BISON FMFM 5-5 ANTIAIR WARFARE r.~;--;: ~ . . "' J ..:.~~ :::; J . .~< ~:>:".:'.~~-·::· ',::~~_; U. S. MARINE CORPS PCN 139 000358 00 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20t02 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380 14July 1980 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE This publication, FMFM 5-5, Antiair Warfare, sets forth doctrine, tactics, and techniques to be employed in operations and training for antiair warfare operations within the Fleet Marine Forces. 2. SCOPE This manual expands on the doctrine, tactics, and techniques applicable to antiair warfare contained in FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation. This manual, along with its classified supplement, FMFM 5-SA, (C) Antiair Warfare Supplement (U), provides specific guidance for air defense of the landing force via the integration of LAAM, F AAD, and VMFA units. This manual also provides combat document examples and descriptions of air control agencies for antiair warfare. 3. SUPERSESSION FMFM 7-5 dated March 1970 and FMFM 7-6 dated September 1968. 4. CHANGES Recommendations for improving this manual are invited from commands as well as directly from individuals. The attached User Suggestion Form should be utilized by individuals and forwarded to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command (Code D 036), Quantico, Virginia 22134. 5. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS cr:-~~.~ }.H. MILLER Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION: TEG USER SUGGESTION FORM From: To: Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command (Code D 036), Quantico, Virginia 22134 Subj: FMFM 5-5, Antiair Warfare 1. In accordance with the Foreword to FMFM 5-5, which invites individuals to submit sugges tions concerning this FMFM directly to the above addressee, the following unclassified recommendation is forwarded: Page Article/Paragraph No. Line No. Figure/Table No. Nature of Change: D Add D Delete D Change 0 Correct 1. Proposed New Verbatim Text: (Verbatim, double spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary.) 2. Justification/Source: (Need not be double spaced.) NOTE: Only one recommendation per page. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS POSTAIJE AN~ FEES PAID WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY DOD•317 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE US& 1300 To: Commanding General Marine Corps Development and Education Command (CodeD 036) Quantico, Virginia 22134 FMFM 5-5 RECORD OF CHANGES Change Date of Date of No. Change Entry Organization Signature FMFM 5-5 ,_ ANTIAIR WARFARE TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTIAIR WARFARE Section I. INTRODUCTION PageParagraph 1101 General 1 1102 Historical Evolution 2 1103 Functions of Antiair Warfare 3 1104 Future Considerations 3 Section II. TERMINOLOGY 5 1202 References 1201 General 5 1203 Definitions 5 CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS Section I. INTRODUCTION 2101 General 9 2102 Marine Aircraft Wing 9 2103 Marine Aviation Groups 10 2104 Marine Squadrons 11 2105 Battalions and Batteries 12 Section II. MARINE AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 2201 General 14 2202 Control of Aircraft and Missiles 14 2203 MACCS AAW Agencies 15 2204 U.S. Navy AAW Agencies 15 2205 U.S. Air Force AAW Agencies 15 Section III. EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS 2301 General 17 2302 System Requirements 17 2303 Aircraft/Air-to-Air Weapons 19 2304 Hawk Air-Defense Guided Missile System 22 2305 Gap-Filler/Maneuver Element Weapon Systems 34 2306 Ground Support 34 iii FMFM 5-5 I Section IV. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT 2401 General 2402 Marine Amphibious Force 2403 Marine Amphibious Brigade 2404 Marine Amphibious Unit 2405 Independent Deployments CHAPTER 3. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS Section I. INTRODUCTION 3101 General Section II. EMPLOYMENT OF ANTIAIR WARFARE MEANS 3201 General 3202 Principle Considerations 3203 Concept of Operations 3204 Methods of Employment 3205 Functional Integration Section III. PREPARATION 3301 General 3302 Training 3303 Rehearsals 3304 Operations Security Section IV. OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT 3401 General 3402 Advanced Base Operations 3403 Carrier Basing 3404 Early Phasing Ashore Section V. EXECUTION 3501 General 3502 Pre-D-Day Operations 3503 D-Day Operations 3504 Post-D-Day Operations 3505 Postassault Phase Operations CHAPTER 4. ANTIAIR WARFARE PLANNING Section I. INTRODUCTION 4101 General 4102 Planning Guidance 4103 Preliminary Planning Directives -4104 Sequence of Air Staff Planning iv 36 36 37 38 39 41 42 42 46 52 61 63 63 66 67 68 68 69 69 71 72 75 77 84 87 87 88 88 Section II. 4201 4202 4203 4204 4205 4206 4207 Section III. 4301 4302 4303 4304 4305 Section IV. 4401 4402 Section V. 4501 Section VI. 4601 4602 4603 4604 4605 4606 4607 4608 4609 Section VII. 4701 4702 Section VIII. 4801 4802 4803 FMFM 5-5 BASIC ELEMENTS OF ANTIAIR WARFARE PLANNING 90 Centralized Control General 90 Achievement of Local Air Superiority 90 Access to Control Agencies 90 Deployment of Air Units 91 Aircraft Availabilities 91 Transfer of Airspace Control 91 PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES 93 General Amphibious Task Force 93 Landing Force 93 Landing Force Aviation 94 95 Aviation Units INITIAL ESTIMATES OF LANDING FORCE ANTIAIR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS 96 Landing Force Aviation Tasks 96 General AVIATION ESTIMATE OF SUPPORTABILITY 97 General DETERMINING DETAILED ANTIAIR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS 98 Task Organization Introduction 98 Integrated AAW Planning Requirements 98 Intelligence Evaluation of Enemy Capability 99 Determination of AAW Requirements 100 Landing Force AAW Planning Considerations 102 Plans for Employment of AAW Establishment Ashore 102 Air Defense Considerations in Tactical Planning 103 AAW Problems Peculiar to Amphibious Operations 103 FORMULATION OF AIR PLANS 104General Amphibious Task Force Operation Plan 104 AVIATION COMBAT DOCUMENTS 105 105 General Antiair Warfare Annex Air Defense Plan 107 v FMFM 5-5 CHAPTER 5. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS Section I. INTRODUCTION 5101 General 5102 Command and Staff Relationships 5103 Special Staff 5104 Affiliation With the Navy Section II. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 5201 General 5202 Joint Command 5203 Naval Command 5204 Landing Force Section III. FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION 5301 General 5302 Intratheater Coordination 5303 Intrasector Coordination 5304 Airspace Utilization 5305 Air-Ground Coordination 5306 Control of Surface-to-Air Missile Units 5307 Automated and Manual Systems Operations Section IV. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 5401 General 5402 Requirements 5403 Equipment 5404 Communication Need-Lines APPENDIXES: A Coordinated Airstrike Planning FactorsB Coordinated Airstrike Planning Guidec Sample Enemy Residual Air Threat AnnexD Sample Antiair Warfare AnnexE Combat Air PatrolsF Hawk Missile Battery Equipment Embarkation Planning DataG Intercept Control LIST OF REFERENCES INDEX vi 109 109 110 110 112 112 113 114 115 116 118 120 121 121 128 133 133 140 142 143 147 151 157 161 165 167 179 181 FMFM 5-5 CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTIAIR WARFARE Section I INTRODUCTION Antiair warfare (AAW) is the action that is required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level llOl. the enemy air and missile threat. It includes such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, GENERAL antiaircraft guns, air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles (SAM's), electronic countermeasures (ECM), and the destruction of the aircraft or missile threat both before and after launch. Other AAW measures which are taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic deception), and mobility. The conduct of AAW is becoming increasingly complex due to the introduction of advanced electronic warfare techniques, sophisticated aircraft and weapons systems, and integration into various automated tactical data systems, such as Marine tactical data system/Navy tactical data system (MTDS/NTDS) and airborne tactical data system (ATDS). Proper countering of an in creasing enemy air .threat demands the exercise of timely and discriminating judgement. This judgement is based upon a thorough knowledge of the capabilities, limitations, and interplay of the many systems and techniques involved in the Navy and Marine air command and control system (MACCS). This manual is designed to expand on the general discussion of AAW provided in FMFM 5-l. It presents the concept of AAW operations employed by the landing force and discusses the considerations, responsibilities, and techniques involved in the employments of the MACCS in AAW, both offensive and defensive. A detailed study of the Navy command and control in AAW is located in NWP 32. FMFM 5-5 ll02. The Beginning. Antiair warfare has a history almost as old as aviation itself. Initially, the estabHISTORICAL lishment of Marine aviation was understandably concerned with organizational considerations,EVOLUTION but at the onset of World War I, attention shifted to the combat functions of aviation. One ofthe first functions to become apparent was the requirement for aircraft to protect other aircraftinvolved in bombing missions. Although Marine aviation was not yet formally organized andequipped prior to the end of World War I, Marine aviators flew with Royal Air Force (RAF)squadrons, accounting for the destruction of at least four German aircraft. Post-World War I. Following World War I, Marines continued to develop their proficiency inantiair warfare. In 1921, Marines went to sea with Naval aviators to develop carrier basing requirements. Most of the years between World War I and World War II were spent perfecting tasks and techniques for supporting ground forces. Consequently, the advent of World War II found Marine aviation with a·limited fighter capability and with antiaircraft guns in ground organizations. British success with radar in the early 1940's gave impetus to its adoption by Marine, Army, and Navy aviation. In addition to airborne radar equipment, ground radars wereemployed to direct both day and night fighter aircraft. The combination of ground controlledintercepts and night fighter aircraft proved particularly effective in the latter stages of the warand, specifically, in the Okinawan campaign. By the end of World War II, the destruction of over 2,300 Japanese aircraft had been credited to Marine aviation. Korean Conflict. Immediately after World War II, Marine aviation was in China as part of anair-ground team, but no air defense combat was required. In Korea, however, Marine aviation was again tasked to conduct antiair warfare. The major difference between World War II andthe Korean conflict was the technological improvements that had evolved in both ground andairborne radars. The tasks of offensive AAW and air defense remained the same. Post-Korea. The years after Korea were characterized by continuing technological improvements which led to the development of sophisticated airborne radars and three-dimensionalground control radars. Eventually, the air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles were added to theactive inventory of Marine equipment. Antiaircraft artillery was phased out and the surface-toair missile was made organic to Marine aviation. This move was prompted by the decision toclosely integrate and control antiair warfare capabilities and training under one commander. Vietnamese Conflict. The war in the Republic of Vietnam required Marine aviation to provide offensive AAW and limited air defense. Among the first aviation units introduced into SouthVietnam were Marine attack and fighter/attack squadrons, followed by facilities for early warning radar and surface-to-air missile units. Only a limited threat was encountered in Southeast Asia and AAW did not become a major responsibility of Marine aviation during the conflict.The MACCS was, however, used in a wide variety of tasks including airspace control. Throughout the Vietnamese war, Marine aviation did participate in offensive AAW operations andMarine aviators were credited with destruction of four enemy aircraft. Technological developments continued during the conflict, and a major portion of the MACCS was automated. Infact, the Marine Corps provided the first capability for semiautomatic, airspace control and dataexchange with U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force air control organizations and provided the background for the development of similar systems by the Navy and Air Force. 2 FMFM 5-5 Overview. The function of antiair warfare has become an integral part of Marine aviation and an essential ingredient for success in an amphibious operation. Historically, the function of Marine aviation has been required with varying degrees of intensity, depending upon the extent and nature of the enemy air threat. Marine forces have not had to actively counter a meaningful enemy air threat since World War II. Today, however, the air defense and weapons systems available to even underdeveloped countries are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious threat to an amphibious operation. Advancements in technology are continuing at a rapid pace, and the Marine Corps must maintain a high level of expertise and operational readiness in all facets of antiair warfare in order to ensure success for an amphibious operation. Increased train ing emphasis and continued development and refinement of the Marine air command and control system must be stressed in order to achieve air superiority in any future conflict. The AAW tasks are fundamental to the attainment and maintenance of air superiority which, in 1103. tum, is vital to an amphibious operation. The three main tasks of an antiair warfare system are FUNCTIONS surveillance, control, and weapons employment. Surveillance is concerned with detecting, OF locating, and identifying hostile targets on the ground and in the air. Control is the task of ANTIAIR directing and coordinating the employment of the weapons systems involved in destroying the WARFARE enemy air capability. All three of these tasks are common to AAW, either offensive or defensive, but the method to accomplish these tasks will vary according to the category of AAW. 1104. The two major future considerations are the enemy threat and the friendly air defense system's FUTURE capabilities. CONSIDERATIONS a. Threat. Marines have not had to actively counter a meaningful air threat since World War II; however, the weapons systems available to even underdeveloped countries are so sophisticated that they could constitute a serious threat to an amphibious operation. Advancements in technology will continue and the Marine Corps must keep pace by con stantly improving weapons and command and control systems. Two factors which have a significant influence on future considerations are: • Enemy Mobile Air Defense. Up to the present, offensive AAW has been carried out against relatively fixed installations. These targets could be preplanned to ensure the proper mix of strike aircraft, fighter cover, and electronic warfare aircraft. This situation will continue because installations classified as offensive AAW targets will always exist. However, the advent of motorized-mechanized forces has changed the nature of some offensive AAW targets. Because of recent developments in SAM technology, a mobile air defense capability can accompany, or closely follow, enemy assault forces. For this reason, what may have previously been an offensive air support target now also becomes an offensive AAW target. Mobile air defense can adversely influence, almost in dependently, Marine aviation's ability to gain and maintain air superiority. Air superiority is still conditioned by the enemy's potential to generate 3 "prohibitive interference" with air operations. Any means, airborne or otherwise,which can provide this interference becomes an offensive AAW target and a major airdefense consideration. The mobile SAM threat could conceivably require that the fullrange of Marine aviation, such as that used to attack a fiXed target, be brought to bear on a mobile target. This effort would have to be applied on an alert-condition basis,without the time to perform the coordination normally associated with a preplannedtarget. • Enemy Electronic Warfare (EW). Electronic warfare is a major threat against Marine air defenses. Electronic warfare capability is becoming more available to countries notpreviously so equipped. Training, tactics, and techniques in electronic countercountermeasures (ECCM) must be constantly upgraded if this threat is to be countered. FMFM 2-3 addresses the subject in detail. b. Friendly Air Defense System Capabilities. Surveillance, control, and weapons employmentwere previously identified as major AAW tasks for both offensive AAW and air defense. Surveillance for air threats must be sufficient to allow the required reaction times. Reaction times should be reduced wherever possible to provide the time required for target evaluation, weap.ons selection, and commitment. This is a function of control. Control, like surveillance, must beextended to overcome the line of sight restrictions which limit existing electronic systems.Although decentralized execution is an existing tenet of the MACCS, future developments maynecessitate even greater decentralization of the target acquisition, evaluation, weapons selection, and engagement process. This may be the only realistic way for the system to guaranteea timely reaction to a hostile air threat. FMFM 5-5 Section II TERMINOLOGY This section presents a series of references and terms associated with antiair warfare. Because of 1201. the commonality of interest in air defense among the Services, joint documents of this subject GENERAL have been under preparation and review for some time. These documents, combined with various Service publications, have resulted in a collection of antiair warfare terms. It is necessary to establish definitions wherever possible for antiair warfare terminology and the terms associated with the control of aircraft and missiles. Paragraph 1202 discusses pertinent references and their influence upon terminology, while paragraph 1203 establishes the definitions themselves. It will be noted that not all of the defined terms can presently cite a reference. It has been necessary, in the approach to this publication, to coin or selectively define terms where formal definitions are nonexistent. These terms will be clearly identifiable. For Marine Corps purposes, their appearance in this manual constitutes Marine Corps approval and their application should become Marine Corps-wide. The following references were used for terminology standards and defmitions. They are listed 1202. in the order of precedence used in the selection of definitions: REFERENCES • JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms • LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations • LFM 04/NWP 17, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone • NWP 22-2, Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations • NWP 32, Antiair Warfare (U) • FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation • FMFM 5-5C, Employment ofthe Forward Area Air Defense Battery In order to describe antiair warfare and the control of aircraft and missiles, some defmitions in 1203. addition to those noted in paragraph 1201 are required. The relationships of various agencies to DEFINITIONS these definitions will also be discussed. a. Terms. The following definitions are established: • Command. "The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, _coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions...."(JCS Pub 1) 5 • Control. "Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations...." (JCS Pub 1) • Ai; Direction. The supervisory activity exercised by an agency over aircraft and missiles to regulate and determine specific aircraft and missile employment and to maintain a balance between available air resources and the priorities assigned for theirusage. • Air Control. Action taken by personnel using radio, radar, or other means external toan aircraft to maneuver that aircraft in relation to another object • Air Controller. "An individual especially trained for and assigned the duty of the con trol (by use of radio, radar, or other means) of such aircraft as may be allotted to himfor operation within his area." (JCS Pub 1) • Air Control Agency. An organization possessing the capability for air control and/orair direction while maintaining a corresponding capability to coordinate such controland direction with other similar agencies. • Airspace Control. The coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of an airspace of defined proportions. In this context, coordination is considered as thatdegree of authority necessary to achieve effective, efficient, and flexible use of airspace without, at the same time providing command authority. Integration considersthe necessity to consolidate requirements for the use of this airspace in the interest ofachieving a common objective at the lowest possible level of effort Regulation indicates the requirement to supervise activities in this airspace to provide for surface-to surface fire, air defense, and flight safety. Airspace control, therefore, denotes aservice provided in order to permit flexibility of actions and does not include measures to approve, disapprove, deny, or delay operations. • Terminal (Air) Controller. An air controller located at or near the scene of an aircraftmission to assist assigned aircraft completing the purpose of the mission. Terminalcontrol does not extend to internal weapons system operations. b. Agency Relationships. Within the framework of the preceding definitions, the MACCS agencies can now be compared. The purpose of this comparison is to specify the associated authority and the nature of the tasks within these types of control. (1) Command. There is one MACCS agency which exercises command and that is thetactical air command center (TACC). In this role, the TACC acts as a command agency for the tactical air commander (TAC), the designated aviation representative of theMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The authority vested in the TACC and reflected in its title is in consonance with the definition of command. (2) Air Direction. The task of air direction is the most common form of "control" exer cised by the major MACCS control agencies. The processes of regulation, determinationof employment, and maintaining balance between assets and priorities is comprehensiveand complex. Depending upon the extent of control authority decentralization, air direction starts with the supervision of the daily fragmentary order execution. From this point on, air direction requires aircraft status checks for pending missions; reassignment of airborne assets to higher priority missions; receipt, processing, and assignment in response to immediate air support requests; advising requesters of pending mission status; briefing aircrews; and exchanging other pertinent information among appropriate control agencies. Air direction, then, is the management of an assigned block of aircraft and control agency assets to accomplish a series of aviation functional tasks. This block of assets is necessarily limited and the costs of imbalance or inefficiencies in air direction are aircraft misutilization and excessive resp.onse times. Air direction requires large volumes of information and distributed communication networks. Mission status information, revisions to planned or on-going missions, and changes in mission priorities are required from all participants to perform the necessary adjustments to scheduled aircraft operations. Air direction requires timely management of both resources and demands, each varying with the specifics of a particular situation. It includes the authority required to adjust mission assignments or to assign missions to contingency assets according to changes in the air or ground situation. The TACC, tactical air direction center (TADC), tactical air operations center (TAOC), and TAC(A) are the MACCS agencies which exercise air direction in antiair warfare. (3) Air Control. Air control is performed by an air controller to provide for physical maneuver of aircraft in flight. Itconsists of providing services to friendly aircraft to assist in their safe transit from point to point and/or the delivery of their particular capability at a given point or against an assigned target. In contrast to air direction, air control does not require the same quantities of information from such a large number of sources. In most instances, the information required is predominantly single-mission related and the communications are relatively dedicated between the aircrew and the air controller. Tasks, such as weapons assignment, aircraft position information exchange/handoff, asset allocation, air schedule supervision, use of contingency assets, and internal functioning, are essential air direction, although they may be performed by an air control agency. Those tasks dealing with the actual maneuver of aircraft are air control. The TAOC, airborne forward air controller (AFAC), and in some instances, the flight leader himself perform air control. (4) Termirwl Control. Within the context of air control, terminal control exists as a type of control which requires separate identification, definition, and discussion. This requirement exists simply because so many discussions of air control and air direction will directly involve activity by the major MACCS agencies which ceases upon assumption of control by a terminal controller. The significant details of terminal control are prescribed according to the type of mission. Terminal control is a subset of air control and deals with those MACCS agencies provided to control the delivery of ordnance or other air capability upon or at a specific geographic location. The training is specialized and differs from that performed by other air controllers. Even as part of the MACCS, some terminal control agencies are not organic to aviation organizations, but are still fully integrated into the system through communications and procedures. Strictly speaking, the definition could be extended until actual weapons release. This is unnecessary and a major qualifier has to be that the terminal controller's task is not to perform the delivery operations, but to control the weapons system in its delivery. Delivery is the function of the weapons system itself. Situational rules of engagement may affect this generalization. For example, in an air defense situation, positive visual identification FMFM 5-5 of hostile aircraft prior to firing may be required. In this case, the flight leader actuallybecomes an extension of the MACCS and its responsibility for identification. Undernormal circumstances, however, terminal control is considered separate from weaponssystem operations. Thus, the vectoring of an interceptor aircraft until it assumes controlof an intercept, regardless of the ranges involved, is an example of terminal control &11:: u u c c. _, u c. 0 u = en = c == c ... c ... ~COMMAND X AIR DIRECTION X X AIR CONTROL X X X X TERMINAL CONTROL X X X Figure 1. Types of Antiair Warfare Control and Associated Agencies. c. Summary. It has been necessary to provide defmitions and discussion of the types of con trol inherent in the function "antiair warfare." These types will be the basis for identifying differences and similarities in the control of aircraft and missiles for antiair warfare. "Control" is a generic term and the function of control of aircraft and missiles will be discussed in thatcontext. The discussions which follow will describe the control methods, procedures, andservices performed by the MACCS to support antiair warfare. Types of control for AAW and the associated agencies are summarized in figure l. Detailed discussions of the MACCS inter relationships are contained in chapter 3. 8 FMFM 5-5 CHAPTER2 ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS Section I INTRODUCTION 2101. The organizations within Marine aviation primarily tasked with antiair warfare roles are fighter/ attack and attack squadrons for offensive AAW, fighter/attack and control squadrons, and SAM GENERAL units for air defense. Since attack squadrons perform the same basic tasks in offensive AAW as performed for offensive air support, a detailed discussion of attack AAW tasks is excluded from . this publication. Fighter missions which protect attack aircraft engaged in ordnance delivery are also in this category. Appendixes A and B discuss the planning considerations for conducting a coordinated airstrike for offensive AAW. FMFM 5-4 discusses the attack AAW capability in detail. The requirements for air defense in the amphibious operation are substantial and unique. The Marine aircraft wing (MAW) is task organized to satisfy the requirements of AAW and the MACCS. This section will emphasizeAAW oriented organizations and missions within the MAW. 2102. The specific organizations of the MAW for AAW are the fighter attack (VMFA) squadrons; head quarters and headquarters squadron, Marine air control group (H&HS, MACG ); and Marine air MARINE control squadron (MACS). The light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalions and the forward AIRCRAFT area air defense (FAAD) batteries are exclusively air defense oriented. As noted in paragraph WING 2101, attack squadrons and other MACCS agencies contribute to AAW through ordnance deliv ery on selected targets and other responsibilities as part of an integrated command and control system. Assault support, aerial refueling, air reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft also exercise their respective tasks to support AAW. Air reconnaissance aircraft contribute to target selection and damage assessment in offensive AAW. Electronic warfare aircraft normally accom pany aircraft attacking those targets. (See fig. 2.) 9 FMFM 5-5 MARINE AIRCRAR' WING MWHS VMFP OR VMAQ Figure 2. Typical Marine Aircraft Wing. 2103. Two Marine aviation groups are of particular concern-the Marine air control group and theMARINE Marine aircraft group (MAG)(VF/VA).AVIATIONGROUPS • Marine Air Control Group. The headquarters and headquarters squadron, the Marine wing communication squadron (MWCS), and the Marine airsupportsquadron(MASS)are found in all MACG's. (See fig. 3.) Variations exist in the presence or the numbersof other organizations such as the MACS, LAAM battalions, and FAAD batteries. The MACG is organized to provide the trained personnel and equipment for theMACCS agencies. • Marine Aircraft Group (VMFA/VMA). The MAG is a task organized unit capable ofextended and independent operations. Depending upon the particular task organization; fighter/attack and attack aircraft, plus a substantial support capability, are in MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP • UGHT ANTIAIR MARINE AIR TRAme MARINE WING MARINE AIRMISSILE BAnAUON CONTRIJ!. SQUADRON COMMUNICAnONS CONTROL SQUADRON(AAOC) IMUCS OETS) SQUADRON (TAOC'S) • ALTHOUGH NOT OftGANtc TO MACG, THE lAAM BAnAUON MAY I[PLACEDADMIJOSTRAnYD.Y AND/OR OPERATIONAUY LIE: UNDEit THE GROUP Figure 3. Marine Air Control Group. FMFM 5-5 each MAG. In larger task organizations, such as a Marine amphibious force (MAF), individual fighter/attack and attack groups may be formed for the economics gained by consolidating support activities. In smaller sized MAGTF's, such as a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB), the MAG may be configured to support a variety of aircraft types, although this may limit the duration of its operations. Essentially, the MAG provides the aircraft weapons systems which perform the majority of the combat in AAW. See FMFM 5-1 for a more detailed discussion of the organization of the MAG. There are several Marine squadrons with an active role in AAW. FMFM 5-l contains detailed information concerning their specific missions and tasks. • Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Air Control Group. The primary AAW role of H&HS, MACG is to provide the personnel for the TACC. The H&HS is found in all MACG's and only one TACC is found in each MAW. The TACC is the focal point for aviation command and control. The H&HS can deploy as an integral unit, given the designated augmentation from MWCS and Marine wing headquarters squadron (MWHS) personnel and equipment. • Marine Air Control Squadron. The primary mission of the MACS is to provide and maintain the personnel and equipment for the TAOC. In order to perform its assigned tasks, the MACS is capable of autonomous operation. This is necessary for two reasons. The first is that radar and communication characteristics will dictate the geographic positioning, determined by the most suitable, available terrain for radar and communication coverage. This terrain may or may not be in proximity to other agencies capable of providing administrative and maintenance support. Therefore, the MACS possesses organic capabilities to meet these requirements. The second reason relates to equipment. Most of the equipment found within the MACS is unique and highly complex. For this reason, it is not economical to distribute the maintenance assets throughout the normal Marine Corps maintenance system. Consolidation has been effected within each operational MACS which complements its "stand-alone" capabilities, and is more economical in conserving material and personnel resources. The number of MACS's varies among the MAW's. The number de ployed with any MAGTF would be dependent upon the extent of the operation. • Marine Wing Communication Squadron. The MWCS is primarily responsible for providing communication support/coordination for the MACCS. This squadron does not provide communications for the control of weapons and aircraft. It provides the interagency communications required to establish and maintain an integrated MACCS. It also performs other communication tasks to support the MAW headquarters and subordinate organizations. The significance to AAW is the support provided to link the TAOC, TACC, and the direct air support center (DASC) for air defense coordination and information exchange. • Marine Air Base Squadron (MABS). The detailed tasks of the MABS are presented in FMFM 5-l. The administrative and other ground support provided by this organization are extremely necessary to flight operations but are not unique to AAW. 2104. MARINE SQUADRONS FMFM 5-5 • Marine Air Traffic Confl"ol Squadron (MATCS). The MATCS, in its role of providingairfield terminal confl"ol facilities and services, significantly contributes to air defense.Approach confl"ol, ground confl"olled approach (GCA), and control tower agencies allprovide airspace confl"ol in the designated air fl"affic confl"ol area. This airspace confl"olis directly encompassed by the MACCS for aircraft identification and strip alert confl"ol purposes. The MATCS is a new concept designed to bring all of the air confl"olfacilities into theMACG. TheMATCS is composed ofseveral Marine air fl"affic conuoldetachments. These detachments can deploy as an integral unit, but they are depend ent upon the MATCS for adminisfl"ative, logistic, and some maintenance support. • Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron. The VMFA squadron is a major contributor to AAW in both offensive AAW and air defense. The squadron provides the aircraft,aircrew, and weapons to perform the air-to-air combat required to maintain airsuperiority. These squadrons can deploy as integral units, but they require outside assistance for logistic support. Their deployment requires external provisioning for airfield/carrier support, administration, and intermediate level avaition maintenance and supply. When deployed as part of a mixed aircraft MAG, fighter-peculiar maintenance, supply, and other support will have to be provided by the parent MAG. • Marine Attack Squadron. Detailed capabilities of the VMA/VMA(AW) squadrons arecontained in FMFM 5-1 and FMFM 5-4. These squadrons, along with VMFA's, pro.vide the ground attack requirements for offensive AAW. Additionally, VMA (AV-8)squadrons are tasked to conduct air defense operations within the capability of the Offensive AirSupport aircraft. ~ • Marine Aerial Refueler/Transport (VMGR) Squadron. The VMGR squadron is taskedto provide aerial refueling service in support of the Fleet Marine Force. In this manner, the VMGR squadrons can provide indirect support to units directly involved inantiair warfare. • Marine Tactical Reconnaissance (VMFP) Squadron. The VMFP squadron consists ofphotographic aircraft, ground handling equipment, and photographic processing devices. The specific tasks associated with antiair warfare are the conduct of day andnight photographic reconnaissance. The VMFP squadron is also tasked to provide aerial pre-and poststrike photography for poststrike assessments. • Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare (VMAQ) Squadron. The mission of a VMAQsquadron is to conduct aerial elecfl"onic reconnaissance and aerial elecfl"onic warfaremeasures (including elecfl"onic warfare support measures (ESM), elecfl"onic countermeasures, and electronic counter-countermeasures in support of Fleet Marine Forces.The main task associated with support of the antiair warfare effort is the conduct ofairborne electronic reconnaissance operations. 2105. Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion. Each Marine aircraft wing normally has one LAAM batBATTALIONS talion. It consists of a headquarters and service battery and three Hawk missile batteries. TheAND LAAM battalion is organized and equipped to provide air defense for an AAW vital area of a BATTERIES Marine landing force of division/wing size. Due to the operational interrelationship with theTAOC's, the battalion is placed under the command of the MACG. 12 FMFM 5-5 • The LAAM battalion is equipped with Hawk surface-to-air missiles, missile launchers, control centers, medium and low altitude acquisition radars, fire control radars, and equipment for the maintenance, transport, and loading of missiles. It is capable of third and fourth echelon maintenance on radars and other Hawk-peculiar equipment. This capability is centralized in the headquarters and service battery, similar to the centralization of intermediate aviation maintenance activity in an MAG. A less exten sive first and second echelon maintenance capability is organic to the firing batteries. Since the firing batteries are dependent upon the battalion for maintenance support of Hawk-peculiar items, this support must be deployed even to provide one battery to anMAGTF. • Each of the three missile batteries is normally displaced from the battalion to allow for the necessary dispersion of firing units. Each missile battery is capable of provid ing an assault fire unit (AFU) which consists of the essential components of a battery necessary to provide a minimum firing capability at an advanced site, or during the initial phases of an amphibious operation. Additionally, selected personnel organic to a LAAM battalion perform additional duty as Redeye gunners. These teams are designed to provide gap-filler or reinforcing services for the LAAM battalion. Forward Area Air Defense Battery. The FAAD battery is the primary unit within the MAW for close-in air defense in forward combat areas. It is organic to the MACG. When employed, it is task organized to provide air defense support for elements of the landing force in conjunction with an overall air defense plan. One battery is considered adequate to support an MAF. The battery consists of a battery headquarters, service platoon, and five FAAD platoons. Because of the structure of the FAAD battery, it can deploy as an entity or as smaller detachments depending upon the size of the MAGTF. Because of its capability for forward area defense, FAAD battery elements could be placed with fire and maneuver units. This would allow Marine amphibious unit (MAU) size MAGTF's to possess organic air defense capability. Control of FAAD elements will remain afloat, but FAAD elements may be deployed ashore. Since platoons/sections deploy separately and are dispersed to support maneuver elements, FAAD units must often rely on the supported unit for logistic support and physical security. This can also apply to FAAD units assigned in direct support. 13 FMFM 5-5 Section II MARINE AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 2201. The ranges, speeds, and types of aircraft employed in an amphibious operation require that GENERAL their control be directed from a high command level. The control of aircraft is in greater detail and covers a much greater area than any other type of military control. The speeds and distances involved preclude a commander from subdividing an extensive area into small zones of action and exercising control of air operations through a number of subordinate commanders,as in the case of ground operations. High speed aircraft cross a regimental or battalion zone of action in a matter of seconds. Because of these factors and the requirement for immediate in·flight response to directives and orders in air operations, it is necessary for the controlling commander to deal directly with individual flights of aircraft through a centralized control system.For example, a situation may develop in which an aircraft airborne on a prebriefed attack mission must be diverted to engage a newly discovered target threatening the landing force. Timewould not permit the changes in orders to be transmitted through the MAG commander, eventhough the aircraft are organic to the MAG. Thus, coordination and control of air operationsover a relatively broad area by a single commander is necessary. This single commander, whoexercises air control, uses an air control system which acts for him in the actual control of aircraft. All aircraft operating in the objective area, however, are not controlled from a singlelocation. The air control system has subagencies, all of which exercise detailed control of air craft to assist the commander. The Marine air command and control system permits centralized coordination and supervision of air operations at the highest level, but also has the flexibility topermit decentralization of control authority to subordinate control agencies. The primary role of antiair warfare in amphibious operations is to ensure that the degree of air superiority required for a successful operation is achieved and maintained. To accomplish this task, variousagencies or combinations thereof are employed. In strictly amphibious operations, the Marine air command and control system AAW agencies are employed in conjunction with U.S. NavyAAW agencies. When the amphibious objective area (AOA) is dissolved, or in subsequent phasesof joint military operations, Marine air command and control systems AAW agencies are employed with U.S. Air Force AAW agencies. 2202. ControL This aspect of Marine aviation is crucial since it integrates all aircraft activity into aCONTROL OF single, coordinated system. It provides for the exercise of authority over, and direction of, airAIRCRAFT support elements during the conduct of operations. Through the MACCS, control is exercisedAND MISSILES to perform the following for all aviation functions: • Airspace and air traffic control. • Employment of aviation assets and weapon systems. • Selection, coordination, and integration of the agencies of the MACCS for the execution of all Marine aviation functions. 14 FMFM 5-5 Command Relationships. The characteristics of aircraft are such that a functional, rather than organizational, approach is required for their control. Organizational integrity is maintained in the staff process by providing for the influence of commanders in their tasking of subordinate units and personnel. Once aircraft assignments are completed, authority for mission execution rests with the functional control agency. The MACCS has been designed to furnish control over the tactical functions of Marine avaition. Overall supervision and responsibility for air direction, control, and operational management of air resources are assigned to the TACC or the TADC as appropriate. In addition to providing the MAGTF commander with a means by which to super· vise his aviation assets, the TACC/TADC also acts as his primary point of contact for coordina· tion with forces external to his MAGTF. The MACCS contains two primary subordinate control agencies-the TAOC and the DASC. The agency responsible for the conduct of air defense oper· ations is the TAOC, while the agency responsible for the control of air support operations is the DASC. Branching out from air defense and air support are more specialized agencies inovlved in the control process. The MACCS provides the command and control facilities required to prosecute the air war with· 2203. in the AOA. It includes agencies for air support, air traffic control, and air defense. The air de· MACCS fense or AAW agencies include the TAOC, the AAOC, and the battery control centers (BCC's) AAWAGENCIES and platoon command posts (PCP's) of the Hawk firing batteries which are linked to the TAOC and/or the antiaircraft operations center (AAOC) by the missile battery data link (MBDL). Also included are the FAAD teams of the FAAD battery and four additional duty FAAD teams of each LAAM battalion. A detailed description of these agencies and the tasks performed is contained in FMFM 5-l. The tactical air control cente; is the primary air control agency for the commander amphibious 2204. task force (CATF) from which all AAW means are controlled during the task force's movement U.S. NAVY to, and arrival at, the AOA. Command relationships during the phasing of air control ashore AAWAGENCIES vary with the tactical situation. When the MACCS is established ashore, a tactical digital infor mation link (TADIL A)/link 11 data link is established between MACCS AAW agencies and the tactical air control center afloat. Then, at a time mutually established by CATF and command· er landing force (CLF), control of AAW function is passed ashore. The CLF exercises overall control through his tactical command center. At this time, the tactical air control center (afloat) reverts to a tactical air direction center and functions in a monitoring capacity ready to resume control if required. a. The U.S. Air Force tactical air control squadron (TACS) contains the tactical air control 2205. center which coordinates the employment of tactical air operations within the assigned area of U.S. AIR FORCE responsibility. As such, the tactical air control center operates on the U.S. Air Force concept AAW AGENCIES of centralized control of the tactical air effort. Decentralized responsibility for execution of necessary air functions is accomplished through the control and reporting center/control and 15 FMFM 5-5 reporting post (CRC/CRP). Liaison elements from other Services or forces are located at the tactical air control center to facilitate direction of air-ground operations. Within this context,Marine Corps representation is normally provided to accomplish the necessary liaison and coor dination of Marine Corps operations. The MACCS maintains a communcation interface with the TACS to ensure that information necessary for the overall coordination and integration ofairspace requirements is available to the TACS. (1) Control and Reporting Center/Control and ReportingPost. The CRC, an operationalelement directly under the tactical air control center, contains the primary control radarsof the TACS and supervises the activities of subordinate radar elements. The CRC collects information on all air activities within radar range using organic and subordinateelement equipment Within its assigned area of responsibility, the CRC provides offensiveand defensive mission control, navigation and air rescue assistance, threat warning forfriendly aircraft, and the means for air traffic regulation and identification. The CRP is asubordinate element of the CRC and provides radar control and surveillance within anassigned area of responsibility. It is capable of assuming CRC functions in an emergency. One or more CRP's may be used, as required by area size, terrain conditions, and antici pated level of operations. • Army aviation control agencies, due to a lack of organic radars, are unable toprovide positive radar control for their aircraft Therefore, they are closelyconnected with the CRC, either by collocation or electronic means, so they areable to provide the responsible air defense agency with identification information concerning Army aircraft. • During joint operations, the MACCS will need to coordinate with adjacentCRC's to ensure continuity of effort and overall area management Normally,both the Marine TADC and the TAOC will provide this coordination capabilitywith the majority of coordination found in whichever agency is most suitedfor the required responsiveness; e.g., real time, near real time. Radar coveragewill determine the surveillance information exchange requirements betweensatellite radar sites subordinate to the CRC and TAOC; however, the meaningful level of coordination will be at the CRC-TAOC level (2) Forward Air Control Post (FACP). The FACP is a lightweight, highly mobile radarsurveillance and control facility, subordinate to a CRC or CRP, that is used to extend radar coverage and provide early warning. It conducts surveillance and tactical controlwithin the forward combat area, and it conducts handovers of aircraft to forward aircontrollers or air support radar teams (ASRT's). Additionally, the FACP provides a limited capability for intercept, airspace control, and support for other special missions asrequired. b. During joint operations, the AAW agencies of the MACCS are capable of digitally linking with U.S. Air Force AAW agencies over TADIL B in order to exchange, on a real time basis, airtrack information. 