mm >umw Ear* fc **>J" ^Q ■H* afeM S3 ii@ i«' v*^ F| lihffi w I Hi »f. fe^^-" ^/^A^ 3* (Bnrntll Cam l^rtynnl ffiihrary Cornell University Library KFP 85.R25 Equity in Pennsylvania : 3 1924 024 706 370 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024706370 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. A LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA, FEBRUARY i i, 1868. BY WILLIAM HENRY RAWLE, ONE OF ITS VICE PROVOSTS. WITH AN APPENDIX, BEING THE REGISTRAR'S BOOK OF GOVERNOR KEITH'S COURT OF CHANCERY. PRINTED FOR THE LAW ACADEMY. PHILADELPHIA: KAY & BROTHER, 19 SOUTH SIXTH STREET, LAW BOOKSELLERS, PUBLISHERS, AND IMPORTERS. 1868. Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1868, by THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA, in the Office of the Clerk of the District Court of the United States in and for the Eastern District of the State of Pennsylvania. PHILADELPHIA: COLLINS, PRINTER. Extract from the Minutes of The Law Academy. Resolved, That a Committee be appointed to wait upon William Henry Rawle, Esq., to request him to permit the publication of his Address delivered before The Law Academy on the nth inst : — and further, Resolved, That the Record of Governor Keith's Court of Chancery be published as an appendix to Mr. Rawle's Address. Feb. 12, 1868. Sir, The undersigned, a Committee appointed by The Law Aca- demy, respectfully solicit of you for publication your Address delivered before that body on Tuesday evening, February nth. SAML. S. HOLLINGSWORTH, W. W. WILTBANK, GEO. W. SPIESE, Committee, Feb. 13, 1868. To Wm. Henry Rawle, Esq., 710 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, February 17, 1868. Gentlemen, I send you the manuscript of my Address before The Law Academy, in compliance with your request. Through the kindness of the Attorney-General, the consent of the State Department to the publication of the Registrar's Book has been procured. Very respectfully yours, WM. HENRY RAWLE. Messrs. Saml. S. Hollingsworth, W. W. WlLTBANK, George W. Spiese, Committee, £sTr. &c. ADVERTISEMENT. After the manuscript of this lecture had been given to the Law Academy, it was suggested that the interest of its subject might warrant a more extended publication than the limited number of copies printed for the use of its members. The Committee of the Academy has, therefore, made such an arrangement with the publishers as enables them to present the lecture in this form to the profession. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. More than forty years ago, the Provost and Vice-Provost of this, our Law Academy, appoint- ed as the subject of a dissertation to be prepared during vacation, "Equity in Pennsylvania" — under which head were to be considered the nature and extent of the Chancery Powers of our State Judi- ciary, and the manner in which they were exer- cised. "The subject is to be treated," said the Faculty, "in an historical as well as legal point of view, and the whole reduced to a system under proper divisions. The question whether, in Penn- sylvania, a separate court of chancery is indispen- sably necessary, is to be considered, and in case the writer maintains the negative, he is to point out the manner in which it may be supplied." The modest essay which, in answer to this call, was submitted by a student at law in his twentieth year, now forms part of our legal literature. Its merits have been recognized on both sides of the 2 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. Atlantic; it is read by every student; and you gentlemen of the Law Academy, have especial reason to be proud that the "Essay on Equity in Pennsylvania, by Anthony Laussat, jr.," claims its origin as an academical exercise of your Institu- tion. The author of the essay, and those who then composed the faculty, sleep in their honored graves ; another generation, and still another, have succeeded them, and the system itself, which, in this little book, was so clearly traced and so ably defended, has also yielded to the advance of time. There may, therefore, in answer to your kind in- vitation to address you, be a peculiar propriety in attempting to take up, even though, longo intervallo, the subject which has never since received a con- nected consideration. All of you are aware of the wide distinction between equitable principles, and equitable juris- diction — between the doctrines of equity, which, at this day, are not less consistent and harmonious than are those of the common law, and the pecu- liar means by which they are enforced through the process of a court of chancery. It has fallen to the lot of Pennsylvania, through necessity, to have blended together, in a single tribunal, equi- table principles and equitable jurisdiction, and to have dispensed those principles through the me- dium of common law forms. The administration EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 3 of justice has, under this system, grown up from its youth to its manhood, and now, after a century of trial, while we still retain that system, we have, of late, gradually but liberally, vested in our courts equitable jurisdiction, to be exercised ac- cording to the course and practice of chancery. Thus, at the end of a century, we have, by our course of legislation, frankly acknowledged that to dispense equity through such remedies alone as the common law affords must, in many cases, amount to a denial of justice. It is not a little singular that upon the other side of the Atlantic — -in that country from which we derived our laws — it has at last been acknow- ledged that to administer equity in a court of equity alone, and solely according to the course and practice of chancery, must, in many cases, be equally a denial of justice. Thus, while legis- lation has, in the one country, been directed to the administration of equitable principles in a court of equity, it has, in the other, been directed to the administration of those principles, in certain cases, in the courts of common law. And thus both countries have, after a long trial of each system, approached each other, though over widely differ- ent roads. It cannot be unprofitable to follow the path which has thus been trod by our ancestors, and by those of our own time. 4 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVAVIA. Years before Charles the Second, in 1 68 1, granted by his charter to William Penn the Province of Pennsylvania, chancery jurisdiction seems to have been, in some fashion, exercised over it and the other provinces by their governor.* It is familiar to all of you that, by the express provisions of that charter, the proprietary received authority to appoint any judges, magistrates, and other officers, for such causes, with such powers, and in such form as to him or his heirs should seem most convenient,^ and it was provided that the laws for regulating and governing property within the province " as well for the descent and enjoyment of lands, as likewise for the enjoyment and succession of goods and chattels, and likewise as to felonies," be and continue the same as they * Hazard's Annals of Pennsylvania, 424 ; Records of the Court of Upland, 40. There were then about four thousand persons under the government of New York on both sides of Delaware Bay and River. In 1676, Sir Edmund Andross granted, in New York, an injunction to stay execution on a judgment at law in the court of New Castle, upon security being given, " and all proceedings, writings, and proofs to be transmitted to New York for a final determination in equity." — New York Records, cited in Hazard, supra. "j" Charter of 4th March, 1 681, § 5. The section goes on to say, " and to do all and every other thing and things which unto the com- plete establishment of justice unto courts and tribunals, forms of judi- cature and manner of proceedings do belong, although in these presents express mention be not made thereof; and by judges by them delegated, to award process, hold pleas, and determine in all the said courts and tribunals, all actions, suits, and causes whatsoever, as well criminal as civil — personal, real, and mixt." EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 5 were by the general course of' law in England until the said laws should be altered by the pro- prietary and freemen of the province.* This charter would, therefore, by its terms, have allowed the creation of a court of equity. In the " Conditions or concessions" between Penn and his " adventurers or purchasers," it was, among other things, agreed that the laws as to slanders, drunkenness, swearing, cursing, pride in apparel, trespass, distress, replevins, weights and measures, should be the same as in England, until altered by law in the province,-]- and the " Laws agreed upon in England" contained a provision that in all courts, persons of all persuasions might freely appear in their own way and according to their own manner, and there personally plead their own cause themselves, or, if unable, by their friends. J The "Great Law," as it was imposingly termed, contained the same provision, and provided further, that in every county there should be one court erected, to which the inhabitants thereof might every month repair for justice ; from this lay an appeal to the Provincial Court, composed of not less than five judges, who should hold quarterly sessions ; and from this court, an appeal lay to the *§6. t §7- l 5 May, 1682, Art. VI. 6 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. Provincial Council, which was the "last jurisdic- tion."* In Penn's letter to "the Free Society of Traders," after referring to the happy condition of the Indi- ans, who, he says, " are not disquieted with bills of lading and exchange, nor perplexed by Chancery suits" he refers to the establishment of courts of justice in every county for their well government, but adds that, " to prevent lawsuits, there are three peacemakers, chosen by every county court, in the nature of common arbitrators, to hear and end differences between man and man."j- These peacemakers derived their authority from a statute passed but a few months before Penn wrote, and these laws are all which were then in force with respect to the administration of justice. The Society of Friends had, indeed, internal regula- tions, by which all differences between its mem- bers were submitted to their meetings. When we reflect upon the simple-mindedness of a people who could thus hope to administer a science without the aid of scientific principles, we will not be surprised to find that at the same session which produced these peacemakers, two laws were said to have been proposed to the council, one compelling all young men over a certain age to marry, and the other that two sorts * io Dec. 1682. I Penn's letter, 16 Aug. 1683; 1 Proud's History of Penna. 262. EgUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 7 of cloths only should be worn, one for winter and one for summer use.* Nor does it appear that the simplicity of manners and of morals which should breathe through the every-day life of such a people, preserved them from at least some of those frailties to which flesh was heir ; for the first case which seems to have been tried was an assault and battery, in which both : parties were found guilty; at the third meeting of the Pro- vincial Council, three sheriffs sent in a petition for the establishment of a fee bill ; the next day one of the members of the council was fined five shillings for " being disordered in drink ;" on the next, a "bill for hog stealers" was introduced; and one of the earliest matters which engaged atten- tion was the building of prisons and houses of correction, f The administration of justice by. the Provincial Council seems to have been — and perhaps from * Proud's History, 238 ; Gordon's History, 80. This is asserted doubtfully by the first, and positively by the second of these writers. The proceedings themselves show no trace of such propositions. It is familiar that for thousands of years, at different periods of civilization, laws with respect to marriage and the regulation of dress have been enacted Leckey's Rationalism in Europe, vol. 2, p. 311; Buckle's Civilization, passim. In the Talmud it was ordained that a senator must be married and have children of his own, for deep miseries of families would be laid bare before him, and he should bring with him a heart full of sympathy. — Article on The Talmud, London Quarterly Review, October, 1867. "|" 1 Colonial Records, p. 4 et seq. 8 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. necessity — a singular mixture of original and appel- late jurisdiction. Thus, the petition of the inhabit- ants of Duck Creek as to cutting a canal through the marsh, was referred to the county court in which the same did lie,* while the case of an ejectment for lands in Bucks County, which came up from the court of Philadelphia County, ended in the cause being referred to the Bucks County court, for " all causes shall be first tried where they arise," and the Philadelphia court was then fined forty pounds "for giving judgment against law."y At the same time, original jurisdiction was exer- cised in many cases — civil, criminal, and admi- ralty ; a petition for the payment of boat hire — another for the payment of seamen's wages — another for the payment of a simple contract debt — a complaint against a captain for beating his crew on the high seas — an indictment for passing counterfeit money, and another for witch- craft (in which the prisoner was convicted of "having the common fame of being a witch"), were all considered and determined by the Pro- vincial Council. In the middle of all this, the question was asked in council, whether the peace- makers should sit once a month — but the question does not seem to have been answered. Until 1684, the council would probably not have hesitated to exercise occasional equitable jurisdic- * I Colonial Records, p. 4. f Noble t>. Mann, July, 1683. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 9 tion, as it had, before the charter, been exercised by the Governor of New York.* But in this year, two bills respecting courts of equity were passed. The first of them, numbered 156, provided that monthly and quarterly sessions be held in every county by the respective justices, and that each quarter sessions be as well a court of equity as law, concerning any judgment given, in cases by law capable of trial in the respective county sessions and courts, and the other, numbered 158, entitled "a bill that every court of justice should be a court of equity as well as law," established a provincial court, consisting of five judges, who should have the trying and determining of all appeals from inferior courts, also all trials of titles of land, and all causes, as well criminal as civil, both in law and equity, not determinable by the respective county courts.*}" The judges of this court were commissioned by Penn on the 4th of August, 1684, a few days before he sailed for England. £ * See supra, p. 4, note. f 1 Colonial Records, 47. The act itself differs somewhat from the report in the minutes of Council. I regret to say that these acts, with very many others, have never been published — a single copy exists, compiled and printed by a member of the bar (for many years one of your Vice-Provosts) for his own use, and to this collection I am in- debted for many statutes that must otherwise have been obtained from the manuscripts at Harrisburg. I 1 Proud, 286; 1 Col. Rec. 68. 10 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. Neither the proceedings of the council nor of the Assembly tell us much as to the forms of pro- cedure under these acts of 1684, except that the distinction between the law and the equity sides of the court seems to have been strongly marked. In 1686, we find the appointment, by the council, of the judges for the next provincial court, author- izing and empowering them as judges both of law and equity,* and in the next year, the Assembly came, with their Speaker, to the council, and desired the explanation of some laws, which were, they thought, " liable to divers interpretations or expositions," of which one was "The law con- cerning Quarter Sessions — how far the County Quarter Sessions may be judges of equity as well as law; and if after a judgment at law, whether the same court hath power to resolve itself into a court of equity, and to mitigate, alter, or reverse the said judgment. "f The Quarter Sessions Court thus referred to was the same established by the act, No. 156, and the council rather evasively answered, "that the law No. 156, made at New- castle, doth supply and answer all occasions of appeal, and is a plainer rule to proceed by. "J In 1690, an act was passed, providing that "all trials of titles of lands, all actions of debt, account, * 1 Col. Rec. 142. t Id. 159. J 1 Votes of Assembly, p. 41. The minutes of the House refer to the act as No. I 57. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. i i or slander, actions personal, and all actions civil and criminal whatsoever, except treason, murder, manslaughter, and other heinous and enormous crimes," should be first tried in the proper county- courts, which were to be held quarterly in every county, "which county courts," says the act, "shall be courts of equity for the hearing and determining of all causes cognizable in the said court under the value of ten pounds."* It will have been observed that in none of these statutes was any reference made to any particular form of process or procedure. f But in 1 70 1 was passed an elaborate "Act for establishing courts of judicature in this province and counties annexed," which provided that the judges of the Common Pleas should have full * § 197, Ch. 7, of the Session. In the report of the Revisers of the Civil Code, this act is quoted as passed in 1693, and the language of the act is not quite correctly given. "j" Side by side with these laws had been several which had re- enacted the provision in the " Laws agreed upon in England" that " in all courts, all persons of all persuasions may freely appear in their own way, and according to their own manner, and there personally plead their own cause themselves, or if unable, by their friends." Such re- enactments are to be found, in nearly the same words, in 1682 (ch. 43), in 1683 (§66, ch. 4 of the Session), in 1693, and 1700 (ch. 91, A), and that portion of these statutes which provides that parties may per- sonally plead their own cause, may perhaps be considered as still in force, except so far as supplied by the act of 21st March, 1806, which provided that every suitor and party concerned shall have a right to be heard by himself and counsel, or either of them. I 2 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. power to hear and decree all such matters and causes of equity as should come before them, " wherein the proceedings shall be by bill and answer, with such other pleadings as are necessary in Chancery Courts, and proper in these parts ; with power also to the said justices to force obedience to their decrees in equity by imprisonment or sequestration of lands, as the case may require." And an appeal in equity cases lay to the Supreme Court, which had power to make such decrees thereon as should be agreeable to equity and justice.* It would seem that, for some time at least, no proceedings were had before this court. In 1703, one of the council presented a complaint that notwithstanding the laws of the government had erected courts of equity, and the justices were commissioned for the same, yet that, to the great oppression of the people, there had been no such courts held in pursuance of the present law, the rules of court not having yet received so full a sanction as it was thought might be requisite."