.3 
 
 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE 
 
 SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 $l«nrg ^. Sage 
 
 1891 
 
 f|..5i»l.a..o^ lijni.J.te 
 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MAR 18TJ*' 
 
 Si 
 
 JU1Hr*i999 
 
 _ Cornell University Library 
 
 F 2235.3.P49 
 
 Simon Bolivar "El iibertador" :a life of 
 
 3 1924 021 135 037 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
This book was digitized by Microsoft Corporation in 
 
 cooperation witli Cornell University Libraries, 2007. 
 
 You may use and print this copy in limited quantity 
 
 for your personal purposes, but may not distribute or 
 
 provide access to it (or modified or partial versions of it) 
 
 for revenue-generating or other commercial purposes. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SIMON BOLIVAR 
 "EL LIBERTADOR" 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN 
 POLAND, 1 806- 1 807 
 
 A Military History of Napoleon's First War 
 with Russia, verified from unpublished official 
 documents. With Maps and Plans, and Illus- 
 trations. New Edition. Demy 8vo. 
 
 NAPOLEON'S CONQUEST OF 
 PRUSSIA, 1806 
 
 With an Introduction by Field-Marshal 
 Lord Roberts, V.C, K.G., etc. With Maps, 
 Battle Plans, and 16 Full-page Illustrations. 
 DeAy 8vo. 
 
 NAPOLEON AND THE ARCH- 
 DUKE CHARLES 
 
 A History of the Franco-Austrian Campaign 
 in the Valley of the Danube, in 1809. With 8 
 Illustrations and 5 Sheets of Maps and Plans. 
 Demy 8to. 
 
 THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA 
 
 With Map and numerous Illustrations. Demy 
 8vo. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 

 c.^ 
 
 te^fe' 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 : ''EL LIBERTADOR" : 
 
 A LIFE OF THE CHIEF LEADER IN 
 THE REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN IN 
 VENEZUELA NEW GRANADA Sff PERU 
 BY F. LORAINE PETRE €B 9B €S 
 WITH A PHOTOGRAVURE FRONTIS- 
 PIECE AND A MAP €B CB €S €B 
 
 LONDON JOHN LANE THE BODLEY HEAD 
 NEW YORK JOHN LANE COMPANY MCMX 
 
 S 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
f\.Z\sL\ZOS 
 
 Turnbull &• Spears, Pnniers, Edinburgh 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PREFACE 
 
 SOME apology may be thought necessary for this 
 attempt to revive interest in a man whose name 
 was extremely well known in Europe less than 
 a century ago. He then enjoyed a reputation 
 above his merits, being described as the Washington or 
 the Napoleon of South America. Since then, in Europe, 
 he has fallen into a still more undeserved oblivion, a fact 
 which is, perhaps, largely due to the constant turmoil of 
 revolution and civil war which has existed since his death 
 in those countries, in the liberation of which from the 
 dominion of Spain he played so great a part.^ 
 
 The names of most of the Spanish American Republics 
 have come to be looked upon as connoting revolution, 
 civil war, and financial repudiation. It is only quite 
 recently that European interest in them has begun to 
 revive, with the promise of a more settled era. Mexico, 
 under the able rule of Porfirio Diaz ; Argentina, now 
 covered with a network of railways and recognised as a 
 granary of the world ; to a lesser extent, Chile, Peru, and 
 Colombia have all begun to attract European capital and 
 industries. The immense possibilities of development 
 and trade in these countries, provided a stable and honest 
 government can be assured, are forcing themselves on the 
 attention of Europe and North America. The German 
 trader, ever in the forefront of enterprise, is to be found 
 all over them. Unlike his British rival, he is careful to 
 
 ^ For a discussion of the reasons why Bolivar has been almost forgotten in 
 Europe, see article in the Times of August 8th, 1883, dealing with the cele- 
 bration in South America of the centenary of his birth. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
vi SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 offer to the still half-civilised lower classes the precise 
 kind of goods they desire, instead of attempting to force 
 on them what he happens to have in stock. 
 
 As an outlet for the surplus populations of the more 
 settled countries of the world, South America is rapidly 
 coming to the fore, especially Argentina; and the com- 
 pletion of the Panama Canal within the next few years 
 can hardly fail to bring the states- of the West coast into 
 closer touch with Europe. 
 
 It seems, even, not impossible that the southern con- 
 tinent might become a serious bone of contention between 
 the north and at least one European state. 
 
 For the correct understanding of the heterogeneous 
 populations of South America, and of the miserable period 
 of revolution and anarchy which has, for nearly a century, 
 stunted their progress, there can be no better study than the 
 revolt against Spain, in which Simon Bolivar played so 
 great a part, and the character of the man who, starting 
 life full of hope for his country, died reluctantly convinced 
 of the terrible vicissitudes it was about to pass through. 
 To Englishmen there should be some interest, in con- 
 nexion with the present unrest in India, in studying the 
 revolt of the Spanish American dominions. There is 
 certainly no comparison possible between the colonial 
 misrule of Spain in the beginning of the nineteenth 
 century and the beneficent administration of India by 
 England in the beginning of the twentieth. But there 
 are many points of analogy between the handful of 
 Creoles who drew in their wake the ignorant masses of 
 the Spanish- American populations and the men in India, 
 who, like the Creoles, idealists and victims of a too literary 
 education, advocate separation from England, or, at least, 
 a form of self-government for which their countries are 
 even less suited than were the South American colonies 
 of the early nineteenth century. Bolivar himself saw 
 clearly that a federal republic was impossible. In India 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 the populations differ from one another still more 
 markedly, and the proportion of illiteracy is greater. 
 The Indian peoples have not even the tie of a single 
 language almost universally understood, as Spanish was, 
 and is, in South America. 
 
 If the dissolution of the Spanish dominion in South 
 America was followed by civil war and anarchy, what 
 would ensue on the disappearance of the British from 
 India ? There is at least one great difference — Spanish- 
 America was left by the rest of the world to " stew in its 
 own juice " ; that would certainly not be the case with 
 India. 
 
 Finally, there is an element of interest to Britons 
 in the fact that Bolivar's two decisive victories of Boyaca 
 and Carabobo were mainly due to the valour of our 
 countrymen fighting in the cause of liberty. Even in the 
 " crowning mercy " of Ayacucho, English officers played 
 a leading part, though of the 6000 volunteers who had 
 joined the Liberator's standard in 1 8 19 the greater part 
 had perished by the sword or by disease. It is hardly 
 necessary to allude to Lord Cochrane's immense services 
 to the Chilian navy. 
 
 For the loan of some of the books in the following list 
 I have to thank H. E. Dr Ignacio Gutierrez Ponce, 
 Colombian Minister in London. Also my thanks are 
 due Mr B. Koppel, who, in addition to lending books, has 
 given me many hints and much information. 
 
 F. L. P. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
LIST OF BOOKS, MAPS, AND PAPERS 
 CONSULTED BY THE AUTHOR 
 
 Austria (General Josi;). Bosquejo de la historia militar de 
 
 Venezuela en la guerra de independencia (1855). 
 Baralt (R. M.) and Diaz. Resumen de la historia de Venezuela 
 
 (1841). 
 Baralt (R. M.). Defensa de la xonducta del . . . Sr. M. M. de 
 
 las Casas (1843). 
 Bingham (Hiram). Article in Geographical Journal, October 
 1908. 
 „ „ Journal of an Expedition through Venezuela 
 
 and Colombia, 1906-7 (1909). 
 Bolivar (Simon). CoUeccion de documentos relatives a la vida 
 de S. B. (1826-33). 
 „ „ Speech of February 15th, 1819 (1819). 
 
 „ „ Project of the Constitution for the Republic of 
 
 Bolivia (1826). 
 „ „ Proclamas de Simon Bolivar. 
 
 „ „ Mensaje del Libertador Presidente al Congreso 
 
 Constituente (1830). 
 Cambridge Modern History. Vol. X. 
 
 Chesterton (G. L.). Peace, War, and Adventure, etc. (1853). 
 Cochrane (Capt. C. S., R.N.). Journal of a Residence and 
 
 Travels in Colombia in 1823-24 (1825). 
 CODAZZi (A COSTING). Atlas fisico y politico de la Republica de 
 
 Venezuela (1840). 
 Colombia— Maps, etc. (a) Atlas de los estados unidos de 
 
 Colombia (1865). 
 (6) Atlas geografico y historico de la 
 Republica de Colombia (1889). 
 
 (c) Atlas complete de geografia Colom- 
 
 biana (F. Janvier y Velasco, 1906). 
 
 (d) Die vulkanberge von Colombia, etc. 
 
 (Alphons Stuebel, 1906). 
 CoRREO Nacional. (Bogot£ newspaper.) 
 
 viii 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
LIST OF BOOKS, MAPS, ETC. CONSULTED ix 
 
 DUCOUDRAY-HOLSTEIN (GENERAL H. L. V.). Memoirs of Simon 
 
 Bolivar. 
 Flinter (G. D.). The History of the Revolution of Caracas, etc. 
 
 (1819). 
 Garibaldi (Giuseppe). Autobiography (English translation). 
 Gutierrez Ponce (Dr Ignacio). Vida de Don Ignacio Gutierrez 
 
 Vergara. 
 Gutierrez Posada(Joaquin). Memorias historico-politicas (1865). 
 Hall (Capt. Basil, R.N.) Voyages (1826). 
 Hamilton (Col. J. P.). Travels through Columbia (1827). 
 HiPPlSLEY (G.). A Narrative of the Expedition to the Rivers 
 
 Orinoco and Apure, etc. (1819). 
 Lafond (Gabriel de Lury). Quinze ans de voyages autour du 
 
 monde (1840). 
 Larrazabal (Felipe). Vida de Bolivar^ (1865). 
 Mac Gregor (Sir Gregor). Exposicion documentada que 
 
 el general G. M. dirijo, etc. (1839). 
 Markham (Sir Clements R.). History of Peru (1892). 
 Miller (John). Memoirs of General W. Miller (1829). 
 Miranda (Francisco de, General). The History of Miranda's 
 
 attempt to effect a Revolution, etc., by J. Biggs (i8io). 
 Mitre (Bartolom:^). Historia de San Martin, etc. (1890). 
 MoRiLLO (Pablo, Comte de Cartagena). Memoires (1826). 
 Moses (Bernard). Constitution of the Republic of Colombia, 
 with Historical Introduction (1893). 
 
 „ „ The Establishment of Spanish Rule in 
 
 America. 
 
 „ „ South America on the Eve of Emancipation 
 
 (1893). 
 Mulhall (Michael). The English in South America (1878). 
 O'Leary (Daniel Florencio, General). Memorias pubhcadas 
 
 . . . por S. B., O'Leary (1879-88). 
 Paez (Josi Antonio, General). Autobiografia (1867). 
 Pilling (W.) The Emancipation of South America (an abstract 
 
 translation of Mitre's San Martin ; see above). 
 PiNEYRO (Enrique). Biografias Americanas (1907). 
 Restrepo (J. M.). Historia de la revolucion de Colombia, etc 
 
 (1819 and 1858). 
 R^viREND (Alejandro Prospero). La ultima Enfermedad . . . 
 
 de S. Bolivar, etc. (1866). 
 
 1 Only vols. i. and ii., containing the Life of Bolivar, were published. The 
 remaining volumes, which were to contain the documents on which the Life is 
 based, never appeared. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
X SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 RojAS (Aristides). Historia Patria ; Estudios historicos (1891). 
 
 „ „ Historia Patria ; Legendas historicas (1891). 
 
 Santander (Francisco de Paula, General). Apuntamientos 
 
 para las memorias sobre Colombia (1837). 
 ScARPETTA (Leonidas) y Saturnino Vergara. Diccionario 
 
 biografico de los campeones de la libertad de Nueva Granada, 
 
 Venezuela, Ecuador, y Peru. 
 SCHRYVER (S. de). Esquisse de la vie de Bolivar (1899). 
 Spanish Main. Narrative of a Voyage to the Spanish Main in 
 
 the ship " Two Friends," etc. (1819). 
 Spence (J. M.). The Land of Bolivar (1878). 
 Torrente Mariano. Historia de la revolucion Hispano- 
 
 Americana" (1829-30). 
 The Times, August 8th, 1883. 
 Urquinaona y Pardo. Relacion documentada, etc. . . . de las 
 
 provincias de Venezuela (1820). 
 Venezuela. Recollections, etc. ; by an Officer of the Colombian 
 
 Army. 
 
 UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS 
 
 Despatches addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs in London, by Colonel Patrick Campbell, British Minister 
 in Colombia, 1828-30. 
 
 These despatches are in the Record Ofifice, Chancery Lane, 
 London. (F.O. correspondence, Colombia, 1828-30, vols. 54, 64, 
 65. 73-) 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface ........ v 
 
 List of Books, Maps, Papers, and Unpublished Documents 
 
 CONSULTED BY THE AUTHOR .... viii 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 South America under Spanish Rule .... 3 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 Bolivar's Early Life and the First Venezuelan Republic, 
 
 1783-1810 ....... 32 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 Bolivar and Miranda — The Fall of Venezuela — Events 
 
 IN Quito and New Granada .... 47 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Bolivar's First Liberation of Venezuela — The "War to 
 
 the Death". ...... 80 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 The Second Downfall of Venezuela, 1813-14 . . in 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Bogota and the Two Sieges of Cartagena — Fall of New 
 
 Granada, 1815-16 ...... 15° 
 
 xi 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
xii SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 FAGS 
 
 Bolivar in Jamaica, Haiti, and Venezuela, i8i6 . . 167 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 The Liberation of Guayana and the Execution of Piar, 
 
 1816-17 ....... 182 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 Bolivar and Paez — The Campaign against Morillo— The 
 
 Congress of Angostura, 1818-19 .... 196 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 The Passage of the Andes and the Battle of Boyaca, 
 
 1819 ........ 222 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 The Armistice and Treaty for Regularization of the 
 
 War, 1820 ....... 241 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 The Battle of Carabobo and the Constitution of 1821 . 254 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 Guayaquil and Quito, 1821-22 ..... 275 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 The Interview with San Martin at Guayaquil, 1822 . 295 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 Quito, Pasto, and Peru, 1822-23 .... 308 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONTENTS xiii 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Bolivar and Sucre in Peru — Battles of Junin and 
 
 Ayacucho, 1823-24 ...... 319 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 Bolivar in Peru and Bolivia, 1825-26 . . . 343 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 The Return to Colombia and the Suppression of Paez . 361 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 Colombia and the Convention of Ocana, 1827-28 . . 375 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 Bolivar and Santander — The Conspiracy of 1828 . 386 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 War with Peru — The Dissolution of Colombia — Bolivar's 
 
 Retirement and Death ..... 399 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 An Estimate of Bolivar ...... 427 
 
 Index ..... . . 451 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAP 
 
 Simon Bolivar. (From an Engraving by M. N. Bate) . | ^p^g^^l 
 
 ■avure 
 <iece 
 
 Simon Bolivar. (After a Fainting by Gil, engraved by 
 
 Charles Turner) ..... facing p. 308 
 
 General Map of Parts of Colombia and Peru — 
 Insets, (a) Sketch for Bolivar's Passage of 
 the Andes, 1819 ; (*) Sketch for Bolivar's 
 Operations in Perd . . at end of volume 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 
 
 BEFORE entering upon the life of Simon 
 Bolivar/ it is necessary to give a brief 
 account of the country in which the greater 
 pait of it was spent, and of the circum- 
 stances, the grievances, and the administration which led 
 up to the Revolution in which he played the most pro- 
 minent part. To give anything like a detailed account 
 of the system of administration of her American colonies, 
 or more accurately dominions, by Spain during the three 
 centuries between their first conquest and their final 
 emancipation from the rule of the mother country would 
 require a considerable volume to itself All that we can 
 afford space for here is a mere outline, sufficient to serve 
 as a guide to the motives and interests which prompted 
 the insurrection throughout Spanish America, from 
 Mexico to Chile and Buenos Aires. 
 
 Spain owed the acquisition of her New World king- 
 doms of Mexico and Guatemala, of Venezuela, New 
 Granada, Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires to the semi- 
 private adventures of men like Cortes, the Pizarros, 
 Quesada, and Benalcazar, who have been crowned with 
 a halo of romance which, with the casual reader of 
 history, has served to withdraw attention from the 
 
 ^ Bolivar, not Bolivar, as it is sometimes mispronounced in England. 
 
 3 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
4 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 hideous crimes which stained the annals of most of the 
 " conquistadores." One is apt to think of Cortes or Pizarro 
 chiefly as the hero of deeds of daring which surpassed 
 in splendour many of those attributed by romance to its 
 favourites. It is easy enough to learn from the delightful 
 works of W. H. Prescott, or a dozen other sources, the 
 history of the crimes openly perpetrated on the peaceable 
 and comparatively defenceless peoples of the New World, 
 to whom the invaders at first appeared as gods from a 
 better world. But their ruthless cruelty, shameless 
 treachery, and unbounded lust of riches soon marked the 
 conquerors out as, what many of them were, the scum of 
 Europe. For the conquering bands were largely recruited, 
 not only from Spain, but from Germany, Italy, and 
 almost every other country of Europe. These men, 
 pushed to desperate adventures almost solely by the 
 hope of wealth, encountered anything approaching 
 civilisation only in Mexico and Peru ; for the civilisa- 
 tion of the Muyscas of the highlands of New Granada 
 was of the most elementary description. 
 
 It was impossible that men of the class of the " con- 
 quistadores " should be left permanently to rule the vast 
 empire, twice the size of Europe, of which they had laid 
 the foundations, and in 1542 Spain began the issue of 
 laws for the government of her colonial empire in 
 America and the West Indies. Had all the laws pre- 
 scribed in the course of three centuries been carried 
 out, or been even possible of execution, the lot of the 
 aboriginal inhabitants might have been very different 
 from what it was ; for it was not due so much to want 
 of goodwill on the part of the Spanish sovereigns as to their 
 ignorance of how to solve the problems which, at a dis- 
 tance of several thousand miles, they failed to understand. 
 There was in the government of the mother country a 
 perpetual profession of solicitude for the welfare, not only 
 of its Spanish, but also of its Indian subjects. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 5 
 
 But the laws which were issued, with innumerable 
 amendments, soon became too confused and intricate 
 for comprehension even by administrators of the best 
 intentions, who unfortunately were rare. The men who 
 went out from Spain to fill the higher offices in the 
 transatlantic kingdoms felt that they must make hay 
 while the sun shone, and their main object was to amass 
 a fortune as some compensation for a period of exile to 
 uncongenial surroundings, and often to a bad climate. 
 Moreover, in a territory so vast in area, so sparsely 
 populated, so unprovided, with means of communication, 
 the practical control exercised by even the most well- 
 meaning Viceroy or Captain-General must necessarily 
 be weak. Add to this that many of the laws, especially 
 those aiming at the protection of the aborigines, were 
 directly opposed to the selfish interests of the immigrants, 
 who looked upon the Indians as created only for the purpose 
 of amassing wealth for their conquerors by their labour. 
 Finding on the spot a people generally endowed with 
 muscular limbs, the Spanish mine-owner saw in them 
 excellent labourers for the extraction of the gold and 
 silver, to which he looked as the only wealth of the 
 country. He failed to remember, or, if he remembered, 
 to pay any heed to the fact that such work was fatal to 
 the health, even the life of men bred in the free upper 
 air. What was the loss of life amongst the Indians 
 employed in the mines none can ever know, but it is 
 certain that it was enormous. The importation of negro 
 slaves aimed at stopping this loss, to some extent, by the 
 substitution of their labour in the mines ; but it only 
 succeeded at all in the lower and hotter places ; for the 
 negro was even more useless than the Indian in the high 
 regions and the cold climates of the Andes. 
 
 But we must not fall into the error of imagining that 
 the South American Indian, however much he may have 
 suifered in the mines of Mexico and Peru, disappeared from 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the face of the earth, or was even reduced to the same ex- 
 tent as his brother in the United States or Canada. The 
 early Spaniards were only able to fasten on the coasts and 
 favourable spots of the great continent, and they never 
 succeeded in imposing their dominion on great multitudes 
 of tribes on their frontiers. There there was a constant 
 struggle, and many a Spanish settlement was wiped out 
 by the savages. The " missions " were founded, generally 
 as a sort of advanced guard on these frontiers, in the 
 hope that religion might be able to effect what force 
 could not. Even at the present day one may risk death 
 by a poisoned blow-pipe dart at some places within 
 twenty miles of the great waterway between Bogotd and 
 the sea, and the explorer of the forests about the head 
 waters of the Amazon or the La Plata may still be in 
 some danger of putting in a post-mortem appearance as 
 a roast at some savage banquet. The mass of the popu- 
 lation of several of the South American republics is still 
 Indian, or at least has a large admixture of Indian blood. 
 The population of Spanish South America gradually 
 became more and more heterogeneous as time went on. 
 The aboriginal populations were, no doubt, far from 
 homogeneous, and there was in reality as wide a differ- 
 ence between the Incas of Peru and the savages who still 
 roam the forests in the centre of the continent as there is 
 between the cultivated Brahman of the Indian Deccan 
 and the wildest Bhil of the Nerbadda Valley. But an 
 invading white race is generally unable to distinguish 
 between one coloured man and another, and to the 
 Spaniards all these differences were invisible as a rule. 
 It is just the same in India with the common English. 
 The British soldier or railway employe does not realise 
 the immense gulfs of race, of breeding, and of civilisation 
 which separate one Indian from another. A very large 
 proportion of stay-at-home Englishmen, and even of 
 those whose knowledge of India is confined to what they 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 7 
 pick up in the course of a cold weather tour, are equally 
 under the delusion that the Indian peoples are one nation, 
 and not an immense number of widely different races, 
 whose only common attribute is a dark skin. 
 
 With the Spanish conquest there commenced at once 
 the creation of still wider racial differences, which have 
 resulted in a population, other than the Indians, deeply 
 divided amongst themselves. 
 
 Necessarily, the " conquistadores " carried with them 
 very few women from their own countries, and the immi- 
 gration of unmarried women was always difficult, and 
 hampered by many restrictions. But, from the first, no 
 prejudice was felt against unions, both legitimate and 
 illegitimate, between Spaniards and Indians, and there 
 soon began to spring up a mixed race (mestizos), the off- 
 spring of such unions. Between the extremes of the 
 Spaniard and the Indian there intervened, as time went 
 on, every degree of admixture of the two races. When 
 the negro appeared upon the scene he came as a slave, 
 a mere chattel or a beast of burden, who was sold 
 in the public market alongside of the mule and the 
 horse, and was described, like them, in advertisements, 
 as " sound and free from vice." Under such circum- 
 stances, the union of the Spaniard and the negro was 
 generally illegitimate. Its offspring became the " mulatto." 
 Between the negro and the Indian marriage was dis- 
 couraged, and generally made illegal by the Spanish laws. 
 The conquerors had no desire to foster a combination of 
 the two races which had suffered so grievously at their 
 hands. Nevertheless, there sprang up a certain number 
 of " zambos," half-breeds between the negro and the 
 Indian. With three original colours, white, red, and 
 black, and the three mixed races, " mestizo," " mulatto," 
 and " zambo," added to the innumerable shades of colour 
 introduced by the various combinations of the mixed 
 blood. South America had probably one of the most 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 heterogeneous populations in the world of a century ago. 
 This characteristic has increased since then. But there 
 arose a distinction, not of race but of class, which far 
 exceeded in political importance all the variations be- 
 tween white and black and copper coloured. It was the 
 distinction between the two classes of pure whites, the 
 Creole and the more temporary immigrant from Spain, 
 who looked to return to his own country when he had 
 amassed a fortune. Many people at the present day 
 associate the term " creole " with an admixture of dark 
 blood, but the original meaning implied nothing of the 
 sort.^ To the Spaniard, coming over from Europe with- 
 out any idea of changing his domicile, " criollo " signified 
 a man of the pure blood of his own race, often of bluer 
 blood and higher lineage than himself, who had been born 
 and bred in the colonies, and was domiciled there. In 
 this sense, the founders of the United States were 
 " Creoles " when considered from the point of view of 
 the Englishman, and the half-breed between the North 
 American Indian and the Englishman was a " mestizo." 
 
 The revolt of the British North American colonies 
 against the dominion of the mother country was thus 
 essentially a " creole " revolt, and the case was precisely 
 similar in Spanish America. In both cases the abori- 
 ginal population had ceased to be of serious political 
 importance, and, when it fought, took part on either side 
 according to local circumstances. In both cases the 
 " mestizo " was inclined to side with the creole, and the 
 negro slave followed his master. 
 
 In India the creole problem, which faced England and 
 Spain alike in America, has never cropped up, for the 
 class practically has never come into existence. The 
 
 1 Still the word has always implied some measure of dishonour, and has 
 never been held to be creditable. This is perhaps to be accounted for by its 
 alleged derivation, a corruption from the word " criadillo," the diminutive of 
 " criado," a servant. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 9 
 
 " mestizo," represented by the " Eurasian " of India, can 
 never be a danger there, for he is repudiated by the 
 native races, and driven perforce into the arms of the 
 Englishman. Moreover, he is strong neither in numbers 
 nor in qualities. Between Spaniard and Creole in Spanish 
 America contempt on the one side, hatred on the other, 
 grew apace. To the Spaniard, brought up in his native 
 country by servants and instructors of his own race, the 
 Creole seemed a contemptible creature. For the youthful 
 Creole spent the first five or six years of his life in the 
 charge of a negro slave. After that he was generally 
 made over to a mulatto teacher, from whom he learned 
 no good. He acquired from his nurse only the slave's 
 notion of duty, " which recognises little or no spontaneous 
 effort for others, but whose rule of action is the command 
 of the master enforced by the lash. From his teachers he 
 acquired notions of religion which were full of Paganism, 
 without the grace and poetry of Pagan worship. Out- 
 wardly, he adapted himself to the forms of civilised life, 
 but his mind was full of superstitions acquired from the 
 barbarous companions of his youth." ^ Vanity and 
 cruelty he inherited from his forbears, and they were 
 fostered by the influences to which he was ;subjected by 
 his early guardians and instructors. 
 
 The policy of Spain kept all the good things of the ad- 
 ministration of the country, not for the creole, but for the 
 needy Spaniard, who came to it to acquire a fortune and a 
 title. The creole was not by law barred from high office, 
 but in practice he rarely got it. Of 754 Viceroys and Cap- 
 tains-General, only eighteen were Creoles. Consequently, 
 says Captain Basil Hall,^ they suffered from " the moral de- 
 gradation consequent upon the absence of all motive to 
 
 ' Professor B. Moses, " South America on the Eve of Emancipation," 
 p. loi. 
 
 ° Hall's "Travels" {Constable's Miscellany, Edinburgh, 1826), vol. ii, 
 p. 23. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
lo SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 generous exertion, and the utter hopelessness that any 
 merit could lead to useful distinction." Yet many of 
 them, especially those educated partially in Europe, were 
 well suited for responsible employment in the service of 
 the State. This fact was openly recognised by some of 
 the more intelligent and disinterested Spaniards, who 
 saw at the same time the danger threatened by the 
 existence in the colonies of a large body of such men, 
 discontented, not with the dominion of Spain, but with 
 the tyranny exercised by the avaricious men whom she 
 sent out. On the other hand, says Professor Moses, the 
 inherent vanity of the Creole and his overbearing manners 
 led him to avoid labour and to refuse to engage in trade. 
 The natural result was a life of idleness, often of vice. 
 
 In the correction of this the Church was not likely 
 to do much good ; for its ministers set the very worst 
 example, as was reported • by Ulloa in the " Noticias 
 Secretas." Concubinage and luxury were rife amongst 
 them, and it is stated that they were generally the prime 
 movers in getting up dances, in which they and their 
 mistresses joined. 
 
 The Creole, then, was the real originator of the 
 movement for separation from Spain, though, at first, 
 even he was not, as a rule, for throwing off the dominion 
 of the mother country, and might still have been con- 
 ciliated by the grant of some measure of autonomy, with 
 a fair share in the good things of office. The " mestizos " 
 joined eventually with the Creoles, but, like other mixed 
 races, they were wanting in the spirit of initiative and 
 the energy necessary to incite them to make a start on 
 their own account. As we shall see presently, the 
 revolution would have succeeded much more rapidly 
 than it did had the spirit for it been rife in the country. 
 But, generally speaking, owing to apathy, it was dormant, 
 and it was only by the exertions of leaders like Bolivar 
 that it was galvanised into spasmodic activity. The 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 1 1 
 country side was only brought over to the republican 
 cause by success, and when defeat succeeded to victory, 
 province after province relapsed into the tamest submission 
 to the temporarily restored supremacy of Spain. 
 
 And what was the part played by the Indians before 
 and during this turmoil of the early nineteenth century ? 
 They had no reason to love either the Spaniard or the 
 Creole, for both alike maltreated the Indian, whom they 
 considered as a pariah, as much created to work for 
 the white man as was the negro. The unfortunate 
 Indians who came under the sway of Spain never, after 
 their final conquest, made any serious attempt to throw 
 off the yoke.^ At last, in 1780, Tupac Amaru II., 
 goaded to desperation by the tyrannies of a Spanish 
 " corregidor," raised the standard of rebellion ; but even 
 he did not aim so much at getting rid of Spanish 
 dominion as at calling attention to, and obtaining some 
 redress of, the grievances of his fellow-countrymen. The 
 insurrection, powerful only in its numbers, badly armed, 
 and led by men who had no capacity for organisation, 
 soon collapsed, and was terribly avenged by the 
 Spaniards and Creoles. In the War of Independence, 
 where the Indians took a hand, we shall find them serving 
 indifferently on either side. In parts of Venezuela, in 
 Pasto, and again in the final struggle in Peru, they 
 displayed bitter hostility to the republican cause. In 
 other places they equally supported it. Amongst other 
 instances may be quoted the case of the Colombian 
 " Rifles " battalion which, after the death of nearly all 
 the English rank and file originally composing it, for a 
 time consisted almost entirely of Indians under British 
 officers. 
 
 There were many grievances, of course, besides the 
 exclusion of the Creoles from high office. Otherwise, 
 
 ^ That is, dating the final conquest from the execution, in 1571, of the first 
 Tupac Amaru. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
12 SIMOIsT BOLIVAR 
 
 that alone would not have sufficed to raise the bulk of 
 the population against Spain. In her commercial policy 
 Spain was, after all, not so very much worse than her 
 neighbours in her treatment of her colonies. She only 
 did like others in treating her foreign possessions as a 
 mere milch cow for the supply to the mother country 
 of streams of gold and silver, and as a convenient 
 dumping ground for her own produce. No doubt she 
 went to greater lengths than others in this respect, and 
 was perhaps even more short-sighted than they. She 
 would allow no commercial competition by her colonies 
 with herself, and they were not allowed to supply 
 themselves with goods which could be grown or 
 manufactured in Spain, and sent out for sale at an 
 enormous profit to the Spanish producer and monopolist, 
 and at a price ruinous to the American consumer. Eng- 
 land had encouraged agriculture in her colonies, for she 
 wanted the raw products for her own manufactures. 
 Even agriculture was often discouraged by Spain. The 
 growing of wheat was encouraged, since Spain herself 
 and other colonies of hers in America required it ; the 
 culture of the vine, on the other hand, was generally 
 prohibited, for Spain grew excellent grapes and wished 
 to supply her colonies with wine. The manufacture of 
 cloth was prohibited, for that could be made up in the 
 mother country. Trade with the outside world was almost 
 entirely prohibited, with the result of the prevalence of 
 smuggling. Sometimes utterly ridiculous reasons were 
 assigned for the prohibition of trades. In Peru, for 
 instance, the growth of the coca plant was prohibited on 
 two grounds. In the first place, the plant was sacred 
 in the worship of the Incas, and played a considerable 
 part in their religious ceremonies ; therefore it was 
 anathema in a Christian country ! In the second place, 
 it grew in unhealthy tracts, where the Indian cultivator 
 would suffer or die ; therefore it must not, on his 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 13 
 account, be cultivated. Yet such considerations did not 
 prevent his being made to work in the mines, which was 
 much more fatal to him. Another notable abuse in the 
 matter of trade was the grant to the Guipuzcoa Company 
 of the monopoly of trade with Venezuela, and the general 
 confinement of the trade between the mother country and 
 the colonies to the single Spanish port of Seville. 
 
 The original contract between the Spanish Government 
 and the " conquistadores " and other early settlers provided 
 for a sort of feudal tenure of their fiefs or " encomiendas." 
 But the tyranny of the " encomenderos " soon became 
 so notorious and flagrant that the Spanish sovereigns, 
 beginning with the Emperor Charles V., found it necessary 
 gradually to resume these fiefs, in exchange for minor 
 compensations and patents of nobility. 
 
 From that time, the dominions in America became 
 separate kingdoms under the rule of the Spanish king, 
 who governed through the Viceroys and the Council of 
 the Indies. 
 
 Whilst the European dominions were officially styled 
 " These Kingdoms," the term " Those Kingdoms " was 
 applied to the transmarine possessions of the Spanish 
 Crown. Thus an enactment applicable to both Spain 
 and the colonies was headed as being in force in " Estos 
 y esos reinos " (these and those kingdoms). Though the 
 natives of the colonies were solemnly declared to be sub- 
 jects of the King, on the same footing as the inhabitants 
 of Aragon and Castille, and were endowed with a regular 
 code of laws, they were practically dependent on the 
 officials appointed from Spain to govern them. These 
 men, almost invariably Spaniards, could with impunity 
 interpret the laws as they chose, or apply them just so 
 much or so little as suited their own interests or caprices. 
 Over an official several thousands of miles away, before 
 the days of steam and telegraphs, the central authority in 
 Europe could exercise practically no control. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
14 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 The instrument through which the Spanish monarch 
 governed his transatlantic possessions was the Council of 
 the Indies, sitting in the vicinity of the Court. Its powers 
 were legislative, judicial as the final court of appeal in the 
 most important cases, and executive as adviser of the King 
 in such matters. 
 
 The management of economic matters was confided to 
 another body, the " Casa de Contratacion," ^ whose busi- 
 ness it was to carry out and enforce the exclusive monopoly 
 of colonial trade which had been determined upon. It sat 
 at Seville, which became the sole lawful port of trade 
 between the mother country and her foreign dependencies. 
 Later on it was transferred to Cadiz, and presently other 
 ports were opened. Similarly, the trade of South America 
 with Spain was strictly limited to certain ports in the 
 colonies. 
 
 At the head of the administration in South America, 
 at first, was the Viceroy of Peru, residing in royal state 
 at Lima.^ His unwieldy charge extended from Buenos 
 Aires and Chile in the south to New Granada and Vene- 
 zuela in the north. 
 
 Presently it was found impossible for one man at Lima 
 to rule so vast a territory, and two new Viceroys and two 
 Captains-General were set up. 
 
 The Viceroyalty of New Granada finally came into 
 being in 1 739. It comprised the two former Presidencies 
 of Quito and New Granada, corresponding to the present 
 republics of Ecuador, Colombia, and Panamd. The capital 
 was at Santa F6 (Bogotd). The Captain-Generalcy of 
 Venezuela (Caracas) was of older date (1550). The 
 Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires was created in 1776. Its 
 territory included the present republics of Argentina, 
 
 1 Freely translated by Professor Moses " The India House." It was older 
 in origin than the Council, but eventually became subordinate to it. 
 
 ^ There was another Viceroy of New Spain who concerns us less, foj his 
 jurisdiction did not extend into South America. His capital was Mexico. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 15 
 Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. The Captain-Generalcy 
 of Chile was subordinate to the Viceroy of Peru, who also 
 directly controlled the Province of Guayaquil and the 
 southern part of Quito. Quito itself was part of the 
 Viceroyalty of New Granada. But the " President of 
 Quito " enjoyed a certain amount of independence, due, 
 no doubt, largely to the difficulties of the country inter- 
 vening between his territory and the rest of New Granada. 
 Indeed he is sometimes spoken of as the Captain-General. 
 The Peruvian Viceroy never altogether lost some general 
 power of supervision and control all over South America, 
 even in the other Viceroyalties and Captain-Generalcies. 
 
 The charges of the Viceroys and Captains-General were 
 divided into Presidencies, Intendencies, and Provinces, at 
 the head of which were Presidents, Intendents, Governors, 
 and " Corregidores," according to the importance of the 
 division. These officials, like the Viceroys and Captains- 
 General, were appointed from Spain, but were subordinate 
 to the Viceroys or Captains-General. 
 
 The next subdivision was into Departments or Can- 
 tons, the heads of which were the delegates of the 
 provincial chiefs. 
 
 As a rule. Viceroys and Captains- General were also 
 commanders-in-chief of the military forces of their charge, 
 but in some cases there was a separate military com- 
 mandant. 
 
 The " Audiencia real " was an authority exercising 
 functions on the judicial side similar to those of a 
 Supreme Court in India or the British colonies. It 
 was the final court of appeal in South America, and 
 in some cases exercised original jurisdiction. Appeals 
 from an " Audiencia " to the King of Spain only lay in 
 the most important civil cases. But the powers of the 
 " Audiencias " were much more than judicial, at least in 
 the case of chief " Audiencias," such as that of Lima. 
 The Viceroy was President of the " Audiencia," but 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
1 6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 could not vote in it. On his death, or the occurrence 
 otherwise of a vacancy in his office, the " Audiencia " 
 succeeded temporarily to his powers. There was frequent 
 friction between Viceroys or Captains-General and the 
 " Audiencias," which thus to a certain extent acted, as 
 they were intended to do, as a check on the head of the 
 administration. The right of direct correspondence with 
 Spain increased the power of the " Audiencia " as against 
 the Viceroy or Captain-General. Frequent disputes were 
 the result of failure clearly to distinguish by law the 
 functions of the " Audiencia " from those of the Viceroy 
 or Captain- General. The chief " Audiencias " established 
 in South America were at Lima, Santa F6 (Bogoti), 
 Quito, La Plata, Caracas, Buenos Aires, and Santiago 
 de Chile. 
 
 The " Cabildo " or Municipal Council was a very 
 important institution. It was often endowed with very 
 considerable powers ; sometimes it was empowered to 
 nominate a governor in case of vacancy. In a special 
 meeting called "cabildo abierto," held in consultation 
 with the principal civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 
 matters of considerable local importance were often 
 discussed and settled. In the more remote districts 
 the cabildo often was practically the only representative 
 of authority. We shall presently see the authority of 
 the cabildo frequently invoked as a starting-point for the 
 formation of a revolutionary "junta." In them Creoles 
 figured largely as members. There was no legislative 
 authority in the colonies, in which, according to theory, 
 the King of Spain was the successor of the native rulers 
 who had been conquered, just as the British Government 
 in India is regarded as the successor of the Moghul 
 emperors. The South American Indians were regarded 
 as subjects of the Spanish king, entitled to the full 
 rights of Spanish subjects. Laws were manufactured 
 for the government of Spanish Americans and Indians 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 17 
 
 by the Council of the Indies in Spain, but they were 
 poured out in such vast quantities, and were often so 
 contradictory, as to be incomprehensible even to the 
 best - intentioned and most intelligent administrators. 
 These, indeed, were few and far between, and there was 
 nothing in the nature of a permanent and adequately 
 paid civil service such as exists in India. Though every 
 administrator, on leaving office, was bound to have his 
 conduct during his tenure of it inquired into, there was 
 probably little fear of this process, and men openly set 
 themselves to the making of a fortune, by illegitimate 
 means, out of appointments the legal emoluments of 
 which were insufficient for the bare subsistence of their 
 holders. Corruption was rife, and appointments were 
 freely sold. In the case of Viceroys and Captains- 
 General, the opportunities of enrichment offered by the 
 civil, military, and ecclesiastical patronage which they 
 possessed were enormous. 
 
 We have said very little of the oppression of the 
 Indians, which was the work alike of European Spaniards, 
 of Creoles, of mulattoes, and of" mestizos " — Indian griev- 
 ances, as we have said, had nothing whatever to do with 
 the rising against Spain. The revolt of Tupac Amaru 
 was the last bolt shot by these unfortunate people who, 
 later, became mere pawns in the struggle, when they took 
 part in it at all. As for the " mestizos " and " mulattoes," 
 they were, as a body, almost as incapable of concerted 
 action as the Indians. The negroes and " zambos " 
 counted for nothing. The revolution was entirely 
 initiated by Creoles in the sense of Spaniards of pure 
 blood, born and bred in the country, though the 
 " mestizos " and the others followed their lead. The 
 chief grievances of the Creoles are thus summarised 
 by Cochrane ^ : — 
 
 " 1st. The arbitrary power exercised by the Viceroys 
 1 i. 266. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
1 8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 and Captains-General, who very frequent^ evaded the 
 laws, and even the orders which they received from the 
 King. 
 
 " 2nd. That the ' audicncias ' were composed solely of 
 Europeans, who interpreted the laws as they pleased. 
 
 " 3rd. That, under the authority of the ' audiencias,' 
 clandestine decrees in causes were often made ; nocturnal 
 arrests took place ; persons were banished without trial, 
 and numerous other acts of injustice were committed. 
 
 " 4th. That they (the native Spanish Americans) were 
 treated with distrust by the Government, notwithstanding 
 the loyalty and courage which, upon several occasions, 
 they had manifested in defence of the rights of the 
 Crown of Spain. 
 
 " 5 th. That they were obliged to bear insults from the 
 meanest of the Spaniards, who, merely on account of 
 their European birth, considered themselves superior to, 
 and, as it were, the masters of, the Spanish Americans. 
 As an instance of this kind of feeling, a report is quoted, 
 which was made to the King by his fiscal, upon the 
 petition of the city of Merida de Maracaibo in Venezuela, 
 to found a university ; the opinion of the fiscal was that 
 'the petition was to be refused, because it was unsuitable 
 to promote learning in Spanish America, where the 
 inhabitants appeared destined by nature to work in the 
 mines.' After a pretended solemn deliberation of the 
 ' Consulada,' or Board of Trade in Mexico, the members 
 informed the Cortes that 'the Indians were a race of 
 monkeys, filled with vice and ignorance ; automatons 
 unworthy of representing or being represented.' ^ 
 
 "6th. That, notwithstanding the original compact 
 made between the King and the first settlers in Spanish 
 America, which stipulated ' that in all cases of govern- 
 ment, justice, administration of finances, commissions, 
 
 ^ There seems to be some confusion of ideas in this instance, for the writer 
 quoted puts forward grievances of Indians rather than of Creoles. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 19 
 
 etc., the first discoverers, then the Pacificadores, and 
 lastly the settlers and those born in the said provinces, 
 were to be preferred in all appointments and public 
 employments,' the Creoles were gradually shut out from 
 all participation in local commands and dignities ; that 
 they were also prohibited from ' visiting the mother 
 country without the express permission of the King, 
 which could not be obtained but with much difficulty. 
 
 " 7th. That the South Americans were prohibited 
 from making wine or brandy, or extracting oils, and from 
 planting vines or almond trees, except in Peru or Chile, 
 or from cultivating more than a specified and limited 
 number of tobacco plants ; whilst the wine, almonds, etc., 
 produced in Peru and Chile were not permitted to be 
 sent to Mexico, New Granada, or Tierra Firma ; and it 
 was forbidden to cultivate tobacco or the sugar cane 
 in Chile. 
 
 " 8th. That, in order to check the progress of popula- 
 tion and to keep distinct the different classes, there were 
 many laws tending to throw obstacles in the way of 
 marriage." 
 
 Notwithstanding all these grievances, and the open 
 contempt with which Spaniards treated every native of 
 South America, from the Creole to the Indian, there still 
 subsisted amongst the Creoles a general feeling of respect 
 for the royal authority, and of attachment to the mother 
 country. The cry was never "down with Spain," but 
 always, "down with the bad government of her dele- 
 gates." Even in the revolution of the beginning of the 
 nineteenth century, the first movements were invariably 
 favourable to the Royal House of Spain, and the new 
 Government was set up in the name and on behalf of 
 Ferdinand VII. It was only as it appeared more and 
 more clearly that all parties in Spain were hostile to 
 reform in the colonies, that the more extreme leaders of 
 the revolution were able to gain over public opinion to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
20 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 their idea of final separation from the mother country. 
 Why is it that, with all the grievances of the South 
 American population, serious revolt should have been 
 deferred till the end of the first decade of the nineteenth 
 century? The causes must be traced partly in South 
 America, partly in the comparative strength of Spain 
 herself previous to the catastrophe resulting from the 
 unscrupulous proceedings of Napoleon in 1808-9. 
 
 The Indians, as we have already said, were by far the 
 greatest sufferers, but their intellectual inferiority, their 
 want of proper armament, and their incapacity for con- 
 certed action on a large scale foredoomed to failure any 
 attempt they might make to obtain redress by force. 
 The only really serious Indian rising was that of Tupac 
 Amaru II. in 1780, and that collapsed before the resist- 
 ance incurred from Spaniards and Creoles alike. 
 
 Qreole apathy and inertia, combined with the narrow 
 limits of the education allowed in the colonies, served to 
 keep back the South American Spaniard. Teaching, 
 which was mainly confined to religion, canon law, and 
 literature of a carefully-selected type, tended to drive 
 its pupils in the direction of legal studies, and to exclude 
 from their ken scientific subjects and practical matters.^ 
 The strictest supervision was exercised over the class of 
 books permitted to enter the colonies, and no press 
 existed. What knowledge of the progress of liberal 
 ideas reached these countries from the United States or 
 Europe was smuggled in by those Creoles who had gone 
 abroad to complete their education, and these, under the 
 
 ' It is curious to note the somewhat similar result produced by the strongly 
 literary character of the educational system in India during the latter half of 
 the nineteenth century. To that we have to attribute mainly the growth of a 
 large body of unpractical lawyers in Bengal and elsewhere. Industrial 
 education, it is true, has not been deliberately suppressed as it was in the 
 Spanish colonies, but it has certainly not been encouraged as we think it 
 should have been. In the Spanish colonies it would have been useless so 
 long as the restrictions on trade remained. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 21 
 
 Spanish rule, were strictly limited in numbers. It might 
 have been thought that the revolt of the English North 
 American colonies would have produced a great and 
 immediate effect in the adjoining continent, but it was 
 not so. North American ideas had to cross the Atlantic 
 first, and it was only when they had been developed in 
 France into the excesses of the great Revolution that 
 they began to return to Spanish America as a 
 powerful influence. The apathy and ignorance of the 
 South Americans for long resisted the efforts of the men 
 who came back from Europe imbued with the spirit of 
 the French Revolution, or from the United States under 
 the influence of the more moderate ideas of that country. 
 The dominion of Spain in South America was very far 
 from being a military one. The Spanish contingents 
 rarely withstood for long the trials of a bad climate in 
 the coast ports, and these were the places where they 
 were usually stationed. Most of the regular troops were 
 themselves Creoles, " mestizos," or mulattoes, and the local 
 militias were generally of small fighting value, and might 
 well have been looked to as supporters rather than 
 opponents of a movement for freedom. It was by the 
 close supervision exercised by Spain, through the courts 
 of the Inquisition at Lima and Cartagena, and through 
 the other instruments of control which she possessed, that 
 she was able to nip in the bud such schemes of revolt as 
 were formulated before 1808. Up to then, she generally 
 had in reserve the power of enforcing her rule by the 
 despatch of an expeditionary force. The dissolution of 
 the Spanish Monarchy in that year, and the conflict with 
 Napoleon, practically put a stop to any considerable 
 expedition, until the return of Ferdinand VII. to Spain in 
 1 8 14. It was largely due to Ferdinand's misgovern- 
 ment after that that the possibility of an eventual recon- 
 quest of his American dominions finally disappeared with 
 the mutiny in the great expedition preparing at Cadiz in 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2 2 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 1820. The utter apathy of the creole population as a 
 whole is constantly in evidence in the early years of the 
 War of Independence. The bulk of the Spanish forces 
 against which the revolutionaries had to contend was 
 South American. In several provinces it was impossible 
 at first to get up a serious opposition to Spanish supre- 
 macy, and in many others a general relapse to the 
 royalist side occurred the very moment that there was a 
 change of the fortune of war adverse to the Republican 
 cause. Not only was the revolt, in its inception, of 
 purely creole origin, but it had to be engineered by a 
 comparatively few leaders, who had generally imbibed 
 their ideas of liberty in Europe or the United States. 
 
 In considering the origin of the revolution, Tupac 
 Amaru's insurrection in 1780 may be left entirely out of 
 consideration, as being an Indian movement directed as 
 much against the creole as against the European Spaniard. 
 
 The first real movement against the Spanish G^yern- 
 ment was the insurrection of Leon, a man from the 
 Canary Islands, not a South American creole. His 
 insurrection, in the middle of the eighteenth century, 
 aimed at the destruction of the Guipuzcoa Company, to 
 which the monopoly of trade with Venezuela had been 
 made over by Spain. The plot was discovered before it 
 was ripe, Leon was executed at Caracas, and a monu- 
 ment erected to perpetuate his shame ! 
 
 In 1 78 1 there was a rising at Socorro, in Central New 
 Granada, to the cry of " Long live the King ! Down 
 with our bad Government ! " This was so serious that 
 the Viceroy was reduced to calling in the ecclesiastical 
 arm by sending the Archbishop of Santa ¥6 to negotiate 
 in full canonicals. The malcontents were induced to 
 disperse on promises of redress in the matter of the new 
 taxes of which they complained. As might have been 
 expected, once the danger was past there was very little 
 hope of fulfilment of its promises by the Government. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE 23 
 
 In 1794 a more serious scheme of revolution in 
 Caracas was set on foot by Antonio Nariflo, who after- 
 wards played a considerable part in the revolt of New 
 Granada and subsequent events. It seems, however, to 
 have been very much delayed in execution ; for, in 1797, 
 it was still not ready when it was discovered by the 
 Government. Gual and Espafia, the nominal leaders, 
 fled to Cura9ao, whence the latter, thinking the matter 
 had blown over, returned, two years later, to La Guaira, 
 only to be arrested and hanged. In June 1797 Sir 
 Thomas Picton, Governor of Trinidad, had, with the 
 sanction of the British Government, then at war with 
 Spain, issued a proclamation promising help to insurrec- 
 tionary movements. 
 
 Were the Spanish-American colonies ripe for revolution 
 and independence in the early nineteenth century, when 
 their chance of success came in the collapse of the Spanish 
 Monarchy before the might of Napoleon ? They were 
 certainly ripe for revolt, for there was general discontent 
 with a corrupt, tyrannical, and utterly selfish Government. 
 Of improvement there was no hope so long as Spain 
 ruled them. The subsequent history of Cuba and the 
 Philippines has shown that from improvement in Spanish 
 methods nothing was to be expected for a century to 
 come. 
 
 But when we come to the question of readiness for 
 independence, especially in the form of a republican 
 government, the case is different. Look back, first on 
 the history of the last century in the revolted colonies, and 
 compare it with that of the United States. In the north 
 we have a nation ready not only for revolt, but also 
 qualified to form a true popular Government, under which 
 internecine struggles, save for the great one in the sixties 
 of last century, have not served to spread misery or 
 retard progress. Then turn to the Spanish colonies, torn 
 by factions in the midst of their revolt against Spain, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
24 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 devastated by civil war long before independence had 
 been assured, trampled on by rival tyrants, each appeal- 
 ing to the great principles of liberty in support of a cause 
 which was purely personal. For the greater part of 
 a century every one of the former Spanish colonies has 
 been the scene of bloodshed and revolution. Their most 
 prosperous times have in reality corresponded to those 
 periods when some strong man, proclaiming, with his 
 tongue in his cheek all the while, the blessings of popular 
 government, has succeeded in imposing his own practi- 
 cally absolute rule. As for progress, where has there been 
 any among the mass of the people ? Primary education 
 has been neglected, and probably there is not much more 
 of it now than there was a century ago. There are many 
 highly educated and cultivated men among the upper 
 classes, but the lower classes know nothing, and still re- 
 main but pawns in the hands of every ambitious man 
 who may aspire to be a general or a dictator. One, at 
 least, of the leaders of the revolt, San Martin, a republican 
 to begin with, recognised that popular government was 
 unsuited to peoples in the backward state of those of 
 South America early in the nineteenth century. Bolivar, 
 indeed, professed throughout to be a republican, but this 
 history of him will perhaps show what his conception of 
 a suitable republic was. If he ever really believed in the 
 possibility of the success in South America of a genuine 
 representative government, his last ideas were very dif- 
 ferent. His opinion of the future of South America, said to 
 have been expressed only a month before his death, is a re- 
 markable prophecy. "These countries," it says, "will 
 inevitably pass into the hands of an uncurbed multitude, 
 to pass later into those of petty tyrants of all colours and 
 all races." 
 
 It is only now, very gradually, that the South 
 American republics are beginning to improve, and that 
 largely thanks to the influence of European and North 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY 25 
 
 American capital, and, in some cases, of European 
 immigration. 
 
 Here it will be well to give some general description 
 of the vast territories over which, during twenty years, 
 Bolivar operated, whether as a general or as a civil 
 administrator. 
 
 The total area with which he came more or less into 
 direct contact may be roughly stated as about i8| times 
 the size of Great Britain and Ireland, with a population 
 between one-eighth and one-seventh of theirs at the 
 present day. 
 
 Venezuela, the native country of Bolivar, having been 
 brought of late years into somewhat undesirable notoriety 
 by the behaviour of its late President, Don Cipriano 
 Castro, most people are aware of its general situation, 
 a remark which is perhaps not always applicable to some 
 of the other South American republics. It is a country 
 of vast plains ^ and mountain ranges, of a climate vary- 
 ing with the altitude above sea-level, from the extreme 
 of tropical heat on the coasts and the great plains, 
 through a sub-tropical temperature at 3000 feet and a 
 temperate climate at from 4000 to 7000 feet, to an 
 Alpine region at the higher levels up to over 15,000 
 feet. 
 
 The western districts, towards Merida and Trujillo, 
 are generally mountainous, being traversed by a branch 
 of the Andes thrown out eastwards from the eastern 
 Cordilleras of the adjoining Republic of Colombia. To- 
 wards the coast this range falls in altitude and skirts the 
 northern coast right along to opposite Trinidad. The 
 range forms, as it were, a great wall, shutting out the 
 vast plains of the Orinoco valley from the Caribbean 
 Sea. Even in this coast range there are peaks, such as 
 the Silla at La Guaira, which rise to over 9000 feet, 
 
 ' According to Codazzi, nearly two-thirds of the whole area consists of 
 plains, more than one-fourth of mountains. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
26 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 though the general average is 3000 or 4000 feet lower. 
 In the south-east, in the angle formed by the Orinoco 
 as it changes its course from north to east, lie more 
 mountains, forest-clad and for the most part but im- 
 perfectly known to explorers, forming the " Hinterland " 
 of British Guayana. Roughly speaking, the agricultural 
 portion of Venezuela corresponds with the area covered 
 by the eastern extension of the Andes and the coast 
 range. The pastoral portion is the vast plain between 
 the coast range and the Orinoco, and stretching right 
 back westward all about, the Apure, the Arauca, the 
 Meta, and the innumerable other tributaries of the 
 Orinoco, to the foot of the great range of the Eastern 
 Cordilleras. The forest region is that of the south-eastern 
 mountains of Guayana. This division must not be taken 
 as strictly correct, for there are plenty of forests in the 
 Andean and coast ranges, whilst cultivation is to be 
 found in Guayana and on the banks of the Orinoco. 
 However, the division serves to indicate generally the 
 character of the produce of the country. 
 
 The most fertile and least thinly populated tracts were 
 in the early nineteenth century, and indeed still are, in 
 the coast range, which is almost everywhere characterised 
 by broad valleys of abounding fertility, watered by 
 numerous lakes and innumerable rivers and streams. 
 The largest of the lakes is that of Valencia or Tacarigua,^ 
 30 miles long from east to west and 12 miles 
 broad. Its eastern end is some 5° miles west of 
 Caracas and lies 1600 feet above sea level. Into this 
 eastern end flows the little river Aragua, in the fertile 
 valley of which lay Bolivar's estate of San Mateo. 
 From the other side of the watershed on which the 
 Aragua rises flows eastward the Tuy, with a valley of 
 equal richness. At the western end of the lake is 
 
 ^ Excepting, of course, Maracaibo, which is an inlet of the sea rather than 
 a lake. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY 27 
 
 Valencia, which was so often the scene of fighting 
 between the contending parties in the War of 
 Independence. 
 
 Caracas, the capital, stands in the midst of a valley 
 just south of the port of La Guaira, at an elevation of 
 3000 feet above it. From Caracas to La Guaira is, 
 as the crow flies, but 6 or 7 miles, and in this space, 
 shutting the capital off from its seaport, stands a gigantic 
 natural wall, the mountain known as La Silla, rising 
 steeply 6000 feet above the city and falling still more 
 suddenly 9000 feet to La Guaira, which lies crushed into 
 the narrow space between the foot of the mountain and 
 the sea.^ Nowadays a wonderful railway climbs pain- 
 fully up 5000 feet to the lowest pass in the Silla, and 
 then descends 2000 feet to the basin of Caracas ; in 
 Bolivar's time the journey was done on horseback in 
 nine miles, whereas the railway requires twenty-four 
 miles of sinuous track to cover the distance between the 
 two places. On the west of the Captain-Generalcy of 
 Venezuela lay the Viceroyalty of New Granada, now the 
 Republic of Colombia. It has been described as the 
 most mountainous country in the world, though to make 
 that description accurate it would be necessary to leave 
 out of consideration the vast plains between the eastern 
 foot of the Andes and the Venezuelan border on the 
 Upper Orinoco. In the south, the Andes are united 
 into a single great knot of mountains, stretching from 
 the Pacific Ocean to the plains of the Putumayo. A 
 little farther north the mountains separate into three 
 great ranges — the Western, Central, and Eastern Cor- 
 dilleras — stretching like three great claws over the land, 
 and the two outer ranges throwing out supplementary 
 claws westward and eastward, the latter to form the 
 Venezuelan Andes of Merida and Trujillo. The central 
 
 ' La Guaira and La Silla are most graphically described in " Westward 
 Ho!" 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
28 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 range alone stops short some distance south of the 
 Caribbean Sea. There is another great mass of moun- 
 tains about Santa Marta rising above the level of 
 perpetual snow, even in that torrid climate. Between 
 the western and the central ranges is the valley of the 
 river Cauca, one of the richest in the world ; between 
 the Central and the Eastern Cordilleras flows the river 
 Magdalena, with its fertile valley still largely covered by 
 forest. The Magdalena is 1300 miles in length, a 
 stream as long and as great as the Ganges. In the plain 
 between the northern end of the central range and the 
 sea the Cauca joins the Magdalena and is absorbed in 
 it. The capital of this country, perhaps the richest in 
 mineral wealth in South America, is Bogotd, or, as the 
 Spaniards called it, Santa F6 de Bogotd, perched high up 
 in the Western Cordilleras, 700 or 800 miles from the 
 Caribbean Sea. The characteristic of this part of the 
 range is the chain of broad, open, high-lying valleys, 
 evidently the dry beds of ancient lakes. BogotA itself 
 stands on such a surface 8700 feet above sea-level, 
 surrounded by hills varying from 200 or 300 to 4000 
 or 5000 feet above the plain. On the Caribbean Sea 
 New Granada had the magnificent harbour of Cartagena, 
 with a fortress considered, in the early nineteenth 
 century, the strongest in South America. 
 
 In the south of New Granada lay the Presidency of 
 Quito, now the Republic of Ecuador, with its capital, Quito, 
 standing in the midst of what Mr Whymper has aptly 
 described as an " avenue of volcanoes," in which are in- 
 cluded Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Chimborazo, and many others. 
 Here again there are great open plains like that of 
 Bogotd, only still higher. There is a succession of 
 these valleys, 300 miles long and 40 broad, stretch- 
 ing from north of Quito to Cuenca. The length is 
 divided by transverse ranges, connecting the two chains, 
 of which the Andes here consist, into the valleys of 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY 29 
 
 Quito, 9500 feet above the sea; Ambato, 8500; and 
 Cuenca, 7800. The first, though the highest, is far the 
 most fertile. The one decent port of the country is 
 Guayaquil in the south-west, whence, at the present day, 
 a railway climbs round the shoulder of Chimborazo to 
 the great line of valleys, and reaches Quito by them. 
 
 Peru comes next to Ecuador, a very different country 
 in some ways ; for, whilst the Ecuadorian coast at 
 Guayaquil or Esmeraldas is moist and rich in tropical 
 vegetation, the greater part of the Peruvian coast is dry, 
 sandy desert, almost devoid of vegetation, save where 
 rivers flowing from the great chain of the Andes divide 
 one desert from the next by transverse strips of fertile 
 land. The average width of this coast strip is about 20 
 miles. It generally ends on the Pacific margin in lofty 
 cliffs. 
 
 Rain rarely falls heavily in this tract ; for the south- 
 east trade winds, blowing across the continent from the 
 Atlantic, have had the last drop of moisture wrung from 
 them by the cold heights of the Andes, and reach the 
 coast region as a cool, dry blast hurrying to regain its 
 moisture from the Pacific. 
 
 On the eastern margin of the coast tract stands the 
 maritime range of the Andes, between which and the 
 central range lies the elevated and barren tract known as 
 the Puna. 
 
 The central range is the true watershed of this part 
 of the continent, for it is nowhere cut through by rivers 
 flowing to the Pacific, whilst the eastern range is 
 breached by several of the great streams which go to 
 make up the Amazon. This region between the central 
 and eastern Cordilleras is called the " sierra," and is the 
 most fertile met with, so far, as one goes eastward from 
 the coast. In this region is the fertile valley of Jauja, 
 south of the Cerro de Pasco, which forms a transverse 
 wall connecting the central and eastern ranges. Beyond 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
30 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the eastern range are the great forest-clad slopes leading 
 
 down to the almost unexplored centre of the continent. 
 
 With Chile, the continuation southwards of Peru, we 
 need not trouble ourselves, for Bolivar's operations never 
 extended into it. Behind Southern Peru and Northern 
 Chile lies Bolivia, the Republic formed from the territory 
 of what the Spaniards called Upper Peru. Its western 
 portion lies amongst the highest regions of the Andes, 
 and is remarkable for its mineral wealth. Agriculture 
 only flourishes in the central portion of more moderate 
 altitude, and in the east, where the country slopes 
 down to the " pampas " towards Brazil, Paraguay, and 
 Argentina. 
 
 What the population of this vast area was in the first 
 quarter of the nineteenth century it is impossible to say ; 
 indeed, even now, census returns are so unreliable that 
 statements of population of the various republics cannot be 
 accepted as better than shrewd guesses. Miller's memoirs 
 give an estimate of the populations as follows : — 
 
 Republic of Colombia (Venezuela, New 
 
 Granada, and Quito) . . . 2,711,296 
 
 Republic of Peru .... 1,736,923 
 
 Republic of Bolivia .... 1,200,000 
 
 5,648,219 
 
 It may be taken for what it is worth, not very much 
 perhaps. 
 
 Restrepo ^ gives details for Colombia alone thus — 
 
 
 Venezuela. 
 
 New Granada. 
 
 Quito. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Pure whites . . 
 
 200,000 
 
 877,000 
 
 157,000 
 
 1,234,000 
 
 Indians . . . 
 
 207,000 
 
 313,000 
 
 393,000 
 
 913,000 
 
 Free "coloured" 
 
 433.°°° 
 
 140,000 
 
 42,000 
 
 615,000 
 
 Slaves .... 
 
 60,000 
 
 70,000 
 
 8,000 
 
 138,000 
 
 
 900,000 2 
 
 1,400,000 
 
 600,000 
 
 2,900,000 
 
 ' Introduction, p. xiv. n., edition of 1858. 
 
 ^ A note to the 1858 edition reduces this total to 800,000, and gives the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY 
 Miller classifies the population of Peru thus- 
 
 31 
 
 Whites . 
 
 240,819 
 
 Indians . 
 
 998,846 
 
 " Mestizos " 
 
 383.782 
 
 Free mulattoes . 
 
 69,848 
 
 Slaves 
 
 43,628 
 
 i,;36,923 
 
 The pure whites, according to these figures, thus 
 constituted between one-third and one-half of the popu- 
 lation in Colombia, less than one-seventh in Peru. 
 
 numbers of pure whites at 12,000 European Spaniards and 200,000 Creoles. 
 The other figures are — Pure Indians, 120,000 ; negro slaves, 62,000 ; mixed 
 races of all sorts, 406,000. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 BOLIVAR'S EARLY LIFE AND THE FIRST 
 VENEZUELAN REPUBLIC, 1783-1810 
 
 THE family of Bolivar appears to have been 
 amongst the earlier of the emigrants from 
 Spain, after the conquest of the American 
 dominions. In 1589 it had evidently- 
 attained considerable eminence in Venezuela, for in that 
 year Don Simon Bolivar was sent as envoy to Philip II. 
 to lay before him the position of affairs in the colony, 
 and to seek to enlist for it the sovereign's interest and 
 sympathy. Some of the concessions he obtained, notably 
 one allowing the free import annually of a " ton " of 
 African slaves, are of very dubious value. In 1663 
 Francisco Marin de Narvaez obtained, at the price of 
 40,000 pesos,-' a concession of the copper mines of 
 Cocorote and the adjoining territory of Aroa, 50 or 
 60 miles west of Puerto Cabello, to which was attached 
 the privilege of appointing and removing the local 
 magistracy. From Narvaez was descended, on his 
 mother's side, Don Juan Vicente de Bolivar, who, 
 towards 1780, was high in the service of the royal 
 treasury, and later was colonel of the militia of the 
 Aragua Valley. His wife, Dofla Maria Concepcion 
 
 ' The "peso" ought to be about equivalent in value to the American 
 dollar, roughly four shillings. The Colombian paper " peso" of the present 
 day is worth only about one halfpenny. Calculations are made in the 
 nominal gold peso equal to one dollar, or about 100 (or more) paper 
 pesos. 
 3' 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EARLY YEARS 33 
 
 Palacio y Soto, of another noble family,^ bore to him a 
 son, Juan Vicente, and two daughters, Maria Antonina 
 and Juana, none of whom are of much interest to us. 
 
 He r last child was born on the 24JJs-^ly 1783, at 
 the family towrTTiouse, in~the i'laza de San Jacinto_[n 
 CaTaeasj a boy destined to playT^_chIilLjs:dle-_ui_the 
 emancipation..J.roin_jSpanish ruie^ of what are now_the 
 ReguBHcs of VenezuelaT'P a.namarXolomb 'iik.JEaiadQr.- 
 Peru/and Bolma; It is said that the name to be given to 
 the~boy at his baptism, on the 30th July at the Cathedral 
 of Caracas, was matter of dispute between his father and 
 his maternal uncle. The latter, evidently representing 
 the more conservative side, would have named him 
 Santiago, after the saint on the eve of whose feast he 
 was born. The father, preferring to seek his patron 
 saint in the family, insisted on naming his son after the 
 Simon Bolivar of 1589. The child's full names were 
 Simon, Jos6, Antonio, de la Santisima Trinidad, but the 
 last three need never again be referred to. Before he 
 was three Simon Bolivar lost his father, whoselntention 
 
 it Tiad~&een t o~send hib'"'sonito Europe ^ >re3McatioP- 
 Whatever the "widow might have done in fulfilment of 
 this design her father succeeded in stopping. The 
 education of the boys was confided to the best masters 
 Caracas could produce. In 1789 Bolivar's mother died, 
 and he was left to^ the guSdianship~of his maternal 
 uncleTUoiTXaflos^ Palacio, an easy-going, indolent per- 
 sonagerinestpable "oTTateing any great personal interest 
 in his ward's studies, or of insisting on steady application 
 to them. The boy, credited witha^ood_memory:,^ady 
 understandiflgrand quickness, was--d€scribed as of open 
 and affectionate character,15u t^ irrit able and impatigjt^of 
 contraHictionT His ^fsrtutor was SlmoiT^Rodriguez,^ an 
 
 ^ The titles of Marquis de Bolivar and Count of CocorotCj conferred on 
 the family shortly before the revolution, were never assumed by them. 
 " Born in Caracas, 1771. Died in Peru, 1856. 
 
 C 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
34 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 eccentric, who, besides trying without great success to 
 teach the boy the elements of Spanish, Latin, arithmetic, 
 and history, certainly exercised in other ways a much 
 greater influence on his mind. Rodriguez, with his 
 eccentricity and uncouthness, his coarse features and 
 harsh speech, was not popular, or likely to ingratiate 
 himself with most boys. Still, he seems to have 
 appealed early to the young Bolivar by his philanthropic 
 views, which he expressed freely, whilst judiciously sup- 
 pressing those an ti- Christian ideas which he held, but 
 which might have frightened his pupil, to say nothing of 
 getting himself into trouble with the authorities. He 
 was more or less of a dreamer, and his ideas of 
 free education were not calculated"" to meet with the 
 approval of the government under which he held a post 
 in the department of Education. He seems to have 
 been to some extent implicated in the revolutionary plot 
 discovered in 1797. Fear of discovery, joined perhaps 
 to his natural tendency to rove, induced him to leave 
 Venezuela in that year, and to resort to Europe, where, 
 outside Spain, he could live in safety, and indulge his 
 love of science and learning. To him succeeded, as 
 Bolivar's tutor, Andres Bello, then a mere boy a couple 
 of years older than his pupil. 
 
 With such tutors, and an indolent guardian, it is not 
 surprising that young Bolivar should have given more 
 time to gymnastics, ridingrand-t3tKer"oinaob1- pursuits 
 thaintTTEgxrlrar study. He spent inil'cK~-of-his"'t7nte-at 
 his brother's eslate'of San Mateo, in the Aragua Valley, 
 at the eastern end of the lake of Valencia, and, in_L7Q2>- 
 was appointed ensign in his father's old command, the 
 Aragtramirlftra: HiyTiTiiitary^edtication- iti' thaf posFwaS 
 probSBIJTvSy little, but it is all he got. 
 
 In 1799, Carlos Palacio^robably tired of having to 
 look affef-aTatheFunruly aJi3~idte^[^B6yrrenevea~iiim- 
 self^of the burden " by "sending his'"ward"oir to "coin- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EARLY YEARS 35 
 
 ..glete his education in Spain. Under charge of the 
 
 captairTTrf" tte~ Spaflish ship San Ildefonso, Bolivar 
 
 embarked, in January 1799, at La Guiira. The_ship 
 made a long stay at Vera Cruz, whence Bolivarjwenf to 
 visit ^the-city— ot-Mexieo. — -There'''Tie^wras^os£itabIy 
 received~-bjf-Azanza -the Viceroy and others. He_ended, 
 howCTefrl3y'saniewh:arsKo"efcing his ■Spmrfsh fViejids^jyith- 
 hjs_JreeIy'e5^jresSe3~views on the" French Revolutionj,, 
 views which 'he~Tiad"gou^te"g5~4 mbib e d -1rom hlF friend 
 Simoii Rodriguez: On~MsTrgfunrio"YeFa~T!ruzTBoTIva 
 wrote^ar-shorT account of his doings to his uncle, Pedro 
 Palacio, the spelling of which shows that he had not 
 profited much in that respect by his studies. Altogether, 
 it is a very ordinary boy's letter. Leaving Vera Cruz, 
 the San Ildefonso touched at Havana, and finally made 
 the port of Santona, on the shores of the Bay of Biscay, 
 in May 1799. From Santona Bolivar went to Madrid, 
 where he lived with another maternal uncle, Esteban 
 Palacio, until the latter left the capital. Amongst 
 Palacio's friends was Manuel Mallo, a native of Popayan 
 in New Granada, who had lived for a time at Caracas, 
 and was now sharing with Manuel Godoy the illicit 
 affections of Charles IV. 's disreputable wife. Bolivar was 
 taken up as a compatriot by Mallo, and witnessed some 
 of the Queen's unworthy doings. There is a curious 
 story told by Bolivar himself of his having been invited 
 to play tennis with the Prince of Asturias, whom he 
 beat. The Prince was vexed and would have stopped 
 playing, but his mother made him go on. This Prince 
 was afterwards Ferdinand VII., from whose grasp Bolivar 
 wrested a large portion of his South American dominions. 
 A more worthy friend than Mallo was the cultivated 
 Marquis de Ustdriz, who, amongst other things, used to 
 discuss with the young man the idea of a separation of 
 Spanish America from the mother country. The Marquis, 
 whilst not disapproving generally of the idea, was so much 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
36 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 impressed by the difficulties of its execution as to dis-V 
 courage tiie enthusiasm of Bolivar. At the house of' 
 Ustdriz, Bolivar met and fell in love with a mere child, 
 Maria Teresa Rodriguez de Toro, niece of the Marquis 
 de Toro of Caracas, who reciprocated his affection. Her 
 father, Don Bernardo de Toro, was willing to agree to 
 the marriage, but, in view of the youth of the parties 
 (Bolivar was but eighteen, and the girl fifteen), insisted on 
 some delay. 
 
 Bolivar now got into trouble owing to his friend Mallo. 
 The young man was arrested and searched, under the 
 pretext of breach of a sumptuary regulation ; but it is sur- 
 mised that the real object was to ascertain if he had letters 
 indicating Mallo's infidelity to the jealous Queen. Bolivar 
 consequently followed Don Bernardo and his daughter to 
 Bilbao, and, when they returned to Madrid, betook him- 
 self to Paris, where he arrived early in 1802. In the 
 French capital he soon became an admirer of the 
 Republic, which he imagined to be the only good form 
 of government. For Bonaparte he expressed the warmest 
 admiration, which disappeared when, in later years, he 
 found Bonaparte the Consul transformed into Napoleon 
 the Emperor. 
 
 In the spring of 1802, Bolivar returned to Madrid, 
 where, at the end of May, he was married to Maria 
 Teresa de Toro. The young couple spent their honey- 
 moon on a vessel sailing from Coruna to La Guaira, the 
 port of Caracas. 
 
 On Bolivar's side, at any rate, the marriage was one 
 purely of affection ; for his will shows that his wife 
 brought no dowry, and the husband was extremely 
 wealthy as wealth went in Caracas. ^ The poor girl had 
 little opportunity of proving her disinterestedness, for, a 
 few months after she had reached her husband's estates 
 in the Aragua Valley, she died, after five days of fever, 
 1 Rodriguez told him that he was worth four millions of francs {;^l6o,ooo). 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EARLY YEARS 37 
 
 leaving Simon Bolivar, at the age of 19, a childless 
 widower. 
 
 He was in despair, vowed he would never marry again, 
 a vow which he observed,^ and offered to make over his 
 whole estate to his brother, reserving only sufficient to 
 live upon. The brother refused, and Simon resolved on 
 another prolonged visit to Europe. Bolivar himself said 
 that his wife's death changed the whole course of his life. 
 Had she lived, he would perhaps not have been satisfied 
 to remain Alcalde of S. Mateo, but, unless she had died, 
 he would not have revisited Europe, or gained the 
 experience which he acquired there. 
 
 Landing at Cadiz about the end of 1803, he spent 
 some time in Madrid with his father-in-law before pro- 
 ceeding to Paris, which he reached in May 1 804.^ There, 
 according to Ducoudray-Holstein, he led a life of the 
 wildest dissipation. Though this is not alluded to by 
 Larrazabal, and is somewhat slurred over by O'Leary, it 
 is probably not without foundation ; for O'Leary speaks 
 of Bolivar's giving up gambling, after he had lost and 
 then regained a large sum, and states that his health 
 was much broken by ten months of Paris life. Both 
 M. de Schryver and the writer of the introduction to 
 his work ^ make no secret of the fact that Bolivar's 
 devotion to dancing, and to the fair sex, severely tried 
 his constitution. 
 
 Things in Paris had changed much since Bolivar had 
 been there in 1802. Napoleon was declared Emperor 
 about the_^time of his arrival, and Bolivar was so dis- 
 gusted with the line taken by his former idol that he 
 deposed him from the niche which he had formerly 
 
 1 In the Georgian sense, " Je ne me marierai pas ; j'aurai des maltresses. " 
 
 ^ As far as his departure from Madrid is concerned, Bolivar's movements 
 
 were not voluntary. By an order of 2Sth March 1804, the King required all 
 
 foreigners, as well as colonials, to leave the capital. The ground assigned 
 
 for this order was scarcity of food. 
 
 ' " Esquisse de la vie de Bolivar," by Simon de Schryver. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
38 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 occupied, and would not even go to see the sights of the 
 coronation. Bolivar himself has recorded this sudden 
 change in his feelings towards Napoleon.^ 
 
 He had long ago repented of his youthful idleness in 
 study, and, during his first visit to Spain and France, as 
 well as in the short period of his married life, had become 
 a diligent student and a voracious reader. He was a 
 great admirer of Hobbes, but, according to O'Leary, 
 Spinoza was the writer who most influenced him. For 
 Rousseau, too, he seems to have had a great admiration, 
 and amongst his possessions mentioned in his will is a 
 copy of the " Contrat Social," formerly in the library of 
 Napoleon. He acquired from French translations some 
 knowledge of Greek and Roman history, and of the 
 heroes of antiquity. He learned to speak French and 
 Italian fluently, and could understand English. 
 
 His friends in Paris were many. Amongst them were 
 Eugene de Beauharnais, Delagarde, and Oudinot ; whilst 
 of the savants he knew Humboldt and Bonpland. With 
 these two he discussed the question of the possible revolt 
 of South America, a subject on which their views differed. 
 Humboldt holding, as did Bonpland, that the Spanish 
 colonies were ripe for separation, doubted if a man was 
 to be found capable of leading the revolt. Bonpland, 
 on the other hand, believed that with the occurrence of 
 revolt the necessary leader would arise.^ Neither had 
 
 ' O'Leary, i. 15. The memoirs of General O'Leary, aide-de-camp of 
 Bolivar, were edited by his son at the instance of Guzman Blanco, President 
 of Venezuela, about 1880. There are 31 volumes in the British Museum, of 
 which, I to 26 and 29 to 31 contain correspondence of Bolivar and all his 
 principal generals, ministers, etc. Vols. 27, 28 are O'Leary's history of 
 his master, based on the documents. The present writer had at his disposal 
 vols. 27, 28 in a separate edition. The references to these in the notes 
 are to " O'Leary i. and ii. " Those to the other volumes are given as 
 " O'Leary docts. I, etc." There was a third volume of the history, but it was 
 suppressed as noted later. 
 
 ^ With reference to these opinions O'Leary (i. 18) very sensibly writes : 
 "However flattering this opinion may have been to the colonies, it was 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EARLY YEARS 39 
 
 any suspicion that the nervous, weakly-looking youth 
 they addressed was to be the leader. 
 
 A propos of Bolivar's personal appearance at this time, 
 a story is told of his meeting Eugene Beauharnais at the 
 house of a lady,^ a mutual friend. She mischievously 
 asked Eugene to what bird or animal he would liken 
 Bolivar. The reply nearly resulted in hostilities, for 
 Bolivar was furious until it was explained that Eugene's 
 answer had been the French word " moineau " (sparrow), 
 and not the Spanish " mono " (monkey) as the Venezuelan 
 had supposed. His forehead appears to have acquired 
 premature wrinkles at a very early age, and it was perhaps 
 this peculiarity which made him think for the moment 
 that the more objectionable description had been applied. 
 
 In Paris, Bolivar again met his old tutor Simon 
 Rodriguez, who, fortunately, persuaded him to leave the 
 capital and go for an extended walking tour with his 
 old friend. The idea of travelling on foot, which was 
 Rodriguez's, was well calculated to restore Bolivar's 
 shattered health. The two trudged off in May 1805 to 
 Italy, were in Milan at the time of Napoleon's coronation 
 as King of Italy, witnessed his mimic reproduction of 
 Marengo, and passed on to Venice, with which Bolivar 
 was disappointed, after having heard so much of it as 
 the place after which his native country was named.^ 
 
 fundamentally false ; because, if they had been ready for independence in 
 1804, many of the disasters which occurred in the course of the revolution 
 would have been avoided, and once the struggle was over, Liberal Govern- 
 ments would have been established. Jefferson, a better politician than 
 Humboldt, was less indulgent towards Spanish America, and said afterwards, 
 * Ignorance and fanaticism are incapable of self-government. I believe it 
 would have been better for the colonies to attain their liberty gradually.'" 
 Few, looking to the disastrous series of revolutions and civil wars which have 
 devastated the former colonies of Spain for the better part of a century, will 
 hesitate to concur with O'Leary and Jefferson. 
 