16 FMFM 5-5 Section III EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS In AAW, as in all other military elements during the amphibious assault, the capabilities and 2301.GENERAL limitations of equipment and systems influence tactical decisions. This section describes aircraft, weapons, and ground support equipment and systems as they apply to AAW.Some of the equipment and systems are used in areas other than AAW. Such application will not he addressed in this text; therefore, reference to the appropriate FMFM 5-series manual is required for information regarding application in other functional areas. 2302. Successful accomplishment of AAW requires that the total capability of the landing force he merged into a single, flexible AAW system capable of operating independently or as an integral SYSTEM part of the overall amphibious task force AAW system. The AAW system integrates all availREQUIREMENTS able AAW assets and requires that the functions of surveillance and control, and the destruction of the enemy offensive weapons systems, he performed. a. Integrated Means. The AAW system in the objective area employs all means, regardless of Service component, to achieve maximum protection. These AAW means are integrated into a single system that offers improved control, timely intelligence, and effective employment of resources by accomplishing the following: • Exploiting the capabilities of each subsystem. • Integrating AAW early warning, command, and control capabilities. • Timely exchange of information on friendly and enemy aircraft. • Achieving economy in use of weapon systems. • Achieving maximum destruction of mass raids. h. Surveillance. An effective AAW system requires the capabilities to detect, locate, and identify hostile targets on the ground and in the air. This surveillance system must have com munications for transmitting acquired information to a control agency. The method of surveil lance may he electronic, photo, infrared radiation, or visual techniques. Operational character istics of AAW surveillance equipment should provide long-range detection and identification at all altitudes for early warning. The surveillance system must also provide accurate range, hear ing, and altitude discrimination for weapons control and the ability to observe and identify ground targets. The landing force surveillance system must also he compact and lightweight and possess the mobility that will ensure ease of handling for amphibious operations. c. Control. The command and control system is the means through which the commander controls and coordinates the variety of AAW systems involved in the detection, interception, 17 and destruction of hostile targets. The efficient integration and coordination of the surveillanceand destructive means is the key to making the system effective. Further, the command and control system should provide the means to maintain positive control over friendly air supportoperations in an antiaircraft missile environment in order to prevent mutual interference in theaccomplishment of missions. d. Weapons Systems Considerations. Weapons systems are the means to destroy or reduce theeffectiveness of hostile air attacks. Fighter and attack aircraft are the primary and longest range AAW weapons. The secondary and shorterrange defensive weapons system is the SAM employedby the LAAM battalions. Antiaircraft guns of the Navy contribute a degree of air defense againstvery low-altitude aircraft attacks, as well as close-in protection for the amphibious task force(ATF), just as the Redeye/Stinger missile provides this protection to the landing force ashore. All AAWweapons and related systems should possess the following capabilities: (1) Flexibility. Flexibility is necessary to permit land and shipboard control agencies to cope with rapidly changing tactical situations and, particularly, to ensure uninterruptedoperations during the ship-to-shore movement. The landing force AAW system requiresthe flexibility of operating by itself or integrating into the ATF system or a much broadersystem under a unified or area commander. (2) Mobility. AAW means should he installed and operating in a relatively short time.The situation will often require a displacement. This subjects the AAWsystem to handling and transportation problems. The system should he extremely mobile and portable in order to he transported by the various means used in the ship-to-shore and cross-countrymovements, including helicopters. (3) Collection and Dissemination of Information. The, landing force AAW system should he able to handle a large number of air contacts (friendly and enemy) through ahigh-speed data processing system. This requirement increases in importance whenever: • Friendly forces on the offensive require large numbers of air support aircraftin the objective area. • An enlarging AAW area increases the number of air contacts that will he detected. • The enemy possesses the capability for launching mass air attacks. (4) Electronic Countermeasures Environment. The enemy can he expected to employelectronic jamming and interference in an attempt to make the AAW system ineffective.In order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy ECM, the AAW system should he capableof operating effectively with the capabilities of its equipment degraded by enemy ECMand/or possess an alternate capability not then substantially degraded by the ECM. FMFM 5-5 (5) All-Weather Operations. The AAW system is required to operate under all condi tions of weather and visibility. This may necessitate a compromise in some types of equipment in order to provide a design to cover the spectrum of climatic conditions. Units and personnel improve their proficiency and maintain their all-weather capability of operation by participating in periodic exercises under varying climatic and environ mental conditions. There are several types of aircraft utilized in antiair warfare. These include airborne early warn2303. ing aircraft (AEW), fighter/interceptor aircraft, fighter/attack aircraft, and various attack AIRCRAFT/ aircraft. The airborne early warning and fighter/interceptor aircraft are not organic to Marine AIR-TO-AIR aviation, but are organic to Navy aviation and are tasked to provide antiair warfare support to WEAPONS the fleet. During an amphibious operation, these aircraft will interface with the Marine air com mand and control system and are, therefore, described in this manual. a. Airborne Early Warning Aircraft. The E-2 Hawkeye is a carrierbome early warning aircraft It was produced in three models-E-2A, E-2B, and E-2C. The E-2A aircraft has been retrofitted to update all operational aircraft to the E-2B standard. The aircraft has a crew of five consisting of pilot, copilot, combat information center officer, air control officer, and radar operator. The E-2 has a maximum speed of 325 knots and a cruising speed of 270 knots. The E-2A/B has a limited capability in a land-clutter environment. The E-2C utilizes an advanced radar, capable of detecting airborne targets in a land-clutter environment, and has a carrier airhome inertial navigation system. E-2 aircraft are able to maintain patrols on naval task force defense perimeters in an all-weather environment, and are capable of detecting and assessing any threat from approaching enemy aircraft The nerve center of the intercept-control system is the ATDS, consisting of the autodetection radar, airborne computers, memory, and data link system. ATDS is linked with the NTDS, which processes, organizes, and displays information obtained from the aircraft, submarines, and land and ship-based radar to provide an overall picture of the tactical situation. The automatic ATDS is monitored by the E-2 crew, who can be assigned responsibility for controlling carrier orland-based fighters by the TACC. The ATDS E-2 aircraft can also link with the Marine TAOC/TACC. b. Attack Aircraft. Attack aircraft range from light to medium all-weather bombers. Light FMFM 5-l, attack aircraft organic to the amphibious task force are the A-4, A-7, and AV -8, while the A-6 provides the medium attack, all-weather capability. Attack aircraft are the most suitable means ~ available for attacking AAW targets beyond the force beachhead (FBH). Such missions are pre planned in order to permit detailed planning, coordination, selection of the most suitable type FMFM 5-4, of aircraft ordnance, and economy in aircraft utilization. A detailed discussion of Marine aviaOffensive Air Support tion attack aircraft is contained in FMFM 5-1 and FMFM 5-4. ~ c. Fighter and Strike Fighter/Attack Aircraft. Fighter aircraft organic to the ATF are versions of the F-4 and F -14. These aircraft are primarily designed to fulfill the air defense requirement 19 of antiair warfare. The F-14 aircraft is organic to Navy aviation while the F4 aircraft is organic to both Marine and Navy aviation. The F / A-18 strike fighter will become operational in theearly 1980's and will he capable of performing both fighter and light attack missions. (1) F-14 Tomcat. The F-14 is a supersonic, two.j)eat, twin-engine, jet-propelled, allweather fighter interceptor. It is designed to fulfill AAW missions including fighter escort/sweep and air defense of the ATF via combat air patrol and deck-launched intercept operations. The F-14 is a high performance aircraft able to fulfill both air combatmaneuvering and air defense roles, while offering advantages with other current fighter aircraft. Armament includes a 20mm, multiharrel, air-to-air gun. The aircraft is also capable of being armed with a mixture of eight Phoenix, Sparrow, and Sidewinder airto-air missiles. The aircraft has a track while scan (TWS) radar capability against up to24 targets and can engage 6 targets simultaneously employing the Phoenix missile. Theaircraft is also fully data link equipped and integrated into the Navy and Marine Corpstactical data systems. (2) F-4 Phantom II. The F4 was developed as a twin-engine, two~at, long-range, allweather fighter/attack aircraft. The F4 was designed to fulfill AAW missions, hut alsohas a significant capability for offensive air support. The F4 can carry up to six Sparrowor four Sparrow and four Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The aircraft is also capable ofcarrying alternative loads of up to 16,000 pounds of conventional bombs and missileson five external attachments. It is also capable of carrying up to three external fuel stores totalling over 1,300 gallons. This external fuel capability extends the combatradius, hut reduces the ordnance capability of the aircraft. The two models of the aircraft currently in the Navy and Marine Corps aviation inventory are the F4] and F4N.The F4] aircraft possesses a pulse-doppler radar with increased overland lookdowncapability. The F4N is an updated F4B model aircraft with a pulse radar. Both aircraft have received a service life extension and improved avionics and weapon systemchanges. The F4] 'will also he updated with an improved radar and improved maneuverability for air defense. When completed, F4] aircraft will he redesignated F4S. Both theF4N and F4] are capable of receiving data link inputs hut do not have the two-waydata link capability of the F-14. The aircraft can, however, utilize TADIC C (link 4A). (3) F/A-18 Hornet. The F/A-18 is being developed as a twin-engine, single-seat, longrange, all-weather fighter/attack aircraft. The F/A-18 is designed to fulfill AAW missions and for offensiv~ air support it can he equipped with three 315-gallon external fuel tanks for extended range. The F/A-18 has a wide variety of armament. Air-to-air armament includes: • Two AIM-7F Sparrows • Two AIM-9L Sidewinders • 570 rounds 20mm,ammunition • Plus outboard pylons with two AIM-7F Sparrows or four AIM-9L Sidewinders FMFM S-5 Air-to-ground ammunition includes: • Air-to-surface missiles • Guided bombs • Conventional bombs • Cluster weapons • Rockets The F / A-18 possesses an AN/ APG~S radar which offers a full spectrum of air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. With air-to-air features that include TWS and three optional air combat maneuvering modes, the system is designed for all-altitude, all-aspect radar coverage. In the attack arena, the radar provides the pilot with a high resolution map ping capability as well as a complete set of modes for the successful delivery of a variety of ordnance against fixed and moving targets on both land and sea, in good weather or under conditions of low visibility. d. Air-to-Air Missiles. Air-to-air missiles have significantly increased the range for engaging enemy aircraft. This extension in firing ranges provides interceptors more opportunity for engagement and offers less exposure time to hostile aircraft. A significant factor for employment of the various missiles has been the requirement for visual identification by friendly interceptors prior to missile firing. This requirement has somewhat reduced the capabilities of current air-toair missiles and resulted in various missile modifications to enhance close-in capability in an air combat maneuvering (ACM) environment. The weapons available to the ATF are the Phoenix, Sparrow, and Sidewinder. (1) AIM-54 Phoenix. The Phoenix is carried on the F-14 and is designed for long range interception. It is a semiactive, radar homing, air-to-air missile. The F-14's weapons control system must lock on an enemy target prior to missile launch. After launch, the missile can then tak~ over and complete the intercept to the target. This allows the F-14 to maneuver to engage other targets or to conduct another attack against that target. The missile and F-14 fire control systems provide the capability for simultaneous launch of up to six missiles. The long-range, high power pulse doppler radar provides lookdown capabilities that enable identification of moving targets in ground clutter at long ranges. The fire control system can operate in a lookdown track while the scan mode is keeping up to six Phoenix missiles on course and searching for other targets. (2) AIM-7 Sparrow. The Sparrow is a radar semiactive homing, all-weather, all-altitude, air-to-air missile designed for carriag«JTby the F-4, F-14, and F/ A-18. The Sparrow requires the aircraft weapon system to be locked on an enemy target during missile inter cept. After launch, the Sparrow can then lockon to the target and complete the intercept. The Sparrow has been significantly improved to provide better maneuverability and to improve its close-in, air combat maneuvering capability. While the Sparrow's range and lookdown capability are inferior to that of the Phoenix missile, it does have a much greater capability in an ACM environment. 21 FMFM 5-5 (3) AIM-9 Sidewinder. The Sidewinder is an infrared radiation homing missile. It is the only heat seeking air-to-air missile available to Navy and Marine aviation. It can becarried on the F-4, F-14, and F /A-18 aircraft, and although not mission required, it canalso be carried by all attack aircraft for close-in defense. The Sidewinder is one of the simplest and cheapest guided missiles produced. The Sidewinder requires closer proximity to the target for successful intercept. The Sidewinder is a complimentary asset whenused in conjunction with the longer range radar air-to-air missiles, like the Phoenix and Sparrow. The capability of the Sidewinder has been continually improved, particularlyin the area of air combat maneuvering. The latest version has an "all aspect" capabilityand can now be employed from virtually any angle in an ACM environment e. Air-to-Air Guns. With the advent of the air-to-air missile, the reliance on the air-to-air gun as an air combat weapon decreased markedly. Increased performance characteristics madeemployment of the air-to-air gun more difficult. Airborne weapons systems were also improved,providing for the attacking of targets well beyond gunnery range. The F-4 was designed as aninterceptor and, therefore, was not equipped with an internal air-to-air gun. It was found, however, that the air-to-air guns were still a significant weapon for air-to-air warfare. Throughoutthe Southeast Asia conflict, friendly aircraft were required to visually identify enemy aircraftprior to weapons employment These rules of engagement tended to nullify the long-rangecapability of air-to-air missiles and often resulted in visual identification inside the minimumeffective range of the air-to-air missiles. The result was a degraded probability of kill (PK) forfriendly fighter aircraft. During the Middle East conflict, large-scale air battles were fought in a visual environment Once again, air-to-air missiles produced disappointing PK while air-to-air guns achievedan exceptionally high PK. These factors have resulted in a reassessment of air-to-air gun capa bility. With the advent of radar ranging and a "heads up display" with a lead computinggunsight, air-to-air guns have become a potent weapon in the ACM environment. This, in conjunction with the improved close-in capability of the Sparrow and Sidewinder, has improvedthe AAW aircraft capability in an ACM environment, without degrading the long-range capability of the interceptor. 2304. Due to the limited amount of unclassified material on Hawk in Navy/Marine Corps publicaHAWK tions, a detailed description of the Hawk missile system is provided in this paragraph.AIR-DEFENSE GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM a. History and Development. The basic Hawk system provided air defense for the MarineCorps against enemy air attack. However, since its deployment, new aircraft and aeroweaponstechnology has led to the development of very high-speed aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles.Possible attack by an enemy with these advanced weapons implied the need for a more sophisticated air defense guided missile system. Therefore, the basic Hawk system was modified toincrease the system's electronic counter-countermeasures, target acquisition, identification,and engagement capabilities. The following criteria were established for improving the capabilities of the basic Hawk system: 22 FMFM 5-5 • Extend the target speed handling capacity. • Decrease system reaction time from acquisition to firing a missile. • Increase target evaluation and assignment capabilities. • Provide greater ECCM capabilities. • Increase in-flight reliability and lethality of the missile. • Improve system maintainability and reduce logistic support burden. The development of the improved Hawk system was based on the criteria above, using the basic Hawk as a starting point. The improved Hawk system uses continuous wave (CW) radar techniques, automatic data processing equipment which automatically processes targets, advanced ECCM techniques, and the certified round missile. Also, the improved Hawk system has built-in test equipment (BITE) for more effective maintenance. No missile testing is required at the orgnizational or support levels. b. Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion. The LAAM battalion (see fig. 4) is organized and equipped to provide surface-to-air missile defense of assigned areas of operation, or installation and vital zones, against hostile low and medium altitude air attacks. LIGHT ANTIAIRCRAn MISSILE BATTALION 34 OFF/550 ENL -MISSILE FIRING HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE r-BATTERY BATTERY 5 OFF/91 ENL 19 OFF/277 ENL I Figure 4. Subordinate Batteries of the Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion. (1) Headquarters and Service (H&S) Battery. The H&S battery (see fig. 5) of the LAAM battalion is organized and equipped to provide command, control, supply, and logistic support of three light antiaircraft missile batteries employed as a battalion in either an integrated air defense system or in an independent battalion operation. Its tasks are as follows: • Provide for battalion operation as the mobile surface-to-air missile component of the antiair warfare system of the MAW, to include the capability of rapid deployment ashore in an amphibious operation with integral command, control, and logistic support of subordinate missile batteries. FMFM 5-5 HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BAntRY 20 OFF/288 ENL 1 OFF/65 ENL HAWK MAINTENANCE BATTERY HEADQUARTERS ENGINEEit PUTOON AtlnAIRCRAn OPRAnGNS PUTOGN PUT1811 OFF/28 ENL 2 OFF/20 ENL 1 OFF/37 ElL 0 OFF/10 ENL Figure 5. Headquarters and Service Battery, LAAM Battalion. • Plan and coordinate requirements for liaison and communications with apprQpriate commands to ensure the integration of surface-tQ-air missile operationswith other air, ground, and AAW operations of the Marine Corps and Navy. • Provide for the temporary separate deployment of subordinate missile batteries to meet special tactical situations, with such personnel augmentationand logistic support as required. • Plan for the helicopter transport of essential equipments of the missile batteries and supporting elements. • Plan for the fixed-wing air support of all or any portion of the subordinatemissile batteries and supporting elements. • Plan and coordinate requirements with appropriate commands for the localsecurity of all deployed missile batteries and supporting elements. • Conduct, supervise, and coordinate such individual and unit training as isrequired to qualify missile batteries and supporting elements for tacticaldeployment and combat operations. • Provide the following levels of maintenance: •• Third and fourth echelon field maintenance of surveillance radar,fire distribution, and Hawk: peculiar equipment •• Third echelon field maintenance of communication, engineer, andmotor transport equipments. •• First and second echelon'. organizational maintenance of all otherassigned equipments. • Be capable of organic supply. 24 FMFM 5-5 • Provide organizational maintenance of all authorized H&S battery equipment and provide field maintenance on all Hawk systems, surveillance radar, communication, fire distribution, engineer, and motor transport equipments within the LAAM battalion. • Provide sufficient motor transportation to displace the essential fire control elements of one missile battery and the essential operation elements of H&S battery simultaneously, and to sustain missile supply for three missile batteries. • Be capable of providing medical services to include emergency treatment, operation of a battalion aid station, evacuation of casualties, and supervision of sanitation. MISSILE BATTERY .-----!SUPPORT PLATOON!----, Figure 6. Missile Battery, LAAM Battalion. (2) Missile Battery. The missile batteries (see fig. 6) of the LAAM battalion are equipped and organized to provide surface-to-air missile fires in defense of assigned areas of operation, or installations and vital zones therein, against hostile low and medium altitude air attacks. Their tasks are as follows: • Maintain a primary capability of operating as a firing battery of a LAAM bat talion which is employed either in an integrated air defense system or as an independent battalion. • Be capable of deployment as a separate battery in special tactical situations, or in an assault fire mode of operation, with such personnel augmentation and logistic support as may be required from the parent H&S battery. • Maintain an autonomous capability to detect, identify, and evaluate threat aircraft, and to receive, assemble, test, load, and fire Hawk missiles in engagement thereof. • Be capable of rapid deployment ashore in an amphibious operation, to include helicopter transport of essential equipment when required. FMFM 5-5 • Be capable of fixed-wing air transport when required. • Be capable of rapid displacement overland with motor transport augmentation from the parent H&S battery. • Plan and coordinate requirements for local security against ground and air attacks. • Conduct such individual and unit training as required to qualify the battery for tactical deployment and combat operations. • Provide levels of maintenance as follows: •• Through first and second echelon organizational maintenance of fire distribution and Hawk peculiar equipments, including missiles. •• Through first echelon organizational maintenance of all other assigned equipments, including motor transport. c. Hawk System Organization. The Hawk system is normally deployed as a complete battery. In order to provide even greater mobility and to increase the defense capability of the Hawk system, the battery can be divided into two other major configurations-the assault fire unit and the Hawk battery (minus). The AFU is a small compact firing unit which comprises a Hawk battery firing section and the platoon command post The remaining major items of the battery make up the Hawk battery (minus). (See fig. 7.) (1) Hawk Battery. The Hawk system is divided into four functional groups: • Acquisiton and Fire Control Group. The acqusition data required for target detection, identification, and evaluation is provided by the volume-coverage pulse acquisiton radar (PAR) and the horizon-searching continuous-wave acquisition radar (CWAR). The tactical control of the battery and the control of each firing section is directed from the battery control center. The informa tion coordination central (ICC) contains identification friend or foe (IFF) equipment, communications, and automatic data processing (ADP) equipment The range-only radar (ROR) provides target range information in certain electronic countermeasure environments. • Guidance Group. The high-powered illuminator radar (HIPIR) acquires, tracks, and illuminates the assigned target, and provides a reference signal for the improved Hawk missile. • Launching and Handling Group. The Hawk battery comprises 2 firing sections, each section consisting of 1 HIPIR, 1 launching section control box (LSCB), 3 launchers, and 18 missiles. The LSCB connects the HIPIR with the three launchers. The designated launcher activates, aims, and launches the missile at the optimum position for target intercept. The loader-transporter is used for missile handling and rapid reloading of the launchers. Handling equipment includes 12 pallets for storage of additional missiles. BATIERY (-) ASSAULT FIRE UNIT ~ INFORMATION COORDINATION CENTRAL PULSE ACQUISITION ~·.:·,: RADAR . · ... , ~ I . Jt RANGE ONLY RADAR BATIERY CONTROL CENTRAL HIGH POWER ILLUMINATOR .- _f_ _f_ _f '-.:1 3:: LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES '-.:1 3:: b:· t.:> -..) Figure 7. Hawk System Organization. FMFM 5-5 TM 9-1425-525-12-1, Emplacement ofImproved Hawk Air Defense Guided Missile • Test Equipment Group. A minimum of organizational maintenance equipment and field maintenance equipment is required, since the ground equipment contains built-in test equipment, and the improved Hawk missile is a certified round which requires no field test or maintenance. The field maintenance equipment that is required is incorporated in a mobile configuration for maximum flexibility. Seven 45-kilowatt or 60-kilowatt engine-driven generators supply power to the entire battery. (2) Assault Fire Unit. The AFU consists of one Hawk battery firing section connected into the PCP, with a CWAR providing the low altitude volume coverage. The HIPIR provides target illumination and tracking information and may be employed in special search modes to supplement the CWAR's coverage and provide limited medium-to-high altitude coverage in designated sectors. The LSCB connects the HIPIR to the three launchers with nine missiles. The handling equipment includes a loader-transporter and six missile pallets. The AFU interconnecting group and three 45-kilowatt or 60-kilowatt engine-driven generators are used to interconnect and supply power to the AFU. (3) Hawk Battery (Minus). The battery (minus) comprises those major items of the Hawk batteries which are not deployed with the AFU. The battery (minus) is used primarily for medium altitude targets with the PAR supplying acquisition information to the ICC and the BCC. The HIPIR may be used to provide acquisition information of low altitude targets. The LSCB connects the HIPIR to the three launchers with nine missiles. The battery (minus) handling equipment is the same as that used with the AFU. d. Tactical Considerations (l) System Mobility. Since the Hawk system functions primarily to protect the MAGTF in combat areas, transportability is a major consideration. Therefore, all major items of the system are transportable by cargo truck, aircraft, or ship. • Cargo Truck Transportation. Type M35 and M36 vehicles tow and/or transport the major items and additional equipment of the battery. • Aircraft Transportation. Helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft can transport the major items and additional equipment of the system. Special preparation procedures for helicopter travel are given for the major items in Department of the Army TM 9-1425-525-12-l. • Ship Transportation. Naval or Military Sealift Command (MSC) shipping can transport all Hawk equipment. (2) Site Selection and Evaluation. The basic configurations of the Hawk system must be deployed in a manner which provides for maximum possible exploitation of system capabilities in the prevailing terrain and tactical situation. Hawk deployment process involves: • The reconnaissance/selection of firing position and approach route thereto. • The coordinated movement of the unit to the firing position. • The emplacement and interconnection of system components within the position. • The orientation and alinement of major items for fire control purposes. • The preparation and checkout of the system for firing. (a) Reconooissance/Selection of Firing Positions. The theoretical objective of of Hawk reconnaissance-selection of the "optimum" location for the unit configuration involved-must be pursued but is seldom achieved. Such an ·"optimum" location may not exist in the prevailing terrain, may be inaccessible by the reconnaissance party and/or the unit, or may not become apparent during the time afforded for reconnaissance. Usually, the firing position selected represents the best compromise between a number of governing tactical and technical consider· ations. (b) Site Characteristics. Consideration should be given to the following optimum characteristics in the selection of a suitable firing site for a Hawk battery: • An elevated site should be selected to minimize radar masking by surrounding terrain. • Accessibility to the site should be such that even if the fire unit is helicopter-lifted to a position, the supportability does not depend on helicopters entirely, but on organic battalion truck transportation. . • Slope and vegetation should not require extensive engineer support for leveling of the surface or removal of tree masking. Additionally, line of sight is required between specific items of equipment and the maximum slope on which equipment may be emplaced is 10 degrees. • Equipment separation should be maximized within the 114-meter inter connecting data cable length. This lessens the density that the firing unit presents as a target, and minimizes the cross-radar and generator frequency interference. A good site would be approximately 400x290 meters for a full battery and 333xl80 meters for an AFU. (3) Operatioool Considerations (a) Enemy Force Capabilities. The performance characteristics of enemy aircraft represent a technical challenge which the Hawk system has been designed to defeat. Enemy force capabilities, on the other hand, are a tactical challenge which impacts upon the number and type of Hawk units required and the manner in which they are deployed. Enemy ground force as well as air force capabilities must FMFM 5-5 FMFM 5-5 be considered, since Hawk units are vulnerable to ground attack while in position and to ambush and mining tactics while on the move. The assessment of combined enemy capabilities raises deployment considerations which may conflict. For example, an air capability which is not extensive may permit the concentration of Hawk units at the most vital of assets and the use of position areas which inherently provide excellent mutual fire support and local security. Conversely, an extensive enemy air capability may force consideration of the extensive dispersion of Hawk units to cover all forces and assets, which in turn will force consideration of the resultant reduction in mutual fire support and vulnerability of remote units of both air and ground attack. All of the considerations and conflicts imposed by enemy force capabilities must be weighed and resolved at battalion or higher levels. (b) Unit Mission. The specific mission of a Hawk unit is paramount and will essentially dictate the general area in which reconnaissance must be conducted This general area may be relatively small if the unit is involved in the defense of an air base or other specific vi tal complex, or relatively large if the unit is involved in an MAF area defense. In any event, the batteries and platoons of the LAAM battalion must position themselves to accomplish their assigned purpose-the defense of operational forces and related vital assets as defined by higher echelon. (c) Unit Configuration. The configuration of a Hawk unit is mission-oriented and and must be considered in terms of its impact on such technical matters as terrain masking (i.e., battery (minus) has no CWAR, AFU has no PAR), local clutter (CWAR versus PAR), and equipment spacing requirements, and tactical requirements such as firepower, mutual support, mobility, and local security. (d) Mutual Fire Support. Mutual fire support between batteries and platoons is highly desirable and should be utilized whenever the terrain and tactical situation permit. Its utilization will serve to fully utilize battalion level fire support coordination capabilities, increase firepower levels achievable against saturation raids, and enhance the probability of survival of the individual batteries and platoons. However, it must be noted that the missions assigned to the battalion and its subordinate units remain paramount and may frequently override the advantages of mutual support. e. Equipment Description. The following discussion provides functional descriptions of the major items of Hawk equipment. Physical characteristics data is outlined in appendix F. (I) Acquisition and Fire Control Group. The major items of Hawk equipment that make up this functional group are as follows: (a) Pulse Acquisition Radar, AN/MPQ-50. The PAR is the high and medium altitude search radar. It provides detection at distances which allow Hawk to engage fast flying tactical threat aircraft. This radar incorporates such features as a moving target indicator (MTI), staggered pulse video integration, and ECCM receivers. FMFM 5-5 The PAR's D-band frequency was chosen for optimized performance in an allweather environment The radio frequency (RF) pulses are generated by a stabilitron which is a very stable high power oscillator with characteristics particularly well suited for MTI. The MTI circuitry differentiates between return signals from fixed objectives (clutter) and moving targets. The signals received from moving targets are sent on to the displays and the clutter is rejected. Video integration is a PAR feature which improves target detection in the normal (non-MTI) mode. Video integration allows the target on the plan position indicator (PPI) to appear brighter than the background signals by means of delaying, comparing, and reinforcing the regularly recurring target returns. The PAR includes several advanced ECCM receiver designs for capability against specific types of jammers. (b) Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar, AN/MPQ-48. Aircraft detection at the lowest altitudes in the presence of heavy clutter is the primary feature of the CWAR. The CWAR and PAR are synchronized in azimuth for ease of target data correlation. Other features include frequency modulation (FM) ranging, BITE, and J-band frequencies. FM is applied on alternate scans of the CWAR antenna tp obtain target range information. During the CW scan, range rate is obtained. On the FM/CW scan, range rate minus range is obtained. The ADP in the ICC processes this information to derive target range and range rate. This feature provides the necessary data for threat ordering of low altitude targets detected by the CWAR. (c) Range Only Radar (ROR), AN/MPQ-51. The ROR establishes the range to a target when an HIPIR is unable to obtain this information because of certain enemy countermeasures. During a tactical engagement, the radar may be called upon automatically by an HIPIR or put into operation manually by the fire control operator. The features of the AN/MPQ-51 include operation at a separate J-band frequency, and a quick response time. When the radar is energized and not in use, the RF power is dissipated in a dummy load. Upon receiving a transit command, the RF energy is immediately switched to the antenna. (d) Battery Control Central, AN/TSW-8. The BCC provides the facilities for the man-to-machine interface. The tactical control officer (TCO) is in command of all BCC operations and maintains tactical control over all engagement sequences. The TCO monitors all functions and has the authority and facilities to preempt any engagement or to change established priorities. The tactical control assistant assists the TCO in detection, identification, evaluation, and coordination with higher commands. The tactical control console gives these two operators the necessary target and battery status information and controls required. The azimuth-speed operator has the sole mission of earliest possible detection of low altitude targets. The azimuth-speed indicator console, a separate radar B-scope display, provides CWAR target data for this purpose. Targets selected for manual engagement are assigned to one of two fire control operators. Each operator uses the fire control console display and controls for rapid IDPIR target lock, target track, missile launch, and target intercept evaluation. FMFM 5-5 (e) Information Coordination Central, AN/MSQ-95. The ICC is the fire control data processing and operational communication center for the battery. It provides rapid and consistent reaction to critical targets. Automatic detection, threat ordering, and IFF, followed by automatic target assignment and launch functions are provided by the ICC. The ICC contains an automatic data processor, IFF, battery terminal equipment, and communication equipment. The ADP is comprised of an electronic data processor and a data take-off (DTO) unit. The DTO forms the interface between the other system equipment and the ADP. With the exception of inputs from a tape reader and outputs to a printer, all communications with the ADP is through the DTO. The ADP is a militarized, general purpose, digital computer especially adapted to this role. (f) Platoon Command Post, AN/MSW-11. The PCP is used as the fire control center and command post for the AFU. It can also be used to replace an ICC. The PCP provides manual and automatic target processing, IFF, intraunit, intrabattery and AAOC/TAOC communications, and the displays and fire control equipment for the three-man crew. The PCP is essentially an ICC with a tactical display and engagement control console (TDECC), a central communication unit, a status indicator panel, and an automatic data processor. The tactical display and engagement control console provides the man/machine interface for the AFU. The interior of the shelter is divided into two compartments. The tactical officer, radar operator, and communication operator occupy the forward compartment with the display console, status panel, power distribution panel, and communication equipments. The rear compartment contains the ADP, air conditioning unit, and IFF equipment. (2) Firing Section Equipment (a) High Power Illuminator Radar, AN/MPQ-46. The HIPIR automatically acquires and tracks designated targets in azimuth, elevation, and range rate. The AN/MPQ-46 target intercept computer serves as the interface unit supplying azimuth and elevation launch angles computed by the ADP to up to three launchers. In the casualty mode of operation (loss of the ADP), the target intercept computer computes these angles. The HIPIR J-band energy reflected off the target is also received by the Hawk missile for guidance. A missile reference signal is also received directly from the HIPIR. Target track is continued throughout missile flight, and after intercept, HIPIR doppler data is used for kill evaluatioiL The HIPIR receives target designations from the BCC and automatically searches a given sector for rapid target lock-on. The HIPIR features ECCM and BITE. (b) Launcher, AN/M-192. The launcher is trainable simultaneously in azimuth and in elevation. To minimize operation of the launcher, it is only operated when a firing section is placed in a ready alert condition. When a fire command is initiated, a ready missile is selected and its power supplies activated. At completion of rapid gyro runup, the missile antenna is stabilized to the target line-of-sight while the missile lead angle is inserted by the launcher slewing to the aimpoint commanded by the HIPIR. After the lead angle is inserted, the missile rocket motor is ignited and the missile is launched. FMFM 5-5 (c) Launcher Section Control Box, AN/GSA-132. The LSCB receives signals from the HIPIR for distribution to the three launchers in the firing section. The LSCB generates missile and launcher status signals for display on its panel and the BCC. The SAFE/OPERATE switches prevent remote operation of the launchers while reloading or maintenance functions are being performed. (d) Missile, MIM-23B. The Hawk missile is a surface-to-air, dart wing missile launched from a trailer-mounted firing platform and powered by a dual thrust solid propellant rocket motor. Its four wings are arranged in a cruciform configuration with control surfaces located aft of the main fixed lifting wing panels. Missile-to-target intercept is based on a proportional navigation law implemented from guidance signals generated by an on-board, semiactive, continuous wave seeker. The seeker receives transmitted energy from the HIPIR directly in its rear receiver and establishes a coherent reference necessary for guidance. The HIPIR tracks the target whose reflected illumination is received in the missile front receiver where the target is tracked in a narrow doppler filter (speed gate). Signals are also generated to enable and establish the proper parameters for the fixed angle, variable delay, semiactive fuze which detonates the warhead. (4) Missile Handling Group. When a launcher becomes depleted of missiles during a firing engagement, a tracked loader brings additional ready missiles from the battery storage area and reloads the launcher. Missiles are supplied to the battery in single missile tactical containers. Missiles are removed from the containers and placed on the storage and transportation pallets in the battery storage area. (a) Loader, M501-E3. The reload capability required to sustain a high rate of fire is provided by the loader. Although in normal operation the loader handles missiles three at a time, it can load or unload from one to three missiles. The loader is a tracked vehicle. with a superstructure of movable missile supports which are controlled from the driver's compartment. During a loading operation, the loader indexes to the pallet or launcher for load support during missile transfer. If required, the loader may be converted to a crane by attaching a single fixture. (b) Pallet, M502 Series. Pallets are provided for the storage and transportation of ready missiles. Pallets may be placed directly on the ground, on a trailer, or in the bed of a truck. Three missiles on a pallet form a basic load for transport. (c) Container, M430. The container has an inner frame, wing racks, and front cover. The inner frame which slides into the container supports the missile main body. The wings and elevons are stored in a rack in the upper portion of the container. A missile assembly stand is stored on the organizational maintenance equipment test pallet This stand holds the missile body after removal from the tactical container to allow for the installation of missile wings and elevons. FMFM 5-5 2305. GAP-FILLER/ MANEUVER ELEMENT WEAPON SYSTEMS FMFMS-SC, FMFM l-3A, 'C:7 2306. GROUND SUPPORT a. Redeye Missile System. The Redeye guided missile system is the first man-transportable, surface-to-air guided missile system in the history of U.S. weapon technology. It provides an antiaircraft weapon more responsive to the air defense requirements of combat maneuver elements. The Redeye is capable of acquiring, tracking, intercepting, and destroying low-flying fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The Redeye weapon itself is a shoulder fired, rocketpropelled, infrared-seeking missile consisting of the missile and the launcher. The basic operational fire unit is the F AAD team, consisting of a team leader/gunner and a motor vehicle operator/gunner. This element and all elements, operating independently at platoon or lower level, are dependent upon the supported unit for logistical assistance and physical security. Detailed guidelines for F AAD weapon employment are contained in FMFM 5-5C. The most basic consideration in Redeye employment is whether the employment will be as protection for combat maneuver elements or whether Redeye is intended to act as a gap-filler in an overall AAW surveillance/weapons employment plan. The Redeye will soon be replaced by the Stinger missile with improved capability. b. Light Arms. As the very last line of AAW defense, organic ground weapons can be employed. The use and effectiveness for AAW planning purposes excludes them for consideration, but to a unit under air attack, organic weapons offer some defense. The volume of fire from ground units can be effective in contributing to that unit's air defense. Over 400 fixed-wing and 2,000 helicopters were lost to ground fire during the Vietnamese conflict. Not often emphasized in ground unit training, organic weapons can be exploited and special training can he conducted. See FMFM l-3A for a detailed discussion. Ground support requirements for antiair warfare aircraft are similar to those of other aircraft. Additionally, there are special requirements for missile buildup areas, avionics, and environmental control. a. Missile Buildup. Air-to-air missiles require a dedicated area for missile assembly and checkout. This area and its physical requirements varies with the sophistication of the missile systems. The more sophisticated the missile system, the more extensive the facilities and sanitization requirements. Mobile maintenance facilities and collapsible shelters accompany fighter ground support units for this purpose. Vans are the standard 8-foot by 20-foot shelter, interconnected by cable and requiring external power. Space requirements are dependent upon the maintenance level for the operation and the number of vans necessary to provide that capability. Hawk and Redeye utilize the certified-round concept and do not require extensive missile checks: Consideration must be given to Hawk requirements for initial decanning and loading of missiles onto launchers. b. Avionics. It is difficult to separate avionics and weapons, since both are integral elements of a weapons system. However, there are noticeable differences in the amount of support FMFM 5-5 equipment required by each type aircraft. Because of the electronics associated with all-weather fighter operations, these squadrons generally require more avionics support. The fighter/attack squadron requires slightly more facilities than does an attack squadron. The all-weather attack squadrons require about twice as much as the fighter/attack squadron. Mobile maintenance facilities and collapsible shelters are provided for avionics maintenance. Vans are the standard 8-by 8-by 20-foot shelter, interconnected by cable and requiring external power. All of these facilities require space and power, effecting shipping requirements and location considerations once ashore. c. Environmental Control. Environmental control requirements increase with the level of aircraft sophistication. Air conditioning and RF control requirements are associated with the more complex weapons systems. For interceptor operations, external air conditioning is required for radar maintenance. There are also enviornmental control conditions required for the aircrew on alert, since these aircrews are equipped with personal survival equipment, etc., and must remain prepared to man their aircraft when scrambled. This will also affect space and power requirements. FMFM 5-5 2401. GENERAL 2402. MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Section IV ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT This section discusses the manner in which aviation organizations, agencies, and equipment are combined for combat. Since each task organization is tailored to a specific mission, the discussion must be generalized. "The Marine amphibious force, the largest of the Marine air-ground task forces, is normally built around a division/wing team, but can include several divisions and aircraft wings, together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The Marine amphibious force is capable of conducting a wide range of amphibious assault operations and sustained operations ashore. It can be tailored for a wide variety of combat missions in any geographic environment." (JCS