ON THE 
 
 USE AND ABUSE 
 
 OF SOME 
 
 POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 BY 
 
 SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS 
 
 NEW EDITION, WITH NOTES AND INTRODUCTION 
 
 BT 
 
 THOMAS RALEIGH, D.C.L, 
 
 FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFOKU 
 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 1898 
 
 Price Three Shillings and Sixpence 
 
crc 
 
 L(o7 
 R3 
 
 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME 
 FROM THE 
 
 SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 SUcnrg M. Sage 
 
 1891 
 
 A'JMOp. iljA^(fJ<f. 
 

 DATE DUE 
 
 
 tmf 
 
 TJW*^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GAVLORD 
 
 
 
 
 Cornell University Library 
 JC223.L67 R3 
 
 Remarks on the use and abuse of some pol 
 
 3 1924 032 455 655 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032455655 
 
REMARKS ON 
 
 THE USE AND ABUSE 
 
 OF SOME 
 
 POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 BY 
 
 SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, Bart. 
 
 SOMETIME STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD 
 
 A NEW EDITION, WITH NOTES AND INTRODUCTION 
 
 BY 
 
 THOMAS RALEIGH, D.C.L. 
 
 FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 
 * Seal up the mouth of outrage for awhile, 
 
 we can clear these ambiguities, 
 And know their spring, their head, their true descent/ 
 
 Romeo and Juliet^ Act v. Scene 3. 
 
 Otforft 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 1898 
 
! ,,. '' 
 
 
 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. 
 
 PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
 
 rONDON, EDINBURGH, AND NEW YORK 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Editor's Introduction ▼ 
 
 Author's Introduction i 
 
 I. Government i8 
 
 II. Constitution. Constitutional . . . .20 
 
 III. Right. Duty. Wrong. Rightful. Wrongful. 
 
 Justice 22 
 
 IV. Law. Lawful; Unlawful 39 
 
 V. Sovereign. Sovereignty 41 
 
 Division of Forms of Government ... • iZ 
 
 VI. Monarchy. Royalty. King 58 
 
 VII. Commonwealth. Republic. Republican . . 68 
 
 VIII. Aristocracy. Oligarchy. Nobility ... 72 
 
 IX. Democracy 76 
 
 X. Mixed Government. Balance of Powers . . 79 
 
 XI. People. Community 98 
 
 XII. Representation. Representative. Representa- 
 tive Government loi; 
 
 XIII. Rich. Middle Class. Poor 115 
 
 XIV. Nature. Natural. Unnatural. State of 
 
 Nature 135 
 
 a 2 
 
IV CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XV. LiBERxy. Freedom. Free 151 
 
 XVI. Free Government. Arbitrary Government. 
 
 Tyranny. Despotism. Anarchy . . . 163 
 
 XVII. Power. Authority. Force 
 
 XVIII. Public. Private. Political. Civil. Municipal 175 
 XIX. Property. Possession. Estate. Estates of Par- 
 liament 181 
 
 XX. Community of Goods 184 
 
 Tabular Division of Governments 189 
 
 Index 191 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 George Cornewall Lewis, elder son of Mr. (afterwards 
 Sir) T. Frankland Lewis, was born in London on the 21st 
 April, 1806. At the preparatory school of M. Cldment, 
 and afterwards at Eton and Christ Church, he laid the 
 foundation of that wide and accurate knowledge of books 
 which gives weight to all his deliberate opinions. After 
 leaving Oxford he read law for a time in the chambers 
 of a special pleader; and he was one of the small but 
 distinguished body of students who attended John Austin's 
 lectures at University College, London. The first fruits of 
 Austin's teaching were given to the public in the Essay re- 
 printed in this volume. 
 
 George Lewis had chosen the Bar as his profession ; but 
 his health proved unequal to thestrain ; his connexion with 
 the leaders of the Whig party introduced him to another 
 and perhaps a more congenial kind of work. Following 
 in the footsteps of his father, he made a special study of 
 poor-law administration, and in 1833 he was appointed an 
 Assistant-Commissioner, to report on the state of the Irish 
 poor in the chief cities of Gr^t Britain. He presented an 
 able Report on the special Object assigned to him; his 
 views on the state of Ireland generally were recorded in 
 
VI EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 two Essays, on Local Disturbances, and on The Church 
 Question, which he published in one volume. The book 
 was well received, but it was rtot a financial success. 'There 
 is no market,' he says, ' for books on Irish subjects, unless 
 they are full of religious bigotry.' 
 
 In 1836 John Austin and George Lewis were appointed 
 Commissioners to report on the changes to be introduced 
 into the laws and government of the island of Malta. Their 
 appointment was hailed with joy by the local leaders of 
 popular opinion, who thought that the Commissioners would 
 bring with them a ready-made code, which would at once 
 put an end to all abuses. But even abstract jurists, when 
 they happen to be Enghshmen, must inquire before they 
 act ; the process of reform was slow and troublesome. In 
 the course of eighteen months a good beginning was made ; 
 an improved tariff, which we may conjecture to have been 
 mainly the work of Lewis, gave relief t5 trade and in- 
 dustry; and something was done to relax the restraints 
 which a succession of military governors had laid on the 
 press. Austin's more ambitious plans of codification stood 
 over for further inquiry when the Commissioners were 
 recalled. 
 
 In 1839 George Lewis succeeded" his father as one of the 
 Poor Law Commissioners for England and Wales. His 
 tenure of* this office was rendered unpleasant by the attacks 
 of persons who vented their dislike of the amended poor- 
 law of 1834 in abuse of those who administered it. Once 
 Lewis was compelled to apply for a criminal information 
 against a member of Parliament who accused him of con- 
 spiracy and falsehood; the result of the application was 
 that the charge was withdrawn, and the case was settled 
 out of court. 
 
 In 1844 Mr. Lewis married Lady Theresa Lister, widow 
 of Mr. T. H. Lister and sister of the Earl of Clarendon. 
 In 1847 he resigned his place at the Poor Law Board, and 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION vii 
 
 in August of the same year he was returned to Parliament as 
 one of the members for Herefordshire. Lord John Russell 
 at once offered him the Secretaryship to the Board of Con- 
 trol, a post which he accepted with satisfaction, for the 
 office-work which it involved was by no means burden- 
 some, while at the same time it gave him an opportunity of 
 becoming familiar with the details of Indian administration. 
 From this, his first political oflSce, he was transferred to the 
 parliamentary Under-Secretaryship of the Home Department, 
 and from the Home Office he was promoted to be Financial 
 Secretary of the Treasury. In these subordinate positions 
 Lewis established his reputation as an industrious and use: 
 ful member of Parliament. He was not an eloquent speaker, 
 but he commanded the confidence of the House of Commons 
 because he was always well informed, always courteous, col- 
 lected, and fair. He probably knew more about books than 
 any of his colleagues or opponents ; but in practical matters 
 he was no doctrinaire ; when he had to make an important 
 speech, he usually began by trying to show that the measure 
 which he supported was in accordance with the traditions of 
 the public service. 
 
 At the general election of 1852 Lewis's parliamentary 
 career was arrested for a time by two successive defeats. 
 In July of that year he was dismissed by the electors of 
 Herefordshire to make way for a protectionist; in the 
 following November he was beaten at Peterborough by 
 Mr. Whalley. He bore his disappointments calmly; re- 
 turned, not without a sense of relief, to his books ; and 
 undertook, by way of holiday task, the editorship of the 
 Edinburgh Review. The work to which the best of his 
 mind was given at this period was an elaborate Essay On the 
 Credibility of Early Roman History. His purpose in writing 
 this book was purely negative ; for Lewis, with all his varied 
 acquirements, lacked many of the qualities of a great his- 
 torian. He could not reconstruct the past ; but he thought 
 
vyi EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 he could prove to demonstration that Niebuhr's reconstruc- 
 tive theories were untenable. We may fairly say that his 
 proof was convincing ; but a scholar who renders this kind 
 of negative service to history may find that his arguments 
 are buried, like well-directed shot, under the ruins of the 
 edifice which they have brought to the ground. If the 
 Essay survives, it is not because the present generation 
 needs to be warned against the theories of Niebuhr, but 
 rather because Lewis's critical handling of the classical 
 historians is full of instruction for those who follow him 
 in the same field of research. 
 
 There are two incidents of George Lewis's literary career 
 which ought to be placed together, as a lesson for critics. 
 Niebuhr, travelling beyond his own province, had bestowed 
 great praise upon a book, purporting to be written by 
 Massillon, entitled Memoirs of the Minority of Louis XV. 
 He failed to discover that the so-called work of Massillon 
 was a clever piece of imposture. Lewis noted the blunder 
 with a certain mild satisfaction; it confirmed him in the 
 opinion that Niebuhr's power of 'historical divination' 
 was apt to render him oblivious of the rules of evidence. 
 It happened unfortunately that Lewis himself was passing 
 through the press an edition of the spurious Fables attri- 
 buted to Babrius, never suspecting that he was introducing 
 to the public the work of a clever but extremely modern 
 Greek. Continental scholars were not wanting, to bestow 
 on Lewis's Greek scholarship the censure which Lewis had 
 bestowed on Niebuhr's Roman history. 
 
 Lewis had spoken of his exclusion from the House of 
 Commons as if he neither expected nor wished to return 
 to the slavery of office ; but his exclusion was not to last 
 very long. In 1855 he succeeded his father in the baron- 
 etcy, and in the representation of the Radnor Boroughs, 
 about the time when Lord Palmerston was forming his first 
 administration. The difficulty of the moment was, to find 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION ix 
 
 a Chancellor of the Exchequer. Two competent men had 
 refused the position ; it was no light matter to succeed 
 Mr. Gladstone, whose ability h^d dazzled the country, and 
 to prepare a War Budget — for the allied armies were still 
 encamped in the Crimea — at a few weeks' notice. Lord 
 Palmerston oifered the place to Lewis, who accepted it at 
 once. It was part of his creed that a public man should 
 not be afraid to undertake any duties for which his col- 
 leagues considered him to be well qualified: he thought 
 of the Pope, put, in hell by Dante, ' che fece per viltade 
 il gran rifiuto.' The financial outlook was certainly not 
 encouraging. The expenditure for the coming year was 
 estimated at 86 millions sterling ; the estimated revenue from 
 existing taxes was 63 millions. To cover this large deficit, 
 Lewis proposed to levy additional taxes, and to borrow 
 16 millions. His proposals drew down upon him the wrath of 
 many Liberals and Radicals, who maintained that the ex- 
 penditure of each year, even in time of war, should be met 
 out of the taxation of the year. Mr. Gladstone accepted 
 the Radical principle, but announced his intention to vote 
 with the government. He pointed out that even the 
 soundest principles cannot always be carried out to their 
 logical conclusions. ' You must remember,' he said, ' that 
 you are dealing with flesh and blood.'- The Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer carried his proposition ; and the Roths- 
 childs took up the whole of the new loan on the terms 
 which he proposed — ;£ioo in money for every ;£^ioo 
 Three per cent Consols; the lender of each ;^ioo re- 
 ceiving an annuity of i+f. 6d., terminable at the end of 30 
 years. 
 
 The Budget debates of 1856 were not exciting; but when 
 Parliament met in 1857 the war was over, and the various 
 sections of the Opposition were pressing the government 
 to reduce taxation. As a member of the Cabinet, Sir 
 George Lewis stood committed to an expenditure larger 
 
X EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 perhaps than he as an individual thought necessary. He 
 was not in a position to offer any great measure of relief 
 to the taxpayer; he had in fact to argue in favour of 
 certain taxes, the paper duty for example, which he did not 
 wholly approve. In this strait he contented himself with 
 a dry exposition of his difficulties, and sought consolation 
 in the dictum of Arthur Young that ' simplicity in taxation 
 is by all means to be avoided.' Mr. Disraeli brought forward 
 an amendment in favour of economy, carefully framed with 
 a view to his next electoral campaign. Mr. Gladstone 
 criticized his successor and rival with merciless vigour; 
 poured contempt on Arthur Young and his dictum ; and 
 gave the House a general notion of what might have been 
 done for the reduction of public burdens. Lewis stood to 
 his proposals with his usual dry but conciliatory precision, 
 and carried them without substantial alteration. 
 
 In the autumn of 1857 there occurred one of those 
 crises in the mercantile world which test the courage and 
 shrewdness of the statesman who presides at the Exchequer. 
 Some great houses were compelled to stop payment, and 
 many thought they could not weather the storm without 
 assistance. The Scotch banks sent a deputation to Sir 
 George Le^vis ; they wished him to compel or persuade the 
 Bank of England to come to their relief. ' Ah, gentlemen,' 
 said Sir George, ' if I were to interfere with the discretion 
 of the Bank, there would be a run on me much greater 
 than there ever was on you.' In the month of November 
 the state of things in the city was so bad that the Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer took the responsibility of suspending the 
 Bank Charter Act of 1844. He intimated to the Governor 
 and Deputy-governor of the Bank of England that if they 
 were unable to meet the demand for discounts and advances 
 without exceeding the limit of their circulation as pre- 
 scribed by the Act, the government would lay before 
 Parliament a Bill of Indemnity freeing them from penalties 
 
EDITORS INTRODUCTION xi 
 
 incurred in respect of the excess. The action of the 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer met with general approval, 
 and the Bill of Indemnity was passed through both Houses 
 of Parliament without difficulty. 
 
 When Lord Palmerston was forming his second admin- 
 istration in 1859, he offered Sir George Lewis his old post 
 at the Exchequer. Sir George was prepared to accept the 
 offer, but on hearing that Mr. Gladstone was also willing to 
 undertake the duties of that department, he very loyally 
 placed the seals of the Exchequer at the disposal of the 
 Prime Minister, and allowed himself to be transferred to 
 the Home Office. Two years later he migrated to the less 
 congenial duties of the War Office. He was entirely 
 ignorant of the details of military organization, and it is 
 not easy to discover the reasons which induced Lord 
 Palmerston to make the appointment. But, if we may judge 
 from the Parliamentary Debates, the new Secretary of State 
 for War was very soon able to hold his own with the 
 experts. His speeches on the military estimates of 1862 
 might even be cited as illustrating the advantages of the 
 English principle of 'civil control.' It is, at first sight, 
 absurd to place generals and colonels under the orders of 
 a civilian who may never have seen an army in the field ; 
 but as the army is maintained for the protection of civilians, 
 it is just as well that all military schemes should have to 
 encounter the criticism of a practised administrator, free 
 from professional bias. 
 
 Though he was not and never tried to be brilliant. Sir 
 George Lewis was both admired and liked by his colleagues, 
 and by the House of Commons generally. His cool, 
 methodical manner, and his disregard of the smaller arts 
 of diplomacy, sometimes drew down upon him the wrath of 
 less philosophical persons ; but in the course of his re- 
 markably successful career he made no enemies and many 
 friends. His devotion to books never impaired the sound- 
 
xu EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 ness of his practical judgement ; we may even say that his 
 practical virtues were rooted and grounded in his love of 
 knowledge for its own sake. Men felt that he would do 
 nothing unworthy of himself, because they saw that his 
 heart was not wholly set on power : he remained in public 
 life because he had duties to perform, but he was always 
 glad to escape to his own house and his favourite studies. 
 
 Sir George Lewis was never a strong man physically. He 
 was very sensitive to cold ; he took but little exercise ; he 
 seems to have had no amusements. His unflinching in- 
 dustry was one of his greatest merits, but he was perhaps 
 too careful in iilling up his spare hours and minutes with 
 work. Even the professed scholar often learns most in 
 hours of comparative idleness, when his acquired knowledge 
 has time to settle down and take a clear outline in his mind, 
 and when his original powers have time to grow. At the 
 close of his political career, George Lewis showed the 
 marks of his prolonged labours. He was more than twenty 
 years younger than Lord Palmerston, but the vigorous old 
 man was destined to outlive his less robust junior. In the 
 Easter vacation of 1863, Sir George Lewis caught cold in 
 the course of a visit to his country house at Harpton, and 
 he died after a few days' illness. 
 
 II 
 
 In all his opinions and actions Sir George Lewis may 
 stand for a type of the Liberalism of his generation. 
 He was predisposed by birth and training to take the 
 Whig-Liberal view of politics. He entered the public 
 service at the moment when the Reform Act of 1832 
 gave a preponderant importance to the opinions of the 
 middle class; and he died before household suffrage 
 involved his party in the shifting currents of democracy. 
 
 'Liberalism' is a convenient general name for the 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xiii 
 
 opinions which began to come into fashion about the 
 middle of the last century. There were at that time 
 many educated men who sympathized with the movement 
 against absolute or paternal government in Church and 
 State, while at the same time they had no belief in extreme 
 democracy. They set themselves to prove to kings and 
 statesmen that all authority is in its nature limited. In 
 practical matters their advice was for the most part nega- 
 tive. ' Do not govern too much, ' the Liberals said. ' Do 
 not attempt to force people to be of one mind in regard 
 to religion. Do not think you can force trade into profit- 
 able channels ; leave men to find out for themselves what 
 they can make and where they can sell it to advantage. 
 Do not suppress opinions because you think them unrea- 
 sonable ; give your subjects the benefits of parliamentary 
 government, and hear what they have to say.' If the 
 Liberal creed cannot be regarded as a complete summary 
 of political truth, it certainly contains much sound common 
 sense. 
 
 It may here be observed in passing that the Liberal 
 movement in England was never a party movement. 
 The Whigs, for reasons of their own, took the name 
 of Liberals after 1832 ; but the leaders of the modern Tory 
 party^Pitt, and Canning, and Peel — were all Liberal 
 Tories j it is only when we come to Disraeli that we 
 begin to perceive the inevitable democratic reaction against 
 the Liberalism of the middle class. 
 
 His varied official experience confirmed Lewis in the 
 belief that it is always a mistake to govern overmuch, and 
 that no authority, however well-informed and well-meaning, 
 can afford to disregard the criticism of its subjects. He 
 applied this principle with good effect in the sphere of 
 colonial policy. If it were only for the sake of simplifying 
 their own work, he thought that English statesmen would do 
 well to encourage the formation of a strong popular opinion 
 
XIV EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 in the colonies. He thought also that when the colonies 
 complained of the men sent out to them by Downing Street 
 they were often entirely in the right. He quoted in support 
 of his opinion a letter in which O'Connell, after describing 
 a certain person as a swindler, unfit for the society of 
 gentlemen, went on to say that he had done his best to get 
 the man a colonial appointment. But while he was deeply 
 interested in the distant parts of the empire, Sir George Lewis 
 was not what would now be called an imperialist. . ' I am 
 quite unable/ he wrote in 1837, ' to see what possible benefit 
 England derives from the possession of Canada.' The date 
 of this opinion is significant; it was in 1837 that the 
 Imperial Parliament found it necessary to suspend the 
 legislature of Quebec. None but a prophet could then 
 have told what the Dominion of Canada would be in 1897. 
 Though firmly attached to representative government, 
 Sir George Lewis held that its principles could not be 
 applied to Asiatic and African communities. ' You cannot,' 
 he said, ' have a Hindu House of Assembly.' He thought 
 there was something to be said for the dual arrangement 
 which divided the government of India between the East 
 India Company and the Crown, and he did not at first 
 anticipate that any great improvement would result from the 
 abolition of the Company's political powers. .But ■ when, 
 in February, 1858, Lord Palmerston moved for leave to 
 introduce his Bill for the Better Government of India, 
 the most cogent argument in support of the motion was that 
 which was delivered by Sir G. C. Lewis. Accepting the 
 version of Indian history which has been driven into 
 the English mind by Burke and Macaulay, he dwelt on 
 the abuses of the Company's government : he argued that 
 our Indian empire had been won, not by the policy of 
 the Company, but by the irregular and insubordinate energy 
 of their servants ; and he asserted boldly that no civilized 
 government was ever more corrupt, perfidious, and rapa- 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xv 
 
 cious than that of the Company between 1765, when it 
 acquired the Dewanny or civil government of Bengal, 
 and 1784, when Pitt established the Board of Control 
 as a check on the Directors. The defenders of the 
 Company had predicted that if the imperial government, 
 which is the creature of Parliament, were to take over 
 the work of Indian administration, the result would be 
 to make India the shuttlecock of party. Lewis admitted 
 that Indian questions must, for the future, be to some 
 extent party questions; but he maintained that this was 
 inevitable in view of the fact that British authorities in 
 India must, under any system, derive their powers from 
 imperial legislation. 
 
 Even in Europe there was at least ope country to which 
 Sir George Lewis would have hesitated to apply the formula 
 of popular government. After a prolonged study of Irish 
 questions he felt that little was to be expected from the 
 workings of popular opinion in Ireland. Improvement 
 and civilization must come, he said, from above. So far 
 as appears from his writings, Lewis was not animated 
 by any hostile prejudice against the Irish nation. He 
 declined to admit that they were disqualified for industry 
 and progress by their Celtic blood (if they are more Celtic 
 than the English) or by the ' errors of Popery.' A popu- 
 lation of German Protestants would, he observed, be as 
 troublesome as the Irish, if they had come through the 
 same experiences. The misfortunes of Ireland were due, 
 in Lewis's judgement, to the fact that the line of division 
 between religions was also the line of division between 
 classes. Thus it happened that the gentry, who should 
 have been, as in England, the leaders of local opinion, were 
 trained in ignorant contempt of the beliefs of their poorer 
 neighbours, while the peasantry regarded the governing 
 class as enemies of religion Classes and creeds were 
 so divided that only a long period of just and firm 
 
XVI EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 administration could reduce them to order. It must 
 be remembered that Lewis's opinions about Ireland were 
 formed in the days before the Famine, when the population 
 exceeded eight millions, and when the general level of 
 education was much lower than it is now. 
 
 If Sir George Lewis was opposed to absolute government 
 in the State, he was equally opposed to all attempts 
 to extend the powers of ecclesiastical authorities. Like 
 all hereditary Whigs, he was ready to take arms at the least 
 appearance of papal or clerical despotism in the church. 
 His dislike of clerical ascendency made him a convinced 
 supporter of the union between Church and State. Dr. Chal- 
 mers had founded his defence of church establishments on 
 the argument that voluntary effort could never make adequate 
 provision for the religious instruction of the people. Lewis 
 did not admit the force of the argument ; the experience of 
 the United States seemed to him to prove that the churches 
 could do their work without the support of the state. 
 He objected to the voluntary principle, not because it 
 supplied an insufficient amount of religion, but because 
 it produced religion of a bad type. A priest or minister 
 who is dependent on his flock will always (so Lewis 
 argued) be tempted to work upon the superstition or the 
 fanaticism of his people. Liberalism is founded on a firm 
 conviction of the fallibility of all governments; it would 
 have been contrary to Sir George Lewis's principles to admit 
 that the State was wise enough to discriminate between 
 true and false religion. Mr. Gladstone in 1839 defended 
 the establishment of the Church of Ireland on the ground 
 that the State was bound to support the religion which 
 it accepted as true, even when that religion was in a 
 minority. Lewis, on the other hand, thought it impos- 
 sible to defend an establishment which was maintained 
 for the benefit of a small fraction of the people ; but he 
 was always very unwilling to attack vested rights of pro- 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xvii 
 
 perty. He would have left the Church of Ireland in 
 possession of a very substantial portion of its endowments ; 
 the remainder he would have employed in making a decent 
 provision for the Roman Catholic clergy. He thought the 
 State would gain by 'unsentimentalizing' the cause of 
 the priesthood, and by identifying their interest with that 
 of the government. 
 
 On all questions connected with the administration 
 of the poor-law, Sir George Lewis was a recognized 
 authority. His practical experience in this department 
 was gained during the years which immediately preceded 
 and followed the passing of the new poor-law of 1834; 
 and of that measure he was always a firm supporter. 
 Dr. Chalmers had displayed all his wonderful powers 
 of exposition and appeal in the endeavour to persuade 
 his countrymen that the poor-rate was an unnecessary 
 and even a pernicious institution. As minister of a poor 
 parish in Glasgow, he had proved by experiment that 
 poverty may be most effectually relieved by organized 
 voluntary effort. Lewis was much impressed by Chalmers's 
 argument; but in the existing state of English society 
 he did not think it possible to do without some legal 
 provision for the poor. And if voluntary effort was not 
 a sufficient resource in England, still less could it be 
 depended on in Ireland. To stay the plague of beggars, 
 and to raise the standard of living, the State must intervene 
 and make some provision for the destitute. But in Ireland, 
 where there was no sound tradition of local government, 
 the necessary relief must be given with the strictest pre- 
 cautions. A lax system of outdoor relief would be simply 
 an engine for transferring the annual value of the land 
 from owners to occupiers. Legal relief, safeguarded by the 
 workhouse test — this was Lewis's prescription for Irish 
 poverty; and this was in fact the remedy applied by 
 Lord Melbourne's government in 1838. 
 
 b 
 
xviu EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 The two great interests of Sir George Lewis's life 
 were politics and literature. His political judgement was 
 generally to be trusted ; but his Liberal prepossessions were 
 so strong that he often showed a certain want of sympathy — 
 one might even say, a certain want of intelligence — in dealing 
 with opponents, though he was never consciously or 
 intentionally unfair. In literary matters he erred perhaps 
 in being too austere. He predicted that Macaulay would 
 never be more than a rhetorician ; he censured Carlyle 
 as a person of unbalanced mind, and an enemy of exact 
 methods in history. Froude, in his eyes, was a ' complete 
 historical sophist'; the voluminous work .of Alison was 
 merely ' heaps of balderdash, with gleams of acuteness 
 and common sense.' These literary judgements are taken 
 from his published letters ; and it would not -be fair to 
 attach any great importance to phrases written, down 
 in the freedom of private correspondence. But, taken 
 ogether, they seem to show that Sir George Lewis's 
 scholarship was not altogether free from pedantry. Ac- 
 curacy and logic are not everything, even in historical 
 composition ; we owe something to the men who can make 
 facts interesting, even if they state their facts less precisely 
 than a parliamentary return. 
 
 in 
 
 Sir George Lewis's contribution to the theory of govern- 
 ment consists mainly in three books, each of which deserves 
 the attention of students, though none has attained a wide 
 popularity. The longest and most important of the three 
 is entitled Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics ; 
 it was published in 1853. Mill's Logic had provided men 
 of science with a manual of rules for the proper conduct of 
 their inquiries ; Lewis endeavoured to perform the same 
 service for historians and politicians. 'A work of this 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xix 
 
 kind,' he wrote in a private letter, ' would dispose of nearly 
 the whole body of political speculators, from Plato down- 
 wards, without refuting their conclusions separately, by 
 showing that their methods were unsound.' The book was 
 written, and Plato still survives. Like most academic 
 Liberals, Lewis was disposed to attach too much importance 
 to correct reasoning in politics. In practice, he was always 
 willing to allow for sentiment and tradition ; but in theory 
 he seems to assume that if men would only define their 
 terms, and argue soberly from cause to effect, or from 
 effect to cause, their actions would be as consistent as 
 their opinions. 
 
 It is not easy to give, in a short compass, any adequate 
 account of this elaborate treatise. In the preliminary 
 chapters, the author endeavours to define the province 
 of politics, the departments of political inquiry, and the 
 technical terms to be employed. He proceeds to describe 
 the methods of observation by which poUtical facts may be 
 studied. He points out that there are in this science no 
 experimenta lucifera, as Bacon would say, no -experiments 
 undertaken simply with a view to obtaining fresh light on 
 abstract problems. _pn the other hand, experimenta fruc- 
 tifera are possible and easy ; every change in the laws and 
 government of a state is an experiment, undertaken with 
 a view to some practical result, but indirectly valuable to 
 the scientific inquirer. These abstract doctrines are illus- 
 trated by a very full and careful disquisition on the uses 
 of political history. Passing to methods of reasoning, 
 Lewis discusses the laws of causation in politics ; he lays 
 stress on the distinction between the causes and the conditions 
 of historical events, and on the errors which are due to the 
 assumption of false causes. After determining the place to 
 be assigned to theory and hypothesis, he sums up what he 
 has to say of the science of politics, and proceeds to discuss 
 the corresponding art. This he proposes to class, not with 
 
 b 2 
 
XX editor's introduction 
 
 the fine arts, which are all imitative in their purpose, but 
 with the useful arts, which are essentially original. Whether 
 this distinction is fundamentally sound, may perhaps be 
 questioned, but it suggests to the author some shrewd 
 remarks on the art of government, its scope and its limita- 
 tions. The fine arts aim at perfection; the artist sets 
 before himself an unattainable ideal. In politics, the 
 practical man aims at the best which can be made of 
 the men and things under his hand; ideal models are 
 of little use to him. To make good this position, Lewis 
 examines the ideal commonwealths of Plato, and of those 
 who have followed Plato in the same line of speculation. 
 In this part, and indeed in all parts of his treatise, Lewis 
 marshals a great host of authorities in support of his con- 
 clusions. He lacks the power to give Ufe and interest to 
 his subject ; the Methods 'of Observation and Reasoning 
 will never be a popular book; but it will not be wholly 
 forgotten. No careful student can fail to derive some 
 advantage from the unstinted labour which Lewis has 
 bestowed upon this his magnum opus. 
 
 In his Essay on the Influence of Authority in Matters 
 of Opinion, published in 1849, Lewis has endeavoured to 
 supply a logical method by which we may guide ourselves 
 in determining difficult or disputed questions in science, 
 politics, and religion. Where the question is one of fact, 
 we rely on our own sensations and feelings, or on the 
 testimony of persons who have seen and heard what they 
 relate. Where the question, whether it be of fact or of 
 opinion, lies within the scope of our own knowledge, we 
 exercise our reason ; we do not adopt the belief of others, 
 unless they can produce arguments which seem to us 
 sound. But our experience and knowledge are so limited 
 that in many matters of opinion we accept the principle 
 of authority, i. e. the principle of adopting the belief of 
 others without reference to the particular grounds on which 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxi 
 
 that belief may rest. Authority supplements reason, but 
 there is no opposition between the two. Before I can 
 accept a belief because I am commanded or invited to do 
 so, my reason must be satisfied (i) that this is a case in 
 which I am not competent to form my own opinion, and 
 (2) that the authority which tells me what my opinion 
 should be is worthy of confidence. The Roman Catholic 
 exercises the ' right of private judgement ' no less than the 
 Protestant ; but his reason is satisfied by arguments which 
 appear to the Protestant unsound or insufiScient. 
 
 In the abstract part of this Essay, the author was cer- 
 tainly too elaborate in his exposition of tolerably obvious 
 truths ; there is some justice in the criticism of the ' hasty 
 thinker' quoted (or invented) by Mr. Bagehot, who said 
 that Lewis had written a book to prove that if you didn't 
 know a thing you asked some one who did. Lewis might 
 well have replied that many people are content to ask. some 
 one who says he knows ; and that his Essay justified its 
 existence if it reminded the average man that he is respon- 
 sible for his own opinions, even if he chooses to accept 
 them ready-made from the church or the party to which 
 he belongs. In developing the practical applications of 
 his doctrine, Lewis displays his usual information and 
 judgement, especially in those parts of the Essay which 
 relate to representative government and to the influence 
 of newspapers. His object in this work is, not to convert 
 men from one opinion to another, but rather to induce 
 men of all opinions to examine the grounds of their belief 
 before pressing it on their neighbours. 
 
 The Dialogue on the Best Form of Government is in some 
 respects the most satisfactory of Lewis's political writings ; 
 it is short, clear, and pointed, as an essay in abstract poli- 
 tics ought to be. The author makes no attempt to conjure 
 with the wand of Plato; the scheme of his imaginary 
 conversation is almost absurdly simple. Three friends. 
 
xxu EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 Monarchicus, Aristocraticus, and Democraticus, meet at 
 the house of Crito. Disagreeing in everything else, the 
 three are agreed in holding that the form of government 
 in a state determines the substance of the laws and the 
 mode in which they are administered, and that there is 
 only one good form of government. Each states his rea- 
 sons for holding the form which he prefers to be the only 
 good one. Crito placidly denies the assumption on which 
 the argument has proceeded; and the disputants depart 
 without having arrived at any conclusion. 
 
 Monarchicus opens his case with a bold appeal to uni- 
 versal experience. All the states of the ancient world were 
 at first under the government of kings ; the Greek and 
 Roman republics gained nothing by dispensing with them. 
 The limited monarchies of the modern world owe their 
 success to the fact that they are monarchies; even if they are to 
 be classed with republics, the abstract argument for monarchy 
 is irresistible. If power is entrusted to a body of men, 
 whether the members of that body be few or many, they 
 must act by the vote of a majority, one of the clumsiest 
 contrivances for securing rectitude of decision. A king 
 may act on good advice, but in an assembly wise men 
 are always in a minority. In short, a monarchy may be, 
 but a republic must be unwisely governed. If the stock 
 instance of the ancien rigime in 'France is quoted against 
 him, he is prepared to maintain that it was not the abuses 
 of the rrionarchy but the theories of the philosophers which 
 ■brought about the Revolution of 1789. 
 
 Aristocraticus asserts that the free governments of 
 Greece and Rome produced all that was great in 
 antiquity, and that hereditary nobility has produced and 
 established freedom, as understood in the modern world. 
 If the king of France and his advisers had shared the 
 enlightenment of the nobles, there would have been no 
 Revolution. Aristocracy is the happy mean ; the despotism 
 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxiii 
 
 of one is always attended by abuses, while extreme 
 democracy tends to the supremacy of a small class of 
 logroUers and electioneering agents. The so-called con- 
 stitutional monarchy of England is really an aristocratic 
 republic, and ought to be so described. 
 
 Democraticus maintains that no theory of government 
 is sound unless it is founded on mistrust. If one person, 
 or a class of persons, be allowed to govern, it is certain 
 (human nature being what it is) that the interest of the 
 whole community will be sacrificed to the interest of 
 the governing part. There is no safety unless in giving 
 electoral rights to all .(i.e. to all adult males) and letting 
 them choose their lawgivers. It is true that all men are 
 not equally competent to decide political questions; but 
 all are sufficiently competent to choose representatives. 
 It may be true that democratic legislatures, in America 
 and elsewhere, are composed of second-rate men, but 
 this is not a fatal objection to the principle; the object 
 of democratic government is that the interest of the 
 majority should be represented. In order to give the 
 people a direct control over their own aifairs, it is desirable 
 that the world should be divided into small states. Perhaps 
 at first these small democratic states would wage petty 
 wars among themselves; perhaps their commercial policy 
 would be of a retrograde character. But in course of 
 time they would emancipate themselves from the evil 
 tradition of monarchy and feudalism. Crito suggests that 
 these extreme doctrines cannot be applied to Asiatic and 
 African nations, but Democraticus declares that this opinion 
 is inconsistent with religion. 
 
 Crito declines to admit that any form of government 
 is the best for all states at all times. No form of govern- 
 ment is wholly bad, unless perhaps despotic monarchy. 
 He distrusts all revolutionary movements, and thinks 
 it expedient that each state should make the best of 
 
XXIV EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 the institutions which it has. He seems to favour a rather 
 aristocratic form of representative government, but he 
 is convinced that there are communities to which the 
 representative principle cannot safely be applied. 
 
 Concerning the Essay now reprinted, the reader of 
 these pages will form his own judgement. It is an early 
 and, in some respects, an immature performance. Like his 
 master Austin, Lewis is too fond of assigning one meaning 
 to a term, and of marking all other uses of the same 
 term as improper and misleading. This kind of precision 
 is possible in mathematics, for example, or in botany, 
 where the technical words employed are invented and 
 designed to embody a scientific notion. But the jurist 
 and the politician must be content with such precision 
 as the nature of their subject-matter permits. Enghsh 
 lawyers have a maxim to the effect that all definitions 
 are dangerous ; they know by experience that when the 
 terms of a rule are exactly defined, the framer of the 
 rule may discover that he has excluded the very part 
 of the subject for which he was most anxious to provide. 
 If we bear this necessary caution in mind, this Essay 
 On the Use and Abuse of Political Terms may help us 
 to clear our minds of cant, and to discern the true 
 meaning of the phrases which are offered in exchange 
 for votes by practical politicians. 
 
 For full information in regard to the life and writings of the author, 
 reference-may be made to the Letters of Sir G. C. Lewis, edited by his 
 brother Canon Lewis : to W. Bagehot's Biographical Studies ; and to 
 the article in the Dictionary of National Biography, which contains 
 a complete list of Lewis's writings, including his numerous contributions 
 to the Edinburgh Review. 
 
 An edition of the Essay now reprinted was published by Sir R. K. 
 Wilson, Bart. (Oxford, Thornton, 1877). 
 
 The text of the present edition follows the edition of 1832 ; the 
 Editor has corrected a few mistakes and misquotations. Those parts 
 of the notes which have been added by the present Editor are enclosed 
 in square brackets. 
 
REMARKS 
 
 ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF SOME 
 
 POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The object of the following work is to illustrate the 
 various uses of the principal terms belonging to political 
 science. It is the duty of every science to perform this 
 office for itself; and those equivocal words which belong 
 to no particular subject might conveniently be assigned 
 to the province of logic. An inquiry of this description 
 may be considered as occupying a middle place between 
 a technical dictionary, and a scientific treatise on the same 
 subject ; as being more copious and connected than the one, 
 more meagre and desultory than the other. With the view, 
 then, of affording to political speculation the assistance to 
 be derived from a technical vocabulary, I have attempted 
 to collect from different writers examples of the principal 
 meanings attached to those terms of political science which 
 seemed of the greatest importance and most frequent 
 occurrence. As it was obviously desirable to ascertain such 
 usages, not only in the set phrase of scientific inquirers, 
 but also in the living language of party discussion, I have 
 purposely selected examples from writers of all opinions, 
 often from modern anonymous publications, having no 
 other care than to represent their statements with fidelity. 
 For the most part, however, I have limited myself to works 
 
 B 
 
2 USE AND ABUSE OF' POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 of extensive circulation and established character, and 
 especially to those employed in this country as elementary 
 treatises in various departments of political knowledge ; as 
 their authority has the widest influence, and their errors 
 and confusions are the most mischievous. Hence I have, 
 wherever it was possible, selected instances from the Com- 
 mentaries of Blackstone, the speculative parts of which 
 work may be considered as an epitome of popular fallacies 
 and misconceptions on most of the fundamental doctrines 
 of jurisprudence and government '- 
 
 The explanations and distinctions which accompany and 
 connect the various passages examined in the following 
 inquiries, are intended to assist in assuring the results or 
 detecting the fallacies of political reasoning, by putting 
 the reader on his guard against unconsciously passing from 
 one signification of a word to another. Of the liability 
 even of the most skilful and experienced reasoners to this 
 fatal error, the instances cited in the ensuing pages furnish 
 examples, which may perhaps surprise some persons who 
 have not considered and observed the powerful influence 
 of equivocal language in deceiving the mind. Perhaps 
 there is no moral or political treatise of any length, 
 certainly no considerable argumentative work, of which the 
 conclusions are not in some degree affected by an incautious 
 employment, or an unperceived ambiguity, of language. 
 
 The following work is therefore strictly adapted to the 
 purposes of political argument; and even if the definitions 
 which I have either borrowed or suggested should be 
 thought incorrect, yet the investigation of the various 
 senses of each word, as occurring in popular language, must, 
 if properly employed, furnish to others the means of detect- 
 ing fallacy in political discussion. The Book of Fallacies, 
 published by Mr. Bentham, was not properly a guide for 
 
 ' [Bentham's youthful prejudice against Blackstone was transmitted in 
 full force to Austin and Lewis. The- 'speculative' propositions on which 
 they comment are taken, for the most part, from the Introduction, not 
 from the body of the Commentaries.'} 
 
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 the detection of sophisms in political argument : it was 
 a treatise on the truth of certain propositions commonly 
 assumed in political reasoning. The arguments which he 
 attacked were not fallacious : like the arguments of a mad- 
 man, they were correct and conclusive, if certain premises 
 or principles were granted. Some of these principles he 
 disproved with great force and ingenuity : but the utility 
 of his book is limited to arguments in which those par- 
 ticular propositions are either stated or implied, and it 
 furnishes no clue for the solution of questions in which 
 those principles are not involved. 
 
 The following researches, however, relate, not to the 
 truth of any particular propositions, but to the meaning 
 of certain terms used in political reasoning ; which, being 
 often employed with different senses in the premises and 
 conclusion, have given rise to countless inconclusive argu- 
 ments, and have thus caused fallacies of argument in the 
 proper meaning of the word. The soundness of an inference 
 cannot depend on the truth of a proposition though it may 
 depend on the use of a term. Hence an inquiry into 
 the meaning of words may furnish an instrumental art 
 for the purposes of argument, applicable to an indefinite 
 extent, which an inquiry into the truth of certain pro- 
 positions never can. 
 
 There are two ways in which an argument may be 
 refuted : viz. i. By showing that one of the premises is 
 false ; and 2. by showing that though the premises may 
 be true, the conclusion does not follow from them. In 
 most cases the opponent has his option which of these two 
 courses he shall adopt ; for, on account of the mutilated 
 form in which arguments are commonly stated,* the entire 
 syllogism may be restored, either by supplying a false pre- 
 mise — in which case the inference would be good — or by 
 supplying a true premise— in which case the inference 
 would be bad. Thus the argument of the ancient Egyp- 
 tians mentioned by Herodotus ', that fire is a living animal 
 ' [Hdt. Hist. iii. 16.] 
 B 2 
 
4 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 ^because it devours, may be either restored thus — Fire is an 
 •animal, because all things that devour are animals, and fire 
 devours ; where one premise is false, although the inference 
 is correct; — or thus: Fire is an animal, because animals 
 devour, and fire devours ; where both premises are true, but 
 the conclusion does not follow from them. So the argu- 
 ment of Mr. Canning, examined below (under Tyranny), in 
 its present form, is an unsound inference founded on true 
 premises : it might be converted into a sound argument 
 by assuming 'one^ falser premise. In most cases, it is advis- 
 able to adopt the former course, because the generality of 
 people are better able to comprehend the falsity of a, pro- 
 position, than the .unsoundness of an inference. But out 
 of the whole number of invalid arguments, a very small 
 portion are so palpdbly inconclusive as those just noticed. 
 In the great majority of instances, the error springs from 
 the hidden and unsuspected source of verbal ambiguity ; 
 the effects of which, imperceptibly mingling with the dis- 
 cussion, poison the Whole current of the reasoning, and 
 vitiate every part which they touch. 
 
 The influence of this cause upon reasoning is the more 
 powerful and extensive, because not even those who know 
 the ambiguity of a term are always proof against the con- 
 fusion which it tends to generate. 'It is not the same 
 thing (as has been truly observed) to 'be merely acquainted 
 with the ambiguity of a term, and to be practically aware of 
 it, and watchful of the consequences connected with it '.' 
 For this reason it may be useful, even to the practised 
 poUtical reasoner, to illustrate the various usages of the 
 words with which he is conversant, and to point out the 
 mistakes and confusions to which theyTiave given rise ; in 
 order that the impression of their ambiguities, and the con- 
 viction of the necessity of attending to them, may be more 
 deeply fixed in his mind. 
 
 It is for a want of attending to points which, if ever 
 
 ' [Whately's Bampton Lectures and Other Sermons, third edition, 
 p. 418.] 
 
INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 thought of, would not require half the labour and ingenuity 
 often wasted by disputants in eloquent declamation or 
 personal invective, that (as Lord Bacon has observed) 
 'Unde fit ut magnae et solennes disputationes hominum 
 doctorum saepe in controversias circa verba et nomina 
 desinant : a quibus (ex more et prudentia mathematicorum) 
 incipere consultius foret, easque per definitiones in ordinem 
 redigere '.' As the experiment has never yet been tried, 
 how far, by a close attention to the definitions and meanings 
 of words, controversies in the moral and political sciences 
 may be rendered useful in the discovery of truth, and be 
 relieved from the curse of barrenness which has hitherto 
 almost constantly been upon them, it is uncertain how 
 much of the blame is to be attributed to the insufficiency 
 of the weapons, and how much to the unfairness and un- 
 skilfulness with which they are used. So deep a sense of 
 the imperfections of language had Locke, that he even goes 
 so far as to affirm that if any one ' shall well consider the 
 errors and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are 
 spread in the world by an ill use of words, he will find some 
 reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, 
 has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of 
 knowledge among mankind I' Although it is impossible 
 to agree with this opinion in its whole extent, as language, 
 whatever may be its defects, is the only means by which 
 knowledge can be preserved and communicated ; yet it is 
 difficult to overrate its influence on reasoning, especially 
 when we remember that language is not only the sign by 
 which we express our thoughts and reasonings, but also 
 the instrument by wfiich we think and reason. The mis- 
 take arises not in the expression or communication, but in 
 the conception of the argument. It is an error to suppose 
 that a man cannot be misled by a verbal fallacy, without 
 seeing it formally drawn out in words. 
 
 Whether or not the following attempt to unravel some 
 
 ' Novum Organon, lib. i. aph. .19. 
 
 ''■ \^Essay Concerning Human Understanding, b. 
 
 iii. ch. II. § 4.] 
 
6 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 of the chief ambiguities of political language may be found 
 satisfactory, it is obviously desirable that persons about to 
 engage in controversy should be agreed as to the use of 
 certain common signs ; otherwise, if they disagree both as 
 to their opinions, and the manner of establishing and ex- 
 pressing them, there is no prospect of any other result from 
 the debate than mutual misunderstanding and misrepre- 
 sentation. ' Quum enim (as Lord Bacon says) nee de 
 principiis consentiamus, nee de demonstrationibus, toUitur 
 omnis argumentation' Disputants in this condition are 
 familiarly said to be ai cross purposes. Each one is eagerly 
 combating a shadow, which he mistakes for the substance 
 of his adversary's argument. If men are not agreed about 
 their weapons, they cannot engage in controversy. If two 
 duellists go out into the field, the one armed with a sword, 
 the other with a pistol, they cannot settle their dispute. 
 
 Unluckily, however, as the difference of weapons is not 
 so obvious in intellectual as in physical conflicts, the dis- 
 putants proceed to the encounter without further explana- 
 tion; and as their minds are often too eagerly bent on 
 victory to take a calm survey of the subject, and its real 
 difficulties and obscurities, each one falls upon those state- 
 ments of his adversary which appear most objectionable, 
 probably because a sense is attributed to them which was 
 never intended ; and the controversy commonly ends in 
 the most frivolous verbal questions. ' Nothing (says Hume) 
 is more usual than for philosophers to encroach on the 
 province of grammarians, and to engage in disputes of 
 words, while they imagine they are handling controversies 
 of the deepest importance and concern ''.' As in legal con- 
 troversy, when all the facts are admitted by both parties, 
 the point in dispute must be a question of law; so in 
 political controversy, when all the facts are given, and the 
 question does not relate to some future event, the dispute 
 must turn on the meaning of words. Thus, for example, 
 
 ' Novum Organon, lib. I. aph. 6 1. 
 
 ^ \Essays, ed. Green and Grose, ii. ■278.] 
 
INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 when it is debated whether an hereditary upper chamber is 
 better than one for life, whether a king is better than a 
 president, &c., the question is real. When it is debated 
 whether the English constitution is a monarchy or an 
 aristocracy, whether it is a pure or a mixed government; 
 whether the King of England is sovereign ; whether 
 monarchy can be combined with aristocracy or democracy, 
 or both; these are merely verbal questions. A verbal 
 discussion may be important or unimportant, but it is at 
 least desirable to know that it is verbal. For want of 
 attending to this distinction, nearly all controversialists, 
 blinded by the heat and fury of the discussion, treat the 
 merest verbal disputes as questions of vast moment and 
 difficulty, and draw out their arguments to an immeasur- 
 able length, until, having fairly bewildered their readers, 
 irritated each other by fruitless wrangling, and embroiled 
 the subject which both undertook to explain, they at last 
 retire from the field for very weariness. 
 
 But that verbal questions, if treated as verbal questions, 
 and not mistaken for what they are not, may lead to the 
 most useful results, I need not express my conviction, who 
 have compiled the following observations for the sake of 
 explaining the signification of political words. In pointing 
 out their various senses, however, it is not intended to 
 imply, that it is possible, either in scientific or popular 
 discourse, constantly to attribute to each word only one 
 meaning. Many of the ambiguities remarked upon, depend 
 on causes not connected with our own language ; and may 
 be traced to historical associations and other circumstances, 
 which have equally influenced the languages of other 
 nations, both in ancient and modern times. Hence many 
 parts of the following pages might be literally translated 
 into French or German, without losing their application 
 or truth. The links which bind together these various 
 shades of meaning, are connected too closely with the 
 general course of our thoughts to be broken at the com- 
 mand of any individual. It is impossible to legislate in 
 
8 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 matters of language * : the evils arising from its imperfec- 
 tions may be eluded, but can never be removed. No 
 mischief, however, arises from the variable meaning of 
 a word (except sometimes a partial obscurity), unless the 
 argument turns on the double sense. Thus there is no 
 harm in calling the republican government of England 
 and France a monarchy; there is no harm in calling the 
 aristocratic government of the United States a democracy ; 
 only let it be remembered that they are not what they are 
 called. There is no objection to a misnomer, so that it 
 does not lead us astray. But if it were argued, th.aX justice, 
 not law, ought to be administered in courts of justice ; that 
 no man can have a right to do that which is wrong ; that 
 in a kingdom the institutions ought to be monarchical, 
 &c. ; then the ambiguity is mischievous, because it serves 
 as an inducement to error, and confounds things as well as 
 words. 
 
