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 BERNARD ALBERT SINN 
 
 COLLECTION 
 
 NAVAL HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 BERNARD A. SINN. 97 
 
 1919 
 
Cornell University Library 
 V167 .B16 1894 
 
 Elementary naval tactics 
 
 olin 
 
The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 924030751 91 5 
 
ELEMENTARY 
 
 NAVAL TACTICS 
 
 BY 
 
 Commander WM. BAINBRIDGE-HOFF, 
 
 United States Naity. 
 
 FIRST EDITION. 
 FIRST THOUSAND. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 
 JOHN WILEY & SONS, 
 
 53 East Tenth Street. 
 
 1894. 
 
 L 
 
 UNI VI ,;;M 1 V 
 1,1 1; U A MY 
 
Copyright, 1894, 
 
 BY 
 
 WM. BAINBRIDGE-HOFF 
 
®o nig Son, 
 
 AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY, SERVING IN THE FOURTH 
 
 GENERATION, I DEDICATE THIS LITTLE WORK 
 
 WITH GREAT AFFECTION. 
 
Hcfenowle&gment. 
 
 As I design the following pages to form an elementary treatise on Naval 
 Tactics, and to be used as a text-book, I have, in order to simplify matters, 
 omitted in the body of the work all reference to authorities by name. 
 
 I therefore take this means of expressing my great indebtedness to the 
 many writers upon this subject from whose books I have quoted, and whose 
 ideas I have to a greater or less degree appropriated. 
 
 WM. BAINBRIDGE-HOFF, 
 
 Commander, U. S. Navy. 
 Washington, D. C, April, 1894. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Acknowledgement iv 
 
 Chapter I. — Definition and General Scope of Naval Tactics . i 
 
 I. Definitions — Units of offence — Units of defence — Ratio to be main- 
 tained between them — Classes of weapons used against the ship. 
 
 II. Tactical survey. 
 
 Chapter II. — War Vessels . 6 
 
 I. Constitution of the fleet — General qualities — Particular qualities 
 required by each class of vessel. II. Necessity for each ship to be 
 equipped for general work. 
 
 Chapter III.— The Ship n 
 
 I. Demands upon the Captain — The necessity for his familiarity with 
 signal methods. II. Manoeuvring qualities of the ship — Helm and 
 Engine power — The Water Envelope — Manoeuvring area— Advance 
 and transfer— The " Neck " — Twin rudders. III. Definitions relating 
 to the ship. IV. Discussion of the turning-circle. V. Determination 
 of the turning-circle and its functions. VI. Analysis of the turning- 
 circle. VII. Turning-circles of twin-screw vessels — Forces acting 
 upon the ship in turning— Drift angle — Heeling as an accompani- 
 ment to turning. VIII. Helm Table — Speed Table — Tactical Table. 
 
 Chapter IV. — The Ship in Action . n 
 
 I. Discussion of the use of weapons during the engagement — The com- 
 parison of ships, and general rules for entering the fight. II. Tactical 
 values of weapons. III. The value of gun-fire and rules for its use — -A 
 rapid speed is forced upon combatant vessels — Firing of guns in duels, 
 not to be from central point of control, but toipedoes are best fired 
 from such a point — The rudder not to be used to a great degree in 
 sighting guns. IV. The ram in action— Theorems and rules for its use, 
 with ships of different tactical qualities — The "danger-field" — The 
 " position of greatest danger." V. The torpedo in action — Bow installa- 
 tion — Stern installation — Broadside installation. VI. Two ships engag- 
 ing one. VII. Two ships against two. VIII. Three ships against two. 
 
 Chapter V. — The Sea Army 47 
 
 The Organization and Command of the Fleet : — I. Its factors — The com- 
 batant fleet and its non-combatant consorts. ' II. The line of battle and 
 reserve — Vedettes — Skirmishes — The intercommunication to be main- 
 
 vii 
 
Vlll CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 tained — Convoy. III. Composition of the combatant and non-com- 
 batant force. IV. Coaling. V. The Admiral— His battle plans— Signal- 
 books— His Captains— Organizing the fleet. VI. Post of the Admiral 
 in action. 
 
 Chapter VI. — The Fleet under Dkili 57 
 
 I. Definitions — Table of distances II. Formations — Their main object, 
 Concentration — Condition of the formation for attack— Division of the 
 fleet — Natural and inverted order — Close and open distances — Utility 
 of simple formations. III. Line— Double line — IV. Echelon — Chase 
 angle and retreat formation. V. Naval square — Groups. VI. Column 
 — Double column — Indented or Alternate column — Column of sec- 
 tions. VII. Ideal formation— Tactical units. VIII. Evolutions — The 
 six methods — Basis of all manoeuvres — What constitutes the value of 
 manoeuvres — Rules applying to steaming information — Proper prin- 
 ciples of manoeuvres. IX. Discussion of the several movements. 
 X. Remarks concerning evolutions, etc. 
 
 Chapter VII. — The Fleet in Action on the Open Sea . . .81 
 
 I. Necessity for formation — Requirements of a good battle formation 
 — Order in which the force should attack — Example — Torpedo-boats. 
 
 II. Fundamental tactical directions — Plans of battles to be prear- 
 ranged — Axiom concerning attacking — Rules for gun-fire and concen- 
 tration of fire — Ramming concentration — Concentration for torpedo 
 attack. III. What is imposed upon the battle formation— Remarks 
 concerning gun-fire — Breaking through the enemy's line — Cruiser v. 
 Battle-ship— Speed a necessity. IV. Smoke in battle — Ramming rear 
 ships — Necessity of preserving the formation — Concentration, total 
 and partial— Automobile torpedoes in fleet actions — Cruisers in fleet 
 actions— Torpedo-cruisers and sea-going torpedo-boats in fleet actions. 
 V. Unexpected meetings of hostile fleets — Attack upon a fleet at 
 anchor. 
 
 Chapter VIII. — The Sea Army for Offence and Defence . . 92 
 I. Setting out of the sea army for offensive operations — lis composi- 
 tion — Sea march. II. What the attack upon the enemy's position by a 
 sea force involves— Ships v. Forts — Countermining— Telegraph-cable 
 ships — Protection of ships at anchor — What the blockader is exposed 
 to in the way of attack. III. Blockading — Attacking the enemy's 
 position — The defence of a vessel against torpedo-boats. IV. Attack 
 of torpedo-boats upon ships or a ship under way — Automobile torpedo 
 v. Spar-torpedo — Conclusions concern. ng each. V. Distribution of 
 naval elements in the defence of the coast— The two categories of 
 coast defence — Conclusion. 
 
 Plates. 
 
ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 DEFINITION AND GENERAL SCOPE OF NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 Naval Tactics is the art of — 
 
 1st. Disposing and installing in ships the weapons used in 
 naval warfare, so that they may inflict the greatest damage 
 upon the enemy, and at the same time preserve to themselves 
 the greatest amount of protection. 
 
 2d. Disposing the defensive qualities of ships so as to 
 permit the greatest liberty of movement in regard to their 
 weapons, while protecting in the best manner all these parts 
 necessary to gain this end. 
 
 3d. Moving or manoeuvring the ship by means of the helm 
 and propelling power, so as to gain some advantage as regards 
 position in respect to the enemy. 
 
 4th. Combining and moving ships in respect to each other, 
 or to some natural or artificial obstruction or defence, so as 
 best to employ each and every weapon, while maintaining the 
 greatest amount of support between the vessels. 
 
2 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 5th. Moving vessels in force and formed so as to be con- 
 trolled by general signal. 
 
 It is patent from these definitions that the study of naval 
 tactics embraces the planning and construction of the ship, as 
 well as the organization and fighting of fleets. 
 
 In the ship, the units of offence are divided among three 
 weapons, — the gun, the ram, and the torpedo ; while the units 
 of defence are all embraced in the consideration of armor-dis- 
 tribution ; the intimate division of the hull by bulkheads ; 
 rafting and water-excluding devices ; the celerity of change of 
 direction, and the gathering and losing of way, through rudder 
 and engine power. 
 
 There is a certain ratio which must be maintained in a ship, 
 between her offensive and defensive qualities. No weapon 
 mnst be so placed that it cannot be employed at its full value, 
 through the insufficiency of its defence. For instance, a gun 
 capable of doing certain work against an enemy's armor must 
 be put behind a protection sufficiently strong to enable it to 
 be brought acceptably into action. 
 
 The ship will have to defend herself against three classes 
 of weapons which attack the hull at different depths : 
 
 A. Obstructions or Mines, which operate against the bot- 
 tom, between the turns of bilge. 
 
 B. Rams and Torpedoes, which act against the side be- 
 tween the turn of bilge and a line below the water-line. 
 
 C. Shells and Shot, which assault the ship above this line. 
 No gun or torpedo can be made so powerful that it can 
 
 stop short in her career a ship laid on to ram the vessel firing 
 at her. Hence the ram is the weapon to be most dreaded. 
 Fortunately it is the weapon most difficult to use. 
 
 Ram-blows given, or ram-blows received, are best absorbed 
 
DEFINITION AND GENERAL SCOPE. 3 
 
 by distributing the strength and thickness of the hull over the 
 whole fabric. The blow of a ram is comparable to the strik- 
 ing of an object with an axe. To be serviceable, the axe 
 must have its weight distributed over the external figure, .and 
 not concentrated at some point remote from its cutting edge. 
 It must resemble A, and not B. (See Plate I, Fig. I.) 
 
 It is of vital moment to protect in the best manner possi- 
 ble the ship's engines and boilers, rudder and connections. A 
 ship in action that cannot move is doomed to destruction, no 
 matter how powerful she may be. 
 
 However, no defence can be made strong enough to shut 
 out the heaviest assaults of offensive weapons. Therefore the 
 constructor must strive to gain for his hull as slow sinking 
 conditions as he can, and endeavor also to have his ship sink 
 on an even keel in the event of disaster incident to extensive 
 penetration. 
 
 The precision of gun-fire depends in a great degree upon 
 the steadiness of the platform, and upon the large slow-firing 
 guns being installed as near as possible to the pivoting-point 
 of the vessel, so as to be free from the aberration in pointing 
 due to the traverse of the ship, which would be the case if the 
 guns were placed at the extreme ends. This applies es- 
 pecially to stern fire. 
 
 The use of the ram depends upon the ability of a ship to 
 turn quickly, and to change with the greatest promptness her 
 rate of speed and her direction — either ahead or astern — 
 through the water. 
 
 The torpedo is the weapon which finds its greatest sphere 
 of usefulness when installed in heavy-armored ships en- 
 dowed with modest speed, to offset their inferior turning 
 qualities and slowness ; and also when fitted to the lightest 
 
4 ELEMEN TARY NAVAL TA C TICS. 
 
 vessels of small size possessed of enormous speed, which are 
 intended for the sole purpose of destroying the heaviest ships 
 at great risk to themselves, and with the chance of only deal- 
 ing a single blow. 
 
 II. 
 
 For these reasons, and to serve best the ends for which it 
 was built, every vessel must be surveyed in a tactical sense. 
 As the human body, although symmetrical to outward appear- 
 ances, has, as far back as we can reason, been developed on 
 lines seemingly opposed to this symmetry — so it is with the 
 ship. For instance, man has developed right-handedness ; 
 probably because his most vital organ is situated on his left 
 side ; so that, by advancing his right side and employing his 
 right hand more dexterously, he affords better protection to 
 his heart. 
 
 To apply this reasoning to the ship, it will be found that 
 she changes direction better with one helm than with the 
 other ; that there are certain qualities of the screws which 
 make her turn more favorably towards one particular side, or 
 which cause her to gather or lose speed more quickly under 
 certain conditions not at first apparent. There will be, too, 
 some common bearing where her guns will unite in doing 
 most execution, where their supply of ammunition will be 
 the most easily kept up, and where their crews will be best 
 protected. Taking the ranges of the guns into account, there 
 will be some particular distance at which you will have the 
 enemy at the greatest disadvantage. Then as to her torpedo 
 outfit. It will be decided which installation is to be used 
 with the greatest facility, and against an attack from what 
 
DEFINITION AND GENERAL SCOPE. 5 
 
 quarter will it be most effective. Also what rate of speed 
 can be attained without interfering with the precision of fire 
 with this weapon. 
 
 When we have discussed in order every factor of the 
 offence, then a consideration of the defensive qualities is in 
 order. On what bearing does her armor, or protection of coal, 
 or bulkhead arrangement best cover her vitals, this important 
 steam-pipe or outboard connection, or that ammunition-sup- 
 ply ? And so on through every question entering into the 
 fighting of the ship. 
 
 Out of this all, by drawing comparisons between advan- 
 tages, and disadvantages comes a settlement upon three things: 
 ist. Some presentation of the ship, which shall be the 
 strongest to offer to the enemy for offence and defence. 
 
 2d. Some rate of speed, which shall serve your weapons 
 best. 
 
 3d. Some one range for your guns at which the greatest 
 damage will be inflicted. 
 
 Doing all this is making a tactical survey of your ship ; and 
 upon this bearing, with this speed, and at this distance you 
 must endeavor to keep and fight your enemy. 
 
 Further on we will see that what is true of one ship is true 
 of ships in combination ; and that, in solving the problem con- 
 cerning the position to be occupied by ships in the line of 
 battle, the question of rank of the several commanding officers 
 hardly even enters. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 WAR-VESSELS. 
 
 To be able to meet the enemy, we must oppose him with 
 a fleet equal, at least, to his own in numbers, construction, 
 speed, and offensive power. To protect our coast, we must be 
 supplied with proper vessels which can keep the sea, yet be 
 of sufficiently light draught to enter most of our harbors. 
 They must be either very swift, or else adequately defended 
 against the fire of the enemy's ships which they are likely to 
 encounter, and must also possess weapons of the very best 
 pattern. 
 
 To assist these fleets, we need protected vessels of large 
 size-termed cruisers ; also a smaller class of the same name ; 
 corvettes and gun-vessels. 
 
 Torpedo-vessels of good size — in fact, torpedo-cruisers, — 
 able to keep the sea, armed with automobile torpedoes and 
 machine-guns, are most necessary, but are not of the line of 
 battle. 
 
 Torpedo craft to act in smooth water, armed with auto- 
 mobile torpedoes, must be provided in large numbers. 
 
 Each war-vessel should possess as many as possible of the 
 following qualities : 
 
 1st. Good speed, with a reserve speed immediately avail- 
 able. 
 
 6 
 
WAR-VESSELS. 7 
 
 2d. Resistance to sinking ; great water-discharging ca- 
 pacity. 
 
 3d. Quick turning; great helm power. 
 
 4th. Strong ram bow ; ability to ram in its class. / X 
 
 5th. Heavy bow fire, looking to the greatest penetration 
 for the largest, most destructive missile that the fighting of 
 its particular class and size of enemy will demand. 
 
 6th. Broadside and stern fire of as many and as large 
 quick-firing guns as she can carry. 
 
 7th. Fair weight of secondary battery. 
 
 8th. Ability to use all weapons under all conditions of the 
 sea. 
 
 The foremost factor for war: the ideal unit of the line of 
 battle is the battle-ship. She should have, in addition to the 
 qualities mentioned above : 
 
 1st. Armor-resistance to the penetration of large shells. 
 (This weight of armor to call for a sacrifice of coal- and stores- 
 carrying capacity.) 
 
 2d. A merging of the number of broadside guns into an in- 
 creased weight of gun, designed to augment the strength of 
 stern fire. 
 
 3d. A complete all-around installation of the heaviest auto- 
 mobile torpedoes. 
 
 4th. Largest possible secondary battery. 
 
 Since the battle-ship has not the speed of the large cruiser, 
 herself adequately protected against a fairly heavy class of 
 gun-fire, she must offset her inferiority of speed by being able 
 to keep the cruiser from ramming her, by means of her tor- 
 pedoes ; and the torpedo-cruiser, and her smaller congeners, 
 by the fire from her secondary battery. 
 
 The cruisers of both classes must have : 
 
t> ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 1st. Armor-resistance to quite a heavy class of gun-fire. 
 
 2d. Great speed ; great reserve force for speed. 
 
 3d. Broadside installation for automobile torpedoes. 
 
 4th. Greatest coal- and stowage-capacity. 
 
 5th. Non-fouling protection for the bottom. 
 
 6th. Largest secondary battery. 
 
 7th. Ability to berth and transport large crews. 
 
 The reason for bow or stern installation of the automobile 
 torpedo is not apparent. If the ship is laid on for using a 
 torpedo ahead, she is in a position for ramming ; and it would 
 be wiser for her to go ahead at the great speed she is capable 
 of making, and ram her opponent, rather than to use a 
 weapon of less precision and probably less effective, and 
 which, under the circumstances, might affect or damage the 
 firer. Again, in running away from a ship in chase, using a 
 stern installation, and firing a torpedo through the disturbance 
 created by two or three screws turning at their fastest speed, 
 would be less effective than the using of some of the older 
 devices of strewing the wake with floating torpedoes. 
 
 As a large cruiser has a large tactical diameter, a complete 
 installation of torpedoes in broadside will be most effective. 
 To protect herself from torpedo craft, the ability to maintain 
 a heavy fire from her secondary battery is most vital. 
 
 The corvette should be roomy and fast, have a large coal- 
 capacity, be of strong scantling, and be sheathed with cop- 
 per. She should be capable of making good speed under 
 sail, and be suitably sparred and square-rigged. She may be 
 built of steel, or constructed in a composite manner. She 
 should have no fitted torpedo installations. 
 
 Ships other than those protected by armor should be con- 
 structed to shut out secondary fire from entering their 
 
WAR-VESSELS. 9 
 
 primary battery, and their secondary battery should in like 
 manner be defended from machine-gun fire. 
 
 The larger the ship, and the more feeble her protection 
 against gun-fire, the greater must be her speed and her coal- 
 endurance. Such a vessel is of less value to the line of 
 battle, but she may be needed for other duty quite as neces- 
 sary, such as commerce-destroying, or carrying or convoying 
 an expeditionary force to some strategic centre. 
 
 The exterior of ships must be smooth, so that a scraping 
 past of the enemy, which might possibly occur, would not de- 
 molish sponsons and so disable guns. 
 
 The conning-turret, wherever fitted, must be protected from 
 as heavy fire as the ship would be called upon to stand. It 
 must be roomy, have the most approved means of communi- 
 cating with the different parts of the ship, and be easy of 
 access and exit. 
 
 The armored tops must be so designed that they do not 
 become death-traps. Fire from aloft is most advantageous ; 
 and marksmen, to do their work well, must feel measurably 
 safe. 
 
 Cruisers and corvettes are not only the eyes of the fleet, 
 but they become commerce-destroyers, convoy-ships, and de- 
 fenders of temporary bases. 
 
 The gun-vessel of any class, and the torpedo-vessel of any 
 size or peculiar designation, belong with the fleet, and may be 
 utilized for supply, and dispatch-vessels. Gun-vessels should 
 be fitted with bow torpedo-tubes. Torpedo-vessels should carry 
 machine-guns, and the smaller ones spar-torpedo fittings. 
 
 Torpedo-nets are generally furnished to line-of-battle ships ; 
 they will probably keep out all but the largest class of auto- 
 mobile torpedoes. 
 
JO ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 II. 
 
 All ships must be fighting ships. Although it may be said 
 that unarmored vessels should not engage armored ships or 
 fortifications, still it will probably happen that unarmored 
 men-of-war will have to do just that very thing, and there- 
 fore we should strive to have our ships as good "all-around " 
 ships as their inches will permit them to be. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SHIP. 
 
 Formerly, when the ship was put in commission, the cap- 
 tain, officers, and men could go to their posts, recognize 
 everything within their jurisdiction and care, and be up with 
 the requirements of their stations. Nowadays, so far from 
 this being the case, the joining of the ship means for each 
 one the taking up, in his special department, some novel ap- 
 plication of science or some new mechanical device, studying 
 it and mastering it. 
 
 For the captain, it means the constant oversight of his 
 subordinates to determine whether the results they give him 
 in their special departments are adequate and good. He 
 must supply the vital strength, nerve-power, and necessary 
 intelligence, which shall circulate throughout the whole mass 
 of his command ; give it life, and infuse energy to make it 
 fulfil in the most laudable manner the earnest of all those 
 things for which it was assembled as a righting unit. 
 
 What one of the oldest naval fathers said of his time ap- 
 plies perfectly to the captain of to-day : 
 
 " Absolute force amounts to nothing if one is not able to 
 compete in capacity with another which knows how to crystal- 
 lize and control the elements of such force. The ship which 
 
12 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 attacks another is sure to triumph if the one attacked does 
 not know how to fight or is not able to do so." 
 
