oo General Staff I !W}!SS{..''S-rM.!-i;;,;|j,,:SiftWtU (^orttcU Hmnctattg ffiihrarg BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE JACOB H. SCHIFF ENDOWMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF STUDIES IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION 1918 Cornell University Library JX4513.P97 1915a The war book of the German general staff 3 1924 005 230 564 The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924005230564 THE WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF THE WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF BEING THE USAGES OF WAR ON LAND' ISSUED BY THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY TRANSLATED WITH A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION J. H. MORGAN, M.A. rKOi'ESSOB OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT UNIVERSITY COLL£QE, LONDON, LATE SCHOLAB OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD; JOINT AUTHOR OF " WAR : ITS CONDUCT AND ITS LEGAL RESULTS " NEW YORK McBRIDE, NAST & COMPANY 1916 Copyright, 19 IS, by McBaiDE, Nast & Co. Published March, 1915 TO THE LORD FITZMAURICE IN" TOKEN OF FOURTEEN YEARS OF FRIENDSHIP AND OF MUCH WISE COUNSEL IN THE STUDY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREFATOEY NOTE The text of this book is a literal and integral trans- lation of the Kriegsbranch im Landkriege issued and re-issued by the German General Staff for the in- struction of German officers. It is the most au- thoritative work of its kind in Germany and takes precedence over all other publications whether mili- tary or legal, alike over the works of Bemhardi the soldier and of Holtzendorff the jurist. As will be shown in detail in the critical introduction, The Hague Conventions are treated by the authors as little more than " scraps of paper " — the only " laws " recognized by the German Staff are the mili- tary usages laid down in the pages of the Manual, and resting upon " a calculating egotism " and in- judicious " form of reprisals." I have treated the original text with religious re- spect, seeking neither to extenuate nor to set dovra aught in malice. The text is by no means elegant, but, having regard to the profound significance of the views therein expressed or suggested, I have thought it my duty as a translator to sacrifice grace to fidelity. Text, footnotes, and capital headlines are all literally translated in their entirety. When I have added Prefatory Note footnotes of my own they are enclosed in square brackets. The marginal notes have been added in order to supply the reader with a continuous clue. In the Critical Introduction which precedes the text I have attempted to show the intellectual pedigree of the book as the true child of the Prussian military tradition, and to exhibit its degrees of affinity with German morals and with German policy — with " Politik " and " Kultur." I have therefore at- tempted a short study of German diplomacy, politics, and academic teaching since 1870, with some side glances at the writings of German soldiers and jurists. All these, it must be remembered, are integrally re- lated; they all envisage the same problem. That problem is War. In the German imagination the Temple of Janus is never closed. Peace is but a suspension of the state of war instead of war being a rude interruption of a state of peace. The tem- perament of the German is saturated with this bel- ligerent emotion and every one who is not with him is against him. An unbroken chain links together Clausewitz, Bismarck, Treitschke, von der Goltz, Bernhardi, and the official exponents of German policy to-day. The teaching of Clausewitz that war is a continuation of policy has sunk deeply into the German mind, with the result that their conception of foreign policy is to provoke a constant apprehen"- sion of war. Prefatory Note The first part of the Introduction appears in print for the first time. In the second and third parts I have incorporated a short essay on Treitschke -which has appeared in the pages of the Nineteenth Century (in October last), a criticism of German diplomacy and politics which was originally contributed to the Spectator in 1906 and a study of the German pro- fessors which was published, under the title of " The Academic Garrison," in the Times Supplement of Sept. 1st, 1914. I desire to thank the respective Editors for their kindness in allowing me to repro- duce here what I had already written there. J. H. M. CONTENTS PAGE DEDICATION v PREFATORY NOTE vii INTRODUCTION — I THE GERMAN VIEW OF WAR 1 II GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT . 16 III GERMAN CULTURE: THE ACADEMIC GARRI- SON 44 IV GERMAN THOUGHT: TREITSCHKE .... 53 V CONCLUSION 65 CONTENTS OF THE WAR BOOK OF THE GER- MAN GENERAL STAFF — Introduction . . 67 PART I USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS THE ENEMY'S ARMY I WHO BELONGS TO THE HOSTILE ARMY . . 75 Regular Army — Irregular Troops — People's Wars and National Wars. II THE MEANS OF CONDUCTING WAR ... 84 A. MEANS OF WAE DEPENDINO ON FORCE .... 85 1. Annihilation, slaughter, and wounding of hos- tile combatants. 2. Capture of Enemy combatants: Modern conception of war captivity — Who is subject to it? — Point of view for treatment of prisoners of war — Right to put prisoners to death — Termination of the captivity — Trans- port of Prisoners. xi xii Contents PAGE 3. Sieges and Bombardments: (a) Fortresses, strong places and fortified places. Notification of bombardment — Scope of bombardment — Treatment of civil population within an enemy's fortress — Diplomatists of neutral States within a besieged fortress — Treatment of the fortress after storming it. (6) Open towns, villages, buildings and the like, which, however, are occupied or used for mili- tary purposes. B. — METHODS NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE . 110 Cunning and deceit — Lawful and unlawful stratagem. Ill TREATMENT OF WOUNDED AND SICK SOL- DIERS 87 Modern view of non-effective combatants — Geneva Convention — Hyenas of the battlefield. IV INTERCOURSE BETWEEN BELLIGERENT AR- MIES .117 Bearers of flags of truce — -Treatment of them — Forms as to their reception. V SCOUTS AND SPIES .... . . 124 The notion of a spy — Treatment. VI DESERTERS AND RENEGADES . . 127 VII CIVILIANS IN THE TRAIN OF AN ARMY . 128 General — Authorizations — The representa- tives of the Press. VIII THE EXTERNAL MARK OF INVIOLABILITY 133 IX WAR TREATIES 135 A. — TEBATIES OP EXCHANGE . . . 135 B. TREATIES OF CAPITULATION . . . 136 O. — SAFE-CONDUCTS . . . . 140 D. — TREATIES OF ARMISTICE . . . . 141 PART II USAGES OF WAR IN REGARD TO ENEMY TERRITORY AND ITS INHABITANTS I RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE INHABITANTS . 147 General Notions — Rights — Duties — Hostages Contents xiii PAGE — Jurisdiction in enemy's provinces when occu- pied — War rebellion and War treason. II PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR 161 III BOOTY AND PLUNDERING 167 Real and Personal State Property — Real and Personal Private Property. rv REQXnSITIONS AND WAR LEVIES .... 174 V ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY 180 General — Legislation — Relation of inhabitants to the Provisional Government — Courts — Offi- cials — Administration — Railways. PART III USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS NEUTRAL STATES . 187 Idea of neutrality — Duties of neutral States — Contraband of war — Rights of neutral States. CONTENTS OF EDITOR'S MAEGESTAL COMMENTAEY PAGE What is a State of War. ... 67 Active Persons and P assi ve . 6 7 That War is no respecter of Persons 68 The Usages of War 69 Of the futility of Written Agreements as Scraps of Paper 70 The "flabby emotion" of Humanitarianism 71 That Cruelty is often " the truest humanity " 72 The perfect Officer 72 Who are Combatants and who are not 75 The Irregular 76 Each State must decide for it- self 77 The necessity of Authorization 77 Exceptions which prove the rule 77 The Free Lance 78 Modern views 79 The German Military View. . 80 The LevSe en masse 81 The Hague Regulations will not do 83 A short way with the De- fender of his Country .... 83 Violence and Cunning 84 How to make an end of the Enemy 85 The Rules of the Game 85 Colored Troops are Black- legs 87 Prisoners of War 88 VcE Victis ! 89 The Modern View '39 Prisoners of War are to be Honorably treated 90 Who may be made Prisoners 91 The treatment of Prisoners of War 92 Their confinement 92 The Prisoner and his Task- master 93 PAGE Plight 94 Diet 95 Letters 95 Personal belongings 95 The Information Bureau..., 96 When Prisoners may be put to Death 97 " Reprisals " 97 One must not btf too scrupu- lous 98 The end of Captivity 99 Parole loO Exchange of Prisoners 102 Removal of Prisoners 102 Sieges and Bombardments : Pair Game 103 Of making the most of one's opportunity 104 Spare the Churches 105 A Bombardment is no Re- specter of Persons 105 A timely severity 106 *' Undefended Places " 108 Stratagems 110 What are "dirty tricks" ?.. Ill The apophthegm of Freder- ick the Great Ill Of False Uniforms 112 The Corruption of others may be useful 113 And Murder is one of the Fine Arts 114 That the ugly is often expedi- ent, and that it is a mistake to be too " nice-minded ". . 114 The Sanctity of the Geneva Convention 115 The " Hyenas of the Battle- field ** 116 Flags of Truce 117 The Etiquette of Flags of Truce 119 The Envoy 120 His approach 120 The Challenge — " Wer da?" 120 His reception 120 Contents to Margmal Notes XV FAQE He dismounts 121 Let his Yea be Yea, and his Nay, Nay 121 The duty of his Interlocutor. . 121 The Impatient Envoy 122 The French again 122 The Scout 124 The Spy and his short shrift 124 What is a Spy? 125 Of the essentials of Espionage 126 Accessories iwe Principals... 126 The Deserter is faithless, and the Renegade false' 127 But both may be useful. . . . 127 *' Followers " 128 The War Correspondent: his importance. His presence is desirable 129 The ideal War Correspondent 130 The Etiquette of the War Cor- respondent 131 How to tell a Non-Combatant 133 War Treaties 135 That Faith must be kept even with an enemy 135 Exchange of Prisoners 135 Capitulations — they cannot be too meticulous 136 Of the White Flag 139 Of Safe-Conducts 140 Of Armistices 141 The Civil Population is not to be regarded as an enemy . . 147 They must not be molested . . 148 Their duty 149 Of the humanity of the Ger- mans and the barbarity of the French 149 What the Invader may do. - 151 A man may be compelled to Betray his Country 153 And worse 153 Of forced labor 154 Of a certain harsh measure and its justification 154 Hostages 155 A "harsh and cruel" meas- ure 156 But it was "successful"... 156 War Rebellion 157 War Treason and Unwilling (Guides 159 Another deplorable necessity. 159 Of Private Property and its immunities 161 Of German behavior 163 The gentle Hun and the look- ing-glass 165 Booty 167 The State realty may be used but must not be wasted. . 168 FAOK State Pei'sonalty is at the mercy of the victor 169 Private realty 170 Private personalty 170 " Choses in action " 171 Plundering is wicked 171 Requisitions 174 How the docile German learnt the " better way " 175 To exhaust the country is de- plorable, but we mean to do it 175 Buccaneering levies 177 How to administer an invaded country 180 The Laws remain — with qualification 181 The Inhabitants must obey. . 182 Martial Law 182 Fiscal Policy 184 Occupation must be real, not fictitious 135 What neutrality means 187 A neutral cannot be all things to all men; therefore he must be nothing to any of them 187 But there are limits to this detachment 188 Duties of the neutral — bel- ligerents must be warned off 188 The neutral must guard its inviolable frontiers. It must intern the trespass- ers 189 Unneutral service 191 The " sinews of war " — loans to belligerents 191 Contraband of War 191 Good business 192 FoodstuflEs 192 Contraband on a small scale 193 And on a large scale 194 The practise differs 194 Who may pass — the Sick and the Wounded 195 Who may not pass — Pris- oners of War 196 Rights of the neutral 196 The neutral has the right to be left alone 197 Neutral territory is sacred . . 197 The neutral may resist a vio- lation of its territoiT " with all the means in his power " 197 Neutrality is presumed 198 The Property of Neutrals... 198 Diplomatic intercourse 199 THE WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I THE GtESMAN VIEW OF WAE Thei ideal Prince, so Machiavelli has told us, need not, and indeed should not, possess virtuous qualities, but he should always contrive to appear to possess them.^ The somber Florentine has been studied in Germany as he has been studied nowhere else and a double portion of his spirit has de- scended on the authors of this book. Herein the perfect oflBcer, like the perfect Prince, is taught that it is more important to be thought humane than to practise humanity ; the former may probably be use- ful but the latter is certainly inconvenient. Hence the peculiar logic of this book which con- sists for the most part in ostentatiously laying down unimpeachable rules and then quietly destroying them by debilitating exceptions. The civil popula- tion of an invaded country — the young officer is re-, minded on one page — is to be left undisturbed in 1 II Primcipe, cap. 18. 2 The War Book of the German General Staff mind, body, and estate, their honor is to be inviolate, their lives protected, and their property secure. To compel them to assist the enemy is brutal, to make them betray their own country is inhuman. Such is the general proposition. Yet a little while and the Manual descends to particulars. Can the officer com- pel the peaceful inhabitants to give information about the strength and disposition of his country's forces ? * Yes, answers the German War-Book, it is doubtless regrettable but it is often necessary. Should they be exposed to the fire of their own troops ? ^ Yes ; it may be indefensible, but its " main justification " is that it is " successful." Should the tribute of sup- plies levied upon them be proportioned to their abil- ity to pay it ? ^ 'No ; " this is all very well in theory but it would rarely be observed in practise." Should the forced labor of the inhabitants be limited to works which are not designed to injure their own country?^ Wo; this is an absurd distinction and impossible. Should prisoners of war be put to death ? 2 No ! the Hague Regulations, Art. 4'4 : " Any compulsion by a belligerent on the population of occupied territory to giite information as to the army of the other belligerent, or as to his means of defense, is prohibited." 3 No ! the English Manual of Military Law, ch. xiv, sec. 463. * Yes ! the Hague Regulations, Art. 52 : " They must be in proportion to the resources of the country " ; and to the same effect the English Manual of Military Law, sec. 416, and the British Requisitioning Instructions. 6 Yes ! the Hague Regulations, Arts. 23 and 52 ; also Actes et Documents (of the Conference), III, p. 120. The German View of War 3 It is always " ugly " but it is sometimes expedient. May one hire an assassin, or corrupt a citizen, or in- cite an incendiary? Certainly; it may not be reputable (anstdndig) , and honor may fight shy of it, but the law of war is less "touchy" (em- pfmdlich). Should the women and children — the old and the feeble — be allowed to depart before a bombardment begins ? On the contrary ; their pres- ence is greatly to be desired {ein Vortheil) — it makes the bombardment all the more effective. Should the civil population of a small and defense- less country be entitled to claim the right, provided they carry their arms openly and use them honorably, to defend their native land from the invader ? ® ISTo; they act at their peril and must, however sud- den and wanton the invasion, elaborate an organiza- tion or they will receive no quarter.'' We might multiply examples. But these are suf- ficient. It will be obvious that the German Staff are nothing if not casuists. In their brutality they are the true descendants of Clausewitz, the father of Prussian military tradition. 6 Yes ! the Hague Regulations, Art. 2 : " The population of a territory which has not been occupied who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invad- ing troops, without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents." 1 The whole of these propositions, revolting as they may appear, are taken almost literally from the text of the War Book, to which I refer the reader for their context. 4 The War Booh of the German General Staff " Laws of war are self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth nientioning, termed ' usages of war.' Now philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great blood- shed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated, for in such dangerous things as war the errors which proceed from the spirit of benevolence are the worst. ... To in- troduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. . . . War is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds." ^ The only difference between Clausewitz and his lineal successors is not that they are less brutal but that they are more disingenuous. When he comes to discuss that form of living on the country which is dignified by the name of requisitions, he roundly says they should be enforced. "by the fear of responsibility, punishment, and ill treatment which in such cases presses like a general weight on the whole population. . . . This resource has no Umits except those of the exhaustion, impov- erishment, and devastation of the whole country." * sClausewitz: Vom Kriege, I, Kap. 1 (2). ^Ilid. V, Kap. 14 (3). Clausewitz's definition of requisi- tions is " seizing everything which is to be found in the coun- try, without regard to meum and tuum." The German War Book after much prolegomenous sentiment arrives at the same conclusion eventually. The German Viei0 lof War 5 Our War Book is more discreet but not more merciful. Private property, it begins by saying, should always be respected. To take a man's prop- erty when he is present is robbery ; when he is absent it is " downright burglary." But if the " necessity of war " makes it advisable, " every sequestration, every appropriation, temporary or permanent, every use, every injury and all destruction are permissi- bl&" It is, indeed, unfortunate that the War Book when it inculcates " frightfulness " is never obscure, and that when it advises forbearance it is always ambigu- ous. The reader must bear in mind that the authors, in common with their kind in Germany, always en- force a distinction between Eriegsmanier and Eriegsraison,^'^ between theory and practise, between the rule and the exception. That in extreme cases such distinctions may be necessary is true; the mel- ancholy thing is that German writers make a system and indeed a virtue of them. In this respect the jurists are not appreciably superior to their soldiers. Brutality is bad, but a pedantic brutality is worse- in proportion as it is more reflective. Holtzendorff's 10 Kriegsraison I have translated as " the argument of war." " Necessity of war " is too free a rendering, and when neces- sity is urged " notig " or " NotwencUgkeit " is the term used in the original. Kreigsmanier is literally the " fashion of war " and means the customary rules of which Ereigsraison makes havoc by exceptions. 6 The War BooTc of the German General Staff Handhuch des Yollcerrechts, than which there is no more authoritative book in the legal literature of Ger- many, after pages of sanctification of " the natural right " to defend one's fatherland against invasion by a levee en masse, terminates the argument for a gener- ous recognition of the combatant status of the enemy with the melancholy qualification, " unless the Ter- rorism so often necessary in war does not demand the contrary." ^^ To " terrorize " the civil population of the enemy is, indeed, a first principle with German writers on the Art of War. Let the reader ponder carefully on the sinister sentence in the third paragraph of the War Book and the illuminating footnote from Moltke with which it is supported. The doctrine — which is at the foundation of all such progress as has been made by international law in regularizing and humanizing the conduct of war — that the sole object of it should be to disable the armed forces of the enemy, finds no countenance here. No, say the German staff, we must seek just as much (in gleicher Weise) to smash (zerstoren) the total " intellectual " (geistig), and material resources of the enemy. It is no exaggeration to interpret this as a counsel not merely to destroy the body of a nation, but to ruin its soul. The " Geist " of a people means in Ger- man its very spirit and finer essence. It means a 11 Holtzendorff, IV, 378. The German View of War 7 good deal more than intellect and but a little less than religion. The " Geist " of a nation is " the partnership in all science, the partnership in all art, the partnership in every virtue, and in all perfec- tion," which Burke defined as the true conception of the State. Hence it may be no accident but policy which has caused the Germans in Belgium to stable their horses in churches, to destroy municipal palaces, to defile the hearth, and bombard cathedrals. All this is scientifically calculated " to smash the total spiritual resources " of a people, to humiliate them, to stupefy them, in a word to break their " spirit." Let the reader also study carefully a dark sentence in that section of the War Book which deals with " Cunning and Deceit." There the German officer is instructed that " there is nothing in international law against " (steht volkerrechtlich nicMs entgegen) the exploitation of the crimes of third persons, " such as assassination, incendiarism, robbery and the like," to the disadvantage of the enemy. " There is noth- ing in international law against it ! " No, indeed. There are many things upon which international law is silent for the simple reason that it refuses to con- template their possibility. It assumes that it is deal- ing not with brutes but with men. International law is the etiquette of international society, and society, as it has been gravely said, is conducted on the as- sumption that murder will not be committed. We 8 The War Booh of the German General Staff do not carry revolvers in our pockets when we enter our clubs, or finger them when we shake hands with a stranger. ISTor, to adopt a very homely illustra- tion, does any hostess think it necessary to put up a notice in her drawing-room that guests are not al- lowed to spit upon the floor. But what should we think of a man who committed this disgusting of- fense, and then pleaded that there was nothing to show that the hostess had forbidden it? Human society, like political society, advances in propor- tion as it rests on voluntary morality rather than positive law. In primitive society everything is " taboo," because the only thing that will restrain the undisciplined passions of men is fear. Can it be that this is why the traveler in Germany finds everything " verboten," and that things which in our own country are left to the good sense and good breeding of the citizen have to be officiously forbid- den? Can it be that this people which is always making an ostentatious parade of its " culture " is still red in tooth and claw ? When a man boasts his breeding we instinctively suspect it ; indeed the boasfr is itself ill-bred. If the reader thinks these refiec- tions uncharitable, let him ponder on the treatment of Belgium. It will be seen therefore that the writers of the War Book have taken to heart the cynical maxim of Machiavelli that " a Prince should understand how The German View of War 9 to use well both the man and the beast." We shall have occasion to observe later in this introduction that the same maxim runs like Ariadne's thread through the labyrinth of German diplomacy. Machiavelli's dark counsel finds a responsive echo in Bismarck's cynical declaration that a diplomatic pretext can always be found for a war when you want one. When these things are borne in mind the reader will be able to understand how it is that the nation which has used the strongest language ^^ about the eternal inviolability of the neutrality of Belgium should be the first to violate it. The reader may ask, What of the Hague Conven- tions? They are international' agreements, to which Germany was a party, representing the fruition of years of patient endeavor to ameliorate the horrors of war. If they have any defect it is not that they go too far but that they do not go far enough. But of them and the humanitarian movement of which they are the expression, the German Staff has but a very poor opinion. They are for it the crest of a wave of " Sentimentalism and flabby emo- tion." (Sentimentalitdt und weicheler Gefuhls- schwdrmerei.) Such movements, our authors de- clare, are " in fundamental contradiction with the na- ture and object of war itself." They are rarely men- 12 In Holtzendorff's Eandbuch des Volkerrechts, passim. 10 The War Booh of the German General Staff tioned in this book and never respectfully. The reader will look in vain for such an incorporation of the Hague Eegulations in this official text-book aa has been made by the English War Office in our own Manual of Military Law. Nor is the reason far to seek. The German Government has never viewed with favor attempts to codify the laws and usages of war. Amiable sentiments, prolegomenous resolu- tions, protestations of " culture " and " humanity," she has welcomed with evangelical fervor. But the moment attempts are made to subject these volatile sentiments to pressure and liquefy them in the form of an agreement, she has protested that to particular- ize would be to " enfeeble humane and civilizing thoughts." ^^ ISTothing is more illuminating as to the respective attitudes of Germany and England to such international agreements than the discussions which took place at the Hague Conference of 1907 on the desirability of imposing in express terms re- strictions upon the laying of submarine mines in order to protect innocent shipping in neutral waters. The representatives of the two Powers agreed in ad- mitting that it did not follow that because the Con- vention had not prohibited a certain act it thereby sanctioned it. But whereas the English representa- tives regarded this as a reason whj' the Convention 13 Baron Marschall von Bieberstein. Aetes et Documents (1907), J. 86. The Oerman View of War 11 could never be too explicit," the spokesman of Ger- many urged it as a reason why it could never be too ambiguous. In the view of the latter, not interna- tional law but " conscience, good sense, and the senti- ment of duties imposed by the principles of human- ity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sol- diers and sailors and the most efficacious guarantees against abuse." ^^ Conscience, " the good German Conscience," as a German newspaper has recently called it, is, as we have seen, an accommodating mon- itor, and in that forum there are only too many spe- cial pleaders. If the German conscience is to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of German practises, then it is a clear case of " the right arm strikes and the left arm is called upon to decide the lawfulness of the blow." It is, indeed, difficult to see, if Baron von Bieberstein's view of international agreements be the right one, why there should be any such agree- ments at all. The only rule which results from such an Economy of Truth would be : All things are law- ful but all are not expedient. And such, indeed, is the conclusion of the German War Book. The cynicism of this book is not more remarkable than its affectation. There are pages in it of the most admirable sentiment — witness those about the turpitude of plundering and the inviolability of neu- i4 4ctes et Documents (1907), I, 281 (Sir Edward Satow). 15 Ihid., p. 282 ( Baron Marsehall von Bieberstein ) , and p. 86. 12 The War Book of the German General Staff tral territory. Taken by themselves, they form the most scathing denunciation of the conduct of the German army in Belgium that could well be con- ceived. Let the reader weigh carefully the follow- ing: Movable private property which in earlier times was the incontestable booty of the victor is held by modern opinion to be inviolable. The carrying away of gold, watches, rings, trinkets, or other objects of value is therefore to be regarded as robbery, and correspondingly punishable. No plundering but downright burglary is it for a man to take away things out of an unoccupied house or at a time when the occupant happens to be absent. Forced contributions (Kriegschatzungen) are de- nounced as " a form of plundering " rarely, if ever, to be justified, as requisitions may be, by the plea of necessity. The victor has no right, the Book adds, to practise them in order to recoup himself for the cost of the war, or to subsidize an operation against the nation whose territory is in his occupation. To extort them as a ransom from the violence of war is* equally unjustifiable: thus out of its own mouth is the German staff condemned and its " buccaneering levies " upon the forlorn inhabitants of Belgium held up to reprobation. Still more significant are the remarks on the right and duty of neutrals. The inviolability of neutral The German View of War 13 territory and the sanctity of the Geneva Convention are the only two principles of international law which the German War Book admits to be laws of perfect obligation. A neutral State, it declares, not only may, but must forbid the passage of troops to the subjects of both belligerents. If either attempts it, the neutral State has the right to resist " with all the means in its power." However overwhelming the necessity, no belligerent must succumb to the tempta- tion to trespass upon the neutral territory. If this be true of a neutral State it is doubly true of a neu- tralized State. No one has been so emphatic on this point as the German jurists whose words the War Book is so fond of praying in aid. The Treaty of London guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium is declared by them to be " a landmark of progress in the formation of a European polity " and " up till now no Power has dared to violate a guarantee of this kind." i« " He who injures, a right does injury to the cause of right itself, and in these guarantees lies the express obli- gation to prevent such things. . . . Nothing could make the situation of Europe more insecure than an egotistical repudiation by the great States of these duties of inter- national fellowship." ^^ 16 Holtzendorff, III, pp. 93, 108, 109. mUd. The whole subject (of the neutrality of Belgiiun) is examined by the present writer in War, its Conduct and its Legal Results (John Murray). 