 Such verbal ambiguities generate confusion of thought 
 in those who sincerely seek after truth, and afford an 
 opportunity for delusion to those whose only object is to 
 support a party measure, or a preconceived opinion ; who 
 seek an end without caring for the honesty of the means. 
 Still, notwithstanding the vast number of unsound argu- 
 ments advanced on all great political questions, there are 
 probably few politicians who constantly follow the rules 
 suggested by the author of the work on Parliamentary 
 Logic : they generally share in some degree in the delusions 
 which they propagate, and feel some part of the enthusiasm 
 which they kindle. It is impossible to say how much of 
 the evils of party contention has arisen solely from interested 
 persons making use of certain phrases as a pretext, and 
 how much from honest mischievousness caused by the 
 delusion of language; for it is to be remembered that 
 political terms do not always occur singly in reasoning, and 
 
 ' [The statement in the text is perhaps too wide. The French Codes, 
 for example, have fixed the meaning of certain terms, not only for 
 lawyers, bnt also for educated Frenchmen generally.] 
 
INTRODUCTION 9 
 
 that when several are crowded together in the same pro- 
 position or argument, the chances of delusion are infinitely 
 multiplied '. 
 
 The following researches, however, are chiefly designed 
 for the use of persons engaged in political studies, espe- 
 cially of those beginning such pursuits, who often require 
 some manual, some book of reference, beyond a mere 
 dictionary, which should furnish an explanation of the 
 terms belonging to political science. For want of this 
 assistance, persons not acquainted with the vocabulary of 
 a science, are sometimes unable to detect the flaws in 
 reasoning by which they are not convinced. It often 
 happens that an argument seems inconclusive, without our 
 being able to comprehend why it is so : we may be able to 
 disprove the conclusion, but not to refute the argument. 
 It serves, however, greatly to confirm and strengthen our 
 conviction if we can perceive, not only why we are right, 
 but why those who differ from us are wrong ''- Now for 
 this purpose there is no instrument so powerful as an 
 accurate knowledge, and a watchful observance of the 
 different uses of words. This often affords the master-key 
 which discloses the whole mystery, and at once resolves all 
 difficulties by showing that they have no existence. 
 
 Nor is it only in the detection of the fallacies of others 
 that an attention to the different meanings of words is to be 
 recommended : this test of correctness may be applied with 
 
 ' ' The best verbal fallacies are those which consist not in the am- 
 biguity of a single word, but in the ambiguous syntaxis of many put 
 together,' says Mr. Hamilton, in his very acute, though not very honest, 
 Maxims of Parliamentary Logic, p. 29. By best is here meant, most 
 calculated to deceive. This remark, which refers to ambiguities of 
 construction (as, Aio te, Aeacida, Romanes vincere posse), applies with 
 at least equal force to such collections of equivocal words, as ' Man has 
 a natural right to his liberty.' 
 
 * Ov fi6vov Zur6,Kifj9\s utretv, 6,\\i Koi t6 airiov tov ipevSovs' tovto yd.p 
 ffv/i^aWfTai npos t^v mariv' orav yap ev\oyov ^av^ rd 8ta ri (paiveTai 
 dKt]9is oiiK &v oK^qBis, iriarfveiv iroiet to) a\ri0et /iaWov. [We must not 
 only state the truth, but the cause of the untrue statement ; this is art 
 element in our belief; for when it is made apparent why a statement not 
 true appears to be true, our belief in the truth is confirmed.] Aristotle, 
 jEtA. Nic. b. vii. ch. 14. § 3. 
 
10 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 at least as much benefit to our own reasonings as to those 
 of our neighbours. And above all is this attention requisite 
 in communicating our thoughts ; for it sometimes (though 
 perhaps not often) happens that a man may clearly under- 
 stand a subject which, nevertheless, for the want of 
 appropriate language, he may fail to make intelligible to 
 others. To the acute and profound Butler it might, 
 indeed, seem that 'confusion and perplexity in writing 
 is indeed without excuse, because any one may, if he 
 pleases, know whether he understands and sees through 
 what he is about ^ ; ' but, unhappily, there are few qualities 
 so rare as a clear perception of the boundaries of a man's 
 ignorance and knowledge. The multitude of treatises 
 which discuss a subject without explaining or proving 
 anything with distinctness, ' darkening counsel by words 
 without knowledge,' owe a great part of their obscurity 
 and inconclusiveness to a neglect of definitions, and to an 
 inaccurate use of language. 'They who are accustomed 
 to reflect on ideas, know well how much ideas depend 
 on words. Improper terms are the chains which bind men 
 to unreasonable practices. Error is never so difficult to 
 be destroyed, as when it has its root in language. Every 
 improper term contains the germ of fallacious propositions ; 
 it forms a cloud, which conceals the nature of the thing, 
 and presents a frequently invincible obstacle to the dis- 
 covery of truth I' Such errors cloud the minds both of 
 the author and his readers, of the teacher and his disciples, 
 of the speaker and his audience; and from their very 
 minuteness, and seeming insignificance, are only the more 
 difficult to discover, and the less wiUingly acknowledged : 
 as people are indignant at being supposed liable to be 
 duped by a trick apparently so inartificial, or to be eagerly 
 searching at a distance for that which lies at their feet. 
 The number of pohtical arguments now sent forth into 
 
 * Preface to i'i?r?«ff«j in the Rolls Chapel. {Works, ed. Gladstone, 
 ii. 4.] 
 " Bentham on Evidence, by Dumont, b. iii. ch. i. 
 
INTRODUCTION II 
 
 the world by means of newspapers, magazines, reviews, and 
 other periodical publications is so great, that errors arising 
 from the indistinctness of words are embodied in a thou- 
 sand forms, and multiplied in a constantly increasing 
 progression. For this reason it is the more desirable that, 
 where all people talk on the same subject, they should 
 be agreed about the vocabulary with which they discuss 
 it : or, at any rate, that they should be aware that they 
 are not agreed. There are, indeed, too many political 
 discourses, besides Sir R. Filmer's, of which we may say 
 with Locke, that 'if any one will be at the pains to strip 
 it of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour 
 to reduce the words to direct positive intelligible proposi- 
 tions, and then compare them one with another, he will 
 quickly be satisfied that there was never so much glib 
 nonsense put together in well-sounding English'.' On the 
 application of the tests suggested in the following inquiries, 
 pages of flowery declamation, or serious mysticism, shrink 
 into nothing, or. fall to pieces, deprived of their apparent 
 coherency. Possibly too, the same weapons may sometimes 
 avail against those shameless impostors, who seek only to 
 produce an immediate effect without caring for subsequent 
 detection : like the passers of bad money, to whom it is 
 indifferent how soon the fraud is discovered, so that they 
 escape with their dishonest gains. But let me not be 
 understood to affirm that it is possible, by any system 
 of rules, however well framed, to afford an infallible guide 
 for the perception of fallacious reasoning derived from 
 the imperfection of language : still less to undeceive those 
 whose minds are under the influence of arguments, artfully 
 adapted to party feelings, and urged with confidence and 
 eff'rontery, by a practised and ingenious sophist" When 
 
 ' Preface to Treatise on Government. 
 
 ' [' Natura cavillationis, quam Graeci ffOi/iiTiji' appellant, haec est, ut ab 
 evidenter veris per brevissimas mutationes disputatio ad ea quae evi- 
 denter falsa sunt perdncatur.' — Dig. 50, 16, 1 77.] The method of deceit 
 by a slight variation in the use ot a word, is practised in the same manner 
 by the modem, as by the ancient sophist : only instead of displaying his 
 
12 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 we think of the difficulty of finding the way when we are 
 most desirous to go right, how easy to mislead those whom 
 we wish to go wrong ! 
 
 In selecting the words to be included in an explanatory 
 catalogue of the terms of political science, a doubt some- 
 times arose : as, on account of the imperfect separation 
 between the provinces of government and law, many words of 
 which it seemed desirable to treat, lie on a debatable ground, 
 and owe a divided allegiance to politics and jurisprudence. 
 In these, such as right, sovereignty, &c., I have generally 
 followed the definitions laid down by Mr. Austin in the 
 Outline of his Lectures on General Jurisprudence ' ; but 
 although much of what I have said under these heads is 
 either stated or implied in . the short but comprehensive 
 work referred to, yet the mere statement of the truth, though 
 it implies the correction of error, was not sufficient for the 
 purpose which I had in view. My object was to show that, 
 although the truth is one, error is manifold ; and to point 
 out the inconsistencies, as well as the inaccuracy, of popular 
 
 ingenuity by appearing to prove tliat which his hearers know to be false, 
 he displays it by appearing to prove that which they wish to be true. 
 
 ' The statements allurled to (which I had, moreover, the advantage 
 of hearing filled up by Mr. Austin, in his oral lectures) are chiefly con- 
 tained in the following passage : — ' Neither a sovereign one (or a monarch, 
 properly so called) nor a sovereign number (in its collegiate and sovereign 
 capacity) bears a status or condition (in the proper acceptation of the 
 term). Conditions are composed of legal rights and duties, and of 
 capacities and incapacities to take and incur them. But, since such 
 rights and duties are products of positive law, and since positive law 
 is merely the creature of the sovereign, we cannot ascribe a condition 
 (which is composed of such rights and duties) to a monarch or sovereign 
 body. We may say that the sovereign has powers. We may say that 
 the sovereign has rights conferred by the law of God : that the sovereign 
 has rights (improperly so called) conferred by the law (improperly so 
 called) which I style positive morality : that the sovereign is subject to 
 duties set by the law of God : that the sovereign is subject to duties (impro- 
 perly so called) which positive morality enjoins. But to say that the 
 sovereign has legal rights, or lies under legal duties, is to say that the 
 sovereign is subject to a sovereign, by whom those rights are conferred, 
 and by whom those duties are imposed. . In other words, the proposition 
 amounts to this : that the sovereign is not sovereign.' — Outline of a 
 course of Lectures on General Jurisprudence, to be delivered in the 
 University of London, p. 50. [Lectures, ed. 1869, p. 72.] 
 
INTRODUCTION I3 
 
 views : for it commonly happens that scientific explanations 
 are rejected by a large majority, who agree only in that 
 negative opinion; and entertain on the point in dispute 
 notions just as irreconcilable with one another, as with the 
 truth which they unanimously condemn. 
 
 When the definition of sovereignty 'is once determined, 
 the principle of division for the different forms of goverri- 
 ment, and their respective definitions (as laid down by most 
 political writers), flow from it as necessary consequences. 
 On this important point there appears to be a difference of 
 phraseology rather than opinion ; for although the established 
 legal language of this country gives the title of ' sovereign ' to 
 the King alone, yet many eminent writers, well acquainted 
 with the English Constitution both in its ancient and modern 
 form, and little inclined to derogate from the authority 
 and amplitude of the Crown, have considered the legislative 
 sovereignty as belonging jointly to the King and the two 
 Houses of Parliament : nor am I aware that objections 
 have ever been made to this language. Whether or not the 
 name of 'sovereignty' is to be given to a power indispensable 
 to the making of a law, and subject to no responsibility, is 
 of course a mere question of convenience. But by whatever 
 name this particular kind of power may be distinguished, its 
 character is essentially different from power which, though 
 indispensable to the exercise of government, is subject to 
 responsibility. In this respect, however, I have followed 
 the course which seemed to possess the most obvious con- 
 venience, and to be sanctioned by the highest authority. 
 
 The simple and original method of dividing governments 
 by the number of the governors, employed and illustrated 
 in the following pages, may to some persons seem barren 
 and inconvenient; inasmuch as, since the extinction of 
 city communities, such as those of ancient Greece, or of 
 ancient and modern Italy, and the general introduction 
 of the system of political representation, there exists no 
 longer such a government as a democracy. Nor can it be 
 denied that, according to that phraseology, to say that 
 
14 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 a state is an aristocracy, conveys very little information 
 as to the character of its institutions, as this name would 
 include governments as different as those of Venice, 
 England, and the United States of America. But, on 
 the other hand, it is to be remembered that the division 
 into monarchies and republics, or into governments where 
 one rules, and where several rule, always marks a mighty 
 distinction in the real character of the respective consti- 
 tutions; nor can anything more tend to confusion, both 
 of words and thought, than an attempt to make the names 
 of governments imply more than they rightly denote, by 
 attributing to them subsidiary meanings besides their proper 
 and direct signification. It is thus that the term republic, 
 having been distorted from its right sense, and understood 
 to imply particular accidents of some governments desig- 
 nated by that name, has clouded many political discourses, 
 and raised many unfounded prejudices; and the term 
 monarchy, by being applied to kingdoms, and confounded 
 with royalty, has induced many persons to transfer to kings 
 the evil impressions justly entertained against arbitrary 
 princes, or monarchs properly so called. 
 
 In general, I have intentionally avoided all remarks on 
 the meanings of the words examined, which do not fall 
 within the scope of political science. Thus under Liberty 
 I have said nothing of freewill and necessity; nor under 
 Power, have I made any allusion to mechanical powers, 
 powers of the mind, &c. But in the word Nature, on 
 account of the difficulty of tracing its numerous and 
 discordant significations, it was necessary to take a wider 
 range than its political applications would include. An 
 attempt was indeed made, many years ago, by Boyle, to 
 lay down the various uses of this word^; but, as his 
 researches are confined to its physical meanings, and 
 although drawn out to a considerable length, they have 
 not exhausted, nor indeed greatly elucidated the subject, 
 
 ' Free Inquiry into the received Notion of Nature. Works, vol. v. 
 pp. 158-254- 4to- 
 
INTRODUCTION 15 
 
 it appeared necessary to occupy an independent ground. 
 In the words Nature and Liberty I have distinguished two 
 senses — one positive, the other negative ; both of which 
 respectively may doubtless be traced to a common head, 
 although it was sufficient for my purpose to indicate 
 without accounting for them. Liberty, in its original 
 sense, appears to signify a power of doing what we desire : 
 but as this power may be considered in a double light, the 
 word liberty has obtained a double sense, and we some- 
 times use it in reference to the capacity which enables us 
 to act, and sometimes to the absence of that which disables 
 us from acting. In like manner, Nature seems to have 
 originally expressed a notion of that which anything is : 
 whence it sometimes means the essence, disposition, &c., of 
 anything ; sometimes that which it was before it was altered. 
 In a work which contains an examination of so many 
 elementary doctrines, and which incidentally touches on so 
 many debated and debatable questions of political science, 
 it must of course be expected that some persons will find 
 passages which will seem to them obvious truths, not 
 worthy of statement; while others may find assertions 
 which they may think not only false in themselves, but 
 likely to lead to dangerous conclusions : — in short, that 
 many parts may seem to be made up of useless truisms 
 and mischievous paradoxes. To the former I can only say 
 that truths, familiar to them, may possibly not be familiar 
 to all others ; that things familiarly known are not always 
 practically observed ; and that, moreover, it sometimes 
 happens that people are satisfied of the truth of doctrines 
 to which they were led by steps which they have forgotten ; 
 — that they believe the conclusion without remembering 
 the premises. Now to such persons it may, perhaps, be 
 useful if their attention is recalled to the connexion 
 between -their opinions and the assumptions which these 
 involve; and if they are reminded that the positions 
 which they now at once condemn were the parents of many 
 doctrines to which they still steadfastly adhere. 
 
i6 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 To the latter class I would submit that the following 
 remarks are not intended to establish a theory of govern- 
 ment, but to investigate and explain the use of political, 
 words ; and that definitions, laid down for the sake of con- ■ 
 venience, and sanctioned by the authority of usage, are 
 not to be treated as positions intended to serve as the basis 
 of a system, and established only for the sake of their 
 results. But above all, I would suggest, that, in drawing 
 conclusions from the statements of others, the reader may 
 fancy that there is a real, because there is a verbal con- 
 nexion ; and may think, without reason, that others 
 necessarily draw from certain premises the same inference 
 as himself There is no objection to a fair iise of indirect 
 reasoning ; nor can any writer have just cause of complaint, 
 if it be shown that the doctrines which he establishes 
 necessarily and legitimately lead him to an absurdity. But 
 no man can so far trace the consequences which the greater 
 ingenuity and wider combinations of others may deduce 
 from his statements, as to be justly held responsible for the 
 errors which he may thus be made to seem indirectly to 
 countenance. 'There is,' says a distinguished writer, 
 'among the worst arts of controversy no fallacy more 
 reprehensible than this, though, unhappily, scarcely any 
 is more frequent. In some minds, the temptation to this 
 unworthy sophistry seems to increase always in proportion 
 to the importance of the subject on which it is employed, 
 and to the extent of public or o(^private evil which the 
 misrepresentation is likely to produce. It has, in every 
 case, a direct tendency to discourage all freedom of thought 
 and sincerity of -speech'.' 
 
 But while I guard myself against the cavils of others, 
 it may perhaps be thought that I have myself laboured to 
 disparage the fair fame of many great writers, by minute 
 criticism on insulated passages, without adverting to the 
 general merit of their works, or exhibiting the entire 
 
 ' Oxford and Locke, by Lord Grenville, p. 75. 
 
INTRODUCTION 17 
 
 course of their reasonings. To this charge the nature of 
 my inquiries must afford an answer ; which did not embrace 
 a view of large treatises or political systems, but were 
 confined to an examination of the usage of certain words 
 by political writers : in which examination it was necessary 
 to be precise ; to be precise, it was necessary to be minute. 
 When, therefore, I may adduce examples of verbal fallacies 
 from the works of celebrated writers, it will not be supposed 
 that they were chosen from a love of detraction, but rather 
 as ' exempli documenta in illustri posita monumento,' and 
 as being blemishes, rendered more apparent by the excel- 
 lence of the' material by which they are surrounded ; still 
 less that I entertained the faintest imagination of imputing 
 anything that could savour of intentional or deliberate 
 deceit. 
 
 If, in the course of these remarks, I have canvassed 
 with freedom many statements made by writers of deserved 
 reputation and acknowledged usefulness, and if I have 
 not enlisted under the banners of any political party or 
 philosophical sect, let it be remembered that I have only 
 exercised a privilege without which no inquiry can possess 
 an independent value, or bring any sensible contribution 
 • to the cause of science. But I would willingly bear the 
 blame of needless precision or over-curious criticism, if 
 the following pages should be found to afford any, the 
 smallest, assistance to the progress of political knowledge : 
 or if they might sometimes help to soften the anger and 
 direct the efforts of political disputants, by suggesting an 
 explanation of their differences, and calling their attention 
 to the question really at ifsue. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
 
 When a body of persons, yielding obedience to no 
 superior, issue their commands to certain other persons to 
 do or forbear from certain acts, and threaten to punish the 
 disobedience of their commands by the infliction of pain, 
 they are said to establish or exercise political or civil 
 government '. 
 
 The persons who issue and enforce these commands, or 
 the sovereign body, are said to possess the governing power, 
 and their acts are called the acts of government. ' Govern- 
 ment,' in this sense, is a certain exercise of the highest power 
 over a whole community. 
 
 ' Government ' is likewise used as synonymous with form 
 of government, or constitution, to signify the arrangement or 
 disposition of the ruling power in the members of the com- 
 munity ; thus we speak of a free government, a monarchical 
 government, a republican government. 
 
 It is moreover used to express the persons in whom the 
 ruling power, or some part of the ruling power, resides. Thus 
 we say that the people rose against the government ; that 
 
 ^ [They exercise /0J««>" j to constitute them a. government it is necessary 
 that the persons to whom their commands are addressed should be in 
 the habit of obeying them.] 
 
 ' The annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our 
 power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment before- 
 hand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of govern- 
 ment.' — Butler's Analogy, part i. ch. a. \Works,^t. Gladstone, i. 53.] 
 
GOVERNMENT 19 
 
 the government was overthrown by rebels ; that it main- 
 tained its ground against them, &c. In such expressions 
 as these we mean the whole body in whom the sovereignty 
 is vested : sometimes, however, the word has a narrower 
 sense, being applied only to those who have the adminis- 
 trative power, or (as they are commonly called) the ministers ; 
 as, a Tory government, a Whig government, a strong 
 government. 
 
 The primary and derived meanings of the -word, government 
 are marked with sufificient clearness, and do not seem likely 
 to afford occasion for fallacy or confusion. Sometimes, 
 however, this word and its conjugates are employed to 
 denote neither the exercise of the sovereign power, nor the 
 members of the sovereign body, nor- persons deriving their 
 authority from the sovereign ; but persons having only 
 a vote for the election of members of the sovereign body, 
 who themselves can never, in that capacity, possess any 
 portion of the ruling power. It is- by attributing this double 
 sense to the terms government, governing power, governing 
 body, &c., that those constitutions are represented as demo- 
 cratical, in which the right of suffrage is widely extended, 
 although the governimg power resides, in a small minority 
 of the whole nation. Ott this subject more will be said in 
 another place '. 
 
 ' See in Democracy, People, and Representation. 
 
 C 2 
 
II 
 
 CONSTITUTION. CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
 Constitution signifies the arrangement and distribution 
 of the sovereign power in the community, or the form of the 
 government. This is the meaning of such expressions as 
 a free constitution, a democratic constitution, the British 
 constitution \ &c. 
 
 Constitution therefore, properly, expresses something 
 which either has, or has had, a real existence. It is, 
 however, frequently used to , signify something ideal, an 
 imaginary model 'of excellence which the government has 
 never, in fact, attained, though in the writer's or speaker's 
 opinion it has constantly been tending to it. Hence people 
 speak of the maxims of the constitution, the theory of the 
 constitution, the spirit of the constitution, meaning some 
 supposed rules to which, in their judgement, the constitution 
 ought to conform, though, in fact, they have never been 
 observed. Constitution, in this sense, is little more than 
 a vague term of praise, though it is calculated to deceive 
 ignorant persons into a belief that a measure or law recom- 
 mended to them is only a recurrence to ancient institutions, 
 and that the change is restoration, and not innovation. 
 
 ' Sir J. Mackintosh, in his Discourse on the Law of Nature and 
 Nations, defines the constitution of a state to be ' the body of those 
 written and unwritten fundamental laws which regulate the most im- 
 portant rights of the higher magistrates, and the most essential privi- 
 leges of the subjects ' (p. 65) ; but this explanation does not agree with 
 the common usage, the^KJ et norma loquendi. 
 
CONSTITUTION. CONSTITUTIONAL 21 
 
 Hence is derived the common use of constitutional, and 
 its opposite, unconstitutional. When certain practices or 
 usages, though not legally binding on any part of the com- 
 munity, have been constantly observed both by the governors 
 and governed, they are properly styled constitutional ; and 
 any measure or practice contrary to them, is styled uncon- 
 stitutional. But more usually these terms are used with 
 a very indefinite meaning, and convey little more than a 
 general sentiment of approbation or dislike. If persons are 
 agreed as to the history of any country, there can be no 
 doubt whether a measure is to be characterized as consti- 
 tutional or unconstitutional; but often, in controversy or 
 debate, these epithets are applied to a measure without any 
 regard to reality, and merely denote agreement or disagree- 
 ment with some imaginary standard of propriety which each 
 man sets up for himself. Generally, therefore, when discus- 
 sions arise, whether anything is or is not constitutional, the 
 dispute is merely verbal, and can only be terminated by 
 mutual explanation ; yet, unfortunately, men ' regard it as 
 so high an affront to be suspected of being unconsciously 
 engaged in a logomachy, that he who proposes to terminate 
 a contest by proving that it turns on the ambiguity of words, 
 must prepare himself to incur, from the eager controver- 
 sialists of both parties, even more ill-will than they feel 
 towards their opponents *.' 
 
 ' [Whately's Bampion Lectures and Other Sermons, third edition, 
 p. 1 18.] 
 
Ill 
 
 RIGflT. DUTY. WRONG. RIGHTFUL 
 WRONGFUL. JUSTICE 
 
 When the sovereign power commands its subjects to do or 
 forbear from certain acts, the claim ' for such performances 
 or forbearances which one person thereby has upon another, 
 is called a right; the liability 'to such performances or 
 forbearances is called a duty; and the omission of an act 
 commanded to be done, or the doing of an act commanded 
 to be forborne, is called a wrong. 
 
 All rights,»therefore, must be subsequent to the establish- 
 ment of government, and are the creatures of the sovereign 
 power ; no claim upon another, which may not be enforced 
 by process of law, i.e. by calling in the assistance of the 
 sovereign, however recommended by moral justice, can, 
 without an abuse of language, be termed a right. The 
 existence of a moral claim may often be a matter of doubt 
 when the facts are ascertained, and one party may demand 
 what the other may not think himself bound in conscience 
 to yield ; but, the facts being given, the existence of a right, 
 or a legal claim, can never admit of dispute, as it is defined 
 and conferred by a third party, who will, if required, step in 
 to enforce it. 
 
 ' There does not appear to be any reason why claim or requisition 
 should not be considered as the genus of right ; though Mr. Bentham 
 {Principles of Morals and Legislation [224 n, in the Clarendon Press 
 edition]) says, that right has no superior genus. 
 
RIGHT AND WRONG 23 
 
 Properly, therefore, right signifies a claim conferred or 
 sanctioned by the sovereign power, i. e. a legal right. Some- 
 times, however, it is used to mean a claim recommended 
 by the practice, analogy, or doctrines of the constitution, i. e. 
 a constitutional right ; and, sometimes, a claim recommended 
 by views of justice or public policy, i. e. a moral right. 
 
 By the first and proper sense is meant a claim which may 
 be enforced in a court of law, or by the proper authorities, 
 and which actually exists : by the two last a claim which 
 cannot be enforced by any public authority, and which does 
 not exist. Thus, in the first sense, it is said that a man has 
 a right to his own property, reputation, &c., meaning that 
 he has an available claim which can be enforced by process 
 of law. It is also said that, constitutionally, every British 
 subject who pays taxes has a right to vote for a member of 
 the House of Commons ; meaning that such a claim is sup- 
 ported by the practice or doctrines of our constitution. It is 
 also said that all the people have a right to be represented ; 
 that they have a right to choose their own governors, to 
 cashier their governors for misconduct, and to frame a , 
 government for themselves; that the poor have a right to 
 be maintained by the rich ; that the poor bate a right to 
 spoil the land-owners, and divide their lands ; that the poor 
 have a right to spoil the rich, and divide their property, &c. 
 In the latter cases, the persons who use these expressions 
 mean that, in their opinion, there is a claim founded in 
 justice and expediency, which they call a right ; though, in 
 truth, what they mean to express is, that it ought, by the 
 sanction of the legislature, to be made a right. 
 
 Burke's explanation of rights, in fact, amounts to no more 
 than that last stated, though he appears to have intended 
 something very different ; as his definition is perfectly con- 
 sistent with the doctrines which he is professedly combating, 
 and which he held in utter abhorrence. The following 
 passage from his work on the French Revolution', is in 
 
 ' Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. 1792, p. 94. 
 
24 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 answer to those who maintained the doctrine of the natural 
 rights of men. 'The pretended rights of these theorists are 
 all extremes ; and, in proportion as they are metaphysically 
 true, they are morally and politically false. The rights of 
 men are in a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not 
 impossible to be discerned. The rights of men in govern- 
 ments are their advantages ; and these are often in balances 
 between differences of good; in compromises sometimes 
 between good and evil, and sometimes, between evil and 
 evil.' If this doctrine were admitted, a man would have 
 a right to everything which might appear advantageous to 
 him, and private opinion would be the only rule of law '. 
 
 No objection, even on the score of inconvenience, can be 
 made to the use of an equivocal word when its different 
 senses are plain and palpable; as, for example, the word 
 light, which sometimes means the contrary of heavy, 
 sometimes the contrary of dark ; or the word duty, which 
 sometimes means a legal or moral obligation, sometimes 
 a tax on a commodity. By such ambiguous terms as these, 
 no one could be misled. But when the two significations 
 lie on each other's confines, the one being perhaps a meta- 
 phorical or derivative use of the same word, there is great 
 difficulty in marking the boundaries which the ambiguity 
 
 ' ' When I went into the house first,' says one of the witnesses ex- 
 amined on the trial of Watson for high treason, ' I went in company 
 with a nobleman's servant who wore a livery ; they seemed discoursing 
 among themselves for a little while, and then turned round and observed 
 that the crest upon his button was the crest of a lord, and they asked 
 him who made his master a lord. He could make no answer, not 
 readily, to this question that was put to him. After a little while they 
 turned to me, upon which I explained it as well as I knew. how : and 
 after my explanation, they asked me how this nobleman came to be 
 possessed of so much landed property as he was possessed of ; and they 
 turned round to the servant, and told him he had a right to as much 
 land as his master, and that the time was now fast approaching when he 
 would be as good a man as his master, and possess as much property ; and 
 also asked by what right he held this property.' — 2 Watson's Trial, 65. 
 This passage affords a striking example of the effect which may be pro- 
 duced on ignorant persons by the ambiguity of i,mposing terms, and the 
 employment of (what Mr. Bentham has termed) question-begging afpella- 
 iives. [James Watson, surgeon, was tried for high. treason in 1817, and 
 acquitted : see State Trials, ed. Howell, vol. xxxii.] 
 
RIGHT AND WRONG 25 
 
 always tends to confound ; though the distinction is the more 
 important, because, even if the names were different, such 
 near neighbours would be likely to encroach on each other's 
 territories. In the present case, the confusion of legal and 
 moral rules, to which, at all times, mankind are sufficiently 
 prone, is heightened by an additional meaning of the word 
 in question. 
 
 Right is sometimes a substantive, sometimes an adjec- 
 tive. When used as a substantive, it properly signifies a 
 legal claim, and answers to duty. Where the law confers 
 a right on one person, it creates a corresponding duty in 
 another. Wrong, the substantive, signifies the violation 
 of a right. But, when used as an adjective, right expresses 
 agreement with the standard of morality (whatever that 
 may be), and is opposed to wrong, the adjective, that which 
 disagrees with this standard. Thus a right may be right or 
 wrong (i.e. a claim given by law may be just or unjust, 
 politic or impolitic) in the judgement of different persons. 
 The necessity of a legislative sovereignty, or of a power of 
 altering old and enacting new laws, is entirely founded on 
 the supposition that rights may be wrong — a truism which 
 has sometimes been treated as a paradox and an antithesis. 
 If the different senses of right, just pointed out, really coin- 
 cided ; that is, if all claims founded on justice and sound 
 policy were legal rights, and all legal rights were founded on 
 justice and sound policy, there would be no necessity for 
 deliberative assemblies or legislative enactments, and the 
 whole business of government might be confined to the 
 administration of existing laws. 
 
 This ambiguity, so manifest when pointed out, and so 
 easily detected by a translation into Latin (which has dif- 
 ferent terms for the substantive and adjective) ' has yet mis- 
 
 ' Jus means a right, the substantive ; honestus 'or rectus, right, the 
 adjective. On the other hand, the Latin language has an ambiguity of 
 jus, from which the English is free, viz. that it means both law and 
 right, an ambiguity which has led Blackstone into the most fearful 
 errors. — See Mill's British India, vol. i. p. 195 ; and Austin's admirable 
 Outline of a Course of Lectures on Jurisprudence in the London Uni- 
 
26 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 led many unreflecting persons, and even some writers of high 
 authority, who might have been expected to keep clear of 
 so obvious a fallacy. Thus Paley, in his Moral and Poli- 
 tical Philosophy^ b. I, chap. 9, says that 'right is a quality 
 of persons car of actions ; — of persons, as when we say, 
 Such a one -has a right to this estate, &c. ; — of actions, as in 
 such expressions as the following : It is right to punish 
 murder with death, &c.' The argument by which Black- 
 stone proves the latter part of his definition of municipal 
 law, that it is 'a rule of civil conduct . prescribed by the 
 supreme power in a state, commanding what is right, and 
 prohibiting what is wrongs,' proceeds entirely on this uncer- 
 tainty of meaning. ' In order to do this completely,' he says, 
 ' it is first of all necessary that the boundaries of right and 
 ivrong be established and ascertained by law. And when 
 this is once done, it will follow of course that it is hkewise 
 the business of the law, considered as a rule of civil conduct, 
 to enforce these rights, and to restrain or redress these wrongs^.' 
 If, in defence of Blackstone, it -should -be said that by right 
 and wrong he only means that which the law enjoins or 
 forbids, then the latter part of his definition is superfluous, 
 and to say that a law is right would be an identical propo- 
 sition". Hence also Crabb, in his Dictionary of English 
 
 versity, p. 48. (London, 1831.) The French droit, and the German 
 recht, have the ambiguities both of the Latin and English words, for 
 they signify lex, jus, and rectus. Ambiguities of words are often brought 
 out in translation ; for instance, lingiia in Latin and Italian, in English 
 is sometimes rendered by tongue, sometimes by language. The most 
 perplexing ambiguities, however, run through all the commonly known 
 languages of civilized nations. It may be remarked as a singular circum- 
 stance, that the Greek language should possess no term for right, or jus. 
 The treatise of Aristotle entitled biKai^imra 'n6Kio3v appears to have 
 been upon the rights, or privileges, of different states (see Neumann, 
 Aristoteiis -nohnaSiv fragmenta, p. 43) : but the word Sixaiaiia never 
 came into general use in the sense of jus. Sir J. Mackintosh, misled by 
 a false reading vohiimv for itdXeav, represents this as a treatise on the 
 laws of war. — Onthe Law of Nature and Nations, p. 16. 
 
 ' I Com. 44. Introd. § 2. ^ i Com. 53. 
 
 * It is however obvious, that he uses right and wrong in the former 
 sense, as he quotes the words of Cicero, repeated by Bracton, that a 
 law is ' sanclio justa, jubens konesta, et prohibens contraria^ — i Com. 
 122. 
 
RIGHT AND WRONG 27 
 
 Synonyms, says, that ' right (the substantive) signifies what 
 it is right for one to possess.' The same confusion of the 
 two very different senses of right is well shown in the fol- 
 lowing passage, where the argument turns upon the double 
 sense. ' If it be right that the property of men should be 
 protected, and if this can only be done by means of govern- 
 ment, then it must be right that some person or persons 
 should possess political power. That is to say, some person 
 or persons must have a right to political power'.' The 
 apparent force of this argument rests on a mere verbal fallacy. 
 So the author of the Dictionary of English Synonyms, just _ 
 cited, states, that a certain conclusion cannot be received, 
 ' unless we admit the contradiction that men have a right 
 to do what is wrong''-. ^ This instance is perhaps the more 
 worthy of notice, because it occurs in the work of a writer 
 whose professed object was to point out and illustrate the 
 different meanings of words'*. In the celebrated verse which 
 would represent as a paradox ' The right divine of kings to 
 govern wrong,' the antithesis is only in sound and not in 
 sense : if a sovereign has not the powar to enforce his com- 
 mands, whether right or wrong, that is, whether the subject 
 thinks them right or wrong, he is not sovereign. ' When 
 governors shall be so perfect, as never to propose a measure 
 that is not faultless, and when subjects shall be so infallible 
 in their judgements, and so candid in their dispositions, as 
 universally to perceive and acknowledge this perfection — 
 
 ' Edinburgh Review, vol. lii. p. 364. [The quotation is from 
 Macaulay's article on the Civil Disabilities of the Jews.] 
 
 ^ Crabb's English Synonyms, in Right. 
 
 ' Mr. Bentham, in Vis Principles of Morals and Legislation [p. 323, 
 Clarendon Press edition], points out an ambiguity of the English word 
 law, which signifies both a single law, and the whole body of laws, 
 or (as we say) the law ; and appears to lament that we have not, like 
 the Germans, appropriated the word right to the entire corpus juris, 
 i.e. to law in its collective sense. Doubtless it would be desirable 
 to have two different words to express the two ideas distinguished 
 by Mr. Bentham ; but it cannot be wished that any additional burden 
 should be laid on the term right, which has already a sufficient weight 
 of meanings to sustain. 
 
28 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 then, and not till then, may a peaceable and permanent 
 government be established on such principles'.' 
 
 It may moreover be observed, that if all rights are the 
 creatures of the sovereign power, and can only be enforced 
 by calling in the assistance of a superior authority; no 
 absolute monarchs or sovereign governors can be said to 
 possess rights, or to be subject to duties, except in a moral 
 sense. A claim which a man gives himself, of which he 
 is alone judge, an^ which he can alone enforce, may un- 
 doubtedly be called a right, though it seems much more 
 precise and simple, in such cases, merely to speak of 
 power ; but a sovereign, whether one or many, can never 
 be liable to any legal duties, because a legal duty implies 
 the legal means of enforcing it ; and if a sovereign power 
 could be legally forced to any act, it would not be sovereign. 
 That governors have not, as governors, any legal duties, is 
 distinctly stated by Dr. Whately, in a sermon preached 
 before the University of Oxford, although he too speaks of 
 the rights of a governor. 'The governor,' he says, 'is 
 bound to make a good use of his power, no less than his 
 subjects are to obey him ; and he is accountable to God 
 for so doing ; but not to them ; for if this merely condi- 
 tional right to obedience be once admitted, it must destroy 
 all government whatever''.' The attributing of rights to 
 governors appears to have arisen from a confusion of the 
 effects produced by the exercise of the power of a sovereign, 
 and of the right of a subject. A man by hiring a servant 
 acquires a right to his services and obedience ; a sovereign 
 issues its commands, and thereby has a claim on the sub- 
 mission of its subjects : whence it is inferred that the 
 claim of the sovereign is of the same nature as the claim 
 of the master ; i. e. that they both have a right to the 
 performance of the respective duties. But in the one case, 
 the claim is given by a third party; in the other, it is 
 
 ' Whately's Sermon on Obedience to Rulers [in Bampton Lectures, 
 &c., third edition, p. 295]. 
 ^ Ibid. p. 289. 
 
RIGHT AND WRONG 29 
 
 obtained by -an exercise of individual volition : three par^ 
 ties are necessary to the existence of a legal right, as two 
 parties are necessary to the existence of moral justice. 
 A man cannot be just towards himself, nor can that be 
 a right which A gives himself against B, and A alone can 
 enforce ^ 
 
 In this country a mistaken notion as to the rights of 
 subjects has arisen, from confounding the powers of the 
 King and those of the Parliament. The people have 
 rights as against the King; and hence it is correct to say 
 that Charles the First and James the Second violated the 
 rights of their subjects : without having the legislative 
 sovereignty, they commanded acts to be done which were 
 contrary to law. But the people have no rights as against 
 the Parliament, or the whole sovereign body ; and hence 
 such expressions as the Parliament withholding or refusing 
 the rights of the people, are not only unmeaning and 
 absurd, but also mischievous, as they tend to encourage 
 the idea that members of that body are legally, as well as 
 morally, answerable for their acts. 
 
 In a like manner, the rule of the English constitution 
 that tke King can do no wrong, appears to be an ab- 
 surdity, and startles some who hear it, only because a 
 breach of legal right is confounded with a breach of moral 
 duty. Neither the whole sovereign body, nor any part of 
 the sovereign body, so far as it is sovereign, can do a 
 wrong, that is, infringe a right ; as that implies a superior 
 power to redress the wrong or enforce the right, which, 
 by the supposition, does not exist. ' All orders issued by 
 a competent authority are necessarily dispunishable; but 
 this immunity does not extend to those who execute them, 
 if contrary to law. For example, the King may order his 
 
 ' [It must not be forgotten that a civilized government voluntarily 
 sobmits to the rules of law which it applies to subject persons. Thus, 
 for example, in employing a member of the civil service, the government 
 virtually makes a contract with him, and acts as if it were bound by the 
 contract.] 
 
30 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 piinisters to do an illegal act, but they will obey at their 
 peril. The House of Commons may order their serjeant- 
 at-arms to arrest a man for an act not falling within their 
 jurisdiction, but their officer will obey at his peril. If the 
 House of Lords, or House of Commons, were to go in 
 a body and kill a man, they would be guilty of murder, 
 because this would not be an act done in virtue of the 
 sovereign power which in their collective capacity they 
 severally possess for certain purposes \ This is stated in 
 substance by Blackstone ", though his expressions are not 
 strictly accurate. 'The supposition of law is,' he says, 
 'that neither the King nor either house of Parliament 
 (collectively taken) is capable of doing any wrong ; since, 
 in such cases, the law feels itself incapable of furnishing 
 any adequate remedy ; for which reason, all oppressions 
 which may happen to spring from any branch of the 
 sovereign power, must necessarily be out of the reach of 
 any stated rule or express legal provision.' He afterwards 
 states, that the maxim that ' the King can do no wrong,' 
 means two things: i. 'That whatever is exceptionable in 
 the conduct of public affairs, is not to be imputed to the 
 King, nor is he answerable for it, personally, to his 
 people;' and, 2. 'That the prerogative of the crown 
 
 ' \lithe Queen were to kill a man, the act would be murder, but the 
 Queen could not be tried for it, because she is personally exempt from 
 the jurisdiction of the courts.] 
 
 " I Com. 244. Boswell, in his Life of Johnson [ed. Birkbeck Hill, 
 i. 423], reports a conversation on this point, between Goldsmith and 
 Johnson. Goldsmith argued, that 'as the King might, in the exercise 
 of his regal power, command and cause the doing of what was wrong, 
 it certainly might be said, in sense and in reason, that he could do wrong.' 
 (This is what the logicians call an ignoratio elenchi ; the question was, 
 whether the King could do a wrong.) Johnson in answer, among other 
 things, said, 'We hold the King can do no "wrong, that whatever may 
 happen to be wrong in government may not be above our reach by being 
 ascribed to majesty. Kedress is always to be had against oppression by 
 punishing the immediate agents. The King, though he should command, 
 cannot force a judge to condemn a man unjustly ; therefore it is the judge 
 whom we prosecute and punish.' Johnson's sentiments are quite accurate ; 
 though he too falls into the common errors of confounding wrong, an 
 injury, with wrong, improper. 
 
RIGHT AND WRONG 31 
 
 extends not to do any injury ^.' As to the first of these 
 rules, it is clear that the King cannot be answerable for 
 any act done by him in his capacity of sovereign ; as this 
 immunity is implied in the idea of supreme power : while 
 the second is merely a statement, in different terms, of the 
 proposition that ' The King can do no wrong ' ; for JCing, 
 putting prerogative of the crown ; and for ' wrong,' injury. 
 By ' injury,' a breach of law can only be meant ; as all 
 political parties think that the King does that which is 
 hurtful to the nation, when he chooses his ministers from 
 their opponents^. The statement of this rule by Hume, 
 in his Essay on Passive Obedience, is very precise, and 
 seems framed for the express purpose of cautioning per- 
 sons against the superficial error, so often committed, of 
 confounding a legal injury with a moral impropriety. The 
 King of England, he says, 'though limited by the laws, 
 is, in a manner, so far as regards his own person, above 
 the laws, and can neither be questioned nor punished for 
 any injury or wrong which may be committed by him '.' 
 
 Before the word ' right ' is dismissed, it may be useful to 
 notice some of the epithets applied to it; the number, 
 variety, and discordancy of which are almost past belief: 
 though,' when they come to be examined, most of them 
 will be found to be either unmeaning or inapplicable. 
 The following passage occurs, as spoken by Dr. Johnson, 
 
 ' I Com. 246. 
 
 ' The Attorney-General, in his speech in Hardy's trial, cites a 
 passage from an American work communicated to an English political 
 society, where it is said, that 'in government, the maxim being that a 
 King can do no wrong, the maxim ought to be that he can do no good' — See 
 Erskine's Speeches, vol. iii. p. 199. If the author of this passage had 
 understood the maxim which he objects to, so far from thinking that his 
 remark was pointed and antithetical, he would have seen that it is ab- 
 solutely unmeaning. Mr. Hallam, in his History of the Middle Ages, 
 vol. ii. p. 243, 4to ed., says, that 'In the prudent fiction of the Englisli 
 law, no wrong is supposed to proceed from the source of right.' This 
 statement is not correct ; it is not a legal fiction, but a plain truth, that 
 the King can do no wrong. It is another maxim of English law, that there 
 is no wrong without its remedy : and against the acts of the King, no 
 remedy is, or can be, provided by law. 
 
 ' [Essays, ed. Green and Grose, i. 463.] 
 
32 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 in a conversation preserved by Boswell ' : ' Every man has 
 a right to Hberty of conscience, and with that the magis- 
 trate cannot interfere. People confound liberty of thinking 
 with liberty of talking ; nay, with jliberty of preaching. 
 Every man has a physical right to think as he pleases ; 
 for it cannot be discovered how he thinks. He has not 
 a moral right, for he ought to inform himself, and think 
 justly.' Here ^physical right' must xn&zn. power; '■■moral 
 «^/%^' appears to mean ' legal right,' for Johnson never could 
 have intended to say that a man is, in conscience, bound 
 to conceal opinions which he thinks true : the doubt would 
 rather be the other ■*ay, whether a man is justified in con- 
 cealing what he thinks true. On another occasion he said 
 that 'there seems to be in authors a stronger fight of 
 property than that by occupancy ; a metaphysical right, 
 a right, as it were, of creation, which should, from its 
 nature, be perpetual ^' This expression is manifestly 
 founded on the erroneous supposition, that a right to a 
 tangible is more corporeal than a right to an intangible 
 object; but elsewhere he uses a more common epithet, 
 when, speaking of government, he says that ' if the abuse 
 be enormous. Nature will rise up, and, claiming her original 
 rights, overturn a corrupt political system".' It is, however, 
 a contradiction to speak of original rights, if by original is 
 meant anterior to government ; for, as has been shown 
 above, the notion that 'right is altogether an abstract 
 thing, which is independent of human laws and institu- 
 tions *,' is not only not true, but is the direct contrary of 
 the truth. The verse of .Dryden, in the Wife of Bath's 
 Tale, that 
 
 ' Sovereign monarchs are the source of right,' 
 
 expresses the truth, but not the whole truth ; as not only 
 
 ' [Zz% of Johnson, ed. Hill, ii. 249.]' 
 
 ' [Ibid. ii. 259.] iiurke, in his Reflections mi the French Revolution, 
 also speaks of metaphysical rights; where, by metaphysical, he appeal s 
 to mean imaginary, or unreal. 
 
 ' \^Life of Johnson, ed. Hill, i. 424.] 
 
 * Crabb's English Synonyins, in Right. 
 
RIGHT AND WRONG 33 
 
 sovereign monarchs, but all sovereign legislatures, whethei; 
 of one or many, are, and are alone, the sources from which 
 all rights flow. Yet we hear of original rights, natural 
 rights, indefeasible rights, inalienable rights, imprescrip- 
 tible rights, hereditary rights, indestructible rights, inherent 
 rights, &€., where there is no pretence of legislative 
 sanction : indeed the only object of using these names is 
 to induce the legislature to convert these supposed rights 
 into real rights, by giving them the sanction of law. The 
 phrase, natural right, takes its origin from the doctrine 
 of a state of nature, which will be more fully explained 
 below ^- It appears to signify a claim recommended by 
 natural law, or by those rules which were recognized by 
 common consent, when mankind were in a state of nature, 
 An indefeasible right- is a right which man enjoyed in a 
 state of nature, and which he only surrendered condition- 
 ally at the making of the social compact ; so that nothing 
 has since been able to defeat or destroy it, and it is ready 
 to be revived at any time. An imprescriptible right is 
 a right which was prior to the social compact, and which 
 continues to exist without being subject to prescription or 
 failure by lapse of time. An inalienable right is a right 
 which cannot be alienated from a man. Indestructible 
 rights, inherent rights, hereditary rights, birthrights of 
 liberty, &c., appear to have nearly the same meaning : 
 viz, that they are dormant rights, never exercised by th^ 
 possessors, and not extinguishable by any law. In fact, 
 however, these imprescriptible, inalienable, indefeasible 
 rights, in most cases never have been rights, or, if they 
 have, long since were alienated and defeated by the sove- 
 reign po.wer. These various expressions have all taken 
 their origin from the theory of the state of nature and the 
 social compact ; but they are frequently used by persons 
 who have never heard of this absurd and mischievous 
 doctrine, and would perhaps reject it if they knew it. All 
 
 • In the word Nature. 
 D 
 
34 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 that those persons mean is, that, in their opinion, the claims 
 which they call rights ought, in sound policy, to be sanctioned 
 by law. It is the duty of such persons to show that sound 
 policy requires what tkey require ; but as this would require 
 a process of reasoning, and as reasoning is often both hard 
 to invent and to understand, they prefer begging the question 
 at issue by employing some of the high-sounding phrases 
 just mentioned. 
 
 Rights are, moreover, divided into political or dvil rights, 
 and private rights : the meaning of which division will be 
 explained elsewhere '. 
 
 ' Vested rights'^'' is another expression which has been 
 much used of late years. In its legal sense, 'vested^ is 
 opposed to ' contingent^ and expresses a right of which the 
 next possessor is ascertained, whenever the prior right to 
 the same object may determine ; as opposed to a right of 
 which the next possessor is not so ascertained '. But its 
 political sense (with which alone we are now concerned) is 
 widely different from its legal acceptation, and appears to 
 have no connexion with it whatever *. When a legislature 
 passes a law, not for any temporary purposes, nor limited 
 as to the time of its operation, and which therefore may 
 be reasonably expected to be permanent — and persons, 
 confiding in its permanency, embark their capital, bestow 
 their labour, or shape the course of their life, so that their 
 only hope of success is founded on the existence of the 
 law — the rights which they have acquired in the reliance 
 upon its continuance are termed ' vested rights ' ; and per- 
 sons in this situation are considered as having a moral claim 
 on the legislature for the maintenance of the law, or at 
 
 ' In the word Political. 
 
 ' This passage is noticed and commented upon by Austin, in his 
 fifty-third lecture. 
 
 " [Rights in expectancy are vested or contingent ; rights generally are 
 said to be vested when there is an existing ascertained person entitled to 
 exercise them.] 
 