 Being endowed with the necessary nerve, the captain must 
 come to his command with a fundamental knowledge of naval 
 drill and a complete mastery of the methods of signalling. 
 With this equipment he is fitted to begin his research into the 
 most intimate and intricate understanding of the individuality 
 of his own ship, and, in a general sense, the knowledge of the 
 requirements of his consorts. 
 
 Signalling has passed out of the phase of a looking into 
 the signal-books at the last moment, with a general condem- 
 nation of the compilation at not finding what you want, be- 
 cause you do not know how to look for it. Formerly, there 
 was plenty of time to learn at the minute, and correct mis- 
 takes before the execution of the signal. Now we have only 
 seconds to work in, and no chance to correct errors. There- 
 fore the modern captain must not be willing to let his fertile 
 brain fail to carry out its ideas because he is ignorant of the 
 methods by which he can transmit them beyond the range of 
 his voice. When this point is reached, he must know himself, 
 by all methods of signalling, how the communication must be 
 kept up, and must employ as little as possible any intermedi- 
 ary. By this means time is saved and time wasted means 
 inevitable disaster for the ship. 
 
 II. 
 
 The manceuvring qualities of a ship lie in the application 
 of the forces supplied by her helm and her engines, acting 
 though the rudder and propellers. The screw is the present 
 general means of propulsion applied to vessels ; and where sail- 
 
THE SHIP. 13 
 
 power is not furnished, the screws are two or more in number. 
 By means of these the ship is given speed ahead or astern, or 
 having acquired momentum in either direction, a reversal of 
 the screws is used to absorb this force and bring the vessel to 
 a standstill. During any time that the ship is moving in the 
 water, a movement of the rudder will cause a change in the 
 direction of the ship's head. 
 
 A ship moving at a high rate of speed through the water 
 carries along with her a body of water called the water en- 
 velope, which is being constantly made on the forward edge 
 near the bow, and which is constantly losing the exact weight 
 of this accretion of water off the after edge, some distance 
 astern. This causes the ship to swim, as it were, in a tank of 
 fluid which she takes along with her. The phenomena enter- 
 ing into the water envelope are quite complex and elaborate 
 in their nature and discussion, but only those parts concern us 
 which govern the ship's movement under the influence of her 
 helm and engines. 
 
 The rudder power is at all times active, owing to the con- 
 stant passage of the water particles on each side of the 
 rudder. It is, however, very different with the engine power, 
 which is slow to act, owing to the screws working in a com- 
 plex condition of currents created by the screws themselves 
 and the passage of the bulk of the ship through the water. 
 For this reason, although the screws will be turning in a re- 
 verse way, their effort to absorb the momentum is not at first 
 apparent ; and the screws do not get out of the influence of 
 the water envelope until the ship has advanced more than twice 
 her length, and do not operate in good water, and produce a 
 state of rest for the ship, much before she has advanced four 
 times her length. Indeed with very large ships, this condition 
 
14 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 does not come about until the vessel has gone ahead five or 
 six times her length, which fact becomes a very important 
 one when taken in connection with naval tactics. We will see 
 shortly that the time and distance occupied by a vessel pro- 
 ceeding at great speed will, on reversing her engines at their 
 best power even, advance for four lengths at very nearly the 
 same speed, and nearly cover the same distance, that she would 
 have done if she had kept her engines going steadily ahead. 
 
 So far as the consideration of helm enters into the ques- 
 tion of ramming or avoiding collision, it is all embraced in the 
 first six points of turn of the ship's head on either side of the 
 straight. This governs the extent of what is known as the 
 ship's manoeuvring area. 
 
 To define it more closely, the manceuvring area is that area 
 of sea which a ship must pass over to avoid collision, either by 
 use of the helm or speed, or both, with the engines going 
 ahead of reversed. Referring to Plate I. Fig. 2, we have the 
 positions of a large ship, steaming at the speed of twelve 
 knots, plotted every five consecutive seconds, taken when 
 steaming ahead on the straight, and with her helm hard over 
 in each direction. At A her speed is still twelve knots : at B 
 and C she has changed the direction of her head six points, 
 with the speed reduced to 9.5 knots by the effort of turning, 
 and she has advanced from O, 3.5 lengths, and traversed to 
 the side, or transferred, nearly two lengths. Now then, mark 
 the side boundaries and the boundary to the front, which 
 govern her movements during the time necessary for her to 
 avoid a collision or ram an enemy. If we take intermediate 
 helm-angles for the same elapsed times, we will have on each 
 side of A a series of points ; and if we trace a line through them, 
 as B A C (see PL I. Fig. 3), we will inscribe an area which we 
 
THE SHIP. 15 
 
 call the manoeuvring area. This description refers to the area 
 occupied by the ship when going ahead. 
 
 For a fact, should the ship, when going ahead at twelve 
 knots speed, suddenly reverse her engines in order to stop her 
 way as soon as possible, or should put her helm hard over to 
 either side, as in the former case, her manceurving area would 
 resemble very nearly, in all its measurements, the manoeuvring 
 area for going ahead ; and if we place this manoeuvring area 
 exactly over the other, as we have done in the figure referred 
 to (see PI. I. Fig. 3), we will be surprised to see how little 
 difference it makes, as regards the position of the ship during 
 this time, whether we continue to go ahead with the screws, 
 or whether we go astern with them. Looking at the figure, 
 we see we arrive at A' in the same time that we arrive at the 
 point A in the first case, and that these points are very near 
 each other. At A' we are, however, dead in the water. The 
 same thing is to be observed in the positions B' and C : both 
 are near B and C, corresponding positions in the " going 
 ahead " diagram. At B' and C, however, the ship is stopped. 
 
 It will be noticed that these diagrams show that the 
 quickest way to stop the advance of the ship is to reverse the 
 engines and heave the helm hard over. 
 
 The narrow portion of the manoeuvring area — D (same 
 plate and figure) — is called the neck. 
 
 Corollary to all this showing of the quickest method of 
 stopping the advance of the ship, it may perhaps occur that 
 the fitting of twin rudders, to the stern-post might be service- 
 able, each rudder to be hung on an edge of the stern-post 
 (see PI. II. Fig. 1), and be capable, through their being inde- 
 pendent of each other, of swinging out on their own sides, and 
 so act as a water-brake. 
 
i6 
 
 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 Theoretically there would be no transfer, and their use 
 should prevent the advance of the ship at least one-third from 
 what it would be without using the helm and only reversing 
 the engines. The strain and weight would be very much in- 
 creased on the stern-post by these twin rudders ; but it would 
 seem that their fitting was not beyond what mechanical skill 
 could supply. Again, in case one rudder was disabled, you 
 would have a spare one immediately available. 
 
 III. 
 
 The following explanations and definitions relate to the 
 manoeuvres of the ship : 
 
 Change of course ; change of head ; change of direction. — 
 Bringing the ship's head on some compass point other than 
 the one previously occupied. 
 
 Moveynent or manoeuvre. — Making a turn, or less than a 
 turn. A component part of an evolution. 
 
 Evolution. — -The movement or movements by which a ship 
 proceeds from one position to another to gain some tactical 
 advantage. 
 
 Transfer. — Sea gained towards the side or flank in turning. 
 
 Advance. — Sea gained towards the front in turning. 
 
 NOTE. The advance is the ordinate, and the transfer the 
 abscissa, of the curve at any point. 
 
 Octant. — That part of the turn included in a change of 
 head of four points. 
 
 Quadrant. — That part of the turn included in a change of 
 head of eight points. 
 
 Final Diameter. — The diameter of the final circle, when 
 
THE SHIP. 17 
 
 all the forces controlling a ship's movement have assumed a 
 fixed relation to one another. 
 
 Tactical Diameter. — The distance between the position of a 
 vessel heading in one direction, when she commences to turn, 
 and her position when she has turned and is heading in an 
 opposite direction. 
 
 Front. — The direction in which the ship heads, except when 
 she is obliquing. 
 
 Right Flank. — Sea to the right of the ship. 
 
 Left Flank. — Sea to the left of the ship. 
 
 Rear. — Sea astern of the ship. 
 
 Oblique (see PI. II. Fig. 2 A). — A change of course of 
 three (3) points ; used to gain sea to the right or left ; em- 
 ployed to diminish or increase the distance between ships in 
 line (see Fleet definitions) where the front is unchanged. 
 
 Half Turn (see PI. II. Fig. 2 B). — A change of course of 
 four (4) points ; used to gain sea towards a flank, and so 
 change the front four points. 
 
 Turn (see PI. II. Fig. 2 C). — A change of course of eight 
 (8) points. Used for moving towards either flank, or to 
 charge front eight points. 
 
 About (see PI. II. Fig. 2 D). — A change of course of six- 
 teen (16) points. Used to change front to rear. 
 
 Circle (see PL II. Fig. 2 E). — A continuous turning 
 through thirty-two (32) points under the influence of either 
 helm. 
 
 Figure of Eight (see PI. II. Fig 3). — Performed by moving 
 through sixteen (16) points with either helm, then quickly 
 throwing the helm hard over in the other direction, making a 
 complete turn of thirty-two (32) points, and finally, by reversing 
 the helm again, make a complete circle in the other direction, 
 
1 8 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 and so on. The movements are to be continuous. Used to 
 present alternate sides of your vessel to the enemy firing at 
 you from a fixed point. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The reason that a ship, in turning, does not describe a 
 circle is due to the fact that when the helm is put over she 
 is moving in a straight line, which her momentum seeks to 
 continue. It is only by degrees that she yields to the power 
 of the rudder, and then she is always an observable time be- 
 hind it. The quicker the helm can be put over, the quicker 
 will the vessel respond, and also more rapidly will the diame- 
 ter of the turning-circle decrease, and the time, if the helm 
 angle can be decreased to 40 or more. We must have great 
 angular movements for rudders and their connections, and 
 quick-acting power immediately available to move the helm. 
 
 The radius of the turning-circle of an ordinarily large 
 vessel is about 300 yards, with a speed of twelve knots on 
 the straight, and a helm angle of about 30°. 
 
 Some qualities of the turning-circle bear more on naval 
 tactics than do others ; for instance, the advance and transfer 
 for the first six points of turn are of the highest importance, 
 as we have seen. The determination of the tactical diameter 
 is also imperative. 
 
 The loss of speed 'in turning through a whole circle may be 
 assumed at three times the length of the vessel. 
 
 A vessel with two screws, if she goes ahead on one and 
 backs on the other, describes a spiral which constantly di- 
 minishes until its diameter becomes nothing, when its motion 
 of translation ceases. If this vessel went ahead on one screw 
 
THE SHIP. 19 
 
 and stopped the other, she would describe a turn of less diam- 
 eter than if she went ahead on both screws and used her helm 
 hard over. 
 
 The curve which a ship with a single screw makes in 
 turning has generally been set down as a circle, and when 
 the helm is righted she is supposed to start off on a tangent 
 to this circle. As we have before stated, this is not so. Al- 
 though the assumption may answer for the ordinary purposes 
 of fleet drill, it would prove wofully inaccurate in fighting 
 with the ram. 
 
 V. 
 
 The methods in practice for plotting the turning-circle are 
 generally very crude. The following method, however, has 
 been found to answer very well, and furnishes a giod rule to 
 work by where the ship is of good length. The question of 
 length enters, because you measure from a base-line on board 
 ship ; and the shorter the base-line, the greater chance there is 
 for errors to creep into your work. 
 
 Choose a calm, still day in the open sea, but in view of 
 a distant point of land or object sufficiently conspicuous for 
 observation. Prepare two casks with flags or staffs, each flag 
 to be of a different color. Care must be taken to weight the 
 casks, so that a very few inches remain above the water: this 
 in order to prevent wind-drift, an element calculated to mar 
 the accuracy of the experiment. Range-finders, or plane-tables 
 equipped as range-finders, are used to take cross-bearings from 
 the ship on one or the other of the buoys. In case you have 
 to fit the instruments yourself, they are to be placed, one for- 
 ward and one aft, on the side towards which the turn is to be 
 
20 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 made. These sighting-instruments are to be put the same 
 distance from the fore-and-aft middle line of the ship ; the 
 distance between them to be as great as the length of the 
 ship will allow. All angles observed will be reckoned from a 
 zero point, which is right abeam. The distance between the 
 sighting-instruments is the base-line of the triangle. The 
 graduated ring of the standard compass, and the alidade 
 mounted thereon, will be used for observing the distant point 
 of land. Four observers are necessary : one to note the suc- 
 cessive bearings of the distant point, and change of direction 
 of the ship's head for every four points ; one to note the times ; 
 and one at each alidade to note the angles between the per- 
 pendicular to the base-line, and the bearing of the buoy about 
 which the ship is turning. 
 
 All being in readiness, the two buoys are to be dropped 
 about 1500 yards apart, on a bearing convenient for observing 
 the distant object at each point in the turn around either of 
 them. A hand is stationed to sound the engine-room gong, 
 and another hand is stationed at the steam-whistle. The 
 engineers are ordered to note the engine-counter at each 
 sound of the gong, and the man at the whistle is directed to 
 sound it at the orders, " Stand by! " and " Stop ! " — the gong 
 to the engine-room being struck at the order " Stop ! " 
 
 The ship is now put on a course nearly parallel to the line 
 of the buoys, and at the speed desired. (See PI. III. Fig. 1.) 
 One buoy is passed in this manner ; but when the second buoy 
 comes about four points on the bow, the observer, noting the 
 time, gives the words, " Stand by ! " and " Stop ! " The 
 whistle sounds for each, and, at the second, the helm is moved 
 to the determined angle, the observer at the compass notes the 
 engine-counter, while the observers at the bow and stern note 
 
THE SHIP. 21 
 
 the position of the ship's head both by the compass and the 
 bearing of the distant point of land, and the engineers note the 
 engine-counter, while the observers at the bow and stern note 
 the bearing of the buoy. As the ship arrives at four, eight, 
 twelve, and sixteen points change of course, the observer at 
 the compass in like manner gives the words, " Stand-by ! " 
 and " Stop ! " — when the whistle sounds, and the time, bear- 
 ings, angles, and revolutions are taken. 
 
 When a series of observations completing the turn of six- 
 teen points is thus taken, the ship proceeds on a course nearly 
 parallel to the line of buoys, and a turn of sixteen points is 
 made around the other buoy, either at the same speed and 
 helm angle, or with any desired variations of either or both. 
 The experiment may, of course, be varied by stopping or re- 
 versing one or both engines in a vessel with twin screws, at 
 any point in the turn ; and in all cases the exact position of 
 the ship, when she has turned through four, eight, twelve, and 
 sixteen points, respectively, can be laid down from the obser- 
 vations. 
 
 The plan will be understood from Plate III. Fig. 2, which 
 represents an actual complete experiment. Here the ship has 
 arrived at a straight course at the point P, then going 5 to 
 5J knots with thirty-five revolutions. At this moment the helm 
 is ordered 34° a-port; the angles abh and bah are observed, 
 the engine-counter noted, and the time taken. At d 1 the ship 
 has turned, by compass and bearing, four points. At d* she 
 has turned eight points, and so on, and at each position the 
 observations are repeated, the experiment being complete 
 when the middle point of the ship is at d\ The respective 
 positions can easily be laid down to scale by a protractor with 
 sufficient accuracy for practical purposes. The object of hav- 
 
22 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 ing two buoys is to save time, and to allow the ship to recover 
 herself on a straight course before repeating the experiment. 
 
 VI. 
 
 We now take up the analysis of a single turning-experi- 
 ment, to see what principles govern it. 
 
 Plate III. Fig. 2, shows the trace of the curve made by a 
 vessel in turning. The curve is drawn differently from what 
 has been usual in the first part of the turn. When the trace 
 is assumed to be that of the centre of gravity, near the middle 
 point of the ship, it has been usual to show the arc it describes 
 at the beginning of the turn as tangential to the original 
 course. There are, however, good reasons for believing that 
 the curve described is more truly represented in the figure. 
 It is certain that the stern of the vessel does not describe a 
 curve to which the original course is a tangent, and of this we 
 will be given one conclusive proof. If two ships are steaming 
 in column in smooth water, and the order is given to alter 
 course in succession, — say to starboard, — the sternmost ship 
 will see that the foremast of the headmost ship does not alter 
 its bearing for some time after the stern has swung to port, and 
 the wake of the leading ship will have a bend in it to port, 
 which becomes an excellent mark for the sternmost ship to go 
 by for putting over her own helm when she comes to this 
 point. It is called the "kick." (See PL III. Fig. 3.) 
 
 In most heavy ships this kick amounts to a sagging of the 
 whole vessel to such an extent to the right or left of its 
 course (according as the helm is put hard-a-starboard or hard- 
 a-port), that the vessel transfers a distance, at least equal to its 
 beam, to the side indicated, and does not gain a position clear 
 
THE SHIP. 23 
 
 of her former course until she has advanced two or more 
 ship's lengths from the spot at which her helm was put over, 
 when she has in addition changed the direction of her head 
 fully three points. 
 
 The reason for this is that the resistance of the water- 
 pressure on the bow turned from is not able to offset the 
 combined forces acting at the time on the ship, — the mo- 
 mentum tending to advance her, and the rudder power tending 
 to transfer her stern to the side towards which her helm is 
 moved. It is only after these forces have balanced them- 
 selves that the ship continues her course on the curve in 
 obedience to her helm. 
 
 VII. 
 
 The turning-circle made by two screws acting on the ship 
 is comparable to the action of the single screw : that is, if each 
 screw is turning at the same speed in the same direction. 
 When, however, there is a difference in the speeds where one 
 screw is stopped, or where one screw is reversed, the change 
 in the relations of the different parts of the turning-circle be- 
 comes very great, except during the first octant. By refer- 
 ring to PI. 4, Fig. 1, we can see at a glance the effects pro- 
 duced by the screws acting under different relations to each 
 other. There are three curves to compare. 
 
 Category No. 1. Where both engines are going ahead at 
 the same speed. 
 
 Category No. 2. Where the starboard engine is stopped, 
 the port engine going ahead at the same speed as in No. 1. 
 
 Category No. 3. Where the starboard engine is reversed, 
 while the port engine is going ahead, both engines making 
 the same number of turns as in No. 1. 
 
24 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 In every case the helm is hard over (34 ) to port) and the 
 effect of the wind is not considered. 
 
 It will be noticed : 
 
 First. If we wanted to avoid a collision in the first octant, 
 the manipulations of the engines would assist us very little, as 
 the position of the ship is very nearly the same for all three 
 curves. 
 
 Secondly. We can save an advance of one-fifth of the great- 
 est advance made, when the vessel has turned through the 
 first eight points, if we turn under Category No. 3 rather than 
 under No. 1. It may be remarked too, that this is the greatest 
 amount of advance that can be saved in turning. 
 
 Thirdly. When the position of the ship's head is reversed, 
 the advance is substantially the same for each of the three 
 categories. One point, however, merits the closest attention : 
 turning under Category No. 2, you turn through sixteen points 
 in the shortest time. That is, with one engine going ahead, and 
 the other engine stopped, with your helm hard on towards the 
 moving engine, you reverse the ship's head in the fastest time 
 possible. 
 
 Now where does the advantage lie in turning for the twin- 
 screw vessel? We see at a glance that it is in the transfer, 
 and that Category No. 2 has the advantage over Category No. 
 1 in saving one-third of this distance ; while Category No. 3 
 saves one-half 'of the amount of sea, when compared with that 
 traversed when turning under Category No. 1. 
 
 There is a great deal to be learned from the study of this 
 figure ; especially when the manoeuvring of vessels formed and 
 in force may make collision between them other than a remote 
 contingency. 
 
 The two things which oppose a ship's turning when the 
 
THE SHIP. 25 
 
 helm is put down, the ship steaming ahead, are inertia and 
 water-resistance. They are remarkably different in' effects, 
 inasmuch as inertia, as an opposing element, is at its max- 
 imum when motion begins, and when water-resistance is at its 
 minimum. Then, as we go on applying the accelerating 
 force of rudder-power, or other force which has a moment 
 about the pivoting-point of the ship, we generate angular mo- 
 mentum, and then water-resistance. When we have once 
 started the ship, so that every point in the middle line begins 
 to revolve around the pivoting-point, we get momentum of 
 all the particles in the ship around this point. There are, in 
 fact, moments of momentum set. up by the first action of the 
 rudder, which are added to the moment of rudder-power and 
 increase as the angular velocity increases. But a check to this 
 growing angular velocity is developed by the increasing resist- 
 ance of the water. Then we have, tending to turn the ship 
 round on the pivoting-point, moments of momentum and mo- 
 ments of rudder-power, which are opposed by moments of 
 water-resistance. It is evident that ultimately moments of 
 monemtum must be equal to moments of water-resistance, 
 and that there will remain the constant force of the moments 
 of rudder-power opposed also by equal moments of water- 
 resistance, leaving no unbalanced forces, and so giving a uni- 
 form angular velocity to the middle fore-and-aft line of the 
 ship, and she turns in a circle. This circle is spoken of as the 
 final circle. 
 
