CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND RELATIONS A GUIDE FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGERS FOURTH EDITION LOCKWOOD UBRAh; UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO MAY 0 91996 MENTS DEPOSITORY LIBRARY 0433 Wilbur D. Jones, Jr. Defense Systems Management College Press Fort Belvoir, Virginia April1996 DISCLAIMERS The views, findings, and opinions contained in this Guide are those of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of Defense position, policy, or decision unless so identified. Whenever feminine or masculine nouns or pronouns appear, other than with obvious reference to named individuals, they have been used for literary purposes and are meant in their generic sense. 11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Congressional Involvement and Relations: A Guide for Department of Defense Acquisition Managers, Fourth Edition, is published by the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) Press, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The DSMC is part of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The First Edition was published in November 1986, the Second Edition in October 1989, and the Third Edition in August 1992. The author wishes to thank the following persons for their valuable professional assistance in updating this Fourth Edition: Lt. Col. Charles O'Connor, USAF, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), for the view from The Pentagon; Dr. Jim Hershman and Dr. Phil Chartrand, The Government Affairs Institute at The Brookings Institution, for contributing their exceptionally canny overview of the mood and political changes on Capitol Hill, as they have done for the previous two editions; Mr. Mike Hammon, assistant to Representative Jane Harman (D-Calif.), and Lt. Col. Barry Levy, USAF, legislative fellow in the office of Representative J. C. Watts (R-Okla.), for their staff views from Capitol Hill; and Mr. Larry Zimmer, Professor of Financial Management, DSMC, for the second time he has provided changes and new directions in the appropriations process and budget. The author also thanks Ms. Christina Shinn of DSMC' s Acquisition Policy Department for her administrative support of this Fourth Edition. 111 PREFACE The first three Editions of this Guide in 1986, 1989, and 1992 were well received and widely used by various levels of Department of Defense (DoD) managers, the defense industry, and academia. We at the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) are pleased with the Guide's usefulness. We firmly believe it has served the acquisition manager (AM) well in understanding how to do business with Congress and fortify for its diversions. The Third Edition cautioned DoD AMs to listen and look for repercussions and new directions in working with Congress brought on by the end of the Cold War. The current scene is as dramatic, but domestic politics only. Political parties at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue have virtually switched places, but the basic Washington political landscape remains unfettered: the American voters continue to demand split government between the executive and legislative branches. Players' titles, names, and faces change, even congressional committee names, but the basic culture for doing business properly with Congress-from the authorization and appropriations processes to dealing with personal staff-has shown only slight (or is it temporary?) evidence of gene alteration. (Keep in mind that some of the political angst on Capitol Hill emanates from this sudden role reversal: the Democrats controlled Congress for 59 of the last 63 years.) The obvious exceptions, of course, center around the Republican takeover of the 104th Congress in January 1995, and the reorganizations, ambitious legislative calendars, and speed toward agenda accomplishment. How long this so-called "revolution" will sustain itself, or whether it will settle into traditional conformity, has to be watched closely before any longterm conclusions or predictions can be drawn. While much of v the foregoing deals with issues outside of-and larger thanthe realm of the DoD AM, one can assume that any weapon system or any program can become a chip at the political table. Thus, while advisedly maintaining a "flexible business as usual" approach at the working level with Capitol Hill, until he discovers differently, the AM must still be alert to sensitive issues of concern to Congress and the Administration that may impact his program. The DoD officials must recognize the relevance of the continuing face changes in Congress. For example, since 1990, approximately half of the House of Representatives has turned over, and with many incumbents not running in 1996, the number will be approximately two-thirds by the 105th Congress. Congressional corporate memory and experience levels are being drained. Fewer and fewer Members, and their staffers, have served in the military and thus assumedly enter with limited or no knowledge of DoD concerns. What does this mean for DoD? For one, it means DoD AMs are involved in a continuing, detailed educational process to bring Members and staffers current. But it also means that "the way we have always done it" may no longer be a starting point in discussions. Regardless of who occupies seats in Congress, certain fundamental tenets still apply to the successful and functioning DoD AM in doing business with Congress: He must work hard overcoming probable personal shortcomings in political knowledge, sensitivities, and exposure to the Washington environment inherent in most military officers and many senior civilian managers. He must understand Congress as an institution, its role in governing, its objectives, and how it operates. He must learn the systems through which Congress approves, funds, and monitors defense programs. vi He must appreciate the relationship between DoD and Congress and work within the framework of that relationship to manage those programs. The mandatory requirement for acquisition officials to come up to speed quickly has rendered a seat-of-the-pants, "learn for yourself as I did" educational process obsolete. Existingeven simply functioning-in today's volatile budgetary world of forces downsizing, reduced research and development, and tailing-off of procurement, coupled with properly identifying the threat and roles and missions to counter it (them), is tough enough by itself. Add to it the world of congressional involvement and relations, and the picture might appear unstable or overwhelming. This Guide describes how Congress is organized and structured to perform its two major responsibilities in working with DoD: the legislative process and the oversight function. It provides history, timetables, explanations, and rationale. It attempts to educate without hand-holding, inform without overwhelming. It offers recommendations based on current directives and operating procedures, tradition, experience, and a great deal of "street smart intellect." Included as reference material is a partial listing of DoD directives on this subject. Because this Guide is written in the broadest sense, it does not republish contents of those documents. You should refer to this listing and other documents for specific "how-to" guidance. InJanuary 1990, the Secretary of Defense sent to the President a White Paper on the Department of Defense and the Congress, a treatise on the congressional defense oversight process. In citing numerous instances of congressional"intervention" in budgetary and management matters which complicated the management and execution of defense programs, the paper called for consensus on reform goals and improved working relationships between the DoD and Congress. The paper subsequently was approved by the President and presented to congressional leadership, but there was little movement to modify procedures. vii Most of the identified issues remain. Even the casual student of Congress would be well advised to read the White Paper and examine its close connection with the material contained herein. A copy is held in the DSMC Acker Library. For any references hereinto the DoD 5000 Documents, a series of defense acquisition directives, the reader is reminded to check the 1996 revised issuance of the Documents to see what