Pub 1) a. Command Element. The MAF is normally commanded by a major general. It is the type of MAGTF appropriate to the majority of situations involving Marines in sustained combat b. Ground Combat Element. The ground combat element of the MAF is normally a Marine division reinforced with appropriate force combat support units. More than one ground combat element is rarely need in the MAF task organization. The MAF headquarters may he required to control ground combat elements other than the division for relatively limited missions. Characteristically, such additional ground combat elements do not exceed the combat capability of a regimental landing team (RLT) and are attached to the division upon completion of their missions. c. Aviation Combat Element. The aviation combat element of the MAF is a Marine aircraft wing, task organized to conduct all types of tactical air operations. The wing is organized and equipped to facilitate its early establishment ashore in the amphibious operation and is designed for operations in an expeditionary environment. Normally, the MAF deployment will include all the AAW capability within the MAW. Control squadrons, the LAAM battalion, and the FAAD battery are included, since the size of the force< presents a lucrative target The full scale of AAW operations, including the employment and 'execution described in the following chapter, is associated with the MAF. All air control agencies of the MACCS are normally present and control of air operations will normally be passed to the CLF. The amount of AAW activity will vary from situation to situation, but it can be anticipated that this activity, particularly air defense, will be more precautionary than active. This is due to the time factors required to phase a full MAF ashore and the AAW operations which must have been conducted to achieve FMFM 5-5 the air superiority necessary for the MAF-size amphibious assault and subsequent buildup. By the time control is passed ashore in the MAF operation, AAW may have been relegated to a role subordinate to offensive air support, except for emergency situations. d. Combat Service Support Element. The combat service support element of the MAF is built around a force service support group (FSSG ). It will normally include other combat service support units from a division support group (DSG), Marine wing support group (MWSG), and minor detachments from other FMFand Navy combat service support resources. e. Other Considerations. A Marine amphibious brigade may be included as a separate element in the MAF task organization to conduct air-ground operations separated sufficiently in space or time from other MAF elements to preclude MAF command and control. Such operations are normally of limited duration. "A Marine amphibious brigade is a task organization which is normally built around a regimental landing team, a provisional Marine aircraft group, and a logistics support group. It is capable of conducting amphibious assault operations of a limited scope. During potential crisis situations, a Marine amphibious brigade may be forward deployed afloat for an extended period in order to provide an immediate combat response." (JCS Pub 1) a. Command Element. The MAB is normally commanded by a brigadier general. It is capable of conducting sustained air-ground combat operations. However, the majority of situations in which sustained combat is anticipated will eventually require a larger Marine air-ground task force. Accordingly, the MAB is normally organized to accomplish a limited mission. Upon accomplishment of the mission, the MAB is usually absorbed by a Marine amphibious force. b. Ground Combat Element. The normal ground combat element of the MAB is a regimental landing team. The inclusion of more than one ground combat element in the MAB task organization is more common than in the MAU. However, the ground combat capability of the MAB does not significantly exceed that of a regimental landing team because a situation in which a requirement is anticipated would be more appropriate for a Marine division. c. Aviation Combat Element. The normal aviation combat element of the MAB is a Marine aircraft group. This group has substantially more varied aviation capabilities than a typical MAG. It normally contains greater antiair warfare capabilities as required by the situation. Unlike the MAU, the entire aviation combat element of the MAB is usually organized and equipped for early establishment ashore in the landing area as airfields are developed. Prior to 2403. MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FMFM 5-5 2404. MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT the introduction of Redeye, the MAB was the smallest size MAGTF with AAW capability. Where deployment and employment considerations are concerned, the MAB is still the smallest size MAGTF wherein AAW planning is substantial requirement Due to its relative size, AAW in the MAB will probably be air defense oriented, although fighter aircraft may have participated in preassault operations. Offensive AAW on and after D-day is not normally assigned to the limited assets of the MAB. Rather, those assets are employed to provide self-protection for the MAB. The MAB will consist of at least detachments, and probably entire squadrons/battalions, of air defense organizations. Control may or may not be passed ashore, but the establishment of a TADC, TAOC, LAAM detachments, and a FAAD platoon are normally in the MAB. Other MACCS air control capabilities are usually present, and the requirement for integrated operations necessitates almost as much attention as it does for the MAF. Essentially then, the MAG found in the MAB contains fighter, attack, and helicopter aircraft; control and missile squadrons; and support organizations. Realistically speaking, this size organization could represent over half of the combat capability of an aircraft wing. d. Combat Seroice Support Element. The combat service support element of the MAB includes significant resources from FSSG, as well as DSG and MWSG, and minor detachments from other FMF and Navy combat service support resources. e. Other Considerations. The Fleet Marine Forces are capable of deploying one MAB from each division/wing team for extended periods. However, one division/wing team does not have sufficient resources to deploy more than one MAB concurrently and retain a capability of deploying as an MAF. The concurrent deployment of two MAB's from the same division/wing team is, therefore, undesirable and normally should not be planned. "The Marine amphibious unit is a task organization which is normally built around a battalion landing team, composite squadron, and logistic support unit It fulfills routine forward afloat deployment requirements, provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis situations, and is capable of relatively limited combat operations." (JCS Pub 1) a. Command Element. The MAU is normally commanded by a colonel. It is capable of performing combat missions of relatively limited scope and duration. It is the smallest of the three types of Marine air-ground task forces and is provided primarily from the personnel and equipment resources of a division/wing team. The coordinated tactical employment of two MAU's is not contemplated since a combat mission of this scope would normally require the assignment of larger forces. In exceptional circumstances, the MAU may be an element of a larger MAGTF. FMFM S-5 b. Ground Combat Element. The ground combat element of the MAU is normally a battalion landing team (BLT). Two ground combat elements are required only in unusual circumstances. In any case, the ground combat capability of the MAU does not significantly exceed that of a BLT. c. Aviation Combat Element. The aviation combat element of the MAU is a Marine aircraft group built around an attack squadron and a helicopter squadron which may be augmented by elements of an observation squadron. The attack squadron would normally operate from a previously established airfield ashore. In certain instances, however, the aviation combat element of the MAU may be a composite helicopter squadron. The aviation combat element does not normally contain the aviation resources to conduct significant air defense or establish airfields ashore. Long-range communications, mobile air traffic control communications, and control facilities for air support operations are included in the aviation combat element of the MA U as necessary. Because of this configuration and the inherently limited self-sustaining capabilities of the MAU, historically, there has been no major organic air defense capability. Necessary air defense control of aircraft and missiles is retained by the CATF and his agencies afloat. Recent technological developments in surfacr-to-air weaponry has modified this historical approach by providing for Redeye capabilities within the MAU, if appropriate. Even in this instance, how· ever, control still would be retained afloat, air operations would be brief and limited, and controls placed upon FAAD sections would be strict. d. Combat Service Support Element. The combat service support element of the MAU is formed primarily from division, wing, and FSSG resources. Minor detachments from other FMF and Navy combat service support resources are usually required. There may be occasion for AAW elements to deploy independently from an MAGTF. Augmen· tation of Navy aviation is also an adjunctive mission of Marine aviation. This mission might require fighter, attack. reconnaissance, or electronic warfare aircraft to independently deploy as part of an advance carrier strike force, for example. These elements may even be deployed to support other Services or the armed forces of other countries. These instances will be rare, but they do occur. This situation is not favorable to MAGTF requirements, for once independently deployed, aviation assets which become committed in conjunction with other forces tend to stay committed, unavailable to the MAGTF. In some other instances, they may support the MAGTF as well as other users. These situations hamper the effectiveness and economy of resources that characterize the Marine air-ground team; but, it must be recognized that this is of concern mostly to Marines, and joint operational commanders may not be sympathetic in the face of overall priorities. This same reversal of precedent could also find Marine forces in a tac tical assault to seize or defend airfields and facilities of strategic or at least of theater signifi· cance. This situation might find independent deployment of Marine AAW resources to provide air defense of a strategically significant facility, accompanied only by security forces. Many alternatives exist for independent deployments, but for AAW, they will normally be in con· junction with a broader application of U.S. combat power. 2405. INDEPENDENT DEPLOYMENTS FMFM 5-5 CHAPTER 3 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS Section I INTRODUCTION The amphibious operation integrates ships, aircraft, weapons, and landing forces in a concerted military effort against a hostile shore. The amphibious assault builds up combat power ashore from an initial zero capability to a fully coordinated striking power in the face of the difficulties of seas, surf, and hydrographic features, in addition to the problems normally encountered in land warfare. The closest cooperation and detailed coordination among all participating forces in an amphibious operkation are essential to success. There must be a clear understanding of the mutual obligations and of the special capabilities and problems of each component Amphibious task force antiair warfare operations are closely interconnected between shipboard elements and landing force elements ashore, particularly for air defense. A discussion of the amphibious task force, landing force, and landing force aviation is found in FMFM 5-1. 3101. GENERAL FMFMS-1, ~ FMFM 5-5 Section II 3201. GENERAL 3202. PRINCIPLE CONSIDERATIONS EMPLOYMENT OF ANTIAIR WARFARE MEANS The close integration required by antiair warfare necessitates the examination of the concept of operations of the amphibious task force and the landing force, the methods of employing antiair warfare, and the functional integration of the antiair warfare means. a. Air Superiority. Air superiority is that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former an:d its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. The significant points for analysis in the preceding definition are "prohibitive interference" and "at a given time and place." In planning the conduct of an operation, the requirement exists to address these points in detail to identify what actually constitutes air superiority for each situation. The single, greatest vulnerability of an amphibious task force to opposing air power is during the ship-to-shore movement when the amphibious operation is most readily disrupted by enemy air. Once forces are ashore, vulnerability still exists, but to a lesser degree. Therefore, the term "prohibitive interference" is relative to "a given time and place" and must be analyzed for each phase of a particular operation. The greater the scope of the operation, the more encompassing this analysis must be. The question arises as to the precise meaning of the term "prohi~ itive." A prohibitive level of interference exists for each phase or element of an operation beyond which success is improbable. The lack of success of any particular aspect of an operation is not necessarily characterized by abject failure. It may be limited to levels of damage or interference which, if received, will seriously jeopardize the accomplishment of the assigned mission according to time, degree of thoroughness, or similar qualifying factors. Consequently, analysis of the major facets of the operation determines the level of interference which is prohibitive. Once this determination is reached, planning specifies what AAW objectives are required to ensure air superiority. (l) Enemy Air Capability. An analysis of the existing and potential enemy air capability makes clear whether enemy air has the ability to inflict the previously defined levels of prohibitive interference. In some situations, it may not This interference is examined according to the sequence of the operation and is compared to the potential of enemy air ordnance delivery. All aspects of this delivery potential are analyzed, including the enemy reinforcing capability. Ordnance availability and delivery techniques, such as standoff capabilities, are compared to the varying degrees of friendly force vulnerability. (2) Friendly Air Capability. A review is made of the friendly air capability according to types of aircraft, their probable deployment, and their quantity. Thus, a comparative measure of friendly and enemy air resources indicates what degree of success friendly air can achieve in combat against the enemy. Degrees of neutralization and destruction of enemy aircraft and offensive missiles are specified to determine how much damage will FMFM S-5 prevent the enemy's attainment of prohibitive interference. This desired level of damage is reviewed from both an offensive and defensive AAW viewpoint to determine an opti mum mix of both types of activity. Trade-offs may be necessary due to the availability of friendly forces, but the emphasis is toward offensive AAW due to the greater margin of safety and flexibility inherent to any offensive activity. (3) Selection of Forces. With destruction levels and the optimum offensive/defensive mix identified, forces are selected. This selection reflects the type of AAW elements to be employed and establishes its general capacity. Further, this selection indicates the ob jectives for preparatory AAW activity and pre-D-day, D-day, and post-D-day activity by specifying the levels of destruction essential throughout each phase of the operation. These objectives indicate the type and intensity of friendly AAW activity and set the stage for the commencement of the operation. b. Enemy Air Threat. In determining the enemy's air potential, the requirement exists to conduct a detailed and comprehensive intelligence collection effort. Significant preliminary intelligence information is furnished by the unified commander or other authority ordering the amphibious operation. Collection of current intelligence throughout the operation by interested agencies within the ATF results in the acquisition ofa large quantity of data. An analysis of this data assists planners in scheduling offensive AAW strikes. The primary AAW factor which contributes to the attainment of air superiority is obtaining the required level of offensive destruction. This includes attacks to preclude enemy recovery and a sufficient level of destruction/neutralization to counter the enemy's residual air threat. The residual threat includes both enemy air which has escaped destruction and reinforcements which may be in NWP32, introduced. The following factors are analyzed in predicting the enemy's air potential: enemy air resources, including long-range aircraft and missiles, short-range aircraft and misAntiair Warfare (U) siles, and residual air; electronic countermeasures; and the location of the objective area. For a detailed discussion of the enemy air threat, see NWP 32. c. .Concept of Operations. The primary role of AAWin an amphibious operation is to ensure that the degree of air superiority required for a successful operation is achieved and maintained. The first step in meeting this requirement is the preparation of the amphibious objective area prior to the arrival of the ATF. When the ATF arrives in the area, air elements from the fleet, operating either from advance bases or from carriers, fly offensive AAW strikes. Until the MAGTF establishes its air defense means ashore, the fleet provides this service for the landing force. When the landing force assumes control of AAW ashore, control is decentralized for effective aJ}d responsive air defense. (1) Establishment of air superiority in and near the objective area is initiated with air and missile operations directed by the area commander against known enemy air bases and missile installations. During the period that the landing force is en route to the ob jective area, antiair warfare protection for all elements of the ATF is normally provided from fleet resources. These may include carrier-based Marine and Navy aircraft, other landing force or land-based aircraft, ship-based surface-to-air missiles, and search and detection facilities located in areas contiguous to the objective area. During the landing, 43 the CATF has overall responsibility for protection of all assault units from hostile aircraft and missiles. (2) The forces afloat have a limited ability to provide overland surveillance. It is necessary that the landing force establish its AAW system ashore as soon as possible in orderto provide a landward extension of the amphibious task force AAW system. Normally,the first AAW elements to land are the FAAD units, early warning radar, and SAM units.The installation of these elements thereby extends the ATF target acquisition system ashore and provides a degree of protection from low-altitude landward air attacks. (3) Early establishment of the landing force air control facilities and communicationmeans ashore permits the landing force to assume control of its AAW means and toextend the landward control capability of the ATF. The installation and operation ofthese air control facilities and means as a suhsector within the ATF enable the CATF to control the various elements of the landing force AAW system. Establishment of airbases ashore and phasing in of landing force aircraft completes the landing force AAW system. (4) The above stage in the assault landing force AAW system represents a landward extension and augmentation of the ATF AAW system. At a later stage, when the com plete landing force AAWsystem is ashore and control of air operations has passed ashore,the landing force assumes responsibility for AAW operations within the objective areaemploying the integrated systems. At that time, the Navy AAW units afloat constitutea sea-based extension and augmentation of the landing force AAW system. Navy AAWunits normally include: • Radar picket ships stationed on the flanks and to seaward of the landing force. • Long-and short-range missile ships stationed offshore. • One or more carrier groups operating within supporting ranges. d. Types ofAntiair Warfare-In review of the antiair warfare generalities which the MAGTF must address, it is appropriate to note the types of antiair warfare. Active and passive antiair warfare are jointly employed by MAGTF elements to reduce and nullify the effectiveness of the enemy air effort. (1) Active AAW,Operations. Active AAW operations are those actions taken to destroy,or reduce to an a'cceptable level, the enemy air threat. Included are those measures takento destroy this threat prior to and after launching. Upon entry into the objective area,MAGTF AAW operations consist mainly of offensive strikes to destroy hostile aircraft and missiles and! to neutralize airfields, radar installations, missile sites, and logisticsupport facilities.', As the capability of the enemy to reconstitute his air resources varies,neutralization of the enemy air potential continues, employing interceptor sweeps, attack bombing, and aggressive air search and surveillance. These operations are intended to supplement the preliminary offensive AAW activity previously conducted by carrier attack forces or area forces. Air defense measures to protect the MAGTF from residualenemy air constitvte another category of active AAW. FMFM 5-5 (2) Passive AAW Operations. Passive AAW operations are employed by all elements of the MAGTF and are designed to minimize the effect of hostile air action. Passive operations include cover and concealment, dispersal of forces and installations, deception (including electronic deception), shielding, damage control provisions, and exploitation of the mobility of an expeditionary force. e. Principles of Antiair Warfare. Destruction in depth, mutual support, and centralized coordination and decentralized control are three principles of antiair warfare which have evolved from years of experience in opposing an air threat. The application of these principles is necessary to achieve and preserve air superiority. Destruction-in-depth is considered the most important principle of AAW. The main effort is to destroy the enemy air threat at its source. In this respect, sector boundaries are assigned within the area of responsibility. The principle of mutual support involves the simultaneous engagement of a target by multiple elements of the same type weapon. The principle of centralized coordination and decentralized control offers the best means of achieving economy of forces while minimizing the reaction time and vulnerability to losses. (1) Destruction-in-Depth. Destruction-in-depth is based on the principle that detection and destruction begin as far from the vital area as possible and continue as long as the threat exists. When a hostile nuclear attack capability exists, consideration is given to additional depth in order to provide time and space for repeated engagements by available AAW weapons. This produces an acceptable cumulative kill probability that ensures maximum AAW protection to the ATF. The area required to ensure destruction-in-depth is designated as the antiair warfare area. By means of operation plans and orders, the AAW area is made known to subordinate units of the landing force and to interested external commands. The four major factors which govern the expansion or contraction of this area are the effective communication range, detection range, weapons ran~e, (friendly and enemy), and the relative danger from an air and surface attack. • Reaction Time. Reaction time is the most important single factor in achieving destruction-in-depth. Minimum reaction time provides for maximum destruction-in-depth. Reaction time is the elapsed time delay from the detection of an enemy air target until it is engaged by a designated weapon. This is a relatively fixed quantity for each weapons system that is dependent on material characteristics, adequacy of equipment, and the state of training of AAW units and personnel. Functions that cause time delays include identification, evaluation, designation, communications, computer settings, target transfer from acquisition to tracking, launcher slew rates, interceptor reaction, and personnel performance and capability. Any modification to the AAW system which reduces reaction time, such as the MTDS, increases the system's effectiveness. • Long-Range Detection. It is essential that targets be detected at the greatest possible range to permit a maximum number of engagements and destruction with minimum penetration of the AAW vital area. Detection means must be aggressively extended, as far as possible, on the ground and in the air. FMFM 5-5 (2) Continuity ofEngagement and Mutual Support_ AAW weapons means are employed and/or located in such a manner as to ensure continuity of engagement and provide for mutual support. In this way, the landing force increases the probability of preventing thepenetration of the AAW vital area by hostile aircraft or missiles. Proper employment and/or location ensures that each target is within range of several AAW elements. Thisintegrated and overlapping pattern of mutual support and continuity of engagementminimizes any reduction in effectiveness of the AAW system resulting from loss of oneor more AAWelements. (3) Centralized Coordination and Decentralized Control. Coordinated operations andeconomy of force require centralized coordination; however, in order to achieve a systemthat has minimum reaction time, maximum damage resistance, and elemental selfsufficiency, the system requires a capability to function under decentralized control.The overall centralized command, control, coordination, and supervision of the AAWsystem is the responsibility of the CLF, delegated to the TAC, and exercised through the agencies of the MACCS. To meet the demands of a decentralization, authority and control is delegated to subordinate elements within the system ashore;i.e., TAOC and AAOC.These subordinate elements possess the capability to react immediately to a threat unlessvetoed by higher authority. 3203. During the conduct of air defense operations ashore, surveillance facilities are established., CONCEPT OF weapons are placed in position, and offensive AAW strikes are conducted to reduce the enemyOPERATIONS threat to a manageable level. Air control management requires supervision and coordination ofall tactical air support operations to include the integration of aircraft from a variety of sourcesand the establishment of air defense sectors. Detailed local planning examines contingenciesrelated to both enemey air successes and system failures within the MACCS. Due to the significance of the threat, all control agency personnel must he familiar with the immediate actionsrequired to offset foreseeable degradations. In order to obtain this familiarity, standardizationand a thorough knowledge of participant responsibilities and relationships are necessary. a. Air Defense Sector ControL Due to the coverage of air defense weapons, there will generallyhe only one vital area complex per air defense sector. The sector boundaries will be arranged toensure that the principles of AAW can he applied throughout the sector. Such an arrangementguarantees definition of responsibility for the protection of the vital area. Rapid engagement requires interagency coordination to he kept to a minimum. The establishment of landward andseaward sectors in amphibious operations does not imply split responsibility for a vital area.With landing force air defense systems established ashore, the landward/seaward sector boundaryis located to ensure that the portion of the vital area ashore is within the responsibility of asingle air defense agency. The tactical principle of unity of effort in assigning control houndaries is thus applied to the vital area. (1) Integration and Coordination of Weapons Sytems. In order to select and assign aproper destructive means before the target penetrates the vital area, the weapons systems 46 FMFM 5-5 must be coordinated. This assignment depends upon the target position once identified, and the relationship of this position to available weapons. In this context, weapons include air defense control agencies and their sectors of responsibility. Establishment of sectors is a general control measure and does not suggest inviolability. The TAOC or sector antiair warfare center (afloat) which first detects the target will initiate the engagement sequence, simultaneously notifying the TACC afloat/ashore. This sequence may be terminated by the TACC if the target is in another sector of responsibility and the appropriate sector control agency has surveillance information, uncommitted weapons, and is better positioned to engage the target. In unusual circumstances, the control of particular combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft may be passed from one sector to another. (2) Engagement Sequence. Within a single sector of air defense responsibility, the engagement sequence depends upon the position at which the target is identified. Under ideal circumstances, this position is at the limit of the surveillance area, well beyond the CAP stations. Time and position allowing, the first engagement will be made by inter ceptor aircraft according to the desired process; i.e., single aircraft attack-reattack or single front attack by one or more interceptors. Should the success of the intercept be questionable, as the target approaches the crossover zone, missile batteries will be directed to acquire and lock-on. Once the target reaches the crossover point, the decision is made whether to allow the interceptor to continue his attack or to assign the target to the SAM system. If the interceptor is in position to fire and the sector an:tiair warfare coordinator concurs, the SAM units will be given a CEASE FIRE command to allow completion of the interceptor attack. If not, the interceptor will be directed to break away and the missiles will engage the target. b. Sector Detection/Identification Means. Within the processes of any air defense system, the starting point for all operations is detection/identification. This is most critical and must be rapidly accomplished at a reasonable range. The destruction-in-depth deployment of weapons allows some margin of flexibility in the engagement process, but the speed capabilities of incorning enemy aircraft reduces flexibility in the time allowed for identification. The system must provide for rapid and positive identification through clear-cut assignment of identification responsibility. The most effective measures designed to provide timely identification include positive radar control, visual control, flight plans, IFF, and air corridors. A detailed discussion of these measures is found in NWP 32. Another method employed in the various identification processes is identification by flight characteristics. In effect, however, this method more often determines hostile rather than friendly targets. In many instances, the observed movement of an air contact may be presumed hostile if out of character with local air activity. Some examples are: • Low-level, high speed, approaching targets detected by SAM units may be presumed hostile because close air support delivery maneuvers are not of long duration on a consistent inbound heading, inbound aircraft speeds are slower close to the vital area due to the density of aricraft, and whenever marginal communications exist, CAP pursuits are broken off well before the crossover point. • An unidentified air contact maneuvering for attack position on friendly aircraft should be presumed hostile as all friendly interceptor aircraft will be under positive control. The flight characteristics ofan aircraft maneuvering for an advantageous position for air-to-air engagement are obvious to a radar observer and relative positionsof other friendly fixed-wing aircraft are immediately available. • The third and most obvious type of flight characteristic providing hostile air identification is the commission of a hostile act observed by any friendly force element c. Identification Sources. In an active air defense environment, the indicated agencies are responsible for securing and maintaining the friendly identification prescribed below: (l) Positive Radar Control. The TAOC is the initiating agency for air defense action andis the source of most positive control information. It controls CAP aircraft, providesflight following, and exchanges mutual interest track information with adjacent air defense agencies. It is not, however, an exclusive source of positive radar control information and requires supplementary information from the following sources: • ASRT. The ASRT possesses the necessary information on aircraft either orbiting or executing a close support bombing run. The most expeditiousmethod to pass information is the direct link between the two units which already exist to allow the TAOC to hand over aircraft to the ASRT. • MATCS. The aircraft status on radar controlled departures and approaches is maintained by the MATCS_ The MATCS additionally maintains the status ofaircraft in holding patterns. The TAOC is kept informed of the status of aircraft under MATCS control and those aircraft anticipated to report for airtraffic control purposes which are penetrating the sector. (2) Visual Control. The only consistent sources ofvisual identification offriendly fixedwing aircraft are FAAD teams and terminal close air support (CAS) control agencies orobservers such as the forward air controller (FAC), TAC(A), or air observers (AO). Aspreviously discussed, these agencies, with the exception of the additional duty FAADteams of the LAAM battalion, operate through the DASC. Therefore, the DASC isresponsible to furnish the TAOC with position information on these aircraft and on anyaircraft under the visual control of these terminal agencies. (3) Flight Plan Information. The sources of flight plans are aircr;~ft crews assignedmissions by the daily fragmentary order, aircraft crews on routine flights, and aircraftcrews departing or entering the air defense sector. Flight plans are filed with the appro. priate air traffic control center (ATCC), including any designated en route ATCC. Sector ATCC's receive and forward to the TACC/TAOC flight plan information as prescribed.At the discretion of the TAC, the ATCC may directly forward these to the TAOC, which then advises the TACC. For aircraft departing or entering the sector, adjacent ATCC's exchange flight plan data of mutual concern. Verbal flight plan information is recordedand retained by the receiving agency and promulgated as necessary. FMFM 5-5 (4) Identification, Friend or Foe/Selective Identification Feature (IFF/SIF). Due to its nature, this identification. data requires different handling than other types. IFF/SIF information is only available to agencies possessing the equipment required to provide electronic challenge. Such a capability is found in the TAOC, BCC, PCP, AAOC, and MATCS. When applicable, IFF/SIF modes and codes accompany initial position reports from these units. (5) Air Corridors. Identification of aircraft within air corridors is obtained through radar surveillance and the exchange of flight information between adjacent and internal air defense sector control agencies. Corridor boundaries are maintained by all concerned agencies. (6) Flight Characteristics. Any agency which identifies hostile aircraft by their flight characteristics will immediately report this information, with the status of any initiated engagement, to the TAOC. Ground units, FAAD teams, FAC's, etc., report through the DASC. TAC(A)'s, helicopter coordinators (airborne) (HC(A)'s), AO's, and other aircraft report directly to the TAOC when possible by appropriate air-to-ground communica tions. LAAM batteries, AAOC, and early warning and control (EW/C) sites report di rectly to the TAOC. d. Surveillance/Traffic Monitoring. Once initial radar detection has been made, the air defense control agency requires a means of maintaining the changing position of the radar contact. Itis additionally necessary to keep abreast of the movements and intentions of friendly aircraft operating within the objective area. For this purpose, surveillance operators, traffic controllers, and weapons controllers are stationed in the TAOC. (1) Surveillance. The TAOC establishes radar-detected tracks through its surveillance system. Upon detection, the identification process begins and each friendly control is identified by appropriate category. The contact is assigned symbology and the system automatically updates its position. Depending on the degree of threat and the volume of traffic, surveillance is conducted by assigning a surveillance operator to each subsector. Thus, detection, identification, and symbology assignment are performed. The surveil lance capacity of the TAOC is limited by the detection capability of the input radars. (a) Naval TacticaiDataSystem/AirbomeTacticaiDataSystem. TheMTDS/ATDS have been designed to develop and exchange digital data on a variety of air mat ters. The information of concern to the MACCS is the position and identification data on aircraft operating under the cognizance of naval air control agencies. In this manner, an aircraft passing through a sector or flying in a sector overlap area is identified with current and accurate position information. Two-way exchange of infof!llation between the MACCS and NTDS/ATDS is possible and is made through the Marine tactical data communication central (TDCC), normally em ployed with the TACC and TAOC. 49 FMFM S-5 (b) SAM Acquisition. In addition to visual acquisitions by FAAD teams which are relayed to the TAOC through the DASC or AAOC, the coverage of TAOCradars has been supplemented in the shorter range, low to medium altitude radar envelope by the acquisition radars of the Hawk system. This coverage product is relayed to the TAOC for initial identification and/or identification confirmation. (c) Other Agencie&. Provisions are also made by the TAOC to allow surveillance input from other radar sources, such as airborne or ground gap-filler radar facilities. (2) Track Monitoring. Once traffic is detected and identified as friendly, they are passed to a TAOC traffic controller whose function is to provide flight following, navigational assistance, and altitude separation from other air traffic. Traffic controllers arenormally assigned geographic subsectors in which they maintain accurate and timely situation data on all friendly aircraft Their tasks include control of aircraft reportillg forflight following. These personnel assist the surveillance effort by sustaining timely information on targets already processed for identification. Weapons controllers are responsible to ensure current track status on interceptor aircraft under control. When CAPstations are not actively manned, weapons controllers may function as additional trafficcontrollers. e. Display and DiBSemination. In order to effectively perform the air defense function, the agencies concerned require an ability to display selected summary information of the air defense situation. Some of this information is generated within an agency itself and the remainder is received from other agencies. The requirement exists to display and disseminate the situation summaries which dictate the assignment of assets and weapons. Selected summary information is disseminated as required to internal and external MACCS agencies. Display systems are designed to present the summary to supervisory personnel for evaluation. In identifying the items of air defense summary display, only the TAOC and TACC are discussed. All other associ ated air defense agencies maintain similar displays. (1) TAOC. The following information is made available to the TAOC on a real time basis and is necessary to achieve threat evaluation and ~eapon assignment: • The location, composition, status, and alert condition ofall friendly air defenseweapons. Particular items required for CAP aircraft are: -Type of aircraft. -Number of aircraft -Control frequency. -Armament -Fuel state. • The location, identification, and controlling agency of all friendly aircraftwithin the surveillance envelope. so FMFM 5-5 • Major equipment status of subordinate and adjacent air defense units. • The location, composition, speed, altitude, and course ofall unknown/assumed hostile/hostile aircraft. • The status of controlled airborne intercepts to include aircrew assumption of intercept, attack mode, weapons release, and completion or noncompletion of the intercept. • ECM/ECCM conditions. (2) TACC. For air defense purposes, the TACC requires the following information: The location, composition, speed, altitude, and course of all unknown/assumed • hostile/hostile aircraft from all subordinate and adjacent agencies. • Major equipment status of subordinate and adjacent air defense units. • Commitment status of air defense weapons. • ECM/ECCM conditions. • Readiness conditions and availability of unassigned weapons. f. Evaluation and Commitment (1) Upon determination that an airborne target is hostile, weapons are assigned to des troy it. Where many hostile tracks are present, it is necessary to evaluate the varying degrees of threat represented by these tracks. Weapons commitment will then be made according to the degree of threat posed by each track. This stage in the air defense process is dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of the total surveillance product which provides the basis for the following supervisory evaluations to determine commit ment: • The location and assumed capabilities of the hostile threat (to include raid composition). • The anticipated direction of hostile attack or location of the target if an attack is in progress. • The tactics most likely to be employed by the hostile air force. • The location, capabilities, and status of ground alert or airborne interceptor aircraft. • The location, status, and readiness condition of friendly SAM units. 51 FMFM 5-5 • The rules of engagement as they apply to unknown/assumed hostile aircraft. • The status and location of any other existing air defense engagements. • The influences of existing or anticipated friendly and h~stile ECM/ECCM. • The influences of meteorological conditions. (2) Assignment of surface-to-air missiles proceeds as follows: • Alerting a battery to the possibility of engagement is accomplished at the discretion of the senior air director (SAD) in the TAOC as he evaluates long-rangesurveillance radar products. As a hostile track is detected, the interceptionweapons are assigned and engagement is commenced. • When FAAD assignment is considered probable, the decisive selection of an FMFM5-5C, enemy aircraft as a FAAD target involves the assessment by the FAAD team of Employment ofthe ~ those factors related to the capabilities and limitations of the weapon. Theteams are normally deployed with overlapping areas of capability for engagingtargets. For a detailed coverage of FAAD firing doctrine, see FMFM 5-5C. 3204. The primary determinant in establishing the air defense system's standards for surveillance and METHODS destruction is the enemy air capability. This capability is ascertained by an analysis of the mostOF successful counterweapons available and the distribution of friendly forces/installations whichEMPLOYMENT require aif defense protection. Following the identification of these factors, the compositionand deployment of specific air defense elements are planned. In order to obtain the optimum degree of air defense protection with available forces, capabilities are examined, and operationalrequirements are determined. a. Characteristics ofVital Area. A vital area is a designated area or installation to he defended by air defense units. It contains the facilities, units, and installations necessary for the landingforce to accomplish its mission. The outward edge or boundary of the vital area is always the reference point in applying destruction-in-depth principles. There may he one or more vital areas, depending on the scope of the operation. The following factors are examined in deter mining and designating vital areas: • The probable method of air delivery. • The anticipated weapons to he used by an enemy. • The addition of an overall standoff range to the outside edge of the defended com plex. After the vital area boundary is determined, it becomes the range by whichenemy air attacks must he destroyed to prevent damage to the vital area. In the eventof an enemy nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) capability, standoff ranges will heexpanded to include the delivery capability for his largest weapon. 52 FMFM 5-5 b. Characteristics of the Destruction Area. The destruction area is an area in which it is planned to destroy or defeat the enemy airborne threat. The area may be further subdivided into air intercept, missile (long, medium, and short range), or antiaircraft gun zones. It begins at the edge of the vital area. The size of the destruction area will depend upon the situation; however, the goal of every air defense system should be to make it as large as possible. The three factors which normally determine the size of the destruction area are the capabilities of the air defense weapons system, engagement sequence, and surveillance capabilities. c. Geographical Subdivision ofthe Destruction Area. The destruction area is normally divided into three geographical subdivisions-missile intercept zone, buffer zone, and air intercept zone. The missile intercept zone is that geographical division of the destruction area where surface-toair missiles have primary responsibility for destruction of airborne objects. It is normally established to include the maximum range of the surface-to-air missile system: The buffer zone (crossover point) is that range in the destruction area at which a target normally ceases to be an air intercept target and becomes a surface-to-air missile target. (Intercepter may continue intercept into buffer zone, only after air-to-air missile launch, in order to continue providing missile guidance.) The air intercept zone is a subdivided part of the destruction area in which it is planned to destroy or defeat the enemy airborne threat with interceptor aircraft. (See fig. 8.) OUTER RANGE OF SURVEILlANCE AREA OUTER RANGE OF DESTRUCTION AREA MISSILE ZONE (INCLUDES VITAL ZONE) VITAL ZONE OUTER RANGE OF BUFfER ZONE VITAL AREA (NOT TO SCAI.EI Figure 8. Destruction Area. d. Principles ofSuroeillance. The entire air defense sequence is initiated through the function of surveillance. For this reason, a close and careful analysis of the requirements for an MAGTF surveillance system is in order. As surveillance is the significant link in the air defense chain, detection is the primary link to surveillance. 53 FMFM 5-5 (1) Reliability of Surveillance. Although sophisticated radar systems require considerable maintenance for ideal performance, they are capable of operating at levels less than optimum. Those radars considered essential to achieve required detection probabilitiesmust be assigned a minimum acceptable level of degradation. Once this level is exceeded,for any reason, standby radars assume the surveillance activity, while also meeting performance standards. If primary radar assets permit sufficient overlap coverage, standbyradar requirements may be reduced. However, overlap coverage is often degraded byadverse terrain characteristics and requires the utilization of secondary radars as a supple mentary measure. When resources are limited, priorities are established for the employment of secondary radars. (2) Surveillance Area. The surveillance area is the area in which air search, detection,and tracking are accomplished. It must extend beyond the destruction area to allowenough warning that reaction times will permit engagement as the target reaches thedestruction area. This surveillance area is not coincidental with the destruction area as itis not limited by interceptor positive control restrictions. Further, the destruction area isoriented totally toward the assigned air defense sector of responsibility, while the surveillance area might extend into another air defense sector. Thereaction time previously cited is described as "lag time"when applied to air defense. This lag time is the sum of alltimes required to collect, evaluate, and commit a weaponssystem to a detected air defense target The surveillancearea is expanded to absorb this lag time by converting themost logically anticipated target speed into distance. One No0.672 (R-1.2211') particular qualification applies to this surveillance area forlow-altitude detection. When surface radar is employed as EARTH CURVAlURE the principal method of detecting low-altitude targets over OPEN SPACE IIErWEDI RAOAR ANO OBJECT land, extended range is better attained by locating radars on POINT H 30,000 high elevations and supplementing coverage with gap-filler 25,000 radars displaced inland. Special visual zones in specific ave h • HEIGHT Of RAOAit ABOVE SEA LEVEl R -RANGE FROM RADAR TO POINT H nues of approach may be used beyond the vital area or sur 20,000 H-HEIGHT OF SHAOOW DUE TO THE rounding installations to further supplement this coverage. EARTH'S CURVAlURE 15,000 15,000 ... e. Determination ofSurveillance Systems 10.000 10.000 250 5,000 (1) Radar. Radar, both surface and airborne, is the 5,000 principal air surveillance means. Radar provides detection and location of air targets as well as the warning 2.0011 necessary to intercept and destroy. It is the primary 1.000 100 1.000 means hy which friendly aircraft are controlled. How4410 100 ever, there are limitations and restrictions with each 4410 lOO 100 100 2110 2110 type of radar, depending on its characteristics and the 50 25 50 method of employment These limitations must be25 identified and examined in order to obtain the opti 0 -R--11 mum surveillance coverage. All radars are affected hytheir line-of-sight limitations as illustrated in figure 9. Other factors that limit the unrestricted use ofradars are terrain masking, weather, enemy ECM, andFigure 9. Radar Horizon Limitations. the enemy's ability to conduct offensive AAW. 54 • Surface Radar -Functions. The functions performed by surface radar include 1he normal search, early warning, detection, location, and identification of air targets by electronic means. 