 By absolute experiment it has been determined that the 
 first quadrant of the circle is passed through in the quickest 
 time, although the distance traversed is greater than in any 
 subsequent quadrant. Until the final circle is entered upon, 
 these three phenomena present themselves for every succes- 
 
26 
 
 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 sive quadrant : less speed, shorter paths to traverse, and a 
 longer time to perform that part of the turn. 
 
 When the motion of rotation has become uniform, and the 
 centre of gravity is moving in a circle, the keel-line of the ship 
 makes a constant angle with the tangent to the circular path of 
 the centre of gravity. PI. IV, Fig. 2, illustrates this case. A 
 represents the bow and B the stern of the ship ; G shows the 
 position of the centre of gravity on the keel-line AB ; O is the 
 centre of the circular paths in which G, A, and B are moving ; 
 TGT is the tangent to the path (GG.G,) of the centre of 
 gravity; and the angle (AGT) made by the keel-line with 
 the tangent is termed the " drift-angle." 
 
 This drift-angle amounts to nearly one point at a speed of 
 twelve knots. 
 
 A rough measurement can be made of the drift-angle, by 
 observing the angle made by a light line, one end of which has 
 a drag attached to it and trailed in the water, while the other 
 end is made fast to the cathead on that side towards which 
 the turn is made. 
 
 In regard to the heeling which accompanies turning, and 
 which bears most especially upon the question of gun-fire, it 
 may be said that the forces which tend to produce it are as 
 follows (see PI. IV, Fig. 3): 
 
 1. The centrifugal force acting outwards through the 
 centre of gravity of the ship, and tending to make her heel 
 away from the centre of the circle (R). 
 
 2. The lateral component of the rudder-pressure, acting 
 through the centre of pressure of the rudder at some depth 
 below the centre of gravity of the ship, and tending to make 
 her heel inwards towards the centre of the circle (Q). 
 
 3. The lateral component of the fluid-resistance on the 
 
THE SHIP. 2 J 
 
 outer side of the ship, which equals in magnitude the resultant 
 
 of the centrifugal force and the rudder-pressure, and acts 
 
 through the centre of lateral resistance (p). 
 
 Vessels with high speed and quick-acting helm-control 
 
 have the heaviest heeling-angle. In some cases a heel of 6° 
 
 has been observed. 
 
 It has been determined that the angle of heel varies — 
 (i) Directly as the square of the speed of the ship ; 
 
 (2) Inversely with the metacentric height ; 
 
 (3) Inversely with the radius of the turning-circle. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 There are three classes of tables which must be made out 
 for the ship and corrected constantly. 
 
 The Helm Table. — A study of the effect on the movement 
 of the ship of the different helm-angles. The influence of the 
 wind on turning. The advance and transfer for the different 
 octants, under different speeds, with the engines turning with 
 different relations to each other. 
 
 The Speed Table. — A study of the effect of the screws on 
 the movement of the ship with respect to gathering and los- 
 ing. The factor of wind-power. 
 
 The Tactical Table. — A digest of all the phenomena of the 
 turning-circle. A study of the effect of trim, and of foulness 
 of the bottom, on the ship in regard to her speed and turning 
 power. Different draughts of water. The whole question of 
 fuel supply and consumption. Taking on of coals, etc. 
 
 From the instant that the pennant is broken at the mast- 
 head when the ship is commissioned, until the time that she 
 
28 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 passes into the hands of the dockyard authorities, these tables 
 can never become too complete. 
 
 It will be hard, too, to overestimate their value to a new 
 commanding officer on the occasion of the recommissioning of 
 the ship. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SHIP IN ACTION. 
 
 I. 
 
 Although gun-fire is no longer the only power of attack, 
 still the fight will undoubtedly be opened by artillery, and its 
 conduct will be principally based upon its use. The ultimate 
 _X design, however, will be to ram. The whole point to strive 
 for will be a commanding position, — a position of advantage, — 
 using the guns to reduce the enemy to a condition much 
 below the normal, and then to use the ram or torpedo to deal 
 the coup de grace. We refer more especially to combats be- 
 tween single ships, but the remarks apply as well to fights 
 between numbers. 
 
 Discussing the subject of single combats, it is a funda^ 
 mental principle that a ship need never be rammed by a 
 slower one ; indeed, if the turning-powers are equal, the faster 
 ship can always ram her antagonist. While this remark is 
 strictly true, it is necessary to look a little into the meaning of 
 the terms " faster ship," " slower ship ; " how near can the 
 speeds of the two vessels become alike, and yet have the 
 principle hold? 
 
 Where the tactical diameter of one ship is only half the 
 
 length of the tactical diameter of another ship, and where the 
 
 shorter-turning ship requires three minutes to reverse her 
 
 29 
 
3° ELEMENTARY A' AVAL TACTICS. 
 
 course, with a speed of eight knots on the straight, the vessel 
 with the larger turning-circle, to perform the same manoeuvre, 
 must steam at the rate of ten knots on the straight. There- 
 fore it is well to put down, in an engagement between two 
 ships, where their turning powers are equal as to time but 
 unequal as to space, that the faster vessel should possess 
 twenty per cent excess of speed to feel sure of her power to 
 use the ram. 
 
 Speed, then, is so valuable a quality that it may be said to 
 cut down the number of the slower vessel's weapons from 
 three to two. Therefore, the slower the vessel, the heavier 
 must be the defence, and especially the protection against 
 ramming. 
 
 Speed for entering action is most necessary. Where, you 
 are deficient in heavy rapid-firing guns this quality is cer- 
 tainly of vital importance. There are cases, though, where 
 slow speed will be used ; as, for instance, two vessels running 
 side by side : each would naturally tend to slow and turn 
 toward her adversary, as neither could advisedly permit the 
 other to enter her wake close astern. 
 
 If you are stronger in gun-fire than your adversary, smoke- 
 less powder will assist you greatly. 
 
 , As a rule the enemy should be put in a position to leeward 
 
 j of the attacking ship, so that the smoke from the guns and 
 
 j funnels combined will blind him. It follows as a postulate, 
 
 / i that should a vessel unfortunately be placed in this position, 
 
 before closing with the enemy, befogged with smoke, she 
 
 should stop firing, so as not to add to her difficulties. It may 
 
 be observed, however, that some of the best tacticians do not 
 
 see in this leewardly position all the disadvantages charged 
 
 against it. 
 
THE SHIP IN ACTION. 31 
 
 A vessel in action with another will find that her opponent 
 will possess one of the following combinations of qualities — 
 
 1st. Greater speed, larger turning-circle ; 
 
 2d. Greater speed, smaller turning-circle ; 
 
 3d. Less speed, larger turning-circle ; 
 
 4th. Less speed, smaller turning-circle. 
 
 Each of these categories will call for different action on the 
 part of the ship to secure a position of advantage in respect 
 to the enemy, or to suffer as little as possible from the 
 manoeuvres of her adversary. 
 
 II. 
 
 The tactical value of an offensive weapon, at any instant 
 during an engagement, maybe completely denned by stating — 
 
 1st. The area within which it can strike ; 
 
 2d. The chance that it will strike any desired point ; 
 
 3d. The damage that it will do. 
 
 The area within which the ram must strike at any one instant 
 is a point situated on the prow of the ship. The area belong- 
 ing to the gun, within which it must strike, is measured by the 
 sector of fire of the gun, where the radius of the circle de- 
 scribed to define its limits is 1500 yards in length — assuming 
 this distance as the extreme range at which single combats 
 will be fought. In regard to the torpedo, the area under con- 
 sideration, within which the weapon must strike, is comprised 
 within its sector of train, drawn about its foot, with a radius 
 representing the range of the torpedo — say 350 yards. The 
 lines of fire that can be drawn within these areas are, for the 
 gun and torpedo, as a matter of course infinite in number. 
 
 To classify, then, the areas within which these weapons 
 
32 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 can strike in respect to their extent, we have the following 
 order : 
 
 ist. Gun ; 
 
 2d. Torpedo; 
 
 3d. Ram. 
 
 In regard to their striking the desired point (i.e., their 
 accuracy), they probably stand — 
 
 ist. Ram ; 
 
 2d. Gun ; 
 
 3d. Torpedo. 
 
 In respect to the damage they would do, the order would 
 be— 
 
 ist. Ram; 
 
 2d. Torpedo ; 
 
 3d. Gun. 
 
 If, however, we consider the tactical value of the weapon 
 through any interval of time, the foregoing simple classification 
 will not hold. The values of the weapons are largely en- 
 hanced or diminished by the time element, so that the ques- 
 tion becomes very complex, and varied almost to infinity. As 
 we know, the element of time enters largely in connection 
 with the handling of the ram, in a smaller degree with the 
 torpedo, and hardly at all in the case of the gun. 
 
 III. 
 
 History shows that but few vessels in modern times have 
 been put out of action by other than gun-fire. 
 
 The increase in the speed of ships, and the rapidity with 
 which they will have to move in future fights, oblige us to 
 look to every means to increase the quickness of fire, so that 
 
THE SHIP IK AVTIOX. 33 
 
 we may hit the enemy as many times as possible in a given 
 time. The engagement will probably be so short, sharp, and 
 decisive that there should be no limit to this quickness, save 
 when the smoke interferes with the pointing. 
 
 Gun-fire is of two kinds : the slow and heavy guns to fire 
 against the enemy's material ; the rapid-firing and light guns 
 to destroy the enemy's men. But this lighter, secondary bat- 
 tery, is in its fire sufficiently strong to interfere very effec- 
 tively with the service of the enemy's principal ordnance, 
 and his torpedo offence, by its playing upon their points of 
 installation. Heavy secondary fire is very available also for 
 damaging the screws and rudder of the enemy. The large 
 guns, the principal battery of the ship, must only be used 
 where there is a chance to produce a serious effect, while the 
 machine-guns and small arms must search out the small open- 
 ings in the conning-tower, sighting-hoods, shields, and ports, 
 and demoralize the protected people. 
 
 Secondary fire should be opened on the enemy as soon as 
 possible. It can begin, for the 6-pounders, at a distance of 
 about 3000 yards, and for the larger calibres of the secondary 
 battery at about 2000 yards. Machine-gun fire of small cali- 
 bres and small-arm fire are available at 1500 yards. The 
 great-gun fire of the ship has its greatest weight inside of 
 1200 yards. ^0,0 - , 
 
 The precision of fire depends on — 
 
 1. Relative movements of the two ships ; 
 
 2. The smoke from the guns and funnels of your own and 
 the enemy's ships ; 
 
 3. The pitching and rolling of the ship firing ; 
 
 4. The uncertainty of the intervening distance ; 
 
 5. The action of the wind ; 
 
34 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 6. The state of the nerves of the firer, from his knowing 
 that the instant he discharges his battery the enemy will do 
 the same. 
 
 The speed at which ships on opposite courses approach 
 each other must be such that when passing at short distances 
 the chance of being hit by the enemy's shot or torpedo is 
 reduced to a minimum, through the shortness of time that his 
 weapons will be effective. Then when the enemy has passed 
 by you need the greatest speed to get out of the range of his 
 most aggressive fire, to turn quickly and get back at him, or 
 to strive to enter his turning-circle, where you will be safe 
 from any possibility of his ramming you. 
 
 It may be said that in passing so rapidly this way each 
 ship loses her opportunity of using her gun-fire on the other. 
 This is so in a degree, but you are rather forced to keep up the 
 speed. You have probably discharged your heaviest artillery 
 before you have reached your antagonist, and you would hardly 
 dare, at this point, to stop your engines in order to prolong the 
 period of your presumed superior artillery-fire, lest he, notic- 
 ing the slacking up in your speed, should instantly take ad- 
 vantage of his then superiority in this respect, and give you 
 his ram, which, with your way falling off, you could not 
 manoeuvre to avoid. In point of fact, to reduce your way 
 you would have to stop your engines some lengths before 
 coming up with his bow, otherwise the momentum of your 
 ship would make your speed quite as great, when you passed 
 your antagonist, as if you had not touched your engines. 
 
 Since an engagement between two vessels is very likely to 
 degenerate into an artillery duel, each moving in the same 
 direction around the circumference of a common circle, each 
 
THE SHIP IN ACTION. 35 
 
 vessel should look out for torpedoes dropped in the wake by 
 the other. 
 
 Unless you are going to run away, keep your stern as little 
 as possible towards your enemy; and if you are circling in an 
 artillery duel, keep if possible by your speed, the enemy bear- 
 ing a little forward of your beam. The instant he begins to 
 grow abaft your beam, it shows that he has the heels of you, 
 and if he continues his advantage of speed, will get in your 
 wake and eventually ram you. You must immediately throw 
 him out of his advantage by ceasing to circle, or by circling in 
 the other direction : you can turn with greater or less advan- 
 tage to yourself by applying the rules given further on for 
 ramming. 
 
 Firing the guns of the principal battery by electricity, in an 
 action between ships from some central point of control, is of 
 doubtful utility ; but gun-fire by individual act should be so 
 tied down by hard-and-fast rules, that the battery-officer could 
 only exercise his own judgment within strictly defined limits. 
 
 With regard to torpedoes, their discharge should, in action 
 between ships, be directly under the control of the conning- 
 tower. 
 
 The rudder should be made use of very sparingly in sight- 
 ing guns. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Undoubtedly the ram is the most terrible weapon fur- 
 nished the ship, but it is the hardest one to handle, since it 
 depends upon being able to calculate for a vessel of thousands 
 of tons weight, her position to within one hundred feet, when 
 moving in a seaway at a speed of perhaps fifteen knots, with 
 
3 6 ELEMENTARY A AVAL TACTICS. 
 
 no point of rest for the eye of the captain for judging, except 
 the bearing and heading of the other ship moving arbitrarily 
 at an equal speed with his own. 
 
 In regard to vessels entering a combat, by rushing immedi- 
 ately at each other to strike head on, it would present itself to 
 the mind in two phases of opinion. If you feel that you are 
 safest meeting the enemy by presenting to him your bow, the 
 strongest part of your structure, the novelty of the position, 
 or the fear of a successful ramming on his part, would most 
 likely lead you to keep your head on him. But as you ap- 
 proach your opponent, smoke may obscure him for a moment, 
 or he may waver; and if he wavers, you will hardly be able to 
 judge of that " half of a ship's length," which makes your ram- 
 ming attack either a success or a disaster ; and so, through 
 caution on your part, you change your mind in regard to 
 keeping your bows on his, and you and the enemy will 
 turn from each other, on the safe side of automobile-torpedo 
 range ; use your artillery ; charge past each other ; and as 
 you pass mutually establish a point of departure, after which 
 it will remain with you to apply the proper tactical rules to 
 maintain your advantage over the enemy. 
 
 Much more unlikely than ramming between ships upon 
 first encountering each other is scraping alongside. 
 
 The ramming attack will only take place when one vessel 
 has the advantage of position to do it, and will never take 
 place when the opponents are on absolutely equal terms. Each 
 vessel will strive to enter the turning-circle of the other, and 
 when this advantage is gained by one ship, the other one will 
 manoeuvre to overcome it by throwing her enemy out of her 
 turning-circle ; and so gun-fire and torpedoes will be used, until 
 a moment will come when the vessel that has lost the most 
 
THE SHIP IK ACTION. 37 
 
 in an artillery sense will try to even up matters by ramming 
 her antagonist. The ram then remains the weapon of last 
 resort, always provided the manoeuvring qualities of the ship 
 are intact. 
 
 If yours is the ship which is being put at a disadvantage as 
 regards guns, and we will also say torpedoes, and you wish to 
 ram your enemy, then as soon as you conclude that you have 
 attained a commanding position you must commence work. 
 Should you try and fail, then make up your mind to strive to 
 remain alongside and foul of your antagonist, for this position 
 will be the safer one for you, as regards your demoralized 
 guns and torpedoes. The enemy cannot use his torpedoes, as 
 their explosion would be as likely to injure him as to damage 
 you. Again, the contingency of capturing him by boarding is 
 not to be entirely ignored. Small arms and machine-guns are 
 thoroughly effective alongside, and their use might establish 
 a condition of affairs that would prevent him from serving his 
 guns, and so bring you up to an equality with him — enable you 
 to clear yourself from him, and ram him again — this time, we 
 we will say, with better results. 
 
 Before contact is made with the enemy the engines must 
 be stopped. 
 
 As far as ramming duels are concerned, the following theo- 
 rems and the rules under them cover nearly all the cases of 
 manceuvring, and should be committed to memory and put in 
 practise, so that proper movement of the helm would become, 
 almost automatic, when you are acquainted with the manceu- 
 vring qualities of your opponent. These rules are not infallible, 
 but they contain the consensus of opinion of tacticians as 
 to the best thing to do. 
 
 (The faster vessel has twenty per cent excess of speed.) 
 
3§ ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 THEOREM I. Where the speeds are different, but the turn- 
 ing-circles equal in diameter, the faster vessel can always ram 
 the slower. 
 
 Rule I. The vessel having the greater speed should strive 
 to turn with the helm the same way as her antagonist. (See 
 Plate V, Figs, i and 2.) 
 
 A with greater speed than B completes her own circle and 
 enters B's. 
 
 Rule 2. The slower vessel must strive to constantly throw 
 the enemy out of its turning-circle by turning from him. It 
 can be done with least advantage when he has the enemy 
 heading for him, and with the greatest advantage when the 
 enemy has his broadside towards him. (See Plate V, Figs. 3 
 and 4.) 
 
 In Fig. 3, B turns from A to delay ramming, with least 
 advantage ; and in Fig. 4, B does the same thing, with greatest 
 advantage. 
 
 Theorem II. Where the speeds are equal, and the tac- 
 tical diameters different, the ship with the smaller diameter 
 should never be rammed. 
 
 Rule 1. The quicker-turning vessel should strive to turn 
 with her helm opposite to that of her antagonist. (See Plate 
 VI, Figs. 1 and 2.) 
 
 No matter whether A turns under B's stern or away from 
 her, B using her helm opposite to A will enter or remain in 
 A's circle. Where A turns away from B, B should not turn 
 beyond the third octant, B '. 
 
 Rule 2. The slower-turning ship should endeavor to turn 
 with her helm the same way as her enemy, and delay his 
 getting a position of advantage. 
 
THE SHIP IN ACTION. 39 
 
 THEOREM III. The vessel with the greater speed has the 
 advantage of the vessel with the smaller tactical diameter. 
 
 Rule i. The quicker-turning ship should strive to turn as 
 close to the enemy as possible. 
 
 Rule 2. The speedier vessel can delay her turn and offset 
 the helm advantage of her antagonist. 
 
 In PI. VI, Fig. 3, B gains all he can by a quick turn, while 
 A, the faster vessel, stands on and makes his turning-circle 
 beyond the point where B's speed will permit him to arrive 
 and enter it. 
 
 As a postulate to Theorem I, it may be stated that the 
 swifter vessel, if astern within limits, has the advantage. The 
 slower ship should make it a stern-chase, while the faster ship 
 keeping after her, but out of her wake, should endeavor to 
 draw up on her quarter and ram her. 
 
 Another postulate to the same theorem is that the swifter 
 vessel, if ahead, can always make it a ramming fight, for she 
 can gain at any time enough sea to turn and face her op- 
 ponent. 
 
 It is now in order to take a look at the field of battle 
 itself, and see why certain points of it constitute areas of 
 greater danger than do others. 
 
 What is a position of advantage for the one ship is natu- 
 rally a position of disadvantage for the other, and a discussion 
 of the question is an examination into the relative bearings 
 of the two ships, their distance apart, the angular distance of 
 their courses, and the controllable conditions of their speeds. 
 
 We consider two vessels, A and B, of equal tactical value, 
 and it is to be shown that one of them can, to a greater or 
 lesser degree, force the other to assume a disadvantageous 
 position, and that this locality may be termed the "danger- 
 
4° ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 field." To escape from this environment requires certain 
 tactics which, if not adopted, put the threatened vessel in a 
 constantly increasing position of danger, until she arrives at a 
 point called the "position of greatest danger," where her 
 destruction is imminent. (See Plate VI, Fig. 4.) 
 
