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Cornell University Library 
 DC 151.D64 
 V 1 
 Napoleon a history of the art..9*...yy.Srj. 
 
 3 1924 024 308 698 
 
Pi Cornell University 
 S Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024308698 
 
^p t!)e §bnmt attt!)or. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. With Maps. 8vo, 
 
 RIDERS OF MANY LANDS. Profusely illustrated by Remington, and 
 from photographs of Oriental subjects. 8vo, $3.00. 
 
 A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. With Maps and Illus- 
 trations. Students^ Edition. Crown 8vo, $1.00, net. 
 
 PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE: A Chat in the Saddle. Popular 
 Edition. With woodcuts from instantaneous photographs. Crown 
 8vo, half roan, $1.25. 
 
 GREAT CAPTAINS. With Maps, etc. 8vo, $2.00. 
 
 Great Captains : 
 
 ALEXANDER. A History of the Origin and Growth of the Art of War, 
 from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, b. c. 301 ; with a de- 
 tailed account of the Campaigns of the Great Macedonian. With 237 
 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts of 
 Armor, Uniforms, Siege Devices, and Portraits. 2 vols. Svo, $5.00. 
 
 HANNIBAL. A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians 
 and Romans, down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 b. C. ; with a detailed 
 account of the Second Punic War. With 227 Charts, Maps, Plans of 
 Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts of Armor, Weapons, and 
 Uniforms. 2 vols. Svo, S5.00. 
 
 C>CSAR. A History of the Art of War among; the Romans, down to 
 the End of the Roman Empire ; with a detailed account of the Cam- 
 paigns of Caius Julius Cassar. With 258 Charts, Maps, Plans of 
 Battles and Tactical Manoauvres, Cuts of Armor, Weapons, and 
 Engines. 2 vols. Svo, J5.00. 
 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. A History of the Art of War from its 
 revival after the Middle Ages to the end of the Spanish Succession 
 War, with a detailed account of the Campaigns of the great Swede, 
 and the most famous Campaigns of Turenne, Cond^, Eugene, and 
 Marlborough. With 237 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tac- 
 tical Manoeuvres,^ Cuts of Uniforms, Arms, and Weapons. 2 vols. 
 8vo, S5.00. Also in i vol. Svo, $5.00. 
 
 NAPOLEON. A History of the Art of War, with many Charts, Maps, 
 Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Portraits, Cuts of Uni- 
 forms, Arms, and Weapons. 
 
 VOL. I. Includes the period from the beginning of the French 
 Revolution to the end of the Eighteenth Century, with a detailed 
 account of the Wars of the French Revolution. 
 
 VOL. 11. Includes the period from the beginning of the Consulate 
 to the end of the Friedland CampEugn, with a detailed account of 
 the Napoleonic Wars. 
 
 VOL. III. and VOL. IV. in preparation. 
 
 4 vols. Svo, each $4.00 net. Postage extra. 
 
 IN PREPARATION: 
 Uniform in style with the above volumes. 
 FREDERICK THE GREAT. 
 The complete series (Alexander to Napoleon) will cover the History 
 of the Art of War from the earliest times down to 1815. 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANV 
 Boston and New York. 
 
■^ kaJu?^^-?/ /7^6' 
 
ddrcat Captains 
 
 NAPOLEON 
 
 A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR, FROM THE BE- 
 GINNING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE 
 END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, WITH A DE- 
 TAILED ACCOUNT OF THE WARS OF THE FRENCH 
 REVOLUTION 
 
 WITH 202 CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES AND 
 
 TACTICAL MANCEUVRES, PORTRAITS, CUTS 
 
 OF UNIFORMS, ARMS, AND WEAPONS 
 
 THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE 
 
 BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRM LIST ; AUTHOR OF * 
 CAMPAIGN OF CHANCE LLORSVILLE," "a BIRD's-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR," 
 " PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE. A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," "GREAT CAP- 
 TAINS," "ALEXANDER," " HANNIBAL," " C^SAR," ETC., ETC. 
 
 IN FOUR VOLUMES 
 VOLUME I 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 
 
 @ri)e Etbereilie {Jrese, C-amiirilise 
 
 1904 
 
Copyright, 1904, 
 Br THEOPOEE ATEAULT DODGE. 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 Published April, 1904. 
 
 The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A. 
 Blectrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton and Company. 
 
To 
 THE AMERICAN SOLDIER 
 
 WHO, NOT BBED TO ARMS, BUT NUKTUKED BY INDBPENDBNCE, HAS ACHIEVEI) 
 THE PEOtJDEST BANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY 
 
 Ci)e£te Solttmect 
 
 ABE DEDICATED 
 
" Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, Gisar, 
 Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Engine et Fridific ; lisez, reli- 
 sez I'histoire de lew quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modilez-vous sur 
 eux, — c'est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine et de surprendre 
 le sicret de I'art ; voire ginie, ainsi iclairi, vous/era rejeter des max- 
 imes cpposies ti celles de ces grands homm.es." — Napoleon. 
 
 "Xo tactique, les (volutions, la science de Vofficier de ginie, de 
 I'officier d'artillerie peuvent s'apprendre dans les traiUs ; — mais la 
 connaissance de la grande tactique ne s'acquiert que par Vexpirience 
 etparl'itude de I'histoire des campagnes de tous les grands capitaines." 
 — Napoleon. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The laurels worn by Gustavus Adolphus fell upon the brow 
 of Frederick the Only ; and the narrative of that great cap- 
 tain's campaigns, as a part of this History of the Art of War, 
 was completed several years ago. But the publication by 
 the Great German General Staff of the early volumes of its 
 extensive treatise on the Prussian king has interrupted the 
 chronological sequence of this history. The abundant fresh 
 matter and the new point of view in the splendid monument 
 thus erected to the German national hero have made it expe- 
 dient for the author to await its completion, so that he may 
 embody in his own work many of the new facts developed by 
 the profound research that has for years been made in the 
 inaccessible German archives, and may recast much of what 
 he has already finished. It has meanwhile been deemed wise 
 to begin the publication of the Napoleonic wars, although 
 these should properly follow the campaigns of Frederick. It 
 is hoped that there wiU be no unreasonable delay in the issue 
 of the remaining volumes. 
 
 The basis of all our information about the campaigns of 
 Napoleon exists primarily in the letters, orders and bulletins 
 issued from the headquarters of the armies in campaign. 
 These, checked off by the official reports of the campaigns 
 and battles by his opponents, and compared with other ac- 
 counts from more personal sources, furnish the material from 
 which to construct an accurate and consecutive narrative. 
 The " Correspondence of Napoleon I.," as far as obtaina- 
 
viii PREFA CE. 
 
 ble, was published by Napoleon III. in thirty-two volumes. 
 Some letters and orders could at the moment not be pro- 
 cured ; a few were for other reasons omitted ■; but the bulk 
 of all Napoleon's correspondence is spread before the public 
 in the twenty-two thousand official documents printed therein. 
 The volumes also contain Napoleon's Memoirs and other 
 matter dictated at St. Helena. While the latter possess 
 marked interest, they are, like all comments in after days, 
 less reliable than the orders issued and the letters written at 
 the moment of action. These have a positive value. Chiefly 
 upon this Correspondence the author has relied for his de- 
 tails, although the story of this great captain has been so 
 often told that its bald facts may be gleaned from many 
 sources. 
 
 The reader will remember that this work deals with only 
 the military life of Napoleon. The political events of this 
 era, or indeed his personality, althoiigh replete with interest, 
 can be touched on only so far as they illustrate the art of war, 
 or elucidate campaigns. 
 
 The bibliography of Napoleon is numbered by thousands of 
 works, from Thiers' brilliant history of this period in thirty- 
 one volumes to the simple brochure occasionally issued to- 
 day. Most of these works contain comparatively little that 
 can be used, although the author has made himself familiar 
 with most of them. Some have a personal charm or a politi- 
 cal value, but viewed from the standpoint of the art to which 
 Napoleon contributed so much, the majority possess scant 
 interest. Much reliance has naturally been placed on the 
 criticisms of the well-known military historians, beginning 
 with Jomini. It is difficult to say anything about the great 
 warrior that may not already have been recorded. The Me- 
 moirs of some of the marshals — Victor, Marmont, St. Cyr 
 and others — the histories and critiques of Scharnhorst, 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 Clausewitz, Riistow, Lindenau, Biilow, Martens, Kausler, 
 Woerl, de Ligne, Venturini, Massenbach and many more, 
 are full of matter. Of later books, one of the most valua- 
 ble is Wartenburg's. To this work, and to that of Prince 
 Gallitzin, which extends up to 1801, the author is greatly 
 indebted. Wartenburg closely follows the Correspondence, 
 and in pursuing the same path, the author has made much use 
 of the intelligent suggestiveness of this distinguished officer. 
 To C. von B. K., Berndt, Odon and various French text- 
 book writers for the present generation of soldiers, thanks are 
 also due. A preface in which acknowledgment were made by 
 name to all the Napoleonic students who have contributed 
 to the author's knowledge would exceed all limits ; but he 
 owes much to one and all his predecessors in this study. 
 
 It has been thought that quotations from Napoleon's utter- 
 ances at the moment of action would be interesting to even 
 the general reader, and such quotations have been largely 
 indulged in. Most of them are verbatim ; a few only recite 
 the general statement or opinion. Those not otherwise 
 credited are from the St. Helena Memoirs. An occasional 
 difference in dates may be due to the use of the Republican 
 Calendar. 
 
 The same care in visiting the battlefields in person that 
 was given to former campaigns has with few exceptions been 
 exercised in writing these. 
 
 The portraits of the marshals and generals celebrated at 
 that time, as weU as those of the great captain himself, will 
 be found interesting. It has been thought better to spread 
 upon the pages many of these, even when of scant artistic 
 value, than to put in a few only on account of their merit as 
 pictures. It will be noted that most of the portraits are those 
 of middle-aged or old men, whereas many of Napoleon's lieu- 
 tenants were young; but they were too busy during their 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 fighting years to give sittings for painters. In many cases 
 portraits of even celebrated men seem not to be in existence. 
 Many of the portraits are mere sketches from old engravings, 
 which cannot be reproduced. 
 
 The cuts of uniforms and arms help to illustrate the subject 
 treated, even when they lack 1>he highest grade of execution. 
 Nearly all are copied from pictures of the period, among 
 others those of Van der Meulen, Vernet, Charlet, Lami, Bel- 
 lange and those in the Versailles Museum. 
 
 The maps and charts will be found sufficient. From the 
 maps has been omitted everything which is not needed for the 
 matter in hand. In the charts of battles there has been no 
 attempt to enter into great detail, the general position of the 
 lines alone being indicated, so tha-t the battle in its larger 
 features can be readily understood ; for it is not the fighting 
 of the separate divisions so much as the general plan of the 
 leader which interests us. In the charts, the blocks or lines 
 of troops merely indicate general position, and not numbers 
 or specific place. 
 
 More space has been given to the strategic operations of 
 Napoleon than to the grand-tactics of his battles. Wonderful 
 as the latter were, the strategic marches were yet more so. 
 They are not in most histories so amply treated, whereas the 
 key-note of Napoleon's successes was that his strategy so led 
 up to battle that victory became decisive ; and to the military 
 student the strategic manoeuvres are of perhaps greater in- 
 terest. This has, in fact, sometimes induced the author to give 
 the day's routes of the various corps ; but as the legends at 
 the head of each chapter enable the general reader to skip 
 what he cares not to read, it is hoped the prolixity will not be 
 out of place. Much matter has also been put in small type. 
 This matter is, as a rule, not essential to the narrative, but 
 possesses its own interest. 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 This history of Napoleon is written largely from the French 
 standpoint, although due weight has been given to the author- 
 ities of every nation. It is not possible to describe Napo- 
 leon's brilliant lessons in the art of war from the point of 
 view of any one of his opponents. Moreover, less space has 
 been devoted to those campaigns in which our British cousins 
 figured than might be natural in volumes written for English- 
 speaking people ; but in the case of the Peninsular War, 
 where so great a character as Wellington figured, and where 
 he so often held the initiative, much has been stated from the 
 English standpoint. The Peninsular War has, however, been 
 so thoroughly covered by Napier, and is being again covered 
 with so much amplitude and skill by Professor Oman, that 
 the author has deemed it more desirable to treat these cam- 
 paigns as a minor part of the great Napoleonic scheme — as 
 indeed they were — than to seek to compete with these bril- 
 liant and laborious historians in describing the events in Spain 
 and Portugal. 
 
 More than all are thanks owing to my collaborator for the 
 past twenty-three years, my wife, whose patient intelligence 
 has so often saved me from serious blunders, and whose skill- 
 ful pencil has lent interest to over twenty volumes. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE PAGE 
 
 I. Aemy Organization at End of Eighteenth Century . 1 
 II. Tactics and Administration at End of Eighteenth 
 
 Century 21 
 
 ^ III. Wars of the French Revolution. 1792 . . .61 
 
 UlV. The Wars of the French Revolution. 1793. . 81 
 
 ^ V. The Wars of the French Revolution. 1794 to 1795 . 107 
 
 VI. The Youth and the Company Officer. 1769 to 1793 . 131 
 
 VII. Toulon. August, 1793, to March, 1796 . . .151 
 
 VIII. MONTENOTTE AND DeGO. MaRCH AND APRIL, 1796 . 176 
 
 IX. LoMBARDY. April 28 to May 14, 1796 . . .214 
 X. On THE MiNCio. May 15 to August 1, 1796 . . 241 
 
 XI. LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE, BaSSANO AND MANTUA. 
 
 August and September, 1796 268 
 
 XII. Archduke Charles versus Moreau and Jourdan. 
 
 May to October, 1796 311 
 
 Xin. Arcole. October and November, 1796 . . . 344 
 XrV. RivoLi. November, 1796, to February, 1797 . . 378 
 
 XV. On to Vienna. March, 1797 407 
 
 XVI. Leoben. March to May, 1797 . ... 432 
 
 XVn. Egypt. January to July, 1798 . . . .456 
 
 XVIII. Aboukir. July, 1798, to January, 1799 . . . 490 
 
 XIX. Syria. January to August, 1799 520 
 
 XX. SuwARROV AND Massena. 1799 567 
 
LIST OE ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 FAaB 
 
 Napoleon Bonaparte Frontispiece 
 
 Fiom an engraving in the collection of George H. Mifflin, after a miniature in 
 1796, by Jean Baptiste Faulin Gu^rin, in the Biblioth^que Nationale, Paris. 
 
 Soldier of Legioa du Midi ........ 3 
 
 Old Guard Sharpshooter 4 
 
 Infantryman. (1796) 5 
 
 Hungarian Border Hussar 6 
 
 Austrian Light Infantryman ........ 7 
 
 OfBcer of the Republic. (1793) 9 
 
 Austrian Mounted Chasseur ........ 11 
 
 Mounted Guard Grenadier ........ 12 
 
 EbW 13 
 
 Bavarian Sharpshooter . . . . . . . . . 14 
 
 French General. (1794) 15 
 
 Guns of the Period 16 
 
 Mameluke in French Service 17 
 
 Dutch Sapper 18 
 
 French Sapper ..... 19 
 
 Cornet of Voltigeurs 20 
 
 Russian Chevalier Guard ......... 23 
 
 Bavarian Dragoon 24 
 
 Lafayette 25 
 
 Bochambeau 26 
 
 Swedish Line Infantryman ........ 27 
 
 Dutch Hussar 28 
 
 French Marine 31 
 
 Austrian Light Grenadier 33 
 
 Austrian Royal Infantryman 37 
 
 Baden Musketeer 39 
 
xvi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Westphalian Guard Grenadier 41 
 
 Russian Grenadier 43 
 
 Hungarian Grenadier 49 
 
 Sword presented to. Masaena by the Directory. (Rivoli Collection) 50 
 
 Necker 53 
 
 Louis XVI 54 
 
 Marie Antoinette 55 
 
 Mirabeau 57 
 
 Danton .....••■■... 58 
 
 Robespierre 58 
 
 Carnot 59 
 
 Northerly Frontier of France 60 
 
 Eastern Frontier of France 62 
 
 Luokner . 64 
 
 Kellermann (Senior) 66 
 
 Allied Invasion, 1792 67 
 
 Dumouriez . 68 
 
 The Argonnes 69 
 
 Battle of Valmy 71 
 
 Custine ........... 75 
 
 Battle of Jemappes ......... 76 
 
 Louis Philippe 77 
 
 Belgium . 78 
 
 Light Infantryman. (1791) 79 
 
 Sword worn by Bonaparte in Egypt 80 
 
 Commissary of Wars ......... 83 
 
 Kleber 84 
 
 Pichegru ........... 85 
 
 Middle Rhine Country 86 
 
 Battle of Kaiserslautern ........ 88 
 
 Hoche 89 
 
 Battle of Neerwinden ......... 91 
 
 Heavy Cavalryman. (1795) 93 
 
 Jourdan ........... 94 
 
 Kellermann (Junior) ......... 95 
 
 Ofacer of Light Infantry. (1795) 96 
 
 The Vendue Militaire 99 
 
 Laroohejaqueliu 101 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. xvii 
 
 Cathelineaa -.qo 
 
 Marceau .... 
 
 104 
 
 Charette jq- 
 
 Westermann ........ infi 
 
 Kepublican General and his Orderly 108 
 
 Line Infantryman. (1795) 109 
 
 Battle of Fleurus 112 
 
 Lefebvre ijj 
 
 rrenoh Grenadier. (1795) 115 
 
 French Hussar. (1795) 117 
 
 Moreau Hg 
 
 Battle of Mainz ■.......,. 120 
 
 Campaign of 1795 122 
 
 Gouvion St. Cyr 123 
 
 Battle of Loano .......... 125 
 
 Massena 127 
 
 Sword of Murad Bey, worn by Bonaparte 130 
 
 Corsica I33 
 
 Carlo di Buonaparte I34 
 
 Letitia di Buonaparte I35 
 
 Napoleone di Buonaparte. From a sketch by a school-friend at 
 
 Brienne . 137 
 
 Autograph of " Buonaparte fils cadet gentilhomme h I'^cole Eoyale 
 
 militaire de paris " 138 
 
 Paoli 141 
 
 Marat I47 
 
 Toulon 156 
 
 Barras 171 
 
 The Defeat of the Sections 173 
 
 Clerfayt 179 
 
 The Valley of the Po 180 
 
 The Army of Italy on the Riviera, 1796 186 
 
 Berthier 191 
 
 Serurier 195 
 
 Augereau 196 
 
 Battle of Montenotte 199 
 
 Var-Mincio Country 200 
 
 Ceva-Vico Country 205 
 
xviii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Pistols once belonging to Napoleon. (Prince Victor's Collection) . 213 
 
 Crossing the Po 221 
 
 Kilmaine 223 
 
 Lannes . , 224 
 
 Plaoentia-Lodi Country 227 
 
 The Bridge of Lodi 229 
 
 Beaulieu ........... 231 
 
 Bonaparte. (Engraved at Milan, 1796) 234 
 
 Infantryman on the March. (1796) 237 
 
 Bonaparte's Sword of Institute of France ..... 240 
 
 Adda-Mineio Country 243 
 
 Mantua-Trent Country 249 
 
 Sword of Massena. (Rivoli Collection) 267 
 
 Wurmser 269 
 
 Lonato-Castiglione Country ........ 271 
 
 Battle of Lonato 273 
 
 Battle of Castiglione ......... 281 
 
 Combats of Roveredo and Caliano ...... 295 
 
 Bessiferes 297 
 
 Bassano Country 301 
 
 Mantua-Padua Country ......... 303 
 
 Mantua 306 
 
 Pistol of Massena. (Rivoli Collection) 310 
 
 Desaix 316 
 
 Battle of Malsch 317 
 
 Battle of Neresheim 319 
 
 Rhine-Isar Country ......... 320 
 
 Archduke Charles 323 
 
 Battle of Wiirzburg 327 
 
 Kray 329 
 
 Battle of Biberach 335 
 
 Battle of Emmendingen ..... . . 337 
 
 Battle of Schliengen 339 
 
 Alvinzi's Campaign 350 
 
 Battle of Caldiero 357 
 
 Battle of Arcole 361 
 
 A Scimitar ........... 377 
 
 Battle of Rivoli 390 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. xix 
 
 Rivoli Plateau 393 
 
 Papal Campaign 404 
 
 Alvinzi .^ 406 
 
 Bernadotte 413 
 
 Mantua-Leoben Country 416 
 
 General Bonaparte. By d'Angers 439 
 
 Clarke 443 
 
 Hoche's Advance in 1797 445 
 
 Bonaparte. Sketch by David, 1797 ...... 447 
 
 Unfinished Portrait of Bonaparte. By David 451 
 
 Sword of the Period 465 
 
 Tippoo Sahib 461 
 
 Duroc 465 
 
 Bonaparte on board the Orient. By Dutertre 467 
 
 The Mediterranean 468 
 
 Alexandria 472 
 
 The Delta of the Nile 474 
 
 Bonaparte's Signature in Egypt . 477 
 
 Murad Bey .479 
 
 Mameluke . 481 
 
 Mameluke 482 
 
 Battle of the Pyramids 485 
 
 Reynier 486 
 
 Bonaparte in Egypt 487 
 
 OfBcer of Dromedary Corps 492 
 
 Dromedary Soldier 493 
 
 Nelson , 500 
 
 Brueys 501 
 
 Alexandria to Assnan 504 
 
 Talleyrand 615 
 
 Egypt and Syria 517 
 
 Silver-Mounted Pistol of Massena. (Rivoli Collection) . . . 519 
 
 Syria 524 
 
 Siege of Acre 535 
 
 Sidney Smith 537 
 
 Junot 538 
 
 Battle of Mount Tabor 541 
 
 Battle of Aboukir 657 
 
XX LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Murat .... 559 
 
 Marmont 563 
 
 Ganteaume 665 
 
 Sword of Massena. (Rivoli CoUectiou) ..... 566 
 
 Rome and Naples 569 
 
 Cbampionnet 571 
 
 Jourdan and Massena, 1799 576 
 
 Battle of Stockach , . 679 
 
 Oudinot 583 
 
 Battle of Feldkirch 584 
 
 Battle of Magnano 590 
 
 Suwarrov-Moreau Campaign ........ 592 
 
 Suwarrov .......... 593 < 
 
 Battle of Cassano 595 
 
 Macdouald 597 
 
 Battle of the Trebia 600 
 
 Joubert 603 
 
 Battle of Novi 605 
 
 Infantryman. (1799) 607 
 
 The Dutch Expedition . . 609 
 
 Brune 611 
 
 Suwarrov-Massena Campaign 613 
 
 Switzerland 614 
 
 Battle of Zurich ; .... 615 
 
 Soult 617 
 
 Theatre of Napoleon's Campaigns 618 
 
 Sword presented to the First Consul by Officers of the Army of 
 
 Egypt. (Prince Victor's Collection) . ... 620 
 
NAPOLEON 
 
NAPOLEON. 
 
 I. 
 
 ARMY ORGANIZATION AT END OF EIGHTEENTH 
 CENTURY. 
 
 Wab, substantially as it is conducted to-day, dates from the French Revolu- 
 tion. Personal service then began, and many tactical changes, some borrowed 
 from the American Revolutionary War, were made. In 1789 the ancient, rotten 
 royal army of France gave place to a National Guard for home defense, and a 
 levy of the people for active armies. Every citizen being liable, half a million 
 men were quickly raised, and all France became a factory of munitions. Every 
 one worked on material for the army. The scientist turned his attention to war ; 
 mechanical engineers and chemists trained masters and foremen for the provin- 
 cial workshops. Church-bells and statues were recast into cannon. The energy 
 and courage of the Revolutionary leaders were equaled only by their bloody 
 methods, and a man was safer in the army than out of it. In 1793 Carnot took 
 Jiold of military ^affairs, and became the Organizer of Victory. All arms were 
 improved, and the French troops partooi of the leaders' enthusiasm. In the 
 other nations improvements came more slowly, and light foot, horse and batteries 
 were usual in France long before they appeared elsewhere. At first the ill-- 
 drilled infantry required too much artillery to sustain it, but the amount later- 
 equalized itself. Artillery schools gained in teaching-methods. Excellent 
 polytechnic schools trained young men for the army. Miners, sappers and 
 artificers, as well as engineer-geographers and road-builders, were joined in a 
 special corps of exceptional utility. 
 
 The beginnings of the modern era in the art of war date 
 from the French Revolution. It was the upheaval of the 
 people of France which laid the foundation of_£ersonal ser- 
 vice, and added to this patriotic gain, though in a crude 
 manner, the changes that gradually led up to the art as it 
 
2 THE NATIONAL GUARD. 
 
 exists to-day. All this was later moulded into a definite 
 form by Napoleon. Terrible as were the excesses of that 
 rising of a downtrodden people, the good which eventually 
 came of it was yet greater. The general social gain was also 
 partaken by war, the old mercenary army of the kings dis- 
 appeared in France, and its place was taken by the National 
 Guard, parent of that manhood service in which every citizen 
 pays his duty to his country. 
 
 In 1789 the French army numbered about one hundred 
 and thirty thousand foot, thirty thousand horse, and ten 
 thousand artillery and engineer troops, including the several 
 foreign corps — Swiss, German, Irish — and the Guard. The 
 army was rotten in its organization, discipline and morale. 
 At the very opening of the Revolution the Guards and the 
 foreign bodies were dissolved, and whatever of the militia had 
 not deserted was mustered out. What remained was as bad 
 as the worst of the mercenaries of the Thirty Years' War. 
 To replace this under the existing conditions worse than use- 
 less force, a body called the National Guard was originated in 
 Paris, and later assembled in the other large cities, by volun- 
 teering among three classes : the unmarried men from eigh- 
 teen to forty-five years old, the married of like age, and the 
 single and married from forty-five to sixty. The first class 
 was organized in battalions which should meet once a year 
 for drill ; the second was enrolled in companies of one hun- 
 dred men each for secondary use, and the third was listed 
 for service only in its own precinct. This organization, in 
 a population of twenty-four millions, produced a fine body 
 of soldiers of the people ; but having little discipline or edu- 
 cation to build on, it was suited mainly for home defense. 
 For this reason, in 1791 there were formed one hundred 
 and seventy new battalions of infantry, and for the defense 
 of the frontier eighty-three battalions of "national volun- 
 
A NEW ARMY CREATED. 
 
 teers ; " and the following year a number of free corps, de- 
 partmental companies and legions of light troops were raised ; 
 but it was readily seen that these raw levies could not cope 
 with the standing armies of Austria, 
 Prussia and the other European states 
 which were sure to combine against 
 France, — at least in regular warfare. 
 
 As soon as France was declared a re- 
 public and war appeared on the horizon, 
 the National Convention began the crea- 
 tion of a new army, and on the ground 
 that ' the fatherland was in peril,' called 
 upon every citizen to rally to her protec- 
 tion. The size of the army was set at 
 four hundred and fifty thousand men, 
 including the National Guard and the 
 gendarmes who had supplanted the old 
 provincial police ; and meanwhile there 
 were raised thirty thousand men in Paris, 
 which force, with the volunteers and the 
 relies of the old line troops, was got ready to oppose the 
 Prussian invasion of France in 1792. At the same time all 
 France was roused into producing army supplies, firearms and 
 pikes, ammunition and equipments, fieldpieces and caissons, 
 saltpetre and powder. Astonishing energy, backed by the 
 issue of unlimited paper money (assignats) and the ever pre- 
 sent threat of the guillotine, enabled the Convention to raise, 
 before the end of 1792, an army of four hundred and forty- 
 six thousand foot, forty-three thousand horse, and twenty- 
 three thousand men of artillery and engineers. This army 
 was by no means of the best ; and though it possessed exu- 
 berant good-will, yet it melted away so fast that in March, 
 1793, a further levy of three hundred thousand men was 
 
 Soldier of Legion dn 
 Midi. 
 
A GENERAL ENROLLMENT. 
 
 "Vi 
 
 made, and in July one of twelve hundred thousand men. 
 These enormous numbers could be raised by no method 
 except a general enrollment, which should embrace all men 
 from sixteen to forty-five; and this was the first time in 
 modern history when every citizen was held liable to mili- 
 tary duty, and the entire nation was marshaled under arms. 
 The act was that of the people, so- 
 called ; and a fanatical patriotism, or 
 else the fear of the Convention and its 
 bloody methods, led all men to seek 
 some military duty in the rage for lib- 
 erty, or as the only personal safety. In 
 the campaign of 1793 some two hundred 
 thousand men were lost to the ranks by 
 sickness and wounds ; yet in 1794 the 
 army was greater than ever before. 
 
 Inasmuch, however, as this army 
 lacked everything except men, the Con- 
 vention appointed a War Committee to 
 work out of the existing conditions a 
 plan for an army really suited to the 
 necessities of the time, and able to cope 
 with regular forces : by the autumn of 
 1793, owing to its efforts, the French 
 army began to assume a definite shape, 
 and when in August of that year Car- 
 not, then a member of the Convention, 
 was put at the head of military affairs, the strides towards an 
 efficient army were rapid. The old line troops, which consti- 
 tuted a third of the whole body, the National Guards, the 
 volunteers and the popular levies were all consolidated. The 
 national volunteers and the old sharpshooters made up the 
 light infantry. The legions and the free corps contributed to 
 
 Old Guard Sharpshooter. 
 
ALL ARMS IMPROVED. 5 
 
 the light cavalry of the line. Infantry, cavalry, artillery and 
 engineers all received proper and simplified organization. 
 Eegiments, or, as they were denominated, " half -brigades," 
 were placed on a more modern footing in make-up, titles of 
 officers and tactical work. A Central General Staff was 
 placed at the head of the army, and the whole was systemati- 
 cally cut up into divisions, each one comprising troops of all 
 arms, and having its own staff and administration, thus being 
 a body weU fitted for detail on any specific duty. The entire 
 year of 1794 was occupied in this me- 
 thodical work, which in 1795 was fairly 
 completed ; and there then stood ready 
 an army of five hundred and forty- 
 three thousand foot, with thirteen hun- 
 dred and fifty-six regimental guns ; 
 over ninety thousand horse ; two hun- 
 dred and eight batteries of artillery, 
 with twenty thousand men and twelve 
 hundred and fifty guns ; in all a force 
 of over six hundred and fifty thousand 
 well-organized men, not including the 
 technical corps, invalid corps, coast ar- 
 tillerymen and the gendarmes. France 
 had risen in her strength. 
 
 To complete the good work the Di- 
 rectory, which succeeded the Conven- 
 tion, passed in 1798 the Conscription Act, and this has 
 practically been followed in France until to-day. During the 
 Consulate, 1800 to 1804, Napoleon continued and perfected 
 the work of organization and detail, created new military 
 schools, originated the Consular Guards, a corps d'elite of 
 all arms, which later became the Imperial Guard, instituted 
 the Legion of Honor, framed a new body of light infantry 
 
 Infantryman, 1796. 
 
6 
 
 MANHOOD SERVICE. 
 
 called voltigeurs, because they could vault on behind and be 
 carried by a cavalryman, placed the National Guard on a 
 suitable footing for home service, and erected the police force, 
 or gendarmes, into a superior body. France was destined to 
 possess a new army fit to be commanded by its new emperor. 
 Some notable changes had also taken place in the arma- 
 ments of the other European nations. Until this period wars 
 had been conducted by the sovereigns with their standing 
 armies, and without any voluntary participation by the people, 
 the part of the latter being confined to furnishing such men 
 and material as might be requisitioned by the rulers to fill 
 gaps, and to paying without remonstrance such taxes as were 
 laid upon them, — a duty not always cheerfully performed. 
 This uncertain source of supply made it 
 difficult for the monarchs to provide by 
 mere army chests and state economies for 
 the enormous cost of the wars they 
 waged, and often led to their making a 
 peace on poor conditions for the nation, 
 because of the exhaustion of their re- 
 sources. To these rulers the French 
 Revolution with its popular power was a 
 revelation, and one not entirely to their 
 taste. The whole burden of the war was 
 borne by the French people, and when 
 their armies conquered fresh territory, as 
 in the Netherlands, the burden was im- 
 posed in a similar manner on the popu- 
 lation newly added to France. In imita- 
 tion of the French, Switzerland and the 
 Black Forest region soon began a system 
 of manhood service. And Austria anticipated much from a 
 similar action, voluntarily taken in the Tyrol and the Slavic 
 
 Hungarian Border 
 Hussar. 
 
MUSKETS PROCURED. 
 
 provinces, in the way she had always counted for recruits on 
 the ancient Hungarian Insurrection. 
 
 At the opening of the French Revolution, Austria had 
 about two hundred and twenty-five thousand infantry and 
 forty-five thousand cavalry troops, from 
 which figures might be deducted some 
 late losses in Turkey and in the recent 
 revolts in the Netherlands. Prussia had 
 one hundred and seventy thousand in- 
 fantry, and forty thousand cavalry. In 
 addition to these forces were some gar- 
 rison troops, in Prussia about forty thou- 
 sand men, in Austria less. To compare 
 these figures with the later enormous 
 levies is instructive. 
 
 Austrian Light Infan- 
 tryman. 
 
 Infantry. In this arm there had for 
 some years been no great change, except 
 that light foot had proportionately in- 
 creased. In France, where at first there 
 was a dearth of muskets, the National Guard was armed in 
 part with pikes, and indeed the Vendue troops were originally 
 put in line and won their initial successes with only scythes, 
 flails and pitchforks. Gradually, however, muskets enough 
 were procured. At one time there was some use made of air- 
 guns, as among the Austrian sharpshooters, though this weapon 
 held its place no great time. As regards organization, drill 
 and minor tactics, the infantry of Europe remained much what 
 it had been. The Austrian line regiments had three battal- 
 ions, the Hungarian four ; there were special grenadier battal- 
 ions, and the light foot was composed mainly of Croats and 
 riflemen. Each battalion had six companies, and numbered in 
 the line regiments nine hundred and twenty-four men, in the 
 
8 AVAILABLE FORCES. 
 
 grenadier regiments six hundred and ninety, with the Croats 
 and riflemen, six hundred and sixty men. In 1799 there were 
 sixty regiments of line infantry, two grenadier and eighteen 
 fusilier regiments, each of twenty companies ; seventeen regi- 
 ments of Croats, two garrison regiments of eighteen companies 
 each, and fifteen rifle battalions of six companies each. The 
 Prussian line regiment, just prior to the French Revolution, 
 had contained one grenadier, two musketeer, and one reserve 
 battalions. The light infantry was made up of fusilier battal- 
 ions, and there was a regiment of riflemen. Each company 
 contained ten or twenty riflemen drilled to skirmish in open 
 order in its front. The battalion was seven hundred strong, 
 in four companies, the reserve battalion having but three 
 companies. When Frederick William III. came to the throne 
 in 1797, the line regiment had ten musketeer and two grena- 
 dier companies, in all about two thousand men ; and the four 
 grenadier companies of each two regiments were taken from 
 it and put into a separate battalion. In England, at the end 
 of the eighteenth century, owing to fear of a French invasion, 
 the available forces were largely increased by the enlistment 
 of fencibles to protect the coast. There were in all one hun- 
 dred and eleven line regiments, forty regiments of fencibles, 
 one hundred and forty-seven regiments of militia, and some 
 five hundred volunteer corps of various kinds. 
 
 In France, when, at the beginning of the Revolution, the 
 National Guard was originated, each first-class battalion had 
 one grenadier, four fusilier, and one rifle companies; and 
 two field-guns, served by seventeen men, accompanied the 
 body. Outside Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Rouen 
 and Nantes, there were five hundred and forty-seven battal- 
 ions, comprising four hundred and sixty thousand men. The 
 National Guard of Paris, which Lafayette, fresh from his 
 American training, had well organized and drilled, was the 
 
THE GRENADIERS. 
 
 9 
 
 pattern for the rest. The eighty-three battalions of national 
 volunteers raised in 1791 each numbered five hundred and 
 sixty-four officers and men ; and later these grew to two hun- 
 dred and ten battalions. The riflemen of the old line regi- 
 ments were detailed as light troops, and to these were added 
 in 1792 six legions of two battalions of eight companies each, 
 a regiment of mounted riflemen, and a corps of artificers. In 
 1793, after the national volunteers had been consolidated 
 with the line infantry, each regiment (half -brigade) contained 
 one line battalion and two volunteer battalions. The Revolu- 
 tionary French foot was specially classed as line infantry and 
 light. Of the line there were one hun- 
 dred and ninety-six, and later two hun- 
 dred and thirty half-brigades, each con- 
 sisting of three battalions ; and each 
 battalion comprised one grenadier com- 
 pany of sixty-two men, and eight fusilier 
 companies of eighty-six men each. These 
 numbers were increased by supernumera- 
 ries when the battalions went on foreign 
 service. Like other foot soldiers, the gren- 
 adiers carried muskets, but these com- 
 panies fought separated from their bat- 
 talions. They were considered as higher 
 in standing than the average soldier, and 
 under special rules. Grenadiers were not 
 to be used for escorts, they were to re- 
 main in a body with their battalion. 
 They were not to be put on picket nor distributed with other 
 troops. The grenadier company was always to be at the head 
 of the column, or ready to march out to sustain the picket, 
 and by its good countenance keep up confidence ; but impor- 
 tant posts, such as bridges, might be guarded by the grenadiers. 
 
 OfBoer of the Republic. 
 (1793.) 
 
10 LIGHT CAVALRY INCREASE. 
 
 Of light infantry there were thirty half-brigades of similar 
 size, but in these the grenadiers were called carbineers. Each 
 half-brigade, or later each brigade, had a battery of six four- 
 pounder guns. All this made up a force of two hundred and 
 twenty-six half-brigades, numbering over half a million men 
 and thirteen hundred and fifty-six guns. In 1795 the half- 
 brigades were reduced to one hundred and ten, but the grena- 
 dier companies were increased to ninety men, the fusilier 
 companies to one hundred and twenty, the battalion, including 
 staff, to one thousand and sixty-seven, the half -brigade to 
 thirty-two hundred men. The light infantry companies were 
 increased in similar fashion, which produced a relative gain 
 in light infantry. In 1800 there were of line infantry one 
 hundred and ten half-brigades ; and of light infantry thirty 
 half-brigades. But the regimental guns had been taken from 
 the infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. The only general change all over Europe was 
 towards increasing the light cavalry in proportion to the heavy. 
 This arm had cuirassiers and carbineers who were the heavy, 
 and dragoons, hussars, mounted riflemen (chasseurs a chevaV), 
 so called " light horse " (chevauxdegers^ and some lancers, all 
 classed as light cavalry. The dragoons were not infrequently 
 put to use as line cavalry, having lost their original character 
 of mounted infantry, which preferably fought on foot. In 
 Austria, in 1789, the regiments of cuirassiers, carbineers, dra- 
 goons and light cavalry had six squadrons each ; the hussar 
 regiments ten squadrons each. There was one volunteer lancer 
 regiment. Each heavy squadron had one hundred and sixty 
 horses, the light squadron two hundred. In 1799 Austria had 
 twelve cuirassier, fifteen dragoon, twelve hussar, and two lan- 
 cer regiments of six squadrons each, and one regiment of 
 mounted riflemen of eight squadrons. In Prussia there were 
 
FEWER CHANGES IN FRANCE. 
 
 11 
 
 thirteen cuirassier regiments of five squadrons each, twelve 
 dragoon regiments of five and ten squadrons each, and nine 
 hussar regiments of ten squadrons each, the squadron having 
 one hundred and seventy-five horses. In England there were 
 
 Austrian Mounted Chasseur. 
 
 forty-one regiments of line cavalry, six regiments reserve 
 cavalry, thirty regiments of mounted fencibles, and some two 
 hundred and seventy-five corps of mounted volunteers. 
 
 Fewer changes in cavalry organization were made in France. 
 In 1789 there were sixty-two regiments of line cavalry, the 
 heavy and dragoon regiments having three squadrons each, 
 the carbineer, mounted riflemen and hussar regiments four 
 squadrons each. Within four years the cavalry was much in- 
 creased by adding mounted national volunteers, and creating 
 new regiments of mounted riflemen and others. In 1793 the 
 
12 
 
 DIVISION OF HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 organization was changed. The heavy cavalry had neither 
 helmet, cuirass, nor carbine, being armed with only a long 
 straight sword and pistols. There were twenty-nine regiments 
 of heavy cavalry of four squadrons of two companies each, 
 about seven hundred horses to a regiment. The light cavalry, 
 consisting of dragoons, mounted riflemen and hussars, was 
 armed with carbine, pistols and curved sword. There were 
 twenty dragoon regiments of four squadrons each, twenty- 
 three mounted riflemen regiments, and eleven hussar regi- 
 ments of six squadrons each, the squadron 
 containing two companies. The regiment 
 had fourteen hundred horses. There was 
 thus a total of eighty-three regiments 
 with four hundred squadrons, numbering 
 nearly one hundred thousand horses, two 
 thirds being light cavalry. In conse- 
 quence of the great losses in war, the 
 heavy regiments were cut down in 1796 
 to three squadrons, and the light to four 
 squadrons ; but three new regiments were 
 raised. In 1803 the entire heavy cavalry 
 was divided into eighteen regiments of 
 four squadrons each, and in 1805 they 
 were made into cuirassiers. There were 
 also the mounted companies of " guides," 
 soldiers originally intended to study the 
 roads and lead the columns, but they later 
 made up the emperor's escort; and the 
 gendarmerie nationale, which in 1791 
 had taken the place of the marechausee or country police, 
 was divided into twenty-eight divisions, in which were six- 
 teen hundred " brigades " of one non-commissioned officer 
 (brigadier) and four gendarmes. The provost-marshal de- 
 
 Muunted Guard Grena- 
 dier. 
 
FRESH DISCOVERIES. 
 
 13 
 
 partment of the armies was made up of military gendarmes. 
 This excellent body was shortly imitated in every European 
 country. 
 
 Artillery. The energetic men of the French Revolution 
 initiated many improvements in this arm. The casting and 
 boring of guns, the cleaning of saltpetre and the preparation 
 of powder, were much improved by the clever French chem- 
 ists and men of science of that day. The campaigns in the 
 Alps originated mountain artillery which was effective, and 
 portable enough to be really useful. Gribeauval's gun-carriage 
 was simplified, and artillery munitiori-wagons and all running- 
 gear .were perfected. General Eble invented a grapeshot, and 
 contrived a new speicies of fur- 
 nace for heating cannon-balls for 
 the coast artillery. The manu- 
 facture of rockets, to throw light 
 as well as to set fire to distant 
 buildings, and other fire-balls, 
 was improved. In technical ar- 
 tillery construction and service 
 many fresh discoveries were 
 made. In Prussia Tempelhof 
 introduced small field mortars, 
 first used to advantage at the 
 siege of Longwy, and later 
 against troops. Guns were cast 
 with conical chambers, as long used by the Swedes, which gave 
 a greater velocity to the projectile. Mortars were also cast 
 with conical chambers, and were proved by the experiments 
 of the Austrian Vega to be more efficient. Count Rumford 
 and others added to the general knowledge about ballistics. 
 On the whole, artillery was increased in proportion to the other 
 
 Ebl^. 
 
14 
 
 A FACTORY OF MUNITIONS. 
 
 BaTarian Sharpshooter. 
 
 arms, and light and horse artillery in proportion to the rest. 
 Regimental gang were taken from the battalions and collected 
 
 in batteries. And there be- 
 ing more room for improve- 
 ment in this arm, it gained 
 in perfection faster than the 
 others. 
 
 In France, particularly, 
 attention was paid to the 
 artillery as a separate and 
 not a merely auxiliary arm. 
 Even before the Revolution, 
 artillery had received an 
 impetus among the able 
 French scientists and offi- 
 cers, and this advance con- 
 tinued. The arm had con- 
 sisted, prior to 1789, of seven regiments of foot artillery, with 
 six companies of miners and artificers ; but although Austria, 
 Russia and some other nations had introduced Frederick's 
 horse batteries, the French had not done so. When the Con- 
 vention began its universal levy, the necessity of producing 
 ammunition and guns became imperative ; and all France, 
 under four representatives of the people, was divided into 
 eight sections, each supervised by an inspector, who was to 
 oversee the production of saltpetre and powder, and the cast- 
 ing of guns. Most of the copper and iron mills and all the 
 furnaces were utilized for the casting and boring of guns ; 
 church-bells were turned into cannon ; and the whole of 
 France, under requisition of the central authority, became 
 one vast workshop. Nor was this done carelessly. The strong 
 men of the Revolution were wise as well as energetic. Mas- 
 ters and foremen were trained in Paris under the most cele- 
 
FIELD ARTILLERY DIVIDED. 
 
 15 
 
 brated chemists and men of science, and sent into the pro- 
 vinces to superintend the work. As a result, in not many 
 months, the production of all material of war grew apace. 
 But too little heed was paid to uniformity of calibre and 
 pattern ; and in the early Revolutionary wars there was much 
 trouble in providing proper ammunition for the guns at hand. 
 This, however, got rectified little by little. 
 
 Field artillery was then still divided into regimental guns 
 and batteries. The batteries had six, eight and twelve- 
 pounders, with some sixteen-pounders for siege work; and 
 there were six and eight-pounder howitzers. 
 The whole field-artillery arm was divided 
 into regiments and companies. The guns of 
 the foot regiments were mostly four-pound- 
 ers, and of these there were twelve hundred, 
 which with the battery artillery made a dis- 
 proportionate number of guns. But the ob- 
 ject in this was to back up the courage of 
 the ill-drilled and inexperienced conscript by 
 means of a heavy artillery fire. The creation 
 of a large body of light infantry led up to 
 the production of lighter batteries which 
 might keep pace with the men ; and in 1791 
 there were already two companies of this 
 light artillery, each with two eight-pounder 
 guns and two six-inch howitzers, the men 
 serving which were carried along in wagons of peculiar con- 
 struction. But during the next year these men were mounted, 
 as being a handier conveyance, and thus the arm grew into 
 horse artillery. Frederick's horse batteries had been a con- 
 ception of the master-mind rather than a growth. This arm 
 suited the quick-acting French temperament so well that it 
 took on undue proportions. When, in 1793-94, the army was 
 
 French General. 
 (1794.) 
 
16 BATTERIES COME INTO USE. 
 
 reorganized, each half -brigade was given a battery of six 
 guus, that is, the same number of two guns to each battalion 
 was retained. As, however, it was soon discovered that too 
 much artillery retarded the manoeuvres of the army without 
 actual corresponding gain, this allowance was cut down to one 
 gun per battalion, or a six-gun battery to each brigade, — a 
 better proportion. The battalions were no longer hampered 
 by each dragging its own gun, the guns being consolidated 
 into one battery, which followed the brigade manoeuvres. 
 Thus regimental guns gradually disappeared and batteries 
 came into use, consisting of foot and horse artillery, or ac- 
 cording to calibres of heavy and light artillery, the organiza- 
 tion being that of regiments and companies, or batteries. 
 Though this distribution changed from time to time, the gen- 
 eral trend was towards light artillery rather than heavy ; and 
 the mobility of the French armies markedly increased. 
 
 In 1794 the French field artillery comprised eight regiments 
 of foot and eight regiments of horse artillery, twelve companies 
 of artificers and a battalion of pontoniers. The regiment of 
 foot artillery had a staff and twenty companies ; each company 
 was a battery of six guns with eight men per gun, having also 
 supernumeraries for general service; all of which ran the 
 company complement up to ninety-three men. The mounted 
 artillery regiment had a staff and six companies ; each com- 
 pany was a battery of six guns with ten men per gun, a total 
 of sixty men. This made nine hundred and sixty guns and 
 fifteen thousand artillerymen in the foot artillery, two hun- 
 dred and eighty-eight guns and three thousand artillerymen 
 in the mounted artillery ; a total of twelve hundred and forty- 
 eight guns and eighteen thousand men. In charge of the corps 
 of artillery were two hundred and twenty-eight general, staff 
 and superior officers, including inspectors of field, coast and 
 fortress artillery, arsenal and laboratory commanders and 
 
J^ 
 
 HO\A'lTZ.E.F\ 
 
 &OME.R MOF^TAf^ 
 
 PONTOON 
 
 fe SE.CTION 
 
 1-^-- 
 
 J-— --=^— [ 
 
 -—=05 
 
 -^J"'"&'"'.-^ 
 
 ^-=J'--^ 
 
 w^^S 
 
 M U N IT I O N 
 
 GUNS OF THE PERIOD. 
 
GUNS OF THE PERIOD. 
 
"TRAIN-BATTALIONS." 17 
 
 assistants ; and there was a large corps of veteran and coast 
 gunners. The total artillery arm counted over forty thousand 
 men. 
 
 Of the heavy batteries, with guns and howitzers of calibres 
 above-named, excepting the six-pounders, six or twelve were 
 united in a hatterie de position. The four and six-pounders 
 and six-inch howitzers were placed in light batteries made up 
 of four guns and two howitzers. When 
 the French troops were consolidated into 
 divisions, the light artillery got to be 
 called division artillery, and the heavy 
 artillery park or reserve artillery, often 
 le grand pare. And inasmuch as the park 
 artillery carried all the reserve ammuni- 
 tion, the division artillery was entirely 
 dependent on it for supplies or for new 
 guns. Such was the 1795 status of the 
 French artillery. A few changes were 
 later made by Bonaparte when First 
 Consul. Gribeauval had long been In- 
 spector-General, but his place was left 
 vacant from his death in 1789 until 
 Bonaparte filled it. 
 
 The wretched habit had long obtained 
 of having the guns, caissons and wagons hauled by contract. 
 This was altered in 1801 by the organization of eight " train- 
 battalions." The seventh and eighth mounted regiments of 
 artillery were abolished in 1802, and next year seventeen new 
 artillery companies were organized for colonial service, one 
 being mounted. An attempt was made in 1803 to change 
 Gribeauval's simple calibres ; but later this was given up. 
 
 In Austria the mounted batteries had six guns each, and 
 the foot artillery was distributed among the infantry regi- 
 
 Mameluke in French 
 Service. 
 
18 THE PRUSSIAN ARTILLERY. 
 
 ments, two twelve-pounder or six six-pounder guns with each 
 one. An artillery park accompanied the army, out of which 
 the supply could be increased, or a reserve of guns created. 
 Archduke Charles increased the mounted artillery and added 
 some guns to each corps of light 
 troops. In 1799 the Austrian field 
 artillery was divided into three regi- 
 ments of eighteen companies each. 
 
 The Prussian artillery was partly 
 mounted, partly foot, in batteries 
 and with the foot regiments. Bat- 
 teries varied greatly in guns and 
 calibres. There were two mortar- 
 batteries of eight ten-pounder mor- 
 tars each. In 1797 the arm was 
 divided into nine battalions of foot 
 artillery and one battalion of mounted 
 artillery. In the Prussian army op- 
 erating in France in 1792 there were 
 some thirty thousand foot and eleven 
 thousand horse ; and this force had 
 two hundred guns of varied calibre, 
 with the foot regiments and in batteries. This supply was a 
 fair average of all the armies of Europe. 
 
 The artillery had its own regulations and tactics. The 
 French artillery was specially speedy in manoeuvre. Artillery 
 schools were constantly improving. The Berlin Artillery 
 Academy, organized by Tempelhof , vied with the Chalons-sur- 
 Marne school. But France had more polytechnic schools, to 
 which cadets went from Chalons ; and here they studied two 
 years, and then went for practical work to the " regimental 
 schools " at La Fere, B^san9on, Grenoble, Metz, Strasburg, 
 Douay, Auxonne and Toulouse, where the several artillery 
 regiments had their headquarters. 
 
 Dutch Sapper. 
 
PONTONIER COMPANIES. 19 
 
 Engineer Troops, and such men as pontoniers, miners, 
 sappers and artificers, had heretofore been a part of the 
 artillery arm, but in France, early in the Kevolutionary War, 
 they were all collected in a special corps of engineers. 
 
 Part of the equipment of every army was a pontoon-train. 
 In Austria and Prussia there were 
 three pontonier companies. In France 
 in 1793-94 there were two battalions 
 of six hundred men each ; this was 
 reduced next year to one battalion of 
 eight companies of seventy-four men 
 each, and in 1799 a second similar 
 battalion was formed. These ponto- 
 nier companies were constantly prac- 
 ticed in their work, and proved very 
 useful in the Low Countries, Italy and 
 Switzerland, where bridges had con- 
 stantly to be thrown, not only con- 
 structed of boats and pontoons, but 
 made of any material which happened 
 to be at hand. In addition to ponto- 
 niers, there existed in France bodies of 
 expert swimmers for use in this work, 
 to lead sudden attacks across streams, and to protect the 
 throwing of bridges. 
 
 Of miners there were in Austria four companies, in Prussia 
 four, in France a number varying in the several years from 
 four to nine, which at last was fixed at six companies. 
 
 Of artificers there were in France up to 1793 nine com- 
 panies, from then on twelve companies, each with four officers 
 and eighty-three men. 
 
 The sappers were created in 1792 ; in 1793 there were 
 twelve battalions of eight companies each, the company two 
 
 French Sapper. 
 
20 TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS. 
 
 hundred men strong, making the battalion sixteen hundred 
 men, and, all told, nineteen thousand two hundred men. In 
 1793 the sappers and miners, as above stated, were put into 
 the engineer corps, and later the artificers. In 1797 the 
 twelve battalions were cut down to four, and in 1799 a fifth 
 was made, with weaker companies for all. Austria had but 
 three sapper companies. 
 
 During the Kevolution the French engineer corps at first 
 fell into decay, because many trained officers had left the 
 country ; but the arm was later fully revived. Engineer 
 geographers (what we call topographical engineers), road- 
 builders and others of like profession were collected, and the 
 graduates of the polytechnic schools little by little built up 
 the service. In 1794 there were four hundred officers, from 
 generals down, in the corps ; later, some additions were made. 
 This corps rose to great prominence in the Revolutionary 
 wars, and attained a high grade of skill and utility under 
 the Empire. 
 
 Cornet of Voltigeurs. 
 
11. 
 
 TACTICS AND ADMINISTRATION AT END OF 
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 
 
 DuKiNG this period most European nations, save France, remained under the 
 influence of Frederick's system, wliich had been iU-eonstrued, and had degen- 
 erated into formal tactics, and what is known as the cordon system. This was 
 such a posting of troops in small bodies over long fronts as subjected the line 
 to be broken through with ease. For battle armies were similarly marshaled, 
 had no reserves to retrieve disaster, and battles were rarely fought out. In the 
 American Revolution the marksmen-farmers fought in open order behind trees 
 and walls, and won against regular troops in line. Lafayette, Rochambeau 
 and others carried this idea to France, and the French Revolution produced 
 large bodies of skirmishing light foot. In addition to this, to utilize the 
 momentary courage of the French recruit, heavy columns charging with the 
 bayonet, and backed up by plentiful artillery, were used. What this period 
 produced was the new system of personal service and the creation of larger 
 amounts of light foot, horse and artillery, which suited the genius of the 
 French people, and made it easier to get value from the young conscript. In 
 open order, sustained by columns and squares, the French soldier did wonders. 
 The army was divided into divisions for administration. Staff duties were made 
 more prominent. Instead of being fed from magazines, rations were requisi- 
 tioned on the march. The French soldier was taught to make huts or shelters, 
 and tents were abolished. This lightening of the train largely increased the 
 speed of the troops. Other armies followed these movements slowly, but the 
 French kept well ahead of them. They were a constant surprise to the enemy. 
 
 Minor and Battle Tactics. At the opening of the French 
 Eevolution the influence of the Prussian tactics, which Fred- 
 erick had so splendidly illustrated, was predominant every- 
 where, except in France. The three-rank foot and two-rank 
 horse formation was almost universal, but in battle the third 
 rank, in Austria and Prussia, grew to be held superfluous, and 
 later the foot was marshaled in two ranks. In the Austrian 
 
22 INFLUENCE OF PRUSSIAN TACTICS. 
 
 army the third rank of each battalion was drilled to withdraw 
 before action, and to form into three two-rank companies, which 
 made up a species of reserve. The English infantry had for 
 a long while stood in only two ranks, and the Spanish cam- 
 paigns proved the formation equal to all demands. The Aus- 
 trian cavalry still rode mostly in three ; but before action the 
 third rank also withdrew, and ployed into column to protect the 
 flanks. Thus the formation for both attack and defense was 
 a long thin line, in which the foot relied chiefly upon its fire. 
 The main evolutions of minor tactics were advancing and 
 retiring in line, wheelings, ployments and deployments by 
 smaller or greater bodies, forward and flank marches by pla- 
 toons and sections in close or open column. The battle order 
 of an army usually consisted of two lines of foot with light 
 troops out in front, and a reserve too small to be efficient. 
 Each line was under command of a general officer, and con- 
 sisted of brigades of from four to six battalions each. The 
 horse invariably stood on the flanks, unless these were leaned 
 on obstacles which would fend off cavalry charges by the 
 enemy ; and then the horse was stationed in the rear. Each 
 battalion had a gun or two, and at certain places in the line 
 batteries of reserve artillery of heavier calibre were placed. 
 The mounted artillery was generally employed in the front 
 with the light troops, or with the reserve ; or else it accom- 
 panied the light troops, if detached; the cavalry was given 
 but little of it to complete its efficiency. 
 
 Artillery opened the action, and the skirmish line fended 
 off the enemy's light troops. Then the first line of the attack- 
 ing army advanced to within musket range of the enemy, 
 strove to break it down by its fire, and when this was done, 
 charged. The cavalry meanwhile sought to outflank and at- 
 tack the enemy's foot and thus demoralize it. When covered 
 by its cavalry, this had first to be driven in. If the first line 
 
CONCENTRIC ATTACKS. 23 
 
 did not soon succeed, it was reinforced or relieved by the 
 second line. Should this make no better progress, and the 
 cavalry not have beaten the opposing 
 horse, the victory was rightfully claimed 
 by the enemy, who had stood on the de- 
 fensive. Concentric attacks were com- 
 mon, in front and on the flanks and rear 
 of the enemy's army ; but unless these 
 attacks could be timed so as smartly 
 to work together, the result was apt 
 to be failure. The army acting on the 
 defensive fought in place after much 
 the same fashion, relying on its artillery 
 and infantry fire ; and the second line 
 and cavalry assisted the first line. The 
 retiring of the first line was wont to 
 have an ill effect on the second. Hence, 
 unless the first line of the army on the 
 defensive could stand off the enemy's 
 first line and cavalry to good effect, this 
 army would be apt, for fear of defeat, 
 to break off the battle and retire to a fresh field, an opera- 
 tion in those days of slow manoeuvres much more easy of 
 accomplishment than it is to-day, as the opponent was rarely 
 ready to follow. 
 
 Frederick had given to his battles the true flavor of his^ 
 own burning genius ; but as a rule, in disposition for battle 
 and in its conduct, there had since been little homogeneity 
 or concentration. The troops were far too much spread and 
 out of hand. They often lay in small isolated bodies, each 
 exposed to be separately beaten. The whole mass was wont 
 to be put into action at once, so that no reserve was left to 
 reestablish a waning action, or renew an attack which had 
 
 Russian Chevalier 
 Guard. 
 
24 LINEAL TACTICS SUPPLANTED. 
 
 failed, but which, delivered afresh, might succeed. Battles 
 were never fully fought out, and one party or the other re- 
 tired from a field half won or lost. Reserves powerful 
 enough to give a new turn to a battle were unknown. The 
 French troops were the first which, partly by the accident of 
 exceptional conditions, opposed to this system the open order 
 combined with the column of attack. The success of this 
 
 new idea quite supplanted the old Prussian lineal tactics ; and 
 it forms the most important of the tactical changes of this 
 remarkable period. 
 
 Thrice at least in our history we Americans have taught 
 the world some valuable lessons in war. At Concord and 
 Lexington we proved the superiority of good marksmen in 
 open order, each one taking advantage of the accidents of the 
 ground, over seasoned regulars who fought elbow to elbow. 
 
FIGHTING IN OPEN ORDER. 
 
 25 
 
 In 1812 we gave numerous lessons iu naval warfare to the 
 English. In the Civil War, among other things, we showed 
 what was to be the future role of cavalry which moved in the 
 saddle and fought on foot ; what successive thin lines of at- 
 tack could accomplish ; we first armored ships and effectively 
 used them in war, and we first made many of the inventions 
 in arms which have been the basis of modern rapid fire. This 
 list could be enlarged. 
 
 There had been firing in open, or skirmishing, order known 
 as early as the first introduction of firearms. But at the 
 beginning of the eighteenth century only the irregular foot, 
 mostly irresponsible though brave men, thus fought. Then 
 Frederick introduced it among his light infantry ; but as the 
 advancing fire of the regular Prussian line was what the 
 king relied on to win 
 his battles, this dis- 
 persed manner of fight- 
 ing never grew to 
 great importance in his 
 scheme. In the Amer- 
 ican Kevolutionary 
 War the open order 
 fighting of the sharp- 
 shooting farmers, with 
 little discipline, lent 
 lustre to the system 
 by beating the mar- 
 shaled lines of British 
 or Hessian regulars, 
 led by excellent offi- 
 cers. What had suc- 
 ceeded in America was imitated in France, many French offi- 
 cers who had served in America being on hand to teach the 
 
 Lafayette. 
 
26 
 
 COLUMN RUSH TACTICS. 
 
 Rochambeau. 
 
 method. Such were Lafayette and Rochambeau. When the 
 armies of the First Coalition crossed the French border, their 
 long lines were met by irregular parties of skirmishers, who 
 
 took advantage of every hedge 
 and wall and ditch, and advanced 
 upon them with a fire which did 
 much harm, though these franc- 
 tireurs suffered little ; while in 
 the rear, under cover of the 
 horse, the new levies formed a 
 heavy column of attack in which 
 multitude lent confidence. And 
 when the skirmishers had done 
 their work, this deep column, 
 with true French elan, preceded 
 by artillery fire and sustained by 
 cavalry, advanced on the long thin formation of the allies 
 with great effect, and frequently disrupted their weakened 
 line by a charge with the naked weapon. The effect of this 
 novelty in action upon the old-fashioned line of battle was 
 marvelous. Not until the Gaul met the colder-blooded Anglo- 
 Saxon in the Spanish Peninsula did this column rush tactics 
 fail against the line. 
 
 While it is true that the use of the open order which began 
 in Europe in the French Revolution was a direct product of 
 American experience, and was imitated by the French under 
 conditions similar to those which had prevailed in the New 
 World a decade before, the ployment into a deep column of 
 the reserve was already well known. Folard, early in the 
 eighteenth century, made plans to draw up troops for battle 
 in deep formation, so as to attack with the pike and bayonet. 
 This was in part a copy of the Greek phalanx, or of the 
 " battles " of the Middle Ages ; but it was also founded on 
 
THE ATTACK IN MASS. 
 
 27 
 
 the French national character, which Folard aptly recognized 
 as being better adapted to a charge in column than to long- 
 drawn-out fire in a slender line. But there was too great for- 
 mality in war in Folard's time to lend his column any proper 
 success ; and at the end of his century there was far too much 
 adherence to the Prussian line system to enable anything but 
 an entire change of conditions to bring about a new method 
 of infantry attack. Two other French military authors, Mesnil- 
 Durand and Guibert, indulged in long and bitter controver- 
 sies on these points ; but nothing was settled until the raw 
 levies of the French Revolution, instinct 
 with patriotic fervor, found that some new 
 means of overcoming the allied troops was 
 called for. This means proved to be the 
 above described attack in mass with the 
 blank weapon, covered by heavy artillery 
 fire and sustained by horse. The endless 
 theorizing of Folard, Mesnil-Durand and 
 Guibert was supplanted by an instant and 
 practical object lesson. Yet their works 
 had pointed out the way. 
 
 Thus arose, in France first of all Eu- 
 ropean countries, a large body of light in- 
 fantry trained to fight in open order ; and 
 its success also introduced a similar train- 
 ing in the line infantry. Following hard 
 upon this came, as an essential sequence, 
 the creation of battalion columns which 
 should attack with the bayonet, a tactics which was also learned 
 by both light and heavy infantry. These two quite opposite yet 
 consistent ideas were united and made to work together ; and 
 their use soon rendered them effective. Later, in Egypt, the 
 square against cavalry, long used by Russians and Austrians 
 
 Swedish Line Infan- 
 tryman. 
 
28 
 
 NO CAVALRY RESERVE. 
 
 in battle with the Turks and Tartars, and by the English in 
 India, came into play, and the French grew expert in com- 
 bining these three methods. 
 
 Another meritorious French idea was the creation of the 
 grand-tactical unit known as the division, in which all three 
 arms should be represented, and should work together jointly. 
 This assembled an excellent body for separate action, or for 
 action in unison with other divisions, and it was not so large 
 or unwieldy but that a general of moderate ability and active 
 habit could handle it. The main weakness of every army lay 
 in the fact that there were not reserves of infantry or artillery 
 of sufficient size to be effective. There was an artillery park, 
 but this was rather to supply gaps than 
 to act as reserve artillery ; and the infan- 
 try reserve was always kept too small, 
 while there was no cavalry reserve at all. 
 The cavalry was divided up among the 
 divisions, and even if collected, it was not 
 habituated to operate in great masses. 
 To the credit of Hoche, the commander- 
 in-chief of the Army of the Sambre and 
 Meuse in 1797, it must be scored that 
 he first thought of collecting the cavalry 
 (dragoons, chasseurs, and hussars) into 
 special divisions. This was an important 
 step, but it yet did not amount to a cavalry 
 reserve. In 1796-97, in Italy, Bonaparte 
 on several occasions took the cavalry from 
 the divisions and collected it into a cav- 
 alry reserve. But this was an unusual 
 step ; and at the end of the eighteenth century the general 
 want of foot and horse reserves was much felt. For this 
 reason, too, the mounted artillery was of lessened utility, 
 
 Dutoli Hnsaar. 
 
MOBILITY ACQUIRED. 29 
 
 as it had no considerable body of cavalry with which to act. 
 But though the French cavalry could not work in masses, it 
 had become excellent for outpost, scouting and minor duties. 
 And it learned to fight in open order like the foot, which until 
 the middle of this century had been done in Europe only by 
 the Turks, Cossacks, Poles and Hungarians ; and this method 
 was gradually put into practice by the line cavalry. 
 
 There were nine years of uninterrupted war following the 
 opening of the French Revolution ; and these years gave the 
 young and able men who furthered the destinies of the new 
 Republic opportunity to introduce and perfect the fresh system 
 of war above spoken of. To this system the French raw levies 
 owed their successes ; the alert Gaul eagerly lent himself to 
 forwarding it ; and the Revolutionary armies attained so re- 
 markable an elasticity and ability to manoeuvre, such speed in 
 marching, and such energy in battle, as to lend them an un- 
 questioned preponderance over their enemies. Moreover, the 
 Convention ruling France, never freed from fear that the 
 troops would rise against its merciless authority, kept the 
 several armies in constant motion from one point on the f ron- 
 tier to another, never leaving them long in any one place, 
 nor affording them idleness in which to conjure up mischief ; 
 and as a result the divisions acquired a mobility in marching 
 and manoeuvring, a power to overcome difficulties and sustain 
 prolonged exertion, which in a few months gave the raw 
 French soldier the qualities of the veteran. All this gain was 
 of course not made without much opposition to the new system, 
 without many grievous backsets, as well as many splendid 
 victories. There were not wanting able men who discredited 
 the new idea, and would have put the French soldier back 
 into the old line-of-battle rut. And it was only real and bril- 
 liant success which at length settled the new tactics as pecul- 
 iarly adapted to the French genius, and as superior to the 
 
30 "MILITARY DIVISIONS." 
 
 Prussian lineal-tactics. From France the new system slowly 
 spread, forcing its way against the opposition of the old 
 school; but during this entire period there was, in other 
 European countries, a mixing of the old with the new, a 
 struggle of the latter for precedence, which lent the art of war 
 a color far from clear, and helped to confuse the operations of 
 armies. 
 
 There was much written discussion in these days of the 
 rival systems. Advocates of the new system theorized about 
 its advantages and wrought out of darkness a definite method ; 
 while the lovers of the old clung to their ancient habits. Lin- 
 denau's noteworthy " Higher Prussian Tactics," issued in 
 1790, showed that what was left of Frederick's method, a 
 mere shadow indeed, though then deemed the best in existence, 
 was full of impossibilities and of imperfections. Other writ- 
 ers followed Lindenau, and by pointing out the value of the 
 one and the weakness of the other, prepared the way for the 
 advent of the new system. And this system was perfected 
 much earlier and to better advantage in France than in the 
 other European countries, and lent the French armies a 
 marked advantage. 
 
 The Decree of the Convention of March 15, 1792, divided 
 France into sixteen " military divisions " or sections. Each 
 of these divisions controlled several of the so-called " depart- 
 ments," and all the troops, line and National Guard, therein 
 stationed. These military divisions were kept in force for 
 many years. They were in no sense allied to the tactical 
 divisions, into which, as above stated, the army was divided 
 at about the same time. This latter organization, whose 
 administration was distinct, made a great change for the 
 better, so far as responsibility and care of the troops was 
 concerned. In active service the tactical divisions were homo- 
 geneous bodies well adapted to every species of duty. Four 
 
THE ARMY CORPS. 
 
 31 
 
 or five divisions, placed under one leader, made up an army 
 which was convenient to handle up to a certain size, say forty 
 thousand men. But in large armies 
 it was found that these bodies were 
 too small and numerous, and that 
 they made too many units, for one 
 commanding general to handle. This 
 led to placing several divisions into 
 an army corps, the first instance of 
 which was in Moreau's army in Ger- 
 many in the 1800 campaign. This 
 army had eleven divisions ; and these 
 were consolidated into four corps, 
 viz. : the reserve of three divisions 
 under Moreau ; the right wing of 
 three divisions under Lecourbe ; the 
 centre of three divisions under St. 
 Cyr, and the left wing of two divi- 
 sions under Ste. Susanne. This ex- 
 cellent idea shortly spread to the 
 other French armies. The rest of 
 
 the European nations had, during peace, adopted the regi- 
 ment as the unit of administration ; during war, several 
 regiments were wont to be placed in a so-called division under 
 a general officer, whose staff was an adjutant-general, two 
 assistant adjutant-generals and one engineering officer. The 
 separate armies had larger but similar staffs of higher rank. 
 But the administration was not taken from the regiments. 
 
 French Marine. 
 
 Administration and Supplies. For the supply depart- 
 ments in France there were war commissaries, and these 
 officials, often to the confusion of all regularity, were quite 
 independent of military control. Before the Revolution there 
 
32 ADMINISTRATION REGULATED. 
 
 was a general staff for the whole army, one for the artillery 
 and infantry, and one for the cavalry; these were in 1792 
 consolidated into a single body. The utility of a general 
 staff had long been recognized by military men, somewhat on 
 the lines of those which are so efficient to-day, though far 
 less detailed in organization ; but no such body was actually 
 created until the end of the eighteenth century. In France 
 engineer officers and topographical engineers were appointed 
 by the Convention to do duty quite similar to that of a gen- 
 eral staff ; but until the period of the Consuls, the idea was 
 not broadened. When Bonaparte became First Consul, he 
 began such work by organizing the " Depot de la Guerre," 
 and by increasing the corps of geographic engineers. His 
 system of maps and charts became excellent. It was then a 
 novelty, the lack of which, as in Moreau's 1799 campaign, 
 was grievously felt. 
 
 The entire direction of military affairs in France was held 
 by the ministry of war, whose chief, the war minister, was 
 responsible to the heads of the State. There was a War 
 Council prior to 1789, which in 1790 was called a War Com- 
 mission, and was made up of members of the Assembly ; and 
 later under the Convention a War Committee. During the 
 early years of the Eevolution and under the Convention, 
 there was much disorder and irregularity in military affairs ; 
 but under the Directory and Consulate, especially by Bona- 
 parte's efforts, matters were regulated and carried on with 
 method. The work of the engineers and artillery was par- 
 ticularly to be commended. 
 
 When the reorganization of the French army was effected 
 in the years 1793 to 1795, a number of changes were made, 
 partly only in nomenclature, the record of which appears 
 slightly confused. Infantry regiments became known as 
 " half-brigades," lieutenant-colonels (our majors) as chiefs of 
 
OFFICIAL PROMOTIONS. 33 
 
 battalions ; colonels as chiefs of squadrons ; brigadier-gener- 
 als as commanders of half-brigades; marechals des camps 
 (or major-generals) as generals of brigade, lieutenant-gen- 
 erals as generals of division ; marshals of France as gener- 
 als-in-chief. And the staff officers were known as chief of 
 staff, adjutant-general, adjutant-major, etc. Promotions were 
 changed so that a third went by seniority, and two thirds 
 among the generals by selection 
 of the ministry, and among the 
 lesser officers by selection of those 
 of equal rank. Commanders of 
 half-brigades were promoted only 
 by seniority. " The generals in 
 chief were selected by the gov- 
 ernment from the generals of 
 division. In 1801 there was 
 appointed in the cavalry, and in 
 1804 in all the other regiments, 
 a staff officer with title of Major, 
 to whom was committed, as a 
 species of assistant to the com- 
 mander of the regiment, the 
 charge of the horses and equip- 
 ments, instruction and discipline. 
 
 The pay of the troops, up to the time of the Consulate, 
 was very irregularly made, and then only in paper money. 
 This was, in view of the condition of the French finances 
 and the huge levies, by no means to be wondered at ; but 
 it gave rise to very great dissatisfaction and uurest, not infre- 
 quently to mutinies. Not before the consular period was 
 this corrected. Nor was France an exception. In the Ger- 
 man armies it was nearly as bad. 
 
 The most important change of this era was in the victual- 
 
 Austrian Light Grenadier. 
 
34 INSUFFICIENT FOOD SUPPLIES. 
 
 ing of the armies. During the first Revolutionary campaigi 
 the troops were fed by the long-used system of magazine 
 common all over Europe. It was the war commissary wl 
 served with each army to whom was committed this tasl 
 and this official handled all moneys and issued all supplie 
 Soon this means proved insufficient, on account of the lar^ 
 levies to be fed, of the rapid movements required of thei 
 over all kinds of country, in much of which supplies we: 
 hard to get, and particularly because the war commissaru 
 commonly proved to be inefficient, and all too often di 
 honest. Many of these men grew, rich while the trooj 
 starved ; and yet the military authorities had no control ov< 
 them. It was much like, and worse than the clashing of tl 
 Indian agents and the army officers in the Indian wars of tl 
 United States. These war commissaries procured influenc 
 in Paris by the usual means known to all ages and in a 
 climes, and were thus protected in their authority and the: 
 peculations. The fact that the army commanders could n( 
 get their troops fed led them to resort to requisitions on tl 
 inhabitants of the countries traversed. Thus in 1792 an 
 1793 the French armies got victual partly from the magazine 
 and partly by forced requisitions, the latter being most! 
 accompanied by disorder and pillage. The next year, 179' 
 requisitions became the rule. From the moment the troops lei 
 their quarters, they began to levy for their food and forage o 
 every peasant and in every village. If not willingly givei 
 the iprovieion was taken by force, both in France and i 
 foreign lands. Thus arose, out of the existing evil condition 
 the excellent system of victualing by requisitions, at the ii 
 ception an irregular and unsystematic plan, accompanied b 
 much plundering and suffering to the country occupied, bi 
 later worked into a methodical procedure, chiefly during tl 
 Consulate and by the efforts of Bonaparte. 
 
VICTUALING BY REQUISITION. 35 
 
 This was not an entirely new means of victualing. In the 
 Thirty Years' War, and indeed before and after, armies had 
 been fed on the country. In fact, the reason for moving into 
 any given territory was often not so much strategic as that it 
 afforded good supplies ; and the land traversed was wont to 
 be left a desert. The armies of the seventeenth century 
 moved slowly, and eat out the country before they left it. 
 The French Revolutionary armies requisitioned as they went 
 rapidly along. The object of the one was to find a prosper- 
 ous country which might be plundered, so as to keep the 
 mercenaries of some potentate from disbanding until some 
 happy manoeuvre or accident yielded the advantage sought ; 
 that of the other was to enable it to live while carrying out a 
 legitimate operation. 
 
 It was only in the French armies, at first, that this system 
 took root, while the other nations continued to rely on maga- 
 zines ; and this accounts for the more rapid marches of the 
 French. But it was by no means a perfect system, and much 
 suffering among the troops and infinitely more still among the 
 country people was the result, as well as marked deterioration 
 of the discipline of the French levies. It was, however, well 
 suited to the offensive character of the French wars ; and as 
 good results followed the rapid manoeuvring of their armies, 
 the system prospered. Nothing hampers the operations of an 
 army so much as labored victualing ; nothing leaves it so free 
 as to live on the country, if this is rich. But in a poor land, 
 or one long occupied, the result is sure to be a crop of the 
 worst outrages and crimes by the men, as well as much depri- 
 vation for the troops, coupled to a complete devastation of the 
 territory passed over. Bonaparte's orders on this subject in 
 1796, and frequently thereafter, show to what this system had 
 grown. The other European armies still clung to their mag- 
 azines ; and it must be acknowledged that these were not 
 
36 BAGGAGE TRAINS DECREASED. 
 
 much more successfully managed ; for the Prussians in 17S 
 suffered greatly on account of defective victualing, both i 
 strength and discipline ; and the Austrian campaigns in Ita] 
 from 1796 to 1800 were vastly hampered by the difficulty < 
 magazine-victualing, in the effort to oppose Bonaparte's moi 
 rapid operations, which were fostered by living on the countr; 
 
 Baggage. In this period, too, the baggage trains began 1 
 be limited, and the abolishing of the daily transportation an 
 erection of tents added as much as requisitions to the mobilii 
 of the French armies. In lieu of tents the French levi< 
 were taught to construct huts or shelters out of boards take 
 from nearby buildings, branches of trees, poles, straw an 
 other materials, much as our own Continentals had done 
 dozen years before. Even in permanent quarters this pla 
 was made to work well. All people used to frontier life, c 
 with a knowledge of woodcraft, know how comfortably me 
 can house themselves with even limited material. Our Ame: 
 ican volunteers became expert at this business in the Civ 
 War. The system among the French cut down the numbf 
 of wagons to a small fraction of what they had been, an 
 vastly increased the mobility of their columns. It was im 
 tated towards the end of the century by other nations, an 
 helped decrease the enormous trains, but scarcely in the sam 
 degree as with the French. For instance, the Prussian trai 
 in 1792 carried one hundred and eight tents for each ba 
 talion, and forty for each squadron, to transport which thei 
 were needed twenty-eight horses and sixteen men for tl 
 infantry tents, and sixteen horses and eight men for tl 
 cavalry. Each infantry and artillery company had one, an 
 each squadron two wagons for rations; and in addition \ 
 these, each battalion was followed by four, and each squadrc 
 by two two-horse wagons to carry the tent-poles and blauke 
 
MUTINIES. 
 
 37 
 
 of the men. The officers were allowed wagons, horses and 
 servants, according to rank. The result was that for an 
 infantry regiment which had twenty-two hundred combatants, 
 there were over twenty-four hundred non-combatants and 
 four hundred horses in the train ; for a cavalry regiment of 
 five squadrons with nine hundred mounted men, there were 
 nearly eleven hundred men and twelve hundred horses ! 
 
 Hospital service during this period dragged ou, as a rule, in 
 the same old ruts, although many learned books were written 
 on military hygiene, war surgery, etc., and though in some 
 European armies an effort was made to better the practice of 
 the art of healing. 
 
 Discipline. As regards discipline and morale, the French 
 armies at the opening of the Revolutionary period were on 
 the lowest possible scale ; but by the w 
 efforts of the many able men and officers 
 whom the troublous era brought to the 
 front, this condition was changed, so that 
 by the end of the century the evils al- 
 ways attending a time of civil war and 
 anarchy were finally and fully corrected. 
 But the early years were one long record 
 of mutinies against generals suspected 
 of treachery, against officers loosely 
 charged with appropriating the sol- 
 diers' pay and rations, and for numer- 
 ous other causes. In Metz and Nancy 
 these mutinies reached their flood-tide 
 in extensive outbreaks. Politics in- 
 vaded the ranks, especially in the Na- 
 tional Guard and the fresh levies. This mixture of politics 
 and war led naturally, at the first reverse, to a cry of treason 
 
 Austrian Royal Infantry- 
 man. 
 
38 NO FORMAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 by the men against the officers suspected, and to these office! 
 being murdered on the spur of the moment, or to their beiii 
 speedily brought to the guillotine. Later there was lei 
 of this wayward conduct, but real discipline consumed a d 
 cade to bring about. Infrequent pay, poor rations and tl: 
 establishment by the Convention of " public denunciators 
 and " revolutionary tribunals " in the armies made it eas 
 for discontent to take the form of a legal arraignment of ar 
 unpopular general as an " enemy of the country," which wj 
 wont to be followed on a half-hearing by the execution ( 
 the supposed offender. As a result, the efforts of even sue 
 leaders as Hoche, Pichegru, Moreau and others were Iod 
 unrewarded by any real gain in discipline. Only those wl: 
 were favorites with the men could accomplish anything. Bi 
 on the other hand, the sharp, long and energetic wars bre 
 an unflinching spirit and a power of endurance among tl 
 French troops which was of the highest type ; and this in 
 way took the place of formal discipline. And while it is tru 
 that to the French soldiery — as indeed to nearly all othe 
 troops of the day — can be traced untold instances of cruelt; 
 robbery, arson and rapine, yet these same troops withstoo 
 hunger, cold, toil and danger in a manner beyond all praisi 
 Gallant and bold, though fierce and unrelenting, the Revoli 
 tionary French soldier covered himself with glory. By 179 
 these good qualities rose to their greatest height, and froi 
 that year on, not only were his deeds more marked, but h: 
 general conduct became more soldierly ; and the discipline i 
 general responded, as is usual, to the character of the office 
 in command. But discipline as we understand it to-day, ths 
 discipline which tends to lessen the horrors of war by mal 
 ing the soldier respect the rights of others, while in no wis 
 decreasing his fighting qualities, a discipline perhaps moi 
 marked in our Civil War than in any other where enormoi 
 
TOKENS OF REWARD. 
 
 39 
 
 forces have been under arms, was never known in the Revo- 
 lutionary or Napoleonic armies. 
 
 A change in military penalties was made during the Revo- 
 lutionary wars. Corporal punishment, usual for centuries, was 
 abolished. A new penal code prescribed death for the higher 
 crimes and imprisonment for the lesser. It is 
 curious that in this code no mention is made 
 of dueling, though this was common, not only 
 among individuals, but between bodies of men, 
 whole companies indeed ; a fact which led to 
 much absurd but lamentable bloodshed. The 
 habit may have been considered as essential to 
 sustain the honor of a corps as well as of an 
 individual ; and the term " honor " was then 
 more apt to be misconstrued than now. A 
 system of military orders and decorations was 
 instituted by the Convention. The highest re- 
 ward that a French citizen could attain was 
 public mention by the government as having 
 well deserved of the country (" bien meiite de 
 la patrie "). It was Napoleon, as First Con- 
 sul, who again began the ancient tokens of 
 reward by medals, swords of honor, pensions 
 of soldiers, their wives and orphans, paid 
 out of the army and navy appropriations, and the institu- 
 tion in 1802 of the Legion of Honor. Although the Con- 
 vention had decreed that captured Vendeans and emigres 
 should be shot without trial, it is to be said to its honor that 
 all other prisoners of war were placed under the shelter of 
 the law, and received rations and even a small inoney pay- 
 ment. The shooting of Vendeans naturally led to retaliation, 
 and such consequent cruelty as lent the war of the Vendee 
 a peculiar atrocity. 
 
 Baden MuBketeer. 
 
40 CAPTIVE BALLOONS. 
 
 Balloons and Telegraphs. There were two inventior 
 made in this period which added somewhat of interest t 
 military matters, those of balloons and telegraphic signaling 
 So soon as balloons were conceived by Montgolfier in 178' 
 the idea of their utility in field operations was mooted. Aer< 
 static Institutes were started in Paris to prepare air-ship 
 which could be availed of to observe the enemy, and thea 
 captive balloons were actually employed in the early Revok 
 tionary wars. Companies of aeronauts were created, an^ 
 each army was accompanied by two balloons and a prope 
 service. At first the officers who a,scended used the nava 
 signals ; but they later employed telegraphic instruments 
 then just discovered. Teams of thirty and forty horses wer 
 attached to these captive balloons to move them from plac 
 to place ; but as all other efforts to make them dirigible wer 
 fruitless, they proved to be of questionable utility. At th 
 battle of Fleurus in 1794, the captain of aeronauts, Coutell 
 by name, remained above the Austrian lines for nine hours 
 and telegraphed the movements of the enemy to the Frencl 
 army. It was not this, however, that won the battle, but i 
 had its effect in raising the spirits of the French and in annoj 
 ing the Austrians. A balloon and full equipment accom 
 panied Bonaparte to Egypt ; but we do not learn of its havini 
 been used, and after this the service declined. Telegraphi 
 or semaphonic signaling had been well known to the ancients 
 In modern times, the first use in war of the new electric ar 
 was at this period. Especially at the siege of Mainz, ; 
 Frenchman named Chappe constructed a simple means o 
 military telegraphy ; and later a number of men of scienc 
 improved the system. 
 
 Fortification and Field-works. Perhaps in no war wer 
 field fortifications and temporary defenses put to use mor 
 
FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 41 
 
 than in the French Revolution. On a large scale the system 
 of separate redoubts, mutually supporting each other, took 
 the place of the old fortified lines. This was, it must be 
 remembered, the era of cordon lines of defense ; and it was 
 not unusual to find, for the protection of a frontier, or of an 
 army in quarters, or otherwise, a long line of these separate 
 works. On the north, east and south, in the first Revolu- 
 tionary wars, France was in fact surrounded by a girdle of 
 several lines of such works, as supplementary to the large 
 fortresses ; and between these lay a dozen armies stretched out 
 in cordon. These redoubts usually had a sharp profile and 
 excellent obstacles in their front ; and though the old form 
 was conserved, the works were now constructed so as better 
 to conform to the lay of the land. And 
 yet, as always happens, even in what were 
 called inaccessible positions, these re- 
 doubts were often captured out of hand. 
 Field fortifications grew apace in these 
 wars. Many engineers and men of sci- 
 ence took up the subject, and Fouassac, 
 Jetze and Marquard added much to it. 
 D'ArQon showed how isolated works 
 could support each other, and the ter- 
 rain be utilized to this end ; Hennert in 
 Holland wrote learnedly on permanent 
 fortification. This latter art was also 
 improved. War sat upon all western 
 Europe ; there was no time to build 
 new fortresses; but much was done in 
 improving those existing. Mainz was 
 a good sample of such work, the city being transformed into 
 a fortress in 1792-93. Chasseloup and Bousmard drew plans 
 to correct the evil of leaving fortified places open to ricochet 
 
 Westphalian Guard 
 Grenadier. 
 
42 SIEGES SHORTENED. 
 
 firing, and to the breaching of the main wall at any poini 
 All the means adopted by Vauban, Coehorn and others ha 
 not been able to prevent the effectiveness of ricochet firing 
 except at great expense. Calibres of guns for fortresses wei 
 changed. In 1792 it was ordered that a third of such gur 
 should be sixteen-pounders and twenty-four-pounders, a thir 
 twelve-pounders and a third smaller. One marked idea i 
 the changes instituted was to make the work suit the existin 
 conditions, not to construct it by hard and fast rules. Tl 
 details of these improvements, however, belong to the eng 
 neer's art and not to this history. 
 
 On the other hand, the means of taking fortresses w£ 
 somewhat improved. The siege-batteries were given moi 
 mortars, and guns capable of ricochet firing; and thoug 
 there are no instances of the capture of large fortresses o\ 
 of hand, and few by bombardment alone, yet the reguh 
 sieges were much shortened in duration, though they remain€ 
 the same in form. There cannot be said to have been a di 
 tinct gain in the art of besieging in this period. As a rul 
 when a breach was made, a fortress was surrendered wii 
 honor, and with free exit of the garrison ; or at least, tl 
 garrison surrendered as prisoners of war. Acre was one i 
 the most noteworthy sieges of this epoch. 
 
 Rations and Pay. As all men who have seen servi 
 know, a soldier, during a serious campaign, rations hims€ 
 as best he may. Messes and other means of feeding tl 
 troops may at any moment lose organization and utility, ai 
 the hard-worked man eats as, and when, and what he ca 
 But in the French army there was supposed to be a mess f 
 each company, the bulk of the expense of which was bor 
 by the government, and the rest deducted from the soldie: 
 pay. The men largely lived on soup and bread ; meat a: 
 
ARMY RATIONS. 
 
 43 
 
 vegetables were issued when procurable, to make a pot-au- 
 
 fou ; and issues of wine at night and brandy in the morning 
 
 were usual. In garrison or on a peace 
 
 footing the men lived better in the ranks 
 
 than the average French peasant, — a fact 
 
 which partly reconciled the raw recruit to 
 
 his new life. In the field, of course, it was 
 
 alternate abundance and starvation, more 
 
 frequently the latter than the former. 
 
 The pay at different periods was that 
 given in the following tables, a consider- 
 able part of the dues to the enlisted men 
 being consumed in mess money, and 
 money for shoes and underclothing. For 
 instance, in a decree of March 12, 1806, 
 aiming to " furnish soldiers more abun- 
 dant nourishment to protect their health," 
 it was ordered " that from the 1st of 
 May there should be furnished an ordi- 
 nary mess administered by the captains, 
 be made up from the five centimes previously ordered plus 
 ten centimes now given to the men present for duty, and from 
 what remains of the pay, — washing, footgear and pocket- 
 money excepted. Out of this amount, companies are to be 
 provided with three ounces of white bread per head for soup, 
 a half pound of meat and necessary vegetables. The cap- 
 tains may manage this matter as seems best to them, accord- 
 ing to the existing conditions, but must not divert any of the 
 money to other purposes. The colonel or other commander 
 is to inspect this matter every month. On a war-footing, 
 fifteen centimes is to be taken from the soldier's pay, for 
 which he is to receive four ounces of bread in addition to his 
 ration, half a pound of meat and two ounces of vegetables." 
 
 Russian Grenadier. 
 
 This mess was to 
 
44 
 
 PAY OF THE TROOPS. 
 
 And Bonaparte wrote about the same time to Forfait, Mi 
 ister of Marine, " Why, Citizen Minister, do they give 
 pound of beef to the English prisoners, while the ration of tl 
 soldier is but half a pound ? " 
 
 Just prior to the French Revolution the pay of the troo] 
 appears to have been as follows, the livre being twenty soi 
 or cents. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 Colonel — a sinecure 
 Lieutenant-colonel 
 Captain of Grenadiers 
 Captain of Fusiliers 
 Lieutenant of Grenadiers 
 Lieutenant of Fusiliers 
 Sub-lieutenant of Grenadiers 
 Sub-lieutenant of Fusiliers . 
 Sergeant of Grenadiers 
 Sergeant of Fusiliers . 
 Private of Grenadiers 
 Private of Fusiliers 
 
 30,000 livres a year. 
 
 2,000 " 
 
 2,000 " 
 
 1,500 " 
 
 900 " 
 
 600 " 
 
 600 " 
 
 540 " 
 
 222 « 
 
 204 " 
 
 125 « 
 
 107 « 
 
 CAVALET. 
 
 Mestre de Camp (colonel) . . . 4,700 livres a year. 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel ...... 3,600 " 
 
 Major 3,000 " 
 
 Sub-major 1,000 " 
 
 Quartermaster ...... 600 " 
 
 Standard-bearer ...... 480 " 
 
 Treasurer 2,000 " 
 
 Captain 2,000 " 
 
 Lieutenant ....... 900 " 
 
 Sub-lieutenant ....... 600 " 
 
 Mardchal des Logis (Sergeant) ... 13 sous a day. 
 
 Fourrier (Company quartermaster) . . 12 " " 
 
 Brigadier (Corporal) ..... 8 " " 
 
 Private 7 sous 9 deniers a day. 
 
VARIATION IN PRICES. 45 
 
 In the dragoons aud hussars the pay varied somewhat from 
 these rates. 
 
 During the French Revolution there were a number of 
 laws passed relating to this subject. The last one, of Sep- 
 tember 9, 1799, established the total pay of a regiment of 
 infantry at Frs. 529,065.30 a year. Under the Empire the 
 principal acts were dated December 30, 1810, and June 15, 
 1812. 
 
 Under the law of July 20, 1794, the pay was as follows : — 
 
 INFANTRY, LINE AND LIGHT. 
 
 Chief of Brigade 21 livres 10 sous a day. 
 
 Chief of Battalion .... 
 Quartermaster Treasurer 
 Adjutant Major .... 
 Adjutant Major's Assistant 
 Drum Major ..... 
 
 Private 
 
 Captain ...... 
 
 Lieutenant 5 
 
 Sub-lieutenant 
 
 These prices varied somewhat in the grenadiers, carbineers 
 and fusiliers ; and there were a number of ranks, such as 
 saddler, armorer, tailor, shoemaker, trousers-maker, artist- 
 veterinary, etc., and various musicians. 
 
 CAVALRY, LINE AND LIGHT. 
 
 Chief of Brigade 22 livres a day. 
 
 Chief of Squadron 16 " 
 
 Quartermaster Treasurer . . . . 6 " 10 sous a day. 
 Non-commissioned Adjutant . . 2 " 9 " " 
 
 In the artillery there were several grades of captains re- 
 ceiving from 6 to 10 livres a day, and the other officers and 
 non-commissioned officers were paid substantially like the 
 
 15 
 
 
 10 " 
 
 . 6 
 
 
 10 " 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 . 2 
 
 
 9 " 
 
 1 
 
 
 9 « 
 
 about 10 to 13 " 
 
 9 livres 
 
 
 . 5 
 
 " 
 
 10 " 
 
 4 
 
 tt 
 
 5 « 
 
46 RATES ESTABLISHED. 
 
 infantry. Successive laws made a number of changes, bi 
 none of great moment. 
 
 By the law of May 13, 1797, the following rates we: 
 established for generals and staff officers : — 
 
 . 40,000 livres a year. 
 . 18,000 « 
 
 General-in-chief 
 General of Division 
 General of Brigade . 
 Adjutant-general . . . . 
 Chief of Brigade 
 
 Chief of Squadron or of Battalion 
 Captain ..... 
 Lieutenant . . . . . 
 Sub-lieutenant .... 
 Chief Commissary of War . 
 Commissary of War 
 Commissary of iirst class 
 Commissary of second class 
 
 12,000 
 7,000 
 5,500 
 4,000 
 2,300 
 1,450 
 1,100 
 
 12,000 
 8,000 
 4,000 
 3,500 
 
 The pay of the enlisted men varied considerably, but ra 
 between 6 sous a day for privates to 32 sous a day f< 
 non-commissioned adjutants. A surgeon not commissioned i 
 a regiment received from 15 to 20 livres a day. 
 
 By the law of September 9, 1799, a 
 
 General of Division received 
 
 General of Brigade " ... 
 
 Adjutant-general "... 
 
 Aide Brigadier-general " ... 
 
 Aide Major "... 
 
 Aide Captain " ... 
 
 Aide Lieutenant "... 
 
 The commissaries of war received from 3500 to 8000 franc 
 The line was thus paid : — 
 
 12,000 francs a yes 
 
 8,000 
 
 
 6,000 
 
 
 6,500 
 
 
 4,000 
 
 
 2,500 
 
 
 1,450 
 
 
 LINE INFANTRY. 
 
 Chief of Brigade 
 Chief of Battalion 
 
 6,000 francs a yes 
 3,600 « 
 
PAY OF THE LINE CAVALRY. 
 
 47 
 
 Quartermaster 1^200 francs a year. 
 
 Adjutant Major 2,000 
 
 Doctor 800 to 2,000 
 
 Dram Major 292 
 
 Captain 1,800 to 2,400 
 
 Lieutenant 1,100 to 1,260 
 
 Sub-lieutenant 1 000 
 
 Sergeant 225 to 300 
 
 Corporal 165 
 
 Private ........ 110 
 
 Drummer ........ 146 
 
 The carbineers were paid slightly more. 
 
 LINE CAVALRY. 
 
 Chief of Brigade 
 
 Chief of Squadron 
 
 Quartermaster . 
 
 Surgeon 
 
 Artist veterinary 
 
 Master saddler 
 
 Armorer spur-maker 
 
 Master boot-maker 
 
 Trousers-maker 
 
 Tailor . 
 
 Adjutant Major 
 
 Captain 
 
 Lieutenant 
 
 Sub-lieutenant 
 
 Private 
 
 Trumpeter 
 
 5,500 francs 
 4,000 
 1,400 
 2,000 
 
 324 
 
 286 
 
 286 
 
 122 
 
 122 
 
 122 
 2,300 
 2,500 
 1,450 
 1,150 
 
 122 
 
 256 
 
 a year. 
 
 FOOT AETILLERY. 
 
 The foot artillery was paid ten to fifteen per cent, more, 
 and the mounted artillery about twenty per cent, more, than 
 the cavalry. 
 
 Artificers and pontoniers were paid about the same as the 
 infantry. 
 
48 BETTER COMPENSATION. 
 
 On May 30, 1810, an Imperial decree was issued, tabula 
 ing and settling the pay of all the troops, to begin January 
 1811, mess money being merged into the pay of the troop 
 The table annexed to this decree is long and intricate, b 
 a few items being of present interest. There was a me 
 to cover underclothing and foot-gear, to which the soldie 
 contributed thirty francs a year. The rules for employme: 
 of the ration money were made more positive. Under th 
 decree a 
 
 Colonel received 
 Major .... 
 Chief of battalion • . 
 Adjutant 
 
 Quartermaster Treasurer 
 Eagle-bearer 
 Sergeant Major 
 Wagon-master 
 
 400 to 416 francs a moni 
 
 . 358 
 
 . 300 
 
 . 166 
 
 (minimum) 100 
 
 . 104 
 
 . 48 
 
 50 
 
 Eagle-bearer's assistant ...... 24 
 
 Drum Major . . . . . 24 
 
 Musicians ... .... 16 
 
 Master workmen .... .9 
 
 Captain 150 to 200 
 
 Lieutenant ... ... 91 to 104 
 
 Sub-lieutenant ..... .83 
 
 Sergeant .... . 20 to 25 
 
 Corporal .... ... 15 
 
 Drummer ..... .13 
 
 Private . . 10 
 
 To this were added rations when in the field, the supp 
 being lessened when in quarters. The pay of cavalry w 
 some ten per cent, higher ; the pay of the foot artillery av( 
 aged twenty per cent, higher ; and the mounted artille 
 averaged between twenty-five and thirty per cent, higher th 
 that of the infantry. The soldiers of the artillery train we 
 paid still higher, and the pontoniers and men of that oh 
 
A NEW SYSTEM OF WAR. 49 
 
 were also better compensated. Artificers generally averaged 
 fifty per cent, more than infantrymen. Officers of the train 
 were paid nearly forty per cent, more than infantry officers. 
 Doctors received monthly from one hundred and sixty-six to 
 two hundred and twenty-five francs, according to the length 
 of service, in time of peace ; and in the field about forty per 
 cent. more. For extra distance, in addition to the regular 
 day's march, additional pay was given, from two francs to the 
 colonel down to ten centimes to the soldier. 
 
 To resume what has been said, in this period in France a 
 new system of war arose, suited to the changed conditions, in 
 which the people took part as 
 such, and not as mercenaries. 
 At first full of the rough ear- 
 nestness of the Revolution, this 
 system was completed by the 
 Consuls. Infantry was divided 
 into half-brigades (regiments) 
 and brigades ; and light infan- 
 try was increased. Cavalry was 
 also increased, especially the 
 light cavalry. Artillery gained 
 much, and horse batteries were 
 created. Engineer troops were 
 formed into separate organiza- 
 tions. Tactically, open order 
 came into use, with better fire 
 and less loss of life as a result, 
 and it was sustained by columns 
 and squares for attack. The 
 French troops surpassed all others in their new system. Ad- 
 ministratively, the creation of divisions was the most impor- 
 tant step ; and staff duties were made more prominent. Vict- 
 
 Hungarian Grenadier. 
 
50 
 
 FEW CHANGES IN THE OLD SYSTEM. 
 
 ualing by requisition instead of by magazines grew into u 
 Tents gave way to huts and other temporary shelter ; a 
 the train was markedly cut down. Much increased spe 
 followed the change. 
 
 In other European countries little was at first done to alt 
 the old system. When the French showed the superiority 
 the new system, a few changes were begun. Such were t 
 collection of regimental guns in batteries ; the imitation 
 the French infantry formation ; the creation of divisions ; t 
 giving up of tents ; the increase of artillery, light foot ai 
 light horse. But no European army during these wars 
 any degree reached the mobility of the French. Fortificatii 
 was theoretically improved ; practically no great advance w 
 made. 
 
 Sword presented to Maesena 
 by the Directory. 
 
 (Rivoli Collection.) 
 
III. 
 
 WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 1792. 
 
 The early years of the French Revolution are interesting from a historical 
 rather than a military standpoint. Louis XIV. and Louis XV. had created an 
 enormous deht. The peasants were downtrodden, but the middle classes had 
 increased in intelligence. Free-thinking writers had filled the minds of all with 
 ideas of independence, and to this the American Kevolution added fuel. To 
 raise money, Louis XVL called together the States General in 1789. The 
 Third Estate exerted its numerical power over the Nobles and Clergy, and 
 formed a National Assembly. This body began to demolish the monarchy, and 
 the king finally became the prisoner of the people. The Royalists emigrated, 
 and urged outside nations to intervene. This the Emperor of Germany and the 
 King of Prussia did in 1791, and the invasion of France in 1792 led up to a 
 Reign of Terror. The people rose to defend its frontiers, and fended off attack 
 on northern France. Another allied army expected to move through Cham- 
 pagne to Paris, but the advance was slow and ill-conducted. Having crossed 
 the Argonnes, the allies under Brunswick were defeated in an artillery battle 
 at Valtny by Dumouriez and Kellermann. This success raised the courage of 
 the French and enabled Dumouriez to beat the allies at Jemappes in Belgium, 
 and Montesquieu to conquer part of Savoy. After these victories the enthusi- 
 astic French soldier felt that he could face all Europe. 
 
 Before approaching the great era which Napoleon illus- 
 trated by his victories, we must make a rapid survey of the 
 years which preceded his debut on the military stage of 
 Europe. The early campaigns of the French Revolution are 
 of marked historical interest, but scarcely being within the 
 scope of this work, they cannot be treated in great detail. 
 The changes in organization and tactics are of more value than 
 any lessons taught by the marches and battles. A sketch of 
 the Revolution and a short narrative of its early campaigns 
 is, however, essential to draw attention to the status of the art 
 
52 AN ENORMOUS DEBT. 
 
 of war when Bonaparte electrified the world by his brilliant 
 Italian campaign in 1796. 
 
 The role of France in the Seven Years' War had not been 
 one to enhance her reputation or standing. But at its close, 
 the French royal family, allied by marriage with Austria, 
 Piedmont, Spain and Naples, was, under Louis XV., in a 
 position to hold the balance of power of Europe. No country 
 but England disputed her sway, and this at sea alone. And 
 England, towards the end of the eighteenth century, by ill- 
 calculated methods, succeeded in losing her American colonies, 
 to the great weakening of her sea power. 
 
 The never ceasing wars of Louis XIV., and the heedless 
 expenditures of Louis XV., had created for France a burden 
 of debt beyond her power to carry. The crushing taxes called 
 for by this debt and by the insane extravagances of the 
 French Court should, for the sake of equity and wisdom, have 
 fallen not only on the people, but on the nobility and the 
 clergy as well. But the classes, though holding most of the 
 land, steadily strove to shift the burden from their own to 
 the shoulders of the masses, and by evading many taxes sapped 
 the financial power of the throne. The political standing of 
 France in Europe did not improve, and money matters finally 
 drove the throne to call together the States General to devise 
 means of lightening the burden. This body consisted of the 
 Nobles, the Clergy and the Middle Classes, or Third Estate. 
 
 The leaders of the people had grown intelligent, rich and 
 powerful. Downtrodden though the peasants still were, the 
 middle classes had notably increased in brawn and brain. Eng- 
 land in the prior centuries, America a few years before, had 
 taught the masses valuable lessons. The revolutionary idea had 
 for twenty years found a lodgment in all French minds, from 
 peasant to courtier. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, the 
 Encyclopedists, Helvetius, Diderot and many other irrepres- 
 
RANK ABUSES RESENTED. 
 
 53 
 
 sible writers, had spread abroad doctrines dangerous to the 
 monarchy. Land, of which the peasantry and middle classes 
 held but a small share, was miserably tilled, and the guilds 
 limited trade and in- 
 dustry. Arbitrary gov- 
 ernment, rank abuses 
 in the administration, 
 lettres de cachet by 
 which any one could 
 be imprisoned, Uts de 
 justice to collect un- 
 equal taxes, forced and 
 unpaid labor on roads 
 and other public works 
 (corvees) , had brought 
 the middle classes into 
 a condition ripe for 
 any, even a violent 
 remedy. The political 
 hearth of Trance was 
 
 covered with inflammable matter ; to conserve the kingdom, 
 sparks should have been kept away from it. Instead of this, 
 the French monarch applied the match with his own hands. 
 From the standpoint of the French autocracy, a limit should 
 have been set, and the people not permitted to transcend it, 
 laws being meanwhile passed to do them justice. But the 
 well-meaning king took the people into his confidence ; and 
 the people, once having gained a standing, found a means to 
 assert their rights. 
 
 After many efforts to raise money, Louis XVI. finally 
 fell into the financial hands of Necker, who had been director- 
 general of finances from 1777 to 1781, and was again in 1788 
 and 1789 ; and during his administration this minister, to cre- 
 
 Necker. 
 
54 
 
 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ORGANIZED. 
 
 ate a force on which to lean, began to give to the Third Estate 
 some idea of its value in the economy of the nation. There 
 were two parties in France, Neckerites and anti-Neckerites, 
 bitterly opposed to each other; and it was under volcanic con- 
 ditions that the States General were called together in 1789. 
 The three orders, Nobles, Clergy, Third Estate, should by 
 ancient custom have voted separately in the States General. 
 
 As the Third Estate prac- 
 tically furnished a major- 
 ity of its members, there 
 being three hundred each 
 of Nobles and Clergy, and 
 six hundred of its own 
 members, increased by a 
 number from the other or- 
 ders, it desired the votes to 
 be counted in one body; 
 but being refused this 
 right, it organized itself 
 into a National Assembly 
 June 17, 1789. To this 
 some nobles and still other 
 strong and free-thinking 
 men joined themselves. 
 When its place of meeting was closed by the king, it met at 
 the Jeu de Paume, and bound itself by oath to make France 
 a constitutional monarchy. This act threatened to erect the 
 National Assembly into the real governing power, for, guided 
 by the Gallic temperament, these new-fledged legislators could 
 not, like "town-meeting" Anglo-Saxons, keep within the 
 bounds of law or wisdom. If he desired to conserve his king- 
 dom, the king should have ruthlessly dispersed the National 
 Assembly, and he might then have voluntarily given the peo- 
 
 Louia XVI. 
 
THE MONARCHY DEMOLISHED. 
 
 55 
 
 pie such suitable reforms as he was by nature inclined to do. 
 He indeed appeared in the Assembly June 23, and declared 
 it dissolved, but he did not see to it that his will was obeyed, 
 — with the bayonet if necessary. This would have been 
 tyranny, if you like ; for the French people was right, the 
 French monarch wrong. But Louis could only succeed against 
 the Assembly by force, and this he did not employ when he 
 might. It was well for France and for the liberties of Con- 
 tinental Europe that he did not do so. Instead of thus assert- 
 ing himself, he requested the Clergy and Nobles to meet with 
 the Third Estate, which 
 they did, and Mirabeau, 
 chief orator of the Assem- 
 bly, soon became master 
 instead of Louis. The 
 better classes in vast num- 
 bers, headed by the Count 
 of Artois, second brother 
 of the king, Conde and 
 Polignac, foreseeing what 
 might come, abandoned 
 their estates, collected what 
 they could in personal pro- 
 perty, and emigrated. 
 
 Having gone so far, the 
 Third Estate was compelled 
 
 for its own justification and safety to demolish the monarchy 
 stone by stone. It needed only the 14th of July (when, on 
 a rumor that the National Assembly was to be dissolved, the 
 people, or rather a mob of the people, destroyed the Bastille), 
 and the creation of a National Guard under Lafayette, to en- 
 able the Assembly to gain control of the entire army. From 
 then on the popular force grew, while the Clergy and Nobles, 
 
 Marie Antoinette- 
 
56 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. 
 
 by seeking help abroad, denationalized their cause. The repre- 
 sentatives of the nobles in the National Assembly surrendered 
 the privileges which this class had for centuries enjoyed — and 
 abused ; the guilds were dissolved, and a declaration of the 
 rights of man followed, founded on the strivings for liberty of 
 the English peoples from Magna Charta down.-' 
 
 Louis had retired to Versailles with some troops ; but he 
 was not the man to grapple with such a tempestuous situation. 
 He gave way and agreed to the acts of the National Assembly, 
 which had adopted a democratic monarchical constitution. 
 Another revolt occurred in October, and after the excesses of 
 the 5th and 6th, Lafayette brought the king back to Paris with 
 twenty thousand men of the National Guard. Having stripped 
 the throne of every attribute except a naked veto power, the 
 Assembly seized all authority, and Louis dwelt in the Tuil- 
 eries, rather as a suspect than as the king of France. On the 
 first anniversary of the destruction of the Bastille the Consti- 
 tution was accepted by the king. France was divided into 
 eighty-three departments, and subdivided into districts con- 
 taining the forty-four thousand ancient communes, with a tax 
 
 ' From 1789 to 1815 there were six goTernments : — 
 
 1. States General and Constituent Assembly (Creation of a. Constitu- 
 tional Monarchy), May 5, 1789, to September 30, 1791. 2^ years. 
 
 2. Legislative Assembly (Limitation of the Monarchy), October 1, 
 
 1791, to September 21, 1792. 1 year. 
 
 3. National Convention (Abolishment of Monarchy, Keign of Terror, 
 
 Wars against Coalition), September 21, 1792, to October 25, 1795. 5 years. 
 
 4. Directory (Recovery of Influence by Middle Classes. Bonaparte's 
 Rise and Coup d'Etat of 18th Brumaire, Year VIII.), October 26, 
 
 1795, to November 9, 1799. 4 years. 
 
 5. Consulate (One Man Power), December 25, 1799, to May 20, 1804. 4^ years. 
 
 6. Empire (France the most Prominent Power of Europe), May 20, 
 
 1804, to June 22, 1815. H yeara. 
 
 There were three Coalitions formed against France ; the first lasted from 
 1792 to 1799, the second from 1799 to 1802, the third was in 1805. 
 
A PRISONER OF THE PEOPLE. 
 
 57 
 
 Mirabeau. 
 
 suffrage. Juries were created. The hereditary nobility was 
 abolished. The clergy was made elective. Clubs became prom- 
 inent : the Jacobins, Cor- 
 deliers, Feuillants. Paris 
 was reorganized with forty- 
 eight sections. Mirabeau 
 strove to reconcile the As- 
 sembly and the king, but 
 he died in April. Had he 
 lived, Liberty might not 
 so violently have purged 
 the body-politic. 
 
 The emigres had long 
 urged Louis to flight. In 
 1791 he attempted this, but 
 was arrested at Varennes, 
 June 25, and brought 
 
 back. He then accepted the revised Constitution and became 
 a prisoner of the people. 
 
 From October 1, 1791, the National Assembly called itself 
 the Legislative Assembly. The Jacobins and the Cordeliers 
 — the " Mountain " — succeeded to power. "While many 
 strong and able men sat upon its sloping benches, no Cromwell 
 arose in the Assembly who could steer the ship of state through 
 the stormy sea into which France had drifted. A Latin race 
 was now grappling with the problem which the English had 
 solved five generations before. 
 
 Meanwhile the several European monarchies, each busied 
 with its own affairs, stood as horrified but silent spectators of 
 the upheaval. Russia had its war with Turkey and the fear 
 of Poland to engross her attention ; Austria and Prussia de- 
 voted themselves to watching the manoeuvres of Russia rather 
 than of France ; England was seeking some means to indemnify 
 
58 
 
 THE PILLNITZ DECLARATION. 
 
 I 
 
 Danton. 
 
 herself for the loss of the 
 North American colonies. 
 Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
 Sweden and Denmark 
 counted for little in Euro- 
 pean policy. But when 
 the people of France had 
 deprived the king of prac- 
 tically all power, and the 
 emigres had brought to bear 
 the strong influence they 
 possessed at every European court, the Emperor Leopold 
 and King Frederick William held a meeting at Pillnitz, near 
 Dresden, in August, 1791, at which the Elector of Saxony 
 and the Count of Artois were present. As a consequence of 
 this meeting, in the "Pillnitz Declaration" the Emperor of 
 Germany and the King of Prussia called upon the French 
 people to return to the old order of things and restore the 
 monarchy, on pain of war. 
 This academic threat was 
 so little followed up by the 
 powers involved, that it 
 had no effect in France ex- 
 cept to enable the Republi- 
 can party to persuade the 
 people that the French 
 king had been at the bot- 
 tom of it. The Legisla- 
 tive Assembly demanded 
 that Louis should declare 
 war against Austria; and 
 when Louis declined to do 
 
 so, the Assembly, seeing Robespierre. 
 
FRANCE A REPUBLIC. 
 
 69 
 
 its advantage in opening the struggle before Austria was 
 prepared, itself declared war April 20 against the German 
 Empire, over which outworn skeleton of power Francis II. 
 succeeded Leopold as emperor, and so remained until 1806. 
 Austria, Prussia and Sardinia then joined hands. The Duke 
 of Brunswick, nephew of Frederick's great lieutenant, Ferdi- 
 nand, was placed in command of the Austro-Prussian armies, 
 and unwisely issued his threatening proclamation of July 25, 
 1792, from Coblenz. This and the growing irritation against 
 the monarchy were the 
 
 origin of a fresh revolt in 
 
 
 j^^B|^Ht^Mgy!^^WW|K' 
 
 
 
 M- *-' 1 
 
 
 
 f^B^f^ --t*^ ^^ 
 
 
 
 ^9^& ^ ~^B 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^n^'H 
 
 M^K'A-'N 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 1 
 
 Paris on August 10 ; the 
 Tuileries was stormed by 
 the mob, the Swiss Guards 
 were murdered, the king's 
 life was imperiled, and 
 being declared an enemy of 
 the country, as having trea- 
 sonable correspondence 
 with its foes, he was incar- 
 cerated in the Temple. A 
 jail-delivery and massacre 
 of royalists, instigated by 
 Danton, took place in 
 Paris, September 2 to 7, 
 
 and was repeated in other cities. France was declared a 
 Republic, Louis was tried, condemned and executed in Jan- 
 uary, 1793, and the highest power devolved upon the Na- 
 tional Convention, which was composed entirely of Eepub- 
 licans. September 22, 1792, became the first day of the 
 Year I. Later the power centred in the Committee of Gen- 
 eral Security, and then the Committee of Public Safety, a 
 body including Danton, Robespierre and Carnot. A com- 
 
 Carnot. 
 
THE FIRST COALITION. 61 
 
 peting power was the Commune of Paris, under the direction 
 of Chaumette and Hubert. In 1793 and 1794 the French 
 Revolution culminated in a Eeign of Terror all over France. 
 Robespierre rose to power and ruled as representing the 
 Cotnmittee of Public Safety. All manner of extravagances 
 ensued, and the Cult of Reason succeeded the time-honored 
 religion of Rome. 
 
 Meanwhile England, Holland and Spain had more or less 
 heartily followed the lead of Austria and Prussia against 
 France ; and an alliance was formed with the avowed purpose 
 of restoring the Bourbon monarchy. Thus came into being 
 the First Coalition. Its strategic plan was to march its armies 
 into France and straight on Paris, from three directions, the 
 north, the east and the south. The war was to be a sharp 
 offensive on its part ; and the early purpose of France was 
 the simple defense of its frontiers. Such was the political 
 status when the sword was drawn from its scabbard, to be 
 hardly sheathed for quarter of a century. 
 
 In 1792 the frontiers of France, on the north and north- 
 east, ran from Dunkirk via Menin, Conde, Philippeville, 
 Longwy, Sierk, Saarlouis and Bitsch to Lauterburg on the 
 Rhine. The Meuse cut this frontier in two. From sea to 
 Meuse the border near the coast was protected by canals 
 and morasses, which seriously impeded military mancEuvres ; 
 the rest was open, but the entire line had a triple row of 
 fortresses. Seven lay in first line : Dunkirk, Lille, Conde, 
 Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Maubeuge, Philippeville. Nine lay 
 in second line : St. Omer, Aire, Bethune, Douay, Bouchain, 
 Cambray, Landrecies, Avesnes, Rocroy. Four lay in the 
 third line : St. Quentin, Bapaume, Arras, Amiens. The post- 
 road (chaussee) from Brussels to Paris ran through Maubeuge, 
 Laon and Soissons ; there was also a post-road from Cond^ 
 via Cambray and Senlis to the capital. On the northeast the 
 
62 
 
 PLAN OF DEFENSE. 
 
 French frontier touched 
 Luxembourg, which then 
 belonged to the Elector of 
 Mainz and Trier (Treves); 
 and the Saar and Moselle 
 cut at an angle through 
 this frontier. The Meuse, 
 the Argonnes, the foothills 
 of the Vosges Mountains 
 and many forests pre- 
 sented natural obstacles, 
 but not serious ones, to an 
 invader. iThis northeast 
 boundary was protected by 
 a double row of fortresses. 
 In first line were seven ; 
 Bitsch, Saarlouis, Thion- 
 ville, Longwy, Montm^dy, 
 Bouillon, Gi vet. In second 
 line were four : Metz, Ver- 
 dun, Sedan, Mezieres. 
 This plan of defense was 
 ill arranged ; for an enemy 
 who should take Longwy 
 would pierce the centre of 
 the line, and could march 
 on Paris practically un- 
 opposed bj^ the other for- 
 tresses. The roads on 
 Paris from the northeast 
 frontier were via Givet, 
 Eocroy, Mezieres, Eethel, 
 Soissons ; via Longwy, Verdun, Chalons, or Vitry ; or via 
 
 -^ ^^^ 
 ECHE.LLELS t V > 
 
 FT BAI^otrE.s'VMT CENEVRE 
 
 BRIANCONX, IJ 
 
 , £ /nONTE VI SO 
 
 UPHIN V " 
 
 MT. DAU 
 
 ";f\ 
 
 B/iRCE.Li;oNETTE -• 
 
 MILES 
 
 Eastern Frontier of France. 
 
PROTECTION OF THE FRONTIERS. 63 
 
 Metz and Verdun. The entire line on north and northeast was 
 weak in the centre, but the streams, forests, ravines, hills and 
 other natural obstacles made its defense an easy task for a 
 good army. 
 
 The eastern frontier ran from Lauterburg, along the left 
 bank of the Rhine, to the fortress of Hiiningen, or Basle, and 
 was strong. On the Rhine lay six fortresses : outlying Lan- 
 dau, Strasburg, Vauban, Schlettstadt, Breisach, Hiiningen. 
 The second line had three : Bitsch, Pfalzburg, Belfort. The 
 Vosges Mountains made a third line of great strength. Neu- 
 tral Switzerland was the bulwark on the right of this section 
 of the frontier. Only one good road led from the central 
 Rhine to Paris : via Strasburg, Nancy, Toul, Bar le Due, 
 Vitry. 
 
 The southeast frontier was divisible into two parts : One 
 part ran from Basle along the Doubs and Jura Mountains 
 to Geneva, protected by Switzerland. The mountain passes 
 were easy of access, but were mostly held by forts. Besan9on 
 and Auxonne were in second line. The roads from Switzer- 
 land to Paris were bad. The other part ran from Geneva 
 along the Rhone to BeUey, thence along the Savoyard Alps 
 via Les Echelles, Mount Genevre, Monte Viso, and Barce- 
 lonette, to and down the Var to the sea. This part was 
 well protected, not only by the natural features, but by Fort 
 BaroUes, Brian^on and Mount Dauphin. In second line 
 were Grenoble and Toulon. Lyons was the " cross-roads " of 
 this section. Here also ended the highway over Les Echelles 
 from Chambery. The roads were not of the best, not even 
 the highway along the coast. 
 
 The southern frontier was the Mediterranean and the Pyre- 
 nees, the western the Atlantic up to Dunkirk. 
 
 The Pillnitz Declaration and the action of France having 
 rendered war inevitable, the Legislative Assembly decreed the 
 
64 
 
 ASSEMBLING OF THE FORCES. 
 
 putting afoot of two hundred thousand men, of which there 
 were already one hundred and forty thousand men in the 
 Armies of the North, Centre, Khine and South. The two 
 
 former armies of between 
 forty and fifty thousand 
 men each, mostly young 
 troops, stood under Ro- 
 chambeau and Lafayette 
 along the north and north- 
 east frontier; the Army 
 of the Rhine, of equal 
 strength, under Luckner, 
 was watching the Rhine ; 
 the Army of the South 
 under Montesquieu was 
 yet forming, and had but 
 twenty-five thousand men, 
 mostly in garrison. The 
 Coalition assembled its forces slowly. The Prussian troops, 
 forty thousand strong, nominally under King Frederick Wil- 
 liam and the Elector of Hesse, but really commanded by 
 Brunswick, were heading for Coblenz ; Austria had but sixty 
 thousand men available, of which half were already in the 
 Netherlands under Sachsen-Teschen, and twenty-five thousand 
 more stood under Hohenlohe on the right bank of the Rhine ; 
 but it was intended to double this force. Clerfayt with fifteen 
 thousand men was advancing from the Brabant country to join 
 the allied right wing. It was proposed in France that the 
 armies should attack the Austrians in the Netherlands, and 
 act on the defensive elsewhere. On the other side the allied 
 main armies were to march through Luxemburg and Cham- 
 pagne on Paris, while the Rhine and Netherlands armies were 
 to keep to the defensive. The Coalition harbored small doubt 
 
 Luckner. 
 
A FAULTY METHOD. 65 
 
 that their forces could reach the French capital in one short 
 campaign, and dictate terms to the new Republic and its 
 fresh levies. For, ran their argument, most of the good officers 
 had emigrated, and were now in the allied ranks. Little they 
 knew the cataclysmic vigor of the new men who now ruled 
 France. 
 
 The French armies, strung along the north and northeast 
 frontier, were faced by the Austrians, each force split into 
 many parts, and extending over a thin line from fortress to 
 fortress, as the cordon system of the day prescribed. This 
 altogether faulty method had gradually crept into use all over 
 Europe, since the days when Frederick gave up war. It was 
 diametrically opposed to the great king's tenets, for " whoso 
 seeks to protect everything will end in protecting nothing," 
 he had said; and during his campaigns he repeatedly dis- 
 garnished one position, to the last able-bodied man, in order 
 to fall in force on the enemy in another. He was in fact the 
 first great modern exponent of the value of massing for a 
 single blow. 
 
 In accordance with their plan the French, early in the year, 
 crossed into the Netherlands in a number of small columns, 
 in the Lille-Valenciennes-Givet country. Near Jemappes 
 one of the centre columns was thrown back by the Austrians ; 
 another fell back before it reached the enemy; the right 
 (Lafayette's) and the left columns, though successful, then 
 deemed it essential also to retire ; for the cordon theory de- 
 manded that the advancing heads of column should keep on a 
 level, and as the centre had retreated, so must the columns 
 on the right and left. Both the central French columns had 
 much outnumbered the enemy, but discipline was so lax that 
 there had been no attempt at real fighting. One of the com- 
 manders, Dillon, was shot by his men for suspected treason ; 
 and Eochambeau was later replaced by Luckner. Quiet 
 
66 EVENTS IN CHAMPAGNE. 
 
 reigned until June. Then Luckner advanced and took Cour- 
 tray ; but he there arrested his operation, on the ground that 
 the Belgians did not rise to aid him. Dillon (brother of the 
 one killed) took command in July near Maubeuge, but ac- 
 complished nothing; whereupon Dumouriez was given con- 
 trol. The operations on the northern border had only gone 
 to prove the utter worthlessness of the cordon system, with 
 its numerous strong places and isolated columns operating 
 between or against them, and the still greater lack of value 
 of the French levies, as they then stood. 
 
 In Champagne, meanwhile, more important events had oc- 
 curred. The Army of the Rhine, now under Biron near Weis- 
 
 senburg, did nothing until 
 July. The Army of the 
 North, under Lafayette, 
 was near Sedan, Luck- 
 ner lay under the guns of 
 Metz, Kellermann (Sen- 
 ior) was near Lauterburg ; 
 all told, one hundred thou- 
 sand men. Brunswick 
 was fast approaching the 
 Rhine with sixty-five thou- 
 sand men, and with these 
 the Netherlands forces, 
 twenty-five thousand men 
 
 Kellermann (Senior). 
 
 under Teschen, were preparing to cooperate by a diversion. 
 The allies proposed to thrust themselves in between the French 
 armies and move straight on Paris, on a line from Coblenz 
 via Longwy and Verdun, where the French frontier was to 
 be ruptured ; thence to Chalons and down the valley of the 
 Marne. The emigres had assured the allies that the people 
 would spontaneously rise in favor of Louis, and the Coalition 
 
ALLIED INVASION. 67 
 
 felt convinced that the Eepublic would speedily succumb. 
 Should the rising against the Republic occur, all would go 
 well from the start ; but even should it not, a secondary base 
 on the Meuse would at all events be gained. In August Treves 
 was reached by the Prussians, while eighteen thousand men, 
 under Hohenlohe, opened the blockade of Landau August 10, 
 and later advanced on Thionville ; Longwy, after two days' 
 bombardment, fell August 23 ; Verdun, early in September, 
 capitulated to the Netherlands army under Clerfayt, which, 
 operating by its left, here joined Brunswick ; and the latter 
 
 Allied Lirasion, 1792. 
 
 had already forced Kellermann to fall back on Metz. All this 
 promised success ; but the allies had in many ways been care- 
 less, having, as an instance, neglected to provide for a safe 
 retreat across the Rhine in case of failure. Even Mainz was 
 not occupied in force. The advance was slow, at the rate of 
 only five miles a day, owing to pedantic tactics, the result of 
 blind imitation of the letter of Frederick's methods without 
 the spirit, the putting of the men nightly under canvas, and 
 the feeding from magazines. Yet, despite their errors, the 
 allied oncoming seemed like an irresistible flood. The out- 
 look for the Republic was a desperate one. 
 
68 
 
 WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH ARMIES. 
 
 The French leaders meanwhile were striving to bring order 
 out of chaos in their forces. This advance on French soil of 
 an army led by generals trained in the methods of Frederick 
 seemed perilous indeed ; but they had abundant courage, and 
 
 aimed to place themselves 
 athwart the lines of ad- 
 vance of the allies on Paris. 
 Kellermann had felt com- 
 pelled to fall back towards 
 Metz ; Luckner had retired 
 to the Chalons country ; 
 Lafayette, at Sedan, being 
 suspected by the Assembly 
 of an intention to use bis 
 forces to sustain the mon- 
 archy, was proscribed, fled 
 the country, and was re- 
 placed by Dumouriez, who 
 shortly joined the army. Separated from Kellermann by the 
 enemy's advance, Dumouriez was also constrained to retire, 
 and both French armies crossed the Meuse in retreat, leaving 
 much fertile country to the allies, and producing a disheart- 
 ening effect on the raw levies. But this withdrawal operated 
 as a concentration, and it was the only proper step they could 
 well have taken. Elated by apparent success, the allies under 
 Brunswick kept on their slow advance, but failing to catch 
 the French armies separated, tarried long at Verdun to close 
 up their interminable column, and to collect victual. Time was 
 afforded Dumouriez to make his plans, and to call in troops 
 from the Maubeuge region. Fall was coming on ; the coun- 
 try roads were bad ; continual rain spread disease in the allied 
 ranks. Still, as his line of advance was now headed for the 
 French left flank, Brunswick felt that his strategic success 
 
 Dumouriez. 
 
A FATAL STRATEGIC POSITION. 
 
 69 
 
 was assured. The Meuse was crossed, and in his front lay the 
 Argonnes Mountains, through which ran a number of passes, 
 the Chene Populeux, the Croix au Bois, Grand Pre, La Cha- 
 lade and Les Islettes. This range, and the marshy woods 
 and valleys of the Aire and Aisne, might well have been 
 stoutly defended by the French, especially as in crossing the 
 mountains the allies were much split up. Dumouriez ought at 
 least to have held Chene, but he weakened his force there and 
 at Croix to strengthen Grand Pr^ ; and the allies, by using 
 the first two, turned 
 him out of the last, 
 and forced him also 
 to vacate La Cha- 
 lade and Les Islettes 
 and to retire behind 
 the Aisne. Not far 
 from Ste. M^n^- 
 hould he took up a 
 defensive position 
 at Valmy, and here 
 Kellermann joined 
 him by the long cir- 
 cuit he had been 
 obliged to make from 
 Metz. Dumouriez 
 was actually farther 
 from Paris than 
 Brunswick, should 
 the latter move by 
 way of Reims. But 
 having thus manoeuvred himself into a fatal strategic posi- 
 tion, though perhaps unaware of it, Dumouriez put on a bold 
 front, and determined to invite an attack from the allies. 
 
 The Argonnes. 
 
70 THE ALLIED ADVANCE. 
 
 Failing to secure this, it was his purpose to follow them, 
 should they march on the capital ; or perchance turn against 
 the allied line of operations, and threaten theirs as they were 
 now threatening his own. Although the first stage of the close 
 manoeuvring had been quite in favor of the allies, this latter 
 was the manifest strategic operation for the French, for all 
 that would be left for Dumouriez and Kellermann to do, if 
 the allies marched on Paris, was to seek to deter them by a 
 movement via Metz on their communications, however ques- 
 tionable this might prove with a bold opponent, who had an- 
 other line of retreat to Flanders. But the allies feared to 
 advance on the French capital, with an army on their rear, 
 and finally, reduced to some forty-five thousand men by de- 
 tails and shrinkage, Brunswick advanced towards Ste. Men^- 
 hould, purposing to take possession of all the Argonnes 
 passes, and then to seize the Chalons road in the rear of the 
 French army, when, as he imagined, he would have it at his 
 mercy. Such, indeed, might have been the result, had his 
 boldness only equaled the position chance had yielded him. 
 