 ^ Madame Dervieu de Villars, O'Leary, i. 17. 
 
 ' Venezuela — " Little Venice " — so called by Amerigo Vespucci, who was 
 reminded of Venice by the sight of the native huts on the edge of Lake 
 Maracaibo, which, like Venetian buildings, were supported on piles. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
40 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 In Rome, Bolivar declined, it is said, to kiss the cross 
 on Pius VII.'s shoe. The Pontiiif tactfully offered his 
 ring to be kissed. When remonstrated with by the 
 Spanish ambassador, who had presented him, Bolivar 
 replied, " The Pope can think very little of the emblem 
 of Christianity since he wears it on his shoes, whilst the 
 proudest sovereigns carry it on their crowns." The reply 
 was characteristic. As a matter of fact Bolivar then, and 
 probably throughout his life, whilst conforming outwardly 
 to the practices of the Catholic Church, was far from 
 being religious. His attitude probably did not differ 
 much from Napoleon's. At Rome, Bolivar, in a moment 
 of enthusiasm, inspired by the surrounding monuments, 
 vowed to Rodriguez that he would liberate his country.^ 
 
 Returning from Naples to Paris, Bolivar left again for 
 home, vi& Holland, Hamburg, and the United States, 
 regretfully parting from Rodriguez, who would not, or 
 dared not, return to Caracas. When Bolivar reached 
 Caracas in the end of 1806, Miranda's abortive attempt 
 to raise the standard of revolt was already suppressed.^ 
 
 ' This incident is alluded to by Bolivar in a letter, dated Pativilca (Pern), 
 19th January 1824, in which he welcomes Rodriguez on his return to 
 Colombia (O'Leary, ii. 348). In this letter he freely acknowledges his obli- 
 gations to Rodriguez in the domain of philosophy and politics. 
 
 ^ Miranda had fitted out a small expedition in New York, consisting of 
 one armed corvette and two small transports, carrying a small force, and a 
 good supply of arms and ammunition for the expected Venezuelan recruits. 
 He arrived off Ocumare (between La Guaira and Puerto Cabello) on the 
 25th March 1806, believing the Spaniards to be ignorant of his enterprise. 
 But they had received information from the Spanish ambassador in the 
 United States. Attacked by a superior force, Miranda lost both his transports 
 and sixty prisoners, himself escaping in the corvette to Trinidad. He was 
 burnt in effigy by the Spaniards, a large reward was offered for his capture, 
 aad of the sixty prisoners, ten were hanged and the rest sent to the prisons 
 of Cartagena and Puerto Rico. At Trinidad Miranda raised fresh forces, 
 with which he sailed on the 24th July. Landing near Cor6 in the face of 
 superior forces, he captured the port and citadel, which he held from the 4th 
 to the 8th August. Finding no sympathy in the neighbourhood, and receiv- 
 ing a refusal of help from Sir Eyre Coote, Governor of Jamaica, and from the 
 British admiral, he broke up the expedition and sailed for Trinidad, and 
 thence to London. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REVOLT OF CARACAS 41 
 
 Once more he retired to his Aragua estates, to his 
 studies, his reading, and an out-of-doors life. 
 
 In 1808 and 1809 came the news of decisive events 
 in Spain, the action of Napoleon in compelling the abdi- 
 cation of Charles IV. and his son Ferdinand, the gift 
 to Joseph Bonaparte of the Spanish throne, which his 
 Imperial brother had wrested from its rightful occupants, 
 the rising of the Spanish people against the French 
 dominion, and the institution of the Central Junta of 
 Aranjuez. Napoleon, having bestowed on his brother 
 the crown of Spain, naturally desired to transfer with it 
 Spain's transatlantic possessions ; but the destruction of 
 his naval power at Trafalgar had rendered him powerless 
 to employ force. The French corvette Le Serpent 
 safely reached La Guaira on the isth July 1808, closely 
 followed by the British frigate Acasta — Captain Beaver. 
 The last-named officer, as well as the captain of the 
 French ship, landed, and Beaver followed the Frenchman 
 to Caracas, where he was received almost with insult by 
 the Captain-General, Juan de Casas, who had already 
 been gained over by Napoleon's emissary. The populace, 
 however, informed by Beaver of the true state of affairs, 
 regarded matters very differently. They would have 
 nothing to do with the French usurper, demonstrated 
 vigorously their loyalty to Ferdinand VII., and compelled 
 his public proclamation. The French, in considerable 
 danger of being torn to pieces, were got away quietly to 
 La Guaira, whence the Serpent sailed. She was followed 
 by the Acasta, and taken at sea. 
 
 After this, there were numerous secret meetings in 
 Caracas, in which Bolivar and his brother, as well as 
 many others of the Caracas aristocracy, took part. The 
 idea of a separate Junta, similar to the provincial Juntas 
 now being set up in Spain, was mooted for Venezuela. 
 Nothing, however, came of this, despite the dissatisfaction 
 aroused by the decision of the Central Junta of Spain to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
42 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 give to America only twelve seats in the Cortes, against 
 thirty-six allotted to the mother country. Even these 
 twelve were to be nominees of the Government, not dele- 
 gates of the people. 
 
 Early in 1809 there arrived at Caracas Vicente Em- 
 pdran, the newly-appointed Captain-General. Larrazabal 
 affirms that he governed with great tyranny, and that 
 Bolivar left Caracas in order to avoid banishment, with 
 which he was threatened by Emp^ran. O'Leary, whose 
 version we prefer, says that Empdran was aware that 
 plots were brewing for the establishment of a " Junta," 
 and that Bolivar actually toasted, at a banquet at which 
 Empdran was present, " the independence of America." 
 That he was not immediately imprisoned, but was per- 
 mitted to retire to his estates, certainly does not point to 
 a tyrannical government. 
 
 On the 1 8 th April there reached Caracas Count Carlos 
 Montiifar and Antonio Villavicencio,^ who had been sent 
 to announce the installation of the Regency, and then to 
 pass on to pacify Quito and New Granada. From them 
 the agitators ascertained the course of events in Spain, 
 which decided them to take immediate action. Larrazabal 
 says Bolivar was present, but again we prefer the account 
 of O'Leary, according to which, looking to his former 
 friendly relations with Empiran, Bolivar honourably 
 decided to hold aloof, and remained at his farm in the 
 valley of the Tuy. 
 
 The 19th April 1809 was Maunday Thursday. The 
 Municipal Council had assembled, as usual, preparatory 
 to attending the religious office in the Cathedral opposite 
 the Town Hall. The Captain-General, invited according 
 to custom to join them, arrived in the council chamber. 
 
 ' Both were natives of Quito, educated in Spain, and great friends. Both 
 went over to the republican side, and were shot by the Spaniards as rebels, 
 Montufar at Popayan in September i8i5, Villavicencio at Bogota in June of 
 the same year. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REVOLT OF CARACAS 43 
 
 Some of the members spoke to him regarding the state 
 of Spain, urging the necessity for a local Junta in 
 Venezuela to protect the interests of Ferdinand VII. 
 Even the names of the proposed members of the Junta 
 were mentioned. After listening quietly, Empdran 
 replied that he would consider this delicate subject after 
 service. The astonished agitators followed him across 
 the square, convinced by his resolute demeanour that he 
 would order their arrest as soon as he got into the square, 
 which was full of soldiers. But he merely returned the 
 salute of the guards, and was passing into the Cathedral 
 when Salias, the leader of the agitators, took him by the 
 arm and told him that the public interest demanded his 
 return to the Municipal Hall. The guard, seeing Salias' 
 action, were on the point of interference when they were 
 stopped by their commander, who knew nothing of what 
 was going on. 
 
 Empiran's courage had failed him, and, the demand 
 for his return being repeated by others, he meekly re- 
 crossed the square as bidden. The fact that the guard, 
 probably taken unawares by this unexpected move, did 
 not repeat their salute, completed his discomfiture. So 
 completely was he overcome that, when J. G. Roscio and 
 Felix Sosa proposed the installation of a Junta, he made 
 no objection, and failed even to observe that neither of 
 them was a member of the Cabildo. Yet, so great was 
 the respect still felt for Spain, that the agitators were 
 about to elect Empdran President of the Junta when 
 there arrived on the scene, from the Cathedral, Dr Jos^ 
 Cortes de la Madariaga, a Chilian-born ecclesiastic, 
 styling himself the " Deputy of the Clergy." ^ In a 
 
 ' He was a native of Santiago de Chile, and was sent to Spain to arrange 
 a dispute between the ecclesiastical authorities and the "Audiencia" of 
 Chile. Having succeeded, largely thanks to the influence of Mallo with the 
 Queen of Spain, he started back for Chile viS Caracas. He was so pleased 
 with Caracas and its people that he decided to stay there, and exchanged his 
 Chilian prebendary for a canonry of the cathedral of Caracas. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
44 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 violent speech, which completely cowed the Captain- 
 General, Madariaga pointed out the condition of Spain, 
 insisted on the necessity for a truly local government, 
 and demanded the deposition of Emp^ran. Then, going 
 out on to the balcony, he shouted to the crowd below, 
 asking them if they were content with the present regime. 
 When he was answered with cries of " No ! we do not 
 love it," Empdran only said, " I love it just as little." 
 Then the Cabildo passed a resolution laying down the 
 principle of the " right of the provinces of America to 
 rule themselves in the absence of a general government." 
 Furthermore, they disclaimed the authority of the 
 Regency, and, " in the exercise of their natural and 
 political rights," proceeded to the establishment of a 
 government to exercise authority in the name of Ferdi- 
 nand VII. 
 
 The Junta's first acts were to proclaim equal treatment 
 for Spaniards and Americans, to invite all Venezuelans 
 to the union and fraternity demanded by their interests, 
 to abolish the Indian tribute and the duties on necessaries, 
 to prohibit the importation of slaves, to organise the 
 branches of the administration, and to order the estab- 
 lishment of patriotic societies for the improvement of 
 agriculture and industry. They also sent missions to 
 try and gain over the other Venezuelan provinces, and 
 wrote to the Regency informing them of what had 
 occurred. As for Empdran and his friends, they were 
 sent out of the country, with salaries paid up to date, 
 and enough money to take them to the United States. 
 
 Bolivar, as we have said, took no part in the events of 
 the 19th April. As soon, however, as he heard of the 
 establishment of the new government he proceeded to 
 Caracas to tender his services. He was appointed lieute- 
 nant-colonel of the militia, of which he was already 
 captain, and of which his father had been colonel. 
 
 The Spanish Regency, not in the least inclined to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MISSION TO LONDON 45 
 
 recognise the new state of affairs in Venezuela, promptly 
 decreed the blockade of her ports. England being now 
 the ally of Spain against Napoleon, the Junta of Caracas 
 determined to send a mission to inform the British 
 Government of recent events, as well as to solicit its 
 good offices with the Regency in Spain. The suggestion 
 came from Bolivar, who with some difficulty also induced 
 the Junta to send himself as head of the mission. He 
 was only twenty-seven years of age, and without diplo- 
 matic experience. With him, as a make-weight, was 
 sent Luis Lopez Mendez, a person whose name was far 
 from popular in England in the following years, when he 
 was financial agent of Colombia. The Secretary of the 
 Mission was Bolivar's former tutor, Andres Bello.^ 
 Reaching London in July 18 10, Bolivar at once obtained 
 an interview with the Marquis Wellesley, then Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom he delivered the 
 letter for George III., with which he had been charged 
 by the Junta. This document, after a lengthy denuncia- 
 tion of the misdeeds of the Central Junta of Spain, and 
 an exposition of the impotence of the Regency, distinctly 
 says that the special object of the provisional govern- 
 ment in Caracas is, " to maintain the integrity of these 
 dominions for the sovereign (Ferdinand VII.), to whom 
 we have sworn fidelity." It goes on to implore the 
 assistance of Great Britain against French pretensions, 
 and her mediation with the Regency. Nor did Bolivar's 
 instructions say a word about independence of the lawful 
 sovereign of Spain, though, on the other hand, they said 
 nothing of submission to the Regency whilst Ferdinand 
 was a prisoner. 
 
 Bolivar, however, appears to have exceeded his instruc- 
 tions, and to have revealed to Wellesley his personal views, 
 
 ^ He remained for nearly twenty years in London, after which he served 
 the Chilian Government with some distinction. He has a great reputation 
 as a poet. His writings fill many volumes. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
46 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 which were for breaking altogether with the mother 
 country. Naturally, the Foreign Secretary could not 
 encourage an idea of this sort, seeing that England was 
 in alliance with Spain. The bases of reconciliation which 
 he agreed to propose to Spain were : — 
 
 (i) Cessation of hostilities between the Regency and 
 the colonies. 
 
 (2) A general amnesty for Americans in respect of 
 
 recent events. 
 
 (3) A larger representation, and that by popularly 
 
 elected deputies, for the colonies in the Cortes. 
 
 (4) Freedom of commerce for the colonies, with some 
 
 preferential reservations in favour of Spain. 
 
 (5) Equality of rights for Americans and Spaniards 
 
 in regard to employment in the public service 
 of the colonies. 
 
 The proposals did not satisfy the Venezuelan Govern- 
 ment, which actually turned to Napoleon for help. That, 
 owing to his having his hands full in Europe, and to his 
 impotence against Great Britain at sea, the Emperor was 
 unable to give. As for the Regency, it resented any 
 interference, and declared war against the rebel govern- 
 ments in the colonies. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 BOLIVAR AND MIRANDA— THE FALL OF VENEZ- 
 UELA—EVENTS IN QUITO AND NEW GRANADA 
 
 ONE of Bolivar's principal objects in seeking 
 employment in the mission was to get into 
 touch with Miranda, then residing in London, 
 and to induce him to take up actively the 
 cause of the independence of the colonies. 
 
 The career of Francisco Miranda had been remarkable. 
 Born at Caracas in 1756, he had served as an officer in 
 the Spanish army. He next fought against the British 
 in the struggle with the North American colonies. 
 Thence he went back to his own country, in the hope of 
 being able to induce a similar revolt against Spain. 
 Failing in that, and compelled to flee the country, he 
 proceeded to England, where he could raise no help for 
 his schemes. Then he travelled all over Europe, includ- 
 ing a visit to the court of Russia, whence he was 
 " moved on " at the instance of Spain and France. He 
 had at first been well received, and is said to have enjoyed 
 a share of the large-hearted affections of Catherine H. 
 Returning to England, inspired with hope by the dispute 
 with Spain over the English settlement at Nootka Sound 
 in 1 79 1, he was again disappointed by the peaceful settle- 
 ment. He next tried France, which was too busy with 
 European affairs to be able to meddle in those of South 
 America. He now took service in the French Repub- 
 lican armies, commanded at the siege of Maestricht in 
 1793, and was in command of the French left at the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
48 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 disastrous defeat of Neerwinden. He endeavoured to 
 shake himself clear of Dumouriez's treachery, . but was 
 tried by the Revolutionary tribunal, though he was 
 fortunate enough to be acquitted. After staying some 
 ' time longer in Paris at great risk, he again tried England 
 and the United States, neither of which, however, was 
 prepared to back fair words with substantial aid for the 
 proposed Spanish American revolution. Returning to 
 Paris, he was deported by Bonaparte in 1802. Again 
 failing in England, he fitted out at his own expense the 
 expedition of 1806, already described. Miranda, after 
 his failure, again returned to England, where, as has been 
 mentioned, Bolivar found him in 18 10. 
 
 It will be seen from the above sketch that Miranda 
 had been for most of his life a genuine republican, 
 keeping his eye steadily on the definite separation from 
 Spain of her American colonies, just as the United 
 States had broken away from England. That was an 
 idea which, so far, had taken little root in the colonies 
 themselves, where loyalty to the Spanish Crown was still 
 the prevailing note. Bolivar and others had long held 
 views similar to Miranda's. In Bolivar's mind they had 
 been implanted by the early teaching of Rodriguez, by 
 what he saw in Europe, and by the course of study 
 which he had pursued. In Miranda he recognised, not 
 only an enthusiastic supporter, the real originator of the 
 separation scheme, but also a tried soldier, who had had 
 considerable experience in high command of troops 
 whose want of training was almost as great as that of 
 the men who would have to be raised in South America. 
 He was not a first-rate commander, but was certainly 
 better than any one likely to be found in Caracas. 
 Bolivar himself had no experience of war or command. 
 
 Succeeding in enlisting the services of the veteran, 
 Bolivar sailed with him on H.B.M. corvette Sapphire, 
 placed at his disposal by the Government. According 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MIRANDA'S CAREER 49 
 
 to Ducoudray-Holstein, Miranda sailed under an assumed 
 name, which is not at all improbable, seeing that the 
 British Government would hardly care to be openly 
 responsible for landing such a notorious firebrand in a 
 colony of Spain, now allied to it. Moreover, the Junta 
 of Caracas was not in the least anxious to see Miranda, 
 and had warned Bolivar against encouraging his return 
 to Venezuela. Bolivar's whole conduct in this mission 
 is characteristic of his masterful nature, his self-reliance, 
 and his disregard of the desires or orders of his 
 supei-iors. He and Miranda landed at La Guaira on 
 the sth December 18 10. 
 
 So different were their views from those of the Junta 
 that Bolivar retired in disgust to his country seat, 
 whilst Miranda was received with the utmost coldness. 
 Nevertheless, he succeeded, finally, in obtaining a com- 
 mission as lieutenant-general, and election as a deputy 
 to the Congress which had been summoned, in June 
 1 8 10, to meet on the 2nd March 181 1. The Congress 
 was summoned and met in the name of Ferdinand VII . 
 Almost its first act was to place the executive power 
 in the hands of a triumvirate (Escalona, Mendez, and 
 Padron), who were too weak either to carry on the 
 contest with Spain, or to curb the revolutionary ten- 
 dencies of their own followers. 
 
 Though the deputies to the congress represented 
 several provinces,^ it must be remembered that Spanish 
 authority remained unweakened in the provinces of 
 Cor6 and Maracaibo in the north-west, and in Guayana, 
 including the great plains of the Orinoco valley. Nor 
 was it by any means extinct elsewhere. Consequently, 
 in June 181 1, the new Government found itself con- 
 fronted by a vast reactionary conspiracy. In the terror 
 and excitement consequent on this discovery lay the 
 opportunity of Miranda, Bolivar, and the others, whose 
 ' Caracas, Cumani, Barinas, Margarita, Barcelona, Merida, and Trujillo..f 
 D 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
so SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 whole object was to " cut the painter " binding Venezuela 
 to Spain. On the 5th July 181 1 the Congress crossed 
 the Rubicon by declaring independence of Spain, whose 
 throne, it was declared, had been shattered by Napoleon, 
 and whose government in South America was nothing 
 but an instrument of tyranny and oppression. 
 
 This end had been largely attained by the exertions 
 of Bolivar and Miranda in the club called the " Sociedad 
 Patriotica," established by them in Caracas for the pur- 
 pose of fomenting the separatist movement. 
 
 Of the Deputies present in the Congress, only one 
 refused to sign the Declaration of Independence, M. V. 
 Maya, the clerical representative of La Grita, who held 
 that he had no mandate to pass such a resolution. 
 Miranda's name appears in the list of signatories, 
 Bolivar's does not, for the very good reason that he 
 was not a member of the Congress. 
 
 With the declaration of independence the tricolour 
 flag had been adopted, and, on the 30th July, a mani- 
 festo was issued announcing to the world the reasons 
 which had led to this bold action. 
 
 The declaration of independence was by no means 
 universally accepted in Venezuela. On the r i th July 
 there was an insurrection in the capital, designed to 
 overthrow the Government and return to the allegiance 
 of Spain.^ It was forcibly put down, after a sharp 
 fight, by Miranda, and sixteen of the leaders were 
 executed. 
 
 A more serious revolt occurred at the important town 
 of Valencia, seventy or eighty miles south-west of Caracas. 
 There the leaders called in Spanish help from Cord, 
 where, as already mentioned, the royalist power was un- 
 shaken.^ The insurgents were attacked by the Marquis 
 
 ' The rebels were principally "Islenos," men from the Canary Islands, 
 who were the staunches! supporters of Spanish rule. 
 
 ^ Ducoudray-Holstein says Valencia revolted because the Congress would 
 not allow it to become a separate province. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 51 
 
 de Toro ^ at La Cabrera, between Valencia and Maracay. 
 At this point, which was aftervferds the scene of several 
 combats, a spur of the mountains descends to the north 
 bank of the lake. The road from Valencia to Caracas, 
 passing through the southern end of the spur, forms a 
 dangerous defile. The position was a difficult one to 
 attack whether from the cast or from the west, and the 
 Marquis was unable to take it. The repulse created the 
 greatest alarm in Caracas, and all eyes were turned to- 
 wards Miranda, the only man who could lay any claim 
 to be a trained soldier. It is not surprising that, when 
 invited to take command of the rabble which constituted 
 the forces of the Republic,^ he should have said : " Where 
 are the armies which a general of my position can com- 
 mand without compromising his dignity and reputation ? " 
 Still, the remark was indiscreet, and not likely to add to 
 Miranda's small popularity. The fact was that he had 
 been so long absent from South America as to have lost 
 touch with his compatriots, as well as recollection of their 
 sensitive and vainglorious character. He treated them 
 very brusquely, and made no secret of his preference for 
 French or English officers over Venezuelans. Eventu- 
 ally, he accepted the command, but made a condition that 
 Bolivar should not have a part in it. The two men had 
 already fallen out over the question of treatment of Euro- 
 pean Spaniards residing in Venezuela. Miranda was 
 for letting them remain in peace, provided they were 
 not hostile to the new government; Bolivar would drive 
 them ruthlessly from the country, till such time as the 
 Spanish dominion should be finally overthrown and the 
 independence of the colonies recognised by the mother 
 country. Miranda would not allow Bolivar the command 
 even of his own regiment of Aragua militia which was 
 
 1 Appointed Commander-in-chief by the Junta in iSio. 
 ^ The government distrusted much of the regular army on account of the 
 Spanish element in it. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
52 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 to form part of the force. He would have had to go out 
 as a simple soldier had not the Marquis de Toro appointed 
 him his aide-de-camp. 
 
 The campaign was short, and, on the 1 2th August 1 8 1 1 , 
 Valencia was taken, after a fight in which Miranda lost 
 eight hundred men. Bolivar had distinguished himself 
 in this his first campaign, and Miranda selected him to 
 carry the despatch announcing to the government at 
 Caracas the suppression of the revolt. 
 
 The Congress was now able to settle down to the 
 discussion of the form of government to be adopted by 
 the new republic. 
 
 A project of a constitution submitted by the deputy 
 Francisco Javier Ustdriz, formed the basis of discussion. 
 The general feeling in the Congress was in favour of 
 a Federal Republic in imitation of the " magnificent 
 example of the first and most powerful of the Republics 
 of the world," the United States of North America. 
 
 The constitution which was eventually passed, after 
 being discussed spasmodically in the Congress from the 
 2nd September to the 2ist December i8ii, consisted of 
 228 articles. We can only aiford space for a brief analysis 
 of them. Many of them dealt with elementary rights, 
 with personal freedom, the abolition of slavery and of 
 torture, and the like. One article abolished titles of 
 honour and another set up a " Colombian era " in imita- 
 tion of that of the French Republic.^ What is most 
 important to us is to realise what was meant by a " federal " 
 republic as illustrated by this constitution. 
 
 The legislative power of the confederation (the pro- 
 vinces of Caracas, Cumani, Barinas, Margarita, Barcelona, 
 Merida, and Trujillo) was to be exercised by a Chamber 
 
 ^ Bolivar's letters, proclamations, etc., are constantly dated with the "year 
 of independence," as well as that of the Christian era. After the isth 
 June 1813 until the armistice of 1820, the year of the " war to the death" 
 was also very frequently added. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1811 53 
 
 of Representatives and a Senate. The representatives 
 were to be chosen by the electors of the capital district 
 of each province. Nominations were submitted to them 
 by the parochial suifrage holders, on the basis of one 
 representative for every twenty thousand souls. The 
 senators, elected by the provincial legislatures, each re- 
 presented seventy thousand people, with the proviso that 
 every province should elect at least one senator, even if 
 its total population was under seventy thousand. Senators 
 held office for six, representatives for four years, one 
 third of the former and half the latter retiring by rotation 
 every two years. There was to be an annual session 
 commencing on the 1 5 th January, lasting ordinarily for 
 one month, but capable of prolongation indefinitely. 
 
 The executive was entrusted to a triumvirate elected 
 for four years by the electors of capital districts. 
 
 The judicial power consisted of a Supreme Court and 
 such subordinate tribunals as the Congress might estab- 
 lish for the time being. 
 
 Each of the provinces was constituted a "state, sove- 
 reign andindependent" and in each there was to be a tripar- 
 tite division of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
 powers analogous to the division in the Federal govern- 
 ment, for the disposal of all business not specially 
 delegated to that government. 
 
 The constitution required sanction and ratification by 
 the people of each province before coming into force. 
 
 In the matter of religion the constitution was anything 
 but liberal, for it decreed that the Roman Catholic religion 
 was that of the State, and that no other form of worship 
 should ever be permitted either in public or in private. 
 
 This extraordinarily complicated instrument of govern- 
 ment was evolved, after nearly four months' deliberation, 
 by an assembly consisting largely of lawyers, almost 
 wholly of men who had no practical experience in the 
 art of government and whose knowledge was entirely 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
54 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 theoretical. They were utterly incapable of proportioning 
 their end to their means. They failed to take account of 
 the fact that the vast majority of the population was 
 plunged in the blindest ignorance, that very few indeed 
 outside the walls of the assembly knew anything what- 
 ever about constitutions in general or federation in par- 
 ticular. The voters who would have to elect the members 
 of the legislature neither knew nor cared anything about 
 the form of constitution. All they craved for was peace 
 and a decent government, which would give them personal 
 liberty, security of property, and the possibility of buying 
 the necessaries of life at a reasonable price. Such a con- 
 stitution as this was suited to no people whose education 
 and political knowledge was not of the highest class. The 
 only end it could attain would be to throw all power into 
 the hands of the educated few. 
 
 Moreover, it was eminently calculated to produce dis- 
 ruption at a very early period. In a federation so loosely 
 knit together, in which what political knowledge there was 
 existed only in a few towns, it was almost certain that 
 the capital of each province would be for secession on the 
 most insignificant pretext. Every capital cabildo, puffed 
 up with an undue sense of its own importance, would have 
 been for setting up an independent republic in the " sov- 
 ereign and independent state " to which it belonged. The 
 very strength of municipal institutions like the cabildos 
 would make for separation. That is why federation in 
 South America is generally held to imply separation 
 rather than union.^ 
 
 It is easy to imagine a congress of Bengali lawyers 
 framing just such a constitution for the federation of the 
 districts of Bengal, without any thought of the results 
 which must ensue amongst a population of ignorant 
 peasants. The result would almost inevitably be the 
 setting up of an independent republic in Calcutta, 
 
 ^ Cf. "Cambridge Modern History," vol. a., p. 298. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1811 55 
 
 another in Patna, another in Dacca,- and so on ad in- 
 finitum, each ruled by an oligarchy of intellectuals. 
 
 Two men at least, Miranda and Bolivar, saw the utter 
 futility of such a constitution in the existing circumstances 
 of the country, and, whilst regarding federation as theo- 
 retically the most perfect form of republic, would have 
 none of it as matters stood. To the end of his life Bolivar 
 fought for a centralised as against a federal government. 
 
 The Congress, however, was quite satisfied with its 
 bantling, and widely published and belauded it. Then 
 they suspended their sittings to await the assembly, on 
 the 1st March 181 2, of the deputies now to be elected. 
 They had made other mistakes besides passing this con- 
 stitution. They pardoned the leaders of the late revolt 
 at Valencia, ten of whom Miranda had condemned to 
 death. Bolivar was especially irritated by this act of 
 clemency. Another mistake was made in the issue of 
 paper money supported by no metal reserve. The issue, 
 of course, at once began to depreciate rapidly, and was 
 the foundation of the financial disasters of Venezuela. 
 Yet another mistake was made in deciding on Valencia 
 as the capital and seat of government of the republic. 
 This necessarily gave offence to Caracas, which hitherto 
 had always been the capital of Venezuela. Looking to 
 recent events at Valencia, it might have been supposed 
 that the choice would have been the last to be made. 
 
 As for the constitution, it was not destined to have 
 any great opportunity for testing its merits or demerits, 
 for before it could come into force the infant republic was 
 in the throes of dissolution. 
 
 The year 1 8 1 2 opened ominously for the new republic. 
 All attempts by the British Government to bring about 
 a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Spanish Cortes, 
 which had now succeeded the Regency, towards the 
 colonies had failed dismally. Amidst all the dissensions 
 then prevailing in Spain, there was one point on which 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
56 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 all parties were agreed — the necessity for subduing the 
 rebellious colonies. The prevailing spirit is illustrated by 
 some remarks of members of the Cortes. One said : " If 
 the Americans complain of having been tyrannised over 
 for 300 years, they shall now experience a similar treat- 
 ment for 3000." Another, after the battle of Albuera, 
 " rejoiced at the advantage we have gained, because we 
 can now send troops to reduce the insurgents." Yet 
 another said : " I do not know to what class of beasts 
 the South Americans belong." Even in the revolted pro- 
 vinces the royalists were hopeful. In Cor6 and Maracaibo 
 they stood in possession on the defensive ; from the banks 
 of the Orinoco they harassed the republican provinces 
 of Cumani and Barcelona. The revolution had made no 
 progress amongst the half-civilised inhabitants of the vast 
 plains about the Orinoco, south of the belt of hilly country 
 of the northern coast. The royalists everywhere, especi- 
 ally in Cor6 and Maracaibo, anxiously awaited reinforce- 
 ments from Spain. The republican government was 
 preparing expeditions for the subjugation of the west 
 and of Guayana, when their enemies were suddenly aided 
 by an ally far more awful and devastating than any force 
 from Spain. 
 
 Maunday Thursday, the 26th March 18 12, was the 
 anniversary, in the ecclesiastical calendar, of the first 
 establishment of the Junta in Caracas.^ All Caracas 
 was engaged in the preparations for the solemnities of 
 Good Friday. The afternoon was calm and cloudless ; 
 there was nothing to give warning of the awful visitation 
 which was about to fall upon republican Venezuela. 
 Suddenly, in the distant mountains of Merida, on the 
 frontier of New Grenada, there was heard, about 4 P.M., 
 a subterranean roaring and rumbling moving rapidly from 
 south-west to north-east. 
 
 The awful sound, louder than any thunder, was 
 ^ Maunday Thursday, the 19th April 1809. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE EARTHQUAKE $7 
 
 accompanied by tremendous upheavals of the earth. 
 There appear to have been two systems of earth-waves, 
 one from south to north, the other crossing it at right 
 angles, the meeting of the two causing the ground to 
 heave almost like a boiling liquid. Nothing could resist 
 this terrible upheaval, which was repeated several times. 
 In the space of a few minutes the towns of Merida, 
 Barquisemeto, Caracas, La Guaira, and San Felipe were 
 nothing but a heap of ruins. Great churches, crowded 
 with people waiting for the starting of the procession, 
 sank in an instant into a pile of debris a few feet in 
 height. The barracks in the north of Caracas almost 
 disappeared, burying in their ruins the greater part of 
 the garrison. Everywhere in the track of the earthquake 
 was ruin and death. Caracas was covered by a pall of 
 dust rising from the falling buildings, but by nightfall it 
 had settled to the earth, and nature, after her tremendous 
 effort, seemed to sink into a tranquil sleep. There were 
 no more shocks after the appalling few minutes between 
 4 and 5 P.M., and a brilliant moon shone serenely on the 
 devastated and panic-stricken city. The scenes in the 
 streets were heartrending. The survivors who had 
 escaped injury wandered through the ruins, seeking 
 relatives and friends whose fate they knew not. Poor 
 wretches, crippled by falling masonry, dragged them- 
 selves painfully from the ruins, or struggled in vain to 
 emerge from the mass which imprisoned them. And 
 there was another class of scene where the sinner of 
 yesterday saw in the dreadful visitation a warning 
 directed by the Almighty to himself specially. Couples 
 who had been oblivious of the marriage ceremony 
 hastened in search of a priest to tie the nuptial knot. 
 Children, hitherto recognised by a mother only, suddenly 
 found themselves acknowledged by a terrified father. 
 Men and women, in an agony of alarm at the judgment 
 which they believed to be falling on them from heaven, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
58 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 confessed openly in the streets crimes or sins of which 
 no one suspected them, or vowed restitution of ill-gotten 
 property. The deaths in Caracas alone have been esti- 
 mated at 9000 or 10,000, exclusive of those who died 
 later from injuries or exposure. There were 4000 or 
 5000 dead in La Guaira, the seaport close by, and every 
 town and village on the track of the earth-wave had its 
 tale of death and mutilation. The total loss of life has 
 been estimated at as high a figure as 120,000. In Bar- 
 quisemeto 1000 republican troops, on the march for 
 Coro, were almost entirely destroyed, artillery, arms, and 
 ammunition being buried deep amongst the ruins. What 
 with these losses, and the havoc wrought amongst the 
 garrison of Caracas, the slender fighting forces of the 
 republic were seriously crippled. 
 
 In the midst of all the panic and confusion in Caracas, 
 a few kept their heads, and some improved the occasion. 
 The clergy, mostly adherents of the royalist party, made 
 capital out of the earthquake, by pointing to it as the 
 judgment of God on the rebels. They were able, as 
 news came in, to point to the fact that it was the re- 
 bellious provinces alone which had been devastated, 
 whilst the loyal districts in the east and south were un- 
 harmed. The revolution had begun on Maunday 
 Thursday 1809, the punishment had fallen on the same 
 festival of 1 8 1 2. There was no need to mention the 
 fact that similar disasters had previously befallen Lisbon, 
 Messina, Quito, and Lima. In one church everything 
 had fallen except, as it happened, one pillar bearing the 
 Spanish escutcheon. Here was a fine opportunity for 
 the preachers to point out to an ignorant population 
 how the hand of God was in favour of the Spanish 
 government against which they had rebelled. 
 
 Bolivar, amongst others, exerted himself in relieving 
 the unhappy people, in making arrangements for burning 
 the festering corpses which polluted the air, and which 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MONTEVERDE AND MIRANDA 59 
 
 there was neither time nor labour available to bury, and 
 in suppressing the preachers who so seriously injured 
 the cause of liberty. 
 
 But there were other dangers to be met besides those 
 from earthquake, famine, and pestilence. Ceballos, the 
 royalist governor of the province of Cor6, had been 
 spurred on by Andres Torellas, the parish priest of 
 Siquisique, who succeeded in suborning Reyes Vargas, 
 an Indian captain of the separatist force which was at 
 Barquisemeto threatening Cor6. Torellas even borrowed 
 money and made it over to Ceballos for the costs of an 
 advance. 
 
 At that time there happened to have arrived from 
 Puerto Rico a Spanish naval officer, a Canarian, named 
 Domingo Monteverde, a man of little experience or 
 ability, but with an excellent opinion of himself He 
 commanded a company of marines forming part of the 
 forces being assembled by Don J. M. Cajigal at Cor6 for 
 the suppression of the revolted provinces. Monteverde 
 offered his services to Ceballos. That officer recom- 
 mended him to Miyares, the Captain-General, who 
 sanctioned his appointment to the command of an 
 expedition. On the loth March 18 12, Monteverde, 
 accompanied by Torellas, with only 230 men, of whom 
 100 were sailors, marched on Siquisique, which he 
 entered on the 17th. He was joined there by the 
 traitor, Reyes Vargas, and the two together seized 
 Carora, after a fight with 700 patriots on the 23rd. 
 Three days later came the earthquake which destroyed 
 the republican troops at Barquisemeto, and afforded 
 Monteverde an opportunity to seize that point on the 
 2nd April. Realising the disastrous effects of the 
 earthquake on the republicans, Monteverde demanded a 
 reinforcement of 1000 men, proposing to march on 
 Valencia. He had but 1000 men all told, but he suc- 
 ceeded in digging out of the ruins of Barquisemeto 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
6o SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 seven guns and a great quantity of ammunition. Disre- 
 garding the timid orders of headquarters, which directed 
 him to stop at Barquisemeto, Monteverde pushed on. 
 On the 7th April he defeated a republican detachment. 
 On the 1 8th Araure was taken by one of his subordi- 
 nates. On the 25 th he took and sacked San Carlos. 
 Everywhere his advance was marked by massacres and 
 summary executions of the enemy. The fear which he 
 inspired, coupled with the recent terror of the earthquake, 
 induced the country to declare generally for the king. 
 The panic had been augmented by a recurrence of 
 earthquake shocks on the 4th April, though they were 
 not comparable in severity to the great tremor of the 
 26th March. Meanwhile, the government at Caracas, 
 in its despair, had seen no hope save in the appointment 
 of Miranda as commander-in-chief with dictatorial 
 powers. He managed to get together some 7000 men, 
 but they were largely recruits, and the morale of the 
 whole had been rudely shaken by recent events. As for 
 Bolivar, his relations with Miranda were still bad, and 
 the dictator, in order to get rid of him, sent him off to 
 command the fortress of Puerto Cabello, which at the 
 time was full of Spanish prisoners, many of them 
 amongst those who had recently revolted at Valencia. 
 Bolivar left Caracas for Puerto Cabello on the 29th 
 April. When, after a few days' rest, Monteverde again 
 set out towards Valencia, Miranda evacuated that place, 
 which was occupied without resistance by the Spanish 
 commander, on the 3rd May. 
 
 The situation of Miranda became more and more des- 
 perate. The government had no money, the people were 
 discontented, and Miranda's overbearing manner and 
 actions made him intensely unpopular, alike with soldiers 
 and civilians. The plains of Calabozo were ravaged by 
 guerilla bands in the royalist interest, who behaved with 
 a savagery which spread terror everywhere, On the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MONTEVERDE AND MIRANDA 6i 
 
 Orinoco a patriot flotilla, threatening Angostura, had 
 been destroyed. To the east of Caracas a rising of the 
 slaves had been fomented by the Spaniards, and the 
 revolted negroes threatened the capital. When Monte- 
 verde had captured Valencia, he found himself opposed 
 by Miranda, whose headquarters were ten miles on the 
 road to Caracas, and whose forces were numerically very 
 superior to the Spaniards. But Miranda seemed to have 
 lost all his energy, and, instead of advancing boldly to 
 the attack, was content with harassing the enemy in 
 small affairs of outposts. 
 
 Monteverde, finding himself too weak to continue his 
 advance, besought reinforcements from Cor6, where, 
 fortunately for Ceballos, a small force had arrived from 
 Cadiz and Puerto Rico. The governor promptly 
 marched with these to join Monteverde, who, not 
 wishing to be superseded in the command, persuaded 
 Ceballos to return to Cor6, leaving the fresh troops 
 under himself. Even with these reinforcements, the 
 Spaniards had a force inferior in numbers, though 
 superior in other respects, to that of Miranda. The 
 latter, after being twice beaten off" in attacks on 
 Valencia, and being still more disheartened by numerous 
 desertions amongst his troops, fell back on La Cabrera. 
 This strong position on the Caracas road has already 
 been described. It was now still further strengthened 
 by the flanking defence of gunboats on the lake. 
 Monteverde, after thrice failing with considerable loss 
 in frontal attacks on the position, began to feel his 
 position to be precarious, notwithstanding the facts that 
 the province of Barinas in his rear had declared again 
 for the royal cause, and that the Spanish general 
 Antofianzas, whom he had detached for the purpose, 
 had captured Calabozo and massacred its garrison. 
 
 At this juncture, a deserter from Miranda's army 
 revealed to Monteverde a path leading round the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
62 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 enemy's right. It was so difficult that little care had been 
 taken for its defence. Monteverde succeeded in passing 
 it and rendering untenable the position of Miranda, who at 
 once retired and again fortified himself at La Victoria. 
 Again Monteverde's attack was beaten off, this time so 
 disastrously that he was forced to retire to Maracay, 
 in order to collect his forces and await more ammuni- 
 tion and supplies from Cor6. Had Miranda, his troops 
 flushed with victory, boldly pursued, it is possible he 
 might have completed the enemy's destruction. But 
 nothing would induce the veteran to move. 
 
 At this point, Monteverde had yet another piece of 
 good fortune. Bolivar, it will be remembered, had been 
 sent to command at Puerto Cabello, a great magazine 
 of supplies of all sorts, and the prison-house of many 
 Spaniards. He was disgusted at being shelved in this 
 way, and it is perhaps not unwarrantable to assume that 
 he was somewhat slack in what appeared to be a simple 
 matter, the guarding of a number of unarmed men, con- 
 fined in the citadel, which was separate from the town. 
 The prisoners found means to corrupt Francisco Vinoni, 
 the officer in charge of them, and to induce him to take 
 an early opportunity of setting them free.^ On the 
 30th June, the commandant of the citadel, Ramon 
 Aymerich, had gone to take orders at Bolivar's head- 
 quarters in the town. The moment was seized by 
 Vinoni to release the prisoners, who overpowered the 
 small garrison, proclaimed the king, raised the draw- 
 bridge, and, after threatening an officer whom Bolivar 
 sent to see what was happening, opened fire on the city 
 with the guns of the citadel. Artillery fire between 
 the citadel and Bolivar's artillery continued off and on 
 up to the Sth July, when the city, which Bolivar had 
 left for the fortified heights above, surrendered to the 
 
 ^ Vinoni's treachery was duly punished seven years later, as will be related 
 in due course. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DOWNFALL OF MIRANDA 63 
 
 rebels. Meanwhile, many of Bolivar's men had deserted ; 
 detachments sent out by him to meet a force despatched 
 by Monteverde were driven in or destroyed, and he 
 found himself threatened with destruction by pressure 
 between Monteverde's people and the garrison of the 
 citadel. On the 6th July, abandoning all hope, he sailed, 
 with only seven officers, in a ship, the Celoso, which he 
 had succeeded in preserving out of range of the citadel. 
 About forty men joined him just before he sailed. 
 According to his own report, he had lost Puerto Cabello, 
 but was himself blameless, and had preserved his honour 
 intact.^ It was perhaps fortunate for Bolivar that the 
 end was at hand. Otherwise, looking to the summary 
 methods of the time, he might have been shot, after a 
 drumhead court-martial, under the orders of Miranda, 
 whether he was to blame or not. In such warfare as this 
 the line between failure and treachery is often dis- 
 regarded when it comes to dealing with a defeated 
 commander. 
 
 The fall of Puerto Cabello practically decided the 
 fate of the Venezuelan Republic for the time being. 
 Miranda himself, when he heard of it, said, " Venezuela 
 is stricken in the heart." He still had, according to 
 O'Leary and Mitre, 5000 men, and Monteverde, with 
 less than 3000, was considerably demoralised by his 
 repulse from the lines of Victoria. Miranda made an 
 attack on Monteverde's lines, but obtained only some 
 partial successes. Then, thinking the contest hopeless, 
 he, on the 1 2th July, proposed an armistice, and, finally, 
 against the advice of some of his officers, offered to 
 capitulate on condition of a guarantee of the lives and 
 property of the insurgents, and the introduction of the 
 Spanish constitution of 1 8 1 2. Monteverde granted the 
 terms, on condition of the complete submission of the 
 patriots, and Miranda retired to Caracas, whilst his 
 ' See his official report in O'Leary Documents, 13, p. 44. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
64 • SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 troops either went over to the royalists or dispersed to 
 their homes. From Caracas, Miranda, with some of his 
 officers, went off to La Guaira, intending to embark on 
 an English vessel, the captain of which had offered them 
 a passage to a place of safety. O'Leary acquits Miranda 
 of treachery, holding that he acted in good faith, that he 
 had come to believe the revolution had been premature, 
 and that, under the Spanish constitution, the colonies 
 could attain as much liberty as was suitable for countries 
 in their situation, and of the habits and character of 
 their inhabitants. Restrepo's opinion is much the same 
 as to Miranda's honesty of purpose. He absolutely 
 disbelieves the story of his corruption by a money 
 payment.^ Larrazabal, a thorough-going advocate of 
 Bolivar, and a Venezuelan himself, holds that the 
 surrender was unnecessary and universally condemned. 
 He even asserts that Miranda went so far as to arrange 
 terms, through the Marquis de Casa Leon, who acted as 
 go-between with Monteverde, under which Miranda, 
 retiring to Europe, was to be provided with funds to 
 enable him to live in comfort there. 
 
 Miranda's republicanism is beyond suspicion : he was 
 the real father of the revolt of Venezuela against Spain, 
 at which he had worked steadfastly for many years. He 
 had, however, during years of absence, lost touch of his 
 country, and it is quite possible that, filled with disgust 
 at the apathy of the Venezuelan people, he may have 
 been converted to the Ipelief that, with the introduction 
 of the Spanish constitution of 1812, which he had stipu- 
 lated for in the capitulation, a people in the backward 
 condition of the Venezuelans would have got as much 
 liberty as they were yet fit to enjoy. He certainly 
 could have made a much better fight than he did 
 against Monteverde, but, on the whole, it seems extremely 
 improbable that he deliberately betrayed his countrymen. 
 
 1 II. 8s, 86. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DOWNFALL OF MIRANDA 65 
 
 Even if he had made a better fight of it, it seems more 
 than probable that he could only have temporarily 
 postponed the adverse decision of the campaign. The 
 strongest point against him is that he proposed to leave 
 Venezuela, instead of staying on to see that Monteverde 
 himself carried out the terms of the capitulation. 
 
 On the 26th July Monteverde occupied Victoria ; on 
 the 30th he was in Caracas. 
 
 Bolivar, meanwhile, had landed at La Guaira on the 
 7th July, and was proceeding to Miranda's head- 
 quarters when he heard of that general's surrender. 
 Strongly disapproving the capitulation, he returned to 
 La Guaira. 
 
 Miranda reached La Guaira on the evening of the 30th 
 July, to find Bolivar already there, with other leaders of 
 the revolution who had very little confidence in the 
 probability of Monteverde's observance of the terms 
 of surrender. H.B.M. corvette Sapphire lay in the 
 harbour ready to take Miranda off. Other fugitive leaders 
 continued to arrive in the town. Captain Haynes of 
 the Sapphire came ashore as soon as Miranda arrived, 
 being anxious to take him on board at once. But 
 Miranda, worn out with fatigue, sat down to dinner with 
 Casas, the commandant of the place, Pena, the civil 
 governor, and others, including Bolivar. At dinner it 
 was proposed that Miranda should spend the night on 
 shore and embark next morning, as it was too late to 
 do so now. Haynes protested that there was no difficulty 
 about the embarkation, and that Miranda would be 
 much safer and more comfortable on the corvette, where 
 all preparations had been made for his reception. The 
 others, however, carried the day, and Miranda retired 
 to bed. 
 
 As soon as he was out of the way, a secret meeting 
 was held by the republican leaders present in La 
 Guaira to discuss his case and what was to be done. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
66 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 At this meeting the most active part was played by 
 Bolivar. He argued that Miranda's proposed departure 
 showed his disbelief in Monteverde's observance of the 
 treaty, that Miranda, having signed the capitulation, was 
 in honour bound to see it through, if he believed it to 
 be worth the paper it was written on, and that he 
 should be compelled to stay to the bitter end. The 
 secret assembly soon determined upon the arrest and 
 detention of Miranda, who was peacefully sleeping in 
 a room, the door of which could not even be locked. 
 Elaborate arrangements for the execution of the plot 
 were made, and the actual arrest of the old warrior was 
 entrusted to Bolivar, Chatillon, and Tomas Montilla. 
 When arrested, he was to be sent to the castle, there to 
 be guarded by Mires. At 3 A.M. the three conspirators 
 entered Miranda's room, and, after removing his sword 
 and pistols, awakened him. The weary old man 
 muttered that it was not yet time to get up, and 
 then awoke to a consciousness of what was really 
 occurring. Resistance he saw was useless, so, after 
 dressing, he quietly followed his captors to the castle, 
 where, for several months, he was immured. Bolivar 
 and others had apparently intended to shoot Miranda 
 as a traitor, but Casas, the military commandant, saw 
 a better way of saving himself from the vengeance of 
 the Spaniards by betraying the dictator to them. To 
 have shot Miranda would have been to kill the goose 
 that laid the golden eggs. 
 
 Bolivar maintained to the end of his life that the 
 object of Miranda's arrest was the punishment by death 
 of his treason. O'Leary"^ quotes a letter from Colonel 
 Belford Wilson in which he says of Bolivar : " To the 
 last hour of his life he rejoiced in that event, which he 
 always asserted was solely his own act, to punish the 
 
 ^ !• P- 75- Belford Wilson was son of Sir Robert Wilson, who gained 
 some fame in the Napoleonic wars. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DOWNFALL OF MIRANDA 67 
 
 treachery and treason of Miranda in capitulating to an 
 inferior force and then intending to embark, himself 
 knowing the capitulation would not be observed. . . . 
 General Bolivar always gloried to me in having risked 
 his own safety, which he might have secured by embark- 
 ing on board a vessel, in order to secure the punishment 
 of Miranda for his alleged treason. His plea was not 
 altogether ill founded, for he argued that, ■ if Miranda 
 believed the Spaniards would observe the treaty, he 
 should have remained to keep them to their word ; 
 if he did not, he was a traitor to have sacrificed his 
 army to it. General Bolivar invariably added that he 
 wished to shoot Miranda as a traitor, but was withheld 
 by others." That is the case for Bolivar. On the 
 other hand, it must be remembered that his relations 
 with Miranda at the time laid him open to suspicion, 
 and it will be seen presently that Monteverde was 
 clearly under the impression that Bolivar had meant 
 to surrender Miranda to him. Looking dispassionately 
 at the whole aiifair, and especially at the immediate 
 circumstances of Miranda's arrest, it seems difficult to 
 exonerate Bolivar. 
 
 On the morning of the 31st July an order was 
 received by Casas from Monteverde, requiring him to 
 prevent all embarkations from La Guaira.^ Casas at 
 once complied, and, though the Sapphire and another 
 ship succeeded in getting off, and a few of the patriots 
 were thus enabled to escape, the majority had perforce 
 
 > In 1843 the children and relations of Casas published a pamphlet of some 
 seventy pages (" Defensa de la conducta del . . . Sefior M. M. de las Casas," 
 etc.), defending his conduct against Restrepo and others who had dubbed 
 him a traitor on the strength of what Bolivar had said of him in 1821. We 
 must confess to not having read the whole of this pamphlet, but the gist of 
 the defence appears to be that Casas stopped the emigration on the ground 
 that he thought it would be a violation by the Venezuelans of the terms of 
 the capitulation, which would afford an excuse to Monteverde for disregarding 
 it. The pamphlet is in the British Museum. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
68 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 to remain in La Guaira, where, on the arrival of 
 Spanish forces, they found themselves in the power 
 of Monteverde. 
 
 As for the unfortunate Miranda, he was presently 
 removed to Puerto Cabello, then to Puerto Rico, and 
 finally to Cadiz, where he was confined in the arsenal 
 in chains till, worn out by suffering and misery, he died 
 on the 1 4th July 1 8 1 6. 
 
 It was soon evident that the capitulation, in so far as 
 Monteverdc's observance of it went, was not worth the 
 paper it was written on. It is not necessary to assume 
 that he deliberately accepted it with the intention of 
 violating it. O'Leary, who cannot be described in any 
 way as a witness favourable to the Spanish commander, 
 holds that he was not naturally cruel or false, but that 
 he was weak and liable to be led astray by the evil 
 councillors by whom he was surrounded, especially by 
 the Islenos (the Canary Islanders), who were detested 
 above all others by the republicans, and who were 
 anxious to revenge themselves on irreconcilable enemies. 
 Monteverde had succeeded in retaining the supreme 
 command, notwithstanding the arrival at headquarters 
 of Miyares the Captain -General. He finally got rid 
 of his superior by pleading a clause in the capitulation 
 which stipulated for Monteverde's retention of the com- 
 mand till the terms should be carried out. 
 
 On his first arrival in Caracas the Spaniard issued 
 reassuring proclamations, asserting his intention of 
 loyally observing the terms of capitulation. So clear 
 were these terms that confidence was largely restored, 
 and all, except the extremists, began to see that the 
 best thing, under the circumstances, was the union of 
 all moderate men of both sides, with the object of 
 preventing the spread of anarchy, and combating the 
 danger which was still threatened by the insurgent 
 slaves to the east of Caracas. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MONTEVERDE IN CARACAS 69 
 
 But the suggestions put forward by the Islenos, that 
 fresh plots were on foot amongst the republicans, soon 
 began to work on Monteverde, and to gain predominance 
 over the better advice of many of his followers who 
 saw the falsity of these witnesses. From the 14th 
 August there commenced a reign of terror for the 
 leaders of the late revolution. In Caracas, and many 
 other towns, the streets were patrolled by troops, whilst 
 numerous arrests of the most prominent leaders were 
 effected, often with great brutality and violence. Numbers 
 of the prisoners were hurried off to the dungeons of 
 La Guaira and Puerto Cabello. Their fate was thus 
 described by Miranda, himself a prisoner, in a letter 
 to the Audiencia.^ : " Now I witnessed with consterna- 
 tion a repetition of those same scenes of which I was 
 an eye-witness in France ; I saw arriving at La Guaira 
 droves of the most illustrious and distinguished men, 
 treated like criminals ; I saw them buried with myself 
 in those horrible subterranean dungeons ; I saw venerable 
 age, tender youth, the rich, the poor, the artizan, and 
 even the priest subjected to fetters and chains, con- 
 demned to breathe a foul air in which artificial light 
 was extinguished, and which vitiated the blood and 
 prepared certain death." 
 
 German Roscio, a scholar and a man distinguished 
 by his humanity, was, as well as others of the same 
 class, exposed to the jeers and insults of the mob in 
 the public stocks. He and seven others (amongst them 
 Canon Cortes Madariaga) were shipped off to the 
 dungeons of Ceuta, with a letter from Monteverde to 
 the Regency describing them as " these eight monsters, 
 the origin and prime cause of all the evils and novelties 
 of America which have horrified the whole world." 
 
 Some of the leading revolutionists escaped. A few, 
 as already mentioned, had succeeded in getting away 
 
 ' O'Leary, Documents, 13, p. 63. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
70 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 from La Guaira by sea. Casas, by his servility in 
 stopping the embarkations and in deHvering up his 
 comrades and Miranda, had made his peace. Bolivar 
 had left La Guaira early on the evening of the 31st 
 July, and passed unrecognised through the Spanish 
 posts to Caracas, where he remained in hiding with the 
 assistance of the worthy Francisco Iturbe, a mutual 
 friend of his and Monteverde's, and a royalist by convic- 
 tion. This gentleman addressed himself to Monteverde 
 with a view to getting a passport for Bolivar to leave 
 the country. With some difficulty he succeeded in 
 obtaining the promise, and Bolivar appeared before 
 Monteverde for the purpose of getting his passport. The 
 Spaniard at first charged him with having put himself 
 beyond the terms of the capitulation by having shot two 
 Spaniards at Puerto Cabello. To that Bolivar replied 
 that they were spies, liable to their fate under the rules 
 of war. Monteverde then said, " You have done a 
 praiseworthy deed in arresting Miranda, and that entitles 
 you to the king's favour." To this Bolivar replied, 
 " Since that was not my intention in arresting Miranda, 
 I disclaim the right and the merit which you attribute to 
 me ; my conduct had a very different motive ; I saw in 
 Miranda a traitor to my country." Monteverde, at once, 
 on hearing these words, withdrew his promise of a pass- 
 port, but it was eventually obtained by the personal 
 intercession of Iturbe, who was present at the scene.^ 
 Both O'Leary and Larrazabal deny the truth of Monte- 
 verde's view of Bolivar's motives. It has also been said, 
 though this Larrazabal again indignantly repudiates, that 
 Bolivar owed his escape to his comparative insignificance 
 
 ^ In 1820 Bolivar showed that he had not forgotten the debt of gratitude 
 he owed to Iturbe, who was then resident in Cura9ao and had never aban- 
 doned the royalist cause, though not taking any active part in the war. The 
 Congress was about to confiscate his property when Bolivar obtained the 
 stoppage of the order on the ground of the great service" rendered to himself 
 by Iturbe in 1812. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S PERSONALITY 71 
 
 at this time. Yet it seems by no means improbable that 
 this consideration influenced Monteverde ; for, except at 
 Puerto Cabello, BoHvar had held no important command, 
 and his relegation to that place prevented his appearance 
 on the main scene. His subsequent acceptance of a 
 small command under Labatut, a French soldier of 
 fortune of no eminence, shows that his position was 
 still not the highest. 
 
 Nevertheless, when he sailed from La Guaira on the 
 27th August 1 8 12, he was about to pass very shortly 
 from a secondary position in the revolt of the northern 
 colonies of South America to the very foremost, which 
 he continued to occupy for the remaining eighteen years 
 of his life. This, therefore, seems a convenient place in 
 which to endeavour to place before ourselves a general 
 picture of the man as he then was. We shall not, at 
 present, deal in detail with his character or his political 
 and military conduct, for these will be more appropri- 
 ately considered when we have before us the whole 
 history of his career. Bolivar was just twenty-nine years 
 old in August 1 8 1 2. In stature he was small ; O'Leary 
 gives him 5 feet 6 inches, though some accounts repre- 
 sent him as still smaller.^ He had a narrow chest and 
 a spare body, with slender limbs, and hands and feet so 
 small as to be the envy of many women. His com- 
 plexion was sallow, the skin somewhat rough. His high 
 forehead was curiously seamed, even in his youth, by 
 wrinkles. His hair was very black, with thick eyebrows, 
 surmounting very black and piercing eyes, which, accord- 
 ing to Miller,'' rarely looked straight in the face of the 
 person he was speaking to. The nose was long but well 
 shaped, the cheek-bones prominent, the cheeks hollow, 
 the ears large. Above a mouth, which O'Leary describes 
 as " ugly," was a very long upper lip. The teeth were 
 
 ' Sir C. Markham ("History of Peru," p. 269) says 5 feet 4 inches. 
 
 ' n. 331. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
72 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 white, well formed, and scrupulously cared for. The 
 chin was somewhat pointed, and the face and head very 
 long.i His portraits often represent him as almost clean 
 shaven, though several authorities say he had a heavy 
 moustache and whiskers. They probably refer to cam- 
 paigning days, when shaving was difficult. 
 
 The expression of his face was ordinarily calm though 
 careworn, but his temper was impetuous and capricious, 
 and, once it was aroused, his expression became fierce 
 and threatening, and his language was far from measured. 
 But these outbursts of temper, if not resented and aggra- 
 vated, soon subsided and were followed by an attitude of 
 conciliation. O'Leary, who must constantly have seen it, 
 describes the change from Bolivar in a good humour to 
 Bolivar in a rage as " terrible." Without vanity he would 
 not have been a true Creole, and he had perhaps rather 
 more than the ordinary share allotted to others of his 
 compatriots. Another creole quality, indolence of body, 
 was not altogether absent in him, for he loved to loll 
 about in a hammock, even when he was dictating. Some- 
 times he would stand to hear the reports of his secretary, 
 with his arms folded, and the left hand tugging at the 
 collar of his coat, whilst he rapidly dictated the order on 
 each paper. But when he was in his hammock it was 
 only a survival of the natural tendency of his race to 
 indolence and apathy ; for he was endowed with an 
 appetite for hard work, and a readiness to undertake the 
 greatest physical exertion when necessary, which was 
 worthy of Napoleon. He was an excellent horseman, 
 and his powers of endurance were truly remarkable in 
 one of his apparently frail physique. That quality he 
 doubtless owed to his early devotion to field sports and 
 an out-of-door life. 
 
 ' This characteristic is very marked in most portraits of Bolivar, especially 
 in the Bogotd miniature figured at p. 123, vol. i., of Mr M. Spence's " Land 
 of Bolivar." 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S PERSONALITY 73 
 
 He wrote well and impressively, but, to the English 
 reader, his letters and proclamations are rendered un- 
 palatable by the turgidity of their style, and the pre- 
 valence in them of vain self-glorification. Endowed with 
 a powerful though somewhat harsh voice, he was an 
 excellent and fluent speaker, fiery and eloquent, but 
 sometimes too excitable. 
 
 His excessive admiration for the ' fair sex and his 
 devotion to dancing have already been referred to. He 
 was hospitable and fond of entertaining, though himself 
 very simple in his food, so much so that he would often 
 dine alone and only join a banquet towards the end, 
 when, as a proposer of toasts, he was unsurpassed. He 
 drank with the greatest moderation, and did not smoke 
 at all, which was particularly remarkable in a country 
 where almost everybody else lived with a cigar between 
 his lips. In his Paris days he indulged in gambling, 
 but, after having had to borrow of a lady to enable 
 him to win back a large sum which he had lost, he 
 eschewed cards entirely. O'Leary records that only once 
 in his later life did he touch a card, and then only to 
 humour his companions in camp during a long march.^ 
 He was a great reader, when he had leisure, chiefly of 
 French, through the medium of translations into which 
 language he acquired the knowledge of ancient history 
 which he so frequently paraded in his letters, proclama- 
 tions, and speeches. 
 
 He always professed the greatest admiration for British 
 institutions, and some of his best friends were English 
 or Irish. Amongst them were Moore, his doctor ; 
 O'Leary, his chief aide-de-camp for many years ; Fer- 
 gusson, who was killed defending him against assassins 
 in Bogotd ; and Belford Wilson, son of Sir Robert Wilson 
 of Peninsular fame. 
 
 '■ One of them was Santander, whom Colonel Campbell describes as "an 
 habitual gamester. " 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
74 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 The above sketch is sufficient for the present to give 
 some idea of Bolivar's personality. It is based mainly 
 on the picture drawn of him by O'Leary, tempered by 
 the naturally more unprejudiced account given by Miller, 
 who, unlike O'Leary, was not in his personal service, 
 though he had excellent opportunities of gauging him in 
 Peru in 1824. Neither Larrazabal, who can see nothing 
 but good in Bolivar, nor Ducoudray-Holstein, furiously 
 prejudiced against him, is a safe guide, and the same 
 may be said of many South American writers on one 
 side or the other. 
 
 As the scene is about to change for the moment from 
 Venezuela to New Granada, it is necessary here to 
 recount very briefly the course of events in that Vice- 
 royalty during the years 1 809- 1 8 1 2, which had witnessed 
 the temporary rise of the Venezuelan Republic, and its 
 destruction by Monteverde. 
 
 To begin with the Presidency of Quito, the first 
 outbreak of revolt occurred in August 1809 in Quito 
 itself. The President, Ruiz de Castillo, was deposed, a 
 Junta was set up, and troops were raised. The news of 
 this revolt reached Santa Fd (Bogotd) early in September, 
 and Amar, the Viceroy of New Granada, at once 
 summoned a meeting of the principal authorities and 
 inhabitants to consult as to the attitude to be taken up 
 towards the revolutionary Junta in Quito. His real ob- 
 ject appears to have been to discover the state of feeling 
 in Bogota itself. He found that there was a distinct 
 cleavage of opinion, the Creoles advocating recognition 
 of the Quito Junta, and even the establishment of a 
 similar assembly in their own city. The European 
 Spaniards, on the other hand, were for prompt suppression 
 of the movement in Quito. With them Amar concurred, 
 and at once sent 300 men southwards to suppress the 
 Quitenos. A larger force was sent northwards from 
 Peru against Quito. To meet the force from Bogotd, the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REVOLT IN QUITO AND NEW GRANADA 75 
 Junta of Quito despatched a small force, which never got 
 beyond Pasto. The fierce inhabitants of that ultra- 
 royalist province fell upon and destroyed the Quiteflos 
 long before they could meet Amar's troops. A panic in 
 Quito was the result of this mishap. Ruiz de Castillo, 
 promising an amnesty, was reinstated. When the troops 
 from Peru and New Granada reached Quito, the amnesty 
 was thrown to the winds, the leaders of the late revolu- 
 tion being arrested and sentenced to death or imprison- 
 ment. This severity produced a futile popular ^meute, 
 which was put down by the troops with terrible severity. 
 Castillo, who seems not to have been privy to these 
 severities, hastened to proclaim a general pardon, and to 
 get rid of the Peruvian and other troops. 
 
 The news of events in Quito precipitated revolt in New 
 Granada, where the city of Cartagena broke out and set 
 up a Junta, of which the governor was made president. 
 He was soon found to be bitterly hostile, and was sent 
 off to Cuba ( 1 1 th June 1 8 1 o). 
 
 A small insurrection in Casanare, on the borders of 
 Venezuela, was easily suppressed from- Bogotd, and the 
 leaders were executed. At Socorro and Pamplona, in the 
 Eastern Cordilleras north of Bogotd, Juntas were success- 
 fully set up in July 18 10. 
 
 There remained Bogotd, where everything was ripe for 
 revolt. It was precipitated by an insulting speech aimed 
 at the Americans by a European Spaniard. The people, 
 assembling in the great square, demanded a Junta. The 
 Viceroy was at first for resistance, as he had a consider- 
 able force at his disposal. Then he thought better of it, 
 and allowed the cabildo to meet openly. It at once 
 (21st July) named a Junta, of which the Viceroy himself 
 was to be president. The leader in this movement was 
 Dr Camilo Torres. The revolution was at first of the 
 mildest order, for the Junta, in drafting a constitution, re- 
 cognised, not only the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII., but 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
76 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 even the temporary authority of the Spanish Regency 
 during Ferdinand's imprisonment in France. The con- 
 stitution provided for a federal union of the various 
 provinces of New Granada. All this was far from satis- 
 fying Torres and the other leaders, who presently deposed 
 the Viceroy and made use of the weak Junta as a tool. 
 Ferdinand VII.'s sovereignty was still acknowledged, but 
 the Junta was ordered to refuse recognition of the 
 Regency or any similar body in Spain. Then there 
 arrived from Spain the envoys Montiifar and Villa- 
 vicencio, whom we have already seen in Caracas on 
 the 1 8th April i8io.^ Being powerless in the face of 
 recent events, Montiifar proceeded to Quito to see what 
 could be done there. 
 
 Most of the other provinces of New Granada, follow- 
 ing the example of Cartagena and BogotcL, had set up 
 their own Juntas, and it only remained to work out their 
 federal union. But there was no union ; for Bogotd and 
 Cartagena each wanted to hold the Congress in its own 
 territory and to unite the provinces around itself. 
 Neither would recognise the authority of the other. 
 Some of the other provinces, moreover, wished to set up 
 independent republics. 
 
 Then the Bogotanos set up a " monarchical republic " 
 with Dr Lozano as President. He was unable to succeed 
 bringing about the desired federal union, and he was 
 soon deposed, at the instance of Antonio Narifto, who 
 favoured a centralised republic. Cartagena, with which 
 Antioquia concurred, was for the federal system. A 
 Congress of sorts had assembled in Lozano's time, but, 
 when it attempted to inaugurate a federal republic, 
 was driven out and forced to retire to Ibague in the Mag- 
 dalena valley. On the nth November iSii Cartagena 
 declared itself an independent state, whilst the eastern 
 provinces sought incorporation with Venezuela. The 
 ' Supra, p. 42. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REVOLT IN QUITO AND NEW GRANADA 77 
 royalists still held Quito and the territory as far north as 
 the province of Pasto in the south of New Granada, 
 though they had been driven from the valley of the 
 Cauca, including Popayan. They also held what is now 
 the Republic of Panamd, and they occupied the two pro- 
 vinces of Santa Marta and Rio Hacha, east of the lower 
 Magdalena, the stream of which they also commanded 
 with their gunboats and posts on both banks. Thus 
 Cartagena was sandwiched in between PanamA and Santa 
 Marta, which latter, with Rio Hacha, effectually cut it off 
 from the central and eastern provinces. These again lay 
 between the Santa Marta-Rio Hacha wedge and Quito. 
 The latter had meanwhile made another attempt to throw 
 off Spanish dominion. In it the principal part was 
 played by Montufar, the envoy of the Spanish Regency, 
 who had gone over to the revolutionists. He was at the 
 bottom of the setting up of a Junta, in September 18 10, 
 with Ruiz de Castillo at its head. Presently Castillo 
 was deposed and murdered, and Quito proclaimed its 
 independence. We need not follow in detail the course 
 of this revolution, which was finally put down after the 
 storming of Quito in the latter part of 1 8 1 2. Quito after 
 that remained quiescent for eight years. At the same 
 time, civil war was in progress in New Granada between 
 Narino,^ representing the supporters of a centralised re- 
 public, and the Congress at Ibague, with Camilo Torres "^ 
 
 ^ Antonio Narino, born in Bogota, 1765, where he served as a youth in 
 the royal treasury. He was imprisoned in Spain for publishing an account 
 of the French Constituent Assembly. Escaping from Cadiz he fled to Paris 
 and England. Returning to Bogota, he was again arrested and imprisoned 
 at Cartagena till released by the revolution there. His later adventures will 
 be narrated in the text up to the date of his defeat in the contest for the vice- 
 presidency with Santander in 1S21. After that he appears to have taken no 
 active part in politics. He died at Leiva in September 1823. 
 
 ^ Camilo Torres, born at Popayan in 1 766. Became an advocate and public 
 employ^ at Bogota. He joined the revolution from its commencement and 
 will be mentioned later in the text. From 1812 to 1814 he was President of 
 the Republic in New Granada. He fled southwards before Morillo in 1816, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
78 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 at its head, representing the federal party. It is un- 
 necessary to follow the changing fortunes of this miserable 
 contest, which ended in union of the forces of Narifto and 
 the Congress, with the object of beating back the Spanish 
 advance from Quito under Sdmano, who had reconquered 
 Popayan by the end of 1 8 1 2. Narifio, in command of 
 the republicans, was at first successful in driving the 
 royalists back into the province of Pasto, the " Vendue of 
 the Revolution of New Granada," as Mitre appropriately 
 calls it. There he was defeated in an advance-guard 
 skirmish by the mountaineers. His army, seized with 
 panic, fled to Popayan, and Narifio, after wandering alone 
 for some time in the mountains, finally surrendered him- 
 self and was shipped off in chains to Spain. 
 
 The general situation in New Granada and Quito was 
 as follows at the time when Bolivar was approaching 
 Cartagena. Quito was in the power of the royalists, who 
 were advancing against the now united forces of Narino 
 and the Congress towards Popayan. The province of 
 Antioquia^ had declared itself an independent republic. 
 Cartagena was likewise an independent state, cut off from 
 the central states by the wedge of Spanish territory in 
 Santa Marta and Rio Hacha, extending across the lower 
 Magdalena. It was threatened by the forces in this 
 wedge, and also to some extent from Panami,^ where the 
 Spanish titular Viceroy of New Granada had established 
 
 but was captured and executed in Bogota in October i8i6. He was shot in 
 the back, his body was then hung on the gallows, and afterwards quartered, 
 and his head exposed to public view. 
 
 ' This province is situated in the northern part of the Central Cordilleras 
 and the Cauca valley south of the province of Cartagena. 
 
 ^ The danger of invasion by land from Panama was slight. The country 
 between Panama and Cartagena is so marshy and fever stricken as to be 
 practically impassable for troops. That the Colombians found to their cost 
 in 1904 when, the sea route being forbidden by the United States after the 
 Panama revolution, they attempted to send a force by land. Three-fourths 
 of the men perished, and the rest returned in a state of starvation. 
 
 The real danger to Cartagena in i8i2 was from the sea. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REVOLT IN QUITO AND NEW GRANADA 79 
 
 himself. In view of the danger from Santa Marta, Carta- 
 gena had accepted the dictatorship of Dr Torices, a young 
 man of twenty-four years. This move was the imme- 
 diate consequence of the destruction by the Spaniards, in 
 March 1812, of a flotilla sent from Cartagena against 
 Santa Marta. A force was now being sent against that 
 place under Labatut, a French adventurer who had 
 escaped from La Guaira after Miranda's fall, before the 
 emigration had been stopped by Casas under Spanish 
 orders. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 BOLIVAR'S FIRST LIBERATION OF VENEZUELA— 
 THE "WAR TO THE DEATH" 
 
 MONTEVERDE soon had good reason to 
 regret having let Bolivar escape. The 
 future Liberator landed at Curasao, then 
 in the possession of the British, on the 
 28th August 1 8 12. He was almost penniless, for, 
 owing to informalities in the papers of the ship by which 
 he arrived, all his property on board was seized by 
 the customs, and Monteverde had sequestrated his 
 Venezuelan possessions. He is said to have talked of 
 going to England to seek employment in the Peninsula 
 under Lord Wellington. Whatever his real intentions, 
 his financial difficulties prevented any such scheme. At 
 Curasao he found some of his companions who had 
 escaped from La Guaira, and others had accompanied 
 him. 
 
 It was not long before, having succeeded in borrowing 
 some money in Curagao, Bolivar was again off to offer 
 his services to the republican government at Cartagena. 
 He arrived there in the middle of November 1 8 1 2, and 
 at once set to work at his new enterprise of inspiring 
 energy amongst the separatists of the republic, and of 
 acquiring a position amongst them which might hereafter 
 enable him to come to the aid of Venezuela. For the 
 moment, the fire of revolution in his own country had 
 been stamped down, though it was still smouldering. 
 In Cartagena he hoped to fan the flame into a blaze 
 
 8o 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CARTAGENA AND NEW GRANADA 81 
 
 involving all the neighbouring provinces. On the i Sth 
 December, two days after Labatut had successfully driven 
 the Spaniards from the mouth of the Magdalena, Bolivar, 
 with the approval of the Dictator Torices, by whom he 
 had been well received, issued a manifesto to the inhabi- 
 tants of New Granada. It is too long for quotation in 
 full ; for, like most of Bolivar's proclamations, it is prolix 
 and wearisome to English ears, and much too full of 
 highflown sentiments, self-glorification, and flattery of his 
 audience. However, he knew his people, and that this 
 style of writing was acceptable to them, and gratifying 
 to their vanity. The manifesto, which occupies nearly 
 eleven pages of O'Leary,^ may be summarised in a 
 few words for our purpose. After explaining his own 
 position and his desire to help New Granada, Bolivar 
 states what to him appear to have been the main causes 
 of the Venezuelan failure. To begin upon, there had 
 been a deal too much leniency on the republican side ; 
 he was thinking of his own differences with Miranda on 
 this subject. Then there had been too much theory, 
 and too little practical work ; " we had," he writes, 
 " philosophers for leaders, philanthropy in place of legis- 
 lation, dialectics instead of tactics, and sophists for 
 soldiers." Instead of well-trained soldiers, the re- 
 publican leaders had endeavoured to compel the service 
 of yokels, thus raising useless bands of militia and 
 ruining the agriculture of the country. Curiously 
 enough, Bolivar strongly opposes, for his own country, 
 the idea of the " nation in arms," though he admitted its 
 success against mercenary troops in France and North 
 America. Perhaps he was right, looking to the peculiar 
 circumstances of his country, and recognising in his 
 heart of hearts that the revolution, as yet, had 
 
 ' The manife-sto is given in full in O'Leary, i. 86-96. The letter to the 
 Congress of New Granada in the same terms is in O'Leary, Documents, 13, 
 P- 57- 
 F 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
82 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 little root amongst the general population, and would 
 never have been started but for the influence of ideas 
 imported from Europe and North America by men like 
 Miranda and himself. Then he denounces the federal 
 Congress, which he blames as an instrument of dissolu- 
 tion and civil war rather than of union, which, in his 
 opinion, was only to be attained by a centralised re- 
 public. A federal government, with its factions and dis- 
 sensions, was far too weak to succeed. He had no faith 
 in popular elections made by ignorant rustics and the 
 intriguers of cities. " Our own divisions," he wrote, " not 
 the arms of Spain, have brought us back to slavery." 
 Whilst admitting fully the effects of the earthquake, 
 combined with ecclesiastical influence, he always harks 
 back to his argument that, if Caracas had imposed itself 
 on the country as the governing authority, all would 
 have been well. Then he boldly advocates the re- 
 conquest of Caracas by New Granada. Its difficulties 
 he admits, but urges that Venezuela, in the hands of the 
 Spaniards, now occupies the same position in regard 
 to South America generally as Cor6 had formerly occu- 
 pied towards Caracas. Venezuela should be attacked 
 in Maracaibo through Santa Marta, and in Barinas 
 through the mountains of Ciicuta. The whole manifesto 
 is Bolivar's first real profession of political and military 
 faith. He appealed in similar terms to the General 
 Congress of New Granada assembled at Tunja, and his 
 arguments gained him many adherents, of whom the 
 most important was Camilo Torres, the original leader 
 of the outbreak in Bogotd in July 1 8 1 o. 
 
 In the meanwhile, Bolivar was given a command 
 under Labatut in the expedition which was to attempt 
 the conquest of Santa Marta. The appointment was 
 by no means acceptable to the Frenchman. By way of 
 getting rid of his subordinate, Labatut posted him at 
 Barranca, a small place on the western (left) bank of 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CARTAGENA AND NEW GRANADA 83 
 the Magdalena, some fifty or sixty miles from its mouth. 
 Bolivar had strict orders to remain there, guarding 
 Labutut's rear in the advance on Santa Marta. Those 
 orders he disobeyed as soon as Labatut's back was 
 turned. He set out with 200 men for Tenerife, some 
 thirty miles farther up the river on the opposite bank. 
 The Spanish garrison, surprised by Bolivar's sudden 
 arrival, evacuated the place and fell back towards Valle 
 de Upar, south of Santa Marta. After compelling the 
 submission of Tenerife to the republican government, 
 Bolivar continued his march up the river, through a 
 country of grass and marshes, to Mom pox,* some 150 
 miles from the mouth of the river. On the way he 
 cleared out all the small Spanish posts on the left bank 
 of the great river. Mompox in those days was an im- 
 portant place, and in it Bolivar was received with en- 
 thusiasm, on 27th December 18 12. Here he gathered 
 in many recruits, and was able to leave for Banco, 
 travelling by boats on the river, with 500 men. Banco,^ 
 though fortified, was evacuated by its Spanish garrison, 
 who retired up the river Cesar towards Valle de Upar. 
 Still pushing on, Bolivar, after defeating a royalist 
 detachment at Chiriguana, reached Tamaleque, Puerto 
 Real,^ and finally Ocana, an important place well above 
 the valley of the Magdalena in the foothills of the 
 Eastern Cordilleras. He had gained a very considerable 
 and important success, opening as he had nearly 300 
 miles of the lower Magdalena, clearing out the Spanish 
 garrisons, and capturing their boats, as well as much 
 
 1 Mompox was in Bolivar's time on the main stream. This has now 
 shifted twenty miles to the west, and the branch which passes Mompox has 
 become a minor one, only navigable for steamers when the river is in flood. 
 
 2 Banco stands on a slight eminence on the right bank of the Magdalena, 
 at the point where, now, the branch passing Mompox separates from the 
 main stream. 
 
 * Puerto Ocafia on the map. Now called Puerto Nacional. Up to about 
 this point steamers can travel day and night. Above it, it is generally only 
 safe to proceed by day. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
84 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 ammunition, many muskets, and some artillery. More- 
 over, he had freed for the use of Cartagena all the plain 
 to the west of the Magdalena, whence supplies of cattle 
 and grain could be drawn. 
 
 It was now time for Bolivar to call a halt and 
 endeavour to regularise his very irregular position. 
 Labatut was furious at his disobedience of orders, all 
 the more so because it had redounded to the glory of 
 a man of whom he was jealous. He issued orders for 
 Bolivar's immediate return to Barranca, orders to which 
 the successful lieutenant replied by detailing his victories, 
 without any promise of obedience. Labatut appealed 
 to Torices at Cartagena, demanding Bolivar's trial by 
 court martial. But Torices, appreciating the advan- 
 tages gained at the cost of insubordination, refused the 
 request, even when Labatut hastened to Cartagena to 
 back it in person. 
 
 Bolivar, therefore, had matters all his own way, and 
 rose immensely in the estimation of the Cartagenians.^ 
 He now considered himself on the high road to carrying 
 out his greater scheme of invading Venezuela from the 
 west. 
 
 At this time the Spanish military commander of 
 Maracaibo, Ramon Correa, was firmly established about 
 Ciicuta. He had marched thither from Maracaibo 
 whilst Monteverde was subduing the central part of 
 Venezuela. 
 
