does not involve a lag at \nall. These econometric models then would not forecast excessive lags \nin economic effect should grants to state-local governments be \nincreased. This is inconsistent with the position taken by some \nanalysts. \n\nThe Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the \nEnd of Vietnam Hostilities has stated:^ \n\nDecisions on Federal expenditires, as part of the program \nof fiscal adjustment, should be made in light of the promptness \nwith which various types of outlays will add to total demand. \n\nFor example, according to our staff studies, some\xe2\x80\x94although \nnot all\xe2\x80\x94Federal grant programs to States and localities in\xc2\xac \nvolve a significant lag between the expenditure of the funds \nby the Federal Government and their translation into additional \npurchases by the recipients. Programs with long lags are not \nideal for supporting demand during the transition. In con\xc2\xac \ntrast, other Federal programs generate orders or contracts to \nthe private sector which would increase employment and economic \nactivity promptly even before expenditures are incurred by the \nFederal Government. \n\nThis position was based on an analysis of the spending patterns of state- \nlocal governments and on certain estimates of the time-phasing of this \nspending. It is this time-phasing aspect which was an unsolved problem \n\n\n^Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the \nEnd of Vietnam Hostilities, pp. 196-197. \n\n\n445 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nfor the Committee. In discussing the timing of the fiscal stimulus of \nvarious Federal expenditure programs, Schultze argued that increased \nexpenditures for direct Federal programs have a more rapid and certain \neffect than an increase in grants. 26 He attributed the slowness at the \nstate-local level to 1) the need for matching funds to be approved by \nstate legislatures and city councils, 2) limitations of trained person\xc2\xac \nnel, and 3) organizational barriers. The Committee and Schultze thus \nconclude that some substantial lags, at least for some grant programs, \nwould be present. \n\nAdditional light can be shed on this conflict by looking at the \neconomic consequences which can be isolated from grant programs that \nhave been used as stabilization devices. \n\nFriedlaender has concluded that Federal efforts to use highway \nconstruction expenditures in a countercyclical fashion were not par\xc2\xac \nticularly successful. 1 She placed the blame for this on institutional \nrigidities rather than on any lags in the highway construction program \nitself. It was found that the usual lag between initial approval and \npayment of funds to the states was between one and two years. This lag \ndid not necessarily represent the period from the program 1 s conception \nto the beginning of its impact on the private economy; rather it might \nrepresent the period from project initiation to completion. This is \nbecause the Bureau of Public Roads reimburses the state only for funds \nthat the state has already paid the highway contractor. \n\nThe Accelerated Public Works program is another example of a \nFederal aid program which has been used to help stabilize the economy.^ \nFunds were allocated to Federal departments which then had to approve \ngrant applications from local committees for specific projects. These \nfunds were obligated (or project approved) very rapidly\xe2\x80\x94the last \n\n\n2 6 \n\n\xe2\x80\x9cCharles Schultze, "Budget Alternatives After Vietnam," in \nKermit Gordon (ed.), Agenda for the Nation (Washington: The Brookings \nInstitution, 1968), pp, 13-48. \n\n27 \n\nAnn F. Friedlaender, "The Federal Highway Programs as a Public \nWorks Tool," in Albert Ando, E. Cary Brown, and Ann F. Friedlaender \n(eds.), Studies in Economic Stabilization (Washington: The Brookings \nInstitution, 1968), pp. 61-116, especially pp. 98-101. \n\n28 \n\nIbid. , p. 98. \n\n29 " \n\nData for this analysis was provided by the Bureau of the \nBudget, Executive Office of the President. \n\n\n446 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nproject was approved only 19 months after the first project had been \napproved. While these two cases may not be convincing, they lend \n\nsupport to the position that only minimum lags are present in at least \nsome programs. \n\nThe U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has sponsored a \nrecent st\\icj^ oa the lags associated with certain Federal expenditure \nprograms. The purpose or the study was to provide information regard\xc2\xac \ning the time pattern of the employment impact due to changes in the \ncomposition of governmental spending, Adams and Spiro utilized a case \nstudy approach which included an analysis of four Federal expenditure \nprograms\xe2\x80\x941) NASA programs, 2) Urban Mass Transit, 3) Urban Renewal and \nPublic Construction and 4) The special "D" Highway Construction Program. \nSince three of these program areas involved state and/or local govern\xc2\xac \nments, valuable information was produced relative to the special nature \nof time lags when there is a state-local responsibility for implementa\xc2\xac \ntion rather than a Federal responsibility. \n\nIn some of the programs, administrative or bookkeeping rules and \nprocedures have been found to make a considerable difference in the \nmeasured lags between program components when objective analysis would \nlead one to conclude that there were few or no real differences in the \nactual timing of economic impact. Further it was found that the length \nof time which elapses between initiation of policy and the obligation of \nfunds by the government often turns out to be the true culprit causing \nthe lengthy lags found in the impact of many government expenditures. \n\nThe lapse of time between the obligation of funds and the eventual \nimpact on demand or employment was found to be surprisingly short when \navailable capacity existed in the private sector of the economy. Both \nof these lags may be shortened by a conscious attempt on the part of the \nFederal government. Finally, it is recommended that detailed plans for \nparticular projects be drawn up, approved, and be added to the authorized \nreserve of projects maintained by most agencies, to give maximum flexi\xc2\xac \nbility to any compensatory spending program, where rapid economic impact \nis desired. \n\n\nXI.5 FEDERAL GRANTS AND STATE SPENDING \nFormal models of state-local decision-making are just beginning \n\n\n3Q Earl W. Adams, Jr. and Michael H. Spiro, "The Timing of the \nImpact of Government Expenditures,* Prepared for U.S. Arms Control and \nDisarmament Agency (Washington: Government Printing Office, ACDA/E-157, \n1970). \n\n\n447 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nto appear in the literature of public finance,While models of this \ntype are still in the development stage some clues regarding the possible \nreaction of state-local governments to alternative Federal grant programs \ncar- be obtained from them. Theoretically it is unclear whether a Federal \ngrant for a specific function which requires state matching will in\xc2\xac \ncrease or decrease total state spending\xe2\x80\x94Gramlich argues that the \nmatching grant must increase total state spending while Barlow points \nout it need not, Gramlich and Barlow also disagree about the relative \neffectiveness of unconditional or blocked grants and Federal tax \nreductions in stimulating state and local expenditures. \n\nOn the basis of standard economic analysis, Wilde has concluded \n\nthat it is necessary to know the particular features of a grant program \n\nas well as the characteristics of the recipient governments before one \nis able to predict whether the grant will stimulate total expenditures \nor will reallocate expenditures between aided and non-aided functions.32 \nAt this stage in the development of formal models it must be concluded \n\nthat policy relevant conclusions are still some time in the future. In \n\nthe absence of theoretical answers many analysts have turned to empiri\xc2\xac \ncal work. \n\nA considerable number of attempts have been made to isolate the \ninfluences which account for the variations in expenditures of state- \nlocal governments. One of the earliest of these was done in 1952 by \nSolomon Fabricant.\'^ He used population, income, density, and urbani\xc2\xac \nzation as determinants but did not include Federal grants as a variable. \nSince Fabricant a number of studies have employed Federal grants to the \nstates and/or state grants to the local governments as determinants of \n\n\nJ ^Edward M. Gramlich, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Alternative Federal Policies for Stimulat\xc2\xac \ning State and Local Expenditures: A Comparison of Their Effects,\xe2\x80\x9d \nNational Tax Journa l, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (June, 1968), pp. 119-129; and \nRobin Barlow, "A Comment on Alternative Federal Policies for Stimulating \nState and Local Expenditures,\xe2\x80\x9d National Tax Journal , Vol. XXII, No. 2 \n(June, 1969), pp. 282-285. \n\n32 \n\nJames A. Wilde, ? \xe2\x80\x98The Expenditure Effects of Grant-in-Aid \nPrograms \xe2\x80\x9d National Tax Journal , Vol. XXI, No. 3 (September, 1968), \npp. 340-348. \n\n33 \n\nSolomon Fabricant, The Trend of Governmental Activity in the \nUnited States Since 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic \nResearch, 1952). \n\n\n448 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nper capita expenditures*\' When intergovernmental aid has been used as \na determinant it has been very important as an explanatory variable. \n\nThe use of intergovernmental aid as an independent variable in \nmultiple regression^analysis of state\xe2\x80\x94local expenditures has been sub\xc2\xac \nject to criticism. This criticism centers around 1) the relative \nuniformity of intergovernmental aid, 2) the non-independent nature of \nmatching grants, and 3) the fact that thejaid is, at once, part of the \nindependent and the dependent variable. These points have led to a \nreluctance to use intergovernmental aid a*< a determinant and to look \nwith skepticism at statistical results which employ an aid variable. \n\nGramlich has been able to analyze state-local expenditure re\xc2\xac \nactions on the basis of the Federal Reserve-MIT econometric model. He \nfound that states have a marginal propensity to spend matching grants \nof 1.120. This means that state-local spending changes by 11.2 per\xc2\xac \ncent for each ten percent change in grants. Matching grants were thus \nfound to stimulate states 1 * spending. Thus, the Gramlich findings \npostulate a sizeable reduction in the aggregate fiscal effort of states \nand localities if the aid program were changed to rely on bloc grants\xe2\x80\x94 \nespecially in comparison with the present grant program. The most damag \ning aspect of bloc grants is that they would result in lower expendi\xc2\xac \ntures and/or higher taxes as compared to matching grants. Thus on \npurely fiscal grounds, unconditional grants do not appear to be nearly \nas stimulative as the present matching variety of grants. 3 * * * \' 7 \n\n\nSeymour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and \nLocal Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flows of Funds," \nNational Tax Journal , Vol. XVII, No. 1 (March, 1964), pp. 75-85; and \nRoy W. Bahl, Jr., and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes in \nState and Local Government Expenditure," National Tax Journal , Vol. \n\nXVIII, No. 1 (March, 1965), pp. 50-57. \n\n33 Harvey E. Brazer, City Expenditures in the United States (New \nYork: National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 66, 1959); \nand Jack Osman, "On the Use of Intergovernmental Aid as an Expenditure \nDeterminant," National Tax Journa l, Vol. XXI, No. 4 (December, 1968), \npp. 437-447. \n\n3 ^Edward M. Gramlich, "State and Local Governments and Their \n\nBudget Constraint," p. 179. \n\n3 ^The Administration proposals provide for no "strings" or \n\nrestrictions on the use of the money, however, bee Murray L. Weidenbaum, \n\np. 2. \n\n\n449 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nXI.6 CONCLUSION \n\nA very good case can be made for a transfer of resources from \nthe Federal to the state-local governments. Such a transfer is rele\xc2\xac \nvant today and will be even more appropriate after the Vietnam conflict. \nSuch transfers will have additional feasibility after an arms limitation \nagreement. If such a transfer is not accomplished, it will not be \nbecause of a lack of implementation plans as there are a considerable \nnumber of alternatives. \n\nMany influential spokesmen propose that the transfer be accomp\xc2\xac \nlished by the simultaneous use of more than one mechanism. The leading \ncontenders seem to be 1) a fairly modest increase in present Federal \ngrants-in-aid, perhaps including the Federal assumption of a larger \nshare of the financial responsibility for specific programs such as \nwelfare, 2) a modest beginning of unconditional grants of the Heller- \nPechman type, and 3) partial tax credits which render the Federal \nindividual income tax a substitute for state-local taxes. Grant pro\xc2\xac \ngrams are on the books and could be expanded fairly easily. An \nAdministration bill to begin unconditional grants has reached the \nCongress. Tax credits, because of their influential supporters, have \nmore than an outside chance of adoption. \n\nUnfortunately we know very little about the likely reactions of \nstate-local governments to various resource transfer programs. Neither \ntheoretical nor empirical analysis has yet provided adequate policy \nanswers. Significant short-term lags in achieving an income or employ\xc2\xac \nment effect from grants-in-aid programs are often postulated. A number \nof econometric studies, however, have shown that these lags are, or can \nbe, less serious than they are generally imagined. The Adams-Spiro \nstudy provides evidence that the most significant fiscal policy lag of \nexpenditure programs are internal to the Federal government. The \nalternatives which may be employed to secure the chosen level of \nresource transfers will differ in their economic impact. Both because \nthe Federal government can influence the speed and the direction of this \nimpact and because such influence may be desirable, the Federal govern\xc2\xac \nment could 1) create a \xe2\x80\x98 ? shelf of public works 1 \' to be undertaken at the \nnational level and provide planning grants to state and local govern\xc2\xac \nments so that they also could undertake additional public works, and \n2) create the legal and administrative machinery which would facilitate \nthe resource transfer. This might involve programs such as scheduled \ntax reductions or low levels of revenue sharing which could be \nincreased as needed. \n\n\n450 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nINDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO MILITARY EXPENDITURE \n\nSHIFTS AND CUTBACKS \n\nby Murray L. Weidenbaum \n\n\nXII.1 INTRODUCTION \n\nNumerous shifts have taken place in the past two decades in the \nlevel and composition of military spending in the United States. These \nchanges, in turn, have required various adjustments and responses on \nthe part of the defense industry. \n\nXII.1.1 The External Forces \n\n\nThe largest changes in military spending were the increase in \nAir Force outlays during the period between the Korean and Vietnam \nconflicts, the reverse movement in Army procurements, and the develop\xc2\xac \nment of a substantial military market across service lines as \nestablishment-wide functions were activated or expanded (see Table 1). \n\nAnother way of looking at the basic factors affecting the defense \ncompanies is to examine the changing trends in the product composition \nof military purchases. As shown in Table 2, the major weapon systems\xe2\x80\x94 \nnotably aircraft, missiles, and electronics\xe2\x80\x94have accounted for over \nforty percent of military procurements from the private sector. This \nis the portion of military buying which is characterized by special\xc2\xac \nized development and production of equipment on specific order. Here \ncan be seen the explosive growth of science and technology demonstrat\xc2\xac \ning its effect through rapid creation of successive generations of \nsupersonic aircraft, ballistic missiles, and satellites exploring \nouter space. \n\nThe major changes in military product demand to which the weapon \nsystem suppliers have had to adjust can be inferred from the data in \nTable 2. Aircraft has gone through a cycle of decline and now expan\xc2\xac \nsion as well as through a shift in emphasis from strategic bombers \nto tactical fighters and transports. With the completion of much \nof the production of the second generation of the ICBM\xe2\x80\x99s, such as \nMinuteman and Polaris, a substantial decline has occurred in the \noverall missile category. The expansion of the U.S. involvement in \n\n\n451 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nw \n\nh3 \n\nPQ \n\n<3 \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\nx\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n-0- \n\nr". \n\nax \n\n\n\nin \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n>xO \n\nM r"~ \n\nt(J OX \n\nU rH \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H | \n\nm \n\no \n\nV\xc2\xa9 \n\nrH \n\nco \n\n\n\nOO \n\nCM \n\nO \n\noo \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\nrH r\xe2\x80\x944 \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\nm \n\nx\xc2\xa9 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n*H in \n\nax \n\no \n\nrH \n\noo \n\no \n\n1 \n\n\n\xc2\xab* \n\nax \n\no \n\nin \n\no \n\no \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO CO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n#* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 X \na. a \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 3 \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nx\xc2\xa9 \n\nax \n\nx\xc2\xa9 \n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\noo \n\n\n\no o \n\na -h \no > \n\n4-3 u \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco a> \n\n\n^? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nOx \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 co \n\nCM \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\n\n\nxD \n\nax \n\nO \n\nr^. \n\nCO \n\nox \n\n\n\nu \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n1 \n\n\nm \n\nm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\n\nto \n\nax \n\no \n\nx\xc2\xa9 \n\nm \n\n00 \n\n1 \n\n\n#* \n\nOx \n\no \n\nCO \n\no \n\nin \n\ni \n\n\n>. J3 \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nto r a \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* n \n\n4-J CO \n\n0) \xc2\xa3 \n\n^5 <3 \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nax \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nV-4 \n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 \n\no \n\no \n\ni"- \n\nCO \n\n\n\nX \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nC0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns \n\n\n\n\n\n\nto \n\n\n3 ^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\ntn \n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no co \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCU \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H *4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nQi \n\n\n.fl \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCu \n\n\nrH Cd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCu \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n30 \n\nrH r \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x94v \n\n\n\nx \n\n\n\n\n- \n\n\nO \n\na> \n\na \n\n0 O \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\nu \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n3 \n\n\n\nx-/ \n\n\n\nu \n\n(U \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nx \n\n\n\n0) \n\n<3 \n\n\n\nu \n\np \n\n> \n\n3 \n\nu \n\n44 \n\n\nU \n\n\nu \n\n\xc2\xa33 \n\n> \n\nu \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\no \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\n\nO \n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\naj \n\n\na) \n\n\n\n\nH \n\n<3 \n\nS3 \n\n<3 \n\na \n\n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n<3 \n\n525 \n\n<3 \n\nP \n\n\n\n452 \n\n\nTotal (millions $24,197 $25,312 $23,689 $25,584 $29,254 $29,379 $28,796 \n\n\n\n\nTABLE 1 (continued) \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\no \n\nr". \n\nON \n\n\nON \n\nNO \n\nON \n\n\n00 \n\nNO \n\nON \n\n\nr\xc2\xbb. \n\nNO \n\nON \n\n\nNO \n\nNO \n\nON \n\n\nm \n\nVO \n\nON \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\no \n\n\nm cm \n\n\noo \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\nBnS \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\no \n\n\nCO r*. \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO 00 \noo cm \n\n\noo \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\n\nNO \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n\nr- \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\no \n\nO \n\n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 o \n\nr-. rH \nCM CO \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\n\n^2 \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\no \n\n\nm \n\nON \n\nCM \n\n\nT"- \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\n&\xe2\x80\xa2$ \n\no \n\n8 \n\n\nNO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nd \n\no \n\nH \n\n\nU \n\n< \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\ncd \n\n23 \n\n\n0) \n\no \n\nu \n\no \n\nPm \n\nN \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n< \n\n\nm \n\n\nm \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\n\n00 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nCO \n\n\no \n\nm \n\n\nON \n\no \n\n\nr- \n\nO\'. \n\nn \n\nm \nco \n\xe2\x96\xa0c ry \n\n\nNO \n\n00 \n\nON \n\n\n<1- \n\n{/> \n\n\nm \n\nm \n\nr>- \n\n* \n\nco \n\n \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nNO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2t \n\n \n\n\ncx \n\nCU \n\n0 \n\nco \n\na \n\ncd d \nco cu \nd oo \na> <3 \n\n4-1 \n\na> \n\nQ \n\n\na) \n\no x \n\n\nCD \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n0) \n\n44 \n\nCD \n\nQ \n\n4-) \n\nO \n\nd \n\nd \n\nCD \n\n0 \n\nd \n\nd \n\ncd \n\ncx \n\nN \n\nXi \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\nCJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n> \n\nd \n\n \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nd \n\nCD \n\nd \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nX \n\n\na \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nSo *H \n\n\n*H \n\nrH \n\n> \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nd \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nX \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n0 \n\nco \n\nXI \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nco \n\nO \n\nco \n\n> \n\n(D \n\n44 \n\nco \n\n*H \n\n\n\no \n\n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nCD \n\no \n\n\nS \n\n\xc2\xb0H \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n(D \n\n\nCX CM \n\nX \n\n<3 \n\ncx X \n\nd \n\nco \n\nd \n\nON \n\n\nQ \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n44 \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n>> O \xc2\xabH d \na | d \nd a so a> \n\nCD o d e \n\n00 CJ Cd n *H cd o \nH cd h o \n\n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\nco \n\ncx d \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\nrH \n\ncx \n\nd \n\no \n\nCX \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\ncd \n\nd \n\n(D \n\nd \n\n\n\n \n\n\no \n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nO \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nn) \n\n\na. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nX \n\n(D \n\nd \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n44 \n\nX \n\nQ \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCD \n\n\nON \n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nco \n\nCD \n\nX \n\n\nON \n\n\nX \n\n\n1 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCJ \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nCD \n\nd \n\n\nX \n\nd \n\nrH \n\n\n1"* \n\n\nX \n\no \n\nS>N \n\n\nO \n\nCJ \n\n\nCM \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\nPm \n\nd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2co\xc2\xac \n\n\ncd \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nSo \n\nCD \n\ncd \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n0\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n0 \n\n<3 \n\noo \n\n<3 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n(D \n\n\ncd \n\n\nco \n\n\nd \n\nrH \n\n\nd \n\nX \n\n\n\nd \n\n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\no \n\nco \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\na \n\nCJ \n\ncd \n\nd \n\n\n*H \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\na \n\no \n\n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nCD \n\nd 1 \n\nd \n\n\n0 \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nd \n\nX \n\nCO \n\ncx \n\n> \n\n(X \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H \n\n0 \n\nO \n\nu \n\nX \n\na> \n\n* \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nv_/ \n\nX) \n\n\nCD \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\n\na* \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\nd \n\n00 \n\nCN \n\nCD \n\n> \n\nrH \n\n44 \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nCD \n\ncd \n\nSo \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\nO \n\nd \n\nd \n\n44 \n\nd \n\n0 X \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\no \n\no \n\nCD \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nCJ \n\nO \n\n\nH \n\n\nQ \n\n0 \n\n<3 \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nH \n\n\ncd \n\nX \n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n453 \n\n\nSOURCE: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations, Military \nPrime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments or Commitments, July 1969-June 1970 \n(Washington: Department of Defense, 1970), pp. 12-13. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\no> \n\nvO \n\nI \n\nm \n\nm \n\non \n\n\nCD \n\nG \n\ncd \n\na) \n\n\ncd \n\nu \n\nCD \n\n\nFn \n\n\n4-i Cd \n\n2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\non \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\nVO \n\nco \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nON \n\n00 \n\nON \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nr- \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\nON \n\nin \n\ne- \n\nin \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nVO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\non \n\nO \n\no \n\nrH \n\noo \n\nCM \n\n\nON \n\neg \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2N \n\nON \n\no \n\n00 \n\neg \n\no \n\nm \n\n\nON \n\nm \n\n^N \n\nrH \n\no \n\nco \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n6-2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\nm \n\nO \n\nr*- \n\n00 \n\ne>- \n\no \n\nrH \n\nin \n\nm \n\n00 \n\no \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\neg \n\neg \n\nrH \n\no \n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nON \n\nO \n\nCM \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n^^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\nTJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\nT3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<1) \n\nr \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 ) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0 ) \n\n\n\nS \n\no \n\ng \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\n \n\n42 \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n0 ) \n\n42 \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\ng \n\n\n4J \n\nCD \n\nG \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\nCD \n\nO \n\n\n\nC/3 \n\n\n\n<3 \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\n\ncn \n\n\n\nC \n\n4-1 \n\no \n\nG \n\nOC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n0 \n\nOC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nO \n\n0 ) \n\n\n\nX5 \n\n\n\nrH \n\nXJ \n\nXJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n \n\nCD \n\nCL> \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH \n\nT) \n\ncd \n\no \n\nCD \n\na \n\na \n\n> \n\na) \n\n> \n\ncd \n\nT3 \n\ncd \n\na \n\nCD \n\nO \n\na \n\n> \n\n0) \n\n> \n\ncd \n\nO \n\n4J \n\ng \n\nCD \n\n \n\n\nox \n\nxo \n\ncrx \n\n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\nax \n\nn \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOx \n\ncm \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nin \n\nO \n\nOx \n\n*H \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nvo \n\n00 \n\nOV \n\n\nO\' \n\n \n\n\ncn \n\nM3 \n\nO \n\n\ncS \n\n\nM3 \n\nu \ncd \nffi \n\n\n0) \n\n2 \n\nO \n\na> \n\n\n\nm \n\nn ^ m to h n c?\\ lt\\ \n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 f"- \n\n \n\n\n0) \n\no \n\ncn \n\n\nid \n\n\ncn \n\n4-J \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n.JO \n\nhJ \n\n\nXI \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n\ncn \n\n\nvO \n\n6-S \n\nO \n\nvD \n\nn- \n\n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nOx \n\nO \n\nar\\ \n\n0 \n\nOv \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\ntn \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nn \n\nO \n\nr^ O O tH \n\n00 \n\nr-. \n\nVO \n\n! \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nrt\\ \n\n1 r~\\ \n\nO *n 0 vex \n\n\xc2\xbbr\\ \n\nry \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nCM rH rH \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-> \n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\nCL) \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nni \n\ncn \n\n>x \n\n\ncd \n\ng \n\n<3 \n\nd \n\n\na \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\n\n4-J \n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n<3 \n\n\nM3 \n\nrH \n\nM3 \n\n4J \n\n\nd cn \n\ncd \n\nO \n\ntd \n\n\ncd 0 \n\na \n\n\nO \n\n/ \xe2\x80\x94 s \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\n\n4 -J to d \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\n4-J \n\n\nM-4 CU O \n\n4-J \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\nCd rH d \n\n0 \n\n\n2 \n\nrH \n\nd -H 4-J cn \n\n0) \n\nd \n\nXI \n\nCd \n\nU W Cj Cl \n\n> \n\na) \n\n0 \n\n4-J \n\nd 0 } Q) *H \n\nd \n\nx: \n\nd \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H *H rH -d \n\nO \n\n4-J \n\nPH \n\nH \n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\ncn \n\ncn \n\n\n\nrH \n\nd \n\n\n\ncd \n\n0 \n\n\n\n4-J \n\nCl \n\n\n\nO \n\ncd \n\n\n\n4-J \n\n<3 \n\n\nOx \n\n\nMe \n\n\nOV \n\nO \n\n\nO \n\n#v \n\nM \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\nCM \n\nM3 \n\n> \n\n\nx \n\nC \n\nd \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\n1 \n\nQ) \n\n0 \n\n6 \n\n\n-d \n\nXI \n\n\nd \n\n4-J \n\n\nrH \n\ncd \n\nO \n\n14-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nH \n\n\nO \n\ncd \n\n\nM3 \n\n\n4-J \n\nrx \n\nd \n\ncn \n\nQJ \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nr <3 \n\n0 \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncn \n\n*H \n\nM3 \n\n4-J \n\n0) \n\nrH \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\nrH \n\nM3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nrH *H \n\nrt \n\n3 \n\n> \n\nCd B \n\n3 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nd \n\n4-J ^ \n\n0 \n\n\na) \n\n0 \n\nPi \n\n\nCO \n\nH \n\ncd \n\n>0 \n\n\n<3 \n\n2 \n\n\na) \n\n00 \n\ncd \n\ncn \n\nH \n\n3 \n\n0 " \n\nw \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab \n\n00 \n\na \n\n\n\nCO \n\n<3 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-J \n\nX \n\n<3 \n\nH \n\n\n<3 \n\nO \n\nd \n\n(3 \n\n4-J \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\n-O \n\n2 \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n455 \n\n\nServices, Construction, All Actions of Less Than $10,000, Intragovemmental, Work Outside \nU.S., Educational and Non-Profit Institutions \n\nSOURCE: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations, Military \nPrime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments or Commitments, July, 1969-June, 1970 \n(Washington: Department of Defense), pp. 22-24. \xe2\x80\x99 1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nVietnam resulted in another major shift, with greater emphasis on \nfighter aircraft, conventional armaments, food, clothing and fuel. \n\nMilitary purchases of relatively standard, commercial types of \nmanufactured items receive much smaller shares of the defense budget. \nItems procured include petroleum products, spare parts, medical equip\xc2\xac \nment, and office supplies. Although smaller than the weapon system \nmarket, this category of military procurement is of interest to nearly \nall elements of American industry. The requirements are relatively \nstable, with a far lower rate of product obsolescence than is the \ncase for the exotic weapon systems. \n\nXII.1.2 The Internal Responses \n\nThe responses on the part of defense contractors to these basic \nchanges in their external environment take a number of forms. Some \nare essentially passive, such as layoffs of personnel when contracts \nare terminated. Other actions are more positive, such as attempts \nat diversification into nonmilitary lines of business. Still other \nresponses are more hedged, such as contingency planning. \n\nEach of these industry reactions to shifts in defense demand \nis analyzed in the sections that follow. Greatest attention is paid \nto diversification experiences and potentials. \n\nXII.2 RESPONSES TO PRIOR CUTBACKS \n\nA study of a representative sample of large defense contractors, \nconducted by the Stanford Research Institute, reported a basically \nsimilar pattern of initial company response to a decline in defense \nbusiness. \xe2\x80\x98 The immediate action was to lay off large numbers of \npersonnel, with little distinction as to whether they were production \nor research and development personnel. \n\nIn all cases, the companies made a specific effort to retain \nthe better people by bumping personnel in other parts of the company, \neven though they may not have been working on the project being can\xc2\xac \ncelled or cut back. This move to maintain the better people \xe2\x80\x94 in\xc2\xac \ncluding managerial, production, and R & D \xe2\x80\x94 was found to be a \n\n\nMurray L. Weidenbaum and A. B. Rozet, Potential Industrial \nAdjustments to Shifts in Defense Spending (Menlo Park, California: \nStanford Research Institute, November, 1963), pp. 15-18. \n\n\n456 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ncarefully studied part of each company\xe2\x80\x99s reaction to a military cutback. \nSuch bumping permeates the total organization, regardless of geographic \nlocation, cost increases, and disruption of other work. \n\nMany industry executives stated that such cutbacks were helpful \nin upgrading the general quality of personnel in the company. One \ncompany which had reduced its R & D organization from 5,000 to 500 \nover a two-year period stated, H In making the cutback we bumped the \npoor people, and in fact, simultaneously carried on a hiring campaign \nso that as a rgsult we were able to upgrade the total R & D result \nconsiderably. 