14 The War Boole of the German General Stajf The reader will, perhaps, hardly need to be cau- tioned against the belligerent footnotes with which the General Staff has illuminated the text. They are, as he will observe, mainly directed towards illus- trating the peculiar depravity of the French in 1870. They are certainly suspect, and all the more so, be- cause the notorious malpractices of the Germans ia that campaign are dismissed, where they are noticed at all, with the airy remark that there were peculiar circumstances, or that they were unauthorized, or that the " necessity of war " afforded sufficient justi- fication. All this is ex parte. So too, to a large extent, is the parade of professors in the footnotes. They are almost always German professors and, as we shall see later, the German professor is, and is compelled to be, a docile instrument of the State. The book has, of course, a permanent value apart from the light it throws upon contemporary issues. Some of the chapters, su.ch as that on the right and duties of neutrals, represent a carefully considered theory, little tainted by the cynicism Avhich disfigures ' the rest of the book. It should be of great interest and value to those of us who are engaged in studying the problem of bringing economic pressure to bear upon Germany, by enclosing her in the meshes of conditional contraband. So, too, the chapter on the treatment of Prisoners of War will have a special, The German View of War 15 and for some a poignant, interest just now. The chapter on the treatment of occupied territory is, of course, of profound significance in view of the pres- ent state of Belgium. CHAPTEE II GEEMAW DIPLOMACY AND STATECEAFT BisMABCK, wrote Hohenlohe, who ultimately suo- ceeded him as Imperial Chancellor, " handles every- thing with a certain arrogance (Uehernut), and this gives him a considerable advantage in dealing with the timid minds of the older European diplomacy." This native arrogance became accentuated after the triumphs of 1870' until, in Hohenlohe's words, Bis- marck became " the terror " of all European diplo- matists. That word is the clue to German diplo- macy. The terrorism which the Germans practise in war they indoctrinate in peace. It was a favorite saying of Clausewitz, whose military writings enjoy an almost apostolic authority in Germany, that War and Peace are but a continuation of one another — " War is nothing but a continuation of political in- tercourse with a mixture of other means." ^ The same lesson is written large on every page of von del Goltz ^ and Bernhardi.^ In other words, war pro- 1 Vom EHege, VIII, Kap. 6 (b). 2 The Nation in Arms, see. 3 : " Policy creates the total situation in which the State engages in the struggle"; and again, " it is clear that the political action and military action ought always to be closely united." a Germany and the Newt War: "The appropriate and con- 16 German Diplomacy and Statecraft 17 jects its dark shadow over the whole of German diplomacy. The dominant postures in " shining armor " at critical moments in the peace of Europe, and the menacing invocations of the " mailed fist " are not, as is commonlyj supposed, a passionate idiosyncrasy of the present Emperor. They are a legacy of the Bismarckian tradition. To keep Eu- rope in a perpetual state of nervous apprehension by somber hints of war was, as we shall see, the favorite method by which Bismarck attained his diplomatic ends. For the German Ohancellerie rumors of wars are of only less political efficacy than wars themselves. After 1870> metaphors of war became part of the nor- mal vocabulary of the German Government in times of peace. !Not only so but, as will be seen in the two succeeding chapters, a belligerent emotion suffused the temperament of the whole German people, and alike in the State Universities, and the stipendiary Press, there was developed a cult of War for its own sake. The very vocabulary of the Kaiser's speeches has been coined in the lecture-rooms of Berlin Uni- versity. Now War is at best but a negative conception and Bcious employment of war as a political means has always led to happy results." And again, "The relations between two States must often be termed a latent war which is provision- ally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a position justifies the employment of hostile methods, just .as war itself does, since in such a case both parties are determined to employ them." 18 The War Booh of the German General Staff its adoption as the Credo of German thinkers since 1870 explains why their contributions to Political Science have been so sterile. More than that, it ac- counts for the decline in public morality. Polit- ically, Germany, as we shall see, has remained absolutely stagnant. She is now no nearer self-gov- ernment than she was in 1870 ; she is much farther removed from it than she was in 1848. The inevita- ble result has been, that politics have for her come to mean little more than intrigues in high places, the deadly struggle of one contending faction at court against another, with the peace of Europe as pawns in the game. The German Empire, like the Prus- sian kingdom, has little more than a paper constitu- tion, a lex imperfecta as Gneist called it. The Eeichstag has little power and less prestige, and its authority as a representative assembly has been so enervated by the shock tactics practised by the Gov- ernment in forcing, or threatening to force, a series of dissolutions to punish contumacious behavior, that it is little better than a debating society. A vote of censure on the Government has absolutely no effect* Of the two powers, the Army and the Eeichstag, the Army is infinitely the stronger ; there is no law such as our Army Annual Act which subjects it to Par- liamentary control. Even the Bundesrath* (or * The Bvmdesrath is a Second Chamber, a Cabinet or Exec- utive Council, and a Federal Congress of State Governments German Diplomacy and Statecraft 19 Federal Council), strong as it is, is hardly stronger than the German General Staff, for the real force which welds the German Empire together is not so much this council of plenipotentiaries from the States as the military hegemony of Prussia and the military conventions between her and the Southern States by which the latter placed their armies under her supreme control. In this shirt of steel the body politic is enclosed as in a vice. Wothing illustrates the political lifelessness of Ger- many, the arrogance of its rulers and the docility of its people (for whom, as will be seen, the former have frequently expressed the utmost contempt) more than the tortuous course of German diplomacy during the years 1870-1900. I shall attempt to sketch very briefly the political history of those years, particularly in the light of the policy of calculated Terrorism by which the German Chancellerie sought to impose its yoke upon Europe. Well did Lord Odo Eussell say that " Bismarck's sayings inspired respect " (he might, had he not been speaking as an ambassador, have used, like Hohenlohe, a stronger word) " and his silences apprehension." ^ If it be all in one. Indeed, its resemblance to a Second Chamber is superficial. It can dissolve the Reichstag when it pleases. See Laband, Die Entwickelung des Bundesraths, Jahrbuch des OeffentHohen Rechts, 1907, Vol. I, p. 18, and also his Deutsehes Staatsrecht, Vol. I, passim. B I have based the remarks which follow on a close study of 30 The War Booh of the German General Staff true, as von der Goltz says it is, that national strategy is the expression of national character and that the German method is, to use his words, " a brutal of- fensive," nothing could bring out that amiable char- acteristic more clearly than the study of Bismarck's diplomacy. The German is brutal in war just be- cause he is insolent in peace. Count Herbert " can be very insolent," vsrrote the servile Busch of Bis- marck's son, " which in diplomacy is very useful." * Bismarck's attitude towards treaty obligations is one of the chief clues to the history of the years 1870-1900. International policy, he once wrote, is " a fluid element which under certain conditions will solidify, but on a change of atmosphere reverts to its German, French, and English anthoritiea — among others upon the following: Bismarck, Gedajriken und Erinnerungen; Ho- henlohe, DenTcwilrdigkeiten ; Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine ; de Broglie, Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron; Fitzmaurice, The Life of Lord Granville. All these are the works of statesmen who could legitimately say of their times quorum pars magna fui. Lord Fitzmaurice's book, apart from its being the work of a statesman, whose knowledge of foreign affairs is equaled by few and surpassed by none, is indis- pensable to a study of Anglo-German relations since 1850; being based on diplomatic sources, in particular the despatches* of Lord Odo Russell. Some passages in The Life of Lord Lyt- ton are also illimiinating, likewise the essays of that prince of French historians, Albert Sorel. But I have, of course, also gone to the text of treaties and original documents. 6 The study which follows is based on cosmopolitan mate- rials: The reader must exercise great caution in using polit- ical memories such as those of Bismarck. In autobiography, of all forms of history, as Goethe observes in the preface to Wahrheit und Dichtung, it is supremely difficult for the writer German Diplomacy and Statecraft 21 original condition." ^ The process of solidification is represented by the making of treaties; that of melting is a euphemism for the breaking of them. To reinsure Grerman's future by taking out policies in different countries in the form of secret treaties of alliance while concealing the existence of other and conflicting treaties seemed to him not only astute but admirable. Thus having persuaded Austria- Hungary to enter into a Triple Alliance with Ger- many and Italy by holding out as the inducement the promise of protection against Eussia, Bismarck by his own subsequent confession concluded a secret treaty with Russia against Austria. To play off each of these countries against the other by inde- pendent professions of exclusive loyalty to both was the Leit-^motif of his diplomacy. Nor did he treat the collective guarantees of European treaties with any greater respect. Good faith was a negotiable security. Hence his skilful exploitation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856) when he to escape self-deception; he is so apt to read himself back- wards and to mistake society's influence upon him for his in- fluence upon society. In the case of Bismarck in particular, his autobiography often took the form of apologetics, and he invests his actions with a foresight which they did not always possess, while, on the other hand, he is so anxious to depreci- ate his rivals (particularly Gortchakoff) that he often robs himself of the prestige of victory. Hohenlohe is, in this re- spect, a far safer guide. He was not as great a man as Bis- marck, but he was an infinitely more honest me. 7 OecUmken und Erinnerungen, Bd. II, Kap. 29, p. 287. S3 The 'War Booh of the German General Staff wished to secure tlie friendly neutrality of Russia during the Franco-Prussian War. Eussia, it will be remembered, suddenly and to every one's surprise, denounced those clauses. The European Powers, on the initiative of England, disputed Eussia's claim to denounce niotu proprio an international obligation of so solemn a character, and Bismarck responded to Lord Granville's initiative in words of ostentatious propriety : "That the Eussian Circular of the 19th October [denoimeing the clauses in question] had taken him by surprise. That while he had always held that the Treaty of 1856 pressed with undue severity upon Eus- sia, he entirely disapproved of the manner adopted and the time selected by the Eussian Government to force the revision of the Treaty." ^ ISTearly a generation later Bismarck confessed, and prided himself on the confession, in his Eeminis- cences,* that he had himself instigated Eussia to de- nounce the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty ; that he had not only instigated this repudiation but had initiated it as aifording " an opportunity of improv- ing our relations with Eussia." Eussia succumbed 8 Notes of Lord Odo Russell, British Ambassador at Berlin, of a conversation with Bismarck, reported in a despatch of November 22nd, 1870, to Lord Granville, and published in the Parliamentary Papers of 1871 [Cd. 245]. 9 Qedamken und Erinnerungen, II, Kap. 23. German Diplomacy and Statecraft 33 to the temptation, but, as Bismarck cheerfully ad- mits, not without reluctance. This, however, is not all : Europe " saved her face " by putting on record in the Conference of London (1871) a Protocol, subscribed by the Pleni- potentiaries of all the Powers, in which it was laid down as " an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can repudiate treaty engagements or modify treaty provisions, except with the consent of the con- tracting parties by mutual agreement." This instrument has been called, not inaptly, the foundation of the public law of Europe. It was in virtue of this principle that Russia was obliged to submit the Eusso-Turkish Treaty of Saji Stefano, and with it the fruits of her victories in 1877-8 to the arbitrament of the Congress of Berlin. At that Con- gress Bismarck played his favorite role of " honest broker," and there is considerable ground for believ- ing that he sold the same stock several times over to different clients and pocketed the " differences." What kind of cConflicting assurances he gave to the different Powers will never be fully known, but there is good ground for believing that in securing the temporary occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina he had in mind the ultimate Germanization of the Adriatic, and that domination of the Mediterranean at the ex- 24 The War Book of the German General Staff pense of England which has long been the dream of German publicists from Treitschke onward.'-" What, however, clearly emerged from the Congress, and was embodied in Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty, was, that Austria was to occupy and, administer Bosnia- Herzegovina under a European mandate. She ac- quired lordship without ownership; in other words, the territory became a Protectorate. Her title, as it originated in, so it was limited by, the Treaty of Berlin. Exactly thirty years later, in the autumn of 1908, Austria, acting in concert with Germany, abused her fiduciary position and without any man- date from the Powers annexed the territory of which she had been made the guardian. This arbitrary ac- tion was a violation of the principle to which she and Germany had subscribed at the London Conference, and Sir Edward Grey attempted, as Lord Granville had done before him, to preserve the credit of the public law of Europe by a conference which should consider the compensation due to Servia for an act which so gravely compromised her security. Eus- sia, France, and Italy joined with Great Britain in this heroic, if belated, attempt to save the interna- tional situation. It was at this moment (Marchj 1909) that Germany appeared on the scene " in shining armor," despatched a veiled ultimatum to 10 See the remarkable articles, based on unpublished docu- ments by M. Hanotaux, in the Revue des deux Mondes, Sept. 15th and Oet. lat, 1908, on " Le Congrfes de Berlin." German Diplomacy and Statecraft 35 Kussia, with a covert threat to mobilize, and forced her to abaadon her advocacy of the claims of Servia and, with them, of the public law of Europe. Thus did History repeat itself. Gennany stood forth once again as the chartered libertine of Europe whom no faith could bind and no duty oblige. May it not be said of her what Machiavelli said of Alex- ander Borgia : " E non fu mai uomo che avesse mag- giore efficacia in asseveraie, e che con maggiori giura- menti affermasse una cosa, e che I'osservasse meno." ^^ It would carry me far beyond the limits of this Introduction to trace in like detail the German policy of Scharfmacherei which consisted, to use the mor- dant phrase of M. Hanotaux, in putting up to auction that which is not yours to sell and, not infrequently, knocking it down to more than one bidder. That Bismarck encouraged Russian ambitions in Asia and French ambitions in Africa with the view of making mischief between each of them and England is no- torious.^^ In his earlier attitude he was content to 11 " No man ever had a more eflfeetive manner of asseverating, or made promises vrith more solemn protestations, or observed them less," II Principe, Cap. 18. 12 Cf. Lord Ampthill'8 despatch (Aug. 25th, 1884). "He has discovered an unexplored mine of popularity in starting a colonial policy which public opinion persuades itself to be anti- English, and the slumbering theoretical envy of the Germans at our wealth and our freedom has taken the form of abuse of everything English in the Press."— Pitzmaurice's Granville, II, 358. 26 The War Booh of the German General Staff play the role of tertius gaudens; in his later he ■wa8 an active agent provocateur — particularly during the years 1883-1885, when he joined in the scramble for Africa. The earlier attitude is well indicated in Hohenlohe's revelations, that Bismarck regarded French colonial operations as a timely diversion from the Ehine, and would not be at all sorry " to see the English and French locomotives come into collision," and a French annexation of Morocco would have had his benevolent approval. After 1883 his attitude was less passive but not less mischievous. Ten years earlier he had told Lord Odo Eussell that colonies " would only be a cause of weakness " to Germany. Eut by 1883 he had been slowly and reluctantly con- verted to the militant policy of the Colonial party and the cry of Welt politiJc was as good as a war^ scare for electioneering purposes. It was in these days that hatred of England, a hatred conceived in jealousy of her world-Empire, was brought forth, and the obstetrics of Treitschke materially assisted its birth. Bismarck, however, as readers of his Reminiscences are weU aware, had an intellectual dislike of England based on her forms of govern- ment. He loved the darker ways of diplomacy and he thought our Cabinet system fatal to them. He had an intense dislike of Parliamentarism, he de- spised alliances "for which the Crown is not an- swerable but only the fleeting cabinet of the day," German Diplomacy and Statecraft 27 and above all lie hated plain dealing and publicity. " It is astonishing," wrote Lord Ampthill, " how cordially Bismarck hates our Blue Books." The story of Bismarck's diplomatic relations with England during these years exhibits the same fea- tures of duplicity tempered by violence as marked his relations with the rest of Europe. He acquired Samoa by a deliberate breach of faith, and his pre- tense of negotiations with this country to delimit the frontiers of English and German acquisitions while he stole a march upon us were properly stigmatized by the Colonial Office as " shabby behavior." Whether he really egged on France to " take Tunis " in order to embroil her with England will perhaps never be really known, ^^ but it was widely suspected in France that his motives in supporting, if not in- stigating,^* the colonial policy of Jules Ferry would not bear a very close examination. That he re- garded it as a timely diversion from the Rhine is certain; that he encouraged it as a promising em- barrassment to England is probable. There can be no doubt that much the same construction is to be put on his attitude towards Russia's aspirations in 13 For a careful examination of the story see Pitzmaurice, II, 234 and 429. 1* There is a spirited, but not altogether convincing, vindi- cation of Ferry in Eambaud's Jules Ferry, p. 395. It is not Ferry's honesty that is in question, but his perspicacity. 38 The War Booh of the German General Staff Asia; that they should divert Eussia from Europe was necessary; that they might entangle her with England was desirable. Eear of Eussia has, in fact, always been an obses- sion of the German Government. That fear is the just Nemesis of Frederick the Great's responsibility for the infamous Partition of Poland. The reader, who wants to understand the causes of this, cannot do better than study an old map of the kingdom of Poland, and compare it with a map of Poland after the first and second Partitions. The effect of those cynical transactions was to extinguish an ancient " buffer state," separating Prussia, Austria, and Eus- sia, and by extinguishing it to bring them into menacing contiguity with each other. Never has any crime so haunted its perpetrators. Poland has been the permanent distraction of the three nations who dismembered her, each perpetually suspicious of the other two, and this fact is the main clue to the history of Eastern Europe.^® The fear of Eussia, and of a Eusso-French or a Eusso-Austrian Alliance, is the dominant feature of Bismarck's diplomacy. He ■ was, indeed, the evil genius of Eussia for, by his own confession,^® he intrigued to prevent her from 15 Its profound reactions have been worked out by the hand of a master in Sorel's L'Europe et la Revolution franQoAse, and, in particular, in his La Question d'Orient, which is a searching analysis of these tortuous intrigues. 18 Cf. Bismarck's Erinnerungen (the chapter on the Alvens- German Diplomacy and Statecraft 39 pursuing a liberal policy towards Poland, for fear that she would thereby be drawn into friendship with France. To induce her to break faith with Russia, her Polish subjects in one case, and with Europe in another — the former by suppressing the Polish constitutional movement; the latter by re- pudiating the Black Sea clauses — was to isolate her from Europa German writers to-day afFect to speak of " Muscovite barbarism " and " Oriental des- potism," but it has been the deliberate policy of Germany to cut Russia off from the main stream of European civilization — to turn her face Eastwards, thereby Bismarck hoped, to quote his own words, to " weaken her pressure on our Eastern frontiers." But Bismarck's contempt for treaties and his love for setting other Powers by the ears were venial com- pared with his policy of Terrorism. His attitude to France from 1870 to the day of his retirement from office — and it has been mis-stated many times by his successors — was very much that which Newman ascribed to the Erastian view of the treatment of the church — " to keep her low " and in a perpetual state of terror-stricken servility. That this is no exaggera- tion will be apparent from what follows here about leben Convention) : " It was our interest to oppose the party in the Russian Cabinet which had Polish proclivities ... be- cause a Polish-Russian policy was calculated to vitalize that Russo-French sympathy against which Prussia's effort had been directed since the peace of Paris." 30 The War Booh of the Oerman General Staff the war scares with which he terrified France, and with France Europe also, in the years 1873-5, the years, when, as our ambassador at Paris, Lord Lytton, has put it, he " played with her like a cat with a mouse." " Perhaps the most illuminating account of these tenebrous proceedings is to be derived from Hohenlohe, who accepted the offer of the German Embassy at Paris in May, 1874. The post was no easy one. There had already been a " scare " in the previous December, when Bismarck menaced the Due de Broglie with war, using the attitude of the French Bishops as a pretext ; ^® and, although Hohen- lohe's appointment was at first regarded as an eireni- con, there followed a period of extreme tension, when, as the Due Decazes subsequently confessed, French Ministers were " living at the mercy of the smallest incident, the least mistake." The truth about the subsequent waf scare of 1875 is still a matter of speculation, but the documents published of late years by de Broglie and Hanotaux, and the despatches of Lord Odo Eussell, have thrown considerable suspicion of a very positive kind on 17 Life of Lord Lytton, II, pp. 260 seq. On the whole story see Hohenlohe passim; also Hanotaux, Vol. Ill, ch. iv; de Broglle's Gontaut-Biron and Fitzmauriee's Granville. The cheerfully malevolent Busch is also sometimes illuminating. 18 It was on this occasion that, according to Hanotaux, quoting from a private document of the Due Decazes, Lord Odo Russell reported an interview with Bismarck, in which the latter said he wanted " to finish France off." German Diplomacy and Statecraft 31 Bismarck's plea that it was all a malicious invention of Gontaut-Biron, the French Ambassador, and of Gortchakoff. A careful collation of the passages in Hohemlohe's Memoirs goes far to confirm these sus- picions, and, incidentally, to reveal Bismarck's inner diplomacy in a very sinister light. Hohenlohe was appointed to succeed the unhappy Amim, who had made himself obnoxious to Bismarck by his inde- pendence, and he was instructed by the Chancellor, that it was to the interest of Germany to see that France should become " a weak Republic and an- archical," so as to be a negligible quantity in Euro- pean politics, on which the Emperor William I re- marked to Hohenlohe that " that was not a policy," and was not " decent," subsequently confiding to Hohenlohe that Bismarck was trying " to drive him more and more into war " ; whereupon Hohenlohe confidently remarked : " I know nothing of it, and I should be the first to hear of it." Hohenlohe soon found reason to change his opinion. As Gortchakoff' remarked to Decazes, " they have a difficult way with diplomatists at Berlin," and Hohenlohe was in- structed to press the French Ministry for the recall of Gontaut-Biron, against whom Bismarck complained on account of his Legitimist opinions and his friend- ship with the Empress Augusta. Thereupon, that supple and elusive diplomat, the Due Decazes, par- ried by inviting an explanation of the menacing 33 The War Booh of the German General Staff words whick Gontaut-Biron declared had been ut- tered to him by Radowitz, a Councilor of Legation in Berlin, to the effect that " it would be both politic and Christian to declare war at once," the Duke adding shrewdly ; " One doesn't invent these things." Hohenlohe in his perplexity tried to get at the truth from Bismarck, and met with what seems to us a most disingenuous explanation. Bis- marck said Badowitz denied the whole thing, but added that, even if he had said it, Gontaut-Biron had no right to report it. He admitted, however, that Eadowitz made mischief and " egged on " Billow, the Foreign Secretary. " You may be sure," he added, "that these two between them would land ns in a war in four weeks if I didn't act as safety-valve." Hohenlohe took advantage of this confession to press for the despatch of Eadowitz to some distant Em- bassy " to cool himself." To this Bismarck assented, but a few days later declared that Eadowitz was in- dispensable. When Hohenlohe attempted to sound Bismarck on the subject the Chancellor showed the utmost reserve. After the war scare had passed, Decazes related to Hohenlohe an earlier example of Imperial truculence on the part of Arnim, who, on leaving after a call, turned round as he reached the door and called out : " I have forgotten one thing. Recollect that I forbid you to get possession of Tunis"; and when Decazes affected to regard the German Diplomacy and Statecraft 33 matter as a jest, Amim repeated with emphasis: " Yes, I forbid it." Hohenlohe adds that an exami- nation of his predecessor's papers convinced him that - Arnim did not speak without express authorization. When the elections for the French Chamber are imminent in the autumn of 1877, Bismarck informs Hohenlohe that Germany will adopt " a threatening attitude," but " the scene will be laid in Berlin, not in Paris." The usual Press campaign followed, much to the vexation of the Emperor, who complained to Hohenlohe that the result of these "pin-pricks" (Nadelstiche) would provoke the French people be- yond endurance. In studying this calculated trueulence we have to remember that in Germany foreign and domestic policy are inextricably interwoven. A war scare is with the German Government a favorite method of bringing the Reichstag to a docile frame of mind and diverting it from inconvenient criticism of the Government's policy at home. Moreover, just as war is, in von der Goltz's words, a reflection of na- tional character, so is diplomacy. A nation's char- acter is revealed in its diplomacy just as a man's breeding is revealed in his conversation.^® We must therefore take into account the polity of Germany and its political standards. 19 Cf. Albert Sorel: "La diplomatic est I'expression dea moeurs politiques"; and cf. his remarkable essay, "La Dip- lomatie et le progr6s," in Essais d'Mstovre et de oritique. 34 The War Boole of the German General Staff The picture of the Prussian autocraxjy in the later days of Bismarck's rule which we can reconstruct from different entries in Hohenlohe's Journal from the year 1885 onwards is a very somber one. It is a picture of suspicion, treachery, vacillation, and calumny in high places which remind one of nothing so much as the Court of the later Bourbons. It is a regime of violence abroad and dissensions at home. Bismarck's health was failing him, and with his health his temper. He complained to Hohenlohe that his head " grew hot " the moment he worked, and the latter hardly dared to dispute with him on the gravest matters of State. Headers of Busch wiU remember his frank disclosures of the anarchy of the Foreign Office when Bismarck was away: "if the Chief gives violent instructions, they are carried out with still greater violence." In Hohenlohe we begin to see all the grave implications of this. Bis- marck, with what Lord Odo Eussell called his pas- sion for authority, was fond of sneering at English foreign policy as liable to be blown about with every wind of political doctrine ; but if Parliamentary con- trol has its defects, autocracy has defects more in- sidious stiU. Will becomes caprice, and foreign re- lations are at the mercy of bureaucrats who have no sense of responsibility so long as they can adroitly flatter their master. When a bureaucrat trained under this system arrives at power, the result may German Diplomacy and Statecraft 35 be nothing less than disastrous. This was what hap- pened when Bismarck's instrument, Holstein, con- centrated power into his own hands at the Foreign Office ; and as the Neue Freie Presse ^^ pointed out in its disclosures on his fall (1906), the results are writ large in the narrowly averted catastrophe of a war with France in 1905. Bismarck's disciples had all his calculated violence without its timeliness. In the Foreign Office, Hohenlohe discovered a kind of anarchical " republicanism " — " nobody," in Bis- marck's frequent absence " will own responsibility to any one else." " Bismarck is nervously excit- able," writes Hohenlohe in March, 1885, " and har- asses his subordinates and frightens them, so that they see more behind his expression than there really is." Like most small men, in terror themselves, they terrorized others. Moreover, the disinclination of the Prussian mind, which Bismarck himself once noted, to accept any responsibility which is not cov- ered by instructions, tended to reduce the German Ambassadors abroad to the level of mere aides-de- camp. Hohenlohe found himself involved in the same embarrassments at Paris as Count Miinster did in London. Any one who has studied the inner his- tory of German foreign policy must have divined a secret diplomacy as devious of its kind as that of 20 June 3rd, 1906, in a remarkable article entitled "Hol- stein," which is a close study of the inner organization of the German Foreign Ofllce and its traditions. 