}" The statute itself was, however, soon after re- pealed in England,]; and then commenced that * Act of 1 70 1, ch. 2, MSS. Collection. This act was passed and approved in the end of October, at the close of that stormy session which resulted in the Charter of Privileges. I Proud, 434; 2 Col. Rec. 23 &c. ; 1 Votes of Assembly, 143 et seq., passim. f 2 Col. Rec. 115. % In 1705- EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. I 3 long and angry quarrel between the new governor, the Provincial Council and the House, in which the establishment of courts of judicature formed an element. It is familiar to all that, in the early history of England, the king, who was considered the fountain of justice, exercised, through his council, judicial functions, and that the chan- cellor, who at first was merely an assistant, was, from time to time, vested with certain of these functions. He was a privy councillor by virtue of his office ; he was the keeper of the king's conscience ; the visitor, in right, of all hospitals and colleges of the king's foundation ; the general guardian of infants and lunatics, and had the general superintendence of all charitable uses. Besides which was the jurisdiction which he exercised in his judicial capacity in the Court of Chancery, on its common law and its equity side. When the counties palatine were created, these had their separate courts, and among them their separate courts of chancery. The charters of some of the principal American colonies made them, in a measure, resemble the counties pala- tine, and the doctrine that the office of chan- cellor ought to vest in one who, under the great seal of England, acted as the king's representative, crossed the Atlantic, and was tenaciously supported by the prerogative lawyers of the colony, and in New York, in New Jersey, in Virginia, and in 14 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. South Carolina, the office of chancellor was exer- cised by the Governor of the Province.* It has been only within the recollection of many of us, that in some of these States a different regulation has been made. Upon this point — whether the Governor of the Province should or should not be the chancellor — arose the contest which finally cost us our Court of Chancery. Governor Evans proposed that him- self, by virtue of his commission, and certain of the council (whom he thus added in order to strengthen his position) should have the power to hold a court of equity ;-f- but the House were opposed to such an extension of his authority, J and this question was, as you will find from the minutes of the Provincial Council and the proceedings of the Assembly, tenaciously fought upon both sides. § * The difference between the judicial systems in the several colonies was, of course, in a great degree owing to the different character of their several governments, which were, respectively, provincial, proprie- tary, and charter governments. See passim I Story on the Constitution, Chapters I. to XVII. ; Parke's Equity Jurisdiction in the United States, 48. ■j" 2 Col. Rec. 263. J 1 Col. Rec. 265 ; 1 Votes of Assembly, 106. § 2 Col. Rec. 274, 288. On behalf of the governor, it was urged that it was proper that this province should follow the example of New York, New Jersey, and some other provinces, in which the offices of chancellor and governor had always been united, but the House deemed " that the Court of Equity should be lodged in commissioners of the governor's appointing, whereby we prevent the council here to fall into that inconsistency which the council table did by assuming EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 15 It is both sad and instructive, at this day, to review this bitter quarrel, which lasted through more than three sessions, during which the people of the province suffered, while each party threw up to the other its shortcomings, till, said the Governor once, " If we have lived free from open rapine, 'tis more owing to the honesty of the people, than any public provision made against it."* And yet in this very quarrel may be seen unto itself a power to intermeddle in civil causes, and matters only of private interest between party and party." (2 Col. Rec. 278, Nov. 27, 1706.) To this the governor answered that what was proposed was the practice of all the governments in America — that it was " every- where always thought most reasonable that those persons who, par- ticularly chosen to counsel in matters of state and of the greatest importance, should be considered the fittest to judge in matters of equity. . . . The answer to this," he added, " as well as some other cases, seems really to be, to divest the proprietary and governor and all those about him, of power." (2 Col. Rec. 283.) The House replied, that "if a law could pass here to settle the Court of Equity in the governor and council, it might meet with a like rebuke at home, as that part of the ordinance of Wales did, which gave the president and council there the power of a chancery court," and which was suppressed by the 1 W. & M. c. 27 (id. 288), and the governor re- joined that "that particular court had been found to be an intolerable burden," yet the queen, in most or all of her governments abroad, expressly established her courts of equity in the governor and council alone, and therefore if the same were done here, the old abusive chancery of Wales could be no objection, since by the queen herself such courts are settled in New York, Maryland, Virginia, and the Islands, &c. (Id. 295-6.) * Feb. 4, 1707; 2 Col. Rec. 312. 1 6 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. the germ of that spirit which, more than half a century later, cost the crown its colonies. At last, in 1 710, two years after Governor Evans had been succeeded by Governor Gookin — the latter as mild, steady, and economical, as the former had been hot-headed, tactless, and ex- travagant — another " Act for establishing courts of judicature" was passed. Its equity powers were not vested in the governor. A court of equity was to be held by the Common Pleas judges four times a year in every county, with power "to hear and decree all such matters and causes of equity as should come before them," and express power was given to issue subpoenas and all other process to "compel appearance, to award commissions for the examination of witnesses, to grant injunctions for staying suits at law and for stopping wastes, * * observing, as near as may be, the rules and practice of the High Court of Chancery in Great Britain."* An appeal lay from the decrees of these courts to the Supreme Court, which was constituted, for this purpose, a court of equity in every county of the province. This act contained a proviso * Bradford's Laws, Ed. 17 14, p. 120. Gordon says: " The judiciary bill was a compromise between the proprietary and popular interests, and most probably was opposed by the former before the throne" (Gordon's History of Pennsylvania, p. 166); but the correctness of the author's supposition may be doubted. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 17 that the courts should have no powers to hear and determine in equity any cause wherein sufficient remedy might be had before any other magistrate or judicature, either by the rules of the common law or the laws of the province ; and when matters of fact should arise in the hearing of any cause, the court should first refer them to issue and trial before the Common Pleas, before proceeding to decree in equity. But, as might have been sup- posed, this statute was, in 171 3, repealed in council, the attorney-general objecting that the clause as to determining no matter of fact save by an issue at law, must make proceedings in equity insufferably dilatory, and multiply trials at law in plain cases to no manner of purpose.* Again, in 171 5, "a Supreme or Provincial Court of law and equity" was established, which had, in general terms, authority " to hold pleas in equity by bill, appeal, petition, or suit, to be brought or exhibited in the said court by, for, or against any person or persons whatsoever, for any discovery or other matter relievable in equity, and for the parties to proceed thereon and thereupon according to such rules, and under and in such manner and form as the Courts of Chancery and Exchequer in Great Britain have used to proceed by." After an infancy of four years, this court also came to its grave. * Penna. Archives, 158. I 8 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. You will have observed that the life of these statutes (the acts of 1701, 1710, and 171 5) — that is, the period between their enactment here and their repeal in Great Britain — was, respectively, four, three, and four years, and it may be reason- ably asked why they remained so long unrepealed, and why, if so, they were repealed at all. The answer, I believe to be, that the jealousy in Eng- land of the exercise of power in the colony was in proportion to the ignorance which was there entertained of its real internal condition, and this was well understood on this side of the Atlantic. The colonists had, by the terms of the charter, five years within which to transmit their laws for approval, and, after their passage, they would keep them here and act under them as long, within that period, as they decently could ; they were then sent to England, and, when re- pealed there, other laws, as nearly similar as they dared to pass, would be enacted here. When, after some years, these were sent to the mother country, they were repealed in council. Nor was our province the only one which thus suffered. In Massachusetts, at the very beginning of the eighteenth century, four acts for establish- ing courts of justice had, within seven years, been sent, one after another, to England before the royal approbation could be obtained.* * 1 Parkes' Eq. Jurisdiction in the United States, Introduce, p. 50. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 19 We come now to the first and last Court of Equity which, as a separate tribunal, has existed in our State. William Keith had, in 1717, become the go- vernor. In the following year Penn died, and in the year after, the act of 17 15 was repealed. Complaints as to the administration of justice were then constant and well founded. Courts had not, they said, been held for many terms.* The opportunity was favorable, and the governor was popular, for he had thoroughly studied the errors of his predecessors. In a message to the House in May, 1720, he informed them that it having been represented to him that a court of chancery was very much wanted, he had con- sulted those learned in the law and others of good judgment, who all agreed that the office of chan- cellor could only be lawfully executed by him who, by virtue of the great seal, might be under- stood to act as the king's representative ; but, he added, that upon this subject the opinion of the House should principally direct his conduct. A resolution was the next day unanimously passedf that, considering the present circumstances of the * See the subsequent petition to Governor Gordon, in 1735. 3 Votes of Assembly, 270. "j" The unanimous passage of the resolution is not recorded in the Votes of Assembly (2 Votes of Assem. 271), but in the minutes of the Council it is stated to have been unanimous. 3 Col. Rec. 100. 20 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. province, it was the opinion of the House that " for the present the governor be desired to open and hold a court of equity for the province, with the assistance of such of his council as he shall think fit, except such as have heard the cause in any inferior court." The governor laid this resolution before the council, who not only considered that he might safely comply with the desire so expressed, but that holding such a court might be of great service to the colony, and was, moreover, agree- able to the practice which had been approved of in the neighboring governments. And here the governor interposed, and referred to his own want of experience in judicial affairs, and repre- sented the great addition of attendance and fatigue in the public business which would be thereby laid upon him, but was pleased to add, neverthe- less, that, considering the many marks of confi- dence which had been shown him, he should not decline to serve the public in that station, but insisted that while, on the one hand, no court of chancery could be held without him, so, on the other, he should not fail of having a due assistance from the council on their parts. The result of this delicate coquetry was, that it was agreed that no decree in chancery should be pronounced but by the governor as chancellor, with the as- sent of two or more of his six oldest counsellors, EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 21 who might also be employed as masters in chan- cery.* On the ioth of August, 1720, only four days after the last proceedings of the council, appeared the governor's proclamation. It recited that "courts of chancery or equity, though absolutely necessary in the administration of justice, for mitigating, in many cases, the rigor of the laws, whose judgments are tied down to fixed and unalterable rules, and for opening a way to the right and equity of a cause for which the law cannot, in all cases, make sufficient provision, have, notwithstanding, been too seldom regularly held in this province in such manner as the aggrieved subjects might obtain the relief which, by such courts, ought to be granted," and declared that, with the assistance of the council, the governor proposed to hold a court of chancery or equity on the 25th day of that month, "from which date the said court will be and remain always open for the relief of the subject, to hear and determine all such matters arising within this province aforesaid as are regularly cognizable before any court of chancery according to the laws and constitution of that part of Great Britain called England."f No published record exists of the proceedings * 3 Col. Records, 100. ■}■ 2 Votes of the Assembly, 270, 271-273. 22 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. of this, our only separate Court of Chancery, nor is allusion made in any reported case, to any cause said to have been determined therein. But I became satisfied, from the familiarity with the principles of equity shown in the early reported cases, that there must have been a time when those principles were administered in more or less conformity with the course and practice of chancery. A careful search was, therefore, made, but a few weeks ago, among the old records and archives of our state department, and there, in one of the many cases in the main room, and among a quantity of old and dusty books, was found a modest folio, of no great size, and bearing no title, which appeared to have hitherto escaped the research of the curious. Its existence was unknown to any of the state officials, and it bore none of those marks of annotation and indorse- ment which appear upon most of the colonial archives. It was the Registrar's Book of Keith's Court of Chancery.* * Since this was written, I have seen the report of the secretary of the commonwealth in 1838 as to the publication of the Colonial Records, in which, under the head of " Colonial Documents in the Secretary's Office," he refers to "one book of records of chancery from 1729 to 1735," and afterwards among the records recommended to be printed, he included " The volume of chancery proceedings before the governor (who seems to have been ex-ojficio chancellor) and the EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 23 It commences, in the beautiful and clear hand- writing of Charles Brockden, who was the first registrar, with the oath of the chancellor taken on the 25th of August, 1720, that "well and truly he shall serve in the office of Chancellor of this Province of Pennsylvania wherewith he is intrusted, that he shall do right to all manner of people, as well to Poor as to Rich, according to ye laws and usages of that part of his Majestie's Realm called England, that he shall not know nor surfer the hurt nor disheriting of the King, nor that the Rights of the Crown and the Proprietor of this Province be distressed by any means as far forth as he may it let, and if he may not let it, he shall make it clearly and expressly be known, that he shall do and purchase the King's profit and the right of the Proprietor of the Province of Penn- sylvania in all that he reasonably may." Then follow the appointment and the oath of Charles Brockden as registrar, and of James Logan, Jonathan Dickinson, Samuel Preston, Robert Hill, and Anthony Palmer as masters in chancery. The record of the causes in this court shows curiously the nature and extent of the chancery jurisdiction which it exercised. masters in chancery." But the legislature did not act upon the recommendation, so far as this book was concerned. It is now printed as an Appendix hereto, through the kindness of the attorney-general. 24 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. Although the first case which it contains (England v. Shute) is entitled "Anno n Georgii Regis" (1724), yet it is probable that there were many cases before this, for there are consecutive entries of the appointment of masters in chan- cery in the years 1720, 1721, 1722, and 1723, and there are allusions and references in this case to previous cases in the same court. An attachment had issued against the defendant for not answering, which his counsel moved to set aside, " praying the chancellor that the several heads from which he deduceth his arguments for that purpose, may be set down, in order to have the mind of the court the more clearly thereunto, viz : " 1. The attachment was not regularly entered in the six clerk or Register Book. " 2. The process was not signed by a six clerk or one fully authorized. " 3. The special cause of issuing the writ was not endorsed thereon. " 4. The writ ought to be close and not patent, whereas this is an open writ. " 5. No one is compellable to appear in any other court than that which the writ commands, whereas, by the style of this writ, it seems to direct otherwise. " 6. The seal ought to be always in the Chan- EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 25 cellor's custody, and not affixed without his special direction." But all these objections were overruled, on the ground that the writ had, in all respects, con- formed to the " constant practice of issuing writs out of this court."* To the fifth objection it was answered that "the style complained of, viz : ' before us in our Court of Chancery wheresoever it shall be in our pro- vince of Pennsylvania' hath been hitherto used for the style of this court." In the case of Sanderlands v. Munday, in the following year, the court, being informed that the defendant's plea, answer, and demurrer "would not be argued by any of the practitioners of the court, for the many gross errors therein contained, the defendants having procured them to be drawn by some persons unskilful in the law," ordered the same to be dismissed with costs, and that the defendants a better answer make on or before a certain day. In this, as in many other cases, orders of the court upon interlocutory applications begin with the words, " The prayer of the petition appearing to be agreeable to the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, it is ordered," &c. * By the expression " this court," was probably meant not Keith's Court in particular, but the Court of Chancery. 26 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. As to the cases in which our Court of Chancery- exercised jurisdiction, we find bills for account — for partition ; to subject real estate to the payment of debts and legacies ; to stay waste ; to restrain proceedings at law ; to take the testimony of wit- nesses in foreign parts ; to settle differences be- tween partners ; petitions for writs de lunatico inquirendo, and many writs ne exeat provincia. I will briefly refer to a few of the cases which thus appear. In the case of Shippen v. Shippen, which was presented in 173 1, it appeared that Edward Ship- pen died in 1714, having bequeathed a legacy of £800 to his son William, and devised to his wife Esther, certain real estate in trust to secure its payment, with power of sale for that purpose. The latter died in 1724, having appointed Samuel Preston and Samuel Powell her executors, against whom and Joseph Shippen (who was the testator's residuary devisee) William Shippen filed a bill for the payment of his legacy, and it was ordered that the real estate devised, or so much thereof as might be sufficient, be publicly sold by the executors, so that from the sale the said £800 with interest be paid to the complainant on or before a certain day named in the decree, the surplus to be disposed of according to the original trusts of the will. The sale was accordingly EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 27 made, and a return by the executors confirmed absolutely.* So, in the case of Philips v. Evans, which was a bill filed to subject the real estate of a testator to the payment of debts and legacies, the master having, on the 6th of May, 1735, reported that there were not sufficient assets in the hands of the executor for the payment of the same, it was ordered that the executors make sale of certain lands in the manor of Moreland not devised by the testator, and bring the money into court to abide its order, and the record shows the disposition of the fund.