 Forcing back such republican troops as he encountered 
 in the provinces of Trujillo and Merida, he was now in a 
 position to threaten the Granadian towns of Pamplona 
 and Ocafia. Had he been bold enough to press on, he 
 
 ' According to Briceno Mendez, Bolivar had got permission from Torices 
 for his expedition even before the capture of Tenerife. This seems more 
 than doubtful on the virhole. In any case, Bolivar's appeal to the govern- 
 ment, behind the back of his immediate superior, would not much improve 
 his position in the matter of insubordination. Labatut nras soon aftervrards 
 arrested by order of Torices, and expelled from Cartagena territory. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CARTAGENA AND NEW GRANADA 85 
 
 could probably have easily driven out Manuel Castillo, 
 the republican officer commanding in Pamplona. For- 
 tunately for Castillo, who was weak in troops and 
 hampered by factions and dissensions in the country, 
 Correa remained inactive. The commandant of Pam- 
 plona, hearing of Bolivar's arrival in Ocafla, now appealed 
 to him for help. 
 
 But Bolivar, however much the proposal might suit 
 his ultimate aims, was compelled to refuse for the 
 moment, until he could obtain permission for the ex- 
 pedition from Torices, and also replace the heavy losses 
 which he had suffered from desertion and hardships. 
 Informing Castillo of the necessity for sanction from 
 Cartagena, and leaving his faithful lieutenant and uncle, 
 Jos6 Felix Ribas ^ in command of the troops at Ocana, 
 Bolivar returned to Mompox, inspecting his posts on the 
 river as he went, and collecting all spare arms and 
 ammunition. 
 
 By the 9th February he was able to start back for 
 Ocana, armed with the sanction of Torices, and ready 
 to march eastwards with 400 men — truly a miserable 
 force with which to set out, but Bolivar relied upon 
 gathering recruits after his first successes. The march 
 from Ocafla to Ciicuta involved crossing the great eastern 
 branch of the Colombian Cordilleras. Perhaps the 
 feature that strikes the traveller most in the Colombian 
 Andes is the apparent simplicity of general outline, 
 combined with a most remarkable wildness and savagery 
 of detail. Mountains which are seemingly rounded and 
 easy hills, prove, on closer acquaintance, to offer the 
 greatest difficulties to transit. Immense gorges, shut in 
 by precipices, sometimes thousands of feet in height, 
 traverse them in all directions, and through these, closely 
 shut in on both sides, with no road beyond the bed of 
 the torrent, which in the course of ages has cut its way 
 ^ Ribas was married to the sister of Bolivar's mother. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
86 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 through the rock, Bolivar's force, for army is hardly an 
 appropriate name for the equivalent of half a battalion, 
 had to pass. Frequently places were met with where 
 the invading troops, deep down in a gorge so narrow 
 that the rays of the sun rarely reached the bottom, 
 might easily have been stopped and destroyed by a 
 handful of resolute men. At other times the path 
 skirted the edge of a precipice, where a false step 
 meant destruction. The country was uninhabited, save 
 by a few Indians living in solitary huts, and was con- 
 stantly swept by terrible storms. Such was the tract to 
 be traversed, after the first thirty miles from Ocafla, till 
 Salazar de las Palmas was reached. The road was 
 difficult for mountaineers ; for the men of the hot plains 
 of Cartagena composing Bolivar's force, unaccustomed as 
 they were to the cold, the piercing winds, and the rarefied 
 air of these high altitudes, it was terrible. But Bolivar's 
 enthusiasm and energy carried them along with him. 
 At one place the way was barred by lOO royalists 
 holding heights which, properly defended, were im- 
 pregnable. It was only by stratagem that Bolivar 
 succeeded in opening the road. He sent a countryman 
 round by a difficult and dangerous path over the shoulder 
 of the hill of which the Spaniards held the summit. He 
 was, as Bolivar intended, captured by the enemy and 
 searched. On him was found a despatch, addressed to 
 a fictitious officer, supposed to have been sent by 
 Castillo to attack the position in rear, in combination 
 with Bolivar's attack in front. The Spanish commander 
 promptly resolved to march back on Salazar, in order to 
 surprise the detachment supposed to be marching on his 
 rear. When he found out that the force was imaginary, 
 and attempted to return to his old position, it was too 
 late, for Bolivar was installed there. Thence the 
 republicans marched without opposition to Salazar. 
 There Bolivar stopped to rest his men, and to wait for 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CARTAGENA AND NEW GRANADA 87 
 
 reinforcements from Pamplona, which were to meet him 
 at Arboledas. Before him the Spaniards fell back, thus 
 allowing him to reach San Cayetano, on the banks of 
 the Zulia, a tributary of the Catatumbo, which flows into 
 the Gulf of Maracaibo. He was now close to San Jos6 
 de Ciicuta, on which he marched on the 28th February. 
 
 Correa was at Mass at S. Jos6 when he heard that his 
 outposts had been driven in. He left his prayers, and 
 hurried off to draw up his forces against the small body 
 which was all the republicans showed. Thinking he 
 had to deal with only an advance guard, which he could 
 destroy before the main body arrived, he decided to 
 attack it in the strong position which it had occupied on 
 some heights. The fight lasted four hours, ending in the 
 complete defeat of the Spaniards, with heavy loss in 
 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Correa himself, slightly 
 wounded, narrowly escaped capture. Nevertheless, he 
 retreated in good order unpursued by the weary enemy.^ 
 Next morning, Bolivar followed him as far as San 
 Antonio on the Tichira, the boundary at this point 
 between New Granada and Venezuela. 
 
 By this advance Bolivar had cleared this part of New 
 Granada, and was rewarded by the capture of immense 
 quantities of merchandise collected by the Maracaibo 
 merchants in anticipation of a victorious advance by 
 Correa on Bogotd. At last, Bolivar stood within the 
 western portal of Venezuela, in the midst of plenty. 
 
 Here we must glance at what had been happening in 
 Venezuela since Bolivar's hurried departure seven months 
 previously. Monteverde had an excellent opportunity of 
 conciliating the country, which, exhausted by recent 
 events, and by the losses of the earthquake, looked 
 only for peace and reasonably good government. This 
 opportunity he allowed to escape him, and, by indis- 
 criminate arrests of well to do people, and by persecu- 
 ' Bolivar's report of the battle is in O'Leary, Docts. 13, p. 147. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
88 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 tions of the poor as well as the rich, soon exasperated 
 the whole population. He had raised some hopes by 
 promising to introduce the Constitution of Cadiz, as 
 stipulated in Miranda's capitulation ; but, when he at 
 last published it, he soon made it clear that the constitu- 
 tion was a dead letter when it happened to run counter 
 to his own absolute authority. Everywhere there was 
 consternation and oppression of Americans by Spaniards, 
 though many of the best of these latter clearly saw the 
 mistake, and openly lamented it. Still, Monteverde had 
 undoubtedly succeeded in reducing the rebellious pro- 
 vinces to subjection. He was now threatened both in the 
 east and in the west. Bolivar, victorious at San ]os6, set 
 vigorously to work to enlist the sympathies and assistance 
 of the republican government of New Granada, describ- 
 ing, in writing to its members, the fate of Venezuela, and 
 pointing out to them that Monteverde's success there 
 being once thoroughly achieved, he would turn his arms 
 westward for the subjugation of New Granada. He 
 painted in the rosiest colours the prospects of an inva- 
 sion of Venezuela, carefully suppressing all mention of 
 its dangers and risks. Those he reserved till it should 
 be necessary to urge them as an argument in favour of 
 implicit trust in himself and the supply to him of rein- 
 forcements and arms.^ 
 
 He had other difficulties to contend with ; for Castillo 
 was by no means inclined to serve under the Venezuelan 
 leader. Manuel de Castillo y Rada, a Cartagenian of 
 noble family and great influence, had hitherto played an 
 important part in the revolution, and it is not surprising 
 to find him resenting supersession by a Venezuelan 
 fugitive from his own country, even though that Vene- 
 zuelan had saved him from a very great danger. More- 
 over, he commanded looo men, a larger force than 
 Bolivar's. Both were men of violent and proud tempera- 
 ' Letter of 19th March 1813. O'Leary, Docts. 13, p. 159. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INVASION OF VENEZUELA 89 
 
 ment, neither would yield, and the quarrel grew and 
 rankled in the breasts of both in the succeeding years. 
 The dispute was taken up by the army, and dissension 
 spread amongst officers and men alike, the Venezuelans 
 generally espousing the cause of Bolivar, the Granadians 
 that of Castillo. Both commanders were in fault, but 
 once the quarrel had started it could not be appeased. 
 It was rare indeed to find among these republican 
 leaders patriotism sufficient to induce them to sink their 
 personal differences for the common good. 
 
 Bolivar had, with much difficulty, extracted from the 
 Congress of New Granada a grudging permission for the 
 continuation of his advance beyond the Venezuelan 
 border into the provinces of Merida and Trujillo. They 
 had made him a brigadier-general, but had proposed to 
 hamper his movements and restrain the extent of his 
 march by attaching a commission to him. He had 
 started long before the commissioners reached him. 
 
 The army had received some reinforcements of Grana- 
 dian troops. Its vanguard was commanded by Castillo, 
 whilst Ribas, the Venezuelan, was at the head of the 
 other division. At La Grita, four days' march from 
 S. Jos6, Castillo came upon Correa, now inferior in 
 forces, but holding a strong position. On the 13th 
 May the Spaniard was driven from his position. Castillo 
 then left the army, returned to Ciicuta, and, sending in 
 his resignation of his command, retired to his native city, 
 Cartagena. Some of his officers followed his example, 
 and it was with great difficulty that his division was held 
 together at all. It was reduced in numbers to 500 men. 
 
 Bolivar was glad to be rid of a troublesome sub- 
 ordinate, but his position was so difficult that at one 
 time there seemed a prospect of the expedition break- 
 ing down entirely. He had, however, some devoted 
 adherents, both Granadian and Venezuelan. One of the 
 latter, Rafael Urdaneta, wrote to him thus : " General ! 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
90 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 If two men are sufficient to liberate the Fatherland, I 
 
 am ready to accompany you." ^ 
 
 When Bolivar reached La Grita, he found Castillo 
 gone, but he also found that that commander had been 
 working vigorously against the invasion of Venezuela, 
 holding a council of war on the subject, and endeavour- 
 ing to get the Government of New Granada to withold 
 their promised assistance. As for the leading division, 
 it was now under the command of Francisco de Paula 
 Santander,2 a warm supporter of Castillo, and a man by 
 no means inclined to obey Bolivar, who, however, treated 
 him with great firmness. " March at once," said he 
 peremptorily to Santander ; " there is no other alternative 
 to marching. If you do not, either you will have to 
 shoot me, or I shall infallibly shoot you." * The division 
 indeed marched, but without Santander, who excused 
 himself from rejoining it, much to Bolivar's relief 
 
 The Congress of New Granada was now genuinely exert- 
 ing itself to help Bolivar's project, though it was probably 
 a good deal surprised by the rapidity of his advance. 
 Leaving La Grita on the 17th May, he reached Merida 
 on the 23 rd, the whole population rising against the 
 Spaniards as he progressed. At Merida he replaced 
 in power the republican government which had been 
 driven out by Monteverde's people. In the midst of 
 the rejoicings at this provincial capital came the news 
 that Antonio Nicolas Bricefio, surnamed " El Diablo," 
 
 ' O'Leary, i. 122. Rafael Urdaneta played a considerable part under 
 Bolivar, and was one of his most faithful followers to the end. He was born 
 in Maracaibo in 1789. He died in Paris, where he was Venezuelan Minister, 
 in 1845. 
 
 Cochrane (ii. 97) describes him as " a handsome, agreeable, well-informed 
 man, more resembling an European officer than any other I have met with in 
 the country." 
 
 ^ Santander, born at Kosario de Ciicuta in 1792, had served in the army of 
 New Granada since the commencement of the revolution. He held in 1813 
 the rank of major. 
 
 ' O'Leary, i. 123. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
WAR TO THE DEATH 91 
 
 had been captured and shot by the Spanish general 
 Yanez, an event which is of importance, mainly, as being 
 the immediate cause of Bolivar's declaration of the 
 " Guerra a muerte " against the Spaniards. 
 
 Bricefio was a hot-headed, enthusiastic Venezuelan 
 who had accompanied Bolivar to Cartagena. Against 
 the advice and wishes of his chief, he set out on an 
 independent expedition, with an inadequate force of 
 143 men, breathing vengeance against the Spaniards 
 and proclaiming loudly that he would give no quarter. 
 He was as good as his word, for two unfortunate 
 Spaniards who fell into his hands were promptly 
 decapitated by his orders. It is said that he sent the 
 heads of his victims, one to Bolivar and the other to 
 Castillo. With them he sent letters, the first line of 
 which was written with the blood of the victims instead 
 of with ink. Marching for the plains of the Upper 
 Apure, he was surprised, before reaching Guadalito, by 
 Yanez, his force was destroyed, himself made prisoner 
 and carried off to Barinas. Considering their treatment 
 of the two Spaniards, it is hardly surprising that Yanez 
 should have shot Bricefio and his fellow-prisoners. This, 
 however, gave Bolivar an excuse for proclaiming a war 
 without mercy, which he had long contemplated. It 
 will be remembered that he had fallen out with Miranda 
 on account of what he considered the too great leniency 
 of the Venezuelan commander-in-chief He had again, 
 in his manifesto at Cartagena, urged the employment of 
 measures of unstinted severity. Now, on the 15 th June 
 181 3, after taking possession of Trujillo, he issued his 
 proclamation of war to the death.^ The gist of it 
 is in the concluding words : " Spaniards and Canary 
 Islanders ! reckon on death, even if you are neutral, 
 unless you work actively for the liberty of America. 
 Americans ! count on life, even if you are culpable." 
 ' Given in full. O'Leary, Docts. 13, p. 251. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
92 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 This terrible order it is difficult, notwithstanding the 
 pleas of Bolivar's admirers, not to reckon as one of the 
 most serious blots upon his character and humanity. 
 Few unprejudiced persons, probably, will hold that a 
 decision can on any grounds be excused which con- 
 templated the wholesale massacre not only of prisoners 
 of war, but even of Spaniards who desired to remain 
 neutral, and which was, as will be seen later, actually 
 carried into action in this sense. No Spaniard could 
 hope to escape unless actively a traitor to his own 
 party. It is true that Bolivar, in many instances, did 
 not carry out his own decree, and, as we shall see 
 presently, he appears to have repented of the order not 
 very long after its issue. He finally rescinded it in 
 1820, in agreement with his opponent Morillo. It may 
 be also true^ that Tizcar, on the Spanish side, had 
 already issued a similar order, which was the immediate 
 cause of Bolivar's decision. Still, the misdeeds of the 
 other side are no sufficient excuse for so barbarous a 
 decision as Bolivar's. Restrepo (ii. 141) defends the 
 measure on the ground that it was necessary to arouse, 
 by violent methods, a race which, living in slavery, had 
 sunk into inveterate apathy. " Deep-seated evils require 
 extreme remedies." Surely a very insufficient plea.^ 
 
 Before continuing the description of Bolivar's further 
 advance into Venezuela from the west, it will be well to 
 refer briefly to what was going on simultaneously in the 
 east. 
 
 Amongst the fugitives from the vengeance of Monte- 
 verde in the eastern districts were a few rather notable 
 
 ^ Lairazabal, i. 173. 
 
 ^ That Bolivar did not hesitate to carry out his threats was soon shown. 
 In reporting his proceedings to the Congress of New Granada (14th August 
 1813), he wrote: "After the battle of Tinaquillo, I marched without delay 
 by the towns of Tocuyito, Valencia, Guayos, Guacara, San Joaquin, 
 Maracay, Turmero, San Mateo and La Victoria, where all the Europeans 
 and Canarians, almost without exception, have been shot " (Restrepo, 
 ii. 169). 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MARINO IN THE EAST 93 
 
 men. Santiago Marifio was the chief among them. 
 Perhaps Ducoudray-Holstein is not far wrong in de- 
 scribing him as " a weak and ignorant but very ambitious 
 young man." ^ Another was Jos6 Francisco Bermudez,^ 
 who played a very considerable part in subsequent 
 events, as did Manuel Valdds.^ Antonio Jos6 de Sucre * 
 rose to much greater eminence, especially in Peru and 
 Bolivia, and was admittedly a better commander than 
 Bolivar himself Manuel Piar,^ a mulatto native of 
 Cura5ao, was also one of the most capable commanders 
 on the republican side, a man whom Bolivar feared 
 as a dangerous rival, and whom he eventually caused to 
 be shot. 
 
 All these took refuge, when Monteverde overran and 
 crushed the eastern districts, in the British colony of 
 Trinidad, where, according to O'Leary, they met with 
 rather shabby treatment at the hands of the governor. 
 Sir R. Woodford.6 
 
 At Port of Spain, the capital of Trinidad, the exiles 
 
 ' Santiago Marino was born in Margarita in 1788 of a family of some 
 distinction. He came into his possessions on the death of his father two 
 years before the revolution. In 1810 he was appointed captain by the 
 Junta, and marched with Colonel Villapol against Guayana. His services 
 gained him the rank of lieut. -colonel, and later he was appointed commandant 
 of the coast of Guiria, where his gallant defence was rewarded with the 
 grade of colonel. When Miranda capitulated in 1812 Marino retired to his 
 sister's farm in Trinidad. It was there that he heard of Monteverde's 
 violation of the capitulation, and at once assembled his fellow-refugees to 
 decide on the invasion of Venezuela. 
 
 ^Born at Areocar in Cumana in 1782. Joined the republicans from the 
 beginning in 1809. He will constantly appear in this history, more often as 
 the opponent of Bolivar than as his friend. After Bolivar's death he joined 
 Paez, then President of Venezuela. Bermudez was assassinated in December 
 1831. 
 
 * Manuel Vald^s. Born at Caracas 1785. Died at Angostura, 1845. He 
 fought throughout the War of Independence, including Bolivar's campaigns 
 in Peru, and his career will be incidentally recorded hereafter. 
 
 * Sucre was born in Cumana in 1793. His career, which was inseparably 
 bound up with that of Bolivar, will be related hereafter. 
 
 ° A notice of Piar will be found when we deal with his execution. 
 ^ O'Leary, i. 148. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
94 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 were alwg.ys in sight of their native shores, just across the 
 Gulf of Paria ; indeed, at the north-western and south- 
 western horn-hke projections of Trinidad literally only 
 a musket-shot intervenes between British territory and 
 Venezuela. 
 
 In Trinidad these refugees organised an expedition to 
 fan the smouldering flames of revolution in the Venezuelan 
 districts of Guiria and Maturin. On the night of the 1 3th 
 January 1 8 1 3, the refugees, under fifty in number, and 
 having but five muskets among them as their whole 
 modern military stock-in-trade, sailed on their apparently 
 desperate enterprise. Landing at Guiria, within sight of 
 Port of Spain, they succeeded in surprising the small 
 Spanish detachment holding it. Their arrival was the 
 signal for the collection of many of the down-trodden 
 inhabitants of the neighbourhood, men rendered desperate 
 by the tyrannies of Monteverde's officers. The invaders 
 did not allow the grass to grow under their feet, but 
 pushed out parties in all directions against the scattered 
 royalist detachments, who, unsuspecting of any danger, 
 were surprised and defeated. With the arms captured 
 from them, Mariflo and his friends were able to exchange 
 the bows and arrows, with which alone they had been for 
 the most part armed, for muskets. The most important 
 advance was made towards the south by a force com- 
 manded by Piar and Bermudez. They first moved on 
 Maturin, a town lying on the northern edge of the great 
 plain of the lower Orinoco. The inhabitants, ripe for 
 revolt, received Bermudez and Piar with enthusiasm. 
 Between these two commanders there was friction, which 
 ended in Piar taking the chief command. He now had 
 to defend himself against the forces sent by the governor 
 of Cumand to recover Maturin. They appear to have 
 been dribbled up, and Piar was able to defeat them in 
 succession, taking arms, ammunition, and even artillery. 
 Thus, when Monteverde himself arrived with a force 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN THE WEST 95 
 
 which is probably very much overstated at 3090 men,^ 
 he also was badly beaten and forced to retire towards 
 Caracas. 
 
 Meanwhile Marino, gradually gaining strength at Guiria, 
 was at length able to advance on the town of Cumand, 
 which, on the 3rd August, opened its gates to him. 
 
 But we are anticipating somewhat, and must now 
 return to Bolivar, whom we left at Trujillo, towards the 
 close of June, preparing to advance on Caracas. His 
 force had been augmented by the enlistment of American 
 prisoners taken from the Spaniards in the various actions. 
 On the 28th June he marched from Trujillo, whilst Ribas 
 started from Merida with 400 men, the objective of both 
 being Guanare, south-east of Trujillo and north-east of 
 Merida. Bolivar reached Guanare on the ist July, after 
 crushing a detachment of fifty Spaniards as he issued from 
 the mountains on to the plains of Barinas. He had marched 
 by a little-known and difficult pass, by which his arrival 
 was evidently not expected. 
 
 On this same i st July, Ribas,^ who had a much longer 
 distance to march, had reached Bocon6 unopposed, when 
 he heard of a Spanish force 800 strong, under Marti, at 
 Niquitao, between himself and Bolivar. Marti had been 
 sent northwards by Yanez for the special purpose of cutting 
 Bolivar's communications, and at Niquitao he was almost 
 on them. He was in a position either to march on Bolivar's 
 rear, as the latter moved south to meet Tizcar, who was at 
 Barinas, or to move on Barinas, and, united with Tizcar, 
 meet Bolivar in front. Though Ribas had only 400 men, 
 he saw that Marti must at all hazards be destroyed. 
 Marching promptly, he found Marti drawn up at the 
 
 * O'Leary, i. 151 n. 
 
 ^ Jose Felix Ribas, born in Caracas in 1775 of a noble family, was married 
 to the sister of Bolivar's mother. He was a member of the Junta of Caracas 
 of the 19th April 1810. He raised the battalion " Barlovento," of which he 
 became colonel. In 1812 he is said to have owed a passport, to leave Caracas 
 and accompany Bolivar, to some relationship to Monteverde. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
96 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 top of a steep ascent, on a plateau much cut up with 
 ravines. The fight lasted nearly all day, from 9 A.M., 
 and Ribas's ammunition was almost exhausted. Then 
 he charged with the bayonet, and completely broke up 
 Marti's force, which was divided and hampered by the 
 very ravines to which it looked for protection. The force 
 was almost entirely destroyed, 450 prisoners were taken 
 and 700 muskets, and Marti himself escaped with diffi- 
 culty, accompanied by only a few men. Amongst the 
 prisoners were 400 South Americans, whom Ribas 
 promptly drafted into his own force. Meanwhile Bolivar, 
 marching south from Guanare, was within ten miles of 
 Tizcar, at Barinas, before the Spaniard was aware of his 
 movements. 
 
 On the 6th July Bolivar entered Barinas, which Tizcar 
 had evacuated, and captured there a quantity of arms, 
 ammunition, supplies of all sorts, and thirteen guns 
 abandoned by Tizcar in his hurried retreat towards the 
 Apure. A force under Girardot, a young Granadian, who 
 had recently beaten the Spaniards at Carache, was sent 
 southwards in pursuit of Tizcar, who hoped to cross the 
 Apure at Nutrias, in order to effect a junction with the 
 Spaniards under Yafiez, about Guadalito. He was aware 
 of the destruction of Marti's force by Ribas at Niquitao, 
 and was too weak to continue alone the advance on Merida 
 and Trujillo. Bolivar, in fact, had been completely suc- 
 cessful in landing himself in the very midst of the Spanish 
 forces in Western Venezuela before they could concentrate. 
 He had effectually separated Yafiez and Tizcar from the 
 forces in the north. Girardot's pursuit of Tizcar was 
 very effectual. The Spanish general, closely followed, 
 found a fresh obstacle in a rising against him of the 
 exasperated inhabitants of Nutrias. Caught between 
 two fires, his force was dispersed, and he himself, almost 
 alone, had to escape by boat down the Apure to S. 
 Fernando. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN THE WEST gy 
 
 Bolivar, having disposed of Marti and Tizcar, and 
 having little fear of Yanez for the present, now turned 
 northwards against the two forces remaining in that 
 direction — those of Oberto at Barquisemeto, and of 
 Izquierdo at San Carlos. Before marching, he sent a 
 detachment towards the plains of Calabozo to divert 
 attention in that direction. Leaving a battalion in 
 Barinas to guard his rear, he himself marched, on the 
 1 6th July, for San Carlos, at the same time sending 
 Ribas against Oberto at Barquisemeto. Ribas, march- 
 ing by Tocuyo, came upon Oberto on the 2 2d July, 
 drawn up in a good position on the plain of Los 
 Horcones, between Tocuyo and Barquisemeto.^ The 
 Spanish force was particularly strong in the fact that 
 three-fourths of it consisted of European troops, whilst 
 only one-fourth was American. The fight was short 
 but sanguinary. Ribas was at first repulsed, but then, 
 pushing in with the bayonet, completely defeated the 
 enemy, capturing the four guns which he had. Ribas, 
 after occupying Barquisemeto, marched eastwards to 
 rejoin Bolivar. The latter, meanwhile, had reached San 
 Carlos unopposed on the 28th July; for Izquierdo, who 
 had 1500 men, hearing of the ruin of Oberto at Los 
 Horcones, had retired on Valencia. At San Carlos 
 Bolivar remained two days to draw in his detachments 
 and rearguard. On the Spanish side, meanwhile, Mon- 
 teverde, as already mentioned, had only just escaped 
 capture by Piar at Maturin in the east, and had made 
 his way to Caracas on the 6th July. Hearing of 
 Bolivar's advance, and successively of the defeats of 
 Marti, Tizcar, and Oberto, and of the retreat of Izquierdo, 
 he ordered the last named to hurry to Valencia, whither 
 Monteverde himself went. 
 
 Bolivar had apparently already begun to repent of his 
 declaration of war to the death, for at San Carlos he 
 
 ' About midway between Quibor and Barquisemeto. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
98 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 issued a proclamation to the Spaniards and Canary 
 Islanders offering them terms, and urging them to 
 abandon Monteverde. Bolivar left San Carlos on the 
 30th July with 2300 men, taking the direction of 
 Tinaquillo, where he heard the royalists were. 
 
 On the night of the 30th, Izquierdo camped at Los 
 Pegones, Bolivar about fifteen miles south of him, at Las 
 Palmas. At 2 A.M. Bolivar heard from his cavalry that 
 the enemy was 1000 strong, and about to advance. 
 Forcing the pace, the republican leader, on coming up 
 with the enemy, found him already retreating. The 
 cavalry were sent in pursuit as far as the plain of Los 
 Taguanes, where Izquierdo formed for battle. Bolivar 
 had now to await the arrival of his infantry for the 
 attack. Both forces advanced simultaneously. Bolivar 
 sent his cavalry, which was on his right, to get round 
 Izquierdo's left on the open plain. The latter, seeing 
 himself in danger of being cut from Valencia, began to 
 retreat in good order, which was maintained for six hours. 
 Then a fresh threat of the republican cavalry broke him 
 up, and in the disordered flight which ensued he lost two 
 hundred prisoners, many muskets, and much ammunition. 
 Some of his infantry deserted, many were killed or 
 wounded, and the whole force was almost annihilated. 
 Izquierdo, mortally wounded, fell into Bolivar's hands, 
 and died at San Carlos from his wounds.^ Monteverde, 
 at Valencia, had only just time to escape to the fortress 
 of Puerto Cabello. So hurried was his flight that even 
 his correspondence was left behind. Amongst it was a 
 letter from Zerberiz, a subordinate commander, in which 
 he calmly advocates leaving alive none of "those in- 
 famous Creoles who foment these dissensions." On the 
 2nd August, Bolivar occupied Valencia, whence the road 
 to Caracas was now open. He considered the campaign 
 
 ^ Bolivar's report to the Congress of New Granada, dated Valencia, 2nd 
 August 1813. O'Leary, Docts. 13, p. 321. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE LIBERATOR IN CARACAS 99 
 
 practically over, except for the siege of Puerto Cabello,^ 
 which could hardly hold out long. Meanwhile, he 
 sent a force under Girardot, who had greatly distin- 
 guished himself at Taguanes, to threaten the place and 
 keep Monteverde from breaking out. Then, on the 3rd 
 August, he set out on his march for Caracas, between 
 which and himself there was now no hostile force. 
 
 In Caracas the utmost confusion prevailed, for Monte- 
 verde was gone to Puerto Cabello, and Fierro the 
 governor had no idea of organising resistance. Instead, 
 he decided to send envoys to Bolivar to treat for a 
 capitulation. On the 4th August, Bolivar reached La 
 Victoria, where he was met by Fierro's envoys, headed 
 by his old friend and benefactor, Don Francisco Iturbe, 
 the man to whom he owed his passport after the 
 surrender of Miranda. The terms eventually agreed 
 upon were as follows ^ : — 
 
 (i) The inhabitants of Caracas to be allowed to choose 
 their own form of government. 
 
 (2) Security of life and property for all Spaniards, 
 
 including the garrison, together with the right 
 to a passport to leave Venezuela at any time 
 within two months of the capitulation. 
 
 (3) Surrender to Bolivar of Caracas itself, of La Guaira, 
 
 and of all other towns in the province. 
 
 (4) The capitulation to be sent to Monteverde at 
 
 Puerto Cabello for ratification within twenty- 
 four hours. 
 
 The envoys returned to Caracas with the capitulation, 
 only to find that, in their absence, there had been a 
 regular stampede of the Spanish authorities and their 
 sympathisers, headed by Fierro himself. Altogether, it 
 was said, some six thousand persons had followed Fierro 
 to La Guaira, without waiting to see what terms would 
 
 ' Idem. ° O'Leary, Docts. 13, p. 325. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
loo SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 be granted by the victor. Many of them had embarked 
 there and left the country, or gone to Puerto Cabello. 
 After all, the terms were at least as good as could be 
 expected under the circumstances. Fierro's action in 
 thus leaving the capital at the mercy of the mob must 
 certainly be condemned. He had not even ratified the 
 terms of the capitulation arranged by his emissaries. 
 Doubtless his flight was largely due to fear of the enforce- 
 ment of Bolivar's decision as to the " guerra k muerte," 
 of which, as we have said, he had already shown signs of 
 repentance. 
 
 On the 6th August, Bolivar and his troops entered 
 Caracas in triumph, the commander being for the first 
 time saluted by the populace with the title of " Liberator." 
 On all sides he was surrounded by crowds shouting, 
 " Long live our Liberator ; Long live New Granada ; 
 Long live the Saviour of Venezuela." Wreaths of laurels 
 and of flowers were offered in profusion, salutes were fired, 
 bands played, and everyone treated Bolivar as a sort of 
 tutelary deity of Venezuela. Much incense has, of course, 
 been burnt at the shrine by Venezuelan writers in describ- 
 ing the events of this day. To others it may seem doubtful 
 how far all this enthusiasm and flattery was genuine. 
 
 However sweet the plaudits may have sounded to 
 Bolivar, he had much to do to set things in order after 
 the disappearance of all semblance of government with 
 Fierro and his officials. After re-establishing order, and 
 providing for the safety of the public offices, magazines, 
 and parks, which had been left unguarded, and in some 
 cases had been partially pillaged, he issued the proclama- 
 tion which was always made wherever he arrived under 
 similar circumstances. In it he announced the re-incar- 
 nation of the republic under the auspices of the Congress 
 of New Granada.1 He invited foreigners to settle in the 
 
 ' O'Leary, Docts. 13, p. 332. It is dated 8th August 1813, iii. of 
 Independence. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE LIBERATOR IN CARACAS loi 
 
 country, offering them full protection and safety, which 
 it was certainly beyond his power at this time to 
 guarantee.! Then he appointed secretaries to the 
 different departments, and drew out a scheme for the 
 provisional government. Tomas Montilla^ was Secretary 
 for War, R. D. Merida Secretary for Justice and Police, 
 whilst A. M. Tebar held the portfolios of the " State " 
 department, and, temporarily, of finance. Crist6bal 
 Mendoza was made governor of Caracas, and Ribas 
 military commandant. Lastly, Bolivar organised a Com- 
 mission, consisting largely of Spaniards, whose mission 
 was to proceed to Puerto Cabello and demand Monte- 
 verde's ratification of the capitulation of La Victoria. 
 
 Having made all these arrangements, he issued, on the 
 9th August, another proclamation convoking an assembly 
 of the chief inhabitants to discuss and settle the form of 
 government to be instituted, and to appoint officials to 
 carry on the administration meanwhile. It concluded 
 with the words : " The Liberator of Venezuela renounces 
 for ever, and formally declines to accept, any authority 
 except that of leading our soldiers to danger, in order to 
 save the Fatherland."' This was Bolivar's first resigna- 
 tion of authority, a resignation which it is difficult to 
 suppose was intended to be accepted. We shall find 
 many more instances, in the course of this history, of 
 similar resignations at critical periods, which, like the 
 present one, were not accepted, and were probably never 
 intended to be so. 
 
 On the loth August the Commission to Monteverde 
 was despatched from Valencia to Puerto Cabello, preceded 
 by a lettfer to him signed by the Commissioners them- 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 342. 
 
 ■-' A native of Caracas. Member of the Junta of 1810. Accompanied 
 Bolivar to Cartagena, and followed him in many actions, besides gaining 
 several himself. Died in Caracas, 1822. 
 
 ^ O'Leary, Docts. 13, p. 343. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
I02 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 selves, amongst them being Salvador Garcia de Ortigosa, 
 
 a Spanish priest. 
 
 It will be remembered that Fierro had sent envoys to 
 negotiate a capitulation, but he had certainly not author- 
 ised them to ratify it when concluded. When they 
 returned to Caracas with it, Fierro was gone, and there 
 was no one to approve it before it was sent to Monte- 
 verde. This was admitted in the letter, which concluded 
 with a demand for a safe conduct {ox parlementaires. No 
 answer was vouchsafed to this or two subsequent letters 
 till the 1 2th August, when a brief reply was received 
 from Monteverde. He denied the authority of Fierro or 
 the Cabildo of Caracas to negotiate a capitulation,^ and 
 held as void all acts done under their assumed authority. 
 He added — " and I can never assent to proposals un- 
 befitting the character and spirit of the great and 
 generous nation of which I am a servant." Further 
 correspondence resulted in no change of Monteverde's 
 defiant and uncompromising attitude, notwithstanding 
 Bolivar's warning to him that his ratification of the 
 capitulation was the only way to save the lives of the 
 thousands of prisoners now in the power of the republi- 
 cans. Perhaps Monteverde did not believe in a wholesale 
 massacre of all these unhappy people, who numbered some 
 four thousand in Caracas and La Guaira. The last-named 
 place had surrendered after the escape from it by sea of 
 Fierro and his friends, as Monteverde was aware from a 
 statement in the letter of the Commissioners. He was 
 running a fearful risk for these unfortunate people, but 
 he was not a man to care much for such risks, and it 
 cannot be doubted that he fully appreciated the immense 
 importance to Bolivar of obtaining ratification of a docu- 
 ment which practically put Monteverde out of court. 
 
 ' When Monteverde was compelled, by Izquierdo's defeat, to make for 
 Puerto Cabello, he had sent orders to Fierro to defend the capital (Restrepo, 
 "■ 159)- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE LIBERATOR IN CARACAS 103 
 
 His reply was certainly, it seems, a proper one, for Fierro 
 had evidently exceeded any powers he could possibly 
 pretend to have as Governor of Caracas. Had Bolivar 
 appeared before Puerto Cabello with all his force, except 
 so much of it as was absolutely necessary to keep order 
 in Caracas ; had he threatened to storm the fortress, 
 backing his threat with sufficient force, Monteverde might 
 possibly have thought otherwise. His decision was, 
 perhaps, largely based on his knowledge that Bolivar was 
 far away at Caracas, busy issuing proclamations and 
 doing other things which could quite well have waited 
 till matters were more settled. Monteverde was also 
 expecting reinforcements, with the aid of which he would 
 be able to drive off the weak observing force of Girardot. 
 Larrazabal objects to Torrente's ^ criticism, on these lines, 
 of Bolivar's action, but it seems to us justified. Bolivar, 
 in fact, was committing the old fault of attending to 
 minor matters before effecting the annihilation of the 
 enemy's armed forces. 
 
 His position was none too strong. He held, it is 
 true, Caracas, Valencia, La Guaira, and many other 
 towns ; he had so far been victorious in every action 
 with the Spaniards since he left Cartagena ; he knew 
 of the successful advance of Marino and Piar in the 
 eastern districts. Nevertheless, there were many causes 
 of anxiety on the other side. In his advance from 
 Trujillo, Bolivar had beaten Tizcar, Marti, Oberto, and 
 Izquierdo, but had left untouched the force of Yanez 
 beyond the Apure ; Monteverde, blockaded in Puerto 
 Cabello by an insufficient force, was still a danger in 
 the probable event of his receiving reinforcements from 
 Cuba and Puerto Rico. The province of Cord was 
 unsubdued, and still strongly royalist, and the case 
 was the same in Maracaibo. Guayana also was un- 
 touched, and, with its opening to the sea, and continuous 
 
 ^ Torrente, i. p. 415. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
104 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 water communication by the Orinoco, with its supplies 
 of food, and its recruiting area amongst the wild cowboys 
 of the vast plains, was a splendid base for royalist 
 operations. Into it had escaped Cajigal, when he 
 weakly abandoned hope before the advance of Piar on 
 Barcelona. But one of his lieutenants, Boves, had 
 insisted on staying behind, when Cajigal retired to 
 Angostura, with the object of organising forces on the 
 north bank of the Orinoco. Of him there will be much 
 to be said shortly. Lastly, though Bolivar might expect 
 to be aided in the common cause by the victorious 
 republicans in the east, he soon found them a very 
 broken reed. Whilst Bolivar was conquering western 
 Venezuela and setting himself up as Dictator there, 
 Marino and Piar had been almost equally successful 
 in the east. The former had proclaimed himself 
 Dictator of the Eastern Provinces, and was not in the 
 least inclined to cede the supremacy to Bolivar. After 
 all, there was no special reason why he should do so. 
 He and his companions had started their conquests 
 before Bolivar left New Granada, and they had done 
 almost as much as he had. It was not as if Bolivar 
 had previously exercised supreme command ; for in 
 Miranda's time his position had been distinctly sub- 
 ordinate, and, as we have said, it is by no means 
 improbable that it was that very fact which induced 
 Monteverde to let him slip through his fingers in 
 1812. 
 
 In addition to all these dangers, it is necessary to 
 take account of the fact that the principles of the 
 revolution had as yet taken no deep root amongst the 
 general population, who would probably have submitted 
 again willingly to Spanish rule if only the Spanish officials 
 and the Spanish Government could have made up their 
 minds to treat bygones as bygones, and to conciliate 
 public opinion by reasonable clemency, and the in- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE LIBERATOR IN CARACAS lOS 
 
 troduction of decent government. Even Larrazabal 
 writes of this period : " Tlie well-informed party in 
 Venezuela, the rich, the illustrious, sought independence 
 and sacrificed themselves for liberty ; but the people, 
 no ! " ^ He admits that, with the return to power of 
 the royalists in the end of 1 8 1 2, the country generally 
 had declared emphatically for the King. The people 
 were weary of the massacres by the royalists and the 
 retaliations of the republicans. Peace was their great 
 desire, and they would accept any government which 
 could give it. 
 
 Bolivar ordered a close blockade of Puerto Cabello, 
 and wrote to Marino for help. Meanwhile, he freely 
 confiscated the property of Spaniards and Canary 
 Islanders. On the i6th August he marched, at last, 
 for Puerto Cabello. The moment he turned his back 
 on Caracas, the slaves and Spaniards in the valley of 
 the Tuy broke into a revolt, which was only partially 
 put down by Francisco Montilla. Arrived at Valencia, 
 Bolivar thought it necessary to divide his forces. He 
 sent Tomas Montilla with 600 men towards Calabozo, 
 where Boves was organising a force; another 600 were 
 sent, under Ramon Garcia de Sena, against Reyes 
 Vargas and the priest Torrellas, who had 1000 men 
 towards Cor6. These two detachments of republicans 
 were presently to unite and march against Yaflez, who, 
 operating from Apure, was preparing to reconquer 
 Barinas. Bolivar himself, marching to Puerto Cabello, 
 succeeded in taking the outlying forts and confining 
 Monteverde to the fortress itself. In one of these fights 
 was captured Zuazola, a Spanish commander, whose 
 cruelties had made him specially obnoxious to the 
 republicans. Bolivar offered Zuazola in exchange for 
 Jalon, one of his own officers, a captive in Monteverde's 
 hands, but the Spaniard refused, saying he would 
 ^ Lariazabal, i. 237. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
io6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 kill two Creoles for every Spaniard executed.^ Zuazola 
 was hanged, in full view of the garrison of the fortress, 
 and Jalon was spared ! On the 1 6th September news 
 both good and bad reached Bolivar. The good news 
 was that Garcia de Sena had defeated Reyes Vargas, 
 the bad that Monteverde had received, by sea from 
 Puerto Rico, a reinforcement of 1300 men under Colonel 
 Salomon. That commander had narrowly escaped 
 capture at La Guaira, where he at first proposed to 
 land, believing it to be still in Spanish hands. When 
 he reached the port, on the 13 th September, the 
 republicans had hoisted the Spanish flag for the purpose 
 of deceiving Salomon, who entered the port without 
 suspicion, and was just about to disembark when he 
 discovered the ruse. He was fortunate enough to be 
 able to sail again for Puerto Cabello, though not without 
 some loss in ships and men from the fire of the fortress. 
 The means by which the republicans almost succeeded 
 in luring Salomon to destruction, smacked somewhat of 
 those of Murat at Prenzlau — indeed were rather worse. 
 
 On the night of the 17th September, Bolivar, raising 
 the siege of Puerto Cabello, fell back on Valencia. 
 Larrazabal would have us believe he did so because 
 he could operate better in the open country, owing to 
 his superiority in cavalry, but we need not hesitate to 
 believe that his real motive was fear of a sortie by the 
 reinforced garrison. Monteverde promptly issued from 
 Puerto Cabello, leading an advance guard of 500 men of 
 his own troops, and leaving Salomon to follow. The 
 latter had raised objections to serving under an upstart 
 like Monteverede,^ and, as Salomon had all the best of 
 the troops now in Puerto Cabello, Monteverde had to be 
 content with his promise, somewhat reluctantly given, to 
 
 ' Larrazabal, i. 215. 
 
 ^ Salomon was a gentleman of humane disposition. Monteverde was 
 neither one nor the other. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE LIBERATOR IN CARACAS 107 
 
 follow with the " Granada " regiment of Spaniards. He 
 appears to have taken his time, and was possibly by no 
 means unwilling to see Monteverde checked. Anyhow, 
 when Monteverde came up with Bolivar's rearguard at 
 Bdrbula, near Naguanagua, Salomon was halting many 
 miles behind him. Bolivar had intended to fall back 
 through Valencia to the famous position of La Cabrera 
 on the road to Caracas, and had already got Urdaneta's 
 division at Valencia, when he was aware of the presence 
 of Monteverde's 500 men on the heights of BArbula.^ 
 At first, he would only believe that this was an advance 
 guard a short distance in front of the main body, thrown 
 out to tempt him to a rash attack. It was only on the 
 30th September, after reconnoitring for two days, that he 
 found out the true position of affairs. 
 
 Monteverde, rashly as he had hazarded himself by his 
 advance, was now too much alarmed to allow himself to 
 be provoked into a descent on to the plain of Naguanagua 
 in front of him. Bolivar, having now brought back 
 Urdaneta from Valencia, proceeded to attack the 
 heights in three columns, under Girardot, Urdaneta, 
 and d'Elhuyar, respectively. His cavalry was useless 
 on the steep slopes leading to Monteverde's position. 
 However, his infantry so vastly outnumbered that oi 
 Monteverde that the Spaniards, after firing a single 
 volley, took to their heels. Girardot was killed by a 
 musket ball in the moment of victory, and though there 
 was nothing particularly remarkable in his death, Bolivar 
 chose to make it the subject of a glowing panegyric, 
 and, a little later, took the dead man's heart to Caracas, 
 where it was buried with an extraordinary amount of 
 ceremony and pomp. Bolivar, like Napoleon, loved a 
 theatrical display, but, in this instance, there was a good 
 deal of method in his display. He desired, no doubt, to 
 
 1 Barbula and Naguanagua, not shown on the map, are about half way 
 between Puerto Cabello and Valencia. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
io8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 raise the spirits of his followers generally, and especially 
 to conciliate the Granadians by the posthumous honours 
 showered upon one of themselves.^ 
 
 The night of the 30th September was spent by the 
 victors at Naguanagua, and next morning d'Elhuyar was 
 taken forward by Bolivar with only 1000 men against 
 Salomon and Monteverde at Las Trincheras, the rest 
 of the troops remaining where they were. This division 
 of his forces by Bolivar was hardly less rash than 
 Monteverde's unsupported advance on the other side. 
 He had not learnt that in war it is impossible to be too 
 strong at the decisive point. Nevertheless, the result 
 was different, for d'Elhuyar's division, all Granadians, 
 were burning to avenge the death of Girardot, and, when 
 they reached Salomon's and Monteverde's strong posi- 
 tion at Las Trincheras, they attacked with fury. After 
 five hours of desperate fighting, the royalist defence was 
 broken down and the whole force fell back in disorder to 
 Puerto Cabello, losing many men, arms, and stores of all 
 sorts. Monteverde was severely wounded in the jaw 
 during the retreat, and was now once more shut up in 
 Puerto Cabello, where his wound compelled him to yield 
 the command to Salomon. The blockading force was 
 left in charge of d'Elhuyar,^ whose victory of Las 
 Trincheras was extremely creditable to him and his 
 men ; for it was gained over a force composed largely 
 of picked European troops, and, if they did not number 
 as many as the 2000 that Larrazabal gives them, they 
 must have at least equalled the attacking force. 
 
 ' The memory of Girardot is preserved in the town, named after him, 
 from which the railway from the Magdalena to Bogota now starts. Hard 
 by is the river port of Ricaurte, commemorating another young Granadian, 
 whose death, to be recounted presently, was far more heroic. 
 
 2 D'Elhuyar was with Bolivar up to 1815. He was drowned in a ship- 
 wreck in that year when returning to Cartagena to take part in its defence 
 against Morillo. He had recently left it in consequence of the intrigues 
 then at their height there. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ORDER OF LIBERATORS 109 
 
 Bolivar found Salomon a more reasonable person to 
 deal with than Monteverde ; for, when Father Ortigosa 
 was sent to propose an exchange of the prisoners taken 
 at Barbula and Las Trincheras against republicans in 
 Puerto Cabello, on equal terms, Salomon agreed, and did 
 not even except Jalon, whom Monteverde had so recently 
 threatened to hang. Monteverde had refused an exchange 
 of two Spaniards for each republican offered by Bolivar 
 before Salomon's arrival. 
 
 The Spaniards had begun to recover from their defeats 
 in the east and west within a month of Bolivar's arrival 
 at Caracas early in August, and now he, in his central 
 position, saw himself threatened by several forces acting 
 concentrically. They were as follows : — 
 
 (i) Royalist guerillas were committing depredations, 
 in Maracaibo and towards Cdcuta, on the communica- 
 tions with New Granada. 
 
 (2) Rosete was ravaging the valley of the Tuy to the 
 south-east of Caracas. 
 
 (3) In the Orinoco plains, south and south-west of 
 Caracas, Bovcs and Morales were raising royalist forces 
 and harrying the country towards Calabozo. 
 
 (4) Yanez, on the Upper Apure, was threatening 
 Barinas. 
 
 On the 13th October, Bolivar was back in Caracas, 
 where he was again saluted as " Liberator," a title 
 which was confirmed by acclamation of an assembly 
 of the principal inhabitants convoked by the Cabildo. 
 This title Bolivar retained to the end of his life ; it was 
 always used in official documents, and by it he is generally 
 remembered in South America to this day. The title, 
 in 1813, was rather a dangerous one, however flattering 
 it might be to Bolivar's vanity. He was quick to see 
 that his personal elevation over the heads of men like 
 Urdaneta, Ribas, d'Elhuyar, Piar, and Marifio, who had 
 played so large a part in recent events, was calculated 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
no SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 to excite amongst them feelings of jealousy and dis- 
 satisfaction, and might give ground for suspicion that the 
 Liberator was aiming at a royal crown for himself 
 Though in the eyes of some Venezuelan writers it would 
 be treason to say so, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
 that it was by these considerations that Bolivar was 
 influenced in his creation of the " Order of Liberators," 
 which was freely conferred on everyone of any distinc- 
 tion amongst the republican leaders. Mark that the 
 name of the order was " of Liberators," not of " the 
 Liberator," a distinction clearly calculated to imply dis- 
 avowal of any monarchal ambitions.^ Nevertheless, 
 Bolivar himself remained par excellence " The Liberator." 
 The first members of the Order were Ribas, Urdaneta, 
 d'Elhuyar and Ortega (both the latter being Granadians), 
 and Campo Elias, a Spaniard who had embraced the 
 republican cause with such insane vehemence that he 
 vowed to kill every other Spaniard in the country, and 
 then to destroy himself as the last of them ! 
 
 ^ The inscription on the obverse of the badge of the Order was 
 "Liberator of Venezuela," and on the reverse was engraved the name of 
 the holder. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE SECOND DOWNFALL OF VENEZUELA, 1813-14 
 
 BOLIVAR'S position, in the centre of a circle 
 of enemies standing at various distances, 
 most of them considerable, from him, should 
 have impressed upon him that safety lay 
 in keeping his forces united, and falling in succession 
 upon his adversaries, beginning with the nearest, Rosete. 
 Instead of that, he committed the fatal mistake of 
 dividing his troops. Urdaneta was sent westwards 
 with one force to gather in the troops of Garcia de 
 Sena and those at San Carlos for operations against 
 Ceballos, the Spanish commander in Cor6, and later 
 against Yanez. At the same time, Campo Elias was 
 sent southwards towards Calabozo, to deal with Boves 
 and Morales, who had destroyed Montilla's force at 
 Calabozo. About this time also, Bolivar wrote to 
 Marino, the Dictator of the East, inviting him to a con- 
 ference at Caracas for the arrangement of the mutual 
 position of the two leaders. But before Marino could 
 possibly arrive, if he were willing to come, Bolivar found 
 himself called away from the capital by news of disasters. 
 The force of Garcia de Sena, now commanded by 
 Vald6s in consequence of the illness of Garcia, had been 
 beaten at Yaritigua, not far from Barquisemeto, by 
 Ceballos, issuing from Cor6 with 1300 men. Shortly 
 before, another republican commander, Aldao, had 
 suffered defeat at Bobare, west of Barquisemeto. At 
 the same time Yanez, who had reorganised his forces 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
112 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 at San Fernando on the Apure, marched upon Nutrias 
 with 2500 men, inflicting defeats there, and at Guanare, 
 Obispo, and other places on republican parties. At 
 Barinas he had executed the governor, and had his body 
 cut up into small pieces. He was rapidly approaching 
 Ceballos, and the united forces threatened disaster to the 
 besiegers of Puerto Cabello, and to Valencia. 
 
 Against these misfortunes must be set a victory 
 gained on the 14th October by Campo Elias, at Mos- 
 quitero,^ over iBoves. Unfortunately, however, this con- 
 verted Spaniard had done the republican cause more 
 harm than good by massacring the American prisoners 
 as \yell as the Spaniards, and treating the whole country 
 side with the utmost ferocity. Bolivar would have 
 enlisted the Americans in his own army ; for, in his pro- 
 clamation of war to the death, he was careful to exempt 
 Americans.^ The great danger was, therefore, for the 
 moment, in the west. Bolivar accordingly marched to the 
 rescue of Urdaneta, who was encamped at Gamelotal on 
 the slope of the Altar mountain, facing Barquisemeto. 
 Bolivar, sending a battalion ahead to reinforce Urdaneta, 
 marched as rapidly as possible with the rest of his force. 
 On the loth November he was within three miles of 
 Barquisemeto, at Cabudare. In front of him was the 
 victorious Ceballos, barring the advance of Urdaneta 
 into the province of Cor6. Bolivar at once attacked, 
 and, after two hours' fighting, Ceballos was forced to 
 retire on the Carora road. But, in the midst of the 
 pursuit, some one sounded the retreat on the republican 
 side. Panic resulted, as a report got about that Ceballos' 
 retirement was merely a stratagem to draw his enemy 
 
 ' Mosquitero is not shown on the map. It is on the left bank of the 
 R. Guarico, north of Calabozo, about three-fourths of the way from that 
 place to Sombrero. 
 
 2 Nevertheless, Bolivar, on the 6th September, had issued a decree of 
 death against all Americans joining the Spaniards in revolt (Restrepo, ii. 
 182). 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
OPERATIONS FROM CARACAS 113 
 
 into an ambuscade. Bolivar's men took to their heels, 
 hotly pursued, and were only saved from utter disaster 
 by the fortunate presence on the river Cabudare of a 
 squadron of cavalry, which charged the pursuers and 
 covered the republican retreat. This stopped Ceballos' 
 pursuit, but Bolivar and Urdaneta, when they succeeded 
 in rallying their troops on the Altar mountain, found 
 they had been so badly beaten as to necessitate retire- 
 ment to San Carlos in order to refit. It was also clear 
 that there was nothing now to hinder the junction of 
 Yafiez and Ceballos, so Bolivar returned to Valencia 
 to bring up reinforcements. Not only did the two 
 Spaniards unite, but Ceballos urged Salomon to 
 break out of Puerto Cabello and join them, either at 
 Barquisemeto or San Carlos, marching by San Felipe 
 and Nirgua. Salomon accordingly issued, on the i6th 
 November, with 1000 men, and had reached the heights 
 of Vigirima, on the road to Valencia, where he en- 
 countered Ribas with 500 men, chiefly students whom 
 he had collected in Caracas, now practically denuded of 
 troops. Bolivar, who had directed Ribas to hurry up 
 with everything he could collect, now joined him with 
 the troops from Valencia. On the morning of the 23rd 
 November, Bolivar endeavoured, by four hours of firing, 
 to provoke Salomon into a descent to the plain in front 
 of him. He failed, and was equally unsuccessful on the 
 24th. On the 25th he changed his tactics, and sent 
 Lamprea to seize some heights covering Salomon's left 
 wing, whilst d'Elhuyar acted similarly on the opposite 
 flank. These points appear to have been weakly held, 
 for both were captured by midday, whilst Bolivar, 
 advancing against the centre, withdrew Salomon's atten- 
 tion from his flanks. Seeing his position threatened on 
 both flanks, Salomon, under cover of darkness, withdrew 
 again to Puerto Cabello. Probably he would have had 
 a better chance of success had he followed Ceballos' 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
114 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 suggestion of marching on San Felipe, instead of into 
 
 the heart of Bolivar's army towards Valencia. His idea 
 
 was to march by Guacara to the valley of the Aragua, 
 
 or, at any rate, to divert attention from Ceballos and 
 
 Yaftez. 
 
 Bolivar now returned to Valencia to prepare for the 
 campaign against Ceballos and Yafiez. He ordered 
 Campo Elias to leave a force to contain the royalists 
 towards Calabozo, and to bring the rest towards San 
 Carlos.^ On the 28th November, Bolivar marched for 
 San Carlos, where, on the ist December, he found 
 himself in command of 3000 men. He could get no 
 information in a country which was now once more 
 entirely royalist, and, believing Ceballos to be at Bar- 
 quisemeto, he made for that place. On the way, he 
 heard that Yanez had seized Araure on his left rear, and 
 Ceballos also had moved thither. He at once turned 
 back in that direction after them, leaving some cavalry 
 to protect his communications with San Carlos against 
 raids by the royalist guerillas who swarmed in the 
 country. Passing the river Coyede on the 3rd December, 
 he was before Araure on the 4th, in sight of the 3500 
 men of Yafiez and Ceballos. On the morning of the 
 5 th, they were gone, and Bolivar sent Manrique to 
 regain contact with them with the advance guard and 
 400 cavalry. Manrique, who had orders not to hazard 
 an attack, discovered Ceballos drawn up at the foot of 
 some wooded heights, his front covered by a lake, and 
 his flanks protected by woods. Disregarding his orders, 
 Manrique attacked, with the result that he was utterly 
 defeated before Bolivar's arrival with the main body. 
 When Bolivar came up, he renewed the battle. Part of 
 his cavalry had some success against Ceballos' infantry, 
 but the rest was already broken by infantry and artillery 
 fire when Bolivar saved the situation with the infantry, 
 ' Campo Elias had had 2500 men in his battle with Boves at Mosquitero. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN CARACAS 115 
 
 and completely defeated the Spaniards, who dispersed 
 with the loss of 300 prisoners, the whole of their 10 
 guns, a quantity of supplies, and 1000 killed and 
 wounded. Amongst Bolivar's troops on this day was 
 one battalion composed of the remains of the infantry 
 who had fled at the recent battle of Barquisemeto. By 
 way of emphasising his disapproval of their conduct, 
 Bolivar had dubbed them the " Nameless Battalion " 
 (" Batallon sin Nombre "). At Araure they redeemed 
 their reputation by their gallantry, and were rewarded 
 with a name, that of the " Victor of Araure " (" Vencedor 
 de Araure "). Amongst their opponents was the battalion 
 " Numancia," which Yanez had organised at San Fer- 
 nando, entirely of Venezuelans. 
 
 After his victory, Bolivar fixed his headquarters at 
 La Aparicion de la Corteza, sent back his spoils to San 
 Carlos, despatched columns to recapture Barinas, Bar- 
 quisemeto, and other places, and himself went to 
 Valencia, which he reached on the evening of the 8th 
 December. On the 20th, he visited the besieging force 
 in front of Puerto Cabello, returning thence to Valencia, 
 and again reaching Caracas on the 29th to prepare for 
 operations in the south against Boves and Morales. 
 
 Here, in reply to the compliments of his officials on 
 his recent successes, he uttered words which were 
 decidedly premature in their optimism. He spoke of 
 having already avenged Venezuela, of having prostrated 
 the best army which had aimed at her enslavement, and 
 went on to state his views of the necessity of going on 
 to liberate, not only Venezuela, but the whole of Spanish 
 America, and of creating a united American nation in 
 Venezuela, New Granada, Quito, and Peru. Again, 
 Larrazabal admits that, "it was necessary to liberate 
 America by creating a public opinion which did not 
 exist." ^ To the Congress of New Granada, Bolivar 
 
 ^ Lairazabal, I. 246. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Ii6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 wrote, reporting his successes, and asserting that " the 
 independence of Venezuela is assured." Again, in in- 
 structions to his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he puts 
 forward his desire for the union of Venezuela and New 
 Granada as one nation, a scheme which he steadily pur- 
 sued to the end of his life, only to die seeing its defeat 
 by the separation of the two. The scheme was never 
 really practicable ; the differences of character of the two 
 populations were too great, the area of the two countries 
 was too vast for management by a single government, 
 and the jealousies of the leading men of either were a 
 bar fatal to it. At this particular time the chief sup- 
 porter in New Granada of Bolivar's scheme of union was 
 Camilo Torres.^ 
 
 Bolivar, at Caracas in December 1813, had a difficult 
 political position to deal with amongst his own country- 
 men. Openly opposed to a Federal government, as 
 unsuitable to the circumstances of a people struggling 
 to throw off a foreign yoke, he had set up a provisional 
 government, which was practically nothing but an absolute 
 autocracy, with Bolivar himself at its head as Dictator. 
 No one else had any real power, though there were many 
 hungering for it. Under these circumstances, it is not in 
 the least surprising that there should have been a rapid 
 spread of hostility to Bolivar, and of intrigue against him. 
 It was not from the lower classes that he had to fear 
 opposition, for they had no politics. His opponents 
 were men of his own class, the wealthy and influential 
 Creoles, who, one and all, with true South American 
 vanity, considered themselves at least equal in ability to 
 Bolivar, whose advancement they envied and resented, 
 feeling that, under him, they were in no better position 
 than they had been under the Spanish rulers. His 
 admirers boast that his absolute rule had been blameless 
 and excellent. But there were certainly abuses under it. 
 ^ Larrazabal, p. 249. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN CARACAS 117 
 
 Ducoudray-Holstein, a prejudiced witness certainly, says 
 there were many complaints of Bolivar's behaviour as an 
 absolute sovereign ; of his following of his own caprices ; 
 of the influence over him enjoyed by his mistress and 
 other women, who distributed appointments in many 
 cases ; of his disorganisation of the finances ; of his 
 neglect of the army, which was in a very poor state ; 
 and, finally, of his persistent evasion of demands for the 
 assembly of a congress. Probably, too, his proposed 
 union of Venezuela with New Granada was unpopular 
 in Venezuela, whose people were as jealous of New 
 Granada as the latter country was of them. 
 
 Aware of the strength of the feeling against him, 
 Bolivar sought to appease it by summoning, for the 
 1st July 1 8 14, a general meeting of the principal people 
 of Caracas, with the greater part of the population in the 
 streets outside as a background, and perhaps a threat. 
 
 This meeting Bolivar addressed at length,^ vaunting 
 his achievements and those of his companions-in-arms 
 towards the liberation of the country. Having made the 
 most of this, he proposed to resign his power into the 
 hands of representatives of the people. No one ventured 
 to propose acceptance of this offer, and only those spoke 
 who were prepared to advocate Bolivar's retention of 
 supreme power. That he had any intention that his 
 offer should be accepted few will be ready to believe. 
 This device of a resignation tendered, often with repeated 
 protests of its finality, but without any intention that it 
 should be accepted, became almost a habit with Bolivar, 
 often his trump card. In the present case, it was certain 
 that the best hopes of the republic lay in his retention of 
 power. Whilst accepting this popular confirmation of 
 his position, Bolivar had the good sense to refuse a 
 proposal to erect a statue of himself at Caracas. 
 
 Before proceeding to describe his next campaign, some 
 ^ O'Leary, Docts., xiii, p. 410. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ii8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 mention may be made of the fate of Monteverde when he 
 retired wounded to Puerto Cabello, after the defeat of 
 Las Trincheras. He was, he found, out of favour with 
 the Spanish Junta, which had been set up in the city, and 
 presently he found himself compelled to resign his com- 
 mand. At the close of 1813, he embarked for Curagao. 
 According to Baralt and Restrepo, he sailed thence direct 
 for Spain, but Larrazabal ^ affirms that he returned to 
 Venezuela when the Spanish arms were again successful, 
 and did not leave for Spain till the 7th July 18 16. He 
 appears to be right, for his statement is supported by 
 quotation of a letter from Monteverde, dated Maiquetia, 
 29th October 181 5. However, as Monteverde took 
 no important part in Venezuelan affairs after December 
 1 8 1 3, the matter is of no importance. 
 
 To Monteverde as Captain-General succeeded Cajigal, 
 a Spanish gentleman, humane, and moderate, who, in 
 18 12, might have been successful in pacifying the 
 country, but was too much of a diplomat, and too little 
 of the rough soldier, for these later days. 
 
 The new enemy, whom Bolivar was about to meet 
 to the south of Caracas, requires some description. 
 
 With all due allowance for South American exaggera- 
 tion, it is impossible not to regard Jos6 Tomas Boves as 
 one of the most atrocious ruffians who have ever 
 disgraced any country. Born in Spain, at Gijon, 
 about 1770, and then surnamed Rodriguez, he was 
 in early life a pilot. Then he emigrated to Venezuela, 
 where he became half pirate, half smuggler, and, in 1 809, 
 was sentenced at Puerto Cabello as a "sea-robber" (" ladron 
 del mar "). Thanks to the kindly intervention of two 
 Spanish gentlemen, his imprisonment was commuted 
 to simple detention at Calabozo, in the plains between 
 the Orinoco and the northern hill tract of Venezuela. At 
 the outbreak of the revolution in 18 10, he changed his 
 
 1 1. 252. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOVES AND THE LLANEROS 119 
 
 name to Boves, and joined the insurgents. Getting again 
 into prison, he quarrelled with his friends, and transferred 
 his services to the royalists, who had released him in 
 1 8 1 2. He raised a body of cavalry and turned bandit 
 in the King's interest — and his own. It was he who 
 raised the insurrection of the negro slaves in 18 12. 
 When Bolivar entered Caracas in 18 13, Boves joined 
 Cajigal, the Spanish commander in the east, at Barcelona, 
 and marched with him for Guayana, before the advance of 
 Marino and Piar. But, instead of crossing the Orinoco 
 with Cajigal, he persuaded that commander to leave him 
 to collect forces amongst the inhabitants of the plains, 
 with whom his residence at Calabozo had rendered him 
 familiar. 
 
 These " Llaneros," ^ as they were called, were a half 
 wild, uncivilised race, largely of mixed Spanish and 
 Indian blood, living widely scattered in solitary huts, 
 or in small groups of huts. They were cattle-breeders by 
 occupation, subsisting mainly on the ilesh of their herds, 
 often unseasoned even with salt, which was scarce in 
 these inland plains. The cattle being practically wild, 
 had, when required for use, either to be lassoed, or else 
 ridden down on horseback, and cast by a dexterous twist 
 of the tail, which was a special accomplishment of the 
 Llaneros. As a consequence of this necessity, the 
 Llaneros were also breeders of horses, which they rode 
 magnificently. They were skilled in the use of a 
 long spear, which they wielded lying along the near side 
 of the horse, thus affording practically no mark above the 
 animal for an enemy to aim at. They were capable 
 of being made into a very terrible cavalry of an 
 extremely irregular type. To reckless bravery they 
 added absolute ignorance and illiteracy. To discipline 
 generally they were entire strangers, and it was only 
 when one of themselves, a man such as Paez, of whom 
 ' "Llano " in Spanish, a plain. " Llanero," a plainsman. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
I20 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 much will be heard presently, was able by a strong 
 personality to take the lead, that they could be com- 
 manded at all. Naturally, to such men it was of very 
 little consequence whether the government at Caracas 
 was represented by Monteverde on behalf of Spain, or by 
 Bolivar the Dictator of the Republic. Neither monarchy 
 nor republic could do much good, or much harm, to men 
 living under these conditions, having no property beyond 
 the cattle and horses which they alone could manage, 
 and scattered over vast plains, covered with long grass 
 and seamed with rivers, watercourses, and morasses, in 
 the midst of which they could defy pursuit by any 
 punitive force. Under ordinary circumstances, they had 
 no special predilection for or object in fighting ; but they 
 were as susceptible as any other half-civilised race to the 
 attractions of plunder, and it was this motive which alone, 
 for the present at least, could enlist them on either side. 
 They had nothing to gain in the way of liberty, of which 
 they enjoyed as much as they could desire. They had 
 the strongest objection to leaving their native plains. 
 So long, then, as the Spaniards held the towns in 
 the Orinoco valley, Angostura, San Fernando, and a few 
 others, and were the only known authority, the re- 
 publicans could look for no help from these people, who 
 cared as little for them as for the Spaniards. 
 
 Boves, starting on the collection of his force, was a 
 man quite ready to offer to the Llaneros great prospects 
 of plunder, unhindered by any scruples on the part of 
 the commander. His previous career raises a presump- 
 tion against any tenderness of conscience on his part. 
 He was, moreover, a perfect monster of cruelty, who 
 seemed to delight in useless bloodshed for its own sake. 
 Stories innumerable are told of his ferocity. Briceno 
 Mendez relates that Boves was in the habit of tying his 
 victims to posts, and exposing them naked to 
 the rays of the tropical sun and the torment of 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOYES AND THE LLANEROS 121 
 
 tropical insects, often aggravated by a previous 
 flogging, which left the wretched creatures a mass 
 of sores on which the flies settled. There the 
 poor wretches were left, so far as Boves was concerned, 
 to die of hunger and thirst. One other famous story of 
 his brutality may be related. He had ordered the 
 decapitation of an old and harmless prisoner, not even a 
 soldier, when the man's son, a mere boy, fell at Boves' 
 feet, imploring mercy for his father. " Will you," was 
 the reply, " submit to have your ears and nose cut off", in 
 order to save your father's life ? " The boy accepted, 
 and bore unflinchingly this terrible torture. All that 
 Boves did was to order both father and son to be 
 beheaded, the one as a rebel, the other as a potential 
 enemy. 
 
 On the other hand, to give Boves what little credit is 
 due to him, he was, considering his opportunities, an 
 able leader. On his own followers he imposed an iron 
 discipline in the field, treating cowardice or disobedience 
 amongst them with the same severity which he meted 
 out to the enemy. His courage was admitted by friends 
 and enemies alike. Wherever the fighting was most 
 desperate there was Boves to be found, dealing death on 
 all sides and exposing himself without a shadow of fear. 
 Such a man had little difficulty in gathering round him, 
 besides the savage Llaneros, every ruffian and jail-bird 
 in the country. So desperate and depraved were his 
 men that even the Spaniards nicknamed them the 
 " Infernal Division." 
 
 His second in command was Tomas Morales, a naval 
 adventurer like Monteverde, but far more of a savage 
 than the other. In this respect he ran a fair second to 
 Boves. Each has characterised the other. Of Morales, 
 Boves said that he was ' atrocious,' whilst, after Boves' 
 death. Morales said of him that he was, " a man of 
 merit, but too bloodthirsty ! " Arcades ambo ! 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
122 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Boves had, as already mentioned, destroyed the force 
 which Bolivar had sent against him under Montilla in 
 August 1813. He had subsequently been heavily 
 defeated by Campo Elias at Mosquitero. Now, at the 
 close of 18 1 3, he was threatening the valley of the 
 Aragua and Caracas itself with a force of 4000 men 
 from Calabozo. 
 
 Bolivar, earnestly appealing to Marino for help, went 
 off to visit the siege works in front of Puerto Cabello, 
 which he reached on the 1 6th January 1 8 1 4. There he 
 learned that Marino's jealousy had prompted him to stop 
 his westward march, and even to order away the small 
 squadron under Piar, which was blockading the place by 
 sea. With difficulty Piar was persuaded not to sail away, 
 whilst Bolivar made a fresh appeal to Marino. In it he 
 recognised Marino as " Dictator of the East," a move 
 which at last induced that vain young man to march, 
 though too slowly and too late to save the situation.^ 
 
 Boves was now at Calabozo, whilst news came in that 
 Yafiez, recovering from his defeat at Araure, had 
 collected 2000 Llaneros on the Apure, and had retaken 
 Barinas, from which Garcia de Sena had unaccountably 
 retired. Yafiez had massacred the survivors of the 
 garrison of 120 men which had been left in the place. 
 Garcia, without any attempt at fighting, retired through 
 the difficult gorges of Merida to Trujillo, losing most 
 of his men by hardship or desertion on the way. There 
 he left the remnants of his force, and himself fled to 
 Valencia. Yafiez, having taken Barinas, laid siege to 
 Ospino, of which the small garrison refused to surrender. 
 A chance shot in a skirmish put an end to Yanez on the 
 2nd February. His body, falling into the hands of the 
 enemy, was torn to pieces by the townspeople in their 
 fury. To him succeeded Calzada, who from a private 
 soldier in 1 8 1 o had now risen to be lieutenant-colonel, a 
 ' O'Leary, Documents, 13, p. 426. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST BOVES 123 
 
 man of the stamp of Boves and of Yaflez himself. Re- 
 assembling the troops which had fled on the death of Yaflez, 
 Calzada returned to Ospino, which he took and burned. 
 Again advancing, he took Araure and threatened San 
 Carlos. The whole country in this direction was infested 
 by royalist bandits. 
 
 As a final blow to the republican cause, came the 
 news that Boves, advancing from Calabozo, had en- 
 countered Campo Elias at La Puerta and completely 
 defeated him. Boves, who had been severely wounded, 
 in order to secure the fruits of his victory, pushed 
 forward Rosete, with a strong column, into the valley of 
 the Tuy, where Ocumare ^ was taken and sacked, many 
 of its inhabitants being massacred. Rosete, like many 
 of the Spanish leaders, was of low origin, being in 
 fact in 18 1 2 the keeper of a miserable tavern. It was 
 men of this stamp who were responsible for many of the 
 Spanish cruelties. Amongst the higher classes there 
 was no doubt cruelty, but some of them, men of the 
 stamp of Cajigal or Salomon, could not be accused of 
 such atrocities. 
 
 The news of Boves' victory filled Caracas with horror 
 and consternation. Bolivar, almost alone, retained hope. 
 The news reached him when he was in front of Puerto 
 Cabello. He at once hastened to Valencia with a large 
 part of the besieging troops, ordered the fortification of 
 the already famous position of La Cabrera, and placed it 
 in charge of Campo Elias, who had reached Valencia 
 after his defeat at La Puerta. To Ribas at La Victoria 
 Bolivar sent instructions for his conduct as advanced 
 guard, and to Urdaneta in the west he wrote to hurry up 
 the pick of his division. Bolivar himself, with all the troops 
 he could collect, marched to meet the new and terrible 
 enemy. He could expect no help, at present, from 
 
 1 South by east from Caracas. To be carefully distinguished from 
 Ocumare de la Costa, a port between La Guaira and Puerto Cabello. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
124 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Mariflo, who was marching slowly from Barcelona at the 
 
 end of January 1 8 1 4. 
 
 On the 1 2th February, Boves, with his army of 
 Llaneros and ruffians, fell furiously upon Ribas at Victoria, 
 which was prepared for defence. The fighting raged for 
 hours with the utmost desperation. The houses and the 
 streets were converted into a veritable shambles, deluged 
 with the blood of royalists and republicans. By four 
 o'clock in the afternoon the outnumbered patriots had 
 been driven into the centre of the town, and their end 
 seemed to be at hand, when suddenly a cloud of dust 
 was seen in the west. It indicated the approach of 
 Campo Elias with his troops from La Cabrera. Sending 
 on an advance guard under Montilla, Campo Elias 
 followed as quickly as possible, and attacked Boves with 
 such fury that in an hour Victoria was cleared and Boves 
 driven back in disorder on to the neighbouring heights. 
 He is said to have lost 1000 men. He now received 
 reinforcements from Cura during the night. 
 
 In the morning of the 13th Ribas, his men encouraged 
 by their success of the previous day, assumed the 
 offensive, driving Boves from his position and capturing 
 guns, muskets, ammunition, and large quantities of 
 supplies. Prisoners there were none, for quarter was not 
 given when the fierce Campo Elias was present. 
 
 This victory was everywhere announced to the 
 patriots with the greatest satisfaction, and Bolivar, in a 
 proclamation, awarded unstinted praise to Ribas and 
 his men. The Liberator now used part of Ribas' force 
 to observe Boves, whilst the general himself was sent with 
 the rest against Rosete, who had fortified himself in 
 Yare, near Ocumare in the Tuy valley. Ribas executed 
 his mission with complete success, putting Rosete to 
 flight and reoccupying Ocumare. The streets of that 
 town exhibited a ghastly spectacle, for they were strewn 
 with the dead and dying inhabitants masscred by Rosete. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MASSACRE OF SPANISH PRISONERS 125 
 Neither sex nor age had been spared by the savage 
 Spaniard, and a large proportion of the victims were 
 women and children. Ribas captured Rosete's 
 correspondence, which included, it is said, a plan for a 
 rising of the Spanish prisoners in Caracas and La 
 Guaira. An iron was also found which Rosete used 
 for branding Americans on the forehead with the letter 
 P (patriot). A similar iron had been taken at Araure 
 bearing the letter R (republican). Bolivar's position at 
 Valencia, before the defeat of Boves and Rosete, had 
 been a very critical one, and it was the immediate cause 
 of a measure taken by him, which it is impossible not to 
 regard as a terrible crime. The position at Caracas and 
 La Guaira was equally difficult, for they were threatened 
 by the advance of Boves and Rosete ; every man was 
 required to fight, and it was difficult to spare guards 
 for the numerous Spanish prisoners at both places. It 
 will be remembered that, when Fierro fled from Caracas 
 and embarked at La Guaira, in the beginning of August 
 181 3, great numbers of Spaniards had been captured by 
 the republicans at both places. The prisoners are 
 stated to have numbered 4000 or more, and were 
 confined partly at Caracas, partly at La Guaira. They 
 were not by any means all soldiers, but comprised 
 numerous peaceable citizens, merchants, and others. 
 Had Monteverde ratified the capitulation signed by 
 Fierro's emissaries, these prisoners should have been 
 released, and it was pointed out to him that, under the 
 Trujillo proclamation of war to the death, they were all 
 liable to execution if he refused ratification. But he 
 would not yield. On the 8th February, Bolivar received 
 a report from Leandro Palacios, governor of La Guaira, 
 saying that there was imminent danger from the 
 multitude of Spanish prisoners in the place, combined 
 with an insufficient garrison. Bolivar's reply was 
 terrible in its brevity and its ferocity. " I order you," 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
126 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 he wrote on the same day, " to shoot all the Spanish 
 prisoners in those dungeons, and in the hospital, without 
 any exception whatever." Similar orders were issued to 
 the civil and military commanders in Caracas. That is 
 Larrazabal's version.^ O'Leary ^ quotes the same order. 
 The executions took place without any semblance 
 of trial, on the 14th, 15th, and 1 6th February, at La 
 Guaira and Caracas simultaneously. O'Leary gives the 
 total number of Spaniards and Canary Islanders thus 
 executed as 800 — Larrazabal says 886. Ducoudray- 
 Holstein, not speaking from personal knowledge, places 
 the figures as high as 430 in La Guaira and 823 in 
 Caracas. Mitre,* following Restrepo, puts the number 
 at 866. He gives details of the execution as carried 
 out by Arismendi, some of them being given by 
 Restrepo also. He says that Bolivar's order was for the 
 execution, excluding those who had taken out letters of 
 naturalisation, and was signed by his secretary. On this 
 Arismendi remarked : " The Secretary of the Liberator 
 is a fool : he has put ' with exception ' instead of 
 ' including! " The writer goes on to say that Arismendi 
 set the prisoners to make a great funeral pyre on which 
 to burn their bodies. When it was ready, the prisoners 
 were brought up in batches and done to death by the 
 soldiers with bayonet, axe, and poniard, and their bodies, 
 still quivering, were thrown upon the fire. Many of 
 them, he says, were men who had saved the lives of 
 patriots at the risk of their own. This massacre is 
 ghastly enough in all conscience, even according to the 
 least exaggerated account as to numbers and details, and 
 its horror is aggravated by the admitted facts that many 
 of the victims were innocent even of having borne arms, 
 
 ^ Larrazabal, i. 284. ^ i. 191. 
 
 ' Fillings' translation, p. 345. The account is apparently based on that of 
 Torrente (ii. 74), who gives the total at 1000 roundly, and gives details of 
 the massacre as above. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MASSACRE OF SPANISH PRISONERS 12; 
 and that they were not prisoners executed in more or 
 less hot blood immediately after a battle, but had for the 
 most part been for months in prison. 
 
 Larrazabal, Restrepo.^ and O'Leary, the latter rather 
 half-heartedly, endeavour to excuse Bolivar's action ; but 
 it is best to look to what he himself said in an attempt 
 to justify it in a lengthy manifesto issued, under his 
 orders, over the signature of his secretary,^ at the very 
 moment when the massacre was in progress, on the 14th 
 February. It is too long to quote in extenso, but may 
 be briefly summarised. Scarcely resisting the tempta- 
 tion to plead as justification the three centuries of 
 Spanish oppression, this extraordinary document begins 
 with the bloody suppression of the revolt in Quito in 
 1 8 1 o, which " armed us with the sword of reprisals to 
 avenge it on all the Spaniards." A merit is made of the 
 abstention from massacres in the Caracas revolution of 
 1 9th April 1 8 1 o, and the employment in high posts of 
 some Spaniards thereafter. Then follow several pages 
 of details of the massacres and other atrocities committed 
 by men like Antonanzas, Boves, Yanez, Zuazola, and 
 other Spanish leaders, without any admission of the 
 atrocities which were committed on the other side, such 
 as Campo Elias' massacre of Spaniards and Americans 
 alike, and the Liberator's own massacres on the march to 
 Caracas. Bolivar vaunts his own clemency and good faith 
 regarding the capitulation of Caracas in 18 13, and 
 details the refusals of Monteverde to agree even to an 
 exchange of prisoners. Then he alleges plots of the 
 prisoners, in communication with Boves and Rosete, * 
 and again refers to the brutalities of these two 
 Spaniards in Ocumare and elsewhere. 
 
