CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM EDITED BY JAMES OUTZEN, PH . D . r t 1 APR I q 2012 L ' ... u ~ r '' ' { ~---------------~ CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE JANUARY 2012 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) is an independent National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) research body reporting to the NRO Deputy Director, Business Plans and Operations. Its primary objective is to ensure that the NRO leadership has the analytic framework and historical context to make effective policy and programmatic decisions . The CSNR accomplishes its mission by promoting the study, dialogue , and understanding of the discipline, practice , and history of national reconna issance . The Center studies the past , analyzes the present, and sea rches for lessons-learned . Contact Information: To contact the CSNR , please phone us at 703-488-4733 or email us at csnr@nro .mil To Obtain Copies: Government personnel can obtain additional printed copies directly from CSNR. Other requestors can purchase printed cop ies by contacting : Government Printing Office 732 North Capitol Street , NW Washington , DC 20401-0001 http://www.gpo .gov Published by National Reconnaissance Office Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance 14675 Lee Road Chantilly, Virginia 20151-1715 Printed in the United States of America ISBN : 978 -1-937219-04-8 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . CONTENTs CONTENTS FOREWORD ................ ............................ .......... ......... ....... ......... ......... .... ..... ........ .. .................................................. x PREFACE ............ .. .. ......... ..................... .. .. ......... ......... ...... ... .. .. ... ......... ......... ... ... .. ............................................ ....... xii INTRODUCTION ........... .. ........ .. ..... ...... .... ..... ...... ...... ... ..... .. ..... .... .. ... ..... ... ...................... .......... ........ ......... ..... ....... . xiv SECTION 1: HISTORY BY GERALD HAINES, PH .D .................... .... .. ... ................ ................................. ................. 1 GAMBIT ........................... ... ..... ... .... .......... ............. ............... ......................... .......... ..................................... ..... 5 HEXAGON .... .......... .. ..... ............................ ........ .... ..... .. ...... ...... ......... ................................... .... ....... .. ............ .. 21 CONCLUSION .... ............ ................. ........ ... ........ ... ..... .... ........... ... ... ... ... ... .. ..... ... ... ... ..... .. ......... ... .. .................. 35 ENDNOTES ........... ............................................................. .. ........... .......... ............. ............................ ........... .. 37 SECTION II : SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS .. .. ............... .............................. ........ .. ................................................41 1. Report: U.S. Air Force, General Operational Requirements for a Reconnaissance Satellite Weapon System, 26 September 1958 ........................... .................... .. ............................................................ 44 2 . Memorandum: Air Force , Assistant Ch ief of Staff for Intelligence, Major General James H. Walsh, Intelligence Requirements for SENTRY, 10 November 1958 .. ...... ..... .... ... ........... .... .. ...... .. .. .. .......... ... 49 3. Report: CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance Systems of Which Samos is an Example, 5 July 1960 .. .. ............. .. ............ .. ....................................... .. .. .. .... .. 55 4 . Report: Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Report of a Special Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance, 25 August 1960.. .. .............. ....... ..................... .... .. ... 74 5. Memorandum and Report: Edward Purcell to the Director of Central Intelligence, Panel for Future Satellite Reconnaissance Operations, 3 July 1963 ......... ............... ... ....... ............... .. .. ... .. .. .......... .. ...... 82 6. Memorandum and Attachments: United States Intelligence Board , Long-Range Requirements for Satellite Photographic Collection , 27 July 1964 .... .. .. ... .. ...... .. .. .. ............ .... .. .. ... ........ ......... .. .. ... ...... ... .. .. .. 104 7. Memorandum: United States Intelligence Board, Long -Range Requirements for Satellite Photographic Collection , 31 July 1964 ....................................................... .... ....... .. ................ .. .. .. ........ .... .... 133 SECTION Ill : PROGRAM INITIALIZATION .................. .. ... .... .. ............... ... .. ..... .. .. ... .. .. ... ... ................ ...... .... ..... .. .. 139 1. Organizational Instruction: Operational Order for the Satellite and Missile Observation System , Lieutenant General Bernard A . Schriever, undated ........................... .............. ....................... ..... .... ........... ... 142 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 2 . Organizational Instruction: The Basic Policy Concerning SAMOS , Memorandum f om Major General R. M. Montgomery, 29 December 1960* 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 178 3. Security Instruction : Security Guidance of an Unclassified Nature Relating to SAMOS, Colonel Harry L. Evans, undated 00 0000 00 00 000 000 00 00 000 oooo· 00.00 00 ... 00 oo .00 00 00 000 00. 00 0000 00 000 00 000 00 00 0000 00 000 oo .00 00 000 00 00000 000 oooo .00 0000 183 4 . Letter : Kodak 's Arthur B. Simmons to Air Force Undersecretary for Research and Development Joseph V. Charyk, Preliminary Schedules for Blanket and Sunset Strip, 22 July 1960 oo oooo oooooooooo oo oooo oooooo oo oo . 187 5. Report : Major General O.J . Ritland , Project Cue Ball : Outline Development Plan , 9 November 1961 ooo ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo oo oo ·•oooooo ooo oooo ooooo ooooooooooo oo oooooooooo oooo oooooooo oo oo oooooooooooooooooooooo oooo oooo oooooo oo .200 6 . Report : Colonel William G. King , Program Management Plan , Project G-3 , 1 February 1966 00 00 00 .00. 00 00 .00. 00 00.00 00.00 00 00 .00 00 .00 00 00 00.00 00.00 00.00 00 .00 .00 00 00.00 00.00 00 00 00.00 00 .00 00.00 00.00. 00 00 00 00 00 00.00 00.00 00 00. 00 00 .00 00 226 7. Report : CIA Directorate of Science and Technology, Preliminary Project Fulcrum Phase I Tasking , 1 July 1964 00 000 00.00 00. 00 00 000 000 00000 00 000 oooooo. 00 000 00 0000 000 000 00 00000 oo. 00 0000 000 00000 oooooooo .. 00 0000 0000 00000 00.00 oo .0000 000 000 00 000 00 00.243 8 . Memorandum : CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology Albert D. Wheelan to the Director of Central Intelligence , Project FULCRUM , 30 September 1964 oooo oooooooooooooo oooo oooooooooooooooo oooooo oooo oooo o248 9. Memorandum: Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Alexander Flax to Director of Special Projects , SAF and Director of Reconnaissance , CIA, System Operational Requirements for the New Search and Surveillance System , 29 April 1966 000000 00000000 0000 00 0000000000 0000 000000 00 00 0000 00 0000 00 00000000 00 00 00 00 252 10 . Letter : President of the Perkin-Elmer Corporation Chester W. Nimitz, Jr., Cover Letter for Design Definition of Hexagon Optical Sensor, 21 July 1966 OOOOoooo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oooooo oo oo oo oooooooooooooooooooooooooooo oo ooooooooo 279 SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES OOOoooooooooo ooooo oo ooo ooooooooo oooooo oo ooooo oo oooooooooooooo ooo ooo oo oooooooooo•oo·· ·oo .oooo oooooooo ooooooooo 285 1. Technical Document: KH-7 Camera System (Part 1), National Photographic Interpretation Center, July 1963 .. ooooo ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo ooo oo ooooo ooo oo ooooooooooooooo ooo ooooooo oo ooo oo ooooooooooooooooooo ooo oo ooooooooooooooooooooo oo ooooo oooooo287 2 . Technical Document: The KH-88 Camera System (Third Edition) , National Reconnaissance Office and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 1970 oo oooooo oo oooo oooo oooooooooooo oo oooooooo oooo oooooo oo oooo 305 3. Briefing Book: Project Hexagon Overview, National Reconna issance Office , 25 January 1978*. 00 00 00 00 00 00.00 00 00 .00. 00 00 .00 00 00 00 00 00 .00 00 00 00.00 00 00 00 00 00 00.00 00 .00 00 00.00 00 .00 00 00. 00 00.00 00 00 .00. 00 00.00 00 00 00 .. 00 00 00 00 00.00. 00 00 .334 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS ooo oo ooooo ooooo oooooooooooooooooooooooo oooo oo ooo oooooo ooo oo oo oooo oo ooooooooooooooooo ooo oooooo oooooooooo.447 1. Report : Analysis of Gambit Project, 24 August 1967* .... .. .... ...... ..... ...... ...................... ......... ...... ....... 449 2 . Report : Analysis of Gambit (110) Project, Brigadier General William G. King , 28 April 1970* .............. ..... ................. ...... ... .... ... ......... .. ...... .... .... ....... .. ................... .... .. .... ..... .... ... .... ...... ... .. .. 487 CONTENTS 3. Report Excerpts: Program 206-11 System Performance , Lockheed Martin Miss iles and Space Company, undated .. ................................... ........ ............... ................................................................. 511 4 . Letter: Major Factors Contributing to Program 206-11 Success, written to Alexander Flax , 13 November 1966 ................... .... .... .................................... ... ........ .. .... ... ... ...... ... ................. .. .... ...... .. ... ... .... 513 5. Memorandum: Innovations and Trends in Exploitation in the Western Geographic Division, lEG caused by the KH-9 System , 20 March 1973 ........................................................................ .. .. .... ........ . 517 6. Report: The KH-9 Sea rch and MC&G Performance Study (Volume II) , National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 1977*.. ...................................... ..... .. ... ... .. ..... .. ...... .. .... .. ........... 520 SECTION VI : PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES .......................................................................... .. .................. .. .... 587 1. Report : US Air Force , Minutes of Joint Meeting of Reconnaissance Panel and SAMOS Working Group , 1 July 1960 .... ................. ................................. .............................. ...................................... 591 2. Memorandum: National Reconnaissance Office , Approval to Re-Orient Program 206 to Air Retrieval Over Pacific Area , 19 September 1962 ........ .. ................ ........ .... .......................................... ..... 603 3. Memorandum: Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Brockway McMillan for the Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, Space Recovery Responsibility, 18 October 1963 ................ .. .. ...... ...... .... .... .. .. .. . 609 4 . Letter: Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Brockway McMillan to Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director of Science and Technology Albert Wheelan , Concerning the Establishment of the Satellite Photography Working Group , 18 November 1963 ........ .. ...... 611 5. Memorandum: Colonel Paul E. Worthman Memorandum for the Record , Telephone Conversations with Representatives of the ltek Corporation , 24 February 1965 .......... ........ ...... .... ............ .. 615 6. Memorandum: Colonel Paul E. Worthman Memorandum for the Record , ltek Discussions with Dr. McMillan and Dr. Land , 25 February 1965........................................................................................617 7. Memorandum: DNRO Brockway McMillan Memorandum for the Record , Discussion with ltek Leadership and Pullout from Fulcrum Follow-on, 25 February 1965 .... .................................................. 618 8. Memorandum: Fulcrum Program Manager Jackson D. Maxey to Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Ground Rules for the New Search System Competition, 2 August 1965 ...... .... .... 623 9. Memorandum: John Martin , SAFSP Director to Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Dr. Alexander Flax , Comments on Alternate Management Arrangements for the New Photographic Satellite Search and Surveillance System, 4 November 1965 ............................. .. ................. 625 10. Memorandum: Huntington D. Sheldon CIA's Director of Reconnaissance to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Alexander Flax-CIA Comments Concerning Alternative Management Arrangements for the New Photographic Satellite Search and Surveillance System, 4 November 1965 .............. ... ....... ......... ...... .. ...... ..... ..... ..... ... ... .... ................................ ......... ...... ... .... ... ... .. .. .. 634 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 11. Memorandum: Brigadier General James T. Stewart, Director of NRO Staff Department of the Air Force for Dr. Alexander Flax, Task Group Report for Alternative Management Arrangements for the New Photographic Search and Surveillance System, 5 November 1965............... .. ..... ... ... ........ ....... .... . 636 12. Letter: Acting Director of CIA Rufus Taylor to Director of Bureau of the Budget Charles Zwick , Concerning Memorandum Regarding FY1970 Hexagon Funding, 20 December 1968 ...... .. ... ............ ......... 640 13. Letter: Robert Mayo Bureau of the Budget to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms , Concerning Assessment of Hexagon Contributions, 22 March 1969* .... ....... .... ...... ...... ... ....... ... .. .. ..... .......... 644 14. Report: Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Robert Naka, Report of the Hexagon Review Committee, 4 September 1969.................................. ...................... ..... .... ....... ...... ... ... ... ... 653 15. Letter: CIA Program Manager Robert Kohler, Concerning the Reliability of Corona, Gambit, and Hexagon Film Return Systems, 20 February 1973..... ... ........ ... ......... ........................ ...... ................ ..... .. 665 SECTION VII : PROGRAM CONGRATULATIONS ..... .... ...... ...... .... ....... ...... ..... .. ..... ..... .... ..... .... ...... ...... ... ....... ..... 671 1. Letter: Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms to Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Dr. Alexander Flax , Congratulations on First KH-8 Mission, 18 August 1966.. ...... .. 673 2. Letter: Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, Commendation for the Operation of Hexagon Mission 1217 , 3 January 1983 ................. ... ..... .. .. .. .... ........ ........... ...... .... ... .. ... ... .. ......... .... ...... ..... .. 674 3. Memorandum: Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Edward C. Aldridge, Letter of Appreciation from the Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, 7 January 1983.... ..... ..... ........ ... ...... .. 675 4. Report: National Reconnaissance Office, Hexagon Transition Plan, March 1972 .. ........ .. .......... ... .... 676 * Pages incl uding full-page red actions and blan k pages have been rem ove d from these doc uments. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . I am pleased that the Historical Documentation & Research (HDR) Section of the Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) has produced this collection of Gambit and Hexagon documents titled Critical to US Security: The Gambit and Hexagon Satellite Reconnaissance Systems Compendium . This will give researchers in the Intelligence Community and academic world an opportunity to preview some of the program documents that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) will be declassifying and an opportunity to study the history and background of these two phenomenal filmreturn satellite reconnaissance programs as reflected in these documents . I personally have been involved in efforts to declassify the Gambit and Hexagon satellite programs for over a decade . The declassification process has been slow and deliberate because these two systems have represented state-ofthe-art capabilities that even in 2011 , on the occasion of the NRO 's 50th Anniversary, remain impress ive . The CSNR conducted a series of assessments of the risks of declassifying program details and consulted with experts across the Intelligence Community. There has been extended dialogue to ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to protect any capabilities , the disclosure of which might adversely impact on current operations. National reconnaissance is a much too valuable national treasure for its secrets to be lost to compromise . During the past decade , I have come to understand the importance of these programs on a number of levels . First, the then newly established NRO developed these systems relatively early in its history, and that activity helped forge the way for the NRO to develop and operate satellite systems . Second , the systems provided essential data to intelligence users and valuable information to national security policymakers, thereby making the NRO an essential organization for succeeding in the intelligence battles of the Cold War. Third , the systems proved essential for teaching the NRO how to transition from successful programs to new programs that promised even greater capabilities. In short , these programs are cornerstones of the NRO 's history and architects of its culture of success. The NRO developed the Gambit and Hexagon satellite photoreconnaissance systems to satisfy intelligence requirements that date back to at least the mid 1950s. Dr. James Outzen, the NRO Historian , selected the documents contained in this compendium to provide the reader with information on the history, capabilities , and technical contributions of these programs. The first section of this volume is a short history of the Gambit and Hexagon programs prepared by the NRO 's first historian , Dr. Gerald Haines . Dr. Outzen and I chose this history because Dr. Haines wrote it for the occasion FOREWORD of the declassification of the programs-something we had anticipated years earlier, but only became possible in 2011 , the 50th Anniversary of the NRO . We have additional document sections in this compendium that contain primary source documents on the initilization of each of the systems, intelligence requirements for the systems , and capabilities and contributions of the Gambit and Hexagon systems, as well as the controversies surrounding the systems and recognition of the systems successes. Based on the intelligence requirements for these programs and the information contained in the compendium, I anticipate the readers of this compendium will gain an appreciation of the roles Gambit and Hexagon played in the NRO 's history. I also expect that the compendium will help readers understand the intelligence reasons for developing the programs , the challenges in meeting the intelligence imperatives, and the successes of the programs. The readers should come away from reviewing this volume with insight applicable to their own efforts to assure the United States ' success in gathering intelligence by using satellites . Although not exhaustive , the compendium will provide a hearty introduction to the dynamics surrounding the development, operation , and termination of these important overhead reconnaissance systems. This compendium is an opportunity to have an early look into a formerly highly classified world of national reconnaissance. Robert A. McDonald , Ph.D. Director, Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance Business Plans and Operations National Reconnaissance Office CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM I . This compendium of documents related to the Gambit and Hexagon satellite programs was inspired by a practice initiated with the 1995 declassification of the Corona satellite reconnaissance program . A few months after the declassification announcement for the Corona program , the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published a similar volume edited by Kevin Ruffner. Like the CIA's Corona compendium , we wanted to include a basic history of the Gambit and Hexagon systems . Dr. Gerald Haines , the NRO 's first historian wrote a history of the Gambit and Hexagon systems that was unpublished up to this point. Dr. Haines finished the history in 1997 in anticipation of the declassification of the Gambit and Hexagon programs . We are pleased to publish the history for the first time in conjunction with the 2011 Gambit and Hexagon declassification announcement. To enhance the history, we have also included photographs and graphic illustrations that were used to explain the capabilities of the two systems. A much more challenging task was to identify documents to include in the compendium in order to expla in the development , launch , and operation of the Gambit and Hexagon systems . The difficulty arose from an abundance of documentation for all of the systems . To determ ine which documents to include , I conducted document reviews at the CIA records center, the NRO records center, and NRO field sites where documentation still resided for the programs. I also reviewed a small number of Hexagon documents complied by the NRO 's Public Affairs staff. From these efforts , I identified some 4 ,000 pages of documentation for consideration to include in this volume. After this initial selection , I sorted the documents into main themes that characterize the histories of the Gambit and Hexagon systems . Those themes include program requirements , program initiation , system capabilities , technological contributions , controversies surrounding the programs, and recognition of program successes . The challenge then was to select documents representative of these themes. I made the selections that best described important elements relevant to each theme . Unlike the Corona volume , we are not able to include later Gambit or Hexagon panoramic imagery. This imagery remains classified at this writing . As with any major publ ication , there are many individuals who are responsible for completing the project. I express appreciation to the N RO records center. Their staff provided outstanding help in locating dozens of boxes of records for me to review . Likewise , I express my appreciation to the staff at the CIA's record center who located many boxes for my review related to the CIA's development of what would become the KH-9 camera system for Hexagon . I express appreciation to the NRO 's Public Affairs staff, for sharing documents located through part of their research process. During the summer of 2011 , four interns for the PREFACE Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) provided invaluable assistance with this effort. Steve Glenn and the records declassification staff for the NRO provided incredible support in reviewing several hundred pages of documents for release. Without their efforts . this project would never have been completed The Director of the CSNR , Dr. Robert A. McDonald, provided not only essential support, but valued wisdom in developing this volume. Finally, none of this would have been possible without the editing , layout, and graphic design work by the CSNR support staff. James Outzen , Ph .D. Chief, Historical Documentation and Research Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ,. I II ·~ After the 1960 success of the Corona program , users of imagery intelligence developed growing appetites for more space based photoreconnaissance. During the more than two and a half decades that followed , the United States operated three additional film-return satellites. They were named Gambit, Gambit-3 , and Hexagon . The introduction of the Gambit system in 1963 provided the United States with the ability to take higher resolution images of specific targets . This complimented Corona 's wide area coverage. Gambit allowed the United States to carry out "surveillance, " or ongoing tracking of known targets . Corona 's wide area coverage allowed the United States to continue to "search " broad areas of the Soviet Union and China in order to locate the targets such as intercontinental ballistic missile sites , nuclear test sites and facilities, and other strategic and tactical land , air, and naval targets . Search and surveillance from space became a key strategic capability for the United States to fight the Cold War. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) developed Gambit-3 to further improve resolution for surveillance of targets identified by Corona imagery or other sources of intelligence. First launched in 1966, Gambit-3 incorporated a number of technological changes to not only improve resolution, but also increase the length of time the system operated , the amount of coverage , and control of the system . Hexagon was developed to improve resolution of widearea search imagery captured by the Corona program . Hexagon's developers introduced a primary camera system that produced imagery of high enough resolution to fulfill some search requirements as well . Later Hexagon missions would also include a mapping camera system to aid possible Cold War military operations . The NRO launched the Hexagon system in June 1971 , replacing the Corona program that developers originally only expected to last two years . Hexagon would be the last of the nation 's four film return imagery systems that , together, provided insight into the U.S. adversaries ' military capabilities . Gambit and Hexagon moved the Intelligence Community closer to meeting the intelligence requirements that prompted the development of space imagery systems . The requirements can be traced back to as early as 1955 for what would become the Air Force 's Samos program . First and foremost, the United States needed satellite imagery systems that could provide "instantaneous warning of ballistic missile attack(s)" by the Soviet Union. The requirements also included supporting U.S. war planning, understanding the intentions of possible U.S . adversaries , and determining the military capabilities of those enemies. The historical record indicates that Corona and Gambit were essential for assessing the Soviet nuclear strike INTRODUCTION capabilities in the 1960s. The systems worked hand in hand , with Corona imagery first identifying nuclear facilities and then Gambit providing detailed information on those facilities. By the end of the 1960s, while U.S. concerns about the size of Soviet nuclear remained , the United States began to focus on curtailing those nuclear capabilities . Gambit and Hexagon would also become essential resources for helping achieve this end. The United States and the Soviet Union entered the 1970s act ively pursuing control of nuclear arms. The Strategic Arms and Limitations Talks (SALT) resulted in an agreement to control development of antiballistic missiles as well as an interim agreement on limitations on nuclear weapons development. By this time, the Hexagon system was operational and replaced Corona for wide area search requirements . Hexagon satellites joined later Gambit satellites in serving as a primary means for verifying Soviet compliance with the agreements reached through the SALT process. As the systems neared the end of their lifespans in the mid-1980s, they remained a key resource for nuclear arms limitation verification. The systems also served as a means for gaining insight into other intelligence issues that would arise over their lifespans . Together, Gambit and Hexagon yielded intelligence information that assisted the President of the United States, as well as U.S. military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials to make better informed decisions on matters of national security. Eventually the costs , both in terms of money and time , would lead to the replacement of Gambit and Hexagon by near-real-time imagery systems. Gambit and Hexagon would remain highly regarded for their technological innovations and invaluable contributions to the defense of the United States. The contents of this volume are intended to help the reader understand and appreciate this high regard for the Gambit and Hexagon imagery satellite systems . James D. Outzen, Ph.D . Compendium Editor --J , , .,. 1. I • CRIT ECURITY: CA L TO us s ATELLITE HEXAGONs PENDIUM GAMBIT AND SYSTEMS COM THE I RECONNAI SSANCE SECTION I: HISTORy WRITTEN BY GERALDHAINES,PH.D. OVERVIEW Since the early 1960s, U.S. policymakers have come to rely increasingly on photoreconnaissance satellite imagery for timely and accurate intelligence. Photoreconnaissance satellites and the information they provide have become virtually indispensable to the U.S . Intelligence Community and its intelligence assessments . Developed , operated , and managed by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) , these satellite systems sparked a revolution in intelligence collection . Operating in a crisis atmosphere , the NRO forged a unique working partnership with U.S. private industry partners to design and build these new satellite systems . The NRO/industry partnership drove space reconnaissance technology beyond current limits . It made possible a new generation of photoreconnaissance technologies that resulted in the acquisition of neverbefore-seen , detailed intelligence data fo r U.S. officials . Corona , the first U.S . reconnaissance satellite program ushered in this new era in intelligence . A stop gap film recovery system , Corona focused primarily on the Soviet Union and other denied areas . Corona imagery provided U.S. decisionmakers with vital information on Soviet weapons development, order-of-battle , and its nuclear program. During the 1960s, Corona satellites were this nation's primary search system. Covering wide swaths of the Soviet Union , Corona cameras swept the Soviet land mass for signs of missile development and nuclear testing activity. Although its contribution to U.S . intelligence was "virtually immeasurable ," Corona imagery also had limitations . In 1961 , for example , it could resolve no object smaller than 10 to 15ft. U.S. photointerpreters and U.S . planners needed , and demanded , higher resolution imagery for their intelligence estimates relating to Soviet weapons systems and target identifications . To fill this gap , Director, NRO (DNRO) , Joseph Charyk , pushed the development of a high-resolution spottin~ satellite system , Gamb it. Also known as the KH-7 , Gamb1t was to provide resolution better than 2 ft . After overcoming a series of developmental problems , both technical and managerial, the first Gambit satellite flew in July 1963 . The returned film product whetted the appetite of U.S. intelligence analysts for more . Although Gambit, a surveillance system , covered far less area than Corona , it produced photography with a much better resolution , for example , objects as small as 6ft could now be located and observed . An improved Gambit, known as Gambit-3 or the KH-8 , flew in 1967 . Capable of stereo photography, it proved highly successful replacing Gambit-1 . The Gambit program eventually flew 54 missions over 20 years , concluding in 1984. It provided U.S. officials with unique , highly detailed imagery of sensitive targets, and became a major tool for photo analysts during the Cold War. SECTION 1: HISTORY-OVERVIEW Film-recovery payloads culminated with the development of the Hexagon series of satellites . Approved for design and development by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in 1964 , the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) designed Hexagon as both a high resolution and wide area coverage system . It was one of the largest and most complex reconnaissance satellites ever built. Known to the American public as "Big Bird," it was 10ft in diameter and 55 ft in length. It rivaled the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 's (NASA's) Space Lab in size . Hexagon featured two panoramic counterrotating opticalbar cameras and four recovery capsules (later Corona and Gambit satellites carried two). Later Hexagons also contained a fifth capsule to return film from a separate mapping camera . Accompanying stellar and terrain cameras in Hexagon made it possible to extract mapping , charting , and geodetic data for the Defense Mapping Agency and other organizations of the Intelligence Community. The NRO launched twenty Hexagon's between June 1971 and April 1986. The only failure to mar this remarkable satellite program occurred on the twentieth and last flight when the launch booster exploded above Vandenberg Air Force Base , Cali fornia on 18 April 1986 . 1n the 1980s, the next generation of U.S . photoreconnaissance satellites (which eliminated the need for film return) replaced both Gambit and Hexagon. During their years of operation , however, Gambit and Hexagon proved invaluable to U.S . policymakers . For much of the Cold War, these systems kept watch over the Soviet Union and other communist bloc areas . They proved critical to U.S. security by providing detailed intelligence on U.S. adversaries . Their search and surveillance capabilities also made possible arms limitation negotiations and the verification of nuclear reduction treaties. This study traces the origins and development of the Gambit and Hexagon programs. It details the technological problems , breakthroughs , and accomplishments encountered as NRO, CIA, Air Force , and private industry engineers, designers , and program managers pushed the cutting edge of space reconnaissance technology. It outlines the evolving close partnership and working relationship between the NRO and industry in pursuing far-reaching scientific and technological goals . This study also describes the bureaucratic battles among the CIA , the NRO , and the Air Force over control and management of these systems . Finally, it places the development of these unique satellite systems squarely in the crisis atmosphere of the Cold War and the constant demands of U.S. officials for more and better pictures. It is a remarkable story. BA KGROUND Deeply concerned over Soviet boasts about the success of their missile program and the growing "missile gap ," CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM controversy, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, despite reservations , authorized a U-2 penetration flight of the Soviet Union for 1 May 1960 . The Department of State and the CIA strongly supported the decision. The intelligence objective of gathering information on the Soviet missile program was overwhelming in spite of the dangers. The most experienced U-2 pilot , Francis Gary Powers was selected to fly Operation Grand Slam . According to CIA analysts , this route offered the best chance of photographing suspected locations of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) sites . Powers ' first target was the Tyuratam Missile Test Range ; he was then to head for Chelyabinsk , just south of Sverdlovsk . Powers never made it past Sve rdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission , a Soviet SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) disabled his aircraft 70 ,500 ft above the Sverdlovsk area . The Soviets had succeeded in downing the United States' most advanced reconnaissance aircraft. When Eisenhower finally admitted U.S . responsibility for the U-2 overfl ight , he suspended all future U-2 flights over the Soviet Union . The United States was now primarily blind regarding Soviet missile advancements . At the same time the U-2 was successfully overflying the Soviet Union , 1956 through 1960 , and following the dramatic Soviet space successes in 1957 with Sputnik I and Sputnik II , President Eisenhower formally endorsed a stop-gap U.S . satellite program in February 1958 . The new Corona project , managed jointly by the same CIAAir Force team , which had built the U-2, was to produce a satellite imaging reconnaissance system that would take pictures from space and deorbit a capsule with film back to earth . Like the U-2 , this was a bold initiative to counter the closed societies of the S ino-Soviet bloc. A string of twelve successive failures , however, threatened to end the Corona program before it even succeeded in returning a single film capsule from space . As the failures continued to mount , CIA Deputy Director for Plans , Richard Bissell and his Corona team became frustrated. It was not like the development of the U-2 where , if something failed , the pilot , unless it was a fatal error, could usually relate what happened. With satellites , according to Bissell , "they spun out of control, burned up in the atmosphere, crashed , hopelessly lost in the ocean , or exploded . Because the whole system was destroyed on reentry, it was often impossible to retrieve it and do an assessment." Discouraged , on 10 August 1960, the Corona team launched a diagnostic payload in an attempt to determine what was going wrong. The launch from Vandenberg , AFB , California , was perfect , the Agena rocket sent the spacecraft into the proper orbit, and on its 17th revolution , it successfully returned to earth , the first payload from space . Buoyed by this success, the CIA/U .S. Air Force team launched a camera-equipped Corona on 18 August. Like the earlier mission , Corona Mission 9009 worked perfectly and deorbited its film payload on Friday, 19 August 1960, exactly 1 00 days after the Soviets shot down Powers and his U-2 . The two recoveries did not make a successful program , however. Of the next four launches , only three went into orbit and one of these suffered a camera failure . Corona Mission 9013 , recovered on 10 December 1960, revealed Soviet construction work on its SS-6 missile sites at Plesetsk and at Yurya . Photoreconnaissance was beginning to pay off. Corona photography obtained in June 1961 also revealed a new Soviet missile project around Leningrad. Some CIA analysts believed this new system was an Antiballistic Missile (ABM) system designed to counter U.S. intermediate-range missiles . The John F. Kennedy administration , anxious ove r this new development, turned to the CIA and the Corona program for more data . Corona , however, was not able to perform the required task. Even its newest camera , the stereo KH-4 , known as Mural , was not good enough to provide technical data on the design of objects as small as a SAM . Moreover, Corona engineers were still grappling with keeping the satellite cameras in focus. According to the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (SIRC) , new U.S . satellite systems were needed that could resolve objects as small as 6 , 1.5 , and 0.3 m. Corona cameras called only for a resolution of 6 m . This was in accordance with its role of performing widearea , low resolution "search" missions. ~~-~---~- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . GAMBIT ORIGINS OF THE PROGRAM The NRO Gamb it satell ite program evolved from the Air Force 's larger developmental plans for building reconnaissance satellites-the WS -117L program in the mid-1950s. As originally envisioned , the Air Force sought to create a multifaceted satellite observation system . Little came of these efforts, however, as the Department of Defense (DoD) struggled to eliminate "non-critical " defense expenditures and the Eisenhower administration stressed a "space for peace " theme. Following the Soviet space successes of 1957, however, Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy authorized the acceleration of WS-117L to proceed "at the maximum rate cons istent with good management. "7 Upon the urging of his civilian scientific advisors , President Eisenhower in 1958 ordered a small part of the WS-117L program , a satellite with a returnable film capsule , be taken from the Air Force overall program and given to the same team that had built the U-2-the CIA's Richard Bissell and the Air Force 's Brig Gen Osmond Ritland-for quick development. Corona was to be a stop-gap measure until the larger Air Force effort produced results. In the aftermath of the U-2 shoot-down , the suspension of U-2 operations over the Soviet Union in May 1960, and the mounting failures of the Corona and Samos programs , U.S. officials urgently sought new sources of high resolution reconnaissance photography. 8 The imagery was critical to U.S. national security interests . The U-2 shoot-down triggered a series of top level meetings on the status of the Air Force 's Samos programs . The Eisenhower decision to stop all aircraft overflight operations meant the loss of high-resolution observation of the Soviet Union. Even if Corona achieved success , and at this point it had not , there was an immediate need for much better resolution than it could provide. George B. Kistiakowsky, who had succeeded James Killian as President Eisenhower's science advisor, was pessimistic about the Samos programs . On 26 May 1960, Eisenhower directed Kistiakowsky to set up a group to advise , as quickly as possible , the best way to expand satellite reconnaissance options. Kistiakowsky turned to James Killian , Edwin H. Land , Carl Overhage of Lincoln Laboratories , Richard M. Bissell , Jr., and Air Force Under Secretary Joseph V. Charyk . They all echoed Kistiakowsky's concerns over Samos and suggested a DoD streamlined , super-Corona program. Charyk also argued strongly for keeping the program in the Air Force. If given the chance, Charyk believed he could create a successful covert satellite program within the Air Force . On 25 August 1960, Eisenhower approved the recommendation of the Kistiakowsky Study Group . Charyk SECTION 1: HISTORY-GAMBIT got his wish and Samos became part of a new Air Force organization known as the Air Force Project Office , which subsequently became the Secretary of the Air Force Special Project Office (SAFSP) . The new Samos project office in Los Angeles was to be housed in the same building as the new Space System Division. It would have direct access to all Air Force resources : an Atlas booster; an Agena spacecraft ; a launching site at Vandenberg AFB ; tracking and control services at Sunnyvale , California ; and recovery services at Oahu, Hawaii. Brig Gen Robert E. Greer became the first SAFSP director. He had previously been the Air Force's assistant chief of staff for guided missiles . At the same time , under a security strategy called "Raincoat ," Charyk hid the sensitive space program by forbidding any publicity releases on an Air Force space project. Another factor that affected the Gamb it program was the formal establishment of the N RO in September 1961. Now, all national collection requirements went through the NRO and its Satellite Operations Center (SOC) located in the basement of the Pentagon . Joseph Charyk and Richard Bissell , Jr. became the first co-DNROs and Gambit became the first full-scale venture of the new organization. Charyk assigned the Gambit Project to Program A (Air Force) at SAFSP. It proceeded independently from the Corona project and the CIA satellite effort (Program B). NT In March 1960, Eastman Kodak submitted proposals to the Air Force and the CIA for the development of a 77-in (focal length) camera for satellite reconnaissance . Building on its development work for the CIA's Oxcart aircraft program, Kodak suggested that the new high performance catadioptric lens camera might be suitable for satellites. 9 In June , Kodak proposed a 36-in camera system to provide convergent stereo coverage of Soviet terri tory. Termed "Blanket ," Kodak claimed the new system could be made operational in a short period of time because it was based on existing technology from the Oxcart program . Kodak officials , Arthur Simmons and Herman Waggershauser, showed the proposal to Edwin H. (Din) Land, one of Eisenhower's scientific advisors . Land enthusiastically brought the proposal to the attention of Air Force Under Secretary Joseph V. Charyk . Charyk, too , was interested . He liked the Kodak proposal , a film-only recovery scheme like Corona with a very high-acuity, long focal-length camera . In discussion with Charyk , Kodak officials confidently projected the feasib ility of providing a surveillance camera with 2-to 3-ft around resolution with high-acuity stereo coverage . A month later, on 20 July, Kodak offered a modified proposal , which integrated the 77-in camera with the stereo feat ures and film recovery techniques embodied CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM in "Blanket. " It termed the new proposal "Sunset Strip " after the popular television series. This was promising technology for new orbital reconnaissance systems . In September 1960, Charyk met with Greer, Col Paul J. Heran (Chairman of the E-6 Source Selection Board) and Lt Col James Seay (Greer's procurement chief) to review proposed satellite programs. All agreed to proceed with both E-6 (which had the potential of being twice as good as Corona) and the Kodak "Sunset Strip" proposal. Charyk directed that "Sunset Strip" be developed on a cover basis , hidden in the E-6 program . He set initial funding for research and development study funds for the balance of FY 1961 . Greer named the new "black" program Gambit. By keeping the physical and environmental limitations of E-6 and Gambit compatible, it seemed possible to develop and test Gambit without any outward indication that such a program existed . At the same time Charyk moved to hide the Gambit project, he also shielded it from the overall Air Force Samos program , cutting out the Strategic Air Command , the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division , and the Air Force System FUm s uppl y spool Film chute Lviewing po r t Command. They all objected strongly to "losing" Samos. Charyk later reflected that it was extremely difficult limiting "need to know" especially when everyone believed they were working on a strategically important program . On the one hand he was telling them that Samos was extremely important and on the other that it would be drastically cut back. Since the 77-in camera development program was well publicized, Charyk and Greer followed the earlier Corona precedent. They terminated the Kodak study contract for "Sunset Strip" as "no longer required" and simultaneously authorized Kodak to continue the development as a covert effort. As the "Sunset Strip " activity closed and Kodak personnel nominally shifted to other Kodak projects , they actually moved into a new facility in a different building and resumed their work. In establishing the Corona program, Bissell and Ritland followed much the same procedures .10 The complex , involved , security procedures for Gambit "cover and deception," in retrospect seem overdone. There were few challenges or threats to the system or the disclosure of Gambit. THE GAjMBIT 1 SYSTEM Prlmary mirror cell DIMENSIONS Length: 15 feet Dl.ometer: 5 feet PAYLOAD-mirrors, came.ro, film supply, command & control Gambit-1 configuration SECTION 1: HISTORY· GAMBIT Samos Nose Cone GETTING PICTURES While putting the rather elaborate security system in place , both Charyk and Greer agreed that their real job was to "get pictures," the objective of the national satellite reconnaissance program. Although Charyk initially balked at Eastman Kodak's demand for a ?-percent profit margin on camera development , by January 1961 , he and Kodak had reached agreement. Greer supported Kodak . According to Greer, the fee was not excessive . He based his judgment on the U-2 camera expenses and Kodak's "unique capability." Moreover, the 25 August National Security Council directive ordered the Samos "take to be processed by the same agency that processed U-2 take "-Eastman Kodak . There were no alternatives. General Electric's (GE's) Space Division was to build the orbital-control vehicle. By mid-1961 , Gambit had evolved into a 15-ft long , 5 ft in diameter space vehicle . The Gambit payload embodied a Maksutov f/4 .0 lens (both reflecting and refracting elements) similar to an astronomical telescope with a 77-in focal length and a clean aperture of 19.5 in . This lens , when flown at a nominal 95 rim altitude was to produce an around resolution , at nadir, from 2 to 3 ft . Gambit was to carry 3,000 ft of 9.5in diameter, thin-base film through a strip camera , which would prov ide image-motion compensation by moving the film across the image exposure slit at the same velocity that the projected image moved over the earth . The camera would image a strip on the earth 10.6 nm wide . It possessed the capabil ity of photographing specific targets , CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM which were off the immediate orbital track through oblique pointing . The planned weight of the total photographic system was 1,154 lbs . The high resolution requirement for Gambit imposed a need for accurate orbit maintenance over a period of several days and for an ability to rotate the camera section about the vehicle's roll axis. The GE Orbital Control Vehicle (OCV) was to be capable of varying the roll attitude from 0 to 45 degrees and of performing 350 roll maneuvers at an average role of one per second. The command system was to receive , accept or reject , and execute both realtime or stored commands. The attitude control system was a two-axis gimballed platform on which were mounted infrared horizon scanners and an integrating gyroscope. The horizon sensors measured pitch and roll error; the gyro measured yaw error. Control movements were dependent on several jet-nozzle apertures. A set of four rocket engines , each capable of producing 50 lbs of thrust, would provide orbit maintenance. The initial Gambit launch vehicle was an Atlas Agena-D . The Atlas used 123 tons of liquid oxygen and refined kerosene (RP-1) to power the booster engines-each generating 154,500 lbs of thrust and a 57,200-lb thrust sustainer engine. The Agena-D upper stage used 13,234 lbs of fuel to power its 16,000-lb thrust engines. After exposure , the camera 's film was wound up in the Recovery Vehicle (RV) . At the end of the mission , the RV was separated from the OCV, spun up on its axis of symmetry by a cold-gas system , and then deboosted from orbit. Parachute deployment was to occur at 55,000 ft . The initial recovery vehicle was intended for land recovery. In fact, in October 1961 , Charyk approved the use of the Wendover AFB in Utah for Gambit land recovery operations. At this point , both Kodak and GE appeared to be ahead of schedule in completion of their design concept. By 1 August 1961 , a Gambit launch date in January 1963 appeared possible . Even with progress in the Gambit program , by January 1962 , the need for an on-orbit, high-resolution , photographic reconnaissance system was even more critical. The Samos E-5 program had been cancelled after a series of failures and Corona was experiencing operational difficulties. DNRO Charyk , under constant pressure to get quick and effective results from the satellite reconnaissance program, wanted to accelerate the pace of Gambit development and improve its product. In discussions with Greer and Quentin A. Riepe , the program director for Gambit, however, it soon became clear that serious problems remained and any quick fixes would seriously degrade the photography. There was general agreement that the earliest possible date for the initial launch would be May rather than February 1963. PROBLEMS The National Security Council (NSC) program directive in 1960 approving Gambit specified the development of a land recovery program. In the climate of the early Corona program, land recovery appeared to be a useful option, less risky, more reliable , and less costly than the ocean recovery used by Corona . Moreover, the projected weight of the Gambit RV would exceed the capability of the C-119 recovery aircraft. By July 1962, however, the reasons for distrusting air-sea recovery methods seemed less valid. The improving capability of the Corona RV and the good performance of the overwater recovery system convinced Greer of the feasibility of using a Corona-like RV on Gambit. The Gamb it RV was then 500 lbs over design weight and most of the overweight derived from complications introduced by the land recovery requirement. Overwater recovery, as developed in the Corona program , seemed to Greer a very simple process when compared to the planned land recovery scheme. In its descent toward the ocean, a Corona reentry ve hicle cou ld safely shed all sorts of accessories-hatch covers and ablative cones , for example. They simply fell into the ocean and sank. A land recovery vehicle could shed nothing , lest it became a lethal projectile. Greer asked GE to do a quiet study of "gluing the Discoverer capsule on the front end of Gambit. " Greer was attracted to the concept by the potential of major savings on weight , cost , and launch schedule. More than 600 lbs of orbital weight could be saved by going to an overwater recovery mode . Facility funds for the Wendover range could be cut from the budget. Most importantly, with a modified Corona RV, Gambit could maintain its launch schedule . After listening to the various arguments , including the Gambit program office, which felt that the land recovery approach was still the better option , on 18 September Charyk authorized Greer to begin immediate development of a Corona-type recovery system for Gambit in preparation for a June 1963 first flight date . The sw itch to a Corona-type water recovery vehicle markedly simplified the entire Gambit system and probably saved the program. It did not, however, eliminate all problems. While work on the camera payload at Eastman Kodak continued to progress , major problems threatened the launch date schedule. The optics for Gambit were to be larger and lighter than any previously built for space including the primary and stereo mirrors . Using large boules of very pure fuse d silica glass , engineers joined the sections . The fusion operation was extremely delicate: heated too long or at too high a temperature , the structure became a molten blob , too low a temperature or too short a time prevented the parts from fus ing properly. Engineers shipped the large, lightweight blanks to Kodak for figuring and polishing at its special facility. 11 SECTION 1: HISTORY· GAMBIT Frederic Oder, director of Special Projects at Kodak rate gyros, environmental doors, and pyro devices , caused and familiar with the Corona RV from his previous work major cost overruns and severely threatened delivery on WS-117L, favored the use of Corona technology on schedules. Gambit. Kodak had originally planned to keep the film path pressurized including the film chute and take-up cassettes. Using his Corona background , Oder urged the adoption of a nonpressurized film path . This simplified the process and allowed the Gambit film load to be accommodated in a Corona-like RV without serious modifications. Kodak was also having problems attaching or cementing the silica mirrors to their metal case and with the platen drive, which caused the film to move irregularly over the exposure slit. Although the problems were not considered major, they added to existing pressure on delivery time and flight schedules. The OCV development by GE, in its Valley Forge , Pennsylvania facility, was another story. Repeated failures in such varied experiments as the harnesses, power supplies, batteries, command systems, horizon sensors, The prevalence of cost overruns, particularly at GE, the threat of new schedule slippage, and the increasing cost of the Gambit program greatly concerned Charyk. At the same time , pressures continued to increase for hard intelligence on the Soviet Union. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 added to the sense of urgency. At a meeting with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the "special group" of the National Security Council , Charyk characterized Gambit as "imperative" and urged that the program be pressed with a "maximum sense of urgency." "No reasonable steps," Charyk argued , "should be omitted to guarantee its success at the earliest possible time." According to Charyk, Gambit offered the most promising approach to discovering whether or not the Soviet Union was actively preparing for war.12 Gambit-3 Agena Vehicle CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON Discouraged about the rate of Gambit progress, Charyk suggested to Greer a management change. He wanted an exhaustive technical review of the program to locate any remaining problems. Greer was reluctant to relieve Col Riepe , the original program manager. Nevertheless, on 30 October 1962, Greer replaced Riepe with Col William G. King . King had a long experience with satellite reconnaissance. He had been Samos program director in the late 1950s and was one of the first to recognize the advantages of film recovery techniques over the technically more difficult readout systems. At the time of his appointment to head the Gambit program, he was serving as Greer's special plans officer.13 Immediately upon taking over the Gamb it program, King discovered that the GE adaptation of the Corona capsule to Gambit was seriously off course. Greer's original intent, confirmed by Charyk , was to "glue on" the Corona recovery vehicle. Elaborate or extensive modification of the capsule was neither intended nor desired. In the course of chang ing over from land recovery to air-sea recovery, however, Gambit launch SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Gambit officials had authorized GE to develop a recovery vehicle capable of accepting the original pressurized Gambit take-up cassette and film ch ute.14 Responding to the request to convert Gambit to a Corona recovery vehicle, GE scaled up the Corona capsule, making it deeper and increasing its base diameter. T he result was a completely new capsule which required an extensive test program . The cost also escalated. King suggested that the original intent of the Corona modification be reinstated and that the rapidly expanding GE development effort be stopped. Greer, who had originally ordered that changes to the Corona capsule should be minimal, agreed. King imposed an "absolute minimum" change policy in his instructions to GE on adopting the Corona recovery system to Gambit. At the same time , King was sorting out the technical problems with Gambit, Charyk and Greer decided to strengthen Gambit management further by transferring the program from the Space Systems Division to SAFSP. Such a move would give Gambit the prestige and authority of the office of the Secretary of the Air Force. This set off a fire storm in the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). General Bernard Schriever, commander of AFSC , had been a major force in establishing the Air Force space program. Schriever believed strongly that all Air Force space activity should be under AFSC management. He made several determined but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to regain "ownersh ip." High priority space programs would from now on report directly to the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. King continued his technical review of the Gambit program by questioning GE's untested OCV and its attitude-control subsystem. In order to improve the probability of early Gambit flight successes, King and Greer suggested that the Agena, at least for the first three flights, remain connected to the OCV. The reliable Agena, while not as precise as the Gambit system, could provide a stabilization and control mechanism to stabilize the Gambit camera long enough to secure operating experience and proof of system feasibility. Flying in this "hitch-up" configuration would not allow the demonstration of Gambit's full capability and it would only permit near-nadir photography, but King and Greer were determined that the first Gambit should return at least "one good picture." King and Greer also envisioned using a roll-joint coupling (invented for an interim high resolution satellite developed by the CIA, known as Project Lanyard and its KH-6 camera) between the spacecraft (Agena) and the camera system. Should the GE OCV prove unreliable, the introduction of the Lanyard roll-joint could stabilize and control the vehicle. As was the case with the Corona reentry capsule, the roll-joint technology was unknown to most Gambit people. Because of the high degree of security compartmentation in the reconnaissance Program structure , CIA security officials were reluctant to disclose even the ex istence of Lanyard to Gambit personnel. Charyk got around this problem by "suggesting " to Greer (Greer actually drafted the suggestion) that he contact Lockheed Corporation about the roll joint as ".. .he (Charyk) believed a similar idea was once proposed and possibly designed in connection with another space program. " Lockheed thus delivered the finished roll joints to the Gambit program as though they were new items with no relationship to any other reconnaissance program . On 14 December 1962 Greer and King proposed yet another technical innovation . The latest change advocated incorporating "Lifeboat" provisions into Gambit. "Lifeboat" was another Corona originated technique . It involved providing independent reentry command circuitry (including a receiver) , a separate magnetometer, and its own stabilization gas supply. All were independent of the main systems . If the primary reentry systems became inoperative , "Lifeboat" could be separately activated . "Lifeboat" had proven its value on several occas ions with Corona . Charyk formally approved adding "Lifeboat ," "hitchup ," and "roll joint" to Gambit on 19 December. "Lifeboat" was to be a permanent part of Gambit, "hitchup " was to be used on just the first four vehicles and then on a flight-by-flight basis. "Roll joint" was to be developed as an operational substitute for the OCV roll system. At the same time, in order to maintain the launch schedule , Greer and King deleted a substantial portion of the test program for Gambit. There was no alternative if Gambit was to meet its proposed schedule of June. Both knew the risk , but additional overruns or schedule slippage could put the program in danger of being cancelled .15 U.S. policymakers demanded useful intelligence images of Soviet targets . When Charyk resigned as DNRO on 1 March 1963 , Brockway McMillan of Bell Telephone Laboratories replaced him. All seemed to be proceeding well with Gambit. By May, Gambit was in its first flight checkout sequence . On the afternoon of 11 May, however, a faulty valve and a deficient fuel loading sequence caused a loss of internal pressure on the Atlas 190D . The booster collapsed on the pad, dumping both the GE orbital vehicle and the Agena on the concrete slab . The GE vehicle was severely damaged , the Agena to a lesser degree . Surprisingly, there was no explosion or fire , although 13,000 gallons of liquid oxygen and a full load of fuel sloshed over the pad . The camera system was damaged beyond repa ir, a large part of the optics demolished . The Gambit project team worked furiously to repair the damage and keep the pre -flight checkout on schedule . Despite their efforts the original 27 June launch date slipped back to July.16 SECTION 1: HISTORY-GAMBIT FIRST LAUNCHES Twenty-two months and 17 days after the National Security Council decision to proceed with a covert highresolution satellite , Gambit flight vehicle No. 1 lifted off from its Vandenberg launching pad on 12 July 1963 at 1344 , Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) . For an instant during the launch , most observers experienced the horrified sense that disaster had come again to the NRO/Air Force satellite reconnaissance program. The splashing rocket exhaust of the Atlas knocked out all electrical connections to telemetry and cameras . It gave the impression of a major launch start explosion . Seconds later, however, the Atlas could be seen climbing steadily towards its launch window. Climbout , separation , and orbital injection went smoothly. Greer and King knew, however, it would be another 90 minutes before they would have proof that the bird was in a proper polar orbit. It would take another five orbits before the Gambit payload came to life . After another nine "working " passes , a recovery attempt would be made. There would be another wait as the capsule re-entered the earth's atmosphere , hopefully survived its passage through the upper atmosphere , arrested its descent by parachute , and was recovered . On the fifth orbital revolution, command controllers turned on the camera for light strip exposures of 20 seconds each . On orbits eight and nine , two stereo pairs , and five , 2-second strips were exposed . A premature exhaustion of Agena stabilization gas then forced the discontinuance of camera operations . With the Agena out of fuel , "Lifeboat" became the only means of recovering the film capsule. On the eighteenth orbit , a ground station commanded "Lifeboat" and Gambit back toward earth. A C-119 aircraft waiting near Hawaii swept the parachuting reentry capsule out of the sky. The first Gambit was a success , but what about the film? Evaluation of the recovered film, only 198ft was exposed , indicated an out-of-focus condition for most of the flight caused apparently by uncompensated temperature changes that affected the face of the primary mirror and by faulty image motion compensation settings . Nevertheless , the best resolution was close to 3.5 ft , the average resolution about 10 ft . It was the best photographic return ever obtained from a reconnaissance satellite . Greer, gratified by the success of the first flight , informed King that he very much wanted "two in a row. " The very success of the first flight raised Intelligence Community expectations for subsequent flights . The second Gambit flight took place on 6 September 1963 . All went well. During 51 hours on orbit , the hitched vehicle completed 34 orbits and exposed 1 ,930 ft of film. On the 34th revolution , the reentry vehicle was detached CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM GAMBIT OPERATIONAL MODES LATERAL TRIPLET MONOSCOP fC STRIP LATERAL PAl R STEREO STRIP Gambit Operational Modes and successfully recovered by air catch . An analysis of the photographs recovered from the second Gambit showed consistently high quality until the 31st orbit. The resolution achieved during the initial portion of the fight meant the photointerpreters could distinguish such detail as aircraft engine nacelles , small vehicles , and even maintenance equipment. For the first time , a satellite reconnaissance camera had returned detail at levels previously obtained only from reconnaissance aircraft. Only three years after Eisenhower ordered manned reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union discontinued , U.S. satellites had filled the intelligence gap . First , Corona had returned coverage of areas most U-2s could not reach or safely overfly, and now Gambit had returned detail not greatly inferior to that produced by U-2 cameras . Gambit imagery, however, was limited to 1,930 ft of film from Gambit's second flight. Although Gambit's achievements were remarkable , it did not yet provide recurring coverage of the Soviet Union . Such cove rage , at resolutions much better than Corona could provide , was still an urgent national goal. McMillan , under constant pressu re for more pictures , wanted future Gambit missions to concentrate on obtaining the best possible ground resolution over larger numbers of "denied area " targets. McMillan informed Greer, "... the name of the game is specific coverage of specific , known targets with stereo photography of the best possible quality. " Greer was increasingly confident Gambit could produce the desired results . On 25 October 1963, Gambit's third fligh t produced photography "better and more cons istent than that of either of the first two missions ." Imagery was the first to show identifiable figures of people on the ground-from a distance of 90 miles . The scene was a football fie ld in Great Falls , Montana . In one photo , a place kicker could be seen putting the football in place while the other players moved into position. In a second photo , the players had lined up , ready for the kickoff. Despite the superb resolution , however, the first three Gambit flights produced little intelligence. They did , however, whet the appetite of the U.S. Intelligence Community for more and better satellite imagery. Gambit No . 6, launched on 11 March 1964, seemed to bring the program to maturity. Despite some continuing problems , Gambit No . 6 returned substantial quantities of highly useful intelligence data on targets . The year 1964, however, brought serious problems to the program . From May through October 1964, half of six flights produced no coverage whatsoever. The best resolution degraded to 7 ft . Despite some successes in early 1965, the Gambit program was seriously ill . Maj Gen Robert Greer retired on 30 June. He was replaced by Brig Gen John L. Martin who had been chief of the NRO Staff in the Pentagon and deputy to Greer. The summer of 1965 brought key personnel changes as well. Dr. Alexander H. Flax , Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development replaced McMillan as DNRO on 1 October. Only Col King continued in place as project director for Gambit. As Greer's deputy, Martin had a detailed knowledge of Gambit. He had witnessed the agonies of the early Gambit operations and years later recalled the emotion of "watching a bird go dead ." "You simply cannot imagine ," he said , "the frustration you feel when a healthy-looking Gambit suddenly became a zombie. " Shortly after assuming command , Martin faced the issue of whether or not Gambit No . 20 should hold to its early July flight date. Martin decided to go ahead with the previous schedule . On 12 July Martin witnessed a comprehensive failure, the Atlas booster shut down prematurely and Gambit No. 20 flew a 682-mile arc into the Pacific Ocean . Martin demanded immediate changes . He and King set about tightening quality control and the incentive contracting system . They subjected the Gambit system to new and more stringent test and inspection procedures. Despite their efforts , Gambit No. 21 became the third successive Gambit to experience catastrophic failure when the AC/ DC power converter in the OCV failed , resulting in the SECTION 1: HISTORY-GAMBIT loss of stability. The Intelligence Community, increasingly dependen t on high-resolution photography to determine Soviet ICBM activity expressed its major concern with the gap in detailed coverage of the Soviet program .17 Martin , although under pressure to produce detailed imagery, delayed the next scheduled Gambit launch. He turned his attention to GE's OCV, which had , on balance , provided most of the program difficulties . Traveling to GE Philadelphia , he and King mystified GE management by requiring exclusive use of a dining room, ten tables , ten white tablecloths , and ten completed Gambit electronic boxes. With GE management looking on, Martin produced his own screwdriver and removed the cover-plates from the first box. He raised the box above the cloth-covered table and shook it hard . He paused to inventory the native and foreign items which fell on the table. He and King moved from table to table repeating the operation with each box. Martin concluded by stating that someone or someones had to be responsible for the debris on the table . GE management responded by revamping its organization and production and testing procedures . They were determ ined that GE hardware would become a quality member of the Gambit components family. GE was not the only errant contractor King and Martin took to task. Lockheed and Kodak were both criticized for shipping unfinished products to Vandenberg and then attempting to complete their work in Vandenberg's Missile Assembly Building (MAE) . Determined to guarantee hardware integrity, King even threatened to close the MAB , forcing all contractors to deliver flight-ready hardware to the launch site . Martin also made an exhaustive study of the incentive contracting in effect for the Gambit program. He was amazed to find that the system of rewards paid more for under-cost, on-time delivery than for high quality performance on orbit. He observed , for example , that such a set of values placed GE in position to collect a healthy bonus for providing the OCV under cost and on time despite the failure rate on orbit. To the contractor, the arrangement stressed the cost factor far more than the performance factor. The result was that GE was motivated to delete as many control and test procedures as poss ible in order to save money and time in producing the OCV. Taken to its logical extreme , the incentive formula could result in the delivery of a minimum cost vehicle which failed catastrophically, but, nonetheless, earned a premium for the contractors. Martin shifted the focus of the incentive system from cost to performance. Martin's new system placed the emphasis on orbital performance and provided large bonuses for on-orbit success . Gambit No . 23 , launched on 8 November 1965, was the first satellite to have full benefit of the new test and inspection regime . Unfortunately, it too quickly succumbed CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM to flaws and during its 18-revolution lifetime photographed limited targets . The Martin-King plan for improvement in the Gambit program , however, continued unrelenting. It finally paid off. The next 1 0 flights were all qualified successes . From January to October 1966, the NRO launched Gambit satellites at a rate of about one per month. They routinely returned photographic intelligence of high quality, covering more targets in each flight. "Best resolution" averaged about 2 ft. By the third anniversary of the Gambit flight program , 12 July 1966 , Gambit had extended its longevity from one to eight days on orbit; had increased the number of targets and had improved resolution from 3.5 to 2 ft . The last Gambit mission , No. 38 (KH-7), flew on 4 June 1967 . It was replaced by the highly successful Gambit-3 Program.18 GAMBIT-1 SUMMARY Gambit was the first operational U.S. satellite system to return high resolution photography consistently. An AtlasAgena booster combination launched the Gambit into orbit. GE built the orbital control vehicle which housed the camera system. Eastman Kodak developed and manufactured the camera system itself which was originally designed around a lens of 77-in focal length , producing photographs with a ground resolution of 2 to 3 ft . GE built the recovery capsule , which was adapted from the Corona program . The first Gambit was launched in 12 July 1963 and flights continued until 4 June 1967 when Gambit-3 replaced the Gambit-1 system. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GAMBIT-319 Even before the launch of the first of the Gambit reconnaissance satellites in July 1963, U.S. planners discussed the need for an even greater capability system. Gambit, with its 2 to 3-ft resolution, (three to five times better than anything Corona produced) could produce significant operational and technical details on Soviet weaponry. But , they believed, even greater intelligence on the Soviets could be obtained if the United States developed an imaging system that could return better ground details. Intelligence Community analysts wanted "more ." In the early 1960s, the dominant factor in obtaining higher resolution tended to be focal length and pointing accuracy. Long lens systems created enlarged images of relatively small areas. Eastman Kodak worked on such a system with its Valley program. By August 1963, Valley research and Gambit-1 experience convinced many NRO officials that long focal lengths were feasible for satellite operations. In December 1963 , Kodak employees, Charles P. Spoelhof and James H. Mahar, presented their ideas for an advanced Gambit system to DNRO Brockway McMillan and Gen . Robert Greer. Following the presentation , McMillan approved the developme nt of an improved , higher resolution, Gambit program. The crux of Kodak's proposal was a system that would exploit the pointing accuracy of Gambit-1 with a new camera . Kodak engineers believed that better resolution could be obtained , assuming imagery from an orbital altitude of 90 miles . Spoelhof and Mahar also proposed that the new system incorporate a "factory to pad " concept to provide greater modularity, instead of an orbital control vehicle enveloping the camera system (Gambit-1 ). They proposed using two modules , one containing the camera and the recovery vehicle , the other housing propulsion and the on-orbit initial subsystems. Kodak also incorporated the Lockheed roll-joint concept between the forward photographic payload/recovery vehicle section and the satellite-control section. Kodak also planned to use a speci al, very-low-coefficientof-thermal-expansion lnvar (an iron-nickel alloy) for both the optical barrel and related assemblies, and a new thinbase (1 .5 mile) high-resolution film w ith an exposure index of 6.0. (The film was roughly three times more sensitive than the film then in use on Gambit-1.) Concerned that the new program might have major problems in producing the larger optics and that the improved film could not be delivered on schedule , DNRO McMillan sponsored a host of alternative technologies . This caution was also evident in the selection of the booster. Although King and Greer favored using the Atlas and Agena booster combination , McMillan wanted an option of using the new Titan-Ill booster which would provide for a greater payload weight. King and Greer worked out the remaining major elements of the Gambit-3 concept in January 1964 . Their plan called for the entire Gambit-3 program to operate under the purview of the SAFSP. They called for an initial flight in July 1966 . The Gambit-1 system would continue until Gambit-3 became operational. Because of DNRO McMilla n's strong interest in the Titan as a possible booster for Gambit-3, Greer and King tasked Lockheed in July 1964 to study Agena compatibility with the Titan-Ill. In October 1964, on the basis of the Titan 111-Agena study carried out by Lockheed , Greer's staff prepared cost estimates for switching from the AtlasAgena. Consideration for making the change included the desire to use the Titan Ill family of boosters for other Air Force space missions , the potential versatility and on-orbit weight-growth capability, and the likelihood that a new search system replacing Corona would rely on Titan Ill boosters . Despite the fact that the Atlas was considered the standard launching vehicle fo r the Air Force , DNRO McMillan officially approved the switch to Titan in October 1964. Although this increased cost and caused a slippage SECTION 1: HISTORY-GAMBIT in the initial launch date , the choice of the Titan , in hindsight, was a major improvement. It allowed future system changes with less consideration of the limited lift capacity of the Atlas . At Lockheed , the Gambit-3 program came under the direction of the Space Systems Division . The program manager was Harold Huntley who reported directly to James W. Plummer, assistant general manager for Special Programs (Plummer would become DNRO in 1974). While Lockheed's work on the Agena modifications proceeded and never seriously threatened the planned launch date of July 1966 , payload development by Eastman Kodak was behind schedule by the fall of 1964. The major problem for Kodak centered on the manufacture and mounting of the two large mirrors of Gambit-3 optics . These optics were larger than those of many earth telescopes , but needed to be much lighter to operate in space . Kodak experienced several failures in attempting to manufacture the mirrors . In addition , the figuring and polishing processes were far more difficult than originally anticipated . Kodak originally OPTICS STRIP CAMERA CORRECTOR LENS ASS£MBLY •STEREO MIRROR STELLAR CA ERA TIEARAIH CAMERA ST I CAMERA VIEW T AR.AIN CAMEitA VIEW ORBff TRACK A 0 ROU estimated that each of the two mirrors would require around 800 hrs of grinding, polishing, testing , and coating to finish. The early mirrors took 3,000 hrs per mirror. Because of mirror-fabrication problems , Kodak was three mo nths behind schedule . Kodak's problem was compounded by its underestimation of the needed engineering manpower. The company experienced a major shortage of technical people , apparently from an overcommitment of resources . Kodak was working simultaneously on Gambit-1 , Gambit-3 , a lunar camera for NASA, and a proposed new search system that later became the Hexagon program . The final determination for fabrication fused silica, for the primary aspheric mirror substrate and the return to conventional polishing techniques , pushed the production schedule ahead . By January 1966, there still existed considerab le doubt that the high-speed , high resolution film on which Gambit-3 depended would be ready for use in initial flights. If it was not ready, the fall-back film, with an index of 3.6 and a resolution capability of 110 lines per millimeter, as against the 130 lines ASA (American National OBJECTIVES e HI GH RESO LUTION OlJ .ARTERL't SURVEILL ANCE e 1 CMNIC•u. IIITELLIGEN CE PAYL OAD DATA e STEREO~ST RIP CAMER A , 17~ IH f'L e STELLAR•TERRA I CANEAA e !0, 000 FT • 9.$ IN l'llM e FR AM SI Z E 4 NM" VA RI ABLE LENGTH • RESO L UTION 8 -tO IN e COVERII. G£ ?-15,000 TARGE'T$ e TWO RECOV ERY EHICLI!S ORBIT AL DATA e C U ATION-80-1 t O DEG e A VI! RACE PERIGEE-75 H • AVE"AAG E AP OGEE • 240 NM e ISSION LIFE • 2o-J O DA YS BOOSTER e TI'TAN Ill AGE A Gamb it system and optics swath CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Standards Institute, formerly known as American Standards Association) 6.0 film would be used . It would build a certain amount of smear but there was no alternative . In fact , the new film did not become available until June 1968. Given their experience with Gambit-1 , Greer and King also introduced another innovative management technique. In contrast to the extensive testing at the launch site that characterized Gambit-1 , testing that frequently brought substantial repair work in the Missile Assembly Building , Greer and King initiated a command system for Gambit-3 , featuring an automated checkout system that allowed telemetry readout of functions . These readouts directly indicated whether or not various subsystems and components operated within acceptable limits . This automated checkout was normally performed during final assembly at Kodak and Lockheed , the principal manufacturers . The components , therefore , went directly from factory to launch pad . NRO planners took no chance with the success of the first launch of Gambit-3 . By the time of the launch , recovery operations had become rather routine , using Air Force C-130 aircraft and Navy range ships . An NRO agreement with the U.S. Navy provided for the Navy to support these recoveries with two such range ships . As the first Gambit-3 launch approached , the Navy, however, had only one ship on duty station . NRO program officers requested additional Navy support through the Office of the Commander-in Chief, Pacific Forces (CINCPAC) , which controlled all DoD assets in the Pacific. CINCPAC responded that because of the Vietnam conflict, the usual recovery support could not be provided. Col King took the issue to DNRO John Mclucas. This was a serious threat to the successful completion of the mission. Mclucas took up the matter with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , ADM David L. McDonald , who , in turn , sent a flash precedence message to CINPAC ordering the support . CINCPAC signaled back to SAFSP, "We don't know whom you know, but how many battleships do you want and where do you want them delivered?" GAMBIT-3 BECOMES OPERATIONAL On 29 July 1966 at 1130 PDT, the first Gambit-3 roared off the launch pad at Vandenberg (the initial launch had been projected nearly three years earlier for 1 July 1966). Two hours later, Sunnyvale reported , "All systems appear normal. " The first Gambit-3 performed exceptionally well. The satellite achieved a near-nominal orbit. Its mission lasted five days during which it acquired targets that were successfully "read out. "20 The overall quality of the imagery from the first Gambit-3 mission was better than that obtained from any Gambit-1 mission . Although the primary optics fell short of the design goal , the intelligence provid ed by this mission was the highest of any reconnaissance satellite to date. The fate of Gambit-1 was now sealed , although DNRO Alexander Flax was extremely reluctant to cancel any planned Gambit-1 launches until Gambit-3 actually demonstrated a consistent level of capability. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms , however, felt strongly that the success of Gambit-3 warranted cutting back Gambit-1 launches . The United States Intelligence Board's (USIB) Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) proposed , after listening to the arguments , that Gambit photographic payload section nine Gambit-1 s and eight Gambit-3s be approved for the FY 1967 flight schedule . Contemporary launch schedules called for the launch of Gambit-1 s at the rate of one per month . The decision to proceed with a mix of Gambit-1 and Gambit-3 was based on the perceived greater cost of the new system (Gambit-3), and the concern that success in all of the scheduled missions would cause the exploitation and analytical elements to be inundated with high resolution imagery. The concern was real. During the 11-month period , July 1966 to June 1967, the success of Gambit-3 created a new problem for U.S. officials by returning huge quantities of surveillancequality photography. The sheer volume overwhelmed U.S. photointerpreters. The United States now had three successful satellite systems routinely returning large quantities of imagery: Corona , Gambit-1 , and Gambit-3. The Satellite Operations Center (SOC) in the Pentagon was also feeling deluged . It was barely able to cope with Gambit and Corona . Despite the success , DNRO Flax was less than euphoric. A best resolution fell well short of the planned resolution. He, nevertheless, cancelled the final five Gambit-1 missions on 30 June 1967. Gambit-3 was to be the main surveillance satellite system. Unlike Flax , DCI Helms characterized the take from Gambit-3 in November 1967 as providing "extremely important intelligence ." He saw it as a striking success . Flax's more cautious optimism proved prophetic . By late 1967 the inadequacy of the Gambit-3 camera system remained an unsolved problem . Despite the fact that it was better than that of Gambit-1, it did not obtain the resolution originally specified . Some at NRO believed Gambit-3 would never achieve the resolution for which it had been designed , much less the long coveted resolution desired by photointerpreters. However, improvements were on the way as Kodak continued its work on improving the mirror substitute materials and the high-speed emulsion on its ultra-thin base film . Kodak introduced its new film on the 14th Gambit-3 flight on 5 June 1968 . By the 27th flight it exceeded all expectations .21 Gambit program officials strongly believed that neither the Soviets, nor anyone else , knew the capability of the Gambit program. In 1969 , however, officials held their breath as a Soviet satellite, Cosmos 264 , began to make orbital adjustments that U.S . engineers calculated would bring it within 70 miles of Gambit-3 . Eventually the two satellites passed within 15 miles of each other as NRO controllers held their breath, wondering if Cosmos was a "killer satellite ." SECTION 1: HISTORY-GAMBIT THE BLOCK II PROGRAM One of the major innovations in the Gambit-3 progra m was the introduction of a second recovery vehicle. It eventually became known as the Block II program. Growing national interest during the period of Gambit-3 development in creating a satellite capability of quick reaction to world-wide crisis situations drove concepts for improving Gambit-3. As early as January 1965, DNRO McMillan informed Secretary of Defense , Robert McNamara , of studies underway for providing Gambit-3 with such a capability. The Corona program had demo nstrated the feasibility and utility of using two recovery buckets . The premise behind the change was that a long-life , multiple capsule , film return system, could provide urgently required images that would be taken and returned to earth for evaluation , while at the same time continuing the satellite's routine surveillance duties . Fortunately, owing mostly to McMillan's foresight, the Titan booster used for Gambit-3 had excess lift capability. The addition of a second reentry vehicle and more film capacity, while they greatly increased Gambit-3's weight, did not exceed the Titan lift capacity. Work began on the Block II se ries of Gambit-3 in late 1966. The double-b ucket Gambit was ready by the fall of 1969. The first Block II vehicle (Gambit-3, no. 23) flew on 23 August 1969. After this first successful Block II flight , the program suffered a series of annoyi ng problems, from poor orbits, to failed parachutes, to program malfunctions, which kept it from reaching its full potential. Despite the nagging problems, the resolution of Gambit-3 cameras continued to increase. Operational longevity also increased from 1 0 days to 27 days . A new lens, under development by Kodak for several years, was finally introduced in 1971 . It brought an immediate performance improvement in the camera system. With a different focal length , the new lens permitted Gambit resolution to surpass even the previous best. Target coverage also increased . A FULL By August 1977 Gambit-3, with 48 vehicles flown , was a fully mature , successful satellite program. During the next seven yea rs, Gambit-3 continued to steadily improve its performance. Time-on-orbit lengthened to three to four months for each flight. Target coverage also increased significantly. By the time of the last Gambit-3 flight in April 1984 , Gambit-3 was still producing the high quality imagery, which mai ntained its preeminence in technical collection. 