99 \n\n\nThese past experiences indicate that the defense companies act \nrapidly and matter-of-factly in carrying out the pattern of layoff and \ntransfer in the race of actual cutbacks. The internal mechanisms for \nhandling contract terminations in terms of both personnel changes and \ncontractual procedures are well-defined and well-established as a \npart of the industry\xe2\x80\x99s way of life. \n\nIndirectly, shifts in the military market result in more positive \nactions on the part of defense industry management. During the 1955- \n1959 period, that is, following the end of the Korean War, defense \ncompanies made numerous moves to realign their organizational structure \nand to increase their investment in new fields of activity to. meet the \nchanging patterns of weapon system requirements. \n\n\nMost of the actions taken to counter the post-Korean cutbacks \nwere devoted to other areas of military business. As a result, the \naircraft companies, in particular, diversified their product line into \ncomplex electronic systems, propulsion activity, and nuclear work.. \n\nMuch of the investment that went into bringing this change about was \nunder government contract. The amount of risk capital supplied by \nthe companies themselves was relatively limited. \n\n\nIt would appear from these past experiences that, where the \nindustry has substantial amounts of lead time and can see pending \nchanges that can be considered more as opportunities than as threats, \nit will take specific actions oriented to taking advantage of these \nnew opportunities. Generally, these actions have been centered in \nthe familiar government markets utilizing established capabilities. \n\n\nRecently, several large and medium-size defense contractors have \nset up new divisions or subsidiaries geared to providing products or \n\n\n2 Ibid.,p. 15. \n\n\n457 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nsystems to civilian government agencies. Recent organizational changes \nalong these lines have followed one of two paths (see Table 3). Some \ncompanies, such as Aerojet-General Corporation, are setting up divi\xc2\xac \nsions which focus on one specific public sector market, such as \nabatement of environmental pollution. Other firms have set up units \nwith broader charters to seek out government business generally. An \nexample of the latter approach is the TRW, Inc. Civil Systems Program \nManagement Office. \n\nXII.3 CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY \n\nMost surveys of contingency planning by the defense companies \ntend to conclude that the top managements do not seriously consider the \neventuality of disarmament or even of substantial reductions in the \nsize of the military budget. \n\nThe financial vice president of a leading defense company was \nrecently quoted as saying, \'\xe2\x80\x99We\xe2\x80\x99re going to ^ncrease defense budgets \nas long as those Russians are ahead of us.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\nNevertheless, staff studies are commissioned by most of the lead\xc2\xac \ning defense contractors. \xe2\x80\x9dSoft\xe2\x80\x9d planning is being done in the form of \nStudies of "What would happen in the event of disarmament?\xe2\x80\x9d or "Seven\xc2\xac \nteen alternatives to defense production" or "Game theory approaches to \nnational strategy for arms control.\xe2\x80\x9d However, little "hard\xe2\x80\x9d planning \nis found \xe2\x80\x94 in terms of detailed descriptions of courses of action \nthat would bg taken by the companies in the event of arms control or \ndisarmament. \n\n\nXII.4 NON-MILITARY DIVERSIFICATION \n\nThe continuing need for defense industry diversification into \nother markets may have been most clearly expressed by the late John Jay \nHopkins, the founder of the General Dynamics Corporation, in Congres\xc2\xac \nsional testimony: \n\n"Reviewing the history of two almost disastrous \nwars, and appraising the technological and ideological \n\n\nInterview with Samuel F. Downer of LTV Aerospace, reported in \nBernard Nossiter, "The Pentagon\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x99Wish List\xe2\x80\x99 of New Weapons," Boston \nGlobe , December 16, 1968. \n\n4 \n\nWeidenbaum and Rozet, pp. 9, 19-20, \n\n\n458 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 3 \n\nNew Organizational Structures for Dealing with Government Markets \n\n\nCOMPANY \n\nAerojet-General Corp. \n\nAVCO Corp. \n\nBendix Corp. \n\nEG&G Corp. \n\nNorth American Rockwell Corp. \nThiokol Chemical Corp. \n\nTRW, Inc. \n\nWestinghouse Electric Corp. \nAmerican Cement \nControl Data Corp. \n\nEmerson Electric \nLockhead Aircraft Corp. \nNorthrop Corp. \n\nPalph M. Parsons \nRaytheon \n\n\n\nNEW DIVISION OR SUBSIDIARY \n\nEnvironmental Systems Division \nEconomic Systems Corporation \nCivil Systems Division \nEnvironmental Sciences Operations \nNartrans \n\nEconomic Development Operations \nCivil Systems Program Management Office \nUrban Systems Development Corp. \n\n\nConsortium on civil systems market \nunder B. A. Schriever Associates \n\n\nSOURCE: William H. Gregory, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Industry Probes Socio-Economic Markets, \n\nAviation Week , Vol. 88, No. 24 (June 10, 1968), pp. 39-5/, and \n"Job Training Programs Expanding," Aviatio n Week, Vol. 88, \n\nNo. 25 (June 17, 1968), pp. 43-55. \n\n\n459 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nrealities of this century, it is my conviction that \ndefense must be a permanent business \xe2\x80\x94 a permanent \nway of life. And that in order to keep in being those \naggregates of vital skills that underlie our capability... \nto be strong, the modern industrial corporation should, \n\nI believe, seek a broader base. It must be strong in \ndefense production, strong in civilian production. It \nshould not, I believe, for the economic and political \nwelfare of the country, be entirely dependent upon \nthe armed services \xe2\x80\x94 it must not, for the military \nsafety of the Nation, be devoted solely to commer\xc2\xac \ncial causes." \n\nMr. Hopkins went on to note the situation of the companies that had not \nexpanded into civilian markets: \n\n"Those companies which are not yet diversified\xe2\x80\x94 \nwhich depend largely upon military orders \xe2\x80\x94 \nobviously must contemplate serious problems of \nlong-term growth and stability." \n\nXII.4.1 Post World War II Burst of Enthusiasm \n\n\nEver since they attained the production peaks of World War II, \nthe major military contractors have been concerned with the problem of \ndiversifying into new markets and new types of production in order to \nmaintain and expand the scale of their operations. The older and more \nestablished industries, such as automobiles, rubber, and steel, which \nhad originally converted from civilian markets, experienced little \ndifficulty in returning to their traditional lines of business when \nthe war was over. Backlogs of pent-up demand and accumulated wartime \nsavings made this transition relatively easy. \n\n\nU.S. Congress, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representa\xc2\xac \ntives Committee on Armed Services, Hearings Before the Subcommittee \nfor Special Investigations Commencing February 16, 1956, Aircraft \n\nProduction Costs and Profits , (Washington: Government Printing Office, \n1956), p. 2574. \n\nThis section draws upon material in "Aircraft Makers Diversify\xc2\xac \ning," Business Week , No. 891 (September 28, 1946), pp. 21-22; Murray L. \nWeidenbaum, "Product Diversification in Aircraft Manufacturing Indus- \ntry," Analysts Journal , Vol, 15, No. 2 (May, 1959), pp. 51-56; Murray \nL. Weidenbaum, "Problems of Adjustment for Defense Industries," in \nEmile Benoit and Kenneth Boulding (eds.). Disarmament and the Economy , \n(New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp, 66-86. \n\n\n\n\n460 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIn contrast, however, the specialized defense contractors \xe2\x80\x94 \nnotably those In the aircraft industry \xe2\x80\x94 had typically grown during \nthe wartime period from small job shop operations to large industrial \nenterprises. The virtual or at least temporary disappearance of their \nbasic market when the war ended brought fundamental problems of adjust\xc2\xac \nment, The multitude of efforts that these companies made to diversify \ninto other lines of business was characterized by diversity, enthusiasm, \nand confusion. One among numerous examples of the naivete of some of \nthese efforts was contained in the recommendation by a prestigious con\xc2\xac \nsulting firm to one large aircraft producer that it manufacture \npesticides for farmers. \n\nSome of these efforts were merely designed to take immediate \nadvantage of a temporary demand for consumer items which had been \nmissing from the economy during World War II. Other efforts were \ndesigned to utilize the substantial cash reserves accumulated during \nthe war, and to help tide the companies over during the reconversion \nperiod. Some of the defense companies began producing buses, trolley \ncoaches, marine engines, aluminum canoes, and sport boats, which \nrequired their skills in fabricating light metal products. Some of \nthe related products were a bit far afield from their customary fields, \nincluding bottle labelers, coin-changing machines, dry cleaning \napparatus, artificial hands and midget racing cars. Among the most \nimaginative efforts was the production of coffins, both stainless \nsteel and aluminum. \n\nSeveral defense firms became subcontractors for established \ncompanies in commercial markets. In that role, they built heater \ncases, parts for musical instruments, automobile components, plumbing, \ncabinets for radios and water tanks for railway cars. One company \nbought into a consumer finance agency in order to prepare for the post\xc2\xac \nwar boom in private aircraft that, unfortunately, never materialized. \n\nIn general, the income from these new ventures was disappointing. \nThey did not generate a significant fraction of the sales attained \nduring World War II; the profits were often negative. This was illus\xc2\xac \ntrated by the experience of the major aircraft companies during the \ninitial postwar adjustment period,1946-1948, when sales declined to a \ntenth of their former peak and losses totaled over $50 million. \n\nMost of the diversification activities by the major, specialized \ndefense contractors, which were begun at the end of World War II, were \nabandoned as unsuccessful or marginal, or sold to firms traditionally \noriented to industrial or consumer markets. The expansion oi the \nmilitary budget brought on by the Korean War soon turned the primary \n\n\n461 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nattention of these firms back to the military market. When faced \nwith the alternative, few aircraft companies preferred to manufacture \npowered wheelbarrows or buses rather than bomber or fighter airplanes. \n\n\nXII.4.2 Post-Korean Industrial Diversification \n\nThe end of the Korean War, of course, sparked another round of \ninterest in commercial diversification on the part of defense con\xc2\xac \ntractors. These efforts attempted to take account of some of the \nworst mistakes of the past, bypassing particularly the consumer \nmarkets which had prove^ to be so alien to the high-technology \ncefense-oriented firms. \n\nThe largest diversification efforts were represented by the \nclosest adaptations of military work \xe2\x80\x94 aircraft for the airline and \nexecutive markets. The other diversification projects also typically \nwere limited to industrial markets. These included industrial elec\xc2\xac \ntronics, small gas turbine engines, nuclear reactors, wall panels for \ncommercial buildings, and heavy-duty land vehicles. Despite the \nvariety of these latter efforts, the non-government sales of the major \naircraft companies during the middle 1950 f s were almost entirely trans\xc2\xac \nport aircraft delivered to the commercial airlines. Most of these \nindustrial diversification efforts outside of aerospace fields have \nsince been abandoned. The surviving diversification programs continue \ngenerally at marginal levels \xe2\x80\x94 either actually losing money, barely \nbreaking even, or at best showing profit results below typical military \nbusiness returns. \n\n\nXII.4.3 Reorientation in Defense Industry Diversification \n\nDuring the late 1950 1 s and early 1960 5 s, the interest and atten\xc2\xac \ntion of the high technology companies that primarily serve the military \nmarket were focused predominately on the expanding military and closely \nrelated space budgets. The cutbacks in 1963-1964 in military procure\xc2\xac \nment programs, particularly for large missile systems, produced a \nreorientation of defense industry thinking on diversification, a shift \nwith particular significance for the civilian parts of the public \nsector. \n\nSeveral reexaminations of the previous diversification efforts \nof defense contractors, as well as new evaluations of their peculiar \n\n\n\' Ibid. , p. 82. \n\n8 \n\nAircraft Production Costs and Profits, pp, 2724 and 2928. \n\n\n462 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nstrengths and weaknesses, led to the awakening of their interest in \ndoing^work for government agencies other than the military establish\xc2\xac \nment, The success of the leading defense firms in gaining the major \nNASA contracts was an important indication of their ability to use \ntheir engineering and scientific skills in other government markets. \nIt also demonstrated that it was not the ability of defense producers \nto fabricate light metals (shades of aluminum and stainless steel \ncoffins) which was their primary competitive characteristic. Rather \nit was their scientific and systems management capability which \nenabled them to develop and penetrate new markets. In their search \nfor additional civilian public sector business, often the new market \nhad to be established and developed before it could be penetrated. \nThat is, the potential contractors for civilian public sector systems \nnot only had to* convince the government customer that they had the \nability to perform as promised, but that the very undertaking itself \nwas something that the government, rather than private enterprise, \nshould sponsor and fund. \n\n\nXII.5 ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DIVERSIFICATION \n\nFive major methods have been utilized by defense contractors \nfor commercial or nondefense diversification: 1) mergers with a \nvariety of companies in defense and industrial markets, 2) licensing \nof by-products of the military product line to established commercial \ncompanies, 3) joint ventures with foreign companies, usually in a \ntechnical area, 4) creation of a by-products exploration group based \non internal inventions, and 5) permitting military divisions to \ndevelop nonmilitary products during periods of slack defense business. \n\nXII.5.1 Mergers \n\nThp roprapr route is generally taken bv companies that desire to \n\n- -TV- o \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nbroaden their defense capabilities, such as a large aircraft company \n(Lockheed) acquiring an electronics firm (Stavid) or a propulsion \ncompany (Grand Central Rocket). In part, thus, the industrial cap\xc2\xac \nability or diversification that is acquired through such a merger is \noften secondary or accidental to the main purposes of the merger. \nOther mergers are of the "stockholder diversification" type \xe2\x80\x94 Martin \nAircraft Company and American\xe2\x80\x94Marietta. These latter combinations \n\n\n9 See Electronics Industries Association, Changing Times in the \nDefense Industry (Washington: The Association, 1964). \n\n\n463 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nafford little opportunity for utilizing the physical resources \xe2\x80\x94 \nmanpower or facilities \xe2\x80\x94 of the military producers. Several have \nbeen simply viewed as spreading stockholder risks over wider market \nareas. \n\n\nBased on experience since the mid-1950 ? s (see Table 4) the large \naerospace companies--those with assets of $200 million or more at the \ntime of the merger \xe2\x80\x94 have been acquiring companies in other high \ntechnology oriented industries, also primarily catering to military \nand space markets. Over three-fifths of the companies that these firms \nacquired in the years 1955-1967 were in the electronics, chemical, and \ninstrument industries. This development follows from the tendency of \ndefense and space programs to require large amounts of electronic, pro\xc2\xac \npulsion, instrumentation, and other extremely sophisticated \xe2\x80\x99\'subsystems\xe2\x80\x99 1 \nand less of the airframe and fabricating capabilities which were the \nmainstay of the traditional firms in the aerospace industry. \n\nMedium-size aerospace companies (those with assets between $50 \nmillion and $200 million at the time of the merger) have become involved \nin a somewhat different pattern of acquisition. To a far greater \ndegree than the larger companies, these firms have been acquiring other \ncompanies with metal fabrication and machinery production capabilities. \nHowever, these other firms typically are outside of the aerospace \nindustry, indicating a tendency toward diversification, but in somewhat \nless technically-oriented industries than in the case of the larger \naerospace corporations. \n\nIn contrast, the relatively small aerospace companies (those with \nassets under $50 million) have made numerous acquisitions of other, also \nsmall aerospace companies. The differences here are both of degree \nand size. The acquiring companies in this size category, as well as \nthe firms being acquired, are usually suppliers of components and fabri\xc2\xac \ncated parts of larger aerospace systems, rather than designers and pro\xc2\xac \nducers of end products or major technical subsystems. \n\nThe smaller aerospace companies can engage in mergers within the \naerospace industry itself to a far greater degree than the giants of the \nindustry without running afoul of antitrust considerations. Because \nof their limited scientific capability and technical management, they \nare showing far less interest in mergers with companies in highly \ntechnical fields. Like the medium size aerospace firms, the smaller \ncorporations also are involved in a relatively large proportion of \n\nacquisitions of firms with relatively similar levels of technology in \nthe metal fabricating and nonelectrical machinery industries. \n\n\n464 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\ntd \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n1 \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xa31 \n\nco \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\n\n\n\n\n\nSo \n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\ns \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\np \n\nr^. \n\n\n5 \n\n\nCO \n\np \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \'G \n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\np \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\n\nP 1 \n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nB \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrO \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncrj \n\n\no \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4m \n\nSo \n\np \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\na \n\n\n\nPm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\np \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\np \n\nB \n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n0 \n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\nu \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2rH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n13 \n\n\n\nO \n\noo \n\n\non \n\n\nCO \n\n\na \n\n\n\nM \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2U \n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\nW \n\n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nhi \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd" \n\n\n\n\n6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4J \n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\na \n\nm \n\n\nrH \n\n\nON \n\n0) \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\nJ-i \n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\nCD \n\n\n\n\n\n\nPm \n\n\n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x94N \n\n\n\n\n/\xe2\x80\x98\xe2\x80\x98"S \n\n\n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nP \n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\no \n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n\nrH \n\n\n*H \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\no \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n4-1 U \n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n*H \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nO 0) \n\np \n\n0 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n< \n\ncd \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nB \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\nN t>0 \n\n0 \n\nO \n\n\nO \n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H p \n\no \n\nCM \n\n\no \n\n\n \n\n\n\non -H \n\nCJ \n\n \n\n\nCM \n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n\n0 \n\n \n\n\nM \n\n\n\n-U *H \n\np \n\n0) H \n\n\n1 \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nCD \n\n\n\na) P \n\na \n\n&o a) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nrH \n\n13 \n\n\n\nco cr* \n\ncd \n\nM > \n\n13 \n\nm \n\ncd \n\nP \n\n\n\nco a \n\na \n\ncd o \n\nP \n\n \n\n0 \n\nP \n\n\n\n6 \n\n\nmanufacturing is performed; only licensing of Boeing internal inven\xc2\xac \ntions is offered. \n\n\nInternal Development of Commercia l Products \n\nThe commercial, nonaircraft products that result from internal \ndevelopment on the part of defense corporations generally yield less \nrevenue than the items in the basic military product lines. They \nalso account for a minor fraction of the sales volume and employment \nof these companies. Of 23 internal product developments of defense \nfirms analyzed by the Denver Research Institute, 16 resulted in annual \nsales of less than $1 million. Of the other seven, five produced less \nthan $5 million each and the other two, between $5-10 million. Four \nof the 23 were terminated by the time of the study, 10 were losing \nmoney and only nine wejje reporting any net profits, although no profit \nrates were available. \n\nManagement interest and support is often reported as being only \nmoderate and intermittent. The majority of commercial products in\xc2\xac \nternally developed by defense companies fall into three major industry \ngroups: 1) electrical machinery, primarily electronics equipment, \n\n2) transportation equipment, mainly through the extension of aircraft \ntechnology to surface vehicles and^o aircraft handling, and 3) profes\xc2\xac \nsional and scientific instruments. \n\nThe individual commercial items produced and marketed cover a \nwide array: precision-welding machines, lightweight structural \nmaterial, fuel oil registers, gas turbine engines, powered wheel\xc2\xac \nbarrows, aluminum curtain walls, bus bodies and, literally, the kitchen \nsink. \n\n\nIn what is still the most comprehensive analysis available, the \nNational Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1963 commissioned the \n\np. 266. \n\n12 \n\nJohn S. Gilmore and Dean C. Coddington, Defense Industry Diver\xc2\xac \nsification: An Analysis with 12 Case Studies , U.S. Arms Control and Dis\xc2\xac \narmament Agency Publication No. 30 (Washington: Government Printing \nOffice, January, 1966), p. 42. \n\n1 3 \n\nMurray L. Weidenbaum, "Adjusting to a Defense Cutback: Govern\xc2\xac \nment Policy Toward Business," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business , \nVol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 1964), pp. 7-14. \n\n\n\n\n467 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nDenver Research Institute to survey the various types of missile and \nspace technology which either have had or may potentially exert effects \non the civilian economy. Table 5 summarizes the impressive catalogue \nthat resulted. However, no quantification of the results were available \nin terms of jobs or sales volumes that were generated. In part, this \nwas not possible in view of the large extent to which many of^^he pro\xc2\xac \nducts identified had not yet been used in commercial markets. \n\n\nXII.6 EVALUATING THE OBSTACLES TO DIVERSIFICATION \n\nIn evaluating the diversification efforts of the major defense \ncontractors, it is helpful to consider these undertakings from a broader \nview than merely entrance into commercial markets. \n\nIn terms of diversification within military and related high \ntechnology government markets, these firms have been eminently suc\xc2\xac \ncessful. The shift from aircraft to missiles and space systems ranks \nas a noteworthy accomplishment in the development and sale of new \nproducts. (See Table 6.) Moreover, this latter type of diversification \nalso met such basic and important business standards as high return on \ninvestment, increasing the growth rate of enterprise, and effective \nutilization of surplus resources and capabilities. This is a striking \ncontrast to their commercial experience. \n\nA variety of explanations is given by students of the defense \nindustry for the inability of the large specialized government con\xc2\xac \ntractors to use their capabilities successfully in commercial endeavors. \nThe major reasons for the past failures fall into two major cate^gries: \nlack of management motivation and lack of required capabilities. \n\nThe lack of management motivation, it appears, is due to such \nbasic factors as the belief that strong incentives to change are absent. \nThis is bolstered by the feeling that commercial opportunities are in\xc2\xac \nadequate. Thus, defense company personnel who are concerned with re\xc2\xac \norienting their operations to more traditional lines of industry obtain \nlimited interest or support from management. These factors are \ncumulative and interacting. \n\n\nJohn G, Wells, et al. , The Commercial Application of Missile/ \nSpace Technology (Denver: University of Denver Research Institute, \nSeptember, 1963). \n\n^Weidenbaum and Rozet, pp. 34-38. \n\n\n468 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nU1 \n\n-3 \n\n3 \n\nH \n\n\nC \n\no \n\n\np \n\n-C \n\n\nc \n\no \n\no \n\ncj \n\n \n\n\nU \n\n\xc2\xab\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nT3 \n\n3 \n\n\nJ2 \n\n\nc \n\no \n\n\np \n\nJ3 \n\n0 \n\nH \n\n\nV \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nw. \n\nat \n\n\nc \n\n\xc2\xab* \n\n*0 \n\na \n\no \n\n< \n\n\neq ^ \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H O* \n\n\ng \n\n\n3 \n\nA \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2W \n\nId \n\nu \n\na \n\no \n\n\nc \n\n41 \n\nT> \n\n\nO <*d \n\n\n3 \n\nU \n\na \n\ns \n\n1 \n\n\n3 \n\nO \n\n\n\xc2\xbb (J \nO 3 \no -o \n\n4) \n\np{ \n\n\na> \nu \n\nC u \n\n41 \n\nB T3 \n\no. o \n\nO Id Id \n^ O d. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nI I \n\n\n*j ao \n\nc a \n\n41 -r4 \nB \xc2\xab O \n\xc2\xab \xe2\x96\xa0 3 \n> -h -g \no x 8 \n\nU Id u \n\na \xc2\xa3 \n\nB \xc2\xabd \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaH O \n\n\no \xe2\x80\xa2 \xc2\xae \n\xe2\x80\xa2 3 \n\nU II o \n\na \xc2\xab -w \n\ni \xc2\xab c \n\n8*5 \n\nO * t> \n\n^ \xc2\xa3 H \n\n| 8? \n\n\nC X \n\no o \n\n\n4J *o \n(0 V \n>~i m \n4) \n\nac \n\n\nv> o \n\n\nsO \n\n\n& \n\n\ng \n\nje \n\nu \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nH \n\n\ns \n\n\nXXX \n\n\nW X X x X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX \n\n\nX \n\n\nX X X X \n\n\nXXX \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX \n\n\nX X X X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX X \n\n\nX X X X \n\n\nX \n\n\nX X X X \n\n\nX X X X \n\n\nX X \n\n\n3 \n\n \n\nk \n\n\na 3 < w \n\n\nId \xc2\xab 0 \n3 \xc2\xae O \n\n\nQ to \xc2\xab <4 4J \n\no a \xc2\xae v \xc2\xab \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 4) M JC Id Id \n\nO 3 3 \n\n\xc2\xab c -a v \xc2\xabj ~ \n\nu a) 41 w <9 \n\n3 - - \n\nw \n\nId r. \n\n2 91 Id II tl \xc2\xab \n\n\xc2\xae c u 5! a \n\nWKHfcHH \n\n\n3 3 \n\nfl BT) 41 d # \n\nr-l 4J S \xc2\xab Id 3 i \n\n~-d a u Id 3 M 9 \n\nai w a m a id \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbb Id \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2a \n\n\n\xc2\xab \xc2\xab o \nX \xc2\xab u \xc2\xab d-t \n*j oi \xc2\xab a q \n\nfr w *M 5 \n\nO Of -H -4 i \xc2\xabh \n\nU 13 \n\n\xc2\xa3 I \n\n\n469 \n\n\nJohn G. Well*, et_al, The Cocmercl a l Application of Mlaaile/Space Technology (Denver: University of Denver Research Institute, Sept\xc2\xabber, 1963) \np \xe2\x80\xa2 14 \xe2\x80\xa2 9 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMarket Diversification of Aerospace Companies \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nG \n\nON \n\nnO \n\nON \n\n\n00 \n\nm \n\n\non \n\n\non o \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94i i\xe2\x80\x94i \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\n\nno cn \n\nm \xc2\xabH \n\n\n \n\no \n\nH \n\nH \n\n\nG co \n\n\nM \n\nC0 \n\nu \n\nd g \n\n"G \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncu \n\nB 0) \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO \n\nB \n\nU 4-1 \n\n10 \n\n> \n\nH \n\nO \n\nU * \n\n\nu \n\no \n\nu \n\nu \n\n<0 \n\nu \n\nu \n\nd \n\no \n\no \n\n0) \n\nu \n\ncO \n\nM \n\nO \n\nx \n\nu \n\no \n\nu \n\n\nu \n\no \n\noi \n\nT\xe2\x80\x9c \n\nX \n\nd \n\nCO \n\n\nM \n\nai \n\n\nI \n\n73 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\n3 \n\n\nCO \n\n\nrH \n\nr* \n\n\nrH \n\n\n4-1 \n\n00 \n\n1*0 \n\n\n(0 \n\nd \n\n(4-1 \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nu \n\nc0 \n\nCO \n\np \n\n0 \n\n\nd> \n\na . \n\nM \n\no \n\nQ \n\nX \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\ni \n\n1 \n\nu \n\na> \n\n\nM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\no \n\n\n0) \n\n*H \n\nrH \n\nrH X \n\nX \n\nT \n\na x \n\n<3 \n\n\n0) \n\nd \n\na \n\no \n\nQ \n\no \n\na \n\n\n0) 0) \n\ni I \n\nX O \n\nO O \n\na \n\n\n0) \n\n\nI \n\nO \nO \nrH O \n\xe2\x80\xa2H M \nX 0) \nX \n( 1 ) 0 ) \n\ns I \n\no o \no o \n\nXI X \n\n\n73 \n\n \n\nd) \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nc0 \n\no \n\no \n\n9 \n\nCD \n\n\ncd \n\nd) \n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nd) \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nH \n\n3 \n\nd \n\n\n\n\ndl \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nu \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\n(0 \n\ncd \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\nd \n\nco \n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\ndl \n\no \n\nco \n\ncd \n\no \n\n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nd \n\nrH \n\n*4 M \n\nw \n\nM \n\nu \n\n\n4 \n\nX \n\n44 \n\n\n4-1 \n\ndl \n\nd \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n73 \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\nCJ \n\nM \n\nd) \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nH \n\nCO \n\no \n\no \n\nH \n\n\nd \n\nu \n\nM \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\nH \n\nH \n\nco \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\n\nH \n\nCO \n\neg \n\n\n\ndl \n\nO \n\n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\nO \n\ng \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nCJ \n\no \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCJ \n\na \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n> \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCJ \n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCJ \n\na \n\n\nCD \n\nVI \n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n4-> \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n4-1 \n\n\nO \n\n4J \n\n4-1 \n\n\nJ-4 \n\nX \n\n*H \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n\n4-4 \n\n(44 \n\n44 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\nX \n\n\n(44 \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n44 \n\nCJ \n\nP\xc2\xab \n\nX 44 \n\nd) \n\nM \n\nd \n\nd \n\ndl \n\n(H \n\nO \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n0) \n\nd> \n\no \n\nO \n\nO \n\n01 \n\n\no \n\nO \n\ndi \n\nO \n\n\ndl \n\n01 \n\no \n\n> \n\nO \n\no \n\no \n\nQ \n\no \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\nQ \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n4-1 \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\no \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n> \nCO CO \n\nd d \no o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H -H \n\n44 U \n\n99 \n\no o \n\n4~l CM \n\nd d \n\n\nM \n\n0) \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nd \n\nd) \n\nO \n\na) oo \no o \n\nd rH \n\n0 ) o \nu d \na x \nM-i a \n\xe2\x96\xa0v ai \n\nPd H \n\n\ncj cj \n\n\n0 a \xc2\xa7 3 \n\no o o o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H *H *H *H \n44 44 4-1 44 \nCO CO CO cO \n\no o o a \n\nd d d d \n\n3323 \n\n\nd d \n\no o \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H *H \n44 4-1 \n\nc 0 c 0 \n\n4J 4.1 \n\nO O \n\nx a \n\n3 3 \n\n> >> O \n\nCO (O CO H \n\nd 0,0 \xc2\xabfl \n\no o \' o x \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0H rl fH C \n\n44 44 U 01 \n\n9 9 9 1 9 \n\nO O O 4J \n\nCO \n\nB \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n> \n\n44 B \n\n\ndl \n\n\no \n\n> \n\nd \n\nco \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\ndl dl \n\no \n\nCO \n\n01 \n\no \n\nO \n\nO \n\no \n\n& > \n\n\n\nB \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\ndl \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\nX \n\nd \n\n0 ) \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\n\nm d a \n\n\ncO \n\nd \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\n01 \n\na \n\n\nd \n\nm a \na) ai \n\n4-1 00 \n\no 3 \n\nrH \n\na) u \n\nO Q) \n\n3 g \n\nX X \n\n\n \n\n \n\n13 -H \n\no \n\nc \n\ng \n\nX \n\nC X \n\nX \n\nCD \n\ncd \n\nCO \n\n3 \xc2\xa3 \n\n\no \n\no \n\nX \n\n\n< \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\no \n\nl \n\nO \n\no \n\n\nc \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\n4J \n\nX \n\no \n\n(X \nCO CO \n*H G \nG CO \nX X \nO H \n\n44 \n\n>> *H 44 \nWHO \n*H cO \n\ncj cj . \n\n4J \n\n44 cx \nMOO) \nQ \n* \n\n\nQ) \n\n2 CO p \n\n\n0) \n\no \n\n> \n\nX \n\nQJ \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H ,C \nG X \n>4 rH \nO CO \n44 0) \n\n*H ffi \nrH \n\nCO o \nCJ -H \n\nrH \n44 JD \n\nO 3 \n(X \nQ) \n\n4J \xe2\x80\xa2 \nCO CO \n4J \n\nCO JZ) \n\n\nTJ \n\nX \n\nO \n\n(X \n\nI \n\no \n\no \n\n\n& \n\nfX \n\n\nQ) \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n44 \n\n44 \n\nO \n\n4J \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n(X \n\n\nCO \n\n\nCO \n\n\nVJ \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nE Q \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n!G> \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n0) \n\nX \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nG G \n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\nrH \n\nPH \n\n(1) O \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\ncd \n\n0 X \n\n\n\ncO \n\n\n\n\n#s \n\nG 00 \n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nX G \n\n\n\nc x \n\n\n\n0) \n\nO \n\nQJ *H \n\n\n\n00 o \n\n\n\nX \n\n> JG \n\n\n\n*H p\xc2\xab \n\n\n\ne* \n\no \n\nO CO \n\n\n\nCO CO \n\n\n\ncd \n\n \n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\nX T) \n\n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nx co \n\n\n\nCO G \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n00 % G \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nG rH \n\n\n\nCO o \n\nX X \n\n\nCO \n\n \n\nX \n\no \n\n0 0 \n\n13 \n\njG \n\n\ncd u \n\n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H X \n\n \n\n\n\nm \n\nCO \n\nCN \n\n\nG \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n1 \n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCN \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nav \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nO \n\n\nCN \n\noo \n\nvO \n\n\nCN \n\n\no \n\no \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\nr>- \n\n\n\n<3 \n\n\nG \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nov \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n#\\ \n\n\n\nPn \n\n\n4-> \n\nVO \n\no \n\nco \n\n00 \n\nm \n\nCN \n\n1 \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nO \n\nCN \n\nav \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n\n\nr-- \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nOn \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n\n\n\nov \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nev \n\n\n<13 \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-co- \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-co- \n\n\n\nN \n\n\nU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3-4 \n\n\nP-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nP-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr*- \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n1 \n\n\no \n\n00 \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\n\n\nCN \n\n\no \n\nvO \n\nm \n\nco \n\nm \n\nrH \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n1 \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nev \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nVO \n\nO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nCN \n\n1 \n\nrH \n\nvO \n\no \n\nCN \n\n00 \n\nCO \n\nm \n\n\n\nr^. \n\n\n\n4J \n\n\nrC \n\nOV \n\nO \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n\n\n<3- \n\nav \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nf\'-. \n\n\n\na \n\n\nu \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-CO- \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-co- \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n\n3-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\'w\' \n\n\nPQ \n\n\n&>2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n\n<13 \n\n\nO \n\nO \n\n<* \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nCN \n\n\nO \n\nrH \n\nm \n\nav \n\n\nrH \n\n\nvO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nG \n\n\nOV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nrv \n\nr>- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\n\nW \n\n\nO \n\nm \n\nO \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nvO \n\nCN \n\n1 \n\nrH \n\nvD \n\nO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nco \n\nvD \n\n\n\n\nr"- \n\n\nG \n\n\n\nON \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n\n\n<3- \n\nav \n\no \n\nCO \n\nCN \n\nco \n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nav \n\n\nG \n\n\n> \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-CO- \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-co- \n\nrH \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nPj \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ni \n\n\nG \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\nQ \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCN \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nav \n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nav \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\nSo \n\n\no \n\nCN \n\nOv \n\nCN \n\n\n\nO \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\n<3- \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCN \n\n\n<3- \n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n#\\ \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n#v \n\n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\no \n\nCO \n\nr-- \n\n\nrH \n\n1 \n\nOv \n\nvD \n\no \n\nf"\xc2\xbb \n\nav \n\nr-- \n\nvO \n\n\n\n<3- \n\n\n\nPo \n\n\n03 \n\nOv \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nav \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nm \n\nfH \n\n\n3-4 \n\n\n>V \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-CO- \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOv \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nco \n\nw \n\nw \n\n3-i \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr>. \n\nPo \n\nrH \n\na \n\n\no \n\n\nO \n\nv\xc2\xa3> \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nVO \n\n\n \n\nm \n\no \n\nCO \n\n\n\nrH \n\n1 \n\n00 \n\nvD \n\no \n\nm \n\nav \n\nav \n\nvO \n\n\n\nvO \n\n4-J \n\no \n\n\n\nG \n\nOV \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nav \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\ncd \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-co- \n\nH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-CO- \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nG \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 rv \n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\nC/3 \n\n\n3-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOv \n\n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nvO \n\nr d \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG \n\n\no \n\nCO \n\nCN \n\n00 \n\nr-v \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n\nav \n\nx) \n\nC/3 \n\n\n-ut \n\nvO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nr\\ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2<3- \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrv \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nm \n\no \n\n \n\nT3 \n\nov \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n\n\n\nco \n\nav \n\no \n\nCN \n\nCN \n\n<3- \n\n\n\n\n\nm \n\n4-J \n\n\nG \n\na \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-co- \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\ng \n\n\n\'\xe2\x80\x94*\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nu \n\n0) \n\na \n\nw rH \n\n\n\n\n\nu \n\n03 \n\nQ \n\nSw/ \n\nrH \n\nW \n\nPtf \n\nO \n\n\nu \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n0) \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nC/3 \n\n\n\nO \n\nG \n\n4=1 \n\nCO \n\n\nu \n\n\nM \n\n\n\nPh \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nrH X> \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\nPh \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nT) \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\ncd \n\nSO \n\npn \n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n^v \n\n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCl, \n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0P \n\n\n> \n\nu \n\n4-1 \n\n> \n\n4-J 4H \n\n\n4J \n\n8 \n\n> \n\nu \n\n4-4 \n\n> \n\n4J \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\no \n\nc \n\nG \n\n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no o \n\n\nO \n\nC \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\nH \n\n\nS3 \n\n<3 \n\na \n\nU \n\nH \n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xab3 \n\n\n< \n\nQ \n\nQJ \n\nH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n495 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\nI \n\n\nCN \n\nfa \n\nfa \n\nPQ \n\n<3 \n\nH \n\n\n\nvO \n\ntN> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON \n\n\nX \n\nO \n\non \n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nrH \n\n\nX \n\nrH \n\n\n \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\nx> \n\no \n\nX \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nX \n\n00 \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\nX \n\n3 \n\ncr> \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nvD \n\nXI \n\nrH \n\no \n\nX \n\nr\xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nX \n\nO\' \n\no> \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\no \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n1 \n\no \n\nx \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n03 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGO \n\nX \n\no \n\nCsl \n\nrH \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCN \n\nrH \n\no \n\no \n\nX \n\nr- \n\nCN \n\nX \n\nO\' \n\n\nON \n\nCM \n\nX \n\nrH \n\n* \n\nG \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\nrH \n\nX \n\npH \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n00 \n\nfa \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncry \n\no \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nfa \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n:>> \n\nCN \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nXI \n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nX \n\n \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n*H \n\n\ncn \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\na \n\ncn \n\nX \n\nO \n\n00 \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nG \n\n\n03 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nG \n\n03 \n\nfa cn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\ncn \n\nG \n\n\na \n\n03 \n\n*H \n\no \n\ncn \n\nO \n\ncn \n\nX X \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\ng \n\n\nX \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nX \n\ncn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG G \n\nX \n\n\n< \n\n\no \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\no \n\nfa \n\nS \n\n0) \n\n< \n\nX \n\nX \n\n<3 rH \n\no \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nO \n\nX \n\nfa \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nrH \n\n\n\nrH \n\n\no \n\nCJ \n\nX \n\n\nrH \n\nXJ \n\n\nx> \n\nZ \n\n03 \n\nrH O \n\nrH \n\n\ncd \n\n\nfa \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nG \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n\nX P^ \n\nG XJ \n\n03 \n\n\nG \n\ncn \n\n\nXJ \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nP> \n\n> \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nX G \n\nG \n\nX \n\n\no \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nG \n\ncd \n\nX \n\n03 \n\n\na \n\n\n03 \n\nG fa \n\nO fa \n\no \n\n\n\na \n\ncn \n\nG \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nQ \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nC \n\nfa \n\nV \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H O \n\nH \n\n\n4-4 \n\nx \n\no \n\n\ncn \n\ncn \n\n\nrH \n\nXJ \n\no cn \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\no3 \n\no \n\nfa \n\n03 \n\n\n03 \n\nXJ \n\nfa \n\n03 \n\n*H 03 \n\no \n\nG \n\nG cn \n\n\n\n00 \n\nfa \n\nX \n\na \n\nXJ \n\nfa \n\nG \n\nfa \n\ns \n\nX *H \n\n\n1 03 \n\n00 G \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\ncd \n\nG \n\n\nG x \n\nfa \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H O \n\n\n\nT\xe2\x80\x941 \n\no \n\nfa \n\n0) \n\ncd \n\nX) \n\n\ncn \n\n\nX -H \n\nO \n\n03 \n\ntH *h \n\n\n\nX \n\n*H \n\n\n00 \n\n\nG \n\nfa \n\n\n00 \n\nX > \n\n\nXJ X \n\nfa rH \n\n\n\no \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nX \n\ncd \n\na \n\nrH \n\nG \n\nCD *H \n\nX \n\n03 *H \n\nO rH \n\n\n\n\n03 \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H X \n\nX \n\nno X \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nTJ \n\ncd \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG O \n\nO \n\nG 03 \n\niH g \n\n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nrH \n\nX \n\n03 \n\nX \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H <3 \n\nfa \n\nG fa \n\nG \n\n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\nX \n\nc \n\nX \n\nX \n\ncd \n\ncn \n\nG \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nfa \n\nfa \n\nX \n\n\n\nO \n\nX \n\n03 \n\nG \n\n*H \n\nG \n\n03 \n\n03 \n\nX \n\nX) \n\nG \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\n\nH \n\ncn \n\no \n\nM \n\n \n\no \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n496 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 2 (continued) \n\n(est.) \n\n__ FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971 \n\nTotal Obligational Authority (%) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\nOh \n\noo \n\nCN \n\nO \n\n- \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\npH \n\n\nCM \n\nr\\ \n\nrH \n\ncn \n\ni\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n*H \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nOh \n\nOh \n\nCM \n\nr^- \n\n-c/y \n\nuo \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOh \n\nhO \n\n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nvO \n\nrH \n\n. \n\n \n\n\n00 \n\nhO \n\nCO \n\no \n\nr-^ \n\nOh \n\n00 \n\n\nhO \n\nvO \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n00 \n\n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nm \n\npH \n\nUO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x94I \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\nOh \n\nr^. \n\n \n\n\nOh \n\nCM \n\n \n\nrH \n\nOh \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n\nCM \n\nMf \n\nuo \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n*\\ \n\nOh \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\nCM \n\n1 \n\nUO \n\nvO \n\nr- \n\n \n\nCN \n\n \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\ncn \n\n4-J \n\nP \n\n\nO \n\ncn \n\nd \n\n\nO \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94*N \n\n\n\nd \n\n\n \n\n> \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nd \n\n\n0) \n\ncd \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nd \n\na> \n\n\no \n\n\n0) \n\nd \n\nPH \n\no \n\n4m \n\no \n\ncn \n\ncd \n\na) \n\n0) \n\nQ \n\nPm \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\n-d \n\no \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nd \n\no \n\n\nCO \n\ncn \n\n\nrH \n\nX) \n\no cn \n\n4-J \n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n4-J \n\n\no \n\ncn \n\nCD \n\n\n0) \n\nX) \n\nCn \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 0) \n\nO \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94s \n\nd \n\ncd \n\ncn \n\nPm \n\nd \n\no \n\n-d \n\nPtf \n\nd \n\nCu \n\ns \n\n4-J -H \n\n\n1 \n\nCD \n\n00 \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\ncd \n\nd \n\n\nCd 4-J \n\n14-4 \n\n\'w\' \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\na \n\nPH \n\n0) \n\ncd \n\nxj \n\n\nCO \n\n* \n\nd *H \n\no \n\n\na) \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n*H \n\n\noo \n\n\nd \n\n\n\n00 \n\nH > \n\n\nX) \n\nd \n\nJO \n\nrH \n\n00 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\ncd \n\na \n\npH \n\nd \n\ncn h \n\n4-J \n\n \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nd \n\nd CJ \n\nO \n\nd \n\nCD \n\nrH \n\n0 \n\ncd \n\na) \n\n(U \n\npH \n\nd \n\na \n\n4-J \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H <3 \n\ncn \n\nd \n\nP3 \n\ncd \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nP \n\nd \n\ncd \n\ncn \n\nd \n\ncd \n\n0 \n\ncn \n\n*4-4 \n\n\n4-J \n\n\np \n\na) \n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nd \n\ncd \n\nCD \n\nd \n\nX) \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nO \n\n\nCO \n\no \n\nM \n\nc \n\no \n\nptf \n\n \n\n\nH \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n \n\n\nCD \n\nO \n\nCD \n\n0 \n\n4-J \n\nd \n\nCD \n\n\xc2\xabJ \n\n4-4 \n\nP \n\n\ncd \n\n\ncd \n\ncn \n\nX) \n\n0) \n\nHI \n\n\nd \n\nCD \n\n\nd \n\nd \n\nrO \n\n*r~ \n\n\n0\xc2\xa3 \n\nd \n\n0 \n\n(D \n\npq \n\n\n\n\nO \n\nO \n\ncd \n\n4-4 \n\n\nXJ \n\n\n\nd \n\n4-1 \n\nd \n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nd \n\nO \n\n\nPH \n\nCD \n\nOC \n\nQ \n\ncn \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\na \n\n\n\n40 \n\no \n\n\nd \n\ncd \n\nrO \n\nCD \n\n\nd \n\n4-1 \n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaJ \n\nd \n\n\ncn \n\ncd \n\nPH \n\nO \n\n4-4 \n\n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nCD \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\nOJ \n\ncd \n\nCD \n\nPo \n\nQ \n\npp; \n\n(D \n\n4-4 \n\ng \n\ncn \n\nd \n\n\n\nP \n\n\n \n\n(D \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nCD \n\nd \n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCO \n\nT\'- \n\n\nQ \n\nCJ \n\n\nCD \n\n\n\nOh \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\nCD \n\nXJ \n\na \n\nCD \n\nr\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nr>. \n\n\ncd \n\nCD \n\n4-J \n\n\nd \n\n4-J \n\n1 \n\n4-4 \n\n\ncn \n\n\n\ncd \n\nd \n\nOh \n\no \n\n0 \n\nd \n\nr a \n\n\nCD \n\nCD \n\nvO \n\n\ncd \n\nCD \n\nc \n\n\n!H \n\nJO \n\nOh \n\n4-> \n\nd \n\n4-4 \n\ncd \n\n\no \n\npH \n\nd \n\n00 \n\n* \n\ncd \n\nCD \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2r \n\n\nPm \n\nCD \n\n\n4-J \n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\nh \n\n \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nCD \n\ni \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\ncd \n\n0 \n\nE \n\n\nPX \n\n\n4-J \n\n\n0) \n\nCD \n\nd \n\n\nO \n\n4-4 \n\n4-J \n\n\npH \n\nP \n\n< \n\n\nd \n\no \n\n*H \n\nCN \n\n\ncd \n\n\n\nPX \n\n\ng \n\nCN \n\niH \n\n4-J \n\n \n\njd \n\na \n\nJC \n\n\n0) \n\nCO \n\n> \n\n\nEh \n\npn \n\np \n\n1 \n\nQ \n\n\nOh \n\nLO \n\n\nPu \n\n\nr\\ \n\n\no \n\n\nr*- \n\nOh \n\n\no \n\nCN \n\n\nco \n\nW \n\ncj \n\nu \n\no \n\nco \n\n\n497 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nCO \n\nw \n\n\xe2\x96\xbaJ \n\nPQ \n\n< \n\nH \n\n\ng \n\n\np \n\no \n\nX3 \n\nP \n\n3 \n\n\nVO \n\nhO \n\nOh \n\n\nE \n\n\nG \n\nin \n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\nvD \n\nO \n\nCM \n\n00 \n\n00 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nOh \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nP \n\nrH \n\nO \n\nOh \n\n \n\nr* \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nQ \n\n4 \n\nI\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nUa \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\np \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n0) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nph \n\nCO \n\nS\'? \n\n\n\n\n\n\nvO \n\nO \n\nm \n\n\'Cf \n\n\nC- \n\ni \n\nOh \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\ni \n\n\xc2\xbb\xe2\x80\x941 \n\no \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nCO \n\n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n0) \n\nrH \n\n1\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\ni\xe2\x80\x94i \n\nUa \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nE \n\n\no \n\no \n\nOh \n\n00 \n\nuo \n\nOh \n\nOh \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\nvO \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\no \n\nCO \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nO \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\nO \n\nCM \n\n\nOh \n\n\nCM \n\n\n \n\nCM \n\nm \n\n00 \n\nOh \n\nX) \n\nm \n\n\nOh \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\ni \xe2\x80\x94 1 \n\no \n\nm \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\no \n\nCO \n\no \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0U \n\n\no \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\niH \n\n\n\n\n\n\nC \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 \n\n\xe2\x9c\x93\xe2\x80\x98"\'S \n\n\n\n\n\n/\'\xe2\x96\xa0N \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\nS\'S \n\n\n\n\nX) \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\'-Z \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nX> \n\nP \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n00 \n\n\nrH \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n/\xe2\x80\x94N \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\np \n\n\n\n\nP \n\n\no \n\nP \n\n0 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0 \n\nP \n\n\n\n\n\nC0 \n\n\nG \n\nPH \n\nG \n\nO \n\nG \n\ncd \n\nP \n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nP \n\nG \n\nP \n\n00 \n\no \n\n\nO \n\n\nH \n\n\n\nG \n\n00 \n\nPH \n\n00 \n\n*H \n\nrC \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\nO \n\no \n\nCO \n\no \n\nrH \n\np \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n00 \n\nG \n\nP \n\n\np \n\nX> \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n\nP \n\nG \n\nc \n\nG \n\nP-i \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 rv \n\nPH \n\no \n\n< \n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nP \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n4-\xc2\xbb \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nCO \n\n>> \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n\n0 \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nG \n\no \n\nG \n\nG \n\ng \n\n*H \n\n\na \n\nU \n\nO \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nP \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\no \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nto \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xab4H \n\nG \n\nO \n\no \n\nG \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\n\nrH \n\nP \n\n* \n\n G \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nG \n\n\nG \n\np \n\nG \n\n\nG O \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\np \n\nCO \n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCJ \n\n\n00 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n4-1 \n\na *h \n\no \n\n0 \n\nG \n\nco \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n*H \n\nPH \n\n\nG \n\nP \n\nCJ \n\nG \n\nG \n\n< \n\n> \n\nG \n\n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nr Cd \n\n\nPm \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n00 \n\n\nX) \n\n>N \n\nO \n\n0 \n\nX3 G \n\nPo \n\n\no \n\n>N \n\nO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\nO \n\nP \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nCJ rH \n\nP \n\nG \n\nG \n\nP \n\nv-z \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\n4J \n\nP \n\nP G \n\nG \n\nCO \n\n0 \n\nG \n\n\nP \n\n\nrH \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG > \n\n4-J \n\nG \n\nO \n\nP \n\np \n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n*H \n\nP \n\no \n\nG W \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nPC \n\n*H \n\nG \n\nP H \n\n\nP \n\nrH \n\nG \n\no \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n4-4 \n\n\nrH \n\nX2 \n\n\n\nO \n\n\nPH \n\nP \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\nP \n\n\n\nH \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\nPH \n\nPH \n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nQ \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\nm \n\nhO \n\n\n\n00 \n\n\n\n498 \n\n\nTotal Obligational Authority \n\n(millions of dollars) $50,441 $51,208 $50,979 $50,657 $65,449 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 3 (continued) \n\n(est.) \n\n__ FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971 \n\nTotal Obligational Authority 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n03 \n\nCM \n\nfs\xc2\xbb \n\nMD \n\n\xc2\xabH \n\n03 \n\no \n\n03 \n\nU0 \n\nrH \n\n \n\n\n\nT3 \n\nd) \n\n4-1 \n\nI\xe2\x80\x941 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\xc2\xbb \n\nUO \n\n00 \n\n03 \n\nrH \n\nuo \n\nCO \n\n\n\n0) \n\nd) \n\nQ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nX \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\n30 \n\nCM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n03 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\no \n\n#3 \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n03 \n\n30 \n\nG \n\nG \n\n3^ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrs. \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n1 \n\n4-4 \n\n0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-> \n\n03 \n\nO \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n30 \n\n\nG \n\n\n30 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCM \n\n\n\nd) \n\n03 \n\n4-4 \n\n0\xc2\xa3 \n\nin \n\nUO \n\n03 \n\nrs. \n\n30 \n\no \n\nrH \n\nSt \n\n\n\nJO \n\niH \n\nC \n\nO \n\n\n30 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nO \n\n\n\no \n\n\nCU \n\nG \n\n\nCM \n\n03 \n\niH \n\nO \n\nrH \n\no \n\n#3 \n\n\n\nPd \n\nG \n\n0 \n\nOh \n\nCM \n\nCM \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\nG \n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrs- \n\n\n\n-< \n\nG \n\ncn \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na) \n\ntH \n\nCO \n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncn \n\nCU \n\nU \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 #3 \n\nCU \n\n\n\n\n\n\n00 /"v \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nQ \n\ncn \n\n G \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\n\nr- \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\nG 00 \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n \n\n\no \n\ng \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n\n\n\ncn \n\n\nC D. \n\nG \n\nCJ G \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n4-4 \n\nG \n\n\n#3 \n\n03 \n\n\n \n\nG \n\nC G \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 r a. \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n>4 \n\n\n4-4 \n\n\n \n\n#3 \n\n\nrH \n\nc \n\n\n0 \n\n4-4 \n\nG *H \n\ncj \n\nG a \n\nrH \n\no \n\nG \n\n44 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nCM \n\n\n3 \n\n4-1 \n\n\xc2\xa7 \n\n\nG \n\ng \n\nX \n\n\ntH \n\nG \n\n<1 \n\n4-4 \n\nd) G \n\nO \n\n4-1 \n\nG \n\nG \n\no \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\n\nCU \n\n4-4 \n\n>3 \n\ncn \n\nQ G \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\no \n\nS \n\n G \n\n05 \n\nrH 05 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\n4-4 \n\n\n\n0 \n\n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ng \n\nG \n\n\n0) O \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H G \n\n05 \n\nH CJ \n\nG \n\ncn \n\nrH \n\nCU \n\ncn \n\nG \n\nIH \n\n C \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nO \n\nG \n\nG \n\na \n\nG \n\ncu \n\n\ng \n\n0) \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2* G \n\n\nPh \xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H 00 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-4 \n\n4-4 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0o \n\n\n>\xe2\x80\xa2\xc2\xbb \n\no \n\n0 \n\ns: G \n\n>3 \n\no \n\nJo \n\nCJ *H \n\n40 \n\ntH \n\nd> \n\nCO \n\n> \n\n3_^ \n\nH \n\nu \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n0) \n\na rH \n\nu \n\nd) \n\n4-4 \n\nG O \n\n4-4 \n\nG O \n\niH \n\n0 \n\nT3 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n\n\n\nM \n\na \n\n \n\nCO \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nU \n\nG \n\n\nCM \n\n3 \n\nO \n\nM \n\nO \n\n\nO \n\nU \n\nU \n\nc \n\no \n\ncj \n\n\nc \n\n\n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\no \n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n4-J \n\nCM \n\n\n\n\no \n\nO \n\n\n\n\nH \n\nX) \n\n\n\n\n4 \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n4-5 \n\n\nG \n\nCO \n\n\nG \n\nC \n\nG \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2U \n\n\nG \n\nG \n\nX \n\nG \n\n00 \n\nM \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-> \n\nG \n\nsO \n\nu \n\ng \n\no \n\nM \n\nOs \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n4-5 \n\nrH \n\nX \n\ncj \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n3 \n\n\nW \n\nx \n\nG \n\nG \n\n\n\ncj \n\nT3 \n\na \n\n\n\xc2\xa3 \n\nM \n\nU \n\ni \n\no \n\nCO \n\nG \n\nG \n\nG \n\nM \n\nx) \n\nX \n\nX> \n\nO \n\ncd \n\nH \n\n\nG \n\n55 \n\ng \n\nG \n\n1 \n\nG \n\n\n55 \n\nXJ \n\n\nu \n\n\n\nG \n\nsO \n\nCO \n\n\n\nG \n\nsO \n\n\n\n\n4-5 \n\no \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\ng \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n55 \n\n\nG \n\n\nH \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nG \n\ng \n\n\n\nCO \n\n55 \n\nX \n\n\n\nG \n\ns \n\no \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n3 \n\nsw \n\nCJ \n\n\n\nG \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n\nCJ \n\n\ncj \n\nCNJ \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nCO \n\n00 \n\n\ncj \n\n00 \n\nX \n\n\nCM O O O 00 \n\n\nO \n\no \n\n\nCO so 00 CM O \n\nCM lO rl \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\no \n\no \n\n\n6^ \n\nm \n\n\nCO rH so \n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nm oo so \n\nCM so \n\n\nO CO CO 0- sO U0 CO rH \n\nm co \n\n\no \n\no \n\n\nc \n\n0 ) \n\no \n\nu \n\n\n4-5 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nO \n\n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCh \n\n\nG \n\n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ns>\xc2\xbb \n\n\nM \n\n\n*H \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nXJ \n\n\nX \n\na \n\n3 \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nCJ \n\n*H \n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-5 \n\n\n\n4 -\xc2\xbb \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nM \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n\nX) \n\nCO \n\nU \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n\nG \n\n*H \n\n4-5 \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n\n\na, \n\n\n4.5 \n\nM \n\nG \n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\n\nB \n\n\nCJ \n\n \n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\nG \n\n\nG \n\n(U \n\nG \n\nO \n\n\n\n\n\nX) \n\nO \n\n\nX \n\ncj \n\ng \n\n\n\n\n\n\nG \n\n*H \n\n\nCJ \n\nM \n\nu \n\nX) \n\n\n\n\n\nU \n\n4-5 \n\n\n\n0 ) \n\nM \n\nG \n\no \n\no \n\nm \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n3 \n\n\n\na \n\nG \n\nG \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nG \n\n\nX \n\n\n\nS-/ \n\nP-. \n\n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n1 \n\n4-5 \n\nrH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nsO \n\no \n\nO \n\no \n\nH \n\n\n\n0 ) \n\nH \n\nCO \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\nrH \n\nH \n\nO \n\nX \n\n\n\no \n\nO\' \n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\nG \n\n\n\nG \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n*H \n\n\n\nPti \n\n \n\n0 ) \n\nX \n\n\nG \n\n> \n\n0 ) \n\nX \n\n00 \n\ng \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\nT3 \n\ncd \n\ng \n\nPd \n\n\n0 ) \n\n> \n\n0 ) \n\nX \n\na) \n\nx> \n\ncd \n\nn \n\no \n\n\no \n\no \n\nX \n\na \n\nco \n\n\n532 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ncd \n\n\nP4 \n\nd \n\no \n\nu \n\no \n\n\no \n\nu \n\nX \n\nd \n\no \n\n \n\nCO \n\nO \n\n\nd \n\ncd \n\n\n\nw \n\no \n\n\nX \n\n\nd \n\n\n0) \n\nCO \n\ncd \n\n\nd \n\nx \n\ncj \n\n\nd \n\nM \n\ni \n\no \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\nd \n\nX \n\nX \n\nX \n\no \n\nOf \n\nd \n\nd \n\n2 \n\n05 \n\no \n\ncd \n\n\n53 \n\no \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n \n\nin \n\n- uo X \n\nCM rH CO CM \n\nCO CO \n\n3 rH \n\nrH CM \n\nrH \n\ncm \n\nCO \n\nrH \n\nvD \n\n\nCM \n\no \n\nrH \n\nCM \n\n\nrH \n\nCM \n\nrH \n\n\nCO \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\n\n\nrH \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n5-4 \n\n5-1 \n\n\n\n5-4 \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\na \n\n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\n\n4-J \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCO \n\n\n\n\n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nCJ \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\n05 \n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n\n05 \n\n05 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n05 \n\n05 \n\n\n\n\na \n\ncd \n\n4-J \n\n\n\nd \n\n\nCd \n\no \n\n\n4-> \n\no \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\n*H \n\n05 \n\ncd \n\n\nX! \n\ncd \n\nrH \n\n\n\n\nd \n\n\n\n\n\n\n4-1 \n\n5-< \n\n4-1 \n\n\nd \n\nrH \n\ncd \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\ncd \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\nCO \n\nc \n\nC/3 \n\n\nCd \n\n4-> \n\n5-4 \n\n4-5 \n\n4-J \n\n\nrH \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n\n\n\nrH \n\n<2 \n\n4-J \n\n5-4 \n\n5-J \n\n\n4-> \n\nd \n\nd \n\n\nd \n\n\nX \n\na \n\nX \n\n4-J \n\n00 \n\n\nd \n\nO \n\nO \n\n\n<2 \n\no \n\no \n\n\n*H \n\nCJ \n\n05 \n\n\xe2\x99\xa6H \n\na; \n\nCO \n\nd \n\n05 \n\n05 \n\n23 \n\n53 \n\n\n\nCO \n\nC/3 \n\n\ncd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n4-J \n\nX \n\n4-J \n\ncd \n\nw \n\ni\xe2\x80\x941 \n\nCJ \n\n\n\n\nX \n\n\n\n\nX \n\nX \n\na \n\npH \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\n05 \n\n\nX \n\n\n4-J \n\n4-J \n\n\n4-J \n\nX \n\nX \n\n\nd \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2H \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\nd \n\n43 \n\n\nX \n\nX \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\nX \n\nd \n\nCO \n\nCO \n\n\nd \n\nO \n\nX \n\n5-4 \n\nx \n\n4-1 \n\na) \n\n*H \n\n4J \n\ncd \n\n05 \n\n4-> \n\no \n\ncd \n\n05 \n\nX \n\no \n\ncd \n\ncd \n\n00 \n\n\nX \n\n23 \n\nS \n\n5-4 \n\nw \n\n\nd \n\nCO \n\nw \n\n\nCO \n\nX \n\n\nX \n\nO \n\nrH \n\nO \n\n\n\nO \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n\n05 \n\n\n\no \n\n05 \n\ncd \n\n23 \n\n\n\n23 \n\n\n\nC/3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nX \n\no \n\nH \n\n\n533 \n\n\nSee next page for Source and notes. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nTABLE 4 (continued) \n\n\nEntrants selected by each Service as representative of accessions \nduring October, 1966 - September, 1968, under previous mental standards. \n\n^Caucasian - 90.9%, Negro - 8.8%, Other - 0.3% \n\nBased on total accessions during period, exclusive of new standards \nentrants. \n\n^The states within each geographic area are as follows: \n\nNew England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode \n\nIsland, Vermont \n\nMiddle Atlantic: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania \n\nEast North Central: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin \n\nWest North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, \n\nNorth Dakota, South Dakota \n\nSouth Atlantic: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, \n\nSouth Carolina, Virginia, Washington, D.C., West Virginia, \nPuerto Rico \n\nEast South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee \nWest South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas \nMountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, \n\nUtah, Wyoming \n\nPacific: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington \n\nSOURCE: Harold Wool and Eli Flyer, \'\'Project 100,000" in Peter \nDoringer (ed.). Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged \n(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. \n\n207-245. \n\n\n534 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ngruous in terms of the stated purposes of the program, are predictable \nin terms of the procedures that each Service uses in assigning its men \nto specialties, the formal aptitude tests. Since no one had bothered \nto modify the test, the new standards men fared poorly and their \nassignments reflected this measure. \n\nNo one intended to subvert the aims of the program. Racist atti\xc2\xac \ntudes need not be invoked to explain the assignments of blacks to \n\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99cannon fodder\xe2\x80\x9d brigades. Rather, these people entered the system and \nwere given assignments according to ASQT scores and placement SOPs. \n\nThey were not retested because the Services have no procedures for \ndoing so. They were tested upon entrance, rather than after sp^gial \nliteracy training because the Army always does things that way. \n\nD. What options did the Service open to the disadvantaged? \nClearly, for many of the new standards men, particularly Southern \nblacks, a Service career is a live option. However, the majority of \nnew standards men enrolled in 1967 cannot re-enlist. As mentioned \nabove, it had been decided that new standards men should not be segre\xc2\xac \ngated. Thus their eligibility for re-enlistment was determined by \nexisting Service regulations. Men who originally test in group IV \n(below 31%) on the AFQT are ineligible for re-enlistment without pass\xc2\xac \ning supplementary skill knowledge tests. Formal testing rather than \nperformance measure is used because of the notorious unreliability of \nthe rating systems. While the performance of the new standards men \nhas been satisfactory (as marked by the attrition rate and disciplin\xc2\xac \nary record) their scores on standardized tests do not permit re\xc2\xac \nenlistment. The organizational interest in the testing system is \nunderstandable; no Service wants to retain "unpromotables\xe2\x80\x9d who clog a \nseniority-orientec system. Given such an organizational process, one \ncould have suspected the outcome. \n\n\nXIII.3.2.2 Project Transition \n\nProject Transition, like Project 100,000, was aimed at ascertain \nunskilled portion of the population. Both were concerned with skill \ntraining; but where Project 100,000 emphasized increased opportunities \n\n\n39 \n\n\nIbid. \n\n\n/+0 These points should not be misinterpreted as a suggestion \nthat the program has been a failure. In fact, in spite of these \nlimits, the socialization effect has been significant. \n\n\n535 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nfor enlistment, Project Transition centered on training those men who \nwere near the end of their Service term. \n\nPresident Johnson, in the 1967 Manpower Report , observed that \n\'\xe2\x80\x98There are, of course, some military specialists whose training does \nnot lead directly to civilian employment" and thereupon instructed the \nSecretary of Defense "to make available, to the maximum extent pos\xc2\xac \nsible, inservice training and educational opportunities which will \n\nincrease their chances for employment in civilian life." \n\n* \n\nThe presidential mandate was implemented by the Secretary of \nDefense who saw four needs of discharged servicemen: counseling, \nskill training, education and job placement. Program guidelines estab\xc2\xac \nlished included: \n\n1. Eligibility would be open to enlisted men with less than six \nremaining months of service. \n\n2. Priority was to be given to disabled combat personnel with no \ncivilian related skill and those with ASQT and aptitude scores so low \nas to be ineligible for re-enlistment. \n\n3. Project Transition would be entirely voluntary. \n\n4. Basic educational skills would be emphasized for those with \nless than a high school education. \n\n5. All courses would be job oriented. Skill training would \nreflect actual job requirements. \n\n6. Maximum support and participation would be sought from both \npublic and private sources within the civilian sectors. If private \nemployers were unable or unwilling to provide training, available \ncapacity for civilian-oriented occupational training on the base it\xc2\xac \nself would be used. \n\n7. Job placement would be done in collaboration with the United \nStates Employment Service. \n\n8. Follow-up provisions would be made. \n\n\nManpower Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress, \nApril, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, April, 1967), \np. xviii. \n\n\n536 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nProject Transition thus was designed as a full-service, large \nscale training and placement project. We must look further to see how \nclosely the outcome approached the chosen analytic alternative. \n\n\nWhile performance in the program to date has been highly praised, \nit is at present a rather small scale operation. Of roughly one mil\xc2\xac \nlion servicemen discharged in 1968, only 47,000 completed training \nunder a Transition project. Since it was set up for experimental pur\xc2\xac \nposes as an extensively decentralized operation, the vigor with which \nit is pursued at any base depends on the attitude and interest of the \nbase commander. There has been a self-selection process at work. Only \nthose interested participated. And participating commanders tended to \nselect "volunteers\xe2\x80\x9d for entrance into the program. A commander with \nenough interest in education to volunteer to supervise this project is \ninterested enough and close enough to guide it through the bureaucratic \nshoals that await it. However, the mean of organizational performance \ncannot be deduced from the performance of the marginal units . If the \nexperiment is expanded so that participation becomes obligatory for \neach base commander, it is unlikely that the tender loving care will \ncontinue. \n\nIn particular, the menu of alternative training offered to par\xc2\xac \nticipants is likely to narrow if Project Transition is run on a large \nscale. As the average personal interest of the commander declines, the \nimportance of the compatibility of organizational SOPs and program \ngoals is likely to increase. Already there is evidence that the happi\xc2\xac \nest collaboration has been with civilian organizations of similar \noperating styles. State, and local law enforcement agencies have been \nenthusiastic; several states have created state police training commis\xc2\xac \nsions for the express purpose of allowing Project Transition servicemen \nto qualify for service immediately upon discharge. At the same time, \nthere are complaints that other "Federal agencies are dragging their \nfeet and don f t want to bend their procedures unless they have to."^ 2 \n\nNo one knows much about training poor achievers. In particular, \nmost private firms have no capability for teaching slow learners or \nthose who have trouble learning in traditional ways, and moreover, have \nlittle reason to acquire one. This difficulty becomes critical when \none considers the conjunction of Project 100,000 type enrollees with \n\n\n^Bernard Udis, "Notes on an Interview with the Deputy Director \nof Project Transition," June 17, 1969, p. 5. \n\n\n537 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nProject Transition. When Project 100,000 people are ready for dis\xc2\xac \ncharge (as they will inevitably be due to re-enlistment requirements) \nprivate industry will in all probability not be ready for them. The \nonly group with SOPs, however ineffectual, for dealing with this group \nis the MTDA. But if they are trained through an MTDA program, one of \nthe organizationally most admirable features of the program is lost. \nWith private industry as both trainer and employer there is no organi\xc2\xac \nzational gap between training and hiring. If the MTDA trains, the \ndischargees sust go through a third organization (the Service, the MTDA \nprogram and a placement agency) before they are actually in a job. \n\nThere is another set of routines that must be made compatible. The \ncandidate for providing the placement is the State Employment Service, \na notoriously ineffectual organization. \n\nThe Services receive none of the benefits of this training; in \nfact, if the program is vigorously implemented they lose the services \nof trained men for three months. Furthermore, to the extent that \nservicemen\xe2\x80\x99s decisions to re-enlist depend on something like a rational \ncalculation, the possibility of a guaranteed job upon discharge may \nswing the decision against re-enlistment. This aggravates the mili\xc2\xac \ntary\xe2\x80\x99s serious personnel problem and increases training costs consid\xc2\xac \nerably. \n\n\nXIII.4 STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING ORGANIZATIONAL IMPEDIMENTS \n\nThe above cases suggest that further questions must be asked in \norder to reduce the gap between alternatives and outcomes. Thus this \nsection advances an approach which might be used to modify standard \nanalyses with specific reference to the cases discussed above. \n\nBut before discussing these strategies for minimizing organiza\xc2\xac \ntional impediments, several bald conclusions about both the context \nand prospects for shifting defense expenditures towards social objec\xc2\xac \ntives must be stated. Social projects, for example, Project 100,000 \nor Project Transition, do not rank high in the operational priority of \nthe military services. The Services do not have programs and SOPs for \nthese activities. Nor are these activities central to the goals and \nnorms of these organizations. \n\nThe priority of social projects for the military will rise neither \nnaturally nor rapidly. \n\nThe ability of any civilian authority, including the Office of \nthe Secretary of Defense, to influence these priorities is quite \nlimited. \n\n\n538 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nExpectations and programs to the contrary are destined to be dis\xc2\xac \nappointed. \n\nWhile these assertions might seem to suggest that analysts inter\xc2\xac \nested in using the Services to achieve social objectives are doomed to \nfailure, this conclusion is not warranted. To recognize the limits and \nconstraints is not to argue that nothing can be done. Indeed, it may \nbe helpful to abstract from some of the present, perhaps overwhelming, \norganizational and political constraints to consider the kind of alter\xc2\xac \nnatives that might hypothetically be open to the Office of the Secretaxy \nof Defense. \n\nOne must consider what a project requires of an existing organi\xc2\xac \nzation. In particular does it require that an organization: \n\n1. carry on, or carry on with more of the same (e.g., experimen\xc2\xac \ntation in vocational education). \n\n2. carry on, but as part of a new team of organizations or in a \nnew environment (e.g., helicopter rescue service). \n\n3. initiate a new activity, i.e., one for which the organization \ndoes not have appropriate, in the sense of producing something like the \ndesired outcome, SOPs and routines (e.g., experimentation in low-cost \nconstruction). \n\n4. carry out programs contrary to its existing goals and pur\xc2\xac \nposes (e.g., recruitment and induction of substandard men). \n\nBy classifying analytic alternatives into these organizational \ncategories, some general predictions can be made about the likely cor\xc2\xac \nrespondence between objective and outcome in most programs. \n\n1. Telling an organization to do more of what it is doing \nalready produces actual outcomes quite similar to intended outcomes. \n\n2. If an organization carries on in a new environment, gross \noutcomes will match expectations. However, an insensitivity to side \ngf\xc2\xa3gcCs caused by inappropriate details of the routine will dramat \nically increase the costs of the program. \n\n3. When an old organization is called upon to perform new tasks \nthere is a high probability it will take one of two approaches: \n\n(1) choose from among old routines that one which looks most like the \nrequested routine, or (2) if no old routine can plausibly be used, it \nis likely that the organization will do nothing. \n\n\n539 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n4. Ceteris paribus , if an organization is given projects incom\xc2\xac \npatible with its goals, the outcomes will bear little, if any, resem\xc2\xac \nblance to the analytic choice. \n\nMany, if not most, of the exciting proposals for social service \nby the military fall into the final two categories, including Project \n100,003 and Project Transition. If the Secretary of Defense, or any \ncivilian official, wants to achieve outcomes in these categories, then \nhe must take one of two routes. \n\n1. Create a new organization to perform a new task. This is, by \ncomparison, an attractive alternative. However, there are a set of \nquestions that should be raised before taking this route: \n\na. Is the task sufficiently understood that it could be \nefficiently executed by an organization? \n\nb. What are the \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99start up" and long-range costs attached to \na new organization? \n\nc. Is it politically feasible to set up a competitor organi\xc2\xac \nzation; if so, at what price? \n\nd. How quickly can new routines be set up? \n\ne. What are the costs in terms of personnel, organizational \nglan and momentum? \n\n2. In the military area, the combined weight of tradition and \npolitics may severely limit the power of the Secretary of Defense to \ncreate new and competing organizations, although in some unclaimed \nterritories a new organization might function effectively. Therefore \nthe Secretary of Defense must get effective social action out of the \nexisting Services. This will be an extremely difficult task, one that \ndoes not allow simple formulas or standard prescriptions. Our sug\xc2\xac \ngested categories and strategies make no pretense of being exhaustive; \nthey are merely suggestive of where help might be found. \n\n\nXIII.4.1 Types of strategies \n\nThe general categories of control variables for a bureaucracy \nare: money, promotions, information and education, induced crisis, \norganizational programming. \n\n\n540 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nXm\xc2\xab4.1.1 Money The persuasive power of the purse is notorious. To \nthe extent that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) controls \nthe defense budget, it can effectively influence the actions of the \nServices. Its possible moves include: \n\na) Tieing While explicit ties are not likely to be viable, to \nthe extent that the OSD passes on questions of funds for items of cen\xe2\x80\x94 \ntral importance to the Services, especially items that may be marginal, \nOSD\xe2\x80\x99s interest in other projects could have some effect. (Clearly, \naccountability is the key to making this a viable strategy.) \n\nb) Competitive spending\xe2\x80\x94If the Secretary let it be known that \nwhen deciding certain classes of budgetary issues, the Services 1 sensi\xc2\xac \ntivity to social ramifications would be considered, it might be pos\xc2\xac \nsible to make productive use of inter-Service rivalry. For example, in \nconsidering Service requirements for additional hospitals, innovative \ndesign could be used as an important criterion. \n\n\nXIII.4.1.2 Promotion . At present, none of the Services furnish any \ncareer incentives to an officer with an interest in social projects. \n\nIf individuals committed to these objectives had any influence over \npromotions, there are a number of strategies that could be used to good \neffect: \n\na) Promotion requirements\xe2\x80\x94The simplest is a new promotion \n\nrequirement: to rise past the rank of colonel, an officer must have \n\ndone a term of duty directing a public service program. \n\nb) Length of duty\xe2\x80\x94The Army, for example, now rotates base com\xc2\xac \nmanders every two years. Because social projects develop over a \nlonger time span, judgment about an officer\xe2\x80\x99s performance becomes \nextremely difficult. Lengthening his tour of duty could make him more \naccountable for, and presumably more responsive to, social projects. \n\nc) Speed of promotion\xe2\x80\x94A distinguished Vietnam record is pres\xc2\xac \nently required for speedy promotion. Similar rewards for distinguished \nsocial service would be equally effective. \n\n\nX II1.4.1.3 Information and education . Distribution of rewards to \norganizational members is the basic mechanism of control in organiza\xc2\xac \ntions. A secondary, but nevertheless important way of changing the \nbehavior of organizational members is to change what influences their \nvalues. Among the potential strategies open to an interested party \nin OSD are the following: \n\n\n541 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\na) Information\xe2\x80\x94The creation of a flow of information into rele\xc2\xac \nvant organizational units about various social problems, e.g., manpower \nand health, and emphasis on what the Services are doing to contribute \nto the solution of such problems would gradually make men in relevant \nslots more conscious of these problems. \n\nb) Education\xe2\x80\x94Material on social problems could be introduced \ninto the curriculum of Service colleges, officers\' programs, etc. \n\nCareer officers could be sent back to universities to be trained in \ndealing with social problems. Special educational programs could be \nestablished within the Services. \n\n\nXIII.4.1.4 Precipitated crisis . Crises are frequent instigators of \norganizational change. Particularly with projects that require the \nServices to search for new SOPs, a crisis at the proper level (be it \nPentagon brass, field commander, staff officer, or non-com) is an \nefficient strategy. The ability to precipitate crises depends to a \nconsiderable extent, of course, on control of money and promotions. \nFor example, a Secretary of Defense might try to convince his chiefs \nthat the post Vietnam spirit of the country would be highly anti\xc2\xac \nmilitaristic; thus to avoid a drastic cut in appropriations the \nServices would be well advised to make their arguments for funds on \nthe basis of social service spillovers to the civilian sector (& la \nNASA). To move in this direction within the bounds of Congressional \nconstraints, however, would not be easy. \n\n\nXIII.4.1,5 Organizational programming . Specifying the desired alter\xc2\xac \nnative in complete detail, down to the lowest level SOP enhances the \nodds of organizational implementation. In a crisis situation, devel\xc2\xac \noping and making new routines accessible to the Services may be \nenough. In the face of stiffer resistance, every new SOP may have to \nbe an order. In either case, the point is the same. If expectations \nand realization are to match, "global" planning is out; minutiae are \nin. \n\n\nXIII.4.2 Examples of strategies \n\nThese strategies should suggest the general considerations and \npossibilities for trying to turn an organization around. But one of \nthe lessons of this framework is that not a great deal can usefully be \nsaid in such general terms. It is more informative to see such strat\xc2\xac \negies "at work." \n\n\n542 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nXIII.4.2.1 The Israeli Defense Forces \n\n\nThe Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have been in the social projects- \nmanpower business since the early fifties. Most of the task of assimi\xc2\xac \nlating and educating Oriental Jews (who differ from European Jews \nmarkedly) has been entrusted to the I.D.F. While there is not a great \ndeal of information available about the workings and outcomes of the \nprocess, a careful look at the existing data suggests the potential \npayoffs of the military serving non-military functions. In addition, \nthe information indicates some measures for realizing this role of the \nmilitary. \n\n1) Coverage. Only individuals who \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99combine lack of education, a \nlow intelligence standard and a lack of knowledge of Hebrew in such a \nsevere degree that enlistment in the army becomes impossible without \neducational preparation, and where there is no possibility of the^ol- \ndier\xe2\x80\x99s being integrated in the military service\xe2\x80\x9d are not drafted. \n\n2) Educational output. About 37% of Oriental Jews have not com\xc2\xac \npleted primary school. By time of discharge, 26 months later, 95% of \nthis gjoup have met national standards for a primary school certifi\xc2\xac \ncate. Oriental Jews with more than a primary certificate who take a \nyear of military "prepping\xe2\x80\x9d to prepare themselves for the universij^ \nhave a graduation of 90% compared with 5% for other Oriental Jews. \n\n3) Educational outputs. Three months of vocational training are \nrequired by the I.D.F. Although we have no statistics on the type of \ntraining, there is some impressionistic evidence for the transfer- \nability of this training to civilian life. \n\n4) Attitudes. One measure of the benefits of military service \nis public attitudes about military service. A poll taken under the \nauspices of Hebrew University included the question, \xe2\x80\x9dIf military \nservice were not compulsory, would you sejrge?\xe2\x80\x9d 70% answered yes, 20% \nwere undecided, and only 10% answered no. In addition, there is \nstatistical evidence that the performance of soldiers with records of \nmisdemeanors does not differ from that of a control group, suggestive \nof a willingness to go along with the institution. \n\n\n^Colonel Mordecki Bar-On, Educational Processes in the Israeli \nDefense Forces (Tel-Aviv: Israeli~Tress, Ltd., December, 1968), p. 23. \n\n\n44 \n\nIbid.. \n\nP- \n\n17. \n\n45 Ibid.. \n\np. \n\n43. \n\n46 , . , \nIbid. % \n\nP- \n\n11. \n\n\n543 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n5) Recognition. The State of Israel gave national recognition \nto the contributions of the I.D.F. when it awarded the Israeli Educa\xc2\xac \ntion Prize for 1965, the highest national distinction, to the I.D.F. \n\nThere are, of course, factors unique to Israel that make the \nI.D.F. an unusually effective educational tool. The sense of fighting \nfor "the temples of our gods and the land of our fathers" creates a \npositive attitude toward the military that is uncharacteristic of many \nadvanced nations in the 1960 f s. The intellectual heritage of the \nEuropean Jew\xe2\x80\x94a deep respect for education, socialist-labor traditions \nthat call for equality\xe2\x80\x94have shaped the atmosphere in which the I.D.F. \neducates as well as the educators themselves. The ratio of European to \nnon-European Jews, expected to sink below one by 1980 makes assimila\xc2\xac \ntion and education of Oriental Jews a top priority item. Finally, as a \nless-developed nation, Israel can productively use the less sophisti\xc2\xac \ncated skills which can be taught in the comparatively short period of \nthree months. \n\nThese factors are for the most part difficult to reproduce. \n\nWithout a detailed study of the workings of the I.D.F. program, other \nelements in its success must remain a matter for speculation. However, \nthe specifics of the operation which are known illustrate how organiza\xc2\xac \ntional strategies look in use. \n\na. Promotion within the junior command ranks is, to some extent, \nbased on increases in, rather than absolute level of, educational \nattainment while in the I.D.F. This procedure creates incentive for \ntaking advantage of in-service educational programs. To provide incen\xc2\xac \ntives for beginning the process, the job of squad commander, lowest of \nthe command positions, requires only a comparatively low level of tech\xc2\xac \nnical sophistication. Thus, short term payoffs from performing well in \nbasic training and elementary Hebrew are easily realized. In addition, \nthere is a "chief education officer" with a small staff of his own who is \nresponsible for all "leadership training." This provides an established \ncareer track for officers interested specifically in education. \n\nb. Information and education. There is a regular rotation of \nlower officers so that all officers at some point in their careers are \npresented with the problems of education, and hopefully internalize \nthem. \n\n\nc. Organizational programming. The present methods for bringing \nthe soldier up to a primary education level\xe2\x80\x94nine hours of class per \nday in classes of ten, led by two teachers during the last three months \nof service\xe2\x80\x94are the end product of a long series of experiments. \nOriginally, this instruction was put at the beginning of service so \n\n\n544 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthat the I.D.F. would reap some of the benefits. A series of experi\xc2\xac \nments showed that instruction at the end of service was much more \neffective. Not only were the enrollees* payoffs closer, but a success\xc2\xac \nful term of service increased the enrollees* tolerance for uncertainty \nand reduced their fear of failure. Thus by specifying and experi\xc2\xac \nmenting with procedures for operation, the I.D.F. has developed an \neffective educational program. \n\nIn addition, due to the large influx of immigrants, funds have \nbeen provided to develop efficient methods of teaching Hebrew. This \nexperimentation with techniques and procedures has contributed to the \nsuccess of the I.D.F. in the educational sphere. \n\nWhile these "strategic 15 features of the I.D.F. project by no \nmeans explain its success, they do illustrate how, with a sufficient \ncommitment to education, the control variables\xe2\x80\x94promotion, information, \neducation and organizational programming\xe2\x80\x94-can be used. \n\n\nXIII.4.2.2 Project Transition \n\nThe earlier predictions abou^the likely outcomes of Project \nTransition were far from sanguine. \xe2\x80\x98 If the Secretary of Defense were \nvery interested in the program, what should he do? According to a con\xc2\xac \nventional account, correctives include earlier and wider dissemination \nof information, more adequate counseling, wider coverage, etc. While \nnot taking issue with any of those needs, the organizational framework \nsuggests a different type of thinking about solutions. It identifies \nthe base commander as key and suggests that his priorities will not \nmove him to push Project Transition, particularly in a difficult area, \ne.g., getting someone to train his less able men, and may lead him to \nactively oppose it for his more able soldiers. Thus, in organizational \nterms the problem is one of moving the base commander. While an effec\xc2\xac \ntive set of strategies depends on detailed information about the job of \n\n\n47 \n\nThis is not to fault the basic strategy of Project Transition \nwhich was to make the task assigned to the Services as simple\xe2\x80\x99 as pos\xc2\xac \nsible. In organizational terms, the idea of requiring the Services \nonly to free the time of its men for training by others, rather than \ntrying to get the Services to do it themselves, is excellent. Only the \nminutiae are missing. \n\n^Udis, "Notes," p. 3. \n\n\n545 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nbase commander, a number of strategies can be suggested on the basis of \npublic information. \n\n1) Promotion. At the moment, promotion is rather firmly in \nmilitary hands, so there is not a great deal the Secretary of Defense \ncan do directly. However, there are small things that might help a \nlittle. If Project Transition were made a standard feature of high \nlevel inspection tours, it might be perceived as more important by the \nbase commander. \n\n2) Money. How many "marginal" projects does a commander have \nthat OSD support could influence? Money for new facilities\xe2\x80\x94housing \nfor his men, a new officers 1 club\xe2\x80\x94could be an understood reward for \nfaithful performance in Project Transition. \n\n3) Information and Education. How well-informed is the Assis\xc2\xac \ntant Secretary of Manpower on the progress of Transition? An informa\xc2\xac \ntion system that collected and transmitted, on a monthly basis, \ninformation of who was in what training program ^d where would create \na sense of being watched for the base commander. Providing him with \nthe same information would allow him to measure his performance \nagainst an organizational norm. \n\n4) Crisis. In this case the appropriate level for crisis is \nclearly the base commander. One possible crisis might involve a \nthreat to military autonomy. If the base commander does not promote \nTransition, civilians could be involved on each base, with some influ\xc2\xac \nence over a serviceman\xe2\x80\x99s off-duty time. The implied threat to the \nintegrity of the military organization might be strong enough to \ngenerate considerable interest in Transition. \n\nA more circuitous route involves dictating that the Services \nlower reenlistment requirements so that each commander faces the pros\xc2\xac \npect of having low quality men for another hitch if not a lifetime. \n\nHis enthusiasm for increasing the range and attractiveness of civilian \noptions open to lower-scoring men could increase markedly if the \nalternative was to downgrade the quality of his Service. \n\n\n49 \n\n\nSome of this is currently being done. \n\n\n546 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nSOCIETAL TURNABILITY: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT 1 \n\nAmitai Etzioni \n\n\nXIV.1 INTRODUCTION \n\nThe time between a ship\xe2\x80\x99s docking and its departure, after unloading, \ncleaning, and reloading to undertake a new mission, is an indicator of \nits turnability. So are the costs which have been incurred in the pro\xc2\xac \ncess. Turnability of ships is affected by the quality of the services of \nthe harbor, the efficiency of the crew, the ship\xe2\x80\x99s design, and the nature \nof its former missions as compared to its new ones.^ In this paper the \nconcept of turnability is applied to modern societies, which have exten\xc2\xac \nsive guidance mechanisms to direct their efforts. We seek to explore \nthe conditions under which nations committed to one course, can as \nswiftly and economically as possible, release the resources and manpower \ninvolved and commit them to new missions. \n\nWe refer to turnability, rather than change of direction to indi\xc2\xac \ncate that we deal with instances in which the change in missions is \nrelatively sudden, encompassing, and swift. That is, we do not deal \nhere with incrementation but with relatively fundamental changes\xe2\x80\x94of \nthe kind involved in terminating or phasing out a war within 12 to 24 \nmonths or so. That is, we are interested here in the problems in\xc2\xac \nvolved in shifting ten or more billions of dollars by changing national \npriorities, rather than a marginal modification in budget or national \nattention. \n\nIt is of course very difficult, if not impossible, to state pre\xc2\xac \ncisely at what level relatively small changes turn into ?, big\xe2\x80\x9d ones. \n\n\nThis report was prepared under the auspices of the Center for \nPolicy Research. The author is indebted to Andrew Barlow, Roberto \nKleinfeld, Richard Kemp and Mary Helen Shortridge for research assis\xc2\xac \ntance. I am indebted for comments on a previous draft, to Emile Benoit, \nKenneth E. Boulding, Julius Margolis, Richard R. Nelson, Bernard Udis \nand Adam Yarmolinsky. \n\n2 0n this concept and the kinds of costs involved see United \nNations, Trade and Development Board, Conference on Trade and Develop\xc2\xac \nment, Shipping And The World Economy (TD/BC.4/17), Geneva, 1966, p. 26. \n\n\n547 \n\n\n/ \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThere is probably a border line area. But changes of $0.5 to $2 \nbillion a year are relatively common and routine; changes of $8 to $12 \nbillion or more, a year, especially for two or three years in a row and \nin the same direction, are very rare and "fundamental n in their conse\xc2\xac \nquences. Of course, the base must be taken into account; changes of 5% \nor less a year are relatively small, 20% or more tend to be "fundamental." \n\nWe emphasize this point not only because we believe such major \nshifts of efforts are necessary for national welfare and security, but \nbecause the operations involved in fundamental shifts are different \nfrom operations which smaller shifts entail. Thus, we are not concerned \nwith such minor operations as adding a few new job training courses for \nenlisted men about to be discharged, although we are in favor of such \nadditions, but with measures required to allow hundreds of thousands of \nmen, and whole industrial complexes, to "turn around" in short periods \nof. time. \n\nWe use the term "turn-around" rather than "conversion" because \nconversion implies that the carrier must be reconstructed, an assump\xc2\xac \ntion we wish to explicitly explore and not implicitly make by our choice \nof terminology. At least logically it is possible, fastest, and least \ncostly to turn men and facilities now in military service to civilian \npurposes without altering them (e.g., military transportation systems \nlike Military Air Transport Service). Theoretically, it is even \npossible to turn around, say, a system of military technical schools \nto civilian missions, without changing either the school system itself \nor those in control. Conversion is only one form of turnability, and \nwhile conversion is often entailed, it is not a necessary concomitant \nof turning around. Below we consider whether turning around with little \nor no conversion makes turnability most effective. \n\nNations as a rule find it difficult\xe2\x80\x94in economic, political and \npsychological terms\xe2\x80\x94to turn around, so difficult that it frequently \nseems that they cannot turn around at all (cases in point are the United \nStates 1 commitment to farm subsidies, veterans 1 benefits, etc.); or can \nonly turn around following a major crisis such as defeat in a major war \nand/or a change in the top level leadership. Such changes, involving \nthe top leader and the party in office preceded the termination of the \nDepression, the French war in Algeria, the war in Korea, and it seems \nthe war in Vietnam. We thus ask, under what conditions can the maneu\xc2\xac \nver which is usually very difficult to accomplish (and hence, typically \ncarried out only when it is overdue, and in an excessively slow, ex\xc2\xac \npensive and incomplete manner) be conducted more effectively? The \nimage which stands before us as we explore the statecraft of modem \nnations is that of ships being turned in the harbor of a very under\xc2\xac \ndeveloped country. \n\n\n548 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe conditions under which turnability may be enhanced seem \ndifferent various policies and for various modern nations. For \nexample, a shift of five billion dollars from NASA to HEW, entails \ndifferent adaptive measures from let us say a shift from HEW to the \nNational Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities. We focus here on \none kind of shift, that of the war machinery, for one nation\xe2\x80\x94the United \nStates, under one set of historical conditions, namely the near future. \nMore specifically, we explore the factors which may enhance the shift \nto domestic missions, once the war is being terminated, of those \nresources now invested in the Vietnamese war and in the maintenance and \ndevelopment of a strategic weapon system. Such a turn-around will be \naffected by many factors studied by others who work on the same project \nwe do; we limit our exploration to key structural organizational factors. \n\nOur approach is theoretical in the sense that we seek to specify \nthe variables involved and explore their relationships. As the limited \nexamples of turn-arounds of modern war machinery (and limitation of our \nresearch budget) do not allow us to collect data on the many variables \ninvolved, the material provided below is strictly illustrative. \n\nTurnability is one instance of a category of processes we classify \nas societal guidance.