 ' Restrepo, ii. 225, etc. ^ Larrazabal, i. 285. 
 
 ' It will be remembered that Rosete's papers captured by Ribas are said to 
 have confirmed this, but even so they were not taken till after the issue of 
 the orders of the 8th February. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
128 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 The whole attempted justification is practically based 
 on two grounds : ( i ) the atrocities of the enemy, justify- 
 ing reprisals in the same form ; (2) the danger of the 
 position, with Boves and Rosete threatening Caracas, 
 and backed by conspiracies among the prisoners. 
 
 No one, probably, belonging to a truly civilised nation 
 will for a moment admit the validity of the first argu- 
 ment, and it is difficult even to allow it as an extenua- 
 tion of the cold-blooded orders issued by a man of 
 Bolivar's education and advantages. As for the second 
 ground of defence, Boves and Rosete were, no doubt, 
 a great danger when the orders issued on the 8 th 
 February, but the defeat of the former, at La Victoria 
 on the 1 3 th, had disposed of them for the moment. The 
 executions only began next day, and might have been 
 stopped. As for the plots of the prisoners, their existence 
 is not to be lightly assumed, though it is not in the least 
 improbable. It is certain that, in any case, many were 
 slain who certainly took no part in them. Allowing 
 Bolivar every possible advantage in his argument, is it 
 possible to suppose that he will now be held blameless 
 by anyone outside of South America ? 
 
 On the 20th February, Bolivar established his head- 
 quarters at his own farm of San Mateo in the Aragua 
 valley.^ He commanded but 1200 infantry and 600 
 cavalry, and, as Boves' great strength lay in his numerous 
 Llanero cavalry, the Liberator's object was to draw him 
 into the hilly country. He was, at the same time, hard 
 put to it to keep a check on the royalist guerillas about 
 the Lake of Valencia, threatening his communications 
 with the blockading force in front of Puerto Cabello 
 under D'Elhuyar, as well as with Escalona at Valen- 
 cia, and Marifio, now slowly coming up from the east. 
 On the 2Sth, Boves with 7000 men, chiefly cavalry, 
 
 1 The manifesto just described is dated, Headquarters at San Mateo, 14th 
 February 1814. Is it possible that it was ante-dated? 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOVES AT SAN MATEO 129 
 
 attempted to pass the river Aragua at Cagua, near San 
 Mateo, but was checked by Mariano Montilla, and 
 retired at night. 
 
 On the 28 th, Boves again advanced against a heavy 
 fire from the trenches with which Bolivar had garnished 
 his position. The royalist loss was heavy, but Boves 
 continued the fight all day. At night, being wounded 
 himself, he once more fell back on the heights behind 
 him. In this day's action Bolivar lost a good officer in 
 Colonel Villapol, a Spaniard by birth, who had joined 
 the independent party. A still greater loss was that of 
 Campo Elias, who was wounded, and died a fortnight 
 later. 
 
 Boves was, after this, lying wounded at Villa de Cura, 
 when the attempt by a young officer, Cedefio, sent by 
 Bolivar with twenty men to try and capture him, failed.^ 
 On the 9th March, news arrived of the return of Rosete, 
 now recovered from his recent defeat at Yare, to the 
 Tuy valley, whence he seriously threatened Caracas, now 
 practically undefended. 
 
 Boves also, cured of his wound, was preparing a fresh 
 attack on San Mateo. Bolivar now sent Montilla, with 
 300 men, to Caracas with drums beating and making 
 a great show, so as to alarm the Spaniard for his right 
 flank. When he discovered that he had been fooled, 
 Boves was furious. His next attack, on the iith 
 March, was again repulsed. Nothing more happened 
 
 ' When a gallant Spaniard, later on, made a similar attempt on Bolivar, 
 the Venezuelan writers speak of it as an attempted assassination ! 
 
 Cede&o played a considerable part after this. He was one of those who 
 kept alive the guerilla warfare in Venezuela between 1814 and 1816. He 
 was afterwards a member of the Council of State at Angostura, and governor 
 of Guayana. Born in Apure in 1784, he was killed at the battle of Cara- 
 bobo in 1821. His division were hardly engaged in that battle, but Cedeiio, 
 armed with a lance, must needs take a personal share in the pursuit, and was 
 shot down by a stray bullet when he was snatching a hurried meal. His 
 valour was such that Bolivar gave him Ney's title, " the bravest of the 
 brave." 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
I30 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 till Bolivar, making a night march, fell upon Boves at 
 daybreak on the 1 7th, inflicting a severe blow on him. 
 Once more, on the 20th March, Boves, rendered 
 desperate by the news that Marino was at last ap- 
 proaching, furiously attacked Bolivar. Beaten off, he 
 renewed his efforts on the 25 th, directing them specially 
 against the park and hospital, which were defended by 
 Antonio Ricaurte, a young Granadian. The house in 
 which was the hospital was the dwelling-house of the 
 farm. It was to be assaulted by a special column, 
 whilst Boves diverted attention by vigorous attacks all 
 along the line. Boves himself, riding with desperate 
 valour into the very midst of the fighting, and hurling 
 against the patriots his reckless Llaneros, led charge 
 after charge. Meanwhile, his assaulting column had 
 got in silence round the flank of the enemy, and only 
 came into view when it was close upon the hospital. 
 
 Now it was that Ricaurte^ heroically sacrificed him- 
 self. First he removed the wounded, then ordered all 
 his men to evacuate the house. He alone remained 
 behind. Even Bolivar thought there was nothing left 
 but to die fighting as the Spaniards charged with shouts 
 of victory on the key of his position. They were already 
 entering the house when a fearful explosion occurred. 
 Ricaurte had fired the powder magazine, blowing him- 
 self, the empty house, and a large part of Boves' column 
 to destruction. His gallantry saved the battle, for 
 Boves, witnessing the destruction of his column, retired 
 once more to the heights. On the 30th, he raised this 
 siege of San Mateo, moving off by the road leading to 
 San Sebastian and Villa de Cura. 
 
 But, though Boves was beaten off, Bolivar had suffered 
 losses which he could ill afford. Two hundred officers 
 and 1500 men were hors de combat, as the result of the 
 
 ' Bom at Bogota, 1792. Joined Bolivar with the Granadian contingent 
 at Cdcuta in 1813. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MARINO AND BOLIVAR 131 
 
 prolonged defence. Bad news, too, came in, telling of 
 the defeat of Urdaneta at Barquisemeto by Ceballos and 
 Cajigal with 1000 men from Cor6. Unable to make a 
 stand at San Carlos, Urdaneta fell back on Valencia, 
 whence he reported to Bolivar that he expected to be 
 attacked. Bolivar implored him to defend himself to 
 the death, as Valencia contained all the magazines and 
 ammunition. Meanwile, Urdaneta was to send 200 
 men to D'Elhuyar's besieging force at Puerto Cabello. 
 Bolivar promised that, as soon as Marifio's arrival 
 enabled him to crush Boves, he would return to rescue 
 Urdaneta. Valencia was attacked by Ceballos and 
 Cajigal, who now had 3000 men, and, on the 30th and 
 31st March, nearly the whole town was captured. 
 
 On the latter day, Marino had met Boves at 
 Bocachica,^ defeated him, and driven him back by 
 Gufgue and the south side of the lake on Ceballos at 
 Valencia. Then he marched to join Bolivar at Victoria. 
 
 Boves, though his rearguard was harassed by Bolivar's 
 cavalry, arrived at Valencia with 3000 men, thus raising 
 the besieging force to 6000. The garrison of Valencia 
 was still holding out in the centre of the town, though 
 suffering from the want of water, very hard pressed, and 
 much reduced by desertions. It was the 2nd April 
 when Boves reached Valencia, where the fight against 
 Urdaneta raged all day. By evening, the defenders 
 were reduced to the most desperate straits. Attacked 
 on all sides, their position riddled by artillery, they had 
 almost abandoned hope, when suddenly the attacks 
 ceased. Ceballos' courage had failed him on the arrival 
 of the defeated Boves, and at the prospect of the 
 appearance of Bolivar and Marino behind him. As a 
 matter of fact they only met that day at Victoria, but 
 Ceballos abandoned his attack on Valencia and fell 
 back towards Tocuyito. 
 
 ^ Not shown on map. It is not far from Cura. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
132 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 After a cordial meeting with Marifio on the 2nd 
 April, Bolivar reached Valencia on the 3rd with rein- 
 forcements, only to find the place out of danger. On 
 the 5 th, he was back at Victoria, whence, after per- 
 suading Marino to advance on Valencia, he paid a 
 flying visit to the lines in front of Puerto Cabello. 
 When he got back once more to Valencia, he found 
 that Ceballos and Boves had separated, the former 
 having gone to San Carlos, whilst Boves had marched 
 for Calabozo to recuperate. 
 
 Bolivar now organised a force of 2000 infantry and 
 800 cavalry, partly his own men, partly Marino's. He 
 left Marino in command, and himself returned to Puerto 
 Cabello. 
 
 Marifioj marching on San Carlos, had to halt at 
 Tinaco, ten miles short of that place, waiting for artillery 
 and supplies. Then, hearing a false report that 
 Ceballos had evacuated San Carlos, Marifio advanced 
 through a hostile country, despite the warnings of 
 Urdaneta, who knew the state of the country better. 
 
 On the 1 6th April, Marino found himself on the 
 plain of Aroa, short of ammunition, and faced by 2500 
 men drawn up in line of battle. First of all his 
 cavalry was defeated, then Cedefio's men, overtaken by 
 panic, gave way, and the troops were driven back to 
 Tinaco, which they reached on the morning of the 
 17th. Marino was not to be found, for he and others 
 had made off as soon as Cedeno's men yielded. As 
 they passed Tinaco they had destroyed the park and 
 carried off the horses. At Palomeras, as the troops 
 continued their retreat on Valencia, they found the 
 artillery waggons had been fired by Marino to prevent 
 their capture. There, too, were found Marifio and 
 Cedeno, whom the troops rescued from a handful of 
 Spaniards surrounding them on a hill. 
 
 Bolivar was celebrating the anniversary of the 19th 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MARINO AND BOLIVAR 133 
 
 April outside Puerto Cabello, and preparing to assault 
 the place, when he received exaggerated accounts of 
 Marino's defeat, representing the force of the Dictator 
 of the East as utterly destroyed. Yet he did not lose 
 hope. Turning to Palacios, he said, " Our position 
 becomes more critical, we are alone to control the 
 furious torrent of devastation ; but we will stop it." 
 Then he returned to Valencia, where he found the 
 disaster was not quite so bad as he had believed. He 
 at once proposed to start again to fight Ceballos. That 
 general, however, as Bolivar learned, had been again 
 reinforced by troops brought by Cajigal from Cor6, and 
 was at the head of 3000 men. 
 
 Bolivar, therefore, hurried off to Caracas for more 
 troops. Thence he sent on Ribas with 800 men, 
 followed by ammunition, medicines, and other supplies, 
 whilst he himself went by Carabobo to take command 
 in person of the new expedition. Just before he 
 started he received a deputation sent from Cartagena 
 to communicate to him the resolution passed by that 
 city in his honour, and also the powers conferred on 
 him by the Chamber of Representatives in the matter of 
 the confederation of Venezuela and the State of 
 Cartagena. This latter project, Bolivar remarked, must 
 be put off for the present, looking to the existing pre- 
 carious state of affairs in Venezuela. 
 
 On the I oth May he was at Valencia again ; on the 
 1 2 th he reviewed his troops ; on the 1 7 th he was on the 
 plain of Carabobo in presence of the enemy. 
 
 He had got together 5000 men, but those who had 
 come with Marino were unreliable and deserted freely. 
 Urdaneta, meeting a body of 200 such deserters who 
 had lost their way, brought them back in custody of his 
 own troops. By way of example, all their leaders were 
 shot at Valencia, and one in every five of the rank 
 and file. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
134 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Bolivar reorganised this army in four divisions, the 
 right wing under Bermudez, the left under Vald^s, centre 
 under Florencio Palacios, and the cavalry under Freites. 
 Urdaneta was chief of the staff, whilst Marino and Ribas 
 were seconds in command under Bolivar. 
 
 Perhaps Mariflo might have made difficulties about 
 being reduced to this position had he not felt how com- 
 pletely he had put himself out of court by his fiasco at Aroa. 
 
 There was no fighting worth mention till the 28 th 
 May. On that day the battle began at i P.M. and was 
 decided by 4 P.M., when Cajigal, forced back on to the 
 heights, found himself unable to defend them, and was 
 driven back in disorder with very heavy loss. 
 
 His infantry was almost entirely cut up or captured, 
 whilst there remained in Bolivar's hands the whole of the 
 Spanish artillery, 500 muskets, 9 standards, 4000 horses, 
 and large stocks of munitions of all sorts. The colonel 
 of the Spanish regiment " Granada " was captured, and 
 several other leaders were killed. 
 
 Cajigal, Ceballos, Calzada, and others fled towards 
 Barinas.^ When the pursuing victors under Urdaneta 
 reached San Carlos, they found that the barbarities of 
 Calzada there had been as great as those of Rosete at 
 Ocumare. He had spared neither sex nor age, nor did 
 he treat a priest any better than a layman. 
 
 Bolivar, after his victory, again committed the fault 
 of splitting up his army, instead of keeping it united for 
 the destruction of Boves and the capture of Puerto Cabello, 
 which still held out in face of a very feeble blockading 
 force. Urdaneta was sent westward to recover the country 
 which had been lost, Ribas went back to Caracas, Marino 
 and Jalon were sent towards Cura to face Boves. Bolivar 
 himself went to Caracas. 
 
 ' Larrazabal, i. 312. He speaks of this as the "celebrated battle of 
 Carabobo." He should have called it the "first," for there was a much 
 more celebrated battle on the same field in 1821. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
LA PUERTA AND VALENCIA 135 
 
 Boves, reaching Calabozo after his separation from 
 Ceballos, had displayed his usual energy in repairing 
 the losses of Bocachica, and was now again at the head 
 of 5000 Llaneros and 3000 infantry. He had, as 
 mentioned, only 3000 men in all when he joined 
 Ceballos at Valencia, and it is surprising to find him 
 so soon again at the head of more men than he had at 
 Bocachica. 
 
 The fact appears to be that, in all these battles of 
 undisciplined troops, once disaster commenced the greater 
 part of the defeated army dispersed all over the country, 
 and filtered back to their starting-point, where they were 
 quite ready to join again on the reappearance of their 
 leader. The knowledge of this doubtless moved Boves 
 to leave Ceballos and go where he knew he could recruit 
 again when, pritnd facie, the better course would have 
 been for the two to hold together. Had they done so, 
 the fight at Carabobo might have had a very different 
 result. 
 
 On the 1 2th June, Marifio, hearing of Boves' approach, 
 advanced to La Puerta, a place of peculiar ill-omen for 
 the republicans in this campaign.^ Marino had but 2300 
 men when Boves, on the i Sth, showed only a small 
 portion of his force. Marino, thinking he had only an 
 equal force before him, proposed to attack. At that 
 moment, Bolivar, arriving from Caracas, took over the 
 chief command. He was not to blame for the dangerous 
 position into which Marino had got himself, and he pro- 
 posed to retire. It was too late, for Boves, who had 
 concealed his numerous cavalry in the neighbouring 
 ravines, fell upon Bolivar with immensely superior forces, 
 and simply swept him ofT the field, with a loss of nearly 
 half the republican force. Boves, as usual, massacred his 
 prisoners, amongst whom was Jalon, the man who had 
 
 ^ La Puerta is not shown on the map. It is a short way east of Cura at 
 the bifurcation of the roads to S. Sebastian and S. Juan. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
136 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 formerly had a narrow escape of being hanged in revenge 
 for the execution of Zuazola in front of Puerto Cabello. 
 Boves was guilty of a refinement of cruelty towards this 
 unfortunate general, for he treated him with civility, sat 
 down to dinner with him, and then turned round upon 
 him and had him hanged. Jalon's head was cut off and 
 sent to Calabozo as a present to Boves' friends. At this 
 battle there perished Freites (by his own hand), Garcia 
 de Sena, Aldao, and Tebar, Bolivar's secretary. Marino 
 escaped with difficulty. Bolivar and Ribas got away also 
 to Valencia, and thence to Caracas, where they arrived on 
 the 1 6th June. 
 
 On that day Boves was in Victoria, where he also 
 divided his troops, sending 2000 to Caracas under 
 Gonzales,^ and marching on Valencia himself with the 
 main body. After beating and massacring the force at 
 La Cabrera, he laid siege to Valencia, on the 1 9th June, 
 with 3000 men. The place was held by Escalona, who 
 fought desperately, hoping to be succoured by Bolivar or 
 Urdaneta. Boves was furious, and sent the most ferocious 
 threats to the garrison, but Escalona would not yield. 
 By the 22nd, the Spaniards had fought their way far into 
 the city. 
 
 The ferocity of the besiegers is illustrated by an anec- 
 dote. Two brothers on the republican side, apparently 
 hoping to save their lives, deserted to the enemy. When 
 they reached Boves' camp, bull's horns were bound on to 
 their heads and they were turned loose in the midst of 
 a ring of horsemen, to be tormented and done to death 
 with lances, like bulls in the ring. 
 
 On the 24th June, Boves learned that D'Elhuyar, 
 finding himself now between two fires, had raised the 
 siege of Puerto Cabello and embarked with his troops 
 
 1 Ducoudray-Holstein says he was informed by witnesses on both sides 
 "that the column of Colonel Gonzales did not exceed 550 men; that the 
 second, under Colonel Mendoza, was less" (i. 194). 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE EMIGRATION OF 1814 137 
 
 for La Guaira. Leaving Morales in charge of the attack 
 on Valencia, Boves marched for Puerto Cabello, where 
 he procured fresh supplies of ammunition, was joined by 
 Cajigal, Ceballos, and Calzada with 1200 men, and then 
 returned to Valencia, where he now had 4000 men. In 
 the town there was a mere handful of defenders, hard 
 pressed by the attack, and suffering grievously from 
 hunger and thirst. They still held out gallantly till the 
 9th July, when, after a salute of twenty-one guns fired 
 by the royalist batteries, a white ilag announced the 
 advent of emissaries from Boves. They reported the 
 occupation of Caracas by the royalists, and the retreat 
 from it of Bolivar. The negotiations which ensued 
 ended in the conclusion of a capitulation by which the 
 lives, property, and liberty of the defenders were guar- 
 anteed. Next day Boves entered the place, and, with 
 atrocious profanity, swore in the presence of the Holy 
 Sacrament to respect the lives of all. Immediately he 
 was in possession of the arms deposited in the great 
 square, disregarding alike the terms of the capitulation 
 and his solemn oath, he brutally massacred Espejo, the 
 governor, 90 of the principal inhabitants, 6 5 officers, and 
 310 troops. 
 
 We must now return to Bolivar, who, on reaching 
 Caracas on the 1 6th June after his defeat at La Puerta, 
 found the capital in a terrible state of panic and dis- 
 organisation. His own military position was desperate, 
 owing mainly to his foolish dispersion of his forces after 
 Carabobo. With Urdaneta far away in the west, cut off 
 from Caracas by Boves at Valencia, there was nothing 
 to be hoped for from that direction. The Liberator 
 assembled the people and endeavoured to inspire some 
 hope in them ; he demanded from the churches all the 
 plate not actually required for use. All his measures 
 were in vain, and an early attack was threatened by 
 Gonzales, now approaching from Victoria. From the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
138 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 south, Caracas was threatened by the guerilla Machado, 
 moving over the Pass of Ocumare. With the few troops 
 Bolivar could command, the defence of the capital was 
 impossible. He saw that he must evacuate it to pre- 
 vent further disaster, and his own capture. 
 
 On the 6th July, after wasting some troops in a 
 useless attack on Gonzales, the Liberator set out on his 
 retreat eastwards to Barcelona, leaving to the mercy of 
 Boves all who elected to remain behind. Mercy with 
 Boves of course meant massacre, pillage, and confisca- 
 tion. Cajigal, at least, was a man of moderation, and 
 he was now Captain-General in name. In reality, he 
 was powerless, and all authority was vested in Boves 
 and Morales. The contempt with which Boves treated 
 his nominal chief is illustrated by his brief report to 
 Cajigal of his victory at La Puerta : " I have recovered 
 the arms, ammunition, and the honour of the Spanish 
 flag, which your Excellency lost at Carabobo." So trying 
 was his position with this ruffian that Cajigal withdrew to 
 Puerto Cabello, rather than submit to the open shame of 
 sanctioning what he could not prevent. He duly re- 
 ported Boves' misdeeds to the Spanish government, 
 which, quite satisfied with success, had nothing but 
 praise for them. 
 
 It was the i6th July when Boves entered Caracas. 
 As usual, his first act was to promise oblivion of the 
 past. This was very shortly followed by general orders 
 for the shooting of all who might be held to be accom- 
 plices in the death of Spaniards. Bands of assassins 
 roamed through the city, murdering, robbing, and commit- 
 ting every other atrocity. 
 
 Boves himself set out, on the 26th July, in pursuit of 
 Bolivar, leaving Quero^ to carry out his orders in 
 
 * Quero, a Venezuelan who had served the republican cause under 
 Miranda, went over to Monteverde in 1812. He could be thoroughly trusted 
 to carry out orders in the spirit of Boves. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE EMIGRATION OF 1814 139 
 
 Caracas. Bolivar had twenty days' start of his pursuers, 
 and he needed it all, for he was not marching with a 
 mobile army. He had, indeed, some 2000 troops, in- 
 cluding D'Elhuyar's force, which had arrived from Puerto 
 Cabello at La Guaira and Caracas, but he was also 
 accompanied by a large part of the population of 
 Caracas, on whom the prospective terrors of the march 
 had less effect than the anticipation of the horrors of an 
 occupation by Boves. The roads to be traversed were 
 bad at their best ; now, in the height of the rainy 
 season, they were mere lines of mud and slush. There 
 was no accommodation for housing this multitude of 
 people of all classes, all ages, and both sexes. Ladies, 
 accustomed to comfortable living, found themselves, 
 after a long day of tramping through a sea of mud or 
 over rugged, rocky roads, compelled to lie for the night 
 in the open, drenched to the skin by the pitiless rain, 
 without even a fire, and almost starving. Despair drove 
 them to desperate deeds, and they were constantly 
 haunted by the dread of being left behind to fall into 
 the hands of the royalist guerrillas. Mothers, unable 
 longer to nourish, or even to carry, their children, were 
 seen to hurl them over precipices, rather than leave them 
 to die by the roadside. All the horrors of the retreat 
 from Moscow were here, except the cold, which was 
 made up for by the rain. For twenty days this miserable 
 " Emigration of 18 14," as it was called, dragged on until 
 Barcelona was reached, just as Boves was starting in 
 pursuit from Caracas. By that time, the emigrants had 
 been terribly reduced in numbers by the hardships of 
 the road, by famine, and by fever. From Barcelona, 
 notwithstanding the desperate condition of his enterprise, 
 Bolivar contemplated sending one of his commanders to 
 London to open up relations between republican Vene- 
 zuela and Great Britain. This at a time when the 
 republic was on its last legs ! There is something here 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
I40 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 of the strange admixture of comic opera which seems 
 to be inseparable from many things South American. 
 The idea was worthy almost of the Presidency of Don 
 Cipriano Castro of our own times. 
 
 Morales, Boves' second in command, leading the pur- 
 suing force by El Chaparro, appeared, on the 17th 
 August, before Aragua, south of Barcelona. The place 
 was fortified and occupied by Bermudez, with 1000 men 
 sent back from Cumand by Mariflo, who had accom- 
 panied the flight to Barcelona. 
 
 Morales attacked in the morning of the 1 8th August. 
 The fortifications enabled Bolivar and Bermudez to hold 
 out for some hours. Apparently there was some dis- 
 agreement between them, for Larrazabal says that Bolivar 
 wanted to use his cavalry, which was good, in the open 
 country behind the river Aragua,^ but was compelled to 
 give way to Bermudez, who was all for a passive defence 
 of the town. 
 
 The fighting in Aragua streets was furious for seven 
 hours. Then the republicans were driven out and put 
 to flight. Bolivar, with some of the remnants, made for 
 Barcelona, whilst Bermudez took the direction of Maturin. 
 
 Morales, a good second to Boves in ferocity, signalised 
 his victory by wholesale massacres, which were carried 
 even to the church, where many were killed, seeking 
 sanctuary at the high altar. Larrazabal says 3500 
 inhabitants of Aragua were slain, but it is perhaps 
 permissible to doubt this figure. 
 
 When Bolivar reached Barcelona with the few worn- 
 out troops from Aragua, he found the inhabitants bent 
 upon opening their gates to Morales, rather than risk the 
 horrors of a sack. It was hopeless to attempt a defence 
 under these circumstances, so Bolivar, accompanied by 
 Ribas and Piar, set out for Cuman^, whither the poor 
 
 ' This town of Aragua, and the river of the same name, must not be con- 
 fused with the valley of Aragua at the east end of the Valencia lake. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REPUBLICAN DISSENSIONS 141 
 
 remnants of the Caracas emigration had already dragged 
 their weary limbs. 
 
 When Bolivar reached Cuman^, he found it almost 
 deserted. Marino, hearing of the disaster of Aragua, 
 had proclaimed martial law (scarcely necessary under 
 the circumstances one would have thought), and, in 
 agreement with his officers, resolved to fall back on 
 Guiria, almost the extreme point of Venezuela. The 
 position at Guiria was good, and at the worst there was 
 always a possibility of escape to the British colony of 
 Trinidad, which was in sight just across the landlocked 
 Gulf of Paria. The inhabitants of Cuman^ were invited 
 to emigrate to Guiria on the ships which had come back 
 to Cumand when the siege of Puerto Cabello was raised. 
 
 What happened at Cumani it is very difficult to 
 
 ascertain with certainty. Let us first take the account 
 
 put forward by Bolivar and Marino themselves in the 
 
 Cartagena Gazette of the 30th September 1814.^ 
 
 According to this, Marino was in great straits, abandoned 
 
 by his troops, part of whom had embarked on board the 
 
 squadron commanded by Bianchi, an Italian adventurer, 
 
 who, it was reported, had decided to sail away with all 
 
 the treasure brought from the churches of Caracas. 
 
 Bolivar and Marino were, therefore, obliged to embark 
 
 with him in order to save the property. Arriving at the 
 
 island of Margarita, and afterwards at Carupano on the 
 
 mainland, they found those places in a state of anarchy, 
 
 " in consequence of the seditious views of some military 
 
 chieftains, who were anxious to raise themselves to the 
 
 high station of chief magistrates." Ducoudray-Holstein, 
 
 always bitterly hostile to Bolivar, accuses him and Marino 
 
 plainly of deserting their companions in order to save 
 
 their own lives. He also says that they could not land 
 
 at Margarita because Arismendi,^ who commanded there, 
 
 ' Ducoudray-Holstein, i. 193. 
 
 2 Juan Bautista Arismendi was born in Margarita in 1786 of parents in 
 moderate circumstances. He received little or no education, and was scarce 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
142 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 threatened to shoot them as deserters, a threat which was 
 repeated by Bermudez, whom they found at Cardpano. 
 
 O'Leary's story is that they sailed with the intention 
 of landing somewhere on the coast in order to rally the 
 republican forces. Both at Cumand, and Margarita they 
 were unable to land on account of the seditious attitude 
 of the other leaders. Nothing is said about Bianchi. 
 
 Larrazabal's account is again different. He says 
 Bianchi sailed whilst the leaders were holding a council 
 of war in Cumand, the Italian meaning to appropriate 
 the treasure. Bolivar and Marino sailed after him, and 
 succeeded in coming to an arrangement, under which 
 he disgorged part of his plunder, which he pretended he 
 had seized on account of arrears of pay of himself and 
 his fleet. Under this arrangement, Bianchi returned 
 two-thirds of the treasure, and gave up to Bolivar and 
 Marino part of the fleet. The arms and stores were to 
 be landed in Margarita by Bianchi, who thus had left 
 to him three ships and 40,000 or 50,000 pe.sos in 
 treasure. The two remaining ships carried Bolivar and 
 Marino to Cariipano, where they arrived on the 3rd 
 September. Afraid that Bianchi, repenting of his 
 bargain, might attack him, Bolivar anchored under 
 cover of the shore batteries. When Bolivar and 
 Marino landed, they found Ribas and Piar in posses- 
 sion. These two accused them of desertion, and Ribas 
 even put Marino in confinement. Then occurred a 
 genuine comic-opera situation, for Bianchi appeared on 
 the scene, took the part of Bolivar and Mariflo, and 
 
 able to read and write. Short and broad in figure, with yellow hair and 
 bright piercing eyes, Arismendi was of pleasant manners and of great energy 
 and considerable natural ability. He was strong willed and cruel. Bolivar 
 made him governor of Caracas in 1813, and it was he who carried out the 
 massacre of the prisoners in February 1814. After the retreat from Caracas 
 in that year, he returned to Margarita as governor, and his immense personal 
 influence and popularity with the islanders gave him a power such as no one 
 else exercised among these poor and hardy fishermen. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REPUBLICAN DISSENSIONS 143 
 
 insisted on Ribas allowing them to embark for Carta- 
 gena. Before leaving, they made over part of the 
 treasure for the defence of the country. 
 
 From all this confusion of accounts, all that seems 
 possible to infer with certainty is that the two Dictators 
 were in very bad odour with their subordinates who, 
 perhaps, having witnessed the failure of the leaders, 
 thought they could do better themselves, and, at any 
 rate, were determined to get rid of Bolivar and Mariflo. 
 Before leaving, Bolivar fired a parting shot in the form 
 of a verbose manifesto, dated 7 th September, to his 
 " fellow citizens," of which the general sense can be 
 sufficiently inferred from the following passages : ^ " Your 
 brothers, and not the Spaniards, have torn your breasts, 
 spilt your blood, burnt your dwellings, and condemned 
 you to expatriation. Your cries should be directed 
 against those blind slaves who seek to bind you with 
 the chains which they themselves bear. ... I swear 
 to you that, Liberator or dead, I will always merit the 
 honour which you have conferred on me. . . . Hope, 
 my compatriots, in the noble and virtuous people of 
 New Granada, who will return, anxious to gain fresh 
 triumphs, to lend you new help, and to bring you renewed 
 liberty, if your own valour has not already gained it." 
 
 Before following Bolivar on his journey, we will 
 recount briefly what happened in the eastern districts 
 of Venezuela after he and Marino left them. 
 
 Piar arrived at Cariipano on the 9th of September, 
 just as Bolivar sailed. Bermudez was at this time 
 at Maturin with Cedeflo, Mondgas,* Zaraza,* and other 
 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., 13, p. 467. 
 
 ^ Jose Tadeo Monagas, born on the plains of Maturin in 1784, was one of 
 the principal guerilla leaders who kept up the war in the interval between 
 1814 and 1816. He managed to survive all the perils of the war, and was 
 President of Venezuela in 1847 and 1858. He returned from banishment in 
 1864, and died after taking Caracas and Puerto Cabello. 
 
 ' Zaraza, another of the guerilla leaders, was a native of Chaguaramas. 
 His carelessness cost the republicans more than one defeat in 1818. He 
 died at Caracas in 1825. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
144 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 leaders, and had obtained some successes over Morales' 
 detachments. Boves was in Cumand on the i6th 
 October, his passage everywhere marked by rivers of 
 blood. Amongst the republicans there was disunion ; 
 for the men of the east objected to the supremacy in 
 command of Ribas, whilst those of Caracas and the 
 west equally disliked being under Bermudez. These 
 two disagreed in their views of what was expedient ; 
 for Bermudez wished to await Boves at Maturin, whilst 
 Ribas was for marching to meet him. This latter 
 opinion eventually prevailed, and, on the Sth December, 
 3000 republicans met a larger force under Boves at 
 Urica. The result was disastrous, and but few of the 
 patriots succeeded in escaping to Maturin. But the 
 victory cost the Spaniards dear, for Boves, ever in the 
 forefront of the battle, dealing death in every direction, 
 refusing quarter to all, was killed by a republican spear 
 which pierced his body. 
 
 To him, more than to any other man on the royalist 
 side, was due the complete subjugation of the Venezuelan 
 republic of 18 13-14. His vices were many, his virtues 
 perhaps were limited to courage worthy of a better 
 cause. Some accused him of keeping his courage up 
 with drink ; but, as O'Leary justly remarks, such courage 
 does not last, whilst of Boves none ever pretended that 
 he was for an instant wanting in bravery. As for his 
 personal appearance, he was tall, with red hair, dark 
 eyes, and a fair skin. Larrazabal quotes, as exactly 
 applicable to him, the description given by Paulus 
 Diaconus of Attila : " Broad of chest, hideous of ex- 
 pression, the forehead lowering, the nostrils wide, the 
 eyes deep sunk, the head massive, with a restless and 
 horrible look, wandering round like that of a tiger 
 watching its prey . . . born for the desolation of the 
 universe." 
 
 In the command he was worthily succeeded by 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DEATH OF BOVES AND RIBAS 14S 
 Morales. Piar's force had already been destroyed by 
 Boves at Salado, Bermudez's at Magueyes. 
 
 The unfortunate Ribas, after his utter defeat at Urica, 
 fled to Maturin, where his ruin was completed. Thence 
 he tried to make his way, with two of his officers, to the 
 plains of Caracas. Broken and ill, he halted for a few 
 hours in the mountains near the valley of La Pascua. 
 Thence he sent a negro servant to seek provisions in 
 the town. The man betrayed his master to the royalists 
 who seized Ribas asleep and carried him to the town. 
 There he was slain to the accompaniment of insulting 
 words and gestures. His head was sent in an iron cage 
 to Caracas, and exposed on the road to La Guaira, 
 wearing the Phrygian cap which he used as an emblem 
 of liberty. He was Bolivar's uncle by marriage, and 
 was for long one of his most trusted chiefs, but, in the 
 end, his ambition brought him into collision with the 
 Liberator, and resulted in his death. Venezuela, with 
 the exception of a few guerillas under Cedeno, Monigas, 
 and Zaraza, was in the power of the royalists. What 
 had become of Urdaneta will be related presently. The 
 coast was now in part blockaded, from Trinidad to 
 Yrapa,^ by a Spanish squadron under Gabazo, which 
 stopped all emigration in that direction. 
 
 Thus rose and fell the second republican government 
 in Venezuela. The campaign of 181 3-14 was Bolivar's 
 first in chief command, and had served to mark him out, 
 not indeed as a great commander, but as one of the 
 greatest determination and with an almost unlimited 
 power of imposing the strength of his own personality on 
 his subordinates. We have spoken of battles, but it 
 must be remembered that throughout this campaign 
 Bolivar never commanded a force of a strength greater 
 than that of a European brigade. His troops were of a 
 quality which would have entitled them to no respect in 
 
 * West of Guiria, nearly in the north-west corner of the Gulf of Paria. 
 K 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
146 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 a campaign in Europe. Amongst them were a certain 
 number of regulars, men who had formerly been in the 
 Spanish service, but the majority were recruits picked up 
 as he went along. Their training was of the scantiest, 
 their discipline almost nil. Yet they fought splendidly 
 on many occasions, and were even able to defeat regular 
 Spanish European troops. Not that we would vaunt the 
 fighting value of these, for Wellington's Peninsular ex- 
 perience showed that it was not great. Still they were 
 probably superior to any of the local troops in training 
 and discipline. As for arms, the republicans at this 
 period were rarely well provided, and a victory was 
 largely valuable for its captures of muskets, ammunition, 
 and artillery. The forty-five men with whom Marifio and 
 his friends landed at Guiria were chiefly armed with 
 spears or bows and arrows. It was only as they sur- 
 prised and cut up the Spanish detachments that they 
 were able to arm themselves in modern fashion. Uniforms 
 of course there were none, except such as were found in 
 the Spanish arsenals, or were worn by the men who deserted 
 that service for the republican camp. In later years 
 Colombian troops were a strange motley in this respect. 
 Many of them were clad in uniforms bought from dealers 
 in second-hand garments who had bought up, as a 
 speculation, old French, Prussian, Austrian, or Russian 
 uniforms after the fall of Napoleon. Many of them had 
 possibly been filched from the dead by the ghouls who 
 wandered over the battlefields of Europe, robbing the 
 dead and even the wounded, as was the case at Eylau 
 and Heilsberg. 
 
 The following extract from O'Leary's description of 
 the recruits gathered in 1 8 1 9 will give some idea of the 
 raw material obtainable, and the difficulties of making 
 soldiers out of it. "There was much to be done to 
 transform these unhappy, though patriotic, peasants into 
 soldiers and give them a martial appearance. Nothing 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
GENERAL REMARKS 147 
 
 could be less military than thfeir clothes ; a hat of grey- 
 wool with a broad brim and a low crown, covering a head 
 which recalled that of Samson before the fatal scissors 
 had shorn him of his long thick hair ; an immense square 
 blanket of coarse wool, with a hole in the middle for the 
 head to pass through, hung from the shoulders to the 
 knees, giving the impression of an armless man. How- 
 ever easy it was to be certain that they were well set up 
 and strong, and to impart a martial aspect by merely 
 removing the ' ruana,' as the blanket was called, by 
 taking away the hat and cutting their hair, it was quite 
 a different matter to teach these men to handle a musket, 
 or to fire it without shutting both eyes, turning the head 
 to the rear, and so causing much greater danger to 
 themselves and their fellows than to the enemy." ^ Yet 
 these same recruits formed nearly one-third of the force 
 with which Bolivar, within a few days, gained the decisive 
 battle of Boyaci ! How far such infantry corresponded 
 to trained soldiers must be left to the reader's imagina- 
 tion. Clearly troops of this class must have been in- 
 capable of manoeuvring or of shooting with any accuracy, 
 though O'Leary adds that " they presented an imposing 
 appearance — -from a distanced ^ 
 
 Evidently most of the battles must have consisted 
 largely of a rough-and-tumble scrimmage carried out by 
 an armed mob. 
 
 1 O'Leary, i. 573. 
 
 * The following description is taken from Chesterton's book (vol. ii. p. 158): 
 "A Creole force usually consisted of men and lads of all ages and colours, 
 some naked, others with merely a shirt or a pair of drawers ; a few wore old 
 military jackets without pantaloons ; some were bareheaded, while others 
 had straw hats or hairy caps. Such as were armed with muskets often 
 strapped their cartouches round their naked loins, whilst the majority had 
 no other arms than pikeheads loosely fixed upon short rough sticks. They 
 marched in Indian or single file, and were unrestrained in their movements 
 by practical exercises. . . . Still these men were the very men adapted to 
 the regions they inhabited ; and in the hour of trial, as Morillo had too fatally 
 proved, were more than a match for the heavily accoutred Europeans." 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
148 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 As for the numbers engaged, an industrious writer in 
 the Carreo Nacional'^ has made out a table showing the 
 number of combats of all sorts in which the Colombian 
 army was engaged in the years i8i 0-1826 in Venezuela, 
 New Granada, Quito, and Peru. There were 696 en- 
 gagements, in which the numbers of troops on both sides 
 totalled 973,000. That gives an average of about 1400 
 men, republicans and royalists, engaged in each. 
 
 Bolivar showed in this campaign no remarkable 
 strategical qualifications. The direction of his advance 
 was practically prescribed for him by circumstances in 
 New Granada. It is true that he was successful in 
 planting his army right in the centre of a widely dis- 
 persed enemy, when he debouched from the mountains 
 of Merida, but that, looking to all the conditions, was 
 probably more by good luck than good guidance. He 
 was himself divided, and, had Marti succeeded, as he 
 should have, in destroying Ribas at Niquitao, Bolivar's 
 position would have been a very dangerous one. 
 
 The leaving of Yanez in unbroken force south of the 
 Apure, in a position to threaten Bolivar's communications 
 with New Granada, was fraught with danger. As was 
 shown later, Bolivar would have done better to break 
 up Yaflez's force, to establish himself on the Apure and 
 the Orinoco, and thence to operate northwards against 
 the capital and the north of Venezuela. That would 
 probably have resulted in his gaining over the Llaneros 
 who formed the majority of Boves' forces. It, however, 
 might have enabled Marino and Piar to gain the credit 
 of taking Caracas from the east, and have left Bolivar in 
 a less commanding political position. 
 
 Later, when Bolivar found himself in a central position, 
 he showed that he did not appreciate his advantages. 
 The distances were so great between the various hostile 
 forces that, had he kept his whole army together, he 
 
 ' A Bogoti newspaper. Issue of 20th July 1908. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
GENERAL REMARKS 149 
 
 could probably have crushed Boves and Rosete before any 
 of the others could interfere. Then he would have been 
 at liberty to turn against Yafiez, Ceballos, and the rest. 
 Again, he might have begun by dealing more strongly 
 with Monteverde in Puerto Cabello. If he had followed 
 him thither with the greater part of his army immediately 
 after the capitulation arranged by Fierro's envoys, it is 
 by no means improbable that he might have stormed the 
 place and got rid of Monteverde for good. Whilst he 
 was doing this, he could have contained Boves with a 
 small force. That was not difficult in the hilly region, 
 seeing that Boves' strength lay largely in his Llanero 
 cavalry, who were comparatively useless in the hills. 
 
 On the whole, it may be said that very little of the 
 military art was displayed on either side. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 BOGOTA AND THE TWO SIEGES OF CARTAGENA- 
 FALL OF NEW GRANADA, 1815-16 
 
 BOLIVAR and Marino, without touching any- 
 where on the way, landed at Cartagena on 
 the 2Sth September 18 14. Castillo, the 
 bitter enemy of the former, was soon busy 
 representing that to Bolivar alone was due the loss of 
 Venezuela to the republican cause. The Liberator's 
 justification of his own conduct is contained in a mani- 
 festo of the 30th September, which has already been 
 referred to.^ 
 
 Bolivar very soon left Cartagena to go up the 
 Magdalena and, vik Ocafia, to Tunja, where the Con- 
 gress of New Granada was in session. When he got to 
 Ocafia he heard of the presence at Ciicuta of Urdaneta, 
 and that his Venezuelan troops were quarrelling with the 
 Granadians. Turning aside to stop this friction, he heard 
 at Salazar that the story was exaggerated, and, therefore, 
 continued his journey to Tunja. Urdaneta had been at 
 Barquisemeto when the news of La Puerta and the other 
 disasters reached him. Entirely cut off by the inter- 
 vening Spaniards from Bolivar and the east, having only 
 three Venezuelan battalions and a squadron of cavalry, 
 and recognising that the republic had for the time 
 being collapsed, Urdaneta decided to fall back on New 
 Granada. Arriving at Trujillo, he reported his situation 
 to the Congress at Tunja. In reply, he was taken under 
 
 ^ Fide supra, p. 141. 
 ISO 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR SUBDUES BOGOTA 151 
 
 the protection of New Granada, and directed to march 
 to Tunja. Bolivar joined him at Pamplona, and was 
 cheered by an enthusiastic reception by officers and men 
 alike, notwithstanding that he had reproached the force 
 with its indiscipline and insubordination. 
 
 On arrival at Tunja, Bolivar was cordially received by 
 Camilo Torres, then President of the Congress. He 
 insisted on appearing at the bar of the Congress to 
 submit an explanation of his proceedings. The assembly 
 was pleased to express loudly its approval, and Bolivar 
 was at once commissioned to reduce to order Santa F6 
 (Bogotd),^ which had separated itself from the Union 
 and set up as an independent State, under the Dictator- 
 ship of M. B. Alvarez.2 
 
 Marching from Tunja, Bolivar arrived before Bogoti 
 with 1800 men. In the city were Alvarez the Dictator 
 and J. R. Leiva, a Spanish general in the service of the 
 recalcitrant State. They had called in the aid of the 
 Spaniards, and were supported by the influence of the 
 clergy. The archbishop went so far as to excommunicate 
 Bolivar as an enemy of religion. 
 
 That general was, on the 8th December 18 14, camped 
 at the farm of Techo, some four miles from Bogotd. 
 Thence he wrote to Alvarez that he (Bolivar) was 
 destined to be the Liberator, not the conqueror, of 
 oppressed peoples. He desired union, and demanded 
 the surrender of Alvarez and his State to the govern- 
 ment of Tunja. He promised security of life and pro- 
 perty, but Alvarez refused to yield. 
 
 ' Santa Fe, as the name of the present capital of Colombia, was finally 
 abandoned under article 5 of the fundamental law, passed on the 17th 
 December 1819. Henceforward we shall always speak of the city by its 
 modern name, Bogota. 
 
 '•' Manuel Bernardo Alvarez, born in Bogota in 1750, was a member of 
 the Cabildo at the outbreak of the revolution in 1810. He was an opponent 
 of Nari&o, after whose capture in Pasto he became Dictator of Cundina- 
 marca. He was shot at Bogota in September 1816 by Morillo. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
1 52 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Bolivar, reconnoitring the city, was fired upon by 
 artillery. He at once brought up his forces and com- 
 menced the attack of the city, which was not walled. On 
 the third day of street fighting, Alvarez found himself 
 driven back to the great square, and very short of water. 
 He begged for an armistice, and negotiations were 
 at once commenced for a capitulation. On the I2th 
 December 1814, Alvarez surrendered the city to the 
 national government. The news was received with 
 delight at Tunja, and Bolivar was appointed Captain- 
 General of the forces of the Confederation. The loss in 
 the fighting had not been great, some 300 men on 
 Alvarez's side, and less on Bolivar's. Having settled 
 affairs in Bogota, Bolivar returned to Tunja to arrange 
 plans with the government for further operations. His 
 proposal, which was accepted, was for an attack on the 
 Spaniards at Santa Marta, on the north coast, which 
 they still held in force. Thence a fresh advance east- 
 wards could be organised against Rio Hacha, and later, 
 against the Maracaibo province of Venezuela. Bolivar 
 was clearly aiming at a repetition of his exploits of 
 1 8 1 3. He had already indicated his views in his fare- 
 well to Venezuela at Carupano.^ In the meanwhile, 
 Urdaneta was to be sent to Cdcuta with a division, to 
 pacify that neighbourhood, and to be ready to support 
 the advance against north-western Venezuela. Yet 
 another detachment was sent southwards across the 
 upper Magdalena, to Popayan in the upper valley of the 
 Cauca, which was threatened by royalist attacks from the 
 Quito direction. This expedition, which would have to 
 cross the high passes of the Central Cordilleras, was com- 
 manded by Serviez^ and Montufar. 
 
 ' Supra, p. 143. 
 
 ' Manuel de Serviez, a Frenchman, after serving in the British and 
 Russian armies, went to New Granada, where he played a part in Narino's 
 civil war in 1813. In 1816 he served in Casanare and under Paez. He was 
 murdered in that year by robbers for the sake of $6000 which he had. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR SUBDUES BOGOTA 153 
 
 Having arranged all this, Bolivar returned once more 
 to Bogotd, which he reached on the ist January 1815, 
 to prepare his column for the march on Santa Marta. 
 On the same date Congress decided to transfer itself 
 from Tunja to Bogotd, and adjourn till the 23rd for that 
 purpose. On the 13 th, the President, the members of 
 the Congress, and the chief officials were received in 
 state outside Bogotd by Bolivar, the Archbishop, the 
 CabildOj and others. Bolivar made a long speech, and 
 was followed by others. The Representative Body of 
 Cundinamarca did not separate till it had decreed to 
 Bolivar the title of " Illustrious and Religious Pacificator.'' 
 The second adjective was perhaps meant as an apology 
 for his recent excommunication. 
 
 For the expedition against Santa Marta, the only 
 stronghold of the royalists now remaining on the Atlantic 
 coast of New Granada, Bolivar had 2000 men, amongst 
 whom was only one squadron of cavalry. Arms and 
 ammunition are said to have been deficient, though it 
 might be thought that enough would have been found in 
 Bogotd. 
 
 Castillo, whom Bolivar knew to be intriguing against 
 him at Cartagena, was still a thorn in his side. In order 
 to get rid of this enemy from the scene of operations, 
 Bolivar proposed to appoint him to a seat on the 
 Supreme Council of War at Bogoti, where he would be 
 out of the way, and deprived of the local influence which 
 he enjoyed at Cartagena. This being agreed to, Bolivar 
 marched from Bogota, on the 24th January 1815, for 
 Honda, the town on the Magdalena where the upper and 
 lower rivers are separated by a mile of rapids.^ All 
 
 ^ During this march a shocking act of barbarity was committed by one of 
 Bolivar's subordinates. Eleven unfortunate Spaniards, under sentence of 
 banishment, were murdered on the plea that they were worn out and could 
 not keep up. (O'Leary, i. p. 249.) There is nothing said of Bolivar's hav- 
 ing inflicted any punishment for this atrocious act. He can hardly escape 
 blame, at least as an accomplice after the fact. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
154 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 these marches sound very little ; for the distance from 
 Bogotd to Honda is little over i oo miles ; but it must 
 be remembered that the road, even at the present day, is 
 of a character almost inconceivable to Europeans who 
 have not left their own continent. A single traveller on 
 a mule can get down from the plateau of Bogoti (nearly 
 9000 feet above sea-level) to the Magdalena at Honda 
 (8000 feet lower) in three days in fine weather, but to 
 march a force even of 2000 men is quite another matter. 
 Even the journey to and from Tunja and Bogoti is not 
 the plain sailing it looks on a small scale map. 
 
 In saying that Santa Marta was the last Spanish 
 stronghold in the north of Colombia, it must be re- 
 membered that, besides the fortress, the royalists still 
 held the province of that name down to Ocaiia, which 
 they had just recovered from the republicans. Bolivar 
 now once more drove them from it with heavy loss. 
 Thence he proceeded to Mompox, which was commanded 
 by his friends, the brothers Pin^res. 
 
 All was going well when Bolivar found that Castillo, 
 too wary a bird to be taken with the bait of honourable 
 exile at Bogotd, had refused his appointment to the 
 Council of War there. It is certain that he had estab- 
 lished himself as the principal power in Cartagena, the 
 governor, Juan de Dios Amador, was his ally, and, 
 though to some extent unpopular owing to his arbitrary 
 conduct, Castillo had a large following, and held all the 
 military power of the fortress. 
 
 Beyond this it is difficult to unravel the tangled skein 
 of Cartagenian politics, and the result would be of little 
 interest to European readers. According to Bolivar's 
 admirers, his sole object was to get the arms and supplies 
 necessary to enable him to conquer Santa Marta. On 
 the other hand, enemies of Bolivar, and partisans of 
 Castillo, like Ducoudray-Holstein, aver that Bolivar was 
 well supplied ; that Santa Marta, hating Montalvo, the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR BESIEGES CARTAGENA 155 
 
 Spanish Viceroy, was ready to rise ; and that Montalvo 
 himself had a French ship lying in the harbour ready to 
 take him off at a moment's notice. Under these circum- 
 stances Ducoudray-Holstein says that Bolivar had only 
 to march on Santa Marta to ensure the surrender of the 
 fortress. He affirms that the destruction of Castillo was 
 Bolivar's real object, and that in this he was supported 
 by the Pin^res, who, during his former stay at Cartagena, 
 had intrigued with him against Torices (the then dictator) 
 and Castillo, but had failed, and been banished. 
 
 The fact that the old enmity of 1 8 1 3 between the two 
 men was still as vigorous as ever is perhaps sufficient for 
 our purpose. Castillo, determined not to have Bolivar at 
 Cartagena, issued orders to oppose his march. During 
 Bolivar's stay at Mompox, negotiations for a settlement 
 with Castillo were carried on through the medium ot 
 Marimon, an ecclesiastic sent for the purpose from Car- 
 tagena. Nothing came of them, and Bolivar descended 
 the Magdalena to Barranca, whence he again opened 
 negotiations. Finding that Castillo was trying to suborn 
 his troops, he marched to Turbaco, in the hills, a few 
 miles from Cartagena. Thence he sent another emissary, 
 Tomas Montilla, whose brother Mariano happened at the 
 time to be military commandant of the fortress. He was 
 not received at all, and some of Bolivar's friends in Car- 
 tagena were imprisoned when they demanded passports 
 to go to him. 
 
 Thus the relations between the two leaders grew worse 
 and worse, until Bolivar finally decided to appear before 
 Cartagena with his troops. On the 27th March 1815 
 he seized the hill of La Popa, an elevation within cannon 
 shot, even in those days, of the fortress. It rises some 
 500 feet above the plain, and commands, from the 
 monastery on its summit, the whole town and the fort of 
 San Felipe (or San Lazaro), from which Admiral Vernon's 
 attack was so disastrously beaten off in 1741. La Popa 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
IS6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 had a very deep well as its only source of water supply, 
 and so bitter were the feelings against Bolivar in Carta- 
 gena that the garrison, unable to hold the hill themselves, 
 poisoned the well by throwing rotten hides into it. That 
 Bolivar should dare to sit down to blockade what was 
 considered the strongest fortress on the north coast of 
 South America, with a large garrison in it, certainly 
 seems to show that his complaints of want of means to 
 attack a place in the precarious state of Santa Marta 
 were not founded. The only thing in favour of the story 
 is Ducoudray-Holstein's statement that Bolivar had only 
 one small gun to mount on La Popa. From the Popa 
 there were more negotiations with Marimon, into the 
 details of which it is useless to enter. They dragged on 
 without result till the 22nd April, when Marimon wrote 
 that General Morillo, with a large army from Europe, 
 was already in Venezuela. About this time, too, Montalvo, 
 the Spanish Viceroy ^ at Santa Marta, sent olTers to the 
 Cartagenians of assistance against Bolivar. These they 
 had the decency to refuse. Even the bitterness of civil 
 war was not sufficient to induce one party to call in the 
 common enemy to help in the destruction of the other. 
 
 By the 29th April, the Spaniards had reconquered the 
 Magdalena from Mompox to its mouth, and Bolivar was 
 cut off from communication with Bogota. 
 
 Then, at last, he gave way. Assembling a council of 
 war, he explained that his own departure was an absolute 
 necessity, if the situation was to be saved at all. The 
 council agreed to this, provided they themselves, and any 
 other officers who so desired, should be allowed to resign 
 and leave the country. 
 
 On the 7th May, Marimon was informed of the decision. 
 On the 8th, Bolivar embarked on the British brigantine 
 " Discovery," sailing next day for Jamaica. Before sailing, 
 
 ' In 1813 the Spanish Government had united New Granada and Venezuela 
 under a single Viceroy, Marshal Montalvo (Pilling, 353). 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR BESIEGES CARTAGENA 157 
 Bolivar addressed his soldiers, explaining his motives. 
 Advising his Venezuelans to go home, and his Granadian 
 soldiers to conquer for their country, he laments the fate 
 which compels him to resign the command, in order to 
 save the army from destruction. He writes in a tone of 
 deep despondency, saying that he is fated to have to 
 leave his country and to die in inaction abroad. His 
 own existence, he said, and that of the army being in- 
 compatible, he had preferred the army.'^ 
 
 Of Bolivar's conduct in the whole of this affair and of 
 his final departure what shall we say ? 
 
 Ducoudray-Holstein, as usual, has nothing but blame 
 for him ; Larrazabal nothing but praise. These are the 
 extremes. To us, looking at the whole matter from an 
 impartial standpoint, it seems impossible to exonerate 
 either Bolivar or Castillo. The quarrel between them 
 seems to have been based, on both sides, mainly on per- 
 sonal considerations. Neither of them thought fit to 
 yield, or even to compromise, in a personal quarrel which 
 was incompatible with the interests of the cause which 
 both professed to serve. It was perfectly well known 
 that Spain was about to make a desperate effort to 
 retrieve her lost position in the colonies, and true patriots 
 would have hastened to sink their differences in favour of 
 a united effort against the common enemy. Neither of 
 them would do so, and, at the last moment, one of them 
 was compelled to depart if he was not to be destroyed, 
 and that one must be Bolivar, who, otherwise, would have 
 found himself between the upper millstone of the Spanish 
 forces from the Magdalena, and the nether of Cartagena 
 itself. 
 
 Had Bolivar and Castillo united for an active defence 
 
 of Cartagena, it is by no means improbable that Morillo's 
 
 army might have been destroyed, perhaps even before it 
 
 ever sat down before the place. The remarks made by 
 
 1 O'Learjr, Docts., 15, p. 14. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
IS8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Bolivar in his manifesto of 1 8 1 2 ^ anent the destructive 
 
 effects of disunion might well be quoted against himself. 
 
 No sooner was Ferdinand VII. back on his throne at 
 Madrid, on the 13th May 18 14, than he began to think 
 of measures for the suppression of the revolted American 
 colonies. That was an idea which was always uppermost 
 with every Spanish Government, were it Junta, Regency, 
 Cortes, or the King himself. We must except the late 
 Government of Joseph Bonaparte, for he knew well that 
 he had quite enough to do at home, and that the naval 
 supremacy of England forbade to him, though it allowed 
 to a Spanish Government, any idea of an over-sea 
 expedition. 
 
 The expedition now equipped by Ferdinand was the 
 largest and most complete which Spain had been able to 
 send. It consisted of 6 regiments of infantry, 2 of 
 cavalry, and 18 guns, altogether 10,642 men, fully 
 equipped in every way, including a siege train. The 
 naval squadron, which carried and convoyed it, in- 
 cluded I line of battleship of 74 guns, 3 frigates, 40 
 smaller ships of war, and 60 or 70 transports. To 
 the chief command was appointed Don Pablo Morillo, 
 who sailed, in the middle of February 1815, from 
 Cadiz, as if for Buenos Aires, carrying sealed orders, 
 to be opened off the Canary Islands. They were found 
 to direct the fleet to Venezuela, which colony Morillo 
 was to reduce to order. Having done that, he was to 
 reconquer New Granada, then to march south, and, 
 joined by the Quito royalists, under Montes, to carry 
 the triumphant banners of Spain to Peru, and finally to 
 Buenos Aires. Truly an immense and, as it turned out, 
 impossible task. 
 
 On the 3rd April 1815, the fleet reached Puerto 
 Santo, near Cariipano. Morillo decided that the first 
 thing to be done was to subdue the island of Margarita, 
 
 ' Supra, p. 81. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MORILLO'S EXPEDITION 159 
 
 whose warlike inhabitants had kept the flag of liberty 
 flying when it had been beaten to the ground on the main- 
 land. At Canipano Morillo found Morales, now master of 
 the eastern provinces, in command of 5000 men, ready 
 to proceed to Margarita. When the expedition landed 
 there, the islanders saw that it was too strong to be 
 resisted, and Arismendi, who commanded there for the 
 republicans, submitted, with practically the whole of the 
 island. Not so Bermudez, who succeeded in sailing 
 with a single ship through the midst of the Spanish fleet, 
 and, making a long circuit by Martinique and St Thomas, 
 eventually arrived safely at Cartagena. 
 
 Morillo himself landed at Asuncion in Margarita on 
 the 9th April. That general, like so many of the 
 Spanish commanders in South America, was of humble 
 origin. Originally a sergeant of marines, he had served 
 on shore under Wellington, and quickly risen to the 
 rank of brigadier-general, which he held when Ferdinand 
 returned to Spain. He was one of the first to salute the 
 restored monarch, which fact is said to have gained him 
 his appointment, one beyond his very mediocre talents. 
 His second in command and chief of the staff was Don 
 Pascual Enrile, a Cuban of good family, whom Morillo 
 called the " terror of evil doers," but of whom Boves had 
 said that he " exceeded in barbarity and cruelty." The 
 latter character was truly remarkable, looking to the 
 source from which it came. 
 
 Leaving garrisons in Margarita and Cumand; Morillo 
 left for Caracas, where he arrived on the 1 1 th May, and 
 took over charge of the office of Captain-General from 
 Cajigal, who became commander of the army. One of 
 Morillo's first operations was to raise a forced loan of 
 200,000 " pesos," to replace the military chest which 
 had been lost by the burning of the " San Pedro." In 
 Caracas, he and his men acted in a very overbearing 
 fashion. Many leading Creoles were arrested, private 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
i6o SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 property was confiscated, the inhabitants were treated 
 with entire lack of consideration in billeting soldiers on 
 them, and cattle were taken without payment for the 
 expedition to Cartagena. On the 17th May, Morillo 
 issued a proclamation, informing the Granadians that he 
 would soon be in their midst with an avenging army. 
 
 On the 1st June, the expedition left Caracas, con- 
 sisting of 8joo men, led by Morillo and Enrile, and 
 accompanied by two Inquisitors, who were to reopen the 
 Holy Office at Cartagena. 
 
 The fleet of 56 ships, sailing from Puerto Cabello on 
 the 1 2th July, reached Santa Marta on the 23rd and 
 24th. Morillo despatched thence two columns to 
 operate by land. The first was to clear the lower 
 Magdalena, to reinforce Mompox, and to occupy Ocafta 
 on the east bank, and the province of Antioquia on the 
 west. The second, under Morales, was the vanguard of 
 the force for the siege of Cartagena. By the 15 th 
 August, Morales, after marching through a devastated 
 country, crossed the Magdalena above Soledad and 
 advanced on Turbaco, sweeping in all the resources in 
 grain and cattle of the country to the south of Carta- 
 gena. Morillo, leaving Santa Marta on the 17th 
 August, landed unopposed with the main body not far 
 from the fortress on the 22nd and 23 rd. 
 
 The blockade was established on the ist September 
 18 1 5. Cartagena was ill prepared for a siege, and the 
 inhabitants of the surrounding country, after the dis- 
 graceful exhibition of civil war which they had recently 
 witnessed, were inclined to help rather than to resist 
 Morillo. Even those within the fortress were not all 
 hostile to the Spaniard, seeing that the success of the 
 independents apparently only meant civil war. Pro- 
 visions were by no means sufficient for the maintenance 
 of the large non-combatant population. For the suffer- 
 ings from hunger, which soon began to be felt, Castillo 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SECOND SIEGE OF CARTAGENA i6i 
 
 was blamed, and, on the 1 7th October, he was deposed 
 from the command, Bermudez being elected by the 
 garrison in his place. 
 
 Morillo's troops, however, were also suiifering severely. 
 Disease spread rapidly amongst the European troops, 
 unseasoned to the trying climate of the neighbourhood, 
 and they suffered constant loss in the frequent skirmishes 
 which occurred. The defence was carried on with equal 
 vigour by the gunboats in the outer harbour, and it was 
 only after suffering considerable loss that the Spanish 
 warships succeeded in entering it. 
 
 By November the famine in the fortress was intense. 
 All ordinary food had run out, and the wretched people 
 were living on limited rations of horse-flesh, dogs, cats, 
 and rats. A certain amount of food was procured by 
 fishing in the harbour along the shore of the Tierra 
 Bomba, the island lying between the obstructed channel 
 of the Boca Grande and the forts of Boca Chica com- 
 manding the open entrance of the harbour, seven or 
 eight miles south of the city.^ This source of supply 
 Morillo determined to cut off by occupying Tierra 
 Bomba. In order to divert attention, he proposed to 
 attack the hill of La Popa, half a mile inland from the 
 harbour. In Bolivar's siege this height had been held 
 by the besieger, though, as he had practically no 
 artillery, he could do little or no harm from it to the 
 fortress. Against Morillo's artillery it was absolutely 
 necessary for the garrison to hold La Popa, from the 
 top of which the whole fortress was commanded. 
 
 ^ Cartagena stands practically on an island, connected with the mainland 
 only by a narrow strip of land on the east. About two miles south of the 
 city is the Boca Grande, the best entrance in old times to the splendid har- 
 bour. This entrance was blocked up with sunken ships in order to prevent 
 the entrance of the buccaneers and other invaders, who, after that, had to 
 go down another six miles to the narrow Boca Chica, and then beat up 
 the harbour against the North-East Trades — no easy matter. The piece of 
 low land between the Boca Grande and the Boca Chica is the Tierra 
 Bomba. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
1 62 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 On the 9th November, two deserters brought to 
 Morillo the fullest information as to the defences of La 
 Popa, and the attack was fixed for the night of the 
 loth. In the darkness the stormers arrived unperceived 
 within 200 paces of the ditch of the defenders' works on 
 the summit. Then a sentry gave the alarm. Though 
 the surprise had failed, the Spanish column pushed 
 bravely on up the steep hill ; two men had actually 
 reached the ditch when, the commander being shot 
 down, the rest retired in disorder, after losing a third of 
 their number. At the same time, an attack by the 
 Spanish gunboats on those of the defenders in the bay 
 had been repulsed. 
 
 Another attack was driven off on the 12th, and the 
 besiegers' gunboats were compelled to run close into the 
 shore to seek protection from their infantry. On the 
 13th, Morales succeeded in landing on Tierra Bomba, 
 which stopped the fishing. He was master of the outer 
 harbour, but was repulsed in an attempt to storm the 
 now isolated forts of Boca Chica.^ 
 
 By the end of November, the sufferings of the in- 
 habitants were so fearful that the civil population were 
 urged to leave the fortress. A few hundreds, mostly 
 women and children, got out, only to die for the most 
 part of starvation. 
 
 The garrison, reduced almost to a shadow, looked in 
 vain for a ship bringing relief. Sentries actually died 
 of starvation on their posts ; resistance was no longer 
 possible. Morillo's men, the Europeans at least, were 
 almost as badly off, owing to the ravages of disease, and 
 the general called on the governor to surrender, throwing 
 himself and his men on the mercy of the king. Other- 
 
 ' These forts still stand on either side of the narrow channel. As one 
 passes in a steamer through the Boca Chica, it seems almost possible to 
 throw a stone into either. They are now useless. During the siege they 
 were commanded by Ducoudray-Holslein, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SECOND SIEGE OF CARTAGENA 163 
 
 wise, Morillo threatened to send back the starving 
 wretches whose misery alone had induced him to forgo 
 his right to prevent their exit. 
 
 But the governor, though determined not to surrender, 
 now realised that further resistance was hopeless, and 
 was preparing to evacuate the place by sea. On the 
 5 th December, the guns were spiked as well as was 
 possible, and the garrison, with about 2000 of the 
 inhabitants, assembled on the edge of the harbour ready 
 to embark. The last post to be abandoned was La 
 Popa. 
 
 To carry this multitude there were but sixteen small 
 ships, badly provisioned, and ill equipped for sea. Under 
 cover of night the flotilla succeeded in running the 
 gauntlet of the fire of the enemy's gunboats and shore 
 batteries, and reached without very heavy loss the Boca 
 Chica, where they anchored in safety under protection of 
 the guns of the forts. Having taken in a supply of 
 water and embarked the garrisons of the forts, the ships 
 sailed the same night. 
 
 Morillo, becoming aware of the evacuation on the 6th 
 December, entered the fortress. In his official account 
 of what he saw he writes — " The city presented the 
 most horrible spectacle, the streets were strewn with un- 
 buried corpses, which polluted the air, and the greater 
 part of the inhabitants were actually dying of hunger." 
 O'Leary states that Morillo and his men behaved with 
 the greatest humanity to these starving creatures. The 
 soldiers divided their own rations with them, whilst 
 Morillo took all possible measures to relieve their suffer- 
 ings. Not so Morales and his troops, mostly Venezuelans, 
 who freely indulged their lust for blood by indiscriminate 
 massacres. That commander, on occupying the Boca 
 Chica forts, found in them three officers and sixty 
 soldiers who had been unable to embark with the other 
 fugitives. Every one of them was brutally murdered. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
i64 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Next day the inhabitants of the village of Boca Chica, 
 who had concealed themselves in the scrub on Tierra 
 Bomba, were induced by promises of safety to leave 
 their hiding places. As soon as they returned, 300 or 
 more of them were put to death. As usual, there had 
 been atrocities on both sides, for O'Leary describes the 
 murder, just before the siege, of some Spanish prisoners 
 captured by republican privateers and brought to 
 Cartagena.^ 
 
 Morillo, too, took toll in a more deliberate way of the 
 patriot leaders who fell into his hands. Among those 
 who were shot or hanged was Bolivar's enemy Castillo, 
 the ex-governor of Cartagena.^ 
 
 Here it will be convenient to narrate briefly the 
 remaining movements of Morillo in subjugating New 
 Granada. 
 
 As soon as he had occupied Cartagena, he sent Colonel 
 La Torre southwards with a strong column. He was to 
 be joined on the way by Calzada, already arrived in New 
 Granada from Barinas. 
 
 Meanwhile, in Bogoti things had not been going 
 smoothly. There had been two reactionary plots, in one 
 of which it had been sought to implicate Torices 
 (formerly of Cartagena). He was honourably acquitted. 
 The people, generally alarmed at the impending danger 
 
 ' O'Leary, i. 287. 
 
 * Close to the present railway station, on the outskirts of Cartagena, may 
 be seen a double row of columns, each with a bust on the top. If the 
 author's memory serves him rightly, he counted sixteen. Under each bust 
 is the name of the patriot, followed by the words "ahorcado en 1816" 
 (hanged in 1816), or else " fiisilado por la espalda " (shot in the back). A 
 list is given by Larrazabal and others of the names of patriots executed in 
 different parts of New Granada in 1816, with their rank and place of execu- 
 tion. There are 125 in all, of whom the most notable are Castillo (shot at 
 Cartagena), J. Camacho (Bogota), Torices (President — shot and body hung 
 on gallows at Bogota), Camilo Torres (the same as last), F. Caldas (Bogota), 
 J. R. Leiva (Spaniard, at Bogota), and Montufar. The last-named will be 
 remembered as originally a Spanish envoy, and then a revolutionary leader 
 in Quito. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SUBJUGATION OF NEW GRANADA 165 
 when Cartagena should fall, would give little assistance 
 to the government's schemes for resistance. The Con- 
 gress was busy talking of reforms, whilst the Spaniards 
 were losing no time in following up their success at 
 Cartagena. 
 
 Calzada, after suffering a slight check, had defeated 
 Urdaneta at Chitagd, in the province of Trujillo, on 
 the 30th November 1815. He had occupied Ciicuta 
 and Pamplona, and presently moved towards Ocafia 
 to meet La Torre. On the Paramo of Cachirf he 
 attacked 3000 republicans, mostly recruits, on the 21st 
 February 1 8 1 6. Thanks largely to the " Numancia " 
 battalion of Venezuelans, Calzada gained, in the second 
 day's battle, a complete victory, which was followed 
 by the usual massacres. One Spanish colonel is said to 
 have boasted that he had, with his own hand, killed so 
 many rebels that his right arm was useless for several 
 days. The force destroyed at Cachiri was practically all 
 the Bogotd government had to oppose to the Spanish 
 advance. Had Calzada advanced at once, he could have 
 conquered Bogotd there and then. But he had to wait 
 for La Torre. 
 
 Meanwhile, Warleta, with another column sent by 
 Morillo, had, by the middle of March, subjugated the 
 whole of Antioquia and Choc6,^ though he encountered 
 serious resistance from the manly population of the 
 former. In Bogotd, J. F. Madrid now succeeded Torres 
 as President. He found himself with very little influence 
 in the panic-stricken capital, and was abandoned by the 
 troops under Serviez, who, - with many of the country 
 people, sought safety on the plains of Casanare. Madrid 
 then retired with his personal guard to Popayan, leaving 
 Bogotd to its fate. 
 
 On the Sth May, La Torre was in Bogotd. A few 
 
 ' The western district of the Western Cordilleras down to the Pacific 
 Ocean. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
i66 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 days earlier he had issued promises of amnesty to all 
 who should submit and swear fidelity to Ferdinand VII. 
 When Morillo arrived, on the 26th May, he disallowed 
 the amnesty. Those leaders who had remained at home 
 on the strength of it were arrested, tried by court-martial, 
 and hanged or shot. Amongst them, as already noted,^ 
 were Torres, Torices, Camacho, Montiifar, and others, in- 
 cluding Caldas, a well-known scientist. 
 
 Morillo stayed at Bogoti till November 18 16, when 
 events in Venezuela, to be presently recounted, recalled 
 him to that province. He left in command of 3800 men 
 at Bogotd General Sdmano, whom he later appointed 
 Viceroy of New Granada, in place of Montalvo, whose 
 methods were, he thought, too mild. Sdmano was a real 
 savage, who deluged Bogotd in blood.^ His troops were 
 principally Venezuelans and Pastusos. 
 
 ' Supra, p. 164, «. 
 
 ^ Amongst Samano's victims was a girl named Polycarpa Salabarrieta. 
 Her lover, a republican like herself, had been compelled to serve in the 
 Spanish ranks. It is not denied that the girl plotted the desertion of her 
 lover and others, and prepared supplies for their flight to join the republican 
 bands in Casanare. They were arrested, and Polycarpa's letters, found 
 on the lover, implicated her. The two lovers, with six companions, were 
 shot in the back at Bogota on the 17th November 1817. Just before her 
 death, the girl exclaimed, "My blood will very soon be avenged by the 
 liberators of my country " This horrible case has attained the greatest 
 celebrity in Colombia, where the story of the martyred heroine is a prime 
 favourite of poets. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 BOLIVAR IN JAMAICA, HAITI, AND VENEZUELA, 
 
 i8i6 
 
 IT is time to return to Bolivar, whom we last 
 saw sailing from Cartagena on the 9th May, 
 in the deepest despair. Arriving at Kingston, 
 he sought help from the Duke of Manchester, 
 then Governor of Jamaica, for the relief of Cartagena. 
 The Duke, naturally, could not assist in the rebellion of 
 his colonies against a sovereign with whom Great Britain 
 was at peace. He seems, however, to have sympathised 
 with the exile, and to have treated him with civility. 
 Speaking of Bolivar on. one occasion, and alluding to the 
 fiery nature of the Venezuelan and his weak physique, 
 the Duke remarked that, " the flame has absorbed the 
 oil." Failing with the English authorities, Bolivar found 
 little sympathy amongst the foreigners in the island, 
 to whom he applied to aid him in his scheme for an 
 attack on Venezuela whilst Morillo was busy at Car- 
 tagena. Then he took to writing voluminous letters and 
 manifestoes. One of his letters to a Jamaican gentleman ^ 
 is a regular pamphlet on recent European and South 
 American history. On the loth July, he issued a long 
 manifesto to his compatriots.^ It summarises his move- 
 ments after leaving Venezuela on the destruction of the 
 republic. It deals at length with the case of Castillo, 
 who, the writer says, had fraudulently and forcibly 
 obtained possession of Cartagena. Bolivar had done 
 
 ' O'Leary, i. 291, etc. ^ O'Leary, Docts., 14, p. 246. 
 
 167 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
i68 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 everything in his power, but in vain, to effect a reconcilia- 
 tion with this personal enemy. He had, he says, been 
 forced by Castillo's perfidy to lay siege to Cartagena, 
 a course approved by a council of war. The whole 
 document is a vehement indictment of Castillo, and 
 a perfervid defence of the purity and patriotism of 
 Bolivar's own motives. It is unnecessary to go into it 
 in detail, though it has been fully considered in forming 
 the opinion we have already expressed regarding this 
 miserable quarrel between two men whose whole thoughts, 
 and whose every action should have been devoted to the 
 repulse of the common enemy. 
 
 As time passed in Jamaica, Bolivar realised the im- 
 possibility of organising an expedition there. It is true 
 that the difficulty of ships and arms was to a certain 
 extent got over by the generous offers of assistance made 
 by Luis Brion, of whom much will have to be said in the 
 history of the next few years. 
 
 This devoted adherent of the Venezuelan cause 
 was born in 1782 in the island of Curagao, the 
 son of a wealthy Dutch merchant, a native of 
 Brabant. Luis had been sent to Holland to be 
 educated. He voluntarily enlisted in the Dutch army, 
 and served gallantly at the time of the Anglo-Russian 
 descent on Holland in 1799. He was then sent back to 
 Cura9ao, and, after some years spent in travel and trade, 
 he returned there, with the large fortune which his 
 father had left him much augmented by his own trading 
 ventures. This was in 1804. In the following year he 
 made a brave attempt to beat off the English landing in 
 Cura§ao. Then he went to La Guaira and Caracas, 
 where, amongst others, he met young Mariano Montilla, 
 whose fortunes he pushed. When the revolution began, 
 he joined the independents, and was appointed captain of 
 a frigate in 181 1. Thereafter, he devoted the whole of 
 his large fortune to the cause which he had adopted. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EVENTS IN HAITI 169 
 
 When Bolivar was in Jamaica, Brion was at Aux Cayes, 
 in Haiti, raising means for the relief of Cartagena, and 
 Ducoudray-Holstein asserts that Brion actually supplied 
 the place with a considerable amount of arms and pro- 
 visions during Morillo's siege. 
 
 On the 9th December 18 15, Bolivar narrowly escaped 
 assassination. A negro servant, at whose instigation is 
 uncertain, entered his chamber at night, and stabbed to 
 death the occupant of Bolivar's hammock. Fortunately 
 for the Liberator, he was away in new lodgings at the 
 moment, and the man in the hammock was Felix Amestoy, 
 one of his oilScers. The murderer was duly captured, tried, 
 and hanged. Larrazabal ^ snatches at a story that he was 
 instigated by Mox6, the governor of Caracas, but O'Leary^ 
 says the story was that Morillo was at the bottom of the 
 affair. O'Leary, however, who was personally acquainted 
 with Morillo in later years when the war was over, held 
 him in esteem, and declines to believe him capable of 
 such an action. 
 
 Shortly after this escape, Bolivar sailed from Kingston. 
 According to Larrazabal, he was bound for Aux Cayes 
 to join Brion. Ducoudray-Holstein, on the other hand, 
 says he was on his way to Cartagena to supersede Ber- 
 mudez, at the request of Ducoudray himself However 
 this may be, both agree that, on the way, he met a 
 Colombian privateer who informed him of the evacuation 
 of Cartagena, whereupon he made for Aux Cayes, whither 
 also the fugitives of Cartagena were bound. From Aux 
 Cayes he proceeded to Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital, 
 where at that time Alexandre Potion ^ was President of 
 
 ^ i. 407. 2 i. 312. 
 
 ' A mulatto, born at Port-au-Prince in 1770. In 1800 he went with Tous- 
 saint-Louverture to France, and returned in 1802 as a colonel in the French 
 expedition under Pauline Bonaparte's first husband, Leclerc. Disgusted with 
 the cruelties of the French and their treatment of Toussaint-Louverture, he 
 joined the independents against them. He rose to be President of the Republic 
 of Haiti, and died in 1818. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
I70 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the Black Republic. To him Bolivar was introduced by 
 Sir R. Sutherland, and found in the mulatto President 
 an excellent friend, who gave him substantial assistance 
 in the matter of arms and ammunition. Potion had to 
 take precautions against this assistance embroiling him 
 with Spain. 
 
 On the 1 6th January 1 8 1 6, there arrived at Aux Cayes 
 the remains of the party of fugitives from Cartagena. 
 Immediately they got to sea after the evacuation, their 
 ships were dispersed by a storm, some being lost or driven 
 ashore on the coast between Cartagena and Puerto Bello. 
 Amongst those who, at last, reached Aux Cayes were 
 some notable enemies of Bolivar, especially Mariano 
 Montilla, Bermudez, Aury, and Ducoudray - Holstein, 
 though the latter professes to have been well disposed 
 at the time towards Bolivar. On the other hand, Marino, 
 Zea, Piar, and Brion were friendly, and tried to keep the 
 peace. There was plenty of wrangling and squabbling. 
 Mariano Montilla went so far as to challenge Bolivar to a 
 duel, whilst Bermudez openly charged him with cowardice 
 and incapacity. 
 
 Bolivar now summoned a meeting of all the exiled 
 chiefs to consider the question of the proposed expedi-- 
 tion to Venezuela. At this meeting Brion proposed the 
 election of Bolivar to the chief command, provisionally 
 at least, until the assembly of a larger number of leaders 
 in Venezuela should enable a supreme chief to be chosen 
 by a more general vote. Brion's proposal was supported 
 by Marimon, Zea,^ and Duran, whilst Aury (commander 
 of the ships), Montilla, and Bermudez strongly opposed 
 it, proposing instead to entrust the command to a com- 
 
 ' Francisco Antonio Zea was born at Medellin, in Antioquia, in 1770. In 
 1797 he was tried in Madrid for his republican sentiments freely expressed. 
 He was released after two years in the dungeons of Cadiz. After being 
 employed in Spain in various capacities, he went to England in 1812, whence 
 he went to join Bolivar in 1816. He plays a considerable part in thishistory. 
 He died at Bath (England) in 1822. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EVENTS IN HAITI 171 
 
 mission of three or five. In the end Aury yielded, whilst 
 Bermudez and Montilla ^ were turned out as irreconcilables. 
 Bolivar was then elected unanimously. Marifio became 
 chief of the staff, with Ducoudray-Holstein as assistant ; 
 Brion was appointed admiral, and Zea Intendant. 
 