22 SUMMARY The Corona program provided U.S. policymakers, for the first time , a capability to monitor military and industrial CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM developments over vast areas of the Soviet Union and other denied areas of the world. Although Corona provided immeasurable contributions to national security, its resolution was not good enough to answer numerous critical intelligence questions regarding Soviet weapons development. Nor could it provide the image quality needed to provide true science and technology analysis. Gambit filled this gap . By the end of the program , Gambit routinely collected high-resolution imagery. Gambit imagery closely monitored the Soviet Union. Gambit also provided insight on China . This information was vital to U .S . strategic planners , photointerpreters , and U .S . policymakers and defense planners . The Gambit system proved to be an invaluable intelligence collection tool during the Cold War. In August 1984 President Ronald Reagan emphasized Gambit's contribution to U .S . intelligence in a message to DNRO Pete Aldridge : When the Gambit Program commenced we were in the dawn of the space age . Technologies we now take for granted had to be invented, adapted, and refined to meet the Nation 1 s highest intelligence information needs while exploiting the unknown and hostile medium of space . Through the years you and your team have systematically produced improved satellites providing major increases in both quantity and quality of space photography. The technology of acquiring high quality pictures from space was perfected by the Gambit Program engineers; Through the years , intelligence gained from these photographs has been essential to myself, my predecessors , and others involved with international policy decisions. These photographs have greatly assisted our arms monitoring initiatives . They have also provided vital knowledge about Soviet and Communist Bloc scientific and technological military developments , which is of paramount importance in determining our defense posture. A generat ion of this Nation 1 s youth has grown up unaware that , in large measure , their security was ensured by the dedicated work of your employees . National security interests prohibit me from rewarding you with public recognition which you so richly deserve. However, rest assured that your accomplishments and contributions are well known and appreciated at the highest levels of our Nation 1 s government . CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ~ INTRODUCTION Gambit was primarily a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)/Air Force program to develop a high-resolution "spotter-type" satellite. It caused few bureaucratic turf battles and became highly successful. Proposals for and the development of a second-generation search satellite to follow Corona, however, became embroiled in major bureaucratic conflicts between the NRO and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Despite the bureaucratic in-fighting, the development and operation of the Hexagon photoreconnaissance satellite system provided U.S . policymakers and planners with a unique collection capability. Hexagon's ability to cover thousands of square nautical miles with contiguous , cloudfree, high resolution imagery in a single operation, provided U.S. intelligence users with vast amounts of intelligence information on the Soviet Union and other denied areas . It also collected large-scale contiguous imagery within specific geometric accuracies and unique mapping, charting , and geodesic data . Used in combination with the Gambit program, Hexagon was of paramount importance in confirming or denying Soviet strategic weapons development and deployment. Its ability to detect quickly any new Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) complex or mobile missile placement became invaluable to U.S. negotiators working on arms-limitation treaties and agreements. OR GINS In May 1963, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John A. McCone convened a Scientific Advisory Panel under the chairmanship of Edwin Purcell , Nobel laureate and professor of physics at Harvard University, "to determine the future role and posture of the United States Reconnaissance Program. " The Purcell Panel recommended a Corona improvement program rather than an entirely new satellite system: We believe that an attempt to make a completely new (search) system, which would provide equally wide coverage (as Corona) with a modest improvement in resolution (5-feet , say, instead of 10-feet around resolution) would not be a wise investment of resources . Not entirely satisfied with the Purcell Panel recommendation, in the fall of 1963, McCone directed his Deputy Director of Science and Technology (DDS& T), Albert D. (Bud) Wheelan, to explore the requirements and possible configuration for a second generation search satellite to replace Corona . One of the major questions SECTION 1: HISTORY -HEXAGON confronting Wheelan and his staff was the degree of resolution needed to fulfill the various requiremen ts of the Intelligence Community. Wheelan directed his newly created Systems Analysis Staff, headed by Jackson D. Maxey, to review the types and characteristics of United States Intelligence Board (USIB) targets to determine the kinds of coverage needed . A detailed experiment, which included 25 National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) photointerpreters, concluded that the majority of USIB targets could be properly identified using imagery with a resolution in the 0 .6 to 1.2 m (2 to 4 ft) range. Due to the cost of booster rockets, Wheelan concluded that an entirely new camera system with a longer focal length covering a large swath would have to be developed to meet such target requirements . While Wheelan and Maxey continued to work on their study, Corona's Performance Evaluation Team (PET) also looked at the problem. The PET investigation effort examined the possibility of "scaling up" the Corona camera from the existing 61 0-mm (24-in) lens to a 1-m ( 40-in) lens while maintaining the same "acuity." According to the PET report , "scaling up" could improve Corona 's resolution without having to design an entirely new camera and satellite.23 Director, NRO (DNRO) Brockway McMillan and his NRO staff strongly supported the Purcell Panel and PET recommendations. This sparked a growing debate between the NRO and the CIA over the development of a follow-on system to Corona .24 Critical of the NRO position, McCone asked for a meeting with Deputy Defense Secretary, Roswell L. Gilpatric, to discuss the issue . On 22 October 1963, McCone and Gilpatric agreed to form a separate CIANRO/Air Force sponsored research group of the nation's leading optical experts to explore the issue of improving satellite photography. Chaired by Sidney Drell of Stanford University, the group met on 13 November 1963 to study image quality. The Drell group findings basically supported the CIA contention that the United States needed a new system, which would provide Corona-type coverage with consistent Gambit-type resolution . At the same time, in order to augment these studies , Wheelan asked for additional reports from ltek and Space Technology Laboratories (STL) of the Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge (TRW) Corporation . All seemed to be in agreement. A new system was needed to meet the growing requirements of the Intelligence Community for high quality imagery and expanded coverage . PROJECT ULCRUM Following up these studies , in May 1964, Wheelan directed ltek and STL to prepare a joint proposal for CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON a satellite system that could replace both Corona and Gambit. The ltek-STL proposal recommended a 2,495-kg (5,500-lb) payload containing two, counter-rotating ltek cameras in an STL three-axis stabilized spacecraft with a simple recovery system. A modified Titan II booster with no second stage would place it directly in orbit. The camera was to be a dual Maksutov reflective system with f/3.0 lenses having a 1.5-m (60-in) focal length employing a corrective lens, beryllium mirror, and eggerate quartz main plate. The cameras would provide a nadir resolution from 0.8 to 1.2 m (2.7 to 4ft) at an altitude of 185 km (1 00 miles). In his memorandum recommending NRO/CIA funding for Project Fulcrum , Wheelan suggested the program could be developed within 24 months. He also stressed the cost savings. According Wheelan, by replacing the Corona and Gambit programs, the government could save money by the end of FY 1969.25 McMillan was furious. Wheelan and the CIA were contracting for satellite systems and subsystems studies without even informing the NRO, which theoretically had responsibility for all reconnaissance satellite development. Deputy Director, Research and Engineering (DDR&E), Eugene Fubini, sympathetic to McMillan's position , questioned the entire Fulcrum proposal. Fubini reported that the recent Corona missions seemed to confirm the Purcell Panel recommendations that substantial improvement in the Corona camera results could be obtained . Over the strong objections of McMillan and Fubini, DCI McCone asked Gilpatric to direct the DNRO to establish Fulcrum as an NRO development project and assign responsibility for research , development, and operation to the CIA. SV SEP.-..~ATION CORE U BURN SHROUD EJECT CORE I 'f& BURN TITAN MD SRM BURNOUT ', CORE I ENTRY _.. e JETTISON \ \ ', \ \ ' \ ' '\' ' ' ' ' ' I ' ' I ' ' • I • I • I SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Looking for further support, McCone also asked Polaroid's Edwin H. (Din) Land to convene a panel of experts to consider the technical feasibility of the Fulcrum proposal. The group met on 26 June 1964 and issued its recommendations the same day. Land called the proposed system "extremely attractive," and "praised the ingenuity of the idea." The Land Panel also noted several problem areas but added that the system looked good enough to fund study efforts. Armed with the Land Panel recommendation, Wheelan, on 2 July 1964, formally presented a plan to McMillan for initiating Fulcrum. After conferring with McMillan, on 8 July, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, cautiously suggested that the DNRO complete comparative studies and explore all possible alternatives before committing to the new system. He, nevertheless, authorized the CIA to pursue "design tests necessary to establish the feasibility of the proposed Fulcrum camera concept." McCone's and Wheelan's plan went far beyond design studies. They wanted to build a strong CIA space system development and management capability. Wheelon and McCone received the backing of the USIB on 27 July 1964. The Board approved the recommendation of its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) that there was an urgent need for a search and surveillance system capable of Corona coverage and Gambit resolution . This echoed Wheelan's justification for Fulcrum. In August 1964, Wheelan created a Special Projects Group (SPG) within DS&T to handle all CIA satellite reconnaissance programs. He named Jackson D. Maxey Fulcrum Project Manager. (Maxey was one of several senior engineers Wheelan hired COMMAND AND ORBIT CONTROL AD.JUST t RECOVERY I I ' I• I I I I I•'I t1.or.s or c.. potentJ.a.l enemy and the status of his ve.:nn.aking capa.bil.ities. · B. A.erlal recOCD.aissa.nc:e v1ll be performed by phatogre.ph1c, ferret, ~rared, and other sensor systems as necessary to collect data Cl:l intelligence objectives vhicl:l v1.li be designated oo the basis of priority requirements. Enemy capabilities are contained in the "GOR Intelligence Annex. ·· (U) D5 5 8 .; 4 7tf~ A?.... . _...,----::: . ., -r CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM -~ . A.. General It is desired that satellites be launched t'ran the c:ont1nent.e.l. l.imi.ta of the Uni.t.ed Statee end macito..-ed :t'rcm gra.md stations .1n the Western Eemiaphere. ~ .B. Ground Baaed P'acllities l. A satellite cCillpUtation and ccnt.rol cen-ter is recr..t.!red . 2. Acquisition and tracking sites are required to receive col.leeted data 1'rcm the satell1te end to relay c(:mmand m.esaage.s to the orbiting vehicle. The f'e.cU1ties will be designed a.nd located to receive the data t'rom aatell.1tes v.1th mi.ni.Jm.un de.lay or degradation nod t.o mill1.mi.z.e enemy .1ntercept.1on ot' or .1ntert'erence rtth the s~e 1:.o groond trsnsm.issicn. 3. A data proceasi.n.g subsystem is requ:ired t'or effective operc.tionnl. control., a.nd t'or processing, scref!ning, storing end tran~ission to other agencies via the USI~ Communications Support Systenl 456L (GOR 129) to the USAF Intelligence I:lnta }land.line System 438L (GOR 149 and 1.49-1). V. O~'l'IONAL EM:FI.DXME!'lT. A. Satellites rlll be empl.oyeci to acquire or cont'irm data concerning locations, capa.bi11ties end. vulnerability o'f .manned and un.mnnned strike f'orcea, d.e:tenee systems, technola&ical. deve.lopnents 1 m.eteor~f,P', topography and geocraphy. '!'bey w:Lll be et:tpl.oyed singly or-rn-nULllbera t.o wsure d.esL--ed coverage ~ a sel.ected areo. i.n a given peri.od ~ time . The t"requency or density or coverage required vill "Qe determined by correl.a.ti.on or data acquired hem a variety or sensors . separate or ca:nhi.."led conf'iguratians o'f the photographic 1 el.~ctronic 1 i.n.:f:rared or other. sensors v1ll be employed to :Provide the desL""ed coverage. .B . These sensors Y1ll be employed to acquL..-e browi caveraae Vit.'U.n vtich ereas or subJects of crit!.cti interest v1.ll be identi.t'ied.' When a specif'ic objective tr~t merits scrutiny is· identiried, rrequent, or ;perhaps :for brief periods, continuous coverage on t.b.e relatively cant'ined specific objective may be directed. C. Each sntellite may requ:Lre the ea.pe.bll1ty o'f in-f'llgbt processing or the data co.llected and traz-..sm.i.s81an to the appropriate grIS. Present reconnaissance systems are limited a.s follovs : A. :tnabli1ty to prOVi.d.e ccntinuou.a survei.ll.o.nce. -fe-1 SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS :s. vu.l.ne.!·aoility to detect1on. -te1 c. VUl.ner.lb.ility to countermeasures. iet A. Airframe and PrOpulsion Subsystems 1. 'nle satell!te airlrame ahruld be designed ttl insure ca:apa.tibility with the load ca.rryi.ng capability a£ ICW. boosters . f&t 2. :!1le propu.l.sioo system visualized rll.l use the ICBM boosters for the 'first stage prop.U.sion1 and a. second stage engine to f'u...-nia.h addit1onal t.hruat to BC.hieve orbital speedB. -ft:;t B. Au:.d.lia.ry Pc:lWer SUbsystem 1 . IW. e.ux:Uie..ry palter aubsystem is requl.red in the aat.ellite to supply electrical power to the vari·ows airborne cCXIIiPG'Ilents :t'rtn just prior to launch untU the eod at the satellite ' s rec0tl!l.8.isse.nce lifetime. 'nlese cCJliPQlents must be ccnpo.tible Vith available ground power duz·in8 varm-up, testing a.nd check-cut on the launch stand. ts7 C. Guidance and Control SUbsptem l. 'nlis subsystem vill. be designed to provide guidance and central necessary to place the satelllte oo the required orb1t. -fSt 2. A methoo of ael.f-ata.bllization. in a.ttitude must be prov-ided vhen this vehicle is on orbit. fS1 3. APPropriate 1tems ar g:rQ.llld support equipnent necessa:-y to service 1 test M.d ce.l.1b:ra.te the elements o'f this sub-syst.en are rec;r.J..L--ed. fS-j-- D. Choice of Orbit and Inelinat101l Angle l. ~e al.titude and inclination angle or the aatellite should be selective, dependiag upon the intellj,gence requirements o'f the spec.if'l.c m1osion. f57 E. !.Aunc.b Facilities l. lbe satellite launch~ facility Yti.l nonnally be a fixed, penna.oent type insta.llation. -f5T 2. Satellite lw.mch.iJ:l6 'fac:U1t1ea should utilize to the ma.xium extent,-grru.nd support equipnents designed far current ba.llistic missiles. -fst F. C-ements OCS , I)!~lopnent 1: 5 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ·......... -..._ .~ -.' . -.:':_ :i I '·i I t ; • ,. ;~ 0 . I. ·i ,-) I. . :·.:. t-.. J .· . 1:'i, i,. ' · ~ I f!) \.,.-/ ~ ~ C) ':]"' ': ; ·.· ~ "' ~ SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS .-· ·-~-. .>..:\::~~. '•. ' .t: : '•: a!~~~~;~~~r:~~!rf!,trrrtr~~~~~~~~£~~.J~~~t,, .·' .s :. -1.__... _ .... - .. ~~~-: : I. .-.._ ;.":'" .._.:·. ·........ -... .. I'-';-'··· .. :~ .· ·. .; .. _._ '· ·;: .· :l. .·, :.' ,·.··:.~--· .. .·fte lntei-e~ i:~~~·~i.a..b:Y;•Pl."ll.0.11\Y': -.~~- --• "' 0 • •.. :· • -~ • ' . '· .:·.' ·:.-· . ~-. .~.. . . CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS - -.: ... ,_._· --~ :: . -~ . '· ~:f .-· .~~-:-~~>: a_ ~-~~~;'_/~~~-~-~~;{:-· -~;:P.;~;'';.:· ~".<'...·.;/'-:/-~-.l"~, _ ·:~ ·-~-: _· .. · •·· .. . , . ; ·:· ·... <::·_·\.: ·_ _ _.t._.'.~~~-e·e~·~ -~~~-~--~~~~:~~~J~W,. J:Il~1~~' ·..·._ ·:.\.'.: det&Ue4 bi:IO..,~-•·-~~t~·Of_Piu .· •• ~~~~ · ..·. ·. .; · ·. ~ea· Ot~--#j~-·:fiU · w.,u;~·· of mSUi&l'y·ila~UOa;f;:. · . . · .~-.~--~~; ~ -~~ :-·: ~:: . .~:~;:~.-:···:.-~---.-. .--_ ,·;·::~~ . -+ ~~·;..&.t:t:• . a . . . . .' -~·r~ ----:---T._.,........~..-.-.~q-. ,, ,, ··.. •-J , -~--. • . •P.c~.,~.. ~pe·...,.·j;a...·. ~r._t,.-.. :. rw'.1'~ol,:~..., .. ,.,ut p~4•aA bUd&l ~1~·-: ~•:of..~~ COvbac•· ·.:~rtbe'_fir•t . · ~·~~ cOil:li»l.., ·-the fr.~cy~·~~,u.JJt ~.,....-.~~~n.4-· by th8 scho4u).• fo~ · :tan.~of ~~-: ~~: ca.ri• .at'• •w•::~f~~:.. · ~~J' 1 /l, o~. ·~ ~~1· :· · . ., :,-· ··· ooo. O~" DOt aa~r• --· ·': . .~ ~ .. •· . . -6~· The Pllotoarapk~--: ~.• lroUsw& ~~~~"et·obJ~/•ptneX~· -::I~~-~':t-.:1-M~~~~;ai~~"f---~~?.1-::;:~ PhOto we· --.r~rt"-ceute-~ Af~iN-~-¢~1'P...;.-~<~~ . , ~' .. -.•:. ,.-;. ' I . c'-: . . _., :·· '.: . ·-:--:•·...'-.:.-:_._. Jl~"--. ...1. lor tU_ J»rOdU:cUoa~-~Y. barelu.pn~: ...:;r~~.: ~e.sth a sr~~~~~'ot 1~ ~: a~~ ~:et:oj~-~-~~~--~· ·~~lf:.,• actt,..-. • =~e:;~~~·~::::=:·;=:~~\~=.c·~~~::-. ~~a,ne• B.:eqal..-~nhil' Uet Ui . r~Ul:rif4 ~il_ tJle· aw,-•••·-ot./.oa.ce a ·.,..a. J"roaa tlma ~. tlmo clu~-.W.ry_li_hOr~ -~rt.oda. ~-pbMOj~'hic eo"-...•• of a 1MW ta.t'J•• may be .J-.-.llitr!d4 '· ·. · · · •· · .. . ... -.;·,:·,. . .. :! . ·. • : ·::. •... ' .. ... ..... .\ . ~ ··· ·'-~ic~Et~. · ._~ ~:4.·:_·:~ ~~.f:J~_;:~~-~.'.::.... ----. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS ': . ..··· ' ... . : ; CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SECRE'i' The Honorable Thomas S. Gates The S ecre t a ry of Defense Department of Defense 'Washington, D. G. Dea:r Mr. S'ec:reta!"y: The United States Intelligence Board has considered two ma3or areas relatiU:g to the development and employment of the SAMOS. 'recon naissance system. The firflt of theee areas is th~ consolidation of the g•eneral intelligence requirements of the various departments, services and agencies of the United States to serve as the overall basis :!or the SAMOS system development. The second of these areas is to establish priorities for the 11}'-stem developers and for the employment of the SAMOS system in the development stage during the 1961-196Z time period. Theae requirements an4 priorities are set forth in the a t tached paper entitled: "Intelligence Requi~eme~ts for Satellite Reconnaissance Systems of which SAMOS is an Exa.m.ple" . The flllfillment of these :requirements as expres11ed is considered critical to the security of the United States·, this is also evidenced by the national priority e-stablished for SAMOS. Sincerely, Allen W. Dulles Chairman 6EGRE'3:' SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS SEC RET USIB-D-33. 6/8 (FrnAL -USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTE,¥SOF WHICH SAMOS IS AN EXAMPLE 1. The U~ited States has, and will continue to have for the foreseeable .~ future, a high priority requirement for photog:aphic and electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and other denied areas. In theory, it is feasible to conduct a large amount of this reconnaissance in a number oi different ways, but this feasibility will be affected from time to time by· technical and political considerations that might make it difficult or impossible to use all of the theoretically feasible means. Although a satellite reconnaissance system has not yet been operationally demonstrated and is not likely in the near term to produce the quality of infqrmation that can be obtained by other systems, on balance, it should be able to perform a number of reconnaissance tasks better than other systems and should be able to produce useful information on the great majority of intelligence questions against which reconnaissance systems might be employed. A satellite reconnaissance system might also be less affected by some of the political considerations affecting other reconnaissance systems. The U. S. Intelligence Board considers it essential, therefore, that the United States develop and maintain an qperational satellite reconnaissance system with a wide range of capabilities, 2. The intelligence situation facing the United States will continue to be highly dynamic, influenced both by changes in Soviet capabilities and SECRET OS b 0-4718 'B l CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM USIB-D-33. 6/8 SECRET (FINAL -USIB APPROVED' 5 July 1960 our own intelligence assets, making it impossible to specify at any one time the precise nature of the satellite reconnaissance system t;hat will be required in the distant future. As stated in paragraph 1 above, however 1 we are sure that there will exist an urgent r1;quirement for a satellite :i-econnaissance system throughout the for·eseeable future. 3. The photographic system must be capabie of obtaining coverage of ttl {) -rl +> l.r\ denied areas at object resolutions of approximately 20 feet, 5 feet, and 0) ...... cOrd J...j l.r\~ G) ultimately 1 foot on a. side. However I the 1 00 feet on a aide programmed +> 0 ~..-! .-r IZ: 0 ~ f.< (()11 0 a! for R&D design objectives will be utilized and exploited for intelligence ri p. tJ .i !'< ... Ul G) ~ • 0. +> purposes to the maximum extent possible. {See Annex "A" for examples 0 0 +> ~ . . ~ 0 (\l ~ of objects that can be identified at·these resolutions.) The system must provide for repeat coverage of targets at these various r ·esolutions, depending on the nature of the target and the intelligence problem involved. The periodicity of this repeat coverage wilt also depend on the · nature cf the target and the intelligence situation, as well. as on other • Ol source e that can be brought to bear on it. The anticipated frequency og. . o> can be predicted more precisely as the intellige nee situation develops. \--.;f. It is essential that the U. S. have access to information derived L--..·. from electronic emissions inside of denied areas that, in the present state of the a ·rt, can be collected only by electronic reconnaissance over those denied areas. A satellite electronic reconnaissance vehicle is likely to be of great value in this reconnaissance. It is essential that such an electronic reconnaissance vehicle have a wide range of capabilities in order that it may fulfill the requirements expressed in. the -2 SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS / .......... J: USIB-D-33. 6/8 (FINAL -USIB APPROVE:C 5 July 1960 ·National ELINT Requirements List that are appropriate to collection by a satellite, The characteristics required of these vehicles are described in Annex "B". Unfortunately, however, in the present state of the art electronic art, these capabilities are likely to be obtained only after a considerabl~ R&D effort. We feel t.hat the information derived from photographic reconnaissance is now, and is likely to be, of greater value and priority than that obtained by any foreseeable electronic reconnaissance system. Even in these circumstances, however, we feel that the information likely to be obtained by electronic reconnaissance would be of such value that the R&D effort to achieve this capability should be carried forward with the highest priority short of interfering with the photographic tasks outlined elsewhere in this paper. In the absence of a fully developed electronic reconnaissance system, and in view of the uncerta inties as to what can be collected with interim systems, we are r eln.ctant to specify detailed requirements for the short term that might cause serious di sruptions i n the R&D effort leading toward the fully developed system . The re are important problems, however, toward which ele ctroni c reconnaissance could contribute critical information d u r ing the R&D phase without serious disruption to that effort. One of the most important of these is the search for emissions associated with an Anti-Ballistic Missile system. These problems are outlined in greater detail .in Appendix I to Annex "B". It is probable that from time to time the intelligence situation will require that additional tasks be levied on -3 -SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SECRET USIB-D-33. 6/8 (FINAL -USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 the satellite electronic reconnaissance system during the R&D phase. ---1 These will be communicated to the proper authorities as they arise·. : --J ~ 5. In order for the system to move in a realistic direction and provide ~ ..0, the maximwn amount of intelligence to the country, it is essential that the R&D phase of the system be guided by and devoted to the intelligence tasks outlined below and to such additional high priority intelligence tasks as may arise from time to time. The intelligence community will review these requirements at frequent intervals as the intelligence situation develops in order that new tasks may be identified and brought to the attention of the R&D authorities at the earliest possible time. 6. At the present time, the U. S. intelligence community maintains a National Priority Reconnaissance Requirements List which identifies those specific targets in the Soviet Union against which photographic r econnaissance should be employed. This list is concer ned with Soviet offensive ~apabilities including installations associated with the Soviet Long Range Bomber program, the Soviet Guided Missile progran1, the Soviet Navy especially with regard to nuclear-propelled and guided missile configured vessels and Soviet Tank, Motorized and Artillery Forces. Other targets on the list are concerned with the capabilities and strategic positioning of Soviet military forces, Soviet capabilities for defense against air and .missile attack, and the Soviet power base in the form of atomic energy installations and industrial complexes. The National Priority Reconnaissance Requirements List is broken down into various categories of priority interest. -4 SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS USIB-D-33. 6/8 5li:CRET (FINAL -USIB APPROVE! 5 July 1960 At the present time, ·approximately 35 objectives are considered to be of the highest priority interest. Approximately 500 objectives are of high priority interest and approximately 3, 000 additional objectives are of priority interest. In addition to these specific objectives, information is required on a·reas that have been inaccessible to other collection systems. It is anticipated that reconnaissance of these areas .may reveal the existence of important installations previously unknoWn. 7 . The specific composition of the National PriOrity Reconnaissance Requirements List will change from time to time as new information is acquired from all sources and as the important intelligence problems facing the United States change. It is anticipated, however, that at any given time within the foreseeable future, our requirements for photographic reconnaissance will approximate the .present list in size and variety. Complete and simultaneous coverage of the Soviet Union would not eliminate such a list, even if it were possible to achieve, because the t:D LA elements of power in the Soviet Union are dynamic and ne"": developments (J >~ and additions are occurring constantly. Repeat coverage of many of the oco •vctl co'"' 114+> target areas in the Soviet Union will remain a requirement. therefore, ..., :.. 0~~ although the number and periodicity of this repeat coverage will vary. depending on the nature of the target and the intelligence situation existing at the time. From an ideal point of intelligence utility, many of the high ,prj,p.rJ,t:y a.,pd highest priority targets should be covered at intervals on the order of l to & months, but the reconnaissance system should have -5 -SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SECRET USIB-D-33. 6/B (FINAL-USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 sufficient flexibility to permit the coverage to be timed to meet the needs of the specific intelligence situation as it develops. 8. The information obtained by the satellite reconnaissance syst em would be of maximum use in providing strategic intelligence information. In addition to this primary mission, it should provide important by-products in the form of inforrnation bearbg on indications of Soviet intentions. 9 . At the p r esent time, th e U. S. Intelligence Board is faced wi th C) u-.. o sev eral outstanding problems which should be considered on a priority ~ ~ bas is for system development and employment of the photographic satellite k $ vehicles during the 1961-1962 time period as follows: +> .s a. Our first and most urgent priority requirement is for a photo graphic reconnaissance system capable of locating suspect ICBM launch sites. It is estimated that many sites for the launching of operational Soviet ICBM's will be completed between now and the end of 1962.. It is our strong belief that our best and possibly our only chance to detect these sites will be·during the construction phase; once these sites are completed, we will have considerably less opportunity to detect them. It is important. therefore , that a maximwn effort be made to find the Soviet ope:-ational ICBM launch sites before the end of 1962. Once any ICBM site i s located, a satellite reconnaissance system with adequate ground resolution should be able to maintain surveillance and report changes in its status, but if these sites ar~ not located before the end of the construction phase almost any reconnaissance system would be of ·considerably less value -6 -SECRET SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS USIB-D-33. 6/8 SECRET {FINAL-USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 against such a target. We believe that ii we are to find the Soviet operationalJCBM lau."lch sites, our highest priority effort should be directed to a general search of a substantial portion of that part of the USSR covered by the rail net. Photographic resolution to accomplish this search mission would need ~ approach 20 feet on a side, Repetition of this general search at the rate o:f: approximately once each month initially would give us a relatively high degree of assurance of providing the information required. Read-out of the photography on this frequency would establish trends and priorities for the programming of subsequent search missions, It is expected that the photography will a.lso be used to supplE'ment tha: obtained by other means for the improvement of mapping and more precise location of targets in the Soviet Union in response to the Emergency War Plans o of the Armed Services. b. If suspicious locations are Jden!::ified which might be possible ICBM launch sites, these locations wi~l be added to the highest priority category of the National Priority Reconnaissance Requirements List. co l<"' ~ Our second priority requirement, therefore, is for photographic coveragt ~ ;! of the highest priority target category in the USSR, with a photog?"aphic ... lilt ~ k system of sufficient resolution to supply us with descriptive information .s~ on those targets. It is believed that resolution approaching 5 feet on a side is necessary for this :requirement. There should be a capability to launch i.\JJd/or control these missions on-call at short notice to meet the needs of the intelligence situation as it develops. -7 -SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM USIB-D -33. 6/8 SECRET (FINAL-USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 c. Our third priority requirement is for a photographic syst em of suificient resolution to supply us with the technical characteristics ~£the highest priority targets before the end p£ 196Z. This will require a resolution of better than 5 feet on a side. d. If technological development -'barriers preclude the design objectives ior resolutions described above, the USIB will designate resolutions which are acceptable frpm an intelligence standpoint. 2 Atchs 1. Photo (Annex "A") _ [_~. ELINT /COMINT (Annex "B"!J -8 -SECRET SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS S EGRET.· USIB-D-33. 6/8 (FINAL-USIB APPROVED)5 July 1960 Annex 11 A" EXAMPLES OF INTELLIGENCE TARGETS THAT MIGHT BE IDENTIFIED AT VARlOUS RESOLUTIONS The following categories, although not intended to be definitive or comprehensive, are presented for the purpose. of giving some idea of object·size in the intelligence spectrwn which might be identified at the limiting resolutions indicated. This evaluation is considered valid provided the targets are not concealed by deception or camouflage. a. Photography with a ground resolution of objects 100 feet on a side should provide information for identification and location of cities, forests, large bodies of water, changes in rail alignments and transportation patterns, industrial complexes, CBR and nuclear R&D test facilities , major military complexes, possibly including large missile sites or related electronic facilities and patterns, air bases and large Naval and port facilities . Indications of industrial growth should be detected. Large ships (300 feet in length or .more) should be detected at anchor or at sea and naval formations at sea identified. The extent of complexes, installations and sea formations should be approximately measured and some locational and topographic information should be available. b. Photography with a ground resolution of objects· ZO feet on a side should provide all the information available from that with a ground resolution of 100 feet on a side, plus intelligence information concerning DS b0 -4 71 B C ( SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM S E G R E ~ USIB-D-33. 6/8 (FINAL-USIB APPROVED) SJuly 1960 components of installations or complexes. Some air base runways, submarine bases, drydocks, piers and supporting facilities, ground forces barracks areas, equipment _parks, and training centers, major or isolated surface-to-air missile sites, atomic energy installations, ballistic missile sites, and industrial installations should be detected, located, identified by type and approximately measured. Large vessels including surfaced submarines, large aircraft and missile launch pads, should be c ounted. Military support facilities should be identified by type. The identification arit;J. disposition of major Soviet naval forces should be determined. c. Photography with a ground resolution of objects 10 feet on a side should provide a capability to identify large aircraft and known missile carrying submarine and ship types, determine base utili~ation, locate special weapons _and CBR facilities, limited map and chart revision could be accomplished, and analyze base support facilities. A general functional a:nalysis of industrial, military and transportation facilities should be completed. Above ground ICBM and IRBM facilities such as lal.inch pads, stands and some support equipment should be accurately measured. The capacity of military storage facilities, the generaLlevel of military activity, military trans.portation capabilities and indications of security should be determined. Naval ships and units should be identified by type. d. Photography with a ground resolution of objects 5 feet on a side should provide relatively detailed intelligence information concerning -z - SEGflE'f SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS SECRET USIB-D-33. 6/8 (FINAL-USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 mo.st military and indust:r'ial installations. All aircraft, except model improvements, ground forces disposition and equipment to include tanks and artillery,. some large mis.siles, early.warning sites, AAA sites, atomic energy materials production, except weapons, structural shipboard configurations for .missile handling,.and special weapons storage, loading and handling should be identified, measured and analyzed. A level of military activity and type of training should be discernible. e. Photography with a ground resolution of objects 1 foot on a side should provide detailed technical intelligence concerning air, naval or grotmd force equipment and industrial production processes. -3 -SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SECRET USIB-D-33. 6 / 8 (FINAL-USIB APPROVED)5 JulY. }Qt)QAnnex "Bf' REQUIREMENTS FOR ELINT/COMINT CAPABILITY c:o rl 1, GENERAL ...: c:o~ a . The E':LINT/COMINT reconnaissance sy~te.m must provide the rl . 1111 .. .. J.. 0 C\JZ I to return the intercepted information in a s_ecure manner to appropriate 00 COrl locations, and to record against an accur~te time base this information in a form suitable for other processing. b. Development of electronic reconnaissance satellites will involve maximum equipment progression, utilizing state-of-t he-art . ~ equipment without inhibit~ns of pa!!t techniqUes and custom in inter- H ~£ ,...; co cept, recording and processing. The most advanced equipment poBsible H~ ie> must be employed as early in the program as is permissible within oper 0 ruz I g g ational considerations and equipment availability. No individual vehicle n • '-< cx:;CI 0 ~ will necessa-rily have all of the characteristics and capabilities required ~~ for the· sub-system as· a whole. c. As SAMOS reaches the operational s t age, intelligence information received 'from the project or other sources may indicate the need lor additional types of directed intercept systems capable of receiving, recognizing and recording specific types of signals. As more is learned .of the technical capabilities of the system, operational , .re-qui:I'eme-nts will be revised. Provisions should be made to procure SECRE'f' DS b 0.;. ~71 8 ]) I SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS US{..B-D-33. 6/8 SECR#JT (FINAL-USIB APPROVED 5 July 1960 such equipme'nt as might be required by Quick Reaction Capabilities. A close working relationship between the R&D organization and the intelligence community is required. d. The ELINT ·targets for the system will be drawn from the National ELINT Requlrements List .and the COMINT targets from the National COMINT Requirements List. It is not intended that collection by ~atellites will replace other means of ELINT/COMINT collection. It is important that the effort be concentrated on obtaining signals inaccessible by other means of collection. e. Facilities should 'be provided to allow programming of the collection systems from the ground !or specific targets_, by changing the system directivity, radio frequency and bandwidth vs time, . f. The read-out and data processing capability for intercepted signals must be cl.l!i effective as the capability for c.;oll.ection ao as ·to p;qvide a. means of rapid processing aad dissemination of the products to producers and users. Every effort should be made to insure that any machineable output of the system be in a form compatible with the input capabilitie,s of the use:r s . g. The objec.tive is to have an operational system as soon as possible. However, during the R&D phase, flights are required for R&D purposes, during which time it is recognized that intelligence priorities may be of a secondary consideration, -2 - SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM USLB-D-33. 6/8 ---SECRET (Fil'lAL-USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 2. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS: The following characteristics represent the ultimate in the ptystem. Appendix "1'1 to this Annex which shows the specific requirements 'for selected priority targets demonstrates th(lt not all of the operational c-haracteristics given below are needed for each· requirement. (IJ a. The system should provide receiving and recording equipment J.. ~.8: capable of intercepting land based, shipborne and airborne electronic (.) r-1 "''iR emissions between 10 mcs and 50 k.mcs and at lower and higher 8!~ (IJ~ ' • frequencies, if propagation will permit. ·Equipments covering specific 00 «J..-i ~ ~ bands within this range should be in easily substituted modular form. ·~ 0-P ~ ~ b. The receiving and recording equipment should be of high sensitivity, low noise, high fidelity and most modern design in keeping with the latest developments within the state-of-the-art. c. Receivers covering specific RF bands should be capable of receiving 1 recognizing, and providing outputs for the recording of all known types of modulation within their specified bands. (IJ d. The system should be capable of recognizing and recording I 0 co new and unusual signals. The original modulation of intercepted signals . p:; . 0 should be preserved to the greatest degree possible. 0 e. The system should incorporate a direction finding capability that will permit location of electronic emitters withiri a five mile <;::EP~ however, achieving this capability should not preclude attaining a high (\1 0 I order technical collection capability within the syatem. co . ~ . 0. . -3 0 SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS USIB-D-33. 6/8 SECRET {FlNAL-USIB APPROVED) 5Julyl960 f. I£ feasible, receiver outputs are required that will allow determi.nation o! scan rate and polarization of intercepted signals . g. The system should be capable of storing and discriminating C\1 0 I ' between int ercepted data from several orbits,-'at least until readout has co . ~ been accomplished. . 0. c.'? · h. The system should also provide calibration data to the grpundspace communications and to ,th,e data .processing sub-systems adequate for the production of the most reliable intelligence information. C'<"l ~ 3. GENERAL TECHNICAL CHARACTER~TICS: a. The receiver dynamic range requirements should be maximized to .pteserve pulse ampliaa.le motldations tha.t o~cur in klemetry. miealle b. ReceiYer sensl:Uvitie.s should be a maximum eonsistenl with ·intercept requirement. RF a.cc:uracy should be the best attainable. c, Rapid automatic spectrum coverage is required with a high probability of intercept. d. Image and spurious response interference should be a min.imwn. e, The .system should be·capable of determining the .synchroniza-ticm of several different signals simUltan:e'ously. I '' 4. SPECI'tiC !:LINT COLLECTION: The foregoing cha.r"terhrtics m e nts will change during the development phase and will be subject to -4 -SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM USIB-D-33. 6/8 (FINAL-USIB APPROVED) 5 July 1960 continui.'1g revisioc by the Intelligence Comm\Ulity in accordance with the priorities established by the National ELINT Requirements List. E;xamples of targets of cur~ent importance and considered to be obtainabl e by the system are listed'in Appendix "I", Section A. The technical parameters desired and the accuracii!s needed a1·e added. Section B lists examples of specific targets which will become progressively attainable with development of the system. These will be moved to Section A when appropriate. 5. COMINT COLLECTION: a, COMINT requirements for SAMOS are of lower priority than the ELINT requirements. Development of COMINT collection devices will be dependent upon empirical data acquired by the ELINT system. b. The frequency spectrum of interest ranges from below ten megacycles per second to ~en thousand megacycles per second. c. The estimated radiated power of the transmitters to be intercepted is tabulated below: FREOUENCY MINIMUM POWER SIGNAL BANDWIDTH HF l. 0 watts 1 kc min to 10 kc max VHF 10 watts 5 kc min to 100 kc max UHF 3 :watts 30 kc min to 1 megacycle d. The recorder will provide for storage of video signals and will have a bandwidth capability of one megacycle. e. The minimum sub-system (antenna, receiver, recording and playback} signal to noise ratio should be of the order of ten decibels. 1 Atch Appendix I -5 -SECRET SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS I i ' '· '. SPEA-IFIC ELINT REQUIREMENTS F .OR SAMOS SECTION A TYPE FREQ. DESIRED ACCURACIES ABMRadar 130 -Z25 me RF 111/o-PRF 111/o -PW 511/o and 375 -425 me scan rate 511/o 800 -900 me 1200-1300 'mC DF 25 nm CEP Missile ·6o -80 me Analog Recording 1 me Telemetry (against VTMTR) DF 25 nm CEP Earth to. Satellite TX and Command TX 130 -1000 me RF _1% -PRF 511/o -scan rate So/c DF 25 nm CEP :SECTION B GCI Radar 560 -575 me Se~ SPECOR or superseding 2700 -3200 me document. HF I_HINGTON Z:S, D.C• .AFCIN-P2 ~' Intelligence Requirements for SAMOS To, Undersecretary of the Air Force ..,; 1. The following is submitted' in response to your question about the difference between the statement of intelligence requireu1ents for satellite reconnaissance by the USIB, 5 July 1960, and previous Gtatements on which S1\MOS development was based. 2. There is no change in the intelligence requirement. However, the 5 July statement is complete; the previous statements dated 10 November and 8 December 1958 were supplements to GOR 80. The main editorial changes pertain to the operational employment o:f the system. This is evident bycomparing the USIB statement, 5 July 1960, paragraphs 3, 7 and 9b (Atch 1) with GOR 80, page 2, paragraph 5 (Atch 2), letter, 10 November 1958, Tab B, page 3, paragraphs 5 and 6 (Atch 3), and letter, 8 December 1958, paragraph 2a (Atch 4). 3 . For your convenience a copy of the USIB state!Jlent with the references for comparison typed in the margin is att.acbed. (\"l .. ~ I ~~ JAME; ~-~~~--"-S program. Since we must nm.r rely upon the physical retrieval of satellite photographs it is necessary that increased efforts be made to improve the reliability of recovery techniques . Recent achievements in the DISCOVERER program are most encouraging. An alternative procedure, unproven operationally, but most appealing in concept, involves the use of a drag brake mechanism to effect reentry. The applicability of this technique to the SAMOS recovery operation should receive serious t:onsideration. Until recently, the operational aspects of recovery have been greatly complicated by the obvious requirement for safety to restrict these activities to the ocean areas. As a result of our increased confidence in the precision of the recovery operation, the Air Force is now studying the feasibility of effecting recovery over land. Since this would significantly increase the probability of success of the recovery operation, we heartily recommend the support of AirForce efforts in this area. PROCESSING AND EVALUATION The reconnaissance 11 take" of the proposed systems is recovered as a set of latent images on photographic film. The intelligence yield that will be extracted from these latent images is critically dependent on quality factors in the chemical processing of the film and in the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the finished photographs. We cannot emphasize too strongly that much of the detailed information captured in the latent image can be irretrievably lost unless first-rate work is done in the processing laboratory and in the interpretation center. TOP SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP 6ECR:ST In the purely technical domain, we must point out that the achievement of optimum image-quality calls for the closest possible interaction between individuals concerned with emulsion design and manufac.ture and individuals concerned with processing techniques. If these two activities were to be organized as separate and independent enterprises it is most unlikely, in our view, that the results would be the best obtainable. A full awareness of these factors led to the special organization of processing and evaluation that was used in the handling of the U-2 films. Our experience with the superior results obtained under that arrangement leads us to reconunend firmly that the same pattern De followed in preparing the outpUL of the proposed satellite reconnaissance systems. We further reco~nend that this output be distributed by a centrali zed community laboratory. \•lEATHER In aerial photo-~econnaissance operations, the state of the weather over the target has long been a primary consideration. For satellite reconnaissance operations, the sensitivity to weather is in some respects even worse. If the target is obscured by clouds on the first pass, the satellite may have later opportunities to observe the target. But the times of subsequent passes over the target are fixed by the orbit parameters, and t:he situation is less flexible than the scheduling of aircraft. Moreover, the weather over the great majority of Soviet targets is very b~d indeed, and the opportunities for good photography are scarce. The program outlined in this discussion can succeed only if it is closely integrated with the weather .services that will be associated with the TIROS ·project, with the Air Force's 433-L system, and tvith other sources of weather data that may come into existence. Because of the short reaction intervals that are necessary here, these arrangements will be difficult to establish, and we recommend early attention to planning. 6 TOP SECRET SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 'fOP S 6CtUIT RECO.l'IMENDATIONS Our analysis of the investigations already carried out by the Air Force leads us to the conclusion that from the array of important studies a few can now be extracted and integrated into a single simple and powerful program to give us the reconnaissance we need. Therefore, our recommendation is that the following selected components of the AirForce satellite reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very high priority. 1. A recoverable satellite-payl oad for high r esolution convergent stereo photography. 2. To be recovered for the time being at sea. 3. To be recovered as soon as feasible on land. 4. To carry in some of the satellites camera and film competent to identify with certainty missile sites both in construction and after completion. 5. To carry in other satellites camera and film competent to study the state of readiness, type of activity, and type of missiles. We recommend emphasis on the development of more advanced recovery techniques , particularly for land recovery. We recounnend that electronic readout techniques be given lt1Wer priority but be continued as a research project and that the extensive program for a ground-based electronic readout system be cut back very substantially and promptly. 11 F11 Also, the so-called payloads for gathering electromagnetic intelligence should be given lower priority than that assigned to photography. We further recommend that this program be managed with the directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great success, for projects of overriding priority. We suggest thBt TOP SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP SECRET this can best be accomplished by a direct line of cormnand from the Secretary of the Air Force to the general o f ficer in operational charge of the whole program, with appropriate boards of scientific advisors to both the secretarial level and to the operationa1 level. The genera1 officer in command would look to associated military boards for support in the execution of his plans. We recommend this extraordinary type of organization to execute the program because we are convinced that the situation presents an unusual combination of urgency and i.nher.ent amenability to a direct approach. In addition, we recommend that the scu11e organization as was used in the handling of the U-2 films be used for chemical processing of the recovered film and that the output be distributed by a central community facility. We also recommend that this program be closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with the TIROS project, with USAF 1 s 433-L system and other sources of weather data. PANEL ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE Dr. Dr. J. R. Killian, Edwin H. Land Jr. ) ) Co-Chairmen Dr. William 0. Baker Mr. Richard Bissell Dr. Carl F. J. Overhage Dr. Edward M. Purcell TOP SECRB'f 8 SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS .....,__.' BYE -2869-63 (Series B) Copy.:.!_ 3 Jcly 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director.o! Central Intelligence SUBJECT Panel for l:ucure Satellite Reco~issance OperaLions 1. The Panel which you appointed to consider questions related i:.O the future su.tel; i,...: reconnaissance prograr.t". has concluded its study, and I am transmitting herewith our Report. lvlay I say at the outset that the J:p·oup oi Panel n'lembers and consultants over wh:.ch you asked me to preside was an extremely well-informed, thoughtful, and conscientious group. I want to expres-> my personal gratitude to the Panel members and consultants, and also my appreciation for the excellent staff support with which we were prov1iled. 2. I know t.'lat you.apprecute that ti~::;c was a severely limi"ting factor. Because our s~dy had to be compressed into so short a period, · we had to limit t."'e nu..rnber of questions wr; .,::ould come to grips with. \Vithin these limitations, however, I think the Panel has exa.mir,ed carefully and objectively the major questions you set be!ore us. 3. :'he Pane.: hac two full day meetings on •1 ;..:ld 5 June which were: ;;receded by special brie:flngs o.f son1e cf th;·, 1..embcrs. Our Rcpo1·t ·= has gc.:-...: through several stages of drafting in tn0 .,:rse o£ which the Panel .I men ':z~·s were consulted, il1dividually or 1n smu.il ~-·· oups. Except for ' v~:r ~ minor editorial changes our Report, as sub:::~: .ted herewith, h;;.s ·:.cen reviewed by all Pa.nel ffi(;mbers, who concur substanti"-llY in its · I {.indings except where specifically nc.ted to the contrary in the Report i :tsel!_ 4. ln behalf of the Panel nlc:1~ 'i~ r s and consultants, I wish :o (!x;p-ess ou:r appreciation o:f the privi.~..;ge aad :responsibi.li.>' you have ------------------------·--·--------------. ..... CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 0 :Bx £-2869-63(Series B) assig:-.,: .:: to us in ca.lling on us to serve in this way. lt is our sincere !~ope thn.t our counsel, in some way, will benefit the work oi tbe Intelligence Community. SIStlEn EDWARD M. PURCELL Chairman Recor.naissa.nce Pa.nel Dr. purcell Dept of Physics Harvard Cambridge, Mass. 0 ' i · -2.-. SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 0 A TTACH!v1ENT TO BYE-Z869-63 PURCELL PANEL I REPORT i· ' ······· ---~--------..- ---------~,- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . --. 0 ATTACHMENT TO BYE~_Z869-63 MEMBERSHIP D"·· Edward M. Purcell, Chairman Dr. Allen F. Donovan Dr. Eugene G. Fubini Dr. Richard L. Garwin D-: . Edwin H. Dr. Donald P.. Dr. Arthur C. Dr. James G. Dr. Henry C. Land :..,i..~g :....unda.hl CONSULTANTS Bak~r Yutzy ·,-;-;·~~ ': -· ,.,, . . . . . ~· , ~; . ::~.~· ·---~-----·-·----------·--·--·..--·----·-··---------""""" St·c:1on SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 0 ATTACHY£NT TO BYE-2.869-63 PURCELL PANEL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENT 1. INTRODUCTION 2. . G.::l\'ERAL OESERVATlO:KS Oil! COVERAGE -"-ND RESOLUTION 3. CURRENT PROGR.-\Y.S 4. Pl.AN~.L"\G BEYOND CUR.i:\.EW::·Ly PROGRAMMED SYST.EY...S 5. -:!:"ECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES a.. Emulsior.. Pro:pcrt:cs b. Irna.ge Intensifiers c. St.:..bili::c:.t..on 6. EVENTUAL L!WJTS OF RESOLUTION 7. SATELUTE VULNERA.BILITY I .,' S. READ-OUT SYSTEMS ! 9. S01V1E SPECIAL SYSTElv:S AND MISSIONS a . Q\...ici<. !.leacticn Satellite CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ,-......·... --:-··· .... ,, ,. ,.• 0 ..-...... : ~-~ t. ·~ . . . . . ~ ......... ATTACHMENT TO BYE-2,869-63 c. Full)' Covert Satelli~e :·:: the :...hrc::at, and 't,.).th.:..t st:cps should b.:z p:c..:.r:~.:.cd to n1cet :.:.? In .:;..dclition to th-.;::;~ ~::...:~:\t. :..~al qt~(;:-; tionsJ the Pz.nel COl.i.!::icic:.:c~...L a nu.n:;.hcr o! pro;)Osals and 1dc<>.~ for spc,ci;;.l systelns . .Fin,;.lly, alLhough -:he Panel did ::ot uncel'takc l..ii!:>sance may reasonably be C>q.h~C~...: d t;:, c:kv":.:··r in the service oi our intclli~-::uce needs, and who.t work r;(;<;;:l>: :c. ur... '"-~r-,(· to in~urc that 1t d.::velops ~s :rap~dly as _:)oss:.ble ir.r. ~~:: ,:-:-igh~c:. :..~ ~c~ .. v:· . .:-1. It i.~ obvious that so shcx·~ a s1:udy h.:s.d to leave many i:-:·li}.,::. ~ :: :...:~~ r p rvjlcn"l s un~ot:.ch.~cl.. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM .r ......,.., .... . ____,.___~ . -. -, ...... ~ .l 0 0 - ATTACEMENT "1'0 EYE-2369-63 1""~~c :· ~!:.1u:·:,ab:y ~ucc~::;z:!ui ~<:vcloprn~nt of ?hc~.:ogra1~hic r~~or~!i.;:::.i ..~.:;~ncc irc.rn sa.ccllitc.s, rc.?:.:t.:~._~1tQd by cur C\4l"rc:it:.y c.~c:~a~b1g sys~crn.~, J·&::..s brought l.h,'.: t~c:1.nology to ~ point w.hc.1.·e .future p:::-ogrezs can 1:\,~ .r..'\ .J. cl~ : n '!:\vo r~tll~l-dii£crcnt clircct~ons. N~turally, high resolUtion a.:1.d full ccv.:::.c~ge ~rc i>oth cicsirJ..blc. ln any ::;ir,t)e !>ro~ran~J however, ao:n.c cY:o iC('. w1ll h-::.vc to be rnu.dc:.. ~I'h~ cxccllc:nce of :r~sol-ution now .fcrc: a~\;.:lbL~~ :i 'Ne striv~ !or rcsQlution alon~. is sc high that full se~rch covcra~c a: -:_:~1.-:lt S:!.lnc l'C30l\!tion \VOU.ld p1·ociuce avolwnc of infcrm~tion subst:a.nti::tlly ~:-:ccecin~ th(: cap~city of ou:: p1·cscn"!: resourc e::: fc:r intc1·prctatio'~ anc ~X~).:....-.. .:. ...~L~icl:.. This ilrbumcnt i~ hil::Gly a decisive one.. VYay-:; could b (! _...'ot....n.d to cvpe w!·~1. st..:::ch ;;.~ crnh~rassrncnt o! ricl-acs . What ib .n.1.o=e i l-t:po rt,!.n:: i s th:J.t tb~ dcvelop1nent af $y!-; t0n1s 1: ~quircd to provirlc full :.\(:a. r~~'l coverage is not the spccdics~ v::J.y i:o attain th~ rct;olution cn.p:.j,~~-i t: y which t'nc st;i..t<: o£ the a:·t pc"!.·mi L·~-:~ o~her words, tb.c naLu.r..1.1 0 1::~vmp~ti.bility of wic!~ cove rase U!1cl·h:,._.-:-... .r ~.:; olution.. v,i-;.:.!tin a giv.:::n pc.::y:.__--.,~ ci, is ~cca::~~1ng rn.ore acutc:o, ::~:d}H').:· .. :~-:::.;1. lt:!SS) as the art. il.dvanc.t:s: .. ·::·.ti~ ~ tL:clnp':.: to obt: a~ t: both s·:.~~ ...2.; .J.n~ v~l.:· · y ;.~.:; l:.kely to pr~v<..nt.. ~h~ ach:~v'='-:-:i<.li.t cf ciC:.c:-one. 0:: lh.::; other hand., tht! gr~t:.rj,d i· ,:svh!~i~.~rl achieved ur1a\;!~· the h~st# ctHi.C:itior~s ~y theM ~yste...r.n :ao\V C!_Jc ~d,.-~ quaLc Lo :ni..:~t a lzLrge .fraction of :.hose intell:.~cnce rcqu:.. rements which depend vn g'~:H~ · ra.l covt:!ra:g~oJ . We bcL.ev(!, th\;rcfc:l:e, . t.~t an attcn1.pt to ·rnak(: a. cc:-:.:?lctcly !1t."!'-Y' sy~:':.._--_·..i.. V..'h.:.ch \Vculd }:J:.-ovid\: equally \Viti~ covc:.·.:.f:,e v.-:..:h ::·L:..y o. n-lcde~~~ i::-nprvver-nc~~~ i:~ .t· ,~::::ol\!ti.u;"l {5 foot~ say, i n.stc;.G vi 10 icc'... g:...·our-... d = ·~ .:..~..>h!tion) woul~ nvt Le ::;. wi t\'.; l.nves.t.... ..·ncnt of resouTc:-::S. Jn.~tcz.. d, c.~::; \v,~ -p.r.oc~ccl b~yond th(! current sy~: t c~\1. , we ot:ght to aini. prir:.1.arily ~·.... h.:.:;;h !'t;S~~-lt:~.:..vr. ~cce::;ti~g t.hu co·ve1·a~~~ lirn.it.at..!.on.. that will b e ~n:.aiicd! ;::t l.:;:....s:: ::-:; :h~ b~gin;1~:1.j. Covc;.~~gc ca:::-: ':Jility c~n evolve tJ.ftcr i:~-t(; -:-csc,~;..l ;:iu~1. j~ ,-:.s !';~ ...:n obt.1.in cd. \'-/c.; h c:l i ~.;vc th~t v1:ry subs~nti~l in1prove:rt1 er.t2 l.n :..·(,._:.-·~ ..: ::-:;~olution ;.:.l·.:~ obW.~natl-2 ar!d -. >~a.t i:n th~ .:o::-cs~eabl-::: futu!·e t'!: \.~::.~ ,.: ',)~· -:1 t.J.'.-..:~ ys be vc:.·y important u:::\::~• I0r spot cove;~·<-~c c:At the ve-::y high\.!~-~ . ~... f~::; .... _ c.:~ rc~oh.l~lGfL -2 ... ~ ·-· ....... -... ..:.:; L . . : ... :-. .·-~ • .... J .. ··-------·---------- SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 0 0 -----'--_...._-~ -~":':?... Ct-!:ve:;-..:NT ~CJ EYE -2.8(>9·-63 cniy ~i;oA.._d; lC"'/, c£ t~1e ti..11~ ct· !t:.:S.:i. .Scrnc .:;.f :~~.~ <.ic~:::-Z~..~~-:~ion is d·c. t:; t0 ~::. :.1~; '-;! S. \A1 ·!·;.ich a:rc. unC..:.cr :$tooO$U:.:~ in;;:,p;.·or;.:ri.:\t.c f:J r the light (;OtHlitions at u.. 1~2..-r·~ici.:lal· t.:i-..1.c, ,.:·:~ . 1~ !.;)CC.:.ns cnri_~cly ie~sibl(: tG b:-i.og n'"lost oi ~=h~sc· .[~ctors \.1:!1...:lc :· con.L::-vl so t:h.::l.t on.c could co\.,nt V!l peak re·solut:ivn. pe:-lol·:rT·... .::..ncc £ron~ t';1c )..'!. :::y.;!:~ln on 90'fv v£ ~he c.xp...">:;t'..U fil1n .. T1'1i::i wc;u:!.d ·r~prci:J;UI'~~ ~n cr:o:t·.r.)O"C.5 :;;:J.in in infcrroc.tio:1. :!.cquj :;ition, G.i.:ncl th.e ipior:n~tion 'vould s~ill be ir.. tl-'... l! for:::n \V~"1. ich 0\.1.4intC~"i:;::ci::!.ti..:>n and f'.a.ndling. fz... c i litics ;.;.::C 4 d{;!~ign.cd to n~ a.~c"h.. On tnc cpcra~icn~l Side, it: l1as ~Lc ~c:.·it of l·:.(.~pi:;g t~·:i:·.. r;~ l"l""lovir.. ~ i:.1 i:hL; pc.lt;tcrn alr<;;;:.cly established "\-Jit.lL obvious o.dv~:..~1.t:.>..6CS i-:1 ;·~ll~l.bility.. lt rnz.y be good fvr politic~l securi ty too; ~·hat could t~ ~c:.~s l>l· ovr,ca~iv~ t~'l.an to l'ccp <."lcing, wit~out visi.bl~ ~~ .. :--.:.nge .. wha.: on.z l~-2.~ l::.0c:1. ir.c.Gn.;)picuous1y doing al:::\:!a<.:y? r:'-":: .r:.J~~~st ~j::·01Tli5lt:.b ·,v~.y -~..; ~-:·· .:....·:.:; ;..n .. . : ...·....;~!:.:-:..~;.; ~·L1c.:. :a.. ~:.::>:...ln~:..z;.l 1~J..in i.r~ tJllv·..vgt·~pl"iiC l.·c~oru.....~:.. is~;:.;.::.::.~~ .. \..:,.\...;: .:.'~;· ·-;'· _·e.cO.i7lr..1cn::!::~t:.~cJ"a.l i!.:; !;)in·:.?~y: 1'-./l~·l:~zc the lvl systern. vvo1·~'" vr~,.,;}.l ~.l.l t1-:..:: ·..: ;_; ·~-. (; . Sur~...:: c.·~ t::1..c.; il~lpCrL;.l.nt steps in cii~c:ing the dcsir.:;a p:::o,:t.:.~, . t: :.:1"""l!;l.~..J\,.,;:::..-..~nt \.Vill b-.!: :::·.Ji""-:.~...: : .. ....:.~~·..!.liy .:~c:sig;,."'!.e (: <:~x~')c~~i~:nc~~:..::~ .,;1vu.l~ !.>c c<:.. ~-;.·icd out v:i\..h tt·.c c,~_-Jc~·: ·• · ·. :j'iS.t~;n""t to S..:!pu..::.· l!.t~ :_:~<-:::t.=-..;:.;...;~;:; ~-~1c :f.:.:.c::.c:-;: :.; cr.:ntr.. bct~:1 g tv . . _. .. ~(~li.::~iOn. and t.O '-.:V;.~.: \.:;·;. :..~ ~:::t.<.-·;_· .,:~;.-..! r.;dics . 1 ·-;l ~ ri~~,J, cv:::n nvw, ~ :-....::!...-.. :::: . .::-..:..:x..:::.C: c:.,bj~~,:t~v...; ·~~!.,:: c ... · ..;~_. ,,_~t~:..:.:j::. :...-::.....!:. :. y l.:t :.~1 (.· :L.l"!.i.ll ~vr nc;?::i. tiv~; !..v 1· 4 .. :·a: 1.lrOg)·::::..:n.:: ~.;;:;.:::.<.-.•:~1~-:-: .;.·:.... ....: u,;.;,t; v~. .:. ·.:...:;::;;.. ·;.: ~st i~:; :,;..!)~vlut.cly i~ci.i:~p~.:~ :~:--;<.~.. bl0. ...r1~e L'-!~t !'1~l..!d r..~~ ....:.,; .... ~>plic:l~'>l~ -3 . . ... . '-. t. ..... .:. • -· , _ .:. .. -···---· ---·· ·-~~--.,..--.----~--------..---·-·-- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 0 ATTACHM!:-::NT TO BYE-2S69-&3 .o ::..ll films and carneras; nor ne<:;d it measu:::-c any precisely clefi:1~d · \;l:~c:..·~tica.l parameters. lt n.czd nu~ even relate closely to the milita::y spcciiication itlvolvinr; ba.-tar~ots, but it must be applica.bl~ rout.in~ly and sin>ply to any segment oi usc£ul M negative• . Possibly a simple 1ucasu:relnent o.f som.ething related only to the cut-o.U of th0 spatialfrequency power spectrum in the final negative can be de'lti:;ed. :f it can be diagnostic, eo much the better, but the overriding need is :fo1· an unambiguous quality control te.st. This "product improvement" program fo:: M presents a re:(; o.f: <:~ ~;cld ~;;:~p in wh~t W(>. \vo·~ld thirJ.k is generally th.c rigl1t clircct.ic11., J.:hat is, in p\:..!·:hi.ng t"cso lution to th•~ limit· ~arly to :freeze the concept of t:h~ :n-::xt advar.ced syste:::n. '?,i·,c; ;:c:asons fo1· th'i~; arc the :following: in the current state of the a•·t, as was convincingly dernonstra·ted by the e.;;:cclle:'lO: parametric studic:l p::r~.::i<-!:'!t.t~d to us. the cont::-ol_ling parameters of iil.a1 spc~d. filn1. rcsol\l.ti.on, V (I.J:.icl·.?.: at:tit\.l.d\! stabi~ity, and tr..e laws of ......va ve optics, lead CH'".:...:! to 4t ccn1pro:-nisc in which size, weight a.nd colnplexi.::y of the~ i:;~trui!H::Jt ;;..r-:o :.h..Lfi'c:c· ;,;.~d by ,;ven. ,.l.. modest cl-....ange in a. basic pa:::-arnetcr. Or... e c:.J.n alr:1C5t b;·).y t.i"l.a t;::;.. mvdc.st ia.ctor in filn'l speed could 1nea11. the C:if.iel"·ence ~Je\:v.r\~~!n ;;.. -::i:.r<.l.st-augrn.e:ntccl TI-iOI:t a11d a 'I'ITAN lor the tra.nsrJu:.rti.ng ve~~icJ.e .. In oth~::.r '\Vords, in til\:~ n.ext generation o.f recon.nais~;(-j. :lce ca::nera.s it '<.·.·ill be cvi:!n ~ei:r:.-:;:;ortant than before, ·if that i"' i.'T-.agin:.tblc, to t<:•kc th~~ utniC.JSt advantage i.)f every a.civancf:! in opticalt~:lt~ri:.Lls and l:cch.niqu~~. ln the following oection, we discuss som'~ possibil.iti~s ·:for ~c:chnologiGa.l ad.va.nces which can probably be cvalu;;..tcd ·:;oon enough ~o that c.ne ca.n t.?.stimate thei:r irr._p<>rtance for ~-l("! comi::1g generation. oi sy~t,~ro.s. In.:... iew m.o~-..-;_:::-.s ' !=ll.ne_. it m.a.y be .Poss~ble to sc:c much n"lore clearly than :now what kind of systern we ought to go for• .-·· -5 • ··~ : •·.• "! .... ~.....~ ' ... ¥ •""""\ ____________._,___,_______._.______________________________ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 0 0 AT'I'ACHMEKT TO .BY.E-2S69 ~63 5( TECriNOLOGICAL .ADVANCES a. Emulsion Properties Current camera design&S, Wh.:ln optilnizeci, tu;;.·n out to b~ c.n expression of the properties of the S0-132 emulsion. W1th.in .lin~~t~ a: a given state oi. the emulsion art, t.'l-:lere is a trade ofi b~twcen s~..:n<>itlvi.t>· and resolution which can be manipulated tv gat bctto::r results in a particular context. On the other hand, it c:.ppears not u;1rcasonable tc hope .for some absolute improvement in emulsion prcperr.ie::s which wouid. y idci a .fa.st.:lr film at the same resolution or i.tli equivalent. Probab! y a. factor of 4 in speed io::-a given :resolution is too rnur:h t<.J r..ctpc fo~,. but we have some confidence that a factor of 2 rr..:.y be obtaino..bl c. Tr,::-. would be an e.xtren1ely significant gain, which would oi coux-:sc :)~ wdcomc in c)ur current systems.· ft could be irnrned.iately·exploit<:ci in t ::.G design of new syst~ms to alter materially the weight-si.ze-st.abiliz:1tio:-. recluircrnents in the next genera,tion of instruments. Within a few months one n~ay know whether such an improvement in emulsioxls can indeed b.e anticipated. We think it ext·remely important t.'l.at this question be purs·...ed. b. Imagt: Intensifiers The electronic im<...ge itltensifiel· is <.. device whic:~ is now be ing dc~eloped vigorously in a. nurnber of forrnf;4 It m .ay po s o.:1 bly p;.: .;;~: \-; l~t :·ln opportunity .for a n::.ajor breakthrough in sat(!llite photogr<:cphy. rn·::h(.; i1Ylage ln.l:cnsifiC'!r, light fron1 the original sccn.c falls ..)n a ph.()t O-c2..tli.(,.:l,.: rathcr tha.n on the film di:rectly. The electrons ejected h·orn the photoca~hode are accelerated 'to bombard the phospho::-, where the:y r;·;.:..kc n>.:::·;.; light. This light can then expose a photographic fillu or the process czc:·, be cascaded to make more electrons, mere ligl:.t, ere.• u:n:.l ;.u so1r.-~ stc.t.g<~ photographic recording occurs~ It ~eznair..s ~o b.:! see n. '-Vh <.! Lh e r tLc ::-equi~· ecl resolution in lines per mi.llir:1eter can be rn " ".:;;.~: ~c.n peculiarly favorable to the <:?plication of th.e i.-:l"-&;e-iat ::;n:::i..:.. ~:· ~cchni.. ,,r l . r'·· -. \.:'-··· SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 0 ATTACHMENT TO BYE-28.69-63 :· e~.: C'::dcci at any giv en instar.t along a narrow strip o:r slit, a gc.cmet.o·y h ig>..ly aclv<:tntageous for control of. the electron traj.:cto:·ies. This t ec:;.:~ique may permit the further flexibility of recording photogr.:..~::.hic:r.. 'l":.j~ ~~.t a scale different h·orn that oi_t.'\;.e prixnary image. We re.::.omn1e:r.d. that the po.:;sibilities of image-intensifier techniques be immediately investigated. Ii closer investigation corroborates our prese.nt optin1is1Y1, a v i gorous program of developm.ent should be started. Here, 'too, we expect that a few months' study could give us a very much dearer p i cture of the implications for planning of our future systems. c. Verv Large Outics A d vances in the design of very large optical syst~;ns arc; ,:or..tinuing r:o b e rnade. These include not only new geometrical <:l.rrangc~:.;.'1.'1et'\ts o:f reflecting su1·faces, correcting plates and lenses, b~t. a Lso naw technique s for constructing large mirrors that are accu ~· ate but not enormously heavy. It is reasonable to conr:ernplate aperture-:1 at least as large as 60'1 diameter operating, so fCJ.r a s their ir.trinsic optical. perfo1·mance is concerned, close ·to the ''diif:raction limit'' sct b y thc wave length o:f light. To be more specific, it app~_ <.rs that<'· 60" :Jin.meter f./2 system forming a good image on a 10" ,;li t is entirc.ly feasible, as 1s a 40" diarneter, £/1.5 with a 6" slit. l£ and wh;;:n we ~11cv~ into large:r vehicles, it is t.hese larger sy=:lte~s we slltH.ild be ~l1.in~. ,.irlg ;.:.bout. lt is not too early to support research and development or:. corr.po n c n:: s , in view o i the fact. that the lead tinJ.c on the ve::ry large opt1cal c.~. L:3rnents 1nvolved may be as much i\.S two or three y0a.rs. (Cf c o urs(! v;e must net iorgct thc.t the lead time on launching facili~ic5 n'"l<•Y be c:~no~·::tc.r c:t·iti c;.,;.l elc1:nent in the utilization oi large:r veh. icl(! ~ . } · ".Lhe impress i on gained from our discussions of t'hese large optical s yste1:::1s is that bulk is likely tc be a more stringent lirnit<:.tior~ theli cv:d~nt, prcvcn~ir.g any further usciul advances. 011 this Cj\:c:::~i::m \Vc IH;.vc n(> ":onctus~vc c~xporinlen:.;.-..1 evidence. The astronon:\cr.s 0..1-~ ia;:niha:· with the inverse p::-oblem of seeing up ::hrough the ;:;.~mosph;;:x_.,, but ::heir experience does not nece·ssarily provide th..:: ;:,.nswc~:. \'{,;: "-rC ;:d,;v -unab~c to predict at present whether this eve·ntu.al lunitc:.tic.n will (~ be re::lacivcly more or less serio-us for the satellite borne c;unc::-a ~han v ::-:n· an :au-borne camera. As we ;:.dv;:,.ncc into a new domain oi pc.:£or.:-r;ance thi!:> fundamental qu.::s~:o:: will ciescrve serio·us :re:;earch attc:~~ion. ln aclv;;.nce oi empirical tesE, we :nay w.ell be able tv d;r<:.w ;..:sc.ful ::or' cJ.usions Iroln .::alculat10ns for va:::ious n10dels of a tu;·bul~nt <..L":·.o.sphcre. Sat:t.-!llite sy.ot<~:::-'flS are com.?lr:t0ly free !rolYl cnc l~l·c.blc!";1 whL.::h :-:-:v.y <:!venr.t.:ally J.i.mit thS not entirely beyond remedy. ~1,....,,·· ,,- , -'": : .· . .. ~ ... . ..... J \:.J ~. 1 --....... · CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 0 0 .to..:'TACl-:ME;.NT TO BYE -2S69 -63 s_~ .. TZL.!...:ITE VULNEIL.L\.B!.Ll~Y ~'. The !?anel was giv0~ 2. d~::..-~:.:.~d b~~i\3:.ing on .:-Jatellitc vu.!.nt~ra bili~y and on the c.t:rl·0nt r;rograr/i .:.imeci :J.~ the plu.nnin;j: ·o! cvuntc r cO\.\n.te ·rrr-.. caDu:.·c;i 4l.nd. :protection oi ~·~conn..,i::ssanc¢ s.a.tclli:~s* Or".. tho whole, the iactsJ as presented to us , w'-!rc :"'co.ssuring, in the .follc'-~~ing lilnitcd ~cnse: a) It appears t.h.:lt ii the Sov.i~ts were to r:"'~oun.t an. ::~tack ~11\?loying their e.;:.i~~ting l'"ac..~ar capability with a medium-:=an..g\:! b;:.l~is;,;.lc G.:J$tl i.le as the attacking vch1.cl~, th~ problc:n. the .ss; b} the analysis of pcll~t attaclt pretty co::wincin:;;ty shows that oul.· pr~·sent satellite con£igul·ations , shiclch:d r.s th.::y "-'-"'~ anyw~;y by th•~ AGENA. .stageo forward, WOltld be quite di.lficu.J.t 'LO h.it w i-::h peilcts a.nd that a vcl·y n'lvderatc c:;.mount of judiciously pL.1.c.:"!cl ~11icld1ng can protect thcrn v·ery eiicct1vcly. L'1 short~ it: look a fro~~ L..i.lls a.n:-:.lys i ~, as thougi1. the a\.t4\.cl,cr w1ll h:1vc ."~o employ a nuclear bu.rs:. I-Io\v severely th.is will inhi'l.>it him :frorn :l~~sorting to at',ack i.t-11 oi cou~·s.:..~, a q:.;.e~t•on. ti-\c::.t involves rp;;.c.ll rnore than t(;chr"..icc"'l CCl~sid.cr;,.t;.on.s. It s..;el-::S pl·obablc:,. !lO'..Vcvc::· , th::;..t the: Nikc ZC\!$ 1"l.!.rge~: Tr~ck :?\.~ da.1~ :11: i(\v.:.t;a.l.:in (a.:r.;.d th\,; ~~~LJ:· ·~ pc:rh(:...!>S ,'tl!JO the 54-~out d1!-d::. :.o..t s~ry Shr:: !;an} could n.cqui~c ~h.~ .::.:c..te:i!.t~C (J.S it: CG:..lYlC UV'=:l.· t.ht ll.o~·i zv:-:. This might be done 0:1 the b:J.sis of 5:!'>"\..:'.;UR-like clat:~~ .:i:~; tt:..n':~ ui a.bou~ 200 met~rs. at.: v-;hich cilstance -3 . 000 pounds c{ p..:ll,.•:; ;;;pr::C :~(.;~l ·:.:..-:. . .:..:.;ir~:--:~ s :!.t(;llitcs Y-"hose g::""our.d :.~a.cks pass rnorc than ai.>vut 10 0 n1.il:...: :.. :·:: :.:;n·! ~!1\!: la~nch site. -l 0 .. l ...... . .... · (':· .· ...· ,-... -..., '--· SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 0 ''---"' ,,.-...., u P.. :--'rAC~-!1\/!.E NT BYE-2.Sf~9--63 I-!o,veve:-one niiy £\i!cl about ~:~esc es~i:c~a.:es. it ·i!j ce ri.:a..-i.nly '..v~;;:c to t;-.. :,~ a.l: . rc,"..so::.~b~~ ~t~l::.S tv n."H::~t such a :h:reat, 1n pa~·..::..._'....!:z:.;."':..hc :.)~u dic~ :J: n~~i,;!loc:$ £c:~ 1·cr.::~....:ing ~::.tclar detcct:.:..~..;i.!.:ty il.:.1d 1'or Z:..d~:. ::--.s scn'11~ ~:l. p<.-s.1:.il.:..ty io:-l.TI<:i.~'l~·.."o.v-..;:; C.:...::::::h.~~·v~ coatinuing support. lt s...;crns ':.:!'l5:.\.t ov~....n l)"'ujl'C.: _could b~ donc,tLau Wa$ iadic~tcd to uo in t;h.~ w~y oi :;.-;:i.r"ia..!"' i.::l-o:sn-s~~ction rccluct.ion .. V.f~ r~ise the cru~stio:: wh<..;fh~:::-.;.;..ll th~ ~c.:v.:.:.r:cof> of tc(;hnique and meaSUl"Cn1.cnt \.Vh.ich hav~ b(;_en d~vclvrcc2 l!~ ~~;i:y:.:.la:-vtork on other prograrn.s CJ.:te being ::akcn aci,:-al...t;J.g<.~ of c:fc·cJ..ivcly i r~ t.!1is j:JrnJcct:....-\.s concerns red\.Lc ...:.l.O:J:. of racla::-.;.::rGSS-S0..ctionJ it W0\.:1ri p::-~;!..>i.-l.bLy be \.oo opt.i:n=.st1.c to hope t.h..at the c::-oss -scc.t.lon. coulo 'be r0duccci tc; the point where i:: wo\:.ld be unclct~;;ct<1ble by rada:;:s of a class 6c:sig~.cc i;n· AICBM u.cquisition. Neverth.;lc:::s, reduction oi rada.:r crocs -.sc:::ction maker,; decoying casicrj ar.d it can hardly b..!! anything but bcnc..:i.ci#ll to n1ake our t<:.rgcts l;;;,;,;s conspic<..lous. It will pJ.~obably e;~S~! the situation if there urc t:\v:~6 satellite~; oth.~r than rccon.n=-..issa.-'lc~ :1Gt0llitos ir: pvla.l· o rbit.. We ~"')..\.: :,;: .r..;;pe :.o:: · ~:-~d, "'-'here pos$ible, io~te1· a proli.Co:r·aticn of space act:iv:.;.;.y ~.:pule:...!.· v:··Jit. Meteo:rolugica.l satellit2s~ ~n1or.g others, ca.n p:rovici,:: ;x.q;:::c~i4"::~c co~r..pa.:.¥ :y. ~I'hf..:-:c a1·e many sci~nti.fic ohJ~ctivcs, ,l..1~d LJ;~ ..;y c:.:.--L: !:).rc.b~~;ly h :-':.>'ving rntJl"C ni..il':"lerc)us, which could bcnc.fit I:fol:n inst;:ur~·~ ';: n:s i:-1 p.:-~l:• =o::.--1:llt. With enough of this goir.::; on, the work cr. !.TIOdi!:-:.::t:Gn cf rz:.C:.... .:: s:gnat1.1;.:e m-lght have :he spec1fic :.i.i:~~ of rn:.J..::ir1g t}-.. ~ r{:.~co:r:Jl::t.i.s~:t:..nc ...: s::.:;:ellit\! lc)ok like a C.e1-ta.1n c:l:~.:::s of (.')p<::.n satellites. L"'l the long run ,;ur i~ ~·;...~l.t..est horn::; ~::;l.;;' \.V~ll lie: i-rl th~! ~.~: ~-.J.(!~la! esLL!.bl.tsh;-~~ent o£ public rct.-:0~:-.. ~~ion o:· th;.;:: Ir~~clor-.n of ~p;~c~ .fc::.-i)il.S~ ~ '..tO: tr<.:in.sit. '".!"he stre:lgth of Cli..ll. · 2!;C;;S(!llt positic~ c.l~!:&:ives fron"l. th· ~ l:;as·-. G<.;r;duct of our space prog:::am ;).nd cur of:fici.ai policy witb respect u:; i:::.-ccodDJYl of space. VIe should l:.c alc:l·t to ev<:ry opp~l::tl!nity to rcin.f~>~·c'~ tl!i.,s pO.::ii.tlOn... -1 l - I ·; • ~ .. ..' . ... . . ·' '· \ .. .............; ! ' • --~ .. 'v -.... ~· ·~ · CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 0 0 ,-. I. ......:.; (.,.:....'~~.: .••• ~! u .f. TT/.CH~::ZN1' TO .BYS £869-63 ..._/ ~z-:-: ...~-.. :::-. () \J""l"' -S''-'~-:J."':::'~-:~S ___......._ The Pc.ncl ccnsidc:rcC: =~thcr bl:iefly t::-.11':.~ cur:-cnt .;;tat\.:.*; o.f. (:.~vclo;)~-.."'1..:.:'1~~ \~1 :.·caG.-out syat.crr.s. ...l'"hi::: 1;e:c>...ni:-C!;ic, an.d t'hiz ~1.a:.1Cica.p has g:.· l;'.vr.." i£ ~~.:~?th.ing , :relatively rno~c discou~· :J.gir:I! i~ ccr-!"..pa:::-iso:1 wi:.h p1'-_cto~r~phic ~.. ~~~j:-..:!ing ~~:<1 ~: ccovery. ;._ canst~:-/.: ,-..,.:~ich p::-c,-:.:.y well ch=..:·:tct·:";'ri:!..c.C. ;.~;.::.:1\:i.:.out. !:•,rsterr,.s V/:!.S stat~.:'!d in t:'1c !'o!:~\~JinJ fo:;:n:: o~~e v:: tv1c squ~:.. .::: :.n:::!-•c::> oi pictur,~ pe r r.·.: ~C~\.ltning tccbn:L}~:.:::s ;:...:·j~ very ,,.u;.:..:. ·::..~"..':'1-d cor.."'lrnu:..._:c:~·.:~.:.. ::.;; . .:::>..:t \)lC conclucic t~a.t there arc 1·~o cvi~.:::v~t 0!'2:'<-':·~·-~;· .. itics in rcz..d-..:.~:.: .. ~)'"'!::c:-n:J: whjc:h cu2,ht to a.f!ect our rn;).jU::-~:.::... ns ~·.::,::· i~:.-~hcr dc.velcp:~~e.:n .::..:.1.d "...:!:~ o: pl-.otog rn p:-... ~~c t'iy stc::nJ w i th r~,:~cov~ry. • ·:• •• • v .... -!.!:. SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 0 3YE-2~69-£3 -~... i~c }:-"'::::.::-.. c.~ ::o;".. .... : ~:...:-::~c. "'::.1 -C~ 1 'r ;). ~-~u!--::.b c i. CJ: s pec~::Ll ~>::t: t.Cr:."'.d:~ ~ ::;..:~r~·~c ;:.r ..:~ z..:... :-(:::. 2-/ ,.. :..~~---~:~:i:··~ v:.:~...:.::!: n~.J.Y Y.J2..i'~:t:r•~ ~x;;.~"'in.:.~iu:.. ('t . (}';~ i c 1-:· ·r:.~c:l,.!::~~~'. .~) J. ~c;) 1·~ ~-~.. Cl<:~t'l.l"ly O'..l :· P~"'t!$ .:;nt C.<:tl)a.:)':"L; L.Y ic.::..-·p.::c:::·1pt :;...:::-:.iuisit.icr~ of i.rnpo;.·t:~lnt _!"J!:.. ocor;:w2..';)hi(:. ir.. ~~-~.lif~C:!.:lCC i~~ l.!.~l-.~ .. ;..;::_~ , .::ct. $.:> ~· nuch by -::he .l-ccovcl·y cycl~.. ~s '!..)y t.l:c L.:;acl ~:.:L'~e l.~!vo:vcU i.:~ t;1:::; launchi ng o:£ a. ?r;~viously unschcdul .:::<.l f!ig,ht. 'I'he ?.,j. ·,~ el ::::ba..:-cs '".:b~ r;.::.:!.l1~r obvicus v1ew :l1a!.:, son1cth~n6 ou.g;~.t to be <;one abcut !.:h~s, .:1 n~ c;1..:.t in a.d ci :tu:..n to t~~ e general ;:itl.· carr.:.iir~ir.z vf 1.-hc L.l1..: r..ch!.t1~ .:~:.)e.::;::.tions~ \.v:;.ich. 5::3 c:. J.;.rohlc1n nl rc3.<.!.y:_ hcin g ~ttac!,ed o . .-1. vt!1c:r i1·o ..:.ts, th. c pt·~::.:::>ibi~ity ('\:.a. ~peci~lly pJ.an:r'.. cC quick rc6.:!. c ticn v~hich.! ~buulC. be ~t..1uch o:l~c:..· n1.ca.r.s as :·~~:. ~out sa~clli:cs .~;1d ~:!:one~. ~:. ~i:\oa[;l: th<: ;.~:.ldi.J..ti.;.:;r. \J':·.:pcsure WOt:..ld~ 0f CO\.l.!·s~.:: ;.:;. ;;..~ 2 t:O b-~ (1!;..!:-~S~L.':d. Vl:~~--~ :· ~~ ~.-;;,~;d~·d i!:.; 2. s.n"'l~ll sy:ro....:::11 ::;:;:::;·y o i ~,; c1: __ :; ..:.:)c::·:.... :.:ion i.:o Gv~l"~l.l~~ :~.. ;-~ ~~.-.. .::~.:::~·:..!.. prvrn.i~:.c. ~l'hc p:..·oblc.:-.~ vi (..·.:~.,:;e,:.;.·v-~ c:. g ;::.. r ·.·:·:.:.1. ~JJl~~ r:-~) irlt on ::::::.r·~~-1 :· :.. . :l.. O~:!:~J.~"l cc.-."._~·._;..._.:;::.:~. t-:-~:.-, , in-o:·Li:: '!.~·.:...j..;:cto:..:y c.v.t·.:: ~;.:;·i.:~::. s, en:;!..~(.: .~ ,:-,.,·.!.-..:i~ •.:.~.l.l lJ.-~t\7.! tY::.t:l :: i:J~.: .•.-~~ c :•.. ~ ..... bil~i:~.. 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'!"i:i(; co~11pa.ct :-!. ~--:c: ,:-·,r.·. -~~ ,. ;~·~-~ :·.-: ;_:-.~l_-,; ~= ~~.-~~:1'... v:. : :/ :.Lr.:.·:, ;:.. .:~o;l, ·. :=..:."'-. ,:...:: :.: 'JJ:'I.icl-.. ~he· pi*'0s cn"!: opt: :·..!. ·..: ... ~;;·.:. : :-.:: .-~1:\".-i. r, :.-: \v·c. ::.:~ <.::..::v·:.:i.op~ '-.: 1 '..·,-,.,; i:,~.:.:.:.;-,..-.;: ;~~-~:..:. cO!"l t:l·i.by,·:;e;J l\.!.:i"'-=~(.;ly 1...0 -~~"': :..; (1:!~-~ ·-:.!~ .........: •. ~ .:. \-,_~ ·;;~1...: !):· o~~:;:i·.:.':.-. . '".:.."'h.:.: :,:,.z_::ci cl..:.. (..: nv~.. t: ~:.n:-:i (i\..""":;: :.:~L t:·1 ... .::.: ~:!.!r, c ~ ~ .\· L:.-r :• ... t ;_. .. :: ...;c '" .~.. ch~-...{:g·::. ~:. j _;-~:-. ~....· .!:·: ;.:::·:<;.:..· . . ....... ~ \:t":. ;. ... ;.., _:""'.. :....:t:: .'! -'1.~ SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS .·. t4W '~· rf~ .,. .-:.. · · R~L~61; J7". ~erf,e~~1. · ··'·· ·co:RoNA/GAMBI:I" I LANYARD HANDLE VIA BYEMAN-TALENT/KEYHOLECOMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY USIB-D-4 • 1 (COMOR-D-13/16) . Z7 July 1964 Limited Distribution UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR.D · t ~ ... . ':~ . . . MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES ll'~_TELLIGENCE BOARD .. . .. " ·;. . . . . .. . .·· . -·..:.;:··_ .-.:.. ·. . ··-~.::: .: .._...:'l:;_·:: ; SUBJECT : Long-Range Requirements for Satellit~. ·~::,:; :, :··,.>> :<'·~·~,,~: ,· ·.. Photographi~ Collection · ··. ·.: :· ::.::: · .·,.: ·· -' ~' ·. :· .. - _·,_ .. ':.•....·· ,:· . . ·..·=.,:_~-.. ··• -~-.~-~· ~ •:._: ..~-~-. ~... . . ' :· • .. . ' ...,:-::.'-~·:.-':;!-·· . l REFERENCE USIB-D..;.41. 13/lo (COMOR-D-13/14) :. ... ·::: .. ,,· .. 24 July 1964, Limited Distribution · . -.: · .. :. :.".,·' ,.. .. . 1~ The enclosed report on the subject from the .Committee on ·. OverheadReconnaissanc~ (COMOR), ·in response to USIB action in·;··.· .:..: E;xecutive' Ses-sio~_at its ZZ July -~eeting as ~e-~orded in the ·reference, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the Board of the COMOR · · ..· Conclusions and Recommendations.contained .i~··. Tab B hereto, pages 6· · . ...;· through 10. · . . . ... ~.. ;.:r.;~ ·.. · .. ·-··· ·i. :· The-. Nationai Photographic Interp~etation Center' .·-~)~~---~·;:;.-_ ..-.. :.·,;_ ·: c • --~ ~~:-~~---~ -· . .. ..~~1i ·· ment to the referenced docwnent• . Fo" r't:h~con..-enience o£ the Board·in· ' ' :;.:.:.;."~: ... . .. ., .....· i :~~· ---. .._:-~;;~~.i:.'::··. :::.-· .:;~~.:.:~ ' ·i~~'f}~::~~~:._''. ~ft1:~ studying this report, that _attachrnent is set forth as .Tab A • . -:_·i~, :;-: ~ ·. ::·:~ -. :·-._,~ /.f~-I ·,-_:.i~-'~~~~:~·:~.':..-=~ ?.if~:· knowledge·of the-nature and mode o-£ operation of the-pr.eaent KH·-4 ·and .::_:, ._,,ffi :;_ ·. ;:_... ·..:.--~~-,,:~, ,' ;{;-:;: . 0 ~c:-;·:tit;i.~p;:-,:: ;;·-;;~~~~~~ ·. KH-7 systems and the· results· obtained-· theref~· ~e~entS: C?f::"the: NR0"."•.:7>=,~-, -_ -·_i_~·-~-.... -: · -~--::_~-; ~-~~i)-~~::.~·~:.._...:!~~w~ on the prospects of improvements to these sylrtenu, a briefing by_CIA · ._-·.;. . . . . ·.: .... ~:__ . . . . •.· -·;··:-·.;-·._ .. . . "?:~:.:: .:~:':;· ~~:.ri: : __ ,-~ = _ _-; ~1.[~~..... on a proposal for: a search system. -with-area coverage approxi;u:iatmg . . . 7·-:;:"'~ . . -~ -----.)"~ . : · ~ KH-4 and resolution approximating KH-7, and a briefing by the NRO _o~ :. ~ . ~:. .. .-· . BYE-4590-64'·' . . z· ~andle via BY~> --/~f~~ -. · CORONA/GAMBIT:.LANYARD ~~~~--~~~~._ ,,,-j_:f._"-;;_~i · · : >.:<:'SEGRB~ ~;.0~7-.';{c~riJ.¥!:·;1~~ SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS NRO APPROVED .FOR 4 · . . R'ELEASE 17 Septembe~11 ·. Handle via BYEMAN, TALENT-KEYHOLE CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD . Controls Attachment USIB-D-41. 13/11 ·· (COMOR-D-13/16) .· 27 July 1964 Limited Oistribution .~ G-3 and LANYARD•.It had available, of course, the papers on the same subject submitted to the Board i~ April 1963 but on which ther-e had not . : .. ~ been ·a conclu-sion by the Board. NRO and the NPIC rep_resentativc:s · · /·· . -. • =:. -. .-. :· •.·_ . . . t d f 11 . th d-• ·l • ':·1~~... --~-:: . :;~ .:_ , ::: :·:·:.·::.~·•.:~·.~-~'.'!·..:,·--=.::_,· ~-~:.:·_·.:~---~::_· --~----~--~~~:!.~~· ) . .'q· • -. • . __ ...-···..:_;·... part1c1pa e . u y 1n e tscusstons. -•·· . ,_-., ' ·. _ · _:·-.. :~·~t::~ -3~ In direct ~esponae t~ the Board'~ asaigmn~nt-= the COMOR · . ·: . . . . · .--, , i~.-..-~~~ .spec.~fied to NPIC the essential ele~ents of Information on major prob _.; -~-~~ . . lema with a ~eqU:est that the NPic·. t.sirig th~ ~~source;~ ~!~all ~J~~-:·:~5~ -~ :' . -.-:·..,_ -· _;r-.~ . ~-.....,... :::... . .. :~!};~_...._..... ·-. -:-. . ' ~ . .agencies participating i~ NPICP advise on the. extent to which ·the EEI could be met by .photogr·a-phy·with~ a-_ c·apability .of't'esoiution "'tO":~ernHr.interpretation·, . ~ . . --~~ :·~ -;~y_: .:... . :-. -·-. ~ .. -· .. . :· • -~-•·.. -:,; ·.. . ..._-. -..~~-.... :-:-=-...: .: objects ten feet, three feet, -The re.1lults of ' · . ·.._ ' .. ' ~ . ·, Conunitte Overhead R econnaissanee Attaclunents (3) ::. 3 . BYE-4590-64Tab A . . .· •--:~--::;~·/·!.. .. -.~-·.·: - Tab B · ' Handle via BYEMAN, TabC CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARDTALENT~KEYHOLE . ..-, '{ . . Controls · • TOP 9EORET ' . ,_. -~:}:~ii\,_;.;c::'';~ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM I • NRO APPROVED70R ~·ELEASE 17:Septembe;!i'j1 Handle via BYEMAN, TALENT-KEYHO~i Controls . .. ·. ;' ·. . ;i· ·:! " !: .·.. .··--. _TOP SEGRf [' ~-. _._.-;. CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD . USIB-D-41. 13/11 ' (COMOR-D-13/16) 27 July 1964 Limited Distribution ··Tab A · . I _;..;.··: ': ::.._•;·/ · • ~~·: •>.::;: · Directive to COMOR Regarding Long-Terr:ri'Intellige.nce . , Requirements f:r Satellite Photo:raphic Re~.o~~.;~t~c•.i ~~.t~~i: ;~~ L COMOR is dire~ted to p~ovide fo~· the . Board'"s· considera-... ) tion at its 29 July meeting recom.mendati~ns for future· intelligence ;:S:-~ ·. ~-~ '·'_:,""r: 1 requirements for.. satellite photographic·reconnaissance from th.e ata'i)d-~ _:']; point of requireti input to the: in_telligence :inventory.' . In.preparing it_s~;: .: . = ' report. COMOR should take into accounfthe experie.nce·: achit,wed thus . .. far through the use of the KH-7 and KH-4 configurations and a·n analysis · "by NPIG on the extent to which-specified :E;ssential·Elements o!'Infonna-. , . tion. can be met by impr~ved re'solution atl4. qualitY o.(photography;~·;·}:<· · · ' .. •' -·---~ . . ~ .··-... _.. ..· ::~ ._:: ·_ . . : _.:.--·._ .· .. _.: ··__ ..· -~-·. ·: . -:· · .~-~-~f~~:~~~:. . 2. · · The COMOR deliberations and report should be concerned. '· with the needs from an intelligence viewpoint of improved resolution~ in ·.:· . ;::' the GAMBIT spotting system•. the·advantages and disadvantages of:Cl,'.vny".' _·:} much higher ·Tesolution i.n the spotting .system even though the ar-e.a='CC)yer~· :~·:: age is reduced. the ability of the_present aftd contemplated spotting;f.tt~.r :_ :~· -~' sy.stema to cover targets of interest with due con'sideratioll to ~ccuri:cy · .'. :_:.: ·: _ ~ of pointing and the ability to· cover succes!tive target.'becau.se o!tfn:i~ :. ~-·~:r:::r involve'~. -in the -~~11 and poi~ng oi -th~,·.;t7.!~~:· . ~: ~:.: . };:~~:;.~_·,>:..~-·~)s:~~~lti'-~~ . _.., 3. :: -· Recommendations will be expected on the advantageS-of _ · .·> ··:: :-improvements to the presentGAMBIT. system -con~idered.. feasib~e~~~... ::..: -;.~.~ further research and developt:nent and also. advantage~·-to'.b~ga.ineci}~J?.J:ri· /. -:.<2~· furth_er improvement. in the existing.CORONA system• . '.--~_ ·.· . :·f.;.. 't_'tj~::;f.. f:~-:_:;:_.;;~ ·. ::· 4. The importance of the development o{ a search·sys-tem.. with are~ coverage approximating the.CORONA (KH..:4) but _with resolu-· . tion equaling the GAMBIT (KH-7) should be examined from ·the stand~·· point of the value of the input of Essential Elements o£ Inform.ation to the intelligence inventory resulting from such a development. CORONA/GAMBIT/LA:NYARD . t, Controls i .. • . -t ·• -~-~. ~ ·. . . ~ . ·. . ·.-·:.· .. ·· ~ ... .··. .. .TOP SECRET . . . -~. -. .~ . . SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS ~ . NRO APP.ROVED .fOR €i\ TOP~SECRfr e RELEASE 17 Sep~mber·~1 .-:·. ·::·' Handle via BYEMAN. ·.<··.·¥-!:.: TALENT-KEYHOLE .CORONA/GAMBI1'fLANYARD · Controls USIB-D-41. 13/11 . (COMQR....D-13/16-) . 2.7 .July 1964 Limited Distribution ~ t •. ·.,; •: TabA <:Dntd .'.· .. :· . • •• f :~: -· -"-•• :-. , . , 5. Finally. consideration should be given td;thtni"eed for a~ .. : .~;_:~: i · .. ~ iuterhn. search system built around the LANYA.RD carneras which might .... . · ··produce resolution considerably better than the KH-4 but··not a.S good as __ ~-' ~# the KH-7 and which could be available long in advance of any of the pro-_.,_ . .. : -;~-:::'·,,·. : ~:,~ '.;.:.···-::.t. · . · ·"! ·--,· . . . .. • . • !""~~·-:. . pose~, ~~stems. . . . -~..::;.~~:~:-. ~-:. , . . . . 6. Although there is no indication that budget re.strictions,_or .. technical or physical-.re·sources would necessa·ruy foreclose concurrent _ ~action iri several of the areas mention~d above~: USIB wo~d be interested --~ ~ . in COMOR 's views on the relative importance and hence the priorities . -. .which might be attached to the several courses of action:indicated• .: ~--.. .-..~. •ol • I .... .,.' _·,.>-:.;_',:),~/:~-;; ·.i. . , I . .··.. : . . .. -~k· .. •·· .; ·'•·:· ..•··. _. ' · --~ ·~: ,' ··., . ·. _;. ... . ... ··. : -.-..: ~ .. .·-· · '-·-r ·' .. :· · . '. ·-._ ; • _ . ·.; · :· ... . . ~ .:·:,':..· ~i ~ ; •• -~ . _! ....... -·.-... · .:r· :• -.~~ -t . .·· . . ·. ....-: ·.-\ .. ._, ;, > ,. . 5 BYE-4590-64 Handle vi~ BYEMAN, CORONA/GAMBITI LANYARD TALENT-KEYHOLE Controls ' 't . ; ·• TOP'·SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . N_i.:{o APPRGVEq.roR. \\'> RELEASE 17-·septemb.ef 2011 Handle via BYEMAN, TALENT-KEYHOLE Controls " :• ~ ! .: .• CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD .. - C 0 N C ~~~1~N<5 ~~ . · __ :· .~;~r-..~. ·-...-t· :-· f_o-.\(; -41"~--- usm·-D-41.13/11 (COMOR-D-13/16) Z7 ~uly 1964 Limited Distribution Tab B .'t ··--~~ 1: :_. _~: _..... . .: -·: ~ -.:. . ~ l.t· · ~· : : }_;_}_-_' :·'_·_._._~:~~ ~-~,-~ . ....·< ~~_;_.\,~_;~-~-..~-~-;g,.,~.~-' ~;'"ii.~-~ 1. · Intelligence requirements f~x s·ea;ch ~d: ~-ur;·~;~c~: -. ;·.;:_;:__:: .~~ . :~ ·.·':\' -.. :.~ :_~--. .. ·. ~ ·' _:·~ •...·.-.:.':~---~~~-!~·~:~-~---:...·._ ~--. ·---~_j f."~ ~~~~~~~~b~~.;.~:::_;~-~:~*~ ;..· neceasitate a satellite photographic capability-or capabilities for coin-. "··: .. i ·· · · . <~ · · ·· .· ' ·.:.-\.. .._ ~--:'~· >.~-~· ',--~_-' ·· :(r.~;..!:~;~:;t plete area coverage of. the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a resolution which _,.· · _.; -_-.--:·.-~ . • • T ' ' • •....:;; ·-.. ;~-· ~~~~; >~;_.-.:~.~ will permit interpretation of objects between three and four feet on a side; ' ' ' ' :~' ·:'•, " }t;~~r;c; ,:¢i~:}}i~j .. z. · "There·is also a: ·requirement for photography which -'·..z-~ ··,..,. . ·:. _-i~.... . :. :_: . ......-· : ~ . :· Handle via BYEMAN, ~I CORONA/GAMBITI LANYARD TALENT.-KEYHOLE ...: Controls .. · ~ r· . ·.-:· .:::-.: .. . ·.· ·TQPa:.SEiJREr· t... • .• .·:.-:·..::-;~::t;??~;?.\:t~·:;_:~-: -;~ . -. ;~~-{~~ SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS · · . . TOP SE C'RE~~ _ ~1 et-..1 . ___ .· -. .; .. ·NoRO APPROVED~·· OR IJIIi' . ( · '¥' ~~-: . RELEASE 17 Se rn_ber 2011 ~- Handle via YEMAN. -_...'·:. TALENT-KEYHOLE CORONA/GAMBIT/-LANYARD Contro.ls USIB-D--41. 13/11 (COMOR-D-13/16) 27 July 1964 Limited Distribution Tab B Contd 4. There would also be advantages in a system wi~ the ._ ,.. ~: .~ : ' capability to permit interpretation of de~ails· on.a :....~ • • : ~--· • Jo' . ,' _. ::.-:-. -.-~ · ·--;~~~: -~. ----:.~ --~;.:7.~5~~ ' .~ -. . :.-:. : .. side even With a swath width approxi~at~ly-~Uthat of I:-'-; *'11-::f :;:"~ ~:~:·~'#~ ~ . inventory. . Although the ·number of targets for whi.ch such a system : :' -... ·-~~:_: ~-· ·": . ~ : . · · ' · ~r.. ; __: .... :;_~.. :.;,.•.•-. ... -: : . ' .:·;}~:;;s; would be required_in terms of vital . ~p,~rtance. is relatively small. . ·>:'; -~ the ·ability of such a system to also. provide: additional information --·= :::_:~;:. . ·: ·. .-. .... .. •f, ..:·., .ft··~~. ~ ~.... ;:,..·· .)~~:·;:~ on less critical targets could be an ove;--al1 important b~us. . :"·_,·7 .-~-. ' l:~:-:: ~ .5. Im.prov_ernents are perhaps possible in KH~4 and KH-7 . ··'}..:c. resolution--at beat a reduction in the. KH~:4-~·~-ten t~>·.~e..f~~;.-~d~ ···. :~}~r~ ; .-~~.t ~:.-\·:·~~~(~-;~ . ·...... .;:·::ii~::.~~ in the KH-7 from three to two feet. Improvement should·be made in . ,~ · ~' :::_:~)": --~-~<·. ::~. ::) ~·.; :_.. -.:.,. ·.·;·:. t·::.: ~~--:. \~J:~~f~\-t~r~-:/~~:l;:;:;.~~~;~~ these systems. ·a; well ·as iii their reliability. without' ~p-edi"ng·:·:'·~·~ · ' : :···:··~hlf~1, . -; -~~ ::=·-~ -~~-:~· '. ' -~---~~~ -... · ·... :. . . .:~~~-~~~ ~f.:':. ~it~~;\~;_~=-~~!¥D.!~ ·. developmentof the s~sterns di~.c~ssed· ~~ paragraph 7_-_. . ':~~.,,:~~~:.~.~ ,:.'-~~~· ;.;_;i'<~{iiJ • • ' 1 , • ·-~ 1~ -· ~_-;: ;·.-.-:1:-f:.-;··::.-;;.;.. . ·:-: ~-~-;_.t::~/ ~~~~::.-~ : ~ -'!·~~~.:~:~¥~~~:.:-::;t:-~~* 6. · · Because of·its-relatively narrow ewath width {about · · ···:,~. :.~~·1'i .. :-. ---. -..-:> .' . ":1 '•'. -., ;· ·:;{.-:-.i; :~::...::~·=-:.:.·-~...:~: ;; _.~: ·>-:~. ·: -~i~~~ 50 miles) and non-contiguous stereo coverage. the: LANYARD System : ...::. ..:........ ;:. ..~-·.··.~·,.._-.--~ i.i.'-.~. -. .-·: . -~:j . ~..·. .-'4-.·: .~~-~ ..-····-. . --. .... ~.~~ ·-·--. -:;·,·: .:r.:· -· -~· · " 7' . . -,~~-: ~-:: ·'I BYE-4590-64 I 1 I: .:. Handle via BYEMAN. CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD TALENT-KEYHOLE Controls ... .: ~. .. ... ; ·:~~ ~\~~:,:~~ ~: .. ". :·_ ..~/~::·;~~~G:·· ;.:. ·· -·.. · 0 '0 t • . -"·!-.. -. -; · ~ . . . ·.. -·~ ~;:.C -~ .. --· ...i .:.: . . -'" .,. · -. • , ' I ,• ,-,. ,_, ·: .. .,; -~. . . . .. ;..~_::'.ii..~~_f.=f_\ ·: .• ~ :-·.. .:.·. .: ' : ~-7~"!'. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM • ·NRO APPROVED,FOR 4 . -·~ .·~ ~: . RELEASE: 17 Sep~embe,..1-'ifii/1 ·, .. . Handle via BYEMAN, TALENT-KEYHOLE, CORONA/GAMBITI LANYARD Controls USIB-D-4l. 13/11 (COMOR-D-13/16) Z7 July 1964 . ..~ : Li.Jnited Distribution Tab B Contd __;;'--: (KH-6). of which there are five packages available. could not b-e ~sefully-.;: • ··.,. • • '.-' .' • • • ' .~;; ·.::_:.-~~--:·_• ' •,•T~:.-:-.· !..:: .~~~~~-~-, :. ~: ~t~ ..=~J~;_i~·-=;:·.::~: • • r~~t~i..~ # _ employed as a substitute for-KH-4; nor. -since it ha's an estimated five---_ ::_:-.·. _ .-:..-. ----~;-~·.. _-:~--·--'.. . . ..]-;>~_::~·-:_.__-~-i;~:.< ~;-:~:-~ - -- ..~-:-~~~E~!l ,_ foot on a side resolution, could it be employed as a subatitute.-!~r KH-7•.-:/,c-~. ..-.•:-::-~~ ~: -~.: :· Z· _.. .~; ~~~~~~ COMOR has con~luded that the KH-7 should be used in-Ue:U of the KH-4 _, :_ ., •' •; •. ') •. ":. '• • -.·,:, ' : .~--~T : • ...;r;;~.;~:, : ~... ' as a crisis satellite~ However, before submitting its-recommendation . \ . ... .--... ... ··-:.: ··.: .. .-: ~"'.: . . :~·---· :~· ·. .. ·--\tr:ft: _-to the Board, COMOR has requested conun.ents frorn."the -NRO and-the · ·' ' . . ... ~-. ·: . . -~· ·· .'-. _~: . _~:::~·~:!~~J~~· ": ··:.· ';.~~~~q1 · NIC. In view of the !act that we are advised that the five_LANYARD paek-_·t~' • . '·' . . · .., . ~; ; .. .. . .·_. . · -~·:·._. ·-. :'~. ... ::._~:~:~ . _ages can be reinstitUted and placed on standby as a criS-is satellite with..: <->-; out ,n,eHerence wi~the dev•lop=en••_~·c=end~d-·~-r~~~~h:~L ··.:~~ below, we recom.znend the consideration of LANYARD fo_r this purpo.ae. · · _· . . . . . . ·: . ·<:-·~~ ··,_:~>;. . --~-. ~ :~:.~~-~~=i~f..:· :-~-;~i4:1:;J.;·~~~~~-:~·:·=):~~~~~~ In that case, there might eventually be.·on standby for a crisi s both a · · ---__-,';;_.;·::-_1 -~: }:·. -~-: ~ . .·: :··. ·.. ~~--~_: ..-:.:~-. .-~~· -~;~:· . ·. :~~ &-ji~b:~::l~{':' ~ ;~~it;~!~· KH-7 and a LANYARD•. w~ich in certairi 'circumstances'W:ould:b-e: ,extr_emely--' duira~le. ·. •.• "> r"''_''1 · ~'--•.. <,:<:' . ' --~;~~,~~~~~-: 7. Reconunendations on New Systexn.s: -:·'-'-:-:.:.-:-:_--_-_' -~<~· _ · ':~ < -~:·-~~; -::~:!:;r..-: _:-,~1l'{~ a. · That developmental work should proceed·: urgently toward the achievement of 8 BY:£-4590-64 Handle via BYEMAN. CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD TALENT-KEYHOLE .., • .---- Controls- 0 t, . .... -~ .::: ·.. •' TOPtSECRET . -..·.. . SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS NRO APPROVED.FOR ~El:.EASE 17 ~eptejnb~11 TOP SECRET( P:i\ '•. ,. .-··.. . :.-~~- .-. ~ .. ..._.. -•:. • Handle via BYEMAN, TALENT-KEYHOLE CORONA/GA~lUT/LANYARD . Controls USIB-D-41. 13/11 ' ·:. .I (COMOR-D-13/16} ,. 