36 The War Booh of the German General Stajf Louis XV. Of its exact bearings little is known, but a great deal may reasonably be suspected. There is always the triple diplomacy of the Court, the Im- perial Chancery, and lastly the Diplomatic Service, which is not necessarily in the confidence of either. The same debilitating influences of a dictatorship were at work in Ministerial and Parliamentary life. Bismarck had an equal contempt for the collective responsibility of Ministers and for Parliamentary control. Having done his best to deprive the Mem- bers of the Eeichstag of power, he was annoyed at their irresponsibility. He called men like Bennig- sen and Windhorst silly schoolboy politicians (Karl- chen-Miesnick-Tertianen) or " lying scoundrels " (verlogene Halunken). He was surprised that rep- resentation without control resulted in faction. It is the iN'emesis of his own political doctrines. When he met with opposition he clamored for repressive measures, and could not understand some of the scruples of the Liberals as to the exceptional laws against the Socialists. Moreover, having tried, like another Richelieu, to reduce his fellow-Ministers to the position of clerks, he was annoyed at their want of corporate spirit, and when they refused to follow him into his retirement, he declaimed against their apostasy in having " left him in the lurch." He talked at one time of abolishing the Beichstag; at another of having a special post created for himself German Diplomacy and Statecraft 37 as "General-Adjutant." He complained of over- work — and his energy was Titanic — but lie in- sisted on keeping his eye on everything, conscien- tiously enough, because, he tells Hohenlohe, "he could not put his name to things which did not reflect his own mind." But perhaps the gravest moral of it all is the Nemesis of deception. It is difficult to be both loved and feared, said Machiavelli. There is a somber irony in the remark of the Czar to the Em- peror in 1892, which the latter repeated to Hohen- lohe. Bismarck had been compelled to retire be- cause he had failed to induce the Emperor to violate Germany's contractual obligations to Austria by re- newing his secret agreement with Russia, and he con- soled himself in his retirement with the somewhat unctuous reflection that he was a martyr to the cause of Russo-German friendship, betrayed, according to him, by Caprivi. " Do you know," said the young Emperor (in August, 1892), " the Czar has told me he has every trust in Caprivi; whereas when Bis- marck has said anything to him he has always had , the conviction that ' he is tricking me.' " We are reminded of the occasion when Talleyrand told the truth so frankly that his interlocutor persisted in regarding it as an elaborate form of deception. After all, there are advantages, even in diplomacy, in being what SchuvaJoff called Caprivi, a " too hon- est man." It was the same with the domestic atmos- 38 The War Booh of the German General Staff phere. Bismarck, an adept at deceiving, is always complaining of deception; a master of intrigue, he is always declaiming against the intrigues of others. He inveighs against the Empress Augusta: "for fifty years she has been my opponent with the Em- peror." He lived in an atmosphere of distrust, he was often insolent, and always suspicious. It af- fected all his diplomatic intercourse, and was not at all to Hohenlohe's taste. " He handles everything with a certain arrogance (Ueiermut)," once wrote Hohenlohe (as we have already said) of a discussion with him over foreign affairs. " This has always heen his way." All these tendencies came to a head when the scep- ter passed from the infirm hands of William I to those of a dying King, around whose death-bed the military party and the Chancellor's party began to intrigue for influence over the yoimg Prince whose advent to empire was hourly expected. Of these in- trigues Hohenlohe, who was now Statthalter of Al- sace-Lorraine, soon began to feel the effects without at first discovering the cause. He loved the people of the Eeichsland, was a friend of France, and an advocate of liberal institutions, and in this spirit he strove to administer the incorporated territories. Eut the military party worked against him, hoping to secure the abolition of the moderate measure of local government and Eeichstag representation which German Diplomacy/ and Statecraft 39 the Provinces possessed; and wheai the latter re- turned a hostile majority to the Eeichstag they redoubled their efforts for a policy of " Thorough." Bismarck gave but a lukevrarm support to Hohenlohe and insisted on the enforcement of drastic passport regulations, which, combined vrith the Schnaebele affair (on v?hich the Memoirs are very reticent), al- most provoked France to War — naturally enough, in the opinion of Hohenlohe, and inevitably, accord- ing to the forebodings of the German Military At- tache at Paris. To Hohenlohe's imploring repre- sentations Bismarck replied with grim jests about Alva's rule in the Netherlands, adding that it is all done to show the French " that their noise doesn't alarm us." Meanwhile Switzerland was alienated, France injured, and Austria suspicious. But Hohen- lohe, after inquiries in Berlin aud Baden, began to discover the reason. Bismarck feared the influence of the military party over the martial spirit of Prince William, and was determined to show himself equally militant in order to secure his dynasty. " His sole object is to get his son Herbert into the saddle," said Bleichroder ; " so there is no hope of an improve- ment in Alsace-Lorraine," — although Prince Her- bert alienated everybody by his insolence, which was so gross that the Prince of Wales (King Edward), at this time in Berlin, declared that he could scarcely restrain himself from showing him the door. 40 The War Booh of the German General Staff The leader of the military party, Waldersee, ■wag hardly more public-spirited. He had, according to Eismarck, been made Chief of Staff by Moltke, over the heads of more competent men, because he waa more docile than they. Between these military and civil autocracies the struggle for the possession of the present Emperor raged remorselessly, and with appalling levity they made the peace of two great nations the pavnis in the game. The young Em- peror is seen in Hohenlohe's Memoirs feeling his way, groping in the dark; but those who, like the Grand Duke of Baden, knew the strength of his character, foresaw the end. At first, he " doesn't trust himself to hold a different opinion from Bis- marck " ; but, " as soon as he perceives that Bis- marck doesn't teU him everything," predicted the Grand Duke, "there will be trouble." Meanwhile Waldersee was working for war, for no better reason than that he was getting old, and spoiling for a fight before it was too late for him to take the field. Eor Bismarck's dismissal there were various causes : differences in domestic policy and in foreign, and an absolute impasse on the question whether Bismarck's fellow-Ministers were to be treated as colleagues or subordinates. " Bismarck," said Ca- privi afterwards, " had made a treaty with Russia by which we guaranteed her a free hand in Bulgaria and Constantinople, and Eussia bound herself to Oerman Diplomacy and Statecraft 41 reanain neutral in a war with Franca That would have meant the shattering of the Triple Alliance." Moreover, the relations of Emperor and Chancellor were, at the last, disfigured by violent scenes, during which the Kaiser, according to the testimony of every on^ showed the most astonishing dignity and re- straint. But it may all be summed up in the words of the Grrand Duke of Baden, reechoed by the Em- peror to Hohenlohe, it had to be a choice between the dynasties of HohenzoUem and Bismarck. The end came to such a period of fear, agony, irony, despair, recrimination, and catastrophic laughter as only the pen of a Tacitus could adequately describe. Bismarck's last years, both of power and retirement, were those of a lost soul. Having tried to intrigue with foreign Ambassadors against his Sovereign .be- fore his retirement, he tried to mobilize the Press against him. after he had retired, and even stooped to join hands with his old rival, Waldersee, for the overthrow of his successor, Caprivi, being quite in- difFerent, complained the Kaiser bitterly, to what might happen afterwards. " It is sad to think," said the Emperor of Austria to Hohenlohe, "that such a man can sink so low." When Bismarck was dismissed every one raised his head. It seemed to Hohenlohe to be at last a case of the beatitude: "the meek shall inherit the earth." Holstein, the Under-Secretary, who, to the 43 The War Booh of the Oerman General Staff disgust of Bismarck, refused to follow his chief and who now quietly made himself the residuary legatee of the whole political inheritance of the Foreign Office, intended by Bismarck for his son, freely criti- cized his ex-chief's policy in a conversation with Hohenlohe : "He adduced as errors of Bismarck's policy: The Berlin Congress, the mediation in China in favor of France, the prevention of the conflict between England and Russia in Afghanistan, and the whole of his tracasseries with Eussia. As to his recent plan of leav- ing Austria in the lurch, he says we should then have made ourselves so contemptible that we should have be- come isolated and dependent on Eussia." Bismarck, whom Hohenlohe visited in his retire- ment, vsdth a strange want of patriotism and of per- spicuity, pursued "his favorite theme" and in- veighed against the envy {der Neid) of the German people and their incurable particularism. He never divined how much his jealous autocracy had fostered these tendencies. One may hazard the opinion that the Germans are no more wanting in public spirit and political capacity than any other nation ; but if they are deprived of the rights of private judgment and the exercise of political ability, they are no more likely to be immune from the corresponding disabili- ties. Certainly, in no country where public men are accustomed to the exercise of mutual tolerance German Diplomacy and Statecraft 43 and loyal cooperation by the practise of Cabinet gov- ernment, and where public opinion has healthy play, would such an exhibition of disloyalty and slander as is here exhibited be tolerated, or even possible. When in 1895 Caprivi succumbed to the intrigues of thei military caste and the Agrarian Party, Hohen- lohe, now in his seventy-sixth year, was entreated to come to the rescue, his accession being regarded as the only security for German unity. To his eternal credit, Hohenlohe accepted ; but, if we may read be- tween the lines of the scanty extracts here vouch- safed from the record of a Ministerial activity of six years, we may conjecture that it was mostly labor and sorrow. He was opposed to agrariauism and repressive measures, aud anxious " to get on with the Reichstag," seeing in the forms of public discussion the only security for the public peace. But " the Prussian Junkers could not tolerate South German Liberalism," and the most powerful political caste in the world, with the Army and the King on their side, appear to have been too much for him. His retirement in 1900 marks the end of a fugitive attempt at something like a liberal policy in Ger- many, and during the fourteen years which have elapsed since that event autocracy has held undis- puted sway in Germany. The history of these latter years is fresh in the minds of most students of public affairs, and we will not attempt to pursue"^it here. CHAPTER III GEEMAN CULTUEE THE ACADEMIC GAEEISON Nothing is so characteristic of the German nation as its astonishing single-mindedness — using that term in a mental and not a moral sense. Sine© Prus- sia established her ascendency the nation has devel- oped an immense concentration of purpose. If the military men are not more belligerent than the di- plomatists, the diplomatists are not more belligerent than the professors. A single purpose seems to ani- mate them: it is to proclaim the spiritual eflBcacy, and the eternal necessity, of War. Already there are signs that the German professors are taking the field. Their mobilization is appar- ently not yet complete, but we may expect before long to see their whole force, from the oldest Pro- fessor Emeritus down to the youngest Privat-dozeni, sharpening their pens against us. Professors Har- nack, Haeckel, and Eucken have already made a reconnaissance in force, and in language which might have come straight from the armory of Treitschke have denounced the mingled cupidity and hypocrisy 44 German Culture 45 with whidi we, so they say, have joined forces with Muscovite " barbarism " against Teutonic culture. This, we may feel sure, is only the beginning. German professors have a way of making history as well as writing it, and the Prussian Government has always attached the greatest importance to tak- ing away its enemy's character before it despoils him of his goods. Long before the wars of 1866' and 1870 the seminars of the Prussian universities were as busy forging title-deeds to the smaller Ger- man states and to Alsace-Lorraine as any medieval scriptorium, and not less ingenious. In the Franco- Prussian War the professors — Treitschke, Momm- sen, Sybel — were the first to take the field and the last to quit it. Theirs it was to exploit the secular hatreds of the past. Even Eanke, the nearest ap- proach to " a good European " of which German schools of history could boast, was implacable. When asked by Thiers on whom, the Third Empire having fallen, the Germans were continuing td make war, he replied, " On Louis XIV." Hardly were the results achieved before a casuistry was developed to justify them. Sybel's apologetics in " Die Begriindung des deutschen Reichs " began it ; others have gone far beyond them. " Blessed be the hand that traced those lines," is Professor Del- briick's benediction on the forgery of the Ems tele- gram ; and in language which is almost a paraphrase 46 l^he War Book of the German General Staff of Bismarck's cynical declaration that a diplomatic pretext for a war can always be found when you want one, he has laid it down that " a good diplo- mat" should always have his quiver full of such barbed arrows. So, too, Sybel on Frederick's com- plicity in the Second Partition of an inoffensive Poland anticipates in almost so many words the re- cent sophistry of the Imperial Chancellor on the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. "Wrong? I grant you — a violation of law in the most literal sense of the word." But, he adds, necessity knows no law, and, " to sum it up," after all, Prussia " thereby gained a very considerable territory." And thus Treitschke on the question of the duchies, or again, to go farther afield, Mommsen on the in- exorable " law " that the race is always to the swift and the battle to the strong. Frederick the Great surely knew his fellow-countrymen when he said with characteristic cynicism : " I begin by taking ; I can always find pedants to prove my rights afterwards." ISTot the Chancelleries only, but even the General Staff has worked hand in glove with the lecture- room. When Bemhardi and von der Goltz exalt the spiritual efficacy of war they are repeating almost word for word the language of Treitschke. Not a faculty but ministers to German statecraft in its turn. The economists, notably von Halle and Wag- ner, have been as busy and pragmatical as the his- German Culture 4:1 torians — theirs is the doctrine of Prussian military hegemony upon a basis of agrarianism, of the ab- sorption of Holland, and of " the future upon the water." The very vocabulary of the Kaiser's speeches has been coined in the lecture-rooms of Berlin University. To understand the potency of these academic in- fluences in German policy one must know something of the constitution of the German universities. In no country is the control of the Government over the universities so strong; nowhere is it so vigilant. Political favor may make or mar an academic career ; the complaisant professor is decorated, the contuma- cious is cashiered. German academic history is full of examples. Treitsehke, Sybel, even Mommsen all felt the weight of royal displeasure at one period or another. The present Emperor vetoed the award of the Verdun prize to Sybel because in his history of Prussian policy he had exalted Bismarck at the ex- pense of the HohenzoUerns, and he threatened to close the archives to Treitsehke. Even Mommsen had at one time to learn the steepness of alien stairs. On the other hand, no Government recognizes so readily the value of a professor who is docile — he is of more value than many Pomeranian Grenadiers. Bismarck invited Treitsehke to accompany the army of Sadowa as a writer of military bulletins, and both he and Sybel were, after due caution, commis- 48 The War Booh of the German General Staff sioned to write those apologetics of Prussian policy which, are classics of their kind. Most German pro- fessors have at one time or another been publicists, and the Orenzboten and the Preussische Jahriicher maintain the polemical traditions of Sybel's " His- torische Zeitschrift." Moreover, the German uni- versity system, with the singular freedom in the choice of lectures and universities, which it leaves to the student, tends to make a professor's classes depend for their success on his power of attracting a public by trenchant oratory. Well has Acton said that the " garrison " of distinguished historians that prepared the Prussian supremacy, together with their own, " hold Berlin like a fortress." They still hold it and their science of fortification has not changed. It is not necessary to recapitulate here the earlier phases of this politico-historical school whose motto found expression in Droysen's aphorism, " The statesman is the historian in practise," and whose moral was " Die Weltgeschichte ist das Welt- gericht," or, to put it less pretentiously, " Nothing succeeds like success." All of them, Niebuhr, Mommsen, Droysen, Hausser, Sybel, Treitschke, have this in common r that they are merciless to the rights of small nationalities. This was no accident ; it was due to the magnetism exercised upon their minds by the hegemony of Prussia and by their opposition to the idea of a loose confederation of German Culture 49 small States. They were almost equally united in a common detestation of France and could find no word too hard for her polity, her literature, her ideals, and her people. " Sodom " and " Babylon " •were the best they could spare her. " Die Nation, ist unser Feind " wrote Treitschke in 1870, and " we must draw her teeth." Even Eanke declared that everything good in Germany had risen by way of opposition to French influences. The intellectual war was carried into every field and epoch of his- tory, and all the institutions of modem civilization were traced by writers like Waitz and Maurer to 'the early German tribes uncorrupted by Eoman influ- ences. The same spirit was apparent in Sybel's hatred of the French Revolution and all its works. This is not the place to expound the intellectual revenge which French scholars like Fustel de Coulanges in the one sphere, and Albert Sorel in the other, afterwards took upon this insensate chauvin- ism of the chair. Sufficient to say that this cult of war and gospel of hate have narrowed the outlook of German thought ever since, as Eenan warned Strauss they would, and have left Germany in an intellectual isolation from the rest of Europe only to be paralleled by her moral isolation of to-day. It was useless for Eenan to remind German scholars that pride is the only vice which is punished in this world. "We Germans," retorted Mommsen, " are not modest and §0 The War Booh of the German General Staff don't pretend to be." The words are almost the echo of that " thrasonic brag " with which Bismarck one day electrified the Eeichstag. In the academic circles of to-day much of the hate formerly vented upon France is now diverted to Eng- land. In this, Treitschke set the fashion. Noth- ing delighted him more than to garnish his im- mensely popular lectures with uproarious jests at England — " the hypocrite who, with a Bible in one hand and an opium pipe in the other, scatters over the universe the benefits of civilization." But there was always method in hiai madness. Treitschke was one of the first to demand for Germany " a place in the sun " — this commonplace of Imperial speeches was, I believe, coined by Sybel — and to press for the creation of a German Navy which should do what " Europe " had failed to do — set bounds to the crushing domination of the British Fleet and " restore the Mediterranean to the Mediterranean peoples " by snatching back Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar. The seed fell on fruitful soil. A young economist, the late Professor von Halle, whose ve- hement lectures I used to attend when a student at Berlin University, worked out the maritime possi- bilities of German ambitions in " Volks-und See- wirthschaft," and his method is highly significant in piew of the recent ultimatum delivered by Germany to Belgium. It was nothing less than the seduc- German Culturs SI tion of Holland by economic bribes into promising to Germany the abandonment of the neutrality of her ports in the event of war. Thereby, and thereby alone, he argued, Germany would be reconciled to the "monstrosity" (Unding) of the mouth of the Ehine being in non-German hands. In return Ger- many would take Holland and her colonies under her " protection." To the same effect writes Professor Karl Lamprecht in his " Zur jiingsten deutschen Vergangenheit," seizing upon the Boer war to demon- strate to Holland that England is the enemy. The same argument was put forward by Professor Lexis. This was in the true line of academic tradition. Even the discreet and temperate Eanke once coun- seled Bismarck to annex Switzerland. Such, in briefest outline, is the story of the aca- demic "garrison." Of the lesser lansquenets, the horde of privat-dozents and obscurer professors, whose intellectual folly is only equaled by their audacity, and who are the mainstay of the Pan-Ger- man movement, I have said nothing. It may be doubted whether the second generation can show anything like the intellectual prestige which, with aU their intemperance, distinguished their prede- cessors. But they have all laid to heart Treitschke's maxim, " Be governmental," honor the King, wor- ship the State, and "believe that no salvation is possible except by the annihilation of the smaller 53 The War Book of the German General Staff States." It is a strange ending to the Germany of Kant and Goethe. N'ur der verdient sieh Freiheit wie das Leben Der taglich sie erobern muss — The noble lines of Goethe have now a variant reaJd- ing — " He alone achieves freedom and existence who seeks to repeat his conquests at the expense of others " might he the motto of the Germans of to- day. But as they have appealed to History, so will History answer them. CHAPTER lY. GERMAN THOUGHT TEEITSCHKE In a pamphlet of mordant irony addressed to " Mes- sieurs les Ministres du culte evangelique de I'armee du roi de Prusse " in the dark days of 1870, Fustel de Coulanges warned these evangelical camp-fol- lowers of the consequences to German civilization of their doctrines of a Holy War. " Your error is not a crime but it makes you commit one, for it leads you to preach war which is the greatest of aU crimes." It was not impossible, he added, that that very war might be the beginning of the decadence of Germany, even as it would inaugurate the revival of France. History has proved him a true prophet, but it has required more than a generation to show with what subtlety the moral poison of such teaching has pene- trated into German life and character. The great apostle of that teaching was Treitschke who, though not indeed a theologian, was characteristically fond of praying in aid the vocabulary of theology. "Every intelligent theologian understands per- 53 54 The War Boole of the German General Staff fectly well," lie wrote, " that the Biblical saying ' Thou shalt not kill ' ought no more to be interpreted literally than the apostolic injunction to give one's goods to the poor." He called in the Old Testament to redress the balance of the New. " The doctrines of the apple of discord and of original sin are the great facts which the pages of History everywhere reveal." To-day, everybody talks of Treitschke, though I doubt if half a dozen people in England have read him. His brilliant essays, Historische und Politis- clie Aufsdtze, illuminating almost every aspect of German controversy, have never been translated; neither has his Politik, a searching and cynical ex- amination of the foundations of Political Science which exalts the State at the expense of Society ; and his Deutsche Geschichte, which was designed to be the supreme apologetic of Prussian policy, is also unknown in our tongue. But in Germany their vogue has been and still is enormous; they are to Germans what Carlyle and Macaulay were to us. Treitschke, indeed, has much in common vnth Car- lyle; the same contempt for Parliaments and con- stitutional freedom; the same worship of the strong man armed; the same somber, almost savage, irony, and, let it not be forgotten, the same deep moral fervor. His character was irreproachable. At the age of fifteen he wrote down this motto for his own : Oerman Thought 55 " To be always upright, honest, moral, to become a man, a man useful to humanity, a brave man — these are my ambitions." This high ideal he strove manfully to realize But he was a doctrinaire, and of all doctrinaires the conscientious doctrinaire is the most dangerous. Undoubtedly, in his case, as in that of so many other enlightened Germans — Sybel, for example — his apostasy from Liberalism dated from the moment of his conviction that the only hope for German unity lay not in Parliaments but in the military hegemony of Prussia. The bloody triumphs of the Austro-Prussian Wax con- vinced him that the salvation of Germany was " only possible by the annihilation of small States," that States rest on force, not consent, that success is the supreme test of merit, and that the issues of war are the judgment of God. He was singularly free from sophistry and never attempted, like Sybel, to defend the Ems telegram by the disingenuous plea that " an abbreviation is not a falsification " ; it was enough for him that the trick, achieved its pur- pose. And he had a frank contempt for those Prus- sian jurists who attempted to find a legal title to Schleswig-Holstein ; the real truth of the matter he roundly declared, was that the annexation of the duchies was necessary for the realization of German aims. When he writes about war he writes without any sanctimonious cant: 56 TKe War Booh of the German General Staff It is not for Germans to repeat the commonplaces of; the apostles of peace or of the priests of Mammon, nor should they close their eyes before the cruel necessities of the age. Yes, ours is an epoch of war, our age is an age of iron. If the strong get the better of the weak, it is an inexorable law of life. Those wars of hunger which we still see to-day amongst negro tribes are as necessary for the economic conditions of the heart of Africa as the sacred war which a people undertakes to preserve the most precious belongings of its moral cul- ture. There as here it is a struggle for life, here for a moral good, there for a material good. Readers of Bernhardi will recognize here the source of Bemhardi's inspiration. If Treitschke was a casuist at all — and as a rule he is refresh- ingly, if brutally, frank — his was the supreme casuistry of the doctrine that the end justifies the means. That the means may corrupt the end or become an end in themselves he never saw, or only saw it at the end of his life. He honestly believed that war was the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, he feared the commercialism of mod- ern times, and despised England because he judged her wars to have always been undertaken with a view to the conquest of markets. He, sneers at the Eng- lishman who " scatters the blessings of civilization with a Bible in one hand and an opium pipe in the other." He honestly believed that Germany ex- hibited a purity of domestic life, a pastoral sim- German Thought 57. plicity, and a deep religious faith to which no Euro- pean country could approach, and at the time he wrote the picture was not overdrawn. He has writ- tea passages of noble and tender sentiment, in which he celebrates the piety of the peasant, whose religious exercises were hallowed, wherever the German tongue was spoken, by the massive faith of Luther's great Hymn. Writing of German Protestantism as the corner-stone of German unity, he says: Everywhere it has been the solid rampart of our language and customs. In Alsace, as in the mountains of Transylvania and on the distant shores of the Baltic, as long as the peasant shall sing his old canticle Ein' f este Burg ist unser Gott German life shall not pass away. Those who would understand the strength of Treita- chke's -influence on his generation must not lose