CONNECTICUT. STATE COMMISSION ON 
 COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS, 
 
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 3 1924 024 640 264 
 
 REPORT 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Connecticut. State Commission 
 
 ON 
 
 Compensation for Industrial 
 Accidents 
 
 TALCOTT H. RUSSELL 
 BURTON MANSFIELD 
 JOHN ECCLES 
 
 Commissioners 
 
Law Library 
 Cornell Law School 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 ~2^i2^U... { 
 
 Date IM&y. %.j lf..J...f... 
 
To the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut: 
 
 The undersigned, having been appointed by the Governor of 
 the State of Connecticut members of a Commission authorized 
 by a resolution of the General Assembly of 191 1, which is as 
 follows : 
 
 "Creating a Commission to Investigate concerning the Advisability of 
 Establishing State Insurance for Workmen. 
 
 "Resolved by this Assembly : 
 
 Section i. That the governor is hereby authorized and requested to 
 appoint a commission of three persons, whose duty it shall be to investi- 
 gate and report to the next session of the General Assembly upon the 
 legality, advisability and practicability of establishing a state insurance 
 department, or other form of state insurance, as a means of providing 
 compensation for workmen and others injured through accidents occur- 
 ring in industrial occupations. Said commission shall further investigate 
 and report as to the advisability of a compensation act based upon the 
 taxing power of the state, and such other legislation connected with 
 said subject as shall be practical and wise. 
 
 Sec. 2. If said commission shall recommend such legislation or policy, 
 it shall include in its report a draft of any act or acts which it shall 
 deem necessary in order to carry its recommendations into effect, together 
 with an outline of any plan or plans for the establishment of such a 
 department as it shall deem wise. 
 
 Sec. 3. Said commission shall serve without compensation, but it shall 
 have power to employ necessary clerical assistance, and its proper 
 expenses, when audited by the comptroller, shall be paid by the state." 
 
 respectfully report: 
 
 That they have given careful consideration to the subjects 
 committed to them, and have sought information by diligent 
 inquiry as to the necessity and demand for legislation concerning 
 workmen's compensation, and as to the best and most efficient 
 method of meeting that demand. For that purpose they have 
 held public meetings, widely advertised, at New Haven, Hartford, 
 Bridgeport, Waterbury and Norwich, some of which have been 
 very largely attended. They have had expressions of opinion from 
 representatives of all interests, including especially labor unions 
 and workmen generally, also from the Manufacturers Association 
 of the State of Connecticut and from individual employers of 
 labor. 
 
— 2 — 
 
 The expression of opinion has been substantially unanimous, 
 and has shown to the satisfaction of this Commission that there 
 is a strong demajid for such legislation in this state. The plat- 
 forms of all the leading parties have contained declarations in its 
 favor. A large part of the time of the Legislature of 191 1 was 
 occupied with the consideration of this subject, numerous bills 
 being presented and an act finally recommended by the Joint 
 Committee on Judiciary and Labor, which was passed by the 
 Senate but defeated in the House. 
 
 This demand in the State of Connecticut is part of a general 
 movement throughout the civilized countries of the western 
 world, which, commencing in Europe, resulted there in the pas- 
 sage of acts on the subject by most of the nations of that 
 continent. The movement in the United States has been more 
 recent, substantially all the legislation on the subject dating 
 within the last three years. During this period fifteen states 
 have actually passed laws on the subject, including New York, 
 where the act did not go into effect owing to the decision of 
 the Court of Appeals on a constitutional question. It may be 
 added that a constitutional amendment has been passed by 
 the Legislature of New York, which, if ultimately adopted 
 by the people, will remove the constitutional objection. The 
 Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate has also, 
 after a very full hearing, recommended an act known as the 
 Sutherland Bill affecting all employes engaged in interstate or 
 foreign commerce by railroad. In many, if not most, of the states 
 which have not passed acts Commissions have been appointed, as 
 in this state, which are considering the subject. The Conference 
 of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, consisting of rep- 
 resentatives appointed by substantially all of the states of the 
 Union to prepare and recommend acts designed to promote uni- 
 formity in the laws of the several states, appointed a Committee 
 which has already reported to the Conference an act upon the 
 subject which is under consideration by that body. It is a fair 
 presumption that in the course of a few years such legislation will 
 be very general throughout the country. 
 
 The old common law on the relations of master and servant, 
 so far as the liability for accidents is concerned, was perhaps 
 
— 3— 
 
 fair and reasonable as applied to the industrial conditions of 
 the time when it came into existence. When the employer and 
 employe were in a more nearly equal position, the number of 
 employes being smaller, and having the same opportunities with 
 the employer to ascertain and fully appreciate the dangers arising 
 out of the employment, including the danger from carelessness 
 by co-workers, and to protect themselves, it was perhaps fair 
 that the employer should be free from liability except in cases 
 where he was in fault personally or through his agents, and 
 where the employe was not to any extent to blame. But condi- 
 tions have changed. The modern industrial system in this country 
 gathers together an army of employes. The efficiency of the work 
 necessarily involves discipline and prompt obedience. The almost 
 universal introduction of machinery, with its peculiar dangers, 
 in place of the old methods, has greatly increased the risk. Under 
 these circumstances a demand has arisen for a change of the old 
 rule in regard to the responsibility of the employer for accidents. 
 
 It must be borne in mind also that in this country many of the 
 employes in large industrial establishments are engaged in a class 
 of labor for which the compensation is barely sufficient for their 
 support and that of their families. In such cases it is increasingly 
 difficult to accumulate savings sufficient to provide for their fami- 
 lies in case of death or incapacity for labor, either temporary or 
 permanent. Humanity, therefore, would seem to demand that 
 some provision should be made for the results of accidents under 
 such circumstances. 
 
 Aside from considerations of humanity, the public has a direct 
 interest in the matter. An accident causing incapacity for labor, 
 or death, is an injury to the public, for through such accident 
 the capacity of the workman to support himself and his family 
 is so far affected that they may become wholly or in part a 
 burden to the public. 
 
 In addition to this, there is a demand on the part of both 
 employer and employe that they shall be relieved from the 
 expense and friction of litigation: that the liability in case of 
 accident shall be so far fixed that both parties will know what to 
 expect ; that the employe will know what he and his family have 
 to rely upon, and that the employer may have a certain basis upon 
 which to make his calculations as to the expense of compensation 
 
— 4— 
 
 for accidents, and protect himself by adjustment of prices or by 
 insurance against it. 
 
 It is important to the state that accidents shall, so far as possi- 
 ble, be prevented. Many calculations, differing considerably, have 
 been made as to the proportion of preventable industrial accidents 
 compared with the total. There is no doubt whatever that they 
 constitute a considerable proportion. It is important to stimulate 
 the diligence of employers in protecting their employes. In no 
 way can that end be so efficiently accomplished as by imposing 
 certain charges in case of each accident. This is one of the 
 strongest reasons for the adoption of the compensation principle. 
 
 The demand for workmen's compensation may be said, there- 
 fore, to be based upon public convenience, that the expense of 
 business may so far as possible be made certain ; upon humanity ; 
 and upon public necessity, for the prevention of destruction of 
 life and limb and the protection of the community from pecuniary 
 burdens. 
 
 Legislation on this subject may be divided into three classes: 
 First, state insurance; second, state managed insurance; third, 
 the direct compensation plan. 
 
 Norway is the only European country which has adopted the 
 full state insurance. England and most of the continental coun- 
 tries have gone upon the compensation principle, which provides 
 for payment to be made by the employer direct, and either leav- 
 ing him free to protect himself by insurance or not as he sees 
 fit, or requiring him to insure the payment but leaving him a 
 wide choice in methods of insurance. 
 
 The term "state insurance" in the United States has been 
 used in such a way as to be misleading. No states have adopted, 
 nor so far as appears have proposed to adopt, any plan of insur- 
 ance for industrial accidents involving responsibility for pay- 
 ments on the part of the state. All the forms of so-called state 
 insurance either adopted or proposed are conducted by Boards or 
 other officials appointed by the state under rules provided by the 
 state, but the responsibility only extends to the funds collected 
 or administered by such Board. In case of the failure of such 
 funds there is no guarantee of payment on the part of the state. 
 
 Only two states, Ohio and Washington, have adopted state 
 managed insurance. The others acting upon the subject have 
 
— 5— 
 
 adopted the direct compensation plan, except Massachusetts, 
 which has a peculiar method of its own, to some extent, but not 
 altogether, based upon German ideas but not providing for any 
 state responsibility for losses. 
 
 State managed insurance is perhaps the first and most obvious 
 suggestion, but on full consideration many practical objections 
 occur. Such insurance would have to be based either on the 
 assessment principle, that is, the levying of a charge from year 
 to year as the necessity arose, or upon the reserve principle, 
 which would necessitate an assessment according to a fixed 
 rate based upon the assumed risk of each particular class 
 of employment. 
 
 There would be great difficulty in adapting the assessment 
 principle to this class of insurance. It would be important that 
 the charges should be made regular, not based upon uncertainties. 
 In some cases, as for instance in the manufacture of explosives, 
 one or more accidents might occur which would impose so heavy 
 a burden upon the other employers as to seriously, cripple their 
 business. 
 
 It would be necessary to adopt a fixed rate of premium, pro- 
 viding a sufficient reserve. These premiums must be apportioned 
 by a general rule for each class, taking no account of the degree 
 of care exercised by the particular employer, or the risk in his 
 employment. It is impossible to imagine a state departmenc 
 which would give different rates in the same business. Such 
 distinctions would invariably breed dissatisfaction and result in 
 confusion, while an ordinary insurance company is at liberty to 
 make sUch rates as it sees fit. 
 