items are changed. At the time this Fourth Edition went to press, publication of the new DoD 5000 Documents was pending. For ease of reference, the following terminology is used herein: AM--Defense acquisition manager. A DoD official-military or civilian -at any level of responsibility, including senior management, program executive officers, program managers, and functional specialists. PM --Program, project, or product manager. A DoD official-military or civilian-responsible for developing, producing, and supporting an acquisition system. Member--Member of Congress, either of the Senate (Senator) or the House of Representatives (Representative). Congress --The institution, or the Legislative Branch. Also, either Members and congressional staff or both, or generally Capitol Hill ("the Hill"). WILBUR D. JONES, JR. Defense Systems Management College Acquisition Policy Department Fort Belvoir, Virginia April1996 viii LESSONS LEARNED Or, thoughtsfor keeping your program afloat and your head above water and offthe reef Philosophically Speaking Changes in political parties in either Congress or the White House do not automatically cause changes in the ways of doing things. Cautious attention to the flow is imperative. Tradition feeds on itself and dies hard, ifever. However, understand there will be missteps by parties assuming new leadership roles. Anybody out of power for so long has forgotten what it was like to organize, plan, and execute. Besides, the book has been rewritten many times since. New alliances are formed, old ones strengthened. Know the new players, staffers, structure, and power points. Congress is not a manufacturer for the executive branch. It is a separate branch of government, and will accept responsibility only for matters it wishes to be within its purview often on its own timetable. Political science is a contradiction in terms. Never assume that politics will subsume logic. Newton's law does not apply. There may not be a reaction, but an overreaction. It could be based on misconceptions, wrong perceptions, or responses to the media. Be prepared for it. Politics is give-and-take, the way we solve problems peacefully. The purpose of politics is to win, thus having one's point of view prevail. ix Compromise might not fit your political shibboleths, but practicing its art to attain most of your objectives is what the other guy will be doing for his. Officially, Congress runs by rules, traditions, and institutions. Unofficially, it runs on personalities, persuasiveness, political winds, paybacks, commitments, issues coalescence, constituent feedback, personal agendas, and polling data. Almost everyone can agree on the problems. Finding agreement on the solutions is extremely difficult-including the distribution of anything considered excess, or largesse. New programs have been easy to establish. Dismantling old ones requires the wisdom of Solomon and the skill of Merlin. By the same token, passing legislation is easier than defeating it. To reach maximum efficiency in carrying out personal objectives, representing constituent needs, and discharging legislative responsibilities, a Member must remain in the Congress. Therefore, it stands to reason that reelection is the prime motivator. The DoD is in the insurance business. If we buy enough stuff we won't have to use it. Bad data or no data are data and will be used by Congress to decide the future of your program. Reelection is the prime motivator of Congress, but remember who elects. The driver is C3 -equaling constituent, constituent, constituent. Understanding a corporate constituent's interest will allow you to respond best to the Member. The Machine On Capitol Hill, perceptions are realities. If the Congress perceives something, it is a fact. You must never lose sight of this· ax10m. X But-false (unwanted) perceptions can be corrected by presenting the facts, i.e., using opportunities to "correct the record." Year-in and year-out, Congress does not sustain 100-day agendas. Chances are your issue will be handled routinely. The bulk of public business does not take place in public, such as hearings or on the Senate and House floor. Understand how things get done and whether, or how, you should play. Except in national emergencies, "deliberate" and "ponderous" are the cornerstones of congressional machinery. No one, or even two, is in charge, although some are on television more than others, and some present taller targets for the opposition. The shortest distance between two points in Washington is the network between the Pentagon and Capitol Hill. Congress is never in front of any power curve. It doesn't start initiatives, infrequently moves on Administration initiatives, and normally responds only to strong public opinion when it is politically smart in its interest. Congress pushes parochial concerns, not always asking what is best for the country. Some Members always call for cuts in defense spending ...unless such might affect their district. It's often a case of "do it in the other guy's backyard, not mine." For examples, see recent base closure lists. Members don't usually get reelected by creating pain: raising taxes, cutting social spending, etc. Citizens hold Congress (the institution) responsible for the public interest, and individual Members (notably their Member) responsible for what they do for them. xi Congress may be unable to change a defense policy or decision but it wants to be part of the process. Recognize defense acquisition is a two-way street. Without Congress, there are no programs and no money. Without programs, there is no national defense (or jobs back horne). Dependence on each other produces a "win-win" situation. Work toward it. Congress almost never makes a (pushed-into-the) "corner" solution to a problem. Congress has the "right" to do "whatever it wants." So, instead of you saying Congress "can't do this," say Congress "ought not to," or "it is not prudential to do so." Congress plays Humpty-Dumpty with the defense budget but no one puts it back together again. Regardless of their obvious importance to you, spare parts and gun ammunition have less political appeal than hardware systems. This is one reason why "sustainability" and "force modernization" projects, regardless of how they are spoken, carry lower congressional priorities and shorter attention spans than main battle tanks, attack submarines, and stealth aircraft. Virtually anyone on the Hill can bring something to a halt, but few can say "yes." Acquisition legislation usually is triggered by something that happens. Members just don't sit back and invent issues. In normal times, Congress doesn't change the thrust of the DoD budget. It plays on the margins with a little here and there. Recognize the myriad agendas attempting to be carried outstate, district, party, caucus, defense committee, other committee, personal. Understand motivations. xii Trade-offs, deal-making, and back scratching form the basic political process in Congress. With 535 equals (in ego and authority), it is difficult for one point of view to prevail on everything. Despite so-called two-year defense budgets and five-year defense programs, Congress continues to look at defense issues one year at a time. Staff, particularly on the "Big Four" (defense) committees, make the bills happen. Be professional, rather than arrogant, in dealing with them, regardless of their military expertise. Doing Your Homework Handle things promptly, quickly, correctly, and ethically. You must use your legislative liaison office. Its job is to take temperatures and soundings, and help you score. Don't play games or waffle with information. To do so is a deadly game. Know your committees and how they are organized and operate. No two are alike. A fatal pitfall-Congress hearing different things on the same program from OSD, the Services, and the contractors. Check out minor events. What seems small might be taken out of context and blown out of proportion. Don't take anything lightly. The situation may be convoluted, but Congress is not shooting in the dark. Major defense contractors have Washington staffs adequately representing their interests. Be careful in having your contractor doing your congressional liaison. His interests, not yours, must come first, in spite of your relationship. For one thing, it xiii