sight of these purer elements in his teaching. But Treitschke was dazzled by the military suc- cesses of Prussia in 1866. With that violent reac^ tion against culture which is so common among its professional devotees, and which often makes the men of the pen far more sanguinary than the men of the sword, he derided the old Germany of Goethe and Kant as " a nation of poets and thinkers without a polity" ("Ein staatloses Volk von Dichtem und Denkem "), and almost despised his own intellectual vocation. "Each dragoon," he cried enviously, 58 The War Boole of the German General Staff " who knocks a Croat on the head does far more for the German cause than the finest political brain that ever wielded a trenchant pen." But for his griev- ous deafness he would, like his father, have chosen the profession of arms. Failing that, he chose to teach. " It is a fine thing," he wrote, " to be mas- ter of the younger generation," and he set himself to indoctrinate it with the aim of German unity. He taught from 1859 to 18-75 successively at Leipzig, Freiburg, Kiel, and Heidelberg. From 1875 till his death in 1896 he occupied with immense eclat the chair of modern history at Berlin. And so, al- though a Saxon, he enlisted his pen in the service of Prussia — Prussia which always knows how to attract men of ideas but rarely produces them. In the great roll of German statesmen and thinkers and poets — Stein, Hardenberg, Goethe, Hegel — you will look almost in vain for one who is of Prussian birth. She may pervert them; she cannot create them. Treitschke's views were, of course, shared by many of his contemporaries. The Seminars of the Ger- man Universities were the arsenals that forged the intellee-tual weapons of the Prussian hegemony. ISTiebuhr, Ranke, Mommsen, Sybel, Hausser, Droy- sen, Gneist — all ministered to that ascendency, and they all have this in common — that they are merciless to the claims of the small States whose Qerman Thought 59 existence seemed to present an obstacle to Prussian aims. They are also united in common hatred of France, for they feaxed not only the adventures of Napoleon the Third but the leveling doctrines of the Prench Eevolution. Burke's Letters on a Begi- cide Peace are not more violent against Trance than the writings of Sybel, Mommsen, and Treitsehke. What, however, distinguishes Treitsehke from his in- tellectual confreres is his thoroughness. They made reservations which he scorned to make. Sybel, for example, is often apologetic when he comes to the more questionable episodes in Prussian policy — the partition of Poland, the affairs of the duchies, the Treaty of Bale, the diplomacy of 1870 ; Treits- ehke is disturbed by no such qualms. Bismarck who practised a certain economy in giving Sybel ac- cess to official documents for his semi-official history of Prussian policy. Die Begrundung des deutschen Beichs, had much greater confidence in Treitsehke and told him he felt sure he would not be disturbed to find that "our political linen is not as white aa it might be." So, too, while others like Mommsen refused to go the whole way with Bismarck in do- mestic policy, and clung to their early Eadicalism, Treitsehke had no compunction about absolutism. He ended, indeed, by becoming the champion of the Junkers, and his history is a kind of hagiography of the HohenzoUerns. " Be governmental " was his 60 The War Boole of the German General Staff succinct maxim, and he rested his hopes for Ger- many on the bureaucracy and the army. Indeed, if he had had his way, he would have substituted a unity state for the federal system of the German Empire, and would have liked to see all Germany an enlarged Prussia — " ein erweitertes Preussen " — a view which is somewhat difficult to reconcile with his attacks on France as being " politically in a state of perpetual nonage," and on the French Government as hostile to all forms of provincial autonomy. By a quite natural transition he was led on from his championship of the unity of Germany to a con- ception of her role as a world-power. He is the true father of Weltpolitik. Much of what he writes on this head is legitimate enough. Like Hohenlohe and Bismarck he felt the humiliation of Germany's weak- ness in the councils of Europe. Writing in 1863 he complains: One thing we still lack — the State. Our people is the only one which has no common legislation, which can send no representatives to the Concert of Europe. No salute greets the German flag in a foreign port. Our Fatherland sails the high seas without colors like a pi- rate. Germany, he declared, must become " a power across the sea." This conclusion, coupled with bitter recollections of the part played by England in the German Thought 61 aflFair of the Duchies, no doubt accounted for his growing dislike of England. Among the English the love of money has killed every sentiment of honor and every distinction between what is just and unjust. They hide their poltroonery and their materialism behind grand phrases of unctuous theology. When one sees the English press raising its eyes to heaven, frightened by the audacity of these faith- less peoples in arms upon the Continent, one might im- agine one heard a venerable parson droning away. As if the Almighty God, in Whose name Cromwell's Iron- sides fought their battles, commanded us Germans to allow our enemy to march undisturbed upon Berlin. Oh, what hypocrisy! Oh, cant, cant, cant! Europe, he says elsewhere, should have put bounds to the overweening ambition of Britain by bringing to an end the crushing domination of the English Eleet at Gibraltar, at Malta, and at Corfu, and by " restoring the Mediterranean to the Mediterranean peoples." Thus did he sow the seeds of German maritime ambition. If I were asked to select the most characteristic of Treitschke's works I should be inclined to choose the vehement little pamphlet Was fordern wir von Franhreich? in which he insisted on the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. It is at once the vindication of Prussian policy, and, in the light of the last forty- four years, its condemnation. Like Mommsen, who wrote in much the same strain at the same time, he 63 Th» War Booh of the Oerman General Staff insisted that the people of the conquered provinces must b© " forced to be free," that Morality and His- tory (which for him are much the same thing) proclaim they are German without knowing it. We Germans, who know Germany and Prance, know better what is good for Alsace than the unhappy people themselves, who through their French associations have lived in ignorance of the new Germany. We will give them back their own identity against their will. We have in the enormous changes of these times too often seen in glad astonishment the immortal working of the moral forces of History (" dasunsterbliche Fortwirkung der sittlichen Machte der Geschichte") to be able to be- lieve in the unconditional value of a plebiscite on this matter. We invoke the men of the past against the present. The ruthless pedantry of this is characteristically Prussian. It is easy to appeal to the past against the present, to the dead against the living. Dead men tell no tales. It was, he admitted, true that the Alsatians did not love the Germans. These " mis- guided people " betrayed " that fatal impulse of Ger- mans" to cleave to other nations than their own. "Well may we Germans be horrified," he adds, "when to-day we see these German people rail in German speech like wild beasts against their own flesh and blood as 'German curs' ('deutschen Hunde ') and ' stink-Prussians ' {' Stinkpreussen ')." Treitschke waa too honest to deny it. There was, he German Thought 63 ruefully admitted, something rather unlovely about the " civilizing " methods of Prussia. " Prussia has perhaps not always been guided by genial men." But, he argued, Prussia united imder the new Em- pire to the rest of Gei*many would become humanized and would in turn humanize the new subject-peoples. Well, the forty-four years that have elapsed since Treitschke wrote have refuted him. Instead of a Germanized Prussia, we see a Prussianized Ger- many. Her " geniality " is the geniality of Zabern. The Poles, the Danes, and the Alsatians are still con- tumacious. Treitschke appealed to History and His- tory has answered hinu Had he never any misgivings? Yes. After twenty-five years, and within a month of his death, this Hebrew prophet looking round in the year of grace 1895 on the "culture" of modern Germany was filled with apprehension. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Sedan he delivered an address in the University of Berlin which struck his fond disciples dumb. The Empire, he declared, had disarmed her enemies neither without nor within. In every direction our manners have deteriorated. The respect which Goethe declared to be the true end of all moral education disappears in the new generation with a giddy rapidity: respect of God, respect for the limits which nature and society have placed between the two sexes; respect for the Fatherland, which is every 64 The War Book of the German General Staff day disappearing before the will-of-the-wisp of an in- dulgent humanity. The more culture extends, the more insipid it becomes; men despise the profundity of the ancient world and consider only that which subserves their immediate end. The things of the mind, he cried, had lost their hold on the Grerman people. Every one was eager to get rich and to relieve the monotony of a vain ex- istence by the cult of idle and meretricious pleas- ures. The signs of the times were everywhere dark and gloomy. The new Emperor (William the Sec^ ond), he had already hinted, was a dangerous char- latan. The wheel had come full circle. Fustel de Coulanges was justified of his prophecy. And the handwriting on the walls of Destiny was never more legible than now. CONCLUSION, The contemplation of History, so a great master of the art has told us, may not make men wise but it is sure to make them sad. The austere Muse has never had a sadder page to show than that which is even now being added to her record. We see now the full fruition of the German doctrine of the beatitude of War. In sorrow and in anguish, in anguish and in darkness, Belgium is weeping for her children and will not be comforted because they are not. The invader has spared neither age nor sex, neither rank nor function, and every insult that malice could in- vent, or insolence inspire, has been heaped upon her bowed head. The hearths are cold, the altars desecrated, the fields untilled, the granaries empty. The peasant watches the heavens but he may not sow, he has regarded his fields but he might not reap. The very stones in her cities cry out ; hardly one of them is left upon another. No nation had ever given Europe more blithe and winning pledges of her de- votion to the arts of peace. The Flemish school of painters had endowed the world with portraits of a grave tenderness which posterity might always ad- mire but could never imitate. The chisels of her 65 66 The War Booh of the German Geteral Staff medieval craftsmen had left us a legacy of buoyant fancy in stone whose characters were alive for us with the animation of the Canterbury Tales. All this the invader has stamped out like the plague, A once busy and thriving community begs its bread in alien lands. Never since the captivity of Babylon has there been so tragic an expatriation. Yet noble in her sorrow and exalted in her anguish, Belgium, like some patient caryatid, still supports the broken architrave of the violated Treaty. Her little army is still unconquered, her spirit is never crushed. She will arise purified by her sorrow and ennobled by her suffering, and generations yet unborn shall rise up to call her blessed. THE WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF INTRODUCTION" The armies of belligerent States on the outbreak of whitua hostilities, or indeed the moment war is declared, enter into a certain relation with one another which is known by the name of " A State of War." This relationship, which at the beginning only concerns the members of the two armies, is extended, the mo- ment the frontier is crossed, to all inhabitants of the enemy's State, so far as its territory is occupied ; indeed it extends itself ultimately to both the mov- able and immovable property of the State and its citizens. A distinction is drawn between an " active " and a achtb " passive " state of war. By the first is to be under- Passive, stood the relation to one another of the actual fight- ing organs of the two belligerents, that is to say, of the persons forming the army, besides that of the representative heads of the State and of the lead- ers. By the second term, i.e., the " passive " state of war, on the other hand, is to be understood the relationship of the hostile army to those inhabitants of the State, who share in the actual conduct of war only in consequence of their natural association with 67 Persons and 68 Th& War Boole of the German General Staff the army of their own State, and who on that ac- count are only to be regarded as enemies in a passive sense. As occupying an intermediate position, one has often to take into account a number of persons who while belonging to the army do not actually par- ticipate in the conduct of hostilities but continue in the field to pursue what is to some extent a peaceful occupation, such as Army Chaplains, Doctors, Medi- cal Officers of Health, Hospital Nurses, Voluntary Nurses, and other Officials, Sutlers, Contractors, Newspaper Correspondents and the like. That War Is Now although according to the modem conception no Respecter o o r of Persons. q£ wht, it is primarily concerned with the persons belonging to the opposing armies, yet no citizen or inhabitant of a State occupied by a hostile army can altogether escape the burdens, restrictions, sacrifices, and inconveniences which are the natural consequence of a State of War. A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual ^ and material resources of the lat- ter.^ Humanitarian claims such as the protection 1 [The word used is " geistig," as to the exact meaning of which see translator's footnote to page 72. What the passage amounts to is that the belligerent should seek to break the spirit of the civil population, terrorize them, humiliate them, and reduce them to despair. — J. H. M.] 2 Moltke, in his well-known correspondence with Professor of War. Introduction 69 of men and their goods can only be taken into con- sideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit. Consequently the " argument of war " permits Tue usages every belligerent State to have recourse to all means which enable it to attain the object of the war; still, practise has taught the advisability of allowing in one's own interest the introduction of a limitation in the use of certain methods of war and a total re- nunciation of the use of others. Chivalrous feel- ings, Christian thought, higher civilization and, by no means least of all, the recognition of one's own advantage, have led to a voluntary and self-imposed limitation, the necessity of which is to-day tacitly recognized by all States and their armies. They have led in the course of time, in the simple trans- mission of knightly usage in the passages of arms, to a series of agreements, hallowed by tradition, and we are accustomed to sum these up in the words " usage of war " (Kriegsbrauch), " custom of war " (Kriegssitte), " or fashion of war " (Kriegsmanier). Customs of this kind have always existed, even in the Bluntschli, is moved to denounce the St. Petersburg Conven- tion which designs as "le seul but Kgitime" of waging war, " I'aflfaiblissement des forces militaires," and this he denies most energetically on the ground that, on the contrary, all the resources of tiie enemy, country, finances, railways, means of subsistence, even the prestige of the enemy's government, ought to be attacked. [This, of course, means the policy of " Terrorismus," t.e.,^ terrorization. — J. H. M.] 10 The War Booh of the German General Staff Of the futility of Written ' Agreements as Scraps of Paper. times of antiquity; they differed according to the civilization of the different nations and their public esonomy, they were not always identical, even in one and the same conflict, and they have in the course of time often changed ; they are older than any scien- tific law of war, they have come down to us un- written, and moreover they maintain themselves in full vitality; they have therefore won an assured position in standing armies according as these latter have been introduced into the systems of almost every European State. The fact that such limitations of the unrestricted and reckless application of all the available means for the conduct of war, and thereby the humanization of the customary methods of pursuing war really exist, and are actually observed by the armies of all civilized States, has in the course of the nineteenth century often led to attempts to develop, to extend, and thus to make universally binding these pre- existing usages of war ; to elevate them to the level of laws binding nations and armies, in other words to create a codex belli j a law of war. All these attempts have hitherto, with some few exceptions to be men- tioned later, completely failed. If, therefore, in the following work the expression " the law of war " is used, it must be understood that by it is meant not a lex scripta introduced by international agreements; but only a reciprocity of mutual agreement ; a limita- Introduction 71 tion of arbitrary behavior, whieh custom and con- ventionality, human friendliness and a calculating ^otism have erected, but for the observance of which there exists no express sanction, but only " the fear of reprisals " decides. Consequently the usage of war is even now the only The •■ aabby means of regulating the relations of belligerent States Humanita- 1 T-» - 1 1 .1 rianism. to one another. But with the idea of the usages of war will always be bound up the character of some- thing transitory, inconstant, something dependent on factors outside the army. Nowadays it is not only the army which influences the spirit of the cus- toms of war and assures recognition of its unwritten laws. Since the almost universal introduction of conscription, the peoples themselves exercise a pro- found influence upon this spirit. In the modern usages of war one can no longer regard merely the traditional inheritance of the ancient etiquette of the profession of arms, and the professional outlook accompanying it, but there is also the deposit of the currents of thought which agitate our time. But since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considera- tions which not infrequently degenerated into senti- mentality and flabby emotion (Seniimentalitdt und weichlicher Gefuhlschwarmerei) there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental 73 The War Booh of the German General Staff Cruelty Is often *' the truest hu- manity." The perfect Officer. contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Con- ferences. Moreover the officer is a child of his time. He is subject to the intellectual ^ tendencies which influ- ence his own nation; the more educated he is the more will this be the case. The danger that, in this way, he will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of. The dan- ger can only be met by a thorough study of war it- self. By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions, it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them. It will also teach him how the rules of belligerent intercoxirse in war have devel- oped, how in the course of time they have solidified into general usages of war, and finally it will teach him whether the governing usages of war are justi- fied or not, whether they are to be modified or whether they are to be observed. But for a study [3 " Den geistigen Stromungen." " Intellectual " is the near- est equivalent in English, but it barely conveys the spiritual aureole surrounding the word. — J. H. M.] Introduction 73 of military history in this light, knowledge of the fundamental conceptions of modern international and military movements is certainly necessary. To present this is the main purpose of the following work. PAET I THE USAGES OS' WAS IN KEGAED TO THE HOSTILE AEMY CHAPTER I WHO BELONGS TO THE HOSTILE AEMY? SiNOE the subjects of enemy States have quite dif- who are f erent rights and duties according as they occupy an ^dii who are active or a passive position, the question arises : Who is to b© recognized as occupying the active position, or what amounts to the same thing — Who belongs to the hostile army? This is a question of particular importance. According to the universal usages of war, the fol- lowing are to be regarded as occupying an active position : 1. The heads of the enemy's state and its ministers, even though they possess no military rank. 2. The regular army, and it is a matter of indiffer- ence whether the army is recruited voluntarily or by conscription; whether the army consists of subjects or aliens (mercenaries) ; whether it is brought together out of elements which were already in the service in time of peace, or out of such as are enrolled at the moment of mobiliza- 75 lar. 76 The War Book of the German General Staff tion (militia, reserve, national guard and Land- sturm) . 3. Subject to certain assumptions, irregular com- batants, also, i.e., such, as are not constituent parts of the regular army, but have only taken up arms for the length of the war, or, indeed, for a particular task of the war. Theirregu- Only the third class of persons need be more closely considered. In their case the question how far the rights of an active position are to he con- ceded to them has at aJl times been matter of con- troversy, and the treatment of irregular troops has in consequence varied considerably. Generally speaking the study of military history leads to the conclusion that the Commanding Officers of regular armies were always inclined to regard irregular troops of the enemy with, distrust, and to apply to them the contemporary laws of war with peculiar severity. This unfavorable prejudice is based on the ground that the want of a military education and of stem discipline among irregular troops, easily leads to transgressions and to non-observance of the usages of war, and that the minor skirmishes which tbey prefer to indulge in, and which by their very nature lead to individual enterprise, open the door to irregularity and savagery, and easily deteriorate into robbery and unauthorized violence, so that in every case the general insecurity which it develops The Hostile Army 77 engenders bitterness, fury, and revengeful feelings in the haxassed troops, and leads to cruel reprisals. Let any one read the combats of the French troops in the Spanish Peninsula in the years 1808 to 1814, in Tyrol in 1809, in Germany in 1813, and also those of the English in their different Colonial wars, or again the Carlist Wars, the Eusso-Turkish War, and the Franco-Prussian War,^ and one will every- where find this experience confirmed. If these points of view are on the whole decisive Each state against the employment of irregular troops, yet on fontseit. the other hand, it must be left to each particular State to determine how far it will disregard such considerations; from the point of view of interna- tional law no State is compelled to limit the instru- ments of its military operations to the standing army. It is, on the contrary, completely justified in dravsdng upon all the inhabitants capable of bear- ing arms, entirely according to its discretion, and in imparting to them an authorization to participate in the war. This public authorization has therefore been until The neces- slty of Aa- quite recently regarded as the presumed necessary thorization. condition of any recognition of combatant rights. Of course there are numerous examples in military Exceptions . , , which prove history in which irregular combatants have been the rule. 1 [The General Staff always refers to the war of; "1870 as " the German-French War."— J. H. M.] 78 The War Boole of the German General Staff recognized as combatants by the enemy, without any public authorization of the kind; thus in the latest wars of North America, Switzerland, and Italy, and also in the case of the campaign (without any kind of commission from a State) of Garibaldi against ^NTaples and Sicily in the year 1860. But in all these cases the tacitly conceded recognition originated not out of any obligatory principles of international law or of military usage, but simply and solely out of the fear of reprisals. The power to prevent the en- trance on the scene of these irregular partizans did not exist, and it was feared that by not recognizing their quality as combatants the war a cruel character might be given, and consequently that more harm than good might result to the parties themselves. The Free On the Other hand there has always been a universal consensus of opinion against recognizing irregulars who make their appearance individually or in small bands, and who conduct war in some measure on their own account (auf eigene Faust) detached from the army, and such opinion approves of the pun- ishment of these offenders with death. This legal attitude which denies every unauthor- ized rising and identifies it with brigandage was taken up by the revolutionary armies of France to- wards the insurrection in La Vendee, and again by Napoleon in his proceedings against Schill and Domberg in the year 1809, and again by Welling- Lance. The Hostile Army 79 ton, ScLwarzenberg, and Bliicher, in the Proclama- tions issued by them in France in the year 1814, and the Grerman Army adopted the same standpoint in the year 1870-71, when it demanded that: " Every prisoner who wishes to be treated as a pris- oner of war must produce a certificate as to his char- acter as a French soldier, issued by the legal authori- ties, and addressed to him personally, to the effect that he has been called to the Colors and is borne on the EoU of a corps organized on a military footing by the French Government." In the controversies which have arisen since the Modem war of 1870-71 over the different questions of inter- national law and the laws of war, decisive emphasis has no longer been placed upon the question of pub- lic authorization, and it has been proposed, on grounds of expediency, to recognize as combatants such irregulars as are indeed without an express and iiamediate public authorization, but who are organized in military fashion and are under a re- sponsible leader. The view here taken was that by a recognition of these kind of irregular troops the dangers and horrors of war would be diminished, and that a substitute for the legal authorization lack- ing in the case of individuals offers itself in the mili- tary organization and in the existence of a leader responsible to his own State. Moreover the Brussels Declaration of August 27, 80 The War Booh of the German General Stajf 1874, and in consonance with it the Mamial of the Institute of International Law, desire as the first condition of recognition as combatants " that they have at their head a personality who is responsible for the behavior of those under him to his own Gov- ernment." ^ The German Considered from the military point of view there Military . , , . . . . f i i i View. la not much objection to the omission of the demand for public authorization, so soon as it becomes a question of organized detachments of troops, but in the case of hostile individuals who appear on. the scene we shall none the less be unable to dispense vidth the certificate of membership of an organized band, if such individuals are to be regarded and treated as lawful belligerents. But the organization of irregulars in military bands and their subjection to a responsible leader are not by themselves sufiicient to enable one to grant them the status of belligerents ; even more im- portant than these is the necessity of being able to recognize them as such and of their carrying their arms openly. The soldier must know who he has against him as an active opponent, he must be pro- tected against treacherous killing and against any military operation which is prohibited by the usages of war among regular armies. The chivalrous idea which rules in the regular armies of all civilized 2 Art. 9 (1). The Hostile Army 81 States always seeks an open profession of one's bel- ligerent character. The demand must, therefore, be insisted on that irregular troops, although not in uniform, shall at least be distinguishable by visible signs which are recognizable at a distance.^ Only by such means can the occurrence of misuse in the practise of war on the one side, and the tragic con- sequences of the non-recognition of combatant status on the other, be made impossible. The Brussels Declarations also therefore recommend, in Art. 9 (2 and 3), that they, i.e., the irregular troops, should wear a fixed sign which is visible from a distance, and that they should carry their weapons openly. The Hague Convention adds to these three conditions yet a fourth, " That they observe the laws and usages of war in their military operations." This condition must also be maintained if it be- -nie Lev6e en masse. 8 The necessity of an adequate mark of distinction was not denied even on the part of the French in the violent contro- versy V7hich blazed up between the German and French Gov- ernments on the subject of the Franctireurs in the war of 1870-1. The dispute was mainly concerned with the ques- tion whether the marks worn by the Franctireurs were suffi- cient or not. This was denied on the German side in many cases with all the greater justification as the usual dress of the Franctireurs, the national blue, was not to be distin- guished from the customary national dress, as it was merely a blouse furnished with a red armlet. Besides which, on the approach of German troops, the armlet was often taken off and the weapons were concealed, thereby offending against the principle of open bearing. These kind of offenses, as also the lack of a firm organization and the consequent irregularities. 83 The War Booh of the German General Staff comes a question of the levee en masse, the arming of the whole population of the country, province, or district; in other words the so-called people's war or national war.