 A is in this position as regards B : If A attempts to turn 
 in order to put himself on equal terms with B, B will ram him, 
 A can only use a weak stern-fire on B. B can keep up a pow- 
 erful bow-fire on A. A has perhaps one advantage over B— 
 he can use his torpedoes better. 
 
 The danger-field is the forward half of A's turning-circle 
 on either side if A and B bear relatively as in the diagram. 
 In order that A shall clear the danger-field and meet B on 
 equal terms, the time that it takes him to turn through the 
 first two quadrants must be less than the time it would take 
 for B to get to him. The necessary distance can be deter- 
 mined by A measuring B's mast-head angle. 
 
 A can hardly escape when, having swung through, say, the 
 first quadrant, he runs off at right angles to his first course, for 
 his pursuer having only to move on the circumference of a 
 larger circle has had his speed but little reduced, and therefore 
 arrives in A's wake nearer to him than on the last course. In 
 other words, unless A can shake B off by superior speed, he 
 only helps him by turning. (See Plate VII, Fig. 1.) 
 
 In a ramming duel, then, one vessel will try to force the 
 other into the danger-field, and to the position of greatest 
 danger in that field ; and the question arises how to avoid it 
 for one, and how to force it on the other. If two vessels are 
 manoeuvring, and one is unable to approach the other, the 
 one has the advantage if he can get in the wake of the other 
 within 400 yards. The pursued is, of course, safe as long as 
 
THE SHIP IN ACTION. 4 I 
 
 he steers a direct course, but if he attempts to manoeuvre, he 
 shortens the distance between himself and the pursuer. By 
 the pursued having the advantage, is meant that the natural 
 impulse of the pursued is to fight, and the instant he turns he 
 comes in the danger-field. (See Plate VII, Fig. 2.) 
 
 There is another phase of this example : Suppose A wishes 
 to close with B. If he can force B into his wake at a distance 
 that would take B a longer time to traverse than it would for 
 A to turn his bow to B, then A could effect his object, or if B 
 continued to stand on and not turn towards A, then A would 
 have B in her danger-field. (See Plate VII, Fig. 3.) 
 
 In all ramming attacks, it may be said that the great object 
 to strive for is to arrive at a safety point inside your enemy's 
 turning-circle, and it follows as a maxim that the ship which 
 passes first into the turning-circle of the other has achieved a 
 great advantage. It may be further said that this advantage 
 is as easy to lose as it is hard to gain, through a misjudging of 
 your adversary's capabilities. When you gain this advantage 
 use it instantly and for its full value ! 
 
 V. 
 
 A discussion of the use of bow torpedoes from a fixed 
 installation in the cutwater or in the keel-line is but discuss- 
 ing the question of ramming, and all the rules which apply to 
 the one apply to the other. 
 
 In case the torpedo is installed astern the best time to use 
 it is when the vessel, having missed ramming you, passes 
 under your stern. Or should two vessels be passing on oppo- 
 site courses, B turns across A's stern. A would stop and fire 
 his torpedo with his head pointing in such a direction that it 
 
4 2 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 will reach B at B' . (See Plate VIII, Fig. i.) Then shifting 
 his helm in the same direction as B, he starts ahead at full 
 speed and continues his circle. There is really no good reason 
 why he should continue to turn beyond a, unless he has 
 much greater speed than B, as any further turn brings A 
 within B's turning-circle and puts him at a disadvantage as 
 regards B. 
 
 Should the torpedo be installed in the side, the instant of 
 discharge will depend upon the speed of the two ships. It is 
 of great importance to discharge your torpedo so as to strike 
 your adversary before he can fire his concentrated broadside. 
 The exact place of installation is really of great moment, es- 
 pecially for distances close aboard. Probably the best in 
 broadside is as far aft as possible, as the great point is to have 
 a torpedo ready to prevent the enemy ramming you, which he 
 will try to do on the quarter. The discharging-tube should 
 admit of a train three points forward of the beam. 
 
 As an example of when the broadside installation is of 
 greatest use, we suppose two vessels to steer courses that 
 intersect ; the slower one can use his torpedoes on the faster 
 at any time that the ships are within 350 yards of each other. 
 In this case, also, the best point of installation would be as 
 far aft as possible, as the slower vessel could always turn from 
 the faster vessel and have him in range as regards his torpedo. 
 (See Plate VIII, Fig. 2.) 
 
 VI. 
 
 Two Ships Engaging One {the one more powerful than either 
 of the other two). 
 a. If the two ships are equal tactically, in order to use 
 their artillery power to the best advantage they should ap- 
 
THE SHIP IN ACTION. 43 
 
 proach the single ship so that their batteries would present 
 the most guns through the longest time. 
 
 b. But should their combination for offence be such that 
 one has better ram-power and the other greater gun-power, 
 then they must form so as to give each ship the best chance to 
 use her most effective weapon. 
 
 In either category, however, these two ships must act 
 together to obtain satisfactory results. 
 
 To fulfil the conditions of the first combination, they 
 should approach their enemy so as to offset his superiority 
 by their greater handiness. This would consist in their enter- 
 ing the enemy's turning-circle a number of times, only to 
 be thrown out each time by his perhaps superior speed, or 
 through their being obliged to take up a position at longer 
 range, owing to the great weight of fire of his large guns. 
 The fight on the part of the consorts in dealing with one 
 larger ship would be to prevent being separated, and thus be 
 whipped in detail, and this can only be avoided by sedulously 
 striving to keep inside of her turning-circle. 
 
 They should approach the one in column, that is, one ahead 
 of the other, and near together. The sternmost vessel in 
 approaching with her consort the one ship should keep a little 
 on the quarter of her leader, on the side of the wake nearest 
 the enemy, until just before passing the enemy, when the 
 sternmost vessel should sheer to the other side of the leader's 
 wake. In this way most guns are unmasked for the longest 
 time. It is better to approach in column than in line (that is, 
 abreast each other), as the larger, stronger single ship might 
 attempt to run between the two and give each one a much 
 stronger fire than they could return ; or again, if they were in 
 line, when they wanted to use their most effective fire in pass- 
 
44 El EMEXTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 ing, one vessel would interfere with the fire of the other. 
 Being in column, however, the single vessel would be deterred 
 from dashing at the leader, to ram him on the onset, since the 
 sternmost vessel would be in position to certainly ram him — 
 the single vessel. 
 
 The larger enemy, in fact, will not let the smaller vessels 
 approach him nearer than 500 yards, because they have two 
 torpedoes to use where he can use only one. The two on 
 passing their enemy should round to under his stern, enter his 
 turning-circle, and hang on his quarter as long as they can. In 
 this position they will be in line or something resembling it, and 
 being head on to him will present the smallest target. Although 
 this position admits of their being raked, it gives them the chance 
 of using their heaviest guns on his weakest portion ; and then, 
 too, they must head up for him, and strive to keep in his turning- 
 circle, if they wish to fight at all ! The fight, then, for the two, 
 as far as formation is concerned, consists in receiving him in 
 column, and after he has charged past, in rounding to under 
 his stern and following him up, re-forming in column when the 
 single vessel turns again for the new encounter. 
 
 The tactics of the single ship is to use up the two with gun- 
 fire ; to charge between them, and separate one out, and try 
 to get him on the run ; or to bring them both on a bearing, 
 and so get one of the two to interfere with the fire of the 
 other. 
 
 To fulfil the category where one of the two has great 
 ram-power, she should take the place of the sternmost ship in 
 the column, and essay to ram the single ship on the first onset. 
 She can do this, since she has her leader for a point of rest for 
 the eye, to "sight" her position in respect to the enemy. If 
 she fails in her first rush, she should proceed with her consort 
 
THE SHIP liX ACTION. 45 
 
 to use their artillery as laid down in the case just considered, 
 being then formed in line, and then afterwards await the 
 second encounter formed in column, ready to try conclusions 
 with the ram on the next charge past. 
 
 If it should happen that the three vessels engaged were of 
 about the same size and were equal tactically, then the two 
 could do best by keeping one on each quarter of the single 
 ship so that an angle of 90 was subtended by their cross-fire. 
 They should be near enough to the one to prevent her taking 
 on a sheer to turn and ram either one of the two. 
 
 The one ship, so hardly beset, should try and draw off 
 gradually to one side, concentrate her fire on the ship nearest 
 to her, and trust to the smoke to drop down astern, where she 
 would be better off, and where she might achieve a position 
 which would permit her to use her ram upon one of her 
 assailants. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Two Ships against Two. 
 
 The advantage lies with the two ships which keep closest 
 together, formed either in line or column. The point to 
 strive for is to get the vessels separated and steering divergent 
 courses, and then combine two on one. Here a complete 
 understanding between the two vessels on either side in re- 
 gard to helm and speed signals will tend to a solution of the 
 action in their favor. For in no engagement will the speed 
 be so varied, or the helm be so much used, as where two 
 ships are pitted against two. 
 
4 6 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Three Ships against Two. 
 
 The general rule is for each side to strive and ram the 
 enemy's ships farthest off. The two ships, keeping well 
 together, should try and ram the two ships farthest off the 
 line. Other than this rule there is no special tactics for the 
 two ships to use. The great point is to use both of your ships 
 on one of the enemy, if you can. 
 
 For the three ships, a formation is best where two of the 
 ships are in line, and the third ship is kept in the rear, ready 
 to assist either of her consorts which may be attacked. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE SEA ARMY. 
 
 THE ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF THE FLEET. 
 
 I. 
 
 THE commander-in-chief of a fleet in time of war has from 
 the outset a very complex duty to perform, viewed from a 
 tactical standpoint. Not only must he be able to exercise his 
 fleet in the various evolutions, and to classify and to arrange 
 his ships in line of battle according to their values as regards 
 speed, armament, and turning qualities, but he must know 
 just what types of vessels are suited to compose his squadrons, 
 in order that he may undertake the work cut out for him. 
 
 Although the word Fleet is employed to designate the 
 fighting force under the command of an admiral, it does not 
 begin to indicate the number of vessels under his control. In- 
 deed there are so many vessels not of the line of battle, that, 
 when compared with the fighting units, the tactical problem 
 which presents itself in regard to the protection of these non- 
 combatant associates of the fleet seems harder of solution 
 than how to fight the enemy. 
 
 This array of ships, even in its simplest aggregation, — that 
 which has to do with encountering the enemy on the open sea, 
 — consists not only of ships which go to make up the line of 
 battle, but other fighting ships, as squadrons of small cruisers, 
 
 •47 
 
4§ ELEMENTARY XAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 corvettes, gun-vessels, and torpedo-vessels. Then there is a 
 non-combatant list —ammunition- supply ships, coal-supply 
 ships, and torpedo-depot ships. These supply-vessels are 
 specially built to accompany the fleet, and are different from 
 the cargo-carrying merchant-steamers and steam-colliers. All 
 these non-combatant ships must be kept in touch at all times 
 with the line of battle. 
 
 The enemy's fleet has, of course, the same impedimenta to 
 care for, but this does not make the tactics of the engagement 
 less complex ; for not only must you protect your own supply- 
 vessels, but you must do your best to cripple the enemy by 
 capturing or sinking his. 
 
 In case the admiral is called upon to establish the block- 
 ade of a coast, or command an expedition against an enemy's 
 port, then the number of ships outgrows enormously the or- 
 dinary conception of a fleet. Bases must be established, with 
 very many ships for replenishing the combatants with stores, 
 ammunition, and coal, and these cargo-carriers must be con- 
 voyed and protected by small cruisers and corvettes. 
 
 Among the factors which enter into the establishment of 
 the fleet may be cited, supply-ships of various kinds, store- 
 ships, commissariat-ships, floating workshops, countermining 
 flotillas, hospital ships, tugs, cable-laying and telegraph ships, 
 ordnance and coal vessels. 
 
 To express the scope and size of this aggregation of 
 vessels the term Sen Army seems very appropriately applied. 
 
 The questions governing the organization of such a sea 
 army do not come within the consideration of an element- 
 ary work, but the preceding remarks concerning it should 
 impress the student with some idea of the tactical problem to 
 be solved, viz., the interdependence for supply and protection 
 
THE SEA ARMY. 4g 
 
 existing between the fighting units and the silent consorts 
 which must accompany them. 
 
 II. 
 
 In regard to the ships composing the line of battle, they 
 must be so much alike as to be able to act together against 
 the enemy in any tactical evolution which the admiral may 
 require to be performed. 
 
 The line of battle will be composed of armored ships of 
 the greatest size and power, and of protected and partially 
 protected cruisers. 
 
 If these ships differ very widely in type and speed, a 
 tactical survey should be made of all the ships of the force, so 
 that they may be arranged to have the weak points of any 
 ship in the formation strengthened by the protection to be 
 afforded by her consorts ; and, further, so to assemble the 
 force for battle that the formation may be broken up into 
 smaller portions, where each part shall become eminent for 
 certain qualities, as speed, handiness, ramming, fire ahead, 
 broadside fire, and so forth. 
 
 Again, very clumsy and slow vessels had better be taken 
 out of the line of battle altogether, and associated with a force 
 which might be held in reserve. The idea of a reserve is not 
 that of a force which enters the arena of battle after the fight- 
 ing line has encountered the enemy, but has reference more 
 especially to the assemblage of ships not of normal quality ; 
 for this so-called reserve should contain rams, gun-vessels, 
 and torpedo-cruisers, which must act independently of the 
 main force, but be manceuvred on some prearranged plan in 
 which their peculiar qualities are best developed. 
 
SO ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 A fair definition of the term reserve would be, that part of 
 the fleet which contains factors that would interfere with the 
 efficiency of the fighting line if employed with it, and which 
 also contains factors that would have their special qualities 
 much impaired if assembled in the main formation. 
 
 The protected or partially protected cruisers are thoroughly 
 adequate to be classed with line-of-battle ships as fighting 
 consorts ; but the advantage of their superior speed, which in 
 any line of battle must be kept down to that of the slowest 
 ship, must not be thrown away. Therefore cruisers in the 
 fighting line must be put in some part of the formation from 
 which they can be withdrawn without breaking up the forma- 
 tion of the remainder of the line of battle — this in case that 
 these cruisers should be needed for any emergency ; as, for in- 
 stance, to strengthen some hardly-assailed point, or to con- 
 centrate quickly upon some weak point in the enemy's forma- 
 tion. 
 
 Squadrons of smaller cruisers and corvettes are useful for 
 employment as " vedettes " — to be the " eyes of the fleet " — 
 when cruising at sea. They should stretch over a distance of 
 twenty miles ahead, and ten miles in every other direction. 
 
 This vedette or lookout squadron is a regularly organized 
 body, and differs entirely from single ships sent out from the 
 main force to feel the enemy. These last may be termed 
 " skirmishers." 
 
 There are other vessels which are fighting units, hovering 
 between the reserve and convoy portion of the fleet and wait- 
 ing on the line of battle. These are despatch- vessels, gun- 
 vessels, and torpedo-vessels. 
 
 In the convoy we have special types of vessels; among them 
 vessels fitted to carry ammunition. As they will have to sup- 
 
THE SEA ARMY. 5 1 
 
 ply the fleet tinder all conditions of environment, their fittings, 
 as regards protection from the projectiles of the enemy, de- 
 fence from any attack, and ability to supply their cargo, 
 becomes a serious war problem. The armament of the ammu- 
 nition-ship should be a large number of machine-guns. The 
 enemy will do their utmost to capture or destroy such a 
 vessel. 
 
 What is true of the ammunition-supply ship is also true of 
 the coal-supply vessel, which is a ship regularly built for the 
 purpose, and armed with machine-guns. 
 
 Among the special ships is the torpedo-depot ship. This 
 vessel must be capable of getting torpedo-boats of quite a 
 large size in and out of the water, and be able to carry quite a 
 number of them. She must be capable of making great speed, 
 so that in case the state of the sea will not permit of her tor- 
 pedo craft being used she can keep out of the enemy's reach. 
 
 III. 
 
 For the combatant portion of the fleet what kinds and 
 numbers of ships are adequate for service to engage the enemy 
 on the high seas ? Probably the smallest number to establish 
 an efficient fighting line would be — 
 
 4 large line-of-battle ships ; 
 
 4 small line-of-battle ships (sea-going monitors and tur- 
 reted vessels) ; 
 
 4 large protected or partially-protected cruisers ; 
 
 16 torpedo-vessels of large size. 
 
 (These torpedo-vessels are not part of the formation, but 
 keep at all times with the line of battle.) 
 
 In the reserve we would have— 
 
S 2 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTLCS. 
 
 4 armored vessels or rams (ships whose peculiarities render 
 them unfit to be put in the line of battle) ; 
 
 4 torpedo-cruisers ; 
 
 4 despatch-vessels ; 
 
 4 gun-vessels. 
 
 All these vessels, except the torpedo-cruisers, should be 
 furnished with a good outfit for towing vessels. 
 
 The vedette squadron would contain — 
 
 4 cruisers of great speed, perhaps feebly protected ; 
 
 4 small cruisers ; 
 
 8 corvettes. 
 
 The vedette squadron during an engagement will keep an 
 eye on and protect the vessels composing the convoy. 
 
 The convoy portion of the fleet embraces — 
 
 1 torpedo-depot ship, carrying from 4 to 8 torpedo-boats ; 
 
 2 ordnance and ammunition supply ships ; 
 2 (or more) coal-supply ships. 
 
 The line of battle under ordinary circumstances of manoeu- 
 vring would have associated with it the armored vessels of 
 the reserve ; but in time of action the reserve would break up 
 into its indicated units, so that the ships would be free to use 
 their most eminent weapons in the most independent manner. 
 
 In respect to operating on an enemy's coast or against a 
 port, the combatant elements become so special that it is 
 impossible to state exactly how they should be grouped, or 
 what ships would constitute the groups. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Vessels will certainly be obliged under some circumstances 
 to coal at sea, but the problem regarding their supply seems 
 no nearer a solution than it did ten years ago. It L true that 
 
THE SEA ARMY. 53 
 
 great speed enables vessels to go into sheltered harbors, coal, 
 and not be a long time absent from the theatre of action ; but 
 so much more coal is used than formerly, that if we can go 
 farther for it, we have to go more frequently. 
 
 The strategic value of coaling-points is apparent. Nations 
 with navies must make sure in time of peace that their vessels 
 will not be rendered useless in time of war through a lack of 
 fuel-supply. This supply may be divided into two classes : 
 fixed, or coal stations ; and movable, or by steamers using a 
 temporary base. Probably the carrying on of a war will re- 
 quire both systems to be in a degree maintained. Each has 
 its advantages, but undoubtedly the last category presents 
 the greatest number. 
 
 To insure a coal-supply under the last category, in time of 
 peace, the Government must encourage a large proportion of 
 the fast merchant-steamers to be so built that they can carry 
 cargoes of this commodity to such rendezvous as the nature of 
 the war shall decide. These rendezvous, from a strategic 
 point of view, should be as varied as possible in location, so as 
 to mislead the enemy. The advantages of a movable coal- 
 supply here become apparent. The location of the depots 
 not being known to the enemy, the capture of the supply- 
 vessels is much less likely. Then, the points of supply being 
 near the base of operations, little or no coal will be consumed 
 uselessly. The drawbacks to this method of supply are : that 
 a rendezvous where the fleet could coal, having a hostile envi- 
 ronment, would be harder to establish, and, if established, 
 would be more likely to be attacked in force. Then, again, 
 steamers at the outbreak of a war may be hard to obtain, the 
 distances that they have to be sent may be very great, and the 
 fleet might suffer in consequence. 
 
54 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 V. 
 
 A good means of communication between the admiral 
 and his ships is vitally important, as the success of an action 
 depends upon this thing. 
 
 The admiral for this reason must have an intimate ac- 
 quaintance with the signal-books, and in them should be laid 
 down his general plans of battle, and the lines of action that 
 will be followed in an engagement. These plans, in common 
 with all other tactical manoeuvres, should be thoroughly dis- 
 covered to his captains. 
 
 Too great stress cannot be laid upon the necessity of the 
 captains being thoroughly cognizant of the admiral's plans, 
 in order that they may render an intelligent obedience to 
 them. If the commanding officers of the ships are not im- 
 bued with the spirit of the commander-in-chief, have not his 
 confidence, and are not conversant with his tactical plans, 
 then only disaster and defeat can be looked for. 
 
 In order to have signals read, formations should be simple 
 and compact, and coal and gunpowder must be of a smokeless 
 variety. It is the general opinion that signal-flags can best be 
 seen from to windward. 
 
 The admiral must be in possession of all the tactical 
 qualities of the ships of his fleet, and he must see that his 
 captains know all these things for their own ships, and those 
 with which they are associated. In like manner, too, he will 
 establish tables of masthead angles and speed, and helm 
 coefficients for his ships, which shall enable them to maintain 
 their positions in the formation and insure their carrying on 
 of evolutions in a safe and seamanlike manner. 
 