 The so-called battle of Valmy, which should rather be called 
 the cannonade of Valmy, for there was no infantry fighting, 
 decided the campaign and the fate of the new Republic ; but 
 the French victory was due rather to utter lack of energy on 
 the part of the allies than to the exceptional bearing of the 
 raw levies of Gaul. On the 20th of September, 1792, at day- 
 break, the allies broke up, and soon reached the Chalons post- 
 road at Cabaret La Lune. Here they were surprised by an 
 occasional cannon-ball which fell into their column and indi- 
 cated the enemy in their front ; but the fog prevented their 
 gauging the value of his position. The shots came from the 
 guns of Kellermann, whose scouts had reported the allied ad- 
 vance, and who held a position near Valmy ; while Dumouriez, 
 on his right rear, stretched out as far as the Aisne at Chaude 
 
POSITION OF THE FORCES. 
 
 71 
 
 Fontaine, and leaning his left on the Chalons road, had put 
 a heavy detachment with artillery out on the hill of Maffre- 
 court, and his cavalry van along the Bionne. Kellermann had 
 purposed that morning to occupy a fresh position on Du- 
 mouriez's left behind the Auve and Jevre, but the unexpected 
 
 Battle of Valmy. 
 
 allied advance held him in place ; and moving up to the wind- 
 mill hill south of Valmy, he ran his guns in battery and de- 
 ployed his foot, sending a detachment to Gizancourt and! 
 placing his cavalry on the Chalons road. Dumouriez on his 
 part sent sixteen battalions to Cote de I'Hyron on Keller- 
 mann's right, dispatched a small force across the Bionne to 
 threaten the allied left, and ordered a column towards La 
 Lune heights. 
 
 As the allied brigades successively came up, they deployed 
 
72 THE CANNONADE OF VALMY. 
 
 to the left of La Lune, with the artillery in front of the fork 
 in the road, and along the line ; and later in the day three 
 columns of attack were formed to move up on Valmy hUl. 
 So soon as the fog lifted, the artillery opened, and though 
 Kellermann replied heartily, the allied fire was so much more 
 effective that after an hour or two the French troops began 
 to weaken. Every one kiiows how disheartening artillery fire 
 is to young troops ignorant of its slight effect and held in 
 hand without action. Kellermann's horse was shot, and an 
 aide was killed at his side ; a French munition-wagon was 
 exploded by a shell ; alarm seized the young conscripts. Had 
 the allies pushed in their columns of attack at this moment, 
 the battle would have been won before contact was reached, 
 and perchance the French Republic, with all that it promised 
 for the future, might have perished in the smoke of the Valmy 
 batteries. But Brunswick could not see his chance ; and the 
 pause gave Kellermann the time to rally and hearten his men. 
 In this he measurably succeeded. He then put in his reserve 
 artillery, and formed three columns with battalion front, pur- 
 posing in his turn to attack, should the opportunity offer. 
 But all the allies did was to send a detachment to Gizan- 
 court, and this accomplished nothing. Neither would the 
 French assume the offensive, so long as the allies did not. In 
 all the actions hitherto delivered, the French levies had de- 
 camped almost at the first fire, and Brunswick had good rea- 
 son to expect them now to withdraw, if not retire in confusion. 
 As they did not do so, the allied commander failed to follow 
 up what was really the turning-point in the action, but con- 
 tinued to rely on the fire of the artillery to do the work ; and 
 this fire, which, owing to the good conduct of the French 
 generals, failed to accomplish the usual result, died out by 
 five o'clock. 
 
 Not to win was for the allies to lose the battle. The casu- 
 
A DECISIVE BATTLE. 73 
 
 alties were barely five hundred men on either side ; but the 
 French gained immensely in morale by finding that they could 
 withstand the enemy, while the allies lost whatever heart they 
 had left for this campaign. 
 
 No battle ever exhibited the infiuence of success on the 
 bearing of an army, or of a nation in arms, as did that of 
 Valmy. It is in any event probable that the shrinkage in the 
 allied forces by heavy marching, exposure and disease would 
 have prevented their reaching Paris in condition to accom- 
 plish their task, unless heavily reinforced. But Valmy short- 
 ened the campaign, and furnished the spark which electrified 
 the half-alive body of the French raw levies into an alert and 
 self-confident power. Valmy was in truth one of the Decisive 
 Battles of the World. 
 
 Clerfayt came up at night and went into line behind Bruns- 
 wick. Kellermann moved next morning to the position pre- 
 viously chosen, and Dumouriez returned to that he had held 
 anterior to the battle. Brunswick remained ten days lazily 
 facing Valmy, and then retired towards Verdun and Longwy, 
 proposing to go into winter quarters in that neighborhood. 
 Clerfayt marched to Belgium via Namur ; Dumouriez slowly 
 followed up Brunswick ; but whether owing to the misunder- 
 standings between Kellermann and himself, or owing to an 
 arrangement made with the Duke of Brunswick, or to general 
 mistrust of the situation, cannot be said, no pursuit worthy 
 the name was undertaken. 
 
 Dumouriez now turned towards the Netherlands, leaving 
 Kellermann to drive the allies out of France. Brunswick, 
 seeing that he could not maintain himself without further 
 battle, vacated Verdun and Longwy, and at the end of Octo- 
 ber retired into Luxemburg. Kellermann followed slowly, 
 and put his troops into winter quarters near Longwy. The 
 news of Custine's approach to Mainz, down the Rhine in the 
 
74 WEAKNESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 allied rear, drove Brunswick back on Coblenz, the magazines 
 of whick were thus threatened. He crossed the Rhine in 
 mid-November. 
 
 The allies' plan had been good, but its execution was of 
 the very worst. The capture of Longwy and Verdun gave 
 a proper base, and the moral preponderance was on their 
 side. But the slothful advance was indicative of what was to 
 come, and the retreat after a little cannonading exchange at 
 Valmy was ludicrously weak for generals pretending to know 
 war. The French made a grave error at the inception of the 
 campaign in dividing their forces, and another in not defend- 
 ing the Argonnes passes. And even when the Meuse and 
 these were passed by the allies, had Dumouriez only ma- 
 noeuvred to keep the enemy on the constant move, he could 
 have quite exhausted his army and rendered it unfit for the 
 campaign, without the grave risk of a battle. Previous to 
 Valmy he was quite outnumbered ; at Valmy he ran an un- 
 necessary danger, in view of the fact that the French had 
 as yet never stood the oncoming of the enemy's line. But 
 Brunswick's fortunate want of enterprise saved him. After 
 Valmy, it has been said, had Dumouriez been active, had he 
 drawn in the Army of the Rhine and marched sharply on the 
 allies, he could have seized. Mainz, Coblenz and Cologne ; 
 and, having paralyzed the allied army, he could have taken 
 the Netherlands in reverse and overrun the whole land. But 
 Dumouriez was not this species of general. We cannot 
 fairly hold him up to the standard which Napoleon later 
 established. 
 
 In this Valmy campaign there is nothing new. The old 
 hidebound system of cordons and divided forces was apparent 
 at every turn. But it serves to show how low, since Freder- 
 ick's day, the art of war had fallen. 
 
 While operations on the northern frontier and in Cham- 
 
A SHORT-LIVED TRIUMPH. 
 
 ,75 
 
 pagne were thus going on, Custine with his seventeen thousand 
 men had not been idle in the Landau region. Until Septem- 
 ber he had been held in check by the superior forces of the 
 allies, but at the end of the month, the enemy having dis- 
 persed his divisions (the greater part having gone to the 
 Aisne), he advanced downstream and captured Speyer and 
 Worms; and, encouraged by this 
 easy success, determined to move 
 on Mainz, with some of whose 
 inhabitants he had entered into a 
 secret understanding. This bold 
 idea was well carried out, and 
 Mainz fortress was taken Octo- 
 ber 20, without a show of re- 
 sistance. Frankfort was cap- 
 tured in like manner, and the 
 country between the Rhine and 
 Lahn was overrun by the French. 
 Custine then sat down in Mainz and built a bridge-head at 
 Castel on the opposite bank. By sending a corps on Co- 
 blenz he also could have destroyed the allied magazines, and 
 markedly aided the other French operations ; but he did not 
 attempt this manoeuvre. Custine's triumph was short-lived. 
 In December the Prussians recaptured Frankfort, and Custine 
 withdrew to the left bank of the Ehine, still holding Castel. 
 But what he had done was of itself a great moral gain. 
 
 Kellermann's going into winter quarters lost him the com- 
 mand. He was sent to the Army of the South, and Beurnon- 
 ville took his place. But the latter accomplished nothing in 
 his attempts to again drive the allies across the Rhine. 
 
 In the Netherlands, the allies besieged Lille without result, 
 and then took up a position near Mens, which they strongly 
 fortified, but which was too long, and had its left, by which 
 
 Custine. 
 
76 
 
 ESSAYING THE OFFENSIVE. 
 
 they must retreat if defeated, ill-protected. After Valmy, 
 Dumouriez had, as stated, moved into the Low Countries with 
 his superior forces, but in several columns. In Champagne 
 the French had proved their ability to stand on the defensive 
 against the allies ; they were now to essay the offensive. 
 Valence, with the Army of the Ardennes, twenty thousand 
 strong, was manoeuvring on the Meuse, while Labourdonnaye, 
 with the Army of the North, of nearly equal strength, was 
 operating on the Scheldt, the two being intended to threaten 
 the allied flanks, and thus divert their attention. Dumou- 
 riez was in the centre with nearly fifty thousand men. The 
 
 Battle of Jemappes. 
 
 Austrians, under Beaulieu, Latour, Teschen and Clerfayt, 
 had some forty thousand effective, and held the debouches of 
 Namur, Mons and Tournay. It being on the route to Brus- 
 sels, they strove to make Mons unapproachable. 
 
 This fortress lies in the marshy confluence of the Hayne 
 and Trouille. In its south front lies a chain of moderate 
 hills, between which and the rivers, like outlying works, stand 
 the villages of Jemappes, Cuesmes and Bertaimont, while 
 
Louis Philippe. 
 
 CAPTURE OF JEMAPPES. 77 
 
 Quaregnon flanks the hills on the west. On this highland 
 the Austrians had built fourteen redoubts and manned them 
 with fifty-four guns; and here 
 Clerfayt, Teschen and Beaulieu, 
 with about twenty-five thousand 
 men, proposed to arrest the French 
 advance. Dumouriez had the di- 
 visions of the Duke of Chartres 
 (Louis Philippe), Miranda, Fer- 
 rand, Beurnouville, Dampierre and 
 Harville, and with these, forty-five 
 thousand strong, he started from 
 Valenciennes and Maubeuge, while 
 a column from Conde was ordered 
 forward to observe Tournay. On 
 November 6, 1792, he came in presence of the Austrians, and 
 speedily moved upon them, holding in hand a good reserve. 
 
 Ferrand attacked Quaregnon with his foot ; Dumouriez in 
 the centre and Beurnonville on the right opened on the Aus- 
 trian redoubts with artillery. Harville with a flying right 
 wing was intended to debouch from Siply, take Bertaimont, 
 turn Mons by the right and cut the Austrians off from retreat 
 on Brussels. But he went at his task in a slothful manner, 
 also opening with his guns alone, instead of advancing with 
 his foot. All along the line the Austrian defense was hardy. 
 But French numbers told. At ten o'clock Quaregnon was 
 taken. At twelve Dumouriez advanced his troops in battalion 
 columns under Dampierre and Beurnonville. The wood of 
 Deflenu offered a stout defense, but when Ferrand captured 
 Jemappes and took it in reverse, the Austrians vacated the 
 shelter. On debouching from it, however, the French wer*) 
 thrown into unsteadiness by the heavy fire from the Austrian 
 line and guns, and were on the point of falling back in a panic. 
 
78 PRAISEWORTHY COURAGE. 
 
 when Chartres rallied them, and at their head gallantly 
 stormed the heights and captured the redoubts. Beurnonville 
 at the same time got possession of Cuesmes, and drove back 
 the enemy's cavalry. At two o'clock the Austrians beat a 
 retreat, which, owing to HarviUe's failure to accomplish his 
 task, was easy. 
 
 Dumouriez would have done better had he attacked the 
 Austrian left, which was the strategic flank, as covering the 
 road to Brussels. But he had not yet risen to the compre- 
 hension of this now simple idea. He did, as stated, send 
 HarviUe's column to attack the allied left, but this officer, it 
 is urged, had orders, according to the cordon system, to keep 
 on the same level with the other columns; and thus ham- 
 pered, the attack came to naught. The fighting was the first 
 creditable work of the French levies. Elated by what they 
 had done at Valmy, they carried the field-works of the Aus- 
 trians with praiseworthy courage. The loss was not far from 
 four thousand killed and wounded on each side, and the vic- 
 tory raised the spirits of the French conscripts to a singular 
 degree. The next day the victors occupied Mons. The Aus- 
 trians retired to Brussels, which a further French advance 
 soon induced them to vacate and retreat behind the Meuse, 
 along which river Dumouriez took up winter quarters. He 
 had overrun all Belgium. The Austrians had lost the land 
 by their absurd adherence to the cordon system. But Du- 
 mouriez did not understand how to utilize his vast prepon- 
 derance of forces so as to destroy the Austrian army. 
 
 After this pronounced success, the Convention unwisely de- 
 clared the country out of danger, a proceeding which was 
 followed by wholesale desertion from the French ranks. 
 
 In the southeast, during 1792, Sardinia, allied to Louis 
 XVI. by marriage, raised a force to meet some forty thousand 
 French in the Army of the South, of which latter army part 
 
P9 
 
INVASION OF SAVOY AND NICE. 79 
 
 was ordered to operate against Savoy and part against Nice. 
 The Sardinian regular army consisted of twenty battalions, 
 say ten thousand men of foot, forty squadrons of cavalry, 
 scarcely over five thousand men, and, including fortresses, 
 some four thousand artillery. Its discipline was good. The 
 French invaded both Savoy and Nice, and overran part of 
 each land. It is quite noteworthy that Montesquieu, who 
 commanded the Savoy expedition, concentrated his forces and 
 advanced into that country in one body, thus throwing aside 
 the shackles of the cordon system. This was in a way pre- 
 scribed by the topography, but still the idea was good. The 
 execution was, however, so faulty that less came of it than 
 might have been expected. An expedition undertaken against 
 Naples, moreover, bore no fruit. 
 
 On November 19, 1792, the Convention issued a proclama- 
 tion offering the assistance of France to any people desirous 
 of throwing off the yoke of its exist- 
 ing government. This was a chal- 
 lenge to all Europe, and its effect was 
 to knit together the not overstrong 
 purpose of the allies. 
 
 On the whole, the campaign of 1792 
 proved that France could hold her 
 own against the Coalition. Belgium 
 had been conquered. Mainz, a salient 
 on the Ehine in the enemy's territory, 
 had been taken. Savoy and Nice had 
 in part been added to the French do- 
 
 ^ Light Infantryman. (1791.) 
 
 minions. The allies had set them- 
 selves the task of marching on Paris and dictating terms to 
 the new Eepublic. Had they fallen markedly short of this 
 end, the French would have deemed the campaign won. But 
 not only had their armies been driven back across the French 
 
80 GAIN IN SELF-CONFIDENCE. 
 
 frontier, but the allies had lost a substantial territory beside. 
 And the main thing gained by the French was self-confidence, 
 and ability to do better work in future. The raw levies of 
 the Republic had met the allied regulars and had beaten them. 
 Up to Valmy, the French recruit or national guardsman was 
 altogether lacking in morale. After Yalmy, with his Gallic 
 exuberance, he felt that he could face all Europe. The troops 
 gained, the generals learned, the requisition system worked 
 well, gaps were easily filled in the ranks, and the attitude 
 of the French armies was strengthened out of all proportion 
 to the gain actually made, which was small. What they had 
 won, to be sure, they owed to the allies' slothful method and 
 foolish cordon system, rather than to their own good conduct. 
 A strong allied commander could have marched into Paris 
 and restored the monarchy ; but no words can describe the 
 utter weakness of the operations of the Coalition. 
 
 Sword worn by Bonaparte in Egypt. 
 
IV. 
 THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 1793. 
 
 The execution of Louis XVI. markedly strengthened the Coalition against 
 France, and the civil "war of the Vendue, the want of money and internal 
 troubles of many kinds made a difficult task for the French leaders. Yet they 
 raised a million men, and had armies at every point on the frontier. The mer- 
 ciless system of the guillotine kept the army full, and obliged generals to do 
 their best work. Hoche and Pichegru held the Rhine. Despite hearty efEort, 
 Hoche was beaten at Kaiserslautern, but his gallantry saved his head. Duraou- 
 riez took Holland, but lost Belgium at Neerwinden. Still the allies parceled 
 out their forces, and accomplished no worthy, result. Kellermann evacuated 
 Nice, and lost, but later recaptured, part of Savoy. The English took Toulon, 
 a heavy blow to France. Spain joined the Coalition, and the rival armies fought 
 south of the Pyrenees. But though the French lost battles, the allies made no 
 advance. Meanwhile the Vendue gave great trouble, and required large armies 
 to keep this part of France under control. At first the Yendeans had much 
 success ; later they were put down by the Republican forces. 
 
 In 1793 the situation of France was complicated by the 
 fact that the execution of Louis XVI., on January 21, ar- 
 rayed against her many of the other powers. So soon as the 
 National Convention had thrown off the mask, most of the 
 nations hitherto neutral cast in their lot with the Coali- 
 tion. England had delayed actual participation in the strug- 
 gle, but on February 1, 1793, France boldly anticipated her 
 by declaring war. Holland was dependent on England, and 
 the decree equally included her. Spain had remained neu- 
 tral until the execution of the king, but on March 7 France 
 declared war against Spain also, rather than await such an 
 act on her part. The German Empire had been making pre- 
 parations ever since the capture of Mainz, and on April 30 
 issued a formal challenge. Protected by an English fleet. 
 
82 STRINGENT PROVISIONS. 
 
 Naples joined the enemies of France. Portugal, also de- 
 pendent upon England, offered troops. The Pope threw in 
 his lot with the allies out of religious policy. Excepting the 
 Scandinavian kingdoms, Russia and neutral Switzerland, all 
 Europe was in effect arrayed against the Republic. At home 
 matters had gone from worse to worse. Disorder reigned. 
 The finances were at a low ebb. The army was depleted by 
 deserters and absentees, who had construed too literally the 
 last year's decree that the country was out of danger. So 
 shrunken was the army that on February 24, 1793, a levy in 
 mass was ordered. The decree recited that until the com- 
 plete expulsion of the enemy out of the land, and beyond the 
 frontiers of France, the entire male population was to stand 
 in readiness to seize arms at the first call. Unmarried young 
 men and childless widowers should be drawn first to complete 
 the active armies ; the married and less fit for field duty 
 should be used for interior duty and the repair of arms. All 
 weapons in private hands were to be delivered to the war 
 authorities, for distribution to the armies. All horses not 
 absolutely needed for agriculture were to be taken for the 
 cavalry and artillery. Other equally stringent provisions 
 were made. It was not alone the foreign danger that the 
 Republican leaders had to contend with ; for the Vendee and 
 other uprisings against the Convention — in Marseilles, Lyons, 
 Bordeaux, Caen and later at Nantes and Angers — obliged 
 the authorities during the whole war to draw from the already 
 depleted frontier armies battalions by the wholesale for inte- 
 rior use. 
 
 The operations of 1793 were conducted on the border, 
 against the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Spain. Under 
 the February decree, three hundred thousand additional men 
 were to be raised and distributed among the several existing 
 armies, which would give a total of half a million men, includ- 
 
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 
 
 83 
 
 ing fifty thousand cavalry and twenty thousand artillery. But 
 actually not much over two hundred and seventy thousand 
 men were at any one time present udder the colors. These 
 were parceled out along the frontier, in the Army of the 
 Rhine, the Army of the Moselle, the Army of the North, the 
 Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy, the Army of the 
 Eastern Pyrenees and the Army of the Western Pyrenees. 
 The Army of the North was ninety thousand strong, the Army 
 of the Rhine half as large ; the oth- 
 ers were much smaller. Garrisons 
 and reserves considerably swelled 
 the number. Most of this force 
 was raw. 
 
 The allies had three hundred and 
 seventy-five thousand men, well-dis- 
 ciplined and in good heart. The 
 general plan was again to attack the 
 north and northeastern French fron- 
 tier. On the Rhine were to operate 
 one hundred thousand men in two 
 armies under Brunswick and Wurm- 
 ser, with Hohenlohe and Beaulieu 
 in support. On the northeastern 
 
 frontier were eighty thousand allies under Coburg. Pied- 
 mont had forty thousand men. Spain put a force of thirty 
 thousand men afoot. 
 
 Dumouriez drew up the French plan of campaign. The 
 general idea was to complete the conquest of Belgium and 
 of Nice ; and to act along the Rhine and Spanish frontier as 
 occasion demanded. The allies proposed to recover Mainz, 
 and to push the French back across the Meuse. 
 
 The allied forces on the Rhine were ill parceled out from 
 the Lahn to Basle, and these were faced by the Army of the 
 
 Commissary of Wars. 
 
84 
 
 FALL OF MAINZ. 
 
 Ehine in Mainz, and the Army of the Moselle behind the 
 Saar. There was so scant a cooperation between the allied 
 armies, that had the French debouched from Mainz across the 
 Ehine and turned against the Prussians, they might have 
 quite upset the allied plans. But the French held to the de- 
 fensive. On the other hand it was open to the allies to cross 
 the Ehine at Mannheim and cut the Army of the Ehine and 
 the Army of the Moselle asunder, an operation which would 
 have thrown these forces back from the river. As it was, they 
 crossed in the Hundsriick country, turned the left of the 
 Army of the Ehine, and beat part of Custine's forces at 
 Bingen. Custine withdrew the balance of his force to the 
 left bank at Mainz, and the two French armies being now put 
 under his command, he left that city with an ample garrison 
 to its own defense, and retired up river to the Landau region. 
 The allies laid siege to Mainz, and Custine's several operations 
 
 remained fruitless. In May 
 Custine went to the Army 
 of the North, and Beauhar- 
 nais (first husband of Jo- 
 sephine) succeeded him. 
 Several attempts were 
 made to relieve Mainz, but 
 the city, though defended 
 valiantly by Kleber, Meu- 
 nier and Dubayet, fell to 
 the allies in July. Beau- 
 harnais ascended the scaf- 
 fold for thus abandoning 
 Mainz, and was succeeded 
 by Landremont. Being a 
 noble, Custine was easily suspected of not having done all 
 that he might have done to save this city; and accused of 
 
 Kleber 
 
UNSUCCESSFUL COMMANDERS. 85 
 
 such failure, he suffered the same fate. Houchard was put 
 in command of the Army of the Moselle. One commander 
 replaced another, all to the destruction of good discipline 
 and morale, and to the utter ruin of pending operations. 
 During the summer a num- 
 ber of small actions were 
 fought, and on September 
 1 the Army of the Moselle 
 was defeated at Pirmasens, 
 with loss of four thousand 
 men against a few hundred 
 by the enemy. But owing 
 to the lifeless attitude of 
 the allies, no strategic iU 
 resulted. Change still suc- 
 ceeded change, and in the 
 frequent small affairs the 
 French were more often 
 worsted than successful. 
 
 These constant defeats 
 led the Convention to raise the cry of " Traitors ! " One after 
 another incompetent general was put in command, and one 
 after another of the unsuccessful commanders was driven to 
 the guillotine. But no gain was made until Hoche and Piche- 
 gru were put at the head of the forces operating between 
 the Rhine and Moselle ; while until Pichegru reached head- 
 quarters, Carlin, an obstinate old captain of dragoons, the 
 latest appointment, ^almost completed the ruin of the army. 
 
 The allies had finally prepared to invade Alsatia. The 
 first step was to drive the Army of the Rhine from the lines 
 of Weissemburg, an ancient series of fortifications along the 
 Lauter between the Rhine and the Vosges Mountains, which 
 in the past had played an important role. The Army of the 
 
 Pichegru. 
 

 S 19 £0 30 J*Q 
 
 Middle-Ehine Country. 
 
ADVANCE OF HOCHE. 87 
 
 Moselle was first attacked at the end of September and driven 
 behind the Saar, and this uncovered the left flank of the 
 Army of the Ehine. On October 13 Wurmser gallantly 
 assaulted and took the Weissemburg lines, and the French 
 retired to the Zorn, just below Strasburg. Landau was be- 
 sieged ; and Wurmser, urged on from Vienna, penetrated 
 into Alsatia and threatened Strasburg. 
 
 Such was the situation when Hoche took command of the 
 Army of the Moselle, and Pichegru of the Army of the 
 Rhine ; they were given some substantial reinforcements, and 
 ordered summarily to attack the enemy. A levy in mass was 
 ordered, so as to provide a suitable reserve. Pichegru at once 
 began his task, and pushed the allies in his front back to the 
 Moder, where they intrenched. 
 
 Hoche's duty required more extensive operations. He pro- 
 jected the relief of Landau by an advance down the left bank 
 of the Queich, crossing the Vosges at Zweibriicken and Hom- 
 burg. But about the same time, late in November, the Prus- 
 sians and Saxons under Brunswick, who was proposing to go 
 into winter quarters, took position in the neighborhood of 
 Kaiser slautern with twenty thousand men, Hohenlohe being 
 at Pirmasens ; and in his advance Hoche found that he had 
 in his front a powerful army. The rest of the allies were 
 distributed over a line nearly one hundred miles long, up the 
 Hhine. Hoche, who had forty thousand men and abundant 
 energy, moved against Kaiserslautern, and on November 27 
 came in presence of the enemy, whom ^ he struck first at 
 Vogelweh, and pushed in on the Galgenberg, the gallows hill, 
 which was now crowned by a redoubt. Another French col- 
 umn occupied Katzweiler. After reconnoitring, and finding 
 that Brunswick had intrenched himself on the west and north 
 of Kaiserslautern, Hoche determined to turn his right by 
 capturing Erlenbach and Morlautern, and for this purpose 
 
REDOUBTS CONSTRUCTED. 
 
 set up a battery of sixteen heavy guns near Sambach on the 
 right bank of the Lauter stream which flows past Kaisers- 
 lautern. The allies held the Kaiserberg, where they had 
 
 
 V CAuCE-NBtRO >'>"^ ^ 
 
 Battle of Kaiserslautem. 
 
 built another redoubt; and on the high land south of the 
 Otterbach they had constructed a third one, and back of it 
 stationed the cavalry. Erlenbach was filled with riflemen. 
 Early November 29 Hoche debouched from Katzweiler in 
 
A GALLANT ASSAULT. 89 
 
 three columns against the villages of Otterbach, Erlenbach 
 and Otterberg. A cross-fire from the French batteries at 
 Erfenbach and Sambach drove the enemy out of the lower 
 land and towards Kaiserslautern. Hoche followed, crossed 
 the Otterbach and took position on the Osterberg, where he 
 established a battery of 
 twenty-nine guns. A can- 
 nonade of several hours 
 followed, when a French 
 column of ten thousand 
 men, which had formed 
 under cover in the valley, 
 debouched on Morlautern. 
 The allies received the gal- 
 lant assault of the French 
 with stanchness, replied by 
 a countercharge and sent a 
 body of cavalry to take 
 the French column in the 
 
 left flank. This was too much for the young conscripts, who 
 retired back to the cover where they had formed, and the 
 Prussian pursuit was stopped by the French horse. Each 
 side withdrew to its old location. The French columns sent 
 on Erlenbach and Otterberg likewise failed to make a gain ; 
 and on the left bank the allies stood off the French attack. 
 By six o'clock the fire ceased. During the night Brunswick 
 reinforced Morlautern and Erlenbach. 
 
 Determined not to score a failure, at daybreak of the 30th 
 Hoche opened his batteries, and shortly sent forward a column 
 of foot in the Erlenbach vaUey on Buchberg. But Kalkreuth, 
 here stationed, took the French _ column in flank, drove it 
 back, and even threatened to take in reverse the position at 
 Osterberg. About the same time the French made an unsuc- 
 
 Hoche. 
 
90 INVASION OF HOLLAND. 
 
 cessful attack on Galapfelberg ; and on the other bank two 
 assaults on the Galgenberg, and near by it, were driven back 
 by Weimar. At three o'clock the fighting was over. Hoche 
 was forced to retire to Zweibriicken December 3. Brunswick 
 went into winter quarters. 
 
 Although Hoche had lost at Kaiserslautern, the Convention 
 recognized the heartiness of the attack, and weary of changes, 
 reinforced the Army of the Moselle. Meanwhile Pichegru 
 with sixty thousand men was pushing Wurmser, and tiring 
 out the allied troops by restless enterprises ; and when Hoche 
 moved by his right to join him, the allies, sixty thousand 
 strong, retired to the right bank of the Rhine. Landau, 
 Worms and Frankenthal were relieved. The Army of the 
 Moselle went into winter quarters on the Saar, the Army of 
 the Ehine on the Queich. At this point on the French fron- 
 tier the allies had once more quite failed to accomplish their 
 end. The Republican forces, despite frequent backsets, had 
 firmly held the French frontier. 
 
 In the Netherlands, in 1793, Dumouriez commanded the 
 French, one hundred thousand strong, against allied armies 
 of equal force. The Army of the Netherlands was strung 
 out, cordon fashion, from Antwerp to the Meuse ; the allies 
 were parceled out all over the land. The French proposed 
 to conquer Holland, and to give to the people the power held 
 by the Stadholder ; the allies to reconquer Belgium. About 
 mid-February Dumouriez invaded Holland with a small part 
 of his force, and in three weeks captured several strong places ; 
 but on hearing of the allied inroad into Belgium, he person- 
 ally returned to the Meuse. The allied leader, Coburg, under 
 whom were serving Archduke Charles, Wurtemberg, Latour 
 and Clerfayt, advanced on the Roer in March, drove away 
 the French troops there lying in cantonments, occupied Aix- 
 la-Chapelle, threw the French back beyond the Meuse, took 
 
AT NEERWINDEN. 
 
 91 
 
 Maestricht and Liege, and forced Miranda and Valence back 
 on St. Trond and towards Louvain. The French finally con- 
 centrated on the Dyle, where Dumouriez joined them, and at 
 once assuming the offensive, took Tirlemont after a lively 
 fight, and the heights between the Great and Little Geete. 
 The Austrians retired behind the latter stream, and drew up 
 in a position about Neerwinden, with thirty thousand foot 
 and ten thousand horse. Dumouriez had some forty-seven 
 thousand men in line, but only half the cavalry. This was 
 the ground on which one hundred years before the French 
 
 Battle of Neerwinden. 
 
 under Luxemburg had won a great victory against William 
 III. ; and the memory of this triumph was no doubt used to 
 cheer up the Gallic levies for the coming battle. 
 
 On the Austrian right, extending up to Halle, stood the 
 van under Archduke Charles, later so renowned ; in the cen- 
 tre, CoUoredo with Wurtemberg in second line ; on the left. 
 
92 THE FRENCH ONSET. 
 
 south of Neerwinden, the reserve under Clerfayt ; light troops 
 occupied all the villages along the Little Geete. The French 
 right was under Valence ; the centre under Chartres ; the 
 left under Miranda ; a flying wing was on right and left ; 
 and a reserve lay behind the Great Geete. Never doubting 
 success, for. he had won so often and now outnumbered the 
 enemy, Dumouriez marshaled the French army in eight 
 columns of attack, three under Valence, which crossed the 
 river and advanced on Eacour and Oberwinden ; two under 
 Chartres, which also crossed and pushed through Laer on 
 Neerwinden; and three under Miranda along the postroad 
 on Halle ; while the reserve was given the task to take Leau 
 and debouch to the right on the same village. 
 
 The first news received by Coburg early on the 18th of 
 March was from the announcement of attacks on his right ; 
 and fearing for his line of retreat along the highway, he with- 
 drew a heavy force of foot and horse from the centre, and 
 sent it to protect Halle. Meanwhile the French right and 
 centre had captured Racour, Oberwinden, and later Neerwin- 
 den ; the French left had driven the Austrians back on Dor- 
 mael ; and the reserve had occupied Leau and advanced on. 
 Halle. But shortly Coburg recovered himself, while the 
 French onset had exhausted the young recruits. The reserve 
 was thrown back on Leau, and the Austrians held firm in 
 Dormael. This moment was seized by Archduke Charles to 
 advance. His sharp onset pushed the French back along the 
 postroad, and afforded the cavalry the chance to ride down 
 on the weakening French left, and push it behind the Little 
 Geete. The blow delivered by Charles had been well timed 
 and heavy. So demoralized did the French left wing become, 
 that only at Tirlemont could Miranda rally a part of it. 
 
 Meanwhile on the Austrian left, after making splendid 
 efforts to regain Neerwinden, Oberwinden and Racour, and 
 
DEMORALIZATION RAMPANT. 
 
 93 
 
 after a murderous defense of these villages -by the French, 
 
 during which the two last were taken and retaken again and 
 
 again, the troops succeeded in tiring out Dumouriez's raw 
 
 infantry, and aided by the cavalry, which charged in the open 
 
 between the villages, drove them out of all three places. The 
 
 Austrian work had been strong, and the battle was theirs. 
 
 The French cavalry handsomely cfovered the retreat of the 
 
 brigades, and the line 
 
 held itself in front of 
 
 the Little Geete until 
 
 next morning, when, on 
 
 account of the serious 
 
 defeat of his left by 
 
 Charles, Dumouriez saw 
 
 that he must definitely 
 
 retire. This he did, and 
 
 took position southeast 
 
 of Tirlemont. 
 
 The ill effect of the 
 defeat on the French was 
 such that they deserted 
 wholesale, and made for 
 France. Even the Con- 
 vention could not guillo- 
 tine an entire army, and demoralization was rampant. Three 
 days after the battle, Dumouriez had but twenty thousand 
 men. The allies recovered a great part of Flanders ; while 
 the French kept but a section, and this by severe measures 
 only. In taking Holland, Dumouriez had lost Belgium. 
 
 Whether or not this defeat was the result of treachery on 
 Dumouriez's part is not certain ; but treachery was charged, 
 and when the deputies of the Convention came to headquar- 
 ters to hold him to task, he openly proposed to the army to 
 
 Heavy Cayalryman. (1795.) 
 
94 
 
 JOURDAN IN COMMAND. 
 
 march on Paris and restore the monarchy. Met, however, by 
 stern refusal, he fled to the allied camp. The Army of the 
 North was consolidated into the Army of the Ardennes. Co- 
 burg was at this moment afforded a fine opportunity for a 
 fatal blow to the Republic by an advance on the capital, but 
 he failed to utilize it. He was indecisive and slow. Neither 
 were the French in any position to assume the offensive, and 
 the allies managed to capture Valenciennes, Conde and le 
 Quesnoy, and besieged Dunkirk during the summer months. 
 They had a quarter of a million men on their line from LiUe 
 to Basle, but as usual infinitely divided their forces. The 
 Convention raised fresh levies, and placed Houchard in 
 command of the Flanders armies. 
 
 Despite their excellent chances this year, the allies practi- 
 cally accomplished nothing in the Netherlands. Houchard, 
 who received orders to cut the English off from Furnes and 
 
 drive them into the sea, 
 beat the Dutch at Hond- 
 schoote and saved Dun- 
 kirk ; but as he took no 
 advantage of his victory 
 and had failed to accom- 
 plish the task set him, he 
 was recalled and guillo- 
 tined, "pour encourager 
 les autres." The allies, 
 with a second army out 
 for protection, laid siege 
 to Maubeuge. In place 
 of Houchard, Jourdan was 
 put in command of all the 
 armies along the northern frontier. With forty-five thousand 
 men the new leader advanced on Maubeuge, beat the protect- 
 
 Jourdan. 
 
SPAIN JOINS THE COALITION. 
 
 95 
 
 ing army at Wattigny, and relieved the fortress. The allies 
 retired across the Sambre. After some unimportant addi- 
 tional mancEuvres in Flanders, both contestants went into 
 winter quarters. The allied work in the Netherlands had 
 practically come to naught. The French had maintained their 
 frontier, though they had lost part of their outside holdings. 
 
 In Italy, in 1793, after some changes, Kellermann (Junior) 
 came into command of both the Army of the Alps and the 
 Army of Italy. His oper- 
 ations were not, however, 
 followed by much good 
 fortune. The allies re- 
 captured Savoy, and the 
 French were compelled to 
 vacate Nice. Later, part 
 of Savoy was again taken 
 by Kellermann ; but on 
 the other hand Toulon was 
 captured by the English. 
 Yet, weighing the ^ros and 
 cons, the allies had made 
 no greater gain on this 
 field than in the north. 
 
 The execution of Louis 
 had brought Spain into 
 
 the Coalition. She had a force of ninety thousand foot and 
 fifteen thousand horse, of which thirty thousand men were on 
 the frontier, in Catalonia, Navarre and Aragon. In the East- 
 ern Pyrenees Davout, and later Thureau and Doppet, were 
 held in check in their attempt to invade Catalonia by Kicarod. 
 A number of minor engagements were fought, and much 
 manoeuvring done over this difficult terrain, with no decisive 
 result, and the French went into winter quarters near Per- 
 
 Kellenuann (Junior). 
 
96 
 
 UNIMPORTANT RESULTS. 
 
 pigiian. In the Western Pyrenees no greater result was ob- 
 tained ; nor indeed in Aragon. The French had not been 
 able to get a foothold in Spain. But they had made secure 
 the Republican frontier. 
 
 The important recapture of Toulon from the English, which 
 occurred this year, and in which Bonaparte first played "a 
 leading role, will be detailed later. 
 
 The results of 1793, then, were unimportant for the allies, 
 who in their project of invading France and changing her 
 new government had made no substantial headway. On the 
 whole the French had, even with their raw levies and poor 
 conduct, more than held their own against the regular troops 
 of the allies, which, led by hidebound exponents of the old 
 methods of war, had done themselves scant justice. 
 
 The war of the Coalition on the French Republic was 
 largely one of Anglo-Saxon business methods pitted against 
 the furious energy of the Gaul. While England put few 
 
 British regiments into 
 the field, she was lavish 
 of her money in subsi- 
 dies to those who could 
 furnish men. Still striv- 
 ing to bring all the Euro- 
 pean powers into the 
 Coalition, by 1794 she 
 was in good part suc- 
 cessful with the smaller 
 ones. Portugal, Naples 
 and Tuscany mobilized. 
 Holland did the same. 
 Genoa wavered. Venice 
 refused French advances 
 and armed. Prussia had been tempted to leave the Coalition, 
 but was persuaded by England to remain in it and furnish 
 
 Officer of Light Infantry. (1795). 
 
MEN OF THE MOMENT. 97 
 
 sixty thousand troops, to be fed and paid by England. Switz- 
 erland remained neutral, which was of vast gain to France, 
 and Bussia held aloof. England raised her army to sixty 
 thousand men, subsidized forty thousand foreign troops for 
 her own service, and put her navy on a war footing of eighty- 
 five thousand men. The Vendeans. were furnished aid, and 
 an expedition was sent against Corsica. 
 
 Perhaps no leaders of a great national uprising ever had 
 more difficulties to face than the men who fathered the French 
 Revolution. There were great men in those days, not always 
 men such as peace and plenty breed, but men of the moment, 
 fierce, intractable, ruthless, who sought by any means, fair or 
 foul, just or unjust, to accomplish the one object they had at 
 heart — • the liberation of the French from the yoke of cen- 
 turies of oppression. However much hatred they engendered, 
 however much the world may shudder at the recital of their 
 doings, no one can withhold his meed of admiration for their 
 courage and ability. 
 
 The difficulties before them were not only those of foreign 
 interference fostered by the Royalists who were driven out 
 of France, but those of internal struggles, which necessitated 
 the keeping of large armies to suppress civil war, and made 
 the tenure of office by the parties in power one of extreme 
 uncertainty. As there was much civil bloodshed, and as 
 no tyranny was ever worse than that which succeeded the 
 deposal of Louis XVI., so there were many men in power 
 whose guiding motive was merely self-seeking ; but amongst 
 these men there was also a leaven of true patriots, and it 
 was eventually the influence of these men which prevailed. 
 
 Foremost among the difficulties which the Revolutionary 
 leaders had to face was the war in the Vendee. This strug- 
 gle has little to do with a history of the art of war, except 
 for its interest as the insurrection of a people. As such, a few 
 words may be devoted to it. 
 
98 THE VENDEE MILITAIRE. 
 
 The Vendee began in 1793, and lasted with more or less 
 intensity and after sundry truces and pacifications, until 
 1799, when it was suppressed, only to break out spasmodically 
 thereafter, especially in 1813, 1814 and 1815. It was a war 
 for the throne and the rights of the Bourbons, and was char- 
 acterized by extraordinary courage and self-sacrifice on the 
 part of the Vendeans. 
 
 The theatre of the Vendee Militaire was that which is 
 known to-day as the departments of the Vendee, the Sevres, 
 the Loire Inferieure, and the Maine et Loire, that is to say, 
 the country lying on the northeast of the Bay of Biscay, 
 sheltered by the peninsula of Finisterre. It contained a pop- 
 iulation of eight hundred thousand souls, and was topogra- 
 iphically divided into Le Bocage, or forest land ; Le Marais, 
 or marsh land ; and La Plaine, or flat upland. The forest 
 land comprised two thirds of the area, and contained isolated 
 farms and estates closed in, as were also the fields, by ditches, 
 live-hedges and fences, and connected by mere semblances 
 of roads, which during the rainy weather could scarcely be 
 used. Le Marais was near the sea, open and flat, and cut up 
 by many canals, ditches and small shallow ponds, through 
 which, as in many parts of Holland, nearly all communication 
 between town and town, and farm and farm, was kept up by 
 means of flat-bottomed boats. Pedestrians were forced to 
 carry poles by means of which they might vault over the 
 canals and ditches. Open stretches of country could be found 
 only near the mouth of the Loire. There were scarcely any 
 highways which could be used for the operations of an army. 
 Over most of this land troops would have to move by squads, 
 or even in single file. 
 
 The Vendeans were a robust people, moderate, laborious, 
 of strong and stubborn character, and fixed though narrow 
 religious views. They were strong partisans of the Bourbons, 
 
PEASANT WARRIORS. 
 
 99 
 
 but the priesthood had greater influence than the nobility. 
 These men never became soldiers, but every one responded to 
 the call to arms, shouldering such weapons as he could col- 
 lect, with clothing and victual ; and having received absolu- 
 tion from the priest, he sallied forth to help the cause. After 
 
 
 The Vendue Militaire. 
 
 victory or defeat alike, these peasant warriors melted back 
 into the population and resumed their every-day work ; while 
 only a few leaders and some men, in small part mounted, 
 kept on foot to act as patrols and news-carriers. 
 
 When the war broke out, the Vendeans had only pikes, 
 flails, scythes and pitchforks, with an occasional fowling- 
 piece or carbine. Little by little, however, they seized from 
 the enemy weapons of a more regular kind. There was no 
 
100 VENDEAN PATRIOTS. 
 
 drill or discipline ; the men merely marched in a crude mass 
 as directed by their leaders. The advance was nothing but 
 an irregular mob following the men in whom they had con- 
 fidence ; and the only value of the body was the weight of a 
 mass of men whose purpose was strong. There could be 
 no greater difference between two classes of men fighting for 
 independence than existed between the Americans of our 
 Eevolution and these Vendean patriots. Those of the men 
 who were armed with muskets, usually fowling-piecea loaded 
 with buckshot or scraps of iron, were placed in front or on 
 the flanks. When the enemy (Les Bleus) was met, the lead- 
 ers ordered : " Egaillez-vous, mes gars ! " whereupon the 
 whole body would move to right and left into a long line, so 
 as to encircle the body of the enemy, and at a signal boldly 
 rush forward with loud shouts. A special body was detailed 
 to capture the enemy's guns. This was not infrequently done 
 by volunteers, who would creep out towards the guns, throw- 
 ing themselves on the ground when they saw these about to 
 fire, hiding themselves behind obstacles, dashing forward at 
 intervals, and finally throwing themselves in a crowd upon 
 the guns, though armed only with iron-shod clubs. There 
 were few mounted men, and these unreliable. Superstition 
 made the Vendeans worthless at night, and discipline was so 
 lax that sentries commonly slept on post. 
 
 It was the decree of the Convention in 1793 for raising 
 some three hundred thousand men which gave the signal for 
 the rising in the Vendee, already much wrought up against 
 the Eepublican government because of the execution of Louis 
 XVI., and the action taken against religion, churches and 
 holy orders. In March, 1793, the insurrection began in 
 Anjou, and in the Marais and the Bocage, under their leaders, 
 Cathelineau, StofSet, D'Elbee, Bonchamp and Charette. The 
 Vendeans seized a number of places, beat several of the bod- 
 
LAROCHEJAQUELIN. 101 
 
 ies of Eepublican troops sent against them, and captured 
 some artillery. Hereupon the Convention declared the insur- 
 rectionists to be outlaws, 
 and ordered La Bourdon- 
 naye, who commanded in 
 this district, to form two 
 columns of three thou- 
 sand men each, to guard 
 the communications with 
 Brittany. At the same 
 time it called out fifteen 
 thousand men under Ber- 
 ruyer, composed of fresh 
 levies. In Angers Ber- 
 ruyer divided his army 
 into four parts, purposing 
 to move on the Vendeans 
 
 from different directions Larochejaquelin. 
 
 and push them into the ocean ; and, in fact, he did win a vic- 
 tory at Beaupr^au against thirty thousand Vendeans ; yet 
 Larochejaquelin, leader of the Vendeans, beat one of his ad- 
 vance bodies at Aubiers, collected a number of the insurrec- 
 tionists, threw part of the Republican troops across the Loire, 
 and shut up others in Bressuire and Fontenay. On May 5 
 the main Vendean army, twenty thousand strong, under 
 D'Elb^e and Cathelineau, surrounded and captured a Eepub- 
 lican army, taking six thousand muskets and twelve guns, and 
 the patriots were joined by the experienced Lescure, and 
 many less valuable friends, among them an adventurer who 
 called himself Bishop of Agra. On May 9 this force closed 
 in Parthenay, and on the 13th Chataigneray ; but the booty 
 collected induced many of the men to desert. Even patriotism 
 is not always proof to the seduction of loot. On May 16 the 
 
102 
 
 CATHELINEAU. 
 
 Vendeans attacking Fontenay were beaten ; but Bonchamp 
 and Larochejaquelin came up to their assistance, and the 
 Eepublican troops on the 24th were defeated with the loss 
 of forty guns and much material, victual and money. 
 
 Biron now took charge of the Bleus, but his forces were 
 still undisciplined ; they were in fact no better than the forty 
 thousand men that the Vendeans collected in Chatillon and 
 Vihiers. The Vendeans took Doue and Saumur early in 
 June, but were shortly driven back to Tours by Menou, who 
 
 commanded ten thousand 
 Bleus. Cathelineau was 
 then elected " Generalis- 
 simo of the Royal Catholic 
 Army." He determined 
 to move on and capture 
 Nantes as a central base. 
 Bonchamp wanted to move 
 into Brittany and Nor- 
 mandy and on towards 
 Paris ; but the Vendeans, 
 in fact, moved down the 
 right bank of the Loire, 
 took Angers and reached 
 Nantes the end of June, being joined by Charette, who had 
 marched by the left bank. Here fifty thousand Vendeans 
 shut in ten thousand Bleus under Canclaux, but the Vendeans 
 could not get possession of the city. Cathelineau was killed. 
 Canclaux was joined by other Republicans; and Westermann, 
 who commanded Biron's cavalry, beat the Vendeans in sev- 
 eral engagements, but earned a bad reputation for cruelty to 
 prisoners. On July 5 he was entirely defeated by Bonchamp 
 and Larochejaquelin, whereupon, in retaliation, the Vendeans 
 cut down aU the prisoners they took. Another Republican 
 
 Cathelineau. 
 
CRUEL MEASURES. 103 
 
 force marching from the Saumur country was defeated, but 
 the southern Vendeans failed in their effort to capture LuQon. 
 D'Elbee succeeded Cathelineau, but there was much disagree- 
 ment among the Vendeans as to leaders and management. 
 
 In five months the Vendeans had created a strong and 
 fairly well-armed force, and their successes over the Bleus 
 had been so considerable as to compel the central power to 
 raise large forces to put them down, and as they phrased it 
 to " destroy the race." The bitterness of the Eepublicans 
 was equaled by their cruel measures. It was essential to put 
 better troops in the field against the Vendeans ; and the gar- 
 rison of Mainz, which city had lately been surrendered to the 
 Austrians, was sent to the Loire. Here the army was par- 
 celed into three divisions, one so called of Brest under Can- 
 claux, six thousand men and twenty guns ; one of La Eochelle, 
 ten thousand men and thirty guns, under Eossignol ; and one 
 of the Mainz troops, eighteen thousand men and thirty guns. 
 These forces, thirty-five thousand strong, were to operate from 
 Nantes, cut the Vendeans from the sea, push them into the 
 interior and surround them. On September 9 the Republi- 
 cans broke up from Nantes in two columns, the Brest column 
 against Machecoul, the Mainz column (Kleber commanding 
 van) against Lege. The La Eochelle column also moved on 
 Saumur and Cholet, but the Vendeans managed to beat the 
 latter separately, and to force back Kleber and Canclaux. 
 The Republicans retired to Nantes. Hereupon the Conven- 
 tion joined the Brest and La Rochelle divisions under the 
 name of the Army of the West, and Lechelle was put in com- 
 mand, a poor soldier, who during his short term of office 
 moved into the Vendean country in two concentric columns. 
 On October 15 twenty-three thousand men of the Army of 
 the West, under Beaupuy, Marceau and Kleber, got in the 
 rear of the Vendeans, forty thousand strong, at Cholet. 
 
104 
 
 THE REPUBLICANS ORGANIZED. 
 
 Here D'Elbee and Bonchamp were defeated October 17, and 
 driven back to Beaupreau with heavy loss. Charette, busy 
 with other operations, had failed to sustain his brother offi- 
 cers. The Vendean 
 army was compelled 
 to cross to the right 
 bank of the Loire, 
 followed by many old 
 men, women and chil- 
 dren, to escape the 
 fury of the Republi- 
 cans. 
 
 Larochejaquelin 
 succeeded D'Elbee ; 
 Chalbos, Lechelle. 
 The Vendeans strove 
 to enlist Brittany in 
 their cause, and in 
 October took Laval. Here Kleber was defeated by them, 
 despite which, however, he was left in command of his divi- 
 sion. The Republicans reorganized, after repeated defeats, in 
 Angers. The Vendeans, though above all they needed union, 
 disagreed as to plans, and finally, in the hope of English aid, 
 moved in force to Granville, on the Normandy sea-coast. But 
 they could capture neither this town nor Avranches. 
 
 The Republicans collected a force of levies and peasants 
 behind the Vire, and the troops from Angers and Rennes fol- 
 lowed the Vendeans into Normandy. Seeking to move back 
 to the Loire country, the Vendeans won a battle at Dole, but 
 instead of pursuing the enemy, turned to bombard Angers, 
 hoping to cross the Loire on its permanent bridge. This 
 vicinity, however, they soon had to leave on the approach of 
 the Republican army under Marceau, who had now been put 
 
 Marceau. 
 
THE VENDEANS VANQUISHED. 
 
 105 
 
 in charge. The Vendeans again strove to reach the left bank 
 of the Loire, but the Republicans headed them off, and they 
 moved back into Maine. On December 8 they were nearly 
 defeated at La Fleche, being saved only by the clever man- 
 agement of Larochejaquelin. Marceau now marched from 
 Angers towards Laval, and obliqued on Le Mans in three 
 columns. The left column, in advance of the others, struck 
 the Vendeans a heavy blow, but was beaten off ; and the sec- 
 ond column attacked and took the suburbs, December 12. 
 Kleber with the right column came up in the succeeding 
 night, fell on the Vendeans, and drove them back on Laval 
 with the loss of ten thou- 
 sand men and all their 
 artillery and train. Very 
 many old men, women and 
 children were ruthlessly 
 cut down. A detachment 
 occupied Angers to pre- 
 vent the Vendeans reach- 
 ing the other side of the 
 Loire. . 
 
 After this defeat the 
 Vendeans could not hold 
 head to the Republican 
 forces. Marceau followed 
 them up sharply, and the 
 
 garrisons of Saumur, Angers and Nantes prevented their 
 crossing the river. On December 16 they attempted to steal 
 a passage between Angers and Nantes, but fruitlessly. They 
 were driven back to Sarenay, where on December 22 the body 
 was attacked by the Republicans and cut to pieces. The few 
 who escaped the sabres of Westermann's cavalry went to the 
 guillotine. Only a handful saved their lives. South of the 
 
 Charette. 
 
106 A HOPELESS STRUGGLE. 
 
 Loire, Haxo's Eepublicans had been equally successful ; and 
 the year 1793 ended with the almost total destruction of the 
 Vendee and its population. The first six months had been 
 favorable for them, but from September to December their 
 chiefs disagreed, and they worked in detail instead of together, 
 and thus could not meet the better troops and generals the 
 Eepublicans continued to send against them. Instead of 
 sticking to their proper role of a popular uprising, moreover, 
 
 and fighting in small bands on the 
 defensive, they undertook a regular 
 warfare to which they were not 
 suited. In the beginning of 1794 
 the Vendee was still further ravaged 
 by the Republicans, and on the other 
 hand the Vendeans revenged them- 
 selves by killing all captured Bleus, 
 It became a war of extermination. 
 Larochejaquelin alone held the Ven- 
 deans together. Westermann, whom 
 Larochejaquelin had defeated at 
 and Larochejaquelin fell in battle. 
 The further operations in the Vendee are less interesting ; 
 but France had to struggle with civil war until Hoche finally 
 pacified the country in 1796, and Bonaparte subdued the 
 Chouans of Brittany in 1800. After this the outbreaks were 
 spasmodic. 
 
 There is no end to the stories of heroism, on the part of 
 men and women alike, in this hopeless struggle for faith and 
 king ; but these may not be dwelt upon. The war is men- 
 tioned solely to show the method of the Vendeans, as well as 
 to draw attention to the serious internal difficulties with 
 which the Republican authorities had to contend while facing 
 all Europe in arms. 
 
 Westerjnann. 
 
 Vezins, was guillotined ; 
 
THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 1794 TO 1795. 
 
 The Reign of Terror and the Bnances were at their worst, yet, dragooned 
 by fear, the people of France proposed to raise a million and a, quarter men. 
 The Coalition, snhsidized by England, raised a million men. Fichegru com- 
 manded the French on the northern frontier, along which several costly battles 
 were lost and won. Jourdan made several crossings of the Sambre, in June 
 captured Charleroi, and somewhat later fought the battle of Fleurus. This was 
 really lost, but the allies retired. Fichegru again advanced, and the allies re- 
 tired into winter quarters, while Fichegru overran Holland. All these opera- 
 tions were weak and ill-considered, hut the French had shown much energy, 
 and the Coalition armies, which were to enter France and march on Faris, could 
 gain no real foothold within the frontier. On the Rhine the French were again 
 defeated at Kaiserslautem, but on the whole, under Moreau, they held their 
 own. In the Alps Xellermann, and on the Riviera Massena, did good work. 
 The campaign of 1794 was a failure for the Coalition. In 1795 only Austria 
 and the German empire remained in the field. The French had more than six 
 hundred thousand men all told, two thirds campaigning against the Coalition. 
 In September Joiirdan crossed the Rhine at Diisseldorf, and Fichegru crossed 
 and took Heidelberg. Fichegru turned traitor, and the allies recaptured Mainz. 
 In 1795 Kellermann did no more than to hold his position in the Alps, but 
 Scherer, aided by Massena, won the battle of Loano in November, and drove 
 the enemy back across the mountains. If during the first years of the Revolu- 
 tionary wars France was able to defend her frontiers, in 1794 and 1795 she ad- 
 vanced into the enemy's territory, and showed energy and ability far beyond 
 those of the allies. The year 1794 saw the Vendean struggle largely quieted. 
 
 As 1794 opened, the internal conditions of France were at 
 their worst. All power was held by the Committee of Public 
 Safety, and the Reign of Terror was in full blast. The 
 finances were desperate, the paper money worthless. Civil 
 war added to the burdens of the country; and to forestall 
 
108 ENORMOUS PREPARATIONS. 
 
 famine food had to be got from Italy, Barbary and even 
 
 North America. 
 
 Despite all this, enormous preparations 
 were made for the ap- 
 proaching campaign by 
 the men in power, with 
 whom it literally was 
 neck or nothing. By 
 the decrees of August 
 and September, 1793, a 
 million and a quarter 
 men of all kinds were 
 ordered to be raised; 
 and throughout the sev- 
 eral armies the old sol- 
 diers were mixed with 
 the new, one old bat- 
 talion and two new ones 
 in each half-brigade, as 
 a means of easier education and better discipline, and to 
 steady the bodies in action. 
 
 The bulk of the French forces were on the northern and 
 eastern frontiers. The Army of the North numbered one 
 hundred and sixty thousand men ; the Army of the Ardennes 
 was thirty-five thousand strong ; the Army of the Moselle had 
 sixty thousand men ; the Army of the Rhine forty-five thou- 
 sand men ; the Army of the Upper Rhine numbered nearly 
 fifty thousand effective ; the Army of the Alps forty thousand 
 men ; the Army of Italy fifty-five thousand men ; the Army 
 of the Eastern Pyrenees seventy thousand men ; the Army 
 of the Western Pyrenees fifty thousand men ; and there were 
 three armies in the interior. These were, however, paper 
 figures, never actually reached and by no means represent- 
 ing men under the colors. Opposed to this force on the 
 
 Republican General and his Orderly. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE ALLIES. 
 
 109 
 
 northern frontier of France were the troops furnished and 
 subsidized by England. Austria, despite her losses, got into 
 line a quarter of a million men, most of which force went to 
 the Netherlands. The Prussian troops were fed at a large 
 cost by England and Holland, and numbered over fifty thou- 
 sand men. Holland furnished its usual contingent. The 
 German Empire did the like. The Coalition in one way or 
 other had nearly a miUiou men of all kinds afoot, but as this 
 comprised home and garrison troops, not half of the numbers 
 were actively engaged. The Upper Rhine forces numbered 
 sixty thousand men; sixty-five thousand men stood near 
 Mainz ; twenty thousand were in Luxemburg. The main 
 army in the Netherlands had fully one hundred and fifty 
 thousand men for duty. In Italy stood forty thousand, and 
 in the Pyrenees fifty thousand men. 
 
 The purpose of the allies was to push hard on the northern 
 and northeastern frontier of France, and perhaps this year 
 to open the long essayed path to Paris. 
 In Italy the troops would stand on the 
 defensive, or assume the offensive only if 
 good chance offered ; and the Spaniards 
 were to push through the Eastern Pyre- 
 nees and act on the defensive in the 
 Western Pyrenees, so as to draw French 
 forces away from the northern armies. 
 The allies' plan was good, but they for- 
 got to take into account the tremendous 
 momentum of the popular uprising in 
 France. 
 
 Pichegru, high in favor, commanded 
 the Army of the North, which was strung 
 out from Dunkirk through Lille, Douay and Cambray to 
 Maubeuge, with the Army of the Ardennes sustaining its 
 
 Line Infantryman. 
 (1795.) 
 
110 CAPTURE OF LANDRECIES. 
 
 right. The fortresses were mostly garrisoned by new levies. 
 Coburg commanded the allies in the Netherlands, and these 
 were also strung out from the ocean to the Rhine, the Eng- 
 lish under the Duke of York on the right. The French had 
 several fortresses to recapture. They were superior in num- 
 bers, but not as good in discipline. Carnot, now French 
 minister of war, drew up the plan of campaign, which, under 
 his pet theory, was to comprise the turning of both allied 
 flanks in the Netherlands. Each opponent was again about 
 to operate on the old cordon system, which had fully taken 
 possession of men's minds, to the exclusion of every sound 
 strategical idea that Gustavus and Frederick had taught the 
 world. 
 
 In March, 1794, the allies advanced upon Landrecies with 
 eighty-five thousand men and closed it in. The fortress sur- 
 rendered April 30, and the French fell back after two rather 
 faint attempts to relieve it. The capture of Landrecies in a 
 way ruptured the centre of the French line, and foreseeing 
 the danger, the Committee of Public Safety ordered Jourdan 
 up with the Army of the Moselle, and Pichegru was other- 
 wise sustained. On Aprils 25 the latter general advanced in 
 two columns on Menin and Courtray. Menin was smartly 
 taken by Moreau. Clerfayt advanced to meet Pichegru, but 
 was beaten at Courtray May 11, and the allied right wing fell 
 back. Ypres was blockaded by the French about the end of 
 April. 
 
 At the same time the Army of the Ardennes attempted to 
 cross the Sambre in several columns on a front extending 
 from Charleroi to Maubeuge ; but after some heavy fighting, 
 was defeated, with a loss of four thoiisand men and twelve 
 guns, on May 13. All the battles of this period, however 
 stoutly contested and costly, seem to have remained without 
 result. Nor even when the details which remain to us suffice, 
 
SERIOUS ENGAGEMENTS. Ill 
 
 do they present points of interest salient enough to make a 
 lengthy narrative useful. In a renewed effort to place the 
 French armies beyond the Sambre, Kleber's troops suffered a 
 defeat with considerable loss May 21, and again on the 24th. 
 Despite these three defeats, the French showed admirable 
 activity; but still they clung to the fatal system of many 
 columns. Operations and attacks in one mass were reserved 
 for Napoleon to revive. Frederick's lessons had been appar- 
 ently forgotten. 
 
 After the battle of Courtray the allied right wing advanced 
 again in a number of columns on the French, who had for 
 unexplained reasons retired to their old lines. As a matter 
 of course these columns did not work together, and one of 
 them was defeated May 18 and 19 at Turcoing, with loss of 
 four thousand men and all its artillery. The records of these 
 several serious engagements are very crude. In no respect did 
 the French utilize their victory as they might. The allies 
 returned to Tournay, where they took up a position in a half- 
 circle around the town. On May 22 Pichegru attacked them 
 here, and heavy fighting occurred at Pont-a-Chin ; but though 
 the French were defeated, with a loss of over five thousand 
 men, and retired to Courtray, this battle also remained with- 
 out immediate result. Coburg and York were at odds ; and 
 the allies quite failed to work for a common purpose. The 
 French, who showed great vigor if not good strategy, kept on 
 their advance along the coast towns, and took Ypres June 18, 
 and Ostende and Nieuport in July. 
 
 In the centre, at the end of May, the French made another, 
 the third, attempt to cross the Sambre, but after an advance 
 barely worth mentioning, again retired. 
 
 The Army of the Moselle meanwhile, under Jourdan, had 
 marched to the Sambre, Moreau being placed in command on 
 the Moselle ; and a new army was created, under Jourdan, to 
 
112 
 
 CHARLEROI BLOCKADED. 
 
 be called the Army of the Sambre and Meuse. About mid- 
 June, for the fourth time, the French under the new leader 
 crossed the Sambre, but after a defeat north of Charleroi, in 
 which they lost three thousand men and sixteen guns, they 
 still again retired. Later in June, urged on by'the never-to- 
 be-satisfied Committee of Public Safety, Jourdan's army for 
 the fifth time crossed the Sambre, and laid siege to Charleroi, 
 
 Battle of Fleurus. 
 
 shutting up all avenues to the place. The left was at Tra- 
 zegnies and Forchies ; the centre at Gosselies and Heppignies ; 
 the right at Fleurus and Lambusart. Here on June 16 the 
 Prince of Orange attacked Jourdan's centre and right and 
 drove them across the Sambre, and the rest of the French 
 army was constrained to foUow ; but Orange's heavy losses 
 induced him also to retire. Coburg then came up with thirty 
 thousand men to his aid ; but with praiseworthy energy 
 Jourdan had already reestablished order, recrossed the Sambre 
 and again blockaded Charleroi. By a hearty bombardment 
 
PLAN OF OPERATIONS. 113 
 
 the city was made to capitulate June 25, just as Coburg 
 got ready to take decisive action. The possession of Charleroi 
 gave Jourdan a marked advantage, and added the French 
 besieging forces to the fighting line. 
 
 The allies had forty-six thousand men ; the French are 
 given as seventy-five thousand, but they were of far inferior 
 quality. Coburg drew up his line on the usual cordon plan 
 in a huge semicircle around the French position, and formed 
 five columns of attack widely separated, each one subdivided 
 into other columns. On the right. Orange was to debouch 
 from Herlaymont ; next came Quosdanovich from Frasne ; 
 then Kaunitz, who was to operate towards Fleurus to help 
 the Archduke Charles, after taking which, both would ad- 
 vance on Ransart ; finally Beaulieu was to debouch through 
 Baulet on Lambusart. 
 
 Jourdan's line ran from river to river, through Trazegnies, 
 Gosselies, Heppignies, Fleurus, Lambusart, the divisions 
 standing in order, Kleber, Marlot, Championnet, Lefebvre, 
 Marceau. Considerable forces were out beyond the line in 
 the several villages. 
 
 At daybreak of June 26 the allied leader threw all five 
 columns on the French lines. Exhibiting great gallantry, 
 they met with uniform success. Orange had three columns 
 of attack, and speedily drove in Kleber's division as far as 
 Marchiennes, where, learning that Charleroi had surrendered, 
 he paused, and afforded Kleber time to mass his guns on the 
 hills and force the allies back. Quosdanovich pushed in 
 Marlot's advanced parties to Gosselies, and Kaunitz forced 
 Championnet in to Heppignies, where he waited until Charles 
 ousted Lefebvre from Fleurus ; but Kaunitz was shortly driven 
 out by Jourdan, who brought up his cavalry for the purpose. 
 Meanwhile Beaulieu had attacked Marceau's division, broken 
 the young troops, and forced the bulk of them across the 
 
114 
 
 L AMBUS ART THE KEY-POINT. 
 
 Sambre. But, collecting a few brigades, Marceau held fiercely 
 on to Lambusart, where Lefebvre came up to his aid. Here 
 was the bloodiest fighting of the day; and this village be- 
 came the key-point of the field. Finally the haystacks and 
 
 thatched roofs of the vil- 
 lage caught fire, but the 
 battle raged on in the 
 midst of fiames, with sur- 
 prising tenacity on either 
 hand. Jourdan brought 
 up all the reserve troops 
 he could gather, and the 
 place was held. The day, 
 with more energy, would 
 have proved an allied vic- 
 tory, but Coburg, on the 
 news of the faU of Char- 
 leroi being confirmed by 
 Beaulieu, elected to retire, which he did in many columns on 
 Sombref, Quatre-Bras and Nivelles, Koeulx and Mons. 
 
 The French loss is given as six thousand men. The allies 
 quoted their own losses as sixteen hundred, and the French 
 claimed the allied loss to be thirteen thousand. It is probable 
 that the allied casualties exceeded five thousand. The battle 
 of Fleurus was followed by a fresh advance of Pichegru's 
 army during the summer, by the retreat of the allies behind 
 the Meuse, and the occupation of Belgium and West Flanders 
 by the French. Brussels was entered July 10. The persist- 
 ency of the Republican leaders had been as admirable as their 
 military methods were lacking. 
 
 Clerfayt succeeded Coburg. Jourdan, late in August, 
 marched against the former and pushed him back to the Roer, 
 on which river he defeated the enemy October 2 ; and after 
 
 Lefebvre. 
 
A STRANGE CAVALRY EXPLOIT. 
 
 115 
 
 a number of smaller exchanges the allies retired behind the 
 Rhine into winter quarters. On either side these armies of 
 seventy or eighty thousand men had been ill-handled. Upon 
 Clerfayt's retreat the Duke of York and the English army 
 felt constrained to retire behind the Waal, upon which York 
 went to England, leaving Walmoden in command. The Army 
 of the North followed up the allied retreat. Pichegru crossed 
 the Meuse and the Waal on the ice and, taking Bommel by 
 assault, reached Utrecht January 19, and Amsterdam next 
 day. The whole of Holland was overrun by the end of Jan- 
 uary, 1795. To show how oddly warfare is at times conducted, 
 the fact may be mentioned that the French hussars rode out 
 into the Helder Strait upon the ice, reached the Dutch fleet, 
 which was frozen in near Texel island, and captured it, — as 
 strange a cavalry exploit as ever occurred. The Army of the 
 North then went into winter quarters. 
 Holland had no recourse but to make a 
 treaty with the French. 
 
 There is much in the campaign in Flan- 
 ders which is of interest ; but as it is no 
 part of this history, furnishing as it does 
 no lesson in the art of war, except to ex- 
 hibit the folly of the cordon system and 
 the status upon which Bonaparte grafted 
 his new method, these otherwise impor- 
 tant events must be passed over with only 
 brief mention. 
 
 The result of the Netherlands cam- 
 paign of 1794, during which the allies 
 had proposed to invade France and push 
 on to Paris — a purpose by no means duUed by three successive 
 failures — had resulted not only in their not entering France, 
 but in their being pushed back behind the Rhine, and being 
 
 French Grenadier. 
 (1795.) 
 
116 ADVANCE MOVEMENTS. 
 
 compelled to abandon Belgium and Holland. Whatever criti- 
 cism may be passed on the lamentable strategy and tactics of 
 both sides, it is to be said to the credit of the French that, 
 during each of the years 1792, 1793 and 1794, they had placed 
 more men and better generals in the field as time went on. 
 The energy of Pichegru and Jourdan, under the lash to be sure 
 of the Committee of Public Safety and its horrible methods, 
 was much to be commended. Four times they failed after 
 crossing the Sambre ; the fifth time they succeeded ; and while 
 this success was largely due to the bad system, quarrels and 
 utter lack of energy of the allied generals, yet the French 
 commanders deserve none the less credit for what they ac- 
 complished. It is to be noted that here and on the Rhine 
 were a number of Bonaparte's later opponents. Mack, Beau- 
 lieu, Wurmser and others, practicing in a subordinate com- 
 mand those errors of the cordon system of which the great 
 soldier was by and by on a larger scale to teach them the 
 worthlessness. 
 
 While the Netherlands armies were waging a warfare in 
 detail, which eventuated in favor of the French, the allies con- 
 centrated one hundred and fifty thousand men on the Rhine. 
 Facing this array of allies were the Army of the Moselle and 
 the Army of the Rhine. The purpose was to stand on the 
 defensive along this part of the French frontier, and up to 
 May little occurred beyond small-war. In July the French 
 made an advance movement, but without result. Later, under 
 orders from Carnot, another movement forward was made in 
 the Vosges region, and part of the allied army retired across 
 the Rhine at Mannheim. In August Moreau advanced on 
 Treves and took it ; and though its recovery was attempted 
 and the French were a second time beaten at Kaiserslautern, 
 yet the general effect of the French advance in September 
 and October was that the allies retired to their side of the 
 
OPERATIONS IN ITALY. 
 
 117 
 
 river. Mainz was then blockaded. Thus on the Ehine, as 
 well as in the Netherlands, the French had held their own, 
 and more. According to the strict rules of the cordon system, 
 when the main army in the Netherlands retired, the Ehine 
 forces had to do the like ; and although the French also fol- 
 lowed the cordon system in a way, they displayed much greater 
 decision and intelligence in their operations. 
 
 In Italy the Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy, 
 respectively of thirty-five and forty thousand men, were faced 
 by not exceeding forty thousand allies all told. 
 The Army of the Alps under Kellermann got 
 possession of the little St. Bernard and Mont 
 Cenis. The Army of Italy under Massena did 
 some good work. A plan drawn up by Bona- 
 parte, who was then serving in the Army of 
 Italy as an artillery officer, was begun ; but 
 lacking, as it did, its author's vigor of execu- 
 tion, it failed of the largest result. The pirates 
 were, however, driven out of Oneille ; and 
 chiefly by the efforts of Massena, Saorgio was 
 also taken, and the Austrians driven back to 
 Ceva. Seizing the Col di Tenda, the French 
 forced the allies down to the foothills, where they 
 concentrated around Coni. In July an advance 
 was made on this fortress, but the 9th Thermidor and fall of 
 Robespierre arrested the undertaking. The French retained 
 the watershed. The allies in September, attempting to take 
 Savona, were beaten off ; and the place being occupied by a 
 French garrison, the coast as far as Savona was covered by 
 the French winter quarters. The allied winter quarters lay in 
 the shelter of the fortresses beyond the mountains. Scherer 
 took command of the Army of Italy, and to Kellermann was 
 given the joint control of both armies. 
 
 French Hnssar. 
 
 (1795.) 
 
118 PEACE WITH PRUSSIA. 
 
 In the Pyrenees the western Spanish army was intended to 
 remain on the defensive, the eastern one to advance across the 
 French frontier. But the French anticipated the Spanish, 
 and Augereau, the later so distinguished Marshal of the Em- 
 pire, won some credit for a victory at Seret ; after which the 
 Spaniards retired across the border, followed by the French. 
 Constant exchanges took place during the campaign, in which 
 the names of Victor and Sauret also appear with distinction. 
 The campaign ended by the capture of Figueras. In the 
 Western Pyrenees there was also much secondary fighting of 
 no particular interest. On the borders of Aragon a number 
 of expeditions were undertaken, and swords crossed without 
 important effect. 
 
 On the whole, then, the result of the campaign of 1794 was 
 naught on the part of the Coalition, and of marked value on 
 the part of France. The allies had accomplished no part of 
 their vast undertaking, while the French Republic, in three 
 years, had pushed forward its frontier on all sides in a man- 
 ner which Louis XIV., after nearly fifty years of warfare, 
 had been unable to attain. The Committee of Public Safety, 
 and especially Carnot, had conducted the defense of France 
 with an offensive method which, allowing all its faults, had 
 produced great results. The campaign had shown what an 
 active organization , like the new Republic could succeed in 
 doing against a lifeless body like the Coalition. The raw 
 levies and new generals of France had proved more than a 
 match for the veterans of the allied armies, led by officers 
 long trained in war. 
 
 The fine results of the French operations in 1794 led to a 
 peace with Prussia in April, 1795, by which France remained 
 in possession of some of the conquered Prussian territory on 
 the left bank of the Rhine. Hesse-Cassel made a later peace, 
 and Holland concluded an offensive-defensive alliance with 
 
Moreau. 
 
 INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES. 119 
 
 France. England remained stubbornly opposed to the French 
 regime, and increased her navy to two hundred thousand 
 men ; but the English-paid 
 German troops were dis- 
 charged. Only Austria 
 and the German Empire 
 continued in the field as, 
 since the execution of 
 Marie Antoinette, they 
 were in a way constrained 
 to do. From financial 
 stress, indeed, the emperor 
 would have been glad to 
 make peace, but England 
 subsidized Austria, and de- 
 termined her to keep the 
 
 field. Russia now joined in the fray, and sent a few ships to 
 join the English fleet. Denmark and Sweden remained neu- 
 tral. Spain entered into negotiations with France. All Italy, , 
 except Genoa and Tuscany, remained in the Coalition, but 
 Sardinia would have rejoiced to be quit of the war. Thus in 
 reality England and Austria were the only great powers which , 
 still faced France. But though the Republic had won in 
 arms, the internal difficulties of the country grew. There 
 was little food, and the English fleet captured a great part of. 
 the corn-laden ships. The Vendeans made a temporary truce, 
 but one hundred and twenty thousand men had to be kept 
 afoot in the armies of the interior. The French forces in 
 1795 numbered less than six hundred thousand men, of which 
 not exceeding two thirds were disposable for use against the 
 Coalition. 
 
 Moreau commanded the Army of the North, fifty thousand 
 strong, with an equal number garrisoning the fortresses, and 
 
120 
 
 AMPLE GARRISONS. 
 
 was closely watching neutral Prussia. The Army of the 
 Sambre and Meuse under Jourdan numbered nearly one hun- 
 dred thousand men, with ample garrisons in the strong places 
 along the Rhine from Cleves to Coblenz and Bingen. The 
 
 Battle of Mainz. 
 
 Army of the Rhine and the Army of the Moselle under Piche- 
 gru in Alsatia and the Palatinate, ninety thousand effective, 
 had nearly as many more in garrison along the Rhine from 
 Mainz to Basle, and four divisions were blockading Mainz to 
 keep the allies from debouching on the left bank. The Army 
 of the Alps of twenty thousand men and the Army of Italy 
 of ninety thousand men remained under command of Keller- 
 mann. The two Pyrenees armies of seventy-five thousand 
 each stood as before ; and the so-called Army of the West 
 
PICHEGRU'S TREACHERY. 121 
 
 faced the Vendue, seventy thousand aggregate. The above 
 were really paper figures, never reached. Two armies stood 
 at Cherbourg and Brest to prevent landings by the English. 
 The French plan was to assume the offensive all along the 
 line, and the Republic particularly aimed to capture Luxem- 
 burg and Mainz. 
 
 Along the Rhine lay the allies with eighty-five thousand 
 men under Wurmser, in detachments from Basle to the 
 Neckar ; and nearly a hundred thousand men under Clerfayt 
 from the Neckar to the Ruhr. In Italy were seventy thou- 
 sand men. The Spanish armies were smaller than before. 
 The allies hoped this year to reconquer Belgium. 
 
 Serious questions of food, equipment and munitions of war 
 delayed the opening of the campaign. In June, 1795, Lux- 
 emburg, after a busy siege of eight months, was captured by 
 the French. Both parties held the long line of the Rhine on 
 the cordon system, and spread their forces in small isolated 
 bodies over the entire distance. In September Jourdan 
 crossed the Rhine and took Diisseldorf, the Austrians falling 
 back behind the Lahn and Main ; and Pichegru, who being 
 in correspondence with the enemy was slow at his task, also 
 crossed and occupied Mannheim and Heidelberg, where vast 
 stores were found. Jourdan followed up the Austrians to 
 the Lahn and beyond, but in October the latter, under Cler- 
 fayt, by manoeuvres threatening his flanks, and facilitated by 
 Pichegru's treachery, forced him back and across the Rhine. 
 Pichegru also retiring, the allies turned to the relief of 
 Mainz. 
 
 Mainz had been well fortified, and the French lines were 
 also elaborate, mounting over two hundred guns. These 
 lines began at Laubenheim near the Rhine, and ran via 
 Hechtsheim, Mariaborn, Gonzenheim, to near Monbach, where 
 they again reached the river. Their main fault lay in leav- 
 
AL5 Xt I A 
 
 Campaign of 1795. 
 
THE BLOCKADE BROKEN. 
 
 123 
 
 ing a gap between Laubenheim and the BMne. General 
 Schaal, in command of the French, had about thirty thousand 
 men in the blockading lines, and the division commanders 
 stood from right to left: Courtot, Gouvion St. Cyr, Men- 
 gaud, Rencauld. So soon as Clerfayt reconnoitred this posi- 
 tion on October 25, he saw that the gap of over half a mile 
 between Laubenheim and the Ehine opened a good chance 
 of breaking the blockade. He arranged to make stout feints 
 on the French left, and under 
 cover of these, via Weissenau 
 and across the Rhine, to take 
 the French right in reverse. 
 This attack was carefully pre- 
 pared during the night of Octo- 
 ber 28-29. Early on the 29th 
 Monbach was smartly attacked, 
 and the French generals drew 
 troops from the right to rein- 
 force the left. Bodenheim, in 
 Courtot's rear, was taken by a 
 column which crossed the Rhine in boats. The Weissenau 
 column advanced without firing a shot, captured the outly- 
 ing works of Laubenheim with a rush, and pushed in on 
 Courtot's division ; while a second column advanced on 
 Hechtsheim, a third on Brenzenheim, and still another col- 
 umn captured Gonzenheim. Courtot retired after a good 
 defense, and St. Cyr was thus taken in flank. The column 
 at Bodenheim was heavily reinforced, and advancing rapidly 
 captured Gaubischofsheim. The French were fairly turned 
 out of their position, much to Clerfayt's credit, and retired 
 from the blockade, with a loss of over four thousand men, 
 and all their guns and material. The allied loss was less 
 than half as much. 
 
 Gouvion St. Cyr. 
 
124 KELLERMANN IN THE ALPS. 
 
 The allies now in their turn kept on in their advance, and 
 in November both French generals fell back behind the 
 Vosges. Mannheim was occupied by the Austrians and later 
 Kaiserslautern, Homburg, and Zweibrucken; and when the 
 Army of the Sambre and Meuse was withdrawn to the Mo- 
 selle, the Army of the Khine withdrew behind the Speyer- 
 bach. From January until the spring, a truce kept the 
 armies on the Rhine quiet. 
 
 In 1795 Austria strengthened her army in Italy, and Sar- 
 dinia did the like. There were seventy thousand men on 
 paper, fifty thousand under the colors. The Army of Italy 
 stood along the coast from Savona to the Finestre and Tenda 
 passes ; the Army of the Alps still held the Alpine passes 
 from the Little St. Bernard to the Argentieres. All these 
 forces were in poor condition, numbering barely thirty thou- 
 sand men for duty. The Austrians proposed to drive the 
 French back to the Var, and occupy the coast ; the French 
 to force the Bocchetta pass. Kellermann was given a free 
 hand to advance or retire, as circumstances might dictate. 
 
 The Army of the Alps accomplished little but to hold its 
 own. The Austrians advanced in June against the Army of 
 Italy, and forced it back some distance to the line Borghetto- 
 Ormea-Tenda. The English fleet cut off its supplies and 
 reduced the troops to great straits ; and reinforcements did 
 not reach the army until August. Kellermann's lack of suc- 
 cess resulted in his being left in charge of the Army of the 
 Alps alone, the sole command of the Army of Italy being con- 
 fided to Scherer. 
 
 Late in the year the allies had gone into winter quarters, 
 their left covered by a twofold line of field-works from Rocca 
 Barbena to Loano and from Bardinetto to Finale, and the 
 right extending across the mountains to Ceva. They were 
 well provided with food from Genoa. Fresh from compelling 
 
ADVANCE ON LOANO. 
 
 125 
 
 peace in Catalonia, Scherer proposed to surprise the enemy in 
 his quarters, especially as many of the Austrian officers had 
 left their command for the greater comfort of the towns, and 
 he himself had received reinforcements, including Augereau's 
 division from the Eastern Pyrenees, which ran the Army of 
 
 Battle of Loano. 
 
 Italy up to nearly fifty thousand men. Loano and Finale lie at 
 the foot of valleys whose upper ends were closed by strong 
 works at Rocca Barbena, Bardinetto and Melongo ; and as these 
 had to be taken to insure the success of any advance on Loano, 
 the task was confided to Massena, who, born in Nice, hap- 
 pened to be familiar with the country and its mountain paths. 
 On November 23 Scherer formed three columns, to advance 
 at the same moment. Serurier on the left made his way down 
 into the Tanaro valley ; Augereau on the right advanced 
 straight on Loano ; Massena in the centre headed the column 
 destined to clear the enemy away from the works at the head- 
 waters of the valleys. His knowledge of the country here 
 
126 THE AUSTRIANS RETREAT. 
 
 came into play ; he led his men through ravines and over hills 
 with a secrecy and ardor which proved him to be a born moun- 
 tain fighter, and quickly surprising and successively capturing 
 the redoubts at Rocca Barbena, Bardinetto and Melongo, 
 he then swung to the right and swept like a whirlwind down 
 upon the rear of the allied positions. The next day a heavy 
 engagement was fought in front of Loano. Argenteau, sur- 
 prised, and soon finding his position turned, was fain to decamp 
 from Loano, which Augereau at once occupied, and was able 
 to hold Finale but a short while. Serurier pushed down the 
 Tanaro, captured Garessio, and forced the Piedmontese back 
 to Ceva. Massena, following up his gain, pushed Argenteau 
 behind the Bormida, and the Austrians did not stop their re- 
 treat until they had reached Dego and Acqui. They had lost 
 in this short and sharp winter operation three thousand killed 
 and wounded, five thousand prisoners and forty guns. This 
 victory opened for.the French the road to Genoa, and gave 
 them control of the passes in the Apennines. Though the 
 plan for the operation was drawn up by Bonaparte, who was 
 then working in the department of war in Paris, its conduct 
 reflected great credit on Scherer, and particularly on Massena. 
 And, moreover, it gave all the French generals a better 
 knowledge of the country in which they were next year to 
 campaign to such good effect under the new leader. 
 
 In the Eastern Pyrenees region there was much manoeu- 
 vring to and fro without especial result ; among the hills of 
 the Western Pyrenees there was more activity, but equally 
 unfruitful. In July peace was concluded between Spain and 
 France. 
 
 The campaign of 1795 had been quite as disastrous for the 
 Coalition as that of 1794. The total forces operating in the 
 field were on each side something over three hundred thou- 
 sand men. On the Ehine, Jourdan and Pichegru had been 
 
PUBLIC SPIRIT. 
 
 127 
 
 active enough to prevent the allies from winning much beyond 
 what they had held at the opening of operations. In Italy, 
 the French had gained more than the allies. On the whole 
 the offensive of the Coalition had weakened into defensive, 
 and the French were now in better condition to carry forward 
 their projects. The entire scheme of the Coalition was crum- 
 bling. 
 
 The first four years of the French Revolution were the 
 beginning of the wars of the new era. Not only did France 
 introduce a new system 
 of war, but the Eepublic 
 showed itself fully able 
 to defend its frontiers 
 against all Europe ; and 
 the years 1794 and 1795 
 proved France ready to 
 conquer territory outside 
 her old borders. Though 
 there was no special gain 
 in a strategic sense on 
 either side, for both op- 
 ponents held firmly to the 
 cordon system, yet the 
 French exhibited a great 
 
 excess of moral force over the allies. However much their 
 methods may be questioned, to the Convention and the Com- 
 mittee of Public Safety must be attributed wonderful intelli- 
 gence, unanimity and energy in conducting the wars of France. 
 This was complemented by the extraordinary public spirit of 
 the people, partly controlled to be sure by the tyranny of the 
 governing power, but largely due also to the strong innate 
 love of country. Every available man was in arms, every one 
 learned his lesson in the ranks, and the whole population of 
 
128 ABILITY IN WAR. 
 
 France became instinct with military fervor. Although the 
 feats of arms attempted by the French troops often turned 
 out to be lamentably weak, yet the constant work along the 
 border from Dunkirk to the Pyrenees, in daily conflict with 
 the enemy, was a good school for officers and men. Many of 
 the ancient and well-educated officers, being nobles, had left 
 France, but the Eepublic bred up others, and the rule of mak- 
 ing success the sole test brought the able men to the front, 
 though it buried from sight many who had failed from no 
 fault of their own. 
 
 On the other side there was little unity and less moral 
 force ; the operations of the allies had no general method ; 
 they were conducted largely by the Vienna Aulic Council, 
 and the men at the head of the armies were hampered by red 
 tape, apt to be at odds, and rarely worked together. As a 
 rule the allied operations lacked energy; the unnecessary 
 dread of being turned or cut off from their base appeared to 
 be a constant motive for retreat. As to their army organiza- 
 tion, this had not been changed for fifty years. The armies 
 were loaded down with immense trains and impeded by mag- 
 azines, and they could not tear themselves loose from the 
 glaring defects of the cordon system and concentrate any 
 respectable force for a single operation. The four years on 
 the part of the allies had been a war of fortresses and field 
 fortifications. The French armies, on the other hand, with 
 small trains, and feeding themselves on the country, were able 
 to accomplish better results, despite their own adherence to 
 the cordon system, which had been less formal ; and while 
 these campaigns were on their part defensive, they took the 
 shape of offensive operations. 
 
 In these four years the French showed by far the greater 
 ability in war, and the operations of their generals and armies 
 during this period laid a foundation upon which Napoleon 
 
HOCHE SUCCEEDS CANCLAUX. 129 
 
 could erect his magnificent schemes. Circumstances were 
 building up for him an army with which to essay his new 
 theory of war, much as Philip and Frederick William had 
 trained armies to be later led to victory by Alexander and 
 Frederick. 
 
 In the Vendue, in 1794, Thurreau was in command of the 
 Republicans, who numbered forty thousand men, more or less 
 raw. The Vendeans had half as many and were still in 
 disagreement as to plans, and could consequently make no 
 progress. In June the Committee of Public Safety withdrew 
 the bulk of the forces from the Vendue, which encouraged the 
 revolutionists. The year 1794 had no occurrences of value. In 
 1795 Canclaux took command of the Republican army, and 
 on the 5th of February Charette made a treaty of peace with 
 him, and his lead was followed by Stofflet. The rest thus 
 given lasted no great time. The emigres started the Vendeans 
 afresh, and the uprising broke out in Poitou. In June the 
 Vendeans were again in full insurrection, and the utmost 
 cruelty was exhibited by both parties. On August 10 an 
 English squadron brought supplies to Charette at St. Gilles, 
 and an English fleet soon followed. The Republicans strength- 
 ened the Army of the West by some troops from the Pyre- 
 nees. Hoche succeeded Canclaux, and marched on Belleville 
 against Charette. He had fifteen thousand men, and used 
 these cleverly cordon -fashion, pushing Charette farther and 
 farther towards the ocean. At the end of the year the whole 
 coast from Bordeaux to Cherbourg was placed under Hoche, 
 who practically pacified the Vendue. 
 
 The year 1793 was the most important one in the Vendue 
 war. In 1794 only isolated attempts made by Thurreau and 
 Hoche against Charette and Stofflet were noteworthy. The 
 fault of the Vendeans had been that instead of carrying on a 
 people's war, they attempted to wage a regular war in masses, 
 
130 A DRAGGING WAR. 
 
 for which they were not suited. On the Republican side, 
 poor generals and poorer troops bad kept the war dragging 
 beyond any necessity. 
 
 But we must now turn to the young officer, whose future 
 exploits are to be the burden of these volumes, and see what 
 he has been doing to qualify himself for the extraordinary 
 campaign of 1796, which at once raised him to the level of 
 the greatest captains of aU time. 
 
 Sword of Mnrad Bey, worn by Bonaparte. 
 
VI. 
 
 THE YOUTH AND THE COMPANY OFFICEE. 
 1769 TO 1793. 
 
 Napoleottb Buonapabtb was the fourth child of a poor but noble family in 
 Ajaccio, Corsica. His father was an easy-going man, his mothei a woman of 
 character. Born in 1769, he was educated at home, at ten was sent to the mil- 
 itary school at Brienne, and later to that of Paris. He was a small, strange 
 boy, morose and obstinate, capable in some studies, neglectful in others, but with 
 intelligence and character. Looked down upon by his rich classmates, he yet 
 in a way impressed himself upon them, and in 1786 received his commission as 
 artillery subaltern in the French army. For a number of years, instead of serv- 
 ing with his regiment, young Buonaparte mailed to be much absent in Corsica, 
 where he was at first an adherent of the patriot Faoli, and harbored an ambition 
 to free his native island. But later he deemed it wiser to accept the French 
 occupation. He was pitifully poor. When off duty in Paris, he would live on 
 bread to buy books. He wrote much, read voraciously and made prolific notes. 
 Little by little he rose to be captain, but, probably on account of his useful- 
 ness to the French in Corsica, was allowed to be much away from regimental 
 duties. Daring the early Revolutionary struggle he paid vastly more heed to 
 his birthplace than to France. Though energetic, he seemed to fail in all his 
 undertakings, and made as many enemies as friends. This ill success and his 
 French leanings were so marked that finally the whole Buonaparte family was 
 compelled -to leave Corsica and become refugees, subsisting in Provence on a 
 pittance allowed them by the government. This was small promise for the 
 futnxe. 
 
 About no great character in history has there been so 
 much to dispute as the wonderful son of Corsica, who for two 
 decades kept Europe aflame. Even disagreement as to the 
 date of his birth exists ; but in military history it has long 
 been accepted that Napoleone di Buonaparte first saw the 
 light at Ajaccio, August 15, 1769. 
 
132 BIRTH OF NAPOLEON. 
 
 A legend exists that, on the night of the birth of his suc- 
 cessor as captain, Frederick the Great had a singular dream, 
 which he next day narrated to the members of his house- 
 hold. In the west arose a star, which, as it ascended above 
 the horizon, grew to huge proportions, descended upon the 
 earth, and covered it with a brilliant light. Surrounding this 
 star was a luminous sea, extending out into a comet's taU. 
 In seeking to free himself from the oppressing glare of this 
 awful body, the king awoke. 
 
 Napoleon was the fourth child, two having died in infancy, 
 and his brother Joseph being the third. As nine children 
 followed, it was fortunate that one of the family should 
 make his mark, so as to be able to aid the others.^ Madame 
 Buonaparte was a woman of much activity and ambition. 
 Though her time was near at hand, she personally assisted 
 at the fete of the AssumpJ;ion at Ajaccio ; but no sooner had 
 she reached the church than — as is narrated — she was 
 compelled to seek her home, and, unable to reach her bed- 
 chamber, gave birth to her famous son in her parlor, on an 
 old rug representing characters from Homer. Little is 
 known as to his boyhood, though he spoke of himself in late 
 years as having been of a domineering, restless nature ; but 
 as, despite a life well calculated to breed quick temper and 
 impatience, he exhibited in his trying days at St. Helena a 
 singular amiability and equipoise, we are led to believe that 
 some of the gentler qualities were inborn. 
 
 Some historians have found much that was exceptional in 
 his youth. He himself denied that there were any such char- 
 
 ^ Thirteen children "were born, of "whom eight grew np. The list is as fol- 
 lows : Joseph (king, first of Naples, then of Spain), Napoleon, Lucien, Eliza 
 (Princess Bacciochi), Pauline (married first to General Leclerc, afterwards to 
 Prince Borghese), Caroline (married to Murat, became queen of Naples), Louis 
 (king of Holland), Jerome (king of Westphalia). Of these the eldest was 
 born in 1768, the youngest in 1784. 
 
HATRED OF TYRANTS. 133 
 
 acteristics, in much the same way that he denied the necessity 
 of ancestors for one who by his own merit had reerected the 
 throne of Charlemagne. Except that the lad possessed the 
 true Corsican hatred of its tyrants, Genoa and France, and 
 strove to tread in the steps of Paoli, the liberator, there is 
 
 ,5^-^^ 
 
 Corsica. 
 
 nothing in the youth of Napoleone Buonaparte which may 
 not be found in that of many boys who have risen only to 
 mediocrity. 
 
 Endless origins have been traced to distinguish the ances- 
 tors of the family ; and in a way the Buonapartes had pos- 
 sessed a past on the Italian mainland. One William, a 
 Ghibelline of Florence, took the name of Buona Parte (the 
 
134 
 
 DISDAIN OF ANCESTRY. 
 
 good part) in the thirteenth century ; but when the Guelphs 
 chased their opponents out of the city, this citizen, who had 
 apparently chosen the worse part, retired to Sarzana in Tus- 
 cany. Here the family hid its poverty, until in 1529 it 
 migrated to Corsica. So much distinction might be claimed 
 in the ancestry of almost any family. Yet it remains true, 
 if it has any value, that the Buonapartes had held titles of 
 nobility from both Genoa and Tuscany. 
 
 When the Emperor Francis, before the Russian campaign, 
 showed Napoleon what he had dug out with regard to the 
 Buonapartes, from old records and parchments at Treviso, 
 a mass of matter which he considered much in their favor. 
 Napoleon replied to his father-in-law, " I attach no price to 
 these old parchments. My nobility dates only from Mon- 
 tenotte, and the 18th Brumaire. I prefer to be the founder 
 
 rather than the descendant 
 of an illustrious race. I 
 wish to be the Rudolph of 
 Hapsburg of my family." 
 Corsica had from an- 
 cient times been under the 
 dominion of every nation 
 whose navy ruled the Medi- 
 terranean, but this domin- 
 ion had never overthrown 
 the hardy, turbulent popu- 
 lation of the mountainous 
 interior. This race pos- 
 sessed in a rare degree 
 the virtues of courage, devotion and fidelity ; but they were 
 engrafted on habits as savage as those of the feud-loving dwell- 
 ers of our own southern Appalachians, where a shot precedes 
 a word, and honor sullied requires bloodshed to the seventh 
 
 Carlo di Buonaparte. 
 
HIS PARENTS. 
 
 135 
 
 generation. In Ajaccio the Buonapartes were adherents of 
 the patriot Paoli, and indeed Charles, the father of Napoleon, 
 was educated at the University founded by him. 
 
 Carlo di Buonaparte was an easy-going man, who relied 
 throughout life rather 
 on what his influence 
 could procure from tlie 
 efforts of others, than 
 on what he might him- 
 self create, in order to 
 care for his constantly 
 increasing family. Na- 
 poleon's mother, Le- 
 titia Hamolino, was a 
 beautiful woman with 
 much force of char- 
 acter. She, too, came 
 of Florentine ances- 
 try which had emi- 
 grated to Corsica, and 
 the young people were 
 married at a very early 
 age. Though she gave 
 
 evidences of good extraction, Letitia's frugality was bred of 
 Italian economies as well as of the family necessities, and 
 it was largely due to her that on the slender means provided 
 for the family budget, there was anything substantial accom- 
 plished towards the proper nurture and education of the chil- 
 dren. She lived to be eighty-six, and the extraordinary rise 
 of her great son never dazzled her, as his downfall did not dis- 
 hearten. It was she who chiefly moulded her son Napoleon. 
 
 Genoa had been succeeded by France as protector of Cor- 
 sica ; and Paoli, who had ejected the Genoese, would gladly 
 
 Letitia di Buonaparte. 
 
136 AT BRIENNE. 
 
 have done the same thing with the French ; but his efforts 
 ended in failure, and he and his chief adherents fled to 
 England. Carlo Buonaparte accepted the French amnesty, 
 and when, as a part reward for this conduct, the gift of an 
 appointment to the military school of Brienne was secured 
 by him through the French governor of Corsica, Count Mar- 
 bceuf, young Napoleon's future was first determined. 
 
 In his tenth year, April 23, 1779, after three months' 
 schooling in French at Autun, the future leader of men, a 
 small, thin, strange boy, entered upon his early training in 
 arms. Curiously, the school of Brienne stood at that time 
 under the direction of Benedictine monks. The lad naturally 
 possessed a scant knowledge of French ; indeed, at every stage 
 of his life Napoleon was crude as a linguist, though he could 
 use language in a most incisive way ; and his comrades, many 
 of whom came from rich if not noble families, looked jeeringly 
 at the poverty-stricken, half -savage islander, who was educated 
 at the royal charge, and treated him after a fashion that often 
 forced him to a quarrel, or else to seek solitude, and taught 
 him to keep his own counsel. He was nicknamed " the Spar- 
 tan." The lad had a large store of pride in his make-up ; he 
 was silent and obstinate ; and a letter written in his eleventh 
 year to his father shows that this treatment not only excited 
 his anger, but also stirred up a determination some day to do 
 that which should place him on a par with, if not beyond his 
 companions. Many a boy would have succumbed to the 
 treatment he received ; this one rose superior to it, and he is 
 represented in many accounts, despite his low social standing, 
 as having succeeded in impressing himself upon his school- 
 mates, both in their games and studies, as he later did on all 
 who met him. He was imperious in his way, and irascible ; 
 but he was able enough to accomplish some things the other 
 boys could not do. His schoolmate, Bourrienne, tells of his 
 
MENTAL EQUIPMENT. 
 
 137 
 
 ""mi 
 
 directing the construction of snow forts in the school-yard 
 in the winter of 1783-84, after a fashion unequaled by any 
 comrade. He learned some things more easily than others, 
 especially the exact sciences, but he was not noted for general 
 excellence in his classes. His memory was, however, of the 
 best, his mind alert, and anything which he willed himself 
 to do he could accom- 
 plish. He thought so 
 quickly that he had 
 time to reconsider a 
 question which others 
 had just mastered. 
 His imagination was 
 keen, his mental equip- 
 ment left nothing to 
 be desired ; and he was 
 known for a self-will 
 which often overrode 
 others. But the les- 
 son mainly impressed 
 upon him at Brienne 
 was that some social 
 change was demanded 
 
 
 ^5^' 
 
 ' ^fW 
 
 ■.',7r 
 
 Napoleone di Buonaparte. 
 From a sketch by a school-friend at Brienne. 
 
 which might give him an even chance with the rest of the 
 world, to stand or fall in the military or political arena. At 
 that time all France was permeated with the revolutionary 
 idea — peasantry, middle classes, clergy and nobles alike ; 
 even the Court was not free from discussions on this subject ; 
 and we may well believe that the new idea penetrated more 
 or less into every school. The American Kevolution had 
 taught a lesson for all to study ; and the Gallic temperament 
 was then what it is now, the Gallic mind much narrower. 
 The character and native intelligence of the young Napoleon 
 
138 HIS ASPIRATIONS. 
 
 continued to grow beyond Ms scholarship. He was outspoken, 
 
 if an act or word chanced to gall him. When he was being 
 
 ^ _ confirmed, the archbishop 
 
 ^i/^2ec2et>^ liuc^^^^^ seemed astonished at the 
 
 '^aHuyjoJ^^K^^ °^°^® '^^ Napoleone, when 
 
 \ ..ff X P *^® future monarch, an- 
 
 f«*^^;>?!!s*V^<^/K«c^^ noyed, and not diverted by 
 
 « "Kd/i^fi^y^^/^ j^ ^^wt&JL t^® holiness of the place or 
 ^lAi^ . t'^ ^^ dignity of the church- 
 
 man, replied, "He is a 
 Corsican Saint, and, more- 
 over, are there not more 
 
 Autograph of " Buonaparte fils cadet gen- 
 
 tilhomme i I'^cole Royale militaire de Martyrs than there are 
 
 days in the year?" In 
 1784 the lad, then but fifteen, wrote a letter to his great- 
 uncle Fesch about his elder brother Joseph's future, which, 
 though full of errors of spelling and diction, clearly shows 
 that in self-poise and in habit of thought he was more than 
 abreast of his years ; and the letters written the next year, 
 at the time of his father's death, exhibit exceptional sta- 
 bility and clearness of thought in one so young. He read 
 with avidity Plutarch's Lives and Caesar's Gallic War ; it was 
 a delight to him that a son of Italy should have conquered 
 Gaul, and he was an ardent lover of Paoli. But France was 
 not in his thoughts ; all his aspirations were centred in his 
 beloved Corsica and her eventual freedom. His future com- 
 mission in the French army was in his view but a means to an 
 end. On leaving Brienne, in October, 1784, Monsieur de 
 Keralio, the inspector of the twelve French military schools, 
 thus judged the young man : " Monsieur de Bonaparte 
 (Napoleon), born the 15th of August, 1769, four feet ten 
 inches ten lines tall, has finished his fourth class. He has a 
 
" CADET-GENTILHOMME." 139 
 
 good constitution, excellent health and a character submissive, 
 honest and grateful ; very regular conduct, has always dis- 
 tinguished himself by his application to mathematics. He 
 knows fairly well his history and geography. He is rather 
 feeble In the lighter studies and Latin. . . . He would be an 
 excellent sailor, and deserves to pass into the school at Paris." 
 This same inspector had said to the monks who wished to 
 keep Napoleon an additional year, so as to perfect him in 
 Latin, " No, I can see in this young man a spark which cannot 
 be too highly cultivated." Domarion, his professor of belles- 
 lettres, said of his rhetoric, " It is granite heated by a volcano," 
 an indefinite but easily understood phrase. His teacher of 
 mathematics was Father Patrault, whose assistant, Pichegru, 
 was later so famous. 
 
 Thus equipped, on October 17 Napoleon was transferred 
 as " cadet-gentilhomme " to the military school in Paris, to 
 prepare fov an artillery commission, the suggested purpose of 
 going into the navy having been abandoned. His standing 
 among his comrades here, too, was similar to what it had been 
 at Brienne : the school, created by Louis XV., gave the cadets 
 far too much luxury ; and there is an essay of the lad's written 
 at this time which suggests as a means of discipline a much 
 simpler life for the future French officer, and leads one to 
 believe that he still harbored the feelings of antagonistic pride 
 with regard to his richer classmates. The reforms suggested 
 in the essay also show that the young Napoleon's mind early 
 began to dwell on creative things. 
 
 On September 1, 1785, the gentleman-cadet passed his final 
 examinations with credit, but not high marks. The certificate 
 f i^om the military school is, however, in a way prophetic i 
 " Reserved and laborious, he is more fond of study than of 
 any pleasure ; likes to read good authors ; very diligent in 
 abstract sciences, little inquiring in others, he knows thor- 
 
140 ATTENTION TO DUTY. 
 
 oughly mathematics and geography ; silent, loves solitude, 
 obstinate, haughty, exceptionally given to egoism, talks little, 
 is energetic in his answers, prompt in action, and severe in 
 meeting opposition; has much self-esteem, is ambitious -and 
 striving for all things. This young man is worthy of being 
 favored." He was sent to the La Fere regiment at Valence, 
 where, on about eighteen dollars a month, he had three months' 
 work to qualify himself for his lieutenancy in the service of 
 Louis XVI. His talent was recognized by his superiors, he 
 got a fuller view of what a military life meant, and in due 
 season he received his commission as second lieutenant. 
 
 Stationed at Valence, for the first time the young officer 
 found congenial surroundings and society, and, as contempo- 
 rary letters tell us, showed himself at times frank and amiable. 
 Taking small part in the usually frivolous recreations of his 
 brother subalterns, he was noted rather for scrupulous atten- 
 tion to duty, and for a special aptitude for the artillery arm. 
 He affected the society of the better iourgeoisie, and it was 
 here that his earliest love story was told to a young lady 
 named Caroline de Colombier, who seems to have grown fond 
 of the young officer in earnest. His flirtation, however, he 
 said in later life, never went beyond eating cherries with his 
 lady love, at a rendezvous which she gave him one day at 
 sunrise, in her father's orchard. Though he kept steadily at 
 work, as aU through life it was his habit to do. Napoleon was 
 peculiarly devoted to military studies only in so far as they 
 applied to mathematics useful in his profession, and history, 
 whose great military heroes aroused in him the ambition, not 
 to conquer the world, but solely to follow in the steps of 
 Paoli, and free his native Corsica. He also began to read 
 Rousseau, whose Swiss blood led him to admire the hardy 
 pride and courage of the islanders. 
 
 Though in 1786 Napoleon was promoted to be first lieu- 
 
LEAVE OF ABSENCE. 
 
 141 
 
 PaoU. 
 
 tenant in the Grenoble regiment, his constant work did not 
 keep him from serious fits of despondency. His father had 
 entered into speculations which 
 ended in financial ruin; and 
 after participation in the put- 
 ting down of the riot in Lyons, 
 he asked for leave of absence 
 and in September went to Cor- 
 sica, where the Buonaparte 
 family matters were at their 
 worst. Mixed with these griefs 
 was, however, a joy at revisiting 
 his native land, of which his ex- 
 pressions were youthfully overwrought. With the confidence 
 of ignorance, at the end of 1787 the young subaltern went 
 to Paris, thinking in some fashion to obtain money from the 
 national treasury for his family's services in Corsica. It was 
 not until after an absence of twenty-one months that he re- 
 joined his regiment. Unless we assume that his superiors 
 recognized that the Buonapartes were useful in Corsica, one 
 can scarcely understand his obtaining so long a leave. 
 
 Eeturned to his regiment at Auxonne, from June, 1788, to 
 September, 1789, Lieutenant Bonaparte resumed his wo^k and 
 studies. His books were his only friends, and he used his 
 pen much. In the lowlands of the Saone his health suffered 
 markedly from malaria, as later it did at Toulon from a skin 
 disease (J! sarcoptes sc«6iei), which constantly annoyed him 
 until he became emperor, when better living and skillful treat- 
 ment enabled him to throw it off. But he allowed ill-health 
 to make no difference in his work. In April, 1786, he wrote 
 his first manuscript now extant, on the right of the Corsicans 
 to revolt. If a people elects a prince, he argues, he is bound 
 to do its will ; if the prince gets his authority elsewhere. 
 
142 EARLY MANUSCRIPTS. 
 
 yet he is bound to make and execute laws for the happiness 
 of the people. So soon as he fails so to act, the people may 
 throw off his yoke. This manuscript was manifestly inspired 
 by Eousseau's " Contrat Social." His next one was on " Sui- 
 cide," which he justifies, and at times he was assuredly in a 
 mood for it. In 1790 he produced a " History of Corsica ; " 
 and the next year he received from the Academy of Lyons a 
 prize for an essay under the title, " What are the Principles and 
 Institutions to be inculcated to Mankind to render them the 
 most happy possible." Later in life this essay was unearthed 
 by Talleyrand and brought to the emperor, who at once threw 
 it in the fire. A less perfect copy was afterwards discovered, 
 and published in 1826. One phrase from the original is 
 worth preserving. " Great men are like meteors, which shine 
 and consume themselves to give light to the earth." A vora- 
 cious reader and endless in his notes, the young officer made 
 a Summary of English History down to 1688, and came to 
 the conclusion that few kings deserved their thrones. There 
 was an unceasing struggle between his aristocratic feeling 
 and his republican tendencies. Yet every fibre yearned for 
 the freedom of his well-loved Corsica, with which sentiment 
 only his love of kin, and his innate sense of superiority — 
 always a dominant note in his character — conflicted. 
 
 The French Revolution was in the throes of its birth. The 
 seed sown by England and America had fallen on soil all too 
 fruitful, soil which was destined to produce a tropical exu- 
 berance of good and evil. No doubt all the extravagant hap- 
 penings of the day were very real to a mind like that of the 
 young lieutenant, and produced their due effect. " Revolu- 
 tions," said he, " are good for soldiers with intelligence and 
 courage ; " and to his ambition, not limited by over-active 
 moral principles, the great upheaval in France seemed to offer 
 a rare chance. But as, at the outset, he personally thought 
 
PAOLI AMNESTIED. 143 
 
 only of a struggle for freedom by Corsica, he again asked 
 leave, and returned thither in the fall of 1789. He would 
 have been glad to essay afresh the role of Paoli. Indeed it 
 was fortunate that what he did and strove to do at this time 
 bred no evil results in his French career. There were larger 
 dramas to enact, and his small but questionable by-play in 
 Corsica was overlooked, or was perhaps deemed to have 
 been useful to the Republic. 
 
 In the autumn of 1789, then, we again find Lieutenant 
 Bonaparte on leave in Corsica, where he preached democratic 
 ideas, all tending to the independence of the island, and 
 urged the formation of an insular National Guard. His name 
 appears at the head of a petition to the National Assembly of 
 France for Corsican civil liberty. Much disorder reigned on 
 the island, and on November 5 there was an affray between 
 the royal troops and the populace. Meanwhile Paoli and his 
 adherents were amnestied and allowed to return, in the belief 
 that they would now aid the French regime in Corsica. But 
 while Paoli worked for liberty, he yet was far from being a 
 Kepublican in the Paris sense ; he was indeed of an autocratic 
 mood ; and Napoleon soon found himself drifting away from 
 his idol. This may have been in part due to the fact that the 
 young author had dedicated his manuscript on Corsica to the 
 great patriot, with a panegyric, and that the latter had declined 
 the praise as being strained, and mislaid the manuscript as 
 having scant value. Yet Paoli seems to have admired Bona- 
 parte to begin with. " This young man," he is said to have 
 observed, " is cut antique-fashion. He is a hero of Plutarch." 
 But his fancy was short-lived. In February, 1791, our sub- 
 altern again returned to his regiment. He had prolonged 
 his leave by certificates of sickness ; but his means, unless 
 political, of satisfying his superiors as to his long absences 
 cannot be guessed. On his return journey he found aU the 
 
144 COMMISSION AS CAPTAIN. 
 
 peasants, as well as every enlisted man in the ranks, heartily 
 in favor of the Revolution. Despite his shallow purse, he at 
 this time brought with him his brother Louis, and looked 
 after his education. " I lived like a bear," said he. This 
 meant that black bread was often his only food, in order to 
 save money for books ; but this was not the only occasion 
 in life when Napoleon's kindliness of heart came to the 
 • surface. He never forgot his family, placing them indeed in 
 positions to which many of them did small credit. 
 
 In the summer of 1791 Lieutenant Bonaparte was trans- 
 ferred to another regiment in Valence. Later in the year he 
 went to Paris to see whether the seething of the Revolution 
 would afford him a chance of rising. The extraordinary lax- 
 ness in army discipline which could afford a subaltern so many 
 absences was but typical of the times. Not only did he visit 
 Paris, but in September he returned to Corsica, to which he 
 was devoting so much fervor. It can scarcely be deemed curi- 
 ous that he failed to see the outcome of the Revolution in 
 France ; few people did. In the first trying days of 1861, 
 many later stanch Unionists were of doubting spirit. And 
 to Napoleon at this period Corsica was greater than France. 
 He remained in the island until the succeeding May. It was 
 at this time that the break occurred between him, who was a 
 revolutionist, and Paoli, whose sober tendencies led him away 
 from the wreckers of solid government. 
 
 The young man's ambition at this time scarcely reached 
 beyond the epaulets of a general of artillery ; and when, on 
 February 6, 1792, the regular course of promotion gave him 
 his commission as captain in the Fourth Regiment of Foot 
 Artillery, he began to see life expanding before him. But the 
 untold ambition of the future does not at this early age seem 
 to have shown much growth. 
 
 In the National Guard that had been created in Corsica, 
 
REVOLT IN CORSICA. 145 
 
 Napoleon had been made major, and aspired to be lieutenant- 
 colonel. His tenure of rank in the French artillery appeared 
 to be a secondary thought. In seeking election to the higher 
 rank, he is said to have resorted to questionable methods, even 
 to sequestrating one of the Commissioners who was working 
 for Paoli's interests — a prototype of future coups d'etat. 
 But these were the ordiuary tricks of the day and place. 
 
 By this time the Legislative Assembly was master in Paris ; 
 the king was a prisoner, and the First Coalition had been 
 formed against France. Still the young man's thoughts re- 
 mained centred on Corsica. He did not yet see his future in 
 France. As is wont to be the case in civil wars, he scarcely 
 knew which side to embrace. Whether, indeed, he followed the 
 military preparations of France at this juncture, we have no 
 means of knowing. " As a general," he said later, " I would 
 have sustained the Court; as a lieutenant without fortune, 
 I had to place myself on the side of the people." The island 
 was divided between the French revolutionary methods and 
 the ancient ways of the Corsicans. Loving their church, the 
 populace rose against the French acts of clerical repression ;, 
 and the National Guard was called in to subdue the riot.. 
 Napoleon not only endeavored to seize the citadel of Ajaccioj 
 but he went so far as to strive to seduce the enlisted men of 
 the French troops from their duty to their aristocratic officers. 
 The entire scheme failed, and the young officer awoke to the 
 fact that he had placed himself in opposition to both the native 
 majority of the island and to the government whose commission 
 he held. His enemies accused him of having fermented revolt 
 against the French in Corsica, for the sake of making the 
 island independent ; and not only was he obliged to go to 
 Paris to exculpate himself from the charge of desertion in 
 again overstaying his leave, but his attitude towards the 
 French troops had been little short of treason. Just what 
 he had purposed to accomplish cannot be said. 
 
146 RESTORED TO THE SERVICE. 
 
 Shortly after he had reached Corsica, in September, 1791, 
 his great-uncle Fesch died, and Napoleon henceforth looked 
 upon himself as the head of the house of Buonaparte. His 
 brother Lucien says that he permitted no contradiction^ and 
 ruled in everything. Apparently blind to the fact that he 
 had overstayed his leave, and that his regiment had been put 
 on a war footing, Napoleon's tarrying in Corsica had actually 
 resulted in his being rated, according to the orders of the 
 law-making powers of the day, as a deserter, and being 
 stricken from the rolls of the army. Though he claimed to 
 have been serving the French Revolutionists, it is a wonder 
 that he was able to return to France at all, without suffering 
 disaster from his to say the least extravagant conduct. But 
 the young man was even then ready to beard the lion in his 
 den. With a certificate in his favor from the French authori- 
 ties on the island, he journeyed in May, 1792, to Paris, and 
 strove to get restored to the service, while struggling along on 
 the slenderest means. The rising of June 20, when the mob 
 invaded the Tuileries and insulted the king and queen, he 
 observed from a room near the palace, and though he himself 
 may have been fresh from an attempt to overturn the French 
 regime in Corsica, yet in viewing the excesses of the popu- 
 lace, his strong feeling for order and authority — for he was 
 always an aristocrat at heart — was expressed in the exclama- 
 tion, " Che coglione ! " (What rabble !), and the desire to 
 blow away the revolutionists with his guns. The 10th of 
 August, 1792, when the monarchy fell and the Republic suc- 
 ceeded it, was for him salvation. Officers of talent were in 
 demand for the National Guard, and to replace those who 
 had emigrated ; small misdemeanors were cast into the shade 
 by grave events ; the past was overlooked, and Napoleon again 
 received his old commission as an artillery captain. 
 
 The French patriotic fervor had risen to white heat. The 
 
A DESPERATE SITUATION. 147 
 
 Prussian invaders met their match in the memorable battle 
 of Valmy ; Dumouriez beat the Austrians at Jemappes and 
 won all Belgium ; and Custine pushed by way of Mainz to 
 the Lahn. Savoy and Nice were wrested from Piedmont. 
 The Jacobins became unduly excited by so much success, — 
 and Louis XVI. ascended the scaffold. 
 
 This act set the rest of Europe against the French Kepub- 
 lic; and the tide of victory turned. Striving to conquer 
 Holland, Dumouriez was 
 beaten at Neerwinden and 
 lost Belgium, the Prussians 
 crossed the Rhine, and 
 Cond^ and Valenciennes 
 were besieged. The Sar- 
 dinians reentered Savoy, 
 the Spaniards came close 
 to invading France ; the 
 Vendue rising of royal- 
 ists brought on civil war. 
 To the Committee of Pub- 
 lic Safety — Eobespierre, 
 Danton, Marat — the situ- 
 ation was confided ; the " Mountain," with the aid of the 
 Paris mob, had driven out the Girondists, and these raised 
 the standard of revolt in many towns ; but against the supe- 
 rior organization of the Jacobins, and its possession of the 
 central power, they could accomplish nothing. To add to the 
 difficulty under which the Committee staggered, England 
 now headed the Coalition, and furnished the needed funds to 
 carry on the war ; and to her business methods the Conven- 
 tion could only oppose its fervid energy and a million men. 
 " From Alps to Pyrenees and from Rhine to Ocean the tri- 
 color fell back." The military situation was desperate, when 
 
 Maiat. 
 
148 DECREASE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE. 
 
 Carnot was added to the Committee of Public Safety on Au- 
 gust 14, 1792 ; a levy in mass was ordered August 23, under 
 the motto, " Le Peuple Fran9ais Debout Devant Las Tyrans ; " 
 and " Aux Armes, Frangais ! " rang throughout the land. 
 
 During this violent period, instead of serving with his regi- 
 ment in Savoy, Napoleon on a flimsy pretext again managed 
 to return to Corsica, reaching the island in September, 1792. 
 It was not long after the Convention had seized the reins of 
 power in France, September 21, that disagreement followed 
 between it and Paoli, whose influence made him the practical 
 ruler of the island ; and when Napoleon, who was a pro- 
 nounced Republican, as Paoli had always been the head of the 
 aristocracy, took the side of the French, he was made Major 
 and Inspector-General of Artillery of Corsica, October 19. 
 
 The French party in the island was declining. The action 
 of Paoli had not resulted, as the rulers in Paris had, from 
 their efforts to conciliate him, hoped it would do, in reconcil- 
 ing the Corsicans to Republican terrorism ; and French influ- 
 ence steadily decreased. While, early in January, 1793, 
 Major Bonaparte was working one way and Paoli another 
 (the hero and the hero-worshiper were now far apart), six 
 thousand French volunteers landed at Ajaccio on a filibus- 
 tering expedition to Sardinia. The coarse brutality of these 
 men, mostly from the slums of the maritime cities of France, 
 raised a riot in Ajaccio, and when the French soldiers caught 
 and in their zealous fury hanged three of the citizens, the 
 excitement grew intense and was hard to be allayed. The 
 Corsicans refused to march to Sardinia in company with the 
 French troops. The Inspector-General suggested a purely 
 Corsican invasion of the Maddalena Islands, lying between 
 Corsica and Sardinia. This was undertaken ; but internal 
 jealousies, perhaps fostered by Paoli, brought about failure, 
 and Major Bonaparte, who was almost captured at the time 
 
CORSICAN REFUGEES. 149 
 
 of the landing and attack, returned to Ajaccio March 3, now 
 a strong anti-Paoli man. 
 
 French commissioners were appointed to disband the Cor- 
 sican National Guard, to investigate this expedition and pass 
 on Paoli's conduct ; and these sought, to seize the patriot. 
 One of the commissioners, Saliceti, and Major Bonaparte 
 strove in vain to get possession by stratagem of the citadel of 
 Ajaccio, held by the Paoli party ; and in trips to and from 
 Bastia at the north of the island, where the French commis- 
 sioners sat, the young officer had a series of quixotic personal 
 adventures which might well have put an end to his career. 
 An armed attempt was now made on the citadel by the 
 French, but this also failed. Almost to a man the Corsicans 
 became enemies of the French, and the English fleet was 
 asked to cooperate with Paoli and his adherents. During 
 these days Major Bonaparte wrote many lurid pamphlets. 
 
 It was quite natural that the Corsicans should take um- 
 brage at the conduct of the Buonaparte family, and the whole 
 tribe found it wise to leave the island early in June, 1793, to 
 land at Marseilles, and wander in Provence on a pittance 
 allowed by the government to Corsican refugees. Napoleon 
 reported to his regiment at Nice. In July the island drifted 
 into the hands of the British. 
 
 Thus we see that, instead of serving with his regiments and 
 learning his profession, the greater part of the time of this 
 French company officer, from the date of his leaving school, 
 had been spent in what appears to have been a striving to lib- 
 erate Corsica, and to turn its population towards republican 
 doctrines. There is not much promise to be extracted from 
 these early years on which to found the hope of a great future 
 for the young man. Perhaps his native ability can, however, 
 be put to no higher test than by the fact that he grew profi- 
 cient in the artillery arm, when he devoted so little time to 
 
150 FAME OR RESULTS? 
 
 regimental service in Ms early military years. For no one 
 will deny that, at every age, Napoleon knew his profession as 
 few others did, although he never became, as Carnot says, a 
 truly scientific man. Out of these years only the energy, per- 
 sistency and, if you like, the gambling instinct, or readiness 
 to take chances, stand out from the other traits of the half- 
 formed character. He was twenty-four years old, and he had 
 so far failed in every undertaking. Even his motive in de- 
 voting himself to Corsica is obscure. Whether by nature he 
 was more governed by a love of fame or a love of power can 
 hardly be determined. " One can scarcely say," writes Ma- 
 dame de Eemusat, " that he really loved fame, he never hesi- 
 tated to prefer results." On the other hand : " Fame, always 
 fame, that is what he wished, for France and for himself ; " 
 and, " In all his business the present moment disappeared in 
 the future centuries," says Bourrienne. And to Carnot, from 
 Verona, January 28, 1797, with regard to things said against 
 him, Bonaparte wrote : "... So far as I am concerned, 
 whatever they may say, they do not reach me. The esteem 
 of a smaU number of persons like you, that of my comrades 
 and the soldiers, sometimes also the opinion of posterity, and 
 above all the sentiment of my conscience and the prosperity 
 of my country, alone interest me. . . ." While we cannot 
 always give full credence to Bonaparte's own expressions, 
 which were apt to be colored by the demands of the moment, 
 yet there may be a glimmer of truth in this one. 
 
 As with all ambitious, hard-working, successful men, so in 
 Napoleon's case, fame and activity were consuming fires. But 
 if he was working for either fame or results, his judgment as 
 to what he might accomplish in Corsica had been lamentably 
 at fault. He had, however, shown two of the essential factors 
 of the great captain, force of intellect and force of character. 
 Would the third factor, opportunity, ever come ? 
 
VII. 
 
 TOULON. AUGUST, 1793, TO MARCH, 1796. 
 
 The Coalition did not work harmoniously, though it won suoceaa on the 
 French frontiers. The execution of the queen practically arrayed all Europe 
 against France. But the French overran Belgium and the Palatinate, while 
 the English held the sea and the French colonies went lost. In the south there 
 had been Koyalist uprisings, and here Major Bonaparte first attracted atten- 
 tion by a paper favoring the Revolution. In 1793 the French made a strong 
 effort to take Toulon, and the most active artillery officer present with the 
 army was Bonaparte. He suggested that Toulon should be captured by taking 
 the promontory which commanded the harbor, and thence bombarding the 
 enemy's fleet. This plan was put into execution. The most necessary point, 
 I'Eguillette, was taken by storm, and the English fleet was at once compelled 
 to sail away. The Republican commissioners recognized Bonaparte's ability, 
 and he was made brigadier-general. Bonaparte had so far accomplished little 
 except this, but the whirl of events worked in his favor. As commandant of 
 artillery of the Army of Italy he drew up a plan for capturing Saorgio, which 
 succeeded. He later drew up plans for operations in Italy, which, though 
 sound, were rejected by the commanding generals as impossible. Some thought 
 Bonaparte an intriguer, some welcomed his ability. He was sometimes in the 
 army, sometimes out of it. His military life was a series of ups and downs, dur- 
 ing which he saw little active service. In 1795 he was put in the geographical 
 bureau to work up plans of campaign, but few people could see the value of 
 his ideas. When the Sections rose against the Convention, Barras took control 
 for the latter, and among his lieutenants was Bonaparte. In charge of the 
 artillery he blew away the forces of the Sections and saved the Convention. 
 By this act he rose .to a marked position ; and early in 1796, after his marriage 
 with Josephine, he was made commander of the Army of Italy. 
 
 As has already been narrated, the members of the Coali- 
 tion did not work with much unanimity. To be sure, Mainz 
 and Valenciennes were captured ; the English and Spaniards 
 were admitted to Toulon ; Dunkirk was besieged by the Brit- 
 
152 A FORMIDABLE ARRAY. 
 
 ish, Quesnoy and Maubeuge by the Austrians, Landau by the 
 Prussians ; the Austrians captured the lines of "Weissemburg 
 and Fort St. Louis, and threatened Strasburg. All this work, 
 however, though effective, lacked the ensemble essential to real 
 success. 
 
 These irruptions the Committee of Public Safety met with 
 vigor. Jourdan marched on Maubeuge and pushed the Aus- 
 trians back. KeUermann put down the uprising in Lyons, 
 and drove the Sardinians across the Alps to Piedmont. Du- 
 gommier recaptured Toulon, as we shall see. Kleber and 
 Marceau for a while checked the Vendee at the battle of Le 
 Mans. Then came the fatal mistake of the execution of the 
 queen ; and soon France had arrayed against her England, 
 Austria, Spain, Prussia, the Empire, Eussia, all Italy and 
 Holland. 
 
 But even this did not dishearten the strong men of the 
 Eevolution. While the campaign in the Alps was discour- 
 aging, three hundred thousand French overran Belgium and 
 the Palatinate, boldly claimed victory over the allies at Tur- 
 coing, Fleurus, Kaiserslautern, on the Ourthe, on the Koer, 
 drove them behind the Rhine, entered Brussels, Antwerp 
 and Maestricht, Amsterdam, Cologne and Coblentz ; and 
 turned the tables on Spain. On the sea, however, the Eng- 
 lish were supreme ; the French Atlantic and Mediterranean 
 fleets being neutralized, the French colonies all went lost, 
 from the Antilles to India ; and England, having declared the 
 French ports in a state of blockade, began to confiscate neu- 
 tral vessels trading therewith. 
 
 In the south of France there had occurred an uprising 
 against the Convention, centring in Lyons, Marseilles, Tou- 
 lon and other places, to meet which General Carteaux, an 
 ancient artist turned soldier, was sent to Avignon. Hither 
 also came Major Bonaparte, sent from Nice to assemble artil- 
 
A CONVINCING ESSAY. 15? 
 
 lery. While the batteries were being got together, in August 
 1793, Major Bonaparte was intrusted with a mission to Mar 
 seilles, to persuade the insurrectionists to withdraw from 
 Avignon, at which point they prevented supply trains from 
 moving to the Army of Italy. Inspired by certain events on 
 this trip, he wrote a paper entitled " The Supper at Beau- 
 caire," in which he placed hiipself firmly on the side of the 
 " Mountain," then in power, sketched in a masterly manner 
 the political and military situation in the south, and prophe- 
 sied the success of the Republican arms. The essay was 
 prompted by and was in the form of a conversation between 
 an officer (no doubt himself) and several citizens, in which 
 the former urges all classes to rally to the side of the party in 
 power, as representing France in arms against European 
 despots. Any concession to save the nation and the Repub- 
 lic was its tone. This paper came into the hands of the peo- 
 ple's representatives, Saliceti, Gasparin and the younger 
 Robespierre, who had just arrived at Avignon, and of whom 
 the first named already knew the author; and, printed at 
 public cost, it was Bonaparte's first introduction to the powers 
 that be, to whom he soon proved that he could act as well as 
 write. He had now sloughed off his Corsican dreams, and 
 could see his future in France. The tone of the " Souper," 
 unlike his overheated pamphlets up to tliis day, was as cold 
 and cynical as it was business-like and convincing. 
 
 Toulon, the key of southern France, whose harbor was 
 then held by the English and Spaniards, was the burning 
 question of the hour. It was essential to recover control of 
 the place. The Royalists had called in outside aid, and on 
 August 28, 1793, the English fleet, under Admiral Hood, 
 had sailed into the harbor and taken possession of the city for 
 the king of France. This was only the day before the van of 
 the Republican army, under Mouret, appeared in the defile of 
 
154 DEFENSES OF TOULON. 
 
 OUioules, on the road from Marseilles and Lyons ; and even 
 here it had not been able to hold itself. The work of retak- 
 ing the defile was begun September 7, and on the wounding 
 of Dommartin, the commandant of artUlery, — an accident 
 which left only one captain and some sergeants in charge of 
 the batteries, — Bonaparte, on his arrival September 16, was 
 made second in command, and put in his place by Saliceti, 
 who was on the ground. He went actively to work. About 
 these days Mouret had been succeeded by Carteaux; but the 
 latter had been able to undertake nothing definite against 
 Toulon until reinforcements could come up from the Army 
 of Italy, and material and men could be got from Lyons ; but 
 when the division of Lapoype had arrived from the Riviera, 
 a blockade was at once begun, and a regular siege was pro- 
 jected. Carteaux, who quite lacked ability, was shortly re- 
 placed by Doppet, an ex-doctor, and he finally by Dugom- 
 mier, a veteran and an excellent soldier. 
 
 Admiral Hood had taken possession of all the works as 
 well as the harbor of Toulon, and had disembarked a motley 
 array of sixteen hundred Royalists, seven thousand Spaniards, 
 five thousand Neapolitan and fifteen hundred Piedmontese 
 troops, to leaven all which two English regiments of twenty- 
 two hundred men under Colonel O'Hara were on hand. This 
 ran the garrison up to seventeen thousand men, a goodly force, 
 but hardly sufficient to man the very extensive outlying works. 
 The city had only a simple bastioned wall, but it was defended 
 by a circuit of excellent forts and redoubts. On the shore, 
 east of the city, lay Fort Malque, and thence, running around 
 the rocky ridge of Mont Faron, which stood like a vast pro- 
 tecting wall to the city, was a succession of works, well placed 
 on east and west of Faron, and ending in the strong Fort 
 Malbosquet on the inner harbor. To protect the harbor there 
 were also a number of forts, chiefly I'Eguillette and Bala- 
 
"LITTLE GIBRALTAR." 
 