 ' [The two are really the same. It is a rule of policy, commonly 
 observed by legislative authorities, that valuable rights, vested in private 
 persons, should not be taken away without compensation.] 
 
RIGHT AND WRONG 35 
 
 least for the allowance of a sufficient time to withdraw their 
 investments, and to take the measures necessary for guarding 
 against the loss consequent on so large a change. When 
 duties are imposed for the purpose of excluding a cheap 
 foreign commodity, in order to enable it to be produced at 
 a higher price at home, the persons who carry into effect 
 the intentions of the legislature, by engaging in the favoured 
 manufacture, are considered as having a vested right in 
 their undertakings, and possessing a claim to notice of 
 a reasonable length, before the duties are removed ; for 
 although their profit is not larger than it would have been 
 in any other unprotected branch of trade, and although 
 the public lose the difference between the prices of the 
 foreign and native commodity ; yet having, in consequence 
 of the encouragement of the legislature, once engaged in 
 the protected trade, they cannot, at a moment's warning, 
 withdraw their capital and invest it elsewhere, without 
 incurring a certain loss. In consequence of the high 
 duties on French, Portuguese, and Spanish wines, many 
 persons were induced to invest their capital in the making 
 of wine at the Cape of Good Hope. They produced an 
 inferior commodity at a higher price : but when it was 
 prpposed to equalize the import duties on wines, it was 
 allowed that the vested rights of these persons ought to 
 be respected, and that they were fairly entitled to have 
 a sufficient time to engage in new speculations. All pre- 
 ferences given to particular classes of traders create vested 
 rights of this description; and it is for this reason 
 that, although the existence of such preferences is an 
 unmixed evil, their abolition is very far from being an 
 unmixed good. 
 
 A vested right may therefore be described as a right of 
 investment • ; giving to its possessor a moral claim upon the 
 legislature, for the permanency or tardy abolition of a law, 
 
 ^ [This is qnite incorrect. If I give a penny to a beggar, he acquires 
 a. vested right to the coin ; but there is no question of investment on my 
 part or on his.] 
 
 D 2 
 
:36 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 which he has gained by employing his capital or labour in 
 adventures only compatible with the existence of the law. 
 Being founded on the principle of not disappointing ex- 
 pectations, it is founded on a principle of the wisest and 
 most enlarged policy ; but the doctrine of vested rights 
 must not be stretched too far, as there is scarcely a right on 
 which some expectations are not founded, and which does 
 not, in some degree, serve as a guide of conduct : it can 
 ■pnly be admitted where the loss would be great, and the 
 probability of the law being repealed or modified was 
 inconsiderable. 
 
 Of vested rights, that on which the greatest number of 
 calculations and expectations is founded, and which, in most 
 states, offers the fairest hope of permanency, is the right of 
 property. There is scarcely a step in a man's life, if it hag 
 any prospective view, which is not taken in reference to his 
 property. His bodily and mental habits, his connexions, 
 whether of friendship or marriage, are all formed with 
 reference to the rank of society in which his property places 
 him. A man is brought up by his parents, and insensibly 
 adapts himself, to the situation - which he is likely to fill, 
 A poor man suddenly made rich is not more likely to be 
 happy, and is much less likely to do good to others, than 
 a rich man suddenly made poor '. There is no change in 
 the condition of human life, except the change ftom free- 
 dom to slavery or imprisonment — no deprivation of rank, 
 honours, dignity, political power, military power, or sovereign 
 dominion — which blights so many prospects, which chills 
 so many hopes, which brings such bitter disappointments, 
 and such painful humiliations ''j which offers such violence 
 
 ' [The author must have meant to say, 'than a rich man who has 
 received the training which befits his position.'] 
 
 " It is to this that Juvenal probably refers, when he so feelingly says 
 *°^' ' Nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se 
 
 Quam quod ridicnlos homines facit,' — iii. 153. 
 Men are not ridiculous simply by being poor ; it is when they become 
 poor, that the shifts and expedients to which they are driven, in order 
 to conceal their poverty and keep up a semblance of their former wealth, 
 too frequently make them ridiculous. 
 
RIGHT AND IVRONG 37 
 
 to a man's familiar habits and thoughts, and forces him into 
 courses for which he is so little fitted, as the change from 
 affluence to beggary. The interruption of this right takes 
 a man from a station where he is contented,, and which he 
 is fitted to fill, to put him in a station where he will be dis- 
 contented and dangerous, and which he is not fitted to fill, 
 The effect on the person who is supposed to be benefited 
 by his loss, need not be considered ; as, at times when this 
 right is interrupted, the resistance is usually so great, that 
 although the plundered are impoverished, the plunderers are 
 seldom enriched. It is for these, among many other reasons^ 
 that the right of property is one of those vested rights which 
 should be most sparingly and tenderly interfered with by 
 a wise legislature ; but, like all other rights, it is the mere 
 creature of the sovereign power, which can at any moment 
 destroy what it created : and to deny the power of the 
 legislature to dispose of it at pleasure, is to confound ex- 
 pediency and justice with fact, and to conclude that what 
 oug/i( not to be done, cannot be done. 
 
 Wrongful and rightful are the adjectives of wrong and 
 right the substantives ; and differ from wrong and right 
 the adjectives, inasmuch as the former signify that which 
 agrees or disagrees with the rule of law, the latter that 
 which agrees or disagrees with the rule of morality. 
 
 Justice is commonly used by political writers in the sense 
 of moral justice. In this sense alone it is applicable to 
 acts of the legislature. Sometimes, however, it is used as 
 identical with law, as when we speak of the administration 
 of justice, of courts of justice, &c.' 
 
 •■ 'The legal criminal intention necessary in criminal law is not iden- 
 tical in strictness with the evil intention imputable in morals. It is 
 enough, that there exists an intention to do the act. It is not necessary 
 that the party should know that the act is morally wrong. It makes 
 no difference even if the party believe that the act is morally virtuous. 
 ... A case like that of Martin the incendiary will illustrate the dis- 
 tinctions. There could be no pretence for his acquittal, supposing the 
 jury of opinion that he believed that it was morally or religiously right to 
 bum York Minster, but knew, at the same time, that it was legally 
 wrong. If they meant by their verdict to express that his undetitanding 
 
38 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 was too disturbed to be capable of knowing that it was legally wrong, 
 the acquittal was correct.' — Edinburgh Review, vol. liv, p. 221. 'There 
 could be no doubt that Martin was aware that the burning of York 
 Minster was a criminal act, as his contrivances for escaping observation 
 in committing the deed evinced considerable forethought ; and the same 
 remark applies to nearly all cases of crimes committed by madmen. If 
 madmen were acquitted only when proved to be ignorant of the law, 
 they would be acquitted, not on the ground of their madness, but on 
 quite a different plea, of which others, besides madmen, might avail 
 themselves. The true state of the question seems rather to be, whether, 
 when a man's mind is so diseased that he believes himself to be driven 
 by an overwhelming duty, whether moral or religious, to the commis- 
 sion of an act which he knows to'be illegal, he is to be considered as a 
 person whose punishment can bS useful to society, and whom society can 
 hold as responsible for his acts. A merely depraved man may think 
 murder or robbery indifferent acts ; he may d6ny the existence of right 
 and wrong, or of all moral rules whatever ; but if he commits murder or 
 robbery, he is properly amenable to punishment. But a madman is not 
 indifferent to a moral duty ; he is hurried on to a violation of law by the 
 suggestions of a deranged understanding and a heated imagination, which 
 seem to him far to outweigh all other considerations. A man in this 
 state of mind is no more an accountable political agent, and a fit sub- 
 ject for the animadversion of the law, than he is an accountable moral 
 agent, and a subject for moral disapprobation : as a moral agent, his errors 
 can only be pitied ; as a political agent, he must only be prevented from 
 doing further mischief. [For the trial of Jonathan Martin, see the 
 Annual Register for 1829, p. 301.] 
 
IV 
 
 LAW. LAWFUL. UNLAWFUL 
 
 A FULL investigation of the different meanings of the 
 word law would of itself furnish matter for a long treatise ; 
 but as it is a subject which belongs properly to the pro- 
 vince of jurisprudence, and could not be satisfactorily 
 explained without diverging into questions unconnected 
 with political science, I shall limit myself to one remark 
 on an ambiguity which has a very extensive influence on 
 political reasoning. 
 
 Law properly signifies a general command of the sovereign, 
 whether conveyed by the way of direct legislation, as in the 
 case of statutes, or of permissive legislation, as in the case 
 of legal rules established by courts of justice. The only 
 proper mode of determining a dispute as to the existence 
 or construction of a law, is by application to a competent 
 tribunal, which alone has authority to decide it. 
 
 Law, however, is often used to denote, not the commands 
 of a sovereign, but certain moral rules, the e'xistence of 
 which can only be determined by the arguments of private 
 individuals, and not by the authority of pubhc officers. 
 It is in this sense that we speak of the law of God, the law 
 of nature, the laws of honour, &c.' 
 
 The same confusion of legal and moral rules is likewise 
 transferred to the adjectives derived from this term : for, 
 as Archbishop Whately has observed, 'The words lawful 
 
40 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 and unlawful are sometimes employed with reference to the 
 law of the land, and sometimes to the law of God and 
 the dictates of a sound conscience : so that the same 
 thing may be lawful in one sense, which is unlawful in 
 another \' 
 
 • [Bampton Lectures, &c., third edition, p. 335.] [The laws of nature 
 are general statements, setting forth the order in which events occur in 
 the physical and moral universe ; if we refer the order of the universe 
 to the will of the Creator, we say that the laws of nature are the laws 
 of God. The moral law is that part of God's law which is addressed 
 to His reasonable creatures ; it consists of rules to which our actions 
 ought to conform. The laws of the state are rules of conduct addressed 
 by the government to its subjects; these rules are to some extent coin- 
 cident with the moral law, but they are narrower in their scope. They 
 concern not the whole duty of man but only that part of his duty which 
 the magistrate can enforce.] 
 
V 
 
 SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTV 
 
 ' For a state to be entirely sovereign,' says Martens, in 
 his Treatise on the Laiv ef Nations, ' it must govern itself, 
 and acknowledge no legislative superior but God.' That 
 is to say, some person or persons in a state are said to 
 be sovereign, or to possess the sovereign power, when 
 they yield no obedience to any person on earth, and when 
 they receive obedience from the community which they 
 govern. The independence of a state, or the non-obedience 
 of its sovereign to any foreign power — and the existence of 
 a government, or the obedience of a community to a sove- 
 reign power — are both questions of degree, to be decided 
 by the length of time during which obedience has been 
 yielded or withheld, as well as by other circumstances ; and 
 thus can only be determined according to the facts of each 
 particular case. 
 
 As long as a government exists, the power of the person 
 or persons in whom the sovereignty resides, over the whole 
 community, is absolute and unlimited. The sovereign has 
 the complete disposal of the life, rights, and duties of every 
 member of the community. It has also power to modify 
 or change the existing form of government. There is no 
 law which it has not power to alter, repeal, or enact. 
 
 When the sovereign acts as sovereign in a legislative 
 capacity, it cannot be said to possess rights, or to bje subject 
 to duties. By legislating, it confers rights and imposes 
 
42 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 duties ; but its legislative power is not founded on any right, 
 or restrained by any duty. 
 
 Not only cannot a sovereign be limited by any power 
 residing in the community which it governs ; but it cannot 
 limit itself, so far as its own subjects are concerned. It 
 can limit itself, i. e. bind itself and its successors, by agree- 
 ments with foreign powers, as then it is party to a contract, 
 which it is not when it makes laws. A law excludes the idea 
 of a compact; 'for a compact is a promise proceeding ^^»? 
 us, law is a command directed fo us. The language of 
 a compact is, " I will, or will not, do this ; " that of a law is, 
 "Thou shalt, or shalt not, do it\"' No agreement can 
 exist, except in a moral sense, between a sovereign and its 
 subjects — between a government and people — as there 
 is no legitimate means of enforcing it. A sovereign can 
 only be liable to duties towards another sovereign, in which 
 relation it becomes, as it were, an individual in the great 
 community of nations. 
 
 The sovereign power may be exercised in two ways ; viz. 
 in making laws, and in administering them or carrying them 
 into execution. Of these two functions, the latter must, for 
 the suppression of crime, and the maintenance of civil rights, 
 be kept in constant activity ^. A day's interregnum of law- 
 lessness — during which the sovereign slept, no protection 
 was allowed to persons and property, and there was 
 a complete impunity of crime — would be sufficient to 
 overturn the most flourishing society. The existence of the 
 executive sovereignty is therefore uninterrupted. But when 
 a state has once been founded, and laws established, the 
 legislative sovereignty is often in abeyance for long periods 
 of time ; nor, in modern times, is it ever kept in constant 
 existence, except in absolute monarchies. Thus, in Great 
 Britain, the legislative sovereignty is only alive during 
 
 ' Blackstone, i Com. 45. Introd. § 2. 
 
 ' In this country, the prosecution of a civil suit, or of a criminal, 
 cannot at all times be carried to its last stage : but the preliminary 
 steps, such as arresting a debtor, or committing an offender for trial, 
 may be always taken. 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 43 
 
 the session of Parliament : during a prorogation, or after 
 a dissolution, it is in abeyance, and does not revive until 
 it vests in the whole Parliament at its next meeting. It 
 has been sometimes imagined that, during such intervals, 
 the legislative sovereignty resides in the community at large, 
 or in those who have votes for the election of members of 
 the House of Commons : but this opinion, if taken in its 
 plain and direct sense, has evidently no foundation in truth ; 
 and it is difficult to understand what benefit can be derived 
 from giving metaphorical or figurative meanings to expres- 
 sions of such importance as that now in question. 
 
 Such is essentially the nature of sovereign power, 
 whether it be possessed by one person or by several ; and 
 if by several, whether by a minority or majority of the state. 
 There is no diiiference in the nature of the power belonging 
 to an arbitrary monarch, to a supreme council of nobles, 
 or to a democratic assembly; the difference lies in the 
 manner of exercising it. 
 
 Nevertheless there may not unfrequently be traced, in 
 the speculations of political writers, a vague notion that the 
 sovereign power is less absolute in free governments than 
 in despotisms; that is, in governments where the sove- 
 reignty resides in many, than where it resides in one ; and 
 that a limitation of the King's power is also a limitation 
 of the sovereign power. Whereas, in fact, a Kingis power 
 is limited, not by destroying it, but either by taking it 
 from him and giving it to others, or by compelling him to 
 share it with others. On the other hand, some writers, 
 thinking that the discretion of the sovereign body is, in 
 limited monarchies, subject to a regular check and control, 
 have mistaken the exercise of sovereign power in republics 
 for arbitrary or tyrannical power; confounding the use of 
 sovereign power with the abuse of it ; an error which may 
 be observed in the following passage in Mr. Hallam's Con- 
 stitutional History of England : ' Numerous bodies,' he 
 says, ' are always prone to excess, both from the reciprocal 
 influences of their passions, and the consciousness of irre- 
 
44 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 sponsibility ; for which reasons a democracy, f/ta( is, the 
 iibsolute government of the majority, is the most tyrannical 
 of any ' (ch. i6). In a democracy, the government of the 
 majority is absolute, for the same reason that the govern- 
 ment of one is absolute in a monarchy, and the government 
 of a minority absolute in an aristocracy; viz. that the 
 majority are sovereign. The same confusion is discernible 
 in the following extract from one of Mr. Canning's speeches, 
 who appears, at the moment, not to have adverted to the 
 fact, that the royal, not the sovereign power, is limited 
 in a limited monarchy : ' Now to this view of the matter 
 I have no other objection than this — that the British con- 
 stitution is a limited monarchy ; that a limited monarchy is, 
 in the nature of things, a mixed government ; but that 
 such a House of Commons as the radical reformer requires 
 would, in effect, constitute a pure democracy — a power, as 
 it appears to me, inconsistent with every monarchy, and 
 unsusceptible of any limitation '.' Mr. Mitford, also, in his 
 History of Greece, frequently confounds the tyrannical 
 acts of the Athenian democracy with the sovereign power 
 possessed by the body of citizens ; which, he seems to 
 think, ought to have been legally checked or balanced, in 
 order to prevent misgovernment. Thus in one place he 
 says, that ' despotic governments, whether the power be in 
 the hands of one or of a multitude, will have a near resem- 
 blance of character".' Again, he remarks, that 'the balances 
 of Solon's constitution were no sooner overthrown, and 
 sovereign power became absolute in the hands of those without 
 property, &c., than the interest of all who had property 
 placed them necessarily in the situation of conspirators 
 against the existing government'.' In another place, 
 professing to translate Aristotle, he says, that • absolute 
 
 ' Speeches, vol. vi. p. 383. [Mr. Canning thought that sovereign 
 power is more likely to be used with moderation if it is distributed 
 among several authorities, differing from one another in kind, than if it 
 is vested in one authority (e. g. the Athenian Assembly, or the Emperor 
 of Ru^sia).] 
 
 ' Hiitory of Greece, vol. iv. p. 19. ^ Ibid. p. 31. 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 45 
 
 democracy is tyranny ' ' ; meaning, as it appears, that 
 a democracy in which there is an absolute or sovereign 
 power, is necessarily tyrannical. This confusion is easily 
 cleared up by remarking that all checks and balances in 
 governments arise from the construction and internal 
 arrangement of the sovereign body, and the manner in 
 which it is formed, and not from any outward authority 
 controlling its actions ; and that the sovereign is equally 
 absolute in all forms of government. This obvious truth 
 has long since been stated and explained by writers of 
 high authority. Thus Sir William Temple observes, that 
 ' all government is a restraint upon liberty ; and, under all, 
 the dominion is equally absolute where it is in the last 
 resort''.' So likewise Blackstone says, that 'however the 
 several forms of government began, or by what right soever 
 they subsist, there is, and must be, in all of them, a supreme, 
 irresistible, uncontrolled authority, in which iht jura summi 
 imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside '.' Paley, morer 
 over, lays it down, that ' there necessarily exists in every 
 government a power from which the constitution has prcH 
 vided no appeal ; and which power, for that reason, may 
 be termtd absolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbitrary, 
 despotic, and is alike so in all countries *.' These remarks, 
 Which are implied in the very notion of sovereignty, may 
 serve to explain an expression which some have found 
 mysterious, unintelligible, and even profane ; viz. the phrase 
 ■omnipotence of Parliament, as applied to the English cout 
 stitution. In fact, however, it is nothing more than 
 
 ' History of Greece, vol. iv. p. 33. The words of Aristotle are 
 ,15 Stj/ioKparia ^ TeXevraia Tvpavvis tOTt {Pol. v. 10, 30), i. c. ' the 
 extreme or worst form of democracy is a tyranny ; ' for instance, such 
 a government as existed at several periods during the great French 
 revolution, which may assuredly be with justice called tyrannical. 
 But Aristotle never meant to imply that the Athenian government, 
 even at its worst periods, was a tyranny. 
 
 * On the Original and Nature of Government, fVoris, vol. ii. p. 34. 
 8vo ed. ' I Com. 48. 
 
 * Moral and Political Philosophy, book vi. ch. 6, at the beginning. 
 See likewise Bentham, Fragment on Government, ed. Montague, p. 209. 
 
46 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 a hyperbolical or exaggerated method of signifying the 
 legislative sovereignty of Parliament, which necessarily 
 overrules all other powers, even the executive sovereignty — 
 which alone can alter the established constitution, and can 
 cause any act to be done which it is in the power of the 
 state to effect. 
 
 From the above remarks, it sufficiently appears that-, in 
 its proper sense, the word sovereignty means the supreme 
 power of the person or persons who are sovereign in the 
 state, and are legally uncontrolled both from within and 
 without; frequently, however, it is used in an improper 
 and metaphorical sense, to signify the moral influence of 
 a whole or a part of the community, upon the acts of the 
 sovereign. It is in this sense that we must understand 
 those persons who speak of ' the sovereignty of the people ' 
 in states where the people, in any sense of that word, is not 
 sovereign. The phrase, sovereignty of the people, unlike 
 most of the political terms, is of a very recent origin ; as no 
 expression corresponding to it occurs in the ancient writers, 
 although they wrote on all forms of government, and 
 although in many ancient states the people really were 
 sovereign : nor is it very easy to give it any determinate 
 meaning ; but, as some have laid great stress on the prin- 
 ciple of popular sovereignty, in states where the sovereign 
 power is clearly defined, and does not reside in the people, 
 we may presume that they meant to express the moral 
 control and influence exercised by the community at large 
 upon the acts of the legislature. 
 
 In the same sense we are to understand the difference 
 between constitutions imposed upon and accepted by the 
 head of the state, and constitutions granted by him, to 
 which so much importance has been attributed. If, in an 
 arbitrary monarchy, the King were voluntarily to divide the 
 (sovereign power with a representative chamber on certain 
 terms, or if he were compelled to divide it on the very same 
 terms by the complaints or rebellion of his subjects, the 
 sovereignty would belong to identically the same persons ; 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 47 
 
 but the moral influence exercised on the sovereign legislature, 
 by the rest of the community, would be widely different. 
 Thus, at the Revolution of 1688, by which the principle 
 of the sovereignty of the people is said to have been estab- 
 lished in England, the sovereign power was not extended 
 to more persons than hg.d enjoyed it in the reign of James II. 
 But the moral influence of a part of the community, and 
 particularly of the members of the legislative body, on the 
 head of the state, was greatly increased ^ So Ukewise, if, 
 at the late revolution of France, the very same charter had 
 been accepted by Louis Philippe which was granted by Louis 
 the Eighteenth, the moral influence of public opinion on 
 the two kings and their njinisters, and on the whole legislative 
 body, would have been very different, though the sovereign 
 power would have been possessed by the same persons, 
 standing mutually in the same relations to one another. 
 In one case it would have been said that the principle of 
 the sovereignty of the people had been asserted ; in the other, 
 that it had not. 
 
 Sometimes the phrase, sovereignty of the people, means the 
 admission of all the members of the community, or all the free 
 adult males, to the election of representatives or magistrates. 
 In this sense it appears to be applied to the government of 
 the United States of America : but this usage is not less 
 improper and figurative than the other just mentioned ; as 
 the right of voting for the election of one who is to possess 
 a share of the sovereignty is itself no more a share of the 
 sovereignty than the right of publishing a politital treatise 
 
 ' ' It could not be held,' says Mr. Hallam, speaking of the effects of 
 the Revolution, ' without breaking up all the foundations of our polity, 
 that the monarchy emanated from the Parliament, or even from the 
 people. But by the Revolution and by lie Act of Settlement, the rights 
 of the actual monarch, and of the reigning family, were made to emanate 
 from the Parliament and the people. In technical language, in the grave 
 and respectful theory of our constitution, the crown is still the fountain 
 from which law and justice spring forth. Its prerogatives are, in the 
 main, the same as under the Tudors and the Stuarts ; but the right of 
 the house of Brunswick to exercise them can only be deduced from the 
 convention of 1688.' — Constit. Hist, of England, ch. 14. 
 
48 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 or a political newspaper ^ The exercise of the one right 
 may influence the decision, as the exercise of the other may 
 influence the formation, of the sovereign body. 
 
 When the difference between the literal and metaphorical 
 meanings of the ' sovereignty ' — between legal power and 
 moral influence — is clearly perceived, there is no danger 
 in speaking of the sovereignty of the people in states where 
 the people is not sovereign : we may indeed avoid it, as 
 a clumsy and inaccurate mode of expressing an idea which 
 may be conveyed by precise and convenient terms, but not 
 from any fear of its producing a worse result than obscurity, 
 This phrase, however, is often presented to persons little 
 acquainted with political reasoning, who may easily confound 
 real with figurative sovereignty, and thus be led to suppose 
 that the people truly possess the sovereign power, and there- 
 fore are not subject to it. On the mischievous tendency of 
 such notions, which are incompatible with the existence of 
 government, it is unnecessary to make any comment. 
 
 The strict and scientific meaning of sovereignty appears 
 to be so well ascertained, and to admit of so little doubt, 
 that political writers might have been expected to agree on 
 this point, if they agreed on no other. Nevertheless, explana- 
 tions of sovereignty have been proposed which sin, both 
 in excess and defect, by including what ought to be excluded, 
 and excluding what ought to be included. Thus Heeren, 
 in his ' Discourse on the History of Political Science^,' after 
 laying it down that the distinction between monarchies and 
 Tepublics depends on the possession of the sovereign power, 
 says that, in a monarchy, if the prince is hereditary and 
 inviolable, and nothing can be done in the affairs of state 
 against his will, he is sovereign. This definition would be 
 satisfied if a tribune of Rome, or a member of the Polish 
 
 '■ [ This is perhaps too strongly expressed. The choice of a person to 
 assist in malcing laws is a constitutional act ; whereas the publication of 
 a treatise is only an expression of opinion.] 
 
 ' Historische f^if^-^^, vol. i. pp. 436-440. Heeren's definition is framed 
 •with considerable ingenuity, to account for the common practice of 
 calling limited kings sovereigns : on which see in Monarchy. 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 49 
 
 diet, was termed a prince, and the office of the one was 
 hereditary and the person of the other inviolable. It is not, 
 therefore, sufficiently comprehensive ; as there are some parts 
 of the sovereign power which it omits. 
 
 According to Blackstone, ' by the sovereign power is 
 meant, the making of laws ; for wherever that power resides, 
 all others must conform to, and be directed by it '.' It is, 
 no doubt, true, that the executive is so far subordinate to the 
 legislative sovereignty that the legislature may model the form 
 of the administration at its will and pleasure : but both 
 branches of the sovereign power are equally necessary to 
 the existence of a state, and each is dependent on the 
 other ; for although laws could not be administered if they 
 were not made, it would be useless to make them if they 
 could not be administered. The inquiry, therefore, as to 
 their comparative importance, is not more profitable than 
 the question, which is the worst, he who plots a crime, or 
 he who carries ^t into execution. If, on the one hand, it is 
 said that a crime would not be contrived if there were no one 
 to effect it ; on the other it may be answered, that if the 
 crime had never been planned, it never would have been 
 committed. The fact is, that in all such cases, where both 
 parts are indispensable, one is as important as the other. 
 With regard to its exercise, the executive is of greater moment 
 than the legislative sovereignty : for the latter may be dor- 
 mant for long intervals of time, while the former must 
 necessarily be kept in constant watchfulness. 
 
 On the other hand, Rousseau has given to the term 
 sovereignty an unwarrantable extension ; and it is from his 
 doctrines on this point that the modern phrase of sovereignty 
 of the people, and the opinions connected with it, have chiefly 
 been derived. According to the theory explained in his 
 Contrat Social, governments are formed by all the members 
 of the community agreeing to a certain compact by which 
 each places his person and his power under the supreme 
 direction of the general will. When this compact has been 
 ' I Com. 49. Introd. $ 2. 
 
>50 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 formed, the whole community becomes sovereign ; the 
 sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, and is inalien- 
 able and indivisible. This account is given by Rousseau, 
 not as a sketch of a perfect state, of the manner in which 
 a new society ougM to be founded ; but as a general theory 
 of government, to which all states, whatever their consti- 
 tution, musi necessarily conform. All, therefore, that need 
 be said in refutation of it, is, that in no state has any such 
 surrender or compact been made ; in no state is the general 
 will, or the whole community, sovereign : nor in any state 
 is the sovereignty inalienable or indivisible. It is, indeed, 
 possible that all the members of a community might make 
 the compact which Rousseau describes, or, without entering 
 into this compact (which proceeds on the false assumption 
 that persons before the existence of a government have 
 rights to surrender), might make the whole community 
 sovereign ; and such was really the case in the Athenian 
 and other Grecian states, if by community we understand 
 the adult freemen without the free women and children and 
 without the slaves : but that the sovereign power in any 
 state should be inalienable or indivisible, is a simple impos- 
 sibility ; and no compact or contrivance of any kind could 
 prevent a sovereign body from surrendering the sovereignty 
 as the Romans did to their dictators, as the Syracusans did 
 to Dionysius, and the Danes to Frederick the Third — or 
 dividing it, as the Albans are said to have done with the 
 Sabines in the infancy of Rome, and as the English did 
 with the Scotch and Irish at the two Unions. 
 
 The origin of Rousseau's error appears to have been, that 
 he saw that the whole community so far virtually possesses 
 the sovereign power, that if all, or a large part, of the 
 members of it agree to destroy the existing government, 
 and substitute another, they can carry their agreement into 
 effect, as all government is ultimately a question of superior 
 force '. But because the community holds in its hands the 
 
 ' This is what Aristotle means, when he says, that iv Tafi iXiyapxlais 
 KoX vaifTaxov ri irkiov liipos Kvpiov [in oligarchies, and indeed in every 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 51 
 
 issues of sovereignty, it is not to be called sovereign, any 
 more than the Earl of Warwick is to be called King, because 
 he was called King-maker. 
 
 According to the above observations, the two marks of 
 sovereignty are : i. Necessity of consent; and 2. Irrespon- 
 sibility. When there is any person or body in a state, 
 whose consent is necessary to the doing of a public act, 
 and who cannot be called to account for his or their con- 
 duct in the exercise of such power, then (if the definition 
 just proposed is correct) this person or body has a part of 
 the sovereign power. Thus the consent of the Houses of 
 Lords and Commons being, in England, necessary to the 
 passing of a law, and the members of these two bodies not 
 being answerable for the votes given in their legislative 
 capacity, the Houses of Lords and Commons severally 
 possess a part of the legislative sovereignty'. But, 
 although the King cannot issue a proclamation without 
 the advice of his privy council, yet the members of the 
 privy council, being answerable for their advice so given, 
 in case a royal proclamation should command a breach 
 of the law, have not a share of the executive sovereignty. 
 In like manner, although pleas of the crown and civil 
 actions cannot be tried by the King in person, but must 
 be tried by the King's justices, whose consent is therefore 
 necessary to the exercise of the judicial sovereignty ; yet 
 as these ofificers are responsible for their acts, and may 
 be impeached before the proper tribunal, they cannot 
 be said to have any portion of the judicial sovereignty, 
 the whole of which resides in the crown. The same 
 remark applies to all the other officers intrusted with the 
 
 government, the majority rules] : Pol. iv. 4. Elsewhere he nses uipios for 
 sovereign, in its strict sense. 
 
 ■ 'Parliament,' says Blackstone, 'hath sovereign and imcontroUable 
 authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, 
 repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all 
 possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, mari- 
 time, or criminal ; this being the place where that absolute despotic 
 power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted 
 by the constitution of these kingdoms.' — i Com. 160 ; Book i. ch. 2. 
 
 £ 2 
 
52 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 administration of the laws; whence it is apparent (as 
 Blackstone has laid it down) that the whole executive 
 power of the English nation is vested in the King '- 
 
 The King of England is usually called sovereign (and 
 such is his legal and constitutional title), because he is in 
 all things supreme. The court of Parliament is called the 
 King's court, in which he presides, which is held by his 
 authority, which is assembled and dissolved by his com- 
 mand. All laws are enacted ' by the King's most excellent 
 Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords 
 spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in Parliament 
 assembled, and by the authority of the same.' These 
 laws, when in activity, are administered by the King ; and 
 all executive officers derive their authority from him. Pro- 
 clamations to enforce laws are issued by the King, with 
 the advice of his privy council. In the King's courts, and 
 by the King's justices, all laws are administered ; the King 
 being ' in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as civil, supreme ^.' 
 He is likewise head of the army and navy, and of the 
 church as by law established ^ He is the fountain of all 
 honours and dignities, and every inhabitant of the United 
 Kingdom is his subject, and inferior to him. Nevertheless, 
 according to the scientific definition of sovereignty, the 
 King of England cannot be considered as sovereign, i.e. as 
 possessing the entire sovereign power; as he is not able 
 to make laws by his sole authority, and it is necessary 
 that the advjce and consent of two bodies, irresponsible 
 in a corporate capacity for such advice and consent, should 
 previously be offered and obtained. Hence it is that the 
 King of England is termed a limited monarch, and the 
 government of England is called a limited monarchy; 
 because the power of the King in enacting laws is limited 
 
 ' I Com. 190, 242 ; Book i. chs. 3, 7. 
 
 ' A subject can only obtain redress from the King for a dvil injury 
 hy petition,— See Blackstone, 3 Com. 256 ; Book iii. ch. 17. 
 
 " [The title ' head of the Church,' though conferred upon Henry VIII, 
 was not assumed by Elizabeth, and is open to some objections : see 
 Prothero, Statutes and Constitutional Documents, Introd. p. xxx.] 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 53 
 
 by the necessity of obtaining the consent of the two Houses 
 of Parliament to their enactment. And thus the King 
 of England cannot properly be said to possess the entire 
 sovereign power, because all - sovereign power is unlimited 
 and uncontrolled ; and a limited sovereign is a contradiction 
 in terms. The difference between an absolute and limited 
 monarchy is, that in one the entire legislative sovereignty 
 belongs to the prince, in the other it is shared with several. 
 It is indeed generally admitted, that all sovereign power 
 is uncontrolled : and it is expressly laid down by Blackstone 
 that 'the sovereignty of the British constitution is lodged 
 in the three branches of the Parliament^'; and in another 
 place he calls the King 'one of the constituent parts 
 of the sovereign legislative power "' : so that, although, 
 according to our legal language, and the written doctrines 
 of our constitution, the King is our sovereign lord, yet 
 in a general sense he cannot properly be called sovereign, 
 or be said to possess the entire sovereign power : sove- 
 reignty, in this peculiar acceptation, being only equivalent 
 to pre-eminence ', or supremacy, and not signifying unlimited 
 and absolute authority. 
 
 Division of Forms of Government. 
 
 When the whole sovereign power over a community 
 belongs to one person, the government is called a monarchy; 
 when it belongs to several, it is called a republic or common- 
 wealth. In a commonwealth, if the sovereign power belongs 
 to a minority of the nation, the government is called an 
 aristocracy ; if to a majority, a democracy. 
 
 Such appears to be the division of governments most 
 consistent with the received phraseology, formed on the 
 number of the persons who possess the sovereign power. This 
 was the basis of the division into monarchy, aristocracy, 
 
 1 I Com. 51. Introd. § 2. ' i Com. 243 ; Book i. ch. 7. 
 
 ' ' The law ascribes to the King the attribute of sovereignty, or pre- 
 eminence.' — Blackstone, i Com. 241. 
 
54 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 and democracy, when the respective merits of those three 
 forms of government were discussed by the Persian con- 
 spirators after -the death of Smerdis the magician; which 
 debate, as reported by Herodotus ^ contains the earliest 
 use of the triple division of governments with which we are 
 acquainted. It is partially adopted by Plato ^, and also 
 by Aristotle' (who, however, proposes another principle 
 of division for republics, which will be presently noticed), 
 is fully explained by Polybius *, and is briefly stated by 
 
 ' Book iii. chs. 80-82. The terms used are S^/tor, dKiyapx'n, and /wvy- 
 apxos' and they are employed in their strict sense ; monarchy to signify 
 the sole government of one, and democracy to signify the goTernment 
 of the majority. Pindar, however, had previously described the forms 
 of government thus : irapci TvpavviBi, x^to'toi' o \d0pos ffrparis, x^°^ 
 woMv 01 aoipol TTipeiavTi [in a tyranny, or when the mob rules, or when 
 the wise men keep the city] {Fyth. ii. 160), i.e. absolute monarchy; 
 aristocracy, or the government of the educated ; and democracy, or the 
 government of the multitude. 
 
 ' Plato's division of governments, contained in his Republic, book 
 viii. pp. 544, 545, ed. Steph. is as follows : — i. His own perfect state, or 
 aristocracy, that is, the government of the dpiaroi, or most virtuous. 
 a. The Cretan and Lacedaemonian form of government, in which the 
 love of distinction or emulation is the prevailing motive. 3. Oligarchy, 
 in which the prevailing motive is a love of wealth. 4. Democracy, in 
 which the prevailing motive is a love of liberty and equality. 5. 
 Tyranny, or Despotism, in which the prevailing motive is the personal 
 gratification of the prince. This, in fact, is not a logical division, but 
 rather an enumeration of governments, as they follow one another in a 
 constant cycle. Plato's doctrine as to this regular succession of govern- 
 ments is, however, completely demolished by Aristotle, Pol. v. 12. 
 
 ' Aristotle's division of governments {Pol. iii. 7 ; Ethics, viii. 12) may 
 be best understood by means of the following scheme : — 
 
 GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 \ 
 
 I. 
 
 Where one is sovereign, 
 
 1. e. Monarchy 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 Where the' few or the 
 
 rich are sovereign 
 
 Where the many or the 
 poor are sovereign 
 
 Where the 
 monarch go- _ 
 verns for the his own good. 
 
 Where he 
 governs for 
 
 public g^ood. 
 Royalty. 
 
 TvpavvK, 
 
 JDespotism. 
 
 Where they Where they 
 
 rule for the rule for their 
 
 public good, own good. 
 
 Aristocracy. Oligarchy. 
 
 Where they 
 rule for the 
 public good. . 
 Polity, or 
 Tinwcracy. 
 
 Where they 
 rule for the 
 good ^ of the 
 majority, as 
 opposed to that 
 of the whole 
 state, or of the 
 poor. 
 
 Democracy, 
 
 * Polybius (vi. 5) objects to the triple division of governments into 
 royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, which, he says, was employed by 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 55 
 
 Cicero'. By these writers (though they likewise admitted 
 the doctrine of mixed governments) the words were under- 
 stood in their strict and proper sense; that is to say, 
 in communities where an absolute majority of the whole 
 number of citizens or freemen shared in the sovereign 
 power, the government was considered as democratic ; in 
 communities where a minority of the whole number of 
 citizens or freemen shared in the sovereign power, the 
 government was considered as aristocratic : it being under- 
 stood that slaves were left out of the account, as not being 
 members of the state (TroXlTat, or cives). The same principle 
 of division has been adopted, since the revival of learnings 
 by many writers on various subjects, whether moral, political, 
 or historical, and indeed has usually been taken for admitted 
 and understood. Amidst such a multitude of examples it 
 will be sufficient to select four of the clearest explanations 
 given by professed political inquirers. ' The difference of 
 commonwealths,' says Hobbes, ' consisteth in the difference 
 of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and 
 every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty 
 is either in one man, or in an assembly of more than one ; 
 and into that assembly either every man hath right to enter, 
 or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the 
 rest, it is manifest there can be but three kinds of common- 
 wealth. For the representative must needs be one man, 
 
 most political anthorities in his time ; and substitutes a classification of 
 his own into six kinds (ch. 4), which nearly resembles that of Aristotle ; 
 i.e. each member of the triple division is subdivided according to the 
 mode in which the government is administered, i. Monarchy. This 
 government Polybius appears to consider as the starting-point of society, 
 and therefore excludes it from his sum total of governments. 2. Royalty. 
 3. TupaKi'is, or Despotism. 4. Aristocracy. 5. Oligarchy. 6. Democracy. 
 7. Ochlocracy, or mob government. Polybins considers that these 
 governments follow one another in regular order. Plutarch's explanation, 
 with regard to the three chief forms of government, and their corruptions 
 or deviations, is nearly similar. — De Monarchia, ch. 3. 
 
 ' Cicero's definitions are contained in the following sentence : ' Cum 
 penes unum est omnium summa rerum, regem ilium unum vocamus, et 
 regnum ejus rei publicae statum. Cum autem est penes delectos, tum 
 ilia civitas optimatlum arbitrio regi dicitur. Ilia autem est civitas 
 popularis, sic enim appellant, in qua in populo sunt omnia.' — DeRepA. 26. 
 
56 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 or more ; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but 
 a part. When the representative is one man, then is the 
 commonwealth a monarchy; when an assembly of all that 
 will come together, then it is a democracy or popular 
 commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only, then 
 it is called an aristocracy. Other kind of commonwealth 
 there can be none ; for either one or more or all must have 
 the sovereign power entire '.' According to Montesquieu ^, 
 governments are divided into those where one rules, and 
 those where several rule, or republics. In a republic, if the 
 people in a body has the sovereign power, it is a democracy; 
 if the sovereign power is in the hands of a part of the 
 people, it is an aristocracy. Rousseau says that ' the sove- 
 reign (that is, in his vocabulary, the whole nation) may 
 give the government to the whole people, or to the majority 
 of the people, which form of government is a democracy ; 
 or it may confine the government to a minority, which form 
 is an aristocracy ; or it may concentrate all the government 
 in the hands of a single magistrate, from whom all the 
 other magistrates derive their power, which form is called 
 a monarchy, or royal government^ .^ The same triple division 
 is adopted by Mr. Mill, in his Treatise on Government. 
 'There are,' he says, 'three modes in which it may be 
 supposed that the powers of protecting the community 
 are capable of being exercised. The community may 
 undertake the protection of itself, and of its members. 
 The powers of protection may be placed in the hands 
 of a few. And, lastly, they may be placed in the hands 
 of an individual. The many, the few, the one, these 
 varieties appear to exhaust the subject. . . . And these 
 varieties correspond to the three forms of government, 
 the democratical, the aristocratical, and the monarchical*. 
 
 ' Leviathan, part ii. qh. 19. 
 
 ^ Esprit des Lois, liv. ii. chs. I, a. His subdivision of the govern- 
 ment of one is examined below, in the word DESPOTISM. 
 
 ' Contrat Social, liv. iii. ch. 3. 
 
 ' Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. iv. p. 492. See 
 likewise p. 497, where Mr. Mill says, that ' if the powers of government 
 
SOVEREIGN. SOVEREIGNTY 57 
 
 The government, in the language of Rousseau, and the 
 powers of protection in that of Mr. Mill, appear to have 
 the same meaning, and to signify the sovereign power. 
 The common usage of the three terms in question, in 
 modern times, does not, however, at all agree with these 
 definitions, as will be explained elsewhere. 
 
 It is quite evident that thp division of governments just 
 explained must be exhaustive ; and that in every possible 
 state, whether real or imaginary, the sovereign power must 
 reside in one, or in a minority, or in a majority of the 
 whole people. Nevertheless, most political writers, both 
 of ancient and modern times, have made a fourth form 
 of government, compounded either of any two or of all 
 three of these forms, and different from all, which is known 
 by the name of a mixed government. On this variety of 
 government, which is commonly considered as different 
 from either monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, though 
 in fact it is not opposed to them, more will be said in its 
 proper place'. 
 
 are intrusted to one man, or a few men, and a monarchy, or governing 
 aristocracy, is formed, the results are fatal.' Here, too, monarchy and 
 aristocracy are clearly used to signify goyemments, in which one man 
 or a few men possess the sovereign power. This writer, however, is not 
 consistent in his language. See below in People, and Representa- 
 tion. 
 
 ' [The meanings given to the terms explained in this section are not 
 in accordance wilti popular or even with literary usage. Monarchy, e.g. 
 means simply the rule of one, whether absolute or limited, but the title 
 of monarch is not given to elected rulers, such as the President of the 
 United States. Monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy may be called 
 forms of government ; or they may be considered as principles or institutions 
 which are variously combined in the constitutions of different states.] 
 
VI 
 
 MONARCHY. ROYALTY. KING 
 
 Monarchy, in its proper sense, signifies the government 
 of one ; that is, when the whole sovereignty belongs to one 
 person. ' When the sovereign power,' says Blackstone, ' is 
 intrusted in the hands of a single person, the government 
 takes the name of a monarchy '.' Examples of this are 
 afforded by the government of France under Louis the 
 Fourteenth, who used to say, ' L'dtat c'est moi ^ ; ' and by 
 the actual governments of Russia, Austria, Prussia, Spain, 
 Portugal, Turkey, &c. It is in this sense that Machiavelli 
 understands the word in his treatise on the art of monarchical 
 government, his Principe. The same definition of monarchy 
 is also given in the passages quoted above from Hobbes, 
 Montesquieu, Mill, and Rousseau; the latter of which writers 
 has enlarged upon the subject in another place, always 
 restricting it to the supremacy of one person '*. So likewise 
 Mr. Crabb, in his Dictionary of English Synonyms, says 
 that ' Monarch signifies one having sole authority ' ; and 
 again, ' The term monarch does not define the extent of 
 
 ' I Com: 49. Introd. § 62. 
 
 " The same expression, applied to a monarch, occurs in Aeschylus, 
 Suppl. 370 — 
 
 ai Toi ir6\is, ah Si rb S^/uov, 
 
 •npvTavis UKpiTos &v, 
 
 KpaTVPeis 0ajfi6v kariav x9ov6^, 
 
 [Thou art the city, thou the common weal ; a prince with none to try 
 thee, thou rulest an altar, hearth-stone of the land.] 
 ' Contrat Social, liv. iii. ch. 6. 
 
MONARCHY. ROYALTY. KING 59 
 
 the power, but simply that it is undivided, as opposed to 
 that species of power which is lodged in the hands of the 
 many '.' In this sense the kingly ofifice is taken by a late 
 writer on the history of England. ' If by the royal dignity/ 
 says Mr. Palgrave''^ 'we are to understand a permanent 
 authority, enabling the sovereign to give laws to his subjects 
 in time of peace, to command them to follow him in time 
 of war, and to impose taxes or tributes upon the nation at 
 all times, such an authority was wholly unknown to the 
 Jutes, Angles, and Saxons before they settled in Britain.' 
 The same definition of monarchy is also given by Martens, 
 who says, that 'when the rights of sovereignty, and con- 
 sequently the majesty of a state, are lodged in the hands of 
 one person, the government is monarchical ; when they are 
 lodged in the hands of several persons, it is republican.' 
 He proceeds, however, to modify this definition by adding, 
 that 'when we say that the rights of sovereignty are intrusted 
 to some one, we do not always mean that he possesses them 
 all without exception; it is understood that he possesses 
 the greatest part, or the most essential of them \' And he 
 further states, that 'in applying these principles to the states 
 of Europe, it is easy to perceive that every state in it which 
 has a King for its chief, is monarchical*.' Such undoubtedly 
 is the common use of the term monarchy, although it does 
 not result from the principles laid down by Martens. For, 
 at the time when his book was written, neither the greatest 
 part, nor the most essential, of the powers of sovereignty 
 belonged to the King of England, although the English 
 government was then, and ever since has been, called a 
 monarchy ; and the same is now the case with the King of 
 France. The fact is that, by common agreement, we call 
 all governments of which a King is chief, monarchies; 
 which agreement is solely derived from historical recollec- 
 tions, and is not founded on the actual state of things. 
 There was a time when the kings of France were truly 
 
 ' In the word Prince. " History of England, vol. i. p. 73. 
 
 ' Law of Nations, p. 34. * Ibid. p. 35. 
 
6o USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 monarchs, or absolute princes ; there was a time when the 
 kings of England were, in practice, nearly absolute, and 
 when the crown was by far the most important part of the 
 constitution. The King of England is always, in solemn 
 language, styled 'our sovereign lord'.' Yet the King of 
 England possesses only a part, and that the least important 
 part, of the sovereign power. With regard to the adminis- 
 tration of the laws, and the declaration of peace and war, 
 he is sovereign ; but the entire legislative sovereignty he 
 shares with two deliberative bodies, altogether forming a 
 Parliament, which alone possesses the power of making laws. 
 To this arrangement of the supreme power Gibbon has 
 adapted his account of monarchy when he says, that ' the 
 obvious definition of a monarchy seems to be that of a state 
 in which a single person, by whatsoever name he may be 
 distinguished, is intrusted with the execution of the laws, 
 the management of the revenue, and the command of the 
 army^" 
 
 According to this usage, therefore, monarchy would sig- 
 nify, not only a government in which the whole sovereign 
 power is possessed by one, but all governments in which 
 the head of the state is called king, prince, or emperor, 
 although he may only be part of the sovereign body. Another 
 method of distinguishing monarchies from republics, different 
 both from the scientific and the popular mode, is adopted 
 by Mr. Millar in his historical view of the Englisli Govern- 
 ment, according to whom a republic 'is ' a government in 
 which there is no king or hereditary chief magistrate*.' 
 Although, on the other hand, Mr. Millar appears to con- 
 sider monarchy as a government in which the King alone 
 
 ' This, however (as was above remarked), does not prevent ns from 
 calling our government a limited monarchy, and our King a limited 
 King : although a limited sovereign is an impossibility. 
 
 ' Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. iii at the beginning. 
 Under the ' army,' he probably means to include the ' navy ' ; but it is 
 to be observed, that he studiously excepts the making of laws, in which 
 according to Blackstone, all sovereign power is centred. Above, p. 49. 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 326. 
 
MONARCHY. ROYALTY. KING 6l 
 
 is sovereign, yet we may assume that the point on which 
 he intended to rest the distinction between monarchies 
 and republics was the mode of nominating the chief magis- 
 trate : if the first place in the state is elective, the govern- 
 ment is a republic ; if hereditary, the government is a 
 monarchy '. This method of division is perfectly accurate ; 
 but it does not agree with common usage more than the 
 method of division according to the numbers of the sove- 
 reign body. For if we deny the name of monarchies to 
 governments where the King is .elected, the kingdom of 
 Hungary will be a republic ; the kingdom of Sweden will 
 be a republic ; Rome, before the expulsion of the Tarquins, 
 would be a republic or commonwealth, because the kings 
 were elective. To speak, with Lord Bacon, of an elective 
 monarchy would be to make a contradiction in terms; 
 and to compare, as Paley" has done, the advantages of 
 an hereditary monarchy with those of an elective monarchy 
 would in fact be to compare the advantages of a monarchy 
 and a republic. If, therefore, we are to depart from the 
 received usage, it would perhaps be more convenient to take 
 for the basis of the division the numbers of the sovereign 
 body, than the mode of nominating the head of the state, 
 as being a more characteristic and important point of 
 disagreement '. 
 