 State managed insurance should be exclusive, depriving the 
 insurance companies of the right to transact this class of business. 
 This might give rise to possible constitutional objections, and is 
 at any rate contrary to American ideas of good policy. If it 
 were not made exclusive, there would be discrimination against 
 it as regards risks. The state being governed by fixed rules 
 could not adjust its rates to the conditions of each particular risk 
 and the private companies would get the best class of business 
 by making allowances for cases where extra care was exercised 
 to prevent accidents. Therefore the state would get the poorer 
 risks, thus disturbing the laws of average upon which premium 
 
— 6— 
 
 charges are made. Under /the state managed insurance system 
 with a fixed rate one of the great advantages of a compensation 
 system would be lost, that is the tendency to reduce accidents, 
 because the employer would be under no pecuniary incentive to 
 prevent accidents as it would not affect his rate of premium. 
 On the other hand, where the insurance company felt at liberty 
 to diminish the premium where the risk was less, there would 
 be a strong pecuniary inducement to extra diligence on the part 
 of the employer. 
 
 In addition to the considerations above stated, another and very 
 strong argument against the immediate adoption of state managed 
 insurance arises from the circumstance that the policy of com- 
 pensation for accidents is so recent that there has not been 
 sufficient experience upon which to base reliable calculations as 
 to the risk and expense of such insurance. Even in the countries 
 of Europe where such acts have been in force for some years, 
 the estimates of risk have not corresponded with the results of 
 experience. This consideration would be still stronger in the 
 United States, where we have practically no experience on the 
 subject. The recent literature of insurance is full of discussions 
 on this matter. The calculations of the companies doing this class 
 of business have been found to be very unreliable, the assumptions 
 as to risk and cost not corresponding at all with the actual results. 
 There is, therefore, no experience upon which the state could 
 safely rely in establishing such a system, and in all probability 
 the results at present would be unfortunate. 
 
 It would be extremely difficult for a state agency, having once 
 assumed its rate, to explain to the satisfaction of the public the 
 reasons for increase. Such a system would necessitate the estab- 
 lishment of a Bureau with a considerable number of high class 
 employes, causing a very great public charge. The managers of 
 a state managed insurance system would be quite likely to under- 
 estimate the risks and make the rate of premium too low. In 
 their desire to make the scheme popular they would be under 
 great temptation to do this. In that event such an insurance 
 system would be certain to result in disaster and be unable to 
 pay its risks in full. In such case the workman has no protection. 
 The state is not responsible, the managers are not responsible, 
 and there is no remedy against the employer, for he, having paid 
 his insurance, is no further liable. 
 
Under the plan recommended by the act submitted herewith, 
 there is a direct responsibility by the employer to the workman. 
 The workman's claim is privileged, in case of insolvency, over all 
 others. In case the employer takes out insurance, as he almost 
 universally will, the claim of the injured workman is made a lien 
 upon the policy so that the insurance company is bound to see 
 to its payment in case of the inability of the employer. The 
 workman therefore is doubly secured for payment. 
 
 The expense of state managed insurance must of necessity be 
 large. A high order of ability and experience would be necessary 
 in its management, which must be adequately paid, and the 
 expenses of actuaries and other employes would be heavy. Two 
 states, Washington and Ohio, are experimenting in this direction. 
 In Ohio, where the state managed insurance act was passed on 
 the last day of May, 1912, the State Liability Board consists of 
 three commissioners, paid five thousand dollars each, with power 
 to employ secretaries, actuaries, accountants, inspectors, exam- 
 iners, experts, clerks, stenographers and other assistants and fix 
 their compensation. The sum of twenty-five thousand dollars 
 was appropriated for expenses other than the salaries of the Com- 
 missioners for the balance of the year 19 12, and one hundred 
 thousand dollars for the year 1913. Washington has three sal- 
 aried Commissioners, with power to employ assistants, and an 
 appropriation of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for 
 expenses. The report for the year ending September 30th, 1912, 
 gives expenses as follows: salaries, $72,842.53; other expenses, 
 $3S>°25.55 J total, $107,868.08. 
 
 It is against the general American policy for the state to assume 
 the transaction of business until it sufficiently appears that there 
 is a strong necessity for such a step. This does not so far appear. 
 It is the general belief in this country that, except in a certain 
 narrow class of activities, the state does not manage business 
 with as much economy and efficiency as private concerns. 
 
 For these reasons the Commission has deemed it not advisable 
 to recommend either state or state managed insurance. 
 
 We have also considered the suggestion as to basing the act 
 upon the taxing power of the state. Legislation of this character 
 clearly comes within the police power and in this country has 
 been so considered. It is more doubtful whether it could be 
 supported in this state as an exercise of the taxing power. There- 
 
—8— 
 
 fore, in drawing our Act we have adopted the view that it is an 
 exercise of the police power. 
 
 In preparing the act submitted herewith we have kept in 
 view the idea that the necessity for change in the law arises 
 largely from the modern industrial system, and for that reason 
 we have made it applicable to a classified list of industries where 
 such a system prevails, and where special risks are involved, 
 carefully excluding domestic service and all industries employing 
 regularly less than seven workers. 
 
 As regards domestic service, no special risks are involved and 
 the other conditions are such that there has been no demand for 
 legislation of that sort. In those other industries employing less 
 than seven hands the employes are not generally subjected to 
 risks against which they are not able to protect themselves by 
 reasonable care. They are often in this respect in as advanta- 
 geous position as the employer. Much hardship and injustice 
 might result from the subjection of an employer in these cases 
 to heavy responsibility for accidents the consequences of which 
 he is perhaps no better able to bear than his employe. 
 
 The constitutionality of acts incorporating exceptions and 
 classifications has been attacked, but universally sustained by the 
 courts. In Massachusetts, in the Opinion of the Justices as to the 
 Constitutionality of House Bill No. 2154 — 209 Mass., p. 607, 
 the court sustained an act which was general in its scope but 
 excepted domestic service and farm labor. In Wisconsin, in the 
 case of Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N. E., 209, the court sustained 
 the constitutionality of an act general in its nature but excepting 
 employers having less than four workmen. In Ohio, in State ex 
 rel. Yaple v. Creamer, Treasurer, etc. — see Bradbury on Work- 
 men's Compensation, pp. 765 and 783 — the court sustained an 
 act making a compensation law applicable only to employers 
 having more than four workmen, referring for authority to Coal 
 Company v. Illinois, 185 U. S., 203. The question in the Coal 
 Company case was as to the constitutionality of an act classifying 
 coal mines in Illinois, and exempting from a law providing for 
 mine inspection and for the payment of fees, owners of mines 
 employing not more than five men. Mr. Justice Brown in render- 
 ing the opinion of the Supreme Court says in reference to this 
 provision : "This is a species of classification which the Legisla- 
 
— 9— 
 
 ture is at liberty to adopt provided it be not wholly arbitrary 
 or unreasonable." 
 
 In the case of Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., decided 
 by the United States Supreme Court January 12th, 1912, speaking 
 of an act subjecting employers engaged in interstate commerce by 
 railroad to certain liabilities in case of injury to employes, the 
 court said in reference to the objection that the classification 
 excluded other employes not engaged in interstate commerce by 
 railroad, and included employes not exposed to the hazards of 
 such business: 
 
 "But it does not follow that this classification is violative of the 'due 
 process of law' clause of the Fifth Amendment. Even if it be assumed 
 that that clause is equivalent to the 'equal protection of the laws' 
 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the most that can be 
 claimed for it here, it does not take from Congress the power to classify, 
 nor does it condemn exertions of that power merely because they 
 occasion some inequalities. On the contrary, it admits of the exercise 
 of a wide discretion in classifying according to general, rather than 
 minute, distinctions, and condemns what is done only when it is without 
 any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. Lindsley v. 
 Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. Tested by these standards, this 
 classification is not objectionable. Like classifications of railroad carriers 
 and employes for like purposes, when assailed under the equal protec- 
 tion clause, have been sustained by repeated decisions of this court. 
 Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Louisville & 
 Nashville Railroad Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36; Mobile, Jackson & 
 Kansas City Railroad Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35." 
 
 The act recommended is made compulsory, abandoning the 
 so-called optional feature adopted in many of the states. The 
 general form of this latter plan is an act providing for com- 
 pensation in all cases of accidents, with certain exceptions, with- 
 out reference to fault on the part of the employer, but making 
 the operation of the act dependent upon the consent of the 
 employer and the employe, providing that in case the employer 
 does not consent, he shall be deprived of the defense of fellow 
 servant, contributory negligence and assumption of risk. This 
 form of act was adopted in order to avoid the effect of the decision 
 of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Ives v. South 
 Buffalo Railway Co., 201 N. Y., 271. In that case the New York 
 act provided that the employer should be liable for accidents to 
 an employe "arising out of and in the course of his employment 
 
where such accident was caused or contributed to by a necessary 
 risk or danger of the employment or one inherent in the nature 
 thereof." This provision was irrespective of fault on the part 
 of the employer. Judge Werner in rendering the decision said 
 of this provision : 
 
 "Fault on his part is no longer an element of the employe's right of 
 action. This change necessarily and logically carries with it the abroga- 
 tion of the 'fellow-servant' doctrine, the 'contributory negligence' rule, 
 and the law relating to the employe's assumption of risks. There can 
 be no doubt that the first two of these are subjects clearly and fully 
 within the scope of legislative power; and that as to the third, this 
 power is limited to some extent by constitutional provisions." 
 
 The court further said, speaking of the fellow servant rule and the 
 law of contributory negligence: "These doctrines, for they are 
 nothing more, may be regulated or even abolished. This is true 
 to a limited extent as to the assumption of risk by the employe." 
 But of that provision of the act subjecting the employer to the 
 consequences of a necessary risk or danger of the employment, 
 or one inherent in the nature thereof, he'said that this, by depriv- 
 ing the employer altogether of the defense of assumption of risk 
 and making him liable without fault, was unconstitutional. 
 