^ The two main components of societal guidance are \nconsensus-building , to gain support for the new course of action, in this \ncase, civilianization, and control \xe2\x80\x94the development of the tools neces\xc2\xac \nsary to implement the policy which is being introduced and to phase out \nthe obsolescent one, in the case at hand, the high commitment to military \nmissions. We explore first the role of consensus-building in enhancing \nthe capacity of the United States to focus significantly more of its \nefforts on domestic missions; we next turn to the constraints on the \nimplementation of such a policy resulting from the limitations of \nexisting control structures. We close with a discussion of the rela\xc2\xac \ntive effectiveness of four administrative options for the transition \n(the turnability ladder) in view of making the transition more \neffective. \n\n\nXIV.2 THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS-BUILDING \n\nXIV.2.1 Constraints: Democratic or Generic \n\nGenerally, we have already noted, the capacity of the societal pro\xc2\xac \ncesses required to bring about turn-around seems to be rather low. \n\n\n3 Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York; Free Press, 1968), \nChapter 5. \n\n\n549 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThere are, though, two major competing propositions as to the core \nstructural reason for this difficulty in introducing fundamental changes \nof direction. According to one school of thought, the difficulties are \nnot universal to all modern societies but only endemic to democracies. \nDemocracies are said to prefer to slowly reduce commitments to an \nobsolescent course, meanwhile adding new ones when internal pressures \nor external changes so require, over large-scale shifting of resources \nfrom one mission to another.4 \n\nThe concentration of power over policy in the Soviet Union means \nthat its leaders are more frequently able to make clear-cut choices \namong major alternatives than American political leaders, whose \nchoices are almost invariably marginal or ambiguous. The Soviet \nLeadership is also better able to coordinate policies in various \nareas, and, because of the greater scarcity of resources, the need \nfor such coordination is far greater in the Soviet Union than in \nthe United States. The concentration of the responsibility for \ninitiating policy in the top leadership means that the Soviet \nsystem may be slow in responding to gradually developing policy \nproblems. In the American system the agitation of the affected \ngroups is likely to bring the problem to the attention of the top \nleadership more quickly. Once the problem is recognized by the \nSoviet leaders, however, their concentrated power enables them, if \nthey wish, to deal with it vigorously and to reverse, if necessary, \nearlier policies. Policy innovations invariably are slow in the \nUnited States.^ \n\nApplication of the general proposition just reviewed to the issue \nat hand suggests (a) that the system will not generate internally a \n\n\nErnest W. Lefever, of the Brookings Institution, wrote to the \nWashington Post on August 5, 1969: \xe2\x80\x9dNo member of the House or Senate \nis ever confronted with a clear option to authorize $10 million for \neducation or defense, highways or space. Each program, domestic or \nforeign, is presented on its own merits, not as an alternative for other \nunrelated programs. The Congressman, keeping in mind his own priorities \nand responsive to his constituents, votes for the measure as presented, \nagainst it, or seeks a modification. He never presents an amendment \ncalling for a transfer of $10 million to an unrelated program.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n^Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: \nUSA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 413. \n\n\n550 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nmajor reduction in expenditures on military purposes and release the \nresources to other use on short order, let us say within a year or two, \nfrom the beginning of the shift; (b) that if opportunities arise for \nmajor reductions in military expenditures due to events such as termin\xc2\xac \nation of the war in Vietnam or strategic arms limitations agreed upon \nwith the Soviet Union, the resources released will not be primarily \nturned over to domestic missions but divided among three major uses\xe2\x80\x94 \nother military needs, increased private consumption (via lower taxes \nor reduction of the national debt) and domestic missions.6 At the \npresent time, we see moves toward tax-reduction, which release re\xc2\xac \nsources to private use, and claims being staked by the military for \nfunds which will be released for such uses as replenishing stockpiles \ndiminished during the war in Vietnam and developing new strategic \nweapons.7 The proposition would further imply that new resources \ngenerated by the growing economy of the nation are expected to be \ndirected in a fashion similar to those released by peace in Vietnam and \narms reduction rather than focused on the domestic front. \n\nThe alternative proposition is not that it is easy for democracies \nto turn around\xe2\x80\x94we are unaware of anyone who subscribes to this view. \nRather, the competing proposition is that all political systems have not \nyet developed the kind of guidance mechanisms (consensus-building \nincluded) which allow them, in the face of a rapid change in the environ\xc2\xac \nment or internal needs, to swiftly alter their priorities in terms of \nmajor commitments of funds, manpower, and psychic energy. \n\nEven more significant than establishing which system is more \ntransferrable and at what costs, is the question of which specific \nfactors, within each system, account for its particular turnability. \n\nThis is of special interest to us as we seek the steps which may in\xc2\xac \ncrease this society 1 s turnability, if not permanently, at least for our \npost-Vietnam war transition from war and space-oriented priorities to \nmajor domes tic effo rts. \n\n^For relevant statements of spokesmen of the Administration, see \ndiscussions of the size of the peace dividend by Daniel P. Moynihan, \nHerbert Stein and Arthur Burns, as reported by the New York Times , \nrespectively on August 26, 1969, August 28, 1969 and September 3, 1969. \nSee also Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "After Peace Breaks Out, What Will We Do \nWith All That Extra Money?" New York Times Magazine, February 16, 1969, \n\npp. 32 ff. \n\n7 For a discussion of the background, see Charles L. Schultze, \n\n"Budget Alternatives after Vietnam," Agenda for the Nation (Washington: \nThe Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 13-48. William Beecher reports \n"Military Asking for $20 Billion More," New York Times , December 19, \n\n1968, and Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "A Pentagon Aide Bars Major Reductions in \nBudget after War," New Y ork Times , June 7, 1969. \n\n\n551 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nMany of those who hold that democracies turn as slowly as tugboats \nwhile tyrannies are torpedo-boat swift (a theory particularly popular \nin the thirties as Nazi Germany mobilized swiftly while France and \nBritain faltered) view constraints on the capacity to turn around as \nsample indications of the poor quality of the system. One of the major \nconstraining forces is the need to build consensus for the new course; \nif turning around more swiftly further requires going beyond that which, \nat the particular stage, the large majority views as legitimate, then \nobviously the constraint on turnability is at one and the same time a \nsafeguard of the democratic process, and the \xe2\x80\x99\'costs\' 1 generated by \ndelaying, must be tallied against the values invested in such a system. \nTyrannies, in contrast, it is said, can turn on, off, and on again \nquickly, and turn around as sharply as Krushchev did in Cuba in 1962, \nwith little concern about citizens T reaction to the loss of national \nprestige entailed by the involuntary change of direction. \n\nThe opposing school of thought points out that, to stay with the \nexample, Krushchev did not remain long in power after the Cuban crisis \nand though other factors also contributed to his unseating, his Cuban \ndebacle was a major one. More generally, it is suggested, societies \nwhose polities function differently from ours must also worry about the \nrespect of their citizens and a sense of legitimacy, and hence cannot \nturn around much more readily than democracies, although they may be \nable to do so somewhat more rapidly. 8 For each type of polity, it may \nbe asked, given its specific nature, what could be done to increase \nits capacity to change course fundamentally and swiftly, without \ntipping it in the process? The answer, we shall see, lies in part not \nin the steering mechanism but in the processes which are being guided. \n\nXIV.2.2 Mobilization for Change \n\nWhile the government does constitute the guidance overlayer of \nthe society, the overlayer is deeply affected by the dynamics of the \nsocietal underlayer. The many and varied facets of articulations \ninclude values which the staff of the guidance centers (the elites) \nshare with major segments of the membership of the society (e.g. patrio\xc2\xac \ntism, conservatism), and shared cognitive maps and expressive memories \n(such as implied in the symbols of "Munich" and "Pearl Harbor"). How\xc2\xac \never, the single most important link, and the one which explains most \nwhy guidance mechanisms find it difficult to reorient the societal \nprocesses they are to guide, even when they see the storm ahead quite \n\n\nFor studies on rigidities in totalitarian countries see Burton \nKlein, Germany\'s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge: Harvard \nUniversity Press, 1959) and Robert Butow, Japan\'s Decision to Surrender \n(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). \n\n\n552 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nclearly, is that they cannot readily change "their" interest group \nmoorings. The views from the captain 1 s tower and from the top decks \nare closely related but not identical and the captain tends to feel \nthat he must satisfy his first class customers, first.9 \n\nihus, although we do not hold the pessimistic view of societal \nguidance and do see a capacity for fundamental reorientation\xe2\x80\x94we also do \nnot share the rationalist view, which sees a great capacity for easy \nplanning and implementation. This view is largely discredited as a \ngeneral theory of human nature but still subscribed to in practice by \nmany government officials and theoreticians, as they imply when they \nevaluate organizational reforms without exploring the underlying \nsocietal anchors and the conditions under which they may be lifted. We \nthus chart a middle course between the optimists and the pessimists in \nour view that fundamental decisions to turn around and change the organi\xc2\xac \nzational structure accordingly can be made, but chiefly only after\xe2\x80\x94or \nduring\xe2\x80\x94broad mobilization of support of private or public pressure \ngroups and the public at large. One of the major reasons many domestic \nprograms in the United States, for instance, desegregation of schools \nand eradication of poverty, have proceeded so slowly, is that their \ninitiation and extension was not accompanied by a mobilization of \nconsensus. (Even when there was such mobilization in reference to ulti\xc2\xac \nmate goals, and to social justice, it did not cover the means used, \ne.g., "busing" of children). Even now, the idea that all or most of the \nso-called "peace dividend" will be turned over to domestic missions is \nnot widely supported. It is one of our central propositions that unless \na broader base is built, the desired turn will not be accomplished. \nRecently such support was being mobilized. By the end of August 1969, \n\n52% of the public came to regard military spending as too high, follow\xc2\xac \ning a barrage of criticism of military expenditures in the U.S. Seriate \nand the press. Only 8% thought military expenditures should be in\xc2\xac \ncreased. In 1960, the respective figures were 18% and 21% (the balance \neither thought the amount proper or had no opinion). 10 Whether public \nsupport for reduction of military expenditure continues to rise or the \nAugust 1969 figures show a temporary arousal which will soon subside, \ndepends in part on the action of the national leadership in Congress, \nthe White House, and the press, in part on the educational efforts of \n\n\n9 \n\nA question has been raised as to whether we imply the system is \nreally guidable at all, or\xe2\x80\x94if so, is it only for the upper classes? Our \nposition is that it is inadequately guidable for all, but comparatively, \nsignificantly more responsive to the upper classes. All members of \nsociety, though, suffer as changes in the environment (or internal \nchanges) require swift and encompassing action. \n\n\xe2\x80\x9c^Time, Vol. 94, No. 9 (August 29, 1969), p. 13. \n\n\n553 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe opposition.il \n\nBefore we can further explicate the preceding proposition, we must \ndigress to depict the kind of society we see before us. We view America \nas neither tightly controlled as the power-elite conception implies, nor \nas free-for-all as the liberal conception of pluralism suggests. The \ncountry is not run by any one elite or class. Numerous groupings have a \nleverage on the central societal processes, and their interests are \nusually not highly coordinated and often are in partial conflict. Big \nbusiness and small business, big business and the Administration, the Air \nForce and the State Department\xe2\x80\x94all these do not act like the members of \na well-drilled football team. Civic groups (e.g., the League of Women \nVoters), religious associations (e.g., the National Council of Churches) \nand universities (e.g., on NSF Board)\xe2\x80\x94sometimes referred to as public \ninterest groups\xe2\x80\x94have some autonomous bases of power .^ While the \nownership of the mass media is concentrated, the range of viewpoints \nexpressed is much broader than the patterns of ownership would lead one \nto expect. The supporters of, let us say, Goldwater and Rockefeller \nhave conflicted quite sharply on the air and in newsprint, and while \nSenator Eugene McCarthy did not gain "equal time" to answer President \nJohnson\xe2\x80\x99s charges on television, he was extended much more time than \nany theory of monopolization-of-the-media explains. Despite all the \ntalk about the manipulated American citizen, a high percentage of \nAmericans favor world disarmament and a stronger United Nations (about \n70%); the enacting of gun controls opposed by the industry (73%); and \nmore government efforts to revitalize city ghettos (57% in November \n1967, after the riots). While more than a third of the citizens are \nill-informed and frequently do not vote, another sizeable segment\xe2\x80\x94 \nreferred to as the "attentive publics" by political scientist Gabriel \nA. Almond 1,3 \xe2\x80\x94follows events closely and responds actively in political \nterms, by perhaps re-channeling their votes, campaign contributions, \nand voluntary labor. They are not controlled by whoever is in power. \n\n\nAnother major difference between the American polity as we see it, \nand the power-elite image is our recognition of a plurality of interest \ngroups whose consensus must be won and sustained by anyone who seeks to \n\n\n^ "For a study showing the effects of moving, first, without building \nconsensus, and again, after its formation, see Morton Inger, Politics and \nReality in an American City (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1969). \n\n12 \n\nThe subject has been recently treated effectively by Grant \nMcConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: A, Knopf, \n1966). For our own view, see The Active Society , Chaps. 16-18. \n\n13 \n\nThe American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace \nand Co., 1950), p. 139. \n\n\n554 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nlaunch a major new program in the United States. The voters-at-large \ndo play a real role; they must be counted as one more, rather impressive \npublic interest-group. That is, launching cf new programs usually \nrequires some genuine efforts at mobilization of public opinion support, \nas well as that of a conglomerate of interest groups. \n\nOn the other hand, one main reason why the system is not nearly as \npluralistic as the liberals believe is that the contesting interest \ngroups differ largely in their power. Small business and big business \nboth have a say, but big business 1 say on national matters seems con\xc2\xac \nsiderably greater, although this remains to be documented. Business and \nlabor unions both exert pressure, but that of the unions cannot counter\xc2\xac \nvail that of business, when the latter acts in unison. The A.M.A. \ncarried more weight than nurses ? associations, and so forth. Political \ngive and take among the various groups hence does not yield the neat \ncompromise which serves as many needs of as many groups as possible \n(the political equivalent of the greatest happiness of the greatest \nnumber), bul: is tailored to the existing power -differential . No interest \ngroup is ignored; but some are heeded less than others. \n\nSecond, important segments of the citizenry are more or less locked \nout of the political process. Weak groups\xe2\x80\x94such as the poor, lower- \nclass ethnic minorities, and farm hands\xe2\x80\x94are not only underprivileged, \nbut also have little political say-so. This is because they are under\xc2\xac \norganized and hence cannot mobilize whatever latent power they do have. \nTo the extent that these groups have been mobilized over the past \ndecade, or\xe2\x80\x94because of social disorders in which they were involved\xe2\x80\x94 \nthe system has made some concessions to their much neglected needs, thus \nshowing that the American power elites can neither keep the under\xc2\xac \nprivileged from mobilizing (although they can slow down the process \nconsiderably) nor can they refrain from bargaining with them once they \nare politically active. \n\nIn our semi-pluralistic system alliances are important. As the \nNegro groups of the civil rights movement reacted to the slow pace of \n1964-1965 reforms (then at their "peak\xe2\x80\x9d) by growing more internally \ndivided and externally militant, thus alienating many white liberals, \nthe political conformation lost the liberal versus conservative line and \nacquired a Negro versus white coloration, although some lingering of \nwhite liberal support remained. As these sentiments were registered in \nthe 1966 Congressional elections and later in public opinion polls,14 \n14 \n\nAccording to the American Institute of Public Opinion, only a \nthird of the American people (34%) felt in March 1965 that the Johnson \nAdministration was "pushing" integration too fast. By December 1966 \nthey numbered more than half of the population (53%). Those who felt \nthat integration was progressing "not fast enough" numbered only 9% at \nthe later date, a sharp decline from 17% in March 1965. \n\n\n555 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe political bases for "concessions* 1 to the Negro (and, to some extent, \nother poor) were undermined. The social reforms involved\xe2\x80\x94slum clearance, \nanti-poverty programs and Aid for Dependent Children\xe2\x80\x94also lost ground, \nwhile others such as social security and medicine\xe2\x80\x94which also serve the \nmiddle classes\xe2\x80\x94continued at the slow pace that the liberal-conservative \ncompromise and the Vietnam war exigencies tolerated. The public*s views \nseemed to be close to those of the political leaders: when a national \nsample of Americans was asked which programs to cut first, anti-poverty \nand welfare were listed five times more often than medicaid and ten \ntimes more than Federal aid to education (Harris Poll, January 29, 1968). \n\nThe picture of changing coalitions and public sentiments outlined \nabove does not reflect a concentrated capacity of one elite to regularly \npush through its program in the face of opposition by other power groups, \nor to manufacture consensus at will, making the "masses" see in its \nmonopolization of power and privilege the best of all worlds ("The \nAmerican Way of Life," "peoples 1 capitalism") or a legitimate policy. On \nthe other hand, the relations between those who favor reforms and those \nopposed are not like the bargaining between two roughly equal groupings, \nlet us say, as between a powerful union (like the UAW) and the well- \norganized automotive industry. Rather, in some matters they are like \ndealings between an oil company and gasoline pump owners, or between the \nInternational Ladies T Garment Workers Union and a small "shop" owner. \n\nThe very weak groupings (e.g., farm hands) gain few concessions and then \nfor the most part when they are in coalition with others (e.g., with \nassociations of Mexican-Americans or the AFL-CIO); the more powerful \nlabor groups such as white organized workers attain, albeit slowly, \nseveral reforms they desire (e.g. in the health area) and not insignifi\xc2\xac \ncant pay-offs (in the form of a higher standard of living); still a more \nhighly disproportionate part of the total privileges are concentrated \nin the hands of a few powerful groupings who vie with each other over \ntheir distribution. \n\nThis picture of the American polity leaves open three questions \nwhich we cannot explore here: how large are the gaps among the have- \nnots, have-somes, and have-mosts? Are they shrinking or expanding? \n\nAnd under what conditions can these gaps be substantially reduced? But \nwhatever the answers to these questions, two features stand out\xe2\x80\x94power \nis dispersed to a considerable extent (including, we must repeat, among \nthe various power "elites") and in order to advance new programs suc\xc2\xac \ncessfully, coalitions must be formed and consensus built. \n\nFor the issue at hand, we find that, on the one side, some of the \nmost powerful private interest groups are basically not interested in \nshifting from a greater mobilization for war and national security to \n\n\n556 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ngreater mobilization for domestic missions. (This set of groups is \nsometimes referred to, rather loosely and without recognition of the \ninternal divisions and lack of tight coordination, as the industrial \ncomponent of the military-industrial complex.) If this were the whole \nor even nearly complete picture, there could hardly be a rapid turn\xc2\xac \naround from intensive national mobilization for war and security to a \nsimilar mobilization for domestic missions. To put it in the most \nelementary terms, if the view of America which sees its war machinery \nas being run to provide easy and sure profits for its industrialist \nclass were even nearly accurate, a major turn-around from military to \nc ^ v Hi- an programs, short of a revolution, would not be possible. \n\nThe very fact that such a turn-around, and a rather sharp one, \ntook place in 1945-1946 suggests that this is simply not a true picture \n\xc2\xb0f the United States. The number of military personnel on active duty \nin 1945 was 12,123,455. It had dropped 75% a year later, to 3,030,088, \nand had decreased another 12% from the 1945 level by 1947 (to \n1 > 561 , 000 ).the same period military expenditure dropped from \n$83,309 million to $43,207 million (1946) and to $14,372 million \n(1947). 16 \n\nEven now more than half a million persons are discharged each year \nand somehow absorbed into the civilian economy without special efforts \nto ease the transition being made. In recent years the number has been \neven higher: 830,000 in 1968. The projection for 1969 is 840,000, and \nfor 1970\xe2\x80\x94970,000. 17 \n\n\nU.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United \nStates 1968 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968) p. 257 and \nthe same publication for 1957, p= 247. \n\n~ ^Ibid. , 1957, p. 238 and 1968, p. 296. For a detailed discussion \nof the extent of mobilization during the war see Report of the Chairman, \nWar Production Board, Wartime Production Achievements released by the \nWhite House, October 9, 1945. On preparations for the transition and its \ninitiation, see John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in \nthe United States Army (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the \nChief of Military History, 1951); A.D.H. Kaplan, The Liquidation of War \nProduction (Washington: Committee for Economic Development, 1944) and \nBernard M. Baruch, and John M. Hancock, Report on War and Post-War \nAdjustment Policies (Washington: U.S. Office of War Mobilization, Feb\xc2\xac \nruary, 1944). \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0^U.S. Department of Labor, Transferring Military Experience to \nCivilian Jobs: A Study of Selected Air Force Veterans , Manpower/Auto\xc2\xac \nmation Research, Monograph No. 8 (Washington: Government Printing Office, \n1968). \n\n\n557 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nOf course one must take into account the special conditions that \nprevailed in 1945; for instance the pent-up consumer demand which accu\xc2\xac \nmulated in the war years. But the fact remains that within the confines \nof the capitalist system, such a turn-around was accomplished. The main \nlesson which follows is that "special conditons" may again have to be \ncreated. It might even be said that this time it will be more: difficult \nto turn around, but one cannot conclude that such a turn cannot be \nbrought about within the confines of the system. \n\nA major reason it is possible, at least in principle, to reduce arms \nrapidly is that the industrialist interest groups are divided against \neach other, in at least the following ways: (a) those groups which bene\xc2\xac \nfit from military contracts compete with each other, (b) those interest \ngroups which benefit from military contracts compete with the larger num\xc2\xac \nber of industries which do not, and which constitute at least a potential \npressure group for conversion (so far their pressure has mainly taken \nthe form of demands that government spending be kept down, which\xe2\x80\x94in the \ncontext of mounting domestic demands\xe2\x80\x94led to some trimming of military \nexpenditures, and, more substantially, prevented them from rising even \nmore), and (c) those interest groups which benefit from military con\xc2\xac \ntracts often have a higher profit margin and/or safer and simpler markets \nin their deals with other sectors of the economy and hence have an inter\xc2\xac \nest in diversification and, at least potentially, in turning to domestic \nmissions. \n\nSecond, there are many other interest groups whose interests are in \nconflict with those of industrialists, including teacher associations, \nsocial workers, nurses\xe2\x80\x94all interest groups which can expect to gain from \nconversion. \n\nThird, there are the public interest groups, ranging from Americans \nfor Democratic Action to the National Council of Churches, who do not pro \npromote their self-interest in this context but the national interest and \nwho mobilize the public on these issues, on balance, in favor of turning \nto domestic missions. \n\n\nRecently, it has been argued that defense business is less profi\xc2\xac \ntable than other production. See, for instance, The New Republic , \n\nGeorge E. Berkley, "The Myth of War Profiteering", Vol. 161, No. 25-26 \n(Dec. 20, 1969) pp. 15-18. However, this does not take into account the \nlower risks such production entails, and most contractors frequently work \nwith government-owned property, materials, and working capital. See \nStanford Research Institute, The Industry-Government Aerospace Relation\xc2\xac \nship , (Menlo Park, California: The Institute, 1963), Vol. II, pp. 118 ff \nAlso, as one can see in the 1969 copper market, producers are willing to \nsell for a lower price, if they can have "safe" customers. \n\n\n558 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nFourth, the taxpayers i.e. the public-at-large\xe2\x80\x94are interested in \nkeeping taxes low, hence in keeping down the total level of government \nexpenditures. When the justifications for military expenditure are weak\xc2\xac \nening and there are urgent needs on other fronts, segments of the public \ntend to favor a shift of resources to domestic plans. The size of these \nsegments would grow if the kind of efforts which are now being made to \nlegitimate the war ceased and the energy used to legitimate higher com\xc2\xac \nmitments to domestic missions. \xc2\xb0 \n\nIt must, though, be recognized that the public-at-large is the \nleast likely source of active support for this particular turn-around. \n\nThe deeper reason the public-at-large is much more difficult to mobilize \nfor domestic than for military or space programs is that those projects \nwhich involve national interests and prestige potentially "pay off" to \nall, or at least most citizens. At stake most commonly is national \nprestige. As a result of secularization and of nationalization, the \nstate has become the prime frame of identification for most citizens. \n\nHence they derive personal psychic satisfactions and frustrations from \nreal and imaginary gains and losses of their nation. Thus, humiliating \nthe nation (e.g. in the Bay of Pigs) will displease most Americans, \nwhile building up the nation\'s prestige (e.g., Apollo 11) will gratify \nmost of them. \n\nMost domestic programs are allocative in nature in the sense that \npleasing one group of Americans tends to displease another. Plans aimed \nto help labor, "offend" the industrialist; those which please the Blacks, \noffend many Southerners, and so on. While it is possible to negotiate \nthis rift by either packaging reforms so that the total package will in\xc2\xac \nclude some pay-off for each major group, or at least gain majority sup\xc2\xac \nport, or will appeal to a moral value subscribed to by those not serviced, \nit is a. priori much more difficult to build consensus around most domes\xc2\xac \ntic plans than many foreign ones, especially war. \n\nIn toto, we see not one monolith\xe2\x80\x94holding a heavy hand on the socie\xc2\xac \ntal guidance mechanisms, pushing the wheel toward ever greater military \nspending while blocking turns toward a civilian course\xe2\x80\x94but a large var\xc2\xac \niety of hands, that differ in the directions in which they pull and the \nmight with which they pull. At a particular point in time the profile of \nsupport of interest groups (private and public) and of the unorganized \n\n\n19 \n\n\'One reader commented that this statement is a "personal value- \njudgement." On retreading it, I let it stay, because I see no indica\xc2\xac \ntion of preference in it but only a statement, value free as far as I \ncan tell, that if^ "A" were done, the consequences specified are likely \nto follow. (Of course there is nothing wrong with value-judgements as \nlong as one subscribes to the right values.) \n\n\n559 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-I56 \n\n\npublic for a particular course may seem rigid and unchangeable, but over \ntime new coalitions can be formed and new courses can be \'\'charted." \n\nWe thus concur with those who see an intimate relationship between \nthe course the government follows and the pressure of various interest \ngroups, including public ones. But we do not see these groups as all \npulling in one direction nor their net pull as necessarily opposed to the \nparticular turn-around we study here. Under conditions which cannot be \nexplored here, we do expect the net effect to be in the direction of a \nhigh domestic priority, if not a domestic top priority. This would be \nespecially true if sizeable segments of the public-at-large were mobi\xc2\xac \nlized around domestic priorities, for instance pollution control. \n\nFor any given level of consensus more or less turnability can be \nachieved, depending on the way the system is structured in terms of cy\xc2\xac \nbernetic overlay and organizational networks, i.e., how "rational" it \ncan be. To this we turn next. \n\n\nXIV.3 CONTROL \n\n\nXIV.3.1. The Limits and Opportunities for Societal Guidance \n\nWe move from the question\xe2\x80\x94-can we mobilize the will to recommit? \xe2\x80\x94 \nto the second most important question underlying the study of turnability: \ncan we find the tools to do so? This is, in effect, a question as to how \nmuch rationality societal systems are capable of in general, in our plu\xc2\xac \nralistic society in particular, and in reference to the post-Vietnam \nincrease of domestic programs, specifically. To put it differently, the \nquestion as to our ability to redirect is: can we set goals and gear \nour system to serve them, or are we so caught by our previous commitments \nand surrounding constraints that we cannot cut loose? The rationalist \nanswer is affirmative, recognizing only ad hoc limitations on societal \nguidance; the incrementalist answer is that we can at best plan marginal \nmodifications but not set overall patterns, and in that sense we can only \nmove slowly away from adverse conditions.^ But, the incrementalist says, \nwe cannot set goals, especially if they entail basic structural reorgani\xc2\xac \nzation. Our own position is an intermediate one; we see nothing even \nremotely approximating a capacity to plan and fundamentally restructure \nsocietal systems to order; but we see the conditions under which, if the \n\n\nFor an example of a typical incrementalist viewpoint see Charles \nE. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965). \nThe rationalist viewpoint is represented by the many advocates of the \n"total planning" approach. \n\n\n\n\n560 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nappropriate efforts are made, more than incremenation can be achieved. \nTo guide to direct in a general sense, even to make occasionally fun\xc2\xac \ndamental decisions\xe2\x80\x94is less demanding than detailed planning, but pro\xc2\xac \nvides more than mere marginal modifications. The capacity to make such \nguiding decisions is explored next. \n\n\nXIV.3.2. Decision Making \n\nTo effectively turn around requires a capacity to make fundamental \ndecisions. Even if the actual turn-around is relatively slow and gradual, \nand the decision to change direction is implemented in a piecemeal manner, \nthere must be a guiding line, a base-decision which the more limited \ndecisions seek to specify. Without such a fundamental commitment, the \nefficacy of turn-around will be reduced. But incremental implementation \nis not necessarily a sign of lack of base-decision. Thus, the. termina\xc2\xac \ntion of the war in Vietnam may drag on for years, with a small proportion \nof the American troops there withdrawing every few months, but this still \ncould reflect a prior policy decision. The monthly incremental decisions \n(e.g., how many units to withdraw this time) are not necessarily an indi\xc2\xac \ncator that there is no underlying policy decision. \n\n21 \n\nWhen no such policy decision has been made, the course of a coun\xc2\xac \ntry may nevertheless turn, due to slow erosion of implementation and in\xc2\xac \ncremental recommitments, but, we suggest, turning around under these con\xc2\xac \nditions will be slower and costlier than it would be under a basic guid\xc2\xac \ning decision. The greater effectiveness (or more accurately, the lesser \nineffectiveness) of turning after a policy decision has been reached is \nexpected to result not from the fact that once there is a fundamental \ndecision all or most specific acts will be rationally geared to it. \nConsiderable zigzagging is still likely to occur as a result of pres\xc2\xac \nsures to reverse or undermine the change in policy by private interest \ngroups and segments of the public, \'\'second thoughts" by the highest \nauthority, escalations by the enemy, and other factors. We propose \nonly that tjrnability will be enhanced\xe2\x80\x94to some degree\xe2\x80\x94if a fundamental \ndecision to recommit has been made before the actual turn-around occurs \nand is sustained, as it takes place. \n\nThis proposition may seem quite self-evident; it should be noted, \nhowever, that there is a significant body of literature, both analytic \n\n\n21 \n\nThe hypothetical nature of this statement rests on the fact that \nas these lines are written no one knows if the President has made a \npolicy decision or is enlarging on a present one. Of course, public \ndeclarations cannot be used as evidence in such matters. The lines were \nwritten before the May, 1970 invasion of Cambodia. \n\n\n561 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nand empirical, which holds that democracies are unable to make funda\xc2\xac \nmental decisions and that the only major change of direction which does \ncome about is due to accumulation of incremental decions, whose accumu -22 \nlative effect is neither foreseen nor guided by a fundamental decision. \nPresident Nixon announced that he was withdrawing 5% of the American \ntroops in Vietnam in June, 1969 and later announced additional small \nwithdrawals. However, this did not indicate what course he would follow \nafter these limited decisions were implemented as they could have been \nfollowed by additional small withdrawals, by larger ones, or even by the \nrecommitment of troops. What is at stake is not the suggestion by incre\xc2\xac \nmentalists that the President (or other decision-makers) make contingency \nplans, for instance, deciding to continue to turn around in Vietnam only \nif the enemy would not escalate (or not too much), but that typically, \ndecision-makers, faced with too many factors to speculate about (e.g. \nSoviet response, domestic pressures, situation in Laos, development in \nKorea, etc.) make only incremental decisions, leaving the door open for \nas many future alternative courses as possible. This includes continuation \nof the previous course and its reversal, that is, leave open even the \ndecision as to whether the steps they undertook constituted part of \nturning around or not. \n\nThis characterization of decision-making seems to us a correct \none for the way many decisions, probably most, are made. Such a mode \nof decision-making is too rewarding for politicians in pluralistic socie\xc2\xac \nties, for them to avoid using it. The question remains though: are \nthere exceptional occasions in which fundamental decisions are made? \n\nAnd, when such decisions are reached do they enhance the turn-around? It \nmight be said that even if there are exceptions they do not challenge the \nrule, but\xe2\x80\x94as we see it\xe2\x80\x94these are exceptional exceptions: as fundamen\xc2\xac \ntal decisions affect a myriad of incremental ones. Even if they are very \nrare, their significance may match or even outweigh that of the much more \nnumerous incremental decisions. \n\nRegarding the first point, we note that the data provided by the \nincrementalists themselves illustrates that occasionally fundamental \ndecisions are being made. We suggest that (a) most incremental deci\xc2\xac \nsions specify or anticipate fundamental decisions and (b) the cumula\xc2\xac \ntive value of the incremental decisions is greatly affected by the \nunderlying fundamental decisions . \n\n\nThe reasons leading to this statement are summarized succinctly \nin Charles E. Lindblom, \xe2\x80\x9dThe Science of Muddling Through,\xe2\x80\x9d Public \nAdministration Review , Vol. XIX, No. 2 (Spring, 1954), pp. 79-99, and \nelaborated in his The Intelligence for Democracy (New York: Free \nPress, 1965). Our position is spelled out in The Active Society , Chs. \n11 and 12. \n\n\n562 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThus, it is not enough to show, as Richard Fenno did, that Congress \nmakes primarily marginal changes in the Federal budget (a comparison of \none year\xe2\x80\x99s budget for a Federal agency with that of the preceding year \nshowed, on many occasions, only a 10 percent or lower difference), 3 \nor that the defense budget does not change very much in terms of its \npercentage of the Federal budget, or that the Federal budget remains \nthe same in terms of its percentage of the Gross National Product.^\' \n\nThese "bit\xe2\x80\x99\' (or item) changes are often indicative of trends which were \ninitiated at critical turning points when fundamental, contextuating \ndecisions were made. The United States defense budget increased at the \nbeginning of the Korean War in 1950 from 4.9 percent of the GNP to 10.3 \npercent in 1951. The fact that it stayed at about this level (between \n9.0 and 11.3 percent of the GNP) after the war (1954-1960) did reflect \nincremental decisions, but these were made within the contextual deci\xc2\xac \nsion of engaging in the Korean War. 25 Fenno*s own figures show almost \nas many changes of above 20 percent as below this level. Out of 444 bud\xc2\xac \nget changes, within one year, 211 were 20 percent or larger. Seven bud\xc2\xac \nget changes represented an increase of 100 percent or more, and 24 bud\xc2\xac \ngets increased 50 percent or more. ^ Once Congress set up a national \nspace agency in 1958 and consented to support President Kennedy\xe2\x80\x99s space \ngoals, it made "incremental,\xe2\x80\x9d additional commitments for several years. \nBut, first, a fundamental decision had been made. Actually, Congress \nin 1958, drawing on previous experience and on an understanding of the \ndynamics of incremental processes, could not but have been aware that \nonce a fundamental commitment is made, it is difficult to reverse. And \nwhile the initial space budget was relatively small, the acts of estab- \nlising a space agency and subscribing to the space goals were, in effect, \n\n\n23 \n\nRichard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little, \nBrown, 1966). pp. 266 ff. See also Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster and \nAaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," The American \nPolitical Science Review , Vol. 60, No. 3 (September, 1966), pp. 529-547, \nespecially pp. 530-531. \n\n9 / \n\nNelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, \n\nN.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 86. \n\no c \n\nIbid . While this decision itself had some "prepatory" bits and \np ost-ho c specifying ones, a fundamental decision was made in 1950. One \nmight consider a contextuating decision by the United States Supreme \nCourt on desegregation which was then "spelled out" in a long series of \nincremental decisions. A decision-maker may make a fundamental decision \nwhen he intends to make an incremental one, for instance, if he wishes to \nkeep his decision "minimal" and leave as many options as possible. \n\n26 \n\nNelson W, Polsby, p. 83. \n\n\n563 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nsupporting additional budget increments in future years. Of course, \nCongress and other societal decision-making bodies do make cumulative \n"bit\xe2\x80\x99 1 decisions without understanding the fundamental ones which under\xc2\xac \nlie them, but, often, what appears to be a series of "bit\xe2\x80\x9d decisions is, \nin effect, the extension of a fundamental decision. \n\nThe reasons we expect a fundamental decision to reduce the costs and \ntime of turn-around are several. The very act of making such a decision \nand its annunciation, even if only to a small circle of confidants and \nstaff members, tends to commit the decision-maker to the new course and \nto reduce the chances that he will zigzag later, or the extent to which \nhe will deviate whe.i he does. Also, it makes it more difficult for his \nstaff and subordinates to revert to the old course or block the new one. \nNeither of these pressures can be expected to disappear but they can be \nexpected to be smaller, after a fundamental decision has been made. \n\nTrue, such a basic change of direction, if it is announced ahead of \ntime, provides an opportunity for greater mobilization of the opposition \nthan when the change of direction is concealed (opposition includes here \nboth domestic and international). Actually one of the deeper reasons \nfundamental decisions are often shunned is because there seems to be no \nway to keep them from the opposition. Still it seems to us there are \noccasions in which the gain in efficiency generated by making a funda\xc2\xac \nmental decision will outweigh the costs. The main reason experienced \npoliticians tend to act as if the costs always exceed the gains is be\xc2\xac \ncause they tend to narrow their calculations to the short run. Like a \nchess player who is able to anticipate only three moves, they lose in \nthose instances in which anticipating five moves would allow one, by \nabsorbing a loss at the third round, to win the game at the fifth. In \npolitical life this takes the form of a great reluctance to sacrifice \nthe pleasure of a major interest group or segment of public opinion in \nthe short run, even if this is required to solve a problem (such as the \nwar in Vietnam) and bring relief to all groups in the longer run. For \ninstance, as late as March 1970, 7% of a national sample of Americans \nfavored sending more troops to Vietnam and 38% advocated staying there \nfor as many years as needed for the South Vietnamese to take over. \n\n(New York Times , March 15, 1970, Gallup Poll). It is not that politi\xc2\xac \ncians cannot see the longer run but that it has an unpredictable and \nhence risky quality in their eyes. Leaders differ from politicians, \nit may be said, in a greater capacity to act on the longer perspective; \nto make, when necessary, fundamental decisions. Also in the longer run, \nonly a guidance system which is capable of making fundamental decisions \nwill be effective if sharp turns are needed, a need which rises in fre\xc2\xac \nquency as environments change more rapidly. That we face an environ\xc2\xac \nment which changes more rapidly than in the founding days of the Republic \nhas often been pointed out. \n\n\n564 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIn summary, we suggest that the capacity to make fundamental deci\xc2\xac \nsions is an essential quality for a system which can rapidly reduce its \ncommitment to military missions and pick up domestic ones. This state\xc2\xac \nment may sound tautological, but we hope the preceding discussion indi\xc2\xac \ncated the reasons many observers maintain that at least democracies are \nbest at turning without such basic decisions, and the reasons we maintain \nthey are necessary nevertheless. \n\n\nXIV.3.3. Organizational Fragmentation \n\nArmed vrith a fundamental decision to turn around, we must find the \norganizational tools for implementation. Implementation is more likely \nto be successful the less fragmented is the organizational network which \nis to carry out the decision. One of the most striking differences be\xc2\xac \ntween the military and domestic efforts of the nation is the much greater \nfragmentation of the domestic efforts. Frequent reference has been made \nto the lack of coordination and duplications in the Armed Services. \n\nWhile there seems to be some justification to these statements, in com\xc2\xac \nparison to the domestic front, the administration of military affairs in \nthe United States is highly coordinated and streamlined. There are thirty- \nodd domestic agencies in contrast to three Armed Services. (True, there \nare divisions within each Armed Service, but that is also true within \nthe domestic services, in addition to those among them). There is a \nDepartment of Defense which provides a measure of coordination to the \nArmed Services, but there is no Department of Domestic Affairs. There \nare two domestic agencies whose mandate specifically calls for coordina\xc2\xac \ntion of the services of the other domestic -agencies in one mission area; \nnamely, the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Department of Housing \nand Urban Development. In effect, however, they tend to add to the wel\xc2\xac \nter of agencies whose efforts should be, but are not, coordinated. The \nPresident does have a domestic coordinating role but he tends to spend \nmore time on coordinating foreign and military policy than on domestic \naffairs. \n\nOn the domestic front there is additional fragmentation and proli\xc2\xac \nferation of decision-making posts and efforts among the levels of govern\xc2\xac \nment. Federal, regional, state and local authorities* efforts are often \nnot highly harmonized. To turn around under these circumstances requires \nan almost Herculean attempt to get a large variety of authorities to pull \ntogether. \n\nAs this frequently proves impractical, some efforts to reduce the \nfragmentation, or mitigate its consequences, have been made. These in\xc2\xac \nclude the creation of specialized agencies; delegation of authority and \nfunds to the states and cities (which so to speak removes or reduces \none level, the Federal one): still another attempt is the creation of \n\n\n565 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n*\xe2\x80\xa2 / \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nlocal coordinating bodies for the various Federal agencies. Other acts \nwhich affect the level of fragmentation are the establishment of inter\xc2\xac \nagency committees and task forces (including several on the post-Vietnam \nenvironment), the expansion of the Bureau of the Budget, and increases \nin the White House staff. While some of these efforts have been much \nmore effective from this viewpoint than others, e.g., the Bureau of the \nBudget for instance has a high reputation in this regard, but, by and \nlarge, the amount of governmental activity which needs coordination seems \nto have grown more rapidly than the capacities of the coordinating units \nand overlayers. The great and, it seems, growing fragmentation (435 new \ndomestic programs initiated by President Johnson) in addition to increas\xc2\xac \ning the costs and difficulties of government in general, makes it espec\xc2\xac \nially difficult to turn around. It is as if one would try to turn one \ndeck and one compartment of a ship as the others still steam ahead, in \nthe previously set course. \n\nTo overcome fragmentation it is not necessary to create a domestic \nsuper-bureaucracy, to form one agency which would deal with all domestic \nmatters. Indeed, if such a department were created, the internal frag\xc2\xac \nmentations and bureaucracies might be as damaging as the existing one, \nif not more so. But splintering could be reduced by a measure of con\xc2\xac \nsolidation (merging some agencies; some local governments); increase in \nthe staff and authority of supra-units (such as the White House staff \nand the Bureau of the Budget);, and greater use of cross-agency "think \ntanks." The Urban Institute and the suggested Institute for the Study \nof Education are small beginnings in this direction. \n\nAs the last avenue is the least explored and as we favor its appli\xc2\xac \ncation to the specific problem at hand, we shall elaborate our views on \nthe possibility of setting up a Think Tank on the use of the "peace- \ndividend." \n\nMany of the problems that the nation has decided to attack are what \nsocial scientists refer to as the "system" type. Such problems have \ndeep roots, are widespread throughout the society and cannot be handled \nconveniently by taking them one at a time with a dozen agencies each \ntrying to trim its branch of the societal tree. \n\nExample: Many of the poor to be helped by the antipoverty drive \nare Negroes. What is less often stressed is that the other major group \nof poor people is diehard segregationist. The more effective the ameli\xc2\xac \noration of their poverty, the less violent desegregation is likely to be. \n\nMost other domestic problems are of a similarly intricate "system" \nnature in which affairs handled in one sector of the society are affected \nby and affect matters in other sectors. It is a commonplace among \n\n\n\n566 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nstudents of American government that the Federal approach to national \nproblems is just the opposite of a system approach: each Federal \nagency focuses on one or a few aspects of a total problem. \n\nWhile Federal coordination on the domestic front might be increased \nto a degree, as has been done in the defense area, we must assume, at \nleast for the short run, that it will remain more or less low, as it is \nnow. A score of agencies will each continue to reform their respective \nslice of America, jealously guarding their empires from encroachment and \nexposure by the others. \n\nOne major way to provide the system approach is to include at the \nlevel of policy what cannot be provided at the level of executive action. \nWhat is needed is more studies of the Nation as one combination of socie\xc2\xac \ntal forces and processes, all interacting with each other, all affecting \neach other. \n\nThis is not a question of one more research job: many Federal \nagencies have research and development divisions and all have some form \nof intellectual input in the form of expert advice, consultants or advi\xc2\xac \nsory boards. The problem is that this thought input itself is fragmented \nalong the same lines as the agencies. \n\nRelatively little investment is made in studying the way things hang \ntogether, the changes in one section that hinder or assist those in \nothers. On the domestic front, we still study each weapon rather than \nentire weapon systems. \n\nThe conditions under which the system approach thrives can be \nspecified. They are rarely satisfied by a White House conference in \nwhich a large number of eminent men are flown to Washington for 3 days \nof discussion. Nor can such an approach be fruitfully developed by White \nHouse advisory committees whose members have scores of other assignments. \n\nAnd whatever the value of such reports, they rarely have a "system" \nquality. Needed is a much more continuous, professional, systematic \neffort. The Air Force provides a good example. Without judging here \nthe general posture or the specifics of the strategy the Air Force \n"think factory" (the Rand Corp.) turns out, the work it turns out tends \nto be highly systematic. The Air Force has retained for more than 10 \nyears a sizable professional staff drawn from a large variety of discip\xc2\xac \nlines. These researchers are paid comparatively high salaries, which is \nnecessary to compete with rising academic salaries and to retain the same \npersonnel over long periods. The Air Force gave this "think" corporation \nconsiderable autonomy and put it 3,000 miles from Washington and its \n\n\n567 \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nt 1 / \n\n\ndaily political life.^ \n\nWhat seems to be needed is a similar institute for domestic problems. \nThe ratio of social to natural scientists would have to be much higher \nthan in the Rand Corp. and the domestic Rand might well report to the \nWhite House rather than to any one Federal agency. \n\nThis group would study questions that cut across the responsibili\xc2\xac \nties of any Dne Federal agency and examine the effects that programs \nplanned by one agency could have on those of another. It would also ask, \nusing the tools of modern social science, what will be the cumulative \neffect on our society of increased population, migration to cities, auto\xc2\xac \nmation, mass education, etc., not independently for each process, as if \nthe others do not exist, but as they work on each other. \n\nThese relationships are now occasionally explored in a "system" \nfashion by nonprofessionals or as a rush job by not fully qualified re\xc2\xac \nsearch organizations, often with a partisan or commercial bias. It seems \nworth the $2 million or so that it would cost to find out what could be \nachieved if a team of the best social scientists the Nation can recruit \nwere put on the job on a full time, fully professional basis. \n\nDomestic policy deserves the same systematic strategic thought that \nour military policy has enjoyed. \n\n\nXIV.4 THE TURN-AROUND OPTIONS \n\nThere are four major ways in which a societal program may be turned \naround; we discuss them here with specific reference to the reduction of \nFederal investment in military missions and an increased commitment to \ndomestic programs. \n\n(A) One may change the missions of existing units within existing \norganizational structures; e.g., assign the Military Air \nTransportation Service to help poor people who seek to move \nfrom underdeveloped areas to locations where employment is \navailable. \n\n(B) One may transfer a unit from one organizational structure \n(e.g., a military service) to another (a civilian agency); \nfor example, transfer the Military Air Transportation Service \nto the Office of Economic Opportunity, \n\n\nSee Bruce L.R. Smith, The Rand Corporation: Case Study of a \nNonprofit Advisory Corporation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, \n196 W- \n\n\n568 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n(C) One may dismember a military unit and transfer the components \nseparately (e.g., transfer planes, pilots, maintenance crews) \nso as not to maintain the identity and system of relationships \nof the original unit. \n\n(D) One may transfer knowledge or managerial conceptions (such as \nSystem Analysis) without necessarily transferring any unit, \nmen, facilities or funds. \n\nThe dimension along which the four options are arranged is the de\xc2\xac \ngree of conversion required. The first option entails only a change of \nmission without a change in the structure or composition of the unit. \n\nThe second option entails changes both in the unit\'s mission and in its \ncontrol overlay (in terms of who is in charge). The third option entails, \nin addition to a change of mission and control, a restructuring of the \nrelations among the component elements. The fourth option is a residual \ncategory since the transfer of knowledge may or may not require conver\xc2\xac \nsion efforts. The significance of these differences in the degree of \nconversion the exercise of different options requires is explored below. \nHere we should reiterate our previous point that turnability is not syno\xc2\xac \nnymous with conversion; some, actually considerable, turn-around may be \nobtained without conversion. \n\nThe four options also differ in the mechanisms employed. The first \nand second options involve the use of organizational control mechanisms \nand administrative decrees; and, especially if the turn-around is sizable, \nat least some consensus-building. The third option operates largely \nthrough the marketplace, although this can be in part regulated. Trans\xc2\xac \nfers can be encouraged and to a degree guided by budgetary changes; for \ninstance, if subsidies to civilian airlines are increased significantly \nand at the same time the budget of the Military Air Transportation \nService is cut sharply and its planes offered for sale rather than moth\xc2\xac \nballed, some "reallocation\xe2\x80\x9d from the military to the civilian sector \nwill be achieved, although no direct specific reassignment of men or \nmaterial from a military to a civilian task will have occurred. The \nfourth option may work through either administrative channels or the \nmarketplace. \n\nAs our analysis focuses on the conditions of a large scale trans\xc2\xac \nformation, we recommend that all four options be exercised at one and \nthe same time . Each option has some drawbacks and some advantages of \nits own. Together they provide not only a broader but also a more ver\xc2\xac \nsatile and mutually complementary approach to turning around than does \nreliance on one or two of these options. Still, one may ask: Which \noption and hence which mechanism should be relied upon more heavily? \n\nThe most suitable form of transformation for our society as presently \nconstituted seems to be that of shifting components via the marketplace \n\n\n569 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n(i.e., option C); the next bes\xc2\xbb is the transfer of units (i.e., option \nB). A major change can be accomplished more \xc2\xa9wiftly through this means \nthan through market reallocation and more direction can be given to the \nnew commitment of the manpower and facilities, however, this option \nalso requires more nation-wide planning and may encounter, we shall see, \ngreater conversion difficulties. Option D, the transfer of knowledge, \nis both one of the most promising and most dangerous options; promising- \nif applied on the proper level of abstraction and with the appropriate \ncorrectives; dangerous\xe2\x80\x94when the knowledge transferred is applied \nmechanically. While redefinition of mission (option A) seems to us the \nleast desirable, there are some domestic missions which may be best car\xc2\xac \nried out in that: way. These problems will be examined more closely in \nthe following discussion. \n\n\nXIV.4.1 Mission Change and Structural Change \n\nA general proposition underlying much that follows is that the or\xc2\xac \nganizational structure most suited to carrying out a mission is the \nstructure specifically designed and evolved with that particular mission \n\nin mind (e.g., NASA, for space missions). When attempts are made to \nchange the missions to be carried out by an existing unit (and especially \nwhen the change is major), far-reaching structural adaptations are likely \ntc be required if the old supra and/or unit structure is to be used \n\nefficiently and effectively . Since structural changes are costly in \nmonetary and human terms, and tend to provoke resistance, we expect that \noption C will be, in general, more economical than B, and B more economi\xc2\xac \ncal than A. The value of D seems to be indeterminate from this viewpoint; \nknowledge-transfer \'\xe2\x80\x99works\'* if the structural specifications are discarded \nand if the knowledge-transfer is properly abstracted. There is a widely \naccepted myth that organizations are social machines which combine a \nlarge number of individual efforts into a socially useable instrument, \nequally useful for almost any mission. Their special power is said to \nrest in the coordination of effort, achieved through highly specified \nrole definitions and institutionalized lines of communication and author\xc2\xac \nity, above all. None of these attributes is deemed to be institutionally \nspecific; churches, armies, prisons, and schools are said to all have \nthese attributes and hence it is also very widely assumed that organi\xc2\xac \nzational tools can be readily transferred from one application to another. \n(These assumptions underlie most textbooks on organizations because they \ndiscuss "organizations" without specifying which subcategories the \npoints apply to.) \n\n\n570 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nWe subscribe to the opposite proposition: no two missions as we \nsee it, can be served with equal effectiveness and efficiency^ by the \nsame organizational structure* When the difference between two missions \nis considerable, the need for a different structure is usually equally \nas great. \n\n\nXIV.4.2. Mission Distance \n\n\nThe capacity to adapt man, machines, or organizations seems to be \nmore often overestimated than "under-assessed" in our optimistic culture. \nThis may be illustrated by the following apocryphal anecdote: a major \nsoft drink producer of the cola type is reported to have decided to di\xc2\xac \nversify by branching out into the coffee and orange juice business. All \nthree seemed to be highly similar missions. But the diversification \neffort failed as the company soon learned that its special skills, which \nhad won it a world-wide reputation, had little applicability in the pur\xc2\xac \nchasing of coffee beans or production of orange juice. More generally, \ndiversification plans fail much more often than they succeed, ^ possibly \nbecause of unduly optimistic and rationalist assumptions about transfer- \nability. \n\nJanowitz pointed out that on four key social and organizational \ndimensions, the "distance" between the military and the civilian sector \nis declining: (a) Organizational authority in the military is becoming \nless based on domination, more on initiative, and persuasion; (b) tech\xc2\xac \nnical skills grow in importance in both the military and the civilian \nsectors; (c) the military recruitment base has broadened socially; and \n(d) military ideology is less separatist and more "civilian."30 \n\n\n2 \xc2\xab \n\nBy effectiveness we mean the extent to which a mission is \naccomplished. By efficiency , the cost per unit of output. \n\nz9 A study of diversification of twelve defense firms stresses, as \nits first finding, the importance of strong commitment of top management \nto the program. John S. Gilmore and Dean C. Coddington, Defense Indus\xc2\xac \ntry Diversification: An Analysis with 12 Case Studies , U.S. Arms Control \nand Disarmament Agency Publication 30 (Washington: Government Printing \nOffice, 1966), p. vii. The "sub-culture" of the executive world, the \nstudy reports, contains numerous accounts of failures to diversify; a \nbelief that "the defense customer" does not favor commercial diversifica\xc2\xac \ntion, and a recognition that "there is little indication that the owners \nof defense firms or the financial community wish defense manufacturing \nto diversify." Ibid . \n\n3 \xc2\xb0Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, \nI960), pp. 8 ff. \n\n\n571 f \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nAccording to the U.S. Department of Labor: \n\nUntil World War II, service in the Armed Forces provided \nlittle experience and training that could be carried over \ninto civilian employment, but since then the onrush of \ntechnology has transformed our fight:.ng force into a mili\xc2\xac \ntary machine whose mainstay is the skilled technician. As \na result, for all services combined, the enlisted force \nrequires three mechanics or technicians for every man in \nground combat, and the number of highly skilled electronics \nrepairmen alone exceeds the number of infantrymen (as of \n1963). 31 _ JfiH \n\nAt the same time, as we see it, while the distance has declined, it \nstill is large; and on other dimensions than those considered by Janowitz \nthe distance seems to have increased. For instance, the military deals \nwith ever more esoteric and hostile environments (e.g., nuclear weapons \nin space) which are very different from the routine surroundings we take \nfor granted like our schools, hospitals and homes. \n\nFurther, factors which may have first actually narrowed the distance \nnow seem to be increasing it. Civilian attitudes toward the military \nseem to have undergone such a change. Though the military is less \n"militaristic" in its outlook than it used to be, it does not follow \nautomatically from this fact that the civilian population will view the \nmilitary more sympathetically. Actually, it seems that the public at \nlarge held unfavorable attitudes toward the military during the Depres\xc2\xac \nsion^ and wa s much more positively oriented toward it during World War \nII and during the early Cold War Years. Since the escalation of the war \nin Vietnam, a renewed disaffection with the military, at least in some \nsegments of the public, seems to have set in. \n\nThe context of public views in which conversion takes place will \ninfluence the extent of the gap which must be closed. As these lines \nare written, returning GIs, especially discharged officers, who served \nin Vietnam, are not received with particular affection or enthusiasm, \nnor is there a widespread feeling that our Vietnam soldiers deserve spe\xc2\xac \ncial attention or treatment as they return to civilian life. 33 Such an \n\n\nU.S. Department of Labor, Transferring Military Experience to \nCivilian Jobs . . . p. 1. \n\n32 \n\nFor a literary illustration of the pre-war attitudes toward the \nArmy, the reader is referred to James Jones, From Here to Etemitv (New \nYork: Scribner, 1951). \n\n33 \n\nSandra Blakeslee, "Crippled Veterans Find Hospitals Crowded and \nAttitudes at Home Ambiguous," New York Times . April 3, 1970, p. 19. \n\n572 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\noimentation running from indifference to hostility is new in modern \nAmerican history and makes the conversion and absorption of returning \n\nveterans into civilian life more difficult than it was twenty-five \nyears ago. \n\n\nWe recommend that if large-scale conversion is to occur in an \nenvironment of public opinion unfavorable to the military (this situa\xc2\xac \ntion is likely to prevail, because if the need for the military were \nurgent and visible, large-scale conversion would be unlikely), special \nefforts be made to encourage the public to welcome the military men \nbeing released. \n\nFinally, the decline in distance between the military and civilian \nsectors may have taken place much more for some military units than for \nothers. The Air Force is highly technical, as are some civilian indus\xc2\xac \ntries\', but this seems to be much less the case for the regular Army \nunits. Moreover, the highly technological units are those which have \ngrown closer to each other in social terms but more distant technically \nwhile the less technical units have remained more remote socially. \n\nAll said and done, the gap between most military missions and most \ncivilian ones seems to us to still be considerable, which serves fur\xc2\xac \nther to explain why options A and B may not provide sufficient conver\xc2\xac \ntibility and why we favor, on balance, option C. \n\n\nXIV. 4.3 Option A: Redefinition of Missions \n\nSpeaking on a high level of abstraction, we suggest that as little \nof the turn-around as possible should be carried out by military units \nwhose structure is kept intact. This suggestion is based upon the .ten\xc2\xac \ndencies of existing structures to resist change, the great differences \nin military and civilian missions and the relatively great power the \nAmerican military acquired after World War II. There is little evidence \nthat the military is more "cost effective" in carrying out most domestic \nmissions than are civilian agencies or the private corporations. Even \nif the military were, in a narrow sense, regularly more efficient or ef\xc2\xac \nfective, this might be viewed as a major reason to develop the civilian \nagencies. If the military should acquire the halo of a savior on the \ndomestic front in addition to its natural national security function, the \nsurvival of our existing political system might well be seriously ques\xc2\xac \ntioned. Moreover, the assignment of civilian missions to the military \nwould further weaken the civilian sector as the military would utilize \nmore young men, R and D manpower and other resources that otherwise \n\n\nt \n\n\n573 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nmight go to strengthen the civilian sector. \n\nThere remain two relevant questions: Will involvement in the trans\xc2\xac \nformation reduce or increase the natural resistance of the military to \nthe suggested change in priorities? Are there any civilian missions \nwhich some branches of the\xe2\x80\x99military are especially suited for and there\xc2\xac \nfore might be drawn upon to carry out, even if they are excluded from \nparticipation in the new, overall domestic drive? \n\nIt is difficult to assess the consequences of military involvement \nin civilian missions which require large-scale efforts since there seems \nto be no precedent for such a drive in the United States or other coun\xc2\xac \ntries. Typically, military involvement in \'\xe2\x80\x99civic action\xe2\x80\x9d in Latin \nAmerica or Israel has meant small-scale operations, involving at most one \npercent of the resources available.