* Starting from the view that one can never deny to the population of a country the natural right of defense of one's fatherland, and that the smaller and consequently less powerful States can only find protection in such lev>ees en masse, the majority of authorities on International law have, in their proposals for codification, sought to attain the recognition on principle of the com- batant status of all these kinds of people's champions, and in the Brussels declaration and the Hague Regu- lations the aforesaid condition^ is omitted. As against this one may nevertheless remark that the condition requiring a military organization and a clearly recognizable mark of being attached to the enemy's troops, is not synonymous with a denial of the natural right of defense of one's country. It is were the simple reason why stern treatment of the Franctireurs in the Franco-Prussian War was practised and had necessarily to be practised. i The eflfacement of the distinction between fighting forces and peaceful population on the part of the Boers no doubt made many of the severities practised by the English neces- sary. [5 i.e., the condition as to having a distinctive mark. So too, the Hague Regulations dispense with the other condition (of having a responsible leader and an organization) in such a case of a lev4e en masse. See Eegulations, Art. II. — J. H. M.] The Hostile Army 83 therefore not a question of restraining the popula- tion from seizing arms but only of compelling it to do this in an organized manner. Suhjection to a The Hague responsible leader, a military organization, and clear wiu not do. recognizability cannot be left out of account unless the whole recognized foundation for the admission of irregulars is going to be given up altogether, and a conflict of one private individual against another is to be introduced again, vnth all its attendant hor- a short way /■i-ii-i T • with the rors, of which, for example, the proceedings m Defender of Bazeilles in the last Zranco-Prussian War afford an instance. If the necessary organization does not really become established — a case which is by no means likely to occur often — then nothing remains but a conflict of individuals, and those who conduct it cannot claim the rights of an active military status. The disadvantages and severities inherent in such a state of affairs are more insignificant and less inhu- man than those which would result from recognition.^ « Professor Dr. C. Liider, Das Landhriegsrecht, Hamburg, 1888. [This is the amiable professor who writes in Holtzen- dorflf's Sandhuch des Volkerrechts (IV, 378) of "the terror- ism so often necessary in war." — J. H. M.] , [The above paragraph, it will be observed, completely thrpws over Article II of the Hague Regulations extending protection to the defenders of their country. — J. H. M.] CHAPTEK II THE MEANS OF COMDUCTING WAB Violence and By the means of Conducting war is to be iinderstood all those measures which can be taken by one State against the other in order to attain the object of the war, to compel one's opponent to submit to one's will ; they may be summarized in the two ideas of Vio- lence and Cunning, and judgment as to their ap- plicability may be embodied in the following proposi- tion: What is permissible includes every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be obtained ; what is reprehensible on the Other hand includes every act of violence and destruction which is not demanded by the object of war. It follows from these universally valid principles that wide limits are set to the subjective freedom and arbitrary judgment of the Commanding Officer; the precepts of civilization, freedom and honor, the tra- ditions prevalent in the army, and the general usages of war, will have to guide his decisions. 84 The Means of Conducting War 85 A. MEANS OF WAK DEPENBING OlT FOECE The most important instruments of war in the pos- session of the enemy are his army, and his military positions; to make an end of them is the first object of war. This can happen: 1. By the annihilation, slaughter, or wounding of the individual combatants. 2. By making prisoners of the same. 3. By siege and bombardment. 1. Annihilation, slaughter, and wounding of the hos- tile conibatants In the matter of making an end of the enemy's how to forces by violence it is an incontestable and self- o'the . . . . . Enemy. evident rule that the right of killing and annihila- tion in regard to the hostile combatants is inherent in the war power and its organs, that all means which modem inventions afford, including the fullest, most dangerous, and most massive means of destruction, may be utilized ; these last, just because they attain thei object of war as quickly as possible, are on that account to be regarded as indispensable and, when closely considered, the most human. As a supplement to this rule, the usages of war The Rules of 1 1 • 1 -T I- T • the Game. recognize the desirability oi not employing severer forms of violence if and when the object of the war may be attained by milder means, and furthermore 86 The War Booh of the German General Staff that certain means of war which lead to unnecessary suifering are to be excluded. To such belong: The use of poison both individually and collectively (such as poisoning of streams and food supplies^) the propagation of infectious diseases. Assassination, proscription, and outlawry of an op- ponent.^ The use of arms which cause useless suffering, such as 8oft-nosed bullets, glass, etc. The killing of wounded or prisoners who are no longer capable of offering resistance.^ The refusal of quarter to soldiers who have laid down their arms and allowed themselves to be captured. The progress of modern invention has made super- fluous the express prohibition of certain old-fashioned but formerly legitimate instruments of war (chain shot, red-hot shot, pitch balls, etc.), since others, more effective, have been substituted for these ; on the 1 Notoriously resorted to very often in the war of the Span- isli against Napoleon. 2 Napoleon was, in the year 1815, declared an outlaw by the Allies. Such a proceeding is not permissible by the Interna- tional Law of to-day since it involves an indirect invitation to assassination. Also the offer of a reward for the capture of a hostile prince or commander as occurred in August, 1813, on the part of the Crown Prince of Sweden in regard to Napoleon, is no longer in harmony with the views of to- day and the usages of war. [But to hire a third person to assassinate one's opponent is claimed by the German General Staff (see II, b, below) as quite legitimate. — J. H. M.] 3 As against this there have been many such offenses com- mitted in the wars of recent times, principally on the Turkish side in the Eusso-Turkish War. The Means of Conducting War 811. other hand the use of projectiles of less than 400 grammes in weight is prohibited by thei St. Peters- burg Convention of December 11th, 1868. (This only in the case of musketry.*) He who offends against any of these prohibitions is to be held responsible therefore by the State. If he is captured he is subject to the penalties of military law. Closely connected with the unlawful instruments coiorea of war is the employment of uncivilized and barbar- " Blacklegs.- ous peoples in European wars. Looked at from the point of view of law it can, of course, not be for- bidden to any State to call up armed forces from its extra-European colonies, but the practise stands in express contradiction to the modem movement for humanizing the conduct of war and for alleviating its attendant sufferings, if men and troops are em- ployed in war, who are without the knowledge of civilized warfare and by whom, therefore, the very cruelties and inhumanities forbidden by the usages of war are committed. The employment of these kinds of troops is therefore to be compared with the use of the instruments of war already described as *This prohibition was often sinned against by the French in the war of 1870-71. Cp. Bismarck's despatches of Jan. 9th and Feb. 7th, 1871 ; also Bluntschli in Holtnendorff's Jahrhuch, I, p. 279, where a similar reproach brought against the Baden troops is refuted. War. 88 The War Booh of the German General Staff forbidden. The transplantation of African and Mohammedan Turcos to a European seat of war in the year 1870 was, therefore, undoubtedly to be re- garded as a retrogression from civilized to barbarous warfare, since these troops had and could have no conception of European-Christian culture, or respect for property and for the honor of women, etc.® 2. Capture of Enemy Comhatants Prisoners of If individual members or parties of the army fall into the power of the enemy's forces, either through their being disarmed and defenseless, or through their being obliged to cease from hostilities in con- sequence of a formal capitulation, they are then in the position of " prisoners of war," and thereby in some measure exchange an active for a passive posi- tion. 5 If we have principally in view the employment of imeivil- ized and barbarous troops on a European seat of war, that is simply because the war of 1870 lies nearest to us in point of time and of space. On a level with it is the employment of Russo-Asiatic nationalities in the wars of emancipation, of Indians in the North-American War, of the Circassians in the Polish Rising, of the Bashi-bazouks in the Russo-Turkish War, etc. As regards the Turcos, a Belgian writer Rolin-Jacqu6- myns said of them in regard to the war of 1859, " les allures et le conduite des Turcos avaient soulevg d'universels dggotits." On the other side it is not to be forgotten that a section of the French Press in 1870 praised them precisely because of their bestialities and incited them to such things, thus in the Inde- pendanee algerienne : " Arri6re la pitig ! arrifire les senti- ments d'humanitei Mort, pillage et incendie! " The Means of Conducting Woo- 89 According to the older doctrine of international vae Vlctls \ law all persona belonging to the hostile State, whether combatants or non-combatants, who happen to fall into the hands of their opponent, are in the position of prisoners of war. He could deal with them ac- cording to his pleasure, ill-treat them, kill them, lead them away into bondage, or sell them into slavery. History knows but few exceptions to this rule, these being the result of particular treaties. In the Mid- dle Ages the Church tried to intervene as mediator in order to ameliorate the lot of the prisoners, but without success. Only the prospect of ransom, and chivalrous ideas in the case of individuals, availed to give any greater protection. It is to be borne in mind that the prisoners belonged to him who had captured them, a conception which began to disappear after the Thirty Years' War. The treatment of prisoners of war was mostly harsh and inhuman; still, in the seventeenth century, it was usual to secure their lot by a treaty on the outbreak of a war. The credit of having opened the way to another conception of war captivity belongs to Frederick the Great and Franklin, inasmuch as they inserted in the famous Treaty of friendship, concluded in 1785 between Prussia and North America, entirely new regulations as to the treatment of prisoners of war. The complete change in the conception of war in- The Modem troduced in recent times has in consequence changed 90 The War Booh of the German General Staff all earlier ideas as to the position and treatment of prisoners of war. Starting from the principle that only States and not private persons are in the posi- tion of enemies in time of war, and that an enemy who is disarmed and taken prisoner is no longer an object of attack, the doctrine of war captivity is en- tirely altered and the position of prisoners has be- come assimilated to that of the wounded and the sick. Prisoners of The present position of international law and the War are to ■*■■*-, he honor- l^LW of War on the subiect of prisoners of war is ably treated. '' ^ based on the fundamental conception that they are the captives not of private individuals, that is to say of Commanders, Soldiers, or Detachments of Troops, but that they are the captives of the State. But the State regards them as persons who have simply done their duty and obeyed the commands of their superiors, and in consequence views their captivity not as penal but merely as precautionary. It therefore follows that the object of war cap- tivity is simply to prevent the captives from taking any fiu-ther part in the war, and that the State can, in fact, do everything which appears necessary for securing the captives, but nothing beyond that. The captives have therefore to submit to all those restric- tions and inconveniences which the purpose of se- curing them necessitates; they can collectively be involved in a common suffering if some individuals The Means of Conducting War 91 among them have provoked sterner treatment; but, on the other hand, they are protected against un- justifiable severities, ill-treatment, and unworthy handling; they do, indeed, lose their freedom, but not their rights ; war captivity is, in other words, no longer an act of grace on the part of the victor but a right of the defenseless. According to the notions of the laws of war to- who maybe " made Prls- day the following persons are to be treated as pris- """s. oners of war : 1. The Sovereign, together with those members of his family who were capable of bearing arms, the chief of the enemy's State, generally speaking, and the Ministers who conduct its policy even though they are not among the individuals be- longing to the active army.^ 2. All persons belonging to the armed forces. 3. All Diplomatists and Civil Servants attached to the army. 4. All civilians staying with the army, with the ap- proval of its Commanders, such as transport, siitlers, contractors, newspaper correspondents, and the like. 5. All persons actively concerned with the war such as Higher OfBeials, Diplomatists, Couriers, and the like, as also all those persons whose freedom can be a danger to the army of the other State, for 6 Recent examples : the capture of the King of Saxony by the Allies after the Battle of Leipzig, and also of Napoleon, that of the Elector of Hesse, 1866, Napoleon III, 1870, Abdel- Kader, 1847, and Schamyl, 1859. 93 The War Book of the German General Staff The treat- ment of Pris- oners of War. Their con- finement. example, Journalists of hostile opinions, promi- nent and influential leaders of Parties, Clergy who excite the people, and such like.'' 6. The mass of the population of a province or a dis- trict if they rise in defense of their country. The points of view regarding the treatment of prisoners of war may be summarized in the follow- ing rules: Prisoners of war are subject to the laws of the State which has captured them. The relation of the prisoners of war to their own former superiors ceases during their captivity ; a cap- tured officer's servant steps into the position of a pri- vate servant. Captured officers are never the su- periors of soldiers of the State which has captured them; on the contrary, they are under the orders of such of the latter as are entrusted with their custody. The prisoners of v?ar have, in the places in which they are quartered, to submit to such restrictions of their liberty as are necessary for their safe keeping. They have strictly to comply with the obligation im- posed upon them, not to move beyond a certain in- dicated bovmdary. These measures for their safe keeping are not to 7 In this light must be judged the measures taken in 1866 by General Vogel von Falckenstein against certain Hanoverian citizens although these measures have often been represented in another light. The Means of Conducting War 93 be exceeded; in particular, penal confinement, fet- ters, and unnecessary restrictions of freedom are only to be resorted to if particular reasons exist to justify or necessitate them. The concentration camps in which prisoners of war are quartered must be as healthy, clean, and de- cent as possible; they should not be prisons or con- vict establishments. It is true that the French captives were trans- ported by the Eussians to Siberia as malefactors in the years 1812 and 18131 This was a measure which was not illegitimate according to the older practise of war, but it is no longer in accordance with the legal conscience of to-day. Similarly the methods which were adopted during the Civil War in North America in a prison in the Southern States, against prisoners of war of the Union Forces, whereby the men were kept without air and nourishment and thus badly treated, were also against the practise of the law of war. Freedom of movement within these concentration camps or within the whole locality may be permitted if there are no special reasons against it. But ob- viously prisoners of war are subject to the existing, or to the appointed rules of the establishment or garrison. Prisoners of war can be put to moderate work pro- The pns- ,. ,,. .•..,. ,. J. oner and hlR portionate to their position m liie; work is a sate- Taskmaster. 94 The War Booh of the German General Staff guard against excesses. Also on grounds of health this is desirable. But these tasks should not be prejudicial to health nor in any way dishonorable or such as contribute directly or indirectly to the mili- tary operations against the Patherland of the cap- tives. Work for the State is, according to the Hague regulations, to be paid at the rates payable to members of the army of the State itself. Should the work be done on account of other pub- lie authorities or of private persons, then the condi- tions will be fixed by agreement with the military au- thorities. The wages of the prisoners of war must be expended in the improvement of their condition, and anything that remains should be paid over to them after deducting the cost of their maintenance when they are set free. Voluntary work in order to earn extra wages is to be allowed, if there are no particular reasons against it.* Insurrection, insub- ordination, misuse of the freedom gTanted, will of course justify severer confinement in each case, also punishment, and so will crimes and misdemean- ors. Flight. Attempts at escape on the part of individuals who have not pledged their word of honor might be re- 8 Thus the French prisoners in 1870-1 were very thankful to find employment in great numbers as harvest workers, or in the counting houses of merchants or in the factories of operatives or wherever an opportunity occurred, and were thereby enabled to earn extra wages. The Means of Conducting War 95 garded as the expression of a natural impulse for liberty, and not as a crime. They are therefore to be punished by restriction of the privileges granted and a sharper supervision but not vrith death. Btit the latter punishment will foUow of course in the case of plots to escape, if only because of the danger of them. In case of a breach of a man's parole the punishment of death may reasonably be incurred. In some circumstances, if necessity and the behavior of the prisoners compel it, one is justified in taking measures the effect of which is to involve the in- nocent with the guilty.® The food of the prisoners must be sufficient and Diet, suitable to their rank, yet they will have to be con- tent with the customary food of the country; lux- uries which the prisoners vnsh to get at their own expense are to be permitted if reasons of discipline do not forbid. Correspondence with one's home is to be permitted. Letters. likewise visits and intercourse, but these of course must b© watched. The prisoners of war remain in possession of their personal . , , . « 1 belongings. private property with the exception ol arms, horses, 9 Thus General von Falckenstein in 1870, in order to check the prevalent escaping of French officers, commanded that for every escape ten officers whose names were to be determined by drawing lots should be sent off, with the loss of all priv- ileges of rank, to close confinement in a Prussian fortress, a measvire which was, indeed, often condemned but against which nothing can be said on the score of the law of nations. 96 The War Book of the German General Staff and documents of a military purport. If for defi- nite reasons any objects are taken away from them, then these must be kept in suitable places and re- stored to them at the end of their captivity. Theinfor- Article 14 of the Hague Kegulations prescribes Bureau. that ou the outbreak of hostilities there shall be estab- lished in each of the belligerent States and in a given case in neutral States, which have received into their territory any of the combatants, an information bureau for prisoners of war. Its duty will be to answer all inquiries concerning such pris- oners and to receive the necessary particulars from the services concerned in order to be able to keep a personal entry for every prisoner. The information bureau must always be kept well posted about every- thing which concerns a prisoner of war. Also this information bureau must collect and assign to the legitimate persons all personal objects, valuables, let- ters, and the like, which are found on the field of battle or have been left behind by dead prisoners of war in hospitals or field-hospitals. The informa- tion bureau enjoys freedom from postage, as do gen- erally all postal despatches sent to or by prisoners of war. Charitable gifts for prisoners of war must be free of customs duty and also of freight charges on the public railways. The prisoners of war have, in the event of their being wounded or sick, a claim to medical assistance The Means of Conducting War 97 and care as understood by the Geneva Convention and, so far as is possible, to spiritual ministrations also. These rules may be shortly summarized as follows : Prisoners of war are subject to the laws of the country in which they find themselves, particularly the rules in force in the army of the local State; they are to be treated like one's own soldiers, neither worse nor better. The following considerations hold good as regard whenpns- the imposition of a death penalty in the case of pris- be put to oners ; they can be put to death : 1. In case they commit offenses or are guilty of prac- tises which are punishable by death by civil or military laws. 2. In case of insubordination, attempts at escape, etc., deadly weapons can be employed. 3. In case of overwhelming necessity, as reprisals, either against similar measures, or against other irregularities on the part of the management of the enemy's army. 4. In case of overwhelming necessity, when other means of precaution do not exist and the ex- istence of the prisoners becomes a danger to one's own existence. As regards the admissibility of reprisals, it is to "Reprisals.- be remarked that these are objected to by numerous teachers of international law on grounds of humanity. 98 The Wa7- Booh of the German General Staff To make this a matter of principle, and apply it to every case exhibits, however, " a misconception due to intelligible but exaggerated and unjustifiable feel- ings of humanity, of the significance, the seriousness and the right of war. It must not be overlooked that here also the necessity of war, and the safety of the State are the first consideration, and not regard for the unconditional freedom of prisoners from molestation." ^'^ onemuBt That prisoners should only be killed in the event not be too scrupulous. of extreme necessity, and that only the duty of self- preservation and the security of one's own State can justify a proceeding of this kind is to-day universally admitted. But that these considerations have not always been decisive is proved by the shooting of 2,000 Arabs at Jaffa in 1799 by ISTapoleon; of the prisoners in the rising of La Vendee; in the Carlist War ; in Mexico, and in the American War of Seces- sion, where it was generally a case of deliverance from burdensome supervision and the difficulties of maintenance; whereas peoples of a higher morality such as the Boers in our own days, finding them- selves in a similar position, have preferred to let their prisoners go. Tor the rest, calamities such as might lead to the shooting of prisoners are scarcely likely to happen under the excellent conditions of transport in our own time and the correspondingly 10 [Professor] Lueder, Dos Landkriegsrecht, p. 73. The Means of Conducting Wai' 99 small difficulty of feeding them — in a European campaign. ^^ The captivity of war comes to an end: The end of Captivity. 1. By force of circumstances which de facto determine it, for example, successful escape, cessation of the war, or death. 2. By becoming the subject of the enemy's state. 3. By release, whether conditional or unconditional, unilateral or reciprocal. 4. By exchange. As to 1. With the cessation of the war every rea- son for the captivity ceases, provided there exist no special grounds for another view. It is on that ac- count that care should be taken to discharge pris- oners immediately. There remain only prisoners 11 What completely false notions about the right of killing prisoners of war are prevalent even among educated circles in France is shown by the widely-circulated novel Les Braves Gens, by Margueritte, in which, on page 360 of the chapter "Mon Premier," is told the story, based apparently on an actual occurrence, of the shooting of a captured Prussian sol- dier, and it is excused simply because the information given by him as to the movements of his own people turned out to be untrue. The cowardly murder of a defenseless man is regarded by the author as a stern duty, due to war, and is thus declared to be in accordance with the usages of war. [The indignation of the German General Staff is somewhat overdone, as a little further on (see the chapter on treatment of inhabitants of occupied territory) in the War Book they advocate the ruthless shooting or hanging of an inhabitant who, being forced to guide an enemy army against his own, leads them astray. — J. H. M.] 100 The War Booh of the German General Staff sentenced to punishment or awaiting trial, i.e., until the expiation of their sentence or the end of their trial as the ease may be. As to 2. This pre-supposes the readiness of the State to accept the prisoner as a subject. As to 3'. A man released under certain conditions has to fulfil them without question. If he does not do this, and again falls into the hands of his enemy, then he must expect to be dealt with by military law, and indeed according to circumstances with the pun- ishment of death. A conditional release cannot be imposed on the captive ; still less is there any obliga- tion upon the state to discharge a prisoner on condi- tions — for example, on his parole. The release de- pends entirely on the discretion of the State, as does also the determination of its limits and the persons to whom it shall apply. The release of whole detachments on their parole is not usual. It is rather to be regarded as an ar- rangement with each particular individual. Arrangements of this kind, every one of which is as a rule made a conditional discharge, must be very precisely formulated and the wording of them most carefully scrutinized. In particular it must be pre- cisely expressed whether the person released is only bound no longer to fight directly with arms against the State which releases him, in the present war, whether he is justified in rendering services to his The Means of Conducting War 101 own country in other positions or in the colonies, etc., or whether all and every kind of service is forbidden him. The question whether the parole given by an of- ficer or a soldier is recognized as binding or not by his own State depends on whether the legislation or even the military instructions permit or forbid the giving of one's parole.^^ In the first case his own State must not command him to do services the per- formance of which he has pledged himself not to undertake. ^^ But personally the man released on parole is under all circumstances bound to observe it. He destroys his honor if he breaks his word, and is liable to punishment if recaptured, even though he has been hindered by his own State from keeping it.^* , According to the Hague Eegulations a Government can demand no services which are in conflict with a man's parole. 12 In Austria the giving of one's parole whether by troopa or officers is forbidden. 13 Monod, AUemands et Frangais, Souvenirs de Campagne, p. 39: "I saw again at Tours some faces which I bad met before Sedan; among them were, alas! officers who had sworn not to take up arms again, and who were preparing to vio- late their parole, encouraged by a Government in whom the sense of honor was as blunted as the sense of truth." i*In the year 1870, 145 French officers, including three Generals, one Colonel, two Lieutenant-Colonels, three Com- mandants, thirty Captains (Bismarck's Despatch of December 14th, 1870), were guilty of breaking their parole. The ex- cuses, afterwards put forward, were generally quite unsound, though perhaps there may have been an element of doubt in 103 The War Book of the German General Staff Exchange of Prieonera. Kemoval of Prisoners. As to 4. The exchange of prisoners in a single ease can take place between two belligerents with- out its being necessary in every case to make circum- stantial agreements. As regards the scope of the ex- change and the forms in which it is to be completed the Commanding Officers oh both sides alone decide. Usually the exchange is man for man, in which case the different categories of military persons are taken into account and certain ratios established as to what constitutes equivalents. Transport of Prisoners. — Since no Army makes prisoners in order to let them escape again afterwards, measures must be taken for their transport in order to prevent attempts at escape. If one recalls that in the year 1870-71, no fewer than 11,160 officers and 333,885 men were brought from France to Ger- many, and as a result many thousands often had to be guarded by a proportionately small company, one must admit that in such a position only the most zealous energy and ruthless employment of all the means at one's disposal can avail, and although it is opposed to military sentiment to use weapons against the defenseless, none the less in such a case one has no other choice. The captive who seeks to free him- self by flight does so at his peril and can complain gome of the cases so positively condemned on the German side. The proceedings of the French Government who allowed these persons without scruple to take service again were subse- quently energetically denounced by the National Assembly. The Means of Conducting War 103 of no violence which the custody of prisoners directs in order to prevent behavior of that kind. Apart from these apparently harsh measures against at- tempt at escape, the transport authorities must do everything they can to alleviate the lot of the sick and wounded prisoners, in particular they are to protect them against insults and ill-treatment from an excited mob. 3. Sieges and Bombardments War is waged not merely with the hostile combat- Fair Game, ants but also with the inanimate military resources of the enemy. This includes not only the fortresses but also every town and every village which is an obstacle to military progress. All can be besieged and bombarded, stormed and destroyed, if they are defended by the enemy, and in some cases even if they are only occupied. There has always been a divergence of views, among Professors of International Law, as to the means which are permissible for waging war against these inanimate objects, and these views have frequently been in strong conflict with those of soldiers; it is therefore necessary to go into this question more closely. We have to distinguish : (a) Portresses, strong places, and fortified places. (6) Open towns, villages, buildings, and the like, which, however, are occupied or used for mili- tary purposes. 