01her radars may be employed for strictly height finding purposes. Most radars maintain target position information accurately enough to permit target transfer to fire control radars, 1hus ensuring engagement by all weapons of 1he air defense system. -Limitations. Certain limitations upon surface radar are imposed by antenna size, frequency, power requirements, and 1he earlh's curvature. Low frequency sets give poor low-angle coverage and, bearing discrimination, may have fade areas in 1he vertical pattern. Conversely, high frequency sets are effective in 1he above shortcomings, but at 1he expense of range. Consequently, low and high frequency radars are often employed togelher in order to complement each olher. A furlher restriction is imposed by land/sea areas which reflect back into the radiation lobe and cause the interference described as "clutter." Since clutter can become a serious limitation, continuous wave radars and radars equipped with moving target indicators are employed whenever possible. • Airborne Radar -Functions. Airborne radar performs 1he same general functions as does surface radar, although some exclude a height finding capability. How ever, the inherent mobility of aircraft allows these radars to extend the radar horizon, thereby extending the destruction and surveillance area. Some aircraft may be used as an airborne early warning and control (AEW/C) facility. The latest models are equipped with data processing equipment and data communication links for information relay and are described as being equipped with the airborne tactical data system. These AEW aircraft are integrated into the AAWsystem. -Limitations. The primary limitation of AEW use in the MAGTF air defense system is their poor overland coverage characteristics which severely limit overland surveillance. This, however, is not a factor for newer AEW systems. Also, whereas surface radar is subjected to minor variations in temperature, pressure, and vibration, these variations may be quite extreme for an airborne system. A major limitation of AEW systems is that of availability. AEW aircraft with a control capability are not organic to the MAGTF and must come from other limited sources. The use of interceptor aircraft radar as a surveillance means while on combat air patrol also has limitations. Although interceptor aircraft can be organic to the MAGTF, the primary limitation is the quantity of aircraft required to cover a surveillance sector at extended ranges. Aircraft time on station is restricted by fuel consumption rates, and while in an orbit, the surveillance capability of a single CAP is not available 100 percent of the time because of the changing aircraft heading. This necessitates an examination of the assigned orbit, a calculation of search time lost per orbit, and a comparison of that time to the probable penetration distance which an enemy aircraft will travel during this time. The use of two aircraft to FMFM 5-5 compensate for this limitation imposes its own cost in aircraft utilization.The final limitation on search with airborne interceptors is that line ofground-to-air communication requirements will restrict the altitudes and ranges at which these aircraft may be stationed. (2) Electronic Interception. Electronic intercept equipment is used as electronic war fare support measures and is designed to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyzeradiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose ofexploiting such radiations in support of military operations. The intercept equipment includes facilities for receiving a signal, then determining the direction, source, and characteristics of the signal. Intercept equip. ment emits no signals of its own; therefore, it is capable of operating continuously without alerting the enemy. Electronic intercept equipment is particularly valuable underconditions of reduced visibility when the enemy is using electronic means for navigationand fire control. This application is most useful for offensive AAW purposes, but airdefense may also be secondarily served if incoming enemy emissions are detected priorto surveillance radar contact. This surveillance function may be performed by bothground and airborne equipment. (3) Aerial Infrared and Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) Reconnaissance andSuroeillance. For offensive AAW purposes, reconnaissance and surveillance are conducted to detect and identify the enemy air capabilities. In this application, the following means are employed: • Passive infrared collection makes it possible to conduct air reconnaissanceduring periods of reduced visibility. This device compensates for visual andphotographic methods which are relatively dependent upon conditions of goodvisibility. Portrayal methods used by passive infrared include scope presentation for instantaneous viewing and imagery recording on film for retention anddetailed study. • SLAR can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in condi tions of light rains, smoke, haze, and dust. Italso is valuable as a moving targetindicator. Information obtained should be supplemented by other means, suchas visual observation and photograph, which can better determine the natureof the SLAR detected activity. (4) Visual Suroeillance. Visual surveillance is a positive and secure means of detection which is used to fill the low-altitude gaps inaccessible to search radars. Visual means are greatly limited, however, by the ability of the observer to identify high-speed targets,the inability to detect long-range targets, and the obscuring of targets during conditionsof impaired visibility. Visual surveillance is performed by FAC's, FAAD gunners, other ground obServers, and aircrews. Its marked limitations relegate visual surveillance to a strictly secondary measure. f. Positioning ofSuroeillance Systems. In order to determine the effectiveness of surveillance, an examination of the various influences of positioning the means is required. For a comprehensive discussion of positioning surveillance means, see NWP 32. 56 g. Selection and Positioning of Weapons Systems. The determination of the required number and disposition of weapons elements, both aircraft and SAM's, is based on the minimum safe intercept point for each type threat, enemy delivery technique, attack altitudes and speeds, ordnance, and the anticipated rates of attack. Another determinant of weapons selection is the time lapse between target detection and actual interception. This time lapse is minimized by selecting optimum weapons systems and positions. h. Determination of Control Systems. Determining control systems involves selection, positioning, and the assignment of responsibilities. For a discussion of selection and positioning of control systems, see NWP 32. Responsibilities for the control of air defense are determined and assigned during planning. These assignments are in consonance with the missions and functions of the agencies listed in chapter 2. They establish priorities, command relaionships, and tasks as conditioned by the locations and capabilities of the units involved. Generally, air defense control is not decentralized below the level of the TAOC. In addition to the assignment of general control responsibilities, special provisions and measures are provided for the following: (1) Coverage limitations of surveillance equipment and weapons may require positioning of air defense systems outside the vital area. This dispersion requires special control pro visions. (2) Decentralization of functions is anticipated and planned for agencies which might become saturated in their target handling capabilities. (3) Decentralization of functions is plarmed for the possibility of communication system failures. The circumstances for unilateral assumption of decentralized air defense control authority must be clearly defined. • As such a failure may be progressive and/or widespread, each remaining agency must have compensatory activities assigned, particularly weapons control. • Plans for control system degradation include preassigned aircraft electronic identification codes and the establishment of air corridors, control reporting points, restricted areas, and other special aircraft flight procedures to aid in friendly identification. All control agencies are furnished the locations of friendly aircraft orbit and • control points to assure their awareness of friendly aircraft activity, thus providing aircraft a degree of safety in the event of ground system failures. i. Electronic Warfare Considerations. In the determination of AAW employment ashore, elec tronic warfare considerations must be examined for possible application. Prior to the movement ashore, offensive AAW and deep air support strikes generally employ organic electronic warfare capabilities as protection for strike aircraft. The degree of this EW activity depends upon the corresponding degree of the enemy's electronic employment. The communication nets utilizedbetween intercommand(s) as well as the aircraft control nets will be prime targets for enemy jamming. By the time the MAGTF lands against a relatively sophisticated enemy, the EW environment probably has already been created. Electronic counter-countermeasures are found inthe MACCS to protect the MAGTF electronic capability and are employed in the phasing andestablishment of the MAGTF ashore. However, in addition to ECCM, other factors may be used to the advantage and protection of the MA GTF air defense capability and to reduce the effectiveness of an enemy air attack. If the requirements of offensive air activity allow, the MACCS may draw upon the ECM assets found in the VMA Qaircraft for use in air defense. Further, theMACCS employs electronic emission control to reduce its vulnerability to enemy ECM. (l) Electronic Countenneasures. The use of certain ECM capabilities is coordinated with weapons and control means to degrade the effectiveness of an enemy air attack.The intent of this ECM, as employed, is to degrade the efficiency of enemy equipmentand tactics employing or affected by electromagnetic radiation. (a) Electronic lamming. Electronic jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic signals with the object of impairing the useof electronic devices by the enemy. Jamming is employed against both communication or noncommunication-electronic equipment. Examples of the latter are_electronic navigational aids, radars, drones, some fuzes, and guided missiles. (b) Electronic Deception. Electronic deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alternation, absorption, or reflection of electromagnetic radiations in amanner designed to mislead an enemy in the interpretation of data received by hiselectronic equipment, or to present false indications to his electronic sensors.Deception may also be employed against communication or noncommunicationelectronic equipment. It is directed primarily against the enemy electronic surveillance, acquisition, and control systems and the enemy communication intelligence activity. (c) ECM Equipment. ECM devices are both electronic and nonelectronic. Theelectronic jammer type equipment includes continuous wave or noise-modulated, high-power, brute-force jammers and pulsed or repeater jammers using varioustypes of modulation. Repeater jammers also serve as an electronic deceptiondevice. Nonelectronic jamming and deception equipment includes such devices as chaff, window, rope, corner reflectors, and kites. (2) Electronic Emission Control (EMCON). The management process of electronic radiation is important to the security of friendly forces both en route to and once ashore in the AOA. Therefore, EMCON procedures will be analyzed and planned for each opera tion as enemy capabilities dictate. An enemy with any degree of electronic sophisticationmay be expected to employ the same general techniques to collect MAGTF electronics characteristics. Accordingly, planning will provide for the following FMFM 5-5 (a) Enemy Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Capability. Early in the planning process, ATF intelligence personnel, in conjunction with communication-electronic staff representatives, will examine the enemy capability to employ signals intelligence. This capability will then be defined as closely as possible by type, degree of coverage available, and collection means. The product of the analysis is then provided to the concerned ground, sea, and air control elements for review and analysis. (b) MAGTF Planning Considerations. Once received by the MAGTF, this capability is analyzed along with other enemy capabilities in the preparation of the intelligence estimate. Required additional information is formulated into the appropriate essential elements of information (EEl). (For further extended discussion of the intelligence process, see FMFM 2-1 ). If available information appears to be adequate, it is disseminated to the appropriate MAGTF elements for consideration in the planning process. This discussion will be concerned with EMCON only as it affects the MACCS. (c) MACCS EMCON. Within the EMCON procedures developed for the MACCS, the following responsibilities are found: • TACC. With control ashore, the TACC becomes the directing agency for the promulgation of EMCON conditions. The plans for implementation will include: -Means for recognition of the enemy's employment of their various SIGINT processes, wherever possible. -Designation of which emission sources are considered necessary under which varying conditions of enemy SIGINT or ECM activity. -Rules of engagement for SIGINT/ECM sources and the agencies responsible for engagement -Designation of specific equipment for "shut down" considering the necessity for their use during the various air defense alert conditions. -Procedures for information exchange between the various air, sea, and ground control agencies concerning enemy SIGINT/ECM activity. -Procedures for implementation of necessary EMCON measures during conditions of communication systems degradation. • TAOC. The responsibilities of the TAOC under the prescribed EMCON conditions include: -Reporting to the TACC evidence of enemy SIGINT/ECM reported by any subordinate agencies or aircraft under control. FMFM 5-5 -Initiating and supervising the prescribed EMCON activity as itaffects the antiaircraft operations center/battery control centerEW/C facilities, AEW/C aircraft, and the Marine air traffic controlsquadron. -Directing the engagement SIGINT/ECM processes wherever possible. -Initiating the necessary ECCM activity within the TAOC and sub. ordinate agencies according to the capabilities of the agencies and the requirements of the situation. -Preparing to assume sector EMCON direction if the TACC is notcapable of so doing. • DASC. Within an enemy SIGINT/ECM environment, the DASC's responsibilities will include the following: -Reporting to the TACC evidence of enemy SIGINT/ECM as identified by any subordinate control agency, ground combat element,or aircraft under their control. -Initiating and supervising the prescribed EMCON activity as itaffects the status of in-progress direct air support (DAS) missionsand air support radar team functioning. -Advising the appropriate level fire support coordination center(FSCC) of any reduction in the capability to provide direct airsupport due to existing EMCON procedures. -Reporting to the TACC and TAOC all identified enemy SIGINT/ ECM activity after the initiation of EMCON conditions and react ing as required. j. Prescribing Alternate Agencies. In an air defense environment, provisions are made in case of operational failure of the TAOC either from enemy action or system malfunction. Failuresmust not disrupt the continuity of air defense operations and some system degradations mustbe anticipated during planning to provide alternatives. In lieu of establishing a duplicate TAOC within a sector, proper planning will ensure air defense functional continuity. This preservation requires significant decentralization of authority as well as imposing some operating restrictions on friendly aircraft. Local standing operating procedures (SOP's) will establish the specific procedures and relationships for decentralized operations. The EW/C and AEW/C facilities may assume some of the functions of a TAOC. Since each of these facilities possess the same basic capabilities, they are considered equally suitable as alternate facilities for performing some TAOC functions. Long-range surveillance capabilities will vary with each configuration, butthese facilities do offer the MAGTF continuity of this vital function. Further, these facilitiesalso offer an alternate means of control for interceptor aircraft. ATDS equipped AEW/C aircraft allow semiautomatic data exchange with the TACC and reduce the requirement for thedegree of decentralization necessary with a manual EW/C facility. However, where both 60 FMFM 5-5 operational modes are concerned, saturation occurs more quickly, coordination with missile systems is indirect, and the general level and quality of management is greatly reduced. Other alternate facilities (i.e., the AAOC) must compensate for these shortcomings. 3205. The preceding paragraphs in this section have discussed the various functions required for FUNCTIONAL effective air defense. It is appropriate to discuss the interrelationships of the various air defense INTEGRATION functions and to describe the sequence of air defense activity. The TAOC, due to its air defense design, is the focal point for all such activity and is also the point of primary evaluation of the various inputs. An examination of the internal tasks of the TAOC should effectively illus trate the ratiomile behind the preceding discussion. Warning. The surveillance identification section provides detection, acquisition, and identi· a. fication of all unknown targets within the assigned air defense sector. Subsectors are assigned according to the specifics of the situation, and surveillance is accomplished within these sub sectors. For this task, operators employ the radar organic to the TAOC as well as surveillance reports from SAM and EW/C radars. "Unknown" contacts are forwarded by these sources for the application of identification criteria by the warning section. Altitude information is con firmed. Then, flight plan correlation, use of friendly corridors, and aircraft flight character· istics are applied to the contact to provide identification. Should all of these methods fail to produce positive identification, the track is designated as unknown. b. Traffic Control. The traffic control section performs the TAOC's most reliable identifi· cation process-positive control of friendly aircraft. All operating fixed-wing aircraft transiting the sector or not otherwise under control of another MACCS element are processed through the TAOC. The TAOC traffic control task is performed by one or more weapons control teams as permitted by the air defense alert condition. Subsectors are assigned these weapons control teams to allow for concentration of effort and to assist recall. En route friendly aircraft are received by these teams, identified, designated, and either vectored or monitored as they pro ceed with their mission. If the mission requires control by another agency, aircraft are released but will be required to report back for recovery and reclassification. Aircraft reporting in/out procedures are found in FMFM 5-l. Not only is safety served by this process, but ideally, all fixed-wing aircraft are under active control/monitoring at all times. This control/monitoring allows rapid comparison of the warning section reports to known position information. These operators also query agencies external to the TAOC concerning their positive control informa tion. Should internal data not allow correlation, an attempt is made by the traffic controller to correlate positive control position information from other agencies such as the DASC or Marine air traffic control squadron. If time and target speed allow, correlation will be at tempted before initiating any engagement. This process is vital not only for friendly aircraft safety but also for air traffic management. It should also be obvious that as sector aircraft density increases, less time will be available for the TAOC to individually query each positive control agency. 61 c. Weapons. The weapons section responds to weapons assignments, executes decentralizedthreat evaluation and weapons assignment when authorized, and performs the engagement processes. The desired engagement sequence is interceptors first, then Hawk surface-to-air missiles. Within the weapons section, enemy air tactics, friendly air performance characteristics, and air-to-air engagement techniques are evaluated to produce a successful engagement. Surface to-air engagement techniques are evaluated to produce a successful engagement. Surface-to-air missile performance characteristics and engagement boundaries are also considered. In an ECMenvironment. all weapons elements blend their composite ECCM capabilities to ensure the completed engagement. The weapons section maintains the status of weapons resources and theprogress ofengagements for display to the command section. d. Command. The command section provides supervision and direction of internal functionsas well as a point of command contact with senior and adjacent agencies. Itensures the compliance with all in-flight operational procedures specified by the TACC as well as the destruction of hostile air targets. In so doing, air defense weapons resources must he efficiently and effec.lively managed and compensations must meet unforeseen shortcomings. Air defense alert conditions, set by the TACC for the MAGTF, are disseminated by the command section. Thissection provides the supervisory talent required when the TAOC assumes limited or emergencyTADC functions. The command section must maintain continuing and accurate analysis of theair defense situation and the total sector air situation while they oversee the passage of thisinformation to superior, adjacent. or subordinate air defense agencies. FMFM 5-5 Section III PREPARATION This section addresses some of the preparatory activities required to conduct an amphibious operation. Essentially, there are two aspects to this section. In preparing to execute amphibious antiair warfare, some activity is oriented solely to the function of AAW. Other preparations are required, because of the operation, which are relatively independent of the AAW function. Section V blends these functions in its descripiton of AAWin amphibious operations. This section identifies and discusses the nature of these factors. Training for AAW is a substantial requirement and must be continuous in order to maintain readiness. Air defense is particularly rigorous in its requirements for communications, coordi nation, integration, and control. High proficiency levels must be achieved by aircrews, supervisors, controllers, and operator personnel to attain necessary response times. Whenever possible, special training should be conducted to familiarize all personnel with unusual but predictable AAW situations. The training and readiness manual syllabi cover the detailed aspects of an individual's training requirements. More general individual and organizational AAW training requirements are as follows: a. Offensive AAW. General areas for offensive AAW training are: (1) Strike&. Experience is required in ordnance delivery against ground targets. Aircrews should be familiar with delivery techniques used for conventional ordnance and guided air-to-surface weapons in a hostile air and ground environment Training should be con ducted by all aircrews to develop SAM evasion/countering procedures for the types of SAM's which are anticipated. This training should be conducted by all types of aircraft and should emphasize detection and evasion techniques. The opportunity exists to con duct this training in conjunction with Marine air defense units and should be exploited. One area often overlooked is the training of enlisted crewmen in the detection of SAM firings. (2) ECM Coordination. Closely related to the preceding training are coordination procedures among an aerial strike force comprised of attack, fighter, and electronic warfare aircraft Here again, coordination requirements may be strict, particularly in regulating attacks on hostile missile sites or well-defended targets/installations. (3) Combat Air Patrol/Strike Aircraft Coordination. Coordination between CAP and strike aircraft requires training attention for offensive AAW. Target CAP (TARCAP) 3301. GENERAL 3302. TRAINING FMFM S-5 engagement procedures may require close coordination with strike aircraft, if the strikeforce is actively threatened by hostile aircraft. (4) Airborne Early Warning Control. Ideally, there will be no unique requirements forAEW aircraft control training. It should be the same as that involved with any air con trol/radar agency. These types of aircraft are not organic to Marine ·aviation, but are found in the U.S. Navy. It can be anticipated that they will be encountered, particularlywith advance force operations. The ATDS should guarantee procedural standarizationbetween surface and airborne control agencies. Periodic reviews of these procedures arerequired to identify and adjust to changing requirements brought about by technologicaladvancements. (5) Attack Aircraft Intercepts. Emergency situations may arise in which attack aircraftare diverted to interceptor missions. This may occur only rarely, if at all, but does exist as a contingency option to a tactical air commander. The air control requirements forclose positive radar control are very strict. The intercept itself is demanding, but can becomplicated by an aircrew's unfamiliarity with ground control intercept (GCI) procedures and techniques. Some familiarization with GCI is required for attack aircrews, andGCI controllers should be capable of successfully conducting gunnery type intercepts. Intercept simulators and liaison with attack squadrons may satisfy this requirement (6) Air Refueling Procedures. These procedures are normally found in crew trainingprograms for most aircraft capable of air refueling. When aviation assets are limited,air refueling contributes significantly to aircraft availability by extending on-stationtimes of airborne aircraft. This is even more pertinent in an active air-to-air combat situation in which engagements will rapidly draw down from interceptor aircraft reserves. Air refueling allows either an extension of on-station time, or the maintenance of scheduled on-station time for aircraft completing engagement Training for these operationsmay not be AAW unique, but is significant to AAW. Airspace control for these air refueling operations is also significant to overall airspace control requirements. b. Air Defense. There are training requirements which are singularly identifiable to airdefense. (1) Intercept Training. Both aircrews and air controllers require prescribed intercept training. This training is normally the subject of daily operations for these personnel andorganizations. Due to equipment reliability factors, training must also include intercepts under degraded equipment modes. In combat, engagement of identified hostile aircraftwill not be discontinued because of airborne or ground system degradation. Air defenseobjectives provide for defense in-depth and attempt to ensure optimal intercept conditions, but first they provide for engagement Degraded airborne or ground system condiditions can be simulated or actually experienced and intercepts under these conditionscan be practiced. The probabilities that both aircraft and ground system failures/degradations will occur simultaneouslyare low. The possibility of partial loss of airborne electronics is defmite and should be anticipated. Ground controllers require the capability 64 FMFM 5-5 for close positive radar control of an intercept to a point at which the interceptor may make a visual attack with nonradar dependent weapons. The controller must also he cap able of performing intercepts in the manual mode of the ground system. From a close positive radar control viewpoint, the worst case for intercept control is under broadcast control conditions. These conditions are the lowest level of ground control capability and interceptor aircrews have to determine and execute their own attack headings and relative positioning. In all of the preceding cases, experience is required with degraded modes of operation and should be the subject of individual training. (2) Electronic Counter-Countermeasures. All elements of the air defense system require experience with ECCM capabilities in the equipment they operate. ECCM techniques should he the subject of frequent instruction, and actual experience should be scheduled whenever possible. Electronic warfare is a sensitive area and most pertinent information is classified. For this reason, personnel tend to shy away from the subject in favor of continuing normal operations. Substantial coordination may have to he met. These conditions must he accepted if realistic ECCM capabilities are to be achieved by air defense system control agencies and weapons systems. (3) Emission Control. Perhaps one area which requires a great deal of procedural detail, but less actual understanding, is EMCON. Responsibilities for EMCON applications are contained in paragraph 3204. The development of EMCON procedures requires the greatest degree of analysis. Once developed, distribution of these procedures and periodic exercises are adequate to ensure familiarity. The nature of EMCON is such that procedural dissemination and coordinating reaction times are the keys to proficiency. Operating personnel do not require a knowledge of how or why the procedures exist, but more what the procedures are and what response times are involved. There is a require ment for certain supervisory personnel to become familiar with "how's" and "why's" in the event that adjustments are required in an actual situation. This training may he in tense, almost in the nature of a formal school. Certain simulation capabilities greatly assist EMCON training. (4) Interagency Coordination. As discussed under intercept training requirements, ground control agencies must expect to experience periodic system degradation. Training is required in all systems for reversion to fully manual operations. This also contributes to planning, since this training will identify necessary configuration, manning, and infor mation exchange modifications. Another aspect of interagency coordination is training which emphasizes alternate agencies and the experience to be gained by practicing to assume the tasks of another agency. Paragraph 5303 also discusses these responsibilities. (5) SAM Identification and Engagement. Visual training for Redeye gunners is a con tinuous requirement. Hawk units also have a responsibility for identification and engage ment. The requirement to train under a degraded mode of operation may generate a requirement for Hawk units to perform preliminary identification oftargets they acquire, which are not acquired by the :;I'AOC or are at either ranges or altitudes within TAOC detection capabilities. These "popup" targets must be reacted to in a relatively short time. Intensive training is required to ensure Hawk proficiency in identification proced ures to include all control points/lanes in an area of operation. This requires dissemina tion of airspace control overlays down to the firing battery level. 65 FMFM 5-5 FMFM l-3A, (6) Organic Ground Weapons. FMFM 1-3A contains a discussion of air defense trainingwith organic ground weapons and can be applied by all elements of the MAGTF whomay be subjected to air attack. These considerations are pertinent even to units not within the ground combat element of the MAGTF. Although not frequently recognized astraining objectives, small arms air defense training can be conducted by aviation combatelement units and combat service support element units, both more likely to find themselves in defensive combat situations. (7) Mobility Training. Mobility training is an area of frequent emphasis, but one whichneeds to be cautiously approached. Marines recognize their historical readiness to deploy upon short notice. It is significant to maintain this readiness, but indiscriminate trainingfor full organizational deployment may be prohibitively expensive and counterproduc-tive. A reasonable alternative is found in varying the configurations of operational agencies and employing detachments/modules for exercise purposes. The selection of criteria for mobility training should be the same as those for a rehearsal. (8) Miscellaneous Operational Training. The bounds of operational training are subjectonly to the imagination. There are numerous combinations of capabilities which can bepostulated and practiced. The last 10 to 15 percent of full operational readiness is theability of an organization/agency to adapt and perform well in unusual situations. Thesesituations are the most severe test of the ability to synthesize variables and objectivesand to respond promptly and effectively. An example of such a special case would be thetraining of the AAOC to perform CAP/SAM coordination in the event ofTAOC casualty;Another example is deployment of an EW/C facility with an LAAM battery to test its ability to react. These are just two of many situations which could be conceivably encountered in a tactical situation. Expectations and training scenarios should be reasonable in their content; there is little to be gained by having aircraft train to ram other aircraft for last-chance air defense operations. But, there still are a great many variations onthe doctrinal theme of the integrated functioriing of the MACCS and which can contribute to training effectiveness. 3303. a. Embarkation. Due to the sizable embarkation requirements and the longer loading timesREHEARSALS associated with many participants in AAW, rehearsals may not be practicable. In making thisdetermination, the nature and the requirement for rehearsills must be considered. The purposesfor conducting rehearsals are to test the following: • Adequacy of, and familiarity of all echelons with, plans. • Timing of detailed operations. • Combat readiness of participating forces. • Communications. b. Alternatives. There are obviously other ways to test the above criteria for AAW other than physically embarking aboard ship and going through the ship-to-shore movement; and in air 66 FMFM 5-5 defense, a requirement for a rehearsal to test the timing of detailed operations may he less critical. Air defense is time-sensitive by nature and, under normal operating conditions, is routinely practiced as a function of time. Therefore, no unusual requirement to check timing may exist. Detailed plans which relate to the embarkation, unloading, movement to position, and the coming operation for those air defense elements found in either scheduled waves or on-call waves may, however, he prime candidates for rehearsals. Redeye elements, Hawk AFU's, even major portions of Hawk batteries of EW/C sites may he found in these waves. Boat space requirements, actual loading time, and communications might well he tested for adequacy. Involved units should he made available for rehearsals and participate in at least the final rehearsal of an integrated rehearsal. c. Staff Rehearsals. Other AAW elements will normally participate in at least staff rehearsals or separate force rehearsals as appropriate. The most critical key to determination of the re quirement for rehearsals is communications. Since larger AAWmeans will normally he found as either nonscheduled units or in general unloading, their participation in rehearsals is not crucial. The phasing of control ashore can be varied as debarkation conditions allow, but the one constant vital factor is communications. Command post exercises which test communications, according to the sequence of passing control ashore, are extremely valuable and should he incorporated into rehearsals, even though ground combat and other elements do not carry their rehearsals thatfar. For this reason, and because ofshipping restrictions, a separate force rehearsal may have to be formulated for the air defense system. Operations security encompasses "those actions that are necessary and appropriate to deny the 3304. enemy information concerning planned, ongoing, and completed operalions." All personnel OPERATIONS must he forewarned as to the threat aspects in various areas such as: SECURITY • Electronic Surveillance. The hostile capabilities in the areas of radar, IFF, and similar active emitters. • Signals Intelligence. The hostile capabilities in the areas of communications, elec tronics, and telemetry communications. • Human Intelligence. The hostile capabilities and practices in the areas of espionage; subversion; exploitation of lost, captured, or misplaced documents; and prisoner interrogation. • Open Literature. The hostile capability to exploit news media releases and technical publications divulging information relative to weapons, tactics, and operations and to exploit unclassified military communications, such as weather and flight plan traffic, by overt means. 67 FMFM 5-5 Section IV OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT 3401. An AAW capability for any size MAGTF is virtually a necessity; however, the employment andGENERAL preparation for AAW in amphibious operations are substantial and complex. Recognizing that attainment of local air superiority is a prerequisite for an amphibious operation, this section discusses deployment alternatives and the trade-offs between capability and movement/lift requirements. 3402. There are two aspects to advanced base operations, once the term is defined. They are advancedADVANCED base operations in support of a theater operation and advanced base operations in support of anBASE amphibious operation.OPERATIONS a. Definition. An advanced base is defined as "a base located in or near a theater of opera tions whose primary mission is to support military operations." (JCS Pub 1) b. Advanced Base in a Theater of Operations. In this instance, an amphibious operationmight be conducted to seize an advanced base in support of a theater-wide or strategic objective. An MAGTF could be employed to provide security for a proportionately larger aviationcombat element, supporting a theater-wide objective such as air superiority or air defense.This is one alternative situation in which the majority of shipping/lifting resources would beaviation dedicated. While not commonly associated with amphibious operations themselves,the purposes of many amphibious operations has been the seizure of advanced bases. These types of operations do not reduce the air defense deployment requirements. c. Advanced Base in Support ofan Amphibious Operation. The use of advanced bases fromwhich to support amphibious operations reduces some of the burden of deploying air defensecapability with assault shipping. There are some basic qualifiers here as well. There is muchmore flexibility in an advanced base for offensive AAW. The combat radius of strike aircraftis much greater than the effective radius of fixed-wing air defense means. The combat radius can also be extended through air refueling. Given appropriate airfield operations capability,advance aviation forces can be deployed to advanced bases in or adjacent to the AOA to conduct offensive AAW and other air operations. One advantage to this situation is the time madeavailable to conduct these operations. Another advantage is the obviously reduced lift support from amphibious assault shipping. A third advantage is the flexibility it offers the groundscheme of maneuver in relation to seizing and securing airfields in the objective area. This sameadvantage in short term operations serves as a disadvantage in longer term operations. En route 68 FMFM 5-5 or transit times for fixed-wing operations from the advanced base to the immediate objective area will become costly in terms of reaction times, times on-station, and aircraft and aircrew utiliz11tion. The surge rates for missions supporting D-day and immediately thereafter will require an intensive aircraft maintenance effort. This surge will impact upon aircraft capabilities to satisfy it and to sustain operations from extended distances. This type of situation can only exist for a limited amount of time before the toll has to be paid in aircraft availabilities. For operations of more than a very brief duration, air operations from advanced bases are too costly. Landing force aviation should be established within the force beachhead area as soon as feasible. Carrier basing is an alternative to advanced base operations, but only applies to aircraft organi3403. zations. A colateral mission of Marine aviation is to augment Navy aviation forces as required. CARRIER Marine aviation units should be placed aboard carriers, but in so doing, they become a part of BASING the ship's combat complement. As such, they would perform missions as assigned to the ship by the fleet commander. As part of a carrier strike force, they may or may not participate in oper ations supportive of an amphibious task force. In either case, they definitely would not be part of landing force aviation. In a strategic sense, carrier basing provides greater flexibility to oper ational planners than advanced bases do. Yet, for Marines, this advantage does not apply, since forfeiture of control accompanies this alternative. Additionally, carrier basing does not encom pass control units and no major embarkation gains are made. A possible, but not probable, exception to this situation would be where a carrier strike force is assigned to support an am phibious task force, under the control of the CATF. Then Marine aviation could be part of landing force aviation and could be phased ashore as soon as conditions allowed. This is not normally planned, however, as it would place too many operating constraints upon carrier operations, and carriers are the most lucrative targets of all Navy forces. Even if such a situa tion occurred, carrier forces would not remain in the AOA for a significant amount of time, and here again, Marine aviation would have to be phased ashore early in the operation. 3404. In most amphibious operations involving the MAGTF of MAB or larger size, a prime consider ation will be the early establishment of aviation ashore. A number of factors lead to this reEARLY PHASING quirement. They are described as follows: ASHORE a. Warning System Extension. The capabilities of shipboard surveillance systems are limited where overland surveillance is required. This necessitates early establishment ashore of surveil lance and communication means to extend this landward surveillance. This is a most significant factor and is meaningful to defense of not only the forces ashore, but also the fleet This is accomplished according to the following sequence: (1) Redeye. Depending upon the threat, SAM (Redeye) teams may accompany sched uled, assault waves. They are limited to visual surveillance, but they do offer some additional defense in depth and a primitive "gap-filler" capability. 69 (2) Hawk. Hawk assault fire units or even full batteries may be found either as on-callwaves or as nonscheduled units. With this weapons system, low level, short-range radarsurveillance substitutes for that provided by Redeye units. Depending upon the configu~ ration of the Hawk batteries, the increase in landward surveillance can be meaningful, particularly at low altitudes. Control continues to be exercised from afloat, but surveil· lance and detection capabilities are increased. (3) Early Warning and Control Sites. It is feasible to load the necessary equipment foran EW/C site into on-call boat waves. In fact, the embarkation requirements for the min imum configuration of shelters, radar, and other equipment are less than for a full Hawkbattery. If semiautomatic capability is desired, more equipment is obviously required and could necessitate a shift from on-call waves to nonscheduled units. As always, theprimary criterion is the nature of the threat and the relative priorities for boat spaces.The increase in landward surveillance reliability can be significant, however, by introduction of such an agency prior to establishment of a fully equipped TAOC. Warning andcontrol facilities are phased ashore as described in section V, this chapter. b. Weapons Systems Ashore. The next consideration has already been addressed in discussionof the disadvantages of advanced bases and carrier basing. For landing force aviation to be the most effective, it is to be established ashore at the earliest possible moment. Distances associ ated with advanced base operations are eventually costly in terms of aircraft availability. Mobil ity requirements and the strategic significance of carrier strike forces strongly suggest against their being allowed to stay within an AOA for any length of time. The ideal situation would be the allocation of sufficient resources to allow initial air operations to be conducted from an advanced base with additional assets to move ashore at the earliest feasible opportunity. In any case, the point to be made is that landing force aviation is organized and equipped to operate in an expeditionary mode, and that this capability should be fully exploited. FMFM 5-5 Section V EXECUTION 3501. The following general observations apply to execution of AAW during the amphibious assault: GENERAL Major AAW Problems Peculiar to an Amphibious Operation. The development of an anti a. air warfare effort within the AOA involves problems and conditions with which other opera tions are not normally confronted, such as: • The necessity of simultaneously defending the forces afloat and ashore as well as pro viding air defense for helicopter movements. • The problem of control within the amphibious task force of both waterborne and land-based antiair warfare means operating simultaneously, and often under condi tions of wide separation. • The frequent problem of integrating the amphibious task force antiair warfare system into a much broader system under a unified or area commander. • The complication of air surveillance and employment of antiair warfare means caused by the large number of friendly aircraft operating simultaneously in the objective area during the assault phase. .. Fur • The time-consuming transfer of antiair warfare equipment from ship to shore thermore, the conditions under which the transfer is made subject the equipment i:o rough handling and impose limits on its weight and size. b. Sequence of Events.. Execution of AAW in support of art amphibious assault is intricate and complex, and requires close coordination. Offensive AAW continues to be accomplished, probably from efforts of an advance group of the ATF, or from a strike force which is not part of the ATF but which is part of an overall joint task force (JTF). Active air defense weapons consist of aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. Appropriately, similar weapons are found within the naval elements of the ATF for its air defense means. As soon as landward surveillance by the ATF is practicable, at least two air defense sectors are established-landward and seaward. Initially, shipboard and airborne early warning radars are employed for surveillance and identi fication. Air operations requiring air control and air target identification are conducted within the designated combat information centers (CIC) where radar control capabilities exist Toward this effort, force or sector antiair warfare (SAAW) operations are conducted through these CIC's under the supervision and coordination of the TACC (afloat). Therefore, ATF air defense employment entails centralized coordinaion and decentralized control throughout the various sectors of responsibility. As the assault forces land and proceed inland, the necessary DAS control facilities are landed and prepare to assume control of DAS operations. One of the 71 FMFM 5-5 significant factors in establishing landing force air defense agencies ashore is the effectiveness ofsurveillance coverage available through shipboard and airborne radars. Accordingly, terrain considerations and threat capability affect the timing and sequence of landing air defense meansashore. 