 155 
 
 quier ; but they could play no part in the operations of an 
 attacking land army, so far as the French generals could see. 
 Carteaux had but eight thousand men, with the three bat- 
 teries under Dommartin, west of OUioules ; Lapoype, from 
 the Army of Italy, had brought little over five thousand men 
 
 OVI/i 
 
 F . FORT 
 
 P" P0WDE.R MILL^ 
 
 R- REDOUBTS 
 
 Toulon. 
 
 and two field batteries ; and there were but eight twenty-four- 
 pounders, which had come from Marseilles. Of these Bona- 
 parte had placed five at La Brega to annoy the English fleet ; 
 and on September 28 had opened so hearty a fire that the 
 enemy recognized the danger, and landing three thousand men 
 at I'EguiUette, took possession of the hill of La Grasse and 
 built Fort Mulgrave, otherwise called " Little Gibraltar," 
 manning it with heavy guns and a garrison of eight hundred 
 men. The position of this fort was ably chosen. So long as 
 it was held, the French could not reach ground which would 
 enable them to command the harbor, and no pains was spared 
 
166 REGULAR OPERATIONS BEGUN. 
 
 to make it strong. Purposing to reduce this »fort, Bonaparte 
 constructed a number of siege-batteries. One day, having an 
 order to give, he called for a non-commissioned officer to act 
 as clerk. A young man stepped out of the ranks and wrote, 
 from his dictation, on the epaulement of the battery. Just 
 as the letter was finished, a ball striking near by covered the 
 paper and the writer with dirt. " So much the better," said 
 the scribe with consummate coolness, " I shall need no sand." 
 This youngster was Junot. 
 
 After the capture of Lyons on October 9, the army in front 
 of Toulon gradually rose to forty thousand men, and several 
 artillery officers senior to Bonaparte arrived. A series of bat- 
 teries was erected against all the forts protecting the city, and 
 regular operations were begun. The original plan suggested 
 by the Committee of Public Safety, — the work, says Napoleon, 
 of General D'Arcon — had been to capture all the forts about 
 Mont Faron, and then to open trenches against Toulon on the 
 north. The Commissioners with the army, of whom Barras 
 was one, had written the Convention, September 13, that when- 
 ever the siege-guns came they would be so placed as to reach 
 the fleet with hot shot; and thus by driving it out of the 
 harbor, would enable the army to capture the town ; but how 
 far their plan had been matured cannot be said. 
 
 At a council of war held November 25 (there had been 
 two previous ones), to approve and adopt means to carry out 
 one or other plan, there were present Dugommier, Lapoype and 
 Mouret, two generals of brigade. Chief of Artillery Duteil, 
 three battalion chiefs, including Bonaparte, and two captains 
 of engineers. Bonaparte appears to have written the report 
 of the council to the Paris authorities, and as he had already, 
 on November 14, sent to the minister of war a detailed scheme 
 for capturing Toulon, which had been received with approval, 
 he was able to argue his plan with effect, as he did with force 
 and intelligence. In the scheme referred to he said : — 
 
PLAN OF ATTACK. 157 
 
 " Citizen Minister, the plan of attack for the City of Toulon which I 
 presented to the generals and the representatives of the people is, I he- 
 lieve, the only practicable one ; if it had been followed from the beginning 
 with a little more warmth, it is probable that we should be in Toulon. . . . 
 To drive the enemy from the harbor is the preliminary point to a siege in 
 form ; and perhaps this operation alone will give us Toulon." {Then 
 follow extended details of what it is desirable to do.) " It is more than a 
 month ago that I told the generals that the artillery on hand at this mo- 
 ment was sufficient to stop the fire of the English redoubt placed on the 
 summit of the promontory of I'Eguillette." (Then follows the detailed 
 work to be done Iry each of the eleven batteries he had constructed.) " If this 
 has not been done, it is because the general persisted in thinking he had 
 not sufficient infantry.'' 
 
 Four long collateral reports are appended, giving every 
 essential detail. In one of them Bonaparte claims that the 
 allied attack on the upland of I'Eguillette to build Fort Mul- 
 grave might by proper measures have been beaten back. 
 
 At the council of war it was concluded that the right wing 
 should make a feint on Fort Malbosquet and take it if pos- 
 sible, while its main attack should be on the Eguillette 
 promontory ; that the left wing should make a feint on Cap 
 Brun and its main assault on Mont Faron, which it was to 
 seize and hold ; that Toulon was to be bombarded so soon 
 as proper ground between the Battery of the Convention on 
 Arenes heights and Fort Malbosquet could be seized, mean- 
 while protecting the former work from a coup de main. 
 
 No one will deny Bonaparte, beyond all others, the ability 
 to cast aside minor considerations and keep in view the main 
 object to be attained. His sense of perspective was perfect, 
 though perhaps at this day not fully matured. Here at Tou- 
 lon it is in evidence that most of his superiors seemed to see 
 no other means of capturing the place than a regular siege 
 from the land side — and steps were to this end taken. Bona- 
 parte went into the subject deeper, and (whether he origi- 
 
158 A DISCOURAGING RECALL. 
 
 nated the scheme or not seems immaterial) insisted that if 
 Toulon harbor could be commanded, the allied fleet, no longer 
 able to protect the town, would withdraw the defending gar- 
 rison ; for the latter would have no means of retreat if the 
 fleet had left, and must sooner or later succumb to siege or 
 starvation. He next pointed out the fact that to control the 
 roadstead and prevent the allied ships, for fear of being 
 burned by hot shot, from there riding at anchor. Point I'Eguil- 
 lette should first be taken ; and to accomplish this he drew 
 up in writing a feasible plan, as above quoted. And there 
 appears to be no other scheme in existence by any other hand. 
 The earliest suggestion may not have been Bonaparte's ; his 
 detractors claim it was not ; but it was his advocacy which 
 determined the matter, as indisputably it was his courage and 
 skill which carried it through. With slight variation the 
 young officer's ideas were adopted. 
 
 It is clear that Bonaparte was the busiest man at Toulon ; 
 that above all others he exhibited intelligence, courage, power 
 to lead men and to make them willing instruments for his 
 purposes. He embraced this, his first chance, and showed the 
 stuff that was in him. He had not liked his early superiors. 
 While Doppet was in command, Bonaparte had, on November 
 15, organized a demonstration on the works at Fort Mulgrave, 
 or, as his St. Helena narrative has it, two or three battalions 
 had started an attack. This in the carrying out grew into a 
 hearty engagement. The garrison made a sortie and drove 
 the French back. Bonaparte rallied his men, and, deeming 
 it safer to go on than to discontinue the operation, was head- 
 ing his column to make a rush which distinctly promised suc- 
 cess, when Doppet sounded the recall, — an act which discour- 
 aged and angered the young officer and all his men. The 
 latter loudly railed at the " painters and doctors " who were 
 at their head ; and Dugommier was heartily welcomed, when, 
 a few days later, he came to take supreme command. 
 
A STANCH ASSAULT. 159 
 
 Lapoype now commanded the left division of Dugommier's 
 forces, and Mouret the right one. In the shifting of com- 
 mands, Duteil became chief of the corps artillery ; Bonaparte, 
 to begin with, had had charge of only that of one brigade of 
 Mouret's division. Duteil was old and not over active, and 
 his junior's views, always fresh and original, were frequently 
 accepted by the chief and acted on. No one showed activity 
 in the siege equal to Bonaparte's, and practically he was after 
 a while left in charge of all the artillery business of the right 
 wing, where the important work was being done. But he 
 does not appear to have been technically chief of the corps 
 artniery, or appointed by the government to take charge of 
 all the artillery, as in his St. Helena papers he suggests that 
 he was, though as locum tenens he acted as such ; and it seems 
 that he had a comparatively free hand. 
 
 There is no doubt that Bonaparte's lead, as the best, or cer- 
 tainly the most energetic and suggestive artillery officer pre- 
 sent, was commonly followed. As a first step he had erected 
 the Battery of the Convention on the heights of Arenes, at a 
 point which commanded Fort Malbosquet, and in November 
 — the date is in dispute — surprised its garrison by a rapid 
 and annoying fire, which dismounted several guns. To sup- 
 press this annoyance O'Hara landed twenty-three hundred 
 men and attempted to capture the battery. His assault was 
 stanch, and his force entered the works and spiked several 
 guns ; but Bonaparte marched a battalion through the 
 trenches leading to the battery and took the English in flank. 
 O'Hara, wounded, fell into his hands. On Dugommier's 
 coming up from a direction which threatened to cut the Eng- 
 lish off, they retired With a loss of nearly five hundred men, 
 and without having silenced the battery. Dundas succeeded 
 O'Hara. The French now moved down more forces and 
 began regular approaches on Fort Mulgrave. In the effort to 
 
160 FORT MULGRAVE TAKEN. 
 
 reduce this fort, Bonaparte constructed a number of batteries, 
 one of which was within pistol-shot of the enemy ; and so dan- 
 gerous was the manning of it that he could get few volunteers 
 until, relying on the fact that his countrymen do not calmly 
 take a challenge, he aptly dubbed it the " Redoute des 
 Hommes Sans Peur." The soldiers then vied with each other 
 for the duty ; and Bonaparte was ever first in their company. 
 Having by December 14 got thirty guns and fifteen mortars 
 in position, the young officer directed a heavier fire against 
 both this Little Gibraltar and I'Eguillette, and after a steady 
 two days' bombardment, the works of the enemy were much 
 broken ; and as they do not appear to have been substantially 
 reinforced, an assault was set for December 18. Lapoype 
 was at the same time to assault the Faron forts. 
 
 In the night of December 17—18 the storming column of 
 eight thousand men started from La Seine towards Fort Mul- 
 grave, the capture of which meant the evacuation of I'Eguil- 
 lette. It was hoped to reach the fort unobserved, for the gar- 
 rison was apt to remain under cover during the bombardment ; 
 but at the foot of the hill of La Grasse the French van ran 
 across some pickets, and the resulting fire alarmed the garri- 
 son and called it to the walls. Bonaparte's horse was shot 
 under him — according to some authorities this was the third 
 during the siege — and he accompanied the men on foot. The 
 first assault was thrown back ; but a small party climbed the 
 heights unobserved, entered by a broken casemate and thus 
 captured a portion of the wall. Followed sharply by more 
 and more men, the gain was maintained, the garrison was 
 overpowered and the fort was taken. Bonaparte received a 
 slight wound in the leg. By five o'clock in the morning 
 the allies had decamped towards Fort Balaquier, where they 
 were picked up by boats from the fleet. At the same time 
 Lapoype seized the hill and redoubts of Faron. 
 
FIRST FEAT OF ARMS. 161 
 
 Though an old man, Dugommier had accompanied his 
 troops ; but he was much worn out by the fatigue. So soon 
 as the fort had been taken, Bonaparte, who was near by, 
 turned to him with, " Go and rest yourself, general, we have 
 captured Toulon. You will sleep there to-morrow." 
 
 Having occupied Fort Mulgrave and I'Eguillette, Bona- 
 parte immediately turned every available gun on the enemy's 
 fleet. Eecognizing that the harbor was untenable, Dundas 
 called a council of war ; and the effective garrison of Toulon 
 having fallen to twelve thousand men, it was decided to evac- 
 uate the place. This was set about at once, and during the 
 day of December 18 the troops were embarked, and the fleet 
 passed out under the French guns. The arsenal and twenty 
 ships of the line and frigates were burned. Next day the 
 Republicans entered the town. To prevent pillage, all the 
 property of the citizens was declared forfeited to the army. 
 This property was soon redeemed by the payment of two mil- 
 lion francs by the citizens. 
 
 Saliceti and Eobespierre recognized that in Bonaparte the 
 Republic had a man of original ideas and abundant energy 
 for its service, and the hero of Toulon profited accordingly. 
 He had seen his opportunity, and had seized it with the sure 
 hand of genius. And it was in this siege that Bonaparte dis- 
 covered the qualities of Junot, Marmont and Victor, his later ■ 
 so able lieutenants. 
 
 It is quite true that Bonaparte's later overshadowing suc- 
 cess may have led historians to exaggerate this first feat of 
 arms ; but in view of his exhaustive written reports, and of 
 the work he confessedly did at Toulon ; in view of the fact 
 that he was rapidly promoted at and after the siege ; inas- 
 much as no documents exist to show that his then superiors 
 disputed his written claim to have suggested as well as car- 
 ried out the scheme that won Toulon, which, had it been 
 
162 RAPID PROMOTION. 
 
 false, they had abundant chance to do, it may fairly be as- 
 sumed that to him, largely at least, was due the idea and the 
 work which produced the success there gained, and that he 
 fairly earned his laurels. 
 
 The rapidly succeeding events of these whirling years, as 
 good luck would have it, had all worked in favor of Bona- 
 parte. Although he had taken no active part in the stirring 
 campaigns in the Netherlands and on the Rhine during the 
 first four years of the wars of the French Revolution, the fre- 
 quent gaps made by the emigres, by the attrition of service 
 and by the lack of able men, afforded him promotion. "We 
 have seen that he had but recently become chief of battalion 
 (major) in the Fourth Regiment of Artillery ; and now for 
 handsome services in the subjection of the Marseilles Feder- 
 alists (although for ordering the rehabilitation of the ante- 
 revolutionary Fort St. Nicholas, to which the populace ob- 
 jected, he was reprimanded and temporarily placed in arrest), 
 he received promotion to a colonelcy. This was no doubt 
 due in part to the influence of Saliceti and Robespierre, who 
 had gauged his ability at Toulon. The new colonel was set 
 to work to place the Riviera and Provence in a state of good 
 defense ; and on February 6, that is as soon as promotion 
 could be secured from the authorities in Paris, he was made 
 general of brigade. 
 
 That as a result of his work at Toulon Bonaparte rose 
 from a junior major to brigadier-general cannot, however, be 
 wholly referred to the influence of Robespierre and Saliceti. 
 To be sure, promotions were at that day made rapidly and by 
 favor. Any one whom the Convention believed to be capable 
 or brave might find himself in a dangerously important post 
 at a moment's notice ; and many there were whom fame, thus 
 thrust upon them, led to the guillotine. It was otherwise 
 with Bonaparte. From Toulon days on, his promotion was 
 
THREE PERIODS. 163 
 
 due to solid work, founded on that exceptional ability which 
 kept him on the upward path to the zenith of his career. 
 That his friends should help him so long as he needed help 
 was but an accident. 
 
 In April, 1794, the Army of Italy moved from Nice for- 
 ward in order to take possession of the passes of the Maritime 
 Alps. Bonaparte had joined this army as general command- 
 ing the artillery ; and as Commissary of the Convention with 
 the army stood the younger Robespierre, to whose good sense 
 much of its success was due. Bonaparte had drawn up a plan 
 to turn the famous position of Saorgio, which, as already told, 
 was duly adopted; and in the absence of Dumirbion, who 
 was general-in-chief, but sick, Massena, second in command, 
 carried out the plan with entire success. In the St. Helena 
 Memorial Napoleon claims, perhaps with too much breadth, 
 to have " carried the Arpiy of Italy to Savona and the gates 
 of Ceva, which advance freed Genoa, then menaced by the 
 Coalition." But he did play a distinguished part in it. Late 
 in May there was a general consultation as to future plans, 
 and Bonaparte was selected to draw up the scheme, which 
 fairly presents his views on war, as then held. 
 
 Wartenburg aptly divides the career of this great captain 
 into three periods. The first comprises the years when he was 
 only one general out of many, and when in what he did he was 
 compelled to pay heed to the ideas and prejudices of others, 
 being hedged and hampered accordingly. In the second 
 period he was in sole command of his army, but had behind 
 him a government which controlled the resources, and from 
 whom he must receive general orders. The third period is 
 that in which all the resources of France were in his sole con- 
 trol and he could act as he saw fit. We are now in the first 
 period, which lasted until Bonaparte received the sole com- 
 mand of the Army of Italy ; the second lasted until the Con- 
 
164 MONOGRAPHS. 
 
 sulate came in on the 18th Brumaire, 1799 ; the third lasted 
 until 1815. 
 
 The plans, then, which Bonaparte drew up for the operations 
 of the Army of Italy before he received its command in chief 
 exhibit less boldness and more sense of limitation than the 
 later ones. There are a number of these monographs : two 
 dated respectively May 21 and June 20, 1794, four dated 
 July 20, 1795, and two dated October 12, 1795, and January 
 19, 1796. The first-named even from its contents appears to 
 have had a lost predecessor, which was probably the one on 
 the taking of Saorgio. Each plan is worked out at length. The 
 same intellectual conceptions are apparent in all. He begins 
 by saying, " One cannot enter the Piedmont plain except 
 with forces superior to the enemy's ; in order to obtain this 
 superiority, one must unite the Armies of the Alps and of 
 Italy. . . . Whatever plan is adopted, this is a preliminary." 
 The desire to outnumber the enemy was his principle all 
 through life, and very different from Frederick's readiness — 
 bred, to be sure, of dire necessity — to fight double or treble 
 his own numbers. " The junction of the two armies can only 
 be made in the valley of the Stura, in order to take advantage 
 of the positions and debouches won by the Army of Italy," 
 he continues; and after indicating that both armies were 
 heading for a point where the Stura enters the plain of Lom- 
 bardy, and that this plain was their natural meeting-place, 
 Bonaparte goes into detail. The Army of the Alps was to 
 create several columns, the task of some of which would be 
 to attack, of others to protect the attacking columns, and of 
 yet others to make feints to deceive the enemy as to the point 
 of attack. The eventual objective would be the Stura vaUey. 
 Meanwhile the Army of Italy would watch the gaps leading 
 from the Tinea valley to the Stura, and out towards the right 
 to Mondovi, and form several columns of attack, with similar 
 
WONDERFUL ADAPTATION. 165 
 
 tasks ; and would eventually force its way to Borgo San Dal- 
 mazzo, and cooperate with the Army of the Alps in the Stura 
 valley. The advance of the Army of Italy would, by mono- 
 polizing the enemy's attention, have the effect of making the 
 work of the Army of the Alps easy. 
 
 In a mountainous country there is more excuse for divid- 
 ing an army into a number of columns. A mountain pass 
 is practically forced only by the head of column and a few 
 flankers ; the rear is useless, if not dangerous ; while a second 
 column moving by a parallel pass may possibly take the enemy 
 in reverse, and thus insure his retreat. Bonaparte's usual 
 habit all through life was to work in masses and not in 
 detached bodies ; but here he probably had other than purely 
 military problems to face. He was by no means free from 
 interference, and had superiors, whose very marked ideas of 
 their own importance he must respect. The plan shows close 
 study of the topography and a sharp eye for the key-points ; 
 but its weakness lies in the fact that, like all work in separate 
 detachments, it depends on the success of each and every 
 column to produce the desired result ; and the failure of any 
 one column, from a fact unknown to the commanding general 
 or not under control of the column commander, might upset 
 the entire scheme. The detailed daily operation and the means 
 of subsistence of each column are well worked out in the 
 papers, and each commander is held strictly to its perform- 
 ance — another weakness. The entire plan exhibits wonder- 
 ful adaptation to what was apparently strong pressure from 
 many seniors. 
 
 At Nice, on the 2d Mesidor (June 20), Bonaparte made 
 a change in the plan, also probably brought about by some 
 pressure from several generals, by which the Army of the 
 Alps was to send fewer columns into the Stura valley, and 
 the Army of Italy was also to operate in fewer columns. The 
 
166 ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. 
 
 one destined to sustain the Army of the Alps in the Stura 
 valley is lessened ; and the columns which are to march on 
 Dalmazzo to close the pass and to secure the whole operation 
 are respectively increased. "This," says he, "is really the 
 corps which is the key of the whole army and the whole 
 system, from Castel Delfino to the Tanaro." In this changed 
 scheme, more freedom is left to the several commanders of 
 columns, and it is by thus much simpler and better. 
 
 But neither plan was destined to be put into practice. 
 The upheaval of the 9th Thermidor (July 27, 1794) and the 
 fall of Robespierre menaced Bonaparte with disaster, for the 
 favors he had received from the Robespierres had made him 
 enemies at headquarters. Sent on a secret mission to Genoa, 
 which was threatened by the British from the sea and by the 
 Austrians and the French by land, he had done well; but 
 upon his return in August some unwarranted suspicion caused 
 his arrest and imprisonment in the fort at Antibes. 
 
 A strong friendship had existed between the younger 
 Robespierre and Bonaparte, although the former acknow- 
 ledged that he never quite understood, perhaps never fully 
 trusted the general. Bonaparte had come out flatly for the 
 Jacobins : whether or not he agreed that Terrorism was an 
 evil necessary to purge the body politic, cannot be said ; but 
 he was either with the Terrorists or truckling to them, and 
 the latter is unlikely. He saw, as others did, that Terrorism 
 had become a bogy to the French peasant, who feared the 
 soldiers as infidels and as upholding the high-handed and 
 bloody methods of the Convention, and was thus less ready 
 than he might be to aid in furnishing them food and shelter; 
 and that to this extent Terrorism was a failure. But in act and 
 word Bonaparte had been faithful to the ruling party. His plan 
 for the Army of Italy had, however, made him enemies in the 
 Army of the Alps, which had no desire to play a second role ; 
 
RESTORED TO DUTY. 167 
 
 still the general suspicion no doubt came from his intimacy 
 with the Eobespierres, and it took form on their downfall, 
 which had just occurred. But Saliceti remained his friend ; 
 a war commissary was a power in the army ; and, as nothing 
 definite could be alleged against him, he was released August 
 20, 1794, and restored to duty. The reason given was that 
 better than any other he knew the coast and mountains along 
 the Maritime Alps, and was too able and useful a man to 
 s^pare. 
 
 How everything that Bonaparte had to do with Corsica 
 seemed to go wrong is a noteworthy fact. In the spring of 
 1795 an expedition had been fitting out by the French to 
 recapture the island from the English, and Bonaparte was 
 put in charge of the artillery. But as matters turned out, 
 the British fleet drove the French convoy back to the coast ; 
 and on his return Bonaparte found that he had not only once 
 more lamentably failed, but owing to a reorganization of the 
 arm, had lost as well his berth as Inspector of Coast Artillery. 
 From his activity, slow Scherer had classed him as too ambi- 
 tious and intriguing. Very much to his disgust he was, in 
 lieu of his artillery command, given a commission as briga- 
 dier-general of infantry, and was assigned to the Army of 
 the West, which was facing the Vendee. On the score of ill- 
 health, however, he managed for a while not to report for duty 
 with that force. 
 
 With his brother Louis, Marmont and Junot, he traveled 
 to Paris in May, 1795, to protest against what he deemed an 
 injustice. The Deputy Aubry, recently created general, was 
 at the head of the military committee. He had never seen 
 service. He reproached Bonaparte with his youth. " One 
 ages quickly on battlefields, and I have just come from 
 them," replied Bonaparte. In the capital he spent some 
 time, hoping to be on hand for the next political upheaval. 
 
168 A BOLD AND TRUE PLAN. 
 
 He was alone, the Jacobins having been elbowed to one side ; 
 but not being on duty, he had more leisure to devote to his 
 pen, and he prepared his " Memoire militaire sur I'Armee 
 d'ltalie, Paris, premiers jours de Thermidor III.," about July 
 20, 1795. In this memorial, which he opens by the signifi- 
 cant words, " In the present position of Europe, one can 
 turn the Army of Italy to great account, and enable it to 
 deliver blows decisive for peace and of marked effect on the 
 House of Austria," he lays bare the kernel of the 1796 cam- 
 paign : the advance through the gaps between the Alps and 
 Apennines ; the idea that a military severance of their armies 
 would at once result in the political severance of Austria and 
 Piedmont, the former army to rush to the protection of Lom- 
 bardy, and the latter to that of its own country; then the 
 forcing back of the Austrians on Alessandria, while a threat 
 against Turin would compel a peace from Piedmont. 
 
 Only to true genius or to arrant incapacity is ever given 
 the power to see perfection in the plans it draws up. In this 
 memorial Bonaparte argues out, in burning phrases and with 
 entire confidence, the value of his plan, and tells what its 
 immediate results must be. The paper first exhibits the 
 man's exceptional far-sightedness and breadth of view ; for he 
 goes on to show how the Army of Italy, after peace forced on 
 Piedmont, may conquer Lombardy, march towards the Tyrol, 
 unite with the Army of the Rhine on the Danube, and dic- 
 tate terms in the heart of Austria. Even Carnot had never 
 conceived so bold and true a plan. 
 
 As a wonderful proof of Bonaparte's genius, it has been 
 pointed out by some authors that he took command of the 
 Army of Italy in 1796, and at once proceeded out of hand 
 upon the marvelous campaign which first illustrated his 
 career. But one must not forget that genius, apart from 
 study and hard work, has never yet accomplished its end. 
 
A BOUNDLESS IMAGINATION. 169 
 
 Bonaparte's success in 1796 was due to years of office study 
 of the country and the situation. While other generals of 
 higher or equal rank were spending their leisure in wonder- 
 ing what was to be done next, or how they could strike a safe 
 blow, or indeed in trivial pleasures, Bonaparte set himself to 
 work out the problem with his maps and charts ; he weighed 
 each factor until he found its true value in the whole scheme ; 
 he studied the theatre of war until he knew its every hill and 
 river ; and he only then felt that he could command success. 
 Like every great captain, his imagination was boundless, and 
 in his brain there revolved at all times problems of what 
 might thereafter be. Whenever he was confronted by a new 
 proposition, he found its answer in the work of many sleep- 
 less nights of his restless past. " All great things that one 
 saw him do as emperor," says Bourrienne, " were but the 
 carrying out of projects long ago made, when his future 
 greatness was only a dream, or rather a demand of his own 
 imagination." The man was indeed a dreamer, but his 
 dreams were full of reality, and peopled with facts ; and his 
 imagination mainly wandered over those fields upon which he 
 was thereafter actually to play his part. 
 
 How much this memorial, how much the recommendations 
 of Saliceti and other friends weighed, we do not know, but, 
 on August 21, 1795, instead of being sent to bury himself in 
 the command of a brigade in the Army of the West, Bona- 
 parte was assigned by the Committee of Public Safety to its 
 geographical bureau (the " Direction of the Movement of the 
 Armies of the Republic "), to work out plans of campaign ; 
 and here he speedily gained the confidence of its members, 
 who utilized his suggestions constantly. The leaders of the 
 several armies to whom these suggestions were sent received 
 them, however, with little patience. Kellermann wrote back 
 that the originator belonged in an insane asylum ; and Scherer 
 
170 A CAREER APPARENTLY ENDED. 
 
 answered that the man who had made the plan for the Army 
 of Italj' had better come and carry it out himself. Curiously 
 prophetic suggestion I 
 
 Bonaparte remained no great time in this position. Opin- 
 ions and men changed rapidly in those weeks. With appar- 
 ently small desire to give his best days to the service of 
 France, and perhaps with his first symptoms of Oriental fever, 
 he made a request to the Committee of Public Safety to be 
 allowed to go to Turkey to reorganize the Sultan's artillery, 
 — a matter he must have been preparing for some time ; and 
 this request was being favorably considered by the sub-com- 
 mittee he was specially serving when, not having reported to 
 his brigade in the Army of the West, he was, under the tech- 
 nical regulations made for the reorganization of the levy in 
 mass, stricken by the Central Committee from the list of 
 active generals. Here was apparently a violent end to the 
 career of a man who had so far succeeded in but one under- 
 taking in life, in a subordinate though prominent position at 
 Toulon. But Providence was reserving him for greater things. 
 His loss of rank was but a step upward. Remaining in Paris 
 he busied himself with many projects, yet often nearly at the 
 end of his resources and without friends. But the 13th Vend^- 
 miaire (October 14, 1795) came on, and with it active work. 
 
 In 1795, as already stated, treaties had been made with 
 Spain and Prussia, and a more moderate political situation 
 had come in. The emigres had been dispersed by Hoche at 
 Quiberon. Jourdan and Pichegru had but half succeeded on 
 the Ehine. In Italy Scherer had, under the plan claimed by 
 Bonaparte as his own, and ably seconded by Massena, won 
 the battle of Loano, which gave the Army of Italy a position 
 on the Apennines as far as Savona. Matters began to wear 
 their old-time aspect, and France was apparently recovering 
 from the awful disease which had nearly buried the nation. 
 
RISE OF THE SECTIONS. 
 
 171 
 
 Paris was then, as now, toujours gai. The Reign of Ter- 
 ror had been a nightmare, and the city had awakened to fresh 
 social life. In this Bonaparte mixed little. Politically, in 
 1795, France was in a struggle between Jacobins and Royal- 
 ists, in which the latter, in the provinces at least, came close 
 to winning, until Hoche put an end to their hopes in Brit- 
 tany. Prance was again threatened, as she has at stated in- 
 tervals been ever since, with the danger of anarchy from the 
 masses, tyranny from the governing power, or a coup d^etat 
 by some ambitious schemer. A new constitution was laeing 
 made, under which tax-paying residents might vote, and a 
 Council of Ancients should have a steadying influence on the 
 Deputies. The Committee of Public Safety was to become 
 a Directory of five members, with more moderate powers. 
 Extreme measures had seen their day. 
 
 But the Convention did not willingly cede its enormous 
 powers, and shortly the Sections rose against it. To Barras, 
 who had commanded the 
 Army of the Interior with 
 energy, was given the task 
 to protect the Convention. 
 He already knew Bona- 
 parte. There were thirty 
 thousand National Guards 
 without artillery arrayed 
 against the Convention's 
 five thousand regulars with 
 several batteries. Barras 
 is said to have appointed 
 seven lieutenants, among 
 whom, though he was but one, Bonaparte was the ruling 
 spirit; the entire operation was in his control, and from the 
 first word spoken all followed in his steps. While his senti- 
 
 Barras. 
 
172 SUPERIORITY OF THE CONVENTION. 
 
 ments were always with the people (" he was ever the peas- 
 ants' General, the peasants' Consul, the peasants' Emperor "), 
 his action was in favor of the ruling party of law and order. 
 In addition to the five thousand line infantry there were 
 fifteen hundred citizens, and when Barras authorized him to 
 get guns from Sablons, he dispatched his subordinate Murat 
 thither to bring them up. The latter was only just in time : 
 the Sections had sent to seize the cannon for their side. 
 With guns well served the Convention had a distinct supe- 
 riority, unless the Sections should happen to be unusually 
 well led, as it turned out they were not. General Menou 
 had been in charge for the Convention, but he had weakly 
 dallied with the Sections. After Bonaparte took the matter 
 in hand, the day was still spent parleying and awaiting a 
 movement of the Sections. But Bonaparte had for hours 
 been ready, with his guns trained on the Louis XVI. bridge 
 (now Pont de la Concorde), the Pont Royal, the rues de 
 Rohan, du Dauphin, St. Florentin and St. Honore, and with 
 matches lighted. The members of the Convention were also 
 armed, and the whole great mass of solid buildings making up 
 the Louvre and the Tuileries was held by its troops. About 
 4 p. M. a few stray shots were fired from adjoining houses, and 
 the Sections advanced on the Convention army by the issues 
 of the rue St. Honore, and first near the church of St. Roch, 
 where they had their headquarters. Waiting for nothing, and 
 although but a single gun could be trained up the narrow rue 
 du Dauphin, Bonaparte so ably managed his batteries that 
 the troops of the Sections were blown away with a few rounds 
 of grape and canister. A similar attack from across the Seine 
 by the Pont Royal was somewhat later dispersed in like man- 
 ner. By six o'clock the matter was finished, the Sections had 
 played their cards and lost, with casualties on each side of 
 about two hundred men. The Convention had won by Bona- 
 
THE CITIZENS DISARMED. 
 
 173 
 
 parte's quick and uncompromising measures, and lie was 
 promoted to be general of division, and made second in com- 
 mand of the Army of the Interior, with headquarters in 
 Paris. 
 
 After the defeat of the Sections, the disarmament of the 
 citizens was decreed, and it was strictly carried out. No arm 
 of whatever kind was left in the hands of the people. A few 
 days later, one morning, a lad of thirteen came to see Bona- 
 parte, and though received kindly, could explain with difficulty 
 
 The Defeat of the Sections. 
 
 through his tears that he was the son, Eugene, of General de 
 Beauharnais, and that his dead father's sword had been taken. 
 Touched by the gallant bearing of the lad, Bonaparte saw to 
 the return of the weapon. Madame Josephine de Beauhar- 
 nais later came to thank the soldier, and this was their first 
 introduction. 
 
 Bonaparte now busied himself with reorganizing the Na- 
 tional Guard, and formed the Guard of the Directory and 
 Legislative Assembly, — a body which later became the Consu- 
 lar and Imperial Guard. He found himself at once a lion in 
 
174 SUFFERING FROM HUNGER. 
 
 society, and shortly in Barras' salon lie again met Josephine, 
 with whom, though she was six years his senior, he fell des- 
 perately and honestly in love. 
 
 In this year there was much suffering from hunger in 
 Paris. One day, while inspecting the issues to the multi- 
 tude, Napoleon and his staff were surrounded by a riotous 
 group of women clamoring for bread, which threatened a 
 critical result. The leader was an extremely tall and fat 
 woman, one of the notabilities of the great market near by. 
 " All these epauleted men," she cried, " well cared for and 
 fed, are mocking us. As long as they eat and grow fat, little 
 care they how many poor die of hunger." Bonaparte good- 
 naturedly turned towards her with " My good woman, are 
 you or am I the fatter ? " This turned the laugh against the 
 woman, and broke up the riot, as a French laugh will always 
 do. Ridicule is the strongest Gallic argument. 
 
 Early next year Bonaparte was given command of the 
 Army of Italy. Barras' claim that the appointment was ow- 
 ing entirely to him cannot be substantiated. The man who 
 made such appointments was Carnot ; and this able admin- 
 istrator was not slow to recognize the strength of the young 
 general, for whom, moreover, much later correspondence shows 
 that he harbored a sincere regard. Barras may indeed have 
 been Bonaparte's backer, or one of them. The new Direc- 
 tory had come in ; Carnot asked Bonaparte to redraw his 
 plan for the Army of Italy, which he did in January, 1796 ; 
 and Scherer having given small satisfaction and being more- 
 over in bad health, Bonaparte was put in his place. 
 
 Marmont, who became his adjutant-general, tells us that he 
 found Bonaparte transformed into a man positive of what he 
 knew and could do, and with a full sense of his own impor- 
 tance. In every way he made his appointment tell in his own 
 favor, and one of its immediate results was his marriage to 
 
A REMARK OVERHEARD. 175 
 
 Josephine, of which Barras, in his Memoirs, tells us so much 
 and suggests more. 
 
 What Josephine narrates of Bonaparte's manner in those 
 , days is of marked interest. " I admire the courage of the 
 general," says she, " the breadth of his knowledge in all 
 things, of which he also talks well, the liveliness of his mind, 
 which allows him to understand the thoughts of others almost 
 before they speak ; but I confess I am frightened at the do- 
 minion which he seems to desire to exert over all who surround 
 him. His inquiring eye has something peculiar which is in- 
 explicable, but which even impresses our directors." She 
 further tells that Bonaparte said to her, " Think you that I 
 need influence in order to rise ? All will some day be happy 
 when I give them mine. My sword is at my side, and with 
 it I will go far." Josephine adds : " I do not understand it, 
 but sometimes this ridiculous positiveness so impresses me 
 that it makes me believe everything possible that this ex- 
 traordinary man puts into my head ; and who knows what, 
 with his imagination, he may not undertake." 
 
 At that time Madame de Beauharnais was fairly well off. 
 Her notary, a certain Kaguideau, who was drawing up the mar- 
 riage contract, remonstrated with her. " How can you," said 
 he, " marry a soldier who has only his cloak and his sword? " 
 Bonaparte, who was sitting in the adjoining room, chanced 
 to overhear this remark; and eight years later, when he 
 was being dressed for the imperial crowning, and Raguideau 
 was near by, having indeed been employed by Bonaparte as 
 his own notary, he showed him the imperial mantle covered 
 with golden bees, and beside it the long sword of Charle- 
 magne, with the remark, " There, sir, are the cloak and the 
 sword ! " 
 
VIII. 
 
 MONTENOTTE AND DEGO. MARCH AND APEIL, 1796. 
 
 The position of France was critical. The Coalition was strong. England 
 had captured the French colonies. Finances were at lowest ebb. The three 
 main armies were those of Jourdan on the lower Khine, Moreau in Alsatia and 
 Bonaparte in Italy. The two former were to cross the Rhine and unite against 
 the allies under Archduke Charles. Bonaparte took command with firmness, 
 and all quickly recognized his authority and ability. He corrected the bad 
 strategical position of the army, which had been strung out along the coast, with 
 communications in prolongation of the left. He equipped and fed the troops 
 better than before, roused their enthusiasm by his masterful work, and won 
 their affection by his hearty words. The allies in Italy (the Austrians and the 
 Piedmontese) were so ill-posted as not to support each other. Bonaparte 
 ployed his forces into one mass, crossed the mountains and defeated the Aus- 
 trians at Montenotte ; then turned on Dego, again beat them, broke through 
 the centre of the allied line, and separated the two armies. His speed and au- 
 dacity had nerer yet been equaled in modern days. He worked his divisions 
 in a marvelous manner. Then leaving small forces to hold the Austrians in 
 check, he advanced on the Piedmontese, beat them repeatedly, and drove them 
 back towards Turin with such rapidity that the Aiistrians could not help them. 
 Piedmont was glad to sue for peace, and the Austrians withdrew behind the Po. 
 The campaign was fairly startling in its energy and skill. 
 
 Appointed to command the Army of Italy March 2, 1796, 
 Bonaparte, accompanied by his faithful comrades, Marmont, 
 Junot, Berthier, Murat and Duroc, left Paris the 21st, and 
 on the 27th assumed command at Nice. He at once issued 
 the following : — 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Headquabters, Nice, 7 Germinal, IV. 
 Soldiers ! You are naked, ill-fed ; the government owes you much, it 
 can give you nothing. Your patience, the courage you exhibit in the 
 midst of these rocks, are admirable, but they bring you no glory ; no 
 
A CRITICAL SITUATION. 177 
 
 lustre is reflected on you. I will lead you into the most fertile plains of 
 the world. Rich provinces, great cities will be in your power ; there you 
 shall find honor, fame and riches. Soldiers of Italy, shall courage or 
 constancy fail you ? Bonaparte. 
 
 This proclamation showed a keen sense of the strength as 
 well as weakness of the French soldier's character, Bona- 
 parte promised them food, fame, spoils. The Gallic conscript 
 was about to fight for his rations, as the gallant Confederates 
 so often had to do from 1861 to 1865, but with the additional 
 incentive of loot. 
 
 France was in a critical situation. In coalition against her 
 were England, Russia, the German Empire, Austria, Naples 
 and the Pope, who had formally joined the allies September 
 28, 1795 ; while Prussia and Spain, which had recently made 
 peace at Basle, were still far from reliable as neutrals, though 
 Prussia had reason to hope for an increase of territory. Russia 
 had gone so far as to send ships to the North Sea. Sweden 
 and Denmark, Hanover, Saxony and some other German 
 States were friendly, and Portugal would have been glad to 
 leave the Coalition. Holland had established a republican 
 government, and Beurnonville was there in command of the 
 joint Dutch and French forces. Poland had ceased to exist, 
 and Turkey had no interest in European politics. Switzerland 
 remained neutral. All the French colonies had been alien- 
 ated or seized by the English ; the French fleet had been de- 
 stroyed ; the small foothold of France in India had been 
 lost. On the other hand Belgium had been formally reunited 
 to France, though without the consent of Austria, who viewed 
 the loss of the Netherlands as a grievous blow to her prestige ; 
 and the Austrian victories on the Rhine in 1795 gave small 
 hope that Vienna would voluntarily cede this territory. The 
 German armies were expected to make an attempt to cross 
 the Rhine. Finances were at such low ebb that the Directory 
 
178 THE MAIN ARMIES. 
 
 resorted to the offensive quite as much to subsist the armies 
 it could not feed upon the enemy's soil, as for strategic gain. 
 
 There were three main armies, Jourdan's, Moreau's and 
 Bonaparte's, and two in reserve : Kellermann's Army of the 
 Alps, and one in Provence and on the Var. Jourdan had 
 upwards of seventy thousand men ' on the lower Rhine, with 
 which to mask Mainz and advance into Franconia with forty- 
 five thousand. Moreau had an equal number in Alsatia, with 
 which to mask Mannheim and advance into Swabia. The two 
 were then to unite, and descend upon Bavaria. The Army of 
 the Alps and the Army of Italy, while near each other, did 
 little work in common, and the former commander of the Army 
 of Italy, Scherer, after the victory of Loano, had sat down to 
 rest upon his laurels in a useless defensive. 
 
 Although Clerfayt had done well in 1795, Archduke Charles 
 had superseded him, and with his ninety thousand men 
 was expected to recapture Belgium. On the Upper Rhine, 
 Wurmser with eighty thousand men was to hold head to 
 Moreau ; and Beaulieu, with sixty thousand men in Italy, was 
 ordered to drive the French from the Riviera and follow them 
 into Provence. 
 
 In 1796 Italy, divided up into twenty petty principalities, 
 existed only on the map. Sardinia, with Savoy, Nice and 
 Piedmont, Genoa, Lucca, Lombardy, Venice, Modena, Tus- 
 cany, comprised the northern part ; the States of the Pope took 
 up the centre ; and Naples covered the southern part of the 
 peninsula, including Sicily. Corsica was French. Victor 
 Amadeus III. of Piedmont, " le portier des Alpes," had mar- 
 ried his daughters to the brothers of Louis XVI. ; and his 
 fear of republican doctrines, his family ties and English 
 subsidies, all induced him to cling to the Coalition. And yet, 
 in truth, for in her alliance he had everything to lose and 
 nothing to gain, it was but a feeble fealty that he harbored 
 
TWO FIELDS OF ACTION. 
 
 179 
 
 towards Austria. Lombardy was Austrian. Tuscany was gov- 
 erned by a scion of the Hapsburg family. Modena and Lucca 
 were under the thumb of Vienna. Ferdinand IV. of Naples 
 was allied by marriage to 
 Austria, and sent a con- 
 tingent to her army in 
 Italy. The execution of 
 Marie Antionette had ex- 
 asperated every one who 
 had pro-Austrian tenden- 
 cies. The Pope, Pius VI., 
 was governed by his reli- 
 gious motives. The oli- 
 garchies of Genoa and 
 Venice had fallen from 
 their old estate, but might 
 still be of weight in the 
 balance. Austria had es- 
 sayed to create an Italian league against France, but though 
 she had not accomplished much, all Italy was really anti- 
 French to the last degree. Yet there existed among the mid- 
 dle classes in Piedmont and Lombardy, and in other states, 
 as Bologna and Ferrara, a distinct striving towards liberty, 
 bred of the French Revolution and the iniquities of their 
 present rulers. 
 
 Strategically there were two theatres, Germany and Italy. 
 In northern Italy the Alps and Apennines play the great to- 
 pographical role, inclosing as they do on north and south 
 the valley of the Po. Though in a way the two are the same 
 range, the point of geographical division is at the CoUe di 
 Tenda. The mountain ranges on the south lie near the sea, 
 leaving only a narrow territory along the Gulf of Genoa. 
 The Po valley is practically shut in from the north and west. 
 
 Clerfayt. 
 
THE VALLEY OF THE PO. 181 
 
 From the south it is approachable by easy passes across the 
 Apennines ; from the east by fairly good ones over the Julian 
 Alps, and by the passes of the Tagliamento (Pontebba) and 
 of the Piave ; on the north and west, however, it can only be 
 entered by the rugged passes of the Adige (Brenner) and of 
 the Brenta ; by the Spliigen, St. Gothard, the Simplon, and 
 the St. Bernard, Great and Little ; by Mont Cenis, Mont 
 Genevre, Argentiere, Tenda. All the latter French and 
 Swiss passes were at that day protected by more or less strong 
 forts ; the eastern gaps were not. The debouches from the 
 Riviera to the Po valley were covered by the fortresses of 
 Coni, Ormea, Ceva ; and that all these passes ran through 
 valleys into the Padane plains at nearly a right angle lent 
 greater value to these strong places. From the coast, between 
 the Bocchetta and Tenda passes, the roads across the moun- 
 tains over the Ormea and Cadibona passes were poor. 
 
 From Turin down the Po is navigable. It is about as wide 
 as the Danube, but not being deep and having a quiet current, 
 it is in many places easily crossed by troops. The Isonzo pro- 
 tects northern Italy from the east, and the Palmanova aids 
 in its defense ; but these rivers can be turned by the pass of 
 Pontebba via Osopo into the valley of the Tagliamento. The 
 Piave protects Venice. The Brenta has many fords. All 
 these rivers are torrential in the mountains. They can all be 
 turned by the upper waters of the Adige, along which run 
 roads from the Tyrol and Bavaria into Italy. From this it 
 follows that the Adige is the strongest barrier of the Po val- 
 ley on the east, as the line of this river can only be turned by 
 the difficult passes farther to the west. Down to Rivoli the 
 Adige is protected by Monte Baldo, and the position at La 
 Corona, just above Eivoli, practically prevents artillery from 
 moving along the road. Verona commands the Adige at the 
 outlet of the mountains, and still farther down Legnano, 
 
182 STRONG FORTRESSES. 
 
 below which the country is too marshy for military operations. 
 The Mincio, from the Lake of Garda to the Po, is watched 
 by the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, but between the 
 former and Goito there are many fords. About Mantua lie 
 much marsh land and many lakes. The line of the Mincio 
 can be turned south of the Po, or by the north of the Lake 
 of Garda. The Adda, which flows through the Lake of 
 Come and to the Po above Cremona, has several fords, but 
 Pizzighetone protects its lower course, while Lecco, Trezzo, 
 Cassano and Lodi are strong points above. The Ticino 
 flows through Lago Maggiore, and divides Piedmont from 
 Lombardy. Navigable, with many affluents and uncertain 
 fords, it is a good defensive line, Pavia being its strongest 
 place. Opposite the mouth of the Ticino lies the pass of 
 Stradella, between the Po and a rugged spur of the Apen- 
 nines ; and all roads along the left bank of the Po, practicable 
 for an army, must pass through this defile. We remember 
 that Hannibal saw and seized its advantages. 
 
 Mantua was the best fortress in Italy, lying on an island 
 in the Mincio in the midst of marshes and flanked by a citadel 
 and by Fort San Giorgio. Venice, from her position and 
 her forts, was of marked value. Verona had good walls, and 
 on the left bank a strong fort. Legnano was fairly strong. 
 Peschiera was small but important. Pizzighetone had consid- 
 erable value. Palmanova was a new fortress. Milan pos- 
 sessed a six-bastioned citadel, but was not otherwise strong. 
 Pavia held the Ticino bridge and was strengthened by walls 
 and a citadel. Brescia had like defenses. Bergamo had a 
 citadel and the fortified castle Capella. Crema was strong. 
 Turin boasted good walls and a fine citadel. Alessandria, 
 Tortona, Valencia, Gavi, Ceva, Coni, all strong fortresses, 
 protected Piedmont on the south, while the forts of Bard, 
 Exilles, Fenestrelles, Pignerolo, Castel Delfino, Demonte, 
 
THE HAND OF AUTHORITY. 183 
 
 performed like office on the west. Such was the theatre which 
 lay open to the new commander of the Army of Italy. ^ 
 
 At this date Bonaparte's appearance had little that was at- 
 tractive. Short of stature (being scant five feet five, English), 
 spare, and with features so pinched that their real beauty of 
 outline was quite hidden, high broad forehead, thin lips, long 
 yellow hair, not always well kempt, wearing his clothes in a 
 loose and ungainly fashion, ill-groomed to the last degree, 
 there was nothing to suggest his real character, except the 
 big, deep-set, blue-gray eyes, which never failed to fascinate, 
 and his voice, whose words none could fail to heed. Appar- 
 ently lacking physique, he yet possessed unlimited nervous 
 strength, and he soon proved that he could outwork almost 
 any man in the army. On his first appearance the older gen- 
 erals in the Army of Italy looked with small favor on this 
 twenty-seven years old commander-in-chief ; hut in a few 
 weeks they were heart and soul his willing lieutenants. 
 
 " Headquarters had not left Nice since the beginning of 
 the war. . . . The administrations considered themselves as 
 at a permanent post, and busied themselves more with the 
 comforts of life than the needs of the army." The new leader 
 at once showed the strong hand of authority. He disbanded 
 one battalion for refusing to march for want of shoes and 
 pay, and consolidated the men in groups of five into other 
 commands, " the officers not having shown enough nerve " in 
 the mutiny. He raised money from local bankers to partly 
 pay the troops, and began to gather food and forage with an 
 energy and success not yet seen. Everything was done for 
 the men ; everything was demanded of them. " I am com- 
 pelled to threaten the agents, who have stolen much and who 
 have credit, and I accomplish a good deal by following up 
 my threats with caresses. The army will hereafter eat good 
 bread and have meat," he wrote the Directory. And to Com- 
 
184 "HEROES IN RAGS." 
 
 missary Lambert he wrote, April 7, concerning a complaint 
 as to the weight of the rations and forage, and stating that 
 larceny had been proven : — 
 
 "The general-in-chief orders you to make an official report on the 
 weight of the bundles of hay which remain and which have been placed 
 under charge of the guard. You will have Citizen Michel arrested until 
 you can find out who bundled the hay, and the storekeeper who received 
 the lettuce. ... It is important, Citizen Commissary, that not a single 
 rogue shall escape. For a long time the soldiers and the interests of the 
 country have been a prey to cupidity. An example is necessary at all 
 times, particularly on the opening of the campaign." 
 
 To Scherer's credit be it said that he received the new 
 commander-in-chief cordially, and gave him all the aid he 
 could. In return Bonaparte suggested him for the post of 
 ambassador. " I have been particularly satisfied with the 
 frankness and integrity of General Scherer. By his loyal 
 conduct, and by his promptness in giving me all the informa- 
 tion which can be useful to me, he has acquired a right to my 
 gratitude," he wrote the Directory March 28. And to Car- 
 not : " I have seemed to see in Scherer a man pure and en- 
 lightened. He appears to me tired of war, which has broken 
 his health. Could you not employ him as ambassador ? He 
 has knowledge of men, and moral breadth." 
 
 The Army of Italy, whose soldiers the allies derisively called 
 " heroes in rags," — as indeed they were, for " privations, pov- 
 erty, misery, are the school of the good soldier," said the em- 
 peror at St. Helena, — was perched upon the watershed along 
 the coast of the Gulf of Genoa, over too long a front, from 
 Ormea, at the headwaters of the Tanaro, to Savona. Its com- 
 munications with France ran along the sea parallel with its 
 front — always a dangerous situation — and were thus liable 
 to be cut at any time. Supplies had to come by the seashore 
 road, as an English flotilla under Nelson and Jervis held the 
 
ROADS NOT PRACTICABLE. 185 
 
 sea, and could cut off French ships sailing from Toulon. The 
 condition of the army was pitiable. " Bread was ill-assured ; 
 for a long while no distribution of meat had been made." 
 The men and officers alike were unpaid, ill-clad, unshod, ill- 
 fed. 
 
 From France into Italy there were many roads : by the 
 CoUe di Tenda, the Argentiere, Mont Genevre, Mont Cenis, 
 the Little and Great St. Bernard, and farther along the Sim- 
 plon, the Spliigen and the St. Gothard. But none of these 
 could really be called practicable for an army, most of them 
 being snow-bound except for a brief summer period, and few 
 of them having wagon-roads. From Nice into Italy there 
 were at that day but two highways. The present fine chaussee 
 from Nice to Genoa and Florence was not begun until 1805, 
 at the same time as the military roads over the Simplon and 
 Mont Cenis. One of the roads then existing ran across the 
 CoUe di Tenda via Coni to Turin ; the other was the Corniche, 
 winding its narrow, tortuous way along the coast ; and beyond 
 Genoa on to Alessandria the road ran over the Bocchetta range, 
 the pass through which was protected by the fort at Gavi. 
 By his march across the CoUe di Tenda, Bonaparte was really 
 turning the Alps. From the coast at Port Maurice to Ceva 
 ran a third road across the mountains, practicable for artil- 
 lery ; while less good roads were those from Loano to Gares- 
 sio and Ceva ; from Savona to Carcare, and thence either to 
 Dego or Ceva ; from Savona via Montenotte to SasseUo ; and 
 from Voltri to Campofreddo. Country roads, fit enough for 
 infantry or pack-mules, ran along every valley and over every 
 pass from town to town ; but for guns or cavalry most of them 
 would serve only in case of necessity. 
 
 The French thus held the Riviera coast and the steep 
 southerly foothills of the Apennines ; the allied Piedmontese- 
 Austrian armies held the northerly slopes of the range. 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS. 187 
 
 which were much less pronounced. In the Alps, on Bona- 
 parte's left and with communications running back through 
 Savoy, stood Kellermann's forces, over which Bonaparte had 
 no control. It is plain that by way of Coni, had it so wished, 
 the Army of Italy could have reached out towards the Army 
 of the Alps and worked in unison with it; but there was 
 actually no intimate cooperation. Each commander paid 
 heed to his own front only. 
 
 The distribution of troops was as follows : on the left of 
 the army stood Garnier's division of thirty-two hundred men 
 along the Colle di Finestre towards Isola; then came Mac- 
 quart's division of thirty-seven hundred men along the road 
 from SospeUo up to the Colle di Tenda. These two were 
 intended to keep up connection with the Army of the Alps 
 by the Coni road, and to block the way to the Piedmontese, 
 so that the French communications should not be cut by the 
 enemy's advance through the Tenda pass. Serurier's division, 
 seven thousand strong, lay on the road Pieve-Ormea-Garessio 
 as if ready to push on Ceva and Turin, with Augereau's divi- 
 sion of eight thousand men stationed behind its right and 
 leaning its own right flank on the sea at Langueglia. There 
 were two divisions in the van, Massena's of nine thousand 
 men, and Laharpe's of eight thousand men ; and these held 
 the coast from Augereau's position out to near Voltri. The ar- 
 tillery boasted but sixty guns. All the troops were in canton- 
 ments, and far from being in marching order. Of cavalry 
 Bonaparte had not exceeding three thousand men. These he 
 placed under the command of the veteran Steingel, and sta- 
 tioned them in two divisions near Loano, in rear of the foot. 
 In a limited sense both Kellermann's Army of the Alps and 
 the troops on the Var were a reserve to the Army of Italy. 
 But they were not subject to Bonaparte's control. As a fact, 
 Kellermann was none too eager to cooperate with his new 
 associate. 
 
188 POSITIONS OF THE ALLIED FORCES. 
 
 The forces of the allies were equally ill-distributed. After 
 the battle of Loano they had been crowded down from the 
 watershed to the northern foothills of the mountains, and lay 
 covering the approaches to Turin and Milan. Over twenty 
 thousand Piedmontese were contained by KeUermann in the 
 passes of the Alps from Mont Blanc down to the Argentiere, 
 so as to be of practically no present use against the Army of 
 Italy ; and to this extent KeUermann was doing useful work. 
 But in the immediate problem which Bonaparte was to work 
 out, he was playing only a neutral role. 
 
 In the valleys of the Tanaro and the Great Bormida, about 
 Ceva and Mondovi, stood Colli, and under him Provera and 
 Latour, with the rest of the Piedmontese, twenty-five thousand 
 effective, covering Turin, with his left on Millesimo ; and the 
 Austrians, thirty-five thousand strong under Beaulieu, a 
 veteran of seventy-one, who was, indeed, supposed to be in 
 command of both armies, extended their left out towards the 
 Bocchetta pass, thus covering Milan, and with a flying wing 
 near Genoa. The Austrian centre was at Sassello, with out- 
 posts along the ridge of the Apennines ; the right was at Dego 
 on the Little Bormida. The main body, which had been in 
 winter quarters on the Po and Adda, was yet assembling in 
 the plains near Alessandria. Beaulieu had good lieutenants : 
 Argenteau, Melas, Wukassovich, Liptay, Sebottendorf. The 
 entire allied line thus extended from the fortress of Coni, 
 which strongly protected its right flank, to the Bocchetta pass 
 and the great city of Genoa. They numbered about sixty 
 thousand men under the colors, and had one hundred and 
 fifty guns. This line was long, and was so placed that, owing 
 to the trend of the watersheds, intercommunication between 
 parts was over difficult ground; if interrupted at any one 
 point, it could be reestablished only by a considerable circuit. 
 The entire allied force was marshaled cordon fashion : Sebot- 
 
AN INHERITED SYSTEM. 189 
 
 tendorf , opposite Voltri, was supposed, while advancing down 
 the coast, to keep in touch with the English fleet and Genoa ; 
 Argenteau was to advance from Acqui towards the coast with 
 his mass at Sassello ; Provera, with a brigade at Saliceto and 
 Millesimo, was to keep up contact between the Austrian right 
 and Piedmontese left ; and Colli, with the main Piedmontese 
 army, was to hold firm in Ceva. 
 
 Bonaparte's orders from the Directory were to separate the 
 allies and force peace on Piedmont, in accordance with his 
 own plans already mentioned, and for which he had been 
 ridiculed by his associate, Kellermann, and his predecessor, 
 Scherer ; and though he was resolved to undertake the ofEeu- 
 sive at an early day, yet there remained a host of things to be 
 done before he could move. Many have portrayed Napoleon 
 as a man always pushing forward, " following his star," with- 
 out regard to logistics or lines of retreat. The truth is, 
 that no man was ever more scrupulous in his care of victual, 
 clothing and material than he ; no man ever knew more cer- 
 tainly what he should do in case of disaster. He was far 
 removed from a Charles XII. Napoleon, to be sure, always 
 made " war nourish war " (excepting the cost of his wars with 
 England, his campaigns were made to pay for themselves) ; 
 but he none the less calculated everything relating to admin- 
 istration with a nicety of detail which was marvelous ; and 
 woe betide that officer who failed him in the department of 
 supplies. It is, however, true that he relied on the country, 
 rather than on magazines, as Frederick had to do. This 
 system he had inherited from the bold recklessness of the 
 early Revolutionary generals. But on the other hand, the 
 valley of the Po, whither he was bound to push his way, was 
 rich, as were not Bohemia and Moravia, where the Prussians 
 campaigned in the seventeenth century. Inasmuch as, in 
 this particular case, what Bonaparte was resolved to do would 
 
190 EFFECTIVE IF SUCCESSFUL. 
 
 demand great speed, so the question of supplies had all the 
 more to be considered and provided for. And the greater 
 part of his early days in command were devoted to this task. 
 
 It seems that Bonaparte had for a moment conceived an 
 idea that he might persuade or compel Genoa to give him 
 passage, so that through the Bocchetta pass he might, by a 
 threat to the Austrian left, throw Beaulieu back on or beyond 
 Alessandria, detach Piedmont from the Austrian alliance by 
 advancing between the allies from that direction, and, taking 
 their defenses in reverse, call in the Army of the Alps and 
 move in mass on the Tyrol. In fact, his advance on Voltri 
 was in part owing to this idea, and was in part a threat on 
 Genoa, to persuade her to pay an indemnity for the burning 
 by the English of a French ship in her neutral waters. But 
 on due weighing of the chances, he reverted to the 1794 plan, 
 which he had so carefully worked out in his Memorial and 
 other papers, and which would be much more effective if suc- 
 cessful. In general, as already shown, this plan was to break 
 through the enemy's centre across the western Apennines, 
 strategically separate the Austrians from the Piedmontese, 
 force peace on the latter, and then turn upon the Austrians. 
 The point of attack was to be along the Savona-Carcare road ; 
 and to carry out this plan he must first concentrate on his 
 right. " To change from the defensive to the offensive for- 
 mation is one of the most sensitive of operations," said he, as 
 he began this work. A few months later, when his hand had 
 got used to his tools, — or perhaps we should say used to 
 holding the baton, — he found it easier ; and thereafter he 
 paid small heed to tactical difficulties, which he always felt 
 he could overcome when met. 
 
 Bonaparte's chief of staff was Berthier, then forty-three 
 years old, the man who served him as such throughout his 
 campaigns, except the last. He had been lieutenant-colonel 
 
BERTHIER. 
 
 191 
 
 on the staff of Eochambeau in America, had served in the 
 Vendee and under Kellermann in the Army of the Alps. 
 Berthier was a most useful officer, brave, exact and reliable 
 in every part of the practical business of war, but " of an in- 
 decisive character," and without the slightest conception of 
 its intellectual side. Napoleon gave him fame, riches, friend- 
 ship, a,nd this, said he, 
 Berthier later repaid him 
 by betrayal. At St. He- 
 lena he characterized Ber- 
 thier as a gander whom 
 he had in a way trans- 
 formed into an eagle. 
 This was scarcely a fair 
 simile, but the emperor 
 was then embittered. Un- 
 tiring at work in the tent 
 or in the saddle, master 
 of all the details of ad- 
 ministration, Berthier was 
 invaluable to the great 
 army leader ; but he was not strong in any place except be- 
 side his master. On Bonaparte's staff were also Marmont, 
 Murat and Junot, later to rise to fame ; and in subordinate 
 positions were serving Lannes, Joubert, Bessieres, Suchet 
 and Victor. As lieutenants, each worked up to the top of 
 the ladder. 
 
 All the regiments capable of work on the fighting line were 
 now ordered up, and as soon as they could be relieved by gar- 
 risons, came on from Nice and Albenga to Savona. These 
 were all places essential to be held to protect the line of com- 
 munications with France. Bonaparte left his Nice head- 
 quarters for the front on April 2, to set the army in motion. 
 
 Berthier. 
 
192 ACTIVE OPERATIONS. 
 
 His purpose was to concentrate at Savona, push at once up to 
 Carcare on the Little Bormida, where the road forks towards 
 the capitals of Piedmont and Lombardy, and having seized 
 this fork, he might advance on either road at will. 
 
 The allies had also been contemplating active opera- 
 tions. " The minister of France had demanded of the Senate 
 of Genoa a passage through the Bocchetta, and the keys of 
 Gavi, announcing that the French desired to penetrate into 
 Lombardy, and lean their operations on Genoa," narrates 
 Napoleon. Beaulieu had thus conceived fears for the safety 
 of Genoa, and by March 31 had begun to reinforce the troops 
 which lay in front of the French extreme right at Voltri, 
 while Argenteau should debouch from Sassello, via Monte- 
 notte, on the French left. " Had General Beaulieu reflected 
 on the topographical conditions, he would not have marched 
 on Voltri to cover Genoa; he would have moved on Acqui 
 and on Cairo ; from here he would have debouched ... in 
 three columns ... by Montenotte on Savona, ... by Cadi- 
 bona, . . . and on Finale. . . . The French army would have 
 quickly fallen back from Voltri and Genoa to defend these 
 three important positions," say the Memoirs. Certain Aus- 
 trian movements in this region equally demonstrated to Bona- 
 parte that there was no further chance of surprising the allies 
 in their winter quarters, as at one time he had hoped to do. 
 And meanwhile Colli, also alive to a possible advance of the 
 French, had got his troops together into close cantonments 
 about Ceva and Mondovi, and in an extensive camp near the 
 former town. From Albenga, April 6, Bonaparte wrote the 
 Directory : " The Piedmontese army is of the strength of 
 forty thousand men of infantry and five thousand men of 
 cavalry ; that of the Austrians is of the strength of thirty- 
 four thousand men of infantry and three thousand of cavalry. 
 I have disposable only forty-five thousand men, all included. 
 
LAWFUL BOOTY. 193 
 
 They have held back many troops in the rear and beyond the 
 Rhone. . . . The King of Sardinia has made a requisition of 
 young men over fifteen years of age. He has condemned to 
 be shot those who do not join, and as a matter of fact has had 
 some shot in Turin." The effective for the field would be 
 nearer stated at twenty-five thousand under Colli, and thirty- 
 five thousand under Beaulieu, as against not over thirty-seven 
 thousand French. Even this was a superiority which the 
 enemy might well have utilized ; and the French status fur- 
 nished a problem not easy of solution, especially as the allies 
 had an unlimited supply of artillery, and the French had far 
 less. 
 
 Bonaparte also wrote the Directory, April 6 : " I have found 
 in Oneille some marbles which are valued at quite a sum. I 
 have ordered them to be estimated, and to be put up at auc- 
 tion in the Genoese Riviera. That might give you a sum of 
 thirty to forty thousand francs." This was the beginning of 
 the habit of seizing works of art as lawful booty, later so pro- 
 nounced. 
 
 It would appear that Beaulieu could have threatened the 
 French to better strategic advantage by an operation in force 
 against their left by way of Ceva, while with a small force 
 retaining his hold on the Bocchetta pass ; for this operation 
 might have compelled Bonaparte to retire summarily to the 
 line of the Var ; but the manoeuvre did not appeal to the 
 Austrian leader, and he chose to push in where Bonaparte 
 was strongest, forgetting that the latter might advance on his 
 own line where he himself was weakest. But Beaulieu, like 
 nearly every other general of that day, had limited views as 
 to what strategy meant. His desire to work against the 
 French right may have come from fear for Genoa ; or per- 
 chance he had orders from Vienna not to lose touch with that 
 city. Remembering the capacity of the Aulic Council for 
 
194 FEINTS FROM GARESSIO. 
 
 blundering interference, one might almost assume this to be 
 true. 
 
 Colli had in fact advised Beaulieu to concentrate on his 
 right, across the Apennines between Loano and Savona, and 
 by thus cutting off the French right at Voltri force the Army 
 of Italy back to the Var — an excellent operation. But Beau- 
 lieu's conception of the offensive was markedly tame ; and in 
 preparing for it he lost sight of the demands of his own de- 
 fensive. Still it was not left to Bonaparte to open the cam- 
 paign. His advance on Voltri had roused the Austrian leader 
 from his quiet. On April 9 Beaulieu sent Sebottendorf with 
 the bulk of his seven thousand men forward on Voltri, while 
 Argenteau, who disposed of a column of nine thousand men, 
 pushed forward from Sassello, intending to march on Savona 
 by the Montenotte pass. Beaulieu apparently thought that 
 between Argenteau and Sebottendorf, with a fraction of the 
 force they should have got in line, the French right wing 
 could be cut off and destroyed. Colli, commanding the Pied- 
 montese, while advised of the operation, merely retained his 
 position at Ceva, where Serurier by feints from Garessio held 
 him fast, lest he should open the road to Turin. The Aus- 
 trian commander may have purposed to pivot on Ceva, and 
 after pushing in the French, form a new line from this for- 
 tified place across the mountains to Loano. This on the 
 face of it was practicable ; but the result of the operation 
 would have been to separate the centre so far and by so bad 
 a route from the right at Ceva and the left near Genoa, that 
 the French might fall on it in force and destroy it. What- 
 ever Beaulieu may have intended to do, what he actually did 
 fitted into Bonaparte's plans with nicety. 
 
 Bonaparte had been purposing to inspect Serurier's force 
 and position, but on hearing the news from Voltri, speeded 
 to Savona, to ascertain how much the Austrian activity there 
 
DEFENSE OF MONTENOTTE. 
 
 195 
 
 Serurier. 
 
 might mean. On April 10 Sebottendorf's division seriously 
 attacked Cervoni's brigade, which held the extreme right ; and 
 though the French made a gallant all-day fight for the posi- 
 tion, they were at eventide forced 
 to fall back on the main body, and 
 reached Laharpe next day near 
 Savona. Nor, indeed, was Argen- 
 teau idle. At noon on April 11 
 he met and pushed the French 
 outposts back of Montenotte, until 
 he was checked by the fierce resist- 
 ance of a French force (whether 
 under Rampon or Fornesy is dis- 
 puted), in one of three old re- 
 doubts on Monte Legino. There are two Montenottes, Supe- 
 rior and Inferior, one almost on the watershed, and one below 
 on the northerly slope. From the Superior ran a road via 
 Monte Legino to the sea. It was this pass Bonaparte had 
 sent a body of thirteen hundred men to hold, and these were 
 the troops Argenteau had struck. Thrice the Austrian forces 
 advanced on the brave Frenchmen's post ; thrice they were 
 thrown back with loss. French infantry has often defended 
 positions such as this with admirable constancy. 
 
 The meaning of the two attacks could not be misappre- 
 hended. No doubt was left in Bonaparte's mind that the 
 Austrians had set out with a determination to drive the French 
 back to Nice. It was for him to counter the blow. 
 
 There was nothing to indicate how large a force the allies 
 had put in motion, nor at what point the bulk of it might 
 debpuch. But Bonaparte was not slow to recognize the fact 
 that the two operating Austrian columns were separated by 
 a mountain chain, and that he might easily hold one with a 
 small force and fall on the other with enough men to crush it. 
 
196 
 
 BREAKING THROUGH THE CENTRE. 
 
 At the very outset the enemy had committed the error of 
 moving on him in two concentric columns, an operation which 
 generally endangers them both ; and here in effect did so. 
 Bonaparte elected to deliver his main blow on Argenteau, 
 because, should he defeat this general, he would place him- 
 self between Colli and Beaulieu, to the assistance of neither 
 of whom could the other come, except by a long detour, 
 and he might thus be able to move upon one or the other 
 of the main armies to marked advantage. To this effect, 
 then, his orders were at once issued on April 11. With 
 Augereau, Massena and Laharpe, Bonaparte purposed to 
 
 cross the Apennines near 
 the sources of the Little 
 Bormida, while Serurier 
 should descend the moun- 
 tain slopes towards the 
 plain of the Tanaro. His 
 minor operation was to be 
 a tactical advance against 
 the right flank of Argen- 
 teau's column at Monte- 
 notte ; his major operation 
 was to be a strategic break- 
 ing through the centre of 
 the whole allied line. 
 
 Augereau, who with his 
 six thousand men had 
 been marching on Savona, 
 was ordered to head on Mallare, and next day on Cairo, 
 where further orders would be given him. This he pro- 
 ceeded to do in good style, forcing back whatever small out- 
 lying parties he met. Massena, collecting his nine thousand 
 men, advanced as ordered by way of Altare. This manoeuvre 
 
 Augereau. 
 
A DISASTROUS RETREAT. 197 
 
 was intended to project these two divisions around the right 
 flank of Argenteau. Laharpe, with seven thousand men, 
 leaving a small force to act as rearguard on the Voltri road, 
 started at daylight on the 12th to sustain the Montenotte 
 battalions in their gallant stand at Monte Legino ; and on 
 arrival filed into place on each flank of this small force. In- 
 formation of the manoeuvre was sent back to Serurier, with 
 instructions to demonstrate sharply but safely against Colli 
 down the valley of the Tanaro. Personally, Bonaparte accom- 
 panied Massena's column. 
 
 This plan, rapidly formed and stoutly carried out as a 
 counter-blow to the attack of Sebottendorf already inaugu- 
 rated, deserved and met with complete success. The Aus- 
 trians were but ill-prepared for larger operations. Argen- 
 teau had apparently got together not exceeding half his force 
 (Beaulieu stated it at one third), and finding himself sharply 
 attacked by Laharpe in front and his right about to be turned 
 by Massena, whose van had pushed over country roads to- 
 wards Montenotte Inferiore, he was compelled from the out- 
 set to fight in retreat. Laharpe followed him up sharply, 
 while Massena strove to reach his right. Bonaparte, from a 
 hill near Carcare, which dominated much of the surrounding 
 country, directed all the manoeuvres. Argenteau did his best, 
 but it was a losing game ; and lest he should be cut off from 
 Dego, where lay considerable Austrian forces, he soon beat a 
 disastrous retreat down the mountain roads, with a loss of 
 nearly twenty-five hundred men in killed, wounded and miss- 
 ing. Augereau did not reach the field, as sundry movements 
 of Piedmontese scouting parties up the Gre^t Bormida valley 
 called his attention thither, for fear the French left flank should 
 be threatened ; in fact, before reaching Carcare he retired up- 
 stream some distance lest the enemy should get in his rear. 
 Serurier at Garessio contented himself with his r81e of con- 
 taining the Piedmontese by a feigned attack. 
 
198 ATTACK ON COLLI. 
 
 Having found Voltri abandoned, and learning of the com- 
 bat at Montenotte, Beaulieu now threw up his initiative and 
 strove to reach Dego by such mountain roads as were available. 
 But his progress was necessarily slow, and he could do nothing 
 to arrest the impending disaster. 
 
 For the nonce Argenteau was checked, and retired down 
 the Erro valley in the effort to reach Dego by a circuit across 
 the hills. He was followed by a party sent in pursuit by 
 Laharpe. Bonaparte had crushed him by concentrating su- 
 perior weight at the point of contact. Believing that the 
 Austrian corps was quite neutralized and would not again 
 advance, the young leader now saw that he might at least 
 for a moment turn his attention to Colli. Assembling ten 
 thousand men, the whole of Augereau's division with part 
 of Massena's, he sent them via Millesimo towards Monteze- 
 molo on the road to Cava ; and meanwhile Serurier, learning 
 Napoleon's advance, also worked his way down the Tanaro ; 
 seeking with his left to envelop the enemy's right, and with 
 his right to reach out towards the French forces heading for 
 Montezemolo. Laharpe, and Massena with what was left of 
 his division, marched across the hills to Dego, to fend the 
 Austrians off from interfering with the attack on Colli, and 
 perhaps to push on to Acqui, which they could now threaten 
 down both the valley of the Little Bormida and that of the 
 Erro. 
 
 In order to cooperate with Beaulieu, Colli should not have 
 leaned his right on Millesimo, but on Dego. It was not neces- 
 sary to stand astride the highway in order to protect Turin. 
 At Dego he would have been covering the road to Milan, but 
 he would have equally protected Turin, because he was lying 
 on the flank of any column moving towards that capital. 
 And at Dego he could not have been so speedily cut apart 
 from his allies. 
 
A COMMENDABLE EFFORT. 
 
 199 
 
 On the morning of the 13th Augereau struck the left wing 
 of the Piedmontese, as he was marching on the pass of Mille- 
 simo. Provera, in command there and at Saliceto, in a com- 
 
 Battle of Montenotte. 
 
 mendable effort to maintain connection between the allied 
 armies, and recognizing the importance of holding himself at 
 the upper waters of the two Bormidas until the allies could 
 assemble their forces, had sent part of his men back to Colli, 
 and with part had thrown himself into the ancient castle 
 of Cosseria, in which, as it lay between the valleys of the 
 Great and Little Bormida, he hoped to arrest the French col- 
 
200 ASSAULT ON DEGO. 
 
 umns in their attempt to advance down towards the plain. 
 And here he held himself stanchly for a day and a night, for 
 Augereau could not advance another step until he had taken 
 the place. To clear the way, Augereau attacked, and Bona- 
 parte soon brought up a brigade to his aid. Provera resisted 
 two stout assaults ; but as, Colli being unable to reach him, 
 he could receive neither reinforcements nor further orders, 
 want of water and ammunition compelled him next day to sur- 
 render with fifteen hundred men. The Piedmontese army 
 being also for the moment neutralized by the French capture 
 of the headwater passes, so that Colli would be more apt to 
 look to his own safety than strive to assist his allies, Bona- 
 parte now sharply turned on Dego, to meet a fresh Austrian 
 column which he heard was on the way thither, and by taking 
 and holding this key-point to fully secure the French right in 
 further operations against the Piedmontese. Dego was in the 
 hands of some three thousand Austrians, and Laharpe and 
 Massena were already in its front. There had been ample 
 time, while Provera held Cosseria, for the Austrians to rein- 
 force Dego, but Beaulieu was not only slow by nature, he was 
 hampered by bad roads. Until the French could drive the 
 Piedmontese back on the Stura, Dego was of the utmost im- 
 portance ; and the force had been placed there by Beaulieu's 
 orders, to hold the town as an outpost until he could for 
 further operations concentrate at Acqui, whither from the 
 Bocchetta country he had betaken himself on hearing of 
 Bonaparte's sudden onslaught on Argenteau. His advance 
 on the French right at Voltri had been quite suspended. 
 Bonaparte had snatched the initiative from his hand. 
 
 The assault on Dego, with its six hillocks each crowned by 
 a redoubt, began at noon of April 14. Bonaparte pushed in 
 from the direction of Cosseria to aid Massena and Laharpe, 
 and between them the place, with nearly all the garrison and 
 
VAR-MINCIift 
 
to COUNTRY. 
 
CARELESS OUTPOST SERVICE. 201 
 
 eighteen guns, fell to the French by evening. Thus in these 
 two days, the French had, as they claimed, won two smart 
 combats, which are usually called the Battle of Millesimo, and 
 inflicted on the enemy a loss of six thousand men, killed, 
 wounded and missing, thirty guns and five flags. The French 
 loss was very much less. Bonaparte gives it at four hundred 
 men ; but owing to his intentionally perverse arithmetic, it 
 is never possible to procure acceptable figures of the French 
 casualties. They always have to be estimated. 
 
 Beaulieu was now fully cut off from Colli. Nothing but 
 an advance in force sufficient to overwhelm the French could 
 reestablish his connection with his ally on their original line. 
 
 From Dego Bonaparte returned to Carcare, determined to 
 push in without delay on the Piedmontese and bring them to 
 terms. Massena was ordered to gather his regiments and 
 hold Dego ; and by 8 A. M. of the 15th, with all the rest of 
 his forces, Bonaparte was on the way back to Montezemolo. 
 The cavalry was ordered up to Carcare, and Bonaparte felt 
 secure as to his right flank. 
 
 But Dego was not safe yet. No sooner had Bonaparte 
 turned his back than, owing to careless French outpost service 
 and the absence on foraging of too large a party, an Austrian 
 column of three thousand men, being five battalions from 
 Sassello, under Wukassovich, who was to have reached the 
 place for the fight of the 14th, but bad been retarded by bad 
 mountain roads, appeared before the town, and with a sudden 
 dash, by 11 A. M. of the 15th had driven the French out. A 
 rumor had reached Bonaparte that Beaulieu proposed in person 
 to march on Dego, and before hearing from Massena of this 
 new onset, he had already given Laharpe fresh orders to halt 
 at Kochetta. So soon as he heard of the disaster, he hurried 
 to the spot ; about 2 P. M. the French again assumed the 
 offensive, and drove out the Austrians with loss of a thousand 
 
202 TURNING THE ALPS. 
 
 men and eighteen guns, and pushed them back on Spigno. 
 Lanusse especially distinguished himself; and here, too, Bona- 
 parte first saw Lannes in action, and noticed his ardor. Dego 
 was left in good hands. This last effort made the riglit flank 
 safe ; and on the left, on this same day, Serurier had marched 
 down the Tanaro valley well towards Ceva, while Augereau, 
 forcing in the Piedmontese, reached Montezemolo and estab- 
 lished connection with his brother officer. Colli withdrew to 
 his intrenched camp at Ceva. 
 
 In these four days Bonaparte had given the first illustra- 
 tion of the value of his mass- theory as opposed to the cordon 
 system. 
 
 When from the heights of Montezemolo the French army 
 contemplated the gigantic, snow-clad chain of the Alps, which 
 they had faced with dread, but which now seemed to be behind 
 them in their march, Bonaparte encouraged them with the re- 
 mark, " Hannibal crossed the Alps ; we have turned them ! " 
 
 Personally the young commander had been omnipresent, 
 galloping from column to column, cheering and directing 
 every movement. Scarce Alexander could have excelled him 
 in bodily efficiency. In a strategical sense he had worked so 
 rapidly and skillfully as to convince Beaulieu that the French 
 were superior in numbers, and to set that officer to concentrat- 
 ing all his forces at Acqui, not indeed for advance on his op- 
 ponent, but for the bare protection of Lombardy. The Aus- 
 trians had lost not far from ten thousand men ; and the French 
 blows had succeeded each other with such astonishing rapidity, 
 and on such unexpected places, that the veteran Austrian 
 commander was completely dazed. He had never conceived 
 of such abnormal speed ; it appeared to him quite outside the 
 rules of the game of war ; and he recognized too late that 
 Colli was cut off from touch with his Austrians. Beaulieu was 
 slow of thought, slower of action ; Bonaparte was as rapid in 
 
STRATEGIC SEQUENCE. 203 
 
 both. Still on the 15th, himself delaying for neither rest nor 
 food, while Beaulieu was wondering what he could do to meet 
 this half-comprehended peril, Bonaparte made arrangements 
 to take the Piedmontese left in reverse from Dego, while 
 his own left should attack them in front. It began to look 
 as if this new strategist could actually bring the Piedmontese 
 to sue for peace, as he had planned to do. He was taking 
 Scherer at his word. 
 
 Of the two armies of the enemy, the Piedmontese was the 
 one to attack first. It was manifestly useless to move against 
 the Austrians. Beaulieu would have retired from the French 
 advance, and have led them away from the main scheme. And 
 Bonaparte was all the more intent on following up his suc- 
 cess against Colli, lest the Piedmontese should retire to Turin 
 and there delay him by a siege, for which he was ill-pre- 
 pared, having neither siege-guns, material, nor equipment. 
 Nor did he forget the difficulty Prince Eugene had labored 
 under in 1706, in his masterly operation up the Po against 
 this capital city. In any event, whatever idea may have 
 tempted Bonaparte to follow up his success against the Aus- 
 trians instead of Colli he summarily dismissed, and kept in 
 view his main and original plan : first, the separation of the 
 allies ;' second, the forcing of a Piedmontese peace. Many 
 a general fails by forgetting his first and better intention, 
 and in being led astray by an unimportant gain to do what is 
 not in natural strategic sequence. A sense of proportion, of 
 the relative value of things, is one of the highest qualities in 
 the captain — as in every other workman. 
 
 Though there seems to have been no further need of anx- 
 iety about the French right flank, yet Bonaparte, on April 
 16, joined part of the divisions of Laharpe and Massena in 
 still another advance on Sassello. Just why this was done is 
 not indicated by any contemporary evidence. It is probable 
 
204 THE ENEMY OUSTED. 
 
 that reports came in of further bodies of Austrian troops 
 seeking a junction with Argenteau from Voltri. To lose no 
 time, he seems to have left full orders for his other lieuten- 
 ants to go on during his absence with the work cut out for 
 them. On the 16th Augereau left Montezemolo, and reach-- 
 ing Ceva, attacked with marked vigor the redoubts in front of 
 the intrenched camp of the Piedmontese near this city. The 
 camp was held in force, and after several hours' hot work 
 Augereau was thrown back. A second and a third assault met 
 with the same fate ; but soon Serurier and Massena came up to 
 his aid, and each moved in from a direction to threaten one 
 of the enemy's flanks. With this additional force the French 
 had by evening ousted the enemy from his camp, and driven 
 him back on the roads leading to Lesegno and Mondovi. 
 Early on the 17th Serurier occupied the town of Ceva and 
 invested the citadel. On the 16th also Laharpe was called 
 back from Dego and left at San Benedetto to observe the 
 Austrians, and Steingel's cavalry, as useless in the mountains 
 as it would now be valuable in the plain, was added to Seru- 
 rier's column. Headquarters was changed to Saliceto. 
 
 This section of country is cut up by watersheds, aU 
 running substantially northeast and southwest, and in each 
 valley between these watersheds flows a torrential stream. 
 Behind any one of these rivers was an opportunity for the 
 Piedmontese to make a strong defense ; but Colli seemed to 
 have no such thought. He had too hearty a fear for Turin. 
 As for Bonaparte, having apparently neutralized Beaulieu 
 for good, he could begin in earnest his attack upon Colli. 
 On April 18 Serurier moved towards San Michele, seeking 
 to turn Colli's right flank and cut him off from Mondovi ; 
 Augereau, with part of his division, marched about his left 
 flank via Castellino ; Massena's division, accompanied by 
 Bonaparte, moved up to Ceva. Bonaparte could now more 
 
HEADING OFF THE AUSTRIANS. 
 
 205 
 
 accurately ascertain Colli's position, and issue his orders with 
 a precision hitherto impossible. Some of Augereau's troops 
 were placed under Massena, who was ordered to Lesegno ; the 
 remaining part of Augereau's division which had not been 
 
 Ceva-Vico Country. 
 
 dispatched to Castellino was pushed on to the Monbarcaro 
 gap, to head off any possible approach of the Austrians up 
 the Bormida valley. Thither also Laharpe was ordered, a 
 brigade only of his division being left to occupy Ceva, with 
 a rearguard out at Cairo to connect with Dego. 
 
 Passing the Tanaro, Massena marched to Lesegno before 
 daylight on April 19, while Serurier was ordered across the 
 Cursaglia at Torre, to turn by a longer circuit the right flank 
 of the enemy, who, since his fight at Ceva, lay behind that 
 stream with his right leaning on Vico. From here Serurier 
 
206 THE PIEDMONTESE RETIRE. 
 
 was to push on to Mondovi. CoUi's position was a good one — 
 on the high and steep left bank of the Cursaglia. He had 
 broken all the bridges and erected strong field-works. Here 
 Bonaparte attacked him the same day, Serurier falling on the 
 position from the left, while Massena moved up in front, and 
 Augereau around the right Hank of the enemy. Massena's 
 front and Augereau's flank attack, owing to the difficulties of 
 the ground to be passed over and the fact that the river was 
 not fordable, proved fruitless ; and Colli, drawing from his 
 left to reinforce his right, threw back Serurier, who had fought 
 his way across the stream, with loss. The Piedmontese on 
 this day claimed the victory with a show of right. 
 
 The French troops had long been ill-fed, were wearied with 
 fast marching and heavy fighting, and needed rest ; but as 
 Bonaparte could not sit down after a backset, lest he should 
 encourage the Piedmontese to continue the struggle and give 
 the Austrians time to resume their advance, he made prepa- 
 rations on April 20 for a renewed attack on Colli's position 
 for the morning of the 21st, manoeuvring to find a weak spot, 
 and throw the enemy off his guard. He, proposed to force 
 his way to Mondovi, and by a turning manoeuvre compel 
 Colli to vacate his strong position. But Colli had little 
 stomach left for battle; he and his Piedmontese did not 
 await another attack, but retired through Mondovi towards 
 Fossano. Early on April 22 the French in pursuit reached 
 the rear of the retiring Piedmontese, and a lively combat 
 began in the village of Vico. Guyeux moved round to the 
 left towards Mondovi ; Fiorella and Dommartin attacked the 
 centre. Colli made no great defense, and abandoned the field 
 of battle with a loss of one thousand men and eighteen guns, 
 and the French entered Mondovi at night. Gallant Steingel 
 was killed in the pursuit. On reaching Mondovi Bonaparte 
 took a short survey of the situation, gave orders for further 
 
A SHORT RESPITE. 207 
 
 operations, and then, with his usual extraordinary activity, 
 rode back to Lesegno to hurry forward his troops and mate- 
 rial. 
 
 On April 22 the French army lay on the line Mondovi- 
 Niella-Castellino. Bonaparte was not certain as to what 
 Colli might do, and his troops had, by their wonderful exer- 
 tions, earned some hours for rest and for realigning the divi- 
 sions. But the respite was short. All through his campaigns 
 Napoleon called on his troops for the same exertions that 
 Frederick demanded from his. Exceptional situations must 
 be met by exceptional exertions ; and on the 23d he pushed 
 Serurier forward on the road to Fossano beyond the Pesio, 
 to harry Colli's rear, and Massena on that to Cherasco near the 
 Tanaro ; Augereau moved to Dogliano, and Laharpe in reserve 
 next day came up to Niella. Colli still had the strongest of 
 his positions on the Stura, with the fortress of Coni on his 
 right and Cherasco on his left ; but his sense of resistance 
 had been broken. He had small mind to keep the field. On 
 April 25 Serurier was in Fossano, Massena in Cherasco, and 
 Augereau at Alba. Macquart and Garnier were ordered on 
 Coni to capture the place. Colli retired to Carmagnole. 
 Here he resigned from the Piedmontese, and later entered the 
 Austrian service. 
 
 There had been a great deal of pillaging by the long-starved, 
 ill-clad French troops, and the Piedmontese common folk 
 were incensed at this treatment by the men who came in the 
 guise of friends to wreak woe upon them. Bonaparte deter- 
 mined to stop this by summary means, and issued orders to 
 punish every soldier caught in pillage. He always used the 
 resources' of the country he traversed to the utmost extent, 
 but at this period he was strenuous to stop excesses by the 
 men, not only for the effect on a perhaps friendly population, 
 but principally because it loosened all the bonds of discipline. 
 
208 SUMMARY MEASURES. 
 
 " I will restore order, or cease to command these robbers," 
 said he at this time. Not even as a reward for the great 
 exertions of his men could he tolerate the evil, which had 
 grown beyond all bounds. On the 22d of April he published 
 an order on the subject which deserves attention. It has 
 no uncertain sound. The " morality " referred to applies, of 
 course, only to courage and discipline. 
 
 OEDEK. 
 
 Hbadquabtebs, Lbsegno, 3 FlortSal, Year IV. 
 
 The general-in-ohief expresses to the army his satisfaction with its 
 bravery, and with the successes it obtains every day over the enemy ; but 
 he sees with horror the frightful pillage indulged in by wicked men, who 
 straggle behind their corps until after the battle, so as to devote them- 
 selves to excesses most dishonoring to the army and the French name. 
 
 Consequently he orders : — 
 
 1. The general, chief of staff, to make him within twenty-four hours 
 a report on the moral conduct of the adjutants-general and other officers 
 attached to the staff. 
 
 2. The generals of division will send within twenty-four hours to the 
 general-in-chief a. note on the morality of the superior officers who have 
 been under their orders since the opening of the campaign. 
 
 3. The chief commissary in charge will make the same report on the 
 conduct of the war commissaries. 
 
 4. The general-in-chief reserves the right to decide with regard to the 
 superior officers or war commissaries against whom complaints are 
 made. 
 
 5. The chiefs of brigade, the chiefs of battalion, will assemble at the 
 quarters of the general of the brigade ; they will make a, note of the 
 officers of each half-brigade, and of the moral conduct they have shown 
 since the opening of the campaign. The general of brigade will forward 
 this note to the general of division, accompanied by his remarks. 
 
 The generals of division are authorized summarily to cashier and even 
 to send in confinement to the castle of Fort Carr^, at Antibes, the officers 
 who by their example authorized the horrible pillage which has been 
 going on for several days. 
 
 The generals of division are authorized, according to circumstances, to 
 
PILLAGING CHECKED, 209 
 
 have summarily shot the officers or soldiers who, by their example, shall 
 excite others to pillage, and thereby destroy discipline, introduce disorder 
 in the army, and compromise its safety and glory. 
 
 Every officer or non-commissioned officer who has not followed his flag, 
 and who without a legitimate reason is found absent at the moment of a 
 combat, shall be dismissed, and his name shall be sent to his department, 
 in order that he shall be branded in the opinion of his fellow-citizens as a 
 coward. 
 
 Every soldier who shall be convicted of having remained away from 
 his flag (i. e., straggled) twice in succession, shall be published in orders. 
 
 Every soldier who shall be convicted of not having been in one combat 
 shall lose his rank of seniority, and shall be carried on the roll at the 
 foot of the company, and if he be a grenadier or carbineer, he shall be 
 stricken from the company roster. A soldier who shall be convicted of 
 being absent twice from a combat shall be degraded at the head of the 
 battalion ; he shall be stripped of his uniform, and he shall be sent beyond 
 the Var to mend the roads as long as the campaign shall last. 
 
 The commanders of battalions, or of companies, when they are detached, 
 will make the report to the superior officer commanding the column , who 
 will order the above punishment, and report the same to the general of 
 division. 
 
 The generals of division, the generals of brigade and the chiefs of the 
 corps are held responsible for the execution of the present order. 
 
 By order of the General-in-Chief. 
 
 This order accomplished its end. Bonaparte shortly wrote 
 the Directory : " Everything goes well. Pillaging is less. , 
 This first thirst of an army deprived of everything is being 
 quenched. The wretches are excusable. After having groanedl 
 three years on the summit of the Alps, they arrive in the' 
 promised land, and they want to taste it. I have had three 
 shot, and have put six at work with the pickaxe beyond the 
 Var." 
 
 The proclamation which was issued April 26 was aimed to 
 convey a political hint to Piedmont, to encourage the army, 
 and to threaten those who plundered. As thoroughly Napo- 
 leonic, it also is quoted entire. 
 
210 TO THE VICTORS OF TOULON. 
 
 PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY. 
 
 Headquakteks, Chekasco, 7 Flor^al, Year IV. 
 
 Soldiers ! lu a fortnight you have won six victories, taken twenty-one 
 flags, fifty-five guns, several strong places, and conquered the richest part 
 of Piedmont ; you have taken fifteen thousand prisoners and killed or 
 wounded more than ten thousand men ! You had been fighting for ster- 
 ile rocks, illustrated by your courage, but useless to the country ; to-day 
 you equal, by your services, the Army of Holland and the Rhine. 
 Deprived of everything, you have supplied everything ; you have gained 
 battles without guns, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches 
 without shoes, bivouacked without brandy and often without bread ; re- 
 publican phalanxes, soldiers of liberty alone were capable of enduring 
 what ^ou liave endured ! Thanks be to you, soldiers ! The grateful 
 country will owe you its prosperity ; and if, victors of Toulon, you fore- 
 told the immortal campaign of 1796, your present victories foretell a yet 
 finer one. 
 
 The two armies which recently attacked you with audacity are fleeing 
 in terror before you ; the perverse men who laughed at your misery, and 
 rejoiced in their thought of the triumph of your enemies, are confounded 
 and trembling. 
 
 But, soldiers, you have as yet done nothing, because things remain for 
 you to do. Neither Turin nor Milan are yours : the assassins of Basse- 
 ville yet tread upon the ashes of those who vanquished the Tarquins. 
 
 At the opening of the campaign you were naked of all things ; to-day 
 you are abundantly supplied. The storehouses taken from the enemy are 
 numerous. The siege and light artillery has arrived. Soldiers, the coun- 
 try has the right to expect great things of you : will you justify its 
 expectations ? The greatest obstacles are overcome, no doubt ; but you 
 have yet combats to deliver, towns to take, rivers to pass. Are there 
 any among you whose courage will weaken ? Are there any among you 
 who prefer to return and bear patiently, on the summits of the Alps and 
 the Apennines, the insults of soldiers enthralled ? No ! There is none 
 among the victors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego and Mondovi ! All 
 burn to bear to distant parts the glory of the French people, all wish to 
 humiliate the haughty kings who thought to put irons upon us ; all desire 
 to dictate a glorious peace which shall indemnify the fatherland for the 
 immense sacrifices it has made. You all wish, in returning to your vil- 
 
A TRUCE SOUGHT. 211 
 
 lages, to be able to say with pride : " I was of the conquering Army of 
 Italy." 
 
 Friends, I promise you this conquest ; but there is a condition you 
 must swear to fulfill, and that is, to respect the peoples which you deliver ; 
 to repress the horrible pillaging in which indulge some wretches encour- 
 aged by our enemies. Without this you would not be the liberators of 
 the peoples, you would be their scourge ; you would not be the honor of 
 the French people, it would disavow you ; your victories, your courage, 
 your successes, the blood of your brothers who have died in battle, all 
 would be lost, even honor and glory. As for me and the generals who 
 have your confidence, we should blush to command an army without dis- 
 cipline, without rein, which knew no law but force. But, invested with 
 the natioual authority, strong with justice and law, I shall know how to 
 make the small number of men lacking courage and heart respect the 
 laws of humanity and honor which they trample under foot ; I shall not 
 suffer brigands to soil your laurels ; I will carry out with vigor the rules 
 I have published in orders. 
 
 Pillagers will be pitilessly shot ; several have already been, and I have 
 had occasion to remark with pleasure the alacrity with which the good 
 soldiers of the army have sought to carry out the orders. 
 
 Peoples of Italy, the French army comes to break your bonds ! The 
 French people is the friend of all peoples ! Come confidently to meet it ! 
 Your property, your religion and your customs will be respected. We 
 wage war like generous enemies ; we bear ill-will to none except the 
 tyrants who enslave you ! Bonaparte. 
 
 That all the calculations of the new commander of the Army 
 of Italy were accurate was clearly proved on the 23d, while 
 the columns were crossing the Pesio, by the arrival of a dis- 
 patch from Turin praying for a truce. It has been said that 
 the truce was first suggested by Bonaparte, and that Turin 
 promptly replied. But so limited by the Directory was the 
 army leader that he had no power even to agree to an armis- 
 tice, and did so only on the surrender of some fortresses. On 
 the 28th the truce was signed at Cherasco, after an interview 
 with Generals Latour and Beauregard, to whom had been given 
 power to treat. At the meeting Bonaparte bore himself in a 
 
212 THE ARMISTICE SIGNED. 
 
 courteous, but cold and haughty manner. For the first time 
 he had led an army ; for the first time he had conducted 
 negotiations of the highest importance; and in both, the 
 wonderful character which dominated all who met him, in the 
 cabinet or the field, came at once to the fore. He told the pro- 
 crastinating envoys that the army had orders to advance at 
 2 p. M., and that, while he might lose battles, he would not 
 be taxed with losing minutes. Quite browbeaten, the envoys 
 signed the truce. The French leader was glad thus to put a 
 glorious term to this his first campaign, especially as it neu- 
 tralized one of the armies he had to meet, and enabled him to 
 turn in force against the other. It was a welcome crowning 
 of a series of victories, glorious and fruitful, but which yet left 
 the French in far from a secure situation ; and Bonaparte was 
 fortunate in being able to impose on the enemy the surrender 
 of two out of three fortresses, — Coni, Alessandria and Tor- 
 tona, — and to insist that negotiations for a permanent peace 
 should at once be begun. And the terms he informed the 
 Directory they could prescribe, as he possessed the certain 
 means of enforcing them. " The King of Sardinia will be 
 obliged to make a peace such as you wish to dictate to him," 
 he wrote to Paris, " because, independently of the country com- 
 prised between Coni, Cherasco, Alba and Alessandria, we have 
 the town and the fortress of Coni, and the towns and the 
 fortresses of' Tortona and Alessandria. . . . You can dictate, 
 as masters, peace to the King of Sardinia." So soon as the 
 armistice was signed, Coni and Tortona were delivered over 
 to the French. This armistice served the Directory as the 
 basis of the Treaty of Paris, which was executed in that capi- 
 tal. May 15. Alessandria and Tortona were to remain in 
 French hands during the war, Susa, La Brunette and Exiles 
 were to be razed, and Piedmont agreed to keep open the 
 routes over the Mont Cenis and Argenti^re for French uses. 
 
THE ADVANTAGE OF NUMBERS. 213 
 
 " Colonel Murat, First Aide-de-Camp," was sent to Paris 
 with the flags and papers, as Junot had been dispatched from 
 Millesimo. The French legislature decreed on five separate 
 occasions that the Army of Italy had " well deserved of the 
 country " during this short campaign. 
 
 In order that there should be no half-way measures about 
 the negotiations, Bonaparte continued to push on towards 
 Turin, the Piedmontese retiring before him, and on April 27 
 the French army crossed the Stura. Next day orders were 
 issued providing garrisons for all the strong places taken or 
 surrendered, as a base for further operations ; for so dispos- 
 ing the army as to head it towards Tortona ; and for Mac- 
 quart's and Grenier's divisions to march in via Coni, as rein- 
 forcements to the Army of Italy. Bonaparte would thus have, 
 after deducting garrisons, a force of thirty-five thousand men 
 under the colors with which to march against Beaulieu, who 
 had but twenty-six thousand effective left for field service. 
 The French now possessed the advantage of numbers. 
 
 Pistols once belonging to Napoleon. 
 (Prince Victor's Collection.) 
 
IX. 
 LOMBAEDY. APRIL 28 TO MAY 14, 1796. 
 
 In two weeks Bonaparte had done what the Army of Italy had striven for 
 years to do. In these few days he had rectified the bad position of the Army 
 of Italy, he had fed and encouraged it, he had beaten the Austrian army, 
 nearly equal to his own in numbers, and had forced peace on Piedmont ; he 
 had opened a free line of operations, and had swept the ground in his front 
 clean. He had worked in concentrated masses. He had led these against the 
 decisive points ; and with weaker forces, whenever he came in contact with the 
 enemy, he had outnumbered him. So soon as he had divided the allies, he 
 held one with small forces and advanced in mass against the other. In what 
 he had done resided the whole theory of modern war. Beaulieu crossed the 
 Po, and placed himself so as to defend it. Bonaparte feigned a crossing oppo- 
 site Valencia, quietly massed his army, marched rapidly down river to Placen- 
 tia, where he passed, thus turned Beaulieu's left, beat his outlying parties, and 
 forced him to summary retreat. With an audacity which enheartened his 
 troops, he stormed the bridge of Lodi, defeated the Austrian rearguard, and 
 drove the army into a hasty withdrawal to the Mincio. Thus Lombardy was 
 also conquered in a bare two weeks, as Piedmont had been. The Directory now 
 suggested that the army be divided, and that Bonaparte should move with part 
 of it down the peninsula. This he declined to do, and the Directory annulled 
 the order. In a month Bonaparte had won several sharp combats, three well- 
 contested battles, made twelve thousand prisoners, taken several fortresses and 
 two capitals, detached Piedmont from the Coalition, overrun Lombardy and 
 opened the road into Italy through Savoy. So magnificent a piece of campaign- 
 ing had not been seen since Leuthen. 
 
 In two weeks Bonaparte had accomplished more than the 
 Army of Italy under its former commanders had done in four 
 campaigns. The masterful grasp with which he had under- 
 taken his work was in correct sequence to the exhaustive pre- 
 parations he had undergone by his study of the terrain and 
 the conditions, while in his poverty, years before, he was pre- 
 
STRATEGIC CALCULATION. 215 
 
 paring his Memorial on the Army of Italy. Neither Alex- 
 ander nor Hannibal had set to work with a firmer hand than 
 the young French general who was destined to follow in their 
 footsteps. The strategic situation of the army had been a 
 false one. Strung out along the Maritime Alps, with an Eng- 
 lish fleet in his rear, and confronted by two powerful armies ; 
 with his line of communications running out from his left 
 flank and in prolongation of his front ; liable to be cut off 
 from Nice and Marseilles by a strong column of Piedmontese 
 with which any enterprising commander might debouch from 
 the Colle di Tenda, the Army of Italy could hardly have been 
 in more parlous case. Out of this danger, in two weeks' 
 time, Napoleon had wrought a -marvelous situation : he had 
 beaten one of his enemies, practically equal in force to his 
 own army, and had thrown him back into Lombardy ; he had 
 forced the other to sue for peace, and to surrender two of his 
 fortresses ; and he had opened a free line of retreat in rear 
 of his centre, and had swept for himself a clean front from 
 Saluzzo to Savona. Though outnumbered by the enemy, 
 wherever he had struck him he had put more men into fight- 
 ing contact. He had developed his paper theory of action by 
 masses in actual manoeuvres on the field, and he had again 
 and again demonstrated the exceptional marching power of 
 the French soldier. As Jomini's rules put it, in " The Funda- 
 mental Principles of War," " Bonaparte had by strategic cal- 
 culation led the mass of his forces against the decisive points 
 of the theatre of war, usually the communications of the 
 enemy, and this without endangering his own ; and he had so 
 manoeuvred that he had hurled the mass of his force against 
 divided portions of the enemy." In 1794 Bonaparte said : 
 " To conduct war is like besieging a fortress ; you must unite 
 your fire against one point. When a breach is made, the 
 balance is broken, all other work is useless, and the fortress 
 
216 NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY. 
 
 is taken. . . . You must not divide your attacks, but unite 
 them." And on first meeting Moreau in 1799, when that 
 able soldier asserted that it was always the greater force that 
 beat the lesser, Bonaparte agreed with him ; but, said he, 
 " with the lesser force you can, by rapidity and skill, hurl the 
 greater force on the enemy, and by successive attacks on dif- 
 ferent points by your mass, always retain the advantage of 
 numbers." 
 
 To be thus superior in numbers at the point of fighting 
 contact is the basis of Napoleon's conduct of war; but it re- 
 quires a Napoleonic coup d'oeil, speed and decision to carry 
 it out. Frederick enunciated the same idea and acted on it ; 
 and both Alexander and Hannibal, because always outnum- 
 bered, were compelled to act on the theory. During our own 
 Civil War, partly owing to their interior lines, often to better 
 management, the Confederates as a rule had as many men at 
 the point of contact, tactically if not strategically, as the 
 numerically superior Federals. Especially was this true in 
 Virginia. What is needed is an eye to see the key of the 
 field, and moral courage to disregard everything else, and to 
 push in straight and hard upon the one essential point, afford- 
 ing your opponent no leisure to take advantage of any open- 
 ing you may thus give him. When Bonaparte had concluded 
 the entire campaign of 1796-97, and was dictating terras to 
 Austria on her own territory, he said, " Many good generals 
 exist in Europe, but they see too many things at once ; I see 
 but one thing, and that is the masses ; I seek to destroy them, 
 sure that the minor matters will fall of themselves." Here, 
 then, he closed his eyes to Beaulieu at Genoa and to Colli 
 watching the Tenda pass, merely leaving a suitable force 
 under a good commander to contain each of them ; and from 
 April 11 to 15 he destroyed the allied centre by the superior 
 mass he hurled upon it ; whereupon both the Piedmontese 
 
KEEN POLITICAL GUESSES. 217 
 
 and the Austrians yielded up Genoa and Ceva. Napoleon 
 always made keen political guesses subserve his strategy ; he 
 knew that Savoy hoped for accessions of territory from the 
 Milanese ; and he was wise in divining that the Piedmontese 
 and Austrians would not long hold together when once stra- 
 tegically severed, but that the former would think first of the 
 safety of their own country. This they did, though from a 
 military standpoint their real safety lay in a junction with 
 the Austrians and the delivery of one great battle, in which 
 their total numbers would have told. 
 
 Again, as soon as Beaulieu was neutralized, acting on the 
 same theory, Bonaparte pushed his mass in on Colli, merely 
 containing the Austrians with a small force. From the 17th 
 to the 23d was all the time he needed to force the Piedmon- 
 tese to sue for peace. He even drew from the force left to 
 watch the Austrians, so soon as he saw that Beaulieu was so 
 stunned as to be apt to keep quiet, and that the immediate 
 theatre of operation was getting distant from him. This was 
 one of those risks which tells, but which only the active, able 
 leader dares assume. He concentrated to fight, and in time 
 for action, just as he was wont to separate to feed the army. 
 Add to all this his scrupulous care in the matter of supplies, 
 his protection of his base, his untiring labor and his discipli- 
 nary measures, and we have a picture which no other modern 
 captain has given us at the opening of his career. 
 
 In his dispatches home, Bonaparte greatly exaggerated 
 matters in his own favor ; but this is the common prerogative 
 of the campaigning leader. " The combined armies were 
 eighty-five thousand strong," he wrote April 29 ; and May 1, 
 "I have beat them with thirty-five thousand men all told. 
 . . . Beaulieu flees so fast that we cannot catch him ; . . . 
 he told the King of Sardinia that he would not unshoe him- 
 self until he reached Lyon ; but he is not on the road thither." 
 
218 LOOKING FOR FRESS LAURELS. 
 
 Yet while his attitude towards the Directory was strong 
 and self-confident, he never failed in showing good-will in 
 word as well as deed. " Be sure that we shall do everything 
 that is feasible," he wrote. 
 
 No sooner had Bonaparte accomplished this first success 
 than he began to urge the Directory at home to add at least 
 a part of the Army of the Alps to his own, and to send hiai 
 reinforcements to complete the great work. His tone in ad- 
 dressing the Directory was that of a successful man, who pro- 
 posed to make himself necessary. Instead of sitting down on 
 his laurels, he at once looked forward to fresh ones. " While 
 waiting" for the truce to be ratified, "I march to-morrow 
 against Beaulieu," he wrote the Directory April 28 ; "I shall 
 force him back across the Po ; I shall immediately follow him 
 over ; I shall take possession of all Lombardy ; and before a 
 month, I hope to be on the mountains of the Tyrol, to find 
 the Army of the Ehine, and with it to carry the war into 
 Bavaria. This project is worthy of you, of the army, and of 
 the destinies of France." " If you continue to give me your 
 confidence, and yoii approve these projects, I am sure of the 
 result : Italy is yours." " I have justified your confidence." 
 " I shall constantly seek to give you proofs of zeal." These 
 phrases from his letters speak the man's purpose as well as 
 his independence. 
 
 Among other failings Beaulieu was wanting in enterprise. 
 He might at an early day have struck Bonaparte's rear by an 
 advance on Laharpe at San Benedetto, and thus have seri- 
 ously hampered the French operations ; and in fact, by April 
 26 he rather feebly set out to do this thing, but it was then 
 too late ; and shortly hearing of the truce, he gave up any 
 idea of a counter-blow. 
 
 Having failed in an attempt to get possession of Alessan- 
 dria and Tortona, and thus to retain a foothold on the right 
 
DEFENSE OF THE PO. 219 
 
 bank of the Po, Beaulieu retired before the advancing French, 
 and on May 1 crossed the Po at Valencia, where, breaking 
 the bridge, he took up a position at Valeggio, and along the 
 Ogogno near Lomello, with van out at the Sesia, and detached 
 parties along the Po down to the mouth of the Ticino. He 
 thought he might hold the line of the Po, especially with his 
 excess of cavalry. This was, however, a task which as a gen- 
 eral proposition was impossible of accomplishment, unless for 
 the temporary purpose of giving battle on favorable terms 
 whenever the French should cross the river. Colli, now one 
 of his lieutenants, was stationed at Buffalora, to hold the road 
 to Milan against an attack from the west ; and a force was 
 placed at Sommo to protect the left. To defend Milan, which 
 was his first duty, Pavia on the Ticino would have been a 
 better town to hold in force ; but Beaulieu did not suppose the 
 French woidd undertake to march across neutral Parma, to 
 which the territory here on the south bank of the Po be- 
 longed. Bonaparte had cleverly inserted in the negotiations 
 with the Piedmontese an article giving the army permission 
 to cross the Po near Valencia, without having the remotest 
 intention of so doing ; and into this crude trap the enemy 
 fell. Beaulieu imagined that Bonaparte would attack him in 
 front, and the latter did all he could to encourage the error, 
 making a marked show of forcing a passage at Cambio. On 
 May 2, when the Austrian commander retired behind the 
 Ogogno, Massena was near Castellaccio, Laharpe at Rivalta, 
 Augereau in the rear ; and the army headquarters was at 
 Bosco, while Serurier was still a full day's march behind, at 
 Alba. All this, so far as he knew of it, had a distinct ap- 
 pearance to Beaulieu of a French passage near by his front. 
 The Austrian general would have defended the Pb to better 
 advantage against a manoeuvring army by a position astride 
 the river connected by several good bridges near Stradella. 
 
220 SEMBLANCE OF PREPARATION. 
 
 This would have compelled the Army of Italy to cross above, 
 and have left Beaulieu both the Ticino and the Po as defen- 
 sive barriers. 
 
 Beaulieu's having crossed the Po at Valencia gave Bona- 
 parte just the chance he desired and had hoped for ; he had 
 no idea of forcing a river almost as formidable as the Rhine 
 in the face of a numerous army not yet defeated in one body 
 in battle, nor of successively forcing several other streams, 
 when, by a speedy and well-calculated manoeuvre, he might 
 turn them aU. He could now without danger move down the 
 Po on the right bank, take possession of a large territory which 
 could be made tributary to the French army ; cross at any one 
 of several places farther below, and take Beaulieu and his 
 army completely in reverse. This, too, by rapidity and skill 
 he might manage secretly, and have his crossing of the great 
 river unopposed. He feared the enemy's horse more than any 
 other thing. " If I have any chances to run in Lombardy, it is 
 on the score of the enemy's cavalry," he wrote the Directory 
 April 29 ; and " The Austrians are redoubtable only for their 
 cavalry, of which they have six thousand," he later said. 
 
 From headquarters, now moved to Tortona, Bonaparte on 
 May 3 ordered an elite corps, made up of four grenadier and 
 two carbineer battalions and fifteen hundred cavalry, to be 
 ready May 5 ; and these as a van he proposed should seize 
 on the crossing-point he aimed at ; but meanwhile he kept up 
 an active semblance of preparation to force the river near 
 Valencia, by pushing his divisions to the neighborhood of Sale 
 and Castelnuovo, by taking possession of all the boats he 
 could gather, and by writing to the governor of Alessandria 
 that a division would surely cross at that point — which mis- 
 information soon reached the Austrian commander, and was 
 credited in full. All communication with the left bank was 
 then cut off, and Beaulieu, completely in the dark, strove to 
 
222 GAUGING AN OPPONENT. 
 
 hold all the territory north of the Po, by distributing his 
 forces in small parties all along the threatened river. He 
 was doing everything in his power to aid Bonaparte in his 
 projected operation, and yet what he did was strictly in ac- 
 cordance with the rules of his precious cordon system, which in 
 those days was a positive disease. While on the 4th the six 
 elite battalions above named assembled at Casteggio under 
 General Dallemagne, and were joined .by the cavalry and six 
 guns, the army was being secretly prepared for a rapid march 
 by the right down the Po. 
 
 Bonaparte here began to show his peculiar force of apprehen- 
 sion and character. Having gauged his opponent and his weak- 
 nesses, and feeling that he could certainly rely on his commit- 
 ting those errors into which he chose to lead him, and which 
 were essential to his own success, he forged ahead with his plan, 
 never doubting that Beaulieu would second the French ma- 
 noeuvres. This would not have been wise, or indeed possible, 
 with some generals in his front ; but all great captains have 
 habitually based their action on a knowledge of their oppo- 
 nent's strength or weakness, and this one never met an an- 
 tagonist to whom he did not feel superior. At the beginning 
 this self-reliance bred success ; later in his career the virtue 
 grew to an excessive fault, and bred failure. In some of the 
 qualities of the great captain Napoleon outranked Frederick, 
 but in one quality Frederick was markedly his superior : the 
 king learned a lesson from each victory and each defeat ; Na- 
 poleon was sometimes unteachable. Not to recognize defeat 
 is in one sense the guiding strength of the great soldier ; but 
 it may be carried too far. 
 
 On the 6th of May Bonaparte headed his column for Pla- 
 centia. Dallemagne reached Castel San Giovanni, Augereau 
 Broni, Laharpe and the cavalry under Kilmaine got to the 
 pass of Stradella. Serurier still stood opposite Valencia and 
 
FOSTERING A DELUSION. 
 
 223 
 
 Massena near Sale, and their presence kept the enemy from 
 fathoming the French commander's design. With respect to 
 this situation, Bonaparte wrote the Directory, May 6, " If my 
 movement on Placentia leads Beaulieu to vacate the Lumel- 
 lina, I will quietly cross at Valen- 
 cia. If Beaulieu remains twenty- 
 four hours in ignorance of our 
 march on Placentia, and I can find 
 boats or material for rafts in that 
 town, I will cross in the night." 
 
 In order to keep in touch with 
 both his wings, Bonaparte retained 
 his headquarters in Tortona, but 
 was personally much at the front, 
 while Berthier conducted the for- 
 mal business. In this he had the 
 further object to keep Beaulieu as 
 long as possible subject to the de- 
 lusion of a crossing near Valencia ; for as, in order to succeed 
 fully, he must steal the passage at Placentia, it was essential 
 that Beaulieu should send no large body of troops thither. 
 Throughout life Napoleon was fertile in this species of strata- 
 gem, and judged with great astuteness what would or what 
 would not deceive the enemy. 
 
 It took all day of May 6 to determine how the conditions 
 were shaping themselves, and the crossing had in effect to be 
 done by daylight, and not by night as Bonaparte had in- 
 tended. Late on the 6th, from Tortona, he ordered Massena 
 to Voghera, Augereau to Castel San Giovanni, Dallemagne, 
 with Laharpe in support, to Borgo San Antonio, near Placen- 
 tia, prescribing early morning hours for each division to start. 
 He himself came on to Castel San Giovanni, reconnoitred the 
 neighborhood and collected some boats. By 4 A. M. of May 
 
 Eilmaine. 
 
224 
 
 A SLOW PASSAGE. 
 
 7 Dallemagne started, reached Placentia by 9 a. m., and 
 found on the farther side of the Po but a single squadron of 
 Austrian horse. The column d'elite had marched from Tor- 
 tona to Placentia, forty-four miles, in thirty-six hours. Upon 
 the absence in force of the enemy being reported to head- 
 quarters, all the French divisions, which so far had been 
 cautiously advanced for fear that the calculations might by 
 some untoward accident be upset, were ordered by forced 
 marches forward to Placentia. It was now certain that the 
 passage could be effectuated here ; and the town being on the 
 right bank, the difficulties were much diminished. Lannes, 
 
 " as brave as he is intelli- 
 gent," then commanding 
 a brigade under Dalle- 
 magne, was the first to 
 cross with the van, and to 
 put foot ashore ; and by 
 2 p. M. Dallemagne had 
 got over the rest of his de- 
 tachment. Had the army 
 been equipped with a pon- 
 toon bridge, Bonaparte 
 could have dealt Beaulieu 
 a fatal blow ; as he was 
 compelled to rely on boats 
 and rafts alone, the passage was slow and laborious. Some 
 flat-boats had been captured on the river above Placentia, 
 carrying five hundred wounded Austrians and a large quan- 
 tity of medical stores. There was also a big ferry-boat at 
 Placentia, which could make a trip every half hour, with a 
 considerable number of men and horses, across the river, 
 which here is rapid and some quarter of a mile wide. The 
 bridge did not get finished until the 9th. Laharpe's division 
 
 Lannes. 
 
NO SENSE OF PERSPECTIVE. 225 
 
 was the first to follow Dallemagne. Bonaparte could truth- 
 fully write to Carnot : " Beaulieu is disconcerted, he calcu- 
 lates rather ill, he falls constantly into the snares one lays for 
 him. Perhaps he will wish to deliver battle, for the man has 
 the audacity of madness and not of genius." 
 
 Cremona has been pointed out by many military critics as 
 the better place to cross in order to cut off Beaulieu. But as 
 Placentia was nearer and on the right bank, it was chosen 
 rather than Cremona, though it is true that by crossing at 
 the latter place the French would have got beyond the Adda. 
 Moreover, time was of the essence in this manoeuvre. 
 
 As a matter of fact, expeditious and secret though the 
 mancEuvre had been, Beaulieu had received abundant notice 
 of the proposed crossing at Placentia to enable him, with the 
 French army's accidental delays, to concentrate forces which 
 could offer serious resistance to ^the operation. But he was all 
 strung out in the effort to hold the Ticino with his right and 
 extend to the lower Adda with his left, so as to protect Milan. 
 He had no sense of perspective. He could not see that if the 
 French crossed below him, Milan would still be compromised. 
 Wise enough in his effort to hold the Adda, he was mistaken 
 in his desire not to leave the Ticino. But Beaulieu naturally 
 judged that an advance would now be made by the Army 
 of the Alps in support of the Army of Italy. This indeed 
 Bonaparte had been asking for, and it would have been good 
 policy for the Directory to order it. 
 
 On hearing of the French appearance at various points 
 down the river, Beaulieu, on May 4, ordered Liptay with five 
 thousand men to march towards Pizzighetone to dispute any 
 crossing the enemy might attempt, and especially to cover 
 the Austrian communications with that city and Mantua. 
 Sebottendorf marched to Pavia, and Beaulieu followed. Colli 
 was left in Buffalora to fend off the expected attack by 
 Keller mann. 
 
226 THE COMBAT OF FOMBIO. 
 
 Bonaparte utilized the enforced delay at Placentia in com- 
 pelling the Duke of Parma to sign an armistice, to pay two 
 million francs, and deliver up ten of his best museum pictures 
 as purchase money for his neutrality ; and to furnish, more- 
 over, large supplies, and many horses for the artillery and 
 cavalry. It was here Bonaparte systematically began that 
 habit of collecting works of art from captured cities which 
 has so wonderfully enriched the French capital. The Duke 
 of Modena had fled to Venice, but his territory was none 
 the less mulcted in ten millions of francs and twenty chefs- 
 d^oeuvre. Both these rulers had rather haughtily refused 
 Bonaparte's recent overtures, and were treated with corre- 
 sponding harshness. 
 
 Late on this same 7th of May the French advance on the 
 north bank struck the head of the enemy's column, which the 
 Austrian commander had ordered downstream, and which had 
 been all too leisurely coming on. Liptay's van had reached 
 Guardamiglia, and from here he managed to throw the French 
 van back towards the river. But by May 8 Bonaparte, who 
 had now got across enough men, pushed forward Lannes, 
 who struck Liptay at Fombio, where the Austrians had col- 
 lected twenty guns and intrenched. Dallemagne's grenadiers 
 attacked on the right ; Lanusse headed a column on the high- 
 road ; and Lannes fell to on the left. After a lively combat, 
 Liptay was hustled back on Pizzighetone with loss of twenty- 
 five hundred prisoners, some guns and three flags. " The 
 success of the combat of Fombio is in great part due to the 
 courage of the Chief of Brigade Lannes," reported Bonaparte. 
 By night Laharpe had got to Codogno, and Dallemagne ad- 
 vanced towards Pizzighetone. About 10 p. M. a fresh Austrian 
 detachment, sent by Beaulieu from Belgiogoso, and coming 
 from Casalpusterlengo, fell on Laharpe's outposts in the dark 
 and came close to pushing them in. As ill fortune would 
 
A CHANGE OF ORDERS. 227 
 
 have it, Laharpe, "a grenadier in height and heart," was 
 killed by the fire of some of his own men, narrates the Order 
 of the Day of May 9 ; and Menard received his division. 
 Beaulieu had not only unduly spread out his main force, but 
 had even divided the small body he had sent out to check the 
 
 CassaISo) 
 
 Plaoentia-Lodi Country. 
 
 French crossing. When Bonaparte saw Beaulieu's awkward 
 effort to arrest his advance, he was well satisfied that he 
 would be able to concentrate on the north bank and meet the 
 enemy on his own terms. 
 
 Curiously, Beaulieu had conceived the idea of a general 
 engagement, and gave orders to this effect on May 8 ; but as 
 the conditions gradually developed, he saw that he was not 
 sufficiently concentrated to permit a battle, while the French 
 were so ; and during the night he changed the orders to his 
 several divisions to such as would effect a withdrawal behind 
 the Adda ; and to protect this operation he stationed a force 
 at Lodi, where there was an excellent bridge. His right under 
 
228 THE AUSTRIAN REARGUARD. 
 
 Colli, which had come down part way to Pa via, was compelled 
 to make a detour ; and it would scarcely have reached Cas- 
 sano had Bonaparte been able to effect a quick passage of 
 the Po. It consumed the 8th and up to the evening of the 
 9th for Massena and Augereau to complete the crossing (the 
 latter, indeed, had to pass at Veratto, a few miles above), and 
 they were then ptished forward on Lodi. Augereau reached 
 Borghetto, Massena Casalpusterlengo, Dallemagne, who was 
 now placed under Massena, got to Zorlesco, Menard to near 
 Pizzighetone. On the 10th, at 3 A. M., Bonaparte reached 
 Massena's division, pushed Dallemagne on Lodi, and on its 
 being reported that the place was occupied, himself headed 
 Augereau and Massena thither. 
 
 Beaulieu kept his main column on the march in retreat 
 towards Cremona, where he hoped to establish a point d'appui 
 on the Po below the point where Bonaparte had crossed ; and 
 he left Sebottendorf and ten thousand men as rearguard to 
 hold Lodi until the main column could file past. 
 
 Having meanwhile masked Pizzighetone, and sent Serurier 
 to Pa via to threaten Milan, and if possible to seize the Austrian 
 magazines, and having thus protected his right and left, Bona- 
 parte pushed on, and before noon on May 10 the French 
 van reached Lodi, " with four pieces of light artillery which 
 had just arrived, and which were drawn by the carriage horses 
 of the lords of Placentia," as Bonaparte reported ; and here 
 they found the Austrian rearguard still on the right bank and 
 holding the bridge, which Sebottendorf believed he could main- 
 tain or else destroy. Most of the Austrian force was at the 
 end of the bridge on the farther bank. A detachment was at 
 Corte del Palasio, where the stream was fordable, lest the 
 French should attempt a passage there, and the cavalry was 
 at Cadella Fontana, to protect the retreat of the rearguard, 
 which it was expected might occur next day. Fourteen guns 
 
AT THE BRIDGE OF LODI. 
 
 229 
 
 were trained on the bridge, supported by nine battalions. 
 Curiously, Buonaparte, making the same error as at Jena, 
 imagined that he bad Beaulieu's main army in his front, 
 — "Beaulieu with all his army was drawn up in line of 
 battle," — and determining to show his men that there were 
 no obstacles for the Army of Italy, especially as he ran no 
 strategic risk by failure, he at once prepared to seize Lodi out 
 of hand and to force the passage, instead of turning the posi- 
 tion. Throwing Dallemagne and his grenadiers upon the 
 place, it was quickly ceded. Massena was coming up in his 
 
 The Bridge of Lodi. 
 
 rear with six thousand men from Pusterlengo, Augereau with 
 an equal number from Borghetto. The Austrians stationed 
 in Lodi retired across the bridge, but the French so energeti- 
 cally followed them up that preparations for destroying the 
 
230 STORMING THE BRIDGE. 
 
 structure could not be completed. Bonaparte occupied the 
 front of the town, and placed his artillery, as it arrived, on 
 the overhanging right bank on the road along the river. 
 Opening a cannonade which he kept up until the evening to 
 gain time, and to enable the other divisions to come up, the 
 French guns drove the Austrian batteries away from their 
 post at the other end of the bridge. Beaumont with two 
 thousand horse was sent upstream to cross at a ford near 
 Montaraso and ride down on the Austrian right flank. 
 
 The young leader had already impressed himself on the 
 Army of Italy in a wonderful fashion, but he concluded to 
 storm the bridge as a further means of encouraging the troops. 
 He " needed a stroke of vigor to affix the seal of individuality 
 on his conduct ; the occasion was good, and he seized it." The 
 grenadiers were ployed into a deep column behind the Lodi 
 walls, and at 7 p. M., with a battalion of carbineers at the 
 head, debouched at a double-quick, and were hurled upon the 
 bridge, which was some three hundred feet long, shouting 
 " Vive la Rejyublique ! " 
 
 Met by a fire of grape and canister from the Austrian 
 guns, which had been again brought up and well posted to 
 command the bridge, the entire head of the column was swept 
 away, and the brave grenadiers were brought to a pause ; but 
 they were instantly rallied by the valor of their general offi- 
 cers. Dallemagne was still at their head, Massena was close 
 at hand ; Berthier, Lannes, Cervoni rushed to the scene, and, 
 filled with Gallic fury, led them on in their perilous task ; when, 
 promptly recovering their ardor, and making their way over 
 the piles of dead and wounded men, these splendid battalions 
 fell with rage upon the Austrian guns, bayoneted the artillery- 
 men, and captured every piece. They were in their assault 
 markedly aided by the diversion of a portion of their com- 
 rades, who, seeking a less murderous footing, had dropped 
 
THE GAIN FORFEITED. 
 
 231 
 
 from the timbers of the bridge upon islands in midstream up 
 and down river, and then, finding they could wade to the 
 farther bank, had formed as skirmishers, and, under cover 
 of the bank, had taken the Austrians in reverse by a lively 
 fire. The first Austrian line having been broken, the grena- 
 diers pushed in without a moment's delay ; Massena crossed 
 and deployed on their right and left ; and at the point of the 
 bayonet the French fell upon the second line ; the Austrian 
 position was carried, and in addition to the fourteen guns, 
 thirty munition-carts were taken. After uselessly putting in 
 his cavalry, Sebottendorf retired with the loss of two thousand 
 men. The French loss is not given. It was probably more. 
 The combat had been only an affair of the rearguard, but a 
 brilliant one. The French advanced to Tormo Palasio and 
 camped, the cavalry, which 
 arrived too late to take 
 part in the battle, protect- 
 ing their front. 
 
 As Beaulieu had already 
 anticipated the French on 
 the road to Brescia and 
 Mantua, any gain there 
 might have been made in 
 the fight at the bridge of 
 Lodi was forfeited. 
 
 In the Army of Italy 
 there had grown up a 
 habit among the old gren- 
 adiers to hold daily a little 
 
 council of their own, to discuss events, and to promote from 
 time to time their young leaders. It was on Bonaparte's 
 return to camp after the battle of Lodi, when he rode around 
 among the regiments, that the old grenadiers saluted him as 
 " P'tit Caporal ! " 
 
 Beaulieu. 
 
232 A RASH ASSAULT. 
 
 It appears that the storming of the bridge of Lodi was what 
 first gave Bonaparte the idea that he was cut out for great 
 things. Though a handsome affair, it was one which has 
 been many times equaled by other troops ; but the young 
 general's vast imagination had been set at work ; and later, 
 at St. Helena, the emperor said : " Vendemiaire and Mon- 
 tenotte had not warranted me in considering myself an ex- 
 ceptional man. Only after Lodi did the idea come to me 
 that henceforth I should be a decisive player on the political 
 boards; then arose the first sparks of high ambition." This 
 seems to exhibit a somewhat curious limitation of judgment ; 
 for while Lodi was a bold, it was not a great feat of arms. 
 
 Bonaparte had imagined that Beaulieu in force stood be- 
 yond the river to defend the position of Lodi ; and even on 
 the evening of the fight he clung to the idea that he had 
 beaten the whole Austrian army. His resolve under these 
 circumstances to carry the bridge was an act of excessive 
 hardihood, if not rashness, to be gauged by history as many 
 other rash assaults have been, — as Gustavus' assault on the 
 Alte Veste, or Sherman's on Kenesaw, have been alternately 
 praised or blamed. Good fortune seconded the courage of 
 his grenadiers. As the obstacle could have been readily 
 turned ; and as, had the entire Austrian force actually been 
 present, the assault would almost to a certainty have failed, 
 it can scarcely be called an act of wisdom. But if Bonaparte 
 merely desired to give a lesson in daring to his opponents, he 
 certainly gave it in good style. Moreover, it must be remem- 
 bered that time was essential to him, and like Gneisenau he 
 could say : " Strategy is the science of how to use time and 
 space. I am less miserly of this than that. We may recover 
 space, lost time never again." 
 
 Bonaparte, " in his nightly rounds " after the battle of 
 Lodi, " met a bivouac of prisoners, where was a talkative old 
 
SURRENDER OF PIZZIGHETONE. 233 
 
 Hungarian officer, of whom he asked how their affairs were 
 going. The old captain could not help admitting that they 
 went very ill : ' But,' he added, ' there is no longer means of 
 understanding anything about it ; we have to do with a young 
 general, who is sometimes before us, sometimes on our rear, 
 then again on our flanks ; we never know how we ought to 
 place ourselves. This way of making war is insupportable, 
 and violates every usage ! ' " He did not know who his inter- 
 rogator was. 
 