 ' Millar's words, ' no King or hereditary chief magistrate,' I have 
 taken to mean, 'no King, or, in other words, no hereditary chief 
 magistrate ; ' the particle or being used in its explanatory sense. If it 
 was meant to have its disjunctive sense, so that the words import ' neither 
 a King nor an hereditary chief magistrate,' Mr. Millar adopts the common 
 distinction, adding, at the same time, another distinction of his own. 
 
 ' Moral and Political Philosophy, book vi. ch. 6. 
 
 ' As a set-off to the common practice of calling kingly republics by 
 the name of monarchies, we have the following passage of Rousseau, 
 according to which some pure monarchies ar« to be called republics. 
 ' By the word republic! ^'^ says, ' I understand not only an aristocracy 
 or a democracy, but in general every government guided by the general 
 will, which is the law. For a government to' be legitimate, it must 
 not be confoimded with the sovereign, but be its minister ; then monarchy 
 itself is a republic' — Contrat Social, liv. ii. ch. 6 n. This division into 
 monarchies and republics appears to coincide with Montesquieu's divi- 
 sion into republics, monarchies, and despotisms : the republic of Rousseau,. 
 
62 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 All attempts of this kind to reconcile the common usage 
 of monarchy with any general principle must be unsuccess- 
 ful, as it is only determined by the accidental circumstance 
 of the style and title of the chief magistrate; whether he 
 is, or is not, called a Ji^tng or Prince. If, instead of the 
 numbers of the sovereign body, the election of the chief 
 magistrate is taken as the touchstone of monarchies and 
 republics, then the governments of Sweden and Hungary, 
 and of Rome before the expulsion of the Kings, cannot 
 be called monarchical, and an elective monarchy is a contra- 
 diction in terms ; if the election of the chief magistrate only 
 for a term of years, then the Pope of Rome, the Doge of 
 Venice, the Stadtholder of the Netherlands, are to have the 
 name of monarchs. The common phraseology is too capri- 
 cious and arbitrary to be explained on any rational ground^. 
 So far indeed has the doctrine of attending to the mere 
 name of King been carried, that a most accurate writer hag 
 called the government of Sparta a monarchy, although there 
 were two Kings at the head of it''. 
 
 It is perhaps unfortunate that usage has sanctioned the 
 extension of the term ' monarchy' in all states to which 
 a King is chief; in other words, has identified monarchy with 
 
 comprising both the republic and monarchy of Montesquieu, and the 
 monarchy of Rousseau being equivalent to the despotism of Montesquieu. 
 See below in the word Despotism. 
 
 ' ' In qua re publica, ' says Cicero, ' est unus aliquis perpetna potes- 
 tate, praesertim regia, qnamvis in ea sit et senatus, ut tum fuit Romae, 
 quum erant reges, ut Spartae Lycurgi legibus ; et ut sit aliquod etiam 
 populi jus, ut fuit apud nostros reges ; tamen illud excellit regium 
 nomen, neque potest ejusmodi res publica non regnum et esse et vocari.' — 
 De Rep. ii. 23, 43. Undoubtedly, states in which there are Kings may 
 properly be called kingdoms, but they are not therefore to be called 
 monarchies. It does not follow that, because some monarchs are Kings, 
 all Kings are monarchs. [AH Kings are monarchs, except in books on 
 political science.] 
 
 ^ 'A monarchy under a double race of Kings,' — Clinton, Fasti 
 HeUenici, part i. pref. p. 6. This is the only inconsistency in the re- 
 ceived use of monarchy and republic that I am aware of, as the govern- 
 ment of Sparla is generally called a republic; an irregularity which 
 Mr. Clinton has most consistently, according to the common usage, 
 corrected. [Sparta has been well described as an oligarchy at home, 
 governed by kings in the field.] 
 
MONARCHY. ROYALTY. KING 63 
 
 royalty. For as the mind, even of the most careful, is insen- 
 sibly influenced by words, the idea is naturally suggested that 
 there is a greater affinity between a commonwealth with a 
 ' King, and a genuine monarchy, than between a common- 
 wealth with a King, and a commonwealth with a chief elected 
 for a term of years. The difference between a state in which 
 one person has the whole sovereignty, and a state in 
 which the legislative sovereignty is shared among a large 
 number, of whom many are chosen by popular election, 
 is immense. The maxims and acts of the two governments, 
 and their influence on the community, must be most 
 dissimilar. But when we compare a royal commonwealth 
 with a commonwealth not royal (or, in common language, 
 a limited monarchy with a republic) the principal difference 
 is, that in one the chief is hereditary, and for life ; in the 
 other elective, either for life or for a term of years. It is not 
 that the forms of government differ greatly ; or the p6wers of 
 a King, and of a President, Doge, or Stadtholder ; but the 
 manner in which those powers are acquired, and the time 
 for which they endure. For instance, the government of 
 England resembles that of the United States of America 
 (barring the differences caused by the nature of a federal 
 union) far more nearly than that of Austria or Russia. The 
 representative franchise may be more extended, property 
 may be more equally divided, in one state than in the other : 
 but the principal difference in the construction of the sove- 
 reign power is, that in one state the chief is determined 
 by election, in the other by inheritance ; that in one state 
 the office lasts for life, in the other only for a limited time. 
 Yet Austria, Russia, and England, are generally classed 
 together as monarchies, and together opposed to the United 
 States as a republic. Monarchical institutions, in a limited 
 monarchy, are also frequently opposed to republican 
 institutions, and the two are considered as incompatible. 
 If, at the Revolution, the name of the King of England, 
 as well as his power, had been changed, but he had never- 
 theless exercised precisely the same influence in the 
 
64 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 constitution as the crown has exercised since that time, 
 the government would have been called republican, instead 
 of monarchical ; although the only difference would have 
 been in the name of the first person in the state. 
 
 The influence of ambiguities of this kind upon the course 
 of our thoughts is in most cases so subtle, that the fallacies 
 produced by them can seldom be detected and presented 
 to readers in a tangible form. The transition from the strict 
 to the popular sense of monarchy may, however, be traced 
 in the following argument of a celebrated institutional writer, 
 whose work unfortunately abounds in similar errors. In 
 speaking of the several advantages and disadvantages of the 
 three simple forms of government, Blackstone lays it down 
 that ' a monarchy is the most powerful of any ; all the 
 sinews of government being knit together, and united in 
 the hands of the prince *.' In another place, he says that 
 'the great end of society is to protect the weakness 
 of individuals by the united strength of the community ; 
 and the principal use of government is to direct that united 
 strength in the best and most effectual manner, to answer the 
 end proposed. Monarchical government (meaning absolute 
 monarchy) is allowed to be the fittest of any for this purpose : 
 it follows, therefore, from the very end of its institution, 
 that in a monarchy (meaning a limited monarchy) the 
 military power must be trusted in the hands of the prince ".' 
 
 One of the chief mischiefs of this confusion both of words 
 and thought, has been that, in comparing the advantages 
 of a limited monarchy and a repubUc (to use the common 
 expressions), it has not been perceived that the principal 
 question is, whether it is more advantageous that the 
 
 ' I Com. 50. 
 
 " I Com, 262. The well-known and often-quoted passage of Claudian 
 (3 Cons. Stilich., 114) — 
 
 'Nunquam libertas gratior extat 
 Quam sub rege pio ' — 
 
 ' the sentence,' according to Gibbon (ch. xxix. note 54) ' so familiar to 
 the friends of despotism,' — is not more applicable to absolute than to 
 limited Kings, although it is always applied to the former. 
 
MONARCHY. ROYALTY. KING ' 65 
 
 headship of the state should be determined by election 
 or succession, and whether it should last for life, or for 
 a term of years? All the other advantages actually 
 possessed by limited monarchies seem communicable to 
 republics, and vice versa. The real difference by which 
 their respective merits should be tried, is the mode of 
 determining the first person in the state. The objections 
 to an hereditary succession are l(as Gibbon ' and Paley have 
 remarked) obvious to all the world. To confer on a man 
 the largest political powers in a state, not because he is the 
 wisest or the best, but because he is the son of a particular 
 person, seems at first sight the very height of absurdity. 
 It would appear more reasonable to imitate the ancient 
 Aethiopians, and make the tallest or the fairest man King. 
 But the real, and not less obvious benefits, of hereditary 
 succession, are that it puts an end to all questions of supre- 
 macy ; that it prevents the constant existence of intrigues, 
 cabals, factions, and party measures, for the sake of attaining 
 to the first place in the state; and saves the community 
 from ever being disturbed by a contest for the possession 
 of its highest honours. It is not because a King is wiser 
 or better, or more versed in political affairs, or more skilled 
 in the art of governing, than any of his subjects, that he 
 is King. He is King that no one else may be King : 
 to make it certain that, as long as the established govern- 
 ment lasts, all attempts to obtain the chief rank in the 
 state will be fruitless. In the republics of Athens and 
 Syracuse, if a man by his political talents, or from any other 
 cause, obtained great influence over his fellow-citizens, 
 he might be banished by ostracism or petalism, lest he 
 should make himself prince over his fellow-citizens. Under 
 a King, such a person could never be first in the state, and 
 must always acknowledge a superior. Whatever his ambition, 
 or wealth, or station, or eloquence — whether he be a vic- 
 torious general, a noble formidable from his opulence and 
 connexioiis, or a statesman backed by a large and powerful 
 
 ' Decline and Fall, ch. vii, at the beginning. 
 F 
 
66 USE' AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 pairty^he must still be content cgnstantly to show at least 
 an outward respect to the royal name and person; and 
 gratefully himself receive, and see all others receive from 
 the King, the highest marks of honour, and the chief places 
 of power. The station and the hereditary succession of the 
 King render his possession of great political abiUty and 
 influence both improbable and hurtful ; while the impossi- 
 bility that a subject can become king, prevents his political 
 talents being wholly perverted by ambition'. In this 
 manner, the greatest and most useful talents are safely 
 brought into the service of the public,' and the good of 
 the individual is reconciled with the good of the community. 
 We may reverse the maxims of Aeschylus ", and say, that 
 it is both desirable to breed a lion in the state, and easy to 
 curb' it when grown into vigour. 
 
 Even if the evils caused by a perpetual competition for 
 the chief magistracy, and the danger of uniting the greatest 
 legal authority with the possession of the greatest personal 
 influence, are left out of the question, it is to be observed 
 that persons, who have made great sacrifices to obtain an 
 object, sometimes think that they are at liberty to abuse 
 their acquired poWer in order to indemnify themselves for 
 the toils which it has cost them to acquire it ; as the French 
 
 ' ' The advantages which seem to us to be pecnliar to this arrange- 
 ment are, first, to disarm the ambition of dangerous and turbulent 
 individuals, by removing the great prize of supreme authority, at all 
 times and entirely, from competition ; and secondly, to render this 
 authority more manageable and less hazardous, by delivering it over, 
 peaceably, and upon understood conditions, to an hereditary prince^ 
 instead of letting it be seized upon by a fortunate conqueror, who 
 would think himself entitled to use it, as conquerors commonly use 
 their booty, for his own exclusive gratification.' — Edinburgh Review, 
 vol. XX. p. 333. ' The chief advantage of monarchy consists in its taking 
 away the occasions of contention for the first place in the state, and, 
 in a manner, neutralizing that place by separating it entirely from any 
 notion of merit or popularity in the possessor.' — Ibid. p. 324. The 
 force of the argument with regard to conquerors, in the first of these 
 passages, is not very apparent. 
 
 * Ov XP^ \ioVTOS ffKVflvbv €V 7r(5\« Tpicpeiv. 
 
 ^v 5* eKTpatp^ Tts, Tots rp6iT0is tmjpeTuv. 
 [It is well not to breed a lion-whelp in a city ; but if one should be 
 bred up it is well to comply with his ways.] — ^Aristoph. Han. 1431. 
 
MONARCHY. ROYALTY. KING 67 
 
 judges, who bought their offices, reimbursed themselves by 
 taking bribes. Elective chiefs may likewise come to the 
 head of affairs, loaded with a debt of gratitude to their friends 
 and supporters, which they must at all rates pay, and which 
 they cannot pay consistently with the public good. 
 
 The argument of those who prefer an elective to an here- 
 ditary chief, on the ground of economy, is as old as the reign 
 of Charles the Second, when, according to Dryden, — 
 
 ' Others thonght kings an useless heavy load, 
 Who cost too much, and did too little good. 
 These were for laying honest David by, 
 On principles of pure good husbandry'.' 
 
 But this is a motive completely inadequate for the change 
 of an existing government, and would only turn the scale 
 at the creation of a new state, if the other benefits were 
 equally balanced. 
 
 Whatever may be the merits or demerits of hereditary 
 royalty, it stands on a perfectly different footing from here- 
 ditary nobility or title. The arguments for or against each 
 do not apply to the other ; nor does the one necessarily 
 require the presence of the other. 
 
 ' Absalom and Achitophel. 
 
 F 2 
 
VII 
 
 COMMONWEALTH. REPUBLIC. REPUBLICAN 
 
 Commonwealth, or republic, is a general name for all 
 governments in which the sovereign power resides in several 
 persons, whether they be few or many. Thus we speak of 
 the commonwealths or republics of Rome in early times, 
 Venice, &c., which were aristocracies ; of Athens, of Rome 
 in later times, &c., which were democracies. A few in- 
 stances of this usage will be sufiScient to exemplify.it. Thus 
 Machiavelli, at the beginning of his Principe, says, ' Tutti 
 li stati, tutti i dominii che hanno havuto e hanno imperio 
 sopra gli uomini sono stati e sono o republiche o principati.' 
 Dryden, in the following couplet, opposes commonwealths 
 generally to kingly governments (i. e. monarchies) : — 
 
 ' Plots, true or false, are necessary things 
 To raise up commonwealths and ruin kings'.' 
 
 Hume, in his Essay on the ' Populousness of Ancient 
 Nations,' remarks, that ' at present there is not one republic 
 in Europe, from one extremity of it to the other, that is 
 not remarkable for justice, lenity, and stability, equal to, or 
 even beyond Marseilles, Rhodes, or the most celebrated 
 in antiquity. Almost all of them are well-tempered aris- 
 tocracies'^! In this passage Hume makes aristocracy a 
 species of republic; on the other hand, so many writers have 
 
 • Absalom and Achitophel. 
 
 ' \_Essays, ed. Green and Grose, i. 409.] 
 
COMMONWEALTH. REPUBLIC 69 
 
 included democracy under it, that some have been led to 
 confine the term republic to democracies. Thus Crabb, 
 in his Dictionary of Synonyms, says, that 'governments 
 are divided by political writers into three classes — monar- 
 chical, aristocratic, and republican.' Here he makes a re- 
 public equivalent to a democracy ^ He does not, however, 
 adhere to this usage ; for afterwards he says, that ' most of 
 the constitutions of Europe, whether republican or monar- 
 chical, are indebted to time and the natural course of events 
 for their establishment " : ' where his republic includes all 
 governments not monarchies. 
 
 According to the custom already noticed of identifying 
 royalty with monarchy, or of calling all states in which a King 
 rules, monarchical, it is usual to class England and France 
 with monarchies, and not with commonwealths or republics, 
 to which, in strictness, they belong ". The interval in 
 English history, between the death of Charles the First and 
 the Restoration, is commonly known by the name of the 
 Commonwealth : although, during part of that time, the state 
 was more absolutely under the rule of one individual than 
 it has ever been since the Restoration, or, at any rate, 
 since the Revolution. By the writers, indeed, of the age 
 which preceded the Civil War, the English government (as 
 Mr. Mitford has remarked*) is often called a commonwealth: 
 but they appear to use this term as nearly synonymous with 
 
 ' This use of republic appears to be of very frequent occurrence, 
 though it is difficult to discover what is commonly signified by this 
 word. [In the Federalist, No. xiv, Madison distinguishes between a 
 democracy, in which the people meet and exercise the government in 
 person, and a republic, where they administer it by their representatives 
 and agents.] 
 
 2 In Government, Constitution. 
 
 ' Thus Hume notices ' the common opinion that no large state, such 
 as France or Great Britain, could ever be modelled into a common- 
 wealth; but that such a form of government can only take place in 
 a city or small territory.' — Essays. 
 
 * History of Greece, yo\. ix. p. 53. However, in the following passage 
 from Lord Bacon's Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and 
 Estates, ' commonwealth ' appears to be opposed to ' kingdom ' : — 
 ' In the great game of kingdoms and commonwealths, it is in the power 
 of princes or estates to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms.' 
 
70 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 state, or res publica. This is the sense in which Locke 
 uses the word in his treatise on government : and such he 
 considers to be its genuine signification '. Unquestionably, 
 however, since the end of Charles the First's reign, it has 
 received the narrower meaning of a republic (thus, at the 
 end of the' seventeenth century, a commonwealth' s-man 
 signified what a republican does now) ; although, even now, 
 it occasionally obtains its wider acceptation. And hence, 
 in such passages as that where Mr. Hallam calls the Kings 
 of England, 'the chiefs of the English commonwealth 'V it 
 is uncertain in what way the teirm should be understood. 
 Probably, however, no one would call an absolute monarchy 
 by this name ; would speak, for example, of the Turkish 
 commonwealth, or the French commonwealth under Louis 
 the Fourteenth '- 
 
 Commonwealth and commonweal are synonymous, and 
 mean a society formed for the common good ; wealth and 
 weal being originally the same word, and signifying welfare 
 or happiness. 
 
 Res publica is used by the Romans in rather a wider 
 acceptation, as it included all governments except a violent 
 despotism : thus Cicero, in his dialogue De re publica, says, 
 ' When all are subject to the rule of one tyrant, the state 
 cannot be called a res publica*'' 
 
 ' ' By commonwealth I must be understood all along to mean, not 
 a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent com- 
 munity, which the Latins signified by the word civitas ; to which the 
 word which best answers in our language is " commonwealth," and most 
 properly expresses such a society of men, which " community " or " city " 
 in English does not : for there may be subordinate communities in a 
 government ; and " city," amongst us, has a quite different notion from 
 commonwealth : and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use 
 the word " commonwealth " in that sense in which I find it used by King 
 James the First ; and I take it to be its genuine signification ; which, if 
 anybody dislike, I coQsent with him to change it for a better.' — On 
 Govermnent, b. ii. § 134. 
 
 ^ Constitutional History of England, c. 14. 
 
 ^ ' "Commonwealth," although not appropriately (query not j»appro- 
 priately) applied to any nation, is most fitted for republics.' — Crabb's 
 Mnglish Synonyms, in State. 
 
 ' 'Ergo lUam, rem populi, id est rem publicam, quis diceret tum cum 
 crudelitate unius oppressi essent universi ; neque esset unum vinculum 
 
COMMONWEALTH. REPUBLIC 71 
 
 A republican is defined by Johnson to be 'one who 
 thinks a commonwealth without monarchy the best govern- 
 ment.' More precisely, ' one who thinks a commonwealth 
 without royalty the best government.' A commonwealth 
 with royalty is usually called a monarchy. Republican, how- 
 ever, seems to have obtained a narrower sense than republic. 
 For republic is applied to all aristocracies and democracies 
 of which a King is not the head; whereas a republican 
 generally signifies a democrat, as opposed either to an 
 aristocrat, or to a favourer of kingly government '. 
 
 juris, nee consensus ac societas coetus, quod est populus ? . . . Eigo ubi 
 tyrannus est, ibi non vitiosam, ut heri dicebam, sed ut nunc ratio cogit, 
 dicendum est plane nnllam esse rem publicam.' — De Rep. 3. 31, 43. 
 
 ' [In the United States at the beginning of the present century most 
 active politicians called themselves Democratic Republicans. The two 
 halves of this name have become the badges of the two great parties.] 
 
VIII 
 
 ARISTOCRACY. OLIGARCHY. NOBILITY 
 
 Aristocracy signifies a government in which the sove- 
 reignty is shared by several persons, being less in number 
 than half the community ^ Such are the governments of 
 England, France, Bavaria, the United States of America, &c. 
 
 It also signifies a certain class in a state, whatever may 
 be the form of its government. Thus we speak of the 
 French aristocracy, when the government was a monarchy ; 
 of the aristocracy of Rome, when the government was 
 democratic : and many writers have called the English 
 government an aristocracy ; and a class of persons in 
 England, the aristocracy. 
 
 Aristocracy, as the name of an order or class of persons, 
 is applied variously to the following classes : — 
 
 1. To the class of nobles : as when we speak of the, 
 French aristocracy before 1789, meaning the clergy and 
 the noblesse ; and the English aristocracy, meaning the 
 members of the House of Lords and their families. 
 
 2. To the class of wealthy land-owners. In this sense 
 the members of the House of Lords, together with most 
 members of the House of Commons, and a considerable 
 portion of the rest of the community, would, in England, 
 form the aristocracy. Thus, in a recent pamphlet, it is 
 
 * [Lewis, following Austin, presents us with a definition which tends to 
 obscure the difference between government by a class of wellborn or 
 wealthy persons, and government by a body of representatives.] 
 
ARISTOCRACY. OLIGARCHY. NOBILITY 73 
 
 said, that 'For all England there are eighty-two county 
 members. These, if any, are supposed to be chosen by 
 the landed interest— the aristocracy'.' 
 
 3- To the class of rich men generally, from whatever 
 source their wealth is derived, or that class which, in 
 England, is known by the name of gentlemen ''. Thus, 
 Mr. Mill says, in his Essay on Government, that 'the 
 class which is universally described as both the most wise 
 and the most virtuous part of the community, the middle 
 rank, are wholly included in that part of the community 
 which is not the aristocratical " : '■ plainly identifying the 
 aristocracy with the rich. 
 
 The ambiguity of this word has been turned to great 
 account by modern writers and speakers, who shift from 
 one sense of it to another, as it suits their purpose, and 
 having succeeded in raising a prejudice against one class, 
 transfer and direct it against another, by merely con- 
 founding them under one name. Substantially, however, 
 ' aristocracy,' as the name of a class in England, is synony- 
 
 ^ Friendly Advice to the Lords (London, 1831), p. 12. 
 
 '^ In England, whenever gentlemen are spoken of as a class, the rich 
 are signified as opposed to the middle ranks and the poor. In a nar- 
 rower sense, and as applied to individuals, the word gentleman is used 
 to denote persons remarkable for the qualities and attainments which 
 ought to distinguish those who have had the advantage of a liberal 
 education, and, from their birth upwards, have associated with persons 
 of refined and cultivated minds. It is likewise employed, in a restricted 
 sense, to mean those who, by their wealth, are enabled, and by their dis- 
 position are induced, to live in entire idleness, engaged only in the pursuit 
 of pleasure. In this latter sense, Lord Chesterfield (if I am not mistaken) 
 remarked that it was unbecoming for a gentleman to walk quickly in the 
 streets, because It seemed as if he had some business or occupation. So 
 Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, defining the popular acceptations of words, 
 says, that ' things useful are those which bring a profit ; things gentle- 
 manlike (lA.eufl^/)ia), those which are for the sake of enjoyment ' (Jihet. 
 i. 5, 7)- Nevertheless, this latter meaning is commonly given to the 
 word in question by those who scarcely belong to the class which they 
 describe — the vulgar in mind — who seek to obtain admiration by in- 
 sisting on the casual eccentricities of a few, or at least to the imimportant 
 accidents of the class, without adverting to its genuine characteristics, 
 which they are unable to appreciate. 
 
 » Supp. to Encycl. Brit. vol. iv. p. 505. See below in Rich and 
 POOR. 
 
74 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 mous with ' the rich ' in the widest sense : and any measure 
 tending to increase the power of the rich is considered 
 aristocratic ; and ' any measure tending to increase the 
 power of the poor is considered anti-aristocratic. 
 
 Oligarchy, as well as aristocracy, signifies both a form 
 of government, and a class of persons in a state. It is 
 generally used as an opprobrious term by those who think 
 either that ,the government is in the hands of too few, or 
 that in an aristocracy the rulers govern oppressively. 
 
 Nobility is a narrower term than either aristocracy or 
 oligarchy : and signifies only those who have titles of 
 honour or dignity, accompanied with political privileges '- 
 
 In the republics of ancient Greece, where there were 
 no titled orders, or hereditary marks of distinction con- 
 ferred by the statej the nobles were not distinguished 
 from the rest of the community by any precise line ; but 
 nobility was a moral rather than a legal distinction, and 
 consisted in the ancient wealth and respectability of a 
 man's family''. It appears that the distinction between 
 persons of high and low birth {evyeveis, dva-yevels) existed 
 down to the latest times of the Greek states, even when it 
 received not the slightest countenance from the law ° 
 
 ' See Lord Bacon's Essay on Nobility. 
 
 ^ See Welcker's Prolegomena to Thevgnis, p. 58. 
 
 ' The tiniversally prevailing opinion in favour of noble or gentle 
 descent, i. c. of u descent from a wealthy and respectable family, is 
 founded on truth, so far as one generation is concerned ; for a person 
 brought up by parents in the same rank of life to which he himself 
 belongs is more likely to have early formed the habits and imbibed the 
 notions suitable to his station, than one who has been the cause either of 
 his own rise or fall in society^. Beyond this point, the feeling of pride 
 in an illustrious ancestry is akin to that which makes us glory in the 
 renown and great deeds of our countrymen : the national pride which an 
 Englishman feels in being the countryman of Bacon and Shakespeare, is 
 exactly analogous to the family pride of an individual in the ancient 
 exploits of his forefathers. 
 
IX 
 
 DEMOCRACY 
 
 Democracy properly signifies a government in which a 
 majority of the whole nation or community partake of the 
 sovereign power. Such were, at one time, the govern- 
 ments of Athens, Rome, and many other Grecian and 
 Italian states, as well as of some of the Italian and German 
 cities in the middle ages, in which all the male adult 
 citizens had a voice in the supreme legislative assembly. 
 
 It is also used to signify a government in which either 
 a majority or a large portion of the people have, by means 
 of the right of election, an influence on the appointment 
 of members of the suprenje power. In this sense the 
 federal government of the United States^ as well as the 
 governments of the several states, are called democracies ; 
 although, both in the one and in the others, the sovereign 
 power resides in a very small minority of the whole people. 
 Even during the rule of the multitude in the French 
 revolution, at the worst periods of the reign of terror, 
 the sovereignty was never shared by a large part of the 
 population of France. The government was really in the 
 hands of the lower orders of Paris, and hence it was termed 
 a democracy. This agrees with the definition of Aristotle, 
 who says that democracy is not, according to the common 
 opinion, a government in which the many govern, but a 
 government in which the poor govern. It so happens (he 
 adds) that the rich are always the minority, the poor the 
 
^6 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 majority of the people ; and hence accidentally a democracy 
 is a government where the many rule '. 
 
 In the following passage, Mr. Millar extends the term 
 ' democracy ' to those governments where the right of voting 
 for the election of members of the sovereign body belongs 
 to a majority of the nation. ' Many politicians,' he says, 
 'have asserted that a republican constitution is peculiarly 
 adapted to a small state, and cannot be maintained in a 
 large community. This doctrine seems to have arisen 
 from a view of the ancient republics, in which the whole 
 people composed the legislative assembly ; and is evidently 
 inapplicable to those modern systems of democracy, in 
 which the legislative power is committed to national repre- 
 sentatives. Nothing is more common than for philosophers 
 to be imposed upon by the different acceptation of words ^.' 
 It is, however, very questionable whether Mr. Millar and 
 other philosophers, who have given the name of democracy 
 to governments in which the sovereignty belongs to a small 
 minority, have not themselves been imposed upon by the 
 doubtful acceptation of words ; or, even if they have 
 advisedly employed this phraseology, whether it is not 
 likely to impose upon others less wary and keen-sighted 
 than themselves, less familiar , with political reasoning, and 
 less aware of the fallacies likely to arise from the use of 
 equivocal terms. 
 
 In states where there is a slave population, the form of 
 government is commonly decided by the arrangement 
 of the sovereign power among the freemen or citizens : 
 thus it has been above remarked that the government of 
 Athens was, and is always called, a democracy, although the 
 whole number of the freemen, men, women, and children, 
 was not, in the times of which we have any accounts, above 
 a fifth part of the number of slaves. In like manner, some 
 of the southern states of the American Union are said to 
 
 * Pol. iii. 8. 3 ; iv. 4. 2 ; v. i. 12 ; vi. i. i. See below in Rich and 
 Poor. 
 ^ Hist. View of English Government, vol. iii. p. 325. 
 
DEMOCRACY 77 
 
 possess a democratic government, notwithstanding the large 
 slave population which they contain '. This phraseology 
 has been objected to by Mr. Bentham, who in his Frag- 
 ment on Government, has the following remarks : ' What 
 is curious,' he says, ' is, that the same persons who tell you 
 that democracy is a form of government under which the 
 supreme power is vested in all the members of a state, will 
 also tell you that the Athenian commonwealth was a de- 
 mocracy. Now the truth is, that in the Athenian common- 
 wealth, upon the most moderate computation, it is not one 
 tenth part of the inhabitants of the Athenian state that 
 ever at a time partook of the supreme power; women, 
 children, and slaves being taken into the account ".' If, in 
 computing the numbers of a community in respect of 
 its government, women and children are not taken into 
 the account, not only has there never been, but probably 
 there never will be a democracy, in whatever sense that 
 word is taken. As to slaves, the constant usage has un- 
 questionably been to exclude their numbers in determining 
 the question of aristocracy or democracy; and to attend 
 solely to the distribution of the sovereign power among 
 the citizens, freemen, or body politic (TroXiVfu^a). Never- 
 theless, Mr. Bentham's remark should never be neglected ; 
 and in comparing two governments, it should always be 
 borne in mind, that although they may be the same in 
 name, their true characters may be widely different, if in 
 the one state all manual labour, whether in manufactures 
 or husbandry, was performed by slaves, in the other by 
 free men. 
 
 Mr. Mill, in his Essay on Government, appears to 
 follow the common use of this word, not assenting to 
 
 ' [Slavery was abolished by a Constitutional Amendment passed 
 Dec. 18, 1865; a subsequent amendment, passed March 30, 1870, 
 provides that no discrimination shall be made among citizens of the 
 United States in the exercise of the frauchise or in the right to hold office 
 in any state, on account of race, colour, nativity, property, education, or 
 creed.] 
 
 ' [Ed. Montague, p. 180 «.] 
 
78 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 Mr. Bentham's remark ; for he says that ' in Greece, not- 
 withstanding the defects of democracy, human nature ran 
 a more brilliant career than it has ever done in any other 
 age or country '.' Now if we take from the rolls of 
 democracy the illustrious name of Athens, and give to the 
 cause of aristocracy the splendid achievements of her sons 
 in every department of literature, science, and art, there 
 will be little ground for extolling the renown of Grecian 
 democracy. Indeed there was no republic in Greece which, 
 according to this phraseology, would not have had an 
 aristocratic government. 
 
 ' Suppl. to Encyclopedia Brit. p. 494. 
 
X 
 
 MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF. POWERS 
 
 A MIXED government is opposed to a pure or simple 
 government, and belongs to a classification of governments 
 upon a different principle from any hitherto examined ; 
 though what that principle may be, or in what manner it 
 is connected with the theory of the balance of powers in 
 a state, to which it is always linked, cannot be very readily 
 or satisfactorily determined. The common notion appears 
 to be, that there are three pure forms of government, viz. 
 monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, in which there is 
 no balance of powers : but that by combining any two of 
 these forms of government, or all three together, a mixed 
 government is formed in which a balance of powers exists ; 
 that is to say, in which the elementary parts of the com- 
 pounded constitution mutually check and counterpoise one 
 another. This notion 'is subject to the obvious difficulty, 
 that as the triple division of governments is strictly accu- 
 rate and logical, it must be exhaustive, and its members 
 must be opposed to one another ; whence it follows, that 
 there can be no form of government which is not one of 
 these three, and that a combination of any two of them, 
 much more of all three, is as inconceivable as that a 
 number should be odd and even at the same time; inas- 
 much as the notion of one excludes that of any other. 
 For example : monarchy is the government of one, aristo- 
 cracy of more than one : therefore, as a state cannot be 
 
8o USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 governed both by one person and by several persons, it 
 cannot, at the same time, be both a monarchy and an 
 aristocracy. Aristocracy is a government of less than half, 
 democracy of more than half the community : therefore, 
 as a state cannot, at the same time, be governed by more 
 and less than half its members, it cannot be, at the same 
 time, a democracy and an aristocracy. Still less can it be 
 governed by one, by a minority, and a majority of its 
 members, all at once. On whatever principle the division 
 of governments into monarchies, aristocracies, and demo- 
 cracies is taken — whether on the numbers of the sovereign 
 body, on the presence of a King in the state, on the 
 inheritance of the chief magistracy, on the wealth or 
 poverty of the governors, or any other circumstance — the 
 difficulty still remains the same : for by whatever test 
 monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, are distinguished 
 from one another, by the very hypothesis there is a dis- 
 tinction between them, and, therefore, no two can be 
 united in the same state. This irreconcilable hostility 
 between the three forms of government, may be illustrated 
 by the three numbers in the Greek language, the singular, 
 dual, and plural ; each of which represents something 
 distinct from the others, and incompatible with either or 
 both of them. A noun can no more be at once of 
 the singular, dual, and plural numbers, than a state can 
 be at the same time a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a 
 democracy '. 
 
 ' D'Alembert, in his Analysis of Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois, dis- 
 poses of this difficulty in the following easy manner ; that is, he states 
 the inconsistency, and thinks thJt by the statement he accounts for it. 
 ' Three sorts of government,' he says, ' may be distinguished — the re- 
 publican, the monarchical, and the despotic. In the republican, the 
 people in a body has the sovereign power. In the monarchical, one 
 person governs by the fundamental laws. In the despotic, no other law 
 is known than the will of the master, or rather of the tyrant. This does 
 not mean that then are not in the world any but these three kinds of 
 states ; it does not even mean that there are states which belong wholly 
 and strictly to some one of these forms : most states are, as it were, mixed 
 or shaded with one another. In one the monarchy inclines to despotism; 
 in another monarchical is combined with republican government; in a 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 8l 
 
 > As the use of the term in question is quite famihar and 
 established in language, and yet there appears no way of 
 escaping from the perplexity to which it gives occasion, 
 it will be desirable to examine the principal passages in 
 the works of political writers, where the doctrine of mixed 
 governments is laid down. 
 
 Plato, in his ' Treatise on Laws,' introduces the Lace- 
 daemonian interlocutor in the dialogue, speaking thus : 
 ' When I consider the constitution of Lacedaemon, I cannot 
 readily say by what name it should be called. In the first 
 place, it appears to resemble a despotism, for the power of 
 the Ephors has a marvellously despotic character : and yet 
 it sometimes seems to be more democratic than the govern- 
 ment of any other state. On the other hand, not to call it 
 an aristocracy appears altogether absurd. Moreover, it has 
 Kings who hold their dignity for Mfe, belonging to a lineage 
 confessedly more ancient than any other in Greece. So 
 that being thus suddenly called on for my opinion, I must 
 acknowledge myself unable to define the constitution of my 
 native country.' The Cretan then adds, ' It appears that 
 I am in the same difficulty myself: for I cannot say posi- 
 tively that the constitution of Cnosus (in Crete) can be 
 distinguished by any one of these names.' Upon which 
 the Athenian remarks, 'The truth is, my friends, that the 
 governments of your two countries are severally made up 
 of all these different forms '.' 
 
 Aristotle, after speaking of the mode of establishing a 
 government between an oligarchy and a democracy, by 
 taking some of the peculiarities of each, and combining 
 them in the same state, proceeds as follows : — ' The test 
 
 third, not the whole, but only a part of the people, have the power of 
 making laws. But the preceding division is not less accurate or less just. 
 The three kinds of government which it includes are so distinguished 
 that properly they have nothing in common ; and, moreover, all the states 
 which we know partake of one or the other of them.' D'Alembert here 
 proposes to remove the difficulty by the very considerations which give 
 rise to it. 
 
 ' Leg. b. iv. p. 7i3, ed. Steph. The final remark of the Athenian 
 stands thus in the original : ovtos ydp, Si dpiffToi, TroKtretwv fier^xfTe. 
 
 G 
 
82 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 by which to try whether democracy and oligarchy have 
 been well mixed, is that the same government may be called 
 either by one name or the other. The perfection of the 
 mixture is evidently the cause of this doubt ; and the same 
 is the case with regard to anything placed between two 
 extremes, as it seems to partake of both. An instance of 
 this uncertainty is afforded by the Lacedaemonian consti- 
 tution, which some call a democracy, some an oligarchy : 
 a democracy, because there are in it many democratic 
 institutions ', such as the equal treatment of the ricb and 
 poor, both as regards education and the public tables ; and 
 of the two chief offices, the one (the Gerusia) is conferred 
 by the people, and to the other (the Ephoralty) they are 
 eligible : an oligarchy, because many of its institutions 
 are oligarchical ; such as that all the offices are conferred 
 by election, and none by lot — that a few persons have the 
 power of inflicting sentence of death and banishment, and 
 many more regulations of a like kind. A constitution which 
 is well mixed ought to appear to be both, and neither, of the 
 governments of which it is composed : and it should preserve 
 itself without foreign aid ; that is, both parties in the state, 
 the rich and the poor, should be contented with the existing 
 order of things ^.' 
 
 The next writer to be noticed, in reference to this 
 question, is Polybius, who, when about to prove that the 
 Roman government was mixed, introduces his subject by 
 speaking of the Lacedaemonian constitution in the following 
 terms : — 
 
 ' Lycurgus, instead of adopting either of the single forms 
 of government, collected what was excellent in them all, 
 and so joined together the principles that were peculiar to 
 each several form, that no one of them might be extended 
 beyond proper bounds and slide into the evil to which it 
 
 ' In the original, we should, as it appears, read Sid to ST]iioicpaniciiv 
 iroXAd rfiv tA^iv Ix^'v, for Bid to Sr]iu>KpaTiKa iroWcL t^i/ toIiv «x"''- 
 
 ' Pal. iv. 9. Compare what is said on the mixed nature of the 
 Lacedaemonian government, in ii. 6, 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 83 
 
 was inclined by nature ; but that each separate power, being 
 still counteracted by the rest, might be retained in due 
 position, and the whole government be evenly poised and 
 balanced — on the principle by which a vessel is steadied 
 by being impelled against the wind.' After exemplifying 
 the manner in which the different powers in the Lacedae- 
 monian government mutually checked one another, and 
 making some further remarks, he proceeds to say that ' the 
 three kinds of government of which we have been speaking 
 were all found united in the commonwealth of Rome, and 
 so even was the balance between them all, and so regular 
 the administration that resulted from their union, that it was 
 no easy thing, even for the Romans themselves, to determine 
 with assurance whether the entire state was to be esteemed 
 an aristocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy. For if they 
 turned their view upon the power of the consuls, the govern- 
 ment appeared to be purely monarchical and regal. If, 
 again, the authority of the senate was considered, it then 
 seemed to wear the form of aristocracy. And, lastly, if 
 regard was had to the share which the people possessed 
 in the administration of affairs, it then appeared plainly to 
 be a democracy '^.^ Hence Cicero, doubtless adopting the 
 opinions of Polybius, laid it down in his Dialogue De 
 Republica, that ' the best form of government is a moderate 
 mixture of royalty, nobility, and democracy ^.' In the same 
 ^treatise he says that 'he does not know whether royalty 
 (i.e. monarchy) is not far preferable to any other simple 
 form of government — if indeed he could approve of any 
 simple form '.' 
 
 ' Polybius, vi. 10, 11. Hampton's translation has been followed, 
 except in some places, where he seemed to depart unnecessarily from 
 the original. 
 
 " ' Statu esse optimo constitutam rem publicam quae ex tribus 
 generibus illis, regali et optimati et popular!, confusa modice,' nee 
 puniendo irritet animum immanem ac, ferum . . .' — De Rep. ii. 23. In 
 this passage, which is preserved by a grammarian, and does not form part 
 of the, fragments discovered by Mai, the last words are either corrupt or 
 mutilated. 
 
 ' Ibid. In another place, he says, that a simple form is ' non per- 
 fectum neque optimum, sed tolerabile tamen,' i. 26. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 Some years afterwards, Tacitus, following only the course 
 of his own vigorous and original mind, remarked that ' all 
 states are governed either by the people, the nobles, or 
 a single person ; but a form of government, selected and 
 combined from all these kinds, is more easily praised than 
 put in practice, or, if put in practice, is not likely to prove 
 lasting '.' 
 
 Having extracted these detailed passages from the ancient 
 political writers. I will now subjoin some of the doctrines of 
 modern philosophers on this subject, with whom the theory 
 of mixed governments is sometimes supposed to have origin- 
 ated " : although the foregoing extracts prove, that not only 
 the notion of combining the simple forms of government 
 was current in antiquity, but that the doctrine of the halance 
 of powers was likewise known. Indeed, this very expression 
 is employed by Polybius to signify the reciprocal action of 
 the different parts of the sovereign body. 
 
 Blackstone's account of the mixture of the three forms 
 of government in the British constitution, is so strongly 
 marked with the vagueness and obscurity which characterize 
 his method of treating political subjects, that his opinions 
 on this point cannot be very satisfactorily ascertained. His 
 doctrine on this question is, however, chiefly contained in 
 the following passage. After having described the partition 
 of the sovereign power among the King, the Lords, and the 
 Commons, he proceeds to say that 'in no other shape could 
 
 ' Annals, iv. 33. Tacitus was probably led to this remark, by con- 
 sidering the political changes of his own country, in which a despotism 
 had been submitted to, as a less evil than the anarchy which it had super- 
 seded. Otherwise it is not easy to understand by what course of thought he 
 arrived at this opinion : for the Spartan constitution, which had a longef 
 duration than that of any other Greek or Italian state with which we are 
 acquainted, was, by all the ancient politicians, considered to be a mixed 
 government. [Tacitus was perhaps thinking of the empire of the Caesars 
 in its early days, when the form of a republic was combined with 
 monarchy. In this form, the empire was not, in fact, lasting; it soon 
 developed into a despotism.] 
 
 ^ ' The political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three 
 regular forms of government (viz. democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy). 
 All other species of government, -they say, are either corruptions of, or 
 reducible to, these three.' — Blackstone, i Com. 49. 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 85 
 
 we be so certain of finding the three great qualities of 
 government so well and so happily united. If the supreme 
 power were lodged in any one of the three branches sepa- 
 rately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of either 
 absolute monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy ; and so want 
 two of the three principal ingredients of good polity — 
 either virtue, wisdom, or power. If it were lodged in any 
 two of the branches, — for instance, in the King and House 
 of Lords — our laws might be providently made, and well 
 executed ; but they might not always have the good of the 
 people in view : if lodged in the King and Commons, we 
 should want that circumspection and mediatory cautioi* 
 which the wisdom of the peers is to afford : if the supreme 
 rights of legislature were lodged in the two Houses only, 
 and the King had no negative upon their proceedings, they 
 might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative, 
 or perhaps abolish the kingly office, and thereby weaken 
 (if not totally destroy) the strength of the executive power \' 
 Rousseau says, that 'properly speaking, there is not such 
 a thing as a simple form of government. A single prince 
 must have subordinate magistrates ; a popular government 
 must have a head ".' The same extraordinary doctrine ° is 
 likewise maintained by Paley, though not on the same 
 grounds :— ' Political writers,' he observes, ' enumerate three 
 principal forms of government, which, however, are to be 
 regarded rather as the simple forms, by some combination 
 and intermixture of which all actual governments are com- 
 posed, than as anywhere existing in a pure and elementary 
 state.' Then, after treating of monarchy, aristocracy, and 
 democracy, he adds, that 'A mixed government is composed 
 by the combination of two or more of the simple forms of 
 government above described *.' It may be observed that, 
 in all these passages, either one or each of the kinds of 
 
 ' I Com. 51 ; and compare Bentham's Fragment on Government, ch. 3. 
 " Contrat Social, liv. iii. ch. 7. 
 
 ' [When the terms are explained, there seems to be nothing 'extra- 
 ordinary' in the doctrine here set forth.] 
 ■• Moral and Political Philosophy, b. vi. ch. 6. 
 
86 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 republic, i.e. aristocracy or democracy, is supposed to enter 
 into the composition of a mixed government ; but in the 
 following extract from Mandeville's Jfable of the Bees, it 
 is assumed that a combination may be formed of a monarchy 
 and a republic generally. — ' These are the arts which tend 
 to worldly greatness : what sovereign power soever makes 
 a good use of them, that has any considerable nation to 
 govern — whether it be a monarchy, a commonwealth, or 
 a mixture of both — can never fail of making it flourish '.' 
 
 Although there are some prevailing ideas which seem 
 to run through all the above passages, yet there are no less 
 obvious differences in the sentiments of the various writers. 
 For instance, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Tacitus, and Black- 
 stone, conceive that there may be both simple and mixed 
 governments — and such is probably the common opinion. 
 Rousseau and Paley, however, maintain that no govern- 
 ment can be simple; while, on the other hand, Mr. Mill 
 has proved, by a long and laboured argument, that no 
 government can be mixed ''. These contradictions and in- 
 consistencies may, however, as it appears, be explained by 
 the aid of the following considerations, although they cannot 
 be reconciled either with reason or with one another. 
 
 I. When a government is called ' mixed,' on account of 
 certain institutions established in it by the sovereign power, 
 the origin of the appellation may be explained on the 
 following principles. In a monarchy, where one rules — 
 in an ' aristocracy or oligarchy, where the few rule — or in 
 a democracy, where the many rule — certain practices and 
 institutions are generally found to prevail, and to be in 
 harmony with (what is termed) the spirit of the constitu- 
 tion. Such, for example, in an aristocracy, is any measure 
 tending to lessen the number and increase the power of the 
 ruling few ; in a democracy, to increase both the number 
 and the power of the ruling many. These several usages 
 and institutions thus acquire the name of monarchical, 
 
 ' Fable of the Bees, vol. i. p. ii6 [ed. 1724], 
 ^ On Government, p. 496. ^ 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 8^ 
 
 aristocratic, and democratic. If, then, there is a state 
 in which several of the institutions thought characteristic 
 of either government coexist ; the original principle of 
 division, viz. the number of the governing body, is lost 
 sight of, and the government is said to be mixed of 
 monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. It is on this 
 principle that Plato represents the Lacedaemonian as 
 a mixed government. It has certain institutions which 
 resemble those of the simple states. Thus the Ephors 
 have a power resembling that exercised by an arbitrary 
 monarch ; the people have likewise a power resembling 
 that which they enjoy in a democracy ; the nobles have 
 a power resembling that which they possess in an aris- 
 tocracy : and hence, neglecting the principle on which 
 these governments are called monarchies, aristocracies, 
 and democracies, Plato doubts whether a state, containing 
 institutions similar *to those caused by these various 
 arrangements of the sovereign power, is to be named 
 by one appellation or the other ; and ends by determining 
 that it has an equal right to all. So, again, Polybius, 
 because the Roman consuls had, on certain occasions, 
 a power which a monarch possesses at all times — because 
 the senate enjoyed some of the powers belonging to 
 a council of nobles in an aristocracy — and because the 
 people had much of the power belonging to the people 
 in a democracy — decides that the • Roman government 
 was mixed of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. In 
 a nearly similar manner Aristotle prescribes the manner 
 in which a constitution is to be compounded of oligarchical 
 and democratical institutions ; adding, that the mixture 
 is then most perfect, when it is doubtful whether the 
 government should be called an oligarchy or democracy, 
 and may with propriety be said to be either. Aristotle 
 has, in the passage in question, expressed his doctrines 
 with his usual perspicuity and precision ; so that the purport 
 of his reasoning, and the origin of his phraseology, may 
 both be plainly discerned : but if he had adhered to his 
 
88 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 own definition of the three forms of government, formed 
 on the numbers of the ruling body', he never could have 
 conceived the existence of a doubt as to the name by which 
 a government should be distinguished. 
 
 It is evident that this theory of mixed governments, 
 proceeding on the character of the institutions of a state, 
 abandons the division of governments by the numbers of 
 the governors, which it nevertheless presupposes; for the 
 institutions which form the test of the mixture are them- 
 selves characterized by the names of the simple forms of 
 government, defined by the numbers of the sovereign body, 
 in which they commonly prevail. All, therefore, that 
 need be further remarked on this part of the subject is, 
 that the division of governments into monarchies, aris- 
 tocracies, and democracies, and the division into simple 
 and mixed governments, are cross-divisions, founded on 
 distinct principles ; the principle of classification for the 
 latter division being the presence or absence, in a com- 
 bined form, of certain practices, laws, and institutions, 
 which are assumed to be characteristic of monarchy, 
 aristocracy, or democracy, as determined by the distribution 
 of the sovereign power. Consequently, these two divisions 
 are perfectly consistent with each other; and a constitu- 
 tion may be, at the same time, an aristocracy, for example, 
 in respect of the number of the governors, and a mixed 
 government in respect of its laws and institutions. 
 