 Therefore, so far as an act deprived the employer altogether of 
 the defense of assumption of risk, if the Ives case be good law, 
 it is unconstitutional, and the optional form of act subjecting him 
 to a compulsory compensation law unless he consents to waive 
 his defense of the assumption of risk would scarcely seem to avoid 
 the effect of that decision. 
 
 If the employer is compelled to choose between two acts, one 
 subjecting him to a compulsory liability and the other depriving 
 him of a defense to which he has a constitutional right, both of 
 which are unconstitutional, it cannot be held that such legisla- 
 tion is constitutional because it allows him to choose which 
 unconstitutional act he will be subjected to. In any event he 
 is deprived of his rights. Therefore the so-called optional form 
 does not seem to escape the effect of the Ives decision, unless 
 the defense of assumption of risk is used in the optional act 
 with a narrow meaning, that is referring merely to what may 
 be called the special assumption of risk, meaning such assump- 
 
— II — 
 
 tion as arises out of the fact that there is a defect or danger 
 resulting from fault on the part of the employer, and the 
 employe, knowing such defect, continues in his employment. 
 There would seem to be no authority for assuming that an 
 optional act using the general term is to be construed in such a 
 narrow and special sense. If, however, it is so construed, an 
 act of this character might leave the employe entirely unprotected 
 from the results of perhaps the greater part of the accidents 
 occurring, and therefore would fail to meet satisfactorily the 
 necessities of the case. 
 
 It is desirable that an act should be passed which will be fixed 
 and certain, covering the whole ground and providing a uniform 
 rule. An optional form of act which subjects the employer to 
 drastic legislation, depriving him of ordinary defenses in order 
 to compel him to consent to a provision which would otherwise 
 be unconstitutional, is, aside from other constitutional objections, 
 possibly liable to the objection that it deprives the employer of the 
 equal protection of the law. In view of the admittedly unsatis- 
 factory nature of such a law, the Commission has deemed it 
 desirable to adopt a general compulsory law unless such an act 
 is open to constitutional objections. 
 
 The case of Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co. has been dis- 
 tinctly overruled by the Supreme Court of the State of Washing- 
 ton — State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. C. W. Clausen, State 
 Auditor, 117 Pac. Rep., 1101 — and acts removing the defense of 
 assumption of risk have been sustained in the case of Opinions 
 of Justices as to the Constitutionality of House Bill No. 2154, 
 Senate No. 615, 209 Mass., 607, and in the Wisconsin case of 
 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N. E., 209. The acts in both these 
 cases are applicable to general industrial risks and not to what 
 are called specially hazardous risks. In the opinion of very 
 many lawyers of high standing the principle of the Ives case is 
 not sound, and will not be followed in other jurisdictions. 
 
 The doctrine that there can be no civil liability without fault, 
 although applicable to ordinary cases, is not universal. On the 
 contrary the common law in many cases assumes that a party 
 may be held responsible without fault for the consequences of 
 what he does, that casual connection without moral responsibility 
 for damage is sufficient ground of civil liability. 
 
-12- 
 
 Many instances can be given of this principle. The doctrine of 
 "respondeat superior" which makes the principal responsible for 
 the acts of his agent even although in the discharge of the business 
 of the superior the employe violates his instructions, and though 
 the employer exercises all possible care in his selection, is a 
 familiar illustration. If, for instance, a conductor in the course 
 of the discharge of the business of a railroad makes an unnec- 
 cessary assault upon a passenger, entirely contrary to the rules 
 of the railroad and in violation of instructions, the principal is 
 responsible. The railroad in such case is in no fault, except by 
 construction of law, and the principle which makes it responsible 
 is that of public policy. 
 
 In the case of Railroad v. Zernecke, 183 U. S., 583, the Supreme 
 Court of the United States sustained the validity of an act 
 making the railroad liable for injuries to passengers except where 
 the injury arose from the criminal negligence of the person 
 injured, even although without fault of the railroad. Mr. Justice 
 Kenna in rendering the opinion of the Court said : " 'The legisla- 
 tion is justifiable under the police power of the state, so it has 
 been held. It was enacted to make railroad companies insurers 
 of the safe transportation of their passengers, as they were of 
 baggage and freight; and no good reason is suggested why a 
 railroad company should be released from liability for injuries 
 received by a passenger while being transported over its line, 
 while the corporation must respond for any damages to his bag- 
 gage or freight.' Our jurisprudence affords examples of legal 
 liability without fault, and the deprivation of property without 
 fault being attributable to its owner. The law of deodands 
 was such an example : the personification of the ship in admiralty 
 law is another. Other examples are afforded in the liability of 
 the husband for the torts of the wife — the liability of a master 
 for the acts of his servants." Further in his opinion he cited 
 many illustrations in point. 
 
 Our own statute, R. S. 3779, and Chapter 114 of the Acts of 
 191 1, are illustrations of this principle. The law enacted in Sec. 
 3779 was sustained in the case of Grissel v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 
 54 Conn., 459, against the claim that it was unconstitutional on 
 the ground that it subjected the defendant without fault and 
 thereby deprived it of the equal protection of the law and took its 
 property without due process of law. Judge Loomis in rendering 
 
—13— 
 
 the decision of the court says in regard to these defenses : "The 
 several counts in this indictment (that is the defense as to the 
 unconstitutionality of the act) seem to be based principally upon 
 this one principle of the common law, that for a lawful, reason- 
 able and careful use of property the owner cannot be made liable. 
 But this principle is not so wrought into the constitution or into 
 the very idea of property that it cannot be departed from by the 
 legislature where protection to persons or property may require 
 it." Judge Loomis also gives a number of illustrations in point. 
 
 Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 
 219 U. S., 104, in sustaining the constitutionality of an act of 
 Oklahoma making banks liable for an assessment to make up the 
 loss by failure of one of their number, used the following lan- 
 guage : "We have few scientifically certain criteria of legislation, 
 and as it often is difficult to mark the line where what is called 
 the police power of the states is limited by the Constitution of 
 the United States, judges should be slow to read into the latter 
 'a nolumus mutare' as against the lawmaking power. ... It 
 may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all 
 the great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S., 518, 
 42 L. Ed. 260, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864. It may be put forth in aid 
 of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality 
 or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately 
 necessary to the public welfare. ... If, then, the legislature 
 of the state thinks that the public welfare requires the measure 
 under consideration, analogy and principle are in favor of the 
 power to enact it." 
 
 In a recent decision our own Supreme Court — State v. Law, 
 84 At. Rep., 523 — adopts with approval the decision in Noble v. 
 Haskell above cited, using the following language : "What legis- 
 lation is essential to the general welfare is a matter peculiarly 
 adapted to legislative decision." And again in the same case the 
 court quotes from its decision in Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn., 
 344, as follows : "It is our duty to approach the question with 
 great caution, examine it with infinite care, make every presump- 
 tion and intendment in its favor and sustain the act unless its 
 invalidity is in our judgment beyond reasonable doubt." 
 
 The Commission believes that in view of the extremely import- 
 ant considerations of public policy concerned, and the popular 
 demand so conclusively evidenced by statutes and decisions of 
 
—14— 
 
 courts in other states, and in so many other ways, neither our 
 own Supreme Court nor that of the United States will decide 
 unconstitutional an act such as we have recommended, so plainly 
 adapted to carry out such public purposes, on the ground that it 
 is compulsory, but, on the contrary, that such an act will be sus- 
 tained as well within the police powers of the State. 
 
 Section 8 of the act makes the remedy therein provided exclu- 
 sive, thus taking away the common law action in such cases for 
 negligence. One of the main objects of workmen's compensation 
 legislation is to do away with the expense, loss of time and money 
 and general waste resulting from damage suits. The final net 
 recovery to the individual under the most favorable circumstances 
 seldom exceeds or even equals the amount provided in this act. 
 In view of the much greater advantage given to workmen as a 
 whole by extending the rule of compensation to substantially all 
 cases of industrial accidents, and making the remedy certain and 
 inexpensive, it is believed that so much is gained by the exchange 
 of the old common law liability for the system provided by this 
 act that there can be no question as to its wisdom. There should 
 be some mutuality in the case. If the employers are called upon 
 to consent to a very large increase in their responsibility, the 
 employes may fairly be called upon to make some concessions on 
 their part. The complications and difficulties resulting from an 
 attempt to carry along both systems, that is the system of com- 
 mon law liability and the principle of workmen's compensation, are 
 so great as to make it extremely desirable that the statutory lia- 
 bility should be made universal and exclusive. By retaining the 
 two the liability of the employer is rendered uncertain, and it 
 would be very difficult, if not impossible, for him to protect him- 
 self against the expenses of compensation by a suitable adjustment 
 of the" price to the additional accident cost, or obtain adequate 
 protection by insurance. 
 
 As to the constitutional power of the legislature to pass an act 
 changing a rule of the common law and taking away or limiting 
 a common law liability as to cases arising in the future, there 
 can be no doubt. Mr. Justice VanDevanter in delivering the 
 judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
 of Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co.— 223 U. S., 1— says: 
 " 'A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of 
 
—i5— 
 
 the common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, 
 and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property which 
 have been created by the common law cannot be taken away with- 
 out due process ; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be 
 changed at will ... of the legislature, unless prevented by con- 
 stitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to 
 remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and 
 to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.' " 
 
 Statutes taking away such common law causes of action or 
 limiting the damages are very familiar. One of the most familiar 
 illustrations is the limited liability statute applied in the case of 
 damages at sea — R. S. 4282, 4283 — by which the common law 
 liability of the owners of the vessel is limited to their interest 
 in the vessel. 
 