THE SEA ARMY. 55 
 
 Should the admiral seek an engagement with the enemy, 
 he should endeavor — 
 
 1. To surprise and attack him when he is unprepared ; 
 
 2. To throw the whole of his force upon a part of the 
 force of his antagonist. 
 
 There are, however, certain points upon which the admiral 
 will wish to be informed, and feel certain in regard to, before 
 a collision with the enemy is brought about. They are : 
 
 Are the nearest coast ports friendly, neutral, or inimical? 
 
 What are their distances, and how do they bear? 
 
 Can reinforcements be depended upon during the action? 
 
 In what direction can it be reasonably hoped that these 
 reinforcements will appear? 
 
 It may be set down as a maxim, that if a fleet, in any for- 
 mation, discovers the enemy near at hand, — as, for instance, 
 through the lighting up of a fog or coming around a point of 
 land, — and this enemy in the midst of performing an evolution, 
 it is the duty of the commander-in-chief of the formed fleet to 
 charge the other, even if the formation then in is not a good 
 one for attack, and the formation the manoeuvring fleet is 
 striving for is better than his own. 
 
 VI. 
 
 The post of the admiral in action is something of great 
 moment. The admiral must be able at all times to withdraw 
 himself from a position where he is not seen. He must be 
 able to get to a position where he is most needed. He must 
 at all times be well protected ! 
 
 This condition of affairs cannot be met by embarking him 
 in his heaviest and most formidable ship of the line, because 
 
56 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 such a ship is not endowed with the fastest speed. Then, 
 again, when the admiral considers it expedient to proceed from 
 one part of the field of battle to another, he might take such 
 a vessel away from a position where she was most needed, a 
 hot corner where she was doing good work, to a comparatively 
 unengaged portion of the line. 
 
 The only ship fulfilling all the tactical requirements of a 
 flag-ship, which has great speed and good resisting qualities, is 
 to be found in the best and fastest protected cruiser that he 
 can possess. 
 
 He and his war staff should be protected by a roomy and 
 very strong conning-turret, beneath which is the captain's 
 conning-turret, so arranged that communication can be ade- 
 quately kept up with the admiral. 
 
 The admiral's post should have no telegraphs or speaking- 
 tubes ; his communication concerning the manoeuvres of the 
 ship can be through the captain alone. 
 
 Over the admiral's turret, and surrounding the signal-mast, 
 will be the strong shield which surrounds the signal-staff. The 
 admiral, through the grating-deck over his head, can communi- 
 cate directly with the signal-officer immediately above him. 
 
 The admiral under these circumstances is embarked in a 
 ship which is sufficiently strong and well enough protected to 
 enter as hot a fire, for a limited time, as he need encounter. 
 He may not necessarily lead into action, and his flag-ship is 
 not the best ship to destroy the enemy by gun-fire. His com- 
 plete understanding, however, with the commanding officers 
 of his armored ships will safely permit him to delegate to 
 them the privilege of leading the way into action. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 
 
 I. 
 
 Definitions. 
 
 Alignment.— A prescribed dress either to the right, left, or 
 centre, or on a particular ship. The ship dressed or aligned 
 upon is termed the Guide. Alignment has reference also to 
 the keeping of one vessel astern of another next ahead. 
 
 Distance is the space between ships on the same line of 
 bearing, measuring from the nearest point of the water-lines. 
 
 Evolution. — The necessary movement or combination of 
 movements by which a force of ships, acting together, pro- 
 ceed from one formation to another. 
 
 Movement or Manoeuvre. — Action of the whole force or 
 any detached portion of it. A component part of an evolu- 
 tion. 
 
 Conversion. — A method of changing front in line through 
 not more than four points; performed by the vessels steaming 
 a course normal to the line bisecting the angle of change of 
 front, at varying speeds (those vessels on that side towards 
 which the turn is made going slowest), until the line of bearing 
 is at right angles to the new front, when the force comes 
 together into line on the new course. (See Plate IX, Fig. i.) 
 
 57 
 
5 8 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 Direct Movement (sometimes termed an oblique movement). 
 — Made by a ship passing from her station in one formation to 
 her station in some other, by the nearest route, observing the 
 rules of the road. (See Plate IX, Fig. 2.) 
 
 Isodromic Movement or Evolution. — Vessels in line change 
 front eight points (to either flank) by the vessels all steaming 
 ahead at the same rate — except the ship farthest off from the 
 flank changed to, which turns and heads for the new front, 
 running astern of the force, and takes her new position : when 
 she passes astern of the next vessel to her, that vessel turns 
 and steers for the new front ; and so on, until the whole force 
 has changed front to the flank indicated. This inverts the 
 order of the formation. (See Plate IX, Fig. 3.) 
 
 Simultaneous A lavement. — Each vessel of the force changes 
 course at the same time from a common course, through the 
 same angle, to some other course. In practice that vessel 
 towards which the change is made, first marks the manoeuvre. 
 (See Plate IX, Fig. 4.) 
 
 Successive Movement (rectangular movement, counter- 
 march). — Changing direction, when in column, by following in 
 the wake of the leader, which has turned through a given arc. 
 If the change is for eight points, the movement is rectangular; 
 if the change is sixteen points, the movement is a counter-march. 
 (See Plate X, Fig. 1.) 
 
 Wheel. — A manoeuvre performed by two vessels in line 
 through four, eight, or sixteen points, turning either to the 
 right or left flank. The inner ship uses a speed which permits 
 her to turn through the designated number of points in the 
 same time as the outer flank ship, turning on a larger tactical 
 circle. (See Plate X, Fig. 2.) 
 
 Formation. — Any arrangement or combination of vessels 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 59 
 
 on a line of bearing, or on lines of bearing, designed for 
 cruising, attacking, retreating, or anchoring. 
 
 Line. — Ships on a line of bearing at right angles to the 
 front. (See Plate X, Fig. 3.) 
 
 Double Line. — Ships on two parallel lines of bearing at 
 right angles to the front, the ships in one line being astern of 
 the ships in the other. (See Plate XI, Fig. 1.) 
 
 Column. — Ships on a line of bearing in the direction of the 
 front. (See Plate X, Fig. 4.) 
 
 Double Column. — Ships in two parallel columns, the leaders 
 abreast of each other. (See Plate XI, Fig. 2.) 
 
 Echelon. — Ships on a line of bearing which makes an angle 
 of 45 with the front. A bow and quarter line. (See Plate X, 
 
 Fig- 5-) 
 
 Double Echelon. — Ships on two lines of bearing from a 
 central ship, each line making a bow and quarter line with this 
 middle vessel. In double echelon, when the vessels head in 
 direction of the point, they are said to be in " chase forma- 
 tion," and when the vessels head away from the point they are 
 said to be in " retreat formation." (See Plate XI, Figs. 3 
 and 4.) 
 
 Column of Sections. — Ships in column with section front in 
 line. (See Plate XII, Fig. 1.) 
 
 Groups. — A formation in a triangle or square, but generally 
 triangular, either equilateral, rectangular, or scalene. The 
 ships occupy, in any case, the angles of the figure. (See Plate 
 XII, Figs. 2, 3, and 4.) 
 
 Naval Square. — A formation of equal front and depth. 
 The ships are so disposed that distances and intervals are 
 equal, and the same in number. (See Plate XII, Fig. 5.) 
 
 Interval is the perpendicular distance between the lines 
 
fo ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 of bearing when the force is in some compound formation. It 
 is also the shortest distance between two formations. 
 
 Simple Formation. — Ships in formation arranged on one line 
 of bearing. 
 
 Compound or Complex Formation. — Ships formed on more 
 than one line of bearing. 
 
 Indented or Alternate Formation. — A compound formation, 
 where the ships are arranged as shown in Plate XIII, Figs. I 
 and 2. 
 
 Order. — The numerical arrangement of the force when in 
 some formation. If the vessel leads in column, or is on the 
 right when in line and is number one, the order is said to 
 be natural. If this number one is placed on the left of the 
 line or is the rear vessel of the column, then the order is said 
 to be inverted. 
 
 Line of Bearing. — An imaginary straight line passing 
 through the same point in each ship of a formed force. It 
 is expressed either by its magnetic direction and called the 
 Absolute Bearing, or is expressed in terms of the ship — as two 
 points abaft the beam — and called the Relative Bearing. 
 
 Battle Front. — The bearing of the enemy. 
 
 Table of Distances. 
 
 Half distance = i cable = 200 yards. 
 Distance = 2 cables = 400 " 
 
 Double distance = 4 " — 800 " 
 One mile = 10 " = 2000 " 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 6 1 
 
 II. 
 
 Formations. 
 
 There are tactical precepts which are common to armies 
 fighting on shore and to fleets engaging at sea. Napoleon 
 says : " Concentrate your forces ; do not have a weak point. 
 To move en masse and with rapidity on the enemy, and to 
 attack him where he is weakest, is the secret of victory.'' 
 
 The principle which answers to this is concentration. This 
 
 precept of war, which is universally admitted to be excellent, 
 
 is especially applicable to fighting with rams. To weaken or 
 
 to destroy by greater numbers a part of the enemy's fleet, 
 
 then to be able to bear down afresh on some other part of his 
 
 formation with a superior force, is the special object of all 
 
 attacking manoeuvres. 
 
 A fleet is formed for battle when all the vessels composing 
 
 it can use perfectly all the means of offence and defence that 
 they are provided with, without interfering with one another 
 or detracting from their mutual support. The offensive 
 weapons of the line of battle are guns, rams, and torpedoes. 
 
 Formations are useful for purposes of cruising and anchor- 
 ing as well as for fighting. Fighting formations are of two 
 kinds — those used for attacking, and those used for retreating. 
 At least the requirements for separate formations to meet 
 these two conditions of battle are demanded by some tacti- 
 cians ; but it must be said that most of the favorite formations 
 of a few years ago, whose geometrical beauties were so strik- 
 ing to the eye, and whose strength was so apparent, are dis- 
 
62 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 appearing under the exaction of greater speed in ships, and 
 the employment of improved weapons. 
 
 Although the formation of the force of to-day is simple in 
 its structure, formation and strict arrangement are more vital 
 than ever before, since weapons as regards hitting are used 
 within much narrower limits than formerly, which their 
 greater precision enables them to be, and vessels out of 
 position will interfere materially with the free use of their 
 consorts' guns, rams, and torpedoes. The good and efficient 
 drill of the fleet in its simple formations must make up for any 
 want of power that the mathematical arrangement of some 
 complex formation might possess, but which has to be dis- 
 carded, lest certain virtues of the modern ship be lost. 
 
 In regard to all battle formations, it may be said that 
 simplicity must rule. The more simple a formation is, the 
 harder it is for the enemy to break it up, and in case it is 
 broken up, the easier it is to regain. When a formation is so 
 large and so elaborate as to require most of the attention of 
 the captain to preserve it, instead of his putting his mind on 
 thrashing the enemy, it has no value for fighting, and should 
 disappear from the category of a battle formation. 
 
 It is, however, in order to meet certain cases that some of 
 the formations which are in a manner archaic should come 
 under discussion in these pages. 
 
 The principal conditions which a formation of a fleet for 
 attack should fulfil are : 
 
 ist. The largest amount of liberty of evolution for each 
 vessel, and at the same time the best employment of the 
 peculiar fittings of each ship for attack. 
 
 2d. It should permit the execution of every manoeuvre in 
 the least time, with the greatest speed. 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 03 
 
 3d. It should be simple, flexible, and easy to keep, under 
 all conditions of sea and weather, without exposing the ships 
 to collision. 
 
 4th. Unity of direction of each vessel's course must be 
 preserved. The vessels must maintain their stations, and they 
 must be able to change rapidly to the direction of the enemy's 
 attack. 
 
 5th. It should be such as to permit the fleet to be able to 
 cope with any particular necessity for preservation imposed on 
 them by the enemy. 
 
 6th. Between vessels of the fleet there must be mutual 
 support, either for attack or defence. 
 
 7th. It should permit the fleet to be kept well together 
 under the eye of the admiral, so that each vessel can see his 
 signals. 
 
 In dividing the fleet, should the basis of division be either 
 the group or section, attention should be paid to the equality 
 of the ships which are to act together, more especially to their 
 manoeuvring capabilities. These vessels should exercise to- 
 gether, should learn to move as one, and should only be 
 changed under circumstances of necessity. 
 
 Since 1872 the idea has been gaining ground that the unit 
 of organization is the section of two ships. These vessels are 
 always next to each other in the formation, and as a result of 
 comparing the tactical surveys of the ships of the force, are 
 picked out to join forces for offence and defence, since by this 
 means more power for war is got out of the two than would 
 be the case where each acted singly. This power for war may 
 be spoken of as applying the principle of concentration. 
 One vessel of the section is termed the " Leader," and its 
 consort the "Mate." 
 
64 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 Fighting formations all come within one of the four follow- 
 ing categories : 
 
 1. Narrow front — great depth ; 
 
 2. Extended front — slight depth ; 
 
 3. Front and depth equal ; 
 
 4. Groups. 
 
 The first category is represented by column ; the second, 
 by line, chase, and retreat formations ; the third, by the square ; 
 and the fourth, by every formation that may be included in 
 the group system. 
 
 Formations may be either natural or inverted, according as 
 the order is natural or inverted. The natural order should 
 always be maintained except when forced by circumstances 
 to form in an inverted formation, which should be only as 
 temporary as possible. 
 
 It is the opinion of tacticians that it is easier to maintain 
 close rather than open distance for general manoeuvring ; and 
 since it is conceived to be safer to keep close to one another 
 in a fog, close distance will obtain in battle. What constitutes 
 " close distance," as ships get larger and heavier, will depend 
 on a thorough knowledge and a close scrutiny of their 
 manceuvring areas. 
 
 The intervals between ships in two lines should not be less 
 than six cables for a speed of ten knots. This would permit 
 the second line to engage the enemy two minutes after the 
 first, if the enemy's speed was equal and his course opposite in 
 direction to the formation in two lines. 
 
 It may be set down as a maxim, that the victory will 
 probably lie with that fleet whose formation will permit it to 
 keep its integrity the longest time. 
 
 It is patent that the smaller and the simpler the formation 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 65 
 
 is the greater is the chance of its being kept together; but, 
 again, if you divide up your force into a great number of small 
 parts you increase the number of flanks exposed to the 
 enemy's attack, where he can combine or effect a concentra- 
 tion. Granting this to be a fact, it does not, however, seem 
 to apply to small or auxilary formations, properly disposed for 
 mutual protection, and acting in concert in obedience to some 
 prearranged plan. In this case each and every exposed flank 
 is covered by a small formation of a portion of the force ready 
 to concentrate on the enemy if he attempts concentration. 
 Take four ships, for instance, formed in line, and cover either 
 exposed flank by four other ships also formed in line, or 
 formed in column, and placed some distance to the rear. 
 Here are eight ships of a force with four flanks exposed, but 
 the enemy certainly has no greater chance to concentrate on 
 any flank than if there were eight ships in simple line or simple 
 column, when there would be only Uvo flanks exposed, for the 
 other small formation is immediately ready to offset any 
 advantage gained by the enemy. Indeed the two formations 
 have greater facilities for frustrating his designs, as they are 
 in a much more flexible combination, and it is harder to 
 break in upon their arrangement. 
 
 III. 
 
 A formation in line is brought forward as a formation 
 especially favorable for the use of the ram, as it presents that 
 weapon at all times to the enemy. 
 
 It is claimed, however, that it possesses several disad- 
 vantages, which are as follows : 
 
 1st. It is hard to preserve the dress of the vessels. 
 
66 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 2d. It is so extended as to favor concentrated attacks of 
 the enemy anywhere on the line. 
 
 3d. The admiral's signals will be hard to make out by 
 vessels on the flank. 
 
 4th. The flanks are unprotected. 
 
 5th. It is a bad formation for broadside fire. 
 
 6th. It is not flexible; changes of direction require long 
 and difficult manoeuvres. 
 
 7th. It is the easiest formation to break through and 
 break up. 
 
 Notwithstanding this formidable array of charges against 
 it, it has many champions, who say that the whole force is 
 brought up to the enemy at the same moment, and that as 
 you turn to come back to the attack your broadside guns are 
 thoroughly effective, as you are substantially in column when 
 you make the simultaneous movement of coming around. 
 
 Vessels in line should be at least the width of their ma- 
 noeuvring areas apart ; this gives them the unobstructed use of 
 their rams. 
 
 Line as an attacking formation is unwieldy when bearing 
 down upon the enemy, as the enemy will draw to one side or 
 the other to threaten your flank. If you preserve the absolute 
 bearing of your line and merely change the courses of your 
 ships simultaneously to head off the enemy, you will probably 
 enter the fight formed in more or less of a bow and quarter 
 line. 
 
 Double line, although not properly a good cruising forma- 
 tion, is an excellent formation for advancing in when feeling 
 the enemy. It is probably the most imposing of all of them 
 in appearance, and seems the hardest to assail, as no forma- 
 tion seems quite adequate to handle it. It is, however, not 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 67 
 
 dangerous to the enemy, as regards either gun-fire or ramming, 
 as so many of the broadsides of the ships are covered by those 
 of their consorts. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The bad points charged against the formation in line apply 
 equally to formations in echelon, either single or double. Al- 
 though a formation in echelon present to the enemy a line of 
 rams and a line of fire, yet it is a dangerously bad formation 
 if attacked in the direction of its line of bearing, as it is not 
 flexible. An angular formation, such as a chase formation, 
 permits the use of only one broadside on the enemy ; more- 
 over, it is a hard formation to maintain, and an attack from 
 rams is liable to get it into confusion. Although a formation 
 in chase-angle gained for the Austrians the battle of Lissa, its 
 disadvantage is in changing direction. The point of the angle 
 must be kept towards the enemy, otherwise the enemy will 
 concentrate on one of the flanks. Owing to its unhandiness 
 as a general formation for attack, it is not to be recommended. 
 In fact the most modern tacticians condemn it entirely as too 
 clumsy. Unless the enemy, in some simple formation, were 
 very badly managed, he would be able to turn in such a way 
 that he could always avoid the point, and thereby flank the 
 fleet. 
 
 The retreat formation, as a formation for retreat or other- 
 wise, has few friends, and may be considered obsolete. Any 
 spread-out formation such as this is bad. For retreating, the 
 best formation is perhaps in columns, with the least injured 
 ships nearest the enemy. Authors who recommend spread- 
 out formations to serve this purpose forget the following con- 
 
68 ELEMENTARY XAVAI. TACTICS. 
 
 siderations : — A spread-out order supposes that all the vessels 
 can steam without assistance, and are still in a condition to 
 fight. This hypothesis is not tenable, for a fleet would retreat 
 fighting, and only after a reverse or failure. On its face a 
 spread-out order permits an enemy with superior speed to 
 concentrate its force on some point of the fleet in retreat, and 
 destroy it. 
 
 In regard to any Echelon formation, it may be said that the 
 opportunities for using the broadside battery are most excel- 
 lent ; but there really is little mutual protection afforded 
 from ramming, and the formation is hard to keep in, and 
 harder to get out of into any other, preserving tlie same battle 
 front. 
 
 With high-powered guns the range of one vessel's fire near- 
 est the enemy need hardly be considered as more effective, 
 when compared with that of some other ship in the same for- 
 mation a little farther off ; so that there would be accounted 
 no greater force of gun-fire from six vessels arranged in a bow 
 and quarter line, than there would be from two formations in 
 column of three ships each, arranged as shown in Plate XIII, 
 Fig. 3, where the lightly shaded ships show the dchelon, and 
 the darker ships the formation in columns. There can be no 
 question of the superiority of the two columns over the forma- 
 tion in single e~chelon as far as flexibility is concerned ! 
 
 V. 
 
 Before we consider the subject of formation in groups, let 
 us look at the formation in naval square. It is attractive 
 because it is compact, signals are easily read by all the ships, 
 and there are no manoeuvres needed to gain sea in any direc- 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL, 69 
 
 tion save change of course. It is, however, hard to keep 
 formed in, owing to changes of figure incident to changes of 
 course, since ships in turning do not follow the arc of a circle, 
 but the curve of some spiral shape. Naval square although 
 hard to attack, it is not a very offensive formation, since the 
 ships have not all their weapons available, gun-fire at least 
 being confined to the outside ships. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of the group as a tac- 
 tical unit. 
 