 2. A government is sometimes called mixed, when, by 
 a change in the relations of the persons composing the 
 sovereign body, or by lodging the entire sovereignty in 
 a part of that body instead of the whole, the government 
 would become monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical. 
 The train of thought by which some persons are led to 
 take this view of mixed governments, appears to proceed 
 as follows. When people see, in any state, a power which, 
 if all other powers were abolished, would make a state 
 
 ' Pol. iii. 7 di'a7K^ (hcu xipiov tj iva fj 6Xiyovs ^ Toirs iroWois. ' One, 
 or a few, or the majority, musi of necessity be sovereign.' 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 89 
 
 either monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical (in the 
 proper sense of those terms), they call that power the 
 monarchy, the aristocracy, or the democracy ; and if there 
 are two or three such powers in a state, then they say that 
 it has a mixed government. Thus, in England, if the King 
 was alone sovereign, and the Houses of Lords and Commons 
 were abolished, the government would be a monarchy ; 
 if the King and Commons were abolished, and only the 
 Lords remained, the government would be an aristocracy; 
 if only the House of Commons remained, then, according 
 to the common acceptation of democracy, the government 
 would be democratical. But as all these powers coexist 
 at one and the same time, the government is said to be 
 mixed. This is the manner in which Blackstone treats 
 the English constitution in the passage cited above : he 
 considers what would be the effect if the whole sovereign 
 power was lodged in each one of the three branches, 
 to the exclusion of the others ; and he then pronounces 
 that the government is mixed. Persons who try a mixed 
 government by this touchstone are, equally with those 
 who use the criterion of institutions, debarred from using 
 the classification of governments by the numbers of the 
 rulers, as opposed to mixed governments : for even they 
 must admit that these two divisions are quite consistent 
 with each other, and that a government may be, at the 
 same time, an aristocracy, for example, in respect of the 
 numbers of its governors, and a mixed government in 
 respect of the construction of its sovereign body. On the 
 principle adopted by Blackstone, all governments of more 
 than one, or republics, must be mixed governments ; for, 
 in every republic, if the chief magistrate was sovereign, 
 it would be a monarchy : and therefore, whether it is an 
 aristocratic or democratic republic, its government must 
 equally be mixed. Thus if the first' Archon or General at 
 Athens, the Doge of Venice, or the Stadtholder of the 
 United Provinces, had been sovereign, Athens, Venice, 
 and the United Provinces would have been monarchies. 
 
go USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 So the government of the United States of America is 
 mixed, because, if the President was sovereign, it would be 
 a monarchy ; if the Senate, an aristocracy ; if the House 
 of Representatives, a democracy. This mode of considering 
 mixed governments proceeds, in great measure, from an 
 unperceived ambiguity of the words ' aristocracy ' and ' de- 
 mocracy,' which mean either a form of government, or a 
 class of persons in a state ; and of the word ' monarchy,' 
 which, properly signifying the sovereignty of one, is some- 
 times synonymous with royalty, the form of government, 
 or the royal power in a state. Hence it is thought, that 
 because there is in a state, monarchy (meaning the King), 
 and an aristocracy and a democracy (meaning classes of 
 persons), therefore the constitution is compounded of the 
 three forms of government so called. This transition from 
 the one signification to the other may be conveniently 
 illustrated by the following extract from Mr. Mill's Essay 
 on Government. Speaking of the union of monarchy,' 
 aristocracy, and democracy ^, in the same state, he says : 
 ' As a part of this doctrine of the mixture of the simple 
 forms of government, it may be proper to inquire, whether 
 an union may not be possible of two of them? Three 
 varieties of this union may be conceived ; the union of the 
 monarchy with aristocracy, or the union of either with 
 democracy. Let us first suppose that monarchy is united 
 with aristocracy (i.e. the forms of government). Tfieir 
 power (i.e. the power of the King and the aristocratic 
 class, not of the forms of government called monarchy and 
 aristocracy) is equal or not equal. If it is not equal V &c- 
 And he proceeds to examine a question wholly different from 
 that proposed, viz. whether two powers in a state can be 
 equal : and moreover equal, not in legal power, but in 
 moral influence. A trace of the same mode of reasoning 
 
 ' See Mr. Mill's definition of these three forms of government, above, 
 
 P- 56- 
 
 "^ This confusion of the different senses of monarchy, aristocracy, and 
 democracy, is well illustrated by Mr. Beijtham's exposition of Blackstone's 
 sophisms, Fragment on Government [ed. Montague, p. 173]. 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 91 
 
 may likewise be plainly discerned in the following passage 
 from a recent article in the Edinburgh Review, on the 
 subject of Mr. Mill's Essay on Government. ' Mr. Mill,' 
 it is there said, ' tells us that it is a mistake to imagine 
 that the English Government is mixed. He holds, we 
 believe . . . that it is purely aristocratical. There 
 certainly is an aristocracy in England, and we are afraid 
 that their power is greater than it ought to be,' &c. The 
 Reviewer proceeds to show that the aristocratic class are 
 restrained from abusing their power by certain moral 
 motives ; whence he infers that the English' government 
 is mixed'. But even if the class of persons in England, 
 called the aristocracy, had greater powers than they really 
 possess, it would not follow that the English government 
 is an aristocracy. The French aristocracy were a powerful 
 class under the old French rkgime, but the government was 
 not the less a monarchy. So hkewise there was usually 
 a powerful aristocracy of nobles or rich men in the Greek 
 and Italian democracies, if it had not been exterminated 
 or expelled in the fierce dissensions and massacres which 
 so often took place in those ill-constructed and ill-ad- 
 ministered commonwealths. In like manner, Mr. Mill's 
 elaborate argument that monarchy cannot be mixed with 
 aristocracy, is founded on the merest verbal confusion. If 
 monarchy means, the government of one, of course it can- 
 not be mixed with a government of more than one; if it 
 means royalty, it can plainly be combined with aristocracy : 
 indeed, in most kingly governments, both of ancient and 
 modern times, the King has only been the head of the 
 governing body. 
 
 3. A third manner of viewing mixed governments, is to 
 make them consist, not in the arrangement or relations of 
 the sovereign body, nor in the political institutions of the 
 state, but in the moral influence exercised by different 
 
 ' Edinburgh Review,-io\.\.-^.l<:&. [The quotation is from Macaulay's 
 reply to the Westminster Review on the Utilitarian Theory of Govern- 
 ment.] 
 
92 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 individuals and classes in the community. This notion of 
 a mixed government is contained in the sentiments which 
 Dionysius puts in the mouth of Manius Valerius, when 
 addressing the Senate on an extension of the political 
 rights of the plebeians : whence we may infer that, in the 
 age of Augustus, the praise of a mixed government was 
 one of the commonplaces of the Greek rhetoricians. ' That 
 the Roman state,' he says, ' will not be either an unmixed 
 oligarchy or an unmixed democracy, but a constitution 
 compounded of both these forms, is to us senators a signal 
 advantage. Either of these governments, when existing 
 singly, is most prone to run into violence and lawlessness. 
 But when they are mixed in even proportion, any party 
 in the state which may aim at change, and seek to unsettle 
 the existing order of things, is restrained by the party of 
 more moderate disposition, and less inclined to deviate 
 from their accustomed habits'.' It is in this light also 
 that Cicero considers the subject in his Treatise De Re- 
 fublica. ' AH,' he says, ' who have the power of life and 
 death over the people are despots : although they prefer 
 being called Kings in imitation of the title of Jupiter. 
 Again, when certain persons either from their wealth, 
 their family, or other means, obtain the command of 
 public affairs, they are in truth a mere faction, though 
 they are called by the name of nobles. And if the people 
 have the chief power, and all things are governed by 
 their will, this state is called liberty, but is in fact 
 licentiousness. When, however, there is a mutual fear of 
 one man for another man, and of one class for another 
 class, then, as no one relies on his own strength, a sort of 
 compact is formed between the people and the nobles; 
 whence arises that excellent form of polity, a mixed constitu- 
 tion ^' A similar view of mixed governments is taken by 
 
 ' Ant. Rom. b. vii. ch. 55. 
 
 " ' Sed quum alius alium timet, et homo hominem, et ordo ordinem, 
 turn quia nemo sibi confidlt, quasi pactio fit inter populum et potentes : 
 ex quo exsistit id, quod Scipio laudabat, conjunctum civitatis genus.' — 
 De Rep. iii. 14. 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 93 
 
 Sir J. Mackintosh, in his Discourse on the Law of Nature 
 and Nations; who considers the mixture of a government to 
 consist in the mutual influence exercised by different bodies 
 and persons in the state : his objections to the goodness 
 of the simple forms of government are, however, partly 
 founded on an assumption that the sovereign power can 
 limit itself, and partly on a confusion of supreme, with 
 despotic, or rather tyrannical, authority. His opinions on 
 this subject are contained in the following passage: 'The 
 privileges of a powerful nobility, of opulent mercantile 
 communities, of great judicial corporations, have in some 
 monarchies approached more near to a control on the 
 sovereign. Means have been devised, with more or less 
 wisdom, to temper the despotism of an aristocracy over 
 their subjects, and in democracies to protect the minority 
 against the majority, and the whole people against the 
 tyranny of demagogues. But in these unmixed forms of 
 government, as the right of legislation is vested in one 
 individual or in one order, it is obvious that the legislative 
 power may shake off all the restraints which the laws have 
 imposed on it. All such governments, therefore, tend towards 
 despotism ; and the securities which they admit against mis- 
 government are extremely feeble and precarious \' And, 
 after some further remarks, he adds, ' that no institution so 
 detestable as an absolutely unbalanced government perhaps 
 ever existed; that the simple governments are mere crea- 
 tures of the imagination of theorists, who have transformed 
 names used for the convenience of arrangement into real 
 polities ; that, as constitutions of government approach more 
 nearly to that unmixed and uncontrolled simplicity, they 
 become despotic ; and as they recede further from that 
 simplicity, they become free^' The substance of these 
 opinions, viz. that the mixture of a government depends 
 on the reciprocal influence of different classes and indi- 
 viduals in the community, and that the simple forms of 
 government are component parts of real constitutions, which 
 ' P. 61. ' P. 65. 
 
94 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 the mind may consider apart from the rest, but which never 
 occur in an elementary shape, is repeated, though with 
 greater detail, in an article in the Edinburgh Review 
 already mentioned. 'Wherever a King or an oligarchy 
 refrains from the last extremity of rapacity and tyranny, 
 through fear of the resistance of the people, there the 
 constitution, whatever it may be called, is in some measure 
 democratical . . . Wherever a numerical minority, by 
 means of superior wealth or intelligence, of political ,con- 
 ^cert, or of military discipline, exercises a greater influence 
 on the society than any other equal number of persons ; 
 there, whatever the form of government may be called, a 
 mixture of aristocracy does in fact exist. And wherever 
 a single man, from whatever cause, is so necessary to the 
 community, or to any portion of it, that he possesses more 
 power than any other man, there is a mixture of monarchy. 
 This (the Reviewer proceeds to say) is the philosophical 
 classification of governments ; and if we use this classifica- 
 tion we shall find, not only that there are mixed govern- 
 ments, but that all governments are, and must always be, 
 mixed^.' 
 
 According to the doctrine contained in the two passages 
 last quoted, a mixed government is not determined either 
 by the formation of the governing body, or by the nature 
 of the laws and institutions ; but by the reciprocal moral 
 influence of different persons and orders in the society. 
 The doctrine of Cicero appears, indeed, to differ from that 
 of the Edinburgh Review, inasmuch as he admits the 
 existence of simple forms of government ; but he admits 
 it only in words, for his conclusion is incompatible with 
 their existence ; it not being conceivable that there should 
 be any state, in which a moral influence of individuals and 
 classes of men upon each other, or upon the governing 
 pbwer, does not exist. On this principle, therefore, all 
 governments must be mixed. According to the doctrine 
 of the Edinburgh Review, the French government under 
 * Edinburgh Revieiu, vol. 1. p. 109. 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 95 
 
 Napoleon was a monarchy, not because Napoleon was 
 emperor and alone possessed the sovereign power, but 
 because he had more power than any other man in the state ; 
 it was likewise an aristocracy, because a numerical minority, 
 viz. the army, exercised a greater influence on society than 
 any other equal number of persons ; it was a democracy, 
 because neither the emperor nor the army could venture to 
 the last extremity of rapacity and tyranny ; on the contrary, 
 Napoleon thought it prudent to render his dominion popular 
 with his subjects, and indeed by various arts actually suc- 
 ceeded in so doing. The Reviewer, therefore, very justly 
 adds that, according to these definitions, every government 
 must be mixed ; and, he might have added, mixed not of 
 any two, but of all the three forms. It follows necessarily, 
 from his explanation, that there are no simple governments, 
 that all governments are mixed, and that all governments are 
 at the same time monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies ; 
 which of course implies that they are at the same time 
 monarchies and republics. To call this a classification of 
 governments is therefore not less an abuse of language, than 
 to call the offence of one man a conspiracy ; it is, in effect, 
 a denial of all classification, an abolition of all distinction 
 between different classes of governments, which are thus 
 joined together in one undistinguished heap. No govern- 
 ment can differ from another in being a monarchy, an 
 aristocracy, or a democracy, inasmuch as those names are 
 common to all governments. There is no doubt that this 
 system effectually removes the ambiguity and explains the 
 distinctions of the terms in question, by destroying both 
 their signification and their difference; but whether the 
 political vocabulary would be benefited by discarding as 
 senseless those much used and much abused words without 
 an attempt to turn them to some purpose, whether science 
 would be advanced by this summary method of cutting, 
 rather than of unloosing the knot, is very questionable. 
 The weapons of political reasoning may be blunt and 
 shapeless, and of uncertain employment ; but is it not 
 
96 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 more advisable to sharpen and repair them, and t6 ascer- 
 tain their uses, than to reject them, in the lump, as worthless 
 lumber ? 
 
 No classification of governments can be serviceable 
 which turns on moral influences, and not on the construc- 
 tion of the sovereign body, or some permanent attribute 
 of the established constitution. The one principle affords 
 a precise and definite ground of distinction, about which 
 no two persons can disagree. The other depends on an 
 uncertain opinion as to the comparative moral and politi- 
 cal influence of certain persons and parties in the state, 
 an influence which may be exercised in the most various 
 ways, and is liable to fluctuate from year to year, and 
 almost from day to day. And, after all, the system of 
 the Edinburgh Reviewer assumes the very doctrine which 
 it denies : for why does he say that a state is monarchical 
 when one person in it has great influence ? Simply because 
 a state governed by one person, who thus necessarily has 
 great influence in it, is properly called a monarchy. Why 
 is a state aristocratical when a minority have great in- 
 fluence ? For no other reason than that in a state where 
 the few govern, or an aristocracy, the few possess great 
 influence. Why is a state democratical where the people 
 have sufficient moral interest to save themselves from being 
 cruelly oppressed? Because a state where the many govern, 
 and thus enjoy a power similar to this influence, only greater 
 in degree, is properly called a democracy. 
 
 Before the subject of mixed governments is dismissed, 
 it will be necessary to advert to a topic usually connected 
 with it ; the existence of mutual checks and counterpoises 
 in a constitution supposed to be compounded of the three 
 simple forms of government, or (as it is termed) i/ie balance 
 of powers''- - This question, which has been often discussed 
 with much eagerness and little advantage, turns entirely on 
 a confusion of moral influence and legal power. Legally, 
 there can be no competition between different powers in 
 
 ' See Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, b. vi. ch. 7. 
 
MIXED GOVERNMENT. BALANCE OF POWERS 97 
 
 the same state, as the sovereign power is supreme and un- 
 divided ; nor can any other power, according to law, enter 
 into competition with it. But the acts of the persons com- 
 posing the sovereign body may be influenced by the wishes, 
 interests, and proceedings, as well of each other as of other 
 persons and classes in the community. So that, although 
 a legal balance of powers is impossible, a moral balance 
 must always exist. 
 
 Besides the division of governments into monarchies and 
 republics, or into monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, 
 and into pure and mixed, there need only be noticed that 
 into national and federal governments, which proceeds on 
 a principle different from any other classification. A federal 
 government is when an union is formed between several 
 states ', by the terms of which some part of the sovereignty 
 is lodged in persons whose powers extend over all the states, 
 and the remainder is lodged separately in persons whose 
 powers are confined to each particular state. A national 
 government is when the sovereign power, by whomsoever 
 exercised, extends over the whole country, without any 
 territorial distinctions '\ ' 
 
 * [International lawyers distinguish between a federal state, all parts 
 of which are represented, for international purposes, by one government, 
 and a confederation of states, whose governments retain the right to be 
 separately represented and considered.] 
 
 " [The United States of America began their career in 177^ ^^ * •con- 
 federation of states ; the constitution of 1 788 made them a federal state ; 
 and subsequent events have gone far to affirm the national character of the 
 federal government.] 
 
 ' Theocracy is defined by Johnson to be a ' government immediately 
 superintended by God.' In this sense, it is applied by many writers to 
 the Jewish state. Thus Blackstone speaks of ' the theocratic establish- 
 ments of the children of Israel in Palestine' (i Com. igi)- Sometimes, 
 however, it is used to signify a government of priests, a sacerdotal 
 aristocracy. Hence the governments of Ancient Egypt, Modern Rome, 
 &c., have been termed theocracies. See Heeren, Ideen, vol. ii. part ii. 
 P-43°-5. e<i-4- 
 
XI 
 
 PEOPLE. COMMUNITY 
 
 The word People sometimes signifies the whole nation, 
 or society, the populus ', including all persons in the state 
 from the highest to the lowest, whether governors or sub- 
 jects, noble or ignoble, rich or poor, young or old, male or 
 female. In this sense Blackstone divides the people into 
 aliens and natural-born subjects, and into the clergy and 
 laity. 
 
 Sometimes it signifies the whole nation with the exception 
 of the persons composing the government ; or the governed 
 as opposed to.governors. Thus we say that the government 
 is supported by the people, is hated by the people, &c. In 
 this sense it is used by Blackstone, when he makes the 
 people of England include the whole society except the 
 supreme ttiagistrates, or the King and the two houses of 
 Parliament '. 
 
 ' That is, as fopulus was used in the later ages of the Roman com- 
 monwealth ; for in early times, as Niebuhr has shown, it denoted only 
 the patrician order as opposed to the plebeian. See his History of Rome, 
 vol. i. p. 365. Engl, transl. 
 
 ' Blackstone uses the word People in a fluctuating manner, and his 
 divisions into which it enters will not bear examination. He divides 
 magistrates into two kinds — 'supreme, or those in whom the sovereign 
 power of the state resides,' which he explains to be the King and 
 Parliament ; and ' subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary 
 sphere,' i Com. 338. He afterwards says, that the people is the whole 
 nation, inclusive of the subordinate, but exclusive of the supreme 
 magistrates, ibid. 366. Yet he proceeds to divide the people into aliens 
 and natural-born subjects, and into clergy and laity, ibid. 376 : according 
 to which, a peer or a member of the House of Commons conld not be 
 
PEOPLE. COMMUNITY 99 
 
 Sometimes it signifies the party opposed to the aristo- 
 cratic party of the day, or the popular party. Thus, at 
 the beginning of the French Revolution, the tiers Hat, or 
 all who did not belong to the noblesse or clergy, formed the 
 people, or popular party ; at a later period, when the state 
 of parties had greatly changed, the poor, as opposed to the 
 rich and respectable, were the people or popular party '■. 
 
 The same appears to be tlie case in England at this time ; 
 all measures tending to increase the power of persons of 
 affluence and good education are now considered anti- 
 popular; all measures tending to increase the power of 
 the poor are now considered popular. ' It cannot be 
 denied,' says a writer in a late number of the Edinburgh 
 Review, ' that it is for the immediate interest of the people to 
 plunder the rick ^,' In the same manner, those persons who 
 espouse the cause of the anti-aristocratic party are called 
 ' friends of the people.' The anti-aristocratic party appears 
 to have obtained the appellation of the jx)pular party, or the 
 people, from being the most numerous, or containing a 
 majority of the whole people ; and not because the measures 
 which it recommends, and the principles by which it is 
 guided, are most conducive to the welfare of the community. 
 It may, indeed, happen that such is the case, but the name 
 , does not seem to have been derived from this circumstance. 
 
 ' Community ' is synonymous with the first sense of people, 
 and is a collective name both for all the persons exercising 
 the sovereignty of an independent state, and those owing 
 obedience to them. 
 
 a natural-bom subject or a layman, an English bishop could not be 
 a clergyman, inasmuch as they belong to the sovereign legislature. 
 
 1 ' Even in the time of Aristotle,' says Niebuhr, Hist, of Rome, vol. i. 
 p. 516, 'this vford (viz. Vqy.oi) has assumed a varity of senses, and 
 denotes, in democracies, the nation and assembly of the people as op- 
 posed to the magistrates, in oligarchies the commonalty, while popular 
 usage employs it for the needy and common folk ; ' that is to say, in 
 democracies, S^/xos signified the whole nation except the magistrates ; 
 in oligarchies, the whole nation except the sovereign body : in popular 
 usage, the poor. 
 
 ' Vol. xlix. p. 180. [The quotation is from Macaulay's review of 
 James Mill's Essay on Govemmtnt.'] 
 
 H 2 
 
100 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 It may, however, be remarked, that in using the wordf 
 people and community in their widest political sense, we 
 usually mean all the members of the society except women 
 and children, that is, only the adult males. If this mean- 
 ing is not given to the terms in question, there never was 
 such a government as a democracy, or a government of the 
 many ; all states which were not monarchies must have been 
 aristocracies ; for, even at Athens, where every male citizen 
 above the age of twenty ' had a voice in the supreme legis- 
 lative assembly, the number of females, old and young, 
 and of males under twenty, probably more than quadrupled 
 that of the male governors ; so that, after excluding half 
 a million of slaves, the Athenian democracy was in fact 
 wielded by an inconsiderable minority even of the free 
 population ^. 
 
 It has been already stated that Mr. Mill, in his Essay 
 on Government, defines a democracy to be a government 
 in which ' the community undertakes the protection of itself, 
 and of its members,' or, ' a government of the many.' He 
 afterwards says, that 'whenever the powers of government 
 are placed in any hands other than those of the community, 
 whether those of one man, of a few, or of several, those 
 principles of human nature which imply that government 
 is at all necessary, imply that those persons will make use 
 of them to defeat the very end for which government exists : ' 
 in other words, that a democracy is the only good form of 
 government. But as he considers that an assembly of all 
 the members of a community would be too numerous for 
 the transaction of business, he would have the community 
 choose representatives to form the sovereign body. The 
 question, therefore, next arises, who are to compose the 
 
 ' The common age at which persons were permitted in the Greek 
 states to take a part in public affairs appears to have been thirty ; in 
 Athens it was otherwise. See Clinton's Fasti Helhnici, part i. p. 386, 
 note'. The same writer states, that according to the census of Great 
 Britain in 1821, the males above the age of twenty were 4,897 in 20^160 
 persons, i. e. somewhat less than a fourth. 
 
 " See above in Democracy. 
 
PEOPLE. COMMUNITY lOI 
 
 electing body, and whether any part of the community has 
 an interest the same as the ivkole community ? This question 
 he answers by saying that ' one thing is pretty clear, that all 
 those individuals whose interests are indisputably included 
 in those of other individuals, may be struck off without 
 inconvenience. In this light may be viewed all children 
 up to a certain age, whose interests are involved in those 
 of their parents. In this light also women may be regarded, 
 the interest of almost all of whom is involved either in that 
 of their fathers or in that of their husbands.' The electoral 
 body would thus consist, according to Mr. Mill, of ' the 
 aggregate males of an age to be regarded as sui juris, who 
 may be regarded as the natural ' representatives of the whole 
 population.' By the community governing itself, therefore, 
 Mr. Mill means the adult males voting for the election of 
 representatives, or members of the supreme body; that is 
 to say, he considers the sovereign body and the electoral 
 body as together forming the governing body : unless 
 indeed he intends to exclude those who share in the 
 sovereign power from the governing body; but on this 
 point his language is somewhat perplexed. If it is not 
 assumed that the electors, being a majority of the adult males, 
 compose the governing body, then he proves that the only 
 good form of government is an aristocracy, after having said 
 that 'the unfitness of an aristocracy'' (i.e. the class) to be 
 intrusted with the powers of government rests on demon- 
 
 ' What is here meant by natural, does not very clearly appear : prob- 
 ably^it is used as nearly the contrary of artificial, that which is indepen- 
 dent of human institution or contrivauce. See below in Nature. 
 
 ^ This again causes some perplexity : for he defines an aristocratical 
 government to be when ' the powers of government are held by any 
 number of persons intermediate between a single person and the majority.' 
 By majority, therefore, we must understand not a. majority of the 
 whole society, but a majority of the adult males ; and by powers of 
 government, not sovereign power (as is commonly understood by that 
 expression), but the power of electing persons who are to wield the 
 sovereign power. Thus, if a nation consisted of 2,000,000 persons, 
 out of whom 500,000 were adult males, and the sovereign body consisted 
 of 500 persons ; then, if 250,001 adult males voted for the election of 
 members of the sovereign body, the government would be a democracy ; 
 if 249,999, *' would be an aristocracy. 
 
102 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 stration : ' for the representative assembly, and the persons 
 possessing the sovereign executive power must necessarily 
 be a very insignificant minority of the whole population. 
 It is however an unquestionable, though perhaps not un- 
 common, abuse of language, to describe the electoral body 
 as possessed of the governing power, which properly belongs 
 only to the sovereign body; as the constituent is thus 
 confounded with the representative, and incorrect notions 
 of the nature of representation and sovereign power are 
 suggested by the obscurity and vagueness of the language. 
 On this confusion more will be said under the word 
 Representation. 
 
 It will be observed that, in the preceding extract, Mr. Mill, 
 in order to strike off the women and children, assumes, and 
 does not prove, that their interest is identical with that of 
 the adult males. Commonly, however, this deduction is 
 made, not only without proof, but even without mention, 
 and is tacitly assumed as a matter of universal agreement. 
 
 On this exception of women and children fiom the whole 
 community, when considered with reference to its govern- 
 ment — an assumption made by all writers on political 
 science — the true theory of government may (as it appears) 
 be founded : inasmuch as they are thus unanimously set 
 aside from the question, not on account of their poverty, 
 not on account of their depravity, not on account of the 
 smallness of their numbers (for they always form-the largest 
 portion of the society), not on account of their interest 
 being hostile to that of the smaller number of adult males 
 (for it is asserted that their interests are identical) ; but on 
 account of their incapacity for ruling, the inferiority of their 
 intellects, and their general ignorance of political questions 
 and political science ^. All classes of the community are 
 
 1 It must be observed, that when Mr. Mill excludes from his body of 
 electors all women, on the ground that their interests are involved in 
 the interests either of their husbands or fathers, he does not account for this 
 exception ; for his statement might be exactly reversed, and the electoral 
 body might be made to consist only of adult women, on the ground that 
 the interests of their husbands and fathers were involved in their interest. 
 
PEOPLE. COMMUNITY 103 
 
 more fitted for governing in proportion as they differ from 
 women and children, and the less fitted as they resemble 
 them, in these respects \ 
 
 If interest alone was to be regarded as a qualification 
 for rulers, women and children would have the strongest 
 claim to an enjoyment of political rights : as being the 
 weakest, and therefore most exposed to violence, as being 
 the most simple, and therefore most subject to fraud, they 
 have the greatest interest. in good government. 
 
 If, on the other' hand, knowledge alone were regarded, 
 without a desire to promote the interests of the com- 
 munity, rulers might unintentionally, through indifference, 
 or intentionally, through ill-will or selfishness, omit to adopt 
 the measures which they thought best fitted to benefit the 
 state. 
 
 The problem of government is to reconcile these two 
 elements, and to combine the advantages derivable from 
 knowledge with the motive afforded by interest. 
 
 This subject is of too great importance to be pursued 
 further in this place; but I may be allowed to remark, 
 that, on examination, it will probably be found that in the 
 early periods of a nation's history, when the mass of the 
 population was immersed in darkness and ignorance, 
 greater weight was attached to the ' knowledge and wis- 
 dom of the governors, and their moral character, than to 
 
 His argnment goes no further than this : interest is the only thing to be 
 considered in the formation of an electoral body : the interest of husbands 
 and wives, fathers and daughters is identical ; therefore it is'superfluous 
 to give a vote to women, when they would be, as it were, the duplicates 
 of their husbands and fathers. But, by parity of reasoning, if the electoral 
 body consisted only of adult females, then the interest of the males would 
 be equally secured, because it would be involved in that of their wives, 
 daughters, and mothers. [Without imputing inferiority of intellect to 
 women, we may argue that they ought to be excluded from political 
 rights because the most important duties incumbent on them are those of 
 bringing up children and keeping house — duties which cannot be well 
 performed if they engage in the active pursuits of men.] 
 
 ' In this sense Cicero says : ' In dissensione civili, quum boni plus 
 qnam mali valent, expeudendos cives, non numerandos puto ' {^De Kep. 
 vi) : a remark as applicable to times of domestic concord, as of civil 
 war. 
 
104 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 g.ny other qualification; whence the expressions witena- 
 gemot, prudhommes, boni homines, probi homines, buonuomini, 
 &c., in the middle ages ; nor was it till experience had 
 shown that good education is no guarantee against the 
 abuse of political power, and it was perceived how the 
 most grievous oppressions had arisen from the interests of 
 the rulers being opposed to the interests of their subjects, 
 that the theory was imagined, that if the interests — that 
 is, the wishes — of the majority of , any nation could be 
 ascertained and carried into effect, such nation would 
 infallibly be well governed. As, in the former theory, it 
 was forgotten that knowledge without interest is not 
 sufficient ; so in this, it was not perceived that interest 
 without knowledge is not sufficient ; and that, though a man 
 always wishes well to himself, yet in his actions, from 
 ignorance or passion, he frequently pursues that very course 
 which is the least fitted to ensure his own happiness. Each 
 theory embraces, and each omits, an essential condition of 
 the problem. 
 
XII 
 
 REPRESENTATION. REPRESENTATIVE 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 Of the several definitions of the word representation given 
 by Johnson in his Dictionary, that which most nearly 
 approaches its political meanings, is ' the act of supporting 
 a vicarious character.' To represent, he likewise lays it 
 down, is ' to fill the place of another by a vicarious 
 character ; to personate, as the parliament represents the 
 people.' Vicarious he defines to be ' deputed ; delegated ; 
 acting in the place of another.' 
 
 Representation, as is expressed by these definitions, in 
 its primary political sense, means the standing in another's 
 place ; holding another's proxy ; being the organ of his 
 sentiments, and the instrument of conveying his wishes 
 and determination. Thus an ambassador instructed to 
 treat with a foreign power represents the King his master, 
 or whatever power presides over the intercourse with 
 foreign states. Thus, likewise, a person signing another's 
 name under a power of attorney is his representative. 
 
 Representatives of this description were the deputies 
 anciently chosen in England by the counties and boroughs 
 to treat with the King concerning the amount of money 
 required for the service of the state and the wants of the 
 crown, which the several bodies, of whom they were the 
 several organs, would agree to grant to the King. So 
 completely was this transaction considered in the light of 
 
I06 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 a bargain between two parties, that in early times the 
 grant was made in the form of an indenture, each estate 
 granting separately ; and the King's assent (as in the case 
 of a common grantee) was presumed without being formally 
 given '. This proceeding less resembled the making of 
 a law, than a contract between an individual on the one 
 part, and the committee of a company or a body corporate 
 on the other part^. Frequently the representatives of the 
 estate of the Commons, together with the other estates, 
 required from the King a consideration in the shape of 
 some concession of his prerogative or sovereign power, for 
 the subsidies which they granted to him ; and thus these 
 persons appear as negociators treating with an independent 
 power, from whom they require some sacrifice for their 
 benefit, corresponding to the sacrifice which they make for 
 his benefit. They granted subsidies for his immediate use 
 and advantage, and not for the advantage of the whole 
 community, of which they were members. In like manner, 
 the deputies sent to the States-general of the United 
 Provinces represented the provinces to which they respec- 
 tively belonged, and acted upon the instructions which 
 they received, without forming any independent opinion 
 as to the tendency of a measure to promote the common 
 good '- They, like the deputies of the Commons' estate in 
 England, and many German principalities*, were specially 
 appointed to act in the interest of a particular class or 
 part of the whole community. 
 
 Whether the name of a representative government, as 
 
 ' Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 242. 410 ; ConsMutional History 
 of England, vol. ii. p. 369. 4*0. 
 
 ^ See a case in 13 Ed. Ill, mentioned by Mr. Hallam, Middle Ages, 
 vol. ii. p. 248, where the Commons could not grant a subsidy without 
 first consulting their constituents. 
 
 ^ See Sir "William Temple's Obsei-vations on 'the United Provinces of 
 the Netherlands, vol. i. p. 64. 8vo ed. 
 
 * See Hiillmann's Ursprung derStande in Deutschland, p. 653, ed. 2. 
 Leo, in his Handbuch der Geschichte des Mittelalters, p. 767, remarks, 
 that ' the English Parliament had, in its origin, the very same character 
 as the provincial assemblies of the estates in Germany (^Landstande).' 
 
REPRESENTATION l(y] 
 
 applied to governments such as those of modern England, 
 France, Bavaria, Holland, the United States, &c., was 
 derived from an historical recollection of the times when, 
 as in England, the deputies of the estates of the Clergy 
 and the Commons were representatives in the original 
 sense of the word, or from its analogy to strict and proper 
 representation, seems to be uncertain ; although the latter 
 supposition is perhaps the more probable. 
 
 A representative government is when a certain portion 
 of the community, generally consisting either of all the 
 adult males, or of a part of them, determined according to 
 some qualification of property, residence, or other accident, 
 have the right of voting at certain intervals of time for 
 the election of particular members of the sovereign legis- 
 lative body. This right of voting is properly a political 
 right ; nor does it bear any resemblance to the exercise of 
 sovereignty. The possession of this right enables a voter 
 to influence the formation of the sovereign body ; but 
 a voter never has any part of the governing power, nor 
 does he wield a power which in any way resembles the 
 authority of government, except that the decision of those 
 who really wield that authority may be influenced by his 
 vote. The moral duty incumbent on an elector is to vote 
 for that candidate whose services as a member of the 
 legislature are, in his judgement, most likely to prove 
 beneficial to the state. His power, conferred by this right, 
 is strictly limited, and is confined to one point, namely, the 
 contributing to the choice of the supreme legislative body. 
 There is no question of public policy — no .matter of 
 legislation, in the decision of which he has directly any 
 voice. At the times when the mass of electors are called 
 on to exercise their franchises (for example after a dis- 
 solution of Parliament in this kingdom) the legislative 
 sovereignty is in abeyance, and no law can be made. But 
 the power of a member of the legislature is by law un- 
 limited, and may extend to any matter falling within the 
 compass of legislation. 
 
Io8 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 Indeed, no two things can be more clearly distinguished, 
 than the powers of a member of a sovereign representative 
 assembly, and the right of voting for his election. Yet they 
 are perpetually confounded in popular discourse ; as when 
 a state is called a democracy, because a majority of its 
 freemen have a vote for the election of representatives ; for 
 instance, the United States of America, the government 
 of which, as has been already observed, is in strictness 
 an aristocracy; and when the same term of universal 
 suffrage is applied to the votes of the citizens in the ancient 
 democracies, who were members of the supreme legislature, 
 and the votes of electors in modern states, who are not. 
 Nor is this confusion always confined to popular usage, but 
 it occurs even in the most recent works of political philo- 
 sophers. Thus, for example, Mr. Mill, in his Essay on 
 Government, proposes the question — 'Whether, between 
 the two extremes of a very low pecuniary qualification, 
 and a qualification so high as to constitute an aristocracy 
 of wealth, there is any qualification which would remove 
 the right of suffrage from the people of small, or of no 
 property, and yet constitute an elective body, the interest 
 of which would be identical with the interest of the 
 community ? ' He then proceeds to say, that ' it is not 
 easy to find any satisfactory principle to guide us in our 
 researches, and to tell us where we should fix. The 
 qualification must either be such as to embrace the 
 majority of the population (i.e. of the male adults), or some- 
 thing less than the majority. Suppose, in the first place, 
 that it embraces the majority, the question is, whether the 
 majority would have an interest in oppressing those who, 
 upon this supposition, would be deprived of political power ? 
 If we reduce this calculation to its elements, we shall 
 see that the interest which they would have of this 
 deplorable kind, though it would be something, would not 
 be very great. Each man of the majority, if the majority 
 were constituted the governing body, would have something 
 less than the benefit of oppressing a single man. ... In 
 
REPRESENTATION 109 
 
 that case the benefits of good government, accruing to all, 
 might be expected to overbalance to the several members 
 of such an elective body the benefits of misrule peculiar 
 to themselves. Good government would, therefore, have a 
 tolerable security. .Suppose, in the second place, that the 
 qualification did not admit a body of electors so large as 
 the majority : in that case, taking again the calculation 
 in its elements, we shall seg that each man would 
 have a benefit equal to that derived from the oppression 
 of more than one man ^ ; and that, in proportion as the 
 elective body constituted a smaller and smaller minority, 
 the benefit of misrule to the elective body would be increased, 
 and bad government would be insured '.' 
 
 Now, in these remarks, it is evident that the governing 
 body and the electing body are confounded, and that a 
 government is called an aristocracy of wealth, because the 
 members of the elective body, not the members of the sove- 
 reign body (who, according to Mr. Mill's own definition', 
 give the name of aristocracy to a state), are determined 
 by wealth. This is merely a different form of the common 
 error, that the sovereign power resides in the electors, 
 who delegate it, by election, to their representatives, 
 making them the instruments of their pleasure, and bearers 
 of their commands. Thus Blackstone has the following 
 passage on the election of members of the House of 
 Commons : — 
 
 ' This argument is not conclusive, even if Mr. Mill's principles are 
 admitted : for, in the first place, the elective body, not being the governing 
 body, will not have the power to oppress directly ; and, in the second 
 place, it does not follow, even if the electors are the majority, and have 
 the power to oppress, that they will not oppress, because they have not 
 an adult male apiece ; for they may be satisfied with oppressing women 
 and children : which will much more than complete the required number. 
 
 " Supplement to Enc. Brit. vol. iv. pp. 500, 501. 
 
 ' Above, p. 56. Having laid it down that ' the unfitness of an 
 aristocracy to be intrusted with the powers of government rests on 
 demonstration,' Mr. Mill, after all, makes his perfect state (even 
 according to his own definition as .it appears) an aristocracy; i.e. 
 a government, in which a small assembly, possessing the legislative 
 sovereignty, is elected by the votes of all adult males. On the executive 
 part of the government he says nothing. 
 
no USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 'With regard to the elections of knights, citizens, and 
 burgesses, we may observe that herein consists the exercise 
 of the democratical part of our constitution ; for in a 
 democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by 
 suffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will. In 
 all democracies therefore it is of the utmost importance to 
 regulate by whom, and in what manner, the suffrages are to 
 be given. And the Athenians were so justly jealous of this 
 prerogative, that a stranger who interfered in the assemblies 
 of the people was punished by their laws with death ' ; 
 because such a person was esteemed guilty of high treason, 
 by usurping those rights of sovereignty to which he had no 
 title. In England, where the people do not debate in a 
 collective body, but by representation, the exercise of this 
 sovereignty consists in the choice of representatives ".' 
 
 The suffrages exercised by the Athenian citizen and 
 the English elector are, nevertheless, perfectly distinct 
 in their nature: the one being a direct exercise of the 
 supreme legislative power on the passing of a decree or 
 a law ; the other being a vote which goes to determine 
 the election of a person who is to possess a share of 
 the supreme legislative power, and which is not, nor 
 can ever be given, on any legislative question. 'The 
 proposition,' says a writer in the Edinburgh Review, 
 'which we would lay down as the corner-stone of the 
 representative system, [is] that the people' ought not to 
 decide directly and finally on any public measures except 
 the choice of their representatives '.' Whatever ought to be 
 the case or not, it is certain that in this, or any other 
 representative government, so long as those governments 
 
 ' I know not whence Blackstone derived this statement, nor whether 
 it rests on any authority. The usual course certainly was, that a foreigner, 
 convicted of having exercised the rights of Athenian citizenship, merely 
 forfeited those rights ; and, upon a second conviction, was sold for a slave. 
 See Clinton, Fast. Hell, part i. p. 390 n. 
 
 ' I Com. 1 70 ; and again, p. 159: ' In so large a state as ours, it is 
 very wisely contrived, that the people should do that by their repre- 
 sentatives, which it is impracticable to perform in person.' 
 
 ' Vol. XX. p. 408. 
 
REPRESENTA TION III 
 
 endure, the people, i.e. the electors, cannot by their votes 
 decide directly and finally on any public measure : their 
 power is confined to the choice of those who are to decide. 
 The certainty of this fact is not at all impugned by such 
 passages as the following : — 
 
 ' Sovereignty,' says Rousseau, ' cannot be alienated : it 
 consists essentially in the general will; and will cannot 
 be represented : — it is the same, or it is different ; there 
 is no medium. The deputies of the people, therefore, 
 neither are, nor can be its representatives ; they are only its 
 delegates (commissaires) ; they cannot conclude anything 
 definitively. Every law that the people in person has not 
 ratified, is null; it is not a law. The -English people 
 imagines that it is free, but it> is much mistaken; it is 
 free only during the election of members Of Parliament : 
 as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing ^' 
 
 These remarks, though mixed up with erroneous notions 
 on the subject of liberty, chiefly proceed on the supposition 
 that the electors of England are, between the sessions of 
 Parliament, possessed of the sovereign power, which they 
 surrender to their representatives : whereas, by the election 
 of representatives, they enable the King at any moment 
 to summon his Parliament, and so call the legislative 
 sovereignty into existence. 
 
 Rousseau boldly rejects the doctrine that a member of 
 the English House of Commons is permitted in any case 
 to exercise an independent judgement "; while others main- 
 tain that he should be guided only by his views of the 
 public interest, and not by the requisitions of his constituents. 
 Between these two doctrines the following remarks are 
 
 ' Contrat Social, liv. iii. ch. 15. 
 
 " ' A knight, cilizen, or burgess of the House of Commons, cannot by 
 any means make any proxy, because he is elected and trusted by multi- 
 tudes of people,' says Lord Coke, 4 Inst. 12. This reason is adopted 
 by Blackstone, who, however, states it in a rather more objectionable form, 
 ' as he is himself but a proxy for a multitude of other people.' — i Com. 
 168. Such reasoning, however, is not only contradicted by the fact, but 
 is directly at variance with lUackstone's own account of the powers of 
 a member of 'the House of Commons, i Com. 159. 
 
112 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 intended to steer a middle course : which, however, as 
 they had not the advantage of studied composition and 
 calm consideration, must not be scrutinized with critical 
 minuteness. 
 
 'The fundamental principle of our constitution — the 
 great political discovery of modern times — that, indeed, 
 which enables a state to combine extent with liberty — (is 
 that) the system of representation consists altogether in 
 the perfect delegation by the people of their rights, and the 
 care of their interests, to those who are to deliberate and 
 to act for them. It is not a delegation which shall make 
 the representative a mere organ of the passing will, or 
 momentary opinion, of his constituents . . . According 
 to the soundest views of representative legislation, there 
 ought to be a general coincidence between the conduct of 
 the delegate and the sentiments of the electors'.' 
 
 However laudable the endeavour to mediate between 
 extreme opinions, yet, in this case, it appears that there is 
 no middle term, and that one or the other must be true. 
 Either a representative is a mere delegate, empowered 
 only to act according to the instructions of his constituents, 
 and not concerned about the general expediency or in- 
 expediency (as it may seem to him) of the course which he 
 is pursuing; or he is morally bound, no less than he is 
 legally able, to follow that line of conduct which he con- 
 siders most conducive to the public welfare. Besides these 
 two alternatives, there is no third : a representative must 
 be either a delegate or a free agent ; he must either follow 
 the opinions of others, or his own : nor is it possible to 
 distinguish between cases in which he should be his 
 own master, and in which he should be the servant of his 
 constituents. There is no doubt that, in all representative 
 governments, the sentiments of the representative will' 
 generally coincide with those of his constituents, because 
 
 ' The Lord Chancellor's Speech on Pari. Reform, Oct. 7, 1831, p. 71. 
 See likewise, on this subject, some remarks of Hnme [in his Essays, ed. 
 Green and Grose, ii. 113 ».]. 
 
REPRESENTATION 113 
 
 they will chppse a person yirho holds their opinions, and he 
 will frequently be influenced by the desire of insuring 
 a subsequent return. Nevertheless, according to the un- 
 questionable theory of representation, a representative is 
 neither an advocate to plead the cause of his constituents, 
 nor is he ni^rely their grgan, pbeying their instructions 
 with just so much discretion as a lawyer exercises on 
 behalf of his client : but ,he is a member of the sovereign 
 legislative body, acting by no delegated authority, entitled 
 to form an independent judgemer^t, legally answerable to 
 none for his conduct, but bound by a moral obligation 
 to consult and vote for the good, of the wholp community. 
 In all cases of delegation, one party puts another in his 
 place ; transferring to the delegate an authority whiqh he 
 is either unwilUngqr, unable to exercise, for himself. Thus 
 a man delegates to his steward the management of his 
 estate, to a tutor , the educ^-tion of his children; arming 
 them with certain powers, which for specific purposes, he 
 possesses in his capacities of proprietor and father^ But 
 no one can delegate a power, which he does not possess. 
 If an elector does not himself, under any circumstances, 
 possess the power of making lavys, he cannot pfoperly be 
 said to delegate to another the power of making laws. 
 A representative exercises this power by virtue of the 
 votes of his constituents, but not by a delegation from 
 them. 
 
 The distinction between real and virtual representa- 
 tion appears to be founded on the same erroneous notion, 
 that a representative is merely the delegate of his con- 
 stituents : for a town or district is said to be really repre- 
 sented, when it returns a member to Parliament; to be 
 virtually represented, when it does not return a member, 
 but its interests are protected by those who really repre- 
 sent other places '. Those who propose to remedy the evil 
 
 ' The idea of virtual representation appears to be expressed in the 
 following passage : ' The principle of representation, in its widest sense, 
 can hardly be unknown to any government not purely democratical. 
 
114 US^ -A^^ ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 of virtual representation by changing it into real repre- 
 sentation, frequently support the change on false grounds ; 
 for it is not more expedient that a large town should be 
 represented rather than a small town, because its interests 
 will be watched by its own delegate ; but because it is 
 more likely to send a good representative to the national 
 councils. 
 
 Lastly, it may be remarked that those who found ihe 
 expediency of a representative government on the impossi- 
 bility or inconvenience of assembling the whole community, 
 acknowledging at the same time that a nation must be 
 well governed if all public measures coincide with the sup- 
 posed interest, or the wishes of a majority of the com- 
 munity, should remember that there would be no difficulty 
 in putting all important questions to the vote in primary 
 assemblies, and polling the whole nation, without having 
 recourse to the circuitous and uncertain process of repre- 
 sentation. If representatives are to be considered as 
 merely having the proxies of their constituents, and if they 
 are returned merely to avoid the difficulty occasioned by 
 numbers, surely it would be little less expeditious, and far 
 more secure to take the votes of the constituents in detail ' ? 
 
 In almost every country, the sense of the whole is understood to be 
 spoken by a part, and the , decisions of ■■•. part are binding upon the 
 whole.' — Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 216. 
 
 ' [Since this passage was written, several states have adopted the 
 practice of taking the opinion of the electors on legislative questions of 
 the first importance, by means of a plibiscite or referendum. See Bryce, 
 American Commonwealth, and Adams and Cunningham, The Swiss 
 Confederation.l 
 
XIII 
 
 RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 
 
 There are two different ways in which classes of things 
 can be opposed to each other : viz. as contraries, and as 
 extremes. They are opposed as contraries, when a class 
 is logically divided in such a manner that every individual 
 of it, not contained in the one member of the division, is 
 contained in the other ; when the two species are together 
 equivalent to the whole genus to which they belong. Thus 
 true is contrary to false, straight is contrary to crooked^ 
 odd is contrary to even, knowledge is contrary to igno- 
 rance ; because all propositions which are not true must 
 be false, all lines which are not straight must be crooked, 
 all numbers which are not odd must be even, and a person 
 must be ignorant of all things about which he has no 
 knowledge. On the other hand, things are opposed as 
 extremes, when they do not together make up, or exhaust, 
 the class or genus to which they belong, but there is 
 between them a middle state, from which they are not 
 precisely divided, and into which they insensibly graduate 
 at both its extremities. Instances of this class of opposites 
 are old and young, tall and short, belief and disbelief, love 
 and hatred, hot and cold, light and dark, &c. For it does 
 not follow that because a man is not old, he is therefore 
 young ; because he is not tall, he is therefore short ; 
 because the mind does not beheve, it therefore disbelieves ; 
 because it does not love, it therefore hates ; because an 
 
Il6 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 object is not hot, it is therefore cold ; because it is not 
 light, it is therefore dark. Between these several extremes 
 there is an intermediate state, which is respectively called 
 middle-aged, middle-sized, doubt, indifference, tepid or 
 lukewarm, dusk or glimmering, &c. Such extremes are 
 not the negative of each other, nor are they divided by a 
 clear and definite line which can never be passed ; but they 
 admit of an imperceptible itransition from one most dis- 
 similar state to another, and may be likened to the opposite 
 ends of a graduated scale, between which there is an 
 infinite number of degrees, but no "marked separation. It 
 is to this kind of opposites that Mr. Herschel alludes, in 
 his Discourse on >the Study of Natural Philosophy'^, when 
 he says that '-there can be little doubt that the solid,:liquid, 
 and aeriform states of bodies, are merely stages in a pro- 
 gress of gradual transition from one extreme to the other ; 
 and that however strongly marked the distinctions ibetween 
 them may appear, they will ultimately turn out to be 
 separated by no sudden or violent line. of demarcation, but 
 shade into each other by insensible gradations.' 
 