might create the impression you are in bed with the contractor. Avoid this, but don't try to restrict what the contractor can say to the Hill. Be responsive, candid, truthful. Credibility is one of your biggest assets on Capitol Hill. Know how to sniff the winds of change. An example in wind shift: "black programs." Ifyou have one, consider putting it in shape, and prepare to bring it into the daylight with increased access. Congress has been leaning this way. Some view it as a means of hiding money. Be careful of what is written, especially if you write it. Things have a way of getting to Capitol Hill even without that intention. Conclude what you are doing is probably already, or about to be, known there. The network is fantastic. Understand, and take advantage of, working relationships already established by many career personnel with Congress. The military eyes cannot look for blacks and whites, rights and wrongs, all or nothing, as may be customary. Congress doesn't work that way. Ifyou think you can take care of business by yourself, you could be in deep trouble at the outset. Seek help from those who have been there. Because it's new to you doesn't mean it's just been discovered. Keep current on test results. Somehow, sometimes, the media and Hill get there first, necessitating an embarrassing response. Know where you stand in-house. Your program may not be the high priority you think. You must establish your bonafides to be successful with Congress -but, that still requires time and sterling judgment on their part. xiv Changes in schedule and number of buys, stretchout, etc., hurt credibility. Use common sense. While a subcommittee is looking into your program, refrain from terminating for cause a contractor in the chairman's district. Always be fully prepared. Do your homework vigorously, including having answers to all questions that might be raised. This is the only wise way. Providing Information The worst possible thing is for Congress to be surprised. In the day of reduced budgets, the "gray area" for program survival increases. The slightest appearance of DoD deception or inconsistency can be fatal. Don't talk above or below your level of expertise or concern. Stick to the subject. Don't encroach into someone else's area of expertise. Respect territorial rights (read "rice bowls"), or itwill be done unto you. Present a united front. Savvy Hill staffers can detect weak links and why. Ifyour principal job is maintaining your program year-to-year, you lack credibility on the Hill. Keep the antenna tuned toward a "hidden agenda" when requests for information arrive. Don't be overzealous in selling a weapon system once you've decided what you want. That's the user's responsibility. Be careful about promising or making commitments if there is a possibility you can't deliver. Sell it realistically based upon known history. XV Before answering an inquiry, check the facts and what has already been published or said to the Congress on that subject. Inaccuracy or inconsistency from your command's position is dynamite waiting for the match. It is reason enough to cause a mark on your program. Numbers change as quickly as stock market averages. Make sure you have the latest. Ifthey've changed since you last talked with Congress, fully explain the changes. Usually, hearings and reviews are not fact-finding missions. The committee and staff know in advance what is to be said and accomplished. Certainly, you run a risk ifyou blindside or surprise them. Respond equally as fast and efficiently to all Members regardless of party or ideology. Even minority Members wield influence on issues through committee work, networking, and reciprocal agreements. Don't go to Congress and spill your soul. Show restraint, but do not hedge. It is easier to add information than subtract. Backfill the legislative liaison office and your boss after you have contact. You may not be obligated to heed their advice, but it's good practice to keep them informed. Ina backfire, they can provide your case with Exhibit A one way or another. If you raise an issue, be prepared to pursue it at some length. Information volunteered is information explained. Don't be afraid to respond. Ifyou don't know, don't guess. Say: "I'll find out and get back to you." When urgent phone calls come from staff, understand why the information is wanted immediately. xvi About Members Because a Member voted with you the last time doesn't lock in that vote on future issues. For maximum yield, every new crop has to be cultivated. Although most Members are well prepared for you, don't expect them to be experts in your affairs unless you make them so. Don't be led to believe the staffs run Congress, in spite of what you see as their roles and influence. The Members do. Use language Members can understand. Use examples. Don't talk in terms (acronyms, etc.) you would put in your papers to a colleague down the hall. Avoid being too technical or detailed unless specifically asked. Don't be lulled or misled by philosophical generalities. Don't stereotype Members or staffers, or hold grudges. The one who fights you today may be your best friend on tomorrow's issue. Know where each person stands on each issue. Sometimes Members feel compelled to remind officials of the Executive Branch just who is elected and who is not. Neither be offended nor intimidated. Listen and take it as part of the job, realizing some is wing-flapping for the record, the sound bites, and the folks back home. On the other hand, think very carefully before providing Congress the institution or any Member with a lesson in your political acumen. Don't remind a Member how many people your contractors employ in his district, or impacts on him because of a lost contract or budget cut. Members don't get wrapped around programmatics. Staffs are there to fill them in. However, when a Member does, he flags a genuine concern. xvii Members and staff of the Defense Committees really do believe in a strong national defense, though they question how to get there. Be open and cooperative with them. Be polite, but be careful with small talk. The Washington Redskins' season is okay. Raising recent congressional scandals or Congress' low public esteem shows incredible naivete. The RDT&E (research, development, test, and evaluation) and procurement appropriations (they make things) have stronger constituencies than O&M (operations and maintenance) appropriations (which don't make things). Recognize there are a number probably voting against defense most of the time, and a number voting for. Some need convincing each time. Recognize the power of serving in Congress and the egos to match. Members often take themselves more seriously than they do national issues. About Staffs Staffers perceive a program and its AM as having the same character. A poor program reflects on its manager, and vice versa. Staffers usually support national defense, but not necessarily the DoD way of preserving it. Recognize that former military officers and DoD officials with defense expertise and "Washington street smarts" often end up on staffs. Don't presume their bonding with you in the name of national security. Staffers are often stovepiped experts in a particular field and will bore in on their interests. Staffers jockey within their offices for information and standing and internal jealousies exist as anywhere. However, do not think they operate in a vacuum. They talk with each other and compare notes. xviii Be careful about playing staffers off against each other. Not all are experts in your areas, but usually they know how to ask the right questions, discern answers, draw conclusions, and make recommendations. Committee staffers often act as brokers between Members. If you are not getting cooperation from the majority-side staffer, try the minority side. If a staffer perceives you are honest and straightforward, he will work with you in spite of adversity. The mission of appropriations committee professional staff members institutionally has been to cut the budget, but that may be changing. Know which way the flow is going. Staffers have to make a living too. They need you and want to keep their pipelines open and sources accessible. Committee staffers are key to the long-term memory of Congress and are known to remember promises made to the