 The act adopts as the basis of liability the fifty per cent, rule, 
 that is the payment in case of death or total incapacity of weekly 
 payments of. fifty per cent, of the wages during incapacity, or 
 for a certain number of years in case of death, such weekly pay- 
 ments to be not more than ten dollars nor less than five. This 
 corresponds with the rule generally adopted in the states, and 
 it seems wise that the burden on the industries of Connecticut 
 should not be greater than that upon the surrounding states, 
 otherwise our manufacturers are put to a disadvantage in 
 competition. 
 
 In regard to the administrative parts of the bill, as the abo- 
 lition of litigation with its numerous disadvantages has been one 
 of the main objects of the workmen's compensation movement, 
 a bill which would not meet this necessity would probably not 
 be satisfactory either to the employer or the employe. A system 
 of compensation which takes away the common law right of 
 recovery for unlimited damages, subjects the employer to liability 
 without fault, and then turns the parties in interest over to the 
 ordinary procedure at law with all its expense, delay and 
 uncertainty, would seem to be very inadequate treatment of 
 the subject. 
 
 Bills of this kind are based upon the assumption that the 
 employe is not altogether able to protect himself by the use 
 of his ordinary common law rights, that it is necessary, there- 
 fore, to interfere with the ordinary rules of common law in order 
 
— 16— 
 
 to protect him. If the state does that, consistency requires that 
 is should provide machinery which will insure the receipt by 
 the employe of the benefits of the provision. The claims for 
 compensation are in many cases small in amount and would be 
 entirely eaten up in expenses if it were necessary to collect them 
 by the ordinary process of litigation. 
 
 In drafting the procedural part of the statute the Commission 
 has aimed to preserve all of the benefits of the existing legal 
 machinery, at the same time removing all its expense, delay and 
 technicalities. The proceeding for the recovery of compensation 
 is still nominally by suit, but such proceedings have been deprived 
 of the disadvantages accompanying ordinary actions at law. 
 
 The main feature of the procedural action is adapted from the 
 Sutherland Act, that is, the appointment by the Courts of Com- 
 missioners having all the powers of ordinary committees of the 
 Superior Court and of Masters in Chancery to whom all cases 
 under the compensation act are referred and disposed of without 
 any pleadings except the first paper denominated a complaint 
 and without regard for the technical rules of evidence, subject 
 however to the revisory supervision of the courts. The Suther- 
 land Act provides for an unlimited number of these Commission- 
 ers as may be needed. The proposed act of the Commission 
 provides for four, each one located and residing within a District 
 made up of two of the counties of the state. It is believed 
 that these four will be able to dispose of the business. The only 
 necessary expense to parties connected with such a proceeding is 
 the payment of the regular three dollar entry fee to the Clerk of 
 the Superior Court. The suitor can obtain a complaint from the 
 Commissioner for his District without expense, and have it 
 served by any indifferent person. Hearings before the Commis- 
 sioner, having no technicalities, can be conducted by the parties 
 themselves, if they see fit, without aid of legal counsel. If they 
 choose to employ counsel they are protected from overcharge 
 by a provision which makes attorney's fees subject to the approval 
 of the Commissioner. No costs are taxed except the three dollar 
 entry fee in favor of the plaintiff if he prevails. 
 
 The proposed act also adopts a feature which was first sug- 
 gested in the act reported by the Judiciary and Labor Committee 
 in 191 1, that is the appointment of a certain number of surgeons 
 
—17— 
 
 in each county as special examiners, whose certificates as to 
 the facts of the nature and amount of the injury and the effect 
 upon the earning capacity are admitted as evidence, and whose 
 fee shall be limited to five dollars. This disposes of the large 
 charges for expert testimony which have been the main element 
 of expense in damage suits and have made it peculiarly difficult 
 for any poor litigant to take any proceedings at his charge. 
 
 The act also provides that settlements of claims under the act 
 shall not be made binding unless approved by a Commissioner. 
 The act is an exercise of the police power, based on public inter- 
 est. It is therefore right that the state should prevent the bene- 
 ficiaries from sacrificing its benefits by improvident settlements. 
 It provides for the approval, in proper cases, of any settle- 
 ment which may be deemed to the advantage of the parties, and 
 where the Commissioner finds that such settlement is fair. 
 
 The act is intended to do away with the very heavy expense and 
 delay of jury trials. It is believed that these cases are of a 
 class where the parties are not constitutionally entitled to a trial 
 by jury. This was distinctly decided in the State of Washington, 
 see State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. C. W. Clausen, 117 Pac. 
 Rep., 1101. The question as to whether the right of trial by jury 
 is not violated by any statute is always a state question, as the 
 provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment do not guarantee a 
 jury trial, and the provisions of the Seventh Amendment only 
 affect the acts of Congress. The question, therefore, is solely one 
 for the decisions of the courts of our own state. 
 
 The Commission believes that the issues presented in a proceed- 
 ing under this act are not such as prior to the adoption of the 
 Constitution were tried by a jury, and furthermore, that the pro- 
 ceedings are rather of an equitable than a legal nature and do 
 not call for a trial by jury. The statute provides, instead of 
 an ordinary judgment, for an order for payment of certain funds. 
 The procedure is more closely assimilated to an order for allow- 
 ance in special statutory proceedings than to an action at common 
 law. It is provided in Section 38 that the proceeding shall be, 
 so far as possible, in accordance with the rules of equity, the 
 orders being enforced as orders in such cases. 
 
 As to the expense connected with the administration of the 
 act. The satisfactory working of the act will depend to a great 
 
— 18— 
 
 extent upon its administration. Many questions of law will 
 necessarily arise in the first years of experience, no matter how 
 carefully the act may be drawn. A body of precedents and 
 methods of procedure will have to be adopted, and all this will 
 require judgment and capacity of a high character. The act, 
 furthermore, charges the Commissioners with the duty of observ- 
 ing the administration of the law and reporting such changes as 
 they may deem necessary to the next session of the legislature. 
 Undoubtedly experience will show some points where the act 
 can be improved and the Commissioners will, as a result of 
 their experience, be best qualified to recommend such measures as 
 may make it more efficient. 
 
 The question as to the number of claims to be expected and 
 the amount of payments for losses likely to be incurred under 
 this plan is an interesting one, but unfortunately there are no 
 returns as yet in this country sufficient to make a reliable esti- 
 mate. The State of Washington, which has a system of state 
 managed insurance, is the only one where they have had a full 
 year of experience. In the report of the Washington Commis- 
 sioners for the year ending September 30, 19 12, the number of 
 employes covered by the act is given at 130,000, the number of 
 accidents reported 11,896, the amount paid on claims $445,527.51. 
 Amount paid into the accident fund on account of insurance 
 against claims for the year, and expenses, $980,445.75. Expense 
 of management of business, charged to the state, $107,868.07. 
 These figures will probably be considerably increased in subse- 
 quent years. 
 
 The census report of 1910 gives the number of employes in 
 Connecticut engaged in industries substantially of the class cov- 
 ered by the schedule annexed to this act, as 210,792, with an 
 aggregate yearly pay roll of $110,119,045. The figures as to 
 the number of accidents and the amount of payments in Connect- 
 icut would probably be, therefore, considerably more than those 
 shown by the Washington report. 
 
 The Massachusetts Commission reported for two months, July 
 and August, 12,801 accidents. 
 
 The usual way of making estimates as to the amount to be 
 paid on claims is by a percentage on the pay roll, but what 
 that percentage should be in this state it would not be safe 
 
—19— 
 
 to estimate in the absence of statistics. Undoubtedly a very large 
 sum would have to be distributed under any system of workmen's 
 compensation. 
 
 The administration of such a fund, involving so large a charge 
 upon the industries of the state, requires a high order of ability 
 and intelligence. It is believed that the amounts recommended 
 for salaries and expenses are not excessive, nor more than 
 sufficient to secure and adequately compensate the services of 
 persons properly qualified to discharge these important duties. 
 
 The saving on jury trials will amount to considerable, as the 
 average expense of such trials, over and above the fees charged 
 by the Court and the Clerk, are upwards of one hundred dollars 
 a day. The Clerk fees paid in all proceedings will amount to 
 quite a sum, and both together should make a substantial deduc- 
 tion in the net charge. It is believed that the result will be that 
 the expense connected with the enforcement and administration 
 of the act will be very much less than that required in most of the 
 other states for the administration of workmen's compensation 
 laws. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 TALCOTT H. RUSSELL, 
 JOHN ECCLES, 
 BURTON MANSFIELD. 
 
 New Haven, Conn., December 20, 1912. 
 
TENTATIVE DRAFT OF ACT PROVIDING FOR 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. 
 
 Explanatory Note. 
 
 In the Connecticut Legislature of 191 1, a draft of a proposed 
 workmen's compensation act was reported by the Joint Committee 
 on Judiciary and Labor which is entitled File No. 650, substitute 
 for Senate Bill No. 100. This bill, after being adopted by the 
 Senate, and rejected by the House, was referred to a Conference 
 Committee, and somewhat amended. The work of the Con- 
 ference Committee is represented in File No. 823, Second substi- 
 tute for Senate Bill No. 100. Reference will be made in the 
 notes under this act to these bills under the title, File 650, and 
 File 823. 
 
 A draft of an act was prepared by the United States Employers' 
 Liability and Workmen's Compensation Commission, to cover the 
 case of common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign com- 
 merce by railroad, which was introduced into the Senate of the 
 United States and is entitled S. 5382. It is understood that this 
 has been reported by the Judiciary Committee and adopted by 
 the Senate in substantially this form. This bill will be referred 
 to in the notes as S. 5382. 
 