 The expedition consisted of six schooners and a sloop, 
 with only about 250 soldiers, chiefly officers, though the 
 ships carried arms and ammunition for 6000, the rest of 
 whom were expected to join in Venezuela. The expedi- 
 tion was almost broken up at the last moment, for Aury put 
 in a claim for the expenses of his ship, the " Constitution," 
 and there was no money to meet it. Moreover, Aury, 
 Bermudez, and Montilla tried to divert part of the expe- 
 dition to Mexico. Petion again came to Bolivar's assist- 
 ance, not only by guaranteeing the sum due, but also by 
 refusing to recognise the Mexican scheme, or to acknow- 
 ledge any leaders but Bolivar and Marimon. Aury and 
 Montilla thereupon left the patriots, and Bermudez was 
 refused permission to go with them. For all his services. 
 Potion demanded of Bolivar a promise, which was given, 
 that the freedom of all slaves in Venezuela should be 
 decreed as soon as the Liberator landed there. 
 
 The fleet sailed, at last, on the 31st March 18 16. In 
 the " Bolivar " were Bolivar himself, Brion, and the staff. 
 In the " Marino " were Mariflo, Piar, and MacGregor, a 
 Scotch adventurer. Bolivar's orders were to sail for the 
 island of Margarita. 
 
 In that island the moderate Spanish governor, Herraiz, 
 left there by Morillo, had been succeeded by Urreiztieta, 
 a man of a harsher stamp. One of his first measures 
 was to try and do away with Arismendi, who, it will be 
 remembered, had surrendered with the rest of the islanders 
 
 ^ Mariano, brother of Tomas Montilla, born at Caracas in 1782. After 
 his reconciliation with Bolivarj he became one of the most devoted followers 
 of the Liberator, after whose death he presently became the first Venezuelan 
 Minister to England, and died in Caracas in 1 851. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
172 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 to Morillo. Arismendi, warned of the real designs of the 
 governor in asking him to a dinner to celebrate the news 
 of Napoleon's deportation, concealed himself. In Novem- 
 ber 1 8 1 5 he, raising the standard of revolt, and with a few 
 companions armed only with lances, seized . the port of 
 Juan Griego and Villa del Norte. Furious at the suc- 
 cesses of Arismendi, Urreiztieta wreaked his vengeance 
 on the innocent wife of the rebel. She was thrown into 
 prison, where her new-born child died, and was afterwards 
 sent to Cadiz as a criminal. One of the governor's officers, 
 Pardo, even suggested a general massacre of the women 
 and children as the best means of exterminating a rebel 
 population, but this was too much even for Mox6, the 
 Captain-General. 
 
 We now return to Bolivar, whose fleet, after a very 
 slow voyage, only reached the Testigos islands on the 
 1st May. Next day the squadron came upon some 
 Spanish warships, which it attacked. The brigantine 
 " Intrepido " was captured by boarding, as well as a 
 schooner, the " Rita." ^ Two other ships escaped. 
 
 On the 3rd May, the expedition reached Juan Griego 
 in the island of Margarita. As we know, Arismendi 
 was in possession of that place. When Bolivar went 
 to Cartagena, in 18 14, he had characterised Arismendi 
 as " seditious," and there was, therefore, some doubt how 
 he would be received by that chief However, he found 
 Arismendi prepared to receive him well, so he proceeded 
 to disembark. Apropos of Arismendi, we may refer 
 to a story, told by Ducoudray-Holstein, of how some 
 
 1 Ducoudray-Holstein (i. 313) tells a long story of Bolivar's cowardly 
 behaviour in this action, when he hid himself in a place of safety until all 
 was over. Then he came out and began shooting at the Spaniards who were 
 trying to swim away. Considering the marked bias of Ducoudray, and many 
 notable instances where Bolivar showed plenty of personal courage, there 
 seems very insufficient reason for believing this story, circumstantial though 
 it be. After" all, there was no earthly reason why the commander-in-chief 
 should lead a boarding-party. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR LANDS IN MARGARITA 173 
 
 unfortunate Spanish prisoners of the recent naval action, 
 having unfortunately been landed, were promptly shot 
 by the Margaritan. As the writer strongly supports 
 Arismendi against Bolivar, the story is probably true, 
 and serves as evidence to show that massacres of 
 prisoners were just as much in vogue with the inde- 
 pendents as with the royalists. Arismendi had already 
 distinguished himself as a butcher in the massacre of La 
 Guaira in 1 8 1 4.^ 
 
 The landing of Bolivar, and the considerable number of 
 rebel troops, inclusive of those of Arismendi, now properly 
 armed from Bolivar's stores, so alarmed the Spanish 
 commanders in the island that they evacuated the castle 
 of Santa Rosa and the town of Asuncion, which were 
 occupied by Arismendi. 
 
 On the 7th May, Bolivar assembled, at Villa del 
 Norte, the principal inhabitants of Margarita, and all 
 the commanders. Addressing them, he said that it was 
 necessary to appoint as commander the man in whom 
 they had most confidence. Having his team now well 
 in hand, he went on to deprecate his own appointment, 
 which, perhaps, he would not have dared had Aury, 
 Montilla, and Bermudez been still present. He was, as 
 he clearly desired, elected unanimously " Supreme 
 Chief of the Republic." On the following day, he 
 issued a proclamation^ in which he authorised the 
 cities to nominate deputies to the Congress, with the 
 same powers as they had enjoyed under the former 
 republic, which had been wiped out by Boves and 
 Morales. Moreover, he announced to the Spaniards in 
 Venezuela the termination of war to the death on his 
 part, provided they did likewise. It can hardly be 
 doubted that, almost from the first, he had regretted 
 
 ' i. 326. Arismendi it was who carried out the massacre of La Guaira in 
 February 1814. 
 2 O'Leary, Docts., 15, p. 56. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
174 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 his barbarous proclamation of Trujillo. To this Mox6, 
 the Captain-General, replied by the offer of a reward of 
 1 0,000 ^ pesos each for the heads of Bolivar and some of 
 the other leaders. Bolivar now determined to land on 
 the mainland at Cariipano, which he reached on the ist 
 June. The weak Spanish garrison was easily driven 
 out, abandoning its ships, artillery and stores. Bolivar, 
 in accordance with his promise to Potion, called upon 
 the slaves to join his standard, offering to them their 
 liberty, and to their masters compensation.^ Marino 
 was sent to Guiria, Piar to Maturin to raise the country, 
 whilst the Liberator himself worked in Cariipano at the 
 general organisation of the republican army. 
 
 On the 28th June, a fresh popular assembly at 
 Cariipano recognised Bolivar as Supreme Chief, and 
 demanded the constitution of a government " one and 
 central." Three days earlier, Bolivar's authority had 
 been recognised by the guerrilla leaders in the interior, 
 Mondgas, Rojas, Cedefio, and Zaraza. The expeditions 
 of Marino and Piar were successful, but their value was 
 marred by the fact that, as soon as they were out of 
 reach of Bolivar, these two subordinates began to intrigue 
 for his displacement in favour of Marifio. Mean- 
 while, Bolivar's advance on Cumani had met with a 
 reverse at the hands of the Spaniards, who had also 
 beaten the guerrilla forces of Rojas, Zaraza, and 
 Mondgas. Once more Bolivar, thinking his position at 
 Cariipano untenable, sailed on the ist July westwards 
 round the north of Margarita, leaving behind Ducoudray- 
 Holstein and others who were hostile ,t;o him. Here 
 Ducoudray's personal connexion with Bolivar ceased. 
 According to his own account, Bolivar had refused to 
 
 * About ;^2000, at five pesos to the £. 
 
 ^ Notwithstanding many proclamations by Bolivar decreeing the abolition of 
 slavery in Venezuela, a law had to be passed providing for this reform so 
 late as 1854, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EXPEDITION TO OCUMARE 175 
 
 shake hands with him as a traitor who deserved to be 
 shot.i 
 
 The expedition, which consisted of fifteen ships and 
 some 800 men, anchored at Ocumare de la Costa, 
 between Puerto Cabello and La Guaira, on the 6th July. 
 
 Once more Bolivar proclaimed the cessation of the war 
 to the death, and offered an amnesty to all Spaniards 
 surrendering. He also again notified the abolition of 
 slavery. 
 
 That same night Soublette was ordered to march 
 across the mountains to La Cabrera, on the north side 
 of the Valencia lake, and Pinango was sent to collect 
 recruits at Choronf. 
 
 On the day of Bolivar's disembarkation at Ocumare, 
 there arrived at Valencia Morales, with a Spanish force 
 sent back by Morillo from Ocana, through which he 
 was marching, after the fall of Cartagena, to subdue 
 Bogotd and the rest of New Granada. Before the 
 superior force which Morales had collected, Soublette 
 fell back from La Cabrera on Ocumare. On the 14th 
 July, he stood to fight in an advantageous position on the 
 hills south of Ocumare. Bolivar here joined him with a 
 reinforcement of 150 men. The republicans, inferior in 
 numbers to Morales, and also inferior in quality as 
 troops, were badly beaten, and fled in disorder to 
 Ocumare. Bolivar, hurrying back to Ocumare, met 
 MacGregor ^ on the road and despatched him to Choronf, 
 
 ' Ducoudray-Holstein, i. p. 352. The impression of this author, conveyed 
 by a perusal of his work, is of a conceited French adventurer always striving 
 to make himself out a person of much more ability and importance than be 
 really was. * 
 
 ^ Sir Gregor MacGregor, a Scottish adventurer in South America, gives 
 some account of his early life there in a pamphlet published in 1839, entitled 
 " Exposicion documentada que el General Mac Gregor dirijo, &c.," being 
 a claim against the Venezuelan Government. He went to Venezuela in 
 l8n, was Colonel and Adjutant-General in Miranda's force, and married 
 Josefa Lovera. They embarked at La Guaira (or Cartagena after Miranda's 
 capitulation, and MacGregor went with Bolivar to Mompox in 1813. After 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
176 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 whilst he himself endeavoured to embark his park. In 
 this he failed, and presently a false report that the 
 enemy was in the town decided him to cut the cable of 
 the ship on which he was, and to sail away, leaving the 
 remnants of his troops and MacGregor to their fate. 
 Brion, with some of the other ships, had already sailed 
 on a cruise, with instructions from Bolivar to try and 
 open up relations with Mexico and the United States. 
 On the 1 6th July, Bolivar reached the little island of 
 Buen Aire, near Curasao. Here he had fresh difficulties 
 with the captains of his vessels, who proposed to seize 
 the arms in payment of what was due to them. The 
 situation was only saved by the arrival of Brion from 
 Curagao. 
 
 Larrazabal says that Bolivar had tried in vain to com- 
 municate with Soublette and MacGregor on the 15 th 
 July at Choronf, and now, on the 19th, he again sailed 
 for that port, only to find his lieutenants gone, and the 
 royalists in possession. Returning to Buen Aire he 
 found Bermudez there and, sinking their differences, the 
 two decided to sail for Guiria to join Marino.^ 
 
 Before discussing Bolivar's conduct at Ocumare it will 
 be well to look at what happened to MacGregor and 
 Soublette after his departure. The Scotsman took com- 
 mand of the force collected at Choroni. He and the 
 
 that he was employed in the army of New Granada, which he left on account 
 of illness in 1814. In 1815 he was in Cartagena during the two sieges, and, 
 after the evacuation, went to Haiti, where he joined Bolivar. His retreat 
 from Ocumare will be described presently. In i8l8 he had a good deal to 
 do with Lopez Mendez in England in regard lo the British troops for 
 ^'e'lezuela. In 1819 he took, and again lost, Puerto Bello, as will be related 
 later. After that he appears to have been warned off from Venezuela by 
 Bolivar. His later adventures, when he set up as an Indian "cacique" on 
 the Mosquito coast, are recorded in the " Dictionary of National Biography." 
 ^ This is Restrepo's account. Larrazabal (i. 436) says Bermudez, after 
 being left behind at Aux Cayes, had followed Bolivar in hopes of a recon- 
 ciliation. But he denies that the two men saw one another at Buen Aire, 
 whence they sailed, as Restrepo says, in separate ships. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MACGREGOR'S RETREAT 177 
 
 other officers with him, Soublette, Auzodtegui, Salom, 
 and Bricefto, were aware that it had been Bolivar's inten- 
 tion in landing at Ocumare to march into the Aragua 
 valley, where, owing to his estates being there, he had 
 great influence. Thence he purposed to push south to 
 join the guerrilla chiefs who were operating in Central 
 Venezuela. This plan, now that Bolivar was gone, it 
 was resolved to carry through without him. It was a 
 bold resolve bravely executed by MacGregor, who was, 
 perhaps, the only man capable of keeping in order 
 his quarrelsome Venezuelan subordinates. Had it been 
 Bolivar's work, no praise would have been too great in 
 Larrazabal's narrative. Being the work of a foreigner, he 
 passes it over very lightly, even attempting to attribute 
 the real credit to Soublette and the other Venezuelans.^ 
 
 Marching through the Aragua valley by Maracay 
 and Victoria without encountering serious resistance, 
 MacGregor reached Chaguaramas on the 28th July. 
 There he was beaten off in an attack on 300 royalists 
 who had entrenched themselves. Hearing that Quero, 
 whom he had recently brushed aside, was in pursuit of 
 him with a considerable force, MacGregor pushed on to 
 Quebrada Honda,^ picking up small guerrilla reinforce- 
 ments as he marched. At that place he was caught up 
 and attacked by Quero, who was beaten off but not 
 pursued. MacGregor was able, however, to continue 
 his retreat. It was not till he reached San Diego de 
 Cabrutica,^ far on the way to the Orinoco, that he fell 
 in with Zaraza and Mon%as, who joined him with their 
 guerrillas. At San Diego, where he rested till the 2Sth 
 August, he turned northwards for Barcelona. At Aragua 
 de Barcelona he found the royalist Rafael Lopez too 
 
 1 i. p. 434 «. 
 
 ^ Shown on the map as Socorro, just north of Unare, on the river of that 
 name. 
 
 ' Not on the map. Its position about corresponds to that of the "r" of 
 Cabrutica, south of El Pao. 
 
 M 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
178 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 strongly posted to be attacked. MacGregor, therefore, 
 marched round him. Lopez followed at once, without 
 waiting for Morales, who was hurrying up with his own 
 division and Quero's. At El Alacran Lopez attacked 
 the republicans, with disastrous results to himself. In 
 consequence of his victory, MacGregor was able to 
 occupy Barcelona without resistance, whilst one of his 
 companions, Anzoategui, seized the neighbouring small 
 port of Piritii. 
 
 At Barcelona MacGregor was superseded in his 
 command by Piar, his senior, who had arrived from 
 Cumand with reinforcements. Morales was hurrying up 
 to Barcelona to avenge Lopez's defeat at El Alacran. 
 To meet him Piar and MacGregor advanced to El 
 Juncal, where they inflicted a very heavy defeat on him 
 (27th September 18 16). The pursuit was carried out 
 by MacGregor and Mondgas as far as San Lorenzo, 
 Morales' force being almost wiped out, though he is said 
 to have had 3000 men against 2000 at El Juncal.^ 
 
 At San Lorenzo MacGregor resigned his command, 
 in consequence of his disgust at the jealousy of Piar, 
 whose desire for sole and absolute command alienated 
 Mondgas also, and other subordinates. 
 
 Such were the operations successfully carried out 
 by MacGregor after Bolivar's sudden departure from 
 Ocumare. Not unnaturally, Bolivar has been reproached 
 with desertion of his men in circumstances which were 
 shown, by the subsequent course of events, to be far 
 from desperate. 
 
 Restrepo,^ whom Larrazabal follows, defends Bolivar 
 on the ground that he distrusted the commanders of his 
 vessels, whom he suspected of an intention of making off 
 with the arms which had been shipped. He also alleges 
 
 ^ El Alacran, El Juncal, and S. Lorenzo are not on map. They appear 
 to be all close to Barcelona, and Codazzi shows the two latter to the west of it. 
 ^ Restrepo, ii. 346. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR, MARINO, AND BERMUDEZ 179 
 
 that, just before the Liberator cut the cable of the " Indio 
 Libre," on which he had embarked, he was informed by 
 Alzuru that the enemy was already in Ocumare, and 
 that his own troops had retired to Choronf. Soublette, 
 according to Restrepo, had really sent Alzuru to say 
 Morales was apparently halting for the night some 
 distance short of Ocumare. The misdelivery of the 
 message, whether due to stupidity or treachery on 
 Abzuru's part, caused a panic in the port, and there was 
 danger to the ships from the rush of people trying to get 
 on board. On the whole, the story does not seem a very 
 plausible one, and it is difficult to avoid the suspicion 
 that there was some panic on Bolivar's part. 
 
 Bolivar reached Guiria on the i6th August, twenty- 
 four hours after Bermudez, who had already worked 
 upon Marino to oppose the Liberator. Mariflo accord- 
 ingly received him coldly, and the estrangement grew to 
 such an extent that, on the 22nd, there was a riotous mob 
 shouting, " Down with Bolivar and up with Marino and 
 Bermudez ! " According to Larrazabal, there were plots 
 even to assassinate Bolivar, and Bermudez went so far as 
 to draw his sword upon him. Bolivar, in the end, finding 
 his position at Guiria intolerable, re-embarked, leaving 
 Mariflo and Bermudez in undisputed possession. He 
 arrived once more at Port-au-Prince on the 9th October 
 1 8 16. There he found Mina, the ex-Spanish general of 
 Peninsula fame, organising an expedition to Mexico, 
 which he promised should return later on to Venezuela 
 if Bolivar would join it. This offer Bolivar refused. 
 He had hoped for help in his expeditions from the 
 United States, but he found none was to be got, whether 
 public or private ; indeed. President Madison issued a 
 special proclamation against giving help to the revolted 
 South American colonies. Thanks largely to the con- 
 tinued assistance of Brion and Pdtion, Bolivar was ready 
 to start again in November. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
i8o SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 The various republican leaders in Venezuela were now 
 separated by great distances from one another, each was 
 acting independently, and all began to feel that the 
 general control of Bolivar was necessary for united 
 action. First Arismendi wrote (22nd September)^ 
 begging him to return. Then the chiefs of the central 
 forces wrote (27th September) ^ in a similar strain, with 
 many expressions of regret at the recent unfortunate 
 events at Guiria. Their letter was sent by Zea, who 
 sailed from Barcelona. 
 
 It was not till the 21st December 18 16 that Bolivar 
 and Brion sailed from the Haitian port of Jacmel for 
 Juan Griego in Margarita, which was reached on the 
 28 th of the same month. The rest of the ships sailed 
 on the 28th December from Aux Cayes under Villaret, 
 only reaching Margarita a month later. As soon as 
 Bolivar landed he issued the usual proclamation to the 
 Venezuelans convoking a Congress, and again proclaim- 
 ing the emancipation of the slaves. Margarita, "the 
 Sparta of Venezuela," thanks to the exertions of Aris- 
 mendi, was in the power of the republicans, and that 
 leader, having completed his task in the island, had gone 
 to the mainland at Barcelona with 400 men, just as 
 Bolivar sailed from Aux Cayes. Thither Bolivar followed 
 him on the 3 1 st December 1 8 1 6, landing for the last 
 time on South American soil, which he was never again 
 to quit, except for the purpose of passing by sea from 
 one part to another. At Barcelona, Bolivar and Aris- 
 mendi met cordially. To the former, prospects seemed 
 rosy, and he was already beginning to talk of proceeding, 
 after the liberation of Venezuela and New Granada, to 
 turn the Spaniards completely out of South America. 
 His confidence is remarkable, especially when we know 
 that he had only 300 men in Barcelona, besides the 400 
 Margaritenos who had followed Arismendi to the main- 
 ' Larrazabal, i. 444, and O'Leary, i. 364. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR, MARINO, AND BERMUDEZ i8i 
 
 land. These latter would probably not have left their 
 native island for any one with less personal influence 
 over them than Arismendi had. Bolivar began with a 
 very serious misfortune, for, advancing against Jimenez, 
 who had 550 badly armed royalists at Clarines, he was 
 heavily defeated and forced back to Barcelona. This at 
 once reduced him to the defensive, and he had saved so 
 few from the late battle that he could only get together 
 600 very inferior troops, whilst Mox6 was understood to 
 be mustering a force of 4000 at Orituco with which to 
 crush the new revolt. 
 
 Bolivar, notwithstanding the weakness of his force, 
 determined to carry out a passive defence of the Fran- 
 ciscan monastery at Barcelona. He chose to call it a 
 fort {casa fuerte), though it was nothing of the sort. He 
 also wrote to Marino, then near Cumand, urgently 
 demanding help. Bermudez, the evil genius of Marino, 
 tried to persuade him not to move, but he insisted on 
 marching for Barcelona with the 1200 men he had. He 
 came, partly by land, partly by sea, the point of reunion 
 being fixed at Pozuelos. 
 
 The Spaniards, now commanded by Pascual Real, 
 with Morales and Aldama under him, appeared before 
 Barcelona on the 8th February 1 8 1 7, and opened fire 
 on the defenders of the monastery. On the same date 
 Bermudez, with the land division of Mariflo's forces, was 
 at Pozuelos. With great assurance he sent notice to 
 Real that, Bermudez having arrived, he had better retire. 
 This he at once did, first on Juncal, and then on Clarines. 
 For this he does not seem to have had any excuse, except 
 shortness of supplies and absence of his heavy artillery, 
 defects which he should have taken care not to allow. 
 
 Real being gone, Marino and Bermudez entered 
 Barcelona, where Bolivar and Bermudez met on the most 
 cordial terms. Truly kaleidoscopic are the quarrels and 
 reconciliations of these Venezuelan patriots ! 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE LIBERATION OF GUAYANA AND THE 
 EXECUTION OF PIAR, 1 8 16-17 
 
 REAL, after his unjustifiable retreat, left Bolivar 
 unmolested in Barcelona, though the latter 
 place was also short of food, and Bolivar 
 found it difficult to maintain himself in it. 
 The fact appears to have been that this part of the 
 country was almost exhausted, through the constant war 
 and destruction which had prevailed in it for years past. . 
 This remark applies to practically the whole of the hilly 
 coast region of Venezuela, but it does not apply to the 
 plains between the coast range and the Orinoco, which 
 hitherto had vomited forth their hordes to prey upon the 
 hill country, and had seen comparatively little fighting 
 themselves. Still less does it apply to the plains south 
 of the line of the Apure and the Orinoco. There there 
 had been no fighting worth mention, and behind them lay 
 in reserve the rich granaries of the missions. Not only 
 were the Orinoco plains rich in supplies of food, but also 
 they could supply large forces of cavalry to the party which 
 should hold possession of the towns on the rivers. 
 Hitherto the Llaneros had fought almost exclusively for 
 the royalists, because the royalists were in possession of 
 Angostura, San Fernando, and the other towns on the 
 Apure and Orinoco, and alone represented authority. 
 As we have already said, the Llaneros, thanks to their 
 ferocity, their habits of life, and the impossibility of 
 attacking them with a superior force, had nothing to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
GUAYANA AS A BASE 183 
 
 fear from either Spaniard or republican. They had 
 practically no interest in the contest, and, notwithstand- 
 ing the flattering words of some South American writers 
 on the subject of the patriotism of these semi-savages, 
 they were probably innocent of any such sentiment. 
 They joined Boves or Yafiez in the hope of plunder, and 
 perhaps to some extent from a love of fighting. They 
 would be equally willing to join Bolivar or Piar from 
 the same motives, provided they had a leader congenial 
 to them, and that the republicans were in possession. 
 
 In addition to all this, the party which held the line 
 of the Orinoco and the Apure had a splendid waterway 
 connecting them with the sea. They could move in 
 either direction along this waterway, or, if defeated in 
 the north, retire behind it to a position of security, still 
 leaving, as a covering force on the north bank, the whole 
 Llanero population of the plains north of the river. 
 Hitherto Bolivar had neglected all this vast area as a 
 base, and had persistently aimed at the possession of 
 Caracas, Valencia, Barcelona, and the northern coast. 
 Now, at last, perceiving the superiority of this country 
 over the northern hills as a base, he resolved to abandon 
 the exhausted northern area and to base himself on the 
 Orinoco and the country behind it. The credit of the 
 discovery must be given to Piar rather than to Bolivar, 
 for the mulatto chief had already, in the end of 18 16, 
 transferred his operations to the Orinoco, and, by January 
 18 17, was blockading Angostura, though he had been 
 badly repulsed in an attempt to carry it by assault. 
 
 Bolivar, in great difficulties for provisions at Barcelona, 
 resolved to join Piar before Angostura ; but, even then, 
 he made the great mistake of leaving behind at 
 Barcelona 400 men, under the command of Freites, to 
 defend the Franciscan monastery.^ To do so was to 
 
 ' Pedro Maria Freites. The man who shot himself at La Puerta was 
 Antonio. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
1 84 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 doom this small isolated force to destruction. This 
 decision is a notable instance of the military incapacity 
 of Bolivar and the men who formed the council of war in 
 which the measure was decided on. The rest of the 
 forces, some 2000 men, were to march, under Marifio's 
 command, to Guayana. 
 
 On the 2Sth March the Liberator started, with only 
 1 5 officers and a few orderlies, leaving Marino and the 
 main body to follow three hours later. The leading 
 man of Bolivar's small party suddenly came, at 
 Quiamare, upon a Spanish ambuscade. He was closely 
 followed by Bolivar himself, who had the presence of 
 mind to dismount and shout loudly an order to attack 
 on both flanks. This was followed by a volley from the 
 escort, and the two combined had the effect of inducing 
 the enemy to believe the force much greater than it was. 
 The Spaniards promptly fled, and their commander was 
 disgusted when he discovered later what a prize they had 
 missed. Bolivar had very narrowly escaped capture, but, 
 after that, he reached the Orinoco without further adven- 
 ture and crossed it. Finding Piar engaged in the siege of 
 Angostura without any siege artillery, Bolivar decided to 
 retrace his steps to El Chaparro, and to bring up his 
 artillery to breach the place. At Chaparro he found 
 Bermudez and Vald6s, from whom he learnt that the 
 unfortunate Freites had been destroyed at Barcelona. 
 Mox6 had replaced the incompetent Real by Aldama, 
 who, placing his artillery behind the walls of Barce- 
 lona itself, was soon able to storm the monastery, which 
 had no defensive strength, and was, moreover, crowded 
 with non-combatant refugees. The assault was followed 
 by the usual indiscriminate massacres. Freites and 
 Francisco Ribas, who were taken alive, were sent to 
 Caracas and there hanged by order of Mox6. 
 Larrazabal gives a ghastly description of the Barcelona 
 massacres and of the streets strewn with corpses on 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
OPERATIONS IN GUAYANA 185 
 
 which the dogs fed. He puts the number slain, some of 
 them even on the altar steps, at 1 000, of whom many 
 were old men, women, and children. Fifty of the sick 
 in hospital were murdered by special order. Restrepo 
 tells the same story.^ During these events, Marifio's 
 army was still not far from Barcelona, but he remained 
 deaf to all appeals for help. He objected to serving 
 under Bolivar in the eastern districts, which he looked 
 upon as his own special territory, and he had decided to 
 go on his own account to Cumani. Others urged on 
 this weak young man in his perverse and selfish decision, 
 but Bermudez was not amongst them, for he was now 
 entirely on Bolivar's side. Curiously enough, Urdaneta, 
 hitherto always working loyally with Bolivar, now joined 
 Marino, whilst Bermudez and Arismendi went on 
 southwards to Chaparro to join Bolivar. They had but 
 500 men, the rest going with Marino. 
 
 On the 2Sth and 26th April Bolivar again crossed 
 to the south bank of the Orinoco, just above the 
 mouth of the river Pao. The river being now in 
 high flood, owing to the heavy rains, the passage was 
 effected with great diiificulty. Bolivar's position was not 
 a promising one, looking to the facts that Marifio 
 was gone off on his own account, Barcelona was 
 lost, and Morillo, after reconquering New Granada, 
 had returned to deal again with Venezuela. Finally, 
 Bolivar now heard of the arrival at Cumand of a fresh 
 expeditionary force from Spain, under the command 
 of Canterac, a French adventurer. That officer's orders 
 required him, after giving such assistance as might 
 be necessary to Morillo, to proceed across the Isthmus 
 of Panama, and embark his 2300 men on the Pacific 
 for Peru. 
 
 After his repulse from Angostura in January 1817, 
 Piar had thought it well to annex the valuable resources 
 
 • ii. 382. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
i86 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 in grain and cattle of the missions on the river Caronf, 
 which joins the Orinoco from the south, lOO miles 
 below Angostura. Marching thither with part of his 
 force, he seized the various Capuchin establishments, 
 deprived the missionaries of all their power, and collected 
 twenty-two of them at the monastery of Caruache. 
 Thereupon the Indians, hitherto under the rule of 
 the missionaries, promptly sided with the republicans, 
 some of them enlisting in the revolutionary forces. 
 
 Against Piar marched Don Miguel de la Torre, 
 the commander of the royalist troops in Guayana.^ The 
 opponents met at San Felix, just east of the junction 
 of the Caronf with the Orinoco, with the result that 
 La Torre was completely defeated, only escaping himself 
 thanks to a good horse. Seventy-five of his officers, 
 including Ceruti, the governor, fell into Piar's hands. 
 The victor massacred the whole of the 300 European 
 prisoners. What is there to choose in the conduct of 
 the two sides, notwithstanding the virtuous indignation 
 of South American writers at Spanish cruelties ? 
 
 On the 2nd May Bolivar, with the troops from 
 El Chaparro, joined Piar. El Chaparro was by this time 
 occupied by Morillo and Aldama with some 6000 men. 
 Bolivar, operating against Angostura, feared an attack 
 by them on his rear, and, in order to get the captive 
 Capuchins out of the way of re-capture, ordered them 
 to be transferred from Caruache to a settlement called 
 La Divina Pastora in the interior of the missions. 
 According to O'Leary and Restrepo, the officer who 
 received the order, being a new-comer, was unaware of 
 the existence of such a place, and interpreted the order 
 to send these unfortunate men to La Divina Pastora 
 (the Divine Shepherdess) as a euphemism for sending 
 them to another world. The whole of them were 
 
 * He had returned from Bogota with Morillo, who had sent him to 
 command in Guayana. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
OPERATIONS IN GUAYANA 187 
 
 massacred. This version, if correct, would clear Bolivar 
 of the charges made by the Spaniards to the effect 
 that he made himself indirectly responsible for the 
 murders, by uttering hasty words very similar to those 
 of Henry II. regarding Becket. It is not of much 
 importance whether he did or did not. The true 
 significance of the massacre lies in the evidence it 
 affords of the general spirit of the republicans, and 
 of their recklessness of human life. If the officer 
 could innocently misinterpret the Divina Pastora order, 
 it shows clearly that such a massacre as was carried 
 out was looked upon quite as a matter of course, and 
 was certainly not likely to be censured by superior 
 authority. Bolivar, according to Larrazabal, called 
 upon Piar for an explanation. The mulatto replied 
 with expressions of regret and promises of punishment 
 of the guilty officers. Needless to say, the promises 
 were not fulfilled, and no more was heard of the affair. 
 Restrepo makes no mention of the call for an ex- 
 planation, merely recording that the officer had good 
 reason to reckon on impunity, for no charge was 
 brought against him, to the disgrace of the Liberator.^ 
 Meanwhile, Marino was holding an absurd Congress 
 of ten members at Cariaco. He was supported by 
 Zea, Brion, Canon J. C. de Madariaga,^ and others. 
 Madariaga, having only recently returned to Venezuela, 
 thought that an elective administration should be 
 formed at once. He was probably not alone in thinking 
 that there was too much of the despot about Bolivar, 
 and very little probability of his really allowing himself 
 to be hampered by a Congress. How much of all 
 these intrigues against Bolivar represented honest 
 
 ' Restrepo, ii. 402. 
 
 ' This man was deported to Ceuta by Monteverde in 1812. He and 
 others escaped from that fortress to Gibraltar, and eventually back to 
 Venezuela. After helping to create this disturbance in the east of Venezuela 
 he went back to Jamaica. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
1 88 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 patriotism, and how much was mere personal ambition, 
 it is very difficult to say. As a matter of expediency, 
 under the existing circumstances, it is hardly possible 
 to doubt that in the centralisation of power in the 
 hands of one leader lay the best chances of the re- 
 publicans. To this miniature Congress Marino sur- 
 rendered his appointment of second in command of 
 the army. Unlike Bolivar, he found his resignation 
 accepted, and was only compensated by a minor appoint- 
 ment. The executive was to consist of a triumvirate 
 again, but as Fernando Toro, one of them, was living 
 in Trinidad, and Bolivar, another, was in Guayana, 
 their places had at once to be filled by substitutes. 
 The whole thing was farcical, and, notwithstanding 
 the position Brion had taken up, he accepted orders 
 from Bolivar to enter the Orinoco with his squadron. 
 The Liberator, anxious to master the fort of Guayana 
 Vieja and the course of the Orinoco which it commanded, 
 had already gained some advantages with his small 
 river craft ; with the more powerful ships of Brion, it 
 would probably be possible to clear the river completely 
 of royalist gunboats. 
 
 On the 26th May, Bolivar left San Miguel for 
 Guayana Vieja, of which he rearranged the blockade, 
 whilst he took up a position with his main body at San 
 Felix to await the arrival of Brion. Angostura was 
 still blockaded also. The Liberator busied himself 
 at San Felix in drafting a decree regulating courts 
 martial, which after all were the principal class of judicial 
 institution likely to have much to do during the war. 
 
 Bolivar now received a letter from Brion promising to 
 sail from Pampatar in Margarita on the 3 1 st May, and 
 also sending the news that Morillo was proceeding to 
 subdue that island. Both items of news were welcome, 
 the latter because it promised Bolivar breathing space 
 in which to make himself complete master of Guayana, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
OPERATIONS IN GUAYANA 189 
 
 and any attack on the brave Margaritefios was likely to 
 prove a very thorny and unprofitable undertaking for 
 Morillo. On the other hand, the unstable and ambitious 
 Piar, excited by the apparent success of Mariflo's revolt 
 against the authority of Bolivar, was beginning to be 
 restive, and Arismendi, with perhaps better intentions, 
 was talking of a separate government for his native 
 island of Margarita. Piar was warned and went no 
 further for the moment. Arismendi was set to work to 
 construct boats and organise operations on the river. 
 
 Brion, after some delay, duly put in an appearance 
 with his ships on the lower Orinoco. It was desirable to 
 send down to him the boats above Guayana Vieja, and, 
 in the night of the 2nd to 3rd July, nine out of eleven 
 succeeded in passing the fortress unharmed. The other 
 two, unable to pass, returned upstream. The nine which 
 had got past took shelter in the creek of Casacoima,^ on 
 the right bank, in order to avoid the pursuit of a superior 
 royalist flotilla. To protect them there, Bolivar marched 
 with a small force. The Spanish boats had also landed 
 men. Bolivar, carelessly riding with his generals at 
 some distance from his troops, was surprised by the 
 Spanish landing force, and was so nearly finding himself 
 a prisoner that he was, it is said, preparing to stab him- 
 self rather than fall into the hands of the enemy. He 
 was rescued by the arrival of his men in the nick of time. 
 He was, however, too late to save his boats, the crews 
 of which, abandoning them to the Spaniards, effected 
 their own escape by land. On the other hand, some 
 " flecheras " ^ belonging to Brion, under the command of 
 Diaz, gained a considerable success over the Spanish 
 
 ^ Not marked on map. It is just above the head of the delta. 
 
 ^ The "flechera" was a sort of large barge propelled by sails and oars. 
 Many of them could carry 80 or 100 men, besides one or two cannon. 
 Drawing very little water, they could penetrate into shallow places and back- 
 waters of the rivers. They were fast, and, manned by the Margaritan sailors, 
 gave excellent results both on the coast and on the Orinoco. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
190 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 flotilla, which lost seven of its " flecheras." The lower 
 Orinoco being now open, Brion was able to sail up and 
 meet Bolivar at Casacoima, where a fort was built to 
 protect the squadron. 
 
 The news of this river fight, and of Brion's arrival, 
 determined La Torre to evacuate Guayana Vieja and 
 Angostura. The latter place, closely blockaded by 
 Bermudez, had been reduced to great straits, and, the 
 command of the lower river being lost to La Torre, was 
 no longer tenable. On the 17th July, La Torre, accom- 
 panied by Fitzgerald,^ the last Spanish governor of 
 Guayana, all the officials and the garrison, slipping quietly 
 away from Angostura down the river, safely reached the 
 British Island of Granada. Bermudez at once occupied 
 the place.^ Guayana Vieja surrendered at discretion on 
 the 3rd August. Guayana was now completely in the 
 power of the republicans. Writing to the Marquis de 
 Toro in Trinidad, Bolivar says of his new acquisition : 
 " This province is a point of capital importance, very 
 suitable for the defensive, still more so for the offensive. 
 We hold the rear of the enemy from here (Angostura) 
 to Santa F6 [Bogotd], and possess an immense territory 
 on both banks of the Orinoco, the Apure, the Meta, and 
 the Arauca. Moreover, we have cattle and horses, and, 
 since the struggle now depends on maintaining territory 
 and prolonging the campaign, the party which can 
 secure this advantage the best is sure to be the con- 
 queror." Larrazabal, to whom Bolivar always seems 
 perfect, vaunts his military insight as displayed in these 
 words. He would have had better reason for doing so 
 had his hero seen all this at a somewhat earlier date. 
 Out of Guayana had issued most of the forces with which 
 
 ' Fitzgerald had behaved with such moderation that Brion issued a special 
 order that, if he were captured, he was to be treated with the same considera- 
 tion as if he had been a republican leader. 
 
 * Angostura later acquired the name by which it is now known, of Ciudad 
 Bolivar, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PIAR'S REVOLT AND DEATH 191 
 
 Boves, Morales, and Yanez had driven him from Vene- 
 zuela, yet, had Bolivar established himself in Guayana 
 before 1 8 1 4, as he might easily have done, those very 
 forces would have been available on his side, instead of 
 against him. 
 
 Whilst Bolivar was establishing himself on the 
 Orinoco, Morillo made a vain attempt to subdue 
 Margarita. The islanders, whom Morillo himself de- 
 scribed as "giants, fighting like tigers and facing fire 
 and the bayonet with a courage unexampled amongst 
 the best troops in the world," were the ruin of the 
 expeditionary force. Hearing of Bolivar's conquests, 
 and of other successes of the insurgents in all directions, 
 Morillo returned to the mainland at La Guaira. He 
 brought back 700 of his men wounded in the fighting in 
 Margarita. 
 
 But matters were not going smoothly in Bolivar's 
 camp. Piar, still plotting against him, now asked 
 for sick leave to recruit his health in Trinidad or 
 Curagao. After refusing it at first, Bolivar granted the 
 leave on the 30th June. Piar, instead of going to 
 Trinidad or Curagao, merely went southwards to Upatd, 
 where he continued plotting and accusing Bolivar of 
 cowardice and ambitious designs. Worse than this, he 
 tried to stir up race feeling and rivalry between classes.^ 
 Returning after the capture of Angostura, he tried to 
 incite Bermudez, and the leaders of mixed blood like 
 himself, against Bolivar. Remonstrances being in- 
 effectual, Bolivar ordered his arrest and transmission to 
 
 ' There appears always to have been some anxiety lest the men of colour 
 should take part against the whites. Perhaps Bolivar's best justification for 
 shooting Piar lies in the danger of such a movement headed by a man ot 
 Piar's ability and ambition. The despatches of Colonel Campbell, British 
 Minister in Bogota, in 1828, confirm this idea of the dread entertained of a 
 "coloured" movement; for he takes some pains to show that Padilla's 
 insurrection at Cartagena in that year was a political and not a race 
 movement. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
192 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 headquarters. Piar was extremely popular in the army, 
 and, had he held out boldly, it is quite possible he 
 might have made matters very unpleasant for the 
 Liberator ; but, his nerve failing him, he fled to Maturin, 
 whence he entered into relations with Marino. There- 
 upon, Bolivar made over Piar's division at Guayana 
 Vieja to Urdaneta, who appears to have returned to his 
 allegiance to his old chief, with directions to bring it 
 into order and submission. Then Bolivar, after first 
 obtaining from the assembled generals a fresh recognition 
 of his own supreme authority, despatched Cedeno with 
 some cavalry in pursuit of Piar. At the same time, he 
 worked successfully at undermining the influence of Piar 
 with the various leaders. The unfortunate mulatto, 
 abandoned by most of his friends, fled with some 
 cavalry to Cumand, in the hope of obtaining protection 
 from Marino's people. Near that town Cedefio came up 
 with him. Piar would have fought, but the commander 
 of his cavalry deserted him. He was captured and led 
 back a prisoner to Angostura. There he was tried by a 
 court-martial, of which Brion was president, and sen- 
 tenced, on the isth October 1817, to be shot after 
 military degradation. The charges of which he was 
 found guilty were disobedience, sedition, conspiracy, and 
 desertion. Bolivar confirmed the death sentence, but 
 had the decency — perhaps, looking to Piar's popularity, 
 the wisdom — to remit the degradation. The next evening 
 Piar met his death, in the presence of the assembled 
 troops, with the bravery which he had always displayed 
 on the field of battle. Probably he was guilty, but, 
 after all, his guilt was not greater than that of Marino, 
 or Bermudez, or many another who had rebelled against 
 the authority of Bolivar, but met with very different 
 treatment. He was one of the most capable of the 
 Liberator's commanders. Bolivar himself had recently 
 admitted the excellence of his conduct at the Battle of 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PIAR'S REVOLT AND DEATH 193 
 
 San Felix. He was immensely popular with his men, 
 and it certainly required a good deal of courage on 
 Bolivar's part to risk the danger of an outbreak to 
 rescue him from a public and ignominious death. The 
 opponents of Bolivar do not hesitate to accuse him of 
 sacrificing Piar because he was a dangerous rival, per- 
 haps the most dangerous he had at the time. The 
 charges are possibly exaggerated, but it cannot be 
 denied that they appear, on the face of matters, to have 
 some foundation. 
 
 Next day Bolivar published to the army a manifesto ^ 
 justifying the execution, which, he pointed out, was the 
 result of a sentence unanimously passed by men of the 
 distinction and reputation of Brion, Torres, Anzodtegui, 
 and other leaders. The immediate result of it was to 
 bring the army and its leaders completely under the 
 authority of Bolivar. 
 
 Piar was born, the son of a poor carpenter, in Cura5ao, 
 in 1782. He had served the republican cause steadily 
 since Miranda's time in 181 1, and had distinguished 
 himself on many occasions, perhaps never more than by 
 leading the way to the conquest of Guayana and the 
 transfer of the republican base to that province. He 
 was unquestionably brave and capable, but proud, 
 ambitious, and cruel. 
 
 Bolivar, having got rid of Piar, turned his attention to 
 Marino, in pursuit of whom he was about to send 
 Bermudez, naming him governor of the Cumand province. 
 Marino, however, had gone to Margarita, and had ceased 
 to be dangerous. Bermudez, too, put in a good word 
 for his friend Marino, and the idea of capturing him was 
 abandoned. Probably Bolivar was only too glad of an 
 excuse for not proceeding to extremities against another 
 very popular leader. 
 
 On the 3rd September, before Piar's execution, Bolivar 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., 15, p. 423. 
 N 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
194 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 had decreed the confiscation of all Spanish property, and 
 on the loth he issued another order for the division of 
 " national property " amongst the republican army. 
 This, doubtless, was another sop to the troops, the for- 
 feiture of whose goodwill he was about to risk by his 
 proceedings against Piar. 
 
 He had certainly strengthened his position, but he 
 probably felt that there was a good deal of dangerous 
 suspicion of his own motives and intentions, for he now 
 instituted a " Council of State," in order, as he said, to 
 surrender into its hands the supreme power, and to lay 
 the foundations of a constitutional government.^ On 
 the loth November he assembled the principal leaders 
 of the republican party at Angostura and addressed them 
 at length on the situation. His speech is mainly taken 
 up with an explanation of the reasons why, hitherto, 
 since the destruction of the original republic of Miranda's 
 day, nothing but a dictatorship had been possible. The 
 present republic he dated from the assembly in Margarita 
 on the 1 6th May 1816. It was now, he said, necessary 
 to have a Council of State, partly as a legislative body, 
 partly as an advisory council to the supreme chief, partly 
 to take his place in case of absence or death. Further- 
 more, a beginning of judicial organisation was to be 
 made with the institution of a High Court of Justice. 
 The Liberator then goes on to detail the arrangements 
 made for the government of the liberated provinces, and 
 for the distribution to the army of the confiscated 
 Spanish property. Finally, he nominated the members 
 of the various departments of the Council. They were 
 to be presided over thus : — 
 
 State and Finance . . . Zea 
 
 Naval and Military w . . Brion. 
 
 Interior and Justice . . Martinez. 
 
 * Decree of October 30th, 1817. O'Leary, Docts., 15, p. 439. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES 195 
 
 With that the meeting terminated. 
 
 The fact of the matter seems to be that the Council 
 of State was a mere sop to pacify public opinion, to 
 allay suspicions of the Liberator's personal ambitions, 
 and to flatter the vanity of some of the leaders by a 
 nominal enlistment of their aid. Bolivar had himself 
 done all the organisation, both civil and military, includ- 
 ing the fixing of the capital of the new republic at 
 Angostura. As soon as he was firmly based on Angos- 
 tura and Guayana, Bolivar's ideas again reverted to 
 the capture of Caracas. In order to facilitate his opera- 
 tions in this direction, he desired, if possible, to draw 
 Morillo away westwards, and for this purpose he had the 
 good fortune to secure the services of a remarkable 
 man, of whom much more will be heard in the course of 
 this history. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 BOLIVAR AND PAEZ— THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
 MORILLO — THE CONGRESS OF ANGOSTURA, 
 1818-19 
 
 HERE we must pause to give some account 
 of Jos6 Antonio Paez, who now appears 
 on the stage and plays an important part 
 during the rest of this history. 
 According to his own account of himself,^ he was 
 born on the 1 3th June 1 790, in the neighbourhood of 
 Acarigua in the canton of Apure. His parents were in 
 a very humble station of life, and the boy got no educa- 
 tion. O'Leary describes him as absolutely illiterate. 
 So he remained to the end of his life. Restrepo 
 describes him as being Caucasian by race. At the age 
 of sixteen, being attacked by robbers when sent for some 
 money by his father, he killed one of them, and, fearing 
 the consequences, fled from home and took service in 
 the " Llanos " under a rich cattle breeder. There he 
 acquired all the physical accomplishments of a Llanero. 
 On the outbreak of the revolution in 18 10, he enlisted 
 in the Barinas militia, on the patriot side, under his 
 master Pulido. Having risen to be a sergeant, he 
 retired to his old employment after Monteverde's con- 
 
 ' J. A. Paez, " Autobiografia.'' After Bolivar's death Paez was twice Presi- 
 dent of Venezuela. In 1848 he was defeated and banished by Monagas. 
 Returning to Venezuela, he was finally defeated and banished by Falcon and 
 Guzman Blanco in 1863. He died in 1873, an exile in New York, where his 
 autobiography, probably written for him by some one better educated, was 
 published in 1867. 
 196 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PAEZ 197 
 
 quest of Venezuela in 1 8 1 3. Presently he was offered 
 a captaincy in the Spanish forces by Tizcar. To avoid 
 this he fled, to become once more a soldier under Pulido, 
 who commanded a guerrilla band working in support 
 of Bolivar's advance from New Granada. At the end 
 of 1813 he was captured by Puig, a subordinate of 
 Yafiez. He was ordered to be shot, but by bribery 
 managed to put off his execution, and finally escaped 
 when Puig fled after Bolivar's victory of Araure. He 
 then joined Garcia de Sena, and was a captain of cavalry 
 when that commander decided to abandon Barinas in 
 January 18 14, a decision which Paez strongly opposed. 
 
 When Garcia's cavalry broke up, Paez went to Merida, 
 and there was accepted in his rank of captain in the 
 patriot forces. He distinguished himself in action, and, 
 after Bolivar's defeat at La Puerta, followed Urdaneta 
 in his retreat on New Granada. In consequence of a 
 dispute with the commandant of the cavalry, Paez left 
 the force and went off to Casanare. There he was 
 given the command of 300 men, and again distinguished 
 himself in several actions, notably at Mata de la Miel^ 
 in February 18 16. For his conduct on this occasion 
 he was promoted lieutenant-colonel by the Government 
 of New Granada. 
 
 We cannot afford space to follow Paez's adventures 
 in the plains of the Apure during the next two years. 
 He was appointed chief of the forces which had escaped 
 from Bogoti under Serviez when Morillo was marching 
 on that capital from Cartagena in 1 8 1 6.^ Santander on 
 that occasion resigned in his favour, knowing that, unless 
 he did so willingly, he would have been compelled to. 
 Paez's operations against the royalists were generally 
 successful, and on some occasions remarkable. Amongst 
 his own troops he acquired supreme authority in the 
 territory in which he operated. His last considerable 
 ^ A little east of Guadalito. ^ Supra, p. 165. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
198 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 success in this period was gained over La Torre in 
 February 1 8 1 7, as that general marched back from New 
 Granada in advance of Morillo. In this action of 
 Mucuritas, Paez succeeded in drawing after him La 
 Torre's cavalry far away from his infantry. Then, 
 facing about suddenly, he completely cut up the 
 opposing Llanero' cavalry. Only the European hussars 
 escaped. Following up his success, Paez fired the 
 prairie all round the enemy's infantry, which only 
 escaped destruction by standing in a marsh where the 
 fire could not reach it. Thus, in 18 17, when La Torre 
 was gone, Paez with 2000 Llaneros dominated the 
 plains of Apure. 
 
 Paez is described by O'Leary, whose first service in 
 Venezuela was under him.^ Of medium height, he was 
 massively built as to the upper part of his body, very 
 broad in the shoulders, and deep in chest. Below he 
 rather fell away, as is not surprising in a man who 
 spent his life on horseback. A short thick neck 
 supported a large head covered with short crisp hair 
 of a dark chestnut colour. His eyes were dark and 
 vivacious, the nose straight with broad nostrils, the lips 
 thick, and the beard full. His skin, naturally fair, had 
 been tanned by exposure to the sun. Caution and 
 distrust characterised his expression. With persons 
 whom he believed better instructed than himself he was 
 silent, and refrained from joining in conversation, though 
 with his inferiors he was talkative and jocular, emphasis- 
 ing his speech with many gestures. He loved to recount 
 his warlike achievements, but was devoid of military 
 education. Had he had the best education, he would 
 never have been a great leader, for the slightest contra- 
 diction or emotion threw him into violent convulsions, 
 apparently of an epileptic character, which for the 
 moment resulted in unconsciousness, and left him pros- 
 ' 0'l.eary, ii. 441. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PAEZ 199 
 
 trated in mind and body. Such fits often overtook him 
 in fights when he encountered unexpected resistance, 
 " Rash, active, brave, fertile in resource, quick in imagina- 
 tion, resolute in execution, rapid in his movements, the 
 weaker the force he commanded the more terrible he 
 was." A force of 1000 men was beyond his powers of 
 command, especially if many of them were infantry. 
 He was an excellent guerrilla leader, but had no method, 
 no moral courage, and in politics was a nullity. In- 
 constant in friendship, he fell under the guidance of the 
 favourite of the moment. He was full of personal 
 ambition, the ambition which sought only absolute power 
 without any consideration for others. He was also 
 covetous, and, we may add, cruel and reckless of human 
 life. His influence with the Llaneros whom he com- 
 manded was immense, but was acquired at the expense 
 of the relaxation of discipline consequent on his per- 
 mission of plunder. He was an adept in horsemanship, 
 and the feats of strength and skill which were char- 
 acteristic of the Llaneros. 
 
 This character of Paez, taken almost entirely from 
 O'Leary, seems on the whole fair, though perhaps 
 some allowance should be made for the writer's natural 
 prejudice against a man who afterwards proved himself 
 one of his friend Bolivar's most bitter enemies. 
 
 Paez's writings are full of allusions to heroes of an- 
 tiquity and others of whom, looking to his illiteracy, we 
 may be sure he had never heard. It is clear that most 
 of his writing must have been done for him by the 
 educated men in whose hands he was often a tool. 
 
 Bolivar had heard of the operations of Paez on the 
 Apure from Santander, who had joined him in the 
 beginning of the year from that direction. The Liberator 
 had sent from Angostura two officers to confer with Paez, 
 with a view to enlisting his co-operation. After some 
 negotiations, Paez agreed to recognise Bolivar as supreme 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
200 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 chief, and to conduct his own operations under the 
 
 Liberator's general direction. 
 
 The first move of the republican leader was to send 
 Zaraza as an advanced guard to watch towards Orituco 
 and Calabozo, far north of the Orinoco. Morillo, now 
 intent on the destruction of Bolivar, took up a central 
 position, with his main body at Calabozo. He had five 
 divisions, the leading one, under La Torre, at El Calvario, 
 and El Sombrero watching Zaraza, whose military qualities 
 did not extend beyond loyalty and personal bravery. 
 Bolivar, now utilising his newly acquired waterway, sailed 
 up the Orinoco with 1 500 men to Cadenales, seventy- 
 five miles above Angostura. Thence he sent orders to 
 Zaraza to fall back, always avoiding an action, and join 
 himself on the Rio Claro. Unfortunately, Zaraza mis- 
 understood the order as one for union on the Rio Santa 
 Clara, in quite a different direction. Moreover, he dis- 
 obeyed his orders not to fight, and, finding himself with 
 numbers greatly superior to La Torre, attacked that 
 general at La Hogaza. But the discipline of La Torre's 
 force more than made up for its inferior numbers. 
 Zaraza was utterly beaten, losing 1200 men killed, as 
 many horses, all his guns, 1000 muskets, and great 
 quantities of military stores. La Torre's victory was 
 complete, and attained at very small cost. 
 
 This disastrous news reached Bolivar on the 4th 
 December at San Diego de Cabrutica. He at once 
 marched back to Angostura, crossing the Orinoco to the 
 south bank at Soledad. Martial law was at once pro- 
 claimed, and Urdaneta was despatched to Paez to pro- 
 pose his union with Bolivar in an effort to clear the 
 country about the junction of the Apure with the 
 Orinoco. 
 
 On the 3 1 st December, Bolivar again started up the 
 great river, this time with 2000 infantry and 1000 
 cavalry. Morillo, meanwhile, hearing at San Antonio 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR JOINS PAEZ 201 
 
 de Apurito of La Torre's victory, had hastened to 
 Calabozo. Bolivar himself marched with the divisions 
 of Mondgas and Torres by the right bank of the Orinoco 
 to Caicara ; Zaraza was to march to the river Caura ; 
 Cedefio was posted on the Tigre. On the 22nd January 
 1818 the whole army was united at Urbana^ on the 
 upper Orinoco, fifty miles above the inflow of the Apure ; 
 and, on the 31st, Bolivar and Paez met at El Caujaral, 
 from which they marched to San Juan de Payara, 
 Paez had 1000 cavalry and 250 infantry. Thence, after 
 six days' rest, Bolivar marched on San Fernando, which 
 was held by Quero, the Venezuelan renegade, with 600 
 men, determined to hold out. The republican general 
 was for masking the place and marching against Morillo, 
 who was actively organising his forces at Calabozo. 
 Paez would have preferred to lay siege to it. He 
 indicated as the best crossing of the Apure a place called 
 El Diamante, and himself went ahead to prepare the 
 means of passage. When Bolivar joined him there was 
 not a single boat on the south side, but under the oppo- 
 site bank lay a Spanish gunboat, three " flecheras," and 
 some canoes. When asked where the boats for the troops 
 to cross in were to be found, Paez coolly replied that he 
 relied on the Spanish boats opposite. Then he per- 
 formed a very remarkable feat by proving as good as 
 his word. He called for volunteers to follow " Uncle " 
 Paez, as his rough followers called him. He, with 
 Aramendi ^ and fifty of his Llaneros, plunged into the 
 rapid river on their horses, which they rode bare-backed. 
 They reached the Spanish boats, the crews of which were 
 utterly taken aback by this extraordinary form of attack. 
 The Llaneros, climbing from their horses' backs into the 
 
 ' Concepcion de Uruana on the map. 
 
 ' Franciseo Aramendi, a Llanero, like Paez, of whom he was an insepar- 
 able companion. He was with Bolivar in the campaign of 1819 in New 
 Granada, at the battle of Carabobo in 1821, and at the storming of Puerto 
 Cabello under Paez. He was assassinated in 1827. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
202 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 boats, soon overcame such resistance as was offered, and 
 returned in triumph with the captured flotilla. On the 
 1 2th February, Bolivar appeared near Calabozo, much 
 to Morillo's surprise. The comparatively small Spanish 
 force present was attacked and badly beaten. The 
 republicans gave no quarter, and Morillo himself 
 narrowly escaped the pursuit of Aramendi's Llaneros. 
 He evacuated Calabozo itself in the night of the 13 th- 
 14th February, and retired on El Sombrero up the river 
 Guarico. 
 
 Bolivar's wish was to attempt to cut him off from 
 Sombrero, but Paez raised objections, and was even in- 
 subordinate in defending his opinion, for he was too 
 accustomed to be his own master, and sole commander 
 of his Llaneros, to submit to the secondary position in 
 which he now found himself His excuse was that his 
 cavalry were worn out and wanted rest. This enabled 
 Morillo to get safely away to Sombrero, whence, after 
 fighting another indecisive action, he retreated again to 
 Barbacoas. Bolivar could not do without the Llaneros, 
 and LarrazabaP himself admits that these savage warriors 
 cared only for personal independence and set no value 
 whatever on the freedom of the republic. Morillo, in 
 some disorder, retired to the Aragua valley, whilst Bolivar, 
 unable owing to Paez's attitude to pursue, also retired to 
 Calabozo. Morillo, in 1820, affirmed that he had pur- 
 posely fallen back from Calabozo in order to draw 
 Bolivar into the hills where his cavalry would be almost 
 useless. 
 
 Nothing would satisfy Paez but to return to the siege 
 of San Fernando. Bolivar, making a virtue of necessity, 
 appointed him commander-in-chief in the province of 
 Barinas, with the reduction of which he was charged. 
 Yet the force already left before San Fernando was 
 ample to blockade it, and the place was eventually 
 
 1 1. 516. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EL SEMEN AND RINCON DE LOS TOROS 203 
 
 reduced by starvation. Its garrison, after a brave 
 defence, evacuated it on the 6th March 18 18. They 
 were followed by Paez with a greatly superior force 
 towards Barinas. There they were compelled to sur- 
 render. Quero, their commander, who had been badly 
 wounded in the siege, died a few days after his capture. 
 On the 8th March, Bolivar, now apparently joined by 
 his infantry, but without Paez's Llaneros, marched on 
 Cura, whilst Zaraza, with all the cavalry and some 
 infantry, went by Maracay to the familiar position of 
 La Cabrera. 
 
 Bolivar, with headquarters at Victoria, was now master 
 of the Aragua Valley and issued a proclamation to the 
 people of the valley of the Tuy, demanding the services 
 of every man capable of bearing arms. The Liberator's 
 position was a dangerous one, for he was between 
 Morillo at Valencia and La Torre at Caracas. His 
 plan was to march first against La Torre, and then, 
 after destroying him, to turn back on Morillo. The 
 plan was good enough, provided Zaraza succeeded in 
 detaining Morillo at La Cabrera. But the incompetent 
 guerrilla chief behaved with carelessness hardly excusable 
 if the enemy had been 100 miles away. Consequently, 
 Morillo fell upon him and almost exterminated his force. 
 This bad news reaching Bolivar on the 14th March, he 
 found himself in imminent danger of being crushed 
 by the concentric advance of Morillo and La Torre. 
 Instant retreat being his only chance, he fell back in 
 haste in the midst of torrential rain which rendered the 
 miserable roads almost impassable. From Cura, which 
 he reached early next morning, he continued his retreat 
 to Bocachica where he picked up the remains of Zaraza's 
 beaten cavalry. Morillo had just failed to intercept him 
 at Cura. 
 
 At 2 a.m. on the i6th, Bolivar had just passed over 
 the ill-omened field of La Puerta where Boves had over- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
204 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 whelmed him in 1 8 1 4. Here the road from Cura passes 
 across a ravine and then, through a gap in the hills, on to 
 a small plain enclosed by wooded heights. Beyond this 
 plain it issues again, as it entered, over the ravine of El 
 Semen, beyond which it bifurcates, the branch to the left 
 leading to San Sebastian de los Reyes, that to the right 
 to S. Juan de los Morros. Bolivar was in the act of 
 passing his parks and baggage over the ravine of the 
 Semen when the approach of Morales with Morillo's 
 advance guard was announced. The Liberator drew up 
 his force on the farther bank. According to Restrepo, 
 Bolivar had less than 2,000 men. Torrente gives him 
 4,500, including three battalions of Englishmen, but this 
 is manifestly wrong, for at this date Bolivar had received 
 only ten or twelve English officers and a few men. 
 
 Morales advanced to the attack at 6 a.m. and seized a 
 house on the near bank of the ravine, on his left of the 
 road. But his force was very weak and unable to resist 
 the republican counter attack. By 9 a.m. it was almost 
 destroyed when Morillo, hurrying up as soon as he heard 
 of the battle, reached the first ravine, that on the 
 Cura side of the small plain of La Puerta. Seeing 
 the critical state of Morales, he sent orders to his own 
 troops to throw away their knapsacks and hurry forward. 
 Attempting to rally Morales' men on the plain, he was 
 almost captured by Bolivar's cavalry. At that moment 
 two of his battalions arriving on the plain drove off" the 
 cavalry with a steady fire. More infantry and some 
 horse artillery arrived and turned the tide, which had 
 hitherto flowed so strongly against the royalists. The 
 Spaniards, superior in numbers as well as in quality, 
 soon dispersed Bolivar's force, his cavalry fled, pursued 
 by the enemy as far as S. Juan de los Morros. Half 
 of Bolivar's force was killed or wounded, Urdaneta, 
 Valdds, and Torres being amongst the latter. All the 
 baggage, 1 500 muskets, and even the Liberator's 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EL SEMEN AND RINCON DE LOS TOROS 205 
 
 correspondence, fell into the hands of the royalists, 
 whose loss, however, had been very heavy, for Morales 
 had lost half his advance guard by 9 a.m., and the Union 
 battalion at the head of the main body was very severely 
 handled before the rest could arrive. 
 
 In the moment of victory Morillo received a lance 
 thrust in the stomach from a patriot hidden in the 
 brushwood. Half dead from loss of blood, he had to 
 hand over the command to Ramon Correa, whom he 
 ordered to carry on the pursuit.^ So decisive was the 
 victory deemed by the Spaniards that Correa reported 
 to the Captain-General that it was impossible for Bolivar 
 to recover from it. Nevertheless, the royalists were too 
 exhausted to continue the pursuit, and Bolivar, marching 
 by Parapara and Ortiz, reached El Rastro with the 
 remnants of his force on the 1 9th March. 
 
 Morillo's army, now temporarily commanded by 
 Correa, owing to the Commander-in-Chief's wound, 
 waited at El Semen for the arrival of La Torre before 
 marching for Calabozo. 
 
 Bolivar, reaching that place, set to work to reorganise 
 his shattered troops and to remount his cavalry. He 
 sent Torres to the Apure to call up Cedeno and Paez, 
 and placed Calabozo in a state of defence so effectually 
 that when La Torre arrived before it he thought it too 
 strong to attack, and again fell back on Ortiz. Bolivar, 
 energetic as ever, followed and found the enemy posted, 
 with 1000 infantry and a squadron of cavalry, on the 
 heights in front of Ortiz. For the attack Bolivar dis- 
 mounted 500 cavalry, who could have done nothing if 
 mounted against the rugged slope. With these and his 
 infantry he succeeded in capturing the first line of heights, 
 
 ^ For this victory Morillo was made Marquis de la Puerta. That was the 
 name given by the royalists to the battle. The republicans called it El 
 Semen, to distinguish it from the two previous defeats which they had 
 suffered on this fatal spot. There Campo Elias had been defeated, and then 
 Bolivar, in 1814. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2o6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 but La Torre retired to a second and stronger line, 
 against which Bolivar's attacks failed. During the night, 
 La Torre, fearing a fresh attempt by the republicans, fell 
 back to Cura, but was followed no farther by Bolivar, 
 who now abandoned the idea of a march on Caracas in 
 favour of one towards the west. 
 
 The new plan was conveyed in orders dated 3 ist March 
 1818. They required Paez to move on San Carlos up 
 the river Pao. Mondgas was sent to Barcelona, Soublette 
 to Guayana, Zaraza to Sombrero, all charged with the 
 collection of fresh recruits. In a week Bolivar was again 
 at the head of 600 infantry and a few fairly mounted 
 cavalry. Proposing to join Paez on the San Carlos road, 
 he marched, on the 8th April, to S. Jos6 de Tiznados, 
 where, on the i6th, he was joined by Justo Briceflo and 
 took up a position at Rincon de los Toros, three miles 
 from S. Jos6, in ignorance of the presence in the neigh- 
 bourhood of five squadrons of Spanish horse under Rafael 
 Lopez, charged wiith the task of preventing the junction 
 of Bolivar and Paez. Lopez, however, knew all about 
 Bolivar, having captured one of his men who was 
 searching for strayed horses. From his prisoner Lopez 
 extracted full information regarding the republican camp, 
 including a description of the exact place where the 
 Liberator slept, and the password for the night. Captain 
 Tomas Renovales proposed to make a bold attempt to 
 capture or kill Bolivar, to which Lopez assented. Taking 
 with him eight out of thirty-six volunteers, Renovales, 
 in the night of the 1 7th April, made for the enemy's camp, 
 it being understood that Lopez was to attack it at dawn. 
 When he got to the outskirts of the camp Renovales 
 stumbled on a patrol under Santander, but, thanks to 
 having the password, he was able to satisfy the republican 
 colonel. Then he moved silently, with the prisoner 
 beside him as guide, towards where Bolivar's hammock 
 was hung. There are several versions of exactly what 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EL SEMEN AND RINCON DE LOS TOROS 207 
 
 happened thereafter. Perhaps O'Leary's is the safest to 
 take.i According to that, Renovales represented himself 
 to Santander as a patrol seeking the general. Santander, 
 to prepare Bolivar, shouted " General 1 " Bolivar at once 
 jumped from his hammock, and, suspecting something 
 was wrong, made for his charger, which was tethered 
 close by. As he was preparing to mount, Renovales 
 fired, as did his men, in the direction of the hammocks. 
 Two officers and Bolivar's chaplain were killed,^ and the 
 general's charger was wounded. But the Liberator made 
 off on foot for the centre of the camp, on which Lopez 
 had already commenced the promised attack. Zaraza, 
 as usual, was caught napping, and all was in confusion. 
 One officer whom he met refused to give Bolivar his 
 horse or to take him up on the crupper, but a cavalry 
 soldier offered him a mule. As the Liberator approached 
 to mount it, the brute kicked him on the leg. In this 
 desperate plight, Bolivar was saved by a soldier named 
 Infante, mounted on the charger of the Spanish colonel 
 Lopez, who had been killed. This horse he made over 
 to Bolivar, who escaped on it,' coatless and hatless, some 
 say only in his shirt.* The rout of the troops was 
 complete, and so few rallied to Bolivar, when he got back 
 to El Rastro, that they were useless for further operations. 
 The Liberator, therefore, leaving Cedeflo as " Com- 
 mandant-General of the plains of Calabozo," himself 
 set out, with only forty men, to join Paez, whom he 
 knew to be on the Pao. After three days and nights 
 of strenuous marching, Bolivar reached the ford of 
 Guadarama, on the river Portuguesa. Thence, hearing 
 that Paez was approaching San Carlos, and that the road 
 between them was very dangerous, he turned south to 
 
 ' It agrees substantially with that of Restrepo (ii. 457). 
 ' Restrepo denies this, and differs slightly from O'Leary in other details. 
 •There seems some reason to believe that this Infante was the negro 
 colonel whom Hamilton (ii. 242) saw shot for murder in Bogotd in 1825. 
 * Restrepo denies this. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2o8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 S. Fernando, by Camaguan, where he was joined by 
 Cedefio's division, and raised more troops. For nearly 
 the whole of the month of May he lay ill of fever in 
 San Fernando. During this month he received much 
 bad news. Before Paez's advance up the Pao, the local 
 Spanish commander had fallen back on Valencia. 
 Morillo sent La Torre and Correa to his aid, and they 
 occupied San Carlos with 3000 men, their main strengtl) 
 being in infantry. On the 2nd May Paez reached the 
 plain of Coj^des, some distance west of S. Carlos. He 
 succeeded in drawing his adversaries on to the plain, in 
 order to be able to make the most of the cavalry, in 
 which lay his main strength. In the sanguinary action 
 which ensued, his infantry was almost destroyed, but his 
 cavalry retired to San Fernando, which he reached on 
 the 2 1st May. 
 
 Morillo had sent Morales against Calabozo, which he 
 found evacuated by Cedefio, who had taken up a position 
 at Cerrito de los Patos, on the road to El Calvario. The 
 republican force was beaten on the 20th May, and what 
 remained of it had to fall back across the Apure. In 
 this action the numerous republican cavalry behaved 
 very badly, and failed to support the small body of 
 infantry. 
 
 The patriot outlook at this moment was almost as 
 black as it could be. Everything that had been gained 
 in the campaign of 1 8 1 8 had again been lost, and Bolivar 
 and his lieutenants had been disastrously defeated in all 
 directions. Arms, ammunition, and money were all 
 wanting, and the loss in horses had been very heavy. 
 But Bolivar never lost hope, and he now had, what he 
 had not had in his earlier campaigns, something much 
 better than the sea to retire upon — namely, the province 
 of Guayana, with its great waterway the Orinoco. He 
 set about collecting forces from every direction, and, on 
 the 24th May 1 8 1 8, started once more with his staff and 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AT ANGOSTURA 209 
 
 some infantry for Angostura, where he arrived on the 
 7th June. 
 
 Here there was more bad news to come in. First, 
 Bermudez arrived, reporting the loss of Cumand, and his 
 own defeat at Puerto de la Madera, which was partly 
 brought about by fresh vagaries on the part of the 
 unstable Marino, always aiming at his own advancement. 
 Then Marino himself had been defeated at Cumanacoa, 
 and the royalists were in possession everywhere. 
 
 From the Apure came the report that the troops had 
 thrown off their allegiance to Bolivar and acclaimed Paez 
 as chief of the army and the state. He, too, could not 
 brook subordination to the Liberator. 
 
 Bolivar now devoted himself to reorganising the 
 government, which, it will be remembered, he had left 
 in the hands of the Council of State. He appointed 
 secretaries, and started a newspaper, the Correo del 
 Orinoco, under the editorship of Zea. Then he again 
 turned his attention to military matters. Ignoring the 
 misconduct of Marino, he appointed him to the com- 
 mand in what remained of the province of Cumand. 
 Bermudez he sent to Guiria to co-operate with Marino, 
 and to safeguard the trade of Angostura passing through 
 the Gulf of Paria. Santander was despatched to the 
 plains of Casanare^ to organise a force which was in- 
 tended to be the vanguard of the expedition to New 
 Granada which Bolivar was aleady contemplating. San- 
 tander left by boat on the 26th August, carrying with 
 him a proclamation to the Granadians,^ in which the 
 situation was painted in rosy colours, very different from 
 the truth.^ It was stuffed full of promises for the future, 
 
 ^ Casanare, at the foot of the Eastern Cordilleras, was really part of New 
 Granada ; but, owing to its position, practically came under Venezuelan 
 administration. 
 
 = Dated isth August 1818. O'Leary, Docts., 16, p. 84. 
 
 ' The opening words are sufficient proof of this. "Granadians ! Already 
 the army of Morillo no longer exists ; nor do the new expeditions which 
 
 O 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2IO SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 which seemed very unlikely to be realised. Bolivar's 
 idea now was to proceed to Maturin, in order to deal 
 with affairs there and with Marino, but he was detained 
 in Angostura by [administrative matters. However un- 
 willing he really was to hamper himself with a loquacious 
 and meddlesome Congress, he felt that he must redeem 
 his reiterated promises to call one. Unless he did so, he 
 would afford to his rivals and enemies a plausible ground 
 for alleging autocratic ambitions on his part. On the 
 loth October he held a meeting of the Council of State, 
 at which he proposed the convocation of the Con- 
 gress of Venezuela for the ist January 1819; he held 
 forth on the necessity for framing the new government 
 on a republican model, and of summoning for its com- 
 position the most distinguished citizens. Then he went 
 on to say that a soldier like himself, constantly engaged 
 in war, could not, at the same time, carry on the business 
 of government. Nor did he desire to do so, as the work 
 and the position were opposed to his character and his 
 destiny. On his proposal, a commission was appointed 
 to consider the mode of election, and to draft an order 
 of convocation of the Constituent Congress. The 
 number of members was fixed at thirty-five, to meet on 
 the I st January 1 8 1 9. Of course there was a manifesto 
 (22nd October) addressed by Bolivar to the Venezuelans, 
 with a resumd of his own doings, and an optimistic 
 account of the present position, in which it was asserted 
 that Guayana and the greater part of Venezuela were 
 already free 1 ^ The area of the country south of the 
 royalist lines was, no doubt, greater than the north, but 
 in no other sense was the greater part of the country 
 free. Larrazabal complains that the Spaniards ridiculed 
 this proclamation. Considering how very strong a re- 
 came to reinforce it. More than 20,000 Spaniards have reddened the soil of 
 Venezuela with their blood," etc. Exaggeration could hardly go further. 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., 16, p. 113. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
TROUBLE WITH PAEZ 211 
 
 semblance it bore to the division of the bear's skin in 
 the animal's lifetime, their laughter seems scarcely re- 
 markable. At last Bolivar got off from Angostura, 
 and reached Maturin on the 2nd November. Thence 
 he started for Marifto's camp, which he believed to be 
 at Cariaco or before Cumani, which latter place he 
 proposed to besiege. He had not got farther than 
 Guanaguana when he received news that Marino, routed 
 by Don Agustin Nogueras, had fled to Santa Maria. 
 Bolivar at once returned to Angostura, whence he sent 
 Colonel Avendaflo to supersede Marifto in the Cumand 
 command, and directed Marino to go to Barcelona and 
 raise troops — rather a dangerous mission, one would 
 judge, looking to the present ascendancy of the royalist 
 cause, north of the Orinoco plains. 
 
 At this time, too, the republicans were much alarmed 
 at the possible intervention of other European Powers to 
 re-establish the supremacy of Spain over her colonies. 
 This alarm drew from Bolivar, as " Supreme Chief of the 
 Republic of Venezuela," a fresh manifesto (20th Novem- 
 ber i8i8) nailing the republican colours to the mast. 
 The whole gist of it is contained in the phrases, '" no sub- 
 mission to Spain ; negotiations with her only on a footing 
 of equality as two independent nations ; no foreign 
 mediation except on this basis." ^ 
 
 It was the 21st December 18 18, only eleven days 
 before the date fixed for the assembly of Congress, when 
 Bolivar marched westwards, for the double purpose of 
 continuing the struggle against Morillo, and of bringing 
 back to his allegiance the turbulent Paez, who had 
 accepted the title of " Supreme Director of the Republic," 
 by which his officers had acclaimed him. 
 
 What had happened on the Apure was this.^ Just 
 
 ' O'Leary, Docts., l6, p. 172. 
 
 ' Here we follow the narrative of O'Leary, an eye-witness. He had just 
 joined the republican army as a subaltern in the contingent brought out by 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
212 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 after Bolivar had left for Angostura in 1 8 1 8, Paez held 
 a review of the 2000 infantry and 2000 cavalry whom 
 he commanded at Achaguas. A few days afterwards he 
 was invited to dinner by Colonel Wilson, and treated 
 with great consideration. Then Wilson got together a 
 number of officers, who agreed to proclaim Paez com- 
 mander-in-chief. Paez was delighted, and accepted the 
 title at a great review got up for the occasion. Wilson, 
 who had made all sorts of promises of raising levies in 
 England, was then sent to announce the new state of 
 affairs to Bolivar. That leader promptly put him in 
 prison (where he remained till he left the country), and 
 wrote a very sharp reprimand to Paez, though the blame 
 was laid on Wilson, who was to be court-martialled for 
 his insubordination. 
 
 When Bolivar met Paez at S. Juan de Payara, in the 
 middle of January 1 8 1 9, the latter had thought better of 
 his folly, and, finding his chief very firm, proceeded to 
 make out that he had had nothing to do with Wilson's 
 escapade, and to promise to put down the movement. 
 Thereupon, Bolivar made him general of division, and, 
 after reviewing and haranguing the Llaneros, returned to 
 Angostura, where he expected the arrival of Elsom's 
 British battalion. He also wished to instal the Congress, 
 which had not yet assembled. 
 
 As, hereafter, a large part is played in the struggle by 
 troops of British nationality, it will be convenient here 
 to give some particulars as to them. They arrived for 
 the most part in the years 1817 and 18 19. In the 
 former year a contingent of 220 men, under Colonel 
 Skene, was shipwrecked on the French coast, and all 
 
 Col. Wilson from England. His regiment was the " Red Hussars," who, he 
 believes, on account of their gorgeous uniforms, were placed at a review on 
 the right of the tattered and often half-naked Venezuelans. O'Leary men- 
 tions that he was so disgusted with Faez's massacres of prisoners, Americans 
 included, that he resigned his commission, and attached himself to Bolivar. 
 O'Leary, i. 484. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE BRITISH CONTINGENTS 213 
 
 were drowned. The other troops arriving in that year 
 
 \^Q^Q Officers 
 
 and men. 
 
 (i) Colonel Wilson with the nucleus of a regiment 
 
 of cavalry. (This is not Sir Robert Wilson's 
 
 son Belford, but the man who tried to set up 
 
 Paez) .60 
 
 (2) Colonel Hippisley with two more cavalry cadres 120 
 
 (3) Colonel Campbell with the cadre of a regiment 
 
 of Rifles 130 
 
 (4) Colonel Gilmore,^ artillery (six guns) . . 90 
 
 (5) Colonel MacDonald and other officers . . 20 
 
 420 
 In 1 8 19 arrived the following: — 
 (i) Contingent contracted for by Colonel Elsom . 572 
 
 (2) Colonel English's contingent . . .1 200 
 
 (3) Germans (? Hessians) raised by Elsom . .300 
 
 (4) MacGregor's contingent .... 900 
 
 (5) Devereux's Irish brigade . . . .1729 
 
 (6) Further contingent of Irish . . . .187 
 
 (7) Colonel Gore's contingent, to join MacGregor's 
 
 force ....... 200 
 
 5088 
 
 The " British Legion " which fought at BoyacA, in 1 8 1 9, 
 consisted of the remains of the troops of 18 17, added to 
 part of Elsom's contingent. These afterwards became 
 the " Albion " battalion, and some of the officers com- 
 manded the " Rifles," the rank and file of which, after 
 being English in the first instance, were composed of 
 Indians, and later of Creoles, mulattoes, and men of all 
 colours. The above details are given by Restrepo.^ 
 Probably the cadres were added to by other stray British 
 recruits. Many of these men were veterans of the Penin- 
 
 ^ Really only a subaltern. ^ Vol. ii., note on pages 607-609. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
214 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 sula and Waterloo, thrown out of employ by the peace 
 in 1815. English, who died in Margarita,^ had been 
 through the Peninsula War in the ordnance department. 
 His men subsequently became the " Carabobo " battalion, 
 so called from the part they played in that decisive 
 battle in 1821. When they first arrived at Margarita, 
 they were in a state of mutiny, which was not remarkable, 
 considering the class of men who probably constituted 
 the force. The Irish brigade, as will be narrated later, 
 mutinied at Santa Marta, and had to be got rid of. 
 
 The contracts were arranged in London by Lopez 
 Mendez, Bolivar's agent. The soldiers, receiving a bounty 
 of ;^i6 on enlistment, were to receive two shillings a day 
 pay and free rations, and a further bounty of ;£^I00 on 
 the conclusion of the war. Probably neither the daily 
 pay nor the final bounty was realised. Lopez Mendez 
 left behind him a very evil reputation, the result of 
 promises which, in the state of the republican exchequer, 
 could not be carried out. Nevertheless, Bolivar used to 
 say he was the real liberator of Colombia, owing to his 
 success in raising money, arms, and men in England for 
 the service of the republic. 
 