27 July 1964 •. Limited Distribution f . . Tab B Contd .· · · .i .. ...~:::·~~-.. : .: · " .:.. <:"..: . ·· (1) A ·single cap~bility for searc~: . .. . . -: ·; . .~ ---·:·'. --.' . -i . .. ~ ... ..-:,~~~~(·+t~i~.:~;t:;;:::::::~:.~~:~;~;;:· :~·:,~~. :> · -~~;'=" ~~;;; -~ ;;~~:-:~..t\i.t~o';...and a resolution equivalent' to KH-7;. and ; ·::;!_:..:r~~~¥\~:~.,.,.---~::~:-:-~:~}--~:...;_-· .._ ! · ·:;: ••• _ _: .::· --.::.;. : ;:7::~-~.:-_!.·). .-., --·--.·..--~--~·.: _':-.' :~-:.~~}'~ . · <; .. .. (2)' •· A capability which will permit · -:...~.~~.;:· )~};: . i=..·.:.. ~d :.>: ]:. ~ .--">r· ;;:.·:..;~~ ·.' ·.. int~~~~~ta~ion·. :;·de·t~~~~--~~ :~:· ~~der.: -~::\~;:,tf!~J.H\~~·:·~~~·i~1?}l . . ·. · .· .. :· . -.-. :-.. ...... . on a side · ~ven with aswath .. •. ?. . <· ..,~~"-;;-;{; ·;<:~.:. : 0 .·..width apprO;;;,;;~tely half tha;·of KH-7. ,· -' ' ;: ,': :;;);f ''';{,: . . .. _ .. .· . _:.... . . ~ -:.~;-.. ~,·~-# . ~7.::-v.::,~--~-~ ~· ir.:.~ ;~ ......., . . .. ._,, · ·._ ·. · · b. . · That, if a priority of development.must be ·::. /;;; ~t~·;· : . ' . i.~-. · ... . . . ..·.. ·. . . .. ):~r;r:::::~·'·\'/· . established, the second should have fir.st priority~-(COMOR>,, : ·:··<· -'. ..;_:~:· · • . . . . . : . -. -:. . • . ~--. ; . .' . .. . • ; ..· . ' -. ~~·;:;~· ~"l~'. -~· ~. -:. ;~..~ · ;·,.:;:._:~_~_::~:· :,:>,--:~·.~.~;._·_ b~~ie~e~.·... ~ .. :-. a . d......::,.;_• .....'.'·:'><5'. ,:.·_?._: .. _.. ,.· tha··t view of·the_. e_xis~~~~e~. ~o~~y ofsea~ch an --• • 1 • • -• • 'J . •• . -: . _\. • '·~:{';·_· -::·:~~~~~;y .: ~~ ·;'.; :;-/: surveilla~ce capability in ~~_ form of ~H-4 and KH-7, the .· · . ''·"" : .,., :· · :.~:; . ·, . . . ·.. .. :.. , . .. .. -.. :.:::. · :~·L ·;.~ t: ., .·.!·::.:_, .;_ ~.,,,_.-/_,:.;;:}. , ..:. :.~·~;.J<-~ . _ ~ -:.;-_ •• :·. _rno.st Urgent ne~d-i:s·· to develop a collection ·capability to 1 ......·.-t -~....-: _·-_ --.~:_.5-·_.-_:_~~~-.-~:::; ... :: ,.. .--.._ ~-~·,.. _~::.::\~:-. :_•} . ! :·-:-::-.,~ --~.,.~ =-_ ~ _·J> ...~_i --~ ·_ ;·: _ ·--_·.:.1~~:-.-;.t·~~·=:_c_,~-~--~-~~---.. _:-.~~ \';,'~=~~~~-~-~..:... -· ---- . fill the coverage gap in the high-resolution area ·: · · . ·.. '• CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . .. . NRO ·AP.PROVED F.bR ·a ~$LEA$E 1JSep(embe1~11 Handle Via BYEMAN, . TALENT-KEYHOLE '~7.: Controls TOPSEC~'f ..: . . CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD USIB-0-41. 13/11-(COMOR-0-13/16} Z7 July 1964 Limited Distribution Tab B Contd . :: (three feet at nadir} which gives continuous,. stereoptic coverage of a . : : strip some 300 miles wide would appear to have substantially greater : r .• , . ~ .. .'.':"~... ·• .• • •• •'~· _-~ . . .·:· -::. . . ' . . :-_ ,:_·~-~--~ -~ . .. . ,.. ...;.;__ advantages !rom an over-all intelligence point'of view over a very high :_';'):';~ resolution syate~ . . . . ' . . . ~~ic& c~-~·H~·'~-~!:;tt:rL,. '~~ seri~usly limited bY_ the very narrow s~ath ~dth and _by the d'if!i<=.ulty .;.''i,1 . --~ \• ·. ~.-:-~.-.-. ~-~--·.•_-, .. ~_..~---.--=~ ------:"i,o; ~ -:;._:·-~?;~ ol achieving the necessary, extremely high pointing ac_curacy; and . ·-. ) :---:<-~:~ can be ....._. : _ ..' . .; .: .--.:,.. , .....-,·..... ~ .. -.. ... ::·.:.·..": ~ ~:. : ·.'!-·. -·· ..,. .. . 10 BYE-4590-64 CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD .. ~ • -·.=--. -:::;:.:-~~;_::~:~.\~~:~i~i}f.i~~~ .:.;~~~~ SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS -NRO APPROVED FO~tt TOP SECRE'Ir RELEASE 17 Se~ember'2011 ,.. Handle via B YEMAN• -TALENT-KEYHOLE CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD Controls USIB-D-41. 13/11 {COMOR-D -13/16) 27 July 1964 Lilnited Distribution Tab C Ground Res elution Comparison by NPIC · (see attached) · 1. The Board requested that COMOR1 s study take into account an analysis by NPIC on the extent_to ~hicb the specified Essential Elements of Information {EEI)_can-be met by imp_~oved '. ,' .... ~ resolution and qu~lity of photography~ i' COMOR ~ccordingly arranged !or a CIA study on this question to be subjected to amplification of;._ . . . ·, ·:. :. the EEls by DIA and evaluation of targ~t data at three different gr;;und .~ ·: ... . ~ ' ,\ Within ·-·. the li:rnits of the -tirne permitted, such ~plification of tl1e EEI was . :--. . l-··: ·.::· made and the above task force at NPIC.sought to complete its .. evaluation. Pages l ~ough 9have be-~n·;fui·ly. ~~ordi~ted ~so!ar as . •·. __ ;· .~ ·"'~ .. . -~ ,": .these evaluations a~e con:cern~d.. -Pages: io-thr~ugh 11 h.ci.ve nat:;~;-:·: . --· ·. .-~ ··: ";.' .. . . : '!:: : ~=--:.~:~~.. ~: ·-... ·. ·, -·· ;.. -~~~~~· ~' ··:..::_,~ lack of tilne been fully coordinated. . ....~ : -~-~. ~ -. -' . ' 2. ·The Director. NPIC has given as his opinion that ...... ·:~·-.. differences between the CIA study and the.joiilt evaluation are proba bly not significant. He observes that for the most part. they are differences in precise interpretation or small variances inprobabiliry. This judgment was presumably based on pages 1 through 9.• 1 I· · BYE-4590-64 Handle via BYEMAN. ~CORONA/GAMBIT/LANY('>-RD TALENT,.KEYHC?L£ TOP SECRET Controls CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NROAPPROVED~R -. · · RELEAS~ 17 sep¥mb~011 TOP SECRET Handle via BYEMAN• . TALENT-KEYHOLE CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD · . ··. · Controls ·,· USIB:..D-41.13/ll (COMOR-D-13/16) 27 July 1964 Limited Distribution Tab C :contd: 3.· It was the consensus of COMOR 'that the column headed "Alternative, Possibly Better, Sources," should be omitted at this time. It was agreed tha:t this colwnn as pre~ented is incomplete; .. '·~ ·;. particularly as to SIGINT contributions, and would neve.rtbeless be _ .;.· .. ·: th'oroughly meaningful only if it contained alternative sources which could be weighed agai~st a "yes11 or: "partially•• in the -·'' column. It would also only be important should the answers in the ten-foot' column and three..;foot column have_~e~.n 11no11 · or .,partially.·11 .It weuld be·necessary to specify.that such obvious alter;1atives as .' .. . obtaining the article in question; obtaining an operatio~s man~. or • 0 • .. ....,. suborning atechnical expert inv~lved in the design of the article must . . \. . ~ .. ---~· ~ :;~:,_.. be ruled out. Furthermore, to permit 'a proper weighting o~ the. need :. ··.· ··t~.=~~ '• for such detailed photography, the-entry in the 11Alternative Sour~e11 . column should be specific as to the type and value of the various .. elements of information which could be obtained on the one hand by high-resolution photography and on the other by the alternative source. 12 BYE-4590-64 Hancile via BYEMAN, . CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD TALENT-KEYHOLE .Controls . . ~ t ·t TOP SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ; ; .•• •• ~ . ' . '· :: ·, ' 7.-:· ' ··.:·~.\~;': • :~•••• :, :•. 'l.'CG-'(IIn-611 . Hfll.tlLt·: HA 'i·:\r.:~t:·r-ii.rmtor..r:I ,;-. . -· •· n.~· w··ppt"' ~--.-i 11"":"•:t r · • r;~ .. ·:n :: · -:--·'(1; i;o:.niii.' cQ: :~· i;or. sm'l'Ez·iS JOIIi'L'TiY \ u \ rj 1.. J u..l . I ' ·~~d·..;).:>;::.... 2T July 19~,~ -~ -~ .. · ,:..·<~:· :!~' ,· . Copy_:J:~foJS . ···· ·:. '•::'. ~ ', ·..~: . ., . .. . . . :...../~ LcBend _;: ~ ·. ··-·")' . , ··~ ! . .·.·::·:.. :..;::, . .;·· .~ .. 1.. .1 ..•:.:.. .! ;, '{r;c -TMk ccm be accotnpl1shcd ' Par'·: o.lly ·-Tc.sk ~t·tinlly accomplished ... 1· · -So:r.e possibility tnsk C!ln be accomplished ;. Task iml>OGsiblc~~0 ·Eletr.ent:; ·of 1nrormntion added by ll!MP-l ., .... ·. .,_ <~X· . '----' 2:~ncral Il!dlc::!.tion of Intelligence In:t'0111l..'\" l;~.on Ob"tainnble Relative to GrOuJ1d n"e,;olution or Cnmcro."· Systems · ,;~ :;•.·: · -:: · .· ~. ,' '• -~:. ' . . . .......:· ~ .;'; . Altcrnnt1vc1 pos~ibly Rcllllll'ks · Inf0rt~.?.tion Sousht . 10 1 bettcr ·sources . .:,.;·'·: ----L. ,.;;,if: ; A. IG~Ti-l·ltn:.:/IRP.:.l System ·... Icentify launch co1nplex yes , 4 ··_,. '' Area &enl'Ch · · ·.,r yea =~ :... :·., ;r,,, ·. ···· f.· Idcnti!'J launch'& suppclrt · • , ('~ 'r• ~~ t; . , ,./~~:, ' ..~:: ·· 0 ... . ' ' ,I ,>.~: ··. fo.cility _yes -· . • ! ~: · .,;. .. '· :; ; · ·11 • ·r.' ~ _ Eus1ng .... ...... ~ ,. ~ -~~ ' I Hard or sort launch ye' lt., (/) ::. ··· .. .,. ·.. . . If aross rca\X~~·~ m .. ; I : ~ •• c/ .... .. :. ~ . :.~ · -~--~·;; "' ,; (') ·. ,.__ . If sort -how rnis!;i.lc' }>rep;;\·~t\ ' ·are to ·be donsic;ltn'cd -1 ~nd eructed i'or launch · · · · .·· 1 'l f ;:-, Dependant upon... 'rt 0 ninO\Ult 0 r detail _,-··,, · ._ 1, z ..., ~-. ·l'cqucstcd · · :· ·!· (/) H hnl'd -dete:rrnination of : ,• ·.•·. -: ~ :~. -< hc.rtlnesa ~t'.sccl on: (/) , .· -1 .:r:~ m 'l'h:l.c'r'.nr!SS or G1lodOOl' pn\··l;i(\].ly 3!: Thicf.nc:;:; or •.rnlls llC\l'tiaUy (/) r:·:.:t,clit 11 l'i.'.t~tlc Gt>'-C ...... ...... -..J NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 &l H >i ~ ;..,., , .. f',;: .:\~f._-:.' >i 0 ·· :.7:r . ·..· .. ·: ·}~"~''1.\~~t··iiJ''(~~>1·/· .;-.-. '.. ,. .·, ~:, ::5:;~~~:r c= (/) J:.,\i:Di.l·: \' rA '.i'AL}:i· ~..r-Kr:X IIOlol~ . . ,~ n"·, . ·: . .l'CIJ ( ~ (J~t'h . . ......j (/) C()~.;:u;:,r Coi;'.t'iic~: . :3i':3'l'Jo::.:s ·10ItiTLY ~· . ~ .i '' 'ft'Pt\J[·l · ... ,•:· .. '•··. ·····.' . 1 ·: ..;.,,, ,,. tliJ · ~ ,. ~. ,,,.:... ~ ~.:. : :~ . ' . I ," ~J l : . .•.. : :1t,J 't;'f:iiJ.>: ;' ;;. . ,,..N:~~1J1 ~ H >i · ·"'~ ··· · -·· A1tcrndh.1vo1 . r,oa11~blt. . ~·:··/~_f.~~~~< '··1 ...: InL\:n·n:•.'·t ion SO\\Gl~ 10' 3•· · ' bettl).\' dollt•eea . . ·-' Rerr.lll'ks ·: ·: : · >i ,;, :.• gj ~ · Sui~'1~b;1s1on syatcm' • J . -·-7 .•. / ·': 'f. :( 'f~.·, .'··>"~~~~~:;~~.}~~!~ti ~ ~ H >i ~ . .. •...,.,. . . ,."1 .;.~.. ) •rypq 1~\mch. (flY out or : ·--lift out) ·... ,. ,..... ~ •. "< '\ gj ' ~Pcri~ic phetses ot site ' •, portiall¥ .j ;. yO~; ;~~ ~·"~0'~0~\;.: ::·i_;~.~i•i:_ ;, ')' :•;.Gooero: .~~,;~~:.;·JfJ construcHon · constt·uction (e~.'rly)! .···: .· .';. ( . . ' . mid 1 late) id; · .:. -~ , •' ·. :.·.· :.· :~.~· ~ ~. 1 ...: . '• t.'· l ~ -· ... ::.: .. ~ '!::·.,:; :;· '-~-... ., (') ......· -!_:-:,.~ ·..~: ... '~ I ' I '. ·: ..: ·. :. ':'· :~ ~ tliJ •; .. . (:) ·, ·:~·.; _·, ;· H ~ ~ .f -: ·'··-··· "BPl -.SF'fl'~ . n:: :.-''·l I 1 §! NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ~-----,--------------:-----~~~~~~~-~,! ?X~r~---r'~n.. 6'~ .......·'·· ... . :IA:;or:t·: VIA 'l'AI..~·;i·;'.i,'-l{};YJ!O[,E-; • ~-.'\' i' \l <'J;f~ 'H:l ·,: ~.. ·! .I . t:c:-!E'.i.'' CO!.'.i'i\OJ, m·:i•L•:.:;:.;::> .JOlli'.~I,"Y ;-·· I l11 \; t. J \IJ., ··..~.\.;'~ .. '..;...:. :~ II· .... ·t·-; ·:-· · I .. . AJ.t,enll:\'l;!.vr. J!O:u;Lbl:y . I ·bet'tel' sources·· . H•'n~\'ks 10'' _L . ...___..,.__ ~ . ~n\)~~'-.:;'•)ug_!~ ··-'-. : .. ·. ·;,E.i,:! ·· ....~:-. ··r-. ,_; -::·i-', 'r•)~~~-.~u'L'.C~C\'i:;l;ic:J Of .U.Btlile! .. ' pt\l't1ally '~ pu.rtio.lly ·. ~-.... --~~·· ',·-·:· .-~ ···: .. ":'J!!i•iq\lid o\· uol\d fual partially • ~:· w, • •• • ' ;, ::-';_;,._ :' . ~ .\ .· :o'-._; :,,~.+·/ ,· '. • .-~' .· _;... .=., no . ..:. .. .1 ···.J ,_:;. 0 It' ~~qui~, types or propellent ''·,.,: , ·~-.. ·. . " \ .__.. ·· .. . . f . .. .. '_J I-:Ulthc.l' ot' en3ince •. . ~ .~ -:.· ."! . .. : .. . ·cuid!l.n'l:i-J, ~~he thcr all~1.n(!l·t1nl . pa.rtially pa\·tio.lly . . ;.. Ol' r~dio-incrtinl :~-tia.lly ··:.-· .... .~;~_ :-: · : no 1 If l'C.dio-incrtia.l, h0\1 runcl.ions I .-.~ :·~. .. ··: . .. ...~ . :. Dirr.cnGiOilB or taissiio: '· ... ·-:~~L;: ~.:·~ -. pal't11.\l.l1 ·· yes ....·· ' ;--. : :',~c t'! ·-.~ \ \" ~-Lcnsth ... .. ::· :.·. ·:.. :_ .~--~ '.;. . . : .. ~;, .. 'PIll' tio.l.ly'' r." r, ~-Diarn~tcr. at b~s~ .. ·.· ,·: . ., .>:;;~>:::';.~:;': ~;~1·t1ul.i. .).;(_::: . ).; ·'': ::~ .-.. .I1' ·dafi1icd , on · ·:·~l~?~:,; '::'.o-\ en . :. C\ 1!\:..")cr of ~tllac~: ··.· . :: ... miosilc · ·.:::·' · .·: , · m _..... ... '''l.'~..:o:'· C') ·' ···•··· . ::.·· -.· ~ ._:.:~,~:-:. .-{ -1 ... ~ ·. :-.. : .·:~ ··' .., ' '· :_·;~!('\ 0 512.i.ns at nose coM (RV) · .· ~ : z \-. ; ; -:·. ;' I ... .. .... ·.. en . . . ...-. ~ i :· ·.· • . :.., , .... .. :: ' ·:_:..·:· ·:.~ ;. -< en ~ ... -1 :.,;. . l 3: . ·· ·{ m . .'. ) en ;;o •' 0 c ..' ·o . ···::;·,, ...:.l. m .\"" ::.:--~ ~ ,. IIJ\t~~.~· ~~A •rALENT~lO!YltOIE-.. .' ::0 m () ' cotml'r corrmoi. sYs'mi·!S Jonrrr;r 3: m z -1 en ..... ..... (X) -~ ..... tO £ H 1-'3 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ~ ~ ~'" .·... -' ' ~: \:Cl" ' ~~:' -;;: ; ' . ' .:' :,);~;t.~ih'!~.~!;~\~~-i-:f ;: :> . ' ·<'/t.:' ~i p) c: (I) .. EAi·: or,l·! vn 'l.'Af,}:i:·r~Kr·:~moi.J<:4 . (I) •.·... ·"T 8:1 <.T 01rr:T :, < ., .' , !l."3~~r'ITJ46'~ tz.l ,<· ~:c:.II;:i'0CCi,i:mr. s:.:s•ri•:~\:3 JOllfl.'I,r ..· : ·\ .. I. . ··: ·. ..! -:':· ,_'~\· .. I oL 1,1 I; ' .; , :~ 1:; •' .; :t~i:' i , I. .--~· t~-:, .. 1: i ~ ,,. '.-;·, .· '·.·! 1-'3 '-~ H I . ~ ;. 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Ol' cru1.G~ L11o3t.lo support) · i no ' yeSa Lov'nltitudn· 1.\U\'ial Pans nt 31 if mls.o :.':.; ' pho tor~·rt\phy sHe o1· hanc111ns · !.· · (') .C'lU1p, observed .. . ~ ···-: . · . ·.. c·-\ :· ·:·:.. ·· o· . ; ......_.:_..._........:·• .. .-·. ....·;..._ :.;,.. .·.. '··· ...-f)··:;tff ~ H ' . ._) .·.L ·_·. I ·. ir.\rroLE vrA TALE:~r~i:: ( ;\~\L. ..·.'· ~-. Identiric<'..tion ·o£ ;:~.Jol~ Pl'Oductlo~· ".' ..·_. ._>: ... ·,· , -~._r_;_ :_ , :::_;::.:r;:. ; . ·' '• t I :..,.: .. ·.·:-~:-.. .. ... .J fnc 111ty . · yes yos yes. · :. ~ · .·.....,. , ... . :· .. ' ; \ ...._.•·oducti.on ln~·,,ut. · · · pai-t;ially )'CIS ,···.. ', ·.· · · .. . ... . Ovot·c.ll ~':~•· con:;tUill~t,. (m' . .:.:... ):,;...,·:~;~:~,t~~.. :-•..• ·• 'ilartially yes .·.· ..•.: ~ ·: ·,I ,. . ,l ; Po11er col\sll:':ll>lion by sccl:.ion ··,·. no 1\Q ' ·;_· ..~,~. Chcmical ·proccssin3 1'c.c111tiaa ·· ·:· .l: t po.rtlnlly . ' . :fOil . -~. ~· . '·.. . ~. ' ., . . 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' ·, ,.;·' :t 0 m _ ~--' ...:. . ... n c: (.) IG:'.r.r·.~~-,.;(' ;a 0 , oJ t I. .. ; • \ ' 0 ) 1. ;. ~ ( : l • ~ J•.'·. . • l!AilDLI•; Vl'A '1'At.P.il'1'-Kr::iliOT,J-:. m 3: m z -1 ....... (J) J'IV J'IV _. N w &) H ~ NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ~ :·. s·~ .•; .... ·:.__,. ..: 0 ~ ./. ~-~;:-:\;:~~~-···..-~---~~-~:~··;·; _:·~ 1-~·. : I ·: ' :L ~· . ::· i.' *.'· ,~,'1X"-·F·t ¢;. ~-·_ ;:·· · . . _ c: • '·/ . rn (c}>·l:f .,_·c:: :. ·.-l: · rJ.o~ E:\iiOL~: v_,_,, '':t\f;,.:;;'.l'-iG·:mor.:~. ,. rn 'l'~p f\ "'l'l)\"'' t"2 .·;~ ,;(,:.aiL·~ Cl)i,'.liior. m:~;·l'.hi-:!; Joxm:r;:c. t I[ . '"II':•••.S:l 'l' .,,,,. ,,.1 :-II ....... 1 ~ ':':(';.·. . '. ~ ~ · Altcl';ll)t.i Vel·, · i:o~af.i,iy · 10' __]~ l>~l:tct• r.out·r.cB ·.. : -• : !:.:~.~·:_i::.•·:~•:~~~--~2~r~ht. il"l~.C.\'l .. .. ~-~ . .·: ;1~·!~-~>::·:_' .;_t· i H ,~·:.:--·-....:·:::.;ir· ~ : ~~est·. o'b J•:c.t1vc:s -~~~ti~u.; partinlly ·:·Piu·t~nll~ ·-· ......: I ~ ..., -· ;-......,.. '-' ,:;.··. • . 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T.ocntlon- .: ·.. ~ rh .. .. . ~..·,:.. ::·:?, ~: Y.t t . ;. ~ : n tzJ Function t, Cl.\:pnc1ty ·. · . : • ., I PtU'tial..ll : yea . ... · (I) t< (I) ·:r-Co;:.::mnlc:c.ticit\ c.nd J:o.;r1at\t1ot\ Fllcil.itica pro•tinlly' res · .: . ::;,_':}:~~..i,/ · ·. 1. l·bjor ;Fl.\cil.itics on.ti ti ... , . ,) ~·:· · .. ~ ·. · ·,. ffi .. ! . • n i ! ·: ( ..•). . .. ..· -~ .. ~ ., .·.. ,, ... : ·r . ·_:/· ··:·.-_ . 1-1 . ' ...... ~~. ~.~· ~·:1·,-.Qr:. ~nl). · · · a I!Mmr,N VIA ~ri\T,};tl'r~Kl-:YI!Ot.~:• ( i NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 : - -:-_-----=-. :_·_-~.r.,....,...,..-----:-----.-------_..,..._ I!A~Iot~~, VIII. TALEWl'-Klm-[0-1);!--.,....,.......~_:T:-=u-=-p-=-s-=-Ea=-:-lt::::E:::;T-, ,._ --=-:-~: _ , . · cm;nn• Cl1N'l'l~L SYS'l'F'J.iS JOIN'l'LY . • · [ TCS-7473-64 ; · A.lter!'ntivej possibly ·nerr.arks-·:-•·; · Iu ro_t'l1~r:~.tion ~~>ueht 10' better sources ~ M•; . :-)-~; .......... ..· ~·;. ..... I , ' I~ ·, ·,, ~ •: ...li" ' .. .Electronic and Conununications ·. •.;· 'l·..-·· "h:';n~( ./~~~%\: ::-~-~> .· ..... -!· . ,: . ·. Ruda1· t\nd Conuno locations yea >:·h."\,.. t "', · .tj-}3~/1.;> ~ .r. ..~· ·/ \"i\>:~' . .. · • ,·. 'r ~.,. , . . ' i•." Rndo.r -Desi()Tl Determination ? · partiall.y yes ! ·; }: . ?·~-'. \ •: ., .it:.:· Commo· typ~ identification 'l . '· . -t~ .:. :C:~::i-'.:·~_;?:~;_FH ;·;-::· .! • ::-~ ;l=r(::<-::,~~3:?.{~:-_:·\::Dj ~ 1' ::.; MobilitY: Status yes :_,. ~ ••·.....t' ~ . :;f:; . :, \...... "·· . ··' ·,.. . \ ..·;.-.··. I ''::' :-~ .· .,.. .-~· ; ·~ . ' ·., .. ,,_ ' ·~ ... .-:~· ~ :::··-:: .~· ·.~-~-·~-~. ~;:i~~;i:: :.i·· ' .·~ ,i ·, • ·.. ~ ..... 0, · J.!issile Production . ' '. ... .:, . :'•;)f, ,•, ..-* Identification of Production Facility paJ."tially partia.l.ly yes .; ~i ~ Can be ident."1 ;but .,.:.!, ~! .·; 1?roduct must+be.. . . , ··• .. ., seen to .ideni:'as ' .; ,. missile producti~n .,. Production Layout par'tia.lly yes _ .<:'::;);! ::.~; ·... ·· * Product Identification · .·t . 't yea ·· ·Depends on size e.rid .l· , ··· ... :. %;·!:·.· type of mis$1le f · , 1 •' ',•. ,.. .. . . . '.' ~ ... ': ·~i .::, ~·. .,. Assoc, Test Facilities · partially (/) partially yes ~ ..~ . Large vert; stands m . ' ~ . () . '.__. visible at 10' · -1 0 ·• Testing Activity partially partially · .yes Bla~t marks ·•vf:-i:ble~ z at 101 :. , . .• .···· . . .·:;-., ., . . ~..,.' (/) ·:•neseai·ch and Dc\·~lopment Facillties partially partial-LY . po.rtial~ .. .'-· . ... -< (/) -1 m * Tcr.t1ng ActiVity partinlly partially yes 3: (/) ;;o <· m . . • •.~~ ·\· . ,·.... t· 0 . . .. .. ') c \ .. . ~ TQP ~~no (~--~·-3: ;s · ~ ·· HANDLE VJA TALF:N'r-KEYHOLJ< , ·,·-·=·~--' : . . ~~-:. ~'}; ';' ·• • !•, ,""~:~~;·,~-~}:.. ~· ti gj .. .· ' \,=:; :·· . ..: ~ . ~-: Yea I ,· .. .. "· • -:-; ·:-·· ,-· · Yes --~ \ ' H ·..Yc:a .. ;.~-; ·: ~;:' _:.: ...·l· .: 'i~-~ ··.-~.... . _·. 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I ·' .' • _. , · --.; .. . ;·:.: it -~}-·.1·;.....-~ ·. ~ -~.:-.. :·..:.-> ', • ! •, J -;I ~ : ·;· .,. .:., ~-; ::i):~:·;: ;:~:"-,: >···:'''· <. . .-··.-·.':'' • . , .· ·+;;\:\ ..•'· ._, ·: ·,:i:( . . -· t .-\ . ....· ·.··-:· · ::_.. : .-.. · , · ~ .·'~ ... ' ··,J en ... .. ,. m ,._,.., !'"t ....... .. . .~· () ''J ' .~ : .• t:· -~. . ~ . ~ .. ·.:·_:. -. ~~:~~;.:-~~;· ........_. ...... ... _. .·.. .··. . . 5 ;· · • . z .,:~· ~HV.: \ = -· ... en I . ·-·. :'" -< en -.. ., .. f '... . ' I ...... ·. m -,... ~ ·-·· ····· -······ · ·. ·~..:...:.. . -·=· ~-;. t • . 3: 1'( "' '· ... , en ::0 m I • 0 ··r');, R!"P~e llfii!DI.g VT/1. .'rM.~:i;'l'~ KF;YilOLl-!~ c '> ()' . l cl (, ·~ •J I; . . . O·r ::0 - ..• \" . ··-··· .-. ':" ... ...... .. . . . .. .. . .. . ~ COi-11!1'1' COi:'l'nOf, SYS'.m .:s JOUr~r.y· ·. __.. ... m I 3: m z ...... en _. VJ N CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . ,, \ QJ TOP SECRET ~~ . 'CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYA. J j· IIIIJii,~f!!\jlll,l~' • ' HANDLE VIA BYEMAN-TALENT/ BYE 4.594-6i/f',., ·K~YHOLECONTROLSYSTEMS Copy No. . f::1~D)( JOINTLY USIB-D-41. 13/12 (COMOR-D-13/17) 31 July 1964 Limited Distribution UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SUBJECT Lens-Range Requirements for Satellite Photographic Collection REFERENCE USIB-D-41. H/11 (COMOR-D-13 /16 ). Z7 July 1964, Limited Distribution ·" .. 1. At tile United States Intelligence Board (USm} meeting on Z9 July; in restricted sess.ion with D;r. Mcl\1illan. ,Director, National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO) present, the Chairman, · c~n"lmittee on Overhead Reconnaissld..dd T&.An SEGRE'iF CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM •.,::..:'::·'··· ~~ORONAlG~MB~~/.LANYARn~· \ HANDLE VIA Bl' .:;MAN-TALENT/ BYE-4594-64 KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEMS USIB-D-4L 13/12 (Rev.) JOINTLY (COMOR-D-13/17} 31 July 1964 Limited Distribution payload design, or the latter part of 1966. Mr. McCone suggested that in view of Dr. Fubini' s statements last week .regarding availability of funds, it appeared questionable whether priorities !or the development stage were important. The D/NRO replied that he felt it was a matter of convincing Secretary McNamara of the requirement, as the Secretary of Defense had told him repeatedly not to stint on this program~ 3. The Chairman stated that after considerable thought on the matter. he believed the positions developed by COMOR were logical and uncle rstandable. He said he understood and was fully sympathetic to the Defense Depart.m.ent responsibilities and desire for the highest possibl e resolution in order to produce the best technical estimates on Soviet weapons systems. On the other hand. Mr. McCone said he recognized the high p:rio:rity placed by ClA analysts . on the broad view of Soviet progress which could better be answered by broad coverage. The Chairman stated he was not going to try to; resolve this appa re.nt problem as he believed we needed both capabilities. Although new heavier boosters may help, Mr. McCone ·recognized serious problems incident to developrnent of both systems. He said consultants had pointed out areas of serious doubt in the. new CIA-proposed search system. G-3 also has develop-· ment problems, including those surrounding the use of the largest {48 inches) mirror employed to date. The Chairman pointed out that only when research and development is completed can we prove or disprove their capabilities and approve a "go a.hea.d" on either or both of these systems. 4. Mr. McCone then reviewed.the substance of a letter he had written to Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance on 23 July in which he had reco.mmended certain steps be taken to improve or develop GAMBIT, GA...ViBIT-3, .the CIA concept for a higher resolution search system, and alternative high resolution spotting and search systems in ant.ic.ipation of the availability of the TITAN HI . booster. Specilically, Mr. McCone had recommended research and development work on G-3 and the CIA concept over the next six months as a basis .tor further decisions. The Chairman stated that if the Board generally agreed to -3 - CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD .T&PSECRET '>.. · ~ SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS ~ ~A.., SECRET ) G ·.~ ' / .... ..., , · CORONA/GAMBITI LANY. . ~D HANDLE VIA BYEMAN-TALENT/ Kf:YHOLE CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY BYE-4594-64 USIB -D-41. 13/1 Z(Rev.) (COMOR-D-13/ l 7) 31 Jul.y 1964 Limited Distribution this procedure, he would meet with the Secreta,ry of Defense and arrive at definite decisions on how to proceed. Mr. McCone said he w<:LS particularly interested in the eifect TITAN Ill might have on future satellite reconnaissance s ystems. He then requested the D/NRO to make a study regarding the potential of TlTAN III in improvement of satellite reconnaissance systems currently · under consideration. The DIA member said he subscribed to the Chairman's proposal as he believed it necessary and app-ropriate that the Board state firm requirements !or collection systems. Mr. McCone noted that having stated intelligence requirements, the problem of how to fulfill it was beyond the province and competence of USlB. 5. The D/N.RO stated that it was very helpful to have firm statements of current USIB requirements. He agreed that study was needed on the use of TITAN lU, and noted that a fair amount of analysis had already been done on its use. Dr. McMillan pointed out, however, th~t the information on the u s e of TITAN III for general search is not up to date, while studies on its u s e in connection wit.h a high -resolution pointing system are more current. In_E._!:~-~-connection he said that at the present state of~~-~ ..!-~.§..ol~~tioj5.po-tnhng..system woUld not requ1re the IUIT weight carrying capacity --:-of TITAN lli:-The D/NRO emphasized that there were critical technical -problems 1nvolved in the develop~ent of such a very high resolution system and mentioned two: · a. The large (100 inch) mirror, which would require extremely iine finishing, and which would experience to a higher degree, all of the. problems the Chairman had pointed out in discussing the 48 inch .rnirror in G-3. . b. Much development needed for a suitable target tracking device not bas ed on a timed flight schedule. He noted that this second problem is technically easier than the mirr~ problem mentioned above. The D/NRO said that although he was not prepared to discuss :development -4- CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD TOPSEdRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM I ~ ·.,'TOP SECRET CORONA/GAMBIT)LANYARD JKANDLE VIA BYEMAN-TALENT/ KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEMS .JOINTLY BYE 4594-64 USIB-D44L 13 /lZ (COMOR -D-13 /17 31 .July 1964 Limited Distributi prbblems incident to the general search requirements which incorporate re~:~olution with a broad swath, he believ2d such a system WO\.Ild r~qnirc the full prtyloa.d cnpacity o! TITAN III. 6. The CIA member, in connection with the discussion of t~e weight carrying capacity of the TITAN, raised the possibility of eventually using a man to point the camera, Dr. McMillan said studies along this line were being conducted by NRO. It appeared that a man could do the job, but the unmanned system should do almost as well and did not require the 8. 000 pound additional capac,ity required to support manned .£light and was not involved with manned recovery problems~ 7. The Deputy Director, Science and Technology, CIA, asked whether, in view of Board interest in high resolution, our requirements should stop at The Chairman suggested that an _effort be made to find out what this improvement would cost beflllme we go further, as he was becoming increasingly allergic to expressions of requirements which. did not bear a price tag. Mr• .Mc.<:;one indicated there may be a lower lim it to resolution . b~yond which atmospheric phenomena may be a controlling £actor. · Dr. Wheelan explained that the CIA general search propc.l which was pegged to the use of TITAN II had the problem of moving film fast enough. He said that faster films being worked. on by Easttnan fox G-3 might help the problem by cutting down exposure time. ·' :; . 8. In response to a question from the Chairman regarding the stat-u.s of N efforts to resolve G-3 problems. the D/NRO stated that specific efforts were currently being made to bring the resolution down to that requested, through ;: design contract to Eastman for the system. which includes the structure to be orbited. He said that the present schedule calls for the fabrication of !ull siz· mirrors from two set;; of materials by February 1965. Sn:ralle:r m .irrors tot<' materials were expected this fall. Dr. McMillan said that environmental test of the mirrors would be less complicated than silnilar tests for the complete camera, and that money was included in the Eastman contract for the con~t:ruc tion of a test facility. -5 -\ CORONA/GAMBIT/LANYARD TOP SECRET SECTION II: SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS ~ WI' .TOPSECRET . ~ C• ~ · ··•d!\/GAMI'-ITfLANYARD DY:!: 4594-64 USIB -D-41. 13/12 K E YHOLZ CONTROL SYSTEMS (COMOR-D-13/17 ; 31 July 1964 HANDLE VIA BYEMAN-J:'Al..!:NT/ JOINTLY Limited Distributi ... :r. m~1.· .fl•rih~r discussion USIB.: a. Approved as guidance to NRO tb.e COMOR Conclusions and Recommendations contained in Tab B of USIB -.D-41. 13/ll, subject to the deletion of the priority statement in subparagraph 7. b~, and the reservations expressed by the Chairman and the DIA member concerning the COMOR Conclusions regarding LANYARD in paragraph 6. b. Noted the DCI's review of the substance of a letter to Secreta:::) Vance recommending certain steps to improve or develop GAMBIT, GAMBIT · the CLA concept for a new and improved search system, and alternative hig h resolution spotting and search systems in anticipation of the availability of TITAN rn. with which USlB expressed general agreement. Co Requested that NRO report at the next regular usm meeting on the results of the NRO feasibility study to conduct one or two KH-6 mission giving maximum coverage over China near the end of this year. . •·• ·.'llt d. Noted that the D/NRO would have studies on the use of TITAN I for both general search and pointing systems brought up to date and presented to USIB. . _ .. ,._ .. .... .. -···· . ·.·-: : . -.· ···-· ,... Executive Secret . ·:...--·; -6.;. CORONA/GAM(3 IT/LANYARD ' TOP SECRET !T ECURITY: TO us s SATELLITE J CR ICAL AND HEXAGON COM PENDIUM THE GAMBIT SYSTEMS RECONNAI SSANCE SECTION III: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION The Air Force was responsible for initiating Gambit as part of the Satellite and Missile Observation System (Samos) program. Samos was mostly an overt program with several components including film retrieval and film readout systems. The film retrieval elements would fully mature in the form of the Corona and Gambit programs. The film readout elements, beset by multiple difficulties, would eventually wither. The only exception was National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) use of Samos technology for lunar imaging to support the Apollo program. Hexagon initialization really began in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Directorate of Science and Technology. There, CIA scientists worked with ltek and later Perkin-Elmer to develop the Fulcrum imaging system . CIA development efforts caused significant tension with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Eventually CIA and NRO leadership reached a mutually acceptable accommodation where the CIA developed the optics and camera system and the Air Force was responsible for the development of the other major system components, with overall responsibility assigned to CIA's Program B housed at the NRO . Since the Gambit systems can trace their origins directly back to the Samos program, we have included the Operational Order for Samos. The Order includes the assignment of Brigadier General Robert Greer as Director of the Samos Project Office. Greer would also oversee the early development of the Gambit system. The document also includes the structure and responsibilities of the Samos program and relationship to other Air Force elements. By the end of 1960 , the policies for the Samos program office were well developed. We have included a memorandum with a classified attachment that summarizes the governance structure for the Samos program as well as the integration of the Gambit program. The document provides early and concise insight into the efforts and systems that comprised the Samos program. Security has always been a significant concern for national reconnaissance satellites. The Security Guidance of an Unclassified Nature Relating to SAMOS describes the unclassified purposes of the Samos program, basic configuration and other technical details , and the uses of military assets supporting the program. More importantly, the document reveals how the Samos program was presented to the public , allowing Gambit to hide in plain sight as an element of that program. Gambit traces its origins to early camera system proposals from Eastman Kodak known as Blanket and Sunset Strip. We included early company correspondence that confirms initial contact with what would become the Air Force's Program A housed in the NRO . Eastman Kodak would eventually supply the Gambit Camera systems as well as SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION provide film processing for all US intelligence community film return satellite imagery systems. In other correspondence, Eastman Kodak identifies preliminary schedules for the Blanket and Sunset Strip programs as well as budget estimates and capabilities estimates. The package also includes recommendations for organizational and management structures to support the development of the then challenging space reconnaissance systems. By late 1961 , Blanket and Sunset Strip had evolved to Project Cue Ball. We include a project summary that provides significant details of the program that would eventually become Gambit. It includes an overview of the program, the program management approach, schedule estimates, as well as cost estimates. The document includes descriptions of the industrial contractors supporting the project and the facilities used in the project. The document was released shortly after the formation of the NRO in September 1961 . Gambit would be succeeded by the Gambit-3 program. The original Gambit program provided high resolution imagery that became critical to intelligence analysis on a host of issues . NRO 's Program A developed the Gambit-3 to achieve even higher resolution and longer mission duration. We include an early program management plan that contains an overview of the program, techn ical aspects of the program , as well as schedule and finance information. By the mid 1960's Corona 's successful capture ofwide-area imagery allowed the United States significant advantages in searching for threats in the broad expanses of the Soviet Union and other denied areas . The Corona success also led to development efforts for wide-area search capabilities with even higher resolution than Corona could provide . We include a CIA program document that details CIA's early efforts to test such a system known then as Fulcrum . The CIA's effort in the first phase tasking would eventually lead to the Hexagon system and some significant tension with the Air Force in getting there. The phase one testing would assess Fulcrum's film handling capabilities, camera system and optics , facilities needed to support the system, and design and engineering requirements. CIA's Fulcrum project caused tension with the NRO despite the agreed upon approach for testing Fulcru~ described in the previous document. We include a program memorandum to the DCI that describes an earlier memorandum from the Director of National Reconnaissance who raised concerns about Fulcrum to the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology. The CIA and NRO disagreed over whether or not the phase one testing was for design purposes or for development purposes. This document provides the CIA's internal response to the NRO concerns. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM When Alexander Flax became Director of the NRO in the fall of 1965 he inherited an impasse between the NRO and the CIA over the Fulcrum system . In his 29 April 1966 memorandum to Air Force and CIA program leaders, Flax describes the resolution of the impasse where the CIA would assume responsibility for the optics and camera system and the Air Force would assume respons ibility for the remaining elements of the program. This document provides significant details on the anticipated technical capabilities of the new system. In a 21 July 1966 cover letter for the Perkin-Elmer Hexagon optical sensor design proposal , Perkin-Elmer President Chester Nimitz, Jr. highlighted significant elements of his company's proposal. Those highlights include: establishing a separate optical technology division, acquiring a new facility committed to the Hexagon program, and recruitment of an add itional professional personnel to support the effort . Nimitz also highlights characteristics of the system including : 2.7 foot resolution from 95 miles above the earth , a thermal design that yielded a favorable environment for optics , and an optical design that provided for a generous focus tolerance. Perkin-Elmer would provide the system to the CIA and successfully contribute to the overall success of the Hexagon program . LIST OF PROGRAM INITIALIZATION DOCUMENTS 1. Organizational Instruction: Operational Order for the Satellite and Missile Observation System, Lieutenant General Bernard A . Schriever, undated 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00. 142 2 . Organizational Instruction: The Basic Policy Concerning SAMOS, Memorandum from Maj or General R. M. Montgomery, 29 December 1960* ooooooooooooooooooooooooOOooooooooooOOOOOOOOOOooOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 178 3. Security Instruction: Security Guidance of an Unclassified Nature Relating to SAMOS , Colonel Harry L. Evans , undated .00.00 000 00 00 000 00 0000 00 000 00000 00 00000 000 00 00000 00.00 00 000 00.00 00.0000 00000 00 000 0000 000 00.00 000 000 00 000 00 00000.00 00 000 000 00 00.00 00 oo ·00 183 4 . Letter: Kodak's Arthur B. Simmons to Air Force Undersecretary for Research and Deve lopment Joseph V. Charyk , Preliminary Schedules for Blanket and Sunset Strip, 22 July 1960 000000 0000000000 0000000000 00 00 0000 0000 00 187 5. Report: Major General O.J. Ritland, Project Cue Ball : Outline Development Plan , 9 November 1961 000000. 200 6. Report: Colonel William G. King , Program Management Plan, Project G-3 , 1 February 196600000000 000000000000 226 7. Report: CIA Directorate of Science and Technology, Preliminary Project Fulcrum Phase I Tasking, 1 July 1964 0000000 0000000 00 000 oooo· 00.00 00000000 00000 00000 0000000 00 000 0000 .00 00 00000000000 00000 00.00 00 000 00 00 00 000 0000 0000 00 000 00 00000 00 000 0000 000 00000 000000000 00000 00 243 8. Memorandum: CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology Albert D. Wheelan to the Director of Central Intelligence, Project FULCRUM, 30 September 1964 oooooooooo oooo oo oo oo oooooooo oooooooooooooooooooooooooooo oooooooooooooooooo 248 9. Memorandum: Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Alexander Flax to Director of Special Projects, SAF and Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, System Operational Requirements for the New Search and Surveillance System, 29 April1966 oooooooo oo oooooooo oo ooooooOO oo oooooooooooooooooooooo oooooo ooooooooooooOOooOOoo0000000000000000000000 252 10. Letter: President of the Perkin-Elmer Corporation Chester W. Nimitz , Jr., Cover Lette r for Design Definition of Hexagon Optical Sensor, 21 July 1966 oooooooooooooooooooooooooo oo oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo. 279 * Pages including full-page redactions and blank pages have been removed from this document. SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION · ~,·=~rt-r:"~-· ~~· J,.,,. ~o,• vflh~ ttiAOQUAattal • AH~ r~SEARCR.." AND D~VELO?'-~EN'i' CO:.:rr.wm · ~UAt:l A!l fO.:CI ,_,_,.,_... ~1.1,04 I"IY tO 11 .,._.,., ~ , . Ali)~ Ott 1\Wo~etio~l Ordn for S4to1Uto acd Kioailo Obaarvat.loA Sy•taa .. · . (SI.!-:~) t:orial No. 60·1 · . ·. • . . . : . · · .· 1. You arc directed to t~!ENCE li: ILL Bt: CA!~L~D Ill ACCORDANCE WITH PAR 25~, ~l 205· i. CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM HEADQUARTERS .· ·AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMZNT COMMAND WASHINOTON U, DC ~ . . '• : .' OPERATIONS ORDER FOa SATELLITE AND'MISSILE . . OBSERVATION SYSTEM (SAMOS) . . . : . .SERIAL' NO. 60.1 ·. ·! ... . . · . .. .. . .. o:-··.,:~Z>.,Vr! :JN-3 o::-:. ..::ns NO. 60-1 . . .· . SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION ' NRO APP.RQVE;O F_OR RELEASI; 1'? Se~temtier 2011 .'. .. . : •' I' ...... ~, . P:\ge Coniio~r.t.W.l · 1 ,J . '! 2 Con!idcnt,i;!-1 ..;!~: :.:~~!:~:::.?: .l'' . ·.. ·· . "'--. . .. ...,. ••• ·-lr:!:,1c.r.lcnUng Dlrocth-ca·· Uncln:lci.iictl •• . ~ . 'D :.. .com;:.trollor Unclao.:i!lcd 16 c -r~cilitioo UnclOl:!!O!.i'ied 18 . D -· !N;;-i"tlco .A. Unelaeoinc::: · 19 . ~ . r: -~1ot u~ed ."i,.' ,. Cr:-:·.~r.-.un.ic:>tiono ·Elech·onicl Unclnooi~cd Zl zz Z5 Z6 Z7 ZB Uncln:ui ~ic~ 30 -;· .~ ::,;:.)7.:~:, TIOi\"S OiWZ?. IS C.i...ASS!FIED IN ACCORDANCE '\71TH THE RE· '."_-. ·.~.~T.:l'\TS OF PARAGRAPH Z3 OF A}'R 205·1 . . ,· ~ . .. : . ', • . ' .. -:-:--", / · ,. -· r: . •-...J :· ...::. ~ .... · cor· · · ·· . ·""'-. . . ' . CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM '· -CONfiDt:t.fftAL . HEJ\DOU.AR'.l'ERS ·.AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMANp WASHINGTON .~5. DC .. . 1 • • OP~R.ATIONS ORDER NO. • J. TA~t~ OnC:ANIL'.~!.!2!!:, Tho S:ttclUte end MiceUo Obaorvatlt>n Syctcm (SAMCS) .Pr;,Ject Office,··, .field e::tc:telon of tho O!Cico of the Sccrcbry of tbo .1\ir Force, h:1o been . . oc!:lblir.he.-.1 :\t 2100 E~ut El Sogwu.lo Blvd, El So,;undo, California, per SAF Order t-:o. us·;1, 31 AU:JUilt 60. (Soo Annex A) BriR:ldicr Cicnern.l"Robcrt . : E. : Crc~r. l:D.a:b~_~n donirtn~tod Director o{ the' SAMOS Projoct Of!ic'!); with ,;ac!diti~Olt'.J. · _;ty ao Vic:o Commnndor _ ARDC•. «i~!or Sn.tclllto Syat~ma, AFI3MD,· Aa Piroctor.o! tho S.J\MOS Project, Conernl Creer b rcaponsib~c to; ·n.nd .'\vlli rope:.t di:occtly t:tthc Socret:lry o! the Air Force. In hie dud ~~pllcity ao Director. 61. tho SAMPS project ·and Vice Commander, AFBMD, ho.will ·· · cxcrci::o :.\ut~o:-ity a.nd control"oi tho field mnnnccment of the SA¥CS progr&m. · M.:l~po..,:o~ aud BU.nocoeeary reoourcoe will bo ita.de ava.U~b\o by AFBMD. to ·· · aupport.thie.of!lce on tho highcet naUon.al. priority•. Tb~ re•ourcoa ~ncJ ae• · •i~r_!anc:o ·~r B:~(ARDC, _,?iviaion• and Centon wUl ~· ·inaae availa.blo·a• . . · ~~q~rccl•. · .I. G!i:.NZR AL SITUATION:~ Tho D:::puiy Secretary. of.' Defon11o hae directed tho SecretAry of tho ·Air Forco to o:.se:umo d irect reaponoiuillty !o:r iho r~conru1ioa~nce oatcllito'prc.o• · . ~ tl':a:rn..(5.1\;.!ort.wll~ inc1~<1'3. a.U function• normo.lly1conaiC:ored oporaUonara'~per-· fortnl"d -by c?ti_l?r Co~~·~and acUvitiea, · · 3; T./'.!::~s: . . . . • ;,.. ·. ;.:o~ac!t'l\!:1r~.,z:•· .ARDC will,in a.ccord&z:ee with appropria.to directive• p::t " _ ; ~ c,~ no-::c:ec3.ry oupport to tho SAMOS dovclopm~nt pro3r:>.~n. An of!ico, '.1,~ ·. : ·!.,nt !or S::lteH!.!'l Syatcme (ItDRB·l) h.:u booa. estahliebed l.or tbia pur• · :;:>:: ·:. Th~-~u."lctlon•~ o! UU1 o!Iico will iBclude tho .followina l'eoponoibilitioa: • (i) Wc•·rn~· ~~Commander on ~11 ~~~pee~• o! SAMOS develop• ·· m~: :l p•·~?ar~~~ ·... ·_. · · . HQARDC . oPr::R~!~P~s. c)~Ea No: ·6o-• CONFJDEMTtt1L · SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION CONfiDENTIAl (~) Monitore tho program to insure c:onliatcncy b~t-.yeen ita aaairncd priority and tho reaourcea applied again•t the proararn. · . . .. (ll) Maintoline cognbance of ~he activitiea of ARDC Divlaione and Conteioa to include e!!octing' coordination u requeated by the Commander, AF'BMD. · · (4) Maintain~ a knowledco o! the activitlea o£ the eta!£,' Hq ARDC, to acalat in aeeomplishing ata£1 actions expeditiously, · · . . . . . . . . . . ~ Hq .AFBMD will support thq SAMOS development program to the ex· t~nt poooible !rom wlth!n exioting reoourc:ca. Such roDourcce will nqt be at tho c::pcnae o! program• having eq\141 national priority. Hq ARPC will'be advised · o! Any requirom.cnta beyond cxbtine capability to provide. M~imum uae will'be made o£ the to~hnical reaourc'e• o£ tho Aerospace Corporation and .Auociate Con· · · t:-~ctora~ Subordinate unite wlll be aur;mented wherever·noceuary by tho omploy-· . mcut .o£ competent civilian ac:iontiflc nnd technical talent~ The 'prog'rarnming and .. atatus ·rcportin~ !aciliUea of the AFBMD wUl be ausrnootod aa necuaary to . ; suppor~ thiB pros:ram. ., : ' · · · · :_ · · · ·· · • • ' • • " '''I .·' C. Ellch ARDC Divioion and Contcr having an aosigned recponeibility in c:on.~ectlon with tho SAMOS development p:-ogram will eotablioh a aingle point o£ cont.:lc:t of£1ce, reporting cUroctly to tho Division/Cftnt~r Comznander, and wi.ll · aupport !ho proer&nl in accordn.nee with ita nn.tional priority, '.i'be Aaaiatant !or ·. SatcWto Systems, Directorate o! Ballistic Mieailca It Spncc S)'D tema (RDRB-1) ia deaicnatod aa 'tho SAMOS point of contact within Hq ARDC and will r&port ' diroc~ly t~ tho Commander•. ARDC, ou SAMOS ma~tera. ' ., . ·: . \ . .. . . • D • . Hca.dquartera USAF haa directod that the Air Forco provide the , noceeo~:-y reoourcca.and aadatance to &allure the timely attainme~t o£ the S.AMOS obJectivoa. · . . ~ ' · .. . . · . . ·. . . .. :_-.·_.. E.: The UrJ:ency O{ thia program will require lOWOBt 53f'O GOCUrity. · c:ln.o3uic:ltion to ?ermit expeditious a.ccompUohment. Extreme care will be ~xorcised by all concerned, howev&r, to eneuie the 111trictcst 11noed to know" iA orc!ct:,fo p1•otect tho • enaitivo .political nature· o£ tbb ,progrnm. ·, .. F,il.sp cuic-auppor·tln& requirement• are outlined in the att~cned . . ~ea.~ ·. . . . ·, . (ll j I . . ~ V1 . } •· \. '.ANNEXES: .A • Implementing' Dlroetlvoa B • Comptroller ·• C -Facili tieo · D • Logiotica . E • Not uood · F ·-Cotr'.munications-Electronica Ci -Peroonnel, M.anpower L . ' Org::uU:ation . ·'H. • Aircraft Support· I • S'3curity & Invpoc:tion Service• .. . .I-· Logal · · K • In!ormatlon &t Hiatorical Sorvicea HOARDC ; , .. L . .: Administra.tivo Se~v:icea OPER.r\'riONS ORDER NO; '6oJL C0-9~~40' 2 €9N'"'· ~,.."·-~~!·a " ;:..J r.~-.~ I; · _ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM CONFfDENTtAL ·. . · AX:~).Z;S; {Co::ti:;c4) M • Medical Scrvlc:oa DISTRIDUTLON: . O!fic:o o! the Secrct:).ry of the A1r Force: · 3 c:opioa • SAFSM He:ld?,uartera USAF: . • 1 • DCS/D 1 • DCS/M· 1 • DCS/0 .1 ~. DCS/'? . · 1-DCS/C . He~dqul\rter• ARDC: .. · 1 • RDC 1 •· R.OOV 1-RDCE {. RDA 1 • RDE 1 ·-:ani . . 1 :-·aoJ ·1 • .RDC ~-ROY 3 • P..DM ~ • RDP 1 -. RDL. 3 • RDR S • R.DRB AJU)C Commnndo: 5 • E~~.eh ARDC DlvllioD 3 • Each AnDC Center I~Q ARDC • .C0·9U40 · C.?ii:ltATIO~'S OlU)EQ. NO. 60·1 . ... . ' .. . C9NFiD.e~TJA.L' ·. . .. ,· SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION IIZhDQtTJ\!\TERS AL.'l. RESEAnCH AlO DEVELOPMENT Cf0Mlv1AND · W.ASHINGTON z:;, DC COPY · THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON ~:p 15, 1960 ~~t:~1C:t.A:l'.'"D\JM FOR T'rl£ SECR!i:TARY OF THE AIR FCl\.CE T:1o s~crct~ry of tho Air Forco will asoumo direct 1·caponalb.Uity for tho rccor.:,l1.iot:::mco •~tollit~ prosra.m' al'ld will report for rovhsw and Olpproval on t!-lo pro~..-.~m r of tho Office o£ Mi3tliio ll.nct S~tollito Sys;t~~. 1.s p rimarily .rc~p~nl!l::blo lor aeoieUng tho Sccrot:u'Y in dit:chnraing his rcopo~oibillty !or tho direction, a\\pcrvioion and control of the SAMOS Project. He iw r c::p :>nalblc for maintaining li:Uson with the O!!ice, Secrob.ry cf Defense, ~:1'1 o t h e r intercoted Covornrncntal agencies on ~n&ttore relative to hie .;;.:u: i ::_;n!!u rc::pon:sibilitiea. He may bo aa.ligncd additional dutloe ae · dcc.ncd .a.ppropriato by the Secretary o! tho Air F.orc:e. 3, Tho Director will provide tho Secretari:~.t !or the .Air For,ce B,o.UiaUc ' l-.tticoi14e Committee; · · · · DUDLE~· C. SHARP Secretary o£ tbe .Air Force I~Q J.-~r;.DC . OP~:<.:~TIONS ORDZR NO. 60-1 5 ·· . . SECTION Ill : PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEP.<.SE 1{ s'eptember 201 1 • 0 ' ·.· .. COPY NO: 116 . 1 DATE: Auguat 31, 1960 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE ORDER .. . • ! , SUBJECT: The Director of the SAMOS Project I. ECfective thi·a date, Brig~ier CC'ncnl Robert E. Creer, Aui..tant Ch1C'f of Stall lor Guided Miuilea, i• dca;~:nated u Director of the ,SAMOS Project, with add1tional duty a a Vice Commander Cor Satelht\ pyetema, · · AFBMD, ARDC, with duty atation nt 2400 Eut El Segundo Bbujcvard, · El Seg=do, Ca.li!ornia. 2.. The Director will organi:r.c a.n oUice to ma.nagc the SAMOS f>roject. Manpower to •ta!f the oCCice will be dri\wn from manpower 'available to him ~. Vice Comm~nder lor Satellitfl Sy•tcms. The SAMQS PrcJ,.ct OfCice will be a !icld extena1on o! the O!!icc of the Secretary o! ~}le Air Force. · · 3. The Director ja re~ponalble to and will report dir11clly to the Secretary o! the Air Force. 4. .Additional dutiea may be auigncd to the Di rector at deemed approprintc .by the Secreta.ry of lhe Air Force. DUDLEY C. SHARP Secretary o{ the Air Force -.....~~ ........... . f ' -trM .• -----.·-;, ..~;.:r .,._ ....,.. .... - ........... ·...:..;.a..·•· ~· ---· . .. ·. ... .. . CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO AP,P.ROVED FOR RELE~E,i1...September 201 t . ' COPY 31 Aug 60 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHJ.EF OF STAFF 1. In implementation of SAFO llS. I, it u requetted Chat orders be iuued a1aigninc Drigndiet G~neral R1chard D. Curtin u D1rc_ctor of the O!!ice of Mluile and Satolhtc Sya tema. Personnel liated in the attachment should be assigned coincident with General Curtin's aa•ignment. 2. NPceuary adjustment to the authoriz.ed manning o{ OSAF will be' made to accommodate the trani(er 'o( the personnel indicated• . ·). ·. Physical oC!ice space shOuld be in the area presently occupied by · the Auiata.nt ChieC o! Still£ lor Guided Min1lcs, i! leaalble. · 1 Incl /signed/ Attach DUDLEY C. SHARP .·.• .... . :• I • '··= ·· -·· ; · HQ ARDC OPERATIONS ORDERNO. 60-1 . 7 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION ------ - - --- - - NRO APPRQV!;D FOR RELE:ASb 1-l SePtember 2011 COPY IZ Sep 6v ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF MISSILE AND SATELLj'TE SYSTEMS l. Secretary o£ the Air Force Crdor No. 116. 1. dated 31 Auguet 1960, dceignatcd Brigadier General Robert E. Gr~er ae .Director of ~he SAMOS ~rOJ(• n, wilh additional duty ae Vice Commander for Satellite Syatem1, AFDM, AROC, . with duty 11tation at AFBMD. It dirccta· him to organize a SAMOS Project Of!kc. at AFDMD aa afield edteneion ~!the O!!lc.'? of. th~ Sccrcta~y o£ ~bo_ ~': F~rce, It epeci!ioa that Director o! 'the' SAMOS Project ie reaponoiblo to 'And will rcpo~t directly to 'ttu: Sec.retary of the J..i.r Force, · · ·' ~ · . . z. Socr~tary' o! tho AirFor"ce O~d~r N~. 115. 1, · dated Jl .Augu~t 1960, catilb.lished the O(Cicc o! Mi'uile and Satellite Syetcme in tho OfCico of. the Secrcta.ry o! tho Air Force.·· lt prov1dca that the Dlro ctor o! the O!Cice o! Mieeilfl and Satellite Syateme ii' 'prlmarily. rcoponaible for 'aoaioting the Secretary· in diucharsing hie reaponeibility !or the direction, supervision an.J control of the SAMOS Project. He la reoponaible !or maintaining liaison with tho O!!ica, Secretary of Dc!enat;, 1\nd other fntorea'tcd govc rnmontal nccndoe on mt&.ttere relative to hie aaaigned reaponaibllitie11. Ho may be aoaigned additional d\Siea as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of the .Air Force, and he will provide the Secrotari&t for tho .Air Forco BallitUc Miaoilo Committee. • 3. The.g.eneral management atructur:~ !or ti-c SAMOS Project ia outlined in figure 1, attached. The Satellite Reconnaiooa:1ce Technical .Advisory Gronp will b.c appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force and w11l prov1dc the mcilne of obtaining the aerv1cca of rccogniz:ed experts !:-om the acienti!ic and Applied engineering !idda 1n the furtherance .o! the technical program. The Satellite Reconnaiaaancc .Advhory Council will be appointed by tho Secretary o! the Air Force to provide advice and counsel to him in the diacharge o£ hie over· · all reeponslbilitlee. . 4 . . Tho internal organbat:ion and personnel auignment o! the Office o£ Mhoile and Satellite Syetcme !e.outlined in Figure 2., attached. following io a brie£ ducriphon o! tho principal dutiu of SAFMS o!!icere: OFFICE OF THE DffiECTOR ' DffiECTOR Reoponriblc !or conducting all actions o! SAFMS in accordance with policy o! aud delegated authority !rom the Secretary of the Air Force. DEPUTY DffiECTOR Principal aoeietant to the Director, acta with full authority o! the Director on :\It · a!!airt oi SAFMS. Reaponaible !or OVt! r.~ . l direction, guidance, aupervieion, and co. o1·dira tion of the activities o! the o!ficc .· EXECUTIVE On·' 1CE:., ·.¥ ~ ~cu~ivo O!iil:c:r, OUld Chief~£ tho .Ex'-'o:: ... u. ,. ............ .. ,. HQARDC O?EIV.TIONS ORDER NO, 60·l 8 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM .E.-:c<:utivo J\.Jment a.nd payloado and relateli:lhmcnt ol a Director of the SA·MCS Project .:1.t AFD.MD <1s a •' Held cxtcnoion of ·the C!Cice ~!tho Secrot.:~.ry o£ the Air Force, and;::.n -CHice of Miaeilc and Satellite Syatcma. within the Secretary's ota!f to aGoiot him in tho disch:uge .ol Mo rcoponsibilltioe. The SAMOS·Projoc:t will be tn:l.n:lf:ed within thia etructuro, with no intormecbate review or approval ch.:lnnela between the SAMOS Project Director and the S~cretary ol tho .Air Forco.· · · z.· In order to asaiat th~ Sec:~etary in t.ho dia.:harge o( hia rcaponlli-'' biliUcs. there is a need i.or an j Director -. 'l Commander SAFSP Vice Dir .S.AFSP·V I Exoc:lAdmin ~-------------4------------------~l SAFSP•X ., :nep Director !or ~p Director 1or ·Oporatione PJAna SAFSP-DO SAFSP-DP • OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 60·1 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION SECRETARY OF THE . AIR FORCE ..._...,..___.....,______,_. Ofiic-·~ or Miaaile ~d S01tci.Uto 'Sy~tem:; (SAFMS) S~ti:.llito Roconnaia 1 anco S~telU.te Roconn:t.iaaance Tochnic~l Advisory Oroup ·Adviaory Council . Director of the SAMOS Projoct (Add Duty: Vico Comdr {or 51\tzllito Syatema AFBMD) HQ .AROC O?E~TlONS ORDER.NO. 60-1 CJ1 (!) .ASSIST~\~T FOR PROa:'.,AMS Lt Coi Th!ll :J. Herron Flg!Ue 3 . HO .ARDC OPERATIONS ORDER NC'. 60-1 • copy · 01-~!i'IC~ O!i' · ·~ z..!!~"3IL.:~ tr:m c~'i...:!: LLrr::: ~:::~'T.G!~ D~b G~n lUch:ud D. Curtin,· Dlrcct:>r · "t.ii:J3 l!:;rg;u~t ~o~i::ht, Secr~~arl Dirc~· :or n·::!?.'.P.T." --:r n· o ? T~tr:: "''l. F'<':lr:-~ orilc;· ·.;(i;~;-~;_.~;;.~~:7-;i."ii;-~,lr_F_:;;~;· 12 ~-::: :c;-.1';:r· 1%0 ~3 . . • ,. .._..,,-·--------___.-:·-' •I . r~:!::::cu-~·Jv-L: s:2::CnE·..~/\:l!AT SC:crob:y . ... •\FDM~ (~.~e:;ilc:J nnd C:'~ce) A T E L L I · T "E .J\SSI3TAI;T FC:t ELECTROlilCS J\S3~TJ\llT FOR ll:STil.UM~~-l~AT~I)!'# ;.::sr.::.·.:..'.'\N"J:' FOR ~I~o~·c.:;ru.P~~Y l~~:ljo~~ Cli">jon!} ;J:l;~c~ ::I. -..------"1 /.t:3!JTJ\NT FC::t : £YS'l"E!.~ EriCJ;C!._l~I:.;Q 2.::1jor Henry C J-To\vard 8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a I 1-4 ~ I ~ a ~ 1-4 ~ ~ ~ tn a tn ~ j I i 1-4 SECTION Ill : PROGRAM INITIALIZATION COPY I • 1 Octobor 't96o · · I I . • , I 0 I l ' Spcci:ll Orclor .A-1790, 'dat~d 27 September 1960: : t ' • o • • I ! ~ :. . : I : : • I . · · . , '· 1. Tho '\•orbal orde·u o! the Secretary o! the Air ~or·co· o~ 6. s~a~~u-~b~::. 1960 aa !ollowa are co1111rmod: · · · · • 11Drlgcdier Cionenl.Robort E. Cireor. ~ 167ZA~ l• relieved !rom_ H~ AFBM~ (ARDC) Lo• .ADaot c~. ciut{.orni~. ~ bar duty a.a Vico COnun;u-q nr !or' ~to~li~e Syatoma, AFDMD: Aaaignod OSAF, Hq USAF, Waohln_&t~'·.· . . . . . . p. _c •• with duty atation 240~ ~a(;El, Segundo!&ulcva.rd. ~1 -Scg~doM Ca.~ornia ~or duty -aa Director o! tho S::dclUte :and Mi..Uo . Obaervatio~ Syatem Project with additional duty a• Vice Cc$mmander for Sn.telllto .. •--• I ... Sy~t~ma, .AFBMD (ARDC). EDCSA 1 Oc.lobor. No travel 1pvolvoCi. 11 t:<. 1 : . n_c ·.· HQARDC OPERATlONS ORDER.N0•.-60-1 13 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM FO:t-t?FP'lCI:{tL tJ52 OMLY. COPY DEPARTMENT OF THE A:::R FORCE HEAPQUAR'l'ERS UNITZD STATES AIR FORCE \'/ASHINCTON 2.5; :oc . . . AFCSS Miosilc and S3tollite Sy•tema 14 October 1960 AAC /.cAme USJ\FE ./\DC "HqC ArtDC PACAF · AU CONAC "ATC US.o\FSS ~TS USAFIt !>MC. SAC 1. Tho SecrotaT y o£ the Air ~or~e h3a ·csubllahed: .. a. .An O£!ice of Mieeile a.nd S~telllto Sy•temo (SAFMC) in the O!!ice o£ tllciSecirct3ry .oC the ~ir· Foree to ·a:aolct him "in .clloch01.rgln:f hi a ·rc•ponalbility !or·tha .diroct aupcrvleion and control of thb SJ\MOS Project. · Tho Director ·\-,.iil.Pr'ovidc tho.Exccutive: Sccrct~ri3t for' tho Air Forco Balliotic ·Mieoile Committee: Tho Diroe:or; SAFMS, h . ' rc~poneibl. e for malnul~ng liaisonwitit "the'' O!!ic.e .o( the Sacr.ctary.of · ocfcn:~o ~nd othor intoroete.d government aucndoa on matters relative to hla .ao" olc~ed r~o~~po'nolbilitlea.' 'He. may be aollif:!ncd additlon;~,l dutiea·ae dccmcd:appropdate·b .y .t11e Secr.ct.3ry oC the . . .Air Fo~co: Brlsodlcr Cerieral Richard D.''Curtin baa been deei&n3ted as: ' oir.cctor of this oC!ic.e. . . . ·•• • • • . ! . ·b. A · oir~cto. r:lte ·o{ the ·sAMOS Project (SAFSP)at AFBMD .u .:1 field exteri:.i6n.·o! the 0£Cico of tho.Secret~~y "o£ the Air'" Force recponoible to and roportir.G directly to tho Secretary !or m3nagoment of tho SAMOS Project. Brlg;ulicr ·ccnerai Robert E. Crenr h:ia.bcen dE:.tiJ::nlltcd as Director with addition:~.i duty as Vicc .Commandcr !or S3tcl'l.ittt.Syatemo, AFBMD,· ARDC, with ~uty' ata.tion at ~400 : E11ot El Sc.guncio Blvd•. :· El sag~ndo,: 1 ·C:lutornia. · c • . A S;,.tcllitc Reconnai~ollnce Technical':Advisory Cro~p and a S01.tollito Reconnaiaaance Adviaory Council, · z. Ellcctive immediately·, the a:1tcUlto rcconnai..a.nce program will be m.:lna::ed within the a.bovo atructuro. Further: a. There will be no review or approv3l ch:1nnclo between the 'Director · o! the SAMOS Project and tho Sccrota.ry of th e Air Force. ·· However. in ord~r to mllinti.in genel'al proJect lmowlcdgt~ within thoae command or atll££ .o!fices whore auch .knowle~go ill nl:ceaC!ary !or p10gram oupport or coordinntlon ol related matter,., need-to-know briclinga will be civcn o n a periodic bllaia. Bricfins;a will be givfln by SAFMS without rcqueat and not ~a a part of project manllgement actiono. Requests for bric!inga will be . directed to the Secret.ry or"the.Air Force l\nd w il'l bo approved ~n a atriel nced·to-ltnow baaia. · · FOR OPPICl:lcL tJSE ONL't' HQA.RDC OP:C:RATIO~S ORDER NO. 60·1 14 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION c 0 l.) y COPY b. V!eito to tho :;AMO.:i Pr::>jcct Oi!icc, El Sc:;undo,' ·Calilor.Ua, will be !or o!Iicl~l bu..:Jlneoa only, · 'Rc:qccoto .!~r vl.olt11 by other tlun apcciflcally Accrc;.!ited contr:lctoro And agcDclce o£ tho govornmcDt wbooc buoinco1 · rc~uiroa recul:lr and frcquont vis!to will bo dire"cted to tho Sccrctot.ry o£ . the Air Force for 11pprovol. c. Tho Director of tho SAMOS Project b o.uthorizcd direct contact with maJor comrruulda to rcqueet aup_port, d. The Dlrcc;tor, · O.Uico of Mieollo and S:~.t~llito Syotemo, ia Authori~cd d·::-..:ct contact with tho Air Sta.l£ and other atllUa &1\d agencico to J:oqucat oup~ort 11a required• . 3.. Tho Exccutiv~ Socretarlat of the Air Force! Ballbtic' Mb:~Ue Comrn..lttoc will be tho rceponslbiU.ty of the Director of Miaaile And Satell!to Syotema . Pcndlna rcoolution and c~ari!icnUon. of Air Sta.Cf p·articipotlon.in tho dlrl\ction o! ?;.'\ lliFtic MiooUe and Spilco Pror,rnme,'.tho·Sccrctiu:i:~.t,"!"ili ·eontinuc to p.-ovic:o . the Air Forc:o Dl\lliotic Ml;soile Commltte"c .with .a direct channel to t.hc b~lcwood Complex, Air MAteriel Commend, And the Air, St."l.!£• .This will ~nc:lulctc oupport and immc.diat.O r~op~nae ~ro.m· all element• of tho Air. Fo•cc. All individutl.la 'and·organiz'ltiono o£ tho Air Foree.arc urged to provide the neccaoary reaourc:ca and aoolatance'to the•c otficoe to aaaure 'the t~mcly attainment of. ~i••~le. and. oa~l. lite_ objectives. /oi-:,:J.cd/ nc~ERT R. ROWLAND · Colonel, .USAF Secretary o£ the Al_r $taft ~: !::1 / .!:.DC O;?Z!t.\TIONS ORDER NO•. · 60·1 15 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM AN~"'SX "!3" TO OPEnATio:::; .o~. m::n ffi:nu.L O'iO. H::ADQUARTZ:t~ ·AIR ru:S!::Ail.CH AND DiVELo?!-.f..ENT COMMAND \'!A:;~:n·:O'I'CN 25, DC ·· 1 • . ~C-~: ... '.J.oo:,o·:.•.:.~ ::-.:t.Ann~· o.r tho· D~_..,ioitne:-.~ ::"::u~ will :;=c,·!C:tl · f!·;i·b~aio to• ju: :.l~;-! :roprintion · o~ {undo by tho Con:Jrcu, tho ' Fin:u1cbl,Pln~ eo api_'\:-oved by t~o Soere~ry' of tho .Air Forco wlll conetituto th~ 11uth::>rity !or nU iu-.:• !nr: actiono by Hq ·us.AF. · F~"lcla nlloc~ted to tho Co:-:1r.t:1uor, · /,!\DC, -~Hl be •ub-a.llocntecS b : &ppropriato I>ivinion a.nd Co:otor Cot:)::'l:u\dor• M.ilit::ry Consh':.:etloa lunda wUl be a.lloea.ted by 1-:q USAF diroctly·to th:s · Air Foreo Conotruction A"c:nt, ·11.1 c!c•icn:atcd by tho Secro~ry o! tho Air Foree. · · · · • e. Ea.ch Division/Center h'::-.vi."ll a. rcop::~noibility ln thlo pro~r:un will. ct:.t-.:~ ct\r:port fund rcquiromr:."lt:J t9 1-!q .J\RDC. 'l'hh 91\1 corm:lll1 bo .:lcco:m;)U:;bcd ln tho Dlvlaion/Centor :3ud:~t Eotl.mA\c~ ~nd Fin:me1:~.1 Pl~n• a.rid .rovhiona thereto. Fund rc:l}uircrr.onb otutcd by ca.cb Dlv~o1on/Center in oup;x,rt of thio proarcm Will be ICp'lratoly idonti£1cd, l."\ t:;o OVO:\t W\• procr.::un:mcd itcmo rc"~.:irinc fundlnc o.rioo, ;mel th'o Divia!on/Cc;:~or cannot nbo~rb tho fi.Uldins within cx.latinz·rcc;oureeo, tho Divioion/Ccntor 'involvod w1i1 o.dvioo Hq .ARDC o.t tho addition.-.1 !und rcq..Urcmont•. ct 'I'!lo· A:?'DMD nudnct Diroc:tor:atc will provido Buclsot Sorvicoa to the .Director, SAMOS Project, 'Ao . ·required. · . · · · . . u, Tho .AFin.m Ac:count!n:i ond Fin::.nco Dlroctornto will p:r~;,rm Acc.ot;.."1t!nl ppcr:.Uona for thil prosrnm aa prcocribcd lD.'eurr~nt dircctlvo~. b .· The AFBMD Accountina·And Fin~nee Director~to wUl prov1C:o tho tame !i~::.nco aorvlc:o to thJo pro::r.a.m nnd c.ooiencd peroonnol no provided otbcr program• and per•ounol o.oelanod to AFal-.ID. c.· E~ch Divhion/Contor wiit' per!o.rm c.ecolintinz oporo.tiona A~ pre_ccribcd h~ current cUrectJ:'o• !or Cv.ncS. rocolved in 1upport oC tbiD pro-. or;:.."\"\, : : .:;; .:\=tDC .. O?Z:RA'l10NS ORDER.·NO. 60~1 16 . . SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION 3. STATJ.STICAL SERVICES: a. E~c:h Divleion/Contor will provido normal eU.tietJcai 1orvlc:ee in 10upport o£ thia program, · · · 4. MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS: . a. Tho AFBMD Fi~c:ial .An01lylia Dlrectora.to will provide tho Com~ ~ndor ..AFBMD and the Director, S..AMOS Project financiu analyeil urvicco.ae required. · · · b,.: 'E:lcb D1vie1on/Cecter Commander will.lnsuro t~t appropriate A.lltllyoio ie performed to provide him data to iceW'e emooth implomen• tation and a~compllebment ol hie portion of the .proan.m, HOARDC OPERATIO:-:S ORDER NO. 60-l 17 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ANNEX " C" TO OPERATIONS ORDER SERIAL NO. FACILITJES HEADQUARTERS AIR RESEARCH AND .DEVELOPMl:J:lT COMMAND · WASHINGTON ~s. DC 1. POLICY: The Air Research and Oovolopmcnt Command, through tho Air . Force Ballistic Mia~~le Division, Loa Angelc:a 4.5. California, will ~rovido !aclllty support !or,the SAMOS Proaram worldwide and !or the SAMOS ProJec,t O!Cice, El Segundo, California. II. SAMOS PROGRAM SUPPORT: The Deputy Commander !or Facil~t.ica, Alr Force BalliaUc M.isdle Division, will provida the Civil.Engilloorinc · aupport required for 1mpla.mantati~n o! the SAMOS P~9GRAM lncl~a• .but not llmited.to: a. Development o( worldwide facility requirementa. b • . Programming of requlremonta. c, .Dcsinn o_C.all faciUtiea. Dc;algn. reaponaibility l,;cludos archit.oct-, engineer oclectlon, supervision, review and approval o! dcoign eonccpta1 preliminary and !hu.l deaign; dcaign interpretation during eo~\atruction and revlow an.d,_f'pproval o£ dealgn_changc orders during eonetrucUoc. d . Conat.ruetlon surveillance. e. FiDcal manasement of dedgn and conltruction. { . A~eeplance o! completed (aciiltiaa. 'm. SAMOS PROJECT OFFICE SUPPORT: The Civil Engineering Divilioll of tht: 659~nd Support Group, AF:OMD, will oupport the SAMOS Project O!!lc:e, El Segundo, Ca11!orniot., aa !ollowa: a. Provido for the maintcn;a.nc:e, operation and accoW>tability o£ aU Air Force ReAl Proparty utilh;ed in oupport o{ tho SAMOS PROGRAM. . b . In conjunction with Acroop:'loCe Corporation, provide n-ocooeaiy.. oflice space, fixed !acHtties and parking apace. c. A~ly:r.o,' review -and proceoa rcqucata !or modi!ication and .. .:>ltcration.o oC facility requirem.c:nts. oub.mitted in accordance with AFBMD Regulation 85-_1; . ~ ~Work Order.~equest", : 1-~0 .t.?. DC OPE::V.TIONS OR.DER NO. 60-1. 18 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION At.f!:ro:-;:~{ "D" OPE!t/\TI6i1S O!tD~~. SERJAL NO. LCGt~'.i.'!C~ ·H<:..\~·~UI.~'.i.·;:-;.i,1S !Am i~;.:sr:.'.:tC~I .AUD DEVELOPMENT COMMAND W.;\SH!llG'L'vl·>:tS, DC . ~; ; . .-'li:-l'oiity a.nd 'prccod~ne~ 'ro.~in: 0~ 1..1 ~(fa DOD . ra~Di)#bf'nrie1tb:lt . • 01 b c.ocionod to the SAMOS ~o:rAm. · · . · · · · ·· . b. J.'':?L "; !Dis. re:lponcib~e !or in:Jurbi; th:~.t timely LoriioUc:i' Support io nv;~.il::.blo t ·:> r."lcet ~ho rc:quixocnlentG o( tho· SA:t.~OS Project 'Ofii'eo. · Tbio indudeo bc~1~ oc~;ort of MiUt4ry Ora:uu:~t!ona ~nd' Contricton C::lz'~.ged ln Rot:c:l;och a.nd Development o£ tba S.AMOS oyotcm in both tho Loo Anricloa·' nroc. n:1d Dot cperntional oitoa.-· · · · 2. SUP?0::1 T SOT.m.CES: . . . A ', !i\1'7-?ort will bo provided !rom t~rco rn:\jor.coureca -.AF ho~:t comm:lndo (hc-it .t".ir Fol'ec b:uea), .ot.\or DOD e.:;:~acica c::t./or · .AF·rn~D._·:· SupJ)o:rt :lf:rccmcn:e \?-' ~h hoiSt 11soncica_will bo nc~o!btcd by '.AF_DMn:.' b. In t h -:: -..vent alto locat-ion m~tco it · i=;:o!loi~rol to provide au?port !rom Air :Fo:-co or interaorvice aourceo, AFB :MD will talto tho necoso:~.ry nction to contract for tho requiro·CI •upport, · · · ' · -" 3. ·Ti'tAN:->?O:tTA TION: :~.. Tr&Z:.oporbtion for eflu!p:nent o:~.d' r;l\ ??li~:o ~or tho·S.AMCS"Pro:~r::.m will bo ;~.::r:l:'lzod for by AFBU.D ('"/DHT) in <\ccordauce wi~h npplic~~lo dircc:Uvcs' ~Hl a:;l:cero'lCnh betwcori th3 A~~c (u;~..r)• . b. Vehiclea in aupport o£ tho SA~.·~OS 6';.·o:;rrim will bo.arra4~ed !or. by AFin.1:0. S.t\MOS o:tnani:ations: &ro reoponc!blo !or proper uao of_vohicloa · in aeco-r~:=ce ....-!:11 AF:ort the :>AMOS Prc;::ram in &ceord:lneo Tlith .AFR 57·4 :mel will_arrango !o: n.ecom..plishmo~ o.f"mo<1i.!ic:atlono~ ·· · ·b. ~libr~tion, ehomieal·lllboratorieo;·liqwd' 0)..-}·;en el~:min:: ·llnd · other :1ichly ,.poeiali~cd teehnie.111 !zu: .iJ.itica will be nrranaod {or by AFBMD maki:1:; m.-..ximu.m uo_o of ox.iatina facilitieo. c. Technical Order Libraries will be provided by AFDMD. I-::} ,\nl:r: . O:::-·;::R.t"'..'J:IOo:3 O:RDEI\ NO. 60·1 ... '19 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM d. AFDMD will prep~'re and coiuaoli~tebud({ct eatimatca and IinancJal plana !or contract mainten:t.nce and equipment modification in aupport o{ tho SAMOS Pro~:ram. 5. SUPPLY: a. General. , AFBMD will render supply aaAistllnce to the SAMOS Procram on an ao required baeia, and insure that required itomo·are procured a.nd delivered by ea\nbliahcll need datea. · b. Eg\l!pment Authorizations~ AFBMD will be rooponaible f.or equip . rnent review and authorization function• a.a 'prescribed by A~r Force , Dh·ectivee. c. Dudget. AFBMD will prepolre and c:on!_!olidate Una-ndal plans and budget eDtimatea ~or; 9FE eq~pment and aupplie.a re_quircd by the SAMOS Progra~. d. Propellant.. Liquid propellants, fuola ·and c:be~icale required 'for the SAMOS Prograrn will be program~od and/or budgetod_.£or,by AFBMD la ClCcordanco with USAF procedures.· · · F.~ARDC O::?EnATIONS ORDER NO. 60·1 2.0 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION J\NNSX "F" -;l~o- OPERATK».;s or.Dr:R SERIAL NO. COMMUNlCATIOI'C. HQ ARDC OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 60-1 23 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ANNEX ''H" Tl" OPERATJONS ORDER SE:IUAL NO. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT HEADQUARTERS AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMM.Ai·: D • WASHING~ON ZS, DC I. POUCY: The Air Research and Oevolopment Command through the Air· Force Ballistic Missile Division, Loa .Angolca 45, California, will provide all air· craft requirements (assigned or bailed) in di rect aupport ol the SAMOS Pro gram. II. PROCE:DURE: The. Support Operation• Division (WDOO) oi the 659Zd Support Group, AFBMD, will support the S.AMOS Program aa !ollowa: · a. Bailment rcqucata will be proceaaed in ilccordance with AFDMDIR 70-7 and ARDC Regulation 55-3. b. Rcqueata lor aaaignment of aircraft will be proceaaed through WDOO in accordance with ARDC Regulation 55-3. . c:. -WDOO will uaiat in validating aircraft requirement• when required. nO ARDC OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 60·1 Z4 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION 6. 17 September 2011: . .. AN~r·: X " i" 70 OPE.RATfOiiS ORD<.H sr:RiAL NO. SECURITY /\ND INSPF:CTJON SF.H. Vi Cf:S HEADQUARTERS AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT C('~l\: ;, ; .. WASH NGTON 2.5, DC . . SECURITY: The AFBMD will provide..those aecurity aervice• normal to a host/tenant relationship. Services provided will include: a. Guard servh:ce to meet phy•ical •ecurity requirement• within the AFBMD Complex. b. Personnel Security Clearance actions as required. c. · Visitor Control Servicea. d. Claaai!lcation guidance and aaaietance na required. e. Such other requested aervlce• a• are within the capability o( the AFBW.D. 2. INSPECTION SERVICES: The Inspector .Gene ral, AF'BMD, will provide: a. · inspection Serviccil required by AFR 123-l. b . Quarterly Security Inspection Check Liata in compliance with AFR 205-1. . c . Such other rcqueated •ervicca ar.d :..eaialancc a1 'are withi~ the capability o£ the AF'Il~D. ~_- HQ ARDC I OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 60·1 25 . CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ANNC:X " .! " TO OPZ:.nA T:c=if..;s 0ll. l>l·:R SI-:RlfiL 1'10. · u-:GAL HEADQUARTERS AIR Rl:":SF.ARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WASHING T ON ZS, DC 1. The StaU Jud~te Advocate, Hca.dquartcra, ARDC, will p'rovidc ailsi,-;t<\n•··· to and will exerciae eurveillance over all legal activitiea o!.the Balliatic: Missile Di via ion in auppol't of the SAMOS Project, OC!~ce o{ tQe Secretary of the Air Force. 2. The St~l£ Judge Adv.ocate·, He01dquart era AFBMD, aa 'required, will: a. Act aa adviaor to the Director oC the SAMOS Project and hie ataH on legAl problema pertaining to the SAMOS Project. ·b. Provide legal review oC all contracts written in aupp!)~t, o{ ·the SAM~: ~ J>rojec~. · · · · c. Render -3, 1Z Auguat 1960•. HQ .ARDC OI'i::RA'l"lONS ORDER NO. 60-l SECURITY: CRITICAL TO US I i I I. THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SA'l'ELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYS'l'EMS COMPENDIUM ,.,,._ :-.:r:x "L" .. --.ro- OPF.iti'ITJONS ORDER SERIAL NO. ADM1NiSTRA1'JVE SE::\V!CES HEADQUARTERS .AIR RESEARCH .AND DEVELOPM~NT COMMAND .WASHi NGTON 25, DC l. GE!'.'ERAL: . . The Director, SAMOS Project, will receive admini•tra.t~ve oupport !rom Hq AFBMD in the aame maz:nc:r and extent 01.11 ia received by other orga.nlza:tiona located on the AFDMD inatallation. Detaila of aupport requi rement. will be arra.naed and changed aa necc•n.ry by mutual agreement between the Director o£ Adminiatrali\.·e Service, H.:; AFbMD (WDA), and the Executive 0££iccr, SAMOS Project Oifice (SAFSP-X) . · 2. M.AIL, MESSAGE, ·& COURIER SERV:CE: · The Director of .Adminiatrative Servicea (WD.A), Hq AFBMD, will provide normal meaaase center, m;\il room, · and courier •crvicca to the SAMOS Project O!!icc. M~in1cnance ol internal account:.bility recorda lor claui£ied material is the reaponaibility of the SAMOS Project Office. 3 . .ADM INISTitATIVE ORDERS: Travel performed by the Director, SAMOS Project, in hia c:~.pacity aa a reprca~nb.livc o£ the Secreu.ry o! the Air Force and in ·aupport of the ,SAMOS Project, will be covered by blanket orders from the Of!ice of the Secretary oC .the Air Force. All other travel by the Director, SAMOS Project, nnd all travel by mcmbera oC hil ataf£ wUl t.c pcrlormcd under order'o issued by Hq AFBMD upon request of deaign3..ted olficiloh •••i~ned to duty in the SAMOS Pro.Jcct Office. As qunlHied above, Hq AFBMD wi ll provfde complete ordcro-ioauinz oervico to int:lude travel, le:.ve, personnel actiona, board app~intmer:.~o ~nd :my other action requin::~ :~ su3.nce o! & ~pecial order. Hq AFBMD Regulation• ahall apply. 4. PRINTil'!G, DUPUCATING, t. AR..T SERV:CES: Printins, duplicating, and art •ervlcea will be provided by Hq AFBMD. Hq AFBMD Regulatione ahall apply. S. PUDUCATlONS AND FORMS: Hq AFOMD will furniah d-:partmcnt:~.l, ARDC, and AFDMD p ublic&tiona il.f,d ·forma ncceaaary to operate the SAMOS ProJect O!lice. AF'.DMD R c :;ulation• governing leouance o( publica.tiona and forma ahall apply: D~ rcctivea iuued by the Secreta.ry o! tho Air Forcn will be re~eived directly HQ ARDC OPERATIOKS ORDER' NO. 60..·1 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION r 2b11 o~ : lh•.· SA~{\)S Prn,i·. ..l ' ·:11 •· "',,.;,·on! HI · ,. wt\h 1Jf'O :t. U ~I rl'!' to :H· c...:Rl:,tJli~r., ~ ·" the SA MuS Projc,·t <•!:• · , "· P J.:C()H DS ,.., ,,;;A·. ·,;:. \t:'.~·:-1'. -----------·---·· }'ilc& of c-urrent r.·.·ord3 wJ!I b•: oruo: • ... ,.d 111 -.~r· oru.H.c:t' \lo'llh AF·M !Sl-·L As!lislancr in j>r< j'H.'"l> Rt:•:orc!" Co,,t.-o; ~dwo:iulr:o will be !urnisht:d by the Rct:ordl M:tnag(:mc•:t Ofiiccr, 11·1 Al'DMO. •. • I~~• • HQ ARDC OPERATIONS ORDER :NO. 60-l Z9 CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM APPROV.~ FOR RELEAsE.~~ fflE1J;l1~ber 201'1 ·· ·~,-,.~ ,. ... . .: . ANNEX "M" --,,()-- I . OPERATJor:i3 Oll.DF.R Sl':RIAL NO. MEDICAL Sr.P. vYcES HEADOUAR TERS AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT .CO~I:'.:t. . \,, WASHINGTON Z!5, . DC Th" Air Force Ballistic Mieeilc Divi.aion will provtde all medical. eupporl within Ita Cilpabilltiea lo j:u;reonncl oC lhe SAMOS Project 'Directorate, 'in ac-cordancc with t-RDC dircc'tivea and existing procedurea. Such aupport will lncfudc profeuional medical aervicea and appropriate medical aervlcca a5 required: · · ~ -----. , •' I HQ ARDC OPZa..\TIONS ORDER NO. 60·1 30 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR . . ~. RELEASE 17 September 2011 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 0l"J'ICE OF THE CHIEP' OF 5TAP'F UNITED STATES AIR FC>fte£ WASHINGTON, D.C. NI'LYTO ATT"H ~, AFCCS aua.ra:r, j (Uncl) Basic :Policy Concernillg SAMOS 29 December 196o (Expires 29 Mareh 1961) • . . DEPUTIES, niRE'C'iORS, AND CHIEFS OF CCH>.AitAmz OFFICES (110 · 25) 1, Reference is made to: (U) a, Secretary ot the Air Foree Order No, 115.~, 31 Ausuat 196o, b, Secretary ot the Air Foree Order No. 116.1, 31 .Augu.-t ~960. c. AFCSS letter, subject "M:laeUe and Sste~te Systems", 14 October ~96o. d. SAFOI-3c Diesaage, ~"JJ6/6o, J.5 December 1960. 2. Secretary ot the Air Force Order No. 115.1, dated 31 August 1960, eatabl.1ahed the Ottice ot Miasi.le azid Sate~te Syetau :In the Of'tice ot the Secretary ot the Air Foree. It provides that the Director ot the otf'1ce ot Mi.asile &ZI4 Se.te~te S;y.-tem8 is ~responsible tor ass:1.st:1.ng the Secretary 1n d1aclulrg1ng lds respons1~il1t:' tor the direction, su;pervision aiJd control ot the SAMOO project, (U) · 3. Secretary at the Air F:oree Order No. 116.1, dated 31 .Auguat 1960; .directed the organj.zation ot a SAMOS :Project ottice u a field extension ot the ottice ot the Secretar)" ot the Air Force. It speeities tbat tbe Director ot the SAMOS Project is rellpOlUiible to and v1ll report d:1.rectly to the Secretary ot the Air Force, (U) 4. In recognition ot the special manasem.ent procedures aDd the necesllity ot acldeving the program objectives at the earllest date, the tol.lovi.ng policy is establ.18hed tor the SAl03 progr811l: (U) a. No :Ut!ormati.on concern:ing th1a program v1.ll be initiated by Air Force organizations, (C) · b. 'l'b.1s progr811l is 1111 R&D ettort dmed at the deveJ.opment of' various promising recocnaia&a:oce techniques. (U) c. ~e R&D program v1.ll. 1ncl.ude all. the necessary el.emezrts to 1.nsare that tbe data \ltdch is obtained can be efficiently and promptly exploited, (S) d, The nature and character ot an ul.timate operational .,-stem is cazz.pletely con41t1onal upon the success ot the methoaa Yhich v1ll. be exploited 1n the R&D program. Accord1nsly, .Prosreaa to date in the R&D program does not warraut operational. p1 Rnn1ng. Bovever1 as OS 60-~537 ~c . 1 0~'1f1[0 . CRITICAL TO tJS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM , r:.IRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 soon as sufficimt R&D progress 1s made to justif'y effective operatim:lal plann1ng1 speeitie inatl"u~iana v1ll be issued to 1naure timel.y integration ot this system 1n Air Force operational inventor;y. (S) 5. The fol.lovi:lg acticm.a v1ll be taken b7 the approprj.ate Air staff agency 'llhieh are consistent vith tbe establiahecl SAMOS llaZlSgement :Pl'Oeedurea and :Poliey outl.1ned above. (5') a. SA!«lS for the tae being v1ll DOt be :included in the Program Doc:uments (example: PG, PD) deac:ribed in APK 27-1. (tJ) b. SAMOS projeet.infomatian v1ll ~ tum:.lahed as neeeasar,y tor legislative iaatte:rs llild for the Chiet of Ste.U· l'ol1cy Book b7 the Direetor of the Ottice of Misail.e an4 .s.teUite S;ystema. (U) c. The Director cit the Ottice ot Miasil.e IUid Batel.J.j,te S;ystezu v1ll keep the U,. el.centa of the Air staff IIDd tbe camnanc'• 1Dfomed1 aa necea8ar1 1 reprc!:1%lg this program. Noma]. monitol"Ulg by the Weapons Boe.rd system 1a UIIDeceslll&r)"1 aDd no rev:!.en or ~eav1ll be undertaken b7 the TIIZ'ious groups, peneJ.s, boerdtl and c011181tteea. (U) d. Documents reflecting Air Farce requ:lremeut's tor recozmaisaance 1l'1ll ccmtimle to·be pres,pred aDd 8houl4 be :tonarded through llO%'Jial. chamlela to the USIB tor coa.a14eratian in SAII:lS ProJect~. (s) e. The SAM08 Working Group will be dissolved. (U) t. Air Force Regulation 375 aeries v1ll. not apply to this program. (U) 2 SEXJREIT SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION ~/~~~E~~~~~"s~~~~~.,~''SPECfA(iiANDuN~ . SAMOS The Under Secretary of the .Air Force has been delegated responsibility for the S.AMOS pr9ject.. The S.AMOS project consists of both overt and covert programs. The overt projects are numbered, the covert projects are given code word names. _ . . . . The Secretary has established a field extension of his office located with the .Air Force Space Systems Division at El Segundo, California, under the Director of Special Projects. The Director of Special Projects also serves, as additional duty, as Vice Commander, .Air Force Space Systems Division, .AFSC. He also has a small special staff 1n the Pentagon under the Director, Office of Missile and Satellite Systems. other project staffing and support is provided by the .Air Force Systems Command. The programs and their purposes are as follows: L OVERT a. Prog.ram 101 B-.Atlas/.Agena vehicle with E-5 photographic payload. b. Program 102 -Thor/.Agena vehicle with digital and analogue ferret payloads. c~ Program 201-.Atlas/Agena with E-6 photographic payload. ~ d. Program 202 -Design study of maneuverable re-entry vehicle. ll. COVERT ~ a. GAMBIT-.Atlas/.Agena with high acuity photographic payload. ~ ~ '1 D-ll98 Page 2 of t pages l Copy J of 13 copies. I TOP SECRET. _S~£CIAL~HANOUNG ___----'L -----,-----,----~--· --·--------....... ....... -· ... ---------~. ......''""*"""""''"'""'""'~ · CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SAMOS (continued) Technical Management Technical management of all SAMOS programs is the responsibility of the Under Secretary with delegation to the Director oi Special Projects and to.the program directors. ~ . . . The'contractor structure va:i-ies with each program: 101 B -Lockheed is the prime contractor and does the SETD. Itek builds the payload as a subcontractor. 102 -Lockheed is the prime contractor and does the SETD. A~rborne Instrument Laboratories builds the payloads as a subcontractor. 201 -General Electric, Eastman Kodak, and Lockheed are associate contractors for the payload vehicle, the payload, and the orbiting vehicle respectively. . Aerospace Corporation does the SETD. 202 -Martin is the design contractor. Aerospace does the SETD. GAMBIT -The overt aspects of this operation previously have been covered by 201. However, a new cover project is being established Which will show a program office structure in the Space Systems Division. This program will overtly report to the Director under his additional duty as Vice Commander, Air Force Space Systems Division, AFSC. The contract structure is the same as 201. Financial Management The financial :management of the project is by the Under Secretary. He has an individual in the Headquarters US.A F, Directorate of Budget, to assist him. Overt contracting is handled by .A F SSD. Covert contracting is done directly by the Director of Special Projects under a special delegation of authority. . Covert administrative contracting officers are stationed with the major covert contractors. · · D-ll98 Page 3 of i pages Copy 1 of 13 copies. - ---------·--·'--------......,...-..,.,....""' SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION S.AMOS (continued) Operational Management The operational target programming function is done at the Satellite Test Center based on COM.AR target priority lists. .All operational and engineering decisions are made by the Director of Special Projects or his delegate. Security The security of the overt projects is handled in accordance with DOD and .Air Force security procedures with determination of need-toknow reserved tot:ll.e Under Secretary. This has resulted in an extremely tight security system for the project. Covert security is handled within the project with code word security procedures and clearance standards higher than TOP SECRET standards. The major portion of all project communications are on a private TWX system. Normal .Air Force and other channels are used infrequently _and only when absolutely necessary to pass information to other agencies _on overt projects. .A 11 covert communications are handled by a small group within the project. 9_-· , D-1198 . 1(:') Page 4 of t. pages . TOP SECRET ..:s··:z-.... J~_- . -· i)j_illi_JC=-=====··=· -,...;. ::;::z;.c~~·_~r~:~~Ji P....,...l_··~s-.~-~-~D~tf!~_L~I\J._A._U_ -· ..,..,.........c......,.op,.......~"""':.."'".:""".-~rl":".-.~'!"':"'o_~_L_J__ CRITICAL '1'0 US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLI'l'B RECONNAISSANCE SYS'l'EMS CCIIPENDIUM 6. "'2-- RELEASE 17 September 201 L~A.RTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE NRO APPROVED FOR SAMOS PRO.JEC.r OFFICE A1r Force Unit Post OUJee, Los A.nceJa e. Calltomla ~~y ~ SAFSP-X/LtCol.-/3575 SU.JECT : Security Guidance or An Unclassified Nature Relating to SAMOS TO: All. SAFSP and LEe Personnel. l.. There: bas been some misunders-eariding as to the general. classification or SAMOS information. To alleViate some or the misconceptions, I .have attached to this memorandum the SAM05 Fact Sheet that is used in Publ.ic Affairs Plan tor SAMOS S&tel.l.ites. 2. .The only unclAssified i~orzm.tion availAble on the pi.U'liOse or SA.l-9JS is: ''The SAMOS ProJect is a Research and Devel.opuent Program to determine the capab1l.ities ror making observations or space, the atmosphere and the gl.obe from a satel.l.ite." 'l'bis detini.tion or the purpose or SAMOS will be used tor al.l uncl.assiried ~willalso be us.«!. ....re..,r ,.,ssi)>le, in classUietion that you will have interest in a camera design which yields finer ground resolution, we are including data regarding a system known to us as "Sunaet St.rip". Its characteristics are listed on a separate sheet. I!" it is your opinion that either or both of these reconnaissance systeMS would be of value to the Air Force ve would be pleased to discuss with you or YQur representative the appropriate details of the research and development an!i fabrication of the equipments and sU.bmit !or your consideration our estimates of the time of delivery and the cost of such work. Should you have questions regarding this inforniation or want additional information, you may get in touch v:l.th 1118 by calling COgress _6-.2049, liochester~ I.Y., or by the post office box indicated above with an inner envelope addressed to me personally. If you are unable to reach me, please contact Mr-. J, L. Boon, LOcust 2-8573, Rochester, N.Y. Yours very truly1 ~'~.. ABS:aku Arthur B. Si.lllmons Enclosures I Y, ··• "•,. -,_;,;;~{.' ...;;$£,:. ··:···.;· --~-.. ;:;;~-.~ .·:-r· SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION 188 CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Preliminary Schedules for Blanket and S r.set S:rip The equipment ·isualized hercln and or; which the a ttachcd schca~le is predicated, ~s not only complex within itself but poses complex interface problems requiring extensive coordination with other ~ontractors . Such coordination largely must precede any detail design and engineer~ng work . We anticipate that we would perform as much as possible of this coord:natior., t eam organi ~a ticn, e c . , prior r;o form~lizar;ion cf the conr;ract . As dlsc s ed elsewhere, we believe r;hat a modification of r;he ncrmal organizational concept is necessary if such a schedule is t o be fca~ible . Jt..ly 22, 1960 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Address reply to: N. E. Anderson Pos Office Box lJ7~ Rocnester 3, New Yo~k July 22, 1960 The Honorable Joseph V. Charyk Under Secretary of the Air Force '!'he Pentagon Washi~gton 25, De G. Dear D::" . Charyk: As we ag;reed in your office on July 5, I am han carrying to you furt~cr and more complete informatlo~ on several of the items tnat we discussed at that time . We have prepar d more accurate examples of tne output photography for E-1 and E-2 of t "1e amos p:--o,iect and for the Blanket and Sunset Strip proposals . ':'here Eire t1-10 setr. of these simulations . One of the:r, sh0\oi3 the expectt::d er:d resul:; with the scale factO!' relatively correct for ne four systems . Tne o~her snows the expectea results with a varying scale factor sucn that the image size is ncld constant . '!'hese exal"lple3 were p:·epared ·.1sir.g more accurate photographic techniques than for those that I le~t with you . They more ~loSLly simulate the expected photograpty, and I would suggest that you dcs~roy thP original s t in favor of tnese ~ow being oelivered . ....l::_ of the above cxa:noles arc of a scene a: Edwards Air Force Base . Ir.asmuch as the E-1 'amos prograrr. does ~ot ir.cluae stereo capability, the exa~ples of E-1 are not in s ereo , al:nough there are auplicates of the ~arne frarr.c so that t~e view can be seen with botr '~Yt::~- For your· f rtne r inforr.ta t :on we nave a 1 so cncloscci c e rta: n otner examr•lt's of tne expec~ed ot..tpu of ooth the E-1 and E-2 Scm o::o projects wnich w0 will describe to you v rbally . Yuu may r call that I v1as quite cor.servativ': ir, my sta ements 1~ re~aro to the SL.r.Eet Strip pro~osal at the :ime of our .:.eet.ir.g because we had r:ot hud the proper arr-our.:; of time to be really sure of our preaictions . Since then our peopJ~ have more carefully s uaied the possibilities of this system , and we nave assureo ourselves tnat tne concept 1~ inaeed technically pos~ible as aescrlbea lr, Tecnnical P:-ooosal for Recoverable Rc.c:onn3iSflance ystc~, Volume II, Copy #l which is e:nclosed . CIU'liCAL 'lO US SBCURI'l'Y: 'rBB GMIBI'l ARD JI'BXAGON SA'lBLLI'lB RBCOHHAISSANCB SYS'l'BMS CC»>PBHDIUII NRO A PPROVED FOR RELEAS E 1 I September 2011 !Jr . Cha::--yk -2-July 22, :i960 We have also attached to this le ter budgetary esti~ates of cost and delivery for both the Blanket and Sunset Strip projects . As we discussed, we have premised these on certain modifications of ~10rmal Air Force procurement and management practices . We are prepared Lo discuss the details of this with you in yo~r office . \ve have also rearranged ar,d asscnbled data comparing certain characteristics o~ sc eral current ::--econnaissanco projects including those of' B anke-c ana Sunset Strip. · You may recall that I showed yo a r ough c 0py of some of this informat.:..on during r.:y vjslt witn you . If, after w h~ve described it to yo~, yo~ wish a copy , we are prepared to leave jt with you . Very truly yours , ABS/MDG Z:~clos1..;res NRO APPROV ED FOR RELEASE '-September 201 1 •.. Preltm111ary Schedul e 25 JuJ y 1960 " I FY L FY-I :=J FY J~v1960 [--CY l~L -CY 1962 =--r__--------cv --~~:1Jf'J:;[o[NJD~jf~f~MjJ fJFJillNfol~1~J~TililA~o~~~~ .... P = [ r= r=n-r-~ 7f ~n.t..hlL.Mternuthorization c-7 V l_3 1 _6r--~tri!--' .rL.E 1 -'~1~ 1..ctzt 2.1 """3PR0JECT-BLANKET --~ ----! I I -r ~-1 4 -. l r --' ·+-r-t--i -5 Preliminary G.Qrll.r~-COordi-_ -rh X _J:X)--I _ ,_ r-1--.; -6 natio n _ 11--V _ I_ _ t--·1--1-· l-· -; ·· __ ~ _ 7 Mock -Up Model: V . _ 1---1---__ -%-3 tr_uc tllr_ii_l_ P" I r f 1 ..,-o-~l;Pm-;~ ntaJ. J~ode l : --~IL.,Lr-_ I 1---H- I I Dellvc~r to EK V -, 2 -v I -'-i-· 13Fllght Test Models: -1--··-:-,-1,:' f-,_ -.;1 ..!.._4__Deliver to cus tomer l>Lr _ 1-t--_ _ ) l l _ 15 IL -~ -, 6 ,-~-"":;; 1 ~ .. ,.~, _, 7 PROJEC T S_UNSET STRIP ___)~_ 1-1-__ r-,_ _ 1---!-= 16 ,/ _I 9 Pl·eli mi :1ary Contr actor Coordi-v-:r--t--_ X .X XI X: .X _ -+-n-t-+-+~1-20 nat1o:1 21 Mock-u-=/ 1-1 l -' p-...-.M-=-o--:.d~e'l_______ 22----v 1--i _23 Developme ntal l.nizir.g a program has certain disadvantages that are rea onably obvious and r.encc w:!.l:::. r,ot be discuSS8d t.ere . For t!-:ose interested , a more detailed examination of such concept~ js attached . It is the pt..rpose of this paper to propose ar. organiza tionai concept w~~ch, it is ~oped, avo~ds tr.e deficiencies of tr.e Sys tens r.;ana£er-Prime-Sub organiza tior. whi:..c tillzing the a va:1 tages. At :east one eras~ program was carried to a su cessful completion on chedule by uch an unconven ional approach . Th:is is the "tc m" concept of contractors :!.n which the p;oovidE'rs of important assemblies or subasser.\blies are so imbued with ths imperative need for a successful program that they work together to so~ve their and each others problems and prevent inter~ace interferences so t~at ttere is no need to establi r. one a "toss '' or "prime" . T!lis ls not to imply that eacn s upplier of a !1Ut or a bolt is a "p:-irr.e" cor.trac tor . w~ envision three to six ·~ssociates" on the team each of whom is prirr.arl!y responsible ~or an essen i&l assembl y or gro~~ of as semo:les . These , in t~rn, can be relied on to pjck subcontractors ar.d s~ppliers in the:!.:-field to provide the necessary compcncnts for the;r assemblies . We erwlslon the entire operation headed by a Pro~ect Dlrec=or . This ~ ould be a very senior individual frorr. the GovernmPnt or on loan from Industry with broad manacerjaJ experience and a ~ackgrou. d of vis:on and success . His cal:ber must te ~fficien~ to justify the confidence placed in tim by t~e Secretary and the :'residen A Coorr inating Corrurr.~ t ee compo ed ::>f D senj.o.r member of the Nanc;gement of <:ach con ractor o~ as ociate shou::.-oe :'ormcd to assist the :'re ject Virec ur to establisn broad policies ar.d co::>rdinate intercomp·ny relation-hips . They wo~ld adj~dicate s ch infre~ ert clash~s as might be expected occasionally from ~ group of dcdicat~d peopl Such a committee would operate b?th &s a who:~ and by parts as required ty pccif!c prot:ems . Ftcport.Lne d~rectly to the Pro~ect Dir·ector ~J?u:.d be a Project Cor,tro: Gro~p composed as necessary or desired of Civil .:Je rvice , Jv"Ll.:..i tar :1 or of Civi.Liar.s on loan from I?ldustY':; . Thls SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED ~OR RELEASE 17 September 2011 -2 rro~p wo1ld ~ot necessar! y attempt to prov~de technical c~!dance :'..r. fact , :!t rr::ght re better::~ they dia not . They wo~ld, how ver, provide cortrac Jal, lega..c , sccur!ty , materiel and administrat:..ve auvlce anu c.:mtrol . They woula ac: as l.:a.:.son in octain!ng information on the s atus and problems of the program and woula keep the Project D::rector knowledgeable so that he , in turn, could keep the President and others informed through such channels as may be :oet up . In additi on ~o the associated cor.tractors, a.10ther "as soc:..atc" woula b<:-a team from the M:!.l:'.tary . 'i'h::s group would provide l::.a:.son with th(; Services , spell ot:t operatio:;al needs , perform operat::onal planning, arrange for such aervice person:.cl or facii!ties as may be required sucn as tnose to f!rc , track and recover . .:..r:othcr lc:ar.1 wouid be prcvleied by the group or group:; w:signate· t.., LXploi the jnforma~ior, expectE:a fr•om thE: sateJ.l:ite .-vstem a,,d wr;o ·"':Y.Jl..:! be t·Xpec~ed o prov:..ae the f:'.:.al product intell.:. gt:nc<= . Still another group that might be considereo as part of the team is an orga:-.iza tion alreaay provided with the backgroc;.nd ::!ater!al and Qtud!es to provide data ~!thout t~e ~eed fo~ l nd!vldc.al teal"'. mec~Prs reco~p!ling !t. s~ch an organization might come from one of tne "Syster.:s Ma:1agcr (:i'IOn Prcf!t)" type but v10ald be :.wed a consultants rather tha:-1 ir: a ranagerial capac! ty . F-:-c· communication on tc.chn:'.cal rr.a tters sho-..tl be encouraged at al levels among members having rnutual !~terests or interface p:::'cble!T': . lrt a c:.. tion, ::. t is dc::::irable to ha·;c liai ::on pcr:::cr.Lel !'e~.:. -?t.a ,.eacr, company to p1·ovi ·e C·O:-Jtact 1:-: bon di:::'ecti•:m::; , ~cllow up on ~n~cr.ace proo1ema , etc . It is believed tnat Gucl: an organiza:ion wit!