^ Several \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99civic action\xe2\x80\x9d projects \nare conducted more with an eye to public relations than to a major com\xc2\xac \nmitment or mission shift. In one of the Israeli projects, long abandoned, \nhigh school para-military training units were flown to the Southern Negev \nto grow tomatoes in a garden, at the average cost of $4 a tomato. The \nproject was widely reported in the press as having an \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99educational\xe2\x80\x9d \nrather than an agrarian or economic value. \n\nTheoretically, it might be possible to ease conversion by involving \nthe military as a support force for various domestic missions on the \nassumption that excluding and isolating the military would tend to unify \nit as a powerful opposition to the nation\xe2\x80\x99s primary domestic commitment. \nAlthough involving the military in many-faceted domestic affairs would \nreduce its opposition and divide it, the military would be the larger, \nmore organized, more powerful and more legitimated partner of any such \ncombination (say, the Air Force working with the Office of Education, \nand the Army with the Office of Economic Opportunity), and it seems like\xc2\xac \nly that the military viewpoint, tradition, authority pattern, etc. would \nprevail. That is, instead of the military being converted to civilian \nways of doing things while performing civilian missions, it seems more \nlikely that the military would pull things its way. For instance, it \nmight attempt to organize training programs for disadvantaged persons in \n\n\n34 \n\nSee William Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the \nNew States (New York: Praeger, 1965); Ronald C. Nairn, International \nAid to Thailand (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University PreslTj 1966); \nLeonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society \n(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); and Richard Barnet, \nIntervention and Revolution (New York: World Publishing, 1968). \n\n\n35 \n\n\nBased on interviews in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Israel. \n\n\n574 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nthe authoritarian manner new recruits are trained. As the military \npatterns of behavior do not seem suitable for carrying out most \ndomestic missions, we recommend foregoing the political support one \nmay gain by involving the military in civic missions in order to \ninsure a more complete turn-around and the strengthening of civilian \nagencies as well as of the civilian orientation. \n\nWe note in passing that we are unaware of any study in the \nAmerican context of the effect of \'civic action" on the military who \nparticipate in such activies, or on the civilian agencies whose mis\xc2\xac \nsions they preempted or participated in. Such a study seems called \nfor and may change our view, which is based largely on the study of \nsocieties such as Bolivia, Guatemala, and Turkey whose civilian sec\xc2\xac \ntor was much weaker than ours in the United States and hence more \ngiven to "uncivilian" slanting by military involvement. \n\nAs to the second question, whether the military is particularly \nsuited to carry out a few specific civilian missions even if it is \ngenerally unsuited and to be excluded from domestic activity\xe2\x80\x94a \nreview of its organizational features points both to some special \nopportunities and their limitations. The military is free of many \nof the local political restraints\xe2\x80\x94it is "extra-institutional." \n\nFor instance, it is said it could develop low-cost housing because \nit is not bound by labor unions, local building codes, and so forth. \nAs we see it, while the military seems to command more leeway than \ndomestic agencies, it keeps this apparent power mainly by not using \nit on the home front. If the military attempted to engage in large- \nscale civilian operations that violate established civilian laws or \nnorms, would the interest groups which limit civilian reforms not \nimpose similar limitations on the military? The desegregation of \nmilitary bases suggests that there is considerable leeway, but these \nchanges involved only on-the-base, intra-nilitary relations. / \n\nPerhaps on-i;he-base building practices are quite "free" from societal \n\n\nResources available to our study did not suffice to check \nthis point. Hence, the hypothetical nature of our statement. \n\nEditor\xe2\x80\x99s note: It might be pointed out, however, that \nduring the summer of 1967 ex-Secretary of Defense Robert S. \n\nMcNamara issued an order forbidding white servicemen to rent \napartments in off-base housing which discriminated against minority \ngroup servicemen. Students of this problem have concluded that \nthis and related sanctions instituted by his successor, proved \nhighly effective. \n\n\n/ \n\n\n575 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nregulation and could be innovative as long as this were not carried \nout explicitly (as was suggested by Secretary Clifford) as prepa\xc2\xac \nration for ciyilian, off-the-base, building. If such efforts are \ncarried out on a significant scale* we could expect powerful oppo\xc2\xac \nsition to be triggered which would limit the usefulness of the mili\xc2\xac \ntary^ extra-institutionality. \n\nTo the extent the military\xe2\x80\x99s special status can be relied upon, \na technical question arises concerning the effects of dissociating \nthe development of technological or social prototypes from the con\xc2\xac \nditions of their applicability. For instance, will the development \nof a low-cost house on a military base really take into account the \nneeds of members of the deprived class, slated to live in it or the \nobjections which labor unions raise to the use of some prefabricated \nmaterials as against others which are acceptable? \n\nVocational training is another area in which it seems sensible \nto draw on the military for a specific mission, even if one does not \notherwise seek to involve it in an escalated domestic drive. The \nmilitary is already one of the greatest sources of such training in \nthe country, simply because it trains millions of men for its own \nvocations. In addition, the military recently developed schemes \naimed at training\xe2\x80\x94in service\xe2\x80\x94enlisted men for civilian life. \n\nThese programs are of two major kinds: (a) training for civilian \nlife before discharge, mainly carried out by Project Transition,\xc2\xae\xc2\xae \nand (b) training which serves the men both during their military \nservice and after they are discharged. A case in point is the ^9 \nimproved command of English and math provided by Project 100,000. \nBoth projects disproportionately benefit persons of disadvantaged \nbackgrounds. \n\nAlthough a detailed assessment of Project Transition and \nProject 100,000 cannot be undertaken here, several factors should \nbe highlighted. \n\n\n38 \n\nOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and \nReserve Affairs), The Transition Program (Washington: Government \nPrinting Office, 1968). \n\n^"Project 100,000: The Training of Former Rejects," Phi \nDelta Kappa , July, 1969, pp. 1-8; and the New York Times , January \n27, 1970. \n\n\n576 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nOne major consideration concerns the source of the resources \nto be used. Obviously, if the utilized resources are already \nallotted to the Department of Defense but here are turned to \ntraining men for civilian life, we have, by definition, an act \nof turning around and if it is large in scale, a significant one. \n\nOn the other hand, if the costs of these projects are added \non top of the military ones, increasing the total budget of the \nDepartment of Defense, or at least part of the costs are charged \nto civilian agencies (to the Department of Labor in the United \nStates, or to A.I.D. in Bolivia), then the opposite effect is \nachieved: civilian funds are coming under military control. Only \nif one could demonstrate that these funds are used much more \neffectively by the military coild one see here a touch of conversion. \n\nA third possibility is that such projects might be fueled by \nthe voluntary efforts of the officers. However, this would so \nsharply constrain their scope, that they fall outside of our pur\xc2\xac \nview\xe2\x80\x94the study of significant turn-around. Other such projects \ninclude emergency services when floods, earthquakes, or hurricanes \noccur. They are useful, and if the military were not available to \nhelp out, additional investment in civilian preparations for \nemergencies would be needed; but these again are not macroscopic \nsavings. \n\nIn short, there are some civilian projects which military \nunits could carry out effectively, but only under special con\xc2\xac \nditions (especially that they be financed by funds previously \ncommitted to military missions) do they actually constitute \nacts of turning around\xe2\x80\x94and even then\xe2\x80\x94leaving them in military \nhands might constitute a drawback which offsets most if net all \nthe gains. This is well illustrated by the "economy" achieved by \nturning riot control over to the Armed Forces; it may get them \ninto the habit of occupying cities and regulating civilian life. \n\nWith rare exceptions, those concerned with the conditions under \nwhich our kind of pluralistic society is maintained must conclude \nthat the military had best confine itself to nondomestic missions \nand, when it no longer needs resources, they are best released \nto civilian hands rather than used by the military for domestic \nmissions. \n\n\n577 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nXIV.4.4 Transferability of Units Versus That of Components \n\n(Option B versus C) \n\nThe main reason it could seem rather appealing to transfer a whole \n\nuhit from a military to a civilian assignment\xe2\x80\x94thus changing at once \n\nboth the mission and the control structure-\xe2\x80\x94is that in this way large- \n\ns :ale transitions can be accomplished, rapidly, with minimum costs and \ndifficulty; and guidance could be given not only to the units which \nrelease the resources but also to the units which gain them. For \nexample, when NASA was first founded, a major Army laboratory was \ntransferred to its control, test tubes, research assistants, pay masters \nand all. By way of contrast, if the unit is dismembered, this in itself \nwould incur some psychic and financial costs, and then the rather im\xc2\xac \nperfect market mechanism must be relied upon to bring the men and \nfacilities together again where they are needed. Indeed, the advan\xc2\xac \ntages of a unit transfer are so clear that we recommend that this \nmechanism be relied upon when there are clearly identifiable civilian \nneeds for which military units can be used. \n\nThus, if a major reduction in the level of Armed Forces takes \nplace, whole hospital complexes and other medical facilities may be \nturned over to Public Health Departments of the states in which they \nare located, or\xe2\x80\x94to community action corporations, if any are nearby. \n\nThe examples utilized so far refer to instances in which the \ncivilian mission seems not to require major modifications of the \nmilitary unit; the technological and manpower specifications seem \nrelatively similar. Note, though, that these are atypical instances, and \nthat even in these we immediately see serious difficulties (civilian \nopposition, and the carry-over of military attitudes) which rest in part \nin the unit mode of transferring. If the planes were sold and the \npilots discharged by the military and hired by the civilian sector, \ni.e., shift from option B to option C, the opposition of the private \nsector would wane. Similarly, if the schools were turned over to \nexisting systems, but the military instructors were sent to qualify in \nestablished civilian teacher colleges and then blended into existing \nschool systems, the authoritarian carry-over would be more effectively \ncountered. \n\nFurthermore, transferring whole units requires a relatively high \ndegree of national planning. There must be an agency which is able to \nidentify both the domestic needs (whose expressions are frequently \nlocalized, complex, and varied) and the military units ready to be \nreleased, match them more or less in size (it obviously will not do to \nassign an Army unit with a hundred trucks to Montana farms if they need \nat most ten, etc.). In contrast, the market mechanism, used in option \n\n\n578 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nC, would break the units into smaller parts (in the case at hand, into \nindividual trucks or small sets) and avoid the need for central plan\xc2\xac \nning. We recommend that if option B is used, a military-civilian \nmatching center should be set up. \n\n* \n\n\xe2\x80\x98 1 \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0% \n\nWhen the military and civilian mission requirements are substan- \ntially different, which they very often ire, the transfer of a unit \nwill require substantial restructuring and this, we suggest, is best \nachieved if the unit is first dismembered. \n\nxtie reasons that this is the case lie in part in the fact that \ndifferent missions require working with different kinds of manpower \n(e.g., a high Ph. D, mix versus a chiefly blue collar one) which \nrespond to different forms of supervision; that different amounts and \nkinds of technologies are involved which, in turn, require different \ndegrees of coordination and supervision; and that different information \nis needed and hence the specific knowledge of one operation is rarely \ntransferable to another. Also, existing social units tend to \ndevelop interpersonal and leadership bonds as well as sub-cultures. On \nrare occasions, those can be mobilized to support the transition; on \nall others\xe2\x80\x94they will slow it down. \n\nThe mission specificity of organizational structure and its "stick\xc2\xac \niness ft (or resistance to change or conversion) is the main reason why \noption C, in which the old unit is dismembered and its components \nspread among several existing, civilian, units, is in most cases more \neffective than option B in achieving rapid and full conversion. \n\nThe main drawbacks of this option, and the reason the other ones \ncannot be rejected out of hand, is that it involves a measure of waste, \nis slower than option A or option B, and evokes more fear and possible \npolitical resistance among those about to be cast into the marketplace. \nThese wastes, fears, and pressures may be reduced by various mechanisms \nsuch as labor exchanges and pre-discharge hiring by civilians, but \ncannot be eliminated; hence, especially when large-scale turn-around \nis to be considered, the other options may be drawn upon. They can \nbe applied more readily the smaller the distance between the old and the \nnew missions. \n\nOur assumption that firmly established social bonds and structures, \nof the sort often found in the military, solidify individual resistance \nto change, is based upon many social science studies which are sum\xc2\xac \nmarized in a review book by Berelson and Steiner. u Individuals \n\n^Bernard R. Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior (New \nYojrk: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 354ff. \n\n\n579 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nfunction as members of social groups, which means that they have emo\xc2\xac \ntional ties to each other that are supplemented by cognitive and norma\xc2\xac \ntive bonds. That is, they tend to view the world in similar ways, \nshare values and sentiments, etc. While not all organizational units \nprovide the main basis of social life, many of them do as people \ninteract more at work than in most other situations. This is especially \ntrue in the military, and most of all, when the men live on the base in \nthe same unit, which, in effect, turns it into a broad scope if not \ntotal organization. \n\nScope refers to the number of social spheres into which an organi\xc2\xac \nzation penetrates. Thus, prisons penetrate more\xe2\x80\x94by regulating leisure \nand work, prayer time and interpersonal relations (by assignment to \nwards and cells) than factories, not to mention voluntary organizations. \nThe impact of an organization on its members tends to grow in extent \nand depth the broader its scope.41 \n\n\nThus, if we take for instance a military school for jungle warfare \nand tell the instructors to train children from disadvantaged back\xc2\xac \ngrounds, let us say in automobile mechanics, aside from the difficulties \nthe instructors will face in acquiring new teaching material, develop\xc2\xac \ning new teaching facilities and other problems common to the conversion \nof all organizational units which change a mission, they will also face \nthe special problems involved in the military "mentality."^ Thus, \nfor instance, the military puts a higher stress on neatness, punctuality \nand automatic acceptance of authority than many civilian jobs require, \nor a citizen should get used to if he is to function effectively in a \ndemocracy. It is possible to help the military instructors to become \nmore tolerant of less tight patterns of clothing, time rhythm and \nauthority, but this will require considerable efforts. Speedier \nresults may be obtained if the military instructors are absorbed in an \nexisting civilian school system and the jungle warfare school\xe2\x80\x99s facil\xc2\xac \nities are transferred. \n\n\nThe difficulties encountered in moving whole units, rather than \ncomponents, differ for different kinds of men. Shifting enlisted men, \nwho are in their backgrounds disproportionately from lower class and \ndisadvantaged backgrounds, poses different problems from shifting \n\n\nFor additional discussion as well as evidence, see Amitai Etzioni, \nA Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free \nPress, 1961), pp. 161ff. \n\n42 \n\nNot everyone in the military has it, but many, we suggest do. \n\nSee Albert D. Biderman, "What is Military," in Sol Tax (ed.). The \nDraft (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 122-137. \n\n\n580 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nofficers vwith executive backgrounds), who are again different from \nprofessionals (from physicians to research and development men). \nAdditionally, there are differences within each category. \n\nXIV,, 4.4.1 Iransferability of Executives \n\nIn a previously published work,^~ we demonstrated that corporate \ntodies, in which most rarge-scale work of military or civilian nature \ntakes place, differ systematically in their compliance structure. \n\nThere are three archtypes of compliance\xe2\x80\x94coercive, in which the organi\xc2\xac \nzation relies on force primarily to keep its lower participants in \npLace (e.g., a prison) and they are highly alienated; utilitarian \ncompliance, in which the organization relies chiefly on monetary re\xc2\xac \nwards to keep the lower participants working (e.g., in factories) and \nthey tend not to be deeply committed to the organization; and norma\xc2\xac \ntive compliance in which the leaders seek to build up and sustain the \nmoral commitments of the lower participants by the manipulation of \nsymbols (as in a social movement) and they are highly committed to the \norganization. Additional research shows that organizations which \ndiffer in their compliance structure (each concrete organization being \na mix of the three archtypes), also differ on a large array of organi\xc2\xac \nzational attributes including the goals they can serve effectively.^ \nThe compliance profiles of military services are very different during \npeace and war-time. The military compliance profile is highly utili\xc2\xac \ntarian in peace time (participation often being viewed as a kind of \npublic service) and a mix of normative-first, coercive-second, in war \ntime. In line with the compliance theory, when peace time units move \ninto combat, frequently a shift of leadership occurs, as those best at \nkeeping the units working routinely or looking neat are rarely best at \nleading them into combat. The same need to "shift" executive personnel \noccurs when units are returned from combat duties to peace time duties. \n\nThese shifts do not entail discharging one set of officers (or \ndemoting them) and recruiting (or promoting) a different set. Instead, \nmany other mechanisms are at work, the most important of which is a \nmajor change in the number of personnel. The shift to a war basis \n\n\n43 \n\nAmitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations , \npp. 23ff. \n\n^ Ibid ., Chapter 3. For a review of evidence published after the \ntheory was published, see Amitai Etzioni, "Organizational Dimensions \nand Their Interrelationships: A Theory of Compliance," in Bernard P. \nIndik and F. Kenneth Berrien (eds.). People, Groups, and Organizations \n(New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1968), pp. 94-109. \n\n381 \n\n\n/ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nusually entails a very large scale mobilization and hence justifies \nthe recruitment and promotion to officer 1 s rank of many \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99outsiders" \n(often college boys or insiders who under peace-time conditions would \nhave been considered unsuitable). With the return to peace time, dis\xc2\xac \ncharge of a large number of officers allows a selection process to \nretain those who are more suitable for the utilitarian kind of \ncompliance. \n\nWe say "allows" because we do not know to what extent the Armed \nForces take these considerations into account. Our impression is that \nto some extent they are conscious of them and act upon them, and that \nother factors also help to promote a "functional" selection procedure \nat this time, including the fact that professional Army men, left over \nfrom the pre-war utilitarian days, are more likely to stay for the new \nutilitarian period. Other adaptive mechanisms are also available \n(e.g., increasing the importance of disciplinary personnel such as the \nSergeant Major in the British Army, with the transition to peace and \ndecreasing that of the roles in which leadership is invested such as \nthat of the First Lieutenant). \n\nThe main point for our purposes here is that all these mechanisms \nallow organizations such as the Army to turn around without relying on \na capacity to retread, retrain or otherwise "restructure" the officers \nso they will be as effective in the new compliance mode as they were \nin the previous one. Such a shift, we hold, is very difficult to \naccomplish. As this is a central point for the discussion at hand, \nwe elaborate it next. \n\nThe lesson of all this for the issue at hand is both evident and \ndirect: the compliance structure of the military services is quite \n\ndifferent from that of the civilian sector, and the transition from one \ncompliance structure to another cannot be negotiated without consider\xc2\xac \nable difficulties. Officers who served mainly in the wartime army, \nespecially in combat units, are expected to find the transition to \nindustrial corporate life much more difficult than those who served in \npeace time. Combat officers will find the transition easier if they \nmove into work which requires more leadership than the industrial \nrealm (e.g., run for public office) or where coercion may at least \npotentially be applied (e.g., in prison management). While this does \nnot offer a very sanguine picture of the opportunities for easy or \nspeedy conversion, it seems to be a realistic picture. Next to \ndifferences in the technologies used by the military and by the \ncivilian sectors, differences in the way compliance is maintained is \nprobably the greatest hurdle discharged officers must negotiate. \n\n\n582 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\n\xe2\x80\x94^\xe2\x80\x98 1 * a \xe2\x80\x94Executi ves _as Compliance Specialists. Applied to the study \nof intra-organizational and inter-organizational mobility of executives, \nthe following three alternative propositions can be formulated: \n\n(1) An executive will be most effective if he holds positions in \nwhich the same or similar types of performance are supervised, and the \nsame basic knowledge and skills are required. Division of labor and \n\ntechnology are believed to determine the scope of effective horizontal \nmobility. \n\nDrucker is explicit on the subject and does not limit himself to \nthe lower levels of management. He states: \n\nIt means in the first place that the skills, the competence, the \nexperience of management cannot, as such, be transferred and \napplied to the organization and running of other institutions. \n\nIn particular a man f s success in management of a business carries \nby itself no promise\xe2\x80\x94-let alone a guarantee\xe2\x80\x94of his being success\xc2\xac \nful in government. A career in management is, by itself, not a \npreparation for major political office\xe2\x80\x94or for leadership in the \nArmed Forces, the Church or a university.^ \n\n(2) An executive controls people, and since this is the basis of \nall organizational control, effective horizontal mobility is virtually \nunlimited. Dubin represents this alternative position. He asserts: \n\nNote one thing. I have not said that the education of an \nexecutive, as executive t includes learning to be management- \nminded, government-minded, union-minded, or organization-minded \nin terms of the special value system of the organization that \nemploys him. Inevitably, every executive and administrator \ngets 9 minded < in accordance with the values of the organization \nfor which he works. I submit, however, that the educated execu\xc2\xac \ntive is one who can operate effectively in different kinds of \norganizations having different values and objectives. Barnard, \nhimself, is an outstanding example of this...Here is a man who \nwrote the classic. Functions of the Executive , and pursued \nsuccessive or concurrent careers in a business organization, as \na government official, as director of a vast social service \norganization and now, as top executive of a philanthropic \ninstitution.^ \' \n\n\n^^Feter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York: Harper, \n1954), pp. 8-9. \n\n^Robert Dubin (ed.). Human Relations in Administration (Engle\xc2\xac \nwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1951), pp. 3-4. \n\n\n583 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThe "universal" approach to the functions and characteristics of \nexecutives is clearly dominant in the literature. Barnard studies the \nfunctions of the executive, just as students of organization, we saw \nearlier, study the bureaucracy, not particular types. Lists of \nqualities of executives are typically lists of qualities every person \nshould be blessed with (such as capacity, knowledge, courage, \n\n"quality") and those required of every officer (effective use of time, \nperspective and judgment, self-control) or leader (personal power, \nsensitivity). A study of 3,000 executives by Randle is one of the \nfew which supplement a list of "universal" characteristics with some \nspecific traits which distinguish subgroups of executives .^ \n\nSome exponents of the universal approach imply that profit-making \norganizations supply a model for the administration of all types of \norganizations. Business methods and business personnel are seen as \nbest fitted to run any organization, whether a school, a hospital, or \na Community Chest. Churches have been criticized for not adopting \nbusiness methods. Harrison states: \n\nThe American Institute of Management, which conducted the survey, \nwas generally critical of religious groups in this country \nbecause "viewed against the background of modem business cor\xc2\xac \nporations, the management practices of religious organizations \nare appallingly archaic." \n\nA similar study of the Catholic Church, sometimes referred to by \nmembers of the clergy as the "G. M. study of the Church," recommended \nthat the Pope delegate more authority to his subordinates (decentrali\xc2\xac \nzation is good for business), and that the Church create reserve funds \nand keep its budget in the black. Students of hospitals have similarly \nclaimed that "industrial techniques can be transferred."^ \n\nMinisters frequently complain about the lack of insight into the \n\ndifferences between a church and a business which businessmen reveal \n\nwhen they assume that every organization can be run in basically the \n\nsame way\xe2\x80\x94their way. \n\n_ \n\nC. Wilson Randle, "How to Identify Promotable Executives," \n\nHarvard Business Review . Vol. 34, No. 3 (May-June, 1956), pp. 122-134. \n\n48 \n\nP. M. Harrison, Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition: \nA Social Case Study of the American Baptist Convention (Princeton: \nPrinceton University Press, 1959), p. 5. \n\n49 \n\nC. K. Andrew, "Industrial Techniques Can Be Used," Modern Hospi\xc2\xac \ntal* Vol. 84 (1955), pp. 67-72; and M. Greenblatt, R. H. York and E. L. \nBrown, From Custodial to Therapeutic Patient Care in Mental Hospitals \n\n(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955), p. 21. \n\n\n584 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nIhe high representation of business leaders and the low represen\xc2\xac \ntation of labor leaders on the boards of hospitals, schools, colleges, \nuniversities, voluntary associations, and other nonutilitarian organi\xc2\xac \nzations in the United States reflects in part the political reality of \nthe communities in which these organizations operate and which they \nserve. But to some degree it also reflects the assumption that every \norganization can be run like a business. \n\n(3) Our position is that the effectiveness of the mobile executive \nis limited to compliance areas rather than administrative or techno- \nlogical boundaries. As long as mobility takes place between positions \nin organizational units or organizations which have a similar com\xc2\xac \npliance structure, we would expect comparatively little loss of effec\xc2\xac \ntiveness. If, on the other hand, mobility requires transfer from one \nKind of compliance structure to another, considerable changes in \nbehavior, orientation, or effectiveness of the executive are to be \nexpected. An executive who was highly effective in running a steel \nmill may be quite ineffective in running a professional organization, \nsuch as an engineering firm, and an executive who was quite ineffective \nin running a steel mill may prove to be just the man for the engineer\xc2\xac \ning position. Many officers who are quite effective in running pro\xc2\xac \nduction will do much less well in running a public relations depart\xc2\xac \nment. \n\n\nSince we did not find any data directly bearing upon our propo\xc2\xac \nsition, we attempted to collect some of it.* 0 The names of thirty-two \nmembers of organizational elites who had previously held positions in \nmilitary organizations, were picked at random from daily newspapers. \nTheir military positions were classified as \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99combat\xe2\x80\x9d or "desk\xe2\x80\x9d \npositions. Their subsequent civil positions were classified as "ex\xc2\xac \nternalist\xe2\x80\x9d or "instrumentalist." "Externalist" positions require \nhandling external relations of the organization, such as public re\xc2\xac \nlations, labor relations, and serving as contact man in Washington; \nthey also include the top positions in universities and voluntary \nassociations provided the main task is external (e.g., raising funds). \n"Instrumentalist" positions include only direct administration of \nproduction and expert staff positions in production, finance, marketing, \nand the like. \n\nCombat posts, we suggest, require more normative power than desk \nposts, and externalist roles require more normative power than instru\xc2\xac \nmental roles. Hence we expected that military commanders who had made \n\n\n~^R. M. Stogdill, C. R. Shartle, R. J. Whetty, and W. E. Jaynes, \n"A Factorial Study of Administrative Behavior," Personnel Psychology , \nVol. 8 (Summer, 1953), pp. 157-164. \n\n\n585 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\ntheir career and gained their reputation mainly as combat leaders would \nbe more likely to become externalists than instrumentalists, and that \nmilitary leaders who had mainly desk posts would be more likely to \nbecome instrumentalists than externalists.