 For a month the French troops had known no rest, night or 
 day. They needed a respite. But it was short. On May 11 
 Bonaparte remained near Lodi, sending a detachment across 
 to Crema, and one to Milan. His first idea was to " follow 
 up Beaulieu, and to draw some use from his stupor, so as to 
 again beat him." When he learned that the Austrians had 
 moved on Pizzighetone, he started thither at early morning of 
 the 12th ; Massena and Dallemagne marched on the left bank 
 of the Adda ; Menard was to attack on the right bank ; 
 Serurier, yet at Placentia, to move up and support him, if 
 pressed. Augereau was ordered during the 12th to march on 
 Pizzighetone by way of Crema. But the prey had escaped. 
 Beaulieu had concentrated his forces during that day at Cre- 
 mona and retired thence across the Oglio. He was more rapid 
 in retreat than in advance. Pizzighetone, attacked by Mas- 
 sena, with Menard and Serurier on the other side, had no 
 chance, but surrendered after half an hour's bombardment. 
 " This last affair, by yielding the whole course of the Adda 
 to the Republicans, assures them the Milanese, conquered 
 by the winning of the battle of Lodi," says the Relation of 
 May 14. 
 
 Bonaparte was now convinced that Beaulieu proposed to 
 retire behind the Mincio to Mantua, and that neither could 
 he be caught, nor was any danger to be apprehended from 
 
234 
 
 LOMBARDY CONQUERED. 
 
 him. Only the semblance of a pursuit by Augereau was 
 undertaken. It seemed and was wiser to complete the con- 
 quest of what had already been overrun. Sending Massena 
 to Milan, and Augereau to Pavia, while Serurier remained at 
 Cremona and Placentia, Menard at Codogno and Pizzighe- 
 
 Bonaparte. 
 (Engraved at Milan, 1796.) 
 
 tone, and detachments held the Adda, Bonaparte prepared to 
 make secure his footing in Lombardy by military occupation, 
 for he could conclude no treaty with the Austrians as he had 
 with the Piedmontese. 
 
 In seventeen days the Army of Italy, under its new com- 
 mander, had conquered all Lombardy. Bonaparte made a 
 triumphal entry into Milan May 15. The National Guard, 
 formed on either side of the streets with the colors of Lom- 
 bardy, and under command of the Duke of Serbelloni, received 
 the conqueror. His coming was hailed by many as the advent 
 
AN ABSURD PROPOSITION. 235 
 
 of Italian liberty. A triumph in Paris would scarcely have 
 shown greater elation on the part of the populace, he tells us. 
 But there were many regrettable French excesses. 
 
 Bonaparte was instant in his demands for more and good 
 material and men. " Since the death of Steingel I have no 
 superior officer of cavalry who will fight. Send me some who 
 have fire, and who do not know how to make learned re- 
 treats." Lambert was chief commissary of the army, and 
 while Bonaparte could give him orders as to where to send 
 rations, he could not control his methods. On April 28 he 
 asks for an able commissary. " I have only pigmies, who 
 make me die of hunger in the midst of abundance." With the 
 commissary department beyond military control, and a com- 
 missioner of the Directory to interfere with manoeuvres, the 
 French successes were to be wondered at. But Bonaparte 
 was lucky in having Salieeti as chief commissioner. At this 
 time Bonaparte wrote to a commissary of the Directory who 
 was mixing too far in the operations of the army : " The 
 requisition you have made on General Vaubois is contrary to 
 the instructions given me by the government. I desire that 
 you shall restrict yourself from now on within the bounds of 
 the functions prescribed to you by the Executive Directory, 
 without which, I shall be obliged to forbid in army orders 
 the filling of your requisitions. "We exist all of us only by 
 the law. "Whoso desires to command and usurp functions 
 which it does not accord him is not a Republican." 
 
 While at Lodi, in answer to his repeated suggestions that 
 Kellermann's idle forces be placed under his command, Bona- 
 parte, to whom there was some opposition from jealousy of 
 his brilliant successes, received from the Directory the ab- 
 surd proposition to consolidate the Army of Italy and the 
 Army of the Alps, placing Kellermann in command of half of 
 ^the joint forces on the Mincio, while he himself, with twenty- 
 
236 LETTER TO THE DIRECTORY. 
 
 five thousand men, to be known as the Army of the South, 
 should march on Rome and Naples. Too intelligent to be 
 compromised by impossible conditions at a moment when the 
 French had to encounter all the forces of Austria, Bonaparte 
 resigned his command ; but while awaiting the action of the 
 Directory, he made preparations to push Beaulieu still farther 
 back towards the Tyrol. His answer to the Directory, dated 
 May 14, contained the following : — 
 
 " I thiuk it very impolitic to divide the Army of Italy in two ; it is 
 equally contrary to the interests of the Republic to put over it two differ- 
 ent generals. The expedition on Leghorn, Rome and Naples is a small 
 affair. . . . 
 
 " For that (the main operation) is needed not only a single general, 
 but also that nothing should disturb him in his march and his operations. 
 I have made the campaign without consulting any one ; 1 should have 
 done nothing good had I been obliged to reconcile my views with an- 
 other's. I have obtained some advantages over very superior forces, and 
 this while lacking everything, because, persuaded that your confidence 
 was reposed in me, my march was as prompt as my thought. 
 
 " If you impose on me impediments of all kinds ; if I am to refer all my 
 steps to the commissioners of the government ; if they have the right to 
 change my movements, to take from me or send me troops, expect nothing 
 more that is good. If you weaken your means by dividing your forces, 
 if you break in Italy the unity of the military thought, I tell you with 
 sorrow, you will have lost the finest occasion of imposing laws on Italy. 
 
 ..." It is indispensable that you should have a general who possesses 
 your confidence entirely. If it were not I, I should not complain, but I 
 should make efforts to redouble my zeal to merit your esteem in the post 
 you confided to me. Every one has his method of conducting war. Gen- 
 eral Kellermann has more experience, and will conduct it better than I ; 
 we two together will conduct it very ill. 
 
 ..." It requires much courage to write this letter . . . but I owe you 
 the expression of all my sentiments." . . . 
 
 The above letter to the Directory was sent to Carnot, to 
 deliver or not, as he saw fit. In his letter, a confidential one, 
 to Carnot, Bonaparte said, " Kellermann will command the. 
 
A WISE REFUSAL. 
 
 237 
 
 army as well as I ; for no one is more convinced than I that 
 the victories are due to the courage and audacity of the army ; 
 but I believe that to join Kellermann and me in Italy would 
 be to lose all. I cannot serve willingly with a man who 
 believes himself the first general in Europe, and besides, I 
 believe that one poor general is better than two good ones. 
 War is like government, it is a matter of tact. . . . Whether 
 I make war here or elsewhere is indifferent -to me . . . but I 
 have it much at heart not to lose in eight days two months 
 of fatigue, pains and dangers." 
 
 Let us remember our motto, that the great captain is the 
 product of exceptional intellect, exceptional force of character 
 and exceptional opportunity. Given the two first, without 
 the last factor, no general can do his best. 
 History shows us many splendid command- 
 ers, like Turenne and Marlborough, who 
 have been so hampered by the authorities 
 behind them as to have accomplished far 
 less than they might have done with full 
 power to act. Bonaparte believed that op- 
 portunity would come to him if he waited. 
 He was conscious of the brain and the moral 
 force which impelled him ; and he was wise 
 to refuse to conduct an army on terms so 
 unsuited to what he had already accom- 
 plished. " Every commander-in-chief," he Infantryman on the 
 once said upon this subject, " who undertakes 
 to carry out a plan which he holds to be bad and ruinous, is 
 at fault ; he should make representations, insist on changes, 
 and in the end rather demand to be relieved, than be the 
 cause of disaster to his people." From whatever motive, 
 such was now his action. 
 
 What Bonaparte had done had more than settled him in 
 
238 EXCELLENT LIEUTENANTS. 
 
 command. From the moment of his arrival in the Army of 
 Italy he had, in his own manner, secured implicit obedience 
 to all his orders, and had shown the army who was master — 
 of troops and situation alike. He had demonstrated to the 
 rank and file, and to every officer, high and low, that he had 
 not only the commission of the Directory, but possessed the 
 inborn right to supreme command. In his case, in order to 
 command, it was not necessary to know how to obey. This 
 lesson Bonaparte had never fully learned. 
 
 In a certain sense it is the lieutenants of a commanding 
 general who win his battles. Without good ones no captain 
 can succeed. But the great captain makes good lieutenants : 
 that he can make them is one proof of his power. In the 
 Army of Italy, when Bonaparte took command, there were 
 excellent lieutenants, young, ambitious, enterprising, and yet 
 well trained. There was Massena, the miserly, reckless, but 
 high-strung and unsurpassed leaider of men ; " he was never 
 discouraged ; ... if vanquished, he began over again as if he 
 had been victor." There was Augereau, the severe discipli- 
 narian, whom still his soldiers loved ; the excellent battle 
 commander, intrepid and yet careful ; the talkative, quick- 
 witted, sound. There were Serurier, the veteran in service, 
 severe and hard-working ; Laharpe, the simple-minded but 
 able ; Steingel, the tireless pattern of a cavalryman. They 
 were all older in years and war than Bonaparte, and they 
 looked askance at him — but not for long. Not once during 
 the entire campaign, in which Bonaparte made the severest 
 demands on his lieutenants, was there ever a sign of anything 
 but quick obedience — a great tribute to a commanding 
 general of twenty-seven. 
 
 The amount of hard work which Bonaparte did is well mea- 
 sured by the numberless political papers he wrote, the orders 
 he issued, and the amount of ground these all covered. The 
 
A KEEN APPRECIATION. 239 
 
 perusal of a volume of his Correspondence is as interesting as 
 it is instructive. The orders for the march were coupled with 
 instructions to the commissaries for bread, to be delivered to 
 the troops at various places ; and the mayors of towns and 
 officials of provinces were often held personally responsible 
 to see the bread baked and delivered. Entire populations of 
 a district were set to work to repair bridges broken by the 
 enemy. Officers and diplomatic agents were sent ahead of 
 the army to study the country, ascertain the sentiment of the 
 people, and to foster good feeling. The train of the army 
 was carefully inspected, officers were forbidden to have car- 
 riages or carts, or more horses than regulations allowed ; 
 private horses seized were ordered to be turned in to the 
 provost; women were forbidden and ordered out of camp. 
 In no department was the leader's eye or the proper order 
 wanting. Moreover, he was keen in his appreciation of every 
 fact, and saw its significance when others did not. Detail 
 was plain to him without his losing sight of the whole. 
 
 Another thing is worth noting in Bonaparte's reports. All 
 the officers who distinguished themselves were cordially men- 
 tioned and unstintingly praised, and in all he did the chief, 
 while not underrating himself, ascribed his successes to the 
 courage and willing help of his officers and men. " Since the 
 beginning of the campaign," he wrote the Directory, May 6, 
 " General Berthier has always passed the day beside me in 
 the combats, and the night at his desk. It is impossible to 
 join more activity, good-will, courage and knowledge. By 
 just title, I have passed on to him one half of the flattering 
 and honorable things that you express in your letters." 
 
 The action of the Directory was altered May 21. Bona- 
 parte retained command of the undivided Army of Italy. 
 
 In less than a month the new leader had turned the line of 
 the Alps, won a number of sharp combats and three well-con- 
 
240 
 
 RESULTS OF A MONTH. 
 
 tested engagements, — Montenotte, Millesimo, Lodi, — made 
 twelve thousand prisoners, taken a number of fortresses and 
 two capitals, detached Piedmont from the Coalition, opened 
 the route into Italy through Savoy, and overrun Lombardy. 
 " I believe," says Jomini, " that if Napoleon had commanded 
 the most excellent troops, he would not have acconiplished 
 more, even as Frederick, in the reversed case, would not have 
 accomplished less." 
 
 Bonaparte's Sword of 
 Institute of France. 
 
X. 
 
 ON THE MINCIO. MAT 15 TO AUGUST 1, 1796. 
 
 Bon APABTB was starting for the Minoio when a revolt oconrred in Milan and 
 Pavia. He returned, and made a cruel but necessary example in both places. 
 In the rich valley of the Po the troops were now well fed, and the Army of 
 Italy was in the highest morale. The Anstrians defended the Mincio on the 
 cordon system, strung out from Lake Garda to Mantua. Operating from Bres- 
 cia so as to make the Anstrians fear for their communications with the Tyrol, 
 Bonaparte broke through this line at Borghetto and hurried the enemy into re- 
 treat up the Adige. The Anstrians stiU held Mantua in force, and based on 
 Trent. Venice was aggrieved at an invasion of her territory. Naples and the 
 Pope were antagonistic. The English held the sea. The line of the Mincio 
 could only be maintained by fighting for it, and this Bonaparte prepared to do. 
 He began the blockade of Mantua with thirteen thousand men. He had paci- 
 fied the countries in his rear, and mulcted them heavily in money and works of 
 art, thus making war support war, and presenting to Paris what would give the 
 people cause to remember him. Wurmser was now put in command of the 
 enemy. At the end of July he advanced down the Adige and on the west of 
 Lake Garda. Bonaparte was placed in a dangerous situation, but as the enemy 
 had divided his forces, he prepared to attack each body in turn. He threw up 
 the siege of Mantua and advanced on the Anstrians west of Lake Garda, recap- 
 turing Brescia, which they had temporarily taken. 
 
 While awaiting the decision of the Directory, Bonaparte 
 called on the Gallic fervor of his troops, and addressed him- 
 self to the peoples of Italy in the following 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Soldiers ! You have precipitated yourselves like a torrent from the top 
 of the Apennines ; you have overturned, dispersed and scattered every- 
 thing which opposed your march ! 
 
 Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has yielded to her natural 
 sentiments of peace and friendship for France. 
 
 MUau is yours, and the Republican standard floats over all Lombardy. 
 
242 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 The dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence to your 
 generosity alone. 
 
 The army which menaced you with so much pride now finds no barrier 
 which can insure it against your courage. 
 
 The Po, the Ticino, the Adda, have not been able to arrest you a single 
 day ; these vaunted boulevards of Italy have been insufficient ; you have 
 crossed them as rapidly as you did the Apennines. 
 
 So many successes have carried joy to the bosom of the country ; your 
 representatives have ordered a fete, dedicated to your victories, to be 
 celebrated in all the communes of the Republic ; there your fathers, your 
 mothers, your wives, your sisters, your sweethearts, rejoice in your suc- 
 cess, and boast with pride that they belong to you. 
 
 Yes, soldiers, you have done much ; but yet, is there nothing left to 
 do ? Shall they say of us that we have known how to conquer, but that 
 we have not known how to profit by victory ? Shall posterity reproach 
 ' us with having found a Capua in Lombardy ? But I see you already run 
 to arms ; a cowardly repose wearies you ; days lost for glory are lost for 
 your happiness. Well, let us be gone ! We yet have forced marches to 
 make, enemies to suppress, laurels to gather, injuries to avenge. 
 
 Let those tremble who have sharpened the daggers of civil war in 
 France, who have, like cowards, assassinated our ministers, and burned 
 our ships in Toulon. The hour of vengeance has struck ! 
 
 But let the people be without disquiet ; we are friends of all "peoples, 
 and especially of the descendants of the Brutus, the Scipios, and of the 
 great men whom we have taken as models. To reestablish the Capitol, 
 to place there with honor the statues of the heroes who made themselves 
 celebrated, awake the Roman people, benumbed with several centuries 
 of slavery, such shall be the fruit of your victories. They will make an 
 epoch in posterity. You will have the immortal glory of changing the 
 face of the most beautiful part of Europe. 
 
 The French people, free, respected by the whole world, will give to 
 Europe a glorious peace, which will indemnify it for the sacrifices of all 
 kinds it has made in the past six years ; you will then go back to your 
 hearthstones, and your fellow citizens vrill say in pointing you out : " He 
 was of the Army of Italy ! " 
 
 Bonaparte knew Lis fellow soldiers ; he knew the Latin 
 heart of sunny Italy, and he trusted that the proclamation 
 
POSITION OF BEAULIEU. 
 
 243 
 
 would arouse the same enthusiasm among the middle classes 
 as a former one had done in the capital of Piedmont. 
 
 After the defeat at Lodi, Beaulieu had not dared to defend 
 the lines of the Oglio or Chiese, but had retired for safety 
 behind the Mincio, which he hoped he would be able to main- 
 tain. He took up a position with his left at Goito, his right 
 at Peschiera and his centre at Valleggio. 
 
 That the Directory chose to suggest an inexpedient divi- 
 sion of the French forces, and that Bonaparte saw fit to de- 
 cline to serve in a campaign whose end he could in advance 
 
 Adda-Minoio Country. 
 
 predict to be failure, was no reason why the commander-in- 
 chief of the Army of Italy should not keep up his pressure 
 on Beaulieu. During the few days' rest that he allowed his 
 divisions, he made arrangements for future victual, adopted 
 means to secure his communications with the rear (he now 
 had a line through Savoy, as well as along the coast), planned 
 the necessary measures for reducing the citadel of Milan, 
 
244 ONEROUS CONTRIBUTIONS. 
 
 which had held out, and for the siege of which material was 
 to be sent from Alessandria and Tortona, issued orders on 
 May 19 for a further advance to the Adda, and four days 
 later instructions to continue this advance to the Oglio. In 
 command of the van of five grenadier and three carbineer bat- 
 talions, with sixteen hundred horse, now stood Kilmaine; and 
 this officer broke up at 4 A. M. on the 24th, and marched to 
 Soncino, where he seized the bridge. The bulk of the army 
 got afoot an hour later and moved, Augereau from Cassano 
 to Fontanella, Massena from Lodi to Offanengo, Menard 
 from Codogno to Soresina, Serurier from Cremona to Casal- 
 buttano. Headquarters was transferred to Crema. 
 
 Onerous contributions had been levied on all the cities of 
 Lombardy. This was not all Bonaparte's doing. He could 
 not fail to see that to bring so-called liberty with one hand 
 and to levy oppressive assessments with the other was not the 
 best military or civil policy. But he was under the orders of 
 the Directory to do this thing, and he did it in a magnificent 
 way. At the same time, he was wise enough to place the 
 members of the French government under obligations to him- 
 self, as when he sent a hundred of the finest horses he could 
 find in Lombardy to Paris, "to replace the mediocre ones 
 which had drawn their carriages." Bonaparte personally 
 cared little for wealth except to influence others, or bribe 
 them, if you will ; but for this purpose he used the wealth his 
 armies conquered with a superb profusion. All his favorite 
 generals and marshals became wealthy. His friend Saliceti 
 accumulated a fortune by his connection with the army. And 
 so with many others. 
 
 No sooner was Bonaparte's back turned than trouble broke 
 out in the rear. It could scarcely be expected that so su'dden 
 an upheaval as his coming had made in Lombardy should 
 take place without leaving a mass of malcontents, and these 
 had fostered serious uprisings in Milan and Pavia. 
 
SPEEDY VENGEANCE. 245 
 
 Convinced that in these uprisings half-way measures were 
 suicidal, Bonaparte at once ordered Berthier to send to Milan 
 three battalions, two regiments of cavalry and four guns, and 
 he himself hurried thither to put down the revolt with a strong 
 hand. This he did in Milan, holding a summary court there 
 on May 25, and meting out quick military justice to those 
 found guilty ; and thence went straight to Pavia, where eight 
 thousand armed peasants had broken in and captured the 
 French garrison. His demand for admittance being refused, 
 Bonaparte, on the 26th, forced an entrance into the city, cut 
 down a number of the rebels in the streets, had the French 
 commandant who surrendered the place shot by drumhead 
 court-martial, and some of the municipal officers sentenced to 
 death. The latter penalty was, however, commuted ; and two 
 hundred hostages were sent to Paris to insure future good 
 behavior. Bonaparte was on the point of setting fire to the 
 town, but he refrained from his purpose, and in lieu of this 
 punishment gave it over to the troops for several hours' pil- 
 lage. This cruelty — brutality if you will — has been much 
 commented on ; and indeed, within little more than a century 
 it seems scarcely possible. Yet the lives sacrificed at Pavia 
 saved multitudes that by any other treatment would have been 
 elsewhere lost ; an example was needed if the French were to 
 hold Lombardy, which they had fairly conquered, and Bona- 
 parte delayed not, neither shrank from extreme measures in 
 giving it. The speedy vengeance was distinctly effective. 
 Further risings there were none. 
 
 Discipline improved as the men were better fed. They 
 had been on his arrival " without bread, without discipline, 
 without subordination," and " the soldier without bread is 
 driven to an excess of fury which makes one blush at being 
 a man," he said. The leader now strove to seek excuses for 
 the past. " Discipline reestablishes itself every day, but we 
 
246 TOWARDS THE MINCIO. 
 
 have frequently to shoot pillagers." " From the moment that 
 we can arrest our movements, we will clothe the army afresh. 
 It is yet in a frightful condition, but the soldier is growing 
 fat. He eats only Gonesse bread, good meat and in plenty, 
 and has good wine." All through the Italian campaign occa- 
 sional orders against pillaging had to be issued, and instruc- 
 tions were given summarily to shoot men caught in the act, 
 at the head of their battalions. A number were thus executed. 
 But on the other hand, he had on June 14 to write to Lam- 
 bert, chief commissary with the Army of Italy, about similar 
 difficulties he could not personally control : " From all sides. 
 Citizen Ordonnator, arrive complaints to the general-in-chief 
 about the vexations which the miserable inhabitants of the 
 conquered country are made to suffer, from the requisition 
 that the transport contractor exercises to procure horses and 
 cattle. . . . The desolation is such among the poorest in the 
 Mantuan country that they are getting ready to emigrate with 
 all their beasts. Verify this . . . and stop the cupidity of 
 the agents. . . . Bonaparte." 
 
 Meanwhile the French army had been advancing, under 
 orders, towards the Mincio, where, according to the plan of 
 the Directory, it was to await reinforcements from the Rhine, 
 that were to come to it through the Tyrol. But wait Bona- 
 parte could not. It was not in his nature to sit down and 
 idle, especially as certain additional forces had come up from 
 the rear, so that, not counting the troops left in Lombardy, 
 he had some twenty-seven thousand men. Moreover, the re- 
 inforcements from the Rhine had been contingent on success 
 there ; and instead of success there had been failure. On 
 May 25 the divisions had crossed the Oglio, and Kilmaine 
 reached Brescia, Massena Casaglio, Augereau Baitella, Seru- 
 rier Quinzanello, and in these several places they remained 
 May 26. Next day Bonaparte rejoined the army at Soncino, 
 
THE FRENCH DIVERSION. 247 
 
 and on the 28th pushed on to the Chiese, with van out be- 
 yond the river to Lonato. This movement, the collection of 
 boats at Desenzano, and the advance of a half-brigade to 
 Salo were intended to give the impression that Bonaparte 
 was manoeuvring towards the Tyrol, to turn the Austrian 
 right, join the Army of the Rhine by the roads west and north 
 of the Lake of Garda, or at least to reach Beaulieu's line 
 of communications far to the rear, and there to cut off his 
 expected reinforcements. Serurier, by way of Ghedi, reached 
 Mezzano, on the Chiese, May 29, and at the same time Au- 
 gereau crossed and advanced to Desenzano, and Massena to 
 Montechiaro, while Kilmaine moved forward towards Cas- 
 tiglione. At 2' a. m. of the 30th — there were no delays in 
 Bonaparte's programme — the entire force broke up to cross 
 the Mincio at Borghetto, Kilmaine in the van with Bonaparte 
 in his company, and the other divisions echeloned a few miles 
 in the rear. 
 
 It had been the plan of the Austrian commander-in-chief 
 to defend the line of the Mincio. He now had nearly eleven 
 thousand men in Mantua, twelve battalions near Roverbella, 
 and the balance in various detachments, small and large, 
 along the lake and the river. His ideas of defense were, how- 
 ever, scarcely abreast of Bonaparte's ideas of attack. Instead 
 of remaining in one body, so placed on the left bank as to 
 move rapidly on any threatened point, and of carefully scouting 
 the right bank, towards which the French were pressing, — a 
 proceeding which might have inspired even Bonaparte with 
 some respect, — Beaulieu was frightened at the French diver- 
 sion towards Salo and Lonato, and so completely thrown off 
 his balance by the feeling of uncertainty as to what was to 
 happen, that he again shifted his forces, and now placed 
 Liptay at Peschiera, HohenzoUern at Valleggio with Sebot- 
 tendorf below, and Colli at Goito, meanwhile keeping a big 
 
248 FORCING THE RIVER. 
 
 force in Mantua. Thus, not counting this latter fortress, 
 Beaulieu had strung two thirds of his men along a stretch of 
 fifteen miles from Peschiera to Goito ; while Bonaparte, in 
 one solid body, was ready to break through his line at any 
 point he chose. A mere advance would do it, without serious 
 fighting. 
 
 Beaulieu's conception of defending the Mincio was all 
 wrong. Indeed, had he stood with all his forces at Gavardo, 
 he would have prevented Bonaparte from moving beyond 
 Brescia, lest the Austrians should fall upon the flank of the 
 Army of Italy. Had he stood with the bulk of his forces near 
 Mantua, Bonaparte could not have gone beyond the Mincio, 
 for fear the French communications should be cut. Nothing 
 can be worse than the cordon system of defending a river 
 which Beaulieu adopted. 
 
 "The art of strategy," says Jomini, "consists in leading 
 lipon the decisive points of a line of operations the great- 
 est mass possible of your forces." Bonaparte had done just 
 this, and at 7 A. M. on May 30 Kilmaine with the van ap- 
 peared in front of Borghetto, which was on the right bank, 
 and having pushed in the enemy's small body lying on guard 
 there, was ready to force the river. An arch in the bridge 
 had been burnt by the retreating Austrians, and while the 
 repairs were going on to enable the heavy foot and guns to 
 cross, a few enterprising grenadiers waded the river at a ford 
 about four feet deep, holding aloft their pieces, and by their 
 very audacity seized the farther bank. By noon Kilmaine 
 had driven the few Austrian companies away from the left 
 bank and beyond Valleggio. Beaulieu, with Hohenzollern, 
 took up a position on the heights between Villafranca and 
 Valleggio, but held it only a short while, and then fell back 
 to Castelnuovo, where he joined Liptay. The passage accom- 
 plished, Bonaparte at once determined to move against the 
 
ADVANCE ON PESCHIERA. 
 
 249 
 
 right flank of Beaulieu's line, which was now collecting at 
 Castelnuovo, so as if possible to turn it and to cut it off from 
 
 Mantna^Trent Country. 
 
 the Tyrol. It is probable that he expected to find Beaulieu 
 in force at that place. 
 
 While Kilmaine remained at Valleggio to cover Massena's 
 crossing, Augereau, already across, advanced on Peschiera. 
 Beaching it the same evening, the Austrians withdrew, and 
 
250 BEAULIEU DEMORALIZED. 
 
 Augereau occupied the fortress, which belonged to Venice, 
 but without being able to cut the enemy's road up the 
 Adige, as he had hoped to do. As soon as Massena had 
 crossed, Kilmaine followed along on the road to Castelnuovo. 
 Serurier was yet on the right bank at Guidizzolo. Head- 
 quarters was established at Valleggio, and the complete task 
 had been accomplished by early evening of May 30. In his 
 report of the day's operations, Bonaparte says that " Murat 
 with the cavalry did prodigies of valor." 
 
 Early next morning Kilmaine and Augereau advanced on 
 Castelnuovo, hoping to find the enemy there and to attack 
 him ; Massena went to Villafranca to clear the country of 
 what Austrians might still be there ; Serurier crossed to Val- 
 leggio. But Beaulieu had got too much demoralized to 
 attempt any further defense along the Mincio. By the short- 
 est road he had fallen back behind the Adige, and had made 
 Dolce the point of assembling of his scattered divisions. 
 Sebottendorf marched on the same point via Villafranca and 
 Bussolengo. Receiving no orders. Colli from the Roverbella 
 region marched upstream, thinking to be able to attack the 
 French right, and thus aid in the battle that he supposed 
 would be fought near Valleggio to hold the river ; but find- 
 ing that Beaulieu had withdrawn and that his own road was 
 cut, he sent his foot back to Mantua, raising that garrison to 
 over thirteen thousand men, and with his horse skirted Vil- 
 lafranca and Castelnuovo, and crossing the Adige above 
 Verona, marched to Dolce. Having thus collected his forces, 
 Beaulieu retired towards Roveredo, having lost six hundred 
 men and four guns in what could hardly be called a defense 
 of the Mincio. 
 
 Thus in a week from leaving the Adda, Bonaparte could 
 write to the Directory : " The Austrians are entirely driven 
 out of Italy. Our outposts are on the hills of Germany." 
 
A NARROW CHANCE. 251 
 
 Proud words, but true, and uttered by the man who had earned 
 the right to use them. He also added, " I will not cite you the 
 men who have distinguished themselves by traits of bravery. 
 I should have to name all the grenadiers and carbineers of the 
 vanguard. They play and laugh with death. . . . Nothing 
 equals their intrepidity, unless it be the gayety with which 
 they make the hardest forced marches, — they sing alter- 
 nately la patrie et I 'amour." 
 
 As Frederick had some narrow personal escapes during the 
 Silesian wars, so here Bonaparte almost fell into the hands 
 of the Austrians. A reconnoitring party of Sebottendorf s, 
 marching along the Mincio to rejoin the main army, ran across 
 the French headquarters at Valleggio, and quite took by sur- 
 prise its all too feeble guard. The commanding general was 
 occupying a palace, where he was indulging in the luxury of 
 a bath, and it was only by a summary flight through some 
 gardens in the rear — actually, as Mother Goose hath it, " one 
 shoe off and one shoe on " — that Bonaparte managed to 
 escape, and to reach Massena's column. This narrow chance 
 was the origin of the formation of the " Guides," a body 
 d'elite, each man in which had seen ten years' service, to do 
 duty near the commanding officer's person. Its leader was 
 Bessieres, " an officer of reserve, full of vigor, but prudent 
 and circumspect." 
 
 Bonaparte had done on the Mincio substantially what he 
 had done on the Po. By his march through Brescia, and the 
 pushing of a detachment up to Salo, he had created the im- 
 pression in Beaulieu's mind that he might march to the Tyrol 
 on the west of the Lake of Garda, just as his diversion at 
 Valencia had kept Beaulieu from guessing that he would 
 move down to Placentia to cross ; and fearing for his com- 
 munications, Beaulieu had left several passages of the river 
 practically naked, and had reached out his right to save him- 
 
252 TOWARDS MANTUA. 
 
 self from an imaginary threat. Napoleon has said that he 
 knew of but three things to do in war : " march twelve leagues 
 a day, fight, and then quietly go into cantonments." It goes 
 without saying that the leagues must be in the right direction, 
 and that the fighting shall be for a proper object and in proper 
 force, for " the secret in war does not lie in the legs, it resides 
 entirely in the brain that sets the legs in motion. An army 
 may make forced marches all through the campaign ; it will 
 yet be lost if the direction of these marches is faulty." Bona- 
 parte's manoeuvres on the Po enabled him to take Beaulieu in 
 reverse, and had he been able to cross the river rapidly, he 
 might have forced battle on the Austrians to their great 
 disadvantage. Here the Lake of Garda protected the stra- 
 tegic flank of the Austrians, and enabled them to preserve 
 their line of retreat, as well as compelled Bonaparte to force 
 his passage opposite their centre, or at least in their front. 
 Happily, this was not made difficult for him. So soon as he 
 had crossed, he essayed an advance against the enemy's com- 
 munications by his march on Peschiera and Castelnuovo ; 
 and Beaulieu by his retreat confessed his weakness and gave 
 up the whole campaign. 
 
 Augereau effectively followed up the retiring enemy for a 
 day, and Massena marched on Verona, and then, turned 
 on Dolce, out of which he drove the Austrian rearguard. 
 Here the column stopped : it was idle to pursue farther ; there 
 were other things more important to be done to secure what 
 the French had so quickly won. Bonaparte turned towards 
 Mantua. 
 
 Trent, on the upper Adige, was the Austrian depot and 
 place of assembly, their secondary base, as it were, from which 
 was to start their line of operations, whose objective now was 
 Mantua, a fortress essential to their holding northern Italy, 
 and one that, if they would not confess to failure, they must 
 
TOPOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS. 253 
 
 relieve. And there was no question that they would soon 
 undertake to do so. Mantua lies in a bend of the Mincio, 
 and has about it a network of marshes and lakes, fed by the 
 slow flowing river. There entered the fortress at this time 
 two bridges and three causeways, the ends of the roads from 
 Legnano, Verona, Brescia, Cremona and Borgoforte. The 
 plain north of Mantua is not far from thirty miles wide, from 
 the city to the foothills of the Alps ; and to this plain there 
 were from Trent down but three roads fit for artillery. The 
 shortest was by the way of Roveredo and Dolce to Verona 
 along the left bank of the Adige, with an occasional crossing 
 to another road which ran down on the right bank. The long- 
 est way was through the Brenta valley to Vicenza, where the 
 highway from Carinthia came in. The third lay through the 
 Val Bona along the Chiese to Brescia. The Dolce and Brenta 
 roads were not connected, except at the upper part by a few 
 mountain paths. At the head of the Lake of Garda was a 
 road from Roveredo to the Val Bona ; but this could easily 
 be closed at Eocca d' Anfo. The highway along the right 
 bank of the Adige was at places useless for artUlery, and 
 was commanded by the defile of La Corona, and by Monte 
 Magnone and Monte Baldo, a pile of hills which dominate 
 the country like a huge square fortress. South of these lat- 
 ter heights lies a large natural amphitheatre, from the middle 
 of which rises the plateau of Rivoli, around which, in a plain, 
 flows the Tasso stream. The plateau is of itself a species of 
 natural bastion over a mile in length. The Adige and the 
 Brenta are both torrential rivers. The former on reaching 
 the plain is some four hundred feet wide, and its main bridges 
 at that time were protected by Chiusa, Verona and Legnano. 
 From the topographical conditions described, it appears 
 that, starting from the mountain base of Trent, the Austrians 
 would be compelled to march to the plain in one dangerously 
 
254 SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. 
 
 long column, or in several columns far apart ; and the parts 
 of the one long column would have to be as much separated 
 by distance as the several columns would have to be by nat- 
 ural obstacles. On the other hand, the French divisions at 
 Legnano, Verona, Rivoli, La Corona and Salo could easily 
 concentrate on the open ground south of Garda. This was 
 much in Bonaparte's favor. Still, should a superior Austrian 
 army carefully debouch from the mountains, deploy and march 
 in mass on Mantua, striking the French forces whenever met, 
 it might by intelligent and energetic initiative overwhelm 
 them. Wonderful as had been his gain so far, the French 
 leader's task was far from completed. 
 
 As is not uncommon with success, Bonaparte's recent 
 achievements had brought serious difficulties in their wake. 
 The Austrian column was by its retreat nearing the large 
 reinforcements which had been sent to it from the Rhine ; 
 while Bonaparte was growing weaker the farther he moved 
 away from his base, and could not look for equal accessions 
 to his army. The Italian princes were, to be sure, neutral ; 
 but feigned friendliness was not the best of guaranties. Rome 
 and Naples in the south might do the French a mischief. 
 Already annoyed at the French forced requisitions of bread, 
 Venice had grown fairly wroth at Bonaparte's unwarranted 
 invasion of her territory at Peschiera, though indeed she had 
 laid herself open to this treatment by giving free passage 
 through that fortress to the Austrians. An English division 
 of ten thousand men, now in Corsica, might land at Livorno 
 and incite opposition to the French arms. All these items, 
 each small in itself, would make a great sum of strength when 
 added to the efforts of the Austrian army already in the field. 
 Bonaparte had but forty-five thousand men, part in garrison : 
 the Austrians had thirty thousand impregnably posted on the 
 Adige, and as many more said to be coming along as rein- 
 
THREE THINGS ESSENTIAL. 255 
 
 forcements. It has been suggested by some military critics 
 that Bonaparte should have at once masked Mantua and fol- 
 lowed up Beaulieu. But this is an extravagant view. Such 
 a course would change what had so far been remarkable enter- 
 prise and courage into what would have been foolhardiness 
 unworthy of even a Charles XII. And with all his boldness 
 and enterprise, Bonaparte possessed a well-developed bump 
 of caution. 
 
 Three things were most prominently essential. First, Bona- 
 parte must watch the avenues by which the enemy might ap- 
 proach, to learn the fact at once and use means to check their 
 oncoming. Second, he must take Mantua, as a part of his 
 base for a further advance from the line of the Mincio. Third, 
 he must make terms with the Italian states to the south of 
 him, lest at some inopportune moment they fall upon his rear. 
 This last indeed was the idea of the Directory, with which, as 
 we have seen, Bonaparte only in part agreed. The Directory 
 saw, like "many good generals in Europe," altogether " too 
 many things at once." Bonaparte kept his eye on one thing, 
 the Austrian army, certain that so long as this was beaten or 
 neutralized, he need not fear the others. Still, operations 
 against the Austrian army depended on careful arrangements 
 in his rear, and these he at once began to make. Although 
 Bonaparte did not believe in an eccentric movement by a large 
 force on Rome and Naples, he did propose to anticipate 
 trouble from thence ; and being moreover constrained to meet 
 the views of his superiors, he redistributed his army. 
 t Massena was given charge of Verona and its important 
 bridges, as well as the country up the Adige, with orders to 
 watch for and fend off any Austrian advance ; and a small 
 force of his was to be stationed west of the Lake of Garda at 
 Salo, and an equal force at Monte Baldo, on the east of the 
 lake. Serurier and Augereau were sent to Mantua to shut in 
 
256 ROADS SEIZED. 
 
 the fortress, if this could be done. Vaubois' division was 
 coming on from the Army of the Alps, and this with Dalle- 
 magne's three grenadier battalions, twelve thousand five 
 hundred in all, remained free in Bonaparte's own hand for 
 use as occasion demanded. A part of Augereau's force was 
 dispatched to Leguano. The garrisons in Lombardy num- 
 bered nine thousand men. Inasmuch as in forty-eight hours 
 the French divisions could assemble on either bank of the 
 Mincio, the Army of Italy may be said to have been firmly 
 established on that river ; and all northern Italy was in its 
 possession, save only the citadel of Milan and the fortress of 
 Mantua. The works at Peschiera were ordered to be put in 
 good condition with as great dispatch as possible ; and after 
 inspecting Verona, Bonaparte established his headquarters in 
 Roverbella, a central point from whence he could watch the 
 north, as well as carry on the siege of Mantua. 
 
 Situated with a semicircular lagoon on the north and 
 marshes on the south, Mantua was exceptionally strong. The 
 citadel on the north side of the Mincio was practically inex- 
 pugnable ; but the south and the west of the fortress were 
 possible of approach. Augereau, on the right bank, seized 
 the two causeway roads leading into the city on the west and 
 south sides of the lagoon near the fortress ; and Serurier, on 
 the left bank, seized the two on the east side, and occupied 
 the suburb of San Giorgio. Dallemagne, who was at first 
 stationed at headquarters, later replaced Augereau. 
 
 The latter on June 12 was sent to Bologna, crossing the 
 Po at Borgoforte, to further the enterprises ordered by the 
 Directory, and which Bonaparte found it essential to inaugu- 
 rate against Tuscany and Rome. These south Italian matters 
 did not, however, long remain of military significance. By a 
 lucky accident, such as all through life often subserved Napo- 
 leon's vigor and genius, Ferdinand of Naples treated for peace 
 
AMPLE SIEGE EQUIPMENT. 257 
 
 and withdrew his contingent from Beaulieu. And as, judging 
 it wise to draw the temper of the divine pontiff, Bonaparte 
 directed Augereau to march on Bologna, it was an agreeable 
 surprise when this city received the French willingly, while a 
 detachment captured Livorno with a large supply of English 
 stores ; whereupon His Holiness made haste to sue for peace, 
 and signing an armistice, paid twelve and a half million francs 
 indemnity, gave up a hundred of his best pictures, busts, vases 
 and statues, selected by the French Commissioners from the 
 Vatican collection, and five hundred manuscripts from its 
 library, to enrich the galleries of Paris, and yielded up Ferrara, 
 Ancona and Castel Urbino. The guns of these towns, added 
 to those sent on from the Piedmont fortresses, made up an 
 ample siege equipment at Mantua. The Grand Duke of 
 Tuscany, who had broken neutrality, was also mulcted. In 
 addition to the above good fortune, the citadel of Milan sur- 
 rendered June 29, and the material there employed could also 
 be sent on to be used in the siege of Mantua. 
 
 When Bonaparte visited Tuscany, where his family had 
 originated, he was received by an Abbe Buonaparte, who 
 treated him and his staff with great distinction. The general 
 bade the Abbe ask some favor, and after much pressing, the 
 churchman desired that the victorious general should procure 
 from the Pope the canonization of a certain Father Bona- 
 venture Buonaparte, who had generations before been a Capu- 
 chin monk of Bologna. The general laughed heartily at his 
 distant cousin's choice, but the latter persisted, saying that he 
 desired to have in the family a great man on earth and a 
 saint in heaven. Later, indeed, on his death, he left his con- 
 siderable property to Napoleon, who created with it a chari- 
 table institution in Tuscany. 
 
 The siege was pressed vigorously from July 5 on. But 
 news was constantly running in concerning heavy Austrian 
 
258 WURMSER SUCCEEDS BEAULIEU. 
 
 reinforcements on the way, and the force which Bonaparte 
 figured out as the one he would shortly be called on to face 
 summed up some sixty thousand men. So, at least, he an- 
 nounced to the Directory in asking for further accessions to 
 his own force of forty-two thousand. This was perhaps an 
 excessive estimate, but not far wrong if it included the gar- 
 rison of Mantua, and far too low if any of the Italian states 
 should join the Austrians. The Mantua garrison, which 
 Bonaparte gauged at eight thousand men, was really thirteen 
 thousand strong. 
 
 t> It was indeed important that Mantua should be taken at 
 as early a day as possible, for Fieldmarshal Count Wurmser 
 had been appointed to succeed Beaulieu, with instructions to 
 relieve the fortress at all hazards ; and this officer had left 
 the Rhine with twenty-five thousand old and tried troops. 
 He had served Austria fifty years, in the Seven Years' War 
 and against the Turks ; he had gallantly forced the Weissem- 
 burg lines in 1793, had beaten Pichegru at Heidelberg in 
 1795, and had invaded the Palatinate. A fine old cavalry offi- 
 cer he was ; and yet he lacked much of being an army leader. 
 Until the new Austrian army got so close to the outlet of 
 the mountains on the upper Adige as to be an immediate 
 danger, Bonaparte would not give over the siege of Mantua, 
 which seemed to be approaching its end. Massena at Verona 
 and Rivoli had fifteen thousand men ; Augereau's troops on 
 the right at Legnano comprised six to eight thousand more ; 
 while on the left, west of the lake, stood Sauret at Salo with 
 five thousand men, under Massena's orders. Despinoy's divi- 
 sion of five thousand men had just arrived from Milan, and 
 was set to watching the Adige from Verona to Roneo ; Seru- 
 rier, with eight thousand men, was operating against Mantua; 
 while Kilmaine, with three thousand reserve cavalry, occupied 
 Valese, subject to Bonaparte's quick call. As reserve there 
 
A STEADY BOMBARDMENT. 259 
 
 was a brigade at Peschiera, one at Verona, and one in camp 
 between the Lake of Garda and the Adige. The numbers in 
 the several divisions are stated with so much diversity in the 
 various reports that now, as always in Napoleon's campaigns, 
 it is impossible to arrive at accuracy. The effective given is, 
 however, near enough the truth. The French leader watched 
 operations from Verona and Eoverbella alternately with eager 
 eyes. 
 
 The siege of Mantua had been heartily pushed. As in the 
 early weeks, however, the French were far from being well 
 equipped for the operation, an attempt was made early in 
 July to capture the fortress by surprise ; but it failed, for as 
 Bonaparte then said, " all undertakings of this kind depend 
 absolutely on luck, on a dog or a goose." Upon the return 
 of Augereau from the south, the first parallels were opened in 
 the night of July 18-19, and completed the succeeding night. 
 An attack was made on the outworks of the place July 19, 
 but this also failed, and Bonaparte then resorted to a steady 
 bombardment until the end of the month. But Mantua, with 
 its three hundred and sixteen guns and ample garrison, 
 though, in deed out of the thirteen thousand men there were 
 four thousand sick, fended off every attempt the French could 
 make to break down her defense. The several towns cap- 
 tured during the preceding campaign had furnished one hun- 
 dred and forty heavy guns, which were gradually put in place ; 
 and having given his personal attention to the inauguration 
 of this work, Bonaparte returned to the front to watch the 
 oncoming of the Austrian reinforced army. 
 
 He did not have to wait long. Wurmser, whose forces, 
 nearly fifty thousand strong, had assembled at Trent by the 
 end of July, made no great haste, but he came in touch with 
 the French outlying forces on the 29th, and pushed in with 
 energy. Acting in part on the controlling cordon idea, and 
 
260 DIVIDED FORCES. 
 
 in part as prescribed by the theatre of operations, he divided 
 his army into halves, one to go around each bank of the Lake 
 of Garda ; and each of the halves was subdivided into two or 
 more columns. 
 
 The part marching on the west bank under Quosdanovich, 
 about eighteen thousand strong, had three columns : one to 
 march on Brescia, one on Salo, one on Gavardo. It had 
 orders to capture these places, and if the French should retire 
 to the right bank of the Po, as Wurmser fondly imagined 
 they might, to march on Placentia, and cut their line of com- 
 munications. The part marching on the east side of the lake 
 was divided into two columns, one on either bank of the 
 Adige. These various columns were organized for the pur- 
 pose of compelling the French to divide their forces. This 
 they indeed accomplished, but Wurmser did not appreciate 
 the difference between divided forces having interior lines, 
 and divided forces operating eccentrically. He was to learn 
 it now. The several Austrian columns all duly advanced 
 on their respective errands, in high heart and excellently 
 equipped. 
 
 During the Silesian wars and during the Bonapartist wars, 
 the Austrians have so often fought the losing part that one 
 might almost believe something to be lacking in the make-up of 
 the Austrian army. But when you examine into the details 
 associated with their frequent defeats, you arrive at a very 
 high estimate of the fine qualities of the Austrian soldier, of 
 the devotion and intelligence of the Austrian officer, and fre- 
 quently of the skill of the Austrian army leader. There 
 was always plenty of fight in an Austrian army, and its good 
 countenance under conditions fit to dull the keenest martial 
 edge commands the admiration of the student of those cam- 
 paigns which have, on the other hand, illustrated the irre- 
 sistible genius of a Frederick and a Napoleon. Moreover, 
 
THE AUSTRIAN ONSLAUGHT. 261 
 
 the Austrian army was always subject to that extraordinarily 
 hide-bound body, the Aulic Council ; and on many a day when 
 Austrian courage rose to culminating fervor could it accom- 
 plish no result, because the patriarchs in Vienna had given it 
 a task absolutely impossible of accomplishment. No praise 
 can be too high for the gallant white-coats. 
 
 At Salo the head of one of Quosdanovich's columns struck 
 and threw back the small detachment of Sauret's forces that 
 held the place, pushed on to Gavardo, and sent a body to take 
 and garrison Brescia. Sauret concentrated to the rear at 
 Desenzano. The column on the right bank of the Adige, 
 under the commanding general in person, and numbering 
 twenty-four thousand men, turned the position of Massena's 
 outlying force at La Corona, in advance of Eivoli, in the 
 early dawn of the 29th ; and this French force was also com- 
 pelled to fall back on Castelnuovo with loss of sixteen hundred 
 men. The Austrians occupied Rivoli. On the left bank of 
 the Adige, the column under Davidovich was expected to 
 seize Verona, at which place a rendezvous was given to all 
 the forces, as there could be no doubt, thought the Austrians, 
 that Bonaparte must fall back at once to the right bank of 
 the Po. At the same time a flying column of five thousand 
 men had been sent into the Brenta valley to mislead the 
 French commander, as at first it did. 
 
 Bonaparte, who was in Montechiaro on the 29th, at once 
 ordered the concentration of Massena, Despinoy and the re- 
 serve cavalry under Kilmaine at Castelnuovo, and instructed 
 Augereau to collect his forces, cross the Adige to the left 
 bank, march via Villanova to Montebello, and attack the 
 enemy on the 30th ; for he looked on the Brenta detachment 
 as one of the main bodies of the enemy. Further intelligence 
 shortly came in about the columns in the Adige valley, and 
 Sauret likewise reported his unequal engagement with the 
 
262 PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES. 
 
 enemy ; whereupon Augereau, before he had gone too far, 
 was withdrawn to Roverbella and Villafranca. News of the 
 loss of Brescia came in on the afternoon of the 30th. 
 
 For once in his life Napoleon was not seized on the instant 
 by the fighting fever. For a few hours he greatly feared that 
 this sudden Austrian onslaught would compel his retreat from 
 the Mincio. The baggage and trains in the rear of the Army 
 of Italy were started back towards Milan, and the citadel 
 there was ordered to be put into a state of perfect defense. 
 On this same July 29 Bonaparte wrote to Serurier : " Part of 
 the division of General Massena has been obliged to fall back. 
 I am going to-night to Castelnuovo with several half-brigades. 
 Perhaps we will reestablish the business, but it meanwhile 
 compels me to take serious precautions for retreat." Then 
 giving him orders what to do, he added, " All that I tell you 
 is only measure of precaution, for we have yet brave and 
 numerous soldiers who have not been in action." The siege 
 lines at Mantua were not yet ordered to be evacuated, but 
 Bonaparte wrote even next day to Augereau to abandon his 
 position on the Adige. " The moments are precious. I con- 
 tide the execution of these measures to your wisdom and to 
 your prudence. Following is the unfortunate position of the 
 army : the enemy has pierced our lines at three points ; he is 
 master of La Corona and of JRivoli, important posts. Massena 
 and Joubert have been obliged to cede to force. Sauret has 
 abandoned Salo and has made his retreat on Desenzano. The 
 enemy has seized Brescia and the bridge at San Marco. You 
 see that our communications are cut with Milan and Verona. 
 Await new orders at Roverbella. I shall go there in person." 
 
 All this sounds unlike the vibrating tones of the orders 
 issued months ago ; but it must be remembered that this was 
 Bonaparte's first sample of the difficulties of the defensive. 
 He had commanded an army in one series of offensive oper- 
 
A FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY. 263 
 
 atlons, when the briskness of the work carried him and every- 
 thing before it. Now, for the moment, when struck at several 
 points, though he had been carefully watching the enemy's 
 manoeuvres, he seemed not immediately to collect himself. 
 He had no precedents to follow : he had to create them. But 
 the arrested combativeness was but temporary. Within a 
 day and night he was himself again. 
 
 To some of his lieutenants, who saw the matter only from 
 their own partial standpoint, the situation appeared less 
 threatening. With reference to the Brenta column, Massena 
 wrote from Pieverono, July 29 : "I expect to see the number 
 of troops which yesterday reached Vicenza diminish. You 
 will see, Citizen General, that after all it will turn out only a 
 reconnoissance." And Sahaguet wrote from Milan, July 31 : 
 " Up till now nothing indicates, despite the usual exaggera- 
 tions, that the enemy's force which marched to Brescia is 
 worth- notice." This by no means indicates that Bonaparte's 
 judgment on the general situation was not the more intelligent 
 one. For any but a fighting leader, it would have been a 
 sound conclusion. And any one of the division commanders 
 who had served through the late campaign would have weak- 
 ened under the situation, and have at once elected to leave the 
 conduct of the entire defense to his present chief, so strongly 
 had he already impressed himself upon them all. This had 
 been shown when Bonaparte was absent from the front at the 
 time of the revolts in Milan and Pavia : a feeling of uncer- 
 tainty had reigned as the army approached the enemy, and 
 Berthier from Crema, May 25, wrote him : " The army longs 
 with impatience for you." The whole incident is interesting 
 as a study of Napoleon's character ; but as his action, shortly 
 undertaken, was colored by all his own peculiar genius, his 
 first idea has no other value. According to Jomini, Bona- 
 parte assembled a council of war, in which Kilmaine and the 
 
264 IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ENEMY. 
 
 educated soldiers voted for retreat; Augereau, in a fine fervor 
 not usual with him, demanded to fight his division, as he 
 gallantly did a few days later ; others followed suit. 
 
 The entire incident reminds one of the equally curious 
 mental attitude of Frederick at Mollwitz. After freely ex- 
 posing himself in the thick of the fight, he was persuaded by 
 Schwerin to leave the field, though the battle was then not 
 absolutely lost, as the sequel proved. To such weakness the 
 king never again yielded. Neither did Napoleon. 
 
 So soon as the affair developed, the conviction seized Bona- 
 parte that here lay another chance to operate against the 
 separated halves of the Austrian army ; and this soon fully 
 possessed him. " The enemy, in descending from the Tyrol 
 by way of Brescia and the Adige, put me in the middle ; if 
 my army was too feeble to make head to the two divisions of 
 the enemy, it could beat each one of them separately," says 
 the report to the Directory of August 6. With a view, then, 
 to fall first on the column descending on the west bank, be- 
 cause it was nearer to and threatened his communications, he 
 galloped to Desenzano and ordered Sauret, whom Despinoy 
 should follow, to march July 31 on Salo, and attack the 
 Austrians afresh. In his march on Salo, Quosdanovich had 
 cut off Guyeux, of Sauret's division ; but this officer retired 
 to a walled inclosure on the lake, " shut himself up in a great 
 house in Salo," says the report, and desperately held himself ; 
 and three Austrian battalions were left to watch him. Part 
 of Sauret's orders was to rescue his lieutenant. From Desen- 
 zano Bonaparte galloped over to Castelnuovo, to which point 
 Massena had been forced to fall back, and instructed this 
 general to evacuate Verona and to take position at Peschiera, 
 into which he was to throw a sufficient garrison, and on the right 
 bank, facing the Mincio, and to guard the bridge at Valeggio 
 with a strong detachment. Augereau and Kilmaine had got 
 
SIEGE OF MANTUA RAISED. 265 
 
 back to Roverbella and Castellaro, where they were to stand 
 for the moment to protect the siege operations at Mantua ; 
 but as it was evident that these could be no longer maintained, 
 for every man who could carry a musket must march against 
 the approaching Austrians, they soon ceased to be of value 
 there. Though the work was nearing its end, Serurier was 
 ordered to raise the siege, get the artillery away if possible, 
 and march part of his division to the support of Augereau. 
 If not able to save the material, he was to spike the guns, 
 burn the carriages and caissons, destroy the emplacements, 
 bury the projectiles, and throw the powder into the river. As 
 a matter of fact, Serurier had little transportation, and was 
 obliged to destroy the siege equipment, which he did in the 
 night of July 31-August 1. Some of the guns were left 
 intact to the enemy. In justifying this abandonment, Bo- 
 naparte said that " to save guns is a matter of honor to an 
 officer of artillery; to accomplish results, with or without 
 loss of guns, is the affair of the commanding general." Late 
 at night, Bonaparte, who scarcely left the saddle, reached 
 RoverbeUa, and hurried Augereau, Kilmaine and that part of 
 Serurier's division which had come up, by way of Goito and 
 Guidizzolo, towards Montechiaro ; while Serurier's siege troops 
 on the right bank of the Mincio were headed to the bridge 
 over the Oglio at Marcaria, to secure the line of retreat by 
 the Cremona-Pizzighetone-Pavia road, should the army have 
 to forfeit the line back to Milan ; and a few hours later Mas- 
 sena was ordered to move to Lonato, whither Despinoy would 
 also follow, and Kilmaine with the reserve cavalry. The 
 commander-in-chief had quite regained his equipoise ; if he 
 was to deal a blow, he meant that it should be a massed one ; 
 and thus retiring his whole force behind the Mincio, he pre- 
 pared to crush Quosdanovich. Having without resistance 
 occupied Brescia, this Austrian general had advanced July 30 
 
266 GUYEUX RELEASED. 
 
 on Montechiaro, and sent Ocskay to Lonato. On July 31 he 
 ran across the French advance parties. 
 
 Bonaparte was omnipresent, and always found himself at 
 the point most threatened. He proposed to have his plan 
 executed in his own fashion ; and during these few restless 
 days he rode to a standstill five horses, and these of the best 
 to be had, on his never ceasing gallops from place to place. 
 
 On the 31st, also, Sauret moved forward to Salo, and turning 
 the left flank of the Austrian line, seized the place and released 
 Guyeux from his peculiar position ; " General Guyeux and 
 the troops under his orders remained forty-eight hours with- 
 out bread, constantly fighting against the enemy," reported 
 Bonaparte ; having done which, as the Austrian body near by 
 was reinforced to a point far superior to his own, and threat- 
 ened to cut him off, Sauret again retired to Desenzano. Mean- 
 while Despinoy and Massena's head of column, advancing 
 from Peschiera, threw the Austrian detachment under Ocskay 
 out of Lonato. Quosdanovich now recognized that he had a 
 superior force in his front ; and beginning after the Salo sur- 
 prise to fear for his line of retreat, — for the good road along 
 the lake bank to Salo afforded the French an opportunity of 
 throwing forward a large body, — he started back to Gavardo 
 late at night, leaving only a small force at Montechiaro. 
 During the same night Augereau and his division were mak- 
 ing a forced march towards Brescia, which they reached 
 August 1, driving the enemy out of Montechiaro on the way; 
 and the possession of this city at once gave back to the French 
 their direct line of communications to Milan, recovered the 
 large stores of bread-stuffs and material there lying, which the 
 Austrians had left in too much haste to destroy, and rendered 
 the Pizzighetone-Pavia line that Bonaparte had seized at 
 Marcaria superfluous. Sauret was again ordered forward to 
 Salo in support of the general programme, but he did not 
 
AUSTRIAN FORCES RALLIED. 
 
 267 
 
 advance far ; while Massena assembled his arriving columns 
 at Lonato, as the key-point of the region. Quosdanovich got 
 to Gavardo, and here the Austrian forces which had been in 
 Brescia, Lonato and Montechiaro rallied on him August 1. 
 In this place, and at Tormino, he took up his stand, feeling 
 secure of his line of retreat, but having practically accom- 
 plished nothing in the general scheme for beating the French 
 and recovering Mantua. 
 
 Sword of Massena. 
 (Rivoli Collection.) 
 
XL 
 
 LONATO AND CASTTGLIONE, BASSANO AND MANTUA. 
 AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1796. 
 
 BoNAPAKTB had lost Peschiera and Lonato, but had driven Quosdanovich 
 back to Gavardo. Wurmser proposed to cross the Mincio and join his lieuten- 
 ant. Bonaparte lay between the two. Wurmser was slow. Had he operated 
 rapidly, the Army of Italy would have been crushed between superior bodies. 
 On August 3 Quosdanovich advanced towards Lonato, which had been re- 
 taken, and from here Massena drovfe him back, while Augereau by handsome 
 fighting checked Wurmser's van at Castiglione. On August 4 the French left 
 advanced again on Quosdanovich, but found that he had retired up the lake. 
 This enabled Massena to join in the battle of next day at Castiglione. Having 
 rid himself of the Austrian right, Bonaparte now outnumbered the Austrian 
 left near Castiglione. Augereau remained in place, Massena came up from 
 Lonato, and Serurier's corps from Mantua ; and the Brescia troops came along 
 as reserve. Wurmser prepared to fight a defensive battle, and at the proper 
 moment to turn Bonaparte's left. On his side Bonaparte proposed to turn 
 Wurmser's left and cut him ofiB from the Miucio. The French preparations 
 were the better, and the attack was sharp. Augereau quickly broke through 
 the Austrian line, and Wurmser was wise to retire and save his bridges. For 
 six days the French had been marching and fighting, but they were enthused by 
 their splendid success. The siege of Mantua was renewed. Wurmser began a 
 fresh advance at the end of August down the Adige by way of Bassano. Bona- 
 parte kept on with the siege of Mantua, held the lower Adige with small 
 forces, and early in September marched up river, capturing Koveredo and Trent, 
 and thus getting on the rear of the column in the Brenta valley. Holding the 
 Austrians on the upper Adige, he followed Wurmser down the Brenta, beat him 
 at Bassano, threw part of his forces back on the Piave, and followed the rest 
 towards Mantua. A race ensued towards the fortress ; the faster French almost 
 trapped the enemy, but Wurmser eluded Bonaparte's van. In a sharp fight on 
 August 16 the Austrians were defeated and hemmed up in Mantua. The place 
 was again shut in. Wurmser's army had been practically destroyed. The 
 French marching has been rarely equaled. Bonaparte had again proved that 
 speed was one of the great factors in war. 
 
WURMSER TOO DELIBERATE. 
 
 269 
 
 Wurmser. 
 
 Having reached Valeggio the last day of July, and learn- 
 ing that Mantua was freed of the French, Wurmser deter- 
 mined to cross the Mincio, and fall on the rear of the army 
 which was now manifestly opposing the oncoming of his lieu- 
 tenant, Quosdanovich, of 
 whose general wherea- 
 bouts he knew, but from 
 whom he received no news 
 as to details. But the 
 Austrian commander was 
 much too deliberate; he 
 felt that he must first visit 
 the fortress he had re- 
 lieved ; and this he did, 
 entering Mantua in state 
 with two foot and one 
 horse divisions ; he seemed 
 
 not to know that time is of the very essence of manoeuvres 
 leading up to battle, and on August 1 he only sent a van for- 
 ward to Goito, and a small party over at Borghetto to hold 
 the crossing, while the bulk of this Austrian wing assembled 
 at Roverbella. Next day, August 2, Liptay made a formal 
 passage at Goito and moved on Castiglione, but advancing 
 beyond this place, his van was met by some of Augereau's 
 troops from Montechiaro, and hustled back. Bayalich, with 
 more energy, crossed below Peschiera, and marching on 
 Lonato, smartly attacked and drove out Massena, who retired 
 to Ponte San Marco. Bonaparte had in person reached 
 Brescia late on August 1, and while Liptay was crossing at 
 Goito, Brescia now being out of danger, he established Au- 
 gereau's division in Montechiaro, and ordered Guyeux, who 
 commanded wounded Sauret's division, backed by Despinoy, 
 to definitely push Quosdanovich out of Gavardo and Salo to 
 
270 THE REAL CLASH OF ARMS. 
 
 tbe north. Massena received instructions to hold Ponte San 
 Marco as a general central reserve, and Augereau to base 
 on Montechiaro, in any advance he might make against 
 Wurmser. 
 
 A detachment of Augereau's division, acting as rearguard, 
 had retired fighting before Wurmser's advance across the 
 Mincio, as far back as Castiglione ; and here Bonaparte or- 
 dered its commanding officer, Valette, to maintain his ground. 
 The task was a hard one, with less than two thousand men 
 to " defend this important position and thus always keep the 
 division of General Wurmser distant from " the forces under 
 Bonaparte ; but allowing himself again to be, as his chief de- 
 clared, unnecessarily driven in by the much superior Austrian 
 head of column under Liptay, Bonaparte at once cashiered 
 him in the presence of his men. Liptay occupied Castiglione, 
 but Wurmser did not reach Goito until August 2, nor cross 
 until next day. 
 
 On August 3 came the real clash of arms, the French hav- 
 ing to fight to both front and rear. Bonaparte describes his 
 position as a long line, with Guyeux on the left to attack 
 Salo, Massena in the centre to attack Lonato, and Augereau 
 on the right to attack Castiglione. This, in a sense, it may 
 have been considered. Counting in Massena, Bonaparte could 
 face Wurmser with twenty-five thousand men. He was now 
 backing on the Chiese, as the Austrians were on the Mincio. 
 Exact details of the operations of the day are difficult to ex- 
 hume from the letters, reports, or contemporary accounts and 
 histories, as the movements of the minor bodies are carelessly 
 referred to, and the hours or even days of their manoeuvres 
 are mostly slurred or omitted. Even Bonaparte's report to 
 the Directory is blind reading. But the general work of 
 each day is plain, and studied with the map, gives a reason- 
 ably clear idea of how oddly large bodies of both French and 
 
A LONG BATTLEFIELD. 
 
 271 
 
 Austrians wandered and fought over the twenty-five miles long 
 battlefield from Salo to Goito. Fortunately Wurmser's slow- 
 ness enabled Bonaparte to keep his mass in action against 
 Quosdanovich, and to reserve his heavier blow on Wurmser 
 for a future hour. Had the Austrian commander saved one 
 
 Lonato-Castiglione Country. 
 
 day by being a trifle more active, the French situation would 
 have been far more dangerous. 
 
 Bonaparte's first problem was to hold Wurmser from ad- 
 vancing, and meanwhile permanently to drive Quosdanovich 
 away from the vicinity of the French line of retreat. Baya- 
 
272 THE BATTLE OF LONATO. 
 
 lieh was in Lonato, and him Bonaparte must force back in 
 order to keep this Austrian officer from reaching out towards 
 Quosdanovich and establishing connection. Heading Mas- 
 sena's division at San Marco, he advanced during the morn- 
 ing of the 3d towards Lonato. Meanwhile one of Quosdano- 
 vich's columns under Ocskay had advanced, unopposed, from 
 Gavardo on Desenzano, and thence made its way to Lonato, 
 and taken place on the right of Bayalich. As the armies 
 approached each other in front of Lonato, the French van 
 was thrown back by a well-timed Austrian attack which anti- 
 cipated Massena, and Bayalich strove to take advantage of 
 the momentary gain by extending his wings so as to lap the 
 French line, and with his right to get beyond its left in the 
 direction of Quosdanovich. For this extension Bonaparte 
 speedily punished the Austrian general. Throwing out lines 
 of skirmishers to fend off the Austrian wings, which the clever 
 French light troops succeeded for some time in doing by a 
 sharp fire from cover, and forming two half-brigades in close 
 battalion columns with a dragoon regiment in support, he 
 launched the mass forward, and quickly broke through the 
 enemy's centre. General Pijon and some guns, lost in the 
 first rush, were recaptured. By following this blow up with 
 a second line, before the enemy recovered his equipoise, the 
 victory was completed. Of the two Austrian wings thus sepa- 
 rated, the left one under Bayalich naturally retired on the 
 Mincio ; the right one under Ocskay as naturally strove to 
 march back whence it came, unaware that Guyeux by his 
 advance now blocked its way. Massena reoccupied Lonato. 
 Thus Quosdanovich was definitely cut off from his chief, and 
 the French could turn upon either one at will. 
 
 Early on the 3d, in addition to the others, Bonaparte had 
 organized three columns, consisting of Guyeux and Despinoy, 
 with Dallemagne's division in support between them, and sent 
 
A FORTUNATE SLOWNESS. 
 
 273 
 
 them forward from Brescia and San Marco on Gavardo, rely- 
 ing on Massena, who as a central reserve should occupy 
 Lonato, and on Augereau's column, which was to advance 
 from Montechiaro on Castiglione, to fend off the main Aus- 
 trian army until he himself could drive off Quosdauovich, this 
 
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 tUVEUX 
 
 SAN 
 MARCO^ 
 
 MASSENA 
 
 OCSKAV 
 
 'BAYAUCH 
 
 MONTE.CHIAROrJ\ 
 
 
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 AUCEREAG-yJ 
 
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 Battle of Lonato. 
 
 
 officer being under orders to make a fresh effort to join his 
 chief. Wurmser's slowness was fortunate ; but more fortu- 
 nate stiU, instead of working in one body, Quosdauovich, 
 while his chief was concentrating forward on Castiglione, had 
 
274 OCSKAY'S DISASTER. 
 
 cut up his own force into several columns, under Ott on the 
 right, Eeuss in the centre, and Ocskay on the left, which, 
 operating on diverging lines, could by no possibility act in 
 unison. In their advance from Gavardo, the two Austrian 
 columns under Ott and Reuss met the French under Guyeux 
 and Despinoy, and after a smart exchange retired to Gavardo. 
 The third column under Ocskay marched, as narrated, to 
 Desenzano, and thence towards Lonato, where it joined Baya- 
 lich, and got defeated; and when Ocskay started back the 
 way he came, he was not only pursued by Massena, but found 
 himself intercepted by Guyeux. 
 
 This is how it occurred. Ott and Keuss had been followed 
 by the French to Gavardo. Here Guyeux attacked the Aus- 
 trian left, but by their hardy onslaught was cut off from 
 Despinoy, and driven back to Salo, followed part way by the 
 enemy. Meanwhile Despinoy and Dallemagne fell on the 
 Austrian right, but with equal lack of success, and after a 
 combat of some hours, they also were forced back towards 
 Brescia. Matters began to look somewhat doubtful for the 
 French left, despite excellent conduct on the part of both 
 officers and men. But again fortune favored Bonaparte's 
 energy and determination. Though Guyeux was marching 
 in retreat, he was yet in good order, and when, moving south 
 from Salo, he met Ocskay retiring from Lonato and pursued 
 by Massena's troops, he at once set heartily to work to aid 
 his brother officer. Between the two, Ocskay was in evil case, 
 and after a smart resistance saw that to avoid losing his last 
 man, he must lay down his arms. This he did. A small 
 part only of his brigade managed to escape and rejoin Eeuss, 
 who had advanced on the road to Desenzano, but on hearing 
 of Ocskay's disaster, had retired. Quosdanovich had thus 
 won a handsome but partial victory against two of Bona- 
 parte's columns. Yet he was so disheartened by the loss of 
 
JUNOT'S BRAVERY. 275 
 
 Ocskay's division, and so thoroughly puzzled by the report 
 of a few men who escaped from the disaster as to the num- 
 bers of the French, that he determined on retreat, and at once 
 issued orders accordingly. With plenty of physical, he lacked 
 that moral courage which bids defiance to disaster. 
 
 Though perhaps at times prejudiced for or against his lieu- 
 tenants, Bonaparte was not slow to spread the praises of his 
 favorites. In his report to the Directory of August 6 he 
 says : " I ordered my aide-de-camp. Chief of Brigade Junot, 
 to place himself at the head of my company of guides and to 
 follow the enemy, to catch him by his speed at Desenzano, 
 and to oblige him to retire on Salo. Arrived at Desenzano, 
 he encountered Colonel Bender with a part of his regiment 
 of lancers, which he charged ; but Junot, not wanting to 
 amuse himself by charging the rear of the column, made a 
 detour by the right, took the regiment in front, and had 
 wounded the colonel, whom he wished to take prisoner, when 
 he was himself surrounded, and after having killed six men 
 with his own hand, he was overturned, tumbled into a ditch, 
 and wounded with six sabre cuts, none of which, they lead me 
 to hope, will be mortal." 
 
 The battle of Lonato was thus a series of isolated marches 
 and combats. The main reserve body under Massena, in 
 fighting towards the east, had recaptured Lonato. The body 
 under Guyeux, Despinoy and Dallemagne had started as a 
 whole towards the north, but had been cut in two, and then, 
 after operating on the Austrian flank, had been forced to 
 withdraw. Ocskay had marched south, past Guyeux's right, 
 on Lonato, and on retiring after his defeat, had been caught 
 between Massena and Guyeux, and captured. Augereau was 
 holding head to Liptay by superb fighting near Castiglione. 
 This to-and-fro almost hap-hazard battle-manoeuvring had, 
 however, resulted in cutting Quosdanovich from his chief, and 
 
276 AT CASTIGLIONE. 
 
 in throwing him back up the lake — which was the end 
 aimed at. 
 
 While all this was going on at and north of Lonato, Au- 
 gereau, in order to hold back Wurmser, had been equally 
 busy. He had started early on the 3d from Montechiaro 
 towards Castiglione, to contain the main Austrian column 
 under Wurmser. Liptay had also received orders from 
 Wurmser to advance on Montechiaro, and no sooner out of 
 Castiglione than, as stated, he ran against the much superior 
 forces of Augereau. Hoping to be sustained, Liptay fell 
 back to a position on the right and left of Castiglione, and 
 here accepted the French attack that Augereau delayed not 
 to deliver. Beyrand fell on Liptay's left ; Verdier and the 
 grenadiers attacked the castle at the south of the town, while 
 Pelletier indulged in a feint against his right. Robert had 
 made a long circuit in the early hours of the day around Lip- 
 tay's left, and lay in ambush in bis rear ; and Augereau kept 
 a reserve well in hand behind his line. Liptay held his posi- 
 tion with distinct tenacity despite the French superior forces, 
 and yielded no ground to the repeated attacks until Eobert 
 broke out of ambush and fell upon him unawares. He then 
 retired in good order to the heights behind Castiglione, where 
 he threw back several further assaults by Augereau. He had 
 done himself vast credit in resisting the masterful onsets of 
 the French general. Late in the day Wurmser's column 
 began to reach the ground. These reinforcements might have 
 enabled the Austrians to push Augereau back, but they con- 
 tented themselves with holding their ground, and at night 
 retired to the heights behind Castiglione and near Solferino, 
 where during the 4th Wurmser collected twenty thousand 
 men. Augereau had done his work bravely and skillfully. 
 But the report exaggerates in saying that " all the day he 
 delivered and sustained fierce combats against forces double 
 
QUOSDANOVICH IN RETREAT. 277 
 
 \ 
 
 his own." The Austrian loss at Lonato is stated as three 
 thousand men killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners 
 and twenty guns ; at Castiglione on the 3d, four thousand 
 killed, wounded and missing. The French casualties were 
 less, as they lost no prisoners on that day, though during the 
 campaign Bonaparte acknowledges thirteen hundred captured. 
 Towards evening the leader came up and inspected the work 
 of " intrepid Augereau," as he calls him in the Report, gave 
 instructions for the morrow, and returned to his headquarters, 
 then at Lonato, to supervise the whole scheme of action. 
 
 When, according to orders, on August 4 Despinoy, rein- 
 forced by three thousand men from the Army of the Alps, 
 and Guyeux, reinforced by a brigade of Massena's, again 
 sallied out respectively from Brescia and Salo, determined to 
 drive Quosdanovich out of Gavardo, as they had the day 
 before failed to do, they found to their surprise that the Aus- 
 trians were in full retreat up river on Eiva. All they could 
 do was to fall on the Austrian rear, which they did with 
 effect. Quosdanovich had made up his mind that he could 
 not effect a junction with his chief by this route, and had con- 
 cluded to march around the north of the lake to the Adige. 
 A small party had been left behind. This rearguard got 
 cut off by the French advance under Guyeux. Part of it, 
 however, made its way to the main column. The other part 
 essayed to cut its way through to Wurmser south of the lake. 
 Quosdanovich's retreat was a lucky termination to what might 
 have been a situation beyond even Bonaparte's resourceful- 
 ness ; but it was well earned by the French leader's energy 
 and defiance of danger. 
 
 While Massena on the 4th was marching towards Casti- 
 glione and the expected battle there, Bonaparte had returned 
 to headquarters at Lonato, which he deemed to be sufficiently 
 protected with a guard of twelve hundred men. But that part 
 
278 A FEAT OF AUDACITY. 
 
 of Quosdanovich's rearguard which had marched south had 
 lost its way in seeking to join Wurmser, and suddenly appear- 
 ing at Lonato, boldly summoned the headquarters guard to 
 surrender. Only by a feat of audacity, and at marked per- 
 sonal risk, could Bonaparte face the matter out ; but he suc- 
 ceeded in bluffing the Austrian officer in command, and after 
 some show of resistance the party of two thousand men (four 
 thousand he calls it), with four guns, gave in and surrendered. 
 Bonaparte's narration of this affair is interesting : — 
 
 " I myself went to Lonato to look at the troops that I was to draw from 
 thence ; but what was my surprise on entering the place to receive a par- 
 liamentary who summoned the commandant to surrender, because, said 
 he, you are surrounded on all sides ! In effect, the different cavalry 
 videttes announced to me that several columns were in touch with our 
 grand guard, and that already the road from Brescia to Lonato was in- 
 tercepted at the bridge of San Marco. I then felt that it could only be 
 the debris of the division that had been cut off, which, after having wan- 
 dered around and assembled, was striving to make a passage for itself. 
 The circumstance was rather embarrassing. I had at Lonato only about 
 twelve hundred men. I had the parliamentary come before me, and 
 caused his eyes to be unbandaged. I told him that if his general had 
 the presumption to capture the general-in-chief of the Army of Italy, 
 he had only to come forward to do it ; that he ought to know that I was 
 at Lonato, because all the world knew that my army was there ; that all 
 the general officers and superior officers of his division should be held 
 responsible for the personal insult he had been guilty of. I declared to 
 him that if, in eight minutes, his division had not laid down its arms, I 
 would not pardon a single one. The parliamentary appeared much as- 
 tonished to find me there, and an instant afterwards the whole column 
 laid down its arms." 
 
 This occurrence, and what he learned by cross-examining 
 the officers captured, proved to Bonaparte that he had defi- 
 nitely got rid of Quosdanovich, and that he was now safe to 
 turn with his entire force on the main Austrian army. Guy- 
 eux and Despinoy were ordered to follow up Quosdanovich, 
 
MARSHALING THE TROOPS. 279 
 
 and this a part of their force did until he reached Lake Idro 
 and the Rocea d' Anfo defile. 
 
 Wurmser meanwhile had been making some changes in his 
 position behind Castiglione, but had done little either in the 
 way of concentration, or to help Quosdanovich in his efforts 
 to come on to his assistance. He had detached one force on 
 a useless errand down the Po, and another equally useless 
 one to blockade Peschiera on the east bank of the Mincio. 
 Bonaparte, on the contrary, prepared during the 4th to put in 
 his last man against the Austrian main army, and in reality, 
 on the field itself, secured the preponderance of numbers. 
 Wurmser had, however, drawn up his line with care, leaning 
 the right on Solferino and the left on Medolano, and here he 
 cheerfully awaited the French onset. Serurier had fallen ill, 
 but his division, under General Fiorella, by 8 A. M. on August 
 5 arrived from Marcaria ; on the disappearance of Quosda- 
 novich, Guyeux and Despinoy, so far as not engaged in his 
 pursuit, were ordered down by rapid marches, and Massena 
 was placed on the left of Augereau, who still continued to 
 face Wurmser. The French line thus ran : Massena on the 
 left, Augereau in the centre, Fiorella on the right, Despinoy 
 and Guyeux coming up in reserve. Bonaparte was massing 
 his forces according to what Jomini enunciates as this great 
 captain's general rule, as it had been Frederick's : " When 
 you want to deliver battle, assemble all your forces ; neglect 
 none of them ; a battalion sometimes decides a day." And 
 moreover the blow was to be aimed in such a way as to com- 
 promise Wurmser, should he defeat him. For the Austrian 
 retreat across the river must be at or near Valeggio, and his 
 left was his strategic flank. 
 
 Before daylight of August 5 Bonaparte was at Castiglione, 
 marshaling his troops for the battle which was to decide the 
 fate of Italy. Each army leaned on the hills which lie south 
 
280 SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS. 
 
 of Garda and up to the Mincio, the French left and the Aus- 
 trian right being strongly posted there ; and Wurmser had 
 well intrenched his left at Medolano. His twenty battalions 
 and ten squadrons were deployed in two lines, and he had 
 made ready to fight a defensive battle. Moreover, his tactics 
 played into Bonaparte's hands. He essayed to extend his 
 right so as to turn the French left, and at the same time to 
 enable him to reach out towards Quosdanovich, of whose re- 
 treat beyond Lake Idro, to be sure, he did not know, but on 
 whom he had no right to believe he could any longer rely. 
 Augereau, in two lines, stood on the right of the road to 
 Valeggio, with Kilmaine and the reserve cavalry echeloned in 
 bis right and rear. Massena in one line, with a second line 
 of columns in support, stood on the left of the road. Fiorella 
 came up at Birbisi, and was ordered under cover of the accen- 
 tuations of the ground, via Guidizzolo on Cavriana, to turn 
 the Austrian left, and roll the enemy up and away from the 
 bridges at Borghetto. " One must not deliver battle," says 
 Jomini, " only to win it ; one should aim at the destruction 
 of the enemy's organized body." 
 
 In the prosecution of his plan, and to allow FioreUa ample 
 time to gain Wurmser's left, Bonaparte made several simple 
 demonstrations during the early part of the day on Wurmser's 
 front. In fact, he made a slight feint of a retrograde move- 
 ment with the whole army to tempt Wurmser forward from 
 his position, so that Serurier's division might get in his rear. 
 Wurmser replied by extending his right to outflank Massena, 
 but without the careful preparation of the French commander. 
 Bonaparte slowly extended his own right ; and as soon as 
 Fiorella had reached his position in advance of Guidizzolo, 
 this whole French wing was ordered forward on the Austrian 
 left flank. Augereau assaulted the centre at the tower of 
 Solferino, Massena contained the right. Wurmser's left 
 
MEDOLANO CAPTURED. 
 
 281 
 
 centre was protected by a strong redoubt he had built in the 
 plain. This, cannonaded by twenty pieces assembled under 
 Bonaparte's orders by Marmont, and attacked by General 
 Verdier with three grenadier battalions, could not hold long. 
 While the placing of the troops does not appear to have 
 
 
 BIRBISI 
 Battle of Castiglione. 
 
 been in Frederick's echeloned oblique order, yet the general 
 advance of the French has often been said to suggest Leuthen, 
 which in a sense it does, though there the gallant king was 
 attacking thrice his force, and with a tactical precision not 
 elsewhere seen in modern days. 
 
 The lines went forward with a will. Verdier rushed the re- 
 doubt and captured Medolano ; and Wurmser from his second 
 
282 ANOTHER CAMPAIGN FINISHED. 
 
 line threw a crotchet back on his left, to fend off the threat and 
 protect his position from the French reserve cavalry, which 
 had ridden out towards the Austrian left and was heading for 
 San Cassiano. Other battalions from his second line moved 
 on Cavriano, which Fiorella could now be seen to be fast 
 approaching. Bonaparte ordered forward his centre and left. 
 Augereau with a stout onset broke through the Austrian 
 weakened line. Owing to Wurmser's manoeuvre towards the 
 right, Massena had harder work in his front, but Despinoy 
 now came up, a fresh advance was undertaken, and by a 
 strong joint effort the victory was made secure. Wurmser 
 was not slow to recognize his defeat, and before his army was 
 quite broken, retired straight towards the Mincio ; but he was 
 hard put to it to retain his bridges at Borghetto. This, how- 
 ever, he eventually, though with heavy losses, succeeded in 
 doing. The French followed on, and produced grave disorder 
 in his divisions. The Mincio was crossed with a decimated 
 and disorganized army, leaving behind, as the tale for this 
 day, two thousand men killed and wounded, and twenty guns. 
 
 The French were quite exhausted by their long marches 
 and their full week's fighting, but gloriously happy at their 
 wonderful success. , Augereau camped under arms at Castel- 
 laro, Massena at Pozzolengo, Fiorella at Volta. 
 
 On August 6 Bonaparte could write to the Directory : 
 " Here, then, in five days is another campaign finished. 
 Wurmser has lost in these five days seventy field-guns, all 
 his infantry wagons, twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners, six 
 thousand men killed and wounded, and nearly all these troops 
 coming from the Rhine. We lost on our side thirteen hun- 
 dred prisoners and two thousand men killed or wounded. All 
 the soldiers, officers and generals displayed in this difficult 
 circumstance a great character for bravery." 
 
 As a sample of Bonaparte's summary methods, the follow- 
 
MASSENA SUSTAINED. 283 
 
 ing order is interesting : " Headquarters, Castiglione, 19 Ther- 
 midor, Year IV. (August 6). The municipality of Castigli- 
 one will immediately cause to be buried the dead who are 
 found in its territory ; the horses will be likewise buried. For 
 this operation all the inhabitants are requisitioned. The 
 municipality of Castiglione will notify all the neighboring 
 communes which have any dead on their territory to cause 
 them immediately to be buried. The municipal officers are 
 personally responsible for the execution of the present order, 
 and if, this evening by ten o'clock, there remains a single 
 corpse which has not been buried, they shall be punished by 
 martial law." 
 
 By many authors, all the combats from July 29 to August 
 5 are included in the title. Battle of Castiglione. 
 
 To prevent "Wurmser from holding the Mincio, Augereau, 
 early on the 6th, was ordered to demonstrate fox a crossing at 
 Valeggio, while Massena, to turn the Austrian right, moved 
 by way of Peschiera, the garrison of which had managed to 
 hold out against Wurmser. He reached Peschiera by 9 A. M., 
 Augereau meanwhile cannonading Wurmser to attract his 
 attention. Massena crossed the Mincio, and threw back the 
 Austrian force he there met, which was intrenched along the 
 heights on the southeast of the fortress. Bonaparte, deeming 
 this now the place to give the coup de grace, shortly sustained 
 him with Piorella and Augereau. But Wurmser had already 
 issued orders to retire up the Adige valley towards the Tyrol, 
 and could not be caught. The road by way of Bussolengo 
 having been closed by the French, the Austrians moved 
 through Verona, sending the cavalry along the Brenta valley, 
 where it could better forage. 
 
 Serurier's division reached Verona at ten o'clock in the even- 
 ing. The official report says : " The rearguard of the enemy 
 was still in Verona ; the gates were shut and the drawbridges 
 
284 A NEW TREATY SIGNED. 
 
 up. The Proveditor of the Republic of Venice, summoned 
 to open them, declared that he could not do it short of two 
 hours. I ordered at once that the gates should be opened by 
 cannon-balls, which General Dommartin executed in less than 
 quarter of an hour. ... At Castelnuovo, on Venetian terri- 
 tory, a volunteer was assassinated. I had the house where 
 this was done burned, and on its ashes I put up a sign, ' Here 
 a Frenchman was assassinated.' " 
 
 In due time Quosdanovich and Wurmser again assembled 
 at Trent their beaten forces. All they had accomplished 
 for their heavy losses was to leave seven fresh battalions in 
 Mantua. The French had lost some five thousand men, and 
 at Mantua had abandoned one hundred and eighty-seven 
 guns. 
 
 The F;rench pursuit was neither active nor long continued. 
 The troops were absolutely exhausted, and Bonaparte gave 
 them their well-earned rest. Massena went into the old posi- 
 tions he had held in July, Sauret did the same, Augereau took 
 post at Verona, Fiorella led his troops back to Mantua and 
 resumed the siege. The loss of the siege material was heavily 
 felt, and only a slow blockade could be resorted to. 
 
 One marked effect of these victories was the signing of 
 a new treaty, offensive and defensive, between France and 
 Spain. 
 
 Works of art were not the only things which were collected 
 in the French campaigns. From Brescia, August 13, 1796, 
 Bonaparte wrote : " The jewelry and diamonds. Citizen Direc- 
 tors, that the army has sent to Genoa, which since then were on 
 the way to Paris, and which have been started back to Genoa, 
 ought to be worth at least two or three millions ; yet there 
 has been offered for them only four hundred thousand francs. 
 I believe that it is the interest of the Republic that these 
 precious objects should be transported to Paris. The great 
 
A LIMIT OF OPERATIONS. 285 
 
 number of strangers who are in this capital will make the 
 sale of these objects more fruitful. Moreover, I understand 
 that the Flaschat Company is to take them for four hundred 
 thousand francs ; that would be a ruinous transaction for the 
 Republic." 
 
 During this " Campaign of Five Days " Napoleon reported 
 to the Directory : " You would believe, that when we arrive 
 in the bivouac our soldiers would at least go to sleep. Not 
 at all. Each one makes up his reckoning, or his plan of 
 operations for the morrow, and many of the latter are very 
 true. The other day I was watching a half-brigade file be- 
 fore me. A chasseur approached my horse. ' General,' said 
 he, ' you ought to do this.' ' Wretch,' said I, ' wilt thou hold 
 thy tongue ! ' He disappeared instantly, and I sought him 
 in vain. What he had said to me was just what I had 
 ordered to be done." This will appear natural enough to all 
 old soldiers. During our Civil War the veterans were often 
 able to prognosticate what the conditions demanded. 
 
 Whenever an army pushes rapidly into the enemy's coun- 
 try, it by and by reaches a point where its initial force has 
 been exhausted, when it must stop and either act on the 
 defensive, or else create a strong secondary base for a fresh 
 advance. Bonaparte had long before pointed out to the 
 Directory the Adige as the limit of possible operations from 
 Piedmont as the only base. The Alps, between him and the 
 Austrian Tyrol, were too serious an obstacle to overcome 
 with what force was left him ; and the Mincio, flanked by 
 Peschiera and Mantua, was the proper secondary base. Both 
 the mountains as a natural obstacle and Mantua in the 
 enemy's hands as an artificial obstacle were factors altogether 
 too much in his opponent's favor, and Bonaparte's offensive 
 campaign had to come to a legitimate strategical pause. To 
 pave the way for further offensive work, he reestablished as far 
 
286 THE WISER POLICY. 
 
 as possible the siege of Mantua, and placed an observation 
 army to watch the Alps. 
 
 It has been said that on reaching the Mincio Bonaparte 
 should at once have used his entire force to insure the early 
 capture of Mantua. But suppose, as was probable, that 
 Mantua had made a long defense. This would have left him 
 at the mercy of the oncoming reinforced Austrian army, 
 which he knew to be much larger than his own, and which, 
 unopposed, would have first cut him off from Milan by way 
 of Peschiera or Brescia, and then have turned on his isolated 
 army at Mantua. In what a trap, then, with communica- 
 tions cut and with only forty thousand men, would the French 
 commander have been ! He would have had to face an army 
 of relief of fifty thousand men, plus the thirteen thousand men 
 in Mantua ; he himself would have been besieged in his own 
 siege-lines, and if he had broken out from them, he would 
 have even then had to undertake just what he now chose to 
 undertake of his own free will — a renewed offensive against 
 the oncoming Austrian army. It is not frequent in history 
 that armies have been able to cut their way out of a besieged 
 fortress. Besiegers have now and then driven away relief 
 armies and still held on to the siege of a fortress, but rarely, 
 and under exceptional conditions as to communications, force 
 and character of ground. Bonaparte with his food cut off 
 would have been in ill case. Whether he remained before 
 Mantua or not, he must eventually choose either to retire to 
 Piedmont, or to fight for his holding on the Mincio ; and it 
 was unquestionably his wiser policy to undertake the offen- 
 sive at first, rather than be forced into a series of defensive 
 battles. 
 
 Having come to this conclusion, Bonaparte would have been 
 more than unwise to throw away his theory of masses, leave a 
 substantial part of his forces before Mantua, and fight an 
 
MUCH THE SAME PROBLEM. 287 
 
 enemy already superior with a still more diminished body. 
 His main task was to hold the Mincio and thus hold Lom- 
 bardy ; to take Mantua was, to be sure, the immediate task, 
 but it was a subsidiary one. He showed his grasp of the 
 whole problem and a strong sense of perspective by select- 
 ing the course he did, by throwing up the operation against 
 Mantua as of secondary importance, and by directing his 
 whole mass with the utmost rapidity on the enemy ; and espe- 
 cially was this so because Wurmser had divided his forces. 
 "The strength of an army, like that of a body in motion 
 in mechanics, is expressed by the mass multiplied by the 
 velocity." This the French general proved true along the 
 Mincio. 
 
 When Frederick had shut in Prague in 1757, he had before 
 him much the same problem. Daun was approaching with a 
 large army. Had Frederick decided as Bonaparte did ; had he 
 thrown up the siege of Prague, or left only a few regiments 
 there as an observation party to contain the enemy or delay 
 him ; had he concentrated his whole force and marched rapidly 
 against Daun, is there any reason to doubt that he would have 
 crushed him — as, indeed, with his thirty-four thousand men 
 to Daun's fifty-three thousand, he came near to doing, — and 
 then have returned and marched with flying colors into 
 Prague ? But Frederick, in his estimate of masses, had been 
 taught a careless lesson by his extraordinary victories with 
 inferior numbers. On this occasion " he saw too many things 
 at once," and forgot his own rule, "Whoever seeks to conserve 
 everything will lose everything ; " and as a result he lost 
 Kolin, lost Prague, and lost the campaign of 1757. 
 
 Wurmser had been thrown back into the mountains, but 
 this was by no means to be the last of the energetic old sol- 
 dier, who, moreover, had received stringent orders from Vienna 
 to advance once more against the enemy. Bonaparte anti- 
 
288 EQUIPMENT LACKING. 
 
 cipated a further movement, and finding that the late opera- 
 tions had somewhat disorganized not only the troops, but the 
 supply department, and that some time should be devoted to 
 this end, he set vigorously to work on reorganization. It 
 would have been a thrust in the air to follow the Austrians 
 into the Tyrol until he had some knowledge of the advance 
 into Germany of the Army of the Rhine. Instead of blindly 
 pushing on, irrespective of difficulties, and relying solely on 
 his destiny, as he is often carelessly represented to have 
 done, we see him devoting his days and weeks to the small- 
 est details of the commissariat and ordnance, while neglect- 
 ing no factor in the broad strategic scheme. Again, if he 
 was to advance with the Mincio as a secondary base, he must 
 have fresh accessions of troops, for the rule of numbers was 
 the constant basis of his calculations ; and for these rein- 
 forcements he never ceased to press in his dispatches to the 
 Directory. Yet, despite all difiiculties, Bonaparte knew that 
 the safest way of countering the blow he felt sure Wurmser 
 would again deliver was himself at the proper moment to 
 assume the offensive. 
 
 The equipment of the army at this time was lacking. Bonar 
 parte wrote to the chief commissary from Brescia, August 18, 
 " In four or five days, Citizen Ordinator, a new campaign 
 will be opened by the invincible Army of Italy. The barriers 
 of the Tyrol will be forced, and the theatre of war will extend 
 to Germany. The army is partly naked, and the nights are 
 very cold. The mountains demand that the soldiers should 
 have shoes, and many are with naked feet. . . . Gather all 
 your means, and let me know on what we can count. . . . 
 Have we got capes? Finally, what can I announce to the 
 division generals ? " 
 
 Some changes were now made in the troops, stations and 
 commands ; and at the end of August the army lay as fol- 
 
AN EXPRESSION OF OPINION. 289 
 
 lows : Sahuguet's division of eight thousand men blockaded 
 Mantua, now held by seventeen thousand men, of whom a 
 quarter were sick ; Augereau's nine thousand men stood at 
 Verona ; Massena with thirteen thousand men occupied Ri- 
 voli and vicinity ; and Vaubois with eleven thousand men 
 lay at Storo on the Chiese, near the head of the Lake of 
 Garda. 
 
 The following letter of August 14 to the Directory is of 
 interest : — 
 
 Headquabteks, Brescia, 27 Thermidor, Year IV. 
 
 I think it is useful, Citizen Directors, to give you my opinion as to 
 the generals employed in this army; you will see that there are very few 
 who can serve me. 
 
 Berthier : Talents, activity, courage, character. He deserves every- 
 thing. 
 
 Augereau : Much character, courage, firmness, activity, has the habit 
 of war, is loved by the soldier, lucky in his operations. 
 
 Massena : Active, indefatigable, has audacity, coup d'ceil and prompt- 
 ness in decision. 
 
 Serurier : Fights like a soldier ; will not accept responsibility ; firm, 
 has not confidence enough in his soldiers ; is a sick man. 
 
 Despinoy : Soft, without activity, without audacity ; has not the feel- 
 ing for war, is not liked by the men, does not fight at their head ; more- 
 over, he is haughty ; has brains and sound political views ; good to com- 
 mand in the interior. 
 
 Sauret : Good, very good soldier, not clever enough to be a general ; 
 little lucky. 
 
 Abatucci : Not good to command fifty men. 
 
 Garnier, Meunier, Casablanca : Incapable ; not good to command a 
 battalion in a war as active and as serious as this one. 
 
 Macquart : brave man ; no talents ; lively. 
 
 Gaultier : Good for an office ; has never made war. 
 
 Vaubois and Sahuguet : . . . I shall learn to gauge them. So far they 
 have acquitted themselves very well of what I have confided to them ; 
 but the example of General Despinoy, who was very good in Milan and 
 very bad at the head of his division, obliges me to judge men by their 
 actions. Bonaparte. 
 
290 A FRESH ADVANCE. 
 
 The war commissaries frequently gave much trouble. On 
 August 26, 1796, Bonaparte wrote the Directory about a 
 commissary named Salva, who had fled from the army in a 
 panic fright. " Nothing equals this cowardice except the 
 bravery of the soldiers. Many of the commissaries of war 
 have not been more courageous. Such, Citizen Directors, is 
 the inconvenience of the law, which directs that the commis- 
 saries of war shall be only civil agents, while they need more 
 courage and military usage than the officers themselves. The 
 courage they need has to be entirely moral. It is never the 
 fruit of anything but the custom of danger." 
 
 On the last day of August Bonaparte wrote Moreau that 
 he was ready to cooperate with him, and should, two days 
 thence, move on Trent, now Wurmser's headquarters. Despite 
 initial success, however, the Army of the Khine and the Army 
 of the Sambre and Meuse, respectively under Moreau and 
 Jourdan, were not destined to cooperate with the Army of 
 Italy ; and shortly after the time when Bonaparte stood ready 
 to reach out towards these associates, join, and with them march 
 on Vienna, both (as will be later detailed) were to be com- 
 promised by the able strategy of young Archduke Charles, 
 and to beat a retreat to the Rhine ; while Bonaparte on 
 the Mincio was to be left to rely on his own unaided efforts 
 for whatever success France was to obtain in the general 
 campaign of 1796. 
 
 When, at the end of August, Moreau in his initial success 
 had crossed the Lech, the authorities in Vienna, fearing the 
 capture of Innsbruck and the invasion of the Tyrol, drew up 
 a new plan to drive back Bonaparte, or at least to forestall 
 his advance up the Adige. Accordingly Wurmser began his 
 preparations for a fresh advance from Trent, this time to 
 attack the line of the Mincio from the east. After being 
 reinforced, he had some forty-five thousand men, and these he 
 
WURMSER'S PREPARATIONS. 291 
 
 was to divide into two parts, of which one was to close the 
 Tyrol to Bonaparte by holding the Adige valley at its upper 
 waters, while with the other he would himself march down the 
 Brenta valley on Bassano, whence he would turn to Verona 
 or Legnano, and make his way to Mantua. He had small 
 doubt that he should thus take Bonaparte unawares, and suc- 
 ceed in raising the siege of the great fortress, with the numer- 
 ous troops in which, added to his own, he would be able to 
 inflict a severe blow on the French. 
 
 To Davidovich he gave command of twenty thousand men, 
 of which six thousand were at Roveredo, seven thousand be- 
 hind them at Trent, and the rest at various good defensive 
 posts in the mountains in the rear, observing the entrances 
 from the valley of the Po ; and with twenty-five thousand the 
 chief started out on his offensive thrust. His three divisions 
 were under Mezaros, Sebottendorf and Quosdanovich, and 
 he had a fine large body of reserve cavalry. On August 31 
 sixteen thousand men had got to Bassano, four thousand were 
 in Pergine, and six thousand still in Trent. In a week he 
 purposed to have them all in Bassano. 
 
 Wurmser was beset by a notion that a demonstration down 
 the Brenta valley against Bonaparte's flank would drive him 
 back beyond the Mincio. It never appeared to enter his 
 calculations that the French commander could meanwhile do 
 some fairly intelligent mancEuvring on his own account. It 
 is curious that any general of experience should thus continue 
 to divide his forces ; but such was the habit of the day, and 
 the requirement of the universal cordon system. His late 
 campaign had taught him nothing. He calculated that, should 
 Bonaparte turn on his column near Verona or Legnano, 
 Davidovich would debouch on his rear ; while he himself 
 would do the same should the French march up the Adige. 
 If, as was probable, Bonaparte retired behind the Mincio, 
 
292 THE FORWARD MOVEMENT. 
 
 the Austrians would have gained that much territory, and he 
 would pursue the enemy and recover Lombardy. Should 
 Bonaparte, however, defend the Oglio or the Adda, the Austri- 
 ans, having relieved Mantua, would cross the Po and march 
 on Tortona. Wurmser failed to consider that, if he was to 
 fight Bonaparte, his division of forces would be fatal. In 
 war you are constantly called on to divide your forces ; but 
 it behooves you to see to it that you can assemble them more 
 rapidly than the enemy — in other words, that you control the ; 
 interior lines. 
 
 Although Bonaparte was ready to move at the same mo- 
 ment as his opponent, neither had as yet guessed the other's 
 intentions. On September 1 orders issued from the Verona 
 headquarters were to the effect that Massena should start next 
 day up the road which ran on the right bank of the Adige 
 towards Ala, while Augereau, keeping touch with him, was to 
 follow in his right rear on the road along the left bank, so as 
 to sustain his associate at need. Both started about noon, 
 leaving Kilmaine with three thousand men in Verona, from 
 which place he was to patrol down the river to Legnano. 
 Vaubois had already been ordered to start on the same day 
 lip the Chiese and around the head of the Lake of Garda to 
 Riva and Mori. This gave Bonaparte somewhat under thirty 
 thousand men for his marching army. 
 
 Sahuguet, with his eight thousand men at Mantua, was 
 merely notified of the forward movement and warned to be 
 on the alert. That a small detachment of the enemy had 
 been in Bassano, Bonaparte already knew ; but he believed 
 the bulk of the Austrians to be still in Trent, and had no idea 
 of Wurmser's intended operation through the Brenta valley 
 on Mantua. But, like Frederick, Bonaparte always provided 
 for even remote probabilities. " Should the enemy, however, 
 commit such a piece of stupidity," said he, referring to just 
 
CONCENTRATION. 293 
 
 this manoeuvre, Kilmaine was to retire behind the Mincio, 
 and Sahuguet to give up the siege of Mantua, and withdraw 
 behind the Oglio. But Peschiera was to be garrisoned and 
 held at all hazards, to keep open the line of retreat of the 
 main army. 
 
 The above movements were made September 2 and 3, and 
 a few Austrian outposts were driven out of Ala and vicinity. 
 The joint concentration was to be made the next day by all 
 three divisions near Mori, before reaching the immediate 
 presence of the enemy, and the march on Roveredo was to 
 follow. 
 
 Every great captain has recognized the value of the offen- 
 sive, — of the initiative. He cannot bring himself to accept 
 the enemy's directions, to act in accordance with the enemy's 
 plan. He prefers to prescribe the plan himself. To Napoleon 
 the offensive implied concentrated masses hurled at the right 
 spot ; and from the start he acted on the idea of concentra- 
 tion. Division of forces, concentric columns, he will none of. 
 To command success, concentric columns require a clever 
 and exceptionally pushing leader at the head of each one ; no 
 one man can direct several such ; any minor interruption of 
 one of them may be fatal to all. Yet despite their disadvan- 
 tages, there is something about concentric manoeuvres which 
 has always fascinated the average general. To surround an 
 enemy on all sides sounds and looks well ; but this can rarely 
 be accomplished in the face of a clever adversary ; and the 
 latter nearly always has a superiority of forces at whatever 
 point in the chain he chooses to attack. Napoleon wrote in 
 1807 to Jerome, " I see that you are on a false military road ; 
 I see that you think that two columns which shall seize the 
 enemy between them are an advantage ; but this does not 
 occur in war, because the two columns never act in unison, 
 and the enemy can beat one after the other. Of course you 
 
294 MOUNTAIN WARFARE. 
 
 must turn the enemy, hut concentrate first." Napoleon sought 
 so to operate that his plans should not fail because the leader 
 of one of his separate columns did not or could not carry out 
 his part of the united plan. So scrupulous was he as to 
 concentrating before he met the enemy that, with regard 
 to the very movement now in progress, he doubted if the col- 
 umns had not gone too near the enemy before uniting. And 
 we remember how careful he was to concentrate on his right 
 before beginning the campaign in April. In this particu- 
 lar instance, while Bonaparte had organized three columns, 
 Vaubois, Masseua and Augereau, they were so to march as to 
 be able to concentrate before they should reach the enemy. 
 The Austrian commander, on the contrary, separated his two 
 columns so that neither would be able to aid the other. 
 
 Keuss had been stationed and had intrenched himself at 
 Mori to stop Vaubois' advance ; and Wukassovich had been 
 ordered to defend " the inexpugnable defile," as Bonaparte 
 calls it, at San Marco, where the mountains come down near 
 the Adige, against Massena and Augereau ; the reserve held 
 the equally strong defile at Caliano. The situation of the 
 Austrian force was good. Would they be stout enough to 
 hold their ground ? 
 
 On September 3 the leading brigades of Massena's column 
 drove in the enemy's outposts, and next day Massena in force 
 fell on Wukassovich at San Marco, while Vaubois forced the 
 Sarca, stormed the Austrian works at Mori, and then advanc- 
 ing on Roveredo, threatened to turn the Austrian right flank. 
 Wukassovich had placed the bulk of his forces in this posi- 
 tion. Bonaparte made use of the common tactics of mountain 
 warfare. By heavy artillery fire on the front battalion, fol- 
 lowed up by a smart infantry attack, he succeeded in unset- 
 tling the Austrian troops in the rear, that could take no part 
 in the struggle. At the same. time strong parties of riflemen 
 
DAVIDOVICH FORCED BACK. 
 
 295 
 
 under Pijon were sent up along the mountain sides to take 
 the Austrians in flank. Soon he launched Victor with a close 
 column at the double-quick along the highway, on the troops 
 holding the defile, and the fighting came to close quarters. 
 
 Combats of Koveredo and Caliano. 
 
 This was followed by a charge of Dubois and his hussars. 
 The Austrians, outnumbered and overwhelmed, turned, after 
 two hours' fighting, from the defense they had handsomely 
 maintained; and between this attack and Vaubois' flank 
 march, the French forced Davidovich back with heavy casual- 
 
296 THE DEFILE TAKEN. 
 
 ties on Roveredo. For the possession of this town there was 
 another stubborn contest on the same day. Victor again at 
 the double-quick followed the Austrians along the main road, 
 while Rampon was sent through the open ground between 
 Roveredo and the river, and Vaubois arrived from Mori. 
 The place being made untenable, the Austrian forces gradually- 
 fell back towards Caliano, and the French took breath at 
 Roveredo and prepared to advance farther. It was one 
 o'clock. " AVe had yet taken only three guns and made about 
 one thousand prisoners. This was not to win a victory," 
 reported Bonaparte. 
 
 Somewhat to the south of Caliano runs a narrow defile, — 
 some two hundred feet wide, — between river and perpendic- 
 ular rocks. This is dominated by the castle of La Pietra 
 and closed by a good wall ; and Davidovich thought the posi- 
 tion to be sufficiently held by a few battalions, especially as 
 the castle was well equipped with guns that could be trained 
 on an assaulting party. Bonaparte repeated his tactics of 
 San Marco. Sending bodies of riflemen under Pijon to climb 
 the heights on the right, and other bodies to make their way 
 along the river on the left, and posting some artillery on a 
 projecting rocky eminence, he vigorously bombarded the castle, 
 and this then fell at the first assault. Thereupon three half- 
 brigades were thrown into the defile in close column. There 
 was no space to fight, except hand to hand, and the con- 
 test was fierce. A small party of French horse strove to get 
 around and cut the Austrians off at the upper end ; other 
 cavalry followed, and after a short but deadly struggle the 
 defile was taken with its twenty-five guns, and three thousand 
 Austrians laid down their arms. The defile having thus sud- 
 denly yielded to the vigorous thrust, the French column pushed 
 on through it, and Davidovich's main body, which had deemed 
 itself secure in its camp at Caliano, was forced into disorderly 
 
THE KEY TO THE TYROL. 
 
 297 
 
 retreat on Trent. "The Citizen Bessieres, captain of my 
 company of guides, saw two guns on the point of escape ; he 
 rushed forward with five or six guides, and despite the efforts 
 of the enemy, stopped these pieces," reported Bonaparte to the 
 Directory. Thus was the 
 road to the Tyrol opened 
 by the brilliant fighting 
 of the French advance. 
 Davidovich cannot be 
 said to have acted with as 
 much discretion or vigor 
 as his opponent. 
 
 Had he recognized the 
 meaning of this occur- 
 rence, it would have much 
 disturbed Wurmser, whose 
 columns were systematic- 
 ally pursuing their march 
 down the Brenta valley, 
 the rear having already reached Borgo. But though, during 
 the same afternoon, he heard of the Eoveredo combat at his 
 headquarters, which was still at Trent, Wurmser not only 
 made no change of plan, but himself set out to join the field 
 force at Bassano, leaving Davidovich behind with orders to 
 defend Trent to the last man. He held fast to the impression, 
 now that Bonaparte had adventured so far up the Adige, that 
 the moment was all the more auspicious to seize the lower 
 Adige, while his lieutenant should hold the key to the Tyrol, 
 and thus catch the French, as it were, in a trap. He forgot 
 that his method would necessitate a battle, that in this battle 
 he would be outnumbered, and that this was just the scheme, 
 slightly varied, in which he had failed before. That Trent, 
 which had excellent means of defense, could be held seemed 
 
 Bessieres 
 
298 DAVIDOVICirS FATAL ERROR. 
 
 certain ; but the irresistible flood of French brigades speedily 
 swamped the Austrian resistance, and his task immediately 
 proving impossible, Davidovich retired behind the Avisio, 
 and Massena entered the famous City of Councils on the 
 morning of September 5, followed by Vaubois at noon, with 
 Augereau still coming up. 
 
 When he found that he could not hold head to the French, 
 Davidovich had made a fatal error in not leaving the defense 
 of the Tyrol to his lieutenant, Laudon, and a small force, 
 to which could have been added much Tyrolese militia, and 
 marching down the Brenta valley to join his chief. This 
 would have given Wurmser considerably over thirty thousand 
 men with which to oppose the twenty thousand of Massena 
 and Augereau. But Davidovich, like all the Austrian gen- 
 erals, was hampered by his orders from Vienna, which were to 
 the effect that the passage through the Tyrol was to be held in 
 force and kept closed to the French at all hazards. He had 
 no independence of action. 
 
 By the possession of Trent the French were established on 
 the rear of Wurmser's column. Bonaparte, though still know- 
 ing nothing about the operation of Moreau, saw that here was 
 a better game to play than to adventure into the Tyrol in an 
 attempt to join the Army of the Rhine, even had he believed 
 it to be approaching. Moreover, he was clearly holden, first 
 of all, to protect his own rear, and not to expose the troops he 
 had left behind. But Wurmser's manoeuvre itself Bonaparte 
 did not at first correctly interpret. He believed that his own 
 forward movement had been at the root of the Austrian's 
 eccentric march, and he prepared at once to do two things to 
 meet the conditions : dispose of Davidovich, so as to have his 
 own rear protected, and then follow Wurmser, fall on his rear 
 wherever he should reach him, and force him to a battle. He 
 had no idea that Wurmser was aiming to relieve Mantua, but 
 
VICTORY ASSURED. 299 
 
 imagined that he was seeking to cut the French communica- 
 tions, while Davidovich should fend the French off from the 
 Tyrol by holding on to Trent. This scheme Bonaparte pro- 
 posed to render nugatory. 
 
 Davidovich recognized the gravity of the situation, and 
 essayed to defend the bridge over the Avisio River at Lavis. 
 Vaubois strove in vain to seize it. Bonaparte found his pre- 
 sence essential. Eiding to Lavis, Vaubois was again pushed 
 forward, and by evening, under the chief's eye, the French had 
 driven Davidovich out of Lavis and up the Adige on Salurn 
 and Neumarkt. Meanwhile Massena was hurried towards 
 the Brenta valley to Pergine, which he reached late on the 
 6th ; and Augereau, by a short cut, on the same day moved 
 over the mountains to Levico, to follow up Wurmser's ma- 
 noeuvre, whatever it might portend. On the 6th Wurmser 
 was at Bassano, with a rearguard of three battalions at Pri- 
 molano. 
 
 Bonaparte was now sure of victory. He again had before 
 him an enemy divided in two parts, between which he had 
 thrust himself ; and he had beaten the right wing and turned 
 the flank of the left. The march in pursuit was continued on 
 the 6th, Vaubois' division being left behind at Lavis to pro- 
 tect the rear of the marching column from the direction of 
 the Tyrol ; but all the grenadiers accompanied the command- 
 ing general. Augereau and headquarters got to Borgo and 
 pushed out a van to Ospedaletto ; Massena marched to Levico, 
 out of which place Augereau's van had previously driven the 
 last of the Austrian rear. Next day another Austrian detach- 
 ment of three battalions was pushed out of Primolano, where 
 they were holding the Brenta defile, which here, too, was de- 
 fended by a castle. The attack was made with a line of skir- 
 mishers and the light infantry, followed by a close column 
 under cover of the artillery fire ; and a regiment of French 
 
300 THE BATTLE OF BASSANO. 
 
 dragoons having got in the rear of the position and seized the 
 defile, the party laid down their arms. " The ardor of the 
 soldier," says Bonaparte, " is equal to that of the generals 
 and the officers. There are, however, traits of courage which 
 merit to be gathered by the historians, and that I will let you 
 know at my first leisure." 
 
 On the same day the headquarters reached Cismone. On 
 the 8th, in a start at 2 A. M., Massena was put across the 
 Brenta to the right bank, along which ran a fairly good road, 
 while the main column advanced to Bassano, and during the 
 forenoon struck the enemy, who had drawn up on the heights 
 in front of the town, with a van of six battalions holding the 
 long defile at Solagno, and Campo Lungo, on the other bank, 
 being also held in force. 
 
 Bassano is on the left bank of the Brenta, connected with 
 the right bank by a bridge. Quosdanovich lay before the 
 town with his left on the river. Sebottendorf was drawn up 
 on the farther bank to protect the bridge. 
 
 Wurmser had been of a mind to march by way of Vicenza 
 and Verona to Mantua, and a third of his force under Me- 
 zaros was already at Montebello. He was utterly taken aback 
 by the sudden appearance of the French in force. He had 
 expected that Bonaparte would head for Innsbruck, and 
 that his own march on Verona would call him back down the 
 Adige roads. He could scarcely have got himself in a worse 
 dilemma; and now, instead of listening to his discretion, 
 leaving a rearguard of good troops under a plucky officer to 
 delay Bonaparte's pursuit, and striving to rejoin his other 
 division at Montebello by a forced march, he hearkened to his 
 courage and stood to fight a superior enemy, sending a hur- 
 ried dispatch to Mezaros to come back to help in the ap- 
 proaching battle — for which operation there was no more time. 
 The defile between rocks and river at Solagno was taken by 
 
Bassano Country. 
 
302 PARDONABLE EXAGGERATION. 
 
 Augereau's eager brigades at the first rush; Massena, with 
 equal ardor, pushed on through Campo Lungo, seized the 
 bridge, though defended by guns and the Austrian grenadiers 
 cfelite, and entered the town pell-mell with the retiring Aus- 
 trians ; while Augereau, following along from Solagno, had 
 equal fortune against his opponent, whom his brigades, cer- 
 tain of victory, drove from their defense in a couple of hours. 
 The two Austrian divisions were thus cut apart, and Quosda- 
 novich, finding his road suddenly blocked, was compelled to 
 retire to the Piave. Wurmser barely escaped with his head- 
 quarters guard. " In this day we took five thousand pris- 
 oners, thirty-five guns all harnessed with their caissons, two 
 pontoon equipages of thirty-two boats, aU harnessed, more 
 than two hundred wagons, all equally harnessed, carrying a 
 part of the enemy's baggage. We took five flags. Chief of 
 Brigade Lannes took two with his own hands. General 
 Wurmser and the treasury of the army were missed by only 
 a minute. ... I beg of you to accord the grade of general 
 of brigade to the Chief of Brigade Lannes. He is the first 
 who put the enemy into rout at Dego, who passed the Po, 
 the bridge of Lodi, and who entered Bassano," reports Bona- 
 parte, with pardonable exaggeration as to captured men. 
 
 The Austrian leader now had but sixteen thousand men 
 left, of whom, however, six thousand was a body of excellent 
 horse. He made a hasty and irregular retreat with Sebotten- 
 dorf on Fontaniva, where he crossed the Brenta to join Me- 
 zaros, who was on the way from Montebello, losing many men 
 by desertion and by being driven off the main road. The 
 French gathered in at least four thousand prisoners, half of 
 them at the battle of Bassano. The other casualties were not 
 severe on either side, for the Austrians had made no marked 
 resistance ; but they abandoned a vast amount of material. 
 Peaching the vicinity of Montebello, Wurmser joined his 
 
ARRANGEMENTS TO PURSUE. 
 
 303 
 
 advance division, and hurried via Villanova and Arcole to- 
 wards Legnano, off his projected line, and on arrival there, 
 numbered a bare twelve thousand men. With this small 
 wreck of his fine army he crossed the Adige and, protected 
 by a bridge-head, gave his troops some rest. 
 
 The Austrian commander could scarcely have manoeuvred 
 or fought with more pluck or less common sense. There was 
 now an excellent chance that Bonaparte might surround and 
 capture the entire Austrian force, and he lost no time in order- 
 ing his troops accordingly. Wurmser no longer had front, 
 rear, or communications. As speedily as he was able, Bona- 
 parte made arrangements to pursue, and yet on the 8th headed 
 
 Mantua-Padna Country. 
 
 Augereau down the Brenta towards Padua, to cut the Austri- 
 ans off from retreat to the Frioul and Trieste, while with Mas- 
 sena's division he marched on Vicenza, which place he reached 
 next day. Here he received intelligence which enabled him to 
 guess that Wurmser's intention was to make for Mantua, and 
 he at once ordered Augereau to push on Legnano, and him- 
 
304 AN UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT. 
 
 self with Massena marched on Montebello. He intended to 
 use the ground between the Adige and Mincio, which is much 
 cut up by streams and canals, to head o£E Wurmser at the 
 Tidone or Molinella rivers. By the evening of the 10th 
 Massena, who had come on via Villanova, began to cross the 
 Adige at Ronco, — which he did by great exertion, owing to 
 lack of boats, — and Augereau reached Montagnana, while 
 Wurmser on the 10th dallied at Legnano to rest his men, 
 vainly imagining that the French would march no faster than 
 he did. Learning Wurmser's whereabouts, Bonaparte, true to 
 the mass idea, drew his forces together so as to deliver battle 
 if he could reach the Austrians with his main army. Kil- 
 maine, with the garrison of Yerona, was ordered to Isola della 
 Scala ; Sahuguet was to cross at Goito, with orders to use 
 the difficult country between Mantua and Legnano to delay 
 Wurmser's advance ; and on the 11th, while these two joined 
 at Castellaro, and took position on either side of the road 
 behind the Molinella, and while Augereau's van reached 
 Legnano, and Massena a point near Porcarizza, Wurmser 
 kept leisurely on towards Mantua. From the position he had 
 reached Massena, by a vigorous push forward, might have 
 cut off Wurmser from Nogara ; but a stupid guide, instead 
 of taking the road to Sanguinetto, led his column to Cerea. 
 This point Wurmser reached about the same time, and man- 
 aging to cut a passage through Massena's van commanded 
 by Murat and Pijon, got safely to Nogara. Had Massena 
 marched to Sanguinetto, he could have occupied the road in 
 force before Wurmser's arrival. But this was not to be the 
 only accident. 
 
 Sahuguet had been given positive orders to cut the bridges 
 of the Molinella, and to stop the Austrians on that line, but 
 he forgot the bridge at Villimpenta. After a short rest, 
 Wurmser continued his march early on the 12th, and hearing 
 
ADVANCE ON MANTUA. 305 
 
 of Sahuguet at Castellaro, he made a detour to tlie left via 
 Villimpenta, where a French detachment sent from the Man- 
 tua besiegers was met and cut to pieces. Crossing here, 
 the Austrian general reached Mantua during the afternoon. 
 Bonaparte thus lost his prey, and he never forgave Sahuguet. 
 " One must make for the flying enemy a bridge of gold or 
 oppose to him a barrier of steel," said Bonaparte. Here 
 neither had been done. Legnano, held between Augereau 
 and Massena as in a vice, capitulated on the 12th with seven- 
 teen hundred men. 
 
 Wurmser had expected to reach Mantua with twenty thou- 
 sand men, fresh and cheered by success. He arrived with 
 not much over ten thousand men, beaten, tired, pursued. In- 
 stead of raising the siege, he was himself destined to be be- 
 sieged in the fortress, which had, to be sure, an enormous 
 garrison, but of this a third were on the sick list, the Man- 
 tuan marshes making the city liable to fevers and dysentery. 
 At first he camped outside the place, between San Giorgio, 
 and the citadel, whence he could readily forage. Bonaparte 
 determined to drive him inside, and ordered on Mantua the> 
 bulk of the army. On the 13th Augereau, advancing on the 
 place from Governolo, by which circuit he had come, cut 
 Wurmser off from the lower Po, while Sahuguet, with the 
 blockade corps, came in touch with the enemy on the right, 
 north of La Favorita ; and Massena, in the centre, marched 
 from Castellaro as far as Due CasteUi, on the way to San 
 Giorgio. But, lacking not courage, Wurmser held his own. 
 On the 14th Massena advanced on a body of thirteen battal- 
 ions and twenty-four squadrons, which had camped outside the 
 fortress walls, but though at first successful, a body of Aus- 
 trian horse returning from foraging upset his calculations, 
 and he withdrew. On the 15th nearly the entire garrison sal- 
 lied out to forage in force, covered by the cavalry, which took 
 
306 
 
 AN ATTACK IN FORCE. 
 
 up a position in front of San Giorgio, and extending to the left 
 to cover La Favorita, holding both the Verona and Legnano 
 roads. The same day had been chosen by Bonaparte for an 
 attack in force. Sahuguet was on the right astride the Ve- 
 rona road in front of Castelletto ; Massena, in the centre, was 
 
 ^•"^ C/ISTELL-P 
 
 
 
 Mantua. 
 
 kept massed at Due Castelli and hidden by rolling ground, so 
 that Wurmser only saw Sahuguet in his front ; Augereau's 
 division, this day commanded by Bon, was advancing on the 
 left. When the word was given, Sahuguet moved towards 
 La Favorita ; Augereau, who had marched on San Giorgio, 
 forced back the Austrian outposts on Vigol and the Gastelletto 
 which is east of Mantua, with so much energy that Wurmser, 
 
SAHUGUET'S WEAK CONDUCT. 307 
 
 assuming this to be the main attack, drew forces from his cen- 
 tre and hurried them through Tenea to hold it back. These 
 troops deployed between Vigol and Castelletto, and held 
 head to Bon, who had drawn up in face of them. Massena re- 
 mained at Due Castelli until he heard the firing on the left, 
 which was his signal to advance on San Giorgio ; and this he 
 did in two columns, by way of Villanova and La Sprona, so 
 as to cut the Austrian connection between La Favorita and 
 San Giorgio. At the same time that Sahuguet advanced on 
 La Favorita, Massena fell on the weakened Austrian line 
 with vigor, Victor in battalion column forcing the right half 
 of the centre back into San Giorgio at the point of the bayo- 
 net. The fire in its rear alarmed the Austrian right, which 
 fell back on Bodena heights, followed by Bon, who cut off 
 several companies and took them prisoners. While Victor 
 was following on the heels of the defeated Austrians, and 
 forcing his way into San Giorgio, Pijon, sustained by Kil- 
 maine, was striving to cut off this fort from La Favorita ; but 
 Sahuguet failed to help them by a stanch attack on the latter 
 place, only advancing a short distance, when he paused. Had 
 he pressed in as hard as Massena and Bon, Wurmser might 
 have been captured in a body. His weak conduct enabled 
 the enemy to hold himself for a time in front of the citadel, 
 and then by the left to retire through it into Mantua, the 
 French following hard upon. The battle had cost each side 
 twenty-five hundred men, and the Austrians had lost eleven 
 
 guns. 
 
 This day's result prevented Wurmser from again debouch- 
 ing on the left bank of the Mincio, and the various sorties he 
 attempted in October were easily driven back. 
 
 The news now ran in that Jourdan had been forced back 
 to the Ehine, and that this had enabled Archduke Charles to 
 turn in force on Moreau. It was well that the commander of 
 
308 REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED. 
 
 the Army of Italy had not striven to join his associates 
 through the Tyrol. 
 
 Bonaparte had not compelled a surrender of Wurmser's 
 army, but he had followed the Austrians up closely and 
 forced them to enter the fortress, which he now again shut in 
 with Kilmaine's, late Serurier's, division of nine thousand 
 men. Kilmaine made good use of his position, erecting works 
 on the left bank. On the right bank there was only a block- 
 ade, but Wurmser was gradually narrowed down to a small 
 territory in which to forage. Vaubois was still at Trent with 
 ten thousand men ; Massena was dispatched to Bassano and 
 Treviso with nine thousand men, and Augereau with an equal 
 number to Verona. For a reserve Macquart was ordered to 
 Villafranca with three thousand men, and Bonaparte returned 
 to Milan. By October 1 these stations were occupied, and de- 
 spite the severe campaign just passed, reinforcements enough 
 had come in to level the divisions xip to the numbers specified. 
 Wurmser was now in Mantua with twenty-eight thousand 
 men, about twenty thousand being duty fit. Davidovich was 
 in the Tyrol with fourteen thousand men. Three thousand 
 stood in Voralberg. On the Isonzo was a goodly force guard- 
 ing the passes to Carinthia. 
 
 On October 1 Bonaparte wrote to the Directory that he had 
 less than nineteen thousand men in the army of observation, 
 and nine thousand in the army of siege, and that the enemy 
 would have fifty thousand in six weeks. This was his usual 
 method of procuring reinforcements. He insisted that he must 
 have over fifty thousand men all told, and specified troops that 
 might be sent him. He needed twenty thousand muskets, 
 for those he had captured were Austrian, much too heavy, 
 " and our soldiers cannot use them. ... If the conservation 
 of Italy is dear to you. Citizen Directors, send me all this 
 aid." 
 
CAPACITY TO MARCH. 309 
 
 He also addressed the following letter, October 2 : 
 
 QoAKTEBs Gekebal, Milan, 11 Veud^miaire, Year V. 
 To His Majesty the Emperor of Germany. 
 
 Your Majesty, Europe desires peace. This disastrous war has lasted 
 too loug. I have the honor to notify Your Majesty, that if you do not 
 send plenipotentiaries to Paris to open negotiations of peace, the Execu- 
 tive Directory has ordered me to fill up the port of Trieste, and to de- 
 stroy all the establishments of Your Majesty on the Adriatic. Until now 
 I have been restrained in the execution of this plan by the hope of not 
 increasing the number of innocent victims of this war. I trust that Your 
 Majesty may be moved by the distress which menaces your subjects, and 
 may restore to the world repose and tranquillity. 
 
 1 am, with respect, Your Majesty's etc., etc. 
 
 Bonaparte. 
 From any one else this would have been mere brutum ful- 
 men. In a sense it was no more from him. 
 
 The success of this campaign had depended on the French 
 capacity to march, which had proved exceptional. In 1805 
 the French soldier used to say, " The emperor has discovered 
 a new way to make war : he uses our legs and not our bayo- 
 nets." He had already begun to use their legs and their 
 bayonets, too. From the afternoon of September 5 to the 
 early morning of the 8th, sixty hours, the French had marched 
 over fifty miles down the Brenta valley to Bassano, with two 
 combats at Levico and Primolano. Having beaten Wurm- 
 ser at Bassano, Massena reached Vicenza on the 9th, thus 
 fighting a battle and marching twenty-one miles in thirty- 
 six hours ; and in the succeeding twenty-four hours, Massena 
 marched another twenty-one miles to the Adige, which his 
 men at once began to cross. From the morning of the 8th, 
 in eighty-four hours, Augereau fought a battle and marched 
 sixty miles. In sum, from the 5th to the 11th of September, 
 or six days, Bonaparte's army had marched, Massena over 
 one hundred and Augereau one hundred and ten miles, and 
 
310 MUCH TO ANTICIPATE. 
 
 fought two combats and one battle. The pursuit of Wurmser 
 had been brilliant. 
 
 To say pursue is easy ; actually to pursue is the rarest thing 
 in war. Out of a dozen battles won by bravery and intelli- 
 gence, barely one has the results which proper pursuit would 
 yield it. Men who have won a victory feel that this is all 
 they should be called on to perform, and yet, if the enemy 
 has strength to flee, the victor has surely strength to follow. 
 But it has always required a great man to compel this to be 
 done. 
 
 In one sense the army in Mantua afforded a prospect of 
 many trophies and much glory when the place should be 
 taken ; but now that the French armies had been driven out 
 of Germany, there was a probability of a fresh Austrian re- 
 inforcement for the forces on the Adige, and these would 
 again attempt the rescue of their penned-up comrades. In 
 case another army had to be met by Bonaparte, twenty thou- 
 sand men issuing from this fortress in his rear might well 
 turn the scale. Moreover, the French army had been much 
 used up, in its late campaign, and the feverish marshes of 
 Mantua were far from favorable for its reestablishment. The 
 campaign had been glorious, but there was much yet to an- 
 ticipate. 
 
 Pistol of Massena. 
 (Rivoli Collection.) 
 
XII. 
 
 ARCHDUKE CHARLES VERSUS MOREAU AND JOUR- 
 DAN. MAY TO OCTOBER, 1796. 
 
 Although Bonaparte was showiag the world how to make war, yet on the 
 Rhine Moreau was expected to do the brilliant work of the year. Opposed to 
 him stood young Archduke Charles, who, when troops were sent to reinforce 
 the Italian army, was reduced to the defensive. In June Jourdan crossed the 
 Rhine at Diisseldorf , and as this enabled Moreau to pass at Strasburg, Jourdan 
 retired, and Charles moved up to face Moreau. This general pushed the Aus- 
 trians out of the Neokar valley by a victory at Malsch, and early in August ad- 
 vanced on them at Neresheim. Determined to cross the Danube, Charles fought 
 here so as to prevent interference. The battle was indecisive, and Charles made 
 his crossing. Moreau followed, and then remained south of the Danube, instead 
 of cooperating with Jourdan, who meanwhile had forced Charles* lieutenant 
 back to the Bamberg region. Charles now conceived an operation worthy of 
 a great soldier. Leaving Latour to contain Moreau, he crossed the Danube, 
 joined his lieutenant, and falling sharply on Jourdan, drove him back. This 
 a£Eorded Moreau a, chance of crushing Latour, but he did not improve it. 
 Meanwhile Charles advanced to Wiirzburg, where he beat Jourdan in a hearty 
 battle, and threw him back into the mountains. Carnot's plan of attacking 
 both Banks of the enemy by separate columns had thus proved an error ; for, 
 so soon as Charles had pashed Jourdan back across the Rhine, he moved up 
 river to take Moreau in rear. Anticipating this, Moreau was obliged summarily 
 to retire, and Latour followed him up. Moreau fought at Biberach to save 
 his retreat, and having defeated Latour, retired through the HoUenthal on 
 Freiburg. Here Charles had already arrived, and Moreau was compelled to 
 fight at Emmendingen and Schliegen to effectuate his retreat, and cross the 
 Rhine at Hiiningen. Charles had covered himself with glory. He grew to be 
 one of the best soldiers of his time. As Bonaparte had advanced to the Adige, 
 and Moreau and Jourdan had been driven back across the Rhine, all idea of 
 their cooperation had vanished. 
 