-1 the :::'espons:bl 1ty and authority to work toward an ob j ective rather than to a se of establisned rules or restrictive a!1d possibly ~nworkab:e spec f!cat!on3 wil~ encourage the be~t applica~ion of efforts ana w:::_ll resuJ.t.. :::_n the rr.axirr,ur, uccorr.pl:sn:ner11:; 1:. the l..,.ast c;.:_rr.e . CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RCLEASE 17 September 2011 Aavantages ana Disadvantages of Systems Manager-Prime -SJb 8rgar,izations The or~anizational concept of a p~lme con~rac~or togeLher with other manufacturers or suppliers as sujcontractors has certain disadvantages . The prime contractor is most often selected on the basis of rac,io of expenditures. T~1is implies > and rightly> that ~;ls share of the unde::rtakir.g is conplex and requires unique or profound know:edge in hi field. Nev~rtheless , tnere are otn r facets o~ the SJstem wh!ch can be equally or more complex and which are essential to successf:..:l perform2nce but w::icb muy cost only a f ew percent of tne total cost of a system . F"..trc,hermore , tr.e skills a~:d t alents required for the productio~ of successful components of a sys~em very of~e~ require the giant of their re pect~ve inaJstr1es . To SJbordi~ate o~e gla!':t to ar,other ma:y r,ot achl eve cccper EJtio:: 0~1 the part of t~;e :n:J~. nzemen':; o.!' t~.e se~bo:'dir.ated compar.y . Where a crash prcg:'am is involved, there is a tendency for a prime contractor to ~equ!re ur.rea l!stic scheduleE on the part of r1is subs in order to make certain that all of t he as emblies or 3Jbas embl:es are available to him well in advance of t~e actual ~eea fo~ tnem . It car. be arg~ed t: at prime contrac~ors require thl~ extra lead time to make certain all items mate and that per~ormance is as specified or r e quired . But how much of t his can be cnar gea to l ack of ability or to lack of performance on the part of the subco~tractor, and how much to being penal~zed by lnaaeqJate instr uctions or supervision .!'rom tne prime contractor? A satelllte system is somewhat the reverse of the one horse snay it snould go together all at o~ce . A~o~hel weak point ln ~he prime -sub relationship is tnat -:;he prime may provide ';he only corrmunic<:J t:i.o n ljnk betv1:er. the cus tomer a:>d the sut. This car. result in erroneous interpreta-:ion of wnat he is ~o do by the SJb and an equally erroneous impression of ·..mat he is to receive or. ~he oa:-t of the customer . Ir, a n effort ::o briagc: this e:<::.p, the pr::..me. gathers into his fold var·ious "experts" ir. -:;he fields of" rd s subcontractors . T..'1ese experts usually do r:ot h~ve as m~c~ kno~ledge of the specialized fields of th~ suba they are "airectine" in the I:aCJe of the priCJe. we repeat -a satellite system is a most complex ur:dertakir;g . NormaLJ there ls added to the }:rime -sub relationsi.ip 1 a "~y:::terns Mar.aw~r ' . This Syster~s ~anager ::.s all thir.:~:> to aJl P"'Cple . He repr'. 3ents the customer to the prime ana t:,e prirr.E tn tne c'"'"t0r1er· . ik controls, aJdits, cor tract , schedul'"s , i nv.sstig :es explai~: •nd fixes bla~e but nostly he proauce: papc~ work SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RE LEASE 11 September 2011 -2 c·. a~a wurs~, he req~i~~s paper wor~ from others . Beca 1se he mus~ :-~· orr.nipc-:ent , the Systems M::mae:;er must collec': a complete staf.::' l' "<;q::et'7.c 11 i· alt ~!"·h1s rela':ed to tnP sys::""m U!'lder co:-tsideration . Tne~e, )f c~~rse, are in addition ~o the corps of report writers , "eport 1 '-'&ci"'rS ona ':he like that are r.ecessary to suppor::. the Systerr.s i•lc..n&.ier cor.cept . Sorr.e of these cor.ce!'•lS !lave, witho~.,;': q:;estion , ac C'.l:nulated enormous amounts of techr.jcal data hearing or ~~t·oad aspects Jf the problem and provjdj~g ext,er. ive bac~ground valuable in ana:y.,.'..s o.!' tn.:: proble~s . Bllt sa;:;ellite systems are corr.posed of sct•ews that stay tignt, rr.otors tnat run , re~ays that operate and int~rfaces ~nat rrate . The proble~s c3n be so:ved only ~y co~trac ors , although c.:-1ey can be gre3. tly assisted by data on :ouch t!'lings as er:viro~1ment . Tr,e .SystC>:ns Man'lrer concep:. car. be provided in tnro::.:: ways: l . Util:zirr tnc prime as a ~ystems m3~&~er . c.: . UtL. .i:i•.l'-;: service Ol£ar.izat..:.on . 3 . Utilizing a ''r.or. -prof..:.t" cor.cer:•. Utilizi·12: tiic prime contractor as a Systerr.s r.:anaeer may t.:: n;;ner . 'l'r:e:·e is tne fc:rthc-r danger· :..nat,, ..:.n e:.de::Jvor_i_r.£ ~o .:·..:.11 ·~vJO Jobs, n::.s taler.ts rr.ay be spr;o~ ~ too th..:.n :o LL successfJl a· ei:ner . J1, ~ :'ViC( orrar~~:a:.io~ act:.nf 32 E:ys"cer.~ :·1nr..::.;;cr nas an c7er: rr.ore di~~!8u~: ro_e tG f~ll and , usJa.ily , with lcs: talent • •~·.t ~ c~ :r-1c \.ll :.:Ln:I :L c 1:..::c..~ET' of e. sa-'...E::lli ::.c s~s:.en is :.ornal2.y or1e of' the Services -:tle lL!' Force -:t S,yste!TI3 rv:ana[er ::'rorr. the Serv.:.cc CO.l.l O l'"'asonab.!.y 'u';; expectc:a :o know the customc.:"s r:e~:;ds n:1d rc qu.:.rc.ments . He r-:aJ clso hc:vc a:, exccpt::.onal array o.!' talcr'.t ir: :..he f::.e.J,.d ..-~o~ t or~;--~o r~.:.m -::he t..:r.g1ne . But the Ser 'lee Organizat.:.on ca:.'!ot have ~.or !lope to have the required t ccn::ical skills ~or -.lndErstar.O~Ilg :..tnd c~n-r,rol.iir~~ all of' t.!'1~ mar.y tecnn:..ca.L min,Jt:.a::: requ.:.:ea ::.~ ~ sys:~rr . ~sa result there may be a tend•rcy to solve uv edict or rnecr weight of manp0wer or money . problcmE which will t,oi·i or.l:,· :;o c ch;t:..;al cmr.pete!iCe or to ted.:.ous trial. experimenta-ci:~t o,,u lle·•e::.o).Jm.::n:. . TLere rr.a~ be an impatience which evol ·;cs an ur.rcctl..:.st.:.c scned~lc . A crash program with an .lr'.real.:.stic schedule ~1l~ c:·3~·n . 'Ine tr::.r 1 ~.pproach, that of 3 non -profit org:;,.ni:::a tion ~€:.! ~_,~r!t~ qs .:~~/s~em~-r~:t:-:aeer· , nas trie le3.s: "':o condem:. ~: . Th.:...~ ::.s tn1c· par:ic...\J::;rly ~f the ccmcerr. is of reasonab::.y lo·.t: ·tand~ ng CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 -3- JnJ has accum~la~ed a background of data on what has nappened, Vl'ha environments can be expected and has st~died the past attempts o:r failure for their :!.essons . :aut i:-1 tne final analysis what. can they be expected to contrib~te except this guidancE information that cannot come equa~ly as wel l or better from specialist con tractors? 2"uly 22 , :!.9o0 PROJECT DIRECTOR ,-------------~ I PROJECT CONTROL GROUP I "••" ..t'IIJSTRATION ' ·-..... , I I CONTRACTS I FI NANCES I BROAD COORDINATION OF I SECURITY I I Pl.IINN ING I cO<; IS TICS I I I CONSULTANTS ~L__ .SVCH AS 'R~ND COORPINIITING STL COMM ITT EE JPL ~-c~NilV(:rs! I j \ I / : \ : L--;-.1'------~-f\------I L----, 1 1 / \ I I , ----: / r ---~ : ' ~-~-~ I / I : I \ I : i : \ uAIS~N "B"j 1 I LIAISON "A"j \ : lw,ISON ',•:I I I \1 (II I : 1 j I I I I I I i m I I 1 I\ I 0 : I I I I \ I PROPOSED ORGANIZATION [OR I 1 I I t \ ' -t SATELITE SYSTEM : : i i : \ : 0 z L~umoN ·c1 ~~uAisON ·c·j L 1uAISoN ~·1 I 0 I I '"0 ,_ --------l. --------------...,J ;:o L--- 0 C) ~ 3: z :::j > r- E 0 z ....>. 0::0 co CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ..-., _ SECTION Ill : PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 .'! ov~:.::.. · 196:. Jc·.:: . ._: -"'.:adcd st ._.: ~ "'""i' 710 !:.t o! ..ve.ls; :~o·-·.:·'~t i ca l ly ~~c~~ssified. __ _. ;200 . 10 SSZX-1 9 Nov 61 . ' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RE~EASE 17 September 2011 SECRET SPACJE S:XSTEKS DIVISION . AIR FORCE SYSTEK.'S CCHWm 9 November 1961 FOREWORD .. This Outline Development Plan presents the elements o£ Project CUE BALL wh1.ch .is AFSC support £or a classUled prlorit;r Space Program. This document haa been prepared. in responae to Hq WAF Secret Message AFCVC 54852, 25. September 1961. Achievement o£ the tasks outlined in this plan will meet initial requirements £or a program or apace launches, satellite control, and. re-entr;r operat.iona• .. 'l'he directed phase o£ this e££ort includes £our sh6ta at sixt;y-dq interV-als. An alternate program o£ ten ahots at £ort;y-dq intervals is also presented in order to provide more adequate · demonatrat.ion o£ CUE BALL per!ol'.lllance and relia.bil.it;r. . . Tbi.s document Eurther deacr.ibea the teohn:ical .taaka, management approach, schedule o.r activities, and resources required to accomplleh the proposed programs.~ ·-. SECRET SSZX-1 9 Nov 61. u SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR ... RELEAsE 11 september 2011 ~s~E~&::;R£~-J-- TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I. PROGRAM SUMMARY • . . . . . . . . . . . Tab l. l..O Background Information lol. Approach 1.2 Program Scope Part II. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ••••••••••• Tab 2 2.0 SUIIliDa.I"Y 2.1. Management Relationships 2.2 Contractor Status 2.3 Test Support Status PART III. MASTER SCHEDULE • Tab J 3.0 Basic Launch Schedules 3.l. Procurement Lead T~es 3.2 Launch Program 3.3 Master Schedules Part IV. FACILITIES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• Tab 4 4.0 General 4·l Missile Assembly Building (MAB) Part V. FUND ESTIMA.TE • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• Tab .5 5.0 Fund Est~te 5.1. Previous Funding Request 5.2 Funding Requirements Annex A. USAF Program Message • . . -• Tab A Annex B. SPO Ma.nnin8 Document • • Tab B SECRET SSZX-l. 9 Nov 61 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 PART I PROGRAM SUMMARY" ~.0 BACKGROUND INFORMATION a. Project CUE BALL has been estabLished by Hq USAF to carr,y out AFSC support for a cl.a.ssifi.ed Space Program. (See Annex A, "Hq USAF Program Message"). Space Systems Division, AFSC, has been assigned responsi.bi.~ty for Project CUE BALL which i.nc~udes boosters, sate~te vehic~es, . and associated services for ~aunch, on-orbit contro~, and re-entry operations. · b. In accordance with current policy, information on Project CUE BALL will be supp~ied on a strict need-to-lmow basis. Therefore, technica~ information has been minimized in this out~ne deve~opment and .f'undi.ng p~an. c. The presently directed program for Project CUE BALL, referenced herei.n as the Program A, consists of four ~aunches from FMR at 60-day intervals begi.nni.ng :in February ~963. However, the ~eve~ of confidence of success associated with Program A is ~ow. Therefore, an uternate Program B .of ten ~aunches at 40-day interva~ is aJ..so presented using the same starting date. d. Project CUE BALL has potentially serious prob~ems with hardware and faci.llt:1.es ~ead t:l..me. These are discussed :1.n appropriate detai~ in various sections of this document. --. -·--10 ., ~ . I-~ SSZX-~ 9 Nov 6~ SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 1.1 APPROACH a. Program Concepts. Project CUE BALL includes system. engineering, procur8lllent, and test operations. (1) The principal engineering problems concern the dei"inition and integration o£ a suitable satellite vehicle "Wi.thin the very stringent time schedule. (2) In order to meet procurement schedules, maximum use is being made o£ existing hardware, £acillties1 and support equipnent. (3) Maximum assurance of mission succese in the operational ·test phases ·wi.ll be achieved through use o£ ex:l.sting launch and on-orbit tracking and control sites and stations. b. Mission Concept (l) A two-stage Atlas/Agena booster configuration will provide primary propulsive power to launch and inject the satellite vehicle into the selected orbit. (2) Arter separation of the boosters, the satellite vehicle maintains orientation and attitude using internal controls. The principal. on-orbit requirement is for the satellite to be :esponsi:v9 ' to ground based commands in order that accurate de-boost and re-entry can be effected at any point along the trajectory. (J ) The re-entry operation is still under study. l.2 PROGRAM SCOPE a. Number o£ flights -The testing organization has planned three mission con£igurations, each with an identical vehicle interface. ~.-.. ~·~: ' . ··?,~ •'7. ·~··· • • I -2 SSZX-1 9 Nov 61 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 :-~ ... ... .,~ :': ! • • .~ One successful flight with each co!'l.figuration is required to cicmonstrate the requi:::-ed system ve::-sat!.lity. It is assumed that the ~gcncy of Project CUE BALL warrants at least 90% confidence that th::-ee flights will be successful. Figure I-1 shows that the proper number of shots (r) is a function of the probability of success of a single shot (p). For Category I tests of the multi-stage C!E BALL Systeu,, a max:Linum ve.l.ue of (p=.5) seems appropriate. Therefore,. a ten-shot launch series, the so-calledProgram B, has also been exercised and presented. '::l. Program Tasks -The principal tasks and responsible organizations for Project CUE BALL are: (1) Overall program management: Hq SSD SPO (SSZX) (2) Ge:1eral system engineering and technical direction: Aerospace Corporation. (3) Satellite control engineering and technical direction: Hq SSD (SSZC) (4) Atlas Booster: General Dynamics/Ast ronautics. (5) Agena Booster: Lockheed ¥!.isaile and Space Compan;y-. (6) Satellite Vehicle: (Associate to be selected). (7) National range support: Pacific Missile Range. (8) Launch operation: 6565th Test i'ig (VAFB) (9) On-orbit operation: 6594th Test vlg (Sunnyvale) (10) Re-entry operation: (To be determined). (ll) Launch site facilities: Vandenberg AFB. (12) Up-Range TT&C station facilities: (Under study) (13) Impact Range facilities: (Under study) SS7..X-1 9 Nov 61 I -3 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR CRJ:'l'ICAL 'fO US SECURI'l'Y: '1'BB GUIBI'l' AliD IDZXAGOH SA'l'BLLITB RBCORRAISSAHCE SYSTBMS CONPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 PART II -PROGRAl~ l-!AI\AGE;·lENT 2.0 Sl.J!.IMARY a. CUE BALL SPO. .Tho CUE B.\LL SPO, Space Systems Division (SSD), AFSC, is the responsible management agency for Project CUE BALL. This responsibility includes the preparation of development, funding, and testing plans, and the direction of engineering, production, and field operations of the CUE BALL program, as approved by higher authority. The SPO · will establish and maintain overall milestones and schedules (See Section III), make interpretations as required, and coordinate the participation of non-Air Force support aeencies. SPO organization and manning requirements are included in Annex B. b. Contractors. Definitive contracts will be negotiated by SSD for specific portion& of the CUE. l3A.LL System effort. This will include Associates for: o General Systems Engineering and Technical Direction (GSE&TD) o First Stage Booster (ATLAS) o Second Stage Booster (AGENA) o Satellite Vehicle (To be detennined) Each Associate will be responsible to the SPO for the necessar.y planning and programming required to carry out his portion of the e.ffort. This will include task de.finition, management organization, interior schedules, and subcontracted responsib~iti.es. c. AFSC Suoport. The SPO will de.fine, coordinate, integrate, and establish priorities .for the participation required of all USAF agencies. II-1 SSZX-1 9 Nov 61 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 It is anticipated that AFSC organizations will provide the principal. support required !or launch, on-orbit, and re-ent:rr operation. The Director, CUB BALL SPO, is-responsible !or overall direction o£ USAF e1aments. Management relationships o£ participating organizationa are indicated in Figure II-1. 41.2 . CONTRACTOR STATUS. (Aa ot 1 . November) A class Il & F pursuant to 10 u.s.c. 2304(a)(ll) to negotiate CUE BALL contracts is needed i.Dmediate}J" to initiate the £allotting procurt1111ents: a;. Aerospace Corporation(GSE&TD}. New funding is required immediatolz !!9. that SSD can s;ontract wi.th Aerospace Corporation !or ~ eptabllshment o£ A CUE BALL Program Office. The proposed build-up o£ Aerospace support. (in MT5 -Members o£ the Teehnica1 Staf'£) is as £o110W11 s ~ Nov 61 Total MTS b. General D,rnamica/Aatronautics (ATLAS). Six ATLAS £irst stage booatera were placed on order b7 SSD using reimbursable £uods. Th1.a has protected Program A ·lead tilDes and covered Program B through December 196l.. Ini.tial. CUE BALL i'undi.ng is required iillmediate4r" t;, PQ" :for these six boosters. Additional funding !oribur more .A.TLAS boosters will be required i£ the ton-shot Program B is approved. c. Lockheed Missll~ and Space Co. (AGENA). Four AGEMA vehicles have been ordered :for CUB: BALL WJing reimbursable .f"unda. Th:is has protected Program. A lead tilDes and covered Progr8111. B through Dectaber 1961. Initial. P'Y62 1'unding ie requ:irad immediate~ to pq.:for those AGENAs. II-2 SSZX-1 9 Nov 61 -. 1\) 0 CD 9 ..,.. ~ ~ ( --. "'\ ...;,, a tn fa ~TRELATIONSHIP.S: Project CUE BALL. ~ ~ ..,.. Hq SSD -SSZX: [5 .. CUE BALL System Program Office I H ..,.. Aerospace Corporation -· Hq SSD -SSZC . General 8,ystem Engineer~ng Satellite Control ~ and Technical Direction Sys Eng and Tech Direction I I 1 I GD/AstronautJ.cs Lockheed M & S Co 6565th Test Wg 6594th Teet· wg I I tn Firat Stage Booster Second Stage Booster Launch Support On-Orbit Support Re-entry . ~ :Jatellite Vehicle ATLAS AGgA Support ~ ...., ~ H ~ Vandenberg AFB I I Pacific Missile Range i3 FACILITIES I I Nat~onal. Range Support ~ tn ..... 5 FIGURE II -1 ~ ~Bi ~~ ,. i ·< t. ~ ...._. I i H SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Additional FY62 funds for six more AGENA.a will be required for Program B. d. Contractor for Satellite Vehicle. (1) Design Study.' A study is being completed by SSD/Aerospa.ce to define the design requirements of the Satellite Vehicle. Availability, performance, and reliability are primary criteria for thiB effort which will provide procurement data in November 1961. (2) Contractor Selection. Immediate funding is required to permit sollc~tation and evaluation of proposals for the Satellite Vehicle. Source Selection and initiation of contractual coverage in December 1961 is mandatory to maintain CUE BALL launch dates. 2.3 TEST SUPPORT STATUS a. Range Support. A support collllllitment has been obtained from the Commander, PMR, for either Program A or B of CUE BALL. No CUE BALL funding is required by PMR. b. Launch SUffi?Ort· The 6565th Developnent Test Wing will provide · launch support for both CUE BALL programs within presently programmed funding. c. On-Orbit Support. The 6594th Satellite Test Wing will provide on-orbit support (telemetry, tracking, and control) for both CUE BALL programa. Funding estimates are shown on pages V -2 and V -3. d. Re-entry Support. SSD/Aerospace Study. During October, a study of CUE BALL re-entry operations was initiated within SSD/Aerospace. · This study will define facilities, sites, ~d forces necessary to support the CUE BALL m.iss~on. Definitive results (in~luding lead times, ..f'unding requirements, and equipnent) are expected in December 1961. II-4 SSZX-1 ·9 Nov 61 ,---------- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 .3.0 BASIC LAUNCH SCHED!JLES a. De£initionp --.This section presents procurement ana ~aunch schedul.es for two programs: (1) "Program A" is the four-shot/sixty-day interval effort directed by Hq USAF. The vehicles associated with this program are identified by the "-A" sui'fix, e.g., 1-A, 2-A, etc. (2) "Program B" is the ten-shot/forty-day interval effort recommended :for Project CUE .BALL by AFSC. The vehic1es associ ated. nth this program are identified by the "-B" suffix, e.g., 1-B, 2-B, etc. b. Launch Schedu,les. Launch Dates Program A Program B 1 Februaryl96.3 · #1-A #1-B 2 April 196.3 #2-A #2-B 1.2 May 1963 #3-B 2 June 196.3 #3-A 21 June 1963 #4-B · .3~ Jul.y ~96.3 #4-A #5-B 9 September 1963 #6-B · 1.9 October 1.963 #1-B 28 November 1.963 .#8-B 7 January 1964 119-B . 1.6 February 1.964 #l.O-B · III -l. SSZX'-l. ·9 Nov 61 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECIU:1 3.1 PROCtlREM:I!m LEAD TIMES a. Definitiopa -No~ procurement lead times for the principal hardware elements of Project CUE BALL are: o ATLAS 1st St&&e Booster: 21. mont¥ o AGENA 2nd Stage Booster: 18 umths o SATELLITE VEHICLES: 15 menths (a.pprox) These times a.re baaed on the interval !ram initial contractual coverage to completion of launch operations. Under premium overtime conditions, these lead times can be reduced; they can a.l.ao be cut back by pre-em.pt:ing d.mlla.r hardware already under procurement for other, low priority-progr8.1D8. In order to minimize such undesirable mea.eurea, Project CUE BALL .funding ahoul.d be made available at the earliest poaaible time. b. Interim SSD Actions (1) Aeroapace Studies. Action hal!l been taken under a.n existing SSD/Aeroapace support contract to conduct urgent CUE BAU. et~es at a ' level o.r 10 MTS (Membere o.r the Technical Stafi') man-months during October/November 1961. (2) GSF.&TD. Aerospace GSE&TD support cannot !!!, pro'1ded without !!!!!t ~.!Yl9. !!!!!! contra.atua.l coverage. (3) ATLAS. Six ATLAS vehicles have been pl.a.ced on order by-SSD using reimbursable i'und.a. (4) AGENA. P'our AGENJ. vehi.clea have been pl.aced on order b;y SSD using reimbursable .funds. (5) SATELLITE VEHICLE. SSD/Aerospace studies a.re in progreaa in order to devel.op procurement data (vehicle apec:U'icat.iona and a technical lltatement of work) during Noyember 1961. 2 SSZX-1 9 Nov 1961 - SECREI III CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 c. Procurement Lead Time -Tne desirable procurement schedule for the various CUE BALL vehic:es, using the lau."lch schedul.es and normal procurement lead times (paragraphs .3 .0.b and 3 .l.a, respectively) are appro.x:i.mately as follows: BUY BUY BUY LAUNCH NU}lBER ATLAS AGENA SATEU.ITE VEHICLE #1-A/1-B 1 Novl961 -gi>O Q) ~ #2-A/2-B "' r-1 ·.-1 2 Jan 1962 ~,-~g}~ -~~-c§ #3-B 0 Q)""' l2 Feb 1962 S~tQ) #3-A <•~:cl 2 Mar 1962 ~ ~ k~ #4-B 21. Mar 1962 <"frn..o ~ 0 Q) -~ #4-A 0 c ~ Q) 30 Apri.l. 1962 r...o...,s.. #5-B 31 Jan 1.962 30 Apr 1962 #6-B 9 Mar 62 9 Jun 1962 #7-!3 19 jan 1962 19 Apr 1962 19 Jul. 1.962 #8-B 28 Feb 1962 28 May 1.962 28 Aug 1962 #9-B 7 Apr 1962 7 Jul 1962 7 Oct 1962 #l.O-B 1.6 May 1.962 16 Aug 1962 16 Nov 1962 • J · • . ·:: d. FundL'"lg Requirements. (l.) Program. A. Immediate funding requirements (through 31. March 1.962) were forwarded t~ Hq AFSC by SSD Secret Message SSZX-26-1.0-l., 26 October 1961. Estimated FY62 requirements are summarized in Part V, · Fund Estimate. (2) Program. B. Estimated FY62 requirements are summarized in Part V, Fund Estimate. ·3.2 LAUNCH PROGRAM a. Test Support Plans -Support by Pacific Missile Range, 6565th Deve1op:nent Test Wing, and 6594th Satellite Test Wing has been s·chedul.ed. SSZX-l. 9 Nov 61. SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 · The p~~cipal gap in the test program is definition of the re-entry operation. An SSD/Aerospace study of the re-entry phase 'h-ill be complete late in November l961. b. MAB Faci1itv. CUE BALL schedules require the assigmnent of space in MAB-3 at Vandenberg AFB about 1 August 1962. All modi~ication of the facility and checkout of associated equipment must be completed so that CUE BALL MAB operations can begin on 1 November 1962. MAB-.3 is presently occupied by other programs. Thi:s situation is now under study to dete~e the cost and extent of the adjustments required• .3 .J MASTER SCHEDULES. Figures III-1 and III-2 summarize the schedules of Programs A and B for CUE BALL, respectively. III-4 SSZX-1 9 Nov 61 1\..) ..... CJ1 8 li ~ (J ~ ,.. . ,;.:I. en NRO APPROVED FOR w:.~, tjJ uc,' 1.1!1 RELEASE 17 September 201 PROGRAM~ :!JULE c.Y.to. ~ 1-1 -~-Pr-c·~-,,-.~-t-r.--L-~--,,,;-' __11. ----f.. t-TE·.-BA-1-.__-_-_-- ':'. ~;;;·--· "' ]963 c~ n "" .C<[--s--C~- =~--.=-~~c · -·~· =---=-.~-------~~'-lj~~-~ II~ j ~i -1;~!~~~r~~~~--f~~~ A~ J! 63 ~. :! ~~--~~~ ]f:l:~:. !~-rT I r III ~ A ---~ . li _l_I:.lKlGP..A!_L!:NI'fi!'.'{lQ!~---· _ -·---_ ___ . f -J_--. -------_! ~ ...t_ __USAF' Prof.J:i!!)l Hes~ru'~-----..iQ.ct OffuU!l.tal!li.rill.!tcl-:!N.~.lli.eJ>D.e....amLS~.L-:-.. . .. . _ _ _ _ _ --· ... _ tf-H--. __ .. __ _--_15 j lL.. _ _..EY.62..J~1.'~L(0_1Jr.it.:i -'lL~.nd..l:.iual.Jlto.l!:.B.s.e) I_ _ C· D.. __ .. . .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ H. en 4 IL..............fontract .Glll<:eJ.:a.ge _ 1----· ..------·--~--:: . __ ---·-_' lL ~ · ''----'-''W.'-"'''-'=..li.-"""'--------+ _ -_[ __ . ... _ ----~--.. -..[---" ~ -autmt~~L n J.!.__ S.4'i}\iJ}Tf..!.'l')].•:::;..u;_(.,"\Q\~~T>._.t.~.:_h.ll....S.c)f',:.Lr~1: _ • _ ·---~ 19_ ll.__.!T.o.c.u:..:,-::srt._I'!lt!l-(.i:.'}IJ/!J·;.:;:o:.'I~~-:;. c:. f~i-Wl.Je} _ . 0 . . . . .. • . .... _ _ _ __ . _ -f-1! 1-1 ~i:~~e(r!~-;f~;d-Fi.;-;;1 il;J e;;-;;1 . o --... r - -_ ~~ t;,) f n._ Contract Coverage ___ 1-·· --..--=------------·-----·-... _ c.. u. ZL.......__.Vehicle Delivm_&_VM'B 1 . l _ _ Z! ~ ZL --------· _u_ 2.LLA!!liCII J>ROORAM 2t. ~CHEillJI.E.......... 1 ··· -ZL ~ 1-1 en IL_.TEST_>'ll!£l'.OR!.. P.I..AlliL.. 2L 2.L..~ange..Slippcrl._(.p.MR) 0 . 1!. ll..___Lall!ICh....SJJpport (li5.6.illt_Test ~U:) ... .:............ 0 _ . _ H. JL_ _ Qp_::()rhl.t Suuooct..J..02!!11L.!~Wg) · 0 1l s ll__!ie::!nt>:y_fu.tppJ:lz:L~n to be selected) ~Q .. _ . -:--· _ _ _ ll. Jl__EACTI ITTF:S 31. en U-.c ,., ...l:IAR..ii:L.(s.peJ:.e..A~T ---. -----f-3!. t< ll~ [~; ____ __(llo:Ufillil.ti.on._--;;~nut) 1--1 ll. ll~ ~'. -CCl!F...J3ALL....Operations) 1-·-· --.-_-----1 ·--· ·-U. n ,'• _llp::RangLl'r.a~}Q..~.Q!I mTr -. -u. I 0 U 1-' _ (SSP/Aerospace gt,,'rlv r.omnleted) _ " , l, )). . . U l1' _Re-entr;r Operat.i Ol)S -.•: .~ ~ . -.( '" j . -n L_ ___ ~~Q/_Aerosvace Studv Completed) .: -; ·--t, i:i]r I-+-!D.. j a.wromm•-'?'"' R , , J A 1 0 N D 1! 11 A 11 J 1 l ~' ~r,;r.J;r;rJ, u 1 o , r n" • • • ... .... .D . -. -·rt.w~..u"'''".-..e••"" ,.,, ., .. "'7 \II I i 1-1 NRO APPROVED FOR _) 11"":1 {J~; f)11::;:,tr~·J RELEASE 17 September 201~oGn/l!:' s~ .JULE C.Y. I.f·. • 1'!! ,. : .',/;'] _·· -----~-=r-=~:;,icet cur DALL _ ----_--,..-_-_-c-~-6, ~~~~';02i'c--:r;; ~~· -c;';;,-E,:-'': ;~ ; _-__ _-:-·Y-J-,'-2.{__-2~2i_ _ ··--,.....-··~ _,-~--~----,. "--·--J A ! 0 H ~ J F 1J A U J J A ~-~ II 0 ~ !.U A ll J J A ! 0 ~ D J F a :• ~~ J ~ ~~ ~t~~ ~f~! ll ~ IJ 2.. LJ'..RDDliAtUNJ'£1A11D.lL. . ----· -· · t-..! _l___.ll_f;i/if'_ l'rn!TSJ.l.!LMruisa&L--_ ---------· _ Q _ _ _ __ 1-10' ---. --1--..2. J . _::;y.;.:t.r, Jx_QjE)c_LOU.ic.1l_(E'Lt.;l.liUJ•h£ill.L____ . 0 _ . _ _ .. .. _. . . /':--<::. __ _ ... _ ___ .. __ _ .. __ _ .......... J. _j___op ~l :i \lEJ...J).e.Jif-J~'l.t...EJ.an__ _________ _ o__ __ ...: -. ·;r: -.... .. . __ __-----...... ---- ---J. _j__ __ w;'r•J.!:...I'rQE.J.s>..m..Dil:.e.c.t.m_ _______ ... . -1-l----1---,·o, .. '· ~-----t---------r-.1. _L_ ---· -----n· 1--4{f£'·r.. ~-, ""'-------.l. .LP..RD.G!llif.JlE!J.IJ'..ROC.EP.H___. ______·--n· 1-t-1-.. --,, . 1 :.. ~ .L. ...JlliE. .L'JJL(A~~~cg__Go.rpL ll 1--t---1-+-+---l--1 ·j·-1--1---1-.!. _j____~111ds Jl!'.itial ;md Final___Rtl.f!_a_ill Qf:-L..L-Q __ . .__ .. . __ L.L l_ L _ _ .J.. ___L..J._ ,_ JD Gmlt.mc.t. Ccm1~e I··--·--... -----·--.. ··--------1 lQ. u-=:.~!liLA:LC.G.~JJ~, .-~Ii.c.:.l/Ast.:;;,_utill..L _ --TJHfFFLil U-HP-~FFffitFJ-F+T .. ,_ ----· !1 n____ry.QZ_.EP?$lr-:...(Jp~i.t.;i,.al._.ao\U)naLTJill2-.W _ _ .....o0 .u . _l __l__U. .. . _l__ ___ _____..L --"1-__ _ _ .... -n ~>-~~;r~:~-~I~;~f;~~-~~~~~~~~=~i=-,1~t1~-~~~1~t'i-~l~rw~~ffl~~II~~~ -~ ~-~~~ ~:: ~ ~--_: fi 1 lL__E:Y~M..im;i.l:i.aLeJ];LFi.n·i T I I r· , 2L _ ~=ul..u:a.. Gs• -'ll • ac.uticl~'r ----------~~---·· ·· · ·-·· · · ---1------· ·----, -· -· -~ ;i <" Jl SomceDetermi..11at1onu;:LeJ.:ru>P y Q~---. --=t ----_:_·· 1-.:_ --__ · ---1---·=:_,.J_~=--~ =ti. 21__EY62 F)m.ds (Inili.aLa.tl.d..Einal_~ 0 _____ Q __ j ..______ ...J... ... __ _.. ... __ ___ ---~ _____ 11. 23 Goo.tract Coverage.. _ 1---:·.. ;=-~ ---:__--..--.. -.:.·::-=-.:.: · -----::---::::-.::-"' _ .. _ __ ... _. _ ... Zl 24 Vehicle l&li.Y§.l'L..a!<....Yll,nc;!enberg AFf!__ _ __ ± ..j:I. 1 J. 1 1 ~1. l l ...1_ _ _ . _ r-2!. ii u:Hr:fc~~'Dn[j""_____ -~~ · · _ -~-~t.. J~ ili-=-1:1.1_11 ---=-_ __----~ Zl TEST .SU.EEOliTJL!HiS ,, _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _7L n_____jlangJL.Qll1)pRl~t_ill:._rru_ 0 . _ ... _ _ ___ . . _ U Zl Lauru:IJ...S.\lPPm~t...LU5MJ;l1 Test W2 l _ _ jQ _I-.. _ . ____ _ _ .... _ ... _ ZL (/) m 3L_O:u:-O.r.llit...S~QI'L(.6illt1L!Mt Wg) 1Q. ~ __ _ __ _ _ _ ... _ Jt () .3.!_ . Rec•ovecr..SU)lj.)Ol't~Under s!;udy) _ __ _ __ . 1--_ 0 . ... _.. _ __ _ _ _ _ ll -1 lL__. .EACILU'l£;;___ 0 lJ__}:WiltJ Ass~Eql• ""BALL~----~-.J-...~--l---1-+---1-·· ~--· --------·r-:i: --e-;-d"""~;-o.......,CU""E,...-+-z l!-.o 2l ~:ad~f1.cat~on & ?heckout ___ _ ... ~-._ :_! -· _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ H.. .:u.z f'l ___ _QQE..J!:f r ~ 0 z N ...... m CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 4.0 GEi'lERAL a. ~· ?rojE;lct CUE BALL facilities requirements have been examined in four areas: o Contractor production and test facilities o Vandenberg AFB o On-orbit TT&C Stations o Re-entry Operations b. Status. (1) No contractor .facilities requirements have been identified at Aerospace, LMSC, GD/A, or Philco. It is doubtful that.the selected SATELLITE VEHICLE contractor 't;ouJ..d require new facilities. (2) A requirement has been identified at · Vandenberg AFB for mod.i.i"ications to a Missile Assembly Building (MAB #3 ). An esti.mate on the FY62 and/or FY63 facilities funds is being prepared by the appropriate CE organization. (3) Existing on-orbit TT&C Stations are adequate for support of Project CUE BALL from a facilities f~ding position. However, additional TT&C requirements are no't: under study by SSD/Aerospace. It is probable that a new up-range station ar.d a do-.m-range ship nll be required. It :is expected that . some FY63 facilities funds will be associated nth the up-range installation a."ld that PMR nil m.eet requirements for facilities funding related to shipborne stations. Definitive funding information is not expected to be available until December 1961. IV-1 .. '·. L17 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 .-... ·. ~ ~ . 4-l: !USSILE ASSID.ffiLY BUILDDiG (MAB #3. VAFB). a. Reauirement. Vande:J.berg AFB facilities are required .for the assembly and checkout o.f CUE BALL Satellite Vehicles. Current investigations indicate that a portion of MAB #3, currently occupied by elements of the ATLAS booster program, is the most suitable location for CUE BALL operations. Minor facilities funds (e.g., approximately -are required to adapt MAB #3. b. Schedule. Approxiluately three months lead time will be required to relocate ATLAS and insta1J./checkout CUE BALL .facilities. Since CUE BALL operations must start 1 November 1962, MAE #3 modifications must be initiated by 1 August 1962. IV-2 SS~X-1 9 Nov 61 CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 it PART V -FUND i3S7IHA.TE 5. 0 FUND ESTLV...A TE .,.. Scope. Esti=.atcs '.:lased on the incremental fundint; concept are presented separately for Program A (USAF directed) and ?rograrr. B (AFSC recomrr,ended) for Fiscal Years 62, 63 and 64. =nese est~~tes are incomplete concernin~ re-entry operGtio~s ar.d facilities pending completion of studies now in progress. In addition, costs for the Up-Range Tracking Station have been roughly estimated and may require substantial revision during December 1961. b. FY62 Funding. Becat:.se of immediate requirements for CUE BALL program initiation, FY62 funding r~s been identified by TWX to AFSC on 26 Oc~ober in two increments as follows: (1) First. Funds needed to initiate long lead time procurement ~d contract performance through 31 March 1962. Release of Initial FY62 funds is required during November 1961 in the amount of either Program A or B. ~ ~) Balance. Funds required to complete FY62 commitments. Release of balance of FY62 funds is required before the end of March 1962. 5.1 PREVIOUS FUNDTITG REQUEST Previously, FY62 funding requirements, for tJ-,e CUE BALL Program A only, were forwarded through Command char.nels by SSD Secret Message SSZX-26-10-1, 26 October 1961. This message summari zed FY62 requirements,exclusive~of £unds for re-entry operations and facilities, as follows: Initial Increment: Balance Increment : Total FY(\2 5.2 FUNDING SUMMARY: See pages V-2 (Program A) and V-3 (Program B). v-1 SSZX-1 9 Nov 61 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 september 2011 -~S[iEHC..:.RE--T-1-- .... INITIAL FUND ESTIMA.TE PROGRAM "A.", Categorz Contraqtor .TECHNICAL SERVICES General Systems En-Aerospace gineering and Tech-. ni.cal Direction FLIGHT PROGRAM 4 ATLAs Boosters GD/Aatro, . and Launch Serv. HAA, ot.herll 4 .AGENA Boosters LMSC and Launch Serv. 4 SATEU.IT.E VEUnknown ' HICLES and Servi.cea SUPPORT PROORAM Telemetr,r,Tra~ LMSC 8 and Command (Tl'&C) Phllco Additional Up-Range Unknown TT&C Station Re-entr.r Operatiou lfnknown SUB-TOTALS GENERAL SUPPORT • . TOTAL P-6399 \ FMn.m:ES (P-300) !Qcation KAB 113 VAFB Est.imates avai.lab1e in December 61 Up-Range Tl'&C Station Unknown .E.timatea ava.llabl.e in December 1961 Be-1ntr.r Operations Unlmcnm (tbler Stud;T) V-2 SSZX-1 SECRET 9 Nov 61 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ir. .. ~- INITIAL FUND ESTIW,.'T'Z PROGP.P..l-1 "B". PROJECT ClJ"E BAIL Contract.or TEC!TI\ICAL SERVIC:!:S General Systems En- Aerospace ginearin6 and Tech nical Direction FLIGHT PROGRAM lO ATL~ Boosters GD/~tro, and Launch S erv NAA, others 10 AG~~A Boosters I...V.SC a.."'ld La'..!Ilch Serv. 10 SATELLITE VE U:1known HICLES and Services SUPPORT PROGRA}! Telemetry,Tracking L~C and and Co.x:m~.and (TT&C) Philco Additional Up-Range TT&C Station Unknown Re-entry Operations Unkno•m SUB-TOTAlS GENERA::. SUPPORT TOTP~ P-6399 FACILTTIES (P-300) IDeation MAB #3 VAFB Estimate~ available in Dec 61 Up-Range TT&C Station Unkno~~ Estimates availa~le in Dec 61 Re-entry Operations Unknown (Under study) V-3 SSZX-1 9 Nov 61 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION ~:!A52077DS!~ . .: f· : ... . , . "9 R.Jl:iZBK . DE RJlm"F '23C . ' ? 26!4.57Z . R1 . HQ A..T:'SC ANDRE:l:l'S.. ·. .: . . ; ·· . FB t1D . . .. . . 1'<1 SSD L'OS ANGELES CALIF , ..··. r:" ... •, _.,.:, I • SEC R E 1' SCGN 26-So-5115. ~OR SSG. THIS l1ESSAG~ IN Tt:TO PP.RTSe ~~RT io THE FOLLCt:J!NG . ~IESSAGE RECEIVED, FR0:-1 AFCVC IS . . i. . -~ .· P.ETRP.:>!St1I?TED f..S FOLI. COtr.ri.AND AND CONTROL . SERVICES . . ' ·· l.SSCC!A7E.D l:.T1TH THIS SATELLITE SYSTEM. THE PROGRAM S1!0ULD , . ·' . ~~: .:· .• / .:··. :..: ... ' . ' ·· I , I I ~---.~tJ~---· .. ..·,· I :: •, . f . ·...'· . ... .. '· · . I .· F.':. Gil: Ti:.l 0 ~JEz.r.F 23C · :· E F!..P.NNED FOR FOUR LAUt>:CHES FRO~J P~ AT ·SIXTY-DAY . ·' ·: . .• ·· :i:c\J'!'£:1\f~LS BEGI~NI~G !N FEBRUARY 1 ~63. SE".CAF HAS BY SEPARATE. .!~'f!:ON ORDZR!D THE pnccm~t~U::~T 0'; AGE!'!A AND ATLAS ' · ·.. . . · E.JOSTE.~S O~l t-~N UNASSI~NED BASiS. THESE VEHICLES ARE HEREBY ·. · ~·· . · ·. : !3SlGNED ·:.·o EXEt1PLP.Ro YOU ARE RZQUESTED TO SUBMIT AN CiTLii~~ DEVELOF.'IEN1' PLAN NO LATER THAN 15 NOVENBER 1 %1o ·..•. CCS'I' :S7:H!t:r:::s S~{CU!..D BZ BASED ON THE FO!..LON!:NG CRITERIA: . . G.) :':'I'L;:~s/.~Gl::NA COSTS F~ THE ABOVE REFERENCED "UNASSIGNED0 . : \;::;-::Cl..SS t:iiLL BE !~CLUD~D IN TI~E Pl..ANo (2) ~lSTING LP.U~H., . c-:::;c ;~ClJ'! t"ND CC:-Z1UN!CA!ION FACILHI.ES T:JILL & USED. (~) ~ . . 0::.":.YLO.!~I'J COSTS /'..l"U: EXCLUDtDo (ll) T~t1l~'\L VEHICLE l'.i~D. · . ~ :-:~r;.JJ:!:H~JG ··HAAAGE!·lEN'I' C03TS ..U!LL BE INCLUDJ::D. 1 FRCJECT .. . ·: ::::-~?2..!-:~ t:J!LL BE HP.NDLED . ON A STRICT NEED-TO..ICN~J BASIS. ~::::.: OTEr. PtJrr H. SSD IS DIRECT~ TO TAKE. THE. m:cESSA.~Y . .;·:!:.::ON !~·8ICt.TED . IN PA.llT I. -SCP-3 ... ·.·.: .OOWNGRJ --·--!--··--· ---· ..;. . INTERVALS: ;;_'7/:t;i(,'q'Z. SEP RJEZ:F . DEClASSIFIE. SSZX-l ·---9~}~ra~v~6~J--------~r CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM • NRe APPRO\iEO.. ~oR· . ·:: .;. (l;-n~:;"''l" . . · ,..., . -'St': I) t,;" •,.. ' ·; / REL(;ASE.17 ~.ept~[rtber 2011 ~~!!~t:jSH_, U •>-....: . . ...;.. HEADQUARTERS ..\..j .. OFI'IOE OF 'l:HE DEPUTY Co:\I:\L-L'\'"DZ.."t P...FSC FOR /'..EROSP~:.CE SYSTE.'!S . \ . ... . . : UNITED STATES AIR FORCE . · ·:: · Air J'orce UJIU Post OUic:e. Loa ~el""45, Calllomia. ' I :' ;;. ' ~: '•• • i : su:m:cr , CUE BALL Progiam 17 OCT 196\ r.· . TO. Hq AFSC (SCJ.'C)}.t) · Androw AFB Wash 25, DC ·l. nererence :your secret mesn~c nr. SCGN-26-9-50, dD.ted 26 September l9C)l., our secret message nr. ssz·-zr-9-3, d.'!ted 21 Septe:nber 1961, anc. your secret ·message nr. SCGN-10-l.0-14, ·d.ateq. 10 October 1961,. conce~::.na tbe CUE BALL Program. 2. Your hendquarter. has plo.ced this prograt1 in a. high i.:nporta.nce ce.tec;ory. As a result, an ad hoc crol.L-p has l?een established under tl:': Deputy !or·Uatellite Systems, SSD_, to !Il.3.Dae;e the :runction pendir.g · approval. of ~a reCOJ!!!!IPDcled orgnnizatl.on. The· initial. launch date w1.l.l be dU'ficult to meet; theretore, ve as"&ume, :for planning purposes, that a. veey h18h priority vill be assi~e:~ to the progro.:n. :~) 3. Atta.che~.l are a propo=ied listing ~f-: inanpo,.rar require:nents, oraan ization c:ha;l:t1 and :runctional rec;ponsibilitics for each branch. T'.nit requirement is submitted based on lmo1dedge available to this organ . · ization and should be considered within tD.is paremeter. In the event that :you ha·~e add.ition&l in:formtltion concerning cui ::aALL that ha-3 not been releasud to DCAS, request this requirement 'oe a.d,justed accordint).y. 4. You v1l:t. note tbat ve ha.w requested a Lt Colonel position~ AFSC 2716, :for duty aa Deputy Director. T'.nis position is necessa.ry due tc .. the fact tho Director anii/or Deputy ...r-ll be required to engage in m to Jlla.Xlage the program more t.h:J.n fifty per cent ot their time . Addit:lonally, it is ecaent:l.a.l. that one o:f these individuals be present· a.t hiE · duty sta.-t;ion Dot all t:IJ:leG. f 5. AFR 26-J baa not been applied on a ·fUnctl.onal basis to identity manpower spaces for this :prograJll. There is no. reprogram::linG capabil:i ~;y · vithi.ll DCAS to satisfy this re9,Uiret~ent• . Dependent on the priority assiGned~ a pl"'gr&m or programs o:f' lesser priority v1ll. o:f .necessity be. eliminat.!d. 11' we must reprogxulll :from vi.thin DCAS. 6. re therefor; integrating·and coordinating the ef::•n-ts 6f participating local offices and external a.-;-~ncies~ :£'urniGhi:1.g direc;tion and auidD.nce to such par.;Lcip&nta, and moni"boring their pr9c;res10; rcgul.c.t:.·;G· · the commitmont of authorized fUnds · and o"thent:.· ~c exercising program financial control; initiat:.:"l{l;, negotiating, dire.cting, and monitoring contrac: ;u.al. · e:f'i'orts for general systems engineering, vehicLe and component developnent, and sup:portinB rune: ;ions ·as reCJ,uired; supervisin& technical direction l•:r the en~in~ering lllflZUL.$ement contractor; approv: .:lB key technical decisions1 p.nd insuring adequatt> review and approval of specifications and otht:::detailed technical dat>a. Respon~ible for over-all administration and mo:::w.gement o1' non-tec!hnical phase9 o£ the program. : ~fiects proc:urcment ancf·contractual actions. Acquire::, minta.ins, prepares~ and processes procurement data. Negotiates, au"tjhent1ca.tes, and issues contra.c~;. ~ and contractu:ll. cllanges. Pre~res 1'in~::nc1al a.no.~·. ;es, financial status reports, and bu~et est:!.rr.a.te1:. Controls expenditures to insure their most ad,•;mtageous application a.gainat progrorn objective::. Estab~ishes and maintaips master schedul.es1 p:·>sr= milestones, manpower and f'i.nancinl. c:h.e.rts, a.ni! other mannc;ement too~s for·use in periodic revievs 1'·)r the Director. Assembles and arranges other d;. ta. .for inclusion in program b.riefin£ts. Supervise:~ the . . prepa.r.1tion, review, coordination, publicatio!l, up-.. dnting, emending, and distribution of develo:pnmt plans, work statements, special reports, and <-.::her .· proara,'ll documentat:1on as required. Gathers i::t";;uts f'rom contributors and prepares po~ions of sucil documents. Bnrulles general. administrative :i"'..l:l·:tions . for the. Program Directorate including secu.ri~' and personnel -matters •. . ·-+-I ,. . Q..{.q.. . ' · .,~~~{'&-~ \ I [[' ' ~l.:',:" t;'•& -~ . .. . . . -·--__ . ....____ _ _ __ SSZX-1 'j_ Noy 61 . .. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM · • · NRO APPROVED FOR ·• . .• R-ElEASE .17.-September 2011 ·~ u \ ·! · Responsible for the f:i,nDJ. staGe vehicle, for inu.,:trc.tion of subsy:.tem:o 'Within it, and tor , inte~t1on of ~ :.1e . I . ·.. total vehicle cystem.. Directs the en&ineerine mr. U>.Gement contractor 1n exercising 1ts. syatc.-,u:; cna:Lnet : c-i."lG and technical direction function for the owr-o.l:. :pro .gralll o.nd in the desii;ni development, fabrico;tion· md ·, . testing of final stase vehicle, 1nclud1J18 rcsolu·:ion . . of ·unique electrical, thel"JJIBJ., ::tnd radiation in· .~rfnca \ problems introduced by the incor,p:)ro.tion of the :-~ylond. ·Reviews, revises, and a.pprovcs -work stat·ements, :~pac~ . I . cations, test pla.ns, development plans, cost pro : ~sal;., ,• CCN IsI ECP IsI ATP!·~ s and." other technical and adm i ni~trative contractual. document:;. Evnluates the nece:: .ity and a.dequu.cy of contractor•s current and propose ; technical effort£>, relates to ~lrer and f'ino.ncial re~ources applied, and directs cban6es 1n accordan :e llith i'indi.ne",s • . In the booster and communication:; and control c.re~, represents the ·em: :BALL Directora1e in a.ll l!I.C.ttcrs concern1l:lg configurat;!.on, mod1:t'1cat1 :,n, component de::;ign and deveJ.opment, teGtillg, and d~livel"'J schedules. ' 0 Responsible f'or aerospace ground equi: .;·.;::nt, f'aci -.ities, rnnga activities, test operations, and cener:U ~ ·~pr:ort. · .•. Insures that program requir~ents in these o.rea.r-are · · · !ll'operly f'o:onuJ.atedj \l.l)dated, and documented, nr1l that ."1 '\;hey are 1sr:ued to1 understood by, a.nd acted upc:t by reS:)?Onsiblc oi'f'ices a:i.;i agencies. Receives, in ·:;urn, imldinB1 re~ource1 and other requirements ~mJ :lr't1c1IlO.ting o:rga,llizat1ons and nets to tulflll comitt~.-:nts to theJn• .I>ur-..ues cUrect~y those mi.ssi.on-pecul.i.: -~ . lXlrtions o:r the areas cited whi.ch are IlOt withiJ , the responsibility of existing groups. In the acro::·;>ace 6l'Ound equi}?llleilt a.rea, represents the CUE BALL )lLrecto .rate 1n e.ll mo.tters concerniJla; cottrigUration, nniif'ica.. tion, component design. 8lld development, te.sting_. and delivery schedules. · I' ,, I" I 0 DO\'·!NGR!,iJ:;: .: t . :· 1~: 'I' EAR ~~&-~3 !NTEf.: , ·A~S; t·;c; 1 J\uTOr.'. AT:CALLY · . ~~lft.Jfl-l4~Z {?.~L.A~S! i-1£U. i)00 DlR 5:WO.l0 . .. ,". . / SSZX-l 9 Nov 61 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING DI!PARTIII!!NT OP THI! AIR P'ORCI! DIRIICTORATI! Of' ..I:CIAL PI'ICUECTS (OSAI') Af' UNIT POST Of'..ICI!. LOS ANGI:LD, CALI..OI'INIA 1008 IIIPI.Y TO ATTII 0,.: FE'S 1956 sutUitcT, -Program Management Plan. Project G-3 • To: SP-1 (Gen Martin) Submitted herewith is a Program Management Plan for the Advanced GAMBIT System, Project G-3. It is intended for local use in implementing the Preliminary Development Plan, dated 4 Feb 1964. SP-1 -2 FE'S 1956 SUBJECT: Project Approval J . TO: -(Col King)\ t· ....... 1. Pursuant to authority contained in Secretary of the Air Force Order 116. 1, dated 19 July 196Z, the attached Program Management Plan for Project G-3 is approved. 2. This Plan will be used as a guide for over-all objectives, delivery and launch schedules. contracting and financial planning. 3. You will submit change requests for approval when a.ny o.f the project elements require revision. DISTRIBUTION: Director SAFSS 1 Cy SAFSP 1 Cy 2 Cys 1 Cy 1 Cy 1 Cy ~~l,USAF SECRET SPECIAl HANDUNG CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 SeptembERET SPEC~l HANOUNG OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT G-3 (ADVANCED GAMBIT SYSTEM) PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PLAN ( I I I SECRET SPECIAl HANDLING I SECTION Ill : PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 SeptembSECRET SPECIAl HANOUN~ SECTION I SECTION II SECTION lli SECTION IV SECTION V SECTION VI TABLE OF CONTENTS General Description of Mission, System Characteristics and Operations Program Direction Documents Contract Structure Delivery and Launch Schedules Budget Estimates Financial Plan SECRET SPEC~l HANOUNG CIUTICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AHD BBX~ SATELLITE RECORHAISSARCB SYSTEMS COIPDIDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 Septembs~~-:"1~.,.. tGt~tl SPECIAL HANDLING GAMBIT CUBED (G3) GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MISSION, SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS AND OPERATIONS SECTION I GENERAL A. MISSION The mission of the GAMBIT-Cubed system is to conduct high resolution, satellite reconnaissance missions to cover specified high priority targets and record. Ground resolutions will be B. GENERAL 1. The project is covert and has the covert code name of GAMBIT-Cubed (G3). This name indicates that the system is an advanced version of the G or GAMBIT system. The overt identifier is Project 206-ll, which is conducted as a classified (strict need-toknow) R&D space effort. 2. The project was approved by DNRO in message 3 January 1964. . C. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 1. The first stage booster will be the Titan IIIB, with the injection stage to be an adaption of the Agena D, which is identified as a part of the Satellite Control Section. 2. The Satellite Vehicle will have two sections: a Photographic Payload Section (PPS) and a Satellite Control Section (SCS). In covert documentation, the SCS actually includes the Payload Adapter Section (PAS) which is commonly called the "roll joint, 11 which provides the obliquity pointing capability. SECRET SPECIAL HANDUNG SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 3. The payload employs a catadioptric optical system having a focal length of approximately 160 inches. The payload will be an integral pa·rt of the Photographic Payload Section (PPS) structure, as opposed to the GAMBIT system method of separate fabrication of the payload and orbital control vehicle and their mating in the field prior to launch. 4. The PPS contains the following elements as described in the Development Plan: Supply and Looper Assembly Satellite Re-entry Vehicle (SRV) Supply Recovery Module (SRM) Camera Optics Module (COM) Adapter Section Assembly (ASA) External Structure (sub-contracted to LMSC) 5. The SCS is an adaption of the Agena D vehicle and contains the following elements: a. Spaceframe Subsystem. Mounts and supports all vehicle system equipment& and provides environmental shelter to the extent necessary to achieve mission objectives. This includes a program peculiar booster adapter section. b. Propulsion Subsystem. The primary propulsion system is a dual burn liquid rocket engine with its propellant pressurization, loading and feed system and is used for initial orbit injection, as well as for post-mission de-boost. The secondary propulsion system is a fixed thrust, pressure fed, storable hypergolic liquid propellant rocket engine system and is used for orbit correction and change, as well as · for de-boost. c. Back-Up Stabilization System (BUSS). Controls the vehicle during terminal maneuvering in the event the primary attitude control system fails. SECRET SPECiAL HANDUNG CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE IU:CONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 SepHET I Uil..ll.l SPECIAL Hft~NDUNG I I I I d. Electrical Power Subsystem. Provides primary power i £or the SCS and the PPS and also includes the pyrotechnics and the power and distribution system for the vehicle. 1 I I I e. Tracking, Telemetry and Command (T• T&C). Provides for these required functions. I f. Command Subsystem. Consists of an Extended Command Subsystem (ECS) and a Minimal Command Subsystem (MCS) for both normal (ECS) operation and erre'rgency (MCS) operation. g. Guidance and Control Subsystem. Provides necessary attitude, time, velocity references and flight programming to attain orbit; control attitude on-orbit; and control during normal recovery and de-boost operation. 6. Major Specifications: a. Detail Spepification, Model 58205 Vehicle, Program 206-II -LMSC/141 7190A, 23 July 1965 (.C). b. Detail Model Specification for the PAS/SCS -LMSC/ 1417539B, 1 November 1965 fS-SH). c. Program 206-ll General Systems Specification -Aerospace 65-0000-05261, Reissue C, 20 December 1965 ~. d. Photographic Subsystem Specification No. 1402-215-Eastman Kodak Company Document No. K-006490-DH-001, 2 April 1965 t&-SH). D. OPERATIONS 1. Launch. The PPS is shipped by covert means directly to Pad 3 at Vandenberg AFB, where it is mated with the SCS, and integrated pre-launch tests are accomplished. Vandenberg AFB assembly, test and launch operations are under the over-all supervision of the 6595th A TW. 2. On-orbit Operation. Computer Ero2ramming is P-repared i n advance by various software contractors -GE. STL.-to SECRET SPEC\AL HANDUNG SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING I I provide ephemeris determination, command generation and mission I optiznization. The data processing and computation procedures i provide the capability of generating a new vehicle program in 90 minutes. I i I I On-orbit operations utilize the existing Air Force Satellite Control Facility. Various tracking stations track the vehicle for establishment of the ephemeris and for transmission of command loadings to the satellite. Commands are stored and equated through the on-board command subsystem to conduct the on-orbit function of the SCS and PPS. TeleDletry data are recorded and transDlitted to the SCF at station contacts for monitoring of vehicle health. Vehicle health evaluation and on-orbit operational decision are the responsibility of the Director, Special Projects, and his technical staff. The 6594th Support Group has over-all responsibility for conducting the operation of the Satellite Control Facility, including the recovery. a. The orbit has the following general characteristics: Injection·altitude -65 to 160 n. Dli. Orbit inclination -60° to 145° Nominal period -90 Dlin. b. The noDlinal Dlission life is five days for early flights with eight to 12 days as objectives for follow-on flights. 3. Record Handling. SaDle as the G Program. SPECIAL HANDUNG CRI'rl:CAL TO US SECOJUTY: THE GAJIBl:T AND BEDGOR SA'l'ELLl:TE UCORHAISSAHCE SYSTEMS C<»>PEHDl:tJII NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECTION II PROGRAM DIRECTION CORRESPONDENCE SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECRET SPE&W. HANDUNG THIS IS Alf EXACT COP!' ~CP032/1.0221.8Z ZEA lO FEB 1.964 BT XXXXX ZEA S E e R E T 1.0221.8Z PRIORITY-em FOR GBRERAL GREER P'R~ GENERAL MARTIN. REFERENCE YOOR BBIEFnlG ON G-CUBE 00 5 Fl!:BRUAI«. DR.)D(ILLAl'i APPROVES P9JCEEDIBG wr.L'H RFP AMD THE SPEainCA:nOMS AS PROPOSED IN THE BRIEFil'l1. SECRB'l' CP'N GENERAL GREER G:mERAL MARTIN G-CUBE 5 FEBII.JARr DR. MCMn..LA.H RFP BT SECRET SPECiAl HANDLING CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECRET SPECIAL HANDliNG TIIIS IS All EXACT COP'i S!: C ft ~604ZPRIORI'l'Y-CITE FOR GEIERAL GREER FRCM Gni MARTIN AND - REFmmCE-OORO APPROVES INITLU'ION OF 'lKE G3 EF!'ORl' ALONG THE LINES IN REl"ERENCED MESSAGE. All'l'HORITY TO USE PRESENTLY-PROORA*ED· GAMBIT l'UNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE IS GJWfrED. ~UES'l' G3 FUND ACCOUNTA.BILITr BE ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED SEPARA!rELY FRa4 GAMBIT. IT :IS EXPECTED THAT OSD .liMERlP%(Cl PUBIS WILL BE MADE AVAILA.BLE ~NEEDED TO CONTINUE mE ft l.964 EFFORT. HOWEVER, MORE DEFINITIVE COST IlA.TA WILL BE Rl!Y.WIRED BEFORE A ~T TO OSD CAN BE MAllE. ACCORiliNGLY1 AT 'l'RE POINT WHERE mE F'! l.964 COSTS ARE REASONABLY FIRM, SUPPORTING Iml!AIL SHOULD BE FURNISHED, WITH AN INDICATION AS TO ROW MUCH CAN BE ABSORBED wrrRIN THE PRESl!1r.r GAMBIT PROGRAM, ABD THE ADDITIONAL COSTS. ALSO ~UEST THAT REVISED BLACK AND WRr.rE P'UNDiliG UNDER GAMBIT AND G3 BE F'UBNISHED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS DETEBMIHATIONS CAll BE MADE1 WITHIH PRES:mT GAMBIT TOTALS. SEG:RE!P S£CRET SPECIAl HANDUNG SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR . RELEASE 17 September 2011 THIS IS AN EXACT COP'! SPECIAL HANDUNG SECRET SP-1 2 Jan 64 MEMO FOR COL KING SUB.T.ECr: G3 1. Per verbal KY-9 direction of' DE'. McMillan, we ~proc- as of' this date on the c;3 program as outlined in message dated 27 Dec 63. 2. IE. McMillAn des1res to keep open the choice of' booster at this tUie, examining f'urther the alternatives of' Titan I or Titan III core as substitutes f'or Atlas/Ai!,ena. You should probably study and . make rec0111111endations to me on this element prior to f'inal.izi.ng the space vehi~~e RFP's. 3· AdVi.se me on the latest date we need to fix on the booster decisi.on; move ou.t immediately on the pqloa.d contract. ROB!RI' E. GREER cy to: MaJor General., USAF Director, Special ProJects SECRET-SPECIAL ~N~~~~ CIUTICAL TO US SBCORI'l"Y: THE GMIBIT ARD B'B'QGOII SATBLLI'lB RBCOIRAISSARCB SYS'l'BIIS COIPBIIDiml NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECRET SPECIAl HANDU~li THIS IS AN EXACT COP'f SECftE'f~ -ClTE - StmJECT: FOLLOW ON GAMBIT PROGRAM -G3. REFERENCE IS· MADE TO 5 DEC 63 BRIEFING TO DR. )DttLLAH BY EKe. PART I. GENERAL PLANS HAVE BEEN FORMUlATED TO PURSUE THE G3 DEVELOP- MENT AS FOLLOWS: (A} MANAGEMENT -DEVELO:EMENT WILL BE CARRIED OUT UNDER GAMBIT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, EXCEPI' THA!I.' A SPECIFIC AEROSPACE GSE/TD DIRECTOR AND GROOP WILL STEER THE G3 EFFORT. (B) TIME PHASIIG -INITIAL F.LIGRT TESTS OF G3 WILL BE SCHEilJLED FOR mE 2D QUARl'ER OF CY 66. AT SCME POINT OOWNSTREAM IN CY 66, G3 WILL PHASE IN AND G Ot1l'. CONTROLLED EllrRI INrO THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR BOTH THE PAYLOAD CONTRACTOR AND vm:ICLE CONTRACTOR WILL CCNENCE IN FY 64. IT IS l!MPHASIZED THAT BOTH A PAYL r ~ 0z CIUTICAL 'l'O US SECURITY: '1'BB GUIBIT AND IIEXAGOif SATELLITE RBCORRAISSAHCB SYS'l'BIIS CC»>PBRDitDI NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECTION IV DELIVERY AND LAUNCH SCHEDULES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 CONTRACT DELIVERY AND LAUNCH SCHEDULES -----· TIIIB PPS scs Launch Date Date FMT 15Jan66 Date Z4 May 66 FM-1 13 Jtd 66 4751 8 Jul 66 Z.8 Jul 66 z 16 Aug 66 FM-Z 10 Sep 66 475Z. Z5 Aug 66 15 Sep 66 I 3 15 Sep 66 FM-3 l6 Oct 66 4753 1l Oct 66 1 Nov 66 4 14 Oct 66 FM-4 Z.5 Nov 66 4754 9 Nov 66 1 Dec 66 ~ i ~ ~ 5 15 Nov 66 FM-5 Z.9 Dec 66 4755 9 Dec 66 3 Jan 67 ~ ~ = c:= ~ :::z: 6 16 Dec 66 FM-6 l6 Jan 67 = t:r:) 4756 ll Jan 67 1 Feb 67 c:= (Formerly FMT) ::::z: ~ 1/Mo. thereafter 1/Mo, thereafter 1/Mo, thereafter 1/Mo, thereafter thru l4 thru ZZ thru ZZ. (/) m (j -1 0 z 'tl ------ --------·· :::0 0 G') ~ s:: z =i :;: r ~ 0 z N ~ 1\J ClUTICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECOHHAISSAHCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEf\SE 17 September 2011 ;) L(_t ("•..,.'J l-j 1-5'~~ :~J_ -O ()f"> '> ,(....,.1 J Cv1l1 ) 1 July 1964 Prel iminary Project FULCRUM Phase I Tasking 1. Phase I of Project FULCRUM is intended to demonstrate c l early and decisively the feasibility of the FULCRUM Pho to Satellite Reconnaissance System. The duration of Phase I will be approximatel y six months with all final reports delivered to the contracting agency by 31 December 1965. At this time the results of Phase I will be carefully reviewed by all agencies and committees concerned, and a decision will be made to commit funds for hardware or to terminate the program. 2. During the course of Phase I there will be substantial participation by personnel of the contracting agency, and therefore, the five tasks outlined below should not be regarded as final and all inclusive. Task I: Film Handling Feasibility Studies Detail ed engineering study of alternative approaches to the FULCRUM film handling problem. This will include examination of both the constant fil m velocity approach as well as the accel erated film approach. l The most promising constant velocity and the most promising accelerated film approach will be built in prototype and instrumented so as to provide a feasibility demonstration and performance evaluation. The prototypes will incl ude the film drum rotation and t r anslation mechanizations for matching v/h over a 120 degree scan angle. The prototypes will be designed for v/h ranging .J from .06 rad./sec. to .035 rad./sec . f'() ~ I In the case of the constant velocity approach re \.l_ quiring film indexing , the various methods of indexing should be experimentall y evaluated and a preferred method selected. A careful study should be made of the \.1\ reliability and practicality of the film reversingN operati on. Careful attention should be payed to minimizing film wastage and the trade off between startup t0 .;I:. ~ ~ 'G t:0 ~ ~ SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR 'RELEASE 17 September 2011 Preliminary Project FULCRUM Phase I Tasking power and minimum time for an off-on cycle. In the case of the accelerated film approach, an evaluation of wasted film due to degraded imagery should be made. Also, the feasibility of using an interrupted scan mode of operation should be studies. The problem of additional programaer complexity should also be ex amined in this context. At the conclusion of the six month program, a detailed evaluation report on each of the two prototypeswill be delivered. This report will include the following: a. The results of experiments designed to measure the film velocity errors. b. A statistical estimate of image degradationdue to film velocity error. c. The results of environment chamber tests designed to examine high speed film handling problems (such as corona discharge) at operational gas pressures. d. The results of experiments with Kodak Type4404 7" film designed to test the two prototypesfor film damage (scratching, etc.). e. A summary comparison of the two prototypesincluding operational considerations and estimated reliability. Task II: Camera Dynamics Studies and Engineering Test Mock-Up A detailed analytical study of the camera dynamics.Particular emphasis should be placed on: a. Bearing, loading, and gas requirements duringboth prelaunch testing and in flight operation. -2 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS CaiPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Preliminary Project FULCRUM Phase I Tasking b. The perturbations to camera rotation causedby spacecraft torquing. c. Effects of start-up transients -- particularly film supply and takeup spools. d. Effects of c. g. shifts due to film movement. In addition to the above analytical studies , a fullscale single caaera mock-up will be designed and built.The design effort should include a survey of past experience with large air bearings of this type, particularly under near vacuua enviroruaental conditions. The primary purposes of this mock-up will be to test air bearingoperation under operational environaental conditi ons, andto test and evaluate the performance of the slip rings that provide electrical coupling between the opti cal bar and the space craft. These tests will include start-up and stopping as well as steady-state operation. To thisend, the weights and balances of the mock-up should beas realistic as possible, consistant with the prevailing stage of the camera design. A secondary purpose of the mock-up tests will be toinstrument for vibration measureaents insofar as they are deemed useful and feasible. The product of this six month effort will be a detailed report covering the analytical studies outlinedabove, and a second report covering the mock-up design and experimental results. This second report should in clude an extrapolation of the test results to free fallconditions, as well as an examination of the launch loads problem. The mock-up experiaents should be sufficientlydetailed and definitive to permit immediate engineering design of a high confidence bearing and slip ring con figuration. One of the reports should include a summary section discussing the estimated effects on image quality due togross camera dynamics (not including film velocity air effects). -3 245 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 201 1 Preliminary Project FULCRUM Phase I Testing Task III: Optical Design A two to three month effort leading to a final FULCRUM optical system design. The design should be carried to preparation of fabrication specifications. In addition to the engineering specifications, areport will be prepared discussing the essentials ofthe design and the reasons for image degradation, bothon and off axis. This report will include an opticalelement weight estimate . If particular elements of the optical system appearto present basic feasibility problems, this study mayphase into a three to four month critical component fabrication and test phase. In any case, this taskmust be completed and reported on by the end of Phase I. Task IV: Facilities Study A five month study to identify additional facilitiesrequired for the support of the FULCRUM program. Detailed specifications for these facilities will be developed so that, on release of funds, procurement of equipment and facility construction can proceed without delay. This planning should include facilities for dynamic performance measurement of the completed camera system under operational environment conditions. By the end of the five month period, a summary docuaent should be prepared outlining the justifying arguments for the various recommended facilities, including cost and scheduling information . Task V: Design and Engineering A detailed camera design effort to be coordinated with the film handling and engineering test mock-up tasks. This is a six month program, involving detailed component and sub-system engineering with the following major goals: a. Support of the film handling prototype andcamera mock-up tasks. -4 246 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAl:SSANCE SYSTEMS COKPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR • . RELEASE 17 September 2011 Preliminary Project FULCRUM Phase I Tasking b. Preparation by the end of month two of an interface document to be used by companies involved in the space vehicle competition. c. A six month report summarizing the en gineering effort to that date emphasizing weight, power, and ther.al considerations. While the main purpose of this task is to arrive at firm weight and power numbers, the work should be organized so as to minimize additional design and engineering effort required when funds are released for camera procureaent. To this end a full scale design mock-up should be built with all sub-systems in place. This mock-up is intended both to demonstrate packing feasibility and to aid in final design and fabrication. This task will also include some additional study of alternative camera configurations. This work will be concentrated during the first month of Phase I and may include preliminary weights and power estimates. Work will proceed in close coordination with the contracting agency. Specificreporting requirements will be worked out as necessary. - f.. c..c..... +~,.... ~ ~c.~~(·~ "'\ ~ p~~ -;a: -l-.,,_, !,l....... r--:__..r-"~ V~J 'i:,.c_.~.. • L.-'.....o ~---.r ~ ~~ c.. ~.Co'-\ w<....C\ ~·1'-' c... ~. ~(~""L Gr.(. lo~ ~ ~.J ~t 0 '-'-<.~J +-k c.u~-~ ''l VJ~ r ~~ >---<..__d ~t v-......-.,i s~ po..-u<-r ~!f ~ ~-.t-U ik·-t~\~c. "J:OL 1~6"' t SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR -~ RELEASE 17 September 2011 80-0282-64 Con __£ <>f ..£:... J(),Lp, /fij U.,.AIUJVII fOat Director of Ceatral Iatell1pace IIII&DCT Project I'VLCIDII 1. Ia a -.oraaci\la, dated 28 ..ptellber 1864, tile ~rector of tbe ••ttODal ..coaaa1aaaaoe Office advleed tbe i11epatJ' lt.lnotor for 8c1eaoe aDd hcluaolOSY tbat be could aot qree la tllle couree of act1oa wb1cla tlae Aa•a.or bad taua la tbe JVLCaUJl Proar• lJJ eqaclq ta apacecraft aad noove17 ftb.iale ooapeUt10A8 at tlaJ.a u-. TIM D/11110 atated tb.at be felt tbla actloe 1raa preeatur. aad coatrar, to aa aa~at alleaedlr nacbed OD 11 .auawrt, ntcb. acraa..at etlpalated tb.at a a1..le coatractor 1rould 1ae •lected ccapetUlftlJ to collduot a IIJ'.W-aatp atudJ' aDd that, aoraoftr, tM D/JmD would appro.-tlae work etate.eate llefon b.aad. t'lae D/W.O ..at OD to req•at tb.at tarta-r efforta be R8peaded, peDdlq d1ac11•10D of tb.e -tter lo a ...uq of tbe JmO a..cuu.,. ec-tttee (8D-22311-e4). 1. ..,_ JVW.O' a eapn...d optaloe "••rcllq ftJl.CJWII 1a • .u-prl• to tile llD/I!IM' aad certatalr aot la coocert wltb. tile ..., dlacuu1oaa aDd -.oraada wbtcb bad lODe before. 3. OD 2 .Jal;r 1864, Dr......loa b&Ddcarrte4 • -oraadYa to tile D1notor, JQIO 1fb1ch aUpulatecl lbe actloaa io wblcll tbe •••1 wa.ld eacap durlq Pia... 1 of tb.e PULC-Prop--aDd tM oorreapoacliq coat eatiaate for eacb effort. Ia tb1a -.oraa4u. tbe •aor ldelltltled tJae vanaua ettorta la 1rb.lo1& it would eaaap chlrt~ ftaae I la rea.,__ to ta. nc-DdatiODII of tb.e Laad Paael callecl bJ tbe OCJ oa 16 ""'-· Dr. Wbeeloa•a •110r~ of 2 hlJ atated tbat tbe wetabt bwipt aDd. dJaaa1c bah.... probl.. would be •t\ldied 1a a fuadecl pro~l for apace craft ud reeoverr veblcle •1•~ witb follow-up dealau aad develo..-ot efforta b7 t~ea.paale• ll1rarded tbe eoatracta. Handle via 8YEMAH SEDREf-Control System CIUTICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECOHHAISSAHCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM RO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECRET 4. 0a 13 .a.aauat Dr. lbeeloa aad 11r....., •t withDr. lloiU.llaa to d18CUD tbe atat\la of Pba.. 1 effona ofIVLC&IJII. la that ...uq, Dr. lfoJIUlaa Nlawd wbat he felt , .. tile aane-at Yltb t!ae Del CODOel'lliq ~.lie allGINd tut be wwld ti'J to nUeraw tile aadentaad1ac•• Dr. hlt1at alao •• lt. Dr. llciiUlu atated that be coate~lateG J'VLCIUII Jllaaee J effort• u nallJ a pertod ot •1•~ dettlp ati&CIJ. Ia adellt1011 to 11t1ac11 eftoJ'ta naal'd1.. "-o..ra clealp ucl taat fila traupoJ't, the ,._._, W'Mild alao oOIUilar tile llouetaa for tbl paJloacl auch aa tile apaceo.n.tt. a. .wcu. t1oaa111, Dr. llcJitllaa -....Wet tut,whenftr.--tw.e, we._ e&iatt.. Urchraft or laarclwan .._..... *"lop Mat. lie wat oe to ......, tbt ..ach worda OCNl' alao applJ to tM NOOftJ? ftlaiole, &ad M atatecl tlaat tM •at1oaal .......,_.Me Jll'ocraa waa ripe fw a •• HCOfti'Jfthiole, all4l ,...S...l, two. .. .reomnaded tlaat we acnt1n1se U. NG4t.,.l7 wlalola reqllin.eau •wn to tM poiat of ......u-. • lad reeefti"J w1tll a -u nonei'J ftll!ole. • ~.r"'l aallad tbat w •leot a 81..1• ooatraotor to4o U. .,.w_ 4eal.p llt\ldr aa4 tllat tllia coat.raotor, aDd~ltlJ' • o~u-..., lie fttiPOMS~ for p.rod:llaiae u. -tire ~.,n.a ieolUiDC pttlq a noowrr ftlllcle ooatraotor aa a .... e. Dr. •llNl• ntel'teci that he tlloqtat U waa cleaiJ'altle aa4 ....RUT to otna1a •parate 1/f atudleaaad ..leo~ Ule ~,.. laWp-atloa, ...a a.oa.to oao t.raotor and atw Ida ta. .,.._ e..s-ertac f....attoonil• tM .,...._ aot wadena,. 7. oa 14 -.uat ta. Del t...-ct u. followlaa la.tnotioaa n•ard1.. ooat.raehal prooeaJWa la JVU:all; (1) f'MN .....u a. M e-.lt.eat, ooatruwalor tapllecl, tllat .. an to PNo••' ,..t tM ••tllorlMcl a • D won oa u.. tlla -..aunc •oJaaai-aDcl tM o._ra, wbiu iMl_...• Clenlo,..atal.ook-ape llllilt 1D •ffiol••t •tan to ...-.r or to diiiJU'Oft all .-n10DII or dCIIIIlMa eoaoentq fea811tlllt7 aad, wt.til I'WIIPtCt w tu .._-.mt uc1 n-e•bT ftllicle, ooaoeptul deltlpa aad .tt1o1nt detaU•d eacl....riq lto pre••t aocnarate ..teniaatloaa •• to ••t.ctat of I tM total ...-.blJ aad o~t&bilttr wlth ~lauacber. Ii -2-Handle via HUMANSEBRET Control System \I I 249 SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION RO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 --s£ERET (2) You wtll -plO)' •act..ra aDCI oontracton to tbe tulle.t po.aible eatent. re•r.1q .. "1D-Iaou.e aetlYtttea" reapoaa1b111t1ea tor auper.1alOG aa4 pldaaoe of ta. eq1DMra aDd ooatraotora. I wtu 7'0U to aYOtd aa tar aa ~tble u.u.oe--.rtl~ INlldtac aa ta-..__ oapab111t~• NIJtrlat1q tlae ea..-1011 of pear atalf, it • ., ta requl~. to .ucb addlttoa. •• ..,. ..oe_..,. to ac&equatel~ IIUpei'Yi.• u.e work of tbe •-at.....,. ...r tile ooatractoN. !'Ilia ..........._ ..,ectftcall~ ._.teet coapetttift coatract fer tile ct.alp of tile apacecratt. 'fbe Dinctor 1Dd1catecl tbat t• tutJNettoaa ..... eattN~ ooutateat wltll tlae 11Ddeawt•,..lq reaci!Mtd at tM ·b.ecnltt" eo.alttee -tlaa oa 11 ~. a. Oil 18 Aua'IUR the DCI ...~....• ta a -...or&ladua tor tu IIINtozod oa tbe &:DGatt.. ea..J.ttee -t1aa ot 18 .tupattllat tM cleeilllaa .,.. aade to proceed 1a aeoordalaae wttb bia -.ora..s-et 14 Aaap.t• • • 0. 2'1 AlqwR lD a lleaoraochla for ,... ..cord bJ' tu IIDCI npnlq , ... &Dcnltlw ec-.t.ttee -till& of 1• .~upat, Gelleral carter 1Dd1oate4 tJaat 8ee.Nt~ Yaaoe bel n~taterecl Ilia apea111at tlaat tM JaLCIIUII ~-waa all a&fttHI aACI ......-. _.,., aa4 ._ tbavPt tJaat tltta ... a poeat atep foi'WU'd. 10. Ola S? .....,.., tile IIDCI adrt.-4 tM 11D/1114' 'tllat tM aci MAl appre'ftd ,._ tollowl.. addlttODal p1•11-•for ...rall OJWaat&attoa Ud clireotioa o1 tM ~l'losr... "-~....,.,_ ta a CIA PI"'er• aader II» upa. C..tnd, COBtrel, -......naJ.,. aDd d~..-ot~o• o1 tM eata.re ~Plaa• 1 pr-.p-le •-•pe4 to tM IID/1111!1'. .ldcUtl011allJ', ba ~aet:nacted tbe DIVa\' h Dep tJae JmD ftlll:r aDd coap1etel:r i.atonleCI of ita p2'0p'e• aad to Jll'Oride ~onaattoa oopie• of ooatracbal work lltat..eata to ta.. Jlao. 11. 0a a1 -...at Dr. 1r11eeloa prepared a ...OI"&Ddua OD ..._ coacblct o1 .-I'ULCaUII Prop'aa acl tile teftUl ot ref•reaoe wlatc• tMI lm/aatr would ..plOJ' ill tbe aaaaa-at fd ...._ I. 'l'lll.• .....-aDdaa ... approftd -CleaeJ"al Carter, aDd aotatioa ... aade tbat tM DCl laacl Nacl aDd Ol"&llT &pprO'Nd it. ID tiM tenua ot retenac. of tbt• -.oraactua 1t ••• apec1f1ed -s-Handle via BYEMAN Co~trol ~vstP-"1 -sfBRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS CCMPENDIUM APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SECRET BYB-0282-64 that there would be a co.petltlve ..lectton of a apaeeoraft deaip atud)' contractor aa well aa oae tor the reco"ry v.hiole. 12. Oil 1 lepteaber tbe DCI directed a -oraDdua to8eoreta17 'faace, which 1oclu4ed a• attacbaenta not onlJ the ..aorancl'llll prepU"ecl br Dr. Wh"loa apeclfJ1q tbe ter.. ofrefenuaa. and. ba81c aaaap..nt plan for Project ftJLCBUII, but alao the dtreotiv. to Dr. Wbaeloo froa GeDeral Carterwbtcb placed JVLCIUK· under tbe cllrectlon of tbe DD/~ aDd apeclfled that tke DO/~ abould provide the K80latoraation copiea of work atate..Dta. 13. On 8 lepteaber Dr. Wbeelon ac1Yiaed tbe D/1010 bJ' ..aoraA·· ····· .~fl•. ... • ~ .; . tiJ · ~ -'·· .. .. j) ,, ..,; i ;'\i" ."', ; : '"'::.. ,\.f , w··· ' ·.. ,..., ~ SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 Septemberffip1 c;-r•-:-·'T 1t..1LV 1 • ' l 240 nautical mile::. . and at synchronous periods of th1:ee days and f?:reater .. ~ (A three-day synchronous period repeats ground traces be~ning on the fourth day. ) Orbits with earth synchronous periods of three days or vreater and sun-synchronous inclination are shown by the cross-hatched portion of Figure 2. The additional orbits shown in Fie-ure 2 would provide the added flexibility of a family of orbits with uound tracks on successive days lying west of the preceding day's. --------Altliou.!lh no firm criteria for selectin" an inclination other -than sun-synchronous can be stated at this time, the capability to launch and operate in orbits with inclination from 75 to 140 ~.egrees is required. The overall system design must provide the capability to launch at any time commensurate with the desired latitude of photOjlraphy, orbital inclinations, and environmental constraints as described herein: .There is no requirement to incorporate specific provisions in the initial operational system configuration to enhance survivability in a counter-measures environment. It is a requirement, however, to evaluate the potential threat and to define configuration options which could be employed in response to countermeasures activity. It is permissible to consider reduced mission life if required in order to employ these options, but it shall be an objective that provisions to , incorporate them dC? not de~rade the other capabilities of the operational confi~ration. 10 r:--. r ·-.. ..... -., ......... ~· · · ~ .. ..= • .__.., ~. ~;:.;,· . ~-,, ,JJ ~• • .,., ••J .' ' .. ~ ~-··'·~ CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM / 1:::: fJ i . I+=I :;:: .. _:. . , , . ~ 111 it:!:;~;. ~~ I:;:;:; r.:::: \\~ ~/ ·.· .. ·• It:-" I !~ jji~?.: :!.::!1?.~ ~ ~ ~:·.; :· ,r;::: r:r.: . .;~~?}.~m: I I• !:!;;; r;.:r; i::l .fHl' !; $1 .:;::,;i~i F..r. .;:~;: ~-..,·::; ~~~ {:.±H~trr 0::: 0 lL 0 LU · ·--. :.. -:. _... ---~---' ~ .· -~ -u' ~::•_ .. ~ . -. \I ~ '. o' • ...... I ,., . , .··. ' ' ', .' ;; ~~• •'· • • I! SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ,, -·:. "! , ••• • .J, In normal operations, the booster will be targeted to accomplish a direct injection into orbit at perigee, thus fixing perigee initially at about 20 degrees North Latitude. Perigee location will move north as a result of the apsidal motion caused by oblateness of the earth. When perigee reaches 55 degrees North Latitude, the orbit adjust capability will be used to stabilize the apsidal orientation. For these perigee constraints, 'the camera must be capable of photography at true anomalies within t 100 degrees. A capability is required to obtain photography on both south to north and north to south elements of the orbit. Preliminary orbit determination will be based upon telemetered guidance conditions at separation of the space vehicle. · More precise ·r, determination will be accomplished as tracking contacts are made by the Satellite Control Facility. The capability of the SV orbit adjust system will be used to establish the proper period. During the mission life, the .orbit adjust system must also provide a period adjust capability to counteract the effects of atmospheric.drag, and/or to adjust 'or maintain· .. location of perigeeand to deorbit the satellite vehicle after the mission is completed• .. Recovery of the first RV will ?e accomr:ished when the nominal film weight has been loaded on the take-up reels. Camera operating decisions will normally be pro~rammed to use the film thro~hout the nominal mission duration, so that recovery of subsequent RV's will ., U2 . .•;~. Ll ,. .... t~r~· · · _ J ~~ru .. ;. • • . . t;-., j c,, _' • _' • ·.' CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 be at specific times throughout the mission. In the event of a / critical on-orbit failure, a back-up capability will be provided to recover any RV into which film has been spooled. Subsequent to the recovery of the final RV, the space vehicle ' will be deorbited to impact in a water area• • ·'! '~·:.~ ~ ' ~ ;-,/~ f~ ·.=:~ ~". '-' L (.:. n;. .. . .. . -.1 ~:J.. . ·~··· ..4 •• ~ SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION / RO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 '"'· TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CRITERIA SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS Resolution -The !equired ground resolution for the system from design perigee altitude shall be 2.7 feet or better at scan nadir. Ground resolution is to be stated as the geometric mean from design altitude for a Mil . Std 150A three-bar target with · . 2:1 contrast at the entrance pupil and with 30 degrees sun angle. This resolution shall include the effects of manufac . turing tolerances and is to be state._; for dynamic conditions at 2 sigma focus and smear. For purposes of standardization, resolution off nadir will be degraded with the scan angle by the secant of the scan angle to the 3/2 power and will be degraded further by any change in manufacturing tolerances, smear, focus, and other factors associated with the scan angle. Stereo Coverage -Equal-scale convergent stereo coverage with an included angle of at least 20 degrees symmetrical to the verticil shall be provided. A capability to furnish monoscopic coverage with each camera shall also be provided. Viewing Obliquity -The solution used for cross-track scanning shall produce a viewing obliquity of at least 45 degrees and shall not exceed 60 degrees. A capability to program total scan angle 14 TOP SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM . NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ···-:.•: .. ,_.: '). ··.'. • • . .. : -1 ~ ~··.' •• : in 15° increments and to select any increment within the scan for phot~raphy is desired. However, the provision for varying scan a119:le or sele~ting any increment within the scan should not cause substantial dep:radation in system reliability or increase in system cost. If programmable ·scan angle is not provided then the amount of film required will be. adjusted in accordance with the stipulations in paragraph 4, Coverage Requirements. Coverage Requirements -The system must produce enough imagery to insure. repeated coverage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc "('he imagery acquired depends upon the swath width (scan angle) provided by the system. This system shall carry sufficient film per day per camera to photograph 730, 000 (design scan angle) NM2 . scan anr:le to achieve 140 NM swath from desii;1:Il perigee. This formula takes account of the effects of cloud cover, st~ason of the year, typical target spread for search, surveillance, mapping and charti~, and enp:ineering test missions and duplicative frame to frame ~ coverage. If programmable and selectable scan is provided, the constant in this formula may be decreased from 730,000 to 680,000. ... .. . 1 ,..._ ~ .. ,·:._, , I !', , :• ·.~ •,,:_. \ ol SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 .~-. Continuity -The overall system design shall provide a capability for continuous in-track coverage during system operation, and shall provide 3% overlAp in-track at nadir. Mensuration -.A' desip;n goal for the GSS shall be the determination · of the location of the nadir point of any frame relative to an established earth-datum within an error of 450 feet horizontally and 300 feet vertically, and determination of the relative position of points separated by not more than 20 miles ground distance to 40 feet horizontally and 10 feet vertically. The ~ensor· Subsystem should include provision for · ~. · · .calibration with the other elements of the Satellite Vehicle as required ' . to achieve this goal. SATELLITE VEHICLE General Definition-The Satellite Vehicle 1s .the entire on-orbit configuration. It consists of the Sensor Subsystem (SS), the Satellite Basic .Assembly (SB.A), and the Recovery Vehicles (RV's). Figure 3 identifies the major components and functions of each subsystem. The general design goal for the space vehicle shall be minimum weight consistent with the required performance and reliability r specifications. The outside diameter of the entjre space vehicle will .• not exceed 120 inches. 16 . .. .. ~ ' . ~ ...... . ; . I..... ..... . ·~ ~ ~ '\: · . ..i • • • '4 ~ N "'-! ...... 8 ~ ~ NRO APPROVED FOR I AEROSPACE VEHICL~ ~ . I -·- RELEASE 17 September 2011 -·-··· r--·-----· --· -· _ 1 • .. 1 SATELr-E V~H~CLE ] [BoosTER v~~!_=-~J ~ I ~ Sensor Subsvstem I. _j -~~11~:~ ;a·~~c . ---;e~~nt~~:h~le~-J ~~;an-~r~:~~-~~~----J ' I Assembly /_ Solid Motor Strap Ons a I er Structure Structure inc. er Structure Structure . shroud &adapter H ~ Cameras Flight Control Environmental control ~ Peculiar Elect. , Pneu·'Guidance matics & Cabling Trkg-, TM & Command -:r -Propulsion I Film Handling, Supply ttitude Control and Take Up Pressurization § Close-in Environmental C:_-~\ .' ~ C.,.~-~ H Control strumentation •·.. -" i,. .,; ~ trumentation Instrumentation lee. Power & Distr. t= ack-up Recovery ~ --) ' en ··-· ,. ·-·'I =·.! .,., ·_.t: " ,. .. . ·', 5 ;·. ~ en 1perationof Door ., . M: . _, ; . . Figure 3 i • •• } l •. ... :-.. I i H SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ,. •'. Sensor Subsystem (SS) Technical criteria for the major components of the sensor subsystem are as follows: Panoramic Cameras: The SS will contain two panoramic cameras. Each camera includes an optical system and a film transport system for controlling the movement of film within Le camera. The cameras will be moun.ted for stereo viewing at equal scale and equal angle. Maximum film width will be 9 1/2 inches. Sensor Subsystem Electronics and Pneumatics: All electronic and pneumatic components required for the operation of the sensor subsystem maybe mounted with the sensor subsystem. Environmental Control: The Sensor Subsystem will provide the environment dictated by the requirements of the panoramic c~meras and film. This environment will include controlled temperature, pressure, and humidity. The Sensor Subsystem will operate within the environment provided by the Satellite Vehicle. The Satellite Vehicle must provide an environment acceptable to the Sensor Subsystem over the range of angles between the orbit plane and the earth snn line angles of t 60 degrees. Sensor.Peculiar Power Supply Components: Any power supply conversion components which are required solely for the operation of the panoramic earner~~. , and associated instrwnentation maybe.mounted with the Sensor Subsystem. Film Handling System: The film handling system consists of the supply . ----·~ .. , 18 ' • . · . . •• ,; : J ' •. -. ~~ CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 cassettes, the take-up cassettes, and provisions for cut or splice and ,,, wrap, and all other components which have tb do with the guiding or supporting of the film path and its light-tight integrity external to the panoramic camera. With the exception of the take-up cassettes and their associated drives, all components of the film handling system may . . be mounted with the sensor subsystem. The take-up cassettes will be mounted internal to the RV's. Satellite Basic Assembly (SBA) The ~eneral function of the SBA is to provide the structure to mount · and protect all elements of the satellite vehicle and to provide stabilization, . propulsion, command and control, and power for the satellite vehicle. . Provision shall be made to control the orbital decay and re-entry oi the space vehicle upon completion of the mission so that the probability of · land impact of any part of the space vehicle is less than 0. 01. Technical ·.· criteria for the major components of the SBA are as follows: · · Attitude Control: The attitude control system will provide 3 axis earth oriented stabilization for the entire space vehicle. The stability requirements must be consistent with the overall resolution performance ~oals of the system. Minimum tolerable attitude accuracies during . .. l . photographid" operations are: I I. . . . Roll Error 0. 7 degrees Pitch Error 0. 7 de~rrees Yaw· .rror 0. 8 degrees The instantaneous SV rates about each of the three prin'cipal axes at . any time durinp: photographic operation will not exceed the f~llowiru!:· 19 .' . ·. ·.· ,.-.. -. ·.·. •••~ ... . J • • . . :. SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Roll 0. 012 degrees/sec · Pitch 0. 008 degrees/sec Yaw 0. 008 degrees/sec A back-up stabilization capability to continue the mission will be provided at a reduced attitude accuracy if required. Command and Contro~: The.command and control system consists of a programmer and associated encoders, and an .RF linkwith the Satellite Control Facility. Its main function is to provide discrete commands and other necessary data to the spacecraft. The command and control system must be compatible with the configuration of the Satellite Control Facility and include a capability for updating and . ·._. revising the operating program on-orbit. Secure commands will be provided for those functions which could abort the mission. A back-up command and control capability to continue the mission will be provided at reduced capacity if required. Tracking Transponder: The transponder is a beacon to assist tracking by the Satellite Control Facility and must be compatible with the requirements of this facility. Telemetry: The telemetry system must.meet the requirements of all equipment aboard the Satellite Vehicle. The telemetry system does not include (ransducers and signal conditioners peculiar to the Sensor Subsystem. A capability must be provided to store for later playback certain critical data relative to Sensor Subsystem operation, the Satellite Basic Assembly performance, and general health data of the Satellite 20 ::a ~:~·: ~ -·~ 1 ....:·;=--~·.--;::., l;~_!l ~ ~ ....J .... "' t)-1 •Jo :.. .. .. ~J 1:--------------------·-- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM RO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 . ~"---.. _-_-. ___::_ Vehicle. The telemetry system must be compatil;>le with the Satellite Control Facility equipments. Orbit Adjust: The orbit adjust system is a propulsion system integral with the Satellite Basic Assembly designed to insure that the required . orbit is maintained for the duration of the mission. In particular, the orbit adjust system must be capable of adjusti~ and maintaining the desired period and location of perigee. ; . Power Supply: The power supply for the entire Satellite Vehicle will be an integral part of the Satellite Basic Assembly except for power conversion equipment peculiar to tne Sensor Subsystem, and for the .RV power requirements. Back-Up .Recovery: The Sate~lite Basic Assembly must include an ...... independent;.subsys"~m to enable recovery in the event of aprimary system failure. This back-up recovery system must provide a high probability of successful recovery in the primary recovery area in the 21 :~ ' .:~ , .. . ..~ • ~ • J SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 event of a failure of the primary attitude control system, the command system, or the on-board prog:rammer. Structure: The Satellite Basic Assembly will provide the primary load carrying structure for the entire Satellite Vehicle and will be adequate to carry the acceleration and wind loads durinJ! powered flight. The Satellite Basic Assembly structure will also provide a mechanical interface with the RV's. ... ' Stellar Index and Terrain Frame Camera: The Satellite Basic Assembly will contain a subsystem to record that data necessary for timely and accurate post-flight determination of the orientation of the panoramic camera optical axis during camera operations, and the calibration of the panoramic imagery with an accuracy consistent. \ . . . ;• ·with the system performance requirements for mensuration. Re-Entry Vehicles (RV's) The Satellite Vehicle configuration will provide for mounting and protecting Recovery Vehicles. The RV's will be separated sequentially ... . .· ,. by command during the orbital operation. The RV's will be essentially . identical. Each Recovery Vehicle will contain two take-up cassettes -. one for each main panoramic camera. The re-entry vehicle design must permit a successful recovery in the primary recovery zone from all orbits described in the System Description Section of this document. In addition, the recovery vehicles must be capable of successful .. 22 •' .. · ' 41. · • •'· , ' L , . • • . • • I. .4 .. ~ . . .-. ,; '---------------·-... CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECOHHAISSAHCE SYSTEMS C<»>PEHDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 .;..___----'----- re-entry over the range of payload weights from both take-up cassettes empty to both full, and with any weight distribution between the two cassettes. A separate recovery vehicle will be carried for the SI film or one of the primary RV's may be used if'found.more advantageous. Technical criteria for the major components of the recovery vehicles are as follows: Heat Shield: The ablative or other appropriate heat shield will provide for the protection of the film cassettes and·other RV subsystems during the re-entry phase of the operation. The heat shield and its associated thermal coatings and insulation must be desicmed so that the internal time/temperature profile does not exceed the constraints specified for protecting the physical and chemical properties of the exposed film. Retro Rocket: The retro rocket will provide for ·a 11. V large enough to insure that the re-entry dispersions do not exceed the requirements of the recovery force. Spin-Despin System: The spin-despin system will impart a controlled angular velocity to the Recovery Vehicle after separation from the space vehicle. Aftr :firing the retrorocket, the RV will be despun to an accuricy as required by the re-e'ntry dynamics of the vehicle. Parachute System: The parachute system will insure that the sink. . rate of the package to be recovered does not exceed a specified velocity/ altitude profile as determined by the capability of the recovery force. 23 ":_' ... • J SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION ROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 The parachute configuration must also be consistent with the air-borne catch gear deployed with the recovery force. Re-Entry Vehide Electronics: The RV will contain electronic subsystems as required for sequencing events, tracking, and telemetry. The RV will also contain its own power supply for operation of these subsystems after separation from the Satellite Vehicle. Structure: Each RV will contain a load carrying structure to integrate all RV components and to provide an internal mechanical interface for · the take-up cassettes and associated compnnents as well as an external mechanical interface for mating to the space vehicle. This structure . will be adequate to carry the powered flight loads of the empty RV's and the re-entry loads of the RV's with both take-up ·cassettes full.· The structure shall also guarantee structural integrity upon water impact and insure flotation. Provision will be made for destructive sinking after 48 hours as a security precaution. Launch Vehicle The Launch.Vehicle for this system is the TITAN lliD. A capability to achieve a range of operational orbits from 75 to 140 degrees is required. Applicable specifications for this Launch Vehicleshall be· • used during system design and development. ·. 24 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM •OQ7tr•....- Hx TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ..,f I:J VOLUME I (PART 1) DE.SIGN DEFINITION •, ! ) sensor subsystem NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 @ TR66-300-1 -1/.;?0 H FILE COPY , I .. ·-··-·' PERKIN-ELMER Hx TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING dUL.1"-1.4 _,...,_ ,.., SECTION Ill: PROGRAM INITIALIZATION NRO APPROVED FOR Hx TOP SECRET RELEASE17September2011 SPECIAL HANDLING NORWALK, CONNECTICUT , U.S .A. Tl-tE PERKIN-ELMER CORPORATION CHESTER W . NIMITZ. JR. ....,"""' 21 July 1966 Gentlemen: We are pleased to make this submission in response to requirements defined in your 23 May 1966 Request for Proposal for the sensor subsystem on the Hexagon Program. The proposa 1 is responsive in all aspects to that request . The Perkin-Elmer Corporation considers itself uniquely qualified to accomplish the objectives of the Program. The Corporation baa a record of significant accomplishment in the design, development, and production of advanced scientific instrumentation with emphasis in the technical disciplines particular to Hexagon. We are prepared to commit the personnel, facilities, and financial resources necessary to assure satisfaction of that Program's performance, delivery, and coat goals. As evidence of our confidence in satisfying auch goals, we have undertaken a aeries of actions aimed at timely implementation of a full program on date of award. These include - Preparations for the establishment of a separate Optical Technology Division specifically charged with management and technical performance responsibilities for the Hexagon Program. Purchase of a facility committed solely to this program with A & E studies (partially funded at company risk) now in progress to provide for expansion as is necessary. Commitments of funds at company risk to procure critical long lead-time materials and services. Evaluation of a aeries of potential major sub contractors in order that vendor commitments can be triggered coincident with contract award. Hx TOP -SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING CRITICAL '1'0 US SECURI'l'Y: THE GAMBIT ARD HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COIPERDIOII NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Hx TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING THE PERKIN-ELMER CORPORATION -2- Initiation, months ago, of a program for recruitment of professional personnel which has produced tangible results to date, and which continues, As noted above, to better assure a successful Program, it is our plan to establish a separate Optical Technology Division. Personnel presently assigned to the Program will be augmented according to plan by identifiable personnel presently within the Corporation, and by recruitment as required. This combination of identifiable people will represent a cross-section of the technical excellence, and management and administrative capability drawn from all facets of the Corporation. A conscientious effort has been made as a part of this Program to anticipate the principal technical problema to be encountered, and specific conclusions in regard to such problems are documented in the proposal. Our extensive analysis, design, and experimentation have led us to full confidence that the technical approach which we propose will meet or exceed the requirements of the Hexagon mission for the following reasons: The ability of our design to resolve 2.7 feet from a perigee altitude of 95 nautical miles, thereby achieving operational flexibility between the increased coverage capability at this altitude and an even better resolution of 2.2 feet at the minimum altitude of 80 nautical miles. A passive thermal design that yields a favorable environment for the optics, and which is both significantly lighter and more reliable than an active thermal system. An optical design that provides for a generous focus tolerance (14~, 2a), yields high resolution, is enclosed in a single structure for maintaining alignment integrity during launch as well as uncoupling from vehicle distortions in orbit, and provides an additional measure of thermal protection. The use of proven components and techniques in the film transport system including: air bars, edge-guidance sensors and steerer&, focal-plane Hx TOP-SECRET SPI ~~QUIRE(l TF ~1-'"'ILAL 0 U6 LICA TION KH -7 CAM ERA SYSTEM PART NPIC TP-18 63 July 1963 NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CE~HER Hondle 'v o TANL[NT-YEYHOLE TOP SECRET :onlrol J~ly CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM l TOP SECRET ... SPECIAL HANDLiNG REQUIRED NPIC,'1 P-18/63 PREFACE This publication pres.:-ms general ccchn•~.:al imurmauon for the early exploitation of pnotography obtained by the KH-~ camera sv:f rhe mort> pr.,ci~e m· nsuntltJn parameter~. TechmcHl iniormarion with .:ompler> miHhemaucal nnaly!