 A Committee on Workmen's Compensation has been appointed 
 by the Conference on Uniform State Laws, and at the last session 
 in Milwaukee this Committee reported a proposed draft of a 
 compulsory act for uniform workmen's compensation covering 
 industries classed as hazardous. The Conference passed a resolu- 
 tion that this act be tentatively approved, and that the Committee 
 be continued in power to report further. This act has been pub- 
 lished and in the notes under various sections reference will be 
 made to it under the title, Conference Act. 
 
21 
 
 A Bill to Provide a Remedy in Compensation for Accidental 
 
 Injuries Resulting in Disability or Death to Workmen 
 
 Engaged in Industries Described Therein. 
 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in 
 General Assembly convened: 
 
 Sec. i. This act shall apply to hazardous trades and occupa- 
 tions only, a schedule of which is contained in Section 50 of this 
 act. 
 
 Sec 2. Except as hereinafter provided, when any workman 
 shall have received personal injuries from any accident arising 
 out of and in the course of his employment in any such trade 
 or occupation, the employer shall be liable and pay therefor to 
 the extent and in the manner hereinafter provided, unless said 
 accident or personal injury is attributable wholly or in part to the 
 intoxication or serious and willful misconduct of the workman. 
 
 See Sec. 10, File 650; Sec. 9, File 823; Sec. 1, Conference 
 Act. 
 
 Sec. 3. This act shall not affect any pending suit, or any suit 
 hereafter brought on account of any injury received before this 
 act takes effect. 
 
 Sec. 5, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 4. This act shall not affect the liability of employer to 
 workmen where such employer is not engaged in business, trade 
 or manufacture carried on for the purpose of obtaining profit, or 
 employing less than seven workmen engaged in manual labor 
 regularly in the same business and in or about the same estab- 
 lishment, nor the liability of employer to domestic servants. 
 
 See R. I. Act, Article 1, Sec. 3 ; Ohio Act, Sec. 21-1 ; File 
 650, Sec. 6; Sec. 65, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 5. This act shall not apply to employes of the state, or 
 of any county, city, town, or other municipal body. 
 
 Note. — The committee is of the opinion that there should be a work- 
 men's compensation law applying to state and municipal employes, 
 but by reason of the varying pension systems and other means of 
 affording relief, deems it better to leave such employes to be covered 
 by special provisions. 
 
 Sec. 2, Conference Act. 
 
— 22 
 
 Sec. 6. This act shall not affect the relations of employers 
 to outworkers or workmen casually employed. 
 See Sec. 40, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 7. This act shall not affect the liability of employers to 
 workmen engaged in interstate or foreign commerce for death or 
 injury so far as the laws of the United States concerning inter- 
 state or foreign commerce govern such liability. 
 
 See Kansas Act, Sec. 7, and Washington Act, Sec. 18; Brad- 
 bury, p. 916 and p. 1083. 
 
 Sec. 8. Any employer who shall establish a system of insur- 
 ance for his workmen, or of compensation for injuries received 
 by them, shall not be liable under the provisions of this act 
 provided the insurance commissioner, after ascertaining by such 
 means as he shall deem best, the views of the employer and 
 of his workmen, shall certify in writing that such system con- 
 fers upon such workmen benefits at least equivalent to those 
 provided by this act, and, if such system provides for contribu- 
 tions by workmen, that it confers benefits in addition to those 
 provided by this act or equivalent thereto, at least commensurate 
 with such contribution. No system shall be so certified which 
 contains an obligation upon the workmen of such employer to 
 join in such system as a condition of their hiring, or which does 
 not contain equitable provision for the withdrawal of workmen 
 from such system. When any such system has been so certified 
 by said commissioner, he shall issue a certificate enabling the 
 employer to substitute such system of compensation for the pro- 
 visions of this act, and shall file and keep such certificate on 
 record in his office. 
 
 Such employer shall thereupon be liable under the provisions 
 of such system and not liable under the provisions of this act. 
 The insurance commissioner shall have all the jurisdiction over 
 any such system of insurance so established given to him by 
 Chapter 186 of the Statutes of 1909 over insurance companies, 
 and may proceed to examine the affairs of such system and pass 
 such orders in reference thereto as provided by said statute, and 
 may also, in case of failure to obey orders made under the 
 authority of said section, proceed in the manner provided by 
 R. S. 3491 for the appointment of a receiver of the property 
 
—23— 
 
 and affairs pertaining to said system or for such other remedy 
 as may be given by section 3491 in regard to the affairs of 
 insurance companies. 
 
 Sec. 12, File 823; Sec. 13, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 9. Unless an employer comes within the classes excepted 
 in sections three to seven, both inclusive, he shall not be civilly 
 liable for any personal injury or the death of any workman 
 resulting from any such accident as described in section one, 
 except as provided in this act ; but nothing in this act shall affect 
 the liability of any employer to a fine or penalty under any other 
 statute. 
 
 Sec. 39, File 823 ; Sec. 3, S. 5382 ; Sec. 4, Conference Act. 
 
 Sec. 10. When any principal employer, in the course of his 
 trade or business, and in the operation thereof, procures any 
 work to be done, wholly or in part, for him by a contractor or 
 through such contractor by a sub-contractor, and the work so 
 procured to be done is a part of or process in the particular 
 trade or business of such principal employer, and said work is 
 performed in, on, or about premises under the control of the 
 principal employer, he shall be liable for compensation for 
 personal injuries caused by any accident in the same manner and 
 to the same extent as if the work were done without the inter- 
 vention of such contractor or sub-contractor. In cases in which 
 the principal employer is liable to pay compensation under the 
 provisions of this section, he shall be entitled to be indemnified 
 by any person who would have been liable, independent of the 
 provisions of this section, to pay compensation to such workmen. 
 
 Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a 
 workman from recovering compensation under this act from 
 his immediate employer, instead of the principal or any inter- 
 mediate contractor, and the institution of a proceeding against 
 the one shall not operate as a waiver of his rights against the 
 other, but he shall not collect from both more than full 
 compensation. 
 
 Sec. 10, File 823; Sec. 11, File 650; Sec. 5-c Conference Act. 
 
 Sec. 11. The compensation to be paid by any employer liable 
 under the provisions of this act shall, in case the injury results 
 in death, be as follows : (a) If the injury results in the death of 
 
—24— 
 
 the workman within the period of one year from the date of the 
 accident, there shall be paid, in addition to other payments herein- 
 after provided for, the reasonable expenses for medical and 
 surgical attendance and funeral expenses of such workman, not 
 exceeding in the aggregate two hundred dollars. In determin- 
 ing the amount of such expenses for medical and surgical attend- 
 ance, any sums which have been paid by the employer on account 
 thereof prior to the death of such workman shall be considered, 
 (b) In case such workman shall die during the period speci- 
 fied in sub-section (d) from an injury the effects of which 
 shall have been continuous from the time of the accident 
 and shall leave surviving a widow or widower, or children 
 under eighteen years of age, a weekly payment shall be made 
 of an amount equal to fifty per centum of the average weekly 
 earnings of the deceased during the year last preceding the injury 
 but in no case shall such payment exceed ten dollars per week, or 
 be less than five dollars per week. Such payments shall, subject 
 to the provisions of sub-section (d), continue so long as any such 
 children shall be under eighteen years of age, and so long as such 
 widow or widower survives unmarried. In case there be child 
 or children mentally or physically defective to such an extent as 
 to destroy their earning capacity, the payment shall continue as 
 long as such incapacity for earning continues, subject to the 
 provisions of sub-section (d). (c) In case such workman 
 leaves neither widow or widower nor children under eighteen 
 years of age, but leaves next of kin wholly or in part dependent 
 upon him, a weekly payment shall be made of an amount not 
 exceeding the sum provided for in sub-section (b) of this section, 
 or such sum proportionate thereto as may be determined according 
 to the extent of such dependence, such payments to continue, 
 subject to the provisions of sub-section (d), during such depend- 
 ence, (d) In no case shall any weekly payments, as provided in 
 sub-sections (b) and (c), be continued for more than six years 
 from the time of the accident. 
 
 Sec. 13, File 823; Sec. 14, File 650; Wisconsin Act, Sec. 
 2394-10, (Bradbury p. 1100) ; Michigan Act, Sec. 6, (Bradbury 
 p. 961). 
 
 Sec. 12. (a) In case the injury results in total incapacity of 
 the workman for work at his employment or some other suitable 
 
—25— 
 
 employment, a weekly payment shall be made of an amount equal 
 to fifty per centum of the average weekly earnings of the 
 workman during the year last preceding the injury. But in no 
 case shall such payment exceed ten dollars per week or be less 
 than five dollars per week, such payment to continue, subject 
 to the provisions of sub-section (c) during such incapacity, 
 (b) In case the injury results in partial incapacity of such work- 
 man for work at his employment or some other suitable employ- 
 ment, a weekly payment shall be made of an amount equal to 
 fifty per centum of the diminution of the injured workman's 
 earning capacity, such payment to continue, subject to the pro- 
 visions of sub-section (c), during such incapacity, (c) In no 
 case shall any weekly payments, as provided in sub-sections (a) 
 and (b), be continued for more than six years from the time of 
 the accident. 
 
 Sec. 13, File 823 ; Sec. 14, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 13. In the following cases it shall, for the purposes of 
 this act, be conclusively presumed that the injury resulted in 
 permanent total disability, to wit: The total and irrevocable 
 loss of sight in both eyes, the loss of both feet at or above the 
 ankle, the loss of both hands at or above the wrist, the loss of 
 one hand and one foot, an injury to the spine resulting in per- 
 manent and complete paralysis of the legs or arms, and an 
 injury to the skull resulting in incurable imbecility or insanity. 
 
 The above limitation shall not be taken as exclusive. 
 
 Sec. B, S. 5382. 
 