-^ Note that unlike most \nstudies of inter-organizational mobility from one type of organization \nto another, we examined mobility from one type of subo rganization to the \nsame analytical subunit in another type of organization. This enables \nus to control for compliance differences in each organizational type. \n\nMobility from Military to Civilian Positions \n\nf* \n\nPast Military Posts Present Civilian Posts \n\n\xc2\xab \n\nExternalists Instrumentalists \n\n(High Normative) (Low Normative) \n\nCombat \n\n(High Normative) 11 1 \n\nDe.sk \n\n(Low Normative) 4 8 \n\nOf the 32 persons, 24 were classified as either externalists or \ninstrumentalists in their present positions, and as either combat \nleaders or predominantly desk men in terms of their military career and \nsource of reputation. As the above matrix shows, those who held combat \npositions were much more likely to hold externalist rather than \ninstrumentalist civilian positions. This finding is in line with our \nhypothesis, since combat and externalist positions have similar com\xc2\xac \npliance requirements; both require more normative power than desk and \ninstrumentalist positions, which give comparatively less weight to \nnormative controls and greater weight to utilitarian controls. As we \nwould expect, then, those who had a desk position in their military \ncareer were twice as likely as combat officers to hold a less norma\xc2\xac \ntive, more utilitarian position in their civilian career. Five had \nsuch a mixed military career that they were classified as "compound 1 \xe2\x80\x99 \ntypes. All of these five also had a compound civilian career\xe2\x80\x94that is, \nthey moved back and forth between instrumentalist and externalist \npositions in civilian life. These cases also support our hypothesis \nconcerning the relationship between compliance specialization and \nmobility: less specialized actors are better able, both in the mili\xc2\xac \ntary and the civilian domain, to move from one compliance structure to \n\n\nLeonard Reissman, "Life Careers, Power, and the Professions: the \nRetired Army General," American Sociological Review , Vol. 21, No. 2 \n(April, 1956), pp. 215-221. \n\n\n586 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nanother. ?or three cases the post-military career could not be deter\xc2\xac \nmined with sufficient precision to allow classification. This limited \nmaterial seems to illustrate our hypothesis and to lend to it some \n\nsupport (the significance level of the above results, computed by \nFisher 1 s Exact Test, is .0046). \n\n^ In sum, the first approach we have described sees executives as \n\n&peciaxists, the second as \xe2\x80\x99generalists\' 1 in knowledge about a \nparticular type oi organizational output. We suggest that most top \nexecutives are generalists in the performances they can supervise, \nbut specialists in the type of compliance they utilize in doing so. In \nother words, it seems to us that most executives are more effective in \none type of compliance structure than in the other two . It may be true \nthat all executive positions require the ability to work \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99through\xe2\x80\x9d \npeople, but there are different ways of doing that--differences in the \nappeals which can be made to lower participants, and in the sanctions \nwhich can be applied to them. \n\nCompliance specialization of executives is less apparent than \nperformance specialization, in part because there are only three common \ntypes of compliance structures while there are many hundreds of per\xc2\xac \nformance specializations. An executive can move among positions and \ncross many administrative boundaries without changing to a different \ntype of compliance structure. In this sense the specialization of \ncontrol agents, of executives, is broader\xe2\x80\x94permits more horizontal \nmobility without loss of effectiveness\xe2\x80\x94than does the performance \nspecialization of skilled workers and experts. \n\n\nXIV.4.4.1.b Executive Specialization*. Positions and Personalities. \n\nOur discussion of compliance specialization rests on the following \n,hs sumption: that in addition to positions requiring different types of \ncompliance, there are actors who differ in the type of compliance they \ncan effectively achieve and sustain, and that these individuals tend to \nbe recruited into positions requiring the compliance pattern for which \nthey are suited. We expect most individuals to be more effective in \ncontrolling lower participants in one way than in the other two ways, \nsince each type of compliance seems to require a distinctive set of \npersonality characteristics, aptitudes, and inclinations. One actor is \nunlikely to have the characteristics required for more than one type \nof compliance position. \n\nThe two distributions, of actors and positions, are related in \nsuch a way that effectiveness is supported, though never maximized, \nbecause the mechanisms which distribute persons to positions\xe2\x80\x94self\xc2\xac \nselection and organizational selection\xe2\x80\x94are imperfect. One problem \n\n\n587 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nlies in the difficulty of determining precisely the compliance \naptitudes of actors and the compliance requirements of positions, \neven when these are perceived as important criteria for selection. \n\nOther barriers to effective allocation result from the interference of \nparticularistic criteria, such as internal political factors (e.g., \n\nX would be effective in position Y, but this would endanger the hold \nof the present eline over the organization), external political con\xc2\xac \nsiderations (e.g., party affiliation), ethnic and racial factors, \nfriendships, and the like.^ Nevertheless, although actors do have \ncompliance preferences and aptitudes, they are to some degree felxible. \nThat is, some role adaptation takes place. (By role adaptation we mean \nchanges in a person which occur after he is assigned for long periods to \na role which initially did not match his need-dispositions. It refers \nto adaptation _to the role, not of_ the role.) \n\nThe relationship between personality types and vocations is \nfairly well established. Goode and Cornish (forthcoming) review a \nlarge number of studies which show personality differences among people \nattracted to various professions. MacKinnon and Centers showed marked \ndifferences in authoritarianism among various occupational strata. ^3 \nThe percentage of authoritarians varied as follows: 50 percent for \nlarge business; 23 percent for professionals; 33 percent for small \nbusiness; 59 percent for white-collar workers; 51-86 percent for blue- \ncollar workers. Applying these findings to an organization, for \nexample a business corporation, one would expect to find authoritarian\xc2\xac \nism high among the lower ranks; comparatively low in the middle ranks, \nwhere professionals are concentrated; and high among the top ranks. \n\nOther studies point directly to differences in personality struc\xc2\xac \nture between actors holding different organizational ranks. Argyris \nfor example, found that personnel lower in rank tended to be more \nsubmissive, passive, dependent, and subordinate than those higher in \nrank.^4 \n\nBut there is very little systematic evidence that would allow us \nto relate differences in personality structure to different control \npositions in various types of compliance structures. We would expect, \nfor example, that individuals who have leadership qualities, such as \n\n50 \n\nMelville Dalton, Men Who Manage (New York: Wiley, 1959). \n\n53 \n\nWilliam J. MacKinnon and Richard Centers, \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Authoritarianism and \nUrban Stratification,\xe2\x80\x9d American Journal of Sociology , Vol. 61, No. 6 \n(May, 1956), pp. 610-620. \n\n54 \n\nChris Argyris, Executive Leadership (New York: Harper, 1953), \npp. 50-55. \n\n\n588 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n/ \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\npersuasive power, vision, ability to verbalize, and the like, would be \nmore inclined to seek a career in normative than in utilitarian organi\xc2\xac \nzations, and to prefer a utilitarian organization to a coercive one, \nsince these organizations differ in the opportunities they offer for \nsatisfaction of the need-dispositions associated with leadership \nqualities. \n\nA study which illustrates the kind of evidence needed is that by \nPine and Levinson. They show that the more authoritarian the per\xc2\xac \nsonality of an aide in a mental hospital (as measured by an F-scale), \nthe more custodial (i.e., coercive) and the less "humanistic\xe2\x80\x99\' (i.e., \nnormative) his orientation to patients and their control is likely to \nbe. \n\n\nWe would expect to find officers or formal leaders of the three \ntypes of organizations to score differently on a scale measuring \nauthoritarianism. For example, authoritarian predispositions among \nprison guards and wardens are probably quite high, lower among fore\xc2\xac \nmen and corporation executives, and lowest for leaders of democratic \nparties, teachers, professionals, and some other elites of typical \nnormative organizations. Again, there seems to be no evidence rele\xc2\xac \nvant to this proposition. \n\nThe central point for us is that because of various processes, \nsuch as self- and organizational selection, there is an association \nbetween compliance positions and personality types. This, except for \nthe flexibility due to role adaptation, defines the limits of effective \nmobility. \n\nXIV,4.4.2 Transferability of Professionals \n\nWhile billions of dollars can be shifted relatively readily by \nlegislative strokes and executive decrees, manpower\xe2\x80\x94especially pro\xc2\xac \nfessional manpower\xe2\x80\x94-cannot be moved about that easily. It is not just \na question that while the government can order a contract terminated it \ncannot order let us say a group of biologists to work on cancer re\xc2\xac \nsearch instead of biological warfare, but a question of to what extent, \neven if these professionals are willing to shift\xe2\x80\x94they are able to do \nso... . ... \n\n\n*^D. J. Levinson and F. Pine, "Two Patterns of Ideology, Role \nConception, and Personality Among Hospital Aides," in M. Greenblatt, \n\nR. H. York and E. L. Brown, From Custodial to Therapeutic Patient Care \nin Mental Hospitals (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955). \n\n\n589 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nOur first proposition is that while some professional skills are \nmore readily transferable than others, some kinds of men are less \nguidable than others. On the question of sheer transferability, basic \nresearchers seem to us more transferable than applied researchers and \napplied researchers more than technologists. The main reason for \nadvancing this proposition is that basic researchers* skills are least \nspecified to begin with and hence comparatively little conversion must \ntake place. Applied researchers are more area specific but not as much \nas technologists. (Each of the three kinds possesses some skills which \nare more readily transferable than others; however, reference here is \nto the overall picture.) \n\nConcerning guidability, in the sense that an agency of the govern\xc2\xac \nment or a corporation could reassign men to new tasks, the opposite \nladder holds. Basic researchers subscribe to the notion of autonomy of \nwork, we suggest, more strongly than applied researchers, and these\xe2\x80\x94 \nmore than technologists. Hence the first group can best be transferred \nby reallocation of research funds and changes in relative terms of \nemployment and facilities for research but that leaves them free to \nmove "on their own" (i.e., via the market of professionals) while \ntechnologists may be more readily reassigned as a group by an adminis\xc2\xac \ntrative order. \n\nFortunately, there seems to be a correlation between the relative \nguidability of the three groups and their needs to move as a team (a \nneed which is hindered when the market mechanism is employed). Move\xc2\xac \nment in teams seems least important for basic researchers, who are more \nlikely to work as individuals (or with their younger associates and \nassistants), while applied work, it seems, is more frequently conducted \nin teams, and technologists work not just in teams, but most frequsntly \nin larger organizational units. Again, these are to be viewed as \nstatistical propositions. Some basic research is conducted by large \nunits and some technologists work by themselves, but across the board \nthe differences are expected to hold. (We reiterate that these are \npropositions because the data on these matters are far from complete \nand what is available is far from clear.) \n\nReassigning whole professional teams or laboratories makes turning \naround easier, in the simple sense that one act can move a large number \nof facilities and men, and may be necessary if the technologists and \napplied researchers are to have the collaborators, assistants and \nfacilities their work requires. On the other hand, however, reassign\xc2\xac \nment as a unit may have a drawback which outweighs all these advantages \nand suggests reliance on the marketplace of professionals for the trans \nfer of all three categories and not just basic research. Without \n\n\n590 \n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nreaking up at least the large-scale units, we fear, the necessary con\xc2\xac \nversion may not be completed. We do not fear that a missile developing \nunit, assigned to build teaching machines, will continue to produce \nweapons, but we expect that tie unit will find it difficult to make the \ntransition if all the people at work on the new assignment used to work \non missiles. Easier and more complete transition is to be expected if \nindividuals (or teams) are integrated into established units which \nalready work on teaching machines, to stay with our example, in small \nnumbers at a time, allowing the established units to absorb the new\xc2\xac \ncomers. This seems to us the best means of bringing about the neces\xc2\xac \nsary shift of orientation. \n\nThere are several levels to this shift of orientation. One is \nideological. Each job carries with it a rationale, a myth, a legiti\xc2\xac \nmation, from prostitutes (keeping deviance down) to scientists \n(advancing the truth). The myth is particularly articulated and \ninternalized when the job is under attack, as for instance the team\xc2\xac \nsters or scientists working for bacteriological warfare. In order for \nmilitary personnel to successfully make the transition to a civilian \nmission, the military myth (for instance, the notion that civilian work \nis .a priori less efficient than military, and less important than work \non national security) must be unlearned and a new one picked up. \n\n\nSecond, reorientation to the nature of the client is needed. \nMilitary and space clients are relatively few, very big, with fairly \nclearly identifiable needs and preferences. Civilian clients are \nrumerous, small by comparison, and it is relatively difficult to fore\xc2\xac \ncast their needs and preferences. We refer here not only to the \nmillions of consumers of the private sector but to the thousands of \nschool boards, hospitals, etc., in the civilian public sector. While \nan individual research and development worker is unlikely to have to \ndeal directly with those, the differences in markets will indirectly \naffect his work and he needs to be reoriented to face them. \n\nThird, the military deals largely with a hostile environment, \nwhile civilians deal largely with friendlier ones, and hence the con\xc2\xac \ncern with making the civilian product immune from tampering is much \nsmaller. \n\nOn the other hand, military research and development, at least \nuntil recently, could count on favorable support from the key commit\xc2\xac \ntees in Congress, while civilian programs, at least until recently, \nfrequently faced a critical environment, requiring frequent payoffs \nand not allowing for sufficient time to test and develop a program. \nLead times are hence shorter for civilian projects and tolerance for \nfailure much lower. \n\n\n591 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nThere are many other ways professionals must be reoriented; we do \nnot seek here to exhaust the list but rather to illustrate the need for \nconsiderable reorientation. Further, we hold that, until it is proven \notherwise, such reorientations are achieved more easily and completely \nthrough reassignment of individuals or segments of a unit rather than \nthrough reassignment of the unit as a whole. \n\n\nXIV.4.5 Option D: Transferability of Knowledge: Systems Analysis? \n\nIt is the special quality of knowledge that you can give it and \nkeep it at the same time; it does not conform to the traditional laws \nof scarcity. Knowledge-manpower and facilities are scarce; but, while, \nif you assign to someone else a programmer or a computer, you no longer \nhave it, you may invest a million dollars in developing a program for a \ncomputer, make a copy for a few dollars, and make it available to \nanother organizational unit and save it a million dollars without in\xc2\xac \ncreasing your costs or reducing the value of your program, especially \nif you are not in the private sector. (The deeper reason for the un\xc2\xac \nusual quality of knowledge is due to its being a pattern of symbols \nwhile the other transfers deal with objects.) ^6 \n\nEach modern organization generates and consumes vast amounts of \ninformation which, when synthesized, become knowledge. Most of the \nknowledge produced by the military service is of little value to \ncivilian organizations nor can it be converted. This includes most of \nthe information about weapons, tactics of warfare, military intelli\xc2\xac \ngence, etc. Regarding technology\xe2\x80\x94"The first myth is that most \ndefense technology i\xc2\xa3 marketable in the private sector. Though a \ngreat deal of defense technology is "technically" applicable to the \nprivate sector, much of it is not marketable .^ It concerns such \nmatters as the number of submarines the USSR has and the number of \npersons an H-bomb exploded in Columbus Circle would kill. \n\nNevertheless a claim is being staked that the defense and space \nindustries, especially the related "think tanks," have identified a \n"scientific" method for managing large-scale projects, the Apollo \nprogram for instance, and that while specific items of information may \nnot be transferable, the method is. The method has been variously \ndescribed as systems analysis, operations research, cost-effectiveness, \n\n\nWe elaborate this point in The Active Society , pp. 22ff. \n\n^From a speech by Rodney W. Nichols of the Office of the Di\xc2\xac \nrector of Defense Research and Engineering before the National Security \nIndustrial Association\'s Research and Development Symposium, Washing\xc2\xac \nton, June 12, 1969. p. 3. \n\n\n592 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nand PP3S (for Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System). For the insider, \nt ere are significant differences among various versions of these \n\napproaches; for the outsider, they may be treated jointly, as we shall \ndo for the issues at hand. \n\nThe origins of Systems Analysis (the term we use to refer to the \nwhole set) seem to lie in studies conducted during World War II con\xc2\xac \ncerned with military equipment in Britain.They found wide applica\xc2\xac \ntion on this side of the ocean, especially at RAND. The Pentagon \nintroduced the method widely while Robert McNamara was Secretary of \nDefense. In August 1965 President Johnson ordered the introduction \nof Systems Analysis in domestic agencies. Here the approach never \ntook root successfully. Since then Systems Analysis has come under \nheavy criticism in the military area, and it is now less favored even \nin the Department of Defense than it used to be. 59 Still, the largest \nclaim that the space and military industries and organizations can \ncontribute knowledge successfully to the solution of civilian problems \nlies here. \n\nFirst, the nature of the claim which is being staked must be \nindicated: \n\n\nThe civil systems approach which is evolving from defense \nsystems experience offers two prospective benefits to the nation: \n\n1. It may be a powerful tool for helping decision-makers \ndeal with complex national and local problems. \n\n2. It may offer opportunities for diversification (and a \nlimited degree of conversion) to defense-dependent \nfirms and their personnel. These adjustment processes \ncould help in dealing with the economic impact of cut\xc2\xac \nbacks in defense spending. \n\nThe civil systems approach is concerned with solving civil \nproblems: problems in the non-defense aspects of Federal, state, \n\n\n58 \n\nP. M. S. Blackett, Operational Research (London: British Associ\xc2\xac \nation for the Advancement of Science, 1948), reprinted from The Advance\xc2\xac \nment of Science , Vol. V, No. 17 (April, 1958), and his Studies of War , \nNuclear and Conventional (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962). \n\n^According to Time fVol. 94, No. 9 (August 29, 1969), p. 17H \n\n\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99Another McNamara favorite that has lost influence is Systems Analysis \n" \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\n\n593 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nand local government. \n\n\n60 \n\n\n"The new techniques...are beginning to be recognized as \nthe greatest advance in the art of government since the intro\xc2\xac \nduction nearly a hundred years ago of a civil service based on \ncompetence," according to one observer of the new interest in \nthe civil systems approach.61 This enthusiastic claim is not \nyet proven, although it may well be true.^^ \n\n\nThe main features of Systems Analysis have been described \nas follows: \n\n1. Bounding the problem; defining objectives for solving \nit. \n\n2. Developing and comparing alternatives for achieving \nobjectives. \n\n3. Furnishing comparison information and selection cri\xc2\xac \nteria for decision-making. \n\n4. Designing and implementing the required policy, organi\xc2\xac \nzational, or hardware systems. J \n\n\nGenerally, the systems approach involves identifying the \nproblem or the threat, learning and describing the environment, \nand defining the objectives which must be achieved to counter \nthe threat or solve the problem. Alternative methods of meeting \nthese objectives must be considered, and the most attractive \n\nconcept is then elaborated into the design of a system. 4 \n\n_ ..2 -- \n\n60 \'\' \n\nJohn S. Gilmore, John J. Ryan, and William S. Gould, Defense \nSystems Resources in the Civil Sector: An Evolving Approach, An Un\xc2\xac \n\ncertain Market , Prepared for U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency \n(Washington: Government Printing Office, ACDA/E-103, July, 1967), \np. vii. \n\n61 Max Ways, "The Road to 1977," Fortune , Vol. LXXV, No. 1 \n(January, 1967), p. 95. \n\n62 \n\nJohn S. Gilmore, et al ., Defense Systems Resources... , p. 5. \n\n^Ibid., p. vii. \n\n64 \n\nIbid ., p. 5-6. For several good descriptions and analyses of \nthis approach, see Stephen Enke (ed.). Defense Management (Englewood \nCliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967). \n\n\n594 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nBasically the systems approach is rationalistic. It assumes a \ncapacity to clearly state the goals (the threat or the problem), to \norder them, to express them in quantitative terms, and to hold them \nconstant. It further assumes that we have a capacity to depict fairly \naccurately the environment and the alternative routes leading from the \npresent condition to the goal or goals stated. Careful arguments \nhave oe\xc2\xa3n advanced to show that under most conditions it is not pos\xc2\xac \nsible to even approximate these requirements.^ \n\nWe have very little evidence of studies from critical observers. \nThe authors of a recent detailed study of the applicability of defense \nsystems resources to civilian problem areas were unable to present un- \nequivocal conclusions.^ Most of the studies available are those of \nadvocates or favorably-oriented outsiders. \' An exception is found in \nthe following remarks of an experienced systems analyst: \n\nThere is no question but that research and development \nand systems analysis has been drastically oversold in terms of \nwhat it can do for the civilian market. If you look at the \nreal capabilities of the industry you will pretty much find it \nrestricted to huge operations where large aggregations of per\xc2\xac \nsonnel and capital are put to work on high-quality, high- \ntechnology problems. Few major problems meet these criteria. \n\nEven if the technology of the aerospace industry is in some \nsense applicable to urban problems, it just doesn\xe2\x80\x99t take that \nmany people. Another problem deals with whether we are dis\xc2\xac \ncussing research or production. It is clear that the money \nlies in the development and production side of things rather \nthan research as such, and the aerospace firms have not as yet \nbeen convinced that there will be a large production run as the \nultimate payoff if they get into the civilian market. \n\n\nCharles E. Lindblom, M The Science of \xe2\x80\x99Muddling Through,\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x9d \n\nPublic Administration Review , Vol. XIX, No. 2 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88. \n\n^John s. Gilmore, et al ., Defense Systems Resources... , Chapter 8. \n\n67 Elizabeth Drew, "HEW Grapples with PPBS," The Public Interest , \n\nNo. 8 (Summer, 1967), pp. 9-29. \n\n66comments by a staff member of one of the major "think tanks" \nassociated with systems analysis, given in an interview with Bernard \nUdis, March 11, 1969. \n\n\n595 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nOn the basis of a year\'s observations in Washington, D.C., the \nfollowing statements concerning the effectiveness of Systems Analysis \nseem Vcilid to us: \n\n1. In some instances, the rationalistic model is useful, \nespecially for mass aggregate technological systems (such as an auto\xc2\xac \nmated telephone system), that is, those in which there are a large \nnumber of units (helpful to quantification) and where the non-human \nelement is predominant. As there are both military and civilian \nsystems which have these attributes. Systems Analysis, developed in \nthe military, has clear civilian application, for instance, for \ntraffic control. * \n\n\xc2\xab \n\n2. For systems in which the human elements are more potent, e.g., \nin educational networks. Systems Analysis is either loosely applied or \nfaked. In the first approach, rough figures and estimates are used \nnot only to substitute for descriptive data which is not available but \nfor assumptions about relations among variables. For instance, not \nonly do model builders make assumptions about the costs of books \n(e.g., that they are roughly $5 on the average), but they also assume \nthat cutting the cost by half would lead to three times more reading. \n\nIf one asks, why three times and not 2.6 or 16?\xe2\x80\x94one always gets an \nanswer in the form of an argument or conjecture but rarely empirically \nverified statements. \n\nSuch hypothetical data and relationships, mixed with bits of \nevidence, are the fuel of much domestic Systems Analysis; without \nthem it would come to a halt. \n\nThe value of the projections based on very crude estimates and \nartificial assumptions lies mainly, not in the specific forecast which \nresults, but in that it helps to develop a sense of the factors in\xc2\xac \nvolved and the possible relations among them, and calls attention to \npossibilities which otherwise might escape one\'s attention and brings \ninto the open hidden assumptions, even prejudices. That is. Systems \n\n\n69 \n\n"The real strength of aerospace companies is their technical \ncapability. The strong and often unique capabilities of the industry \nare engineering accomplishment, technical systems management, meeting \nmajor national requirements, and serving government markets. How to \nmate these capabilities with the requirements of nondefense business \nmay be the challenge and the problem." (Murray L. Weidenbaum, "De\xc2\xac \nfense Cutbacks and the Aerospace Industry," in John S. Gilmore and \nDean C. Coddington, Defense Industry Diversification , p. 311.) \n\n\n596 \n\n\n\n\nI \n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nAnalysis in domestic circumstances, still does offer a powerful heuris\xc2\xac \ntic device. Its main value lies in its mind-stretching quality, in its \n\nC r\\ q 1 (* -T r \xe2\x80\xa2 . ^ itS rigid application, as if the \n\nspeci ic igures given prove anything or can be relied upon in any way. \n\nFinally, there is the deliberate slanting of figures and assump\xc2\xac \ntions so as to make the model (or computer) print out the desired \nconclusion, expressed in technical symbols and seemingly scientific. \nEspecially in areas where data is soft and theory just budding, the \nabuses of Systems Analysis seem rampant. In a brief informal survey, \nwe found civilian agencies, especially local governments, more in\xc2\xac \nclined to crudely manipulate Systems Analysis, while the Military seems \nto do so with greater finesse. As finesse means here, among other \nthings, greater attention to the real figures, and hence to reality, \nmore transfer of military accounting schemes and experience may make \ncivilian agencies more "honest" in their Systems Analysis, unless, of \ncourse, the poorer data and theory available, especially in reference \nto systems low in technological factors, do not allow a much higher \nlevel of application at this stage. \n\nThe main point of all this is that even if there were no diffi\xc2\xac \nculties whatsoever in transferring Systems Analysis from military and \nspace missions to domestic ones, the weakness and limitations of the \nwhole approach, and especially its diluted or misapplied versions, \nmust be guarded against. \n\nSecond, there is a major difference in the mission areas which \nmust be taken into account. In the military, systems which are \ncentralized, bureaucratic, highly controllable, and rich in techno\xc2\xac \nlogical elements are prevalent. Civilian systems are frequently de\xc2\xac \ncentralized, pluralistic by comparison, and less technological. The \nconclusion is not that Systems Analysis cannot be transferred, but \nthat it is much more applicable to some civilian missions (de-pollution \nof water and air, traffic control, weather control, radio frequencies, \netc.) and much less to others (drug addiction, education, psycho\xc2\xac \ntherapy) although even these will have some components in which it \ncould work (e.g., mass urine tests needed for methadone programs). \n\nXIV.4.6 Conclusion \n\n\nTo turn around, the societal will must be built; it does not \nspring into being because there is an objective need to turn from \nmilitary to domestic priorities, or because a Presidential or Con- \ngessional interest is announced. It must be constructed out of a \ncoalition of interest groups (private and public), and public opinion. \n\n\n597 \n\n\n\nACDA/E-156 \n\n\nWithout such a systematic buildup of support, a significant turn is \nunlikely to occur. \n\nAssuming there is a well-founded and broadly based commitment, \nwe still need the instruments to implement it. These include \ndecision-making which goes beyond incrementalism to policy making and \norganizational networks which are less fragmented than civilian ones \nare now. The reasons the market rather than administrative mechanisms \nshould be relied upon as the main tools of turning around rather than \nchanging the missions of the military itself, have been explored. In \npart, they lie in the prerequisite of conversion, in part in the need \nto sustain the civilian potency and the civic society. \n\n\n4 \' \n\n\nT \n\n\n598 \n\n\n\n\n\nACDA PUBLICATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT \nOF DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT \nIN THE UNITED STATES \n\n\nGENERAL \n\n\n* Economic Impacts of Disarmament (ACDA 2), January \n1962. \n\n* The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament \n(ACDA 21), June 1964. \n\n* The Timing of the Impact of Government Expenditures \n(ACDA/E-157), University of Pittsburgh, November 1970. \n\nMEASUREMENT \n\n\nSurvey of Economic Models for Analysis of Disarmament \nImpacts (ACDA/E-59), University of Michigan, July 1965. \n\nA Study to Measure Direct and Indirect Impacts of \nDefense Expenditures on an Economy (ACDA/E-85), \nUniversity of Washington, August 1967. \n\n* An Economic Impact Study of the Minuteman II Weapon \nSystem (ACDA/E-125), Research Analysis Corporation. \n\nINDUSTRY \n\n* The Implications of Reduced Defense Demand for the \nElectronics Industry (ACDA/E-48), Battelle Memorial \nInstitute, September 1965. \n\n* Defense Industry Diversification (ACDA/E-68), \n\nDenver Research Institute, January 1966. \n\n\n\n\n\nIndustrial Conversion Potential in the Shipbuilding \nIndustry (ACDA/E-66), Midwest Research Institute, \n\nMay 1%6. \n\n* Defense Systems Resources in the Civil Sector (ACDA/E-103) \nDenver Pesearch Institute, July 1967. \n\nThe Management of Growth and Technological Change \n(ACDA/E/RA-15), Northeastern University, August 1967. \n\nTechnological Innovation in Civilian Public Areas \n(ACDA/E-118), Analytic Services, Inc., August 1967. \n\nThe Processes of Technological Innovation: A Con\xc2\xac \nception Systems Model (ACDA/E/RA-35), George Washington \nUniversity, January 1968. \n\nDefense Dependency of the Metalworking Machinery \nand Equipment Industry and Disarmament Implications \n(ACDA/E-130), Resource Management Corporation, \n\nJune 1969. \n\nMANPOWER \n\n\n* The Dyna-Soar Contract Cancellation (ACDA/E/RA-13), \n\nState of Washington Employment Service, June 1965. \n\n\'\xe2\x96\xa04 \n\n* (I) Post Layoff Experiences - Republic Aviation Workers \nand (II) The Transferability of Defense Job Skills to \nNon-Defense Occupations (ACDA/E-69), State of New \nYork, Department of Labor, August 1966. \n\n* Reemployment Experiences (ACDA/E-67), Martin Marietta, \nDecember 1966. \n\n* The Transferability and Retraining of Defense Engineers \n(ACDA/E-110), Stanford Research Institute, November 1967. \n\nThe Potential Transfer of Industrial Skills from \nDefense to Non-Defense Industries (ACDA/E-102), \n\nState of California, Department of Labor, June 1968. \n\n\n\n.JS > \xc2\xbb \n\n\n* R e employment Experiences of Defense Workers (ACDA/E-113), \nUniversity of Colorado, November 1968. \n\nPensions and Severance Pay for* Displaced Defense \nWorkers (ACDA/E-138), University of Illinois, July 1969. \n\n# Characteristics of Potential Unemployment Problems \nin Vietnam Procurement Reductions (ACDA/E-168), \n\nResearch Analysis Corporation. \n\nREGIONS i \n\n\nAdjustments to Reduced National Defense Expenditures \nin New Mexico (ACDA/E-58), Kirschner Associates, \n\nJanuary 1966. \n\n* Community Readjustment to Reduced Defense Spending \n(ACDA/E-57), National Planning Association, January 1966. \n\nCommunity Information System (ACDA/E-88), National \nPlanning Association, July 1967. \n\n* Ammunition Production for Vietnam-Impact on Southeast \nKansas (ACDA/E-142), Midwest Research Institute, \n\nFebruary 1970. \n\nEconomic Impact of Military Base Closings (Vol. I \nand Vol. II) (ACDA/E-90), University of Kansas, April \n1970. \n\n\nCopies of completed studies which have been printed by \nthe Government Printing Office may be purchased directly from \nthe Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, \nWashington, D.C. 20402. Several other reports are available \nin limited number in ACDA and may be obtained on request to \nRIC, U.S. Arras Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. \n20451. Copies of research reports have been forwarded to major \npublic and academic libraries in the U.S. and to U.N. libraries \nin New York and Geneva. \n\n\n* U.S. Government Printing Office \n\n# Forthcoming Publication \n\n\ni \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBD - 7 6 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\no ^ \n\nv, * \n\ni \\ s . * , C\\ \n\nv % A\xc2\xb0 \xe2\x96\xba\' \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 V \xc2\xa3 \'\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nr

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