>ts for reduction of quamiratJve c:lara will be publisl .-J el:ond orbital ephemens for eacll second of t:a1rera oper,1tlon, includ.ng velocity, altl wde, geographic. po~itton, t1me oi operation, etc. 4. Velncle AtrltUdt: Pttch, roll, and yaw, and r;;Jtes 01 each when available. -iii - TOP SECRET Handt• Vio TALENT-KEYHOLE SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED Control Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES TOP SECRtT SPECIAL hANDLING REQUIRED INTRODUCTION 1hc KH-7 camera .-,y.~rem cuns1st::o of a ingl<' ~trip c:nllt'r-t, il st;;>!J 1 c:tlllt'ra, pic or ster'" modes. lt lb d~ ·igne'i to proviJ£ ·he plwtn-tm.:r rete!' \•Jtn an UJHI~'-' con::.tdt>Fll>l·l,trgerandwtthbet.l?r~rot.nd r<.!solurion th.Jn rh:H 1roviJe I t 1 I ~ presem 'H-4 c;urv~illam··· -;y::;tl'lll •rhC' ,;t ip ,-,.merJ c:Jn rol l about it; lunl!.i wL n:.tl axi, w etlllt'' s i d · vf the grqunu rae~. n lllLJ"em '11-ot J.709 de)!;r "::; o a •n.1 'llllUPl oc plu-or m'nus -H ;.kgrc•t_.; -!0 .'lilll ' . Hsal!nl\>-i •n1 •· n~of•llC ;.~q;et drea 111 ·n~.. rn1.1 o( thL stnp f.-:nne . 1\l:-;o the camer~ is \dWCd oround It~ ·ertt c~l .1 xis to elimin::tk •':lrtvlts fore',copic oUJl rtrnpo,;ed <., rq s, Or l.1't'r,tl p;,ttn; Of rrip1;. ,\ny ut tlte,;e mod ,; 11··· dl'ysrct 1 '-"ttsbun·~ •Jf J pnn 1r y rntl!ing m irror . .1 menis,us lens, .1 sr·tt ionilr ) prim.trv mirror, a diaq;onal min·ot·, field ilartencrs , 1 :;lit plat . ·md a rotatm~ pl ten Ihc J"Ot.Jtincr mirror moves tO forward wJ ;I it pusirion.q to produc" 30 de~ree cnn -l ra.''« No 1. o/ l'os~:c:o"'" At-ai ,,b" 1'1 !Jt'}rl:t. Lti " t ~ RifJ-l} I Vcrtjcal 11.3;~ ~2.1iS8 'H ,.. u /1)'!) ~~ 0!\3 ""-"· 'J T ;;j ;4 t I~ 2. t'.!i l n . 7ti _ ' .4 I ~~ 1/ h ~-t olo ..,, ·l· ••t:d 2.530 ~>·Pi 14.1~0 1•1.'-SU '".::l.~~·l '.!li ~.\~ ·~ ti ~ij,; ..-~.. , loPII 4 ~-·4 l:i . .)!IS ~ti.!lL! ~8-·)M .~G1 tti.3n< ~7. (i;,l] I .~I~~ :i t:, 7'' 17.Ull· ~~ 3\iJ .1!t.7fH 6. :16 I 17 •o ....J ~·) li') 4 • 7. 11:10 1< 43·1 ~lJ. 7-:<; :"1'.._ 7 lq 1'1 . • 4' :•). JS7 1" ~:n X :,11 '') q· :;t Jnr. 12 .i I} .1 , 1Jj J J21.i ~I •, ,11; 1 Jt _:J, ·n Jti.J :~<\ f I,.. 4~. l'l 4 Li~ 1(1' fi ~-· " ~~· ;t.J.,l~;j t I.IIG'O The f 11'1 Width i>' \l.·lliO inche ".11th ,-.~~•.1hk 1~1'5! h "e·1 ·h ,;tnpt.JepenJlllgunop, rJtlOn 1 1 meters. '1 his :-;y;;rtm \\Ill 1roduc<• .tn una ~a: a nOil'inal ,.;L·alt? oi i!htllll J:'JO,flOO, li1L1rl.e notnill"tl Sl>lp wtll bt> tl>out I~ lldUtic.,ll llllle,, ,run) it, Width 'fhe lens tilr1 sn uuon 1 II I J ppro: 111 rely 2. S tee wi h p!·oper c11n '' t op.-t tt;un Twve ry ~ ,~econd. '1w >.tts :tn: expo.> •J •>n botlt stJc ~ or I c f1lm 3::> ~n Jtel il, <~t:ttudtc nnct y:-;t::.. CAMERA ~~ r co!nt p1Ju1 5Z:~ Jphy tor th "ereo md lakral p,lir oper. ung m<".ks In ti1C' 110110 -,tr p mode' the mtrrnr iS <; [It Onary "[ 45 d .4 degrE'e~ wtrh a 1-talf .1n~le of .l.2 dcgrE'eS across ground rnck. The pnmary n it rot· .111J diagonal m ir·ror focus the tm;t~e throu(!;h the slit onto the rot::tting plilk'n. - Han:H• V111 TOP SECRET TALENT-KEYHOLE SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED Con·r~l Only CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ... --.1,' SP ECIAL HANDliNG REQUIRED NPIC/TP-18/ 63 TIME T RACK 114E N ISCUS LENS OPTIC AL CO MPONE NT S 28 " PRIMARY MIRROR FIGURE 1. KH-7 CAMERA LENS SCH EMATIC. The speed of the rQ[ating platen is the produce sharp images with high resolution. controlling factor in production of sharp, dis(See Table No 2. ) tortion-free images and therefore is of utmost A pair of fiducial lines will be on the importance to the intelligence community. (See film, one on each edge, rather than fiducial "Discussion of Strip Camera".) This cylindrical marks. These lines will be the same distance platen moves at variable speeds and carr-ies apan at all times, since they are being exthe film past the image forming slit at a speed posed at the same time that the image is compatible with the movement of ground images exposed, and will be one controlling factor past the slit. When operating at the proper in mensuration and determination of coverage speed, this platen will enable the camera to and size of objects. In addition w these two -2 -· :· --,'.f' ---.-.. • .,_---~1 . -rep SECRET Handle Via T ALENT -K EYHO LE SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED Control Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES TOP SECRET SPECIAL HAND L /t~G ~£QUIRED T·Jhl• N. J t. I f'n•jtli'!l of F·ilm &rip.• ttl !nch~s W.;th Yt:ry i7l 1 Film -"7ur:d.-: r'llm SP""d lnC'h•·~ PN Rt~c:onJ ..!.0:.!~ --Ll~ 4 \14 ,, '" li.tl7' 'i.4U ~on 9.o2 il).•1 lO.IlG --~12 0:. ;)f>~ 4.1~ 4 ,, tl. iJ lh s 97 'l.~ l 11 .~1 1' 7U ~.413~ 4 !1~ 7.~9 :I ~5 j1J •I...... _.,;,'j:,! .• .ll j.7() tu 2G U. 'i6 .U82 ~.~ti ;:,.0.1 I U. i:l 13.1 2 7\l.l ., .1H "',,) F! 11.17 t:L Q7 ".9il:l J q1 h. il l.ll ' 1.4 .5~ ••(Jl:l II .I t•.cH 1~.05 15.07 1.1~3 o.n~ 0.1 i 1~ .4q 1!>.~2 :J.~:\:1 t1 4 T I 70 12 !};) 1ti 17 :l.~H I' lj!1 l(' :-t> :t ·; li.ii'! "1.4:;~ "''1 1 II• 1 ;.ft~ 17.~7 :~ ,l6 ~ 7 . 1 111.6~ 1·1.~6 1 , , "2 ., till 7 :n l.llc 14.70 b o"' 3.7!:1-1 7 " ll . ~b ~.-, 1~ l8.!)~ ::!.\) ~-J 4 .u o.O le~vl lin~· , then· w11! bP fou•· V!l\\ slits, wo on each edi!,L' of the fdn> . E.1 h pair of .~l.!t~ is offst•l from the: itnagl.! ,;lit, une on dLher ide, so tha t t11t~ ~ame una)(;, is cxpoc.;ed a • 1 v.u ..h fie reut ume,;. Bv ·uwly;.ing tl.e ima,:e dlsplaceJ•Jent trom sln •o slil, rol .m \ cl\\ c.1n IJ.., Jerermined STRIP CAMERA FEATURES L.ons: len;,;._u.-Mak:::uwv. CvnL tve-C,>nv ·x 1 ype. Ro: ,rim: ,V.Ir o~. !?l.mo ::.•trfal<' t\.fi1TOr 33 lnLh Diam • <.' •• f• -:al l.t~ll).!; II : 77 lnch.~s. '),ic Platt. Thre~ Slit WiJLJs Available (nor .:ilange 1ble during operation). [' fiOI.I V I fi f ror· ls Surf.Kc' ,'pn, rica! "-llrror ,ioc.usm rn1rrnr). Diagon.1l ;\.{Jrror· .\ect:ln~ulat fln tM11 ror. Fie!J Fl1, enc!·. -wo Lt.ns Elemem,; (Ch r o ma ric \ !• , :·uic>n Cllr recwr). Film Ln:-td: ,,,fJOO Feet, " .460 Inch Width. Fnnn.11 :'>!~<'· 8.7l'>lnch·•,(v,,r::;hlelengch). I~ :1:-l ts ~r 1!.07 1 9 19 1 .qo no t8 . 0 1 l.,l ~1 J7 lti :!. 2:.! 1ti lG.\l~ '·" ;, _., 17 . 71l '.!4 14 1~.-1 .. ~) . 1 I UI.J~ ~6.12 19 . RR .!7.11 11 0. h I 2S. 111 ·• .:iJ ;,~_0!1 ~·'.Ut-i 30 ns n. .1 !1 ~ l.O' ,,., ~:! ,,, .!4· ~:J 1"' (ff ' '24 ~1H ~-l .•.lli li .b ()fll•r ;\ I ton n S•· ··md~ • 1 ['lU1!'-l~/63 .nJ L,·n~J·IJ~ oi Upt :rtH!c," 21 .87 ~G. ~01 10 207 o. ' 2ti.~... 5~ ~0 : l~.t•U .1' D J7 ,.)$ "" l 1 ~. \11 ~ng ~.;, ' ..:H .'.I:': R.BI l lif1 24· ~' 11 -•) ,, 64 td ·.o l ~h.tiO ~-::: ,R :IJ 1[1 tii o: 1:.·1 •o ... it ~l. 3~ :Jft tl ~1.3:\ :.nJ.fi., >q1J no 3o.JO ~~ '>R J•t ~I , 1r) l!\7.::!'i" .n.o~ 7ft ,J : 1;,o.tir, )os.~,.1 ~8.41 i~ I~ 1f•G IJ 1•1 q" ~u i' 6 ,o ~: Ib 1. 1)!) 3:; !.\}.1 ·1 ..12 S'Lt.,~ liii !.) 30.-0 13 t.r,:. _., .0 ~ 2 Ll -~ '~-~~ ·L.!.4!l 81; :::< 7·' .. .. -~3.l";1 ol.fiH IJ hi '·' 1. '·' 4!J.l u n !:1~1 1 H:, I) 3ft: ~~:! 413 .•.1 4 Ut.liO 'fl< ion,try <;lJt 'II tile s,l!ilt> spt:C'll .. ~ he' 1m.1g;t mo ·es past he sit• . \~he'l he,;l' '\'• 11 >rion,; 1re in svnchroniz:Jtion, a hi~'-h •·....s~Jl 11 on nag..: ts ·~-:ordc.d on he-film 'im-c tlw In ,f"\t:eu tnd linage speed a•:e difticulr to esi.Jb!ish in 1 1 orhitin~ vchic!;;, a d!Sl"t;S61Ul1 >fv;~nauons c.ru :Pel by h mt::es 1n >[l<:'l?d :r, ll•'Ce sarv. ,\s,utning G ,;table w.hide, th·~ duner,l c.1n be ope1·aLPd ar nP•tr rhe J•roper SJl<'L'd, 1nd howf:·ve ·, ,:-:; lhe spc.: I•• "' 1011 :trie~ .twav (cc•rn tltc ynchronous po"l on, di;;rortlon wtll oc._u .1long lit:: line •>f tl igh· . , hi:> lt:-. turrton or sm"' 1nn!> ot i m flight pnth . 'lm'"JJ is not tht· nnly ·y~ distorllon .lppan•nt tn blr"il pl10rog• aphy :;inCL J tntsnwtch l - TOP SECRET liondl" Y10 SPECIAL HAND! lNG REQUIRED 7ALENT-~EYHOLE Cordrol nly CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM fOP SECREt- SP EC IAL HANDLING REQUIRED NPlC/T P-18/63 of film-image speed can also cause compression of images along the flight path. If film speed is too fast for the image, elongation occurs, and if the film speed is too slow for the image, compression occurs. Any change of film speed will cause elongation or compression of images along the flight path, and because of this, It is very difficult to de termine sizes of objects in that direction. A high order of elongation or compression is r eadily apparent to the trained eye; however, a small order of elongation or compression will make distortion of the s ize and shape of objects difficult to detect. lf the speed of the film changes during exposure, a different ia l dis tortion pattern will result in trapezoidal shapes of rectangular objects and cur ving lines that s hould be straight. Since the speed of the fllm is applicable In only one direction, there is no distortion across the film with a s table vehicle, and all distortions caused by incorrect film speed are in the longitudinal direction of the film (parallel to flight path ). Since the vehicle is not a stable platform, it is possible to have dis tortions caused by vehicle motion in the pitch, roll and yaw planes. Ther e are two separate motions, static and dynamic conditions, in each of the plane s . The static condition is when the vehicle is r olled, pitched, or yawed from its nominal position and remains in this position throughout the exposure. The dynamic condition is when the vehicle is pitching, rolling, or yawing during the exposure . For the s tatic condition, pitch and roll are altitude sensitive bec ause any change in vehicle attitude in these planes will alter the image speed at the center of the lens; since image speed is the one that con trols film speed, distortions will occur in tlie direction parallel to the flight path. In the dynamic condition where movement is occuring during expos ure, the motion is translated to the images being recorded, and distortions will occur in eithe r direction, pa rallel to the flight path or perpendicular to it. Yaw is not altitude sensitive, but the rotational motion in the dynamic condition is translated to the image the same as the pitch and roll mot:ons are. Under static yaw conditions only small amounts of distortions are evident unless the yaw is ex.cessive. All of the distortions or smear of im ages discussed ma y occur a t the same time and on the same exposure; therefore, determination of the exact cause of image distortion is not possible. Part ll of this manual will discuss the mathematical approach to the problem of determination of image size and shape with multiple image motion problems. OPERATING MODES The KH-7 camera system ca n produce single strips of photography over a wide range of sizes from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 387 inches in length; however, nor mal operations will fall in a much narrowe:r range of 13 to 46 inches in length. (See T able No2.) The film speeds available are from 2.022 inches per second up to .3. 784 inches per second in 64 separate speeds ; this allows operation in various portions of the orbit to produce distortion -free photography. (See "Dis cus sion of Strip Cameras".) When operating in eithe r t he stereo mode or in the lateral pair mode, the lengths of strips a r e controlled by s peed of the vehicle and its altitude. T he s te reo pairs are programmed to produce 100% forward lap, and the lateral pairs are programmed to produce parallel str ips with minimum side lap. (See Figures 2and 3.) ln the stereo mode, the rotating mirror is moved to the forward-looking position (15 degrees from the vertical along the fl ight pa th or parallel to the flight path); a strip of photography is ex -4 - TOP SECRET Handle Via TALENT·KEYHOLE SPEC IAL HANDLING REQUIRED Control Only ------------------" SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES TOP SECRET SP!:C! L HANDLING REQUIRED NPlC;1P-l~163 I ~ •Ill I 'It>~ FIGURE 2. STE! n. "' .. , ": ~ k c "' c. "" ::l )... ;: ~ ... .... .., "' ::l 0 '6-;:;: <:: ::. Q: 0 LL ~ ~ 0: '!?..,. LA. '{ ::!: <;. Cl: '-' I < I lLJ ~ V\ ~ lU ...J Q:) ""' Vi 1 Ill"' .., "' 0 I " i J Q ~ ..,; I u UJ 0: 1.,I <.:> r -"• J ;::, z u. 0 '" -7 - TOP SECRET Haodl~ V,,. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED TALEIH KEYHOLE Conlrol On ly CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED • :; ~· ' • _' J 1·l , NPIC/TP-18/63 STEREO P AIRS A VAI L A8L Ei IN ' ALL· R0LL P OSITIONS U TO MAXIMtJM ROLL CAPACITY F ~·· 40' I\AJ,,1M/TSK/r ·zA uv LATERAL BLACK ·. SEA I I I . lcO~~~~~ozo ~========'~o========; N AUTI C Al-MILES · s cALE . ht . ~oo. ooo FIGURE 5. TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF CONTINOUS STRIP AND LATERAL PAIR FRAME COVERAGE AT NOMINAL 95 NM AL TITUDE . -8 - Handle Via TOP SECRET TALENT-KEYHOLE SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED Conrrol Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES TOP SECRET 4f.l F8REIGII Ell,lii" SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED Table No 3. VertiCil/ Cot•n<~g< 1'·161•: ALT!TIJDE ~AI!TJrAL ~HLER ALTITUDE fEET WIDTH COVERAGE NAUTICAL \IILE1> SCALES WIDTff COVEI!AGE IN FEET 30 511 20() 1U.fl6 SS,:!7fl ti 1.1~6 .H) -lt ..,.;ll,t/00 ]11.1~ h5 .7 1~ ti!,51JO ~~ ~d.OS .177 Ji00 ~00.000 () 6!' 11.03 UO,I! 13 ~13.~04 64,5~6 •n ,ono 1!10 !10.:>:: till~}!<}U_ tHO,OOll 'I ~~ 11.2!' -~·~5.!.1 !l5,1l62 67 ,!184 iTh,~oO lU:!.'i\1 i12!iJlOO u :;o 07,400 fiU,RRO 10-I.H tll:1,000 n.ss 08,05!1 7 1 ,0(11 105 618.100 ll.iI 09,48~ 71,JH-l l06.Dl 0~0.1~00 ll.!lj .!_Ol , ~Uii i~.li80 llO ·~~g.8ou 12.Jll 104,2\!5 71,7H4 111.6; G"O,r~OIJ l~.:.it to~ . 9711 71),036 U:l.l9 UJO.OOO l2.tlU !07,:·311 7i.lf>4 ll!J •1~19 .~uo J2.8G 108,!)1);, 7R, 15~ --1_15 l.l ,~01 011!_) _ 1!2.~!) 1~•.!:'88 76,:172 Utl.7 ilti,OOO Ja.OG 110,0-lti 7!1,1011 118.1~ 7~0.000 13.24 l l~ 205 ~0,50~ 1~0 7~:1,GOU ],1 1~ 113, 701! S l,GS~ \'>f>.M~ l .. :i,OOC~ 1~.• 1 1!4,fJ40 q~.l~G t2:) ..\:l l_.,!;, 7o~,Oill 71)0 ,110(1 13.80 ia.o~ 116 . s~ ll~:4~15 ..~.~0-1 '4,!!80 t2:· R~! 7s;,.uon 14. 17 ll9,~!R "'!.,.,40 1~7 Jt; 'j 5,1•00 l·l ~~:i 120, i76 ~6,fifl(l 12u.n 79tl,001' 14.!1J t!~3 , 1i5 ~8.340 JIO J:IJ.j~ ·~lj\_400 snu,oon H.~·1 14.1 l 1 2~,_!7 :.l 1~~.67~ R~,3~Q sn.-1:.4 l:lfi ~~O,ROt1 l" I) l.?T,t\13 !11,71!0 t.:..3!1 CS!lo,ooo Jr..~·l 1:J~,4ti.t !)!'i,f}44 1·10 l4:J HJ (4::, 551.2011 si.;.ooo 8~l.liUII 1~ .6:i 1R.tlV lfj ~l 13~,o;,_ 1:!~,3_61) .. ~7,3SU 'J:;,J ~() •li,S.'Hl,, y"j~ 11".'1~ uoo,ooo lf .!)5 l·JU ~~~g !IJ0.631S l:iO ) ~. 0111 16.77 14~,:!1f 1111,~H l5~.LJ :)2.• ,uuu l i. Jl t44, Hi~ 11':!,430 1ii:i 1 ltL:!5 !.11.2,:l00 ~)~0.00\1 11. :n J'i ~{8. _146,.164_ ll!i,No l l!:iJi( 1Vti,:.! 0f~ 1~(1 .,7._~ , S0t) 17 .S>l l .>l ,tOI. 10<;,7711 160:16 v7:;,ooo J'i'.O .l j ,, :!H 10~1.{1:! I tti·l.41 1,\100, \!0 :8 .41 t:-.:.,1).;0 llt,1Hl il)fJ l.}Jf';~.:!tltl l~ l.~i lf,t;_, J4ll - Jl!! 1711 fi>l ..iq 1,'):2~),0110 ld.S:i l ~~t . 7:JQ l H,I'I~ 11(. ; ,u3:l,MO 19.00 lti l,HiG l 15.-·i I J7'2 .t)~l l,OoO,OOO l 'l..H ltl:~.ti3~ 117,4UF 1j'j 1,116·1,11110 ]!I >7 ltib,,l4 'IS,H~ 17fo:; l 1,t1iJ ,{J(l0 19.11 f,f 1~~- l:!(!_y~O"' l~C l ,\;9·1, iiit) 20. ,, 170.:::i')! 12~.37 t i81J.92 l,JuO.OOO ~n -!5 171 1!!4 1~3,111)1 of the optimal lens-il age piine --film-surtace recwrl, rh focus output S1c,nals ~generated by plane relat ionship. Tho:: nnge of focus adjusrthe detector) !nJ1 .He thar <>11 adiustmem ul fm;us •11t!nt is .t u.nlO inch<.:' . is required The fncus Jriv moror, upon com In gener il terms, rt1c focus control asm:mi, r 1en stlifts rho film platen :1 controlled »•'mb : evaluates rtJe conditions 01 fc>eus . When disnnce, retuP1ing rh p lane •li hesr f cu.· to jep.1nure from th.! Jinir:> of best !-ocus is de-comL'idenc<.> w 'th the fd m <>urtJce plane . -9 - Handle Via fOP SECRET TALENT KEYHOLE 119 FSR € 1611 91&&EM Conlrol Only SPECIAL HANDL lNG REQUIRED N (!) (!) n lit! .... 1-i .... ~ ~ c::: (I) ... z nr > 'U (I) o m :r 0 1.".1 ' Z a ...... ::--t :J ..., 0 , a.. -~· .... I ;'~< .:;-:r. a· ..... 1-i 12 CX> ...... ~ a m (.).) ~·.".)('1 1-i -·.: 'U ~ ..,..•· s ~ DIRECTION OF FLIGHT FI L M T IT L E • .... 1-i YAW IMIIG E FIDUCIA L LI NES ~ NOM INAL POSITIO N IS IIREA NO. 2 .003" .t .COt" CEN TER OF IMAGE A R EA "' .1 00'*' :! . 0 0 31t -o m n , -z ~p ___ j ____ ___ :C~---- I :r~ LENS 1\XIS 2: ~X! om YAW IMAGE ,..... re> 1\REA NO . I z:z 0 . , oo· ± . ooJ ·· e "E 1.".1 ;ov. t" m"' om t" s3:: .... ;o 1-i m m "" 1.".1 00 ~ n •F IL"" TITLE WILL B E PL ACE D 1 . 8 INCHES ,ROM S T AR T O F P RA._.E A ND WILL BE ~ REPEA.TEI) EVERY 1 8 IN CHES ~ (I) ~ n 1.".1 (I) i ~ (I) n N P\C ti · 3D;J~ i R£\1 . / 6.1 1 FIGURE 6 . .KH·l FILM FORMA T . .... I ~ ~ .... SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES TOPSECRET ~ SPECI,\l HANDLING REQUIRED ~ I TIME MARKS A time track will be e. pns d on the Lim fro wh1ch ,-orrel e~ri c d,na rn:JV be extr,lclc;U T 11s ume tmck is '-ompo:;ecl of two sepa. -.Jle rime tr ILk>' one operuing It 10 c;-cles per :>econd (cps) md •>ne operating ;Jt 20 cps. lJin.nv time is re.:nt·df.>d i•1 bot!, timt: tracks for redundanc~· checks, wirlt r 'w 1ndcx m·trks ior e~ c 1 truck ·1ppearin!1' ar d1fterem i11te vals (50 milll;,econds 1p:1rt lor rile 20 ~..ps trnd and J.(}(\ n illlsec is a variable speed. tile reco1d1ng of riu' t1me track t-varwble ,tbo. (Sec ['1,;c t:ss io nf Strip C.:tmeras ".) 1l1e size of t e time 'rack ;,; so ~m.lll rh.lt it is diffit 11lt ro " arrttude determinatiOn. - 1 I ICj'T P-l:3 .'P3 STELLAR CAMERA T'1e stell-1 r r':lmet a prndL ce,.. photnl!Llphy of the stellar field ovc~· a furm.lt an~a 0.'.>375 iiKlle: diJm~Te•·. A rese~u g"id 1s Sllperi mpo::;ed on the tmage plane to prodtJce four tidunal m;lrks .lt certain int~:;rscctious of tile )/;rid 1ndabotopro-Jucc a gri<.l on tile ~xpo;;ur 1 he til r cam~; a d ·~ ior e:-tch mission. F n1me correlati11n lllilrk,; will ilppe 1r on J.dnaol"l frame:; for correlltTons •'l stellar frame qnd i'!<.lex fr1me. Only he fr<~me number willbentledone·1ch fnme . F r mes will be numbered C'lnsecutively tllroughout the miss ion . 'J it! in!! i nf,Jrm·n ion consisring ,,t missicJ number, date, c.:l.tssifka•ion, codeword , and .J ·h.\rt correlating !r1m.:s ro passe.<; will be 'll'fixed fi) the head le der. Stellar Camero Dolo focd.J Lt'ngth: 35 rnm. Cone 1\ngle: l() det;rees. Shul'c;r Spe<'d: O . .S ..;r.cnntl ro r, sel'5 mm by 75 ro Format Siz,~ . t}.'l'l75 inch...s diametel'. R~::;e·tu Cnd: 2. 5 mm calibrated grid. In rhc r oll posttio'ls IV nl•llle. th ~rellar c unt:ra wtll hr.! phorog;raph'ng a changin~ stnr fie ld since th e entire p.1cbge is rolled to these po~uions. In rhe case <)t a negative roll conLlitlon, the stellar un tr will be pomnn~ nr or ne1r the earrl 's surface: therefore, ,utitudc may not !lway:-; be avail:..tble from thi,; soun.:e. ll ' . TOP SECREf Handle V same ITIO'Hlt as the mam C':leau. 2 5 m n Cdlihrare grid. c.tmera svstem. Th1.' will preclude ytw analvsts .wd sr reo coverage between 'rJmes taken at Sc !.;;; Approximate y 1:4,400,'JUO. differe'lt clll positions. GLOSSARY The possibk dPf!Tlc' lt•on ,,r pl:ot•1gr.1pi) by line offlighrorappro)(im telvperpendicul.ll' im.1ge smean:1g :s tnher ~t ;, ony «.e-r:al phoroo it, depending on rhe f3ctor'3 involved. gnplnc sy,;tem. (See F1g• s ~. o, .md ll!.) Elongation nr curnpres:;io11 ol irn 1gps 1 •Hence. one clt tile ma'or requircme:1ts of a ,ult,;, und ..:ir<:tli.:u objecrs nuy t>e r,•cnrdcd .·ysrem is tile ;;.,pabil.ty of r 'dllcin~ or compenas Pllipncal forms. sating tor ne V3rious s1-:1e.tr-indudng factors. ALO 'G-TRACK. s, 1EAR: !mage smeurparallc. The foll<>wmg .ue rechnic:.d tc>rms n·,ost com1u the torward motmn cJr ·li11:ht path ot the monly encounrer~d with relmwn to tilis problem : camera vehicle. [,\!AGE SI\1E '\R : T 1e degr~d:ll ion ur d is tor• ion CROSS-T HACK SMEAR: Image smear perpen nf tLrrestrial 101:1!];<:::;, uswtlly e,;idenced by diLulat to rile forward mntion or flight path et!ge-smear111' 1'1 :1 d1r ction pJrallelwthc of the , amera Yellic le. FIGURE 3. DIS TORTION IN STRIP PHOTOGRAPHY. -l I - TOP SECRET. HQndle v, SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED TALENT-. \ THE KH-88 CAMERA SYSTEM THIRD EDITION PUBLISHED BY NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETAT ION CENTER OCTOBER 1970 Group I Excluded from Automatic Downgrading ond Declassification TOP SECRET Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Only .. SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Handle Via TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TAlEIH ·KEYHOlE Control System Only PREFACE This data book has been prepared by the National Reconnaissance Office with the assistance of the ).lational Photographic Interpretation Center to facilitate the use of the photography from the KH-8B camera system. This book revises and updates previous releases oncerning this sygtem. Third Edition October 1970 i . Handle Y11 TAlEliT -KEYIIOLETOP SECRET Cutrol System Only CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Handle Via TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TALEMT ·IIEYHOLE Co trol System Only TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION .... 1 MAIN CAMERA 1 Stnp Camera . .. 1 Optics .. .. . 1 Film Drive ... .. ... . 2 Exposure .. . 3 Control . . . . 3 Modes of Operation .. 5 Start-up Times and Film Coast . . 8 Format..... . . . . . . . ...... . . . ... . . .. . . .. ... .. . . ... . . 8 Titling Information... 9 Recorded Data . . . .. . . . . 9 ASTRO-POSITION TERRAIN CAMERAS 14 Terrain Camera. 18 Titling Information . 18 Data..... . .. ... . . 18 Stellar Camera 19 Titling Information . 19 Data . .. 23 APTC Operation . 23 GLOSSARY .. ... ... . . . .. .... . . .. . 24 -iii - Handle Via TALEMT ·KEYIIOLE -fOP SECRET Caatrol System Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES ll11dla Via TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET lllEIIT·II£YIIOLE Cutrel Systn1 Daly Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. Figure 6. Figure 7. Figure 8. Figure 9. Figure 10. Figure 11. Figure 12. Figure 13. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS KH-8B Camera System ......... . ... . .... . ....... . . .. ..... ... . KH-8B Lens Improvement Program .... . ..... . . .. . ........... . Slit Code on Film ... Frame Coverage With Frame Coverage Length una .... . . .. .. .. .... . Primary Camera Slit.. . ...... . . . .. . . . ... . ... .. . .. . . ... . . .... . Primary Camera Film Format, Film Negative Emulsion Side Down .............. .. ... . .. . ... . Primary Film Data Tracks, Negative Emulsion Down . .. . . . T he Astro-Position Terrain Camera (APTC) Coordinate System .. APTC Orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . APTC Film Format and Identification of Reseau Intersections. . . . . Terrain Camera Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stellar Camera Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2 4 5 6 7 10 11 15 16 17 20 21 22 -iv llaldle Vie ULEIIl -KEYHOLETOP SECRET Cutral Syste• Daly CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Handle Via TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TAlEN-T IIOHOlE Control System Only INTRODUCTION The KH-8B camera system (Figure 1) consists of four cameras and two recovery buckets. Various improvements are designed to increa e the primary camera resolution by about 30% and increase the lifetime of the vehicle by an additional 6 days over the next 10 missions (starting with 27). The Primary camera is designed to produce high-resolution, large-scale photography of selected target areas. A separate unit, the Astra-Position Terrain Camera (APTC), contains the other 3 cameras, one 75mm focal length terrain frame camera and dual90mm focal length stellar cameras. The terrain camera is designed to point in the direction of the principal ray of the main camera. It provides mapping coverage and images for relative orientation . The stellar cameras are pointed 180 degrees apart, one to the port (left) side of the vehicle and one to the starboard (right) side. These provide at least one reduceable stellar frame with each main camera frame. The APTC will also be improved by providing a larger film load. MAIN CAMERA Strip Cameras A strip camera is a device which stabilizes an image in the focal plane of the camera by moving film past a stationary slit at the same speed that the image is moving past the slit. When these two motions are synchronized, an unsmeared image is recorded on the film. If these motions are not synchronized, the images are distorted by either compression or elongation in the direction of film movement. Mensuration techniques allow for these variations in film speed and permit determination of changes in film speed with a high degree of accuracy. When the camera is operating normally, the film speed should be within 0.6 mm/sec of the speed desired, except during looper action and start up transients. Image distortion will also occur if the film speed drive malfunctions or is commanded to operate at the wrong speed. However, this compression or elongation will not be discernible to the photointerpreter, and proper mensuration techniques still permit accurate mensuration of images on the film. Optics The optical part of the main camera consists of a flat stereo mirror, an aspheric mirror used as a converging lens, a corrector lens assembly, a slit, and a platen. -1 Kln•le VII ULEMl -KEYHOLE TOP SECRET CowtrDI Systea Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Radle Yla TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TALEMT ·IIEYIIOLE Co•trol System ORIJ Film Drive The film-drive mechanism is designed to maintain highly accurate and consistent film speeds throughout camera operation and through the following range of possible image motion: altitude from 65 to 135 naut ical miles (nm) and obliquity angles from 0 to 45 degrees. The film load can be either 10,000 feet of black and white 1414 ultra-thin-base (UTB) film; 7,500 feet of S0-242 UTB color film; or a combina tion of both film types which results in a variable film load . The fil m-drive mechanism prevents motion, except rotation of the platen, during normal exposure. Accurate determinations of film speed can be made by measuring the time-track recordings on the edge of the film . These aid greatly in determining the mensuration capability for missions (See Recorded Data, p. 9). ., IJ(PLC M.O IJ5 I FIGURE 1. KH-88 CAMERA SYSTEM -2 - llatflt Yil lOP SECRET TAltilT·KEYHOLE Cu tnl Syst•• 01ly 22Li 2iii iS 1 2 1I I I £1 5222 I CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM llndle Yia TOP SECRET TCS-20292/70 TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System Only Exposure Film speed, slit size. and sun angle determine the exposure of images on the film. Since the film speed is determined by the speed of images in the focal plane, variation in film speed cannot be used for exposure control. Several slits have been supplied so that exposure can be controlled from sun angles of from 2 to 90 degrees and throughout the range of film speeds ava1lable (Figure 3). Faster film speeds shorten and wider slits lengthen the exposure time. The film speed is determined by the image speed, and then t he sun angle (and predicted snow cover) are viewed to find the best possible exposure. With these two parameters determined, the slit with the nearest exposure time for this combination can then be programmed. Exposure may be determined by this formula: T=WNF Where: T = Exposure time in seconds W = Slit width ininches VF = Film velocity in inches per second Unpred1eted snow cover, de ert scenes, and heavily wooded areas present special exposure problems. Consequently. some frames on each mission will not have the best possible exposure. These individual frames can be enhanced through printing techniques. Control The vehicle control system is designed to allow · accurate pointing of a main camera system to the area of interest. The stereo mirror is rotated in the pitch plane of the vehicle to give the necessary angular relationship for stereoscopic coverage . The mirror can be stopped in any one of 3 positions. The effective lines of sight are 8.65 degrees forward from the vertical, vertical, and 8.65 degrees aft. Normal stereo is obtained in the forward and aft positions, but may be acquired in other modes. The mirror is crabbed in the roll plane to compensate for the Earth's rotation. . 3 -Handle Via TAlEIH KEYHOlETOP SECRET Co~trel Syste11 Only STEREO MIRROR ...... ,.,...........-.....--!t-t• ~;.. :5....... .. -c-......... ......•.:c KH-B.,OCAL LE NGTH 4301-433 1, OESIGN GOAL-T 72 NM ~ STEREO MIRROR PR IMA RY LENS (MIRROR) VJ_... N ". --...~::; ~~:c.. ...-,........·=·~~:! .... ,.,. LENGTH 4332-4341, DESIGN 72 NM FIGURE 2. KH·BB LENS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM I NP/C MAm J, ____ c:5 00•t.:> 0 t.:> ~ 0 en m n -1 5 z :? en - ~ Ill F =i iii en CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM llanlllt Vi1 TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TALENT -KEYHOLE Control System Oaly SLIT CODE ON FILM SLI T NO 5 8 SLIT Sl ZES -,0036 .0056 .0086 .0135 .0207 .0322 ,300 VARIABLE (IN ) (NIGHT ! 005 z :I: I 0 .020 ~ u.J 0 0 u .010 FIGURE 3. SLIT CODE ON FILM Modes of Operation The main camera can be used in various ways to provide the best views and selection of targets . These include: Stereo: Fwd-aft, fwd-vertical, vertical-aft, fwd-vertical with aft mono, fwd-aft with vertical mono, fwd mono with vertical-aft. Stereo: Double stereo fwd-aft of target with fwd-aft of second target interspersed. Mono: Forward, vertical, aft, lateral pair, lateral triplet, end to end, and strip. -5 -Handle Via TALENT -KEYHOlE TOP SECRET Control Syste111 Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Ntdlt Via TC S-20292/70 TOP SECRET TALENT -KEYHOLE Coatral Syst111 lhly -_ ..... ,· ..... .11' : ... .,.. ... ' ?':o===:;:;:;;:>'w -'.;,o·====:io=-~:=:::::=~ NAU T I C AL Ml L£5 SC -A' LE 1 1 , 000 , 000 3S• I FIGURE 4 . FRAME COVERAGE WITH 160" FOCAL LENGTH LENS -6 . ll11dlt Yla TALEIIT-KEYHOlETOP SECRET Cutnl Systtll Oaly CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Handle Vta TC -20292/70 TOP SECRET TALENT -KEYHOLE Control System Only 33• 34'' CONTINUOUS STRIP (VERTICAL) WITH AFT STEREO CONTINUOUS STRIP (OBLIQUE) I Okty abr 'skoye Sak• STEREO PAIRS AVAILABLE IN ALL ROLL POSITIONS UP TO MAXIMUM ROLL CAPACITY OF 44.45" -45 LENGTHS OF CONTINUOUS STRIP PHOTOGRAPHY ARE VARIABLE BLACK SEA LATERAL PAIRS (VERTICAL) Se ilstop 34° I FIGURE 5. FRAME COVERAGE WITH 175.6 " FOCAL LENGTH LENS . 7 • Hadle Via TALEIIT -KEliiOlE __xon c-r:rnr:T SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Hudle Vi1 TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TALEIT·IIEYIOLE Coatrol Systerw Ontr Table 1. Ma in Camera Improvem ents Mission Improvement 27 Low coefficient stereo mirror 29-31 (only) Minus red filter coated on lens 32 Focal length increase fro~ 32 Flatter field & color corrected lens 26-32 Approach lower end of altitude range Start-up Times and Film Coast This system utilizes film moving on the platen face to record imagery; and, since this is a dynamic motion, a 0.25-second start-up transient time is necessary for the film to gain the proper speed. Also, when the com mand to stop is received, the platen and film coast to 8 stationary position. This coasting distance varies with the speed of the platen, but it is between 0.3 and 1.35 inches. These two areas of the film may re cord some degraded imagery which should not be used for interpretation mensuration . Format The main camera records t he image a nd all data on 8 film roll 9.5 inches wide (Figures 6 and 7). The image area is 8.810 inches wide with a yaw slitO.lOO inch wide on both sides of the film . The yaw slits record images at the ends of the main slit and provide some checks on vehicle motion ( see Figure 6). Two data tracks are recorded outside the yaw slit on one side of the film. The end-of-frame markers are recorded on the opposite edge of the film. At the beginning of each exposure or frame , the film will have remained stationary for a period far in excess of any normal exposure ti me, resulting in a burn-in area or burnin line. A pair of frame-line position marks are centered about a line 2.25 inches preceding the burn-in area or burn -in line. These marks are produced by lamp exposure in the area normally reserved for labeling on the edge opposite the data tracks. The location and dimension of t hese marks is given in Figure 4. These marks are simultaneously flashed 700 ± 50 milliseconds after the camera is commanded off. -8 . Ha•••• Yia TAlEIT-UYIIGLETOP SECRET Ctatrtl Systttl lair CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Handle Via TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TUE~T·KEYHOLE Conhol Sys\em Only Titling Information · Titling information is on the base side of the original negative along the edge opposite the time track. It includes: SAMPLE a. Revolution number (Pass) 196 b. Frame number c. Mission -bucket number 4332-2 d. Date of actual photography Jan 4, 1970 e. Classification TOP SECRET RUFF f. Index number +33 27 This information is repeated on long frames within each 18 inches of tilm. The frame numbers remain constant within each frame, but the index numbers advance sequentially with each title. Frames are numbered sequentially within each pass, beginning with 001. Index numbers on each pass also begin with 001. Recorded Data The data tracks are located near the left-hand edge of the primary film (see Figure 6). These data tracks record as photographic code marks such pertinent data as vehicle time, time of terrain camera shutter actuation and roll position. A time label is recorded on data track A at 200 millisecond intervals. Each positive bit in the time code causes a lamp to produce a 1-millisecond exposure. The first bit in the code is always positive (binary one) and serves as synchronization pulse. The synchronization pulse is followed by a 22 bit time word with least sig nificant bit first. For example, Figure 8 reads: binary 1 010 010 111 111 111 100 100 10 octal 2 2 7 7 7 1 0 1 or. reading from most to least significant bit, 10177722. A slit identifier code is also recorded on the same edge of the frame as the time track. This recording identifies the slit that is being used by continuously recording a code in three channels on the film edge (Figure 3). Data track B is a 500 pulse-per-second timing signal containing the complement time label of data track A and the terrain camera shutter actuation indicator. -9 -Kadle Via TALENT -KEYHOLETOP SECRET Control System Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Hadlt VIa TOP SECRET TCS-20292/70 TAUIIT ·lHIIOll Cutnt srsttll oat, FIDUCIAL LINE .035" A = SLIT WIDTH 8.810" 6 SLITS A\IAILABLE .0036 TO .0 32 " WIDE SECONDARY YAW SLIT I IHPIC K-1 012 I PRIMARY YAW SLIT FIGURE 6. PRIMARY CAMERA SLIT -10 - Hadlt Via Ul£11HUIIOLE-T6P SECRET C11trol Syattll OaiJ w _.. <.0 ~ r-i ~ r-i 0 ........ :c c:: ........ (I) -,..._..., ..... ·----9 462-t -o7S (I) ~..~: 1."3 .010-001 Cl't::lll -· n oc.. .........., .020 ' .001 •o ~ -= 9,... 1-1 -.005 '.001 o'"' 0025 ! .:c 8 81 1 ; .003 r----. 325 ± .015 l .. ~ Mo\1'1 !MACE ' a 0025 g 005 ! .001 1-1 r-i ~ g) ~ :z: ,.... - " II ~ ~ 1-1 . il i ~ Do\TA TRACK B~~ ,I; ~ n OATA TRACK A----~~~~1 i ~~: I __ 1_ ~ (I) .040 : -.035 :.005 • [ .-j .... v () s ~ DIRECTION 0~ ~~~M rJ) =-TRAVEL ~~ (I) SLIT ......... ~ ~ ...... IDENTIFICATION MARK ...... = f:;i.&~ 'SEE" FIG 2\ !.¥he l. -9i90] tg !i ....... -c: o::z:'" ~ i 0 ,o-c FIGURE 7. PRIMARY CAMERA FILM FORMAT, FILM NEGATIVE EMULSION SIDE DOWN .::c-~-· n fi ~ i 1-1 SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES NaR~II VIa TOP SECRET . TCS-20292no TALUT-IIEYHOLE Cutul Syst•• Oely In addition to the data recorded in t he came ra system, there are other sources of information available such as telem etry, command lists, calibration manuals, computer sources, and the mission correlation data (MCD), an outline of which is given below. Mission Correlation Data A. Data Output at Beginning of each Run 1. Earth constants 2. Vehicle Payload Constants: a. Primary: ( 1) Slit calibrations (2) Focal length (3) Field angles (4) Mirror pitch angles (calibrated ) (5) Skew angle b.APTC: (1) Focal lengths (3 came ras) {2) Field angles (3 cameras) (3) Calibration angles (3 cameras) B. Data Output at the Beginning of Each Rev Which Has Camera Operations 1. Start of new rev indicators : a . Rev & mission number b. GMT date of new rev c. GMT time & longitude of ascending node 2. Ephemeris Data: a. Vehicle inertial position (X, Y, Z) b. Vehicle inertial velocity (XD, YD, ZD) c. Vehicle inertial acceleration (XDD, YDD, ZDD) C. Data Output for Primary Camera Operations 1. Event data: a . Rev number b. Frame number c. Duration of event {camera exposure time) d. Mode: . 12 . Ha1~11 Yia TALUT ·UYIIOLETOP SECRET Cutul Syst1a 0Riy CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Hudle Yi1 TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET lAtENT ·KEYHOLE Control System Only (1) One-half of a stereo pair (2) Strip (3) One-half of a lateral pair (4) F=mirror fwd (5) V=mirror vertical ( 6) A=mirror aft e. Aperture designator ( lit size) f. Cone angle (angle between nadir and principal ray) g. Camera roll h. Film velocity (theoretical & commanded) in inches/second 1. Camera crab angle J. Effective shutter speed k. Intrack-crosstrack scale l. Frame altitude m. kew angle n. Frame length in inches 2. Target Data: a. Programmed (TargetiD) b. Actual target ID. prionty and X and Y coordinates on frame for target location c. Marginal targets d. Frame corners latitude and longitude 3. Ephemeris and Positioning Data: a . Svstem time referenced to GMT b. Geodetic position of vehicle nadir c. Geodetic position of intersection of camera principal ray with the earth. d. Vehicle altitude e. Inertial velocity & azimuth of vehicle f. Flight path angle of vehicle g. ~un elevation & azimuth h. V/H (Velocity/Height) ratio in radians/second 1. Payload clock time (OCTAL) 4. Programmed blank frame event & corresponding data: D. APTC Camera Data 1. Dependent operation 2. Independent operation -13 lludle Via TALENT ·lEYHOLETOP SECRET Coatrtl System Daly SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Mu~lt Via fOP SECREt-TCS-20292/70 TAL£11T-IIEYHOLE Coatral Syst•• Oalr 3. Frame number 4. Time of exposure GMT & OCTAL 5. Shutter speed 6. Geodetic Latitude & Longitude of Principal Ray 7. Alti tude & radial distance 8. Inertial velocity & azimuth 9. Right ascension 10. Camera roll 11. Velocity/height ratio 12. Right ascension & declination 13. Solar azimuth & elevation 14. Flight path angle 15. Swing angle E. Film Summary Data 1. Primary Camera Data: (a) Rev number (b) Exposed frames & footage (c) Unexposed frames & footage (d) R&D exposed frames & footage (e) Total footage for rev (f) Total footage for mission 2. APTC: a. Independent & dependent fra mes b. Blank frames c. Rev and mission total footages ASTRO-POSITION TERRAIN CAMERA The Astro-Position Terrain Camera (APTC) system is used to produce: 1) terrain photographs for image correlat ion, mapping, geodetic, and relative orientation purposes, and 2) stellar photographs for attitude de term inations and rate computations (Figures 9, 10, and 11). -14 Hu~le Via TALEIIT·IIEYHDlE lOP SECRET Cutul Srst•• Oalr VJ 1\) VJ 0 " H ~ ~ ~ 0 C">-4""..... :s ,.... "' ...... 0....,.z~~cw . """ "".=-::-,., ..-· .. ... -= •o3.c::>,.., =. .... c:: {/) {/) l.o:l ~ H ~ t< r----------------------------:OOMS--------------------------__j ~ g; .... '-" NEXT TIME J LABEL SYNC PULS E / SLIT CODE AREA FILM~UGE ~0 I I I I I FORMAT 23 SIT TIME LABEL A--SO MS ! I Oi"1US. 11 BIT ROLL POSITION CODE . A f-23 BIT TIME LABEL-COMPLEMENT. 8I I I j"" I 1 1 1 1 I I I Ill I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SYNC PULSE I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I LSBJ DATA TRACK A DATA TRACK B I I . I l\ I" t I I I SOO PPS FIDUCIAL LINE "'"F.RRAIN CAMERA SHUTTER MARKER iH ~ ~ I2: ~ ~ H ~ l.o:l ~ 0 ~ DIRECTION Of FILM TRAVEl. >'H {/) ~ n...._ .... ..._,.... .,...-""'...... x-.. ...""' ..3""'"'-c-g::C ... "'""""'.:c r-·,., .. FIGURE 8 . PRIMARY FILM DATA TRACKS, NEGATIVE EMULSION DOWN l-:Vrt_<:._ M·9540 1 >--3 (') (/} I ~ t-v (.£> ~ 0 l.o:l {/) t< I IH i ........ =-= 1 111 ...... _,.. ... RE FE RENCE MARKS ;;~;:;;,;.. !!i.......... ~ -a•o.,..... EM lJLSIOH o"'•;;c ' /10101DIAPOSITIVE )/ Bl LENS RIGHT LOOKING ';..,~. ' ' ' ' ' "- ASTRO) ' \ t FILM I I TRAVEL I ; I /ENCEMARK XL/ -{' 1-' C/) / 0111 YL ' ' DATA BLANKS 010 1 DIRECTION t OF FLIGHT 62 LENS (LEFT LOOKING ASTROI en m 0 ..... ...•..-....-...!!.,..... 1-3 {j '00 ' 0 z :;;: -=~=-,........ _!1-:z:• ooc !-~; FIGURE 9. THE ASTRO-POSITION TERRAIN CAMERA COORDINATE SYSTEM [~IC~ ~ t.:) (,0 ~ en - ~ ~ I ::::j iii en (...) ~ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM llandle Via TOP SECRET TCS-20292/70 TAlENT -KEYHOLE Control Syst111 Daly LEF"T STEL. LAR RIGHT ST "L L AR • I 6' 96" j / I NDEX CAMERA AXIS ~ NADIR VERTICAL / ,96" ~ ~.,)·, 6 ' · NADIR NADIR ROLL LEFT JOo ROLL RIGHT 45' FIGURE 10. APTC ORIENTATION -17 - Handle Via TALENT -KEYHOlE TOP SECRET Coetrol System Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Hl•dle Yla -fOP SECREl--TCS-20292/70 TALENT -KEYHOLE Central System Owly Terrain Camera The terrain camera is an f/5.0 frame camera with a 75 mm focal length. The camera uses an Aptcagon lens with a 74-degree field angle and produces frames 4.5 x 4.5 inches on 5-inch film . The camera contains sufficient ultra-thin-base (UTB) 5inch film to photograph approximately 3,190 fram es per mission. The film load will be increased wit h Mission 4330 to match the new APC capacity of 4,150 frames per mission. The primary purpose of the terrain camera is to provide input to relative orientation computations for an accurate determination of the attitudes of the main frame. The terrain camera and t he stellar cameras are accurately calibrated. The terrain· camera is also used independently for mapping and geodetic purposes to obtain photography of poorly mapped or controlled areas of the world. Titling Information The titling information for the t errain camera is placed on the base side of original negatives. The informat ion is along the edge of the fllm, opposite the binary time word. It includes: Pass number Frame number Mission number Date of photography Classification Pass numbers are titled in the blank frame at the beginning and end of each pass. Frames are numbered sequentially throughout each pass, beginning with 001. The terrain format is shown in Figure 12. Data Table 3. Te"ain Camera Data Focal length 75mm fnumber 5.0 Half field angle 47 deg diagonal Full field angle 94deg Film format 4.5x 4.5 in Film type 1414 Exposure 1/200 sec, 1/300 sec, and 1/500 sec (changeable on orbit) Film supply 3,190 to 4,150 frames 'Reaeau 2.5-mm grid -18 . Hatdle Via TAlENT-KUIIOL£lOP SECRET -Coat ret Syst1111 Only CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Handle Yia TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TAlENT ·KEYIIOLE Control System Only Stellar Camera The stellar cameras, pointed out opposite sides of the vehicle, are used to match main camera frames with useable stellar frames . These cameras point with the main camera. Therefore when the main camera rolls the APTC roBs to the same place. Since high roll angles would cause a single stellar camera to be pointing at the ground half the time, two stellar cameras are required to get full coverage. They are mounted to point six degrees above the horizontal line through the vehicle to eliminate albedo light. Therefore, in the vertical and near vertical positions, two useable photographs will be taken . The stellar cameras are f/2.0 cameras with a 90-mm focal length, a 25.6-degree field angle, and a 29 x 29mm square film format (Figure 13). A 2.5-mm reseau grid superimposed on the format of both the stellar and terrain cameras aids in calibration and data reduction . The stellar cameras produce two exposures with each index frame, and, since these two cameras are physically separated, the same left and right exposures are two frames apart on the film. The exposure time selected for the stellar camera is 0.4 seconds. However, if this should prove inadequate, it can be changed to .8, 1.2, 1.6. or 2.0 seconds as necessary on future missions. Titling Information The original negative on the stellar camera i not titled except for t he beginning and end of each pass. The duplicate negatives are titled on the base side, the duplicate po itives are titled on the emulsion side. The information carried on the duplicate negatives and duplicate positives includes the frame number (in sequence) and the left or right designator. The sequence of photographs in each stellar pass is as follows : 1 left, blank, 2 left, 1 right, 3 left, 2 right. 4 left. 3 right, etc. The leader contain the mission number and cla sification. The stellar format is shown in Figure 13. -19 llandle Via TALENT ·KEYIIOLETOP SECRET Control Sy$lera Only ~ j ~ - -•n ... .... !!.,... ... "'•c -:: -:--t. ;:,... s=; ~~::!: .:c '" .. VJ co "" 22 BIT TIME LABE L TYP ICAL INNER MARKER [NP!C M-95431 8 BITS FOR ELAPSED TIME TYPICAL TOP PLATE SERIAL NUMBER TYPICAL REFERENCE YR MARK + 0606 I 11 11 I I B2 LENS (LEFT ASTRO) 81 LENS (RIGHT ASTRO) + 0111 + 1111 ,_XL 0606 I I I ... XR 0101 1101 + + FI LM ADVA NCE 0101 + 1101 + FILM ADVANCE == = a A LENS (TERRAIN ) + 01 45 0 FLIGHT DIRECTION FILM D ADVANCE 4501 45451 0 FO RMAT SIZE + + 29 x 29mm ASTRO 4.5 X 4.5in TERRAIN ALL CASES SHOWN ARE X NEGATIVES WITH EMULSION DOWN FIGURE 11. APTC FILM FORMAT AND IDENTIFICATION OF RESEAU INTERSECTIONS n~z .... - • .,_:II..... 2. .... •.... .,... - .. ...-c ... -a .... lil. .., ... ~ - en m (") -1 0 ~ z CJ :;; Cfl to.:) en 0 to.:) -< en CD -1 ~ m ~ ~ 0 en (") > ~ ~ r :::j iii en CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Han"• Via TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TALENT -KEYHOLE Control System Only MS: MOST SIGNIFICANT TIME LABEL LScLEAST SIGNIFICANT (22 BITS) INDEX MARKER SCALE 10. 1 y DRAWING SHOYIN WITH NEGATIVE EMULSICN SIDE DOWN tX+ X .07 4" ~ . 025" t V 1.627 '~ .lSi' l DIRECTION 2.250" OF FLIGHT 4.960" • 010' ·I DI RECTION I4.500-. -'----+ 0F FILM TRAVEL .375' NPIC L-9395 I FIGURE 12. TERRAIN CAMERA FORMAT . 21 - Handle V1a TOP SECRET TALENT -KEYHOLE :utral System Only Han"• Yla TAUNT ·KEYHOLE Central Systa• IIIJ DIRECTION OF FILM TRAVEL SCALE 10:1 SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES TOP SECRET TCS-20292/70 DRAWING SHOWN WITH NEGATIVE EMULSION SIDE DOWN !: .025" V ERTEX OF TRIANGLE POINTS TOWARD EARTH ~------ ~0 TOWARD RIGHT STELLA R FRAME ELAPS EO TIME 8 BITS L.S (2 0) DIRECTION OF FLI GHT IN DEX MARKE R SCAL E 10: 1 INP/C L·l396 I FIGURE 13. STELlAR CAMERA FORMAT -22 h••l• Via TAUIIHEYHDLE 'fOP SECRH-Ctltnt Syst•• Daly CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Handle VIi TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET TAlENT ·KEYHOlE Control System Only Data Table 4. Stellar Camera Data Focal length 90mm f number 2.0 Half angle 12.8 deg diagonal Full angle 25.6 deg Film format 29x29mm Film type 3401 Exposure 0.4 sec (standard), changeable at factory up to 2.0 sec Film supply 3,190 and 4,150 frames Reseau 2.5-mm grid APTC Operation The APTC can operate in either a dependent mode with the main camera or in an independent mode for mapping or geodetic purposes. The independent mode is utilized exclusively for coverage of areas of the world that have inadequate maps or inadequate geodetic bases. The depencent mode is used to match the main camera frames with reduceable stellar frames. For strip photographs of long duration, one reduceable frame will be cycled each 10 second of operation. Both the terrain camera and the stellar cameras record the time of exposure to an accuracy of .001 second in a 30-bit binary time word in the space outside the frame. The stellar cameras record the time word across the format and the terrain camera records along the format. Both units record a camera number or designator at the ends of the time words. The lower 8 bits are used to designate the milliseconds of elapsed time and the higher 22 bits record the actual clock time to .1 seconds. The stellars are presently inhibited in the near-vertical positions since attitude is not necessary in the lower roll posit10ns. The inhibited portion of the flight is at approximately 16 degrees obliquity. -23 - Hn~l1 Y11 TOP SECRET TAlENT-KElHOlE CDntrol System Only SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES Haalllt Via TOP SECRET TCS-2o292no TAlEIIT·IUMOL£ Cutrol Systea 01ly GLOSSARY The possible degradation of photography by image smearing is inherent in any aerial photographic system. Hence, one of the major requirements of a system is the capability of reducing or compensating for the various sm ear-inducing factors. The following are technical terms most com monly encountered with relation to this problem. IMAGE SMEAR: The degradation or distortion of terrestrial images, usually evidenced by edge-smearing in a direction either parallel to the line of flight or approximately perpendicular to it, depending upon the factors involved. Elongation or compression of images results, and circular objects may be recorded as elliptical forms. ALONG-TRACK SMEAR: Image smear parallel to the forward motion or flight path of the vehicle. ACROSS-TRACK SMEAR: Image smear perpendicular to the forward motion or flight path of the vehicle. FILM SPEED: The rate at which t he fil m is advanced in the camera as a means of compensation for the relative motion between terrestrial images ·and the camera. If the film is too slow, images of ground objects will be compressed; if it is too fast, images will be elongated. PITCH: Rotation of t he vehicle about its lateral axis. Pitch deviations may be negative or positive with relat ion to the nominal reference angle, and may alter the camera's effective attit ude over ground objects. PITCH RATE: Motion about the lateral axis--not to be ·confused with p itch, per se. Pitch rate causes along-track image smearing. ROLL: Rotation of the vehicle about its longitudinal axis. This results in a change in attitude that alters the slant range of the camera to ground images; hence, it is an along-track error. However, note carefully the distinction be tween roll and roll rate with re lation to image-smear effect. -24 - H •1• Via Ul£MT-IUIIDL£TOP SECRET Cutrol Systtlll Daly CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM lludle Via TAUNT ·IIEYIIOLE Central Sf$lem Only ROLL RATE : YAW: YAWRATE:. TCS-20292/70 TOP SECRET Motion about the longitudinal axis. Since roll change is perpendicular to the line of flight, it is so record ed by film, resulting in across-track image mears. Rotation from the line of flight of the longitudinal axis of the vehicle about its vertical axis. The resultant displacement of ground imagery is solely in a lateral direction and induces cross-track mearing. Motion about the verticle axis. Smearing caused by yaw rate is negligible. -25 - Handle Via TUEMT-UlHOLETOP SECRET Centro! System Only w w -I> en m 0 -1 0 z :<; en -< en -1 m 3: en 0 )> ~ !:!:! r =i iii en w w TAP <:rro fT/H PROJECT HEXAGON OVERVIEW NA Tt()HAl SECUfUTV 1Nf0RMATt()lirriJ CLAiiSiflfO IV IYEMAN 1 fXfM" fROM GENERAL DlCLASSIFICAT IOH J j UHAUTH0Ailf0 DIICLOSUIU SUIIJECT TO CIIIMINAL SAHCTIOHii KHEOULE OF E 0 111112 fXEMPTIOH CA TEOOAY !>II . 121 AUTOMAfloCAllY OE-CLA.SSIFIE:O Ofrii ;IW'OSSIILE TO OfTEfiiiMIIIItl WAfll ,4!'fG HOT.CE BfF003W/ 2 -· 093942-77 HEXAGON CY t' 31 DECEMBER 1!177 72 SHEETS n ~ H ~ ~ CJ c= (/) (/) l.:o:l a H ~ ~ g; i H ~ i ~ ~ 8 H ~ 1.':1 ~ g ~ ! H (/) (/) i>< ... ..,. o, l "' ' " B V [MAN C.O..,"'te<'l~ S.• .TI:W 04't'-• UNSITIVE INTHLIG(fr«:f JOUf!K(S lt.HO llllfTH()OS IHVOL.VEO n ~ ~ H TOP ~FCRETIH !i TOP SECRETIH HEXAGON VEHICLE ON ORBIT The Hexagon vehicle performs world-wide search and surveillance missions with two cameras that provide !5tereo panoramic photography. The film is recovered as each of four (4) large reentry vehicles (Mark 8) is filled. Each reentry vehicle is ejected from the Hexagon vehicle and is ca ught by USAF JC130 aircraft near the Hawaiian Islands. The film is then flown to Eastman Kodak at Rochester. N.Y. . to be despooled, processed, and then copied for the using agencies. The Hexagon vehicle also performs mapping and geodesy missions with stellar and terrain frame cameras. The film Is retrieved via the small (Mark V) reentry vehicle mountcri on the Hexagon vehicle nose. Accurate Hexagon vehicle location for the mapping mission is determined with the Dopplt.•r Beacon System and in the future via the Navigational Package'. The Hexagon vehicle flies in a near polar orbit (97 deg inclination) at a typical perigee/apogee of 88/155 NM, respectively. Mission durations of up to 180 days have been flown. ramic cameras and the Mapping Camera System, the Hexagon vehicle TAP C:l=f"P I=T/H 2 In addition to the stereo pano en m () ..... 0 z :c;: en -< en ..... m 3: en () > BIFOOJVV/2-093942-77 ~ Ill ;= =i ffi en (..J (..J O'l CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ~ .... ~ ~ 0 z 0 w -J u .... % w > z 0 ~ X w % ,_I - ~ - - - ~ -~ TOP SECRET/H SATELLITE VEHICLE CONFIGURATION The SV configuration incorporates overall mission success considerations as well as weight minimization and structural efficiency. Film supply, cameras, and RVs are arranged in line for film path simplicity; the two-camera assembly is relatively close to the attitude control system in the Aft Section to enhance pointing accuracy. Aft Section electronic/ electric equipment, mounted on trays in a modular fashion. is accessible through removable panels during the factory and pad spans. Access is provided to the RVs, two camera assembly, and film supply for necessary servicing. Propulsion/control force elements are grouped in a module for testing efficiency and brazed plumbing is used to assure the integrity of the propellant system through handling, launch, and flight. In the factory the SV is brought to flight readiness by acoustic and thermal vacuum testing of the assembled vehicle; vehicle instrumentation is designed for such system level testing with RF command and data links. The SV is shipped flight-ready to the launch base, ·with validation prior to launch. When required, equipment is re placed on a module/box basis to preserve factory verifications. Provision has been made for alignment of critical elements during assembly and for verifying the alignment of the Attitude Reference Module with the two-camera assembly at the launch pad. The SV configuration permits modification to meet specific mission requirements. The Mapping Camera System.••••••••••••can be omitted, and propellant and RVs can be off-loaded at the base. en The overall length in orbit of the SV illustrated is 52 feet. At launch, with shroud and booster adapter. the length is m C') 58. 75 feet. The shroucl, which protects all but the Aft Section. is 52 feet long. The solar arrays, when deployed, extend -1 0 17 feet outboard on each side of the vehicle. Injection weight for the SV illustrated is approximately 24, 000 pounds. z ?;: ~ en -1 m 3: en C') 4 TOP SECRET/H BIFOOJVV/2-093942-77 )> ;g o:J ;= 3 m en w w CXl V> V> n :xl H ~ 1-i TOP SECRET/H 0 c:: (/) SATELLITE VEHICLE CONFIGURATION (/) tzl MAPPING ( GEODESY SYSTEM • STELLAR ( TERRAIN CAMERAS e MARK~ REENTRY VEHICLE (RV) d SEARCH/ SURVEILLANCE • MARK 8 REENTRY VEHICLES (4) • TWO CAMERA ASSEMBLY • FILM SUPPLY UNIT EQUIPMENT MODULES ORBIT ADJUST /REACTION CONTROL MODULE TAP <;I=('~ I=T/ H 1111.1'.\ '-•r!<:•ltl..! -;7 !ii n H 1-i t< 1-i tzl= ~~'"" i H 1-i ~ gj ~ ~ tzl ~ H ~ ~ n 0 ~ H (/) OVERALl LENGTH (/) ~ tzl (sa· a") (/) t< (/) ! 1-i n ~ ~ H TOP SECRETIH ASSOCIATE CONTRACTORS Project HEXAGON is a team effort consisting of nine major contractors throughout the United States. These contractors provide a coordinated effort by using Interface Control Documents as binding technical agreement on responsibilities and performance of their respective equipments. The project HEXAGON team consists of: Search/Surveillance (Stereo Panoramic) • Two Camera Assembly-Perkin-Elmer, Danbury • Film supply and take-up units-Perkin-Elmer, Danbury • Shroud, Mid and Forward Section structure-Lockheed, Sunnyvale • Reentry vehicles (Mark 8)-McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis • Film-Eastman Kodak, Rochester Mapping and Geodesy System • Stellar and terrain cameras-Itek, Burlington • Reentry vehicle (Mark V) -General Electric, Philadelphia • Structure -Lockheed, Sunnyvale • Film -Eastman Kodak. Rochester Satellite Control Section • Telemetry, power, and pyros-Lockheed. Sunnyvale • Command system-General Electric, Utica • Attitude control and orbit adjust-Lockheed, Sunnyvale • Structure and booster adapter-Lockheed, Sunnyvale C/) Booster Vehicle-Titan IfiD m C') • Stage 0 solid propellant -Un;ted Technologies Chemical System Division. Sunnyvale -1 • Stage I and II liquid propellant -Martin Marietta Corp:>ration. Denver 0 z ~ The photographs were taken via the search and surveillance camera and magnified 40 times. C/) -< C/) -1 m s:: C/) C') )> ~ TnP c:rrD rT/1-1 ~ 6 BIF003VV/2-093942-77 r 3 m C/) w ~ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP «;Fl'"D FT~ AEROSPACE VEHICLE The HEXAGON Satellite Vehicle is launched by the Titan liD Booster Vehicle. When mated together, the entire assembly is tcrmt.' 10 TAP ca:rPI=T/H ~ BI F003W/2-093942-77 Ill r= :::j iii en w .(:>. N CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 12 (...) ~ ~ TAP ca:rD J:T/H TITAN I liD BOOSTER VEHICLE The Titan TIID booster vehicle is a three-stage booster consisting of the standard liquid core for Stages I and II plus two solid rocket motors (SRMs) as Stage 0. Each SRM is 10 feet in diameter and 85 feet long. It consists of five identical interchangeable segments, a sixdegree canted nozzle, a gas generator type igniter, staging rockets. and an externally mountt>rl thrust vector control (TVC) injectant tank. The TVC provides steering during Stage 0 burn by injecting nitrogen tetroxide (N2o ) through 24 proportional valves around the SRM nozzle. Jettison is provided by pyrotechnic separation 4of the interconnecting structure between each SRM and the Titan core vehicle, followed by ignition of four solid staging rockets at each end of each SRM. Stage I liquid core is 10 feet in diameter and 71. 5 feet long. It is aluminum skin-stringer construction with propellant tanks arranged in tandem. The two turbo pump feed Aerojet LR87-AJ-ll engines burn a 50-50 blend of hydrazine/UDMH (Aerozine) as the fuel and nitrogen textroxide as the oxidizer. Each engine subassembly contains a regeneratively cooled gimballed thrust chamber combined with an ablative skirt extension giving a 15:1 expansion ratio. The stage II propulsion system is similar to that of Stage I. It is also 10 ft in diameter but only 31 feet long. The single engine thrust chamber is also regeneratively cooled and has an ablative skirt extension that provides (/) an overall expansion ratio of 49:1. m 0 0 ~ The flight control system stabilizes the vehicle from launch to SV separation in response to (1) attitude data, z :;:;: (2) rate data, (3) command data -issued by flight control computer and/or the radio guidance system via ground tracking station. Electrical power for the flight control system, instrumentation. is provided via silver-zinc primary batteries. TAP C::l=f"D I=TJI..I (/) -< (/) ~ m flight safety, and electrical sequencing systcm 3: (/) 0 )> ~ !!:! BIF003VV/2-093942-77 r 3 m (/) CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ...... TOP «;~l'"D ~T/H OPERATIONAL EVENTS The major operational events are launch, orbit maintenance/payload operations, and RV recovery/SV deboost. Sequence of launch events: 0. 0 sec 0.2 40.0 54.0 113.9 125.3 262.0 262.7 276.0 460,6 472.6 SRM Ignition Lift-off Transonic passage Maximum dynamic pressure Core I start burn SRM separation Core I shutdown and Core II start burn Core I separation Shroud separation Core II shutdown Core II separation (injection) The solar arrays are deployed after SV stabilization on Rev 1 with payload operations starting on Rev 5. Orbit adjusts to correct period, altitude and perigee location occur every two to four days. All control of en the SV and telemetry data is processed through the Air Force Satellite Control Facilities and associated m remote tracking stations. The SV is pitched down to a specified angle for each RV ejection. after the last RV is ejected. TAP C:~l"'P ~T/H 14 C') -t 0 z :? The SV is deboosted for ocean impact en -< en -t m 3: en C') > ~ lXI BIF003VV/2-093942-77 j= ::::j n; en w ~ 0) w ~ -.j Q H ~ H ~ TAP <:rl"'PI=T l H OPERATIONAL EVENTS ~ 0 c:: (I) (I) l.oJ a H SV SEPARATION ~ t< CORE n BURY ~ • ...., SHROUD EJECT SENSOR t.. rl OPERATIO... . a ,., SOLAR ·~ -~~-ARRAY ~ -~ DEPLOY CORE I r8URN TITAIIIIO SRM BURNOUT ~ e JETTISON \ CORE 1 ENTRY ~ ., \ \ \ \ \ ' ' ' ' ' ' I I ' I \ \ \ \ \ ' \ ' I I ' I I I• ~ · ORBIT ~.41 ADJUST COMMAND AND CONTROl ~...... t <: I I ' I I I I I ' I ' ' ~ RECOVERY \ \ \ \ \ .l fi DE BOOST ~ i5 iH ~ ~ i5 ~ !2: e l.oJ 1:"' 1:"' H ~ ~ 0 ~ (I) (I) !!;; Q (I) t< (I) ~ B 1111'11::\\:. ll(l:l!ll:: 7. TAP <;rrP fT/ H 1. I 0 8 ~ H !i TOP SECRET/1-t USAF TRACKING NETWORK The Sunnyvale Satellite Test Center (STC), part of the SAMSO Satellite Control Facilities, is organized to provide operational control of on-orbit satellites and does this function for project HEXAGON. The center directs the tracking and commanding of these satellites through a net of remote tracking stations (RTS). The STC also coordinates the aerial and surface recovery operations for reentry vehicles (RV). Launch activities are a coordinated effort between the Vandenberg AFB Test Wing and the STC. Servicing the HEXAGON vehicle requires skin and beacon tracking, recording and displaying telemetry data. and com manding that often needs more than one RTS each revolution. Because the STC supports several programs, the Mission Control Center (MCC) within the STC is used to direct the effort of each tracking station in support of each program. The SV real time telemetry data incoming to the RTS are processed and displayed in real time via 1200 bit lines or relay satel lites to the STC. The SV real time and recorded data are recorded at the RTS for later playback to the STC. Complete RTS recorded tapes are flown to the STC as permanent records. Display and analysis of these data provides SV health and status information to the Technical Advisor (TA) staff on a continuous basis throughout the mission. TheTA staff, located at the STC, includes operational specialist teams for each major contractor. The remote tracking stations acronyms and locations are as follows: • Vandenberg Tracking Station (VTS) or COOK at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California • Guam Tracking Station (GTS) or GUAM on Guam Island en m • Hawaii Tracking Station (HTS) or HULA at Kaeha Point on the island of Oahu 0 • Indian Ocean Station (lOS) or INDI in Seychelles Island group on Mahe' Island 0 ~ z • New Hampshrre Station (NHS) or BOSS near New Boston. New Hampshire :t; • Thule Tracking Station (TTS) or POGO at Thule Air Force Base, Greenland en -< en ~ m 3:: en 0 )> ~ lG TOP SfCRfT/H BIF003W/2-093942-77 ~ r ::j ;;; en VJ -'=' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM I• - I ,_ -J J· I .... TOP SfC~FT/H HEXAGON INTELLIGENCE TASKING LOOP REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS 8l§lu< :::l <0.. ... .., ____J.___JL__L.......__ READOUT soc (NRO) I• FILM PROCESSING COMMUNICATION STC OTHER PROGRAMS WEATHER INFORMATION Bff'OO:IW :.! flfl:l!J I.! ', 7 fl) m 0 -t 0 z :? fl) -< ~ m 31: fl) 0 )> ~ IJJ r= =i ffi fl) (,.) CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TnP c;r::rD "/H SEARCH/SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS The search/surveillance cameras provide high-resolution stereoscopic coverage of selected areas on the earth's surface by using two independently controllable panoramic cameras. The system pro\ ides a target resolution of 2. 7 ft or better at nadir when operating at primary mission orbital altitudes with an apparent target contrast of 2:1, sun angles greater than 30 degrees and using *S0-208 film. The search/sun·eillanee system has been designed with the following characteristics: Optics Film Film Load Film Resolution (2:1 Contrast) Field Angle Scan Modes Center of Scan Maximum Scan Angle Stereo Convergence Angle Frame format (120 degree scan) Film Velocity Image Motion Compensation Range Weight (less film) 60-in. focal length, f/3 Folded Wright (Modified Schmidt) System 6. 6-in. wide film-Type 1414 or S0-208 (B & W), 80255 (Color), and S0130 (Infrared) 123,000 ft Type 1414 or 144,000 ft S0-208 per camera (1950 lb total) Center of format o93942-77 ~ !!! r =i iii C/1 w CJl "' w w 0 lid .... toil .... ~ toil TOP SECRET/H 0 en en SEARCH/ SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS c: I.IJ a .... ~ toil C) I I FILM SUPPLY STACKS .... Z LOOPERS toil 3 TWO-CAMERA ASSEMBLY I ~ 4 ARTICULATORS 5 FILM TAKE-UP ASSEMBLIES 2 o S/5 ELECTRONICS ~ ~ ~ .... toil 1.111 ~ 0 ~ en ~ l'll en t< en 8 0 I BIF003VV/ 2-093942-77 TAP 22 TOP «;Fl"D FT/H BIF003W/2-093942-77 ~ til j= ~ m en w l> CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 1./') ~ 4 co a. co ::::: -' 4 1./') -' ~ ~ M I V) IJ.J > oc: V) w I z 0... 0 V) ~ V'l -' 0 Oj CQ 4 co N z 0 1 0 0 N UJ V) UJ w <: UJ oc: tn u tr\ :I: < ~ VI 0 oc: w u z ..... u < u I• o."l "1' .:: ~. TAP Cl=f'D I=T/H SYSTEM FILM PATH The coarse film transport includes all components that operate at nominally constant speed during photography and recycle, as well as the looper carriage whlch operates at the recycle frequency. The supply and take-up control system maintains a steady flow of film into and out of the loopers at pre cisely the average rate at which film moves through the platen. The loopers serve as an interface be tween the coarse and fine film transport system. Total film in the loop<·r is e.:onstant but relative lengths in supply and take-up sides vary with looper carriage position. The control of film tracking is by active and passive articulators. The film path of the forward camera functionally includes component assemblies in the following order: a. Supply "B" g. Platen m. Take-up 4 b. Seal Door/Exit Vestibule h. Metering Capstan n. Articulator c. Articulator Steerer i. Output Drive Capstan o. Takeup 3 d. Looper j. Crossover p. Articulator e. Crossover k. Looper q. Takeup 2 f. Input Drive Capstan I. Articulator Steerer r. Articulator s. Takeup 1 en m (") The film supply spools rotate in opposite directions, and the re:::pective take-up spools rotate opposite to -1 5 the supply spools in order to reduce vehicle torques. The start-up disturbances are minimized by z :;;;: accelerating the film path to the required coarse velocity before photographic operations are begun. en -< en -1 m s: en (") )> ~ 24 TOP SECR Ef/H BIF003VV/2-093942-77 !!! r 3 m en VJ (}I 0> CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP SECRET/H OPTICAL BAR ASSEMBLY The two cameras mounted in a frame make up a two-camera assembly with each camera having a folder! Wright optical system mounted in a rotating optical bar. Structurally the bar consists of two rigid end bulkheads separated by a cylindrical tube with housings and hollow shafts at each end on which bearings are mounted. The platen end bulkhead is the memb~r to which the optical components are referenced. The optics consist of the corrector plate as the aperture, a folding flat mirror, a concave primary mirror and a field group of refracting elements and a filter. The optics wavefront errors spec values are shown as a fraction of the wavelength. All values are root mean square (RMS). 00 m (") -1 0 z :;; 00 -< 00 -1 m 3: 00 (") )> TnP C:l=f"D I=T/I.l ~ 26 BIF003W/2-093942-77 03 r= ~ ffi 00 w ()'1 VJ 0'1 (0 n :;.3 H 1-i TAP C::Fl"'R FT/~ H 1-i 0 d OPTICAL BAR ASSEMBLY ~ en en l'l n ~ H 1-i .. ~ 1-i :t: l'l ~ H 1-i ~ £5 ~ · ~s· E.~MENT } EACH ~ SECOND flE'-4E:N. ,. SURFACE "' l"ltRO I:I..E'-lE' 7"; ~nP t;FCR FT/H H '' I i TOP SECRET!H OPTICAL PATH The optics for each camera are mounted in an optical bar (OB). The system is a f/3 folded Wright. The aperture is formed by an aspheric corrector plate that corrects for spherical aberration. Light entering the aperture is folded 90° by the folding flat and reflected onto the primary mirror at the far end of the OB. The primary mirror focuses the light back through the field group mounted in a center bole in the folding flat. The field group includes four refracting elements and a filter. The refracting elements provide correction for the field curvature and residual chromatic aberration characteristics of optical systems using a concave primary mirror. CJJ m (') -1 0 z :-; CJJ -< CJJ -1 m 3: CJJ ~ 28 TOP SECREVH BIF003VV/2-093942-77 ~ ~ r :::j ffi CJJ (.,.) 0) CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP SECRET/H PLATEN AND FILM DRIVE The platen is mounted at the focal plane end of the optical bar (OB). The platen assembly is mounted un the OB's Inner housing tu support the film in the camera focal plane, and to rotate on its own bearings independently of the OB. While the OB is rotating continu ously on its end bearings, the platen assembly is free to oscillate through its 130-degree operational arc. The fine film drive assembly encloses the outer end of the platen assem bly and is stationary. A twister assembly, included in the fine film drive assembly, accom modates the twisting of the film path at the interface between the stationary film drive assembly and the oscillating platen assembly. The twister assembly consists of a twin air-bar assembly and a housing that incorporates a manifold through which nitrogen gas is supplied to the bars. The use of air bars in the twister, rather than rollers, permits the film to translate along the length of the bars without damage as the film path twists. en m 0 -1 0 z :r;: en - ~ 30 TAP ca:rD I=TM BIF003W/2-093942-77 lXI j= 3 m en VJ 0) N CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM z ~ _J _J t-- c;.,:_J a en ~ ,_l 'I TOP SECRET/H PNEUMA TICS SYSTEM Dry nitrogen gas is supplied to the film path alr bars at specified flow rates and pressures. Air bars are located in the twister, TCA cross-over, and the supply cross-overs. These bars are D-shaped in cross-section and hollow with small holes in their curved portion through which nitrogen is forced by the pneumatic system. This provides a practically frictionless bearing for the film, permitting both lateral film movement and film transport across the bar. The nitrogen supply is two spherical tanks with a combined storage capacity of 68 pounds of which 62 pounds are usable. Pressure enclosures seal the entire film path including the film supply and the take-ups, maintaining the required relative humidity for film moisture content stabilization. The film path gaseous environment includes the 50 pounds of water in the film as outgassing water vapor plus the 62 pounds of nitrogen coming through the orifices of the gas bars. During non-operating periods the film supply unit is isolated from the rest of the film path by a commandable seal door to minimize leakage and moisture loss. In test and during ascent the sealed film path accommodates atmospheric pressure changes through relief and pres surizing valves. When film is being transported, a lower pressure relief setting in the film path compared to that in the supply allows a system pressure bleed-off through vents on the forward steerer enclosure. The pneumatics supply module is a self-contained unit consisting of high pressure storage spheres, regulators, and valves. The system is designed with individual paths from a supply sphere to a camera with cross-overs at the high 32 pressure and low pressure portions of the system. The high pressure cross-over valve between the nitrogen tanks is normally closed. It is used to transfer gas from one tank to the other. To isolate a flow path, on external command or in response to a feedback signal of over-pressure downstream of the regulator, a solenoid latching valve in the high pressure portion is closed. Normally, a uniform simultaneous flow through both sides Is maintained by the open low pressure cross-over valve, which is C(lmmanded closed only because of any failure requiring isolation. The shut-off valves in the low pressure paths are commandable, controlling on/off requirements of gas flow. TAP ca:rD I=T/H BIF003VV/2-093942-77 (I) m 0 -1 5 z :;;: ~ (I) -1 m 3: (I) 0 )> ~ OJ ;= =4 iii (I) w ~ w (j) n ~ H H TAE) ca:ro E~jH ~ 0 ~ d PNEUMATICS SYSTEM ~ en en LJ.I a •Uil"f"""f'r.-: t• •U ::: •tl'f t r•r """' : •1' .. .,. .. .... H .. .,. ... ,..:"' ~ •n•• \ I< l! .. ,..,,. .. / ' " { ...., ...... ~ ,_., <-C <'" ••<•K.<•U \ \ i5 'f' 1\ Jl.&l t;P.o •• . I ,_ ; -. ······" " I ,' ,, ......... ,t' .•. .• H ../ ... .... ~ f .,_ '\ ... . . "'t' "A '-•··· ,..,....... .~~ ................ , l " ,..,.,':., •• ....... _ ,,. • '•"' ••1 •• ,.. ·~4 '·''~''' ~ ·~-" "" Flltl PATH VENTII'JG SCHEMATIC PNEuMA TICS SUPPLY MODULE I 2: en !!; LJ.I ~ H ~ LJ.I n ~ en en I ~ t n LJ.I en I< (_0 REENTRY VEHICLES @) SUPPLY VENT VA~VE" en '2 PNfLMAT IC SUPPLY MODUlE tV PRESSU~IZ r-JG '.'AL\IE ~ \,, ) B PRESSUR17ED RlGIOtJS-SHADED 'jl AIR BM PAif~S (Z) SUPPLY SEAL DOOR n ·4·-, FlUI, PATH VENT VALVf S 8 ~ I. HII \)P::\\" ~ ll,t; l :t 1.! TOP <;~C~I=T/H ' . ... I !i H TOP ~I=CDI=T/H LARGE LOOPER The accompanying illustration shows a Two Camera Assembly (TCA) incorporating the large looper which will become operational with SV-17. The increased film capacity (45 feet versus the 13 feet on the original design) enables the platen to be fed film at the desired rate during the time the coarse transport system is accelerating and to be stopped while the coarse film transport system is decelerating. Film management is greatly simplified since all the film is used in sequence. The present delay in the start of photography until the coarse film transport has accelerated to the average rate and the rewind of unexposed film passed through the platen is eliminated. This removes rewind as a possible source of contamination or as a wastage of film when rewind could not be accomplished between nested operations. Because this major change is being accom plished in-line, full provisions are retained to operate the coarse transport system ln the original mode. en m 0 ..... 0 z :;; en - ~ !!! r =i iii en w m m CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM I ·-\ , TnP «;J:t"D J:T/H MARK 8 REENTRY VEHICLE 'When the take-ups in the RV are filled, the next in-line RV is enabled and the full RV is ejected from the optimized pitched down SV at a 3 ft/second rate. The spin-up to 10 radians per second is accomplished via hot gas generator to stabilize the RV during the retro rocket motor burn. The retro rocket provides a 1623 pound thrust to slow the RV for reentry. The despin system then slows the spin rate to 1. 4 radians per second, which provides the needed stability during the coast period and still permits the aerodynamic torques to align the RV angle-of-attack with the flight path early in the reentry period. The drogue parachute is de ployed upon closure of an acceleration switch at approximately 60,000 ft altitude. The drogue parachute is released and main parachute deployed upon closure of a barometric pressure switch at about 50.000 feet. At 15,000 feet, the rate of descent is from 1200 to 1650 feet per minute, which is suitable for aerial recovery by USAF JC130 aircraft. Each RV has a base diameter of 57-1/2 inches and is 85 inches from the heatshield nose to the retro motor nozzle. Maximum total weight of the RV and film is 1695 pounds. This consists of 956 pounds of RV and equipment, 239 pounds for film take-ups, and 500 pounds of film. The heatshield when removed shows the gold tape covered canister which is part of a passive on-orbit thermal control system which, together with electrical heaters, maintains the desired canister temperature. The f/) propulsion truss assembly and SV attachment fittings are shown. m (") -1 0 z :? ~ f/) -1 m 31: f/) (") )> 36 TOP SECRET/H BIF003VV/2-093942-77 ~ IJJ F ~ ;;; f/) w m co CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM I• _j L&.l 0 -I w I u Vl 1 -. I w ~ :::) ::1: 1- I 1- LLI 0 > > 3 >-0! :I: ~ t z w L.U ~ a:J w 1 u zz w w ~ :::> > a a.. w cc UJ V> :::> >-z I V1 0 u ~ w CY · ~ :'>I t:. :.'I ~ ? ...:.., !!: · TOP SECRET/H DATA RECOVERY OPERATIONS The target cone is 10 feet in diameter and 15 feet high. It contains the nylon load lines which are engaged by hooks on the retrieval line loops deployed by the retrieval aircraft. The minimum dispersal impact area applies to all normal film load with the maximum dispersal area applicable to a maximum unbalanced film load. In an emergency, recoveries may be required outside this designated area toward Midway Island or the California Coast. If aerial retrieval is not accomplished, water recovery becomes a backup phase. When sea water contacts a sensor, a relay closes the film canister vent valve and transfers vehicle power to the water recovery beacon. A salt water corrosion plug will sink the recovery capsule in 48 to 60 hours after water impact. This allows a reasonable time for location and pickup by Air Force and Navy forces. If the RV significantly overshoots the specified impact point, it will be destroyed. This is accomplished by ejecting the heatshield and deploying the drogue chute if aero drag has not produced 0. 003 g by a given time after RV separation. This results ln the RV burning up when the atmosphere is encountered. This provision has not been utilized on the HEXAGON program to date. en m () .... 0 z :;;: en -< en .... m 3!: en () )lo :38 TOP c;~("D~T/H ~ BIF003VV/2-093942-77 ttl r= ~ m en w -..J w -....j ..... n ~ H to,) H TAP <;I=C"D I=T/H ~ 0 c: en DATA to,) Cll l."l n ~ H "i t< .. "i i = l."l H to,) ~ gj ~ Cll e; l."l f:l f:l H to,) l."l ~ n ~ H Cll Cll 7 !Jt ;---_ 1 f c-'\ HA\'IAIIA"l ISlAND ~ l."l ~ • -t.___ ,__ -.. .. w 25' N )~-I ' ~~~ "-Q a I "--GROUND Cll ,__ :::J l6;j 'VIlA . TRACE • t< 4: -:>c·· N ,_ r----;;-i Cll ''-MI"JIMLM 16 X 150 '·"' \_MAX IMUM 32 ~ JOO '"/.' n 15., N i 1 6Cf'J •'~ ;c" '·. l."l ~ BIFOOJVV/2-093942-77 TOP S~CRET/H LO" 40 TAP <:~rDI=T/H 'F003VV/2 -093942-77 ~ C:J j= :::j m C/) w "' w w (") ::0 H 8 H 8 0 c:: ARK 8 RV EQUIP ENT I ~ I Ul Ul 1:':1 (") ~ H 8 ARTICI.A.ATOR >< .. OUTLET--INL£T 8 :I: 1:':1 ARTICULATORFILM CHUTE • . ., SUPPORT ~ ~ CUnER/SEALU I L~§:;:z ~.._,If SBA H ASSEMil y .!-..-r · · . 1/1l J 8 ~ :I: 1:':1 ~ 8 z Ul > 8 1:':1 1:"' 1:"' H 8 1:':1 ~ (") ~ H Ul Ul t (") 1:':1 Ul >< 8 Ul (") ·\\ Ul ~ ~ 1:':1 ~ i H SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES 374 w ....., (J1 &1 H ~ TOP SECRET/H ~ ~ SEARCH/SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS c: C/) C/) 1.".1 ~ ~ t< Scanning is accomplished by continuous rotation of the optical bars at a rate to produce a nominal ~ three percent frame-to-frame overlap allowance at nadir. The minimum scan sector is 30 degrees, m the maximum 120 degrees. To achieve stereoscopic coverage the port camera (camera-A) looks i forward 10 degrees and the starboard camera (camera-B) looks aft 10 degrees. At 88 nm altitude the H interval of the forward to the aft frame is 31 nm. Since camera-B lags camera-A with respect to ~ ground cover at nadir, the shutter of camera-B is inhibited for the first three frames and camera-A ~ for the last three frames of each operation. Either camera can be operated separately in a mono mode. m ~ :z: The ground format varies with altitude, scan sector, and scan center. With the optical bars counter rotating the ground formats for the two camera are not the same. The area of coverage per mission ~ 1:" 1:" also varies with the average scan sector of acquisitions. At ±45 degrees average scan with the maxiH mum supply of 1414 black and white film. gross sttlrEW coverage of 20 million square nautical miles ~ (M sq. nm) can be achieved at an average acquisition altitude of 88 nm with the current film transport [:1 n system. At an average scan of ±30 degrees, this coverage would be reduced to 16 M sq. nm. ~ H C/) s C/) t< i C/) 44 I TOP SECRET/H BIF003VV/2-093942-77 i H TOP SECREf/H SE RCH/SURVEILL l-~ ;;A. c~·~~as j 31 NM 322 NM -----' ··r j F:A~_/ liNE OF FLIGHT BIF003VV/2-093945-77 TOP SECRET/H OBJECTIVES • CONTINUOUS SEARCH PAYlOAD DATA • STEREO PANORAMIC CAMERA -60-INCH FOCAl LENGTH -246,000 FT -6.6 INCH UTB FILM ~ FORMAT-VARIABLE en - COVERAGE -20M SQ NM/MISSION STEREO m (") -RESOLUTION-2.1 TO 7.5 FEET GRD -1 I NADIR TO 60 DEGREES I 0 • FO\Jt RECOVERY VEHICLES z -FOR PANORAMIC CAMERAS :;;;: ORBITAL DATA • INCLINATION-q6.4 DEGREES SUN-SYNCHRONOUS en • AVERAGE PERIGEE -88 NM -< en • AVERAGE APOGEE -155 NM • MISSION LifE -UP TO I80 DAYS m -1 3: en (") > ~ ,., aJ r= ::::j ;;; en w ....... 0> (JJ ---1 ---1 n :a:! 1-1 ~ TOP SECRET/H ~ ~ T HE CAPITOL c:: en f{l e Conditions for this photograph are: Mission 1212-3, op 723, frame 002 forward, 002 aft, -24° scan. ~ 15 October 1976, stereo, 20X magnification of the Capital, W:1shington, D. C. a The ability of the HEXAGON camera to photograph targets in stereo greatly increase its capability as an intelligence gathering toot. All subjects re,·eal more information in thr ee dimensions because they I 1-1 ~ assume all the spatial dim ension we are used to seeing. This allows determination of structure height, seeing the real shape of unusual objects and separation of items from confus ing backgr ound. I ~ The item at (A) is the press box for the last presidential inauguration. It was still under construction. The relief of the trees at (B) s hows how cover for troops and vehicles can be interpreted and targets located. ~ During the time between exposures, vehicles (C) moved to new locations. The scale of the photograph ~ 1-1 and time interval are known so thei r speed can be calculated. ~ ~ n stereo imagery generally increases the information content of a target area a nd provides for a more complete and accura te intelligence reporting. ~ 1-1 en s en i ~ en 4!:1 TAP cr;:rD r;:T/H BIF00:3W/2-09:!942 -77 I 1-1 TOP SECRETIH PANORAMIC SYSTEM FLEXIBILITY HEXAGON has considerable flexibility in area search because of the selecta.billty of scan sectors, scan centers, mono/stereo modes, n.nd the num~er of frames for contiguous u.rea acquisition. Using the United States as a fam111ar target objective, the four operations shown i n the accompany Ing 111ustration range from a ±30 degree scan sector with 6 frames totaling 5300 sq nm mono to a :t:60 degree scan sector with 18 frames totaling 51,680 sq nm mono. The ex:ample illustrates acqui sitions along the flight path and on either side of it in a variety of modes. all during a single orbit rev. Acquisitions could be either mono or stereo operations. Data return at Hawaii is available in from this particular pass if timeliness is a factor. In its capabtltty to perform world-wide search, data return of any acquisition is achievable within a one-day period. en m 0 -f s z :;; en -< ~ m 3: en 0 > 50 TOP ~EERETIH B1F003VV/2-093942-77 ~ OJ j= :::::j ffi en w -...! (X) VJ ...,. tO &} H ~ £TIH SY,STE ~ 0 c: {/) FLEXIBILITY ~ {/) t'.1 (') !a H ~ .-< ~ gj i H ~ s ~ 30, 60, 90, 120 gj DECREES AT FULL SCA ~ • CENTEP OF SCAN 0, :t:15, :t:30, :45 {/) ~ DEGREES 1:"1 t"' t"' H ~ COt..rTIGUOUS AREA ~ ACQUISI TIONS (') ~ > H {/) {/) ~ 1:"1 {/) .-< {/) ~ ~ (') ~ ~ H i co 'I ~ GUOUS IDE RE COVERAG IDENTIF ICATI O N (''A " ONLY) l4 31.4" =30° SCAN (MIN) .... LE MARK S VAN DENBER G AF B I • • en m • 0 • -i • 0 TIMING DOTS z EVERY 2 MILLI:;;: SECONDS • en -< en -i m 3: en ONCE PER fRAME} 0 )> ~ BJFOO:lW 2-09:l!J42 -77 ~ r :::j iii en w CXl c.u CX> "JAP co TJGUOUS n lid H 1-i ~IWFiliUTIH H ~ 1-i d {I) R COVERAGE 0 {I) 1.1.1 ~ H 1-i t< .. 1-i l5 I H 1-i I ~ ~ ~ H ~ VANDENBERG AF B !HEXAGON LAUNCH SITE ON RIGHT) n ~ VIA M I SSION 1209-1 AT 40 TIMES fv\AGN IF ICAT ION ~ {I) {I) THE KEY UNIQUE FEATURE OF HEXAGON IS ITS ABILITY TO CAPTURE LARGE AREAS ON FILM ~ 1.1.1 WITHIN A H:: \1 MINUf~~. A "FR EE ZING" OF THE ENTIRE AREA AlLONS FOR IDENTIFICATION {I) t< AND ENLARGEMENT OF ANY POINT OF POSSIB LE INTEREST AS ILLUSTRATED A BOVE . THIS {I) IS A VALUABU CAPABILITY WHEN CONDUCTING SEARCH FOR SPEC IFIC 1A.RGETS OF i UNCERTA IN LOCATIONS. I HI Fofi:IW:'~-tl!):i!l·l:.!-;; TOP SECREf/H ;; "I I i H TnP c;r:cD r:TIH MID EAST COVERAGE A typical area search acquisition by HEXAGON is the coverage of the Eastern Mediterranean. This is a single two-minute ster eo operation. At 90 nm altitude and a cross track scan of ±45 degrees, the primary areas of interest in Western Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Western Jorda n, part of the Sinai Peninsula, and part of Cyprus are acquired as a contiguous area. At :1:60 degrees scan, the additional width permits a gr eater tolerance in the longitudinal position of the flight path in addition to a wider area searc hed. In an extreme crisis, through the control of the orbit, a daily report of the acquisitlon of these areas is achievable. en m 0 -1 0 z :;;: en -< en -1 m 31: en 0 )It ~ 54 TOP SECRET/H BIF003W/2-093942-77 Ill ;= 3 m en w CXl N c:.v (X) c:.v 0 !XI H ti H ti 0 c:: JD EAST COVERAGE ~ tn tn l.liJ 0 ~ H ti t< .. I I I g) ti I I ±~SCANAT 90 NM I I I ; H ti I ±60° SCAN AT 90 NM ....J' 34° I I I ~ I I g)I I I I ME DI TERRANEAN SEA 1 ~ I I I tn I • ~ I t"'l I t"'l I I H ti I l.liJ I I I ~ I 0 I I I I H ~ I tn I tn I I I ~ I l.liJ I I tn I t< I , I 30° N • I tn ,' CAIR O I 0 320 I H I TOP SECREl/ H ,,.. i - TAP c:s:rDr:T/H BROAD AREA ACQUISITION 56 w co ~ The HEXAGON system can provide broad area acquisition with a contiguous area acquisition of considerablE: magnitude along the line of flight using any of the selectable scan sector and scan center comhinations. The maximu m 120 degree "'wath width is illustrated [or a 20 minute contiguous operation acquir ing a 4 800 nm long area, 322 nm wide, extending from Western Russia, through the Eastern Mediterranean. down into Southern Africa. The total a r ea approximates 1. 54 M sq nm with an average altitude of 88 nm. C/) m (") -t i5 z :;; C/) ~ -t m s: C/) (") )> ~ TOP «;I=CD r:T/1..4 aJ BIF003VV/2-093942-77 ;::: ::::j ffi C/) w (X) BROAD AREA CQUISITION • .t 6r1" SCAN SECTOR • 20 MINUTE CONTIGUOUS ACQUISITION ALONG LI NE OF FLIGHT SHOWN • THE AREA COVER ON THIS PASS IS AMOX 1.54 M SQ NM AT 88 NM BI FUO:l \\' '~-o:,::~ll:!-77 TOP SECREVH COVERAGE ACHIEVEMENTS The magnitude of the total world-wide imagery accomplished by HEXAGON can be compart:d with a familiar geographic area equivalent. As examples, the c loud-free total worldwide imagery of the fourth mission is equivalent to sixty acquisitions of Texas, or mission three equivalent to eight t i mes the United States. The total are.1 of Communist and free-world Is 52.2 million square nautical miles which could be covered within two to three missions. The re::luced coverage on mission 1201 was due to the loss of RV-3. The percent of cloud-free acquisitions are dependent on several factors. The geographic locations of selected targets, the time of year. the time of day, a nd satellite weather inforrn.'ltion determine basic weather expectancy. The probability of c loud-free acquisitions is improved by longer missions, permitting more selectivity of operations within longer intervals of time between RV returns. The need to acquire cer tain high priority targets on every access reduces the probability of cloud-free acquisitions. The cloud-free unique imagery from mission 1212 consis ted of: USSR -square nautical miles, Eastern Europe..Ch in.::1...other. and Middle East-Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel) for .1 total of-square nautical miles. The unique CO:\f1REX targets shown in the table for each mission were read out by NPIC out of a total en m COMIREX target pt)pulation that has ranged from about () in the earlier missions to about -on -1 0the most recent missions. z :;;: en -< en -1 m 3: en () )> 58 TOP S~CRFT/H ~ BIF003VV/2 -093942-77 IJJ ;= =i m en VJ 0> 0) w CXl -...! COVERAGE ACH 'IEVEMENTS MISSION i ".....,........ -•• '"''" . t-_ . AND MIDDLE E'AS-T NUMBf~ r---:,..,.,. .. , [ PE.RCENT . --... ,..,.~ ..-. ---1----,.. ,nlt"r:ru~e I UNIQU~ COMtRf.X I TARGETS IMAGED 1201 15.9 11.2 1202 21. 1 16.1 1203 26.4 22.5 1204 18.8 U.2 • 1205 17. 5 1?.7 1206 18.9 • 15., 1207 18.0 13.,9 1208 16.6 13.0 1209 18.6 14.1 1210 17.4 13.6 1211 ?.3 .1 17.6 1212 17.9 12.6 1213 14.2 (1) (1) THROUGH RV 13 IH (') ~ H t-3 H ~ I c t-3 0 en en tzJ (') !a H t-3 ..; .. t-3 :X: II tzJ ~ H t-3 ~ :X: tzJ ~ z en :a>' t-3 tzJ t"' t"' H t-3 tzJ ~ (') ~ H en en I ~ (') tzJ J en I I ..; en t-3 ~ en (') ~ tzJ ~ !59 I H ~ TOP SEERET/H SEARCH GLOBAL COVERAGE This is a representative coverage of the Europe, Asia, and surrounding countries. The enclosed block or cell areas taken but not cloud-free are also shown. High priority targets were taken several times to ensure a cloud-free take and to note grOWld activity changes throughout the four-month life of Mission 1209. These geographic areas of interes t total 10. 9 million square nautical mi.les and consist of: USSR 6. 87, Easter n Europe 0. 4, China 2. 82, other Communist countries 0. 56, a nd Middle East 0. 25. The free-world a r ea, including the United states, comprises a total of 41.3 million square nautical miles. en m C') -1 0 z :c; en -< en -1 m 3: en C') )> 60 TnP «;l=l"~I=T/H ~ BIF003VV/2-093942 -77 Ill r= 3 m en w OJ OJ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM :I: u C! <( w en TOP SECRETIH COVERAGE HISTORY The initial contract for HEXAGON was to fly each vehicle for thirty days every 60 days for a 50% search coverage. The highly successful on-orbit perform.mce, higher altitude, and design improvements of HEXAGON has allowed longer mission durations. This has resulted in extending search and surveillance operations up to 176 days. The gap in continuity (RV #4 recovery to next vehicle launch) of HEXAGON coverage has varied widely. These gaps for the 13 flights to date have ranged from a low of 39 days to a high of more than 200 days. Under the accomplished schedule of the 13 launches, operational coverage with the acquisition and subsequent return of imager y data \\.'aS available approximately half the time. C/) m 0 -1 0 z :;;: C/) ~ -1 m iii: C/) ~ BIF003\V/2-093942-77 ~ Ill r= :::j iii C/) TOP ~Fr~FT~ 62 w -M r:; ~ ~ ~ t:2 ~ Cf) ~ N "() -.... :c: I ... :r: ., ..... ~ ~ (.!) ~ N LLI 0 ~ u ~ - ~ - TAP c;t=rD I=T/H INCREASING -DURATION BETWEEN RECOVERIES Since the first launch on 15 June 1971 the int'reasing mission life (from 12 to 176 days) has resulted in an increasing number of operating days between recm·eries. Starting with a low of 5 days, it has increased to intervals of 36, 34, 60, and 46 days on the thirteenth flight. On each of 11 fl1gh.ts, the shortest operatin~ days per R\' preceded the recovery of HV-1. On each of eight flights the longest time period prf>cf'ded RV-4 recovery. Future incr eases in mission life to utilize the potential of the SV will pro~lucc on the average as many as 60 d.l.ys of operations preceding the recovery of each RV. Under crisis condition it is ::>ss ible t o make a non-full R\' recovery after the c r itical target is photographed; however, this option has not been selected to date. Solo operation~; have been used to exploit the S\' capabilities without risk to RV recovery. Solo tests have been instrumental in successfully increasing mission durations. (/) m 0 -t 0 z :<; (/) -< (/) -t m 3: (/) 0 )> ~ TAP C:t=rDJ:TIH aJ 64 BIF003'W/2-093~42-77 r= =i iii (/) w tO N (....) <0 (....) I MIS SIO N 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 l:! Q H 1-i ~ ~ d ASI·NG DURATIO BET E ECO RIES en en l.o:l a DAYS H I 1-i 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 t< i5 ·\ \ g H ' j v "'L 1-i ' \ "'' \ ~~ 1-i ~ \ "t'\. ~ ~ i \ " \ -~ SO LO ~ 1:"'I '\ 1\. 