*} - Emanuel Jocelin filed a bill against Robert Charles, naval officer of Philadelphia, praying for a commission to examine witnesses in the Island of St. Christopher, which was issued and returned; whereupon it was ordered "that a certi- fied copy of the said examination be sent unto the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Phila- delphia where the information exhibited by the * The registrar's book does not set forth all the facts which I have stated above, some of which I have obtained from examination of the wills in the register of wills' office. The proceedings in this cause are recited at some length in a subsequent deed for this same property, which is on record in our recorder's office. ■f" Mr. Hazard, when collecting and arranging the Pennsylvania Archives, came across this master's report (whose date corresponds with that stated in the registrar's book), and also the decree, which is in the same words. Pennsylvania Archives, 440-456. 28 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. naval officer qui tarn, &c, against sundry goods, wares, and merchandise reclaimed by the com- plainant Jocelin, is now depending."* Upon a complainant's affidavit that the defend- ants intended and threatened to pull down and destroy some buildings and outhouses to which he believed and was advised he had a good title, an injunction to stay waste was issued, which, being disregarded by one of the defendants, he was attached to answer the contempt, and it was ordered that he be examined by one of the masters of the court upon certain interrogations filed by the complainant, and remain in custody until the coming in of the master's report. Thomas Willing and others, creditors of William Dowell, presented a petition setting forth that the latter had been, for several months past, non compos mentis, that he was unable to order his estate, and had made alienation and waste thereof, whereby the petitioners were in danger of losing their just debts, and praying that a writ de lunatico inquirendo might be granted, and it was ordered that the writ do forthwith issue. * It is familiar that the courts of common law were deemed to have no power to procure the depositions of witnesses, which was always done by a commission issued out of chancery. The testimony so taken, when returned, was sent into the common law court. See 2 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1 5 14, passim. The statutes 13 Geo. III. 63, and 1 Will. IV. 32, were the first that gave to English common law courts power to issue such commissions. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 29 Lord Hardwicke said, more than a hundred years ago, that the origin of the custody of idiots and lunatics was more matter of curiosity than' use,* and yet the exercise of the jurisdiction in this Court of Chancery seems to call for a passing notice. The general opinion has been, that the jurisdic- tion of the chancellor over idiots and lunatics was specially delegated. It is certain that, originally, their custody and that of their lands was a royal prerogative, and though prior to the statute de prerogatives regis, ~\ this custody was vested in the lords of the fee,J yet this statute, introduced to correct the abuses of that system, was said to be only declaratory of the common law, and intro- duced no new right in the crown. § It has been thought that, before the passage of the statute, the chancellor had committed to his care such idiots and lunatics as the king had then charge of, and that, after its passage, this branch of the preroga- tive was generally, though not universally, dele- * Ex parte Grimstone ; Ambler, 706 ; S. C, 4 Brown's Ch. Rep. 235- ■j" 17 Edward II. c. 9 and 10. "The king shall have the custody of the lands of natural fools, taking the profit of them without waste or destruction, and shall find them their necessaries, of whose fee soever the lands shall be holden. And after the death of such idiots, he shall render them to the right heirs, so that by such idiots no alienation shall be made, nor shall their heirs be disinherited." J 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 303. Shelford on Lunacy, 10. § Beverley's Case, 4 Coke, 126; Oxenden v. Lord Compton, 2 Vesey, jr. 27, per Lord Loughborough. 30 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. gated to the chancellor by special appointment under the sign manual, which took its origin from the statute.* But Lord Campbell has con- sidered that a commission de idiota inquirendo would issue at common law from the Court of Chancery under the great seal, and that the chancellor, without any special delegation for this purpose, would have authority to control its execution, and he acted upon this opinion, when, being made Chancellor of Ireland, the usual warrant under the sign manual had, by some oversight, been omit- ted to be delivered to him, and he made several orders in lunacy before he received this warrant. ~f * I Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, 418; Stanton v. Percival, 5 House of Lords Cases, 284. The warrant has been given to the Lord High Treasurer. Wigg v. Tiler, 2 Dickens, 553. ")" I Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, 35. Judge Story has said: " If one might make a suggestion in a case where there seems no small diversity of opinion, it would be that, upon general principles, the king, as parens patrice, has an original prerogative to take care of all persons and property of infants, of idiots, and of lunatics in all cases, where no other guardianship exists. So long as any special guardianship exists by law or custom in other persons, the prerogative of the crown is in- active, but not suspended. The jurisdiction generally belongs to the Court of Chancery, as delegate of the crown, except where it is speci- ally or personally delegated, or restricted by statute. The Statute de Prerog. Regis, ch. 9 and 10, has rendered special commissions for certain purposes necessary to be granted under the sign manual ; and the jurisdiction being in fact committed to the same person, has, in practice, become mixed. If this view be admitted to be correct, it will clear away some of the difficulties now encumbering the subject." 2 Story's Eq. Jur. 1336, note. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 31 I have paused to notice this, because there is no pretence that Governor Keith ever received any special delegation of jurisdiction as to idiots and lunatics. He exercised it by right of his being the chancellor. John Meredith set forth in a petition that he, being seised of a certain plantation in Bucks County, and of sundry goods and chattels, did, from his affection to his son Thomas, " and for the better advancing him in the world, convey all his estate in the premises to him the said Thomas, who is now possessed of great part thereof, and other goods and chattels acquired by his own industry, but that of late the said Thomas is by the visitation of God become non compos mentis and wholly unfit for the government of himself and his said estate ; and that having already, by the craft of evil-disposed persons, sustained great losses, and being in danger of sustaining much greater, the said Thomas is like to be reduced to beggary and want without the aid and interposi- tion of this court, and therefore praying that a writ de idiota inquirendo may be awarded, directed to the sheriff of the county of Bucks, to inquire into the truth of the premises by the oaths or affirmations of good and lawful men of his baili- wick, and in case the premises be found true, that the said Thomas, together with his goods, chattels, lands, and tenements aforesaid, may be committed 32 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. to the care, government, and management of dis- creet and honest persons to be appointed by this court as in such cases is usual." The sheriff returned the writ which was awarded, with an inquisition " whereby it appearing that the said Thomas Meredith is not of composed mind, but is unfit for the government of himself and his'estate," the custody of the person and estate of the said Thomas was committed to his father and cousin, and the survivor of them. Isaac Miranda presented a petition with an affi- davit annexed, praying that for the reasons therein set forth, the leaving a subpoena with the defend- ant's attorney might be deemed good service, which was granted, and the subpoena issued, and, ten days after, he applied for an injunction " to stop the sale of certain houses and lots of land to be exposed to sale by virtue of a writ of venditioni exponas issuing out of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County," which was granted accordingly. Here was a case in which the chancellor ordered what is called substituted service. Independently of any statute, the Court of Chancery had no power to order actual personal service to be made out of the jurisdiction, but in some cases, the court has ordered service to be effected within the juris- diction on some person other than the actual defendant, and has treated such service as valid EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 33 against him, and this practice was and is most frequent in cases to restrain proceedings at law, instituted by persons out of the jurisdiction of the court.* In another case, the complainant had obtained an injunction to restrain the defendant from pro- ceeding at law against him, and upon the coming in of the answer, it was ordered, by consent, " that the defendants be at liberty to proceed at law against the complainant, so far as to obtain judgment against him and his bail ; or otherwise that he, the complainant, bring into this court within three days the money sued for at law by the defendants, subject to the direction of this court ; wherein if he fails, the injunction to stand dissolved." The widow of Joseph Growdon had also ob- tained an injunction to restrain proceedings at law, and on the coming in of the answer, an order was made that the injunction stand dissolved, unless cause to the contrary be shown within ten days, at the expiration of which time it was prayed that the injunction might not be dissolved till the ex- ceptions then being prepared to the answer should * Anderson v. Lewis, 3 Brown's Ch. R. 429. 1 Daniel's Ch. Prac. 437. Substituted service is now provided for by statute, both in England and in Pennsylvania, though the English statute (15 and 16 Vic. c. 86, s. 5) is much more ample, leaving the whole matter within the discretion of the court. Our own statutes on the subject are referred to infra. 3 34 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. be heard, and the chancellor, a few days after, ordered that both parties be heard the next day on their respective applications, which was ac- cordingly done, and the complainants were there- upon ordered to file their exceptions on or before the ioth of October next. And here the cause rested till the following June, when the com- plainant filed a petition setting forth " that not- withstanding the injunction in this cause filed, the defendant Lawrence Growdon, in the term of April last, did proceed, ex parte, in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to try the said cause, and obtained judgment thereupon, in open contempt of the said injunction and in manifest violation of the course of equity and justice, and now threatens, by exe- cution of the said judgment, to eject the com- plainant out of the lands settled upon her in jointure, and therefore praying an attachment against the defendant Lawrence Growdon, his counsel and solicitors, for the contempt aforesaid, and an injunction for quieting the complainants' possession until the matters aforesaid be duly heard and decreed upon in this honorable court." No further proceedings appear in the cause. Daniel Moore, collector of his majesty's cus- toms at New Castle, filed a bill against Joseph Browne, judge of the Court of Vice-Admiralty for the Province of Pennsylvania, praying an in- junction, which was awarded accordingly. A few EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 35 weeks after, the counsel for the owner or freighter of the schooner Sarah, alleging that the injunction had been obtained to stay proceedings "in a certain cause then depending upon an information ex- hibited in the said court by the complainant qui tarn, &c, against the said schooner and her lading, and the said judge, being the person enjoined, had never apply'd to this court to have the same injunction taken off, neither had the complainant made any further proceedings in the cause since the obtaining the said injunction, which is now four weeks, and that the said Peter Baynton and the other persons interested in the said vessel and cargo are, therefore, much hurt and damnified by this delay, it was therefore prayed that the said injunction may stand dissolved," and it was ordered that the complainant have notice to attend the court at three o'clock on that afternoon, to show cause why the injunction should not be dis- solved, and upon proof of service of notice, it was then ordered that the injunction stand dissolved, unless within ten days the complainant show cause to the contrary, and at the expiration of that time, on proof of service of notice, the order was made absolute and the injunction dissolved. This, you will observe, was not an injunction to restrain a party from proceeding at law, but an injunction, as it was called, to restrain the Court of Vice-Admiralty itself. It was, therefore, a 36 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. writ of prohibition, which, you are aware, was a writ directed to the ecclesiastical, admiralty, and some other courts, where they had concerned themselves with any matter not within their juris- diction. Thus, in a case at the close of the last war with Great Britain, a petition was presented in the English Chancery praying that a writ of prohi- bition, returnable in the King's Bench, might issue to the judge of the Admiralty Prize Court, to prohibit him from further proceedings in hold- ing pleas before him in any manner touching the seizure of the brig Harmony, which had, in ignorance of the treaty of peace, been captured since its date. The writ was refused, not, of course, by reason of any doubt as to the right to issue it, for none such was even suggested, but because the court thought that, under the circum- stances of the case, it came properly within the jurisdiction of the Prize Court.* In the next year, certain part owners of a ship presented a petition setting forth that the defend- ant, who was part owner with them, had refused * Ex parte Lynch, 1 Maddock, 20 (181 5). For the difference between writs of prohibition to the Admiralty, and an injunction to restrain parties from proceeding in admiralty courts, see the note to Earl of Oxford's Case, 3 Leading Cases in Equity, 526; and as to pro- hibitions to the admiralty courts in the colonies, see the opinion of the attorney-general in 2 Chalmers' Opinions on the Colonies, 187 et seq. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. ^7 to join them in fitting out and loading the vessel on a proposed voyage ; that she was about to sail in ten days for Barbadoes, and that there being no person in this government then acting as a judge of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, they were obliged to make this application to the governor, as chan- cellor, to be aided by him in equity, and prayed that, according to the custom and usage in such cases, the chancellor would appoint appraisers of the defendants' interests, they being willing to account to him for the appraised value. The de- fendant prayed for time that he might dispose of his part of the vessel, and four days were given him to either sell or join with the petitioners in fitting out the ship, but he left town without leaving any notice of what he had done or in- tended to do, whereupon an appraisement was accordingly ordered and had. This case also deserves notice. It was not an appeal to the chancellor as a sort of fountain of justice and ex necessitate. You will observe that the application was that the chancellor would appoint these appraisers " according to the custom and usages in such cases," referring plainly to the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, which, though now deemed obsolete, was cer- tainly considered to be in force as late as the time of Lord Nottingham, who, scarce fifty years before, had, as chancellor, on several occasions, 38 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. distinctly asserted and exercised the admiralty jurisdiction of his court.* The case of Ellis v. Ellis was a long story of a bill filed for a partition, in which John Ellis, one of the defendants, was singularly recalcitrant. He would not appear to the subpoena ad respondendum, nor to an alias, whereupon he was attached and committed. This was in June, 1733, and he remained in jail till November, 1734, when, all the other answers being in, Mr. Kinsey, the com- plainants' counsel, moved that the bill be taken as confessed against John Ellis, " who had hitherto remained in custody and absolutely refused to * See Peter Blad's case in the Privy Council, 3 Swanston, 603 (1673), when Lord Nottingham said, significantly, "/ stood up and said, this is not a question of state, but of private injury," &c, showing that in the Privy Council he spoke as chancellor, and in Blad v. Bam- field, id. 605, he said : " I took this occasion to show that the Court of Chancery hath always had an admiral jurisdiction not only per viam appellationis, but per viam evocationis too, and may send for any cause out of the admiralty to determine it here ; of which there are many precedents in Noy's MSS. 88, and in my little book, in the preface, de officio Cancellarii, sec. 18, and in my parchment book in octavo, tit. 'Admiralty.'" See also Denew v. Stock, id. 664, and Rex v. Carew, id. 670, where he said : " I observed that this cause was properly in chancery upon many accounts, not only as it was a scire facias to repeal letters patent, but as it was a cause of state, and likewise as it was a marine cause and did not concern depredations on the high seas, in which cases the Chancery as well as the Admiralty hath a clear jurisdiction." The " little book de officio Cancellarii" was written by Lord Nottingham while in full practice at the bar. See 3 Campbell's Lives of the Chan- cellors, 31Z. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 39 answer, whereby he had contemned the authority of the court (the other defendants having, by their answers, disclaimed all right, title or interest in or to the lands in question by the bill)," and the court thereupon sent for Ellis, had the bill read to him, and admonished him to answer it, " which, that he might be the better enabled to do so, the counsel for the complainant consented to his en- largement, and to free him from all costs for con- tempt ;" whereupon he was ordered to answer the bill within a month. That time, and more, elapsed, and still John Ellis " obstinately persisted" in refusing to answer, and the complainants then obtained a decree fro confesso. " Nevertheless, for the greater satisfaction of the court, the counsel produced divers deeds, evidences, and writings in the bill mentioned, by which the court were suffi- ciently satisfied of the truths of the several matters and things in the complainants' bill contained," and ordered that the complainants' third part of the lands be set out to him in severalty by metes and bounds by three persons named for that pur- pose, and that the defendants do thereupon execute conveyances of their interest in the same to him accordingly, unless John Ellis should show cause to the contrary on or before the first day of June thereafter. You are aware that the effect of a decree in equity confirming the report of the master and 40 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. commissioners in cases of partition, merely ascer- tains the purparts, and that the partition is afterwards consummated by conveyances between the parties.* Of course John Ellis would not execute any conveyance, and Mr. Hazard has printed in his collection of archives the affidavit which he somewhere found, of the proof of service of notice of the decree, which says that Ellis "then and there declared that he had been informed before that time that there was a decree against him, but that he did not care."f On the eleventh of June, the decree was, upon this proof of service, made absolute. The partition was, however, still incomplete, and the complain- ant did not seem disposed to repeat his former ex- periment of attachment, and upon the next day is the entry, " a writ for the partition of the lands, pursuant to the decree of this court, is issued." This is the last entry in the cause ; and, whether this was a commission, or an original process in the common law court, or something analogous to the judicial writ of partition, can only be con- jectured. The writs of ne exeat provincia were frequent. * This is now altered by statute in this State. See infra. •j - Pennsylvania Archives, p. 442. This disconnected paper and the decree in Phillips v. Evans, already referred to, are, with the petition and order hereafter noticed as to Quakers wearing their hats in court, the only published records of this Court of Chancery. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 41 As you know, this also was a prerogative writ, and whatever may have been its origin, and its former application only to political objects and purposes of state for the safety of the realm, it became, by custom and usage, applicable to private cases, and though used therein at first with cau- tion and jealousy, it has, within the last two hundred years, been considered simply as a means of obtaining equitable bail,* being confined, how- ever, to cases of purely equitable debts and claims, for it is considered that the writ shall not issue for a demand in which the party can be held to bail in an action at law.f To this rule there are two * This writ had no place in the ancient common law, and the right of every man to depart from the realm at his pleasure was expressly recognized in Magna Charta and the Articles which preceded it. This right had been encroached upon when Fleta and Britton wrote, and the statute of 5 Richard II. c. 2 (which was repealed by 4 Jac. I. c. 1) forbid all persons whatever to go abroad without license, except only the lords and other great men of the realm and true and notable mer- chants and the king's soldiers. " Upon what grounds," says Lord Eldon, " the writ was originally applied to civil purposes, whether upon the principle that no better service could be done to the state, than to compel its subjects to do justice to each other, it is difficult to determine ; but whatever the principle may have been, it is without all question that this court, if not bound ex debito justicice (and I do not say that it is so bound), is bound in the exercise of a sound discretion to grant the writ if the case be a case where the writ ought to be granted." Bcehm v. Wood, Turn, and Russ. 343. + Note to De Carriere v. De Calonne, 4 Vesey, 592 ; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1470; Beames on Ne Exeat Regno, 29; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606. 42 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. exceptions : one, in the case of alimony decreed by the spiritual court, in which case, as that court could not afford a complete remedy, a court of equity has lent its assistance to the wife ;* and the other, where equity has concurrent jurisdiction, as in a suit for an account. -f Few of the cases in the registrar's book, in which this writ was issued, show the cause of action, but the practice as to issuing the writ, and also as to dissolving it, seems to have been according to the course and practice of chancery. J One case, indeed, is given at length : Miss * See the cases cited in the note to 3 Daniels' Ch. Prac. 1802. Although it was formerly held that the writ might issue before sentence of divorce was decreed by the ecclesiastical court, yet it is now settled that the writ can only be marked for sums actually due. f 2 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1473. J Lord Talbot said in ex parte Brunker, 3 P. Williams, 312, that in his experience he never knew the writ granted without a bill in equity first filed, but both previously and subsequently this has been thought unnecessary (Lloyd v. Cardy, Pr. in Ch. 17 1 ; Roddam v. Hetherington, 5 Vesey, 92; 3 Dan. Ch. Prac. 1810); and in several of the cases in the registrar's book it will be found that the writ was granted before bill filed, and in one of them an order was made that the bill be filed by a certain day or the defendant have leave to depart. The act of Congress of 2 March, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, provides that no writ of ne exeat shall be granted, in the Federal courts, unless a suit in equity be commenced. The writ being, as has been said, simply a means of obtaining equitable bail, is dissolved upon the defendant's giving security or pay- ing the money into court, as was done in many of the cases in Governor Keith's court, and the amount of the debt is always marked on the writ. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 43 Bohn, alias Mrs. Miller, obtained a ne exeat against George Miller, between whom and herself a mar- riage had been, she said, celebrated, but never consummated, which she had borne for a long time, till he threatened her life and committed other abuses. He sometimes gave out in speeches that he would sell all that he was worth, and, by virtue of his authority as a husband, take away the complainant from her friends and relations to parts remote and unknown, and at other times that he would go and leave her behind, which latter course would, she said, disable her from moving her alleged ground of divorce. Her case was stated in plainer language than I have used, and the court having granted the writ, made an appropriate order of reference, of which, however, the result was favorable to the gentleman, and no further proceedings seem to have been had in the cause. Nearly a hundred and forty years after Mrs. Miller thus sought to restrain her fugitive hus- band, another wife applied to the Court of Com- mon Pleas of this county for a writ of ne exeat against her husband, who having converted to his own use certain of her securities, was about to take them with him out of the country. The writ was granted, and the case was said to be "a remarkable one, inasmuch as it was the first 44 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. instance of the issuing of a writ of ne exeat by a Pennsylvania court."* The names of the counsel who practised in Governor Keith's Court of Chancery are familiar to most of us. John Kinsey, who was after- wards chief justice, was engaged in most of the cases, and Andrew Hamilton, Peter Evans, Joseph Growdon, who was then attorney-gene- ral, and Thomas Hopkinson were generally his colleagues or opponents. The story is familiar that in 1725 Mr. Kinsey, who was an eminent " Friend," came into this court with his hat on, and refused, by reason of his conscience, to re- move it, whereupon it was taken off by order of the chancellor, who was also himself a Quaker. This produced " great consternation" in the pro- * Dransfield v. Dransfield (1866), 23 Legal Intelligencer, 229. "It is obvious," says the report of the case, " that the only question that could arise in this case was, whether it was a proper one for the exer- cise of this extraordinary jurisdiction ; in general, the writ of ne exeat can only issue where an equitable debt is owing to the plaintiff, and our act to abolish imprisonment for debt confines this class of cases within a very narrow compass. This appears to have been a case in which, by reason of the breach of trust, the husband, under the Pennsylvania married women's act, had become equitably indebted to his wife ; and besides, in Torlade v. Barrazo, 1 Miles, 385, note, Chief Justice Marshall granted the writ of ne exeat in a case in which it could only have been an equitable substitute for the action of trover and con- version." In general, it is not considered that the power of chancery to issue writs of ne exeat is taken away by the passage of laws abolishing imprisonment for debt. 3 Daniels' Chan. Prac. 1801, n. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 45 vince, and in a " humble address by the people called Quakers," they represented to the governor in respectful but very plain words, that his late act, however slight, had a tendency to the sub- version of their religious liberties, and they re- minded him of the law which provided that in all courts, all persons of all persuasions might freely appear " in their own way and in their own manner." It is gratifying to the lovers of toleration to find that at once, upon the pre- sentation of this address, it was made a standing rule of court, that any practitioner of law or person whatsoever professing himself to be one of the people called Quakers, might be per- mitted to officiate therein without being obliged to observe the usual ceremony of uncovering his head.* Such is all the history which we now have of our only Court of Chancery. It is probable that an extended search among the records in our State department may disclose more than you have already seen, but it has, I think, been sufficiently shown that there was a time in Pennsylvania, when chancery jurisdiction was administered in a court of chancery with more exactness and pre- cision than we had probably supposed. * 2 Proud's History of Pennsylvania, p. 200. The order provided that the address be filed with the registrar, but no entry of it appears in the book I have referred to. 46 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. How exactly, and when, this court became un- popular, cannot now be distinctly ascertained. Keith's quarrel with James Logan and the Penns is matter of history, and we all know how, at last, the Penns superseded Keith by the appointment, in 1726, of Patrick Gordon. Soon after assuming his office, the new governor acquainted the council that being informed that there had been held for some time past by the late governor, a court of equity or chancery, and that several matters were depending in that court touching which he had frequently been applied to by the persons con- cerned, to the end that he might take upon him- self the execution of the office of chancellor, but that he had hitherto declined the same until he should be better informed how the said court came to be created and have the advice of the council which he desired on that head. The latter replied that the erection of that court had been in compliance with the unanimous resolu- tion of the Assembly and the approbation of the council, and it was the opinion of the present council that the governor might lawfully take upon himself the execution of the office that there might be no stop in the administration of justice, provided always that due regard be had to the rule that the members of council near Philadelphia should attend as his assistants. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 47 Thus fortified by this opinion, Governor Gordon took the oath of office as chancellor.* But two of the causes appearing upon the registar's book were decided by Sir William Keith. All the others were in the time of his successor, and the latest entry in any cause is dated June 7th, 1736. But in February of that year, a petition had come to the Assembly from Bucks County, which was soon followed by others, complaining of the Court of Chancery " as it is at present established in the province." The seed seems to have fallen upon good ground, for, on the same afternoon,j" a message was sent to the governor, requesting to be informed how the Court of Chancery was constituted, which he answered by sending them copies of all the pro- ceedings in 1720. But the court so established was, the legislature then seemed to discover, a violation of the sixth article of the Charter of Privileges, that no person should, at any time, be obliged to answer any complaint relating to pro- perty before the governor and council, or in any other place but in the ordinary courts of justice, and they proceeded to introduce a bill, not unlike * It was then proposed that some certain rules for the better regula- tion of the court and the speedier dispatch of business should be drawn up, and David Lloyd, Chief Justice, and Andrew Hamilton were named for that purpose. — Minutes of Council, 3 Colonial Records, 281. -j- February 7, 1736; 3 Votes of Assembly, 253. 48 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. those which had formerly been repealed in council, vesting the power of determining suits in equity in the Common Pleas judges, and providing, more- over, for a supreme court, to consist of three per- sons commissioned by the governor, to hear appeals from the decrees of the county courts, and empowered also to take cognizance of all matters in equity prima instantia, where the value exceeded one hundred pounds. While they de- bated the clauses of this bill, an angry correspond- ence went on between the House, on one side, and the governor and council, on the other. The governor urged that, on his arrival, he had found the court to have been established for years, and the country in the practice of it ; if the fees were too high, it would have been easy to have altered them; but, he said, there could not be much com- plaint as to that, since in the nine years that he had presided there but two causes, and both by consent, had been brought to a decree, and very little other process had been entered there, and it seemed strange how, all at once, such petitions should be set a-foot over the province and come in at the same time, without any particular occasion being discovered therefor.* * By the governor's remark as to but two causes being brought to a decree, he, of oourse, meant a final decree ; and although the registry of his court scarcely bears out his assertion, yet it is familiar that the proportion of cases in chancery which are brought to final decree is not EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 49 In addition to the governor's letter, the council also, at his suggestion, prepared an elaborate vindi- cation of the Court of Chancery. They referred to the fact that for more than eighteen years after the Charter of Privileges, there had been in the House " divers persons of figure and consideration," than whom none were more capable of judging of its true intent and meaning — many who had been members of the House in 1701, when the charter was adopted, and who were members of the House in 1720, when the court was established. They argued that the word property in the charter had not its usual signification, but referred to cases only of proprietary property,* which, they said, of course should not be heard before the governor and council; and that, in such a court of chancery as this, the people were not obliged to answer otherwise than in the "ordinary course of justice," according to the words themselves of the charter, and they dismissed the matter of the petitions against the court, with the remark that " the practice and method of obtaining names to peti- tions amongst us are now so very well known, that all persons of judgment must be sensible that the very large. Certain it is, that the governor sat in not less than twenty- nine cases, and that all of these, save very few, are marked upon the registry, "ended." * This was not only evasive, but in strange ignorance of the principle of the sixth article of the Charter of Privileges. 4 ijO EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. matter and not the numbers of the signers is prin- cipally to be considered and regarded" — a sugges- tion which the experience of several subsequent generations has, perhaps, confirmed. But to these papers, the House replied with much force and dignity. No mere vote of the House could, they said, erect a court of equity, which could only be done by a law of the pro- vince ; no opinion of counsel, nor silence of sub- sequent assemblies were of any consideration, nor indeed had they, upon strictest inquiry, been able to find that any one ever thought of the charter at the time ; no practice of other colonies could be a precedent unless it were shown that they, too, had a similar charter of privileges ; the re- stricted definition of the word " property" was, with submission, an absurdity; it was clear that a court of equity could only be established by act of Assembly, and then, and not before then, a suit therein would be " in the ordinary course of justice." No one pretended that in England the king could, by his mere charter, create a court of equity,* and if not the king, how much less the * For this they cited " the case of one Flood, in 40th Eliz." The case is Stepney v. Lloyd, Cro. Eliz. 646, also reported 4 Inst. 97. The opinion of the attorney and solicitor-general in England, in favor of the legality of Keith's Court of Chancery was that although the king could not now erect, by a commission, a court of chancery in England, where all necessary courts were already in being, yet Charles EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 51 deputy of the king's patentee. And, finally, they suggested that if the governor and council were mistaken as to their prerogative, they were not the first great men who had exceeded their juris- diction, and that, too, they added, referring to the angry tone of the paper which they were answer- ing, " without giving any such offence."* Further proceedings seem to have stopped here. The Assembly soon after adjourned without pass- ing the act for establishing courts of equity, and the governor continued to act as chancellor up to the time of his death, but a few months after. For when the Assembly met in August, they had to lament the loss "of that worthy gentleman, our late governor," whose duty had, they said, been II. might, by his commission to Penn, have authorized him to erect courts of equity without the consent of the legislature being necessary, until Penn himself made it so by the Charter of Privileges; that such consent had been given, in 1720, by their request to the governor to open the court, and that the court thus opened, with their assent (but not with- out), was no violation of the charter of 1701. — Brigbtlfs Eq. Jur. 32, n. So, in 1703, the attorney-general (Sir Edward Northey) was of the opinion that there was nothing in the clause in the charter of Massa- chusetts Bay, which was submitted to him, which excluded the power of the crown to erect by its prerogative a court of equity in that province, " as by her royal authority they are erected in other of her majesty's plantations, and it seems to me that the General Assembly there cannot by virtue of this clause erect a court of equity." 1 Chal- mer's Opinions, 482. The difference in the frame of government between Massachusetts and some of the other colonies will, of course, be remembered. See 1 Story on the Constitution, chapters iv. to xvii. * 3 Votes of Assembly, 252 et seq. 5 2 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. so well discharged, both to the proprietaries and the people. No successor of his office has ever attempted to exercise chancery powers, and thus it was that, as we are told, "Pennsylvania lost the system, because her governor and representa- tives could not agree by whom the office of chan- cellor should be held,"* and equity, as a separate system, slept for just one hundred years. In the registrar's book it appears that on the ist of September, 1739, the registrar, then Robert Charles, applied to Governor Thomas for leave to resign his office, and to deliver up the books and papers in his custody, and an order was made that he be dismissed from his office, and deliver up all the books, papers, and writings in his custody to Thomas Lowrie, secretary, to be by him kept till further orders. I have ventured, at the risk of being tedious, to enter into these details of what some might con- sider useless and obsolete history, with the desire to ascertain how, and when, and why it was, that we, in Pennsylvania, began to administer equitable principles through the medium of common law forms. The impression is, perhaps, a general one, that such had always been our practice, and there is not wanting authority in its favor. "I think it not an ignorant prejudice," said a late chief justice, * Mr. Binney's Eulogium on Ch. Justice Tilghman, Appendix to 1 6th Serg. & Rawle, 448. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 53 " but high political wisdom which caused our ancestors to refuse a court of chancery any place among their judicial institutions. The men who founded this commonwealth, who built up her reputation, achieved her liberties and settled her laws, knew very well the amount of good and evil that such a court had done elsewhere, and, upon sound and deliberate judgment, they repudiated it as far as they could. The administration of law, blended and mixed with equity principles, was a happy conception. It was no bungling substitute, but a most admirable improvement of both legal and chancery practice."