Hill. If That's Not Enough Let a sleeping dog lie if all is going well on your program. Being shown up is a sensitive issue on the Hill. Win gracefully. Don't make a Member or staffer look uninformed. The ideal situation for you is: nobody knows you're there, and you get what you ask for. Try to stay low, work the system properly, and keep the right people informed. If you choose confrontation, be absolutely sure you (1) are dead right, (2) you have 100 percent support up the line, and (3) you are prepared for any consequence. The Congress will outlast those of us who come and go in DoD. The President's budget is always "dead on arrival" on Capitol Hill. Rather, it is a guideline to the President's thinking. xix Therefore, defend the President's budget, even if you disagree or feel inadequate, and even if you know a decision was just made adversely effecting your program. One possible way to handle it: "The decision on my program is not blessed yet. When it gets signed off, I will return to brief you." Burning bridges is a cardinal sin. That staffer you hedged your bet with could cross the Potomac and be your Service's next acquisition chief. XX GLOSSARY For acquisition acronyms and terminology, refer to the DSMC Press publication Glossary: Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, Sixth Edition, March 1995. The following are a few acronyms and terms frequently used in this Guide. Act-A bill or measure after it passes one or both Houses of Congress. Also denotes a law in place. Adjournment-Ends a legislative day. Unlike a recess, which ends a calendar day but which does not end a legislative day. AM-Acquisition Manager (Department of Defense (DoD)): program executive officer, program or project manager, or other senior official. ASC -Armed Services Committee in either house dealing with matters of the armed services: Senate Armed Services Committee and House National Security Committee. AS D (LA) -Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs). Appropriating Committee-The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) or Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC). Appropriation -An authorization by an act of Congress that permits Federal agencies to incur obligations and make payments from the Treasury. An appropriation usually follows enactment of authorizing legislation. Appropriation Bill -Grants the actual funding approved by authorization bills. Originates in the House. Authorization -An act of Congress that permits a federal program or activity to begin or continue from year to year. It sets limits on funds that can be appropriated, but does not grant funding which must be provided by a separate Congressional appropriation. xxi Authorization Bill -Authorizes start or continuation of a program(s), specifies its general aim and conduct and, unless "open-ended," puts a ceiling on funding. Usually enacted before an appropriation bill is passed. Authorizing Committee -A committee with legislative and oversight jurisdiction over agency program(s); the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and the House National Security Committee (HNSC) for most DoD matters. Bill-Nearly all legislative proposals being considered by Congress. (Commonly the rest are resolutions.) Designated either a HR (House of Representatives) Bill or S (Senate) Bill according to where they originate, and by a number assigned in the order introduced. Budget -In DoD, the output of the planning, programming, and budgeting system, which becomes part of the President's budget. Until1987 (for FY 1989), it was annual; now it is biennial. Budget Committee-House (HBC) or Senate (SBC) committee determining appropriation limits for fiscal year under consideration. CBO -Congressional Budget Office. Chamber-Either the Senate or the House of Representatives. Conference -A meeting of representatives of the Senate and House, called conferees, to reconcile differences about provisions of a bill. Continuing (appropriations) Resolution -When a fiscal year begins and Congress has not passed all regular appropriations bills, a joint continuing resolution is passed giving agencies authority to spend at same rates as previous fiscal year, or some other specified rate. Also, continuing resolution authority (CRA). xxii CRS -Congressional Research Service (of the Library of Congress). Defense Agency-Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), etc. Defense Committees-The House National Security Committee (HNSC) and Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC), and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) and Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC). DoD -Department of Defense. Executive Session -A meeting closed to the public. FAStA-Federal Acquisition Streamling Act FY-Fiscal year. U.S. Government: October 1 to September 30 (12 months). GAO-General Accounting Office. An agency of the legislative branch, responsible solely to Congress, which functions to audit all negotiated government office contracts and investigate all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds. Determines whether public funds are expended in accordance with appropriations. Germane -Pertinent, bearing on the subject. HAC-House Appropriations Committee. HBC -House Budget Committee. HNSC-House National Security Committee LA/LLO-Legislative Affairs/Legislative Liaison Office in Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the Services/Defense xxm Agencies, which processes congressional inquiries and related matters on acquisition policy, administration, and programmatics. Majority/Minority-The political party in/not in power in either chamber. Markup-Subcommittee or committee action on a bill by proceeding through the bill line-by-line approving, disapproving or making modifications. Measure -A bill or other proposed legislative act under consideration. OSD -Office of the Secretary of Defense. Oversight-Review activity by congressional committees of DoD programs to determine current status, if the law or other desires of the Congress are being followed, or a basis for possible future legislation. PB -President's Budget -The Federal Government budget for a particular fiscal year transmitted on the first Monday in February to Congress by the President in accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act of 1992. Includes all agencies and activities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. PSM -Professional staff member of a congressional committee. Ranking Member -Senior minority Member of a committee, or senior majority Member not serving as chairperson. SAC -Senate Appropriations Committee. SASC -Senate Armed Services Committee. SBC -Senate Budget Committee. xxiv SIDA-Service/Defense Agency. Service-Military department. Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy-U.S. Marine Corps XXV CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................... iii PREFACE .................................................................................... v LESSONS LEARNED ............................................................... ix GLOSSARY .............................................................................. xxi CONTENTS ......................................................................... xxvii BOOK I THE ANATOMY OF CONGRESS ......................................... 1 Chapter1 The Perspective of Congress ................................................... 3 Authority of the Congress ......................................................... 3 Evolution and Expansion of Authority ................................... 4 Chapter2 Organization of Congress ........................................................ 7 The Structure .............................................................................. 7 "Two Congresses" ...................................................................... 8 Characterizing Congress ........................................................... 8 Institutional Ways of Doing Business ...................................... 9 Fundamental Differences ........................................................ 10 Congressional Support Agencies ........................................... 10 Chapter3 The Changing Nature of Congress ...................................... 13 xxvii Other Significant Recent Changes ......................................... 