104 The War Boole of the German General Staff Of making the most of one's oppor- tunity. Fortresses and strong places are important cen- ters of defense, not merely in a military sense, but also in a political and economic sense. They fur- nish a principal resource to the enemy and can there- fore be bombarded just like the hostile army it- seK. A preliminary notification of bombardment is just as little to be required as in the case of a sudden assault. The claims to the contrary put forward by some jurists are completely inconsistent with war and must be repudiated by soldiers; the cases in which a notification has been voluntarily given do not prove its necessity. The besi^er wiU. have to consider for himself the question whether the very absence of notification may not be itself a factor of success, by means of surprise, and indeed whether notification will not mean a loss of precious time. If there is no danger of this then humanity no doubt demands such a notification. Since tovm. and fortifications belong together and form an inseparable unity, and can seldom in a mili- tary sense, and never in an economic and political sense, be separated, the bombardment will not limit itself to the actual fortification, but it will and must extend over the whole town ; the reason for this lies in the fact that a restriction of the bombardment to the fortifications is impracticable; it would jeopardize the success of the operation, and would The Means of Conducting War 105 quite unjustifiably protect the defenders who are not necessarily quartered in the works. But this does not preclude the exemption by the spare the !• !• • • Ti-TT / t t cannot be too stroug placos as also 01 troops m the open neid. m aft r>ii 1.^110 QJ X J. A Here again there can be no talk of a generally ac- cepted model. The usages of war have, however, displayed some rules for capitulations, the observ- ance of which is to be recommended : 1. Before any capitulation is concluded, the authority of the Commander who concludes it should be formally and unequivocally authenticated. How necessary a precaution of this kind is, is shown by the capitulations of Eapp at Danzig, and of Gouvion St. Cyr at Dresden, in 1813, which were actually annulled by the refusal of the General Staff of the Allies to ratify them. At the trial of Bazaine the indictment by General Eivi^re denied the title of the Marshal to conclude a capitulation. 3. If one of the parties to the treaty makes it a con- dition that the confirmation of the monarch, or the Commander-in-Chief, or even the national assembly is to be obtained, then this circumstance War Treaties 137 must be made quite clear. Also care is to be taken that in the event of ratification .being re- fused every advantage that might arise from an ambiguous proceeding on the part of one op- ponent, be made impossible. 3. The chief efEect of a capitulation is to prevent that portion of the enemy's force which capitulates from taking any part in the conflict during the rest of the war, or it may be for a fixed period. The fate of the capitulating troops or of the sur- rendered fortress differs in diiferent cases.^ In 1 How different the conditions of capitulation may be the following examples will show: Sedan : ( 1 ) The French army surrender as prisoners of war. (2) In consideration of the brave defense all Generals, Officers, and Officials occupying the rank of Officers, will re- ceive their freedom so soon as they give their word of honor in writing not to take up arms again imtil the end of the war, and not to behave in a manner prejudicial to the inter- ests of Germariy. ITie officers and officials who accept these conditions are to keep their arms and their own personal effects. (3) All arms and all war material consisting of flags, eagles, cannons, munitions, etc., are to be surrendered and to be handed over by a French military commission to German commissioners. (4) The fortress of Sedan is to be immediately placed at the disposition (of the Germans) ex- actly as it stands. (5) The officers who have refused the obli- gation not to take up arms again, as well as the troops, shall be disarmed and organized according to their regiments or corps to go over in military fashion. The medical staff are without exception to remain behind to look after the wounded. Metz: The capitulation of Metz allowed the disarmed sol- diers to keep their knapsacks, effects, and camp equipment, and allowed the officers who preferred to go into captivity, rather than give their word of honor, to take with them their swords, or sabers, and their personal property. Belf ort : The garrison were to receive all the honors of war. 138 The War Book of the German General Staff the Treaty of Capitulation every condition agreed upon both as to time and manner must be expressed in precise and unequivocable words. Conditions which violate the military honor of those capitulated are not permissible according to modern views. Also, if the capitulation is an unconditional one or, to use the old formula, is " at discretion," the victor does not thereby, ac- cording to the modern laws of war, acquire a right of life and death over the persons capitu- lating. 4. Obligations which are contrary to the laws of na^ to keep their arms, their transport, and their war material. Only the fortress material was to be surrendered. Bitsch (concluded after the settlement of peace) : (1) The garrison retires with all the honors of war, arms, banners, ar- tillery, and field pieces. (2) As to siege material and muni- tions of war a double inventory is to be prepared. (3) In the same way an inventory is to be taken of administrative mate- rial. (4) The material referred to in Articles 2 and 3 is to be handed over to the Commandant of the German forces. ( 5 ) The archives of the fortress, with the exception of the Com- mandant's own register, are left behind. (6) The customs officers are to be disarmed and discharged to their own homes. (7) The canteen-keepers who wish to depart in the ordinary way receive from the local commandant a pass visfid by the Ger- man local authorities. (8) The local Commandant remains after the departure of the troops at the disposal of the Ger- man higher authorities till the final settlement; he binds him- self on his word of honor not to leave the fortress. (9) The troops are transported with their horses and baggage by the railroad. ( 10 ) The baggage left behind in Bitsch by the offi- cers of the 1st and 5th Corps will be sent later to an appointed place in France, two non-commissioned officers remain to guard it and later to send it back under their supervision. Nisch (January 10th, 1878): [The translator has not thought it necessary to reproduce this.] War Treaties 139 tions, such as, for example, to fight against one's own Fatherland during the continuation of the war, cannot be imposed upon the troops capitulating. Likewise^ also, obligations such as are forbidden them by their own civil or military laws or terms of service, cannot be im- posed. 5. Since capitulations are treaties of war they cannot contain, for those contracting them, either rights or duties which extend beyond the period of the war, nor can they include dispositions as to mat- ters of constitutional law such as, for example, a cession of territory. 6. A violation of any of the obligations of the treaty of capitulation justifies an opponent in imme- diately renewing hostilities without further cere- mony. The external indication of a desire to capitulate is ot the wMte the raising of a white flag. There exists no obliga- tion to cease firing immediately on the appearance of this sign (or to cease hostilities). The attain- ment of a particular important, possibly decisive, point, the utilization of a favorable moment, the suspicion of an illicit purpose in raising the white flag, the saving of time, and the like, may induce the commanding officer to disregard the sign until these reasons have disappeared. If, however, no such considerations exist, then humanity imposes an immediate cessation of hostili- ties. 140 The War Book of the German General Staff o. — Safe-conducts Of Safe-Con- The object of these is to secure persons or things from hostile treatment. The usages of war in this matter furnish the following rules: 1. Letters of safe-conduct, for persons, can only be given to such persons as are certain to behave peaceably and not to misuse them for hostile purposes; letters of safe-conduct for things are only to be granted under a guarantee of their not being employed for warlike purposes. 3. The safe-conducts granted to persons are personal to them, i.e., they are not available for others. They do not extend to their companions unless they are expressly mentioned. An exception is only to be made in the case of diplomatists of neutral States, in whose case their usual entourage is assumed to be included even though the members are not specifically named. 3. The safe-conduct is revocable at any time; it can even be altogether withdrawn or not recognized by another superior, if the military situation has so altered that its use is attended with unfavor- able consequences for the party which has granted it. 4. A safe-conduct for things on the other hand is not confined to the person of the bearer. It is obvi- ous that if the person of the bearer appears at all suspicious, the safe-conduct can be with- dravra. This can also happen in the case of an officer who does not belong to the authority which granted it. The oflBcer concerned is in this case War Treaties 141 fully responsible for his proceedings, and should report accordingly. D. — Treaties of Armistice By armistice is understood a temporary cessation otArmis- of hostilities by agreement. It rests upon the volun- tary agreement of both parties. The object is either the satisfaction of a temporary need such as carrying away the dead, collecting the wounded, and the like, or the preparation of a surrender or of negotiations for peace. A general armistice must accordingly be distin- guished from a local or particular one. The gen- eral armistice extends to the whole seat of war, to the whole army, and to allies; it is therefore a formal cessation of the war. A particular armistice on the contrary relates only to a part of the seat of war, to a single part of the opposing army. Thus the armistice of Poischwitz in the autumn of 1813 was a general armistice; that of January 28th, 1871, between Germany and France, was a particular or local one, since the South-Eastem part of the theater of war was not involved. The right to conclude an armistice, whether gen- eral or particular, belonp only to a person in high command, i.e., the Commander-in-Chief. Time to go and obtain the consent of the ruling powers may be wanting. However, if the object of the armistice 142 The War Boole of the German General Staff is to begin negotiations for peace, it is obvious that this can only be determined by the highest authori- ties of the State. If an agreement is concluded, then both sides must observe its provisions strictly in the letter and the spirit. A breach of the obligations entered into on the one side can only lead to the immediate renewal of hostilities on the other side.^ A notification is in this case only necessary if the circumstances admit of the consequent loss of time. If the breach of the armistice is the fault of individuals, then the party to whom they belong is not immediately re- sponsible and cannot be regarded as having broken faith. If, therefore, the behavior of these individ- uals is not favored or approved by their superiors, there is no ground for a resumption of hostilities. Eut the guilty persons ought, in such case, to be pun- ished by the party concerned. Even though the other party does not approve the behavior of the trespassers but is powerless to pre- vent such trespasses, then the opponent is justified 2 Thus, in August, 1813, the numerous trespasses across the frontier on the part of French detachments and patrols led to the entry of the Silesian army into the neutral territory and therewith to a premature commencement of hostilities. Later inquiries show that these trespasses were committed without the orders of a superior and that, therefore, the French staff cannot be reproached with a breach of the compact; but the behavior of Blucher was justified in the circumstances and in any case was based upon good faith. War Treaties 143 in regarding the armistice as at an end. In order to prevent unintentional violation both parties should notify the armistice as quickly as possible to all, or at any rate to the divisions concerned. Delay in the announcement of the armistice through negligence or bad faith lies, of course, at the door of him whose duty it was to announce it. A violation due to the bad faith of an individual is to be sternly punished. !N^o one can be compelled to give credit to a com- munication from the enemy to the effect that an annistice has been concluded; the teaching of mili- tary history is full of warnings against lightly crediting such communications.^ A fixed form for the conclusion of an armistice is 3 We have here in mind not exclusively intentionally untrue communications, although these also, especially in the Napo- leonic war, very frequently occur; very often the untrue com- munication is made in good faith. During the fight which took place at Chaflfois on January 29th, 1871, when the village was stormed, the cry of Armistice was raised on the French side. A French officer of the General Staff communicated to the Commander of the 14th Division by the presentation of a written declaration the news of an armistice concluded at Versailles for the whole of France. The document presented, which was directed by the Commander- in-Chief of the French Army in the East, General Clinchant, to the Commander of the French Division engaged at Chaffois, ran as follows: " An armistice of twenty-one days has been signed on the 27th. I have this evening received the official news. Cease fire in consequence and inform the enemy, according to the forms followed in war, that the armistice exists and that you are charged to bring it to his knowledge. (Signed) Clinchant." 144 The War Book of the German General Staff not prescribed. A definite and clear declaration is suiScient. It is usual and is advisable to have treaties of this kind in writing in order to exclude all complication, and, in the case of differences of opinion later on, to have a firm foundation to go upon. During the armistice nothing must occur v?hich could be construed as a continuation of hostilities, the status quo must rather be observed as far as possible, provided that the wording of the treaty does not particularize anything to the contrary. On the other hand the belligerents are permitted to do every- thing which betters or strengthens their position after Pontarlier, January, 29th, 1871. Of the conclusion of this armistice no one on the German side had any knowledge. None the less hostilities ceased for the time being, pending the decision of the higher authorities. Since on the enemy's side it was asserted that a portion of the French troops in Chaffois had been made prisoners after the news of the existence of the armistice was communicated, and the order to cease fire had been given, some thousand French prisoners were set free again in recognition of this possibility, and the arms which had been originally kept back from them were later restored to them again. When the pro- ceedings at Chaffois were reported, General von Manteuffel de- cided on the 30th January as follows: " The news of an armistice for the Army of the South is false; the operations are to be continued, and the gentlemen in command are on no other condition to negotiate with the enemy than that of laying down their arms. All other nego- tiations are, without any cessation of hostilities, to be re- ferred to the Commander-in-Chief." War Treaties 145 the expiry of the armistice and the continuation of hostilities. Thus, for example, troops may unhesi- tatingly be exercised, fresh ones recruited, arms and munitions manufactured, and food supplies brought up, troops shifted and reenforcements brought on the scene. Whether destroyed or damaged fortifications may also be restored is a question to which different answers are given by influential teachers of the law of nations. It is best settled by express agreement in concrete cases, and so with the revictualing of a be- sieged fortress. As regards its duration, an armistice can be con- cluded either for a determined or an undetermined period, and with or without a time for giving notice. If no fixed period is agreed upon, then hostilities can be recommenced at any time. This, however, is to be made known to the enemy punctually, so that the resumption does not represent a surprise. If a fixed time is agreed on, then hostilities can. be recom- menced the very moment it expires, and without any previous notification. The commencement of an armistice is, in the absence of an expressi agreement fixing another time, to date from the moment of its conclusion ; the armistice expires at dawn of the day to which it extends. Thus an armistice made to last until January 1st comes to an end on the last hour of December 31st, and a shorter armistice with 146 The War Boole of the German General Staff the conclusion of the number of hours agreed upon; thus, for example, an armistice concluded on May 1st at 6 p. M. for 48 hours last until May 3rd at 6 p. M. PART II USAGES OF WAR IN EEGAED TO ENEMY TEKEITOET AND ITS INHABITANTS CHAPTER I EIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE INHABITANTS It has already been shown in the introduction that Thecivii war concerns not merely the active elements, but that is not to be also the passive elements are involved in the com- an enemy. mon suffering, i.e., the inhabitants of the occupied territory who do not belong to the army. Opinions as to the relations between these peaceable inhabitants of the occupied territory and the army in hostile possession have fundamentally altered in the course of the last century. Whereas in earlier times the devastation of the enemy's territory, the destruction of property, and, in some cases indeed, the carrying away of the inhabitants into bondage or captivity, were regarded as a quite natural consequence of the state of war, and whereas in later times milder treat- ment of the inhabitants took! place although destruc^ tion and annihilation as a military resource still con- tinued to be entertained, and the right of plimdering the private property of the inhabitants remained 147 148 The War Book of the German General Staff completely unlimited — to-day, the imiversally prev- alent idea is that the inhabitants of the enemy's territory are no longer to be regarded, generally spealcing, as enemies. It will be admitted, as a mat- ter of law, that the population is, in the exceptional circumstances of war, subjected to the limitations, burdens, and measures of compulsion conditioned by it, and owes obedience for the time being to the power de facto, but may continue to exist otherwise undisturbed and protected as in time of peace by the course of law. They must It follows from all this, as a matter of right, that, molested. as regards the personal position of the inhabitants of the occupied territory, neither in life or in limb, in honor or in freedom, are they to be injured, and that every unlawful killing; evei-y bodily injury, due to fraud or negligence; every insult; every disturbance of domestic peace; every attack on family, honor, and morality and, generally, every unlawful and out- rageous attack or act of violence, are just as strictly punishable as though they had been committed against the inhabitants of one's own land. There follows, also, as a right of the inhabitants of the enemy territory, that the invading army can only limit their personal independence in so far as the necessity of war unconditionally demands it, and that any infliction that needlessly goes beyond this is to be avoided. Rights of Inhabitants of Enemy Territory 149 As against this right, there is naturally a corre- TLeiranty. spending duty on the part of the inhabitants to con- duct themselves in a really peaceable manner, in no "wise to participate in the conflict, to abstain from every injury to the troops of the power in occupa- tion, and not to refuse obedience to the enemy's gov- ernment. If this presumption is not fulfilled, then there can no longer be any talk of violations of the immunities of the inhabitants, rather they are treated and punished strictly according to martial law. The conception here put forward as to the relation of the hn- between the army and the inhabitants of an enemv's the Germans " " and the bar- territory, corresponds to that of the German Staff ^^f^^"'*"* in the years 1870-71. It was given expression in numerous proclamations, and in still more numerous orders of the day, of the German Generals. In con- trast to this the behavior of the French authorities more than once betrays a complete ignorance of the elementary rules of the law of nations, alike in their diplomatic accusations against the Germans and in the words used towards their own subjects. Thus, on the outbreak of the war, a threat was addressed to the Grand Duchy of Baden, not only by the French Press but also officially (von amtlicher Stelle),^ "that even its women would not be pro- [1 It will be observed that no authority is given for this statement. — J. H. M.] 150 The War Booh of the German General Staff teeted." So also^ horses of Prussian officers, who had been shot by the peasants, were publicly put up to auction by the murderers. So also the Francti- reurs threatened the inhabitants of villages occupied by the Germans that they would be shot and their houses burnt down if they received the enemy in their houses or " were to enter into intercourse with them." So also the prefect of the Cote d'Or, in an official cir- cular of November 21st, urges the sub-prefects and mayors of his Department to a systematic pursuit of assassination, when he says : " The Fatherland does not demand of you that you should assemble en masse and openly oppose the enemy, it only ex- pects that three or four determined men should leave the village every morning and conceal themselves in a place indicated by nature, from which, without danger, they can shoot the Prussians ; above all, they are to shoot at the enemy's mounted men whose horses they are to deliver tip at the principal place of the Ai-rondissement. I will award a bonus to them (for the delivery of such horses), and will pub- lish their heroic deed in all the newspapers of the Department, as well as in the Moniteur." But this conception of the relation between the inhabitants and the hostile army not only possessed the minds of the provincial authorities but also the central gov- ernment at Tours itself, as is clear from the fact that it held it necessary to stigmatize publicly the mem- Eights of Inhabitants of Enemy Territory 151 bers of the municipal commission at Soissons who, after an attempt on the life of a Prussian sentry by an imknown, hand, prudently warned their members against a repetition of such outrages, when it [the central government] ordered " that the names of the men who had lent themselves to the assistance and interpretation of the enemy's police be immediately forthcoming." ^ And if, on the French side, the proclamation of General von Ealckenstein is cited as a proof of similar views on the German side — the proclamation wherein the dwellers on the coast of the North Sea and the Baltic are urged to partici- pate in the defense of the coast, and are told: " Let every Frenchman who sets foot on your coast be forfeit " — as against this all that need be said is that this incitement, as is well known, had no effect in Germany and excited the greatest surprise and was properly condemned. Having thus developed the principles governing what the the relation between the hostile army and the in- do- habitants, we will now consider somewhat more closely the duties of the latter and the burdens which, in a given case, it is allowable to impose upon it. Obviously a precise enumeration of every kind of service which may be demanded from them is im- 2 See as to this : Rolin-Jacquemyns, II, 34 ; and Dahn, Der Deutsch-Fremzosische Krieg und das VolherrecTit. 153 The War Book of the German Qeneral Staff possible, but the following of the most frequent oc- currence are: 1. Eestriction of post, railway and letter communica- tion, supervision, or, indeed, total prohibition of the same. 2. Limitation of freedom of movement within the country, prohibition to frequent certain parts of the seat of war, or specified places. 3. Surrender of arms. 4. Obligation to billet the enemy's soldiers; prohibi- tion of illumination of windows at night and the like. 5. Production of conveyances. 6. Performance of work on streets, bridges, trenches (Grdben), railways, buildings, etc. 7. Production of hostages. As to 1, the necessity of interrupting, in many cases, railway, postal, and telegraph communication, of stopping them or, at the least, stringently super- vising them, hardly calls for further proof. Human feeling on the part of the commanding officer will know what limits to fix, where the needs of the war and the necessities of the population permit of mu- tual accommodation. As to 2, if according to modern views no in- habitant of occupied territory can be compelled to participate directly in the fight against his own Fatherland, so, conversely, he can be prevented from reenforcing his own army. Thus the German staff Eights of Inhabitants of Enemy Territory 153 in 1870', where it had acquired authority, in par- ticular in Alsace-Lorraine, sought to prevent the en- trance of the inhabitants into the French armj, even as in the li^apoleonic wars the French authorities sought to prevent the adherence of the States of the Ehine Confederation to the army of the Allies. The view that no inhabitant of occupied territory a man may ^ n 1 • • T 1 ■ 1 be compelled can be compelled to participate directly m the strug- *<> uetray ws gle against his own country is subject to an excep- tion by the general usages of war which must be re- corded here: the calling up and employment of the inhabitants as guides on unfamiliar ground. How- ever much it may ruffle human feeling, to compel a man to do harm to his own Fatherland, and in- directly to fight his own troops, none the less no army operating in an enemy's country will altogether renounce this expedient.^ But a still more severe measure is the compulsion And worse, of the inhabitants to furnish information about their own army, its strategy, its resources, and its military secrets. The majority of writers of all nations are unanimous in their condemnation of this measure. Nevertheless it cannot be entirely dispensed with; doubtless it will be applied with regret, but the ar- gument of war will frequently make it necessary,* 3 [See Editor's Introduction for criticism of this brutality. — J. H. M.] 4 [Ilid.] 154 The War Booh of the German General Staff Of forced labor. Of a certain harsh meas- ure and Its justification. As to 5 and 6, the summoning of the inhabitants to supply vehicles and perform works has also been stigmatized as an unjustifLable compulsion upon the inhabitants to participate in " Military operations." But it is clear that an officer can never allow such a far-reaching extension of this conception, since other- wise every possibility of compelling work would dis- appear, while every kind of work to be performed in war, every vehicle to be furnished in any connec- tion with the conduct of war, is or may be bound up with it. Thus the argument of war must decide. The German Staff, in the War of 1870', moreover, rarely made use of compulsion in order to obtain civilian workers for the performance of necessary works. It paid high wages and, therefore, almost al- ways had at its disposal sufficient offers. This pro- cedure should, therefore, be maintained in future cases. The provision of a supply of labor is best arranged through the medium of the local authorities. In case of refusal of workers piinishment can, of course, be inflicted. Therefore the conduct of the German civil commissioner, Count Eenard — so strongly condemned by French jurists and jurists with French sympathies — who, in order to compel labor for the necessary repair of a bridge, threatened, in case of further refusal, after stringent threats of punishment had not succeeded in getting the work done, to punish the workers by shooting some of them, Bights of Inhabitants of Enemy Territory 155 was in accordance with the actual laws of war; the main thing was that it attained its object, without its being necessary to practise it. The accusation made by the Trench that, on the German side, Frenchmen were compelled to labor at the siege works before Strassburg, has been proved to be in- correct. 7. By hostages are understood those persons who. Hostages, as security or bail for the fulfilment of treaties, prom- ises or other claims, are taken or detained by the opposing State or its army. Their provision has been less usual in recent wars, as a result of which some Professors of the law of nations have wrongly decided that the taking of hostages has disappeared from the practise of civilized nations. As a matter of fact it was frequently practised in the Napoleonic wars; also in the wars of 1848, 1849, and 1859 by the Austrians in Italy ; in 1864 and 1866 by Prussia ; in the campaigns of the French in Algiers; of the Russians in the Caucasus; of the English in their Colonial wars, as being the usual thing. The un- favorable criticisms of it by the German Staff in isolated cases is therefore to be referred to differ- ent grounds of applied expedients.