 The group is composed of three or four vessels disposed 
 at the angles of triangular or four-point figures. Those who 
 pretend to know say that there is no especial virtue in the 
 number three or in the scalene triangular figure; notwith- 
 standing which, the group is generally associated in the mind 
 with this favorite number and distribution of ships. 
 
 One of the vessels of the group is appointed leader, and 
 generally occupies the forward apex of the figure. Sometimes 
 the leader of the group is empowered to form his group into 
 other simple forms as line and column. Where this is so, all 
 prejudice against the group disappears, as the formation then 
 comes within another category. 
 
 It is said that the pdoton or group formation was originally 
 intended for cruising purposes, and not as a fighting formation. 
 During many years the students of this science were struck 
 with the necessity of so dividing the fleet that the particular 
 qualities of each ship could be given their proper value, and 
 the division of the fleet into groups found numerous de- 
 fenders. Until lately this has been a favorite system, since it 
 was considered to develop in the greatest degree the following 
 points : 
 
 1. Each ship's battery was clear. 
 
70 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 2. Each ship was considered to be entirely unhampered in 
 its movements as regards ramming. 
 
 3. There was the greatest mutual support between ships. 
 Tacticians now do not allow these good qualities to the 
 
 group. It is now said that the leader is not free in the use of 
 his ram, as his consorts are too close to him ; and where the 
 group is other than scalene in shape the fire is not unobstructed 
 for all. 
 
 The consensus of naval opinion is against the group formed 
 in a certain shape, and fought and kept in that shape. When 
 the groups are permitted to change their shape, they are no 
 more than small or auxiliary formations of some other arrange- 
 ment of vessels, and it is not fair to consider them as groups 
 at all. In fact, it would be better to form them in the line or 
 column or Echelon in the first instance, and so save the time 
 they necessarily take to manoeuvre from their triangular form 
 to whatever other form they determine upon. 
 
 In Plate XIII, Fig. 4, we give several forms of groups, and 
 the tactician who recommends them explains their uses as 
 follows : 
 
 1. The equilateral triangle, for ramming or as a cruising 
 formation. 
 
 2. The group on a line of bearing. For flanking an enemy, 
 for defence against an attack by ramming, and sometimes as a 
 formation for attack. 
 
 3. The group for evolution or for using the battery. 
 
 4. Group in column. 
 
 5. Group in line. 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 7 1 
 
 VI. 
 
 The simple formation in column, with distances between 
 ships based on the length of their manoeuvring areas, and the 
 number of ships in column so few in number that the signals 
 made from the head of the column can be easily read by the 
 sternmost vessel, would seem to fulfil all the requirements of 
 a good fighting formation. With large battle-ships, four are 
 about as many ships as should be mustered in one column. 
 
 For broadside fire the column stands preeminent as a 
 formation ; and even with the ram as a basis of attack many 
 authorities prefer this arrangement of ships, striking the 
 enemy at right angles to the line of general bearing of its 
 formation, their reasons being : first, that each ship in line 
 ahead can, as it cuts the enemy's line, use both broadsides ; 
 and, secondly, the rear vessel of the column can, without inter- 
 fering with the other vessels, take advantage of the meUe by 
 the time it reaches the enemy's line, and use its ram to advan- 
 tage. They consider, in making this departure from rather 
 well-established ideas, that vessels nowadays have such great 
 speed, and artillery, from its size, must be so slowly served, 
 that the leader of the line ahead will not be punished so 
 badly as formerly. Another advantage of this formation for 
 attack is, that the rear vessels are protected, the strongest and 
 most formidable ships leading into action. 
 
 Besides, the formation is the easiest one in which to keep 
 or for reassembling. It is perfectly flexible, and can in a few 
 minutes change to any direction. Each vessel is flanked by 
 the next astern which can come up on either side. The vessels 
 being in the wake of one another must maintain the same 
 
7 2 ELEMEXTARY A' AVAL TACTICS. 
 
 speed, it is true ; but by sheering to either side any vessel can 
 take up any speed, or use its turning-power in any way. The 
 artillery-fire for the broadside is entirely unobstructed, the 
 ram, the bow and stern fire, and the torpedoes are certainly 
 put out of action ; yet by a slight sheer out of the line any or 
 all of these weapons may be called into play. 
 
 On the other hand there are tacticians who refuse to admit 
 that the column is in any way a good attacking formation. 
 They charge that a concentrated attack of the enemy on the 
 two rear ships would certainly destroy them before the van 
 could turn and come to their assistance. Then, again, they 
 say that, except for the rearmost ship, the ships are not free 
 to rain : for any ship to sheer into an enemy out of the forma- 
 tion means the possibility of interfering with the next ship 
 ahead, and having the ship next astern run foul of her as well. 
 It would seem, however, that when the column is composed of 
 but few ships, and the distance between them is guided by the 
 requirements of their manceuvriiig areas, there is little danger 
 to be apprehended from this last objection. The advantages 
 of the formation in column for attacking the enemy are cer- 
 tainly very apparent when it comes to the manoeuvring of the 
 force in any direction. 
 
 Double column is an excellent formation for purposes of 
 cruising, anchoring, and battle. One half of the ships compos- 
 ing the force in regular order are in one column, and the other 
 half, also in the same order, compose the second column. 
 These columns should be separated by an interval at least 
 great enough to let the force form line on a line of bearing 
 eight points from the front. It has no drawbacks in regard to 
 vessels being able to leave the formation, as they can always 
 do so by dropping out on the off side. All the weapons are 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 73 
 
 available, except guns on the side nearest the other column. 
 Changes of direction are nearly as easily made as in column. 
 The leaders of the two columns keep abreast one another. 
 
 Indented or alternate column gives ships the advantage of 
 using all their guns; but the formation is a hard one in which 
 to manoeuvre, not being flexible. 
 
 Column of sections differs materially from double column, 
 since the two columns are only separated one distance. It 
 will be noticed that instead of the columns being made up by 
 the formation being divided into two parts, the vessels abreast 
 one another are composed of a complete section — a leader and 
 its mate, — and each vessel is the tactical counterfoil of the 
 other ; so that in case one vessel of the section is weak offen- 
 sively as far as entering the combat is concerned, but is strong 
 enough after it arrives at the proper position in the engage- 
 ment, it devolves upon its mate to bring her up to the advan- 
 tageous point. This explanation in regard to the section 
 applies to a remark made in an earlier chapter, that the rank 
 of the commanding officer of a ship should not determine the 
 position of his command in the formation, but that this ques- 
 tion should be one of tactics alone. 
 
 In double column it will be observed that the ships in 
 each column are one distance apart, while in column of sec- 
 tions they are at double distance. This is of necessity the case, 
 as the column of sections manoeuvres by means of the wheel, 
 and needs this amount of room for the purpose. Using this 
 method, the movements of this formation are quite as easily 
 made as manoeuvres in the case of formation in column. 
 
 In all formations in more than one column the ships are 
 well disposed for reading the signals of the admiral. 
 
74 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 VII. 
 
 It would seem, in looking over all that is urged in favor and 
 against the several formations, that the situation resolves itself 
 into this : for cruising and for battle, simple formations com- 
 posed of a few ships each, with the small formations mutually 
 protecting each other's flanks, are the best. For anchoring, 
 any formation is good which permits the flanks to be reinforced 
 by combatant ships not of the line of battle. 
 
 The ideal formation, as far as manoeuvring is concerned, is 
 the single column of four ships. 
 
 In respect to the tactical unit, there is perhaps a feeling in 
 favor of the section over the single ship with her torpedo con- 
 sorts. With the section, the two ships are alike in speed and 
 turning qualities, and supplementary in regard to weapons and 
 defensive powers. With the line-of-battle ship and her torpedo- 
 boats, the weapons of offence are alone supplementary, while 
 all the other qualities are most unlike. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Evolutions. 
 
 Evolutions in naval tactics have for their object the 
 assembling of formations and the passing from one formation 
 to another. They must satisfy the following requirements : 
 
 i. They should be done in the least possible time. 
 
 2. They should be spread out as little as possible. 
 
 There are six methods of evolution : those controlled by — 
 
 1. Simultaneous movements ; 
 
 2. Successive movements ; 
 
 3. Direct or oblique movements ; 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. J$ 
 
 4. Conversions ; 
 
 5. Isodromes; 
 
 6. Wheels. 
 
 In all evolutions performed by a fleet at sea in the presence 
 of an enemy, the one important point is that they should be 
 quickly understood by the ^commanding officers of the ships 
 composing the fleet. To attain this very desirable result, it is 
 necessary — 
 
 1. That the signals should be as few in number as possible ; 
 
 2. That the explanation attached to each signal should be 
 as explicit and concise as possible ; 
 
 3. That the officers of the navy should be instructed in the 
 manner of performing the manoeuvres as early in their career 
 as possible. 
 
 Since changes in naval warfare are constantly rendering 
 changes in ships necessary, changes in ships bring about 
 changes in evolutions and also in the manner of performing 
 them. These changes necessitate changes in the signal-book. 
 
 The knowledge of the helm, the speed of the ship, and the 
 elements of the turning-circle certainly furnish the basis for 
 all evolutions. There will be some difficulty in manoeuvring 
 a fleet composed of vessels varying greatly in speed, turning- 
 power, and armament, so as to develop the special qualities of 
 each ship ; therefore it may be set down as a maxim, that the 
 actual capabilities of the worst of the vessels comprising a fleet 
 must be taken as the representative capability of such fleet. 
 So that the maximum speed of the slowest ship is effectively 
 the maximum speed of the fleet, and the circle of the ship 
 which describes the largest is, effectively, the circle on which 
 every vessel in the fleet has to manoeuvre. 
 
 It seems, therefore, to follow that the power of a fleet as a 
 
7 6 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 I 
 
 fighting unit may be improved by the rejection of those vessels 
 whose power of manoeuvring is bad. 
 
 On the other hand, any evolution is of no value when a 
 ship's speed or turning-power is interfered with to the extent 
 of reducing her usefulness below that which the ordinary good 
 qualities of her engines or helm would demand ; such as, for 
 instance, making a wheel with four vessels : the inner vessels 
 would have to go at such a slow speed that they could not 
 keep their positions. 
 
 It may be set down as a general principle, that no evolution 
 is of merit which employs such a method, to pass from one 
 formation to another, as breaks up the mutual support which 
 should exist, in all good tactics, between the ships of the force. 
 
 The only circumstances under which a vessel is authorized 
 to stop, when steaming in squadron, are the following: 
 
 i. To save a man overboard. 
 
 2. In case of an accident to the engine, screw, or rudder. 
 
 3. To avoid a collision. 
 
 In almost every case the vessel which stops should drop 
 out of line, by sheering to that side which interferes with the 
 other vessels the least. 
 
 In any movement made by a fleet in performing an evolu- 
 tion there are the following requirements to be fulfilled : 
 
 1. To lose as little distance as possible in passing from one 
 point to another. 
 
 2. To avoid any possibility of collision between two or 
 more ships of the fleet. 
 
 3. To keep the fleet in such a condition as to form order 
 of battle easily and quickly. 
 
 We may also state that the nature of all movements of 
 a line of battle presents three phases: 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 77 
 
 i. To approach the enemy — bow towards him. 
 
 2. To keep at a certain distance from the enemy — broad- 
 side towards him. 
 
 3. To retreat, or increase the distance from the enemy- — 
 stern towards him. 
 
 Even with a small number of vessels, no movement can be 
 made, with the enemy bearing down upon you, inside of four 
 miles' separation. If an evolution must be performed, it would 
 be better to charge through the enemy's line, in the formation 
 in which you happen to be, and form on the other side. You 
 have been caught at a disadvantage, you must make a run 
 for it, and this is the safest way to gain time to perfect a 
 formation. 
 
 We have now presented about all the principles involved 
 in the evolutionary systems of the last twenty years ; only 
 those in future will remain which fulfil the following con- 
 ditions : 
 
 1. The ships must cover the least space at full speed with- 
 out danger of collision. 
 
 2. The evolution must be feasible at night as well as by 
 day. 
 
 3. During the evolution the ships must be formed, and be 
 able to give each other mutual support. 
 
 4. If possible, the broadside must not be presented to the 
 enemy's line of rams. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Theoretically, in simultaneous movements every ship puts 
 its helm over in the same direction at the same time ; practi- 
 cally, the ship that has no vessel on the side towards which 
 she turns should commence — as, for instance, the rear ship of a 
 
7 8 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 column, or the ship on the flank turned towards, of a line — as 
 soon as the manoeuvre is marked, then the next ship to her, 
 and so on. 
 
 Some tacticians assert that simultaneous movements — 
 i.e., change of head — are the only manoeuvres that can be 
 used in action ; but this can hardly be the case, as nothing like 
 any tactics — concentration for instance — could be attempted. 
 Indeed, the majority of writers agree that the only movements 
 in combat are successive movements, since they not only 
 require no change of speed, but the course and distance 
 passed over by the force is correctly known. 
 
 Those who believe in the value of direct movements say 
 that rectangular (successive) movements are inapplicable to a 
 fleet of armored vessels in which fighting by means of the 
 ram enters. This point of the ships always presenting their 
 bows to the enemy when manoeuvring by the direct method is 
 not nearly of as much moment as is the fact that from the time 
 the ships leave the old formation until they are completely 
 formed in the new one theyare in no formatioti at all ; which is 
 a very telling point against direct evolutions — for if you can do 
 as well in a fight unformed, why take up the time and trouble 
 of sustaining a formation ? The direct method suffers by 
 comparison with the successive method, as will be seen by the 
 following example: If there was a force of ships in column, 
 and line was directed to be formed, the direct evolution with 
 eight ships and a standard speed of eleven knots would only 
 be completed two miles from where the evolution began, and 
 would take twenty minutes. If the rectangular method was 
 used the evolution would be accomplished in eleven minutes, 
 and only eight hundred feet ahead of the point where the 
 evolution started. 
 
THE FLEET UNDER DRILL. 79 
 
 Some favor the use of both systems, the admiral to be 
 governed by the environment in regard to which method is the 
 best to use. Each of them has its drawbacks. With rec- 
 tangular methods, if we are manoeuvring in the presence of 
 the enemy, our broadsides are exposed to his line of rams ; 
 with direct movements collisions are liable to occur, and the 
 fleet is without order until the new formation is complete. 
 
 Conversions are clumsy and slow for more than four vessels, 
 and should never be attempted in the same waters with the 
 enemy. 
 
 Isodromes, or " paths of equal length," form a very ingenious 
 method of keeping up a single speed and yet keeping the 
 force compact — so it is claimed — and in hand : it is applicable 
 to the manoeuvring of more vessels in simple line than any 
 other, although it is a method which must require a good deal 
 of drill to make it efficient. It must be said for the isodromic 
 method, that in the case of a force manoeuvring in it in the 
 presence of the enemy, each vessel is pretty well covered by 
 the remaining ships from any onset of the enemy for pur- 
 poses of ramming. With much smoke present it would be 
 impossible to use this method. 
 
 A wheel is a simple method of manoeuvring two ships in 
 such a manner that their relative bearing, and therefore their 
 mutual protection, remains at all times the same. 
 
 X. 
 
 The admiral may arrange for himself a position in the 
 formation, and may designate some vessel, not of the line of 
 battle, to assume it, should he wish to keep withdrawn for 
 some reason. 
 
80 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 In our service two vessels constitute a section, two sections 
 a division, and two divisions (eight ships) a squadron. 
 
 When changing from line to column by the rectangular 
 method the distances between ships must be great enough to 
 permit the helm changes required without danger of collision, 
 or else the flank vessel formed upon sheers through five 
 points, and then comes back to the course in order to give 
 the necessary room to the other ships of the force to turn in. 
 
 Ships following a leader in column should when ma- 
 noeuvring avoid turning on a greater arc than that of the 
 leader; if there is any error or difference, it should be due to 
 turning on a smaller arc. As a rule, when a ship has turned 
 wide on a leader, following ships should turn on the guide of 
 their column, and not on the ship that has got out of station 
 and has to recover it. 
 
 When in column any error from the exact station of a 
 ship should be in the direction of being ahead of station ; but 
 when in line, any error should be in the direction of being 
 astern of station, rather than ahead of it. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 
 
 I. 
 
 Unquestionably some formation for attack is necessary, 
 and the fight must be conducted after some method. To 
 fight jn no formation is to add the dangers of collision with 
 ships of your own force to the surpassing horrors of the 
 modern battle. 
 
 Many tacticians, as we know, have striven to contrive 
 some formation which will answer for all kinds and conditions 
 of ships, and be of value throughout the whole time of the 
 engagement. This is now conceived to be an impossible 
 task. 
 
 Ships of the line of battle require free use of their weapons, 
 and can only afford to give up certain offensive qualities to 
 derive the greater benefit which might accrue through in- 
 creased security from an attack of the enemy. This they are 
 enabled to do by adopting those formations which suit their 
 eminent weapon best ; and although these formations may not 
 be the ideal arrangements in which to manceuvre, they should 
 be chosen, provided they are simple, and the ships so formed 
 are few in number. For instance, ships with heavy rams and 
 great weight of bow-fire would naturally develop their powers 
 better when formed in line; broadside ships would do best 
 
 when in column, and rams in columns or column of sections. 
 
 81 
 
8 2 ELEMENT A K Y NA FA L TAC TICS. 
 
 All the formations adopted should be so disposed, in regard 
 to interval and bearing, as to give the greatest independence 
 of action and movement of the formations, and yet preserve 
 the strongest mutual defence for the whole force of ships. 
 
 The force should enter the attack in the following order: 
 
 1st. Bow-fire ships with good ramming power; 
 
 2d. Broadside ships ; 
 
 3d. Rams. 
 
 These should engage the enemy at such intervals of time 
 one after the other, that the enemy could not change his 
 formation or arrange his force for concentration between the 
 time of encountering one force and encountering the next. 
 This would offset any weakening likely to arise from dividing 
 up into many small formations and increasing the number of 
 the exposed flanks. 
 
 Fresh material in this way, being put upon the enemy, 
 will prevent him from knowing what formation he will next 
 engage, and will not allow of his re-forming to meet any 
 change, and cannot but fail to have a very demoralizing effect 
 upon him. 
 
 Inseparable from simple formations are simple evolutions. 
 These must be confined to successive and simultaneous move- 
 ments. 
 
 The advantage of having one force follow another instead 
 of having a compound formation is best shown by an illustra 
 tion. The enemy in some formation meets your first force, 
 which we will take for granted is smaller than his own. Your 
 second force in the same or preferably in some slightly differ- 
 ent formation, but independent as regards manoeuvring with 
 the first, is in sight. 
 
 Contact between the enemy and your advanced force takes 
 
THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 83 
 
 place. This latter, either crippled or not, gets in the rear of 
 the former. The enemy cannot turn, as he is confronted by 
 your second force, to fight which under the best circum- 
 stances he should perhaps re-form, which he cannot do. 
 Therefore the second force has probably an advantage, and 
 can cut off part of the enemy's formation. This would likely 
 demoralize the enemy to the extent of permitting your rams, 
 which should now arrive, free to move — two on his one ship. 
 By this time your first force, which has manoeuvred without 
 being under fire, has returned, and a conclusion should soon 
 be reached. 
 
 In respect to the time when torpedo-boats should enter 
 the fight, it is believed that their opportunity is to be found 
 any time after the first encounter, when they can have the 
 smoke to protect them. 
 
 Torpedo-boats in a pitched battle between fleets should 
 hang about their own line-of-battle ships. 
 
 II. 
 
 The following tactical directions may be considered funda- 
 mental: 
 
 1st. During the execution of a manoeuvre determined on 
 beforehand or ordered by signal, and which has for its object 
 the bringing of the fleet into action, no vessel must change 
 course except to prevent being rammed. 
 
 2d. Mutual support would point out the necessity of not 
 separating. The grand object will be to keep together, and 
 prevent the enemy from concentrating on any point. 
 
 3d. When once the ranks are broken, it is imperative to 
 
84 ELEMENTARY XAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 keep a lookout on the flag-ship for signals, although the fight- 
 ing of each ship as an individual must not be relaxed. 
 
 In all charges, having once passed through the enemy's 
 line, it must be well understood beforehand how the vessels 
 are to turn — whether to starboard or to port. This should be 
 governed by an inflexible rule. If it were arbitrary, confusion 
 and disaster would certainly follow. 
 
 Plans of battles, as far as practicable, should be arranged so 
 that when the enemy heaves in sight he can be attacked with- 
 out numerous signals being made. After the battle has once 
 commenced signals should have reference alone to strengthen- 
 ing the line in some designated direction, ordering one forma- 
 tion to join with some other, rallying, retreating, or which 
 would arrange the fleet in such a manner as to consummate 
 the ruin and rout of the enemy. 
 