* But the review which we have just taken of our earlier history may induce us rather to adopt the conclusion, arrived at by equally high authority, " that this (the absence of a court of chancery) was the consequence of a jealousy of the principles and practice of that court entertained by the people, is not indicated by their early juridical history, "f And the history of other colonies discloses much of the same feeling. In Massachusetts there had been the same disagreement as to the office of chancellor, but we are told that the unpopularity of a court of chancery does not seem to have been * Black, C. J., in Finley v. Aitken, 3 Pittsb. Leg. Int. 2, cited in Brightly's Eq. Jur. 27, note. •f Mr. Binney's Eulogium, supra. 54 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. caused by any aversion or dislike of the people to such a court, but by a disagreement between them- selves and their parent government as to the man- ner in which the tribunal should be established. In New York, there was no question as to the necessity or expediency of a court of chancery, but much question whether the governor or the council should be chancellor.* Our ancestors seem, from the first, to have re- cognized the distinction between law and equity, and to have desired that their principles should be administered, if not in separate tribunals, yet at least in distinct and separate branches of the same tribunal, as was, until lately, the case in the Court of Exchequer. It is quite likely, when we consider that most, if not all, our earlier judges were laymen, incapable, of course, of ob- serving the scientific difference between law and equity, and prone, therefore, to blend them to- gether, that, at times, equitable principles were administered in the courts of common law. But if our judges were laymen, our bar was composed of men who understood their profession, and who would have been unlikely to have considered the * Parkes' History, supra, Introduction, p. 53. It is rather singular that, with the exception of an article in the North American Review, written by Judge Story (1820, New Series, vol. xi. p. 142, see Story's Life and Letters, vol. i. p. 379), the only history of equity juris- diction in the United States should have been written by an English lawyer. 'EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 55 mixture of law and equity in a single tribunal as an act of high political wisdom.* When, too, we add to this history of the times the expressions of regret, in the early reported cases, of the ab- sence of a court of chancery, we are constrained to think that some wrong has been done to the lawyers and the judges of that day; it was not voluntarily that they forced the jurisdiction of equity upon the common law courts, to be ad- ministered as best it might, but when they had no alternative, they made the most of the materials that were given them. We must not of course suppose that it was first and only in Pennsylvania that the courts of com- mon law recognized and enforced equitable prin- ciples. We find in the Year Books the doctrine that parcels of land subject to a common charge are liable in the inverse order of their alienation ; there, too, we find that an executor cannot purchase * In the early case, in 1768, of Swift z>. Hawkins, 1 Dallas, 17, where the plaintifF opposing the introduction of evidence to show want (qu. failure) of consideration of a bond, Chief Justice Allen remarked that there being no court of chancery in our province, it was necessary, to prevent a failure of justice, to admit the defence, and he added that he had known this to be the constant practice of the courts of the province for thirty-nine years past. If the chief justice thus spoke from his actual knowledge, this would carry back the practice to the year 1729, three years after Keith's retirement, when the unpopularity of the Court of Chancery had probably at least commenced ; but if he referred to his own recollection of the practice, it is proper to remember that the chief justice was originally a merchant, and only came on the bench in 1750. 56 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. a debt of his testator and claim more than he paid for it ; the law of bailments is especially a matter of trust and confidence, while the introduction of the action of assumpsit as a means of enforcing equitable demands, the doctrines of equitable estoppel, of relief from the penalty of a bond, of contribution among sureties, and of the discharge of a surety by giving time to the principal — all are cognizable in courts of law. But in Pennsylvania we had to go much farther, and to administer every equitable principle in a common law court. That we accomplished as much as we did, may be matter of wonder, but it can be no matter of wonder that many equitable principles were not administered at all. The history of the system may, perhaps, be divided into three several periods of time — First, from the abolition of the Court of Chan- cery in 1736, or a little before this time, to the adoption of the new Constitution in 1790. Secondly, from 1790 to the passage of the act of 1836; and Thirdly, from that time to the passage of the act of 1857. Mr. Laussat has considered the subject down to the year 1826, when he wrote his essay, and I shall but briefly go over this ground. The first reported case before the Revolution was one that arose in 1768, where, in an action of EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 57 debt on a bond, the court admitted evidence of a want of consideration,* which, said the chief justice, was a matter of necessity in order to pre- vent a failure of justice, there being no court of chancery in the province. f In the year 1785, Chief Justice McKean, in charging a jury upon the question (not, unhappily, unknown in our own times), whether a bond could be paid in a currency which was then depreciated, said that the want of a court with equitable powers like those of the chancery in England, had long been felt in Pennsylvania. The institu- tion of such a court, he observed, had once been agitated here, but the Houses of Assembly, ante- cedent to the Revolution, successfully opposed it, because they were apprehensive of increasing, by that means, the power and influence of the gover- nor, who claimed it as a right to be chancellor. For this reason, many inconveniences had been suffered. No adequate remedy was provided for a breach of trust, no relief could be obtained in cases of covenants with a penalty, &c. This defect of jurisdiction had, he said, necessarily obliged the court, upon such occasions, to refer the question to the jury under an equitable and * Probably a misprint for failure of consideration. Mere want of consideration would be no defence, either at law or in equity, to an action on a sealed instrument. ■f Swift v. Hawkins, 1 Dallas, 17. 58 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. conscientious interpretation of the agreement of the parties, and it was upon that ground that they must consider and decide the cause.* Later in the same year came up the case of a scire facias on a mortgage, under our most simple and efficient statute of 1705 (an act which, after a hundred and sixty-two years of trial, has not been attempted to be improved), in which the doctrine of tacking was sought to be introduced. The plaintiff contended that it was not enough that the mortgagor should pay to the mortgagee the principal and interest of his money, with costs, but that equity would also subject the mort- gaged premises to the payment of subsequent sim- ple contract debts due the mortgagee, and it was ingeniously urged that the chancery jurisdiction for redemption of mortgages having been transferred by the legislature to the common law courts, these would take care that he who claimed equity should do equity. But it was held, that although courts of law in this State had, in some instances, adopted chancery rules to prevent the absolute failure of justice, yet in this case there was no necessity to usurp the power of a court of chancery ; there was a positive statute directing the mode of pro- ceeding upon mortgages, entirely different from those prescribed in England, and which confined the remedy of the mortgagee to the recovery of * Wharton v. Morris, I Dallas, 125. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 59 the principal and interest due on the mortgage.* And it is familiar to all of you that the doctrine of tacking has never been recognized in Pennsyl- vania, -j- Immediately after the commencement of the Revolution, the Constitution of 1776 gave to our courts, besides their other powers, those of a court of chancery so far as related to the perpetuation of testimony, the obtaining of evidence from places not within this State, the care of persons and estates of those non compotes mentis,^ " and such other powers as may be found necessary by future general assemblies, not inconsistent with the Constitution." No " such other powers" were, however, then granted, if we except the acts of 1786 and i78o.§ The first of these authorized the Supreme Court, upon bill or petition filed setting forth the loss of deeds or other writings, to issue a subpoena, re- quiring the persons named to appear and make answer or oath, to refer the cause to a master, and to make such decree as to justice and equity should appertain, and this statute is in force at this day. The statute of 1789 simply authorized a proceed- * Dorrow v. Kelley, 1 Dallas, 142. f Anderson v. Neff, 11 Sergeant & Rawle, ZZ3. Thomas's Appeal, 6 Casey, 378, went to the verge of the opposite doctrine. J See supra, note to pages 28, 29. § Acts of 28 March, 1786, and 28 September, 1789. 60 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. ing in the nature of a bill of discovery against garnishees in cases of foreign attachment. Upon the formation of the new Constitution of 1790, the question of chancery powers, and, in- deed, of a separate court of chancery itself, came up for debate. As to this, it need only now be said, that the political events of the past years had impressed upon most of the members of the con- vention " a bitter animosity to everything that savored of unusual power," and the efforts of the lawyers of that body in favor of chancery powers, or a separate chancery court, failed to succeed.* The utmost that was done was that, in place of the concluding clause in the Constitution of 1776 to which I have referred, were inserted the words, " and the legislature shall vest in the said courts such other powers to grant relief in equity as shall be found necessary, and may, from time to time, enlarge or diminish those powers, or vest them in other courts, as they shall judge proper for the administration of justice." But the power to establish a separate court of chancery thus given to the legislature was not exercised, nor, for nearly half a century afterwards, was any equitable juris- diction given to the courts then in existence, save in the most parsimonious manner. The acts, such as they were, you will find referred to in the * See Minutes of Council of 1790, pp. 38-42. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 6 1 Report in 1835 of the Revisors, "On the adminis- tration of justice." Their sum was little more than the grant of powers to compel trustees to account, to appoint and dismiss them, to compel answers on oath in certain cases of execution, and to complete the contract for the sale of lands, in cases where the vendor had died. The much more important class of cases, viz : the specific performance of contracts inter vivos was, until 1836, left to the common law courts. I will not now detain you by working out the problem which was thus attempted to be solved. Apart from certain general heads of equitable jurisprudence, Mr. Laussat has considered, first, the equities of a plaintiff as administered in the courts of common law, and secondly, the equities of a defendant. As to the former, he has reverted to the decision which rendered unnecessary the profert of a bond — which gave a remedy not only against a surviving partner, but also against the representatives of a deceased partner — and which recognized the right of an equitable plaintiff to sue in the name of his assignor, giving the former and not the latter, the control over the action. Principally, however, and naturally, he has dwelt upon the head of spe- cific performance, enforced, with us, as to lands, by means of the action of ejectment, and as to chattels, by means of the action of replevin. As 62 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. to the former, you are all familiar with the prac- tice by which a conditional verdict, to be released on the specific performance of the contract, was made the ingenious, though clumsy substitute for the neat, simple and flexible remedy which equity provides. It was confessed that the substitute was insufficient when the defendant, without relying on the statute of frauds, confessed a parol unper- formed agreement,* and it is obvious, that where the equity of the complainant to specific perform- ance, however clear in itself, is partially met by the equity of the defendant for compensation, it may be difficult to work out the equity of the latter in an action of ejectment brought by the former. The same remark will of course apply to the case of an ejectment as a means of enforcing a resulting trust. With respect to the action of replevin as a means of enforcing the right to specific chattels, while it may be admitted that with us, as in some of our sister States, a broader remedy exists than is the case in England, " lying in all cases where one man improperly detains the goods of another, it is, in no instance, effective to enforce a specific return of chattels ; since a claim of property, and bond given, is always sufficient to defeat a recla- * Mr. Laussat's Essay, p. 56. But as to this, it must be remarked that in a really contentious litigation, such a waiver of the right of pleading the statute could not occur. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 63 mation, no matter what may be the eventual issue of the contest.* With respect to the equities of a defendant, Mr. Laussat has classed these under the heads of want of consideration, fraud, mistake and accident, set- off, and performance ; in a word, the defendant was considered entitled to give in evidence any- thing which, ex czquo et bono, should defeat the plaintiff's right to recover. And whatever may be said as to the insufficiency of the remedy afforded to a plaintiff, it must be acknowledged that as to the protection given to a defendant, we were in advance of the law as else- where administered. " It must sound oddly to a foreigner," says a great living legal author, - ]- " that on one side of Westminster Hall, a man shall re- cover an estate without argument, on account of the clearness of his title, and that on the other side of the hall, his adversary shall, with equal facility, recover back the estate." And yet scarcely twenty years after these words were written, we find in the English "Common Law Procedure act," \ that it shall be lawful for the defendant (or plaintiff in replevin) in any cause in any of the superior courts in which, if judgment were obtained, he would be entitled to relief on equitable grounds, * McGowin p. Remington, 2 Jones, 56. ■f Lord St. Leonards ; Sugden's " Letters to a Man of Property," p. 4. J 17 and 18 Victoria, § IZ5. 64 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. to plead the facts which entitle him to such relief by way of defence, " and the said courts are hereby empowered to receive such defence by way of plea, provided that such plea shall begin with the words 'for defence on equitable grounds/ or words to the like effect."* And thus we find, after long years of different experience and of travel over different paths, the older and the younger country approach each other. Indeed it is easy to see why in the administra- tion of equitable principles through the medium of common law forms, the plaintiff should suffer, rather than the defendant. The common law had its origin in the wants of the people, and grew with their necessities. Its forms soon assumed certain definite channels, through which, and through which alone, the law was administered. Thus we had the different forms of action, modes of trial, rules of evidence, means of enforcing * " The statute does not say," said Parke, B., in the Mines Royal Society v. Magnay, 10 Exchequer, 489, "that the courts of common law are to give relief on equitable conditions, but that a plea shall be allowed which discloses a defence upon equitable grounds." And such an equitable defence can, it is held, be pleaded only in cases where the plea sets up an equity that will entitle the party pleading it to an uncon- ditional and perpetual injunction ; and where the common law court overrules the plea as not establishing a case for unconditional relief, the defendant may still apply to the Court of Chancery for an injunction. See note to Chitty's Collection of Statutes (London, 1865), p. 785. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 65 judgments, and, in time, the outlines of these forms became more defined, and the forms them- selves necessary incidents to the administration of the common law. If a plaintiff brought an action ex delicto when it should have been ex con- tractu, he was turned out of court, and it was natural that at times new cases should arise, to which no form of action was applicable, not even that very comprehensive one, the action of trespass on the case. The forms of action and the rules of pleading necessarily were, to some extent, rigid. Had it been otherwise — had suitors been permitted to seek redress through the courts in their own way — uncertainty and fraud would have entered, where now certainty of proceeding, and justice in result, are ornaments of the juris- diction. And whatever may be, in any respect, the defects and the rudeness of the common law, " we should ever remember," said a late chan- cellor, "its favor to personal liberty, and its admi- rable machinery for separating law and fact and assigning each to a distinct tribunal, wherein it excels all other systems of jurisprudence which have appeared."* It is true that these forms and rules of the common law may be, and in Pennsylvania they * Lord Campbell; I Lives of the Chancellors, 33, note. 5 66 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. were, tempered and moulded to meet many cases which, in strictness, should be remedied only in equity. And with us, for a time, owing to a more primitive condition of society, the ability of the judges, aided by the ingenuity of the bar, enabled us so to mould these forms and rules as to include the most common and simple classes of equitable remedies.* But with advancing civilization, questions of a more complicated nature must constantly arise, which common law forms are wholly inadequate to comprehend, and any attempt to mould these forms so as to include cases to which they are inapplicable, must change the very principle and character of common law procedure. Take, for example, the case of nui- sance. It is true that the infliction of a nuisance is contrary to the principles of the common law, * Of the period of time between the abolition of Keith's Court of Chancery and the commencement of the Revolution, it has been said : " Scientific equity fell under general proscription, and with some few exceptions was made to give place to a spurious equity, compounded of the temper of the judge and the feelings of the jury, with nothing but a strong infusion of integrity to prevent it from becoming as much the bane of personal security, as it was the bane of science. It was to expel this usurper that the days and nights of Chief Justice Tilghman were devoted — a work suggested, it is true, by that distinguished prede- cessor to whom he owed his office, but consummated by himself and his colleagues, to whom we owe a debt not to be acquitted, for having fully established the principles of methodized and scientific equity in their just sway, as part of the common law of the land." — Mr. Binney's Eulogium, supra. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 67 but it is idle to deny that the forms of the com- mon law, mould them as we will, are inadequate to the speedy and efficient redress of the evil. Hence it was, that from the very necessity of the case, the party injured was allowed to take the law into his own hands and abate the nuisance. But as this opened the door to breaches of the peace, it was necessary, in order to prevent a still greater evil, to provide that the nuisance should be abated peaceably, the effect of which was, of course, to reduce the privilege to nothing, for when the aggressor offered resistance, the party aggrieved was still driven to the common law remedies, viz : the assize of nuisance, and the writ quod permittat prosternere, or, in case of a public nuisance, an indictment. A contrast can scarcely be borne between these impracticable forms of the common law, and the facile, sum- mary, and powerful remedy by injunction, in which the nuisance, if proved, is judicially re- dressed as speedily as the aggrieved party could abate it himself. Shall cases be further added ? Cases of pre- ventive justice enforced by injunction — to restrain proceedings at law where, from the nature of the case, no adequate remedy can be had in the courts of law — to restrain waste where the writ of estrepe- ment would be wholly inadequate — to restrain the transfer of negotiable paper — the disclosure of 68 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. confidential communications — the piracy of trade- marks— the infringement of copy-right and of patent-right — the invasion of corporation fran- chises, which, alone, has in modern times opened almost a new volume of equitable jurisdiction ; shall I add to these the jurisdiction in cases of discovery — of the reformation, the cancelling and the delivering up of instruments — of specific per- formance — of account — of partition — of contri- bution — of marshalling assets — of confusion of boundaries — of bills quia timet and bills of peace ? Can the most ardent admirer of the common law refuse to acknowledge that, at least in some of these cases, the remedy afforded by that law is inapplicable and ineffective ? It is impossible that much of all this should not have been felt by the profession. True it is, that the want of familiarity with the forms of equitable procedure had, especially in the interior counties, brought about a distaste for equitable principles save through those common law forms by which, and by which alone, they had been administered. Still, it was felt, both on the bench and at the bar, that the system was, at the best, a makeshift. " Before the Revolution," it was said in 1826, "when the bench was rarely graced by professional characters, juries were considered almost the same as chancellors," and although a certain degree of control had naturally ensued, EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 69 much was still unavoidably left to the jury. "And how uncertain," it was added, "is the result of a suit committed to twelve men, how- ever honest and upright, unused to professional intricacy and scientific principles, and whose decision is not binding on another jury, either in the same or an exactly similar case that may succeed. * * * In fact, it is time to reduce the uncertain corruscations of Pennsylvania equity to the safe and steady light of chancery."* And in the following year, when our bar met to listen to the tribute paid to the memory of that judge, who, more than any other, " taught us how to clothe a large body of equity in the drapery of the law,"f we were told that " in those cases in which equity consists in the very methods of her administration, the chief justice looked for final relief from the representatives of the people, and he waited patiently, and was content that they should wait the instruction of time. Is the hope * Address to the "Associated Members of the Bar of Philadelphia," by William Rawle, senior. So, as was said by Chief Justice Gibson, in 1832, in speaking of the doctrine which in Pennsylvania allowed a purchaser to defend from payment of unpaid purchase-money of real estate, though the defect might not be covered by the covenants in the deed, " the greatest practical evil of the doctrine is that it subjects the contract to the control of a jury, prone to forget that to cut a man loose from his bargain from motives of humanity is the rankest injustice." Lighty v. Shorb, 3 Penna. R. 451. j- Mr. Binney's Eulogium on Chief Justice Tilghman, supra. JO EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. vain," it was added, " that the opinion of this pure and enlightened judge may be received in- stead of that instruction ?" So from the bench it was soon after said, " As we cannot hope to see a separate administration of equity, we are bound to introduce it into our system as copiously as our limited power will admit."* The time came at last, and the history of the introduction of equitable jurisdiction and its sub- sequent extension is in the highest degree in- structive. Under the joint resolution of our legislature of the 23d of March, 1830, three commissioners were, as you are aware, authorized to revise the civil legislation of our State, and, among other assigned duties, they were directed to report whether it would be expedient to introduce any and what change in the forms and mode of pro- ceeding in the administration of the laws. The commissioners appointed under this resolution made several reports, the last of them being in the year 1836, and that "On the Administra- tion of Justice" in 1835, in which the subject of chancery jurisdiction was considered, is the most elaborate of them all. Themselves men of large experience and practice under the system which had prevailed for more than a hundred * Torr's Estate, 2 Rawle, 253. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 71 years, the revisers considered that " the whole theory of equitable jurisprudence was already in- corporated with our code, and that its principles circulated through all the channels of our judicial system." For the purpose, however, of determin- ing whether such a system was sufficient to meet every reasonable requirement in the administration of justice, they referred to the general heads of equitable jurisprudence. We have seen that both the constitutions of 1776 and 1790 gave to the Supreme Court and the several courts of common pleas, the power of a court of chancery as far as related to — 1. The perpetuating of testimony; 2. The obtaining of evidence from places not within the State ; 3. The care of the persons and estates of those who are non compos mentis. The revisers, in their draft of the proposed laws, gave to the same courts these same powers in the same words. But they recommended the addition of the following powers, which had not thereto- fore been exercised save through the medium of common law forms : — 4. The control, removal, and discharge of trus- tees, and the appointment of trustees and settle- ment of their accounts ; 5. The supervision and control of all corpora- tions, other than those of a municipal character, 72 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. and unincorporated societies or associations and partnerships ; 6. The care of trust-moneys and property, and other moneys and property made liable to the con- trol of the said courts ; 7. The discovery of facts material to a just determination of issues and other questions, aris- ing or depending in the said courts ; 8. The determination of rights to property or money claimed by two or more persons, and in the hands or possession of a person claiming no right of property therein ; 9. The prevention or restraint of the com- mission or continuance of acts contrary to law, and prejudicial to the interests of the community, or the rights of individuals ; 10. The affording specific relief, where a re- covery in damages would be an inadequate remedy ; "And in such other cases as the said courts have heretofore possessed such jurisdiction and powers under the constitution and laws of this common- wealth." " And," it was added, " in every case in which any court as aforesaid shall exercise any of the powers of a court of chancery, the same shall be exercised according to the practice in equity pre- scribed or adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, unless it be otherwise provided by EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 73 act of Assembly, or the same shall be altered by the Supreme Court of this commonwealth by general rules and regulations, made and published as is hereinbefore provided." The jurisdiction was, therefore, to extend to the heads of Trusts and trustees, Corporations, Partnership, Discovery, Interpleader, Injunction, and Specific performance. As to mortgages, the revisers conceived that our system of proceeding by scire facias was so simple and effective as to need no change. They deemed it inexpedient, notwithstanding the regrets expressed in the cases of Yohe v. Barnet* and Slifer v. Beates,f to give any authority to enforce a wife's equity to a settlement, deeming the English rule to be unsatisfactory that the wife's equity would be enforced only when the husband came into a court of chancery to obtain the possession of her property, and would not interfere when she could so obtain it in a com- mon law court. As to the persons and estates of infants, there was, they considered, obviously no need of legis- * 1 Binney, 363. f 9 Sergeant & Rawle, 182. 74 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. lation. The guardians of their persons and estates were fully under the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court. Those questions which might arise be- tween parents as to their custody, were decided upon writs of habeas corpus, and upon the subject of their marriage, the Orphans' Court had never interfered. With respect to charities, it was said that the common law courts had the power to dismiss and appoint trustees for charitable as well as other uses, but none to keep them in the channel of the donor's intention, and the cypres doctrine had been distinctly repudiated ;* the only powers were the indirect ones of removing the trustees upon cause shown, and of determining, on the settle- ment of the trust accounts, whether the funds had been properly applied, and though these remedies were admitted to be but indirect and even insufficient, it was deemed that the nature of the questions on trusts for religious and charitable purposes was so delicate that it was better to sug- gest no change. The practice of chancery in cases of boundary, partition, and dower was referred to, and the superiority of a commission over an inquest in the two latter admitted, but these heads were not added to the list. * See now the act of 26th April, 1855, § 10, Pamphl. L. 331. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. y 5 The jurisdiction under the heads of accident, mistake, fraud, enforcing delivery of specific chattels, and relief against forfeitures and penalties, was considered to be sufficiently exercised in the common law courts. As to the manner in which equitable jurisdic- tion should be exercised, the revisers considered, first, that the establishment of a separate court of chancery was unadvisable ; and, secondly, that the union of a court of chancery with existing courts of law — as was the case with the Court of Ex- chequer in England, and was and is the case in the Circuit Court of the United States — was even less advisable. They recommended, therefore, thirdly, that the common law courts should con- tinue to administer equitable principles through the medium of common law forms as theretofore, but with the addition of chancery forms and materials in certain specified cases. It is easy for us, at this day, to wonder at the reserve with which the grant of equitable juris- diction was suggested to the legislature, but limited as this jurisdiction was, it was too enlarged for the legislature of thirty years ago. They passed the bill as reported by the revisers, giving to the Supreme Court and the several courts of common pleas, the powers of a court of chan- cery so far as related to the first six heads I have just referred to, and here they stopped, so far as j6 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. jurisdiction throughout the State was concerned. But to the Supreme Court when sitting in banc in Philadelphia, and to the Court of Common Pleas of that county, they gave the jurisdiction of a court of chancery so far as related to — i . The supervision and control of partnerships, and corporations other than municipal corpora- tions ; 2. The care of trust-moneys and property, and other moneys and property made liable to the control of the said courts; 3. The discovery of facts material to a just de- termination of issues and other questions, arising or depending in the said courts ; 4. The determination of rights to property or money claimed by two or more persons in the hands or possession of a person claiming no right of property therein ; 5. The prevention or restraint of the com- mission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals ; and 6. The affording specific relief where a re- covery in damages would be an inadequate remedy. Thus the jurisdiction under these heads was withheld by the legislature from the State at large, and confined to Philadelphia County, and in order to preclude every doubt, it was expressly provided that no process to be issued by the courts of that EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. yj county or the Supreme Court sitting therein, under the chancery powers so granted, should, at any time, be executed beyond the limits of that county. In the spring of 1840, a little more equitable jurisdiction was doled out to Philadelphia County, and to it alone, by giving to the Supreme Court within that county, and to its Court of Common Pleas, equity jurisdiction in all cases over which courts of chancery entertained jurisdiction on the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or account ;* and in a later statute it was added, "whether such fraud, accident, mistake or account be actual or constructive.""}" The distinction between actual and constructive fraud is familiar to all of us. It may be more difficult to define what may be con- structive accident, mistake or account. In the autum of 1840, the legislature gave the first extension of equity powers beyond this county, by providing, in a curiously drawn statute, that the Supreme Court, the several district courts and courts of common pleas should have all the powers and jurisdiction of courts of chancery in settling partnership accounts, and such other accounts and claims as by the common law and usages of the court had heretofore been settled by * Act of 13th June, 1840, Pamphl. Laws, 671. It was the 39th section of "an act for regulating election districts." f Act of 16th April, 1845, § 3, Pamphlet Laws, p. 542. 78 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. the action of account render, and it should be in the power of the party to proceed either by bill in chancery or at common law, but no bill in chancery should be entertained unless counsel should certify that the case was of such a nature that no adequate remedy could be obtained at law, or that the remedy therein was attended with great additional trouble, inconvenience, or delay.* In 1844, the District Court of Alleghany County received all the chancery powers that had theretofore been conferred upon any other court of the commonwealth. f In the next year an important act was passed,]; of which the last section gave equitable jurisdic- tion in all cases of dower and partition in Phila- delphia County, and the first two regulated, in an elaborate manner, appeals in equity suits in that county from the Court of Common Pleas to the Supreme Court " from any interlocutory or final order or decree," but so much of the act as related to interlocutory decrees was repealed within a month,§ and I need not, therefore, dwell upon its provisions. It is easy to imagine how the machinery of a court of equity, part of whose usefulness consists in having, if necessary, an * Act of 13th October, 1840, Pamphl. Laws, 7. "j" Act of 29th April, 1844, Pamphl. Laws, § 2, P. L. 526. I Act of 17th March, 1845, Pamphl. Laws, 158. § Act of 8th April, 1845, § 4, Pamphl. Laws, 543. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 79 almost daily control over the cause, would be clogged by an appeal taken to any and every in- terlocutory decree made therein, where such appeal operated, upon security being given, as a suspen- sion of proceedings in the cause. It is familiar, that save upon points where the determination complained of was merely the result of the exer- cise of discretion, in a case when the matter com- plained of was fairly a subject for the exercise of discretion (as for example the question of costs), an appeal from the decree of the court which pronounced it was according to the course and practice-of chancery, though it did not, of course, stop the proceedings under the decree complained of, without the special order of the court. It was otherwise in the common law courts ; no writ of error lay save to the final judgment of the court below, and it has been in consequence of our habit of administering equity through com- mon law forms, that we have at times forgotten the different modes of procedure in the two tribunals. Thus, a very recent act provides that an appeal shall lie in all cases where a special injunc- tion shall be granted, but that the pendency of such appeal shall not prevent the operation of the injunction, or the proceedings in the original suit,* * Act of 14th February, 1866, Pamphl. Laws, 48. 80 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. but it seems to have been forgotten that such was an ordinary practice of the Court of Chancery.* In 1848, the same jurisdiction and power were given to the courts in Philadelphia County as to the discovery of facts, as was possessed by courts of chancery. -j- You will remember that under the revised acts of 1836, it was especially provided that no chan- cery process issued by the Supreme Court or Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia County should, at any time, be executed beyond the limits thereof, but in 1852, the first step was taken towards the diffusion of general chancery powers throughout the State. A statute in that year J de- clared that nothing in that part of the act of 1836 should be construed to prevent the Supreme Court from exercising original jurisdiction in equity, in any of the cases enumerated therein, within any of the counties of this commonwealth, or to pro- hibit the process of the court from running into any other county ; but the Supreme Court, when in ses- sion in any district, should exercise original juris- diction, in the cases enumerated, throughout the State, and provision was made for causes not finally determined before the close of a session * 2 Daniel's Chancery Practice, I 548, passim. ■\ Act of 10th April, 1848, § 4, Pamph. Laws, 449. J Act of 8th April, 1852, § I, Pamph. Laws, 291. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 8 I in any district, being certified to the next dis- trict,* &c. At last, in 1857, the opposition to the extension of equity jurisdiction seems to have broken down, and the legislature then gave to the courts of common pleas of the several counties of the com- monwealth, in addition to the powers and juris- diction theretofore possessed and exercised, the same chancery powers and jurisdiction then vested in the courts of Philadelphia County, with similar provisions for an appeal to the Supreme Court.-}- And thus, after the lapse of nearly a century and a half, we find, once more, chancery jurisdic- tion throughout the State of Pennsylvania. Certain recent acts, however, extending chan- cery powers, have been restricted to the county of Philadelphia. In 1858, jurisdiction was given within this county to the Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas in all cases of disputed boundary between adjoining and neighboring lands, whether the parties held under the same * Two provisos were added : one that the court should not have original jurisdiction under that act to supervise any partnerships or unincorporated associations, and the other, that it should not be con- strued to repeal that provision, in the act of 1 844, which prohibited the issuing of any injunction until a sufficient bond of indemnity should have been given ; but it is difficult to see why the latter proviso was deemed necessary. f Act of 14th February, 1857, Pamphl. L. 39. 6 82 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. or different titles,* and in the following year, this was extended to cases where such boundaries had become confused or rendered uncertain by lapse of time, by natural causes, or by the act, neglect or default of the owner or occupant.f In 1863, the jurisdiction under the former of these acts was extended to Alleghany County. J The jurisdiction in cases of partition may be here particularly noticed. It is familiar that courts of chancery issue commissions for partition, not under the authority of any act of Parliament, but on account of the difficulty attending the process at law, where the plaintiff must prove his title as he declares, and also the titles of the defendants, and this was attended with so much embarrassment that, by analogy to the jurisdiction in cases of dower, partition was obtained by bill. There were advantages and disadvantages which attended this. The advantages were obvious : Where upon a bill filed, the court obtained juris- diction of the subject-matter, it could give not only the specific relief which, and which alone, a writ of partition could afford,§ but it could adjudi- * Act of 15th April, 1858, Pamphl. L. 267. f Act of 5th April, 1859, Pamph. L. 359. I Act of 15th April, 1863, Pamph. L. 499. § Writs of partition were abolished in England by the act of 3 and 4 William IV. c. 27, and now the only mode of obtaining partition is by deed between the parties, or in equity. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 83 cate any question properly arising under the plead- ings. Under such a bill, both real and personal estate might be divided — an account might be had, and the judgment of the court might be readily obtained upon questions of title between the joint owners.* The principal disadvantage was that while, at law, the final judgment that the partition be and remain firm and stable for- ever, operated of itself to transfer the legal estate to the several parties, a decree in equity, as has been already remarked,*}" merely ascertained and allotted the purparts, and the partition was after- wards consummated and perfected by conveyances between the parties, and where any of these were minors, the execution of the conveyances was respited until their majority, \ and there was no power to decree a sale, in case the partition could not be made without prejudice to or spoiling the whole. It is instructive to observe the difference of the manner by which the inconvenience attending the respiting of conveyances in the case of minors has been remedied in England, and in Pennsylvania : There, the infant had, after coming of age, a day * See passim, note to Mundy v. Mundy, I Supplement to Vesey, jr. 171 ; notes to Agar v. Fairfax, 2 Leading Cases in Equity, 398. f Supra, p. 39. t Brook v. Lord Hertford, 2 P. Williams, 518; Attorney-General v. Hamilton, 1 Maddock, 21 ; Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige, 405. 84 EgUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. to show cause against the decree, but since the Trustee Act of 1850,* the court, instead of giving him a day to show cause, declare him a trustee, within the meaning of the Act, of such parts of the property as have been allotted in severalty to the other parties.f Here all the analogies attending the administration of equitable prin- ciples are observed. But our own legislation on the subject is another instance of the effect of our habit of administering these principles through common law forms. In 1857, the legislature passed an act, which in cases of partition in equity provided for the allotment of the purparts by the master, and the awarding of the sums to be charged for owelty of partition, and then declared * 13 and 14 Vict. c. 60; 4 Chitty's Statutes, 794. ■if Bowra v. Wright, 4 De Gex and Smale, 265 ; S. C. 3 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 190. The 7th section of the act provides that " where any infant shall be seized of any lands upon any trust, it shall be lawful for the court to make an order vesting such lands in such persons, in such manner, and for such estate, as the court shall direct; and the order shall have the same effect as if the infant had been twenty-one years of age, and had duly executed a conveyance of the lands in the same manner, for the same estate;" and the 30th section provides that "where any decree shall be made by the court for the partition of any lands, it shall be lawful for the court to declare that any of the parties to the suit wherein such decree is made, are trustees of such lands within the meaning of this act, and, thereupon, it shall be lawful for the court to make such orders as to the estates, rights, and interests of such persons as the said court might, under the provisions of this act, make concerning the estates, rights, and interests of trustees." EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 85 that the decree confirming a partition should have the same effect as a judgment of a court of law in like cases, and of course no deeds are, therefore, neces- sary.* For some reason, this statute was confined, in its operation, to the county of Philadelphia, but in 1863, provision was made for a sale of the property by the master, in case all the parties to the partition should refuse to take the same at the valuation, and the master was directed to make return of the sale, and, upon its approval, to exe- cute a deed of the property sold to the purchaser,^ and this act does not seem to be restricted as to its local operation. J * Act of 14 March, 1857, Pamph. L. 97. Griffith v. Phillips, 3 Grant's Cases, 381. "j- Act of 22d April, 1863, Pamph. L. 519. J Before leaving this subject, it may be remarked that in a recent case in England (Clarke v. Clayton, 2 GifFard, 335, i860), upon a bill filed for partition, the Vice-Chancellor (Stuart) said that a commission in a partition suit was an expensive and generally a very unnecessary proceeding ; under its improved practice, the court could give facilities for dividing the estate in a way much more satisfactory and less ex- pensive than the old mode of proceeding by commission, even in cases where there was adverse litigation, and he therefore ordered a decree that the estate be divided into equal third parts, and then that the par- ties were entitled in the proportion which had been shown, with liberty to each of the parties to bring in proposals, before the judge in chambers, for partition. The decree was in substance thus : Upon motion for a decree, &c, this court doth declare that the real and leasehold estates of the testator ought to be divided into equal third parts, and doth order and decree the same accordingly. And it is ordered that one of the said third parts be allotted in severalty to the plaintiffs, one other third part thereof to the defendant Venton, and the remaining third part thereof 86 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. Recent statutes have also conferred upon the several courts of common pleas, jurisdiction in equity, in cases arising under the general plank- road law.* I have already referred to the early decision in which our courts refused to import into our system some of the incidents of chancery jurisdiction in cases of mortgages. Since that time, a class of mortgages, then comparatively unknown, has become very common. I mean mortgages given by a corporation to a trustee to secure the pay- ment of bonds which are issued and sold in the market. In i860, a bill in equity was filed by the trustees under such a mortgage for its to the defendant Clayton. And it is ordered that proposals for a parti- tion of the said hereditaments among the said persons and in the said proportion be laid before the judge for his approval. And it is ordered that the plaintiffs and the defendants do hold and enjoy their respective thirds in severalty according to such allotments, and do execute mutual assurances to each other of such respective thirds according to their respective interests therein, such assurances to be settled by the judge in case the parties differ. — Then followed the usual order as to produc- tion of title-papers, &c, and leave to apply for further instructions. * Act of 14th April, 1854, P. L. 374. This was probably owing to the decision in Commonwealth v. Wellsboro' Plank-Road Co. 1 1 Casey, 152, where a bill having been filed to enjoin the collection of tolls on the ground that the road was not properly in order, it was dismissed by the Supreme Court, who held that the general plank-road law gave a special remedy by throwing open the gates. The act of 1 2th April, 1867, P. L. 71, as to the equity jurisdiction in cases of fraudulent insolvency of banks, seems rather to impose a duty on assignees than to confer any new equity jurisdiction. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 87 foreclosure, and a decree for the sale of the premises was entered in the court below. But this was reversed by the Supreme Court, who held that the grant of equity powers by the legis- lature did not extend to cases of mortgages, nor could they be so construed in this case under the jurisdiction as to trusts and trustees.* But not long after, the legislature declared that the Su- preme Court should have and exercise all the powers and jurisdiction of a court of chancery in all cases of mortgages given by corporations,*}" and it is familiar to all, that under this act proceedings have been had involving very many millions of dollars. We have seen that the acts of 1701, 1710, and 171 5 had given to all the county courts jurisdic- tion in matters of equity, and this jurisdiction, like that of Keith's Court of Chancery, was not prescribed, limited, nor defined. But the acts which have given to our present courts equitable jurisdiction, have confined it to certain specifically enumerated heads, and to these alone. These, however, are sufficiently numerous to cover most of the cases in which equitable relief is needed. Thus we have the jurisdiction under the heads of partnership, corporations (other than those of a * Ashhurst v. Montour Iron Co. 1 1 Casey, 30. ■j- Act of 11 April, 1862, Pamph. L. 477. 88 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. municipal character), trust, discovery, interpleader, injunction, specific performance, fraud, accident, mistake, account, dower, partition, boundary, mortgages of corporations, obtaining evidence beyond the State, and the perpetuation of testi- mony. It is seldom that a case arises in which a party finds himself without a remedy, where he has a right which is properly cognizable in equity. But the grant of these chancery powers has not, in theory, taken away from our common law courts the administration of equitable principles, though the limits of its exercise have perhaps, in practice, been gradually narrowed, and the former tendency towards its extension has certainly been checked. We have a law side and an equity side in our courts, as was formerly the case in the Court of Exchequer ; but upon the law side we also administer equitable principles. And so, as we have seen, do the common law courts in Eng- land at this day, on behalf of the defendant, when complete relief can be given in the action pending. One word (for I have already detained you too long) as to the present form of equity pleadings. These are now simple in the extreme. In Eng- land, the act of 15. and 16 Victoria, c. 86,* and the subsequent orders of 7th of August, 1852, abolished * 3 Chitty's Collection of Statutes, 882. EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 89 the writ of subpoena — provided that the bill should contain a concise narrative of the facts, divided into paragraphs of distinct allegations, and should pray specifically the relief sought. No interrogations were allowed to be contained in the bill, but were to be filed separately. Provision was also made for simplicity in the answer, which was to be in the first person, and, like the bill, divided into distinct statements. The practice of except- ing to bills for impertinence was abolished, pro- vision was made for the oral examination of witnesses, and many other alterations in practice and pleading, as to which time will not allow me to dwell. Many of these alterations have been adopted in the recent Rules of Equity Pleading promulgated by our Supreme Court. One of them, the 58th, as to the oral examination of wit- nesses on motions for preliminary injunctions, which was intended to dispense with the use of affidavits, which were justly deemed demoralizing and unreliable, has been since repealed, at the request, as I understand, of the judges of the courts of common pleas, who have complained that the loss of time caused by the oral examina- tions was even a greater evil than that which it sought to redress. You have thus been kind enough to follow me in the rapid retrospect which I have taken of the go EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. history of equity in Pennsylvania. Certainly, no State was ever more " traduced and taxed of other nations" for having, through mere necessity, en- grafted one branch of the science of jurisprudence upon another. There have not been wanting those who, without perhaps taking the time to study the philosophy of our system or its history, have accused us of blending indiscriminately toge- ther the principles of law and equity, administer- ing both with but an imperfect knowledge of either, and "producing thereby a hybrid monster with none of the virtues and all the vices of either parent," and a sneering analogy has been suggested to the well-known opening lines of the Ars Poetica — Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam, &c. How undeserved has been much of all this you may now judge; for history — that philosophy which teaches by example — has, I think, suffi- ciently vindicated us from these aspersions. Nor can it be said that with us at the present day much evil is produced by allowing equitable principles to be administered in our common law courts. The chief evil of the system once was, that it was the only system — the means were in- adequate to the end — but now that we have other means, let us not decry those which for a time served us so well, especially when we see that elsewhere, others have at this day begun to EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 91 adopt, through choice, some part of that which, long ago, we were forced to adopt through ne- cessity. Yet while it may be admitted that the science of equity can never be fully administered through the medium of trial by jury, there is, I think, in the fact that we have no separate court of chan- cery^that we have an equity side to our common law courts — a great benefit to both the bench and the bar. Abler pens than mine have dwelt upon the advantages which a judge derives from the mixing with the outside world which comes from trying causes at Nisi Prius,* and any one who has mingled with the chancery and the common law bar in England, cannot fail to be struck with the difference between them — a difference which can be attributed only to the atmospheres in which they respectively live. And here then I must pause — here even upon the very threshold of my subject — for we have but entered the outer court of that temple which has so many sanctuaries. Having thus trodden these dry and rugged paths, there is, indeed, every temptation to dwell upon the beauties of that science whose object is "the amelioration of the * See passim the Report of the Committee of the New York Bar, in 1827; Parke's Eq. Jur., Introduction, p. 35. 92 EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. law in that wherein, by reason of its universality, it is deficient." But from other sources than a mere popular lecture, must be learned the de- velopment of that system which, in England, ex- hibits so completely the adaptation of human wisdom to human frailties and shortcomings. And when you seek to know how far the princi- ples of equity, transplanted to this side of the Atlantic, have here taken root and flourished, you will find that— in the language of that accom- plished writer whose loss we were forced to de- plore so soon after he had given to the profession the last fruits of his matured labor and judg- ment — "Upon the whole, the jurisprudence of this country has developed an equity system scarcely less comprehensive or less complete than that which has been established in England, and it is a conclusive testimony to the wisdom and practi- cable usefulness of the English chancery, that, at the suggestions of experience, its scheme has been adopted substantially, throughout a country not influenced by considerations of authority, but pro- ceeding freely in quest of essential justice, and under the guidance of a reason proud of its inde- pendence."* * Mr. Wallace's Preface to the American edition of "White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity." EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA. 93 The good work to which one of your Associa- tion lent his hand so many years ago, and to which I have ventured to make some addition, has shown some of the difficulties under which Equity in Pennsylvania has struggled, and we may now, from our checkered experience, be all the better able to appreciate that which, denied to us so long, we have at last received in the fulness of time. APPENDIX. THE REGISTRAR'S BOOK OF GOVERNOR KEITH'S COURT OF CHANCERY. [*I] Anno Septimo Georgij Regis Magnas '72° Britaniae, &c. Augt;s - Pensilvania, sct. The Honourable William Keith Esq. Governour of this Province &c. took ye Qualification for Chancellor of sd. Pro- vince to this effect vizt: That well and truly he shall serve in the Office of Chancellor of this Province of Pensilvania wherewith he is Intrusted ' That he shall do right to all man- ner of People as well to Poor as to Rich according to ye Laws and Usages of that Part of his Majesties Realm called Eng- land. That he shall not know nor Suffer the hurt nor dis- heriting of the King nor that the Rights of the Crown and the Proprietor of this Province be Distressed by any means as far forth as he may it let, and if he may not let it he shall make it clearly and expressly be known. That he shall do and Purchase ye Kings Profits and the Right of the Proprietor of the Province of Pensilvania in all that he reasonably may. In Council. Charles Brockden Gent, was appointed Register of the Eodm die. Court of Chancery for this Province who did then thereupon Qualify himselfe by takeing the Solemn Affirmation according to Law to this effect vizt: That he would well and faithfully execute ye Office of Register of the Court of Chancery of this Province according to ye best of his Skill and Learning. Before the Governour in Cane. James Logan Esqr. a Member of the Governour's Council Eodm die. of this Province was Appointed one of the Masters of the Court of Chancery for the same Province Who did then 4 APPENDIX. thereupon Qualify himselfe by takeing the Solemn Affirmation according to Law To this effect vizt: That he would well and faithfully execute and discharge the Office of one of the Masters of this Court according to ye best of his Skill and Learning. Before ye Govr. in Cane. Eodm die. Jonathan Dickinson Esqr. Nominated by ye Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Supra. Samuel Preston Esqr. Nominated by the Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Supra. Eodm die. Richard Hill Esq. Nominated by the Governour a Master in Chanc. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Antea. Eodm die. Anthony Palmer Esq. Nominated by the Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. On Oath. Ut Antea. October 4. William Trent Esq. Nominated by the Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Antea. 1721 1722 [*2] Ao. 8°. Georgij Rs. Aug. 19. Thomas Masters Esq. Nominated by the Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Upon his Solemn Affirmation. Ut Antea. July 25. Robert Assheton Esq. Nominated by ye Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. On Oath. Ut Antea. Eodm die. William Assheton Esq. Nominated by ye Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Antea. Mch. 1st. John French Esq. Nominated by ye Governour a Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Antea. Ao. io° Georgij Rs. 1723 July 30. Andrew Hamilton Esq. Nominated by ye Governour a APPENDIX. - Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Antea. Henry Brooke Esq. Nominated by ye Governour a Master Eodm die. in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Ut Antea. Ao. 12° Georgij Rs. 1725 William Fishbourn Esq. Nominated by ye Governour a June 17th. Master in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Upon his affirmation. Ut Antea. 1 1726 Thomas Graeme. Nominated by ye Governour a Master Aug. 4. in Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. Upon his Affirmation. Ut Antea. Evan Owen nominated by ye Governour a Master in Eodm die. Cane. Who thereupon Qualified accordingly &c. On Affirmation. Ut Antea. 1730 Thomas Lawrence nominated by the Governour a Master July 23. in Can. who thereupon qualified accordingly on Oath. Ut Antea. Ralph Asheton nominated by the Governr. a Master in Eod. di< =. Can. who thereupon qualified accordingly on Oath. Ut Antea. Clement Plumsted nominated by the Govr. a Master in Eoe sold for the Payment of a Legacy of Eight hundred Pounds and Interest devised to William Shippen by his Father the said Edward Shippen together with the Account of sevl. Receipts and Payments made in pursuance and in Consequence of the said Decree. Which said Report together with the sales and other Proceedings therein mentioned are approved and con- firmed, unless the Parties concerned or some Person in their behalf, shall shew Cause to the contrary on or before the fifth day of June next, of which Rule Notice is ordered to be given to the Deft. Joseph Shippen. Per Cur. Anno 6to. Georgij 2di Regis. [ *57 ] 1732 Affidavit of Francis Sherard of Notice by him given on June 3d. the 1st Instant to the Deft. Joseph Shippen of the last Order in this Cause by delivering to the Deft, a Copy thereof filed. None appearing to shew Cause, the Order aforesd. is made 10th. absolute. Per the Chancellor. Anno 4to. Georgij 2di Regis. [*59] Isaac Miranda Complt. Mr. Kinsey p. Quser. Cont. John Acworth Defendt. 