 Some of the uniforms devised by the contracting 
 officers were remarkable. That of Wilson's cavalry, the 
 " Red Hussars," to which O'Leary belonged, gave them 
 the appearance of a theatrical troupe rather than of 
 soldiers. 
 
 Few either of the officers or the men returned to 
 England. Many of those who survived became natural- 
 ised Colombians, and in some cases rose to high rank in 
 Colombia. Colonel Eraser was Minister for War in 
 Bogotd, after Bolivar's time. Amongst those who got 
 
 ^ His widow was very shabbily treated after his death. According to 
 Mulhall ("The English in South America") English died of a broken heart 
 after failing in an attack on Cuman^, in which he was frustrated by the 
 jealousy of Urdaneta. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONGRESS OF ANGOSTURA 215 
 
 home was Hippisley, who left in disgust, as stated in his 
 memoirs. Chesterton, another memoir writer, became 
 governor of an English House of Detention. 
 
 On the 8th February 18 19, Bolivar was back in 
 Angostura. During the long days of floating down the 
 Orinoco from San Juan de Payara, he had employed his 
 time preparing and dictating the address he proposed to 
 make to the Constituent Congress, and the scheme for a 
 Constitution which he meant it to adopt. The i sth Feb- 
 ruary was fixed for the assembly, and soon after noon on 
 that day, the deputies being already assembled, Bolivar 
 entered the hall in which they had met. He forthwith 
 submitted his project for a Constitution, introducing it in 
 a long speech, which covers twenty-four pages of O'Leary. 
 It is an excellent example of Bolivar's style, but we must 
 resist the temptation to translate it in extenso} confining 
 ourselves to an abstract, and to the quotation of a few of 
 the more remarkable passages. Bolivar begins by expres- 
 sions of satisfaction, the sincerity of which is doubtful, at 
 being at last able to resign into the hands of popular 
 representatives the almost absolute power with which 
 it has, so far, been necessary to invest an individual. 
 Hitherto the young nation has been immersed in an 
 ocean of disorder and strife, from which it is now emerg- 
 ing. Many men capable of directing the State are begin- 
 ning to show themselves. 
 
 Then he goes on to review the past and present con- 
 dition of Spanish America. As when the Roman 
 Empire broke up, so with the dissolution of the Spanish 
 Empire in America, each constituent part forms itself 
 into a separate nation, suited to its situation and 
 interests. " We are neither Europeans nor Indians, but 
 a race intermediate between the aborigines and the 
 Spaniards. Americans by birth, Europeans in our 
 
 ^ An English translation of it was published, and can be found in the 
 British Museum. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2i6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 rights, we find ourselves divided between disputing with 
 the natives the right of possession, and maintaining our- 
 selves against the opposition of the invaders in the 
 country which gave birth to us ; thus our position is 
 most extraordinary and complicated. Nay more ; our 
 lot has always been purely passive, our political existence 
 has been void, and we have found ourselves in all the 
 more difficult position for attaining liberty, because we 
 have been reduced to a grade lower even than slavery. 
 . . . We American people, weighed down by the 
 triple yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice, have been 
 unable to acquire knowledge, or power, or virtue. . . . 
 We have been dominated rather by deceit than by force, 
 and have been degraded by superstition more than by 
 vice. . . . Thus, legislators, your undertaking is all the 
 more laborious because you have to rectify men per- 
 verted by the illusions of error, and by noxious in- 
 centives." The Liberator was fully awake to the 
 degradation of his countrymen, the result of three 
 centuries of misgovernment. Where he erred was in 
 supposing that such men were fit, in their present state, 
 for free institutions. Yet he saw it at least in part, for 
 he goes on to point out how many great nations have 
 owed their greatness to a monarchical or an aristocratic 
 government, though, in his opinion, " Democracy alone is 
 susceptible of absolute liberty." Yet he adds — " The 
 more I admire the excellence of the Venezuelan Federal 
 Constitution, the more convinced am I of the impossi- 
 bility of its application to our existing conditions." He 
 admits the success of the Federal Constitution of the 
 United States, but expresses his wonder that even there 
 a form of government, which in theory he considers 
 perfect, should in practice have been able to subsist. 
 He had already, in a letter written in 1 8 14 to the 
 Governor of Barinas,^ explained its success as due, first 
 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., 13, p. 337. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONGRESS OF ANGOSTURA 217 
 
 to the fact that the sovereign states in North America 
 delegated to the central authority all power except 
 that of the administration of justice and local affairs ; 
 secondly, that the federation was only set up twelve years 
 after the first revolt, when independence had been finally 
 recognised, and after years of rule by the organisers of 
 the revolution. Moreover, the population of the North 
 American sovereign states was infinately greater and 
 more concentrated than that of the South American 
 states. Finally, he points to the disastrous results of a 
 Federal Government in New Granada, as shown by the 
 terrible civil wars which had occurred. Page after page of 
 Bolivar's speech of the isth February 18 19 is devoted 
 to arguing against the possibility of Federal Government 
 succeeding in Colombia at present. With all this it is 
 impossible to disagree. He finally appeals to the Con- 
 gress in these terms — " Horrified at the divergences 
 amongst us which have hitherto ruled and, owing to 
 the subtle spirit which characterises the Federal form 
 of government, must continue to rule, I have been 
 forced to implore you to adopt centralism, and the 
 reunion of all the states of Venezuela in a republic one 
 and indivisible. This measure, in my opinion urgent, 
 vital, and salutary, is of such a nature that without it the 
 fruit of our regeneration will be death." 
 
 As for the constitution which he submitted, there 
 were to be no more weak and inefficient triumvirates, but 
 a single President. He probably desired a life Presidency, 
 but dared not directly propose it. His constant references 
 to the position of the King of England show that his 
 thoughts were running in that direction. He vehemently 
 advocated strengthening the executive rather than the 
 Legislature. " The executive power in a Republic," he 
 said, " must be strong, for all conspire against it. In a 
 Monarchy the power should rest in the Legislature, for 
 all conspire in favour of the monarch." Much of what 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2i8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 had been done by the first Congress must, Bolivar 
 thought, be modified in the case of a people not yet 
 fitted for complete representative government. " Our 
 population is neither European nor North American. It 
 is a combination of Africa and America, rather than an 
 emanation of Europe, since Spain herself, with her 
 African blood, her institutions, and her character, is 
 hardly European. It is impossible to say positively to 
 what human family we belong. The greater part of the 
 aborgines have gone under, the European has intermarried 
 with the American and the African, and the progeny of 
 this union has again intermarried with the Indian and 
 the European." 
 
 The Liberator lays down — " A republican govern- 
 ment has been, and must be, that of Venezuela ; its 
 bases must be the sovereignty of the people, the division 
 of power, civil liberty, the proscription of slavery, and 
 the abolition of monarchy and privileges." Then he 
 goes on to argue in favour of a hereditary Upper Chamber 
 or Senate, with an elected Chamber of Representatives. 
 In this he openly bases his proposals on the British Con- 
 stitution. The first senators were to be elected by the 
 Congress, and it was to be the special charge of the 
 government to see that their successors were properly 
 educated and trained for the responsibilities of their 
 position. Such a body would be independent, having 
 nothing to hope or fear from the government, on the one 
 hand, or from popular favour or disfavour on the other. 
 
 Stated briefly the chief provisions of Bolivar's project 
 for a Constitution were — 
 
 (i) The executive power was concentrated in the 
 hands of an elected President, holding a position closely 
 analogous to that of the British sovereign. His 
 Ministers were to be responsible to Congress for his acts. 
 
 (2) The Legislature to consist of an elected Chamber 
 of Representatives, similar to that of the United States, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF 1 8 19 219 
 
 and a Senate, elected by the Congress in the first 
 instance, thereafter to be hereditary. 
 
 (3) Independence of the judiciary : Judges to be 
 removable only for proved misconduct. 
 
 (4) There was a curious and anomalous provision in 
 the constitution of a fourth power, which was to exercise 
 control over public morality, to fight against frauds and 
 corruption of all sorts.^ Not a very practical idea, 
 and a curious commentary on the general state of the 
 people. 
 
 (5) Provision was made for trial by jury, liberty of 
 the press, guarantees of civil liberty, and the abolition of 
 slavery. 
 
 The fundamental law, which was finally adopted by 
 the Congress on the 17th December 18 19, and put into 
 execution by Bolivar two days later, contained the 
 following main provisions : — 
 
 (i) The Republics of Venezuela and New Granada to 
 be united into the single " Republic of Colombia." 
 The necessity for a centralised government was strongly 
 insisted on. 
 
 (2) The Executive to be in the hands of a President, 
 or failing him a Vice-President, both to be nominated 
 by the existing Congress. 
 
 (3) The Republic to be divided into three great 
 departments ; Venezuela, with its capital at Caracas ; 
 Cundinamarca, capital Bogotd (no longer Santa F6) ; 
 Quito, with its capital at that city. Each department 
 to have an administration with a Vice-President at its 
 head. 
 
 (4) The first General Congress to fix on the plan and 
 site for the new capital of the Republic, to be named 
 after the Liberator. 
 
 (5) The General Congress to assemble at Rosario de 
 
 ' This was a favourite idea of Bolivar, which reappears later in the 
 Bolivian constitution. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
220 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Ciicuta on the ist January 1821, the members being 
 
 elected under a scheme to be framed by a commission. 
 
 (6) That Congress to decide on a Constitution, using 
 as a basis the draft which had now been approved. 
 
 (7) The present Congress to dissolve at once, its 
 place being taken by a commission of six members and 
 a President, pending assembly of the General Congress. 
 As for the draft Constitution now passed, it differed in 
 some important respects from that put forward by 
 Bolivar. 
 
 (i) The President was to be elected for four years, 
 with permission to stand for one re-rclection only. 
 
 (2) The Senators, instead of being hereditary, were to 
 be elected for life only. 
 
 Both these modifications were, no doubt, extremely 
 displeasing to the Liberator, but resistance to them 
 would have lent too much colour to suspicions of his 
 monarchical tendencies to be safe. 
 
 As soon as he ended his speech on the i Sth February 
 1 8 19, Bolivar formally surrendered his power into the 
 hands of the Congress, as well as all the offices conferred 
 on himself and his companions in arms during his 
 administration. These latter were at once re- conferred 
 by the Congress, and the Liberater was invited, and 
 consented, to continue in office for forty-eight hours, 
 until a new President could be elected. The election 
 resulted in the choice of Bolivar as President, and of 
 Zea as Vice-President of the Republic. 
 
 Then ensued a comedy which was to be many times 
 repeated in future years. Bolivar, after refusing the 
 Presidency in the most explicit terms, allowed himself to 
 be persuaded into acceptance. Then a decree was passed 
 investing him with unlimited powers in provinces in a 
 state of war, that is, as matters then and for many sub- 
 sequent years stood, in the whole country. As the Vice- 
 President was, at the same time, excluded from all 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF 1 8 19 221 
 
 military authority, that practically amounted to a 
 military dictatorship conferred on Bolivar. 
 
 In view of his own immediate return to active military 
 command, the President now delegated his ordinary non- 
 military functions to Zea, the Vice-President. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES AND THE BATTLE 
 OF BOYACA, 1819 
 
 ON the 27th February 1819 Bolivar set out 
 once more for the Apure, after first sending 
 Urdaneta to Margarita to take command 
 of Colonel English's British troops, which 
 were expected to arrive there, and to try, if possible, to 
 land at La Guaira in order to operate against Caracas 
 in Morillo's rear. On the loth March, Bolivar was at 
 Araguaquen, and, a few days later, on the right bank of 
 the Arauca, where he joined Paez. Morillo had passed 
 to the south of the Apure in the end of January. It 
 was certainly a risky move, for the climate of these 
 plains was sure to play havoc with his European troops, 
 and, if he allowed himself to be detained there till the 
 rainy season commenced in May, he was almost certain 
 to be destroyed by the floods and consequent starvation. 
 Still he moved forward, and on the 3rd April was close 
 to the left bank of the Arauca, beyond which were 
 Bolivar and Paez. 
 
 On this day Paez gained a notable success. Reckless 
 as ever, he had crossed the river with 150 Llaneros. 
 Morillo, seeing him retreating with the river behind 
 him, made sure of exterminating him, and sent in pursuit 
 1000 cavalry, all he had. Paez continued to retreat till 
 he had drawn the royalist horsemen well away from their 
 infantry ; then, utilising his intimate knowledge of the 
 ground, which told him exactly where it was sound and 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
QUESERAS DEL MEDIO 223 
 
 where marshy, he turned on his pursuers. Dividing his 
 men into small bodies of twenty or thirty each, he 
 attacked in several directions, utilising the marshy ground 
 and inflicting very heavy loss on the Spaniards, who 
 were driven back in confusion on Morillo. The action 
 is known by the name of Queseras del Medio.'^ Every 
 survivor of it on Paez's side was rewarded by Bolivar 
 next day with the " Order of the Liberators." 
 
 The rivers were now beginning to rise with the melt- 
 ing of the snows of the Eastern Cordilleras, and Morillo's 
 real difficulties began. Thinking the campaign must be 
 over for the season in these parts, the Spaniard made his 
 way back to Calabozo to find better quarters for his 
 troops. But Bolivar, relieved of the pressure of Morillo, 
 was about to execute a design which he had been con- 
 templating for some time, namely the reconquest of the 
 central and southern provinces of New Granada. The 
 scheme was perhaps one of the best Bolivar ever de- 
 signed ; for its success would cut Morillo from the rich 
 provinces which could supply him when the exhausted 
 hill tract in the north of Venezuela should fail him. It 
 was a large scheme, requiring much preparation, which 
 had already been begun by the despatch, in August 1 8 1 8, 
 of Santander to the plains of Casanare.^ The Liberator's 
 first move was to march on Barinas, which had been 
 uncovered by Morillo's retreat to Calabozo. All went 
 well till the Apure was reached, via Mantecal, about 
 Nutrias. There it was found that the cavalry horses had 
 been rendered practically useless by hard work, and a 
 
 1 Professor Bingham ("Caracas to Bogoti," p. 97) places Queseras del 
 Medio a little east of Guadalito. Codazzi's map shows it a very long way 
 farther east, south of Achaguas. The latter certainly seems the more 
 probable locality, looking to Bolivar's movements about this time. It seems 
 as if there was some confusion with Mata de la Miel, an earlier victory of 
 Paez, the field of which Codazzi shows almost exactly where Mr Bingham 
 puts Queseras del Medio. 
 
 ^ Supra, p. 209. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
224 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 halt had to be made whilst Paez went to beat up fresh 
 horses about Guadalito. Whilst halted at Caflafistolo, 
 Bolivar received Santander's report of the state of affairs 
 in New Granada. The country, goaded to desperation 
 by the tyrannies of the Viceroy Sdmano, was ripe for 
 revolt. Santander had ingratiated himself with the 
 Casanare people. At a council of war Bolivar ex- 
 pounded generally his idea of a march on Bogotd, which 
 was not accepted by all the members. The army then 
 marched back to Mantecal, whence, on the 25 th May, 
 Bolivar started for Guadalito. There he left Paez with 
 1 000 cavalry to execute a movement on Ciicuta. This 
 was designed to screen Bolivar's own movements from 
 Morillo, as well as to prevent La Torre from retiring 
 into New Granada, there to oppose Bolivar's own 
 expedition. On the 4th June the Liberator commenced 
 his march westwards, still concealing its destination, 
 as far as possible, even from his own men ; for he knew 
 that the unknown terrors of a march through the great 
 range of the Eastern Cordilleras would alarm the weaker 
 spirits. But some general idea leaked out, and de- 
 sertions became numerous. The Llaneros in particular, 
 with their rooted aversion to leaving their own plains, 
 abandoned the expedition in great numbers. Colonel 
 Iribarren, one of the dissentients of the recent council of 
 war, left with his squadron ; so did Colonel Rangel, who 
 was ill, taking his squadron with him. On the other 
 hand, Rook, with the British Legion, vowed he would 
 follow Bolivar to Cape Horn if required. 
 
 On the nth June the Liberator was at Tame, where 
 he was joined by Santander with the forces he had 
 organised in Casanare. The whole expedition now 
 counted some 2500 men. 
 
 Looking at the map, it seems but a small matter 
 to march across the broad open plains which lie at 
 the foot of the Eastern Cordilleras all about the head- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE MARCH TO THE ANDES 225 
 
 waters of the Apure, the Arauca, and other tributaries 
 of the Orinoco. In the dry season, no doubt, it is 
 comparatively easy ; for, though the roads were, and 
 still are, elementary in the extreme, the dead level of 
 the country is only varied by slight elevations rising 
 a few feet above it. Even the rivers, shrunk to mere 
 brooks for the moment, are generally no serious obstacle. 
 The country is a vast sheet of grass, broken only by 
 scattered clumps of palms, and streaked with lines of 
 forest trees marking the course of the innumerable rivers 
 and streams. As for the roads, they are mere cattle 
 tracks, rendered difficult only by the fact that the heat 
 of the sun in a period of drought has left a hardened 
 mould of every hoof mark and every rut worn when the 
 mud was soft. But in the rainy season, from May to 
 November, it is very different. The rivers and streams 
 have overflowed their banks, and for the sea of grass 
 has been substituted a sea of water, with islands repre- 
 senting the raised ground, and the lines of the water- 
 courses still marked by the upper part of their fringe 
 of trees. The roads have practically disappeared, and 
 every petty stream has become a raging torrent. It 
 was over such country that Bolivar's little army marched 
 day after day. For a week on end the soldiers would 
 be marching all day up to their knees, or even their 
 waists, in water and soaked by the rain above. At 
 night they camped on the nearest eminence where they 
 could obtain, not dry ground indeed, but ground not 
 covered deeply by water. Day after day they had to 
 ford a dozen streams, or to swim or ferry themselves 
 across in boats constructed of hides. Swimmers were 
 always exposed to terrible risks from alligators, electric 
 eels, and the dreaded " caribe " fish. The men, badly 
 fed, were unable to find any shelter at night, and with 
 difficulty kept their powder dry in the torrential rain. 
 None suffered more than the English, ill suited as they 
 
 p 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2 26 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 were to live on the small ration which kept the frugal 
 Venezuelan alive and well. Bolivar, of necessity, shared 
 all the hardships of his soldiers on equal terms. 
 
 The Mark Tapley of the expedition seems to have 
 been Colonel Rook, commanding the English con- 
 tingent. Nothing could damp his irrepressible good 
 humour, and he was always satisfied, whatever the 
 miseries and the discomforts.^ 
 
 Pore was reached on the 2Sth June, and here the 
 ascent of the Cordilleras began, an ascent full of diffi- 
 culties, which culminated after Paya was reached on 
 the 27th. At Paya the first armed resistance was 
 met with. Three hundred Spaniards, attempting to 
 defend the place, were dislodged and driven back on 
 Labranza Grande, on the ordinary road to Bogotd.^ 
 They expected to be followed thither, but Bolivar, 
 fully aware of the immense defensive strength of the 
 positions on the mountain road, had other designs. 
 After a few days' rest at Paya, during which he issued 
 proclamations to the Granadians announcing his advent, 
 which he could no longer conceal, he started again 
 on the 2nd July. Instead of marching on Labranza 
 
 ' O'Leary tells some amusing stories of Rook's imperturbable acquiescence 
 in the existing conditions. On one occasion he was very near fighting a duel 
 with a friend who maintained that Bogota was a finer city than Caracas. 
 Neither of the disputants had seen either of these capitals, but Rook felt 
 bound to defend the claims of the capital of the country in which he happened 
 for the moment to be. 
 
 Later on, he was left behind at the foot of the Cordilleras as rearguard. 
 When he rejoined Bolivar he reported, in reply to a question, that all was 
 well with his corps, which had had quite a pleasant march through the 
 awful gorges and over the freezing " paramo." Anzoitegui, who was as 
 pessimistic as Rook was optimistic, happening to be present, retorted that 
 25 per cent, of the men had perished in the march. Rook was quite ready 
 with an answer. It was true, he said, but it was really a very good thing, 
 for the men who had dropped out were all the wastrels and weaklings of 
 the force. 
 
 ^ The general map in this part is not accurate. The enlarged sketch, which 
 is taken from Codazzi's atlas, should be consulted. It is more accurate. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PASSAGE OF THE MOUNTAINS 227 
 Grande, he turned to his right by the track which 
 led over the elevated and desolate Paramo de Pisba.^ 
 So difficult was this route, rarely used even in dry 
 weather, that the Spaniards never thought of guarding 
 it, believing its passage by the army to be impossible. 
 Road there was none in the ordinary sense of the word. 
 The track which was followed was in many places 
 blocked by fallen rocks or trees, over which the soldiers 
 had to scramble as best they might. In other places 
 the path had disappeared in a landslide. Every horse 
 which had survived so far perished. Late in the night 
 of the 2nd July the army bivouacked at the foot of the 
 Paramo de Pisba. The unfortunate Venezuelans, hailing 
 from a climate which is alVays warm and in the plains 
 excessively hot, now found themselves, poorly clothed 
 at the best, some of them almost naked, in even greater 
 misery than before ; for these " paramos," at an elevation 
 of 12,000 to 15,000 feet, only just below the line of 
 eternal snow, are truly the abomination of desolation. 
 Swept by an icy north-east wind, constantly enveloped 
 in a chilly fog, almost devoid of animal life, and even 
 of vegetation, except for a few stunted and distorted 
 thorny plants of low orders, Dante, had he known them, 
 would have described them as one of the infernal circles. 
 Yet there was no retreating, and the weary, shivering 
 men pushed on next day over the " paramo " itself. 
 Many died from the effects of the freezing and rarified 
 air. Flogging had to be resorted to, not for punishment, 
 but to revive circulation in the failing bodies. There 
 were even women enduring these hardships. O'Leary 
 records that his attention was called to the case of 
 a soldier's wife who, in this awful desert, gave birth 
 to a child, and yet marched on five miles on the same 
 
 ^ Santander ( " Apuntamientos para las memorias sobre Colombia," p. 9) 
 avers that Bolivar would have turned back but for the persuasion and argu- 
 ments of himself and Anzoategui. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
228 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 day over this ghastly road. Ranks or order it was 
 impossible to preserve as the troops toiled painfully 
 through gorges where a hundred resolute men might 
 have barred the way against the whole army. But no 
 Spaniard was seen, for none supposed it possible the 
 republicans could reach the uplands by this horrible 
 pass.^ 
 
 On the 6th July they had descended beyond the 
 " paramo " to Socha, only some 9000 feet above the 
 sea, and all the horrors of the past days were almost 
 forgotten in a climate where it is always spring, where 
 the thermometer rarely rises to 70° Fahrenheit in the 
 shade, and as rarely falls below ^50°, where frost is 
 almost unknown, and where, in the broad and fertile 
 upland valleys, every crop of temperate climates can 
 be grown irrespective of season. The army was in a 
 terrible state. Not a horse was left, and the Llaneros 
 were reduced to an unaccustomed mode of progression 
 on their own legs. What stores had not been left 
 
 ' Some may think, as many have thought, that this account of the diffi- 
 culties of the passage of the Andes is exaggerated. Fortunately there is now 
 available the evidence of a witness who, holding this view, decided to test it. 
 In the (English) Geographical Journal for October 1908, Professor Hiram 
 Bingham describes how he and a friend followed the route of Bolivar's 
 march. He begins his article thus : " I had always felt that the difficulties 
 of this march, which has been compared to those of Hannibal and Napoleon, 
 had been greatly over-estimated." He then describes the route, noting that 
 he passed the plains of Casanare in the dry season instead of, like Bolivar, 
 in the rains. It was only when he got into the mountains that he encountered 
 the spring rainy season (March to May). (There are, it should be noted, 
 only two seasons in the plains — May to November being rainy, the rest of 
 the year dry. In the Andes of New Granada there are two wet seasons — 
 March to May and September to November.) The last sentence of the 
 article runs thus : " In regard to the difficulties of Bolivar's famous march, 
 we came to the conclusion that the half had not been told." 
 
 Since that article appeared Professor Bingham has published a book, 
 "The Journal of an Expedition across Venezuela and Colombia, 1906-1907," 
 giving a fuller account of his travels. He gives the height of the " paramo " 
 of Pisba as about 13,000 feet. For brevity, the book is referred to in the 
 notes as " Caracas to Bogota." 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE PLATEAU 229 
 
 behind at Paya were almost all lost, for want of 
 transport, in the passage of the " paramo." The 
 cartridges had been kept dry with infinite difficulty, 
 but the muskets were so rusty that the first operation 
 was to get them reasonably clean. It had been essential 
 to push over the " paramo " with the utmost rapidity 
 before the movement could be discovered, and, therefore, 
 much of the ammunition had been left at Paya to follow 
 later with the British Legion, the men of which Bolivar 
 described as half dead with their exertions. 
 
 At Socha the invaders were received with open arms, 
 and supplied with food, tobacco, and country beer. 
 Bolivar was all activity collecting supplies, arms, am- 
 munition, horses, mules,^ and recruits. The class of 
 recruit he got has already been described.^ Arrange- 
 ments were made for bringing up what had been left at 
 Paya, including the British Legion, and some of the 
 stragglers dragged themselves in from the " paramo.'' 
 
 By the 7th July Bolivar was able to send out a cavalry 
 patrol, which captured a small royalist detachment at 
 Corrales, about half-way to Sogamoso. At the last- 
 named town the Spanish commander. Colonel Barreyro, 
 had some 1500 or 1600 troops commanding the main 
 road from the plains by Labranza Grande, by which he 
 had expected the republicans to arrive. Finding that he 
 had been turned by the march over the " paramo " of 
 Pisba, he now moved northwards to meet the invaders, 
 who were moving southwards against him. 
 
 In another small advance-guard action at Corrales the 
 royalists were again worsted, but their main body con- 
 tinued to advance, and had crossed the river Gameza 
 when it encountered Santander's division. Barreyro 
 
 ' Not often saddles, however. The Llaneros, when they were again 
 mounted, for the most part had to ride barebacked, until they were able to 
 get saddles from the stores of the defeated Spaniards. 
 
 ^ Supra, p. 146. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
230 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 drew back over the Gameza to a strong position, the 
 Pena de Topagd. Santander halted for the night at 
 Tasco. Next morning Barreyro again advanced towards 
 the Gameza, but fell back to his position of Topagd as 
 soon as he encountered Santander. Bolivar ordered an 
 attack upon the position before Barreyro could get up 
 the reinforcements he was expecting from Bogotd and 
 elsewhere. Barreyro's rearguard held on to the bridge 
 of Gameza until they were forcibly dislodged, when the 
 whole force took up a still stronger position at Molinos 
 de Topagd. After fighting most of the day, the republi- 
 cans fell back again. Santander was slightly wounded. 
 
 Barreyro was clearly not disposed to fight, for he was 
 waiting for reinforcements from his rear, and, moreover, 
 expected to hear of Morillo advancing by Ciicuta against 
 the rear of the patriots ; for he could not believe that 
 Bolivar's march had been concealed from Morillo. The 
 Liberator redoubled his efforts to draw to his standard 
 the patriots who had taken refuge from the tyrannies of 
 the Viceroy Sdmano in various out-of-the-way places. 
 Seeing that he could not force Barreyro out of his 
 position, the Liberator marched to his right, towards 
 Santa Rosa across the Chicamocha river, and occupied 
 the fertile valley of Serinza. The move had had the 
 desired effect of drawing Barreyro from his strong 
 position at Topagd. Fearing to be turned and cut from 
 Bogotd, he had followed Bolivar's westward march and 
 taken up an equally strong position above the plain of 
 Bonza.1 He had now got in most of the local forces, 
 and was prepared to accept battle. 
 
 On the 20th July Bolivar advanced over the plain 
 but found the enemy's position too strong for attack. 
 On the 22nd he was joined by Rook with the British 
 Legion. On the 2Sth he repeated his manoeuvre of a 
 
 ^ On the left bank of the upper Sogamoso (Chicamocha), a little east of 
 Suitama. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PANTANO DE VARGAS AND BOYACA 231 
 
 march westwards towards Paipa. Barreyro followed the 
 same direction, and, at Pantano de Vargas,^ was found 
 on the hills facing the republicans, whose position was 
 by no means favourable. Their right rested on the 
 marsh (" pantano ") of Vargas, but their left was 
 dominated by heights, which Barreyro seized with one 
 battalion, aiming at getting in rear of the patriots. 
 Santander was easily driven off the heights. At the 
 same time the Spaniards attacked Bolivar's, centre with 
 such vigour that the battalions "Rifles" and "Barcelona" 
 gave way. The day seemed lost, when Bolivar sent 
 Rook with the British Legion to recapture the heights 
 on his left. This was gallantly carried out by the Eng- 
 lishmen. Simultaneously another vigorous attack was 
 made in the centre by Barreyro, which was at first 
 successful, but was repulsed by Bolivar's small reserve. 
 At this critical moment the Liberator seized upon 
 Colonel Rondon,^ commanding a squadron of Llaneros, 
 and with the words, " Colonel, save the Fatherland ! " 
 launched him against the Spanish cavalry, who were 
 driven back in disorder. The infantry, following up, 
 completed the discomfiture of the royalists. Night put 
 an end to the desperate and still doubtful combat. 
 Defeat had been saved by the desperate valour of the 
 British and of Rondon's Llaneros.^ Both forces fell 
 back on their former positions. 
 
 ^ Vargas, according to Professor Bingham's new book, is south of Duitama, 
 beyond the upper Sogamoso (Chicamocha), on the road to Tunja via Toca. 
 The marsh is on the right (west) of the road which runs close under hills on 
 its left. When Bolivar crossed the river, Barreyro moved from Paipa to 
 meet him on this road with 3800 men. The cavalry were on the plain, the 
 infantry on the hills. "Caracas to Bogota," p. 272. 
 
 ^ Juan Jos^ Rondon, born in Caracas, 1790, served in the Spanish forces 
 till 1817, when he joined Paez, and distinguished himself by gallantry in 
 many actions, notably at Queseras del Medio, where he played a leading 
 part. He died in 1822 from tetanus, supervening on a wound in the foot 
 received in one of his fights under Paez. 
 
 5 Rook was badly wounded at Pantano de Vargas. Next day his arm 
 had to be amputated. With his imperturbable equanimity he underwent the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
232 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Recruits now came in freely for the republican force, 800 
 being collected in a few days, and ammunition also arrived. 
 On the 3rd August Bolivar again advanced, with the result 
 that Barreyro evacuated Paipa, and retired to the heights 
 commanding the road to Tunja. That night Bolivar 
 encamped in front of the enemy. Next afternoon (4th) 
 he marched off ostentatiously towards his old position 
 on the plain of Bonza, but at nightfall suddenly counter- 
 marched, crossed the river at Paipa, and marched for 
 Tunja by the Toca road, leaving the enemy in position 
 on his right rear. At 9 a.m. on the 5 th he was at 
 Civatd, and two hours later captured Tunja with the 
 small garrison left in it. The governor had, in the early 
 morning, marched north to join Barreyro with the 
 '' Numancia " battalion and three guns. All Bolivar's 
 troops were in Tunja by 2 p.m., thus having placed them- 
 selves across Barreyro's communications with Bogotd. 
 
 It was only at dawn on the 5th that Barreyro dis- 
 covered the real direction of the republican march. 
 He at once set off along the main road to Bogota, halt- 
 ing at 5 p.m. short of Combitd, and starting again at 
 8 p.m. At 6 a.m. on the 6th he was at Motavita, three 
 or four miles north-west of Tunja, always watched and 
 harassed by a detachment of Bolivar's dragoons. 
 
 At dawn on the 7th the republican scouts brought 
 news that the enemy was marching on Samacd, and a 
 personal reconnaissance by Bolivar revealed the fact that 
 Barreyro was trying to regain the main road to the 
 capital at Boyaci, and to pass by the bridge there. The 
 republican force marched off in the same direction by 
 the main road from Tunja. 
 
 At 2 p.m. Bolivar's cavalry came upon Barreyro's 
 
 operation with some facetious remarks as to the beauty of the limb he was 
 losing. He died a few days later, a victim, no doubt, to the very rough 
 surgery of Bolivar's medical department. Before he went to South America 
 he had served on the staff of the Prince of Orange at Waterloo. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BATTLE OF BOYACA 233 
 
 advance-guard, just as it was nearing the bridge of 
 Boyacd. The Spaniards, thinking they had only to do 
 with some scouts, sent their chasseurs to drive them off 
 the road, whilst the main body moved along it. But 
 the rest of the republicans had hurried up, and the 
 Spanish advance-guard found itself opposed to the whole 
 of the patriot infantry. Driven back at first behind a 
 wall, the Spaniards were presently forced across the 
 bridge and took position beyond it, the rest of their 
 force being still a mile and a half short of it. 
 
 Santander, on the patriot left, attacked the bridge, 
 which was held by Barreyro's advance-guard, and, after 
 a sharp fight, succeeded in capturing it. Meanwhile, the 
 rest of Barreyro's force, cut off from its advance-guard 
 by the stream, was attacked by the other republican 
 troops. Anzoitegui charged the Spanish (European) 
 cavalry on the right flank, which fled, abandoning the 
 artillery. The infantry, which had fought bravely so 
 far, was forced to retire to a second position further west. 
 Here they were again attacked, whilst Santander, at the 
 same time, passed the bridge and completed the rout of the 
 advance-guard. The main hody was now in a desperate 
 situation, and the whole of it surrendered to Bolivar, 
 except the cavalry and some others who had effected 
 their escape. Barreyro had already been captured, and 
 there fell into the hands of the victors Jimenez, his 
 second in command, 1600 men, besides nearly all the 
 officers, the artillery, and all the military stores. The 
 republicans state their loss at only 13 killed and 53 
 wounded.^ 
 
 ' It is extremely difficult to follow the exact movements in this battle and 
 others, such as Pantano de Vargas and Carabobo, seeing that no plan of 
 them has ever been published. Professor Bingham appears to have thoroughly 
 studied these three fields in 1906-7, but until he publishes the plans he pre- 
 sumably made, the difficulty must continue to some extent. With regard to 
 Boyaca, he says that the Spaniards were obliged by want of a guide to take 
 the road to Bogota by the bridge of Boyaca instead of that by Chiquinquira. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
234 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Santander pursued the remnants of Barreyro's force as 
 far as Venta Quemada on the road to Bogoti. 
 
 At Bogota there was consternation in official quarters, 
 but the news of the defeat of Boyaci only leaked out 
 generally on the morning of the 9th August, when the 
 Viceroy had already fled. Despite his great age, he 
 managed to reach Honda, on the Magdalena, in twenty- 
 four hours, a good three-days' riding for most people even 
 nowadays. He was accompanied by the troops left 
 behind by Barreyro, and by all the officials. 
 
 Bolivar entered the capital on the evening of the loth 
 August 1 8 1 9, amidst the plaudits of the inhabitants. At 
 Boyacd he had won his first really decisive victory, one 
 which undoubtedly marked the final liberation of the 
 Andean tracts of New Granada from Spanish dominion. 
 The indomitable courage and determination which he 
 showed in deciding on this bold stroke against Cundina- 
 marca, the resolution with which he carried through his 
 terrible march against all obstacles, are worthy of the 
 highest praise. This was, perhaps, the first occasion on 
 which he had, of his own motion,^ shown a broad 
 strategical insight. He had promised, in his proclama- 
 tion of August 18 1 8, the rescue of New Granada. 
 Unlikely of realization as it seemed when made, he had 
 redeemed his promise. His success at Boyaci he owed 
 largely to his British troops. 
 
 It is admitted by O'Leary that there was some looting 
 and misappropriation of funds by so-called patriots in 
 BogotA, but Bolivar soon reduced the place to order. 
 He had already, on arrival on the plateau of Bonza, 
 appointed governors of the provinces of Pamplona and 
 
 He appears to think that all the Spaniards got across the bridge which 
 Santander was unable to take until the Llanero cavalry, passing by a ford 
 lower down, turned it. He also says that Bolivar did not reach the field till 
 4 p.m., when the battle, which had begun at 2 p.m., was practically over, 
 "Caracas to Bogotd," p. 274. 
 ' In the seizure of Guayana Piar had led the way. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN BOGOTA 23 S 
 
 Socorro farther north. He now organised civil govern- 
 ment in Bogotd, and was recognised by an assembly of 
 the principal inhabitants as " Liberator of New Granada." 
 But military matters equally required attention. In 
 order to^ raise the strength of his army, the Liberator 
 enlisted all the South American prisoners taken at 
 Boyacd. He sent Soublette ^ northwards with one force 
 to occupy the Ciicuta valleys, where he had intended 
 Paez to be. The Spanish commander, Calzada, had 
 gone with the Bogotd garrison towards Popayan and 
 the Quito frontier, whilst Sdmano the Viceroy, on 
 arrival at Honda, had embarked on the Magdalena for 
 Cartagena. In pursuit of Calzada, Bolivar despatched 
 another force to occupy Popayan and watch the Quito 
 frontier. Colonel Cordova,^ with 150 men, was ordered 
 from Honda into the Central Cordilleras of Antioquia, 
 to rouse the people of that province, the best in many 
 ways of the population of New Granada. 
 
 On the 1 8th September, Bolivar enjoyed the triumphal 
 entry into Bogotd which had been decreed to him along 
 with his title of " Liberator of New Granada." He 
 passed from the north, down what are now the Camellon 
 de las Nieves and the Calle de San Francisco, to the 
 Cathedral in the Plaza Bolivar. 
 
 A provisional government was now established, with 
 
 ^ Carlos Soublette was born at Caracas in the end of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury. He was engaged in most of Bolivar's campaigns up to 1 819, when he 
 was chief of the staff at Boyaca. His name will appear several times as 
 Vice-President of Venezuela. Ducoudray-Holstein is particularly hostile to 
 him, and tells many scandalous stories about him and his family, which may 
 be taken for what they are worth. He joined Paez in the separation of 
 Venezuela from the rest of Colombia. Was President in 1837-38, and died 
 in 1870. 
 
 ^Jose Maria Cordova, born at Rio Negro in 1799, was already fighting 
 for the republican cause at the age of fifteen. He fought in many battles 
 with Paez as chief, and was with Bolivar at Pantano de Vargas and Boyacd, 
 when he became colonel. His subsequent doings and death will be recorded 
 in this volume. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
236 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Francisco de Paula Santander as Vice-President of New 
 Granada.^ Before leaving Bogotd for the north, Bolivar 
 proposed to Sdmano an exchange of Barreyro and the 
 other Spanish prisoners. 
 
 On the 20th September the Liberator left Bogoti in 
 charge of Santander. Bolivar's back was scarcely turned 
 when, on the i ith October, Santander had the unfortu- 
 nate Barreyro and thirty-eight other Spanish officers 
 publicly shot on the square in front of the Palace which 
 the vice-president occupied.^ He himself was present 
 on horseback at the execution, which was conducted 
 with the greatest brutality and ignominy. The victims 
 were gallant Spanish officers who had done their duty 
 honourably, yet they were shot in the back like cowards 
 or traitors. For this " cowardly and unnecessary crime," 
 as O'Leary frankly styles it, there is no possible defence. 
 That the Spaniards had shot patriots in the back in 
 Cartagena, Bogota, and elsewhere, is no excuse, nor can 
 any weight be attached to Santander's defence,^ that 
 there was danger from the presence Of these unfortunate 
 men in Bogotei, where they were in prison with no 
 friends about them.* Of this crime Bolivar is absolutely 
 
 * Santander, as a native of the province, was extremely popular in New 
 Granada. It will be remembered that he had formerly been a supporter of 
 Castillo against Bolivar (supra, p. 90), and it will be seen in the sequel 
 that the old enmity never really died out. 
 
 ^ Larrazabal says that the round number of forty was made up by the 
 addition of a Spanish civilian, who, on seeing the preparations for the execu- 
 tion, jvas rash enough to utter invectives against the republican government. 
 Yet Larrazabal is quite inclined to plead extenuating circumstances for San- 
 tander. Probably he would have tried to whitewash Satan, had there been 
 any reason to believe he was a South American patriot. 1 
 
 ' See his " Apuntamuntos para las memorias sobre Colombia," p. 10. 
 
 * O'Leary gives the following account of the execution. In the night of 
 the loth October, the prisoners were removed in chains from the houses in 
 which they were confined to the cavalry quarters in the plaza, and late at 
 night were informed of their fate. Next day at noon they were marched, 
 heavily ironed, across the square where the benches had been set up for the 
 execution. The unfortunate Barreyro handed a portrait of his fiancee to the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EVENTS IN VENEZUELA 237 
 
 innocent. He had already sent to Sdmano to propose 
 the prisoners' exchange on equal terms, and he was 
 much distressed when the news of the execution reached 
 him. O'Leary adds that, " for the honour of the country 
 it should be said that this measure of Santander was 
 generally disapproved." 
 
 Bolivar was on his way back to Angostura, whence 
 bad news reached him. He enjoyed an unbroken 
 triumph as he passed northwards through Velez, Socorro, 
 and Pamplona. 
 
 Let us see now what had been happening in Vene- 
 zuela in his absence. Morillo had remained at Calabozo 
 till the beginning of August, when he moved to Valencia, 
 and, later, to Caracas, where he heard of the battle of 
 Boyacd. Then he went to Tinaco and Barquisimeto, 
 doing his best to conceal the bad news, and to spread 
 reports of Canterac's successes in Peru, and of the great 
 expedition then fitting out in Spain under O'Donnell. 
 In Guayana the republican executive power, as we know, 
 had been vested in Zea, a man of somewhat feeble 
 character, though a scholar and a good writer. He, as 
 a civilian, was looked down upon by the military leaders. 
 There was a good deal of grumbling against him and 
 the absent Bolivar, and presently, Zea himself tried to 
 curry favour by turning against the Liberator. Aris- 
 
 officer in charge, begging him to give it to her brother. Then he, Jimenez, 
 his second in command, and the others were led out in succession and shot 
 in the back. "An ignominious death, certainly not deserved by a brave 
 soldier who on the field of battle had always courageously exposed his breast 
 to the bullets of the enemy." At this sickening scene Santander, mounted 
 on his charger and surrounded by his staff, calmly looked on from in front 
 of the Palace hard by. When all was over, he addressed a few words, 
 "unbefitting the occasion," to the people, and then rode through the prin- 
 cipal streets preceded by some musicians, and himself joining in the chorus 
 of a song alluding to the tragedy which had just occurred. If this story is 
 true, could anything be more disgraceful or more unworthy of a man in 
 Santander's position? (O'Leary, i. 583.) These details are not given by 
 Restrepo or Larrazabal. Let us hope O'Leary was misinformed. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
238 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 mendi had been told by Bolivar before he left, to get 
 500 soldiers from Margarita. Even Arismendi's great 
 influence in the island could only induce the brave 
 Margaritans, fishermen mostly, to serve as sailors, 
 but Zea was obstinate in insisting on having soldiers. 
 Then disturbances began at Angostura, fomented by 
 Arismendi and Gomez. 
 
 Marifio, meanwhile, had gained a considerable success 
 at Cantaura. Instead of allowing him to reap the full 
 fruits of his victory, Zea insisted on his coming to 
 Angostura to sit in Congress. Not unnaturally, when 
 Marino arrived, he joined the party of Arismendi against 
 Zea. There was a disturbance and interruption of 
 Congress by a mob raising the cry of " Down with the 
 Vice-President" (Zea). Zea resigned on the 14th Sep- 
 tember, and Arismendi was appointed in his place by 
 the Congress, which fetched him from the prison into 
 which he had been thrown. His first act was to appoint 
 Marino to the command of the " Army of the East." 
 That general at once went off to supersede Urdaneta and 
 Bermudez. 
 
 Arismendi did not govern so badly, but soon made 
 himself unpopular by decreeing a State monopoly in 
 hides, spirits, and tobacco. Then he went off to Maturin 
 to organise the army. 
 
 Bolivar was at the Salt Mines of Chita, on the eastern 
 slope of the Cordilleras, when he received this unwelcome 
 news, as well as that regarding the executions in Bogotd, 
 and that of the death of Anzodtegpi,'^ who had greatly 
 distinguished himself at Boyacd. He had suddenly 
 dropped dead at table. 
 
 The Liberator at once hastened his march for 
 
 ' Jose Antonio Anzoategui, born at Barcelona (Venezuela) in 1789. He 
 had been through the earlier wars, but, in 1815, left the army in consequence 
 of the feud between Bolivar and Castillo. He rejoined the Liberator in 
 Haiti, and was one of his most trusted lieutenants until his death at 
 Pamplona on the 15th. November 1819. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR REACHES ANGOSTURA 239 
 Angostura. Leaving Chita on the 20th November, and 
 travelling by Casanare and Apure, he was in Angostura 
 on the 1 1 th December. There he was received with 
 enthusiasm by the fickle people ; for Arismendi had not 
 yet returned from Maturin, though, as a matter of fact, 
 he was already on the opposite bank of the great river. 
 Thence he could see flags waving in Angostura, and 
 hear the discharge of guns and the shouts. He flattered 
 himself they were meant for him, and sent over an A.D.C., 
 followed by two others. When none of them returned, 
 he crossed over to Angostura, only to find that the wel- 
 come was for Bolivar, not for himself^ Seeing the game 
 was lost, Arismendi made his peace with Bolivar, and, 
 on the 17th December, resigned his post of Vice- 
 President. The Liberator said little to him or his 
 friends, or those of Marino, and took no action against 
 them, though he spoke his mind freely to some of his 
 own special dependants who had deserted him in his 
 absence. 
 
 The Congress was now all subserviency to its returned 
 master. The members all went out on the 1 4th December 
 to meet him at the entrance of the chamber, brought him 
 in, and invited him to address them. 
 
 After recounting his exploits in New Granada, he told 
 them that the time had come to frame a solid and 
 permanent base for the republic. Then Zea, as President 
 of the Congress, made a speech full of the grossest 
 flattery, in the end of which he urged the union of 
 Venezuela, New Granada, and Quito in one republic. 
 Bolivar replied with flattering remarks about his sub- 
 ordinate commanders in the recent campaign. Then 
 Alzuru, a deputy who had been in the opposition when 
 Bolivar was away, added his tribute to the merits of 
 the Liberator. However bold they might be when 
 Bolivar was far away, few at this period dared to oppose 
 ' O'Leary, ii. 14. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
240 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 him when he was on the spot. The conduct of Aris- 
 mendi, Zea, and Alzuru is a good example of this. On 
 the 17th December, Congress elected Bolivar President 
 of Colombia (including Venezuela, New Granada, and 
 Quito), Zea Vice-President of the Republic, Roscio 
 Vice-President of Venezuela, and Santander of New 
 Granada. The law for the incorporation of the three 
 provinces had just been passed.^ As for Quito, the 
 election of a vice-president was postponed until the 
 province should be wrested from the Spaniards who still 
 held it. At this time Bolivar was reconciled to Mariano 
 Montilla, who had been his bitter opponent in the 
 disputes with Castillo at Cartagena in 181 5, and in the 
 expedition from Haiti in 1 8 1 6. Montilla was now 
 sent, with the Irish Brigade of Devereux, to try and take 
 Cartagena from Sdmano. 
 
 ^ Cf. supra, p. 219. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE ARMISTICE AND TREATY FOR REGULARIZA- 
 TION OF THE WAR, 1820 
 
 IT has been already mentioned that Morillo, about 
 the time of Boyacd, was talking loudly about the 
 new expedition which was coming from Spain. 
 He had received notice that there was assembling 
 at Cadiz, for the re-conquest of Spanish America, a force 
 consisting of 20,200 infantry, 2800 cavalry, and 1370 
 artillerymen, with parks and supplies of every sort. 
 
 When Ferdinand VII. returned from France to his 
 kingdom in 18 14, he was resolved to rule absolutely. 
 He abolished the Regency, the Cortes, and every 
 institution incompatible with autocratic rule. These 
 measures being followed by various revolts, Ferdinand 
 thought he might do a good deal towards getting rid 
 of dangerous elements by sending them off on an 
 expedition to South America. He was also anxious to 
 leave no opening to the French, who were intriguing for 
 the appointment of a Portuguese prince as King of 
 Buenos Aires. The chief command was given to 
 O'Donnell, but he was the real soul of the conspiracy 
 in favour of constitutional government. Presently, he 
 was suspected and replaced by the Conde de Calderon. 
 At this moment there was an outbreak of yellow fever 
 in Cadiz, which helped to fan the fire of discontent in 
 the army, by adding a new terror to the prospect of a 
 voyage to South America. A fresh conspiracy was 
 hatched under the direction of Antonio Quiroga. On 
 
 Q "*' 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
242 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the 1st January 1820, two battalionst headed by Rafael 
 Riego, broke into revolt and seized Calderon, the 
 commander-in-chief. Quiroga was voted leader of the 
 revolution. Ferdinand now thought matters were 
 alarming, and saw the sceptre slipping from his grasp, 
 notwithstanding the suppression of the revolt and the 
 execution of Riego. He accordingly summoned the 
 Cortes, and no more was heard of the great expedition 
 to South America. 
 
 Morillo heard of the revolution at Cadiz at the end 
 of March 1820, Bolivar not till late in April. The 
 former naturally said little about it, and equally naturally, 
 Bolivar was delighted at what, it was not difficult to 
 foresee, meant the end of the idea of reinforcements 
 from Spain for the enemy. 
 
 Leaving Angostura on the 24th December 18 19, 
 Bolivar spent most of January 1820 in Apure and 
 Guadalito, reaching Ciicuta on the 8th February. After 
 reviewing the " army of the north," and visiting some 
 of the neighbouring towns in Merida, he went to Socorro 
 where, on the 25 th February, he received news that 
 Santander had, on the 12th, proclaimed in Bogotd the 
 fundamental law for the union of Venezuela and New 
 Granada. To Santander's compliments he replied in 
 the same strain. Santander, whatever his faults, was 
 not lacking in capacity, and had made much progress 
 in the work of administration in Bogotd and the neigh- 
 bourhood. The Congress which Bolivar left sitting at 
 Angostura had also been prolific in laws for the 
 government of the republic, and in conferring honours 
 on the Liberator. He was to be called " Liberator- 
 President " on every occasion, his picture was to be 
 hung in the Congress Hall, with his name and titles 
 inscribed in letters of gold, " Bolivar, Liberator of 
 Colombia, Father of his Country, Terror of Despotism." 
 Finally, a law was passed regulating elections to the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR RETURNS TO NEW GRANADA 243 
 
 General Constituent Congress. The principal business 
 of this Congress would be the final approval of the 
 Constitution of 1 8 1 9. The Congress of Angostura then 
 dissolved itself on the 19th January 1820. Bolivar, on 
 the march once more to Bogotd, reached Tunja on the 
 1st March, Bogotd on the 4th. During the eighteen 
 days of his stay there, he discussed with Santander the 
 campaign both in the south and in the north of New 
 Granada. Expeditions were sent out in all directions, 
 and Valdes, who had arrived from the east with a 
 division, was despatched to Neiva on the upper 
 Magdalena, in order to guard the southern provinces, 
 and to prepare for the advance hereafter to the liberation 
 of what is now Ecuador, and of Peru. He had also to 
 eject the royalists under Calzada from Popayan, which 
 they had wrested from Antonio Obando. Cauca was 
 constituted a new province, and Colonel Cordova, a 
 native of Antioquia,^ who had recently been employed 
 in raising the people of that province, was now directed 
 to do the same in the plains about Mompox. 
 
 Mariano Montilla, with the Irish Brigade, had dis- 
 embarked on the 1 3th March at Rio Hacha on the north 
 coast, whence he had marched on Valle de Upar. 
 Thence, however, fearing attacks on his communications 
 by the Spaniards in Maracaibo and Santa Marta, he 
 had returned to Rio Hacha to refit. At that place, 
 Devereux's ^ Irishmen (600 out of the total of 1300 
 
 ^ The Province of Antioquia is situated mainly in the Central and Western 
 Cordilleras. Its population has a larger admixture of European blood than 
 any other in the Republic of Colombia of the present day. 
 
 ' John Devereux, an Irish adventurer of some private means, had assisted 
 Bolivar's expedition from Haiti in 1816. He and 150 of his men still 
 remained with Montilla till Cartagena was taken in 1821. In 1822 he was 
 sent as Colombian envoy to Russia, etc. He became blind, and in 1840 
 was granted a small pension in Colombia, as he had apparently spent all his 
 fortune in the service of his adopted country. Some of these Irish appear 
 to have been ex-rebels of 1798. One Aylmer, at any rate, a rebel com- 
 mander in Wexford, was killed at Rio Hacha. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
244 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 with Montilla) mutinied. These poor wretches sacked 
 Rio Hacha (which was probably very poor sport, as it 
 was a wretched place), and getting drunk, fired it. 
 Montilla reported this to the Governor of Jamaica, and 
 the British admiral, though why he should have expected 
 them to manage his Irish mercenaries is not quite clear. 
 Eventually the Irish were shipped off to Jamaica, and 
 Bolivar expressed his satisfaction at getting rid of them. 
 Of course, nothing is too bad to be said of them, 
 according to Larrazabal, but it must be remembered 
 that, after all, they were only mercenaries fighting for 
 Venezuela, against the orders of their own sovereign, 
 and they naturally expected, at least, pay and decent 
 food. They had got neither, nor even plunder, and it 
 is not very surprising that they, having no personal 
 interest in the cause for which they fought, should have 
 striven to help themselves. Rio Hacha being an open 
 roadstead, Montilla thought it unadvisable to hold on 
 there, and that he would do better to invade the province 
 of Cartagena. 
 
 Meanwhile, Morillo the Spanish commander-in-chief 
 had his forces distributed thus : — 
 
 La Torre, with 1400 men, in Merida, watching 
 Bolivar. Morales, with 2300 men in Calabozo. 
 
 Real, in Barinas, kept open the communications 
 between these two. Morillo himself had 2500 at 
 Valencia, San Carlos, and Pao. 
 
 There were 1300 men in garrison at Cumana ; 1600 
 in Barcelona ; 4000 were distributed, in small free corps, 
 between Maracaibo and Caracas. 
 
 Altogether there were about 14,000 men, distributed 
 over an enormous area, under Morillo's command. In 
 addition to these, Sdmano had 2000 in Cartagena, 
 whilst Calzada, with 3000 in the south, was acting under 
 orders of Aymerich, the President of Quito. The distri- 
 bution was far too wide, and Morillo would have done 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MORILLO OPENS NEGOTIATIONS 245 
 better to keep his troops together and make an effort to 
 destroy Bolivar, rather than aim at holding outlying 
 places, which must fall if the Liberator and his army 
 were finally disposed of. 
 
 Bolivar, with better judgment, decided to concentrate 
 his efforts on only two points, the destruction of Morillo, 
 and, as a minor matter, the defence of the south, which 
 was necessary to protect his own rear. 
 
 On the 1 9th April, he issued a short proclamation to his 
 soldiers, reminding them that it was the tenth anniversary 
 of the first effort towards liberty — the deposition of Em- 
 pdran at Caracas — and recalling the struggles since then. 
 
 As for Morillo, he had for a long time deferred pro- 
 claiming the Constitution recently granted to Spain. 
 Now, under positive orders from home, he was com- 
 pelled to do so, and to release the political prisoners. 
 These orders had been followed by instructions to open 
 negotiations with the " disidentes " of Venezuela. The 
 term was, as Larrazabal remarks, a considerable ameliora- 
 tion of those of " sedition mongers," " rebels " or " bandits," 
 which had been generally used hitherto in orders from 
 Spain. Morillo was disgusted, and is reported to have 
 said : " They are fools in Madrid, not understanding 
 what they order ; they know neither this country nor 
 what has occurred, nor the present circumstances. They 
 wish me to condescend to treat with those whom I have 
 fought ; to undergo the humiliation of calling the sedi- 
 tious my friends, and recognising as brothers those whom, 
 as enemies and rebels, I have wounded in the most 
 sensitive place. Thus all will be lost. I will obey, but 
 it is useless to hope any longer for the subjugation of 
 these provinces." The Count of Cartagena certainly 
 concluded rightly. The time for negotiations and paci- 
 fication had long passed, though there had surely been 
 room for it in the days of Monteverde, or before. The 
 struggle had now been too long and too embittered to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
246 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 be determined by anything but the complete overthrow 
 of one party or the other by main force. With the 
 prospect of the arrival of more than 20,000 Europeans 
 there had still been hopes of the revolutionists being 
 crushed ; now, since Riego's mutiny had brought about 
 the abandonment of this expedition, there was no hope 
 of reinforcements from Spain, and Morillo must have 
 recognised that it could only be a question of time when 
 his existing army should be worn down, if not defeated, 
 by a hostile nation constantly recruited from the whole 
 of its population. Nevertheless, Morillo loyally carried 
 out his orders. He established a " Junta of Pacification " 
 in Caracas, and entered into communication with the 
 various republican leaders, Bolivar, Paez, Bermudez, 
 Mondgas, Zaraza, and many others, including the Con- 
 gress of Angostura. Perhaps he had a lingering hope 
 that, by addressing all of them separately, dissension 
 might arise among men whose ambitions he must have 
 known, and many of whom he might suspect of being 
 ready to desert the common cause in their own personal 
 interests. Bolivar was now fully aware of the new 
 position of affairs in Spain. He had learnt everything 
 from Spanish correspondence intercepted in Chiriguani. 
 In a long letter to Soublette, dated Rosario de Cucuta, 
 the 19th June 1820,^ Bolivar shows that he understands 
 the desperate position of the Spanish king, pressed by 
 the liberals and afraid of an army which was desirous of 
 peace. Ferdinand had no option but to negotiate for 
 the stoppage of the war in South America. The 
 Liberator was willing to enter into, even to facilitate 
 negotiations, but he would insist, as a preliminary con- 
 dition, on the recogniton of Colombia's independence as 
 a republic. 
 
 His concluding remarks on the incapacity of his own 
 government at Angostura are far from complimentary, 
 ■' Quoted in extenso by Larrazabal, ii, 34. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MORILLO OPENS NEGOTIATIONS 247 
 and he is especially furious at their neglect to send him 
 the arms which, as he was aware, had reached Angostura. 
 Vice-President Zea had now gone to England, and 
 German Roscio had been elected to succeed him. The 
 Congress, which had dissolved in January, was re- 
 assembled to consider the proposals of Morillo's 
 delegates. Their answer had practically been dictated 
 by Bolivar in his letter to Soublette, and it was delivered 
 to the Spanish envoys, Cir^s and Duarte, as follows : 
 " The sovereign Congress will gladly entertain all pro- 
 posals of the Spanish government having for basis the 
 recognition of the sovereignty and independence of 
 Colombia ; it will admit none which differ from the 
 principle so often proclaimed by the government and 
 people of the Republic." Bolivar himself replied in 
 similar terms, on the 7th July, to La Torre, and on the 
 23 rd to Morillo. 
 
 Leaving the Spanish commissioners to digest these 
 replies, he now went off on a tour to the Magdalena, 
 visiting Mompox, Barranquilla, and Turbaco, within a few 
 miles of Cartagena, in order to make arrangements for 
 the continuation of Urdaneta's campaign in those parts.^ 
 At Barranquilla he received a proposal from Torres, the 
 Spanish governor of Cartagena, for a suspension of 
 hostilities. Seeing, however, that Torres demanded the 
 submission of Colombia, Bolivar angrily replied that he 
 would have nothing to do with such proposals.^ 
 Cartagena was strictly blockaded by land by Mariano 
 Montilla, who had been joined by Cordova from Mompox. 
 
 ' During this campaign Luis Brion commanded the operations on the 
 Magdalena, and eventually captured Santa Marta on the I Ith November 1820. 
 He died shortly afterwards at Cura9ao, after spending the whole of his fortune 
 in the service of the republican cause. 
 
 ^ Larrazabal defends the terms of Bolivar's letter to Torres against Restrepo, 
 who calls them " harsh." O'Leary honestly admits that Torres was indig- 
 nant at " the insults which had been hurled at the nation to which he gloried 
 in belonging." He refers to Bolivar's angry reply. To do him justice, 
 Bolivar was generally polite in his correspondence, even with the enemy. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
248 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 The Liberator was back at Ciicuta by the middle of 
 September to find that the Spanish commissioners had 
 come down somewhat in their terms, for, though they 
 still insisted on an oath of fealty to Ferdinand, and the 
 acceptance of the Spanish constitution, they were willing 
 that the republican chiefs should retain authority in the 
 districts they occupied, subject to the general control of 
 the Spanish commander-in-chief. This was refused by 
 the Colombians. The proposal certainly seems to smack 
 of an attempt to work upon the personal ambitions of 
 the leaders, and thus to induce them to betray the 
 common cause. Nevertheless, Morillo, in proposing an 
 armistice, had addressed Bolivar as " President of the 
 Republic of Colombia." 
 
 Bolivar's first agent in London had been Lopez 
 Mendez, who had succeeded in ruining Colombian credit 
 there. Probably the unfortunate envoy was more help- 
 less than deceitful, for he had really very little basis on 
 which to seek credit. Anyhow, the pages of Hippisley ^ 
 show that Mendez had succeeded in making Colombian 
 promises a byword of contempt and distrust. Zea had 
 now been sent to replace him. He succeeded in 
 satisfying the creditors of the republic by the issue of 
 transferable debentures bearing interest at lo per cent, 
 if paid in London, or 1 2 per cent, if paid in Colombia.^ 
 
 Besides attending to financial matters, Zea attempted 
 to open negotiations with the Duke of Frias, Spanish 
 Ambassador in London, regarding the recognition of 
 Colombian independence. His advances were rejected 
 by Spain and disapproved by Bolivar. His idea was for 
 a voluntary recognition by Spain of American inde- 
 pendence, to be followed by a confederation of the 
 
 ' "A Narrative of the Expedition to the Rivers Orinoco and Apure, etc.," 
 passim. 
 
 ^ It is not necessary to recapitulate here the history of Colombian bonds. 
 A short epitome will be found at p. 321 of the author's book, " The Republic 
 of Colombia." The story is hardly a creditable one. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MORILLO OPENS NEGOTIATIONS 249 
 Spanish-speaking peoples. In the United States, Torres, 
 the Colombian agent, found an advocate in Henry Clay, 
 President of the Chamber of Representatives. But the 
 Government held aloof. Sucre, on the other hand, had 
 been successful in procuring from the Windw^ard Islands 
 the 10,000 muskets about which Bolivar was so angry 
 with his people in Angostura when he wrote to 
 Soublette on the 19th June. They were sent up the 
 Orinoco in April, and on, partly by the Arauca, partly 
 by the Meta, to Bolivar. On the 21st September 
 Bolivar wrote to Morillo regarding the proposed 
 armistice, which appeared to be intended as a preliminary 
 of peace.^ He still rode the high horse, alleging that, 
 unless the armistice was to be preceded by an ac- 
 knowledgment of Colombian independence, it would be 
 detrimental to the interests of the republicans, who, by 
 continuing hostilities, might reasonably expect to conquer 
 the rest of Venezuela, as well as Quito. He ended by 
 saying his headquarters would be at San Fernando by 
 the end of October. 
 
 Meanwhile, hostilities continued. Bolivar occupied 
 the provinces of Merida and Trujillo. On the 26th 
 September he wrote again to Morillo, who had not yet 
 replied, that he could not go to San Fernando, and 
 proposing conditions for the armistice. These Morillo 
 rejected, and then Bolivar wrote to him proposing a 
 treaty to "regularise the war of horrors and crimes 
 which so far has inundated Colombia with tears and 
 blood.': 
 
 By way, apparently, of enforcing his views, Morillo 
 had, during this correspondence, advanced from Bar- 
 quisemeto to Carache, with 2000 infantry and 200 
 cavalry. Bolivar at once wrote that he would accept no 
 terms dictated by force, adding : " Your Excellency will 
 be responsible before humanity and your nation for the 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., 17, p. 449. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2SO SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 continuation of this bloody struggle, the final result of 
 which will be either the emancipation of the wj>ole of 
 America, or else its complete destruction, if it is still 
 proposed to subdue it." 
 
 Nothing could shake Bolivar's firmness. Negotiations 
 were continued at a meeting of the commissioners of 
 both sides on the 2ist November. It lasted till the 
 night of the 25th, when the terms were finally settled, 
 after much discussion. The armistice was to last for six 
 months ; the usual provisions were made for the de- 
 limitation of the spheres of occupation. Envoys for the 
 conclusion of peace were to be nominated, and either 
 party desiring to terminate the armistice before the 
 period named must give forty days' notice of his inten- 
 tion. Finally, a treaty fcJr the regularisation of the war 
 was to be made. 
 
 This treaty was signed on the 26th.^ It provided for 
 exchange and proper trea!tment of prisoners, and abolished 
 the death penalty in the case of deserters recaptured 
 from the enemy. The dead in battle were to be 
 properly buried or burnt, captured towns were not to be 
 sacked or burnt; in a word, the war henceforward was 
 to be carried on as if between civilised nations, not as 
 among savages. The armistice and treaty being con- 
 cluded, Morillo expressed a desire to make the personal 
 acquaintance of his antagonist, to which Bolivar willingly 
 agreed. 
 
 The place fixed for the meeting was the hamlet of 
 Santa Ana, midway between Bolivar's headquarters at 
 Trujillo and Morillo's at Carache. On the morning of 
 the 27th November 1820, Morillo arrived there with a 
 staff of some 50 officers, including La Torre, and an 
 escort of a squadron of hussars. Shortly afterwards 
 
 ' Given in full by O'Leary (ii. 52). The preamble distinctly describes one 
 party as "The most Excellent President of the Republic of Colombia, 
 Simon Bolivar." This is repeated in Morillo's ratification. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ARMISTICE AND TREATY CONCLUDED 251 
 
 O'Leary announced the approach of Bolivar. Morillo 
 asked him what escort the republican chief brought. 
 On being told Bolivar had only 10 or 12 officers, be- 
 sides the Spanish commissioners, Morillo replied : " I 
 thought I had adventured myself thus far with a very 
 small guard, but my former enemy has outdone me in 
 generosity ; I will order the hussars to retire," which he 
 did. He also asked the names of any Spanish officers 
 likely to be unwelcome to Bolivar, and ascertained that 
 none of them were present. As the Liberator appeared 
 in sight, Morillo, dressed in full uniform and wearing 
 his orders, went forward with La Torre and others to 
 meet him. 
 
 Again he asked which was Bolivar, and, on O'Leary's 
 pointing him out, exclaimed, *" What ! that little man 
 with a blue coat and a military cap, riding a mule ? " 
 As they met, the two generals dismounted and embraced 
 cordially. Then they returned to the best hut in Santa 
 Ana, where Morillo had prepared breakfast. They 
 spent the day together, talking over their wars, and 
 equal harmony reigned between their officers. Both 
 slept that night under the same roof Morillo had pro- 
 posed erecting a monument to commemorate this strange 
 historic meeting, and a large square boulder was placed 
 to mark the spot meanwhile. Next day the Spanish 
 and Colombian chiefs parted on the most cordial terms, 
 never to meet again.^ Both appear to have been per- 
 fectly satisfied with their interview. 
 
 A few days before signing the armistice and the 
 treaty, Morillo had received orders from Spain relieving 
 him of the command of the army of Venezuela, La Torre 
 being appointed to succeed him. Morillo handed over 
 charge at Caracas on the 14th December 1820, and, 
 on the 17th, sailed from La Guaira for Spain. He 
 appears no more in this history. 
 
 '■ This account is taken from O'Leary (ii. 56-59). 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
252 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 O'Leary ^ gives an estimate of Morillo which, perhaps, 
 may be taken as a fairly impartial one. The Spanish 
 commander was essentially a soldier rather than an 
 administrator. " Without the sword in his hand his 
 manly figure was insignificant, and it was only in the 
 field that he felt himself in his true place." He was 
 incapable of perceiving the great opportunity which still 
 existed, even after he was master of New Granada, for 
 conciliation by just and humane measures of administra- 
 tion. His wholesale executions of men like Camilo 
 Torres and Caldas were a grave political mistake which 
 culminated in his appointment to the Viceroyalty of 
 such a savage as Sdmano. Morillo had done much for 
 the liberation of Spain from the French ; all the merit 
 he thus acquired was wiped out by his enthusiasm for 
 the enslavement of the colonies. But to his administra- 
 tion some credit must be given for the public works, roads, 
 bridges, etc., which he carried out during his short resi- 
 dence in New Granada. If his methods of enforcing work 
 on them were unpopular, they were really necessary, in 
 order to arouse the natural indolence of the Granadians 
 in such a cause. 
 
 In Venezuela his executions were fewer, for he 
 incurred greater resistance, and his appetite for blood 
 was satisfied on the battlefield. 
 
 His personal courage was admitted on all hands ; even 
 the Llaneros, none too prodigal of their praises of the 
 valour of others, used to say of him that " it was a pity 
 he was born in Spain, and a shame that he was not a 
 patriot." 
 
 For Bolivar, after the meeting at Santa Ana, he 
 always expressed the highest admiration, and when 
 O'Leary and Soublette visited him in his retirement at 
 Corunna, in 1 835, he willingly supplied them with such 
 of Bolivar's papers as had fallen into his hands during 
 ^ ii. 63, and Preface to vol. i. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHARACTER OF MORILLO 253 
 
 the war. Restrepo (iii. 80) deals more briefly with 
 Morillo, but does not differ widely from O'Leary in his 
 general estimate of his character. 
 
 After making arrangements for the carrying into 
 effect of the armistice, and the posting of his troops 
 during it, Bolivar returned (22nd December) to San 
 Christ6bal, intending to go south, at least as far as 
 Popayan. His real motive for visiting the south was to 
 get into communication with San Martin, O'Higgins, and 
 the other patriots in Chile, Peru, and Guayaquil. At 
 the last-named place a revolution had occurred, on the 
 9th October 1820, of which information had been sent to 
 Colombia, by ships from Guayaquil to Buenaventura, on 
 the Pacific coast of Colombia. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE BATTLE OF CARABOBO AND THE 
 CONSTITUTION OF 1821 
 
 BOLIVAR now, thinking a fresh outbreak of 
 war in Venezuela unlikely for the present, 
 urged Vald^s, commander of the army of 
 the south, to advance on Quito, and sent 
 Sucre, the best of the republican generals, to command 
 that army. Valdds had met with some reverses, and, by 
 his arbitrary conduct, had made himself very unpopular 
 in the south. Quito had not been included in the 
 armistice, for it had its own independent President, 
 Aymerich.^ As for Guayaquil, it also was excluded, as 
 Aymerich claimed that it belonged to Peru. Sucre's 
 orders required him to go to Guayaquil, in order 
 to get into touch there with the new revolutionary 
 Government, which had already been approached by 
 San Martin, who was anxious to unite it to Peru. 
 Sucre's movements will be more conveniently recounted 
 later. 
 
 Bolivar reached Bogoti on the Sth January 1821, 
 whence, a few days later, he started for the south. But 
 he had only got to La Mesa, the first march out of 
 the capital towards the Magdalena, when he received 
 notice from La Torre of Morillo's departure and his 
 own accession to the chief command. The letter also 
 
 ^ The Viceroy of Peru had practically taken over the administration of 
 Quito and Guayaquil after the outbreak, which was suppressed in 1812. 
 Aymerich is sometimes called Captain-General of Quito. 
 254 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BREACH OF THE ARMISTICE 255 
 
 mentioned the arrival of commissioners from Spain, 
 to treat for peace. The commissioners themselves sent 
 a letter to Bolivar. The latter, supposing the com- 
 missioners to be invested with full powers, decided to 
 return to Bogoti, whence he wrote, on the 25th 
 January, to La Torre, to the commissioners, and to 
 Ferdinand VII. himself The letter to La Torre mainly 
 consisted of congratulations, and expressions of pleasure 
 at having to deal with him as a friend, or, if it should 
 unfortunately so happen, to have him as an honourable 
 enemy. 
 
 To Sartorio and Espelius, the Spanish commissioners, 
 he expressed the desire of Colombia for peace, and 
 stated that he had appointed, as plenipotentiaries to 
 Spain, for the conclusion of a definite treaty, Jose Rafael 
 Revenga and Tiburcio Echeverria. 
 
 The letter to Ferdinand VII., after congratulating 
 him on his accession, ended by requesting him to listen 
 favourably to the cry of Colombia for political existence.^ 
 Bolivar then started again for Cucuta. On the way 
 he received a letter from Francisco Delgado, governor of 
 Maracaibo, stating that that city had proclaimed its 
 independence of Spain and its adhesion to the republic. 
 Urdaneta had, it appeared, sent troops to support the 
 Maracaibo revolutionaries, thereby, as it seems clear, 
 committing a distinct breach of the terms of the 
 armistice. La Torre, naturally enough, wrote to pro- 
 test, and to demand the withdrawal of Urdaneta's 
 troops. On the 19th February, Bolivar, writing 
 from San ]os6 de Ciicuta, in a private letter, to La 
 Torre,^ shows that he felt a mistake had been made. 
 " If," he writes, " the possession of Maracaibo was at any 
 time an object of desire to us, to-day it is a matter of 
 regret, on account of the equivocal position in which it 
 places us. No doubt you will do me the justice of 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., i8, p. 44. " Hid., 18, p. 81. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2S6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 believing that I did not take the slightest part in the 
 insurrection of that city." He went on to deprecate a 
 breach on account of this occurrence. His official 
 reply ^ frankly admits that Heras, who had taken the 
 troops to Maracaibo, was wrong, and promises to put 
 him on his trial for exceeding his orders. He pleads 
 with justice that Heras' act must be separated from the 
 revolt of Maracaibo, and that the latter was no breach 
 of the armistice, seeing that it was spontaneous on the 
 part of the citizens and the governor. Then, with 
 extraordinary perversity, he proceeds to argue, on 
 grounds worthy of the most pettifogging lawyer, that 
 he was bound to support Heras' action. He evidently 
 does not believe his wretched arguments will be 
 accepted ; for, after suggesting arbitration, he inquires 
 whether, if no settlement is come to regarding Maracaibo, 
 hostilities are to recommence without the forty days' 
 notice prescribed ; if the notice is required, from what 
 date will it count — that of despatch or of receipt by the 
 opposite side ? Must notice be given to all commanders, 
 or only to the commander-in-chief? Probably Bolivar 
 felt that he dared not throw over his own commanders 
 at the request of a Spaniard, even when they had acted 
 wrongly. That seems to be the real view of Larrazabal,^ 
 though he pretends to be very indignant with Baralt and 
 Restrepo, who censure Bolivar's action, and characterise 
 his arguments as specious. 
 
 On the loth March Bolivar, from Bocono de Trujillo, 
 sent notice of resumption of hostilities on the 28th April.^ 
 Bolivar's action has met with considerable criticism in 
 this matter. La Torre himself characterised the notice 
 as " unexpected and inconceivable," whilst Restrepo says 
 the Liberator's action may justly be stigmatised as in- 
 
 ' Larrazabal (ii. 70) gives it in full. Those who are interested in the 
 argument of Bolivar can read it there, or in O'Leary, Docts., 18, p. 77. 
 ^ ii. 74. ' O'Leary, Docts., 18, p. 130. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BREACH OF THE ARMISTICE 25; 
 
 consistent.^ Larrazabal ^ attributes his action to his 
 discovery that the Spanish commissioners had no power 
 to conclude a definite agreement. That being so, he 
 considered that it was to his advantage to recommence 
 hostilities at once, without allowing the enthusiasm of his 
 own men to cool, or the spirit of the Spaniards to 
 improve. The rupture of the armistice may, therefore, 
 be considered a somewhat unscrupulous seizure of a 
 favourable opportunity. Larrazabal quotes a private 
 letter of Bolivar to his friend William White, in support 
 of his theory, and another passage in which the Liberator 
 expresses his dread lest his envoys in Madrid, Revenga 
 and Echeverria, should be deceived by false stories of 
 republican defeats, and induced to accept terms which 
 would not be approved in Colombia. 
 
 On the 25th April, Bolivar, whose headquarters were 
 at Barinas, issued three proclamations.^ The first was to 
 the Spaniards, endeavouring to show that La Torre was 
 the breaker of the armistice, and promising that the 
 treaty for the conduct of the war should be faithfully 
 observed. The second was to the Colombian people, also 
 laying the blame on the Spaniards. The third was a 
 short one to his soldiers, foretelling victory, and impress- 
 ing the order that violations of the treaty regularising the 
 war would be punished with death. 
 
 Then Bolivar marched for Guanare to be ready for the 
 opening of the campaign. At Trujillo he heard of the 
 revolt of the" Numancia" battalion against the Spaniards 
 in Peru.* 
 
 ' Restrepo, iii. log. His words are : "It is clear that there was a violation 
 of the armistice, cloaked by a few specious arguments. The Liberator had 
 weighty reasons for breaking the cessation of hostilities ; but ... he 
 adduced reasons which were not in accord with his letters and recent opera- 
 tions ; which afforded good ground for branding his conduct with the epithet 
 inconsistent." " ii. 75. ' O'Leary, Docts., 18, p. 210. 
 
 * The " Numancia" battalion was raiseii, in 1813, by the Spanish general 
 Yafiez in Venezuela, and consisted entirely of Venezuelans. After fighting 
 at Boyacd on the royalist side, it had gone south with Calzada to Quito, and 
 
 R 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
2S8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 In the meanwhile there had been trouble in Ciicuta 
 with the Congress. When Zea went to England he was 
 succeeded, as Vice-President of the Republic, by German 
 Roscio, as has already been mentioned. Owing to 
 Rosario de Ciicuta having been fixed as the meeting 
 place of the Constituent Congress summoned to pass the 
 Constitution, Roscio had to leave Angostura for Ciicuta 
 on the 14th November 1820. To fill his place at 
 Angostura, Bolivar appointed Soublette to be Vice- 
 President of Venezuela. Roscio died at Ciicuta, and 
 Bolivar nominated as his successor General Azuola, who 
 also died very soon after (13th A.pril 1821). To 
 succeed him, the veteran Antonio Nariflo was appointed. 
 He had escaped from his imprisonment in Spain, and 
 was now on his way back, by Angostura and the plains, 
 to his native Bogotd. Till his arrival in Ciicuta, in the 
 end of April, there was an interregnum following on the 
 death of Azuola. 
 
 When Azuola died there were already assembled in 
 Ciicuta all but a few of the members of the Congress. 
 Bolivar being away, and the Vice-Presidency of the 
 republic vacant (for Narifio's appointment was not yet 
 known), the deputies began squabbling as to who was to 
 preside at the opening of Congress. Then they accused 
 Bolivar of having made no provision for their mainten- 
 ance at Ciicuta. Some of them had come from great 
 distances, and were in financial difficulties. 
 
 Narifio's arrival settled some of these difficulties, 
 and the Congress met on the 6th May in the sacristy 
 of the parish church at Rosario de Ciicuta. But 
 Bolivar, furious at the behaviour of the deputies, 
 resolved to play his usual trump card of a threatened 
 resignation. So certain of his position did he feel that 
 he ventured to say that, having been appointed by the 
 
 on to Peru, where it had now revolted, and placed itself under the orders of 
 San Martin, the " Protector of Peru," 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES 259 
 Venezuelan Congress to be President of the Republic of 
 Colombia, he was not President of New Granada, that he 
 was not suited to be so, and that he was weary of being 
 dubbed tyrant by his enemies. Therefore, he declined to 
 continue at the head of the State, adding that, if the 
 Congress insisted on it, he would rather renounce his 
 citizenship of Colombia than accept that position.^ Need- 
 less to say, when the Congress, now thoroughly cowed, 
 wrote him a letter of fulsome adulation refusing his 
 resignation, he was pacified, and accepted the Presidency 
 of the Republic. 
 
 The Congress then settled down to the discussion of 
 the fundamental law and the Constitution. 
 