13 Chapter4 Congressional Decision Making .......................................... 19 Defense Committees ................................................................ 19 Organization and Nature of Appropriating Committees and Authorizing Committees .................... 20 Subcommittees of the Appropriating Committees .............. 22 Subcommittees of the Authorizing Committees .................. 22 Pressures on Decision Makers ................................................ 25 Detailed Oversight vis-a-vis Reasonable Direction .............. 26 Chapter 5 Congressional Committees ................................................... 29 Committees at Work ................................................................ 29 Organization and Structure .................................................... 30 Committee Chairmen .............................................................. 31 Committee Assignments ......................................................... 32 Chapter6 Congressional Staffs ............................................................... 35 Role of Staffs ............................................................................. 35 Division of Work ...................................................................... 36 Personal Staff and the Member's Office ................................ 37 Who They Are ........................................................................... 37 How Staffs Operate .................................................................. 38 Member's Office ....................................................................... 39 Committee Staffs ...................................................................... 40 Who They Are ........................................................................... 40 Roles of Committee Staffs ....................................................... 41 xxviii Chapter 7 DoD Liaison with Congress .................................................. 45 DoD Liaison Policy and Operations ...................................... 45 AM Interactions with Congress ............................................. 46 DoD Liaison Offices ................................................................. 47 Appropriations (Budgetary) ................................................... 47 Authorization (Non-budgetary) ............................................. 50 Comptroller Liaison ................................................................. 50 Legislative Affairs .................................................................... 51 Service/Defense Agency LLO Activities .............................. 52 Congressional Access to Classified and Sensitive Matter ......................................................... 53 Unauthorized Release of Information ................................... 55 Notification of Contract Award .............................................. 55 BOOK II CONGRESS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS .......... 59 ChapterS Congressional Budget Process .............................................. 61 Budget Process at Work ........................................................... 61 Congressional Budget Process Timetable ............................. 62 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) .............................................. 63 "Two Step" Budget Process .................................................... 65 Concurrent Resolution on the Budget ................................... 66 Budget Committees ................................................................. 66 Budget Resolution .................................................................... 67 Reconciliation ........................................................................... 68 Chapter9 Congressional Hearings ......................................................... 69 Characteristics of Hearings ..................................................... 70 xxix Five Types of Hearings ............................................................ 70 Why Hearings Are Held .......................................................... 70 Scenarios .................................................................................... 71 Characteristics to Remember .................................................. 73 DoD Witnesses .......................................................................... 74 Statements and Testimony ...................................................... 74 AM Assistance to Witnesses ................................................... 75 AM as a Witness ....................................................................... 75 Transcripts ................................................................................. 77 Insertions of Material for the Record ..................................... 77 ChapterlO Markup and Conference Committees ................................. 81 Markup ...................................................................................... 81 Conference Committees .......................................................... 82 Chapterll Authorization Process ............................................................ 85 Defense Programs .................................................................... 85 Committee Hearings ................................................................ 86 Floor Action by the House ...................................................... 87 Senate Action ............................................................................ 87 Authorization Conference Committee .................................. 89 Chapter12 Appropriations Process .......................................................... 91 Major Defense Appropriations Bills ...................................... 91 DoD Appropriations Bill ......................................................... 92 House Review ........................................................................... 92 Senate Review ........................................................................... 94 Appropriations Conference Committee ................................ 94 Appeals ...................................................................................... 95 XXX Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) .............................. 95 BOOK IIICONGRESS AND THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION ........ 99 Chapter13Congressional Oversight ..................................................... 101 Origin of Congressional Oversight ...................................... 101 Need for Oversight ................................................................ 102 Impact of Oversight ............................................................... 104 Chapter14Congressional Briefings....................................................... 107 Characteristics of Briefings ................................................... 107 Functions of Briefings ............................................................ 108 Differences Between Briefing and Hearing......................... 109 Chapter15Congressional Inquiries....................................................... 111 Informal Inquiries .................................................................. 111 Formal Inquiries ..................................................................... 112 Chapter16Congressional Investigations.............................................. 115 How an Investigation Generates .......................................... 115 Investigative Hearings........................................................... 116 GAO Surveys and Reviews .................................................. 117 HAC Investigative Staff......................................................... 119 xxxi Chapter17Congressional Trips .............................................................. 121 Where To, and When ............................................................. 121 What the AM Should Do ....................................................... 122 Chapter18 Congressional Data Requirements and Reporting ......... 125 Budget Justification Material and Other Reporting Information .................................. 125 Budget Justification Material ................................................ 126 RDT&E Exhibits (R-Forms) ................................................... 