 Sec. 14. No compensation shall be payable under this act 
 on account of any injury which does not incapacitate the injured 
 workman for at least two weeks from earning his full wages 
 at his customary employment, but if such incapacity extends 
 beyond the period of two weeks, compensation shall begin on 
 the fifteenth day after the injury. 
 
 See Sec. 11, File 823; Sec. 10, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 15. The Judges of the Superior Court shall, within sixty 
 days after this act takes effect, appoint for each county, not less 
 than two nor more than ten reputable surgeons, of at least five 
 years experience, and resident in such county, to be entitled 
 "surgical examiners," to hold office until the first day of July, 191 7, 
 
—26— 
 
 and quadrennially thereafter at their June meeting shall make 
 appointments of such examiners to hold office for four years. 
 A list of the names of -such examiners shall be kept in the office 
 of the Clerk of the Superior Court in each County, also in the 
 office of each Commissioner on Workmen's Compensation. 
 Any one of such examiners shall, when requested by any one of 
 the parties to any proceeding to enforce the provisions of this 
 act, or when directed by the Court or a Commissioner on Work- 
 men's Compensation, make examinations required by this act and 
 make a report, under oath, as to the nature of the injuries to the 
 person examined, the amount and nature of the impairment of 
 his capacity for labor, and the probable duration and extent 
 thereof, which report shall as speedily as possible be filed with the 
 Commissioner of the District having jurisdiction of proceedings 
 on account of such injuries. Such examiners shall be entitled 
 to receive for each examination made and certified in accordance 
 with the provisions of this section the sum of five dollars, and 
 actual traveling and other expenses incurred. 
 
 When such examination is made by the order or request of the 
 Court or of a Commissioner such compensation shall be paid by 
 the State on vouchers properly sworn and submitted to and 
 approved by the Comptroller. In other cases such examiner 
 shall not be compelled to make such examination except on the 
 receipt of his fee. Any such examiner may be removed by the 
 Judges of the Superior Court for cause and they may fill any 
 vacancies. The certificate of any such examiner, or a certified 
 copy thereof, shall be admitted in any proceeding under this 
 act as evidence of the facts therein stated, subject, however, to 
 contradiction by other evidence. 
 
 Sees. 20 and 23, File 823 ; Sees. 21 and 24, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 16. In any case of compensation payable for injuries 
 not resulting in death, the party liable under this act to pay 
 compensation may, before making any payments on account of 
 such compensation, and thereafter from time to time, not 
 oftener than may be reasonable, during the period provided for 
 such payments, require the injured workman to submit to exam- 
 ination by one of the surgical examiners. If a workman without 
 reasonable cause refuses to submit himself to or in any way 
 obstructs such examination, his right to take or prosecute any 
 
—27— 
 
 proceeding under this act shall be suspended until such refusal 
 or obstruction ceases, and no compensation shall be payable for 
 the period during which such refusal or obstruction continues. 
 
 Sec. 21, File 823; Sec. 23, File 650; Sec. 29, Conference Act. 
 
 Sec. 17. Reasonable notice of the time and place of any 
 examination, when had on the request of either party, shall 
 be given to the other party. When such notice i's given by or 
 on behalf of the injured party, the other party shall be entitled 
 to be represented by a physician, and, where proper, to be per- 
 sonally present, the propriety of such presence to be decided by 
 the surgical examiner. 
 
 Sec. 22, File 823 ; Sec. 22, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 18. All payments provided for under the provisions of 
 this act shall, in case the injured workman is living, be made to 
 him or to some person lawfully authorized to act for him. In 
 case of his death it shall be paid to his personal representative 
 for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto under the terms 
 of this act; or if there be no personal representative, in case 
 the deceased leaves a widow or widower, to such widow or 
 widower; if there is no widow or widower, to the guardian of 
 a minor child or children entitled to such payments, if any; if 
 there is no widow or widower or minor child or children, to such 
 one or more of the dependents entitled thereto as may be ordered 
 by the Court or Commissioner, for distribution to the persons 
 entitled to such payments. 
 
 Any person entitled to such payments may bring proceedings 
 therefor in his or her name. 
 
 Sec. 19. In fixing the amount of any compensation, allow- 
 ance shall be made for any sum which the employer may have 
 paid to such injured workman, or to his dependents, on account 
 of such injury, excepting, however, any sums the employer may 
 have expended for the medical or surgical treatment of the 
 injured workman. 
 
 Sec. 15, File 823 ; Sec. 16, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 20. For the purpose of this act, average weekly earnings 
 shall be computed in such manner as is best calculated to give 
 the average rate per week at which the workman has been actu- 
 ally remunerated during the preceding twelve months, whether 
 
—28— 
 
 with one or more than one employer. If, however, a workman 
 at the time of the injury is regularly employed in a higher grade 
 of work than formerly during the year, and with larger regular 
 wages, the average weekly earnings shall be computed with refer- 
 ence to the larger amount. Where, by reason of the shortness 
 of the time during which the workman has been in the employ 
 of his employer, or the nature of the employment, or the terms 
 of the employment, it is impracticable at the date of the injury 
 to compute the average weekly earnings as hereinbefore pro- 
 vided, regard may be had to the average weekly amount which, 
 during the twelve months previous to the accident, was being 
 earned by a person in the same grade employed at the same work. 
 If there is no person so employed, then reference may be had 
 to the actual remuneration of a person in the same grade 
 employed in the same class of employment and in the same 
 district. 
 
 Sec. 16, File 823. Compare Sec. 17, File 650. See Michigan 
 Act, Sec. 1 1 ; Bradbury, p. 623 ; Sec. 23, Conference Act. 
 
 Sec. 21. All sums due for compensation under the pro- 
 visions of this act shall be exempt from attachment or execution, 
 and shall be non assignable. 
 
 Sec. 24, File 823'; Sec. 24, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 22. All claims for compensation under the provisions 
 of this act shall be preferred to their full amount in the case 
 of any insolvent estate or insolvent debtor, and shall be allowed 
 and paid by the trustee or personal representative in the same 
 order of preference as claims for wages. 
 
 Sec. 25, File 823 ; Sec. 26, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 23. No claim of an attorney-at-law for any services or 
 disbursements in any proceeding under this act shall be enforce- 
 able at law or equity unless the amount of such claim shall have 
 been approved, in writing, by the Commissioner having jurisdic- 
 tion of such proceeding. 
 
 Sec. 26, File 823; 27, 650. 
 
 Sec. 24. No proceedings for compensation under this act shall 
 be maintained, except as hereinafter in this section provided, 
 unless as soon as practicable after said accident, and before the 
 injured workman has voluntarily left the employment in which he 
 
—29— 
 
 was injured and during the continuance of the incapacity on 
 account of which the compensation is claimed, notice shall have 
 been given to the employer, stating the name and address of the 
 injured workman and the time, place, and nature of the injury. 
 In case the injury results in death, the notice provided for in this 
 section shall be given within one year after the accident, and 
 in case an administrator or executor is appointed, within sixty 
 days after his qualification. No want of or delay in giving the 
 notice of the injury and the place and nature thereof, or defect 
 or inaccuracy in such notice, shall be a bar to the maintenance 
 of proceedings unless the employer proves that he is prejudiced 
 by such want, delay, defect or inaccuracy. 
 Sec. 27, File 823. Compare Sec. 28, File 650. 
 
 Sec. 25. No proceeding for compensation under this act shall 
 be brought in favor of the person injured unless such action is 
 brought within one year from the date of the accident, except 
 that where periodical payments of compensation shall have been 
 made and such payments shall have ceased, then action may be 
 brought for additional installments of such compensation within 
 six months after the cessation of such payments, but not later. 
 
 See File 823, Sees. 31 and 32. 
 
 Sec. 26. For the purpose of this act, four districts are 
 established, as follows: First District — Hartford and Tolland 
 Counties ; Second District — New London and Windham Counties ; 
 Third District — New Haven and Middlesex Counties; Fourth 
 District — Fairfield and Litchfield Counties. The Judges of the 
 Superior Court shall, within sixty days after this act takes effect, 
 appoint one competent person, resident in each of said districts, 
 to be a Commissioner on Workmen's Compensation for said 
 district, to hold office until the first day of July, 1917, and 
 quadrennially thereafter, at their meeting in June, shall make 
 appointments of such Commissioners to hold office for four years. 
 
 Each of said Commissioners shall reside in the district for 
 which he is appointed, and have jurisdiction of all claims or 
 questions arising out of accidents or injuries received in such 
 district. If an accident occurs outside of the state, the Com- 
 missioner for the district where the employer resides or has his 
 place of business shall have jurisdiction. 
 
— 3°— 
 
 The Judges of the Superior Court may remove a Commissioner 
 at any time in the public interest, or for good cause shown, and 
 appoint a successor to serve for the balance of the term of the 
 person so removed. In such case said Commissioner so removed 
 shall transfer all his official files and papers to his successor in 
 office, or if none has been appointed, then to a Clerk of the 
 Superior Court within his District. 
 
 Each Commissioner before entering upon the duties of his office 
 shall take an oath of office similar to that required by a Judge of 
 the Superior Court. 
 
 Sec. 27. Each of said Commissioners shall receive a salary 
 of $5,000. per annum, payable in equal monthly installments in 
 like manner as the salary of a Judge of the Superior Court, and 
 an allowance for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in 
 the discharge of his duties, including the services of a stenog- 
 rapher where necessary, not exceeding in all six hundred dol- 
 lars, to be taxed and allowed by a Judge of the Superior Court. 
 
 See S. 5382, Sees. 11 to 13. 
 
 Sec. 28. For the purposes of the disposition of such claims, 
 each of said Commissioners shall have all the powers exercised 
 by a Committee or Auditor appointed by the Superior Court, 
 and also the powers of a Master in Chancery, and shall further 
 have power to pass upon questions of law as well as of fact, 
 subject to revision by the Superior and Supreme Courts, as 
 hereinafter provided. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the Insurance Commissioner to furnish 
 to any such Commissioner such information or actuarial calcula- 
 tion as may be necessary in the discharge of his duties. 
 