1:"' l \~ \ \ ~ H ~ ~ \ ~ ~ I'- "' ~ 0 I I \ / e= \ v J en ~ ........ ""/ ~~ ------t---I t- r"'------~ i t< RV-1 "' ~ ~ RV-2 \ > RV-3 ~~ RV -4 ~ en .1 TIMf RV-1 ~TIME RV -2 .l TIME RV -3 60 DAYS A TIME RV-4 36 DAYS 34 DAYS MAXIMUM TO DATE 46 DAYS r:p-;; . --. IH ,TOP SFCR~l !i TOP SECRET/H S0-255 COLOR FILM Conditions for this photo are: Mission 1208-4, magnification of San Francisco, California. OP 733 , Frame 006 , Aft, Scan Angle -2°, 15 July 1974, 40X Color photography contributes an additional dimension to search and surveillance photography. It removes the image from the abstraction of black-and-white and places it in a context we understand more readily. We see the world as a collection of shapes with size, texture, one element in relation to reality. and color. A photograph lacking color is lacking This scene is photographed in natural color and many items are readily identifiable because of color cues. The school buses at (A) could be interpreted a s such in blackand-white by their proximity to the s chool complex. However, the distinctive yellow hue that we associate with school buses signals their use immediately. The blue color traditionally found in swimming pools is easily located in several residential areas (B). Black and white coverage would require a detailed search because their geometr ic shapes would be los t among th e buildings. The competition pool at (C) shows varying depth by the transition from lighter to darker blue as the water deepens. This same signature is seen at (D) indicating an expensive. in-ground pool. Numerous other items will be apparent to the viewer because of its association with object color in everyday experience. Military, industrial, a nd transportation items al so have distinctive color coding signatures and are separated fr om the enormous amount of photo detail in the same manner as the item s cited above. (/) m C') -1 0 z :;;: ~ GG TOP <;~l"D~T/H BlF003VV/2-093942 -77 ~ m 3: (/) C') ):o ~ ID r= ::::j ffi (/) c..:> <.0 """ w tO 0'1 TOP SECRETIH S0-130 INFRARED COLOR FILM Conditions for this photo are: Mission 1213-3, OP 713, Frame 006, aft. scan angle 0°, Oct 14, 1976, SX magnification near Santa Fe. New Mexico. Infrared color films were originally designed as a <'amouflage detection film. They have tbc capability of separating man-made, hidden objects from natural vegetation because of ~pecial characteristics of infrared radiation. Res olution is quite low compa.red to the black-and-white fi lms u~t.>tJ as the primary pa~load. Vegetation containing living chlorophyl reflect:; a large percentage of the infra-red component of natural sunlight. Plants under stress (having insufficient water, diseased, etc.) will have a breakdown in their chlorophy1 str ucture and consequentl y reflect less infrared. This type of color fi lm shows infrared reflectance a s a magenta colored image. Healthy vegetation will appear as bright magenta and wil l change in either color or brightness as the plants degrade. As a result of this characteristic, S0-130 is an ideal film for monitoring crop vigor and potential yield giving very basic intelligence data .:tremely fine grain, high resolution, and ver y sl ow emulsion speeds. Thi s film has a n AFS of 6. 6 and is coated on the ultra-thin 1. 2 mil base. COLOR FILMS ARE: en m • S0-255 -This is a. conventionally sensitized, fine grain, high-definition color reversal fil m . The e muls ion (") -1 i s c oated on a 1. 5 mil base with the film having an AFS of 9. 5. 0 z • S0-130-This is a "False Color" infrared sensitive color reversal film on a 1. 5 mil base with an AFS of 7. 5. :;;: This film is used extensively for economic intelligence evaluation. en < en -1 m 31: en (") )> ~ 70 TAP c;r:rDr:TM aJ BlF003\V/2-093942-77 r= =i iii en w co (J) VJ < 0 ~ TOP ~Ff'RF'f/1-1 Bl F003W/ 2-093942-7 ~ 71 i! H I 01' ~~ L~l 1/H PPI G ( ' r---. ~,, OVERLAP OBJEC"IVES -MAP P'NG AND GEODETIC SURVEY PAY\.OAD DATA -MAPPING CAMERA o 3,300 FHT-9 . 5 INCH £K 3414 FilM \T ERRAIN) o 2,000 FEET -70 MM FilM /STEL LAR (/) o FORMAT-134X 67 NMAT 88 NM m o COVERAGE-5.4 M SQ NM' MISS ION (") -1 -ONE RECOVERY VE HI ClE 0 z :c; -INCLINAT10N-96 . 4 DEGREES SUN-SYNChRONOUS (/) -AVERAGE PERIGEE-88 NM -AVERAGE APOGEE-55 NM -< (/) -MAPPING MtS'iiON DU~ATI ON-UP TO 120 DAYS -1 m 3: (/) AT 8P NM. ALTITUDE (") )> ... BIF003W/2-093942-77 ___, --; ~ ----TOP SECRET/H ---- IJJ ;= :::j ;;; (/) """ ~ 0 ...... &} H ~ TOP t;I=CDI=T/H ~ ~ MAPPING CAMERA SYSTEM ~ ~ ~ H ~ The :\tapping Camera System (MCS) structure supports and positions the individual :;ubsystems with respect to each other and within the space constraints of the SV shroud. The loads are a transmitted to six structural attach points on the vehicle bulkhead. Pitch and yaw alignment of the structure to the SV attitude reference module ib achieved b) shimmin?: the attach points. i H ~ Temperature control is achieved by passive means (paint. tape. multilayer blankets and thin ~ metal sheets, 1. e., cocoons) for all but the precise temperature requirements of the lens sys tem, which employs heaters for their accurate control. I Electrical interfaces between the SV and the MCS are at the bulkhead. timing and power are provided by the SV. ·~ 7G TOP SEERET/H ~ All command, telemetry, ~ H ~ ~ ~ en ~ en t< j BlF003VV/2-093942-77 I i H TOP SEERET/ H PPI G CA SYSTE RECOVERY VEH I CLE M U LTILAYER BLAN KETS DO PP LER BEA CON tn ANTE NNA m 0 -1 0 z :;; tn -< tn -1 m 3: tn 0 )> ~ TOP SECRET/ H .______ tD r= :::::j ffi tn ~ 1\J CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TnP c;a:rg I=TIH MAPPI G CAMERA LENSES LENS FOCAL LENGTH 10 . 0 INC HE S RELATIVE APERTU RE f/2 . 0 SENSITIVITY 6 th MA G NIT UDE 5TARS OR BRIGHTE~ BORESIGHT STABILITY 2 ARC-SEC IN O PE RATION FIELD OF VIE W 16 BY 25 DEG REE S J_/I' IN HIBIT SENSOR ~ARTH STELLAR LENS AND .---FllTER (\vRA HEN 21 ) 24.4 IN. ~~ASPHERIC SURFACE (/) m FOCA L LE NGTH 12.0 IN. 0 -1 REL. APERT URE DISTORTI ON f/ 6, T/ 14 100 MICRONS MAX RADIAL . 20 MICRONS MAX TANGENTIAL 0 z :c; STABILIT Y 2 MICRONS IN OPERATION ~ L 15. 13-IN.---..l OIAMElElt RESO LUTION FIELD OF VIEW 95 L/ MM AWAR (VEM Of'.J 3414 FILM) 38 BY 72 DEGREES (/) -1 m 3!: (/) T!:r,,~tl': _:N5 0 > r nP <;I= ('R FT/ H 7'' ~ 1:13 r= =i ;;; (/) .1:> .!=> CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM t~ t ~ I t ~ ~ .., • .J I' W.l • ,.,_~..~~ <:f) zo (.!)U M <:f) -o:: ~ 0 I ·~ C.. a. :..::.:... ~ ~ a. ....... ct L-0 :; ~ :E g 0 r.. v z 0 .... 0 ll=l . t= • ~ ~ DJ r= =i ffi en CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ,_ ~I LU :r: SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES r u..a t!J <( ~ LU > 0 t._) UJ <( ~ J: t.L. -l ...... ::1 La.. '-' 0 z 0 !;:( u - u_ - r- t-,_ - "I .... I w I -Q :'I ::::: 0 :.:.. co CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM t• co 0 N :I:~ - (f) LJJ 0 ...J <( - - ~ 0:. 0 SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES • 0 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ,. t z '1 :t: w ~ _J <: 2 > I 0 z ...J ;g~ :;::) 0 NO.. U 0 ~ ..... ~ <: zu=~ 0 o<:u....~ ...., _..... w -I -J . ~ - :) 0 <( 0 ~ z <( V) :r: > w ....J ....J <( > u..z o ::> Q..a ~8 V'l ..., 0z V'l<( ::>Vl • ;.; "'0 0 ::... .... ~ .j::. _,. . r I AREA ACCESSED PER MISSION ACTUAL TERRAIN COVERAGE l EQUIVALENT MEA .ACCESSED ~ MI SS IO N MISSION LENGTH I TOTAL AREA ACCESSED (SQ NM) (N UMBE R) I ~ DAYS) (THOUSAND SO NM) -__-__~T_ -: ~---:-~.-r .------· 1205 I 40 I 5894. I 2.6 X I 1.1 X I 0.6 X I 1206 I 42 I 6282 I 2.8 X I 1.2X I 0.7 X I 58 I 6671 I 3.0 X I 1.3X I 0.7 X I 6487 I 2.9X I 1.3X I 0.7 X I 0.8 X I 0.7 X I 6919 3.1 X I 1.3X I 0.8 X I 1212 I 62 7363 I 3.3 X I 1.4 X I 0.8 X I 1213 112 8099 3.6 X 1.6X 0.9 X I I I I I I B£1-'00::W 1>!1!1:1!14~-~ TOP SECRET/H ~0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0 ~ H ~ H ~ 0 ~ c:: tn tn I.IJ ~ H ~ .. ~ i5 i H ~ ~ ! i5 ~ 1:" 1:" H ~ I.IJ j ~ 0 H tn t tn Q tn t< tn ~ 0 ~ ~ !i H SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES N ..... ("J ......... LU ~ <( :t: (( UJ > 0 (..) _J <{ co 0 ......1 ~ ~ ~ -...J 8 li TOP SECRET/H ~ ~ METRIC PAN CAMERA SYSTEM-ATTl TUDE DETERMINATION ~ e ~ ~ The metric pan camera attitude determination provides accurate coordinates of selected geographic points to be used as control points for comptling maps. It derives image space angles from measured space coli t=J ordinates and requires auxiliary data to establish absolute coordinates and base distances; e. g. , accurate ephemeris data and time of exposure, the angular orientation of the stellar relative to the pan terrain i camera (interlock). the stellar angular orient..1.tion and camt-·ra angular motion history are the required H li data. ~ Stellar OTientJ.tion data is acquirerl by a solid state electronic camera system accurate enough to determ mine pan camera line-of-sight pointing to within 5 arc seconds (1 cr). Two stellar cameras will be mounted § 2: on the TCA frame, one on each side of the SV, with line-of-sight elevation of 10 degrees up from horizontal rn and 55 degrees aft in azimuth. Data of star image detections will be processed and stored in existing on ~ board recorder. This data will be reau out to supporting tracking stations and wil l be processed off-line. ~ Film markings will be provided correlating stellar camera star image detections and pan photography time. H t-1 SV rigid body motion history during photography is obt..1.1ncd from the current ARM rate gyros through t he ~ existing telemetry system. Vibration and thermal distortion motions are accounted for in on-ground data proct!ssing. Implementation is schecluled for SV-17 and up super::.ening the Mapping Came1·a Svst em (MCS) ~ e rn previously described. Q I rn In H2 TOP SEERET/H RIF003VV/2 -093942-7? H !i ETRIC PA CA ERA SYSTE 5.!" f'HO Of Vl('N • \ " ATTI TUD E DETERMINATION ' v NAP II l 0\'TIC I SK IN ...-SHUTT ER Dill '/£ //,_.... (+TAC'ICP"'•~C ~f"-') rf<:)O.L 1\.AN f El fCTJON ICS CON TIOI WDOut I ; ....._,...___ Ol'fiC'IL&>t rv.o r::? / >3 VtWIII()IU '-A·StO( ) 1 OATA f't'OC £SSING tue10NC5. ..._s3 •~sro¥!&1v \L 'ITC "f LH·· 't.JNC'4V:r•G Mf(~l'.i,~M STELLAR SOLID STATE ($3) CAMERA ASSEMBLY UF003W/ 2 -09:3942:::77 TO,...,,.. ., IN( Pt\XESSING STELLAR CAMERA DATA FLOW 9:1 (/) m 0 -1 0 z :;;: (/) -<(/) -1 m 3: (/) 0 )> ~ I:JJ r= ~ ffi (/) ..... """ CXl .j:>. _,. CD &l H 1-! TOP SECRETIH ~ METRIC PAN CAMERA ~ c: til SYSTEM-LOCATION DETERMINATION g) a H ~ The primary tracking system for the reconstruction of an accurate ephemeris has been the Doppler a Beacon System (DBS) using a worldwide network of geoceivers. This subsystem is a dual oscillator of ultra high stabili~y which provides a method for the accurate tracking of the Satellite Vehicle by I H the-suppot·ting station ndwork. The electronics and the antenn:t arc currC'ntly mounted on the mapping 1-! camera system. ·The plan is to install the antenna on the forward bulkhead s tarting with SV-17, which I ~ will be configured without a mapping camera system. The DBS will be redundant to the Navigational Package (NAVPAC), which will be the primar y means by which a precision ephemeris can be reconstructed for mapping. NAVPAC consist s of two s ensing systems plus associated control and data processing hardware. The antenna/recei\'er system can ~ acquire up to three Navy Navigation Satellites (NAVSATS) simultaneously and track the doppler and ~ H refraction frequencies. The miniature electrostatic accelerometer (l\tlESA) provides data on all non ~ gravitational accelerations sensed . The delta processing unit collects, sorts , and time annotates a ll the data, recording NAVPAC times at which NAVSAT time marks are received, thus calibrating the = NAVPAC clock. Timing accuracy is expected to be 1.-2 m icroseconds. ~ til NAVPAC is mounted on the -Y pallet with the antenna erected vertically above. s til I t< I 94 TnP ca:r Q J:T!l-1 H BIF003VV/2-093942-77 !i TOP S~CRFT/H ETRIC PA CAMERA SYSTE "JAVSATS ~ LOCAT ION DET UMINATION DBr ACCUf(ACY DOPPLER ±200FT IN-TRACK BEACO N__. ±175FT CROSS-TRACK 100FT RADIAL O~"BITAL VELOCITY ±0.12 FT/S EC tn NAVPAC ACCURACY m () -1 5. 30FT ALL 3 AXIS 0 z :;;: tn ST C-RTS -< tn -1 m -.~...J~l---------------------------------,ASGLSI SGLS -, s: tn () )> ~ Ill 5 j= ::::j m tn ~ N CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM - .... TOP SECRET/H SHROUD CONFIGURATION The shroud provides a protective enclosure for the payload on the launch pad and during ascent. It is a corrugated monocoque aluminum cylinder 52 ft long and 10ft in diameter. Through air conditioning umbilicals and dueling the tempera ture and humidity arc maintained at the desired \ alues while on the launch pad. Twenty-four removable doors provide access for servicing reentry vehicle igniters, sub-satellite trickle charge and arming, alignment checks of attitude reference to two-camera assembly reference axes, shroud thruster spring cocking, a nd shroud final pyro arming. The shroud separates from the Satellite Vehicle after the pyrotechnic agent, Mild Detonating Fuse (MDF), breaks the magnesium longitudinal and beryllium circum ferential breakstrips. Springs initiate the shell separation and then the acceleration from the booster Stage ll cause the halves t o fall away from the SV. No single failure in the pyrotechnic or electrical system will prevent shroud separation. C/1m C') -1 0 z :? C/1- 104 TOP SECRET/H BIF003W/2-093942-7', ~ OJ ;= ::::j iii C/1 .f>. I\.) 1\J N ""' c..> n ll:l H 1-i H ~ : I Ut' !)t\o:tttttH SHROUD CONFIGURATIO 1-i 0 c: t/) t/) l.oJ a H 1-i ALUMINUM SI. !\,) .j:>. 0 metric pan camera stellar z :t; ~ .... m 3: C/) () )> BIF003W/2-093942-77 :: 0:1 r= ::::j fii C/) ~ N (.Jl 0 ~ 1-4 ~ ~ c: en THERMAL CONTROL ~ en t.oJ a 1-4 ~ >< ! ORBIT ADJUST VALVE SHIELD$ HEATER ~ 2 MULTILAYER INSU L ATION BLANKETS t STRIP ELECTRICAL i5 HEATERS ON REACTION CONTROL, LIF EBOAT II. $ ORB IT ADJUST PROPEL L ANT TANKS. REPRESSURIZATION/ULLAGE g ''4' TANKS ( BAYS 8 ~ 10) HAVE MULTILAYER IN SUL ATION BL ANKE TS 1-4 BUT NO HEATERS ~ , FL EXIB L E OPTICAL SOL AR REFLECTOR ON EOAP, BAT T ERY, -, COMMAND PROGRAMMER,~ LI FEBOAT BAYS; WHITE PAINT ON AT TI TUDE REFERENCE t T tT BAYS; BLACK PAINT ON A SCENT T ELEMETRY t PYRO BAYS 4 . COCOONS-POLI SHED ALUMINUM/ 8L ACK ACRY LIC PAI N T j B l F003W/2-093942-77 'i I ~ ~ ~ ~ 1-4 ~ I ~ 1-4 en i ELECTRONICS CONTR OL OF RV HEATERS-BASED ON SENSOR SUB SYSTEM TEMPERAT URE ~ \f MULTILAYER INSULATION BLANKETS en (7:• PLUM E IMPING EMENT SHIELDS FOR REACTION >< CONTROL THR USTERS en .~ WHITE PAIN T ON BAYS 3 t4 BARE ALUM INUM/BLACK i ACRY L IC PA INT ON REMAINING BAYS 0 ~ ( f)~ ~ 1-4 i .TOP SECRET/H SATELLITE BASIC ASSEMBLY STRUCTURE The SBA structure, shown in the cut-away drawing, is of semimonocoque construction. The booster adapter section has aluminum skin, rings, and stringers. This section contains the booster separation joint. which uses 2-1/2 grain/ft of mild detonating fuse to break a circumferential beryllium strip. The OAM/RCM s ection has corr ugation-reinforced aluminum skin with aluminum and magnesium internal structure. This section contains the propulsion elements and the solar array modules . The equipment section has twelve removable corrugation reinforced aluminum skin panels bolted to an alumi num tubular inter nal structure which supports honeycomb equipment panels. Guidance, communication, com mand, and power components are mounted on these panels as subsystem modules. The Mid-Section has a short titanium conical section and a cylindrical section of magnesium s kin, with mag nesium hatsection longitudinal stiffeners. Magnesium and titanium internal structur e s upports the primar y payload. The Forward Section has aluminu m and magnesium skin with magnesium hatsection longi tudinal stiffeners. The internal magnesium and aluminum structure with titanium fi ttings supports the four (4) reentry vehicles. The Mapping Camera System, are supported on the exter nal surfaces of (/) m the Forward Section. 0 -t s z The Mapping Camera System is supported in the Auxiliary P.ayload Structure Assembly (APSA). ~ (/) -<(/) -t m ~ (/) 0 :1> I Oil TAP quipment bay pr ovides sufficient access to allow complete module installation and removal at :? the factory and pad as shown in the lower completely open bay. The other hays as shown have non-flight panels C/) -< C/) with ground access doors used in factory assembly and test. This section interfaces with the main l'lcctr·ieal -t m umbi Ileal and the Mid Section. 3: C/) 0 > ~ 110 TOP SECRET/H RIF003W /2-09:1942-77 m r= 3 m C/) .j:::. N CX> CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 1-UJ~ V> Z N C¥-C¥. 1-:::> - Ww a;-,<..')N 0-1-1 V'l o.. C¥.0 z 0 0 < O <..') CQ 0 z w _} a z ~ UJ ::r: UJ - <..') -1 <( ...... UJ I-==., · ~ TAP c::r:rDrT/H ATTl TUDE CONTROL The Attitude Control System (ACS) provides earth-oriented attitude reference and rate sensing. It de\ elops RCS thruster firing signals to bring the vehicle to a commanded attitude and to maintain attitude and rate within the accurac1es shown below. The ACS also provides measurements of vehicle attitude and rate during search/surveillance operation to the accuracy shown. The ACS is a three-axis rate gyro-integrator system with updating in pitch and roll by horizon sensor and in yaw by gyrocompassing. Error signals generated by the gyros and horizon sensor arc combined 1n the flight control dectronics. ano modulated by pseudo-rate circuits in each axis to provide thruster firing commands with the impulse bit control necessary to meet the light rate control and short settling-time requirements. All elements are redundant for malfunction correction. Cross-strapping between redundant and prill1.:l.ry ACS components (horizon sensors, gyros, flight control electronics assembly) is possible to permit selection of non-failed components to drive the RCS thruster. Control Regui rements Measurement Requirements Pitch Roll Yaw Pitch Roll Yaw For search/surveillance operations Attitud e accuracy (deg) 0.7 0.7 0.64 0.4 0.4 0. 5 Rate accuracy (deg/sec) 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.001 0. 001 0.001 During non-horizontal operations (/) m Attitude accuracy (deg) 3 1 1 n -1 Rate accuracy (deg/sec) 0. 15 0. 15 0. 15 0 z :;; Setting time from search/surveillance disturbances: Stereo 0. 2 seconds, Mono 6 seconds (/) -< (/) -1 m 3l: (/) n > TOP C\~l"'D ~T/1..1 112 BIFOO:lW/2-093942-77 j! OJ ;= =t ffi (/) ~ (,...) ~ (..) _... fJ H ~ ~ ~ c: en ATTITUDE CONTROl ~ ~ :l THRUSTERS ~ i5 i H ~ ~ i5 NO:ES: I. IRA ROll. PITCH AJID YI.W OWIItfi.S ATTITUDE CONTROL ~ MAY liE caGSS-STRAPPEO lltDIVIDli.W.Y MODULE 2: Z. THRUSTERS MAY BE CROSS·STRAPPrD AT PAIR LEVEL ~ ~ 1 THRUSTERS H ~ HORIZ ON SEN SOR (P~CS) TWRUSTERS 7 i:1 3 HORIZON SEN SOR ( RACS) IRA (PACS) ~ 5 IRA (RACS) en FLT CONT !lOL ELEC. FLT CO NT RO L El EC ~ en i t< lr--+~ I 6 H/S ELECTRONICS {PACS) HOR IZOM I"ERTIAL INERTIAl HORI ZO N 1 H/S ELECTRON ICS (RACSJ SENSOR REFEREN CE RE FERENCE SENSOR 8 F/C EL ECTRON ICS (PACS> PRI MARY ATTITUDE ~t:DUNDANT ATT ITUTE 0 CONTROL SYS (PAC$) CONTROL SYS (AACS) 9 F/ C ELECTRONICS (RACS. 8 TOP SEC-RET/H__._~~-~ BI F003W/ 2-09394:! -7': IU H ~ !i TOP SECRETIH ORBIT ADJUST AND REACTION CONTROL An Orbit Adjust System (OAS) and Reaction Control System (RCS) provide the forces necessary to control the vehicle orbit and the vehicle attitude in orbit, respectively. The OAS provides injE:ction error correction (if required), drag and perigee rotation makeup, and deorbit of the Satellite Vehicle at the end of the mission. T he RCS provides pitch, yaw, ;md roll control via 8 thrusters. OAS and RCS both use catalytic decomposition of monopropellant hydrazine to generate thrust. For reliability, the systems are pressure-fed. with the pressurizing gas enclosed in the propellant tank "";t h the hydrazine. This results in declining or blowdown pressure characteristics; the thrust level of the OAS engine declines from 250 to 100 pounds and tha.t of the RCS engines from 6 to 2 pounds. A quad-redundant valve operated by the command system controls flow to the OAS engine. T he ACS generates signals that control the firing of the RCS engines. On SV-15 the 62-inch diameter OAS tank can be loaded with up to 4000 pounds of propellant with two spheres c ontaining high pressure nitrogen (isolated by pyro valves and admitted i nto the OA tank at times selected during the mission) to maintain the pressure within the desired operati ng range. This propellant can be utilized in OA burns to provide velocity increments o[ 2 ft /sec to 400 ft /sec. A passive (su r face tens ion) propellant management device maintains propellant at the tank outlet at all times, permitting engine firings In any attitude . On Vehicles SV-13 and SV-14 the two nitrogen tanks are manifolded directly with the OA tank and provide enough ullage space to permit 3700 pounds of propellant to be loaded within the operating pr essur e range. UJ The four 22-in. diameter RCS tanks provided capacity for 450 to 540 pounds of propellant . Propellant orientat ion is main m (') tained by diaphragms. The thruster impulse bit (0. 15 lb-sec or less. depending on bl owdown status) is compatible with the -t 0 tight r ate-contr ol requirements. A complete r edundant set of thrusters is provided for malfunC'tion pr otection: either set z :c;: can be supplied by the four tanks and each pair of thrusters can be driven by the primary or redundant ACS valve drivers. ~ A transfer line is provided between the OAS and RCS tanks to permit propellant exchange to optimize the use o f on-board UJ -t m propellant for each mission. 3!: UJ (') l> fOP SECRET/H BTF003VV/2-093942-77 ~ OJ ;= =i m UJ 4> (..o.) N ~ w w B ~ ~ a d I (I) O!RBIT ADJUST t REACTION CONTROL ~ [! s H ~ --· ~ OAS ULLAGE TANKS (2) --- VIEW LOOKING AFT NITROGEN FILL VALVE 7 I VI EW LO OKIN G FO RWARD CAPilLARY CALLERY-] oz· DIA ORSI T ADJUST TANK I OAS FILL VALVE ~ QUAD PROPELLANT VALVE F: t R CS GAS FILL VALVES (2) H CATALYST BED ------... ~ 3 RCS PROPELLAN T FILL VAL VE 4 ISOLATION VALVES (6) n -~ NlTROGEM FILL VALVES (Z) ~ = ~ RCS GAS/PRO P TANK (4) t ,-\ ' b RCS THRUSTERS (16) .,',~\ 1 NITROGEN----. ~ H ~ ! (I) HVDRAZIN E ~ ...::::---~...· 4 , .iJo~·~~~ OAS ~ Res FILL ( DR AIN-----!..-• • r ISOLATION VALVES (6) (I) I ~ ----,-- PRIMAR Y REDUNDANT RCS THRUSTERS 111 BI F003VV/2-0~39~2-77 I H §! TOP SECRET-/H ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION AND POWER Power to operate the Satellite Vehicle is provided by solar arrays deployed from the Aft Section following separation from the booster. Rechargeable N!Cd batteries (type-40) provide energy storage to meet dark-side-earth and peak power requirements. Unregulated power Is distributed throughout the vehicle to us1ng equipment within a 24 to 33 vdc range. The power generation and storage system comprises four parallel segments. with an array section, charge controller. and battery In each to reduce the effect of a failure; a single malfunction will not terminate the mission. Fusing of equipment, limiting minimum '1\rire size. and isolating voltage-critical circuits add to the reliability. The power system Is capable of providing approximately 11,000 watt-hours/day of usable power over a beta angle range of -8 to +60 deg by adjusting the array angle about the vehicle roll axis. This will support at le:.tst 52 minutes per day of search/survt!illance and mapping camera system operation. Power for the lifeboat system is provided by one type-40 battery from the main power system. Equ ipment necessary for recovery vehicle and Satellite Vehicle deorbit can be S\\ritched to this battery for emergency operations. Depletion of the batteries below 55 percent or an excessive load on the main power system wtll automatically isolate the lifeboat system and its battery. This assures adequate power for the emergency operations. The lifeboat system can be reconnected to the main system by command if the anomaly can be corrected. f/) m 0 -1 Pyro power is provided by either of two type-40 batteries from the main power system and distributed by redundant 0 z circuits. :;;: f/) -< f/) -1 m 3: f/) 0 llG TnP C:~rDI:T/1...1 )> BIF003VV/2-093942-77 ~ U3 r= :::::j ffi f/) w ~ ~ .to. VJ !J H 1-i TAP «;F("~FTIH ~ d en ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTIO ~PO ER ~ en 1.":1 ~ H 1-i ..; SOLAR ARRAY PANEL 6 1-i gj i H 1-i POWER DISTRIBUTION ~ ' ,, J-BOX MAPPING SEARCH/ gj CAMERA SURVEILLANCE 1 22 PANEL SOL AR ARRAY (177 FTl) PAYLOAD PAYLOAD i RV z PO SITIONAL DRIVE ASSYS i t 3 CHARGE CURRENT CONTROLLERS .' AFT SECTIO N FWC' DIST (INBOARD) ~ EQUIPMENT J·BOX. ~ ~ AF T POWER DISTRIBUTION J-BOX H I 1 LIFEBOAT II s TYPE 40 BATT ERIES ( 4) ~ o FORWARD PYRO J-BOX v----SEPARATION SWITCH J4 + ~ (HIGH CURRENT) n PYRO BUS"1 COMMAND t ~ I • PYRO 4 ~ TYPE 40 TYPE 40 -4 TYPE 40 l' TYPE 40 1BUS:2 en 81-TTERY BATTERY BATTERr ~ BATTERr ~ 1.":1 r INTERFACE J-BOXES CHARGE CHARGE CHARGE CHARGE enCONTROLLER CONTROLlER. CON TROl LER CONTRlllLER ..; 6 FWD PWR DISTRIBUTION en J-BOX f t 11 tt t f i 9 MAPPING CAMERA MODULE s u-BOX I H BIF003W / 2-093942 -77 TOP «;F('R FT/H u i TOP SECRET/H TELEMETRY AND TRACKING The SGl.S-compatible telemetry subsystem provides PC'M real-time data (ascent at 48 kbps, engineering analysis at 128 kbps, and orbit at 64 kbps). and PCM tape recorded data (48 khps played back at 256 kbps). The PC'M telemeter provides status data for normal mission operation, test operations and evaluation. command acceptance confirmation, and postflight evaluation. Each tape recorder stor age allows the monitoring of the SV temperature profile by periodic sampling. Over 1500 data sources are monitored -some at up to 500 samples per second. T he SGLS-compatible tr acking subsystem provides range measurement information, including slant range {50 ft maximum l o bias error and 60 ft rrns maximum noise error), range rate (0. 2 ft/sec maximum la error). and angle-of-arrival (1. 0 milli radian maximum lcr bias error and 1. 0 milliradian rms maximum noise error). en m 0 -1 0 z :;; en -< en -1 m 3: en 0 118 TAP BIF003VV/2-093942-77 ~ ID r= =t iii en ~ w 0) .j:>. VJ -...J 8 1-i ~ TOP SECR:H/H 1-i 0 c:: I'll I'll 1.":1 ~ H 1-i >< 1-i gj PCM MASTER H UNIT i 1-i TAPE RECORDER INSTRUMENTATION J·BOXES (3 ) ?CM REMOTE {5) 3 PCM M~STER NO. I PC M MASTER NO. ~ gj DAT4 • i PCM REMOTE <5 PL-'C£ 5) $ IDE.,_. ~ I:"' I:"' D4T'-1.r SIDE 'S ' · ~1Dr• H ~ PCM MASTER PCM '-\A.STER ·z ~ r ., g TI M I NG TIM ING - TA PE SIGNALS SIGNALS ~ RECORDER H 5 TAPE RECORDER NO. I OUTB OARD •z I'll EQUIPMEIT b TJ\PE RECORDE R NO.2 ~--r- ' -...... , ---I 6 • ! ! ~ \ C'TS II ! 't • I'll . '\"z' 5 >< 7 VCTS NO. I MULTICOUPLER MULTI COO PLER I'll ' \ 7 * t "Z 8 VCTS N0.2 ~--8 I 7 9 BACK-UP TI MER 1---=--1-NTENN~ ~ i n 10 CONTROL J-BOX T YPE -1 ~ffiP ~a:rD I=T/H il l) BIF' OO J W / 2-09 3 04 :!-i7 ~ H i TAP ca:r D I=TfH COMMAND AND TIMING The Extended Command System (ECS) provides real-time and stored-program command capability. The SGLS compatible ECS system with complete redundancy provides 64 real-lime and 626 stored-program com mands with a memory capability of 1152 commands. Ninety-six secure command operations are possible. On SV-15 and up the number of secure command operations will be increased to 192. The ECS pro\1des opera tional commands to perform primary and secondary missions. the capability to configure the vehicle into various operational modes, a pre-flight test and checkout capability, security for critical functions, and a time signal to the PCM and the payload. The Minimal Command System (MCS) provides 28 real-time and 66 stored-program commands with a memory capability of 53 commands. Ten secure command operations are available . The MCS provides lifeboat commands for an independent capability of recovery RVs and initiating SV deboost and the capability to obtain real-time and recorded telemetry data. The Data Interface Unit (DIU) provides for the generation, storage and transfer of time information to the search/surveillance camera, mapping camera, telemetry, The om also provides the mapping en m camera system and pan camera time request pulse to the NAVPAC experiment. C') -1 0 z :;;: en -< en -1 m 3: en C') )> 120 ~ TOP SECRET/H BI F00:3W /2-093942-77 OJ ;:::: =i iii en .j::. c..v CXl ~ (JJ c.o TnP C:t:rDr:TIH O~T G EQUIPMfWT LOCATED ON OUTBOARD SlOE Of RACK (EXCEPT ITEM 6) DATA INTERFACE UNIT COMMAND SYSTEM 1 EXTENDED COMMAND SYSTEM(ECS) CMOS 0$ _,_ t 2 375 MHz RECEIVER (UFEBOAT II:) ECS 3 MINIMAl COMMAND SYSTEM(MCS} REMOTE DECODE~ MCS I l A 8 BACKUP 4 COMMAND J-80X TYP£ 2 l OPER+TiaU l ·DECODER 5 PRIMARY COMMAND BACKUP RECEIVER Tllllltt SlaAl DA.TA TIMIK SIGNAL VCTS RECEIVER NO. I eM1)6 INTERFACE CMOSJ CMD$ T t UNIT VCTS RECEIVER NO. 2 t t I MlltiM..L ' (UICAtED INIOAIIDI LEXTENDED cDIUIA•D srm• Lcon••o A b S'\'STEM -i IICTS PAIMARY 8 DATA tNT£AFAC£ UNIT NO 1 C.M O BACKUP JTS MHz JtEC EIVER RECEIVER RE~EIVER 9 ECS REMOTE O£COOER 1 I MCS BACkUP DECOD£A ANTENNAS 1 BIF003W 2-093942-77 TOP SECREl/H 0 :xl H ~ H ~ ~ 0 c::: (/) (/) l.:o:l 0 !a H ~ ...; ~ :z: l.:o:l g H ~ ~ gj ~ 2: (/) e; l.:o:l 1:"' 1:"' H ~ l.:o:l ~ 0 ~ H (/) (/) ~ 0 l.:o:l (/) ...; (/) ~ B i 0 l.:o:l 12 I ~ H i! TAP «;J:r~J:T/H LIFEBOAT II The lifeboat system provides cmergl!ncy capability to initiate separation of two Reentry Vehicles (RV) and to deorbit the Satellite \"ehicle in the event of a complete failun• of the m;un power system. tho attitude contt·ol system, or the extended command system. Emergency operational control is provided by the 375 MHz receiver and minimal command system, with capability for real-time. stored-program, and secure commands. Attitude control for RV releases and SV deorbit is pt·ovided by earth-field sensing magnetometers, rate gyros. and a cold gas (freon 14) control force system. Lifeboat is capable of RV releases and SV deorbit operations on both south-to-north and north-to-south passes . Power to keep the system ready for use, and for the emergency operations is provided by a type-40 battery and 1/4 of the solar arrays from the main power system. The OAS engine and the redundant SGI.S, PCM, tape recorder, and other equipment necessary for RV release, SV deorbit, and recovery of vehicle diagnostic (/) data are switched from the main power system to the lifeboat bus for the emergency operations. In a nominal m 0 tumbling mode, enough power is generated to keep this emergency mode operating until the vehicle reenters. -t 0 z :;;: (/) -<(/) -t m 31: (/) 0 122 TOP c;~rPI=T-/H BIFOOJVV/2-093942-77 > ~ OJ ;::: ~ ffi (/) .t:>. .t:>. .1:> .1:> ...... OUTBOAR D VIEW INBOARD VIE t MINIMAL COMMAND SUBSYSTEM 2 MAG~ETOMETER (3 A'iiS ) 3 LIFE BOAT U J-80 4 375 MHz RECEIVER BIF003W/ 2-09394 2-i7 ~ H ~ l+lP "-t r k!l 11H ~ ~ 0 en LJFfBOA n c:: en tliJ ~ H ~ t< ~ i ~ 5 RATE GYRO ( 3) ELECTRON ICS 7 TYPE 40 B.t.TTERY H ~ ~ e ~ FREON GAS TANKS ~ 0 0 FILL ~ REGULATOR~1VALVE H ~ i3 n THRUSTERS ~ H en 375 MHz MCS -ELECTRONI CS l REC EI VER ~ ~ ~ X Y·Z AXIS X Y·Z AXIS ' en AN TENNA MA-GNETOM ETER RATE GYROS t< 8 REGULATOR I N-S-N FREON GAS TA.NkS (2) i POLA.R ITY SWITCH THRUSTERS (6) n FILL VALVE 8 12' ~ H i TAP (J.";rDJ.";T/H HARDWARE FLOW The HEXAGON integrated test program begins at the piece-part level anci continues through component, module and vehicle levels of assembly. Te.>ting at progressive levels of assemhly permits workman ship faults to be identified and eliminated early in the test program. The SBA piece-parts are .;ul:Jjected to electrical and environmental stress and vlsual inspection tests to verify piece-part specification. The SEA components a r e subjected to ambient, random vibration. temperature-vacuum a nd burn-in acceptance tests for early detection and correction of design, parts and manufacturing defects. The components are then assembled into the aft section modules or installed in the forward and mid-sections. The aft section electronic modules are subjected to am'>ient, acoustic and thermal vacuum tests. The propulsion module and solar array modules are subjected to ambient a nd acoustic tests. The sections are then mated to form the Satellite Vehicle which is then ready for the system level tests prior to VAFB shipment. The nomenclature shown on the accompanying illustration indicates the contractor where manufacturing or testing occurs: SBAC-Satellite Basic Assembly Cont ractor (Lockheed) en m 0 MWC -Midwest Contractor (McDonnell Douglas) -t 0 OPC -Our Philadelphia Contractor (General Electric) :;;: SSC -Sensor Subsystem Contractor (Perkin-Elmer) en NEC -Northeast Contractor (ltek) z -< ~ m 3: en 0 ):oo 124 TOP SECRET/H BTF003VV/2-093942-77 ~ OJ r= =f ;;; en ~ ~ N ~ ~ w Q H toi TAP <;~('D~l/H ~ a HARDWARE FLOW ~ g) I a I H • ~ I I a ~-•. '' n~r I I I I H I toi I qA(t I ~ I I I 1P.' A5~V T(~f JM I I I I~I'IALLrO Pft C~ , ...... './Af8 ~HIPII.• £1-.T ~ ~ MID 'fCT M•C. ilM H ~ ~ DO I n ~ I'AM ~(>I ~ BLI IU>UP (I) "!7E~-;'.t."I i 0N & TESTING _B:. ( ~ 1."3 (I) t< I (I) I i H TOP SFERFT/ H TAP c;~:rDI=TIH HARDWARE FLOW The objective of the factory-to-pad test program is to demonstrate flight readiness of each vehicle at the factory and to perform vehicle checkout and launch preparations at the launch complex. The assembled vehicle is tested as a system with payload electrical simulators to verify compatibility of the SBA equip ment with the payload interfaces. The payloads are then electrically connected to tht> Satellite Basic Assembly (SBA) and the vehicle is tested to verify performance and compatibility. The vehicle is subjected to an acoustic test and is monitored during the exposure to 'verify proper SV health and status. The vehicle is then tested to verify that it survived the acoustic environment. The vehicle is next subjected to a tht'rm::tl vacuum test with the aft section subjected to two thermal cycles and the payloads subjected to o ne t hermal cycle. Aft section perfor mance tests are conducted at low and high temperatures and typical mission profile tests are performed on the payloads including film transfers to each reentt·y vehicle. A collimation test of the Two Camera Assembly (TCA ) is performed a t vacuum to verify optical performance and to deter mine the flight focus setting for the camera system. The mapping camer a flatness is verified and the flight setting for the film path pressure makeup is determined. The vehicle is then prepared for shipment which includes flight film loading A sys terns test is then performed to verify systems performance. Final shipping preparations are performed and th e s hround is installed. The vehicle is then transported to the launch base. 126 The vehicle i:<~ mated to the booster and an Aerospace Vehicle (AV) systems test is performed to verify that the SV operates prope r ly and to verify compatibility between the A V and the Vandenb e rg tracking station and the Satellite Test Center. Final flight preparations consisting or propellant loading and pyrotechnic installation is performed. The countdown is Initiated and consists of the final SV functional test and launch configuring for lift-off, roll back of the Mobile Service Tower, flight command loading, performing terminal count and launching the Aerospace Vehicle. TAP C:I=("'P I=T/U BIFOp3VV/2-093942-77 en m 0 -t 0 z :;;: en - ~ IXJ r= =i iii en .j::. .j::. .j::. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM w Q: ~ Q Q: u'\ CONTROL SYSTEM 0~· SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792·67 (7) Polystyrene capacitors were eliminated from the primary camera drive system and from the supply torque motor after a number of failures. The wrong type of lubricant resulted in variable running rates for the platen drive motor. (8) Degradation in results was traced to thermal effects on the primary and stereo mirrors. A new design resulted in segmented potting of the mirrors to the casing. Also the temperature specifications were changed during optical testing at the factory and at the launch base. (9} Some servo failures were caused by arcing between relay contacts and case. This was corrected by modifying the design, purchasing new relays, and reinspecting decoders. d. Although it is believed (erroneously) in some quarters that once a space project becomes operational, the quantity of technical changes decreases significantly, the GAMBIT experience was to the contrary, and in this respect was typical of all reconnaissance satellite effort. It was necessary to introduce technical changes throughout the entire liie of the GAMBIT project for two reasons: to correct design deficiencies which usually resulted in on-orbit anomalies and to improve the operational effectiveness of the system. As an illustration of these changes, Atch 6 shows the Contract Change Notifications (CCN) history of GE-580, the contract on which the last 2.0 OCVs were procure d. The originally negotiated price of was increased by the technical changes (and also to a slight degree by a cost overrun} to a growth of 73o/o over the three year period of performance. These changes were all necessary, and in fact were the means by which the operational performance was improved significantly during the later stages of the project. 5. Procurement a. Of the total dollar cost of the GAMBIT project, nearly was incurred on SAFSP contracts and the remaining on SSD and CIA contracts. HANDU: VIA BltMm CONTROL. SYSTEM ONLY CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE-70792-67 b.. The SAFSP contracts were of the following types: Total White Black CPFF 10 8 2 CPIF 14 12 2 FFP 5 4 1 L/C (terminated) l l 0 50 25 5 c. The most significant procurement development on the GAMBIT project was the introduction of a new incentive strncture devised by Gen Martin. Previous structures, written at a time when cost was the principal concern and the effect of GE workmanship problems on flight performance was not yet apparent, bad emphasized cost at the expense of performance. Under the new structure, the only way the contractor could earn fee was by successful in-flight performance. There were only negative incentives on coat a nd schedule, to insure responsible financial and production effort by the contractor. (Atch 4 desc:ribes the structure. ) d. Cost experience on the major contracts was: (1) Eastman: While CPFF, over-ran (l.. 711/o) While CPIF, under-ran (4. 2%) (2} GE: -76 (CPFF) over-ran (7. 3o/o) -155 (CPIF) over-ran (3. 8o/o} -432 (CPIF) over-ran (7.1%} -580 (CPIF over-ran (26. 2%) -7705 (CPFF) over-ran (. 9%) -2106 (CPIF) broke even 7 HANDLE V \A CYEM~'R "CONTROL. SYSTEM ONI.'t SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792·67 {3) LMSC: -92 (CPFF) Over-ran (2. So/o) -506 (CPIF) under-ran (3. 90/o) -670 (CPIF) unde r-ran (7. 3%) e. Schedule eXPerience showed that GE consistently lost fee on schedule. and only gained fee in this par ameter. Since the OCV was the pacing component in the system, GE schedule delays impacted on the launch dates. f. Performance experience showed fee gain by a ll contractors except on GE -155 (smallest GE contract for 4 OCVs) which lost on performance. Contracts having the old performance incentive showed small fee gains for performance. The only contract with the new performance incentive (GE-i80) showed a fee gain of for the performance j>a.Tameter (of a possible gain of schedUle penalties resulted in a net fee loss. g. Of all the GAMBIT contractors, GE pose d the greatest workload by far in contract administration. Agreements reached a t top management level were disseminated to lowe r levels slowly and/or with varying accuracies of interpretation. Positions taken during negotiations were more often intractable; resulting in discontinuance of negotiations. There were frequent disputes concerning whether directed work was within contract scope, and a growing tendency to request new contractual coverage for all minor directions from the SAFSP project office. These, combined with other examples too numerous to mention here, reflected unfavorably on GE's capability to manage the project. This is confirmed by Gen Martin's letters to DNRO in 1965 (BYE 40317-65 and BYE 40329-65) i.n which the poor GE performance was documented. 6. Cost a. As of 30 June 1967 the GAMBIT project had cost Fmal contract settlements over the next few years w ill cause minor changes in this amount. HANDL.E VIA B)'EMJI\1t CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE·70792-67 b. The includes the cost of hardware purchased for GAMBIT but reallocated by DNRO without reimbursement t9 other SAFSP projects. c. The non-recurring costs for d evelopment, industrial facilities, and one-time support totalled o r 24. 3'o of the total program cost. Two-thirds of the development cost was for development of the satellite vehicle by GE, and 18% was for development of the payload by EKC. d. Determination of unit costs is difficult because of overlapping contract periods and fiscal year accounting. It is possible to make a fairly accurate division of the recurring costs into two groups: those associated with the first 10 flights and those associated with the last 28 flights. On this basis .the unit costs of a GAMBIT flight averaged ____. for Ple first 10 and for the last 28. e. On a more arbitrary basis, the recurring costs were allocated to the vehicles flown in each calendar year, i.e., the cost of the four flights in CY 1963 was determined to be , etc. This allocation gives the following comparisons 63 64 65 66 67 Average Cost per flight Average Cost per day in orbit Average Cost per target photographed f. It is perhaps more meaningful after a project is completed to lump all costs (recurring and non-recurring) into one total and then determine the above averages. This gives Average Cost per flight Average Cost per day in orbit Average Cost per target photographed 9 \ HANDLE VIA B~ CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY l I i SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792-61 - 7. Summary The GAMBIT project can be said to have been highly successful in that: a. It produced the first high resolution satellite photography and thus filled the gap created by the cessation of U-2 flights following the Powers incident. b. Its record of successful launches, orbits and recoveries far surpassed the records of earlier systems, especially during comparable periods of the initial four years. c. It advanced the state of the art to the point where a follow-on larger system could be developed and flown so successfully that GAMBIT could be phased out. d. The record of cost control showed a steady decrease in cost of days in orbit and cost of targets photographed. e. Specific technical, procurement and cost problems successfully resolved during the GAMBIT project improved the capability of SAFSP. and indeed the NRC, to prosecute other satellite projects. Colonel, USAF 5 Atch Vi.ce Director 1. Proj history and list of flts 2. Graphs 3. Flt anomalies 4. Procurement Data 5. Cost Data HANDLE v·A tl\Y;';nA~ CONTROL SYSTEM ON\.~ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE-70792·67 ~I Attachment 1 Project History 1. A detailed historical record of the GAMBIT project is contained in the official SAFSP history being compile d by Mr Robe r t Perry. Volumes completed to date are on file in SP-3, Following is a summary of a few key points. 2. GAMBIT was the first NRO satellite project to produce reconnaissance photographs with high (2~ 3 ft) ground resolution. (The CORONA project, which began earlier and is still operating, produces photography of 8-15ft resolution. ·In the SAMOS series, the one E-1 flight achieved about 100ft resolution, the one E-5 camera flight (LANYARD) achieved 7-12ft resolution, and no photography was recovered from the five E-6 flights. ) 3. The photography produced by GAMBIT has been extremely valuable to the intelligence community. 4. GAMBIT has been managed entirely by SAFSP, which office had complete responsibility for development, production and operation of all system components. This contrasts with CORONA, where the CIA bas responsibility for the sensor subsystem. F or cover purposes, GAMBIT was overtly placed under ostensible SSD management until Dec 1962, when the overt assignment was changed to SAFSP: however, SAFsP covertly had the complete management responsibility from the outset. 5. There were a number of overt designators used throughout the life of the GAMBIT project: Sep 1961 Exemplar Dec 1961 Cue Ball and 483A Feb 196Z 698AL Aug 196Z 206 6. After earlier SAFSP parametric work had established feasibility, official GAMBIT go-ahead was given in Sep 1961. The first flight was I launched lZ Jul 1963 and the thirty-eighth and final flight was launched I I 1 HANO\..C VIA BYEMAN \ CONTROL SYSTl::M ONL.'I' , SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE·70792·67 4 June 1967. The first three flights were flown in the "Hitch-up" mode, wherein the Agena stage was not separated, but orbited attached to the Orbital Control Vehicle (OCV). In the remaining thirty-five flights, the Agena was programmed to separate and the OCV was the orbiting vehicle. 7. Principal components and their manufacturers were: Payload ocv RV Agena Stage Atlas Booster S/1 Camera Horizon Sensor EKC GE GE LMSC GOA Itek Barnes 8. During the life of the project there were these changes in key personnel: a. DNRO: Sep 1961 -Mar 1963 Mar 1963 -Sep 1965 Sep 1965 -Jun 1967 Dr J V Charyk Dr B McMillan Dr A H Flax (Initial Development) (Final Dev and Z.Z. Flights) ( 16 Flights) b. Director of Special Projects: Sep 1961 -Jun 1965 Jul 1965 -Jun 1967 GenRE Greer Gen J L Martin Jr (Dev and 19 Flights) (19 Flights) c. Project Director: Sep 1961 -Dec 1962 Dec 1962 -Aug 1966 Sep 1966 -Jun 1967 Col Q Riepe Col W G King Jr (Initial Development) (Final Dev and 31 Flights) (7 Flights) 9. The following pages contain a list of the thirty-eight GAMBIT launches. I II · ~ANDLE VIA BYEiv\1\ I ···' CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY ' I . . 'I -~ :· ' •.,_ '- ,j ~ 0) w 9 ti ~ ~ List of GAMBIT Flights W'~'\Jitn. ~.~~~w'l~·..,.. n c: t:n t:n 1!!1 B~st ~ Orbital Days on Orbit · Targets Ground Resolution ~ Sequence 1 2 OCV# 951 952 Launch Date 12 Jul 63 6 Sep 63 Orbit Yes. Yes Revs 18 34 Total 1. 125 2. 125 AcceEtab1e . 50 2. 125 1 Photo~raehed (ft) 3, 5 2 . 5 Recovery Yes Yes a i 3 953 25 Oct 63 Yes 34 2. 125 2. 125 3. 0 Yes H ti 4 954 18 Dec 63 Yes 18 1. 125 0 N / A Yes ~ 5 9 55 25 Feb 64 Yes 34 2. 125 0 N /A Yes 6 7 8 9 956 957 958 959 11 Mar 64 23 Apr 64 19 May 64 6 Ju1 64 Yes Yes Yes Yes 51 66 34 34 3. 188 4 . 125 2. 125 2. 125 3.188 4. 125 1.0 I0 3. 0 2. 5 2.0 50.0 Yes Yes Yes Yes e i t:n 10 960 14 Aug 64 Yes 66 4. 125 1.0 7.0 Yes ~ 11 962 23 Se p 64 Yes 67 4. 188 4.188 7. 0 Yes ~ 12 961 8 Oct 64 No 0 0 0 N/A N/A H ~ 1 3 963 2.3 Oct 64 Yes 67 4.188 0 N/A No 14 964 4 Dec 64 Yes 16 1. 0 . 5 2. 1 Yes ~ n 15 16 965 966 23 Jan 65 12 Mar 65 Yes Yes 67 67 4,188 4. 188 4.188 4.188 2. 0 (b) 2. 4 Yes Yes ~ H 17 967 28 Apr 65 Yes 83 5. 188 5. 188 2.0 Yes t:n 18 968 27 May 65 Yes 83 5.188 5,188 2. 0 Yes B t:n SPE~lAl HANDLING t< j ------- --- --__.. ____________ -- HANDL:: VI;\ CYE:,JAi'l CONTROL S r' S TEM Ot/LY --·-------·--·----- I !i H r~~,....__. r-~:fl, BYE-70792·67 ·I I ' ~ \_ ... (IJJrnm m~~~~~~~~ List of GAMBIT Flights (cont'd) Best Orbital Days on Orbit Targets Ground Resolution Sequence OCVH Launch Date Orbit Revs Total Acce;etable PhotograEhed (It) Recovery 19 969 2.5 Jun 65 Yes 18 1. 125 0 N / A Yes 2.0 2. 1 970 971 12. Jul 65 3 Aug 65 No Yes 0 67 0 4. 188 0 0 l N/A N/A N/A Yes 22 972 30 Sep 65 Yes 67 4.188 4.188 Yes 2.3 973 8 Nov 65 Yes 18 1. 12 5 .25 N IA (c) Yes 24 974 19 Jan 66 Yes 83 5. 188 5. 188 2.0 Yes 25 975 15 Feb 66 Yes 84 5.2.50 5. 250 2.0 Yes 2.6 976 18 Mar 66 Yes 99 6.188 5. 2.50 z.o Yes 27 977 19 Apr 66 Yes 98 6. 12.5 6.12.5 z.o Yes 28 978 14 May 66 Yea 99 6.188 6. 188 2 . 0 Yes 29 979 3 Jun 66 Yes 99 6 . 188 6. 188 2.3 Yes 30 980 12. Jul 66 Yes 131 8. 188 5. 50 2. 5 Yes 31 981 16 Aug 66 Yes 130 8. 125 6.75 2. 0 Yes 32 982 16 Sep 66 Yes 11 5 7. 188 7.188 2..0 Yes 33 983 12 Oct 66 Yes 131 8.188 8. 188 Ye s (/) 34 984 2 Nov 66 Yes 115 7. 188 0 N/A Yes m 0 -1 35 985 5 Dec 66 Yes 13 1 8. 188 8. 188 z. 5 Yes 0 z :o;: (/) r--,..-.... "7"\ '. . ' '~ .._ w\.ati t1 ' , r-, . ; i_ tfd.rf\ .----~f{rf ' . ~,,__ -' ... .....c; i1 -••• p l ~ · ."\ \''!!'I,., lo , • o ' 't• /' r'!vi L::~L ' nl .l!.... .. HANDLE V:A BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONL.Y -<(/) -1 m 3: (/) 0 0 z -1 :::0 ----- ---------·- tii c: -1 0 z (/) ,t:.. 0) ,t:.. .!::> (]) (.J'I Q H 1-i ~ YE. 70792-67 CJ List of GAMBIT Flights ~ SPlCl~I 'I ::'lDllVC (cont1d) en 1.'11 Best a H Ground Days on Orbi t ~ Orbital Targets Resolution Sequence CCVII Launch Date Orbit Revs Total Acceptable Photographed (ft) Recovery i ~ 36 986 2 Feb 67 Yes 131 8. 188 8.188 2.2 Yes 37 987 22 May 67 Yes 131 a. 188 8. 188 Yes 1-i H 38 988 4 Jun 67 Yes 130 8. 125 B. 12 5 Yes I ~ TOTALS z. 716 169.745 136.445 Notes: (a ) Targets shown fo r flights 1 and 14 are cloud free targets photographed and do not include other ~ ~ targets photographed. H ~ (b ) Resolution on flight 15 was 2. 0 ft on day 1 but degraded to 10 ft on day 4. ~ (c) Resolution on flight 23 was so poor it was not measurable. ~ en s en i t< SPECV\L HANDUNG HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY I i H Attachment #2. 1. Total targets photographed, by mission. 2. Average targets photographed, by calendar year. 3. Orbital Life by mission, actual vs planned. 4. Acceptable Life by mission, actual vs planned. 5. Ground Resolution, act ual (best) vs specified. 6. Costs, per flight, per day and per target. t:" -· • -..,. r-~ • ' I ' u \ I '• •. -.. ~ ~ -- SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792·67 SPECIAL HANDUNS ~t I I I I CONTROl. SYSTEM ONt..Y CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM .. 1•1 i r • 1~ ·. 'l • " " • 1.. ..l" ~· "' ~i ........ .. cz <.0 .. .... a; .. c'..J ~ • · -:-· O'l "' ... ........ • 0 "' ,._ . .. ..,-•f co • .. • "' .. ·• • .. .,~ • .." .~ '·. .. 0 • ... ,. ... • • r4 • ... ~ ,.. "' ~ ~ " ' ~ .,-... ~ ... <4 .. ~ ~ ~ .. >._ ~ ~ l ~ ~ .. ... ' ... ~ ...... >I> ~ ' J,:· ~ ~ l" r ~ .,J • • • . '!) ... -~ .... .. - I ~ .. -' I· • . " ,,. ... • J .. :., ... • II\ ..t 41 • I .- •.·, SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS ..... !>..~ •i Cll~ ,J '-'!! " '> (/! I ' .J _, 0 :1 0: .: 1 'I "" z I J. u 0 .. • .. • :..~ <;:.!" ~· 2'"~ r- t..O c'1 • O'l r- C> r- I..L.J >-.. txl '· ' ........ ' • . . • ' ~ - "'II. ... _, " ...• ' ~ "' < ., "' -1 . ... IQ . f. "' » .J .,. ... ~ (.) • .. low ' ' 't • t. l ' • •• " ..,_ .,<-~ Q .1\ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE-70792-67 ~I Vehicle 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 962 961 963 964 Attachment #3 GAMBIT Flight Anomalies Days on Orbit Total Acceptable Principal Anomalies 1. 1 • 5 Agena gas depletion, vehicle unstable. 2. 1 2. 1 Same 2. 1 2. 1 None 1. 1 0 RAGS package overheat and loss of rate. Vehicle unstable. OCV did not deboost. 2. 1 0 Excessive yaw through rev 16. Environmental door did not open on rev 22. 3. 1 3. l Excessive settling times 4. 1 4. 1 Bad component in horizon sensor mixer box caused pitch bias equal to 4 miles in-track error beginning rev 42. 2. 1 1. 0 Unstable in all three axes from rev 16. Horizon sensor could not discriminate · over Antarctic. 2. I 0 Same 4. 1 0 Slit misalignment and improper temperature correction caused out-offocus condition. Unable to load programmer after rev 19. 4. l 4. 1 Imprope r temperature correction caused out-of-focus condition. 0 0 No orbit. Agena engine failure. 4. 1 0 No retrofire on RV. capsule lost. 1.0 • 5 Loss of power to stabilization system on rev 9. Vehicle unstable. ~PECIAI. ~a.NDLING \ HANLLO:: >loA BYEMAN l : CONTROL. S'I'SiEM ONL.Y I SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792·67 GAMBIT Flight Anomalie s Vehicle 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 (cont'd) Days on Orbit Total Acceptable 4. 1 4. 1 4. 1 4. 1 5. 1 5. 1 5. 1 5. 1 1. 1 0 0 0 4. 1 0 4. 1 4. 1 1. 1 . 25 5. 1 5. 1 5.2 5. 2 6. 1 5.2 6. l 6.1 6. l 6. 1 6. l 6. 1 8. 1 5. 5 -~ ~ --::-"'-'\ ~ -~ . j h ; ;.:} Principal Anomalies Payloa d t emperature anomalies, Stereo mirror stuck forward. Stereo mirror stuck in 0 degree on rev 16. Mono photography only. P rimary door actuator. Same Power supply m a lfunction during ascent. No orbit. Booster failure. DC/DC power converter failed. Vehicle unstable. High gas consumption. Roll maneuvers restricted on day 4 . High gas consumption caused early mission termination. Stereo mirror failed to drive to proper angle beginning rev 2 5. Crab servo mechanism failed to move from zero. Stellar shutter malfunctioned. S/1 camera intermittent between revs 40 and 59. No commanding attempted after rev 71. Slit position commanding anomaly. Slow platen drive motor, Torque motor failure Stabilization system performed improperly. Vehicle clock malfunctioned, resulted in 58 degree pitch down, pressurization of the orbit propellant tanks and driving platen to full forward position. SPtC\~l HANDliNG HANCL.F;. \.,A atEJJIAN CONTftOL SYSTEM ONLT ...---------~~--------------------------- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE·70792·67 GAMBIT Flight Anomalies (cont'd) Days on Orbit Vehicle Total Acceptable Principal Anomalies 981 8. 1 6. 7 Stereo mirror stuck 0 degrees on rev 9, resulting in mono only 982 7. l 7. l High gas cons umption 983 8. 1 8. l Low thrust roll control valve leaked intermittently. 984 7. l 0 Outside hatch fa iled to jettison, preventing main camera photography. 985 8. 1 8. 1 Excessive time for roll at low rate. 986 8. l 8. 1 Software selected wrong slit on revs 7 through 25. Primary stored command system inoperative on rev 126. 987 * 8. 1 8. I None 988 * 8. 1 8. 1 None * Although both of these flights achieved planned performance, GE did not earn the maximum fee on the performance portion of the incentive structure per flight) for the following reasons. Prior to these flights, GE completed an analysis of component ·vibration data obtained on previous flights, from which they concluded that some components on these two vehicles would probably exceed the vibration levels for which they had been qualified originally. Accordingly, GE considered that some adjustment should be made in the fee structure for these two vehicles. The government contracting officer proposed to score each of these two flights at the average performance score awa rded on the previous 13 flights per flight). or to fly them under the full incentive provisions, with the provision that the same option would have to apply to both flights and would have to be elected prior to the first of these two flights. GE accepted the option of the aver age performance score, with the result I :;., .. ---'.' " .;..Y=:fJ!.'II'!'t CONTROL SYSTEM ONl..'l'. SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792·67 TOP SECREJ that these two flights earned a total performance fee of as opposed to that would h a ve otherwise been earned by the actual performance of the vehicles. The government contracting officer's rationale in accepting the apparent risk of guaranteeing GE a performance fee prior to flying either of these vehicles was based on the following considerations: a. Both vehicles at the time of the settlement on the average performance option had already been completely manufactured and shipped to the launch base, this manufacturing cycle having been carried out under the full terms of the incentive contract. Thus, the incentive had already had all" possible effect on the quality of these two vehicles, except for the actual launch activities, all of which were under detailed supervision of experienced Air Force personnel at Vandenberg AFB. b. These two vehicles had had all previously e stablished improvements carried out completely in the above manufacturing process. Therefore, they had a higher probability of successful operation than any of the preceding 13 flights. I ' I I I I ·I I HANPLE VIA BYEJ,,~ c ::l"iTROi.. SYSTEM ON-':' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM I BYE-70792-67 I I I I ~~ I I I I I Attachment 4 I Procurement Data I GENERAL l. SAFSP contracted for the payloads, Orbital Control Vehicles (OCVs), Agena peculiars, Recovery Vehicles (RVs), horizon sensors, mission planning and miscellaneous support effort. z. SSD contracted for the Atlas boosters and launch service, standard Agena and launch services, satellite control, aerospace MTS and miscellaneous support effort. Funds for these items were released to SSD by SAFSP. 3. CIA contracted for the S/I cameras, film, roll joints, and certain RV parts. Funds for these items were released to CIA by the NRO comptroller at SAFSP request. 4. The SAFSP contracting was accomplished by an procurement division collocated with the GAMBIT project office. Division chiefs were: Sep 1961 -May 1965 Jun 1965-Jun 1967 INCENTIVES 5. Several types of incentive structure were used. Following is a narrative description of them, showing actual results obtained: General Electric a. Contract -76 (white) and (black) covered development and production of the first six OCVs and RVs. (1) -76 began as CPFF, but a performance incentive was introduced on the last two flights. Under this incentive, 100 possible points could be HANCLE. VIA BYEMJ!..1l CONTROL SYSTEM ONI..Y SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792·67 earned during orbit and recovery and 70 points was par. At par the contractor received target fee, at above par he earned additional fee up to a maximum increase of per flight , and below par he lost fee up to the same maximum. Of the two flights, one earned maximum fee and one lost maximum fee, thus canceling each other. The cost overrun was 7. 5%, but since there was no cost incentive, thi s did not penalize GE. Final fee situation was («?'o is of actual cost): Target fee Maximum possible fee Actual fee (2) was CPFF throughout, with a fixed fee of {6.4'fo). There was a small overrun of less than 1%. b. There followed a series of four follow-on white contracts and one black contract with a life covering the lives of all four white contracts. (1) -155 (white) produced four OCVs. It had the same performance incentive as -76, but added a negative schedule incentive penalizing GE per week up to a maximum penalty of as well as a cost incentive under which GE could earn or lose 7. 871% respectively of underruns or overruns up to a maximum gain/loss of . Actual results were losses on all three parameters: Performance Schedule Cost Total Final fee situation was («yo is of actual cost) Target fee Maximum possible fee Actual fee (2) -432 (white) produced 12 OCVs. It had the same general performance incentive, except that the par was higher and the maximum gain/ loss per flight was The negative schedule incentive was HANDLE VI A BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONL.Y CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE-70792·67 per week penalty up to a maximum penalty of The cost incentive had graduated sharin·g ratios with maximum gain/loss of Actual results were: Performance gain Schedule loss Cost loss Net loss Final fee situation was (% is of actual cost): Target fee Maximum possible fee Actual fee (3) -580 {white) produced 20 OCVs, of which 16 were flown. The incentive structure was changed significantly effective with the second of these 20 OCVs. (a) For the first CCV, the performance incentive was generally the same as -432, except that the par was higher and the maximum gain/loss per flight wae There was a savings clause that where final score was lower than par the score would be adjusted to equal the average of previous flights on this contract but not lower than par. The negative schedule incentive was per week penalty up to a maximum penalty of The cost incentive was 2enerally the same as on -43Z except that the maximum gain/loss was .....___ {b) Effective with the second of the ZO OCVs, the incentive structure changed. The performance incentive was based on a list of critical events and on the ratio of the number of revs until the first critical event occurs to the number of planned revs. GE could earn an additional 7. 51fo above target fee of 7. 5% for having no critical events during all the planned revs, and lose fee progressively because of critical events down to the point where there was no fee if a critical event occurred at 50% of the planned revs. There was a savings clause under which SAFSP could unilaterally award a higher fee if the intelligence obtaine d indicated a higher Ofo of mission achievement. Maximum gain/loss per flight on performance was for OCVs 2 through 11 and for OCV 12 3 HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONLX i I I I SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS avE-70792·67 through 20 (8-day birds). (The last four birds were not flown and were awarded average performance fees of each. ) Schedule incentive was negative only, with penalties of per day up to a. maximum penalty of Cost incentives were negative only, with sharing ratio of 80/20 up to overrun and 70/30 thereafter, up to a. maximum penalty of!liiiiii.BJ (c) Pending completion of contract termination, we estimate the following result s: Performance Schedule Cost Net (d) Final fee situation is estimated to be (o/o is of actual cost): Target fee Maximum possible fee Actual fee (4) was to have produced three OCVs. This was issued as a letter contract which was negotiated but terminated before the definitive contract was executed. The OCVs were in various stages of completion at the time of termination. wars to have had the same incentive structure as , but since it was terminated from letter contract status there was no incentive operation. Actual fee paid was as set by the terminating contracting officer. This is 7. 6% of actual cost. (5) was a. black contract covering mission -revealing aspects of the production of all but the first six OCVs and RVs. It had incentives on two elements: (a) Performance. The incentive was on how well GE integrated the CIA-furnished S/I cameras. GE could earn points on the following formula: 100 x no. pairs of acceptable photos obtained 95% of no. pairs available at liftoff HANDL E VIA S~MA~ CONTROL. SYSTEM ONL.V' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE·70792·67 The maximum fee gain/loss per flight was Pending completion of contract termination, we estimate the contractor will earn about on performance. (b) Cost. The contractor could lose or earn ZOo/o of overruns or underruns up ~aximum gain/loss of Pending completion of contract termination, we estimate no gain or loss on cost. (c) Estimated final fee position (%of actual cost): Target fee (7. So/o) Maximum possible fee (12. 5%) ...._____ _ Actual fee (7, 6%) Eastman Kodak (6) All the GAMBIT payload development and the production of 45 payloads was done on black contract (a) The contract began as CPFF in Oct 1960 and was converted to CPIF in May 1964 effective with the Z3d payload. At the time of conversion we recognized a cost overrun of (6. 7%) and in effect started over again from scratch on the CPlF basis. (b) From payload no. 23 on, the incentive was on cost only, with fee gain/loss of 3% of target cost without dollar limit (up to 15% of cost). Pending comoletion of contract termination, we estimate EKC will earn a fee gain of (c) Final fee situation will thus be (%is of actual cost): Target fee (7. 3%) Maximum possible fee (15%) Actual fee · L----~--(7. 8%) Lockheed (7) White contract -92 called out development work and the peculiarization of 10 Agenas as GAMBIT stages. It was CPFF, with a fixed fee of 5 HANDL.E lilA BYE~ CONTROL SYSTEM ONL.'( SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792-67 (8) White contract -506 was a CPIF follow-on for peculiarization o£ 12. Agenas, with incentives on cost only. LMSC earned a fee gain of Final fee situation was (o/o is of actual cost): Target fee (7. Oo/o) Maximum possible fee (8. 80/o) Actual fee (7.4%) (9) White contract -670 was a CPIF follow-on for peculiarization of 13 Agenas, with incentives on performance and cost. LMSC earned fee gains of on performance and on cost for a total gain of Final fee situation was (% is of actual cost): Target fee (4. 9%) Maximum possible fee (11. 2%) Actual fee (7. 8o/o) (10) White contract -874 was a CPIF follow-on for peculi.arization of 6 Agenas, with incentives on performance and cost. Pending completion of contract termination, we estimate LMSC will earn a fee gain of on performance and break even on cost, with the following final fee situation (% is of actual cost): Target fee (5. 2%) Maximum possible fee (11. 2o/o) Actual fee (7.8%) (11) None of the above LMSC CPIF contracts contained the new incentive structure described for GE Barnes (ll) White contract -666 was a CPIF contract for production of 17 model 155 sensors, with incentives on schedule and cost. The contract was terminated, and there was no fee gain/loss because of the incentives. Actual fee paid was as set by the terminating contracting officer. (13) White contract -840 was a CPIF contract for production of 20 model 151 sensors, with incentives on cost and schedule. Pending HANDL£ VIA BYEMAM CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BVE-70792·67 completion of contract termination, we estimate the following :results: Schedule gain Cost gain Total gain Fmal fee position will thus be (o/o is of actual cost): Target fee (3. So/o) Maximum possible fee (8. 4o/o) Actual fee (7.60/o) TRW (14) White contract -841 was a CPIF contract for mission planning software, with incentive on cost only. This was a follow-on to earlier CPFF and FFP contracts. The contractor broke even on cost. The actual fee was thus the target fee of C_ which was 8. 20/o of actual cost. (15) White contract -1014 was a CPIF follow-on contract to -841, but provided mission planning for both GAMBIT and G-3. The contract is still active. We estimate the GAMBIT portion of the work will break even on cost, and that the actual fee for GAMBIT will be the target fee of which is 4. 5% of cost. 6. Listings The following pages contain listings of SAFSP contracts for GAMBIT and a summary of results of those which bad incentive features. 7 ' i"! . I • j' ~ - .-, -·1 ·.· ---:--. HAN !::LS VIA BYEMAtl CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY '-.. --.\. ,,.. -· - Lht of ~A BYE-70792·67 Number ~ Secur With E'or Lite FJ,_g.al Price Fee Earned {~ of actual cost ) PAYLOAD CPJrll' for 22 then CPU Black EKC Dev and Production of 45 pa.y~oads Oct 6o-JUl. 67 (? .8~) .Q£Y -76 -155 -432 -580_q88 CPFF CPIF CP:rF CPIF Lfc CPFF CPill' White White White White White Black Black GE GE GE GE G! GE GE Dev' Prod and Iaunch or 6 ocv Prod and Launch ot 5 OCV Prod and IAunch of 11 OCV Prod and Inch of 20 OCV~part.term) Prod and Inc)l of 3 OCV term) Mission Pevea.liJ18 vork on 10 SVs Same, plus Incentives on Integration ot 32 GP'E S/I Cluneras Dec 61-fo&y 64 ~62-Sep 64 Ji>r 63-Sep 65 fo&r 64-J\ul 67 Mar 66-M!r 67 Dec 6o-Sep 64 Oct 63-Jun 6? I (6.3~~ (5.8~ (? .1~) ~2.7~~7.6~ (6.4~ (7 .6~) MEliA PECULIARS I -92 -506 -670 -874 CPP'P' ~IF CPIF CPD' White White White White IMSC tNSC tNSC IJi!SC 10 Vehicles 12 Vehicles 13 Vehicles 6 Vehicles Mlr 62-Jun 64 ... 64-Jun 65 1 Apr 65-0ct 66 Apr 66-Jun 67 I(7 (7 .4~) .0~) (7.8~~(7 .8~ HORIZON SENSOR -503 CPFF -666 CPIF -840 CPIF -16o CPFF White White White White Bernea Barnes l!Brnes EKC Sensor Development 17 Model 155 Sensors 20 Model 151 Sensors 1 Prototype and 4 Flight Jotldels Nov 63-.Apr 64 Sep 64-lbv 65 Apr 65-foBy 66 May 62-Dec 64 I (7 .6~) (7 .o~) (7 .6~) (5.8~) C/) m n .... 6 z :c;: ~ .s::. ()) - ---- - ·------· HANOl.e: CONTROL VIA BYEMAN SYSTEM ONLY C/) .... m 3: C/) n 0 z -4 ::0 iiic: -4 6 z C/) ~ co ..... !J H ':"'"'rv 65 -757 FFP White Philco Spiral Decay Study Feb 65-Jan 66 FFP White D C Power Supply Fail ure Analysis Sep 65-Nov 65 -895 -0014 CPFF White GE O:Jmm.a.nd Gen and Sof'tvere Dec 66-current (8.2J) ~ FFP Black U!SC Oltter/Sealer and Psrts Ckt 64-lbv 65 CPFF Black GE Command Generation Jul 65-Dec 66 I (7 .3~) -533 CPIF White GE Engineering Study Jan 64-Jun 64 I<1 .o~> ~ -665 Cl'FF White EKC VAFB support 12 Oct 64-curr (8.4~) 8 H ~ RELATED WORK (Funded by GAMBIT) ~ CPIF White STL M1ssion Opt1m1~t1on 20 Apr 65-20 ~r 66 I (8.2~) (') -790 I CPFF Wbite Lev Altitude Stud7 9 Mr!r 64-27 Jul 64 (7 .1~) -573 - H (/) ~ I.IJ (/) I< ..--. ,..., ............ ......_ -,...... ~ -- .. ' ... •, \ ( '. ' ..: i I. :~ JL . . . . . . . ~. :: ,~ i; (') L ·~u o~~~··""~ ~ HAN!)lE VIA BYEMAN 8 CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY ~ H -···------·-----·-_... i ~ftft l'fll..ft tP..urP' ~[\1 b BYE-70792-67 Overall Fee Earnings Principal SAFSP Contractors on Total GAMBIT Work Actual Cost Actual Fee Contractor No. of Contract& ($mil) ($ mil) (% of Actual Cost) r-- GE 10 5. 6 EKC 3 7. 7 LMSC 4 7. 4 STLITRW 4 9.2 Barnes 3 7. 1 1 7. I .J 26 6. 1 (average) Note: Ab ovc dollar figures represent all SAFSP GAMBIT contracts except five small FFP contracts. en m C') -t 0 z :c;: en -< en -t m ~O:t·lDLF. ·.'L' r;-,c:;,!l\1{ en C') l~P ~!=f:~f=-r 3: 1"'01~ T'Hul_ "''STEM -:-JILY, 0 z -t :::0 --. ---------ijj c -t 0 z en ~ CD "' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SPECIAl. HANDUNG BYf-70792-67 Attachment #5 ~I COOT DATA l. 'lbe total. program of includes the following: a. 'Ihirty-eight satellite vehicles launche d plus two canplete for storage and two complete except for syst ems test. Additional parts for three systems are included. ~ cost does not include the l ong tem storage of the excess hardware. b. Forty payloads excluding a possible underrun of recoverable in FY 1968 or 1969. c. Forty-five Atlas boosters and launch services f or th1rty-e1gbt launches. Five boosters have been r eallocated t o bu"t> costed against GAMBIT. 'lhese have been removed f rcm the unit cost recapitulation shown on the page referred t o in paragraph 2.b., below. 'lhe launch services cost i ncludes maintenance of capability at WTR until 30 June 1967. d. Forty-:f'iv e Agenas and launch se:rv1:ces for thirty-eight launches. Five Agenas have been allocat ed to and the costs have been treated the same as the Atlas coats, above . Forty sets of Agena peculiar equipnent were procured. e. Aerospace, mission planning, and general support costs include effort through 30 June 1967. 2. 'lbe :following pages show : a. GAMBIT cost summary by FY with line 1tems as in monthly Financial Status Reports . b. Non-recurring inves"bnent summary, unit cost for the development phase of 10 launches1 and unit cost for t he remainillg units. Each li::le item shows the inclusive equivalent units. c. Development cost by fiscal year. This information relates directly to that referred to in 2.a., above. d. Flight cost per calendar year. This s1.mmary shows the cost in the ce.l.endar year of the flight and does not consider l ong lead funding. \ ---, SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-70792·67 Attachment 116 CCN History of GE Cont ract CCJ.ITRUL. S'!S r EM ONl.Y ----· ----·-- 484 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP SECRET BYEMAN -tSi NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WASHINGTON, O.C. - I Tl1E HRO STAFF I 19 September MEMORANDill.f FOR DR . FLAX SUBJECT: SUmmary Report of GAMBIT Program STATEMEl'iT OF mE PROBLEM General Ma.rtin has submitted a summary of the GAMBIT program. DISCUSSION The highlights of the report are as follows: General Martin' s cover letter points out that: (1 ) Most of the serious failures were associated with the GE equipment. (2) The overall f ee of 5. £51, for GE versus the LMSC and ·EK fees of 7·4~ and 7·7~ reflects the GE problems. (3) Four missions had ground resolutions and 11 had r esolutions approach1ng or equal to 2 feet. analysis summarizes tbe growth in capability as the system matured, the technical problems encountered, and the procurement aspects such as the incentive fee structure and costs. AttaChment jl consists of a s hort project history. Attachment #2 consists of 6 graphs : Graph 1 -Targets per mission Graph 2 -Average targets per mission by calendar year Graph 3 -Acceptable versus planned days on orbit l_n_ _al tOOfltOI •o.__ t _ern.___ car'f_..-.._ o• l co•1n BYEMAN TOP SECRET 2 ...,,, UC.LUOCO fJK)II jlUlOIIUTIC ltE,I.t.O INCi DOD OU,[CTI~( !i200 10 OO£S NOl ''H'r SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS TOP SECRET BYEMAN Graph 4 -Days prior to recovery versus planned days on or bit Graph 5 -Actual (best) ground resolution by flight Graph 6 -Costs per flight, per day, and per target Attachment 13 is a summary of flight anomali es . A f ootnote concerning the last two missions explains that even though the missions had no major problems, GE did not get the maximum performance incentive for these flights because prior to the flights GE accepted the Government contracting officer' s offer to score the flights at the average score awarded on the previous 13 flights. Attac.bment #4 is primarily an analysis of the effect of the incentive contracts. Attachment #5 tabulates t he total costs. Attach!nent Jj6 is the CCN history of GE Contract which illustrates comment (in paragraph 4d of h is report) that the quantity of technical changes do not decrease as a space project becomes operational . RECOMMENDATION That you take note of this report. C:O N1l0t.MO In:ternal ••••c~u. CQf'Y 1 CO PI IS TOP SECRET o• l BYEMAN 2 2 'loQU• P'#IGt Of nt'LODID f.aM A\IT0.411C U'IADtNG COC1111111 .,.". DOC! CIIUCn'II 5200\0 OOU. MOTAftf' l 'll CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ftEPI...Y TO UTM 01": SP-1 SUBJECT~ Analysis Of Gambit (110) Project ro: IlNRO (Dr McLucas) l. h you requested, the subject repor'l# is submitted as ao analysis of Gambit (110}, Fli&hts 1 thrOUe~ 221 coverizl8 the same aspects as a previous report of Cambit {206}. 2. I thi.nk you will consider the success thi.s progr~ has hsd vith obtaillillg higher resolution photography and in reducing cc.$t per target as quite acceptable. With the further increase in primry film capacity, dual recoverv units and projected use of increased battery power and you can expect some :further i.nxproven:ents in these areas ror the follow-on systems. l At.ch .BrigGeneral, USAF -==-letter, subject as Director aboVe, w/5 Ateh.s vwl::L. JE ~ ...... ---.. l ~ ::···-:-:. ~·,:-:: · :-::: ·: AUTOMATIC " ~:v:; viR 5200.10 J.0c:::. ;mr APPLY SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS pvt-16767•70 73, ..?7/-r ~1>~!97D FROM: SUBJ: Analysis of Gambit (llO) Project W: SP-1 l. Purpose and Sco:ge: a. ~s paper anal.yzes the effectiveness of the recently completed Gambit {110) Project, Flights 1 through 22. The folloving parameters are addressed: Intelligence, Operations, Technical, Procurement and Costs. 2. Intelligence: a. As for the missions associated with the 20 successful recoveries, intelligence tar&rets were programmed into the flight vehicles. Only 56.5~, , of the progra.mmed targeU. were processed and readout into clear usable intelligence photography. ~e dll'ferecce between targets programned and targets r.=::Arr.:.t ;,;a~ a result in some cases of operational problems causing poiDtiLO errors or degraded resolution, but most si.gnificantly1 a resul.t of target cloud cover. b. As can be seen from Attachment 2 (Figures 1 and 2)1 the number of prog:ram:aed and readout targets steadily increased. 'l'nis vas attributed to: (1) an increase in mission lifetime; (2) choos1Dg launch times so as to take advantage of s\llli'Der high sun angles to permit asceiiding1 as veil as deCend1ng photography; (3) a Il¥)re accurate orbit drag prediction1 thus decreasing the photography burst time and fi.lrn used; (4) an increase in film quantity vitb the use of ultra-thin base film; (5) an increase 1n desired targets; end (6) improvements in software used for target selection. c. In addition to the increase in target acquisition, there was also a trend of improvement 1n best ground resolution as show in Attachment 2 (Figure 5). ~e increase in resolution was lllOstly a resul.t of better optic lll!!.ter1Als, better optics poUsh1ng controls and ... better optics al:18nment and focus1Dg procedures at the Eastman Kodak Company factory. A specification goal was set to achieve resolution, vbile at 90 nm altitude, of a target with a two to one contrast ratio. 'lhis goal was achieved and slightly surpassed Vith the :.f'1nal. mission, Flight 22., \lhich bad e. best ground resolution or cieterm1.nat1on. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 3· Operations: a. Of the 22 missions attempted, 2 flights (Flights 5 and 11) were complete failures. Flight 5 did not reach orbit because the Titan IIIll Second Stage failed ·16 seconds after start. The :Flight ll re-entry vehicle parachute deployment system failed durina re-entry causing all of its filmed targets to be lost in the w ter. b. Two systems were injected into orbit with fa.r higher energy than plamled. A ground guidance station problem at Vandenberg AFB resulted in a termi.Dation of ground guidance col!lllla.llds and permitted the Flight 18 Titan IIIB Second Stage to burn to depletion even after desired velocity had been reached~ '!be Agena added 1ts planned increase 1n velocity leaving the injection velocity and the apogee altitude fa.r too high. Flight 18 had a later orbit adjust problem 'Which caused an ea.rly mission termination on Da.y 7. Flight 1.9 injection .velocity meter under-measured the change in velocity produced by the Ageoa n:ain engine. '!be Agena burned to depletion. Apogee altitude vas 598 nm. 1he specified maximum apogee altitude of 270 nm vas more than doubled. c. Other than the complete failures or Flights 5 and 11, and the ea.rly termi.Dation of Flight 18, the other flights were considered very successful.. Although most of the 19 successful flights did have SOme flight hardware problems and operational. constraints1 c:perations personnel were able to use redundant !3:Y!!te~ and change opera"t1ng procedures to continue the missions until successtully completed. d. 1he most signi:f'icant operational. details for each flight a.re given in Attachment 3· -some important flight data are given 1.n Attachment lJ ~ble 1. 4. Technical: a. Pbotogra.}ilic Fayloa.d Section (1} Camera-Optics Module (a) During the conceptual phase o! the Gambit (110) system, it was recognized that the large optics Which ~rovided the main performance improvement over the previous Gambit {2o6) program would provide the most serious manufacturing and testing challenge. Initial attempts to introduce unconventional manufacturing techniques and substrates tor the large reflectors failed, resulting in dependence on conventionally polished tused silica reflectors, Two important developments resulted 1n the successf'ul employment of the conventional tecl:Diques: interferometer testing and· selectro-plating. ~using the interferometry to draw a map of the surface errors in the reflective pieces, and the sel.ectro-plating to fill in the surface where i.Ddicated by the interferometry1 the overall surface irregula.rities could be reduced to specified value. System assembly and testing showed steady improvement 2 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS from the first unit on. By Flight 18, both the optical componenta and the assembled camera-optics module were beillg produced at or very near specification quality. (b) A peroistent problem with primary camera drive ·smoothness \18.G present on o.ll units in the form of fine corduroy banding at 250 Hz on the primary photo8raphy. Performance loss due to this lack of SIIIOOthDess was calculated to vary from none to 30~ loss of resolution. A satisfactory fiX has not been determined. (2) Satellite Re-entry Vehicle (SRV) (a) ~e SRV employed on Flight ll :failed to deploy its lllli.n parachute 8.IId was lost in the recovery zone nea.r Hawaii. Failure investigation did not pinpoint the failure cause, but weaknesses in design were discovered and corrected in the area of the thermal cover bridle and its deployment system. (A similar failure on Flight 25 second SRV in the subsequent double bucket series indicated that the true failure may have been inadequate design of the thermal cover ejection system for the flight environment encountered. It appears that the solution is to deploy the thermal cover earlier.) !Ihe SRV vas essentially the same as the Gambit (206) model, and except for the catastrophic failure on Flight ll, the SRV operated well. (3) Electromechanical Hardware (a) Except for minor random failures, the electro uecha.nical (non-optical) portions o:f the photographic payload section performed reliably. No uajor problems were encountered in deployment. {~) Post Flight Evaluation of System Performance (a) While post flight measures of photographic quaJ.ity showed a parallel improvement with the improvements in optical quality show by factory test, a performance, or resolution, gap appeared to exist between the levels of the two. On some flights, this gap was as much as 6Q% of the factory predicted resolution. TWo possible causes ot the resol.ution gap -were investigated: hardware ms.l..f'unction between factory test a.nd f'li.sht and illadequate a.na.lytical modeling of system performance. '.lhese tliO possibilities vere explored in parallel, with no firm conclusions reached at the end of' the series. b. Satellite control Section (scs) 'Ihere 'Were no major technical problems associated with the SCS in the Gambit (110) program. 'lhe hard'Ware was essentially a continued production to that used on the Gambit {206) program. The inadequate design and quality control problems which were corrected on Gambit (2o6) were success~ carried through on Gambit {110). Most of' the technical effort on this program ws directed to eDhancing the reliability of the hardware and addi.ng a Redundant Attitude Control System (RACS) on · Handle Via 3 ~"i' t !? ~-~~ ~ t\J ~-~~ ~ i :~ l ; .• •t! _· , r·.: [.J ,..1 l\. ,,.,.: ... ti" c , . t II VI J \0 j1 \ on~~ol -Systc~ Only CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Vehicle 16. 'lh!s improvement had the capability of providing redundancy to the Primary Attitude COntrol System (PACS) for on orbit vehicle attitude control onl.y. The availability of RACS proved extremely :fortunate: on Flight 17 PACS failed and RACS va.s activated on Rev 4o and operated successfully for the remainder of the !'light; on Flight 20 PACS failed and RACS vas activated on Rev 52 and opeJ:ated successf'ully for the remainder of the :fllght. c. Roll Joint (RJ) 'lhe original RJ used on Vehicles 1 through ll used a belt drive 'With a brushless motor for the prinary servo system. Redundancy vas provided by a second brush-type motor 'Which could be irreversibly ei!888ed but which vould also drive the primary motor and 'belt if used. Capabi.lity of the RJ was 1,250 rolls at a roll rate of degrees/ second. For Vehicles 12 through l5 the servo systems vere changed to tl.'O brush-type motors 'With :tr1ct1on drive. 'l'o provide a fully reversible dual system, the friction drive engage mechatlism was cha.nged from a spring loaded pyro activated device to spring loaded, electrical linear actuators. Ca'DB.bility was extended to 2,250 total rolls with an avereae roll rate of degrees/second. For Vehicles 16 through 22 the redundant drive 1:10tor was replaced Yith a new design "lo~~g-llfe" motor. With a new Servo Electronics Assembly, including an inverterJ the redundant systelrl. could nov operate on unregulated power. ~e primary purpose for these cbal:lges to t he red.U!l"'...ant system on Vehicle 16 vas to ga.iJ1 flight er-~l"i.ence on one of the two "long-life" (7,000 roll capability) servo syatema wich "WOuld be eUective on Vehicle 23. 5. Procurement: a. Of tbl! annroxiz:ate total of cost for Gambit {110) • was contracted directly by Specia1 ProJects tor the satellite syatem and related support. Procurement of the rell3iDder vas bandl.ed by Space and Missile Sy&tems Organ.1zation (SAMSO) ;for the booster ayste and related. support. Funds were prOVided to SAMSO by SAFSP. b. Five of the program's major contracts implemented a novel incentive tee arrangement personally developed by Major General Job.D Y.a.rtin, Jr for use en satellite aystems. His paper entitled1 "A Specialized Incentive Contract Structure for Satellite ProJects" b.B.s become the established incentive guide tor satellite progr&l:I.S. His approach emphasizes vehicle system perforllance, with cost and schedule trade-o!fs. c. Details ot the program contractual arrangements re coutA1ned in Attacbltent 4.. SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS 6. Cost: a. As of 1 April 1970, the Gambit (110) project, Flights 1 through 22, bad cost • Final contract settlements over the next !ev years aay cause minor changes in this amount. b. ot the was determined as recurrillg cost ror the 22 flights. An estiuate or individual flight recurring cost by calendar year was made in an effort to shov the trend or decrease 1n cost per mission day flow and also the decrease cost per clear target readout. Because of long lead fund.i'Dg., the recurring cost attributed to a calendar year of flights my not have been t\mded during the calendar year in vhich the launches occurred. Becaw;e of overlapping contract periods, recurring costs were divided. between those associated vitb the first six flights and those assOciated vi~ the last siXteen flights. Recurring cost of the ,· Redundant Roll Joint System and Redundant Attitude Control SystetD wre not effective until Flight• 10, l2 and 16 respectively. Recurring cost by calendar year then followed by adding recurring cost or those tllgb.ta launched during a calendar year. c. From the supporting·attachments the f"olloving aata of .1'able C-~ ,.. gathered so as to deterJid.ne the succeeding clata of 'J,kbl! C.;2. llo. of Qr.leudar l'lo. of Prilllar;y M1adon . Clear 1\u-geta Recurring Total Year Fl1ghta Days Flovn Readout Cost Coat 1966 3 20 1 1967 6 + 1* 59 '~ 1968 1 + 1* 67 1.969 4 4o ~l 22 l86 .··~~~ = I All coate are 1n ~'~''" ., * Misaion h1lurea . Ha=tdle Via ~~.fT"" ~AN f.~ ~J ' ·,3 !\j~ . ~ . . .. . ~~ r. ~..:tl C.:>ni::L"ol Systam Only CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TABLE c-2 Oal.enc1.ar Cost per Cost per Cost per Cle ·r Yea.r Fligbt Mission Day ~get Readout ~----------~~--~------~~~-=~~~==~~~ 22 Iaunch Average** Al1 coats are in dollars * Recurring cost only **'l'ot&l Cost Most aigni.f'icant :from the above data is that the cost per target ~e constantly go1Dg down to an average in calendar year 1969 ot about ~clear target readout. FortuMtely, costa per target of Gambit ~UO) w:re far more favorable tbao tor G&lllbit (206) which considered f'or the ma~ority of' caaea, targets recovered rather than cloud :tree targets. (Reference report to SP-1, "Analysis of Gambit ProJect" dated 24 August 1961. ) d. More detailed recurring &Dd non-recurril:lg cost dAta are included 1n Atta.cb.me.nt 5· Costa per flight, per mission da.y &Dd per clear ~treadout by cal.eDdar year are charted on Attachmmlt 21 P1gure 6. 1· SUumLr;y: 'Jhe Gambit (110) project, Flights l through 221 was highl)r succeaatul in that: a. Its capab111ty or obta1ni.ng high resolution photography a good :from ita beginning and w.a continual.ly bettered until ita conclusion to the poi.Dt onl;y consi~ered possible at its onset. ·. b. With the cost inflation of wages and materi&ls, its cost per llliaaion dAy and coat per filmed target continued to decrease• .c. !be record of aucceaatul miaaione completed even it n~t perrect, vas outatand1DS• Handle Via ~"\\~\~:\It AN. 6 ;::.\ ~~ ~"' t·.~ . l . . • • . ···' • '5 t r: .,., .:~r 1:;. System Only SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS -,I • .. .. 1 11 • Ia : ~ . r.:' J ·.·'l·:,;,, ~ w _'!. 1w .....;. • ...o4• .._;.~ 111 d. Action vas taken to add features t o 1ncreaoe rel1nb1lity auch as the Redundunt Attitude Control System vhich proved to be required on Flights 17, 18 and 20. Action was taken to increase CApability as in the case or technical improvements vith the optics system. 5 Atchs 1. Project History 2. Graphs 3. Flight :Brief 4. Procurement Data 5 • Cost De.ta I ! t ! ~'""'·'l'":'h":c, schedule end perloxma.nce errangecents. However, concurrent vt~tlt l;be change i n AF-619 the "Specialized Incentive Contract Structure" •.,-a.s implemented. The same performance a.nd cost :pa..~ters as tbos~ ~.A.£-619 vere used. Vehicle performance vas ide!!.tical to ~.!..6-19. ~contract experienced an overrun of 17.(P,. As a result the :final adJusted fee rate was 10.44 perce~. Final fee is as follovs: Target fee Actual fee c. Contracts AF-696 (vhite) and ( lack) -were originally negotiated as sustaining :follov-on effort :for pecuJ.ia.rization of sixteen additional SSOJ.l! Standard Agena vehicles into GAl-ffiiT SCS vehicles and roll joints (:?P.S 's), ::-<:spective~. However, the contracts vere amended to include tlle development {non-recurring) efiort associa.ted w1th longer life1 redundant capabllity vehlcJ.es to be :fl.mm on subsequent contracts. (1) AF-896 o:-:f.ginally covered engineering, manufacturing, test and l.auncll support oi' sixteen SCS vehicles. Later the changes "Were ad.ded :for long life development, SGLS, :RP.CS & DACS. The same incentive structure as AF-61.9 vas used, with the eddition of a schedule incentive -penalty of' one-h.:a.lf percent o:f target cost up to a maximum applied e.t per da.y. Cost incective penalties applied over a range up to % of target cost. Cost sha--ing ratios of 90/10 fra::l ~1~over target cost, E!n/20 from l&j,-3C/f, arid 70/30 rro:n 31 to 45~ vere awlied. Actual results ve:re 1~ vehicle perfoma.nce, schedule pene.lties of and a cost penalty of actual results vere: Target :fee Final fee 2 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS .-..~ -···· · "'~ c~ · --: -.-· ., L 1 (2) produced sixteen PAS's _(roll joints) and ell . develo~nt ~a non-recurring effort !or the long life redundant capability. ':'he identical incentive fee parameters as AF-896 were employed. An overrun of l'f, was incurred. All vehicles were on schedule and 1~ successful perfor:nance was scored. Ac:tuals were: Target fee Final fee I _j General Electric Light Military Electronics Department. Later: Aerospace Electronics Department a. Contracts »-594 and AF-897 (both white) covered the development and production efforts of the vehicle Con:mand Subsystems including STE1 AGE and facilities. (l) AF-594 was negotiated as a CPIF wi th cost and schedule parameters. under this incentive arrangement the contractor shared cost variances rrc.n target cost up to plus or minus 5% at the ratios of' 85/15. Target tee was 8.~. The contractor could earn as much as 13i or lose dovn to ~~-res-.,ectively1 :for undernms or overruns to a ma.ximum tmi nhoss of . Schedule incentive was a penalty of to~ the first unit and :for each subsequent flight unit up to a maximum of . All six :!lights were flovn at lOC!f, success. 'Pending completion of determination of final costs the ~ollowin~ are the estimated tee results: Target fee Cost Pens.lty Schedule Jlena;Lty Net loss Net f'ee {2) AF-897 was negotiated as a CPIF-P contract utilizing the "Specialized Incentive Contract structure" of 1~ for performance and covered flight 'Units 10 through 25. Of the sixteen fl-ights flo-wn_, fourteer. were scored at loot success. Of the tvo units flow with 2nomalies, Flight 7 we.s scored at penalty points and Flight; 16 at penalty points resulting in a total f'ee loss of . Cost incentives were negative ~and bad sharing ratios o~ 90/10 up to 15~ over target cost, 8o/20 from 16 to 3CJ/. and in excess of 3~ to a maximum of . Schedule and cG:Olbi::led s.,stem test penalties of minus 1~ respectively were applied to each -..:....::.t to a ma.xi.mum. of ~or each parameter. Flight 'Unit 13 experier.ced a system test failure of No schedule penalties were ~-perienced. Pending completion of fine.l cost, the follo'Wing are the final results: ($ earned) Target fee Par Perfor:na.nce Adjusted performance C/f!r Failure (loss ) Cost {loss) Net fee CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM -· .. ...__, ~- General Electric -Re-Entry Systems Department a. Black contract covered the production of SRV's 6 thr~ 22 . (All develop:nent work and. Hlght models 1 through 5 was accomplished on a. subcontract basis under prime contract JL~-2108 with Eastman Kodak . ) T"ne contract ~_s a FPIF contract with cost and delivery 'incentives. Cost ceiling wo.s 11.7'~ with sharing of 70/30. Schedule incentive ~o-as 1% of target cost over 4 weeks, shared at t he rate of lo% for the week 1, 25~ for week 2, 30p for week 3 and 35~· for week 4. The contractor experienced an overrun of and all deliveries were on time.· Final results are: Cost Fee (fee loss of Price General E1 ~ctric -Spacecraft Department a. ~~te contract AF-693 was a CPIF contract for mission planning softv.3.re. Cost share ratio was 85/15. The contract tarset fee 'Wtl.S 8.5~ of target cost. Final fee wa s increased to due to an underrun. b. White co~tract was a CP.rr ccr.t~ct for mission planning software with a fixed fee of equivalent to 8.