 In order to keep before us the general plan of the French 
 operations, as well as to enable us to gauge the value of the 
 
312 THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY. 
 
 other French generals, it is essential to cast a hasty glance at 
 the campaign in Germany, which was going on while Bona- 
 parte by such transcendent ability fought his way from the 
 Var to the Mincio. 
 
 At the opening of 1796, neither allies nor French had 
 imagined that Italy would be the great field on which the 
 future fortunes of France were to be decided. It was along 
 the Khine that the bulk of the forces and the supposed ablest 
 leaders had been stationed. The allies had two armies in the 
 Ehine country. The Army of the Upper Ehine was under 
 "Wurmser, eighty thousand strong ; its left wing, under Sztar- 
 ray, Frbhlich and Conde, stretched along the right bank from 
 the Neckar mouth to the Swiss frontier, and as right wing a 
 considerable force was on the left bank, opposite Mannheim 
 and at Kaiserslautern. The Army of the Lower Rhine, under 
 Archduke Charles, then but twenty-five years old, numbered 
 ninety thousand men. Its left wing of seventy thousand men 
 lay on the Nahe, and its right wing of twenty thousand, under 
 the Duke of Wurtemberg and Kienraayer, was on the Sieg 
 and Lahn, watching the debouches of Diisseldorf and Co- 
 blenz. Ten thousand men garrisoned Mainz and Ehrenbreit- 
 stein. Later, when, in consequence of Bonaparte's victories 
 in Italy, Wurmser was ordered to the Tyrol with twenty-five 
 thousand veterans to take command there, Charles was given 
 control of both armies, and this lent him a certain advantage 
 over the French commanders, each of whom was probably 
 bound, by hard and fast instructions, to a previously settled 
 and not cooperative plan of campaign. 
 
 The Army of the Rhine and Moselle was under Moreau. 
 He had succeeded Pichegru, who, suspected of treachery, 
 though no evidence was forthcoming, had retired to his es- 
 tates. It had eighty thousand men, and leaned its right on 
 Hiiningen, while its centre lay behind the Queich, and its left 
 
THE FACING ARMIES. 313 
 
 was near Saarbriick. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse 
 under Jourdan, equally strong, had its centre and right along 
 the left bank of the Ehine from Cologne to St. Wendel in 
 the Nahe country; and its left wing, under Kleber, of twenty- 
 two thousand men, lay in a fortified camp at Dusseldorf. 
 
 There are numerous crossings of the Ehine, of which the 
 principal ones are Hiiningen, Breisach, Strasburg, Selz near 
 Rastadt, Lauterburg, Germersheim near Philipsburg, Speyer, 
 Mannheim, Worms, Mainz. At many other places the river 
 can be spanned by pontoon-bridges. The only fortified bridge 
 held by the French was the one at Diisseldorf; the' Austrians 
 had one at Mainz, and one at Mannheim. 
 
 The first Austrian plan was to push on Treves, and having 
 thus secured a foothold on the Moselle, to file up and down 
 the left bank of the Ehine, taking each French army in 
 reverse. But when Wurmser was withdrawn with his veteran 
 divisions to meet the Italian danger, the archduke was in- 
 structed by the Vienna Council to act on the defensive. The 
 forces facing each other were of about equal strength ; but 
 the allies had much more and better cavalry. The Fi-ench 
 planned to push the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, pivoting 
 on its right on the Hundsriick mountains, forward via Diissel- 
 dorf, to attract the allied attention, so that the Army of the 
 Ehine and Moselle could the easier cross the river to operate 
 against the allied left wing. The advance by Jourdan would 
 at the same time threaten the Austrian communications, and 
 tend, it was believed, to induce Charles to withdraw all the 
 Austrian troops to the right bank. But as Jourdan, counting 
 out garrisons and detachments, had only forty thousand men 
 for the field, his advance became something of a problem, and 
 moreover the question of food and equipment worked much 
 delay, for French finances were at a low ebb. The general 
 idea of the campaign, though on a larger scale than hereto- 
 
314 THE INITIATIVE. 
 
 fore, was in Carnot's usual style : to advance a force against 
 each flank of the enemy. This method lay at the root of 
 the French failure in this campaign. Great as Carnot was 
 as an organizer, his strategic views were far from sound. But 
 at that day no one's military views were sound — except 
 Bonaparte's. Carnot was truly a great man, even if not a 
 perfect strategist. He had been brought up as an officer of 
 engineers. Napoleon said of him that " he had no experience 
 of war, his ideas were false on every part of the military art ; 
 ... he has published works on the attack and defense of 
 places, and on the principles of fortification, which can be 
 acknowledged only by a man who has no practice in war." 
 Yet Carnot honestly earned his title as " Organizer of Vic- 
 tory " during the wars of the Revolution. 
 
 At the end of 1795 there had been a truce made between 
 the opposing armies along the Rhine, and this truce lasted 
 until May 31, 1796, when Austria chose to end it. Still, as 
 the detaching of Wurmser to Italy had arrested the proposed 
 Austrian offensive, the French were enabled to take the initi- 
 ative. Kleber, twenty thousand strong, was ordered to drive 
 Wurtemberg behind the Lahn, whereupon Jourdan would 
 cross the Rhine. This Kleber accomplished early in June ; 
 the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was put over June 10 at 
 Neuwied, and masking Ehrenbreitstein with a considerable 
 force, took possession of the Lahn right bank. Endangered 
 by this operation, the allied troops near Kaiserslautern had to 
 be withdrawn to the right bank at Mannheim ; and they were 
 followed to the river by a part of Moreau's force. Twelve 
 thousand Austrians occupied the Mannheim bridge-head, while 
 the rest reinforced the two allied armies. Latour took com- 
 mand of what was left of Wurmser's troops, and Archduke 
 Charles was made generalissimo, while Wurtemberg was suc- 
 ceeded by Wartensleben. This initial French mancEuvre had. 
 
LATOUR THREATENED BY MOREAU. 315 
 
 as it was expected, swept the left bank of the Ehine clear of 
 the enemy, and would now enable Jourdan and Moreau to 
 carry the war into Germany. 
 
 The Austrians on the Lahn were spread along a distance of 
 fifty miles. Jourdan had an opportunity to break through 
 this cordon, but being too deliberate, he gave Charles time to 
 come to the aid of his overmatched divisions. The archduke 
 too might have operated to advantage against the French 
 right flank, and cut Jourdan off from the Ehine. But he 
 deemed it wiser to attack the left and beat it in detail; 
 and in fact he did defeat the French left under Lefebvre at 
 Wetzlar, and crossed the Lahn at Leun, June 16. Jour- 
 dan, whose immediate duty was limited by the Directory 
 to engaging the enemy's attention, which he had done, retired 
 to Neuwied and recrossed to the left bank of the Rhine. 
 Charles followed awhile, and then retraced his steps, so as to 
 be near Latour, now seriously threatened by Moreau. 
 
 The latter had been meanwhile demonstrating with his left 
 near the Mannheim bridge-head to lead Charles to expect 
 operations at that point, and secretly preparing means of 
 crossing the Ehine at Strasburg. The long cordon of the 
 allies from Hiiningen to Philipsburg made this easy. In the 
 night of June 23-24 Desaix seized Kehl by a coup de main. 
 Moreau put over his divisions June 26 and 27, and advanced 
 against the Austrians, who could at the moment concentrate 
 but eighteen thousand men to oppose the thirty thousand he 
 had got across. Laborde remained on the left bank between 
 Breisach and Hiiningen. The French general speedily drove 
 the allies towards the Murg, and took up a defensive position 
 with Desaix and St. Cyr, until he could secure his right in 
 the Black Forest. Cut off from the Austrian right and centre, 
 the left wing under Conde and Frohlich retired up the Ehine 
 and Kinzig ; the Swabian troops fell back into the mountains 
 
316 
 
 INTERESTING MANOEUVRES. 
 
 at Freudenstadt, and the Saxons joined Sztarray, who retired 
 in the same direction. By this advance Moreau had drawn 
 the pressure from Jourdan, but the specific duty prescribed 
 him was to carry the war away from the Rhine, and as a first 
 step he purposed to push the archduke across the mountains 
 to the valley of the Neckar. Ferino followed Conde and 
 Frohlich, and occupied the Freiburg country ; St. Cyr pushed 
 the Swabians out of the Freudenstadt country, and a detach- 
 ment got as far as the Neckar. Latour and Sztarray sought 
 to defend the Murg, but Desaix attacked them at Rastadt 
 
 and drove them back to 
 the Alb, where they joined 
 the archduke. These in- 
 teresting manoeuvres can 
 be afforded no great space. 
 Charles came rapidly up 
 in the early days of July, 
 with twenty thousand men, 
 leaving his main force of 
 forty thousand men under 
 Wartensleben along the 
 Main to face Jourdan. As 
 the role of Wartensleben 
 was only to delay Jour- 
 dan's advance, Charles, as 
 he himself acknowledges, 
 would have been wiser to leave but twenty thousand men on 
 the Lahn, and to march up river with sufficient force to defeat 
 Moreau and drive him back across the Rhine. Wartensleben 
 could have accomplished all he did do with half his force, used 
 with energy. Charles made preparations to attack Moreau 
 July 10. But the alert French commander anticipated him 
 July 9 at Malsch. His plan was to contain the Austrian right 
 
 Desaix. 
 
THE BA TTLE OF MALSCH. 817 
 
 near Rastadt in the plain at the foot of the hills, and to turn 
 its left in the direction of Pforzheim, on the hills at Herren- 
 alp and Frauenalp. Meanwhile Charles was aiming to force 
 
 Battle of Malsch. 
 
 Gernsbach on the Murg, and to turn the French left wing at 
 Rastadt. In pursuance of Moreau's plan, early on the 9th, St. 
 Cyr sharply pushed his way about the allied left at Rothensohl, 
 though Kaim so heartily defended his position that it took 
 five successive assaults to accomplish the result. At the same 
 time Taponnier threw back Lindt near Neuenburg. Desaix 
 made an equally good showing against Sztarray at Malsch ; 
 but Latour at Oedigheim, by using his artillery against the 
 superior French horse, which he had not sufficient squadrons 
 to match, enabled Charles to hold the plain. Malsch was 
 taken and retaken twice ; but finally Sztarray held it and 
 drove Desaix back to near Rastadt, Latour also forcing his 
 way close to the town. Charles, though he had held his own 
 with good countenance, in fact, been victorious on his right, 
 lest by the French turning manoeuvre he should be cut o£E 
 
318 CHARLES RETREATS. 
 
 from Stuttgart, and anxious to protect his magazines at Heil- 
 bronn, was fain to retire by his left to Pforzheim ; and on 
 July 18 he crossed to the right bank of the Neckar at Cann- 
 stadt, and marched on Gmund, leaving a small force on the 
 left bank to watch the French. Victorious Moreau was now 
 enabled to bring his left wing across the Rhine at Speyer ; 
 but he pursued the Austrians much too slowly. St. Cyr took 
 Stuttgart. The allied left, which had been early sundered 
 from the centre and right, retired to Villingen and beyond, 
 followed by the French under Ferino, with whom Moreau 
 strove, but uselessly, to keep in touch. The Swabians and 
 Bavarians entered into negotiations with the French, and 
 Charles, by so much weaker, retired towards the Danube. 
 The French opening of the campaign had been brilliant, and 
 they now much outnumbered the enemy. 
 
 On July 22 the archduke began his retreat from the Neckar, 
 the Saxon troops joining Wartensleben. He had been com- 
 pelled to deplete his forces by placing garrisons in Mainz, 
 Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, Mannheim and Konigstein, the 
 sum total of which was thirty thousand men. And the defec- 
 tion of his allies, added to these drafts, forced him to adopt 
 a cautious policy ; for the French had a third more men 
 in line than he. Yet again, Moreau was over-cautious in fol- 
 lowing up the enemy. He had no maps, and knew the rugged 
 country ill. On August 2 he reached the Austrians near 
 Geislingen, but Charles continued his retreat down the Dan- 
 ube, his rear sharply skirmishing with the French van every 
 day for a full week. On August 10 the Austrian army stood 
 on the line Nordlingen-Hochstadt-Dillingen, while the French 
 advanced to Neresheim, Ferino, far away on the right, having 
 followed up the enemy's left to Memmingen. It was now the 
 intention of the archduke to retire to the right bank of the 
 Danube, to lure Moreau away from Jourdan, and to take 
 
IN THE NERESHEIM REGION. 319 
 
 advantage of the many affluents on the south side, the defense 
 of which was easy ; but in order to do this with safety, he 
 deemed it necessary first to neutralize Moreau, who with his 
 forty-five thousand men, in the Neresheim region, was alto- 
 gether too near to make the crossing of the river safe. More- 
 over Jourdan was fast approaching the Danube country, 
 and if Moreau could be defeated and driven well back, the 
 
 Battle of Kereslieiiu. 
 
 two French armies would not be able to make a junction. 
 Only battle would accomplish this double end, and despite 
 his inferiority, Charles made ready to attack the French on 
 August 11. The archduke backed up against the Danube ; the 
 French had the mountain ravines in their rear, and Moreau, 
 marching by his left, had his forty-five thousand men extended 
 over a front of twenty-five miles, from Heidenheim through 
 Neresheim to a point near Nordlingen. 
 
 The Austrian troops were ready to start shortly after 
 
320 A DRAWN BATTLE. 
 
 midnight, but a heavy rain made the progress of the several 
 columns slow. A corps was sent across the Danube, to recross 
 at Gunzburg above and take the French right in reverse ; but 
 the distance was excessive, and this part of the operation 
 proved a failure. Part of Charles' left wing won a distinct 
 success in advance of Modingen, driving the French well 
 back, and turning their centre and cutting it from their right 
 at Heidenheim ; another of the Austrian columns likewise 
 made a good deal of headway towards taking the French right 
 in reverse ; but not being in touch with the rest of the army, 
 the French concentrated, and stopped its onset before any 
 serious harm was done, though the headquarters and artillery 
 park had to make a lively retreat. The battle, which was 
 fought over a wide area, in detached columns not mutually 
 sustaining each other, though heartily contested, degenerated 
 at the last into a mere cannonade at a number of points, and 
 was at nightfall undecided. It had been a fair sample of 
 one of those cordon engagements in which, on both sides, the 
 forces were iU in hand, and no such manoeuvring as leads up 
 to great results could possibly be undertaken. The losses in 
 this battle of Neresheim were about three thousand on each 
 side. 
 
 Inasmuch as Charles had Ulm on which to retire, as well 
 as several bridges over the Danube, he would have done bet- 
 ter to attack by his left and cut Moreau's communications. 
 As it was, the column there operating did the best work ; and 
 such an attack, well driven home, would probably have been 
 fatal to the French army, which was stretched over a long 
 line with both flanks in the air. 
 
 Moreau was not in good case. To contrast his work with 
 Bonaparte's is fruitful. He had orders, it is said, under the 
 Carnot theory of turning both the enemy's flanks, to advance 
 down the right bank of the Danube ; his forces were all strung 
 
HUNlNOE-N 
 
 "qasue. 
 
 NSTANCE 
 
 RHINE-ISABt 
 
% 
 
 ■'■'■. 
 
 ■,^fl'"% 
 
 >y,)j- 
 
 ^.<NVV^ 
 
 ■'■l-'i'j 
 
 COUNTRY. 
 
MOREAU'S DELAYS. 321 
 
 out ; his artillery park had moved heyond reach ; and his right 
 was still threatened. He had, nevertheless, the courage to 
 prepare to attack the Austrians next day ; but when at 6 a. m. 
 he advanced on the enemy, he found that Charles, in accord- 
 ance with his prearranged plan, had retired. The battle had 
 no result, except to enable the Austrians, uninterrupted, to 
 cross the Danube. At Dillingen and Donauworth the Aus- 
 trian divisions were put over the river, and destroyed the 
 bridges. Eeinforcements soon came up which increased the 
 archduke's effective to sixty thousand men ; he was once more 
 abreast of the situation ; and of these thirty-five thousand men 
 were stationed on the Lech under Latour, with orders to con- 
 tain Moreau. The latter had been afforded a brilliant oppor- 
 tunity of utilizing the drawn battle of Neresheim, by march- 
 ing up towards Niirnberg to join Jourdan, who about 
 mid-August was advancing to this vicinity ; and between the 
 two they could have crushed the Austrians. But under the 
 orders of the Directory he may not have felt authorized to 
 undertake this manoeuvre. In the St. Helena Memoirs Napo- 
 leon assumes that he had no such specific directions. " Gen- 
 eral Moreau remained several days on the battlefield of Ne- 
 resheim . . . without even sending a party of cavalry to the 
 Altmiihl to seek to operate his junction." Immediately after 
 the battle, the Memoirs go on to say, Moreau should have 
 reached out to Jourdan, and with him marched on and 
 seized Ratisbon and fortified it, an operation which would 
 have decided the campaign. But his delays played into 
 Charles' hands. " One would have said that he was igno- 
 rant that a French army existed on his left." 
 
 While Moreau had been pushing back Charles, the Army of 
 the Sambre and Meuse, towards the end of June, had again 
 crossed the Khine, and Wartensleben had retired behind the 
 Lahn July 6. Jourdan then advanced, defeated the Aus- 
 
322 WARTENSLEBEN ATTACKED. 
 
 trians July 13 at Friedeberg, and after some further ex- 
 chansres Wartensleben retreated back of the Main at Frank- 
 fort^ where, drawing in the bulk of the Mainz garrison, he 
 prepared to defend the river. Jourdan bombarded Frank- 
 fort and took it July 16, and the Austrian s fell back to 
 Wiirzburg. Leaving Marceau with twenty-eight thousand 
 men to hold his communications and mask Ehrenbreitstein 
 and Mainz, Jourdan with forty-five thousand marched up the 
 Main, and through Gemiinden advanced on the enemy July 18. 
 His front covered altogether too wide an area, but as his ad- 
 vance, in accordance with Carnot's orders to operate against 
 the outer Austrian flank, constantly threatened the Austrian 
 right, Wartensleben again fell back on Kitzingen, and the 
 French entered Wiirzburg August 4. The Austrian forces 
 had dwindled down to twenty-five thousand men by sickness 
 and desertion ; while the French, who had captured much 
 victual and munition in Frankfort and along the line of ad- 
 vance, were encouraged by success and in fine fettle. Jour- 
 dan was nearing Moreau and he determined to keep on, oper- 
 ating constantly against the enemy's flank ; and within a few 
 days Wartensleben still farther retired to Bamberg. It is 
 asserted that Jourdan sent a number of couriers to Moreau, 
 to invite cooperation ; but it is also claimed that none of these 
 dispatches got through the lines. Jourdan falling sick, Kle- 
 ber replaced him for a week or two, kept up the pursuit with 
 diligence, and the Austrian commander still farther fell back 
 behind the Wisent, a small affluent of the Eegnitz. Follow- 
 ing him up, Kleber attacked Wartensleben August 7 at 
 Forschheim, and beat him with loss ; and the latter, instead 
 of retiring to Niirnberg, on the road towards Archduke 
 Charles, fell back on Amberg as if to protect Bohemia. Jour- 
 dan soon resumed command, and still pressing the Austrian 
 flank, Wartensleben retired behind the Naab August 18. 
 
JOURDAN ON THE NAAB. 
 
 323 
 
 Archduke Charles. 
 
 Jourdan followed to the Sulzbach-Amberg country, and then 
 took up a position on the hither bank of the Naab, between 
 Naaburg and Schwandorf. The Austrians lay where they 
 could not easily be attacked, and Jourdan held his position, 
 sending Bernadotte to Neumarkt to observe the archduke's 
 army. 
 
324 A TRULY FINE CONCEPTION. 
 
 Charles now matured his plan. It was worthy of a great 
 soldier. Leaving Latour on the Lech to contain Moreau, he 
 determined to join Wartensleben with twenty-five thousand 
 men, mostly his veterans, fall on Jourdan with force enough 
 to crush his army and, driving it back to the Khine, again turn 
 on Moreau, who, for every mile he advanced beyond the Lech, 
 would be the worse compromised. Scarce one of Bonaparte's 
 operations is superior to this ; and Charles proceeded at once 
 to put it into execution. His general idea, similar to Bona- 
 parte's, had been to operate on the enemy's centre, and keep 
 in touch with Wartensleben. Carnot's plan of turning both 
 allied flanks played into his hands. His lieutenant's retreat 
 had prevented the execution of his truly fine conception until 
 now ; and still he bad to be cautious lest, by turning Jourdan's 
 right, he shoiUd open to him a road to the Danube to join 
 Moreau by the rear of the Austrian army. Yet Charles did 
 not believe Jourdan to be capable of so bold a manoeuvre ; 
 nor, indeed, did Jourdan know where Moreau was. 
 
 Sending word to Wartensleben to refuse battle, with 
 twenty-five thousand men Charles crossed to the left bank 
 of the Danube at Ratisbon, and on August 22 reached the 
 vicinity of his lieutenant's army. Sharply attacking Berna- 
 dotte at Neumarkt, he sent the French corps spinning back 
 through Altdorf to the Pegnitz, and then masking him with 
 Hotze's division, he turned on Jourdan, who, with Wartens- 
 leben in his front and Charles on his right, at once retired to 
 Amberg, where on the 24th the Austrians dealt a heavy blow 
 to his rearguard, in which two French battalions were de- 
 stroyed to the last man. Charles had effectively cut the two 
 Eepublican armies apart. Jourdan had expected Moreau at 
 least to hold the archduke in his own front, if he himself 
 could not come over to his assistance ; or, failing to keep him 
 south of the Danube, to follow him up so as to equalize the 
 
AGAINST SUPERIOR FORCES. 325 
 
 bodies. But Jourdan now had to fight his battles alone and 
 against superior forces. Wartensleben pushed on the heels 
 of Jourdan's main army, while Charles advanced from Neu- 
 markt; and Jourdan feU back to Sulzbach August 24. 
 Hotze marched on and entered Niirnberg. Only by most 
 rapid marching around the head of Charles' column could 
 Bernadotte rejoin his chief behind the Wiesent, August 28. 
 
 Though his army was spread over too much territory in a 
 number of columns from Hochstiidt north, the archduke 
 came close to cutting o£E Jourdan's retreat. He was in his 
 way doing as distinguished work as Bonaparte in Italy. In 
 the Memoirs Napoleon taxes him with slowness ; and mea- 
 suring his operations by Bonaparte's rapidity in Italy, he was 
 indeed so. But no one at that day knew what speed meant ; 
 and much of what the emperor says savors of hypercriticism. 
 His columns were expertly placed, though being too much on 
 the cordon system Jourdan broke through the net, and seek- 
 ing to make his way to Wiirzburg, he actually did reach 
 Schweinfurt, and crossed to the right bank of the Main. His 
 army, no longer upborne by success, had shrunk to forty 
 thousand men, hungry and footsore. Bad discipline was ram- 
 pant, which Jourdan ascribed to the requisition system, and 
 the consequent inevitable marauding, despite which the 
 French soldiers had been ill-fed for weeks, and were in bad 
 health and heart. It takes but little success or failure to 
 affect the morale of troops. Jourdan had heard a rumor that 
 Moreau had beaten Latour on the Lech, and his present idea 
 was to await the enemy in the great bend of the Main in 
 which Wiirzburg is situated, and there deliver a general 
 battle, so as if possible to resume Carnot's strategic scheme 
 of a double advance on the Austrian flanks. He marched 
 thither via Schweinfurt. 
 
 Charles now saw his chance. He could assemble a supe- 
 
326 ACTION NEAR WURZBURG. 
 
 rior force, and via Kitzingen could reach Wiirzburg before 
 the Army of the Ehine and Meuse could do so, thus shunting 
 the French off the main and good post-road to the Rhine, and 
 back into the hill country, where it was difficult to march or 
 subsist an army. To this task he at once addressed himself, 
 and we now see both commanders, intent on battle, heading 
 for the one point which would lend either a marked advan- 
 tage. An Austrian detachment was sent by way of Bamberg 
 and Hasfurt to observe Jourdan's manoeuvres, while Lich- 
 tenstein crossed the Main at Kitzingen, and pushing on 
 Wiirzburg, captured and garrisoned it September 1, shut in 
 the citadel on the left bank, and took possession of the Galgen- 
 berg in front of the city. Sztarray, in his rear, reached 
 Eeperndorf, and deploying in its front, slowly moved for- 
 ward ; and the main Austrian army got on to Schwarzach 
 early September 2, ready to cross on a bridge there to be 
 thrown. 
 
 Hearing of the archduke's march on September 1, Jourdan 
 left Lefebvre with ten thousand men to hold Schweinfurt, 
 which was essential to him in case of disaster, and hurried 
 on the reserve cavalry to Wiirzburg, followed successively by 
 the divisions of Simon, Championnet and Grenier, thirty 
 thousand effective. The cavalry reached Wiirzburg at noon 
 on the 2d, and seized the Steinberg. Simon shortly came up, 
 and pushing the Austrians across the brooks, took position 
 between Estenfeld and Lengfeld ; while Championnet, who 
 arrived an hour later, after a hard fight drove a division of 
 Lichtenstein out of the Kornach and Sperl meadows, lying 
 between the two brooks. The Austrians fell back to Euer- 
 feld, where they barely held themselves. The French had 
 begun well ; and this easy success led Jourdan to believe that 
 Charles had sent most of his forces to meet Moreau, and that 
 here was an auspicious moment for battle ; but as a fact, 
 
SZTARRAY'S POSITION. 
 
 327 
 
 Charles was only manceuvring to allow his main force to 
 come up to the field. Grenier, arriving last, was posted be- 
 tween the two Bleichfeld villages, with the reserve cavalry in 
 the rear of the centre at Maynbrunn. Sztarray now marched 
 
 Battle of WiirzbnTg. 
 
 forward to the battlefield, held the wood south of Estenfeld, 
 and posted forces in Euerfeld and on the heights of Rotten- 
 dorf, with a reserve near the Kaltengrund. The Austrian 
 left wing thus had an excellent position ; but the right wing 
 was ill-placed, for if the French could turn and push it back 
 on Euerfeld, the Austrian hold on the Main crossings would 
 be imperiled. 
 
 On the lifting of the fog, about 9 A. M. of September 3, 
 Sztarray, who had his columns all formed, moved forward on 
 Lengf eld, and after a sharp resistance, drove out Simon, while 
 
328 THE CRITICAL POINT. 
 
 Hotze forced the French divisions out of the Aumiihle valley, 
 along which for some hours there was a lively clash of arms, 
 and the rival lines again and again held the field. Simon 
 and Championnet, however, not only remained in possession 
 of the valley, but the latter forged on and gained possession 
 of the Estenfeld woods, after a long sustained effort, pushing 
 the Austrian foot back to Erfeldorf, and the cavalry to Euer- 
 feld. This latter place now became the critical point. Should 
 the French win and hold it, Charles would be compelled to 
 fall back to save his bridges. The archduke failed not to 
 appreciate the fact, but he was also aware that he had consid- 
 erable forces stiU coming up, and on these he was quietly 
 counting, while Jourdan, ignorant of this fact, was over-con- 
 fident that he should yet win the day ; and Grenier's division, 
 with the reserve cavalry, was ordered to sustain Champion- 
 net at Erfeldorf and Euerfeld. This order, however, was but 
 partially executed. Grenier deemed it essential to station a 
 considerable force at Heiligenthal to contain an Austrian 
 column that he saw advancing from Prosselsheim in a direc- 
 tion to turn the French left, — it was indeed Kray's van, — 
 and ordered only the reserve cavalry to Seligenstadt and the 
 Sperl woods, holding the rest at Bleichfeld. Charles had 
 expected his rearward column under Kray to cross the Main 
 at Schwarzach early in the day ; but owing to difficulty with 
 the bridges, it was noon before Kray's head of column was 
 able to come up. Then Wartensleben advanced on Bibergau, 
 while Kray pushed rapidly on Prosselsheim, in an attempt to 
 turn the extreme French left. Despite tenacious resistance, 
 the Austrians shortly won back the Sperl woods and the Kal- 
 tengrund ; and an artillery duel in the centre of both armies 
 ensued, while each was awaiting the oncoming of fresh troops 
 to sustain the tired ones in line. Charles had reserved his 
 critical blow until Kray's arrival with the bulk of his men. 
 
CHAMPIONNET ROUTED. 329 
 
 About 3 P. M. the fight recommenced. As the Austrian cui- 
 rassier squadron came up, Lichtenstein headed it also on the 
 French left wing. The French reserve of horse made a hand- 
 some bid to keep the Sperl woods ; but it was driven out, and 
 ranged itself behind the line of foot, while the Austrians 
 again forced Championnet 
 out of the Estenfeld woods. 
 Kray overwhelmed Grenier 
 at Heiligenthal, and his 
 cavalry completed the rout 
 of Championnet. The 
 French had no reserve to 
 call upon, while fresh Aus- 
 trian troops were still com- 
 ing up. Jourdan recog- 
 nized that he had lost the 
 battle, and retired on Arn- 
 stein, where at night he 
 reassembled his divisions, 
 Championnet with the cav- 
 alry having covered Simon's retreat by a brilliant fight on 
 Kornach heights. 
 
 Charles organized four columns to follow up the French ; 
 but the formal method of their marshaling and the poor 
 ground prevented a vigorous pursuit. Yet Simon's rear was 
 badly cut up. If the Austrian loss of about fifteen hundred 
 men out of over forty-four thousand, and the French loss of 
 two thousand out of thirty thousand men, is accurately stated, 
 neither the casualties nor the fighting can be said to have 
 been heavy ; but Charles had won the innings. The French 
 lost seven guns. 
 
 Thus pushed off his main line of retreat, Jourdan was com- 
 pelled to retire through the Spessart mountains, which he did 
 
 Kray. 
 
330 JOURDAN RESIGNS HIS COMMAND. 
 
 in two columns towards Giessen on the Lahn. It was of the 
 highest importance that he should reach the Mainz country, 
 and there hold head to the Austrian advance, but he was 
 unable to do so. He actually reached the Lahn September 9, 
 where Marceau joined him, and with other incoming detach- 
 ments, he got together over fifty thousand men. With these 
 he held the line of the river, but covering too much front. 
 And while Moreau was advancing to the Isar, Charles con- 
 tinued his march along the highway, and took Hanau and 
 Frankfort September 8 ; whence moving forward, he crossed 
 the Lahn and attacked the French at Altenkirchen Septem- 
 ber 16, with some success. The French line fell back, and 
 with greater speed Charles could have compromised Jourdan, 
 and cut him o£E from the Rhine. But he was over-cautious. 
 In his turn Jourdan neglected near Hof a chance of retriev- 
 ing the campaign. He fell back behind the Sieg, resigned 
 his command, and was succeeded by Beurnonville, who shortly 
 withdrew behind the Rhine at Bonn, Lefebvre occupying Diis- 
 seldorf . Charles followed ; but satisfied that the Army of 
 the Sambre and Meuse would undertake no more active work 
 this season, he headed a detachment up the Rhine to get in 
 Moreau's rear. This body captured Kehl, but shortly again 
 lost the fortress. Napoleon points out that Charles would 
 have accomplished more, so soon as the French had crossed 
 the Rhine, by moving with forty thousand men on Ulm, and 
 calling in Latour to join him via Ratisbon and the left bank 
 of the Danube. Moreau would then have truly been in evil 
 case. Charles left too many men on the Lower Rhine. 
 
 After the battle of Neresheim, it had looked as if the issue 
 of the campaign lay in the hands of Moreau, and indeed, 
 had the commander of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle 
 marched up to join his associate, instead of following Latour, 
 the archduke's brilliant plan would have been shattered ; for 
 
MOREAV FOLLOWS CHARLES. 331 
 
 the Austrian army, caught between two French armies vastly 
 outnumbering it, could not have successfully manoeuvred. 
 How much of this failure was due to Moreau, and how much 
 to the orders of Carnot and the Directory, there seems to be 
 no record to disclose. In retiring August 12 to the right 
 bank of the Danube, Charles had guessed aright that Moreau 
 would follow him, and as the Austrians destroyed all the 
 bridges, the French were compelled to seek crossings well up 
 the stream. On August 20 Moreau concentrated on the Lech, 
 and here Ferino joined him. With his sixty thousand men he 
 proposed to take Augsburg. Latour's thirty-five thousand men 
 were too much spread out to be effective ; and when Moreau 
 advanced on him August 24, he was compelled to fall back 
 after a lively fight at Friedeberg, in which he lost fifteen hun- 
 dred men and seventeen guns, and to take up the Isar line for 
 defense, occupying the river from Munich down to Landshut. 
 
 Charles' manoeuvre, like all such operations, practically 
 opened the road to Vienna to Moreau. But, though the arch- 
 duke's instructious to Latour were to resist the French onset 
 to the utmost, he could well afford the risk, aware that he 
 himself had Bohemia in his rear as a base, and that after de- 
 feating Jourdan he could turn to the left and cut Moreau's 
 sole line of retreat. His entire plan was of the highest value. 
 
 As he gained these advantages, Moreau grew more cautious, 
 and followed too slowly to impress his operation on Charles, 
 who was just beginning to push hard on Jourdan. St. Cyr 
 seized the Isar crossing at Freisingen on September 8, and 
 Latour assembled at Landshut, where reinforcements sent 
 him by Charles were met. It is clear that the best military 
 policy had demanded that Moreau should weeks before have 
 marched to a junction with Jourdan. But though St. Cyr 
 testifies that Moreau knew Jourdan to be hard pressed, 
 yet this was at a date when a junction could no longer be 
 
332 CHARLES' OPERATION BEARS FRUIT. 
 
 effected. Moreover, Moreau was negotiating with Bavaria 
 for peace, and cared not to leave the Isar ; and his orders no 
 doubt also limited his action. Finally he did what might 
 have earlier turned the scales: Desaix was ordered across 
 the Danube and towards Nurnberg, September 10, to inter- 
 fere with Charles' communications. As the archduke paid no 
 heed to this threat, Moreau put his centre over the river at 
 Neuburg. This was an extra-hazardous manoeuvre, which 
 placed the French army in a critical position astride a great 
 river, rather than interfered with Charles' operations. Mo- 
 reau's left was at Eichstadt ; the centre at Ingolstadt ; the 
 right at Geisenfeld. The object to be attained is not apparent. 
 Had Charles not been intent on better game, or had Latour 
 been more enterprising, Moreau might have found himself in 
 evil case. As it was, after four or five days he recognized the 
 weakness of his situation, and reassembled on the right bank. 
 But Charles' brilliant operation was now bearing fruit. 
 Jourdan was painfully making his way towards the Rhine, 
 and Moreau, on learning of his associate's defeat, was forced 
 to recognize that Carnot's plan of two lines of operation, one 
 against each of the allied flanks, had failed. The whole his- 
 tory of war is full of such failures, but it needed a Charles to 
 take advantage of the error, and a Bonaparte to evolve a new 
 maxim out of the failures. It was manifest that Moreau 
 could no longer remain in Bavaria, with Charles so near the 
 Rhine and the French line of retreat ; it required small in- 
 telligence to guess that so soon as Charles had forced Jour- 
 dan across the Rhine, he would turn towards the Neckar 
 country, to cut the communications of the Army of the Rhine 
 and Moselle ; and he determined to retire to Ulm, where he 
 could defend the line of the Iller, and by holding the great 
 fortress, operate on either bank of the Danube at will. In- 
 deed, retreat was imperative, for as couriers between the two 
 
LATOUR HARASSES MOREAU. 333 
 
 French armies, except by a long detour, had during the entire 
 campaign been irregular, and were of late quite interrupted, 
 and as Moreau knew not how far Charles had forced back 
 Jourdan, it was quite within the possibilities that the Aus- 
 trian generalissimo might cross the Danube and cut him off 
 from France. Indeed, a rumor that part of the Mannheim 
 garrison had marched up river and attacked the Kehl bridge 
 added to his disquietude. 
 
 Moreau, accordingly, with his sixty thousand men, retired 
 from the Isar in three columns, with the artillery and train 
 in the advance, Latour following him up step by step. On 
 September 21 he reached the lUer, about the time when the 
 Army of the Sambre and Meuse was seeking refuge beyond 
 the Ehine ; and Desaix crossed the Danube and took up a posi- 
 tion behind the Blau. Yet even here Moreau did not deem 
 himself secure from an allied column which might advance 
 up the Rhine right bank, or indeed up the Neckar valley; 
 and in the last days of September he again retired, this time 
 towards the Upper Rhine. But he deployed his forces over 
 so large an area in the Biberach and Federsee region that he 
 retained but twenty-six thousand men under his own eye. 
 The splendid successes of the Austrian archduke now encour- 
 aged Latour and his lieutenants to a marked degee, and they 
 followed up and harassed Moreau with energy and skill. Nau- 
 endorf threatened the French left by crossing over into the 
 Neckar valley to Tiibingen ; Latour kept on his heels ; a third 
 corps was getting between him and Lake Constance, and 
 Petrasch was advancing up the Rhine from Charles' forces, 
 and would soon seize the Black Forest debouches. The unex- 
 pected retreat and the want of regular issues of rations had 
 caused as much deterioration in the French ranks in this 
 army as in Jourdan's. Superb as is the gallantry of the Gallic 
 soldier, — and there is no denying him a brilliant record in 
 
334 NEAR THE FEDERSEE. 
 
 history, — yet he weakens under failure faster than the Anglo- 
 Saxon. The three-o'clock-in-the-morning courage, the cold 
 persistence in fighting against fate, is peculiarly the birthright 
 of the latter. The French army was quite out of heart, and 
 Moreau was soon fain to acknowledge that he could not expect 
 to hold himself on the right bank of the Rhine. He must 
 fray his path by way of the rugged ravines of the Black For- 
 est, through what is called the Hollenthal, Hell Valley, to 
 Freiburg ; and in order to accomplish this retreat without 
 losing his train, he deemed it essential to neutralize Latour's 
 army by a battle, just as Charles had done at Neresheim, so 
 that it could not pursue him with too much vigor. In two 
 weeks Moreau's handsome achievement had been turned into 
 dire disaster by the archduke's masterly operation against 
 Jourdan. 
 
 The country near the Federsee is hilly, wooded and full of 
 ravines. The position which, on his arrival, Latour had 
 taken up on the hills along the Biss, with that stream in his 
 rear, was a bad one, and his several corps were much too 
 isolated. So indeed were Moreau's. Desaix with sixteen 
 thousand men was north of the Federsee from Alschausen to 
 Wittenweiler ; St. Cyr with ten thousand men was on the 
 south of the lake from Buchau to Schussenried ; and Ferino 
 was at Ravensburg between the Waldsee and the Lake of 
 Constance, more than a day's march away, where he could 
 scarcely be of use in the proposed battle. Moreau planned 
 that on October 2 Desaix should attack the Austrian right 
 under Kospeth at Stafflangen ; that St. Cyr should advance 
 against Latour at Steinhausen in the centre ; and to Ferino 
 were sent orders to march on Winterstetten, and turn the 
 enemy's left under Conde and Mercantin. 
 
 This plan was only partially carried out ; Ferino did not 
 receive his orders in season. Desaix drove the enemy's right 
 
BATTLE OF BIBERACH. 
 
 335 
 
 almost back to Biberach, and deployed in their front. St. 
 Cyr, in three columns, attacked the Austrian centre at Stein- 
 hausen, and on the right front of the village, and after much 
 to-and-f ro fighting, forced it back to Grodt. Latour disputed 
 the groimd with tenacity, but the French onset was too hearty, 
 
 Battle of Biberach. 
 
 and the Austrian divisions finally fell back to Ingoldingen 
 and Winterstetten, and thence towards Biberach. Instead 
 of following up his success, St. Cyr obliqued to the left and 
 captured Grodt. The French outdid themselves, but they 
 had to pay a heavy price for every step. Unable to force the 
 Austrians from the Galgenberg in front of Biberach, Desaix 
 sent turning columns around the right and left of the hill, 
 and seized the enemy's communications back of Biberach, 
 whereupon the town fell to the French. Latour's defeat was 
 
336 MANIFOLD DIFFICULTIES. 
 
 complete, with a loss of four thousand men, eighteen guns 
 and two flags ; and he was glad to retire in any kind of order 
 on Ulm, unpursued. Moreau had won the battle without 
 Ferino's aid, who had not had time to come up. He did not 
 follow beyond the Biss. 
 
 But the French commander still had the task of retiring 
 through a bad mountain country, with Nauendorf and Pe- 
 trasch to dispute his advance or fall upon his flanks. Had 
 he possessed Bonaparte's activity, he could have marched 
 on Rothweil, where they stood, brushed them aside, and then 
 turned on Charles on the Kench. As it was, had the Aus- 
 trians not been seriously checked by their defeat at Biberach, 
 the indecisive and deliberate French retreat might have been 
 converted into a rout. Latour had missed his chance of 
 compromising the Army of the Rhine and Moselle before it 
 reached its base. Moreau would have preferred to march 
 through the Kinzig valley on Kehl, and in fact made an 
 attempt so to do ; but Nauendorf had already headed him off. 
 The only route he could pursue was through the pass which 
 bisects the Black Forest — the Hbllenthal. This he set out 
 to accomplish, sending his train down the Wiese towards 
 Hiiningen. St. Cyr in the advance was to open the way 
 through Neustadt, occupied by the Austrians. Desaix held 
 his own for a day to fend off Latour, and then fell in at his 
 rear. Ferino closed the column. By skillful work Moreau 
 made his way through manifold difficulties to Freiburg by 
 October 12. He had still hoped to be able to move down- 
 stream to Kehl ; but by this time Charles with a small corps 
 had himself come up the river, and drawing in Latour and 
 other detachments, to all of which the road was now open, 
 stood with thirty-five thousand men athwart his path to that 
 fortress, and was preparing to advance upon him. 
 
 On October 19 Charles had taken up a line from Herbolz- 
 
CAPTURE OF EMMENDINGEN. 
 
 337 
 
 heim to Bleibach and beyond. The French went into posi- 
 tion to cover Freiburg, from Riegel through Emmendingen to 
 Waldkirch. Moreau had here the same problem to face that 
 he had had against Latour : he must defeat Charles in order 
 to retire deliberately on Hiiningen and give his train time to 
 get to a place of safety. The archduke advanced on him in 
 several columns October 19, though at a few points the 
 
 Battle of Emmendingen. 
 
 French sallied out and made the first attack. Nauendorf took 
 Waldkirch from St. Cyr after several hours' fighting, and 
 occupied Suggenthal; Wartensleben drove Duhesne across 
 the Elz and captured Emmendingen ; Latour's column after 
 hearty opposition drove the French out of Kondringen and 
 
338 MOREAU RETIRES TO SCHLIENGEN. 
 
 Thieningen ; while a fourtli column, headed against Riegel, 
 only cannonaded the French position, though this in a way 
 contributed to the Austrian success. Thus Ferino alone held 
 head to the enemy ; but Moreau had to withdraw his right to 
 the woodland about Gundelfingen, with his left extending 
 down towards Bahlingen. Next day Charles again attacked 
 the French in the villages they held in front of the Dreisam, 
 but they succeeded in holding themselves. Moreau decided 
 to put Desaix with the left wing across the Rhine at Alt Brei- 
 sach, and to retire with the rest to Hiiningen ; for as the 
 roads were narrow and the bridge accommodation was limited, 
 he feared that these might become congested. Moreover, he 
 gave Desaix instructions, if feasible, to march down river to 
 Strasburg, cross to Kehl, and fall on Charles' communications 
 with the Main. This did not get done, however. 
 
 When Charles was ready for attack on the third day, he 
 found that Moreau had retired. The French commander had 
 assembled the centre and right at Freiburg during the night 
 of October 20-21, and had retired up river to Schliengen, 
 at the entrance to the mountains. Charles rapidly followed 
 him up, and he found that he must again turn and face the 
 Austrians if he would not be driven in disorder back on Hii- 
 ningen. Numbering in all over thirty thousand men, he formed 
 line with his left wing under St. Cyr leaning on the Ehine at 
 Steinstadt, and thence through Schliengen to Liel and out to 
 Eekenen, holding the villages in front, and the heights right 
 and left of Mauchen, with strong parties. Ferino on the 
 right was thrown back as a crotchet from Eekenen to Kan- 
 dern, with outposts in the villages in his front. The cavalry 
 stood between Holzen and Riedlingen. 
 
 Charles reconnoitred the position October 23, and deter- 
 mined to attack next day in four columns. He designed to 
 turn Moreau's right, and by cutting him off from Hiiningen, 
 
KANDERN FALLS TO NAUENDORF. 
 
 339 
 
 compromise his army. He launched the columns forward 
 with vigor. Conde on the right captured Steinstadt ; Fiirsten- 
 berg, next him, took Mauchen, and both held the enemy in 
 place. But the French 
 centre and right were 
 too strong. A first 
 gain by Latour at 
 Eckenen was not fol- 
 lowed by further suc- 
 cess, as he was unable 
 to cross a ravine pro- 
 tecting the French 
 line, nor indeed to 
 bring up his artillery. 
 Nauendorf drove the 
 French out of Sitzen- 
 kirch, but they took 
 up a position behind 
 the Kandern ravine 
 and held him off. It 
 was not until nightfall 
 that Kandern, after a 
 hard day's fight, fell 
 to Nauendorf. The 
 Austrians had been 
 checked by Moreau's 
 determined stand, and 
 
 Batde of Schliengen. 
 
 the French army in three columns followed the train. On 
 the 25th a halt was made at Haltingen, and next day the 
 Army of the Rhine and Moselle, heartsick and footsore, was 
 glad to file within the bridge-head, and to cross safely at 
 Hiiningen to its protecting base. 
 
 Blame was cast by many on Moreau's conduct of this cam- 
 
340 KEHL SURRENDERS. 
 
 paign ; and indeed he had not aided Jourdan as much as he 
 might have done at the auspicious moment. His friends, on 
 the other hand, foolishly likened his retreat through the Black 
 Forest to Xenophon's march to the sea. The simple fact is 
 that Charles outmanoeuvred both him and Jourdan. 
 
 "Thus," say the Memoirs, "after having nourished the 
 war four months in Germany, disarmed and detached from the 
 cause of the emperor the Margrave of Baden, the Duke of 
 Wurtemberg and the Elector of Bavaria, and having accorded 
 them forces, and imposed on them contributions which it had 
 not the time to collect, having carried off several victories 
 without having suffered an important defeat, the French army 
 repassed the Rhine." Napoleon shows in his incisive way how 
 Moreau could have retrieved the campaign, even at the last; 
 but he tries him by his own rapid standard — a scarcely 
 equitable test. 
 
 So soon as Moreau had reached the left bank of the Rhine, 
 he assigned the defense of Kehl to Desaix, and to Ferino that 
 of Hiiningen. Charles masked the latter place and turned on 
 Kehl, fearing a fresh crossing by the Army of the Rhine and 
 Moselle. He was indeed ordered by the Vienna authorities to 
 capture both Kehl and Hiiningen ; and in consequence of 
 these instructions, Latour closed in Kehl with thirty-five thou- 
 sand men, early in November. The place surrendered Janu- 
 ary 19. The bridge-head of Hiiningen was captured in Feb- 
 ruary. The Austrians went into winter quarters on the right 
 bank, the French on the left bank. 
 
 The campaign in Germany in 1796, which, for lack of space, 
 has been but baldly sketched, almost equals in interest that of 
 Bonaparte in Italy, and its hero is the twenty-five-year-old 
 Archduke Charles. The operations of the French armies 
 were all in the hands of one man, the able war minister, Car- 
 not, who, more rich in theory than practice, still lay under the 
 
CARNOT'S GENERAL PLAN. 341 
 
 weight of the old cordon system, and of his own false scheme 
 of concentrating the bulk of the operating forces at the ends 
 of his own cordon, so as to turn the flanks of the enemy's 
 cordon. How mistaken this theory was, it needed only Bona- 
 parte in Italy in this same year to demonstrate. Yet it was 
 much in favor of the French arms that to Carnot was given 
 the sole power, while the Austrian arms were subject to the 
 whims of the Vienna Council, whose pedantic methods often 
 came close to wrecking what would have been excellent opera- 
 tions, if let alone. 
 
 Carnot's general plan was to have Moreau and Jourdan 
 advance, each on either bank of the Danube, and join hands 
 with Bonaparte at the gates of Vienna. The plan was mag- 
 nificent, but like all concentric operations, it possessed the 
 distinct element of failure. The Austrian general plan was 
 to gain a strong foothold on the left bank of the middle or 
 lower Rhine, and thence reconquer the Netherlands. With 
 the forces Austria placed on the Ehine ployed into one body, 
 a determined and able leader might have marched on Paris ; 
 but when Bonaparte reached the Mincio, the wiseacres in 
 Vienna withdrew Wurmser and the best of the veterans from 
 the Rhine, and assumed a defensive rSle where they had pur- 
 posed to deliver their heartiest blow. It was merely by a 
 piece of good luck that the field operations were placed under 
 one man — and he the Archduke Charles. 
 
 The scheme of Carnot was perhaps superior to that of the 
 Austrians ; but its details were less well managed. The 
 principal operations were confided to Moreau, whether because 
 his army lay on the straight road to Vienna, or from the idea 
 that he was more able than Jourdan, cannot be said. Jour- 
 dan's entire army was to begin by making a mere demonstra- 
 tion to aid Moreau's. The two were later to operate, each 
 limited to his own line ; and yet they were supposed to be in 
 
342 MARKED CAPACITY FOR WAR. 
 
 cooperation. This is not, however, the sort of cooperation 
 which produces results. The falsity of this gigantic plan 
 stands out in marked contrast to Bonaparte's success in Italy, 
 in his beautifully simple manoeuvres against the centre of the 
 Austro-Sardinian armies. Had Carnot placed both Bhine 
 armies in one body to operate down the Danube, what might 
 not, in connection with the Army of Italy, have been the re- 
 sult ? The same reasoning applies to the two Austrian armies. 
 Would not Archduke Charles have been better equipped, if 
 both these armies had at the outset been in one body, which 
 could push in between Jourdan and Moreau and destroy each 
 singly ? This was in fact what Charles eventually, but only 
 in part did, and it was this which brought to so brilliant an 
 end this memorable campaign. 
 
 Why Charles retired so constantly at the opening of the 
 campaign, when he had practically the same opportunity as 
 in the latter half, unless he was controlled by the Vienna 
 Council, has been often asked. The answer is that the garri- 
 sons left on the Rhine, and the defection of allied contingents, 
 reduced him to an inferiority ; and being inexperienced, he 
 needed to prove his weapons. He himself says that his object 
 was, so soon as he should reach the Danube, to dispute the 
 advance of the enemy foot by foot, without risking a general 
 engagement ; to draw in his left wing, which had been cut 
 off ; to rejoin Wartensleben farther to the rear ; and to seek 
 a chance of falling with superior forces on one or the other 
 French army. And from the moment he decided to operate 
 against Jourdan, while holding Moreau in check with Latour, 
 he showed marked capacity for war. The inevitable hap- 
 pened. Moreau was compelled to retire when his associate 
 was forced back, and both were glad to seek refuge behind 
 the Rhine. Even gauging Moreau's retreat at its highest 
 value, and it was boldly and skillfully conducted, yet he was 
 
RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 343 
 
 fortunate, in view of Charles' prompt march up the Rhine, 
 after he had disposed of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, 
 to effectuate his escape as he did. The object of the German 
 campaign, say the Memoirs, was to prevent forces being de- 
 tached to Italy ; take from the emperor his allies ; feed the 
 army in Germany, and seize horses and material there ; cap- 
 ture Ehrenbreitstein, Mainz, Mannheim and Philipsburg ; to 
 secure the Rhine as a frontier for France ; take winter quar- 
 ters on the Danube, so as to be ready in 1797, after Mantua 
 should have been captured, to advance on Vienna in concord 
 with the Army of Italy. To accomplish this, the above places 
 should have been besieged, and all the French forces disposable 
 should have been consolidated into one army of one hundred 
 and fifty thousand men to move into the heart of Germany. 
 
 Moreau can scarcely be said to have exhibited more than 
 ordinary talent in this campaign. Jourdan showed even less. 
 " He was," say the Memoirs, " very brave on the day of battle, 
 in face of the enemy and in the midst of fire ; but he had not 
 the courage of the head in the middle of the calm of night, at 
 two o'clock in the morning. He lacked not penetration or 
 intellectual faculties, but he was without resolution, and im- 
 bued with false principles of war." Wartensleben and Latour 
 were on a common plane. Despite some minor miscalcula- 
 tions, the operations of Archduke Charles on the Rhine and 
 Danube were masterful to a high degree. 
 
 There is, however, this marked difference. In Germany 
 the results were naught ; in Italy the results were immense. 
 In Germany, each opponent ended where he began ; Bona- 
 parte won all northern Italy by his new method of conducting 
 war. Not only this, but Bonaparte created a new art ; Charles 
 remained under the influence of the cordon system : and when 
 later he encountered Bonaparte, he found that he had met 
 more than his match. 
 
XIII. 
 ARCOLE. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1796. 
 
 BoNAPAKTE foresaw that he would again have to fight for Mantua, and hia 
 position was far from sound. Still by every meaus, political and military, he 
 strove to better his position. The Austrians were largely reinforced from the 
 successful armies on the Danube, and Alvinzi in October was sent to relieve 
 Mantua. As usual, the Austrians divided their army, proposing to move from 
 Trent and from Ba^sano on Verona, and there join hands. To meet this double 
 threat Bonaparte left Vaubois to hold the upper Adige while he attacked 
 Alvinzi ; but Davidovich drove back Vaubois, and Alvinzi held his own against 
 Bonaparte on the Brenta. Thus both French columns early in November fell 
 back, and Bonaparte saw that if he lost Verona he must retire behind the 
 Mincio. He had never yet been in such danger. At Caldiero, November 11, 
 Bonaparte attacked Alvinzi, but, unable to make any impression on the supe- 
 rior Austrians, retired to Verona. Had Alvinzi, Davidovich and Wurmser 
 now advanced promptly on Bonaparte, the French would have been in ill case. 
 Some new plan must be devised, or Bonaparte could not hold himself. Leav- 
 ing a small force in Verona, he marched down the Adige, crossed at Ronco, 
 and attempted to turn Alvinzi's left and reach his rear. But the French were 
 stopped at Areole by the marshy ground, over which they could only advance 
 along causeways, and here for three days was fought a bloody battle. On each 
 evening the French retired to the west bank of the river. The Army of Italy 
 was saved by Davidovich's slowness, who during all this time did not attack 
 Vaubois, and finally on the 17th Alvinzi weakened, and the battle of Areole 
 was won. This enabled Bonaparte to drive Davidovich back up the Adige, 
 which he could now do with superior numbers. Wurmser made an ill-timed 
 sortie from Mantua, which in nowise aided Alvinzi. 
 
 The lost campaign in Germany had seriously affected the 
 position of the Army of Italy, and the Directory had- no 
 means wherewith to help it. Efforts had been made to open 
 negotiations between the contending powers, but until Austria 
 could recover Lombardy, she would listen to no overtures 
 
ITALIAN POLITICS. 345 
 
 from whatever source. Despite all Bonaparte's victories, his 
 sitviation continued dangerous. He had lost twenty thousand 
 men by battle and disease, and had not over thirty-six thou- 
 sand men left. And yet he must have reinforcements. Re- 
 peatedly he warned the Directory, " Troops, or Italy goes 
 lost." And while France did naught to sustain her one suc- 
 cessful general, Austria put fresh hosts into the field. 
 
 On October 1, 1796, Bonaparte wrote to the Directory : — 
 
 " In January the emperor will have a powerful army in the Tyrol and in 
 Friuli. . . . Nothing equals the activity that there is in the empire to re- 
 cruit the Italian army. Here is the force of our army : Vaubois with eight 
 thousand men covers Trent ; Massena with fifty-five hundred men and 
 Augereau with fifty-four hundred men are on the march to the Brenta ; 
 Sahuguet and Dallemague with forty-five hundred men are before Mantua. 
 In Lombardy, at Coni, at Alessandria, at Tortona, at Ceva, at Cherasco, 
 are four thousand. Sick, fourteen thousand ; wounded, four thousand. 
 Thus I have eighteen thousand nine hundred men in the army of obser- 
 vation, nine thousand men in the army of siege. 1 leave it to you to 
 judge, if I receive no help, whether it is possible that I can this winter 
 resist the emperor, who will have fifty thousand men here in six weeks. 
 . . . Eeflect that you should have here in Italy, to be able to sustain 
 yourselves during the winter, thirty-five thousand men of infantry in the 
 army of observation, and eighteen thousand men of infantry in the army 
 of siege, to make face to the emperor." 
 
 During the two months which the French forces spent in 
 the fever-stricken lowlands about Mantua, Bonaparte was kept 
 busy in working daylight out of the conflicting shadows of 
 Italian politics. His desire was, while respecting and taking 
 advantage of the aristocratic and ecclesiastical sentiments of 
 both classes and masses, to make republics out of the princi- 
 palities of northern Italy, the population of which had taken 
 kindly to the republican ideas, and was wavering between 
 love of their religion and hatred of domestic oppression. 
 After much negotiation and canvassing, Bologna and Ferrara 
 
346 TREATY WITH NAPLES. 
 
 were actually erected into a Transpadane Republic ; Modena 
 and Reggio into a Cispadane, the former town having been 
 occupied by French troops. 
 
 But there were many awkward questions staring Bonaparte 
 in the face. Venice might at any time declare for Austria, 
 and she could put twenty thousand men into the field. The 
 Pope had broken the terms of his armistice, and had made 
 overtures to Vienna. Naples had delayed signing the treaty 
 with France, whose terms had been agreed to. By the death 
 of the king of Sardinia, the attitude of Piedmont again be- 
 came questionable ; and without this base as a positive factor, 
 the French forces on the Mincio were absolutely in the air. 
 Some of Bonaparte's fears, however, came to-an early end by 
 the final execution by the Directory of a very liberal treaty 
 with Naples on October 10 ; and this treaty likewise settled 
 the Roman question, for the Pope was apt to attempt nothing, 
 unless sure of the countenance of Naples. 
 
 As Bonaparte had long desired to create for the Republic 
 in Italy a strong place upon which he could rely, he renewed 
 certain of his demands on Genoa, and these eventually re- 
 sulted in that city paying a tribute, excluding the English 
 fleet, and the great port being transformed into a French 
 armed place. About the same time the English occupied 
 Porto Ferajo, and Corsica having become troublesome, they 
 left that island, which was thereupon promptly seized by a 
 French expedition, October 21. 
 
 There was sufficient reason why Bonaparte, whose troops 
 were still before Mantua, and in the Brenta and Adige val- 
 leys watching the enemy, had not initiated active operations. 
 In addition to the political work, which always consumed 
 much of his time, for Bonaparte was as apt to rely on what 
 he could accomplish by statesmanship as by war, his army 
 demanded much time ; for it had suffered severely from epi- 
 
WAR AGAINST ROGUES. 347 
 
 demic fevers, which had depleted the ranks and filled the 
 hospitals, and reinforcements came in all too slowly. Yet he 
 must keep it in good fighting trim, which was no easy task 
 with its then half-civil, half-military organization. In a long 
 dispatch to the Directory, dated October 12, 1796, Bonaparte 
 made formal complaint by name against many of the civil 
 employees of the army as being villains of the .first water. 
 " Since I am in Milan, Citizen Directors, I occupy myself 
 with making war against rogues. I have had several tried 
 and punished. I myself denounce others to you. In making 
 an open war against them, it is clear that I arouse against 
 myself a thousand voices, which will seek to pervert the (pub- 
 lie) opinion. I understand that, if ' two months ago I wanted 
 to be Duke of Milan, to-day I would like to be King of Italy.' 
 But as long as my force and your confidence last, I shall make 
 a pitiless war against the rogues and the Austrians." He 
 then goes on to state that the evidence proves that the con- 
 tractors and commissaries pocketed a large part of the money 
 furnished them, that they delivered poor goods, that they de- 
 manded fifteen and twenty per cent, rebate on government 
 orders, that they corrupted the military storekeepers and 
 forged vouchers. " They steal in a manner so ridiculous and 
 so impudent that if I had a month of leisure, there would not 
 be one of them who might not be shot." A number of these 
 men are identified by name in this dispatch ; and among 
 them, to their credit, a number of honest men are also men- 
 tioned. This trouble was ever recurring. In writing Ber- 
 thier January 1, 1797, about three citizens who had stolen 
 and made false vouchers, Bonaparte wrote : " I demand in 
 consequence that these three employees shall be condemned 
 to death. They should not be considered as common thieves, 
 but as men who every day diminish the means of the army, 
 and cause the best concerted operations to fail, or at least 
 
348 A DIPLOMATIC ATTEMPT. 
 
 only allow their success after the spilling of much French 
 blood." 
 
 While Bonaparte waged war on plunderers of the army 
 supplies, he consistently upheld the arts and sciences. On 
 October 25 he wrote : " It seems, Citizens Directors, by your 
 letter of the 14 Vendemiaire, that the savants and the artists 
 have complained of not having what they need. It would be 
 very ungrateful on our part not to give them all that is neces- 
 sary, for they serve the Republic with as much zeal as suc- 
 cess, and I beg you to believe that on my side I appreciate 
 more than anybody the real service which arts and sciences 
 render to the state, and that I shall always be anxious to sec- 
 ond with all my zeal your intentions on this subject." 
 
 Turning from the civil to the military side of his duties, 
 on October 16 Bonaparte wrote to Wurmser, stating the fact 
 that Mantua was beyond being saved, offering to let him per- 
 sonally see what the existing conditions were, and suggesting 
 that he had better yield up the fortress. This diplomatic 
 attempt had, however, no result. On October 25 he wrote 
 the Directory : " Wurmser is in the last extremity, he has 
 no wine, meat or forage. He is eating his horses, and has 
 fifteen thousand sick. He found means of getting the pro- 
 position I made him to Vienna." For all that, the fortress 
 continued to hold out. Wurmser had pluck, if not ability. 
 
 Meanwhile the defeat of Jourdan enabled the Voralberg 
 troops to march to the Adige, and Davidovich, who had been 
 put in command with orders to take Trent, received acces- 
 sions which ran his army up to nearly twenty thousand men; 
 and the army of Quosdanovich, which after the defeat of 
 Bassano had retired to Gorice on the Isonzo, was also in- 
 creased to thirty thousand, partly Croats, recently organized 
 into regiments, partly men from the Rhine armies to act as a 
 leaven and partly recruits from the interior. 
 
SUPERIOR NUMBERS DISQUIETING. 349 
 
 Bonaparte's political operations were interrupted by the 
 arrival at the end of October of a fresh Austrian army under 
 Alvinzi, who, like his predecessor, was charged with the relief 
 of Mantua, which Austria was determined to keep at any 
 price. The force which had been assembling in the Friuli 
 under Alvinzi had concentrated October 22 at Pordenone, 
 reached Conegliano October 30, and crossed the Piave on 
 November 2, on the way to Bassano, while Davidovich with 
 eighteen thousand men recaptured Trent. Each of these two 
 columns proposed to push its advance, Davidovich down the 
 Adige, Alvinzi towards Verona, until they could join hands 
 at the latter city ; and meanwhile Wurmser would debouch 
 in force from Mantua. This intention, which shortly became 
 manifest, prevented Bonaparte from advancing on Alvinzi 
 on the Brenta or the Piave, lest he should, by his absence, 
 enable Davidovich to beat Vaubois, march down and join 
 Wurmser at Mantua, and establish a large body on the 
 French communications. Nor could he well advance to E.o- 
 veredo, lest he open to Alvinzi the road to Mantua, with the 
 same results. And should he remain massed at Verona, the 
 two Austrian commanders might join hands by the Brenta 
 valley. The one thing in his favor was that the two armies 
 were again to operate on concentric lines, so that either could 
 be attacked separately, so long as the other kept quiet, or 
 could be neutralized. The late defeat of Wurmser seemed 
 not to have taught the Austrians any military wisdom. But 
 the superior numbers of the enemy were most disquieting. 
 
 Of Alvinzi's movement towards the Brenta valley Bona- 
 parte had received news by October 25, and he proposed, as 
 a first step, to have Vaubois push the Tyrolese troops back 
 on Neumarkt, so that he could draw from his division a 
 goodly detachment to reinforce the main body ; and he sent 
 Berthier thither to see the work done as directed. Should a 
 
350 VAUBOIS' INABILITY. 
 
 heavy force move on Bassano, Massena, who was on the 
 Brenta, was ordered to withdraw to Vieenza, and when the 
 enemy had got tired out by his long marches over bad roads, 
 Bonaparte's time of attack would have come. The French 
 general's calculations were, however, as we shall see, much 
 upset by Vaubois' inability even to hold his own. 
 
 On October 29 Massena made a reconnoissance towards 
 the Piave, and ascertaining the presence of Austrians on the 
 farther side, concentrated at Bassano the troops with which 
 he had been protecting the Brenta valley and watched for the 
 enemy. That Alvinzi had crossed the Piave November 2 was 
 soon reported to Bonaparte at headquarters in Verona ; and 
 next day the Austrian army was in the Treviso-Asolo region. 
 Upon the approach of Quosdanovich with the right wing to 
 Bassano on November 4, Massena vacated the town early in 
 the morning, and withdrew towards Vieenza ; while Augereau, 
 under previous orders, approached Montebello, and Bonaparte 
 came thither to take command. On the 15th Massena and 
 Augereau concentrated at Vieenza. Provera and the left wing 
 marched to the Brenta in front of Citadella. 
 
 While this was going on opposite the Austrian lower Adige 
 army, Vaubois advanced on the upper Adige army under 
 Davidovich according to orders ; and though attacking with 
 vigor on November 2, at early dawn, the position of the Aus- 
 trians near San Michele above the Avisio, was unable to 
 carry the place ; and his right having been turned, he retired 
 by evening to Lavis. Next day Davidovich, who had twice 
 the force of Vaubois, led the attack on the French right at 
 Segonzano, and fearing to be turned, Vaubois withdrew his 
 left to Trent. On the 4th Davidovich, encouraged by suc- 
 cess, pushed sharply in on Trent, and by nightfall Vaubois 
 was fain to leave this town also, and take up the next avail- 
 able position, in the defile of Caliano. Again Davidovich 
 
ALVINZrS C 
 
CAMPAIGN. 
 
WITHOUT GAINFUL RESULT. 351 
 
 advanced, and on the 5th attacked the defile, sending at the 
 same time a turning force of Tyrolese riflemen under Lau- 
 don, by way of Mori and Torbole on the other side of the 
 river, to reach the French rear. He was playing the same 
 role, in the opposite direction, that Bonaparte had played 
 two months before. 
 
 On November 5, 1796, Joubert, in whom Bonaparte had 
 recognized the true quality of the soldier, was ordered to turn 
 over his command of Legnano to another officer, and to report 
 to Vaubois to help him in his campaign. It was here that 
 Joubert learned the Adige country, as a preparation to his 
 future brilliant services there. 
 
 Why Alvinzi did not essay to join Davidovich by the 
 Brenta, or at least organize a line of couriers between the 
 armies, so as to work in some sort in concert with his lieuten- 
 ant, or at all events with knowledge of each other's manoeu- 
 vres, it is hard to comprehend. But a division of forces at 
 that day was not deemed an error. In fact, it is yet the com- 
 mon resort of all incompetent strategists. 
 
 In the Brenta valley, on November 6, the armies also 
 clashed. Early in the morning Bonaparte had moved Auge- 
 reau forward on Alvinzi's right under Quosdanovich at Bas- 
 sano, and Massena on his left under Liptay and Provera, 
 who stood at Carmagnano and Foutaniva, and had striven 
 all day long by repeated attacks to win the crossings of the 
 Brenta held by the enemy ; but though, on the whole, the 
 French were successful, and Alvinzi retired most of his troops 
 across the river, yet the Austrians, by bringing up their re- 
 serves, held fast to the crossings, and the day was without 
 gainful result. The loss was fortunately not great. Having 
 in mind the "Wurmser campaign, Bonaparte was surprised at 
 the good countenance of the Austrian troops. They appeared 
 to be quite equal to his own in action. He proposed to renew 
 
352 LACK OF ENDURANCE. ' 
 
 the attack next day ; but bad news from Vaubois held him 
 back. While the commander-in-chief was thus forfeiting the 
 chance he had hoped for, of throwing Alvinzi permanently 
 towards the Piave, and then of marching up the Brenta valley 
 and taking Davidovich in the rear, the latter had attacked 
 La Pietra in force, and had failed by a frontal attack to take 
 the defile. But a turning column had proved more success- 
 ful, and on learning of its presence, Vaubois was again smit- 
 ten with the fever of retreat, and wrote his chief that he 
 feared he should probably be forced still farther back by dint 
 of numbers. This forward movement of Davidovich, if car- 
 ried too far, threatened to take Verona in reverse, and Bona- 
 parte concluded that he must defer his operations against 
 Alvinzi, and turn his attention to the Adige valley. Augereau 
 and Massena were ordered back to Vicenza, which they 
 reached November 7, and after a short respite, withdrew to 
 Verona by the forenoon of the 8th. This rearward movement 
 markedly encouraged Alvinzi and his Austrians. 
 
 Davidovich had not a clever soldier in his front. On the 
 7th he repeated his attack on Vaubois at Caliano, captured 
 the place by 4 p. M., and the French were forced back to the 
 La Corona-Rivoli line. This operation was getting to be so 
 dangerous that Bonaparte himself went up to Rivoli to encour- 
 age the troops. Two half-brigades had specially shown lack 
 of endurance in the fight of the 7th ; and the commanding 
 general issued an "Allocution to the Division Vaubois." 
 
 RiVOLI, 17 Brumaire, Year V. 
 
 Soldiers ! I am not satisfied with you ; you have shown neither dis- 
 cipline, nor constancy, nor hravery; in no position could you be rallied; 
 you abandoned yourselves to a panic terror ; you have allowed yourselves 
 to be driven from positions where a handful of brave men should stop an 
 army. Soldiers of the 39th and of the 85th, you are not French soldiers. 
 General, Chief of Staff, cause to be written on the flags : — 
 
 " They are no longer of the Army of Italy ! " Bonapakte. 
 
GOOD SERVICE RECOGNIZED. 353 
 
 This punishment bit deep ; the men, with true Gallic fer- 
 vor, vowed to conquer or die ; and when they thereafter kept 
 their word, the stigma was removed. Bonaparte had a way 
 with him which commanded the respect and won the hearts 
 of his soldiers. 
 
 In his dispatches to the Directory November 18, the general- 
 in-chief was fain to apologize for some of these troops. 
 Speaking of this fight at La Pietra, " At the beginning of 
 the night a panic terror seized our troops, the rout became 
 general, we abandoned six guns," he reports. And, " General 
 of Division Vaubois is a brave man, fit to sustain a siege in a 
 place," he wrote November 24, " but in no sense fit to com- 
 mand a division in an army as active, and in a kind of war 
 as decisive. I have sent him to command in Leghorn ; he 
 might be sent to command in Corsica. I ask of you the 
 grade of division general for the General of Brigade Joubert, 
 a young man of greatest merit." Bonaparte was ever ready 
 to recognize and reward good service. 
 
 On the same day, the 7th of November, that had seen Vau- 
 bois' defeat, Alvinzi moved within five miles of Vicenza. 
 On the 8th he kept on and reached the city, while Davido- 
 vich got as far down the Adige as Eoveredo — each with his- 
 main body. Matters were coming to a crisis. It began to 
 look as if Alvinzi's eccentric advance was about to succeed' 
 against Bonaparte's interior lines. 
 
 One thing is worthy of special remark in these days, and 
 that is how little favored by fortune Bonaparte was. De- 
 spite work twice as hard as any done by his opponent, 
 despite marches twice as long, despite courage equal to that 
 of any troops, yet Bonaparte and his men frequently fell far 
 short of success. It has generally been said that he was the 
 constant favorite of the fickle goddess ; but it should rather 
 be said that when she did smile on him, he quickly seized his 
 
354 STUDYING THE SITUATION. 
 
 opportunity; and that when she withdrew her favors, he 
 worked all the harder to win back her smiles. In this par- 
 ticular case Bonaparte had set himself a task with marked 
 risk. As has been pointed out, he wanted to reverse the 
 manoeuvre he had used against Wurmser, and having thrown 
 Alvinzi back beyond the Brenta, to march up the valley, and 
 fall on the rear of Davidovich. After a fashion, this was lay- 
 ing his own communications open to interruption, for unless 
 he beat Alvinzi so thoroughly as to neutralize him for many 
 days, he could not expect to prevent his again advancing to- 
 wards the Mincio before the French could crush Davidovich 
 and reach the danger-zone by the long detour up the Brenta 
 and down the Adige. 
 
 Now, when Vaubois was beaten, and he himself had failed to 
 beat Alvinzi, — in other words, when Dame Fortune frowned 
 upon him, — Bonaparte saw that he must woo her by some other 
 means ; and he changed his plan at once and radically. That 
 he was ready to do so, that he was speedily prepared with an- 
 other plan, shows that, like Frederick, he was always study- 
 ing the situation. " A great captain must ask himself daily 
 a number of times : ' If the enemy's army should appear in 
 my front, on my right flank, on my left, what should I do ? ' 
 If this question puzzles him, he is badly placed, he is not 
 well ordered, he must rectify things." From this study came 
 Bonaparte's readiness, his alertness. 
 
 In these quotations from Napoleon's utterances, there is so 
 much which is, idea for idea, the same which we find in Fred- 
 erick's writings, that one must conclude not only that Napo- 
 leon knew these writings, but that they had sunk deep into 
 his mind. He can scarcely have failed to read or ponder 
 what had already become public property, by translation and 
 publication in many places outside of Prussia ; and though 
 he nowhere refers to inspiration from Frederick's pages, — 
 
ALVINZrS ADVANCE. 355 
 
 this would not in any case have been the way of this self- 
 sufficient man, — the internal evidence would show that he 
 was indebted to the great king for much of what he knew of 
 war. Frederick's seed fell on fertile soil. 
 
 On November 8, then, Bonaparte was at Verona with 
 twenty-one thousand men, and Vaubois at La Corona with 
 eight thousand ; and in their front Alvinzi lay with twenty- 
 seven thousand men at Vicenza, and Davidovich with sixteen 
 thousand at Eoveredo, — an active field force of twenty-nine 
 thousand French to forty-three thousand Austrians. Next 
 day Alvinzi moved forward to Montebello ; but Davidovich, 
 hearing that Vaubois had received reinforcements, remained 
 inactive. On the 10th Alvinzi sent a detachment out to 
 Caldiero, and the following day he marched his main col- 
 umn to Villanova. Bonaparte had meanwhile sent Massena 
 in person to gauge the situation in the Adige valley, and 
 himself closely watched Alvinzi. Should Davidovich advance 
 farther, Bonaparte determined to fall on him and destroy 
 him at any cost ; else his line of retreat via Peschiera and 
 across the Mincio might be compromised. But Massena 
 came back with the reassuring news that Davidovich showed 
 no immediate sign of moving ; and Bonaparte, instead of 
 sending Massena's division to sustain Vaubois, as he had 
 feared he must, determined to keep him for an attack on 
 Alvinzi. He was to need his every man. The French army, 
 then, had rest on the 9th and 10th ; and not until the 11th 
 did Bonaparte hear any definite news of Alvinzi's advance 
 towards Verona. 
 
 If we can imagine Alvinzi's advancing rapidly on Verona, 
 which city he could turn by crossing the Adige below, Davi- 
 dovich continuing to press Vaubois day by day, and Wurmser 
 making a hearty sortie from Mantua with twenty thousand 
 men, it would seem as if this Austrian total of sixty-seven 
 
356 AN OFFENSIVE COUNTER. 
 
 thousand men, although advancing in a faulty manner, ought 
 to have overwhelmed Bonaparte's total of forty-five thousand 
 men, relieved Mantua, and driven the Army of Italy behind 
 the Mineio. But Alvinzi's slowness was matched by that of 
 both Davidovich and Wurmser. 
 
 Before marching out to meet the enemy, Bonaparte, on the 
 11th of November, issued his usual proclamation : " When 
 the drum of battle shall have beaten, and when we march 
 straight at the enemy, with fixed bayonets and in the dull 
 silence which guarantees victory, Soldiers ! be worthy of your- 
 selves. I say to you but two words, they suffice for French- 
 men : ' Italy! Mantua ! ' The peace of Europe, the happiness 
 of your parents, will be the result of your courage. Let us do 
 once more what we have done so often, and Europe will not 
 contest us the title of the bravest and most powerful nation 
 in the world." 
 
 On the afternoon of the 11th, having heard that Alvinzi 
 was marching towards him from Vicenza, Bonaparte deter- 
 mined on an offensive counter. Rapidly assembling some 
 troops, he marched out about three o'clock, struck the Austrian 
 van at San Martino, and by dark, at no great cost, drove it 
 back on Caldiero. The heights of Caldiero come down to, 
 indeed, cross the post-road which runs through Vicenza to 
 Verona ; and, covered by vines, walls and gardens, and flanked 
 by river and mountains, make an exceptionally favorable posi- 
 tion for troops to defend. During the night of November 11- 
 12 the Austrian van had intrenched itself at this place, and, 
 to forestall the arrival of the main body, Bonaparte attacked 
 it by 8 A. M. of the 12th, Augereau going in along the road, 
 while he threw Massena around the enemy's right flank at 
 Colognola, which appeared to him to be less strongly held. 
 The Austrians had two battalions at Caldiero ; three battal- 
 ions and three squadrons on the Colognola heights; two bat- 
 
BATTLE OF CALDIERO. 357 
 
 talions and six squadrons between the two villages ; one bat- 
 talion stood in front of Stra ; and twenty-six guns covered 
 the line. The battle in front of Stra and Caldiero was of the 
 heartiest description, these villages being taken and retaken 
 time and again. It was raining hard, the side roads were 
 almost impassable, the Austrian guns had all been got into 
 
 Battle of Caldiexo. 
 
 place, while many of the French guns were stalled in the muddy 
 fields and could not be put in position to do effective work, 
 and Augereau was accomplishing little. Meanwhile Massena, 
 by way of Lavagno and Illasi, had reached the Colognola 
 heights, and opened his attack. But by 4 p. M., before he 
 had made a marked impression, Alvinzi's main body began to 
 arrive ; the rain turned to sleet and hail, a northeast wind 
 blew the freezing gusts into the faces of the French troops ; 
 Massena not only made no further gain, but when Alvirizi 
 put in his oncoming reserves, he was thrown back from Colo- 
 gnola heights ; and the turning manoeuvre being forfeited, 
 Bonaparte deemed it best to retire from the unequal contest. 
 At the same time Caldiero and Stra were definitely ceded by 
 
358 A JEREMIAD. 
 
 Augereau, who had to fall back to the post-house on the road, 
 to save his right from an attack by Provera's column advan- 
 cing by way of Gombine. Night was coming on, the battle 
 was lost, and under these untoward circumstances the troops 
 were gradually withdrawn by Bonaparte to Verona, while 
 next day the Austrians advanced to Vago, the cavalry swept 
 as far as the gates of the fortress, and ladders were collected 
 for the assault it was proposed soon to make. 
 
 After Caldiero, November 13, 1796, Bonaparte, who keenly 
 felt his defeat, wrote the Directory : — 
 
 " The wounded are the elite of the army. All our superior officers, all 
 our best generals, are hors de combat. . . . The Army of Italy, reduced 
 to a handful of men, is exhausted. The heroes of Lodi, of Millesimo, of 
 Castiglione, of Bassano, have died for the fatherland, or are in the hospi- 
 tal. There is naught left the corps but their reputation and their pride. 
 Joubert, Lannes, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Chabot, Dupuy, Kampon, Pijon, 
 Chabran, St. Hilaire are wounded, as well as Mesnard. . . . We are 
 abandoned at the end of Italy. ... I have lost in this war few men, but 
 they are all men d'etite, impossible to replace. The brave who remain 
 see inevitable death, in the midst of continual risks and with forces too 
 small. Perhaps the hour of brave Augereau, of intrepid Massena, of 
 Berthier, my own, is ready to strike. Then, then, what shall become of 
 these brave men ? This idea holds me back ; I no longer dare brave a 
 death which would be a subject of discouragement and misfortune for 
 those who are the object of my solicitude." 
 
 As this jeremiad was, however, part of a dispatch lead- 
 ing up to prayers for reinforcements, we must construe it 
 accordingly. He added, "In a few days we shall essay a 
 last effort." 
 
 Though Davidovich was making no further sign of imme- 
 diate operations, the French position was becoming critical 
 in a high degree. Verona was at the apex of an angle, an 
 excellent place for successful offensive operations ; but so soon 
 as Bonaparte retired from this apex, the two bodies of the 
 
AN OUTLET TO THE MAZE. 359 
 
 Austrlans would join hands, and, added to the Mantua garri- 
 son, might readily overwhelm him. Verona was within easy 
 reach of three heavy columns, Alvinzi's, Davidovich's, Wurm- 
 ser's. Man for man, the enemy had so far fought as well as 
 the French ; the wonderful work which Frederick's grenadiers 
 used to exhibit against double or treble their numbers is not 
 here apparent ; and Bonaparte was right in feeling that he 
 must so manoeuvre as to be able to outnumber the Austrians 
 whenever contact came. With troops of equal value, the 
 mass theory was all the more essential. 
 
 The chance of retrieving the disaster appeared small. Vau- 
 bois and the left wing had been beaten by Davidovich, and 
 had a bare eight thousand men left ; Bonaparte and the right 
 wing had been beaten by Alvinzi, and could place in line 
 scarcely above seventeen thousand men ; Kilmaine's nine 
 thousand men at Mantua might easily be driven back by a 
 sortie from the fortress, whose garrison was thrice as big. 
 There was no general in the Army of Italy, there are few at 
 any time, who under these conditions would not have retired 
 to the right bank of the Mincio. Not so Bonaparte. His 
 keen eye could stiU see an outlet to the maze, and so long as 
 there was one left, it was no time to weaken. He had in the 
 past benefited by good fortune, should he not now be able to 
 face the ill ? Moreover, the Citizen Bonaparte knew that all 
 his future depended on the success of these few coming 
 months. If he lost the game at this stage, good-by to his 
 growth, political or military. Once shelved by the Directory, 
 in which he had as many enemies as friends, would he have 
 another chance ? It was evident that he must hold his own 
 against even the heavy odds he had now to meet. There 
 could be no turning back ; win he must. And Fortune far 
 vored his courage by casting her cloak of stupor over both 
 Davidovich and Wurmser. 
 
360 A SILENT MARCH. 
 
 Bonaparte devised a new plan. So long as Alvinzi's force 
 immediately before him was superior to his own in numbers, 
 rather than again to chance an attack on him in front, the 
 French general determined to turn the Austrian left flank and 
 fall on its rear at Villanova, where he might seize the artillery 
 park and train. Such a manoeuvre demanded prompt and 
 secret execution, and it also required quite new arrangements 
 that consumed many hours. A body of three thousand men 
 was called from the Mantua besiegers, and under Kilmaine 
 ordered at all hazards to hold Verona, the one thing needful 
 to prevent Alvinzi and Davidovich from joining hands ; while 
 Bonaparte proposed on the evening of November 14 to start 
 downstream on his new manoeuvre. 
 
 The 14th was spent in unusual quiet in Verona. An army 
 is a barometer of success or failure, and the troops were 
 hourly wondering what their chief would do. Yet not a man 
 doubted that the best would be done. As night fell, the divi- 
 sions were ordered under arms, to form three columns, and 
 to march in silence. Surprise seized on all when, instead of 
 debouching from Verona by the gate opposite the enemy, the 
 head of column filed out of the Milan gate and headed towards 
 the west. Was it a retreat? Were all the battles won at 
 such cost of blood to be forfeited at this late day? "Non, 
 camarade," quoth the old French grenadier. " Tu verras ! Le 
 p'tit caporal leur flanquera un bon ! " The question was soon 
 answered. Not far from Verona the head of column filed to 
 the left, and the Army of Italy headed rapidly and silently 
 down the Adige towards Eonco. Here Bonaparte had already 
 ordered a bridge to be built, and on the morning of the 15th 
 the French army crossed the Adige, leaving the reserve cav- 
 alry under Beaurevoir on the west bank. 
 
 Just below Ronco the Alpone flows into the larger river 
 from the northeast, and between the two lies a triangular 
 
MEANDERING CAUSEWAYS. 361 
 
 stretch of marsh land over four miles from apex to base, and 
 crossed by a number of drainage canals, and by two principal 
 roads on built-up meandering causeways: one leading to 
 Arcole by a circuit to the right, and a long one on the left run- 
 ning northerly to Porcile, which had branches to La Bona and 
 Serena. At places the marsh land would bear men ; at others 
 
 MILES 
 
 Battle of Arcole. 
 
 it was soft; clumps of bushes and willow-trees grew at in- 
 tervals. Skirmishers might here and there find a footing; 
 but infantry in line could nowhere deploy. Along these 
 causeways Augereau was in the early forenoon of the 15th 
 sent forward to Arcole, to. capture the town as an exit, 
 and Massena was ordered to Porcile to protect the French 
 left against the Austrians at Caldiero, and to engage their 
 
362 ALVINZI BEFORE VERONA. 
 
 attention while Augereau should debouch upon the plain 
 beyond. 
 
 As he stood before Verona coming along the post-road from 
 Vicenza, Alvinzi leaned his right on the foothills of the 
 Alps, down which at this point all the streams run south into 
 the Adige, and the ravines are such that only mountain paths 
 had been cut along their sides. Two roads ran into Verona 
 from west and northwest, one on either side of the river ; but 
 only the post-road ran into the city from the east. Around 
 the city by the north there was practically no route for an 
 army. On Alvinzi's left ran the Adige, and in his front, in 
 an angle between hills and rivers, lay the fortified city, which 
 he could not capture out of hand ; while in his rear was the 
 defile of Villanova, between mountain and marsh. This was 
 not a good situation for an army, and if Bonaparte could 
 promptly reach the enemy's left rear by way of Konco, the 
 Austrian superiority disappeared in a measure, as the fighting 
 had to be done either along the causeway over the Alpone 
 marshes, where only so many men could stand, and only the 
 head of column could fight, or else, on the part of the Aus- 
 trians, in line faced to the rear, with their communications 
 cut, — a condition which would lend superior morale to the 
 French. 
 
 Some critics have suggested that Bonaparte should have 
 thrown his bridge at Albaredo below the confluence, and have 
 then gone around the marshes. There is some value in this 
 suggestion, and later in his career Bonaparte might have done 
 so. But it was just this open country he now desired to 
 avoid, especially in view of the superior Austrian cavalry, and 
 of the recent excellent fighting of the Austrian foot. Bona- 
 parte never possessed Fredericb's contempt of numbers, nei- 
 ther had he the marvelous men Friedrich Wilhelm and the 
 Old Dessauer had drilled. He had no idea of blocking 
 
A FLANK ATTACK. 363 
 
 Alvitizi up in a cul-de-sac, and forcing him to fight to the 
 death ; he preferred to beat him and then offer him a bridge 
 of gold, so that he might retire, for a week at least, and 
 enable the French to drive back Davidovich, and again turn 
 on him ; and moreover it was important to be as near as possi- 
 ble to his communications with Vaubois, Verona and Mantua. 
 With Massena, Augereau and the reserve cavalry, the French 
 numbered about eighteen thousand men ; Alvinzi five or six 
 thousand more. 
 
 While Bonaparte was engaged in this turning manoeuvre, 
 the Austrian outposts were all but on the glacis of Verona ; 
 the main body lay along the post-road or upon the heights 
 to the north of it, with the reserves and train in Villanova ; 
 and Alvinzi was preparing one body to move on Verona, and 
 another body at the same time to pass the Adige at Zevio 
 to turn the French flank. It does not appear that Alvinzi 
 had conceived any danger of a flank attack in force by the 
 French; but in view of his own crossing at Zevio, he had taken 
 the precaution to occupy Arcole by two battalions, a squadron 
 and two guns under Colonel Brigido. This was a small force, 
 to be sure, but enough under a determined officer to hold the 
 causeway until reinforcements could reach him, and Brigido 
 proved to be the man. The Austrian commander expected 
 Davidovich to do his share in netting Bonaparte ; but the 
 manoeuvre was a concentric one, and as is usual with concen- 
 tric movements, the clever general was not on hand to be 
 trapped ; so that Alvinzi woke up to find his opponent turn- 
 ing the tables on him by debouching at an entirely unex- 
 pected point. Yet though the Austrian commander found 
 his bearings with uncommon rapidity, it was noon before any 
 number of .troops could be got where they could protect the 
 threatened flank. Luckily for Alvinzi, the terrain was in favor 
 of his defense, as a small body could temporarily hold each 
 
364 SEVERAL GENERALS SHOT. 
 
 end of the causeways, and, owing to the complicated operar 
 tion, the French were necessarily slow. Provera had some 
 troops on hand to meet Massena when he reached Porcile, 
 and Alvinzi promptly fell back from Verona on San Bonifa- 
 cio, and extended his left towards San Stefano, throwing 
 Mitrowsky's Croats into Arcole to sustain Brigido. In Bo- 
 naparte's report to the Directory, November 19, he states that 
 a regiment of Croats and several Hungarian regiments had 
 been stationed in Arcole. 
 
 Like the battle of Caesar at Alexandria, the fighting was 
 begun along the causeways. Massena took Bionde and pushed 
 on ; but despite a vigorous onset, he was arrested at Porcile, 
 and Augereau, though he made several stout attacks on the 
 little stone bridge over the Alpone at Arcole, which was held 
 by Mitrowsky and Brigido, was unable to cross. Watching 
 the operations from Ronco, Bonaparte could see Massena 
 checked, and Augereau, into whose right flank the Austrian 
 sharpshooters stationed along the Alpone were pouring a 
 deadly fire, pause and waver. But Arcole must be had. 
 Even though Bonaparte might manage to advance by way of 
 Porcile on Alvinzi's line of retreat, he could not leave behind 
 such a tactical threat to his own rear of column. It seemed as 
 if his first plan to debouch through Arcole on Villanova was 
 to be wrecked. The enemy's small force was doing famous 
 work. Several French generals had been shot in leading the 
 column and striving to take the bridge ; and yet this must be 
 captured. " It was in vain that all the generals, feeling the 
 importance of the moment, threw themselves at the head to 
 oblige our columns to cross the little bridge of Arcole," says 
 the dispatch. " Too much courage was harmful, and nearly 
 aU were wounded. Generals Verdier, Bon, Verne and Lannes 
 were put hors de combat. Augereau seized a flag, car- 
 ried it to the end of the bridge : ' Cowards,' he cried to his 
 
NAPOLEON'S NARROW ESCAPE. 365 
 
 troops, 'do you fear death so much?' and he stayed there 
 several minutes, but without any effect. . . . I went: there 
 myself ; I demanded of the soldiers if they were still the vic- 
 tors of Lodi. My presence produced on the troops a movement 
 which decided me to try the passage again." 
 
 The commander-in-chief indeed did gallop from Ronco 
 over the causeway, and recklessly put himself at the head of 
 another storming column against the Arcole bridge. Yet even 
 Bonaparte's personal example in heading his men did not ac- 
 complish the desired result ; and in fact he came near cap- 
 ture, if he escaped death. As the fresh column charged the 
 bridge, it was met by a counter-charge delivered with true 
 Slavic fury. The French column was forced back, and Bona- 
 parte and a number of the grenadiers at the head were hus- 
 tled off the causeway, and fell into the marsh, where they sank 
 up to the middle. The Croats rushed on with loud cries, and 
 actually all but passed the place where the commanding gen- 
 eral was floundering in the mud, when Belliard, one of Bona- 
 parte's aides, gathering a few men devoted to their chief, 
 with a desperate rush stopped the Croats, who were unaware 
 of the accident, long enough for Bonaparte and his men to 
 climb up on the causeway. The chief then mounted his horse 
 and rode back whence he came. The assault had failed. 
 
 All is not glory in war. The commonplace — the ridicu- 
 lous — is ever and anon mixed with the heroic, as all did sol- 
 diers know. The gallantry on both sides was far from incon- 
 sistent with the prosaic accident to the cOmnlanding general. 
 Nor does this in any sense detract from the performance in 
 history. It did not with the grenadiers. They remembered 
 that Le P'tit Caporal feared not death, and was ready to lend 
 a hand beside them. The rest was forgotten. 
 
 Meanwhile Massena had made a fresh attack, which Pro- 
 vera met upon the causeway. As happens often in war, one 
 
366 ALL FORCES WITHDRAWN. 
 
 of the Austrian rear battalions fired into its own leading bat- 
 talion and threw it into confusion ; the whole column fell 
 back, and in the m§lee Massena reached Porcile. In addition 
 to the two main attacks, a small detachment under Guyeux 
 had been sent by Bonaparte by way of Alvaredo to turn the 
 Arcole force ; but though this body late in the afternoon 
 actually drove the Austrians into the town (Napoleon said 
 at St. Helena that they captured it, though this is denied), 
 and created a diversion which a few hours before would have 
 been of marked benefit, yet at 7 P. M., when the result was 
 obtained, the attack was too much isolated to be of value ; 
 and as the main body had withdrawn, not only had Guyeux 
 to retire, but the general plan of a surprise on Alvinzi's fiank 
 and a march by way of Arcole to Villanova on his rear — and 
 this was the essence — had utterly failed. In ignorance of 
 what Vaubois might be doing, and lest a night march might 
 be necessary to join his lieutenant on the Mincio, Bonaparte 
 thought best to withdraw all the forces and recross the Adige. 
 Alvinzi's van camped at Caldiero ; Provera at La Bona, Por- 
 cile and Bionde ; Mitrowski on the plain from San Bonifacio 
 to San Stefano. The French camped back of Ronco. 
 
 The day had been lost, but if Bonaparte had not surprised 
 Alvinzi, he had at all events arrested his manoeuvre against 
 Verona, and he had taken some prisoners. To save the situ- 
 ation, however, and enable the main army to turn against Da- 
 vidovich, Alvinzi must be thrown back on the Brenta. This 
 was now the only chance, and gauging the contending forces 
 equal in effective striking power, the result depended on the 
 situation and the commanders, with the chances decidedly 
 against Bonaparte. 
 
 News from Vaubois, showing that Davidovich had not moved 
 on the 15th, ran in during the night. This was cheering in- 
 formation. Bonaparte determined to renew his attack on the 
 
ALTERNATE SUCCESS. 367 
 
 16th ; and Augereau and Massena went in again, each as on 
 November 15. On this day Alvinzi had grasped the situation. 
 He reinforced both Porcile and Arcole, and determined to take 
 the initiative, Pro vera from Bionde and Mitrowsky from Ar- 
 cole advancing at daybreak along the causeways, in the hope 
 to force their way to Konco and attack the French on their 
 own ground. But Provera's force, which was in the lead, was 
 met by Massena in front of Zerpa and lustily attacked. The 
 French riflemen along the shore also plied the Austrian col- 
 umn with a demoralizing fire, as Augereau had been served the 
 day before ; and shortly the loss of officers became so great that 
 the column dissolved into flight, and was scarcely rallied until 
 it had reached Caldiero. Following up this success, Massena 
 advanced along the causeway towards Porcile, and gave way to 
 Augereau, who sharply threw back Mitrowsky's column at the 
 point of the bayonet, and would have entered Arcole with him, 
 had not an Austrian battalion along the edge of the Alpone 
 again taken him in flank with a murderous fire and forced him 
 back. All day long this fighting went on at intervals and 
 with alternate success, but the French gained little. Bona- 
 parte strove to make an artificial ford at the confluence of the 
 Alpone and Adige by the use of fascines, and sent Vial down 
 river to seek a crossing and join the garrison of Legnano, which 
 had been ordered up river to turn Arcole ; but the work at 
 the artificial ford proved too long, and Vial found no crossing. 
 Massena once more got possession of Porcile ; but without Ar- 
 cole it could advantage nothing to the French. Fresh troops 
 succeeded the tired ones, but the fighting had to be in detail, 
 and the Croats continued, in a manner quite beyond praise, 
 to hold the bridge of Arcole. The fighting was sometimes by 
 musketry at a distance, sometimes with the bayonet close at 
 hand, with the intervals between clashes usual in such fighting ; 
 but the French could not force their way across the bridge ; 
 
368 ADMIRABLE PERSISTENCY. 
 
 and again Bonaparte, for the same reason as yesterday's, felt it 
 wise to recross the river at night. The Davidovich column 
 gave him great uneasiness, and the Austrians were fighting be- 
 yond expectation well. The news from Vaubois still indicated 
 that another day could be risked at Arcole ; for though Da- 
 vidovich had taken La Corona and Rivoli on the 16th, Vau- 
 bois was holding Bussolengo and Castelnuovo. It was still 
 evident that Alvinzi must be neutralized ; and Bonaparte 
 was in a mood to perish with his men rather than retire from 
 the contest, with all that the defeat implied. With his char- 
 acteristic self-confidence, moreover, he believed that the enemy 
 had lost more men than he had, and was in a condition of 
 morale far less satisfactory ; and now that he felt sure that 
 the real superiority was on his side, — for despite their severe 
 handling his men were in good heart, — he determined to 
 move out on the plain, where at first, and so soon after the 
 defeat at Caldiero, he had not been ready to adventure his 
 inferior forces. 
 
 On the 17th, then, with a persistency which is truly ad- 
 mirable, Bonaparte for the third time crossed the Adige at 
 Ronco, — though there was nearly a fatal delay by a break in 
 the bridge, brought on by the sinking of a boat, — and on this 
 day sent a half-brigade of Massena's under Robert against 
 Arcole, while Massena with another half-brigade marched on 
 Porcile, and the rest of the division remained in reserve near 
 the bridge. It was arranged for Augereau to move down and 
 cross the Alpone on a trestle-bridge constructed at the mouth 
 of the stream during the night, and not perceived by the 
 enemy, and then turn the Austrian left. Massena's column 
 met the enemy on the causeway as before, and the same to- 
 and-fro fighting, but of a less tenacious character, occurred as 
 on the previous days. Robert made a gallant attempt on the 
 bridge at Arcole, where the Austrians had been reinforced, 
 
A QUESTION OF ENDURANCE. 369 
 
 but failed ; and a Croat column, pursuing his retiring regi- 
 ments back towards the Ronco bridge, came so close to taking 
 this and obtaining a foothold on the mainland that at the 
 last moment Bonaparte ordered it broken. But anticipating 
 such a possibility, as the French columns were small, he had 
 concealed a half -brigade in a willow copse which extended on 
 the right along the causeway ; the Croats were there taken in 
 flank by so sudden and close a salvo, followed by an immedi- 
 ate attack with the bayonet, that, surrounded by the reserves 
 of Massena's division and by some of Augereau's troops, they 
 were completely broken ; a large number were killed ; and 
 three thousand men were captured. By noon Augereau had 
 crossed the new bridge and smartly attacked Miloradovich, 
 who now commanded the line which defended Arcole, and 
 whose right leaned on the Alpone and left on low land near 
 the confluence ; but still the bravery of the enemy held him 
 off, despite their exhaustion from the long defense. A small 
 body of eight hundred men from Legnano had been expected 
 even yesterday to turn this marsh ; but they were beyond 
 reason delayed in their advance. Neither would Austrian 
 retire, nor could Frenchman make a further step forward. 
 After three days' fighting over the same ground, it had become, 
 outside interference apart, a question of endurance, not of the 
 men, but of the moral courage of the army commanders. 
 Alvinzi was ready to quit on short notice ; Bonaparte might 
 be called off by Davidovich. 
 
 On the evening of the 17th Alvinzi had written to his lieu- 
 tenant that while he might resist another attack, to undertake 
 the offensive was out of the question. He had, in fact, sent 
 his train well to the rear. Why, when Alvinzi saw that he 
 must fight at or near Verona, he had not urged Davidovich 
 to advance on the 16th or 17th as a diversion to aid himself 
 and annoy the French, it is hard to say. But that he did not 
 
370 THE NEEDED FLURRY. 
 
 do so was Bonaparte's salvation. As a matter of fact, the 
 turning-point had been reached. " The fate of a battle is 
 the happening of an instant, of a thought, . . . the decisive 
 mdment arrives, a moral spark flares up, and the smallest 
 reserve carries it out," says Napoleon ; and again, " In battle 
 there is a moment when the smallest manoeuvre decides and 
 gives the superiority ; it is the drop of water which causes 
 the overflow." 
 
 It had grown to be evident where the moral spark lay, 
 and it was not in Alvinzi's soul. He had become morally 
 exhausted. The decisive moment arrived, and a mere make- 
 believe attack by a handful of men flashed the spark and 
 carried the French forward to victory. About 3 p. M., when 
 Massena and Augereau were pushed in for the last time, 
 Beaurevoir's head of column came up, and the small garrison 
 from Legnano finally arrived and advanced on the enemy by 
 way of Albaredo, threatening to turn his left flank, there were 
 signs of weaker resistance, and all that seemed needed was 
 one more thrust to disturb the enemy's equipoise. The Aus- 
 trians had grown benumbed with constant fighting, and were 
 « ready to dissolve. Now came the needed flurry. A small 
 group of horsemen (twenty-five guides under an officer nick- 
 named Hercules, with four trumpeters, say the Memoirs) had 
 been dispatched by Bonaparte on a circuit around the marsh 
 to fall from ambush on the Austrian left and rear with as 
 much noise as they could make, to simulate the arrival of a 
 column of cavalry. This raw device, used at the proper mo- 
 ment, drew the last grain of resistance from the Austrians 
 defending Arcole. About 5 P. M. this handful of horsemen rode 
 in on the enemy's left with loud outcries and strident blare 
 of trumpets, a few Austrian companies gave way, a regiment 
 followed, and the heart-sick, worn-out soldiers under Milora- 
 dovioh ceased resistance and sullenly fell back. The troops in 
 
THE BATTLE ENDED. 371 
 
 Arcole did the like ; and the entire Austrian force, which for 
 three days had so phickily held the bridge against the re- 
 peated French attacks, withdrew along the road to Cologna, 
 leaving Arcole to the French. The combined attack along 
 both banks of the Alpone had succeeded, and the battle of 
 Arcole was won. Massena meanwhile, having driven the 
 enemy out of Porcile, left a half-brigade there, and was with- 
 drawn to Arcole to strengthen the main column. There being 
 no good ground for defense along the Alpone flats, Alvinzi 
 retired by way of San Bonifacio and Villanova. The troops 
 which had stood at Verona on the 15th and 16th without un- 
 dertaking any operation, and had then retired to Caldiero, 
 summarily withdrew. A slight French attack on San Boni- 
 facio was repulsed, and this ended the battle. The troops of 
 both armies, utterly exhausted, slept on their arms. 
 
 From the battlefield of Arcole, Bonaparte wrote General 
 Clarke : " Your nephew, Elliot, has been killed on the battle- 
 field. This young man had become familiar with arms. He 
 has several times marched at the head of column. He would 
 have been one day an estimable officer. He died with glory 
 and in the face of the enemy. He did not suffer an instant. 
 Where is the reasonable man who would not envy such a 
 death ? " 
 
 On November 18 Alvinzi, reduced to fifteen thousand men 
 under the colors, withdrew by way of Montebello to the 
 Brenta valley. Bonaparte wrote, November 19, from Verona: 
 
 Quarters Genebai, Vekona, 29 Brumaire, Year V. 
 To THE Citizen Carnot. 
 
 . . . Never was battlefield disputed like that of Arcole. I scarcely have 
 any generals left ; their devotion and their courage are without example. 
 The General of Brigade Lannes came to the battlefield not yet healed of 
 the wound he received at Governolo. He was wounded twice during the 
 first day of the battle ; he was, at three in the afternoon, stretched on his 
 bed and suffering, when he learnt that I myself was going to the head of 
 
372 LOSSES AT ARC OLE. 
 
 the column. He jumped from his bed, mounted his horse, and came to 
 join me. As he could not stay afoot, he was obliged to remain on horse- 
 back ; he received at the head of the bridge of Arcole a wound which 
 stretched him lifeless. I assure you it needed all that to win. . . . Send us 
 succor promptly, for we cannot do again what we have done. You know 
 the character of the Frenchman, a little inconstant. . . . Bonaparte. 
 
 But at Arcole the Frenchman had not been inconstant. 
 
 Bonapartei had not defeated Alvinzi ; he had lost nearly as 
 many men ; but he had forced back the Austrians by superior 
 morale, and could now turn on Davidovich. There was no 
 more fight left in Alvinzi for a number of days. 
 
 The Austrian losses at Arcole were sixty-three hundred 
 men, eleven guns and ten munition wagons. The French 
 lost, as quoted, forty-five hundred men ; but nearly every 
 French general was wounded, among them Lannes, Verne, 
 Bon and Verdier, Robert and Gardanne. 
 
 The pursuit of Alvinzi was intrusted to the cavalry. 
 
 "With regard to the conduct of the soldiers at Arcole, Bona- 
 parte wrote the Directory, November 19 : "I must not conceal 
 from you that I have not found in the soldiers my phalanxes of 
 Lodi, of Millesimo, of Castiglione ; fatigue and the absence 
 of the brave men " (who have been lost) "took from them 
 that impetuosity with which I had the right to hope to capture 
 Alvinzi and the larger part of his army." Nor was this all. 
 His complaints against the contractors never ceased. He 
 wrote Garrau, November 19 : " The army is without shoes, 
 without money, without clothes, the hospitals lack everything, 
 our wounded are on the floors, and in the most horrible dis- 
 tress ; all that comes from want of money, and this at the 
 moment when we have just acquired four millions of francs at 
 Leghorn." The brave little French soldier had to exercise a 
 deal of patience. But victory, warmed his heart. 
 
 The salvation of the French had hinged on the temporary 
 
DAVIDOVICH ADVANCES ON VAUBOIS. 373 
 
 lack of enterprise of Davidovich, and this was in a way due 
 to good fortune. This general could scarcely have better 
 played the French game. Satisfied with forcing Vaubois back 
 to Rivoli, he sat down to contemplate his work, regardless of 
 what was happening to his chief. Finally, when it was too 
 late to be of any solid service, and Alvinzi had retired because 
 his lieutenant did not appear, Davidovich undertook to advance 
 on Vaubois at Rivoli. For a week he had amused himself by 
 tapping with a small vanguard at the French earthworks at 
 La Corona ; on the 16th he made a feint at an attack. Early 
 on the 17th, when Bonaparte was for the third time crossing 
 the Adige on his perilous undertaking, — what might not a 
 smart Austrian attack have accomplished two days before ? — 
 Davidovich broke up with his corps from Eoveredo, and started 
 on his too long delayed manoeuvre against the French left 
 flank. He had three columns : a brigade marching via Riva 
 on Rocca d' Anfo, and one on each side of the Adige, that on 
 the left bank being intended as a turning mancBuvre. He 
 was two to one of his opponent ; there was no question of his 
 success (though indeed one's mind cannot, during this battle, 
 but recur again and again to the days when the Last of the 
 Kings hurled his little masses at the thrice greater body of 
 Austrians, and beat them), and by 2 P. M., after a fairly stub- 
 born resistance to the Austrian attack on front and flank, 
 Vaubois, having lost twelve hundred men, was in full retreat 
 from Rivoli along the Adige road. The French division 
 paused for a rest not far from Bussolengo, continued its 
 retreat on Castelnuovo during the night, and on the 18th, in 
 the forenoon, withdrew beyond the Mincio at Pesehiera. 
 What a chance for Davidovich, had he but pressed Vaubois 
 back on the 15th or 16th ! But the Austrians remained on 
 the battlefield even on the night of the 17th, and next day 
 advanced only to Pastrengo. 
 
374 VERONA REENTERED. 
 
 Exhausted though the French troops were, victory gave 
 them hack good cheer, and with the alacrity all soldiers show 
 towards the man who wins success, they turned their backs on 
 the bloody marshes of Areole and marched towards the Min- 
 cio. No sooner had the news run in that Vaubois had crossed 
 that river than Bonaparte recognized that one more hearty 
 blow would win the day for good. He soon ascertained that 
 Alvinzi would not stand at Villanova ; and deeming the 
 cavalry sufficient for the moment, he headed Augereau for 
 Verona on the left bank of the Adige, and Massena on the 
 right bank for Villaf ranca. He would now punish Davidovich 
 for his temerity. To see a French column reenter Verona on 
 the 18th in triumph by the gate of Venice, when apparently 
 in retreat it had left the city on the 15th by the gate of Milan, 
 puzzled and enthused the population of Verona, and added to 
 the French fervor. On the 19th Davidovich received news 
 of Alvinzi's defeat and withdrawal. He was much taken 
 aback, and not caring to face the divisions which had won at 
 Areole, he turned in his tracks and retired, November 20, to 
 Rivoli. Bonaparte joined Massena's division to Vaubois', 
 who recrossed the Mincio at Borghetto and advanced to Vil- 
 lafranca, and sent them on the 21st on the track of the Aus- 
 trians retiring up the Adige, while Augereau was ordered 
 from Verona by the left-bank roads to Dolce, hoping to get 
 up the river faster than they and to cut off their retreat. 
 
 The loss by Davidovich of the 16th and 17th had borne 
 ill fruit to the Austrian scheme. When Alvinzi saw that he 
 was not being pursued by any heavy force, he resolved to 
 about face and return to the attack on Verona, so as to dis- 
 engage Davidovich, if perchance he were in difficulties. He 
 would have been wiser to move up the Brenta to join him at 
 Trent, so as now to operate in one body, as he should have 
 begun by doing ; but unaware that Davidovich had retired to 
 
UTTER ROUT OF DAVIDOVICH. 375 
 
 Rivoli, he advanced to Villanova on the 20th, and next day to 
 Caldiero, easily pushing before him the small French detach- 
 ments on the road. Just at that moment, as, learning of the 
 advance of Massena and Vaubois, Davidovich was retiring 
 from Eivoli, he heard from Alvinzi that the latter proposed 
 to renew the effort to join him, and gave orders to return to 
 the Rivoli position. But no sooner were these orders issued 
 than the difficulties of the situation began to oppress him, 
 and he again countermanded them. Such indecision worked 
 ill on the troops, with the result that when Massena and 
 Vaubois attacked the Austrian position at Rivoli, Davido- 
 vich, with but half a fight, fell back ; and on learning of 
 Augereau's march on Dolce, he made haste to retire to Ala. 
 Augereau had, however, made excellent speed, and part of 
 his troops had reached Peri. Davidovich had to cut his way 
 through the French advance regiments, which he did in truth, 
 but reached safety beyond Augereau only with an army 
 utterly disorganized, a loss of eighteen hundred men and his 
 pontoon-train. 
 
 Between the two Austrian armies there was such poor 
 means of communication that not until the 23d did Alvinzi 
 ascertain the utter rout of Davidovich. Upon hearing this, 
 however, he saw that there was no further chance for him 
 (though had he been energetic, the road was well open to 
 Mantua with its enormous garrison), and on the night of 
 the 24th he started definitely to retire behind the Brenta. 
 Wurmser, hoping to accomplish some good end, made, on the 
 23d, according to previous arrangement with Alvinzi, who 
 had notified him that he could reach Mantua on that day, a 
 sortie which a week before would have been of distinct value. 
 With eight thousand men he drove back the French blockad- 
 ing troops, and seized San Antonio and La Favorita. But 
 finding no sign of Davidovich or Alvinzi, and as the regiments 
 
376 THE CAMPAIGN CLOSED. 
 
 detailed to help at Arcole had already returned to the block- 
 ading force, the sortie was driven back with ease. Alvinzi's 
 army retired behind the Brenta ; the Tyrolese army held 
 itself in Kiva and Roveredo. Communication was main- 
 tained through the Brenta valley. 
 
 The campaign was closed. Bonaparte, by a bold offensive 
 against two concentrically advancing armies, had again main- 
 tained his defensive position on the Mincio. There are few 
 short struggles which better illustrate the strength of interior 
 lines coupled to vigorous offense, as well as exhibit the weak- 
 ness of operations conducted by divided or concentrically 
 operating forces. When you add the numbers of Alvinzi and 
 Davidovich to the big garrison of Mantua, it seems as if 
 worse use could hardly have been made of this superiority. 
 
 The Austrians during the campaign had lost twenty thou- 
 sand men. The French army had also lost heavily, but some 
 reinforcements came in to fill the gaps, and after the divi- 
 sions had been given their new stations, they reached before 
 the end of the year a respectable figure. Kilmaine, who had 
 fallen sick in the Mantuan marshes, was replaced by Serurier, 
 convalescent, and he continued the blockade with nine thou- 
 sand men. Massena held Verona with the same effective. 
 Joubert took Vaubois' place at Rivoli with ten thousand 
 men. Augereau was posted with nine thousand men at and 
 near Legnano. A new division under Rey was on the Chiese, 
 watching the left bank of Lake Garda, four thousand men 
 being between Salo and Brescia, while Victor, with two thou- 
 sand reserves, lay on the Mincio, at Castelnuovo and Goito. 
 In garrison in Lombardy were six thousand men. For the 
 nonce, field operations ceased — on the French side to give 
 time to capture Mantua, and on the Austrian side to repair 
 damages and reorganize for a fresh advance. 
 
 The Directory sent Clarke to Vienna to treat for peace, 
 
ALVINZI REINFORCED. 
 
 377 
 
 and Austrian plenipotentiaries came to Vicenza for a similar 
 purpose ; but neither attempt resulted favorably. Venice and 
 the Pope were ready for war. In fact, His Holiness proposed 
 to send troops to Bologna, on which Wurmser from Mantua 
 might in case of need retire. Sardinia was untrustworthy. 
 French military affairs in Germany were in a bad way, and 
 Bonaparte kept on the defensive. By January, 1797, Alvinzi, 
 reinforced up to forty-five thousand men, was ready for an- 
 other campaign. The Tyrolese army, with which Alvinzi had 
 his headquarters, was in the Adige valley at Ala, Roveredo 
 and San Marco, with detachments at Mori and Eiva. The 
 Friuli army was behind the Brenta, with communication 
 established with the Tyrolese, Mitrowski in Borgo, Quosda- 
 novich in Bassano, Provera in Padua. 
 
 A Scimitar. 
 
XIV. 
 
 RIVOLI. NOVEMBER, 1796, TO FEBRUARY, 1797. 
 
 The Austrian determination to hold Mantua and the Mincio was admirable. 
 With the opening of 1797 Alvinzi was reinforced and hegan a winter campaign. 
 HaTing learned nothing from previous failures, he advanced from three direc- 
 tions. Provera was to capture Legnano, Bayalioh Verona, and Alvinzi was to 
 march down the Adige. Meanwhile Wurmser should operate by a sortie. 
 Bonaparte, guessing which of the columns was the strongest, made ready to 
 hold the Rivoli plateau, leaving a small force to contain the others. The topo- 
 graphy comipelled the enemy to advance in several tactical columns. Bonaparte 
 reached Eivoli only in time to prevent Joubert from vacating it, and on Janu- 
 ary 14 the Austrians attacked the plateau. Bonaparte's divisions had not all 
 reached the field, but he opened the day by driving back the troops in his front 
 and taking up a position along the Trombalora heights. Here three of the 
 columns attacked him vigorously, and at one time the French left weakened ; 
 but Bonaparte reestablished it in season to turn to a very heavy attack on his 
 right, where two Austrian columns advanced up a narrow defile to reach the 
 plateau. At its mouth Bonaparte met them with horse, foot and artillery, and 
 breaking down their head, drove them back in disorder. Meanwhile a last 
 column, which was to get in the French rear, was cut ofE and captured or dis- 
 persed, and a second assault by the Austrian centre was driven back. The bat- 
 tle of Rivoli was won. Leaving Joubert to follow Alvinzi, Bonaparte hurried 
 back to meet Provera. Joubert accomplished the task with some fighting. 
 Bonaparte reached Provera at the gates of Mantua, closed him in, and captured 
 his army. The French marching had again won the campaign. It has rarely 
 been equaled. Mantua surrendered February 2. The three campaigns on the 
 Mincio had cost the Austrians sixty thousand men. Bonaparte now imposed 
 harsh terms on the Pope, and the Army of Italy was reinforced. 
 
 During this cessation of hostilities Bonaparte had his 
 hands full to do justice to the varying phases of the political 
 situation. Venice had rejected a French alliance, and this 
 antagonism he met by sedulously cultivating the Cispadane 
 and Transpadane Republics, and by disseminating democratic 
 
THE DIRECTORY EMBARRASSED. 379 
 
 principles among the various populations neighbor to Venice ; 
 while to secure the left of his army against any advance from 
 the Alps, and give it a further point cfappui, he directed the 
 seizure of the castle of Bergamo, in northern Lombardy, and 
 there placed a suitable garrison. 
 
 It was well that Bonaparte had not relied on cooperation 
 from the Army of the Rhine. The French armies which had 
 so lustily invaded Germany in the spring had been forced 
 back to their bases at Hiiningen and Diisseldorf. Archduke 
 Charles was at his task of capturing Kehl, ably defended 
 by Desaix, while Beurnonville on the lower Rhine, though 
 reinforced up to eighty thousand men, sat still for months 
 opposite an Austrian force of twenty -five thousand, when any 
 advance whatever would have relieved the pressure on both 
 Moreau on the upper Rhine and Bonaparte in Italy. 
 
 So far, the Directory had sent the Army of Italy few troops 
 except the six thousand men under Rey, and now a descent 
 on Ireland by Hoche threatened to divert all further reinforce- 
 ments from the Miucio. The Irish expedition came to naught 
 in December, when a tempest dispersed the French squadron, 
 and the vessels were lucky in that, for the most part, they 
 were able to reach home ports. Negotiations were had with 
 England, looking, among other things, to a formal cession by 
 Austria of her title to Belgium, that country being already 
 in French hands ; but it was Austria thaf- should first have 
 been treated with, and the successes against Moreau and 
 Jourdan had made Vienna equally difficult to approach or to 
 convince. Catherine of Russia died in November ; and it was 
 possible that the great Slavic nation, under her successor, 
 Paul I., might seriously change the trend of European affairs. 
 The result of all these events was that the Directory was em- 
 barrassed, and that Bonaparte was denied the reinforcements 
 he needed and, as the one successful captain, had a right to 
 
380 BONAPARTE'S TRIALS. 
 
 demand. After much deliberation, however, it was finally 
 determined to keep up the forces of the armies at Strasburg 
 and Diisseldorf by accessions from other sources, and Bona- 
 parte was promised the fine divisions of Bernadotte and Del- 
 mas, which were to traverse the Alps in the winter season and 
 join the Army of Italy. This promised to raise its force to 
 seventy-five thousand men. But though his army grew, 
 Bonaparte still had his trials, as his letter to the Executive 
 Directory of January 6, 1797, proves : — 
 
 MHiAU, 17 Nirose, Tear V. 
 . . . The accountability of the army, in the paymaster's office, is in 
 striking disorder ; nothing can be accounted for, and to the reputation for 
 cheating of the controller is joined the foolishness of the employees. 
 Everything is purchasable. The army consumes five times what is neces- 
 sary, because the storekeepers make false receipts, and go halves with 
 the war commissaries. The principal actresses of Italy are entertained 
 by the employees of the French army ; luxury, depravity and embezzle- 
 ment are at their height. . . . The only remedy is a temporary court with 
 the right to shoot any army administrator. . . . Marshal Brunswick had 
 the army intendant hung because he was short of victual, and we, in the 
 middle of Italy, having everything in abundance, and disbursing in a 
 month five times what we need, are often in want. . . . Do not think that 
 I am weak and that I betray the country in this essential part of my 
 functions. I have employees arrested every day, I have their papers ex- 
 amined, I visit their strong boxes ; but I am seconded by nobody, and the 
 laws do not allow sufficient authority to the general to impress a salu- 
 tary terror on this cloud of rogues. Still, the evil is diminishing by means 
 of scoldings, of punishments and of getting angry. Things I hope will 
 be got done with a little more decency. 
 
 Then follow observations on various good and bad com- 
 missaries, by name. 
 
 Nor was discipline by any means perfect, as the following 
 extract from orders of February 4, 1797, at Forli, seems to 
 show : " Art. 1. Every soldier who shall be convicted of hav- 
 ing struck or assaulted in any manner any person, or taken 
 
AN ELABORATE PLAN. 381 
 
 any property of the vanquished people, or who shall have in 
 his haversack pillaged articles, shall be shot at the head of 
 his battalion." In this the leader was sustained by the better 
 element in the army, which did not approve of pillaging. A 
 sub-lieutenant named Rey, as an instance, had despoiled an 
 Austrian officer whom he had made prisoner, and his brother 
 officers met and unanimously demanded his cashiering. But 
 while Bonaparte ordered this done October 5, 1796, he vigor- 
 ously defended the army against outside accusations. In a 
 letter to the General Proveditor of Venice, dated December 8, 
 answering one from that official, he exculpates the French 
 army from charges of misconduct. " I formally give the lie 
 to whoso shall dare assert that there has been in the states of 
 Venice a single woman violated by French troops. Would 
 not one think, in reading the ridiculous note which has been 
 sent me, that all properties have been lost, that there is not a 
 church left, nor a woman respected in the Veronese and the 
 Brescian ? " 
 
 When the new year of 1797 was about to open, Field- 
 marshal Alvinzi found himself again at the head of an ex- 
 cellent army of over forty thousand men, and ready for a 
 fourth attempt to relieve beleaguered Mantua. He had not 
 yet learned wisdom enough to advance in one body, but again 
 drew up, or else the Vienna Council did it for him, an elabo- 
 rate plan which divided his forces into three parts. Provera 
 at Padua had nine thousand men, with which body he was to 
 break up January 7, on the 9th to attack and capture Le- 
 gnano, and from thence to push on to Mantua. Bayalich at 
 Bassano was also to advance January 7 with his six thousand 
 men, and on the 12th was to attack and capture Vei^on^. In 
 case of success, these two columns were to act with Wurmser 
 in Mantua, and with his army to join the papal contingent 
 and operate on the south of the Po. Alvinzi reserved to him- 
 
382 PROVERA REACHES MONTAGNANA. 
 
 self a working column of twenty-eight thousand men, with 
 which he proposed to move from the Tyrol 'on Eivoli, and 
 after taking this on January 13, to march down and join his 
 lieutenants at Mantua. The plan was exact and carefully 
 worked out ; but in effect the two smaller columns were about 
 as good as thrown away. Campaigning armies do not often 
 march like clockwork. 
 
 Though reinforcements were on the way, Bonaparte had at 
 this moment but four divisions of eight thousand to ten thou- 
 sand men each, and one small one : Serurier in front of Man- 
 tua ; Augereau on the Adige from Verona to Legnano ; Mas- 
 sena at Verona ; Joubert at Rivoli, with van out at La Corona, 
 a small village with a big nunnery and a valuable strategic 
 defile in the mountains. Looking upon the division under 
 Rey at Salo and Desenzano as a species of reserve, the Aus- 
 trian advance was thus to be pushed against each French 
 wing, and the centre at Verona. 
 
 In accordance with Alvinzi's plan, on the 9th Bayalich 
 reached Villanova ; and Provera, after a fight at Bevilacqua 
 on the 8th with some of Augereau's outlying troops, in which 
 the French lost two guns and several hundred prisoners, got 
 the mass of his corps as far as Montagnana. Bonaparte was 
 anxious to make no move until he was sure which column con- 
 tained the mass of the Austrian army. On the 9th Augereau 
 reported Provera's advance, but deeming no serious attempt 
 probable on Legnano, he left Guyeux at Ronco with part of 
 his division. On the 10th Bonaparte, in Bologna, received 
 dispatches from his several lieutenants, and foreseeing what 
 was to come, he headed the two thousand men he there had 
 under Lannes on Rovigo to Augereau's succor, while he him- 
 self joined Serurier at Mantua. On the same day Baya- 
 lich's van reached Caldiero ; Provera did not move this day 
 or the next ; Alvinzi was still up the Adige getting his divi- 
 
ADVANCE ON LA CORONA. 383 
 
 sions in prime order for an advance. On January 11 Baya- 
 lich reached Verona, and Alvinzi's head of column advanced 
 as far as the upper slopes of Monte Baldo. Though uncer- 
 tain what the operations of the campaign would develop, yet 
 in the certainty of active work all French troops both on the 
 upper and lower Adige were now kept under arms ; but there 
 was no substantial change in any of their positions. Along 
 which of the three lines — Rivoli, Verona, Legnano — would 
 come the main Austrian attack was as yet a matter of con- 
 jecture. 
 
 Alvinzi had depleted Bayalich of a portion of his troops, 
 which are said to have marched to join the main column by 
 one of the minor valleys between the Brenta and the Adige ; 
 and on reaching Verona on January 12, Massena sallied out 
 and easily drove him back, Bayalich retiring to Caldiero. He 
 had accomplished his task of diverting the attention of the 
 French commander. Eeinforced by Bayalich's detachment, 
 Alvinzi's van began shortly to move forward into touch with 
 Joubert's forces in the vicinity of La Corona. On the 10th 
 the several columns had assembled at their starting-points. 
 Lusignan was at Brentonico, Liptay at Avio, Koblos at Bel- 
 luno, Ocskay and Quosdanovich lay between Ala and E,o- 
 veredo. As contemplated by the plan, Lusignan was to cross 
 Monte Baldo, and by January 12 reach the rear of the French 
 position at La Corona, while Liptay arid Koblos were to co- 
 operate in front. The other two columns, with which were to 
 march the train and artillery, headed for Belluno to act in 
 second line. Lusignan was delayed by deep snow, and Liptay 
 and Koblos reached the front of La Corona long before he 
 could reach its rear. The French party here was but three 
 thousand strong. Koblos wanted to attack, as the Austrians 
 were superior in numbers, but Liptay held to the letter of his 
 orders, which were to let the French vacate the position when 
 
384 THE KNOT OF THE PROBLEM. 
 
 Lusignan should have turned it. Only a slight demonstration 
 was made, against which the French held themselves, during 
 the 12th, but at night, under Joubert's orders, they retired 
 from their untenable position, and fell back on the main body 
 at Rivoli. Provera for the moment did nothing. 
 
 In order to study the situation from a central standpoint, 
 Bonaparte now came on to Verona. From the first message 
 of Augereau and his own first summary of all that he heard, 
 he was led to believe that the Austrian mass was aiming at 
 Mantua by way of the lower Adige ; and to anticipate this, 
 from Roverbella he dispatched orders to Massena to hold 
 himself in readiness on the right bank to march from Verona 
 to Legnano. But arrived in Verona, especially after Bay- 
 alich's feeble attack, the chief modified his view, and left 
 Massena in that fortress, in light marching order. He was 
 yet by no means sure of his ground. So soon as Joubert's 
 report of the Austrian advance on La Corona reached him, 
 however, he began to feel as if here might after all be the 
 knot of the problem. It looked opposite Augereau, accord- 
 ing to this general's reports, less like a large body than it 
 had a day or two since ; he concluded, from his own observa- 
 tion, that he had but a small force in front of Verona ; he 
 could see why the enemy at Rivoli might well be the mass ; 
 and believing the issue would again be one of working from 
 interior lines against successive oncoming columns of the 
 enemy from the three directions indicated, he held himself 
 in readiness personally to hurry to any threatened point. At 
 the same time he kept his eye keenly fixed on Rivoli. No 
 signs of the enemy were apparent on the Chiese. 
 
 Alvinzi's van had revealed some strength in its attack on 
 La Corona ; and as Joubert saw that with his one division 
 he could not long retain his hold on a position which was 
 liable to be turned at any moment, he had been justified in 
 
TO OVERWHELM ALVINZI. 385 
 
 withdrawing his forces from that outlying post, so as to con- 
 centrate all the men he had in one body on the Rivoli plateau. 
 The Austrian van, finding no further opposition at La Co- 
 rona, soon passed the place, and debouching from the hills 
 during the afternoon of the 13th, threatened also to turn the 
 French position at Eivoli. The dispatches of Joubert to 
 Bonaparte were the clear and precise reports of a good sol- 
 dier, and the French commander-in-chief quickly recognized, 
 from what they told, that Alvinzi had in reality massed his 
 army at Eoveredo for an advance down the Adige. 
 
 No sooner assured as to where the enemy's mass lay than 
 Bonaparte, true to his constant theory, began to assemble his 
 own mass with which to overwhelm Alvinzi, regardless for 
 the moment of the other two columns, whose feeble efforts 
 so far gave apprehension of no great danger. To Augereau's 
 force was added a small equipment of cavalry, and he was 
 ordered to defend the Adige, but to refrain from a general 
 engagement. Serurier was to keep up the blockade of Man- 
 tua, but move what troops he could spare as a reserve up to 
 Villafranca. Orders were issued on the afternoon of the 13th 
 for Victor to march to Villafranca ; for Rey to move from 
 Salo to Castelnuovo as a central reserve, whence he was later 
 dispatched to Eivoli ; and for Massena to leave one foot and 
 one horse regiment, something over two thousand men, in 
 Verona, and moving up to Rivoli, to go in on Joubert's left. 
 The commander-in-chief himself started out for the front, 
 Joubert having previously been instructed to hold on to the 
 Rivoli plateau at all hazards. 
 
 The French brigades tramped cheerfully through the night 
 of January 13—14. Bonaparte reached Joubert about 2 A. M. 
 
 Having heretofore fully gauged Alvinzi, and quite familiar 
 with the country, it was not difficult for Bonaparte to guess 
 that not only had the Austrian leader divided his mass into 
 
386 THE RIVOLI PLATEAU. 
 
 three strategic parts, but that he would almost certainly sub- 
 divide his own part into several tactical columns, which he 
 could not, on the hilly terrain, assemble for battle before he 
 struck the Eivoli plateau. This plateau was the " cross- 
 roads " of the open plain, where the many mountain paths 
 and roads meet, and its possessor could readily debouch in 
 any direction on forces coming from the surrounding hills. 
 
 As you stand on the irregular-shaped plateau of Rivoli on 
 a winter day, looking north, you see immediately before you 
 the bold snow-clad height of Monte Baldo, and in the north- 
 west, with a gap between, the less marked Monte Gazo. On 
 your right, at the east foot of the plateau, runs the Adige, 
 which has just emerged from the Tyrolese Alps, and con- 
 tinues its rapid course down to the plains of the Po, with hills 
 and defiles on both hands. A road practicable for aU arms 
 meanders along the left bank, a less good one along the right ; 
 and east of the village of Kivoli on the farther bank is the 
 defile of Chiusa, between precipice and stream. To the west 
 is the broad expanse of Lake Garda, of which glimpses may 
 be caught, and through the plain which surrounds the plateau, 
 from the north around by the west to the south, runs a swift 
 stream called the Tasso, usually bridged or fordable at a 
 number of places. Parallel to the Adige comes down toward 
 the plateau the long narrow ridge of Monte 'Magnone, termi- 
 nating near Incanale in the heights of San Marco. 
 