 The enemy should be attacked, no, matter what your for- 
 mation is, if he attempts to pass from one formation to an- 
 other. 
 
 There are five rules laid down for the use of guns in a 
 general action : 
 
 ist. Guns are on no account to be fired unless there is every 
 probability of their taking effect. 
 
 2d. The broadside guns will always be trained on some 
 prearranged bearing, from abeam to 15 before the beam, so 
 that the captain shall at all times, and without giving a second 
 thought, be certain of the exact direction in which his guns are 
 pointing. 
 
 3d. Guns as a rule will be fired by broadsides. 
 
 4th. A disabled ship with rudder or engines broken down 
 will use her guns to the utmost of her power. 
 
THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 85 
 
 5th. As far as possible, the aim is to be directed at the 
 weakest points of the enemy. 
 
 The mode of concentration differs for whichever arm of 
 warfare is put into action. There are three methods for con- 
 centrating in artillery engagements the batteries of a certain 
 number of your vessels on a smaller number of the enemy : 
 
 1. By cross-pointing (concentrated fire). 
 
 2. By the passing of the fleet before the one point assailed 
 in the enemy's line in column. 
 
 3. By catching any ship or ships of the enemy between 
 two fires (doubling on the enemy). 
 
 This last method of concentration consists in penetrating 
 the enemy's line, to take between two fires each of the vessels 
 of that portion attacked. The fight should take place at close 
 quarters. This system of warfare leaves out of the fight a por- 
 tion of the enemy's fleet which will seek to enter the tniUe ; 
 but if the concentrating movement has been quickly executed, 
 before the unattacked portion of the enemy has had time to 
 get into action, a decisive result should have been attained. 
 
 Considering the question of concentration in regard to 
 rams, two rams cannot well attack the same vessel at the same 
 instant ; still, the two can act in concert, either on the same 
 broadside of the enemy's ship or one on each side, provided 
 their courses did not converge. In each case the attacked ship 
 should endeavor to bring about a collision between its as- 
 sailants. 
 
 The attacking vessels should preferably ram the enemy's 
 ship one after the other ; therefore any number of vessels can 
 be concentrated for ramming on one of the enemy. In artil- 
 lery concentration, however, only two, or at most three, ships 
 can be used against one of the enemy. 
 
86 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 Concentration for torpedo attack resembles somewhat the 
 method used for ramming. If the torpedo is carried ahead on 
 a spar or installed to act right ahead (if of the automobile 
 type), the methods are identical. 
 
 III. 
 
 A force moving on the enemy must do so in some order ; 
 an advance as a mob means defeat. Individual dash is inferior 
 to system, even should that system not be the best. Let the 
 rule be to keep confusion away as long as possible. 
 
 Formations must be compact enough to guard against 
 having the line of battle broken in upon ; but great compact- 
 ness necessitates thorough drill, as an accident happening, 
 such as a collision, would be likely to entail very serious con- 
 sequences. 
 
 Should the formation disappear for each side without 
 either party having the advantage, then the chance of victory 
 would lie with that force which could re-form the sooner. If, 
 in the midst of an engagement, the admiral considers it 
 necessary to re-form the line of battle, he should signal his 
 fleet to draw out of action and to form on him, either in the 
 formation in which the attack was made or in some other, as 
 signalled. 
 
 On the disappearance of the formation endeavor to hold 
 on to your consort and work with him, and add as soon as 
 possible other ships of your force that you may come across. 
 As you return to the attack, concentrate upon any injured ship 
 of the enemy and put her out of the fight. Keep at the same 
 time your eye on the admiral's ship for a signal to re-form. 
 
 It is always in order for any ship in formation where she 
 finds herself unexpectedly in a position of advantage to ram 
 
THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 87 
 
 an opponent to do so on the instant. There must be no mis- 
 take about this, however. 
 
 It will be remembered that it takes some little while to 
 load and fire the largest guns, so that where two columns are 
 passing each other, if the guns of each ship are all fired at the 
 leading ship as she passes, the other ships will receive no heavy 
 gun-fire at all. Several rules have been laid down to meet 
 these conditions : one is, that the first ship shall fire at the 
 enemy's leader, the second ship at the enemy's second ship, and 
 so on ; another is, that the first two ships of the force shall fire 
 at the enemy's leader, and the next two at the enemy's 
 second in column. The constitution of the enemy's fleet, 
 from what you can discover about it, will in a great degree 
 decide your action in this particular. 
 
 Your column breaking through the enemy's formation 
 should do so in a manner to divide his force unequally. In 
 doubling on his smaller portion, the object would be to get his 
 ships out of the formation and headed away from it. If your 
 ships are swifter, and if you can put two on one, you should 
 be able to demoralize him completely by scattering his ships 
 so widely, let alone ramming them, that they could never re- 
 gain the other portion of their force. 
 
 The modern battle-ship is more easily rammed than the 
 well-protected cruiser, being slower, and will perhaps sink 
 sooner, being heavier, and a greater number of people will be 
 destroyed on account of the battle-ships' companies being 
 the larger. 
 
 The well-protected cruiser in an artillery fight will be de- 
 stroyed where the line-of-battle ship will be but slightly in- 
 jured. The cruiser, though, could take to her heels if necessary 
 to save herself from destruction. 
 
88 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 In action the fires will all be lighted. Speed should be as 
 great as the state of drill will permit. High speed may be 
 considered as the first indirect protection against ramming. 
 When the formation disappears, the speed of the ship is 
 governed as an individual ; while the formation is intact, the 
 speed is governed by the speed of the slowest ship of the force. 
 
 IV. 
 
 There is no use in firing your guns unless you can see what 
 you are firing at: if the smoke prevents this, it would be 
 wise to cease firing until your target comes into view. If thjs 
 matter of smoke ended here it would not be so bad; but un- 
 fortunately it might happen that just as you were doing some 
 brilliant artillery work the smoke which you created would 
 serve to conceal the approach of rams and torpedo-boats, 
 which might succeed in sinking you. 
 
 Ramming in fleet fighting will be against the rear ships of 
 your formation by the rear ships of the enemy. This means 
 the meUe will begin by a pitched battle between the rears of 
 the two fleets. The van will strive to get back into the battle 
 as individuals as quickly as possible, and all formation will be 
 at an end. 
 
 Can this be avoided ? It should be, for the giving up of 
 one's formation is the immediate throwing of one's self on 
 one's own resources. Considering the matter for yourself, who 
 can tell what chance will bring to you in the next minute — an 
 enemy, perhaps your superior in either offence, defence, and 
 position, or perhaps superior in all three ! It would be better 
 if, when you are rammed at by the enemy, you could avoid 
 the attack and stick to your consorts, and when you are out of 
 
THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA. 89 
 
 the fire and fury of the onset, turn and go back into the thick 
 of the fight with the rest of your disciplined force ; but hold 
 on to your formation first, last, and all the time. 
 
 In regard to concentration, it will be of little or no use 
 between equal forces, except in the case where the fleets are 
 very large. A concentration may be either total or partial. If 
 a fleet is arranged for a ramming encounter, and its number of 
 rams is double the number possessed by the enemy, the forma- 
 tion for attack in two lines of equal length is naturally indi- 
 cated. This is a total concentration. If the number of rams 
 of the two fleets are equal, this method will not do, and a 
 partial concentration must be made on some weak point in the 
 enemy's line. In a concentrated attack the first line should be 
 composed of the heaviest armored vessels, the second line 
 preferably of rams. The first line is to use its artillery only. 
 Ramming attacks on the broadside of a vessel, the rammer 
 describing a quarter of a circle, are based upon an appreciation 
 of the speed, essentially variable, of the adversary. This 
 manoeuvre presents only a very few chances of success, if we 
 reflect that with a speed of ten knots a vessel passes over her 
 length in fifteen seconds. 
 
 In lines the flanks should be protected by other vessels 
 not belonging to the formation, but which act as a reinforce- 
 ment. 
 
 The use of automobile torpedoes does not seem to have 
 modified the tactics of combat on the open sea in any way 
 except in some special cases, as, for instance, fighting in chase 
 or retreat. 
 
 In the melte automobile torpedoes are as dangerous to 
 friend as to foe, and must be used with the utmost caution. 
 Each captain cannot calculate in advance what he will do, as 
 
9° ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 in a duel between ships. Every moment will bring forth 
 something unexpected. Hence the reason for our asking the 
 question as to whether the automobile torpedo will or will not 
 be used during the mttee. All we can say is, that circum- 
 stances will alone decide its employment. Everything is 
 given up to the unforeseen. One vessel starts to ram another; 
 suddenly she is obliged to modify her tactics, to escape a 
 ram from a second adversary ; some other vessel, going to 
 the succor of a consort, comes on top of an enemy, till 
 that instant unseen on account of the smoke which ob- 
 scures the field of battle. If this is true of ramming, where 
 the missile, so to speak, can be stopped in its flight and its 
 course changed, how much greater would be the responsibility 
 of using a weapon which, after it is discharged, can in no wise 
 be governed ! 
 
 During the fight, the duty of the squadron of cruisers, if it 
 is seen fit not to employ them in the line of battle, would be 
 to keep well clear of the ships of the line, and be ready to 
 assist damaged ships, cut off torpedo-boats, and harass and 
 destroy the enemy's smaller vessels. 
 
 Torpedo-cruisers and seagoing torpedo-boats should move 
 in and out among the enemy where it is not too hot, and 
 especially keeping a lookout for disabled ships. It is thought, 
 though, that instead of forming an advance line and entering 
 the action before the field of operations is obscured by smoke, 
 and when they can be the more easily driven off by machine- 
 gunfire, their time for gathering the best fruits of the contest 
 will be later — during the me'le'e. Indeed, it would seem to be a 
 a maxim that victory will lie with that fleet whose torpedo 
 flotilla is first in action after the first charge. 
 
 Where torpedo-boats are too large to be carried, and are 
 
THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OP EX SEA. 9 1 
 
 too small to keep the sea in all weathers, they hamper the 
 fleet in two ways : 
 
 ist. The fleet can only move when these boats can take 
 the sea. 
 
 2d. If these boats are forsaken or sent into port for shelter, 
 they with their care-takers will not only fall an easy prey to the 
 enemy, but will advertise to the enemy the propinquity of the 
 force. 
 
 V. 
 
 Should a fleet be surprised by an enemy when in no forma- 
 tion, each ship's bow should be turned towards the enemy, and 
 a charge made through the enemy's line. When the other 
 side is reached, they should form in the chosen way for retreat, 
 and fight the now turned and attacking enemy, or, if the occa- 
 sion presented itself, turn simultaneously and attack their pur- 
 suers. 
 
 During an engagement, if the admiral wishes to retreat, 
 the line of battle, by a simultaneous movement or otherwise, 
 as soon as possible should come into some retreat formation. 
 The preferred formation for retreat is column ; in which case, 
 if it is assumed, the best ships should be kept in the rear 
 nearest the enemy, the lighter vessels towing the disabled 
 ones. 
 
 To attack a fleet at anchor, use the ram, each vessel choos- 
 ing a ship of the enemy to attack. A fleet at anchor must 
 depend for its defence on torpedoes, mines, and booms, 
 together with its flotilla of torpedo-boats. A fleet surprised at 
 anchor is a contingency of war hard to realize. A fleet, how- 
 ever, caught in this manner would undoubtedly be destroyed. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. 
 
 I. 
 
 Should a fleet regularly set out from home or from some 
 friendly base, to besiege a port or establish a blockade, the 
 nature of the work to be done would in a great degree decide 
 the class and number of tactical elements entering into it. 
 Besides the force of line-of-battle ships, and squadrons of ships 
 composed of cruisers, corvettes, gun-vessels, tenders, and torpedo- 
 vessels, there will be a semi-naval establishment of heavy 
 wrecking-tugs, surveying-vessels to establish lights and buoys, 
 launches, mining and countermining vessels, telegraph and 
 cable-laying vessels, as well as search-light vessels furnished 
 with powerful electric-lighting devices. Likewise we will have 
 coal and ammunition vessels, commissariat and naval-store 
 ships, hospital ships, and floating repajr-shops. 
 
 The line of battle will ordinarily be composed of lighter 
 vessels, in part, than if the combatant force were designed to 
 meet the enemy at sea. It would contain coast-defence 
 vessels, monitors, turreted vessels, and rams. 
 
 Perhaps, too, there will be a large force of troops embarked 
 in transports, accompanying the fleet. 
 
 The progress of this sea army is termed a sea march. In 
 this case the line of battle acts as a convoying force to the 
 non-combatant ships ; it may be divided to perform this work, 
 
 92 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. 93 
 
 but it must not be so widely separated as to break up entirely 
 the mutual protection of its parts. The cruisers will be con- 
 stantly employed in keeping the convoy in order and in tow- 
 ing disabled ships. The scouts must be thrown out to long 
 distances in every direction. The vessels of this army will 
 be so diverse in seagoing qualities that the speed will be very 
 moderate. Rendezvous will be arranged for and will be fre- 
 quent, and the non-combatant portions of the force must be 
 given specific instructions concerning making friendly ports. 
 
 All these various elements, with their multitudes of experts 
 and attaches, must be protected by a powerful convoy-guard 
 regularly attached to them, and commanded by a flag-officer, 
 who will especially be charged with getting them clear of the 
 field of battle, and into some place of safety in case of collision 
 with the enemy. The convoy should be divided into squads 
 of eight, and two war-vessels should constitute a guard for this 
 number of ships. 
 
 II. 
 
 The attack upon a harbor or position on the coast involves 
 three distinct operations : 
 
 1st. The penetration of the port, or the getting into a com- 
 manding position. 
 
 2d. The bombardment, or control of the enemy's fire. 
 
 3d. The disembarkation of troops, and occupation of the 
 military position. 
 
 In regard to the attack upon fortifications by ships, certain 
 tactical experiences have been undergone by the combatants, 
 which have found expression in the following conclusions : 
 
 I. Although vessels engaging forts will never be able to 
 
94 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 fight on equal terms with them, still forts will offer but little 
 resistance to vessels attempting to run by them. 
 
 2. Under all circumstances the fleet should keep away 
 from forts whose guns are mounted high above the sea-level 
 on account of the danger to be incurred from a plunging fire. 
 
 3. Any projection appearing above the crest of the parapet 
 of a fort furnishes an excellent target for the attacking fleet. 
 It is a means by which the position of the guns is readily in- 
 dicated and located, and which advantage the ships should be 
 quick to seize. 
 
 4. Recent high-powered guns are not adapted to bombard- 
 ing earthworks. Ships for general service should have a com- 
 posite batter)'. 
 
 5. Ships should engage forts at moderate distances. With 
 close range and a stable platform great damage can be done 
 by shrapnel and machine-gun fire. 
 
 6. In all bombardments the target for the fleet should be — 
 
 (a) The guns of the enemy actually firing ; 
 
 (b) Any building believed to be a storehouse or magazine. 
 
 7. An advantage possessed by a vessel with a heavy fore- 
 and-aft fire lies in its ability to anchor head to sea and engage 
 a fort either ahead or astern from a comparatively steady plat- 
 form. 
 
 8. If the ships and forts are about equal as regards artil- 
 lery, the ships had better anchor. If the forts are the heavier, 
 the fleet should fight under way. 
 
 In entering an enemy's enclosed waters it will be necessary 
 to have a countermining flotilla precede the fleet where planted 
 mines are suspected. Armored vessels built for coast and 
 harbor defence, but which can be taken to sea, may be of great 
 use in an enemy's harbor where torpedoes and mines are feared, 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. 95 
 
 to be pushed forward in the van in place of the more valuable 
 armored line-of-battle ships of the force, since they have, as a 
 general thing, great artillery power and good resisting qualities 
 for their size. 
 
 Among the most useful elements of the besieging fleet is 
 the telegraph-cable vessel. The cable-laying flotilla should con- 
 sist of the tank-vessel containing the cable, small vessels to be 
 used as receiving-stations, and tugs for the heavy weighing and 
 handling of buoys. The tank-steamer should be capable of 
 laying out and picking up the cable, and should be in every 
 way fitted for telegraph testing. The tugs will be used to run 
 the lines on shore. The cable as regards size should be a com- 
 promise between the shore-end and deep-sea cable, so as to 
 stand well in shoal water, and to permit of its being picked up 
 and laid down many times. 
 
 In order to protect ships obliged to remain at anchor, they 
 must be surrounded with mines, booms, and nets, besides being 
 guarded by torpedo-boats. The mines, carried by special ships, 
 are as much part of the outfit of the besieging force as they 
 are of the besieged. 
 
 A vessel occupying the position of a blockader will be ex- 
 posed to an attack from — 
 
 i. Automobile torpedoes from a gunboat or torpedo-boat; 
 
 2. A spar-torpedo from a cruiser, gunboat, or torpedo-boat. 
 
 The ship if attacked can defend herself by — 
 
 1. Running away ; 
 
 2. Sinking the attacking vessel before she has time to use 
 her torpedo ; 
 
 3. Fighting the approaching vessel with guns and her own 
 torpedo-launches ; 
 
 4. Using nets, booms, etc. 
 
96 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 The first method is hardly to be thought of. If it were used 
 the enemy could keep the fleet constantly driven off. 
 
 The second method is more practicable. The attacking ves- 
 sel must, however, be destroyed before she can approach within 
 600 yards. A heavy fire of manageable guns should be kept 
 upon her. The only drawback is, that if the guns do not sink 
 her, they will give her the chance she wishes to have, that is, 
 an abundance of smoke to work in. 
 
 The third method is not to be entirely depended upon, be- 
 cause the enemy may glide between your launches — injured 
 perhaps by your attack, but not disabled. 
 
 The fourth method is hardly satisfactory, but when com- 
 bined with the second and third it seems all that is left to us. 
 The moving torpedo-boat is a small object and moves rapidly, 
 and consequently is hard to hit ; but, on the other hand, it is 
 easy to sink if your shot strikes it. 
 
 Since large blockaders will retire during the night to some 
 outside line, in localities where they are likely to be harassed 
 by torpedo-craft, it will be perhaps arranged to have a tele- 
 graph-cable laid between the inshore and offshore blockading 
 lines, with vessels lying to either end of it, so that the earliest 
 notice of any movement on the part of the enemy can be given. 
 Should there be no cable provided, provision must be made for 
 establishing a line of corvettes or gun-vessels to transmit infor- 
 mation by signal to the large vessels. Small vessels will take 
 the inshore blockade at night. 
 
 III. 
 
 The blockade of a whole coast of a country possessing a 
 navy is impossible ; even that of a single port is difficult. 
 Under any circumstances it can only be rendered effective by 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. gj 
 
 the concentration of numerous squadrons Echeloned, as it 
 were, on several concentric circles whose centre is the port to 
 be blockaded. 
 
 It has been decided by experience that up to the present 
 time — 
 
 ist. Blockades are still possible if proper precautions are 
 taken by the blockading fleet. 
 
 2d. Fleets at anchor should be protected by triple booms, 
 and these should be protected by guns and mines. 
 
 3d. The electric light, when intended to protect ships at 
 anchor, should be used from special ships or boats throwing 
 fixed beams, the distances of which from the armor-clads lying 
 behind the booms should be known. 
 
 4th. Guard-boats if used should have special orders and 
 signals, so as to keep clear of the fire of their own ships, and 
 not to hamper or interfere with it in any way. 
 
 5th. Special depot-ships should carry booms and nets so as 
 to enable the booms to be rigged rapidly. 
 
 The following maxims relate to an attack upon a harbor 
 defended by mines as well as forts : 
 
 ist. A systematic attack on the mine-field must be made, so 
 as to clear a passage broad enough for single ships (at least) to 
 move up and bombard the batteries. 
 
 2d. The ships must be powerful and numerous enough, 
 when there, to silence the enemy's forts. 
 
 3d. The van ships must be well protected by nets, or the 
 best means at hand, against torpedoes. 
 
 4th. The attack once begun must be continued until the 
 channel is clear and the batteries silenced. Care must be taken 
 to have small and handy craft stationed about to pick up and 
 destroy mechanical floating mines sent down by the enemy. 
 
gS ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 5th. Vessels moved against the enemy may be fitted before- 
 hand in any way that would facilitate raising them in case that 
 they were sunk, such as slinging them with chains^ discharging 
 coal and stores, and maintaining their draught by means of 
 weights easily got rid of if the ships were wrecked, such as 
 ranges of chain-cable. 
 