 Among the many opposites which belong to the clasg 
 of extremes, are the terms rich and /^or, which denote two 
 classes in the community, of which the members severally 
 possess an amount of' wealth greater or less than a certain 
 fluctuating and uncertain quantity, which entitles its possessor 
 to be called a person of moderate property, of. middling 
 fortune, neither poor nor rich ; or '■ more commonly to • be 
 named a member of the middle ranks. In all societies 
 which have advanced beyond a savage state, and have 
 accumulated some stores of wealth, there: necessarily. exists 
 this tripile distinction of classes : for though all the members 
 of a community may be equally poor, they cannot be equally 
 rich. But although these classes must, except among the 
 rudest savages, everywhere exist, yet the '/w^srft'uwj which 
 they bear to one another in different states may be very 
 various, and the three parts may be unequally developed 
 ' § 352. See also §§ 135 and aoo. 
 
RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 117 
 
 bjf the peculiar circumstances of each ■ commimity : for 
 instance, in some states, the middle class may be of smaJl 
 account, and the rich and poor together make up a large 
 majority of the whole population ; as, in countries where 
 slavery prevails, the society is divided into rich and poor, 
 with scarcely any intervening order :. the same state of things 
 also is described by Aristotle, as existing in many small 
 Greek states whera the opposite parties of rich, and poor 
 were, on account of the scantiness of the population, 
 precisely distinguished; and by Thucydides' as originating 
 in the bloody contests between the rich and poor, in which 
 the middle ranks, who took no part in the struggle, were 
 destroyed by both parties, as well because they would not 
 join either side, as from a feeling of jealousy lest they should 
 escape the common ruin. 
 
 However the pernicious institution of predial and domestic 
 servitude, or an injudicious and unskilful arrangement of 
 the sovereign power, may tend to obliterate the middle 
 rank, and to destroy the connecting links between the rich 
 and the poor, yet in all communities, settled in a fixed 
 habitation, and restrained by a regular government, there 
 must exist rudiments of all three classes ; and the com- 
 parative historian may, like the comparative anatomist, 
 discover throughout the various forms of civilized societies, 
 traces of the corresponding orders which, though subject 
 to disproportionate enlargement and contraction, sometimes 
 swelled to an inordinate size, and sometimes shrivelled into 
 insignificance, by the diseased action of the body politic, 
 may yet be clearly referred to one and the same imaginary 
 pattern. 
 
 The names of rich and poor are, however, applied to 
 different classes in the community, not with reference to 
 one particular standard, but with reference to the condition 
 of the society which they divide into the classes so denomi- 
 nated. No man is absolutely rich, or poor, or of middling 
 fortune ; but one man is rich, and another is poor, as 
 ' B. iu. ch. it. 
 
il8 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL tERMS 
 
 compared with a third who is neither poor nor rich, but 
 of moderate property. Accordingly, these terms as much 
 imply each other, and are as unintelligible without such 
 a mutual reference, as master and servant, husband and 
 wife, debtor and creditor : nor can one man be called poor, 
 without supposing the existence of another who is called 
 rich; both names being applied to signify a common 
 relation to a certain middle point, fixed according to the 
 circumstances of each particular case ; as things are said 
 to be high and low, or long and short, as compared with 
 some arbitrary standard which varies according to the 
 nature of the object so characterized. Hence it appears 
 that the classes of rich and poor in different states have 
 independently no resemblance to each other ; they are only 
 similar in their relative positions. Thus a poor man stands 
 in the same relation to a rich man in England, as a poor 
 man does to a rich man in France ; but it does not therefore 
 follow that either a poor or a rich man in France possesses 
 absolutely the same average amount of wealth as a poor or 
 a rich man in England. So, again, an Englishman and a 
 Swiss might possess the same absolute amount of wealth, 
 and the one be reckoned poor in England, and the other 
 a person of middling property in Switzerland. In each 
 state a certain rough average of wealth is struck, which may 
 differ as much in different countries as the average duration 
 of human life, or the average amount of knowledge : and all 
 persons who possess about that amount of property are 
 called the middle ranks ; while those who exceed, and fall 
 short of it, are respectively called the rich and poor. A poor 
 man in one country is, therefore, no more in the same 
 absolute condition as a poor man in another, than a degree 
 of temperature, which might be called warm at the Pole, 
 would be entitled to the same name under the Equator; 
 or than the dealers in magic, who obtain the wonder and 
 veneration of barbarians, would be respected for their wisdom 
 by a civilized people. 
 
 It is to this mistaken notion, that poverty and riches are 
 
RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 1 19 
 
 absolute, and not relative quantities — that we may trace 
 the error of supposing that the poor of a given country, 
 because they always retain the same name, are therefore 
 always in the same condition. That name is applied to 
 them, not because they enjoy a certain fixed amount of 
 conveniences and necessaries; but because the rich and 
 the middle class enjoy a greater amount of the same con- 
 veniences and necessaries. The class now called poor in 
 this kingdom liold the same place in the community with 
 regard to the other two ranks, as the class described by 
 Holinshed as living in cottages without chimneys, sleeping 
 on straw pallets, under a covering of skins, with a log under 
 their heads for a bolster, and using only wooden utensils : 
 but in their actual situation they resemble rather the middle 
 class of the time of Henry the Eighth; although many 
 things are now reputed necessaries by the poor, which were 
 beyond the reach even of the middle ranks in that age, and 
 some, indeed (such as the glazing of windows), would have 
 been luxuries unattainable to a British prince at a period 
 long posterior to the Christian era. 
 
 It likewise results from the preceding remarks that the 
 rich, and poor, and middling class, are so named, not accord- 
 ing to the aggregate wealth of each class, but according to 
 the separate wealth possessed by each individual : so that, 
 although the joint wealth of the rich in any given state may 
 be less than the joint wealth of the middle class, yet these 
 two classes are not the less entitled to their respective de- 
 nominations. Thus, when it is said that the middle classes 
 are the wealthiest order in the community ', it is not meant 
 
 ' ' I speak now of the middle classes . . . the most numerous, and far 
 the most wealthy order in the community.' — The Lord Chancellor's 
 Speech on Parliamentary Jieform, 1831, p. 54. It is, however, very 
 questionable, whether in this or in any other country, the middle 
 classes are the most numerous order in the community. The line is of 
 course indefinite, and may be differently drawn by different persons : 
 bnt, according to the common acceptation of the word, the poor (in- 
 cluding the paupers) are far more numerous than the middle class of 
 this kingdom. The new population-returns will furnish some data for 
 determining this question : but it is extremely improbable that the rich 
 
I20 USE Ar^D ABUSE OF POLtTlCAL TJSRMS 
 
 that they have s'tn^fy the greatest wealth (in whicli case 
 they would not be' called' the mi'ddle class), but that the 
 suriti' of their wealth is greater than the sum of the wealth 
 possessed by the rich. Nor even if it should happen in any 
 country that the rich' have together more wealth than any other 
 class, yet they would not be called rich for that reason, but 
 oh' account of their several possessions. 
 
 The class of persons having a smaller amount of wealth 
 tha!ri those belonging to' the middle rank, though' commonly 
 included under the single name of poor, are niore properly 
 subdivided into the poor strictly So called', aid the fiduperi 
 or ieggarS. In this sense th'e poor are th'ose whoi as com- 
 pared with the rich and the fnfddTe' class,' severally enjoy 
 a less quantity of decencies and rtedesssines, yet. Oh' the 
 whole, by means of co'nstant labour ah'd a frugal mode of 
 living, are able to maintain' a sufficieh'ily corhfOrtable exis- 
 tence ; it is to thiV class thkt, in ctbu'ntries whfere slavery does 
 riot eifst, those who &rt engaged ih' manual labour about 
 manufactures, mining, and husbandry," for the most part 
 belong. On the other hand, persons c6ntiriually strhggling 
 with waht, and threatened with the danger of starvation, or 
 exposure to the weather from insufficiency of clothing 
 or habitation, are Called pauper^ or beggars. This distinc- 
 tioii, precisely to the same effect ^s observed in our language, 
 was pointed out many centuries ago by the comic pfaet Aris- 
 tophiahes, who, iti ohe of his coriiedies, introduces a dialdgile 
 on the comparative merits of poverty arid riches, between 
 i. than wKb had obtained the assistance of the God of Riches 
 arid a personification of Po\^erty in the ^hape of a female; 
 in which, after the former had described a person in a state 
 of great penjiiry and priyatiori, and asked whether that is 
 a picture of happiness, she replies, that ' the state of a man 
 who has faothirig at all is riot poverty, btit bfeggary. A poor 
 
 and middle classes together make up half the J)opillation of England. 
 It seems to me likewise doubtful whether the aggregate wealth ojF the 
 rich is not in this country greater than the aggregate wealth of the 
 middle classes. 
 
tilCH. MIDDLE CLASS. PdbR 121 
 
 man is he who lives sparingly, and always keeps to his work ; 
 *ho, while he has no superfluities, at the same time suffers 
 no privations '.' 
 
 Mr. Wilmot Hortort, in his Inquiry info the Causes and 
 Remedies of Pauperism ", proposes ' to define the genei'a'l 
 term poor, as denoting those persons who possess nothing 
 disposable, in exchange for which they can obtain the means 
 of subsistence, other than their own labour.' This is an 
 attempt to give an absolute definition of poor, equally 
 applicable to all Countries, and without reference to the 
 other wealthier classes in the commuijity,- or t6 any fixed 
 amount of prbperty. In truth, however, we call a person 
 rich without any reference to the manner in which he galins 
 his livelihood, so that the whole amount which he receives 
 exceeds a certain amount, the possession of which charac- 
 terizes the middle rank ; and, in like manner, we say that 
 a person belongs to tlie middle rank, so that his incotae, 
 however acquii-ed, exceeds that which is considered as 
 characterizing the poor. Thus, £i person m^y pdssesS no 
 capital or certain incbme, and may depend for subsistence 
 entirely on his own labour : yet if the proceeds of that 
 labour are very conSidtifable, he may be Called rich ; if they 
 are of a moderate amount/ he may be callfed a man of 
 middling fortune. Many professional men, stich as physi- 
 cians, lawyeirs, soldiers; &c;i are entirely dependent for thfeif 
 subsistence on their bwn exertions, and yet belong to the class 
 of rich, or to the middle rank. It is ttiie that all poor persons 
 have ndthing but theii- own labbut to givfe' in exchange for the 
 mfearts of subsistence; bilt it is hot true that all persdhs 
 who have nothing but theit own labour to give in exchange 
 for the means of subsistCncCj are podr; So ehtii'ely do we 
 exclude frdm our consideration the mahher in which a person 
 is thaiiitaiiifed^ so that his mdihtehdnce be large^ that the 
 
 TToixov n\v yip Bios bv ob X4yits (ijv iariv iirfiiv ixovrd, 
 ToC 8J viififTOS ^tjv ^tiZiiiiVov rtoi Tois epyois irpoakxovTa, 
 TeptyiyveaSai S' avrf} lafiivj iiii iiivrbi itrfi' imKehfiv. 
 
 Aristoph. Flul. 552. 
 ' tourtH Series, p. 9; 
 
122 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 children of the rich are always reckoned in the class of rich- 
 during the lifetime of their parents, on whose charity they 
 are, nevertheless, for the most part as completely dependent,, 
 as an English pauper on the parish-rate, or a street beggar 
 on the compassion of passengers. 
 
 Mr. Wilmot Horton, in the passage just cited, proceeds 
 to divide the poor into four classes, viz. : — i. Labourers; 
 2. Helpless Poor; 3. Paupers; and 4. Beggars. Labourers 
 he describes as those poor persons who are enabled to 
 obtain by their labour the means of subsistence. This 
 definition, however, combined with the foregoing general 
 definition of poor, would include all persons, whose income, 
 however considerable, depends on their personal exertions ; 
 and therefore would comprehend very many persons, who 
 are not in common language, nor can with any propriety be 
 denominated poor. The helpless poor sxe. those persons who 
 have no property, and are physically incapable of gaining 
 the means of subsistence by their own labour. Paupers are 
 those able-bodied poor who cannot get, in exchange for 
 their labour, wages sufficient to procure the means of sub- 
 sistence ; while beggars are those who, being able to work, 
 prefer to rely for their subsistence on the voluntary gifts of 
 others. Of these four classes, the helpless poor and the 
 beggars are identified in common language; as the latter 
 term is not restricted to those who are able to work. Nor, 
 except in countries where there is a compulsory provision 
 for the indigent, can the classes of paupers and beggars be 
 distinguished ; as those who are not able to maintain them- 
 selves, and have not a legal right to be maintained at the 
 public cost, must, if they are to live, be maintained by the free 
 gifts of others : in other words, all paupers must be beggars. 
 If, therefore, from this quadruple division, we exclude the 
 labourers, who must be considered as a class of the whole 
 community, not of the poor only — and remark that in 
 countries wbere the indigent are not maintained by a public 
 tax, the other three classes of helpless poor, paupers, and 
 beggars, necessarily fall together — there will remain, the 
 
RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 123 
 
 classification proposed above : viz. the poor in its general 
 sense, being divided into the poor strictly so called, and 
 the paupers or beggars ; that is, those who by their labour 
 or any other means receive a certain limited income, and 
 those who derive a mean subsistence from the gratuities of 
 others 
 
 Fielding, in his interesting tract on The Causes of the 
 late Increase of Robbers, had previously suggested a general 
 definition of the poor, which is liable to the same objection 
 as that just examined, inasmuch as it makes not the amount 
 of income, but the mode of acquiring it, the test of poverty. 
 ' By the poor,' he says, ' I understand such persons as have 
 no estate of their own to support them without industry, nor 
 any profession or trade by which, without industry, they may 
 be capable of gaining a comfortable subsistence'.' This 
 definition would obviously include all persons belonging to 
 the class of rich and the middle ranks, who have not a large 
 or moderate income independent of their own exertions, or 
 the charity of their relations. 
 
 The same author further divides the class of poor into — 
 I. Such poor as are unable to work; 2. Such as are able 
 and willing to work ; 3. Such as are able to work, but not 
 willing. The division on which this strictly accurate 
 classification is founded, viz. into those who are able, and 
 those who are unable to work, agrees with that known to 
 our law, of the able-bodied and impotent poor. It is 
 scarcely necessary to remark, that a beggar, and a pauper, 
 or a person receiving an allowance from the poor-rate, may 
 belong to any one of these three classes. 
 
 It has been above remarked in several places, that 
 a democracy is sometimes understood to mean, not a 
 government of the majority, but of the poor; that the 
 aristocracy is sometimes identified with the rich, and 
 the people with the poor; that aristocratical measures 
 are such as favour the rich as distinguished from the 
 poor, and popular measures such as favour the poor a§ 
 ' Inquiry into the Causes of the late Increase of Robbers, § 4. 
 
124 ^-5^ ^'^^ ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 distinguished from the rich.. These terms, however,, which 
 properly refer respectively to the classes of rich and poor 
 a/one, afe occasionally applied, with an uncertain signifiea- 
 tion, aS' denoting not the rich, but those who are not poor, 
 that isj the rich and the middle class ; not the poor, but 
 those who are not rich ; that is, the poor and the middle 
 class. Important mistakes may be Gommitted when the 
 argument is made to turn on this double meaning; and 
 when that which is true of the rich or poor alone, is inferred 
 also to be trUe of tlae rfch or poor together with the middle 
 class. But such terms- are properly applied, when, although 
 the .middle class may be allotted to either side, yet the poof 
 or the rich are the predominant consideration, and in pro- 
 portion as a petson is richer or poorer, so much the greater 
 is his gain or loss* Thusi,. When a measure is said to be 
 aristoeratical* or demo'cratical, it may perhaps have little 
 influence on the middle classy but be of such i character 
 that it will greatly increase the political power of the rich 
 or of the poor. Thus Aristotle, in saying that democracy 
 is a government ih which the poor rule ', meant not that 
 the rich or the middle class were ixduded from the govern- 
 ifient, that the poof were alone rulers ; but that the poor, 
 as opposed to both those orders, had a preponderating 
 influence in the constitution, and administered it accordiilg 
 to their own imagined interests. 
 
 A different view of this question is, however, taken by 
 a writer in the Westminster Review, who has pointed out, 
 With great distinctness, the error of supposing that the 
 community is divided into rich and poor; or (as he ex- 
 presses it) that ' rich and poor bisect the community ' : but 
 nevertheless appears to be mistaken in some of the inferences 
 which he Would derive from that observation. 
 
 'Oligarchy,' he says, 'according to the definition of 
 
 Aristotle, has place when the wealthy few possess the 
 
 powers of government, and employ them for their own 
 
 endSj not for the public good: democracy is when the 
 
 ' See abovej p. ^5. 
 
JUCH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 125 
 
 poor many, possessing the powers of government, useitbem 
 for their own interest, • not for the public interest. jTtbe 
 philosopher seems to -imagine that if the .wealthy, as a class, 
 po^ess no distinct privileges, the power ,of government 
 must necessarily be in the 'hands of the :poor ; anS that 
 the poor have an interest contrary to the public interest. 
 Now the word poor is here .employed in a double sense ; 
 signifying, at one time, the whole community (excepting 
 the rich ; at another itime, that portion of the .(ommunity 
 which is in a' state .of -beggary .and starvation. It lis only 
 inthe latter sense that the poor can ever be said^to have 
 an interest, distinct from the ipublic interest : for the .whole 
 community, ^excluding the rich, if this be meant by the 
 word poor, has obviously ;the same interest as ithe whole 
 community, including the rich. According to this latter 
 sense, since not more :than one man in a hundred can be 
 called rich ', ninety-nine hundredths of the community are 
 ■poor; and the interest of ninety-nine hundredths of .the 
 community must always be the same as ' the interest of the 
 'Mrhole community ... It is from this confusion of the mean- 
 ing of the word poor, that the necessity, alleged in political 
 reasonings, of a balance between conflicting interests,, takes 
 its rise. The rich 'have an interest distinct from- the com- 
 -munity; the -poor are asserted to hav€ an interest -distinct 
 'from the community : consequently, in-order to secure the 
 interests of the community, you must pursue .neither the 
 interest of the rich, nor the interest of the poor, but a 
 balance between the two. As an essential element of this 
 balance, the- rich are to possess cert-ain- political powers, apart 
 and^s a class : if they do-not, all political- powers will be in 
 the hands of the poor, the interest of the poor alone will- be 
 consulted, the rich will have no protection against injury, 
 and the interest of the community will be neglected". The 
 
 * This statement is probably- not meant to be taken .strictly ; as the 
 ratio of the rith to the- other two ranks -mnst obviously be different, in 
 different countries. 
 
 ' The argument here stated (whether ever advanced or not) is 
 
326 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 whole fallacy of this reasoning is at once seen, when the 
 community, instead of being divided into rich and poor, 
 are divided, as they ought to be, into rich and not rich ; 
 and when it is understood that the interest of th£ rich; as 
 possessors of unresponsible poiver, is always at variance^ 
 the interest of those who are not rich always coincident-^ 
 with that of the whole community '.' 
 
 On this passage it may in the first place be remarked, 
 that the poor, in the sense in which that word was under- 
 stood by Aristotle, are not persons in a state of beggary or 
 starvation. Not to mention that in the Greek states the 
 working classes were almost exclusively slaves, and that few 
 of the citizens could be in a state of utter destitution, 
 there is no doubt that the distinction above cited from 
 Aristophanes was that received in the common language 
 of Greece", as a comic poet would naturally appeal tQ 
 the prevailing sentiments and opinions of his hearers. 
 Aristotle, therefore, by the word poor, in his definition 
 of democracy, understood that portion of the community 
 who are raised above absolute want, but are nevertheless 
 more circumscribed in their means than the middle class. 
 This, probably the most numerous portion of every society 
 which has hitherto existed, has not in modern times as yet 
 been often possessed of the powers of government ; but in 
 the Greek republics such a state of things was by no means 
 rare ; and it was when the sovereign power was wielded by 
 a body, of which the rich and the middle class were indeed 
 members, but in which they formed an insignificant minority, 
 and were unable to counterbalance the numbers and power 
 of the poor, that Aristotle called the government a demo- 
 cracy. No charge can be less well-founded than to impute 
 
 manifestly fallacions, for the first reason mentioned by the Reviewer, 
 pis second reason will be examined in the text. 
 
 ' Westminster Review, vol. v. pp. 291, 292. 
 
 ' The poor of Aristotle wonld indeed include the beggars of Aristo- 
 phanes ; but the beggars of Aristophanes would not include the poor of 
 Aristotle. The Greek words are itivrp, and TiTaiyii : the latter being 
 derived from Tniiaatai, to crouch, or cringe, the action of a person 
 . humbly suing for a favour. 
 
. j¥' ^OtgLAuy /- 
 
 RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR I27 
 
 to Aristotle a confusion of the part of the community who 
 are not rich under the common name of poor, and a neglect 
 of the middle classes ; when that philosopher enlarges else- 
 where, with evident satisfaction, on the importance of the 
 middle class to the well-being of a state; on the benefits 
 arising from their number and influence, and the evils 
 caused by the frequent absence through Greece of a 
 numerous and respectable middle order, whereby the rich 
 and the poor were brought into immediate contact, and 
 easily moved to acts of violence by reason of their precise 
 . " is he from repre- 
 
 -*^ or' to all who are 
 
 wn, that all states 
 ich, the very poor, 
 , afterwards, among 
 ice • of the middle 
 es admit of being 
 asses are consider- 
 when the middle 
 the rich and the 
 ire more powerful 
 for, even in that 
 iither scale, makes 
 le rich or the poor 
 heir own peculiar 
 Aristotle did not 
 :r in the state, but 
 ed the term ' poor ' 
 
 the same effect, both in 
 notes with approbation 
 
 ■ 7r^A€£ ttvai. 
 
 middle station for me I] 
 
 )rt Essay on the Middle 
 f his Essays. It con- 
 e merit. [See Hume's 
 
138 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 in its proper sense, conceiving that class to have an interest 
 distinct from that of the whole community'. 
 
 Further, it is necessary to advert to the sense in which 
 the ' Westminster ' Reviewer states, that the rich and the 
 poor separately have an interest distinct from the interest 
 of the community; but that :the interest of the poor, 
 together with the middle class, is identical with the interest 
 of the whole cpmmunity. iFgr this purpose, it shpuld 
 be observed that the word interest bear.s two very distinct 
 senses : i. That .which, to competent and dispassionate 
 judges, appears expedient, upon an enlarged and. prospec- 
 tive view of all the circumstances of the case; the facts 
 being considered, not as constituting an individual case, 
 but as a specimen of an entire, class.; and, 2. That which 
 the person or persons may think expedient,, or desire, with- 
 out any regard being had to it^ rea/ effect, as estimated 
 by the best means ^within the reach of human .wisdopi. 
 Now, it is only in the latter of these senses, th^t , different 
 classes of the community . can be said , to have opposite 
 interests : for one of the greatest and .. most valuable dis- 
 coveries of political, science 1 has been, that oppression and 
 unequal privileges are,, on the whole, for long periods of 
 time and large bodies of men, almost as hurtful , to the 
 classes for whose imagined benefit. the distinction is made, 
 as to those whom it obviously and directly injures. Thus 
 the interest of the, manufacturers and agriculturists, of, the 
 ,rich and poor, are ultimately and jn , substance the same, 
 .though the members of each party conceive ^ them to be at 
 variance, and most • frequently act upon that supposition. 
 Thus the rich have in many countries thought that they 
 were benefited by keeping the manual labourers in a state 
 of personal servitude ; and that they would be impoverished 
 by the manumission of their slaves : whereas they would 
 
 ' The middle class was supposed to have the chief interest in estab- 
 lishing a government mixed of aristocracy and democracy, as being 
 neither the aristocratic nor the democratic class, i.e. neither the poor nor 
 the rich ; which explains the sense in which Aristotle understands a mixed 
 government. — See Plutarch, Solon, ch. 13. Above, p. 81. 
 
RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 129 
 
 inevitably have been benefited by the additional wealth and 
 knowledge, and the increased security of government and 
 property, which the whole community, and they not the 
 least, would have derived from that change. In the same 
 narrow sense of the word ' interest,' the Edinburgh Review 
 remarks, that ' it cannot be denied that it is for the imme- 
 diate interest of the people (i. e. the poor) to plunder the 
 rich\' For the poor, as a class, have ever entertained 
 a feeling of hostility to the institution of property, con- 
 ceiving that it is a contrivance estabhshed for the rich and 
 against themselves, enabling others to live on the pro- 
 duce of their labour. It is chiefly to this mistaken but 
 most prevailing opinion, and the measures to which it has 
 given rise, that Aristotle alludes when he says that demo- 
 cracy is a government in which the poor govern for their 
 own, and not for the public good". It was a common 
 practice in Greece and its colonies, for citizens who had 
 fought their way to the rights of citizenship, or were im- 
 poverished by any accidental cause, for example by a loss of 
 territory, to demand a new division of all the land, and an 
 equal partition of it among the citizens. To this practice 
 (not to be confounded with the agrarian laws of the 
 Romans, which were partitions of unappropriated public 
 land) Aristotle alludes in many passages of his Politics^; 
 and such divisions were made or proposed in different 
 states on several occasions '. Of the same nature was the 
 abolition of all claims of debt, and sometimes even a forced 
 repayment of the interest already received by the lenders ° ; 
 which measures, indeed, could only be proposed after an 
 open conflict between the rich and poor. It is in the 
 Greek states that the most striking examples of the col- 
 
 ' Above, p. 99. 
 
 * His opinions on this subject are expressed very fully in his Rhetoric 
 to Alexander, ch. 3, where he points out the dangers to be feared, and 
 the mode of guarding against them. 
 
 ' Pol. V. 8. 20 J vi. 3. 3, and 5. 3. 
 
 * MiiUer's Dorians, vol. ii. pp. 165, 169, 190. 
 = Plutarch, Quaest. Graec. 18. 
 
 K 
 
130 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 lision of the poor and rich, and the confliction of their 
 supposed interests, are to be found, on account of the 
 insignificance of the middle class in those communities, 
 and the direct share which the poor had in the enact- 
 ment and administration, of the laws, by means of their 
 admission to the legislative and judicial assemblies of the 
 citizens, and the appointment of public officers by lot. 
 Thus it was not only at times of popular commotions, 
 but during the regular course of the government, that 
 the rich were unfairly and harshly dealt with. So, at 
 Athens, the practice of multiplying occasions for the con- 
 fiscation of property, and of willingly entertaining accusa- 
 tions which, if supported, would entail that punishment, 
 was very prevalent ^ : in the same manner, and for the 
 same motives, that grounds for accusations of treason were, 
 in more recent times, diligently sought after by the Euro- 
 pean princes. So Aristophanes describes the poor of Attica 
 as being anxious for war — the rich and the farmers as 
 adverse to it '^ ; because the poor would receive a share of 
 the spoil, if there was any (and the Greeks always con- 
 sidered war in the light of an extensive plundering expedi- 
 tion), while the rich would sustain the loss, if the war 
 was unsuccessful, and the cultivators were liable to have 
 their lands ravaged by the victorious enemy. At Megara, 
 too, the leaders of the popular party (i. e. the poor) on one 
 occasion banished so many of the rich, for the sake of con- 
 fiscating their property, that the numbers of the exiles 
 became sufficiently large to enable them to return and 
 engage with the people, whom they overcame, and then 
 established an oligarchy ' ; making (as Aristotle has re- 
 marked) their preponderance in the government the prize 
 
 ' Boeckh's Economy of Athens, vol. ii. p. 127. 
 ^ vav% S^ KaSeKxeiv to) ireyijTi /liv SoKei, 
 
 Tois irkovaiois di xal yeoipyots oi SoxeT. 
 
 Aristoph. Eccl. 197. 
 [The poor man votes for lannchino; ships of war, but tiie rich men and 
 farmers are against it.] 
 » Aristot. J'el. V. 5. 
 
RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 131 
 
 of their victory. Isocrates describes the Argives, during 
 the short intervals of war, as destroying the most opulent 
 citizens, and rejoicing at their ruin more than others would 
 rejoice at the death of an enemy ^- These instances 
 (which are only a few out of a large number) may serve to 
 put in a clear view the hostile spirit which often exists 
 between the poor and the rich, and which has not hitherto 
 been powerfully developed, or been attended with impor- 
 tant effects in most modern states, for reasons which can- 
 not here be investigated. But that the class of poor have 
 almost constantly acted in opposition to the interests of 
 the rich, and that the class of rich have frequently acted 
 in opposition to the interests of the poor, is not more 
 certain than that their real, and permanent, and general 
 interests, are in perfect unison with each other. 
 
 Now the assertion of the 'Westminster' Reviewer, that 
 the interest of those who are not rich is always coincident 
 with the interest of the whole community, is true, if we 
 take interest in its largest sense, to signify that which is 
 ultimately beneficial to the community : but in that sense, 
 neither is the essential interest of the rich or poor, sepa- 
 rately, distinct from the interest of the community. But 
 if, in a proper democracy, i. e. a government in which a 
 majority of the adult male population partake of the sove- 
 reign power, the poor (who in every country are, and 
 always must be, more numerous than the rich and the 
 middle rank taken together) were to propose, and by their 
 numbers carry, that the property of the rich should be 
 divided in equal shares among all the members of the com- 
 munity, then the interest of the rich would not coincide 
 with the supposed interest of the whole community ; for 
 they are members of the community, and would conceive 
 themselves injured. If the interest of the community 
 means the real interest of all and every of the members 
 composing it; the interest not only of any two classes 
 together, but of every class by itself, must coincide with 
 ' Philipp. p. 92 D. 
 K 2 
 
132 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 the interest of the community. If the interest of the 
 community means not the rea^, but the supposed interest 
 of all and every of its members, then the supposed interest 
 of any number of persons less than the whole, is not coin- 
 cident with the interest of the whole community. 
 
 This difference in the significations of,the word interest 
 may be illustrated by a verse of an ancient poet, which 
 occurs in a collection of maxims made by Lord Bacon : — 
 
 ' Cum vitia prosint, peccat qui recte facit.' 
 
 Of which the following translation is given : — ' If vices 
 were upon the whole matter profitable, the virtuous man 
 would be the sinner '.' In other words, ' if it were for the 
 general and permanent interest of mankind to commit 
 vice, the virtuous man would be the sinner.' In this 
 sense, all vice is contrary to a man's interest ; that is, his 
 true interest is to act virtuously. But it is often said 
 that a man preferred his duty to his interest — that his 
 right moral judgement was perverted by his interest, &c. ; 
 in which cases ' interest ' means, not that which is, on the 
 whole, beneficial to mankind; but that which the indi- 
 vidual desires, or what, to the majority, would be an 
 immediate gratification. 
 
 Even if the subject could be properly discussed at 
 length in this place, it would be needless to attempt, after 
 the excellent dissertation of Dr. Arnold', to trace the 
 manner in which the division of political interests, in the 
 early periods of national development being commonly 
 into the nobles and the rich, when the rich are the popular 
 party — is changed at a later epoch into that of the rich 
 and poor, when the rich become the anti-popular party. 
 Thus much, however, it may be proper to observe, that at 
 no time do the poor consider their interest as identical 
 with the interest of the rich ; but that, when the rich are 
 excluded from political power and privileges, on the ground 
 
 ' Bacon's Works, vol. i. p. 418, ed. Montagu. 
 '' See his edition of Thucydides, Appendix i. 
 
RICH. MIDDLE CLASS. POOR 133 
 
 of their not belonging to certain families, this is the pro- 
 minent grievance of the day: and while this lasts, the 
 other division of interests, though it equally exists, is not 
 brought into light, nor does it become the point of separa- 
 tion between the contending parties. So long as the rich 
 are the excluded party, claiming to be admitted to equal 
 rights, the discontents of the poor remain unheeded, or 
 are enlisted in the cause of the rich. This first contest, 
 therefore, is of a purely political character, and is chiefly 
 carried on between persons of property and education, who 
 may thus on both sides be expected neither to rejoice in 
 massacre and bloodshed for their own sake, nor to be indif- 
 ferent about the destruction of property which takes place 
 in all violent civil wars. But when the struggle comes on 
 between the rich and poor, or (as Dr. Arnold has expressed 
 it') between property and numbers, the contest is not so 
 much for political privileges, as for the equalization of 
 wealth ; not so much for setting up the low, as for putting 
 down the high ; no hopes of accommodation can be enter- 
 tained, because the claims of the attacking party are as 
 unreasonable as their end is unattainable. Add to this, 
 that when the rich are the discontented party, being, even 
 in a state of political disability, somewhat accustomed to 
 rule, they are less likely to make a grievous abuse of 
 power than those who come into possession of it for , the 
 first time, full of hatred and envy against their opponents 
 who have lived in luxury while they perhaps have been 
 pinched by want, and determined to retaliate on them 
 for their former superiority of condition. To this inferior 
 moral state of the poor when contending against the rich, 
 as compared with that of the rich when contending against 
 the nobles, the greater bloodiness and atrocity of the 
 former contest is to be attributed; it is, in its nature, a 
 war of extermination, directed to an inaccessible object ; 
 nor is it to be expected that the flame of such a conflict 
 will be extinguished till it has consumed all the materials 
 ' See his edition of Thucydides, pp. 633, 634. 
 
134 ^SE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 which feed it. Hence, it is no matter for surprise that 
 Dr. Arnold should remark, that he knows no instance in 
 which the struggle between property and numbers has, 
 after having come to a crisis, terminated favourably. 
 Indeed it is difficult to understand how a contest could have 
 a, favourable issue, of which the object is to abolish a dis- 
 tinction not factitious or arhjitrary, but necessarily existing 
 in all communities in which a right of property exists, and 
 of which all the members are not on the same level of 
 barbarism. In the ancient states, this political crisis was 
 followed by every form of evil — native despotism, foreign 
 despotism, invasion, unprincipled oligarchies, unprincipled 
 democracies, national poverty and decline. Whether the 
 same crisis, which seems impending in some modern states, 
 will be averted by the prudence of the rich, the numbers, 
 wealth, and respectability of the middle class, the diffusion 
 of knowledge among the poor, and, above all, by the 
 extension of the rights of citizenship to the whole popula- 
 tion, is a problem which time alone can resolve \ 
 
 ' [In onr own country, wealthy manufacturers and traders took the 
 lead in the liberal movement ; they were the champions of popular 
 government, religious equality, and free trade. When the labouring 
 classes obtained the franchise, the progress of liberalism was stayed, and 
 politicians turned their attention to measures by which it was hoped 
 that ' numbers ' might benefit at the expense of property. If the evils 
 apprehended by Dr. Arnold have not followed, we may attribute this 
 result,, partly no doubt to the diffusion of knowledge, partly also to the 
 instinctive caution which our labouring people have shown in the 
 exercise of their electoral power.] 
 
XIV 
 
 NATURE. NATURAL. UNNATURAL. STATE OF 
 NATURE 
 
 On account of the great number and diversity of signi- 
 fications belonging to the word Nature, and the difficulty 
 of fixing them with clearness and precision, it will be 
 desirable to examine all its principal meanings, without 
 regard to their political bearing, as they mutually serve to 
 explain and throw light, on one another. 
 
 Nature is sometimes used as identical with God, or the 
 Being which made the universe : as when we speak of the 
 works of Nature; or when it is said that Nature makes 
 nothing in vain. It is also employed by atheistical writers, 
 in an indistinct sense, to denote some supposed power or 
 motion which has affected existing matter, and presides over 
 the world. This meaning may be discerned in the two fol- 
 lowing passages, which, though taken from Latin authors, 
 may serve to exemplify the English usage, as they admit of 
 literal translation into our language : 
 
 Horace, speaking of the gods of Epicurus, says — 
 
 'Namque deos didici securum agere aevum, 
 Nee si quid miri faciat Natura, deos id 
 Tristes ex alto coeli demittere tecto.' — Sat. i. 5. 103. 
 
 Juvenal also has ^these verses : — 
 
 ' Sunt in foitnnae qui casibus omnia ponunt, 
 Et nuUo credunt mundum rectore moveri, 
 Natura volvente vices et lucis et anni.' — xiii. 86. 
 
136 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 In botli these passages Nature expresses an active supreme 
 power, distinct from God. 
 
 Akin to this sense, is the use of Nature, not as a real 
 being, but as a personification of the active powers of the 
 universe, of the various causes always in operation around 
 us. This usage of the word, which suits only with a figura- 
 tive and poetical style, is sufficiently illustrated by the 
 following passage from Shakespeare : — 
 
 ' Thou, Nature, art my goddess ; to thy law 
 My services are bound'.' 
 
 Nature is also used to signify the material things created 
 by God, the outward objects which strike the senses. Thus 
 we speak of the order of Nature, the laws of Nature, the 
 beauties of Nature, an observer of Nature. In this sense 
 is to be understood Lord Bacon's work on the Inter- 
 pretation of Nature. In this sense, too, it occurs in the 
 following passages of Pope, who makes great use of this 
 
 word : — 
 
 'All are but parts of one stupendous whole, 
 Whose body Nature Is, and God the soul'.' 
 
 ' Let ruling angels from their spheres be hurled, 
 Being on being wreck'd, and world on world ; 
 Heaven's whole foundations to the centre nod, 
 And Nature tremble to the throne of God'.' 
 
 So likewise Sir Walter Scott : — ■ 
 
 ' Call it not vain : they do not err 
 
 Who say that, when the poet dies. 
 Mute Nature is his worshipper, 
 And celebrates his obsequies.' 
 
 Hence is derived the phrase natural philosophy, as 
 opposed to mathematical and moral philosophy; natural 
 philosophy being that philosophy which is concerned 
 about objects that strike the senses, and do not refer 
 to the qualities or conceptions of the human mind. The 
 expression exact sciences as opposed to moral sciences, com- 
 prehends both natural and mathematical philosophy, and 
 
 ' Lear, i. i. ^ Essay on Man, ep. i. v. 267. 
 
 ' Ibid. v. 254. 
 
NATURE 137 
 
 is a division founded, not on the quality of the subject- 
 matter, but on the greater or less certainty of the results. 
 
 Nature is likewise used to signify the qualities or attributes 
 of anything ; that which anything is, or the system, order, 
 arrangement, or mutual relations, of different things. Thus 
 we speak of the nature of God, the nature of the human 
 mind, the nature of the human body, the nature of society, 
 the nature of government, the nature of an army, the nature 
 of the air, the nature of the sun, &c. So Lucretius wrote 
 a poem On the Nature of Things. 
 
 From this acceptation of the word are derived the expres- 
 sions good-nature and ill-nature, as applied to mankind, in 
 the sense of benevolent and malevolent disposition. 
 
 Hence also the phrase human nature, which appears to 
 signify the sum total of the faculties, dispositions, a;nd pro- 
 pensities of mankind ; or the condition of the human race. 
 Thus Dryden, paraphrasing Juvenal, speaks of 
 
 ' A sonl, that can securely death deiy. 
 And cotint it Nature's privilege to die'.' 
 
 And Milton : — 
 
 ' O why did God, 
 Creator wise, that peopled highest heaven 
 With Spirits masculine, create at last 
 This novelty on earth, this fair defect 
 Of Nature, and not fill the world at once 
 With men, as Angels, without feminine ? ' 
 
 [Paradise Lost, x. 890.] 
 
 In this general sense. Nature includes all the constituent 
 parts of the human mind and disposition, whether bad or 
 good, all which are comprehended in the following passages 
 of Shakespeare ; — 
 
 ' His nature is too noble for the world ^' 
 
 ' How quickly nature breaks into revolt. 
 When gold becomes her object'.' 
 
 ' If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another 
 of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to 
 most preposterous conclusions '.' 
 
 ' [Dryden's Works, ed. W. Scott, xiii. 196.] 
 
 ' Coriolanus, iii. i. '2 Hen. IV, iv. 4. * Othello, i. 3. 
 
138 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 So likewise, in the Paradise Lost, the Angel Michael addresses 
 Adam in the following words : — 
 
 'Judge not what is best 
 By pleasure, though to nature seeming meet, 
 Created, as thou art, to nobler end 
 Holy and pure, conformity divine.' 
 
 [/". L. xi. 603.] 
 
 Hence Nature is used to signify the disposition which a 
 man would have if he did not regulate his passions and 
 appetites, and educate his mind by moral discipline. In 
 this sense Lord Bacon uses the word in his Essay on Nature 
 in Men : thus, ' Nature is often hidden, sometimes overcome, 
 seldom extinguished.' 'A man's nature runs either to herbs 
 or weeds ; therefore let him seasonably water the one, and 
 destroy the other.' Horace applies the same term to the 
 original good taste and feeling which a mistaken system has 
 been unable wholly to stifle : — 
 
 ' Natnram expellas furca : tamen usque recurret, 
 Et mala perrnmpet furtim fastidia victrix'.' 
 
 Sometimes, however, nature is taken in a narrower sense, 
 to express only the prevailing part of the human disposi- 
 tion, those moral principles which are found to actuate the 
 majority of mankind in a civilized state of existence. In 
 this sense we say, that parricide, incest, and other crimes, are 
 contrary to our nature, are revolting to human nature, &c. 
 So the author of the poem of JVew Morality speaks of 
 
 ' Crimes by God and Nature loath'd ''.' 
 
 The ordinary sense of natural has the same origin, signi- 
 fying that which is agreeable to the nature of anything. 
 Thus a natural death, as opposed to a violent death, is a 
 death which happens in the regular course of nature, and 
 does not arise from any extraneous cause. In this sense, 
 it is opposed to miraculous or supernatural, as, 'a miracle 
 is a disturbance of the natural order of things.' As applied 
 
 ' Epist. I. I. ep X. V. 24. 
 
 " [The poem quoted is usually attributed to Canning ; it was published 
 in the Anti-Jacdbin of July 9, 1798.] 
 
NATURE 139 
 
 to mankind, it sometimes follows the general sense of nature 
 just described ; as, ' it is natural to men to be kind, to be 
 cruel, to better their condition, to love their children,' &c. ; 
 so Johnson said, that ' all men will naturally steal ' ' : some- 
 times, in the narrower sense (when it becomes a laudatory 
 term), as when it is said that a man is wanting in natural 
 love, that he violates natural decency, &c. 
 
 ' The word natural,' says Hume, ' is commonly taken 
 in so many senses, and is of so loose a signification, that 
 it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not. 
 If self-love, if benevolence, be natural to man ; if reason 
 and forethought be also natural ; then may the same epithet 
 be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. 
 Men's inclination, their necessities, lead them to combine ; 
 their understanding and experience tell them that this, 
 combination is impossible, where each governs himself 
 by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of 
 others. And from these passions and reflections con- 
 joined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections 
 in others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, 
 has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or 
 other, in every individual of the human species. In 
 so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the 
 exertion of his intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed 
 natural".' In these remarks, Hume properly understands 
 natural to mean that which is agreeable to man's nature, 
 in the general sense above pointed out. 
 
 Unnatural is sometimes used to signify that which is 
 inconsistent with the nature of anything/ and could not 
 have happened without some extraordinary deviation from 
 the usual course of things. Thus we call an incident in 
 a tale of fiction unnatural ; and we speak of an unnatural 
 birth, meaning a monstrous birth. 
 
 ' [■ We are all envious naturally ; but by checking envy we get the 
 better of it. So we are all thieves naturally ... by good instruction and 
 good habits this is cured, till a man has not even an inclination to seize 
 what is another's.' — Boswell's Life, ed. B. Hill, iii. 271.] 
 
 ' See Hume's Essays [ed. Green and Grose, ii. 275]. 
 
140 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 Unnatural is likewise used to signify that which is 
 contrary to the good principles of human nature : as, an 
 unnatural offence, an unnatural child; so in Hamlet the 
 murder of the king is called an act 'foul, strange, and 
 unnatural.' ' The Irish,' said Johnson, ' are in a most 
 unnatural state ; for we see there the minority prevailing 
 over the majority '.' Here by unnatural state Johnson 
 must have meant a state which he considered as unfavour- 
 able to good government ; for there is nothing monstrous 
 or unusual in the smaller governing the larger number- 
 The same person is reported to have ' wondered that the 
 phrase of unnatural rebellion should be so much used, for 
 that all rebellion was natural to man ^.' If nature means 
 only the good part of man's disposition, then rebellion 
 (without sufficient cause) is unnatural; if nature means 
 the whole of man's disposition, then rebellion is natural. 
 
 Nature, again, is opposed to art, or human institutions. 
 In this sense, nature is a negative term, and means that 
 which is not made or fashioned by man. 
 
 These usages, which are of frequent occurrence, will be 
 sufficiently exemplified by the following passages : — 
 
 'All nature is but art unknown to thee; 
 All chance, direction which thou canst not see'.' 
 
 'As nature's ties decay, 
 As duty, love, and honour fail to sway, 
 Fictitious * bonds, the bonds of wealth and law, 
 Still gather strength, and force unwilling awe'.' 
 
 ' Agriculture,' says Gibbon, ' is the foundation of manu- 
 factures : since the productions of nature are the materials 
 of art ».' 
 
 In like manner the proverb says, that ' habit is a second 
 
 1 Boswell's Life [ed. B. Hill, ii. 255]. 
 
 ' [Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. B. Hill, v. 394.] 
 
 ' Pope's Essay on Man, ep. i. v. 289. 
 
 * Goldsmith probably either wrote, or intended to vtrite, factitious ; 
 for the bonds of wealth and law, although in a certain sense contrived 
 and fabricated by man, or factitious, are by no means unreal and imaginary, 
 OT fictitious. 
 
 " Gol&smiiWs Traveller. « Decline and Fall. 
 
NATURE 141 
 
 nature'; and Shakespeare, that 'use almost can change the 
 stamp of nature.' 
 
 So likewise we say that 'artificial flowers, or fruit, look 
 as if they were natural ' ; by the latter word meaning that 
 which is not the work of man's hands. 
 
 In a nearly similar sense, we speak of a natural manner, 
 and an artificial manner ; a natural voice, and an artificial 
 voice; by natural understanding that which would be if 
 man did not make it otherwise. 
 
 It appears that the use of natural, as opposed to 
 revealed, is formed by an analogical application of this 
 sense of nature : natural religion meaning a religion which 
 may be derived from the exercise of our unaided reason, 
 without a revelation from God ^. 
 
 From the sense of nature as opposed to human institution 
 or ordinance, has arisen the expression natural child, signi- 
 fying a child born out of wedlock, as distinguished from 
 one born after marriage, which is an institution of men. 
 
 In some of the writings of Mr. Bentham, the method 
 of natural procedure in courts of justice is strongly recom- 
 mended, and opposed to that of technical procedure. It is 
 impossible to suppose that any mode"' of judicial procedure 
 should be left to the discretion of the judge, guided by 
 no rules. Mr. Bentham must evidently, by natural pro- 
 cedure, have meant procedure governed by certain rules, but 
 by rules different from those commonly established. In this 
 case, natural seems to be a vague term of praise signifying 
 that system which, to the writer, seems most expedient. 
 
 When, however, we use such expressions as 'trade 
 
 ' Natural as opposed to spiritual (i Cor. xv. 44, 46), signifying the 
 present state of man as opposed to his state after death, appears to be 
 derived from nature in the sense of human condition; so likewise in 
 Hamlet, the ghost describes himself as, 
 
 ' Confined to fast in fires. 
 Till the foul crimes, done in my days of nature, 
 Are burnt and purged away.' 
 
 And Hamlet himself afterwards speaks of 
 
 'Passing through nature to eternity.' 
 
142 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 should be left to take its natural course,' &c., we mean 
 that trade should be left to take that course into which it 
 would fall if subjected to no regulations or restrictions 
 whatever'. 
 
 From a general view of the above examples, it follows 
 that the various significations of nature fall into two 
 . classes : i. It expresses a positive idea, as when it means 
 essence, quality, disposition, &c. 2. It expresses a negative 
 idea, as when it merely excludes art, or human regulation 
 and contrivance''- It is from the latter sense of nature, 
 when it denotes the absence of human skill and institutions, 
 connected with a mistaken belief as to the progress of 
 society, that the famous political theory of the state of nature 
 has been derived '. It has been imagined that a cultiva- 
 tion of the moral and intellectual faculties, and an advance 
 in the arts and comforts of social life, have corrupted and 
 debased mankind*; and that the ignorance and barbarism, 
 
 ' ' Natural may be opposed, either to what is unusual, miraculous, or 
 artificial. In the two former senses, justice and property are undoubt- 
 edly natural. But, as they suppose reason, forethought, design, and a 
 social union and confederacy among men, perhaps that epithet cannot 
 strictly, in the last sense, be applied to them. Had men lived without 
 society, property had never been known, and neither justice nor injustice 
 had ever existed. But society among human creatures had been im- 
 possible without reason and forethought. Inferior animals that unite 
 are guided by instinct, which supplies the place of reason. But all these 
 disputes are merely verbal.' — Hume's Essays [ed. Green and Grose, ii. 
 276]. 
 
 " 'The idea of a natural society is a negative one. The idea of a 
 political society is a positive one.' — Bentham, Fragment on Government 
 [ed. Montague, p. 137]. 
 
 ' The negative sense of this expression is well marked in the explanation 
 of the corresponding French phrase, in the Dictionnaire de V Acadimie, 
 ' On appelle Hat de pure nature, I'etat des hommes sauvages, sans societe, 
 et sans lois.' 
 