 Sec. 29. It shall be the duty of said Commissioners to hear 
 and determine, without delay, all matters coming before them 
 under this act within their jurisdiction. In case a Commissioner 
 shall be disqualified or temporarily incapacitated from hearing 
 any particular matter, he shall designate some other Commissioner 
 to hear said matter, who shall possess the same jurisdiction, for 
 the purposes of that hearing, as the Commissioner whose place 
 he takes. 
 
 Sec. 30. Said Commissioners shall jointly be and constitute 
 a Commission on Workmen's Compensation, which shall make 
 a report to each regular session of the General Assembly, at its 
 
—3i— 
 
 opening, stating the number and nature of the claims coming 
 before its members during the previous two years, together with 
 the disposition of the same and the amount and nature of com- 
 pensation awarded, and in addition thereto its conclusions 
 concerning the advantages or disadvantages of this act, and such 
 recommendations as to changes, if such shall be deemed necessary, 
 as may be advantageous to the public or tend to the more satis- 
 factory and effective working of said act. Said report shall be 
 filed with the Comptroller on or before the day of 
 
 biennially and copies thereof shall be printed for distribution 
 
 at the expense of the State, in accordance with the provisions 
 of the law providing for the printing of the reports of other 
 Commissioners. 
 
 Sec. 31. Each of said Commissioners shall keep an office 
 within his District for the transaction of his business as such 
 Commissioner, but may hear cases at any proper place within 
 such District, and shall make report in reference to each case 
 coming before him to the Superior Court in the County wherein 
 the claim arose containing his conclusions of fact and law, and 
 his decision as to the nature and amount of compensation to be 
 awarded. 
 
 The Clerk of the Court shall immediately on the filing of 
 said report notify the counsel on each side, in writing, of the 
 filing of said report, or if no counsel shall have appeared, then 
 he shall notify the parties on each side in the manner provided 
 in R. S., 1902, Sec. 794, in regard to notices of findings. The 
 opposing parties, or any of them, may within ten days of the 
 time of the filing of said report, deposit with the Clerk a fee of 
 five dollars, and file a remonstrance to said report, stating the 
 grounds of exception thereto. The Court shall thereupon hear 
 such remonstrance, and accept or re-commit said report, and pro- 
 ceed with said case in the same manner as in other actions which 
 have been referred to a Committee, except as modified by the 
 provisions of this act. In case no such payment shall be made, 
 and remonstrance filed, within said period, the Clerk of the 
 Court shall at once enter judgment in accordance with the report. 
 
 When any judgment shall be entered by the Court after a 
 remonstrance has been filed, such judgment shall be subject to 
 appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors. 
 
—32— 
 
 Sec. 32. In the trial of issues arising under this act, before 
 any such Commissioner, he may if he deem it advisable admit 
 evidence or testimony not admissible under the ordinary rules 
 of evidence, and in any appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors, 
 or proceedings in the Superior Court, his action shall not be 
 reversed nor his conclusions set aside on account of the admis- 
 sion of such evidence. 
 
 Sec. 42, File 650 ; Sec. 38, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 33. Actions for relief under this act shall be brought 
 to the Superior Court for the County in which the injury for 
 relief on account of which the action is brought, occurred, or 
 in case such injury occurred without the limits of the state, then 
 to the Superior Court for the County in which the defendant in 
 the proceeding resides or has a place of business. 
 
 The complaint in such action may be in the following form 
 in case it is in favor of the person injured : 
 
 To the Sheriff of the County of , his Deputy, or 
 
 either Constable of the Town of within such 
 
 County, Greeting: 
 
 By Authority of the State of Connecticut, you are hereby 
 commanded to summon of the town of 
 
 County of State of Connecticut to appear 
 
 before the Superior Court to be held at in and 
 
 for the County of on the 
 
 Tuesday of 19 , then and there to answer unto 
 
 of the town of County of 
 
 State of Connecticut, in a civil action wherein the plaintiff 
 complains and says : 
 
 1. On the day of 19 , 
 
 was employed by in the Town of County 
 
 of State of Connecticut. 
 
 2. On the day of 19 , while so 
 employed said suffered personal injuries from 
 an accident arising out of and in the course of his said 
 employment, which resulted in incapacity of said 
 
 for work at his employment. 
 
 Plaintiff asks for relief as provided by the statute laws 
 of this state. 
 
—33— 
 
 i 
 Of this writ with your doings thereon make due service 
 and return. 
 
 Dated at this day of 19 • 
 
 Justice of the Peace. 
 Commissioner of the Superior Court 
 
 for County. 
 
 Commissioner on Workmen's 
 Compensation. 
 
 In the case of the death of the workman, the complaint may 
 be in the following form : 
 
 To the Sheriff of the County of , his Deputy, or 
 
 either Constable of the Town of within such 
 
 County, Greeting: 
 
 By Authority of the State of Connecticut, you are hereby 
 commanded to summon of the town of 
 
 County of State of Connecticut to appear 
 
 before the Superior Court to be held at in and for 
 
 the County of on the Tuesday 
 
 of 19 , then and there to answer unto 
 
 of the town of County of State of 
 
 Connecticut, in a civil action wherein the plaintiff complains 
 and says : 
 
 1. On the day of 19 , 
 was employed by in the town of 
 County of State of Connecticut. 
 
 2. On the day of 19 , while so 
 employed, said suffered an injury from which 
 on the day of 19 , he died. 
 
 3. Plaintiff was on the day of 
 
 duly appointed Executor (Administrator) of the Estate of 
 said . (Or, in case there is no Administrator 
 
 or Executor, set out the name of the plaintiff and the capacity 
 in which he sues.) 
 
 Plaintiff asks for relief as provided by the statute laws 
 of this state. 
 
 Of this writ with your doings thereon make due service 
 and return. 
 
—34— 
 
 Dated at this day of *9 • 
 
 Justice of the Peace. 
 Commissioner of the Superior Court 
 
 for County. 
 
 Commissioner on Workmen's 
 Compensation. 
 
 Sec. 34. Process in any proceeding under this act may be 
 signed and issued by any authority now authorized to sign and 
 issue writs, and also by any Commissioner having jurisdiction of 
 the case, and it shall be the duty of any Commissioner to sign 
 and issue such process on application of any person entitled to 
 bring such proceeding, without expense to the applicant, on being 
 satisfied of the bona fide nature of the complaint. 
 
 Sec. 35. Said action shall be served by a proper officer or 
 indifferent person and returned to the Court in the same manner 
 as ordinary complaints brought to said Court. The defendant 
 may, however, accept service, in which case said complaint shall 
 be proceeded with in the same manner as if regularly served. 
 In case of non-resident defendants service may be made under 
 order of notice in the manner provided in R. S., Sec. 578. 
 Said form of complaint is not compulsory, but any form is 
 sufficient which contains in intelligible language a statement of 
 the facts. No other pleadings shall be necessary. 
 
 Sec. 36. Said action shall be at once entered by the Clerk 
 upon the docket of said Court upon payment of an entry fee 
 of three dollars, and an order shall be entered by him referring 
 the same to the Commissioner for the District. No bond for 
 prosecution shall be required, nor shall any charges be made by 
 the Clerk of the Court for services in connection therewith except 
 as in this act provided. 
 
 Said entry fee shall be taxed as costs in favor of the plaintiff 
 in case he prevails, but no other costs shall be taxed, except as 
 provided in this act. 
 
 Sec. 37. Said Commissioner shall as soon as practicable give 
 notice in writing to the plaintiff and defendant to appear and 
 be heard at his office at such time as shall be appointed, which 
 shall not be more than thirty days from the date of the notice, 
 but said Commissioner shall have power to adjourn such hearing 
 
—35— 
 
 to any proper place and for such period as may seem proper, but 
 it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to hear and determine 
 said cause as soon as practicable. In the disposition of all 
 matters coming before him the Commissioner shall proceed 
 informally to ascertain the truth in such way as may seem best 
 adapted to that end, and shall decide all issues arising as speedily 
 as practicable. 
 
 Sec. 38. In case of any judgment ordering an allowance or 
 payments to be made, where during the pferiod for which said 
 allowance was ordered the disability shall have increased or dimin- 
 ished in such a way as to make the allowance disproportionate 
 to said disability by either being too small or too great, or shall 
 have ceased, the Commissioner may on application modify such 
 judgment by increasing or diminishing such compensation or 
 discontinuing it. Application for such modification shall be 
 brought and disposed of in the same way as provided for the 
 disposition of applications for compensation, and service of notice 
 of the application shall be made upon the party entitled to said 
 allowance, or upon the party obligated to pay the same under the 
 judgment, as the case may be. 
 
 Sec. 39. In all cases under this act, the Court shall proceed, 
 so far as possible, in accordance with the rules of equity, and 
 shall have full power to enforce its orders in the same way as 
 such orders are enforced, but no process of execution against 
 the property of any of the parties in such application shall be 
 taken in any judgment obtained in any proceedings under this 
 act, except in pursuance of a special order of the Court, and no 
 attachment of property on mesne process shall be allowed. 
 
 Where a Commissioner shall find in any case that it is neces- 
 sary for the reasonable security of the party entitled to pay- 
 ments that a bond shall be given, the Court may order a bond 
 in a fixed amount, the sufficiency of the bondsman to be subject 
 to the approval of such Commissioner. 
 