 The rear or south of the Rivoli plateau is closed in by an 
 east and west ridge called Monte Pipolo ; and the plateau is 
 accessible from the plain on the north, west and south by 
 a number of roads, while at most points troops can mount 
 the slopes across country from the plain. 
 
 It will be remembered that of the two roads down the 
 Adige, the one on the left bank is the better. That on the' 
 right bank, when it strikes Monte Baldo, follows the river 
 
POSITION OF JOUBERT. 387 
 
 some distance, but at Incanale, midway between Dolce and 
 ilivoli, where by a westerly sweep the Adige strikes Monte 
 Magnone, and there is scant place for a road, this turns up 
 over the hills and later debouches through a difficult zigzag 
 defile on the Rivoli plateau. Near this defile, at the foot of 
 the hUl, was a cluster of houses around a well-known inn, or 
 Osteria ; at the mouth of the defile was a custom-house build- 
 ing, or Dogana. Well up the river several mountain roads 
 branch out from the main one, and run southerly by long 
 circuits around or across Monte Baldo, to tap the upland 
 villages, and thence rejoin the Rivoli cross-roads. These 
 mountain ways are only available for infantry. One of them, 
 on which La Corona is situated, runs between Monte Baldo 
 and Monte Magnone. The Corona heights command the roads 
 on either side of the Adige ; and artillery posted at available 
 places could play havoc with a column filing by. 
 
 The Rivoli plateau is peculiarly suited to defense. 
 
 As it happened, Joubert had, about 10 p. M. of the 13th, 
 begun to leave his Rivoli position, intending to retire to Cas- 
 telnuovo, lest the Austrians, coming on in great numbers and 
 from several directions, should surround and overwhelm his 
 one division. Luckily, his chief's orders reached him in sea- 
 son for him to turn back and reoccupy a position on the pla- 
 teau just in front of Rivoli, leaning on Campana and Monte 
 Castello, with van in Zoane. Had the Austrians anticipated 
 him, the battle of Rivoli might not have been a French victory. 
 Bonaparte's message also informed him that his chief was on 
 the way with reinforcements. He prepared for a hard fight 
 to carry out his orders. 
 
 It was the topography that constrained Alvinzi either to 
 move down upon Rivoli along several roads, or else to con- 
 sume more time than in the presence of an active foe was 
 wise, in a march on one or two ; and the Austrian army was 
 
388 THE ENEMY'S CAMP-FIRES. 
 
 actually coming on in six columns. Counting from the Aus- 
 trian right, the second, third and fourth of these columns, 
 forming the centre, the first two composed of five battalions 
 and the last one of four, respectively under Liptay, Koblos 
 and Ocskay, had come on after the capture of La Corona, 
 and had on the evening of the 13th reached the plain out of 
 vyhich rises the Eivoli plateau ; the first and right flank col- 
 umn under Lusignan, also of five battalions, was still skirting 
 the west slope of Monte Baldo. The fifth under Quosdano- 
 vich, of nine battalions and twelve squadrons, and the sixth 
 under Wukassovich, of three battalions, were approaching 
 along both banks of the Adige. 
 
 The Austrians, during this night, were camped, Liptay 
 and Koblos on a line in front of Caprino and San Giovanni, 
 with Ocskay in front of Gambaron in prolongation of their 
 line ; Lusignan at Lumiui, away back over the Monte Baldo 
 western slope. Wukassovich had not yet reached Dolce ; 
 Quosdanovich was still near Eivalta. And, while this was 
 going on at the theatre of an approaching great battle, to 
 keep the whole strategical situation in view, Bayalich had 
 been driven back to Villanova by Massena's troops left in 
 Verona, and Provera, as a feint, had moved forward to Mi- 
 nerbe, three miles from Legnano, but actually was making 
 dispositions to cross the river at Anghiari. 
 
 The falling weather had ceased, and it was fortunately a 
 clear, cold, moonlight night when Bonaparte reached Joubert's 
 headquarters at Eivoli ; and knowing the country well, " he 
 ascended the different heights and observed the lines of the 
 enemy's camp-fires ; " and could easily recognize the array of 
 Austrian divisions threatening to close in around his lieuten- 
 ant's position. " The atmosphere was aflame with them." He 
 gauged the enemy at forty-five thousand men, — much too high 
 an estimate of any troops he could possibly see, — and recog- 
 
JOUBERT MOVES FORWARD. 389 
 
 nized that here, on the heights of Rivoli, was the one place to 
 meet him ; for here only could he keep the several Austrian 
 columns, now far apart, from joining hands. The infantry, 
 marching alone, he would receive with salvos of artillery ; and 
 the cavalry would not be able to deploy on the zigzag roads 
 for any big manoeuvre. Lusignan and Wukassovich were for 
 some hours practically harmless. 
 
 No one was better aware than Bonaparte that a sharp of- 
 fense is the best defensive operation ; and his first orders were 
 given to Joubert to move his division forward before daylight 
 to a position with left in front of Zoane, and right extending 
 out northeasterly, so as to recapture San Marco Chapel which 
 he had once held and abandoned, and thus prevent the forces 
 he could see in his front (Liptay-Koblos-Ocskay) from join- 
 ing hands by way of the Dogana defile with those coming 
 down the Adige. Though it made a long thin line, this was 
 promptly done ; by four o'clock Vial had driven some Croats 
 out of San Marco and taken it ; and somewhat later three 
 half -brigades were ordered on La Presa and Lubiana ; still 
 another half-brigade was sent forward by way of Zovo ; and 
 Joubert's left moved forward to the edge of the plateau. 
 When this advance was completed, the French left, consisting 
 of two half-brigades, stood along the heights of Trombalora, 
 the centre of four half-brigades was well to the front, while 
 on the right another half-brigade, in a separate position, held 
 the intrenched defile by which, near the Dogana, the road 
 leads up from Osteria. At the latter place a small French 
 force had intrenched itself. Quosdanovich, recognizing the 
 value of San Marco heights, as a means of joining the Aus- 
 trian central columns, attempted to regain possession of them ; 
 but they were fiercely held by the French. 
 
 Small detachments were at Chiusa on the left bank, and at 
 Monte Koca and Monte Castello on the right bank. 
 
390 
 
 MASSENA COMES UP. 
 
 At daylight the Austrian columns were also set in motion. 
 The right column under Lusignan had early got to Pezzena 
 and Costerman. Four thousand strong, it was under orders 
 
 Battle of Rivoli. 
 
 to make a complete circuit of the Rivoli plateau by way of 
 Affi, and to fall on the French rear from the slopes of Monte 
 Pipolo. At a very early hour Massena came up to Eivoli 
 with two half-brigades and two cavalry regiments, the van of 
 his division. One of these, as soon as his manoeuvre was dis- 
 covered, was directed via Garda to fend off Lusignan, and 
 couriers were sent back to Rey to speed his march on Orza, 
 for the same purpose. The left Austrian column, three thou- 
 sand strong under Wukassovich, was still at Dolce at day- 
 
MUCH IN NAPOLEON'S FAVOR. 391 
 
 light, and was to march down river and to seize the Chiusa 
 defile ; and if it could get into position, to use its artillery 
 against the French right flank. Columns two, three and 
 four in the centre, some twelve thousand strong, under Lip- 
 tay, Koblos and Ocskay, were to assault the Rivoli position 
 in front. A column of eight thousand men under Quosdano- 
 vich had marched down the right or hither Adige bank, and 
 was to wait behind Incanale for the result of the central 
 attack, and then to assault the height from Osteria. The 
 artillery train and cavalry followed this column, not being 
 able to pass on the mountain roads without undue delay. 
 This arrangement of columns dispersed the Austrian army 
 all too much. As Lusignan's column was separated from all 
 the rest by Monte Baldo and later by the Rivoli plateau, and 
 the three central columns were separated from Quosdanovieh 
 by the San Marco hills, and Wukassovich was separated from 
 all the other columns by the Adige, it was manifest that, good 
 fortune apart, they could be handled by the French, one set 
 at a time. Moreover, the Austrian columns were none of 
 them, except those of Quosdanovieh and Wukassovich, accom- 
 panied by even light artillery, while Napoleon, from the Ri- 
 voli plateau, could use his twelve-pounders and field-guns, of 
 which he had a goodly number, to marked advantage. This 
 was much in his favor. 
 
 In the expectation that both Massena and Rey would 
 shortly reach the field, Bonaparte had disgarnished both his 
 left flank, thrown back along the heights of Trombolora, and 
 his right, thrown back at the Osteria defile, and by his first 
 advance had massed nearly all the forces which were present 
 so as to receive the three central Austrian columns in the 
 position beyond Zovo and La Presa, and out towards Lubiana, 
 which Joubert had taken up. This action he took because it 
 was evident that theirs was to be the initial attack. Bona- 
 
392 A LIVELY CONTEST. 
 
 parte proposed to meet the Austrian advance by a counter, 
 and if he could thus break through the Austrian centre, he 
 would have the wings at his mercy. So far good fortune had 
 accompanied his central operations ; and here the conditions 
 also led up to such a manoeuvre. 
 
 But the Austrian columns were in motion before Bonaparte 
 could advance far ; and Joubert alone was not strong enough. 
 Instinct with ardor, Liptay and Koblos pushed in on the 
 left centre of the French advanced line with uncommon speed, 
 taking one of the half-brigades in flank, and driving it and 
 the one on its left, after no long opposition, back in confu- 
 sion. But though a veteran half-brigade, posted near by, 
 was headed by Berthier and threw itself crotchet-wise against 
 the enemy, stood its ground and saved the guns, the Aus- 
 trian line, stronger here than the French, broke through, and 
 with the vigor of apparent victory pressed forward as far as 
 Matole. Bonaparte hurried up Massena's leading half-bri- 
 gade, and put it in to rally the two broken ones. This suc- 
 ceeded, and after a lively contest, lasting some three hours, 
 Massena managed to reestablish the French line in a half- 
 cirdle on the plateau, from Rovina through Zovo to Brenzon ; 
 and as the body of Massena's and Key's divisions now began 
 to arrive on the field, the French left was soon beyond 
 danger, firmly established just back of the Trombalora hills. 
 But the forenoon was slipping away. 
 
 None the less, although the Austrians had not maintained 
 their initial gain on the French left, they had made a marked 
 impression ; and they were at this point superior in numbers. 
 San Marco height was occupied by Ocskay, whose column 
 threatened to get in the rear of the French works at Osteria, 
 and Quosdanovich had come on and got ready to force his 
 way up the defile from Incanale, which the defenders had 
 pains to hold. Lusignan too was arriving at Affi on his way 
 
IN APPEARANCE ONLY. 
 
 393 
 
 RiToU Plateau. 
 
 to the French rear. By noon the Austrian army had met 
 success in the centre, had turned the French position on the 
 left, and was ready to assault the right, where only one half- 
 brigade held the defile. Alvinzi appeared to be on the eve 
 of a handsome victory. 
 
 But it was in appearance only. Bonaparte knew that he 
 could hold his ground for the moment, and that when Key 
 should have fully arrived, he would outnumber the enemy 
 at every point of contact ; and he calmly surveyed the field, 
 
394 THE DOGANA DEFILE. 
 
 conscious of both physical and moral preponderance. He 
 saw that Lusignan's column was not dangerous, as Massena 
 could easily neutralize it ; and meanwhile another half-brigade 
 was sent to Tifaro to meet this division. He was likewise 
 fully aware that the Dogana defile must be held at all haz- 
 ards, lest Quosdanovich should be able to throw his heavy 
 force up into the plateau, and by taking the French right in 
 reverse, compromise the centre and left. Happily the defile 
 was deep, and was enfiladed by a French battery. To this de- 
 fense, then, he addressed himself, nor had he quite completed 
 his preparations when the onset came. Alvinzi could also see 
 that the Dogana defile was the key of the field ; and, deter- 
 mined to take it, the Austrians, after ousting the Osteria 
 party from its works, in a splendid exhibition of gallantry 
 made their way without check up nearly to the top. The 
 grenadiers of Quosdanovich had thrown back the half-bri- 
 gade which held the mouth of the defile, while Wukassovich, 
 who had reached Chiusa opposite, and driven out the small 
 French detachment, shelled the troops across the river, who 
 were already barely holding their own. The situation was 
 for the moment critical. A flurry here might throw the 
 whole line back. 
 
 But Bonaparte never for an instant lost his self-confidence 
 or aplomb. His left was already well-secured by two half- 
 brigades, and was in no danger. His right alone needed his 
 presence. The balance of Massena's division was now at 
 hand, and was speedily deployed so as to fend off Ocskay, or 
 take in flank any troops emerging from the defile, while his 
 cavalry under Lasalle was held in reserve back of its outlet. 
 Some of Joubert's troops on the right flank were faced to 
 the rear with the same purpose. 
 
 On came the Austrian grenadiers, already shouting vic- 
 tory, for had they not heard the sound of Lusignan's fire in 
 
THE PLATEAU FREED. 395 
 
 the French rear ? But their gallantry was vain. As they 
 emerged from the deep zigzag cut upon the level, and before 
 they could get a chance to deploy, the French foot, which 
 Bonaparte had gathered, took the head of column on both 
 flanks ; the battery established near by swept through their 
 ranks with canister ; and Lasalle struck the leading regi- 
 ment in front with his column of hussars. The effect of the 
 triple blow was immense. Brave as the Austrian onset 
 had been, the head of column, torn almost to shreds, was 
 stopped at the mouth of the defile, and the impetus of the 
 entire column ceased. Thus summarily checked, Quosdano- 
 vich was falling back in more or less confusion, when the 
 explosion of an Austrian caisson, accidentally hit by a French 
 shell, shattered a body of the troops crowded in deep masses 
 in the defile, and drove front and rear of column in wild 
 flight down the rocky path. This disaster prevented any 
 further effort. The Austrians fell back to Incanale. 
 
 The plateau was freed. But the Austrian centre, which 
 was still in good order, had again to be met, for notwith- 
 standing the recent checks, Alvinzi ordered Liptay, Koblos 
 and Ocskay to assault afresh the Trombalora height. The 
 brave Austrian battalions again pressed forward, and Vial, on 
 the right of the French centre, after a stout fight, gave way 
 and fell back some distance. The position of the French line 
 was, however, a good one ; the tactics of the Austrians seemed 
 not to be directed by any one head, and of the two contest- 
 ants the enemy was the more exhausted. Vial was supported 
 by Joubert's light foot, and an advance of the French line 
 between Matole and San Marco was ordered at the same 
 time; Bonaparte pushed in Lasalle with his small body of 
 dragoons to charge the enemy. Though few in numbers, 
 their timely use produced the marked effect which cavalry 
 alone can do, and horse and foot together, hurled on the 
 
396 LUSIGNAN'S COLUMN WORSTED. 
 
 Austrian line, which haply was in part composed of fresh 
 levies, and had neither artillery nor cavalry to sustain it, 
 drove it back with a shock which soon produced disorder; 
 whereupon Joubert and Massena, pivoting on the left flank, 
 made a quarter-wheel to the left, and dashed forward on the 
 enemy. The Austrian line at this point had got disorganized 
 by its own initial success, its power of resistance had been 
 broken, the regiments fell back in complete wreck behind the 
 Tasso, and could not be again assembled until they reached 
 the Pozzone hills. It was 5 P. M. 
 
 This manoeuvre also resulted in cutting off from the rest of 
 the army the column of Lusignan, which had so confidently 
 started out to encircle the French left flank. Lusignan had 
 got as far as Monte Pipolo, and was actually in line in Bona- 
 parte's rear, astride the Verona road, expecting to catch the 
 French troops in a trap, when Alvinzi should have driven 
 them from the Rivoli plateau. But Bonaparte had faced two 
 half -brigades of Massena's division to the rear to hold Lu- 
 signan in check, should he advance. And, already isolated, 
 this column was soon further threatened by Rey with still an- 
 other half-brigade, who came up from Orza in good season, 
 when, though it strove gamely to cut its way through to 
 Garda, it was utterly worsted and dispersed ; and before the 
 next noon, the entire body, wandering about in squads and 
 companies, had been gathered in. A few hundred only got 
 back to Monte Baldo. 
 
 Alvinzi had twenty-six thousand men in line at the battle 
 of Rivoli ; Bonaparte about four thousand less. The loss in 
 killed and wounded does not appear to be determined ; but 
 the Austrians lost more heavily than the French. Especially 
 in prisoners were their casualties serious. Quosdanovich 
 retired in part by way of Rivalta, and in part by Dolce ; 
 Wukassovich, unable to assist his comrades, fell back up 
 
PROVERA CROSSES THE ADIGE. 397 
 
 river; Liptay, Koblos and Ocskay held the foot of Monte 
 Baldo, where they slept on their arms. 
 
 The battle of Eivoli is ill described in his reports by Bo- 
 naparte; the less important fights in front of Mantua are 
 very carefully detailed. Time and fatigue explain this. 
 
 Just as Bonaparte was preparing, despite the late hour, to 
 finish the day by moving on Osteria and annihilating Quos- 
 danovich, he received word that Provera had crossed the 
 Adige during the night of January' 13-14. " Augereau had 
 made bad dispositions." The importance of immediate action 
 at that point, lest Mantua should be relieved out of hand, was 
 plain ; and placing Key under Joubert's orders, he left the 
 pursuit of Alvinzi's army to the latter. Withdrawing Mas- 
 sena from Rivoli, he ordered him to march on Roverbella at 
 daylight of the 15th. Eey was to follow him as soon as Jou- 
 bert could spare him. This gave Massena, who had gone 
 into battle and fought all day on his arrival from Verona, 
 but a short respite before he was again afoot. But it was 
 just this tremendous activity of mind and body, infused by 
 Bonaparte into his troops, which, like the divine fervor of 
 Frederick, ran down through the officers to every private in 
 the ranks. 
 
 From his position at Minerbe, where he had faced Auge- 
 reau, and having fruitlessly paused, hoping to induce the 
 inhabitants of Legnano to play into his bands, Provera had, 
 as he designed, crossed the Adige at Anghiari on the 14th, 
 unknown to Augereau, though Guyeux with the troops from 
 Eonco offered his flankers some opposition ; and leaving 
 twenty-five hundred men in the Anghiari bridge-head, and 
 HohenzoUern to fend off Augereau, he pushed on to Nogara, 
 hoping to reach Mantua without a battle. Augereau, though 
 he had allowed the Austrians to steal a passage, marched 'to 
 Anghiari, surrounded and captured the enemy's bridge-head 
 
398 A FURTHER PASSAGE OF ARMS. 
 
 party, broke the bridge, and headed for Cerea. Lannes had 
 reported to Augereau on the 13th, and these two, together with 
 Guyeux, advanced on Provera, each from his own direction. 
 They did not indeed succeed in heading him off, but they did 
 considerably delay his progress ; and at Cerea they cut off 
 and captured his rearguard. He had been altogether too slow. 
 On the day after the battle of Eivoli there was still a 
 further passage of arms between the rival forces there. Dis- 
 turbed at the cutting ofE'of Lusignan, Alvinzi believed not 
 only that he eould help his lieutenant out of the net into 
 which he had fallen, but as he heard that Bonaparte had 
 turned against Provera, he deemed it his duty to make one 
 more essay to save this officer and the campaign, by breaking 
 through Joubert's line and pressing on to Mantua. At the 
 same time Joubert, under the orders left by his chief, was 
 himself advancing to disrupt whatever might be left of the 
 Austrian army. At this moment Quosdanovich had retired 
 on Rivalta ; Lusignan had been captured, and Alvinzi's centre 
 was left without support. J oubert gauged the situation with 
 skill. Holding back his own centre, he extended his wings, 
 and by a turning movement on both Austrian flanks. Vial 
 moving along the slopes of Monte Magnone on La Corona, 
 and Vaux along those of Monte Baldo on Ferrara, the enemy 
 was thus taken in a trap. Murat had come up from Salo to 
 Garda across the lake in boats, hoping to fall on the rear of 
 the enemy. Him Vaux joined to his own force, and sent his 
 fresh troops ahead to turn the Austrian flank, whereupon he 
 fell on their front, as did also Vial. The enemy was abso- 
 lutely at a disadvantage. Under these evil conditions there 
 could be but one result. The Austrian soldiers had been 
 roughly handled the day before ; Alvinzi, though a good sol- 
 dier, was not the man to revive their enthusiasm ; they had 
 for days been short of rations, their ammunition was running 
 
THE POINTS OF ASSAULT. 399 
 
 low, and they fought feebly. So soon as Joubert felt the 
 weakness of the resistance to his onset, he pushed in with 
 all the more vigor. The result speedily came : the Austrians 
 fell into disorder and retired in confusion, some reaching 
 Bivalta, some rallying on Quosdanovich, some getting caught 
 at La Corona. The enemy left five thousand prisoners in 
 the hands of the French, and this number, added to those 
 taken on the 14th, made a tale of thirteen thousand men. 
 By 9 A. M. the Austrian army had definitely retired, and out 
 of the twenty-six thousand who had so gallantly struck the 
 French on yestermorn, Alvinzi could barely call the roll of 
 ten thousand men. 
 
 On this same January 15 Provera, with his ten thousand 
 men, marched on towards Mantua, and by noon arrived at San 
 Giorgio, which was held and intrenched by Miollio and fifteen 
 hundred French. Demanding surrender, he was met with a 
 salvo of artillery ; and on turning towards the citadel, he ran 
 into Serurier's troops. He then took up a position near La 
 Favorita Palace, and managed to send a message across the 
 lake in a boat to Wurmser, in which he prayed this ofiicer 
 to join him in an attack on the French on the morning of 
 the 16th. The points of assault were to be La Favorita, on 
 which Provera would fall, and San Antonio, just south of it, 
 which Wurmser was to sally out and assault. 
 
 With regard to means by which the Mantua garrison managed to com- 
 municate with the outside world, in his dispatch to the Directory of 
 December 28 Bonaparte says : "Mantua is closed in with the greatest 
 care. The 2d of this month General Dumas surprised a spy who was 
 entering the town. It was an Austrian cadet, who had been sent from 
 Trent by Alvinzi. After a, good deal of pretense, he confessed that he 
 was the bearer of dispatches, and effectively he threw up twenty-four 
 hours afterwards (allant a la garde-robe) a little cylinder, in which was 
 inclosed a letter from the emperor, hereto appended. ... If this method 
 of having dispatches swallowed was not entirely known, I would give you 
 
400 ONSET ON LA FAVORITA. 
 
 the details, so that they might be sent to our generals, because the Aus- 
 trians often make use of this method. Generally the spies keep it in 
 the body for several days. If their stomach becomes upset, they take 
 care to save the little cylinder, to soak it iu elixir, and to swallow it 
 again. This cylinder is soaked in Spanish wax dissolved in vinegar." 
 
 But in their attempt to overwhelm the small blockading 
 force at Mantua, the Austrian generals failed to reckon on 
 the wonderful speed of the French troops that had fought at 
 Rivoli. Massena and Victor had arrived at Eoverbella by 
 the evening of the 15th, the latter having been picked up 
 en route at Villafranca. They had but a short rest on the 
 succeeding night. At Roverbella Bonaparte, ascertaining 
 that his lieutenant still held San Giorgio, ordered Augereau 
 to push in on Provera's rear ; Serurier, in command of the 
 blockading corps, was to take post at La Favorita to meet any 
 sally Wurmser might make, which he judged rightly would 
 fall on this spot ; and he himself proposed to move down from 
 Eoverbella, and with Massena and Victor shut Provera in 
 by an overwhelming circle of troops. Though Augereau had 
 not followed up the Austrian column, he had been busy in 
 arrangements to cut it off from the Adige, having burned 
 the bridge at Anghiari and blocked the roads. He was, how- 
 ever, not so far away but what he could obey his orders in 
 season to join in the attack at La Favorita. 
 
 Accordingly when, at 5 A. M. on the morning of the 16th, 
 Provera's onset on La Favorita occurred, he soon ascertained 
 that he had substantially the whole French army closing him 
 in. He none the less began his attack, while Wurmser de- 
 bouched on San Antonio. Serurier, who occupied both these 
 places, replied with vigor and, aided by reinforcements sent 
 him by Bonaparte, held on firmly. Wurmser was wise enough 
 to discover the impossibility of his task, and to retire within 
 walls ; but Provera did not so easily escape. Though attacked 
 
RAPID MARCHES. 401 
 
 in front by Serurier, on his left by the San Giorgio garrison, 
 and on his right by Massena's and Victor's troops under 
 Bonaparte in person, for a while he held his own ; but when 
 Augereau appeared in his rear, there was nothing left for 
 him to do. He became convinced of the futility of resistance ; 
 and learning of the disaster at Eivoli, by noon, with his nine 
 thousand men left, he concluded to lay down his arms. Bona- 
 parte had tactically used a concentric manoeuvre which he 
 always condemned strategically, but his troops were all within 
 supporting distance, and he was present in overwhelming 
 numbers. 
 
 The last trick was taken. The Austrians had made a fourth 
 gallant attempt to relieve sore-beset Mantua, but the genius 
 of Bonaparte in nine days had brought all their efforts to 
 naught. Alvinzi had advanced on the Mincio with forty- 
 three thousand men ; he carried back less than twenty-five 
 thousand with which to defend the frontiers of Austria. 
 
 In this campaign of Rivoli the French with thirty thousand 
 men made nearly twenty thousand prisoners. 
 
 The rapidity of the marches made by the French was as- 
 tonishing. The same troops which fought east of Verona on 
 the 13th marched fourteen miles during the night to Rivoli, 
 fought all day on the 14th, marched back to Roverbella, 
 thirty-one miles, on the 15th, and on the 16th compelled the 
 surrender of Provera, who believed them beaten on the plain 
 of Rivoli. Few efforts equal this record. 
 
 Bonaparte reported to the Directory, January 18 : " All the 
 half-brigades covered themselves with glory, and especially 
 the 32d, 57th and 18th of the line, which General Massena 
 commanded, and which in three days beat the enemy at St. 
 Michel, at Rivoli and at Roverbella. The Roman legions 
 made, they say, twenty-four miles a day ; our brigades made 
 thirty, and fought in the intervals." For gallantry in the 
 
402 SURRENDER OF MANTUA. 
 
 next campaign it was ordered, March 21, 1797, to inscribe 
 on the colors of the 57th, " The terrible 57th half -brigade, 
 which nothing can stop." 
 
 Leaving Laudon with eight thousand men to defend the 
 Tyrol, Alvinzi retreated behind the Piave, and at the opening 
 of February the French forces were again in their old places. 
 Joubert pushed the Tyrol army back via Avio, Mori, Caliano 
 and Trent, to behind the Avisio, and took post at Lavis. 
 Augereau's division went to Padua, and later to Castelfranco. 
 Massena followed up the small Austrian force to the Brenta, 
 where he destroyed its rearguard. Alvinzi thought to hold 
 Bassano by intrenching it, but retired on the approach of the 
 French. From Bassano, where his division was posted, Mas- 
 sena kept up communication with Joubert by way of the 
 Brenta. The Tyrolese army kept in touch via Belluno with 
 the Piave, behind which river the Austrians finally withdrew. 
 Alvinzi resigned his command, and was succeeded by Arch- 
 duke Charles. 
 
 Mantua was doomed. The garrison was at the last stage, 
 had eaten its horses, and was dying of pestilence. On Feb- 
 ruary 2, after a seven months' siege, the famous fortress 
 surrendered to the French commander, with the enormous 
 garrison of twenty thousand men, of whom over a third were 
 invalided, as prisoners of war, and multitude of stores, includ- 
 ing the guns Bonaparte had been forced to abandon when he 
 first threw over the siege in the Castiglione days, plus three 
 hundred and fifty pieces on the walls and in the arsenal. On 
 the 3d the French made a formal entry. In the absence of 
 Bonaparte in the Romagna, Serurier received the formal sur- 
 render. Count Wurmser and his staff, together with a convoy 
 of seven hundred men, were liberated ; the prisoners were 
 sent to Trieste to be exchanged. 
 
 "I took pains," said Bonaparte, "to show French gen- 
 
THE PAPAL CAMPAIGN. 403 
 
 eroslty witli regard to Wurmser, a general seventy years old, 
 towards whom fortune has been in this campaign very cruel, 
 but who has not ceased to show a constancy and a courage 
 which history will take note of." This magnanimity was not 
 lost on the brave old Austrian general : " A few days after he 
 sent an aide-de-camp to Bologna to inform him of a project of 
 poisoning which was to be carried out in the Eomagna, and 
 gave him instructions essential to hold himself harmless. The 
 notice was useful." 
 
 The several expeditions sent to save Mantua had cost the 
 Austrians sixty thousand men. 
 
 This result was a great reward for the eight months during 
 which Bonaparte had so splendidly fought to capture the place 
 and maintain himself on the Mincio. During this time he had 
 met and defeated four armies, in each case inflicting an almost 
 fatal blow. He had definitely won his secondary base on the 
 Mincio; he was about to receive accessions of old troops, 
 which would give him an army such as he had now the right 
 to command, and he had made his own future secure. 
 
 Durino- the Eivoli campaign the Pope saw fit to break the 
 armistice made in June, and began to raise troops to be com- 
 manded by the Austrian general. Colli, whom Vienna had sent 
 to Eome for the purpose. To meet this threat, though it had 
 not much significance, Victor, with forty-six hundred French 
 and four thousand Italians, was dispatched to Bologna and 
 Imola on February 2, Bonaparte in person accompanying the 
 column. The French took Faenza and followed via Forli, 
 Eimini and Pesaro towards Ancona, the papal troops having 
 been defeated on the Senio and mostly captured. Victor 
 reached Ancona the 9th, and by the 18th was at Tolentino, 
 where His Holiness sued for peace. This was made Feb- 
 ruary 19 at Bonaparte's dictation. The terms were not such 
 as to crush the papal power, but they were sufficiently harsh 
 
404 
 
 THE PEACE OF TOLENTINO. 
 
 to make of the Pope an implacable foe. He was to have no 
 dealings with the enemies of France, and to keep his ports 
 open to her ships. He was to yield up Avignon and Venais- 
 sin, Bologna, Ferrara and the Romagna. Ancona was to be 
 garrisoned by the French until universal peace was made. 
 He paid thirty million francs indemnity, and gave to France 
 many of the best pictures and statues in the Vatican. The 
 
 Papal Campaign. 
 
 galleries of Paris had thus been enriched from Rome, Milan, 
 Bologna, Parma, Modena and Placentia. 
 
 The peace of Tolentino secured northern Italy and the line 
 of the Mincio. 
 
 The French army was now increased to eighty thousand 
 men. Massena at Bassano had eleven thousand five hundred 
 men ; Serurier at Castelfranco had ten thousand five hundred ; 
 Bernadotte, and Guyeux in command of Augereau's old divi- 
 
SUBSTANTIAL REWARDS. 405 
 
 sion, each with an equal number, were at Padua and Treviso ; 
 Joubert lay in and about Trent with nineteen thousand five 
 hundred men; Victor was on the Adige with six thousand 
 five hundred ; there was a cavalry reserve of eleven hundred 
 men, and nine thousand men in garrison. In his St. Helena 
 Memorial, Napoleon understates his army at fifty-three thou- 
 sand foot, five thousand horse and three thousand artillery, 
 with one hundred and twenty guns. 
 
 The Austrian army, over which Archduke Charles was now 
 placed, had barely twenty thousand of the old forces, and re- 
 serve battalions of not over fifteen thousand men. These were 
 stationed at great distances apart, to hold the mountain defiles 
 on all the roads to Vienna;. 
 
 It must have been with pride that Bonaparte sent Augereau 
 to Paris with the Mantua standards ; and he paid a marked 
 compliment to his gallant lieutenant, in a letter to the Direc- 
 tory from Tolentino, dated February 18 : " General Augereau 
 has left, Citizen Directors, with sixty flags coming from the 
 garrison of Mantua. You will see in this brave general, to 
 whom the Republic owes for marked services, a citizen ex- 
 tremely zealous." 
 
 Nor were the others forgotten, for on March 6, 1797, the 
 general-in-chief issued an order giving substantial rewards in 
 the shape of gratuities to many officers, varying from one 
 hundred and fifty francs to a brave trumpeter who was 
 wounded, and two hundred and fifty francs each to the two 
 soldiers who helped him out of the marsh at Arcole, up to 
 twenty thousand francs to Joubert. Most of the items are 
 ten thousand francs each to general officers, among them Eam- 
 pon, Menard, St. Hilaire, Gardanne, Bessieres and others. 
 And to " every one bearing a sword " was given a pension of 
 one hundred francs, to be levied on the Mantuan country. 
 
 Joubert had been educated for the bar, but the Revolution 
 
406 RISE OF JOUBERT. 
 
 led him into the army. He had risen in the Army of Italy 
 to be general of brigade. Tall, thin, apparently feeble by 
 nature, he yet possessed great endurance. " He was intrepid, 
 vigilant, active." He later was placed in command of the 
 Army of Italy, but fell at Novi. He had the making of a 
 grand soldier. 
 
 Alv 
 
XV. 
 ON TO VIENNA. MARCH, 1797. 
 
 Italt was transformed, and the French holding there was strong. Charles 
 succeeded Alvinzi, and Bonaparte was fairly reinforced. Though Austria had 
 lost northern Italy, the gain on the Rhine was so marked that she was not dis- 
 couraged. Bonaparte proposed to push on, and yet it required great courage 
 to move into the heart of Austria, with the Mincio for a base. He left Joubert 
 to hold the Adige, and a sufficient number in garrison in Lombardy ; and feel- 
 ing that a strong offense was his better plan, he advanced upon the Austrians 
 on the Fiave, sending Massena around the Austrian right. Bonaparte's opera^ 
 tion looks like a division of forces, but Joubert was really only protecting his 
 base, with orders, in case of eventual success, to push forward and join the 
 main army. Early in March the advance began. Prince Charles, whose rein- 
 forcements were mostly militia, retired slowly, offering slight resistance at the 
 Tagliamento. He divided his forces into two columns, one to move towards 
 the Tarvis defile, and the other by a circuit east by way of Laybaoh. Bona- 
 parte hoped that he could pen the Austrians up in the Isonzo valley, and Mas- 
 sena was pushed towards the Tarvis pass, while Bernadotte followed the Lay- 
 bach column. Charles was falling back on his reinforcements at Yillach, and 
 sent his train up the Isonzo. Massena pushed hard to reach the Tarvis defile, 
 and by March 20 he did so ; and by speedy pursuit Bonaparte managed to catch 
 the Austrian train in the Predil pass, and captured it, with its escort. Mean- 
 while Joubert had pushed back the Austrians across the watershed of the Tyrol, 
 and had marched towards his chief through the valley of the Drave. 
 
 The entire aspect of affairs in Italy had been changed by 
 Bonaparte's work — by the peace with Naples and Rome, the 
 evacuation of Corsica by the English, the capture of Mantua 
 and the brilliant victory of Rivoli. Restless at delay and sat- 
 isfied with the fresh reinforcements he had received, every 
 man in which believed in his leader's ability to accomplish 
 any task, he was ready to advance from his secondary base at 
 Mantua, and to march into the heart of the Austrian empire. 
 
408 MIXTURE OF GOOD AND EVIL. 
 
 To guard this base and other essential points, twenty thousand 
 men would suffice ; and with over fifty thousand fighting 
 effective, he could now make a serious thrust on Vienna, to 
 aid which the Directory promised that Moreau should promptly 
 cross at Kehl with the Army of the Rhine, and Hoche should 
 move towards the Main with the Army of the Sambre and 
 Meuse. 
 
 Yet by the brilliant outcome of the recent Italian campaigns, 
 France was by no means freed from her troubles, external or 
 internal, in which there was a mixture of good and evil. The 
 ashes of the Vendee were still alive ; the Royalists were active 
 in the cities of the south ; the finances were worse than ever 
 before. More encouraged by Charles' gain in Germany than 
 disheartened by Bonaparte's advance to the Mincio, Austria 
 was again raising troops in vast numbers, still confident that 
 she could reconquer the Netherlands and northern Italy. 
 Fearing another French descent on Ireland, England mark- 
 edly increased her regular army, created a militia of sixty 
 thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and added largely 
 to her already gigantic navy. In Russia, Paul I. had come to 
 the throne in November, 1796 ; the reinforcements promised 
 by Catherine to Austria and England were arrested ; and a 
 treaty was made with Prussia. Sweden had also crowned a 
 new monarch, Gustavus IV., who protected the emigres, and 
 became the tool of England. Denmark and Prussia remained 
 neutral. All Italy, save Venice, which continued antagonistic, 
 had come under the influence of France, though Naples was 
 ripe for treachery. Sardinia's new king, Charles Emmanuel, 
 soon concluded a treaty with France, and stood ready to fur- 
 nish troops. Though willing to mediate between France and 
 Austria, Turkey did nothing important; and true to her 
 treaty with France, Spain furnished a small squadron in the 
 Channel. Holland was fast becoming a French colony. 
 
MAIN EFFORT IN GERMANY. 409 
 
 The descent on Ireland under Hoche at the end of 1796 had 
 failed, and the troops detailed for the work were sent to Italy 
 and the Rhine. Hoche took command of seventy thousand 
 men on the Lower Rhine ; and the forces on the Upper Rhine, 
 still under Moreau, grew to sixty thousand men. Hoche stood 
 on the left bank from Coblenz and the bridge-head at Neuwied 
 to Diisseldorf ; Moreau along the Middle Rhine and back of 
 the Vosges at Zweibriicken. On receipt of the divisions of 
 Bernadotte and Delmas, Bonaparte could number under his 
 standard seventy thousand men between the Mincio and Piave, 
 on the borders of the Tyrol and in northern Italy. On suc- 
 ceeding Alvinzi, Charles was given twenty-five thousand rein- 
 forcements. In Germany the Austrians had forty thousand 
 men on the Upper Rhine and down to Mannheim, under La- 
 tour ; on the Lower Rhine twenty-five thousand men under 
 Werneck on the Lahn ; and a similar number in reserve. It 
 was plain that the French military problem could be best 
 solved by a defense along the Rhine, and by giving Bonaparte 
 one hundred thousand men wherewith to complete his work ; 
 but some members of the Directory feared to help him to over- 
 much success, and it was decided to make the main effort in 
 Germany. Moreau and Hoche were respectively to advance 
 into Swabia and Franconia ; and it was on the programme that 
 the Army of Italy was merely to sustain them by threatening 
 Carinthia. This proved not to be a wise plan, for the Rhine 
 operations opened so late that Charles might have been enabled 
 to crush Bonaparte by drawing in reinforcements from Ger- 
 many. But the Aulic Council was ever slow and pedantic : 
 advantage was not taken of the opportunity, and no harm 
 ensued. 
 
 Despite their failure in Italy, the Austrians could not con- 
 sider the year of 1796 entirely wasted. It had begun by the 
 threat of three French armies to invade Austrian territory ; 
 
410 A DEFENSIVE ROLE. 
 
 and while of these three the smallest had wrung Lombardy 
 from the Austrian sceptre, yet the two other and larger ones 
 had been thrown back on the Rhine after two handsome impe- 
 rial victories. Archduke Charles had shown signs of a true 
 talent for arms, much was expected of him in the future, and 
 it was the feeling in Vienna that all the fortunes of war had 
 not been against them. The Aulic Council had, however, 
 gained a hearty respect for the new commander of the Army 
 of Italy, and made no sign of present intention to recover 
 Lombardy. Neither had this august body the least idea that 
 Bonaparte would attempt any further advance. France must 
 surely be satisfied with what he had won. For the moment, 
 at least, a defensive role was to be pursued here ; and instead 
 of pressing on to the plain of the Po, the Austrian armies were 
 only so far reinforced that a sufficient body could be left to 
 protect the Tyrol inlets, and a larger corps could be stationed 
 on the Brenta. 
 
 In Bonaparte's mind there had been room for nothing but 
 a further offensive advance as soon as he should have received 
 such sufficient reinforcements as the crossing of a mountainous 
 country and a march into the heart of Austria would demand. 
 It was a bold operation, this advance across the Noric and 
 Julie Alps, with the Tyrol army threatening his left flank, or, 
 worse still, his communications, through the Adige valley, and 
 with Venice lying sullenly on his right ; and it needed the 
 qualities of a great captain to undertake it. Until the acces- 
 sions came in, however, Bonaparte had contented himself with 
 pushing Massena out to Bassano, and Guyeux, commanding 
 the division of Augereau, towards Treviso — which operation 
 was followed by the withdrawal of the Austrian army from 
 the Brenta valley to a new position behind the Piave ; and 
 with ordering Joubert up the Adige, to get in touch with the 
 enemy, who shortly retired to above Lavis. It was in the 
 
CHARLES ON THE PI AVE. 411 
 
 pause brought on by the retrograde movement of the Austri- 
 ans that occurred the operation on Rome, already narrated, 
 and the peace of Tolentino of February 19. 
 
 Bonaparte was not satisfied to be long away from the Army 
 of Italy. From Tolentino, February 17, he wrote to Joubert : 
 " In a few days I shall be back with the army, where I feel 
 my presence becomes necessary;" and one of the reasons 
 he gave the Directory for speedy conclusion of peace with 
 the Pope was, " because my presence is indispensable to the 
 army." But this was not aU. That Archduke Charles, with 
 his reputation freshly won against Jourdan and Moreau, had 
 been put in command in the place of Alvinzi was a still 
 more potent factor in this desire again to grasp the helm. By 
 March 10 the new Austrian commander was on the Piave, 
 where Lusignan with the Austrian centre of ten thousand 
 men was stationed, with right at Feltre, keeping touch with 
 the Tyrol, while the relics of Alvinzi's army, seventeen thou- 
 sand strong, held the Tagliamento from Gemona down, as the 
 left wing, and in the Tyrol, as a right wing of the entire line 
 of defense, fourteen thousand regular troops under Kerpen 
 and Laudon, and ten thousand Tyrolese militia stood at 
 Salurn and in the valleys of the Nos and Avisio. There were 
 awaited three divisions from the Rhine, but these were stiU 
 on the march through Bavaria. Altogether, Archduke Charles 
 had a force variously estimated from thirty-five to forty-five 
 thousand men under the colors, not counting militia. The 
 quality of the force was far from high. 
 
 On this same March 10 Napoleon had returned to the 
 Army of Italy and was at Bassano. His divisions were now 
 stationed as follows : in Mantua and Yerona were garrisons 
 of fifteen hundred men under Miollio, and two thousand under 
 Belland, respectively ; in the Tyrol, along the Adige, Joubert 
 had under his command his own division of ten thousand men, 
 
412 NAPOLEON'S EFFECTIVE STRENGTH. 
 
 together with those of Baraguay d'Hilliers, numbering six 
 thousand men, and Delmas, numbering five thousand men ; 
 Guyeux's (late Augereau's) division of ten thousand men 
 was in the Citadella-Castelfranco country ; Massena lay at 
 Bassano with twelve thousand men ; Serurier with nine thou- 
 sand men at Asolo ; and Bernadotte with ten thousand men 
 held Padua. Victor with six thousand men from Ancona 
 and Ferrara, where he had been watching the Pope and Naples, 
 was ordered back to the Adige to protect the base along the 
 Mincio. Lasalle with three thousand men held Lombardy ; 
 and Vaubois with twenty-five hundred, Leghorn. There is 
 such vast discrepancy in the authorities as to the effective 
 strength of both contestants that, added to Bonaparte's habit 
 of exaggerating so as to produce a favorable impression, and 
 of understating so as to get reinforcements, no numbers can 
 be quite relied on ; but the above figures are not far from 
 accurate. Of this apparently large total a bare half would 
 be able to move against the archduke ; for the base on the 
 Mincio could under no circumstances be denuded. But the 
 French were largely veterans, elate with repeated victory 
 and ready for immediate action ; whereas the troops under 
 Charles had included many fresh levies before the recent dis- 
 astrous campaigns, and were dispirited by failure and unre- 
 liable. 
 
 From the Mincio there were two general lines of advance 
 towards Austria proper : one up the Adige and through the 
 Tyrol, and one through the Venetian states and the Austrian 
 provinces of Blyria and Styria. These lines ran at right 
 angles to one another, the apex being Verona. The first 
 descends to the Danube by way of Salzburg ; and from it 
 to the second are five transverse roads, of which, however, 
 only the Puster valley road came within the scope of Bona- 
 
ROADS INTO AUSTRIA. 
 
 413 
 
 parte's own movement. The others might come into play to 
 enable the enemy to take his line of advance in flank, or to 
 afford the Rhine armies a means of cooperation. The one 
 through the mountains of the Tyrol was easy for the Austrians 
 to defend, and gave small chance for the French to employ 
 large bodies. The one to 
 the east at first crossed 
 the plains of the Po and 
 Adige, skirting the foot- 
 hills of the Alps, follow- 
 ing the single great high- 
 way or stage-road by way 
 of Vicenza, Treviso and 
 Udine, and thence by a 
 tortuous route through the 
 mountains and many de- 
 files to Villach, Klagen- 
 furth and Bruck, and on 
 to Vienna. In the first 
 part, over the plains, the 
 
 line had this advantage to the aggressor, that in attempt- 
 ing to successively defend the Piave, the Tagliamento and 
 the Isonzo, the Austrians would be keeping their line of re- 
 treat in rear of their right flank, and liable to a turning move- 
 ment which might throw them away from their base towards 
 the Adriatic. From the Isonzo another post-road ran farther 
 south by way of Gorizia, Prewald and Laybach to Klagen- 
 furt. This was the high-road from Trieste to Vienna. Over 
 the plain flowed numerous streams, all bridged or fordable ; 
 through the mountains the streams were torrential ; and if 
 bridges had been destroyed, they were difficult to pass. Other 
 and less good roads there were, up all the rivers, and skirting 
 
 Eemadotte. 
 
414 TAKING ADVANTAGE OF WEAKNESS. ' 
 
 the foothills to the north of the stage-road ; but these were 
 practicable for foot and light horse only. After marching up 
 the Adige, and its affluent the Eisach, to the top of the water- 
 shed, several valleys, but especially that of the Drave, — the 
 Pusterthal, — led down to the main line of advance to the 
 east, the latter striking it at Villach. As the crow flies, it is 
 a hundred and sixty miles from Verona to ViUach, a hundred 
 and ten from Verona to the headwaters of the Eisach, and a 
 hundred from there to Villach ; but the constant windings of 
 the mountain roads add largely to these distances. 
 
 Charles would have protected the Austrian hereditary states 
 to better advantage if he had occupied the Tyrol in force, and 
 left a smaller army on the Piave. One need not stand astride 
 a road in order to hold it. With a large force ready to de- 
 bouch down the Adige, there was scant danger of the Army 
 of Italy adventuring itself beyond the Isonzo. But no sooner 
 had Bonaparte discovered the Austrian plan of protecting the 
 Tyrol by one detached army, and the straight road to Vienna 
 by another far removed from the first, than he formulated 
 his own plan of campaign. Upon the forces on the Piave 
 and Tagliamento, say twenty-seven thousand men, he would 
 move with some forty thousand from such a direction that he 
 would interpose between them and the forces in the Tyrol, 
 and thus prevent help coming to them from the latter. Lying 
 as they did, between the Noric Alps and the sea, with their 
 communications back of their right flank, the Austrians were 
 vulnerable ; and Bonaparte proceeded to take advantage of 
 this weakness. To accomplish his end Massena was to move 
 via Feltre and Belluno, and thus around the archduke's 
 right, while Bonaparte, with the divisions of Bernadotte, 
 Guyeux and Serurier, would advance along the stage-road 
 via Treviso. Pushing back the lesser forces of the archduke. 
 
GENERAL ORDERS TO JOUBERT. 416 
 
 he would then move straight towards the defile of Tarvis, at 
 the summit of the Noric Alps, which was the key-obstacle 
 along the Vienna highway. But as the Tyrolese army had 
 still to be reckoned with during this march, Baraguay was 
 sent up the Avisio and across the hills to Primiero to protect 
 Massena's left flank. As to Joubert, on the upper Adige, if 
 he was attacked by forces which he could not overcome, he 
 had general orders to retire slowly down the river, fighting in 
 every good position, as far as Castelnuovo. But as it was 
 probable that Joubert would be able to push the Austrians 
 back, it was understood that when he reached Brixen, Bona- 
 parte might call him to join the main army by the Puster 
 valley down the Drave ; whereupon the joint forces would 
 march on Vienna in one body. 
 
 The plan at first blush looks much like the division of 
 forces which has been so much condemned in the Austrian 
 manoeuvre of 1796. But inasmuch as Bonaparte, with the 
 force he 1^ against the Piave, considerably outnumbered his 
 opponent and had better troops, and as so large a body of 
 the enemy as that on the Tyrol border could not well be left 
 to march down the Adige and cut the French communica- 
 tions, what Bonaparte really did was to leave the care of his 
 communications with Joubert ; but instead of his remaining 
 quiet on the Mincio, he gave him an offensive rSle, and one 
 which might render him useful to the main army, should his 
 preliminary advance prove successful enough to neutralize the 
 Tyrol troops and put them beyond danger of coping with 
 Victor, who remained stationary at the base. As a whole 
 the operation was not only conceived in the highest strategic 
 sense, it was one of magnitude and marked difficulty. 
 
 Having conceived his plan, Bonaparte was not long in put- 
 ting it into execution, and on March 10 issued a 
 
416 TO THE SOLDIERS. 
 
 PROCLAMATION TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY. 
 
 Headquarters, Bassano, 20 Ventose, Year V. 
 
 The capture of Mantua has finished a campaign which has given you 
 eternal title to the gratitude of the country. 
 
 You have borne ofE the victory in fourteen pitched battles and in seventy 
 combats ; you have made more than a hundred thousand prisoners, taken 
 from the enemy five hundred pieces of field artillery, two thousand of 
 heavy calibre, four pontoon equipages. 
 
 The contributions laid upon the countries which you have conquered 
 have fed, clothed, paid the army throughout the campaign ; you have, 
 besides, sent thirty millions to the minister of finances, to ease the public 
 treasury. 
 
 You have enriched the Museum of Paris with more than three hun- 
 dred objects, masterpieces of ancient and modern Italy, and which have 
 taken thirty centuries to produce. 
 
 You have conquered for the Republic the most beautiful countries 
 of Europe ; the Lombardy and Cispadane Republics owe you their lib- 
 erty ; the French colors float for the first time on the shores of the 
 Adriatic, opposite and within twenty-four hours' sail of ancient Mace- 
 donia. . . , 
 
 But you have not finished all. A great destiny is reserved to you. . . . 
 You will continue to be worthy of it. 
 
 . . . The emperor alone remains in our front. Degrading himself 
 from the rank of a great power, this prince has placed himself in the pay 
 of the merchants of London. He has no more will but that of these per- 
 fidious islanders. 
 
 The Directory has spared no pains to give peace to Europe. It has not 
 been heeded. . . . There is no hope of peace but by seeking it in the 
 heart of the hereditary lands of the House of Austria. There you will 
 find a brave people, bowed down with the war . . . and believing that Eng- 
 lish gold has corrupted the ministers of the emperor. You will respect 
 their religion and customs, you will respect their properties. It is liberty 
 you will bring to the brave Hungarian nation. 
 
 The House of Austria . . . will descend to the rank of secondary powers, 
 where she has already been placed by putting herself in the pay and at 
 the disposition of England. 
 
 Bonaparte. 
 
LANDECK. 
 
 BOKr=\COFORTE\ 
 
 
 10 I 
 
 MANTUA-LEOBJ- 
 
L> 
 
 11151'- 
 
 , N COUNTRY. 
 
OBSERVATION PARTIES FALL BACK. 417 
 
 On March 10 Massena was headed for Feltre on the upper 
 Piave, with instructions to strike Lusignan, cut the Austrian 
 right wing in the Tyrol from its left wing on the plains of 
 Venice, and threaten the right of the archduke's army. So 
 soon as Charles became aware of Bonaparte's offensive manceu- 
 vre, he withdrew his troops, which had been lying some ten 
 thousand strong along the Piave, back behind the Livenza, 
 observation parties alone being left on the Piave. The rivers 
 at this season are wont to be full and rapid, and the roads 
 heavy, so that the marching was far from easy. Lusignan 
 being withdrawn up the river on the French approach, Mas- 
 sena on March 11 passed Feltre, and meanwhile Guyeux and 
 Serurier approached the Piave ; and next day the cavalry 
 reserve crossed to the north of Montello forest near Vidor, 
 and Guyeux to the south of it at Spesiano, reaching Conegli- 
 ano. Serurier was not far behind the cavalry reserve. Mas- 
 sena advanced to Belluno ; Bernadotte, who was in reserve, 
 reached Castelfranco. The Austrian observation parties all 
 fell back without crossing swords. Baraguay, somewhat be- 
 lated by the mountain roads, finally reached Primiero. The 
 Austrian line of retreat was along the main road and the par- 
 allel country roads towards Udine, and on March 13 the 
 archduke was nearing the Tagliamento, Guyeux having, after 
 a hearty fight, pushed HohenzoUern and the Austrian rear- 
 guard out of Sacile, and sent a force to foUow it to Pordenone. 
 
 Massena on the 13th had not moved from Belluno, but he 
 seized the defile of La Fossa up river, cut out Lusignan's 
 rearguard at Longaro, and threw this Austrian column back 
 to Cadore, a town on the Piave and near the headwaters of 
 the Tagliamento. Lusignan was taken prisoner. " M. de 
 Lusignan covered himself with opprobrium by the conduct 
 he held in Brescia towards our sick. I have ordered that he 
 should be sent to France without right to exchange," Bona- 
 
418 CONCENTRATING THE DIVISIONS. 
 
 parte wrote to Paris. Serurier and Bernadotte got respec- 
 tively to Conegliano and Treviso. Bonaparte began to believe 
 that the Austrians would stand at the Tagliamento and accept 
 battle ; but as he was unwilling to deliver one, even though 
 superior in force, until Massena had joined the main column, 
 he now ordered this general to march towards the army by 
 way of Aviano, or if this, owing to the snows or bad roads, 
 was not practicable, to join it at Sacile. From Conegliano, 
 on the evening of March 13, Berthier wrote Massena, " Though 
 the general-in-chief deems the forces which he has at this 
 moment sufficient to determine victory, he would decide to 
 retard his attack by one day, so that the brave Massena divi- 
 sion might be of the party." Massena had practically accom- 
 plished his task by driving back Lusignan and severing the 
 Austrian centre from the right in the Tyrol ; and on receipt 
 of his orders he set out for Serravalle on the 14th, while 
 Serurier marched on Porto BufEole, Guyeux and headquarters 
 assembled at Sacile, and Bernadotte got to Conegliano. 
 
 Bonaparte was thus concentrating his divisions so as to 
 mass them for a heavy blow when the time should come, and 
 this he did long before he reached the vicinity of the enemy, 
 who he was convinced would not stand until he got to the 
 Tagliamento. The Austrian rearguard reached the river on 
 the 14th of March, the main body having already crossed and 
 been posted on the line San Daniele-Codroipo-Latisana, with 
 headquarters back in Udine. Anxious to have Massena join, 
 Bonaparte sent him orders to Serravalle to march rapidly via 
 Sacile and Pordenone, and be in Cordemons by the 16th. 
 The bulk of the army advanced little : Guyeux and headquar- 
 ters to Pordenone, Serurier across the Livenza, and Berna- 
 dotte to Sacile. The Austrian rearguard was then withdrawn 
 across the Tagliamento. 
 
 From Sacile, on March 15, Bonaparte wrote Joubert two 
 
THE GENERAL SCHEME. 419 
 
 letters of military instruction, and one for civil conduct in the 
 Tyrol, which contain so much excellent matter that some 
 items in them may well be quoted. They first recite the 
 general scheme. To operate the junction of the Tyrolese and 
 Friuli divisions, the latter (his own force) were to cross the 
 Tagliamento, move up to Osopo, and seize the Pontafel pass, 
 thus opening the way to the Drave valley, while Joubert was 
 throwing the enemy back by way of Brixen, and beyond the 
 mountains on Innsbruck, so as to clear his way for an ad- 
 vance down the same river. But, said Bonaparte, first, the 
 Tyrol divisions may be beaten and forced back to Kivoli, or 
 even to the Mincio. Or, second, the enemy may move by 
 way of Feltre and Primolano into the Brenta valley to cut 
 the French communications — a difficult task. Or, third, the 
 Friuli divisions might be turned by right or left, and the 
 enemy reach the Piave or Brenta before the French could 
 come to the right-about and get there. To meet the first 
 hypothesis, Joubert was given command of all forces in the 
 Mantua country and Lombardy, in fact, of everything between 
 the Adige and the Oglio. In any case Mantua, Peschiera, 
 Legnano and Pizzighetone were to be well provisioned and 
 held by good garrisons ; Joubert was to maintain himself be- 
 tween Mantua and the Po, so as to feed himself by that river, 
 and be able to debouch on the enemy's rear, should he ad- 
 vance on Milan. Sahuguet was to concentrate and hold him- 
 self in Ferrara. Joubert was to use all means to enable the 
 Friuli divisions to fall back on him, " as I do not doubt," says 
 his chief, " that under all circumstances, you will act in a 
 manner consistent with the spirit of the war we are waging." 
 The interesting feature about this discussion is the utter 
 calm with which the leader looks at any one of these appar- 
 ently fatal occurrences. Even if Bonaparte should become 
 completely cut off from Mantua by Joubert's being pushed 
 
420 HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 back on that fortress, yet Joubert should be able, the instruc- 
 tions assume, to hold himself until Bonaparte had beaten the 
 enemy on the Tagliamento, when he would about face on the 
 force which had ventured on his communications, and in con- 
 nection with Joubert destroy it. Unlike the soldiers of his 
 day, this young and bold commander-in-chief did not look 
 on a temporary interruption of bis communications as a fatal 
 occurrence. Beat the enemy, thought he, and the communica- 
 tions will care for themselves. This is now a broad and con- 
 stant maxim ; but it was new at the time, and his chief's self- 
 confidence must have had a reassuring effect on Joubert, with 
 the heavy responsibility laid upon his untried shoulders. An- 
 other point of interest in this letter is the fact that Bonaparte 
 does not undertake to give directions to Joubert how to act 
 under all possible adverse contingencies. This has been for 
 some time recognized as 0, bad policy in a captain's instructions 
 to a distant lieutenant ; and though the rule had not been 
 formulated in his day, Bonaparte evidently saw the wisdom 
 of leaving Joubert to a certain extent untrammeled, and his 
 letter paid no further heed to the other hypotheses. He relied 
 on Joubert's initiative and discretion to do what might at the 
 time be the wisest thing, and recognized the fact that of this 
 Joubert would probably be a better judge than he. 
 
 In the second letter Bonaparte orders him to advance on 
 Botzen by the 28th, and then approves all Joubert has done 
 to procure oil and vegetables for the army. " You may be 
 persuaded that I approve in advance all you shall do to amel- 
 iorate the lot of the soldiers. While you are on the march, 
 have issued to your forces, as much as may be possible, wine 
 in the evening and brandy in the morning." 
 
 The Civil Instruction Bonaparte sent was : First, to confirm 
 all laws and keep in place all magistrates. Second, to confirm 
 the public exercise of religion. Third, to cajole the priests, 
 
SIMPLE PRECAUTIONS. 421 
 
 distinguished theologians and men of science. Fourth, to 
 speak well of the emperor, but blame his ministers. Fifth, 
 to protect all Tyroleans who have served the emperor. Sixth, 
 to see that moneys heretofore paid to the emperor shall go to 
 the army chest. Seventh, to take no money from the Monts- 
 de-Piete (the government pawnshops), nor from the village 
 treasuries, and to seek to conciliate the people. Eighth, to 
 disarm the population, take hostages from and fine the villages 
 which resist, or which murder soldiers. These were substan- 
 tially the principles he acted on in any new territory he over- 
 ran. 
 
 Although he never gave them great liberty of action, yet 
 Bonaparte insisted on his lieutenants neglecting nothing, and 
 doing their work themselves. In a circular to division generals, 
 March 14, Berthier says : — 
 
 " The general-in-chief gives you the order to betake yourselves every 
 day at four o'clock in the morning to your vanguard (outposts), to be 
 present at the report of the daybreak patrol, and thus to be equal to 
 giving your orders according to circumstances. The officer of engineers 
 and chief of artillery of your division are equally to be on hand at the 
 vanguard to receive your orders. You will also order the generals of 
 brigade to remain in camp, that is they must never have quarters more 
 than two hundred toises (a quarter mile) away. 
 
 " The division artillery park is never to be put in a town, but always near 
 and behind the division. The cannoneers and drivers are to bivouac beside 
 their pieces, the horses to be picketed, or attached to the poles of their 
 wagons. The artillery in the vanguard is never to be unhorsed, except to 
 water the horses at the hour to be indicated by the commander of the 
 vanguard." The generals were also ordered to " forbid expressly that any 
 parliamentarian should be received while troops are engaged. This is a 
 ruse the Austrians have put to use more than once, to give time to execute 
 their retreat." 
 
 Such simple precautions are all too often neglected in war. 
 On the 16th the French divisions were headed for Valva- 
 
422 CROSSING THE TAGLIAMENTO. 
 
 sone, in order to cross the Tagliamento. The archduke's 
 right now stretched from Codroipo to Torrida in a position 
 which had been well intrenched ; and Guyeux, who was ahead, 
 was destined to move on this wing, while Bernadotte, a few 
 hours behind, should manoeuvre against the Austrian left wing 
 above Latisena, and Serurier remain as reserve, in a general 
 way heading for Codroipo. Speaking of this division on the 
 march, the chief wrote : " It is assailed by horrible weather ; 
 but wind and rain, on the eve of a battle, have always been 
 for the Army of Italy a presage of fortune." The river was 
 fordable. Bonaparte sent an aide-de-camp and twenty-five 
 guides to reconnoitre up to the intrenchments. Having done 
 this, Guyeux and Bernadotte were ordered forward. The 
 light troops as skirmishers were in front, followed by the 
 grenadiers and flanked by cavalry. Each half-brigade had its 
 right and left battalion ployed into close column, the second 
 battalion between them in line. This was a common forma- 
 tion. 
 
 The crossing began about 3 P. M. ; but the Austrian com- 
 mander, not purposing to stand here to receive battle, and 
 preferring to wait for the twenty-five thousand veterans com- 
 ing from the Rhine, as a leaven for his very questionable 
 lump of troops, made only such defense as would enable his 
 army to continue its retreat, already begun, on Palmanova. 
 This place the Austrian army reached at night, with its rear- 
 guard echeloned along the highway. In the Memoirs Napo- 
 leon describes much more of a battle than the dispatches 
 written at the time and other contemporary reports and docu- 
 ments lead one to believe was fought on this river. Charles 
 had hoped to gain time here, but Bonaparte afforded him no 
 opportunity to do so. Massena had been delayed by the bad 
 mountain roads over which he had to march, and had not yet 
 reached the main army, but Bonaparte now ordered him to 
 
THE RETREAT CONTINUED. 423 
 
 come in rapidly to Spilimbergo. Had the archduke stood for 
 battle, Massena would have been much in demand ; as it was, 
 his absence did not prove of consequence. The Austrian army 
 continued its retreat on the 17th towards Gradisca, on the way 
 to Gorizia, and meanwhile Ocskay took over Lusignan's bri- 
 gade, and making a circuit by the upper Tagliamento, covered 
 the road to Villach at Chiusa Veneta, on the Fella Eiver. 
 
 It is to be noticed in this campaign that there are but few 
 roads to determine the strategic manoeuvres, the side roads, 
 where any exist, being merely complementary to the single 
 highway. In a country of broad expanses of ground and 
 many roads, minor strategic manoeuvres can be indulged in 
 on a larger and more interesting scale than here, where Bona- 
 parte was confined practically to a single line of advance 
 along which to follow up the enemy, and could indulge in 
 manoeuvring only partially, as, e. g., to force the enemy to 
 abandon his defense at any given defile or river. While 
 Charles had the poorer army, he had the easier task in 
 defending the approaches to the Austrian capital. Yet the 
 difference in the quality of the troops was marked. 
 
 It was not apparent to Bonaparte why the Austrian army 
 had marched on Palmanova, or, indeed, evident whether the 
 mass of it had really taken this southerly direction. He had 
 anticipated that the archduke would retire towards the defile 
 of Tarvis instead, this being — via Udine, Ospedaletto, Tarvis, 
 Villach, Klagenfurt — the shorter and more direct road to 
 Bruck and Vienna ; and though he was anxious to follow 
 hard on the enemy's heels, yet it consumed some time to 
 reconnoitre the road in his front and ascertain the facts. 
 These two young generals, respectively twenty-five and twenty- 
 eight years old, had gained a hearty respect each for the other, 
 on the score of the successes each had won in 1796 in Ger- 
 many and Italy. In all his campaigns Napoleon carefully 
 
424 MARKEDLY DIFFERENT TYPES. 
 
 weighed the personal equation as the most important factor 
 in his problem, and he had not at first been able to gauge 
 the archduke. Within a few days, however, he had made up 
 his mind that he had not a dangerous opponent in his front, 
 and wrote the Directory, March 25 : " Up to this hour Prince 
 Charles has manoeuvred worse than Beaulieu and Wurmser; 
 at every step he has made mistakes, and extremely gross 
 ones; these have cost him a great deal, but it would have 
 gone far worse with him had not the repute he has won in a 
 measure deceived me, and had it not prevented my convin- 
 cing myself of certain errors which I noticed, and which I sup- 
 posed to be dictated by views that in reality did not exist." 
 The two men were of types markedly different, and the French- 
 man was unquestionably the superior as a soldier ; but though 
 here unable to do his best, the Austrian held himself through 
 life a worthy prince of men, and won for himself in future 
 years a high military reputation. Bonaparte's slur is scarcely 
 warranted. Just what had induced Charles to give up the 
 direct road as a first purpose, we do not know, as he shortly 
 reverted to it for a part of his forces. It may have been a 
 rumor of Massena's march on Tarvis, which he feared might 
 anticipate his own, and the path there was readily barred. 
 Yet there was time and to spare for a light column to reach 
 the defile and hold it for the Austrians; indeed, this had 
 already been done from Vienna ; and the march via Gorizia 
 was an eccentric one. 
 
 Some days before, Charles had entertained a purpose of 
 advancing a column down the Fella valley, so as to threaten 
 the French left in its advance on Palmanova, but Massena's 
 smart advance up the same valley had anticipated his plan. 
 The archduke was not now dealing with a general who, like 
 Moreau and Jourdan, would pause after every step ; he was 
 facing the most rapid captain of modern days, and that with 
 
HOME AUTHORITIES REMINDED. 425 
 
 a force inferior in numbers and morale. All the factors ex- 
 cept terrain were against him. 
 
 On his side Bonaparte was beginning to appreciate both 
 the value and the growing insecurity of his position. On 
 March 17 he wrote the Directory: "If the armies of the 
 Rhine cross promptly and enter the lists, the emperor is lost. 
 . . . But if you let me be overwhelmed, I shall have no other 
 resource than to fall back to Italy, and all will be lost." He 
 never ceased to remind the home authorities of the coopera- 
 tion they had promised him. 
 
 On March 25 he wrote to Carnot : " Has the Rhine been passed ? It 
 is clear that in four or five days from now, when my movements will be 
 unmasked, and when the enemy will feel the danger in which he finds 
 himself, he will abandon nearly everything on the Rhine to fall upon me. 
 If Moreau does not then march at double speed ou the enemy, so as to 
 push him and be able to reach him as soon as possible, I shall be beaten 
 and obliged to return to Italy." In a dispatch to the Directory of April 1 
 he said : " The army has not yet sustained much loss, and is in the best 
 condition. If I had had twenty thousand men more, I would not have 
 been obliged to wait for the passage of the Rhine, and the army would 
 have entered Vienna almost as if traveling by post : a thing which would 
 have so much astonished this great nation that I would have had nothing 
 to fear from the different assemblages which they are making to-day." 
 On April 5 he wrote to the Directory : " I have not yet news as to 
 whether the Rhine is crossed. I presume, nevertheless, that at this hour 
 Moreau is marching at great speed to prevent the Austrians from all fall- 
 ing on me." And on April 8 : " Our armies have not yet passed the 
 Rhine, and we are already within one hundred miles of Vienna. The 
 Army of Italy is then alone exposed to the efforts of one of the first 
 powers of Europe. The Venetians are arming all their peasants, putting 
 all their priests under arms, and are shaking with fury all the springs of 
 their old government to crush Bergamo and Brescia. The Venetian gov- 
 ernment at this moment has twenty thousand armed men on my rear." 
 
 Eetiring, then, behind the Isonzo to Gorizia on March 18, 
 Charles took up a position east of the town, and in accord- 
 
426 GRADISCA TAKEN. 
 
 ance with orders of the evening previous, Bernadotte started 
 at early dawn of the same day and reached Palmanova, fol- 
 lowed by Serurier and later Guyeux ; while Massena filed off 
 by way of San Daniele and Osopo to seize Chiusa Veneta (or 
 Venzone) and the entrance of the Pontafel pass, through 
 which flows the Fella River. The Isonzo, down to Gorizia, 
 runs through a deep valley with few and difficult outlets — for 
 an army practically none. At one moment Bonaparte held 
 the idea that the Austrian army might retire up this river, 
 and that, by manoeuvring with such speed as to seize the 
 lower and upper ends of the river defile, he could prepare for 
 the archduke another Caudine Forks. Massena in the Tarvis 
 region, and Bonaparte, if he covdd reach the left flank of the 
 enemy near Gorizia, might accomplish this end. But the 
 enemy kept too much in advance for the French to manoeuvre 
 him into the trap. Nor had the archduke harbored any idea 
 of engaging battle until the Rhine troops should have arrived, 
 though Bonaparte did not know it. Thus the French chief- 
 tain was disappointed in both his anticipations. Palmanova, 
 evacuated by the Austrians, was occupied March 18, and the 
 French army occupied the right bank of the Torre, which 
 next morning was crossed. On this same day Bonaparte sent 
 orders to Joubert to advance on Brixen. 
 
 Bernadotte now led the column, Bonaparte accompanying 
 him, and moved unopposed to near Gradisca ; after crossing 
 the Torre, Serurier marched to Villesse ; the two divisions 
 then advanced on Gradisca March 19, and surrounding the 
 town, Bernadotte in front and Serurier taking it in reverse 
 by crossing the river at San Pietro after a somewhat pro- 
 longed combat, compelled its surrender that evening. 
 
 As the Austrian commander expected to find his reinforce- 
 ments at Villach, he remained of a mind to fall back on these, 
 and continued his retreat on the evening of the 19th. Per- 
 
OPEN TO DISASTER. 427 
 
 sonally he hurried to Villach to direct movements to hold the 
 Tarvis defile. His army he now divided into two columns, 
 the larger to march by way of Laybach and Krainzburg on 
 the Tarvis pass, which it would thus approach from the rear ; 
 and the lesser, under Bayalich, towards the same point by the 
 roads up the Isonzo River. This last column was followed by 
 the most of the artillery and train. Perhaps the archduke 
 feared to lose his hold on the Caporetto road, or he hoped to 
 expedite his march by sending his army along the two roads ; 
 and both columns were indeed heading for the same goal; 
 but in case of delay, which would enable the French to attack 
 his Isonzo column, he laid himself open to disaster. Either 
 this was a safe and shorter route for the whole column, or 
 it should not be selected for part of it. 
 
 Massena had made some forced marches and thereby re- 
 paired his early delay. He was, moreover, thoroughly at home 
 in mountain warfare. On the 19th he had entered the Pon- 
 tafel pass, and taken by storm the Casasola bridge, which is 
 one of the strong points in the pass, throwing back the weak 
 Austrian detachment up the Fella. On the 20th the main 
 French column pushed its way up the Isonzo to Gorizia, Se- 
 rurier on the left bank, Bernadotte on the right, while Guy- 
 eux followed an Austrian flanking column on Cormons ; but 
 learning that a substantial part of the Austrian army had 
 retired by way of Laybach, Bonaparte altered Bernadotte's 
 direction, March 21, to one towards Czernitza, and this gen- 
 eral, forging ahead, soon got into touch with the enemy's rear. 
 This same March 21 Guyeux advanced to Cividale, and Seru- 
 rier kept on up the river. And meanwhile Massena had, on 
 the 20th, by hard marching, pushed through Pontafel and 
 with his head of column reached Tarvis, and driven the Aus- 
 rian detachment, which under Ocskay was defending the 
 pass, sharply back to Wurzen. On the 21st, then, Massena 
 
428 AT AND ABOUT TARVIS. 
 
 was at and near Tarvis, and Bayalich's column was labori- 
 ously making its way up the Isonzo from Caporetto on the 
 same point, reaching Predil. Learning here that the French 
 were already at Tarvis, the Austrians determined to cut their 
 way through, and to help in this, the detachment which Mas- 
 sena threw out of Tarvis was ordered to turn back again from 
 Wurzen and join in the attack. 
 
 As a matter of fact, Massena had not yet got forward 
 a force sufficiently large to hold the Tarvis pass, and on 
 March 22 the Austrians under Gontreuil were able by a gal- 
 lant assault to retake the place, Massena's detachment falling 
 back on the main body at Malborghetto. At Tarvis the 
 Austrians concentrated all near-by forces, and sent a detach- 
 ment out to Seifnitz to hold head against Massena, and an- 
 other into the Predil pass to keep open the Flitschler-Klause 
 for Bayalich's column. Meanwhile, after driving an Austrian 
 detachment out of Stupizza, Guyeux had reached Caporetto. 
 Serurier's division (now under Chabot, Serurier being sick) 
 was acting as general reserve. He had at first been ordered 
 to follow on after Bernadotte ; but was withdrawn before 
 reaching Czernitza, and held as reserve to the Isonzo column. 
 
 At and about Tarvis is a network of defiles, on the sum- 
 mit of the Noric Alps. Running east and west is the Tarvis 
 defile, which Massena had approached up the Fella valley ; 
 and running south from Tarvis is the Predil defile at the head- 
 waters of the Isonzo, up through which Bayalich was striving 
 to save the Austrian train. This latter pass was shut at the 
 lower end by the Chiusa di Plotz. 
 
 After his van had been driven out of Tarvis, Massena 
 shortly recovered himself, again advanced on Seifnitz and 
 Tarvis, took both places after a stubborn fight, in which Brune 
 especially distinguished himself, and forced his way down to 
 Raibl in the Predil pass ; and meanwhile Guyeux had sharply 
 
THE AUSTRIANS TRAPPED. 429 
 
 followed Bayalich. At the south gate of the pass Guyeux 
 found himself suddenly checked by Kbblos, but he cleverly 
 turned this officer's position by scaling the heights and cap- 
 turing the castle which dominated the entrance of the defile, 
 and captured Koblos' brigade almost in entirety. Bayalich 
 and the Austrian train were now shut in between Guyeux, 
 sustained by Serurier, at the southern gate, and Massena, who 
 had got to Raibl in the upper part of the pass. Thus trapped, 
 the Austrians could not even consider resistance, and after a 
 short parley they surrendered four general officers, four thou- 
 sand men, twenty-five guns and over four hundred wagons. 
 " A great number of men had been killed, wounded or taken 
 in the different combats since the Tagliamento, and others, in 
 great number, natives of Carniola or Croatia, seeing everything 
 lost, had disbanded in the gorges to regain alone their villages." 
 The Austrian total had not been large enough to cope with the 
 force assembled by the French. During this active work at 
 Tarvis, which accomplished in a small way what Bonaparte 
 had hoped to inflict on the whole Austrian army, Bernadotte 
 pushed on as far as Prevald, and on the 25th reached Lay- 
 bach. 
 
 A small part of the expected reinforcements had reached 
 Villach, and on this body the Austrian detachment beaten at 
 Tarvis fell back ; the archduke proposed to concentrate his 
 army in Klagenfurt, the apex of the two highways along 
 which the French were advancing. On the French side, 
 Guyeux and Massena advanced March 28 on Villach, which 
 was vacated by the Austrians ; and here the army paused 
 until Bonaparte could hear from the Tyrol. 
 
 Joubert had during all this time been far from idle. He 
 had opposed to him Kerpen with the larger part of the Aus- 
 trian forces, while a detachment under Laudon was in the 
 Nos valley to protect western Tyrol. So soon as he heard 
 
430 UP THE EISACH VALLEY. 
 
 from his chief that the main army had reached the Taglia- 
 niento, he broke up March 20, and crossed the Avisio, his 
 main body at Lavis, and a turning column at Segonzano. His 
 left thus imperiled, Kerpen retired, — after a lively combat, 
 but scarcely losing two thousand men killed, as the Memoirs 
 report, nor three thousand prisoners, — and was rejoined by 
 Laudon from the Nos valley. The enemy does not appear to 
 have been alert ; Joubert surprised them at every turn, and 
 on the 21st threw them back towards Neumarkt with loss of 
 many prisoners, himself moving to Salurn. Thence following 
 them up, on the 22d Joubert reached Botzen, where he ascer- 
 tained that a column of eight thousand men under Kerpen 
 had retired up the Eisach valley on Brixen, while the Aus- 
 trian right wing under Laudon, the roads being crowded and 
 the Austrians scarcely guessing the French intention, had 
 marched up the Adige on Meran. Leaving Delmas behind 
 at Botzen to protect Hs left and to secure the road back to 
 his base, Joubert followed up the column which had moved up 
 the Eisach valley. 
 
 Baraguay d'Hilliers had got back from Primiero, and with 
 his five thousand men took post at Botzen, and later followed 
 Joubert. A detachment was sent up the Adige to Terlan, and 
 Joubert moved on Kerpen at Clausen, where the Austrian 
 general had taken up a strong position, his left leaning on the 
 Eisach, and the right on steep hills. Joubert's first attack 
 on the 24th was repulsed ; but his light foot scaled the hills, 
 turned Kerpen's right, and a fresh assault proving success- 
 ful, the Austrians retired through Brixen to Mittenwalde. 
 The French then entered Brixen, where they seized the big 
 magazines amassed by the enemy for the Tyrol campaign. 
 Next day again the Austrians were pushed towards Sterzing. 
 They had left fifteen hundred men at Miihlbach to hold the 
 entrance to the Pusterthal ; but these were captured on the 
 
THE ROOT OF THE EVIL. 431 
 
 26th. Having no late news from his chief, Joubert sat down 
 at Brixen to wait for orders. 
 
 On the 29th' Laudon, who had remained on the Adige, 
 attacked the French left behind at Botzen. These fended off 
 the onset ; but when it was renewed April 2 and 3, Baraguay 
 was sent back to aid in holding the river. Still, though 
 Laudon managed to get possession of the bridge-head at Neu- 
 markt, Joubert, on hearing from Bonaparte of his victories, 
 determined to risk any mischief Laudon could do, and started, 
 as ordered, via Bruneck, Toblach, Lienz and Sachsenburg 
 to Spithal. Laudon followed Joubert to Brixen, and then 
 returned to Botzen April 7. Kerpen kept slowly on after 
 Joubert. 
 
 During these days, in the Army of Italy, repeated orders had to be is- 
 sued against pillaging ; and women seemed to be largely at the root of 
 the evil. On March 28 it was " expressly forbidden to the half-brigades 
 to have in their suite more women than the law allows them as washer- 
 women. The chiefs of half-brigades are held to send the names of the 
 washerwomen of their half-brigade to the chief of staff, and he will have 
 sent to each of them a pass signed by himself. They will be consequently 
 authorized to wear the badge. Every woman who shall be found in the 
 suite of the army without being authorized shall receive public correction, 
 shall be chased out of the army, and sent under guard two marches to the 
 rear." 
 
 In an Order of the Day of April 5 all officers were forbidden to have 
 their wives follow the army, and five days were given them to send them 
 away under pain of cashiering. Again, on April 17, it was ordered : 
 " All women who are not authorized by the Council of Administration are 
 held to leave the division in twenty-four hours ; failing which they shall 
 be arrested by the chiefs of battalion, smudged with black, and exposed 
 two hours in the public square. The general-in-chief is informed that the 
 disorders which are committed are excited by these abominable women, 
 who urge the soldiers to pillage." 
 
XVI. 
 
 LEOBEN. MARCH TO MAY, 1797. 
 
 Bt the end of March Charles had reached Klag'enfurt. His forces had 
 melted. Bonaparte followed him up sharply, and March 31 wrote him a letter 
 deprecating the war. Charles made » good retreat, feeling that if he was to 
 fight a battle, he had better do this near the gates of Vienna, where he would 
 be in force. He was growing strategically stronger as Bonaparte was growing 
 weaker. While the apparent gain was on the side of the French, yet their 
 position was questionable, their line of operation being so long. On April 5 
 Bonaparte was relieved by the arrival of Austrian plenipotentiaries to treat for 
 peace. This was the answer to his letter, and he was wise as well as glad to 
 conclude the truce of Leoben. His advanced position was extra-hazardous. 
 Austria gave up more than France could reasonably expect, and Bonaparte had 
 properly sealed his brilliant march from the Var to within eighty miles of 
 Vienna. He was now the most noted man in Europe. Moreau and Hoebe on 
 the Rhine were slow in advancing so as to sustain the forward march of Bona- 
 parte. Finally in April Hoche crossed at Keuwied and pushed the enemy back 
 to the Main, and Moreau crossed at Kehl. But the truce of Leoben stopped 
 their operations. The terms of this truce were eventually embodied in the 
 Peace of Campo Formio. Austria ceded Belgium to France. A Congress was 
 assembled at Bastadt to determine on universal peace. Austria received Venice. 
 The Rhine was the French frontier. France now interfered in the affairs of 
 Switzerland, which would have been more useful to her as a neutral power, and 
 seized some of the treasuries of the Swiss cantons. Bonaparte returned to Paris 
 in triumph, but the time was not ripe for him there, and he determined on an 
 expedition to Egypt. 
 
 Bt the 28th of March the archduke had assembled thirteen 
 thousand men at Klagenfurt, with a body of five thousand 
 men still at Laybach on the Save. By just what means, 
 shrinkage and attrition, garrisons, detachments or otherwise, 
 his forces had so much dwindled, there is no record to show. 
 But beaten armies melt fast. He had learned of the events 
 
THE WAR DEPRECATED. 433 
 
 in the Tyrol. In front of him at Villach stood Guyeux and 
 Massena, and Chabot was coming up. From near Laybach 
 Bernadotte had sent the reserve cavalry as a flying corps to 
 Trieste, to glean news, and to collect any stores useful to the 
 army ; and his advance was a threat to the Austrian left. On 
 the 29th Bonaparte advanced on Klagenfurt, and driving in 
 the outlying Austrian detachments, entered the town, the 
 archduke retiring upon St. Veit, where his first Ehine rein- 
 forcements reported. But he was still as inferior in numbers 
 as his army was in morale. 
 
 Having passed the Drave, the Army of Italy " was in Ger- 
 many. The language, the manners, the climate, the soil, cul- 
 tivation, everything, contrasted with Italy. It praised the 
 hospitality of the peasants and their good nature. The abun- 
 dance of vegetables, the great quantity of wagons and horses 
 were very useful to it, having found in Italy only wagons 
 hauled by oxen, the slow and inconvenient service of which 
 accorded ill with French vivacity." 
 
 Bonaparte here issued a proclamation to the inhabitants 
 of Carinthia, Camiola and Istria, in French, German and 
 Italian, which the Memoirs say had a good effect. 
 
 On March 31 Bonaparte addressed a letter to Charles, as to 
 a brother soldier, suggesting that nothing could further justify 
 the struggle. 
 
 Headquabtebs, KiiAGENFCBT, 11 Germinal, Year V. 
 To Prince Charles, commanding the Austrian Army. 
 
 Monsieur le G^n^ral-en-Chef : Brave soldiers make war and desire peace. 
 Has not this one lasted six years ? Have we killed enough men and in- 
 flicted enough evils on sad humanity ? This implores from every side. 
 Europe, which had taken up arms against the French Repuhlic, has laid 
 them aside. Your nation alone remains, and yet blood is about to flow 
 more than ever. This sixth campaign is ushered in by sinister forebod- 
 ings ; whatever its result, we shall kill on either side some thousands 
 more of men, and yet we must end by some agreement, for everything 
 has a term, even hateful passions. 
 
434 CORRESPONDENCE WITH CHARLES. 
 
 The Executive Directory of the French Republic has notified H. M. 
 the Emperor of its desire to end the war which is desolating the two peo- 
 ples ; the intervention of the court of London opposed this. Is there then 
 no hope of an agreement between us, and must we, for the interest or the 
 passions of a nation foreign to the evils of this war, continue to cut each 
 other's throats ? You, Monsieur le G^n^ral-en-Chef, who by your birth 
 approach so near the throne and are above all the little passions which 
 often animate ministers and governments, are you decided to merit the 
 title of Benefactor of all humanity and of Saviour of Germany ? Do not 
 suppose, Monsieur le G^n^ral-eu-Chef, that I understand by this that it 
 may not be possible for you to save her by force of arms ; but in the sup- 
 position that the chances of war should become favorable to you, Ger- 
 many would none the less be ravaged. As to me. Monsieur le G^n^ral- 
 en-Chef, if the overture that I have the honor to make to you can save 
 the life of a single man, I shall esteem myself more proud of the civil 
 crown that I shall find myself to have merited, than of the sad glory 
 which can come from military successes. I beg you to believe. Monsieur 
 le G^n^ral-en-Chef, in the sentiments of esteem and of distinguished con- 
 sideration, with which I am, etc. Bonaparte. 
 
 The archduke replied that he had no power to treat, but that 
 he equally desired to end the calamities of the war ; and that 
 he would forward the communication to Vienna. 
 
 " Assuredly," said he, " while waging war, Monsieur le G^n^ral-en- 
 Chef, and in following the vocation of honor and of duty, I desire, as 
 do you, peace for the happiness of the peoples and humanity. As, never- 
 theless, in the post which is confided to me, it does not belong to me to 
 scrutinize nor to terminate the quarrel of belligerent nations, and as I am 
 not furnished by H. M. the Emperor with power to treat, you will find it 
 natural. Monsieur le G^n^ral, that I enter on the subject with you into no 
 negotiation, and that I await superior orders with regard to so important 
 a matter, which is not fundamentally within my province. Whatever 
 may be, however, the future chances of war or the hopes of peace, I beg 
 you to persuade yourself. Monsieur le Gdn^ral, of my esteem and of my 
 distinguished consideration." 
 
 On the same day Bonaparte addressed another dispatch to 
 the archduke, protesting against Austrian sick and wounded 
 
THE DIRNSTEIN GORGE. 435 
 
 being left at Klagenf urt, while the depots of grain had all been 
 destroyed. " This conduct is contrary to the rights of war," 
 said he. In the dispatch it is suggested that, when invalided 
 soldiers of the enemy are left behind to be cared for by the 
 victor, the grain-stores should not be set afire. 
 
 On March 30 Bonaparte remained in situ to hear from 
 Joubert and Bernadotte, and to let Chabot get his division up. 
 During the last day of the month the main column advanced 
 on St. Veit, and Bernadotte on Laybach. Both bodies of 
 Austrians fell back. This was again the case next day when 
 Massena advanced on the archduke's position behind the Gurk. 
 Charles, not strong enough to fight a battle, withdrew beyond 
 Freisach, which the French then entered. On the 2d of 
 April Bonaparte reached the Austrian rearguard, and Mas- 
 sena forced the Dirnstein gorge. 
 
 " Prince Charles was compelled to bring back from his main body his 
 eight battalions of grenadiers," reported Bonaparte, "the same which 
 took Kehl, and who are at this moment the hope of the Austrian army ; 
 but the 2d Light Infantry, which has distinguished itself since its arrival in 
 the army by its courage, stayed not its movement a single moment, threw 
 itself on the right and left flanks, while General Massena, to sweep the 
 gorge, was forming column of the 18th and 32d of the line. The combat 
 was engaged with fury ; it was the elite of the Austrian army which came 
 to fight against our old soldiers of the Army of Italy. The enemy had a 
 superb position, which he had made fairly bristling with guns ; but it only 
 retarded a little the defeat of his rearguard. The enemy's grenadiers 
 were put into complete rout, left the battlefield covered with dead and 
 five or six hundred prisoners." 
 
 Massena followed, and dealt the enemy another severe blow 
 at Neumarkt and Hundsmarkt. It was at these three places 
 that the Rhine troops were first put into action. The French 
 reached Neumarkt at night, and from here Bernadotte was 
 ordered forward to the main column by forced marches. 
 
 Every day brought the archduke closer to his own capital, 
 
436 THE TRUE OBJECTIVE. 
 
 and that the Vienna authorities did not furnish him with more 
 troops can only be explained on the theory that the Aulic 
 Council preferred, if the Austrians were to fight a battle to 
 save the city, to have it come about nearer the walls, where 
 every man could be put in, and where -the French would of 
 necessity be weakened by their excessive marches, and mark- 
 edly endangered by their long communications. To Bona- 
 parte Vienna must have loomed up as a splendid goal ; but 
 before he could call it won, the army in his front must be 
 thoroughly beaten. Charles' retreat was daily making the 
 French situation more difficult. Still Bonaparte never forgot 
 that the enemy's army was the true objective, and that all other 
 matters were subsidiary to beating this. A victory cures a 
 multitude of errors and covers a multitude of risks. 
 
 With regard to Joubert, Bonaparte was still in doubt. 
 From Freisach, April 3, he wrote him that for the moment the 
 French had not gained enough, nor were they near enough 
 Vienna, to make it certain that the Austrians might not yet 
 resume the offensive in the Tyrol ; that in a couple of days 
 things would clear up ; and that while he might perhaps order 
 him in to the main body, he need go to no trouble to do more 
 than keep open the road by the Drave valley. Almost imme- 
 diately after, he was ordered to march to a junction with the 
 army. 
 
 The Austrians arrested their backward movement only to 
 ease the troops, continuing the retreat during the night of 
 April 2-3 ; and the archduke had already instructed the Lay- 
 bach detachment to move rapidly up to Bruck via Marburg 
 and Gratz. Bonaparte was still illustrating the value of his 
 mass theory. Though by calling in Bernadotte he had now 
 opened the road to his rear, by this same way of Gratz, Lay- 
 bach, Palmanova, Treviso, yet so long as he seriously threat- 
 ened the Austrian army by his own massed corps, the enemy 
 
THE TRUCE OF LEOBEN. 437 
 
 could not wisely take advantage of the opening, unless 
 commanded by a man of equal skill and boldness with the 
 French commander-in-chief, and well equipped with men 
 and material. This is a risk common to almost all strategic 
 manoeuvres. 
 
 A rumor having come in that the column from the Tyrol 
 army which, under Kerpen, had been cut off by Joubert, was 
 marching to join the archduke by the valleys of the Salza 
 and the Muhr, Bonaparte was anxious not only to pursue the 
 retiring Austrians, but hopeful of intercepting this stray 
 force ; and with this additional incentive, on the 3d of April, 
 at early dawn, the tireless advance again began. The report 
 as to Kerpen's column turned out to be an error, but the pur- 
 suit of the Austrians was not relaxed. Thus pushed, the arch- 
 duke retired yet farther, and by the 6th reached Bruck, with 
 rearguard in Leoben. The French army entered Judenburg 
 April 5, and here, to Bonaparte's intense relief, there came 
 to the French headquarters Generals Bellegarde and Meer- 
 feldt as plenipotentiaries from Vienna, prepared to treat for 
 peace. Bonaparte's letter to the archduke had been sent to 
 the capital, with this much-to-be-desired result. 
 
 On the 6fch Bernadotte had reached Neumarkt, where his 
 advance was checked by Bonaparte. Guyeux had marched 
 forward on Bruck, while Massena had pushed on and taken 
 Leoben the evening of the same day. Serurier was at Gratz, 
 and Joubert, receiving in Brixen his instructions from Bona- 
 parte, had drawn in Delmas, started along the Puster valley 
 on his way down the Drave, and his van was on this day in 
 Lienz. Next day, April 7, a five days' truce was granted, and 
 on April 18 preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben. 
 These served as a basis for the treaty of Campo Formio. 
 
 During the truce, the line of demarcation ran from the sea 
 between Fiume and Trieste, via Littay, Wiindisch-Feistritz, 
 
438 NOT ON A SOLID BASIS. 
 
 Marburg, Ehrenhausen, Gratz, Bruck, Leoben, Mautern, 
 Rotteumann, Radstadt, St. Michael, Spithal, Lienz. 
 
 The French army shortly started ou its return march to 
 Venetian territory. In due season the news of the truce of 
 Leoben reached Joubert, and hostilities were suspended. It 
 was time, for Laudon had driven back Baraguay and the 
 French troops, and followed them down the Adige to Rove- 
 redo, and had even pushed a detachment along the left bank 
 towards Verona. 
 
 It was just four weeks since the last campaign had opened ; 
 it was just a year since Bonaparte had moved on Beaulieu 
 from the shore of the Gulf of Genoa, and he now stood within 
 some eighty miles of Vienna. One can point to few opera- 
 tions as brilliant as this rapid march with a quite small force 
 had been, with its contempt of danger and its many victories ; 
 but the apparent success was not founded on a truly solid 
 basis. Bonaparte could not safely advance farther. His 
 numbers were distinctly insufficient for a serious campaign 
 against Vienna. A battle with all the forces the enemy 
 could muster at the gates of the capital would be extra-haz- 
 ardous. Counting in Joubert and Bernadotte, the Army of 
 Italy again numbered nearly fifty thousand men under the 
 colors ; but Austrian troops were coming on from Hungary 
 to Vienna, and for every step back the archduke would 
 grow in numerical strength ; and the determination to save 
 the chief city of the country would be universal. The two 
 Rhine armies Bonaparte now learned were still on the left 
 bank in cantonments, accomplishing so little good in the 
 general scheme that he was excusable in suspecting that 
 his enemies at home were striving to isolate the Army of 
 Italy, and destroy it and his reputation at one fell stroke. 
 He could not advance alone into the valley of the Danube. 
 The French communications were already threatened by the 
 
INSURRECTION IN VERONA. 439 
 
 regulars and militia under Laudon and Kerpen in the Tyrol, 
 as has just been stated ; and the Tyrolese sharpshooter, in- 
 flamed by religious hatred of the French, might prove an effi- 
 cient auxiliary in a winning campaign. Not only had a 
 column advanced down the Brenta and reached Bassano, 
 while another was headed for Verona, but the latter city in- 
 deed had risen and murdered the French inhabitants, and 
 driven the garrison of three thousand men under BaUand 
 
 General Bonaparte. 
 By d' Angers. 
 
 into the citadel, where they were being besieged. Trieste had 
 risen and ousted the French cavalry. Luckily Victor was 
 still on hand, and able to assemble fifteen thousand men to 
 hold Venice within bounds ; and joined by Kilmaine and 
 some men from the garrison of the Italian cities, he shortly 
 put down the insurrection in Verona. But in reality, Bona- 
 parte, for all his proud bearing, stood on a volcano. 
 
 Under these circumstances, by cunningly taking advantage 
 
440 DIPLOMATIC QUALITIES. 
 
 of the temporary weakening of the Austrian authorities, and 
 by the exertion of that marvelous power which in any other 
 man we should call bullying, the victorious leader was fortu- 
 nate to sign preliminaries of peace at Leoben, to which place 
 he had moved headquarters. In the negotiations to this end 
 he exhibited as marked a capacity for diplomacy as he had 
 shown for war, and not only made his situation appear sound, 
 but bore down all opposition to the terms he formulated. 
 " The Austrian plenipotentiaries," say the Memoirs, " had 
 thought to do an agreeable thing in placing for first article 
 that the emperor recognized the French Republic. ' Erase 
 that,' said Napoleon ; ' the Republic is like the sun, which 
 shines of its own light ; the blind alone see it not ! ' In effect, 
 this recognition was harmful, because, if one day the French 
 people chose to make a monarchy, the emperor could say that 
 he had acknowledged the Republic." 
 
 On April 19 Bonaparte thus sums up the situation to the 
 Directory : — 
 
 . . . "Moreover, we mast not hide from ourselves that, though our 
 military position is brilliant, we have not dictated the conditions. The 
 court had already evacuated Vienna ; Prince Charles and his army were 
 falling back on the army of the Rhine ; the people of Hungary . . . 
 were rising in mass, and were already on our flanks ; the Rhine had not 
 been crossed. . . . Had they been foolish enough to await me, I should 
 have beaten them ; but they would have constantly retired, would have 
 joined the Rhine forces and overwhelmed me. ... I had determined 
 to levy a contribution in the faubourgs of Vienna, and not take a step 
 beyond. . . . Had I, at the opening of the campaign, insisted on going 
 to Turin, I should have never crossed the Po ; had I insisted on going to 
 Rome, I should have lost Milan ; had I insisted on marching to Vienna, I 
 might have lost the Republic. The real plan of campaign to destroy the 
 emperor is what I have done. ... So soon as I saw that negotiations 
 would seriously open, I sent a courier to General Clarke, who, charged 
 more particularly with your instructions in an object so essential, would 
 have acquitted himself better than I ; but when after ten days I saw that 
 
THE ART OF WAR. 441 
 
 he did not arrive, and that the moment began to pass, I had to drop all 
 scruples, and I signed " (the preliminaries). « Ton have given me full 
 power in all diplomatic operations, and in the position of things, the pre- 
 liminaries of peace, even with the emperor, had become a military opera- 
 tion." . . . 
 
 In the opening of this remarkable campaign from Nice to 
 Leoben, Bonaparte had by his operations enunciated and 
 proved the value of the mass theory. In the operation from 
 the Mincio eastward, he had apparently put aside the mass 
 theory, and had divided his forces. This has led to the ex- 
 pression of opinion by some historians that Bonaparte did 
 not believe in or act on his own maxims, that every campaign 
 must open up a new theory of action, and that after all no- 
 thing can ever be done by rule. This is in only a narrow sense 
 true. Napoleon wrote to the king of Spain in September, 1808, 
 " The art of war is an art which has principles which it is 
 never permitted to break ; " and at St. Helena he truly said, 
 "AU great captains of antiquity, and those who later have 
 most worthily trodden in their footsteps, have only accom- 
 plished great results by adhering closely to the rules and the 
 natural principles of the art ; " and, " The principles of the art 
 of war are those which have led the great captains whose 
 deeds history tells us of." As a fact, no one adhered more 
 fully to his theory of war than Napoleon ; but he knew when 
 to make exceptions, and when to gauge his operations by the 
 character of his opponent. And if we study the situation, 
 we readily see, as has been already explained, that the send- 
 ing of Joubert up the Adige and down the Drave, while 
 he marched east with the main body, was not a division of 
 forces, but a scrupulous care for his base. Joubert was fend- 
 ing off from it the Tyrol army. 
 
 It remains true that few captains have ever utilized so con- 
 stantly as did Napoleon the rules he had evolved from his 
 
442 A MAN OF GENIUS. 
 
 study of history, and from the experience he gained in his own 
 campaigns. But it must be remembered that, as Frederick 
 was the first general who wrote down what he practiced in 
 war, so it was Jomini who first put in print the principles on 
 which Napoleon had acted, and which the great man himself 
 jealously guarded as his own. Military critics are wont to 
 forget that Napoleon's able generalship was the result of his 
 study of the campaigns of the other great soldiers in the past, 
 and of his natural acuteness in evolving the secret of their 
 methods, and in again putting their principles into practice. 
 As his theatre grew in extent, he improved his general stra- 
 tegic scheme ; and as he never doubted that in force and 
 intelligence he was quite able to cope with any opponent he 
 met, so occasionally he allowed himself to vary from his max- 
 ims according as the conditions varied, because he could fore- 
 see that in the particular case in hand his opponent would 
 be unable to take advantage of the variation, and because it 
 was safe and convenient to do so. There were, however, for 
 Napoleon certain constant rules which he never forgot with- 
 out suffering the consequences, and which a lesser captain 
 would violate at his peril. 
 
 What especially strikes the student of the 1796-97 cam- 
 paign is the wonderful personality of the young commander. 
 In his report to the Directory from Milan, December 7, 1796, 
 General Clarke, then Chief of the Topographical Bureau in 
 the Ministry of War, and later Due de Feltre, visiting the 
 army to represent the Directory, and to inspect the conduct 
 of the military chiefs and the civil commissaries, says : — 
 
 " The general-in-chief has rendered the most important services. 
 Placed by you in the glorious position he occupies, he has shown himself 
 worthy of it. He is the man of the Republic. The fate of Italy has 
 several times depended on his learned combinations. There is nobody 
 here who does not look upon him as a man of genius, and he is efiectively 
 
CONTEMPORARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 443 
 
 Clarke. 
 
 that. He is feared, loved and respected in Italy. All the little means 
 of intrigue fall before his penetration. He has a great ascendant on the 
 individuals who compose the Republican army, because he guesses or 
 conceives at once their thought or their character, and that he directs 
 them with science on the point where they 
 can be most useful. A healthy judgment, 
 enlightened ideas, put hira abreast of dis- 
 tinguishing the true from the false. His 
 coup d'ceil is sure. His resolutions are 
 followed up with energy and vigor. His 
 sang-froid in the liveliest affairs is as re- 
 markable as his extreme promptitude in 
 changing his plans, when unforeseen cir- 
 cumstances demand it. His manner of 
 execution is learned and well calculated. 
 Bonaparte can bear himself with success 
 in more than one career. His superior 
 
 talents and his knowledge give hira the means. I believe him attached 
 to the Republic, and without other ambition than that of conserving the 
 glory he has acquired. It would be a mistake to believe him to be a party 
 man. He belongs neither to the Royalists, who calumniate him, nor to the 
 anarchists, whom he loves not. The Constitution is his only guide. And 
 rallying on it and on the Directors who desire it, I believe he will be always 
 useful and never dangerous to his country. Do not think, Citizen Direc- 
 tors, that I am speaking of him from enthusiasm. It is with calm that I 
 write, and no interest guides me except that of making you know the truth. 
 Bonaparte will be put by posterity in the rank of the greatest men." 
 
 All contemporary evidence is to this same effect. Nor was 
 Bonaparte lacking in the amenities of life. Harsh and domi- 
 neering in everything relating to the service, yet his compan- 
 ions testify to his kindly side, and to the marvelous fascina- 
 tion of his society. He had his favorites, — indeed, in a sense, 
 there was far too much favoritism, both in his armies and 
 his government ; he kept unworthy relatives, utterly lacking 
 ability, in important posts ; and it was often claimed that he 
 recognized moderate services in his dispatches home, and said 
 no word about more important ones rendered by those he did 
 
444 LACK OF EQUIPMENT. 
 
 not like, or by those who had once offended him. But this, a 
 merely human weakness, is to be found in every great man's 
 surroundings, and it was in part due to the wonderful indi- 
 viduality he threw into his creation. His work was truly 
 original. Casting aside the narrowness of the old method, he 
 wrought on his own lines. His leading idea was expressed 
 by Bourrienne : " The art of war consists in having, with a 
 smaller army, more men than the enemy at the point you 
 attack, or at the point where you are attacked." This is a 
 clear definition of the mass theory, and one on which he uni- 
 formly acted. But to do this thing, which a few simple words 
 can describe, requires genius. 
 
 After Archduke Charles had himself gone to Italy, and 
 reinforcements had been forwarded to the Noric Alps to stay 
 the progress of Bonaparte, there remained on the Upper 
 Rhine a bare forty thousand men under Latour, and on the 
 Lower Rhine twenty-five thousand under Werneck, with some 
 considerable numbers eaten up in garrisons. Facing these 
 forces were respectively Moreau with sixty thousand men, the 
 bulk near Strasburg, and Hoche with seventy thousand men, 
 along the river below Coblenz. Although the Army of Italy 
 sadly needed their cooperation, these armies passed the Rhine 
 only about mid-April, Hoche at Diisseldorf and Neuwied, 
 and Moreau at Kehl. They had been ordered to cross early 
 in March, but there was lack of pontoons and of equipment 
 generally. Vexed at this unnecessary delay, Bonaparte wrote 
 the Directory : " The armies of the Rhine must have no 
 blood in their veins. ... If one has the good-will to open 
 the campaign, there is nothing to prevent it." He had fre- 
 quently warned the Directory that if he was not supported, 
 it would be impossible for the Army of Italy to hold itself 
 long ; but he yet boldly pushed on, and was rewarded by the 
 glorious triumph of Leoben. 
 
HOCHE'S ADVANCE. 
 
 445 
 
 Prior to crossing, Hoche sent a division to contain Mainz, 
 and another to pass the Rhine and march on Castel. The 
 rest of his six divisions he assembled in three army corps — 
 Championnet with the left wing at Dusseldorf , Grenier in the 
 centre, and the right wing under Lefebvre near Neuwied. The 
 cavalry was on the right and left. Werneck's plan was to 
 
 Hoche's Advance in 1797. 
 
 permit Championnet to advance from Diisseldorf to Alten- 
 kirchen, hoping to crush him there, and then to turn on the 
 enemy up river; but he divided his forces too much, and 
 Latour and he did not agree as to what the joint reserve they 
 had should do. 
 It was April 17 when Hoche crossed at Neuwied. Shortly 
 
446 MAN(EUVRES ARRESTED. 
 
 hearing of the truce of Leoben, Werneck offered him an 
 armistice, but the French general gave an uncertain answer, 
 and kept on, beating Kray at Engers, and Werneck at Dier- 
 dorf . The latter fell back ou Hachenburg ; and when Cham- 
 pionnet moved from below and crossed the Wied at Al- 
 tenkirchen, the Austrians again retreated, and the French 
 followed to the Lahn country. Although Werneck had 
 planned to fight at Neukirch, he changed his mind and with- 
 drew to Wetzlar ; and Hoche felt encouraged to believe that 
 he could drive the Austrians to Mainz. And despite some 
 slight successes in rearguard combats with the French, yet 
 Werneck later deemed it wise to retire still farther to Ber- 
 gen, and Lefebvre soon reached Frankfort. Here news of 
 the peace came in, much to the relief of the Austrians. 
 
 Meanwhile Moreau, with the Army of the Rhine and Mo- 
 selle, began his crossing at Kehl April 19. He had to force 
 his passage, but cleverly managed it in the teeth of Stzar- 
 ray. Yet he did not ably use his great superiority to beat 
 the enemy in detail, as he might have done, and the Leoben 
 negotiations arrested the manoeuvres April 24. 
 
 The active operations of Hoche and Moreau had lasted 
 only a week. Of how much utility they might have been a 
 month earlier, it is easy to judge. Whether Carnot, or Mo- 
 reau, or the Directory, or a common jealoiisy of Bonaparte, 
 was at the root of the delay cannot now be determined. 
 
 The hero of Leoben was glad to enter upon the return 
 march, and to this he cleverly lent the air of doing a favor 
 to Austria by evacuating her territory ; but in truth he was 
 anxious to regain his own all too distant base, and put an end 
 to the dangerous disaffection which was a real threat to his 
 rear. On May 16, by a ruse de guerre, the French army 
 entered Venice, shortly destined to be added to the Austrian 
 territory in exchange for Lombardy and Belgium ; and the 
 
NEGOTIATIONS AT UDINE. 
 
 447 
 
 oligarchy, as a punishment for its opposition to the French, 
 was dissolved. Bonaparte established his headquarters near 
 Udine to await the plenipotentiaries who were to treat of 
 peace, and himself went to Milan to complete the organiza- 
 tion of the Cisalpine Eepublic, and to support the new demo- 
 cratic _ revolution in 
 Genoa. The Genoese 
 oligarchy was trans- 
 formed into the Ligu- 
 rian Eepublic, and the 
 great fortified city 
 came under the control 
 of the French. 
 
 The negotiations at 
 Udine (Passeriano) 
 went on slowly. Every 
 power seemed to strive 
 to influence what was 
 done. It was hoped in 
 France that another 
 expedition to Ireland, 
 aided by the Dutch 
 and Spanish fleets, might be successful. But the battle of 
 Cape St. Vincent, won by Jervis off Cadiz, placed England 
 absolutely in command of the sea. Her ministers were not 
 unwilling to treat for peace, if Austria was to make it ; and 
 indeed negotiations to this end were opened at Lille ; but 
 they had no result. English demands were not based on 
 French successes on land. The Directory proved unreason- 
 able, and would accede to no acceptable terms. 
 
 The Royalist sentiment, fed by the tyranny of the Direc- 
 tory, had long been growing, and the new elections gave the 
 party strength in the Council. Moreau had dallied with the 
 
 Bonaparte. 
 Sketch by David, 1797. 
 
448 A CELEBRATION ORDERED. 
 
 Royalists, but Pichegru was the leader of the movement, 
 which no doubt looked forward to a restoration of the Bour- 
 bons. Three members of the Directory, Barras, La Revelliere- 
 Lepeaux and Kewbel, were Jacobins ; Carnot and Barthelemy 
 were Moderates. The Council demanded Moderate minis- 
 ters, but the three Jacobin Directors put strong Republicans 
 in office ; and as each party desired an able general on its 
 side, for a few days Hoche was minister of war. Bonaparte 
 was a stanch Republican, and the leanings of the troops were 
 strongly so. But being with the army in the field, he was in 
 a way removed from politics. 
 
 On the national fete of July 14, a great celebration was 
 ordered by the general-in-chief in Milan, salvos were fired 
 for all officers of rank killed in action, new standards were 
 delivered, double rations were issued, and races and games 
 ensued. Bonaparte issued the following order : — 
 
 Milan, 26 Messidor, Year V. 
 To THE Army. 
 
 Soldiers ! To-day is the anniversary of the 14th of July. You see 
 before you the names of our companions in arms dead on the field of 
 honor for the liberty of the country. They have given you the example. 
 Y'ou owe yourselves wholly to the Republic ; you owe yourselves wholly 
 to the happiness of thirty millions of Frenchmen ; you owe yourselves 
 wholly to the glory of that name which has received a fresh lustre by 
 your victories. 
 
 Soldiers ! I know you to be profoundly affected by the ills which 
 threaten the country ; but the country cannot run real dangers. The 
 same men who have made her triumph over Europe in coalition are here. 
 Mountains separate us from France ; you would cross them with the 
 rapidity of the eagle, if needed, to maintain the Constitution, defend lib- 
 erty, protect the government and the Republicans. 
 
 Soldiers I The government watches the trust of laws confided to it. 
 The Royalists, from the moment they show themselves, will have lived. 
 Be without disquiet, and let us swear by the manes of the heroes who have 
 died beside us for liberty, let us swear on our new flags : Implacable War 
 to the Enemies of the Republic and of the Constitution of the Year III. 
 
 Bonaparte. 
 
TRIUMPH OF THE JACOBINS. 449 
 
 In the same tone Bonaparte wrote the Directory, July 15, 
 that the emperor was waiting to see the turn things would 
 take in Paris ; that the army was indignant at the condition 
 of affairs, and that his proclamation of July 14 had produced 
 the best effect ; that personally he could not remain insensi- 
 ble to the attacks of the newspapers, or of the Five Hundred, 
 or of the Clichy Club (of Royalists) : " Are there no more 
 Republicans left in France ? You can save the Republic with 
 one stroke . . . and conclude peace in twenty-four hours. 
 Arrest the emigres ; destroy the influence of foreigners. If 
 you need force, call on the armies. Break up the presses of 
 the journals sold to England, more bloody than ever was 
 Marat. ... If nothing can be done to put an end to assas- 
 sinations and to the influence of Louis XVI., I desire to 
 resign." And in a letter to Clarke of July 18, " I confess, 
 however, to you that I much desire to reenter private life ; I 
 have paid my score." Was this last quite ingenuous ? Resig- 
 nation when he deemed himself essential was always one of 
 Bonaparte's weapons. 
 
 Augereau had gone to Paris with the Mantua flags. No 
 one supposed him to be in league with Bonaparte, whose aide,, 
 Lavalette, was there to represent him. On September 4, the 
 18th Fructidor, by Augereau's aid, the Tuileries, where the 
 Council sat, was surrounded, and Pichegru and Barthelemy 
 were seized. Carnot escaped. A new padded Council upheld 
 the Directory, who selected Merlin and Fran9ois as new 
 members, much to Augereau's disappointment, as he had 
 hoped for the place. Thus the Jacobins triumphed, without 
 Bonaparte's having personally appeared in the affair. 
 
 The change had, however, the effect of preventing so much 
 interference with Bonaparte's control of the peace negotia- 
 tions. He continued the discussion of terras at Udine, and 
 on a fresh interference with his work by the home authorities. 
 
450 DISCUSSIONS AT UDINE. 
 
 lie actually handed in his resignation on September 25. This 
 act decided the Directory to favor the man they well knew 
 they could not do without, nor, indeed, dared to place in 
 antagonism to their power. The Army of Italy was rein- 
 forced, and Bonaparte given such ample power that he deter- 
 mined to sign a peace at Campo Formio. 
 
 The St. Helena Memoirs tell the following story of the dis- 
 cussions at Udine. On October 16 Bonaparte recapitulated 
 the conduct of France since the Leoben preliminaries and 
 renewed his ultimatum. Cobentzel, the Austrian plenipoten- 
 tiary, at whose house the meeting was that day held, argued 
 at length to prove that France was getting too much in the 
 treaty, and would join all Italy to Gaul ; " That the emperor 
 was irrevocably resolved to run all the chances of war, even 
 to flee from his capital, if need be, rather than consent to a 
 peace so disadvantageous ; that Russia offered him armies ; 
 that these were ready to rush to his aid, and that people 
 would see what manner of troops the Russians were ; that it 
 was very evident that Napoleon was making his character as 
 plenipotentiary cede to his interests as general ; that he did 
 not desire peace. He added that he would leave in the night, 
 and that all the blood that would flow in this new conflict 
 would fall upon the French negotiator. It was then that the 
 latter, with coolness, but highly piqued with this outburst, 
 rose and took from a pier-table a little liqueur-set (cabaret) of 
 porcelain of which Count Cobentzel was very fond, as the gift 
 of the Empress Catherine : ' WeU, then,' said Napoleon, ' the 
 truce is therefore broken and war is declared ! But remember 
 that before the end of this autumn I will break your mon- 
 archy as I break this porcelain ! ' In pronouncing these last 
 words he threw it to earth with vivacity : it covered the floor 
 with its debris. He bowed to the Congress and left. The 
 Austrian plenipotentiaries were astounded. A few minutes 
 
^iV INTERESTING ANECDOTE. 
 
 451 
 
 afterwards they knew that in entering his carriage he had 
 dispatched an officer to Archduke Charles to notify him that, 
 the negotiations being broken off, hostilities would be begun 
 again in twenty-four hours. Alarmed, Count Cobentzel sent 
 
 Unfinished Portrait of Bonaparte. 
 By David. 
 
 the Marquis of Gallo to Passeriano to carry a signed decla- 
 ration that he adhered to the ultimatum of France. ... On 
 the morrow peace was signed." 
 
 We must accept this story on the testimony of Napoleon. 
 Many others may have had a foundation far more slender 
 than their present form. But all are like the man, and none 
 lack the interest that anecdotes possess which have grown up 
 about any great character of history. 
 
 In the Treaty of Campo Formio, Austria ceded Belgium 
 to France. The Congress of Rastadt was to discuss peace. 
 
452 TREATY CESSIONS. 
 
 Austria received Venice to the Adige, with Istria and Dal- 
 matia, and recognized the Cisalpine Republic. Secret arti- 
 cles provided for an Alps-Rhine frontier for France, with 
 possession of Mainz, the navigation of the Rhine to be open 
 to both France and Germany. 
 
 There was good reason for signing the peace. The Army 
 of Italy was in excellent condition, but was so placed that the 
 Austrians would be nearer their sources of supply, and be 
 better able to prepare for the next campaign, than could the 
 French. Many questions in the rear of the French army — 
 Naples, Venice, Sardinia — were in a high degree disquieting, 
 and Bonaparte felt the desirability of rounding up by a use- 
 ful peace the splendor of his campaign. It cannot be said 
 that he exhibited much regard for the promises which had 
 been made to the recently created Italian republics, from 
 which territory was taken in cold blood in order to compass 
 the desired peace. France retained many fortresses until 
 ratification. 
 
 The Peace of Campo Formio was clearly the work of Bona- 
 parte. It was glorious for France and not unfair for the 
 enemy. It should have been solid, for Austria got Venice 
 for Antwerp, and Istria and Dalmatia for Belgium — in her 
 present condition a valuable exchange. 
 
 There arose during 1797 certain troubles among the Swiss 
 cantons, which led the Directory, in breach of all international 
 law, to interfere in her internal affairs, under the flimsy pretext 
 of establishing a balance between the democratic and monar- 
 chical states. This resulted in the establishment of French 
 control in the Alps in the place of Swiss neutrality, — a 
 grievous mistake on the part of France. It seemed to be the 
 idea of the Directory that to protect the political status of the 
 French Republic, it was essential to surround it with a cordon 
 of small democracies — buffer states, as it were ; whereas these 
 
DESIGNS AGAINST SWITZERLAND. 453 
 
 would but give France a more extended line to protect, instead 
 of the Ehine and the Alps, for French control demanded 
 French protection. The neutrality of. Switzerland is one of 
 the political and military necessities of the modern status of 
 Europe. In the case of France this is peculiarly valuable. 
 So long as this great natural barrier remains neutral, it pro- 
 tects her two lines of attack and defense, — the Khine and 
 Piedmont, — each having the Alps on one of its flanks. With 
 Switzerland no longer neutral, the eastern frontier of France 
 demands greater armies and is but half as well protected. 
 
 The designs against Switzerland were hidden under the 
 guise of an expedition to Egypt, and this again was kept 
 secret by ostensible preparations near the English Channel. 
 The Swiss invasion was hurried up by the fact, discovered by 
 Bonaparte, that Berne had in her treasury forty million francs 
 in specie ; and France needed the money to equip the army 
 and fleet destined for Egypt. As a pretext to take a hand 
 in the internal affairs of Switzerland, Bonaparte made a 
 demand for the passage of a French detachment from Italy to 
 the headwaters of the Rhone, the shortest road from Milan 
 to France ; and to this, as was expected, a courteous refusal 
 was the only answer a neutral state could make. This per- 
 mitted the Directory to begin covert, and later overt, inter- 
 ference with Bernese affairs ; and as a result, a body of French 
 soldiers entered Swiss territory in December, 1797. The Swiss 
 raised troops, and Menard took Lausanne. Fostering revo- 
 lution against the constituted authorities, the French made 
 such exorbitant demands on the Bernese Senate that the only 
 answer could be the raising of an army. This was placed 
 under Erlach. The Directory then demanded that the sev- 
 eral cantons of Switzerland should be made into a republic, 
 one and indivisible, and to Brune was given command of the 
 French army. The Bernese Senate lacked energy. Brune 
 
454 ROMAN REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED. 
 
 and Schauenburg marched against Erlach early in March, 
 1798 ; and by Carnot's ably designed concentric operation 
 from France, Italy and the Rhine (made in anticipation of 
 what actually occurred), coupled with their own really clever 
 work, these generals defeated the Swiss near Berne, March 6 ; 
 whereupon the French entered the city, and seized on the 
 treasury. Soon Switzerland was overrun by French troops, 
 and the Helvetian Republic, under French protection, was 
 formed by Talleyrand. This invasion of Switzerland made 
 the continuance of European peace impossible. 
 
 Revolutionary ideas were growing in southern Italy. Naples 
 was on the eve of an uprising, and the prisons were half full 
 of suspects. Urged on by French partisans, the Roman popu- 
 lace rose to demand a republic. In suppressing this rising, 
 on December 28, 1797, the papal troops charged a mob in 
 front of the French legation, and a French oflBcer was acci- 
 dentally killed. Of this unintentional violation of diplomatic 
 propriety the Directory at once took advantage. Berthier, 
 with eighteen thousand men, was ordered to Rome ; and on 
 February 15, 1798, the Roman Republic was proclaimed from 
 the steps of the Capitol. The Pope left the city for Pisa, 
 and eventually went to France. This interference with papal 
 affairs was a direct blow at Austria. Berthier was succeeded 
 by Massena, and he by Dallemagne. The troops, unpaid and 
 ill-cared for, mutinied, as was not uncommon in these years, 
 and some time elapsed before quiet was restored. All this 
 excessive activity on the part of the Directory was a mis- 
 take. It never knew when it had enough. The occupation of 
 Switzerland and Rome tore the treaty of Campo Formio to 
 shreds. 
 
 Shortly going to Paris, Bonaparte was received as the hero 
 of the hour. At the opening of 1796 the German emperor 
 had lain on the confines of France With one hundred and 
 
NOT A PARTY MAN. 455 
 
 sixty thousand men, ready to cross the Rhine. By his activ- 
 ity in Italy the young general had called both Wurmser and 
 Archduke Charles from the Rhine with over sixty thousand 
 nien, and it was this that had enabled Moreau and Hoche to 
 carry the tricolor to the Lech. Peace forced on the emperor 
 assured that of Europe, for England could have been counted 
 on to make peace if the Directory would be reasonable. Bona- 
 parte had filled the national treasury with money from his 
 forced contributions, and the national museum with works of 
 art ; he had covered the French name with a halo of glory. 
 
 Though Bonaparte already aspired to a leading role, yet 
 the time was not ripe. He could not well overthrow the 
 Directory at this moment. That must topple of its own 
 weakness, so that he might assume the ever-popular role of 
 Saviour of the Republic. In Paris he ran the danger of be- 
 coming allied to one or other party, the last thing he now 
 desired. He could not afford to be a party man ; what he 
 needed was to keep the eyes of France and of Europe on his 
 own personality, while entering no entangling alliances. Out 
 of this desire and the then condition of England in India 
 grew the Egyptian expedition, by undertaking which Bona- 
 parte believed he could gain much for France and for him- 
 self; and at all events he escaped being at the head of a 
 perilous expedition to England, to the command of which he 
 was at this time appointed. 
 
 Sword of the Period. 
 
XVII. 
 EGYPT. JANUARY TO JULY, 1798. 
 
 The Treaty of Campo Formio did not make permanent peace. The Con- 
 gress of Rastadt was a failure ,* but this affected Bonaparte little, for after his 
 brilliant reception in Paris, the Directors, who feared him, were glad to have 
 him set forth on his Egyptian campaign. Success here he believed would en- 
 able him to gain an overland route to India, and thus control the Orient. This 
 would make him the French hero. And he was willing to affiliate with neither 
 political party. The Army of the Orient was organized by order of April 12, 
 and Bonaparte collected thirty thousand excellent men and officers. He was 
 glad to give up the command of the so-called Army of England, with which an 
 invasion had been contemplated. On May 19 the fleet and troop-ships set sail, 
 and on June 11 Malta was captured. On July 1 Alexandria was reached. 
 Bonaparte at once landed his troops and captured the city, sending word to the 
 Pasha of Egypt that he came thither to subdue the Mamelukes, who robbed the 
 Sultan of his power and possessed the land, and did injury to the French. Early 
 in April the army advanced towards Cairo, defeating the Mamelukes at Rama- 
 niyeh and Shubra-Kliet. On July 21 the army reached the plains on the left 
 bank of the NUe opposite Cairo. Here Murad Bey had drawn up his ten thou- 
 sand horsemen, and placed twenty thousand foot in Embabeh. Bonaparte 
 ployed each of his divisions into a square, the artillery in the intervals, and the 
 train and stafE in the centre, and marched forward in echelon. The Mamelukes 
 attacked the squares with vigor, but nothing could resist French discipline. 
 The horsemen were mowed down by thousands, and meanwhile Embabeh was 
 taken by two of the divisions. Disheartened, Murad Bey acknowledged his 
 defeat and fled up the Kile, while Ibrahim Bey gathered his treasures in Cairo 
 and retired towards the Syrian desert. The French collected great booty. 
 Bonaparte entered Cairo, and Desaix was sent up the river in pursuit of Murad. 
 
 Although Austria had gained as much territory in Ven- 
 ice as she had lost on the Po, yet the Treaty of Campo For- 
 mio was to her scarcely more than a long truce ; and at 
 the Congress of Rastadt no two powers were of a mind, and 
 universal peace seemed as far away as ever. Frederick 
 
RECEPTION IN PARIS. 457 
 
 William III., who had ascended the Prussian throne in No- 
 vember, 1797, had character and influence, and in the wish 
 to have Prussia bear her part in the economy of Europe, was 
 apt to create difficulties. Paul I. saw that as a means of 
 self-preservation Bussia must soon begin to act in the affairs 
 of the Mediterranean. By holding to her treaty with France, 
 Spain forfeited her commerce, and was restless accordingly. 
 Portugal was so much under English control that France was 
 assembling an army in the Pyrenees to overawe her. Italy 
 stood as on a volcano ; the aristocrats were moving in Venice 
 and Genoa ; Naples was toying with England ; the Cisalpine 
 Republic was robbing the Pope of territory ; Piedmont was 
 revolutionary. On the other hand, the Batavian Republic 
 was under the influence of France; and Turkey, though 
 friendly, was too much busied by her own difficulties to be 
 any one's ally. For England there was no choice except to 
 keep up the European conflict, or to surrender her recent 
 colonial acquisitions, and she held herself on 'a war footing. 
 In France the political situation was nothing less than a 
 maze, and at every step the Directory seemed to be making 
 fresh enemies. 
 
 Bonaparte's reception in Paris on his return from his 
 splendid Italian campaigns — really a triumphal entry — was 
 of a nature to turn the head of a less imaginative subject. 
 He was received in the Luxemburg by the Directors with 
 unequaled ceremony. At this reception he was presented to 
 the Directors by Scherer, Secretary of War, and Talleyrand 
 made a fulsome presentation speech. Bonaparte handed in 
 the treaty, saying at the close of his address: "This peace 
 assures the liberty, the prosperity of the Republic. When 
 the happiness of the French people shall be founded on the 
 best organic laws, entire Europe will become free." In his 
 answering speech, Barras, President of the Directors began : 
 
458 FRANCE OPEN AS A PRIZE. 
 
 " Citizen General, Nature, miser of its prodigies, gives only 
 from time to time great men to the earth, but she must have 
 been jealous to mark the aurora of liberty by one of these 
 phenomena ; and the sublime revolution of the French people, 
 new in the history of nations, had to present a fresh genius 
 in the history of celebrated men. First of all. Citizen Gen- 
 eral, you have shaken off the yoke of equality, and with 
 the same arm with which you struck to earth the enemies 
 of the Republic, you thrust aside the rivals which antiquity 
 presented to you." He then saluted Bonaparte, giving him 
 what was called the fraternal embrace, and was followed by 
 the other Directors. The Institute of France elected him a 
 member. The municipality of Paris changed the name of 
 the Rue Chante Reine, where Bonaparte lived, to Rue de la 
 Victoire. 
 
 There was about as much insincerity as there was honest 
 good-will in all this adulation, for Bonaparte's success had 
 raised envy as well as suspicion in many breasts. Only 
 the populace with real heartiness welcomed the conqueror. 
 But though he was the lion of the day, the sole effect of the 
 flattery was to prove to Bonaparte that France was open as 
 a prize to contend for, and that it was one which he might 
 win as well as any other citizen. He also saw that the time 
 had not yet come for action ; that provided he could do work 
 to command attention, he was better away from France than 
 in France ; and on this feeling he acted. The Directory 
 was sure sooner or later to crumble of its own weight ; and 
 then would come his chance. " The pear was not yet ripe," 
 said he. 
 
 The Directors were only too glad to keep him at a distance, 
 lest he should interfere with their control of affairs. They 
 had nominated him to the command of the proposed expe- 
 dition against England. But Bonaparte held this appoint- 
 
PRETENSE OF INVASION. 459 
 
 ment cheap. He knew that at least two members of the Di- 
 rectory, Rewbel and Merlin, were inimical, and would be glad 
 to see him fail in such a project. Instead of undertaking an 
 uncertain invasion of England, he reverted to what- he had 
 at Campo Formio already considered as a thrust at the weak- 
 est spot of Great Britain, an expedition against Egypt, as a 
 first step on the high-road to India. " Whoso has Egypt in 
 his hands commands the trade of the whole Orient," Leib- 
 nitz had said to Louis XIV. in 1667. 
 
 Bonaparte had little faith in the expedition to England. 
 He wrote Bourrienne that if a descent upon England should 
 look doubtful, as he presumed it would, the Army of England 
 might become the Army of the East, and he himself go to 
 Egypt. In February, 1798, while in Dunkirk, he definitely 
 concluded that a descent on England was impossible, and 
 wrote the Directory that it would be better to keep up the 
 pretense of an invasion, concentrate on the Rhine, and strive 
 to get hold of Hanover and Hamburg ; or else to threaten 
 England's Indian commerce by an eastern expedition. Yet 
 he had been compelled to keep up preparations ; and from 
 Paris, January 11, 1798, he wrote Berthier that the latter 
 was to be Chief of Staff of the Army of England ; and next 
 day a list of the generals who were to form part of the army 
 was issued. 
 
 On February 23, however, Bonaparte addressed a formal 
 report to the Directory, which he began by saying : — 
 
 " Whatever efforts we may make, we shall not acquire from 
 now for several years the superiority of the sea. To conduct 
 a descent on England, without being master of the sea, is 
 the most hardy and the most difficult operation which has 
 been made." And excellent reason being given for his be- 
 lief, he continued : " The expedition to England appears not 
 to be possible until next year, and then it is probable that the 
 
460 THE EGYPTIAN SCHEME. 
 
 embarrassments which will occur on the Continent will pre- 
 vent it. The real moment of preparation for this expedition 
 is lost, perhaps forever." He then states certain conditions 
 which vi^ere practically impossible, and concludes by saying 
 that if these are not feasible, " I see no other recourse than to 
 conclude peace with England." 
 
 Apart from the desire of Bonaparte to affiliate with none, 
 though sought by all of the political parties then dominant 
 or prominent in Paris, while still keeping himself before the 
 eyes of the nation and the world, the objects of the Egyptian 
 expedition were : to establish a French colony in Africa, 
 mainly for sugar growing, and incidentally cotton, to compen- 
 sate for the loss of the West Indian Islands in the war with 
 England ; to cut through the isthmus of Suez ; to open an 
 Oriental outlet to French commerce ; to capture Malta as a 
 half-way station, and take possession of the Red Sea ; to thus 
 make a base for an advance up the Indus to India, which, 
 being no match for the British fleet, France could not reach 
 by sea ; and eventually to exclude the English from all their 
 possessions in the Orient. Overriding all this, however, was 
 the imperious ambition of the man, already inflamed by his 
 wonderful first campaign ; and the necessity he felt for inde- 
 pendent action and an extensive theatre on which to work. 
 