3502. a. GeneraL Preassault operations are those operations conducted in the objective area by subPRE-D-DAY ordinate elements of the ATF which are normally organized into an advance force. They inOPERATIONS clude air reconnaissance, offensive AAW, and electronic warfare. While this paragraph treatspreassault operations, it is recognized that related supporting operations may be conducted by other fleet and theater forces prior to the arrival of the advance force. Since such supportingoperations contribute to the preparation for the amphibious assault, they should be responsiveto the requirements of the ATF. Operations, preparatory to an amphibious operation, are conducted for the following purposes: • To isolate the objective area. • To gain information of the enemy. • To prepare the objective area. b. Operations Prior to Arrival ofAdvance Force (1) Requirements. The nature of a specific amphibious operation may impose certainrequirements which cannot be met by the forces assigned to the CATF. To ensure thatall his requirements are fulfilled, the CATF submits requests to higher authority for accomplishment of tasks by forces not a part of the amphibious task force. These operations are undertaken on direction of higher authority prior to the arrival of the advanceforce, or prior to the arrival of the main body of the ATF, if an advance force is not em ployed. (2) Tasks. Any or all of the AAW tasks discussed below may be accomplished prior tothe arrival of the advance force. (a) Isolation and Attainment of Superiority. Isolation of the objective area isaccomplished primarily by air operations designed to sever lines of communica tions. However, bombardment of enemy installations by naval gunfire, and sink ing of enemy shipping by surface or submarine attacks also contribute toisolation.Air, surface, and subsurface superiority is attained by bombardment, surface andair sweeps, and antisubmarine operations. Destruction or neutralizaion of distantenemy forces that threaten the ATF, including the advance force, provides freedom from enemy interference while the task force is en route to the objectivearea. 72 FMFM 5-5 (b) Destruction of Specific Targets. Destruction of specific targets in the objec tive area may be undertaken by airstrikes and naval gunfire, by raids, and/or through clandestine operations. Raids and clandestine operations may be under taken by units or individuals transported by surface, subsurface, and air means. (c) Collection ofEnemy Information. Information about the objective area and enemy installations and dispositions may be obtained by: • All measures of aerial reconnaissance. • Operations of amphibious reconnaissance patrols and amphibious raids. • Electronics intercept and direction finding. (d) Destruction or Neutralization of Distant Forces. Destruction or neutraliza tion of distant forces and installations, which will contribute to the success of the assault, may be accomplished. Such operations may include attack on cargo as sembly points, troop installations, or distant naval and air bases. c. Advance Force Operations. An advance force is a temporary organization within the ATF. It is usually dissolved on D-day when the main body of the ATF arrives in the objective area. At this time, the various elements of the advance force are assigned or reassigned to other parts of the ATF. d. Tasks to be Accomplished by the Advance Force. Tasks to be accomplished by the advance force may include any or all of the following: (1) Destruction of Defense Ashore. The advance force destroys beach and landing zone defenses, gun emplacements, control and observation posts, and any other installations which would be used by the enemy in opposing the surface and helicopterbome assaults. Naval gunfire, airstrikes, and artillery, if emplaced, are utilized for the destruction of enemy facilities. (2) Isolation ofthe Objective andAttainmentand Maintenance ofLocalAir Superiority. Attacks by airstrikes, naval gunfire, and amphibious raids are made, when required, against airfields, aircraft, communication and supply centers, shipping, and other critical targets to isolate the objective and attain and/or maintain local air superiority. (3) Pre-D-Day Landings. Pre-D-day landings may be executed for reconnaissance, des truction, or harassment purposes; to capture offshore islands or promontories for the establishment of artillery, navigation aids, radar stations, or logistic bases; or for other reasons. Helicopterbome troop units or airborne units may be employed effectively to accomplish these pre-D-day missions including the reconnaissance of helicopter landing zones and drop zones. Such landings are usually executed in the same manner as the main landings. 73 (4) Electronics Countermeasure&. The advance force obtains maximum information ofthe enemy's communications and electronic facilities in, and adjacent to, the objectivearea. During advance force operations, these facilities are neutralized or destroyed inorder to prepare the objective area for assault. Before destruction is ordered, due consideration must be given to: • Intelligence which may be gained through interception of enemy communications. • Possible use of enemy facilities in the objective area, which may be capturedby the landing force. e. Supporting Arms. An advance force provides support for its. various elements as theyaccomplish their tasks in preparing the objective area for assault. (1) Air and Naval Gunfire. All elements of an advance force engaged in preparing theobjective for assaultare provided with air and naval gunfire support as necessary. (2) Control and Coordination (a) The advance force commander establishes in his flagship an advance forcesupporting arms coordination center (SACC). The advance force supporting annscoordinator maintains an up.to-date target list to pass on to the SACC of theamphibious task force. (b) An advance echelon of the landing force FSCC usually accompanies theSACC. The officer in charge of this advance echelon functions as the landingforce representative in the SACC during advance force operations. He advises the advance force supporting arms coordinator on landing force fire supportmatters.He maintains a complete record of all targets discovered and engaged by air andnaval gunfire elements of the advance force. (c) Control of tactical air operations is exercised through the tactical air control system (TACC/TADC) aboard the flagship of the advance force commander. (3) Coordination With Other Forces. The advance force commander coordinates theoperation of his force with those of other forces in the same area. (a) Air. All aircraft operating in the objective area during advance force operations are under the control of the commander of the advance force. In order toavoid confusion and to assure the safety of friendly forces, coordinated planningis necessary between the advance force and other forces whose aircraft may enter the area. Such forces include fast carrier task forces, hunter-killer forces, striking and covering forces, and U.S. Air Force forces if required. Coordinated planning is necessary for airstrikes, identification, search and rescue, warning, approach to the area, and reconnaissance matters. (b) Other Forces. Prior to the arrival of the advance force in the objective area, other forces may have conducted attacks or reconnaissance therein. The advance force is interested in the results of these missions, and information is provided by such forces to the advance force. (4) Protection of the Advance Force. An advance force conducts its own air defense and protective operations while en route to and in the objective area. In air operations during the assault, emphasis is placed on close support of the assault troops, while execution of all other required air operations continues. Offensive and defensive air operations begun prior to assault operations are maintained, and preparation of the landing area continues. Aircraft not otherwise used are assigned specific targets or areas in which observed enemy are located. Strike groups range outward from the landing area to destroy enemy formatioris and installations. a. ControL Initially, the CATF controls air operations and exercises airspace control through the tactical air control center afloat. Control of close air support and other air operations may be passed ashore when the control agencies ashore are ready to operate, and in accordance with the plan and the dictates of the tactical situation. When the CATF passes control of air operations to the CLF, the latter exercises control of air operations through the tactical air command (Marine)/control (Air Force) center ashore. If the Air Force provides the preponderance of tactical aviation and a commander other than the CLF assumes control of air operations for the CLF, the designated commander will establish and operate a comprehensive airspace control system responsive to the authority of the CLF, subject to the overall authority of the CATF. Maximum integration of landing force tactical control elements will be effected through the assignment, insofar as practicable, of block airspace and/or sectors of responsibility within which authority for control of aerial vehicles organic to each Service and/or belonging to other Services can be delegated. The functions previously performed by the SACC afloat will be assumed by the landing force FSCC. The commander ashore to whom this responsibility is passed assumes the related responsibilities for the daily planning and execution of those air operations. b. Antiair Warfare/Counterair. Antiair warfare/counterair measures are continued as necessary. Aircraft are shifted to meet changing requirements, and except under conditions of heavy and prolonged enemy air attack, an:tiair warfare/counterair does not exclude the assignment of fighter aircraft to other missions. As soon as conditions permit, the landing force air warning FMFM 5-5 3503. D-DAY OPERATIONS organization is established ashore in order to extend the air warning system of the ATF. Land ing force air defense units are landed and integrated into the antiair warfare/counterair controlsystem. Air control agencies of the landing force are integrated into the overall antiair warfare/counterair control system and initially are directed operationally by the TACC (afloat). c. Initial Air Defense Means. The greatest influences in determining what is to compriseinitial air defense elements ashore, and when they are to land, are the extent of the enemy airthreat, the embarkation or "boat" space available, and the landward radar coverage required.It is highly probable where a definite air threat exists, that air defense means will be sent ashore early, but they will be limited in their size and the extent of their capabilities due toembarkation restrictions. The most logical elements for early establislunent ashore are theRedeye platoons and/or the Hawk AFU's and an EW/C facility. (1) Assault Fire Units. Light antiaircraft missile battalions possess a capability, throughtheir AFU's, to provide limited low-level surveillance and short range firing capability,with a minimum of embarkation space. However, these AFU's are restricted in theirability to identify radar contacts and depend upon an external agency to confirm positive identification. This illuminates a problem in the use of these AFU's as time may becritical and this confirmation involves delay. Two immediate means of compensating fordelays are to provide for direct communications between the landward sector antiairwarfare center (SAAWC) and the missile firing units and/or to establish SAM weaponsfree sectors. In both of these circumstances, the TACC (afloat) does not immediatelyparticipate in the control process. (2) Early Warning and Control Sites. Another means to compensate for the delay inaircraft identification inherent to an AFU is to integrate air defense agencies ashore.In order to provide a reasonably early extension of shipboard radar coverage, it is essential to schedule early introduction of Marine air control squadron EW/C radar units. Alsodiscussed, these agencies contain a limited air control capability and can be used to control CAP's. They must be tied to the SAAWC in order to correlate their track information and to report surveillance results. This reporting requirement provides them with alimited means of maintaining the friendly air status in the landward sector. The limitation exists because of the unit's low saturation level and often requires them to presumeall aircraft inside the fire support coordination line (FSCL) to be friendly unless specifically notified otherwise. This air defense effort ashore integrates the advance elementsinto a "TAOC module" in which one or more of the Hawk elements coordinates with the EW/C facility according to the mode of operations. (a) Manual. Within the capabilities of existing control facilities, embarkationspace and/or combat losses might dictate that this EW/C facility function in themanual code. In order to cope with situations where land-based surveillance contacts are not detected by shipboard/airborne radar, collocation of one of theHawk fire units and EW/C facility ashore offers the most effective means torespond to the threats. In this instance, limited control is decentralized to theEW/C facility, the "TAOC module" then possessing both limited SAM firing andaircraft control capability. Further, the adverse effects of time lags inherent tomanual operations are minimized. FMFM 5-5 (b) Semiautomatic. It is highly desirable to exercise the modular capability of the TAOC, provided by the AN/TYQ-2, to establish limited semiautomatic func· tioning during early phases of the operation. This limited semiautomatic capabil· ity is achieved by phasing ashore a predetermined mix of the TAOC's data processing and display, radar, communication, and support equipment. To achieve this semiautomatic capability involves greater embarkation requirement in terms of boat or helicopter spaces. With this capability, however, all control facilities ashore perform realtime semiautomatic data exchange with the naval tactical data system or the airborne tactical data system. This exchange provides for semiautomatic weapons assignment from the SAAWC to the TAOC and from there to the particular firing unit. Tlie effectiveness of such a process greatly increases the degree of control that major agencies afloat may exercise over air defense means ashore. It simplifies and expedites the passage ofland-based surveillance products, compensating in part for ship-based, overland, radar coverage limitations. Post-D-day AAW operations continue to support the landing force as described in the preceding paragraphs. Generally, the MACCS's antiair warfare system is also phased ashore after D-day, as discussed in the paragraphs below. Employment of the MACCS AAW system is planned in five phases to ensure an orderly progression· for the transfer of air control ashore. The termination and commencement of each phase is directed by the CATF in accordance with the operation plan. The phasing ashore of control systems must be sufficiently flexible to permit handling several attack groups operating simultaneously, whether contiguous or separated from each other. a. Initial Sectors. The AAW area is divided into the landward and seaward sector for control of AAW means. Ships assigned an AA W mission assume preplanned stations that best utilize their AA W capabilities to counter enemy air operations and provide protection for the landing force. b. Phase One, Initial Phase (1) During the initial phase of the amphibious assault, elements ashore have no organic AAW capability. Long range surveillance is provided by airborne early warning aircraft and shipboard radars from stations that maximize their capabilities. The weapons systems consist primarily of carrier-based aircraft or land-based Marine squadrons. Missile ships are positioned in the shoreward sector to give close-in surface-to-air missile coverage of the vital area. Elements ashore may be augmented by F AAD teams to provide limited AAW capability. The air control agencies are either afloat or airborne. (See fig. 10.) (2) The AAW area is divided into the landward and seaward sectors for control of AAW units. Ships assigned an AA W mission assume pre planned stations that best use their AAW capabilities to counter enemy air operations and provide protection for the landing force. 3504. POST-D-DAY OPERATIONS FMFM 5-5 Figure 10. Initial Phase . • • DIRECT INDIRECT- Figure 11. Landing Force AAW Means Ashore. FMFM 5-5 (3) Overall control remains with the CATF, who exercises this control through his force antiair warfare coordinator (FAA WC) in the tactical air control center. Sector coordinators control their functions through an SAAWC. The sector coordinators control airborne intercept aircraft, early warning aircraft, and radar picket and missile ships in their sectors. The structure of the AAW control agency afloat depends on the nature of the operation and the size of the vital area. When the vital area is of such magnitude or where there is a two-attack group operation, the CATF may delegate control of an additionally prescribed sector to an attack group commander. (4)· The communications for the control of the AAW means afloat remain the same in the objective area as during the approach. Additional nets are established by the tactical air control center to handle air support requests from the landing force, control aircraft on special missions in the objective area, and control F AAD teams. c. Phase Two, Landing Force AAW Means Ashore (1) In phase two (see fig. 11), the assault force, with F AAD support, is landed and proceeds inland. Missile batteries and the AAOC are landed as their initial preplanned sites are uncovered and report to the landward SAA WC for control. Landing force displaced radar units are emplaced to extend surveillance inland. The nucleus of a tactical air operations center is landed early, and the direct air support center is established ashore. The AAW area is sectored for control purposes in the same manner as in phase one. (2) The control organization remains essentially the same as in phase one, with the landing force AAW means ashore being controlled by the FAA WC through the landward sector antiair warfare coordinator. The SAAWC provides missile batteries with evaluated raid information required for acquisition and intercept. In coordination with the DASC, the SAA WC provides identification information on close air support and reconnaissance type aircraft. The SAA WC also coordinates the employment of CAP with SAM units. (3) The landward sector AAW center is the coordination agency for receiving raid information from landing force radars. Raid information originating from landward sector sources is evaluated concurrently and passed to the FAA WC, missile ships and landing force SAM units, and the seaward SAA WC for inclusion in the overall AAW picture. The seaward SAA WC provides the same service to the FAA WC and the landward SAA WC. Landing force AAW liaison personnel are required at appropriate command levels (F AAWC, landward SAAWC) to facilitate the orderly flow of information ashore and the exercise of fire direction of SAM units. During this phase, ·the landing force T AOC is being established ashore. The TAOC enters the AAW nets as communication equipment and facilities to process information become available. FMFM 5-5 • CAP ~ ~41111·1---11111·, eill·==-llil··· AEW (C) DIRECT INDIRECT-SAAWC (SEA) Figure 12. Tactical Air Operations Center Ashore. d. Phase Three, Tactical Air Operations Center Ashore (1) The extension of AAW means ashore (see fig. 12) is increased by the addition of longer range radar and control facilities of the TAOC. Additional AAW missile units and support facilities for sustained operations also land during this phase. Facilities for the tactical air direction center ashore are landed, and preparation is made to assume control of all air operations ashore. (2) When approved by the CATF, the landward sector, including all the vital area, is assigned to a TAOC. The landward SAAWC's aboard ship monitor the landward sector AAW system in a backup status, ready to assume control when necessary. The landward sector includes all land and sea areas of the vital area out to the limit of the transport area. (3) The control of air begins its transfer ashore in phase three with the functions and responsibility for conduct of AAW in the landward sector assigned to air control agencies ashore. These functions and responsibilities include early warning, air intercept, recon· naissance, and naval and landing force AAW missile control and coordination. All of the AAW means in the landward sector, including the missile ships afloat, report to and are FMFM 5-5 directed by the TAOC. The TAOC is under the direct control of the FAAWC. The landward SAAWC 's afloat revert to backup monitor status and are prepared to take over AAW control and coordination in their sectors if necessary. d .... ft TACC FAAWC DIRECTSAAWC (SEA) INDIRECT- Figure 13. Tactical Air Direction Center Ashore. e. Phase Four, Tactical Air Direction Center Ashore (1) In phase four (see fig. 13), the CLF is ashore and is ready to assume control and coordination direction for all the AAW means ashore through his T ADC ashore. (2) Sector zoning of the AAW area is the same as in phase three. (3) The TADC ashore acts as the coordination center between all AAW elements ashore and the tactical air control center afloat. The TAOC functions as an alternate TADC. An additional TAOC may be established ashore to increase the radar coverage in the objective area. This depends on the size and geography of the objective area and the assignment FMFM 5-5 of sector responsibilities. The TAOC may control missile and CAP in separate sectors. This degree of decentralization depends on the adequacy of lateral communications for coordination between TAOC's and number of missile batteries in each sector. (4) The communication network is increased with the addition of the TADC established ashore with preparations for assuming air control in the objective areas as the tactical air command center ashore. f. Phase Five, Tactical Air Command Center Ashore (1) In phase five (see fig. 14), the landing force AAW control system is ashore and in full operation. Most of the AAW units are ashore or in the process of being phased ashore. The CATF shifts the responsibility for the control of all air operations ashore. (2) The TAOC controls all the AAW weapons in its sector. Additional TAOC's may be required to reinforce the overall structure when SAAWC's are dissolved. Figure 14. Tactical Air Command Center Ashore. (3) The CLF has overall AAW control responsibilities. He exercises control through the tactical air command center ashore which in phase four was the TADC. The SAAWC's afloat receive coordinating instructions from the tactical air command center ashore. When overall control is passed ashore, the tactical air c·ontrol center afloat assumes a TADC status and is a standby for the tactical air command center ashore. The tactical air command center controls all of the AAW means in the objective area. g. Passage ofControl Ashore (1) The landing force air operations control capability (including AAW) is achieved in five phases involving step-by-step installation of agencies and their progressive assumption of control and coordination functions. (2) The passage of control of air operations between CATF and CLF is made by mutual agreement and covers three phases of procedure: • Phase I. All control is afloat; missile batteries, AAOC, and TAOC report to SAAWC's or F AAWC afloat as capabilities are developed. • Phase 2. TAOC is completely operational ashore. SAAWC of landward sector is passed ashore toTAOC as appropriate. FAAWC remains afloat • Phase 3. Tactical air command center ashore is completely operational. FAAWC is completely operational. FAAWC is passed to tactical air command center ashore. TAOC continues reporting on the fleet antiair warfare reporting (AAW(R)) and antiair warfare coordination (AAW(C)) nets. Control of missile ships continues to be exercised by the T ADC afloat on the antiair warfare coordination net. Afloat units must continue to guard all nets and be prepared to resume control in the event of casualty ashore. The CATF is the alternate AAWC and is responsible for the seaward sector until the task force departs the AOA. (3) This phasing of passage of control ashore is not in conflict with the concept of fivephase employment of the landing force command and control system in its progressive buildup toward final assumption of control. The function of control passes through three phases, but the physical installation of control agencies within the landward sector(s) and the subsequent adoption of control functions is a five-phase activity and is planned and executed as such. A comparison of two concepts of phasing is presented in figure 15 in summarized form. FMFM 5-5 FMFM 5-5 OPERATIONAL PHASES OF LANDING FORCE PASSAGE OF CONTROL FROM CATF TO CLF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 1. All control afloat. TAOC, AAOC, and missile 1. All control afloat All agencies afloat or airborne. batteries report to AAWC as capabilities are developed. 2. (Some) landing force means ashore. Displaced radar units, nucleus of TAOC, AAOC, DASC, missile capability. 2. TAOC is completely operational ashore. SAAWC 3. TADC is completely ashore. SAAWC of landward of landward sector passes ashore. FAAWC is sector passes ashore. FAAWC is afloat. Facilities afloat. of TADC being installed. 4. TADC is operational, assuming control and coordination of landing force AAW means under direction of TACC afloat. 3. TACC ashore is operational. Control passes 5. Control passes ashore. TADC becomes TACC. ashore. TACC afloat reverts to TADC. TACC afloat reverts to TADC. Figure 15. Phasing of Passage of Control Ashore. 3505. a. Postassault operations commence when the amphibious operation has been terminated POSTASSAULT LFM 01 sets the following guidelines for this determination: PHASE OPERATIONS • The force beachhead has been secured. • Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to ensure the LFM 01, continuous landing of troops and material requisite for subsequent operations. Doctrine for • Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities have been established ashore. 'c:7 • The commander landing force has stated that he is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations. b. When these conditions have been met, the CLF and CATF will forward a recommendation to the designated higher authority to terminate the amphibious operation. Once the amphibious operation has been terminated, and the ATF dissolved, the CLF will commence postassault phase operations. FMFM 5-5 c. Upon the termination of the amphibious operation, elements of, or the entire landing force, may be required to remain ashore as an MAGTF and engage in what is essentially land combat. Once established ashore, and upon the termination of the amphibious operation, the MAGTF, as an organization of balanced arms, has the capability to conduct sustained operations. It is essential that in postassault operations the CLF, as the commander, continues to exercise command over both the ground and aviation units. d. The tasks performed by Marine aviation during the postassault phase will be similar to those performed during the assault phase. The attack and fighter attack aircraft will continue to maintain air superiority and support the ground'forces. e. Marine aviation, while an element of the MAGTF, is able to integrate with other Service components that are present in the area where combat operations are being conducted. Close coordination between the Marine air commander and the commanders of aviation elements of the other Services, particularly the Air Force component commander, is required. Although this coordination will exist and Marine aviation might even be called upon for some support outside the MAGTF, such support will be with the approval of the MAGTF commander. Also, if the MAGTF commander requires additional support beyond the capabilities of Marine air, he may request coordination and/or support from other Service components. Normally, in either case, the MAGTF will be a component of a joint or unified command and perform tasks assigned by a higher authority. ~ FMFMS-5 CHAPTER 4 ANTIAIR WARFARE PLANNING SECTION I. INTRODUCTION The Marine air-ground task force is designed to operate as the landing force or as a component 4101. of a larger landing force. As we have seen, organic assault support forces within the task force GENERAL contribute to the execution of the operation as elements of landing force aviation. Specific considerations apply to this aviation element in the planning sequence, which are the subject of this chapter. As soon as practicable after the receipt of the initiating directive, the CATF issues a planning 4102. directive to ensure that interdependent plans are coordinated, completed according to the time PLANNING limitations, and are comprehensive in their scope. this directive specifies the principal plans to GUIDANCE be prepared and the time allotted for preparation. Then each successive commander; i.e.,landing force, ground, and aviation, prepares a planning program containing his force planningschedule. This planning guidance, at any level, may be either oral or written and is prepared for and given to subordinate commanders and staffs. It also provides the needed information forconcurrent parallel, and detailed planning for the subordinate unit commanders involved, aswell as a framework for the necessary studies and estimates. It serves, for instance, as a guidefor the preparation of aviation staff estimates. As soon as the CLF provides his initial planning guidance, the MAGTF aviation commander will issue his guidance to aviation subordinates.Such guidance is updated throughout the planning phase by directives, memoranda, outlines,plans, staff conferences, and informal briefings. 87 FMFM 5-5 4103. PRELIMINARY PLANNING DIRECTIVES 4104. SEQUENCE OF AIR STAFF PLANNING Preliminary planning directives augment the CATF planning guidance and may, in fact, precede the initiating directive. They are based upon alerting notices received by commanders providing forces for the amphibious task force. Although the format of such alerting notices are too varied to be defined, they will be definitive enough to permit an analysis of the area of operations and an assessment of additional intelligence requirements. Study of beaches, ports, communication networks, existing air facilities, and terrain provides an initial basis for determining the number and types of landing force air elements that can be accommodated and supported within possible landing areas. The sequence of planning air support, as it affects the landing force, includes the following steps: a. Receipt of Initiating Directive. The initiating directive is an order to the CATF, with copies to the landing force and major component commanders to conduct an amphibious operation. The initiating directive provides for the establishment of an ATF, the assignment of a mission, and the necessary forces to accomplish the mission. b. Initial Estimate of Landing Force Air Support Requirements. Aviation planning commences with the preparation of initial estimates of landing force air support requirements, including offensive air operations, antiair warfare operations, assault support operations, air reconnaissance operations, and electronic warfare. These estimates are prepared as soon as initial information of an operation is received by the CLF. At this time, only the broadest estimates can be made. These initial estimates are usually limited to those which tentatively determine the number and types of participating units, the control agencies necessary, and the logistic support necessary. c. Initial Planning Conference. Subsequent to the receipt of the initiating directive, the CATF conducts an initial planning conference. At this stage, the CATF and the CLF jointly render decisions on issues which concern all of the elements of the amphibious task force, both landing force and naval. The initial estimate of landing force air support requirements assists the CLF in reaching the basic decisions at the initial planning conference. Included in the basic decisions are the selection of landing force objectives, development of the landing force concept of operations ashore, selection of helicopter landing zones, selection of fixed-wing aircraft landing fields, and drop zones. d. Commander Landing Force's Planning Guidance. Planning guidance is derived from a consideration of the information contained in the initating directive, the initial planning conference, and other instructions that may be received. This guidance is the commander' s input to his staff and subordinate commanders for preparation of revision of their estimates. Th~ FMFM 5-5 commander's guidance may take a wide variety of forms and information, but will normally outline a general course of action which the commander particularly desires to be initiated. Subsequent planning guidance will be provided to all levels throughout the planning process. e. Aviation Estimate of Supportability. The aviation estimate of supportability summarizes significant aspects of the situation as they influence any proposed course of action, analyzes the impact of aviation factors upon the particular situations, and then evaluates and determines how aviation units can best be employed in support of each contemplated landing force course of action. The aviation estimate is presented verbally or in writing to the CLF by the landing force aviation element commander. This estimate is discussed in detail in section V, this chapter. f. Commander Landing Force's Estimate. The CLF selects the most favorable course of action in his estimation and announces it as his decision. The commander's decision provides a firm basis for subsequent development of the operation plan, and appropriately amplified, it becomes the commander's concept of operations ashore. g. Detailed Estimate of Air Support Requirements. Detailed planning of landing force air support requirements commences after the CLF issues his concept of operations. The detailed estimate of air support requirements establishes the number and type of aircraft, in terms of squadrons, that will be needed to support the operation. It also provides information concerning the use of nuclear weapons, enemy targets in the beachhead area, enemy targets remote from the beachhead which may effect the force, air reconnaissance necessary to support the operation, assault support operations in and about the landing area, and the control facilities necessary to support the commander's concept of the operation. Attention is given to the time required to locate and prepare facilities and/or sites which will assist the aviation component in the early establishment of aviation units ashore. Special consideration is given to the aviation requirement to conduct AAW operations. h. Aviation Concept. The final step in the aviation staff planning sequence is the preparation of the concept of operations, and completion of the aviation element task organization which includes all aviation support units needed for the tactical units specified in the detailed estimate of units needed for the tactical units specified in the detailed estimate of air support requirements. Air operation plans and orders may now be prepared. 89 FMFM 5-5 SECTION II BASIC ELEMENTS OF ANTIAIR WARFARE PLANNING 4201. Upon receipt of the ATF and landing force initial planning directives, preliminary antiairGENERAL warfare planning is commenced. The following paragraphs cover the principal considerationinvolved in antiair warfare planning. 4202. In an amphibious operation, a single integrated air control system is developed that is capableCENTRALIZED of controlling and coordinating all air operations within an assigned area of responsibility.CONTROL Control of air operations is exercised by various commands as the operation progresses. Plansmust be made to provide each of these controlling commanders with the proper facilities forthe requisite centralized control. As soon as conditions permit, air control facilities are established ashore that parallel the navalcontrol agencies afloat. The control facilities ashore are initially held in a standby status,monitoring all air control circuits. Upon recommendation of the CLF (or appropriate agenciesashore), however, the CATF may pass control of air operations to CLF or the joint task forcecommander concerned. The passage of control may be incremental. After passage of any or allcontrol functions ashore the Navy control centers afloat continue to monitor appropriatecircuits, ready to resume active control in the event this becomes necessary. 4203. Success in an amphibious operation requires a distinct margin of air superiority in the area ofACHIEVEMENT its operations. Because complete destruction of enemy air strength is rarely attained, allOF LOCAL elements of the ATF must be provided with continuing air defense operations that exploit theAIR capabilities of all participating forces. Both types of operations are essential; neither alone canSUPERIORITY provide the degree of air superiority needed for the decisive joint application of military power.Planning and executing of this effort must be closely coordinated with all other operations inthe objective area to ensure friendly aircraft have freedom of action and, conversely, that isdenied to the enemy. 4204. Plans must ensure that all landing force command levels are provided direct access to theACCESS TO agency exercising control of aircraft allocated to direct air support. Intermediate groundCONTROL AGENCIES command levels may countermand or modify requests of subordinates for direct air support atthe time the requests are made to the air support control agency. 90 FMFM5-5 a. Landing Area. Plans should provide for early seizure of sites for operating aircraft and air control facilities in order to: • Provide for the early deployment within the objective area of air units designated for continuing support of the landing force. • Extend the radius of warning and control and therefore improve the task force air defense capabilities. h. Adjacent Areas. Plans providing for deployment of aircraft to airfields in friendly territory adjacent to the amphibious operation area must: • Facilitate rapid deployment to airfields within the objective area. • Provide for the support which may only be acquired through the use of aerial tankers to extend the range of supporting aircraft. Initially, assault support which is pre planned in detail must he provided by aircraft operation from amphibious shipping or bases within effective range of the objective area. As the facilities for operating land-based aircraft are secured within the objective area, aircraft operating from such facilities are employed through the tactical air control system to fulfill an increasing amount of the total air support requirements. Plans must assure that the transition into the objective area can he made without interrupting the effectiveness of the assault support. The need for full systems aircraft availability requires a smooth functioning maintenance effort which should he disrupted as little as possible during the transition. Aircraft are phased into the land-based facilities to shorten response time and, therefore, to improve assault support effectiveness. Plans must provide for the orderly transfer of airspace control throughout the amphibious operation. The following subparagraphs outline the transfer sequence which, if employed, must he the subject of detailed planning. More detailed guidance may he found in LFM 04/NWP 17. a. Airspace Control Authority. The area airspace control authority of the joint force commander exercising control over the combat zone in which the amphibious objective area is located transfers control to the advance force commander of the amphibious task force. 4205. DEPLOYMENT OF AIR UNITS 4206. AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITIES 4207. TRANSFER OF AIRSPACE CONTROL LFM 04/NWP 17, FMFM 5-5 b. Advance Force Commander. The advance force commander transfers airspace control to the commander amphibious task force. c. Commander Amphibious Task Force. The commander amphibious task force passes control to the commander landing force or other commander ashore. d. Commander Landing Force. Upon the termination of the amphibious operation, the commander landing force transfers control back to the area airspace control authority of the appropriate joint force commander. FMFM 5-5 SECTION III PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES Planning in detail ensures the maximum support from available aircraft and equipment, while avoiding unnecessary degradation of the antiair warfare capability. Planning, however, is a coordinate responsibility of all concerned. Although specifically identified herein as the responsibility of one command or commander, the parallel and concurrent characteristics of plarming common to all amphibious operations are also applicable to that needed for antiair warfare. The commander amphibious task force has the following responsibilities: a. Determination of Overall Requirements of the Amphibious Task Force. Naval requirements remain generally constant throughout the operation. Air superiority must be attained and maintained in the objective area, and the movement of enemy forces into and within the objective area must be curtailed or halted. A continuing requirement exists for air defense against enemy air, surface, and subsurface attack. b. Determination of Air Support Capabilities. The CATF determines the air support capabilities of the entire task force in terms of sorties, endurance on station, ordnance loads, and payloads. c. Coordination of All Air Support Tasks. The CATF coordinates all requests for air support originating within the task force and allocates aircraft in accordance with ATF assets and capabilities. When the need arises, he makes requests for additional support to higher authority. d. Preparation of. an Air Plan. The CATF prepares an air plan to govern the employment of aviation throughout the operation. The air plans of subordinate commanders of the amphibious task force must conform to the amphibious task force plan. 4301. GENERAL 4302. AMPHIBIOUS TASKFORCE 4303. The commander landing force has the following responsibilities: LANDING FORCE FMFMS-5 4304. LANDING FORCE AVIATION a. Determination of Landing Force Air Support Requirements. The CLF coordinates all requests for air support originating within the landing force and submits the consolidated requirements to the CATF. b. Determination of Landing Force Air Support Capabilities. The CLF determines the air support capabilities of the landing force aviation units and submits this information to the CATF. c. Submission of Plans for Deployment of Aviation Elements Ashore. The CLF submits recommendations to the CATF for the deployment ashore of landing force and other aviation units. d. Preparation of an Air Plan. The CLF prepares an air plan in coordination with the amphibious task force air plan. Landing force aviation planning responsibilities are: a. Determination of Landing Force Aviation Air Support Requirements. The landing force aviation commander submits requests for air support to the CLF. These requests are consolidated with those from other landing force elements. b. Determination of Landing Force Air Support Capabilities. The landing force aviation commander submits the air support capabilities of landing force aviation units to the CLF. c. Submission of Plans for Deployment of Aviation Elements Ashore. The landing force aviation commander submits recommendations to the CLF for the deployment ashore of landing force aviation units. d. Preparation of Operation Plan. The landing force aviation commander prepares an operation plan in coordination with the amphibious task force and landing force air plans. FMFM 5-5 Aviation units are responsible for providing input as required by the landing force aviation commander regarding their needs and capabilities. Normally, the planning directive published by the landing force aviation commander will contain the necessary guidance as to the type and timeliness of information required. 4305. AVIATION UNITS FMFM 5-5 SECTION IV INITIAL ESTIMATES OF LANDING FORCEANTIAIR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS 4401. The initial estimates of landing force antiair warfare requirements is prepared as soon asGENERAL preliminary information of an operation is received. At this time, only the broadest estimate can be made. This initial estimate is usually limited to the number and type ofunits to participate,the control agencies necessary, and the logistic support needed. Some antiair warfare allocationscan be deduced from predictions of the aviation capabilities of the force involved, estimationsof the enemy air threat which might be encountered, and the general mission of the landingforce. 4402. The landing force aviation commander is tasked with evaluating and submitting an initialLANDING FORCE estimate of landing force antiair warfare requirements. After his evaluation, he will prepare hisAVIATION TASKS initial estimate ofthe numbers and types of units to be employed. He will consider the followingfactors in the preparation of his estimate: a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations. This includes all characteristics which will havean influence on possible courses of action. The factors are divided into two principal classes: • General Factors. A broad field which includes the influence of political, economic, andpsychological conditions upon the conduct of operation. • Fixed Factors. Stable characteristics in the area of operations. It is necessary to determine what limitations they impose ofwhat advantages they may offer to the commander'sforce or those of the enemy. These characteristics include hydrography, terrain andtopography, climate and weather, daylight and dark periods, locations and distances,lines of transportation and supply, health and sanitation conditions, usable facilities andfixed defenses, area communications facilities, and missile sites. Pertinent conclusionsshould be drawn in each case. b. Relative Combat Power. This includes an examination and comparison of opposing forceswhich involves an assessment of communication and electronics capabilities, logistic support,and time and distance factors. c. Assess Factors ofEnvironment and Relative Combat Power. Having surveyed the environ ment, comparative resources, and his own and the enemy's capabilities, the commander willfind it useful to review the conclusions reached thus far. He must assess their possible impact byidentifying deficiencies in information and sensitive areas of security, tabulating strength and weakness factors, and finally, making the initial determination of the adequacy of his own force. 96 FMFM 5-5 SECTION V AVIATION ESTIMATE OF SUPPORTABILITY Preparation of an aviation estimate of supportability is step number two of the air support 4501. planning sequence. It is a special staff estimate prepared by or under the cognizance of the GENERAL landing force tactical air commander. There is no set format for this estimate, and it may be presented verbally or in writing. Its purpose is to summarize significant aviation aspects of the situation as they might influence any course of action proposed, and to evaluate and determine how aviation units can best be employed. The criteria for preparing and presenting the aviation estimate of supportability is found in FMFM 5-1. FMFM 5-5 SECTION VI DETERMINING DETAILED ANTIAIR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS 4601. Antiair warfare is vital to the successful accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. INTRODUCTION Planning and execution are closely integrated and coordinated to include air-to-ground, air-toair, and ground-to-air operations in the objective area. The highest level of this integration is between the CATF and the CLF who determine the employment and sequencing of AAWmeans in the objective area in three phases--movement to objective area, ship-to-shore movement, and command ashore. The overall responsibility for AAW lies with the CATF, but theCLF has a continuing interest, since landing force elements are the principal means for estab lishing the landward extension of the AAWsystem, once shore-based at the objective area. Thisintegration of AAW responsibilities necessitates complete, detailed, and parallel planning byboth commanders. Within the ATF, this coordinated planning integrates all AAW means in asingle AAW system. Each echelon of command coordinates its plans to ensure optimum utilization of all the means available. 4602. TASK ORGANIZATION The ATF AAW team is task organizaed for each operation. Functional control is integratedinto one system under landing force aviation. The fundamentals of amphibious planning andLFMOJ, organization are explained in LFM 01, and FMFM 3-1. 