 Sec. 40. The Judges of the Superior and Supreme Court shall 
 from time to time make such rules of procedure and provide such 
 forms as may seem necessary and proper to carry out this act, 
 and to secure a speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of 
 all proceedings thereunder, and in making such rules of pro- 
 
-36- 
 
 cedure said Judges shall not be bound by the provisions of the 
 Practice Act nor by any rules now existing. In the absence of 
 such rules so made, said application shall be conducted in accord- 
 ance with the general rules of procedure provided for other cases, 
 except as in this act otherwise provided, and so far only as may 
 accord with the nature and spirit thereof. 
 
 Sec. 37, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 41. Actions brought under the provisions of this act shall 
 be privileged, in respect to their assignment for trial over all other 
 actions except writs of habeas corpus and actions brought by or 
 on behalf of the state, including informations on the relation of 
 private individuals. 
 
 Sec. 34, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 42. In any action in which judgment is that the defend- 
 ant make weekly payments, the judgment shall include the amount 
 of payments for which the defendant is liable up to the date of 
 judgment, and the court may make a suitable order for the 
 payment of future installments during the continuance of the 
 disability. 
 
 Sec. 33, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 43. A Commissioner, upon the application of a party, 
 either before or after suit, having regard to the welfare of the 
 workman and the convenience of the employer, may in his dis- 
 cretion authorize compensation to be paid monthly or quarterly 
 instead of weekly; and for good cause shown may authorize 
 the parties to compound and settle all claims on such terms 
 as may be agreed upon by them. Such agreement of settlement, 
 signed by the parties, shall be filed with said Commissioner, and 
 a copy of such agreement, certified by him, shall be evidence 
 in any proceedings as to the execution, nature and terms of 
 such contract. No such settlement shall be a valid defense in 
 any proceeding brought under this act unless the Commissioner 
 shall find that such settlement is fair and equitable, and no con- 
 tract made in advance of the injury by the workman to waive 
 any of the sections of this act shall be regarded as valid, except 
 as provided in Section 8. 
 
 Sec. 44. Where, in order to settle an estate or for any other 
 reasonable cause, it may become necessary to pay off and dis- 
 
—37— 
 
 charge any liability of an employer or his estate for future 
 payments due under the terms of this act, the Court may author- 
 ize the party liable for said payments, or the executor, adminis- 
 trator, receiver or other representative of his estate, to procure 
 the agreement of some corporation duly authorized to transact 
 such business in this state to assume and make such payments, 
 and may authorize the substitution of such agreement for the 
 obligation of such insured or his estate, and thereupon- such 
 insured person or estate shall be released from all such liability. 
 
 Sec. 45. In case a judgment shall have been made ordering 
 an allowance to be paid to the Administrator or Executor, or any 
 other person for the benefit of others, and said Administrator, 
 Executor or person is in doubt as to whom or in what propor- 
 tions the moneys so received shall be distributed, he may make 
 application to the Court for instructions, in the same manner 
 as provided for original applications for compensation, and said 
 application shall be dealt with in the same manner as such appli- 
 cation. When payments shall have been made in accordance 
 with an order made on such application they shall be a complete 
 protection from all liability on account thereof. 
 
 See Sec. 18, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 46. All policies insuring the payment of compensation 
 under this act must contain a clause to the effect that as between 
 the workman and the insurer notice and knowledge of the 
 occurrence of the injury by the insured shall be deemed notice 
 and knowledge of the insurer; that jurisdiction of the insured 
 for the purposes of this act shall be jurisdiction of the insurer; 
 and that the insurer shall in all things be bound by and subject 
 to the awards, judgments, or decrees rendered against such 
 insured. Upon receiving notice of any such injury, the insured 
 shall immediately notify the insurer thereof, in writing. 
 
 Sec. 54 Conference Act. 
 
 Sec. 47. No policy of insurance against liability under this 
 act shall be made unless the same shall cover the entire liability 
 of the employer thereunder and shall contain an agreement by 
 the insurer that, in case the employer shall be or become insol- 
 vent or in case an execution upon a judgment for compensation 
 is returned unsatisfied, a workman of such employer or the 
 
-38- 
 
 dependents of a deceased workman who shall be entitled to 
 compensation under this act may enforce his or their claim or 
 claims to compensation against the insurer to the same extent 
 that the employer could have enforced his claim against such 
 insurer had he paid compensation. No suit shall be maintained 
 for the collection of premiums upon any such policy of insurance, 
 unless such covenant is contained in said policy. Such covenant 
 shall be unaffected by any default of the insured in the payment 
 of premiums and shall be construed to be a direct promise to 
 such injured workman and dependents, and shall be enforce- 
 able by action brought in the name of such injured workman 
 or in the names of such dependents. 
 
 Sec. 48. On or before January fifteenth in each year, every 
 employer within the scope of this act shall report to the Commis- 
 sioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, on forms provided by 
 said Commissioner, the name of every claimant and the date and 
 circumstances of every claim made upon such employer for com- 
 pensation under the provisions of this act within the calendar 
 year last preceding, and the action taken in each case to the time 
 of making such report. 
 
 Sec. 41, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 49. In this act, unless the context or subject matter 
 otherwise requires : (a) Masculine terms include both males and 
 females and other legal persons, (b) "Employer" includes any 
 body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, and the legal per- 
 sonal representative of the deceased employer, and, where the 
 services of a workman are temporarily lent or let for hire to 
 another person by the person with whom the workman has entered 
 into a contract of service or apprenticeship, the latter shall, for 
 the purposes of this act, be deemed to continue to be the employer 
 of the workman while he is rendering services to or for such other 
 person, (c) "Workman" does not include any person, employed 
 otherwise than for the performance of manual labor, whose 
 remuneration exceeds two thousand dollars per year, or any person 
 whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed 
 otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or busi- 
 ness, or an outworker, or a member of the employer's family 
 dwelling in his house, but, except as aforesaid, means any person 
 
—39— 
 
 who has entered into or works under a contract of service or 
 apprenticeship with an employer, whether by way of manual labor, 
 clerical work, or otherwise, and whether the contract is expressed 
 or implied, oral or in writing, (d) "Dependents" means such of 
 the members of any workman's family or next of kin as were 
 wholly or in part dependent upon the earnings of such workman 
 at the time of the injury. No person shall be considered a depend- 
 ent unless a member of the family of the deceased workman or 
 bearing to him the relation of widow or widower, lineal descend- 
 ant, ancestor, brother or sister, (e) "Outworker" means a 
 person to whom articles or materials are given out to be made 
 up, cleaned, washed, altered, ornamented, finished, repaired or 
 adapted for sale, in his own home or on other premises not under 
 the control or management of the person who gave out such 
 articles or materials. 
 Sec. 40, File 823. 
 
 Sec. 50. Schedule of hazardous trades and occupations. 
 The operation of : 
 
 Railroads, 
 
 Vessels, 
 
 Terminal docks, 
 
 Terminal warehouses, 
 
 Street railways, 
 
 Factories, 
 
 Mills, 
 
 Power laundries, 
 
 Power bakeries, 
 
 Foundries, 
 
 Forges, 
 
 Smelters, 
 
 Blast furnaces, 
 
 Coke burning plants, 
 
 Lime burning plants, 
 
 Bleaching works, 
 
 Dyeing works, 
 
 Potteries, 
 
 Phosphate works, 
 
 Rendering works, 
 
— 40— 
 
 Slaughter houses, 
 
 Meat-packing establishments, 
 
 Brickyards, 
 
 Marble cutting or polishing plants, 
 
 Ship-building plants, 
 
 Ship-repairing plants, 
 
 Mines, 
 
 Mining plants, 
 
 Quarries, 
 
 Heating plants, 
 
 Lighting plants, 
 
 Power plants, 
 
 Water works, 
 
 Pumping works, 
 
 Coal yards, 
 
 Lumber yards, 
 
 Building material yards, 
 
 Junk yards, 
 
 Malt-houses, 
 
 Freight or passenger elevators, 
 
 Grain elevators, 
 
 Derricks, 
 
 Stock yards, 
 
 Harvesting machinery, 
 
 Threshing machinery. 
 
 The construction, erection, extension, repair, or demolition of: 
 Tunnels or subways, 
 Underground conduits, 
 Sewers, 
 
 Gas or water mains, 
 Wells, 
 Aqueducts, 
 Canals, 
 Reservoirs, 
 Dikes or dams, 
 Jetties or breakwaters, 
 Bridges, 
 Piers, 
 
—4i— 
 
 Docks, 
 
 Oil or gas tanks, 
 
 Electric wires or cables and their supports. 
 
 Any occupation entailing the manufacture, transportation, care 
 of, use of, or regular proximity to, dangerous quantities of : 
 Gunpowder, 
 Dynamite, 
 Nitroglycerine, 
 Other like dangerous explosives. 
 
 The construction, erection, extension, alteration, decoration, 
 repair, demolition, or removal of buildings or of structural 
 appurtenances thereof. 
 
 The installation, erection, repair, or removal of: 
 Boilers, 
 Furnaces, 
 Engines, 
 Other forms of machinery. 
 
 Work on or about wires or apparatus charged with dangerous 
 electric currents. 
 
 The construction, maintenance, and repair of ways of railroads 
 and street railways. 
 
 Transportation by rail or water. 
 
 Rigging or coaling vessels or loading or unloading the cargoes 
 thereof. 
 
 Logging and lumbering. 
 
 Harvesting and storing ice. 
 
 Paving with asphalt or other molten material. 
 
 Excavating or grading with power machinery or with the use 
 of an explosive. 
 
 Caisson work. 
 
 Working in compressed air. 
 
 Dredging. 
 
 Pile driving. 
 
 .Boring. 
 
 Moving safes. 
 
—42— 
 
 Chimney sweeping. 
 
 Outside window cleaning above street floor. 
 Sec. si. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are, 
 to the extent of such inconsistency, repealed. 
 
 Sec. 52. This act shall take effect on the day of 
 
 A.D. 1913.