 ' It is singular that the doctrine of the possession of wealth being 
 hostile to virtue, should occur in the writings of a person who has com- 
 posed it treatise on Political Economy. 'Prudence,' says Mr. Mill, in 
 his Essay on Government, pi 505, comparing the aristocratic body with 
 the rest of the community, i.e. the rich with the middle class and the 
 poor, ' is a more general characteristic of the people who are without the 
 advantages of fortime, than of the people who have been thoroughly 
 subject to their corruptive operation^ A sentiment of this kind might 
 naturally be expected in Goldsmith's Deserted Village, or in Mande- 
 
STATE OF NATURE 143 
 
 prevalent at some early period of the world, were attended 
 with an amount of virtue and happiness unknown in 
 succeeding times. Hence the term, a state of nature, 
 has been employed to designate a supposed state of 
 primitive simplicity, before the introduction of the arts 
 of civilization^, and the establishment of government and 
 laws. The phrase itself and the theory connected with it 
 have, in this country, been diifused chiefly by the writings 
 and authority of Locke ; though neither he nor any one else 
 has ventured to fix on any time or country which furnishes 
 an example of this form of society, if society it is to be 
 called; and his state of nature is as pure an offspring 
 of the imagination, as Plato's perfect republic, or Sir 
 Thomas More's Utopia. As, however, Locke's account 
 is somewhat diffuse and indistinct, I shall prefer giving 
 Pope's description, in his Essay on Man, of the state 
 of nature, and the change from that state to civilization 
 and government, as being shorter and more explicit. If any 
 one objects to taking an account of a political theory from 
 a poet, let him produce one from a prose writer, which, 
 when it is examined, will be found to be more prosaic 
 or less inconsistent with reason and reality : — 
 
 'Nor think in nature's state they blindly trod; 
 The state of nature was the reign of God : 
 Self-love and social at her birth began, 
 Union the bond of all things, and of man. 
 
 ville's Fable of the Bees ; but how is it consistent with a work, of which 
 the object is to point out those circumstances which most favour the 
 productiveness of industry, and the production, distribution, and accu- 
 mulation of wealth ? It may, however, be said, that, in his work on 
 Political Economy, Mr. Mill described the' circumstances which are 
 most favourable to the increase of wealth, in order that they might be 
 avoided : that he showed how industry may be encouraged, in order 
 that the most effectual mode of repressing it might be perceived : that 
 the knowledge of the best means of increasing wealth implies the 
 knowledge of the best means of diminishing it. Thus his work on 
 Political Economy would be like a treatise on poisons ; the object of 
 which is not to recommend the use of the poisons, but to ascertain their 
 antidotes. 
 
 ' Hence, in familiar language, a state of nature is employed to mean 
 a state of nudity ; clothes being tiie work of men's hands. 
 
144 ^S^ -^^D ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 Pride then was not ; nor arts, that pride to aid ; 
 Man walk'd with man, joint tenant of the shade : 
 The same his table, and the same his bed ; 
 No murder cloth'd him, and no murder fed. 
 * t Iff * * * * 
 
 Ah, how unlike the man of times to come. 
 Of half that live the butcher and the tomb ; 
 Who, foe to nature, hears the general groan. 
 Murders their species, and betrays his own'.' 
 
 The poet then describes man 
 
 ' From Nature rising slow to Art,' 
 
 as addressed by the voice of Nature, which enjoins him 
 to take instruction from the lower animals ; for example, 
 to learn the art of building from the bee; the art of 
 ploughing from the mole ; of sailing from the nautilus, &c. 
 Moreover, to imitate forms of government from the same 
 original : — a republic from the ants ; a monarchy from the 
 bees. 
 
 ' Great Nature spoke : observant man obey'd. 
 Cities were built, societies were made.' 
 
 The result of this account seems to be, that in the 
 state of nature God ruled the world; that is, God alone 
 ruled it — there being no human rulers. Benevolence and 
 self-love existed; but, notwithstanding the existence of 
 self-love, all men. lived in concord, and the feeling of pride 
 was unknown. There were no arts or government ; men 
 lived with the beasts ', and subsisted exclusively on vege- 
 table food. In the state of nature men killed neither beasts 
 nor men. After some time, mankind learnt, by observing 
 some of the lower animals, to imitate their ways ; and having 
 thus invented the arts of social life, upon the same model 
 they formed societies under an established government. 
 
 Such is an outline of this puerile theory of the progress 
 of society; untenable from its self-contradictions, even 
 as a hypothesis, and distinctly refuted by facts: a theory 
 
 • Essay on Man, ep. iii. v. 146. 
 
 2 This supposition implies a change in the nature of beasts, as well 
 as of man : for beasts avoid man, and prey upon him, which have never 
 been subject to his attacks. 
 
STATE OF NATURE 145 
 
 which could only have arisen from the distempered imagina- 
 tion of some day-dreamer, and could only have been toler- 
 ated by a blind ignorance or wilful neglect of all history. 
 Pictures of this description may delight the mind when 
 presented to it in an avowedly poetical and fabulous shape, 
 as in the Greek legends of the golden age; but when 
 introduced into a didactic poem, or a philosophical system 
 of government, they shock the reason without amusing the 
 fancy. 
 
 To refute it in detail would be superfluous; nor indeed 
 need anything more be said, than that there is no record 
 of such a state of existence, at any time, in any country. 
 No one can doubt, that if a history is shown to be utterly 
 destitute of historical evidence, it must fall to the ground : 
 yet Locke treats this objection as devoid of weight, and 
 proposes to answer it, by observing that 'all princes and 
 rulers of independent governments, all through the world, 
 are in a state of nature,' and that members of different 
 communities are, as towards each other, in a state of nature^. 
 These statements are, in a certain sense, strictly true ; but 
 they afford no answer to the fatal objection which Locke 
 treats so lightly. The question is, whether there ever was 
 a number of men living together, not forming a society, 
 or recognizing a common sovereign, or an established 
 law of the state ; but following a certain law of nature as 
 plain or even plainer to be understood than the positive 
 laws of commonwealth's, of which each man is judge in 
 his own cause, and which each has the power to execute for 
 himself; yet never abusing this power, but using it always^ 
 as calm reason and conscience dictate''. To this inquiry 
 it is answered, that there is no account of such a state 
 of existence, and therefore it is to be rejected as a chimera. 
 On the other hand, Locke replies that sovereigns are 
 subject to no law, and members of different states acknow- 
 ledge no common law; and therefore there are persons 
 
 ' Locke on Government, b. ii. § 14. 
 ' Ibid. § 13, 8. 
 
 L 
 
146 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 living in a state of nature. But this reply does not 
 touch the objection which it professes to remove : it is 
 objected that there never was a collection of men living 
 together peaceably before the establishment of a govern- 
 ment, all acknowledging a certain law, which each man 
 makes and executes for himself. This objection is not 
 answered by saying that offer the formation of societies, 
 and the establishment of governments and laws, there are 
 some persons in those societies not subject to the law, and 
 persons in different states who acknowledge no common 
 law. The doctrine of the state of nature may be readily 
 admitted, if it is confined to persons living in civilized 
 communities, and to a period posterior to the establishment 
 of government. 
 
 The ancient errors respecting the innocence and virtue 
 of savages, and their superiority over civilized man, have 
 in late times been so generally exploded by the advance- 
 ment of historical knowledge, more especially since the 
 researches of modern travellers have disclosed the real habits 
 and character of barbarous nations, that scarcely a person 
 could, perhaps, be now found to defend such a theory of 
 the progress of society as is advanced by Locke and Pope ; 
 nevertheless, it is- sometimes important that such ground- 
 less speculations should be set forth, so that their absurdity 
 may appear, and the doctrines deduced from them be shown 
 to want a foundation. Many a person might be startled by 
 imperfections dragged into the broad daylight, which would 
 pass unobserved if suflFered to remain hidden in their former 
 obscurity. It might indeed have been expected that when 
 a theory was abandoned by common consent, and never 
 mentioned but to be rejected, the practical deductions from 
 it would have shared a like fate : that ' when the brains are 
 out, the man would die.' Still we find traces of the belief 
 in a state of nature lingering in many expressions of fre- 
 quent occurrence, which had their origin in that delusion ; 
 and which only owe their currency to an ignorance of the 
 impure source from whence they are derived. It is thus 
 
STATE OF NATURE 147 
 
 that a theory which, in its day, had a sufficient vogue to 
 transfer its peculiar and technical expressions into common 
 language, may continue, by that means, to influence our 
 reasonings after it has fallen into deserved oblivion ; and 
 that its very obscurity may favour the circulation of the 
 errors to which it gave birth. 
 
 No one has furnished a more efficacious antidote to the 
 erroneous and mischievous notions respecting the virtues 
 of savages, and the tendency of civilization to corrupt 
 mankind, than Archbishop Whately, in his lately published 
 Lectures on Political Economy; whose discussion of this 
 subject must afford delight and instruction, even to those 
 who already are most firmly convinced of the principles 
 which it establishes. It is on account of the excellence of 
 this discussion, and the authority which it deservedly 
 carries, that it becomes the more necessary for me to advert 
 to the explanation there given of the expression — 'a state 
 of nature,^ as it disagrees with that suggested in the preceding 
 pages. 
 
 ' There is no good reason,' he says, ' for calling the con- 
 dition of the rudest savages a state of nature : on the 
 contrary, such language is as much at variance with sound 
 philosophy, as the dreams of those who imagine this state 
 to resemble the golden age of the poets are with well- 
 ascertained facts. The peaceful life and gentle disposition 
 — the freedom from oppression — the exemption from 
 selfishness and from evil passions — and the simplicity of 
 character of savages — have no existence but in the fictions 
 of poets and the fancies of vain speculators : nor can their 
 mode of life be called, with any propriety, the natural 
 state of man. A plant would not be said to be in its 
 natural state, which was growing in a soil or climate that 
 precluded it from putting forth the flowers and the fruit 
 for which its organization was destined. No one who saw 
 the pine grow near the boundary of perpetual snow on the 
 Alps, stunted to the height of two or three feet, and 
 struggling to exist amidst rocks and glaciers, would describe 
 
 L 2 
 
148 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 that as the natural state of a tree, which, in a more genial soil 
 and climate a little lower down was found capable of rising 
 to the height of fifty or sixty yards. In like manner, the 
 natural state of man must, according to all fair analogy, 
 be reckoned not that in which his intellectual and moral 
 growth are, as it were, stunted and permanently repressed ; 
 but one in which his original endowments are, I do not say 
 brought to perfection, but enabled to exercise themselves 
 and to expand, like the flowers of a plant ; and especially, 
 in whicl^ that characteristic of our species, the tendency 
 towards progressive improvement, is permitted to come 
 into play'.' 
 
 If nature is taken to mean the whole compound of the 
 moral and intellectual faculties and 'disposition of man, and 
 if natural signifies that which is agreeable to the nature 
 of anything, then it is natural to man to improve his 
 external condition, to regulate his passions, and to cultivate 
 his mental powers ; jn other words, to advance in civilization: 
 and to this course of things he has a natural tendency, 
 in the same way that wealth has a natural tendency to 
 increase at a faster rate than population. But although 
 his tendency is to move in this direction, it is not the less 
 natural, i.e. consonant with his nature, for him to recede 
 instead of advance in the career of improvement, in the 
 same way that population sometimes increases faster than 
 wealth : as is witnessed by the mighty revolutions that have 
 reducefl to misery, ignorance, and barbarism, countries once 
 the seat of gigantic empires, and the home of every art 
 and science; which have converted the palaces of kings, 
 the sites of vast cities, and the territories of powerful 
 and active commonwealths, into wastes scarcely tilled by 
 a few slaves, or occasionally visited by a roving tribe of 
 
 ' Whately's Introductory Lectures on Political Economy, pp. 137, 138. 
 The sentiments expressed in the latter part of this passage coincide 
 exactly with the definition of nature given by Aristotle : olov ydp ticaa- 
 t6v iari t^s '•liviatus Ti\iaeeiarjs, toiJtiji' ^a/tiv t^i/ (piaiv dvat ticaarov : 
 ' that whicli anything is, when arrived -at a state of completion or perfec- 
 tion, I call its nature.' — Pol. i, 2, 
 
STATE OF NATURE r^^ 
 
 barbarians : such instances of national decline and degrada- 
 tion are unhappily too frequent to be called unnatural, 
 or to be considered as monstrous deviations from the 
 ordinary course of human affairs. Although the opinions 
 of those philosophers who conceived that all human affairs 
 revolve in a cycle, and must after a regular succession of 
 changes, end where they began, are not less mistaken than 
 that doctrine which compares the life of a state with the life 
 of an individual, and teaches that its forces will be impaired 
 by long existence, as a man is enfeebled by old age ; yet it 
 is impossible, with some modern historians, to consider the 
 state of mankind as one of perpetual progression, or to flatter 
 ourselves that every retrograde movement will only be a 
 voluntary retrpat, by which society collects all its powers 
 in order to enable it to take a more vigorous spring in 
 advance. 
 
 In this general sense, therefore, it is natural to man to 
 recede, as well as to advance, in civilization ; though his 
 tendency is towards improvement. He might, therefore, 
 be in a natural state, whether in his original barbarism, 
 or having made some progress in the ascent of civilization, 
 or having again relapsed into his former rudeness. But 
 being in a natural state appears to be by no means synony- 
 mous with being in a state of nature, as Dr. Whately's 
 argument assumes. In the one phrase nature signifies that 
 which anything is, the essence or constitution of anything ; 
 in the other, it expresses the absence of art or human 
 regulation. A state of nature is (if I may for once make 
 use of such a word) a state of inartificialness . Men are 
 supposed to be in a state of nature when there are no 
 arts, luxuries, or refinements whatever ; nor any established 
 government and laws. From this state of original simplicity 
 and separateness they emerged into a state of civilization, 
 by learning the useful arts from some of the lower animals, 
 according to Pope; and by forming a government on 
 the basis of the social compact, according to Locke and 
 many other writers. This expression, however, does not 
 
150 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 imply that it is more natural to man (or more consonant 
 to his nature) to be savage than to be educated ; more than 
 the expression a natural child implies that it is more natural 
 to mankind to permit a community of women than to 
 establish the institution of marriage : it is a mere negative 
 term to express the non-existence of certain contrivances 
 and ordinances of men. Nevertheless, it is highly probable 
 that the very mistaken notion of a state of nature being 
 more natural to man than a state of arts and government, 
 may be suggested or confirmed by the doubtful form of the 
 expression in question. 
 
 The law of nature has not been so favourite an expression 
 with modern political writers as natural rights ; but has been 
 chiefly used by writers on ethics and jurisprudence. It is 
 a phrase of great antiquity, being used both by the Greek 
 philosophers and the Roman lawyers, and is of a date long 
 anterior to the theory of the state of nature, with which it 
 had originally no connexion. By the moderns, however, 
 the law of nature has often been made an integral part 
 of that theory; in whose writings (for instance, in those 
 of Locke) it usually signifies, not laws enacted by. a legisla- 
 ture, but moral rules, which are binding on men indepen- 
 dently of law ; and, according to the above hypothesis, 
 were the only rules by which the conduct of men was 
 guided in the state of nature : and which, though unwritten 
 and unascertained, either by common agreement or by the 
 command of a governor, were yet more intelligible and fixed 
 than the established laws of a civilized state '- 
 
 ^ [The tenn ' law of nature,' as used by jurists, denotes those legal 
 rules and principles which commend themselves to the reason of every 
 thinking man, as distinguished from the precise and particular rules which 
 are known only to those who study and practise the law.] 
 
XV 
 
 LIBERTY. FREEDOM. FREE 
 
 Liberty and Freedom', as well as Nature, have both 
 a positive and a negative sense ; and these senses require 
 to be accurately distinguished, in order to avoid the con- 
 fusions and mistakes which they have so often occasioned. 
 
 I. Liberty, in the positive sense, signifies rights, the 
 enjoyment of which is beneficial to the possessor of them. 
 Thus we speak of the liberty of a British subject, meaning 
 certain rights which a British subject may exercise, such 
 as the right of suing out a writ of habeas corpus if he is 
 imprisoned without reason ". So it is said, that ' a man 
 has a liberty to use his own property as he wills, so that he 
 injures not others ' ; for example, that he may ride his own 
 horse, till his own land, fell his own trees, &c. ; that is to 
 say, the law annexes these rights to the right of property, 
 and guarantees the proprietor against the disturbance of 
 them. In like manner, we speak of giving one the freedom 
 
 ' Crabb {Diet, of Synonyms, in Freedom) says that ' freedom is 
 personal and private; liberty is public' Tliere is no ground for this 
 distinction : and in the remarks in the text, both words are intended, 
 where only either the Saxon or the Norman form is expressed. 
 
 ^ According to Blackstone, the ' spirit of liberty is so deeply im- 
 planted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave 
 or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of 
 the laws, and so far becomes a free man.' — i Com. 127. Upon which 
 passage, Mr. Christian remarks, that ' it is not to the soil or to the air 
 of England that negroes are indebted for their liberty, but to the efficacy 
 of the writ of habeas corpus, which can only be executed by the sheriff in 
 an English county.' 
 
152 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 of a borough or corporation, i.e. conf^erring on him the 
 rights and privileges which belong to the members of such 
 a body. Liberties, in the plural number, when employed 
 with a political reference, is always equivalent with rights '. 
 
 A second positive sense of liberty, is when it is used to 
 signify the possession of certain rights by one part over 
 another part of the community. In this sense it is opposed 
 to slavery or servitude. A freeman is he who is not a slave. 
 In communities where there is a class of slaves, liberty is 
 a distinction, and the freemen compose a privileged order 
 in the state. 
 
 In a nearly similar sense, Sir James Mackintosh, in his 
 Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations, 
 defines liberty as consisting in security against •wrong'''; i.e. 
 in the enjoyment of the protection of the sovereign against 
 a breach of law ; in other words, in the possession of legal 
 rights. Hence he properly infers, that ' liberty is the object 
 of all government ' : for all government must have for its 
 end the investing of all the members of the community 
 with certain legal rights. But there is likewise an ulterior 
 end, or a standard whereby these rights are to be judged; 
 viz. thfeir tendency to produce the well-being of the society. 
 
 It is sometimes imagined that all laws are a restraint on 
 liberty ; and that liberties, such as that of moving a man's 
 body, or tilling his own field, are fragments of original 
 natural liberty, which have been left untouched by the 
 encroachments of the legislature, and which man would 
 enjoy without the existence of a government. ' Political or 
 civil liberty,' says Blackstone, ' which is that of a member 
 of society, is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained 
 by human laws (and no further) as is necessary and 
 expedient for the general advantage of the public'.' In 
 this view, liberty is made to seem independent of law, 
 
 ' ' The rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the liberties of 
 Englishmen.' — Blackstone, i Com. i^o. And see Hale's Analysis o/iAe 
 Law, § 13. 
 
 " P. 59. ' 1 Com. 125. 
 
LIBERTY. FREEDOM. FREE 153 
 
 and all law as an abridgement of liberty. There is, indeed, 
 no doubt that a wandering savage, who has occupied a plot 
 of ground, possesses the power of using his limbs, and 
 cultivating his land: but to suppose that these liberties 
 are, under a settled government, only spared by the 
 legislature, and not created and secured by it, betrays 
 a complete misapprehension of the nature of legal rights, 
 and the acts of a sovereign body. Under an established 
 government, no absence of law can be beneficial • because 
 every act which may be done by man must be either 
 permitted or prohibited by the legislature. What the 
 law does not forbid, it sanctions ^ ; and will protect those 
 who do it from obstruction. If a legal prohibition to do 
 an act were removed, without^ a legal permission to do 
 the same act being granted, the repeal of the prohibition 
 would be nugatory; for although the law would not 
 prevent any one from doing the act hitherto prohibited, 
 it would not secure him against the interruption of 
 others. The absence of a disabling law, without the 
 presence of an enabling law, would be of no avail, as 
 the act of the subject would be neither legal nor illegal : 
 it would lie without the pale of the civil jurisdiction ; 
 and might would be the only right, as in an unsocial 
 state. All acts of persons living under an established 
 government must be either lawful or unlawful ; if they 
 are unlawful, the law prohibits them from being done; 
 if lawful, the law authorizes them to be done, and 
 guarantees the enjoyment of the right or liberty which 
 it confers. Therefore, in a state of society, all liberty 
 arises from the existence, and is secured by the protection, 
 of law. The liberty of speaking, or of moving, is as much 
 a right conferred by law, as the right of suing on a bill of 
 
 ' ' What the law does not enjoin, it forbids,' h /ifi KfKtvei ilrayoptvei, 
 says Aristotle, Ethics, v. 11, but not quite correctly, for the law 
 permits many things which it does not prohibit. [What the law permits, 
 it does not always sanction or approve. The law permits a trader to 
 carry on business without keeping any books of account. But if such a 
 trader becomes insolvent, he is severely dealt with by the court.] 
 
154 ^■S-E AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 exchange, or of arresting a debtor; for without law there 
 would be no security for its enjoyment ^. 
 
 2. In its negative sense, liberty or freedom signifies not 
 the enjoyment of a beneficial right, but the exemption from 
 a painful duty, or the absence of unnecessary or hurtful 
 restraint ; as the freedom of trade — liberty of the press— free 
 discussion. In this sense, liberty is opposed to oppression or 
 tyranny ; of which more will be said when we come to the 
 subject of Free Governments. 
 
 Persons who speak of liberty in general, of the blessings 
 of liberty, of the cause of liberty, may be understood to use 
 this word to denote an immunity or exemption from certain 
 restrictions which they consider as pernicious to society '. 
 
 Liberty is likewise used to sxgniiy independence of a foreign 
 power; i.e. an absence of foreign dominion. In its first 
 negative sense, it refers to the relations of the members of 
 a state, as towards each other : in the second, to the relation 
 of the whole state to another state. In the first, the exemp- 
 tion is from oppressive power ; in the second, from all 
 power, whether oppressive or inoppressive. Thus, according 
 to Sir William Temple, ' a free nation is that which has 
 never been conquered, or thereby entered into any conditions 
 of subjection ^' So likewise Gibbon, in speaking of the 
 first deliverance of Britain from the Roman yoke, says, that 
 
 ' ' Men,' says Sir J. Mackintosh, ' are more free under every govern- 
 ment, even the most imperfect, than they would be if it were possible 
 for them to exist without any government at all : they are more secure 
 from wrong, more undisturbed in the exercise of their natural powers, 
 and therefore more free . . . than if they were altogether unprotected 
 against injury from each other.' — Discourse on the Law of Nature and 
 Nations, p. 59. If liberty consists in security against wrong, not only 
 are men living under a government more free, more secure, and more 
 undisturbed, than men living without a government, but without a govern- 
 ment there is absolutely no security, and therefore no liberty. Security 
 is derived from the protection of a third party besides the injured 
 person and the wrong-doer, which in a savage state, by the hypothesis, 
 does not exist. 
 
 ^ ' Every one,' says Montesquieu, treating of the different significa- 
 tions of this word, ' has given the name of liberty to the government 
 which agrees with his habits, or inclinations.' — Esprit des Lois, b. xi. 
 ch. 2. 
 
 ' On the Original and Nature of Government, Works, vol. ii. p. 87. 
 
LIBERTY. FREEDOM. FREE 155 
 
 'the restoration of British freedom was not exempt from 
 tumult and faction '.' In like manner we speak of the free 
 towns of Germany and Italy, meaning those towns which 
 were independent of external control, and administered 
 their own government. It is true that these cities enjoyed 
 what is termed a free government ; but the exemption from 
 external dominion, and not from domestic tyranny, appears 
 to have been the origin of their name. This too is very 
 frequently the sense of iXddepos and ikevdepla in the Greek 
 writers"''; and with good reason, as the evils of foreign 
 dictation and dominion were more severely felt in the states 
 of Greece than the evils of native tyranny. 
 
 A state may be free in the second sense, without being 
 free in the first sense ; i.e. it may be independent, without 
 having a free government: nor is the converse by any means 
 impossible, as we know from the example of the kingdom 
 of Poland, as regulated at the Congress of Vienna, which 
 was an attempt to reconcile freedom with dependence", 
 i.e. to establish a commonwealth with a foreign prince at 
 the head of it; and from the government of Hungary, which 
 still exists *- 
 
 Another negative signification of liberty is when it denotes 
 the absence of imprisonment, in the sense of Mng at large. 
 Thus we say that a captive has regained his liberty, when 
 he escapes from the place of his confinement. 
 
 (Liberty, therefore, may mean both the possession of rights 
 and immunity from duties " ; in both of which senses it 
 
 ' Decline and Fall, ch. 31. 
 
 " See Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, vol. i. part 2. p. 447. 
 
 ' See Malchus, Statistik, § 99, 
 
 ' [The government of Poland is now incorporated with that of Russia. 
 Since 1867, Hungary and Austria form a Dual Monarchy, each retaining 
 its own institutions.] 
 
 ' Blackstone divides rights into absolute and negative ; and absolute 
 rights he defines to be 'such as would belong to persons merely in a state 
 of nature and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society 
 or in it.' — i Com. 123. He then says, that ' the absolute rights of man 
 are usually summed in one general appellation, and denominated the 
 natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in 
 a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control. 
 
156 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 appears to be taken by those who make liberty the end of 
 government ; i. e. they make it consist in the enjoyment 
 of all beneficial rights, and the absence of all pernicious 
 duties. From this explanation, however, it is at once seen 
 that liberty cannot be the ultimate end of government, as 
 there must be some measure by which the expediency and 
 inexpediency of these several rights and duties is to be esti- 
 mated. Persons who employ this phraseology are perhaps 
 liable to be misled, by considering only the negative side of 
 liberty, into an opinion that the removal of all restrictions 
 is desirable, and that the goodness of a government is to be 
 estimated by the absence of regulation. This opinion is 
 supported by the often-quoted sentence of Tacitus ', ' that 
 the most degenerate states have the greatest number of 
 laws;' 'Corruptissimi republici, plurimae leges;' — a position 
 not only not true, but the very reverse of the truth, as the 
 progress of civilization is to multiply enactments, in order 
 to suit the extended relations and the more refined and 
 diversified forms of property introduced by the improvement 
 of society. It is such an absence of restrictions, abolished 
 
 unless by the law of nature.' — Ibid. 125. Thus far it appears, that 
 absolute rights are not positive rights conferred by a legislature, but 
 a mere absence of legal restraint, or natural liberty. Afterwards, he 
 lays it down, that 'the absolute rights of every Englishman, taken in 
 a political-and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties': and 
 proceeds to explain how these ' rights and liberties ' exist by virtue 
 of certain acts of Parliament. — Ibid. 127. Here, then, liberties are 
 positive rights conferred by the legislature, having no connexion vrith 
 natural liberty. Finally he says that ' the rights themselves, thus 
 defined by these several statutes, consist in a number of private im- 
 munities ; which will appear, from what has been premised, to be 
 indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty ^hich is not 
 required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience, or 
 else those civil privileges which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu 
 of the natural liberties so given up by individuals.' — Ibid. 129. At 
 length, we find that these ' absolute rights ' may be either the immunity 
 from certain legal duties, or the possession of certain legal rights, or 
 perhaps both at the same time. It is, perhaps, difficult to conceive 
 greater confusion and obscurity of thought, than is displayed in this 
 laboured discussion. 
 
 '■ [Annals, iii. 27. Tacitus is here stating a fact in the history of Roman 
 law ; it is not clear that his words are to be taken as embodying 
 a general maxim.] 
 
LIBERTY. FREEDOM. FREE 157 
 
 merely for the sake of promoting liberty, without any regard 
 to the public good, that is termed licentiousness (when that 
 word has a political sense), and sometimes improperly, 
 anarchy, which word, though properly it means an absence , 
 or privation of government, is often {as will be shown below) 
 used figuratively to express an insufficiency of restraint. 
 
 The theory of natural liberty is an endeavour to reconcile 
 the advantages of a social with the immunities of a savage 
 life. According to this doctrine, man, in a civil state, is 
 supposed to possess some of the freedom from legal restraint 
 which exists in a state of nature, yet, at the same time, to 
 be entitled to the protection of the government '. This 
 theory, therefore, involves a self-contradiction. A man 
 cannot claim an exemption in right of his civilized condition^ 
 while he refuses a burden in right of his savgige condition. 
 He cannot deny the existence of legal duties, while he 
 asserts the existence of legal rights. He cannot call for 
 the assistance of the sovereign power, given only upon a 
 condition which he repudiates. If a man objects to being 
 imprisoned for debt, on the ground that it is an infringement 
 of his natural liberty, in the same breath he demands the 
 aid of the law against a person wrongfully imprisoning him. 
 If he will not obey the law which orders him to prison, how 
 can he appeal to the law for protection against those who 
 force him to it ? ' How can any man claim (as Burke has 
 justly inquired), under the conventions of civil society, rights 
 which do not so'much as suppose its existence — rights which 
 are absolutely repugnant to it " ? ' 
 
 Generally, however, the phrase in question, on account 
 of the vagueness and uncertainty of both the words which 
 compose it, conveys no precise notion ; and Locke's position 
 — that men are naturally free — may be considered no less 
 unmeaning and insignificant than the opposite position of 
 his adversary Filmer, that men are not naturally free. The 
 argument by which the latter writer establishes his assertion, 
 
 ' See Blackstone, i Com. 125. 
 
 " On the French Revolution, p. 88. 
 
158 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 / 
 
 viz. that men are born in subjection to their parents, and, 
 being under their authority, are not by nature free', is 
 founded on the customary confusion of law and morality ; 
 for though a child, in a savage state, owes a moral duty to 
 his parents, he is bound to them by no legal obligation. 
 
 "The idea of natural liberty in a savage state is an exemp- 
 tion from the duties imposed by government, and an entire 
 command of a man's actions, so far as he is not hindered by 
 superior force. The idea of natural liberty in a social state, 
 as already explained, is derived from the doctrine of the 
 social compact, as delivered by Locke, Rousseau, and others. 
 This theory teaches that mankind, when in the state of 
 nature, made a compact by which the whole surrendered 
 to a part of the community their natural rights and natural 
 liberty, on condition of being well governed ; and if this 
 condition is not fulfilled (of the fulfilment of which they 
 themselves are the only judges), they may at once resume 
 their natural rights and natural liberty^. After the conclusive 
 objections of Hume ', Paley *, and Whately ", to this theory, 
 and after the remarks already made on Rousseau's explana- 
 tion of sovereignty, on the meaning of legal rights, and on 
 the state of nature, it would be unnecessary to examine this 
 subject in detail; nor indeed does this historical account 
 of the origin of all governments require any other answer 
 than that ' it is a mere fiction — the supposition of a thing 
 which never had any existence '.' 
 
 It may perhaps seem extraordinary that so acute and 
 sagacious a writer as Locke should, in laying the foundations 
 of his theory of government, have preferred to reality and 
 
 ' Locke on Government, b. ii. § 6. 
 
 " Hobbes's state is formed by a compact, but made between subject 
 and subject, and not between subject and sovereign : the condition being 
 that, if you will surrender your right of self-government, I will surrender 
 mine. — Leviathan, p. ii. ch. 17. 
 
 ' Essay on the Original Contract [Essays, ed. Green and Grose, 
 i. 103]. 
 
 * Moral and Political Philosophy, b. vi. ch. 3. 
 
 ' Bampton Lectures and Other Sermons, third edition, p. 293. 
 
 • Edinburgh Review, vol. xvii. p. 424. See also Sit J. Mackintosh on 
 the Law of Nature and Nations, p. 57. 
 
LIBERTY. FREEDOM. FREE 159 
 
 truth his own 'exsufflicate and blown surmises" about 
 a state of things which he must have known to be purely 
 imaginary ^. But he had doubtless made up his mind as to 
 the conclusion to be proved ; and people are accustomed 
 to be satisfied with very slight evidence for the assertions 
 which they make in accounting for a position which they 
 consider as unquestionable. ' This is not the first instance 
 in the world (as Mr. Bentham has remarked in relation to 
 another subject), where the conclusion has supported the 
 premises instead of the premises the conclusion ^.' 
 
 The same easy faith in accepting a doctrine, which, if true, 
 would account for the subject to be explained, may be 
 discerned in Aristotle's definition of a law — that it is deter- 
 mined by the common agreement of the state*; and Cicero's 
 definition of a state — that it rests on a consensus juris " ; or 
 that the law is established by general consent : for although 
 it is true that legal duties, imposed by the sovereign, are 
 binding in the same way as duties to which a party becomes 
 liable by entering into a contract, and that many of the attri- 
 butes of law are explicable on the hypothesis of a covenant ; 
 yet it is certain that no such covenant ever exists ; nor if it 
 had existed, could a contract be of any value which there 
 is no third party to enforce. 
 
 According to the historical theory of the social compact, 
 the existing government of a state was settled by agreement 
 of the whole community at an original convention ; and that 
 agreement having once been actually made, its reciprocal 
 
 ' [Shakespeare, Othello, ii. 3.] 
 
 2 ' Were one,' says Hume, ' to choose a period of time when the people's 
 coDsent was the least regarded in pnblic transactions, it would be 
 precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a settled con- 
 stitution, their inclinations are often consulted ; but during the fury of 
 revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, military force or political 
 craft usually decides the controversy.' — Essay on the Original Contract. 
 
 ' Principles of Morals and Legislation [Clarendon Press Edition, 
 
 336 «•!• 
 
 • Rhet. ad Alex. c. i \lrfo% lipiaiiivos koB' 6no\oyiav uoiviiv iroKecas, 
 lajftrioiv wffis S« vpArrfiv ijcaffra. ( A statement, defined with reference to 
 a general agreement of a state, indicating how men must act in certain 
 cases.] Compare Athenaeus, lib. xi. p. 508 A. 
 
 ' De Rep. i. 25. 
 
l'6o USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 obligations are transmitted through all the succeeding genera- 
 tions of rulers and subjects, every new person becoming (as 
 it were) the member of an old partnership upon ascer- 
 tained conditions. Now as this account is liable to the 
 fatal objection that no such agreement ever was made, and 
 therefore could not be perpetuated, another theory has been 
 devised, which may be termed the fictitious theory of the 
 social compact ; which declares that, although no compact 
 that obedience to governors is conditional on their governing 
 well was in fact ever made, yet it is implied, and may be 
 assumed to exist, though it never did exist '. This doctrine 
 will require a closer examination, on account of the proneness 
 of mankind to acquiesce in any explanation- of a position 
 which they wish to see established ; and to be satisfied with 
 fiction where truth is not to be had. 
 
 In common language, a thing is said to be implied, 
 when it follows from another by a certain inference. Thus, 
 the making of a bargain implies two parties to it ; a servant 
 implies a master ; a husband implies a wife ; the power of 
 writing implies the power of reading, &c. In all these 
 instances the existence of the thing implied is a necessary 
 condition for the existence of the thing which affords the 
 implication, and, therefore, the one cannot happen without 
 the other having preceded it. In the language of the 
 English law, ' implication ' has a different meaning, and is 
 nearly equivalent with fiction. Where a thing is presumed 
 to exist under circumstances in which it might probably 
 exist, though it has not existed, or (what comes to the 
 same) is not proved to have existed, there is said to be an 
 implication of law as to its existence. Thus, in many cases, 
 a contract is irnplied where no contract was made ; a promise 
 to pay is implied where no promise to pay was made; 
 the meaning being that the legal consequences are the 
 
 ' ' The original contract of society, which though perhaps in no instance 
 it has ever been formally expressed at the first institution of a state, yet in 
 nature and reason must always be understood and implied in the very 
 act of associating together.' — Blackstone, i Com. 47, 
 
LIBERTY. FREEDOM. FREE l6l 
 
 same as if such contract and promise had been really made, 
 and their existence may be assumed in argument without 
 proof. It is thus evident that neither on the corhmon nor 
 on the legal explanation of implication can the assumption 
 of the social contract be supported. It cannot be inferred 
 from the existence of government, as all must admit that 
 governments may exist without a previous convention. Nor 
 can it be considered as a legal fiction ; for a legal fiction 
 is a supposition avowedly false, but treated as if it were true, 
 for the imagined convenience of administering the law. 
 A legal fiction without the sanction of law is a mere absurdity : 
 and, therefore, it cannot be pretended that the social com- 
 pact, which serves as the foundation of all law, derives its 
 own force from the existence of law. 
 
 How far a belief in the doctrine of the social compact 
 still exists may be uncertain ; but it is not uncertain that 
 the popular notions as to the natur&l liberty and equality 
 of mankind have their origin in this political system, and 
 that they are frequently entertained by those who are 
 ignorant of the polluted source to which these expressions 
 may be traced. The confusion of the exercise of sovereign 
 power with tyranny, or of the coercion of government with 
 oppressive restraint, has further contributed to foster these 
 erroneous conceptions ; for thus, not only does it appear 
 that man in a civilized state may, if he pleases, consider 
 himself as a savage in respect of his legal obligations, but 
 the very act of governing is represented as tyranny and 
 misrule. Hence it is that Rousseau can describe the English 
 people as only being free during the election of members 
 of Parliament ; and as soon as these . are elected, relapsing 
 again into a state of slavery. Reasoners of this description 
 should at least be consistent, and, as they cannot serve two 
 masters, should cleave alone to the mammon of barbarism ; 
 never lifting up their eyes to the arts of civilization and the 
 institutions of government ; but imitating those, who 
 
 ' Led their wild desires to woods and caves, 
 And thought that all but savages were slaves.' 
 
l62 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 If, therefore, the statement of the doctrine of the social 
 contract enables us to deduce the pedigree of these vulgar 
 errors, and to show, not only that such opinions are false, 
 but also to track them to their fountain-head, it may point 
 out to some persons the startling character of the assump- 
 tions on which their belief must be founded ; who may 
 thus, when the connexion of the theory and its results is 
 made evident to their minds, cease to resemble those weak- 
 minded enthusiasts, who continue to practise the super- 
 stitious observances enjoined by a creed which they have 
 abandoned, and to worship the idols which they acknow- 
 ledge to be mere wood and stone. 
 
XVI 
 
 FREE GOVERNMENT. ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT. 
 TYRANNY. DESPOTISM. ANARCHY 
 
 A FREE government is not a government in which liberty 
 prevails, or in which there is an absence of inconvenient 
 restraints and oppression on the part of the sovereign 
 power; but a government in which there is a plurality of 
 rulers, and fixed laws respected by the administrative 
 authority. A free government is thus opposed to an arbitrary 
 or despotic government, such as the Roman, French, or 
 Austrian empire. In this sense, Hume' opposes free 
 states to absolute monarchies, and Rousseau speaks of 
 ' the difference between free and monarchical states ^ ' ; 
 i. e. between states where the sovereignty belongs to one, 
 -and where it belongs to several. Substantially, therefore, 
 the division of states into free and arbitrary governments 
 
 ' ' The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than 
 those of free states.' {Essays, ed. Green and Grose, i. 103.] 
 
 ° Contrat Social, liv. iii. eh. 8. According to Sir James Mackintosh, 
 ' as general security is enjoyed in very different degrees under different 
 governments, those which guard it most perfectly, are by way of emin- 
 ence called free. Such governments attain most completely the end 
 which is common to all governments. A free constitution of govern- 
 ment, and a good constitution of government, are therefore different 
 expressions for the same idea.' — On the Law of Nature and Nations, 
 p. 60. However, one who thought with Hobbes that absolute monarchy 
 is the best form of government, would probably not call that a free 
 constitution. On the difference between free and despotic governments, 
 see likewise Bentham's Fragment on Government [ed. Montague, 
 p. 316]. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 coincides with the division into republics and monarchies, 
 in the strict use of those terms. It may be observed, that 
 a state is not the less a free government because it contains 
 a class of slaves; in the same way that a constitution is 
 called democratic, in respect of the freemen or citizens alonci 
 without any consideration being had of the number of the 
 slave population. 
 
 It is a common mistake to suppose that liberty can only 
 be enjoyed under 3. free government ; and that in despotisms 
 the people are subject to the absolute rule of a master, 
 from which, in free countries they are exempt : whereas in 
 all governments the sovereign power must reside somewhere ; 
 and wherever it resides, must be absolute. Thus, even 
 Cicero says, that ' in a monarchy the people do not enjoy 
 liberty; which consists not in having a just master, but 
 in having no master at all " ; a condition altogether in- 
 compatible with the existence of. a government, and the 
 exercise of sovereign authority. 
 
 Arbitrary or absolute monarchy is opposed to limited 
 monarchy ^ ; and this is properly a division, not of monar- 
 chies, but of kingdoms or governments of which a King is 
 chief, founded on the numbers of a sovereign body. In 
 a state where the prince is alone sovereign, it is said that 
 the monarchy is absolute or arbitrary ; in a state where he 
 is only part of the sovereign body, it is said that the 
 monarchy is limited. 
 
 Tyranny is properly opposed to mild inoppressive rule, 
 and has no relation to the numbers of the governing power. 
 
 '■ ' Desiint omnino ei populo multa, qui sub rege est, in primisque 
 libertas ; quae non in eo est, ut justo utamur domino, sed ut nuUo.' — 
 De Rep. ii. 2;^. ^he kingdom of which Cicero here speaks is governed 
 ' unius perpetna potestate,' that is to say, it is a pure monarchy. 
 
 " Sometimes a fyee monarchy is used as equivalent to a limited 
 monarchy ; in the following passage, however, from one of Lord Bacon's 
 Tracts, it occurs in a directly opposite sense. ' It is impossible an 
 elective monarchy should be so free and absolute as an hereditary, no 
 more than it is possible for a father to have so full power and interest in 
 an adoptive son as in a natural.' — Of a war with Spain. Here free 
 means unchecked, unlimited, as Tacitns says, ' Nee regibus libera aut 
 infinita potestas ' {Germ. 7), and natural son means own child. 
 
TYRANNY 165 
 
 Thus Burke says, that 'free governments have committed 
 more flagrant acts of tyranny than the most perfect despotic 
 governments which we have ever known.' So likewise Sir 
 Walter Raleigh, in his History of the World, remarks, that 
 ' that which we properly call tyranny is a violent form of 
 government, not respecting the good of the subject, but 
 only the pleasure of the commander. I purposely forbear 
 to say,' he continues, ' that it is the unjust rule of one over 
 many ; for very truly doth Cleon, in Thucydides, tell the 
 Athenians, that their dominion over their subjects was none 
 other than a mere tyranny ; though it were so that they 
 themselves were a great city, and a popular estate '.' The 
 following passages from the same author, will also serve to 
 show that tyranny is opposed to lenient or moderate rule, 
 and may be exercised by many no less than one : ' Now 
 concerning the tyranny wherewith a city or state oppresseth 
 her subjects, it may appear some ways to be more moderate 
 than that of one man; but in many things it is more 
 intolerable *.' Again : ' Many tyrants have been changed 
 into worthy Kings, and many have ill used their ill-gotten 
 dominion, which, becoming hereditary to their posterity, 
 hath grown into the most excellent form of government, 
 even a lawful monarchy. But they that live under a 
 tyrannical city have no such hope : their mistress is im- 
 mortal, and will not slacken the reins, until they be pulled 
 out of her hands, and her own mouth receive the bridle 
 of a more mightier charioteer'.' And afterwards: 'The 
 moderate use of sovereign power being so effectual in 
 assuring the people unto their lords, and consequently 
 in the establishment or enlargement of dominion ; it may 
 seem strange that the practice of tyranny, whose effects are 
 contrary, hath been so common in all ages *.' The following 
 passage of Locke, though less precise in its language, 
 clearly points out that tyranny is common both to 
 monarchies and republics : ' It is a mistake,' he says, 
 
 ' B. V. ch. 2. p. 812. 'Ibid. p. 813. 
 
 ^ Ibid. p. 813. * Ibid. p. 817. 
 
l66 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 'to think this fault (viz. tyranny) is proper only to 
 monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it 
 as well as that: for wherever the power that is put in 
 any hands for the government of the people, and the 
 preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, 
 and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to 
 the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have 
 it ; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that 
 thus use it are one or many \' 
 
 Tyranny, however, being the aduse of sovereign power, 
 is sometimes confounded with the mere exercise of it, and 
 sometimes with the exercise of it by one person, or despotism. 
 Thus, according to a writer in the Edinburgh Review, ' the 
 diiference between a free government and a tyrannical one, 
 consists entirely in the different proportions of the people 
 that are influenced by their opinion, or subjugated by 
 force ^' 'Solon,' says Mr. Mitford, in his History of 
 Greece, 'carefully providing for the responsibility of 
 ministers, committed absolute sovereignty immediately to 
 the multitude, who could be responsible to none. . . . He 
 intended, indeed, that the councils of the Areopagus and 
 of the Four Hundred should balance the authority of 
 the popular assembly; . . . but against sovereign power 
 committed immediately to the people at large, no balance 
 could avail. Interested demagogues inciting, restraint was 
 soon overborne, and so the Athenian government became 
 ... a tyranny in the hands of the people'.' Of the 
 numerous errors contained in this passage, our present 
 purpose only requires us to notice the confusion of 
 sovereign with tyrannical power ; which may be likewise 
 discerned in the following extract from one of Mr. Canning's 
 
 ' On Government, b. ii. § 201. 
 
 " Vol. vi. p. 145. A division of governments into free and arbitrary, 
 stated in another volume of the same review, coincides with that into 
 monarchies and republics, stricto sensu. ' All civilized governments may 
 be divided into free and arbitrary ; or, more accurately for our present 
 purpose, into the government of England and other European govern- 
 ments ' (written in 1807), vol. x. p. 11. 
 
 ^ Vol. V. p. II. 
 
TYRANNY 167 
 
 speeches : ' All power is, or ought to be, accompanied with 
 responsibility. Tyranny is irresponsible power. The 
 definition is equally true, whether the power be lodged 
 in one or many; whether in a despot exempted by the 
 form of government from the control of law, or a mob 
 whose numbers put them beyond the reach of law. Idle, 
 therefore, and absurd to talk of freedom where a mob 
 domineers M ' If by power, at the outset of this passage, 
 sovereign power is meant, sovereign power not only ought 
 not, but cannot, be subject to responsibility. The succeed- 
 ing argument appears to stand thus : because tyranny is 
 irresponsible power, and because the dominion of the mob 
 is irresponsible power, the dominion of the mob is tyranny. 
 Such reasoning, however, is obviously unsound. If, instead 
 of saying that tyranny is irresponsible power, Mr. Canning 
 had said that irresponsible power is tyranny, he would have 
 saved his argument, but at the cost of one of his premises ; 
 for all sovereign power, whether tyrannically used or not, is 
 irresponsible. Nor (as has been already stated) is tyranny 
 merely irresponsible power, but irres ponsible po wer exercised 
 in_gr| ppprfiss'"'^p ""' ^ hurtful ma nner. Thus the power of 
 the English Parliament is irresponsible, but not tyrannical. 
 The power of Trajan, or Louis the Sixteenth, was irrespon- 
 sible, but not tyrannical. The power of the republics of 
 Athens and Carthage over their allies, of the Emperor 
 Napoleon over his subjects, was irresponsible, and also 
 tyrannical. Tyranny having no reference to the number 
 of the governors, sovereign power may be wielded as 
 tyrannically by ten thousand as by ten, and by ten as one. 
 
 It thus differs essentially from despotism, which is the 
 sovereign rule of one person. Despotism, however, is 
 sometimes used incorrectly in the modern sense of 
 tyranny (for with the ancient sense of tyranny its proper 
 meaning nearly coincides), to signify the oppressive govern- 
 ment of any number. Thus Mr. Mitford says, that an 
 ' irregular tax, not unknown where single despots have 
 '■ Canning's Speeches, 70I. vi. p. 379. 
 
l68 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 ruled, with the improper name of free gift, was frequently 
 exacted by the despotic democracy of Athens'.' And 
 again : ' Despotic governments, whether the power be in 
 the hands of one or of a multitude, will have a near 
 resemblance of character. . . . We find, indeed, many 
 marks of resemblance between the Turkish despotism 
 and the Athenian democracy'.' A 'despotic democracy,' 
 and ' a despotic government of a multitude,' are, properly, 
 contradictions in terms : but this abuse of language enables 
 Mr. Mitford to insinuate (without proving) that, because 
 the Athenian democracy has some points in common 
 with the despotism of Turkey, it is therefore a tyrannical 
 government. 
 
 According to Montesquieu, there are three kinds of 
 governments ; the republican, the monarchical, and the 
 despotic. Republican government is when the whole or 
 a part of the people has the sovereign power ; monarchical, 
 when a single person governs, but by fixed and established 
 laws; while despotic government is when one person, 
 without laws and rules, decides everything by his will 
 and his caprices"- Montesquieu here makes two kinds 
 of monarchical government; one in which the prince 
 rules according to fixed law ; the other in which he rules 
 according to the fancy of the moment. The same quality 
 had been before pointed out by Aristotle, as characteristic 
 of the government called by the Greeks rvpavvU, which 
 word is most accurately rendered by despotism ; but he 
 extends the distinction further by applying it to some 
 oligarchies where a small number govern without estab- 
 
 ' History of Greece, vol. v. p. 19. ^ Ibid. p. 21. 
 
 ' Esprit des Lois, liv. ii. ch. i. See above, p. 61. Malchus, in his 
 Statistik und Staatenkunde, § 96, divides the governments of the 
 European states into — i". Autocracies ; 2. Limited monarchies ; 3. Re- 
 publics, which are subdivided into aristocracies and democracies. This 
 division does not agree with that of Montesquieu, whose class of republics 
 properly comprehends limited monarchies: but it coincides exactly with 
 that of Hume, who discusses the question, ' Whether the British govern- 
 ment inclines more to absolute monarchy or to a republic,' being itself 
 a limited monarchy. — Essays [ed. Green and Grose, i. 122]. 
 