 It has been thought that Bonaparte could not have had 
 great faith in the Egyptian expedition. It was in a sense an 
 absurdity from the outset. But the French then knew little 
 about Oriental possibilities ; and even Bonaparte's knowledge 
 was limited to an extent which, to the man who lives in this 
 era of transportation, when all things and all knowledge are 
 carried by steam and electricity — ay, even the air — from 
 every part of the world to every other, appears odd. But a 
 century ago men's minds traveled in a narrow circle. What 
 had been accomplished in India by men who were not profes- 
 
LACK OF MONEY. 
 
 461 
 
 slonal soldiers appeared more than possible to be exceeded 
 by an able captain and a French army. The conditions as 
 they actually existed were quite unknown. Moreover, a 
 Frenchman of that day by nature and education looked down 
 upon an Englishman. The two differed in race, knowledge, 
 aspirations. France was an agricultural nation ; England a 
 commercial nation. The French not only failed to understand 
 the Englishman, but they disbelieved in England's strength. 
 They had small conception of the elasticity and endurance 
 of the Anglo-Saxon. Nor was this to be wondered at. Eng- 
 land, in the early years of the French Revolution, had not 
 risen to the height of her naval power. Nor was the influence 
 of the sea power appreciated at its true value. 
 
 At first Bonaparte had some difficulty in bringing the 
 Directory to agree to the scale on which he desired to place the 
 Egyptian scheme. In his final meeting with the Directors, 
 he resorted to his already common 
 method of resignation, and this, it is 
 said, came close to being accepted. 
 A greater difficulty arose from lack 
 of money. The latter was some- 
 what obviated by the seizures made 
 in Rome by Berthier in February, 
 1798, when the Roman Republic 
 was restored, and by the levies of 
 money later made from the treasur- 
 ies of Switzerland. Much of the 
 resources of both raids, as above 
 mentioned, went to Toulon to equip 
 the Egyptian army. 
 
 The Directory itself knew little or nothing about India. 
 Tippoo Sahib had sent an embassy to Louis XVI., to ask 
 his aid in ejecting the East Indian Company from the penin- 
 
 Tippoo Sahib. 
 
462 NO LONGER A COMMON MAN. 
 
 sula ; but except a spasmodic movement by the Directory in 
 1796, nothing had been done to establish French influence 
 in Hindustan. The English were supreme. 
 
 It behooved Bonaparte to be active. " In Paris they can 
 remember nothing. If I long remain without doing some- 
 thing, I am lost," Bourrienne quotes him as saying. He went 
 to Egypt much as Caesar went to Gaul. As Italy was for 
 Csesar, so Europe at this period of his career was too small 
 for Bonaparte's ambition ; it demanded the immensity of the 
 Orient to satisfy his imagination. And as yet the young 
 leader could not give up his belief that he might open a road 
 to India, and that, with the hordes of native soldiers which 
 he could collect, leavened by the European divisions he would 
 bring with him, he might deal England a blow fatal to her 
 Indian aspirations, and reconquer a larger colony for France 
 than she had lost by the better sea management of the Brit- 
 ish. This belief was only later shattered. 
 
 To close the eyes of England to what was going on in Tou- 
 lon and other harbors controlled by the French in the Medi- 
 terranean, much activity was kept up in the Channel ports. 
 At a convenient season, too, an Irish rebellion broke out ; and 
 England ordered many vessels to return to home stations. 
 This in a way opened the road to Egypt. 
 
 Having once adopted the Egyptian scheme, the Directory, 
 both fearing and mistrusting the man, was by no means averse 
 to being rid of Bonaparte, and gave him every assistance he 
 asked, even to authority over all the Orient, wherever he 
 might carry the tricolor. He was indeed no longer a common 
 man, but a personality with whom France or even Europe 
 would now be ready to reckon. The first Silesian war, with 
 MoUwitz and Chotusitz, scarcely placed Frederick the king 
 on a pedestal higher than that which the campaign from Nice 
 to Leoben had builded for Bonaparte the citizen. " It seems 
 
THE ARMY OF THE ORIENT. 463 
 
 as if the Directory was aiming to be rid of so dangerous a 
 warrior at any price," says Gohier. And as European politics 
 again threatened to become embroiled by Russia's embarking 
 therein, Bonaparte, who preferred that others should be pre- 
 sent at the wrecking of the fine structure whose capstone he 
 had laid at Campo Formio, and who was indisputably clever 
 at divining the time when he had best cut loose from an un- 
 promising venture, hurried his preparations to embark upon 
 his Oriental campaign. 
 
 From Paris, April 12, the Directory ordered the formation 
 of the army destined- for Egypt, and " the Citizen Bonaparte, 
 at the moment General-in-Chief of the Army of England, 
 is named General-in-Chief of the Army of the Orient." In 
 several other orders of the same date the conduct of the Egyp- 
 tian Beys, and their association with the English, their ill- 
 conduct to the French, and the right of the French to keep 
 open a road to India are insisted on ; and the Army of the 
 Orient is ordered to sail for Egypt. The Order of Malta is 
 likewise stated to have acted in a hostile manner against 
 France, and the Army of the Orient is ordered to take posses- 
 sion of the island. These preparations were made, and the 
 orders issued in secret, and the secret was well guarded. The 
 Egyptian forces were long known as the left wing of the 
 Army of England, and up to the last moment Bonaparte 
 signed himself, " General-in-Chief of the Army of England." 
 
 The threat of a fresh war with Austria almost led Bona- 
 parte to throw up the command of the Egyptian expedition ; 
 but it was now too late. The orders of the Directory were 
 positive, he must either obey them or attack his superiors, and 
 choosing the former alternative, Bonaparte reached Toulon 
 May 9. 
 
 Following was the army, mostly from the Rhine or Italy, 
 which Bonaparte collected in Toulon, Genoa, Civita Vecchia, 
 
464 ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. 
 
 Marseilles and Ajaccio. In it were fifty-six battalions and 
 twenty squadrons, of which three battalions were left in Malta, 
 and six went to Corfu. By an order of June 22, on board the 
 flagship Orient, it was organized as follows : — 
 
 Bonaparte commanding. Berthier, Chief of Staff. 
 Desaix, van : 21st light half-brigade under Belliard. 
 
 61st and 88th line 
 Reynier, right wing : 9th light 
 
 85th line 
 Menou, left wing : 22d light 
 
 13th and 69th Inie 
 Kleber, centre : 2d light 
 
 25th and 75th line 
 Bon, reserve : 4th light 
 
 18th and 32d line 
 
 Friant. 
 Fugi^re. 
 
 a 
 
 Veaux. 
 
 Vial. 
 
 Dam as. 
 
 Verdier. 
 
 Marmont. 
 
 Rampon. 
 
 These divisions averaged four thousand five hundred 
 
 men, making infantry 22,500 men. 
 
 Cavalry under Alexandre Dumas, with full equip- 
 ments, but only three hundred horses, the rest of 
 the men to be mounted in Egypt 4,000 " 
 
 Reserve artillery under Dommartin (Songis, 2d) 3,000 " 
 
 Non-combatants 1,000 " 
 
 30,500 men. 
 
 Some authorities place the force which Bonaparte took to 
 Egypt as high as thirty-nine thousand foot and three thou- 
 sand horse. But the above figures are reliable. The Me- 
 moirs state the total as thirty-two thousand three hundred 
 men. The Inspector General was Dugua; Commandant of 
 Engineers, Caffarelli ; Commandant of Pontoniers, Sufalga ; 
 and a dromedary corps was later formed, each animal capable 
 of carrying two men, but usually ridden by but one. There 
 were eight companies of artificers, sappers and miners. 
 Plenty of ordnance stores were aboard, including harness for 
 six thousand horses. 
 
 Great care was had to prepare for the health of the troops. 
 
EXCELLENT OFFICERS. 465 
 
 and Bonaparte had been heedful to pick out officers whose 
 good conduct had impressed him. In one capacity or another 
 there were with the army, in addition to the above, men whom 
 ability later carried to a high position. Such were Murat, 
 now commanding the dragoons, and eventually reaching the 
 command of all the cavalry ; Lannes, at first an aide, Junot, 
 Davout, at first also commanding dragoons, Lanusse, Bes- 
 sieres, Rapp, Belliard, Andreossy, Leclerc and Duroc. Louis 
 Bonaparte and Eugene Beau- 
 harnais also formed part of 
 Bonaparte's military family. 
 
 The staff was composed of one 
 brigadier-general, three majors, 
 one quartermaster treasurer, 
 four lieutenants, one doctor, two 
 trumpeters, one drum major, 
 one " artist veterinary," one 
 master bootmaker, one master 
 saddler, one master shoemaker, 
 one master tailor, one master 
 armorer, twenty musicians. A 
 
 distinguished body of men of science accompanied the army, 
 and lent real lustre and no little aid to its work. They car- 
 ried with them a library, French, Arabic, Turkish and Greek 
 printing-presses and type, workmen, and interpreters in all 
 languages. 
 
 This entire force was embarked in four hundred transports, 
 convoyed by thirteen ships of the line, eight frigates, two 
 big pinks, seventy-eight corvettes, brigs, gunboats, etc., all 
 manned by ten thousand sailors and others. The fleet was 
 under Admiral Brueys ; but Bonaparte was in supreme com- 
 mand. 
 
 " Desaix was the most distinguished officer of the army ; 
 
 Duroc 
 
466 NOTE OF FUTURE CONDUCT. 
 
 active, enlightened, loving glory for its own sake. He was 
 small in stature, of an exterior little pleasing, but ... he 
 could command an army like a vanguard." " Kleber was the 
 handsomest man in the army. He was the Nestor, being 
 forty-five years of age. He had served in Germany ; . . . but 
 had become major of volunteers in Alsatia, his country, in 
 1790. . . . His caustic spirit made him enemies. . . . The 
 Directory had a great aversion for him. . . . He loved glory 
 as the path of pleasures, and was a man of spirit, of courage, 
 knew war, and was capable of great things, but only when 
 driven to it by the force of circumstances." "Caffarelli was of 
 such activity that you could not perceive that he was short 
 one leg. . . . He was well off, a brave soldier, faithful friend, 
 good citizen." He was at the head of the body of savants. 
 
 From Paris, April 13, 1798, in a report to the Directory, 
 Bonaparte strikes the note of all his future conduct by saying : 
 " In our position we should make a positive war on England, 
 and we can do so " by reorganizing our navy, a task which 
 will not interfere with the land armies, while " the war obliges 
 England to make immense preparations which ruin her 
 finances, destroy the spirit of commerce, and absolutely change 
 the constitution and customs of this people." He evidently 
 did not understand the English character. He then sketches 
 out a plan for reorganizing the French navy, while the Eng- 
 lish navy would be kept at a distance by the Oriental expe- 
 dition ; and shows how, under such conditions, England might 
 be invaded. This was on the eve of his departure for Egypt. 
 
 On May 10, at Toulon, Bonaparte issued an order to his 
 soldiers and sailors : " You have made wars of mountains, of 
 plains, of sieges ; it remains for you to make war at sea," 
 said he. " The Roman legions which you have sometimes 
 imitated, but not yet equaled, fought Carthage on this same 
 sea, and on the plains of Zama. Victory abandoned them 
 
ARRIVAL AT MALTA. 
 
 467 
 
 never because they were brave, constant in supporting toil, 
 disciplined, and at one among themselves. Soldiers, Europe 
 has it eyes upon you." And to the sailors and soldiers he 
 said : " Hold together. Remember that on the day of battle 
 you will each need the other." 
 
 After reaching Toulon, May 9, Bonaparte was detained by 
 contrary winds some days. He set sail the 19th, himself 
 aboard the Orient. The various parts of the expedition joined 
 in the waters of Genoa, and thence it headed for Malta. 
 
 On May 16, at Toulon, rules had been issued for the govern- 
 ment of each ship at sea. " The squadron navigated in the 
 finest order, in three columns, two of four vessels, that of the 
 centre of five vessels. Captain Decies scouted ahead with 
 a light squadron. . . . The convoy, duly escorted, scouted 
 also on every side," say 
 the Memoirs. During 
 the passage Bonaparte 
 appears to have sent 
 dispatches to the Direc- 
 tory by some of his light 
 boats, giving the news of 
 the weather, the progress 
 of the fleet, and such 
 information of the en- 
 emy as occasional ships 
 picked up on the way 
 could give. 
 
 Malta was reached 
 June 10. In September, 1797, a commercial mission had 
 been sent to this island, the real purpose of which was to spy 
 out the nakedness of the land, and strive to influence a party 
 among the Knights. France now held Corsica, northern 
 Italy, Spain and Holland ; and she thought that with Malta 
 added to the list, she might control the Mediterranean. 
 
 Bonaparte on board the Orient. 
 By Dutertre. 
 
THE ISLAND CEDED TO FRANCE. 469 
 
 The Knights of Malta had deteriorated. The Czar had 
 designs on the island, but the French Knights gave aid and 
 comfort to their countrymen, and the native Maltese revolted. 
 A quarrel was cooked up on the score of water and provisions, 
 as well as general enmity. On June 11 landings were made 
 at seven places, and La Valetta was taken. After some nego- 
 tiations the helpless Grand Master ceded the island to France. 
 In La Valetta there was found an immense supply of weapons 
 and munitions, twelve hundred guns, and in the harbor two 
 line-ships. The treasury was sacked. The Order of the 
 Knights of Malta was abolished, and the island was reor- 
 ganized on a French plan. Many orders and instructions 
 relative to Malta were issued. Bonaparte appears to have 
 been very busy, and to have placed the new conquest on a 
 good footing, from both a military and civil standpoint. A 
 garrison of four thousand men under Vaubois was left here. 
 The fleet again put to sea the 19th of June, and escaping the 
 English fleet, skirted Candia and headed for Cape Aze on 
 the African coast. On July 1 it made Alexandria, after a 
 voyage of forty-three days. 
 
 On June 22, on board the Orient, Bonaparte issued a 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Soldiers, you are about to undertake a conquest, the effects of which 
 on the ciTilization and commerce of the world are incalculable. You will 
 strike England the most certain blow, and the one most felt, while wait- 
 ing until you can give her a death-blow. We will make tiring marches, 
 we will deliver battles, we shall succeed in all our enterprises. Destiny 
 is in our favor. . . . The peoples with whom we are about to live are Mo- 
 hammedans ; . . . work with them as we have with the Jews and Italians ; 
 treat with respect their Muftis and Imans, as you did the Kabbis and 
 the Bishops. Have for the ceremonies ordered by the Koran, for the 
 mosques, the same tolerance you have had for the convents, for syna- 
 gogues, for the religion of Moses and of Christ. The Roman legions 
 protected all religions. You will find here customs different from those 
 
470 COMPREHENSIVE INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
 of Europe ; you must become habituated to them ; these people treat 
 their women difBerently from ourselves, but in every country the man who 
 violates is a monster. Pillage enriches few ; it dishonors us, destroys our 
 resources, and makes enemies of those we need as friends. The first city 
 we shall meet was built by Alexander. We shall find at every step 
 memories which will excite the emulation of the French. 
 
 On June 21 an order on the Orient provided that " every 
 person in the army who has pillaged or violated shall be 
 shot ; every individual in the army who commits extortion of 
 whatever kind shall be shot ; if the members of a division 
 commit disorder, if known, they shall be shot, if not, the divi- 
 sion shall pay the loss." Full instructions were given as to 
 the collection of victual, and in the last article the order 
 says that aU officers and commissaries are held by the gen- 
 eral-in-chief to see to its execution, " his intention being 
 that the fund of the army shall not become the profit of a few 
 individuals, but shall turn to the advantage of all." These 
 orders were, however, far from being always fully carried 
 out. Comprehensive instructions had also been issued from 
 the Orient to cover all probable cases which would occur on 
 landing. 
 
 Nelson had divined that the destination of the French fleet 
 was not associated with the much vaunted expedition to Eng- 
 land, and had been beating all over the Mediterranean in 
 search of it ; he had almost struck it near Crete ; and on 
 June 28 he had been in Alexandria, but not finding the 
 French at this port, he had set sail for Syria. This signal 
 favor of fortune Bonaparte utilized by at once disembarking 
 near the town of Marabout, some miles west of Alexandria ; 
 and by next morning, July 2, after working through the night, 
 he had four thousand five hundred men on shore, from the 
 divisions of Menou, Bon and Kleber. Waiting for nothing, 
 he set out at daylight, leaving Eeynier to supervise the fur- 
 
LETTER TO THE PASHA. 471 
 
 ther work of landing. This was practically completed by- 
 nightfall of July 3. 
 
 Mohammed el Koraim, commanding in Alexandria, had 
 come out at the head of a small party, had met and defeated 
 a company of French scouters, cut o£E the head of its captain, 
 and returned in parade to the city. The Mohammedans pre- 
 pared for defense. 
 
 On June 30 Bonaparte had addressed a letter to Said 
 Abou-Bekr, the Pasha of Egypt and Eepresentative of the 
 Sublime Porte, stating that as the Porte had declared that he 
 could not control the Beys of Egypt, the French army had 
 landed to make them listen to reason. " Thou who oughtest 
 to be the master of the Beys, and whom they yet hold in 
 Cairo without authority and without power, thou shouldst 
 see my arrival with pleasure. Thou art already informed, no 
 doubt, that I do not come to do aught against the Koran or 
 the Sultan. Thou knowest that the French nation is the one 
 and only ally that the Sultan has in Europe. Come then to 
 meet me, and with me curse the impious race of the Beys." 
 The army marched straight to Alexandria, which was reached 
 July 2, during the early part of the day. 
 
 Alexandria, in its earliest years, was protected in its front 
 by an island ; and this, in Caesar's day, was joined to the 
 mainland by only a causeway. On the island was the Pha- 
 ros, a lighthouse four hundred feet high, — one of the Seven 
 Wonders of the world, — built by the Ptolemies. As the 
 demands of commerce increased, the causeway had gradually 
 been broadened by artificial means until the north part of the 
 city had become a peninsula, the projecting points of which 
 inclosed two ports, on the east the New, on the west the Old 
 Port. 
 
 The native troops in Alexandria strove to. arrest his march, 
 but the French commander, from the steps of Pompey's Pil- 
 
472 
 
 SURRENDER OF ALEXANDRIA. 
 
 lar, handled the affair ably, and the enemy was not strong. 
 The wall was good, but there were several unrepaired breaches 
 in it. One column, under Menou, followed the shore and at- 
 tacked the city by way of the Old Port. Two other columns 
 marched around the city and fell, Kleber on the centre and 
 Bon on the Rosetta gate. The walls and towers were manned 
 by a multitude of Arabs, and Bonaparte had not yet disem- 
 barked his guns. But having forced the Rosetta gate by a 
 handsome assault, the city soon surrendered. This enabled 
 
 Alexandria. 
 
 the transport ships to collect in the harbor of Alexandria, 
 while the men-of-war rendezvoused in the Bay of Aboukir. 
 The army was then assembled at Alexandria. The orders 
 here issued were full of Bonaparte's usual careful detail, and 
 one especially mentioned some enlisted men who had fallen 
 with honor. These were to be buried at the foot of Pompey's 
 Pillar, and to have their names engraved upon it. Orders 
 
EFFORTS TO GAIN CONFIDENCE. 473 
 
 here and for some time were headed, " Bonaparte, Member of 
 the National Institute, General-in-Chief." The first so signed 
 was issued April 28 at Toulon, shortly after his election to 
 the Institute. 
 
 On July 2 a proclamation was issued from Alexandria, 
 dated also, " The 18th of the month of Mulharrem, year of 
 the Hegira 1213," reciting the injuries of the Mamelukes, for 
 the benefit of the native population. " Is there a beautiful 
 estate, it belongs to the Mamelukes ; is there a beautiful slave, 
 a beautiful horse, a beautiful house, they belong to the Mame- 
 lukes. If Egypt is their farm, let them show the lease which 
 God has given them." " Thrice happy those who are with 
 us : they will prosper in fortune and rank ; happy those who 
 are neutrals : they will have time to learn to know us and 
 will take sides with us ; but woe, thrice woe, to those who 
 shall arm themselves for the Mamelukes, and who shall 
 fight against us : there wiU be no hope for them ; they shall 
 perish ! " 
 
 In the hope of procuring asses and camels for the army 
 transport, efforts were made through Kora'im, who had sur- 
 rendered and proved useful, to gain the confidence of the 
 neighboring Arabs. This partially succeeded ; but it did not 
 last long, being interrupted by warlike messages from the 
 Beys in Cairo. 
 
 St. Louis had taken four months to march to Cairo. Bo- 
 naparte proposed to do it in two weeks. And restless for this 
 and other reasons to advance on and occupy the capital, — for 
 the idea of speed as an essential factor in war never left his 
 mind, — on the 4th Bonaparte detailed Desaix, with four thou- 
 sand six hundred foot and one hundred and fifty horse as van- 
 guard, to start from the landing-place and march along the 
 road to Damanhur, and unless too stoutly opposed, to con- 
 tinue his march and take this town. This Desaix did on the 
 
THE MARCH TO DAMANHUR. 475 
 
 6th. Until all the material could be got out of the transports, 
 Bonaparte was compelled personally to remain in Alexandria, 
 which he did up to the 9th ; but in his orders to Desaix he 
 gave, on July 3, the key to his method for war in Egypt. 
 " The art resides in this, to keep concealed all my extraor- 
 dinary means, only to employ them, and thereby to create 
 the greater surprise, in case we have to fight great masses." 
 Kleber and Menou had been wounded in the assault on the 
 Eosetta gate ; and Bonaparte placed the former with three 
 thousand garrison in command of Alexandria, turning over 
 his division to Dugua, and the latter in charge of Rosetta, 
 Vial succeeding to his command ; and on July 5 the army 
 left Alexandria, and Eeynier followed along on the road skirt- 
 ing the old canal, which Desaix had already passed over on 
 the march to Damanhur. Vial marched in the rear of Rey- 
 nier, and Bon, on the evening of the 6th, followed Vial. 
 Dugua had been sent to Eosetta the day before, and here 
 he stationed a small force, and organized a flotilla to follow 
 the army up the Nile. The column was twenty-one thousand 
 strong. Later, on July 7, headquarters moved along the road 
 to Damanhur. For ease to the troops, it was proposed that 
 much of the marching should be done at night. The army 
 was followed by a swarm of Arabs, who massacred any strag- 
 glers they could find. This had its good side in keeping the 
 men in the ranks ; but one day Bonaparte was himself close 
 to being caught. 
 
 At Damanhur an order, interesting to-day, put the follow- 
 ing price upon provisions : a goose, twenty-six sous (cents) ; 
 a chicken, fifteen sous ; a pair of pigeons, eighteen sous ; mut- 
 ton, eight sous a pound ; beef, six sous a pound ; eggs, one liard 
 (a quarter sou) each ; rice, two sous a pound ; lentils, three 
 liards a pound. The prices are also specified in paras, Egyp- 
 tian money. 
 
476 THE CLIMATE OF EGYPT. 
 
 In the St. Helena Memoirs Napoleon gives a long and 
 excellent scientific description of Egypt, as it existed in his 
 day. We have room in this history but for an occasional 
 extract, which is peculiarly applicable to its matter. 
 
 Speaking unscientifically, there are in Egypt eight summer 
 months of heat and four winter months of moderate cold. In 
 the Delta region the heat reaches 100° Fahrenheit and the cold 
 rarely strikes the freezing point. As the Atlantic Ocean tem- 
 pers the climate of Europe and the Pacific that of California, 
 so the vast body of the Libyan and Arabian deserts tempers 
 the climate of Egypt. Eain in Upper Egypt is unknown. 
 In the Delta the rainfall is barely an inch and a half a year. 
 In Alexandria it is about eight inches, and this rain comes 
 from the edge of the winter storms of southern Europe, which 
 a north wind occasionally blows across the sea. The inunda- 
 tion of the Nile occurs from June to October. Crops are 
 then sown, and are harvested from February to June. From 
 early in November and until nearly the first of May, the usual 
 temperature is that of pleasant spring or moderate summer. 
 Early in May begins the Khamsin, a parching wind from the 
 desert which lasts fifty days, as the name indicates. During 
 the inundation the water rises in the neighborhood 'of forty 
 feet ; more will cause devastation, much less brings shortage 
 of crops. 
 
 The valley of the Nile has been said to be shaped like a 
 lotus, with a long stem having a single bud, which is the 
 Fayum ; the flower is the Delta, the stem the narrow thou- 
 sand-mile-long valley of the Nile from Cairo up. At Cairo 
 the river divides into two principal branches, which empty 
 respectively at Eosetta and Damietta into the Mediterranean ; 
 innumerable minor branches cover the rich lowland of the 
 Delta, and these are connected by the yet more innumerable 
 canals, the product of many centuries of labor and care. 
 
THE DELTA OF THE NILE. 477 
 
 The fresh soil brought down by the annual overflow of the 
 
 Nile keeps green the Delta up to its rocky boundaries of the 
 
 Libyan and Arabian deserts ; but along the sea-coast, where 
 
 the constant north wind blows the sand upon the shore, there 
 
 is a line of arid territory 
 
 mixed with a number of 
 
 large shallow marshes, or 
 
 lakes, or inlets from the 
 
 sea. The fertile land of 
 
 the Delta is constantly _ , . . -, 
 
 *' rSonaparte s signature m l</gpypt. 
 
 struggling near the sea- 
 coast with the drifting sand. During the overflow the in- 
 habitants of the Nile valley and the Delta live on the little 
 village-crowned eminences which override the water ; and as 
 the flood recedes, the population begins at once to cultivate 
 the freshly fertilized land, as strips of it successively appear. 
 Vegetables spring up with an amazing rapidity, and cereals 
 soon follow. There were in Bonaparte's time few good roads 
 through the Delta, and routes ran for caravans between Cairo 
 and Alexandria, and between other places, across the desert, 
 whose height prevented the overflow from reaching it. 
 To the Directory, Aug;ust 30, Bonaparte wrote : — 
 
 " This country is very rich iu wheat, rice, vegetables, cattle, cotton, 
 sugar, indigo. There is a great quantity of coffee coming in the way of 
 trade from Arabia." " Never a colony has offered greater advantages. 
 I do not doubt that by means of Egypt you will become masters to make 
 such peace with England as you may desire. Mistress of Egypt, France 
 will by and by be mistress of India. The Cabinet of London feels this 
 perfectly. I do not doubt that this will be a guarantee of general peace." 
 And on October 7, 1798, " This country is surrounded by ferocious Arabs 
 in great numbers and brave. All the tribes reunited make a total of 
 twelve thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry. The population 
 of the interior is composed of different species, all accustomed to being 
 beaten or to beat, to be tyrants or to be tyrannized over. The land is the 
 most beautiful on the earth. Its position is as interesting as decisive 
 
478 A BON MOT. 
 
 for India. The European power which is mistress of Egypt will be in the 
 end that of India. We have everything here which we can ask, and we 
 are full of strength, health and gayety." 
 
 This was rather optimistic. 
 
 Most Europeans know Egypt only in the cooler months. 
 It needed but a few days of the fierce tropical summer to rob 
 the expedition of all its charms for the French soldier. Con- 
 tent, even happy, under the rays of the Italian sun, he now 
 foresaw exertion, deprivation, hardship, which he had never 
 imagined. Loud were the outcries against the officers ; dis- 
 cipline weakened ; to escape the hourly struggle with distress, 
 even suicide was not uncommon. On an early march a gren- 
 adier ventured to say : " Do you expect, general, to march 
 to India in this way ? " " Not with such soldiers as you ! " 
 retorted the chief. The bitter water of many of the wells did 
 not slake thirst. Constant mirage deceived the men like the 
 torture of Tantalus. Bonaparte fully understood and forgave 
 the irritation of the soldier, whom the heat doubly affected 
 in his inappropriate uniform, but he had little patience with 
 the officer. On hearing one tall general complaining aloud 
 to his men, he said to him, " Hold your tongue, general. 
 Your six feet of height do not impose on me. If you continue 
 to excite the irritation of the army, I will have you shot 
 within an hour." 
 
 Bonaparte not infrequently had to protect the men of sci- 
 ence against the soldiers. Seeing the savants engaged in 
 their excavations, the men chose to imagine that the expedi- 
 tion was for their benefit. Caffarelli, of the wooden leg, took 
 much pains to disabuse the men of this idea, circulating 
 much among the camps. " Pardie," one day said to him a 
 grenadier, "you care little for all that, you, general, who 
 have one foot in France ! " The hon mot went throughout 
 the army, and the savants really profited by the joke. 
 
RAMANIYEH REACHED. 
 
 479 
 
 Despite all the hardships, Bonaparte seemed cheerful as 
 never before. Climate had no terrors for him ; and in this 
 ancient country his imagination could indefinitely expand. 
 Madame de R^musat sketches him as feeling himself freed 
 from the shackles of civilization, and able to act out all his 
 dreams. He was to create a religion, to write a new Koran ; 
 and he saw himself head of the Orient, employing all the 
 experience of two continents, attacking the English might in 
 India, and subduing half the world. Yet this sketch may be 
 more ideal than exact ; for if ever a man could see fact clearly, 
 it was Bonaparte. One must always draw a definite line be- 
 tween his very real and boundless imagination, and his stern 
 appreciation of facts and their value. This was, how6ver, 
 in a sense, one of the happiest periods of his life, the most 
 Utopian. 
 
 Bonaparte's next objective was Ramaniyeh on the Nile, 
 and for this place, on July 9, he started from Damanhur, where 
 he had assembled his army, leaving ten thousand men, one 
 third fleet equipment organized as 
 a national guard, under Kleber in 
 Alexandria, and over a thousand in 
 Eosetta under Menou. Dugua and 
 the flotilla were ordered from Ro- 
 setta to the same place ; and on the 
 10th the main army reached its goal. 
 
 Egypt was nominally a part of 
 the Sultan's domain, under a vice- 
 roy ; actually it was ruled by the 
 Mamelukes, a warlike caste, whose 
 capital city was Cairo. Of the 
 
 twenty-four Mameluke chiefs, Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey 
 were the most prominent, and they had been selected by the 
 other Beys to head them. Murad was brave and lucky in 
 
 Murad Bey. 
 
480 THE MAMELUKES DEMORALIZED. 
 
 war ; Ibrahim was rich, wise and mighty. Murad looked 
 after the military side, Ibrahim the government. But the 
 two were rather at odds. Upon the landing of the French, 
 Murad Bey assembled a large force of cavalry, which had 
 always been the especial arm of the race, to confront the in- 
 vader. What foot soldiers there were counted for little in 
 civilized warfare. The Mamelukes were joyfully confident 
 of victory and booty. Cairo was illuminated. " They are 
 melons for us to cut open," said the warriors. Murad himself, 
 with five thousand men, had left Cairo on July 6, and had 
 marched to, and with a motley array of Arabs and f ellahin 
 had intrenched a position near, Shubra-Khet. From here a 
 reconnoitring force of eight hundred men was sent out, and 
 this body encountered the division of Desaix on July 10. It 
 was the first meeting for generations between civilized and 
 semi-civilized soldiers in Egypt ; but European weapons and 
 discipline proved irresistible. Desaix was marching in close 
 column with train in the centre. So soon as he saw the enemy 
 ready to charge, he wheeled towards them : " By platoon on 
 the right and left into line, fire from two ranks I " came the 
 order. Though a few horsemen rode in on the French line 
 and fell on the bayonets, the body of the Mamelukes was 
 quickly broken and driven back on Shubra-Khet, quite de- 
 moralized by the rapid French fire of grape and musketry. 
 Unable to understand the defeat, Murad Bey roundly abused 
 the party chiefs, who had shown themselves to be cowards, he 
 said, in not being able to defeat foot soldiers on an open 
 plain. He only knew Oriental foot. 
 
 So soon as Dugua reported with Kleber's division, Bonaparte 
 broke up from Ramaniyeh on July 12, and marched along 
 up the left bank of the Nile. Accompanying the column, the 
 flotilla, under Admiral Peree, moved up the river. This 
 was largely composed of Nile sailing vessels (djermas) which. 
 
A STEADY DEFENSE. 481 
 
 transformed into gunboats carrying four to six pieces, ren- 
 dered excellent service throughout the campaign. The French 
 army continued its advance at daylight, July 13, each division 
 marching over the plain in a square containing the baggage 
 
 Mameluke. 
 
 and the few horsemen, in imitation of the Russian tactics in 
 the wars with the Turks. There were not exceeding five 
 thousand Mamelukes assembled here under Murad Bey, but 
 their splendid mounts and brilliant colors on the open plain 
 afforded the French soldiers a coup d'ceil never yet had. 
 Bonaparte contented himself with a steady defense, as he was 
 anxious to test the Moslem manner of attack, as yet a nov- 
 elty to him. The five divisions formed five squares, six men 
 deep, with the artillery in the corners or between battalions. 
 The right square, under Desaix, was leaned on a big village 
 near the desert, the left one, under Vial, was protected by a 
 smaller village near the Nile, both being intrenched and con- 
 taining some batteries. The other squares stood between 
 these two in checkerwise fashion, the centre withdrawn. De- 
 saix's square was about " a hundred and fifty fathoms front 
 
482 ADMIRABLE SELF-CONFIDENCE. 
 
 by twenty-five on the flank," and Vial " made the same dis- 
 positions." The entire front was about eighteen hundred 
 fathoms — two miles — long. Every man was armed, the 
 subalterns, non-commissioned officers and cannoneers all car- 
 rying muskets. 
 
 The two forces remained several hours in position, the 
 French awaiting their fleet, which could not come on until 
 the north wind sprang up, which it usually did about eight in 
 the morning. Meanwhile distant duels were engaged between 
 the warriors and the Alpine marksmen. A few hardy horse- 
 men came up and dared the French to personal combat ; but 
 they were received by platoons of carbineers in front of the 
 battalion intervals. Finally, out of sheer impatience, the 
 
 Mameluke. 
 
 Mameluke host rode down upon the line, proposing to push 
 in between the squares, and to assail the French in the rear, 
 which they imagined to be naked. Their self-confidence was 
 admirable ; and to oppose to their rapid charges and fero- 
 cious individual bravery Bonaparte had the steadiness of his 
 foot .and the projecting line of bayonets. Led by Murad Bey 
 
BATTLE OF SHEBREISSE. 483 
 
 in person, the glittering array rode in between the squares of 
 Eeynier and Dugua ; but they were received by a frontal dis- 
 charge, then by a flank fire, and when they reached the rear, 
 they found this also vomiting musketry and canister. Murad 
 then turned against the villages, to be no better treated; 
 whereupon, torn to shreds by the unequal conflict, he and his 
 warriors galloped away towards their camp. 
 
 Bonaparte expected another attack, and delayed his advance 
 for a while ; but when this failed to come, the French line 
 advanced towards Shubra-Khet. Meanwhile the French flo- 
 tilla had arrived, and had exchanged about fifteen hundred 
 shots with the boats of Murad Bey. But being carried too 
 far up river by the north wind, it ran some danger of being 
 surrounded by the Moslem fleet. The advance of the squares, 
 however, disengaged the flotilla, and Murad's forces, ashore 
 and afloat, retired towards Cairo. The heavier armament of 
 the French boats had done some damage. The enemy had 
 lost six hundred men to one hundred of the French. The 
 Memoirs give the loss as three hundred French, mostly in the 
 flotilla, to eight hundred Moslems. 
 
 This smart combat, for it was nothing more, interesting, 
 because novel at the time, was dignified as the Battle of 
 Shebreisse, the name the French gave Shubra-Khet. 
 
 The army followed on the 15th and succeeding days, and 
 advancing constantly up the west bank of the Rosetta branch 
 of the Delta, between the river and the desert, reached Lel- 
 Uardan on the 19th, where victual was found. This was 
 much needed, for as the villages had all been deserted by the 
 inhabitants, and communication with Alexandria was cut off 
 by the swarms of Arabs in the rear, scant rations had been 
 collected on the way. Next day the French broke up towards 
 Embabeh. 
 
 At daylight on the 21st the French army came in sight of 
 
484 AT EMBABEH. 
 
 Cairo, having taken eight days to march the eighty miles from 
 Shubra-Khet. The sight of the Pyramids of Gizeh encouraged 
 the troops, and Bonaparte, in an allocution to the army pre- 
 vious to the ensuing battle, used the memorable phrase : " Sol- 
 diers ! you have come to these countries to snatch them from 
 barbarism, to carry civilization into the Orient, and save these 
 beautiful lands from the yoke of England. From these mon- 
 uments forty centuries are watching you ! *' 
 
 The Mamelukes had drawn up for a further defense of their 
 capital at Embabeh, a small suburb of Cairo, on the opposite 
 or left bank of the Nile. Soon the French came in view of 
 the enemy on the plain between the stony hills of Gizeh and 
 the river Nile. As the army advanced, the minarets of Cairo, 
 backed by the brown range of the Mokattam hills, were seen 
 on the left, with the ruins of Memphis in their front, and on 
 the right the everlasting Pyramids. In the Gallic mind this 
 wonderful view bred untold enthusiasm, which augured well 
 for the coming conflict. Murad Bey had collected ten thou- 
 sand Mamelukes on the plain, each served by three or four 
 footmen; and having armed twenty thousand fellahin, had 
 placed them behind earthworks at Embabeh. There had 
 joined him several thousand janissaries and spahis, or sol- 
 diers of the Pasha. His right rested on the Embabeh in- 
 trenchments, which, though defended by forty guns, were of 
 small value, being simply a wall and ditch. Here stood the 
 fellahin and the janissaries, while the little walled town of 
 Gizeh up river was defended by three thousand Arab auxil- 
 iaries. Murad's entire reliance was on his left wing, consist- 
 ing of his Mamelukes, who had vowed to drive the dogs of 
 Christians from the land. 
 
 His wiser colleague, Ibrahim Bey, was on the right bank 
 with a few thousand Mamelukes, spahis, and janissaries, and 
 had foresight enough to collect his wives, slaves and treasures 
 
FORMATION IN ECHELON. 
 
 485 
 
 in a , marching column, ready to abandon Cairo and flee to 
 Syria, should: Murad Bey lose the day. A large flotilla of 
 djermas, with all the treasures of the Mamelukes, lay at an- 
 chor on the- Nile. Murad Bey had drawn up his imposing 
 
 Battle of the Pyramids. 
 
 array of parti-colored, steel-clad, turbaned warriors in one 
 long, glittering line. Bonaparte now proposed to fight an 
 offensive battle. His forces were in five echeloned squares as 
 before : Desaix and Eeynier on the right towards the desert ; 
 Dugua, with whom Bonaparte remained, in the centre ; Vial 
 and Bon resting their left on the Nile. As before, the squares 
 
486 DIRECTION OF THE SQUARES. 
 
 were by division, six men deep, artillery in the angles and be- 
 tween the battalions, and the baggage, commander and gen- 
 eral staff in the centre. In this formation in echelon the 
 
 French advanced, stopping when- 
 ever attacked to permit the sides 
 of the squares to form front. 
 Should a position have to be cap- 
 tured, the foremost three ranks, 
 or first and third division of each 
 battalion, would advance to the 
 task, leaving the rearmost three 
 ranks, or second and fourth divi- 
 sions, to hold the square, which 
 then sustained the column of at- 
 tack. Special orders were issued, 
 so as to save ammunition, that the men should not fire wildly, 
 but wait until the enemy was within fifty paces. This was 
 the lesson of Bunker Hill, which Lafayette and Rochambeau 
 had been at some pains to teach the early levies of the French 
 Revolution, — " Wait, boys, till you can see the whites of 
 their eyes ! " 
 
 Bonaparte had ascertained through his spy-glass that the 
 Arab guns at Embabeh were not such as to be movable to 
 any distance, and saw that if he could rid himself of the 
 Mamelukes, Embabeh could easily be taken. He therefore 
 kept his right squares out of artillery reach, and gave the 
 centre squares such direction that they should cut the Mame- 
 lukes from Embabeh, while at the same time the two right 
 squares should push them towards the Nile. As he set the 
 squares in motion with this object in view, Murad Bey quickly 
 guessed his intention, and threw himself in a desperate charge 
 against Desaix. The latter, owing to accidents in the ground, 
 had scarcely time to close his square, but luckily the first 
 
A LIVING HEDGE. 
 
 487 
 
 onset of the Mamelukes was partial, and when the second 
 charge, which was in mass, occurred, it was met by a point- 
 blank volley of musketry and grape which tore it to tatters. 
 Little groups of the bravest Mamelukes continued to circle 
 
 Bonaparte in Egypt. 
 
 around the French square, charging into every gap, forcing 
 their horses upon the bayonets, striving to leap over the liv- 
 ing hedge, or throwing their rearing steeds upon the serried 
 line of steel. Forty of them actually broke into the right 
 flank square and fell at the very feet of Desaiz. 
 
488 FLIGHT OF THE ARABS. 
 
 Meanwhile the main body opposite Eeynier struck the 
 square of this division, and in striving to avoid its fire, came 
 within the zone of Dugua's musketry. Here the Mamelukes 
 lost their head, and as bravely as they charged, so rapidly did 
 they flee, leaving behind them thousands of corpses. Part of 
 the line wheeled towards the Pyramids, another turned towards 
 Embabeh. The sight of the defeat of their comrades demor- 
 alized the militia in this town, and Bon and Vial were ordered 
 forward to take it. The squares advanced, the three front 
 ranks, or proper divisions, ployed into column, and under 
 Kampon and Marmont rushed towards the village. The 
 Mamelukes left in Embabeh, and in part those who had fled 
 thither, sallied out and attacked the French column ; but this 
 halted and formed square, and drove back the assault. A 
 part of the French column took advantage of a deep ditch, 
 along which they could file, to turn the town, whose defenders 
 were melting away. The fleeing Arabs partly reached the 
 plain, where the French right wing drove them towards the 
 river, and those who remained in Embabeh, after a bare two 
 hundred shots from the guns, were driven into the Nile by 
 the French assaulting parties. As the Egyptians are mostly 
 good swimmers, many were able to save themselves. 
 
 No more dramatic battle had been seen since the Crusades. 
 Murad Bey retired with the wreck of his command to Upper 
 Egypt. From Cairo, Ibrahim Bey and the Pasha who repre- 
 sented the Sultan set fire to the flotilla in the Nile, thereby 
 consuming untold riches, and fled towards Belbeys and Sala- 
 hiyeh, on the caravan road to Syria. Bonaparte claims the 
 loss of the Mamelukes and fellahin at ten thousand men, of 
 which two thousand were Mameluke warriors ; his own at forty 
 killed and two hundred and sixty wounded. Numbers of fine 
 horses were captured, and piles of beautiful weapons ; many 
 a French soldier picked up a purse of gold, which the Mame- 
 
HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED. 489 
 
 lukes were in the habit of keeping on their persons, often 
 amounting in single cases to hundreds of louis d'or. Some 
 fifteen hundred men were drowned, and " for days succeeding 
 the battle the soldiers were busy fishing for corpses " to get 
 the purses. The French captured forty guns. It had been 
 an interesting, not a great battle. The army lay at night 
 near Embabeh and in the vicinity of Gizeh. Of the three 
 hundred men killed and wounded, many had been hit by the 
 cross-fire from the echeloned squares. 
 
 Desaix built an intrenched camp near Gizeh, as a base 
 from which to watch Murad Bey ; and a star redoubt was 
 ordered to be erected on the Pyramid plateau. Bonaparte's 
 first headquarters was established in Gizeh, where a palace of 
 Murad's afforded him abundant luxury. He was compelled 
 to await the flotilla to cross to Cairo, then a city of two hun- 
 dred thousand souls. Meanwhile this capital was in a tumult, 
 and the sheiks and ulemas of the city begged for French 
 aid. 
 
 On July 22 the French occupied the town and the citadel, 
 and next day Desaix moved up river to observe the road lead- 
 ing to Upper Egypt. He had a number of combats with 
 Murad Bey, all resulting in favor of the French. On the 
 24th Bonaparte moved his headquarters into Cairo, leaving 
 the divisions in and about the city, and issued orders looking 
 to the security of what had been already won. 
 
 The leader issued a proclamation to reassure the people, 
 and to show them he was only fighting the Mamelukes. He 
 wrote to the Pasha of Egypt, who had fled with Ibrahim, that 
 he might return, for " the same arms which we have made 
 victorious will always be at the disposition of the Sultan." 
 This letter was unheeded. 
 
XVIII. 
 ABOUKIR. JULY, 1798, TO JANUARY, 1799. 
 
 BoNAPAKTE establisliecl a Divan of prominent natives to govern Egypt. The 
 land was ruled by severity. Taxes, heavy but equitable, were raised on real 
 estate and commerce. The poor, not the rich, were aided. The villages were 
 all disarmed. The army was reorganized, and many natives found work in it. 
 Murad Bey was kept in Upper Egypt by Desaix, and a threatened mutiny having 
 been promptly suppressed, on August 2 Bonaparte started after Ibrahim. This 
 leader escaped to Syria. Salahiyeh was intrenched as a secondary French depot. 
 Contrary to Bonaparte's advice, the fleet had anchored in Aboukir Bay, and 
 here, August 1, Nelson in a fierce naval battle destroyed it, and Bonaparte found 
 himself cut off from France. But he bore this blow with wonderful equipoise, 
 though it changed all his prospects. On October 1 Desaix defeated Murad at 
 Sediman and drove him into the desert. The army was firmly managed, and 
 officers and men were rewarded and punished with an even hand. Severe in 
 reprimand, Bonaparte never forgot those who served him well. Communication 
 was established with Tippoo Sahib, Mecca, Damascus and other places, but 
 without eventual results. The scientific corps which had accompanied the army 
 began the excavations in Egypt which have continued until now, and did much 
 to build up the land. Late in October a native revolt broke out in Cairo, but 
 was suppressed by sharp measures, and by January, 1799, Bonaparte was ready 
 to start for Syria. 
 
 BoNAPAETE had overrun Egypt, but to make it a secure 
 military base and a useful colony, and thus a stepping-stone 
 for his own future as a soldier and a citizen, it remained to 
 organize the land, quiet the inhabitants, and bring order out 
 of chaos. More details of what was thus done in Egypt are 
 herein given than with regard to any other campaign, because 
 of their intrinsic interest as applying to what was then a new 
 country; and because they as well show the indefatigable 
 nature of the man in his work. In all his other campaigns 
 
A NATIVE DIVAN. 491 
 
 up to 1812, he labored with equal diligence, though what he 
 did may be but casually referred to. 
 
 The better to control the local population, he formed a 
 native Divan, " chosen among the most intelligent and wisest," 
 in which he held the power, but which itself controlled the 
 people. This Divan was composed of twenty-five members, 
 nine from Cairo and one from each of the sixteen provinces, 
 two secretaries, one interpreter, two sheriffs and ten court 
 servants. These men were drawn from the sheiks, the mer- 
 chants and the men of law, and themselves chose nine mem- 
 bers to sit in permanence in Cairo. In each province also 
 was a Divan of nine members nominated by the principal 
 inhabitants and chiefs, and chosen by the general command- 
 ing the province. The members of the Divan were well paid. 
 Tallien, ex-member of the legislative body of France, sat in 
 the Divan to represent Bonaparte. 
 
 Courts and bureaus were created, so that taxes might be 
 equitably raised. The ofi&cers of the bureaus, often Coptic 
 Christians, were handsomely paid, from an administrator at 
 six thousand livres (f 1200) down to a book-keeper at two 
 thousand livres. Taxes were raised on imports (on wines 
 and liquors, e. g. from France three per cent, and from other 
 places five per cent.}, on legal papers, licenses, on tavern- 
 keepers, livery stables, trades and from other sources. 
 
 Money was also raised by levying contributions on real 
 estate, the value of which was gauged on the basis of ten 
 times the rental value, and on merchants ; and all commerce 
 was made to contribute. Tribunals of commerce were erected 
 in the different cities to adjudge disputes between merchants. 
 A great part of Bonaparte's correspondence in Egypt was 
 devoted to civil organization. In all taxation he strove to 
 make the burden of the occupation fall on the rich and not on 
 the poor. This was his principle throughout life. The has- 
 
492 
 
 THE DROMEDARY CORPS. 
 
 tinado was abolished as a means of getting evidence, but the 
 agas were allowed to continue its infliction as a punishment. 
 
 Bonaparte strove to impress the people with the fact that 
 they were to be made independent, and to this end a general 
 assembly of the notables of the fourteen provinces of Egypt 
 was called together. 
 
 All Egypt had been disarmed ; but in January it was or- 
 dered that villages which were certainly loyal might bear 
 arms, each armed person being held to join the local French 
 column in case of attack by Arabs. 
 
 Hand in hand with the government of Egypt went the 
 organization of the army. A dromedary regiment was cre- 
 ated, consisting of two squadrons, each of four companies, 
 
 and each company hav- 
 ing a captain, a lieuten- 
 ant and the usual sub- 
 officers. The men were 
 mounted on dromedaries 
 and armed with guns with 
 bayonets and cartridge- 
 boxes, like the infantry, 
 and some of them also 
 carried a fifteen-foot 
 lance. They were dressed 
 in gray with a turban and 
 an Arab mantle ; and 
 were of the best mate- 
 rial, selected by merit 
 from all the regiments. 
 Every infantry soldier 
 was ordered to carry a stake five feet long, for field fortifica- 
 tions and other uses not easily supplied in a treeless country. 
 It was adjusted behind the left shoulder, in a socket attached 
 
 Officer of Dromedary Corps. 
 
NATIVES ENLISTED. 
 
 493 
 
 to the belt of the cartridge box. This was suggested by the 
 camp-stakes borne by the Roman legionaries. Every horse- 
 man was to carry two small skins, each holding ten pounds 
 of water ; and the artillery equipage of each gun was held to 
 
 Dromedary Soldier. 
 
 be supplied with a hundred pounds of water. Not only non- 
 commissioned officers, but lieutenants and sub-lieutenants in 
 the light infantry, were armed with muskets. Non-combatants 
 in the cavalry were also thus armed. 
 
 Janissaries were enlisted, the captain of a company having 
 eighty francs salary. In Cairo ten companies of National 
 Guards were created, consisting of all the civil employees 
 accompanying the army, camp followers and non-combatants. 
 All young Mamelukes over eight years old and under sixteen, 
 and all young slaves of the same age, were incorporated in 
 
494 HORSES PROCURED. 
 
 the army for fatigue and other duty. Organization and drill 
 were kept up in Cairo, and every Frenchman capable of bear- 
 ing arms was given weapons suitable to his state. Intrench- 
 ing tools were made for the guides. 
 
 Horses were procured by taxing each of the thirteen pro- 
 vinces from fifty to three hundred horses each. The horses 
 of each arm of the service, artillery, engineers, transporta- 
 tion, cavalry, etc., were branded with a letter or the num- 
 ber of a regiment, so that they could not be illegitimately 
 used. Yet the horses often got changed on the way to depot, 
 and mares were frequently turned in. Bonaparte said, Sep- 
 tember 24, 1798, in sending a horse to Menou, " It is very 
 difficult to find even passable ones." Presumably Murad Bey 
 had stripped the country. The Arabian is, moreover, small ; 
 and the French horses were found better than the native 
 for artillery, on account of their weight. 
 
 When servants brought from France struck for higher 
 wages, it was made illegal to hire the servant of an officer, 
 and these were forbidden to ask more than the amount settled 
 when first engaged. The servant who deserted his master 
 could be punished by five years in irons. 
 
 Mosques were made into hospitals. Cemeteries for soldiers 
 were erected in Cairo, Gizeh, Alexandria, Eosetta, Damietta, 
 Belbeys. Camels with palanquins, such as carry Arabian 
 women, were among other means used to transport the 
 wounded. 
 
 Numerous little establishments for manufacturing powder 
 were found in Egypt, and were improved and used for keep- 
 ing up the supply, but it was forbidden the people to manu- 
 facture powder anywhere, or to sell the powder made by the 
 natives, which was too poor for the army and good only for 
 the Arabs. 
 
 Bonaparte did all he could to encourage the troops, as was, 
 
SATISFACTORY NEWS. 495 
 
 indeed, essential under the unusual trials. But at times there 
 was scant material to announce in orders. On September 10, 
 1798, from Cairo he instructed Berthier to publish to the 
 army that the dispatches from France gave satisfactory news, 
 that the citadel of Turin had been occupied by the French, 
 that Ireland was in open insurrection, and that the Rastadt 
 negotiations were drawing to a close ; and communicated the 
 thanks of the Directory to the army for the taking of Malta. 
 On September 24, 1798, he announced to -the army that a 
 body of Arabs, some ten thousand strong, attacked at mid- 
 night the garrison of Damietta. They were boldly met by 
 the garrison, and some reinforcements assailed them in the 
 rear. Four or five hundred French thus beat ten thousand 
 Bedouins, fifteen hundred of whom were kiUed or drowned. 
 On September 22, 1798, he issued a 
 
 PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY. 
 
 Soldiers, we celebrate the first day of the seventh year of the Repub- 
 lic. Five years ago the independence of the French people was menaced, 
 but you took Toulon, which was a presage of the ruin of our enemies. A 
 year after you beat the Austrians at Dego, and next year you were on the 
 summit of the Alps. Two years ago you fought against Mantua, and you 
 won the celebrated victory of San Giorgio. Last year you were at the 
 sources of the Drave and the Isonzo, on the way back from Germany. 
 Who would have said that you would to-day be on the borders of the 
 Nile, in the centre of the most ancient continent ? From the English- 
 man celebrated in arts and commerce to the horrid and ferocious Bedouin, 
 the eyes of the world are upon you. 
 
 It is a curious fact that Bonaparte herein refers to the 
 battle near Mantua, and makes no mention of Castiglione, 
 Arcole or Rivoli. 
 
 From time to time Bonaparte reported to the Directory 
 with regard to the army. On October 21, 1798 : " We are 
 here in the same position ; the army is being clothed, and is 
 
496 THE MATTER OF VICTUALING. 
 
 resting, the artillery equipage forming, fortifications are ris- 
 ing, and the country is being organized. ... I will shortly 
 send you a fine map of Alexandria, of Cairo and of Egypt, 
 that I am having made. Every one works, no one loses his 
 time." A month later he reports that much difficulty is met 
 with in organizing the country on account of the inundations. 
 But on December 17 he wrote that " the army is in the best 
 condition, and there are few sick. . . . We have crops in 
 abundance." 
 
 As always, when not on the march, Bonaparte was careful 
 in watching the matter of victualing, and the quality of the 
 rations. On August 26, 1798, it was ordered that "there 
 shall be made in the army only one kind of loaf as a ra- 
 tion : whether for the staff or administration, it shall be the 
 regulation loaf. There shall be made much more carefully 
 bread for the hospitals, but it is forbidden, under whatever 
 pretext, for the administrators and storekeepers to give of the 
 latter bread to the general commanding or any other general, 
 nor to the general storehouse." 
 
 The bread ration of twenty-four ounces, made with wheat 
 mixed with a little bran, was often replaced by six ounces of 
 rice, and there was added to the ration six ounces of vege- 
 tables. Wine and brandy were furnished. Coffee was added 
 to the rations in September. A ration of meat was given 
 every third day, being half a pound, one quarter mutton and 
 three quarters buffalo meat. The hospital ration was some- 
 what better. Pay was retained for excess rations: for a 
 ration of bread five sous, a ration of meat three and a half 
 sous, a ration of rice two sous eight deniers, a ration of vege- 
 tables four deniers, melted butter or oil one franc four sous a 
 pound, a ration of wood, or half a pound, three deniers. No 
 effort was spared to keep up the quality of the ration. On 
 August 29, 1798, the Arab agent who mixed rye with the 
 
PURSUIT OF IBRAHIM. 497 
 
 wheat lie was ordered to grind was fined one thousand talari ; 
 and French officials were frequently reprimanded or punished. 
 
 Vial, with a small force, held Damietta, Lannes taking over 
 Menou's division. Other small bodies were sent to Mausma 
 and Suez. To Kleber was given the task of keeping open the 
 communications between the Nile and Alexandria so as to in- 
 sure those with the capital. The inhabitants of Cairo were 
 disarmed, and extra-heavy contributions were levied on the 
 city ; and in the government of Cairo considerable cruelty 
 was shown, for Bonaparte believed that Orientals could be 
 held in subjection only by severity ; that equity or generosity 
 was wasted, — an assumption but half true, as the English 
 have proved in many lands. 
 
 To make secure his holding of Egypt, that is, of Cairo and 
 the Delta of the Nile, it was essential to drive Ibrahim Pasha 
 across the desert into Syria, as Murad had been driven up 
 the great river. From Cairo up, Egypt is a country ten miles 
 wide on the average, and a thousand miles long. O^ly this 
 narrow valley is fertilized by the overflow of the Nile ; and 
 on either hand well above it lies the rocky, sandy, rolling 
 desert, boundless, waterless, with a rare oasis or a well, which 
 enables caravans at certain places to cross it. It was not a 
 hard task for Desaix to keep Murad in Upper Egypt ; but to 
 keep Ibrahim from doing constant harm, he must be followed 
 and driven entirely out of the Delta. On August 2, accord- 
 ingly, a small party was sent out to El Khanka in pursuit of 
 Ibrahim, at which place it arrived next day. On the 5th, 
 however, Ibrahim attacked this detachment and drove it back 
 on Cairo. Reynier had followed on and, meeting this party 
 on the way, took it up, and with the division reached El 
 Khanka on the 6th. Bonaparte had now completed his pre- 
 parations to move against Ibrahim ; and on the 7th started 
 with Lannes towards El Khanka, leaving to Desaix not only 
 the care of Upper Egypt, but of Cairo as well. 
 
498 IBRAHIM BEYOND REACH. 
 
 The French soldiery had been kept fairly well in check, 
 despite much grumbling at its unusual climatic sufferings ; 
 but at the sight of this new enterprise, which threatened to 
 lead them into deserts to which their lively imagination saw 
 no end, the dissatisfaction became louder and louder, and was 
 on the point of breaking out into open mutiny. But Bona- 
 parte had a peculiar way of keeping his finger on the pulse 
 of his army ; and before a single act of disobedience had 
 occurred, by his presence alone, and by his stern and yet 
 reasonable attitude, he suppressed the threatened breach of 
 discipline by a few words, and brought the men back to their 
 duty. And, says Savary, " so great was the confidence which 
 General Bonaparte had in himself, that with this condition 
 of affairs he actually left Cairo." 
 
 On the 7th the forces under Bonaparte reached El Khanka ; 
 and Dugua followed to El Matariyeh to join the expedition. 
 Two days later the corps was at Belbeys, while Ibrahim had 
 retired to Es Salahiyeh ; and on the 10th, the forward move- 
 ment having carried headquarters to El Karaim and on the 
 11th to Es Salahiyeh, Bonaparte, who had hurried ahead 
 with all the mounted cavalry he had, some three hundred 
 men, reached the vicinity of Ibrahim's party. But it was of 
 no avail ; Ibrahim had started for the Syrian desert, and a 
 rearguard fight accomplished nothing. In cavalry combats 
 the Mamelukes were quite the equals, if not the superiors, 
 of the French, and before the foot could come up, Ibrahim 
 had placed himself beyond reach. Es Salahiyeh being the 
 most available spot for a depot of supplies, lying at a salient 
 towards Syria with the line Cairo-Alexandria as a base, Bo- 
 naparte made arrangements to intrench the place, and to use 
 it as a secondary base for the operation he projected against 
 Syria. Detailed orders to this effect were later given to Caf- 
 farelli. Leaving Eeynier there to complete his plan and to 
 
THE BAY OF ABOUKIR. 499 
 
 cover the approaches from Syria, and sending Dugua on the 
 13th to El Mansura, Bonaparte hurried back to Cairo with 
 the division of Menou. 
 
 A grave misfortune now befell the French at the naval 
 battle of Aboukir. Bonaparte had desired the French men- 
 of-war to take refuge in the port of Alexandria ; and on July 3 
 he had ordered Admiral Brueys to enter the Old Port, if 
 there were enough draught ; if not, to disembark the artillery 
 and stores, and report whether he could hold himself against 
 a superior squadron in the Bay of Aboukir ; and in case 
 neither could be accomplished, to sail for Corfu or Toulon, 
 leaving five specified men-of-war at Alexandria, as well as all 
 transports. Brueys sounded the entrance, and as the ships of 
 eighty and one hundred and twenty guns, which demanded a 
 draught of from twenty-three to twenty-seven feet, could not, 
 he thought, go in, he declined to essay an entrance. He be- 
 lieved, moreover, that a single English ship could blockade 
 the entire port, and confine him to it in uselessness ; and as, 
 moreover, in an excess of zeal, the admiral desired to watch 
 the outcome of Bonaparte's enterprise, and thought that by 
 anchoring in the Bay of Aboukir he would in a measure pro- 
 tect Bonaparte's rear, he sailed thither. On the other hand, 
 Bonaparte's idea was that in Corfu or Toulon the French 
 fleet, being safe, would be more useful than where subject 
 to risk — and he was right. After the event, to be sure, on 
 August 19, Bonaparte reported to the Directory that he had 
 written Brueys to lose not an hour in entering Alexandria 
 or making for Corfu ; but the assertion is sustained by the 
 earlier correspondence. 
 
 In Aboukir Bay, then, on his return from Syria, Nelson 
 found the French fleet anchored. This is a semicircular basin, 
 with the Eosetta cape and the Aboukir cape as headlands ; 
 and the Aboukir cape was fortified so as to prevent a landing. 
 
500 
 
 NELSON'S BOLD MAN(EUVRE. 
 
 Nelson. 
 
 Brueys had seventeen ships stationed in a long line substan- 
 tially parallel to the shore, with broadsides seaward. He felt 
 sure that no ship could cross the shoals between him and 
 Aboukir, — and indeed it took a Nelson to dare it, — and 
 
 placed his strongest vessels at the 
 other end of the line. 
 
 Nelson and his fleet came up July 
 31, having long cruised in search of 
 the French ; and when, after recon- 
 noitring, he ascertained the anchor- 
 ing line of their ships, he deter- 
 mined on immediate action ; and at 
 eventide of August 1 he sailed down 
 upon the French left, taking Admiral 
 Brueys completely by surprise. Nel- 
 son's manoeuvre was bold. Defying 
 the danger of the shoals between Aboukir fort and the French 
 left, and favored by the wind, he sailed in and took the French 
 line of ships in reverse, on the side where no preparation had 
 been made to meet an enemy. Many sailors were ashore, 
 and the French fleet was unprepared for anything but an 
 attack from seaward. Nelson's boldness succeeded, as it 
 deserved to do. The leading English ship stuck on a shoal, 
 but four others which followed passed in safety and struck 
 the French vessels in their helpless condition ; and mean- 
 while, with eight ships of the line, Nelson attacked the sea- 
 ward front. On this front the British suffered severely, and 
 the French admiral at one time even felt sure of victory, 
 ordering his right wing ships to take the English line in 
 reverse. This was not done, however. The Orient was 
 blown up, and darkness brought on a pause. At earliest 
 dawn the fighting began again, and went on till two o'clock 
 in the afternoon. Brueys was mortally wounded. He would 
 
HOPES OF SUCCESS DASHED. 501 
 
 not allow himself to be carried away. " Leave me," said he ; 
 " a French admiral should die on his quarter-deck." All 
 told, the battle lasted twenty hours. Four French ships es- 
 caped to Malta. The rest of the French fleet (save the two 
 ships of the line and seven frigates which were in Alexan- 
 dria with the transports) was destroyed. Nelson left five 
 ships of the line before Alexandria, and shortly sailed for 
 Naples. 
 
 In a letter to Kleber, September 4, 1798, Bonaparte says : 
 " We cannot dissimulate that in the combat of the 14th it 
 was our leaders who were beaten rather than the squadron, 
 for, with equal numbers, the English were three or four 
 against one. I only see in it a 
 false combination ; this gives me 
 a favorable idea of Admiral Nel- 
 son, but gives me a not too un- 
 favorable one of our navy ; and 
 I remain always convinced that 
 if the English had attacked us 
 on our crossing, we should have 
 beaten them soundly." And from 
 Aboukir, October 7, he wrote to 
 the Directory that he sent to Brueys. 
 
 them the soundings of Alexan- 
 dria harbor, and that the French squadrons would well have 
 been able to enter. " What regrets does this not add to our 
 losses ! " 
 
 It was at the moment of Bonaparte's return to Cairo that 
 the news of the sea-fight of Aboukir ran in, and at one blow 
 he saw dashed all his hopes of eventual success in his Oriental 
 schemes. No fleet meant no commerce, no security for the 
 new colony, and therefore no colonists, no communication 
 with home except by vessels which might run the gauntlet of 
 
502 ADHERENCE TO THE MASS THEORY. 
 
 the English fleet. But all who saw Bonaparte at this time tes- 
 tify that in face, words or conduct he showed no sign of even 
 disappointment. The army heard of the disaster with dread ; 
 but one and all recognized that their chief reliance now 
 rested solely on the small, spare, stern, self-contained man who 
 had led them in triumph from Nice to Leoben. All over 
 Egypt the news of Aboukir produced a change of sentiment. 
 Bonaparte had already begun to accomplish results ; this dis- 
 aster arrested all improvement. The Mamelukes gained heart 
 of hope ; the Sublime Porte turned against France. 
 
 Although we learn to know the man and soldier during 
 these trying days, there is perhaps less in the Egyptian cam- 
 paign than in others which adds to our instruction in the art 
 of war. Yet Napoleon's failures are full of interest. And 
 here, though both the adversary and the climate were differ- 
 ent from what he had so far encountered, Bonaparte stuck to 
 his mass theory ; and in order to start on his Syrian expedi- 
 tion, he gathered all the force at his command. And again, 
 in dispatching Desaix after Murad Bey to Upper Egypt, and 
 giving him sole control of the land above Cairo, when the 
 French general wrote that he was about to divide his force so 
 as to surround and capture the Mamelukes, Bonaparte sent 
 him word from Cairo, September 4 : " You know that in gen- 
 eral I do not like combined attacks. Approach Murad Bey 
 from whatever direction you can, but with all your forces. 
 On the battlefield, if he stands, you can take all your mea- 
 sures to do him as much harm as possible." And to Ber- 
 thier he wrote : " You will give orders to General Desaix to 
 attack Murad Bey wherever he shall find him, but always to 
 keep his forces together. My intention is that he shall not 
 divide his forces with the idea of surrounding the enemy. 
 This kind of man<Euvre is too uncertain in a country naturally 
 cut up like the one in which he is situated." As Jomini 
 
ACTION AT SEDIMAN. 503 
 
 says, " The simpler a decisive manoeuvre is, the more certain 
 the result." The perfection of every art tends towards sim- 
 plicity. 
 
 The French army enjoyed a short rest while preparations 
 were going on to consolidate the conquest of Egypt, and pre- 
 pare for the Syrian invasion. After the battle of the Pyr- 
 amids, Murad Bey retired to the Fayum with twelve thousand 
 men, half of them mounted. Desaix followed with eight bat- 
 talions and two guns, after a fruitless effort to negotiate. On 
 August 25 his troops were embarked in Nile boats, and he 
 reached Siut, two hundred miles up river, September 14. No 
 sooner arrived than, hearing that Murad Bey had thrown him- 
 self into the desert to make a rearward circuit against Cairo, 
 Desaix turned his boats about, sailed down again, and on 
 October 1 met Murad Bey at Sediman (Sedments). Desaix 
 marched in a great square, as at the Pyramids, but he added 
 two small squares of two hundred and fifty voltigeurs each on 
 the flanks. Murad Bey attacked the latter, broke through the 
 one on the right wing and rode it down ; but the fire of the big 
 square drove him back with loss. The officer in command of 
 the small square had committed the error of not letting his men 
 fire until point-blank range ; and at this short distance the 
 Arab horses, charging at a gallop, could no longer be checked, 
 but by their very momentum kept on and overwhelmed the 
 men by mere weight of mass. Murad then ployed all his 
 cavalry into column, and rode with fury down upon Desaix's 
 big square, which he attacked with true Moslem fury, time 
 and time again. When the riders could not break through 
 the square, they hurled their weapons at the French line ; the 
 wounded crawled onward to give a last dagger-stroke at 
 the feet of the enemy ; but no individual bravery could resist 
 stanch discipline. Murad now did what he should have done 
 at the opening of the action. There were eight guns mounted 
 
T& % f^tOlTElRRANElAN 
 
 PHlL.AEffl<^c,=,OUAM 
 FIRST J'CATARACT 
 
 Alexandria to Aasuan. 
 
CONTROLLING THE POPULATION. 505 
 
 in his intrenched camp. He filed off so as to unmask these 
 guns, which then opened upon Desaix's square. Had he thus 
 begun, and followed up the artillery fire by his charge, Desaix 
 would probably have lost the day, or at all events he would 
 have had to change his tactics, for the guns soon made a 
 breach in the French square. To save himself, Desaix was 
 forced to capture the battery, and Murad was not quick 
 enough to take advantage of the critical moment. The brave 
 French column rushed the intrenchments, captured the guns, 
 and turned them on the Mamelukes, who fled towards the 
 desert. The French loss was nearly five hundred men. On 
 each Mameluke killed the men found a purse, often holding 
 as much as five hundred louis, it being the custom of the 
 Mameluke to carry his fortune with him. During the winter 
 Desaix's column made its way with numberless skirmishes, 
 some of them severe, up to the cataracts of the Nile. He 
 . established headquarters at Beni Suef, about fifty miles above 
 Cairo, and began to settle the affairs of the country. 
 
 As appears above, Bonaparte had long ago made up his 
 mind that to rule Egypt — perhaps to rule any Oriental race 
 — rigor alone would suffice. Right or wrong, on this theory 
 he acted, at the same time making use of all other means of 
 controlling the population. He pretended interest in Moham- 
 medanism even to the verge, it is asserted with questionable 
 authority, of becoming a convert to its teachings ; and he 
 made much of those in religious authority. It required an 
 abnormal self-reliance, a determination of the highest order, to 
 carry through his plans in the face of the daily growing diifi- 
 culties of the situation. The entire population was inimical ; 
 " though beaten they were not subdued, and would not be for 
 a long period," he reported ; and on every side were growing 
 symptoms of revolt. Repression by the most extreme mea- 
 sures was in order. 
 
506 STERN PUNISHMENT. 
 
 *' To Vial Napoleon wrote from Cairo, September 26 : " Citizen Gen- 
 eral, you will use the days during which the division of General Dugua 
 can remain at Damietta to disarm the city, to arrest the suspects and 
 send them to Cairo, to disarm the villages and take hostages." To Dugua, 
 October 6 : " I am dissatisfied, Citizen General, that the five villages 
 which have acted so badly have not yet been disarmed." For having 
 assassinated an officer and fifteen men, the village of Alkan was pillaged 
 and burned ; and the summary manner of dealing with the chiefs is well 
 shown in an order of July 30 from Cairo. "Bonaparte, General-in- 
 Chief, having proofs of the treachery of Seid Mohammed El-Koraim, 
 whom he had covered with kindnesses, orders : Article 1. Seid Mo- 
 hammed El-Koraim shall pay a contribution of three hundred thousand 
 francs. Article 2. In default of his paying the said contribution five days 
 after the publication of this order, he shall be beheaded." The money 
 must have been paid to little advantage, for on September 5, 1798, " it ap- 
 pears that Seid Mohammed El-Koraim, convicted of treason by having 
 kept up correspondence with the Mamelukes after having sworn fidelity 
 to the Republic, and by having served them as spy, was shot in the citadel 
 of Cairo ; his head was carried about the streets, and all his goods were 
 confiscated." 
 
 Of stern punishment there was plenty, as witness the following : 
 " Cairo, August 1. The town of Damanhur has acted very badly against 
 a detachment of our troops commanded by General Dumuy. An exem- 
 plary vengeance is necessary. . . . General Dumuy will disarm the town, 
 will decapitate five of the principal inhabitants, one being the worst be- 
 haved among the men of law, and the four others taken among those who 
 have the most influence over the populace." On August 4 Bonaparte 
 wrote to General Zajonshek : " You have done well, Citizen General, to 
 shoot five men of the villages which had revolted." On November 3 a 
 list was published of fourteen sheiks and others who were condemned to 
 death and to have their goods confiscated. To Reynier, Cairo, October 27, 
 the chief wrote : " Every night we have some thirty heads cut off, and 
 many of these of leaders ; this will, I hope, give them a good lesson ; " 
 and to Lanusse, Cairo, October 27 : " The garrison of Damietta has been 
 attacked. Citizen General, and, as it seems to me, murdered by the vil- 
 lagers of Ramleh. Strive to capture the leaders and decapitate them." 
 
 Of such orders the records are full, and they show the con- 
 dition of the land, and what had to be contended with. 
 
BREACHES OF DISCIPLINE. 507 
 
 Money too was procured by the ancient Egyptian means of 
 severe cruelty and, until forbidden, the bastinado ; and even 
 with this the army chest was frequently empty. 
 
 The discipline of the army left much to be desired, though 
 in this respect Bonaparte was never as successful as many of 
 his great predecessors in the art of war. The men plundered 
 right and left, official responsibility was lax, and no woman 
 was safe from violation, despite all orders and punishments. 
 All these breaches of discipline had to an extent existed in 
 1796 ; but every man of the Army of Italy was proud to be- 
 long to that body, and happy to see the campaign continued. 
 This was in itself a limitation of indiscipline ; but here the 
 reverse was the case. To those who had looked on Egypt 
 as the land of promise — and the rank and file had all left 
 home with this delusion — disenchantment came in full mea- 
 sure. Only Gallic light-heartedness carried the men through. 
 In the " Correspond ance de I'Armee Fran(jaise," the utter 
 wretchedness of the Egyptian population, of the villages, of 
 Alexandria, and of Cairo, is fully set forth. 
 
 Yet it was sought to enforce discipline by occasional sharp 
 reproofs, and sharper punishments. 
 
 On October 14, 1798, " The general-in-chie£ accepts the resignation 
 of the Citizen Beauvais. The officer who in good health resigns in the 
 middle of a campaign cannot have come here with the intention of ac- 
 quiring glory and to conduce to the end of general peace. He has been 
 brought here by other motives, and is not worthy of the soldiers whom I 
 command." On December 10, Chief of Brigade Grobert having asked to 
 be sent back to France, " The general-in-chief answers this request, that as 
 the Citizen Grobert won his grade of chief of brigade in Paris, and with- 
 out hearing a shot fired, his intention is that this officer shall be continu- 
 ally employed at the outposts : you will therefore order him to Salahiyeh." 
 On January 8 it was ordered that " every health officer who without 
 orders leaves the place designated for the hospital in presence of the 
 enemy, or who refuses to carry help to the sick, is to be arrested, brought 
 before the military council, and judged according to the article of the law 
 
508 SINGULAR FIDELITY. 
 
 relating to soldiers and military men who have fled before the enemy. No 
 Frenchman should fear death, whatever profession he may have chosen. 
 The Citizen Boyer, surgeon of the wounded at Alexandria, who was so 
 cowardly as to refuse aid to the wounded who had been in contact with 
 men sick of a disease supposed to be contagious, is unworthy of the quality 
 of a French citizen. Let him be dressed like a woman, marched about 
 the streets of Alexandria on an ass, with a placard on his back inscribed. 
 Unworthy of being a French citizen. He fears to die. After which he is 
 to be put in prison, and sent back to France on the first ship." A cor- 
 poral and a grenadier were shot for assassinating three women, and the 
 officers and grenadiers of their company were degraded. Two captains 
 were cashiered for gambling with the soldiers : a penalty later modified. 
 
 To compensate for these punishments, rewards for good 
 conduct were not infrequent. On January 18 Citizen De- 
 vouges, light horseman, was promoted to be second lieutenant 
 for having followed the troops when he had received leave of 
 absence. Soldiers who had been recommended for bravery 
 in Italy received double pay in Egypt. On February 2 sil- 
 ver drumsticks were ordered to be given to drummers, silver 
 trumpets to trumpeters, and gold grenades to soldiers who 
 distinguished themselves. Singular fidelity was shown by 
 many of Bonaparte's associates. In January, 1799, Berthier, 
 being really sick, was sent off on a cruise in which he was to 
 visit Corfu, Malta and sail towards Syria. He was also given 
 permission to go to France ; but learning that the army was 
 to march to Syria, he handed back his passport and rejoined 
 the army. Bonaparte recognized this kind of fidelity, not only 
 by honor and rank, but also in a substantial manner — as 
 when, on February 1, certain real estate was given to Lannes, 
 Dommartin, Murat and others. 
 
 Yet neither punishment nor reward could forestall or pre- 
 vent the constant breaches of discipline. The suffering of the 
 army was intense. Unusual exertion in the fearful heat, 
 under which men fell by dozens in their tracks, with rations 
 
FORTIFICATIONS ERECTED. 509 
 
 often ill-supplied, absence of fuel to cook, unfit clothing, 
 heavy loads and poor camps, produced homesickness among 
 ,all. Nostalgia was as serious a sickness as dysentery or 
 typhoid. Officers and men alike suffered. Camp disease in- 
 creased, blindness attacked many ; and by the end of the 
 year the plague set in. There were no two minds as to the 
 horror of the situation. The number of suicides by bullets 
 and drowning increased. Only sharp reprimand and punish- 
 ment kept back resignations, or requests for leave of officers. 
 These latter Bonaparte treated with sharp measures in orders 
 of the day and in personal orders. But he never forgot those 
 officers who here proved faithful. The men who bore with 
 and rose superior to their distress in this campaign found 
 themselves later in the line of rapid and high promotion. Yet 
 the trouble was great, and time rather increased than dimin- 
 ished it. That Bonaparte kept the army in a condition of 
 usefulness and retained its confidence argues distinctly for 
 his strength and ability, for his power over men. 
 
 Fortifications were carefuUy erected wherever they were 
 thought to be essential. On October 20, 1798, on the road 
 from Alexandria to El Ramaniyeh, Caffarelli was ordered to 
 build a good redoubt at every five leagues, capable of holding 
 two hundred men and of being defended by fifty men, and 
 to do so was authorized to use stones and other materials from 
 abandoned mosques. The several places of strategic advan- 
 tage were made as strong as possible. In December a small 
 force went to Suez with orders to fortify it, and especially to 
 look after the wells and to examine and chart the country. 
 Later Bonaparte made a tour of inspection of the Red Sea 
 shore, and Admiral Ganteaume was ordered over to inspect 
 the place with regard to its naval values. 
 
 During the fall and winter of 1798, headquarters was in 
 Cairo. Dugua held El Mansura, and later Damietta. Rey- 
 
510 PLAYING FOR EFFECT. 
 
 nier was in Es Salahiyeh, and Desaix at Beni Suef. Cairo 
 was intrenched, and garrisoned by Lannes and Bon. Some 
 interchanges of troops occurred. Lannes sent his line half- , 
 brigade to Kleber in Alexandria, and Bon sent one of his light 
 half-brigades to Menou in Kosetta. Despite discouraging 
 surroundings, Bonaparte stuck to his work. What was not 
 good he made to so appear; all dispatches which should 
 reach the ear of the French people glowed with a roseate hue. 
 As in a measure he did all through life, he was now doubly 
 playing for effect, though indeed he had by no means yet 
 convinced himself that the Egyptian expedition was a failure. 
 Bonaparte constantly strove to communicate with those 
 whose action might influence the Egyptian situation. 
 
 He wrote, August 27, 1798, to the SherifE of Mecca, telling him that 
 measures had been taken to conserve for the holy mosques of Mecca and 
 Medina the revenues due in Egypt, and offering to provide protection, 
 ammunition and provisions for him On August 31, 1798, he wrote to the 
 Pasha of Damascus, " I have already written you several letters to let 
 you know that we are no enemies to the Mussulmans ; and that the only 
 reason that has brought us to Egypt is to punish the Beys, and avenge the 
 outrages they have done to French commerce. I desire that you should 
 remain persuaded of the wish I have to live in good intelligence with 
 you, and to give you all the signs of most perfect friendship. Bonaparte." 
 On the same date he wrote to the Sultan's Pasha, asking him to return to 
 Cairo. On November 9, in a letter from Cairo to the Grand Vizier, ex- 
 pressing friendship for the Sublime Porte, and reiterating the promise 
 of the French only to punish the Beys of Egypt, "as we have done in 
 Algeria and Tunis," he says : " The French Republic is by inclination as 
 well as by interest friendly to the Sultan, because she is the enemy of 
 his enemies ; she positively refused to enter the Coalition which was made 
 by the two emperors against the Sublime Porte. The powers which have 
 already divided Poland between them have the same purpose against 
 Turkey. In the actual conditions, the Sublime Porte ought to look upon 
 the French army as a friend devoted to it, and which is all ready to act 
 against these enemies." In a letter of December 17 to the Directory, 
 Bonaparte states that an Indian who, said he, had come from Tippoo 
 
HEADQUARTERS IN CAIRO. 511 
 
 Sahib, had arrived at Suez with a letter for the commander of the French 
 forces in Egypt, but the letter had got lost. « It seems that our arrival 
 in Egypt has given a great idea of our power to India, and has produced 
 an effect unfavorable to the English. Fighting is going on there." On 
 December 19 it was ordered that everything should be done for the mon- 
 astery at Mount Sinai, "in order that the tradition of our conquest shall 
 be carried forward to future races, out of respect for Moses and the Jew- 
 ish nation, and because the monastery is kept by men of education and 
 good order." Their taxes were remitted, and they were to be their own 
 masters, subject to no superior. On January 25 word was sent to the 
 Iman of Muscat, asking him to forward the following letter : « To Tippoo 
 Sahib : You have been instructed of my arrival on the borders of the Red 
 Sea with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire to 
 deliver you from the iron yoke of the English. I hasten to make you 
 understand the desire that I have that you should give me, by way of 
 Muscat or Mecca, news as to the political situation in which you are. I 
 could wish that you might send to Suez some able man in your confidence 
 with whom 1 could confer. Bonaparte." 
 
 These extracts throw light on the leader's ideas of what 
 might be done in the Orient to favor France and injure 
 England. But the practical failure of aU these advances 
 must have lent additional discouragement to a situation as yet 
 promising no return for all the sacrifices made. 
 
 At the same time headquarters in Cairo was organized in 
 a manner worthy of a little Paris. In an autograph note of 
 Bonaparte's, probably written at the end of July, relating to 
 things to be ordered from France, there were included come- 
 dians, ballet-dancers, marionettes, one hundred French women, 
 the wives of the French employed in Egypt, together with 
 doctors, druggists, surgeons, gardeners, wine-growers and dis- 
 tillers, and a large supply of brandy, wine, soap and oil. No 
 detail seemed too small for the eyes and time of this many- 
 sided man. And although the French army was really ban- 
 ished from the fatherland, for many months elapsed before 
 any news reached it from Europe, the English fleet holding 
 
512 THE SAVANTS ESSENTIAL. 
 
 complete possession of the Mediterranean, yet both officers 
 and men made the best of their lot, and much gayety was 
 indulged in at each one of the permanent posts. All pro- 
 fessional soldiers make light of suffering; and the Gaul 
 has a peculiar cheerfulness given him by nature. 
 
 No species of amusement was neglected. On August 26, 
 1798, an order to celebrate the establishment of the Republic 
 provided : — 
 
 " Article 3. There will be built in Cairo, in the middle of the Ezeckyeh 
 square, a pyramid with seven faces, each destined to receive the names 
 of the men of the five divisions who have died in the conquest of Egypt. 
 The sixth face shall be for the navy, the seventh shall be for the general 
 staff, the cavalry, the artillery and the engineers." About this pyra- 
 mid games and other celebrations were to be given. On November 13 a 
 request was sent to Caffarelli to have made a few games of bowls to be 
 sent to the troops at Belbeys, and to Desaix. On December 21 daily 
 music was ordered to be played in the open square, beside the hospitals, 
 " to inspire gayety in the sick, and to retrace to them the most beautiful 
 moments of the past campaigns." On January 30 it was ordered that the 
 feast of Ramzan should be celebrated with all fervor and pomp. 
 
 Full support had likewise been given to the men of science 
 who had agreed to accompany the expedition, and their work 
 extended to every department of the army. Having early 
 sloughed off the boorishness of the Terrorists, Bonaparte re- 
 verted to his natural disposition to sustain learning. Nor were 
 these worthy savants without their material uses. Cut off from 
 supplies, the leader found them essential in making the most 
 of the resources of Egypt for the benefit of the army. Hand 
 in hand with this work went archaeology and astronomy. Bo- 
 naparte had once said to the governors of the Ligurian Re- 
 public, " True conquests, the only ones which cause no regrets, 
 are those achieved over ignorance." He now proved his as- 
 sertion good, and an Institute of Sciences was established in 
 Cairo by order of August 22, 1798. With an original mem- 
 
UNEARTHING TREASURES. 513 
 
 bership of thirty-six individuals headed by Bonaparte, this 
 was the beginning of the renascence of Egypt. It was in- 
 deed this body that commenced the work of unearthing the 
 vast treasures of the Egyptian Pharaohs from the detritus of 
 twelve centuries of Mohammedan barbarism. Among other 
 discoveries was the location of the Suez Canal of Sesostris ; 
 and Desaix began the excavations of ancient Thebes. While 
 his late Austrian opponents were living at ease, and Nelson 
 was forgetting himself in Naples, Bonaparte was opening the 
 buried riches of Egypt for the future. Like Alexander, he 
 carried learning with him wherever he went. Many things of 
 this nature must be scored to his credit. They offset much 
 that may be said against him. 
 
 The members and employees of the commission of science 
 and arts were well paid, from the first class at five hundred 
 francs a month down to the tenth class at fifty francs a month. 
 The medical staff was less well treated. In hospitals, a doc- 
 tor, who did the work of our hospital stewards, received eighty 
 francs a month, a clerk a hundred to a hundred and fifty, and 
 the higher officers three to four hundred francs a month, plus 
 one to three rations. 
 
 News was almost impossible to get, though every effort was 
 made to procure it. On December 11 an envoy was sent to 
 Cyprus and Constantinople on the pretext of asking the re- 
 lease of the Frenchmen arrested in Syria, but really to obtain 
 news. On November 16 a parliamentarian was sent on 
 board the English fleet on a slender pretext, in order to pro- 
 cure news from Europe. On December 9 an embassy was 
 sent to Dernah and Tripoli to seek the good-will of the Beys, 
 and to ask them to send such information from Europe as 
 they might from time to time receive. And on December 
 12 and 18 orders were given to Marmont to send Arabs to 
 Dernah to get news, " which occasionally comes thither from 
 
514 CONSTANT SMALL WAR. 
 
 Europe, that port not being blockaded by the English." News 
 would be well paid for, it was said. Yet all that ran in were 
 as a rule idle rumors. 
 
 There was constant small war with the neighboring tribes 
 and with revolting villages. Murat had proved so efficient in 
 handling cavalry that he was apt to be sent out to suppress 
 these revolts and punish the instigators. 
 
 On August 29, 1798, in a letter to Berthier, Napoleon tells him to send 
 Junot to hunt up Bey Torrah, the man who killed a French sergeant. If 
 he could fall upon one of their camps, he is to carry off twenty of their 
 women as hostages. On August 31, 1798, orders were issued to burn 
 down a village near Monsurat, and to levy a contribution on the rich men 
 of the village for their bad conduct to the troops. On November 1 Bona- 
 parte wrote to Berthier : " You will give the order to General Lannes to 
 leave to-morrow at the point of day with four hundred men, and to march 
 to the village of El-Quatah on the Rosetta branch, to punish the inhab- 
 itants for having stopped this morning two flat-boats (djermas) charged 
 with artillery. He will strive to arrest the Sheik El-Beled, and failing 
 this, twelve of the principal inhabitants. He will do all that is possible 
 to make them return the bayonets, guns, muskets, etc., they have pil- 
 laged." On January 20 Murat was ordered with a small force to fall on 
 an Arabian camp, " to carry off the camels, women, children, old men, 
 and to bring them to Cairo ; to kill all that he could not take, and to do 
 all the harm possible." 
 
 The women thus taken were an incumbrance, and on December 8 it 
 was ordered that when women fell into the hands of an expedition against 
 the Arabs, they were to be sent to Damietta, or Alexandria, whichever 
 place was nearest, to be held in prison by the sheiks of the country. 
 
 The English victory at Aboukir was followed by a block- 
 ade of the port of Alexandria, where the French transports 
 and the few remaining men-of-war lay at anchor. It seems as 
 if the English fleet must have been in the habit of amusing 
 itself by coming close in shore and bombarding Alexandria, 
 or French camps or posts in the vicinity. On September 4, 
 1798, Bonaparte wrote Kleber instructions on this subject. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRING. 
 
 515 
 
 " Order, and see it executed, that your cannoneers do not fire when 
 ships are still out of range. It proves that they are afraid. Let the 
 ships advance to half-range, and then let the shell and the red-hot balls 
 commence together, quietly and methodically, and I assure you that they 
 will quickly rue it. 
 
 " When the ships snug up to you (viennent /aire les jolis cceurs), fire 
 at them with half-charges, to draw them on and offer them a bait. Every 
 battery that has only time to fire one or two shells and three or four 
 charges is commanded by a man who does not know his trade, or it is 
 because they have not let the ships come close enough. If they have 
 let the ships get within half-range, they should have time to fire five or 
 six shells and eight or ten balls for each piece, and if the gunners are 
 good and the officers cool, it is certain that with this number of shots 
 some must do great damage and the vessels ought to be lost. Forbid 
 firing with cold balls, unless it be of a few shot mixed in to ease the piece ; 
 otherwise the gunners will always fire cold shot. They do not like to fire 
 hot shot. . . . Have the different detachments of artillery exercise every 
 day with hot balls. Most of 
 our gunners, even our officers, 
 have had little chance to fire 
 with hot balls." 
 
 The closing of the port 
 of Alexandria was not 
 the only ill result of the 
 defeat of Aboukir; for 
 Turkey, irritated at the 
 French invasion of Egypt, 
 had been persuaded to 
 join hands with England, 
 and now agreed to raise 
 armies to drive the 
 French from the land. 
 When Bonaparte left France, it had been agreed with the 
 Directory that Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, should 
 go to Constantinople to explain the French attitude in the 
 Egyptian expedition, for the Porte had always been friendly. 
 
 Talleyrand. 
 
516 NATIVE REVOLT IN CAIRO. 
 
 This was not done, and the result was disastrous. Bonaparte 
 was threatened with further interference from without. 
 Months before there had been a fair chance for France to 
 play into the hands of the Porte, but Bonaparte now learned 
 that a Turkish army was assembling in Syria under Ahmed 
 Pasha, known as Djezzar (" the Butcher ") ; and that another, 
 in Rhodes, was being got ready to land in Egypt and relieve 
 Cairo. These armies were to be convoyed by the English 
 fleet, as Turkey was already assisted by English money. So 
 soon as he heard this news, Bonaparte, with his usual expe- 
 dition, resolved to deal the first blow. It was only against 
 Djezzar that he could direct this, for he had no fleet with 
 which to reach Rhodes ; and moreover the Syrian threat was 
 by far the more dangerous. It also came to his knowledge 
 that a large magazine of breadstuffs and material of war was 
 being equipped in Acre (St. Jean d'Acre), in Syria, and from 
 here the enemy had advanced a detachment to Gaza, and 
 thrown out a small party under Abdallah Pasha, Djezzar's 
 lieutenant, as far as El Arish, on the border of the Syrian 
 desert. Guns and artillerists had been landed at Jaffa. 
 
 Bonaparte was on the point of starting on this Syrian ex- 
 pedition when, owing largely to the disaster of Aboukir and 
 to the news that the Sultan was sending an army of relief, a 
 revolt broke out in Cairo on October 22, and General Dupuy 
 and three hundred French soldiers were killed. The mea- 
 sures for repression were quick and sharp. So soon as the 
 revolt began, General Bon was ordered to attack the insur- 
 gent quarter, bombard the mosques, and put the mortars in 
 such places as would do the most damage. The mosques were 
 to be the centre of attack ; all men found with arms in their 
 hands were to be cut down, all houses from which stones were 
 thrown upon the streets were to be set afire ; every one 
 found in the mosques was to be exterminated. To prevent 
 
TRANQUILLITY RESTORED. 517 
 
 the prowling of dangerous characters, all houses were to be 
 kept lighted at night. And the troops were ordered, October 
 23, to throw down the grand mosque, « by pulling out some 
 columns if possible." On this same day Bonaparte wrote to 
 Berthier : " You will please, Citizen General, give the order 
 
 P -T 
 
 E^ypt and Syria. 
 
 to the commander of the place to have the heads cut off of all 
 the prisoners who have been taken with arms in their hands. 
 They will be conducted this night to the borders of the Nile, 
 between Boulak and Cairo, and their headless bodies will be 
 thrown into the river." The revolt lasted but two days. He 
 wrote Louis Bonaparte " that it had taken two days to put 
 down the revolt, and about a thousand Turks had been 
 killed ; " and on October 24 he wrote Desaix that tranquillity 
 was actually and entirely restored. On the 27th Bonaparte 
 reported to the Directory " that the revolt came about acci- 
 dentally in a crowd, which was about to present a petition." 
 In this report he states the loss of the revolters at twenty-five 
 
518 THE SYRIAN EXPEDITON. 
 
 hundred men, and the French loss at less than sixty, includ- 
 ing General Dupuy and one of his own aides. 
 
 In consequence of the revolt, the Divan .was suspended for 
 a while in Cairo ; but on December 21 an order, couched, as 
 many others were, in the true Oriental phraseology, was issued 
 to the inhabitants. 
 
 " Perverse men misled some of you : they have perished. God has or- 
 dered me to exercise clemency and pity for the people. ... I have been 
 angry against you for your revolt. I took away from you for two months 
 your Divan ; to-day I give it back to you. Your good conduct has effaced 
 the blot of your revolt. SherifEs, ulemas, preachers of the mosques, 
 make the people understand that those who from mere gayety of heart 
 declare themselves my enemies will have no refuge in this world or the 
 next. Is there a man so blind among you as not to see that destiny itself 
 directs all my operations ? . . . I might ask each of you to render an 
 account of the most secret sentiments of his heart, for I know everything, 
 even that which you have said to no one ; but the day will come when all 
 the world shall see that I am led by superior orders, and that all human 
 efforts can do naught against me." 
 
 The Divan was then recreated, and the city reverted to its 
 pristine volcanic quiet. Bonaparte turned back to his inter- 
 rupted project. 
 
 In the Syrian expedition the general thought he saw his 
 chance of repairing the lack of success so far attending his 
 operations ; and he fully expected to destroy the Syrian enemy 
 before spring weather permitted the Rhodes army to cross to 
 Egypt. Bon was dispatched, December 2, with a small force 
 out along the old Syrian caravan route, to organize a first 
 stopping-place ; and Bonaparte joined him on the 26th, to 
 reconnoitre and make final preparations. On January 2, 
 1799, Eeynier was pushed out to Katiyeh, and by the end of 
 January the army was ready to cross the desert, directing its 
 course towards Kalat El Arish. It had required many weeks 
 to make ready a proper base as well as the marching column. 
 
GAIN IN POWER. 519 
 
 The Frenoli soldiers had gained much confidence in their 
 ability to meet the Moslems. The old square six deep gave 
 way to one three or even two deep. The cavalry, too, gained 
 in power. " The Arabs had never stood for French cavalry, 
 unless four to one. The Mamelukes, on the contrary, made 
 a boast of despising it ; but mounted on native horses, it held 
 head to them. A Mameluke was stronger than a French- 
 man ; he was more in training and better armed. A hundred 
 Mamelukes fought with a probability of success against a 
 hundred French cavalrymen ; but in an encounter of two 
 bodies numbering more than two hundred horses, the proba- 
 bility was for the French." " The Mamelukes, before charg- 
 ing, fired off six pieces, a gun, a blunderbuss, two pairs of 
 pistols which they carried, one at the saddlebow, one on the 
 chest. The lance was carried by one of their sais, who fol^ 
 lowed them afoot." 
 
 SaTer-Mounted Pistol of Massena. 
 (Rivoli Collection.) 
 
XIX. 
 
 SYRIA. JANUARY TO AUGUST, 1799. 
 
 To control Syria was essential to the possession of Egypt, which Djezzar Pa- 
 sha at Acre was raising an army to invade. Across the desert between Egypt 
 and Syria, with some thirteen thousand men, Bonaparte started February 12. 
 El Arish was captured, and Gaza. Ja:ffa was next taken and the garrison put to 
 the sword. Bonaparte then marched on Acre, which had an English fleet near 
 by. Kegular siege was laid to this town, which was skillfully defended by a 
 French engineer and a French artillerist, backed by the English. Meanwhile 
 the Pasha of Damascus came towards Acre with a relieving army, and crossed 
 the Jordan, driving in the French outlying forces. Bonaparte drew all he dared 
 from the siege lines and marched out to Mount Tabor to meet this army of re- 
 lief, which had already surrounded Kleber. Moving upon them in squares, he 
 surprised and defeated them April 16, and drove them back across the Jordan. 
 He then returned to Acre, which was shortly relieved by an English squadron. 
 The siege had been heartily pushed, many assaults had been repulsed, and many 
 sorties driven back. The plague had appeared in the army. The heavy g^ns 
 sent from Alexandria had been captured by the English. Bonaparte saw that 
 success was beyond reach, and smothering failure in an enthusiastic proclama- 
 tion, he started back to Egypt, destroying everything on his route, and entering 
 Cairo June 14, after a four months' campaign. A Turkish army landed on 
 Aboukir peninsula July 15, escorted by the English fleet. On July 25 Bona- 
 parte attacked this army and destroyed it. Egypt could be considered safe, and 
 the victory at Aboukir effaced the disaster of Acre. News from Europe finally 
 ran in. Bonaparte saw that his time had come to make his own importance felt 
 in the French government ; and turning over the command to Kleber he set sail 
 the end of August, and landed in France early in October. 
 
 To overrun Syria was a natural sequence to the conquest of 
 Egypt, for its possession would rob the English fleet of a base, 
 as in a letter to the Directory of February 10, 1799, Bona- 
 parte stated ; but why, with his intensely practical mind, and 
 after the experience of the past few months, the hero of 1796 
 
BLIND ADVICE. 521 
 
 should let his imagination run riot in visions of a wholesale 
 conquest of the Orient, it is difficult to fathom. As an exam- 
 ple of what genius and discipline can do, he had Alexander, to 
 be sure, and some other early conquerors of Asia Minor ; but 
 the conditions had quite changed. The Macedonian wisely se- 
 cured his base, the Mediterranean, before projecting his line 
 of operations into the interior, and there was then nothing 
 back of this ocean which could interfere with him, for Rome 
 was no factor outside of Italy ; but inasmuch as the rules of 
 strategy never change, and as what was Alexander's must be 
 Bonaparte's base, and as, moreover, the English fleet rode su- 
 preme in the Mediterranean, why the French leader should 
 have imagined he could conduct anything except a gigantic 
 raid into Oriental countries will forever remain a puzzle. 
 
 To be sure, Bonaparte was as yet ignorant of the recent back- 
 ward stride of the French power. This was, however, marked, 
 and it meant failure for the Army of the Orient ; and yet on 
 November 4, 1798, the Directory had urged Bonaparte either 
 to march towards India and join Tippoo Sahib, or else to 
 march on Constantinople to influence the position of the French 
 in the partition of Turkey supposed to be projected by Aus- 
 tria and Kussia. This was blind advice, if you will, founded 
 on utter misconstruction of the existing conditions. Still, it 
 was just this disregard of obstacles which had so far helped 
 the French Revolutionary rulers to win. Knowing practically 
 nothing about the march of European affairs, for nearly a year 
 had elapsed since he had received dispatches, yet Bonaparte 
 kept the possibilities in mind, even if his Oriental dreams were 
 waning. 
 
 He wrote the Directory, February 10, 1799 : " If during 
 March the report of the Citizen Hamelin is confirmed, that 
 France is in arms against the kings, I will pass into France. 
 I do not permit myself any reflection on the affairs of the 
 
522 ROUTE ACROSS THE DESERT. 
 
 Republic, because for ten months I have received no news. 
 We all have entire confidence in the wisdom and vigor of the 
 determination you shall make." He then goes on to say that 
 he has three objects in moving to Syria : to assure the con- 
 quest of Egypt by making a strong place beyond the desert, 
 and therewith to prevent any enemy from combining with an 
 European army which should try to disembark upon the 
 coast ; to oblige the Porte to explain himself, and thereby help 
 the French negotiations ; to make the coast of Syria friendly, 
 so as to rob the English fleet of its ability to victual and 
 water there. He was to be accompanied by the Mullah of 
 Cairo, who, after the Mufti of Constantinople, was the most 
 revered of the Moslems, by the sheiks of the four principal 
 sects, and by the Prince of Pilgrims. 
 
 The thrice fertile Delta of the Nile is separated from the 
 less fruitful land of Syria by the desert of El Jofar. Across 
 this desert run a number of caravan routes, the most north- 
 erly of which crosses substantially parallel to the coast, from 
 El Kantarah (on the present Suez Canal), via El Arish 
 and Khan Junas (Khanyun), to Gaza. It is an old traveled 
 route, about one hundred and fifty miles long, with a fair 
 supply of wells at reasonably convenient distances. The sea 
 being closed to the French by the victory of Aboukir, Bona- 
 parte's sole means of reaching Syria was to follow the path 
 for centuries trodden by caravans. 
 
 On the 1st of January, 1799, there were about sixty-five hun- 
 dred men in Upper Egypt, ten thousand in Lower Egypt, and 
 thirteen thousand destined for Syria, a total of nearly thirty 
 thousand men. Of these twenty-two thousand were infantry, 
 three thousand cavalry, over three thousand artillery and 
 engineers, six hundred guides and the rest non-combatants. 
 Generals Desaix, Friant, Belliard, Lasalle, Davout, were in 
 Upper Egypt ; Dugua, Lanusse, Marmont, Almeias, were in 
 Lower Egypt ; the rest were to go to Syria. 
 
THE SYRIAN ARMY. 523 
 
 Commands were somewhat shifted to form the marching 
 column. Marmont was left behind in Alexandria in place of 
 Kleber ; to Dugua was given the command of Cairo. The 
 following divisions, each reduced to the figures below by de- 
 tachments left behind, were to form the Syrian army : 
 
 Brought forward . . 10,676 
 
 "Guides" 400 
 
 Camel riders .... 100 
 
 Sappers 350 
 
 Artillery 1,300 
 
 Kleber's . . 
 
 . 2,350 meu 
 
 Bon's . . . 
 
 . 2,450 " 
 
 Launes' . . 
 
 . 2,925 " 
 
 Reynier's . 
 
 . 2,150 " 
 
 Murat's . . 
 
 800 cavalry 
 
 Total 12,825 
 
 10,675 
 
 Each division had six guns, those of the cavalry and the 
 guard being mounted artillery, in all thirty-six. In the park 
 were four twelve-pounders, four eight-pounders, eight mor- 
 tars. A good siege equipment was embarked at Damietta 
 to sail for Jaffa ; and a duplicate was to be carried to Syria 
 by Admiral Per^e on three frigates. 
 
 In addition to this force, Bonaparte had been led to believe 
 that he could rely on the Christians of Lebanon to furnish him 
 aid. They did, in fact, later promise and strive to raise twelve 
 thousand men, but their good-will was nullified by the failure 
 at Acre. On February 10 Bonaparte left Cairo. Engineers 
 had cleared out the wells on the road ; camels with water went 
 ahead of the column; and to avoid overtaxing the limited 
 water supply, the divisions were ordered to march at a day's 
 distance apart. Lannes on that day was in Belbeys, and Bon 
 in Es Salahiyeh. Reynier had reached El Arish the day 
 before, and had found the place held by two thousand men ; 
 and as they were hourly awaiting the arrival of reinforce- 
 ments, he assaulted and took the village, and drove the garri- 
 son into the fort with a loss of five hundred men. The French 
 loss of half the number was severe, but justified by the chief. 
 
524 
 
 SIEGE LINES OPENED. 
 
 Syria. 
 
 With the none too large force in the column, an assault on 
 this fort, though it had no guns, was deemed injudicious as 
 probably costly in men ; and siege lines were opened. On 
 the 12th Kleber was due to come up. Abdallah had pushed 
 eight thousand more troops along from Gaza, and on the same 
 day these camped in the French front behind a ravine, which 
 
CAPITULATION OF EL ARISH. 525 
 
 was really the dry bed of the Egyptus, a near-by river. Rey- 
 nier was sore beset until Kleber's arrival ; but in the night of 
 the 14th— 15th, after careful reconnoitring, Reynier made a 
 circuit of the position by crossing the ravine, took the force in 
 reverse, and at small loss to himself drove it away with casu- 
 alties of several hundred men. Bonaparte arrived on the 16th. 
 In conducting the siege, Reynier was ordered to make what 
 we should call scarecrows, with an upright and cross-stick, 
 clothed with an old uniform and hat. " Make twenty-odd 
 manikins, and place them in different corners, to make the 
 enemy believe that they are sentinels or outposts; so that 
 they shall use up their ammunition and get tired of firing on 
 our sentinels, when they commence to find out that they are 
 invulnerable." This simple outworn ruse succeeded. On the 
 20th, breaches having been made in the walls of the fort, after 
 much correspondence February 17, 18, and 19, the capitulation 
 was thus formulated : — 
 
 Ist. The fort of El Arish shall be given over to the French troops at 
 four o'clock in the afternoon. 2d. The garrison will betake itself across 
 the desert to Bagdad, unless it wishes to go to Egypt. 3d. At four o'clock 
 a list of the names shall be turned in by the agas, with the promise for 
 them and their troops not to serve in the army of Djezzar Pasha, nor to 
 take the route to Syria. 4th. There shall be accorded a safe-conduct, 
 and a tri-color flag under which the garrison shall file out. 5th. It will 
 leave all the provisions and other effects which are in the fort, as well as 
 all the horses. Fifteen horses shall be left for the chiefs. Other horses 
 shall be honestly given up. Bonaparte. 
 
 This proposition was carried out, the place was then garri- 
 soned and put in a good state of defense by the French, and 
 a number of guns were mounted on the walls. 
 
 Owing to the season, the march of about one hundred miles 
 across the desert had so far not been as distressing to the men 
 as they had anticipated, which was a matter of encouragement. 
 
526 COMBAT NEAR GAZA. 
 
 On February 21 Kleber, in the van, started out towards 
 Gaza, Lannes and Bon followed next day, and Reynier brought 
 up the rear on the 25th. Bonaparte left El Arisb on the 
 23d ; and on arrival at Khan Junas, he found the several 
 columns astray, and spent a day assembling them at this place. 
 When Kleber's column was found in so discouraged a condi- 
 tion that many of the soldiers had broken their muskets, 
 Bonaparte rallied the men, drew them up in line, and said, 
 as quoted by Bertrand : "It is not by mutiny that you will 
 remedy your ills ; at worst it would have been better to stick 
 your heads in the sand and die with honor, rather than give 
 yourselves up to disorder and violate discipline." The men 
 were glad to return to duty with no other punishment. 
 
 On February 24 a proclamation was issued to the inhab- 
 itants of Gaza : "If I come with my army to Gaza, it is to 
 drive out the troops of Djezzar Pasha, and to punish him for 
 having made an invasion of Egypt." Next day the French 
 army stood before the ancient town, and the vanguard dis- 
 covered the army of Abdallah Pasha of Damascus joined with 
 the Mamelukes in position in its front. After different evo- 
 lutions, Murat with his cavalry in two lines, and sustained by 
 Lannes and his light foot, cleverly turned the left of the 
 enemy, who at first seemed ready to sustain the assault, but 
 later beat a retreat. This combat occurred near the hill 
 overlooking Hebron, " whither Samson carried the gates of 
 Gaza." Near the town the French army remained two days. 
 
 Gaza received a French garrison, and Caffarelli was given 
 full instructions as to repairing the walls, building hospitals 
 and bakeries, and putting this place and El Arish in a good 
 state of defense ; for both towns were essential points in 
 Bonaparte's line of retreat. To this officer he wrote : " You 
 see that circumstances might arise under which El Arish 
 would become the foremost point of our line of operations, 
 
AN ESSENTIAL PORT. 527 
 
 which, as it can hold out a fortnight or a month, may yield 
 incalculable results." 
 
 From Gaza, February 26, Bonaparte wrote to Dugiia : " We are in water 
 and mud up to our kuees. There is here the same cold and the same 
 weather as in Paris at this season. You are very happy in the lovely sun 
 of Cairo. This country is more beautiful than we had expected, and we 
 have found more magazines of war and victual than we could have 
 thought, many European cannon-balls and much powder." And on Feb- 
 ruary 27, to Desaix : " We have passed seventy leagues of desert, which 
 was extremely tiring, — alkali water, often none. We have eaten dogs, 
 asses and camels. For three days there has been a horrible wind here, 
 and it rains torrents. The sky is covered. It is the climate of Paris. 
 The lemon-trees, the forest and olive trees, the inequality of the ground, 
 represents perfectly the landscape of Lauguedoc." 
 
 Breaking up February 28, with Eeynier as rearguard, the 
 army left Gaza, and on March 3 reached Jaffa, the biblical 
 Joppa, Eeynier following two days later. This port was essen- 
 tial, for Bonaparte hoped, despite the British fleet, to receive 
 here from Alexandria some supplies and heavy guns, and had 
 ordered the vessels to this port. Jaffa, with its forty guns 
 and garrison of four thousand men, was first shut in by Kle- 
 ber, but it had also to be besieged with the field-guns, and 
 this duty was undertaken by Lannes on the left and Bon on 
 the right of the city, Kleber being pushed out along the coast 
 towards Acre to protect the siege. 
 
 On March 7, in a letter to the commandant of Jaffa open- 
 ing with " God is merciful and compassionate," Bonaparte 
 recited that the army had come to Palestine to punish Djezzar 
 for attacking Egypt ; that " Jaffa is surrounded on all sides, 
 batteries will open in two hours, and will strike down the wall 
 and ruin the defenses. The heart of the general-in-chief is 
 touched with the ills that the entire town will suffer in being 
 taken by assault." He offers safeguard to the garrison, pro- 
 tection to the town, and " will retard fire until seven o'clock." 
 
528 JAFFA TAKEN BY ASSAULT. 
 
 With Moslem fatalism, the offer was refused, and the garri- 
 son resiste'd gallantly ; it was late in the day before breaches 
 could be operated in the walls. 
 
 " The 22d Light Infantry was in column behind a roU in 
 the ground which served as a place of arms, awaiting the 
 signal for mounting the breach. The general-in-chief was 
 standing on the epaulement of the battery, indicating with his 
 finger to Colonel Lejeune, of that regiment, the manoeuvre 
 he was to make, when a musket-ball knocked his hat on the 
 ground, passing within three inches of his head, and laid the 
 colonel, who stood five feet ten inches, stark dead. ' That is 
 the second time since I have made war,' said the general-in- 
 chief that evening, ' that I owe my life to my height of five 
 feet two ! ' " 
 
 Bonaparte reported to the Directory : " On the 16th the 
 garrison made a sortie to take the breaching batteries. Al- 
 banese, Kurds, Anatolians and men of all tribes joined in the 
 attack, but they were at once driven back. Duroc particu- 
 larly distinguished himself. On the 17th I summoned the gov- 
 ernor, who cut the head off my messenger. By one o'clock 
 the breach was practicable. Lannes prepared the assault. 
 Adjutant Netherwood, with ten carbiners, was the first to 
 mount the breach, followed by three columns of grenadiers 
 under Rambaud, for whom I ask promotion to brigadier- 
 general. By five o'clock we were masters of the town, which 
 for twenty-four hours was delivered over to pillage and to all 
 the. horrors of war, which have never appeared to me to be 
 so hideous." 
 
 But this punishment was not all. Some two thousand of 
 the garrison had been killed ; other two thousand prisoners 
 were taken, and these, as Bonaparte had no means of feed- 
 ing them, and his forces were too few to detail a guard to 
 keep them, after two days' deliberation, he ordered taken to 
 
PRISONERS SHOT. 529 
 
 the seashore, and shot. It has been said that the prisoners 
 had been promised quarter by Bonaparte's aides, but it rather 
 appears that this shooting was done by urgent demand of the 
 troops and officers, and grudgingly assented to by Bonaparte. 
 Following was the order of March 9, to Berthier : " You will, 
 Citizen General, call to you the colonel of cannoneers ; you 
 will demand the names of twenty principal officers of cannon- 
 eers ; you will seize these twenty officers and have them con- 
 ducted to the village where stands a battalion ready to leave 
 for Cairo. There they will be put in the fort until further 
 orders. When they shall have left for the village, you will 
 order the adjutant-general on duty to conduct all the can- 
 noneers and other Turks taken arms in hand in Jaffa to 
 the borders of the sea, and to have them shot, taking such 
 precautions that not one shall escape." Some of these men 
 — the Memoirs say eight or nine hundred of them — were 
 of those captured at El Arish and released on promise not 
 again to serve against the French for one year ; and these, at 
 least, by the hard rules of war, had earned their fate. Still,. 
 Bonaparte does not seem to have taken the shooting of the 
 Jaffa prisoners much to heart, for he wrote to Marmont, 
 March 9, " The capture of Jaffa was very brilliant, four thou- 
 sand men of the best troops of Djezzar and the best cannoneers 
 of Constantinople were put to the sword." 
 
 From an ethical point of view, the act was no doubt unpar- 
 donable ; from a military standpoint, it was a necessity. Sa-r 
 lus exer cities summa lex. 
 
 Bonaparte, on March 9, sent out sundry letters to the dif- 
 ferent provinces. The phraseology was merely a part of the 
 Oriental attitude he was compelled to assume. 
 
 To the sheiks of Nablus he wrote, ofBering peace or war. If they 
 wish peace, let them chase the Mamelukes from among them. If they 
 wish war, " I will bring it to them myself. ... I am merciful and com- 
 
530 NO TIME TO WASTE. 
 
 passionate towards my friends, but terrible as the flre from heaven against 
 my enemies." A proclamation was made to the sheiks and ulemas, 
 and to the inhabitants of the provinces of Gaza, Ramleh and Jaffa. 
 " God is great and merciful. I write you these presents to let you know 
 that I have come to Palestine to drive out the Mamelukes and the army 
 of Djezzar Pasha. . . . Remain quietly in your homes, let those come 
 back who for fear have left. I accord safety and safe-conduct to all. I 
 will give back to each one the property he possessed. ... It is well that 
 you should know that human efforts are useless against me, for all that 
 1 undertake must succeed. . . . The example of Jaffa and Gaza should 
 make you know that if I am terrible for my enemies, I am kind to my 
 friends, and especially gracious and kindly to the poor.'' A proclamation 
 to the sheiks and commanders of Jerusalem also offered them peace or 
 war. If they wish the first, they are to send to headquarters a deputation. 
 If they want war, Bonaparte will bring it himself. " They are to know 
 that I am terrible as the fire of heaven against my enemies, gracious 
 and merciful towards the people and those who would be my friends." 
 
 The plague had broken out in the army. Kleber suggested 
 that the forces be marched to the Nablus (Shechem) up- 
 lands, a much more healthful region ; and from there Bona- 
 parte might indeed have dominated Syria ; but he had no time 
 to waste, and he never could persuade himself to strike other 
 than at the army of the enemy. He could not delay. If 
 the Syrian work was to be done to good effect, it must be done 
 at once. Merely to occupy the land was no part of Bona- 
 parte's scheme. Until every enemy in arms was subdued, 
 Syria could not be accounted his ; and Djezzar was an ever 
 present threat. Procrastination was the one thing that would 
 work against the French ; and he wisely chose to march on 
 Acre. 
 
 Jaffa was also put in a good state of defense, Menou being 
 brought on to take command, and three frigates were ordered 
 from Alexandria to this port. Eeynier was left to complete 
 the work, and on March 14 the army advanced towards Acre 
 by the land route to the right of Mount Carmel, instead of 
 
FRIENDLY OVERTURES DISDAINED. 531 
 
 along the shore. Next day the van ran across a body of the 
 enemy, — it was Abdallah, backed by some Nablus foot, — and 
 Lannes' division hastily following it up, after breaking it by 
 a charge, lost a number of men. This enterprise was not pa- 
 tiently received by Bonaparte. " We are not in a position 
 to indulge in feats of courage," said he. On March 17 the 
 army entered the plain of Acre. Of the chieftain in command 
 of the fortress, on February 10 Bonaparte had written to the 
 Directory : " Djezzar Pasha, seventy years old, is a ferocious 
 man who has an unmeasured hatred of the French. He has 
 answered with disdain the friendly overtures I have several 
 times made him." On March 9, in a letter to Djezzar, he 
 recited the French injuries, and that Gaza, Ramleh and Jaffa 
 were in his possession. " I shall march in a few days on Acre. 
 But what reasons have I for taking a few years of life from 
 an old man I do not know ? . . . Become my friend again ; be 
 the enemy of the Mamelukes and the English, and I will do 
 you as much good as I have done and can do you ill. BojTA- 
 PAETE." Djezzar paid no heed to this letter. On a former 
 occasion, Bonaparte says, he had decapitated his messenger. 
 
 Acre, the old scriptural A echo, was that part of the Holy 
 Land which had been assigned to the tribe of Asher, but had 
 never been conquered by it. Its kings had stood on a par 
 with those of Tyre and Sidon. The city had once fallen be- 
 fore the arms of Sennacherib, and again before those of his 
 grandson. As a city of considerable size, it was known as 
 Ptolemais under the descendants of Alexander. The Arabs 
 conquered it in A. D. 638, the Crusaders in 1104. Saladin 
 wrested it from the latter in 1187, and four years later 
 the Crusaders again took it. It was then held by the Knights 
 of St. John for one hundred years, and was the last Christian 
 stronghold in Palestine. It stands on a peninsula, with an 
 exposed and useless harbor ; but Haifa, to the south of it, has 
 
532 THE PLAIN OF ESDRAELON. 
 
 a roadstead of about eight miles by four, which affords fair 
 shelter. Acre was sometimes called the key of Palestine, 
 which, holding as it did the plain of Esdraelon, between 
 Mount Carmel and the main range, and thus fending off 
 access to the Jordan from the sea district, it in a sense was. 
 
 Acre had in ancient times been of much military impor- 
 tance ; but in 1799 the works had fallen somewhat into de- 
 cay, though Djezzar had done much to repair the high wall 
 and flanking towers which protected the land side. Not only 
 its harbor was at this time in a bad condition, but even Haifa 
 roadstead was disused. Unaware of the actual conditions, 
 Bonaparte had expected an easy triumph ; but the English 
 had already come to the rescue of Acre, and had helped for- 
 ward Djezzar's plans. To Sir Sidney Smith had been given 
 the command of the eastern Mediterranean, and he had well 
 utilized his opportunities, despite the subsequent acrid criti- 
 cism of Bonaparte. 
 
 Back of the promontory on which the town of Acre is sit- 
 uated is the plain of Acre, some twenty miles north and south 
 by five east and west, and this is a minor part of the great 
 plain of Esdraelon. Several streams cross the plain of Acre, 
 from the mountains to the sea. The plain of Esdraelon is 
 separated from the Jordan valley by the watershed known 
 from south to north as the Mountains of Judaea, which are 
 crowned by Jerusalem, the Hills of Ephraim and the Hills 
 of Galilee. The watershed is a very irregular series of mod- 
 erate mountains, with intervening plains, and at the north end 
 without a regular backbone ; but the range fully separates the 
 plain of the Jordan from the plain of Esdraelon. Another 
 range runs northwest from the southerly end of the plain of 
 Esdraelon, and terminates near the promontory of Haifa in 
 hoary Mount Carmel. 
 
 On March 18 a proclamation was issued to the inhabitants 
 
FRIENDSHIP PROFFERED. 533 
 
 of the Pashallk of Acre, in the same tone as those issued at 
 Jaffa. And on March 20 orders were given Berthier to write 
 to the several villages to have them come in and swear obe- 
 dience and receive safeguards, promising to repair the injus- 
 tices committed by Djezzar. A similar message was to be 
 sent to Sur (Tyre). A friendly hand was also reached to 
 the Druses, to whom Bonaparte promised independence and 
 restitution of their old territory. Efforts were made to re- 
 concile the inhabitants to the French advent, and to assemble 
 in some useful way the enemies of Djezzar ; and a letter was 
 written to the Mullah of Damascus, proffering friendship, and 
 protection to the usual caravan to Mecca. On March 23, also, 
 a letter appears to have been sent to Sidney Smith proposing 
 the exchange of prisoners. 
 
 As the possession of the foothills of the watershed, with 
 their gaps, would shut Acre in on the land side, and prevent 
 access from the trans-Jordan country, the general position 
 taken up by the French was on the easterly slope of the 
 range known as the Turon HiUs, at one end of which there 
 stands the Mount of the Mosque, commanding the plain. 
 Nearer Acre, Lannes, with Bon in reserve, was to hold the 
 centre of the trenches, Kleber to the right of the aqueduct, 
 and Reynier, who came up two days after the rest of the 
 army, to the left of it. Field-works and abatis with proper 
 guards were placed at all the approaches to the camp ; and 
 the streams were bridged and provided with suitable bridge- 
 heads. " No one, strange to the army, could penetrate into 
 this great camp, where there were fine pasturage, wheat, gar- 
 dens, orchards, woods, water, mills and everything essential 
 to the siege." A reconnoissance of the defenses was made on 
 the night of the 19th to the 20th, from which Bonaparte had no 
 reason to doubt that he could speedily reduce the place ; but, 
 having been wounded, Colonel Sanson, the engineer officer 
 
634 THE SIEGE OPERATIONS. 
 
 who made the reconnoissance of the ditch, had failed to dis- 
 cover as much as he might, and reported that the defenses 
 were provided with no counterscarp. Parallels were opened 
 on the 20th. Starting from the gardens, ditches and aque- 
 duct of Ptolemais, these were to operate against the east front, 
 which consisted of two curtains meeting at a right angle, 
 where was situated a strong tower commanding the rest of the 
 works, and enfilading the two lines of wall on east and south 
 fronts. This tower was selected as the special point of at- 
 tack. On March 23 full orders for placing the batteries in 
 front of Acre, as suggested by the engineer and artillery offi- 
 cers, were issued by Bonaparte. 
 
 As a protection to the siege operations, and to hold back 
 Abdallah Pasha, who had large forces coming from Damascus, 
 Haifa was occupied, and the line of the Jordan was observed 
 by four detachments : Junot at Nazareth, Murat at Safed, 
 Lambert in the Carmel region, and Vial on the other flank, 
 with a detachment out on the road to Tyre. Vial later occu- 
 pied Tyre with a battalion. Murat was accompanied by the 
 Sheik Mustapha, whom the Pasha of Damascus had kept seven 
 years in prison, and Bonaparte restored to his dignities and 
 property. He did not keep them long. The responsibility 
 was placed upon the commanders of these detachments to 
 permit no force to pass the circuit thus formed by the posts, 
 without their knowledge. Bonaparte felt much encouraged 
 by the situation. On March 29 he wrote to Dugua : " The 
 army feels its privations no longer. Abundance reigns in 
 the camp. The villages in the mountains send their crops 
 in with profusion and confidence. They see in us their lib- 
 erators, and desire to be delivered of their oppressor, who 
 remains shut up in Acre." 
 
 The breaching batteries having been so far completed by 
 March 25 that fire could be opened on the tower, a few hours 
 
, ORDERS FOR THE ASSAULT. 535 
 
 did much to produce a breach; and this being pronounced 
 practicable, an assault was ordered for 3 p. m. of that day, 
 and duly made. But to the surprise of all, the assaulting 
 party, at first successful, ran up against a counterscarp and 
 a fifteen-foot ditch, and was here checked. Despite the re- 
 port of the reconnoitring engineer, a mine had been driven 
 towards such a counterscarp, which it was thought might yet 
 
 SEA 
 
 Siege of Acre. 
 
 exist ; this mine was exploded on the 28th, and a fresh as- 
 sault was delivered on the breach in the glacis which it had 
 made. 
 
 Following were the orders for the assault, which was to be preceded by 
 a heavy bombardment against the places selected for a breach, at the rate 
 of ten shots per piece per hour for guns, and five per piece per hour for 
 mortars : — 
 
 " When the batteries shall have made a breach and the general-in-ehief 
 shall deem it practicable, fifteen carbineers of distinguished bravery, with 
 six sappers carrying two ladders, six artisans of artillery carrying crow- 
 
536 THE TURKISH DEFENSE. 
 
 bars, axes, pickaxes, and led by an officer of the general staff, will rush 
 at the breach by the road which shall be indicated by such officer of engi- 
 neers as General Caffarelli shall indicate. This vanguard is to be sus- 
 tained by three companies of carbineers, behind which shall march six 
 ladders, ten sappers, six artillery artisans with axes and everything 
 necessary to break in gates and open embrasures. After this are to 
 march the grenadiers of Kleber's division, which shall be followed by 
 the rest of the ladders, and ten sappers with tools necessary to break 
 into houses, and six artillery artisans with the necessary tools. After 
 them, according to circumstances, there shall march the grenadiers of 
 Eeynier's division and the rest of Kleber's division. Each man is to 
 take one or two fascines, which will serve him to make more accessible 
 the entrance to the breach." 
 
 The assault was heartily delivered. The Turks began to 
 waver ; it looked like success ; but the French officer in com- 
 mand was shot at the head of the column, the Turks returned 
 to the fray when they saw the grenadiers pause, and the 
 attack was driven back. This assault came as near success 
 as any made at Acre, but the loss of the leader of the party 
 brought disaster. There should have been two, or even three, 
 of equal repute for courage, to lead the column. The Turk- 
 ish defensp, as it has often been in history, and now espe- 
 cially encouraged by foreign aid, was a stanch one, and the 
 victory raised the spirits of the garrison to a glow of enthu- 
 siasm. 
 
 It was not the Turks alone who had produced this result. 
 A former classmate of Bonaparte's in the military school at 
 Paris, Picard de Phelippeaux, an emigre., was in Acre as 
 engineer under Djezzar Pasha, and skillfully conducted the 
 operations ; while an able French artillerist, Tromelin, had 
 charge of the guns. In addition to these, well-trained English 
 officers from the ships lent a hand. And worse still, the 
 English fleet under Sidney Smith, which had arrived early in 
 March, had not only captured, off Mount Carmel, the French 
 
Sidney Smith. 
 
 DIFFICULTIES OF THE SIEGE. 537 
 
 frigates which had come from Alexandria laden with heavy 
 siege-guns, and put these to use on the walls of Acre (a fact 
 of which Bonaparte did not hear for weeks), but it had 
 opened the way for supplies and 
 material to reach the garrison at 
 will. Bonaparte was thus reduced 
 to continue the siege with light 
 ordnance, and without the power 
 so essential in a siege to cut off 
 the place from the outside world. 
 Thus upheld by European skill in 
 his resistance, Djezzar maintained 
 the defense with confidence, and 
 made a number of stout sallies, but 
 all these were driven back. 
 
 Added to the difficulties of the siege, the large army of 
 relief organized by Abdallah Pasha, which had been assem- 
 bling in the Damascus region, was now afoot ; and early in 
 April Bonaparte learned that one part of this army would 
 probably cross the Jordan by Jacob's Bridge, fourteen miles 
 above, and another one at Medjameh or Mekanieh, ten miles 
 below the Sea of Tiberias ; and that stores were being accu- 
 mulated at the town of Tiberias, on the west shore of the 
 lake. 
 
 To further ascertain the status of affairs, a stout reconnoi- 
 tring party was pushed out under the command of Junot ; 
 and this officer, on April 9, ran across the enemy at Lubieh, 
 half-way from Nazareth to Tiberias, and after gallantly hold- 
 ing his own for a while by forming a square, was forced back 
 to his station. 
 
 " General Junot covered himself with glory at the combat 
 of Nazareth," wrote Bonaparte to Marmont; "with three 
 hundred men of the 2d light infantry he beat four thousand 
 
538 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS TO MURAT. 
 
 cavalry; he took five flags and killed or wounded some six 
 hundred men. It was one of the most brilliant affairs of the 
 war." And a week later a prize was offered for a picture 
 of Junot's battle. Such a reward went far to make up for 
 danger and suffering, and acted as a strong incentive for 
 others. 
 
 If Bonaparte would keep up the integrity of the siege 
 of Acre, this oncoming army had to be at once met. " The 
 
 position of the French army was 
 becoming delicate." Out of thir- 
 teen thousand men who had en- 
 tered Syria, two thousand had 
 been killed or wounded, or had 
 fallen sick; two thousand were 
 in garrison at El Arish, Gaza, 
 Jaffa ; five thousand were needed 
 in the siege ; and this left but four 
 thousand available to meet the on- 
 coming host. On April 9 Kleber, 
 with the light infantry, was or- 
 dered to Nazareth to cover the army. Next day Bonaparte 
 wrote to Murat : " As to the intrenchments which should 
 be erected on the hills occupied by your light infantry, you 
 are to make all the men under your orders work in detach- 
 ments, infantry and mounted men, even servants, if that is 
 necessary. It is a military principle that each detached corps 
 shall intrench itself, and it is one of the first cares one is to 
 have in occupying a position. Do not count on having any 
 laborers for the army. . . . Give the order to your outposts 
 to notify you when they shall see fires in front of them in 
 the mountains, so that you may send them out to reconnoitre. 
 We sleep quietly, persuaded that you will let nothing pass 
 you on the line between the mills of Daud and of Cherdam 
 
 Junot. 
 
THE MAIN BODY OF THE ENEMY. 539 
 
 without our being notified." On April 13 Murat was ordered 
 from Safed to the Bridge of Jacob, and Kleber notified to 
 sustain him if necessary. 
 
 Going out on a second reconnoissance towards Lubieh, 
 Kleber, on the 10th, met four thousand men, mostly cavalry, 
 at Kefr Kenna ; and while he drove them off and towards the 
 Jordan, yet he dared not advance, lest single-handed he should 
 happen to meet the entire army of relief. He therefore again 
 retired to Nazareth and Safarieh, where he intrenched. 
 
 The main body of the Turkish army of relief had actually 
 passed the Jordan at Medjameh, and was leisurely marching 
 on Bisan, while a smaller part had crossed at Jacob's Bridge, 
 and blockading Safed, had occupied Tiberias. Kleber was 
 ordered to watch the main body and fend it off from Acre ; 
 and to Murat was committed the care of the other detach- 
 ment, to meet which he marched towards Jacob's Bridge with 
 a thousand horse. The main body of the enemy did not at 
 once advance, but awaited, at the foothills near Esdraelon 
 plain, reinforcements from Samaria and Nablus which would 
 run it up to an effective variously stated at from twelve 
 to thirty thousand men. Bonaparte had written to Kleber 
 from Acre, April 13, expressing a doubt as to whether the 
 bridge south of the Sea of Tiberias had been destroyed. 
 " Mount Tabor is witness to your exploits. If these people 
 hold on a little, and you have a pretty hot fight with them, 
 it wiU earn you the keys of Damascus. If, in the different 
 movements which may present themselves, you find means of 
 placing yourself between them and the Jordan, you should 
 not be held back by the idea that that would make them 
 march on us. We hold ourselves on our guard. We would 
 be quickly notified of it, and we should go out to meet them ; 
 but it would then be necessary that you should follow in their 
 rear very lively. But I feel that these people are not resolute 
 
540 KLEBER'S MOVEMENTS. 
 
 enougli for this. If it should so happen, they would break 
 themselves all up on the road." 
 