~ or final esti~ted cost. --~ c. White contract i s a CPFF follow-on contract t o to provide continuing software support. The contract is still active. Tile fixed fee is 8.~ of estimated cost. d. Wnite contract AF-636 vas a CPIF contract with targe~ cost of and cost incentives only at a sharing ratio of 86/14. The effort was for a SCS parallel study. The target fee was increased by an unde:-run and the final fee amount was to 8.2',{.. Tin·:, Inc. a. Hhite contract was a CPIF contract, With cost incentives only end a sharing ratio of 75/25, to provide mission planning so:tware fo~ earlier versions of GAMBIT vehicles. The contract re~ai~ed active over the transition from the earlier versions. Target fee was The final adjusted fee is expected to be as a. result o~ ::-eciuction due to an overrun. b. ~fuite contract was a. CPIF follow on to Cost inceDtives only were applied at the ratio of 75/25 . Target fee was Actual fee is expected to be when final rates are esta.blishe~ an~ tee contractors underrun computed. Rant'tlo 'l!ia f'': ~ -"" ~. ., ·"'· !'\.'l 4 ::~~ ~i \~ ~~~ ~ .~ i·~ ·~~f@ ~~-~~~r-r,-~·~li'L 3 ' ·'Q ·', iJ_ R' !u ... ' .!• !1 ... 1 .• ,• Mar 64-Dec 69 Apr 66-Dec 67 Jan 68-Nov 69 Sep 64-Feb 67 Jul 68-Current Dec 66-Jul 68 6.2 10.8 10.9 9.2 8.6 . ' n ~, ..... t '---------: N:r-....9 ~w . -r· • -· ..., H, ~ \ •.:... ": ·· . ;·· ,-~.PI~.. •' ·l \A . .. :. ~ ; . a.o.r n: a • ' ro -<"':' '""" O'l 'I 0\ !\)• ....... 0 ~ i3 n ~ en en ~ en t< i n 8 ~ H §! lil.P.·ffiER TY~ l·ITSCELLA!iEOUS AF-636 CPIF CPFF Related ltlork: CR CPCF FFP FFP SECURITY ('n'hite) (Blnck) (Black) (Black) (Black) (Bleck) LIST OF SAFSP O~IDIT CONTRACTS \.JITH FOR GE-ASPD SCS Parallel Study Perkin-.Elmer Glas s Polishing LI~SC Sylvania Corp Sylvania Corp (Con't) FEEEAnNED LIFE FINAL PRICE ( ~ of AC'IUALS) Jtil 64-Ma:y 65 Oct 66-Sep 68 Jul 66-Current Aug 66-May 69 Apr 67-Sep 69 Aug 66-Current 8.2 7.8 0 8.2 N/A N/A Handlo Via \'.(n :t' In '1 n !\] \ : ., . I ' \ . I I 1: 1 £· 1' Q .:J i. : , '·. J:; u i.J .. co -< f\1 ...... (j) en "'-.J m (") N -1 "'. 0 ....... z 0 :0:: en -< en -1 m 3: en (") 0 z -1 :::tl ijj c -1 0 z en ()l c.n .... OVERALL FEE E-:AR.NJ.NG PRINCIPAL SAFSP CONTR/\CTOl~ ON TOTAL GAMBIT HORK ACTUf\[, 90ST co::TRACTOR NO . OF CONTRJ\CTS ~ I.J.iSC 5 12. 3 7 . GE 8.3 zt(C 1 6. 2 Tn;o~ 2 9.8 erT'riERS 4 .02 I _j 19 I L. 8.84 (average) Handle Via I0J ~rfJl r~ nr\1 t IQ) ukJhJi-l\~1 Control Sy.:rc.:::l Only I ! i &l H 1-i ~ 1-i 0 c: C/) C/) lliJ a H ~ 1-i l!j i H 1-i ~ i l!j ~ 1:'4 1:'4 H t: ~ g !Jl ~ .,.,' H . C/) ...J, 1"1 ~ 1"1 "\) C/) "" ~ • >< ......, J ~ i n ~ !i H SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS BYE-16762·70 \J AT!'ACHMENT 1 PROJECT HIS'roRY 1. As \18.S the Gambit (206) project, Gambit (llO) vas managed entirely by SAFSP, vhich had responsibility for development, production and operation of all system components. With this span of responsibility, SAFSP was able to coordinate efforts tovards obtaining increasingly better resolution photography. The final Gambit (UO) mission obtained a best ground resolution by target · determinn.tion of . Gambit lllUJ 1n1t1aJ. development be~an in :r.'.s.rch 1964, approximately 28 months before the first Gambit ( llO) flight of July 1966. The success of Gambit (110) project brought about the termination of Gambit (2o6) project which had its thirty-eighth and last flight in .June 1967. 2. The launch system configuration of the Gambit (110) project differed considerably from that of the Gambit (206) project. !l..ajor launch system changes incorporated at the onset of Gambit (110) vere: a. 'Ihe tva-stage Titan II!l3 wa.s the booster for ascent from th~ pad. U b. A roll joint \18.8 used between the payload and the Agena stage. In this configuration, the payload nnd Agena orbited together through out the mission Vith roll joint movements as required for photographs in track or either side of track. The Agena ws the orbit control vehicle or Satellite Control Section, as veil as the orbit injection booster. c. 'Ihe Gambit (110) Ptlotograpbic Payload became a separate section vhich adapted to the Agena (Satellite Control Section). This configuration di:t'fered very much from the earlier Gambit arrangement in 'Which the payload fit Vithin the orbital control vehicle. The Gambit (110) optics were arranged to achieve a focal length of 16o inches, a change from 77 inches ~or the Gambit (206) system. d. 'Ihe "factory-to-pad" concept became a reality vith Gambit (llO). 1he Titan ITIB booster, Agena with roll joint, and photographic payload section were shipped separately to Vandenberg AFB and assembled on the launch pad. 'Ibis required more thorough testing at the "factory" before shipment and reduced the testing and hardware ~banges required at Vandenberg AFB. 3. '1\ro important changes ma~ during the deployment of Gambit (110) were: He.:1dle Via ..\·.,':'~.~ "!l (\ ~·l , , I , I 1:\ . 8l u~ ·:..., ~·. ~ ~· .. ~ ·~ Control Sy~r~e:1 Q;:1ly 22 2 a I 2 2 £1 a 2 2 .....---------CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM u a. 'lhe prillll!.ry film ws chansed from a thin base to an 'l.:.l.tra thin base which increased the film capacity from about 31000 feet to about 51 000 feet. Ultra-thin base film vas used on Flights 3 through 22. b. A l1edundant Attitude Control System (RACS) was first flown and tested during solo flight or· Flight 16. Fortunately1 the RACS vas included on all subsequent Agena vehicles and was necessarily used during the primary portion of Flights 171 15 and 20. 4. Principal components and their manufacturers -were: Payload EKC Re-entry Vehicle GE/RESD Agena Ste.Be ooc Command Subsystem GE/AE Titan IID !lartin !l..a.rietta 5. Dur:ing the life of the project, these were the key personnel: a. DNRO: Mar 64 -Sep 65 Dr B. McMillan Initial Development Sep 65 ·-Mar 69 Dr A. H. Flax Development1 Flights l through 20 Mar 69 -Conclusion Dr J. McLucas Flights 21 and 22 b. Director of Special Projects Y..a.r 64 -Jul. 65 !/a.jGen R. Greer Initial Development Jul 65 -Conclus:ion MajGen J . Ma.rtin1 Jr Development1 All Flights c. Program Director liBr 64 -Sep 66 Col W. King, Jr Initial Development, Flight l Sep 66 -Jun 68 Col Flights 2 through 14 Jun 68 -Conclusion Col Flights 15 through 22 6. 'lhe following Table l contains some important data about each of the 22 Gambit (110) flights. 2 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS I. I 1 I i Figure 1 2 3 4 5 6 ATI'ACHMENT 2 GRAPHS Title Programmed Targets by Mission Average Targets per Mission by Calendar Year Actual vs. Planned Orbital Li!etime by Mission Acceptable vs. Planned Orbital Lifetime by Mission Best Ground Resolution by Mission Costs per Flight1 lay and Target by Calende.r Year CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ~ rl ~~ ~ r-.... I ~ /\ ~ v ~ ~ h ~ '"" IM ~ L,,.. ltn r ::z 0 V\ V\ as:ii!:c5 ....t> c:csQ) Cl)~~t-i!zd.l~tC Cll s:: ,..., cd 0 ~~b s:: 0 t.> ~ I :::t" 1 ~ >-CD ~. M V\ ~ ~ N ~ (!) 0! .. . ~ ~ I ' , \ /I -..........:.. --0-I""'' 1...., If \0 a: ""' Ul ::::E :::::1 z: z:. 0 (I) (I)-% ~ 0 ~ :E <0::: <.:> ~ 0.. ~ <1::2 ~ I'" ~ \ \ \ 1-M (\1 - . I --··-.:-...... SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS ffiP SECREf A'l"rACHMENT 5 GAMBIT (ll.O) COST DATA -V.EXICLES l-22 1:< 1. 'Ihe total program of 1 includes the following: a. Twenty-t'WO satellite vehicles, boosters, Ageoas, payloads, and recovery vehicles launched. Some vehicles are configured w1th RACS and Redundant Roll Joints with e!:1'ectiv1t1es as indicated. b. 'l'itan niB costs include the allocated directly to the Titan SPO for development of the booster1 reqUired pad modifications, and payment !or the first booster/Agena and their asaoeiated launch costs. c. Command Subsystem costs 1Dclude twenty-tva flight oy&tem.s and nine spares. d. Aeros~ce, Mission Pla.nning and General Support costs include effort through the final launch of Vehicle 22 (June 1969). e. Although non-recurring investment costs are segregated in total on the contracts, they are not segregated by fiacal year. ~e alloeatiOD shown is based on the best Judgment of the Program Office. 1: TOP SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM BYE·16762·70 ,....t» :z:8 C\1 cd a C\1 ...t~o p. +" z=..-i 0 C\1 =cet~ Ol ~ 0 ~ 0 .......... 0) ,.,. ~ 1' z 0 U) V) V) It> ~ > co ~ wo :;w _o (") ~3 c:: u..u UJ C\1 CJ) ::::i~ :::£ ::::) -'t :z: :z: :!o -z 0 CIO U) a=Z U) 0~ :::£ QV) wtn Ol z- z:E "' 0 co :5o a..__, 0 "" V) 1' > __, .... < U) :1 :::> -........ u ............ -.. t u It) ~ < ~ - '"' ~ rr. 0 Q) ('t) a ' ...... :::J :I en C:5 C\1 .. ~ i.:: .............. ' ~ ~ I ~ ! ,.... 0 0) U) ~ C\1 0 SAVO -3HI13Jll .-" 10 ,I' I I I' \ I 8 ~ I U) 6 I > c c w ~ _\ J I ·~ 4 ..... _. 2 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 0 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 -accmmr M.ISSION NUMBER ---PUICII£D ·" fTII£1 flllll .CC£fi'TAIU Figure 4 ACCEPTABU vs PLANNED ORBITAL LIFETIME BY MISSION (SOLO Ml SSION NOT iNCLUDED) TRP ~I=PDrr \v C/) m 0 -1 m 0 18 19 20 21 22 -< z ITl :c; f-l ' C/) m -< C/) ~ -1 m m N 3: . C/) Handle Via ...... 0 z -1 BYEMAN 0 0 i!! Control System Onlv OJ c -1 0 z C/) tr co C.1l c.o n lill 1-4 >':I 1-4 -TAP Q., •'Dr:r. ~, ~ >':I 0 d 'l'AM.£ l en GAMBIT ( 110) PJ.IOHT D.w. en n.IOII'l' 1'10. UU!ICE DA.!B LAOICZ '1'lMI (ClM'l') DICLilfA!IOII (D!DREIS) APOOD/PIRIG!I AJ"l!DD IliJJCTIOII (181) R!:COY'!R! REV lm:O'ItlltD Dml08'l' REV TAftlm ITAOOm IRm:ou ~IWDOO'l' (DftmS) PllDICIPA.L PROI!LDIS lXJRDG OPERATION 1:".1 n !ii 1-4 ~ l 29 Jul 66 18}) ~.15 150. 33/Bk.43 83 YU 130 1 AP'ro R1uttu IIIL1.1'uDction .. I . (APC 1Jiten!S.ttent): Slit 1 podtion fiXed (lfo...); ll.T I COilltraiaed, .:!: 350 >':I i5 2 2B Sep 66 1907 ~.o 176.cn/B3.93 ll5 Ttl 147 ' 36 APTC di•ble prt.or to tU.ght (erratic behavior ot advance -cham...) i1-4 >':I 3 14 Dec 66 1814 109.5 221.9')/82.64 131 Ytte 1.62 ~. ·: . ·~· ·' .. ' ReS c~d eyetem probl.Anl, memory ch&nnel 22, Rl!!ve 2831; APTC (APC ehutter, inter ~ - •.:,...! Dd.ttently etuck open) i5 ~ 24 Feb 67 1959 107.0 231.2/76.9J 131 - y.. 1.63 II 27 APTC (A.PC tlbutter tailed 1n open poaitt.on, Aev 46) ~ 5 26 Apr 67 1600 - - - Jto - I I_ - . T1tan IUB Secon4 St&4e ! a1.lure (~V 8,000 f'pa lov); l'ailed to obtain orbit !2: e 1:".1 6 20 Jun 67 1615 1ll.42 196.15/75-21 164 Yee 1.65 ' 'l'itan ltill Secoad Stage akirt failure ( ~V ot' 88 tpe l.ov) 1 RJ podt1oo1tlg error, !lev 64, t-t t-t 1-4 ~ certain &nglee vere uoattat.n!able to em ot tllght ~ 7 16 Aug 67 1'101 lll.58 252-91/79.95 163 Iee 195 Priiii!Ll'Y BJ rell!!aae te.iled (B/U eyete11 t'uoctioned proper.cy); n ~ 8 9 10 19 Sep 67 25 Oc~ 67 5 Dec 67 1837 1915 1845 1.06.12 lll.56 109. 57 ~1.91/70.93 ~J.70/74.21 248.90/77.09 1.63 163 178 Iee Tee Tee 1.64 1.64 179 I ECS tailure (delay Une 12, Rev 39; delay line ll inter111ttent, Ren 62-65) IInone !'1.l.a handl.i.t:lg syatem stalled (prt•ry, Rev 155, Lou 200') I1SCS pitch valve intenalttent r.11ure to tire, Rlfv 103; ECS Decoder 2 failure, Rev 163; ·llJ -<'"':" ~ m "'-.J O'l 1\.)• >'1-4 en t Q en t< en >':I B TAP ~~~Dr:T ~ failure, ReY 37 liandle Via BYEMA r.nn'l:'T"t"11 R,r.., +t')"" n ....1w ........ . 0 n 8 ~ 1-4 §! TOP SECRET 'J!AJ!lZ 1 O»>IIIT ( llO) M.tOll'.r DATA (Oon 't) Pa«•2 APOOEE/PERIOD 11!8'1 FLIOllT LAUliC'II TUe llfCLlftA'l'IOll ArlU IJIJF£TIOlt JIECOV1!RY DEli008T T.WJBIB 'tARJB'J!I II!SOW!IOI PRDICIPAL PROBL!MS NO. DATt: (GM'l') (DBJRE&S) (liM) J!EV RJC()Y!'JQ!;D REV PROOJWIM!!D R1WlClU'r ( INCH!S) WRDIG OPERA1'IOlt 11 lB Jan 68 1~ lll.54 241.12/70.90 163 1lo 274 -SRV parachute 4epl..oyaeat • .,.tell ta1l..e4 I -., l2 13 Hs.r 68 1951 99.87 235.tjf/73.26 163 'JH ~ 1're ta1le4, P.n 4 13 17 Apr 68 1700 111.50 ~6.25/73.84 163 'Yu 196 I ftaDe ).4 5 JUD 68 1733 ll0.55 251.ll/69.89 1.63 Yea 196 ' '!ape recorder raUed, Re-v 66 I ).~ 6 Aug 68 1630 llO.O 25<). 6o/69. 36 162 lea 1.63 11 'l'UII ~ 10 ,.,.. 1l ~.o..... -v ?i lilY IOl '":j_~ IDU~r J j,a.A..Io.\.Liw I I 16 10 Sep 68 1.830 106.0 235.81./70.77 1.63 Yea . 238 Elttende4 ~Syate111 ! , tailed on flllv 1.24 I 17 6 l'lov 68 1910 106.0 224.32/72.71 1.63 let 212 PACS rtgbt becd bortzonIte!IIIOr failed, BeT 38: JIACS • took onr on Re-t ~1 lB 4 ne., 68 1923 1o6.20 4os.97/ 75.47 lll Ye11 127 !Ground gu1d&Dce probl1111, Tttan I , Iril! Secol!ld Staae 'barn to de, phtion; BPS liJ161• eagineI J b\lro' Re-v 93 19 22 Jan 69 1910 1o6.153 597. 08/74. 76 161 Yea 1.81 ! V/M railed, Ase-~to r1eplet1oa; ECS Decoder 2 I .:tailed to execute PSPC'a I t 20 4 M&r 69 1930 92.027 253· 68/73.62 1.61 Yet 2.24 (ACS ta1lure, Re. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM SECRET SBCTION 1 The first t'l..:1sht Tehie1e ot Progrem 206-II eonsisted ot the booster SLV-'5B/66-8.1.31, atelllte CODt.rol section (SCS) !)82)5/4751, and a i'orw.rd. satellite vehicle eection (rsvs). The forw.rd aection included a recover.r capsule. The plan.,.., lld.uion -.. u tollova: a. Five ~oratable orbit operation vith recDVerr on orbit 83. b. 1'b1'ee da¥8 ot eolo operat:s.cm to exerciae tbe SCS1 inclwU.ag )'av &l"'OUUd ~era. 5eCOI:Id&r7 p1"0pplla1on 8YBtem (SPS), main engine deboost, 8Dd orieutation via the backup lltabillsat1on qstem (EUSS). The Dd.uion -.a aecompllabed aceord.ing to plan, and &1.1 objectives associated vith the SC8 -were !llet. 1'be 'VeMe1e -.a 1•mehed. f'l'am PAI.C-2 PM. 3 at the Western 'l'eat Range on 29 ~1966 at 1130:19.81. PIJ'1' on the eecond COlllltdow. The 1nit:1&1. cou.ntdown on 2B .Tul;r 1966 -.a aborted at T-1 mimte beccuse c4 a teat i'IIU!t indicat:ion at the wmo growx1 guidance station. The vel.od.t,y u Sta&e n abutdaim .a lov by 8.8 rt/see., due to a allgbtly ear~ llbatc1o1lll ,..,.m t:rom the Wl!CO guidance eysteo. The Asem Telocity p1Jied ,.. 8634.53 ft/sec•• 0.9 tt/see. higher than the velocity :neter setting. Attitude 41ac:repiUlCiea existed ill the SLV•5B and in tbe BS-Ol.B, but the CU"'''at1.ve result pve a uear-DCIIIilal. t.raJeetoJy. All tel.emetxy channels 41~tloiO 6hort data loss perioda du.r1ng Stage II ignition, one 1oaa tor 450 m:Ul.1&ee0Dda .end UIOtber tor 105 m1111aecond.s, separated b7 85 m1.l.ll.seconds or data. 'ho unexplained data dropouts occurred at 318.46 aeeollda aDd 325.13 &SeCODda trcD llftotf'. '1'he traekiog aDd 8-baJ14 eomnencH ng '\l&a a&t:iataetory vith the exce?t.i.On of' lover then normal signal strength afie:r tw ~on orbit and aarne 1Dterm1ttent 'break-up of the S..t.Dd beacon pllaea ~ received by the ground radar. These A1'¥l!l!811es did not affect trecld.ng or ccxnnanding. An aeria:l reeave2'Y ot the ea.psul.e -.a made on orbit 83. · lk1ri.J:Ig the three dqe of 80lo operationa, three yaw-around maneuvers were made, and three SPS burns were accompl1sbed.. 1-l SECRET " no o!Mr lnforma~o" except the printed fO~ Vf.l( 2 TALENT-KEYHOLE ·'co11nno~ S.Y.STEM ow.. • ' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM .I. NRO Approved for Release ~up 9ec;et RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 THE KH-9 SEARCH AND MC&G PERFORMANCE STUDY VOLUME II HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE SUMMARY OCTOBER 1977 Rever&e &ide blank Handle via -i - TALENT-KEYHOLE Channel& TCS-9923/Tl Tep &eeret SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Top &eoret RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 FOREWORD Presented in this volume is a review of the KH-9 performance against the standing search and MC&G requirementa for the first twelve missions. Included are a brief description of the KH-9 satellite ay~~tem, the evolution of the &earch and MC&G requirementa, collection statistics, and BOme specific examples of the unique contributions made by the KH-9 system while performing the search mia&ion. The majority of the data presented was extracted from existing reports and publications by the participating organizations. Reverse side blank Handle uia • iii • TALENT-KEYHOLE Ch4nnell TCS-9!1l3/77 'fop Secret CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 Top &eeret RUFF UPDATED: 14 December 2011 i\lfJP8lL\' TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 'ITrL.EPAGE ........................................................... . . . . . ....i FOREWORD ............................••.•.... ;......•................ ...... iii TAB.LEOFCONTEN'I'S ......................................................... v GLOSSARY •.•...•.......•............••..•.•.•.......•..•.................... vii 1.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Objectives ..........•......•....... . ................. •... •.......... ..... 1 1.2 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 KH-9 SystemDescription Overview ..........•. •................•.... . ......•.. 1 2.1 'l'he Satellite System ........ . .......... . ........ . . . . . ....•................ 1 2.1.1 Operational Characteristics Of the DualCamera Panoramic System .. . .................. ... . ......... 2 2.1.2 Operational Characteristics of The StellarTerrain CameraSystem ............. ........... . .......,. . 3 3.0 Requirements ...................................................... ......... 4 3.1 StandingSearch ....•..........................•...........•.•.. ........• 4 3.1.1 Evolution ofSearch Requirements .......................... . .........4 3.1.1.1 Late50'a and Early60'a .•.........................• . .........6 3.1.1.2 'l'he Mid-Sixtiee .................................. . ....... ..7 3.1.1.3 'l'he 1969Amplification ........................... . . ........ 10 3.1.2 Current Standing Search Requirements .............................. 16 3.2 MC&G Requirements ......•...........•...........•..................... 15 3.2.1. Evolution ofMC&GRequirements ..... . ............................ 16 3.2.1.1 Non-Metric Requirements ........... ..................... .. 21 3.2.1.2 Metric Requirements .............................. . .....•..22 3.2.2 SummaryofCurrent MC&G Requirements ....•............. . ........22 3.2.2.1 PointT&J'I"t Requirement ...........•...... . ......•........29 3.2.2.2 BroadArea Non-Metric Requirements ....•...................29 3.2.2.3 Metric Requirements .....................•. . . ...........•..30 4.0 Performance Evaluation .....•...............................................32 4.1 Coverage Statistics ....... . ........................ . .. ...................33 Handk uio -v -TALENT-KEYHOLE Chtuuaell TcS-91123/77 l'ep leeNt SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release "Fop S&Ciel RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 4.1.1 Performance Summariesfor Broad Area Search ............... ......... 33 4.1.1.1 Grou Coverage Achievement ................................. 33 4.1.1.2 Age Distributions ....•......................................34 4.1.1.3 NAEF NURS Diatributiona ..................................36 4.1.2 Target Surveillance Coverage .•...................................... 46 4.2 Unique Contributiona of KH-9 to Intelligence ................................47 4.2.1 System-UniqueContributiona .......................................4 7 4.2.2 Function-Unique Contributiona ......................................52 4.2.2.1 StandingSearch ... . ........................................52 4.2.2.1.1 Transient or Unexpected Activity ..................... 52 4.2.2.1.2 Lower Priority Targets ............................... 59 4.2.2.2 Special Search .. ...........................................59 4.2.2.2.1 Mobile Miaaile Search ...............................59 4.2.2.2.2 Directed Seuch •....................................60 4.2.2.2.3 Historical Studies ....... ............................60 4.3 MC&G Collection Summary ...........................·....................65 4.3.1 Panoramic Collection Summariesfor MC&:G .......................... 65 4.3.2 MCS Collection Summary ....•...................................... 66 4.3.3 Exploitation .......................................................·67 4.3.3.1 MC&G Product Description ..................................74 4.3.3.2 ApplicationofKH-9Photography .............................77 4.3.3.3 DMA's Manpower and EquipmentReview .....................78 Hondlevia -vi - TALENT-KEYHOLE Claanlwt. TCS-9923/77 'fop Secret CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRC Approved for Release 17 September 2011 'fop Sec1et RUFF UPDATED: 14 December 2011 ACRES APTC COMIREX DMA GRD IDF MC&G MCS NAEF NllRS NRO NRP NTB usm USGS WGS GLOSSARY Area Collection Requirements Evaluation System Astra-Positioning Terrain Camera Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation Defense Mapping Agency Ground Resolved Distance Installation Data File Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Mapping Camera Subsystem National Area Exploitation File National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale National Reconnaissance Office National Reconnaissance Program National Target Base United States Intelligence Board United States Geological Survey World Geodetic System Reverse side blank HIJIId~ uia .-vii - TALENT-KEYHOLE Clttmneu TCS-!1923/77 TeiiiMret ':>23 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 l'op &eeret RUFF UPDATED: 14 December 2011 ...llOJXJIW 1.0 INTRODUCTION This historical review was performed in response to Task 2 set forth in the Terms of and MC&G Performance Study and a companion 1.1 Objectives The objectives of thia review were to establish in quantitative terma the KH-9 historical performance against the standing broad area search and MC&G requirements and to establish a reference against which new collection strategies, when applied to new collection requirements, could be judged. 1.2 Participants The data presented in this volume was compiled by a working group chartered by the HOSS steering Group. Participating in the working group were representatives from a program element of the National Reconnaissance Office, COMIREXIIC Staff, Defense Mapping Agency, National Photographic Interpretation Center, and Defense Intelligence Agency. These organizations were responsible for compiling and collating the information in this report. 2.0 KH-9 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION OVERVIEW The KH-9 System was developed to collect stereoscopic broad area imagery at a resolution adequate for both general search and surveillance. It collects imagery in the two to twenty-foot GRD range. The satellite vehicle contains two camera systems -a dual camera panoramic system and a stellar teJrain camera system. Imagery collected by the panoramic system is used primsrily for search and general surveillance, but it does have MC&G ap.. plicatioris. The stellar teJrain camera system, first flown in 1973 on satellite vehicle number 5, provides DMA with imagery at the required quality and metric accuracies for point positioning to establish a suitable data base for the production of MC&G products. 2.1 The Satellite System The KH-9 satellite consists of three major sections -the forward, the mid, and the aft sections. The forward section contains the four reentry vehicles for recovery of film exposed by the panoramic the stellar terrain camera and the fifth vehicle for recovery of its film; The midsection contains the dual camera panoramic system, its rtlm supply and the supporting electronics. The dual camera system provides for stereoscopic coverage within 60 degrees either side of nadir. Handle via -1 - TALENT-KEYHOLE Clwanels TCS-91123/77 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLI TE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM lort 811Fit RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 The aft section contains all of the equipment for control of the satellite vehicle in orbit. An orbit adjust subsystem provides propulsion for correction of velocity errors, drag makeup, and vehicle de-orbit at mission completion. An attitude control subsystem provides earth-oriented control and stabilization about all three vehicle axes -yaw, pitch and roll. The electrical distribution and power subsystem generates, controls, and distributes electrical power. The tracking, telemetry and command subsystem provides vehicle tracking, telemetry and command function capabilities . 2.1.1 Operaticmal Characteristics of the Dual Camera Panoramic System The panoramic cameras have 60-inch focal lengths and are mounted side-by-side. The port or forward-looking camera (Camera A) is pitched 10 degrees forward from vertical and the starboard, or aft-looking camera (Camera B) is pitched 10 degrees aft from the vertical. Operated together, the two cameras yield a 20-degree stereoscopic convergence angle at nadir. At 60 degrees obliquity, the convergence angle is 10 degrees. Camera A scans the surface of the earth from right to left, while the Camera B scans from left to right. There is a halfframe overlap between Camera A and Camera B frames. The system can be operated in any of 16 different photographic modes. A mode is defined by a selection of scan width and scan center. There are four selectable scan widths, 30, 60, 90, or 120 degree& and seven selectable scan center placements, 0, ±16, ±30, or ±45. Table 2-1 summarizes the characteristics of panoramic camera system. The amount of film carried for each camera varies. Earlier missions carried from 100 to 110 thousand feet. Mi88ion 1212 carried 120 thousand feet on Camera A and 117 thousand feet on Camera ~.. The film is exposed on a frame-by-frame basis. The frame width is 6.6 inches and length varies from about 2.6 feet for a 30-degree scan width operation to about 10.5 feet for a 120-degree operation. Ground coverage at 90 nautical miles is approximately 9 nautical miles in-track at nadir and up to 315 nautical miles cross-track depending on selected mode.1 Image quality and scale_ vary acl'088 the film format depending on the altitude of the satellite·and the viewing angle (scan angle) used. While flying at altitudes of 80 to 90 nautical miles, the system nominally produces imagery in the 2-foot to 20-foot GRD range when allowed to operate across the full range of scan angles. At extremely high scan angles, the usefulne88 of the imagery is degraded considerably due to high distortion. To eliminate this problem, recent KH-9 missions have not been allowed to operate outside a 45-degree obliquity angle. When such restrictions are imposed, the GRD range is usually between 2 and 10 feet producing imagery which range in NIIRS of 2 to 6ofwhich the majority is NIIRS 4 or better. 1 These statistics are bued on expoeed mm footage. For each operation taken and (or each frame expoeed, there ia an a-.oclated unexpoaed (ootqe. Due to hardware problema experienced on early KH-9 miaai.ona, the camera IIY81;ema have not been allowed to operate in the film rewind mode, a capability deeigned to reduce the amount of unexpoaed film due to start-up and shutdown of the camera ayatema. 1bia operationalre~~triction reaulta in aome ·twenty to twenty-five percent of the film being returned unexpo.ed. Tbe pen:entaps vary from miiaion· to-miaaion u it ia dependent on the combination IX modee «operationa taken. -2 TCS-9923/77 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 ~&eeFet RUFF UPDATED: 14 December 2011 'amcra Type 2 pan0ramic Focal Length 60inchcs Field overage 5.73 degrees in-track Field of View Selectable :10, 60, 90. 120 degrees eros -track Modes . Mono or stereo Nadir Field of View per Frame 9 X (up to 312 n.m.) at 90 n.m. vehicle altitude .__ tereo Convergence Angle 20 degrees Nadir Re lution Approximately 2 fp Film Width 6inches Type . Type 1414 Capacity Up to 120.000 feet per camera-.. ta Return 4 reentry vPhicle!. The system wa designed to have an operational mission life of days with a potential to grow ton ·l5-day life. The initial launch schedule called for four launches per year. Since the first vehicle was launched in June 1971, on-orbit mission life has steadily increased while the launche per year has decreased. Th-e maximum number of launches in any one calendar year haA been three, occurring in 1972 and 1973. The shorWst mission was Mission 1201 which operated for 31 day and the longest was Mission 1212 which operated for 154 d.llys . See Table 2-2. The {;amera system is capable of operating at altitudes ranging from approximately 80 to 200 nautical mile . 2.1.2 Opel'ational Characteristics of 1the Stellar Terrain Camera System The teller terrain camera system is known as the Mapping Camera • ubs tern (MCS) and con. i. ts of a vertical terrain camera and dual stellar cameras. The terrain camera has a 12-inch focal length that provides a resolution of approximately 50 line pairs/rom. There are three commandable modes -single, triple or quadruple overlap. Sing! overlap givel' a 10% frame-to-fram overlap. Triple and quadruple modes give 70 and 7 percent frame-to-frame . 3 -TC -9!:/'l.'J/77 T9p 5iec:ret CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 Tep GeeFet RUFF UPDATED: 14 December 2011 . I. .: •H l i · . 1n ~ ·' 11 31 10~ t~· 100~(1, I*L .,,..•..•,..... u.;.ta l • ..!• lu" ~ I >J,. 'I • ~· '""'' """ 'J' • J. J : OJ I I() ·u · lit 1l84 N.t•rliii.J!l..l..,. .... n.-.. tllf;Mt II-l, l!:' l i s·.! ·~Ac, rm 9M~' f! ~J IO• 1q! IT : 41 ,. ,._.,. tal& .• l"'l.IJWMh• IJ.t#IU 11tt7U I!Ol 309 18 1 l!oU ne> 1[h• 13 ! 0/ 1 0/~ 1ae 1: 1 ,,.. t&t•ttUilf'O.• ,...,"" fft ......, _ , 1!11.7U. I."1:-1 y~ } ' tt!; ,I I !I~ I,, n .'~· nn 14 1/9 negll 111 ell~ me \1.'•/IIJrsn-h• .Jd'Jt IM 11ll1t nuqt ' )I' qr, J '911 0 IIH J ., or ~ Otc 7~ i 1£ IIJMrl lll lf) J '217 t71)•/to.l/ UU lUll lilul II U4· · ~~ llde4 .,. ., ~, tl "!) , l)S I r ~ l1J.,f'li] 111 311 111!!;1{1 ,.,.,.:-I a p. r<·-:pt•,·•ivt•l\' AI !I'\ naut teal mi lt><;.r:trh lrnmr ro\·c·r.-.It! arrn uf H Jll)r()X irnnt eJ.,· 7 ! h' 11 ..: n.111ti, al m ilt•h . Tht' terrain t.lmera e,\r!':r._ app!uXIIIIllar <·:.unNa!' pro\'iOf· a mean." for n•·c·urately rlerermininl! the a1titudf' of thl' tPrr.t in nllnNa .lt tlw t·Xtll I :iuw nf t•xpo,-, n·. They an• orienlf•d in"' ch 11 wn:--that Lhe st>ir l11·1d is ph..tographt•d hi lll ult.'l lll'< •u~J\· witt: lr.e a~.· qw:-ition of tc•rrain phHtnJ(raph~·. Tlw film tnrnwt ,.,,,,,.j.-to; ui '"'" aciinn·nt framt>' wb ch arc· ill rnm t)\· 1H1 mm. Tlw o;lt•llar t' lllllt'fa.... logethc·r r r> nl'lllll<-apprnx.rmat,•f,· :!.lli)(J lt't.'l "f film "hit·h ~ie:ld!' ah•Hlf :.!,(X IO p;1ir-. nf stellar lrarn• ·~ ~c·.. l'a!llt· :.!-:1 nr :1 ~urnmar~ ol tht: MCS fpaturt...~ Lt:ld T~bl t> ~-4 for mi:.l"ion ...,f .. l\ i..;t 1C' . .\ d.,ppkr I rll!lfiJlHfd trurt r)(llldt'r i ~ lr:tckt·d h~· a 4:! ·.st.lfion THA~ET and GI<:oc~:JVER ttt>lwork. rt.-:;ultin~ in a w••rldwidP •·:tnwm nn-nrbit pt)silion dt' letmination rap.thility ~t< · •·mate to '!.7 . 1~ tmd !J rrwtNs lon(' -; igma J r'nr Ill ·f nwk . < · ro:-~:o~ -1 rul'k anrl rildial t~omponent~. TI!!\IW~"I iv1-ly . 3.0 REQUIREMENTS :1.1 Standing Search :J.l.l E\·olutioP or St-arch Kequjre-ments The t'o lowin~ ~tra~mpbl tran.' the evolutionary prvc~s res(JOlll'>ihle h•r the present l-1rm·t ure and dimt-nKions of the Intelligence C0mmunity 'l> sttlnding requin·munt~ ior JIE'rindic hroad an-a 1'0\'erage of the CommuniM t·nuntries anti rt>~inns nf' conflict in the Middll· Ea.-:t. Tot2 i Mret SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 it ftA UR( TEP.nAIN ----~-= f:am l.! m('he .l :x 1, inch<'. ;:) . ";' clel(rc'f:"' t'r•• .. I'rm U . I dc-gr i\ l)d • tu. ';'!) • nd i... Jlf.>rf't>IH fram '· 1n · fr. m 'rv'·rl, p • ltth• F11 1.1 .,, \ ll·w -1 !4!! ·1 :n. H • ulttlllll\ ~0 t~l J tc • Fillll r.asu z. SHMiVIARV Of I';I.~PPfNG CA~ERA Ml ~~ ~5 MISSION NUM(HR t "J 1\ l,l 11, ...; ,, '"' .'I 5 '"'' 1208 bCl 3 0 1.1 ., . _., CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release , ?up 8eeret RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 3.1.1.1 Late 50'• and Early 60'• To widentand the initial requirementa for eatellite-bome broad area collection, it il nec:eeeary to recall the enviramnent of the late 19liO'e. AlthcnJp U-2'• bad been overflying the Communilt countries for aeveral yeara: a1arpfraction ofthe Euruian landmai. had yet to be phoe'.olraphed even once. The other eourcea·ofintellipnce then available seemed to be unearthing new problema about 88 fast u they were eolving old ones. Tbe mapa in our poeaeesion were old and/or unreliable. The weapon ByBtems perceived tobe the major tbreata embodied teclmoloiY too new to support reliable SlleMmenta of just where and how they eould be deployed. Tbe quality of the imagery needed to detect the aa-yet-UDII88D ICBM deploYment aitee could on1y be gueeeed at. Under theM~the initial requirement, ilaued in 1958, called for coverage of the entirety of the Euruian communilt countriee every u months. A NIOlution of twenty feet waa judged to be adequate un1-the Soviets deployed mobile or transportable ICBMa, in which cue reeolutiona of ten feet 01' better might be needed. In July 1980, shortly before the launch of the tint 8UCC8IIIIfUl imqing eatellite million, the need for 20-foot reeolution waa reaffirmed. The value of stereo coverage waa not addreleed, and that poteD.tial ieaue aoon disappeared, 88 the camera ayatem adopted wu deligned to operate in stereo. • Although the initial standing requirementa lacked epecific gnidance concerning collection prioritiee, the dominance ofthe threat poeed by the Soviet ICBM program to a large extent controlled the pattern of collectioo during the early yean of the imaging satellite program. Long before the summer of 1960 -indeed, aa eoon aa the USSR bepn to deploy strategic ·miaBilea -the IntelliPnce Community aingled out certain regiona aa the most promising for launch aitea. 'l1leee delineationa fairly quickly became quite eophiaticated and, aa it turned out, accurate. Twenty-three ofthe 26 Soviet ICBM compleue are located in or very doee to regiODB deacribed aa likely deployment areas. • Memoraudum flom Ad Hoc IDtellipoee Requirement. Committee to Dinlc:tor, ARPA, 8 December 1968 (&printed in USIB-D-33.6/6, 10 March 1980); USJB-D-33.61'8, 6 July 1980. Mmym the t-icoollectioD CClllceptll employed today badbeeD emmciated by the time m the fint ~ fUPt: -atob. "Tbe .,.tem mUIIt provide 1m repeat covaoap mtarpta at tbeee varioua r.olutiau, dependiDc 011 tbe nature of the tarpt and the intell.ipnce problem ln'VOlwcl." '"'lle .,.wdiclty mtiU repeat covenp will a1eo depend 011 the nature mthe tupt aDCl .the intellipaee aituatioa, u well u 011 other ~that can be broucht to bear 011 it." ''Prom an ideal poin~ of iDtellipace utility, many mthe h1lb priority aDCl bicbNt priority tarpta ebould be covered at intervale on the Older of 1 to 6 monthe, but the recnnnal..nce eyatem ebould have eufficient flaibiUty to permit tbe ~to be timed to meet t&e neede of the epeciftc intell1amce eltuatiOa u it develope. '"l11e photo .,.tam ehould be capable ofobtainiDc covuap and Nadout within 24 houn on •lected objecti.-anyw!un within ScMet territory _." "It ie imperati'9e that curreot, iDdieputable iaformatioa be available 011 (ta:rpta wheN . Soriet ltrat.llic ltrib fiDreee are located) to accurately -acm.t capabllitiee mdin· teD~and to enable e&c:ti'9e retaliatory lltrib plaaniq ..." -6 TCS-WJ3171 TepSee~Fet SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Top 8ec1et RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 As soon as broad area photography began to be received in quantity, the United States Intelligence Board called for the development of a procedure through which the Community might 888888 ita significance "with respect to confirming the presence or abeence of ICBM deployment in areas which have been covered. In addressing this need, the Director of NPIC pointed out .that 'There are essentially three basic parts to the problem: establishment of definitions for rating photography on a qualitative basis; determining the significance of varying levels of cloud cover; and developing mechanical procedures for recording and reporting the desired informa ·tion.' Beginning il) mid-1961 and continuing for a number ofye8l'8, the status of coverage ofthe Soviet rail net wu reported out regularly, but the procedures employed bad serious shortcomings. Not until the early 1970's, when the National Imagery lilterpretability Rating Scale was developed, did . there become available a workable system for recording photographic quality. And the 'mechanical procedures for recording and reporting' became operational only within the past few ye8l'8."• As a practical matter, some of the film frames returned by a broad area mia.ion will be free of clouds, while others will be completely filled with them. In some cases the ground will be partially obecured, at times by randomly acattered clouds and at times by solid formations that are the borden of broad weather fronts. Where transportation arteries are present, some of the cloud-free photography will be limited to the gro\md on one side ofthe line. Consequently, in accounting for coverage of transportation routes, the minimum area to be recorded must be defined. In the procedure adopted for recording coverage ofthe Soviet rail net, the minimum cloud-free segment counted was a rectangle showing at least eight miles of line and the ground on both sides of it to a depth of at least fifteen nautical miles. The selection of eight and fifteen miles was arbitrary and was not based on any objective analysis. Indeed, at the time the criteria was established, hardly any coverage en.ted on which to make an analysis.• 3.1.1.2 The Mid-Sixties hi early 1963, the usm asked the committee then responsible for imagery requirements development to furnish updated guidance. The subsequent effort uncovered a split opinion as regards the quality requirement. The Department of Defense agencies judged that a capability "to permit recognition of low-contrast objects 10 feet on a side" would be satisfactory, while CIA believed there was a need to see objects five feet on a side. There was general I The usm Directive quoted and the NPIC reepoDM both can be found in USIB-D-33.11/3, 14 November 1961. The ·"aood." "fair," and "poor" ratinp uaed for 10 many yean to deacribe the quality of imagery were firat defined in tbia document. Notice that the wordiq ofthe USm Directive shows recognition ofthe potential that imagery pollaell88 for collfirmiul the abeence of activities . • For evidence of the early 11M ofthele criteria, aee NPICIIM18/61, 25 August 1961 and CIA/RR GP 61-141,18 October 1961. -7 TCS-9923/77 "Felts..... CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 agreement that a swath width "on the order of 200 miles" was needed, and the Defense Department agencies stated that the six million square miles constituting the so-calleci built-up areas of the Communist countries should be covered every 45 days, and the remainder of th~countries should be covered every 90 days. The "practical impossibility" of obtaining complete coverage of such large areas over such short time spans was noted, however.& Following ita discussion of the papers submitted by the requirements committee, the USm instructed that they be forwarded to the NRO for study and comment. Then followed more than a year oC intensive activity that bore fruit in July 1964 with the USIB'a endorsement of a recommendation that work proceed rapidly toward achievement of . "A single capability for search and surveillance with a continuous stereoscopic . ground coverage equivalent to KH-4 and a resolution equivalent to KH-7 ... " . This guidance was the basis for the development of the KH-9 system.• With the question of image quality out of the way, the Community next turned to reconsideration of frequency and distribution. In March 1966, the USIB forwarded to the NRO guidance intended to permit the launch rates of KH-4 satellites to be sized "for the next two Year& or lio." This guidance, the •first long-term standing search requirement sent to the NRO ·by the USIB in nearly five years, called for cloud-free coverage of the entire SinoSoviet area semiannually, with priority to be given to built-up parts. The impossibility of achieving complete coverage was recognized, however, and the requirement was backed up with a recommendation that a program of ten successful launches per year be planned. Statistical evaluations by the NRO had indicated that such a rate would result in coverage of about 90 percent of the Sino-Soviet landmass semi-annually.1 In the summer of1966 the usm furnished amplificatioo ofthe KH-9 guidance levied two years before. The need for a swath width "at least" equivalent to the KH-4's and a resolution equivalent to the KH-7's was reaffirmed. On the basis of "the results obtained and general satisfaction with search coverage acquired over the last 18 months with the KH-4" the fre. quency and distribution of the required coverage was modified as follows: "Search Mission. KH-9 should have the capability to provide stereoscopic, cloud-free (about 90 percent) photography of about 80-90 percent of the built-up areas of the Sino-Soviet bloc (approximately 6.8 • USIB-D--'l.lt/4, 28 January 1963; USIB-D--'1.14/28, 19 April1983. In USIB-D-41.14/28, alao d!Meminated on 19 April, the built-up areu wen identified u "the European Satellites, Eulopean and trans-Ural USSR, the area within 100 milea on either aide of the Trans-Siberian railroad between Petropavlowk and Kharbarovak, the Soviet Far East, lOUth central Alia, the provincea of "old" China, Manchuria, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Arctic cout durinc the eummer period." • USIB-D--'1.14/36, 25 April1963; USIB-D--'1.13/11, 31 July 1964. In USIB·D--'1.lt/294, 21 Juue 1966, the Board made clear that what it bad in mind was a ewath width ofat least 150 miles and a resolution t:A ·s-5feet over the total format." ' USIB-D-4U4/m, 19 March 1966 and USIB-D--'1.14/235, 26 March 1986. -8 TCS-9923/77 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Top Seer•• RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 million sq. run.) semiannually and should provide similar coverage of about 75 percent of the undeveloped areas (2.8 million sq. nm.) annually ... In addition to search of the Sino-Soviet bloc, KH-9 should provide the capability to acquire coverage of contingency 8reas in other parts of the world on demand." This guidance po88888ed several new features. The call for complete coverage that previously had been specified was dropped in favor of levels that experience indicated were realizable. They were, in addition, levels the Community judged to be adequate to meet es sential needs -subjective judgments that were, however, based on feel rather than on technical analysis. Then too, for the first time in official guidance, the distinction between built-up and undeveloped regions was delineated on a map (see Figure 3-1). Also new at the USIB level was the Community's acceptance of imagery less than completely cloud-free as adequate for search. And new for the KH-9 was the recognition of areas outside the Communist countries that might have to be acquired.' Coverage needs for the non-Communist countries were not expected tO exceed three million square nautical miles annually. · The requirement also described a non-search role to be performed by the system: "Surveillance Mission. In recognition of the capability of the KH-9 to obtain high resolution area coverage ... we believe it appropriate to specify frequency of coverage in terms of surveillance ofgeographic areas representing target clusters ... Based on target distribution, we have identified about one hundred clusters ranging in size up to 120-mile by 120-mile areas in which approximately 70 percent of current targets are located." Although potential cluster areas had been identified, no delineations were included in the USIB guidance, and the NRO was told that experience with KH-9 collection would have to precede confident identification of collection frequencies; until then, "for planning purposes" it should anticipate covering 80 percent of the cluster areas quarterly. Later in 1966, the Community brought the standing requirements for KH-4 collection into line with those established for the KH-9. Although it found the principle of obtaining complete coverage of broad areas sti:ll attractive, the Community "had learned through experience that operational considerations make the fulflllment of such a requirement highly unlikely \mder normal circumstances." For this reason, it endorsed a program calling for approximately ten succeasful KH-4 launches annually, which it believed would yield stereoscopic, cloudfree coverage of: -More than 80 percent of the built-up areas semiannually;. -More than 80 percent of the undeveloped areas annually; . -Approximately 2.5 million square miles outside the Bloc annually; ___...;.____ • USIB-D-'1.1~, 21 June 1966 and USIB-D-'1.14/'296, ~July 1966. Uee of the KH·• for periodic aearch of DOD-Communist countriee wu specified in the 1966 guidance for that ayltem. . 9 . TCS-9923/77 'Fe, a..... .--------- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLI TE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM lop 9ec;et RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 -Approzimately eight million square miles of mapping coverage annually; -And "A residual of approximately five percent of the film per mission for unique, one-time search or surveillii.nce tasks."' 3.1.1.3 The 1969 Amplification The requirement sent to the NRO in late 1969 reaffmned the concept and basic structure outlined in 1966, amplified. major elements within it, and introduced several new features. One major innovation was the adoption of the 1:50,000 World Area Grid (WAG) cell, an area averaging about 12 by 18 nautieal miles, as a unit of account for categorizing and arraying area coverage requirements. The WAG system, which already bad been adopted by the NRO as a tool for uae in the management of collection, permitted the Community to delineate and differentiate areas much more finely than was possible theretofore.10 The built-up areas were defined in terms of their proximity to transportation. In the absence of possessing any technique for defming "proximity'' scientifically, the Community stuck with the figure adopted in 1961 -15 miles. If any portion of a WAG cell fell within 15 miles of a transportation artery, the entire. cell should be counted as part of the built~up area. At least 80 percent of these built-up area cells should be kept covered with cloud-free and interpretable photography not older than six months. Another feature was the precise delineation of 108. target clusters and the specification that quarterly coverage of each be obtained -to at least the 85-percent level in the case of a fourth ofthem and to at least the 70-percent level in the case of the remainder. The objective of this coverage was search as well as surveillance, for the clusters were recognized as the moat likely areas for new targets to appear since "new installations of military importance are frequently located near or within facilities of similar nature ... " These more precise delineations of the cluster and built~up regions, depicted in Figure 3 2. led to their combined sizes being reduced from 6.8 million square miles to about 5.1.11 Further, the standing requirements areas were expanded to include Mongolia and the regions of conflict in·the Middle East, and then were divided into seven geographical categories: USSR, China, North Korea, Mongolia, Eastern Europe, Middle East, and North Vietnam. The basis for this differentiation was recognition that the intelligence problems connected with one part of the world frequently are distinct from those cOnnected with others, and the satisfaction ofrequirements for coverage of one part does not necessarily influence .the requirement for coverage of another. · · The guidance pointed out that special requirements associated both with search and with surveillance would be levied prior to and during each KH-9 mission. The quantity of • USW-D-41.16/79, 16 September 1966. •• USIB-D-46.4/32, 10 November 1969. 11 The delineation of the clUiter and built-up regiooa on the basil called for in the requirements waa a large and complex taak performed by the Office of Baaic and Geotlraphic lntellipnce in CIA. COMIREX'a request that OBGI undertake the reapooaibility ill diacuaeed in COMIREX-D-13.3/1, 20 Janwuy 1970. -10 TCS-9923/17 Top &Mret SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS ~tt&rut ·. .. 0 Cl c ...; . ,.; .;: '{ r.. 'fl I Cl ~. I). ., ... q- II V) !) V) -: l V) l. t -:; ...... .... "' .) /'( ·' '"'·'I ;~ Stecet CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 .. ~ \ '• ~ •.. , . It .., 1' ~, '• . ., ~ f/lt' ,_f ..... i!: ..... ~ .E 0 cu r:;r. ~ \// g... :::z: ::.::; SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 film required to satisfy theee ad hoc taaka were expected to v~greatly from mission to mission and could not be estimated with confidence. The COMIREX agreed that, to the extent possible, it would provide its ad hoc requirements in time for them to be evaluated during the pre-mission planning phase of each flight, so that a forecast could be made of their effect on the satisfaction of standing requirements. 3.1.2 Current Standing Search Requirement. The initial delineation of WAG cells for the various target clustei'B, built-up regions, and undeveloped areas called for in the 1969 amplification of the KH-9 requirement was completed in early 1970. In 1973, nearly 1.5 million square miles of the most inhospitable of the undeveloped areas was split off and designated as remote regions. At least 80 percent of each of the three remote categories identified . USSR, China, and Mongolia -was to be kept covered by imagery no older than 18 months.11 During late 197 4 and early 1975, in support of the Search Performance Study then under way, the Intelligence COmmunity produced an area delineation much rmer than any completed previously. This new delineation embraced an eight-level breakdown and used WAG · subcells as the unit of accounting for differentiating among the eight, with the results shown in Figure 3-3. This new categorization was not usable as a standing broad area coverage requirement, however, because the computer software programs then available for managing collection operations could handle only four levels of frequency and could not accept accounting units smaller than a WAG cell. By late 1975, a methodology for aggregating the eight levels of subcells into four levels of cells had been worked out, allowing a foUr-level redelineation that permitted the combined cluster and built-up regions to be reduced from 5.5 million square miles to 4.2. In mid-1976, after certain software modifications had been completed, a fifth coverage category, topographically unusable, was created through the subdivision of the regions previously designated as remote. The topographically unusable regions, shown in Figure 3-4, have a two-year frequency ofcoverage.13 These are the standing search requirements against which the KH-9 system is currently being tasked. 3.2 MCAG Requirements The· Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) has a world-wide mi88ion to produce a wide variety of MC&G products for DoD Military and Intelligence Community U881'8. An overwhelming majority of MC&G products are dependent on the resources available to DMA through the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) in the form of covert satellite imagery. Almost 95 percent of the DMA products require some form of NRP satellite imagery to satisfy levied requirements. In general, products are generated at various scales for 11 COMIREX-D-15.2/15, 11 and 19 February 1970; COMIREX-D-15.2/20, 8 June 1971; COMIREX.-D-16.2/25, 27 October 1972. 11 Details about the eight regions are fumiahed In the Search Performance Study, BYE 2248-75, July 1975; how the delineation wu accomplilhed is described In COMIREX-D-13.3,18, 23 September 1976; the four-fold delineation that followed is contained in COMIREX-D15.2/33, 16 December 1976, and COMIREX-D-16.2/34, 28 June 1976, provide& the WAG ceU delineation oC the topographicaUy unusable regions. -16 TCS-9923/77 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Top Secret RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 air, ground, sea and space operations, and for intelligence and military planning. The geodetic data derived from satellite imagery provides the military with tens of thousands of accurate point locations needed for operation of strategic and tactical weapon systems. Satellite imagery requirements to support these various military MC&G production activities h8ve several different aspects. They include coverage of various areas ofthe world by imagery of varying degrees of resolution and metric fidelity, which includes: calibration, attitude determination (pitch, roll and yaw at instant of exposure), and accurate determination of camera location at time of exposure (latitude, longitude and elevation determined by means of a doppler device and timing marks on the film). Among the technical requirements that are satisfied in whole or in part by the current configuration of the NRP satellite systems_is the derivation of specific levels of horizontal and vertical accuracy of targets and other positional data for maps and feature analysis -both on a World Geodetic System (WGS), as well as on a more localized regional datum basis. Operational weapon systems including Minuteman Win. Polaris, Poseidon, Lance, Pershing, B-52, and F-111 are dependent on this positional information and on maps and charts for navigation and target strike. 3.2.1 Evolution of MCAG Requirementll Military MC&G has employed satellite photOgraphy since 1960. With the aid of this photography, DMA and its predecessor organizations have produced over 50,000 different maps and charts out ofa current requirement which exceeds 80,000 worldwide, levied by the Unified and Specified Commands, the Military Services and the Intelligence Community. Photographic coverage of metric accuracy (currently provided by the KH-9 MCS) and medium_to medium-high resolution (2 to 10 feet , such as that provided by the KH-9 panoramic camera) is indispensable at present, and will continue to be into the 1980&, for the production and updating of these MC&G products to support operational needs. The satellite systems of earlier NRP projects were limited by evolving system design and state-of-the-art improvements for hudware/aoftware components from which optimum onorbit performance could be generated. The three-inch focal length frame cameras of the KH4, KH-5, and KH-8 APTC (Astro-Poeitioning Terrain Camera) were initially employed to provide -the early 1960 era worldwide MC&G coverage. This coverage bas some of the features needed for metric fidelity. Much of the coverage included the stellar index camera coverage for attitude determination, but much of it does not permit positioning of points to accuracies sufficient for a significant number of MC&G products. Only five of the KH-4 Dual Improved Stellar Index Camera (DISIC) missions had the doppler transponder which provided good positional data. About 20 million square nautical miles of KH-4 DISIC frame was collected worldwide between 1962 and 1972, and 16 million square nautical miles of KH-4 DISIC with doppler wu collected worldwide between 1970 and 1971. Nearly all of the Eurasian Communist countries were covered. The KH-4 DISIC frame coverage with doppler provides accuracy of 76 meters for horizontal positioning. -16 TCS-9923/17 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS .................... ......,'I ..... • 1111114(11 .. ·- -: ......, ..... _ .. :·.,...............,_...... .......... .... Ill - • 1 II - -• ......,.. .......................... ..., , ......1111 .. -:_.. _,I ... ......... ...... 7 ... IIIII Ull u• ,.. , ..- • I .. l.tll• 1ft• • .. Ull• 41 1U I t 31 tl .. MJ It _Jl. .-!.• -E.• lir 'ii1 Z.Q4 all - ..,_,.,.... .,..,..1. ·~-~... (Nt--..... CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release Tvp 8ecaet RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 KH-5 was a frame camera system which provided MC&G coverage of more than 43 million equare nautical miles from 1962 through 1964, primarily for geodetic positioning. This system had a three-inch focal length terrain frame camera and a stellar camera. Since it did not include a doppler geodetic package, this photography gives a best accuracy ofonly 230 meters horizontal. This material temporarily satisfied some of the early accuracy requirements for positioning, but for the 1970 time period the KH-5 coverage cannot be relied upon for production of Class A maps at scales of 1:250,000 and larger because 1:250,000 maps require a horizontal accuracy of 127 meters. The KH-8 APTC system included a three-inch focal length frame terrain camera, which provided imagery from Mission 4301, August 1966, until the end of Mission 434<>, Nian Communist countrie . The MC&G Broad Area coverllge requirement i divided into two l·ollection categories: stereoscopic coverage whi h is divided into two priorities (high and low) and monoscopic coverage (see Figure 3-6, Table 3-1 and Table 3-2). • Excludes the Sino-Sov1et Area and important areas of the Middle East. on which pan coverage is provided m response to intelltgence requirements Also incudes the U.S. Geologtcal Survey requirement for coverage of 0 .3 m•llion square nautical miles of the U.S. annually ··Military recoverage requirements for non -Communist areas extend beyond FY 1978 at an annual rate of 2 .0 million square nautical miles. Thts requirement is a continuing one, to satisfy requirements for period1c updating of MC&G products. . 29 - TCS-9!J23/77 ~op &eeret CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release ~~ Seeuu RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 Sino-Sov:et Area 10.2' 1.31 EuraSia 5.0 1.5 South America 3.8 2.0 0(her 28 2.2 ' OMA reqwremeots tn the Smo-Sovaet area are sat!Sfter M & " produc , t hey are either relative or absolute. Relative accuracy r,efers to the relationship of feature*' n a map grid or local reference datum. 'T'he accuracy required for relative relationship currently does not xceed areas larger than 300 x 300 square nautical miles. Absolute accuracy i worldwide and refers to relationship to tM WG . The metric accuracy requirements are related to target horizontal position error and vertical position error. The horizontal ~ition error is termed circular error (CE) which i defined as the radius of the circle in thu horizontal plane centered at the "estimated target location in which the true position of the target lies with a given probability. The vertical position error i. termed linear error (LEl. -30 . rc 9923177 Tep 5teco:ret SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS Top 9eeutt RUFFNRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED; 14 December 2011 AB indicated in Table 3-4, a technical objective to support advanced weapon systems with 23m ters (CE 90% probability) with reference to the WGS is the driving future requirement for the horizontal accuracy portion of the military MC&G products. This technical objective, which would be in direct support of b th the Advanced MX-lCBM and the n w Cruise Missiles, would require repositioning all of the target.q in the National Target Base (NTB). The NTB currently consists of approximately 42,000 targets used by strategic forces in the implementation of the ingle lntej{Tated O~rations Plan (STOP}. The ac<'nracy requirement for positioning targ< t in the NTB has beoome incrementally more stringent, 88 weapon ys t.emR have improv d , from over 300 met.e:rs in the mid-60' to a current requirement of 62 meters horizontally . Stringent vertical WGS accuracies related to the ~TB, Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAM) radar reference points and mini -bloc data forB-52 penetration route planni.ng are concentrated in the Sino-Soviet areas. Present validat-ed requirements call for 29 met.er LE at 90% probability vertical accuracy in positioning of the NTB targets. The technical objective for the Advanced MX-ICBM is 17 met.ers at 90% probability for the TB targets. Other vertical requirement.s are hown in Table 3 4. -31 -TCS-9923/ 77 -'l"op Sec•er CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 rt•Uitnt•J pr,\·ifl£"'-\11\Ut H Jntt•l.t~(·J l'l' i 1111( .11 f' I Ul!l:t"~.IJlll ••I mrl mil. l!l.ll I ' I,,... ll Ill! .ttl .., • 11·;\~•lflh Ill('I\! I II I • till n t' ):rll •• tl't).!•• I I lh ! 1 llllton 111 lt•Jit • : Ill Tilo ' ~,,•• SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Tep &eeret RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 Measuring KH-9 performance against MC&G collection requirements is, to a large extent, more straightforward given that the system delivers the required image quality and mode (mono or stereo), and the necessary data for point positioning at the required accuracies. The most significant evaluation criteria is the gross cloud-free square nautical miles returned by mission. 4.1 Coverage Statistics Three types of coverage statistics are presented in this section -groes coverage, age distributions, and NIIRS distributions. 14 GroeB coverage statistics are presented for both area search and point target surveillance. These statistics show area attempted, area cloud-free, and film used. Age distributions are graphical ways of viewing KH-9 effectiveneBB in meeting the standihg search collection objectives. NDRS distributions provide a means for assessing the interpretability of the imagery. Two types of NIIRS distributions are presented in this section -point ratings and area ratings. The point ratings are ratings assigned to point targets by the photointerpreter during the exploitation proceBB. These ratings are generally applied while viewing the imagery in stereo and are maintained in the Installation Data File (IDF) by NPIC. The area ratings are applied during the search exploitation process. Unlike the point ratings, they are applied to large areas. They are aBBigned to f'llm segments. For film exposed within 30 degrees of obliquity, the ratings are assigned for every 15 degrees of obliquity and for every 7-1/2 degrees of obliquity for film exposed outside 30 degrees. Area ratings are aBBigned while viewing the imagery monoecopically. The ratings are maintained in the National Area Exploitation File (NAEF). Most of the K.H-9 imagery receives an area NIIRS rating. The ratings contained in both files represent a single photointerpreter's 88888Bment of the imagery. For large samples, the difference in mean rating between point ratings and area ratings is about .4 NIIRS units with the point ratings being higher. This is due primarily to the fact that the point ratings are 8.88igned while viewing the imagery in stereo at higher magnifications and the mono ratings are assigned at lower magnification while viewing the image monoecopically. 4.1.1 Performa.Dce Summarln for Broad ~Search 4.1.1.1 Gross Coverage Achievements Table 4-1 summarizes the gross coverage achievements of all past KH-9 miuions. It shows also the number of unique COMIREX targets imaged by. each mission. The total imaging caP-city of the K.H-9 system has averaged about 19 million square nautical miles per ·mission. The first three KH-9 missions were flown at higher altitudes and employed higher ''The NIIRS rating aywtem became operational in 1974. Until ita advent theN wu no syatematicway of1111ening the overall interpretability of imapry produced by utelllta.. It wu de.iped for application to point tarpta, but eoon after ita dewlopmeat it wu applied to aearc:h imapry. The fint KH-9 mt.ion to be NnRS rated wu 120'7. -33 TCS-91123/77 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TeJ' Seeret RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 obliquity scan sectors than present KH-9 mission . These facto r ult..ed in larger amounts of coverage, but at a lower average quality than cWTent m i ion . Due to operational problems, mission 1211 operated mostly in the mono mode. Thi resulted in an unusually high amount of coverage, but at reduced quality. Table 4-2 through 4-5 provide a more detailed breakout of the imaging capacity by mi . sion and by primary area of interest to missions 1209 through 1212. A KH-9 . ystem typically images cloud-free about 13 million square nautical miles. In general term , about 45-50 percent of nn average mission's film is used a;~ainst the USSR ( mpha i on ALT); about 15-20 percent is U!led against China (emphasi8 on missile search); 5-10 percent against Eastern Euxope (emphasis on MBFR baseline); and about 3-5 percent against other Communist countrie . Overall, about 75 percent of the coverage attempted is against Communist coontrieR . Another 15-20 percent is used again:st the Middle East and Third World requirements. The remaining 7-8 percent of the film is used in the U.S. for satellite engineering tests, prelaunch film te ting, and for mapping and other support, including U . . civil applications. 4.1.1.2 Age Di tributions Age distributions r status curves ares graphical way of viewing KH-9 effectiveness in meeting the tanding search colle<:tion objecti':es. Generally speaking, the reQuirement has been to collect eighty percent of each of the delineated search area within the specified coverage period. . 34 -TC -WJ."l/77 Tep $e~ret SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS fop See•tM-RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 TABlE 4-2 111-1 c._...•••• 1201 f29 OC'tr,her 1974---7 March 197.5) C.U.Ctio1 Catapry · II '\ ludt·: . l'·'' ' ,ntl:·. Qf .. u~ l ' UV I 'IJ! II' llll :lude s Sile at Arn ,.... .__, 6 7 .1 28 5 5 . 1 0 35 g ZB 49 7 Peteftl FIIIUIU 4ti I ~5 L2 1 -., '-~ 2 2 5 1 83 8 Dh --5G 1000 MC&G imll: t,uy ;:md (.;IVIIIan) "'· ~~ GriN A,.• 1 1 4 I' 4 4 1 r,,, 1 b ( ? 0 t: - 1 H 6 ,..._...... CIMUJIII.....-Y 8rou ~-..... I; lj Ll ~ 7 4 36 24 ,; 4 2 ., I 4 1:! 4 86 6 1 4 s 4 - 14 ~ 10 4 and En~jHlt!ttrlri!J CLt ilhralion 35 . {f ' -~J' I . CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 6 87 44' 8 61 6 79 :, 74 j,> ,.. Fas tvrn f: , tt(.\() f! 40 9 t 150 1 1 f> "j7 nmu :.> 82 16 5 .. 5 4 1 68 1 1' 8 fhht ·f Tt,lul Commur11~t :,() ,-665 ~0 i48 22 i 2 87 11.1 i o 01 1>1 5'53 CounttiC:~-' ~., MtO.IIt• E,,,, is 6 1 73 67 'J'i hcr W.., Id :Jil 50 12 2 3 04 ~ 29 I 8ft Suhtut.tl 49 5-(l T8J :d7 :> 96 2 0 8 Othe• t.. ru t-.tJ sr..,..~ 28 6!i 76 67 !)0 ~ Figure,. ·l ·1. 4-:l And 4--:\ iilustntt.€' the status of !lt'arch rovel'a~e sat illfat.ttoo of primary l'l'· Qui~mt>ntt~ in l"t"lat.ion to the fil. Xfl. and 90 p&.'rccnt satisfactiun l~\'t•l!4. Jr !>hould he note-d that tht-data in these f~urt'S are sho'A'J\ in tt>rms. nf the area delineations which tuwt' ~n w;ed in KH·9 r~uirement.li' to dalt' . In ~pite uf >~mne interruptiortant of thE' non-timl· · ~ensili\'(' require· ment~ in tt-rms of quality. quantity. and continuity of imagery tlnw . There have been !4hnrl p~ritld!l ~in'"· e KH -9 has bettn operRtional when irnpottunt int.e-Lii~~mce situ.atipn.s rnulrl nut he monitored. These gaps wert' rlu~ tn ~uch factur!'o u" lt\um·h dela~-l> anct utendt:d rx-riuds of had wt>ather . -l.l.t.:l NAEF l\liRS Distrihution~ NU.H.S diMtributionr; at1d I'Unmlntive dil\tributions for searrh co\'<.•ruge rated from KH -9 miAAionl" 1209 through 121:! art> prnvided in :Figures 4·4 throuach 4-7. ThE-se distributions are l'inJ:lt> photo-interpreter rut in~"' extrarted frnm thc.• Kationai Ar~a t-:xploitntion FHe . Generull~· ~pc:ukilll'. 5.5 t•J &' p£>r<·ent of the unique.· imaj.!es rated Me rntcd 1\'URS 4 or heuer. Fur the grosN a~a rated. miSl'liun 1211 received si~nificuntly poorer area ratin~~ thwing the imagery mono!i('opically . -36 Tc 'S-99:!:1/i'i Top 9ec:set SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS Te, ieeret RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 ..... ......... -·1~····--· 14 IJ«,.Wl9'15 •~Matrll-lf1'/eJ -~.... ~ ·· .. 1 P lllll.tiY llll t~III\Jt>i ll'f' USSR 5 .S7 47 2 10 83 H 91 ~00 ~ , )'''' ' ' '~ r t•' I>PP 4.0 4 .8 I 14 63 33 2.82 19 8 4 36 3.63 2 25 Ch'"' Ot •v" 56 33 67 Sb 38 10 65 75. 17 00 '.377 7 96 25 49 6' J7 20 F: e• · V'w ur ld 36 5C 13 8 4 t) 1 3 14 ;> 34 49 40 93 8 27 n 1., 23 10 50 C:tu•• 2 84 €2 8/ ·o 09 2C 28 Of> 06 t.• ~ t E· ~'..!Ill? ~,.: ~ ~ : 8 08 02 01 p,u l.u~ u;. t'l t-1lf""l Tes·s, 1 c 5p·~· '"' • llt11 Su:)POr' ::14 11 01 Ol 011 l~ i I r :vr 1\pJJIII ,.:IIt!WS 1 0 40 01 0 1 ! 000 :.ll09 I 7 33 10 59 "f\·1•d · Ht-t t .J~~ t u h Hff' :-. thr l ! H:!1!tle>; t_! •. ! ; Jo' otj i ! . U ' "'" .,,uses lO'Io'E'fd~ , ,dude!~ .... OOfiiQn that ')ljp('h)ft!'> 11\ 1(11 ' ~H: i Tn itl c.r'Y ..tlloi ('1\.' Ci t.lll .,.,.,,Pf1i1H~ '~ . ,,." 37 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Ts~ ieGut& RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 TAIL! ..._i ....-.... IIIIIM1J1Z (HJui1197d· ID~umbc>r /911} Calui• Cllltlef ... .... .... ...... ~h!~ r;!...,.; •• I ~-;a;-~~...:, · P• •tnary lnl~llr iJt."ICe uss~ 6 87 .:5 I 7 4~ ~ 1 4 3 ~9 E;u:tt! f11 Eurnpe 40 43 77 47 JO Ch llld 2 82 18.6 3.32 2 5) 1 so O: t>l!• S6 3 ~ 56 34 26 i u :.11 Cornrsii.J IUS ! Colont ues 1065 7 1 7 12 10 8 48 5 95 'V> '1111 ~> F,,.,,' 25 26 "6 41 n ftr ... wo·id 38 50 19 • 4 49 2 97 2 40 Sull llfiOII 49 40 934 17 OS 1186 8 !")i Ut htH u .. 284 66 82 6J 57 MC& C..i t~ nc:l M•ll!alyt'' l 7 29 2 1 19 T.,,., En~p11eerr ng 2.7 42 33 JO Pr.,.f ,ltl'lt· ~• Foh 1 f!'S t S 1 5 Sp.~Ladl lil t ., I S.J;JO(H t 4 06 O!l 04 0111Wt C sv ol A nr>IKdts tH'!> .3 05 (14 0 4 hr.'lfld 1u!als 52 24 1000 17 87 , 2 49 914 • ·,.1 •llt 11 "' f:. ·l ·:f · nC" IUCt!~ u... • • fh t · ··~\ll Ht· 'il" ,,, t JSC\ S 1 ove riJQI! rnciU dtrS a ,.rutto i' !hJ~ !.Uflfh.>rt!-. IJC\rh lt)P tt11 h taty .trut ~: t-.dfdfl " '""'•Lung ,,_, ,_.., n ·... .-·~-'-1 11 Inp ieeret ftGURE 4·1 .. ... ..; Statu:; ul Suan:h Coveragtl Sattsfattiun lor Pflmary Ret{UIU:mcnts {Jan }4 thru o~c 76,1 5fl ~~ I I'Vt.!l f~ t 3J ':: .., ., rJ) m n .... f'tt: ~-...~~-· ~, ,. ,: I'"· I tn m 0 -1 ' ~ '"l lJ! utm•n~ Ar ir ~ Frc qw•Ut \' " I 0 z :c; 3 ~ '3 inunth tn 3 5 '6 (llOI\tl> -< tn -1 2 1 ~ ft10ntlt m lfy s 12 •• •v i1 tt, !!!: tn 0 0 z -1 ;;u ijj c -1 0 z tn ()1 ()1 Ol CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Tep ~e&ret RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 ftGURt 4-4 NAEF NIIRS DISTA&BUTION AND CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTtON FDA KH-9 MISSION 1201 12.1 11 .0 I .D 10.1 IO#Cofl ...... ... cr: .... :&i :J-' 7.0 c< ...Ju &,)~ ... :J u o.C ~z a ... ocr: -< =CI 5.1 -':J ::liut 4.0 u z.o 1.1 I .. l 2 NIIRS ---Grou Cloelll·fr• ---Ullillut CNd·Fr• -42 . SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 Top iet>ret RUFF UPDATED: 14 December2011 FIGURE 4-5 NAU IIIRS DISTRIBUTIOI A•D CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FOR KH-9 MISSIOI 1210 12.D 11 .0 10.0 1.0 1.11 :::~ ac ... ... o• :..J 711 oc ....... uj: .. :. etC 1.1 . I! ~~ ... ::) 5.0 .. 0 .,. 4.1 3.0 2.1 111 1 tl 5 4 3 2 NUllS ---Gross CleM F'" ---Unittue ClaY• ·free 4 3 Tl'S ~.!:1: r: Tqp &tarat CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release le~ 5&eFet RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December2011 FIGURE 4-6 NAEF NIIRS DISTRIBUTION AND CUMULAnVE DISTRIBUTION FOR KH-9 MISSION 1211 11.0 tU ... "' ...... CZ.J 1U .... I o_, ~c Ou ti.O ~ ~~ .. ~ oc =: 1.0 otz: -c -';:, u 1-'d ... u l .O 7 4 2' Nlllt$ ---Greu Qewll· f•n ---U""ue Clod·Fro 44 Tof' Sectel SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Tol' Seeret RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 FaGURE 4-7 NAff NIIRS DISTRIBUTION AND CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FOR KH-9 MISSION 1212 1a.a u 1.0 ... .., J.D a: .... "'""' 't c:aa ;:)~ c:atC u _,y uj: ... :::~ O< rnZ li.O .... oa: -c ::::::~ u -o J;.., J .O z.o 1.0 1 • l 2 IIII liS ---Gr-Cl.vd·Frw ---Uniq•t CIHIII -Frw -45 - Te, iaeret £41 &Z 42 o ±i! a X& o £ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 'Top Sec1et RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 -&.1.2 TargPt SurveillaiK't" Covera'c The .~iu~lt· mul't uuique charot'I('Ti."li( oi tbc KH-'1 ~y.-tc•m i!i it ,; ahilit~ '" provid£phuto~raphi·· t'n\'t> ragp of la r~t> gt>Ographit' ~treu.c at a (jUality :Jfl£·q•lalf' for J:f'IINal fJI'Jinl rar~wt snr\'t>illanct>. In the courst> -,j' ,,>llc(.·t in;; search imagttry. i': typkall \' cn\er,; -to to liO IhtHJsHntl 1141int t.ar~.:ets tCOMIREX and non-COMTREX IM!!t'l~l per mi!lsion . If the surn•illant'l' r('(tllircmt•nt is nlln-timt> aitical :md tbt qua!it~· requirtm£·nl fur 1h£•st· tan.{t•ls is l(•r :"JliH:-' ·I imn~t·r~· 11r 1~>~. tlwre i:; tln extrem~ly high pmhahi lit~· thutttJe KH -fl W\' t-rage will peri<'•dit':.tll~· ~•lli>'~ly the !lurveillant't> nt>edtc . Tar:,:t't rovt'raJ':t> stati:.lic:>. for COMIREX target:< arc prCl4t'nt~:tlli•r mi!ll4i(ln> I~Hl. l:?l1. ;tnd 1:!1:.! . F11r t•urh mi~'!ion Tahlt~ 4-6. 4-i' and 4-R gin a hn·nk1111t lly 1'1•11111 ry ,,f 1ht· uniqllt' tm~t· t .nul Fi~urtts 4-~. ~ -!J and 4-]I) providt> KIUtS overall cumulat jq~ and 1li:-l rit.utionf'. The 1'\IIRS cli:-lrihutions nrc hased on the Installation Data File unci rl'I1N·t a l'inglc.> phutoinlerprtot.(>r point tnr~trt NIIR8 rating. The KH-9 system typicnlly mwrs atH•Ut ~0 Jtert•ent nf the COMIRF.X I:Jr:;:r.t dt>ck per mission . Of thi" c()vt>ra~e. 70111 All rwrn~ nl i" NIIK." 'l•1r hettn. . 46 SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Top 9eetel RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 TAIIf4-7 . &NJIIIUE .... ~ldllT CORIA&£ .......1111 I l ; j I G-..,NtAnl t0111TatttU T~~ Htltn•er Ptrctnt USSR 8.595 7.62!i 88 1.2 l'niqu.-Contrihutiun!l of KH-!* t{) lntelligcnct> llw '.tllq• H' t ' ~>lllril. l i iiJoJl:-nf 1-\H-') art' n:-l\\o 'VJH~: " " "' ''' ''' Hlliq oll ' o·t•nlr i hllltOJ 'l;-;utd .,., ,( !Jt l ll · lll l i qu~:-,.,.,urihutu•n:-. :O.\-~It>n' uni•;•a· t ·onrrdulli"n.~ •·an lw Jlf ii \ 'Jdt·d by "" nll;r-r •o po· r ; tll• tll(l ..r 1''"1"•!-'t'd ~\ .-lt'lll. f'lll:''t' l"•lllrlhnlilolh itf( dou· ! 11 KH !t':-IIJUqtlt' al•i ill .' I•• • ••ll o·t·t ' '•·r('". l,r.,;ut ;ut·:t ""~nopli,· t·••vt?ra~::E> at :'\fillS ·I ••r l)t•ltt>f qu:1l i t:-. Fall< IIlli! 111 i411t· •·•·n rrt imli"ll" lift' :hn.'>t' <"oll trihution;; t-hat ht.1H· ~ : i:-lurH11l l .v hN~Il pru\ :fkd on]_,''-' Kll-9. parr:_\ ht •c': ltll.t' of .II lf.a,.r an 1, n>q •"r""' .. "'= -1.~. J System-l lniquc Contribution~ l•:,p}.,itatiPn th;&t rrquin>:< ,..~· noptic covt:·rn~i· t·ial st-arrh n quiremt-:.t ~-Th.-ront rihullllll• art-llll i't-11· ! Jrrarcb ~hiE~:tb. "hil'h •a t i:-1\ tht· ..tand !ll J;: ;md ,.Jlt't'ial "''3~ch n·qutn•mt•n!:-,nllj!ht pro:\-i:il' wmf '''all,,,-:ht':'W ~·ontrtbutlhll-.. \lilhun,. uf :-rt·ti l'uc·h 1\li-~1 mj,.,..j,,n It• :-a! i~l~· ! I~· ~• ;md inl! ,.,.,m ·h n•qttin·mt•nll-. lma~c·ry un1.1ly~t~ then "~'!;lcmotirally c·xnmilll' tht' imu~·· ry t1• rt-p(lrt 'i~:nilicartl dwn~o:t•s and to awgate the presence (•f items of militnry si!(n itic·mu·r· . Io addition. It'll" ,.f t louw,and~ nf I :tl'j.!t-1,; III'P nE'CPssarily image an·;t ol ~-:round . Sinn· t.ht');l' t.arg£'ts must tht>n be t'Xpluitf'(l , J:Oocl quality slf•r<•11 j, t·!'sPntiaJ f,r prnv iding ro·liablt• lar_~!t'l rt-ad1mts. :Mcl."t of tht tarl{t'l~ now iuucgt·d It _\ lnr~o:t•lin!( ~.vstc•mt; 1-\'!'1'1' oi!ool'f!\l'fNI durin~: lll'llrdt. and new target...., artl t'UO~uli 1\H -!J c·un•t;t)!l' 11"'11ally JHII\ idp,.; 1ht· nn lv trnagt>~ of Iht> t'arlit>r ~ta~.;e;; l.lf ('lmstrurl i•m wh<"rt' ,·11hlt· :md tuum!al ion ronfi~;u ra· ltnu~ c·un lw analyzl'rl. I :• ..~ I I Tratbu·nl or l ' nt>x;)('cte:l Acti\·ity Tilt' Jlllfl'• l~(· .,.. tht• H•arrh ph:t:<(' nr Pllpln::arinn i~ '"find -t::ni:h';lttl duw::t·, ;ond l•l :!t':,: .Pc · tiH' Jtrt-~I'IIC't' "' i tt·n~,. .,fin t>l : i ~t'ntr ,.j;:ni!:cn::rt> . \til li· •n· ol ·qtwrt· rw •tt ir a i u; tlf.,-,.f :.:r• u:ud mu-: lw ''-"'"lll:tti. :tU~ 1 :o..lmim•d in •~rtlf:'r In Iir11i dtillll!t~ ur t• • •"'liTE' I h. tl tlu·r(· .trr Hnn,· 1\ 11 -~r~ .thi:i t ~ tn im.\t:E' 'ast arpa.;; at ~·l"d ~..illiit y has mack> t lw dt>lt ' c ''"n nl "mall. ,f. H·n lllt a~tod. cllltl olft~n lll. arc•: (II ('h inf:':-t' S~M lix<'rf lii!l. Tht'St' l>ite~ ell'(· in muuntHII1fous '"'· irw~ and ~onu> latk tlt'rmarwnr ~eh•nt ilyrn~ IE'::tt.ures Wigure 4-l:)t. (:\1 N('w S1\M ~ilf'A. A nrw c•romplrx at KoriiJ'k will dirrf'lly aflt·c·t SlOP (l!'lll'tration rnllll's thtntt~:h lh•· !lHrlhC'rtt l'~SR. an ~:\-£1 c·:' ond tWI• ~A~i support !;wilil it·~ \\'t•rt· found frnm Zavit in,:k to Lr>,.nZa\'od... k 111 thr tar pa.;tt>rn ~oviPt l"oion . . 52 T&p &eeret SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Tel' &eeret RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATEQ: 14 December 2011 -U.2.1.:! Lower Priority Targets KH-9 provide:,; th~ only coverage of 1housands of installation" which ar*' not individually important pnou~h to merit. national intelligence colleC'tion, hut which collf'ctivt-ly arf' wurthwhill' to thl' intellil:!ence l'omm\lnity f•Jr e<~~•n11mic :stnriies ami pmduetion PI;timates. The~ tar~et,~; include hundreds of each _of thf' following kinds of adivilie:s: ( 11 Petrochcmil·al industTy . (21 Coke iron and stef'l plantt:. (:3) Fertilizer piants. (4) AAA. sites throughout the world. {.')) Regimental size m.iJitary installations in China. (6) Lesser airfields and naval farilitiE'S. · (7) POL storage facilitie!'l t.hroughout the world. {81 Di~persed storage arens. WI Agricultural monit-oring-. 4. :!.2.~ Spt•cial Search A t;i!!nificant fmction of l(H-9's imagery il'l tal'iked against l'lpedal !-Jearch rt!quiremcnt:<. While t.h(' ima~ery is also examin~.>d to find the mt~re general "anything of significance," spPciHl ,;eurch ima~ery i.-; taken tf> find something in pmlicnlar. The following IITt' l'Oill<' rx; t m plt>s of the expi<,itation of :-;pedal search imagery. 4.~.:2.2.1 Mohile Missile Search The search for the SS-X-16/SS-20 mobile mi.>tHile has been hampered by the nece!'Mit.y U• !-.eareh large areas of ground, by the la(•k of equipment al lAunch site~. by rhe ext.ensiv(• usw of netting and h_.,· the fact. that certain stmct.ures are toned w hlend with the surrounding scenery. KH-9 has contributed to piecing together mobile miK-~ile equipment and deployment in the following ways: (1) .July l!l?-·1: A TF:L and H rtosupply vehicle were dclcdcd nort.h ofVoJograd (figure 4 141. High resolution photoj!raphy then provided good cHtimRt.es of TEL and resupply con . figuration . 59 TCS-~23/77 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRC Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 l:ll Ft'hruary 1976: Detected liPid acti\·ity nfSS-20 . Detectf'd Ul(I\'('JDCnt ot SS-:!0 launch site from 1\apustin Var to Glad.ka)'&. The st>a.rch area wa.>~ euendtod tnlm 30-naut ica!-mile to ;'il-naufi(•al -milt' radiu~t about IC'B~f complexes . ,<:1) Fttbruary l97f1: Similnrit~· n11ted bttv:ee-n S<-alt>hcoard anrl SS-20 exerd~ and trn<;k Slt'l i\'ily . 141 Utwher 1976: Deterted !! liding -roof building\~ as po:;sihle launch 6ites in timt• or hf'i~htent'd nl<'rt . 4 .:!.:!.:.!.:? Din•l'terl ~<·tlr<.:h 1\H-9 hnfl provf'ci invali.aAble when the general location of II tar~et or activit) it1 known. hut. t,hf' locat.ion i~.ttot kn(lwn prec:isl'ly enuugh for arqui~itiun by 1:1 targetinl( syste m. Typiml examples : · N udenr 1't1Ht.K. After a Chinese nuclear ter.t at Lop Nor, or a J')(>Brcful Soviet let!I. intt>rprt'ters art' ~t'nt'r~tlly required to loeat~ tbt> sit.e in an effort !IJ n4!termine r.he type 1111d purJX~ nf tht> IE'S!. Scililmic· l(lcations ure not lH' t:urate ennut£h for the site lo be pi npointed in mosl ntl>es withuut broad awa ("overage (figure 4-15) . · r,JiJ.Isilr f'nilurt't-. Afttor a fui lure, mi..,sill' t'(lffi{lonenb c·nn impud in un l"\'\'f'·Widenin~ triun~lt> duwnrnn~t> fwm mi ~~..;ile t('t;t (·enter;;~. Tlwir di~W\t'fY mw..a r<"ly nn hruad arcn ('l'\'l'f8l(f' . Onct' locatt'd. t h(' dPhm of thE> impa!."tJ; may t1Pf'E1l'litafl' l'f'fllr)!ef int: fur hil!ht>r rt-solutaou t'O\' t!l'a~.: for tdrntitication and mt'n.surarion of drbris or l>t'('ticms of t ht> mis.o:.i1e whirh !iurviwd the cra sh . f'i\·il Dt>t'l'll~>o(>. A j!t'nt•ral ~;m· h has be<>n (.'f(•n-.e fJflll!r;tOl in t hf. S.t\'iet l ' nimt. Th•J\tsnnds nf JX'r~tttulf'l stwlt('r; hU\'(' rn't'll ftll\!'itrUt> ted. :mtl ma11y ,1ft' nttr nt>:1r knuwu military target:~ anti MH• tht>rl'ft•ff' r\ltl l.wc:n covf'r('d by 1\ tf ~ nr Kt I-ll im<.~gcry. KH -9 ~tere h.U.t iJ rit·nl inlnrmutir•n •>11 OPwly idtm ttfit'll (llrJ.:l'fjo nr nc· tiviti~. Onc·e the rm8f(t:'l)' Annlyst iden t ifies n lll'W ndivii,\' (usually fll' II rt'~ult of good collatertll int'urmatitm or of a find on high~r quAlit-Y imal(ery). il activity !)(>gin ? Whnt did t.hP tu!tivity look like in i1 ~ et:arlit•r st.ng£'1'? How wirle:~prf'arl ill tlw f\d ivi ty'? And whnt evP.ntl' promptc'd that <'ertain mmuri7.ed rifle rf!giuu>nts 1MRRS l had u.dd~ti field artillery in a certain pattt:ru. Amtly111 11 t1l>Uid t h{'ll ~n burk hl KH .!:J covrrtl~t's, and nrrned with this information. l'"ulri idrnt ify other u~rad{'d MRHS . SC · n·~ Y'J:!:J/ ii top Sec·et SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Top ieeret RUFf 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 s,,rne nLher tt>.Jtulta pro\'ided by histtari<·ai "tudj~K: t 1i :\t>\\·ly idtont ifit:tl ,;tt,.· kpilt.-~ ·li hrirlt;ing ~,.uipmtt-nl had ht-vn Ji~nl fM ye~~the~ dtcl nnt repn>!4f'nt .t ~udden dlange in Sm·i('l ;>ractices. subduin~ rumors uf impending hc.,;tilit i ~ 1~1 A mc•tcari~l· d rillt> r~iment in tht> Lt>ningrad Military OitJtrict Wlts train~ in uir muhilt' tacli(~. all•lwin~ot fur mort" mobility than wru. rm~"iou,;ly t•xpertt.•d. Previnuf' ('nverag("s ~howt•d ·t hi"' t·npuhility to he t•ummon thruu~:huut th~ di~t riel. t:n ('()Jialeral information ~Showed that pre\'iously wudentified storage bunkers could be u~t·ci to !Jrnlt·l·l rctoen'l' grain frorn nuclear fallout. BH A<'ivil dPft~nlie measure. Reexomination ..r pr<'Victll'< 1\H-!1 t' UVc'rH!{C!I identified some :10 more bunkers. prc.vidcd UJIJiroximute datl>S nf l'"ll"trudinn, am! !'!O allllwcd analysts tn SJlCculatc what nutionul eventA promptcri the r~nn!il rud iun ol the ~liJTUJ!.-bunk~rs. t.:l MC&G Collection Summary Tlw I'Tilt>riA l'or t>valu31in~ KH -9 imagerv collc<"ti!Jn 8J'llinlll :\1C&G rt.'<.juirc.•mt!nt~ urt.' ,·untllint!rl in Tnhll' 4-9 . Otw nf the tnt•re f'.ijntificant paramaten; i10 the gnN clmui-fTee flquare Mill irtll miles r.-t urned h~· millSions against. validated MC&G requirements. Cloud-free a"lsl',.:.,"nll'nl rt'lll•rts ar" J{t>nerated on World Area Grid tWA<.H ~II (1.2 x 18 r.qua.re nautical ruilt::--1 u.ud \\'A(i Muht·cll (:l x :l ~ua.re nauti<·quired . Satellite image rt'SOlution .requirt>ments for MC&G purpo:~es vary with tht t-e:ale and t~Jl(' of the product. Thl' m,e;t ~tri~ent l"l'quirements fuT Jrround resolutiun lllltlL'l'l imll~(' '-~lnll'nt Ol.'t'rl." otf milita~· :\1('&C pnllfuri!O il• 2 fet'f r(lr 1;:"tO,tliiO line ma,>s and for ()L\1S l.ev('( Tl rli~ital f'Uiturt> and-tt>-rram d11ta . Thin i~ more important lnr the fJannrctmic ima~n>~· than ror the stellar terrain i magery. The KH -9 panoramk imagery taken at ahitudt>s ol fol:l -l:tlnoutical miles (the range of ultitud~ Cnr mi!4l'innt' 1201 t.hmugh 1211) fll(>f'tl' nnrl in many ol,.._.:--t'liCf'Pds the :\fC'&G requirt"menl~ for ,:round re~,(ution t.listunc·e ff:RI)) or ~Jilt.". Similarly. KH-9 M('S frame imagery tllkf>n Rt ~.tra6 nEtntkal miles Ithe ruugr 11f altitucll~ l11r ~f('S ll(ll'rutiuns on mi~!tiHns 1201'1 thrnujlh 12]2) will. for t:erlain prodm·ts. prn\'idf' rhe rP:quirt'd GRD . Thf' remainder of thi11 KC<:t.ion pre11enh; coverage sat i~proved KH-9 panoramic imugery requirement,; un• for 1:!2.4 million :;(jii/ITl' nnutic'nl mile!'. 11huwn in Tnhle :l-1 . Current. satisfaction It-vel" a~;aiNt tbt>~Je requirt'mcnt:~ an· shown in Tnhlc.•.J -10. This t.abk> ill ba.c;ed primarily on the ndual KH-9 collection tlnd cxdu(fl.,. t ht' Sino-Suvicl IU'cu and most. of tht• important ~~eurrh ur JH>int t.aruet area11 in the Middle Ew.t. li•r which MC&l; requiremt>nts art> gent"rall~· m~t. 65 . /'1 'S ·!H.!/. :; Tap Sec••• CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 TABlE 4-9 MC&C COllECJIOH £VAlUAtiON CRIHRIA CRPIHIA wcs 1 1l'~'le OtoM 11l i Mll111'111!!l\ A•ea_____ TRILAP ~hJt1el fllt!tU!IP 5 1 ' I 11 f<•Ltl pt'.llhillll n.WII\ 1•••1111 t hll ~t• "'r n,l'l·t HI 11 1••1i l ltlw :!.! 1rlltlltull "t Gll t-F 17 September 2011 UPOATED: 14 December 2011 SU •• AIH Of H-9 PAr OU .r :"t1C G CO'IERAGE f OR 0 tu~MU IS"' ~REA. IStere•J. $0 ll"lllilln.llj flequtfi!IJlent RtqUtff!ll'l 111 M•ht:lt\ r.,~, 1,, &B 7 lfV 12-77 t C' C•f'f ~ 13 51.1 t l lilt StJ [1114 20~ 1• ID 1 2 I 17 3 1.:1.:\ ... " ''"' "' (Ill 11 • '' '' 11 \.\ ,f tlw () , 1·\ pr '{iu.-ri{•ll pJ<•('t·-.,. i .~ l>"rtl:t\l•d 111 Fi&:ltrP I 1-'I J , ...,. pn P·" ., ... ol (• Jultll Ill fl\1 11\ )If hfl Pt' lht· t'IIJ1i.JI' d ll\01 l.lfllltl "' 'lto(l p.t!l'•f,iltlli I \ 'Jdl ,Pf;'1l 1 .,,,, tt.:• 1 ''"' I• 11'1• 111 t • 1\ r!·t~l· mc·l fh ·" , ..,,\I ,t l·.tl I• llf'lll 'l'h• "UIP 1' •~ 1 • " II 1•!.•1• f ·•'1 11111 •lll\ l\lr·du,r 11'111'"''11! •. ~ l• •trro•tdhotlt• 1,;11.11 •• I \d•.lltH~·s 1111"1 trlo .._r tp' \ I• I I l'llJ>.• t,.l\t I 1.-f.-.,,..,.tflt• tlto I II HIll II"' 'II•IJij•.ltl., d I I Hit' J1fr• 11 '• t r\ • tl • tl tl '1111 It ttl IIII' ~1 h...l'-( It'llI f.t'll! •.t l• II I I II• II' .111 I · Ill• I''" · l 'I ,. • ••• o! .. l,dl•••"•''•'l ~tt•tlul ttq~.···:uo"l·l•r I l ,,. ...!u•t ''"'1'1"111 '-11t -.. ,. ,, ti u r CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 1' i' Stz • r y l R JFf W H 11 ;'i)j) , ii (lft SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS UH HI SQNli~>OOHJ ~0 SNH i:3S O WltJ W t.l OS :II) SNDI111t'll ':UiV BlH OM l:l l~.i 0& l'l r ' ,. ,. l ,,., fio1 {I I l CRITICAL TO US SECURITY : THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 TA8lf4·12 \41 l iTA RY Af.IO :IVIl MC&G PAt.ORAMIC COVERAGE laY MAJOII GEOGRAPHICA RHiiO~ Wnrl•iwidt. IHII!dmg Sina·SOV11tt Are11 (Stf' teG ~0~' f. bud-f u!ttl l 5 l .. !) l 4 fll lttrl lldllllrlll .. ' to. ... SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 +rrt:rSt rret R U FF UPDATED: 14 December 2011 tABlE 4 l3 STATUS Of MltnAHY AkO CIVft MC&G MtS Ci)VERAG£ ($lllu:o. ~0•, t:ILutf.FHII'I M1 lhon~ of SinD t.u1Uta 1'4nrlll 1 s.~~. t Amer ol:t Arc.o S 1:"1 l -- ">• ll ~2 • 4. ~7n .~ I .. 5.! 1 .. :lJ 2!) HI 1 c 1 1 32 II 'loth.t !1111~ ft tl' [IS•H "lllllliV rt It' jiiiJI'II Ill Ill 37 0 mil' M $.In 'Ill I'll II lfr I 111l'1 >!. IIIII II tl•t fA 1\~, S !M 11\'hlt fl II... WAl t , .. u oil(' ·, fil'tCI'I tnl$~11)11 l f!Q!itrl'lr ut ·I~ VI• w• I• I 3!1 H Ill,,.,., .r r. wtudl 1'1' 1111' ·~e u:~l•.-1\r•to~u tr,l I~'CJlil''l IJ 4 •rar llmn sn m A I '>I oh , ,t ruHt ,, 111e II""" 10 te•~r d 12 • 'K 1 1 IA•i G lll T cf i iH8' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ~~RUfF I l I l / l I I I t ( ....r' · - I I \ I I \ t C> I :!:'r !z I ..... · j:;; ... I I ~~ I :::J ( 0 \ .:: . I~ .";! ":J ~tr.' I \ -· 2 J ::::CI \ I \ ~/~ ' \ ·t .::: .u w 0 .~ -1: 4 <: l't: _, ... 0 c ' N 111 SJO ~011'\IW '; 31Ht B IH ·OJl01J .... . - ft ..: \ ,_. ~ ,· -t ,:_ 0 SCREEN ING / ANO r-----..-.+-H LN ARCHIVING AR CHIV ES .___ _ _____ j 0 -.-..... MJ\PS ' CHARTS ~ I ; I r· 0 t:c IMAGERY PRODUCT -T•RGll I; ""'.,EXPLOITATION GENERATION r-COOROJNATES '------_j ~OLMS / HRCOM (/)I m n -1 0 z :c:;: Ftgur 18 01\IJi• MC&G ?roduc ttOil O;en~tew (/) -< (/) -1 m ~ (/) n 0 z -1 ::0 iii c: -1 0 z (/) U'1 -...j CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM l"OI' Seeret RUFF NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 applil·at it•ns. llrl'CI!iiHII guided reentry vehide targt:tin~. and ),"' ·lt"vd ~tlnrk air<.·mft JWnl'trnt.iflll mir-11ioruo dktatl.' inrrea~in~ dcmr. nd fur !OUch digital protlucl!; as tPrrain ht•iJ!hl rnatric.-s and radar re11enh·ity profilt>S. lkt w('(>n I ht• raw imagp~· ;md t !w final Jll'lKiuct~ aff' the Vllrlflll" imug(• proc~o;;ing llJ.Cm · tiun~. t_\·pilic·d hy rerlifiratioo. rt-t,ris!ratioo. •lrth.,pbl.•f(• ~f'neralinn. mot'ltiddng. pl:111imet~· t')(!mrtit'n. and leature exlrnl'tiun. Tht-JO.e operations nre a·arri~d uur by a comhinotion of mnnu11l. optical and hybrid tlpli{·n l/digita l tt>ehniqu.es, onrlcurr~ntl~ l'Uru;titute the hulk of 0~1:\ pru,it•cl pipt'line lim<' n.'odesy exploitation o! !latellite irnu~t>ry ill H direct r~ult of militar~· and intelliJ!t~IH'I' u~rs' Wtlrld\\ide requirement~ for MC&r. J~rtl(hll't. nnrl f'ef\'lcef;. Tht>i!i(> prndud!l anti l'('rvit'l'~ currently com~iRt of some :.!:10 rlillcrt:nl itt~ms which <~an gPnrrally he ruteguri?.r.d 11~ follows: Cum)liltttiun and revision of standard topographic mllpll nnrl t·hart" . S to Marin•rs . nnd Plight Information Publirat iHn s. De,·rlotlment of di~ihtl dat.a base-s for st-~.lt.s~e and retrie\'ul of extra<·tt>d rlntn . ( :enPrat inn nt' rilll a haH'1', I'Uf'h al': .f)I.MS, t•• ,_i mul11t~ anci (oJH>rlllinnnll~, "upport !lf'nll'par(' tPrrain ~n&ln>. 1>t•\·elnpmt.•nt (tf photngrammetrit· data. ha.-.e!l. l)pfermination ·ut poin1 taq!l.'t <'&:kmlinnt~. Th(' prind1>al sourr£' for the generatkm of the!4e product& i& satellite Jlhotography. Try from t.he KH9 sen8onl i~ the mO!It tconomical rquiremt-n!.s. It iM the only !lystf'm whil:h provi de!! imagery !'!atillfflC"tory for the prndut:tion of MC&G pro~ul'tl'l where synopti<· wvera~re of denied aren!l i!\1 rcquire:d. l . ..ine MllpN und Charts M:lp~ an• u ~raphic· rPpre!.'t"ntation, mmally on A plnn<' 1111rfnN.• und at an P~< fnbli~>heo !Will~·. of lllilurnl and · nuuunadl:' features on thf' ~urfac:e of the eurth . l'hnrtli mt~ 11prrinl purpo~e maps. generally det-.iJ(ned f(,r navigation. in whit ·h t•liM.-ntial mar informuliun il!l rombint'd with \·nrious other datA t•ritit'al tu the intended UfOl•, 11uth as ltf'Filllttut irnl infurmat ion for at'ronaut1cal chllrb. . 74 . SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 Trrp See• et RUFF UPDATED: 14 December 2011 The l>MA lamil~· or m ap!i and charts ha.... developt>d m ·er H nurnh(•r•)fyean. in a \'lrm:.. In ~f' tu•rnl. t·ortograph ic product!' rlepenll un the ()pernt.ion supr)(•rtNI land . !'('H. a ir. nr ('ttlllhinat inn . rht• inft>r.dl•ri U:l \lfofll ~... .. ~"\"\ 1J"aP~tvPrnMr~rar~~ .., Mt~ t •' "' ... ""5 .;t· ;; .. .; ll'!lt-~~ Thto iO Cillfl nt a mnp or r·hurt dP.Jlt_•ncl...: .-m it!>~ inlf'nUE-<1 llurpOKE'. A lllf'R~>llrt< 1111 1he ~raphil· rt>pres(!nt,; an itwnw,.;ingly grcnLt>r di~tam•e on thE' ground a~ 1he scale dt>crPa!!E'"· As shown in Tahlt=> -t -14, lar~f' sra le mflps art> appli rabli:' for l{rcqmd 1\nd !lea npl'mticm ... . 'l'hl' ~>raJ,. del crmim·~ tht• a mouut and ll~nt>mli.wt.iPn t)f rie1.ni I petrtrayt'd und limit:< tlw pott·u t ial tt<'t'Url:tt·_v uf horimnf AI ami vertit•al informJlrudm·ti(ln prot·t~S.C!->. The optimum horir.ontnl a('curacy for a ratto~rnphic pmctud l('lus.o; A) i11 t'XPT'<'"-...._.d in the meter equi\·A It> net> of U.!'i millimf'h-'"' -a1 map '-<'ale (9(Jf; prnhuhilityJ. nnd the \Nt i,·nl act·uracy at ont--halt' lht· contour intr·rval (~M)', probability ). Tht> <-'ombination of scale nnd 1\tTumcy can ~u~ul'ntly affect the Kignifil'ance at ththorizontal amt \'Crtil·al datum nf the graphic. ' 75 Top Sacaec CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release Tep ieeret RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 lnformalion Files \'miuus type~! ul' non·llll'l rir J)l•int/ arca targets RT'f' rolledt'd within 1\ I I -9 ima~in~ OJit•ratiun ... rhat 111('1'1 tlw rt•quirl'lllf'lll s <•stuhli;:;hpd Ill updatf' airlidd IPfltttre., proclm·t•l:trJ!f'·"<'llltdt\' lll:lfl~' 1111d ;!Pn..ratl' rnr1111arhur r hart. phl•tnl('r<.tnJnl(•tric·nlly c·Hnlnlllcd poin t pn~i til•ning dutn h11~ ('(11\Ct-pt cic\'doperl h~ 0~1,\ i~ Ot>fint>d Ill-u ~· ur,·ontrnllf'd phot•-,graph:-. IIC"('t1tllpnnyin1' dotil. ~"OIJIUil'r JUII~foltffiS, and h:arcl"are <'llllhlin~ JX·r~..nnr-I t.l derin' coorclin~tt('.; f11r ;JO\' featutf' thut rnuv Itt• lo~t'ntt-rl "11 llw pht~lo)!raph~·. Thi~ Jlrt><·t•dlln' was in itiated tn.!'liminAl.~ l{l'flloio( NTHNt l'IHtsf'd b\' in:tdr:-. qttlll(• positi()naldatn clcri\'NI from maps which contrihutt'd lo unacrep't.aLie mil'sion 'wl->ult,;. A photn~rnmmet.ric prol'e:o~ enllctl annlyt i,·u l triRngulfl! ion is em p luyl!(l t11 prepare l'l'IHk An ocijustmt·nl prll~trnm t•n a lurl!e c.'Ornpuler j,.. us~KI t.o ttt~St>llllJle all inrlh idual plh •lnJ!rnph.-intv 11 ~mrdt-homogenenns !tnlut ion rclat.iV(' t o a\'ailCihle control. This linn I st•ltt · tiun <·nmpri~·l" ti-K• geudt•l kally l'nnt roiiPd PPDB whil'h i!< u t 'Hmpollitinn uf 1ht> hest geodt>t.ic and phutn)!ramnwtrir dul a fur that area. WithClut tur~her rrlint•mt•nt, tht-..,..,, JR c·~tn ht• used to pru,·idf' targt>l nll\'i~atiun JX•int positions whit·h met>t currt'nt weapon "Y"tfm at•curae.\· rt>tptirt>mt>llll'. ()iJ(ital Data llaKe ,\cl\'tllwed llN< ~sptH'l' nn" i~atum. trainintr und mission planning ~>y~t.emsare l'Utrent l.v ht: · ing dt•wluJx.'d. whid1 will he tlq>emlcnt on the availAbili ty of dhdtal cUll a O\'t'f IMJ:<· ntl'll~. Thl'>'r· s\' tvi<-es fnr raJJid and acrurnh.