4603. AAW planning programs the air reconnaissance to locate the enemy air resources, and instalINTEGRATED AAW lations; the offensive strikes to destroy the enemy air capability; and the air defense to protectPLANNING both strike aircraft and the ATF itself. This planning must provide for the three major AAW REQUIREMENTS phases of the amphibious operation; i.e., movement to the objective area, the ship-to-shoremovement and the assumption of control of air operations by the MAGTF. It is probable thatMAGTF aircraft will participate in all three AAW phases in conjunction with ATF naval aircraft.Further, the conduct of air defense during the ship-to-shore movement and the establishment oflanding force air defense means ashore necessitate a substantial degree of overlap and interfacebetween MAGTF and naval agencies. For these reasons, both naval and MAGTF AAW plannersmust be thoroughly familiar with each system's capabilities, procedures, and intentions. Toprovide the necessary degree of familiarity, integraton of the AAW effort begins at the initial planning stage and continues throughout the planning process. This integration entails estab lishment of an AAW planning effort with participation by the appropriate naval and MAGTF elements, as outlined earlier. a. AAW Staff Action. The imperative necessity of attaining air superiority dictates that thenormal staff sequence be modified. In arriving at the ATF AAW plan, balancing requirements 98 FMFM 5-5 against projected assets at the lower echelons of command is eliminated. While the MAGTF elements review air support requests from subordinate elements, consolidate them and forward them to the level where assignment is made, an exception is found in AAW. There is no matching process for valid AAW requirements at levels lower than the ATF air staff. Plans evolved by this AAW staff are concurrently forwarded to the CATF and CLF for approval and then published. A valid AAW requirement is incorporated regardless of the echelon of command which first identifies it. This unique process exists because there is no margin for compromise in attaining air superiority. All requirements, germane to establishing the prescribed level of air superiority, must be acknowledged and included in planning. This is particularly applicable to the process of allocation of aircraft assets. While other means of fire support are available to the ground commander, only aircraft are capable of executing the majority of AAW tasks. Thus, the ATF plan for air support is subject to the approved AAW plan to arrive at assets available for the other types of air support. This AAW plan, once approved, is forwarded to the next superior air defense authority for coordination with the overall area AAW plan. b. Allocation of Aircraft. Generally, initial allocation of aircraft is decided by weighting AAW requirements against direct and other nondirect air support requests. Once AAW necessities have been met, the remaining resources are assigned to the other air support missions by priority. As operations ashore progress, daily evaluation of the tactical air situation may identify decreasing AAW requirements and allow a corresponding increase in other air support missions. This particular sequence would increase the direct air support sorties available to the ground commander, to offset the landing force moving out of naval gunfire range or activity which utilizes aircraft assets to the serious detriment of the ground commander, the CATF will decide whether to request additional aircraft resources, or to adjust the ground combat plans. Essential to effective utilization of the AAW means for gaining air superiority is the intelligence gathered on targets relating to the enemy's air potential and residual air threat. Essential elements of information (EEl) concerning the enemy's air capability in the objective area are promulgated as soon as possible by CATF after receipt of the initiating directive. From these EEl's, the CATF can evaluate his requirements for active AAW air defense. The CLF makes a similar evaluation of the enemy's air potential as to how it will affect the landing force. This process will continue for the entire operation and will be updated continuously at all levels where information is required in the planning factors. a. Intelligence Dissemination. It is imperative that intelligence, as it relates to AAW operations, receives dissemination to the lowest user level, and consideration has to be given to screening intelligence information so that it may be passed to and handled at this lowest level. A discussion of secure voice communication/teletype/electronic transmissions is found in NWP 32. 4604. INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITY FMFMS-5 b. Collection. All available means for collection of target intelligence are exploited and targetscarefully selected. During the planning phase of an amphibious operation, information relatingto enemy permanent airfields, missile sites, and radar sites may be obtained from the following: • National intelligence surveys. • Amphibious objective studies. • Air objective folders. • "Airfield Stations of the World." • Area studies. • Area intelligence estimates. • National intelligence estimates. • Overall intelligence estimate for planning. c. Augmentation. Information concerning recently developed enemy installations and deploy ment and movement of enemy air forces is provided by requests to higher authority or organic amphibious reconnaissance elements. From the commencement of planning until the termina tion of the operation, aerial photographic and electronic reconnaissance aircraft are employedto obtain target information. With the commencement of operations within the objective area, these sources are augmented by the remainder of the organic collection means of the ATF andlanding force. Landing force aviation contributes to the overall collection effort by performingphotographic, electronic, and armed aircraft reconnaissance and by providing aircraft fortactical air observers. d. Target Assignment. Intelligence information on the enemy's bases and weapon systems isevaluated as to the degree of interference these targets may offer to the landing force. Prioritiesfor destruction of these targets are planned. In many cases, destruction of these targets isaccomplished by forces external to the amphibious task force. Targets not destroyed before the arrival of the amphibious task force in the objective area are scheduled for destruction during the assault. 4605. The enemy air situation based upon the continual evaluation of the enemy's air potential and DETERMINATION estimated residual air threat are the primary factors in determining overall AA W requirements.OFAAW Enemy air capability weighted against friendly air capability have the greatest influence inREQUIREMENTS determining AAW means. Data pertaining to each type of enemy air threat. is evaluated interms of planned tactical distribution of friendly forces for which AAW protection must beprovided in order to establish the types, quantity, and location of AAW means. Appendix Coutlines the format for construction of the residual air threat tab to an intelligence annex thatcould be expected in a CATF operation order. 100 a. Surveillance. The types of surveillance components are determined from an evaluation of the types of enemy air threat, their delivery techniques, attack altitudes, attack speeds, and ordnance. b. Control. Units required to form the control component are determined from an estimate of the quantities of AAW weapons which will be required for simultaneous employment, plus the size and nature of the area and the scope of operations. c. Weapons. The determination of the required number and disposition of weapons components, both SAM elements and aircraft, is based on the minimum safe intercept point for each type of threat, enemy delivery technique, attack altitude, attack speed, ordnance, and anticipated rate of attack. This determination of aircraft and SAM elements requires consideration of the following factors; (1) Aircraft Requirements (a) Depth of the antiair warfare area which the landing force may be assigned. (b) Operating characteristics and firepower of the aircraft. (c) Expected duration of the operation. (d) The total destruction expectancy which the landing force AAW system can achieve during the different phases of the amphibious operation. (e) The expected attrition rate for landing force fighter aircraft. (f) Fighter aircraft provided by commands external to the landing force. (g) Other factors as may be imposed due to the nature of a particular amphibious operation. (2) Surface-to-Air Missile Requirements (a) The effects which weather, terrain, and hydrographic conditions may have on deployment of antiaircraft missile units. (b) Operations ashore extending beyond the support of naval antiaircraft missile elements or when operations continue after naval forces are withdrawn. (c) The number, size, and distance between AAW vital areas. (d) The type and duration of naval antiaircraft support available. (e) The number and type of aircraft units available. (f) Helicopter availability and AAW weapons systems transportability. FMFM 5-5 4606. In developing landing force AAW plans for operations ashore, the following factors areLANDING FORCE considered and developed:AAWPLANNINGCONSIDERATIONS a. Number and capability of enemy offensive and defensive air weapons including ECM andECCM. b. Terrain within the objective area and anticipated duration of the operation. c. Provisions and effectiveness of the ATF AAWplan in its shipboard surveillance and weaponscoverage of the area ashore. d. AAW sectors, subsectors, and procedures established by the CATF in accordance with theair defense responsibilities. e. Availability and capabilities of the air control facilities and the AAW weapons system withinthe landing force. f. Plan for landing in relation to the proposed locations of landing force AAW elements, thetime, and the conditions required for phasing control ashore. g. Requirements for centralized coordination, decentralized control, and cooperation of AAWoperations with supporting arms fires, particularly when nuclear weapons are involved. h. The necessity for the use of aerial refuelers in order to provide necessary aircraft availabilityin the objective area. i. The means and procedures required to warn all elements of the ATF of impending air attack. j. The ability of the land based defense system to support forces afloat. 4607. PLANS FOR The development of this phase in AAW planning is contingent upon a thorough understandingEMPLOYMENT OF AAW of the concepts of employment of AAW means. Areas of responsibility are clearly defined inESTABLISHMENT the CATF/CLF operations plans as affected by the concepts of AAW employment. UnitASHORE commanders below the force level should develop those aspects that affect their AAWoperation. 102 FMFMS-5 In evolving the final course of action for the landing force, there may be air defense consider4608. ations which influence some decisions of the CLF. These considerations are: AIR DEFENSECONSIDERATIONS IN TACTICAL PLANNING The rmsswn assigned the ATF by the initiating directive a. Determination of Objectives. designates the broad boundaries of the amphibious objective area. When specific geographic objectives are not delineated in the mission, the CATF with the advice of the CLF, selects the objectives to accomplish the mission. As previously discussed, effective AAW applies the destruction in depth principle. The characteristics of the employed AAWweapon systems may require designation of land objectives for geographic in-depth deployment. b. Scheme of Maneuver Ashore. The necessity to assign terrain objectives for air defense purposes influences the ground commander in the formulation of his scheme of maneuver. The required timeliness of seizure will determine the degree of priority the ground commander must give to his air defense terrain. In other words, if ATF priorities require early establishment of air defense facilities ashore, the ground scheme of maneuver will reflect the priority. Similarly, such a priority is also reflected in the landing plan by scheduling the early landing of air defense elements included in assault shipping. 4609. The development of an AAW effort within the amphibious objective area involves the following problems and conditions which do not normally confront other operations: AAW PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO AMPHIBIOUS a. The necessity of simultaneously defending the forces afloat and ashore as well as providing OPERATIONS air defense for helicopter movement. b. The problem of control within the ATF of both carrier and shore based AAW means operating simultaneously while widely separated. c. The problem·of integrating the ATF AAW system into a broader system under a unified or area commander. d. The complication in air surveillance and in employment of AAW means caused by the large number of friendly aircraft operating simultaneously in the objective area during the assault phase. e. The time-consuming transfer of AAW equipment from ship to shore. Furthermore, the conditions under which the transfer is made subjects the equipment to rough handling and imposes limits on its weight and size. 103 FMFM 5-5 SECTION VII. FORMULATION OF AIR PLANS 4701. Air operations reflect the nature of air plans and centralized control dominates the planning GENERAL phase. Basic uniformity of practice that can promote effectiveness in the conduct of operations is valuable, but it is not intended to restrict initiative or flexibility that may be necessary tomeet the demands of each situation. 4702. a. Development. The chief distinction between various concepts developed in the estimateAMPHIBIOUS of the situation and the development of the operation plan is that of precision. What is to beTASK FORCE done, by whom, and when is set forth in the amphibious task force plan. This plan should beOPERATION PLAN clear, concise, complete, and authoritative in nature. It must convey positively the CATF'sdetermination and intentions. b. Format. The format for the amphibious task force operation plan is found in NWP 22-1.The Amphibious ~ Of particular importance in the preparation of subordinate aviation unit plans are the airoperations, antiair warfare, and amphibious operations (for ship-to-shore movement) annexes. c. Responsibilities. The CATF will identify the tasks to be performed by landing forceaviation in order to: • Attain and maintain air superiority in the objective area. • Curtail or halt the movement of enemy forces into, and within, the objective area. • Provide air control within the objective area. • Conduct the helicopterborne ship-to-shore movement. lOl FMFM 5-5 SECTION VIII AVIATION COMBAT DOCUMENTS The MAGTF commander publishes an operation plan coordinated with the ATF operation plan or other area operation plan if appropriate. In that plan, subordinate commanders are assigned responsibility for preparation of certain annexes if functional responsibility is exercised in a particular area. The aviation element commander directs the preparation of aviation annexes appropriate for the MAGTF operation plan. For an operation in which AAW activity demands a major degree of aviation attention and effort, the MAGTF commander may decide to include an AAW annex in his operation plan. This annex is separate from the air annex and addresses offensive and defensive aspects of AAW. It publicizes the concept of employment of AAW means; specifies the tasks and objectives required to attain the necessary destruction for air superiority; and describes the effort to be directed toward AAW while afloat, during the passage of control ashore, and for subsequent operations ashore. It is usually found only in operation plans of an MAF level. (See app. D.) a. Paragraph 1 of the AAW annex refers to paragraph 1 of the basic operation order. However, in addition, it may direct particular attention to the air situation as contained in the air operation annex. b. Paragraph 2 states the mission to be accomplished by the antiair warfare system. It contains a statement of who, what, when, where, and as much of the why as necessary for coordination and cooperation. c. Paragraph 3 contains the concept for the employment of the antiair warfare units. It also specifies tactical missions for subordinate units and coordinating instructions. This paragraph may include instructions in the following matters if existing standing operating procedures (SOP's) do not provide adequate instructions: • Antiair warfare sectors. • Designation of position areas. • Engagement priorities. • Firing doctrine. • Control and coordinating procedures. • Aircraft identification. • Rules of engagement. 4801. GENERAL 4802. ANTIAIR WARFARE ANNEX d. Paragraph 4 contains the logistic and administrative instructions of immediate concern to antiair warfare units and references to the landing force administrative/ logistics plan ororder. e. Paragraph 5 provides communications-electronics information by reference to that annex.Instructions peculiar to AAW may he included in the paragraph for clarity. Locations of controlcenters afloat and ashore are listed. f. When required, appropriate appendixes to the AAW annex may include but are not limitedto the following: • Position areas. • Sectors of responsibility. • Antiaircraft missile and aircraft coordinating procedures. • Airborne early warning (AEW). g. The magnitude of the operation increases the complexity of planning. Antiair warfare/airdefense are considerations in the planning and preparation of other supporting documents.Similarly, these other plans affect many of the details of AAW/air defense planning. Therefore,AAW/air defense plans will be coordinated with at least the following: • Concept of operations. e Air operations plan/annex. •• Air schedules annex/appendix. •• Air control annex/appendix. • Communications-electronics annex. • Embarkation plan. • Administrative/logistics plan. FMFM 5-5 The air defense plan is included within the AAW annex already described, or will comprise a 4803. separate amplifying document to an air operations plan/annex. Its status is conditioned by the AIR DEFENSE magnitude of the AAW effort. If offensive MAGTF AAW activity is limited, offensive AAW PLAN information is incorporated within the body of the air operation plan/annex or reflected within another supplement such as the air schedules annex/appendix. Then, air defense becomes appropriate for separate treatment. The air defense plan publicizes the concept of employment of air defense means, the assignment of missions, the assignment of areas of responsibility, and methods of control and coordination of air missions. When appropriate, additional supplements may include the following: • Ground and air sectors of responsibility. • Aircraft identification procedures. • Control agency and SAM coordinating procedures. • Coordination procedures for air defense operations with adjacent, non-Marine control agencies. 107 FMFM 5-5 CHAPTER 5 COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SECTION I INTRODUCTION The coordination of Marine aviation antiair warfare forces is of considerable scope and at times 5101. complex. Participation in joint operations, the range and capabilities of high performance airGENERAL craft, the communications necessary to control widely dispersed aircraft and aviation units, and the integration with artillery and naval gunfire units all require extensive planning and precise execution for effective command and control. 5102. Command and staff relationships are discussed in detail in FMFM 3-l. The areas unique to aviation commands are further discussed in FMFM 5-l. Amplification here is directed toward COMMAND commands subordinate to the wing, such as the landing force aviation commander. AND STAFFRELATIONSHIPS a. Command. It is essential that all subordinate commanders have access to the landing force FMFM 3-1, aviation commander. Units either land-based or embarked upon amphibious shipping must rely on either radio communications or messenger service to provide this access when the landing for aviation commander is afloat. Ashore, the units may augment the above methods with landlines. 109 FMFM5-5 b. Staff. The organization of the squadron and group staff is explained in FMFM 5-l. Although aviation command staff members are not integral elements in the chain of command, they will often play a more active role in the decision making processes than their counterparts at the battalion/regimental levels. This is because the aviation commander is sometimes absent, often 2 to 3 hours or longer, as he assumes his leadership role in flight operations; therefore, the commander must rely heavily on the advice of his staff and, in fact, on its capacity to makeresponsible decisions in his absence. 5103. Special staff officers are found at the wing, group, and squadron levels. At the squadron level, SPECIAL STAFF these are the safety and NATOPS officers and, when independently deployed, the flightsurgeon. At the wing and group levels, they are the aviation maintenance officer, aviationordnance officer, avionics officer, and flight surgeon. The duties of these officers are discussed in FMFM 5-l. Additional special staff officers, common to both aviation and ground organizations, are discussed in FMFM 3-1. 5104. The mission of Marine aviation is primarily to participate in the seizure and defense of advanced AFFILIATION naval bases. As a collateral mission, it participates as an integral component of naval aviation. WITH THE As this component of the mission assigned indicates, there is a close relationship with the Navy,NAVY both operationally and logistically. Although the Marine Corps has the unique ability to provideits own aviation element of the air-ground team, it is still dependent upon the Navy, not only toprovide Marine aircraft, but to equip and supply spare parts for them as well. a. Operational Chain ofCommand. A landing force is under the operational control of the Navy, but administratively under the control of the appropriate Fleet Marine Force (FMF) commander. Landing force aviation, as an element of the landing force, is under the operational control of the Navy. Occasionally, Marine aviation supplements the naval air forces and will, inthose instances, be under the direct operational control of a fleet or task force commander. b. Aviation Procurement and Logistic Chain. As already mentioned, the Navy provides the aircraft for the Marine Corps. The Commandant of the Marine Corps determines Marine Corpsrequirements and provides that information to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). CNO then supplies the aircraft and support required through a series of naval commands shown in FMFM5-l. 110 FMFMS-5 c. Technical and Administrative Control. Technical and administrative control of Marine aircraft is exercised by a "Navy type" command. A type command is an administrative sub division of a fleet or force into ships or units of the same "type," as differentiated from a tactical subdivision. Commander Naval Air Forces, Atlantic and Pacific (COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAV AIRPAC) are type commanders responsible to the fleet commander for the train ing and readiness of aviation units of the fleet, including aircraft carriers. They are the control ling custodians of all Navy and Marine aircraft. Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT) and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC) exercise operational control of Marine aircraft at the Service level, and as type commanders, they share with COMNAV AIRLANT and COMNAVAIRPAC the common superiors, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) or Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). 111 FMFM 5-5 SECTION II COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 5201. Because amphibious warfare integrated virtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, and landGENERAL ing forces in a concerted military effort against a hostile shore, the Marine Corps is frequently engaged in joint operations and, normally, as an element of a joint task force. A joint task JCS Pub 2, force, as defined by JCS Pub 2, is "a force composed of assigned or attached elements of theArmy, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of aunified command, a specified command or an existing joint task force." Either the Navy, Marine Corps, or both may provide elements to a joint operation. If both are employed, thesenior element will be considered the Service component. For instance, if the Navy is theService component, the Marine Corps will be an element of the Naval component. 5202. In view of the organization of the United States Armed Forces throughout the world today, theJOINT COMMAND MAGTF will frequently be required to participate in combat action as a component of a joint force. Therefore, it is necessary to examine and standardize certain general applications of theJCS Pub 2, Marine aviation effort in joint operations. See JCS Pub 2, JCS Pub 8, and JCS Pub 10, for a more detailed discussion of MAGTF participation in joint operations. a. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The close integration of air and ground operations is a basic tenet of Marine Corps policy. Whenever Marine forces are committed to joint operations, JCSPub 10, they will be task organized into a MAGTF which will include all elements necessary to operate Tactical Command and Control as an integrated air-ground team. and Communications (I) Operational Control of the MAGTF Within a ]oint Force. ~ The ideal situation, where the MAF is a part of a larger joint force, is to give the MAF a separate operational area and have the commanding general, MAF report directly to the joint force com mander. Where the MAF is part of an amphibious task force, the relationship is clear, the commanding general, MAF reports to the CATF during the assault phase. It is upon passing control ashore and disestablishment of the AOA and the ATF that problems arise. The preferred arrangement would be for the commanding general, MAF to report directly to the joint force commander, but this' is not always possible or convenient. TheMAF operational area might be contiguous to the operational areas of other forces(Army), and therefore, the MAF would probably be attached to or come under theoperational control of a larger ground force, such as an army corps or field army. In any event, the MAF should remain in contact with its naval support. 112 FMFM 5-5 (2) MAGTF Integrity Within a Joint Force. The MAF, MAB, and MAU are tactical entities. Particularly in the case of the MAF, the commander must retain complete operational control over all of its elements. This is mandatory to retain the unique capabilities of the Marine air-ground team. Operational control of the MAW passed to the Air Force component commander is not desirable and should be avoided if at all possible. b. Command Relationships (1) Two basic principles governing command relationships are set forth in JCS Pub 2. • The joint force commander exercises operational command of assigned forces through his service component commanders or uniservice force commanders. • The joint force commander maintains organizational integrity of his service components insofar as practicable in order to exploit fully the inherent overall combat effectiveness of the component. (2) The Marine air-ground task forces assigned to a joint force will operate under a naval component commander or as a uniservice force. If the naval component consists predominantly of Marine Corps forces, the commander of the MAGTF will be designated naval component commander. (3) Operational command of an MAGTF assigned to a joint force will be exercised by the joint force commander through the naval component commander. ( 4) The relationship that exists between an MAGTF and other service components of a joint force is one of coordination and mutual support. As discussed in paragraph 5104, the mission of the Marine Corps places the landing force ~thin the naval operational chain of command. Operational control of landing force aviation is exercised through the commander of the landing force. Aviation supply support will be provided by the amphibious task force during the period that the helicopter units are embarked. JCSPub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces ~ 5203. NAVAL COMMAND ll3 FMFM S-5 5204. Where preponderance of tactical aviation comes from the Navy or Marine Corps, the overall airLANDING FORCE effort in the objective area will be directed by a naval aviator under the CATF until control is passed ashore. The officer so designated will be responsible for the preparation of the amphibious task force air plan. In execution of the plan, he will use the control agency designated bythe joint amphibious task force commander. Landing force aviation will be organized as asubordinate task organization of the landing force. (See fig. 16.) CATF I LFC I I J . ' COORDINATION AVIATION GROUND ELEMENT --------------------ELEMENT Figure 16. Command Relationships Within an MAGTF(Operational Phase). a. Landing force aviation is represented by the commander landing force during all phases ofthe operation, even when the control of all air is vested in the CATF. Since immediate respon sibility for the conduct of landing force operations ashore is vested in the commander landingforce, the planning and execution of the landing and assault are primarily his concern. Thespeed and mobility of aircraft and the requirement to be responsive to the cognizant commander make it essential that control of air be exercised by that commander. b. As early as possible, the commander landing force establishes air control facilities ashorethat parallel those of the CATF. Upon the recommendation of the commander landing force,the CATF may pass responsibility for control of air operations to the commander landing force.The passage of control may be in stages; i.e., cdntrol of close air support may be passed ashoreprior to control of other air operations. After passage of any or all control functions ashore, theNavy control centers afloat continue to monitor appropriate circuits, ready to assume activecontrol in the event that it becomes necessary. ·114 FMFM 5-5 SECTION III. FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION 5301. Functional coordination is a major requirement of Marine aviation. In this sense, it refers to the GENERAL simultaneous coordination of all Marine aviation functions. It is apparent that aviation activities can conflict with each other in the same or adjacent airspace-. Airspace control is designed to minimize this potential conflict and to regulate activity when a conflict arises. Control is obtained according to a set of preestablished priorities established by the MAGTF commander through his TAC. Functional coordination has four aspects in its application, all of which interact: a. Intratheater Coordination. This is the coordination required to govern the use of airspace on a scale much larger than that which affects a sector. Aircraft will routinely transit a sector or enter from an adjacent sector. This interaction requires a centralized authority for coordi nation. b. lntrasector Coordination. An additional need exists to coordinate multiple aircraft activity within a sector. This requirement generates the unique characteristics of the particular air command and control system. The approach followed by the MACCS for assault support operations will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. c. Coordination of Air Operations With Ground Operations. To regulate air activity within one sector is not sufficient. Aircraft operate in a sector to support a ground commander; there fore, a requirement exists to coordinate air activities with those ground activities which are dependent upon use of airspace; artillery as an example. In this instance, there is a requirement which generates unique characteristics of the particular air command system: how it integrates with other supporting arms and the ground commanders' activities. d. Technical Coordination. Technology has advanced in some areas of air activity faster than in others. Needs have become more demanding, creating a situation wherein control of some aviation functions is heavily dependent upon technology. This dependence establishes a require ment for both manual and semiautomatic systems coordination which is in a continuous pro cess of development within the Marine Corps as new items of equipment are introduced. 115 FMFM 5-5 5302. In view of the organization of the United States Armed Forces throughout the world today, theINTRATHEATER MAGTF will frequently be required to participate in combat action as a component of a joint COORDINATION force. It is, therefore, necessary to examine and standardize some applications of the Marineaviation for its role in such operations. See JCS Pub 2, JCS Pub 8, JCS Pub 10, and LFM 04/NWP 17 for a more detailed discussion of MAGTF participation in joint operations. JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces ~a. Sector Assignment. Plans for joint operations involving a MAGTF should provide, as is pointed out in JCS Pub 8, that a specific sector or area of responsibility be given to the JCSPub 8, MAGTF. The boundaries of this sector should be predicated upon the air defense and airspaceDoctrine for Air Defense ~ control capability of the MAGTF, and will normally include the zone of action and objectivesassigned. ~b. Control and Coordination and Communications (1) The joint force commander is responsible for providing overall guidance for theeffective use of tactical air resources, including the general priorities and restraints to be ~ applied, with due regard for the needs of subordinate commands and the maintenance oforganizational integrity. He also establishes procedures to coordinate the employment of air resources with those agencies which require its support, and the control of airspace,LFM 04/NWP 17, as well as the reallocation of tactical air resources when it becomes necessary to meetemergencies. (2) The joint force commander should coordinate air operations and airspace controlthrough a coordinating authority for air (CAA), designated by the joint force commander. • The CAA should normally be a member of the joint staff, operating from thejoint combat operations center (COC). The coordination of tactical airoperations and control of airspace are functions so vital to the overall success of the mission that they must be exercised by the joint force commanderthrough a joint agency. In exceptional situation~, it may become expedient fora component or supporting commander to be designated as the CAA. Suchmight be the case when that commander is providing the preponderance oftactical air assets and possesses 'the requisite capabilities to exercise theauthority. • The joint CAA, under the direction of the joint force commander, shallestablish quidelines and procedures and supervise the coordination of tacticalair operations through the comp~tible and mutually supporting tactical aircontrol systems of the components; 116 FMFM 5-5 • Centralized direction by the CAA does not imply assumption by the CAA of operational control over any air assets. The CAA has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. Matters on which the CAA is unable to obtain essential agreement shall be referred to the joint force commander for resolution. (3) The MAGTF commander, through his tactical air commander and the agencies of the Marine air command control system, commands, controls, and coordinates Marine tactical air operations. The MACCS, while primarily responsive to the MAGTF commander, must also be compatible with and supportive of other like systems within the joint force. The TACC/TADC is the primary point of contact for operational aviation coordination with the CAA and forces external to the MAGTF, although sUbordinate agencies may interface directly to exchange information. When engaged in joint operations, aircraft of more than one service may be required to traverse and/or conduct operations in portions of the same airspace, thereby necessitating procedures to minimize mutual interference and to maximize operational effectiveness and safety. Under such conditions, it is essential that all aircraft operate under an integrated airspace control system. Any airspace control system must, however, be responsive to the ground commander's need fo·r artillery and/or naval gunfire support, as well as providing for air defense an\l ensuring flight safety. The joint force commander establishes general airspace control procedures and responsibilities to achieve the maximum safety and operational effectiveness. The joint coordinating authority for air is additionally responsible for the coordination of airspace control. The purpose of any coordination must be to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. In this case, however, the effectiveness of the coordinated ground, surface, and air effort is the prime consideration, not merely to increase efficiency. Within the MAGTF sector of responsibility, the TAOC is the major en route air traffic control facility, and the Marine air traffic control unit provides terminal air traffic control. c. United States Air Force Tactical Air Control System (TACS). The necessity to operate aircraft of more than one service within the same airspace and coordinate supporting ground fires requires familiarity with the functions of appropriate air control agencies of the other services. During land corllbat operations, the Marine Corps air control effort will interface with the Air Force tactical air control system. The Air Force component commander (AFCC) uses the TACS to exercise centralized control over his forces, to monitor the air-ground situation, and when designated as the airspace control authority, to coordinate, integrate, and administer the airspace over the combat zone. TACS provides the AFCC with the organization and equipment necessary to plan, direct, and control Air Force tactical air operations and coordinate joint air operations with components of the other services. Within the TACS are found the appropriate agencies required for general direction, procedural guidance, and coordination of friendly air activity. For a description of the Air Force tactical air control system, see FMFM 5-l. FMFM 5-5 5303. Within the air defense sector, the coordination between the various air control agenciesINTRASECTOR determines the effectiveness and responsiveness of air defense activity. The specific tasks ofCOORDINATION each participating element are outlined in FMFM 5-l, hut the timeliness of this participationmust he emphasized. a. TACC. In the air defense environment, the TACC may he generally described as aperformance supervisor. Under the cognizance of the aviation element G/S-3, AAW aircraftrequirements are included within overall aircraft scheduling. Offensive AAW is initiated by the aviation element G/S-3 in accordance with information received from intelligence sources. Theprimary AAW concern of the TACC is to ensure the assignment of interceptor aircraft to thepreplanned interceptor requirements, ground alert, or airborne. These aircraft are integratedinto the total fixed-wing schedule and the TACC monitors the execution of the daily fragmentary order. In addition to supervising decentralized air defense execution, the TACCpossesses divert, sector salvo, and scramble authority. (1) Diverts. It may occasionally he necessary to divert air defense aircraft from theirscheduled missions. Under high air defense alert conditions, the TACC may reassign CAPaircraft from one TAOC to another, if the TAC evaluates the enemy air threat as greaterin a particular sector and decides to weight the threatened sector more heavily inweapons. Divert authority empowers the TACC to direct TAOC exchange of controleven with on-station aircraft. This divert authority also applies to aircraft engaged innon-air-defense missions, hut armed with air-to-air weapons. This latter occurrence isadmittedly an extreme application, hut illustrates the extent of the TACC's divertauthority. Such aircraft may he diverted from their scheduled missions and assigned to an air defense control agency if the air defense situation assumes that high a degree ofpriority. In preparation for this eventuality, the TACC maintains status information onlaunched aircraft armament. (2) Sector Salvo. When the air defense situation is such that hostile aircraft havepenetrated the defensive surveillance system, the TACC will promulgate the appropriate air defense alert conditions to the various units, air and ground. Ifhostile identificationinformation is not immediately established, the TACC may order the sector cleared ofall friendly noninterceptor aircraft to simplify air defense target acquisition. This is thesector salvo condition and once in effect, SAM units can revert to a WEAPONS FREE status to engage all aircraft not under TAOC positive control and/or not in prearranged "safe" corridors. Simultaneously, all agencies with aircraft under positive control vector these aircraft to TAOC. Agencies having contact with hut not positive radar control of aircraft, will direct these aircraft to the nearest "safe" corridor and/or predesignated orhit/handover point. Aircraft will anchor at this point until contacted by the TAOC for positive control. Agencies handling aircraft in this manner will report aircraft altitude,status, and identification to the TAOC. 118 FMFM 5-5 (3) Scramble Authority. The TACC's delegation of scramble authority depends upon the anticipated enemy air threat. Normally, the TACC retains scramble authority to balance aircraft allocations among the TAOC's or to weight a particular sector. However, if the enemy air threat is significant, hot pads may be assigned to each sector TAOC. In the case of a single airfield, the TAOC may be assigned direct scramble authority for specified missions. This decentralization reduces reaction time and provides a margin of safety when the TAOC anticipates a delay in establishing hostile identification on a particular target. Therefore, scramble authority usually remains with the TACC, but may be delegated depending upon the local air situation. b. DASC. The participation of the DASC is essential to successful conduct of air defense. In contrast to air defense agencies, the DASC has no organic radar capability and must rely on voice communication to maintain position information on aircraft under its cognizance. Once the MAGTF is established ashore, the preponderance of aircraft missions will be of a direct air support nature. This results in a high level of aircraft density within or just beyond the missile intercept zone. The TAOC's retention of engagement control of the LAAM fire units obligates it to identify and if appropriate, assign engagements in response to LAAM battalion reports on these tracks. The DASC must provide the TAOC with position information on DAS aircraft operating under its control. The DASC is able to do ihis by maintaining current stat':IS on the position, altitude, and track of all its preplanned and immediate aircraft. Timely pas8age of the information ensures timely engagement by the LAAM firing units. Delay in the passage of the information delays target engagement and may, in the event of an enemy air attack, necessitate the TACC declaring a sector salvo condition. This presents a hazard to friendly aircraft and interrupts DAS of ground combat elements. c. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). TACP's contribute to the air defense process by providing the DASC with status information on aircraft under the control of a forward air control party (FAC party). When feasible, the DASC will obtain this information by monitoring the net on which the FAC is controlling aircraft. d. MA TCS. The MATCS is responsible for certain contributions to the air defense process. These contributions consist, in part, of reporting the identification information described in paragraph 3203b to the TAOC. When sector salvo conditions are declared, MATCS receives holding patterns if required and restricts aircraft launches as prescribed. The MATCS passes air defense alert conditions. Finally, the MATCS forwards the necessary flight plan data to alternate airfields for aircraft which are being diverted until termination of a sector salvo condition. 119 FMFM 5..5 e. TAOC. The TAOC, as previously indicated, is the agency responsible for requesting,receiving, and coordinating the various identification inputs, maintaining the appropriate aircraft classifications, and responding to queries made by defensive weapons systems by back-tell. As the focus of the sector air defense system, it must anticipate specific input requirementsfrom associated air control elements and recomment appropriate tasking. It is further responsible to anticipate and recommend alternate procedures to preserve air defense continuityshould its systems become degraded or inoperative. f. AAOC. When employed, the AAOC is normally in a monitor status similar to that of theTACC. It supervises battery status, engagement, and track reporting. It does, however, supplement surveillance reporting with its longer range surveillance radar and will direct its organicgap-filler FAAD teams in coordination with the TAOC. The AAOC advises the senior weapons director (SWD) in the TAOC of any missile peculiar problems which may affect commitment ofdefensive missiles. Finally, the AAOC maintains similar advisory contact with the missile liaisonofficers in the TACC and DASC. The AAOC normally assumes missile control in case of TAOCdegradation. g. FAAD Battery. The FAAD teams and command elements of the FAAD battery supply minimum input into the air defense system hut require coordination for their employment.Due to their "forward area" employment and the mobile nature of their weapons, FAADelements utilize immediate reaction procedures against targets. The FAAD battery commander,located in the FASC, maintains position information on all teams for passage of polar coordinate target information relative to the positions of each team. This procedure is followed onlywhere a warning order will assist engagement. Teams are notified of sector salvo conditions in order to shift to the WEAPONS FREE mode. The FAAD battery commander must be keptinformed of the location and composition of d,etccted raids, engagement results, local air defense alert conditions, the status and location of "safe corridors" and the firing capabilitiesof Hawk elements. This information will be passed by the TAOC. The only inputs to the TAOC from the FAAD battery itself are reports of the sighting of hostile aircraft, aircraft committingan openly hostile act, and team readiness conditions. Reports on hostile air activity are,however, coincidental to the engagement and firing sequence. 