TYRANNY 169 
 
 lished laws ; and to some democracies where the people 
 do not suffer fixed laws to be administered by the regular 
 authorities, but carry on the government by means of 
 decrees in each particular case'. The difficulty under 
 which this principle of division labours is, that in all 
 governments, whatever seems good to the sovereign is 
 law, whether it be a general rule enacted for the guidance 
 of the executive power in all cases arising after its enact- 
 ment, or a special decision passed on the occasion, when 
 the necessity occurs. There is no doubt that the difference 
 between these two classes of governments is immense ; in- 
 asmuch as one of the chief benefits of law is that it furnishes 
 all persons in the community with a fixed rule whereby to 
 guide their conduct. Perfect justice (if such a thing were 
 possible), administered by a tribunal without reference to 
 previous decisions or statute law, would be far less 
 advantageous than an imperfect system administered ac- 
 cording to known rules. But that the distinction between 
 a legal monarchy and a despotism is, that in the latter 
 all things are decided at the moment by the will of the 
 prince, cannot be admitted ; because the will of the 
 prince, whether exercised in the form of a permanent 
 statute or of a temporary ordinance, is equally law. The 
 same may be said of oligarchies and democracies, in which 
 the executive is merged in the legislative power. Montes- 
 quieu's object doubtless was, to make a distinction between 
 the French monarchy of his own time ^ and the violent 
 and tyrannical monarchies of which there have been too 
 many examples; but the point of distinction which he 
 has chosen depends rather on the character and dis- 
 position of the reigning prince, and the mode of his 
 
 ' ' Another kind of oligarchy,' he says, ' is when the son succeeds the 
 father, and not the law but the iiilers govern. This, among oligarchies, 
 corresponds to despotism {rvpavvis) among monarchies, and the worst 
 kind of democracy among democracies.' — Fol. iv. 5. The democracy in 
 which no fixed laws exist, is described in the preceding chapter. 
 
 ' [I. e. the French monarchy as he thought it ought to be. In his 
 description of despotism, Montesquieu sometimes appears to be referring 
 to the government of Louis the Fifteenth.] 
 
170 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 administration, than on any essential attribute of 'the form 
 of government. 
 
 Anarchy properly expresses an absence of all government; 
 an entire cessation of the exercise of sovereign power. 
 Improperly, it is used to signify a feebleness or supineness 
 of the sovereign, in consequence of which the subjects 
 are not sufficiently restrained or coerced. The following 
 passage from the Edinburgh Review ably describes the 
 manner in which unfair arguments are founded on this 
 ambiguity — a description which applies with equal force 
 to the use made of the ambiguity of other political terms. 
 After saying that the question of political change had 
 been stated as if despotism or anarchy were the only 
 alternatives, the writer thus proceeds— 
 
 ' The instrument with which a great part of the delusion 
 is wrought is — the grand instrument of delusion — ambiguity 
 of langijage. Despotism is a pretty definite term ; it is, 
 where the sovereign is subject to little or no regular con- 
 trol of his power, and has scarcely anything to dread but 
 from the chance of resistance in the body of the people. 
 Anarchy is one of the most vague and ambiguous words 
 in language. It means, in the way in which it is used by 
 the friends of despotism, the utter dissolution of all 
 government, and also every intermediate stage of govern- 
 ment between that and absolute power. They paint as 
 strongly as possible, and it is impossible they can paint 
 too strongly, the evils to which the dissolution of govern- 
 ment gives birth. This they call anarchy ; and this term, 
 with all the terrors which it brings, they endeavour to 
 associate with every form of government but the baleful 
 one to which it is the tendency of their endeavours to chain 
 or to reduce mankind '.' 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, vol. xvii. p. 427. 
 
XVII 
 
 POWER. AUTHORITY. FORCE 
 
 The -v/otA power, when used in a political sense, appears 
 to signify the possession of the means of influencing the 
 will of another, either by persuasion or threats ; or of con- 
 straining his person by the application of physical force. 
 Thus ministers or party-leaders possess power, because they 
 may influence the conduct of many persons by the promise 
 of favours or the threat of injury : so it has been remarked, 
 that knowledge and wealth confer power. Sovereign 
 rulers and parents may forcibly constrain their subjects 
 and children, when the motive arising from the fear of pain 
 does not suffice to determine the will. 
 
 In civilized societies, power, which, in default of the 
 desired influence on the will, is supported by the sovereign, 
 and by the application of the physical strength at his com- 
 mand, is called authority. In other words, authority is 
 power sanctioned and supported by the law. Thus we 
 speak of the authority of government ; the authority of an 
 officer over his soldiers ; of a father over his children, &c.* 
 
 Sometimes, however, power is used as synonymous with 
 authority. For example, every person who takes the oath 
 of supremacy declares his belief 'that no foreign prince, 
 prelate, person, state, or potentate, hath any jurisdiction, 
 
 ' ' By authority,' says Hobbes, part ii. ch. i6, ' is always understood 
 a right of doing any act : ' that is, If we assume that sovereigns have 
 rights. [Lewis's definition of authority is somewhat narrow ; it includes 
 only a few of the many senses in which this term is used by good writers. 
 See the New English Dictignary, s, v.] 
 
172 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical 
 or spiritual, within this realm '.' Now, it is clear, that the 
 Pope, in his character of head of the Roman Catholic 
 Church, exercises power, in the ordinary sense of that 
 word, within these realms, although it is not a power 
 protected by the law, or authority. 
 
 When it is said that the power of rulers differs from 
 the power of a band of conspirators only in degree '', the 
 proposition is true as to the compulsive sanction, which 
 in both cases is brute force; but the moral effect of the 
 exercise of sovereignty, the means of influencing the wills 
 of subjects without resorting to extremities, although these 
 are fully as important as its physical force, are not taken 
 into the account. It is true that all governments have been 
 founded by force, and are maintained by force, but its 
 influence in states where it is least used is commonly over- 
 looked for the following reasons, which may be applied to 
 many subjects besides that in question. 
 
 The effects or consequences of any law, institution, or 
 system, may be of two kinds, positive or negative : positive, 
 when they cause a certain event to occur ; negative, when 
 they prevent it from occurring. Thus the positive effect 
 of education is to make a man know many things of which 
 he would otherwise be ignorant ; its negative effect is to 
 prevent him from committing many crimes, and falling 
 into many errors, of which he would otherwise be guilty ^- 
 
 ' See also in [O Geo. IV, c. vii. s. 2, the oath administered to Roman 
 Catholics ; where the terms are slightly varied, and (what is singular) 
 the word /owe;' is retained, while the word authority has been rejected. 
 For, according to the common acceptation of these terms, the Pope has 
 power, but not authority, in this kingdom. 
 
 '' 'The power of rulers is not, as superficial observers sometimes 
 seem to think, a thing sui generis. It is exactly similar in kind, though 
 generally superior in amount, to that of any set of conspirators who 
 plot to overthrow it.' — Edinburgh Review, vol. 1. p. iii. 
 
 = This latter kind of effect is quaintly expressed by Polonius in the 
 well-known lines :- < ^^^ ^^^^;^^ 
 
 That we find out the cause of this effect ; 
 Or, rather say, the cause of this defect ; 
 For this effect defective comes by cause.' 
 
 {Hamlet, ii. 4.] 
 
POWER. AUTHORITY. FORCE IT^ 
 
 Now it is a very common error, in judging of political 
 measures, especially of institutions in actual existence, to 
 overlook this latter kind of negative effects, and not to 
 give them sufficient weight. For this reason, institutions 
 meant only to have a negative effect are sometimes thought 
 unnecessary or hurtful, when in fact they are completely 
 successful. For example, it is settled that in all questions 
 litigated in courts of law (with some exceptions which need 
 not here be specified), the presumption is in favour of the 
 defendant and against the plaintiff or claimant. This pre- 
 sumption is established in order to prevent unfounded 
 claims being brought forward, or innocent persons being 
 harassed with vexatious actions ; and because it has this 
 negative effect, and plaintiffs, tfierefore, are generally on 
 the right 'side, Mr. Bentham concludes that the rule is in- 
 expedient, and that the presumption ought to be in favour 
 of the plaintiff'. If a penal system was completely effica- 
 cious, there would be no crime ; when, probably, some one 
 would discover that punishments are superfluous, and would 
 propose to abolish them. The same oversight is not unfre- 
 quently committed as to the operation of force on govern- 
 ment. We are told that government must be founded on 
 the national will, and can only exist with the consent of 
 the people. No one doubts that it is desirable that the 
 government should be beloved by the people ; and that the 
 people will, in general, know how to appreciate a good 
 government ; but that all governments subsist by force, and 
 that force ultimately is the sole check on wrong-doers, is 
 equally certain. The existence and administration of a 
 criminal law are necessary to the existence of a state ; and 
 no criminal law can be carried into effect without the means 
 of applying physical constraint to those who infringe it. 
 Nevertheless, the knowledge that force may, if necessary, 
 be applied, induces offenders to submit without resistance. 
 The fear of coercion renders the use of coercion unneces- 
 sary. The criminal walks willingly to the gaol and the 
 ' See Bentham on Evidence, by Dumont, b. vi. ch. 2. 
 
174 ^-S-E ^■'V^ ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 scaffold, well knowing that if he does not go with his will 
 he will be forced to go against it. The cases, therefore, in 
 which force is actually applied are not many ; and as the 
 effect of the law authorizing the use of force is to render its 
 use unnecessary, it has been thought that force is of little 
 benefit in civilized societies, and might be banished from 
 the resources of government, although it is in fact the 
 keystone on which all government must ultimately rest*. 
 ' In the community of nations (it has been remarked), the 
 first appeal is to physical force. In communities of men, 
 forms of government serve to put off the appeal, and often 
 render it unnecessary. But it is still open to the oppressed 
 or the ambitious ".' Not only, however, is it open to the 
 oppressed or ambitious against the government, but it is 
 indispensable to the government against the oppressed or 
 ambitious. Superior force is as necessary in order to punish 
 a criminal as it is to repel an invading army or quell 
 domestic sedition. 
 
 ' ' The power of the sovereign is nothing else than the power — the 
 actual force of muscle or of mind — which a certain part of his subjects 
 choose to lend for carrying his orders into effect.' — Edinburgh Review, 
 vol. XX. p. 326. 
 
 ' Edinburgh Review, vol. 1. p. ill. 
 
XVIII 
 
 PUBLIC, PRIVATE. POLITICAL. CIVIL. MUNICIPAL 
 
 Public, as opposed to private, is that which has no 
 immediate relation to any specified person or persons, 
 but may directly concern any member or members of the 
 community, without distinction. Thus the acts of a magis- 
 trate, or a member of a legislative assembly, done by them 
 in those capacities, are called public ; the acts done by the 
 same persons towards their family or friends, or in their 
 dealings with strangers for their own peculiar purposes, are 
 called private. So a theatre, or a place of amusement, is 
 said to be public, not because it is actually visited by every 
 member of the community, but because it is open to all 
 indifferently; and any person may, if he desires, enter it. 
 The same remark applies to public-houses, public inns, 
 public meetings, &c. The publication of a book is the 
 exposing of it to sale in such a manner that it may be 
 procured by any person who desires to purchase it; it 
 would be equally published, if not a single copy was sold. 
 In the language of our law, public appear to be distinguished 
 from private acts of Parliament, on the ground that the one 
 class directly affects the whole community, the other some 
 definite person or persons. 
 
 Political signifies that which relates to a state, or a society 
 of persons comprising several families, and united for. the 
 purpose of government. Hence man is called a political 
 animal, as having a tendency to form a communion more 
 
176 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 extensive than a family ; that is, an union of parents and 
 children, together with their slaves or servants. Social has 
 a wider signification than political ; for man would be a 
 social animal, if he merely lived in families ; but, in order 
 to be a political animal, he must form collections of families, 
 or states \ In like manner, political science is that science 
 which treats of the government of sovereign communities ^ ; 
 political questions are those questions which relate to this 
 matter ; a politician is a person who occupies himself about 
 such questions, &c. Hence, political economy is that science 
 which is concerned about the economy of a state, which 
 examines the same subject-matter in respect of a political 
 community, which domestic economy examines in respect 
 of a family. Originally, the words economy and economical 
 were employed exclusively (according to their etymology) to 
 signify the management of a family ; and in this sense they 
 are constantly used by Xenophon, whose Oeconomics have 
 no connexion with political, and are confined alone to 
 private management. The same remark applies to the first 
 book of the Oeconomics attributed to Aristotle ; and it is one 
 of the many marks by which we are enabled to discover 
 that the second book of those Oeconomics is the work of 
 a later writer than the first ; for in this treatise the word 
 economy has reached its modern acceptation, and is applied 
 to national, as well as domestic finance. The Oeconomics 
 of Cicero, though written at a more recent period, retained 
 the ancient use of the word, and were confined within the 
 original limits of the science, as being chiefly derived from 
 those of Xenophon '. The analogy by which the word 
 
 ■ See Locke on Government, b. ii. § 77. To the ' public relations of 
 magistrates and people ' Blackstone opposes ' the private economical 
 (i. e. family) relations ' of master and servant, husband and wife, parent 
 and child, guardian and ward. — i Com. 422. On the distinction between 
 families and states, see Niebuhr, History of Some, vol. i. p. 264, Eng. 
 Trans. 
 
 ^ [I. e. Communities subject to sovereign anthorities.] 
 ' O'movoiiia was rightly explained by Cicero to mean not the manage- 
 ment of a house, but of a man's entire property : ' non gubemationem 
 villae, sed dispensationem nniversae domns. (Vol. iv. part 2. p. 472. 
 
PUBLIC. POLITICAL 177 
 
 economy has been transferred from the affairs of a family 
 to those of a state, to signify the regulation of its income 
 and expenditure, and the general arrangement of public 
 finance, seems perfectly unobjectionable ; nor can I perceive 
 why the term Political Economy should not be considered 
 as an appropriate and convenient name for this important 
 department of political science. The term Catallactics, which 
 has been proposed as a substitute for it S even if its 
 derivation were correct ■', would not be sufficiently com- 
 prehensive, if we understand an exchange to bear its 
 common meaning of a voluntary or unconstrained dealing 
 between two parties. For although the payment of taxes 
 may be ultimately resolved into an exchange, yet taxes are 
 levied from a man without his consent, and by virtue of the 
 sovereign authority. The science of exchanges would not, 
 therefore, properly include the doctrine of taxation, which 
 has always been correctly considered as belonging to the' 
 province of Political Economy. 
 
 Much importance has been attached by many political 
 writers to the distribution of rights and wrongs into certain 
 classes, determined by their public or private character. 
 Thus Blackstone says, that ' wrongs are divisible into, first, 
 private wrongs, which, being an infringement merely of 
 particular rights, concern individuals only, and are called 
 civil injuries ; and secondly, public wrongs, which, being a 
 breach of general and public rights, affect the whole com- 
 munity, and are called crimes and misdemeanours '.' This 
 division is correct, though the reasons here given for it are 
 
 ed. Orelli) : o'boj, in the language of the Athenians, being different 
 from oiKia, and signifying not house, but estate and effects generally. 
 Cicero's treatise contained three books; the first, on the domestic 
 duties of the mother ; the second, on the duties of the father abroad ; 
 the third, on agriculture (Ibid. p. 476). 
 
 ' Whately's Lectures on Political Economy, p. 5. 
 
 ' The word KaTaXAo«TiKos never has any reference to exchanges, but 
 means reconciling or forgiving. In Aristot. lihet. i. 9. 31, it has the 
 sense oi prctcticdble. [In the passage referred to, the word KaroKKaKTi- 
 xdrrepos seems to mean more plcuable, more ready to give and take in 
 a friendly spirit.] 
 
 » I Com. 123. 
 
 N 
 
178 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 untenable. A crime is called a public wrong, and a civil 
 injury is called a private wrong, not because one respects 
 the community, the other an individual ; but because one 
 offence is prosecuted by a public magistrate, and the offend- • 
 ing party is punished for the benefit of the community ; the 
 other is prosecuted by the party wronged, and the offending 
 party is compelled to make him compensation for the harm 
 which he has sustained '. The same act may be a crime 
 in one country and a civil wrong in another, although its 
 effects on individuals or the whole community are necessarily 
 identical. Thus, according to the Mosaic law, adultery was 
 punished by the death of both offenders, and was a crime ; 
 in England it is only a civil injury, for which the husband 
 has a remedy against the adulterer by suing him for a 
 pecuniary compensation, and against the adulteress by 
 suing her for a divorce. If adultery was made a crime in 
 this country, its effects, as towards individuals or the whole 
 community, would of course be unaltered, although its legal 
 complexion would be changed. 
 
 In like manner, political rights are not distinguished 
 from private rights by their tendency — for all rights either 
 tend, or are supposed to tend, to the public good — but by 
 the purpose for which they are exercised. A private right 
 is a right exercised for the immediate and peculiar benefit 
 of the individual who possesses it ; a political right is a 
 right exercised not for the immediate or pecuhar benefit of 
 any individual, but for the good of the whole community. 
 Thus the right of property may tend equally to the pubUc 
 good with the right of voting for the election of members 
 of a representative body ; but the one is exercised for the 
 direct and separate benefit of the proprietor, though indi- 
 
 '■ [This sentence seems to contain a distinction without a difference. 
 Crime is prosecuted by, public authorities because it concerns the com- 
 munity ; no society can exist if crime may be committed with impunity. 
 On the other hand, trespass, for example, falls within the sphere of 
 private law. A person on whose land I trespass must be compensated, 
 if he claims compensation ; but if he settles privately with me, the state 
 is net concerned to interfere.] 
 
PUBLIC. POLITICAL 1 79 
 
 rectly it tends to the benefit of the community ; the other 
 is not exercised for the direct and immediate benefit of the 
 voter, though ultimately it may tend to his good. 
 
 From a comparison of the remarks made in a former 
 place on the subject of vested rights', it results that no 
 political rights can belong to the class of vested rights, 
 which must necessarily be rights of property, for the peculiar 
 advantage of their possessors ". 
 
 Civil is sometimes used in nearly the same sense as 
 
 ' Above, p. 34. Since the remarks here referred to were printed, it has 
 been suggested to me that the phrase vested rights is in fact devoid of 
 meaning ; that it is never applied generally to any class of rights ; but 
 that, virhen certain rights are attacked, it is used as a specious and 
 delusive phrase, by persons vfho think that those rights ought to be 
 preserved, nested having merely an intensive force, and being equiva- 
 lent to sacred or irrviolable. According to this interpretation, the use 
 of the particular word vested would be explained by supposing, that 
 those who invented or employ this expression, have wished to repre- 
 sent, that a right so vested or lodged cannot be divested or taken away 
 by the legislature. If this explanation is correct, the phrase vested 
 rights would be a mere absurdity, and would belong to the same class 
 of expressions as natural, indefeasible, inalienable, indestructible, &c., 
 rights, examined above, p. 33. Now there is no doubt that the phrase 
 vested rights is often used in a dishonest manner, merely for the sake of 
 raising prejudice, and creating a vague and unfounded alarm, by per- 
 sons who attach to it no definite meaning. But, if it were laid down 
 that all political expressions, which are sometimes, or even frequently 
 used in a senseless manner, are therefore in their origin unmeaning and 
 absurd, the political vocabulary would be contracted within very nar- 
 row limits. I am very far from feeling confident that ,the explanation 
 which I have just mentioned may not be correct, and that the explana- 
 tion which I have proposed may not be wrong ; but, on considering the 
 peculiar kind of rights to which, when they are called in question, the 
 term vested h Usually applied, it seems to me probable, that the notion 
 and epithet of vested, as applied to rights, have been derived from the 
 investment of capital; that, when a man has invested his capital in a 
 certain manner, with a reasonable assurance of the permanency of a 
 law, the right of property which by this investment he has acquired is 
 called a vested right ; and it is considered as conferring on him a moral 
 claim upon the legislature for such a delay or compensation, as will 
 enable him either to withdraw his capital, or to reimburse himself for 
 his loss. If this view of the subject is correct, vested rights would be 
 an admissible phrase, signifying a limited and definite class of rights ; 
 if the other view is correct, vested rights would be a dishonest and 
 deceitful expression, improperly applicable to all rights, but properly 
 applicable to none. 
 
 ' [As was poiuted out, p. 34 «., Lewis has not correctly apprehended the 
 legal meaning of ' vested.'] 
 
 N 2 
 
l8o USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 political, as when we speak of civil society, civil liberty; 
 and, in fact, these two are the corresponding words of the 
 Latin and Greek languages, civilis standing in the same 
 relation to civitas as ■troKmn.os to it6\is. Civil, however, 
 has, in our language, obtained two additional meanings : 
 I. When, as a division of laymen, it is opposed to military 
 and naval; civil service, for example, being any service, 
 not ecclesiastical, which is not concerned with the army 
 or navy ' ; and, 2. When it is opposed to criminal, i. e. 
 civil and criminal law — a distinction which has just been 
 explained. 
 
 Municipal is commonly used in reference to a corpo- 
 rate town, or some body politic subordinate to the sove- 
 reign ; in which sense we speak of municipal institutions, 
 regulations, &c. The municipia of the, Romans were 
 provincial cities, which retained certain privileges and 
 exemptions, and possessed an independent subordinate 
 jurisdiction and authority. Blackstone, however, has per- 
 verted this term and made it synonymous with ' civil ' or 
 • national ' ; for which perversion he assigns a most singular 
 reason, viz. that he calls the law of a state municipal law in 
 compliance with common speech, and then proceeds to say, 
 that in common speech it has not that meaning. ' I call 
 it municipal law,' he says, ' in compliance with common 
 speech ; for though, strictly, that expression denotes the 
 particular customs of one single municipium, or free town, 
 yet it may, with sufficient propriety, be applied to any one 
 state or nation which is governed by the same laws and 
 customs ^.' 
 
 '■ Blackstone first divides the people into the clergy and laity (i Com. 
 376) ; and the laity ' into three distinct states, the civil, the military, 
 and the maritime ' (Ibid. 396). He then proceeds to say, that ' the civil 
 state consists of the nobility and the commonalty.' Now, as a noble- 
 man or a commoner may be either a clerk, a soldier, or a sailor, it is 
 quite clear tfiat either the division is incorrect, or the last statement is 
 false. Blackstone, indeed, admits this inaccuracy ; but he should have 
 avoided his error, as well as confessed it. 
 
 " I Com. 44. See Bentham on Morals and Legislation [ Clarendon 
 Press Edition, p. 328 «.]. 
 
XIX 
 
 PROPERTY, POSSESSION. ESTATE. ESTATES OF 
 PARLIAMENT 
 
 It does not fall within the scope of the present inquiries 
 to investigate the legal meaning and incidents of property 
 and possession ; but, for the sake of many political ques- 
 tions, it is desirable to give a general outline of the notions 
 conveyed by these two terms, and of the distinction between 
 them. 
 
 Without, then, attending to the peculiarities of any one 
 legal system, possession may be described as the actual use 
 or occupation of anything for a man's own convenience, 
 pleasure, or profit. Thus a man is possessed of the clothes 
 which he wears, of the house which he inhabits, of the 
 goods in his premises, of the horses which he rides or 
 drives, of the farm which he cultivates, &c. 
 
 Property, or the right of property, is the right of 
 ownership of any object, without regard to the actual use 
 of it; and it implies the right of obtaining possession at 
 some time or other. Thus a man has a property in a field 
 or house which he lets, in a book which he lends, &c. 
 
 Property and possession may of course coincide ; but 
 there may be possession without property, and property 
 without possession'. 
 
 Each of the words, property and possession (which it 
 may be observed, are often used as synonymous), bears 
 
 ' See Blackstone, 3 Cam. 176, 177. 
 
l82 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TEEMS 
 
 a double meaning; inasmuch as both signify the right 
 itself, and the object of the right. Thus, in such expres- 
 sions as the security of property, infringfement of property, 
 the right itself is meant ; but when we speak of trespassing 
 on another man's property, division of property, &c., it is 
 the o3/'ecf of the right which we mean. 
 
 The word 'estate' is liable to a similar ambiguity. Thus 
 a freehold estate, an estate tail, an estate for life, &c., 
 mean certain rights ; but when we speak of a large estate, 
 the boundaries of an estate, the map of an estate, we mean 
 a portion of land, the object of the right. 
 
 It may be here useful to remark that the word ' estate ' 
 is often used by English writers, in reference to the con- 
 stitution of their own country, with a meaning which 
 better deserves the name of a blunder arising from igno- 
 ra,nce, than an ambiguity caused by the imperfection of 
 language. ' The Court of Parliament,' says Lord Coke, 
 ' consisteth of the King's Majesty, sitting there in his royal 
 politic capacity, and of the three estates of the realm ^.' 
 ' The constituent parts of a Parliament,' says Blackstone, 
 ' are the King's Majesty, sitting there in his royal political 
 capacity, and the three estates of the realm; — the Lords 
 spiritual, the Lords temporal (who sit together with the 
 King in one house), and the Commons, who sit by them- 
 selves in another. And the King and these three estates 
 together form the great corporation or body politic, of the 
 kingdom ''.' Those persons who are acquainted with the 
 history either, of this or any European kingdom, both 
 during and after the middle ages, might reasonably think 
 it superfluous to quote passages from well-known authors 
 to establish a well-known fact. Nevertheless, many writers 
 of high reputation have confounded the three estates of 
 the English realm with the three powers or branches of the 
 constitution or sovereign legislature, and have thought that 
 the King is an estate. For example, we find even in Paley, 
 such a passage as the following : ' By the balance of interest, 
 ' 4 Imt. I. ' I Com. 153. 
 
ESTATES OF PARLIAMENT 183 
 
 which accompanies and gives efficacy to the balance of 
 power, is meant this ; that the respective interests of the 
 three estates of the empire are so disposed and adjusted, 
 that whichever of the three shall attempt any encroachment 
 the others will unite in resisting it. If the King should 
 endeavour to extend his authority by contracting the 
 power and privileges of the Commons, the House of Lords 
 would see their own dignity endangered,' &c.^ So it is 
 said in the Preface to Lord Clarendon's History, that ' the 
 true interest of this kingdom is supported nan tarn fama, 
 quam sua vi ; its own weight still keeps it steady against 
 all the storms that can be brought to beat upon it, either 
 from the ignorance of strangers to our constitution, or the 
 violence of any that project to themselves wild notions of 
 appealing to the people out of Parliament, as it were to a 
 fourth estate of the realm ^ ' : where it is evidently meant 
 that the people out of Parliament are a fourth power in 
 addition to the King, Lords, and Commons. Two of the 
 propositions condemned in the celebrated Oxford decree, 
 passed in 1683, are that 'the sovereignty of England is in 
 the three estates, viz. King, Lords, and Commons ' ; and 
 that ' the King has but a co-ordinate power, and may be 
 overruled by the other two ° ' : doctrines manifestly false, as 
 the King, Lords, and Commons, are not the three estates 
 of the realm ; nor, if they were, could the King be over- 
 ruled, either in an executive or legislative capacity, by the 
 Lords and Commons. Yet several writers appear to have 
 thought that these positions were improperly condemned ; 
 imagining, probably, that the language of this decree 
 implied that the sovereignty did not reside in the three 
 branches of Parliament, but in the King alone *. 
 
 ' Moral and Political Philosphy, b. vi. ch. 7. 
 2 P. II. ed. 1826. 
 
 ' See Wilkins' Concilia, vol.iv. p. 611. 
 
 * See, for example, Lingard's History of England, vol. xiii. p. 341. 
 Edinburgh Review, vol. xli. p. 27. 
 
XX 
 
 COMMUNITY OF GOODS 
 
 Community of Goods ' may mean that no right of pos- 
 session or property whatever is sanctioned by the legislature 
 or protected by the executive ; in which case, not only all 
 land and all products of agricultural and manufacturing 
 industry would 6e the prey of the first taker, but even 
 things in possession could not be retained, and a marr 
 might be stripped of the clothes on his body, or turned out 
 of the house which he inhabited, by any stronger man. If 
 goods were common to this extent, possession could only 
 be maintained, and would frequently be acquired, by supe- 
 rior force. When men live after this manner, their state 
 is so miserable, insecure, comfortless, and degraded, that, 
 perhaps, its adoption has never been seriously recommended 
 by any political guide. 
 
 It may likewise mean, that the legislature recognizes 
 no right of property, but recognizes the right of possession. 
 In this case a man's clothes, food, implements, and money, 
 the house in which he resides, his beasts of burden, &c., 
 would be protected by the law, as well as land in his 
 occupation ; but no property in land or other things could 
 exist ; nor could any one let lands or houses, lend money 
 on interest, deliver goods on credit or to be conveyed by 
 a carrier from place to place ; or, in short, part with any- 
 
 ' By the word goods, I here mean all things which may become the 
 objects of property, whether movable or immovable. 
 
COMMUNITY OF GOODS 185 
 
 thing out of the immediate occupation or possession of 
 himself, his servants, or his agents, if, indeed, a man would 
 be permitted by law to occupy or possess anything by 
 means of another person. The inconveniences of such 
 a state of things to the rich are obvious, but it does not 
 appear that they would in any degree be balanced by 
 countervailing advantages to the poor. A perfect com- 
 munity of goods would effectually put an end to inequality 
 of wealth by making all equally poor ; but a limited com- 
 munity of goods, admitting possession and excluding pro- 
 perty, would not prevent inequality of wealth, and would 
 press with greater hardship on the poor than on the rich, 
 inasmuch as it would prevent the existence of credit, by 
 which those who are occasionally exposed to want, profit 
 more than those who perpetually have the enjoyment of 
 superfluities. Under such a law, theft would be a crime, 
 and punishable as such, as all goods would necessarily 
 be in the possession of some person; and there might be 
 large capitalists employing large numbers of workmen. 
 There would be profits of stock and wages of labour, but no 
 interest of money, or rent of land. 
 
 The reason why the inequality of. wealth presses severely 
 on the poor, and gives the rich and the middle classes an 
 advantage at every turn of the market, is, that, in disagree- 
 ments about the rate of wages, the latter can refuse to 
 continue their workmen, and, being able, without material 
 inconvenience, to live for a short time on their capital, 
 can hold out against the demands for an increased payment ; 
 whereas the poor, having little or no capital to fall back 
 upon, are soon compelled to come into the terms of their 
 employers. The same is the case with persons who live, 
 not on the profits of stock, but on the wages of labour, 
 if their wealth, derived from other sdurces, is sufficient 
 to maintain them for a considerable time without employ- 
 ment. Thus, although the legal profession has always 
 of late years been greatly overstocked, the rate of payment 
 has never varied. The numerous lawyers who, though they 
 
l86 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 are perfectly competent to perform their duties, have never 
 any legal business, prefer living on their own fortunes to 
 offering to practise at a rate lower than that sanctioned 
 by the opinion and usage of their profession. So, likewise, 
 the fees of physicians (if we except a reduction for the 
 sake of convenience caused by a change in the value of the 
 gold coin) have not, like the wages of poor labourers, varied 
 continually from time to time, but have remained the same 
 for many years. But the wages of agricultural labourers are 
 constantly varying, and are, by the working of competition, 
 driven down to the lowest point. In this manner the 
 competition of the poor is more powerful, and operates 
 more to their disadvantage, than the competition of the rich 
 and middle ranks, whether capitalists or labourers. 
 
 It does not, however, very clearly appear, in what way it 
 is proposed to remedy the evils attributed to the inequality 
 of wealth, by taking away the right of property, and retain- 
 ing the right of possession. With regard to land, such 
 a law would compel all persons to cultivate the whole of 
 their own estates ; and thus, by preventing their division 
 into farms and holdings of a manageable size, would increase 
 the difficulties of agriculture, and raise the price of provisions. 
 In manufactures, as the whole concern is in the immediate 
 occupation of the capitalist, no change would be produced, 
 except the impossibility of giving or receiving credit, of the 
 manufacturer selling goods without instant payment, or of 
 borrowing money in any pressure of mercantile jiistress or 
 alarm. All that branch of internal and external commerce 
 which consists in carrying the goods of the manufacturer to 
 the market of the consumer, would be at once destroyed, 
 if possession conferred entire dominion over commodities, 
 and the merchant would, as in ancient times, be compelled 
 to sail in the same ship with his own merchandises '. 
 
 ' Mr. Millar, in the following passage, considers the existence of 
 the right of possession without the right of property as a mark of a 
 barbarous state of- society. ' Among barbarians in all parts of the 
 world,' he says, 'persons who belong to the same family are understood 
 tp enjoy a community of goods, and to be all jointly subjected to the 
 
COMMUNITY OF GOODS 1 87 
 
 Aristotle, in combating Plato's arguments in favour of 
 a community of goods, says that, at first sight, people are 
 captivated by the plausible and benevolent appearance 
 of that scheme, especially when it is urged that such 
 a community would put an end to litigation, perjury, 
 and disputes concerning property; which latter argument 
 Aristotle answers by saying, that these evils arise, not from the 
 institution of property, but from the depravity of mankind ' 
 Doubtless they do ; but it is not the less true, that, if there 
 was no property there would be no disputes about property. 
 The true answer is, that litigation, or the power of calling 
 in the assistance of the law to relieve a party harmed, has 
 been invented as a remedy for the evils caused by the 
 forcible or fraudulent abstraction of that which is in the 
 possession of others, and has been produced by their labour. 
 The lawsuit is not the cause but the remedy of an evil which 
 would otherwise be remediless. A lawsuit may be an 
 evil, but the administration of justice has been established 
 on the express ground that it is an evil far less than 
 those which it redresses or prevents. In like manner, 
 it might with perfect truth be said, that a community 
 of goods would extinguish the crimes of stealing, forging, 
 defrauding, &c., in the same manner that a community 
 of women, as proposed by Plato, would put an end to 
 adultery, and illicit concubinage. Nevertheless, although 
 the world would be relieved of the names of these vices, 
 it would equally suffer from the mischiefs which they 
 produce. Society would not the less be injured by the 
 rights of universal plunder of goods and promiscuous 
 intercourse with women, because those acts were not called 
 by certain names which signify the breaches of the rules 
 
 same obligations. In those early ages, when men are in a great 
 measure strangers to commerce, or the alienation of commodities, the 
 right oi property \a hardly distinguished from the privilege al using ox 
 possessing; and those persons who have acquired the joint possession of 
 any subject, are apt to be regarded as the joint proprietors of it." — 
 Historical View of the English Government, vol. i. p. 190. 
 » Fol. ii. 5, p. 317 D. 
 
l88 USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL TERMS 
 
 meant to repress them. If a revenue system was wisely 
 organized, the name of smuggling would be unknown, 
 but the evil itself, as well as its name, would be banished^ 
 Not so under a system of community of goods and women : 
 there would be the insecurity of property, and debasement 
 of female character, with the consequent evils of indolence, 
 ignorance, improvidence, and neglect of children : only 
 those who caused these evils would not be called thieves 
 and adulterers. 
 
 The modern advocates of a community of goods have, so 
 far as I am acquainted with their writings, dealt much in 
 vague and general assertions of the benefits to be derived 
 from the equality of ' wealth, and the evils arising from 
 its inequality, and have given florid descriptions of a state 
 of universal harmony and concord, which they would 
 represent as the natural result of their system. But they 
 have altogether omitted to make any detailed statement of 
 the extent to which they would carry their community ; nor 
 have they shown, either that the existence of government 
 and civilization is compatible with an absence of the right 
 of possession, or that an abolition of the right of property, 
 while the right of possession remained, would produce 
 an equality of wealth : unless, indeed, by an equality 
 of wealth they mean an equality, of poverty. Instead of 
 aiming at the conviction of competent judges by solid 
 reasoning, they have often indulged in passionate declama- 
 tion, or dogmatic assertion ; faithfully copying the; wildness, 
 the absurdity, and the fanciful reveries of their great leader, 
 though without a particle of the varied and beautiful 
 imagery and captivating rhetoric, which, in spite of all its 
 incoherence and all its folly, will, to the end of time, make 
 even the most sober-minded recur with delight to the 
 Republic of Plato. 
 
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INDEX 
 
 Absolute monarchy, 164. 
 
 Aeschylus, on irresponsible power, 
 57 ; on hereditary princes, 66. 
 
 Anarchy, lax use of term, 170. 
 
 Aristocracy defined, 72. 
 
 Aristophanes, on the poor man and 
 the beggar, 120; on the 'lion- 
 whelp in a city,' 66 ; indicates the 
 poor as the war-party, 1 30. 
 
 Aristotle holds that extreme demo- 
 cracy is tyranny, 45 ; that the 
 majority is always sovereign, 50 ; 
 on forms of government, 55 ; holds 
 that Plato is wrong as to cycle of 
 governments, 64 ; description of 
 mixed government, 81 ; that demo- 
 cracy is where the poor govern, 
 126 ; on Megarian revolution, 130 ; 
 on nature, 148 ; his definition of 
 law, 159 ; tyranny is government 
 'vrithout law, 169 ; on Plato's com- 
 munism, 187; use of term ' catal- 
 lactic,' 177. 
 
 Arnold, Dr., on property and 
 numbers, 132. 
 
 Athens, Bentham on, 77 ; number of 
 free men, 100 ; Blackstone on 
 Athenian jealousy of strangers, no. 
 
 Austin, John, his lectures on Juris- 
 prudence, T, 12 ; at Malta with 
 Lewis, vi. 
 
 Authority, means power supported 
 by law, 171. 
 
 Bacon, on disputes about words, 5 ; 
 on agreement as to first principles, 
 6 ; on elective monarchy, 61 ; his 
 use of the term ' commonwealth,' 
 
 69 ; ' if vice were profitable,' 132 ; 
 on nature, 136 ; on human nature, 
 I38.- 
 
 Bentham, his Book of Fallacies, 2 ; 
 on the importance of words, 10 ; 
 right has no superior genus, 2 2 ; 
 'right' may mean the law, 27; 
 his Fragment on Government, 45 ; 
 on Athenian democracy, 77; on 
 'natural' procedure, 141 ; on the 
 presumption in favour of de- 
 fendant, 173. 
 
 Blackstone,' an epitome of fallacies,' 
 2 ; on rights, 26 ; maxim that 
 'the king can do no Vfrong,' 
 30; sovereign power means law- 
 making power, 49 ; sovereignty 
 in Parliament, 51 ; defines mon- 
 archy, 57 ; balance of the con- 
 stitution, 84 ; his use of the term 
 ' people,' 98 ; on the term ' muni- 
 cipal,' 180 ; no slavery in England, 
 151 ; on the social compact, 160 ; 
 onpublicandprivaterelations, 177. 
 
 Boyle, his definition of nature, 14. 
 
 Brougham, on the Reform Bill, 112. 
 
 Burke, on ' metaphysical ' rights, 32 ; 
 on 'natural' rights, 157; free 
 governments may be tyrannical, 
 165. 
 
 Butler, Bishop, thinks confusion in 
 writing inexcusable, 10 ; on the 
 
 formal notion of government, 18. 
 
 .* 
 
 Canning, thinks limited monarchy 
 a mixed government, 44 ; on 
 tyranny, 4, 167; his poem, 
 ifew Morality, 138. 
 
192 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Catallactics, not a good name for 
 political economy, 177. 
 
 Cicero, definition of law, 26 ; on 
 forms of government, 55 ; ou 
 kingly government, 62 ; meaning 
 of respublica, 70 ; best government 
 is mixed, 83, 92 ; votes should be 
 weighed as well as counted, 103 ; 
 compact between persons and 
 classes, 159 ; on liberty, 164. 
 
 'Civil,' meaning of term, 180. 
 
 Claim, genus of right, ^2. 
 
 Clarendon, on the Three Estates, 183. 
 
 Claudian, on liberty under a good 
 king, 64. 
 
 • Commonwealth ' defined,- 68. 
 
 ' Community,' means people in wider 
 sense, (39, 
 
 Community of goods, 184. 
 
 Constitution, meaning of term, 20. 
 
 Crabb {Diet, of Synonyms), defini- 
 tion of ' rights,' 27 ; of monarchy, 
 57 ; on classification of govern- 
 ments, 69 ; distinguishes freedom 
 and liberty, 151. 
 
 Crime, means public wrong, 178. 
 
 D'Alembert, on classification of 
 
 governments, 80. 
 Democracy defined, 75. 
 Despotism, not the same as tyranny, 
 
 167. 
 Dionysius, on mixed character of 
 
 Roman government, 92. 
 Dryden, Absalom and Achitophel, 
 
 67, 68 ; translation of Juvenal, 
 
 137- 
 
 Edinburgh Eevieiu, uses ' right ' in 
 two senses, 27 ; on criminal intent, 
 37 ; on hereditary monarchy, 66 ; 
 on mixed character of English 
 government, 91, 94 ; interest of the 
 poor to plunder the rich, 99 ; on 
 representative government, 110; 
 social contract a fiction, 158 ; on 
 misuse of term ' anarchy,' 1 70 ; 
 power of rulers same in kind as 
 that of conspirators, 172 ; on the 
 appeal to force, 174; on the 
 Oxford decrees of 1683, 183. 
 
 'Estate,' meaning of term, 182, 
 
 ' Factitious,' meaning of word, 140. 
 Federal government, 97. 
 Fielding, on the poor, 123. 
 Filmer, Sir R., 11, 157. 
 Forms of government, 53. 
 France, ' republican ' government of, 
 
 8. 
 Freedom, 151; free government, 163. 
 
 Gentlemen, who are, 73. 
 
 Gibbon, on monarchy, 64 ; on 
 hereditary monarchy, 65 ; on pro- 
 ductions of nature, 140 ; on British 
 freedom, 154. 
 
 Goldsmith, The Traveller, 140. 
 
 Government defined, 18. 
 
 Grenville, Lord, quoted, 16. 
 
 Hallam, H., ' the king can do no 
 wrong,' 31 ; democracy is ' ab- 
 solute,' 43 ; on the English crown, 
 47 ; use of the term ' common- 
 wealth,' 70 ; the king is chief of the 
 English commonwealth, 70. 
 
 Hamilton, W., his Parliamentary 
 Logic quoted, 9. 
 
 Heeren, on sovereign princes, 48; 
 on theocracy, 97. 
 
 Herodotus, says Egyptians thought 
 fire an animal, 3 ; his dialogue 
 on forms of government, 54. 
 
 Herschel, on solid liquid and aeri- 
 form, 116. 
 
 Hobbes, on forms of government, 55 ; 
 on the social compact, 157; }iis 
 definition of authority, 171, 
 
 Horace, on nature, 135. 
 
 Horton, Wilmot, on the poor, 121. 
 
 Hume, David, on disputes about 
 words, 6 ; ' the king can do no 
 ^f^o-a^' 31 ; his use of the term 
 ' republic,' 69 ; on a middle 
 station, 1 2 7 ; on the term ' natural,' 
 1 39 ; on the original contract, 157 ; 
 provinces better trekted by ab- 
 solute monarchies than by free 
 states, 163. 
 
 Hungary, its government, 155. 
 
 Implication, meaning of term, i6o. 
 Interest and knowledge, 103, interest 
 
 and what men suppose to be their 
 
 interest, 128, 
 
INDEX 
 
 193 
 
 Ireland, said by Johnson to be in an 
 
 unnatural state, 140. 
 Isocrates, on the oppression of the 
 
 rich at Argos, 131. 
 
 Johnson, Samuel, ' the king can do 
 no wrong, 30 ; on liberty of con- 
 science, 32 ; definition of ' re- 
 publican,' 71 ; on theocracy, 97 ; 
 on representation, 105 ; ' all men 
 will naturally steal,' 139 ; on 
 Ireland, 140. 
 
 Jus, meaning of term, 25, 
 
 Justice, ambiguity of the term, 37. 
 
 Juvenal, on poverty, 36 ; on nature, 
 135- 
 
 King of England ' can do no wrong,' 
 29 ; not sovereign, 52. 
 
 Language, we cannot legislate for, 8. 
 
 Law defined, 39. 
 
 Lewis, Sir G. C, his life, v; his 
 political opinions, xii ; his politi- 
 cal writings, xviii. 
 
 Liberalism defined, xii. 
 
 Liberty defined, 151. 
 
 Locke, on the misuse of words, 5 ; 
 his criticism of Filmer, 11 ; on 
 the meaning of ' commonwealth,' 
 70; on the state of nature, 145 ; 
 on the social compact, 158; on 
 tyranny, 165. 
 
 Logic, province of, i. 
 
 Lncretius, on the nature of things, 137. 
 
 Machiavelli, on monarchy, 57. 
 
 Mackintosh, Sir J., his use of the 
 term constitution, 20 ; mistaken 
 as to Aristotle on constitutions, 
 26 ; thinks government should be 
 balanced, 93; his definition of 
 liberty, 152 ; 
 
 Malchus, classification of govern- 
 ments, 168. 
 
 Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, 86. 
 
 Martens, on sovereignty, 41 ; on 
 definition of monarchy, 58. 
 
 Martin the incendiary, 37. 
 
 Megara, revolution at, 130. 
 
 Middle class, alleged virtues of, 73, 
 119. 
 
 Mill, James, on forms of govern- 
 ment, 56 ; on the middle class, 73 ; 
 on Greek democracy, 77 ; on 
 mixed government, 86 ; democracy 
 is government of adult males, loi ; 
 on electoral qualifications, 108 ; 
 on corruptive operation of wealth, 
 142. 
 
 Millar, his definition of a republic, 
 
 • 60 ; democracy is when the 
 majority vote, 76; on property 
 and possession in early society, 
 186. 
 
 Mitford, his mistakes as to Greek 
 democracy, 44. 
 
 Mixed government, 79. 
 
 Monarchy defined, 58. 
 
 Montesquieu, his classification of 
 governments, 56, 168 ; on the two 
 kinds of monarchy, 168 ; on liberty, 
 
 164- 
 Municipal law, i8o. 
 
 Napoleon, his government mixed (?), 
 
 94. 
 Nature, meanings of the term, 135. 
 New Morality, a poem, 138. 
 Niebuhr, on the Roman populus, 98 ; 
 
 on the meanings of 8^/ios, 99. 
 Nobility defined, 74. 
 
 Oligarchy defined, 74. 
 Ostracism, 65. 
 
 Paley makes right a quality, 26 ; 
 holds that an absolute power 
 exists in every government, 45 ; 
 on forms of government, 61 ; on 
 mixed government, 85 ; on balance 
 of power, 94 ; makes the king an 
 estate, 182. 
 
 Palgrave, on royalty, 58. 
 
 Parliament, 'omnipotence' of, 45. 
 
 People, meaning of the term, 98. 
 
 Petalism, 65. 
 
 Phocylides, on a middle station, 127. 
 
 Pindar, on forms of government, 54. 
 
 Plato, on forms of government, 54 ; 
 on mixed government, 81 ; on 
 community of goods, 187. 
 
 Plutarch, on monarchy, 55. 
 
 Poland, constitution of, 155. 
 
 Political economy, 176. 
 
194 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Polybius, on forms of govemment, 
 54 ; thinks Roman government 
 mixed, 82. 
 
 ' Poor ' means the very poor, 117; 
 the poor are the war-party, 130. 
 
 Pope quoted, 136, 140, 143. 
 
 Possession defined, 180; distin- 
 guished from property, ibid. 
 
 Power, meaning of term, 171. 
 
 Property, most important vested 
 light, 36; means both right and 
 object of right, 181. 
 
 Public, meaning of term, 175. 
 
 Raleigh, Sir W., on tyranny, 1 65. 
 Representation defined, 105 ; repre- 
 sentative govemment, 107. 
 RepubIic,not thesame as democracy, 
 
 77- 
 
 Rich and poor areextremes, 115; rich 
 men favour political reform, 134. 
 
 Right, substantive and adjective, 22, 
 25 ; legal and natural, political 
 and private, 31 ; vested rights, 32. 
 
 Rousseau, on the social contract, 
 49 ; thinks sovereignty inalienable, 
 50 ; government is sovereign 
 power, 56; no simple form of 
 government, 85 ; on representation, 
 III; free states opposed to monar- 
 chical, 163. 
 
 Scott, Sir W., on nature, 1 36. 
 
 Shakespeare, on nature, 136. 
 
 Social, wider term than political, 1 76. 
 
 Sovereign power as defined by 
 Austin, 13 ; by Lewis, 41 ; has no 
 rights or duties, 42 ; sovereignty 
 
 of people means influence only, 
 
 47- 
 Sparta called a monarchy, 62 ; why 
 called a mixed government, 87. 
 
 Tacitus, on mixed govemment, 84 ; 
 on multiplication of laws, 156. 
 
 Temple, Sir W., holds that govern- 
 ment is a restraint on liberty, 45 ; 
 on delegates of the United Pro- 
 vinces, 106 ; a free nation is one 
 never conquered, 154. 
 
 Theocracy, 97. 
 
 Thucydides, on contests between rich 
 and poor, 117. 
 
 Tyranny, 164. 
 
 United States, a democracy (?) , 8. 
 
 Unnatural, meaning of term, 1 39. 
 
 Verbal fallacies, used by great 
 writers, 8, 17. 
 
 Vested rights, 32, 179. 
 
 Watson's trial, 24. 
 
 Westminster Review, on rich and 
 poor, 124. 
 
 Whately, on ambiguity, 4 ; if you 
 show dispute to be verbal yon 
 offend both parties, 21 ; govern- 
 ment must have power to do what 
 subjects thinlc wrong, 28 ; on the 
 term ' lawful,' 39 ; on the natural 
 state of man, 147 ; objections to 
 social contract, 158 ; introduces 
 term ' catallactics,' 177. 
 
 Women, rights of, 103. 
 
 Wrong, substantive and adjective, 
 25 ; public and private, 178. 
 
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