® 5 For example, the carrying off of forty leading citizens from Dijon and neighboring towns as reprisals against the making prisoners of the crew of German merchantmen by the French (midoubtedly contrary to the law of nations), the pretense being that the crews could serve to reenforce the German navy 156 The War Booh of the German General Staff A " harah and cruel " measure. But it was " Huceeis- ful." A new application of " hostage-right " was prac- tised by the German Staff in the war of 1810, when it compelled leading citizens from French towns and villages to accompany trains and locomotives in or- der to protect the railways communications which were threatened by the people. Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were without any fault on their part thereby exposed to grave danger, every writer outside Germany has stigmatized this measure as contrary to the law of nations and as unjustified to- wards the inhabitants of the country. As against this unfavorable criticism it must be pointed out that this measure, which was also recognized on the Ger- man side as harsh and cruel, was only resorted to after declarations and instructions of the occupy- ing^ authorities had proved ineffective, and that in the particular circumstance it was the only method which promised to be effective against the doubtless unauthorized, indeed the criminal, behavior of a fanatical population. Herein lies its justification under the laws of war, but still more in the fact that it proved completely successful, and that wherever citizens were thus car- la pretense strikingly repudiated by Bismarck's Notes of October 4th and November 16th, 1870). Luder, Das Land- kriegsrecht, p. 111. 6 Proclamation of the Governor-General of Alsace, and to the same effect the Governor-General of Lorraine of October 18th, 1870. Bights of Inhabitants of Enemy Territory 157 ried on the trains (whether result was due to the in- creased watchfulness of the communes or to the im- mediate influence on the population), the security of traffic was restored^ To protect oneself against attack and injuries from the inhabitants and to employ ruthlessly the necessary means of defense and intimidation is ob- viously not only a right but indeed a duty of the staff of the army. The ordinary law will in this mat- ter generally not suffice, it must be supplemented by the law of the enemy's might. Martial law and courts-martial must take the place of the ordinary jurisdiction.® To Martial law are subject in particular: 1. All attacks, violations, homicides, and robberies, by soldiers belonging to the army of occupation. 3. All attacks on the equipment of this army, its sup- plies, ammunition, and the like. 3. Every destruction of communication, such as bridges, canals, roads, railways and telegraphs. 4. War rebellion and war treason. Only the fourth point requires explanation. By war rebellion is to be understood the taking war Re- bellion. 7 See Loning, Die VerwaUung des General-gouvemcments en Elsass, p. 107. 2 For a state of war the provisions of the Prussian Law of June' 4th, 1861, still hold good to-day. According to this law all the inhabitants of the territory in a state of siege are subject to military courts in regard to certain punishable pro- ceedings. 158 The War Booh of the German General Staff up of arms by the inhabitants against the occupation ; by war treason on the other hand the injury or im- periling of the enemy's authority through deceit or through communication of news to one's own army as to the disposition, movement, and intention, etc., of the army in occupation, whether the person con- cerned has come into possession of his information by lawful or unlawful means (i.e., by espionage). Against both of these only the most ruthless meas- ures are effective. Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph, when, after the latter ascended the throne of Naples, the inhabitants of lower Italy made various attempts at revolt : " The security of your dominion depends on how you behave in the conquered province. Bum down a dozen places which are not willing to submit themselves. Of course, not until you have first looted them ; my soldiers must not be allowed to go away with their hands empty. Have three to six persons hanged in every village which has joined the revolt ; pay no respect to the cassock. Simply bear in mind how I dealt with them in Piacenza and Corsica." The Duke of Wellington, in 1814, threatened the South of France; "he will, if leaders of factions are supported, burn the villages and have their inhabitants hanged." In the year 1815, he issued the following proclamation: "All those who after the entry of the (English) army into France leave their dwellings and all those who are Eights of Inhabitants of Enemy Territory 159 found in the sei-vice of the usurper will be regarded as adherents of his and as enemies; their property will be used for the maintenance of the army." " These are the expressions in the one case of one of the great masters of war and of the dominion founded upon war power, and in the other, of a commander- in-chief who elsewhere had carried the protection of private property in hostile lands to the extremest possible limit. Both men as soon as a popular rising takes place resort to terrorism." ^ A particular kind of war treason, which must be " war Trea- briefly gone into here, inasmuch as the views of the ^^"^ jurists about it differ very strongly from the usages of war, is the case of deception in leading the way, perpetrated in the form of deliberate guiding of the enemy's troops by an inhabitant on a false or dis- advantageous road. If he has offered his services, then the fact of his treason is quite clear, but also in case he was forced to act as guide his offense cannot be judged differently, for he owed obedience to the power in occupation, he durst in no case perpetrate an act of open resistance and positive harm but should have, if the worst came to the worst, limited himself to passive disobedience, and he must there- fore bear the consequence.^" However intelligible the inclination to treat and Another deplorable » J. von Hartmann, Kritische Tersuche, II, p. 73. ^^ ^' loLiider, Das Landkriegsreoht, p. 103. 160 The War Book of the German General Staff to judge an offense of this kind from a milder stand- point may appear, none the less the leader of the troops thus harmed cannot do otherwise than punish the offender with death, since only by harsh measures of defense and intimidation can the repetition of such offenses be prevented. In this case a court- martial must precede the infliction of the penalty. The court-martial must however be on its guard against imputing hastily a treasonable intent to the guide. The punishment of misdirection requires in every case proof of evil intention. Also it is not allowable to diplomatic agents to make communications from the country which they inhabit during the war to any side as to the military situation or proceedings. Persons contravening this universally recognized usage of war may be immedi- ately expelled or in the case of great danger arrested. CHAPTER II PEIVATE PKOPEETY IK WAE SiNCK, aocording to the law of nations and the law of private of war to-day, war makes enemies of States and not itsimmuni- of private persons, it follows that every arbitrary devastation of the country and every destruction of private property, generally speaking every unneces- sary (i.e., not required by the necessity of war) in- jury to alien property is contrary to the law of na- tions. Every inhabitant of the territory occupied is therefore to be protected alike in his person and in his property. In this sense spoke King William to the French at the b^inning of the Campaign of 1870 : " I wage war with the French soldiers and not with the French citizens. The latter will therefore continue to enjoy security for their person and their goods, so long as they do not by hostile undertakings against Grerman troops deprive me of the right to afford them my protection." The question stands in quite another position if the necessity of war demands the requisition of the stranger's property, whether public or private. In 161 163 The War Booh of the German General Staff this case of course every sequestration, every tempo- rary or permanent deprivation, every use, every in- jury and all destruction are permitted. The foUovping principles therefore result: 1. Prohibited unconditionally are all aimless destruc- tions, devastations, burnings, and ravages of the enemy's country. The soldier who practises such things is punished as an ofEender according to the appropriate laws.^ 2. Permissible on the other hand are all destructions and injuries dictated by military considerations; and, indeed, (a) All demolitions of houses and other build- ings, bridges, railways, and telegraphic establishments, due to the necessity of mili- tary operations. (&) All injuries which are required through military movements in the country or for earthworks for attack or defense. Hence the double rule: 'Ro harm must be done, not even the very slightest, vrhich is not dictated by military consideration; every kind of harm may be done, even the very utmost, vs^hich the conduct of war requires or which comes in the natural course of it. Whether the natural justification exists or not is 1 Obviously we are only speaking of a war between civilized people since, in tlie case of savages and barbarians, humanity is not advanced very far, and one cannot act otherwise toward them than by devastation of their grain fields, driving away their herds, taking of hostages, and the like. Private Property in War 163 a subject for decision in each individual case. The answer to this question lies entirely in the power of the Commanding Officer, from whose conscience our times can expect and demand as far-reaching hu- manity as the object of war permits. On similar principles must be answered the ques- tion as to the temporary use of property, dispositions as to houses and the like: no inhabitant of the oc- cupied territory is to be disturbed in the use and free disposition of his property, on the other hand the necessity of war justifies the most far-reaching disturbance, restriction, and even imperiling of his property. In consequence there are permitted: 1. Eequisitions of houses and their furniture for the purpose of billeting troops. 2. Use of houses and their furniture for the care of the sick and wounded. 3. Use of buildings for observation, shelter, defense, fortification, and the Hke. Whether the property owners are subjects of the occupied territory or of a Foreign State is a matter of complete indifference; also the property of the Sovereign and his family is subject to no exception, although to-day it is usually treated with courtesy. The conception of the inviolability of private prop- of German bch&Tior. erty here depicted was shared by the Germans in 1870 and was observed. If on the French side state- ments to the contrary are even to-day given expres- 164 The War Book of the German General Staff sion, they rest either on untruth or exaggeration. It certainly cannot be maintained that no illegitimate violations of private property by individuals ever occurred. But that kind of thing can never be en- tirely avoided even among the most highly cultivated nations, and the best disciplined armies. In every case the strictest respect for private property was en- joined ^ upon the soldiers by the German Military Authorities after crossing the frontier, and strong measures were taken in order to make this injunc- tion effective; the property of the French was in- deed, as might be shown in numerous cases, pro- tected against the population itself, and was even in several cases saved at the risk of our own lives.^ 2 Army Order of August 8thj 1870, on crossing the frontier: " Soldiers ! the pursuit of the enemy who has been thrust back after bloody struggles has already led a great part of our army across the frontier. Several corps will to-day and to- morrow set foot upon French soil. I expect that the discipline by which you have hitherto distinguished yourselves will be particularly observed on the enemy's territory. We wage no war against the peaceable inhabitants of the country; it is rather the duty of every honor-loving soldier to protect pri- vate property and not to allow the good name of our army to be soiled by a single example of bad discipline. I count upon the good spirit which animates the army, but at the same time also upon the sternness and circumspection of all leaders. Headquarters, Homburg, August 8th, 1870. (Signed) Wilhelm." s " It is well known that the vineyards in Prance were guarded and protected by the German troops, but the same thing happened in regard to the art treasures of Versailles, Private Property in War 165 In like manner arbitrary destructions and ravages The gcntie Hun and the of buildings and the like did not occur on the Ger- looking-giass. man side where they were not called forth by the behavior of the inhabitants themselves. They scarcely ever occurred except where the inhabitants had foolishly left their dwellings and the soldiers were excited by closed doors and want of food. " If the soldier finds the doors of his quarters shut, and the food intentionally concealed or buried, then ne- cessity impels him to burst open the doors and to track the stores, and he then, in righteous anger, destroys a mirror, and with the broken furniture heats the stove." * If minor injuries explain themselves in this fashion in the eyes of every reasonable and thinking man, so the result of a fundamental and unprejudiced examination has shown that the destructions and ravages on a greater scale, which were made a re- proach against the German Army, have in no case overstepped the necessity prescribed by the military situation. Thus the much talked of and, on the French side, enormously exaggerated, burning down of twelve houses in Bazeilles, together with the shoot- ing of an inhabitant, were completely justified and, indeed, in harmony with the laws of war; indeed and the German soldiers protected French property at the risk of their lives against the incendiary bombs of the Paris Com- mune." — Liider, Landkriegsrecht, p. 118. * Bluntschli, Volker7-echt, sec. 652. 166 The War Boole of the German General Staff one may maintain that the conduct of the inhabitants would have called for the complete destruction of the village and the condemnation of all the adult in- habitants by martial law. CHAPTEE III BOOTT AND- PLUNDEEING In section 1, the inhabitant of the enemy's territory Booty, was described as a subject of legal rights and du- ties, who, so far as the nature of war allows, may continue to live protected as in time of peace by the course of law; further, in section 2, property, whether it be public or private, was likewise, so far as war allows it, declared to be inviolable — it there- fore follows logically that there can exist no right to the appropriation of the property, i.e., a right to booty or plundering. Opinions as to this have, in the course of the last century, undergone a complete change ; the earlier unlimited right of appropriation in war is to-day recognized in regard to public prop- erty as existing only in defined circumstances. In the development of the principles recognized to-day we have to distinguish. 1. State property and unquestionably: (a) immovable/ (&) movable.^ 1 [These terms are translated literally. They are roughly equivalent to the English distinction between " real " and " personal " property. — J. H. M.] 167 168 The, War Booh of the German General Staff The State realty may be used but must not be wasted. 2. Private property : (ft) immovable, (&) movable. Immovable State property is now no longer for- feited as booty ; it may, however, be used if such use is in the interests of military operation, and even destroyed, or temporarily administered. While in the wars of the First French Empire, Napoleon, in numerous cases, even during the war itself, disposed of the public property of the enemy (domains, cas- tles, mines, salt-works) in favor of his Marshals and diplomatists, to-day an appropriation of this kind is considered by international opinion to be unjusti- fied and, in order to be valid, requires a formal treaty between the conqueror and the conquered. The Military Government by the army of occupa- tion is only a Usufructuary pro tempore. It must, therefore, avoid every purposeless injury, it has no right to sell or dispose of the property. According to this juristic view the military administration of the conqueror disposes of the public revenue and taxes which are raised in the occupied territory, with the understanding, however, that the regular and un- avoidable expenses of administration continue to be defrayed. The military authority controls the rail- ways and telegraphs of the enemy's State, but here also it possesses only the right of use and has to give back the material after the end of the war. In the Booty and Plundering 169 administration of the State forests, it is not bound to follow the mode of administration of the enemy's Forest authorities, but it must not damage the woods by excessive cutting, still less may it cut them down altogether. Movable State property on the other hand can, ac- state per- 1' , 1 • 1 i<,>-ii sonalty Is at cordmg to modern views, be unconditionally appro- the mercy ot ..-If ,1 the victor. priated by the conqueror. This includes public funds,^ arms, and munition stores, magazines, transport, material supplies useful for the war and the like. Since the possession of things of this kind is of the highest importance for the conduct of the war, the conqueror is justified in destroying and annihilating them if he is not able to keep them. On the other hand an exception isi made as to all objects which serve the purposes of religious worship, education, the sciences and arts, charities and nurs- ing. Protection must therefore be extended to: the property of churches and schools, of libraries and museums, of almshouses and hospitals. The usual practise of the Napoleonic campaigns ^ so ruthlessly resorted to of carrying off art treasures, antiquities, 2 To be entirely distinguished from mimicipal funds which are regarded as private property. 3 How sensitive, indeed, how utterly sentimental, public opinion has become to-day in regard to this question, is shown by the attitude of the French and German Press in regard to gome objects of art carried away from China. 170 The Wa/r Booh of the German General Staff Private realty. Private personalty. and whole collections, in order to incorporate them in one's own art galleries, is no longer allowed by the law of nations to-day.* Immovable private property may well be the ob- ject of military operations and military policy, but cannot b© appropriated as booty, nor expended for fiscal or private purposes of acquisition. This also includes, of course, the private property of the ruling family, in so far as it really possesses this character and is not Crown Lands, whose frxiits are expended as a kind of Civil List or serve to supplement the same. Movable private property, finally, which in earlier times was the undeniable booty of the conqueror, is to-day regarded as inviolable. The carrying off of money, watches, rings, trinkets, or other objects of value, is therefore to be regarded as criminal robbery and to be punished accordingly. The appropriation of private property is regarded as partially permissible in the case of those objects which the conquered combatant carries on his own person. Still here also, opinions against the practise make it clear that the taking away of objects of value, money, and such-like is not permissible, and only *As to booty in the shape of horses, the Prussian instruc- tions say : " Horses taken as booty belong to the State and are therefore to be handed over to the horse depot. For every horse which is still serviceable he who has captured it receives a bonus of 18 dollars out of the exchequer, and for every un- serviceable horse half this sum." Booty and Plundering 171 those required for the equipment of troops are de- clared capable of appropriation. The recognition of the inviolability of private property does not of course exclude the sequestration of such objects as can, although they are private property, at the same time be regarded as of use in war. This includes, for example, warehouses of sup- plies, stores of arms in factories, depots of convey- ances or other means of traffic, as bicycles, motor cars, and the like, or other articles likely to be of use with advantage to the army, as telescopes, etc. In order to assure to the possessors compensation from their government, equity enjoins that a receipt be given for the sequestration. Logically related to movable property are the so- "chosesin called " incorporeal things." When Napoleon, for example, appropriated the debts due to the Elector of Hesse and thus compelled the Elector's debtors to pay their debts to him ; when he furthermore in 1807 allowed the debts owed by the inhabitants of the Duchy of Warsaw to Prussian banks and other public institutions, and indeed even to private persons in Prussia, to be assigned by the King of Prussia, and then sold them to the King of Saxony for 200 million francs, this was, according to the modem view, noth- ing better than robbery. Plundering is to be regarded as the worst form of Plundering appropriation of a stranger's property. By this is 173 The War Booh of the German General Staff to be understood the robbing of inhabitants by the employment of terror and the abuse of a military superiority. The main point of the offense thus con- sists in the fact that the perpetrator, finding himself in the presence of the browbeaten owner, who feels defenseless and can offer no opposition, appropriates things, such as food and clothing, which he does not want for his own needs. It is not plundering but downright burglary if a man pilfers things out of uninhabited houses or at times when, the owner is absent. Plundering is by the law of nations to-day to be re- garded as invariably unlawful. If it may be difficult sometimes in the very heat of the fight to restrain excited troops from trespasses, yet unlawful plun- dering, extortion, or other violations of property, must be most sternly punished, it matters not whether it be done by naembers of unbroken divisions of troops or by detached soldiers, so-called marauders, or by the " hyenas of the battlefield." To permit such transgressions only leads, as experience shows, to bad discipline and the demoralization of the Army."* 5 Napoleon, who actually permitted his soldiers to plunder in numerous cases and in others, at least, did not do his best to prevent it, spoke of it at St. Helena : " Policy and morality are in complete agreement in their opposition to pillage. I have meditated a good deal on this subject; I have often been in a position to gratify my soldiers thereby; I would have done it if I had found it advantageous. But nothing is more Booty and Plundering 173 In the Franco-Prussian War, plundering and tak- ing of booty were on the German side sternly for- bidden. The Articles of War in question were re- peatedly recalled to every soldier just as in time of peace, also numerous orders of the day were issued on the part of the higher authorities. Transgres- sions were ruthlessly punished, in some cases even after the War. calculated to disorganize and completely ruin an army. Prom the moment he is allowed to pillage, a soldier's discipline is gone." CHAPTEK IV EEQUISITIONS AND WAE LEVIES Requisitions. By requisitions is to b© understood the compulsory appropriation of certain objects necessary for the army which is waging war. What things belong to this category is quite undetermined. They were primarily the means to feed man and beast, next to clothe and equip the members of the army, i.e., to substitute clothing and equipment for that which has worn out or become insufficient in view of the altered circumstances and also to supplement it; further- more, there will be such objects as serve for the trans- port of necessaries, and finally all objects may be de- manded which serve to supply a temporary necessity, such as material and tools for the building of fortifi- cations, bridges, railways and the like. That requi- sitions of this kind are unconditionally necessary and indispensable for the existence of the army, no one has yet denied ; and whether one bases it legally upon necessity or merely upon the might of the stronger is a matter of indifference as far as the prac- tise is concerned. 174 Requisitions and War Levies 175 The right generally recognized by the law of na- how the tions of to-day to requisition is a child of the French man leamt Kevolution and its wars, it is known that as late as ^"y-" in the year 1806, Prussian battalions camped close to big stacks of corn and bivouacked on potato fields without daring to appease their hunger with the prop- erty of the stranger; the behavior of the French soon taught them a better way. Every one knows the ruthless fashion in which the army of the French Republic and of ISTapoleon satisfied their wants, but of late opinion laying stress upon the protection of private propeity has asserted itself. Since a prohi- bition of requisitions would, considering what war is, have no prospect of acceptance under the law of na- tions, the demand has been put forward that the objects supplied should at least be paid for. This idea has indeed up till now not become a principle of war, the right of requisitioning without payment exists as much as ever and will certainly be claimed in the future by the armies in the field, and also, considering the size of modern armies, must be claimed; but it has at least become the custom to requisition with as much forbearance as possible, and to furnish a receipt for what is taken, the discharge of which is then determined on the conclusion of " To exbaast In order to avoid overdoing it, as may easily hap- i^a™i™^^ig pen in the case of requisitions, it is often arranged t" drftT"" 176 Th^ War Book of the German General Staff that requisitions may never be demanded by sub- ordinates but only by the higher officers, and that the local civil authorities shall be employed for the purpose. It cannot, however, be denied that this is not always possible in war ; that on the contrary the leader of a small detachment and in some circum- stances even a man by himself may be under the ne- cessity to requisition what is indispensable to him. Article 40 of the Declaration of Brussels requires that the requisitions (being written out) shall bear a direct relation to the capacity and resources of a country, and, indeed, the justification for this con- dition would be willingly recognized by every one in theory, but it will scarcely ever be observed in prac- tise. In cases of necessity the needs of the army will alone decide, and a man does well generally to make himself familiar with the reflection that, in the chang- ing and stormy course of a war, observance of the orderly conduct of peaceful times is, with the best will, impossible. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870' much was requisitioned on the German side. According to the opinion of all impartial writers it was done with mod- eration and the utmost tenderness for the inhabit- ants, even if in isolated cases excesses occurred. Re- ceipts were always furnished. Later, in the case of the army on the Mouse, as early as the middle of October requisitions were, wherever it was possible. Requisitions and War Levies 177 entirely left out of account and everything was paid for in cash. Later proceedings were frequently and indeed studiously conducted with a precise estimate of the value in thalers or francs.^ " Moreover, mili- tary history knows of no campaign in which the victu- aling of an army at such a distance from home was so largely conducted with its own stores." ^ By war levies or contributions is to be understood " Bnccaneer- the raising of larger or smaller sums of money from the parishes of the occupied territory. They are thus to be distinguished from requisitions since they do not serve for the satisfaction of a momentary want of the army and consequently can only in the rarest cases be based upon the necessity of war. These levies originated as so-called " Brandschatzungen," i.e., as a ransom from plundering and devastation, and thus constituted, compared vsdth the earlier looting sys- tem, a step in the huTna.Tii7.iTig of war. Since the law of nations to-day no longer recognizes any right to plundering and devastation, and inasmuch as the principle that war is conducted only against States, and not against private persons, is uncontested, it follows logically that levies which can be character- ized as simply booty-making or plundering, that is to say, as arbitrary enrichment of the conquerors, are not permitted by modem opinion. The conqueror is, 1 Dahn, Jahrhuch f. A.u.M., Ill, 1876. Jacquemyns Revue. 2Dahn, iiid., Ill, 1871. 178 Th& War Booh of the German General Staff in particular, not justified in recouping himself for the cost of the war by inroads upon the property of private persons, even though the Vfav was forced upon him. War levies are therefore only allowed : 1. As a substitute for taxes. 2. As a substitute for the supplies to be furnished as requisitions by the population. 3. As punishments. As to 1 : This rests upon the right of the power in occupation to raise and utilize taxes. As to 2 : In cases where the provision of pre- scribed objects in a partiQular district is impossible, and in consequence the deficiency has to be met by purchase in a neighboring district. As to 3 : War levies as a means of punishing in- dividuals or whole parishes were very frequently em- ployed in the Franco-Prussian War. If French writers accuse the German staff of excessive severity in this respect, on the other hand it is to be re- marked that the embittered character which the war took on in its latest stage, and the lively participation of the population therein, necessitated the sternest measures. But a money tax, judging by experience, operates, in most cases, on the civil population. The total sum of all the money contributions raised in the War of 1870 may be called a minimum compared with the sums which Napoleon was accustomed to Bequisitions and War Levies 179 draw from the territories occupied by him. Accord- ing to official estimates, havoc amounting to about six milliards of francs was visited upon the four million inhabitants of Prussia in the years 1807-13. In regard to the raising of war levies it should be noted that they should only be decreed by superior officers and only raised with the cooperation of the local authorities. Obviously an acknowledgment of every sum raised is to be furnished. 