5304. Airspace utilization is the degree of access to a block of airspace required to support a tacticalAIRSPACE mission. It is conditioned by the desired level of aircraft activity, the presence and capabilitiesUTILIZATION of surface-based fire support means, airspace control requirements, and the assignment of priorities. Consequently, when airspace utilization is being planned, all significant uses of airspace over the combat area must be considered. For the amphibious assault operation, thejoint force commander who orders the operation will assign, to the CATF, an airspace ofdefined proportions which will include the amphibious objective area. All operations in the AOA will be under the control of the CATF until the amphibious operation is terminated. Toensure unity of effort in overall air operations, the CATF will coordinate air operations within the defined airspace as necessary with the commander responsible for airspace control in thesurrounding area. 120 FMFM 5-5 a. Utilization Priorities. The speed, range and maneuverability of aircraft require centralization of control throughout the AOA. Yet, the ground commander's requirement for responsive fire support, specifically artillery and naval gunfire, necessitates the use of airspace that may conflict with aircraft operations. The CATF, in conjunction with the commander landing force, establishes force level priorities and general airspace control procedures. Subject to these procedures, MAGTF ground commanders are responsible for assigning immediate airspace utilization priorities within their area of responsibility. Airspace utilization requirements are coordinated with those of adjacent and high echelons. b. Reassignment of Control. At the termination of the amphibious assault operation, the amphibious task force will be dissolved, the assigned airspace will be disestablished, and the airspace control will normally revert to the airspace control authority designated for that area. Air-ground coordination is not a major consideration in antiair warfare since most AAW 5305. operations will take place beyond the FSCL and at altitudes higher than those utilized by AIR-GROUND supporting arms. (Interceptor control is discussed in appendix G.) Two factors must always be COORDINATION considered however: • The control of surface-to-air missile units (see par. 5306). • The provision of air attack warnings to aviation, ground combat, combat service support, and MAGTF headquarters units. Inasmuch as the antiair warfare system will probably be the first portion of the MAGTF to be aware of such attacks (either by detection or by the failure of other antiair warfare measures), air attack warnings logically stem from the AAW system. Air attack warnings are promulgated on the landing force alert/broadcast net, the NAW tactical alert net, the landing force convoy control net, and the division alert/broadcast net. 5306. The basic principle involved in the command and control afforded by the AAW system is that the results of coordinated effort are greater by many times than any possible results of the CONTROL OF random separate efforts of individual units. This increased effectiveness is derived from the SURFACE-TO-AIR manner in which the functioning and effect of each component is complemented by the othe MISSILE UNITS other components. This requires a centralized control for coordination,overall authority, and responsibility; and decentralized control for short reaction time. The delegation of authority to control any of the subsystems is governed by the capabilities of the system and subsystems as related to the situation. In modem AAW, the delegation of authority to subordinate control agencies is required to reduce force reaction time. 121 a. Control Means. The control means are the tools through which the commander controlsall AAW operations. The control means include air and ground control agencies with theirassociated equipment for communications and display of the air situation. Effective control atthe highest levels of command is required in order to integrate the many diverse air and groundmeans into a flexible, comprehensive system capable of initiating destructive action atmaximum range throughout a 360-degree perimeter. The TAOC functioning under the TACCintegrates the efforts of the interceptors and the SAM units. This system provides centralization of control and coordination at the TACC and has the flexibility to permit the superviseddecentralization of authority to the TAOC. b. Control of Ground-Based Air Defense Weapons. Ground-based air defense weapons aregenerally considered as a secondary or backup weapons system. Within MACCS air defense weapons, interceptor aircraft provide the :firSt line of defense. However, the destruction-in-depthapplication does not dictate that all hostile targets need be first engaged by aircraft before being assigned to the SAM units. Should a target be detected inside CAP stations, it may be assigneddirectly to missiles. The TAOC is the agency with the flexibility to choose weapons as thesituation di~tates and resources al!ow, Tltis ,fle.xibility exists through the integration of theMACS and LAAM battalion and through a communication link with FAAD battery personnelin the DASC. The ground-based weapons control conditions are designed to control SAMemployment and to govern their assigrunent. (1) Hawk Weapons Control Commands • WEAPONS TIGHT. The command WEAPONS TIGHT means do not open. fire, or to cease firing on any aircraft (or on bogey specified, or in sectionindicated) unless target(s) known to be hostile. • WEAPONS FREE. This command means fire may be opened on all aircraftnot recognized as friendly. • ENGAGE. This command means to attack designated raid/track. • CEASE FIRE. This command is normally given to air defense artillery units torefrain from firing on, but to continue to track, an airborne object. Missilesalready in flight will be permitted to continue to intercept. • HOLD FIRE. This command means do not open fire or to cease firing ondesignated raid/track. Missiles in flight must not be permitted to continue tointercept designated raid/track. (Note: This is an emergency order thattemporarily terminates the active status of antiair warfare weapons ondesignated raid/tracks.) (2) Readiness States. The TACC establishes air defense warning conditions and FAADweapons control conditions based on the anticipated or existing air defense situation,ensuring the passage of information on friendly, unknown, and enemy aircraft to the DASC, the command post of the FAAD battery. The TAOC controls LAAM battalionweapon readiness states based on existing air defense warning condition. These weaponsreadiness states are: FMFMS-5 • "2 minutes"; missiles can be launched within 2 minutes. • "5 minutes"; missiles can be launched within 5 minutes. • "15 minutes"; missiles can be launched within 15 minutes. • "30 minutes"; missiles can be launched within 30 minutes. • "1 hour"; missiles can be launched within 1 hour. • "3 hours"; missiles can be launched within 3 hours. • "Released"; missiles are released from defense commitment for a specified period of time. (3) Fire Direction. Fire direction of SAM units includes the target assignment process and its relationship to sectors of fire. This fire direction is the.responsibility of the TAC, exercised through the SAAWC for the Hawk batteries and through the FAAD battery commander for the FAAD battery. Coordination among SAM fire units is as significant as the coordination between SAM and interceptor weapons systems. This fire direction considers the sectors of irre, early warning, and target assignment influences. (a) Sectors of Fire. The LAAM battalion commander positions individual batteries and assigns sectors of fire so as to provide coverage of an area of respons ibility which has been assigned to him by the SAAWC. The battalion commander attempts to evenly distribute responsibility for geographic coverage between batteries. Departures from this norm may be warranted for peculiar terrain or particularly attractive enemy air avenues of approach. The Hawk system optimally employs 50 percent missile coverage overlap between adjacent batteries. (b) &rly Warning. Targets may often be detected out of range of missile acquisition radar by other radars within the air defense system. Azimuth and range data on such tracks are passed to alert the missile batteries in whose zones acquisition is anticipated. A CEASE FIRE command is passed when the contact is reported by the Hawk unit, unless it has been already assigned as a primary missile target. (c) Target Assignment. In the TAOC, the SAD confers with the SWD on each target for which missile engagement is a possibility. Alerting a battery to the possibility of engagement is accomplished at the discretion of the SWD as he evaluated long-range surveillance radar products. As a hostile track is detected, the interception weapons are assigned and engagement is commenced. 123 FMFM 5-5 • When Hawk assignment is considered probable, the following factorsdetermine assignment: -The appropriate battery is committed according to target azimuthand battery firing capability. -Whenever possible, the appropriate battery is alerted before targetacquisition range to allow full preparation time. -The SAAWC, through the SAD, directs the engagement of a targetby SAM alone if CAP aircraft are committed to a greater threat orthe detection range does not allow for interceptor engagement. -The SAAWC, through the SAD, may require missile units toCEASE FIRE on a particular target in their zones of fire if theinterceptor is in favorable position for immediate weapons release.Batteries must be prepared for immediate reaction to receipt of anENGAGE FIRE command. -The SAD, through the SWD, may assign more than one battery tolarge raids or targets employing ECM. In this instance, the SWDcoordinates battery firing to avoid unnecessary expenditure ofmissiles or hazard to friendly aircraft. • When FAAD assignment is considered probable, the decisive selection of an enemy aircraft as a FAAD target involves the assessment by theFAAD team of those factors related to the capabilities and limitationsof the weapon. The teams are normally deployed with overlapping areasof capability for engaging targets. (4) FAAD Unit Assignments. FAAD units are located with frontline elements toprovide early AAW protection and to cover avenues of approach which are considered to be the most serious threat to the landing force. FAAD units are also assigned to protect vital areas and/or objectives in the AOA. In offensive situations, the teams areprimarily responsive to the scheme of maneuver of the supported units. In a defensive situation, the teams should complement each other and provide gap-fillers in the overallAAW defense. c. FAAD Command and Control (1) Marine Amphibious Force Operations (a) Command. FAAD support for MAF operations is provided by the FAADbattery. Command of the battery is exercised through elements of the MACCS. 124 (b) Control Afloat. During the early phase of an amphibious operation, control of air and AAW operations is vested in the CATF who exercises this responsibility through his tactical air officer. The FAAD battery commander, or his representative, controls FAAD units from the SACC. Weapons control conditions, air defense warning conditions, and antiair intelligence information are received from the tactical air control center element of the SACC. FAAD platoon commanders displace ashore with the supported units, maintaining communications with the battery commander, or his representative, on the FAAD weapons control (FWC) net. The battery executive officer displaces the battery headquarters ashore with the landing force fire support coordination center. While control of FAAD operations is afloat, the battery executive officer functions as FAAD liaison officer to the FSCC. In this capacity, he monitors the FWC net and coordinates FAAD unit operations ashore. (c) Control Ashore. When the DASC becomes operational ashore, the battery executive officer moves to the DASC, coordinating FAAD battery activities through this agency. Control of FAAD battery operations continues to be exercised from the SACC through the CATF's AAW system until the tactical air command center becomes operational ashore and control of AAW operations is passed to the CLF. When command is passed ashore, the battery commander moves to the DASC and receives weapons control conditions, air warning conditions, and antiair intelligence information over the combat information/ detection (CI/D) net and the antiaircraft intelligence (AAINT) net. (3) Marine Amphibious Unit Operations (a) Command. Support for MAU operations is provided by FAAD section(s). Command of the section(s) is exercised through the MACCS, if available. (b) Control Afloat. The OIC/NCOIC of the FAAD section(s) controls the section(s) from the SACC. The assistant OIC/NCOIC (section leader) displaces ashore with the landing force FSCC, maintaining communications with the F AAD OIC/NCOIC in the SACC over the FWC net. The assistant OIC/NCOIC acts as FAAD liaison officer to the FSCC and relays weapons control conditions, and antiair intelligence information to the FAAD teams ashore over the FAAD team control net. (c) Control Ashore. Normally for operations at the MAU level, control of air and AAW operations in the AOA remains with the CATF.If control of AAW operations is passed to the CLF, control of FAAD weapons is exercised through the appropriate MACCS agency (TAOC or DASC). d. Weapona Control and Coordination (1) General. The MACCS has the assets and the flexibility to coordinate and chooseAAW weapons as the situation dictates. Air defense warnings and weapons control conditions are established by the CATF/CLF and disseminated over the MACCScommunication nets. Local situations may allow subordinate unit commanders toimpose restrictive weapons control conditions. (a) FAAD Coordination. The FAAD teams and command elements of theFAAD battery ·require considerable coordination for effective employment. The FAAD commander maintains position and status information on all teams anddisseminates weapons control conditions. The FAAD commander must be kept info~ed of location and composition of detected or pending raids, engagementresults, local air defense alert conditions, the status and location of "safe flightc~rridors", and the firing capabilities of LAAM battalion fire units. The FAADcommander provides information on friendly and hostile aircraft activity andengagement results to appropriate MACCS agencies. (b) Fire Direction. Fire direction of FAAD units includes target assignmentand its relationship to sectors of fire. The fire direction is the responsibility of theTAOC exercised through the FAAD commander for the FAAD teams. Firingcoordination among LAAM and FAAD units is essential. The TAOC considers zones of fire, early warning, and target assignment when coordinating the fire of LAAM and FAAD units. For a detailed discussion of fire direction coordination for all AAW assets, see FMFM 5-l. (2) Air Defense Warning&. The CATF or CLF evaluates the probability of air attacksand issues air defense warnings. The warnings are promulgated by the SACC or TACC.Air defense warnings are defined as follows: • RED: Attack is imminent or in progress. • YELLOW: Attack is probable. • WHITE: Attack is not probable. (3) FAAD Weapons Control Commands • WEAPONS FREE. This command means fire may be opened on all aircraft(except helicopters) not recognized as friendly. FAAD gunners may engagehigh speed aircraft not positively identified as friendly. Engagement of helicopters requires positive identification. • WEAPONS TIGHT. This command means do not open fire, or to cease firing on any aircraft (or on bogey specified, or in section indicated) unless target(s) known to be hostile. FAAD gunners may engage any aircraft positively identified as hostile. • HOLD FIRE. This command means do not open fire or to cease firing on raid/track designated. FAAD gunners do not fire unless directly under attack by aircraft. • RESUME FIRE. This command is given to terminate the HOLD FIRE restriction. • CEASE FIRE. This command is normally given to air defense artillery units to refrain from firing on, but to continue to track visually, an airborne object. • CEASE ENGAGEMENT. This is an order for weapons to disengage a particular target or targets and. prepare to engage another target. The order terminates engagement on a particular target. (4) Detection/Identification of Aircraft. Coordinated measures which help provide timely identification include information from visual sightings, radar, IFF, flight plans, air corridors, flight characteristics, andthe actions of observed aircraft. • Friendly aircraft are those: -Recognized as a friendly. -In a friendly corridor not committing a hostile act. -Designated by a control agency. . Unidentified and not committing a hostile act. • Hostile aircraft are those: -Recognized as an enemy. -Unidentified and attacking friendly installations. -Unidentified in areas where control agencies have specified all aircraft will be engaged. (5) Loss of Communications. In the event of loss of communications, FAAD units go to WEAPONS TIGHT condition. If the previous condition was WEAPONS FREE, the WEAPONS TIGHT condition is assumed immediately. If prior to communication loss, the weapon was in HOLD FIRE status, FAAD units maintain HOLD FIRE for a period of 10 minutes and then assume WEAPONS TIGHT. Loss of communication procedures should be instituted if the FWC and/or FTC communication nets are down. FMFM 5-5 FMFM 5-5 ( 6) Authority to Change Control Conditions. Authority to change the FAAD weaponscontrol conditions is vested in the CLF and is normally exercised by the tacticalair commander through the TACC. In independent operations, this authority is vested inthe senior organizational commander. It is anticipated that the normal weapons control condition will be WEAPONS TIGHT and that changes will be infrequent. It is possiblethat the tactical situation may require a momentary change in the weapons controlcondition status within a local commander's area. The following criteria will apply: (a) Area Control Agency. Ineither a WEAPONS FREE or WEAPONS TIGHT status, the MACCS control agency may direct HOLD FIRE when appropriate ormay direct engagement of targets. (b) Local Tactical Commander. Organizational commanders to which FAADteams are attached may, when the tactical situation requires, set weapons controlconditions for their local area which imposes additional restraints upon the FAADgunner. FMFMS-SC, (7) Additional Information. For a more detailed discussion of the FAAD battery,Employment see FMFM 5-SC.. ofForward Area Air Defense Battery 5307. The Marine air command and control system possesses a tactical data system (TDS) designedAUTOMATED to provide the MAGTF with increased combat effectiveness. (See fig. 17.) ComputerAND technology is employed to ~nhance timeliness and accuracy of the collection, display,MANUAL SYSTEMS evaluation, and dissemination of information. MAGTF antiair warfare agencies capable of OPERATIONS tactical data link operations are the TACC, TAOC, BCC, and PCP. The most significant advantage of employing tactical data systems in AAW (NTDS/ATDS/MACCS) lies in their abilityto provide a more complete and accurate display of the tactical situation in real time. Theyalso make possible increased effectiveness in weapons employment and greatly increase thenumber of contacts that can be tracked before saturation occurs. These advantages enable theSAAWC to make more timely and accurate evaluations of the tactical situation and enhancethe prospect of destroying threats at greater ranges from the vital area of the force. Thefunction of TDS-equipped units in AAW can best be described as air track management. Thisincludes detection, tracking, and identification or air traffic within the area of operations;support of airstrikes against the enemy; and defense of friendly forces. a. Capabilities of TDS. The capabilities of the TDS-equipped MACCS AAW agenciesinclude: • Rapid processing of air surveillance data collected by the sensors of the MACS. 128 ~ TADIL C (LINK 4A) TAOC f i i ___ D D D D D D D D NTDS NON-TDS TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS TACC TADIL A (LINK 11) TADIL C (LINK4A) .I .a & '-i i .a '"i 3: '"i 3: ..... Figure 17. Tactical Data Systems . 1\:l <:it \0 "' • Real time automatic exchange of track information by digital data link among allparticipating units. • Automated control of data link equipped aircraft. • Automated control of assigned Hawk missile units. • Real time display of the AAW situation. \ b. Limitations of TDS. Although TDS enhances the ability to process, disseminate, and usetactical information, it does not directly increase the ability of individual units to detect thisinformation initially nor does it determine the accuracy of data inputs. With the speed andaccuracy that digital computers process data, inaccurate input data is made more apparent.Interactions between tactical data systems necessitate strict adherence to standardized operating procedures throughout the force. Errors in procedure or judgement are automaticallybroadcast to all uruts and may cause confusion. When a large number of TDS units are operating simultaneously, close force level supervision of TDS operations is required. It is oftendifficult to determine individual or unit responsibility for errors or poor system performance. c. Track Management. Efficient management of MACCS tracking requires that certainfunctions be performed at the TACC and at the TAOC. (1) TACC Track Coordinator. The track coordinator is responsible for interfacecoordination within the MACCS and between the MACCS and other service participatingunits. He is responsible for the MACCS data links and for system tracking, dual designator resolution, and identification conflict resolution. (2) TAOC Track Supervisor. The surveillance identification director (SID) usuallyacts as the TAOC track supervisor. He supervises all detection and tracking operationsby the TAOC (manual and automatic) and is responsible for TAOC data link operations. (3) Surveillance Operator. Identification is a command function and cannot bedelegated in its entirety to a surveillance operator. However, certain known criteria canbe published to identify most tracks. The surveillance operator may use any or all ofthe techniques stated in paragraph 3203c. FMFM S-5 d. Track Classification. The definitions of track classifications herein are general and must be specifically defined by the tactical air commander to conform to the tactical situation. • CONFIRMED HOSTILE; any track positively determined to be hostile. • ASSUMED HOSTILE; any track whose hostile identity has been assumed in accordance with the criteria established by doctrine or the tactical situation. Efforts to positively identify continue. • UNKNOWN; the identity assigned to all tracks whose intent cannot be determined by criteria or doctrine as being either hostile or friendly. • ASSUMED UNKNOWN; an identity automatically assigned to all new tracks which indicates that the track has not been considered by the TDS identification officer. • ASSUMED FRIEND; any track whose friendly identity has been assumed in accordance with the criteria established by doctrine or tactical situation. Efforts to identify positively continue. • CONFIRMED FRIEND; any track which has been positively identified as friendly. e. Tactical Digital Information Links A, B, and C. Tactical digital information links provide the communication means for exchanging automatically processed digital data between air control agencies employing various tactical data systems. Types of data passed over these links include air and surface tracks, weapons status, and selected orders and control functions. T ADIL A identifies netted type operations among several agencies, whereas T ADIL B identifies point-to-point operations between two agencies. T ADIL C identifies point-to-point operations between control stations and controlled aircraft. Multiple T ADIL links are normally required depending on the number of agencies established. f. Intercenter Data Link (ICDL). ICDL provides a means for point-to-point exchange of automatically processed digital data between the TACC and subordinate TAOC's. Types of data passed over this link include situation summaries, weapons status information, and air track information. Multiple ICDL links are required when more than one TAOC is operating with the T ACC. ICDL will be replaced by T ADIL B. g. Missile Battery Data Link. MBDL provides a means for point-to-point exchange of a~tomatically processed digital data between a TAOC and assigned Hawk missile batteries. Types of data passed over this link include reference tracks, missile status, missile engagements, and gap filler reports. Multiple MBDL links are normally required depending on the number of T AOC's established and the number of assigned missile batteries, assault fire units, and antiaircraft operation centers. h. Voice Coordination. Present doctrine does not provide for separate additional voice communication nets for coordination of TDS operations. When linked with U.S. Navy TDS units, the single net information and position (SNIP) net is used. The SNIP net is the primary long range voice net used to coordinate AAW action when the decentralized control procedureis in effect. The SNIP net is controlled by the FAAWC and guarded by all sector AAWcoordinators. The force track coordinator (FTC) and unit track supervisor use this net forcoordination of AAW tracking operations. TDS operations do eliminate the requirement for certain voice nets when that voice net function is performed by the semiautomatic TDS. Netsfor which the primary function has been absorbed by the TDS may then he used for TDS voicecoordination. i. Landing Force AAW Manual Operations Ashore (1) The present inventory of MACCS equipment provides for semiautomatic processing of information using a tactical data system. Because of the inherent advantage of TDS,semiautomatic operations is the preferred mode of operations. However, during the earlyphases of an amphibious operation, or in the event of TDS equipment outages, it will henecessary to voice AAW operations are described in paragraph 5402. The tactical situ ation or partial TDS equipment outages may allow combining or eliminating some AAWvoice nets to reduce the AAW net requirements. (2) During the buildup to integrated semiautomatic operations, or in the event ofTDS equipment outages, semiautomatic agencies must he prepared to interface withmanual agencies. Significant considerations include, hut should not be limited to: • The profusion of information produced by semiautomatic facilities must heselectively examined to identify only necessary and manageable output for exchange with a manual facility. • The probability exists that some positions in the semiautomatic system will beincapable of handling automated volume and simutaneously exchanging datawith a manual facility. Adjustments, in both personnel and equipment, musthe made to pass or receive selected information. • Semiautomatic systems are limited in their ability to assimilate manually acquired data for processing and manual distribution is often necessary. t Conditions for decentralization of functions among and even within agenciesmust be standardized to accommodate manual system saturation levels andsemiautomatic system failures. FMFM 5-5 SECTION IV COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS There are several major equipment considerations required by any AAW capable MAGTF. Some are common to all fixed-wing operations and some are AAW unique. a. General. Providing an MAGTF with an air defense capability requires a significant amount of communication-electronics equipment. Shipping requirements and substantial, geographic location considerations are si'gnificant, and lines of communication are a constant concern. The air defense communications-electronics equipment in the aviation element consists of multiple types of radios, ground-to-air and ground-to-ground radars, from lighter weight, trailer mounted Hawk radars to the larger, less mobile, three-dimensional radars. The ranges of radars can be severely reduced by weather conditions, improper emplacement, and operating efficiency. Rain and snow reduce radar range. A radar emplaced on poor terrain surrounded by low hills has reduced low altitude capability. A radar not operating at its peak of designed efficiency, either due to equipmen failure or improper maintenance, has a reduced capability. Since these factors cannot be forecast, planning must be based on design criteria. These criteria are both realistically reliable under most operating conditions. However, the data given will not always be met under combat and adverse weather conditions. Another problem which affects the effectiveness of radar is radar line of sight. If a radar is at sea level and the lower edge of its beam is at 0-degree elevation, the furthest away a radar can see an object at sea level, assuming no intervening terrain, is roughly 50 miles. This can be improved somewhat by em placing the radar on dominant terrain. The Hawk unique equipment is formally classified as ordnance but is also included because of its similar nature to communications-electronics. The communication equipment to support the MAG and its squadrons must also be considered. The major point to he made is that the inclusion of air defense capabilities in an MAGTF will substantially increase the lift, positioning, and electronics maintenance support requirements for that MAGTF. 5401. GENERAL 5402. REQUIREMENTS b. Landing Force AAW Communication Nets. This paragraph describes the. voice communication nets used by the landing force during AAW operations. Semiautomatic TDS operations eliminate the requirement for certain voice nets. Specific nets to be deactivated may vary with the tactical situation or the availability of communication equipment. Nets to be considered include the combat information/detection (CI/D), antiaircraft control (AAC), antiaircraft intelligence (AAint), command action (CA), and handover/cross tell (Han/CT) nets. An asterisk (*) indicates an as-required unit. (1) Tactical Air Traffic Control (TATC) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for the TACC/TADC to receive reports oflaunches by mission number from aircraft, to clear aircraft to their assignedcontrol agencies, to divert aircraft as necessary, and to receive completed missionreports from aircraft prior to landing. TATC nets are allocated to subordinatecontrol agencies such as the DASC and TAOC to fulfill the same general functionsas indicated above. The number of TATC nets required by the MACCS willdepend on the scope of the operation. See FMFM S-1, for a discussion ofreporting in/out procedures on T ATC nets. (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. e TAOC's. • DASC. e MATCS. • Fixed-wing aircraft. • Helicopters. (2) Fighter Air Direction (FAD) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for air control agencies and elements to controlaircraft in the conduct of intercepts. Multiple FAD nets, designated 1, 2, etc., arerequired and are assigned to major control agencies. (b) Composition e TAOC. • Interceptor aircraft. • Other elements within the air command and control system. (3) Airborne Early Warning Intelligence (AEW!lnt) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for AEW aircraft to pass information on targetsin the AEW aircraft's sector of responsibility. (b) Composition • TAOC's. • AEW aircraft. • (*) Early warning and control (EW/C) agencies. FMFM 5-S (4) Guard (G) Net (a) Purpose. To provide an emergency distress net used by aircraft to declare an emergency. It further serves as a means for air control agencies to advise aircraft of emergency conditions or serious hazards to aircraft safety. (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. e TAOC's. • DASC. • ASRT. e MATCS. • Fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft. • (*)other MACCS agencies. (5) Itinerant Air Traffic Control (IATC) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means to control itinerant aircraft within the objective area. (b) Composition e TACC/TADC. e TAOC's. • Itinerant aircraft. (6) Tactical Alert (TA) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means to rapidly disseminate air raid warning conditions. It is normally a broadcast net and serves the entire MAGTF. (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. • TAOC's. e DASC. • AAOC. • All Marine aircraft groups. • Marine wing support group (MWSG ). • MAGTF headquarters. • (*) Ground units. FMFM 5-S (7) Tactical Air Command 1 (TACmd 1) Net (a) Purpose. To provide the primary operational command channel in the wing. Operational command information is passed by the TACC/TADC regarding the assignment of tasks, the procurement of aircraft from the MAG's, and the promulgation of schedules. (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. e TAOC's. • DASC. • Aircraft groups. • (*)AAOC. (8) Tactical Air Command 2 (TACmd 2) Net (a) Purpose. To provide for an overload for the TACmd 1 net. When activated, it is normally used for the transmission of requests for preplanned airstrikes, lengthy operations orders, and air schedules. (b) Composition. As required. (9) Air Operations Control (AC) Net (a) Purpose. To provide the means for the TAOC to request interceptor aircraft and to report friendly air defense situation information to the TACC/TADC. Information pertaining to combat air, patrol availability, stationing and assignment, assignment and disposition of targets, intercept progress, SAM unit status and employment, and aircraft/missile required, one or more nets being established and assigned for each TAOC in operation. In this case, they are designated 1, 2, etc. (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. • TAOC's. • AAOC. • (*) EW/C agencies. (10) Antiaircraft Control Net (a) Purpose. To provide the means for operational control of SAM battery weapons. Target assignments, fire direction orders, weapons status commands, battery status reports, progress of engagement reports, mutual support coordination, and final target disposition typify traffic on this net. (b) Composition • TAOC's. • AAOC. • BCC's/PCP's. (11) Combat Information/Detection (CI!D) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for reporting on unidentified or hostile aircraft, including initial contact reports, tracking, amplifying, and final disposition reports. Multiple CI/D nets are normally employed and are assigned to appropriate radar surveillance activities as required. In this case, these nets are designated 1, 2, etc. (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. • TAOC's. • EW/C activities. • (*)AAOC. • (*) BCC's/PCP's. e (*)DASC. (12) Antiaircraft Intelligence (AAlnt) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for surface-to-air missile batteries to report targets (acquired by battery surveillance radar) not previously reported on the CI/D net. Additionally, this net may be used by the TAOC (or AAOC as appropriate) to pass selected early warning contacts to missile firing units. LAAM battalion personnel with the various air control agencies; e.g., T ACC and DASC, guard the antiaircraft intelligence net in order to provide a further means to evaluate targets and to ensure coordination of antiair warfare activities. FMFMS-5 FMFM 5-5 (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. • TAOC's. • DASC. • AAOC. • BCC's/PCP's. (13) Handover/Cross Tell (Han/CT) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means to exchange radar information, coordinate weapons control, and to prepare for the exchange of aircraft control between adjacent air defense control agencies. (b) Composition • TAOC's. • EW/C agencies. • (*) Other Service control agencies. (14) Ground-Controlled Intercept/Ground-Controlled Approach (GCI/GCA) Handover Net (a) Purpose. To provide for the exchange of information between TAOC's and MATCS's to ensure continuous radar control of aircraft by air control agencies coincident with aircraft departures and recoveries. Aircraft call signs, position, altitude, control frequencies, and similar information are passed prior to handover. (b) Composition • TAOC's. • MATCS's. • (*) EW/C agencies. (15) FAAD Weapon Control (FAADWC) Net (a) Purpose. To provide air defense warnings, weapons conditions, and pertinent information concerning friendly, enemy, or unknown aircraft to FAAD section leaders. FMFM 5-5 (b) Composition • FAAD battery commander. • FAAD platoon commanders (regimental FSCC, TAOC, or AAOC). • FAAD section leaders (battalion FSCC). (16) FAAD Team Control (FAADTC) Net (a) Purpose. To provide air defense warnings, weapons control conditions, and pertinent information concerning friendly, enemy, or unknown aircraft to F AAD teams. Multiple FAAD team control nets are normally employed, depending on the number of FAAD sections employed. (b) Composition • FAAD section leader. • FAAD teams. (17) TAOC!ASRT Handover Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for the exchange of required information to effect the handover of aircraft between the TAOC and the ASRT. Aircraft call signs, position, altitude, control frequencies, and similar information is passed prior to handover. (b) Composition • TAOC's. • ASRT's. • (*) EW/C agencies. (18) Fire Support Safety (FSS) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for air control agencies and elements to exchange information concerning the employment of artillery, naval gunfire, surface-to-air missiles, and close air support aircraft to e~ure the safety of all aircraft in the objective area. FMFMS-5 5403. EQUIPMENT (b) Composition • DASC. • TAOC's. e MATCS. • (*)AAOC. • (*) Other air control agencies. (19) Command Action (CA) Net (a) Purpose. To provide a means for overall coordination of antiair warfare through the exchange of information pertaining to missile battery employment, assignment of air targets, and interceptor/missile coordination. (b) Composition • TACC/TADC. • TAOC's. • EW/C activities. • AAOC. Tables of equipment for the various aviation units include adequate equipment for the establishment of normal communications. Command communications for independent deployments may require augmentation from the force communication battalion to satisfy long lasting or unusually heavy communication demands. a. For communication purposes, the Marine Corps has three modes of operation: (1) Voice. Voice communications are established within the system as required for a particular mission. Initially, these requirements will be in direct proportion to the phased establishment and activation of MACCS agencies ashore. Complete voice communication capability is required as the entire MACCS .is expanded ashore. Voice communication requirements can be met with wire, radio, or any combination thereof. It is important to keep in mind that a requirement to corilmunicate does not necessarily generate a requirement for a radio net, except for comm\.mications with aircraft. (2) Teletypewriter. Teletypewriter communications are established between elements of the system for general operational and administrative traffic. In some instances, teletypewriters may be used to transmit and receive tactical traffic requiring real time or near real time' response. FMFM 5-5 (3) Data. Data links are established between elements of the system to exchange digital data. These links, with their associated terminal equipments, allow the exchange of information between automated elements of the system. The requirements for data communications will vary depending upon the degree to which a task oriented system is automated. As an example, a single TAOC and DASC operating in the MAB will have fewer requirements for data communications than two TAOC's, a TACC, and a DASC operating in the MAF. Requirements for these links will he identified on the basis of needs of the mission. h. For detection and control, the Marine Corps has radars ranging from lightweight trailer mounted Hawk radars to the large, less mobile three-dimensional radars of the TAOC. Many factors affect the operational capabilities of radars. The ranges of radars can he severely reduced by weather conditions, improper emplacement, and their operating efficiency. Rain and snow, for instance, w~ reduce radar range, and a radar placed on poor terrain surrounded by low hills will have its low altitude capability severely reduced. A radar not operating at its peak or designed efficiency, either due to equipment failure or improper maintenance, adversely affects the unit as well. Since these factors cannot he forecast, planning is based upon design criteria; yet, as we have seen, the actual operational ability is a produce to several variables. TO EXTERNAL SYSTEMS ------------- TO .. -ADJACENT I I TAOC I ,.. / \ 1 AAOC J " ...._----::: / I ,, I ,, I .--'- 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I NORMAL I I AS APPROPRIATE I I I I I L----------------------------------------JI Figure 18. Communication Need-Lines, Typical Marine Air Command and Control System Development ·FMFM 5-5 5404. COMMUNICATION NEED-LINES Requirements to communicate within the system are expressed as need-lines. These need-lines may be satisfied by any communication means available, including those external to the system. For example, circuits established by the Defense Communication System (DCS) may be allocated for the coordination of the control system for tactical air. Need-lines may represent radio or wire used in conjunction with voice, data, or teletypewriter communications, or any combination thereof. The need-lines, as is mentioned above, are simply an expression of the requirement to communicate. The type and number of channels associated with each needline, as well as the means of satisfying a specific form of terminal service, are based upon the particular mission and situation. Figure 18 represents need-lines in a typical situation in which less than the entire assets of the MACCS are employed. It is possible that the totality of requirements expressed in figure 18 could be met with wire and wire-multichannel radio (excluding ground-to-air). On the other hand, radio nets could be extensively employed. The mission and tactical situation will determine the need-lines. Equipment availability and geography will determine how the need-lines are satisfied. FMFM 5-5 APPENDIX A COORDINATED AIRSTRIKE PLANNING FACTORS I. STRIKE TACTICS a. When planning a coordinated airstrike, extensive preparations must be made for alternate plans and mission commanders. Use of airborne spare aircraft prior to crossing into hostile territory must be planned. Weather and tanker assets must also be closely scrutinized. b. Timing is critical in a coordinated strike; provisions must be made for alternate means of communications in a communication jammed environment; i.e., IFF or data link. Procedures for lost communications and airborne aborts prior to and inside hostile territory must be covered extensively. c. Switchology must be preset prior to entering a high threat environment and primary visual emphasis must be outside the cockpit for SAM/antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and enemy aircraft. d. Speed and energy levels must be maintained at the highest possible level consistent with fuel requirements. A reduced bomb load should be used rather than ingress/egress at low calibrated airspeed (below 400 knots calibrated air speed (CAS)). e. Formation and altitude must vary with the type of threat (SAM/AAA/ECM/fighter aircraft) and terrain/weather background. f. ECM/ECCM measures may be successful in reducing effectiveness of AAA/SAM threat; however, expect an increased possibility of an air-to-air threat if this occurs. Anticipate that the enemy air defense system will react immediately to counter an apparent success. g. Multiple ordnance deliveries in a high threat environment will definitely result in an unacceptable high loss rate. This also results in increased vulnerability to escort/CAP aircraft; therefore, the "single run" concept must be practiced. h. For detailed planning of _ground ordnance delivery and weapons employment, refer to FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support, and applicable aircraft tactical manuals. 2. ESCORT TACTICS a. Two-plane escort is insufficient to protect a large strike force. Use 1:3 escort to strike ratio as an absolute minimum. b. Escort positioning is critical to the success of any strike. There is a reduced requirement for escorts preceding a strike force unless a forward firing threat exists or rules of engagement allow missile employment without visual identification. Positioning is determined by minimum and maximum range of aircraft air-to-air missiles and visual acuity. c. Escort's formation must vary with strike and altitude/terrain/airspeed must be considered. d. Escorts cannot stay in the target area for mu}tiple deliveries. Insist on one delivery and egress. The strike is most vulnerable in the target area and while egressing. e. Escorts should not engage enemy aircraft that are not a threat to the strike force. Do not detach from the strike force unless absolutely necessary. FMFM 5-5 f. The consideration for the employment of escort aircraft should Closely tie in with the positioning and functions of various CAP aircraft positioned along the ingress and egress route of the tactical strike. 3. CAP TACTICS a. Plan for airborne spares and alternate plans if one fighter aborts. Anticipate the use of a single fighter. b. Do not rely completely on radar contacts and GCI in multiplanefhigh threat environment. c. Position CAP's surrounding target area but not inside it. Fighters are ineffective in defensive against SAM/AAA. d. CAPS/sweeps cannot stay in the target area. Do not allow enemy aircraft to draw friendly fighters into a high threat (SAM/ AAA trap) environment. e. When a tactical advantage is lost, execute a disengagement. f. Anticipate and plan for communication jamming and meconing. g. Use geographical location and altitude when engaged for vectoring other fighters into the engagement area. h. Use tactical call sign with UHF transmission. Make short, concise UHF transmissions. i. Plan on use of ADF for lost sight with the strike force or other fighters. j. Fuel management is critical to friendly fighters. Flight below combat fuel requirements in an enemy environment makes fighters extremely vulnerable to both SAM/AAA and enemy fighters. This also renders fighters ineffective in providing support for the strike force. 4. COORDINATION a. Coordinated strikes must be varied, not using the same route, altitude, or time frame. Use frequent changes with sound tactics. b. Airspeed, altitude, and routes may limit flexibility and result in predictability. Plan to avoid this. c. All aircraft must have operational ECM/ECCM to survive in a high threat environment. d. Section/strike integrity is essential to survivability in a high threat environment. No matter what size the strike, enemy air defense doctrine will stress picking single targets along the periphery of the strike force or aircraft separated from the main force on egress. e. Use of EA-6A/B is highly effective against SAM/AAA. The employment of UHF/VHF communication jamming by EA-6A/B will also be more detrimental to enemy air defense system than to a friendiy strike force. Use of friendly UHF/VHF communication jamming will require alternate means of communication (IFF/data link) and highly disciplined and well-trained aircrews. f. Positioning of EA-6A/B aircraft is critical.to the strike. Current doctrine may prevent EA-6 aircraft from accompanying the strike to the target area. EA-6A/B must be positioned close enough to target area and ingress/egress route to be effective, yet far enough from high threat area not to be vulnerable. If positioned over enemy territory, friendly fighter cover must be provided. FMFMS-5 g. EA-6A/B are extremely effective against SAM/ AAA. Visual sighting of SAM's is the best defense against SAM's. Most AAA can be avoided by staying above 10,000 feet above ground level. h. Coordinated strike success is directly related to detailed planning, sound tactics, and professional execution. The same basic five steps in troop leading are applicable to coordinated airstrikes: begin planning, analyze the situation, make the decision, issue the order, and coordinate and supervise. FMFM5-5 APPENDIX B COORDINATED AIRSTRIKE PLANNING GUIDE (The following mission guide should be utilized by the designated mission commander when planning for a coordinated airstrike.) L COLLECT INFORMATION a. Air Intelligence (S-2) (1) Target description. (2) Antiaircraft artillery and SAM's (number/type/location/employment). (3) Fighter threat (air order of battle). ( 4) Enemy bases. (5) Maps (distributed and memorized well in advance of strike). (6) Ground controlled intercept capability (enemy). (7) ECM/ECCM/defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM) capability (friendly/enemy). (8) Enemy pilot proficiency/training readiness. (9) Safe areas, friendly locations. (10) Rules of engagement. (11) Anticipated enemy tactics (SAM/AAA/fightersfcommunication jamming/GCI). (12) Enemy state of readiness. (13) Assessment quality of intelligence. b. Strike Operations (1) Strike composition. (2) Ordnance plan. (3) Tanking assets available. (4) Bomb damage assessment (BDA) required. FMFM 5-5 (5) Search and rescue (SAR) plan. ( 6) Bingo airfields/fuel. (7) Timing of mission. (8) Poststrike photo reconnaissance. c. TAOC (1) Radar coverage. (2) Friendly GCI capability. (3) IFF/data link codes. ( 4) Real time intelligence capability and dissemination. (5) Required mission evaluation. d. Meteorology (1) Target area. (2) Departure/recovery base. (3) Ingress/egress. 2. STRIKE FORMULATION a. Formulate the strike plan with timetable and communication plan. (1) Takeoff order. (2) Rendezvous altitudes and order. (3) Air refueling plan/alternate plan. (4) Route of flight (ingress with specific aircraft positioning and altitude/airspeed). (5) Gofno go point. (6) Tactical abort/lost communication procedure. (7) Switchology--air-to-air/air-to-ground. FMFM 5-5 (8) ECM/ECCM/DECM plan. (9) CAP procedures. (10) Procedures in target area. (11) Egress. (12) SAR. (13) Alternate leaders. b. Brief; all pertinent information must be disseminated to all strike aircrew well in advance. Each tactical/tactical support element leader should participate in planning and be able to assist in the briefing. c. Debrief; discuss mission success/failure with TAOC prior to landing if information is critical and secure voice is available. Thoroughly debrief all aircrew along with S-2/T ACC/S-3 and other designated mission commanders. Assist in planning of future strikes as required. FMFM 5-5 APPENDIX C SAMPLE ENEMY RESIDUAL AIR THREAT ANNEX CLASSIFICATION Copy no.--of--copies I Marine Expeditionary Force and Landing Force (TF 19) HOTSANDS, KOOLORA 150800R July 19- Tab---(Enemy Residual Air Threat) to Appendix---(lntelligence Estimate) to Annex---(lntelligence) to Operation Order 1---. Time Zone: Q (effective 300200 Aug 19--) I. FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT a. Starflyer (1) Description (a) Wing: length 150 feet, 45 degrees swept, midwing, located midway on fuselage. (b) Length: 175 feet long, fuselage oval. (c) Engines: 4 -jets on under side of wing close to fuselage. (d) Empennage: high, with swept back vertical and horizontal stabilizers. (e) Combat weight: 200,000 pounds. (f) Range: 1,500nm without inflight refueling. (2) Attack Altitudes (a) Designed for high altitude. (b) Optimum altitude: 45,000 feet. (c) Maximum altitude: 55,000 feet. (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFMS-5 CLASSIFICATION (3) Attack Speed. Optimum altitude: 45,000 feet 1.5 M. ( 4) Ordnance (a) 10,000-pound bomb load; five 2,000-pound HE bombs. (b) Two 40-mile air-to-surface (ASM) missile Meteorite. (c) Six 20mm cannons and four AAM stations. (5) Delivery Techniques (a) High altitude level bombing by radar. (b) All-weather capability. (6) Tactical Information (a) Conventional HE bombing formation is usually a group of six or twelve bombers in a column of three-plane sections spaced 1 mile apart. (b) Nuclear attack formation is a group of six bombers in two three-plane sections in a column spaced 10-20 miles apart. Each section has one plane loaded with nuclear weapons; other planes provide ECM environment. When the first section attack is successful, the second section diverts to an alternate target. (c) Air-to-surface missile attack formation for launching the Meteorite missile at 40 miles from target at 35,000 feet is a column of three bombers 10 miles apart. If the first bomber is successful, the second and third bombers launch their missiles at different targets in the vicinity of the first target. Planes can control missiles to a distance of 50 miles. (7) Refueling Capability. Bombers have inflight refueling capability and when used beyond 1,500-mile range need to be refueled for high-speed attacks. (8) Vulnerability. Bombers are vulnerable to high forward hemisphere air-to-air missile attacks. (9) Total Quantity (a) Enemy has 36 Starflyers based within range of the objective area. (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFM 5-5 CLASSIFICATION (b) Can expect 100 Starflyers sorties in 10 days. b. Other Fixed-Wing Aircraft. Other fixed-wing aircraft are shown as above. 2. ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT a. Whirlwind (I) Description (a) Medium attack helicopter. (b) Streamlined bomb-shaped fuselage. (c) Length: 60 feet. (d) Gross weight: 20,000 pounds. (e) Range: 200 nautical miles. (2) Attack Altitude. Surface to 10,000 feet. (3) Attack Speed. 0 to 200 knots. ( 4) Ordnance (a) 2,000 pounds payload. (b) Two S-mile ASM. (c) Six 250-pound HE bombs. (d) Two 20mm cannons. (e) Chemical and biological bombs. (5) Delivery Techniques (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFM5-5 CLASSIFICATION (a) Hovering. (h) Hillside defilade for delivering 5-mile standoff ASM. (c) Radar bomb up to 10,000 feet in all weather. (6) Tactical Formation (a) Single or two-plane section. (b) Use low clouds for concealme· o and from targets. (7) Total Quanti · (a) Enemy has 25 Whirlwind helicopters within the objective area. No augmentation is expected. (b) Can expect 10 Whirlwind sorties per day. b. Other Rotary-Wing Aircraft 3. MISSILES a. Lightning (1) Description (a) Surface-to-surface missile (SSM). ",) Radar homing. (c) Range: 40 nautical miles (2) Attack Altitude. 1,000 to 10,000 feet. (3) Attack Speed ..9 M continuous 30 seconds after takeoff. (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFM 5-5 CLASSIFICATION (4) Ordnance. 1,000-pound HE. (5) Delivery Techniques (a) Launched from mobile launcher. (b) Missile climbs to preset altitude 1,000 -10,000 feet levels and proceeds to target at 10,000 feet altitude. When target is acquired by radar, a gentle glide is established towards the target. (c) All-weather capability except thunderstorms. (6) Tactical Formation (a) Missiles can only be launched singly to prevent interference. (b) Mobile launchers positioned near main road networks. (7) J'otal Quantity (a) Four missile regiments in objective area. (b) Can expect eight Lightning missiles per day to threaten targets in the objective area. (8) Remarks. Friendly SAM's are effective weapons against Lightning only above 4,000 feet. BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOODE A. B. STEELE Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff DISTRIBUTION: Annex--(Distribution) to Operation Order 1-7- Authentication (on copies bearing neither of the above signatures). (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFM 5-5 APPENDIX D SAMPLE ANTIAIR WARFARE ANNEX CLASSIFICATION Copy no.--of--copies I Marine Expeditionary Force and Landing Force (TF 19) HOTSANDS,KOOLORA 150800R July 19- Annex---(Antiair Warfare) to Operation Order 1-7- Ref: (a) Maps: Koolora, AMS Series V9-75, 1:50,000, Sheets 2540-I, 2640-I, II, III, IV (b) CTF 15 Operation Order 2-7 (c) CTF 13 Operation Order 1-7 (d) NWP 32, Antiair Warfare Time Zone: Q (effective 300200Aug 19-) l. SITUATION a. Enemy Forces (1) Annex---(Intelligence). (2) Current intelligence summaries are issued. b. Friendly Forces (1) Area air component will support TF 15. (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 13) will cover and support TF 15. (3) Amphibious Task Force (TF 15) conducts antiair warfare for the amphibious task force en route to and in the objective area until control is passed ashore. (4) Annex---(Supporting Air Forces). (5) Annex--(Air Operation). (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFM 5-5 CLASSIFICATION 2. MISSION Participate in AAW protection of the amphibious objective area as required by TF 15 and be prepared to assume control of AAW operations when directed. The priority for air targets is given to the "Starflyer" and low altitude attack aircraft. 3. EXECUTION a.• Concept of Operations. TF 15 provides aircraft, AA missiles, and control facilities for the conduct of AAWoperations as directed by the CTF 15 until control is passed ashore. Landing force AAW elements establish the landward extension of amphibious task force AAW area as rapidly as possible to prevent enemy air from interfering with operations in objective area; an air surveillance screen with early warning units landing immediately following assault elements; and operate necessary air control agencies followed by the rest of the antiaircraft missile batteries and aircraft squadrons. They also land two antiaircraft missile batteries as soon as possible and establish vital destruction and surveillance areas when air surveillance screen has been extended inland to the required depth. When control is passed ashore, CTF 15 assigns to CTF 19 additional means to conduct AAW. CTF 19 assigns all AAW means and delegates authority for coordination and control to CTG 19.2. b. 5th Marine Aircraft Wing (-)(Rein)(TG 19.2) (1) Provide AAW means for the conduct of AAW operations as directed by CTF 15 until control is passed ashore. (2) Establish air warning and control facilities ashore in the force beachhead; prepare to assume control of AAW operations on order. ( 3) Establish antiaircraft missile units ashore initially to provide AAW protection for the beaches, and subsequently to provide balanced area protection of the vital area. ( 4) Be prepared to provide AAW support of subsequent operations in contiguous areas. c. Coordinating Instructions (1) AAW procedures. Annex--(Antiair Warfare) to reference (b) and references (c), (d), and (e). (2) Air raid warnings. Reference (d) or (e). (3) Aircraft conditions of readiness. (Annex--(Air Operations) or references (d) or (e). ( 4) Antiaircraft missile control conditions. Reference (e). (5) Air traffic control procedures. Annex--(Air Operations). (6) Antiair warfare operations sketch. Appendix 1 (Antiair Warfare Operations Sketch). (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFM 5-5 CLASSIFICATION (7) Sectors of responsibility and locations of AAW means overlay. Appendix 2 (Sectors of Responsibility and Locations of AAW Means Overlay). (8) Antiaircraft missile and aircraft coordinating procedures. Appendix 3 (Antiaircraft Missile and Aircraft Coordinating Procedures). (9) Electronic emission control, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures in accordance with Annex--{Electronic Warfare). (10) Antiaircraft missile instructions. Appendix 4 (Antiaircraft Missile Instructions). (11) AEW instructions. Appendix 5 (AEW Instructions). (12) The progressive passing of air control ashore will be done in five phases in accordance with antiair warfare annex to reference (b) and when directed by CTF 15. 4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS Administrative Plan 1-7-. 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS a. Communications. Annex--{Communications-Electronics), Annex--{Communications) to reference (b), and reference (f). b. Command Relationships (1) CTF 15 controls all AAW operations within the task force AAW area until control of air operation is passed ashore. CTF 15 is exercised through KINGMAN (TACC afloat) on automatic gain control (AGC)--. (2) The commander landing force (TF 19) establishes the landward extension of task force AAW area and assumes command of all AAWoperations when control is passed ashore. Landing force aviation (TG 19 .2) operates shorebased AAW system under operational control of CTF 15 until control of air operations is passed ashore. Control then reverts to the commander landing force (TF 19); landing force aviation (TG 19.2) control exercised through TALLBOY (TACC/TADC ashore) located at 718342. BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOODE A. B. STEELE Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff (Page number) CLASSIFICATION FMFM5-5 CLASSIFICATION APPENDIXES: (All omitted) 1 -Antiair Warfare Operations Sketch 2 -Sectors of Responsibility and Locations of AAW Means Overlay3 -Antiaircraft Missile and Aircraft Coordinating Procedures4 -Antiaircraft Missile Instructions 5 -AEW Instructions DISTRIBUTION: Annex--(Distribution) to Operation Order 1-7-. Authentication (on copies bearing neither of the above signatures). (Page number) CLASSIFICATION 160 FMFM 5-5 APPENDIX E COMBAT AIR PATROLS 1. In the planning process for air defense, a determination must be made of the location. number, and composition of combat air patrol stations. The kill probability required for air defense has the greatest influence on CAP employment, but another conditioning factor is the number of interceptor passes required against each target. These passes are conditioned by the employment of strip alert aircraft to back up airborne alert CAP's. Other factors which influence the stationing of CAP's are: a. The required probability of detection. b. The capability of surface radar to achieve this probability of detection. c. The effective kill probabilities of secondary, defensive surface-to-air missile systems. d. Size and orientation of an assigned sector of responsibility. e. The number of interceptor aircraft available. 2. Once the preceding factors have been identified, the following process is executed: a. Location of CAP Stations. The distance of the CAP stations from the vital area is found by comparing the required detection range to the CAP detection range. (1) Required Detection Range (RDR). The required detection range is the primary factor in determining the positioning of CAP's. This range varies with each situation and incorporates all time factors involved in completing the intercept. It first determines the times (converted to distances) required to make an initial intercept and then specifies the distance by which the last intercept must be completed. (a) System Times. There are some times built into the process of interception, referred to as lag times, which must be assigned a numerical quantity in order to arrive at distances. It is necessary to identify these times because of the closing speed of the target and the distance it travels during this time. A factor must also be included when employing a strip alert aircraft either as a primary or a secondary interceptor. The necessity to use the strip alert will depend on the kill probabilities of the particular aircraft composition on airborne alert CAP. The following system times are considered: • The decision time for the control system to evaluate and assign a CAP to a target (To). • The time required to get the interceptor out of orbit and established on an attack heading (TR)(in the case of strip alert aircraft, the time required to launch). • The time of travel of the initial interceptor to the interceptor point (Tt)(in the case of strip alert aircraft, the time required to reach the initial point discussed below). • The penetration speed of the enemy aircraft (VE). FMFM 5-5 (b) Initial Point (IP). In each situation, a constant factor applies to all intercepts. This constant is the closest distance to the airborne breakaway line (missile intercept zone or vital area as appropriate) at which an intercept can be initiated and completed prior to target penetration of this line (DJP). It is conditioned by the speed of the enemy aircraft and the type of intercept tactic to be employed. In arriving at this distance, the following is considered: • Time allowed for the intercept (TA). • Enemy speed during the intercept (VE). • The outward distance from the strip alert or airborne station to the breakaway boundary (DB). (c) Solution. The required detection range is found by converting all the above factors to distances and adding. The following formula applies: RDR =(To+ TR + Tt) VE +DIP (where DIP= (TA) VE +DB) (2) Once the detection range is determined, the position of the CAP station is assigned by subtracting the detection capability of the CAP aircraft from this range: CAP Station = RDR • CAP Detection Range b. Number ofCAP Stations. Once the geographic range for the CAP stations is determined, an examination of CAP coverage within the sector establishes the number of stations required. The size of the sector (in degrees) is divided by the degrees of coverage per CAP station: Sector Size = Number of CAP Stations Coverage/CAP 3. To illustrate the use of the preceding method of computation, the following example is offered. The example plans for a backup intercept by a strip alert aircraft. a. Given (1) System decision time (To).............. 2 min (2) Time required to launch strip alert (TR) ...................... 2 min 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • (3) Distance to the IP based upon: (a) Distance enemy travels during interceptor attack-reattack (TAx VE) ••••• ~ •••••••••••••18 nm • Time for attack-reattack (T A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . 2 min • Enemy speed during attack-reattack (VE) .......•............••.....•..... 9 nm/min (b) Distance from launch to breakaway point ...•..................•....•..•....30 nm FMFM S-5 (4) Time required to travel from launch point to IP(Tt)-..................•........•... 4 min (a) Distance from base to IP. . .........•.......................••......•.48 nm (b) Interceptor speed . . . . . . . . ......................................•..12 nm/min b. Solution. From the preceding given values, the formula may be completed and solved as follows: (1) RDR =(To+ TR + Tt)VE +DIP RDR = (2 min + 2 min+ 4 min) (9nm/min) + 48 nm RDR = 72nm + 48nm RDR= 120nm (2) CAP Station= RDR -CAP Detection Capability CAP Station = 120 nm . 50 nm Distance of CAP Station from Base = 70 nm AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD IS FOUND ON THE NEXT PAGE. FMFM 5-5 INDEX z 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 s 80 20 .5 15 14 13 60 12 11 \ 10 1.4 40 1-6 60 9 N 1.8 8 2.0 So/St 7 20 80 6 ............ 100 3 4 5 UNE N' N-180 cos-'(5/Q Figure 19. CAP Stationing Nomograph. 4. Another method used to determine the location and number of CAP stations is to employ the nomograph shown in figure 19. The following example illustrates its use: a. The broken lines represent the solution to a hypothetical situation where the point of planned intercept is 80 miles from the center of the vital area, a 150-mile detection range is planned, and a 3-minute lag in the control system is expected. Fighterspeed is 600 knots, and target speed is estimated to be 600 knots. b. The column on the left, marked Dt, represents usable detection range, computed by subtracting distance of the point of planned intercept and control system lag time (converted to miles target will travel during this time) from detection range. In this problem, 150 miles (detection range) minus 80 miles (point of planned intercept) and 30 miles (control system lag time coverted to miles) equals 40 miles usable detection range. c. The next column, marked S0 /St. represents the fighter speed versus target speed ratio. This factor is computed by dividingthe fighter speed (S0 ) by the target speed (St). In this problem, 600/600 = l. d. The broken line is drawn from 40 miles on line Dt through 1 on S0 fSt scale to intersect the index line. e. From point of intersection of the index line, a line is drawn horizontally to the right to intersect the approximate point of planned intercept line 1; in this case, 80 miles. f. A line is drawn vertically from this point to intersect the distance scale at the top lineS. In this case, 69 miles is found to be the optimum distance from the center of the vital area for CAP to be stationed. g. A new line is drawn from point Z at the top of the index line, through the point where the planned point of interceptcircle was intersected, and extended to intersect line N or N' at the far right or bottom of the graph. This figure represents the number of CAP stations required for a 360-degree coverage. In this case, six CAP's are required, or a CAP every 60 degrees. FMFM5-5 APPENDIX F HAWK MISSILE BATTERY EQUIPMENT EMBARKATION PLANNING DATA WEIGHT* HEIGHT* WIDTH* LENGTH* NO. PER NO. PER (KG/LBS) (M/IN) (M/IN) (M/IN) BATTERY AFU Pulse Acquisition Radar w /Trlr 3516/7750 3.05/120 2.44/96 4.87/191.8 1 0 CW Acquisition Radar 2495/5500 3.15/124 2.39/94 4.34/171 1 1 Range Only Radar 2309/5090 3.1/120.7 22.40/94.5 4.4/171.5 1 0 Information Coordination Central w /Trlr 4353.7/9600 3.4/132 2.44/96 5.9/234 1 0 Battery Control Central 2340/5200 1.8/72 1.8/72 4.5/180 1 0 Platoon Command Post 4966/10960 3.4/132 2.44/96 5.9/234 1 1 Launcher Section Control Box 22.7/50 0.43/16.7 0.45/17.5 0.55/22 2 1 High Power Illumination Radar 4366/9625 3.8/151.25 3.0/118.5 4.9/192 2 1 WingSpan= Diameter= Missile 1408/1408 1.21/47.5 0.26/14 5.03/197.98 36** 18 Launcher 2132/4700 2.3/92 2.4/96 4.4/172 6 3 Loader 2484/5476 2.43/95.64 2.46/96.84 6.17/242.88 4 2 Pallet w /Trlr (w/o Msls) 2138/4713 2.2/86.76 2.44/96 4.98/196 12 6 Missile Container (Empty) 886/1950 1.05/41.28 0.73/28.68 5.49/216.1 36 18 Organizational Maintenance Equipment 491/1082 1.09/42.96 1.27/50.04 2.0/78.72 1 0 Electronic Maintenance Support Van 1406/3100 3.6/85.0 2.06/81 2.16/142 1 0 Generator PU-709 2436.5/5370 2.29/90.12 2.36/92.88 4.27/168 7 3 Battery Interconnecting Group 37.46/8257 1.49/58.56 1.52/60.0 2.18/85.8 36 cables 13 cables (Cables & Reels) & reels & reels * Reference: Raytheon Bedfort Report BR-8145 Rev. A, Vol. I, "Improved Hawk System Functional Description, Performance and Effectiveness Report" (U), dtd February 1976. ** Basic allowance for Hawk battery reference MCO 8010.1B, "Class V Logistical Procedures." FMFM 5-5 APPENDIX G INTERCEPT CONTROL SECTION l GENERAL 101. DEFINITIONS a. Close Control. This control requires two-way radio communication and radar contact with the aircraft. The weapons controller (We) is responsible to the aircrew for flight safety. The aircrew must, therefore, be informed whenever the aircraft is not held on the radarscope for periods in excess of one minute or six sweeps of the radar and, as a result, is being dead reckoned. The We also provides the aircrew with other information pertinent to the tactical situation such as intelligence and EW inputs, geographic positioning, SAM/antiaircraft threat areas, range to Bingo/tanker, steer and friendly support information. The ultimate safety of the aircraft is the primary responsibility of the aircrew. b. Close Control Intercept. In a close intercept, the We places the interceptor in a position to attack an airborne target. ( 1) If an interceptor has an operating weapon system, the control consists of range and bearing to the target allowing the aircrew to consumate their own attack. (2) If an interceptor has a malfunctioning weapon system, or the aircraft assigned has no air intercept system, the we will provide heading, speed, and altitude information necessary to complete a successful intercept. The pilot will not deviate from instructions unless the deviation is required for a successful attack or safety of flight. In either case, the pilot will inform the We of the action taken. c. TADIL C (Link 4A) Control. When conducting data link intercepts, the we directs the interceptor by data link trans missions. This intercept requires radar contact and data link communications with the interceptor. The main purpose for data .link intercepts is to allow voice free operations. d. Broadcast Control. The We broadcasts (one-way transmission) the position, heading, speed, and altitude of all bogeys to all interceptors. The interceptor aircrew uses the appropriate data regarding assigned bogey and completes the intercept using internal navigation and radar. The broadcast controller can handle up to six simultaneous intercepts. He must make a broadcast for each bogey every minute. e. Advisory Control. The aircraft receives recommendations from the we and additional information available. The aircrew must ensure its own traffic separation and navigation. 102. COMMITMENT OF AAWWEAPONS When a hostile raid is detected outside of the missile defended zone, it is important that the interceptor proceed toward the raid at the earliest possible moment. Usually, the speed of combat aircraft is such that the elapsed time between initial a. FMFM 5-5 detection and the arrival of the attack over the force does not allow waiting to release an interceptor until all desired informationhas been obtained. The sooner an interceptor is vectored toward a raid, the better the chance of completing a successful inter·ception before the raid can reach its weapon release point. b. The WC should not delay transmitting necessary information to the interceptors. Initial information does not have toawait definite establishment of the bogey track. c. In the event that aircraft in the raid are missed by the interceptors, or the raid is first detected inside the missile zone,the targets must be assigned to the missile batteries as quickly as possible to ensure sufficient time to lock on the target and fire. d. Other considerations impacting on decisions relative to committing AAW weapons include: • The location and assumed capabilities of the hostile threat (including raid composition). • The anticipated direction of hostile attack or location of the target if an attack is in progress. • The tactics most likely to be employed by the hostile air force. • The location, capabilities, and status of ground alert or airborne intercept aircraft. • The location, status, and readiness condition of friendly SAM fire units. • The rules of engagement as they apply to unknown/assumed hostile aircraft. • The status and location of any other existing air defense engagements. • The influences of existing or anticipated friendly and hostile ECM/ECCM. • The influences of meteorological conditions. 103. COMBAT AIR PATROLS CAP's are airborne weapons systems positioned for intercepting intruding aircraft, identifying, and destroying if hostile.Determination of the composition of the various CAP's required in an AAW environment will be based on the weapons systemsavailable and should be utilized as described in appendix E. Air defense planning should utilize this appendix to prescribe thetypes of interceptor stationing to be employed during the various stages of MAGTF air defense plan. a. Designations. Combat air patrols may consist of from one to four aircraft, although for best tactical employment, asection of aircraft is preferred. CAP's are identified by the follr basic missions performed. These are: (1) Rescue CAP (RESCAP). Aircraft specifically employed to cover and defend other aircraft or surface vehicles thatare engaged in rescue misisons. (2) Target CAP (TARCAP). Aircraft specifically assigned as interceptors, employed in offensive AAW and deep air support (strike mission); to provide air-to-air defense for those aircraft engaged in strikes against enemy resources, facilities, orinstallations. 168 FMFM5-5 (a) TARCAP aircraft accompanys the strike force from ingress to the objective area and also during egress. TARCAP aircraft only engages threats that pose an immediate danger to the strike force. (b) Due to different aircraft performance characteristics, it is imperative that extensive planning be carried out before employing a T ARCAP. (3) Barrier CAP (BARCAP). Interceptor aircraft specifically employed between a friendly ground force or strike force and an objective area or target. The BARCAP is used as a barrier along the probable routes of enemy attack. (a) BARCAP's are utilized as far from the friendly force as control conditions will permit. Again, aircraft limitations and characteristics have to be known for effective utilization. (b) When employed in stationary orbits along the ingress or egress route of the strike group, BARCAP's should be protected with full radar coverage. (c) BARCAP's should also be employed perpendicular to a given threat axis. ( 4) Force CAP (FORCAP). Either airborne or ground alert interceptors employed to protect the force during periods of enemy air threat. (a) FORCAP's should be deployed parallel to or on a projected threat axis. Altitude and position should also be taken into account during the employment. (b) FORCAP's should be employed aggressively to obtain early intercept. b. Deck Launched Interceptor (DLI). DLI's are interceptors launched by the TACC/TAOC from a ground alert to supplement airborne interceptors or substitute for airborne stationing when the air defense situation allows. The primary qualification on the number of aircraft stationed on ground alert is the aircraft launching capability of the airfield (where short airfield for tactical support (SATS) facilities are involved, catapult aircraft are maintained in a condition of on-call readiness for missions from the TACC or TAOC. Scramble procedures and ground-to-air information requirements for ground alert aircraft have been jointly standardized in JCS Pub 12, Tactical Command and Control Procedures for ]oint Operations. The following ground alert readiness conditions are common: (1) Alert 2. Aircraft ready for immediate (2-minute) takeoff; aircraft with starter batteries or units plugged in, handling crews on alert, aircrew in cockpit. (2) Alert 5. Aircraft capable of being airborne within 5 minutes; aircraft with starter batteries or units plugged in, handling crew standing by, aircrew close to aircraft. (3) Alert 15. Aircraft capable of being airborne within 15 minutes; aircrew available to meet 15-minute launch requirements, handling crew available, may perform whatever maintenance desired without jeopardizing launch time requirements. (4) Alert 30. Aircraft capable of being airborne within 30 minutes. (5) Released. Aircraft and aircrew not available until times specified. FMFMS-5 104. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagements with other forces encountered. Ideally, the rulesshould be well.defmed, leaving no room for interpretation. ROE's should specify the authorization for the release of weapons.In order to accurately employ all the AAW means available during all phases of an amphibious operation, it becomes imperativethat the ROE receive the highest and widest dissemination. ROE's often require modification or restrictions on weapons employment which limit the effectiveness. Such restrictions may be required for political or other reasons and result in various tacticalrestrictions on AAWweapons employment. 170 FMFMS-5 SECTION II CONTROL TYPES AND PROCEDURES 201. CLOSE CONTROL INTERCEPTS a. Normally, only one CAP is controlled by this method which requires the full attention of the WC. If the communication data link is not operating, the WC must relay computed commands to the interceptor. b. Poor altitude information is by far the greatest cause for missed interceptions. The aircrew should be given the best altitude information possible. If necessary, bogey altitude should be determined by relative height or fade chart. If the altitude information is estimated, altitude should be passed as estimated so that the aircrew can commence the search in the most likely portion of the altitude spectrum. c. The controller should attempt to keep the interceptor between the raid and the vital area. d. The interceptor's initial vector should be along the approximate bearing line of the bogey. In the case of stem attack, sufficient displacement must be made to provide space for the cutoff and final vector. e. When the aircrew has detected the target either visually or by radar and is ready to take over the attack, he will inform the WC using the pro-word JUDY and commence the attack. This marks the end of the intercept phase and the beginning of the attack phase. f. To ensure a successfi.tl. intercept, the WC must continue tracking both aircraft so that he may resume control of the intercept should it become necessary. g. Defmitions of terms specifically used in close control interception and the basic communication transmissions which the we must furnish the interceptor aircrew are included in this section. 202. AIR CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITIES a. Various air control considerations are: • Variations in weather and visibility conditions. • Types of interceptor aircraft used. • Types of weapons to be used. • Rules of engagement. 171 FMFM 5-5 b. A thorough knowledge of established control procedures is mandatory if problems are to be met as they arise. The WC should be familiar with procedures and tactics set forth in the appropriate aircraft weapon system tactical handbook. In addition,it is necessary that the air controller know the interceptor's fuel consumption data, fuel requirements for landing under existingweather conditions, endurance Bingo data, tanking availability, and procedures. A face-to-face brief with the aircrew prior to themission is also highly advantageous. 203. AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES The CAP must be used aggressively to be an effective weapon. The entire effort behind the CAP on station must beconcentrated and organized. The following procedures pertain to control of various CAP's: a. Prelaunch and Launch Procedures. The commander of assigned interceptors must inform the FAAWC or SAAWC, asapplicable, of expected CAP launch time, launch composition, tactical call sign, and time over marshal point. This informationmust be accurate and passed as early as possible. Prior to launch, the FAAWC/SAAWC must: (1) Determine the assignment of CAP stations. (2) Inform the combat information center (CIC) of carrier units and TAOC of land based AAW aviation unitsregarding CAP station locations, CAP control frequencies, voice calls, and IFF mode/code. (3) Following launch of the CAP, the air intercept controller (AIC) in the CIC on the carrier, or WC in the TAOC,must provide the interceptor with an initial vector and altitude to station or to intercept, and IFF and weapons checks conducted. b. Handover of CAP Control. Handover to the controlling unit must be accomplished while the CAP is en route to station. The controlling unit must require early establishment by controllers of radio communications on assigned CAP controlnets and positive identification of assigned CAP on radar. c. On-Station Procedures: The search capabilities of the assigned aircraft must be considered. CAP will maintain theprescribed CAP station as established by the FAAWC/SAAWC, exercising freedom to maneuver on that station so that themaximum use of CAP radar in the search mode may be realized. The FAAWC/SAAWC will not normally restrict the CAP to acertain altitude. If a different station is desired for any reason, permission for the change must be requested from the FAAWC/SAAWC on the air coordination net. d. Intercept Procedures (1) Threatening bogeys must be evaluated as soon as possible by the CIC evaluator or SID, as applicable. The WC should commence the intercept immediately after the bogey is detected and advise the CIC evaluator/SID. The intercept will becompleted only after bogey evaluation by and on orders from the CIC evaluator/SID. If the tactical situation requires, CAPsections may be split for this purpose, one aircraft remaining on station poised for other intercepts. This should not normally bedone during visual flight rules (VFR) operations. (2) The CIC evaluator/SID must ensure that timely progress of intercept reports are made. He must ensure thatcontact, tally-ho, and bogey composition reports are equally prompt. CAP position reports are not necessary while on station butmust be given while off station or en route to intercept. Aircraft position reports on returning CAP must continue to be givenuntil the aircraft is under control of the parent carrier or local control. 172 FMFM 5-5 (3) DLI's should remain under the control of the unit reporting initial bogey contact (providing that unit is capable of maintaining contact) until completion of the intercept. e. TARCAP!BARCAP Tactics (1) Stationing. This is normally a geographic point from the center of the station. CAP will maintain own station; WC will monitor and be prepared to assist as required. (2) On-Station Search Tactics. CAP will fly tactical formation at altitude determined by terrain, threat probability, and type of enemy aircraft expected. (3) Advisory Control Support (a) In the event that a target is detected by the CAP or the monitoring WC in the vicinity of the CAP, the controller will assist the CAP by: • Attempting to identify. • Sending magnetic bearing and range every sweep of the radar until JUDY or tally-ho from CAP to target. • Calling bogey heading and speed. • Calling bogey altitude if known. (b) The CAP will conduct intercept using the above information, taking heading, speed, and altitude necessary. Pigeons information will be kept current by an air controller but will only be transmitted to the CAP on request. Fuel state reports will be given by TARCAP/BARCAP only when low state or safety of flight is imperiled. f. Vectoring CAP to the Tanker. To facilitate tanking CAP, the T AOC will (if resources are available) dedicate a tanker WC who must be aware of the position of the tanker at all times so that he can immediately vector the CAP to the tanker. The WC should ensure that the tanking is accomplished on a course away from hostile territory and, if possible, toward the CAP's home base/carrier. The WC should put the tanker in a 180-degree turn at a range and speed adjusted according to tanker and CAP speeds. This procedure will: (1) Head tanker and CAP away from hostile territory. (2) Put tanker on a "steer" heading. (3) Allow CAP to use less fuel. ( 4) Allow the CAP, with tanker in a turn, to pick up a visual sighting at longer ranges. (5) Greatly decrease the probability of miss intercept. (This type of intercept is easier for the WC to track than a 90-degree lead pursuit intercept.) FMFMS-5 SECTION III CLOSE CONTROL INTERCEPT COMMUNICATIONS 301. GENERAL Five basic transmissions from the controller are required to draw a complete picture of the intercept for the pilot. Whenthe interceptor is steady on assigned heading, the controller transmits an angle-off and distance after each sweep of the radar.This assists the aircrew in achieving an AI lockon or visual contact. All information transmissions made by the controller willend with "OUT." Order transmissions will end in "OVER" and will be acknowledged by the interceptor. a. Transmissions From Controller to Interceptor • Vectorfor bogey. • Bogey position. • Bogey heading and speed. • Bogey composition and altitude. • Armament switches check. b. Transmissions Between Interceptor and Controller • Contact (interceptor). • Contact confirmed or negated (controller). • Judy (interceptor). • Bogey jinking (controller, when necessary). • Confirm target (controller, when necessary). • Lost contact (interceptor, when necesSary). • Flight safety (controller, when necessary). • Fox (interceptor). • Breaking (interceptor). c. Transmissions Not Vital to the Intercept (1) Lost Communication Procedures. Situation permitting, existing lost communication procedures are relayed to theinterceptor when the controller initially establishes communications and assumes control. 174 FMFMS-5 (2). Transponder Check. When necessary, the controller will interrogate the interceptor's transponder on the modes/ codes assigned. The interceptor will be advised of his IFF /SIF status. (3) State Report. The state report is a five-digit report. The first three digits indicattl fuel in hundreds of poUnds, the fourth digit indicates semiactive missile available, and the fifth digit indicates passive missiles available. Am!llunition and oxygen are reported only when critical. The frequency of state report requests by the controller is governed by operation&l conditions. (4) Weather. Weather information is relayed by the int~rceptor whenever it is considered a factor in the intert;eptor or force mission and when requested by the pilot. (5) Pigeons. Following breakaway from the intercept and on request, the interceptor is furnished pigeons (magnetic bearing and distance) to home plate or any other designated reference point. ( 6) .Steer. Upon release from control, the interceptor is given the magnetic heading and distance to fly to home plate or a designated point. In addition, home plate weather and carrier recovery information should be related to the interceptor at time of steer when applicable. (7) Other Transmissions. This list of commonly used transmissions not involving the interc~pt is by no means complete. Other transmissions which may be made during the intercept would include a weapon status check, a BURNER call to ensure interceptor engine afterburners have been selected, and a BUGOUT call for a tactical disengagement from enemy aircraft. i75 FMFM 5-5 SECTION IV BROADCAST CONTROL 401. GENERAL The broadcast control system is devised to combat mass raids which saturate the close control system. Under broadcastcontrol, the interceptor plans and executes the interception, using the TAOC/CIC update of target position, altitude, andmovements. This eliminates a need of a close controller. a. Basic Equipment. TACAN provides the interceptor a continuous magnetic bearing and line-of-sight distance from thesurface installation. The broadcaster in TAOC/CIC transmits information obtained by radar on a specified target. The pilotreceives and plots this information and, by plotting his own TACAN position, is able to vector himself to an intercept. Care shouldbe utilized to prevent enemy meconing. b. Advantages (I) It eliminates the need for a highly trained air controller. (2) One broadcaster on a single communication channel can maintain a commentary on up to six raids simultaneously. (3) If communications are lost between the TAOC/CIC and the interceptor, broadcast-controlled interceptions can besuccessfully completed by dead reckoning if the interceptor pilot has two or more bogey positions plotted and the bogey maintains a' constant heading and speed. c. Radio Discipline. Broadcast control requires strict radio discipline. The failure of a broadcaster or interceptor aircrewto conform to the recommended procedures will seriously limit the effectiveness of the system. 176 FMFM 5-5 SECTION V AIRBORNE INTERCEPT PROCEDURES 501. GENERAL The type of intercept employed and the procedures established for fighter/interceptors in AAW will vary significantly. The procedures for interception in a clear air mass or VFR will differ dramatically with night or employment in an IFR environment. The procedures will also vary with the tactical situation and the established rules of engagement. MAGTF fighters are required to fulfill an interceptor role in any situation and are, therefore, required to be proficient in all types of intercept employment. The principle of mutual support is essential for successful intercept in a clear air mass. This principle, however, may require modification in a night or all-weather environment and alter the intercept procedures employed by fighter/interceptors. For a detailed discussion of airborne intercept procedures, refer to the F/4 or F/14 NATOPS Tactical Manual. FMFM S-5 LIST OF REFERENCES I. JOINT PUBLICATIONS JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Tenns JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Anned Forces (UNAAF) 2. LANDING FORCE MANUALS LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations LFM 02, Doctrine for Landing Forces LFM 04, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone 3. FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUALS FMFM S-1, Marine Aviation FMFM 5-5C, Employment of the Forward Area Air Defense Battery FMFM 10-1, Communications 4. NAVAL PUBLICATIONS NWP 3, Naval Terminology NWP 4, Basic Operational Communication Doctrine NWP 11, Naval Operational Planning NWP 22-3, Ship-to-Shore Movement NWP 32, (C) Antiair Warfare (U) FMFM 5-5 INDEX Paragraph Page A Advanced base operations .........................................3402 68 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............3402a 68 In a theater of operation. . . . • . • • . . . • • • . • . . • . . . . ·. . ·. ·. . • . . . . . . . . .3402b 68 In support of an amphibious operation..............................3402c 68 Agency relationships ........................•...................1203b 6 Air control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....1203b(3) 7 Air direction.............................................1203b(2) 6 Command •.......................•.....................1203b(1) 6 Terminal control ..........................................1203b(4) 7 Airborne intercept procedures..................•....................5101 177 Aircraft air-to-air weapons. . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2302 19 Air defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....3302b 64 Emission control ..........................................3302b(3) 65 Interagency coordination .....................................3302b(4) 65 Organic ground weapons. . . ...................................3302b(6) 66 SAM identification and engagement ...............................3302b(5) 65 Training Intercept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......3302b(1) 64 Miscellaneous operational ...•.............................3302b(8) 66 Mobility ...........................................3302b(7) 66 Airspace utilization . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..5304 120 Airstrike planningfactors, coordinated.•.....•..........................App A 143 Airstrike planning guide, coordinated ........•.........................App A 147 Amphibious operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................3202 41 Principle considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........3202 42 Air superiority. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......3202a 42 Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3202c 43 Enemy air threat . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....3202b 43 Amphibious task force . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........................4302 93 Antiair warfare Annex ........................................ ·........AppD 157 Function..............•................................1103 3 Planning ...............................................4101 87 Access to control agencies ..........•.....•................4204 90 Achievement of local air superiority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .4203 90 Aircraft availabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .4206 91 Basic elements....................................... .4201 90 Centralized control .............•.........•.............4202 90 Deployment of air units . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........4205 91 Transfer of airspace control ................................4207 91 Requirements Determination....................................... .4605 100 Integrated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........4603 98 Landing force initial estimates......•....................... .4401 96 Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....•............................3202d 44 FMFM 5-5 Paragraph Page 8 Battalions and batteries .....•.......•........•...................2105 12 Broadcast control. •.........•.....•....• , .•....................4101 176 c Carrier basing . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3403 69 Close control intercept communications .........••......................3101 174 Combat air patrols ......•......•...............................App E 161 Command, control, and communications ......•.........................5201 112 Command relationships .•............•...........................5201 112 Control of aircraft and missiles . . . . . . . . . • • • • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2202 14 D D-day operatiorts . . . . . . . . . . . .......•.•......•..................3503 75 Determination of AAW requirements .........................•.........4605 100 E Early phasing ashore . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........•........•.3404 69 'warning system extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . ........3404a 69 Early warning and control sites ..•...........•......•......•.3404a(3) 69 Hawk.......•.•....•..............................3404a(2) 70 Red eye. • • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .3404a( 1) 69 Enemy residual air threat annex. . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . ..•........'...App C 151 F Fo~ulation of air plans ...•......•............ ; .•.............•..4701 104 Functions of antiair warfare .......•..•......•..•..••......•........1103 3 Friendly air defense system capabilities .....•.•.....•......•........1103b 4 Functional integration .........•..•..••..........•...............3205 61 ·command :· . ; . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3205d 62 Traffic 'controL . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; • . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . • . . . . . . • .3205b 61 warning . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3205 61 Weapons ....•...........•..•..••....•...••.............3205c 62 G Ga~filler/maneuver element weaport systems .•.•..................•.......2305 34 Ground support ...·......•..................... : .•.............2306 34 H Hawk Air-defense guided missile system ......•.......•..•...........•...2304 22 Missile battery equipment, embarkation planning data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .App F 165 System organization .•....•.•.••.....•••...............•....2304c 26 Tactical considerations ......•..........•.•...............2304d 28 FMFM 5-5 Paragraph Page I Independent deployments ..............•..........................2405 39 Initial estimates of landing force antiair warfare requirements ....................4401 96 Integrated AAW planning requirements ....•.....•........•............ .4603 98 Intercept control ..............................................App G 167 Intertheater coordination ................•........................5302 116 L Landing force . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·. . . . . . .4303 93 AAWplanning considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4606 102 Aviation ...............................................4304 94 Tasks .............................................4402 96 Light antiaircraft missile battalion ....................•...............2304b 23 M Marine air command and control system .................................2201 14 AAWagencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2203 15 Marine aircraft wing ............................................2102 9 Marine amphibious brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . .2403 37 Aviation combat element . . . . . ..........•.....................2403c 37 Combat service support elements .......................•.....•...2403d 38 Command elements .........................................2403a 37 Ground combat elemen_ts ........•............................2403b 37 Other considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2403e 38 Marine aviation groups ...............•............................2103 10 Marine squadrons ......................•....·...................2104 11 Methods of employment. .....................................•...3204 52 Destruction area Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .•....3204b 53 Geographical subdivision ..................•........•....•.3204c 53 Surface radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3204e 55 Surveillance Area .................•............................3204d(2) 54 Principles.......•..•..............................•.3204d 53 Reliability ..........................•...............3204d(1) 54 Vital area. . . ............................................3204a 52 0 Operational deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........3401 68 Operations security. . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................3304 67 Organization for combat. . . . . . . . . . ................................2401 36 Marine amphibious brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2403 37 Marine amphibious force ............•......................·...2402 36 Marine amphibious unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . ......2404 38 FMFM 5-5 Paragraph Page p Plans for employment of AAW establishment ashore. . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4607 102 Planning guidance.......................................•.....• .4102 87 Postassault phase operations ..............•.........................3505a 84 Post-D-{}ay operations . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . ........3504 77 Pre-D-{}ay operations.....•....•...................•...........•.3502a 72 R Rehearsals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3303 66 Alternatives ...•.........................................3303b 66 Embarkation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3303a 66 Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . ...•....3303c 67 s Sequence of air staff planning............•..........................4104 88 System requirements . . . . . . . . . . . • ................................2302 17 Weapons systems ............•..·.•.........................2302d 18 Collection and dissemination of information ......................2302d(3) 18 Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2302d( 1) 18 Mobility ..............•............................2302d(2) 18 T Tactical data system, automated and manual systems operations ...................5307 128 Training Airborne early warning control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3302a( 4) 64 Air refueling procedures ......................................3302a(6) 64 Attack aircraft intercepts .....................................3302a(5) 64 Combat air patrol/strike aircraft ............•....................3302a(3) 63 ECM coordination ...............••........................3302a(2) 63 Strikes .. '" ...............•.............................3302a(1) 63 Types of antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................3202d 44 Active AAW operations ......................................3202d(1) 44 Passive AAW operations ............•.........................3202d(2) 45 u U.S. Air Force AAWagencies ..................................•....2205 15 U.S. Navy AAW agencies......•......•.....•......................2205 15