 When Bolivar left Barinas with part of the army for 
 Guanare, he was detained some days at La Yuca by 
 a river in flood. He only reached Guanare on the 19th 
 May. There he received the resolution of the Congress, 
 just recorded, and in reply, besides accepting the Presi- 
 dency, renounced the various money grants made to him 
 as President. Perhaps they were not then worth very 
 much, but, to his honour be it said, Bolivar was never 
 grasping in the matter of money, and was always willing 
 to devote his personal property to the service of his cause. 
 At Guanare, also, he learnt that La Torre, after 
 advancing as far as Araure, had again retired on 
 Valencia. The Liberator at once sent Cedefio to occupy 
 San Carlos. Soublette,^ meanwhile, had ordered Ber- 
 mudez to march on Caracas, and Zaraza, aided by 
 Mondgas, to operate towards Calabozo, both movements 
 being intended to relieve the pressure on Bolivar. The 
 desired effect was attained ; for La Torre detached a 
 battalion to aid Correa in the defence of Caracas, which 
 that general, nevertheless, felt himself obliged to evacuate. 
 
 ^ Letter of loth May 1821. O'Leary, Docts., 18, p. 540 «. 
 ^ It will be remembered that he was now Vice-President of Venezuela at 
 Angostura. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
26o SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 It was occupied by Bermudez on the 14th May, after 
 defeating 700 royalists at Guatire on the previous day. 
 Moreover, Morales had to go to Aragua with 800 men, 
 both these detachments being deducted from the main 
 army opposed to Bolivar. 
 
 On the 1st June, the Liberator established his head- 
 quarters at San Carlos, where he was joined by Paez and 
 Urdaneta. Paez was the first to arrive, with 1000 of 
 his Llaneros, followed two days later by the rest of his 
 division. Urdaneta arrived later. La Torre was en- 
 camped on the plains of Carabobo, the scene of Bolivar's 
 victory, in 18 14, over Cajigal and Ceballos. Morales 
 had rejoined him, but, on the other hand, he had de- 
 tached two battalions to oppose a small force sent by 
 Bolivar towards San Felipe to threaten the Spanish 
 communications with Puerto Cabello. La Torre's whole 
 force present at Carabobo was probably about 5500 
 men. 
 
 Bolivar had 6500, and this "army"' (of about the 
 strength of a European brigade) he organised in three 
 divisions. The first, under Paez, comprised the British 
 battalion about 900 strong, the battalion " Bravos de 
 Apure," and 1500 Llanero cavalry. The second division, 
 under Cedeno, consisted of a brigade of the " Guard," 
 three battalions, and one squadron of cavalry. The 
 third, under Colonel Plaza, was similar, but had a fourth 
 battalion, and a whole regiment of cavalry. 
 
 On the night of the 23rd June, Bolivar, who had left 
 San Carlos on the 2 1 st, encamped in front of the heights 
 to the south of the Carabobo plain. He had expected 
 to have to fight at the strong position above the defile 
 of Buenavista, but had found - it unoccupied, and had 
 passed the defile unopposed. It was a night of torrential 
 rain, which reminded some of the English veterans of 
 the night of the 1 7th to 1 8th June 1815 before the 
 battle of Waterloo. On the morning of the 24th the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BATTLE OF CARABOBO 261 
 
 exhalations of the previous night's rain created a mist, 
 which, lifting as the republicans advanced, showed a 
 cloudless sky. The day was oppressively hot, and the 
 English especially suffered greatly from the heat and from 
 thirst. On the plain of Carabobo and the hills in front 
 of it, the Spaniards were drawn up in six columns, 
 evidently expecting a frontal attack by one or both of 
 the two roads leading, the one from San Carlos, the other 
 from El Pao, to Carabobo. Commanding as they did 
 the mouths of both passes, the Spaniards seemed to bar 
 all possibility of a deployment by the republicans in 
 front. Bolivar, recognising the strength of the enemy's 
 position, resolved to turn his right flank. Paez moved 
 in that direction under a heavy fire and through a very 
 difficult defile. The " Bravos de Apure " led the way, 
 followed by the British battalion and a regiment of 
 cavalry. The Spaniards, with the plain to manoeuvre 
 on, were able, as soon as they saw Bolivar's aim, to 
 reinforce their right. About 1 1 a.m., the " Bravos de 
 Apure," issuing from the steep ravine up which they had 
 with difficulty scrambled, advanced against La Torre's 
 right flank, under a heavy fire from the Spanish guns in 
 front of the San Carlos road. The Spanish infantry held 
 their fire until the Venezuelans were close up, and then 
 discharged a volley in their faces, which completely broke 
 the battalion, and sent it hurrying back in the wildest 
 confusion on the British. The latter were almost carried 
 away by the fugitives, but, being a very superior class of 
 troops to the Venezuelans, managed to hold their ground as 
 the " Bravos de Apure " fled through their midst. As the 
 pursuing Spaniards came up, the British grenadier com- 
 pany, under Captain Minchin, received them in line 
 with so steady a discharge at short range that they at 
 once fell back under repeated volleys fired by company 
 after company of the British. They retired to the 
 position in which the Apure men had attacked them. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
262 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 But they still greatly outnumbered their opponents in 
 this part of the field. The British waited for reinforce- 
 ments, but none came, though the Colombian writers 
 assert that the Apure battalion rallied and supported 
 them. Paez also seems to have tried a cavalry charge, 
 which he led himself. The ground was unfavourable, 
 and he was driven back. Ammunition now began to 
 fail in the British line, and the men, especially the 
 officers, fell terribly fast under the Spanish fire. Colonel 
 Ferrier had been killed, and replaced by Captain Scott. 
 He in turn fell, and was succeeded by Captain Minchin. 
 Then, at last, Paez brought up some fresh ammunition, 
 and the Englishmen advanced in line with the bayonet 
 against a superior force in a strong position. They 
 charged with the fury of a forlorn hope. It was a 
 desperate business, and the Spaniards fought bravely ; 
 but British valour conquered, and at that moment some 
 companies of the " Tiradores " of Bolivar's second division 
 came to their aid. The enemy gave ground slowly at 
 first, then fled, leaving the position in the hands of the 
 British. Only a part of both armies had been engaged, 
 and the second and third Venezuelan divisions had 
 scarcely fired a shot. They had made no attempt to fix 
 the Spanish force in its position and prevent reinforce- 
 ments being sent to the right to oppose the turning force. 
 The breaking of their right flank spelt disaster for the 
 Spaniards. Two fresh battalions tried in vain to retrieve 
 the position, though they retreated in perfect order. 
 The Venezuelans were now issuing from the San Carlos 
 road, opened by the Spanish movement to their right, 
 and the cavalry charged upon the open plain which they 
 had before them. The Spanish force completely broke 
 up, whole battalions surrendered, the republican victory 
 was complete. La Torre only succeeded in keeping 
 together his reserve of two battalions, which had not 
 been engaged at first, and part of his cavalry. Bolivar 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BATTLE OF CARABOBO 263 
 
 carried out the pursuit with the " Grenadiers," " Rifles," 
 and Paez's cavalry. He made a vain endeavour to 
 intercept the retreating enemy at Valencia, by mount- 
 ing some of his infantry and sending them round. 
 Nevertheless, only one Spanish battalion succeeded in 
 reaching Puerto Cabello intact. There they were joined 
 by the two battalions detached to the west before the 
 battle, who succeeded in slipping away from between 
 Bolivar and his detachment. 
 
 The loss on both sides was heavy, especially on that 
 of the republicans. The British battalion lost two com- 
 manders in succession, and one-third of its men. Cedefio 
 and Plaza, the commanders of the second and third 
 divisions, were killed. 
 
 This decisive victory may fairly be attributed entirely 
 to the steadiness and valour of the Englishmen, most of 
 them veterans of the Peninsula and Waterloo. Bolivar 
 himself acknowledges their splendid behaviour in his 
 despatch, and, according to the writer in All the Year 
 Round, he saluted the men, as they passed him after 
 the battle, with the words, " Salvadores de mi patria i " 
 (saviours of my country !).' 
 
 ' This account of Carabobo is based on Bolivar's despatch (O'Leary, 
 Docts., 18, p. 337) and on the account of an Englishman engaged in the 
 battle, given in All the Year Round, vol. xix. (1868), p. 367. Professor 
 Hiram Bingham has since published an account of the battle, based on com- 
 parison of the various accounts and a careful study of the locality. According 
 to him, the Spaniards should certainly have fought at Buenavista. They 
 preferred to defend the junction of the roads from Tinaquillo and from Pao 
 to Valencia. The plain of Carabobo was visible from Buenavista hill, five 
 miles off. The intervening country was very hilly and confused. The 
 Spaniards were facing the two roads at their issues from the hills. Paez's 
 turning movement was discovered when his troops appeared on a hill above 
 the Spanish right. His people started down the two miles of hill, under the 
 impression that it led direct on to the plain. When they got to the bottom 
 they found themselves in a valley 150 feet below the level of the plain, faced 
 by the Spaniards, who had had time to reinforce their right. That move- 
 ment, it seems clear, could have been hampered by a vigorous frontal attack 
 along the road. On the other hand, had Paez made a rather wider turning 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
264 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Whilst La Torre fell back on Puerto Cabello with the 
 remnants of his army, Morales' cavalry drew off in dis- 
 order by the El Pao road, making for the plains. 
 
 Hearing of the victory, the Congress at Ciicuta decreed 
 a triumph and other honours to Bolivar, including a 
 column of commemoration on the battlefield which, like 
 that at Santa Ana in commemoration of the meeting 
 with Morillo, was never erected. 
 
 Bolivar, entering Valencia on the night of June 24th, 
 at once sent Heras off after the two detached Spanish 
 battalions towards San Felipe. As already mentioned, 
 they succeeded in eluding him. Colonel Rangel was 
 sent to blockade La Torre in Puerto Cabello. Then the 
 army was reorganised and the chief command given to 
 Marifto. 
 
 To Bermudez at Caracas was opposed a Spanish force 
 under Perreira. Bolivar now marched for the capital to 
 take Perreira in rear, but the Spaniard, hearing of Cara- 
 bobo, tried to slip away towards the plains. On his way 
 he received an order from La Torre, directing him to 
 make for Puerto Cabello. This Perreira found to be 
 impracticable, for Bolivar was in Caracas on the 29th, 
 and the country between him and Puerto Cabello was 
 impassable. Perreira then tried to get the French 
 Admiral at La Guaira to take him off, but was refused. 
 La Torre had sailed from Puerto Cabello with some 
 small ships to try and pick up Perreira, but, finding La 
 Guaira in the enemy's hands, had returned. Perreira, 
 now in a desperate situation, entered upon negotiations 
 for capitulation. He and such of his men as desired 
 were allowed to go to Puerto Cabello. Only 200, out 
 
 movement, he would have descended on the right rear of the enemy without 
 encountering the valley in which he found himself before reaching the plain. 
 Professor Bingham says that the British formed a hollow square in the valley 
 after the first repulse of the " Bravos de Apure " ; these rallied and passed 
 on to the plain farther north, that is beyond the right of the new Spanish 
 line. Vide "Journal of an Expedition, etc.," pp. 276-79. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AND HIS GENERALS 265 
 
 of 700, followed him, the rest preferring to enlist under 
 the republican banner. Soon after reaching Puerto 
 Cabello, Perreira died of fever, brought on by hard work 
 and privations. 
 
 Bolivar now sent for Soublette, the Vice-President of 
 Venezuela, from Angostura, and, leaving him to continue 
 the work of restoring order and government in Caracas, 
 himself returned to Valencia on the nth July, leaving 
 a sufficient force in Caracas and La Guaira. 
 
 At Valencia, the Liberator despatched Marifio, with 
 three battalions, into the western districts, and took 
 measures for making secure the blockade of Puerto 
 Cabello. 
 
 On the 22 nd he was back at Caracas, where he 
 divided Venezuela provisionally into three military 
 districts — 
 
 (i) Cor6, Merida, and Trujillo, under Marino. 
 
 (2) Caracas, Carabobo, Barquisemeto, Barinas, and 
 
 Apure were the charge of Paez. 
 
 (3) In Barcelona, Cumana, Guayana, and Margarita, 
 
 Bermudez commanded. 
 
 The royalist power in Venezuela was now reduced to 
 the blockaded fortresses of Puerto Cabello, and Cumand, 
 and to a few guerrillas in the provinces of Caracas and 
 Cor6, chiefly the latter, which had all through favoured 
 the royalist cause. 
 
 Bolivar gives his reason for dividing the country into 
 military areas in a letter to Dr Gual.^ The army, he 
 said, was in a dangerous state, full as it was of men who 
 had fought long and were now in a state of misery, 
 unpaid and hopeless of any reward of their services. 
 The Llaneros in particular were a danger. " We are on 
 the brink of an abyss," he wrote, " or rather on a volcano 
 in a state of proximate eruption. I fear peace more than 
 ' Larrazabal, ii. 91. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
266 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 war. That gives you an idea of all that I do not, and 
 cannot, relate to you." The situation can easily be 
 understood, and it is to be remembered that Marifto, 
 Bermudez, and Paez, always greedy of separate command, 
 if not pacified by having each his own kingdom, would 
 not have hesitated to plunge the scarce liberated republic 
 into a fresh civil war. What had happened in New 
 Granada, in Venezuela, and in Buenos Aires was suffi- 
 cient to show that patriotism was always liable to be 
 put aside in favour of personal ambitions by the 
 majority of the so-called patriot leaders. 
 
 Venezuela was practically free of the Spaniards, and 
 its freedom was never really in doubt after Carabobo, 
 but Bolivar's mission, at any rate as he defined it for 
 himself, was far from ended. The royalists still held 
 Cartagena and Panama in New Granada, and were as 
 strong as ever in that hotbed of royalism Pasto in the 
 far south. Nor did Bolivar's views of liberation end 
 with Venezuela and New Granada. Beyond these were 
 Quito, Lower and Upper Peru, perhaps even Chile and 
 Buenos Aires, all to be freed. 
 
 On the 1st August, the Liberator left Caracas for the 
 west once more. His plan was to land at Rio Hacha and 
 Santa Marta, with a force sufficient to subdue Cartagena 
 and Panama, and, after that had been accomplished, to 
 embark on the Pacific for the conquest of Guayaquil 
 and Quito. 
 
 In the first days of September, Bolivar found himself 
 in Maracaibo, after issuing orders for the pacification 
 of Cord. From Maracaibo he sent Salom ^ with the 
 battalion of " Rifles " to Rio Hacha. There he 
 was to organise an expedition from Santa Marta to 
 Puerto Bello and across the isthmus to Panama. 
 
 ' Bartolom^ Salom, one of Bolivar's most trusted lieutenants, was born at 
 Caracas in 1780. His last command was in Maturin, where Bolivar sent him 
 to succeed Marino after Paez's insurrection of 1S27. Died at Caracas in 1863. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONSTITUTION OF 1821 267 
 
 The isthmus, Bolivar characterised as the "artery of 
 the universe."^ 
 
 The Congress at C^icuta had already, on the 12th 
 July, sanctioned the Constitution of 1819. As finally 
 passed it stood thus. The republic was centralised and 
 the whole territory divided up into Departments, Pro- 
 vinces, and Cantons. The local Vice-Presidents (of 
 Venezuela and New Granada) were abolished and at the 
 head of the Departments were placed Intendants, who 
 practically occupied the same position of subordination 
 to the executive. Under the Intendants were the chief 
 magistrates of Provinces and Cantons. 
 
 The Legislature consisted of two chambers, the Senate 
 and the Chamber of Representatives, the members of 
 which were chosen by Electoral colleges. Senators were 
 elected for eight years. Representatives for four. The 
 age qualification was thirty years for a Senator, twenty- 
 five for a Representative. There was also a property 
 qualification of ^4000 in the case of the former, and of 
 ^2000 for the latter. The franchise for citizen electors 
 was fixed at ^500. The executive power was exercised 
 by a President elected for four years and allowed only 
 one re-election. In his absence or death, his place was 
 to be taken by a Vice-President elected for the same 
 period. There was a Council of Government consisting 
 of five secretaries and one member of the High Court. 
 The President's powers were strictly limited, and he was 
 responsible for the acts of his government. Only in the 
 case of foreign invasion, or civil war, did absolute power 
 pass into his hands. As Bolivar neatly put it, " the 
 government of Colombia was either a gentle rivulet or a 
 devastating torrent."^ It was hardly ever anything but 
 
 ' " El vehiculo del Universo." To translate the word "vehiculo" by its 
 ordinary English equivalent " vehicle " would not express the meaning. The 
 secondary meaning, "blood-vessel" or "artery," seems more correctly to 
 interpret Bolivar's idea. 
 
 ^ O'Leary, ii. 102. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
268 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the torrent in his lifetime, for there was almost always 
 either invasion or civil war. 
 
 The ministers were the irresponsible agents of the 
 executive. The judiciary was entirely independent of 
 the executive which, while required to take care that the 
 law was properly administered, was rendered impotent 
 by being deprived of the power to punish or dismiss 
 judges, even for gross misconduct or incapacity. Slavery 
 was only partially abolished by regulations for the manu- 
 mission of the sons of slave women. 
 
 The capital of the republic was transferred again 
 from the central position of Ciicuta to Bogota, where 
 it would be very far removed from the Department of 
 Venezuela, a fact not likely to improve the chances of 
 maintenance of the union. In this move O'Leary sees 
 the handiwork of Santander who wished, as Vice- 
 President, to be in a position to curb the great popularity 
 enjoyed by his rival Narifto in Bogotd. Altogether, 
 O'Leary does not think very highly of the wisdom or 
 experience of this Congress, which went a good deal 
 beyond its proper business of promulgating the Constitu- 
 tion.^ Amongst other measures which he condemns 
 is the remission of excise duties on liquors, and the 
 substitution of a direct land tax. 
 
 At this time, the Liberator received many letters from 
 members of the General Congress at Cucuta, begging 
 him to come and direct their deliberations. That was 
 incompatible with his plans of conducting personally the 
 expedition to the Isthmus, and he refused. To Gual, the 
 Finance Minister, he replied at greater length in a letter, 
 in one passage of which he says his ambition is that the 
 verdict of history may be : " Bolivar took command to 
 liberate his fellpw-citizens, and, when they were free, left 
 them to govern themselves by the law and not by his 
 will." ^ Thereupon the Congress proceeded, on the 7th 
 ' O'Leary, ii. 104. ^ Larrazabal, ii. 95. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONSTITUTION OF 1821 269 
 
 September, to the election of a President and Vice-Presi- 
 dent. For the Presidency, BoHvar had a large majority. 
 For the Vice-Presidency there was a closer contest between 
 Narino and Santander, the latter eventually coming out 
 victorious after several scrutinies. 
 
 It now became necessary for Bolivar and Santander to 
 go to Ciicuta to take the oath of office. Both arrived 
 about the same time, but, before taking the oath, the 
 Liberator insisted on being allowed liberty still to con- 
 tinue military operations. A special law was passed on 
 the 20th August 1 82 1, providing that, whilst he was 
 absent in the field, the Vice-President should act for 
 him. He took the oath on the 3rd October. Before 
 he signed the Constitution and decreed its execution, he 
 addressed the assembly, protesting his unwillingness to 
 accept the Presidency. " I prefer," he said, " the title 
 of citizen to that of Liberator, for the latter is the out- 
 come of war, the former of law." To this the President 
 of the Congress replied, insisting, on behalf of the 
 assembly, on the necessity of Bolivar's being the first 
 President of the Republic. Larrazabal is sure that 
 Bolivar bond fide desired what he said. Others, looking 
 back on the whole history of his life, and considering the 
 numerous occasions on which, even after the most violent 
 repudiation of office or honours, he finally accepted them, 
 will hardly be inclined to agree. Santander was next 
 sworn in as Vice-President, an appointment fatal to 
 Bolivar's interests; for Santander, his enemy of 18 13, 
 though cloaking his hostility under the pretence of friend- 
 ship and admiration, probably never ceased to be at heart 
 the enemy of the Liberator. To the Granadian Santander, 
 the Venezuelan Bolivar was never the proper tenant of 
 Presidential chair of Colombia, including, as it then did, 
 New Granada. Bolivar, it will be remembered, had ap- 
 pointed Narino Vice-President in April 1 821, but that 
 high-handed leader had soon quarrelled with the Congress, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
270 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 and been compelled to resign his Vice-Presidency. Could 
 Bolivar have obtained his election, as against Santander, 
 by the Congress, it seems doubtful if he would have found 
 Narifio easier to deal with than Santander. Certainly 
 Narino's past history points to it as unlikely. Yet it 
 must be admitted that he quietly accepted a subordi- 
 nate position under Santander's government in Bolivar's 
 absence in Peru. Finally, Santander was in power at 
 Bogotd, and, had Narifio been preferred to him, he would 
 possibly have raised the standard of civil war. Bolivar 
 now organised his administration afresh, making Gual 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Castillo Rada for Finance, 
 Restrepo for the Interior, and Briceno Mendez for War 
 and the Navy. On the 8th October, the Liberator issued 
 a proclamation to the various peoples of the republic, 
 those of Venezuela, of Cundinamarca,^ and of Quito.^ 
 The last-named had still to be gathered into the fold. 
 The last sentence of this proclamation announces the 
 delegation of powers to the Vice-President during Bolivar's 
 absence in the field. 
 
 Having come to Bogotd, Bolivar now abandoned the 
 idea of an expedition by sea to Puerto Bello and Panama 
 in favour of a march south by land or river. Salom was 
 therefore directed to bring the expeditionary force from 
 Santa Marta up the Magdalena to Bogotd. There was 
 a good deal of delay in starting, and it was not till the 
 6th December that Salom got off with tjie last detach- 
 ment of the troops. 
 
 Bolivar, meanwhile, had sent off two ministers-pleni- 
 potentiary, one to Mexico, the other to Chile, Peru, and 
 Buenos Aires to the republican governments in those 
 countries. At the same time he received information 
 that Revenga, Echeverria, and Zea had gone to Madrid 
 
 ' That is really New Granada. Cundinamarca is the province in which 
 Bogota is situated. 
 2 O'Leary, Docts., i8, p. 558. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONCLUSION OF WAR IN THE NORTH 271 
 as envoys to arrange a peace at the time of the armistice 
 with Morillo. After one formal visit to the minister, they 
 remained three months in Madrid without being able to 
 obtain another, and without being noticed by anyone. 
 Then, on the 2nd September 1821, they were suddenly 
 given their passports and ordered to leave the country 
 within twenty-four hours. Larrazabal's characterisation 
 of this order as " barbarous " is certainly not justified, 
 when it is considered that the news of the battle of 
 Carabobo must have reached Spain. 
 
 On the 1st October 1 8 2 1 , Cartagena had been gathered 
 in to the republican fold. The messenger bringing its 
 golden keys from Mariano Montilla reached Bolivar at 
 Suata on the i Sth October. 
 
 It will be remembered that Montilla had been sent 
 with the Irish brigade, at the beginning of 1820, to 
 conquer Cartagena.^ He had arrived before the place in 
 August — though without the Irishmen, most of whom had 
 mutinied and been sent off — and had blockaded it for 
 fourteen months, when, at last, the governor, Torres, 
 accepted the very liberal terms offered by Montilla. 
 The garrison was sent to Puerto Rico at the expense 
 of Colombia. 
 
 Four months' grace, in which to dispose of their 
 property, were granted to private persons wishing to 
 leave the country, and the safety of the persons and 
 property of all was guaranteed. The only condition 
 demanded by Torres, and refused by Montilla, was that 
 the entry of the Colombian troops should be deferred till 
 after the garrison had sailed. Montilla, who had 4000 
 men with him, was now ordered to proceed to the 
 isthmus of Panama. This, however, was rendered un- 
 necessary by a popular rising at Santos, which ended in 
 the incorporation of Panama, as a new Department, in 
 the Republic of Colombia. Thereupon, Montilla was 
 ' Supra, p. 240. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
272 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 ordered to follow the march to the south by river and 
 land. He was, Bolivar wrote, to follow to Quito "to 
 finish the enterprise." 
 
 As we are now about to accompany Bolivar in his 
 effort to complete the task, which he had marked out for 
 himself, of finally destroying the Spanish power in Quito 
 and Peru, we may pause for a moment to anticipate 
 very briefly the end of the war of independence 
 in Venezuela and New Granada, which had been 
 practically assured by the battle of Carabobo, the 
 blockade of La Torre in Puerto Cabello, and the fall of 
 Cartagena. 
 
 A few days after the fall of Cartagena, Cuman^, 
 capitulated to Bermudez (loth October 1821), the 
 garrison being transported by Colombian vessels to 
 Puerto Rico. Puerto Bello and Chagres in the Isthmus 
 of Panama also fell. 
 
 Spain still had a foothold on the northern coast in 
 Puerto Cabello, and in the province of Cor6, which 
 throughout had been notorious for its fidelity to the 
 royal cause. After the battle of Carabobo, the remains 
 of the forces of La Torre and Morales had been blockaded 
 by land in Puerto Cabello. The republicans had no 
 artillery to enable them to carry on a regular siege. As 
 the Spaniards were superior at sea, their communica- 
 tions in that direction were free, and it was im- 
 possible to starve them out. Moreover, they were 
 free to undertake raids by sea against other parts of the 
 coast. 
 
 As there were some 4000 Spanish troops in the place. 
 Morales, who succeeded La Torre in the command, was 
 able to embark on a considerable expedition in 1822. 
 Proceeding by sea with 1 200 men, he reached Maracaibo, 
 and took it on the 7th September 1822. Thence he crossed 
 the Lake of Maracaibo, defeated Montilla, and threatened 
 a southward march to Ciicuta. Santa Marta and the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONCLUSION OF WAR IN THE NORTH 273 
 province of Cor6 both fell into his hands by the begin- 
 ning of December 1822. In the beginning of 1823 the 
 tide turned. Santa Marta was retaken by Montilla, and 
 Cor6 by Soublette. Later on, Padilla, with a fleet of 
 small ships from Cartagena, followed Morales into the 
 Lake of Maracaibo, where he completely routed the 
 Spanish flotilla on the 24th July. A few days later 
 (3rd August 1823) Morales capitulated at Maracaibo, 
 on conditions which provided for the transmission of 
 himself and his European troops to Cuba, at the cost of 
 Colombia, provided they were not to serve again in 
 the war. 
 
 Calzada still held out in Puerto Cabello, the siege of 
 which had been raised by Paez, who had retired to 
 Valencia. The Llanero chief now again blockaded the 
 place on the land side, and to some extent by sea. 
 Drawing lines of circumvallation about the fortress, he 
 eventually succeeded in cutting off the fresh water supply 
 of the place. But Calzada, in reply to Paez's summons, 
 refused to capitulate, though the garrison was reduced to 
 great straits by hunger and thirst. 
 
 In the beginning of November, Paez, hearing of an 
 expedition fitting out in Cuba for the relief of Puerto 
 Cabello, decided to storm it. 
 
 During the night of the 7th November 1823, 400 
 men, guided by a Spanish deserter, waded across the 
 marshy lagoon, and had almost reached the city before 
 they were discovered. Other attacks were simultaneously 
 made from the besiegers' lines in different parts. Calzada 
 and his garrison made a desperate resistance, but were 
 finally forced to surrender. 
 
 The citadel of San Felipe, still untaken, began to fire 
 on the city next morning. Honourable terms of capitula- 
 tion, including departure with the honours of war, and 
 no promise not to fight again, were offered to the 
 commandant. On the loth they were accepted, and 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
274 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 on the 15 th the Spanish troops were shipped off to 
 
 Cuba. 
 
 Thus, on the isth November 1823, Venezuela and 
 New Granada were finally cleared of all Spanish troops, 
 except a few guerrillas who still carried on a hopeless 
 struggle. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 GUAYAQUIL AND QUITO, 1821-22 
 
 HERE we return to the south and to the 
 movements of Bolivar and Sucre in that 
 direction. It has already been related ^ 
 how the revolt in Quito was suppressed in 
 1 8 1 2, with the result that, for eight years, the province 
 submitted quietly to Spanish dominion. 
 
 On the 9th October 1820, revolution again broke 
 out, this time at Guayaquil, the port nearly south of 
 Quito on the Pacific. The usual Junta was formed and 
 the surrounding province joined in the movement. But 
 Quito itself had been too completely crushed in 1812 
 to dare even now to break out again, and the Guaya- 
 quilefios were left to face alone the wrath of Aymerich 
 the Spanish Captain-General. That officer dealt 
 promptly with the rebels, whom he utterly defeated at 
 Guachi, as they moved on Quito, on the 22 nd November 
 1820. Guayaquil itself was threatened by the victorious 
 royalists, and any ideas of revolution entertained by the 
 Quitenos were nipped in the bud. It was at this 
 juncture that Bolivar, on the signing of the armistice of 
 Santa Ana with Morillo, had sent Sucre to Guayaquil, 
 with the double object of helping the new republic, and 
 gathering it into the Colombian fold. 
 
 Sucre, whom Bolivar described as possessed of the 
 " best organised head in all Colombia," ^ succeeded in 
 ' Supra, p. 77. 
 
 * Mitre, iii. p. 547, giving reference to La Croix. " Diario de Bucara- 
 manga," p. 70. 
 
 37s 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
276 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 collecting looo troops at Popayan. With these he 
 reached Guayaquil by sea in May 1821. He found the 
 people, alarmed by the defeat of their forces at Guachi, 
 only too ready to accept the welcome reinforcement he 
 brought. But there was not the same readiness to 
 accept the condition which Bolivar attached to his offer 
 of assistance, namely, the annexation of Guayaquil to 
 the Republic of Colombia and its absorption into it. 
 The weight of public opinion in Guayaquil was on the 
 side of union with Peru, its southern, rather than with 
 Colombia its northern neighbour. There was a small 
 party in favour of Bolivar, and a third which was for 
 entire independence alike of Peru and of Colombia. 
 This latter party was headed by J. J. Olmedo, perhaps 
 the most important personage in Guayaquil at the time. 
 
 San Martin, the Protector of Peru, was as desirous of 
 getting hold of Guayaquil for his state as Bolivar was of 
 absorbing it into Colombia, and had already despatched 
 Tomas Guido to press his views in Guayaquil. Of the 
 three parties, probably, that of Olmedo was the strongest, 
 that of Sucre the weakest. But Sucre's troops were an 
 important factor. He was wise enough not to insist, for 
 the moment, on complete compliance with Bolivar's 
 wishes for the incorporation of Guayaquil in Colombia, 
 though he was able to induce the Junta to put the infant 
 republic under the protection of Colombia as against 
 Spain. 
 
 In the middle of July 1821, Sucre being at Sam- 
 borondon,^ there occurred a revolt of some of the Guaya- 
 quil troops, and of the flotilla, in favour of Spain. The 
 Junta, in desperation, sent for Sucre, who, returning 
 promptly with some troops, rescued it from its difficulties 
 by putting down the mutineers. 
 
 Sucre now took command of all the troops, Guaya- 
 quileflos as well as Colombians, and advanced to meet 
 ' Sanboramban on the map. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REVOLT OF GUAYAQUIL 277 
 
 Aymerich, who was descending from Quito with 3000 
 royalists. The republican had scarce half this strength, 
 but he was able to take advantage of Aymerich's grave 
 error in dividing his force into two columns marching 
 from different directions. When Sucre fell upon and 
 severely defeated one at Yaguachi (27th August 1 821), 
 the other also retired. 
 
 Sucre now again pressed for union of Guayaquil with 
 Colombia, but the Junta temporised by affirming that, 
 though the provincial vote was in favour of union, no 
 final resolution could be passed till the electoral college 
 had been convoked. Sucre, flushed with his victory of 
 Yaguachi, had moved on to Ambato ^ on the way to 
 Quito. There he was attacked by Colonel Gonzales 
 with superior forces, and driven down again to his old 
 position, after losing a large part of his force, and being 
 himself wounded (12th September 1821). Fortunately 
 he was reinforced by 500 fresh Colombians, and 300 
 more were promised shortly. This enabled him to show 
 a bold front, and, on the 20th November, an armistice 
 for 90 days was concluded with the Captain-General. 
 It saved Guayaquil, but also gave time to Aymerich to 
 make fresh preparations for the defence of Quito. 
 
 On the 24th December 1821 there arrived at Quito 
 the new Viceroy, Murgeon, whose reign was but a short 
 one. He died on the 3rd April 1822. During the 
 armistice, Sucre heard of the revolt against the Spaniards 
 of the Venezuelan battalion " Numancia " ^ and, being in 
 quest of troops, he requested San Martin to send it to 
 
 ' Hambato on map. 
 
 ^ The "Numancia" battalion was originally formed in 1813 by the 
 Spanish General Ya5ez and consisted solely of Venezuelans. We have 
 already heard of it at Calzada's action of Cachiri in 1816, and again on the 
 royalist side at Boyaca. After that battle it went southwards to Peru and 
 now, incited by some patriots serving in its ranks, the battalion had changed 
 sides and placed itself under the orders of San Martin. We shall hear of 
 it again. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
278 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 him, as the men were Colombians. San Martin, how- 
 ever, sent him instead a Peruvian contingent of 1 1 oo 
 men which was quartered closer at hand, at Piura. 
 They marched by land. 
 
 During the armistice, also, there arrived at Guayaquil 
 fresh emissaries, both from Bolivar and San Martin. 
 Diego Ibarra, Bolivar's aide-de-camp, brought to Sucre 
 orders to march on Quito as a diversion in favour of 
 Bolivar's march by Pasto. He also carried Bolivar's 
 offers to San Martin of assistance in completing the 
 liberation of South America. About the same time San 
 Martin's envoy, Salazar, also arrived. His mission was 
 nominally to welcome Bolivar on his expected arrival at 
 Guayaquil. In reality he was charged with the task of 
 pressing his master's claim for the union of Guayaquil 
 with Peru. 
 
 When Sucre returned to Guayaquil from Babahoyo, 
 where he had been organising the defence against 
 Aymerich, he found the city more torn by factions than 
 ever, and nothing could be done towards the desired 
 union with Colombia. His own influence in Guayaquil 
 had diminished considerably after his defeat at Ambato. 
 Taking with him most of the troops in Guayaquil, he 
 marched, in compliance with Bolivar's orders, for Quito 
 towards the end of January 1822. He left behind him, 
 at Guayaquil, La Mar, whom the Junta had appointed to 
 the command of the troops other than Sucre's army. 
 La Mar was a strong partisan of San Martin and an 
 advocate of the union of Guayaquil with Peru. He was, 
 moreover, an intimate friend of Salazar, San Martin's 
 envoy to Guayaquil. 
 
 We must now return to Bolivar, whom we left starting 
 from Bogotd for the valley of the Cauca His intention 
 was to unite his army at Call, in the Cauca valley, to 
 march thence over the Western Cordilleras to the port of 
 Buenaventura, and there to take ship for Guayaquil. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR MARCHES FOR QUITO 279 
 
 Looking at an ordinary map of Colombia, it seems but 
 a simple matter to go from Bogotd to Cali. In reality- 
 it is no such thing. From Bogotd the traveller has to 
 descend from an altitude of 9000 feet to the Magdalena 
 valley, only 1400 or 1 500 feet above the sea ; then there 
 is a long journey up that valley to Neiva, and up the 
 La Plata river to La Plata itself. There the real diffi- 
 culties begin, as the route turns west over the pass of 
 Guanacas, 1 2,000 feet or more above sea level. Mollien, 
 who crossed this pass in 1823, has left a terrible account 
 of its desolation, and of the corpses and skeletons of 
 wayfarers, of the broken-down mules, and other signs of 
 the passage and re-passage of troops and travellers, which 
 strewed the freezing " paramo." From the summit, the 
 path (road there is none) descends again to the Cauca 
 valley, 4000 feet above the sea. There indeed there is 
 genial warmth and fertility exceeding that of most valleys. 
 It is easy to write that a force marched from Bogoti to 
 Cauca. Let us remember, at the same time, the priva- 
 tions it must have undergone on the way. 
 
 Leaving Bogoti on the 13 th December 1821, Bolivar 
 was at Cali on the 5 th January, where he issued 
 (17th January 1822) a proclamation announcing to the 
 peoples of the south of Colombia, of the Cauca valley, 
 of Pasto, and of Quito his own advance to free them 
 from the chains of Spanish servitude.^ He had by this 
 time changed his plan ; for, after starting his troops off 
 over the western Cordilleras for Buenaventura, he received 
 information from Sucre that Murgeon, the Spanish 
 President, had reached Quito by sea from Panamd vi§, 
 the port of Esmeraldas, with reinforcements, and had left 
 a squadron cruising on the Pacific coast from Buena- 
 ventura to Guayaquil. In these circumstances, the 
 transport of troops by sea had become far too dangerous 
 to be risked. Murgeon had been sent out from Spain 
 ' O'Leary, Docts., xix. p. 129. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
28o SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 to replace Aymerich ; for the moment, the new com- 
 mander was to take the title of President of Quito, which 
 was to be raised to that of Viceroy of Santa F6 when he 
 had succeeded in reconquering two-thirds of the kingdom 
 of New Granada. Bolivar, therefore, resolved to go by 
 land to Quito, whilst Sucre, from Guayaquil, made a 
 diversion drawing away the Spaniard's attention from 
 himself Marching up the Cauca valley, the Liberator 
 reached Popayan on the 26th January, passing through 
 an easy and well supplied country. Thence he sent 
 forward J. P. del Castillo and Antonio Obando, nominally 
 to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, really to get 
 information as to the state of the country to the south. 
 They had got to within thirty miles of Quito when 
 Murgeon wisely^ ordered them back out of the country. 
 The Liberator was more successful with the guerrilla 
 chieftain ]os6 Maria Obando,^ commanding the Spanish 
 advanced forces. He was first induced to sign a month's 
 truce, and then to visit Bolivar at Cali. There he was 
 gained over to the republican side. He was a person of 
 considerable enterprise, and, as his influence was great in 
 the valley of the Patia on the road to Pasto, he was a 
 very valuable acquisition. 
 
 If the march from the Magdalena to the Cauca was 
 difficult, that from Popayan to Pasto was even worse. 
 The Bogotano of to-day will tell you that, in the dry 
 season, you can march by land from the Colombian 
 capital to that of Ecuador in about five weeks, that you 
 
 ' Larrazabal (ii. 118) inveighs against Murgeon's barbarity, though only a 
 few lines before he has admitted that espionage was the real object of the 
 mission. 
 
 ^ ]osi Maria Obando was born near Popayan in 1797. He served the 
 Spaniards loyally till Bolivar gained him over. Later, in 1828, he rebelled 
 against the Liberator. He was accused of participation in the murder of 
 Sucre in 1830. His life after that was a stormy one. He was twice 
 banished, and in 1852 was President of New Granada. He was assassinated 
 in 1861. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE ROAD TO PASTO 281 
 
 cannot do it at all in the rainy season, and that, unless 
 you wish to be in misery all the way, you had much 
 better go round by Cartagena to Panama, and thence by 
 sea to Guayaquil, whence you can complete the journey 
 by rail. Roads worthy of the name there are none over 
 the desolate, fog-bound, mud-flooded " paramos " of Pasto. 
 Mule-tracks running, where they have not been washed 
 away, along precipices, thousands of feet deep, alternating 
 with levels obstructed by thickets and undergrowth, are 
 met with all along. The country is sparsely populated 
 and provides little food. When you descend into the 
 valley of the Patia you encounter one of the worst 
 climates in the world, where fever will probably work more 
 havoc than even the privations of the high level route. 
 
 In 1822 matters were still worse; for the fierce 
 mountaineers of Pasto had ever been, and still were to 
 be for some years, staunch supporters of the Royalist 
 cause, who would harass the republican advance at 
 every step. 
 
 Jimfenez de Padilla, bishop of Popayan, was another 
 ardent supporter of royalism whose influence was great 
 with the people of Pasto, living under his jurisdiction and 
 following the lead of their priests with blind ignorance. 
 
 Bolivar, having no wish to disturb this hornet's nest 
 at Pasto, proposed to pass it by at a safe distance, leav- 
 ing its subjugation until he had subdued Quito and 
 joined Sucre. Accordingly, he turned off the road about 
 Beruecos and proceeded down the right bank of the 
 river Juanambu which he crossed near its inflow into the 
 Patia. Between the Juanambii, the Patia, and the 
 Guditara is a great mountain mass extending south- 
 eastwards to the volcano of Pasto, on the eastern slope of 
 which lies the town of the same name. Bolivar's idea 
 was to cross the Guditara also near its junction with the 
 Patia, and then to march up its left bank to rejoin the 
 road which he had left at Beruecos. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
282 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 He had left Popayan with 3000 men on the 8th 
 March, 1822; on the 24th he crossed the Juanambii 
 with only 2000, the rest having died or been incapa- 
 citated by privations and disease. His passage of the 
 Juanambu, though difficult owing to the nature of the 
 country and the bridge, was unopposed. But the 
 Guiitara he found it impossible to pass near its mouth, 
 as even the rope bridge had been destroyed, and the 
 river flows in appalling gorges. There was nothing for 
 it but to march up its right bank to rejoin the road 
 from Pasto to Quito, and pass the river by its crossing 
 at Yaquanquer, instead of only regaining the road 
 beyond the Guiitara. This entailed marching . across 
 all the spurs of the mountain mass stretching down to 
 the river. Opposing this march were 2000 Spanish 
 troops, including a large number of Pasto mountaineers, 
 who knew every inch of this difficult country. Their 
 commander. Colonel Basilio Garcia, had promised the 
 destruction of Bolivar with small loss to his own troops. 
 Aymerich, who, in consequence of Murgeon's death, was 
 now again President of Quito, had replied to Garcia's 
 boasts that " that is not difficult, for Garcia has forces 
 equal to Bolivar's and holds impregnable positions." 
 The Liberator reached, without serious opposition, 
 Consacd, on one of the spurs of the volcano. In front 
 of him, beyond a deep ravine, was the plain of Bombond 
 on the next spur. Beyond that, behind another ravine, 
 Garcia was drawn up, about two and a half miles from 
 Consaci, facing north-west. The plain of Bombona was 
 unoccupied. Garcia's right rested on the volcano, his 
 left on the tremendous gorge of the Guditara ; his front 
 was protected by the ravine in front of him, over which 
 there was but one bridge, and that commanded by his 
 artillery. A thick wood and abattis still further 
 protected it. It was the evening of the 6th April. 
 
 Bolivar, returning next morning from a reconnaissance 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BATTLE OF BOMBONA 283 
 
 of this apparently impregnable position, remarked — 
 " Well, the position is formidable ; but we cannot remain 
 here, nor can we retreat. We have got to conquer, and 
 we will conquer ! " Then he ordered Vald^s to move to 
 the left with the " Rifles " over the slopes of the volcano, 
 above the head of the ravine, and so outflank the Spanish 
 right. The centre and right attacks were to be made by 
 two battalions and a squadron in first line, with one 
 battalion and the rest of the cavalry in reserve. In this 
 part of the field an unfortunate mistake was made ; for 
 Torres, who commanded, set his men to eat their break- 
 fast, misunderstanding Bolivar, who said they were to 
 attack first and breakfast afterwards. Bolivar was 
 furious, for he saw the delay would give the Spaniards 
 time to move troops to their right to meet Vald6s, who 
 was steadily moving forward over the slopes of the 
 volcano. He ordered Torres to hand over the command 
 to Barreto. Torres, thereupon, dismounted, and seizing 
 a musket said, " Liberator ! if I am not worthy to serve 
 my country as general, at least I will serve her as a 
 grenadier." Touched by his devotion, Bolivar embraced 
 him and restored him to his command. Then Torres 
 advanced, endeavouring to cross the ravine and break in 
 the enemy's right by a frontal attack. But the ravine 
 was filled with abattis, and the republicans could make 
 no way. The losses were fearful. Torres fell and was 
 succeeded by Paris,^ Paris by Barreto, Barreto by 
 Sanders,^ Sanders by Carvajal ; both battalions of the 
 
 ^ Joaquin Paris, born in Bogota in 1 795, took part in the earlier events in 
 New Granada with Marino. Captured by the Spaniards in 1816 in Popayan, 
 he was sent in chains to Maracaibo, and later, when on board a Spanish 
 vessel, was set free by a Colombian privateer. He did not go to Peru with 
 Bolivar, whom he had followed in Guayana. He passed through the 
 troubles after Bolivar's death with varying fortune, and died in 1868. 
 
 " Notwithstanding his surname, Arturo Sanders was a native of Venezuela 
 (Valencia). He followed Bolivar to Peru, but was sent home by the rebel 
 troops under Bustamente. He was with Sucre in that general's campaign 
 against La Mar in Ecuador. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
284 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 first line were almost exterminated. Meanwhile, Vald^s 
 and the " Rifles," scrambling as best they could over the 
 rocky side of the volcano, drove in the Spanish right. 
 In places they had to make ladders by sticking their 
 bayonets into crevices of the rocks. The weather being 
 calm, the hanging clouds of smoke long prevented 
 Bolivar from noting Vald6s' progress. At last he saw 
 it and launched his reserve battalion against the Spanish 
 centre. It was his last hope, and, as the battalion 
 " Vencedor en Boyacd " ^ moved forward, he shouted 
 to the men — " Battalion Vencedor ! your name alone 
 suffices for victory. Forward ! and assure our triumph ! " 
 Night had already fallen, and the field was illuminated 
 by a brilliant full moon, when the Liberator received 
 from Vald^s the welcome news that the enemy was 
 retreating. There was no pursuit, for Bolivar's troops 
 were about at the end of their tether, and moreover, he 
 feared a disaster in a country full of precipices and 
 unknown to himself or his men. 
 
 Despite his hard-earned victory, Bolivar was still not 
 across the Guditara for the position of BombonA was a 
 considerable distance short of Yaquanquer. He had lost 
 over soo killed and wounded out of his 2000, whilst 
 Garcia, fighting with about equal forces, but behind 
 entrenchments, had not lost more than 250 altogether. 
 
 On the 8th March, Garcia tried to induce Bolivar to 
 retreat, but nothing resulted from the eight days spent 
 in negotiations. All the time the inhabitants of Pasto 
 kept urging Garcia to a fresh effort. They promised 
 that every man, and many of the women, would join him 
 in destroying Bolivar. The latter would have been glad 
 of an armistice till he could get up fresh men to supply 
 his losses, but at least he was not attacked by Garcia, 
 who had had enough fighting for the present. 
 
 Bolivar remained at Bombond till the i6th April, 
 '" Victor at Boyacl" 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SUCRE'S MARCH ON QUITO 285 
 
 when, as no reinforcements had arrived, he retired to take 
 up a strong position at El Pefiol, near the Patia, in the 
 angle between it, the Guditara, and the Juanambii. He 
 was obliged to leave behind 300 sick and wounded,^ 
 in charge of an officer, who had a letter recommending 
 him and his charge to Garcia's consideration. 
 
 Bolivar was fully alive to the fanatical hatred borne 
 by the Pastusos towards the republicans. In urging the 
 Colombian Government to send him men and supplies 
 he writes : — " These people (the Pastusos) are the worst 
 enemies of liberty ; in their hatred of us there is no 
 distinction of sex, or age, or quality ; we are opposed 
 by every rational being in the country." He gives a 
 miserable description of the trials of his men, of the 
 dearth of food, and of the terrible character of the country 
 they were in. 
 
 Leaving Bolivar at El Pefiol, let us trace the march 
 of Sucre in the early part of 1822. 
 
 We left him marching from Guayaquil in the latter 
 part of January 1822. At the same time, the Peruvian 
 contingent, sent by San Martin from Piura, was advancing 
 through the province of Loja under General Santa Cruz.^ 
 Sucre moved south to meet them. Sucre's troops had a 
 terrible march from Guayaquil, over freezing " paramos " 
 and through dense forests, to reach the great line of 
 valleys running northwards from Loja to Quito. Their 
 transport was wretched, and cold and disease carried off 
 many of them before they reached Saraguro early in 
 February. There they were joined by Santa Cruz and 
 his Peruvians, who were to be under Sucre's orders. 
 This raised the total of Sucre's force to something less 
 than 2000 men, but the country rose as he advanced, 
 
 ■* Among them Torres, who soon after died of his wounds. 
 
 ^ Andres Santa Cruz was born at La Paz (Bolivia) in 1792. His career, 
 in so far as it was connected with Bolivar, will appear presently. He died 
 in Europe, as Peruvian Minister, in 1855. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
286 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 and he gathered in a good many recruits. He also 
 received some reinforcements from Colombia on his 
 march. The Spaniards under Tolri, at Cuenca, were 
 only about 900, many of them recruits. They had 
 retired to that place before the advance of Sucre, and, 
 on the 20th February, again retreated to Riobamba to 
 await reinforcements, which Murgeon, threatened also on 
 the north by Bolivar's advance, could ill spare. 
 
 Sucre, occupying Cuenca immediately Tblri left it, 
 remained there for some time to rest and reorganise, 
 sending out detachments to seize Alausi and other places. 
 He had already fulfilled his prescribed mission by draw- 
 ing southwards troops which, otherwise, would have 
 operated against Bolivar in Pasto. 
 
 At Cuenca there were difficulties with Santa Cruz, 
 who announced that he had been recalled to Peru. After 
 some correspondence, Sucre induced him to stop. When 
 he had been about a month at Cuenca, Sucre recommenced 
 his advance on Quito, a few days after Bolivar's battle of 
 Bombond. On the 3rd April Murgeon died and was 
 succeeded by Aymerich. On the 19th, Sucre met and 
 defeated the Spaniards south of Riobamba, which he 
 occupied on the 22nd. He was at Lactacunga on the 
 2nd May, and on the 4th he turned the Spanish position 
 beyond it by marching to his right over the slopes of 
 Cotopaxi. On the 1 6th, he was in the fertile valley of 
 Chillo, only ten miles south of Quito. The Spaniards 
 were still in front of him, and he was about to endeavour, 
 by a fresh turning movement, to get between them and 
 the capital when, divining his intention, they retreated 
 the same night to Quito. On the 2 1 st they were driven 
 from their position on the hill of Puengasi. The next 
 two days were spent in manoeuvring. On the night of 
 the 23 rd Sucre undertook another of his bold turning 
 movements, marching to his left over the rugged slopes 
 of the volcano of Pichincha, which rises above the west 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BATTLE OF PICHINCHA 287 
 
 side of Quito. It was a night of trial as the men, in 
 pouring tain, stumbled and scrambled in the darkness, 
 over the rocky and wooded slopes of the volcano. By 
 dawn on the 24th, the little army was gazing on Quito 
 spread out like a map below their feet in the open valley, 
 separated from them by forest-clad slopes, up which the 
 Spaniards were pushing to fight for the salvation of the 
 capital. 
 
 Presently the royalists issued from the forest, threaten- 
 ing the left of the republicans. Both sides fought w'ith 
 the fury of despair, for to the Spaniards defeat meant the 
 loss of the whole province with the fall of its capital, 
 whilst the republicans, if beaten, could only look forward 
 to captivity, or to a miserable death amongst the snows 
 and rocks of the mountains. Things were going badly 
 for Sucre's men, especially on the left, which bore the 
 brunt of the attack. The Peruvian contingent had almost 
 run out of ammunition and had to charge with the 
 bayonet. Then they were driven back and threatened 
 on their left by three Spanish companies. At that moment 
 three companies of Sucre's battalion " Albion " ^ charged 
 and turned back the flowing tide of Spaniards. Two 
 more companies of the " Magdalena " battalion, led by 
 Cordova, one of the most gallant of the Colombian com- 
 manders, also charged. At noon the Spaniards were 
 fleeing in disorder down the slope to Quito, which Cordova 
 entered on their heels. The remains of the Spanish 
 infantry took refuge in the fort of Panecillo. Their 
 cavalry, four hundred strong, was still intact, standing 
 to the north of the city. Aymerich hoped, with their aid, 
 to be able to fall back towards Pasto, but, seized with 
 panic, they fled before a very inferior Colombian force. 
 
 Next day (2Sth May 1822) Aymerich, in reply to 
 Sucre's summons, agreed to surrender Quito and all that 
 
 ' The remains of the English of Boyaca had been formed by Sucre into 
 a battalion bearing this name. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
288 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 it contained. The prisoners were i6o officers and i,ioo 
 men ; 400 had been killed, and 190 wounded in the 
 battle of Pichincha, against 200 killed and 140 wounded 
 on Sucre's side. Besides the prisoners, Sucre captured 
 14 guns, and all the military resources of the capital. 
 Aymerich himself was a prisoner, and the province of 
 Quito had passed for ever from the hands of Spain, a few 
 years less than three centuries after Benalcazar had first 
 carried thither the banners of Castille. 
 
 When Quito thus fell to Sucre, Bolivar was again 
 north of the Juanambii which he had been compelled 
 to recross on the loth May, when there remained only 
 three days' provisions at El Pefiol. Reinforcements now 
 began to come up, but only in sufficient numbers to raise 
 Bolivar to his old strength of 2,000 men. With these 
 he again advanced and summoned Garcia to surrender. 
 The Spaniard in his reply of the 28th May was inclined 
 to yield. Then he veered round again under pressure 
 from Pasto. In despair he sent Padilla, the bishop, to 
 try to reduce the Pasto fanatics to reason. But a far 
 more effectual sedative had arrived in the news of the 
 capture of Quito. 
 
 Bolivar, hearing by chance of Sucre's successes, but 
 without any details, was nearing the Juanambii with the 
 Colombian " guard." As he approached the river he 
 met Garcia's envoys, on their way to settle with him the 
 terms of capitulation. The Spanish commander agreed 
 to hand over the whole of the territory occupied by his 
 division, in return for an unconditional guarantee of the 
 persons and property of all within the command. 
 
 The capitulation was hardly signed when Garcia sent 
 to say that the city of Pasto was in a ferment. Bolivar 
 at once formed a column for its subjugation. Garcia, 
 coming out with his staff to meet him, the two entered 
 the city together and proceeded to the quarters prepared 
 for Bolivar which, for more than an hour, were guarded 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CONQUEST OF QUITO 289 
 
 by Spanish troops, until they were relieved by the arrival 
 of the Liberator's personal guard. It was the 8th June, 
 and Sucre had already been nearly a fortnight master of 
 the capital. On that date a proclamation was issued by 
 Bolivar to the Colombians of the South. "From the 
 banks of the Orinoco," it said, " to the Andes of Peru, 
 the liberating army, marching in triumph, has covered 
 with its arms the whole extent of Colombia. Only one 
 place 1 still resists, and it will fall. Colombians of the 
 South ! the blood of your brothers has redeemed you 
 from the horrors of war. . . . Colombians ! share with 
 me the ocean of joy which inundates my heart, and 
 raise in your own altars to the liberating army which 
 has given you honour, peace, and liberty." ^ 
 
 The province of Quito had been wrested from Spain ; 
 but by whom ? Surely the glory belongs largely to 
 Sucre, who, with less than 3000 troops, had driven the 
 Spaniards back from Loja to Quito, had defeated them 
 at Riobamba, and in half a dozen other actions, before 
 the final victory of Pichincha laid Quito at his feet. 
 
 Bolivar, on the other hand, had vainly endeavoured 
 to break into Pasto, until the way was opened for him 
 by Sucre's successes. He had, indeed, gained a Pyrrhic 
 victory at Bombond, but had been so weakened by it 
 that he was compelled to retreat and wait for reinforce- 
 ments. Even with them, it was only when he heard of 
 the fall of Quito that he dared to advance again on 
 Pasto ; it was only that news which had determined 
 Garcia to surrender, and had deterred him from another 
 battle on the Juanambii, which might not have had 
 so happy a result for Bolivar as that of Bombond. 
 Restrepo* calls Bombond a costly and barren victory. 
 Larrazabal, able only to see right in his hero, combats 
 this view. But it certainly was, as a matter of fact, 
 both costly and barren. It was, moreover, unnecessary ; 
 ' Puerto Cabello. " O'Leary, Docts., 19, p. 300. ' iii. 216. 
 
 T 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
290 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 for Sucre would have got Quito whether Bolivar had 
 fought at Bombond or not. The Liberator would have 
 played his part sufficiently had he been content to hold 
 Garcia at Pasto, and prevent his going to the relief of 
 Quito. That was a subordinate part which Bolivar 
 would never have consented to play. After all, how- 
 ever, he cannot be seriously blamed for fighting at 
 Bombond, for he was then ignorant of the successful 
 advance of Sucre, which, indeed, had scarcely begun 
 when Bombond was fought. 
 
 On the 9th June there reached Pasto, from Quito, a 
 Spanish battalion which had escaped from before Sucre. 
 Salgado, its commandant, finding to his surprise that 
 Garcia had surrendered, also capitulated. 
 
 Aymerich, Garcia, and the other Spanish generals 
 embarked for Spain when Bolivar entered Quito on the 
 1 6th June 1822. The Republic of Colombia was now 
 beginning to be officially recognised by foreign nations. 
 Brazil had already done so, and now, in the spring of 
 1822, the United States recognised the independence of 
 the American nations, formerly Spanish provinces. The 
 Spanish Minister in Washington vehemently remon- 
 strated, but naturally in vain. 
 
 This was a good beginning, and, on the 8th April, 
 Zea, from Paris, addressed a circular to the European 
 Cabinets, other than Spain, begging for recognition of 
 Colombian independence by them also. Great Britain 
 did not go further at present than to allow the entry of 
 Colombian ships into her colonial ports, though she 
 afterwards recognised Colombia, and sent a minister to 
 Bogoti in 1825. 
 
 Sweden and France ^ sent envoys to inquire into 
 the state of affairs in South America. Even in 
 the Spanish Cortes the question of recognising the 
 independence of the colonies was discussed. Envoys 
 
 '■ The French envoy was Mollien, to whom we have already referred. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AT QUITO AND GUAYAQUIL 291 
 
 were sent to treat with the Colombian Government, 
 though nothing came of the mission. 
 
 When Bolivar entered Pasto, he organised the neigh- 
 bouring territory as the " Province of the Pastos." 
 Antonio Obando ^ was appointed governor, and the 
 Pastusos were assured that " the beneficent laws of 
 Colombia were the guarantee of their liberty." This 
 organisation took him some time, and, meanwhile, he 
 only sent Salom with a small force to Quito. 
 
 Whilst he was at Pasto he received a letter from 
 Padilla, the bishop, his bitter enemy, and the staunch 
 supporter of the royalist cause, in which the writer asked 
 for a passport to Spain, where he expressed his intention 
 of retiring into a monastery. Bolivar, in a friendly 
 reply, pointed out to him that he would be deserting his 
 flock. Eventually, the bishop returned to his bishopric 
 of Popayan, and thenceforth honourably worked in 
 support of the de facto republican government. 
 
 On the nth June, Bolivar, with 200 infantry and a 
 squadron of cavalry, started for Quito. Everywhere on 
 the way he was favourably received. He reached Quito 
 on the 1 6th June. That city he entered in triumph, 
 the whole population turning out to welcome him, and 
 the municipality decreeing the erection of a pyramid on 
 the field of Pichincha, with an inscription setting out 
 that it was erected " by the sons of Ecuador to Simon 
 Bolivar, the angel of peace and Colombian liberty." 
 Sucre's name was to follow, with the words, " Quito free 
 the 24th May 1822." Other honours were at the same 
 time decreed to Bolivar, but Sucre, the real victor, 
 received no further acknowledgment. 
 
 ^ Antonio Obando was born in Socorro in 1790. He was a mover in 
 the revolt of Socorro in 1810, and afterwards followed Narifio. In 1816 
 was with Serviez in Casanare, served in Venezuela in 18 18, with Bolivar 
 from Pore in 1819, and followed him to Bombona. In 1828 he took charge 
 of Bustamente's rebel troops at Riobamba. After Bolivar's death he was 
 for a time Minister of War, and died at Tocaima in 1849. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
292 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Bolivar was again busy organising his latest acquisi- 
 tions. The provinces of Quito, Cuenca, and Loja 
 became the Department of Ecuador, with Sucre as 
 governor, holding the rank of General of Division. 
 Education received Bolivar's attention, and he favoured 
 the construction of a road to the port of Esmeraldas. 
 In conferring honours on the Peruvian division which 
 had fought at Pichincha, Bolivar wrote to San Martin, 
 that " the war in Colombia is ended, and my army is 
 ready to march wherever its brothers require, especially 
 to the country of our neighbours of the south." ^ 
 
 The question of Guayaquil was still on the tapis, 
 always menacing the maintenance of peace between 
 Colombia and Peru. No doubt Bolivar had in his mind 
 the possibility of not getting Guayaquil when he turned 
 his eyes in the direction of Esmeraldas as the seaport of 
 Ecuador. 
 
 Thanks to the presence in Guayaquil of La Mar and 
 Salazar, San Martin's cause had continued to make 
 progress there in Sucre's absence. Mosquera, Bolivar's 
 envoy in Peru, was at the same time negotiating in 
 Lima, with San Martin's minister, Monteagudo, for a 
 confederation between Colombia and Peru. The nego- 
 tiations always broke down over the question of Guaya- 
 quil. On this subject San Martin felt so strongly that, 
 at one moment, when Bolivar had called on the Guaya- 
 quil Junta to sanction union with Colombia, the Pro- 
 tector actually got the Peruvian Council of State to 
 decide on war with Colombia.^ Nothing, however, came 
 of this, as San Martin's hands were otherwise full. 
 
 Bolivar, having settled matters at Quito, the inhabi- 
 tants of which had agreed to union with Colombia, 
 decided that affairs at Guayaquil must be arranged by 
 
 ' O'Leary, Docts., 19, p. 307. 
 
 * It was this decision which had nearly caused Santa Cruz to leave Sucre at 
 Cuenca in March 1822. — Supra, p. 286. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AT QUITO AND GUAYAQUIL 293 
 
 himself on the spot. At present the place was almost 
 in a state of anarchy, and the general feeling was 
 apparently in favour of Olmedo's party of absolute 
 independence. At that idea the Liberator openly 
 scoffed. He had already declared the whole of Quito, 
 including Guayaquil, to be part of the great Republic of 
 Colombia, and it would have been a terrible blow to his 
 prestige to have allowed a fragment like Guayaquil to 
 set up on its own account, or to go over to Peru. 
 Besides, the port was of great value to Quito, and in 
 those days was the only place on the Pacific coast with 
 a dry dock. The Peruvian troops at Quito would have 
 been a danger to Bolivar's scheme if they had occupied 
 Guayaquil before his arrival.^ Therefore he sent off, in 
 advance of himself, Salom, with three Colombian 
 battalions, to occupy the port, and kept back Santa 
 Cruz and his men. On the nth July, Bolivar entered 
 Guayaquil, arriving there by boat down the river, at the 
 mouth of which it stands. 
 
 From the conflicting accounts of events in Guayaquil 
 during the next few days, given by the partizans of San 
 Martin on the one hand and of Bolivar on the other, 
 it is difficult to arrive at exactly what happened. The 
 broad features can, however, be made out, and that is all 
 that is necessary. The Liberator was certainly received 
 with much outward cordiality and enthusiasm. Trium- 
 phal arches were erected for him to pass under, and 
 he was received everywhere with cheers and salutes. 
 But there were more loud cries in favour of Peru, or 
 of complete independence, than in favour of union with 
 Colombia. Olmedo,^ at the head of the Junta, was 
 
 ' A Peruvian squadron, commanded by Blanco Encalada, was waiting 
 there to embark them on their homeward journey. 
 
 ^ Jos^ Joaquin Olmedo, born in Guayaquil, was deputy for that province 
 in the Spanish Cortes of 1812. In 1820 he took a lead in the Guayaquil 
 revolution, and became President of the Provisional Government ; went on 
 a mission to Europe in 1824, and in 1827, being at Paris, he strongly 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
294 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 hostile to the Colombian idea ; Roca, the second member, 
 was a furious opponent of it, and the third member, 
 more or less of a cipher, was on the whole in favour 
 of Peru. 
 
 What was about to happen was foreshadowed in 
 Bolivar's proclamation of the 1 2th July. He told the 
 Guayaquileflos plainly that the idea of an independent 
 republic was absurd. He offered them union with 
 Colombia, and was sure that they would accept it.^ 
 
 All the Junta would do was to convoke the electoral 
 college for the 30th July. On the 13th, Bolivar finally 
 settled the disturbances, which were still going on, by 
 informing the Junta that he had taken over supreme 
 power, civil as well as military, as the only means of 
 putting an end to the prevailing anarchy.^ The Junta, 
 thereupon, resigned and went on board the Peruvian 
 ships in the harbour. 
 
 Except for the formal vote of the electoral college, 
 
 the result of which, with Bolivar's troops in possession 
 
 of Guayaquil, could not be doubtful, the annexation to 
 
 Colombia was complete. Nothing more remained to 
 
 round off the republic, as designed by Bolivar to 
 
 include the whole territory formerly ruled by the 
 
 Viceroy of New Granada and the Captain-General of 
 
 Venezuela.^ 
 
 opposed Bolivar's Bolivian constitution. In 1845 he was elected to the 
 triumvirate forming the government of Ecuador. He died at Guayaquil in 
 1847. His literary attainments were considerable. Amongst other things 
 he translated Pope's "Essay on Man," described in poetry the Battle of 
 Junin, etc. 
 
 ^ O'Leary, Docts., 19, p. 333. 
 
 » Ibid., 19, p. 334. 
 
 ^ Quito as a whole, including Guayaquil, had been a dependency of New 
 Granada since the creation of that Viceroyalty in 1739. During the first 
 outbreaks in Quito in 1809-12, the Peruvian Viceroy had occupied Guayaquil. 
 The arrangement had been terminated in 1819 by order from Spain. 
 (Pilling, p. 416.) 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE INTERVIEW WITH SAN MARTIN AT 
 GUAYAQUIL, 1822 
 
 AS Bolivar is now about to meet San Martin, 
 and to enter upon the liberation of Peru, 
 it is necessary here to briefly recount the 
 course of the revolt against Spain in Peru, 
 and the part played in it by San Martin. 
 
 The year 1809 had witnessed more or less complete 
 revolts in all the Spanish American colonies, consequent 
 on the overthrow by Napoleon of the Spanish monarchy. 
 In July of that year, an outbreak in Upper Peru resulted 
 in the installation of a Junta, which was promptly over- 
 thrown by Goyeneche, the President of Cuzco. In the 
 following year there was a fresh revolt in Cochabamba, 
 the fertile territory situated between Charcas, Potosi, and 
 La Paz, which extended through all the provinces of 
 Upper Peru, as far as Arequipa. But the energy of 
 Goyeneche, and of the Viceroy Abascal, proved too 
 great for the revolutionaries, who were again put down, 
 after suffering defeat in the battles of Huaqui and 
 Sipesipe in 181 1. 
 
 There was a certain amount of guerilla warfare up to 
 
 1 8 14, the principal actor on the republican side being 
 Arenales. On the 3rd August in that year, Mateo 
 Pumacagua, an Indian, again raised the standard of 
 revolt in Cuzco, but he was defeated in the spring of 
 
 181 5, captured, and executed. 
 
 In Lower Peru, also, there had been a few small con- 
 
 39s 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
296 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 spiracies which had been nipped in the bud. Secret 
 societies had been working hard to rouse the Peruvian 
 people to action. Still, up to 1819, Lower Peru had given 
 no serious trouble to Spain. As the headquarters of the 
 Viceroy, it had always been the centre and mainstay of 
 the Spanish dominion in South America. It was, too, 
 the centre, in a geographical sense, of the colonies, and, 
 pushed in, as it was, like a great wedge between Venezuela 
 and New Granada, on the north - east and north, and 
 Chile and Buenos Aires on the south and south-east, 
 there could be no security for the new republics so long 
 as Peru remained Spanish. 
 
 Buenos Aires had thrown off the Spanish yoke quite 
 in the early days of the revolution, and had succeeded in 
 maintaining her independence throughout. It was from 
 Buenos Aires that there came the liberator of Chile, in the 
 person of ]os6 de San Martin, who was born in Paraguay 
 in 1778. At the age of eight he was sent to Spain to be 
 educated. Entering the Spanish army, he fought against 
 the French in 1808, being promoted lieutenant-colonel 
 for his conduct at the Battle of Baylen in that year. 
 He took part in various other actions in the Peninsula, 
 including Beresford's Battle of Albuera in 181 1. 
 
 Long before this he had become a member of the 
 secret society known as the " Sociedad de Lautaro," which 
 was affiliated to the " Gran Reunion Americana," founded 
 in London by Miranda. The object of both was the 
 fomentation of revolution against Spain in South America. 
 
 Thus, whilst San Martin was fighting the battles of 
 Spain against Napoleon, he was at the same time work- 
 ing secretly to deprive her of her American dominions. 
 
 After Albuera he went to London, whence he sailed, 
 in 1 812, for the River Plate. There he joined the 
 Argentine forces, soon obtained an important command, 
 and did good service. 
 
 In 1 8 14 he formed the project of leading an army 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PERU AND SAN MARTIN 29; 
 
 across the Andes to liberate Chile. It was not till early 
 in 18 17 that the "army of the Andes" was ready for its 
 great task. 
 
 San Martin had now been joined by the Chilian 
 patriot, Bernardo O'Higgins, who commanded one of 
 the brigades of the expeditionary force of 3000 men. The 
 difficulties of the march were as great as those which 
 Bolivar incurred, two years later, in his march to Bogota. 
 They were surmounted with equal success, and, on the 
 14th February 1817, Santiago de Chile was occupied by 
 the patriots. San Martin, a much less ambitious man 
 than Bolivar, refused the offer of the Chilians to make 
 him chief of the new republic, and the place was filled by 
 O'Higgins. 
 
 At the Battle of Maipii, on the Sth April 18 18, the 
 Spanish power in Chile was practically overthrown. 
 
 San Martin, equally with Bolivar, recognising that so 
 long as Spain remained strong in Peru there could be no 
 safety for the new republics, resolved on destroying the 
 power of the Viceroy. For this purpose he, with the 
 invaluable aid of Lord Cochrane, organised a Chilian 
 navy. Cochrane's first expedition against Callao took 
 place in February 18 19. It was merely a raid, and gave 
 no great results, beyond strengthening confidence in the 
 new-born navy. A second expedition, in the latter part 
 of 1819, was of the same nature, but was more successful, 
 and Cochrane had now fairly established the power of 
 Chile at sea. By the time that San Martin's land forces 
 were ready in 1820, it was quite safe to transport them 
 by sea to the coasts of Peru, under the protection of 
 Cochrane's fleet. 
 
 In September 1820, San Martin landed, with 4500 
 Chilian and Argentine troops, at Pisco, 150 miles south 
 of Callao. The Viceroy, Pezuela, had five times as many 
 troops, but they were scattered over a vast area. He, 
 therefore, entered into negotiations, which had no result. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
298 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Then San Martin re-embarked, leaving Arenales with 
 looo men to operate in the mountains, and eventually to 
 reach Lima through them. 
 
 San Martin, passing in front of Callao, landed at 
 Huaura, 50 miles north of Lima, whilst Cochrane 
 blockaded Callao by sea and carried out his famous 
 exploit of the cutting out of the Esmeralda. 
 
 It is not within the scope of this volume to narrate the 
 events of San Martin's struggle in Peru, which led to the 
 evacuation of Lima by the Spaniards, its occupation by 
 San Martin, and the declaration of Peruvian inde- 
 pendence twenty days later, on the 28th July 1821. 
 Torre Tagle, the governor of Trujillo, had already led 
 the way in this respect by a declaration of independence 
 on the 29th December 1820. 
 
 Pezuela, the Viceroy, had been compelled by the 
 general dissatisfaction of the royalists with him to abdi- 
 cate, and La Serna had been elected to succeed him. 
 
 On the 2 1st September 1821, Callao surrendered to 
 the patriots. Amongst its garrison was La Mar, of 
 whom we have already heard in Guayaquil, and who 
 henceforward plays an important part on the republican 
 side, which he joined. 
 
 We must again pass over the events of the latter part 
 of 1 82 1 and the earlier part of 1822 in Peru. The 
 northern provinces had declared for San Martin, who, 
 as " Protector of Peru," practically ruled them, and held 
 Lima, Callao, and other points on the coast. But the 
 Spaniards still held in unbroken force the fertile valleys 
 of the Cordilleras, whence they made occasional descents 
 on the coast region. 
 
 Canterac, a French adventurer,^ chief of the staff to the 
 
 ' The same to whom reference has been made already in the history of 
 the war between Morillo and Bolivar in Venezuela, supra, p. 185. He 
 was born in France about 1775, ^^^ *^s shot in Madrid in 1835 when 
 trying to suppress a mutiny. He was a French royalist who took service 
 under the Spanish Bourbons. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PERU AND SAN MARTIN 299 
 
 Viceroy, in particular gained a notable victory at lea over 
 the republican general, Tristan. The enervating climate 
 of Lima had made it the Capua of San Martin, and he 
 seems there to have lost much of his former energy. He 
 felt that, without assistance from the victorious troops of 
 Bolivar, he had little chance of destroying the strong 
 Spanish forces subsisting in comfort in the mountain 
 valleys. From the Peruvians themselves, lukewarm as 
 most of them were in practical support of the republican 
 cause, he could get little assistance. His endeavours to 
 annex Guayaquil to Peru have already been referred to. 
 
 It was as far back as February 1822 that San Martin, 
 aware of Bolivar's march southwards, determined to meet 
 him at Guayaquil. He started on the 6th February, 
 after announcing his reasons for seeking the interview in 
 the following words : " I go to meet at Guayaquil the 
 Liberator of Colombia ; the general interests of both states, 
 the energetic termination of the war which we are waging, 
 and the establishment of the destiny which America is 
 rapidly nearing, necessitate our interview, since circum- 
 stances have constituted us responsible in the highest 
 grades for the result of this sublime enterprise." ^ 
 
 San Martin, finding Bolivar was not likely to be at 
 Guayaquil for the present, returned to Lima, from Paita, 
 and remained there awaiting an opportunity for the 
 meeting. On the 13th July he wrote to Bolivar announcing 
 that he would sail from Callao before the i8th to 
 Guayaquil, and thence march to meet Bolivar at Quito.* 
 No doubt he intended on the way to gather in Guayaquil 
 to Peru. But Bolivar had anticipated him, as we know. 
 
 On the' morning of the 25th July, San Martin's ship, the 
 " Macedonia," anchored at Pund, outside Guayaquil. The 
 Liberator sent aides-de-camp to meet the Protector, to 
 offer him accommodation in the house which had been 
 prepared for his reception, and to welcome his arrival on 
 ^ Mitre, iii. 6io. ^ IHd., p. 612. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
300 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 "Colombian soil." That was a plain statement that 
 the annexation of Guayaquil to Colombia was definitely 
 settled. 
 
 San Martin, landing on the morning of the 26th, was 
 received by Bolivar and his staff with full military 
 honours. The Protector of Peru had nothing to com- 
 plain of in his reception either by Bolivar or by the 
 Guayaquilenos, but he realised at once that he had been 
 anticipated by the astuteness of the Venezuelan, and that 
 Guayaquil was not to become a province of Peru. In 
 the evening, after dinner, Bolivar and San Martin retired 
 alone to a private room to discuss the weighty matters 
 with which their interview was concerned. 
 
 Of what occurred at this interview Larrazabal professes 
 to give an exact account, though, as O'Leary says very 
 little about it, one is inclined to suspect that the account 
 is founded on presumption rather than on knowledge. 
 
 According to Larrazabal's account, San Martin pro- 
 pounded three principal questions for discussion. First, 
 was Guayaquil |to be Colombian or Peruvian ? That 
 question had practically been decided by recent occur- 
 rences. The electoral college had not yet assembled to 
 vote, but it was to do so in a few days, and, with Bolivar 
 dominating the city with his troops, it was impossible 
 to doubt how the vote would go, despite the efforts of 
 Salazar, La Mar, and the rest of the Peruvian party. 
 Bolivar argued the superior claims of Colombia, finally 
 falling back on the general desire of the more important 
 families in Guayaquil for union with the northern republic, 
 and the fact that the matter would be finally decided by 
 the vote of the Representative Assembly. Of course he 
 vaunted the liberty of choice which was to be allowed 
 to that Assembly, but such vaunts may be taken for what 
 they are worth. 
 
 Then San Martin asked who was to command the 
 auxiliary force to be sent to Peru to form an army round 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN 301 
 
 the nucleus of the Venezuelan battalion " Numancia." 
 To that the Liberator replied that he had decided on 
 General Juan Paz Castillo, an officer who had served 
 under San Martin, and was one of his admirers. San 
 Martin expressed his satisfaction at the appointment. 
 On the next question, of the form of government to be 
 instituted in the Spanish dominions when they were 
 liberated, there was direct opposition between the views 
 of San Martin and Bolivar. The Liberator had all along 
 been a staunch republican. It is true that he would 
 listen to nothing but a centralised republic, as opposed 
 to a loose confederation, or a Federal Government, with 
 its implication of separation as the word was understood 
 in South America. San Martin, on the other hand, 
 starting as a republican, had gradually become convinced 
 that, looking to the conditions of South America 
 generally, the country was not ripe for a republican 
 government. He would have preferred a constitutional 
 monarchy under some cadet of one of the European 
 reigning families, independent, of course, of Spain. For 
 himself he had no wish to wear a crown. He told Bolivar 
 plainly that he had already entered upon negotiations 
 n this sense with La Serna, the Spanish Viceroy of Peru, 
 and had sent as envoys to Spain Don Juan Garcia del 
 Rio and General Jardissen. This action Bolivar strongly 
 disapproved, asserting that the Colombians had worked 
 hard to eradicate the monarchical idea, and propagate 
 a republican sentiment. He strongly maintained that 
 nothing would induce the peoples of Venezuela and New 
 Granada to accept a monarchy. It was this republican 
 sentiment alone which had induced the " Numancia " 
 battalion to revolt, at the instigation of a few men of 
 Cundinamarca and Cauca serving as privates in its ranks. 
 As for himself, the liberator of slaves, even if he should 
 wish to import a European monarch, he would at once 
 be disowned by his countrymen, who had worked with 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
302 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 him for the destruction of the monarchy. In fine, he 
 would have no hand in such an undertaking; to do so 
 would be to forfeit his title of Liberator. 
 
 San Martin replied that, no doubt, the cruelties of the 
 Spanish leaders in Colombia had created a republican 
 feeling which could only be guided in more appropriate 
 directions by men like Bolivar, Sucre, and Santander. 
 In favour of a monarchy he urged the general want of 
 education in the Spanish colonies, the diversity of the 
 races inhabiting them, the unity of religion, the power of 
 the clergy, the general ignorance of the parish priests, the 
 military spirit engendered in the masses by war. All 
 these, he said, foreboded anarchy, once the war of libera- 
 tion was finished. In a few towns, like Caracas, Bogotd, 
 and Buenos Aires, a few men had qualified, by study and 
 by their talents, for leadership. Elsewhere in Spanish 
 America, including Mexico and Peru, there were no 
 republican elements. In his opinion, it would be much 
 simpler to establish a monarchy, as in Brazil. He had 
 left Spain expecting, from what he had heard from 
 Colombia and Buenos Aires, to find South America 
 imbued with republican principles ; but now he confessed 
 he had no longer any hope of seeing the establishment 
 of a republic. So convinced was he on this subject that, 
 if Bolivar still opposed a monarchy, he (San Martin) 
 would prefer to leave the regeneration of South America 
 to him, and to abandon to him the command. 
 
 To all this Bolivar replied that the proclamation of 
 republican tenets in South America was no isolated fact, 
 but the consequence of the great revolution of ideas which 
 had spread from the United States all over the Christian 
 world. He praised English institutions as the light of 
 civilisation, and the origin of the institutions of a model 
 republic. It would be easier to establish a republic than 
 a monarchy, which would be a mere caricature. Such 
 titles of aristocracy as existed in the South American 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN 303 
 
 provinces were held by paupers, who could not afford 
 even to give a dinner to a prince. A monarchy in the 
 New World could only be an ephemeral one, and kings 
 would be deposed by their palace guards, in order to 
 substitute a republic. Yet Bolivar was ready to admit 
 that a fresh revolution would in all probability follow on 
 the final acquisition of liberty. " Neither shall we," he 
 said, " nor the succeeding generation see the glory of the 
 republic which we are founding. I consider America as 
 a chrysalis ; she will undergo a metamorphosis in the 
 physical existence of her inhabitants ; finally, she will 
 develop a new caste formed of all the existing races, one 
 which will produce a homogeneous people. Let us not 
 hold back the march of the human race by institutions 
 which, as I have told you, are exotics in the virgin soil of 
 America." 
 