126 Procurement Exhibits (P-Forms) .......................................... 128 Other Acquisition Information Reports .............................. 129 SARs ......................................................................................... 129 Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) ............ 130 Unit Cost Reporting ............................................................... 130 Studies and Analyses ............................................................. 131 Appendix A -Selected References ..................................... 135 Appendix B -Interviewees and Other Personal Sources .......................................... 137 Appendix C -Partial Bibliography of Government Directives on Congressional Relations1 ..................... 141 About the Author .................................................................. 147 xxxii HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE MAJORITY CAUCUS MINORITY CAUCUS MINORITY CAUCUS (REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE) (DEMOCRAnc CONFERENCE) (DEMOCRATlC CONFERENCE) xxxiii THE ANATOMY OF CONGRESS 1 . 1. ,,.,.,,.,;:,·;:·:·:~~ THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONGRESS It is a fact of life. Members vote on programs in terms of their constituent interests. -Counsel to an Authorizing Committee Authority of Congress While creating our national government, the founding fathers at the American Constitutional Convention of 1787 separated power and responsibility among three branches. The legislative branch, represented by elected Members of ~ongress. The judicial branch, represented by an appointed Supreme Court and the federal judiciary system. The executive branch, represented by an elected President and Vice President, and the agencies reporting to the President. The Constitution says little about national defense. It establishes the President as commander-in-chief. Congress has the power "to provide for the common defense ...to raise and support armies...to provide and maintain a Navy...to make rules 3 for the Government and regulations of the land and naval forces...to declare war...and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out the foregoing powers." The form of government created was a republic. Throughout the years, the term democracy has become more commonly associated with the United States government and through accepted usage means virtually the same. From their experience with the British crown, the founding fathers were most afraid of a strong executive. Indeed, they wrote a weak executive into the Constitution, and provided Congress and the courts with checks and balances against the executive. Historically, however, presidents have become much stronger. Characteristically our system of government is chaotic, adversarial, an invitation to struggle, and without continuance of policy. (Some would say ifJames Madison walked the halls of Congress today, he would be proud.) Evolution and Expansion of Authority Through evolution, Congress has expanded its interests and activity into many national areas of concern. The execution of national defense, a responsibility of the executive branch, is a prime example. From its constitutional powers, Congress grants approval and money for defense programs ranging from manpower levels, to numbers of army divisions and navy carrier battle groups and which weapon systems are produced. This power has been a natural extension rather than an intrusion -of congressional authority concerning fiscal and programmatic accountability of the executive branch. That Congress has license for involvement in any or all defense matters has been clearly evident in recent years. The license is called oversight. Oversight is a year-round review, reporting and funding control umbrella through which congressional committees monitor federal agency activities and assert increasing influence and management of defense issues. This is in addition to the authorization and appropriation power Congress 4 exercises annually. The foundation of this control umbrella is information. Information in Washington is power, and Congress employs a multitude of mechanisms to gather, process, and use it. Congressional assertion of authority in national defense has been cyclical throughout the years. Primarily depending upon the counter role exerted by' the executive branch and emanating from the early 1970s. This follows a period of a strong, activist executive role, and exacerbated by weaknesses in the executive branch during the Watergate era and the attendant jurisdictional problems of the Vietnam War. In its assumed role, because of real and perceived abuses in weapons acquisition, Congress has felt the need to direct the Department of Defense (DoD) to change course or accelerate its efforts to tighten and improve internal procedures. Thus, in recent years the results of enacting significant laws are new regulations and organizations to manage defense acquisition. This expanded authority of Congress has had cascading effects throughout the acquisition community. Oversight begets oversight at all levels; no management level wants unexpected surprises by lacking knowledge of activity. Consequently, the DoD acquisition manager (AM) is under increased scrutiny. They must maintain scrupulous records, be the subject of unsolicited questioning, must make frequent schedule and funding adjustments, and must continuously advocate his program. Whether this increased congressional involvement accomplishes its purposes efficiently, timely, and in a businesslike manner is open to conjecture. Nevertheless, it is a fact of life. 5 How a Bill Becomes Law HR001 Introduced in House S002 Introduced in Senate Similar Propo10l1 Introduced In Both Housn Typically, after a bill has been introduced, it is referred to an appropri· ate committee. Usually, the bill is then senttoonesubcommittee, the proposal is studied, hearings are held, revisions are made and the subcommittee approves the bill. It then goes back to full committee. Additional hearings may then be held. The full committee approves the bill and sends the bill to the chamber for action. Some bills, called "privileged," go directly to the floor for debate and passage. In the House, many bills are sent to the Rules Committee. There, the rules for debate and amendments for each bill are set. The Senate procedure for bringing bills to the floor for debate and passage is less formal and therefore differs from the procedures used in the House. The bill is debated and often amended. Then ills passed or defeated. If it has passed, it goes to the other FLOOR ACTION chamber and follows the same procedures through committee and Senate Debate, floor action. Vote on Passage CONFERENCE C\ If both chambers have passed related bills, a conference committee composed of members from both the House and the Senate Is convened to eliminate the differences. The compromise bill is then sent to each chamber for final passage. This version of the bill is then sent to the President to be signed Into law or vetoed. If the Congress overrides the veto with a two-thirds majority In each house, the bill becomes law without the President's signature. 