3° APPENDIX. •73 1 The Complainants Bill filed. Ap. 6th. Eod. die. A Petn. of the Complt. with Affidat. annexed praying for the Reasons therein sett forth that leaving a Subpoena with the Defendants Attorney may be deemed good Service filed. Be it so. p. the Chancellor. Eod. die. Subpoena ad respondendm. issued Ret. 8th. A Petition of the Complainant and affidt. of the Truth of the Facts therein contained with a Certificate of certain Auditors appointed by the Court of Common Pleas filed. Eod. die. Before the Chancellor and Samuel Preston, Anthony Palmer, Henry Burke, Thomas Law- rence and Samuel Hassell Masters in Chancery. Upon reading the Petition and Affidavit of Isaac Miranda the Complainant, praying an Injunction to stop the Sale of certain Houses and Lotts of Land to be exposed to Sale by virtue of a Writt of Venditioni Exponas issuing out of the Court of Com. Pleas for the City and County of Phila. And upon Motion of Mr. Kinsey Council for the Complainant It is Ordered that an Injunction issue according to the Prayer of the Petn. and it is issued this day accordingly. Per Cur. [*63J Cornelius Vanhorne and John McEvers Complts. Cont. Jonathan Lees Factor to Joseph Clegg and Richd. Gradwell. Kinsey p. Quaer. Evans for Dfts. Maoist. Petition of the Complainants praying for the Reasons therein sett forth a Writt of Ne Exeat agst. the Dfts. until he shall have given security &c. and answered to certain Interrogatory's to be exhibited on the part of the Complain- ants filed. The Prayer of the Petn. is granted. Per the Chancellor. 5th. The Writt of Ne Exeat issued. 13th. Affidavit of Jonathan Lees filed. APPENDIX. 3' Interrogatorys on the part of the Complainants with the 25th. Answer of Jonn. Lees thereunto before one of the Masters of the Court filed. Before the Chancellor, and Henry Brooke May 1. Clement Plumstead and Saml. Hassell Esqr. Masters. Mr. Evans moves for dissolving the Writt of Ne Exeat issued agst. Jona Lees he having fully answered the Inter- rogatory's exhibited by the Complainant and being willing to deposite the money which he hath in his hands belonging to Joseph Clegg or to give Security for ye same. Lett notice of this motion to be given to the Complainant's Council and that they attend this Court on Thursday the 27th Instant. Per Cur. Affidavit of Notice served on Mr. Kinsey per Mr. Lees May 26. filed. Before the Chancellor and the above named Masters. 27. Upon Mr. Evan's Motion for dissolving the Writt of Ne Exeat and upon reading the Affidavits Interrogatories and Answers and hearing Council on both sides It is Ordered that Jonathan Lees be discharged of the said Writt upon his depositing in the hands of the Register of this Court [ ^64 ] the sum of twelve Pounds five Shillings and one penny the Effects of Joseph Clegg which by his Affidavit he hath acknowledged to be in his hands, it appearing to this Court that the Goods shipt on board the Pine Apple Richard Pinketh Master were shipt before the Attacht. was laid and that Jonathan Lees the Garnishee is not answerable for the same. Per Cur. 1733 The money deposited pursuant to the above Order was Ap. 5. this day paid by the Register to Willing and Shippen by Order of Cornelius Vanhorne the Complainant. Ended. 3 2 APPENDIX. Anno 510. Georgij Secundi Regis. [*6j2 Emanuel Jocelin Complt. Cont. Kinsey per Quaer. Robert Charles Navl. OiFr. of Phila. Deft. 1731 Nov. 1 2th. The Complts. Bill filed. Eod. die. The Deft, appears Gratis and consents that a Commission as prayed in the bill issue he having leave to name two Com- missioners on his part, wch. is agreed to by the Complainant. Ap. 1st. A Commission directed to Gilbert Flemming Thomas Bororey James Gregory and Robert Jesson of the Island of St. Christopher Gent, or to any three or two of them for examining Witnesses as well on the Part of the Complainant as on the part of the Defendant is issued. Per the Chancellor. Sept. 25th. The Commission aforesaid is returned sealed up under the hands of three of the Commissioners and their Seals by George Dukeman, whose Affidavit of having received the same at the hands of Robert Jesson and that it hath not been opened or altered since he received it, is this day filed. Nov. 6. Publication papers by Consent of Parties. Whereupon it is Ordered that a certified Copy of the said Examinations be sent into the Court of Common Pleas of the County of Philadelphia where the Information exhibited by the Naval Officer qui tarn &c, against sundry Goods Wares and Merchandizes reclaimed by the Complainant Emanuel Jocelin is now depending. Per the Chancellor. Ended. Anno 6to. Georgij 2di Regis. [ *6°. J James Axford et Ux. Complts. Cont. Kinsey p. Quaerent. Richard Haines et Ux. Defts. July 28. Affidavit of Clement Hall in behalf of ye Complainants this day filed. Eod. die. Upon motion of the Complainants Council a Writt of Ne Exeat against the Defts. is granted. Per the Chancellor. APPENDIX. 33 1732 Solomon Goade Complt. [ *7 J ] Cont. Francis Tones Defendt. Petition of the Complainant and Affidavit of the Facts Sept. 19. therein sett forth, in order to obtain an Injunction filed. Upon Motion of Mr. Assheton Council for the Com- Eod. die. plainant an Injunction is allowed according to the Prayer of the Petition. Per the Chancellor. [*73] Jacob Diemer, Michael Hillegas, Peter Hillegas, Joost Schmidt, Hendrick. Weller, Jacob Siegel, and Wilhelm Rohrich in behalf of themselves and divers other members of the German reformed Church in Philadelphia Complainants. Cont. Jacob Reiff Defendant. Growdon for Quasr. Hopkinson for Deft. 1732 Petition and Affidavits of Complainants filed. Novem. ^ Upon Motion of the Complts. Council on the said Petition Eod. die. and affidavit a Writt of Ne Exeat against the Deft, is granted. Per the Chancellor. The Sherif of Philadelphia returns that he hath taken se- curity on the Writt aforesaid. j 1733 Notice of a Motion by Mr. Hopkinson, on Monday the June 20th. 25th Instant for discharging the Defendant and his Sureties from the Bond by them entered into on the Writt of Ne Exeat. The Notice for this day countermanded and new notice 25. for to-morrow given the Complainants Council p. Affidavit of Mr. Hopkinson filed. Upon Motion this day made by Thomas Hopkinson Sollr. 26. for Jacob Reiff and upon reading an Affidavit of the Service of Notice of Motion on the Petitioners Sollicitor and his Clerk, and also upon reading the Registers Certificate that no Bill of Complaint is filed in this Cause It is Ordered that unless the Petitioners or their Sollicitor file their Bill of Com- plaint against the said Jacob Reiff on or before Tuesday next 4 J«iy 1 2th. 14- Sept. 4- '733 Feb. -4 20th. 24 APPENDIX. the 3rd of July the said Jacob ReifF be at Liberty to depart this Province, and that the said Jacob ReifF his Manucaptors or Securities be discharged from a Bond or Recognizance entered into by them on a Writt of Ne Exeat Provincia issuing out of this Court and that the said Petitioners pay to the said Jacob ReifF full Costs to be taxed by a Master. Whereof lett the Petitioners have notice. Per the Chancellor. 1733 July 3rd. [ *74 ] On Motion of the Plaintiffs Sollicitor and by Con- sent of the Defendants Sollicitor, further Time is given the Petitioners to file their Bill to witt to Thursday the 12th Instant under the Rule aforesaid. Per the Chancellor. The Petitioners Bill of Complaint filed. Subpoena ad respondm. issued ret. ye 20th Instant. The Answer of the Defendant filed. Notice of a Motion by Mr. Hopkinson on Friday the 22nd Instant for vacating the Bond or recognizance entered into pn the Writt of Ne Exeat issuing out of this Court and Affi- davit of the Service of the said Notice filed. Feb. 22. Upon Motion this day made by Mr. Hopkinson of Council for the Deft, and by Consent of Mr. Growden of Council for the Complt. It is Ordered that the Bond or Recognizance entered into by the Defendant and his Sureties on a Writt of Ne Exeat Provincia issuing out of this Court be vacated and discharged, the Defendant entering into Bond with sufficient Sureties in the sum of Five Hundred Pounds current Money of America to abide by and full fill such Order or Decree of this Court as shall be made on the Hearing of this Cause. Per the Chancellor. [*79J Evan Ellis Complt. Cont. John Ellis, Theodore Ellis, Jane Jones, John Jones, Nathan Lewis, William Lewis, Zepthath Lewis, Enos Lewis, David Lewellyn, David Lewellyn junr., John Humphreys and Jane his Wife, Anne Lewellyn, Edward Jones and Gainer his Wife, Humphrey Jones and {Cathe- rine his Wife Defts. APPENDIX. ,r The Complt's Bill filed. 1732-3 ei_ 1 it* it* /■ J an - 29th. bubpoenas ad respondendum issued. Ret. the 26th inst. Feb'y 9th. The Appearance of all the Defendants entered, except of 26. Edward Jones and Garner his Wife who live out of the Pro- vince as 'tis said and of Tohn Ellis. 1733 Another Spa. ad resm. John Ellis issued. Ret. 25th instant. April 4th. Affidavit of Service of the said Spa. by Owen Roberts filed. May 21st. Attachment directed to the Sherif of the County of Bucks June 5th. agst. John Ellis for contempt issued Ret. 18th Inst. Per the Chancellor. The Sherif aforesaid returns that he hath taken John Ellis 18th. whose Body he hath ready this day as by the said Writt he is commanded. And the said John Ellis is committed to Prison until he answers the Contempt. 1 173 3-4 Rule that the Defts. Theodore Ellis, Jane Jones, John Mar. id. Jones, Nathan Lewis, William Lewis, Jepthath Lewis, Enos Lewis, David Lewellyn, David Lewellyn junr., John Hum- phrey's and Jane his Wife, Anne Lewellyn, Humphrey Jones and Katherine his Wife answer the Complainants Bill in this Cause on or before the 12th day of this inst. March or an attachment against them to issue. Lett Notice of this Rule be given them. Per the Chancellor. '73+ The Answer of the last named Dfts. filed. Nov. 27th. Before the Chancellor and Isaac Norris 30th. Thomas Lawrence Masters in Chancery. Anno 8vo. Georgij 2di Regis. Upon Motion of Mr. Kinsey Council for the [ *8o ] Complainant that the Bill of Complaint should be taken as confessed agt. John Ellis who had hitherto remained in Cus- tody, and obstinately refused to answer thereunto whereby he had Contemned the Authority of this Court (the other Dfts. having by their Answer disclaimed all Right, Title or Interest in or to the lands in Question by the Bill) The Court made a Rule for bringing up the said Ellis, who appearing in Court, the said Bill was read to him, and the 36 APPENDIX. Disclaimer of the other Defendants and he was admonished to answer the said Bill, which that he might be the better enabled to do, the Council for the Complt. consented to his Enlargement and to free him from all Costs for Contempt Whereupon it is Ordered that the Deft. John Ellis make Answer to the Bill of Complaint within the Space of One month, or otherwise the same to be taken as confessed. Per Cur. '735 April 15. Spa. agst. John Ellis and the other Defendants to Hear Judgment issued Ret. the 29th Instant. 19- Affidavit of the Complainant of Service of the said Spa. on the Defendant John Ellis filed. Eod. die. Before the Chancellor and James Logan, Saml. Preston, Henry Brooke, Clement Plumstead, Ralph Assheton, Saml. Hassell Esqrs. Masters in Chancery. Upon the opening of the Matter this present day by Mr. Kinsey of Council for the Complainant, and reading an Affi- davit of the Service of a Spa. to hear Judgment upon the Deft. John Ellis. It was alledged on behalf of the same Complainant that by virtue of the former Order of this Court and pursuant to the practise of the Court of Chancery in like Cases the Bill afd. ought to be taken as Confessed, for that the said John Ellis from time to time obstinately persisted in refusing to make any Answer thereunto and therein had contemned the Authority of this Court. Never- theless for the greater Satisfaction of the Court, the Council afd. produced divers Deeds, Evidences and Writings in the [ *8i ] Bill mentioned by which the Court were sufficiently satisfied of the Truths of the several Matters and Things in the Complainants said Bill of Complaint contained. Where- upon, and upon hearing as well the Council afd. on the part of the Complainant and the Council for the other Defts., this Court have thought it fitt and do therefore so Order and Decree that the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the Bill mentioned, late the Inheritance of Margaret Jones als. John in the Bill named be divided by Malachi Jones, Owen Evan, and John Jones of the County of Phila. Gentlemen, or any two of them in such manner as to allot and assign the" APPENDIX. 27 equal third parts (Respect being had to the Value of the same) unto the Complainant Evan Ellis, so as not to interfere with the part of the same Lands claimed by the Deft. Theodore Ellis To Have and to Hold to him his Heirs and Assigns for ever in Severalty, and that peaceably and quietly to be en- joyed agst. any Claim and Demand of the Defts or any of them or any others claiming under the said Margaret Jones. And it is further Ordered and Decreed that the same John Jones, Jane Jones, Nathan Lewis, Wm. Lewis, Jepthath Lewis, Enos Lewis, David Lewellyn, David Lewellyn junr., John Humphreys and Jane his Wife and John Ellis do make a Conveyance of the same third part to him the said Evan Ellis accordingly, and that on executing such Conveyance the same Defts., except John Ellis, be excused from the Pay- ment of any Costs to the same Complainant, but that the same John Ellis do pay to the said Complainant Evan Ellis his full Costs of suit thereupon to be taxed, Unless Cause to the contrary of any of the Premises decreed as afd. shall be shewn to this Court by the same John Ellis on or before the first day of June next. Per Cur. 1735 Affidavit of John Williams of the service of Notice of the June nth. Decree afd. and that the same would become abso- [ *82 ] lute unless Cause shewn to the Contrary as afd. on the Deft. John Ellis. And the decree afd. is made absolute. Per the Chancellor. A Writt of Partition of the Lands pursuant to the Decree June 12. of this Court is issued. Per the Chancellor. Anno 6to. Georgij 2di Regis. [*8 5 J Marens Tucks Complt. Cont. Kinsey per Quasr. Thomas Carvell Deft. 1732-3 The Compli. Bill filed. Feb'y 9. Spa. ad respd. issued Ret. 26th Instant. 38 APPENDIX. J ?33 Upon Affidavit of the Complainants Soil, filed and upon Apl. ioth. f . . ,„ Motion this day made an Injunction to stop the Proceedings at Common Law is issued. Per the Chancellor. [ *%9 J Anno 7mo. Georgij 2di Regis. John Philips Admr. of ye Goods of Mary Ashton formerly Mary Dunn deceased, Richard Morgan and Jane his Wife late Jane Dunn and Sarah Dunn Complts. Cont. Thomas Evans and Margaret his Wife formerly Mar- garet Dunn and Ralph Dunn Defts. Kinsey per Quasr. Evans per Defts. The Complainants Bill filed. Spa. ad respd. issued Ret. 18th instant. The Defendants Appear by Mr. Evans. The Answer of the Dfts. filed with an Account Annexed. Spa. for the Dfts. to Hear Judgment Ret. ye 30 inst. 30. Before the Chancellor and Isaac Norris and Thomas Lawrence Esqrs. Masters in Chancery. The Complainants Bill of Complaint, and the Defts. Answer with an Account annexed being read It is Ordered on the Motion of the Complainants Council and with Con- sent of the Dfts. Council that the Account exhibited be re- ferred to Thomas Lawrence Esqr. a Master in this Court to examine and report what Share of the personal Estate of Ralph Dunn remains in the hands of the Defendants. Per Cur. Anno 8mo. Georgij 2di Regis. May 6. The Report of the Master filed in pursuance of the above order. A U g. I4 . Before the Chancellor and Ralph Assheton and Samuel Hassell Esqrs. Masters in Chancery. It appearing by the Report of the Master, to whom the Accounts exhibited by the Defendants in this Cause were 1733-4 ' Feb. 2. 4th. 18th. 1734 July 24th. Nov. 1 2th. APPENDIX. referred, that there are not sufficient Assetts remaining in the Executrixs hands for the Payment of the Debts and Legacies in the Bill mentioned ; On the Motion of Mr. Kinsey of Council for the Complainant and by Assent of Mr. Evans of Council for the Defts. It is Ordered that the said [ *c9- [*»5] Ann Growdon Widow of Joseph Growdon Complt. Agst. Lawrence Growdon Deft. Evans for Complt. Kinsey for Deft. '735 The Complts. Bill filed. A P . nth. 44 APPENDIX. Eod. die. Upon Motion of the Complts. Council an Injunction to stop the Proceedings at Law against her is issued. Upon the Motion of Mr. Evans and with the Consent of Mr. Kinsey Leave is given to amend the Bill of Complaint. June 2.8. The Bill of Complaint amended, is this day filed, wherein Anne Growdon Joseph Growdon and Hannah Growdon are Complts. against Lawrence Growdon and Grace Lloyd Defendants. 30th. The Defds. by Mr Kinsey appear Gratis. July 21. The Separate Answer of Lawrence Growdon and of Grace Lloyd Defts filed. Aug. 30. Petition of Lawrence Growdon Deft, for dissolving the Injunction because of the Delay of the Proceedings on the part of the Complainants filed. Eod. die. The Injunction to stand dissolved unless Cause to the contrary be shewen on or before the 10th day of September next whereof the Complainant forthwith have Notice. Per the Chancellor. Sept. 10. Petition of Joseph Growdon with a Certificate under the hand of Dr. Thomas Graeme, Physician, praying for the Reasons therein sett forth that the Injunction may not be dissolved until the Exceptions he is preparing to the Dft's' Answers be filed and heard — filed. 16. On the Motion of the Council for the Defendants It is Ordered that both Parties be heard to-morrow forenoon at eleven a clock on the subject matter of their respective Petitions whereof lett the Complts. have Notice forthwith. By the Chancellor. 17. [*u6] Before the Chancellor, and Samuel Preston Clement Plumstead, Thomas Lawrence and Ralph Assheton Esqrs. Mars, in Chancy. Upon reading the Petition and hearing the Council on both Sides It is Ordered that the Complainants file their Excep- tions to the Answers of the Defendants on or before the 10th of October next. By the Court. '735 ^ • ci j Oct. 9. Exceptions filed. APPENDIX. 45 Anno nono Georgij 2di Regis. . . . '736 A Petition of the Complainant Anne Growdon, setting June 1st. forth, that notwithstanding the Injunction in this Cause issued, the Defendt. Lawrence Growdon in the Term of April last, did proceed ex parte in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to try the said Cause, and obtained Judgment thereupon, in open Contempt of the said Injunction, and in manifest Violation of the Course of Equity and Justice, and now threatens, by Execution of the said Judgment, to eject the Complainant out of the Lands settled upon her in Jointure, and therefore praying an Attachment against the Deft. Lawrence Growdon his Council and Sollicitors for the Contempt aforesd, and an Injunction for quieting the Com- plainants possession, until the matters afd. be duly heard and decreed upon in this Honble. Court filed. [*I23] James Portues Complt. Agst. Christopher Tapham, Edward Williams and Joseph Drinker Defts. Evans for ye Complainant. 1735 Affidavit of the Complainant that the Defts. intend and Octr. 29th. threaten to destroy some Buildings or Outhouses to which he believes and is advised he has a good Title in Fee Simple filed. Upon Motion of the Council for the Complts. and on Eod. die. the Affidavit aforesaid, an Injunction to stay waste is issued. By the Chancellor. Affidavit of Charles Hughes of the Service of the said 30th. Injunction upon the Defendants, and of a Contempt of the same by Edwd. Williams filed. An Attacht. agt. Edwd. Williams Ret. ye 4th inst. is Novem. 1. issued. The Sherif returns that he hath attached Edwd. Williams, 4'h. whom he hath here readv this day. 4 6 APPENDIX. Interrogatorys on the part of the Complainant to be ad- ministered to Williams upon the Contempt afd. filed. Upon Motion of the Complainants Council It is Ordered that Ralph Assheton one of the Masters of this Court ex- amine Edwd. Williams on the Interrogatorys afd. and report thereon and that in the meantime the said Edwd. Williams be continued in Custody till such Report is made. By the Chancellor. THE END. M&k