 Next day Kleber was notified that, should the enemy march 
 on him, Murat was charged to sustain him, and act under his 
 orders. He was instructed to throw the enemy beyond the 
 Jordan and hold the line of the river. " If the enemy dares 
 to camp near you, the general-in-chief has no doubt that you 
 will make a night attack, which will have the same success as 
 that of El Arish." Thus instructed, Kleber set out to accom- 
 plish his task, reporting his intention to headquarters. 
 
 A fight under the walls of Acre, where Mussulman fanatics 
 would be encouraged by the presence of their fellow soldiers 
 inside, and the English could head a sortie upon the French 
 rear, was a thing to be avoided ; and Bonaparte soon deter- 
 mined to march himself to meet the approaching enemy, who 
 was evidently aiming to cross the mountains and cut off the 
 French retreat to Egypt. Persuaded that he must be rid of 
 this army of relief for good and all, he relied on the ability 
 of a small force to hold the lines at Acre for a brief season, 
 and prepared to sustain the operation of his lieutenant. 
 
 In this view he secretly set out at noon April 15 with Bon, 
 by way of Nazareth, to join Kleber, who meanwhile had got 
 in rear of the enemy's army in an attempt to cut its retreat 
 to the Jordan. By an all night march around north of Mount 
 Tabor, Kleber had got between the enemy and the Joi-dan, 
 hoping to make essay of the night attack suggested by his 
 chief ; but " liis plan was ill-combined ; " he arrived after day- 
 light ;' the enemy marched around his own right to join the 
 Nablusans ; and on the morning of the 16th he found himself 
 in a corner of the plain of Esdraelon, south and under the 
 shadow of Mount Tabor, surrounded and attacked by a supe- 
 rior force, probably overstated by Jomini as twenty thousand 
 cavalry and a good body of foot. Throwing his force " into 
 
NAPOLEON REACHES NAZARETH. 
 
 541 
 
 battalion square," as Bonaparte reported, Kleber manfully 
 made ready to hold himself until his chief might arrive. 
 
 The Moslem point of assembly would naturally be Samaria, 
 and Bonaparte saw that by a speedy manoeuvre he might 
 chance to strike their column in flank upon the march, if they 
 advanced so far. At the head of a column formed of Bon's 
 division, what cavalry he had left and eight guns, on the 16th 
 Bonaparte reached Nazareth, from which point Mount Tabor 
 is a prominent feature in the landscape, and the plain in which 
 lies Full could be seen through a glass. This level, which is 
 
 Battle of Mount Tabor. 
 
 a part of the edge of the great plain of Esdraelon inclosed by 
 the foothills, appeared to be filled with the smoke of battle. 
 And this was the fact, for Kleber, unconscious of Bonaparte's 
 being so near at hand, was holding head against the huge 
 force of mounted men on what Bonaparte called " an enor- 
 mous battlefield." Several miles beyond, at the foot of the 
 range, and not far from the Jordan, could be seen the camp 
 
542 SHUT IN BY THE ENEMY. 
 
 of the Moslems. On what he discovered through his glass 
 Bonaparte formed his plan. This was to make a wide circuit 
 of the enemy's position by the right, get between the fighting 
 Mussulmans and their camp, and cut the enemy off from the 
 Mekanieh crossing, which is the only one on the J ordan south 
 of and near the Sea of Tiberias ; and on the same march to 
 take the little town of Djeine, where, as he had heard, the Mos- 
 lems had collected their victual. The cavalry with two guns 
 was sent by a circuit against the enemy's camp. 
 
 Before being shut in by the enemy, Kleber had reported to 
 Bonaparte that he had attempted to surprise the Pasha's camp 
 on the night of April 15-16, but that his operation had been 
 arrested by bad roads, and that the Pasha had at once at- 
 tacked him. He had held himself many hours with his three 
 thousand men against the violent but undisciplined enemy, 
 who had repeatedly assaulted him on all sides. His well-di- 
 rected grape and musketry had piled a wall of the enemy's 
 bodies about his army, but Kleber's men were almost spent, 
 and would soon use the last cartridge. Indeed, just before 
 the arrival of aid, the division had concluded to cut its way 
 out at any risk, as it foresaw nothing but death so soon as its 
 ammunition should be exhausted. On the fertile plain of 
 Esdraelon the growing wheat stood, say the Memoirs, full 
 six feet high. This aided in hiding the march. Moreover, 
 the accentuations in the ground were such, the lack of Mos- 
 lem outposts so marked, and the intentness of the enemy so 
 keen in its fine game of destroying Kleber, that, added to 
 the smoke of battle that settled over the plain, Bonaparte's 
 approach towards 9 A. M. had not been heeded. " We did 
 not show ourselves," says Bonaparte's report to the Directory. 
 
 The sight must have been a rare one, when the French got 
 near enough to view it. " Never have we seen so much cav- 
 alry prance, charge, manoeuvre in every direction." 
 
WILD CONFUSION. 543 
 
 The leader's plan was crisp and simple, and every officer 
 was prepared for the manoeuvre. So soon as the Mussulmans 
 caught sight of the approaching French, they paused from 
 very surprise, and hastily strove to so amend their line as 
 to meet the threat now coming from every side. This delay 
 enabled Bonaparte to complete his manoeuvre. " Vial and 
 Rampon at the head of their troops formed in battalion 
 square," says the report, " marched in different directions, so 
 as to form with Kleber's division the three angles of an equi- 
 lateral triangle of two thousand toises " (two and a half miles) 
 " on each side. The enemy was in the centre of the triangle." 
 " Arriving within gunshot, the French unmasked themselves," 
 and opened fire with every gun and musket. The first shot 
 was recognized by Kleber's men as the arrival of succor, and 
 the chief was saluted by long and prolonged cheers from the 
 entire division, and a renewal of its fire. The effect was elec- 
 trical " Fright," says Bonaparte, " spread in the enemy's 
 ranks. In the twinkling of an eye this cloud of horsemen 
 broke into disorder and fled to the Jordan. The infantry 
 fled to the mountains." Kleber stormed Fuli, and Vial cut 
 off the retreat of the main body into the foothills. Abandon- 
 ing their camp and magazine, the Moslems divided into two 
 streams, one flowing in wild confusion along the Damascus 
 road, where Murat at Safed and Jacob's Bridge cut them 
 down in heaps ; the other moved to the Jordan. Some hid 
 in the foothills until night, and then made their way across 
 at Makanieh. Many were drowned in the Jordan rapids. 
 Booty of all kinds, four hundred camels, munitions of war, 
 horses, weapons, the three-tailed pennant of the Pasha and pro- 
 visions enough to last the army a year were taken. " Thus," 
 says Bonaparte, in his report to the Directory of May 10, 
 " this army which had announced itself with so much noise ; 
 as numerous, said the people of the country, as the stars of 
 
544 AMMUNITION SUPPLIED. 
 
 heaven and the sand of the sea, the bizarre assembly of foot- 
 men and horsemen of all colors and all countries, repassed 
 the Jordan with the greatest precipitation, after leaving a 
 great number of dead on the field of battle." Having burned 
 down a number of villages to punish the Nablusans for tak- 
 ing up arms against the French, Bonaparte left Kleber to 
 watch the Jordan, and marched back with Bon's foot and 
 Murat's horse to Acre. On the 17th Kleber followed up the 
 enemy, and then returned to Nazareth. The battle of Mount 
 Tabor and that of the Pyramids remind one more of those of 
 Alexander than any other of modern days ; and show what 
 discipline can effectuate against courage, strength and num- 
 bers, without united action. 
 
 The one thing now proper to be done was to pursue the 
 fleeing host, demoralize it to utter inefficiency, and then, fol- 
 lowing it to Damascus, capture that important capital. But 
 this demanded a force of at least ten thousand men — and 
 where were they ? Much against his grain, Bonaparte was 
 forced to give up any idea of such a manoeuvre. 
 
 At Acre, mining operations had been steadily going on to 
 reach the big tower, and countermining had been equally 
 pushed to destroy these works ; but Bonaparte, confident and 
 resourceful, wrote Dugua that by April 25 the town would 
 surely fall. Nine heavy guns finally reached Syria from 
 Alexandria, after running the gauntlet of the British fleet, 
 and, landing at Tanturah, were on the way to Acre. To 
 supply the want of missiles, a price was offered for each one 
 picked up and delivered to headquarters : twenty sous for a 
 ball of thirty- six or thirty- three, fifteen sous for a ball of 
 twelve, ten sous for a ball of eight. 
 
 " Two English war vessels got angry with us yesterday, and 
 fired more than two thousand balls at us, which has given us a 
 good supply," wrote Bonaparte, April 8. And a week later: 
 
THE MINE COMPLETED. 545 
 
 «' Our siege advances. We have pushed the mine-gallery behind the 
 counterscarp under the ditch thirty feet below the surface, and it is withiii 
 eighteen feet of the rampart on the front of attack. We have two bat- 
 teries at sixty toises, and four at one hundred toises, to enfilade the flank. 
 For fifteen days we have not fired a single ball. The enemy fires like a 
 madman. We are content humbly to pick up his balls, to pay twenty sous 
 for them, and to pile them up in the park, where there are already nearly 
 four thousand. You see that we have the wherewithal to keep up a fine 
 fire for twenty-four hours, and make a good breach. I am waiting to 
 give the signal for the miners to blow up the counterscarp." 
 
 Meanwhile the big mine was completed. On April 23 the 
 troops were notified that next morning the mine would be ex- 
 ploded, and that all the grenadiers of the army, commanded 
 by Legrange, should make the assault imder Lannes' orders. 
 Reynier was to hold the trenches, and follow up the assault, 
 if successful. Music was to be at hand, to begin playing so 
 soon as the men reached the breach. It was accordingly 
 fired April 24 ; but part of the explosion found a vent in the 
 subterranean vaults of the tower, and it did not produce a 
 sufficient breach to warrant an assault, though most of the 
 Turkish guns there were dismounted. On April 25 notice 
 was sent to Egypt " that a great tower, extremely strong in 
 masonry, forming an advanced work at the salient angle, 
 and opposing entrance to the breach, has been mined and 
 blown up. The mine made it uninhabitable for the enemy, 
 and destroyed his entrance and batteries." But to Kleber, 
 two days later, Bonaparte said that the mine had not produced 
 the expected effect. A part of the wall fell, and three of 
 the vaults ; and the ditch was covered up with debris. Still 
 further work of the batteries was called for, and by the 30th 
 the first heavy guns were got mounted and opened fire. This 
 was directed not only at the tower breach, but also on the 
 curtain on the east front, and under this, too, a mine was 
 driven to reach its counterscarp. But the enemy was ec[ually 
 
546 REINFORCEMENTS LANDED. 
 
 enterprising, and began, from two points, countermining to 
 reach the French works. Efforts to drive him back could 
 not stop his reaching the mines directed at the curtain, which 
 he destroyed, leaving operations against the tower and out- 
 works the only ones available. The death of Phelippeaux 
 by a sunstroke helped little, for he was replaced by Colonel 
 Douglas to good effect. 
 
 Bonaparte had stood six weeks in front of the shabby 
 fortress, when on the 7th of May a fleet appeared in front 
 of the place. The landing of the reinforcements thus brought 
 was considerably delayed by a heavy swell, and to anticipate 
 this, Bonaparte directed a sharp fire against a piece of the 
 curtain to the right of the tower, and at nightfall a fresh as- 
 sault was made. This was at first successful. The French 
 reached the place d'armes and the glacis, and made a lodg- 
 ment in the town. Many guns were spiked, the Turks fell in 
 heaps, the French had reached the garden of Djezzar's Sera- 
 glio, and were almost masters of the place, when such of the 
 enemy's troops as had managed to land moved forward upon 
 them, and their fire and that from the houses and barricades 
 and from the Pasha's palace checked them. The leader, 
 Lannes, fell, badly wounded ; Rambaud was killed at the head 
 of his grenadiers. The Turks attacked the French right and 
 left from the ditch, and from the tower hand-grenades, hot 
 tar and burning wood were hurled. The assaulting party fell 
 back. Two hundred men were cut off in the town and cap- 
 tured ; and these Sidney Smith generously rescued from Turk- 
 ish massacre and took prisoner. Despite even this failure, 
 Bonaparte wavered not in his belief that the place would 
 speedily fall. 
 
 For lack of powder the batteries had been for several days 
 silent ; on the 9th they again began their fire, which was now 
 aimed at the curtain, where the French had already got pos- 
 
BON SEVERELY WOUNDED. 547 
 
 session of the ditch ; and this seemed to promise an easier 
 entrance than the tower, from which there was not good 
 access to the town, new curtains and other defenses having 
 been erected inside the wall. The reinforcements received 
 by Djezzar from Rhodes included a corps d'ellte trained by 
 Hussein Pasha in the European style, and as yet no serious 
 impression had been made on the Turkish works or morale. 
 
 A fresh assault in force upon the curtain-breach was pro- 
 jected for the 10th of May at early dawn, and for this all 
 outlying troops that could be spared were ordered in. On 
 May 8 Kleber was instructed to send in Verdier's brigade, 
 and he himself was given the option of staying with Junot, 
 or of coming in to join in the afEair. Next day renewed and 
 detailed orders for the assault were issued. Kleber's division 
 leading, the attack was to be delivered at 3.30 in the morn- 
 ino-. Bon was put in command of the party selected. This 
 assault was delivered with true Gallic fury ; the ditch was 
 crossed, and the breach was entered ; but the defenders again 
 managed to reach the rear of the French column by way of 
 the ditch, the enfilading fire from tower and traverses was 
 deadly, Turkish fatalistic courage had been aroused, Bon fell 
 severely wounded, and the gallant French, though they held 
 themselves where they were able, under heavy fire of the 
 French batteries, to renew the fight at four in the afternoon, 
 were eventually forced to withdraw with heavy casualties. 
 The fanatical Turk and the bulldog Briton had thrown back 
 assault after assault. On the other hand, their own sorties 
 had been equally fruitless. In mere fighting the rival forces 
 had been evenly matched, but the French were losing men 
 and time, and had not the sea by which to fill the gaps. On 
 May 13 a proposition for a truce to bury the dead in the 
 trenches was made by the French. 
 
 The Memoirs state the siege of Acre to have lasted sixty- 
 
548 AWKWARD FACTS. 
 
 two days, during which the besiegers exploded five mines, 
 and made twelve assaults, great and little ; and the besieged 
 made eighteen sorties, all of which were driven back, in addi- 
 tion to much excellent countermining. 
 
 This first real backset in Bonaparte's military career was a 
 sore trial to his fortitude ; but it was evident that he could 
 no longer maintain himself before Acre. There were too 
 many defenders in the place, and access to it was too open, 
 to capture it out of hand. Another assault was not immedi- 
 ately to be thought of ; ammunition was low ; a regular siege 
 required supplies and time ; the plague was counting its vic- 
 tims in constantly increasing ratio ; summer was upon them ; 
 news of fresh Egyptian uprisings came in ; the Rhodes force 
 was about to invade the base of French operations ; and an 
 English squadron had sailed up the Red Sea to Suez. 
 
 But if cheery words and a high head could change awk- 
 ward facts, Bonaparte at least proposed to march away from 
 his unaccomplished task with flying colors. In the report 
 of May 10 to the Directory he speaks of numberless sorties, 
 and of being master of the principal point of the rampart. 
 He says that the enemy has made a second line of fortifica- 
 tions leaning on Djezzar's castle. " We would have to open 
 trenches in front of every house, and lose more men than I am 
 willing to do. The season, moreover, is too advanced. The 
 object that I proposed has been attained. Egypt calls me 
 back. . . . Having reduced Acre to a heap of stones, I will 
 recross the desert ready to receive the European or Turkish 
 army which will disembark in Egypt." He states his losses 
 as five hundred killed and one thousand wounded. 
 
 To Almeras, May 16, Bonaparte wrote : " We have taken the first 
 enceinte of Acre. We have razed the palace of Ujezzar and shattered 
 the city with shells. The inhabitants have all fled. Djezzar himself was 
 wounded." And on the same date to Dugua : "I seized two principal 
 
THE EXPEDITION A FAILURE. 549 
 
 poiuts of the enceinte of Acre. "We did not judge it worth while to per- 
 sist in besieging the two enceintes. It would have cost too much time 
 and too many men." And to the Divan he wrote " that he would bring 
 back many prisoners and flags ; that he had razed the palace of Djezzar, 
 the ramparts of Acre, and bombarded the town so that there remained 
 not a stone upon stone." 
 
 Bonaparte's irritation at Sidney Smith's interference with his siege 
 operations later took the form of bitter criticisms, which have no great 
 value. In a letter to Fouch^ of February 2, 1807, he wrote : "I have 
 looked over the History of the Directory by Lacretelle .... I remarked 
 on the siege of Acre ridiculous things, such as those on Sidney Smith, 
 who was only a madman who did nothing. He only had two warships 
 with which he cruised, and so maintained the Turks masters of the sea. 
 As regards land, he contributed nothing to the siege." And it is narrated, 
 when Sidney Smith, annoyed at some of Bonaparte's comments in a cor- 
 respondence between them, sent the French commander a challenge to a 
 duel, Bonaparte accepted it, provided the Englishman would furnish him 
 a Marlborough to fight with. 
 
 But give whatever reasons he might, it was manifest that 
 the game was lost. Dire necessity, bad calculation if you 
 will, had wrecked Bonaparte's vast plans for the conquest of 
 the Orient. He had even dreamed, say some doubtful au- 
 thorities, of heading these same victorious fanatical Moham- 
 medans, whom he would control by religion as well as by his 
 military skill and successes, of marching on Constantinople, 
 of overturning the Turkish government, and of returning by 
 way of Vienna to Paris to rule the world. 
 
 How mean and small was his failure beside this dream ! 
 And yet no soldier without the imagination to dream such 
 dreams ever reaches the limit of the possible. Some of the 
 great men in the world's history have subordinated military 
 accomplishment to solid statesmanship. In this resided the 
 wonderful capacity of Charles the Great; in a lesser ratio 
 Frederick did the same; and whoso will found kingdoms 
 must put the civil before the military element, though it is 
 
550 A PATH FOR ADVANCEMENT. 
 
 the latter brings the fame. But this course does not usually 
 produce the great captain. Had Napoleon been less a soldier, 
 he might have founded a dynasty in France which would 
 have endured for centuries. But he would never have en- 
 tered Vienna, Berlin, Madrid, Moscow. 
 
 Thus fell Bonaparte's gigantic projects for the conquest of 
 the Orient, in front of what he himself termed a miserable 
 mudhole. One cannot help thinking of Alexander's being 
 arrested by the obstinacy of Tyre, and of the masterful man- 
 ner in which he overcame his difficulties. Compared with 
 this, one of the world's greatest feats of arms, what a pigmy 
 effort was the siege of Acre ! Still, the conditions were quite 
 different, and Bonaparte's inability to win over the Moham- 
 medans to his side or to rely upon the Christians was a 
 marked element in his failure. 
 
 The Oriental expedition had failed ; but by his dispatches 
 Bonaparte had thrown a glamour over the operation which 
 made his name great in France, and at the same moment the 
 months of his absence had led the Directory onward to certain 
 destruction, and opened a path for his own advancement. 
 Personally, his time had not been wasted. 
 
 On the 17th of May, after two months' siege, Bonaparte 
 smothered failure in words of enthusiasm, and announced the 
 return to Egypt in a 
 
 PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY. 
 
 Soldiers, you have crossed the desert which separates Africa from Asia 
 with more rapidity than an army of Arabs. The army which was on the 
 march to invade Egypt is destroyed. You have taken its generals, its 
 campaign outfits, its water-bags, its camels. You have seized on all the 
 strong places which defend the wells of the desert. You have dispersed 
 on the field of Mount Tabor that cloud of men which had come from 
 every part of Asia in the hope of pillaging Egypt. The thirty vessels you 
 saw arrive before Acre twelve days ago carried the army which was to 
 
THE RETREAT BEGUN. 551 
 
 besiege Alexandria ; but, obliged to hurry to Acre, it has finished its des- 
 tiny. A part of its flags will decorate your entry into Egypt. After 
 having with a handful of men nourished war for three months in the 
 heart of Syria, taken forty pieces of cannon, five flags, six thousand pris- 
 oners, having razed the fortifications of Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, we are 
 about to return to Egypt. The season of debarcations calls me there. A 
 few days more and you had the hope of taking the Pasha himself in the 
 middle of his palace, but at this season the capture of the castle of Acre 
 is not worth the loss of a few days. The brave men who would have 
 been lost are, moreover, necessary to-day for more essential operations. 
 Soldiers, we have a career of toil and danger to run. Having put the 
 Orient out of condition to essay aught against us this campaign, we may 
 have to repel the efforts of part of the Occident. You will there find a 
 new occasion of glory, and if, in the midst of many combats, each day is 
 marked by the death of a brave man, new brave men must gather and 
 take rank in their turn among the small number who give Ban in danger 
 and bring victory. Bonaparte. 
 
 Some wounded had already been headed for Tanturah. 
 Supplies which could not be carried off were destroyed, guns- 
 were spiked or blown up, or else cast into the sea ; the rest of 
 the wounded and sick (saving some fifty plague-stricken men, 
 to whom a kindly opiate is questionably said to have been 
 given to prevent their receiving the scant mercy of Djezzar,, 
 the Butcher) and all non-combatants were sent on ahead the 
 18th and 19th, and the fire from the batteries was kept up 
 so sharply as really almost to destroy Acre. On the 20th a 
 sortie from the place was repulsed at daylight and another 
 during the afternoon. At nightfall, May 20, the retreat 
 began, Lannes leading, followed by the train, and then Bon. 
 Kleber's division drew up behind the parallels, and the cav- 
 alry at the bridge over the Acre brook, which was destroyed. 
 Reynier's division, which held the parallels, fell back later in 
 the greatest quiet, followed at the last by the outposts ; and 
 Kleber's division closed the column of infantry. The cavalry 
 followed two hours later. The Turks kept up a fire on the 
 
552 THE RETURN MARCH. 
 
 empty French trenches all night, though not answered by a 
 single shot. Kleber acted as rearguard. The route was via 
 Tanturah and along the coast, and everything on the road 
 was laid waste so as to make pursuit difficult. On May 17 
 Junot was ordered to burn the mills on the Jordan, and to 
 sell, give away, or burn all victual near Tiberias, and to burst 
 the guns. On May 21, at Tanturah : " All men and officers 
 able to march were ordered to give up their horses to trans- 
 port the wounded and drag the guns." " A wounded grena- 
 dier feared to soil a fine saddle, all embroidered ; he appeared 
 to hesitate. ' Mount,' said the general-in-chief, ' there is no- 
 thing too good for a brave man ! ' " Despite the severe tax 
 on his patience and fortitude which this failure caused, Bona- 
 parte's temper was proof to every trial. But when an equerry 
 asked him on this day what horse he would ride, he struck 
 the man with his whip : " Did I not tell you that all should 
 go afoot?" Not until every wounded man had been pro- 
 vided for did he mount a horse. 
 
 The return march occasioned extreme distress. Kaisarieh 
 (Csesarea) was reached May 22 and Jaffa the 24th, and here 
 three days' rest was given to the men. The town walls were 
 blown up, the country devastated, and all war material ren- 
 dered unserviceable or thrown into the sea. Part of the sick 
 and wounded were shipped by sea to Alexandria. On May 
 24, at Jaffa, Adjutant-General Boyer was ordered to carry 
 the captured flags, and to display them as trophies in all vil- 
 lages passed, and to exhibit the prisoners in the same manner. 
 " He will write, say, do, everything which shall enable him to 
 enter in triumph," says the order. From Jaffa, on May 27, 
 a dispatch to the Directory makes the defeat appear a glori- 
 ous success ; and Bonaparte states, as a further reason for not 
 going into Acre, that the plague was ravaging the town, and 
 in fine that he had accomplished all that he had set out to do. 
 
A NOTEWORTHY PERFORMANCE. 553 
 
 On the fourth day the retreat was again begun. Gaza was 
 treated as Jaffa had been. On June 1 the cohimn entered 
 the desert, and reached Katiyeh the 4th. The wounded did 
 better than was expected, the dry atmosphere being favorable. 
 Even few of the cases of amputation were lost on the march. 
 On the 14th Bonaparte entered Cairo in state at the head 
 of three divisions, Kleber having been sent to Damietta, 
 and small garrisons being left in El Arish and in Katiyeh. 
 The campaign had lasted four months. The loss is variously 
 given as from three thousand men upwards. The Memoirs 
 make the number but fifteen hundred. In addition to three 
 narrow escapes, Bonaparte had once been slightly wounded, 
 and had had a horse killed under him. The Memoirs' estimate 
 of ten thousand lost by the enemy is exaggerated. 
 
 The distance from Acre to Cairo is over three hundred and 
 fifty miles, not counting the windings in the road, which add 
 fully fifteen per cent. This was marched in twenty-six days, 
 including; stops. In view of the fact that the men had started 
 weary and disheartened, that they were encumbered with sick 
 and wounded, that the roads were largely desert sands, that 
 to obtain food and water was a daily struggle, and that the 
 temperature was exhausting to Europeans, this was a note- 
 worthy performance — being sixteen miles each marching day. 
 The troops saluted Cairo with fervor, as if they were reaching 
 home. The population came out to meet the soldiery, and 
 showered upon them costly and beautiful gifts. The return 
 was celebrated by many fStes. 
 
 In a letter of June 28 to the Directory asking for reinforce- 
 ments of five hundred men each of cavalry and artillery, and 
 five thousand foot, Bonaparte stated his losses in killed and 
 dead of wounds and disease, up to this time, as five thousand 
 three hundred and forty-four men. " If this reinforcement 
 cannot be sent, peace should be made, because an equal num- 
 
554 KOSSIER SEIZED. 
 
 ber will soon be lost." He was probably not understating 
 the ease, as lie desired to produce the proper effect. Many 
 of his wounded might not recover so as to reenter the ranks ; 
 but it was probable that he had a total of twenty-five thou- 
 sand men left ; or, taking out ten per cent, for sick-list, an 
 effective of twenty-two thousand five hundred, in June, 1799. 
 In order to increase this force, he seriously considered buying 
 and putting under the colors two or three thousand young 
 negro slaves from the Upper Nile, to be placed a hundred in 
 each battalion ; but the project fell through. 
 
 Dugua had kept fairly good order in Egypt during Bona- 
 parte's expedition to Syria. Yet despite all Bonaparte's care, 
 as he himself said June 17 to Marmont, " a large quantity of 
 employees, medical men, have embarked for France without 
 permission." It would seem, from some of his orders on his 
 refurn to Egypt, that all things had not gone to suit him 
 there. 
 
 Desaix had chased Murad Bey up to Assuan, near the first 
 cataract, where he arrived February 1 ; and from here the 
 Mamelukes fled to the desert. On June 23 a report to the 
 Directory mentions a number of the combats of Desaix in 
 Upper Egypt ; and states that Kossier, on the Eed Sea oppo- 
 site Thebes, was being put in the best condition possible of 
 defense, so as, with Suez, to shut the entrance of Egypt from 
 that side. Another report to the Directory, in speaking of 
 the seizure of Kossier, refers to the bad condition of the 
 French naval service. " The Republic will never have a navy 
 until all the naval orders are remade. . . . The juries, the 
 councils, the assemblies must be forbidden. On board a 
 ship there should be but one authority, that of the captain, 
 which ought to be as absolute as that of the consuls in the 
 Roman armies." 
 
 The raiding of the Mamelukes up and down the Nile val- 
 
A NEW THREAT. 555 
 
 ley compelled Desaix also to do much marching to and fro 
 for many weeks. Finally Murad moved down to the Fayum, 
 and from there essayed to reach Cairo ; on Bonaparte's send- 
 ing Murat against him, he once more receded to the desert ; 
 but it was only again to appear at Ghizeh. While Bonaparte 
 was arranging to meet him at this place, news ran in, July 
 11, of the sighting off the roadstead of Aboukir of a fleet of 
 a hundred sail. This bore the Rhodes array of invasion. 
 Murad Bey shortly left Ghizeh. 
 
 Here was a new threat to the French holdings in Egypt ; 
 and to meet this, at least for the moment, although Murad 
 Bey was working in cooperation with the invading armies, a 
 fact which caused additional solicitude, Bonaparte determined 
 for the nonce to abandon Upper Egypt, as he had abandoned 
 Mantua ; and he recalled Desaix to Beni Suef, and thence to 
 the capital, to take command. So soon as the news arrived 
 from Marmont on July 15 that the fleet was ready to land the 
 Turkish army, Bonaparte made preparations to fall with all 
 his forces on the new adversary. Lannes and Eampon (who 
 succeeded Bon, dead of his Syrian wounds)) set out at 1 A. M., 
 July 16, for Ramaniyeh, Murat having been ordered to pre- 
 cede them as a van, with the force that had been assembled 
 to head off Murad. This made about six thousand men in 
 the column, which had orders to force the marching. Kleber, 
 to whom had been committed the guarding of the coast from 
 Rosetta, where were his headquarters, to El Arish, was also 
 ordered towards Aboukir by the south of Lake Edku. 
 
 In the same bay where a year before Nelson had annihi- 
 lated the French fleet, the Turkish army, twelve to fifteen thou- 
 sand strong, under Mustapha Pasha of Rhodes, and escorted 
 by Sidney Smith's fleet, had cast anchor ; and on the 15th 
 of July had landed, a dozen miles from Alexandria, — it is 
 fifteen miles from the city to Aboukir fort, — on the small 
 
556 MASS THEORY AGAIN EXEMPLIFIED. 
 
 peninsula between the ocean and the Lake of El Madieh, or 
 Aboukir. The fort at the point of the cape had been lost by 
 the French officer there in command, who had made a sortie 
 upon the Turks, leaving only thirty-five men in the place ; 
 and when compelled to fall back, he found himself cut 
 off, his force was destroyed, and the fort, thus disgarnished, 
 went lost. Marmont was in Alexandria, and to prevent the 
 landing had started out with the garrison of twelve hundred 
 men early the same day ; but learning that the landing had 
 already been effected, he returned to Alexandria to await 
 Bonaparte's orders ; and the Turks intrenched themselves on 
 the peninsula, landed their stores, and breaking the bridge of 
 boats over which ran the road from Rosetta, sat down to await 
 the expected oncoming of Murad Bey. On the 19th Bona- 
 parte personally reached Ramaniyeh, and for three or four 
 days waited at this town to direct the assembling of his army. 
 We find him here again exemplifying his mass theory. 
 Nearly every general would have been tempted to move Mar- 
 mont out of Alexandria and Kleber from Rosetta on Aboukit, 
 while the centre marched up through Ramaniyeh. But not 
 so Bonaparte. His plan was to advance his forces from Cairo 
 on Birket Gitas, draw in one of these lieutenants to the main 
 body and hold the other as reserve, according to the place in 
 which he found the enemy ready to accept battle — thus not 
 only assembling his mass before he reached the field, but 
 arranging to put in every man. 
 
 The assembly, then, was to be made at Birket-Gitas, be- 
 tween Lake Mareotis and I^iake Edku. Hither, or to Esko, 
 he ordered Kleber to be ready to march and join the army ; 
 Dugua at Cairo was instructed to send on every available 
 man ; Murat was pushed out along the neck of land between 
 the lakes to get into touch with Marmont. Bonaparte hoped 
 that the enemy would attempt to blockade Alexandria, in 
 
THE PENINSULA OCCUPIED. 
 
 557 
 
 which operation he could easily overwhelm him ; but having 
 learned by the 22d that the enemy had elected to stand at 
 Aboukir and had there intrenched, it was settled that an im- 
 mediate forward march should be made with the seven thou- 
 sand men he had got together. Bonaparte himself went to 
 Alexandria. Lannes was advanced to Birket, and Lanusse 
 in support ; by the 22d the army was collected at Birket ; and 
 the next night it marched well in hand towards Alexandria, 
 and having occupied the Aboukir peninsula so as to confine 
 
 Battle of Aboukir. 
 
 the enemy to it, camped some miles from the city. Satisfied 
 that the works of Alexandria were in good condition for de- 
 fense, Bonaparte detailed a small force from the garrison, and 
 established a post half-way on the road to Aboukir near the 
 most important wells. To this post he now ordered the army ; 
 and the troops marched up in the night of July 24-25. Hav- 
 ins: reached Fuad, south of Rosetta and east of the Lake of 
 
558 THE TURKISH INVADERS. 
 
 Edku, Kleber was to hold himself in reserve, but to move up 
 nearer the army. 
 
 At early dawn of the 25th the army marched along the 
 peninsula, a narrow neck of land where stood the Turkish 
 invaders. Having come by sea, the enemy had nothing but 
 infantry and much dismounted cavalry. Mustapha Pasha 
 had established his camp in the village of Aboukir, and had 
 stationed his first line across the peninsula, from a little 
 redoubt on the sandy dune known as the Hill of the Sheiks, 
 near the seashore, to another redoubt on a similar dune, or 
 the Hill of the Wells, near the lake. On the first hill were 
 one thousand men, on the second two thousand, and in the 
 village between and back of the two stood twelve hundred 
 men and four guns. Some gunboats were anchored in the 
 lake so as to fire across the peninsula ; but these were shortly 
 driven off by some heavy guns brought up by Songis. The 
 second line was extended across the Hill of the Vizier, close 
 to Aboukir village, with the centre in a little redoubt built 
 by the French, which had two lines running out to the sea. 
 Here were seven thousand men and twelve guns. Back of 
 all lay Fort Aboukir, cut off from the mainland by a ditch 
 twenty feet wide, and with the counterscarp cut in the solid 
 rock. It was held by fifteen hundred men. The reserves lay 
 in Aboukir village. 
 
 Of the French forces, Murat was ahead with the van of 
 four hundred horse sent down from Desaix's force, three bat- 
 talions under Destaing and three field-guns ; Lannes was on 
 the right ; Lanusse on the left, or as the Memoirs say, in sec- 
 ond line. Kleber came up later with the heavy artillery 
 under escort of a squadron, and Davout, with two squadrons 
 and one hundred camel-riders, held the communications with 
 Alexandria, and had orders to keep the peninsula free from 
 bands of Bedouins. From Rosetta Menou was to march up 
 
THE VILLAGE CAPTURED. 
 
 659 
 
 to the shore near by, and to make demonstrations to annoy the 
 enemy and attract his attention. 
 
 About seven o'clock in the morning, after an easy march 
 towards Aboukir, the French van struck the outposts of the 
 enemy. Some time was spent in forming line, and in an 
 hour's initial cannonade, whereupon Bonaparte gave orders 
 for the attack. Destaing 
 with his three battalions 
 and Lanusse in support 
 moved against the Hill of 
 the Sheiks, Lannes against 
 the Hill of the Wells. 
 Murat with the cavalry ad- 
 vanced in the centre, and 
 rode around to the rear of 
 the two forts through " a 
 fine plain which separated 
 the wings of the enemy." 
 This first operation was 
 crowned with success, both 
 French columns reaching 
 the hills at the first effort. 
 
 The Turks abandoned the redoubts, and fleeing towards the 
 village in the rear, fell under Murat's sabres and were cut 
 down or driven into the sea. Both columns now obliqued 
 towards each other and advanced on the second line, " which 
 had an intrenched village in its front, a redoubt in the centre 
 and works which ran to the sea, flanked by thirty gunboats." 
 The village was attacked in front and flank, and meanwhile 
 Murat made a circuit and again rode down upon its rear. 
 Reinforcements from the Turkish second line and camp came 
 up, but these after a hard tussle were thrust back, the village 
 was captured, and the Turks were driven into the sea, where. 
 
 Murat. 
 
560 THE REDOUBT STORMED. 
 
 refusing to surrender, they nearly all perished, " the most 
 horrible spectacle I have ever seen," says Bonaparte's report. 
 The first line and the village were thus taken, and three or 
 four thousand Turks had been annihilated. 
 
 Bonaparte's principal object had been attained, that of 
 shutting up the Turkish army in Aboukir peninsula, where, 
 with the heavy guns that Kleber would bring up, they could 
 be destroyed. But the successful issue of the morning's fight 
 lured him on, and orders were again given to attack the sec- 
 ond line, whose centre was the redoubt covering Aboukir. 
 This redoubt was hard to take. On the Turkish right a 
 ditch connected it with the sea, and on the left another with 
 the lake, but there was a gap between the lake and ditch, 
 held in force by the Turks with guns, and covered by gun- 
 boats from the sea. This gap was widened by some French 
 guns which took position on a jutting point in the beach, 
 from whence they could enfilade the Turkish left. Bonaparte 
 opened a heavy fire upon the redoubt, attacked the right 
 Turkish Hank with three battalions under Fuguiere, and threw 
 the cavalry against the left flank, where lay the gap. At the 
 same moment Lannes and Destaing stormed the redoubt. 
 Fuguiere did not at first succeed. The Turks themselves made 
 a sortie from the redoubt ; and for a while there was a fight 
 hand to hand and with cold steel. But the French soldier's 
 bayonet was better than the Moslem's sword and dagger ; the 
 Turks were driven back upon their intrenchments, followed 
 by the French, who were, however, checked at this point by 
 a heavy artillery fire, opened as the guns were unmasked. 
 Meanwhile Murat had fruitlessly attacked the Turkish gap 
 between lake and ditch, and Bonaparte had sent him two bat- 
 talions under Lannes, who was to take the redoubt on its 
 left. Lannes' attack here occurred just as the Turks had 
 driven back Fuguiere, and overmuch encouraged by apparent 
 
THE BATTLE A MASSACRE. 561 
 
 victory, had rushed out to decapitate the dead ; for each Mus- 
 sulman bringing in the head of an enemy was to receive a silver 
 aigrette and a substantial reward. Bonaparte sent the de- 
 feated French column in again, so as to make a simultaneous 
 attack on both flanks of the redoubt. Murat had finally suc- 
 ceeded in breaking through the gap, and now rode down to 
 close the rear of the redoubt and catch the Turks, who were 
 fleeing before the last French assault. A regular butchery 
 ensued. Murat, wounded by Mustapha Pasha in a personal 
 encounter, cut the latter down and captured him. The 
 camp, the baggage and twenty guns fell into French hands, 
 and the Turks not killed or drowned were made prisoners. 
 Nothing was left of the Turkish army. The Memoirs claim 
 that two thousand were killed and ten thousand drowned. 
 The French loss was at least a thousand killed and wounded, 
 including a number of excellent officers, though on July 27 
 Bonaparte reported the loss as a hundred killed and four 
 hundred wounded. 
 
 The battle had been a massacre pure and simple, of the kind 
 that we read of in ancient history, and that within a few years 
 we have seeti in the Soudan — inevitable against undisciplined 
 hordes. But a small remnant of the Turkish army reached 
 Aboukir fort. Bonaparte wrote to Dugua : " It was one of 
 the finest battles I have seen ; not a man of the force which 
 landed has escaped. . . . More than six thousand corpses 
 have been counted, of which half have been buried. Two 
 hundred flags were taken, all the baggage, the tents, forty 
 guns, Mustapha Pasha, first cousin of the Turkish ambassador 
 in Paris, who was commander-in-chief, and all his officers. 
 Murat and Fuguiere were wounded." And to the Directors 
 he wrote : " The winning of this battle, which will have so 
 much influence on the glory of the Republic, is principally 
 due to General Murat. I ask for this general the grade of 
 
562 SURRENDER OF FORT ABOUKIR. 
 
 general of division. His brigade of cavalry did the impossi- 
 ble. The Chief of Brigade Bessieres, at the head of the guides, 
 sustained the reputation of his corps." Menou was put in 
 Lannes' place, who was wounded. The prisoners were taken 
 to Cairo. 
 
 Kleber did not reach the field until after the battle was 
 won. Enthusiastically throwing his arms about his chief, as 
 he viewed the scene, he cried : " Permit me. General, to em- 
 brace you ! You are as big as the world ! " 
 
 During this battle the garrison of Fort Ab.oukir had re- 
 mained quiet. It was now shut in, and after seven days' 
 bombardment surrendered,- with many killed and wounded. 
 " In the first twenty-four hours after the exit of the Turkish 
 garrison, four hundred prisoners died from having eaten and 
 drunk with too much avidity," says the dispatch. 
 
 On the 5th Bonaparte left Alexandria, and on the 10th 
 was again in Cairo. On August 15 Desaix was sent back to 
 Upper Egypt after Murad Bey. 
 
 We must not omit to note that in the St. Helena Memoirs 
 Napoleon wrote at length and in a most fascinating manner 
 about both Egypt and Syria, giving much detail for which 
 there is no place here. Like all relations of events long past, 
 in some parts the statements of the Memoirs do not coincide 
 with those of contemporary records, even of his own orders 
 issued at the time. But in this the great soldier erred no 
 more than nearly all men so writing. Everything he says is 
 pertinent and of interest. There is less effort to cover up 
 defeat, as at Acre, than one might imagine him to indulge 
 in ; and the entire narrative about the Egyptian and Syrian 
 campaigns possesses transcendent interest. 
 
 Bonaparte had already made up his mind to leave Egypt. 
 Since he had discovered that his Oriental dreams were im- 
 possible of realization, he again looked to Europe as his field, 
 
QUALIFIED AUTHORITY TO RETURN. 
 
 563 
 
 and in after years lie found it large enough to satisfy any 
 ambition. 
 
 At times during the siege of Acre, scraps of information 
 relating to the new Coalition had been got from Phelippeaux 
 in the many pourparlers which took place in the trenches. 
 " The general-in-chief thought no more of aught but of the 
 means to cross to France. Syria, Galilee, Palestine, had no 
 further importance. The army must be led back to Egypt, 
 where it was invincible. He could then leave it and throw 
 himself into that ocean of events which presented themselves 
 to his thought," said Napoleon at St. Helena. 
 
 After this battle of Aboukir, a parliamentarian was sent 
 to the English fleet to discuss the status of the Turkish 
 wounded ; and this officer came 
 back with all the latest news 
 from Europe, and English and 
 Frankfort journals up to June 
 10. Mustapha Pasha had al- 
 ready told as much. Bonaparte 
 learned of the disasters to the 
 armies of Italy and the Rhine, 
 and the demoralization to which 
 the Directory had been reduced. 
 He had already received a sort 
 of qualified authority to return 
 to France ; and Kleber (whom, 
 
 because of his dislike for him, it has been suggested by some, 
 Bonaparte left in command, with Junot as his second) was as 
 capable of holding Egypt, with five or six thousand reinforce- 
 ments a year, as he himself was, now that the task was but 
 one of occupation. It was the situation in France which par- 
 ticularly determined Bonaparte to leave at once. The laurels 
 of Aboukir effaced the recollection of the defeat at Acre, and 
 he could return to France victorious. 
 
 Marmorit. 
 
564 AN ORDER TO KLEBER. 
 
 About the middle of August Marmont sent Bonaparte word 
 that the moment was favorable. Sidney Smith, who had been 
 observing Alexandria, had got out of water and provisions, 
 and the Turkish and British squadrons had sailed for Cyprus. 
 On August 18 Bonaparte left Cairo for Alexandria, giving 
 Menou at Rosetta and Kleber at Damietta rendezvous there. 
 Kleber did not arrive in time to see Bonaparte sail. Menou 
 was put in command of Alexandria. 
 
 On August 22 an order was issued to General Kleber to 
 take command of the army, giving him news of what had 
 taken place in Europe, and a cipher in which to correspond 
 with France. 
 
 The order asks him to send Junot to France, and tells him that it is the 
 intention of the government that Desaix shall also come back to Europe 
 in November. It tells Kleber that probably he will receive arms and re- 
 inforcements, but if, by next May, none have come, and his losses by the 
 plague and the usual attrition of service grow too high, it will be better 
 not to hazard an active campaign, but rather to make peace with Turkey, 
 even if the evacuation of Egypt is the principal condition, though this 
 will be a grief, because Egypt is so important to France. But much 
 will depend on the success of the Republic in Europe. Bonaparte ad- 
 vises Kleber to use persuasion on the Porte, and to keep on its good side. 
 He is to remember that no treaty is good unless ratified. He advises 
 him as to the manner of conducting the government of Egypt, and to 
 keep Alexandria and El Arish in good condition ; to rely on Sanson, chief 
 engineer, and Poussielgue, financial agent. "The important place that 
 you are to occupy as chief will put you on a level for showing the talents 
 which nature has given you. ... I abandon Egypt with the greatest 
 regret. The interest of the mother country, its glory, obedience, the ex- 
 traordinary events which have just happened, alone decide me to force 
 my way through the enemy's squadrons to reach Europe. I shall be heart 
 and soul with you. Your success will be as dear to me as those in which 
 I myself had a part, and I shall look upon each day of my life as badly 
 used when I do not do something for the army over which I leave you in 
 command. . . . The army I confide to you is all composed of my children. 
 I have had at all times, even in the midst of the greatest griefs, marks of 
 
SARDINIA REACHED. 
 
 565 
 
 their attachment. Keep up this sentiment ; you should do so on account 
 of the very particular esteem and friendship that I have for you, and for 
 the real attachment I hear to it." 
 
 This order, together with long and detailed instructions as 
 to the military and civil government of the land, was left with 
 Menou to deliver to Kleber. 
 
 On the same day an order was issued to the army : — 
 
 The news from Europe has decided me to leave for France. I leave 
 the command of the army to General Kleber. The army will soon have 
 news from me. I can say no more. It costs me to leave the soldiers to 
 whom I am most attached, hut it will only be for the moment, and the 
 general I leave them has the confidence of the government and mine. 
 
 Bonaparte. 
 
 Bonaparte went aboard the frigate Muiron early August 
 23, accompanied by Berthier, Murat and Lannes, all three 
 wounded, Marmont, Duroc, Bessieres and Bourrienne; and 
 under Ganteaume, set sail with 
 the Carere and two other men- 
 of-war. 
 
 A northwest wind obliged 
 the vessels to run along the 
 African coast. It took twenty 
 days to make three hundred 
 miles, but the course was out 
 of the line of English cruisers. 
 Finally an east wind came up. 
 Cape Bon was doubled, and 
 Sardinia was reached. Bona- 
 parte did not know what the 
 state of Corsica might be, but 
 
 found, on being driven into Ajaccio, that it was still French. 
 Here full news was learned of the reverses in Italy. The 
 northwest wind kept Bonaparte in harbor a week. From 
 
 Ganteaume. 
 
566 
 
 LETTER SENT FROM AIX. 
 
 Ajaccio Frejiis was reached October 9, and here Bonaparte 
 was received with open arms. He left at once for Paris, 
 sending ahead, October 10, from Aix, a letter to the Direc- 
 tory : " Citizen Directors, since my departure from France, I 
 have received but one dispatch from you." Then he goes on 
 to state that he destroyed the armies which threatened to 
 invade Egypt from Syria, and those that had disembarked 
 on the coast ; but having learned the condition of France, he 
 had determined to return home, though he had but two slow- 
 sailing frigates. " I did not think of calculating dangers. I 
 had to be where my presence would be the most useful. 
 Animated with these sentiments, I would have wrapped my 
 mantle about me and sailed in an open boat, if I had not had 
 frigates. I have left Egypt well organized and under the 
 orders of General Kleber. . . , Bonaparte." 
 
 His passage home was thus fraught with as much fortune 
 as the one from France to Egypt a year and a half before. 
 
 Sword of Massena. 
 (Rivoli Collection.) 
 
XX. 
 
 SUWARROV AND MASSENA. 1799. 
 
 While Bonaparte had been absent in Egypt, French affairs had gone wrong. 
 The Treaty of Campo Formic had not been carried out, and the allies raised 
 large armies to recover what Bonaparte had won from them. Jourdan crossed the 
 Rhine in March and advanced through the Black Forest. Archduke Charles 
 beat him at Ostrach and again at Stockach, and drove him back across the Rhine. 
 During this time Massena operated with both success and failure in the Alps, 
 and to his army was added that of Jourdan. In Italy Scherer, ordered to at- 
 tack the enemy on the Adige, was defeated at Magnano, and late in March he 
 was forced to retire to Milan. The allies were now placed under Suwarrov, 
 who again defeated Scherer and Moreau at Cassano. Scherer gave up the com- 
 mand, and Moreau retired towards Turin and Genoa. From southern Italy 
 Macdonald was coming up to join Moreau. Suwarrov went to meet him with 
 a heavy force, and defeated him at the Trebia in June. Thus in three months 
 Jourdan had been defeated on the Rhine, Scherer and Moreau iu Italy, and Mas- 
 sena had barely held his own against Charles. Joubert was put in command of 
 the Army of Italy. Suwarrov attacked him at Novi August 15. Joubert was 
 killed, and Moreau, who again took over the command, was defeated and driven 
 back on Genoa. Suwarrov had won back all Bonaparte's Italian conquests. 
 In Holland an Anglo-Russian expedition failed. In Switzerland Massena did 
 some good mountain campaigning. Charles was called to the Rhine, and Su- 
 warrov sent to Switzerland. Before his arrival Massena defeated the allies at 
 Zurich, and his lieutenants drove back all the allied armies. Suwarrov barely 
 escaped. Switzerland was held, but the year of 1799 had been fatal to France. 
 It was time Bonaparte returned. 
 
 At the opening of 1799, the unreasonable attitude of the 
 French Directory, the favorable outlook for Austria to re- 
 cover Lombardy, and the English efforts to create a new coa- 
 lition combined to make war a certainty. Under the guise of 
 spreading republican liberty, France had not only, to all in- 
 tents and purposes, seized on Holland, Switzerland and Kome, 
 
668 UPRISING AGAINST FRANCE. 
 
 but Joubert had compelled the king of Piedmont to abdicate. 
 The natural sequence of these encroachments was that some 
 of the Swiss cantons placed themselves under the protection 
 of Austria, and matters became threatening at a time when 
 France was less able than ever to keep up war ; for her army 
 was either much spread abroad, or absent in Egypt, or in bad 
 order ; and her finances were at their very worst. 
 
 The English sea victory at' Aboukir had fostered the pro- 
 jected uprising against France. Turkey declared war Au- 
 gust 30. Angered by the seizure of Malta, of the Knights of 
 which he was High Master, Paul I. of Russia joined England 
 in fanning the flames of war ; and anti-French treaties were 
 made between Russia and Naples, Turkey and Portugal, be- 
 tween England and Naples and Turkey, and between Naples, 
 Tuscany and Sardinia. Under the financial dragooning of 
 England, which had agreed to pay subsidies to most of the 
 powers, the general purpose was to close to France all ports 
 controlled by the Coalition. After a while Austria entered 
 the Coalition ; but Prussia remained neutral. 
 
 Naples and Turkey began the war, the latter by seizing the 
 Ionian Islands in May, 1799, while Naples had armed to in- 
 vade Rome and restore the Sovereign Pontiff. After his vic- 
 tory at Aboukir, Nelson had sailed to Naples, where the king 
 had raised sixty thousand men, and Austria had lent him 
 General Mack to command them. Championnet had fifteen 
 thousand French, spread all over the Roman States in weak 
 detachments, from Terracina to Ancona. Mack determined 
 cordon fashion to attack both the French centre and wings, 
 and prevent their concentration, but his plan failed. Still 
 Championnet felt compelled to withdraw from Rome, and 
 Ferdinand entered the holy city November 29, called back 
 the Pope, and erected a provisional government ; but Mack's 
 operations being weakened by a series of partial combats, he 
 
THE PARTHENOPEAN REPUBLIC. 569 
 
 retreated, and on December 15 the French again occupied 
 the capital. In the next three weeks other important towns 
 were taken, and early in January the French appeared before 
 Capua. Irritated at the reverses of their army, the lazza- 
 
 Rome and Naples. 
 
 roni rose in Naples, and taking refuge on Nelson's fleet, the 
 Court sailed to Sicily. Mack held himself for a while at 
 Capua, but the revolution in Naples was so pronounced that 
 he entered into negotiations with the French, and a truce en- 
 sued January 11. The lazzaroni had possession of Naples, 
 but its inhabitants really welcomed the arrival of the French. 
 Championnet stormed the city January 23, took control of the 
 government, and the Parthenopean Republic was erected. 
 Championnet had lost but two thousand men, killed and 
 wounded, and had taken twenty thousand prisoners and sixty 
 guns. But while success here seemed marked, it none the 
 less depleted the French forces which had to resist Austria 
 on the Po, and made the allied task the easier. 
 
570 THE SEVERAL ARMIES. 
 
 When, at the end of 1798, it became apparent that peace 
 must be short-lived, the Directory had ordered a levy of two 
 hundred thousand men, wherewith to take the offensive. The 
 French troops were in a wretched state, and as spring ap- 
 proached, were distributed in five armies. In Alsatia Jourdan 
 stood with thirty-seven thousand men ; in Switzerland Mas- 
 sena with thirty thousand men lay on the left bank of the 
 Khine above the lake of Constance ; and in northern Italy 
 Scherer commanded fifty-eight thousand men, of which ten 
 thousand were in Tuscany and the Valteline. In southern 
 Italy Macdonald, who had succeeded Championnet, held 
 Naples and Rome with about thirty thousand old troops. 
 Bernadotte stood in reserve opposite Mannheim and Philips- 
 burg, with the cadre of an army which it was indefinitely pro- 
 posed to increase to forty thousand men ; Brune, with over 
 twenty thousand men, held Holland. These numbers later 
 were considerably varied by attrition, reinforcement and de- 
 tails ; and they did not include the troops on the Channel, 
 still innocuously threatening the English coast. The aggre- 
 gate in March, 1799, was four hundred and fifty thousand 
 men. With the several armies it was proposed to advance 
 into Bavaria, to capture Switzerland, and to cross the Adige, 
 while holding as the points d'appui lower Italy and Holland, 
 on the flanks of the huge front. The Directory was seeking 
 to protect everything, and was actually too weak to hold, let 
 alone force, any one point ; and it managed to draw up a bold, 
 but quite an impossible scheme. The French cause was much 
 assisted by the capture in January of Ehrenbreitstein and in 
 March of Mannheim. 
 
 In Germany, said Napoleon at St. Helena, the French 
 should have remained on the defense, being far weaker than 
 the enemy. The armies of the Danube, Switzerland and 
 Lower Rhine should have been concentrated into one, with 
 
on 
 
 ACTING ON A FALSE THEORY. 571 
 
 some of the old regiments stiU in France. Such an army, 
 with a sound defensive role, would easily have held the right 
 bank of the Khine in the Schaffhausen country. On the 
 contrary, in Italy the offensive should have been sharply 
 pushed, and in force, before Suwarrov could come up. The 
 Directory was acting on the false theory that by seizing and 
 holding the mountain regions they would control the plains. 
 The converse is true. The Swiss mountains themselves de- 
 pend on the plains, whence comes their food, not these 
 Switzerland. No line of operation, as Napoleon points out, 
 should ever run, if it can be avoided, 
 through a mountainous country. 
 There is no victual there, the numer- 
 ous side-defiles must be held, and 
 this depletes the army; either re- 
 treat or advance is hard on the 
 troops; and the best divisions can 
 be beaten by men from the plow, if 
 they know how to shoot. The real 
 spirit of mountain warfare consists 
 in not attacking, but in turning 
 place after place, and obliging the 
 defense to attack or retreat. Moreover a mountain road is 
 fatal for a retreat, and the possibility of falling back must 
 always be a part of the calculation. 
 
 Speaking of mountain warfare, the Memoirs say : " It has 
 happened that great armies, when they could do nothing else, 
 have traversed mountainous countries to arrive in fine plains 
 and in beautiful lands. It is this one must necessarily do to 
 arrive in Italy. But to make supernatural efforts to cross 
 inaccessible mountains, and still to find yourself in the midst 
 of precipices, defiles, rocks, without other prospect than for a 
 long time to have the same obstacles to surmount, the same 
 
572 TO ANTICIPATE THE AUSTRIANS. 
 
 fatigues to endure ; to be disquieted on each new march by 
 knowing that so many bad stretches lie in one's rear ; to be 
 each day more in danger of dying of hunger, and all this 
 when one can do otherwise : this is to delight in difficulties 
 and fight against giants ; it is to act without good sense, and 
 for that reason against the spirit of the art of war. Your 
 enemy has great cities, beautiful provinces, capitals to pro- 
 tect, — march on these by way of the plains. The art of war 
 is a simple art, and all a matter of execution : nothing is 
 vague, everything is good sense ; nothing in it is ideology." 
 
 " Switzerland," further say the Memoirs, " is a huge in- 
 trenched camp, from which one may easily move into France, 
 into Germany and into Italy. The debouches to enter into 
 the Tyrol are the most difficult." To invade Germany from 
 Switzerland, it is easier to move around the west of the Lake 
 of Constance and reach the Danube than to try to fray a path 
 through the Tyrol. The St. Gothard is the best debouch 
 into Italy. The SpHigen is longer and harder. To cover the 
 French frontiers in Switzerland there are four principal lines : 
 the Rhine, the Linth, the Reuss, the Aar. Any one of these 
 is easy of defense. 
 
 In order, then, to anticipate the Austrians in Switzerland 
 and the Tyrol, Massena was to cross the Rhine above the 
 Lake of Constance, and after occupying Vorarlberg and Gri- 
 sons, to advance on the Tyrol. Jourdan was to cross between 
 Kehl and Huningen, and passing the Black Forest, to reach 
 out his right towards Massena; while Scherer's centre and 
 right would operate against the Austrians at Verona and on 
 the Adige, and his left also reach out towards Massena via 
 the Spliigen or Trent, as might best avail. Meanwhile Berna- 
 dotte was to blockade Mannheim and Philipsburg, as a. diver- 
 sion to attract the allied attention, and to protect Jourdan's 
 left. Macdonald was to continue his occupation of Naples ; 
 
CHARLES' COMMAND. 573 
 
 Brune to reduce Belgium. No such magnificent cordon oper- 
 ation had yet been conceived — nor so weak a one. 
 
 The Austrians did not expect an early opening of the cam- 
 paign. Their divisions were much spread, supplies were not 
 yet organized, and their Russian allies were still distant. 
 Their main force had been sent to the Po. Behind the Lech 
 were fifty-five thousand foot and twenty-five thousand horse 
 of good troops, commanded by Archduke Charles ; of which 
 fifteen thousand stood under Stzarray at Neumarkt to contain 
 Bernadotte, should he undertake an advance. Hotze and Auf- 
 f enberg, stationed with twenty-six thousand men in Vorarlberg 
 and Grisons, along the right bank of the Rhine above the 
 Lake of Constance, were also a part of Charles' command. 
 BeUegarde, with eighteen thousand men in the Tyrol, formed 
 the right flying wing of Kray, who with seventy-five thousand 
 men stood between the Tagliamento and Adige, and held 
 Verona and Legnano, some of his divisions being yet in win- 
 ter quarters. The Russian allies were coming on in two 
 columns : one over fifty thousand strong, under Suwarrov, 
 marching through Moravia towards Italy ; the other, under 
 Korsakov, not much less strong, on its way to join the arch- 
 duke. 
 
 Between France and Austria lies a country exhibiting three 
 topographical features : the rich lands of southwestern Ger- 
 many, through which the Danube furnishes the only obstacle ; 
 Switzerland and the Tyrol, poor in victual and difficult for 
 manoeuvres ; the valley of the Po, rich like that of the Dan- 
 ube. To Archduke Charles, Swabia appeared to be the key- 
 point of the theatre of war ; for if held in full force by Austria, 
 the French could not well advance from Italy against Vienna, 
 lest they be taken in flank ; while if the French held it, no 
 Austrian army could reach Turin without being equally taken 
 in flank from Swabia through the Alpine passes. It was the 
 
574 GRAVE ERRORS. 
 
 Danube, not the Po, he claimed, on which the Austrian forces 
 should be concentrated. The archduke's theory was, however, 
 weak in this : that should the French win a decisive battle 
 in Swabia, they could at once push on to Vienna down the 
 Po ; should the Austrians win one, they could not invade 
 France without crossing the Ehine and the French mountains 
 along its banks. This was a very serious task, and when they 
 should have accomplished it, they would be advancing with 
 these mighty obstacles in their rear. Yet to lay siege to Stras- 
 burg and Hiiningen, hold the Rhine country in heavy force, 
 and incidentally fight for Lombardy on the Po, seemed to 
 Charles the wiser policy, and the one which would win most. 
 In opening the campaign, the French committed some grave 
 errors. They paid no heed to the Austrian operations ; they 
 assumed the Tyrol to be of excessive strategical value ; they 
 distributed their far smaller forces over a greater area than the 
 Austrians ; they left large forces to do useless work in lower 
 Italy, and set Bernadotte a quite unnecessary task. Being 
 weaker, if they would not concentrate for one great blow, the 
 French would have done better to assume a distinctly defen- 
 sive role and oblige the Austrians to use up their forces in 
 siege work. In addition to these errors they committed a 
 worse one : they resorted to dishonest measures. While inti- 
 mating to Austria that it was only a precautionary measure, 
 the Directory ordered Jourdan across the Rhine, with secret 
 instructions to march rapidly on Bregenz on the Lake of 
 Constance, so as to have Vorarlberg and Grisons within his 
 grasp. This Jourdan set out to do ; but fearful for his flanks, 
 though speed was the one thing needful in the operation, he 
 paused on the threshold, until Bernadotte and Massena should 
 also cross the Rhine to sustain his right and left. Instead of 
 moving on the prescribed line, moreover, Jourdan likewise 
 chose to advance midway between the Lake of Constance and 
 
BREACH OF SWISS NEUTRALITY. 575 
 
 the Danube, so as to have these obstacles to protect either 
 flank ; but he was heedless of the fact that as this geogra- 
 phical area widened, so must his army be spread over a front 
 which would soon become dangerous. 
 
 On the other hand, the plan of Archduke Charles, who was 
 facing Jourdan, was Napoleonic in its simplicity : so soon as 
 the French should cross the Rhine, to march against them in 
 force and deliver battle, so as to forestall a junction between 
 Jourdan and Massena. 
 
 Jourdan put his forces over at Kehl and Hiiningen early 
 in March, and advanced in four columns through the Black 
 Forest by the Kinzig valley and the HoUenthal, late scene of 
 Moreau's retreat. On March 8 he paused near Tuttlingen ; 
 and ascertaining from Bernadotte and Massena, March 13, that 
 each had moved, he again advanced, and on March 20 stood 
 with his centre in PfuUendorf, his right under Ferino on the 
 Lake of Constance, and his left under St. Cyr in Mengen; the 
 van under Lef ebvre being in front of Ostrach. On this same 
 day he broke the existing truce. On hearing of the French 
 advance, the archduke sent Stzarray to the Eednitz south of 
 Niirnberg to contain Bernadotte ; Ingoldstadt and Ulm were 
 occupied by sufficient garrisons. The Austrian commander 
 crossed the Lech with fifty-six thousand men at and below 
 Augsburg, marched in three columns towards the French, and 
 by the 20th was opposite them in the vicinity of Altshausen. 
 A rumor had reached Jourdan that an Austrian column was 
 turning his left to march on Kehl, and lest he should have 
 his communications interrupted, he sent Vandamme's division 
 into the Neckar valley to head the column off, thus depleting 
 his already inferior forces. Believing in numbers, Charles 
 now called-in Hotze with ten thousand men from Vorarlberg 
 to Lindau, and on March 21, after a slight check to his van 
 under Kerpen, he advanced into the country between Aach and 
 
A FORCED RECONNOISSANCE. 577 
 
 Ostrach, still in three columns ; and attacking Lefebvre's van, 
 he drove it back on Ostrach, crossed the stream of this name, 
 and forced Jourdan back beyond Stockach, where the Swiss 
 and Swabian post-roads cross. The Austrians occupied the 
 town. Only some distance to the west of the place could the 
 French be reassembled, after a loss of two thousand men. 
 Jourdan took post between Tuttlingen and Singen. As an 
 opening manoeuvre, this was well done. 
 
 The archduke might to advantage have foUowe'd up his vic- 
 tory. He did not, however, do so until the 24th of March, when 
 he advanced with his main force to a position west of Stock- 
 ach. The little stream of this name flows in a large loop to 
 the west of the town. The archduke's left wing of thirteen 
 battalions and twenty-four squadrons lay along and back of it, 
 from Nenzingen to Wahlwies, the centre in front of it on the 
 Nellenberg plateau, and his right extending to the Liptingen 
 road and leaning on a forest stretch known as the Grauer 
 Wald. He did not know whether Jourdan was in force in his 
 front, or had marched towards Switzerland, or indeed retired 
 to avoid the danger of battle. He determined on a forced re- 
 connoissance, and for this purpose formed two columns, one 
 to be led by himself to march on Aach and Engen, and the 
 other under Meerfeldt to push on Liptingen and beyond to 
 Emmingen ob Eck. A third column under Schwarzenberg on 
 the left was to feel out in its front, but not advance beyond 
 Steisslingen. These columns' started before dawn. 
 
 Jourdan, meanwhile, despite a disparity which should have 
 made him pause, was proposing to attack the Austrians, lest 
 he should remain permanently cut off from easy cooperation 
 with Massena, and had determined to recapture Stockach, 
 through which he might most easily reestablish his touch 
 with Switzerland. Napoleon says he had no motive for the 
 battle. But he was risking little. Should he win a battle, 
 
578 MEERFELDT FALLS BACK. 
 
 he would regain connection ; should he lose one, he could still 
 retire behind the Black Forest and the Rhine. With this 
 view, before daylight of March 25 he ordered the division of 
 Ferino, eighteen thousand strong, via Steisslingen on Wahl- 
 wies, and Souham's of six thousand men on Nenzingen, to 
 attack the Austrians in front; and the rest under St. Cyr, 
 sixteen thousand effective, on Liptingen, to turn their right 
 flank. Thus, in the early dawn of March 25, Charles was 
 advancing with half his force on a general reconnoissance, 
 and Jourdan was marching in full force to deliver battle. 
 When, thus early in the day, Charles advanced from Stockach 
 and got beyond Aach with fifteen thousand men, he ran across 
 part of the division of Souham, who threw him back across 
 the river, taking a battalion prisoner; and he soon heard 
 from Meerfeldt, who with twelve thousand men had advanced 
 to Emmingen ob Eck, that he found heavy columns in his 
 path. Charles at once guessed the danger. Leaving Nauen- 
 dorf in command of his own column, with orders to fall slowly 
 back on Stockach, and sending like orders to Schwarzenberg, 
 Charles hastily made up a column of grenadiers and cuiras- 
 siers, and hurried towards Meerfeldt. This general, by 5 A. M., 
 had occupied Emmingen ob Eck, whence he was ejected and 
 forced back to Liptingen. Charles found him already in full 
 retreat, and learned that Souham had got possession of Lip- 
 tingen and was pushing the Austrian divisions back in disor- 
 der, his cavalry riding to marked effect down upon their 
 flanks. Just before the arrival of the archduke, St. Cyr had 
 come up to Souham's aid, and Meerfeldt, after holding him- 
 self awhile, was compelled to fall back to the protection of the 
 Grauer Wald. Charles had not brought up enough troops to 
 his lieutenant's aid, and stood in grave danger. The French 
 had made great strides towards victory. 
 
 But now Jourdan was guilty of a serious blunder. He 
 
A FRESH STAND. 
 
 579 
 
 deemed Charles already beaten, and dispatched St. Cyr by a 
 bag circuit to Moskirch to intercept the Austrian retreat, 
 while Souham and the reserve should follow up Meerfeldt. 
 
 Battle of Stockach. 
 
 The latter was being fairly driven through the woods, when 
 Wallis came up to his support with eight battalions, and 
 helped him renew his stand in front of Mahlspuren. Jour- 
 dan had much weakened his left wing, and of this Charles 
 took signal advantage. Bringing up fresh troops, he re- 
 vamped his imperiled right, and finally by a handsome onset 
 
580 JOURDAN RESIGNS. 
 
 on both sides of the post-road through the woods, threw Sou- 
 ham back. Surprised at this fresh stand, Jourdan put in the 
 four regiments of the French reserve cavalry. These Charles 
 met to so good effect with his cuirassiers, that the French column 
 feU back to Liptingen in disorder. Charles had thus turned 
 a defeat that many generals would have accepted into a hand- 
 some victory. Jourdan now called on St. Cyr, but this officer 
 had been quite cut off, could not be reached, and indeed 
 barely saved himself by a clever march to the Danube, which 
 he crossed at Sigmaringen, and thence rejoined the army. 
 Nauendorf and Schwarzenberg had fended off the French 
 right, and had retired successfully. Rallying on Souham and 
 Ferino, the beaten French divisions retired to Villingen. The 
 loss numbered four thousand men and upwards on either side. 
 The battlefield had been much too extended for notable grand- 
 tactics. 
 
 Though Jourdan was not decisively defeated, yet he felt 
 constrained to retire. The great superiority in cavalry of the 
 Austrians, as well as the necessity of giving St. Cyr a chance 
 to come up, forbade, he thought, his marching by the flank to 
 Schaffhausen to join Massena, as the Memoirs claim he should 
 have done. He had not over thirty thousand men left. Being 
 out of health, the ad interim command was left to Ernouf. 
 Desirous of holding himself, however, and seeking to protect 
 all the Black Forest passes, he again spread out his forces 
 too much ; but Charles took no advantage of this error, and 
 Jourdan was able to retire to the Rhine in good order, and to 
 cross at Kehl, Alt Breisach and Hiiningen. Disheartened by 
 his defeat, he resigned. Fearing to adventure too far alone, 
 Bernadotte also crossed to the left bank. The command of 
 Jourdan's army was now added to Massena's charge, as well 
 as that of Bernadotte. Having orders from Vienna not to 
 advance beyond the Lake of Constance, — the Aulic Council 
 
CAUSE OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT. 581 
 
 desired to keep a handsome front alignment, — Charles con- 
 tented himself with sending Stzarray to observe the French, 
 while the main Austrian army went into quarters between 
 the lake and the Danube. SchafEhausen and Stein were taken, 
 and headquarters established in Stockach. 
 
 " If, after the battle of Stockach," says Napoleon, forgetful 
 of the limitation of Charles' power, " he had moved to the 
 Lower Rhine, menacing the interior of the Republic, and es- 
 pecially the ancient Austrian provinces, he would have forced 
 Massena to leave Switzerland to form front towards him. He 
 would have acted in conformity with the rules ; he would have 
 been rewarded for so doing by success. His manoeuvre, when 
 he ordered Hotze to join him, at the battle of Stockach, and 
 having him replaced by Bellegarde, is within the true princi- 
 ples of the art ; one recognizes in it the general of 1796." 
 
 The cause of the French defeat at this time lay in their 
 division of forces. Against a concentrated army, the Aus- 
 trians would have found it more difficult to manoeuvre. 
 Charles could have done this only by a turning operation 
 which might have afforded Jourdan his opportunity. During 
 the usual lull after Ostrach, Jourdan could well have marched 
 by his right to Switzerland to join Massena, leaving Berna- 
 dotte to protect the Rhine. It was useless to retire to Al- 
 satia, which was already sufficiently protected by natural 
 obstacles and the strategical positions of the rival armies. 
 But Jourdan was overmatched by Charles, who was more 
 than the peei; of every general he met, until he was placed in 
 front of Bonaparte. In the battle of Stockach, however, 
 Jourdan's plan of attacking Charles' right and throwing him 
 back on the Lake of Constance was excellent. But it was 
 not made in sufficient force. His fault lay in deeming the 
 Austrians beaten too soon, — he lacked coup d'oeil, — and in 
 sending off St. Cyr, as he had previously dispatched Van- 
 
582 A HANDSOME STROKE. 
 
 damme. On the other hand, Charles' right had not been 
 made strong enough ; but as he had proposed a change of 
 front pivoting on his left, should he find that Jourdan had 
 moved towards Switzerland, this fact accounts for the weak- 
 ness. The manner in which he met the initial disaster to 
 Meerfeldt was masterly. 
 
 Meanwhile Massena, with his thirty thousand men, had or- 
 ders to invade Grisons and Vorarlberg before the Austrians 
 under Bellegarde, twenty thousand in proposed strength, 
 were ready. Auffenberg was in Grisons. Hotze had been 
 in Vorarlberg, but having been drawn in by Charles, afforded 
 Massena an opening, and he determined to take the offen- 
 sive. As is usually necessary in a mountain country, he 
 divided his forces into several columns, some of which were 
 too small, and the united front of all of which was too long. 
 On the other hand, the Austrians had a line of weak posts on 
 the Upper Rhine, with difficult passes in their rear, and the 
 reserve was largely of militia. The campaign was begun by 
 a handsome stroke. Sending Lecourbe by the St. Gothard 
 towards Bellinzona, from whence he advanced on and beat 
 Laudon in the Engadine, Massena crossed the Rhine above 
 and below Coire, and cutting Auffenberg from Hotze, took 
 most of the former's force prisoners, — some six thousand 
 men, with flags and guns. Advancing farther, he imagined 
 that he had made a mistake in not taking Feldkirch, which 
 was necessary to secure his left flank and keep open his con- 
 nection with Jourdan. Feldkirch was also one of the gates of 
 the Tyrol, via the Inn valley ; and through it the Austrians 
 could turn any French force which was too far advanced into 
 the mountains. 
 
 With reference to this matter. Napoleon in St. Helena 
 said that Feldkirch was not necessary to Massena. He could 
 have kept touch with the Army of the Danube via Schaff- 
 
FAILURE TO SEIZE FELDKIRCH. 
 
 583 
 
 hausen and Stein. Then, in dealing with the larger problem, 
 he goes on to say that Lecourbe, with Massena's right wing, 
 sufficed to protect Switzerland ; Massena could have joined 
 Jourdan against Archduke Charles ; and Stockach might 
 then have been a victory. But as Massena had been put in 
 Switzerland to accomplish a certain result, and had been 
 given certain forces, this criticism is more applicable to the 
 Directory than to Massena. Moreover, if the Upper Rhine 
 was to be held, Feldkirch was as essential as Coire. 
 
 Oudinot had made a good bid to seize Feldkirch March 6, 
 but the Austrians had kept the town, and assembled heavy 
 forces there. Again, on 
 March 14, Oudinot es- 
 sayed his luck, but failed. 
 This town lies on the 111 
 between two woods, in a 
 narrow valley, half a doz- 
 en miles from where the 
 river falls into the Ehine. 
 The 111 valley has almost 
 perpendicular hills and 
 rocks on either side ; and 
 from the Ehine district 
 the town can be reached 
 only by roads from Bre- 
 genz and Maienf eld ; from 
 the east by a road from Landeck. A strong line of field- 
 works held the road from Maienfeld by way of Nendeln, 
 and a second line of field-works stood in front of these, while 
 several redoubts, and abatis in various places, protected the 
 
 flanks. 
 
 Jellachic held the place with only five battalions and two 
 squadrons, which were mainly distributed in the intrench- 
 
 Oudinot. 
 
584 
 
 COLUMNS THROWN BACK. 
 
 ments. Within reasonable limits this officer was able, and he 
 possessed true fighting fervor. Determined to take the town, 
 Massena organized several columns of attack. 
 
 Early on March 23 a small French column waded the 111 
 at Noffles, hoping to take Feldkirch in reverse and seize the 
 Bregenz road; but it was thrown back by the Austrians. 
 Another small column attempted to move through the wood 
 
 Battle of Feldkirch. 
 
 at St. Michael's ; and a third column advanced to assault the 
 Blasenberg. Both were thrown back. 
 
 The main attack was made by Massena, with a dozen bat^ 
 talions, at the Nendeln mill, and this was aided by a turning 
 
MASSENA'S ADVANCE ARRESTED. 585 
 
 movement around the Austrian left flank. The column on 
 the latter errand reached Gallmicht, but Jellachic ably dis- 
 posed his few men and his artillery. The militia he had 
 assembled contained good marksmen, and the French assault 
 failed. Jellachic made a sortie at the end of the battle, and 
 the French retired with a loss of three thousand men to Nen- 
 deln. After all said, Massena had to do his work without 
 Feldkirch, and managed it well. 
 
 Oudinot was now sent to join Lecourbe on the right, to 
 aid in checking a column which was to come on from Italy. 
 Lecourbe in the upper Alps did some fairly sucfeessful but 
 Napoleon says aimless manoeuvring against Laudon and 
 BeUegarde, but was finally driven from the Engadine ; and 
 before he had accomplished anything definite, he was ordered 
 to advance no farther, lest manoeuvres on the Danube should 
 compromise the Army of Switzerland. For Jourdan being 
 driven back compelled Massena to arrest his advance ; and 
 when in mid-May the Austrians under BeUegarde assumed a 
 sharp offensive, it was not many days before they had forced 
 the French army of Switzerland behind the Upper Ehine, 
 with considerable loss in prisoners and guns. Vorarlberg 
 remained in Austrian possession. After Bellegarde's hand- 
 some advance on the French in the Tyrol, he was ordered 
 to join Suwarrov in Italy. 
 
 When, as above stated, Jourdan's army was joined to Mas- 
 sena's under the common name of the Army of the Danube, 
 the latter saw that, with Charles in Swabia, Hotze and Belle- 
 garde in Switzerland, and Suwarrov and Melas on the Po, all 
 advancing against him, it was rather the defensive than the 
 offensive which the French had best adopt. To try to hold 
 all the Alpine passes made by far too thin a cordon ; to con- 
 centrate his mountain divisions between the Aar and Keuss 
 rivers, so as to keep substantially on the same front line as 
 
586 CHARLES JOINS HOTZE. 
 
 his Rhine left wing, would be an abandonment of nearly all 
 Switzerland. In charge of the Army of the Danube, however, 
 Massena was now reduced to a choice between making a push 
 with his centre down the Danube, as a diversion to help his 
 right (the Swiss forces), and adopting a strict defensive. He 
 chose the latter. The total of his effective was one hundred 
 and fifteen thousand men, spread out from the Engadine 
 to Mainz, and he was wise in placing the left of his Swiss 
 troops behind the Thur. 
 
 The French breach of Swiss neutrality was bearing its 
 legitimate fruit. Not to mention its drawing troops from 
 the Ehine and the Po, even the maintenance of an army in 
 these mountains was difficult, especially on the French plan of 
 requisitions. By the defeat of Stockach, moreover, the left 
 flank of the Swiss army had been gravely imperiled at a time 
 when its right wing was far advanced ; and it was fortunate 
 that no harm had resulted therefrom. In May Charjes joined 
 Hotze and, crossing the Upper Rhine, drove the French down 
 to Ziirich, where May 27 and 28 there was a lively battle, as 
 a result of which the French retired behind the Limmat, and 
 the Austrians took a position in their front. Bellegarde hav- 
 ing seized the St. Gothard country, Lecourbe was compelled 
 to retire to the Lake of the Four Cantons, with headquarters 
 in Lucerne. Here he kept up a small war. The Helvetian 
 government was transferred to Berne. On June 3 and 4 
 Charles again attacked Massena at Ziirich. The battle was 
 heartily contested, and the casualties were heavy. But the 
 French were forced out of the town, and back to the Reuss. 
 
 So far in the entire campaign there had been no French 
 gain made, for the Austrians had been everywhere superior 
 in force. With less than forty thousand men, Jourdan had 
 advanced against Charles' eighty thousand and been defeated ; 
 in Switzerland Massena had controlled but thirty thousand to 
 
ON THE PO. 587 
 
 pit against seventy-five thousand Austrians, and had been 
 checked, — though chiefly as a result of Jourdan's defeat. 
 The Directory had undertaken too big a task; and it was 
 the Austrian slowness alone that saved the French from dis- 
 aster. On the other hand, considering their strength, the 
 Austrians had accomplished less than they should have done, 
 a fact that was in greatest measure due to the Aulic Council's 
 hebetude. 
 
 Thus on the Danube and in the Swiss mountains the French 
 armies had quite failed to carry out Carnot's immense plan. 
 Let us see what had been doing on the Po. 
 
 In Italy the French had nearly one hundred and twenty 
 thousand men, of whom Scherer, whom we already know as 
 a general of second-rate capacity, could number on the Po 
 barely forty-five thousand for the field, the rest being in 
 Naples, Kome and in various garrisons. The Austrians on 
 and back of the Adige, including the Russians who were to 
 arrive, had considerably over one hundred thousand effective. 
 Even after the lesson in the military art given to the Direc- 
 tory in 1796 by Bonaparte, this body was unable to see that 
 Naples and Rome could probably be held by small forces 
 coupled to success in the valley of the Po, and would despite 
 large forces certainly be lost by failure there ; and they per- 
 mitted these new republics in southern Italy, together with 
 Piedmont, Tuscany and a detachment to Switzerland, to eat 
 up two thirds of the forces which should have been used to 
 conserve northern Italy. They rectified their error when it 
 was too late. On the other hand, Austria had not only vastly 
 exceeded France in troops raised, but she had likewise pre- 
 pared her ground by repairing the works of Verona and Le- 
 gnano, and by filling magazines at various places and building 
 bridge-heads along the line of advance from the Tagliamento. 
 The French could not with common sense adopt an offensive 
 
588 NO CHOICE OF ACTION. 
 
 policy in Italy. But the Directory thought otherwise. Scherer 
 was ordered to assume the offensive along the Adige, though 
 his left flank might be easily threatened from the mountains. 
 The Directory doubted not that the French armies would be 
 able to overrun not only Switzerland and the Tyrol, but all 
 northern Italy. They forgot that Scherer was not a Bona- 
 parte. 
 
 The plan of the Austrians in Italy was simple and effective : 
 to push on Brescia and Bergamo, and thus by threatening 
 the right flank of Massena operating in Switzerland, as well 
 as the left flank of Scherer, to push the former away from the 
 Tyrol, and the latter back to the Riviera. It was really an 
 operation against the centre of the Italian-Swiss armies. 
 
 The operations in Italy should have begun at the same time ; 
 they actually began three weeks later than in Switzerland 
 and Germany. Kray, in command of the Austrians, was slow, 
 and Scherer concentrated on theMincio. The immediate task 
 assigned him by the Directory was to force a passage of the 
 Adige, so as to bring the Austrians to battle near Verona. 
 He had no choice of action. They imagined that, under their 
 lash, any one could do what had once been done. 
 
 Scherer should not have made the many minor detachments 
 he did. The result of a battle on the Adige would control the 
 fate of the Valteline and Tuscany, while nothing these pro- 
 vinces could do would affect such a battle. For the same rea- 
 son it was that the bulk of the Naples forces should have been 
 brought up to the Adige. Acting in one mass, the Austrians 
 might have been crushed before the Russians came up. 
 Scherer divided his forces fatally. Had he concentrated all 
 but feinting detachments just below Verona, where it was high 
 and dry, he could have crossed and beaten the enemy at San 
 Martino. Manceuvring in the swamps of the lower Adige 
 could be of no value. 
 
SERURIER'S FAILURE. 689 
 
 Hearing some false rumors of a concentration of Austrian 
 forces at Pastrengo, Scherer ordered Moreau, who was serv- 
 ing under him as Inspector General of the army, forward on 
 this place with two thousand men, sending detachments to 
 make diversions on Verona and Legnano. After a lusty fight 
 all along the line, Moreau captured Pastrengo March 26, but 
 could do nothing to take advantage of his success ; and the 
 diversions at Verona and Legnano, after a bloody day, quite 
 failed. The French onset had been at loose ends. Scherer 
 then paused three days, until a council of war decided to 
 advance again, when on March 30 he sent six thousand men 
 across the Adige at Polo, under Serurier, who was to turn 
 Verona. But Verona cannot be turned by the north: the 
 topography forbids. Serurier was beaten and driven back 
 with loss of fifteen hundred men, and then withdrawn by 
 Scherer to the main army. The bulk, of five divisions, 
 marched meanwhile on the river in the Eonco country, to 
 force a crossing at any available place between Verona and 
 Legnano. The French army was as usual too much strung 
 out, and though by evening of the 30th the four columns had 
 advanced towards the Adige to Magnano, Mazagata, Isola 
 Porcarizza and Sanguinetto, Serurier's failure necessitated 
 their withdrawal. Kray, who had about sixty thousand effec- 
 tive, seeing that the French commander was determined to 
 cross the river, prepared to attack him as a means of check- 
 ing the attempt. His plan was to turn his left flank and 
 drive him towards the sea, as Moreau learned by capturing a 
 courier. Scherer, on the night of April 8-4, concentrated in 
 and about Buttapietra and vicinity. Kray advanced April 5 
 in four columns and strove to turn the French left flank ; and, 
 as it happened, Scherer, determined to have one more trial, 
 was likewise moving forward the same day, in four columns, 
 both armies along practically the same roads. The forces were 
 
590 
 
 BATTLE OF MAGNANO. 
 
 each about forty-five thousand strong, and the clash soon 
 ensued. The French right column, under Victor and Grenier, 
 drove back the Austrian left column, under Mercantin, to 
 Tombetta ; but, on Kray sending up reserves, this column it- 
 self fell back behind the Tartaro. A second Austrian column, 
 
 Battle of Magnano. 
 
 under Zoph, struck Moreau at Castel d' Azano, who forced it 
 back, after a sharp fight, somewhat shattered. A third Aus- 
 trian column, under Kaim, advanced to Buttapietra, Delmas 
 not having got up ; but it was also held in check by a detach- 
 ment of Moreau's. The right Austrian column, under Hohen- 
 zollern, was driven back by Serurier to Dossobono. Thus the 
 French right had fallen back in much disorder, and the left 
 and centre had but fairly held their own. In this so-called 
 
SCHERER RETIRES TO CREMONA. 591 
 
 battle of Magnano, on each side there had fallen about four 
 thousand men, killed and wounded ; the French lost four thou- 
 sand prisoners and eighteen guns, and the Austrians two 
 thousand prisoners. The latter could scarcely claim a marked 
 victory, but the falling back of the French right, and espe- 
 cially its bad order, made it imperative for Scherer to retire, 
 which he did next day behind the Molinello canal ; and on 
 April 7 behind the Mincio. Here, though no great effort to 
 attack him was made by Kray, Scherer also feared he could 
 not hold himself, and leaving Mantua well garrisoned, and 
 detachments in Ferrara and Peschiera, he weakly retired to 
 Cremona and the Oglio, having but twenty-five thousand men 
 effective left. He should still have clung to the line of the 
 Mincio, which, by drawing in reinforcements, he might have 
 done. He lacked neither intelligence nor courage, but they 
 were not of the stamp that fitted him for war, said Napoleon. 
 Shortly Melas arrived to take command of the allied forces, 
 and in mid-April the Austrians followed the French across 
 the Mincio. 
 
 For this campaign Scherer is not so much to be blamed as 
 the Directory, whose positive orders he was obeying. But his 
 operations before and at the battle of Magnano markedly 
 lacked the ability which Bonaparte had shown in winning 
 against such vast odds this section of northern Italy, which 
 now was fast going lost. Kray's conduct was better, though 
 by no means of the highest order. In a subordinate capacity 
 Moreau had done well ; but he later weakened when acting 
 alone. 
 
 The Austrians having crossed the Mincio at Valleggio, 
 Scherer late in April retired to Milan, where he drew in some 
 reinforcements and occupied the line of the Adda, the left at 
 Lecco, the centre at Cassano, the right at Lodi and Pizzighe- 
 tone, some twenty-eight thousand men over a front of more 
 
BRESCIA TAKEN. 
 
 593 
 
 than sixty miles ! The army was disheartened, and had lost 
 confidence in its chief. In striving to cover everything, Scherer 
 covered nothing. Suwarrov now came up with thirty thou- 
 sand Kussians and assumed command of the whole allied 
 
 Suwarrov. 
 
 army. There were nearly ninety thousand men in the fieldl 
 in northern Italy against the French. Leaving Kray with 
 twenty thousand men to lay siege to Mantua and Peschiera, 
 as ordered by the Vienna Council, Suwarrov took Brescia and 
 advanced on Bergamo and Cassano with his own army and 
 Melas' thirty thousand men, his right being under Bagration, 
 Rosenberg and Wukassovich, and the left under Ott and 
 Zoph. Melas was in the centre. Two detachments, under 
 HohenzoUern and Kaim, advanced at the same time on Lodi 
 and Pizzighetone. This left Suwarrov over thirty-five thou- 
 
594 BATTLE OF CASS A NO. 
 
 sand men opposite the French centre. Along the Adda, from 
 the 25th to the 28th of April, 1799, in order on one side to 
 hold and on the other to break down the line of the river, 
 there was a series of bloody fights, in which the gallant French 
 conscript of this army was for the first time matched against 
 that wonderful tenacity of the Russian soldier which has 
 checked so many chieftains ; and at several points the Rus- 
 sians forced a crossing. After a stubborn fight Bagration put 
 over his division at Lecco April 26, and at San Gervasio next 
 day, though the French made it a costly affair. Scherer, 
 despairing of success, turned over the command to Moreau. 
 He " wanted neither intelligence nor courage ; he lacked char- 
 acter ; he talked of war with hardihood but vaguely ; he was 
 not suited to it," say the Memoirs. 
 
 On the 27th Moreau, with Grenier's division, attacked 
 the Russians at Trezzo, in order to reestablish touch with 
 Serurier's division, which had intrenched at Verderio, and 
 had been cut off by the Russian crossings ; but the French 
 were driven back to Cassano with heavy loss. Here Moreau 
 met Melas, who was seeking to force the bridge-head ; and, 
 after another severe battle, Melas succeeded in his task and 
 Moreau retired to Milan. Serurier, with four thousand men, 
 was surrounded by the Russians, cut off, and after a stubborn 
 defense, compelled to surrender. In this battle of Cassano 
 the loss was three thousand men each side, plus six thousand 
 prisoners and twenty-seven guns lost by the French, to whom 
 remained less than twenty thousand men to marshal in battle 
 line. The allies were at the same time reinforced by Belle- 
 garde and Haddick. 
 
 The Directory now did what should originally have been 
 done. Macdonald was ordered up to the Po to report to 
 Moreau. What might not have been accomplished had he 
 joined the Army of Italy on the Adige ! 
 
MOREAU MOVES TO TURIN. 595 
 
 The victorious advance of the Russians had seriously im- 
 paired the ability of the French party in Piedmont to hold 
 its own, and insurrection was on the cards. Largely to quiet 
 the land in his rear, Moreau determined to retire to Turin. 
 But he should not have crossed the Ticino. Strategically, 
 there were two things of main importance : to hold the direct 
 road to Genoa through the Bocchetta pass, and to join Mac- 
 donald before another battle could be forced upon him. This 
 junction would give him seventy thousand men for a fresh 
 trial of arms. By moving to the Turin country he enabled 
 the allies to march down and seize the Bocchetta pass, and 
 
 Battle of Gassano. 
 
 thus shut his one safe line of communication by way of Genoa 
 and the Riviera. Moreover, should he lose Genoa, there was 
 no possible means by which Macdonald could join him. 
 
 After the battle of Cassano, then, Moreau retired with 
 Grenier's division to Turin, and sent the divisions of Victor 
 
596 COMMUNICATIONS REGAINED. 
 
 and Laboissiere to Valencia and Alessandria. Moreau had 
 been promised reinforcements by the Directory, but although 
 a French fleet did come up into Genoese waters, it brought 
 less than a half-brigade of troops. It was lucky for the 
 French that Suwarrov was compelled by his orders from 
 Vienna to put a great part of his superior numbers at be- 
 sieging the strong places in Lombardy held by French garri- 
 sons ; but he nevertheless slowly and systematically followed 
 up the French with some thirty-six thousand men, half Aus- 
 trian, half Bussian ; and ascertaining their presence at Valen- 
 cia, crossed at several places below. Moreau now began seri- 
 ously to fear for his communications through the Bocchetta 
 pass with Genoa, and indeed, though with some success, he 
 fought two combats, at Bassignano May 12, and at Marengo 
 May 17, to hold himself, yet the allies had advanced so far 
 that Moreau could no longer keep the pass open for his retreat, 
 and was obliged to regain the Biviera by a difficult detour. 
 On May ' 18 Victor was sent by waj' of Acqui and Cairo 
 down to Savona, while Moreau, with Grenier and the cavalry, 
 artillery and train, marched to Asti, and by a longer route to 
 Coni ; and towards the end of May he regained his communi- 
 cations across the mountains. Three thousand men had been 
 left in garrison in Alessandria. 
 
 Although Moreau had some difficulty in forcing his way 
 through the insurrectionary population, he still reached the 
 coast with about fifteen thousand men ; and while Suwarrov 
 with part of his forces marched towards Turin to take this 
 city, which he did May 26, Moreau set to work to effect his 
 junction with Macdonald, — a task to which he should have 
 devoted all his energies a month before. 
 
 Although Suwarrov had been much superior in numbers, 
 yet he deserves credit for his great energy and skillful man- 
 agement. In six weeks he had driven the French out of 
 
MACDONALD AND MOREAU. 597 
 
 Italy, by utilizing his advantages with a clear grasp of the 
 problem ; and he had seized so many places in the mountains 
 on every side of the French that Moreau was put to it to 
 know how to manoeuvre. With part of his forces Suwarrov 
 had gone to Turin, while the rest had been manoeuvring on 
 the Po. On hearing of Macdonald's oncoming, however, the 
 allied leader had himself moved 
 down to the vicinity of Alessan- 
 dria, and with part of his forces 
 blockaded the place. 
 
 The details of the manoeuvres 
 between Moreau, Macdonald and 
 Suwarrov are interesting, mainly 
 as exhibits of the old-fashioned 
 style of war, and can barely be 
 mentioned here. Nothing, how- 
 ever, more strongly proves the 
 value of Bonaparte's maxim, to 
 assemble all your divisions be- 
 fore reaching the possible battlefield, than the present opera- 
 tions of Macdonald and Moreau. 
 
 Macdonald had been slow in coming up. He left Naples 
 early in May, two weeks later than he need have done, and 
 wasted other two weeks, at the end of the month and early in 
 June, in Florence. So long as the French held the left bank 
 of the Po, Moreau's instructions to Macdonald to join him 
 by way of Bologna, Modena, Parma, Placentia and Tortona 
 were proper. So soon as Moreau had crossed the Ticino in 
 retreat, the only way for Macdonald to join him was by way 
 of Placentia and Bobbio to Genoa, provided he could reach 
 Placentia in time. Speed was of the essence, but Macdonald 
 was slow. If he could not be certain of reaching Placentia 
 before the allies should fall upon him, the one safe way was 
 
 Macdonald. 
 
698 SIEGE OF TORTONA RAISED. 
 
 to marcli by Spezzia and the coast to Genoa. This was cer- 
 tainly not a good road, but it was a possible one, and as the 
 French fleet was in the Gulf of Genoa, the artillery could 
 have been transported by coasting-vessels under its protection 
 to Genoa ; or in case, indeed, he abandoned it all, there was 
 plenty more to be had in Genoa. The one thing to do was 
 to make junction before battle ; but with the old-fashioned 
 idea that it was good strategy to catch the allies between 
 two forces, to wit, his own and Macdonald's, Moreau from 
 the Riviera still planned to march on Tortona and there meet 
 Macdonald, who he assumed would have victoriously forced 
 his way through whatever army the enemy detached against 
 him. 
 
 Macdonald had got into communication with Moreau as 
 early as the 18th of May, but this did not mean that he could 
 actually join his colleague. To strengthen Macdonald as 
 much as possible, however, Moreau sent him Victor's division 
 by way of the Taro valley, and himself, with what was left, 
 advanced in two columns, through the valley of the Scrivia 
 and the Bocchetta pass, to lend a hand in the coming conflict. 
 But it was June 18 before Moreau reached Novi and Serra- 
 valle, and the lightning had already struck. When on the 
 20th he got to Tortona, raised the siege and pushed Belle- 
 garde back, he found he had accomplished nothing. 
 
 Meanwhile Macdonald was moving slowly along the pre- 
 scribed road to a hoped-for junction at Tortona. Although 
 the Taro and the coast roads were open, there appears to 
 have been small concert between him and Moreau. On June 
 12 he had met and beaten HohenzoUern and Klenau at Mo- 
 dena with heavy loss, and the latter had fallen back on Ott, 
 who was advancing towards the Stradella pass. Macdonald 
 kept on his way in a leisurely manner, confident that he was 
 marching to an easy victory in connection with his chief. 
 
THE KEY-POINT. 599 
 
 The Nura, Trebia and Tidone run near together, substan- 
 tially parallel, and northerly into the Po. It was here that 
 Hannibal beat the Consul Sempronius in 218 B. c, and 
 proved to the Romans that there was more to war than mere 
 hard knocks. Ott had been sent ahead by Suwarrov to de- 
 lay Macdonald's advance, and had reached the Tidone. The 
 French column had got as far as the Nura, with Victor on the 
 right, Dombrowsky in the centre, and Kusca on the left, and 
 on June 17 pushed Ott back to Sermet. Suwarrov's divi- 
 sions came up by a rapid march to sustain Ott. Bagration 
 moved against Victor, Ott about-faced and attacked Dom- 
 browsky, and Melas on the right moved against Rusca. After 
 a sharp encounter the French centre was brpken, and the 
 army fell back to the Trebia. Macdonald hoped to get up 
 his rear of column, with Olivier, Montrichard and Watrin, 
 on the 18th, and to attack Suwarrov next day along the Tre- 
 bia ; but the Russian commander gave him no time. Recog- 
 nizing with a master's eye the key-point, he concentrated his 
 forces near the spot where the foothills of the Apennines 
 come down towards the Po, so as to be able to cross the Tre- 
 bia at Rivalta, and cut Macdonald off from Bobbio. Here he 
 posted his best foot and horse. The Russian right, Rosen- 
 berg and two divisions, moved on Casaliggio to cross at Ri- 
 valta, where and near by Victor, Dombrowsky and Rusca 
 held the Trebia. The Russian centre under Forster headed 
 for Grignano, where Olivier was posted. Ott on the Russian 
 left moved along the main road, via Rotto Freddo, against 
 Montrichard on the French right. Watrin leaned on Placen- 
 tia. Macdonald had erred strategically in not making his 
 left so strong along the Trebia above Rivalta that if defeated 
 he could certainly retire by way of Bobbio to Genoa and not 
 be forced back on the Nura. Suwarrov had shown keener 
 perception. 
 
600 BATTLE OF THE TREBIA. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th the Russian van struck the 
 French at Casaliggio, Victor crossed with all his force, and 
 a heavy battle began. The French could inake no progress, 
 but when Olivier and Montrichard in the centre, and Watrin 
 
 Battle of the Trebia. 
 
 on the right came up, they continued to hold their line along 
 the Trebia. The battle degenerated into a cannonade. 
 
 Next day Macdonald proposed to cross the Trebia at all 
 points, and turn both Russian flanks, in the hope that Moreau 
 would come in upon their rear and thus do his share ; but 
 early in the night a battle sprang up along the river, started 
 by three French battalions trying to cross on the main road; 
 These were driven back by the Russians, the noise of the bat- 
 tle brought everybody under arms, and in the darkness there 
 
FRUITLESS EFFORTS. 601 
 
 ensued a bloody fight on the sandy bed and in the many 
 islands of the Trebia, the loss being merciless, as the artillery 
 on both banks fired grape and canister across the tiver into 
 the masses of men, mowing down friend and foe alike. Per-i 
 haps no more curious battle was ever fought. It was involun- 
 tary on both sides. It did not end till past midnight, after 
 three hours' slaughter, by the united efforts of the generals on 
 both sides, who recognized the folly of the fighting, and finally 
 managed to withdraw their divisions. 
 
 On the 19th the exhausted regiments did not come togethei* 
 until ten o'clock, when the French left under Dombrowsky 
 strove to cross the Trebia at Rivalta, and Suwarrov detailed 
 Bagration to stop them. This he did ; but by his advance 
 there was a gap left in the Russian line on the left of Bagra^ 
 tion, taking quick advantage of which, Victor and Rusca 
 crossed, and surrounded and fell with fury on the Russian 
 division of Swykowski. Suwarrov's line came near being dis- 
 rupted. This division, however, with characteristic Russian 
 coolness, formed square, and holding itself until some reserves 
 arrived, Bagration came back, and Forster sent reinforce- 
 ments, was able to drive off the French. Dombrowsky had not 
 moved. Meanwhile the French centre and right had made 
 no progress, the Russians under Forster driving back Mont- 
 richard, while Ott and Melas arrested, at San Nicolo, Olivier's 
 attempts, however gallant, to cross the river. A French turn- 
 ing manoeuvre around the Russian left was fruitless, Watrin, 
 without definite idea of what was required of him, having only 
 marched and countermarched. Suwarrov's efforts to gain a 
 footing on the other bank of the Trebia were equally fruit- 
 less. At night the meandering stream still lay between the 
 rival armies. Macdonald had been attacking all along the 
 line ; Suwarrov had confined his main attacks to the French 
 left and refused his own left. 
 
602 MACDONALD BEATEN. 
 
 The loss had been fearful. Macdonald's casualties were, 
 it is said, four thousand killed, and twelve thousand wounded 
 and missing ; five hundred officers and nearly all the generals 
 had been killed or wounded. The Russian loss was six thou- 
 sand men. 
 
 Suwarrov, than whom no more gallant man ever held a 
 baton, determined to fight again on the 20th ; but Macdonald 
 retired at daylight to the Nura. He had lost half his army 
 in attempting to join Moreau. Suwarrov sent Ott in pursuit, 
 but the sound of Moreau's guns in the distant rear prevented 
 its being effective. He himself returned to Alessandria. 
 Macdonald had shown courage, but in his management had 
 been wanting. " After the loss of the battle of the Trebia, 
 not a man of the army of Macdonald should have reentered 
 France, which would have avoided the battle of Novi. Italy 
 was then conquered. But Suwarrov, instead of cutting the 
 French army from Genoa by marching rapidly on the Apen- 
 nines, abandoned his pursuit at the most important moment, 
 and this army escaped him," say the Memoirs. 
 
 As above stated, Moreau had marched on Tortona to join 
 his colleague, and on the 19th he attacked Bellegarde at Cas- 
 sina Grossa and threw him back behind the Bormida. But 
 the bulk of the allied army lay between him and Macdonald, 
 and the latter had already been beaten, and was glad eventu- 
 ally to retire on Parma and Modena. Had Macdonald held 
 his left in force at the battle of the Trebia, he could in four 
 days have joined Moreau by way of Bobbio. As it was, it 
 was a month before he managed to do so, and this only be- 
 cause Suwarrov did not follow him up. Moreau's theory of 
 taking the enemy between two fires had been shown to be 
 worthless compared with. Bonaparte's theory of massing every- 
 thing in one body before meeting the enemy. Upon Suwar- 
 rov's appearance after the battle of the Trebia, Moreau retired 
 
GENERALS SHIFTED. 
 
 603 
 
 down the Scrivia and through the Bocchetta pass. Suwarrov 
 had succeeded in his effort to keep the two French armies 
 apart, for a time at least, by skillful manoeuvring on a sound 
 theory. 
 
 The entire campaign had gone wrong. Barely three months 
 old, it had resulted in French disaster. The only French 
 general who had held himself was Massena, and him Arch- 
 duke Charles, in the two hearty combats of May 27 and 
 June 4, had driven behind Ziirich, where, however, he still 
 held the line of the Albis. The effect in Paris was to threaten 
 the existing government. A new Directory was formed, and 
 many of the generals were shifted. Championnet was re- 
 leased from imprisonment, and set to raising an army. Ber- 
 nadotte was made Minister of War. Joubert, whose fine 
 work in the Adige valley we remem- 
 ber, was sent to command the Army 
 of Italy. Moreau was to receive com- 
 mand of a problematical army on the 
 Bhine. 
 
 Luckily for France, Suwarrov, who 
 was the ablest man on the theatre of 
 war, lost much time under orders fi'om 
 Vienna in besieging fortresses held 
 by the French, — the Austrian s de- 
 sired to repossess the land, — and two 
 months passed before hostilities again 
 began. Joubert reached the Army of 
 
 Italy August 5, with orders to attack, but he requested 
 Moreau to stay by him until the first battle. 
 
 In August the French army, made up of the relics of Mo- 
 reau and Macdonald and some reinforcements from France, 
 still numbered over forty-five thousand men. Championnet 
 at Grenoble had collected thirty thousand men. The two 
 
 Joubert. 
 
604 MONTE ROTONDO. 
 
 together might operate with nearly eighty thousand effective. 
 St. Cyr, with the right wing of the Army of Italy, was in the 
 Bocchetta pass and at the upper waters of the Orha and 
 Scrivia; while Perignon, with the left wing, stretched from the 
 upper Tanaro to the Erro. Mantua and Alessandria had gone 
 lost; and as it was thought that Kray and some forces from 
 Switzerland were about to join Suwarrov, and thus make 
 an army of sixty thousand effective, Joubert desired to give 
 battle in anticipation of such a junction. On August 9, ac- 
 cordingly, he began to assemble at Novi, backing up against 
 the Bocchetta pass, and by the 14th had formed a half-circle 
 on the slope of Monte Rotondo. He had marched to his bat- 
 tlefield by two routes, the left wing debouching from the Bor- 
 mida valley by way of Acqui. It was solely by good fortune 
 that the allies did not fall on Perignon and destroy him. 
 
 Monte Rotondo is a moderate hill which extends from Ser- 
 ravalle on the Scrivia to the Lemo, and is largely covered 
 with vineyards and orchards closed in by walls and live hedges. 
 Novi lies nearly at the foot of the slope ; and the village of 
 Pozzolo-Formigaro, north of Novi, is somewhat higher on a 
 plateau. The French left leaned on the Riasco brook; Grouchy 
 and Lemoine were marshaled in front of Pasturana, with the 
 cavalry reserves under Kichepanse behind this wing; Colli 
 and Laboissiere stood on the slopes in the centre on either 
 side of Novi ; the right under Watrin leaned on the Scrivia 
 at San Bartolomeo ; Dombrosky blockaded Serravalle, whose 
 citadel was held by an allied battalion. The left wing remained 
 under Perignon, the centre and right under St. Cyr. The 
 force in line was some thirty-five thousand men, but without 
 reserves. Asa preparation for the battle, Joubert would have 
 done well to capture the fort of Serravalle, so as to lean his 
 right upon it ; and this could easily have been done, with the 
 force and time at hand. 
 
BATTLE OF NOVI. 
 
 605 
 
 Suwarrov had little short of fifty thousand men, and in 
 addition ten thousand in reserve. He had carefully placed 
 his army so that he could assemble superior forces against 
 the French, from whatever pass they should debouch ; but he 
 neglected the chance afforded him of falling on Perignon at 
 Acqui. When he found the French marshaled on the Novi 
 
 Battle of Not!. 
 
 hills, he drew up for battle. His plan was to turn the French 
 left, cut them off from the Bocchetta pass, and force the army 
 back on the Scrivia and the mountains. He ordered an early 
 attack, and before daylight the allied cavalry advanced against 
 the French cavalry and drove it in. Kray was also sent for- 
 ward with his infantry on the French left, and early August 
 15 he started from Fresonara. Bellegarde attacked Grouchy ; 
 Ott, Lemoine. After a stubborn resistance, the latter divi- 
 sion was falling back from the heavy blows of the Russian foot, 
 when Joubert galloped up to steady it. But the new com- 
 
606 AWAITING ORDERS. 
 
 mander almost on the instant received his death wound ; and 
 Moreau, who was beside him, took his place. It seemed as if 
 Fate called on Moreau to assume the responsibility for this 
 campaign. Colli came on, other reinforcements arrived, and 
 the position was held. Kray alone could accomplish nothing. 
 At 8 A. M. Suwarrov was, it is said, not personally at hand. 
 He expected the French to come down into the plain, or at 
 all events he was relying upon bis lieutenants to accomplish 
 alone the tasks assigned them, so that until late in the fore- 
 noon the allied centre and right were without orders. Feel- 
 ing that by himself he could gain no groutad, Kray begged 
 Bagration to advance on the French centre ; and the latter, 
 who commanded the Russian centre and van, and was still 
 awaiting orders from Suwarrov, sent ten battalions up to this 
 work, while striving with four to turn Novi by the east. This 
 attempt resulted in severe fighting. But Watrin was just 
 coming up from the right, and stopped the success of this 
 manoeuvre by taking Bagration's column in flank. Kray kept 
 manfully at his work. By eleven Suwarrov headed Derfel- 
 den's division from Formigaro, and called Melas up from 
 Eivalta to join in the attack with his fifteen thousand men. 
 But Melas, who had been waiting orders for six hours, had 
 already marched part of his corps on Serravalle and part 
 on Novi. Rosenberg also came up. The allied line was soon 
 engaged along its whole front, making repeated and gallant 
 charges on the French array, Kray on the Russian right, and 
 Derfelden and Bagration in the centre. This continued over 
 two hours, with heavy loss ; the Russians outdid themselves, 
 but the French stubbornly maintained their position. A lull 
 from sheer exhaustion now supervened in the battle, but at 
 4 p. M. the conflict again broke out. Suwarrov would not 
 stop half-way. The reserve under Melas, from the direction 
 of Busselo, fell upon the French right, which under Watrin 
 
DRIVEN IN AT ALL POINTS. 607 
 
 ,had got too far advanced. Much outnumbered, this was 
 thrown back in grave disorder; St. Cyr strove heartily to 
 hold the heights and cover the road of communications with 
 Gavi, but was finally compelled to fall back 
 behind the Fornova brook, and Novi went 
 lost. The French left retired behind Pastu- 
 rana, and a small force of Bellegarde's took 
 the divisions in flank and hurried them back 
 still farther, with loss of their artillery and 
 many casualties. Grouchy and Perignon were 
 wounded and taken prisoners. CoUi's brigade 
 was captured to nearly the last man ; Le- 
 moine's division was all but destroyed. The 
 French were driven in at all points, after six- 
 teen hours of desperate fighting ; and by 
 8 P. M. Suwarrov had won the battle. 
 
 Though their defense had been superb 
 against overwhelming numbers, the French divisions now fell 
 to pieces. St. Cyr alone kept his troops in any kind of 
 order. The rest dissolved and sought safety by battalions, 
 companies and groups in the ravines in their rear. After 
 their long exertions the allied pursuit was not vigorous, and 
 the French reassembled at the headwaters of the Erro and 
 the Orba. The allies had lost eight thousand men killed 
 and wounded. The French casualties were eleven thousand 
 killed, wounded and prisoners, among them the commanding 
 general and four division generals. Thirty-seven guns and 
 four flags went lost. Moi-eau was glad to put the Apennines 
 between his army and the enemy. 
 
 It had been agreed that, to sustain Joubert's operations 
 against Suwarrov, Championnet, with the fresh army organ- 
 ized in Savoy and the Dauphine, should debouch from the 
 Alps and create a strong alarm in the Turin country, so as to 
 
 Infantryman. 
 (1799.) 
 
608 THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN EXPEDITION. 
 
 necessitate the detailing of a force against him. Joubert did 
 not wait for this assistance, but began his manoeuvres a week 
 before Championnet advanced. As it was, the latter with his 
 several columns only reached Susa, Pignerol and Coni Sep- 
 tember 2, and accomplished no good end. He had not shown 
 great ability. 
 
 There was no grand-tactics in the battle of Novi ; it was 
 won by sheer hard fighting, and is a fair sample of thei 
 determination for which Suwarrov was always noted. Yet 
 at the opening of the battle he had not smartly put in his 
 men. Before long he received orders to move to Switzerland. 
 Italy was definitely lost to the French. What Bonaparte had 
 conquered, Suwarrov had won back. 
 
 Meanwhile the Anglo-Russian expedition against Holland 
 had been carried through and failed, partly because the Scan- 
 dinavian kingdoms and Prussia had refused to take part in 
 it, partly because of its own weight. It had been proposed 
 to land a force of nearly fifty thousand men, under the Duke 
 of York, at Helder on the Zuyder Zee, and the aid of the 
 adherents of the House of Orange was hoped. In neither 
 size of army nor internal assistance was the hope realized. 
 Brune was in command of thirty-five thousand French and 
 Dutch spread all over Holland, plus ten thousand men in 
 Belgium. He should have occupied Helder, as he might have 
 done, so soon as the fleet was sighted, but he did not. The 
 expedition landed at Helder toward the end ofA.ugust. Still, 
 adverse weather had so much delayed the operation that Brune 
 had time to assemble part of his force. A combat at Groet 
 Keeten was favorable to the allies. The squadron entered the 
 roadstead of Texel ; and on August 31 the Dutch fleet, in 
 which a mutiny had occurred, surrendered. This was really 
 all that England aimed to accomplish, for without a navy 
 Holland was completely neutralized, so far as she was con- 
 
ON THE ZYPERDYK. 
 
 609 
 
 cerned. But the Duke of York was ambitious, and moving 
 Abercrombie forward with seventeen thousand men along the 
 Zyperdyk, maintained an advanced position some weeks. He 
 
 H^LO! 
 
 C.I\OE.- 
 HvE.C.TE. 
 
 The Dutch Expedition. 
 
 would have done better to intrench and hold himself at 
 Helder until the whole army had disembarked, and then to 
 march in force on Amsterdam. An attack by Brune, without 
 previous reconnoissance, on Abercrombie on the Zyperdyk, 
 September 9, quite failed, and the rest of the allied troops 
 were landed, the whole numbering some twenty-five thousand 
 
610 CONVENTION OF ALKMAAR. 
 
 men. Brune shortly retrieved himself. At Bergen, Sep- 
 tember 19, the allies, though superior in numbers, were 
 beaten, with loss of four thousand men to three thousand lost 
 by the French, owing, said the English, to the over-zeal of the 
 Russians ; and to the slowness of the English, said the Rus- 
 sians. At all events, the two had failed to cooperate. York 
 had detached Abercrombie to turn the French flank ; and as 
 the canals separated the allied columns, the rival forces were 
 thus substantially equalized. On October 2 a second battle 
 fought near Bergen between twenty thousand allies and 
 about an equal force of French resulted in favor of the allies, 
 with a loss somewhat less than in the first battle. After this 
 engagement, the battle of Alkmaar, as the French call it, 
 Brune retired to a strong position in the rear to protect 
 Amsterdam. But on October 6, at Bakum, or Castricum, the 
 French won a battle ; and as there was apparently no chance 
 left of driving the French from northern Holland, for they 
 were constantly receiving accessions, the Duke of York event- 
 ually felt compelled to abandon the expedition. The allied 
 army had dwindled to one half. Brune might have once more 
 attacked to manifest advantage, instead of signing the Con- 
 vention of Alkmaar, but he lacked enterprise. By this Con- 
 vention, which has its ludicrous side, the allies surrendered 
 eight thousand French and Dutch prisoners, yielded up the 
 Helder works in good order, and evacuated Holland. They 
 might have got much better terms. At all events, England 
 had rid herself of the Dutch fleet as against the footing of the 
 bills. Russia had gained nothing for her losses. Just what 
 she was fighting for is not apparent. 
 
 During June and July there were no manoeuvres in Swit- 
 zerland. The Austrian defense was weak. But about mid- 
 August Massena, who had been reinforced, again opened 
 operations, and his troops, under Lecourbe, drove Rohan as 
 
THE LIMMAT HELD IN FORCE. 611 
 
 far as Lago Maggiore, and Haddick back to Ivrea; and 
 clearing the Simplon and Grimsel, occupied the Furca pass. 
 Jellachic's left and right were also pushed back to the Mut- 
 tenthal and Uznach. The French thus recovered the upper 
 valleys of the Rhine, Rhone and Reuss. Charles, on the 
 Austrian right, had been 
 held in check by Mortier, 
 Soult and Lorges, while 
 his left wing was thus 
 beaten with a loss of 
 eight thousand killed, 
 wounded and missing, 
 and twenty - one guns. 
 With his centre Massena 
 moved on Ziirich, which 
 he attacked August 14 ; 
 but the city walls proved 
 too strong for him. 
 Charles, on his side, 
 failed to turn the French left and oust Massena from the 
 Albis hills. Meanwhile Korsakov reached Ziirich. As Mas- 
 sena outnumbered the Austrians when Bellegarde had been 
 sent to Italy, he should have won more after his victories of 
 August 14—16, says Napoleon. Yet Massena was distinctly 
 the French hero of the European campaign of 1799. The 
 Austrian army now held a line from the watershed between 
 the Linth and Reuss through Coire to the sources of the 
 Rhine. Massena's left wing leaned on Basle and ran along 
 the Rhine and the river Aar, while his right wing leaned on 
 the lake of Geneva, and ran up the Rhone and through the 
 Furca to the Reuss and Aar, with outlying detachments up 
 in the mountain passes. The Limmat was held in force. 
 Part of the general allied plan was to sustain the expedition 
 
 Bnine. 
 
612 MASSENA GIVEN A FREE HAND. 
 
 to Holland by sharp operations in Switzerland and on the 
 Middle Rhine. Now that the land had been overrun, the 
 Vienna authorities were selfishly anxious to get Suwarrov out 
 of northern Italy, so as to have their own way there, and reap 
 the credit and prizes of the late victories. There was a good 
 deal of jealousy between the allied commanders, and hearty 
 cooperation was lacking. With his Austrians, Charles, who 
 had been with Korsakov in Switzerland, was to go down to 
 Mannheim, cross and march on the Netherlands, while Melas 
 with his Austrians should drive the French back up the Eivi- 
 era ; the Russian fleet was to seize Corfu and move on Ancona, 
 and the English fleet to help Naples rid herself of French 
 domination. At the same time Suwarrov was to bring his 
 own troops to Switzerland, and with the entire Russian army 
 crush Massena and then invade Franche-Comte. 
 
 Nor were the French leaders all of a mind. Bernadotte 
 and Massena were at odds, and rather than quarrel with Mas- 
 sena, the one general who held his own, the former was re- 
 lieved of his post as Minister of War by the Directory. This 
 gave Massena a free hand. Of Suwarrov's purpose he had 
 got notice, and quickly determined to take advantage of the 
 period after Charles had left the Limmat and before Suwar- 
 rov had arrived from Italy. All told, he had seventy-five 
 thousand men on the line from Basle to Geneva, of which over 
 half occupied an advanced position along the Limmat from 
 Brugg to Ziirich ; and with these he might fall on the twenty- 
 six thousand men of Korsakov, who but shortly before had 
 reached the region, while Hotze with fourteen thousand men 
 was still above the lake of Ziirich along the Linth. It was 
 a wise step to anticipate Suwarrov, for on the day on which 
 he was to cross the St. Gothard, it had, though unknown to 
 Massena, been arranged that Hotze and Korsakov should also 
 make an attack on the French in their front. 
 
SOULT TO ATTACK HOTZE. 
 
 613 
 
 After some manoeuvring the archduke crossed to the right 
 bank of the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and Massena appointed 
 September 25 for his attack — as it fell out, a day before his 
 adversary's. Lecourbe had shut the Eeuss valley, and was to 
 
 SawarroT-Massena Campai^. 
 
 hold the St. Gothard pass with twelve thousand men ; Soult, 
 with Molitor in support, was to attack Hotze at Wesen on 
 the Linth, and push him back to Rheineck, near the Lake of 
 Constance ; and Massena was to give the coup de grace by 
 
614 PREPARATIONS AT DIETIKON. 
 
 an attack on Korsakov. This general had the bulk of his 
 force, eighteen thousand men, in Ziirich, and at Wiedikon and 
 Wallishofen in its front, ready for an advance ; and three 
 battalions were holding an easy ford at Fahr. Korsakov 
 failed to understand Massena's manoeuvres, and Durassov's 
 division was sent down to Wettingen and Kirchdorf to ob- 
 serve the French left. Massena's plan was to put an army 
 corps over the Limmat at Fahr, attack the Russians on 
 both sides of Ziirich, and if possible shut them in. 
 
 Oudinot, with Lorges and Mesnard, sixteen thousand strong, 
 was to undertake the crossing, while a force demonstrated at 
 Vogelsang as if to build a bridge, so as to deceive Durassov, 
 an effort which was quite successful. Mortier on the right, 
 with eight thousand men, was to advance down the Sihl on 
 Wiedikon, to hold the Russians in check in Ziirich. Klein's 
 division, ten thousand strong, was on the road near Altstet- 
 ten, so as to march on Fahr or Ziirich, as might be needed 
 by Oudinot or Mortier. The real preparations for bridging 
 the river were secretly made at Dietikon, and on the night 
 of September 24-25 the boats were drawn to the river, and 
 launched under cover of batteries which commanded the road 
 on the farther side. Infantry lined the banks. 
 
 At 5 A. M. the first party of six thousand men crossed, 
 followed by others, and the Russian battalions at Fahr were 
 captured. The bridge was finished in two hours, and by 
 9 A. M. sixteen thousand men were over the Limmat, of whom 
 six thousand held Oetwyl and Regensdorf against Durassov ; 
 and with the balance Oudinot marched via Hbngg towards the 
 Geisberg, so as to seize the roads to Winterthur. Meanwhile 
 Durassov had led the bulk of his troops to Freudenau to hold 
 head to the threatened crossing there, and was quite useless. 
 Mortier advanced on Wiedikon, but meeting the bulk of the 
 Russian corps, was forced back to the Uetliberg by Korsakov. 
 
^tTRASBURO 
 
 SWITZEI 
 
5EKLAND. 
 
KORSAKOV'S ONLY SAFETY. 615 
 
 Massena sent Klein's division up from Altstetten, and its four 
 thousand grenadiers reestablished the matter, and Korsakov 
 retired into Ziirich. He now heard fire in his rear, and sent 
 out a few battalions to ascertain the cause, but these were un- 
 able to hold head to Oudinot. By evening Ziirich was shut 
 in, and recognizing his evil case, Korsakov drew all his troops 
 into that part of the town which lay on the right bank, while 
 Durassov strove to get back to Ziirich on country roads by 
 
 *1 
 
 t'^^^i;il^J- 
 
 '■'■'\ VV-/ 
 
 Waa/ettinc-en 
 
 'vi.riw,.j;jyj;;[]VyHi; 
 
 .vW"' 
 
 '^.''■,.,.,.,.,.,.,.y^ ''■'"' ''"wi 
 
 OUDINOT -XA. -^ ''''■' 
 
 
 
 Battle of Zurich. 
 
 way of Winterthur. Korsakov's only safety was to cut his 
 way out towards Winterthur, as Ziirich could be battered 
 down by the French guns. He put his infantry at the head 
 of column, followed by cavalry, and the train and guns last, 
 a fatal arrangement, sure to end in disaster. The foot fought 
 
616 UNTOLD OBSTACLES SURMOUNTED. 
 
 with splendid courage, and actually cut its way through the 
 French on the Winterthur road ; but Oudinot's troops closed 
 in again and drove the cavalry and train back on Ziirich, 
 while Klein and Mortier pushed into the town from the other 
 side. The Russian guns and cavalry, twelve thousand men 
 in all, were cut down or captured ; the army chest and train 
 were taken. What Korsakov had escaped with got beyond 
 the Rhine at Schaffhausen. 
 
 On the same day Soult had been equally successful against 
 Hotze, whose corps he drove back to St. GaU and Constance. 
 Hotze was killed. On the upper Reuss, however, although 
 Lecourbe had for a day held the Devil's bridge and pass 
 against Suwarrov, the latter had fought his way down the 
 river to Altdorf and the Lake of Lucerne ; but this is the 
 end of the highway, and there was no means of putting his 
 army across. Seeking to reach the Mutten valley by moun- 
 tain roads, he found this way also closed by Massena from 
 Schwyz ; and when to regain the Linth he marched over the 
 Bragel into the Klonthal, Molitor met him : not even by 
 hard fighting could he open a path to Wesen. He was com- 
 pelled to turn upstream from Glarus, and to cross the moun- 
 tains via Engi and Elm over the Haustock, eight thousand 
 feet high, to Panisk and Ulanz, so as to reach the Rhine 
 valley and Coire (Chur), which he accomplished with only ten 
 thousand men left. Thence he struggled on to Feldkirch. 
 In this perilous march, all his guns had been lost by sliding 
 off the footpaths and into the ravines. From September 21 
 to October 7, sixteen days, Suwarrov had surmounted untold 
 obstacles. Almost any other man would have surrendered. 
 
 Massena had done a noteworthy piece of mountain cam- 
 paigning. 
 
 Hearing of the allied disaster at Ziirich, Charles, who had 
 beaten Laroche at Mannheim, led a large part of his forces 
 
CHAMPIONNET IN COMMAND. 617 
 
 back towards Switzerland, lest Swabia should be endangered ; 
 and on October 6 he reached Donaueschingen, but stopped 
 there. On his leaving, Ney, serving under Lecourbe, who had 
 been sent to the Lower Rhine, crossed the river and for a while 
 blockaded Philipsburg. Lecourbe, with a new army half 
 formed, manoeuvred, actively but to no great purpose, on the 
 right bank of the Rhine 
 during part of October 
 and November. As Mas- 
 sena kept quiet, there was 
 nothing for him to gain 
 by his operations. 
 
 During the late fall 
 there were only minor 
 manoeuvres in Switzer- 
 land. An attack by Mas- 
 sena on October 7, on 
 Korsakov at Schlatt, near 
 Schaffhausen, was driven 
 back; but the French were 
 more fortunate in a fight 
 at Constance some days 
 
 later. In Italy one by one the fortresses fell to the Austrians. 
 Only Coni was left, and Genoa. 
 
 The armies of the Alps and Italy were now joined under 
 Championnet, who took command at Genoa September 10. 
 Under him St. Cyr held the Bocchetta pass on the right, Du- 
 hesme Brian9on on the left. In the centre Championnet ma- 
 noeuvred to hold Coni. There was much to-and-fro movement. 
 On November 4 the French were defeated with the loss of eight 
 thousand men at Genola, and Coni fell to the Austrians. It 
 was with difficulty that Genoa was kept. Championnet retired 
 early in the year, and Massena took command at Genoa, Febru- 
 
 Soult. 
 
618 SUWARROV'S LAST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 ary 10. Championnet " was brave, full of zeal, active, devoted 
 to his country ; he was a good general of division, a mediocre 
 general-in-chief." Melas went into winter quarters, deter- 
 mined to drive the French beyond the Var in the spring. 
 
 The French held almost all Switzerland, conquered by 
 Massena's skill. Suwarrov retired to Bavaria. The Austro- 
 Eussian quarrel waxed apace. Charles and Suwarrov ex- 
 changed some bitter letters, and real cooperation between the 
 two armies ceased. 
 
 The French Directory had this year shown valor, but small 
 discretion. It was indeed lucky that Massena rescued Swit- 
 zerland from the wreck. The errors of the Vienna cabinet, 
 led by Thugut, were scarcely less, and their selfish treatment 
 of their Russian allies was glaring. The Coalition came to an 
 end in October. 
 
 Suwarrov was of Swedish descent, born in Finland in 1729. 
 He was thus seventy years old during this memorable cam- 
 paign in Italy and Switzerland. He had served in the Seven 
 Years' War against the Poles, and from 1773 to 1790 against 
 the Turks. He was the hero of many a brave assault. His 
 work in 1799 in Italy was distinguished, and that in Switzer- 
 land, though unfortunate, scarcely less so. It was his last 
 campaign. Massena saw many more. 
 
 Of Suwarrov Napoleon says that "he had the soul of a 
 great captain, but not the head. He was endowed with a 
 strong will, great activity, intrepidity proof to all events, but 
 he had neither a genius nor the knowledge requisite for war. 
 When he arrived on the Adige, Kray had broken down 
 the gates of Italy, Mantua and Peschiera were blockaded, 
 and Scherer was behind the Adda, weakened by the loss of 
 two battles and by the garrisons he had thrown into Mantua, 
 Peschiera, Brescia, Bergamo, Ferrara, Fort Urbano and 
 Pizzighetone. He could iK) longer hold himself, nor was 
 
THEATRE OF NAPOUqj 
 
JJIOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS. 
 
LITTLE REAL COOPERATION. 619 
 
 dangerous except by his junction with the Army of Naples. 
 Suwarrov should, in all his mancEuvres, have proposed to him- 
 self but one goal : to prevent this junction. It was just this 
 one thing he never thought of. He acted without plan, with- 
 out reckoning." Yet Suwarrov did this very thing effectively. 
 Napoleon draws up a beautiful plan of campaign which Su- 
 warrov should have followed instead of what he did under the 
 direction of the Aulic Council. While in a way the criticism is 
 sound, the fact remains that Suwarrov did win back northern 
 Italy ; and Napoleon rarely appreciated an enemy at his true 
 worth. 
 
 From the beginning of the wars of the French Kevolution 
 there had been no such enormous forces brought together, and 
 never had France been so outmatched in numbers, nor had 
 such commanders against her as Suwarrov and Archduke 
 Charles. As a result, in thirteen months (from the end of Oc- 
 tober, 1798, to the end of November, 1799) less than half its 
 programme was carried out. The Coalition had won Italy, 
 Corfu and the Ionian Islands, and held itself on the Ehine ; but 
 it had been driven out of Switzerland, Egypt and Syria, and 
 Holland. The members of the Coalition had acted each for 
 its own interest, except Russia. England strove to destroy the 
 Dutch fleet and to enlarge its commerce ; Austria to reoccupy 
 northern Italy and hold it for itself ; the kings of Sardinia 
 and Naples to recover their thrones ; the Porte to reconquer 
 Egypt. There was little real cooperation to the one end of 
 humbling France and restoring the Bourbons. Although fu- 
 ture events robbed Bonaparte's conquests in Italy of any util- 
 ity, yet from a military point of view, what he did in 1796 and 
 1797 stands out in marked relief from the weak conduct and 
 consequent defeats of the other French generals. 
 
 Owing to the unfair treatment of Suwarrov, Paul determined 
 to separate from Austria, and to create a northern coalition. 
 
620 
 
 SUWARROV RECALLED. 
 
 A defensive treaty was made October 29 with Sweden. Den- 
 mark was separated from the French allies. Prussia could 
 not be reached. England strove to reconcile Russia and Aus- 
 tria, and Paul was willing to listen, if Thugut, to whom he 
 ascribed the ill-results of the last campaign, was shelved. 
 The old Thugut-Suwarrov ill-will was revived, and Suwarrov, 
 who had been resting his troops in Bohemia, was called back 
 to Russia with the army. 
 
 Sword presented to the First Consul by 
 Officers of the Army of Egypt. 
 
 (Prince Victor's Collection.) 
 
 END OF VOLUME I. 
 
wmm 
 
 mm 
 
 m 
 
 
 
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