6 2g ' " ~"''"'*"'":::<~d·::l ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS It is hard to hold anyone in Congress accountable. What Congress provides for the average citizen is a point ofaccess to the Federal Government. The citizen doesn't feel alienated or disenfranchised. -Senior Staffer, Senate Armed Services Committee The Structure The Constitution organized Congress into two houses (chambers): the Senate, or upper house, and the House of Representatives, the lower house. The Congress consists of 540 Members: 100 Senators, elected for 6-year terms; 435 Representatives, elected for 2-year terms; and five Delegates, non-voting Members of the House: American Samoa, District of Columbia, Guam, and U.S. Virgin Islands, for 2-year terms; and Puerto Rico, a 4-year term. What are the qualifications for being a Member of Congress? Few. The Constitution requires: age-25 to hold office in the House, 30 in the Senate; citizenship-at least 7 years in the House, 9 in the Senate; residency-must be a resident of state from which elected. No skills, no expertise are required. Voter satisfaction is the test ofability. The Congress is housed in 16 buildings on Capitol Hill. The elected leadership receives a slightly higher salary. All Members receive numerous allowances to hire staff, for travel, mailings, etc. 7 "Two Congresses" Essentially, Congress is "two Congresses." A Member serves two constituencies: his home state or district (a representative) and his colleagues in Congress (a lawmaker). The pressures in balancing service to both simultaneously are tremendous. The first constituency elects him, and his obligations are local-a "local face." Therefore, he must see to constituents' needs and, by and large, vote the way they prefer to remain in the Congress. Voting their way may not coincide with the Member's views, forcing him to make a tough decision. The second constituency relates to his legislative responsibility, his obligations nationwide-a "national face." Therefore, the way he performs on the floor and in committees, on political party affairs, and attendant chores impacts how well he survives and advances in Washington. Characterizing Congress Congress is not the efficient, streamlined, disciplined body some might wish. From all evidence, in the minds of the founding fathers that was not the intention. Overlap of jurisdiction in Congress is commonplace by original design to protect against tyranny. Power within Congress is deliberately divided and fragmented to keep majorities from rolling over minorities. Overarching organization and operating procedures is the omnipresent politics, which in the long run drives nearly all decisions and actions. Politics exists in several forms: with the opposition political party, with the Administration governing the Executive Branch, within one's own part)' or committee, and with the public and media regarding the national mood. The AM must recognize the politics of each situation and adjust to them. He is neither immune to politics nor above it, and in many instances is unable to influence it, whether he wishes to or not. 8 Institutional Ways of Doing Business The procedural rules encourage deliberation, negotiation, consensus, collegial decision making, compromise, dissent, openness, participation, accessibility, and pragmatism. Common courtesy and reciprocity ("comity" in congressional lexicon) are two generally accepted rules that serve to cross party, sectional, and ideological lines. The process moves forward slowly, underscored by bargaining and accommodation. These are not qualities that encourage quick decisions or tidy organizational patterns. Congress is neither hierarchical nor a bureaucracy. It is completely decentralized, with power and influence claimed to some degree by its 540 Members and approximately 300 committees, which makes coordinating difficult. No one is "in charge." Even the Senate and House political leaders have limited leverage with which to develop united positions. Except in emergencies, total agreement is nearly impossible. For Congress to arrive at ill-advised agreements, given the deliberative legislative and debate processes, is unusual. Usually, time is on Congress' side as all aspects of an issue are aired, fostering restraint rather than a need to rush to judgment. Members may act alone, with their committees, orunanimously as a body. Natural internal divisions, including institutional, partisan, regional, sectional and, of course, political, are pressures that splinter and coalesce. Members have become more individual activist in recent years. To the outside observer, it may appear there are 540 Secretaries ofDefense and State, each staking out a position, each seeking to have a voice in, or even directing, national security or foreign policy. To forge alliances or positions (or otherwise accomplish their goals) party or issue leaders must bargain, persuade, and compromise. Then, too, coalitions and interests often shift and are short-lived, and each new issue is a challenge in coalition building. Summarily speaking, unwritten "proper" behavior gives Congress a sense of order and discipline and the ability to get things done. 9 Doing business with Members individually or with committees can be frustrating, tiring, repetitive, and time-consuming. Endurance is absolute. As decentralized as Congress is, there may be no alternative. Appreciate, too, that Congress must work within its own system. Fundamental Differences The observer must realize certain fundamental differences between the two chambers. The Senate is a collegial body and has less concern for rules and procedures (for example, there is no rule of germaneness-a bill amendment can occur at any time). The Senate is freer, looser than the House. The House is strict, structured, and accedes to precedence, while teaching its Members to exist by rules. The House limits debate; the Senate allows the delaying filibuster. Congressional Support Agencies Included in the legislative branch are three support agencies offering assistance to congressional offices by conducting research, studies, and analyses. They are the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress, which is absorbing the former Office of Technology Assessment, ar:td the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Because their records remain on file within the agencies (whereas some congressional offices dispose of their records after a Member's defeat), and their professional staffs tend to have less turnover, these agencies are called the corporate memory of Capitol Hill. Analyses are conducted at the request of a committee chairman, ranking minority member, or in some cases for individual Members. Final reports usually are made available to all Members, but are sometimes denied. All can receive CRS Issue Briefs. 10 Members use reports to reinforce and advocate previous positions, to document in detail what they have found in part, as background for legislation, and as justification for public accusations. As can be expected, findings and conclusions dealing with the executive branch are not always agreed to by the administration, but the opportunity to review the draft and comment is usually provided. The AMs can expect communications from these agencies, especially short questions from CRS. If formal inquiries involve GAO or another agency, the AM should consult the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Service directives. Recognize the Special Role ofCongress. Congress as an institution was designed to operate in an adversarial relationship with the executive branch, through a system of checks and balances and separation of powers. The two branches share many common concerns, goals, and objectives, including peace and a strong national defense. Yet, each branch has the natural desire for its will to prevail on how best to achieve those ends. This creates a process where, in all likelihood, neithe.r side will get everything it wants. Therefore, each seeks satisfaction in reaching partial victory through negotiation and compromise, bearing in mind the "good of the country," which often is interpreted as the "good of the constituents." Thus, ideally a "win-win" situation is achieved when each side gets something it wanted. 