• l't>rwratinn of rurlar pn•d~t·· t iotl>-for inrlusicm in up«muinnal and 1rainin1= mit>~iun luldt>rs : :tnrl hardW:ttP ' t-e•flwun:> lttr .11ltmnated SlOP mi.....liion planning. C'orrt>:ation Ryst<-ml' surh ns 1'1:-:Ht'O~lan radar h(•in~ ckn•lopt"d fnr cmU.r miMile . HP\'. and other a ircraft An•! missilr na\·i~;tation !rh·t•d frum ,:atcllitc-imager~. l-itrntcgic Tur~et Dutu Tht> ~trah•git· point lllrtwts , predominAntly in t.he ~ino-Soviet area. art-prE>I'i~t· J!t:ocleti.: po:-~il iunal turgf'l roonlintHt•;; in ~upport i1t' th£• S10Jio1 the .Joint btrategir 'l'urgtJt Planninl! Stull (.I~TPS) with ahi:;oltth••H'C:uracit'S un t.hr \\'(;:-! . The clatn ltust: t: un~i~l~ n( Offgt!t ..1\im · in~: Points tOAf'). Rnrlar Fix Point;; (RFPJ IIJld the National Tnrgt.•t Bn)(c (:'-JTBI: whkh tot ul '"'t•r f)o,noo P••intj;. The Sh,•rt -R~ ancl t ht• !\'I'H hnvt' the samP pnsitiunin~ rt>4uirentE'nt . n2 meters huriwntnlly and t!f rnetcn. \'(•rtically. wlwreA!I 1hl' OAJ 1s hA\'f> a .til mt>ter 1-k'int -lu -point rt>lllttn' uc<.·ural'~' ( LE 50' : l within u turgt·t i~>lnud. The ~TB.(·onsistin~t uf o\·er 4:!.00t) targets. is ~ed by ~trategic forces in the implt>memation of tlw S(OJ» . ThE' riii'Tf'tll tC'c·hmo:a 1 obif!l·ti\·p fur tltrgcl pt'lllit innin1! haj; lwt:n dcvdup('ci in conjut1l'tinn with t.ht• dc•\'dnptm' n l of the \1X-lrH~1. ThiH impnwPnwnl in tht'"\Willl ran~t> ,,1 CEP'~ for tht~ MX-I<'B~1 i" "h(lwn in Tlthle ·l -l.'i . 'Top Secua.. SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS NRO Approved for Release Top Sec; et RUFF 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 1.:t:i.:2 .-\pJJiit·;.Hion lll l\H-9 Pht•Lography f'lll)lu!!raph_v ot lht-KH-B \1\S has very luw rt·solution I~U-f,(l h•ct/ und snwll :-;,;alt> fbt>t Wt't'll all<•lll 1 : .~fiO.onn ~tnd I : ~)(1,0001 . Tht•ref(>rt•. intclligt:ni'(• re•tuir(•nH>nf" aN> nnt normalh levi('(i on the 1\rH'~. Mn; phntrn; arE' used for tho~ MC&G Hpplications which require pret·ise gcunu-trit· titlclit~· nl the imagery. for prodU<:ts such u..; rluta ha~~ alui for t-Jori:wntal nnd Vt'rt i<'ll I controlnf nl'w po~itions nf points ncP.1.~ . T'hf' 1\U'S t•nn tWl u.-n ,.:t and :ll,·me sy,;tem for bo-,th ne,w and revi~ed rnap~:~ wie h t~mllll and nwdium ~(·alt!s (ul' large u~ 1 :200.000) but l'aun•>t be uHCd t'ur pr(oduct~ which depict radar r('t um . The M C'S ha~< insufficient ref'lolution h >r map revision at scale~ lar~er than 1:200.000 lnr whil'h KH -'J panuntmil' photograph~· i~ UM~<.l. When ground survc>y dat~ are hucking. the KH-9 MC~ can ~lil.ahli~b targl'l prtical. Lint>ar Error (huth 00 r~rct-nt probahilityl. Thi;; iF madt> pos.iliLy of prl'l'il4· (' 1-ate.Uite 77 7 np Sec·e' CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Tel' Seeret RUFFNRO Approved for Release 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 trlwking network. The camera calibration dat.n are ut~ed to analytically remove effect:. of ten~ distortions and film ~hrinkaJ(c from the MCS terrain camera image. The stt'lla,. camera~ are used to detennine the att.itude of the MCS terrain ntml!r(l uf the inslanl. of t>xposure. The rlopplcr transmit I l'r and tracking network are used to develop a more aecumtc ephemeris <•f t.he MC~ eamcra·~ posit.ion, and the t.iming data on the film !H'rmit. determination of the cnmt~ rn's location at tht> instnn1 of exposure, to provide accuraci('S of at least. 18 metel'fl intrack. 12 meter~ cr(l!'\s-track. and 6 meter.; vertical (one sigma vHluc!!) . KH-!1 pnnornmk phoU»! ar~ C'mployed in t.hr.IS<' \1C&G Hpplit·at ion;.; I hal n~q11ire rnt•dium-hig-h to medium resolution (:2 to 20 feet)_ KH-~1 panoramic photos provide tn(·clium!'c-alP (ahout I: I 10,000 to I :lM,Ofl()) covl'ragc of large Hrl'8H . Unc~rtaintie~> in t..hc ralihrat.ion , alt.it.uoc. and orbit. oft he pnnorarnic· cam em prc:vcnt. 1he U!\(' uf p;.tnoramic imagery as a sin~lt~ st.and-alone !lystem for cc)m(liling new maps. The cumpilat inn of new map_<; requires eith~!r KH-9 MCS pho~raph_v or gt•odetic ~round survey data for e"'tahlishin~ a control network. Stcreoe~copic panoran1k mndell' are then fitted to thil' network to develop contour line~ and till in rult ural dt't ails. Panorarnic photos provide detail adequate for eompilin~ or revi"ing cull.ural feature~ on rnapi!. part.icularly at large sr~tle!'> but nlsn al medium scales. It may also be usrd fur rcvi~in~ !!mall-:.calc maps in culturally d~vcloped areali. For revision of metrically acc-urate but cultllrally out-of-date map8. the panoramic photos are rectified and fit ted to the map. JmnJ:;ery of 2 to 10 feet. re&olutirm pro\'idt~d IJy th1• KH -9 panoramic c:am~ra l!; aiM (>f;~quire!i. approximately ll half billion dollan; wort.h of resources . Tht> tntat MC& G resotm~eil ali:-.1\ic•n of \hE' :hrt-t-prud: ~dinn n:uh'n. •~ ,ft,l\\!1 in Tahft• I 1'7 . \IC'..\·(; lt·!'iwn(.,:.:y j,. t•xlrt'mt-iy ,·..n:;::,.,. :md ri'llliirc·~ : hl· ll."f> ul n ·ry pn·quip :11.-11: . \btn\ pron..,..'"'-'' rc·t;uirl' ! ht-ap· plit·at i llll ul .n;t ..mfllt•cl di ~il al and an:t!l.'tto•i pi111I111C <'quiprnent uniqm· to ru:lppin:•.. E'IIIIIHllt!!ll ""'l'fl in :'IIJ>Jlllf't nt I>\1.-\'-pnlll.lr\ m:~sion inl'iLJclt>..: ·''•'r• "' ''"lj)(Jrc:t,•r.... j1jr piHtfiJ !!ronPnt·trl • .-j,'rn uitcln , ,/ p~ ,:-.if i qff!tl tf11f1L \uu!\ fl, o! 'ft1 r, ·~ ,plol!•· r:\ f.,r •"'l!llf!lillfll•ll 11{ .;rllf.Jiro 11r1d di~;itnl ilt1ta. .-\11/l•lllllfl'.i •·arlu;.:ruphit ·'"·' · ; t .,,~ S, I• tilt/<' 1 'ltPtfll•f•~r.. Jor t:• ''J ,.,...,.Jd' .1.,.. ·. · i·· ': ~·. ,,;,,('JJ!ra'fl''lt'(r;, . und Jo, ~ •, ,,-: ,,~·nlp!llt t'' 'ITijWI0/11111.•. !.i;i,,:_:,,lfJhio I'• pr.. duc fl•rn • c;:l!f"''' 11/ . Hlld /'hulli~rn;lhi, I'• ·;>r•it iJ II' I 1d/l l'l{i./1 f"tTllt '71 f l'tw 1111.,: 111\'t'qll:t>Of f11r f'qtlipmt-nl llll'Xp~uil :!a• panor;:Jtl:t· ;u;d frtrlll!' illlilCt'(\ '" P\'('r n:ill!·•!l .J,.If,rr~ • l'ah:f•; I"' ThiJO ill'-'E'"fnwnt :-,;... ht't-!1 n:ac:,., '" in->llrl·lhal lt\1:\ could ,..,_ ~fi·.· ......~ ,·:~· . ' E.... at:,~:•• ~ .........~,.· fiiU.UONSOft'J)t)U..\lf$)- Car lograpt1rc Geodetic Loth0\,1' apt••c AutOmatic .0.. ~tag· TOTAL ?9 fbi' Ee;ret CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO Approved for Release . 17 September 2011 UPDATED: 14 December 2011 mef't the MC&G requiremtnts levied by Dt.~D military and intelli~t!llCt' rommunit~· US\"I'S . (',.,, efft•(·tin• MC'&l. nppli('atinns ha\·e bE-en (!lo;tllhli~hNI rlurinl( thl· li((· linK· of the-f\H -9 ~_\'ll lt'nll'i . Stu·h upJJiication may l.l't>ll apply t•; c.•t!:t>r ~RP inul~t·ry in I ht> fu turt-: hnwt•\'t'r. 1h('rt> wi ll ht> additinnal rt16t as;;oriated witn tht: nttel'.~· ~l'el.lrl'h und den•loprnenc for romplet<> implemem.ation . 80 Tap I'IQJ8' TOP SEERET/H MAPPI G CAMERA LENSES LENS fOCAL LF.NGTH 10.0 INCHES RElATIVE APERTURE 2.0 SENSITIVITY 6th MAGNITUDE STARS OR BRIGHTER BORESIGHT STABILITY 2 ARC-SEC IN OPERATION FJELD OF VIEW 16 BY 25 DEGREF.S ~-L 'I' IN ''i&IT SENSOR T ~ ., '""' *', j... . '"" ; --~ ' ~~fSEAU PLA. TE ,---FIL TER (V'I' RATTEN 21) 24.4 IN. en m 0 FOCAL LEI-lGT 12.0 IN. -1 REL. APERTURE '6, T/ 14 0 DISTORTION 100 MICRONS 1'/IAX RADIAL . z :;;: 20 MICRONS MAX TANGENTIAL STABILITY 2 MICRONS IN OPERATION en -< RESOLUTION 5 LIMM AWAR IVEM ON 3414 FILM) en -1 FIELD OF VIEV 38 BY 72 DEGREES L 15.13-IN. ___J m 3: OIAM£T£R en 0 T!:k iU\IN _!:N3 )> ~ 7't !!! r =i ffi en .p... .p... CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM ti t • ·I t"' • ,., IO...!J.l t 0 N 0'> I "' ..,j< ~(.,) C') """ zo 0'> -a: l ~ 0 I""a.. .-· ~ N a.. ' ........ oct L-0 ~ ~ :E C') 0 0 z !( 0 "' ..... ;::::: ~ P ·SECRETIH PPI LO ~-G "'A '-:;! \ ~ ("? I U~1"ATI~N AVPA C uPf" ','l"l ATI(, N f ll/1 MAP RtcCVE!!Y CC~.IPI \ liON c~-- DCfPLE !IEACC~! ---"'"""" :::C~HRC~ POII':T ~---- f,/[l,j~ I ,P,AT'Ot-1 /v\f,F AqE"' ~T-.ANE T PR IOR i TY I \ en m -----+-- ' I I 1 0 -1 0 z :;; en Efi'EMDI -< en -1 m ;:: en ':,EATHE~ 0 REDICT IOf\' )> ~ 9IF003VV/2-093942-77 TOP SECRET/H Rl IJI r= =i ;;; en .f>. 0'> CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM LU SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES u.J ~ <( ~ L.U > 0 ~ L.LI <( ~ u... .....J ....1 ::, LL. ...._ 0 z 0 ~ u - u... - ~ w 0 - i ,_ ··- I "I .... ... T "I - .... ·:"": c ~ Q CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM co 0 N ....I <( - -(!') c:c 0 SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES • 0 LU > 0 c::c a... I Cl co CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM LLJ t- fJJ :I: L.Ll fJ) <:( 0 ~ t (jJ L z ·-I -=· < r ~ I-,....... :E ~ z I o..-.. ~ = • I :E~ z u.. .... .... Vl~ o:! -"co ~(") ~ !!! r:::j ;;; (J) ~ ..... N CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM :X: > :I: ..... > -' I- ..J <( a! 0 z ..J cg~ 0 ::> NO. U 0 ~..... ~ <( zv::~ 0 o :EUVl~ <( .., ' SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES >- LU ..J _J ~ :I: :I: - ::1 0 <( 0 J z <( if) >- UJ ,.j ,.j <( > u..z o - :::lo...o ~~ V\..., Oz VI<( :::lVI • as ~ .... 01 Q H 1-i H ~ 0 r c::: en AREA ACCESSED PER MISSION I 1-i en l.o:l a H ACTUAL TERRAIN COVERAGE I ~ .. 1-i gj MISSION MISSION LENGTH TOTAL AREA ACCESSED I ,-(SQ~!M) .-------~ ~- I I NUMBER\ (DAYS) (fHOUS..~ND SO NM) ~ i H 1-i 1205 40 589.1 ' ?..6 X 1.1 X 0.6 X I ~ I I I ! I gj 42 l 6282 I 2.8 X I 1.2X I 0.7 X I I ~ en 58 I 6671 I 3.0 X I 1.3X I 0.7 X I I ~ 2.9 X t"' 60 6487 I I 1.3X I 0.7 X I I t"' I H 1-i l.o:l 1209 I 59 I 6773 I 3.0 X I 1.3X I 0.8 X I I ~ 0 1210 I 52 I 6668 I 3.0 :~ I l.JX I 0.7 X I I ~ H en . en 1211 I 60 6919 i 3.1 X I 1.3 X I 0.8 X I I ~ I 0 l.o:l en 1212 I 62 I 7363 I 3.3 X I 1.4 X I 0.8 X I I t< en I 1-i 1213 112 8099 3.6 X 1.6X 0.9 X I I I I I I I 0 § ~ ':! -'l~r:1!J4:!-~ 90 TOP SECRET/H BlFno::w I H i SECTION IV: SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES ~ ..... ("J ........ LaJ ~ <( :X: (( L.U ~ > 0 u ..J <( co 0 __. (!) .f>. _,. -...j 8 1-i TOP SECRET/H ~ ~ METRIC PAN CAMERA c:: I'll SYSTEM-ATTl TUDE DETERMINATION ~ ~ ~ The metric pan camera attitude determination provides accurate coordinates of selected geographic points to be used as control points for compthng maps. It derives image space angles from measured spact! co i ~ ordinates and requires auxiliary data to establish absolute coordinates and base distances; e . g., accurate ephemeris data and time of exposure, the angular orientation of the stellar relative to the pan terrain H camera (interlock). the stellar angular orientation and camera angular motion history are the required 1-i data. ~ Stellar orient:1tion dat.1. is acquirerl hy a solid st.alC' electronic camera system accurate enough to detereJ mine pan camera line-of-sight pointing t.o within 5 arc seconds (1 cr). Two stellar cameras will be mounted ~ on t.hc TCA frame, one on each side of the SV, with line-of-sight elevation of 10 degrees up from horizontal 2: and 55 degrees aft in azimuth. Data of star image detections will be processed and stored in existing onI'll ~ board recorder. This data will be reau out. to supporting tracking stations and will be processed off-line. ~ Film markings will be provided correlating stellar camera star image detections and pan photography time. H ~ ~ SV rigid body motion history during photography is obtained from the current ARM rate gyros through the existing telemetry system. Vibration and thermal distortion motions are accounted for in on-ground data processing. Implementation is l:iChecluled for SV-17 and up super~:>eilfng the Mapping Camera Syst em (MCS) ~ I'll previously described. ~ I'll I t< I 92 TOP SECRETIH BI F003W/2-093942-77 H i TAP t;f:ERH!H ETRIC PAN CA ERA SYSTE 5.!" n .o ·f VI('N \ ~ ATTI TUD E DETERMINATION , ,. ......Oft l U r.( lCOJI( SK IN I _,~SHUTTER OliVE ....-(Af.A:""'"ICP~l:C [1' Ot'TIC.Ai itOI..~fNC ~ s,~ CA.fwl(•_..•, CJ) ICAl "'' m 0 -1 ,J wooer 0 z t,.,At<:it. l 'Y""'ft :;;: '-A-1 ·,'c..... l1~C"":ON: ,, ESSING flH.. "l:P~ C5 CJ) ·S3 ASSf:Wt'f -< ..... CJ) \ .... , lfC• ll,... VNC"._Git-.C Mf(H.ANI~M ""O t::? -1 m 3: CJ) STELLAR SOLID STATE (S3) CAMERA ASSEMBLY STELLAR CAMERA DATA FLOW 0 )> ~ 9:1 DJ UF003W/2-09:3942-77 r= =i iii CJ) .;:. _. (X) ~ __. co 8 to! TOP SECRETIH ~ METRIC PAN CAMERA <3 ~ SYSTEM-LOCATION DETERMINATION ~ a H ~ The primary tracking system for the reconstruction of an accurate ephemeris has been the Doppler a Beacon System (DBS) using a worldwide network of geoceivers. This subsystem is a dual oscillator of ultra high stability which provides a method for the accurate tracking of the Satellite Vehicle by i H the supporting station network. The electronics and the antenna arc currC'ntly mounted on the mapping to! camera system. The plan is to install the anterma on the forward bulkhead s tarting with SV-17, which I ~ will be configured without a mapping camera system. The DBS will be redundant to the Navigational Package (NAVPAC), which will be the primar y means by which a precision ephemeris can be reconstructed for mapping. NAVPAC consist s of two s ensing systems plus associated control and data processing hardware. The antenna/receiver system can E acquire up to three Navy Navigation Satellites (NAVSATS) simultaneously and track the doppler and ~ ~ H refraction frequencies. The miniature electrostatic accelerometer (MESA) provides data on all non ~ gr avitational accelerations sensed. The delta processing unit collects, sorts, and time annotates a ll ~ the data, recording NAVPAC times at which NAVSAT time marks are received, thus calibrating the NAVPAC clock. Timing accuracy is expected to be 1.-2 microseconds. ~ en NAVPAC Is mounted on the -Y pallet with the antenna erected vertically above. 8 en I t< I Tn P (: r: r r;u::T/1...4 H 94 BIF003VV/2-093942-77 i -lOP S~C~F'J/ H ETRIC PAN CAMERA SYSTE N A VSA.,.S ~ NAVPAC~¥ DOPPLER BEACON__., .-----1.-.it.------------------fASGL S l SCLS DB" ACCURACY ±200FT IN-TRACK ±175FT CROSS-TRACK ±100FT RADIAL Of BITAL VELOCITY ±0. 12 ~='T/SEC en NAVPAC ACCURACY m 0 -1 5. 30FT A LL 3 AXI 0 z ~ en -< en -1 m 3: r-=--.~=~==-~--....~R!'Il!l.::::s·-, en 0 > ~ DJ ~~~--------------------------~----__j95 r= ::::j en "' ~ CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP SECRETIH SHROUD CONFIGURATION The shroud provides a protective enclosure for the payload on the launch pad and during ascent. It is a corrugated monocoque aluminum cylinder 52 ft long and 10 ft in diameter. Through air conditioning umbilicals and ducting the tempera ture and humidity are maintained at the desired values while on the launch pad. Twenty-four removable doors provide access for servicing reentry vehicle igniters, sub-satellite trickle charge and arming, alignment checks of attitude reference to two-camera assembly reference axes, shroud thruster spring cocld.ng, and shroud final pyro arming. The shroud separates from the Satellite Vehicle after the pyrotechnic agent, Mild Detonating Fuse (MDF), breaks the magnesium longitudinal and beryllium circum ferential breakstrips. Springs initiate the shell separation and then the acceleration from the booster Stage ll cause the halves to fall away from the SV. No single failure in the pyrotechnic or electrical system will prevent shroud separation. tn m n -1 5 z :;;: tn - 104 TOP SECRET/H BIF003W/2-093942-7', ~ I:D r= ~ iii tn .j:>. I\.) I\.) N """' c.u n :a:l 1-t 1-i 1-t ~ : I Ut' !>t\:oKt11H 1-i 0 SHROUD CONFIGURATIO c:: (I) (I) l".. ~ ALUMINUM SKINS. RINGS AND 1-t 1-i t<.. CORRUGATIONS AFT ' MAGNESIUM SKINS I ANO RINGS FWD STAINlESS 1-i =l".. I1-t 1-i STEEl DOME ~ i SHROUOIN JIG 1.8.(8 LONGITUDINAl SEPARATION LINES · ~ .,. e ~ (I) ~ TYPICAl STRUCTURAl DETAil MAG BREAkSTRIP t"' t"' 1-t 1-i l".. BERYlliUM BRE AKST RI P -z MOF ~ n ~ MOF -Y 1-t (I) (I) ~ Q HINGE DE TA il AND CIRCUMFERENTIAl SEPARATION JOINT. BI F OOJVV/2-093942 -77 +Z +Y HINGE LINES (2 PLACES) I TOP ~FC:RFT/H SPRING THRUSTER DETAil to'S I (I) t< (I) I n I i! 1-t TOP SECRET!H THERMAL CONTROL Temperature control is maintained primarily by passive design techniques, with augmentation by electric heaters as required for special control and thermal uncertainties. The two-camera assembly is passively maintained within 70 ±23°F and the film supply within 70 .i30°F by isolating them from the earth-facing environment and coupling to the upper-vehicle surfaces (cocoons). The temperature gradient requirement along the film path is 5°F or less and cannot be met with a passive design; temperature sensors, heaters and control logic are required. ln the Aft Section, the conflicting requirements of keeping the electronic equipment temperature down and the propellant and thruster temperatures up cannot be met passively. Heaters are provided to keep the OAS propellant above 70°F, to beat the OAS engine to 70°F before starting, to keep the RCS engines above 100°F. and to prevent hydrazine from freezing in the RCS tanks a nd OAS valves. However , these heaters are usually not required for nominal conditions. Rechargeable (type-40) batteries are provided with heaters because the 30°F to 70°F temperature limits are tighter thn.n the passive design uncertainties allow. The Lifeboat tanks can be heated to increase their impulse capacity. 106 The thermal design provides required temperature control over a beta angle range of -8 to +60 degrees for the complete range of vehicle activity level and resulting power dissipation with a single paint pattern. Larger negative beta angles are not permitted since the contamination of the thermal control surface by the booster causes the batteries to run at too high a temperature. When sensors are flown, the beta angle is limited to +30 degrees. TnP r; rro rTIH metric pan camera s t ellar BIF003W/ 2-09394277 (/) m 0 -t 0 z :c; (/) -<(/) -t m 3: (/) 0 )> ~ !!! r:::::j ffi (/) ~ N ~ ~ 1\J HER A co 1 ORBIT ADJUST VALVE SHIELD$ HEATER 2 MULTILAYER IN SU L ATION BLANKETS ~STRIP ELECTRICAL HEATERS ON REACTION CONTROL, LIFEBOAT It , $ ORB IT ADJUST PROPELLANT TANKS. REPRESSURIZATION/ULLAGE TANKS ( BAYS 8 ~ 10) HAVE MULTILAYER INS UL ATION BL ANKETS BUT NO \1 EATERS , FlEXIBLE OPT ICAL SOLAR REFLECTOR ON EDAP, BAT T ERY, -,COMMAND PROGRAMMER,$ LI FEBOAT BAYS; WHITE PAINT ON AT TI TUD E REFERENCE t T tT BAYS; BLACK PAINT ON A SC ENT TELE METRY ( PVRO BAYS COCOONS-POLI SHED ALUMINUM/ 6L ACK ·~" ACRYLIC PAI N T ~· I i quipment bay pr ovides sufficient access to allow complete module installation and removal at :;;: the factory and pad as shown in the lower completely open bay. The othex· hays as shown have non-flight panels ~ with ground access doors used in factory assembly and test. This section interfaces with the main (•lcch·ic-al (/) ~ m umbi lie a! and the Mid Section. 3: (/) n )> 110 TAP (l=rRHfH ~ BIF003W/2-09:1942-77 IJI r= 3 m (/) ~ N ()) .;:. 1'\) (0 !J H H TOP ~FCRFT/H ~ ~ 0 SATELLITE BASIC SSEMBLY-FT SECTJO ~ d (I) (I) 1,11.1 EQUIPMENT SEC TION ~ BOOSTER H ~ AGE HANDLING RING t< ADAPTER .. ~ i5 s H ~ I ~ rORBIT AD JUST ENG INE NOZZLE !2: ! 1,11.1 l:"f l:"f H ~ ~ ! n 0 (I) (I) (I) ~ t< i (I) § n ~ H · n I i · TAP «a:rD'"T/H ATTl TUDE CONTROL The Attitude Control System (ACS) provides earth-oriented attitude reference and rate sensing. It de\ elops RCS thruster firing signals to bring the vehicle to a commanded attitude and to maintain attitude and rate within the accuracies shown below. The ACS also provides measurements of vehicle attitude and rate during search/surveillance operation to the accuracy shown. The ACS is a three-axis rate gyro-integrator system with updating in pitch and roll by horizon sensor and in yaw by gyro compassing. Error signals generated by thf' gyros and horizon senl:ivr arc c.:omblned in the flight control dectromcs. and modulated by pseudo-rate circuits in each axis to provide thruster firing cvmmands with the impulse bit control necessary to meet the light rate control and short settlingtime requirem l!llts. All elements are redundant for malfunction correction. Cross-strapping between redundant and prirn:l.ry ACS components (horizon sensors, gyros, flight control electronics assembly) is possible to permit selection of non-failed components to drive the RCS thruster. Control Reg,ui re ments Measurement. Requirements Pitch Roll Yaw Pitch Roll Yaw For search/surveillance operations Attitude accuracy (deg) 0.7 0.7 0.64 0.4 0. 4 0. 5 Rate accuracy (deg/sec) 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.001 0. 00 1 0.001 During non-horizontal operations tn Attitude accuracy (deg) 3 1 1 m 0 -1 Rate accuracy (deg/sec) 0. 15 0. 15 0. 15 0 z Setting time from search/surveillance disturbances: Stereo 0. 2 seconds, Mono 6 seconds :;;: tn -< tn -1 m 3:::: tn 0 112 TOP SECRETIH BIF003VV/2-093942-77 )> ~ OJ r= ::::j ffi tn .j:>. c..u -ll c..> _.. &l .... ti ~ i TOP SECRET/H CJ ~ (I) ATTITUDE CONTROL ... a .... ~ THRUSTERS a i .... ti I ~ NOTES: IRA ROll. PITCH AID YAW CHAIII£l.S ATTITUDE CONTROL I. MAY liE CAOSS-STRAPPEO INDIVIDliAIJ.Y MODULE Z. THRUSTERS M AY BE CROSS-STRAPP£1> AT PAIR LEVEL ~ 8 l THRUSTERS .... ~ 2 HORIZON SEN SOR (PACS) Tf.IRUSTERS ~ 3 1-fORIZON SEN SOR ( RACS) n 0 IRA (PACS) ~ .... 5 IRA (RACS) THRUSTERS-1~1Jt~ljf ..(61ft. (I) PRIMARY I r" ""'-IREOUNtlAMT \;;c..,.. ~~~~~~jj (LC'~o\TED OUTBOARD) FLT CONTROL ELEC. FLT CONTRO L EtEC. ! (I) ~ I\ t l ,----i-~ I T 6 H/S ELECTRONICS (PACS) HORJZOit l"ERTIAL INERTIAL HORIZON j 1 H/S ELECTRON ICS (RACS) SENSOR REFEREIICE REFE RENCE SENSOR ·8 F/C ELECTRONICS (PACS) PR IMARY ATTITVOE REDUND•NT ATTITUTE n 9 F/C ELECTRON ICS (RACS) CONTROL SYS lPAC$) CONTROL SYS(R ACS) 8 -~--~~=-'c;rr""'DrTIH tnP BIF003W/ 2-09394:! 7"; II i ~ .... §! TOP SEERETIH ORBIT ADJUST AND REACTION CONTROL An Orbit Adjust System (OAS) and Reaction Control System (RCS) provide the forces necessary to control the vehicle orbit and the vehicle attitude in orbit, respectively. The OAS provides inj£:ction error correction (if required), drag and perigee rotation makeup, and deorbit of the Satellite Vehicle at the end of the mission. The RCS provides pitch, yaw, and roll control via 8 thrusters. OAS and RCS both use catalytic decomposition of monopropellant hydrazine to generate thrust. For reliability. the systems ar~ pressure-fed. with the pre~surLGiog gas enclosed In the propellant tank \\-ith the hydrazine. This results in declining or blowdown pressure characteristics; the thrust level of the OAS engine declines from 250 to 100 pounds and that of the RCS engines from 6 to 2 pounds. A quad-redundant valve operated by the command system controls flow to the OAS engine. T he ACS generates signals that control the firing of the RCS engines. On SV-15 the 62-inch diameter OAS tank can l>e loaded with up to 4000 pounds of propellant with two spheres containing high pressure nitrogen (isolated by pyro valves and admitted into the OA tank at times selected during the mission) to maintain the pressure within the desired operating range. This propellant can be utilized in OA burns to provide velocity increments o[ 2 ft/sec to 400 ft/sec. A passive (su r face fcnsion) propellant management device maintains propellant at the tank outlet at all times, permitting engine firings In any attitude. On Vehicles SV-13 and SV-14 the two nitrogen tanks are manifolded directly with the OA tank and provide enough ullag~ space to permit 3700 pounds of propellant to be loaded within the operating pressure range. f/) The four 22-in. diameter RCS tanks provided capacity for 450 to 540 pounds of propellant. Propellant orientation is mainm 0 tained by diaphragms. The thruster impulse bit (0. 15 lb-sec or less. depending on blowdown status) is compatible with the -f 0 tight rate-control requirements. A complete redundant set of thrusters is provided for malfunc-tion protection; either set z ?? can be supplied by the four tanks and each pair of thrusters can be driven by the primary or redundant ACS valve drivers. f/) -< A transfer line is provided between the OAS and RCS tanks to permit propellant exchange to opti mize the use o f on-board ~ m propellant for each mission. 31: f/) 0 )> 114 TOP SEERET/H BIFOOJVV/2-093942-77 ~ OJ ;= ::j m f/) ~ w 1\:) .j:>. VJ VJ 8 li I I (Jio' ~t:l:t(_t 1/H ~ ; ~ ORBIT ADJUST t REACTION CONTROL ~ --- :l a i H li I ~ OAS ULLAGE TANKS (Z) VIEW LOOK ING AFT NITROGEN FILL VALVE 7 VI EW LOO KIN G FO RWAR D CAPILLARY GALLERY, oz· DIA ORBI T ADJUST TANK , f j I OAS FILL VALVE ~ QUAD PROPE LLANT VALVE ~ Z RCS GAS FILL VALVES (2) H CATALYST BED ~ 3 RCS PROPELLAN T FILL VALVE 4 ISOLATION VALVES (6) ~ t41 TROGEN FILL VAlVES (Z} ----:::--- RC S GAS/PROP TANK (4) l. "\ 6 NlTROOEN~ ~ I t1 RCS THRUSTERS (16) , ~, \ \ H 1 HYDRA ZlHE tn OAS t Res FILL ( DRI\IN ---.!:::::::• • r ! ISOLATION VALVES (6) • [ ~.---'-'---.. tn ... i J< 7 OAS ULLAGE TANKS (ZJ ---v-PRIMARV REDUNDANT 8 oz· OIA. ORBIT ADJUST TANK RCS THRUSTERS ' I ll 'i BIF003VV/2-0~3942-i7 i H TAP c;r::r~ I=T/H ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION AND POWER Power to operate the Satellite Vehicle is provided by solar arrays deployed from the Aft Section following separation from the booster. Rechargeable NiCd batteries (type-40) provide energy storage to meet dark-side-earth and peak power requirements. Unregulated power Is distributed throughout the vehicle to usmg equipment within a 24 to 33 vdc range. The power generation and storage system comprises four parallel segments. with an array section. charge controller. and battery in each to reduce the effect of a failure; a single malfunction will not terminate the mission. Fusing of equipment, limiting minimum wire size. and isolating voltage-critical circuits add to the reliability. The power system is capable of providing approximately 11,000 watt-hours/day of usable power over a beta angle range of -8 to +60 deg by adjusting the array angle about the vehicle roll axis. This will support at least 52 minutes per day of search/survt!illance and mapping camera system operation. Power for the lifeboat system is provided by one type-40 battery from the main power system. Equ ipment necessary for reco-..ery vehicle and Satellite Vehicle deorbit can be switched to this battery for emergency operations. Depletion of the batteries below 55 percent or an excessive load on the main power system will automatically isolate the lifeboat system and its battery. This assures adequate power for the emergency operations. The lifeboat system can be reconnected to the main system by command if the anomaly can IJe corrected. C/) m (') -t Pyro power is pro\'ided by either of two cy·pe-40 batteries from the main power system and distributed by r"edundant 0 z circuits. :;;: C/) -< C/) -t m 3: C/) )> 116 TOP SECRETIH BIF003VV/2-093942-77 (') ~ OJ ;::: ::::j iii C/) w ~ ~ ~ C,..J n :lll H 1-i H TAP ~rrPrT/H ~ 1-i c:: 1'1) ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTIO ~PO ER 0 1'1) 1.".1 ~ H 1-i >< SOLAR ARRAY I PANEL 6 1-i [5 I H 1-i I POWER DISTRIBUTION ~ " J-BOX MAPPING SEAQCH/ [5 CAMERA SURVEILLANCE 1 22 PANEL SOL AR ARRAY (\77 FTz) PAYLOAD PAYLOAD ~ RV II!: 2 POSITIONAL DRIVE ASSYS t 1'1) 3 CHARGE CURRENT CONTROLLERS i !!; AFT SECTIO N FWC' DIST (INBOARD) 1.".1 EQUIPMENT J -BOX 8 ~ AF T POWER DISTRIBUTION J-BOX H LIFEBOAT II s TYPE 40 BATTERIES( 4) ~ o FORWARD PYRO J -BOX v--SEPARATION SWITCH ~ (HIGH CURRENT) ----IHt~--""'" PVRO I BUSA11 COMMAND + H 1'1) TYPE 40 TYPE 40 TYPE 40 TYPE 40 BATTERY BATTERY BATTER'\' BATTERY ~ 1.".1 T INTERFACE J-BOXES 1'1) >< 6 FWD PWR DISTRIBUTION 1'1) J-BOX 8 q MAPPING CAMERA MODULE J-BOX § ~ i H BIF003W / 2-093942-77 TAP ~rf'grT/H u-I TOP SECRET/H TELEMETRY AND TRACKING The SGLS-compatible telemetry subsystem provides PC'M real-time data (ascent at 48 kbps, engineering analysis at 128 kbps, and orbit at 64 kbps). and PCM tape recorded data (48 khps played back at 256 kbps). The PCM telemeter provides status data for normal mission operation, test operations and evaluation. command acceptance confirmation, and postflight evaluation. Each tape recorder stor age allows the monitoring of the SV temperature profile by periodic sampling. Over 1500 data sources are monitored -some at up to 500 samples per second. The SOLS-compatible tracking subsystem provides range measurement information, including slant range (50 ft maximum la bias error and 60 ft rms maximum noise error), range rate (0. 2 ft/sec maximum lcr error), and angle-of-arrival (1. 0 milli radlan maximum lcr bias error and 1. 0 milllradian rms maximum noise error). en m 0 -1 0 z ~ en -< en -1 m 3: en 0 118 TOP SECRET/H 77 > BIF003VV/2-093942-~ lXI r= 3 m en ~ VJ 0> .J:>. v.> -...! TAPE RECORDER INSTRUMENTATION J·BOXES C3 ) P'CM REMOTE (5) 3 PCM MASTER NO. I PCM MASTER N0.2 5 TAPE RECORDER NO. b TJ\P'E RECORDE R NO. Z ·~. Blf'003 W / 2-09304 :.! -'ii &l H ~ ~ TOP SECRET/H ~ c::: en en I.IJ ~ H :l ~ £5 MASTER PCM i H UNIT ~ ~ OATA i e ~ PCM REMOTE ( 5 PLACE S) SI OE'A' ~ ~ stons· H o•r· Jt i I"r· PCM MASTER PCM '-\A.STER ..., ~ r i t •z ~ TI MING TAPE TAP£ TIM ING ~ I I n ~ SIGNALS RECORDER RECORDER SIGNALS LIT BOARD -•t •z en EQU IPMEIT ~ I.IJ en 1 VCTS NO. I MVLTI COUP LER MULTI COO PLER ., t< "Z 8 VCTS N0.2 I 9 BACK-UP TI MER l_.___:_ANTENM~· ... 10 CONTROL J-BOX T YPE-1 :TnP «;FCRFT/H 11 1) I H !i TAP c:a:rDI=l'/H COMMAND AND TIMING The Extended Command System (ECS) provides real-time and stored-program command capability. The SGLS compatible ECS system with complete redundancy provides 64 real-time and 626 stored-program com mands with a memory capability of 1152 commands. Ninety-six secure command operations are possible. On SV-15 and up the number of secure command operations will be increased to 192. The ECS prm.1des opera tional commands to perform primary and secondary missions. the capability to configure the vehicle into various operational modes, a pre-flight test and checkout capability, security for critical functions, and a time signal to the PCM and the payload. The Minimal Command System (MCS) provides 28 real-time and 66 stored-program commands with a memory capability of 53 commands. Ten secure command operations are available. The MCS provides lifeboat com mands for an independent capability of recovery RVs and initiating SV deboost and the capability to obtain real-time and recorded telemetry data. The Data Interface Unit (DIU) provides for the generation, storage and transfer of time information to the search/surveillance camera, mapping camera, telemetry, The DIU also provides the mapping C/) m camera system and pan camera time request pulse to the NAVPAC experiment. 0 -1 0 z ~ C/) -< C/) -1 m 3: C/) 0 )> 120 ~ TOP SECRET/H BI F00:3W /2-093942-77 IJJ ;:::: =t ffi C/) .j:l. (..U ~ w c.o TAP c;rrD l=:riH Dt G DON RA DATA INTERFACE UNIT COMMAND SYSTEM 1 EXTENDED COMMAND SYSTEM(ECS) CMOS __,._ t Z 375 MHz RECElVER (UFEBOAT II) EC S 3 MINIMAL COMMAND SYSTE'M(MCS) REMOTE DECODE~ B MCS I l A B AC KUP COMMAND J-80X TYPE 2 l OPER+TI Ml l DECODER PRIMARY COMMAND BACKUP RECEIVER TIMI•t SICIW. OAT~ TIMIK SIGNAL MDI IWTfRFACE CMD$J CMDS VCTS RECEIVER NO. I UNIT t YCTS RECEIVER NO. 2 ! t t MIIUMAL (I.OCATED ••IIOAIIDl LEXTENDED "'""••• srsreM LCOMMAND A c S"STEM .____ * .. i ----L-............ VCTS PAIMARY 375 MHz N0.2 CMO BACKUP RECEIVER 8 DATA INTUFAC£ UNIT 9 ECS REMOTE O£COO£R RECEIVER RECEIVER 1 I 1 MCS BACkUP DECODER 1 ANTENNAS BI F003WI 2-0939·12-7 7 0 lill H ti H ~ ti 0 c:: (I) (I) t".. a H ti t< ti ::.:: t".. s H ti ~ i t:i (I) ~ ti t".. ~ ~ H ti t".. ~ 0 ~ H (I) (I) t 0 t".. (I) t< i (I) 0 12 I I H TOP SECRETIH LIFEBOAT II The lifeboat system provides emergency capability to initiate separation of two Reentry Vehicles (fiV) and to deorbit the Satellite \'ehicle in the event ol a complete failure of the m.un power system. the altitude control system, or the extended command system. Emergency operational control is provided by the 375 MHz receiver and minimal command system, with capability for real-time, stored-program, and secure commands. Attitude control for RV releases and SV deorbit is pt·ovided by earth-field sensing magnetometers, rate gyros, and a cold gas (freon 14) control force system. Llfeboat is capable of RV releases and SV deorbit operations on both south-to-north and north-to-south passes. Power to keep the system ready for use, and for the emergency operations is provided by a type-40 battery and 1/4 of the solar arrays from the main power system. The OAS engine and the redundant SGLS, PCM, tape recorder, and other equipment necessary for RV release, SV deorbit. and recovery of vehicle diagnostic en data are switched from the main power system to the lifeboat bus for the emergency operations. In a nommal m 0 -t tumbling mode, enough power Is generated to keep this emergency mode operating until the vehicle reenters. 0 z :;;: en -< en -t m 3: en 0 )> 122 TOP SECRET/H BIF003VV/2-093942-77 ~ IJI j= =i ffi en ~ ~ .f:>. .f:>. _.... n lit! .... ~ .... 'TOP f>t ... flll I IH ~ ~ 0 fl) LIFf'BOAT n c:: fl) l'll a .... ~ t< ~ m RATE GYRO ( 3) g 6 ELECTRON ICS .... ~ 7 TYPE 40 B~TTERY ~ m ~ ~ FREON GAS fl) OUTBOARD VIEW IN BOARD VIEW TANKS e; 0 0 FILL 8 l'll ~ t MINIMAL COMMAND SUBSYSTEM _·~ l'll REGULATOR~VALVE .... 2 MAGNETOMETER (3 A){IS ) -; ' J, ~ n 3 LIFE BOAT U J-BOX 2 s'-.\. · ..11 THRUSTERS 4 375 MHz RECEIVER , .. ' ~. ~ n.. ~ .... 375 MHz f CS -fl) RECE IVER M rELECTRONICS l fl) 1 '7 ~ ...., till £u X-Y-Z AXIS X-Y·Z AXIS fl) AN TENNA MAGNETOMETER R.l.TE GYROS t< fl) I N-S-N ~ B POLARI TY ~WITCH n 8 BIF003W/2-093942-77 12' I ~ .... i TAP C::l=t"D f:T/H HARDWARE FLOW The HEXAGON integrated test program begins at the piece-part level and continues through component, module and vehicle levels of assembly. Testing at progressive levels of assembly permits workman ship faults to be identified and eliminated early in the test program. The SBA piece-parts are _;;u'Jjected to l'!lectricn1 anci environmental stress and visual inspection tests to verify piece-part specification. The SBA components a r e subjected to ambient, random vibration. temperature-vacuum and burn-in acceptance tests for early detection and correction of design, parts and manufacturing defects. The components arc then assembled into the aft section modules or installed in the forward and mid-sections. The aft section electronic modules are subjected to ambient, acoustic and thermal vacuum tests. The propulsion module and solar array modules are subjected to ambient a nd acoustic tests. T he sections are then m.'lted to form the Satellite Vehicle which is then ready for the system level tests prior to VA F B shipment. The nomenclature shown on the accompanying illustration indicates th e contractor where manufacturing or testing occurs: SBAC -Satellite Basic Assembly Contractor (Lockheed) (/) m MWC -Midwest Contractor (McDonnell Douglas) n -1 NEC -Northeast Contractor (It ek) z 0 OPC -Our Philadelphia Contractor (General Electric) :-; SSC -Sensor Subsystem Contractor (Perkin-Elmer) ~ (/) -1 m 3: (/) n :J> TAP c;rrPI=T/H 124 BJF003W/2 -093942-77 ~ OJ F :::j ffi (/) +:.. +:.. N .J:>,. .J:>,. w 8 TOP SEERET/ H li ~ (J HARDWARE FLOW c: I I • en gj a 1-4 ~ M(~~ C'l (, I < '.'.' A~~y T£~T "M . .",( DO CM.• li(.V BtJil C-uP ------------------------------------~----~----~------~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I · a i 1-4 li · ·.r.o I ~ t~JifAllfD PIIIC~ •~ '.'Af8 c-H!P,._'ff'.;:T ~ LOS ~ 1-4 ~ i3 I 0 ! 1-4 en ":~E ~-;'A; iON & TESTING • B-"·C en t< I en ~~----------------~------ i 1-4 TOP SECRET/H HARDWARE FLOW The objective of the factory-to-pad test program is to demonstrate flight readiness of each vehicle at the factory and to perform vehicle checkout and launch preparations at the launch complex. The assembled vehicle is tested as a system with payload electrical simulators to verify compatibility of the SBA equip ment with the payload interfaces. The payloads are then electrically connected to the Satellite Basic Assembly (SBA) and the vehicle is tested to verify performance and compatibility. The vehicle is subjected to :m acoustic test and is monitored during the exposure lo \-erify proper SV health and status. The vehicle is then tested to verify that it survived the acoustic environment. The vehicle is next subjected to a therm:1l vacuum test with the aft section subjected to two thermal cycles and the payloads subjected to one thermal cycle. Aft section perfor mance tests are conducted at low and high temperatures and typical mission profile tests are performed on the payloads including film transfers to each reentry vehicle. A collimation test of the Two Camera Assembly (TCA) is performed a t vacuum to verify optical performance and to determine the flight focus setting for the camera system. The mapping camera flatness is verified and the flight setting for the film path pressure makeup is determined. The vehicle is then prepared for shipment which includes flight film loading A sys terns test is then performed to verify systems performance. Final shipping preparations are performed and the s hround is installed. The vehicle is then transported to the launch base. 126 The vehicle iR mated to the booster and an Aerospace Vehicle (AV) systems test is performed to verify that the SV operates properly and to verify compatibility between the AV and the Vandenberg tracking station and the Satellite Test Center. Final flight preparations consisting of propellant loading and pyrotechnic installation is performed. The countdown is Initiated and consists of the final SV functional test and launch configuring for lift-off, roll back of the Mobile Service Tower, flight command loading, performing terminal count and launching the Aerospace Vehicle. TAP ca:rp I=T/1..1 RIFOp~VV/2-093942-77 en m n -t 0 z :;;: en - ~ lXI j= =t ffi en t CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM J: w ~ ~ Q Q: < V'l 0.. l.l,j IX ~ .... V'l (.!) l.l,j t-z 0.. z 0.. 0 .... :r (/) ~ ~ -I ...J 0 l I• v I ~ c.,:. c I :'I ::: - :;: CURITY: TO us SESATELLITE cR I T I CB~ ~ A N D H E X A G 0 N c 0 M p E N D I 0 M J THE GAM SYSTEMSRECONNAI SSANCE SECTION V: SYSTEMs CONTRIBUTIONs SECTION V: SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS This set of documents describes t e intelligence capabilities of the systems as well as their successes . Gambit and Hexagon were each designed for specific intelligence purposes. However, they wo rl'lcl·:)~r:f r,f the _t.i:Fo..,....~,~,. h'":"~Ll~ c:::~ :. H'hit.e .:1.· r_:.: :;. _~.-~.d~"-j,-:-C:t.:.".lO!,t -~g p'!'c;....::r:~.:..ior~ of ~ ~vi~:.:t.! SJ..~iW D~v~lo~::Bnt Yl.a.~, · ~ rt ll ~ I ~ ~ (1l ·, -\ I, ,.; (2) 1 Jun 6o, Ccn ~1il:lon sil)l:.-d _.letter to ,"J:DC, l11.th ir.fo ccp:c~ to SAC, ADC, ;:;c c.:-.d AFO::J, ~irc:ct.ir:G the prcpa.r:lt~on oi' th~ rcvist..-<1 Dcvtilep:;)Cnt Plan cuxi q~otint; a £tUldar,cc co:~tainod in ~~ frCJ::I D!'. Cha:-y!:. A copy of this lettcr is ir.clo~t."\1 ~::~ · Atch l. At. the :JD.r..e t~ Gen 't!ilson simcc this letter ·ho ~q;.:•.:sted Gr.m Stro-ther to take the lew ~ de.vel~ing an A.ix St...--:.ff po:Jiticn· on foil!" qu.esti~ll ~.'hich .._.,re :!.sk6:i by DJ!. Cha..7k and \-:hich arc q~otcd_ in paras=-a;-h 4 of .'.tch 1~ . Cen ~:il.son staled . th~t in his \~c~ these !~qua:tiar,: ~a~ operational Di~i~ce ~!..::(',, the:z:cfor:!, ::nO:'Jld bo. cc.::3i4~~d .(rc~ an Qpc.rat1on;ll point o! tiel;~ · · · · .. (3) 7 JUn 60, Dr. Yo!'k took note or the tact th:lt tna .~ force \>.-as n a brie!ing at the earliest pcss.\;,1~ date. (4) 10 'Jun 60, tho President "~otc a ,!:.C:r.o to the SccreUll7 of Dr.lfensc stc.tin;t th!.t tl:e s.&J:OS p:-oz:-:.:.m needed to be ca:-e!\llly ~f!'lil:l.t:..:it.e::! o:.r.j clirectc::l th.J.t ll bri'Cf.iA.:; co·:~~ing the rollc-.·:i.:'lf; tl . ~ I ~ (2!.1 •. ~~ f If= nrn~aT~~ .. · -~'/..,..t .-.oow~.._..f_. rn ··:r.JCALLv )' .• . • . tNTERVAl..S:· NO -~ ·.· .-. .. · . co~: .................. _!'IAl~ci~sstFtEo: O(}O .OtR szoo.lo l ~ . . . . . \., '····---•·i .. ,, ~::;0 } i ""\ SECTION VI: NRO APPROVED FOR • REL'EA.SE 17 September 261-{_ ( '(a) ~-::,at. are tho inte11ic;cnco roqu!.ro~.cnt:o tor SMIOS? (b) i-.'h3.t b the technical feasibility of meting thuso rcqu1 rc::.crit:s? ,,. .. Ee &::~ir,ned responsibili~ for the first and third questions to the Dcp3rt~~t of Defense and for the second question to his principal scientific advisor. · (5) Sabseq~c~t to the above -~~changa of me:os, a ~hreer:~o"ln team was rorr.:~d to corr:iuct the NSC briefing, the team coneisting or Dr. Charyk, Dr•. Ruble arA Dr. Iistiakownky• . ( 6) Qr. Ct-.aryk •requested that he be presented a briefing on th.; .nc~t Air Force plllns on S Jul;r so that he could begin t.o prcp.·•r:: l':ir..:H:U for t..he HS<; bri<:fine. Since thi:: br!.efing 1!\ust Le prcecntcd by Cl'll be.fore the .\ir. Starr hz.:~ an opportunity to ovalu-•tc th"l new pl::.n, it has bccra a~w that tho Dej)r.\:1 oi~tod by Con 1\'hit.e :o:tatinr. his vico.'"!l n~i problc!:'.:J in ccr!Ilecticn with SA!-!00 3lld inclo::~inc :1 copy o~ the cupple.::ent;1l guid2). (2) Holding all eteps ~yond the cu."'Tent ARPi~:pl.An in a.beyar-..co . . . ~ndin& .s~eif1e appronl !rom .Of'!ice ·ot Seerot&r7 of Dd'en!!e• . : ·b•. ::c,t l)<)'\"'loP=-~nt. Pl.a."l,· Develop.~nt/Operation:J e.nd Proliminlll"J". • • • • • • • • 0 •• . . . ! .• ·' ..... : ···. ·, · . c. · fl.~rll 20 1:~~o !TC!!I. Dr• .York, .repl.ying to th~ 15 Feb Devolc~rit 4 •: · ~ . . . .(1) &ll:.o~ procram requires further adjU3l'1:8nt: . photo ovpr .·. ...... ... ·· .. ' ... ~~ - ... ... .-. ·· · --~-· -· ~ .lr.d b abova. · : ·. ·~ ·, cl. 'i'hc_Undor Sl:e.ret~~ of the Air Force h.:lu withh'()ld c.uthorit~·ror . · ... . ~ ' tb J.ir Fcre~ to' s~~ -for.nearly · 1'~:~ in•the old J.r.:u-tin ~r Fl:lnt <:.t C::aha. Althoug.'l ho has never ton;aroed th!!! diroctive, m baa -:P-· "' ....... ~~ ~c. . l.t.ch 4 ~ -~ ~TtAL tlv..·. .~ __: 'i ! ' (·-~ .-. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 201 r · ~·. ·-;-.--,"111t ·. ..) I • j . ~-. I 7"·· • I ir.~1ca~d that ho has ono !ro:n DDR&E requiring tbia action. "4e • ro~ · .· -. .. thi~ headquartoro hns dirocted termination ot the contract. . . £1 •• Th~ devslop1:ent plan, per o~, bas _progressed !ar eno~ .t.o prorl4e . A ~u~tantial ~ount. or conc\!M'enQ !or an initial !operati01"..r.l ~pabllit;r. • • • '"'I • r:.cilltiea .that ':.'ill be availAble from tho developrccnt p:-ogr...: i,ncl~o: .. -. , .· (1) A control center ·at ~e. · (2) ·· 'I\t~ tracking and ·acquisition stations ·(v~enberg AFB-~· . . . . . . b) .Lr.unch p&da (~rhnj)~ the mo.st critic~ it~) . . . . . . . . . "I • . ~ ... The Air Force posee:J3oe a sub:st:mtial. cllpabUit;y to. exploit roc~ . . ~ n~is~~ce photo~aphY ~~ !~eilities thnt have been: dcvelope~ over. tho Z• Subst.?.ntial oppositio:t to S.'C control of .th~ "f!ySte:l -exist~• .· · .Follo,·:-.i.m:: · .m-a:::.eMlticm~-1" . A 1 p~dc:ilil~ ~-that-S~m~:t• !~ ~-en.-D'ftDr~e~ . · -.:_-D} ~. . -. .~_. .":-~~~~ ,.· .. r.t!.tic:-1:!1~ in eho.r«ct.e!' t~~!'aby d.tigating against control by the ~or. : . . . .:: .. . :--:---·~..... . . • . u. s. ~cterrent for~e.· . . 2 · -~~ · 00~:;-;::=;.JTIAE:-~ '· -; . · ..: ... .. '· ··-·.: SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR ·. RELEASE 17 Septem_ber 2011 c~ (5) JcAlo-.:~y ·or ZA.C. .. • : h. .Sub-s]3toc I is the nuoject or n:uch ·cr~ticis:~ because a· . (l) It:~ CC.'?lexit;'T in eroatlJr increased trJ t.h~·ELnn' l"'cf.rl.rot::arit. . • . . • . . . . . . '0 . . . ·.. c~ric~ q~e~tio~s· exist about the state ot the ~enaor art in thi~ · nren. (2)' Its dp.,.ol~nt has been 'b8~~d on. estil:ls~s o! 'the type ·ot . . rho·~o7'.::phie t~ke that will bo:l r~ceivN, 1Jo.1t ~r.»riou.o doubta ~st aa to · u~ v.:?.lldity of· th1Jse ostil:at.cs (Rehy . ~or· t.o ~ner~tc: ....· ·:· . . . .. . . .. ·.. .. .. 1. C3neral \·lhite·.has instruc~ ~he . st:.~..!f to got. a proc;re.m tb:1t _will · . c~ll r~the~ thsn lose it. ·.· •.. i . •• . . ... . . .:_ ~ ·_ .. :. ~ . . . . . . . ·.~-... . :···.·· ··. CO"."':)r problem ani det.alled cover than -~ith~"l' the E-1, .E-2 or E-~. • ~.. · · _n. · The authority and tundo t:o bllild th-3 Hartin Bo.-ubcr Plant ·rncllity c!.o:?~ not expirf:! at. tho o~A of the ti~e.l year. o. The op3r3tiono.l natur.:J or a readc..'Jt photo eyst..."'m will: roquiro f:-cqt:c~t ccordination between t,he ~ratol'S ar..:i the agency that D!:· ... ... . ..:}... ::·~· ;·:.t :__· ·-~~~·_;,\~:-] . : .. ~. . . . ·~ -·-~~--4 ·: ...., . -:···· ... ·--. ----· ..:.· .. S:.!::e!l al:. thie t u-~• ·. ' ~ ·. :· :;~-·:.·_.._._f. ;.-. ·.. . ·._; · .. . ' 4. · Critori~ n. ··Air Fo;-co plaM ·for d~velopmen~·_ar:d e~loitation ,ot Sm::OS cu~t· ·· h t~~-~ry t-e::;t that' can bC cl.evfsed•. ··. . . . .. --~tch 4 • ! _ ... -:: · ; . SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR · RELEAsE 17 September 2011 .· ('\{"\ • ~ :-·..... -r 'TI ~I 4Ut \£ ,._f~~ -~ ll~ . ---·-· -···-.... ~LA'/. ~ _; h. · Tha Air Foree desires to rotai.n its 'b.l.llic ccmcepta·tor Sa=e . . c~':l;:o:.Ot.ion.!:l. SiYJc:iticc.U:r the prelUdnar;y cper3tio."UJ plan eurro~ . . :.:..-..:lo:-ecn:licic:.~tion by th3 JCS ehould net be violated.; · .' .· 0 •• • • • 0 c·. · It is n3ccs::ar:Y to bre:l!c ths pollt1c~l log jam that }-~ co:~ . . ~i~~entl7. c~~=cd tho Air Foree's exa:utivu nee~ts in. thio p~c~~ . -' ' to .t.~r.d JI:.O::"~ til:~ revising do'VOlq:'"~n~ ~th~in -:c~ua~ Sup~r ·. ·.-.:.:::i:\g develop~nt or· the . sys'tecl. .. . .· .. d; Tho Air Force ·1:aist obtain ar¥1 retain :support_And epproval. c;.f its plllflS fo~ develop::cn~ ot Sa:~os. :_. . · e. J..ny ::tops takttn to reo.rient. tho Sa:los program J:lUSt ba care . .j . . . . . !ull.J e:=:Clcincd for ~ct on"~he ·l>lidas. progr'a."a run the 1-!idas progl:a.'!l· rr<1::·t be eclj~.:st.:J:i to prohibit &lip~eos in an· Qp-']I'&tional .U.das W"t.em• ... . .· 61 . •• .• ... ~ ·, ···:. ... .... , .• .. .· ., ! • . ~ ; . . . ~ . . .·.. . . -~ :.tch 4 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM - NRO APPROVED FOR .( ' RELEASE 17 September 2011 \. :· ::~ussias .. . fr=:l tho li:~t of fnct.s nnd aasu::r.ptiona it. ie apparent that Sa:::ios !' ;·.:;o:~ soriou:s p::-obleJC:S, both technical and political. 'l'ho politic~ :F•'-'blc~ h3:v:e ~an 1112.grd,f!.ed b7 high le~l dilsagrecavs."lt. on our tochnical. •1p:.:~o:~och. Further the Air Force has not been proporly responsiTO t.o prior techOical guidan~e• . .. _ 2." .Serious doubts o!_ .our p).Jlnr.ecl priz:ary depcr.dcnco. upan. readout p!':otosr::1-pey er.tst in the sc.icntific co::raun:it.y. o-.lr -oPcrntional 'system f~cilities ~ere planned on the basi~ of the ass~~tion that re8dout vould p:r-ovc .:satisfactory. SL"lce this ass~tion is questioned ~st seriously, . ~~ arc accugej, perhaps justifiably, o! 'leapine to cQriclusions oupporting . '· . . a r,r:mdioge operational prop,r<~.m before ":e had any just.ifica.tion to do so. 3. .Th.e ~bjcctio:~:s to SAC control ha:> tllllny .racet:;. S.inco .t!'!e first · ~cp jr: o"..lr plans .ror an operat.~or.u.l sy~t.cr.-~ i:l"./Ol"--e an int~riJ:t ~at~ _-procc::.!.iin;;: f.:icility in tr.c Hartin Bo:nl:-er Plant· at Oftutt1 this step has been deni~d ~3. ~~ oppcsi~ion C3ft ~ttaek it ~· scver~l ~ounds: a. It is do~igned to ~:ld into t.hc center of otir cpcrational" facHitic:s. ";hi'Ch are t\le!:lsclve:s questioned. b. It ~11 lead to co~plete SAC control. o! the eystem. c. \~ ~D take ro:e~ee~ble n~-will bs too u~ll to. ju~t~~ t.hiD action• .4. It muet be recoeni:csd that :tM Air Poroe is .not. t.l}'l.os~ :1ft ·pnot.o i."ltel=". . li!';cnce capabilities. So . far a:s can 00 determined no cc:z:pleto. et.U:S.r o! oxi~ting SAC eapabili~y v:s expected FLD take .has been conducted. consider~ inc C~?~Cin1ly rocont even~s. It _ ~ppoars'that any :tt.egpt to obtain releaso cf fur.ds !or an interk facility in the !-Iartin Bo:nber Pl.~nt ::n!.S~ clearly o~~ rt::asonable RW take c::1nnot bo cond.~.:ctcd wit.hir. enetihg capa.bil.itie~. 6 At.eh 4 . . . . ·-·---~-··· -~---.--.... ...,.. __ --·L~. ~ "'!,,_~ -~----------- · · SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 ~ .. . ~ ~!en that readout w:ll be the prWr'J ·cperatic:-:.;ll node; ar.d ·--. ' . 1~c o?erational syste~ required to opcr~t~ ~nd expioit readout ·. -· -·' .:.. ·. ·. ~.:-l.l and technical oppoflition to ou.-present :pro[fr&U!l is able to . _· :· en thi3 eee!:".inel y r.-.inor i:ssue (o:ll.j -i:s invo1vcd). This . ~ , ,: ti~, is so !o~d3bl~ th~t ~ hav~ ~en directed to ~~thho~d thio I . · • -·· tc:ch.nicnl a.n:1 cpcrati.cn~l plo:ms. c:.. It is not vlta~ to .r\ ~ r ~orce pla11!1 U:at .the initinl· fD.m p:·ocessing · ··: ! dt::"l1.icatin-'! bo~ ccr.do:.::tod at tl~ z;a::.c 1c.-c:lt.ion H:.:..t. ·Sf,C u::ro:s f.;:;=' ex ·. ;:;.•itat1 cr. or the photo,r.rapb:,•. If· sub:scqu~nt stt.rlic~ of this problc:n :;:;::!!.ca!.c thnt· ()ther tac;ilitics can do· tho pr~cc:;:.ing and duplicating job· ~.~r.:-, the Air Force t:hould not object ·to the-ir b(:ine utili:ec.. e. Colocatio:-, or de.ta har.dling and Sa!!!os contro1 CF!!"!ters is nc.t trat..egic Air Co:::n.'\f¥1. b. Cu:-rent c~dwor}-.loads. c. Be::~t po!lsible estit'.:ltos of p.f.cD tak~ ('the~e can be based or.ly-on 01 ne-..r . do-.-el.op::c!rt. plA.."'', not en existing sch~d~~s). 5. Qu.:stion:> o! the utilit.y ~f .the SU:uos eyste::~ in ~eneral trar :nuot. .fir3t de?~~ on the dceree of 3urviv~bility that. can~ provideq. ·If . ~~~vability i:i ·possible, othor cperat.io:-.al. factor$ mmt: be considered -. fuctor3 SUCh a:s: reliabi1j,t.yI neY.ibil.ityI CO!l.:p:rl.ing :;y.T;ews, CtC.io 6• .co~cur.rency built into the devolo~~nt. p~an give~ a -~ubster.t.~~ · Gapa -• . ·. bility to exploit. oither a readout or recoverable s,rat.em. i. J.ny ~elay in the. 1-l.a.rtin BOmber · P.lant. faeil.it~ has se.r1.oU3.. ~ation:; . . . : . .. L~ the Midas pro~am . ~ince the SUnnYvale inc1lit7 ~~ot h~~le the ,~l-splny . eoncrating equip':lent. a. Intc:-~ facilities £o~ proceseins and duplic&t.i!'lg the prisar,y ,racord pi1ot.oeraphy ar.d euppl.ying all users cu.st be rnado a-r.1i.lable. 7\::-t.her ~tcdy of th~ final a~&wer !or the processing ana duplicatinc facilities . ::-.•!::t [: ~ conduc~d. -!otch 4 . . . -·· ..... ·---·- -· -~· ... ·· --·~ -·-·-·-·--· . ·~· .. --------·--·-- SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES .._•.]fF~6-APPR6VED-FOR. -_R~I,.E~S.E 17 September 2011 1;-· 7n:lt. the Air Force support. t~ directives th:lt ~'e Mve received -rcquir~.ns paylc.-td dovelop::~crit in the t'cllowing order: rec:wcrablo pnyloal• re:=Cout p&~.yle.ld., !orret paylo.ld. 2. That thl1 Air Fo::-co ~opt a ca!l;)letcly open mir.d on the. RW -procram ( . - --:; -ar.c! the ~;ub:;oquent facilities required for an -operati-onal systcc~. . -. ~- J. 'ihat Ncomli.deration of t.he hard vs soft problem begin vitfi a tech..: ~\. r.ical. study · o~ the proble~ of givine the ~y~te~ ~u~ivability. 4. That t.t.a Air Force defer _any move:. to establi:h o.n 1.ntori.:n i'acility .:~t C!!utt ·until .,.If: have ~:~ore facts on which to b:l:.;e our cla1J:".:i. -. . . •" ' -.... 5. Th~t. consicicrat1o:l be given .to t.he NO:"Url~ ce:r;;;>le:.c i.n Color~o as a . :t::-cng pos:.ibilitj• for. location of the Hida8 display generatir:B: equi~nt• .~ . . . ~ ·..: :~ :'. ~-~·· .-·. ·: :_.·),. . .··.: .. , . ·..:. ·. . . .,. ··. · -.·:.:. , -. Atch-4 (__. SS: 4B47 CO~.-·~~~ !TIAl: · '"• ·---l• I . CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 SPECIAL HANDLING MEMORANOOM FOR mE RECORD 19 Sep 6Z SU:arECT: Approval to Re-Orient Program 206 to Air Retrieval Over Pacific Area A meeting was held in General Greer's Conference Room, 4th Floor of Bldg. A at the R&D Center, from 0830 to 1000 hours on 18 September 1962 with the following in attendance: Pentagon SSD sszx Aerospace Dr. J. Cbaryk MajGen R. Greer Dr. A. Donovan Col R. Berg Dr. W. Leverton Col J. Ruebel Mr. W. Sampson Col Smith Capt Gorman , (USlf) Purpose of Meeting: 1. To reaffirm the primary requirements of the program. 2. To determine the best design approach to meet these requirements. 3. To obtain approval of the fund requirements for the design approach selected. Discussion: Colonel Riepe gave the first part of the presentation outlLned on v · Document V-pI..3 ~covering cb&rts 1 through 8. On the questioned posed regarding the primary requirements or the IJrogram, the following comments were made: Dr. Cbaryk: At the beginning of the program some of these require ,.\ ~ ments (precise land impact within a 3XlO area) presented I here were objectives, not firm requirements that could not be relaxed regardlesQ or cost and schedule. IJ. Gen Greer: I agree but it has taken tilDe to see which of the original objectives should be relaxed. Today, you will see the ultimate in relaxation of some of the ~ \ original objectives. ~ Mr. Sampson then gave the second part of the presentation covering charts q through 'IJ. On the point of longer mission lite, these com ments were made: v - ~ C) <) ... -S£CR[fsPECtAL HANDLiNG ... 4" - SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Dr. Charyk: Gen Greer: Dr. Charyk: Colonel 1/ through 7 I . were: Dr. Cha.ryk : Col Riepe~ Dr. Cbaryk: - Col Riepe: Gen Greer: LtCol Sides: Dr. Charyk: Gen Greer: Dr. Cbaryk: SE£KET I am not sure why you want longer mission li~e. I thought I understood you to say two or three meet ings ago that you vere interested in this. Perhaps desirable ~or multiple mission ~lexibility. Riepe then concluded the presentation covering charts ..'t -~ During this part, some of the more pertinent comments Do you have a column ror complete program termination? No. I &.'11 ending up.to the good in FY 63 (by deciding on the H-30 over water retrieval design). You show-for GE for 698AL (land retrieval) and -for H-30 , a simplier approach. Why is this? At . tnis point in the program there are unrecoverable cost that have been land retrieval. These costs are included in the This figure is a ~ reduction of GE's estimate. We probably could negotiate these costs down but would most likely just be building in an 6verrun. With the Discoverer schedule decreasing, I do not think it will be necessary to increase 6594th strength ror Program 2o6. (H-30) We sent out a casual request for water retrieval and everyone grabs onto it like a drowning man to a life ra1"t. 'lhis shakes our con1"idence in what we heard last August. I never really thought we would try for land impact on the first flight. What was the rationale of going for land in the ~irst place? Operating cost, efficiency, security. If ve are really going to get sophisticated in this space recovery business, we are going to have to learn to land these things in our backyard. SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 Septe~ SPECIAL HANDLING Dr. Cbaryk: Gen Greer: Dr. Charyk: Dr. Charyk: Dr. Charyk: Gen Greer: Dr. Charyk: Dr. Leverton: Dr. Charyk: (Regarding recommendation to use H-30 water retrieval) We don't have much option, do we! What are your thoughts as vhere ~ go 1"rom here? Do ve go on Yith this forever" Land recovery doesn't make much sense except in an emergency. Ultima.te economic approach rtAy be la.nd recovery. It is expensive to keep an air-aea recovery force in operation. '!he development of an acceptable land recovery capability mayf~ -15 years away. If you are go1ns to recover men, you are going to have to develop a land recovery capability. Cancel present program (land). Proceed With H-30 (air retrieval-water). Will deliberate between nov and January 1963 regarding rollow-on recognizing tnere is a 2 -3 month Atlas lead time problem. indicated that tbe Atlas lead time problem would be taken care or by placing orders aga:Lnst unidentified space shots) . :Ihe 40-d.ay launch interval is not a bad schedule 11' it ia re~stic. · We are confident this is a rea1istic schedule for the RV but we may have problema with the OCV. (SUIIIIII&rizing) we can handle the Atlas lead time problem, so basically it means a decision in January on· follow-on (based on GE follow-on lead time) Simplest design approach -H-30 Next -some land cap&bility 'lhird -In-house study by Aerospace and AF on land recovery. What does land recovery ulti nately buy you? Would you comment on kill proba.b111ty? Are ve :1.n the ball park? I think the range you are working Within is a good number ( ;o-~) SECIQ SPECIAL HANDLING 3 SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Dr. Charyk: Gen Greer: Dr. Cbaryk: Gen Greer: Dr. Cha.ryk: Gen Greer: Dr . Charyk: Gen Greer: -Dr. Charyk: Dr. Cha.ryk: - -5ECRCJ1 SPECIAL HANDLING (Summarizing again) Use H-30 for initial ten (10) shots Do this study between nov and January to determ:Lne wat course to take on the :follow-on Life or program -63 to 65 You did not discuss the point but i! you were starting over, would you use same payload or would you go panoramic~ We have looked into panoramic. /JM~J~~~. We are nov enamored with this program (H-30). What are the problems with this one"l It is not Vithout problems. We still have some of the same ones such as stabilized platform, Wha.t is the poasibillty that six months :from nov we will say we need panoramic camera? It is not zero but like 2~. You went to GE and said let •a go Discoverer. 'lbey leaped on. it. Now, i:f we went to EK and mentioned panoramic, would they leap on it? No. -We have already done this. We have got to protect the budget :for the :follow-on. We will get some brilliant idea in January -have a program modification. That might be a little late. Call out H-30 all the way and in Janua.ry I'll see 1:f' I want to change 1t. If changed in January, make some additions (to budget) at that time. What is FY63 requirement :for H-30 :follow-on? SPECIAL HANDUNG CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 Co~ Riepe: Dr. Charyk: We will give consideration later on this year to land recovery. We Will go with H-30 now. Dr. Charyk: Let 1 s get GE tied down contracts negotiated). on contract immediate~y {u~ Where do we stand now? we have two contracts negotiated -Pbase A for des1gn7 development, testing, qualification;and Phase c~ the corresponding "black" portion of Phase A. Gil 1 s proposal for Phase B -production of satellite veh~cles -is due November 15 . 'nlere was a general d1scussion at this time regarding how to expedite the definitization of the outstanding letter contract {-AF -~55), · the use of one White contract instead of two, and the desirabi~ity of using a CPFF contract for Phase A and a CPIF contract for Phase E. Not much ~an be done at this time to expedite negotiation of AF-~55 ~ess we can get GE to submit its proposal. sooner than November 15, which is doubtfUl. Al.l right to use one contract instead of two. (Note: Apjparllielnlt~ly problem of having one contract for a large amount -like over ~ is not considered a problem from a security ·standpoint anymore). CPIF vs CPFF for Phase B. Dr. Donovan, Dr. Leverton1 and Mr. Sampson of Aerospace expressed reservations of being able to develop any meaningful perforu.L~ce incentives that could be reasonably measured during the design, development, testing and launch of the first ten SVs as the specifications are being developed during this periOd and are therefore subJect to many changes. Dr. Donovan stated that about all. you can do during this period is to measure QC. · Gen Greer and Col Riepe al.so expressed reservations on the appropriateness of writing performance incentives during this phase (:firs.t 1.0 shot&). Dr. Charyk: How many will. you have to fly before you ba.ve real.istic cost and performance data? Dr. Donovan: May not have to fly any but wi~l need to canplete a considerable amunt of testing. SPECIAL HANDLING SECREJi 5 SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 --sEeRff-~~?E.CIAL HANDLING Dr. Charyk: What is our confidence for a June launch? Col Riepe: Schedule calls for week 22 (1 June). May have problems. Col~: think the 4th flight will meet full spec on Col Riepe: Yes. Gen Greer: Are you talking about camera changes· within this scheme? Dr. Charyk: Only in regards to reliability. DECISIONS 1. Firstten (10) SVs will be H-30. 2. Follow-on will be H-30 which will be subject to change in January to incorporate limited iand capability, but we are to proceed with procurement action now. 3. Cancel what we have on ice {precise land impact) 4. A:F and Aerospace will make in-house study between now and January regarding desirability of land recovery. 5. May write one (white) contract instead of two (white) for first ter, SVs. 6. Write CPFF contract for first ten SVs or appropriate portion thereof. Consider CPIF for any balance SVs not on CPFF contract. 7. Write CPIF contract for follow-on. Talk incentives after get cost. Will not consider any letter contract but must start program with a def'initive contract (Note: ihis is an extremely tight schedule to get CPI~ definitive contract distributed by GE lead time for followon approximately 1 March 63.) ... aLit-Is~~ ~ ~,-? SPECIAL HANDLIN~ CRITICAL TO US SECTJRITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 HIJ 18 OCT 1963 IIBMORANDUll FOR The Vice Chief of Staff, USAF BUBJliCT: Space Becowry Respo~M~tblllty Further tD oar receat dlsc._.,aa cCJIICerlliDC programmed trusfer of apace reconry ~Wtiesand atrcratt from the Air Foree Systema Commlll1rl to tbe Alr Jteacae 8ervlce of the Mllttary Alr Truaport Service, I haft reviewed thls entire sabject. 011 cklse exammattoo, it 1a ev1c1eDt that some of the apparent adftiata&H af auch a traDafer wW. DOt be rMltzable in practice. ABatptng the aircraft Ia 4(aetJtlOD to a commacf havlag a larger fleet of tbe IllUDe buic aircraft will DOt pi'OYide better IIUIJPOrt to either the recovery operations or the other rnpcmaJbil1Uea of the commaDd, aiDce the aircraft lD qaeatioa must be spec:1alq modified with unique recovery gear to carry out the atr catch recoveey operat.Soa. Nettber 1111modWed C-130 aircraft DOr aircraft caafiCIIred for groaad recovery mtuiaas are illterchallpable for ue iD the a1r catch Jld881GD. Thls special modtficatlOil iacladea not oaly the wtanattaa Oil tbe recovery equipmem wttbin the fuselage but alao includes apecial ngtne m,odtflcattaas which p:rovide power far the reeeYery eqaipmeDt. The modificatioll coat for each aircraft is · Programmed operatiolul wUl preclude nHJizattoa of these.air catch aircraft in other mt•tons. TheBe operatSona Include, 1n additiaa. to scbedaiad rec09ery apentiMII, subete•Hal reqairemeDts for the recovery fleet to hold ID a grOUDd alert atatus Ill additlon, there is a cOIIltinulag trainiag requiremellt, smce it ts DeCeSSarY to matntam a very high degree of praftciency on the part af all pilots checked out iD the air catch operat:ialls. Thi& Ia lmperatl~, a1ace tbe 81ltlre cost of aU ecautPmeDt and operaticas wh:lch precede an tndtvtdual reeonry may euily be loBt by laek of sufficient pilot skW at the crucial tnsiaat of recovery,. Ill order to qualify as recovery pilot of these aireraft, current requirements are 25 succeasful training recoveries, requiring 70 hours flying time in training in the air catch ;;l 7 " o F~ '· } ,_ ,1' ... :t,. ;,• :: : :~;.; --,~~ ,:. : .6.31 o ') I SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 aircraft. After tnwal q••Uftcattoo, a ml.Dlmwn o.f e1gbt aueceuful recoverlea per moath Ia required af all r«:OVflry pUQm.to ma!ntaiA the qualUlcation. Tbeee requtremeDta DOt oaly affect tbe avatlabWty of the air catch aircraft for oth&r mluiOIUI, bat preclude the aubatltution of other C-l30 pUota 1ato the a1r catch operatlolls. I aJao fllld that the aircraft ut.tl1zatt011 actually realised 1a outatanmag, particularly lD Yiew of the Umttatloaa impoaecl by aubatanHal grOWid alert requirements, aad lt ill dUflcuJt to aee bow tralulfer could la &11)' way lmprcmt thla performallee. The fl¥bc time ~the 1ut 12 mOD&ha baa averace ... ~--:$-~c.-~ =-~..J • . . --,. SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 to the use of the mw fuuda far the costs associated wi.th outside conaultants only. Accordingly, I have instructed the Comptroller, NI.O, to provide financing directions to Director of Program B. 1 will appreciate your instructing the Group to direct its efforts to object~ve• a, b, c, d, f, h, and i as outlined in your letter and reque•ted bere:f.n. I am interested in being kept informed of the progress baing made. I suggest tbat by 15 .January 1964 an intarim status report be made to Gene Pubini, you, and me for determination of prograss for subsequent orientation of the study. Sf.nc:arely, Bll.OCKWAY Mt.IMILLAB Director National Reconnaissance Offic~ IDEALIST CORONA OXCART GAMBIT ¥ ~ "-/ ¥ 4 ~ --S 't_ z. ~ -~3 _.,JI! CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP SECftC! 24 February lQ65 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Telephone Conversations with Repre•entatives of the Itek Corporation This afternoon. in the absence of General Stewart, I was ·seated in his office speaking to General Bleymaier when a telephone call came for~ from Mr. Walt Levison, Itek Corporation. He asked me first if I would agree to keep silent·on the information he was about to relate until such time as he would release me from the agreement. I told Walt that this was a difficult aiJ"eement to mU;e 11in the blind;" I needed some idea as to the content of what he was going to aay and the probable duration of the secrecy to be impo.sed upon me. Furthermore, I could not aeree to silence in any area which miaht adversely affect the organization of which I am a member. He assured me that the need for silence would not extend beyond several hours or perhaps a day and that it could not pos.sibly harm the-tBt-NRO. He also advised me that Mr. John Wolfe was moni~rina the telephone call. With these assurances. I aereed to preserve'the Itek secret. Walt then made the following remarkable announcement: "For a multitude of reasons. Itek has come to a corporate decision that it cannot accept the follow-on to FULCRUM, even if it is offered. " He emphasized that this was a corporate decision; he also stated that ---. there were no conditions which would change this attitude. At this point. Dick Philbrick spoke. confirming what Walt had told me. It was an emotional moment; Levison's voice was shaking throughp-..: the conversation. I told him that it was the most dramatic statement . th~..1. I had ever heard and intellectually "shocking" from an industriAl organization. I reassured him that I would not 'divulge any part of this information without his specific permission. but I was ·very much interested in what Itek proposed to do next. now that the decis~on had be~n made. Walt stated that the main·reason for calling me wu to request advice as to the proper scenario for handling the situation. I · stated that the.first thing Itek had to do was to advise ita ·FULCRUM sponsor-Mr. McCone -of the decision. · He said that Mr. Lindsay (President of Itek) was tryina to get through to Mr. KcCoDe by telephone Handle via BYEMAN· TOP SECRCi Control System · SECTION VI : PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES TOP SECRET to do just that. I urged him to move Yery quickly; specifically. I pointed out the danger of waiting several hours or perhaps a day until one could locate or gain access to Mr. McCone. If Mr. McCone were not immediately available it seemed to me Itek should convey its message to General Carter or to whoever was in charge of the Apncy at the moment. I pointed out that the Land Committee was in executive session and that it would be most embarrassing to all participant. if the Committee were to make a decision and then receive the Itek blockbuster. Levison and Philbrick agreed on the need for quick action. They informed me that they did not know where the Land Com mittee was meeting and asked if they could rely on me to arrange an assured audience with Dr. McMillan or Mr. Land on short notice. I agreed to do this. About twenty minutes later Walt called again to say that Mr Lindsay -. was unable to reach Mr. McCone but had passed the corporate decis~on to Mr. Bross. Would I now arrange for a meeting with Mr. Land and Dr. McMillan? I promised to have them in telephone conversation with Dr. McMillan within five minutes. I located Dr. McMillan at the Polaroid plant. called him to the telephone, and, without divulging the nature of the Itek announcement, urged him to call Walt Levison immediately at Volunteer 2-0419. He did so and seven m~tes after Walt's second telephone conversation with me Walt had completed a conversation with Dr. McMillan and was on his way to a meeting at Polaroid. I consider myself restricted by my agreement with Walt and havenot divulged any of the information he has given me as of the close of.. business today. PA~.'WORTHMAN Colonel. USAF FULCRUM TOP ~ECR.Ef 2 616 CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM TOP SECREf 25 February 1865 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: ltek Discussions with Dr. McMUlan and Mr. Land Walt Levison called me at my home last niaht-at about 2000 hrs to advise me that he had met with Dr. McMillan and Mr. Land in the Polaroid factory late in the afternoon to announce the Itek corporate decision regarding FULCRUM. He said he had stated categoricall7 that under no condition would the Corporation accept a follow-on FULCRUM contract. Both Dr. McMillan and Mr. Land were "stunned" by this announce·ment. Dr. McMillan reminded Walt imme~ately of his own technical preference for the EK proposal. Walt replied that he was aware of _thf8 .. preference, that Dr. McMillan had advised him of this reaction previously, and that the ltek decision was made with the full knowledge that. it would cut the Corporation out of additional satellite camera development within the near-term future. He stated that Itek felt it could not ~~t r '-'ive under the "domination of the CIA. 11 He also referred to the CIA as fostering an "immoral environment" which was becoming increasingly unacceptable to Itek. Walt stated that Mr. Land's response. after a long silence, wu "what will I tell my Committee?" I congratulated Walt on a brave and honor&ble action and asked him tO pass my comment to the Corporation president. Mr. Lindaay. For further events surrounding this situation one should conault a memorandum for record prepared by Lt Colonel Howard. wbO waa at the scene of tbe meeting durina this periQd. P~. WORTBMAN Colonel, USAF. Hannle via Bill1AN TOP SEcRET Control System . . ..._ FULCRUM ·-· SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES February 25, 1965 MlH>RANDUM FOR. RECORD Recording events that took place on the afternoon of 24 February during the closing hours of the meeting ehaired by Dr. Land. At approximately 5:00P.M., I received a message frcm Colouel WortbiDan reporting that Mr. Levison of ITEK wished to talk to me at once. I called Mr. Leviaoa. 'le said that the l'l'!::K, Corporatioo bad made a Corporate dec:iaion that be thought might be of importance to the deliberat1ooa then going oo with Dr. Land's Ccaaittee. Be asked tbat be be given an opportun1.ty to speak to me and to Dr. Land privately. I urged him to CODe to Dr. Land 1 s office at ODce. Dr. Land ' a secretary arrBDged for the use of a private room and Dr. Laud and I met Mr. Levison aud Mr. John Wolf in this room. nt about 6: 00 P.M. M:r. Lavisoo stated t:bat be had a Corporate deeision to report to as and wished to make s0111e preparatory remarks Hrst. He said that he wished to make clear that the decision ITEK had made was a COIUiidered Corporate decision, that it was not politically motivated, that l'l'I!X bad uo intentior: of ueold.ng favor or special treatment of any kiDd as a result of this decision. He then said that that aftarnoon he, Mr. Lindsay, Mr. Philbrick and otber members of the ITEK management, some of whom he o.-aed ,bad decided that they would not accept from the CIA any follow-OD development contract to their present contract on FULCKIM. He said that he wns not sure what the legal and moral obligations of IrEK were iD respect to a proposal now before the CIA to continue the present FUl.CBlJM effort for 30 days more. He said that this decision had been arrived at at approx~ately 4:00P.M., that Mr. Lindsay had immediately tried to telephone Mr. McCone. Mr. Lindsay bad been unable to reach Mr. McCone by telephone, but had communicated the substance of this decision to Mr. Bross at the time of his call, i.e., approxtmately 4:00P.M. He further said that Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Philbrick were already on their way to Washington with the hope of seeing Mr. McCone personally during the evening. CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM Subsequent discussion brought out a number of circumstances surrounding the ITEK decision. Some of the significant points made by Hr. Levison and Mr. Wolf were the following. 1. ITEK felt that they could not maintain their 11 technical integrity" if they undertook a development project for F1JLCRUM with as little technical control over the project as they had been allowed during the work up to this time. 2. ITEK felt that the rotating optical bar technique to be used in FULCRUM could not be justified unless there was a firm requirement for scan angles of 120° or more. ITEK had on a number of occasions expressed this judgment to the CIA, at least once in writing in a letter from Mr. Levison to Dr. Wheelan, approximately 3 February. (This was the only specific citation of a written demur on this subject made in the conversation. The statement was made that other corr~spondence had also raised the same question.) 3. John Wolf stated that at a meeting at which all of the associate contractors were represented, he had pointed out that ITEK believed that the rotating optical bar could not be justified unless the CIA validated a firm requirement for 120° scan. In response, Dr. Wheelan had successively queried Hr. Maxey, Mr. Derks and one other member of the CIA staff whether "at any time, either verbally or in writing, they had stated to ITEK a requirement for U0° scan." All three of these people addressed individually with this question replied, "no". A fourth member of the CIA staff who entered the room during this conversation was also queried. He pointed out that the requirement for the 120° scan was stated in the ITEK contract. 4. Reference was also made to the fact that Mr. Derks, on the 23d of February, had specifically stated that the CLA was considering both 120° scan and 900 scan angles. 5. Mr. Levison stated that in June of 1964, Mr. Philbrick had asked Dr. Wheelan for permission to brief me on the FULCRUM project. He stated that this permission wal denied protem and that several other requests during the summer were also denied. He said that in August, Dr. Wheelan had finally told Mr. Philbrick that ~. Wheelan would be the point of contact between ITEK and me on the FULCRUM project. 2 SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES 6. It was brought out that ITEK had never been given any information from the associate contractors working on alternate film drives or alternate camera concepts. At this point I stated that I had never received any written technical information on the FULCRUM project except some copies of briefing charts that were used in Mr. Maxey's briefing to me in August 1964. I pointed out at one time that in my judgment the NRO could never function effectively as long as people of the character, and sharing the attitudes, of some of those who had been promoting FULCRUM were in a position to interfere with the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program. I reminded Mr. Levison of the meeting that I had with him in my office during the preceding week, at which ttme I had told him that I felt that technically the Eastman Kodak general search proposal was more satisfactory than either of those being pursued by ITEK, but that I felt that it was important that the ITEK pancake idea be pursued further to be sure we were not overlooking ~ortant values and to be sure that we had a backup should any difficulties develop in the Eastman approach. Mr. Levison agreed that our conversation had covered these points and reminded me that he had disagreed with ~ technical judgment at the time and that he still disagreed. I noted that I had told him then, was repeating now, that it was precisely because I respected his disagreement that I felt the ITEK should continue. I po~nted out, but not in connection of this exchange of remarks, that if ITEK did not continue work on FULCRUM a number of highly competentpeople could be made available to support a more vigorous effort on the ITEK pancake concept. I found on occasion duringthe meeting to state that I had always been impressed by the personal courage and integrity of Mr. Levison, Mr. Wolf, and that the events of the moment confirmed that impression. ~. Land raised a general question as to how we could be sure that the competence and resources of ITEK were preservedand made best use of by the Government. I said that I felt there were a number of things very important to do includingfurther work on general search systems to which ITEK could contr~bute effectively, but no details were discussed. There . 3 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM was some discussion of t:be manner in which ITEK' s announcement: would be made available to Dr. Land's panel, one of the principal questions beiDg whether Mr. Lindsay's call to John Bross should be considered adequate prior notice to the CIA, freeing Mr. Levison t:o report to Dr. 'I.aDd and me and, in turn, freeing Dr. LaDd t:o speak to tbe panel. Mr. Ltrvison stated that: it was . with the full Jmowla dga of all of the Corporate Officers who participated in this decision, t:bat: he was CICIIliDg to Dr. Land and me and that be pcracmally felt and believed that Mr. LiDdaay so felt also, t:bat Mr. LiDdsay'a effort to reach Mr. McCone constituted adequate prior taformstion to tbe ClA and that: as far as Mr. Levison was aoacerned, ,.. were further to use this infoxmatiou. The discussion closed at approximately 7:00 P.M. At least twice during the discnusicma, Mr. IAviaoa stated that it was ~·s cOllS:l.dEed juda--t: that the decision to withdraw from I'ULCIDM ._, in their best Corporate interest and that it was hit peracmal judgment that it was 1Ddaed in t:be Goverument'a best iDtt~reat. In elaborating .on tha Corporation iDtareat, be acted that if rrmt Wlft'e to UDdert:aka a development on 11'UI..CR1M, th_,-, as a Corporaticm, would be held reapoaaible for the outcome and that 't. did DDt feel that they could accept: t:bia reapcmslbility without ar•ter freedom for tachnical decisions than they had been given duriDg the study phase. Several t:eclmical diffia1altiea dwt might develop in the P1JLClUiil syat.a were d:l.acuaaad durizla the -ting. John Wolf emphasized t:he severe eff•t• on vehicle motions tbat would result from evea alight 8IIOUIIU of ua'Nlance in tbe large rotati.Dg parts. lD particular, be noted that aD ecc:eat:r:lci.ty of one inch 1D the balauce of a r•l of film would probably be catastrophic in tbe preset design. llafer.-,ce was made to det:aila on thi• point provided duriD& 1'uasday's briefings. Mr. Wolf poillted out tbat tha tiCC..,tricrity of •003 iDchu, cited in the Tue•day briefiDg. wa• t:he reault of cme measuremen£ of one reel of film. Early 1D the discussions, Mr. Levisoa recited iD some deuil the dialogue between him and Mr. MeC011a that took place after he and Mr. Herther bad briefed Mr. McCoDe and Mr. Vance on their pancake system on 2 February. He notad that at that time he bad 4 SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES stated that the preference for FULCRUM or the pancake depended on e::tactly what requirements were levied and, in particular, he recalled that he had been cited a requirement for a 4-day search as being one of those that led to the FULCRUM configuration. He recalled fur~her that Mr. McCone ha.d emphasized ITEK' s five..years experience with general search systems and had asked whether using this experience, irrespective of requirements, they would choose the FULCRUM approach. Mr. Levison noted that he had declined to answer tbat question, and identified it to Dr. Land and me as "a request for an oath of loyalty''. He cited this conversation as the reason for the letter from him to Dr. Wheelon, noted earlier. He stated that no answer to that letter had been received. Mr. Wolf went on to say that he ha.d • soon thereafter, had a conversation with Mr. Maxey in which the latter had denied that any requirement for search in 4-days had been levied upon ITEK. Broc:kway McMillan Director National Reconnaissance Office 5 3£ a1 2 s 2J I Ji I 1 2 21 CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 2 August 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology SUBJECT: Ground Rules for the New Search System Competition 1. Herein are mentioned the key issues which must be facedin order that we have a reasonable context for the three month periodsuggested by the Land Panel: a) Both the Agency and the Air Force must beprohibited from procurring system hardware, facilitiesand architect and engineering services -in other words,from using this three month period to buy a schedule advantage. b) The funding available to both the Agency and theAir.Force shool.d be comparable and sufficient. c) Both parties should be formally notified that a development decision has not been made, and that in structioiJS to the contractors should be given accordingly. d) Common ground rules should be adopted as to thebooster choices available, as well as in the recovery techniques and limitations which can be assumed. e) If the Land Panel has issued, or can be expected toissue, guidance on source selection criteria, an attemptshould be made to iaswethat that this information is available promptly to both parties. 't ~ ~ ~ Cl ~

coster.but it is clearly mt essemial that the oCM co:Dtr&ct be givento thebooster comractor. With respect to systems integration. it may ·well be more econamJcal and expedieut when the overall hardwareflow is examined in deta.ll to uaignthis fuDctiOn to the boostercoutra.ctor. While we are %lOt pleading any p~arrangeme.nt, we do recommelld that these determi:mtions be left, with Director# NRO concurrellee. to the program management.; .-·~. ;~~~.c!Ll a;.• ~ Hm..lTINGTON D.· SHEI .DQN .Director of RetSonnaias-Nlce, CIA . cc: DD/NRO BYE-Q42'l-66Page 5 HANOU:: VIA 5\'Eii.~N CON'i'nOC SYSTtM QNL.Y 635 ·, ·" .. .:... •.·~. - SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WA8HIN~ON November 5, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX SUBJECT: Task Group Report (Alternative Management Arrangements For the New Photographic Search and Surveillance System) In response to ·your October 27 request for an' appraisal of the above report, couments are offered in two categories:the collective views of senior members of the· NRO Staff (sansme)·; and my personal opinion~ on both NRC Staff views and the report itself. I asked appropriate senior members of the St.aff (Worthman.Carter, Howard, Buzard, and llcocij) to give me their ..completelycandid thoughts. A summary of their more pertinent. views follows: · 1. The casual discarding, in the report, ~f the fully integrated System Project Office because 11 ••• the Agreement reflects an obvious desire to maintain organizational identity and responsibility••• 11 was "deplorable" and "distressing" to them. They felt this approach to management was the only valid one for a complex system development, and all alternatives proposed were, in effect, committee-management with all inherent weaknesses. They cited numerous examples of successes for the former, and failures for the latter, and felt the new search system was far more important than anyorganizational status or recognition. 2. In short, the Staff believes that you must have a single, authoritative, responsive System Project Director, and should establish a fully-integrated System Project Office (which co-locates all necessary CIA-DOD engineering, procurement, and security people in one office, and empowers these people to speak authoritatively for their 11 sponsors"). Although the Staff believes the overwhelming management capability to do the job is in SAFSP, they profess not to be antiCIA, since they also assert that total system assignment to CIA ••. : ·..·,:-. ...:r.:!_!Z VJ. ·. ~ · . ·· . · . . . .I . . _, . ;2.. .. , . ' . ~ . :·· - ·~ .. ·..• CRITICAL TO OS SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 would be vastly more effective than the "idealistic but impractical social ventures" proposed in the report. Personally, I basically agree with the Staff on the desirability and effectiveness of a fully integrated SPO--the management alternatives to this approach are inherently weak, are potential trouble-makers, will require more of your attention, etc. However, I am not so positive af[l they that it is the ''only" valid approach. Further, I am convinced the Agreement precludes a fully integrated SPO (as defined in the Report); since it ·· repeatedly refers to "the CIA" and "the DOD" (or AF), not CiAprovided people, DOD-provided people, etc. In that vein, the Agreement specifically states "The CIA will develop the optical sensor sub-system." Therefore we must establish some. compromise arrangement which assigns logical responsibilities for system tasks and specific sub-systems to ·SAFSP and· CIA-OSP ~s organizational entities. So much for the Staff views and my reactions thereto. Next, I should like to give you my personal views on~ the Report (as objectively as possible, but undoubtedly prejudiced by my role in its preparation): 1. I repeat my strong personal desire for the fully integrated SPO approach, but reluctantly must recommend against your selecting it in view of the apparent ·intent and the specifics of the Agreement. 2. I do recommend.we try the so-called Segregated SPO approach, with overall system responsibility ~nd SPD) assigned to SAFSP. The Deputy SPD should be a CIA empl oyee assigned to SAFSP (with no allegiance, per se, to CIA _for the duration of such assignment) for this purpose. Additionally, an Assistant Project Director (APD) for CIA FOSS activi ties must be appointed. All CIA FOSS activities should b·e consoli dated under this senior CIA representative who is responsible and responsive to appropriate project direction of the SPD. Both SAFSP and CIA-OSP must exercise considerable restraint in dealing with this individual. 3. I believe SAFSP is the only logical choice for· overall system responsibility, and to provide the SPD, on the basis of .personnel skills and expe~ience, and personnel resources availabl~ to them. In the middle management ~ield, CIA has virtually no one (other than Crowley and Ledford) ·with I ·-;, 2 - ~ -. ..'-! '·. ... -· ~ SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 September 2011 · · system manag~ment experience and background. There are many such people in SAFSP or AFSC. If total system responsibility for FOSS should be assigned to CIA-QSP, then I recommend an experienced Air Force Colonel or Brigadier General be ·assigned to CIA as the SPD. 4. I have yery firm convictions on the matter of co-location. There is no question about the necessity for. co-locating a "line" DSPD, and I recommend the same :for the APD (plus an appropriate portion of his office). Coordination and interface would, at best, be quite difficult if .the SPD/ DSPD and the APD were 2500 miles apart--particularly so, for the first year or so. 5. With regard to the responsibility of the APD, I believe CIA-OSP should be charged with the Sensor Module as defined in the Management. Report. The prime reason: for this is that it will enhance the Government's ability to 'hold the camera contractor responsible for the key factors ass·ociated with proper camera functioning (i.e., mounting and alignment, thermal control, critical film handling, peculiar electronics and pneumatics, etc). 6. The Technical Evaluation Group proposed that the sensor source selection include the camera sub-system and a .combined Sensor/RV module (as one unit). Although this is a third option in the Management Report, I recommend against it for several reasons. First, these are in fact two separate modules (different types of structures·.:.-monocoque vs truss; different thermal requirements, etc) and will be built as such, in any event. The interface between the two modules-~for example, in film path alignment--is not nearly as critical as the Technicai Group imagines. Last, I do not wish to foster-unless there are overriding reasons--another CORONA "environment". Assigning CIA everything fo.rward of the OCV would almost parallel the CORONA Program and encourage the same kinds of management problems we have today (only more serious, because concurrent sub-system development is involved in FOSS). Therefore, since the RV Module :(see Management Report definition). is a separate element, its development responsibility should be assigned to SAFSP. I .3 . \ I I I I ! I I ~·' I .--- CRITICAL TO US SECURITY: THE GAMBIT AND HEXAGON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS COMPENDIUM 7. I believe the Management Report recommendation that the OCV contractor also build the sensor module shell and RV module (in effect, the entire spacecraft sans payload). and be the system integrator, is most significant. Hopefull y, despit& split responsibilities ~ng Government A&&ncy/Departm~t, this will facilitate -system engineering, structural integrity, and simplify interface matters. This contractor should design and build t ·he sensor module shell and deliver it ·to the camera contractor for camera sub-system integration and test. · · 8. Lastly, an early selection of the systen engineer (whatever management approach is selected) is vital to the work of the three Source Selection Task Groups. I question -that these groups could do an effective job in the ~bsence of the overall detailed sp·ecifications which the SE must provide. I urge the designation of the organization responsible for t he SE at the earliest possible date. ... l AAA~ ~. I rP"ll'\ / I s T. Stewart I adier General, USAF· ctor• NRO Staff · i . i I ! 4 . ). .~ -·---Lt r SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED FOR · 'fop·SECRC'f RELEASE 17 Septemben2011 rm::.c:....~GC.:':·l/ CO"~_-.Oi.'";A/c£ .D!T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGiON 2!5, D. c. OFFICE OF. THE DIRECTOR HANDLE '\i1A BYSH.. ~N CBJ'.NNZLS ONLY . 20 Decombe:r 1963 T~~ :!"Gl1orcblc Chc!'lcz J. Z1.vic!;; I::i~eci:c:-, 3ure:;:u c.£ tl~c EutcllLgcnce contribu.tio.:'l. of th:: P...EXAGOi'! ~ystem is based o~ at lea.ot· two misconceptions. .First. alt:houc;h t~o cu:o::re~'lt CORONA and G.t'U:i:BiT-I!I Gystcms clo .in gl!:ilcJ.·al CO:l.-:te clozc :o rnectinz tho USIB 1.·equircm.euts ~ct f.c.r thc;:;e systemn. thi.s is so on.ly bcc~uce ~he USIB :;:equirementn rcfcr!.·.::d to arc ~i.lcred to the ca;:-;z..bil!.tics and Em.j.~tio~~ o! thoce syst~ms and thus do not ro~::..·cz~::.t a genc:t•al ct~tcrr..ent of informatiou ·needs. ~or eAa:::l!?lc. in it~ 1' July 1963 "A::;zcszment. of th~ Il>tclligdn.cc Ga.f.!l Proviccd by J:<.:H-9 ·ave;.· I~.H-~ ~:~:.d KH-3" (BYE-2265-6\J/1) CQ}..F'R.EX s.tated: "It is particu!~:dy im:;:ortilnt to emphzu;ize that our current requirenlent:~ have becu developed on the baais of cu=ren.t ctcm will !"~ake substant!.:::..l add!.tion:1.l cob.u!butious. Tho Bu:t·cau !1as !>om. c~~c-....., gotten the lr.:1prez~:>io:1 th.:::.t the issue in thb bctance is li:.."J-..it·::lG !;O!.cly to ground forces and solely to cur~cnt :requirements. The.!ntc:l!i::;cncc Cowmu•~ity and Department o! D~fense stucli~s additiol-:.ZL!ly placo cpecial em!_)basLs on emerglnz.p:;:ob!ems !oroseco:::.bie in. the 19701s-,-3.l4 a&pect gcncJ.·~lly ovc;;:-lo-okcd in the Bureau paper. ·HA'NDLE VV. BYE!VL"..N·.CHANNELS ONLY ;... z TOP SECRET HEXA<;JONI GORONA/Cd\1/!.?.I'T SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES NRO APPROVED. FOR 'i'OP SECRET RELEASE 17 Sep~ember(201fiE.XAGON/ COI:.ONA/GAl\·1Bt,..... The HZXAGON syster:1 will mal~e n'lajor contribut!.oi!s in at least £our a:;-cas of llizl• ir.•po!.·ta;.,_ce to the intclli!_;c:t:lce ?recess. sp~d..fically: a. It wBl pi-ovid0 the br3e ar~a $earch .· cov~ra.;;e "7ith a ~rub~t~r!ti~l !m~ze qu~~ty i1np::cv~ment ov;;;r t:!1e p~csent covcra~e ca:,:al>l.lity in that regard. b. !twill provid~ the unique capability to di.G . • c::.-irn.ir..at~ bei:,vccn. mobile forces of '\ladous types, c2.te~o2:ics and clas!4.eo.· c. :Because of its C--<;... . :-..2 .. .. ..:.·.?""----.!.. ;;. --•.!!--=·-•-.. Dep\lty.::Dlrector £or Sclc~c:e arld Technology Datt: .·· Cys 1 & l -Director. DOB l -DepSec:De! 4-Sp. Aut. to Prea. lor S&T 5 ~ .t>/NF.O 6-ADCI 7 .. Exec:. P..eg. 8-DD/S&T 9 -DD/S&T Regl•t"t 10·-D/OSP 11-C/DSzAD lZ-P.B-/OSP DD/s&T/OSP/LCDlrks/JJCrowley:bg/7905 (I 9 Dec:ember 1968) Rewritten:DDCI/as (20 Dec 68) B.YE-7824•68 VI" BYEMAN ' 10' .. HA'NOLE "" Page -our · __.,..., ......,...,..-,~ oNLY CCi'!,, -· lTS? SECRET 64J SECTION VI: PROGRAM CONTROVERSIES 1 NRO APPROVED FOR "'L£/, / lull ~~t~~; .· :· .. RELEASE 17 September 2011 -·un-~/((' 0. S;:; Handla via BYRL'm . ( . . I...... ..\.. ... . . . . .: ~ . . . Contrtl Systam_ EXECUTIVE OFFICE<:.., , _,.TffE PRESIDENT· .r _.; ( BUR£AU OF THE BUDGET WASHINGTON. D.C. ZOSOJ MAR Z2 1359 Honorable ~chard H~lms -Director of Central ~telliqence ·-··-----·_ ~e~t;-a~ _Int:elliqence A9encyWashington, D. c. . . Dear Dick: · ---··---!J!hank you-veey--m\leh -·for your· -letter -of-March 11• . -Let--me start by emphasi~ing our area of agreement: · it is our ---..,i!hu~-·objEf