 In considering the defence of a vessel from an attack by 
 torpedo-boats, as far as artillery is concerned, each gun must — 
 
 1. Be easily trained,, permitting it to follow all the move- 
 ments of the enemy ; 
 
 2. Be capable of rapid loading, so as to fire the instant the 
 aggressor comes in sight, and to keep it up ; 
 
 3. Have the projectile heavy enough to injure seriously a 
 gunboat or sink a torpedo-boat. 
 
 In the opinion of some tacticians there is only one certain 
 means for driving off the enemy's torpedo-boats, and that is, to 
 fight them with your own. The question then immediately 
 arises, How does this class of vessels fight? Not with auto* 
 mobile torpedoes, because the target is too small and too 
 changeable for a torpedo; besides, the boats are not deep 
 enough in the water. Two torpedo-boats could not ram one 
 another without both being used up. The way will probably 
 be, each boat will attempt to destroy the other by means of 
 small gun-cotton spar-torpedoes, by mechanical gun-fire, or by 
 the use of hand-grenades. It should be the aim of a com- 
 batant to try and kill the crew of its adversary, as it is to be 
 supposed that it is composed 1 of skilful and daring men, and 
 that their loss will lie felt. 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. 99 
 
 IV. 
 
 It still remains for us to discuss the question concerning an 
 attack by torpedo L boats upon ships or a ship under way. 
 
 Let us recall the fact that the discharge of the automobile 
 torpedo is subject to' grave drawbacks, arising from a falke 
 appreciation of the speed and course of the enemy, and, fur- 
 thermore, that this is aggravated by darkness. At the outset, 
 to aim at a moving target with a vessel which itself acts as a 
 gun-carriage, especially where there is a little sea on, consti- 
 tutes a very delicate and involved operation — very much more 
 difficult than where the automobile-torpedo tube is installed 
 in a ship of some size. Admitting that an automobile torpedo 
 can be discharged effectively 500 yards from an anchored 
 enemy, we are generous when we allow 250 yards as the 
 effective range of an automobile-torpedo boat firing at a vessel 
 under way. 
 
 Suppose a ship (N) with a speed of 12 knots (see PI. XIV, 
 Fig. 1) is obliged for some reason to follow the line NN'. 
 An automobile-torpedo boat (L) going at 18 knots speed, 
 which has been discovered by the ship bearing forward of her 
 starboard beam, so directs her course as to arrive at the point 
 L abeam of iV when she is at O, and 250 yards off. Here L 
 discharges her torpedo, which has a speed of 24 knots. This 
 done, the boat turns through the arc L, L' , and moves away 
 in the direction d. 
 
 The ship has opened and ceased fire at a distance of 1500 
 yards on the torpedo-boat. The torpedo-boat has been under 
 fire about 2<° 53". 
 
I0O ELEMENTARY NA1AL TACTICS. 
 
 Now let us look into the movements of the spar-torpedo 
 boat (P) manoeuvring under the same conditions. If it 
 should fail to explode its torpedo under N, it would go astern 
 of the ship at 0, then describe the arc of a circle O, P', and 
 run off in the direction e. Therefore it would be under fire 
 but little longer than would the automobile-torpedo boat L. 
 If, however, P succeeds in exploding his torpedo under N, he 
 will remain stopped before the explosion and after it during a 
 time hardly exceeding 30 seconds, then the ship would have 
 forged ahead sufficiently to permit him to describe the curve 
 of O, P'. The torpedo-boat P then would have remained ex- 
 posed to the enemy's fire for about the space of 3™ 23 s . 
 
 Let us now consider the case of an attack by an auto- 
 mobile-torpedo boat coming down from ahead upon a vessel 
 which is obliged to follow the course N, N', N". 
 
 The torpedo-boat has a speed of 18 knots and the vessel 
 (N) 12 knots (see PI. XIV, Fig. 2). Fire commences and 
 ceases at 1500 yards. L, L', L" indicates the positions of the 
 torpedo-boat corresponding to the positions of the ship N, TV', 
 N". The torpedo-boat discharges its automobile torpedo from 
 a distance of 250 yards, and then describes a curve of 175 
 yards with a speed of 15 knots. The torpedo is supposed to 
 travel with a speed of 24 knots. Now if we calculate the time L 
 is under fire it will be found to be 2 ra 51 s , — that is, only 2 s less 
 than is the case in Fig. 1, or the time taken up to describe the 
 curve L, L', which slight difference is owing to the fact that 
 you are attacking a vessel which is approaching you. P, P', 
 P" show how a spar-torpedo boat would take up correspond- 
 ing positions to N, N', and N" . From the figure it will be 
 seen that P will not be under fire much longer than will L, 
 but charging the greatest amount of time that might be so 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. IOI 
 
 taken up against P, it will not exceed 30 s . So that P's time 
 will be 3 m 21 s - 
 
 Finally, suppose instead of L and P coming down from 
 ahead they came up in N's wake (see PL XV, Fig. 1). The 
 time for L under these circumstances would be 9™ 29 s , and for 
 P about the same or even a little less. It will be seen that it 
 is always a disadvantage, for this reason, to approach your 
 enemy from a direction on her quarter. 
 
 We have now, in a certain way, given a few theoretical ex- 
 amples concerning attacks by torpedo-boats on ships. We say 
 theoretical, because the ship has been considered confined to a 
 straight course. Neither of these conditions would govern a 
 vessel (except in the case of a squadron moving along a chan- 
 nel to enter and capture a port) ; still, the simple calculations 
 which we have given suggest two important remarks : 
 
 1st. The time during which a spar-torpedo boat remains 
 exposed to an enemy's fire only exceeds by about one sixth ; 
 the time passed in an analogous situation by an automobile- 
 torpedo boat, and in the case given in PI. XV, Fig. 1 (coming 
 up from astern) this time is even a little shorter for the spar- 
 torpedo boat. 
 
 2d. A torpedo-boat, of whatever description, does not gain 
 anything in the way of time by coming down from ahead on 
 the enemy (as shown in PI. XIV, Fig. 2) over an attack made 
 on the enemy by coming up at right angles to the enemy's 
 course (as shown in same Plate, Fig. 1). More than this, the 
 manoeuvre in Fig. 2 is more delicate, and there are fewer chances 
 of the attack being successful. It obliges the torpedo-boat 
 which undertakes it to remain a comparatively long time under 
 fire at short range, if having missed exploding his torpedo 
 effectively, he wishes to try it again. On the contrary, it is 
 
102 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 relatively easy for a torpedo-boat lying off the how of a vessel 
 steaming ahead to attack her on the bow at right angles to 
 her course as shown in Fig. I, since it can at any moment 
 change the direction of its head so as to engage the enemy by 
 steering for her on the shortest line connecting them. 
 
 It is evident that in daylight the attack .by one or more 
 torpedo-boats on a ship under way and free in her movements 
 will, in practice, not be governed by the conditions we have 
 discussed, but at night such a condition of affairs might easily 
 exist. Now, how will a vessel free in its motions act ? She 
 will certainly try to avoid being put in a position shown in 
 PI. XIV, Fig. i ; therefore she will either try and run over the 
 attacking boats and sink them with her ram and machine-gun 
 fire, or she will run away. We believe that in the majority of 
 cases this last manoeuvre will be the one executed. We have 
 seen that this condition of affairs puts ordinarily a chasing tor- 
 pedo-boat under the vessel's fire for ten minutes or longer, — 
 something hardly to be thought of, so far as considering this 
 a proper manoeuvre for the torpedo-boat during the daytime. 
 However, during the night, even with electric lights, we know 
 that the torpedo-boat could with profit chase a flying enemy. 
 But under these circumstances the spar-torpedo is a better 
 weapon than is the automobile torpedo, since the aim with 
 the latter would be inaccurate ; and, furthermore, the former 
 would have the advantage of gaining 20 seconds or more on 
 the latter, for the reason that the automobile-torpedo boat 
 would have to head for the enemy at a point nearly abeam of 
 her, and 125 yards off, in order to fire her torpedo with a 
 chance of success. It may be thought that this seeming dis- 
 advantage for the automobile-torpedo boat is offset by the 
 danger that the spar-torpedo boat runs by having to absolutely 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. 103 
 
 touch the enemy, thereby encountering heavier fire, and per- 
 haps a counter torpedo and hand-grenades. 
 
 In these illustrations the automobile-torpedo boats are 
 confined to firing their torpedoes ahead : if they can fire their 
 torpedoes from the beam, all that portion of the time which 
 has to do with turning towards the enemy can be eliminated 
 from the time they are necessarily under fire ; which fact 
 alone would give the automobile-torpedo boat a tremendous 
 superiority over the spar-torpedo boat, except under the cir- 
 cumstances to be detailed farther on. 
 
 At the outset, let us consider a ship menaced by two auto- 
 mobile-torpedo boats (see PI. XV, Fig. 1) Z, and L v and by 
 two spar-torpedo boats P and P' . The first mentioned are 
 obliged to run past the ship to attack, one on the starboard 
 side, and the other on the port side, leaving between them a 
 space of 600 yards. At this distance, in night-time, they will 
 not be able to attack simultaneously, as they ought, since they 
 could not see one another; for instance, the starboard one 
 might run beyond her consort and may be at L\ the desired 
 spot, while the other only gets to L\. At this moment the ship 
 whose turning-radius is 325 yards, would only have to change 
 course eight points to starboard to make the attack miscarry. 
 The two spar-torpedo boats /'and P can, on the contrary, 
 act together, as they can keep near enough together to see 
 each other. Should the ship turn in any direction, they can do 
 the same. Should the two automobile-torpedo boats both 
 attack on the same side, she can always keep away from them 
 by turning, and can extend the time of their being under fire 
 long enough to destroy them. 
 
 Nevertheless, certain circumstances present themselves 
 where an automobile-torpedo boat, whether crowned with 
 
104 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TAC7LCS. 
 
 success or not, offers so many chances of immunity from 
 punishment by machine-gun fire, that there should be no 
 hesitation to attack and profit thereby. During a dark night 
 she could, for instance, steal upon a vessel within 300 yards, 
 no matter if the enemy was furnished with electric search- 
 lights, discharge her two torpedoes and draw off without 
 being seen. 
 
 Although single vessels will not follow certain courses sucli 
 as we have supposed N to do in Plate XIV, still, when we 
 commence to look into the movements of a combination of 
 vessels formed in column to force a passage, we encounter a 
 state of affairs resembling for each vessel the one we have laid 
 down in the diagrams referred to. In effect, each ship must 
 follow her leader to prevent breaking up the formation or to 
 escape danger, — generally a narrow channel filled with natural 
 or artificial obstacles. 
 
 If possible, torpedo-boats in attacking squadrons trying to 
 enter a harbor should unquestionably take advantage of am- 
 buscades, natural or otherwise, and should endeavor to appear 
 and discharge their torpedoes on a line perpendicular to the 
 enemy's course. 
 
 Now, for such a manoeuvre, which is best — an automobile- 
 torpedo boat or a spar-torpedo boat ? Let us see. The time 
 that the last mentioned will continue under the fire of a single 
 ship steaming ahead maintaining its course, we have already 
 said, only exceeds by one sixth the time applicable to an auto- 
 mobile-torpedo boat under the same circumstances; but we 
 will see that a spar-torpedo boat when it encounters a squadron 
 has its proportion of danger made much greater than that 
 which menaces the automobile-torpedo boat doing the same 
 thing. 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. 105 
 
 A force will attempt the passage into a harbor, for in- 
 stance, probably formed in column or in one of its derivations. 
 
 Let us consider the case of a force entering, formed in 
 two columns. Distance between ships, one cable ; interval 
 between columns, two cables ; speed, 10 knots. (See PI. XV, 
 Fig. 2.) A spar-torpedo boat (P) coming down from forward 
 of the beam of the leading ship of the enemy (£) manoeuvres 
 to explode his torpedo against the broadside of N'. It will 
 take him longer to disengage himself from his opponent (since 
 the ships N", N', and N, , etc., will prevent him from circling) 
 than it would an automobile-torpedo boat. 
 
 Now less than 40 s suffices for N" to cover 250 yards and 
 come to the rescue of her consort, N'. Therefore N" can 
 turn slightly to starboard, and not only add her fire to JV's to 
 disable P, but in all probability she could run P down. 
 
 If P, on the contrary, has failed to explode his torpedo, 
 and passes astern of N' in hopes of picking up iV 2 , for exam- 
 ple, he would find himself between two lines of the enemy, 
 and in a fire which he could not stand. An automobile-tor- 
 pedo boat, however, could advance to within 250 yards of the 
 passing squadron, discharge its two torpedoes, and withdraw, 
 either on the arc L, L', or by working its head in the other 
 direction. Besides this, if the torpedo is arranged to run 800 
 yards, it is possible that missing a vessel in the right column it 
 might pick up a victim in the left one. 
 
 Although it is to be seen that an automobile-torpedo boat 
 has a certain advantage over the spar-torpedo boat in action, 
 and that any improvements made in the discharge of her auto- 
 mobile torpedoes which permit her to use them at any speed, 
 making a course at any angle with the enemy, add greatly to 
 that advantage, still the spar-torpedo boat has an important 
 
106 ELEMENTARY NAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 part to play, and should not be omitted from among the factors 
 for war. 
 
 In the meUe the spar-torpedo boat would have an advan- 
 tage over the automobile-torpedo boat, as the latter would be 
 afraid to use her torpedoes, since an enemy missed might mean 
 a friend destroyed. 
 
 To sum up, then, in respect to vessels at anchor : 
 i. Automobile torpedoes are best used on a night rela- 
 tively clear and without fog, with a calm sea, when there are 
 weak currents or none at all, and when the enemy is defended 
 with obstacles of less resistance than metallic nets. 
 
 2. Spar-torpedoes are, on the contrary, best used on a dark 
 night, and with the water a little rough, in the midst of strong 
 currents, and against vessels strongly defended with obstacles. 
 The following conclusions refer to ships under way: 
 i. There is hardly any difference between the time that an 
 automobile-torpedo boat and the time that a spar-torpedo 
 boat will be exposed to the enemy's fire. 
 
 2. The attack should be made if possible on a course cut- 
 ting the enemy's course at right angles. Therefore the boats 
 must come down from a position forward of the enemy's 
 beam. 
 
 3. An attack in daytime, made by torpedo-boats on a ship 
 or ships under way, having good speed and not confined to a 
 certain course, is hardly to be contemplated, except in very 
 exceptional cases. 
 
 4. To attack a vessel at night, free in its movements, it is 
 better to use a spar-torpedo boat than it is to employ an auto- 
 mobile-torpedo boat. 
 
 5. For an attack, in either daytime or night-time, against a 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. \0"J 
 
 squadron which attempts to force a passage, automobile-tor- 
 pedo boats are greatly preferable to spar-torpedo boats. 
 
 6. Finally, these last seem to have an advantage over the 
 former in any miUe where an enemy's squadron is opposed 
 by one of your own. 
 
 V. 
 
 Since every point on the coast can become a place of 
 debarkation for an enemy's army, every town on the coast 
 can be burnt and pillaged by the hostile fleet, or even by 
 simple cruisers, it is necessary to distribute over several cen- 
 tres of action the different constituent naval elements for the 
 defence of this coast. These comprise rams, floating batteries, 
 corvettes, gun-vessels of different sizes, and the various classes 
 of torpedo-steamers. 
 
 These forces, in connection with shore defences, must 
 guard and protect those points from which our squadrons and 
 cruisers can escape into the open sea, and to which they may 
 retreat for asylum in case the enemy be too formidable. 
 
 These centres must be beyond the range of guns of greatest 
 calibre, and should prevent, by their number and their distance 
 inland, the enemy knowing what is going on. 
 
 Works carried on in sight of the enemy can sometimes be 
 concealed, especially at night, from the beams of the search- 
 light by screens of dense smoke — such work, for instance, as 
 the emplacing of guns. 
 
 The defence of a coast comes within two categories — a sta- 
 tionary defence and a movable defence. The first comprises 
 submarine mines, booms, fortifications of every kind, placed 
 beforehand or extemporized on the coast ; the second relies 
 
108 ELEMENTARY XAVAL TACTICS. 
 
 on the action, isolated or combined, of rams, floating batteries, 
 gunboats, torpedo-vessels, etc., supported, according to circum- 
 stances, by armored ships, or even the seagoing squadrons, 
 should circumstances so conspire as to render necessary this 
 combination for war remaining in its own waters. 
 
 Unquestionably the best coast defence is a fleet of specially 
 constructed armor-clads, capable of going to sea in any 
 weather along a coast. Then each harbor should have its 
 flotilla of torpedo-boats. 
 
 Coast batteries cannot alone prevent an armored squadron 
 from forcing a passage into a harbor : they must supplement 
 their guns with mines. Conversely, any mine that is not pro- 
 tected by a gun is harmless, as it can be raised and destroyed. 
 
 For this reason gun-vessels and gunboats, small steamers 
 and large tugs, furnished with small rapid-firing guns and 
 machine-guns, are especially useful for mine protection and 
 for coastwise employment. 
 
 Non-seagoing armored vessels are, as a general thing, of 
 more value than fixed forts for the protection of harbors. 
 
 The tactical qualities of the torpedo-boat must be as well 
 known as those of the ship, since, operating from a shore base, 
 torpedo-boats will generally attack as a flotilla : indeed, the 
 torpedo-boat acting singly has no place in modem warfare. 
 No success can be derived from its independent action, as the 
 assailed ship will always be more than a match for each indi- 
 vidual boat. 
 
 To render the attack as irresistible as possible the torpedo- 
 vessels must possess the following qualities : 
 
 I. Great speed, so as to enable the boat to be in the field 
 of fire as short a time as possible, and so diminish the risk of 
 being destroyed. 
 
THE SEA ARMY FOR OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. IO9 
 
 2. Show as little surface as possible, so as to reduce to a 
 minimum the size of the target for the enemy's guns. 
 
 3. Be divided into as many water-tight compartments as 
 possible to prevent being easily sunk. 
 
 4. Have the vital parts as well protected as possible. 
 
 5. A possibility of using automobile torpedoes without 
 reducing speed. 
 
 6. Protection for the crew against small-arm and machine- 
 gun fire. 
 
 7. Noiseless engines, so as to put off discovery as long a 
 time as possible, and so be enabled to approach the enemy. 
 
 8. Great handiness. 
 
 9. Armament with machine-guns, to permit it to fight a 
 vessel of the same size interfering with its designs. 
 
 An attack on a ship by torpedo-boats should be made with 
 the flotilla divided into two or three divisions; one of these 
 should act as a reserve. This last should either dash at the 
 ship when the other torpedo-boats are engaging those belong- 
 ing to the ship, or it should follow the ship when she seeks to 
 retreat. If the vessel must retreat through a channel, it would 
 be good tactics to have her attacked at one or two points in 
 her passage out ; the first attack being intended to engage her 
 torpedo-boats and not to destroy the ship. 
 
 Besides doing their legitimate work, torpedo-vessels will 
 have to fight small adversaries barring their way. As we have 
 before observed, they may be the enemy's torpedo-boats, but 
 again they may be picket-launches, tugs, or even booms and 
 other obstructions. These will have to be overcome by 
 machine-gun fire, hand-grenades, spar-torpedoes, and neck- 
 laces, or mines of gun-cotton or other high explosive. For this 
 
1 1 ELEMEN TARY NA VA L TAC TICS. 
 
 purpose torpedo-boats should be fitted with 1 the necessary 
 weapons, leading wires, and batteries. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Let us conclude with the words of one who has thought a 
 great deal upon the subjects which are dealt with in this little 
 book : " The history of all navies which have attained any 
 importance in the world, from the most ancient times down- 
 wards, has shown that tactical efficiency and naval success 
 went hand in hand, and that the absence of the forrher assur- 
 edly led to the want of the latter." 
 
 THE END; 
 
Plate I 
 
 Like this Not like this 
 
 9 IT 
 
 OM 
 
Plate III. 
 
 1^00 Yards 
 
Plate IV. 
 
 Side most distant 
 
 from Centre of Circle 
 
 Fig. 3 
 
Plate V 
 
 Fig. 2 
 

 
 
 
 Plate VIII 
 
 
 
 
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 1° 
 
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 &B 
 
 
 
 
 \ A, 
 
 
 
 
 4. 
 
 
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 ' *\can use.hu torpedo. 
 
 B' 
 
 A \ 
 
 
 &Bt 
 
 ^^^o^^B 
 
 
 // 
 
 
 
 Rs- 2 4^, 
 
 
 Of ' 
 
 4r ' 
 / ' 
 / / 
 / / 
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 / 
 
 
Ffe.1 
 
 Plate XI 
 
 Fig. 2 
 
 Fig. 8 
 
 Fig- 4 
 
Plate XIV. 
 
 Fig.2 
 
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 Kill 
 
 
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