1. In the military laws of different countries the right of levying contributions is exclusively reserved to the Commander-in-Chief. 2. The usual method of raising taxes would, in con- sequence of their slowness, not be in harmony with the demands of the War ; usually, therefore, the Civil Authorities provide themselves with the necessary money by a loan, the repayment of which is provided for later by law. CHAPTER Y ADMINISTEATION OF OCCUPIED TEEEITOET How to AccoEDiNG to earlier views right up to the last cen- ah Invaded turj, a Govemment whose army had victoriously forced itself into the territory of a foreign State could do exactly as it pleased in the part occupied. No regard was to be paid to the constitution, laws, and rights of the inhabitants. Modern times have now introduced, in this respect, a change in the domi- nant conceptions, and have established a certain legal relationship between the inhabitants and the aimy of occupation. If, in the following pages, we develop briefly the principles which are applied to the gov- emment of territory in occupation, it must none the less be clearly emphasized that the necessities of war not only allow a deviation from these principles in many cases but in some circumstances mate it a positive duty of the Commander. The occupation of a portion of the enemy's terri- tory does not amount to an annexation of it. The right of the original State authority consequently re- mains in existence; it is only suspended when it comes into collision with the stronger power of the 180 Adminktration of Occupied Territory 181 conqueror during the term, of the occupation, i.e., only for the time being. ^ But the administration of a country itseK cannot he interrupted by war ; it is therefore in the interest of the country and its inhabitants themselves, if the conqueror takes it in hand, to let it be carried on either with the help of the old, or, if this is not feasible, through the substitution of the new, author- ities. From this fundamental conception now arises a series of rights and duties of the conqueror on the one side and of the inhabitants on the other. Since the conqueror is only the substitute for the me Laws real Government, he will have to establish the con- withquau- tinuation of the administration of the country with the help of the existing laws and regulations. The issue of new laws, the abolition or alteration of old ones, and the like, are to be avoided if they are not excused by imperative requirements of war ; only the latter permit legislation which exceeds the need of a provisional administration. The French Republic, at the end of the eighteenth century, frequently abol- ished the preexisting constitution in the States con- iThe King of Denmark in 1715, whilst Charles XII, after the Battle of Pultawa, stayed for years in Bender, sold the conquered principalities of Bremen and Verden to the King of England, Elector of Hanover, before England had yet declared war on Sweden. This undouhtedly unlawful act of England first received formal recognition in the Peace of Stock- holm, 1720. flcatlon. 182 The War Boole of the German General Staff The Inhabit- ants must obey. Martial Law. quered by it, and substituted a Republican one, but this is none the less contrary to the law of nations to-day. On the other hand, a restriction of the free- dom of the Press, of the right of association, and of public meeting, the suspension of the right of election to the Parliament and the like, are in some circum- stances a natural and unavoidable consequence of the state of war. The inhabitants of the occupied territory owe the same obedience to the organs of Government and ad- ministration of the conqueror as they owed before the occupation to their own. An act of disobedience cannot be excused by reference to the laws or com- mands of one's own Government ; even so an attempt to remain associated with the old Government or to act in agreement with it is punishable. On the other hand, the provisional Government can demand noth- ing which can be construed as an offense against one's own Fatherland or as a direct or indirect participa- tion in the war. The civil and criminal jurisdiction continues in force as before. The introduction of an extraor- dinary administration of justice — martial law and courts-martial — is therefore only to take place if the behavior of the inhabitants makes it necessary. The latter are, in this respect, to be cautioned, and any such introduction is to be made known by appro- priate means. The courts-martial must base any Administration of Occupied Territory 183 sentence on the fundamental laws of justice, after they have first impartially examined, however sum- marily, the facts and have allowed the accused a free defense. The conqueror can, as administrator of the coun- try and its Government, depose or appoint officials. He can put on their oath the civil servants, who con- tinue to act, as regards the scrupulous discharge of their duties. But to compel officials to continue in office against their will does not appear to be in the interest of the army of occupation. Transgressions by officials are punished by the laws of their country, but an abuse of their position to the prejudice of the army of occupation will be punished by martial law. Also judicial officers can be deposed if they permit themselves to oppose publicly the instructions; of the provisional Government. Thus it would not have been possible, if the occupation of Lorraine in the year 1870-71 had been protracted, to avoid deposing the whole bench of Judges at Nancy and substi- tuting German Judges, since they could not agree with the German demands in regard to the promulga- tion of sentence.^ 2 The German administration desired that, as hitherto, jus- tice should be administered in the name of the Emperor (Na- poleon III). The Court, on the contrary, desired, after the revolution of September 4th, 1870, to use the formula : " In the name of the French Republic." The Court no longer recog- nized the Emperor as Sovereign, the German authorities did not yet recognize the Republic. Finally the Court, unfor- FlBCal Pol- icy. 184 The War Booh of the German General Staff The financial administration of the occupied terri- tory passes into the hands of the conqueror. The taxes are raised in the preexisting fashion. Any in- crease in them due to the war is enforced in the form of " War levies." Out of the revenue of the taxes the costs of the administration are to be defrayed, as, generally speaking, the foundations of the State prop- erty are to be kept undisturbed. Thus the domains, forests, woodlands, public buildings and the like, al- though utilized, leased, or let out, are not to be sold or rendered valueless by predatory management. On the other hand it is permitted to apply all surplus from the revenues of administration to the use of the conqueror. The same thing holds good of railways, telegraphs, telephones, canals, steamships, submarine cables and similar things; the conqueror has the right of se- questration, of itse and of appropriation of any re- ceipts, as against which it is incumbent upon him to keep them in good repair. If these establishments belong to private persons, then he has indeed the right to use them to the fullest extent; on the other hand he has not the right to sequestrate the receipts. As regards the right of an- nexing the rolling-stock of the railways, the opinions tunately for the inhabitants, ceased its activities. The proper solution would have been, according to Bluntsehli ( 547 ) , either the use of a neutral formula, as, for example, " In the name of the law," or the complete omission of the superfluous formula. Administration of Occupied Territory 185 of a:uthoritative teachers of the law of nations differ from one another. Whilst one section regard all roUing-stock as one of the most important war re- sources of the enemy's State, and in consequence claim for the conqueror the right of unlimited se- questration, even if the railways belonged to private persons or private companies,^ on the other hand the other section incline to a milder interpretation of the question, in that they start from the view that the rolling-stock forms, along with the inimovable material of the railways, an inseparable whole, and that one without the other is worthless and is there- fore subject to the same laws as to appropriation.* The latter view in the year 1871 found practical rec- ognition in so far as the rolling-stock captured in large quantities by the Germans on the French rail- ways was restored at the end of the war ; a correspond- ing regulation was also adopted by the Hague Con- ference in 1899. These are the chief principles for the administra- occupation tion of an occupied country or any portion of it. not fictitious. From them emerges quite clearly on the one hand the duties of the population, but also on the other the limits of the power of the conqueror. But the enforcement of all these laws presupposes the actual occupation of the enemy's territory and the possi- 8 Stein, Revue 17, Declaration of Brussels, Article 6. * Mamuel 51; Moynier, Revue, XIX, 165. 186 The War Boole of the German General Staff bility of really carrying them out.^ So-called " fic- titious occupation," such as frequently occurred in the eighteenth century and only existed in a declara- tion of the claimant, without the country concerned being actually occupied, are no longer recognized by influential authorities on the law of nations as valid. If the conqueror is compelled by the vicissitudes of war to quit an occupied territory, or if it is volun- tarily given up by him, then his military sovereignty immediately ceases and the old State authority of itself again steps into its rights and duties. E Article 42 of the Hague Regulations runs : " Territory is considered to be occupied when it is placed as a matter of fact under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation ex- tends only to territories where that authority is established and capable of being exercised." PAET III USAGES OF WAB AS KEGAUDS NEUTEAL STATES By the neutrality of a State is to be understood non- what neu- trality participation in the war by third parties; the duly means. attested intention not to participate in the conduct of the war either in favor of, or to the preju,dice of, either one of the two belligerents. This relationship gives rise in the case of the neutral State to certain rights but also to fixed duties. These are not laid down by international regulations or international treaties; we have therefore here also to do with " Usages of War." What is principally required of a neutral State is a neutral equal treatment of both belligerents. If, therefore, things to aii 1 1 IT m Dien; there- the neutral State could support the belligerents at all, fore he must ^ ^ " be nothing to it would have to give its support in equal measure to any of them, both parties. As this is quite impossible and as one of the two parties — and probably every one of them — would regard itseK as injured in any case, it therefore follows as a practical and empirical princi- ple " not to support the two [i.e., either or both] belligerents is the fundamental condition of neu- trality." 187 188 TAe War Boole of the Oerman General Staff But there are limits to this detach- Dutiee of the neutral. Belligerents must be warned off. But this principle would scarcely be maintained in its entirety, because in that case the trade and inter- course of the neutral State would in some circum- stances be more injured than that of the belligerents themselves. But no State can be compelled to act against its own vital interests, therefore it is neces- sary to limit the above principle as follows : " l^o neutral State can support the belligerents as far as military operations are concerned. This principle sounds very simple and lucid, its content is, how- ever, when closely considered very ambiguous and in consequence the danger of dissensions between neu- tral and belligerent States is very obvious." In the following pages the chief duties of neutral States are to be briefly developed. It is here as- sumed that neutrality is not to be regarded as synon- ymous with indifference and impartiality towards the belligerents and the continuance of the war. As regards the expression of partizanship' all that is re- quired of neutral States is the observance of inter- national courtesies; so long as these are observed there is no occasion for interference. The chief duties of neutral States are to be re- garded as: 1. The territory of neutral States is available for none of the belligerents for the conduct of its military operations.^ The Government of the neutral 1 The passage of French troops through Prussian territory in October, 1805, was a contempt of Prussian neutrality. — The Usages of War as Regards Neutral States 189 State has therefore, once War is declared, to prevent the subjects of both parties from march- ing through it; it has likewise to prevent the laying out of factories and workshops for the manufacture of War requisites for one or other of the parties. Also the organization of troops and the assembling of "Freelances" on the territory of neutral States is not allowed by the law of nations.^ If the frontiers of the neutral State march with The neutral those of the territory where the War is being its inviolable waged, its Government must take care to occupy mSst Stem its own frontiers in suflBcient strength to pre- the Tres- passers. moment the Swiss Government permitted the Allies to march through its territory in the year 1814, it thereby renounced the rights of a neutral State. — In the Franco-Prussian War the Prussian Government complained of the behavior of Luxem- burg in not stopping a passage en masse of fugitive French soldiers after the fall of Metz through the territory of the Grand Duchy. 2 The considerable reenforcement of the Servian Army in the year 1876 by Russian Freelances was an open violation of neutrality, the more so as the Government gave the officers permission, as the Emperor himself confessed later to the Eng- lish Ambassador in Livadia. The English Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, Art. 4* forbids all English subjects during a war in which England remains neutral, to enter the army or the navy of a belligerent State, or the enlistment for the purpose, without the express permission of the Government. Similarly the American law of 1818. The United States complained energetically during the Crimean War of English recruiting on their territory. * [This Act applies to British subjects wherever they may be, and it also applies to aliens, but only if they enlisted or promoted enlistment on British territory. For a full discus- sion of the scope of the Act see R. v. Jameson (1896), 2 Q.B. 425.— J. H. M.] 190 The War Booh of the German General Staff vent any portions of the belligerent Armies step- ping across it with the object of marching through or of recovering after a Battle, or of withdrawing from War captivity. 'Every mem- ber of the belligerent Army who trespasses upon the territory of the neutral State is to be dis- armed and to be put out of action till the end of the War. If whole detachments step across, they must likewise be dealt with. They are, indeed, not prisoners of War, but, nevertheless, are to be prevented from returning to the seat of War. A discharge before the end of the War would pre- suppose a particular arrangement of all parties concerned. If a convention to cross over is concluded, then, according to the prevalent usages of War, a copy of the conditions is to be sent to the Vic- tor.^ If the troops passing through are taking with them prisoners of War, then these are to be treated in like fashion. Obviously, the neu- tral State can later demand compensation for the maintenance and care of the troops who have crossed over, or it can keep back War material as a provisional payment. Material which is liable to be spoilt, or the keeping of which would be disproportionately costly, as, for example, a considerable number of horses, can be sold, and 3 At the end of August, 1870, some French detachments, -with- out its being known, marched through Belgian territory; others in large numbers fled after the Battle at Sedan to Belgium, and were there disarmed. In February, 1871, the hard-pressed French Army of the East crossed into Switzer- land and were there likewise disarmed. Usages of War as Regards Neutral States 191 the net proceeds set ofE against the cost of in- ternment. A neutral State can support no belligerent by fur- umentrai nishing military resources of any kind whatso- °^"'°®' ever, and is bound to prevent as much as possi- ble the furnishing of such wholesale on the part of its subjects. The ambiguity of the notion " Kriegs mittel " has often led to complications. The most indispensable means for the conduct The ■■ sin- J! -ITT- • T71 j-i,- -J. ■ ewsotwar" of a War is money. For this very reason it is —loans to difficult to prevent altogether the support of one * ^"*'' ^' or other party by citizens of neutral States, since there wiU always be Bankers who, in the interest of the State in whose success they put confidence, and whose solvency in the case of a defeat they do not doubt, will promote a loan. Against this nothing can be said from the point of view of the law of nations; rather the Government of a country cannot be made responsible for the ac- tions of individual citizens, it could only accept responsibility if business of this kind was done by Banks immediately under the control of the State or on public Stock Exchanges. It is otherwise with the supply of contraband contraband of war, that is to say, such things as are sup- plied to a belligerent for the immediate support of war as being warlike resources and equipment. These may include : (a) Weapons of war (guns, rifles, sabers, etc., ammunition, powder and other explosives, and military conveyances, etc.). (&) Any materials out of which this kind of war supplies can be manufactured, such as 193 The War Booh of the German General Staff Good business. saltpeter, sulphur, coal, leather, and the like. (c) Horses and mules. (d) Clothing and equipment (such as uni- forms of all kinds, cooking utensils, leather straps, and footwear). (e) Machines, motor-cars, bicycles, telegraphic apparatus, and the like. All these things are indispensable for the con- duct of war, their supply in great quantities means a proportionately direct support of the belligerent. On the other hand, it cannot be left out of account that many of the above-men- tioned objects also pertain to the peaceable needs of men, i.e., to the means without which the practise of any industry would be impossible, and the feeding of great masses of the popula- tion doubtful. The majority of European States are, even in time of peace, dependent on the importation from other countries of horses, machines, coal, and the like, even as they are upon that of porn, preserved foods, store cattle, and other necessaries of life. The supply of such articles by subjects of a neutral State may, therefore, be just as much an untainted business transaction and pacific, as a support of a belligerT ent. The question whether the case amounts to the one or the other is therefore to be judged each time upon its merits. In practise, the fol- lowing conceptions have developed themselves in the course of time: (a) The purchase of necessaries of life, store cattle, preserved foods, etc., in the terri- Usages of War as Regards Neutral States 193 tory of a neutral, even if it is meant, as a matter of common knowledge, for the re- victualing of the Army, is not counted a violation of neutrality, provided only that such purchases are equally open to both parties. (6) The supply of contraband of war, in small contraband quantities, on the part of subjects of a Male!"" neutral State to one of the belligerents is, so far as it bears the character of a peace- able business transaction and not that of an intentional aid to the war, not a viola- tion of neutrality. No Government can be expected to prevent it in isolated and trivial eases, since it would impose on the States concerned quite disproportionate exer- tions, and on their citizens countless sacri- fices of money and time. He who supplies a belligerent with contraband does so on his own account and at his own peril, and exposes himself to the risk of Prize.* *In the negotiations in 1793, as to the neutrality of North America in the Anglo-French War, Jefferson declared : " The right of the citizens to fashion, sell, and export arms cannot be suspended by a foreign war, but American citizens pursue ' it on their own account and at their own risk." — Bluntachli, sec. 425 (2). Similarly in the famous treaty between Prussia and the United States of September 10th, 1785, it was expressly fixed in Article 13 that if one of the two States was involved in war and the other State should remain neutral, the traders of the latter should not be prevented from selling arms and munitions to the enemy of the other. Thus the contraband articles were not to be confiscated, but the merchants were to be paid the value of their goods by the belligerent who had seized them. This arrangement was, however, not inserted 194 The War Boole of the German General Staff And on a (c) The supplj of war resources on a large large scale. scale stands in a different position. Un- doubtedly this presents a case of actual promotion of a belligerent's cause, and gen- erally of a warlike succor. If, therefore, a neutral State wishes to place its detach- ment from the war beyond doubt, and to exhibit it clearly, it must do its utmost to prevent such supplies being delivered. The instructions to the Customs authori- ties must thus be clearly and precisely set out, that on the one hand they notify the will of the Government to set their face against such wanton bargains with all their might, but that on the other, they do not arbitrarily restrict and cripple the total home trade. The practise In accordance with this view many neutral States, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Japan, etc., did, during the Franco-Prussian War, forbid all supply or transit of arms to a belligerent, whilst England and the United States put no kind of obstacles whatsoever in the way of the traffic in arms, and contented themselves with drawing the attention of their commercial classes to the fact that arms were contraband, and were there- . fore exposed to capture on the part of the in- jured belligerent." in the newer treaties between Prussia and the Union in 1799 and 1828. 5 In the exchange of despatches between England and Ger- many which arose out of the English deliveries of arms, the English Minister, Lord Granville, declares, in reply to the com- differs. Usages of War as Regwrds Neutral States 195 It is evident, therefore, that the views of this particular relation of nations with each other still need clearing up, and that the unanimity which one would desire on this question does not exist. 4. The neutral State may allow the passage or trans- who may port of wounded or sick through its territory skkl^aae without therehy violating its neutrality; it has, bounded, however, to watch that hospital trains do not carry with them either war personnel or war material with the exception of that which is necessary for the care of the sick."* plaints of the German Ambassador in London, Count Bern- storff, that this behavior is authorized by the preexisting prac- tise, but adds that "with the progress of civilization the obli- gations of neutrals have become more stringent, and declares his readiness to consult with other nations as to the possibil- ity of introducing in concert more stringent rules, although his expectations of a practical result are, having regard to the declarations of the North- American Government, not very hope- ful." President Grant had, it is true, already in the Neutral- ity Proclamation of August 22nd, 1870, declared the trade in contraband in the United States to be permitted, but had uttered a warning that the export of the same over sea was forbidden by international law. He had later expressly for- bidden the American arsenal administration to sell arms to a belligerent, an ordinance which was of course self-evident and was observed even in England, but he did not attempt to prevent dealers taking advantage of the public sale of arms out of the State arsenals to buy them for export to the French. 6, Belgium allowed itself, in August, 1870, owing to the oppo- sition of Prance, to be talked into forbidding the transport of wounded after the Battle of Sedan, through Belgian territory, and out of excessive caution interpreted its decree of August 27th as amounting to a prohibition of the transport even of individual woimded. The French protest was based on the contention that by the transport of wounded through Belgium, 196 The War Book of the German General Staff Who may not pass — Prisoners of War. Rights of the neutral. 5. The passage or transport of prisoners of war through neutral territory is, on the other hand, not to be allowed, since this would be an open favoring of the belligerent who happened to be in a position to make prisoners of war on a large scale, while his own railways, water highways, and other means of transport remained free for exclusively military purposes. These are the most important duties of neutral States so far as land warfare is concerned. If they are disregarded by the neutral State itself, then it has to give satisfaction or compensation to the bellig- erent who is prejudiced thereby. This ease may also occur if the Government of the neutral State, "with the best intentions to abstain from proceedings which violate neutrality, has, through domestic or foreign reasons, not the power to make its intentions good. If, for example, one of the two belligerents by main force marches through the territory of a neutral State and this State is not in a position to put an end to this violation of its neutrality, then the other belligerent has the right to engage the enemy on the hitherto neutral territory. The duties of neutral States involve corresponding rights, such as : the military communieation of the enemy with Germany was relieved from a serious hindrance. " On such a ground " — thinks Bluntsehli (p. 434) — "one might set one's face against the transport of large numbers but not the transport of in- dividuals. These considerations of humanity should decide." Usages of War as Regards Neutral States 197 The neutral State has the right to be regarded as still at peace with the belligerents as with others. The belligerent States have to respect the inviol- ability of the neutral and the undisturbed exer- cise of its sovereignty in its home affairs, to ab- stain from any attack upon the same, even if the necessity of war should make such an attack de- sirable. Neutral States, therefore, possess also the right of asylum for single members or ad- herents of the belligerent Powers, so far as no favor to one or other of them is thereby implied. Even the reception of a smaller or larger detach- ment of troops which is fleeing from pursuit does not give the pursuer the right to continue his pursuit across the frontier of the neutral terri- tory. It is the business of the neutral State to prevent troops crossing over in order to re- assemble in the chosen asylum, reform, and sally out to a new attack. If the territory of a neutral State is trespassed upon by one of the belligerent parties for the purpose of its military operations, then this State has the right to proceed against this viola- tion of its territory with all the means in its power and to disarm the trespassers. If the trespass has been committed on the orders of the Army Staff, then the State concerned is bound to give satisfaction and compensation; if it has been committed on their own responsibility, then the individual offenders can be punished as criminals. If the violation of the neutral terri- tory is due to ignorance of its frontiers and not The neutral has the right to be left alone. Neutral territory Is sacred. The neutral may resist a violation of its territory " with all the means in its power," 198 The War Boole of the German General Staff Neutrality is presumed. The prop- erty of neu- trals. to evil intention, then the neutral State can de- mand the immediate removal of the wrong, and can insist on necessary measures being taken to prevent a repetition of such contempts. 4. Every neutral State can, so long as it itself keeps faith, demand that the same respect shall be paid to it as in time of peace. It is entitled to the presumption that it will observe strict neutrality and will not make use of any declara- tions or other transactions as a cloak for an in- justice against one belligerent in favor of the other, or will use them indifferently for both. This is particularly important in regard to Passes, Commissions, and credentials issued by a neutral State.'' 5. The property of the neutral State, as also that of its citizens, is, even if it lies within the seat of war, to be respected so far as the necessity of war allows. It can obviously be attacked and even destroyed in certain circumstances by the bel- ligerents, but only if complete compensation be afterwards made to the injured owners. Thus — to make this clear by an example from the year 1870 — the capture and sinking of six Eng- lish colliers at Duclaix was both justified and necessary on military grounds, but it was, for all that, a violent violation of English property, for which on the English side compensation was demanded, and on the German side was readily forthcoming. 7 Dr. A. W. Heffter, Das Europdische Volkerrecht der Gegen- wart (7th ed.), 1882, p. 320. Usages of War as Regards Neutral States 199 6. Neutral States may continue to maintain dip- Diplomatic lomatie intercourse with the belligerent Pow- "'t"™"''^*- ers undisturbed, so far as military measures do not raise obstacles in the way of it. THE END i 11 .'"lii !1 I! illll'i ijllij