11 THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONGRESS There is one law in political science: the law ofunintended consequence. You will have predicted 30 percent of the consequences, not predicted 70 percent. However, the 70 percent will cause more to happen than you ever figured on. -Prominent Political Scientist As an institution, Congress is dynamic. By reorganization and "reform," reacting to the times, Congress changes its nature of operations. However, change comes slowly. Congress reflects the national mood and world events and rarely is in front of them. Not only do congressional rules, procedures, and structures change, there exists a constant interplay between these formal, highly visible aspects of organization and the less obvious ongoing interactions of the Members. The most significant change came after the 1994 elections -Democratic dominance since World War II ceased. The House, in the current 104th Congress, is Republican for the first time in 40 years, and the Senate is Republican for the first time in 11 years. Other Significant Recent Changes Congress of the 1990s is markedly different from previous decades. Sweeping modifications have influenced distribution 13 and use of power and the legislative process. They have affected responsiveness to national problems and their involvement in policy making. The most significant ones are: Decline of the Seniority System. This is more prevalent in the House. For many years, Members' longevity, along with committee membership, determined selection for committee chairmanships. In the 1970s, because of a sudden rare influx of new, younger Members, rules were changed to allow the majority party to choose in caucus its own chairmen without solely relying on seniority. Majority Members in each committee recommend their choice to the caucus, which normally ratifies that choice. Although most committees continue to choose the senior Member anyway, it has not always been the case. In 1985 the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), now the National Security Committee, dropped senior Member and Chairman Melvin Price and elected a more junior Member, Les Aspin. His reelection in 1987 over several opponents reaffirmed this change in process. In organizing the 104th, House Republican leaders ignored seniority in assigning committee chairs. Also, new Members assert themselves and pursue leadership roles quicker and more vocally than in the past. Freshmen Republicans elected in 1994 appear to be continuing this assertiveness, while forming philosophical bonds on many issues. (NOTE: Effects in the Senate are less rigid but minimal; thesenior Member of the majority party usually is the committee chairman, and the senior member of the minority the ranking member.) Subcommittee Government. If, by custom and practice, the real work of Congress is accomplished in committees, then real work of the committees is accomplished by numerous subcommittees. Today, there are 17 standing (permanent) committees in the Senate and 17 in the House. To streamline congressional business, subcommittees proliferated in recent years. The House has nearly 150 subcommittees 14 and several panels which in effect are subcommittees without the title. There are always a few select (temporary) committees. The Senate has about 100 subcommittees plus four subcommittees belonging to the five select or special committees. Additionally, there are two joint committees (Economic and Taxation, between the two chambers) with their subcommittees. With each unit having a chairman (some Members can chair more than one committee or subcommittee), approximately half of the Members mathematically could be chairmen. Increasingly, the House is utilizing the task force concept, versus the usual committees, to conduct a portion of its business. Conceivably, a task force could contact the AM for information. Declining Influence of Leadership and Parties. Until the Republicans elected Newt Gingrich as Speaker for the 104th Congress, observers of congressional dynamics believed the days of the Sam Raybums ("seniority will grow on you"--S. R.) and the Lyndon Johnsons were gone-with their legendary ways of conducting congressional business. Gingrich's leadership has engendered favorable comparisons to Rayburn, but time will evaluate his impact on the general characterization of declin ing leadership. The 104th has seen a revival of party voting discipline, many measures on the floor or committee issues being decided by a straight (or near straight) party vote. Until1995, the frequent marriages of Republicans and Southern Democrats to pass sensitive defense legislation worked in favor of DoD. The days of situational coalition building and appeals, rationale and reasoning, both within each political party and between the two. Power had become diffused and dispersed, and congressional leadership found it difficult to discipline colleagues for "stray ing from the ranch" on issues. The tendency had been for Members to go their own ways, partly because Congress has limited authority to control and discipline its members. Only time, too, will tell whether these are phenomenas or trend reversals. 15 Increased Number of Ancillary Groups. As leadership and party influence waned prior to 1995, another trend was the increasing influence of ancillary groups of Members within Congress: caucuses, regional, and other special interest groups. However, many caucuses have disbanded or have gone "underground" because official funding for their operations has been reduced or eliminated. Some exist in name. The legislative support agencies, the CBO, and GAO in particular, continue their influential roles. Increased Size and Influence of Staffs. Tracking all the important and complex issues becomes increasingly more difficult and demanding for Members, both in Washington and in their home states. More staff was the answer both in the Members' offices and the professional committee staffs. Through expertise or personal relationships with the Members, the staffers actively participate in affairs of Congress and frequently interface with executive branch officials on behalf of their bosses. While the workload remains high, leadership of the 104th Congress has instituted a turnaround of this trend, as well. Staffers have been reduced by approximately 30 percent of the 20,000 employed a few years ago. Smaller congressional staffs with no workload reduction mean potential mistakes. The prudent AM should watch the language in his bills. The "Reform Eras." Until1995, the foregoing changes characterized the "reform era" of roughly 1965-through the early 1980s. Whether that period's reform impact on the congressional environment will be sustained following the 104th Congress is a matter of speculation. Some recent veteran observers said "reform" has "over-reformed," nearly infringes on minority party rights, and slowed things even more. The negative attention drawn to congressional perquisites and ethics in the 1990s (e.g., book royalties, speaking honoraria, influence of lobbyists, 16 House bank overdrafts, and post office problems) caused Congress to overhaul some of its organization and procedures. But the question of whether a new era of reform is upon Congress is being played out. Whatever reforms bring, the recent basic business relationship between DoD and Congress is expected to remain. One area of"reform" remains high on the agenda of both Congress and DoD, however. That is acquisition reform, recently enacted in the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (PAStA). Look for continuing efforts here. The End of the Cold War and Defeat of Soviet Communism. These momentous events played significantly on the way Congress adjusted to meet new or additional national priorities, primarily predicated on earmarking more money for social programs. But the threat(s) to national security became more elusive, and roles and missions became more difficult to define to meet myriad contingencies. Peacekeeping and nation building became a cornerstone of military planning. Defense budgets shrank consistently every year since 1985, checked only by the increase demanded by Congress for FY 1996. The obvious immediate effect has been less funding for personnel, force structure, weapon systems, equipment, supplies, and bases. Members have been torn between defense cuts-which ultimately means fewer jobs -and a desire to shift emphasis to social issues. It appears the defense budget will remain contentious between Congress and the Administration in the near future, among other things increasing instability to acquisition programs. Get to know Congress, especially key events and players in the defense budget and oversight processes. The AM is well advised to learn all he can about congressional timetables, procedures, methods, and key events affecting his budget and the monitoring of his programs ...to know which committees and subcommittees are interested in his program and why, what the record says of their previous positions, 17 votes and statements...to know which Members have contractor facilities in their states or districts with contracts on his program, or are known to want his business. While knowing all he can about the staff with whom he interfaces, the organization of committees, and how decisions are made is highly desirable, the AM should not extend himselfbeyond the defense legislative system and become an expert in all congressional affairs. 18 Jti ~~ .<:.:.:8:<:::'-i~