 As for the idea of his own movement to Peru to take 
 command of the army, Bolivar said that neither he nor 
 the army could go without the sanction of Congress. 
 Yet he made it quite clear that, if the army did go to the 
 south, he alone would command it, and would yield the 
 management of the campaign to no one. That was a 
 plain enough warning to San Martin that, if Bolivar came 
 to Peru, he meant to be at the head of affairs there, and 
 there would be no place for San Martin himself 
 
 As if with the intention of inflicting another blow 
 upon his rival, Bolivar then handed to the Protector a 
 letter, showing that, immediately after his departure for 
 Guayaquil, his own generals had fallen away, and it 
 appeared probable that his unpopular minister, Montea- 
 gudo, had been deposed and Lima handed over to the 
 royalists. This news had reached Bolivar by land from 
 his agent at the Peruvian capital, whilst San Martin was 
 at sea. After reading the letter, San Martin said, "If 
 this has happened, I shall go to Europe and bid an 
 eternal farewell to South America." 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
304 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 So much for Larrazabal's account, which does not 
 pretend to be based on documents or the accounts given 
 by either of the parties to the interview. 
 
 Mitre ^ gives San Martin's version, in so far as it was 
 communicated, about 1840, to Captain Lafond, and pro- 
 duced in his " Voyages autour du monde." 
 
 In the first place, there is San Martin's judgment 
 of BoHvar in the following words : " At first sight his 
 personal appearance prejudiced me against him. He 
 appeared to have much pride, which was in contrast with 
 his habit of never looking in the face of the person he was 
 addressing, unless the latter was by far his inferior. I 
 was able to convince myself of his want of frankness in 
 the conferences I had with him at Guayaquil. His 
 language was at times somewhat rough, but it seemed to 
 me that that was not natural to him, and that he only 
 sought in this way to give himself a martial air. Public 
 opinion charged him with unlimited ambition and a burn- 
 ing thirst for command, a reproach which he himself has 
 completely justified." ^ 
 
 This is supported by a letter from Blanco Encalada, the 
 Chilian admiral commanding the ships at Guayaquil, to 
 O'Higgins, dated 22nd September 1822.' "Guayaquil is 
 incorporated in Colombia by the vote of Bolivar and his 
 bayonets. His modest ambition extends a great deal 
 farther beyond that than you and the world can imagine." 
 
 Elsewhere San Martin says : " His feats of arms entitle 
 him to be considered the most extraordinary character 
 that South America has produced ; of a constancy to 
 which difficulties only add strength." 
 
 Against these opinions of Bolivar may be set his own 
 
 of San Martin, expressed in a letter to Sucre.* " General 
 
 ' "Historia de San Martin, etc." (1890), chap. xlvi. (v.). 
 ^ Lafond, "Voyages autour du monde," ii. 152, cited by Mitre, iii. 
 p. 620 n. 
 
 ' Taken from Vicufia Mackenna's " General San Martin," p. 54. 
 * O'Leary, Docts., 29, p. 259. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN 305 
 
 San Martin was respected by the army which was 
 accustomed to obey him ; the people of Peru regarded 
 him as their Liberator ; his party had been favoured by 
 fortune, and you know that the illusions which fortune 
 lends are at times worth more than merit. In fine, Peru 
 has lost a good captain and a benefactor." 
 
 The most important evidence as to what happened at 
 the conference is afforded by the letter which San Martin 
 wrote to Bolivar on the 29th August 1822, after his return 
 to Peru. This letter was only published by San Martin 
 ten years after Bolivar's death.^ The more important 
 passages in it are these : — 
 
 " The results of our interview have not been such as to 
 promise me the early termination of the war." It goes on 
 to say that Bolivar evidently did not believe in the 
 sincerity of San Martin's offer to serve under him, and 
 had pleaded that it would not be becoming to accept such 
 an offer, and that, in any case, Colombia would not allow 
 him to go to Peru. Then San Martin dilates on the 
 strength of the royalists with 19,000 veteran troops, who 
 could be concentrated in two months, whilst the republi- 
 cans had but 8500 inferior troops. Under such circum- 
 stances, Bolivar's offer of 1400 men would be useless. 
 They would only be enough to garrison Callao. " In fine, 
 my part is irrevocably chosen. I have convened the first 
 Congress of Peru. The day after its installation I leave 
 for Chile, for I am convinced that my presence is the only 
 obstacle which prevents your coming to Peru with your 
 army." 
 
 As for Guayaquil, San Martin says he will only remark 
 that he had thought it a matter which would be settled 
 by the respective governments after the war of independ- 
 ence was over. He had not thought it a matter to be 
 decided by Bolivar and himself. 
 
 Then he says : " I have spoken to you. General, with 
 ' For the letter in full see Mitre (1890 edition), Appendix 31. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 QUITO, PASTO, AND PERU, 1822-23 
 
 ON the 30th July 1822, the Electoral Junta of 
 Guayaquil voted, as it was bound to do, for 
 union with Colombia. Salom was appointed 
 Intendant of the Department. On the ist 
 September, Bolivar started southwards, having previously 
 despatched 2500 Colombian troops to march to Callao 
 by land and join the " Numancia " battalion. From 
 Cuenca Bolivar wrote to San Martin's Foreign Minister 
 offering another 4000 men, provided Chile and Buenos 
 Aires also furnished troops to aid in the liberation of 
 Peru.^ But Bolivar soon had to stop his southward 
 march ; for bad news reached him from Pasto. Benito 
 Boves, said to be a nephew of our old acquaintance of 
 1 8 14, had been captured at Quito, along with Aymerich 
 and the other Spanish leaders, but had effected his 
 escape. Collecting a body of Spaniards, he now ap- 
 peared before Pasto, where there was no garrison, and 
 proclaimed Ferdinand VII. on the 28th October 1822. 
 The Pastusos, ever ready to support the royalist cause, 
 flocked to his standard and enabled him to defeat 
 Bolivar's general Obando. 
 
 Bolivar at once hurried back to Guayaquil, and des- 
 patched Sucre at the head of some troops to put down 
 the insurrection. But the Pastusos faced Sucre bravely 
 and drove him off. He fell back for reinforcements. 
 Having obtained them, he again advanced, and defeated 
 
 ^ O'Leary, Docts., 19, p. 370. 
 308 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SIMON BOLIVAR 
 AfUr a. fainting by Gil engi'aved by Charles Turner 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
TROUBLES IN PASTO AND VENEZUELA 309 
 Boves, who was driven into Pasto. The " pariementaire," 
 carrying a summons to the Cabildo to surrender, was 
 imprisoned, and Sucre found himself under the necessity 
 of storming the place. But the royalists, seeing their 
 situation was desperate, had decided to leave it. Boves 
 and a few companions made for the mountains eastwards 
 whilst the others dispersed among the " paramos " of the 
 Juanambii. When Sucre entered the place he found no 
 inhabitants left, except a few monks, women, and old 
 men. The punishment meted out to the rebellious city 
 was of the severest. More bad news reached Bolivar 
 at Tulcan, where he heard of a movement in Caracas 
 and Bogotd aiming at the restitution of the Federal 
 Republic, which he had so persistently condemned, even 
 before its first failure in the days of Miranda. The 
 constitution was to be modified in this sense by the 
 first Constitutional Congress of 1823, a Congress which 
 had no power to amend or alter the fundamental law. 
 That, however, did not trouble the agitators. 
 
 In Federalism Bolivar saw certain anarchy and civil 
 war, and nothing would induce him to consent to it. He 
 at once wrote to the Congress and to Santander. To the 
 former he said, in firm and unmistakable language, that 
 the fundamental law of Colombia was fixed for ten years, 
 and that he would die sword in hand rather than permit 
 its violation or alteration. To Santander he wrote, 
 equally firmly, in the same sense. So decided was his 
 tone that the danger was averted on the receipt of the 
 letters. 
 
 From the ist to the 14th January 1823, Bolivar was in 
 Pasto, busy settling up for the recent rebellion. Whilst 
 offering an amnesty to those who might come in promptly, 
 he imposed upon the rebel towns a forced contribution 
 for the maintenance of his troops, pressed into military 
 service all those who were fitted for it, confiscated the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
3IO SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 goods of the principal rebels, dividing them amongst his 
 men, and turned out of the country many hostile ecclesi- 
 astics. Finally, as a radical measure for the suppression 
 of opposition to the republican cause, he passed a general 
 order for the expulsion from Colombia of all European 
 Spaniards, and of all South Americans notoriously 
 opposed to the cause. Such an order, applied to a vast 
 territory, was obviously incapable of execution. For 
 the moment, Pasto was cowed into submission. Reach- 
 ing Quito on the 22nd January, the Liberator learnt that 
 San Martin had abandoned Peru, and that the Junta, 
 which now reigned there, had ordered the return north- 
 wards of the Colombian auxiliary force. 
 
 In order to be in closer touch with Peruvian affairs, the 
 Liberator proceeded to Guayaquil, which he reached on 
 the 30th January 1823, and was greeted with the news of 
 the defeat of the Peruvian independents by the royalists 
 at Torat^ and Moquehua. Alarmed for the safety of the 
 southern provinces of Colombia, he ordered the collection 
 of warlike stores, in order to be ready to resist invasion 
 by the victorious Spaniards. 
 
 When he got back to Lima, after the interview with 
 Bolivar at Guayaquil, San Martin reassumed the govern- 
 ment, and attended the assembly of the Constituent 
 Congress on the 20th September 1822. In presence of 
 the Congress he formally resigned his command. The 
 resignation was accepted by the Congress, which declared 
 itself the representative of national sovereignty. 
 
 In this summary manner San Martin left Peru to her 
 own devices. The army was under the command of 
 Alvarado, who promptly showed his incapacity by losing 
 most of his army at Toratd and Moquehua. As for the 
 Congress, it was necessarily devoid of experience, and soon 
 became nothing but a tool in the hands of its President, 
 the ecclesiastic Luna-Pizarro, and of Dr Riva Aguero. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EVENTS IN PERU 311 
 
 Having got rid of San Martin, the Congress voted him 
 various honours and titles, the chief of which were 
 " Founder of the liberty of Peru " and " Generalissimo of 
 the armies of Peru." Next day San Martin embarked 
 again for Chile, bidding adieu for ever to Peru. 
 
 When the Protector was gone, the Congress proceeded 
 to appoint a triumvirate consisting of General ]os6 La 
 Mar, Felipe Antonio Alvarado (brother of the general), 
 and the Count of Vista Florida, to be the executive. It 
 was this " Junta Gubernativa," or rather La Mar, who was 
 the real power in it, who refused Bolivar's offer of 4000 
 Colombians, and ordered the return of the three bat- 
 talions already marching under the orders of Juan Paz 
 del Castillo. 
 
 The defeats of Toratd and Moquehua soon raised a 
 storm of complaint against the inefficiency of the Junta, 
 and even led to a demand by the officers of Arenales' 
 force for the removal of La Mar and his two col- 
 leagues. This the Congress refused ; whereupon the 
 army assembled outside Lima, under command of General 
 Andres Santa Cruz, and told the Congress plainly that it 
 had got to comply. The Junta was at once dismissed, 
 and Colonel Jose de la Riva-Aguero^ was appointed 
 President of the Republic. 
 
 The Republic was certainly in a very unpleasant 
 predicament, and, had it been left to itself, would pro- 
 bably have collapsed completely before the very superior 
 forces of Spain. The revolution had in fact acquired 
 very little vitality in Peru, and, saving the neighbourhood 
 of Lima and part of the coast, the country was completely 
 under Spanish dominion. Bolivar was at this moment at 
 
 1 Born at Lima in 1783 and went to Spain, whence he returned to Buenos 
 Aires in 1808. He went to Lima and served as a Spanish official, though 
 all along favouring and aiding the revolution. His banishment by Bolivar 
 was followed by his return to Lima in 1831. He died in 1858. He wrote 
 very bitterly, under an assumed name, against Bolivar and the Colombians. 
 In 1832 the Supreme Tribunal of Lima absolved him of the charges brought 
 against him in regard to his Presidency in 1824. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
312 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Guayaquil, anxiously preparing to stem the flood which 
 might at any moment break over the southern border. 
 The moment he heard of the two defeats already referred 
 to, he despatched Colonel Luis Urdaneta to offer to Peru 
 2000 Colombians, to be followed shortly by 4000 more. 
 Then, further news reaching him of the great superiority 
 of the Spaniards, he decided to despatch 3000 men at 
 once. On the 13th March 1823, in informing the 
 Peruvian government of this decision, he added an offer 
 to follow later with another 3000, commanded by himself 
 in person. The first 3000 left by sea, convoyed by two 
 ships of war. 
 
 It was a bold decision, to which Bolivar professed to 
 be led largely by considerations of the safety of Colombia. 
 Irrespective of the general consideration that there could 
 be no security for Colombia so long as Peru remained a 
 centre of Spanish power, it was clear that, once they had 
 re-occupied Lima and Callao, and obtained possession of 
 the great resources of the city and port, the Spaniards 
 would be in a much strengthened position. Then they 
 would be able to operate by sea as well as by land. 
 Public opinion, never very strongly in favour of re- 
 publicanism in Peru, would soon be turned by Spanish 
 successes back to the old royalist direction, and even in 
 Guayaquil, Quito, and above all Pasto, the royalists could 
 still command strong support. 
 
 Having decided to help Peru, whether her government 
 wished it or no, Bolivar called upon Chile and Buenos 
 Aires to aid in the work of liberation. As a matter of 
 fact, the unfortunate leaders of the Peruvian Republic, 
 Riva-Aguero and Santa Cruz, were no longer in a position 
 to reject the proffered assistance of Colombia. General 
 Mariano Portocarrero had already been despatched to 
 arrange with Bolivar to carry out his former offer. The 
 envoy, who was invested with full powers, begged 
 Bolivar to come himself He was well received by the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR SENDS TROOPS 313 
 
 Liberator, who, however, made his own coming condi- 
 tional on the previous consent of the Colombian Congress. 
 He probably cared little really what the Congress thought, 
 and only put in the condition by way of enhancing the 
 value set upon his services. Anyhow, he promptly set to 
 work to equip the second 3000 men whom he had pro- 
 mised. The difficulties were great, for there was a 
 shortage of men, money, and every other requirement of 
 war. Just at this moment there arrived more bad news 
 from Santander, who wrote from Bogotd, that Morales 
 was again making headway in Venezuela, and was 
 already marching from Merida against Cucuta.^ Bolivar 
 knew that the country between Merida and Bogotd was 
 very scantily garrisoned, and that the danger was great 
 from Morales' advance. He had received other letters, 
 from Gual and Bricefio Mendez, imploring him to return 
 and save Colombia. 
 
 On the other hand, unless the Peruvian expedition 
 were carried through promptly, it might be too late to 
 save Lima and Callao from falling into Spanish hands, 
 thus necessitating a recommencement of the work of 
 liberation. " Never," wrote Bolivar, " have I had such 
 hesitation over forming a decision ; in the end, after a 
 long inward struggle, the love of my country conquered, 
 and I set out with General Valdds to march to Bogotei." 
 But before doing so he despatched Sucre, certainly his 
 most able commander, to represent him at Lima. With 
 a man of Sucre's stamp to direct them, there was some 
 chance for the Peruvians. 
 
 On the 26th April, just as the Liberator was about to 
 march for Bogota, two more envoys arrived from Lima, 
 urgently pressing him to come at once in person. He 
 still replied that, much as he personally desired to come, 
 he dared not do so without the permission of the Con- 
 gress of Colombia. 
 
 ' Vide supra, p. 272. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
314 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Four days later, he started on the weary march to 
 Bogotcl. He had, however, only made three or four 
 marches when he received fresh advices from Briceno 
 Mendezi from Bogotd, informing him that Morales' 
 forces had fallen away rapidly, and that the Spaniard 
 was already retreating again northwards. Satisfied that 
 the danger was past, Bolivar started back next day for 
 Guayaquil. 
 
 Writing, on the 3rd May, to Gual to announce his 
 determination, he added, " unfortunately the patriots of 
 Peru are divided like those of the rest of America ; 
 moreover, part of the government is Goth,^ and the whole 
 of it incapable. The military men do not agree, because 
 none of them has the slightest authority. The southern 
 hemisphere requires a man of weight, and one having 
 many resources at his command." * 
 
 Whilst he was still at Guayaquil, he received yet 
 another urgent call for help from Riva Aguero, who 
 enclosed a resolution of the Peruvian Congress, dated 
 4th May 1823, in which he was implored to represent to 
 that of Colombia that the universal desire in Peru was 
 that the Liberator should come as soon as possible. 
 This was followed by yet another resolution of the 5th 
 May, full of flattery of Bolivar, and of thanks for what he 
 had already done.* In his reply Bolivar still insisted on 
 the necessity for respecting the Colombian Constitution, 
 great as his desire was to help Peru, and his anxiety at 
 her danger. A letter of the 24th May 1823, to the address 
 of Sucre, is interesting as showing Bolivar's views on the 
 political situation generally.^ 
 
 ' Pedro Bricefio Mendez, born in Caracas in 1794, was with Bolivar in most 
 of his campaigns up to 1819. Was member of the Congress of Cucuta and the 
 Convention of Ocana, and partly conducted the negotiations with Morillo in 
 1820. He was the recipient of almost the last of Bolivar's letters, and him- 
 self died in Caracas in 1836. 
 
 2 The term " Goths " was almost universally used at this time in South 
 America to denote the Spaniards. 
 
 5 Larrazabal, ii. 196. * Ibid., ii. 197. ^ /^j-^,^ jj. igg. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S VIEWS ON PERU 315 
 
 After saying that he does not yet know the result of 
 the expected decisive battle between Morales and Montilla 
 in the north, he mentions that the Congress had assembled, 
 and possibly he might receive his permission to march to 
 Peru by the isth June. He did not greatly regret the 
 delay, as it enabled him to improve his troops. He was 
 more than ever confirmed in his views of the situation as 
 regards Peru. "England," he writes, "is the most in- 
 terested in this matter ; for she desires to form a league 
 of all the free peoples of America and Europe against the 
 Holy Alliance, to place herself at the head of those 
 peoples, and to rule the world." It would not suit 
 England at all to have Peru under a strong European 
 power, such as Spain, whose strength in Europe he seems 
 to have over-estimated. England would prefer to see 
 Peru independent under a weak government. She 
 would, therefore, seek some pretext for supporting the 
 independence of that country. On every ground, she 
 would wish to see Peru independent of Spain. Spain 
 herself must know that her retention of Peru must mean 
 perpetual warfare. Bolivar, therefore, argues that Spain 
 must, as matters now stood, eventually recognise the 
 independence of Peru. He goes on to show that the 
 Spaniards in Peru have every advantage, their troops are 
 good, their resources great, there is unity of command. 
 On the other hand, the independent troops are inferior, 
 and, based on the coast region, they have not the resources 
 of the interior which feed the Spaniards, and there are 
 endless parties and dissensions. As for Santa Cruz, if he 
 goes trying conclusions with Canterac and Valdds,^ he 
 will infallibly be beaten, and will merely contribute to the 
 strength of the enemy. It was clearly impossible to turn 
 recruits at once into veterans, or perform other miracles. 
 " My unalterable decision is that Peru must await her 
 
 * The Spaniard. There was a General Vald& on either side, who must 
 not be confused. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
3i6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 independence from politics and lapse of time ; cer- 
 tainly not from battles." A lost battle merely meant 
 strengthening Spain, and making it more difficult to 
 compel her recognition of Peruvian independence. The 
 Liberator was all for Fabian tactics, the withdrawal of 
 Santa Cruz to Pisco or Callao, and avoidance of any 
 general action. Should it appear, however, presently that 
 Spain would not recognise Peruvian independence, then, 
 and then only, would it be time for a general advance of 
 all available troops, led by Bolivar himself All this 
 throws a good deal of light on the Liberator's professions 
 of virtuous respect for the Colombian Congress, and seems 
 to show that he was not really in such a very great hurry 
 for the permission to go to Peru. 
 
 The Liberator's estimate of the importance of the 
 Peruvian independents had already been realised, for 
 Canterac and Vald^s appeared before Lima with 8000 
 men, and the republican government, unable to oppose 
 anything like an equal number to them, decided to 
 evacuate the capital and retire to the fortress of Callao. 
 Sucre, who had hitherto refused the military command, 
 now accepted it. 
 
 In Callao confusion reigned, and, on the 22nd June 
 1823, the Congress deposed Riva-Aguero, ordered him 
 to leave Peruvian territory, and appointed in his stead 
 Francisco Valdivieso. Riva-Aguero, declining to take 
 any notice of this order, continued to exercise his 
 functions. Sucre, unable to support this sort of con- 
 fusion, promptly turned out of Callao the Congress, Riva- 
 Aguero, and the other civil employes, and sent them off to 
 Trujillo, there to continue their squabbles without inter- 
 fering with his military conduct of the defence of Callao.^ 
 
 Canterac had in the meanwhile come to the conclusion 
 
 ^ But with regard to Riva-Aguero 's guilt, see note on p. 311 supra. The 
 Peruvian view appears to be that he was innocent. See also Markham's 
 " History of Peru," p. 264. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SUCRE IN LIMA AND CALLAO 317 
 that he was in danger from Sucre and Santa Cruz, and 
 that he could do nothing against the fortress of Callao. 
 Therefore, he again evacuated Lima, and marched off, 
 with the design of attacking the insurgents in detail. 
 He left the capital on the 17th July, after exacting a 
 forced loan of 500,000 pesos, as well as a quantity of 
 church plate, and the coining machinery from the mint. 
 He took the direction of Huancavdlica after taking pre- 
 cautions against news of his doings in Lima reaching 
 Europe. 
 
 Sucre, now freed from anxiety on the side of Lima, 
 delegated to the Marquis of Torre Tagle the powers 
 conferred on himself by the Congress, declared the 
 northern departments in a state of siege, and, after seeing 
 that Callao was strengthened so as to be safe against 
 attack, embarked, with 3000 men, on the 19th July, for 
 Chala in the south, with the object of assisting in the 
 operations of Santa Cruz in that direction. But Santa 
 Cruz, who had gone off towards Upper Peru, declined 
 Sucre's aid. His operations, at first partially successful 
 against the Spaniard Valdes, failed completely when that 
 general was joined by Olaiieta. Santa Cruz was driven 
 back to the coast, after losing the greater part of his 5000 
 men. Sucre, unable to save him, re-embarked at Quilca. 
 
 Bolivar, meanwhile, still waiting for permission from 
 Congress for his expedition to Peru, heard at Guayaquil 
 that Pasto was once more in a blaze, that Colonel Flores,^ 
 commanding the republican troops there, had been 
 defeated and forced to escape to Popayan. The king 
 
 'Juan Jose Flores, bom at Puerto Cabello in 1800, was serving in the 
 Spanish ranks at the age of twelve ! Passing over to the republican side, 
 he served under Paez and in the campaign of Boyacd. He was only twenty- 
 three when he commanded at Pasto. In May 1830 he declared the separation 
 of Ecuador from Colombia, and became first President of the former. In 
 the civil wars which followed Bolivar's death Flores was defeated, and left 
 the country in 1845. Returning, he was finally defeated by the Colombians 
 under Mosquera in 1863 and died shortly afterwards. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
3i8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 had been proclaimed by Merchancano and an Indian 
 named Augustin Agualongo, who set up a government 
 in the name of Ferdinand VII. They were collecting 
 troops and preparing to retake Quito. 
 
 Bolivar, his communications with Colombia once more 
 severed by the devoted loyalty to Spain of the Pastusos, 
 set out from Guayaquil to re-open them. He had with 
 him 400 men and iocx» spare muskets. Reaching Quito, 
 he gathered up another iockd men, chiefly militia, and 
 marched against Ibarra, on the road to Pasto, where the 
 rebels had collected a force of about the same numerical 
 strength as his own. 
 
 Arriving before Ibarra on the i8th July, he at once 
 attacked the Pastusos, who fought with their usual fury. 
 They rallied again, after being shaken at first, and it was 
 with the greatest difficulty that Bolivar at last suceeeded 
 in completely defeating them, after they had lost about 
 half their force. The rest were driven across the Guditara 
 and dispersed in the mountains. 
 
 The command of the division was now given to Salom, 
 with instructions to pacify Pasto. Bolivar returned to 
 Quito and there appointed two commissions, one for the 
 expulsion of all adherents of the Spanish cause, the other 
 for the purpose of distributing over the province a 
 monthly contribution of 25,000 pesos, for the support of 
 the republican garrison. Then he returned to Guayaquil, 
 where he found awaiting him yet another deputation 
 from Peru, to which he gave the same reply as to its 
 predecessors — that he would come when he received 
 permission from Congress. 
 
 At last there arrived the decree, dated 5th June 1823, 
 by which the Congress authorised the President to leave 
 Colombian territory and proceed to Peru. Its arrival 
 had been delayed by the rising in Pasto, which had 
 stopped communication with Bogotd. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 BOLIVAR AND SUCRE IN PERU— BATTLES OF 
 JUNIN AND AYACUCHO, 1823-24 
 
 ON the 7th August, Bolivar at last embarked 
 at Guayaquil on the " Chimborazo " for Callao. 
 He arrived there on the ist September, only 
 to find things in a shocking state. Riva- 
 Aguero had replied to his deposition by the Congress by 
 dissolving it, on the ground that its existence was pre- 
 judicial to the public good. The Congress equally dis- 
 regarded Riva-Aguero's order of dissolution, and, when 
 he drove the deputies from Trujillo, they reassembled at 
 Lima, again decreed the deposition of Riva-Aguero, and 
 appointed Torre Tagle as President. Thus Bolivar found 
 that there was one President (Riva Aguero) at Trujillo, 
 and another (Tagle) with the Congress at Lima.i 
 
 The Liberator entered Lima on the first September, 
 the same day that he arrived at Callao. He was received 
 with acclamation by the whole population. Next day, 
 the Congress passed a decree authorising Bolivar to put 
 
 ' There is, it must be admitted, another side to this story, which is put 
 thus by Sir Clements Markham ("History of Peru," p. 263). "Sucre was 
 secretly intriguing to undermine the government of Riva-Aguero, and pre- 
 pare the way for the advent of bis master Bohvar. He, and his colleague 
 Tomas Heres, seduced and corrupted several members of the Peruvian 
 Congress, and through their means a revolution was prepared at Callao. On 
 the 19th June 1823 the President, Riva-Aguero, was lawlessly deposed. 
 Don Jos^ Bernardo Tagle, Marquis of Torre Tagle, a weak, unprincipled 
 man, who was the tool of Bolivar, was nominally placed in command of the 
 Peruvian executive, with the title of Supreme Delegate, but General Sucre 
 retained all the power in his own hands, as commander-in-chief. 
 
 3>9 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
320 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 a stop to the dissensions due to the action of Riva-Aguero. 
 On the 1 0th September, another decree invested him with 
 full civil and military power.^ Notwithstanding this, 
 Torre Tagle continued to be President in name, though 
 in fact his powers, and those of the Congress, were subject 
 to Bolivar's dictatorship. 
 
 Bolivar's first address to the Congress, after thanking 
 the assembly for their confidence, expressed his firm 
 determination to conquer liberty for Peru, and his assur- 
 ance of victory. " Sir," he said, " the liberating soldiers 
 who have come from the Plata, the Maule,^ the Magda- 
 lena, and the Orinoco will not return to their fatherland 
 except they be crowned with laurels, passing under 
 triumphal arches, and bearing as trophies the banners of 
 Castille. They will either conquer and leave Peru free, 
 or all will die — I promise it. I offer victory, confident in 
 the valour of the united army. Thus shall Peru be 
 independent and sovereign through all the centuries 
 which Divine Providence may appoint to her." This 
 speech was received with loud cheers. 
 
 Invited to speak further, Bolivar replied that he was 
 delighted to find, on landing at Callao, that the Congress 
 had reinstated itself in power, a fact which enabled him 
 to devote his whole attention to the main object of his 
 expedition, the war against the Spanish forces. He 
 disclaimed any desire to mix himself up with civil 
 government, to avoid which he had left the Colombian 
 capital. He was a soldier, he said, desiring to confer 
 upon Peru the greatest possible benefit, by protecting 
 her national representation. 
 
 On the 9th September, a great banquet was given by 
 the city of Lima to celebrate the arrival of the Liberator. 
 Besides Bolivar, there were present at it the President 
 of the Peruvian Congress (Dr Figuerola), the President 
 
 ^ O'Leary, Docts., 20, p. 321. 
 
 ^ The river marking the frontier between Chile and Peru. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR REACHES LIMA 321 
 
 of the Republic (the Marquis of Torre Tagle), General 
 O'Higgins the Chilian, Olmedo of Guayaquil, and many 
 others of note. There was in the speeches the usual 
 large amount of mutual flattery between the various 
 leaders, and Bolivar did not forget to mention the great 
 benefits conferred on Peru by San Martin, who was now 
 gone for good. He concluded the proceedings by a 
 vehement denunciation of men who, like Napoleon or 
 Iturbide, the unfortunate Emperor of Mexico, had 
 attempted to usurp supreme power, and had fallen in 
 the attempt. 
 
 Bolivar's first business, notwithstanding what he had 
 said about the power of the Congress, was to deal with 
 the rival President, Riva Aguero. He addressed a letter 
 to him, urging him to terminate the civil war which he 
 was exciting. Whilst awaiting the reply, he requested 
 from Chile a loan of two millions of pesos, as well as the 
 further reinforcements promised by that country. To 
 England he wrote urging a loan of eight millions of 
 pesos, the security for which was to be mainly confidence 
 in himself. He busied himself with preparations for an 
 expedition against the Spaniards in the upland valley 
 of Jauja, and in consolidating his own position in Lima. 
 He was at present very poorly provided with troops, 
 having only two battalions of infantry, a regiment of 
 Buenos Aires mounted grenadiers, and a squadron of 
 Peruvian cavalry. The rest of the forces were partly 
 with Sucre, partly with Riva Aguero at Trujillo, whilst 
 Santa Cruz, as we know, was in process of being thoroughly 
 beaten in his advance on Upper Peru. Riva Aguero 
 would pay no heed to the Liberator's demands for his 
 submission. Clearly, nothing could be done against the 
 Spaniards until this enemy was got rid of Two and a 
 half months were spent in fruitless negotiations with the 
 rebel President. Then some of his letters were inter- 
 cepted, showing that he was negotiating with the Viceroy, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
322 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 La Serna, aiming at the establishment of a sovereign 
 of the House of Bourbon. Bolivar saw that there was 
 no course open to him but the suppression by force of 
 this traitor to the republican cause. He wrote to Quito 
 and Guayaquil for more Colombian troops, and for the 
 despatch of supplies to Callao, for Lima was rapidly 
 becoming denuded of the necessities of life, owing to 
 its separation from the fertile valleys of the Andes, held 
 by the Spaniards. Sucre declined to act against Riva 
 Aguero, on the ground that the latter had calumniated 
 him.i and demanded Bolivar's personal assumption of 
 the command. Arriving at Corongo, Bolivar despatched 
 emissaries to Riva Aguero's military commander, Colonel 
 Silva, who was retiring on Cajamarca. He offered an 
 amnesty and guarantees to Silva and his troops. The 
 bait was taken, and Silva was gained over. Bolivar 
 continued his advance on Trujillo, and, by disclosing to 
 Colonel A. G. de La Fuente, another of Riva Aguero's 
 commanders, the treasonable designs of his leader, gained 
 him over also. On the 25th November 1823, La Fuente, 
 entering Trujillo at the head of his troops, arrested and 
 imprisoned Riva Aguero and his Minister Herrera, and 
 placed his force at the disposal of the Liberator. La 
 Fuente sent Riva Aguero off to Guayaquil, whence Bolivar 
 ordered him to be allowed to depart, on condition of his 
 retiring to Europe, a condition which the ex-President 
 accepted. He had a narrow escape, for La Fuente had 
 received, from the government in Lima, secret orders to 
 shoot him.* 
 
 Thus, this troublesome business being settled without 
 fighting, Bolivar found his forces increased by the 
 adhesion of the troops which had hitherto supported 
 
 ' Bolivar's sketch of the life of Sucre, in O'Leary, Docts., 1, p. 14. 
 
 " Sir C. Markham (" History of Peru," p. 264) holds that Riva Aguero 
 would have liberated Peru had he not been deposed by the intrigues of 
 Bolivar and Sucre. Also that Bolivar incited Torre Tagle to send the order 
 for his execution, for his escape from which he was indebted to La Fuente, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S DIFFICULTIES 323 
 
 Riva Aguero. He now made over command of the 
 troops to Sucre, who was no longer hampered by scruples 
 regarding his personal relations with the banished Presi- 
 dent. On the isth December 1823, Bolivar reached 
 Cajamarca,^ and at once set to work at the organisation 
 of the now united army of Peru. The difficulties were 
 great ; for, whilst publicly asserting that he was received 
 with enthusiasm, the Liberator was obliged to admit 
 privately that the country gave him little or no material 
 support, and required very careful treatment, if it was 
 to be prevented from going over bodily to the Spaniards. 
 Money was wanting, requisitions were dangerous in the 
 existing state of feeling, and the people were by no 
 means 'willing to take up arms on the republican side. 
 " The country," Bolivar wrote to Colonel Heres, " is 
 patriotic, but does not desire to serve; it is good, but 
 apathetic ; it has plenty of food and supplies, but no 
 desire to give them. In truth we have a very great job 
 on our hands." ^ 
 
 To add to his difficulties, he heard, on the very day of 
 his arrival at Cajamarca, that a Spanish squadron had 
 arrived in the Pacific, cutting off his communications by 
 sea with Guayaquil. Orders had already gone for the 
 despatch of troops in merchant vessels, and now, in view 
 of the great danger of the operation, the greatest pre- 
 cautions had to be taken to avoid their capture, and they 
 had to be marched overland. Then Bolivar returned 
 to Trujillo, whence, after issuing more orders for the 
 army, he proceeded to Lima. There he was occupied 
 with the fortification of Callao, but he found his position 
 getting worse and worse, owing to constant desertions 
 both of Peruvians and Quitenos. Again he sent to 
 Colombia for reinforcements. Yet another piece of bad 
 
 ' In the valley of the upper Amazon, between the two ranges of the Andes, 
 north-east of Trujillo. 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii. 2jS. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
324 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 news reached him, namely, that the 2500 men sent by 
 Chile had arrived at Arica, and, not finding Santa Cruz 
 there as they had expected, had first sailed north and 
 then, meeting General Alvarado, had been turned back 
 by him to Coquimbo. As the year 1823 closed, Bolivar 
 was almost in despair, as is shown by a confidential letter 
 to Sucre. " At times," he wrote, " I lose all heart. . . . 
 It is only love of the country which recalls the courage 
 lost when I contemplate the obstacles. As soon as 
 difficulties are overcome in one direction, they increase 
 in another." ^ 
 
 The commencement of 1824 found Bolivar at the small 
 port of Pativilca, 80 or go miles north of Callao. There 
 he succumbed to a bilious fever, the result, no doubt, as 
 much of the worry and anxiety he was passing through as 
 of the climate, For a week or more he was scarcely 
 conscious, but no sooner did his health begin to improve 
 than his indomitable courage reasserted itself in affirma- 
 tions of his certainty of ultimate success, despite all the 
 evil omens of the moment. 
 
 More bad news came from Colombia, in the form of 
 reports of intrigues against himself. The deputies from 
 Quito to the Colombian Congress showed themselves 
 specially hostile to him. They wrote to Quito demand- 
 ing documentary evidence of the oppressions of the magi- 
 stracy, and even accusing Bolivar himself of misconduct. 
 Their letter was put up in the public places and streets of 
 Quito by the Cabildo. Deeply hurt by these accusations, 
 Bolivar wrote to the Congress, resigning his office of 
 President of the Republic, an office which he had, he said, 
 never really exercised. If the country required his services 
 as a soldier, they were at its disposal, but he would not be 
 induced to expose himself to an end such as that of San 
 Martin in Peru. At the same time, he resigned the 
 pension of 30,C)CX) pesos per annum which had been 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii, 223. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S DIFFICULTIES 325 
 
 awarded to him by the Congress. To his friend Sucre he 
 wrote 1 : " I have sent in my resignation to Congress. 
 This course will not fail to produce some result : if it does, 
 I shall take the opportunity to resign the service 
 altogether ; I am determined not to allow Colombia to 
 be destroyed in my hands, still less will I liberate her 
 a second time. Such work is not to be done twice. I am 
 ready to fight a battle against the Spaniards, to terminate 
 the war of America, but nothing more. I am worn out 
 old,* and have nothing to look to. Yet I am like a miser 
 dreading the robbery of his wealth. Everywhere there is 
 suspicion and unrest. It appears to me that I am from 
 moment to moment losing my reputation, which is the 
 recompense and fortune which I have gained by such 
 immense sacrifice." 
 
 Notwithstanding his despair, and his daily increasing 
 difficulties, he continued his organisation of the military 
 forces, and was anxiously awaiting reinforcements from 
 Colombia. Time was what he wanted, and he proposed 
 to gain it by negotiating with Canterac. He wrote, there- 
 fore, to Torre Tagle, the President, to send his Minister 
 of War to Jauja to interview the Spanish commander- 
 in-chief and propose an armistice. Berindoaga, the 
 minister in question, went accordingly to Jauja and 
 negotiated openly in the sense desired, without any result. 
 But, at the same time, he carried on, under secret instruc- 
 tions from Torre Tagle, another negotiation, which had for 
 its objects nothing less than the restoration of the royal 
 authority in Lima and the surrender of Callao. 
 
 Just at this juncture, Bolivar had moved the Colombian 
 regiment from Callao, and entrusted the defence of the 
 fortress to the Buenos Aires auxiliary force. As soon as 
 the latter was in possession, it revolted, under the leader- 
 ship of a sergeant named Moyano, and arrested Alvarado, 
 the commandant, with all the officers of the garrison. 
 ' Lariazabal, ii. 228. ^ He was in years scarcely forty-one. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
326 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 The pretext for the revolt was found in arrears of pay, for 
 the discharge of which there was no money available. 
 Bolivar did his best to find it, but within twenty-four 
 hours of the outbreak the rebels had hoisted the Spanish 
 flag on the battlements of Callao, and sent envoys to La 
 Serna at Cuzco, placing themselves at his disposal. La 
 Serna at once despatched General Rodil as governor and 
 commandant of the province of Lima, with command of 
 the fortress of Callao, and a commission as colonel in the 
 Spanish forces for Sergeant Moyano. Callao was lost to 
 Bolivar for the present. 
 
 The Congress, in despair at these events, turned for help 
 to Bolivar, suspended the Constitution, declared itself pro- 
 rogued, and invested the Liberator with dictatorial powers. 
 
 The Dictator's possessions in Peru were practically re- 
 duced to Trujillo, whither he had gone once more from 
 Pativilca, and where he commanded about 5000 Colom- 
 bians and 4000 Peruvians, ill-supplied, and, in the case of 
 the Peruvians, lacking in military spirit and enthusiasm 
 for the cause. The royalists, on the other hand, had 
 18,000 men, of whom the Viceroy hoped to be able to use 
 12,000 for the destruction of Bolivar and his army, whilst 
 the remaining 6000 maintained peace in Upper Peru, and 
 on the coasts of the south. 
 
 One advantage Bolivar certainly enjoyed in an abso- 
 lutely free hand ; for the decree of the Congress, dated 
 loth February 1824, placed no limits on his civil and 
 military power, and left with him alone the decision as to 
 when the prorogued assembly should be again called 
 together. 
 
 His first thought was for the rescue of Lima from the 
 Spaniards, but his Colombians were too far off, though he 
 himself, with his staff, was at this time only about 70 or 
 80 miles away. He abandoned that idea, but sought to 
 bring back the troops in Lima to join his army. After 
 trying in vain to induce the Chilian general Pinto to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE MARCH TO PASCO 327 
 
 undertake the business, he sent General Mariano Neco- 
 chea. When the latter reached Lima he found everything 
 in the wildest confusion. Torre Tagle, Berindoaga and 
 others had fled to Cailao to join Rodil and the royalist 
 garrison. Amongst the fugitives were the majority of the 
 military officers, a regiment of Buenos Aires mounted 
 grenadiers, and other troops. Desertions to the enemy 
 occurred daily. There was practically nothing left for 
 Necochea to bring back. The situation was desperate, 
 yet Bolivar's courage never failed, and, though he 
 professed to the Congress that he abhorred the office of 
 Dictator, and would hold it no longer than was absolutely 
 necessary, he still spoke hopefully of victory. Everything, 
 as he wrote to Sucre, depended on the maintenance of the 
 army of the north. He summoned Sucre to join it as soon 
 as possible. After detailing all the misfortunes which beset 
 him, and referring to the possibility of help from England, 
 he adds : " The year will not be ended before we are in 
 Potosi." ^ Truly a bold prophecy, looking to the existing 
 condition of affairs ! The Liberator had received notice 
 from Colombia that neither arms, nor men, nor money 
 would be sent without the previous consent of Congress. 
 He wanted 400,000 pesos ; with difficulty he collected one 
 fourth of that sum, and Canterac was already marching 
 against him. 
 
 In the middle of April, Bolivar marched for the Depart- 
 ment of Huamachuco vii Otusco, intending to unite his 
 Colombians with the Peruvian army, which was beyond 
 the western range at Cajamarca. His activity had been 
 rewarded, and, on the i Sth April, he wrote from Otusco to 
 Colonel Heres : ^ " The next fortnight we must employ in 
 
 ' Larrazabal, ii. 238. 
 
 ' Tomas Heres, a native of Guayana, served the Spaniards for several 
 years, when he became a convert to the other side. He was then with the 
 " Numancia" battalion, and he was the leader in the revolt of that battalion 
 against Spain in Peru. He remained behind in Peru in l8z6 as Santa 
 Cruz's minister, but, after opposing the revolt of Bustatnente, he returned to 
 Colombia, where he supported Bolivar's cause to the end. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
328 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 preparation, in May we must march, and in June fight." 
 He wrote to Sucre, at the same time, that he would be 
 able to meet the enemy's 8000 men with an equal 
 number, and that meant victory for himself. The con- 
 centration of the two armies was ordered to go on through 
 May. Some of the troops had 500 miles to march in 
 order to reach Pasco the point of concentration ; all had 
 to pass through terrible snow -clad mountains. The 
 Peruvian army was under La Mar, whilst Sucre com- 
 manded the Colombians. In general command of the 
 united cavalry was the Argentine Necochea, with Miller,^ 
 the Englishman, under him in command of the Peruvian 
 cavalry. The mounted grenadiers of Buenos Aires, such 
 of them as had remained faithful, were led by Bruix, a son 
 of the well-known French admiral of Napoleon. Santa 
 Cruz was chief of the staff of the Peruvian army, Colonel 
 O'Connor of the Colombian. Bolivar himself commanded 
 in chief over the whole, about 9000 strong. During the 
 whole of June the troops continued their march through 
 country as difficult as that which Bolivar had crossed from 
 Ocafia to Cucuta in 18 13, and from the plains of the 
 Orinoco to the lofty plateau of Bogotd in 18 19. It was 
 only on the '29th July 1824, that the Liberator was able to 
 review his united army on the plateau of the Sacramento, 
 12,000 feet above sea level, between Rancas and Pasco. 
 He had 7700 men, besides some 1500 guerrillas. His 
 proclamation on this occasion is less verbose than usual, 
 and is worth quoting in full, as it has something of the 
 Napoleonic ring. 
 
 " Soldiers ! You go to complete the greatest work 
 
 Heaven has been able to entrust to men, to save a 
 
 whole world from slavery. 
 
 ' William Miller, born at Wingham (Kent) in 179S1 served in the British 
 army in the Peninsula and in the United States. Took service in the 
 republican army of Buenos Aires, and was with San Martin in Chile and 
 Peru. His memoirs, edited from his papers by his brother, give much 
 useful and interesting information at first hand. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE MARCH TO PASCO 329 
 
 " Soldiers ! The enemies whom you are going to 
 
 destroy boast of fourteen years of triumph ; they 
 
 are worthy to measure arms with yours which have 
 
 shone in a thousand fights. 
 
 " Soldiers ! Peru and all America look to you for 
 
 peace, the daughter of victory ; even liberal Europe 
 
 regards you with enchantment, for the liberty of the 
 
 new world is the hope of the universe. Will you 
 
 disappoint them .' No ! No 1 You are invincible." 
 
 The beauty of the scene was well calculated to excite 
 
 enthusiasm. Before the troops lay the broad sparkling 
 
 surface of the lake of Reyes, whose surplus waters flow to 
 
 join eventually the mighty stream of the Amazon, whilst 
 
 all around the snowy peaks of the Andes looked solemnly 
 
 down on the little army in which so many hopes were 
 
 centred. As Bolivar passed down the ranks, he was 
 
 greeted with loud cheers, especially by the Colombians, 
 
 whom he reminded of their great victory, in more or less 
 
 similar surroundings, at BoyacA, almost exactly five years 
 
 before. Then they had assured the liberty of New 
 
 Granada, now they appeared to be on the eve of a similar 
 
 struggle for the liberation of Peru, the last remaining 
 
 stronghold of Spanish dominion in South America. 
 
 Canterac was already within a march or two, with 7000 
 infantry and 2000 cavalry, beyond the further end of the 
 lake. The main road leading southwards from Pasco 
 passed between the mountains and the eastern side of the 
 lake, but there was a perfectly practicable road through 
 the hills on the west also. On the 4th August, Canterac, 
 hoping to fall on the patriots in detail as they debouched 
 from the Cerro de Pasco on to the plain, marched to the 
 town of Reyes on the main road. Next day he was at 
 Carhuamacho, with his cavalry patrolling right up to 
 Pasco. All seemed to be going well for the Spaniards, 
 but, whilst they had taken the eastern road, Bolivar had 
 marched parallel to them on the opposite side of the lake, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
330 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 and in the reverse direction. He hoped to fall on their 
 communications at the southern end of the lake and to 
 compel a battle " a front renverse." On the night of the 
 5th, he was at Conacancha, but Canterac, having heard 
 that day of the enemy's movement, was marching rapidly 
 back to recover his almost intercepted communications. 
 On the 6th, Bolivar, from the hills on the west of the 
 lake, looked down on the plain of Junin at its southern 
 extremity. There he saw the Spanish army hurrying 
 back through Reyes and over the plain. His infantry 
 was too late to catch the enemy, but, at 4 p.m., he sent on 
 900 cavalry, who came close upon the retreating royalists. 
 The republican cavalry, before reaching the enemy, had 
 to debouch through the defile between a marshy brook on 
 their left and the hills on their right. Canterac, seeing 
 his opportunity, at once drew up 1200 cavalry in line to 
 cover the retreat of his infantry and charge Bolivar's 
 horsemen as they debouched and attempted to form line 
 after passing the defile. Canterac's line had a squadron 
 in rear of either flank as reserve. Bolivar's men had no 
 time to deploy properly before the Spanish cavalry were 
 on them. Miller, with the Peruvian cavalry, had been 
 sent to the left beyond the rivulet, with orders to get 
 round the right of the enemy and charge him in flank as 
 he met the rest of the republicans in front. There was no 
 time for this, and Miller found himself compelled by the 
 rapid approach of the enemy to form front to his right 
 and meet the Spanish right in a frontal attack. He was 
 still forming when the charge struck him, and he was 
 driven leftwards in disorder, with the exception of a 
 few mounted grenadiers, under a German named Braun, 
 who carved a way for themselves through the Spanish 
 horse. 
 
 The Spaniards, who had come on in an excellent line, 
 now broke up in pursuit, some following Miller eastwards, 
 others driving Necochea, with the republican centre and 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ACTION OF JUNIN 331 
 
 right, back into the defile. The day seemed lost for 
 Bolivar ; but, fortunately, a single Peruvian squadron, 
 under Captain Suarez, had been left some distance behind. 
 This now pushed into the wide interval left between the 
 pursuers of Miller and those of Necochea. Turning to his 
 left, Suarez fell upon the rear of the Spaniards pursuing 
 Miller. The latter also faced about, and the enemy's 
 right, now between Suarez and Miller, fled in confusion. 
 This diversion enabled Necochea to rally his defeated 
 men and turn the tables on his pursuers. The left, too, 
 being rallied, the Spaniards were driven in disorder right 
 back upon their infantry, whose presence alone stopped 
 the republican pursuit. 
 
 In the fight Necochea^ was wounded and taken, but was 
 rescued from death by a Spanish soldier who had formerly 
 served under him, and now took him up on his crupper. 
 At this moment some of the Colombian cavalry came up, 
 rescued their commander, and killed the Spaniard before 
 Necochea could save him by saying what he had done. 
 
 Thus ended the so-called battle of Junin, a purely 
 cavalry action in which not a single shot was fired on 
 either side. The Spaniards lost, in the three-quarters of 
 an hour of fighting, 19 officers and 345 men killed or 
 wounded, and 80 prisoners. The republican loss was 
 only II officers and 133 men killed or wounded. Miller, 
 from whose memoirs the above account of the battle is 
 taken, records that most of the wounded died during the 
 night from the piercing cold of that great altitude. 
 
 Bolivar, who had directed the first movement, on seeing 
 the apparent defeat of his cavalry, had galloped back to 
 post his infantry and guns on a height two and a half 
 miles in rear of the scene of the cavalry action. That 
 night he occupied Reyes. 
 
 ^ Mariano Necochea, born in Buenos Aires in 1790, was educated in 
 Spain, and returned home to embrace, in 1810, the republican cause. 
 Served under San Martin and Bolivar. In 1829 was with La Mar's ill-fated 
 expedition against Guayaquil. Died in Lima in 1849. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
332 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Canterac, without waiting to use his infantry next day, 
 continued his retreat unmolested, but, marching as he 
 had to through difficult mountains, his army, demoralised 
 by the defeat of its cavalry, lost heavily from privations, 
 fatigue, and desertion. At this time his army was short of 
 Sooo men under Valdds, who had been sent to put down 
 Olaneta in Upper Peru. That general, after the restora- 
 tion of Ferdinand VII. to absolute power, and the abolition 
 of the Spanish constitution of 1820, had adopted ex- 
 treme absolutist views, whilst La Serna and the army of 
 Lower Peru remained constitutionalists. Olaneta refused 
 obedience to the Viceroy, and, after much acrimonious 
 correspondence, Valdes was sent to bring him to book. 
 There was a good deal of fighting, with varying fortune. 
 Finally, Valdes was victorious at La Lava on the 17th 
 August 1824. He was then recalled to join the Viceroy's 
 concentration on the right bank of the Apurimac. 
 
 Bolivar's men gained greatly in morale from their first 
 very marked success. 
 
 By the 24th August, the independent army had marched 
 as far as Ayacucho (Huamanga), where it halted till the 
 1 8th September. In the first half of October, Bolivar 
 went over the whole country up to the Apurimac, the 
 boundary between the departments of Huamanga and 
 Cuzco. Thence he returned to the coast in search of 
 reinforcements, leaving Sucre in command of the army. 
 Before doing so, he held a grand review of the forces, 
 followed by a banquet at which he drank to the army, 
 to Peru, to the patriots blockaded in Lima, and to the 
 triumph of liberty. His concluding words were these: 
 " May the valiant swords of those who surround me pierce 
 my breast a thousand times if ever I oppress the nations 
 which I now lead to liberty ! May the authority of the 
 people be the only power which exists on earth ! May 
 the very name of tyranny be blotted out from the language 
 of the nations and forgotten 1 " ^ 
 
 ' Larrazabal, ii. 256. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR RETURNS TO LIMA 333 
 
 His instructions to Sucre required that general, until 
 he should be reinforced, to advance with caution, only 
 occupying districts as they were evacuated by the enemy. 
 If the enemy, whose superiority he recognised, notwith- 
 standing the victory of Junin, should advance, Sucre was 
 to fall back to Huancavelica and take up a position 
 behind the bridge there. He was only to engage a 
 superior enemy in the last resort. 
 
 Miller says that, after Bolivar's departure, he and others 
 counselled a march against Canterac at Cuzco, in order 
 to attack him before he was joined by Valdds from 
 Potosi. Sucre, however, held that his instructions forbade 
 any such offensive movement. 
 
 On his way to the coast, Bolivar received an Act of the 
 Colombian Congress depriving him of the extraordinary 
 powers to be exercised when he was in the field, which 
 had been conferred on him in 1821.^ The Act, in its 
 last clause, even deprived him of the command of the 
 Colombian army. The special powers and the command 
 were conferred, instead, on the actual holder of the 
 executive power, Santander to wit. Santander delegated 
 them to the chiefs of the Departments of the south, and 
 appointed Sucre commander-in-chief. A plausible excuse 
 for this was found in the fact that it seemed anomalous 
 that Bolivar, now Dictator of Peru, should continue to 
 exercise high powers in Colombia, and to command the 
 auxiliary force lent to Peru. There can be little doubt 
 that the move, however apparently justified by such con- 
 siderations, was really based on the enmity and jealousy of 
 Santander, which dated back from the days of Castillo in 
 1 81 3. Moreover, it was Santander's object to keep him- 
 self in power as head of the executive by keeping Bolivar 
 out of Colombia. Bolivar felt the blow bitterly, but he 
 wrote to Sucre, placing him in command of the Colombian 
 troops, and adding that there should be no more inter- 
 * Supra, p. 269. ' O'Leary, Docts., 22, p. 526. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
334 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 ference by the writer than was absolutely necessary for 
 his retention of the general direction of operations, as 
 Dictator of Peru. Bolivar had the highest respect for Sucre, 
 both as a man and as a commander. Indeed, it is diffi- 
 cult not to recognise in him the most upright, loyal, and 
 talented of the commanders with whom the Liberator 
 ever had to deal. There was, perhaps, no other with 
 whom it would have been possible for him to act cordially 
 and confidently under the trying circumstances. 
 
 Bolivar clearly saw the hostile influence of Santander 
 at the back of the new Colombian law which he so deeply 
 resented. The official communication from Santander 
 was accompanied by a private letter, in which he promised 
 Bolivar all the help in troops which he required. To 
 the official letter no reply was sent ; to the private one 
 Bolivar replied that Peru would have remained for years 
 subject to Spain, but for the help of the Colombian troops. 
 Civil war had been threatened in the north, whilst the 
 Spaniards held all the south. Callao had been sold 
 by its garrison. The situation had been saved by the 
 Colombian army, which had set free five departments 
 and thirty provinces. The fear of civil war had been re- 
 moved, the royalist cavalry defeated at Junin, and now 
 the Spanish commanders had evacuated Lima, leaving 
 Callao to be blockaded by the patriots. Santander was 
 thanked for his assistance in sending troops, and for 
 promising more, which were urgently required for the 
 final liberation of Peru. There was no word of reproach, 
 no allusion to the slight which had been passed upon the 
 Liberator.^ 
 
 Three days earlier Bolivar had written to the Marquis 
 de Toro, his old friend, in terms which indicate that, 
 however hopeful he might be about the future in Peru, 
 he was deeply hurt by what had occurred in Colombia. 
 " This news (regarding the war)," he wrote, " will, I sup- 
 1 Larrazabal, ii. 260. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SUCRE AND LA SERNA 33 S 
 
 pose, satisfy you, and mitigate the pain of the com- 
 mencement of my letter. You understand, my dear 
 Marquis, that my melancholy comes from my philosophy, 
 and that I am more of a philosopher in prosperity than 
 in adversity. I say this in order that you may not fancy 
 my condition, much less my fortune, is sad. If I am sad 
 it is for you (in Colombia), since my own condition has 
 been so greatly raised that it is difficult for me to be 
 unfortunate. When I shall have lost everything on earth, 
 there will still remain to me the glory of having per- 
 formed my duty to the utmost, and that glory will for 
 ever be my good fortune and my happiness." ^ 
 
 In the middle of November, Bolivar was at Chancay, 
 30 miles north of Callao, on the point of entering 
 Lima, which had been abandoned by the royalists in 
 consequence of the news of the defeat of Junin. Rodil 
 was now securely blockaded in Callao. On the 7th 
 December 1824, Bolivar entered Lima amidst much 
 enthusiasm, and was begged by the inhabitants not to 
 leave the place again. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Spanish Viceroy, La Serna, was at 
 Cuzco when the news reached him of the unfortunate 
 affair at Junin. He at once sent to summon Vald6s, 
 who was at Chuquisaca. As soon as Vald6s reached 
 Cuzco with his division. La Serna set about the organ- 
 isation of a large force with which to avenge the defeat 
 of Junin. He was able to collect almost 11,000 men, 
 whom he organised in three divisions of infantry and one 
 of cavalry, with twenty-four guns. His divisions were 
 commanded by Monet, Villa Lobos, and Vald6s, his cavalry 
 by Ferraz, and his artillery by Cacho. Placing himself 
 at the head of this "army," which a European commander 
 would have called a division, or a very weak corps, the 
 Viceroy left Cuzco at the end of October. He made a 
 wide circuit in order to get round the right of Sucre, 
 1 Larrazabal, ii. 261. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
336 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 whom he hoped to defeat as easily as he had defeated 
 Santa Cruz in the preceding year. 
 
 When, at last, the Spanish force arrived within a few 
 miles of Sucre, the latter, convinced of the superiority of the 
 enemy, determined on retreat, in accordance with Bolivar's 
 instructions. The general direction of the march of both 
 armies was north-westward, through a country of great 
 difficulty, at a very great elevation. Rivers flowing at 
 the bottom of tremendous gorges had constantly to be 
 crossed, the roads were of the most primitive nature, and 
 marching in the rarefied air of these great altitudes was 
 very trying, even to the most acclimatised troops. The 
 march was very slow in consequence. On the 25th 
 November, Sucre and La Serna were moving parallel 
 to one another. On the ist December, Sucre tried to 
 recover his communications with Lima, but the Viceroy 
 refused the battle offered to him on the 2nd. On the 
 afternoon of the 3rd, the royalists marched, concealed by 
 heights, in order to try and get right across Sucre's com- 
 munications. Sucre, getting wind of the movement, also 
 recommenced his retreat. On this day his rearguard, the 
 " Rifles," under Colonel Sands, was attacked by Valdes, 
 and dispersed.! On the 4th, the retreat was continued, 
 the royalists marching parallel to the republicans, along 
 the crest of the hills a few miles off, just as the English 
 and French marched parallel to one another before Sala- 
 manca. The sufferings of both sides in this strenuous 
 march were great. The Viceroy again refused battle 
 offered by Sucre. On the 6th December, the patriots 
 were at Quinua, with the royalists five miles off on their 
 right, separated from them by a deep valley. Sucre 
 proposed to attack their line of outposts, but s6 much 
 ^ Miller (ii. 188) states that the original battalion of " Rifles " was com- 
 posed of Englishmen. It fought in many actions in Colombia, and nearly 
 all the English being killed or dead of disease, their place was filled first by 
 Indians, then by Creoles, mulattoes, etc. In Peru there remained with it but 
 ten British officers. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SUCRE AND LA SERNA 337 
 
 time was lost in preparations that it was too late by the 
 time he was ready. 
 
 On the 7th, the royalists, moving to their left, on the 
 farther side of a valley 600 feet deep, stood at Guaman- 
 gilla, right across the line of retreat of Sucre, who was 
 unable to attack across this great and precipitous valley. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 8th, La Serna crossed the deep 
 valley beyond Sucre's right,^ and placed his army on the 
 heights of Condorkanki, on the right of the patriot force, 
 facing south-west at right angles to Sucre's front. The 
 Viceroy's object appears to have been to drive the patriots 
 to destruction in the great valley. His new position on 
 the heights was just out of artillery range from the 
 patriots. In the evening there was some skirmishing 
 with a royalist battalion, which started to descend from 
 the heights, but presently retreated. Sucre had faced to 
 his right, in order to get his line parallel with the enemy. 
 ■ The republican army now stood facing north-east on 
 the plain of Ayacucho. Directly in front of it was the 
 Viceregal army on the steep heights of Condorkanki ; on 
 its left there was first a shallow valley, then some level 
 ground, and, beyond that again, the deep valley of which 
 mention has already been made. Behind Sucre lay the 
 village of Quinua, through which passed the road by 
 which he had hitherto been marching, and which on his 
 left rear made a precipitous descent into the great valley. 
 
 From Sucre's position to the road there was a gradual 
 descent, ending in the precipitous heights at the foot of 
 which the main road passed. On his right was another 
 ravine running at right angles to the opposing fronts. 
 
 Sucre's position was clearly desperate; he could not 
 avoid fighting, and, if he were beaten, he could not escape 
 entire destruction. For the coming battle he drew up 
 his army thus — on the right, in first line, Cordova's 
 Colombian division of four battalions ; on the left. La 
 ' The armies were now facing in the direction of their bases. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
338 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Mar's Peruvians, also four battalions ; in the centre Miller, 
 with four regiments of cavalry. Lara's division, of three 
 battalions, formed the reserve, and the one four-pounder 
 gun, which was all Sucre had to oppose to La Serna's 
 twenty -four guns, was placed in front of the centre. 
 During the night the patriots kept up musketry fire, in 
 order to prevent the royalists from descending and 
 attempting a night attack. As La Serna's infantry were 
 within musket-shot from the foot of the heights, they 
 spent a very disturbed night. 
 
 The 9th December dawned brightly on the field on 
 which was about to be decided the fate of Peru, perhaps 
 of the whole of South America. 
 
 There was equal enthusiasm on either side, though in 
 some cases brothers were fighting against one another, 
 and each knew of the other's presence in the enemy's 
 ranks. In one case Miller records the meeting of two 
 brothers at the outposts on the evening preceding the 
 battle. Twenty-four hours later he of the Spanish army 
 found himself the prisoner of his republican brother. As 
 the sun rose over the great mountains, shedding its mid- 
 summer warmth on the shivering men, the enthusiasm 
 waxed. At 9 a.m. the royalists began to move down 
 from the heights. La Serna marched on foot at the head 
 of the division of Villa Lobos, moving slightly towards 
 his left, whilst Monet's division moved straight down the 
 rocky declivity. The cavalry, dismounted and leading 
 their horses, filled the intervals between the infantry. 
 
 As the advance began, Sucre rode along his lines, 
 encouraging his men as he passed. Then, stopping in 
 front of the centre, he shouted, " Upon your efforts of this 
 day depends the fate of South America. Another day of 
 glory is about to crown your admirable constancy." He 
 was answered by loud "Vivas." 
 
 The republicans felt that their situation was desperate, 
 for, though La Serna's humanity was well known, it was 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BATTLE OF AYACUCHO 339 
 
 equally notorious that many of his subordinates were 
 men to whom massacre of the enemy was an ordinary 
 incident of victorious battle. Possibility of retreat, in the 
 event of defeat, there was none. Cordova emphasised 
 the position by dismounting and stabbing his horse, 
 accompanying his action by the words. " There lies my 
 last horse ; I have now no means of escape, we must fight 
 it out together. Forward ! with the step of conquerors ! " 
 About half of the two Spanish divisions had reached the 
 foot of the heights and had begun to re-form, when the 
 republican attack with the bayonet fell upon them. For 
 a moment the result seemed doubtful, for the Spaniards 
 fought gallantly. Then the Colombian cavalry charged, 
 headed by Colonel Silva, who fell covered with wounds. 
 In an instant all was over ; the Spaniards were in flight 
 up the hill which they had just descended. La Serna 
 was wounded and captured, and his defeated troops were 
 decimated by the fire of the pursuing Colombians. 
 
 Meanwhile there had been fighting on the republican 
 left ; for at dawn La Serna had sent Valdes round on to 
 the level ground between the great ravine and the 
 lesser one on which rested Sucre's left. Across the latter 
 Valdds opened fire on the Peruvians with musketry and 
 four guns, just as the attack in the centre began. Two 
 of La Mar's battalions were forced to retire, as did a 
 Colombian battalion sent to reinforce them. Two of 
 Valdes' battalions actually crossed the ravine, but, being 
 opportunely charged by Miller with a regiment of 
 hussars, and then attacked by the rallied republican 
 infantry, were driven back. After them, across the 
 ravine, poured the Peruvian and Colombian infantry and 
 Miller. So fierce was the republican attack that Valdes' 
 men broke and fled, their four guns being taken. The 
 battle, which had lasted but an hour, was won. Sucre's 
 single gun had done admirable service in drawing on 
 itself the fire of the royalist batteries, which would have 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
340 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 been better employed in firing on the crowded columns 
 
 of infantry. 
 
 The royalists had lost 2000 men and fifteen guns, the 
 republicans not more than half the number of men. 
 
 La Serna had allowed himself to be hurried into a 
 premature frontal attack, instead of awaiting the develop 
 ment of Vald6s' attack on the republican left. On the 
 other hand, great credit is due to Sucre for his careful 
 timing of the moment for his counter-attack. He seized 
 the time during the Spanish descent of the hill for his 
 address to his troops, thus preventing them from being 
 lured into a premature advance by their eagerness. 
 When he had finished, there was just time for his men 
 to reach the first half of the two Spanish divisions, as they 
 were seeking to restore their formation, which had been 
 broken by the difficult descent of a rocky and steep 
 slope. The other half was still in disorder on the slope 
 itself. The victory was decisive, and Sucre knew it, as 
 is shown by the opening words of his report to Bolivar : 
 " The war is ended, and the liberation of Peru completed," ^ 
 
 By I p.m. the divisions of La Mar and Lara had 
 mounted the heights of Condorkanki in pursuit of the 
 defeated Spaniards. At sundown Canterac, now in 
 command owing to the captivity of the Viceroy, pro- 
 posed a capitulation, and rode down to Sucre's quarters. 
 The Viceroy, Canterac, Valdes, Monet, and all the 
 principal officers, with some 3800 other officers and men, 
 became prisoners of war. The rest of those who had 
 escaped death dispersed over the country. 
 
 Decisive as was the battle of Ayacucho, it was fought 
 between armies neither of which exceeded in numbers 
 an ordinary European division. The royalists numbered 
 about 9500, their opponents not more than 6000.* Miller 
 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., i, p. 198. 
 
 ' Torrente puts both at about 7000 to 8000 men, but in allowing for the 
 Spanish losses in the trying march and the fighting on it, he forgets to make 
 a similar deduction for Sucre. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BATTLE OF AYACUCHO 341 
 
 says that "the troops on both sides were in a state of 
 discipline which would have been creditable to the best 
 European armies." Perhaps, in considering this state- 
 ment, some allowance should be made for the natural 
 prejudice of a man who himself commanded part of them. 
 
 Late on the night of the battle. Miller visited the captive 
 Viceroy, who was confined in the least miserable of the 
 huts of Quinua. There he found the old man sitting 
 on a bench, leaning against the wall, his white hair still 
 clotted with the blood from his wound. Tall and 
 dignified, but broken by misfortune, was the last of the 
 Spanish Viceroys of Peru, the man who, but a few hours 
 before, had been to all intents and purposes a king. 
 Now he was only too thankful to Miller for the offer 
 of a cup of tea, and for the Englishman's consideration 
 in removing to the outside the sentry whom he found 
 mounting guard in the room in which the Viceroy was. 
 On the very day of his ruin, the King of Spain had 
 despatched to La Serna the patent creating him " Conde 
 de los Andes." 
 
 The terms of the capitulation,^ signed by Sucre and 
 Canterac, provided for the transmission to their own 
 country of all the Spanish soldiers desiring to leave 
 South America, whilst those desiring to serve Peru in 
 their present capacity were to be allowed to do so. No 
 one was to suffer on account of his political opinions, 
 or his past services in the royal cause. The principal 
 officers were allowed to retain their swords and to leave 
 the country with their families. In the surrender was 
 included the whole country still held by the Spaniards, 
 as far as the Desaguadero, that is, excepting Upper Peru, 
 which was outside the Viceroy's jurisdiction. Callao was 
 to be surrendered, the Spanish ships of war being allowed 
 to depart in peace, as well as all Spanish merchants, 
 and their ships in Peruvian ports. Bolivar received the 
 ' For full terms, see O'Leaiy, Docts., 22, p. 565. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
342 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 news of Ayacucho with the greatest joy, and, on the 
 27th December 1824,^ issued a proclamation in which full 
 credit is given to Sucre and his army, the former being 
 styled " The Great Liberator of Peru " ; the latter, " Con- 
 queror of Ayacucho." Sucre also received the title of 
 " Grand Marshal of Ayacucho," and provision was made for 
 various honours and rewards to the army and the families 
 of those killed in the battle. To Sucre Bolivar wrote thus : 
 "The 9th December 1824, on which you triumphed over 
 the enemies of independence, will be for ever a day which 
 thousands upon thousands of generations will recall, ever 
 blessing the patriot and warrior who has made it cele- 
 brated in the annals of America. So long as Ayacucho 
 exists, the name of General Sucre will be remembered. 
 It will last as long as time endures." 
 
 On the signature of the capitulation, Canterac sent 
 orders to Rodil to surrender Callao in accordance with its 
 terms. That officer, however, declined to receive the 
 Spanish and Peruvian officers bringing the orders, or 
 to recognise their authority. The captain of H.B.M.S. 
 Cambridge, then at Callao, offered his ship as a meeting- 
 place for negotiations, but Rodil was obstinate in his 
 refusal to surrender, and nothing remained but for 
 Bolivar to continue to strictly blockade the place and 
 starve it out. 
 
 ^ O'Leary, Docts., 22, p. 605. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 BOLIVAR IN PERU AND BOLIVIA, 1825-26 
 
 BOLIVAR was now practically free from anxiety 
 on the score of the Spanish forces, though 
 Upper Peru still remained to be subdued. 
 He at once set to work at the civil reorganisa- 
 tion of the country. Recruiting was stopped, an amnesty 
 was proclaimed for deserters, a Supreme Court of Justice 
 was established, and a Constituent Congress was sum- 
 moned to meet on the loth February 1825. A proclama- 
 tion was issued on the 25th December 1824, in which 
 Bolivar told the Peruvians that, the liberating army 
 having accomplished its task, he would now, as he had 
 promised, resign into the hands of the Congress his 
 powers as Dictator.^ 
 
 The Liberator, considering America practically free 
 from Spanish dominion, now proceeded to suggest, in a 
 circular to all the governments of America, his idea of an 
 assembly of plenipotentiaries at Panama, as a sort of 
 court of general reference and consultation for all dis- 
 putes and common interests. 
 
 He also wrote to the President of the Colombian 
 Senate, again begging to be allowed to resign his office of 
 President. The letter seems worth quoting in extenso, as 
 illustrating the views which Bolivar publicly expressed. 
 
 Lima, 22nd December 1824. 
 " Most Excellent Sir, — The peace of Peru, which 
 our arms have procured by the most glorious victory of 
 ' O'Leary, Docts., 22, p. 601. 
 
 343 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
344 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the New World, has ended the war of the American con- 
 ' tinent. Colombia thus has no longer any enemies in all 
 her territory, or in that of her neighbours. 
 
 I have fulfilled my mission ; consequently, the time has 
 come for me to complete the offer, so often made to my 
 country, to cease to continue my public career when 
 there were no more enemies in America. 
 
 All the world sees, and says, that my remaining in 
 Colombia is no longer necessary, and no one knows this 
 better than I. I say more, I believe that my glory has 
 reached its zenith, that, seeing my country free, well con- 
 stituted and tranquil, it is time for me to leave her 
 glorious coasts. This result has been attained by my 
 arrival in Peru, and I flatter myself that, in the future, 
 the liberty and glory of Peru will be infinitely greater. 
 The Legislative Body, the Vice-President, the army, and 
 the people have shown in the first years of their career 
 that they are worthy to enjoy liberty, and most capable 
 of maintaining it in the face of the greatest difficulties. 
 I will say once for all. Sir, I desire that Europe and 
 America should be convinced of my horror of supreme 
 power, whatever aspect or name it may bear. My con- 
 science suffers under the weight of the atrocious 
 calumnies which the liberals of America and the slaves 
 of Europe assail me with. Day and night I am tormented 
 by the idea of my enemies that my services are directed 
 by ambition. Finally, I make bold to say to Your 
 Excellency, with the utmost frankness, and hoping that I 
 shall be pardoned for doing so, that I believe that the 
 glory of Colombia will suffer by my remaining on her 
 soil ; because she will always suppose herself threatened 
 by a tyrant, and because the injury she thereby does me 
 dims the brightness of her virtues, since I am a part, 
 though a small one, of this Republic. Most Excellent 
 Sir, I implore you to submit to the wisdom of the Senate 
 the renunciation which I tender of the Presidency of 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SUCRE'S OPERATIONS 345 
 
 Colombia. Its acceptance will be the recompense of my 
 services in these two Republics." ^ 
 
 In this place it will be convenient to anticipate some- 
 what by briefly describing to their conclusion Sucre's 
 operations subsequent to the battle of Ayacucho. 
 
 Immediately after the battle he marched on Cuzco, 
 where he arrived on the 24th December 1824, the very 
 day before Bolivar at Lima issued his proclamation to 
 the Peruvians. There Sucre found that, on hearing of 
 the defeat of Ayacucho, a local Junta had assembled and 
 had elected as Viceroy of Peru, Brigadier-General P. 
 Tristan, then at Arequipa. He had appointed as his 
 locutn tenens, Antonio M. Alvarez, President of the Royal 
 Audiencia. 
 
 Resistance to Sucre's victorious army being clearly 
 impossible, the Spanish garrisons scattered about the 
 neighbouring towns dispersed, and Tristan, the so-called 
 Viceroy, Alvarez, and the rest gave in their adhesion to 
 the capitulation of Ayacucho. There remained only 
 Upper Peru, which was still held by Olaneta. 
 
 From Cuzco, Sucre marched to the Desaguadero, the 
 population everywhere raising the Republican standard. 
 Olaneta, abandoning Potosi, was attacked by Mediflaceli, 
 one of his own lieutenants who had gone over to the re- 
 publicans, at Tumusla, on the 1st April 1825, where he 
 met defeat and death. Three days later Sucre was in 
 Potosf and the Spanish flag had been lowered throughout 
 Peru, except in the fortress of Callao, where Rodil still 
 obstinately held out.^ 
 
 ^ Lanazabal, ii. 278. 
 
 ^ A return signed by Sucre's chief of the staff gives as follows the numbers 
 of Spaniards disposed of by death, wounds, capture, or dispersion : — 
 Defeated at Ayacucho . . , . , . 9, S "^ 
 Garrisons of Cuzco, Arequipa, Quilca, and Fu&o . 3,280 
 
 Army of Olaneta 4,630 
 
 Generals and officers killed or captured . . . 342 
 
 Prisoners south of the Desaguadero .... 836 
 
 (O'Leary, ii. 377».) Total, 18,598 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
346 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 We now return to the doings of Bolivar, whom we left 
 at Lima in the end of December 1824. 
 
 On the 25th January 1825, a great ball was given in 
 his honour by the Municipality of Lima. In the court- 
 yard of the Municipal Hall his portrait was hung, with 
 the inscription : " He created Colombia, restored Peru, 
 and gave peace to America." As he entered, the Libe- 
 rator was greeted with hymns of praise, and his path was 
 strewn with flowers by members of the Cabildo. On this 
 occasion he inhaled the incense of flattery in quantities 
 phenomenal even for him. 
 
 Three days later, Monteagudo, who had returned from 
 banishment, was murdered in a back street of Lima. It 
 was asserted that the murder was political, and indicative 
 of a reactionary conspiracy ; but, on the whole, it appears 
 probable that its motive was either private revenge or 
 robbery. Monteagudo's tyrannies, during San Martin's 
 absence at Guayaquil, and his evil living, are quite suffi- 
 cient to account for his assassination, without seeking to 
 attribute political motives to it. 
 
 On the lOth February 1825, exactly a year after he had 
 taken up the reins of supreme authority, Bolivar met the 
 Peruvian Congress. 
 
 /" To the deputation sent to invite his attendance in the 
 /Chamber he replied with those expressions of his horror 
 of supreme power in the hands of a single man which 
 every South American Dictator uses as a matter of course. 
 The more loudly he proclaims these virtuous sentiments 
 the more completely one is convinced that he means to 
 \ exercise the power he condemns. The words have become 
 a mere formula of hypocrisy. 
 
 The Dictator now adjourned to the Assembly, preceded 
 by all the chief functionaries, civil, military, and ecclesias- 
 tical, through streets everywhere decorated, and crowded 
 by the populace. 
 
 As he entered the Chamber, he was greeted by shouts 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
EVENTS IN LIMA, 1825 347 
 
 of "Long live Bolivar! Long live the Redeemer of 
 Peru ! " Then he proceeded to address the Assembly. 
 
 The liberating army, he said, had broken the fetters 
 which Pizarro had rivetted on the sons of Manco Capac. 
 His own administration during the past year had amounted 
 to little more than a campaign, though he had found time 
 to carry out some essential reforms. Notwithstanding his 
 ardour in the cause of liberty, he was still unable to say 
 that the cloud of political disruption had passed away. 
 It would require all the wisdom of Congress to organise 
 a good government. (In this one can hardly help recog- 
 nising a strong hint that his own services were still 
 necessary.) 
 
 Then, after dilating on the debt of gratitude due by 
 Peru to Colombia, and alluding to his scheme for a general 
 Congress at Panama,^ he proceeded to congratulate the 
 Peruvians on being liberated from the two greatest of 
 evils, " from war by the victory of Ayacucho, from despot- 
 ism by my resignation." He added that his destiny called 
 him to aid in the liberation of Upper Peru and the reduc- 
 tion of Callao. After that, he would return to his own 
 country to render an account of his mission. Then the 
 President of the Congress replied, saying that past events, 
 
 ^ This was an old idea of Bolivar's, to which he gave much thought in 
 the Jamaica days of 1815. It was to be a sort of Amphictyonic League, at 
 which were to be represented all the late Spanish colonies, Brazil, the United 
 States, and even Great Britain and Holland. It would be a sort of Federal 
 Congress for the whole of America, in which would be discussed all great 
 questions concerning the states constituting the Confederation, and their 
 relations with other nations. The idea never came to much. Mexico, 
 Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru sent representatives, who met in 1826, after 
 many delays. Brazil formally agreed. Buenos Aires and Chile would have 
 nothing to do with it. Great Britain, Holland, and the United States 
 merely agreed to send representatives to watch the proceedings. 
 
 The Congress, such as it was, in no way realised Bolivar's expectations, 
 and he finally damned it by comparing it to " that mad Greek who, from a 
 rock in mid-ocean, pretended to direct the ships sailing around him" 
 (O'Leary, ii. 345). 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
348 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the insecurity of the present, and the general opinion of 
 
 all were against the acceptance of Bolivar's resignation. 
 
 The Liberator again spoke, repeating that, now that 
 Peru was practically free, there was no place in it for a 
 foreigner like himself, at any rate once Upper Peru was 
 freed and Callao taken. He would serve Peru with his 
 sword and heart as long as a single enemy remained on 
 her soil ; after that, " let the Republics of Peru and 
 Colombia, hand in hand, give the example of the great 
 confederation which must fix the future destinies of this 
 new universe." 
 
 He then left the Congress, which at once set to work 
 to prepare a decree for the continuation of Bolivar's power 
 until the assembly of the Congress of 1826. As soon as 
 the decree was completed, a deputation waited on Bolivar 
 with it. 
 
 The Liberator, no doubt, fully expected this, and was 
 graciously pleased to yield to the reiterated demands of 
 the Congress. On the same day, the Assembly passed 
 a resolution of thanks to " Simon Bolivar, Father and 
 Saviour of Peru," and to the army. A statue and a medal 
 were decreed, Sucre's title of " Grand Marshal of Ayacucho" 
 was confirmed,^ with a grant of 200,000 pesos added, and 
 finally, a reward of one million of pesos was granted to 
 Bolivar, with a second million for distribution by him 
 among the officers and men of the army. He accepted 
 all but the personal endowment, which he refused, though 
 later on he agreed, at the suggestion of Congress, to 
 accept it for works of beneficence in his native city of 
 Caracas. Personal avarice was certainly not one of 
 Bolivar's faults ; he entered on his career a rich man, he 
 died, notwithstanding all the opportunities he had to 
 enrich himself, a poor one. 
 
 1 It was at this time that Bolivar wrote his "succinct epitome of the Life 
 of Sucre," which is reproduced in O'Leary, Docts., I, 9-lS- AH these 
 decrees are in O'Leary, Docts., 23, p. 29, etc. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN UPPER PERU 349 
 
 The Liberator, seated once more firmly on the Dicta- 
 torial Chair of Peru, again set to work at the organisation 
 of the administration. There were a thousand urgent 
 matters to be attended to. Civil and criminal laws had 
 to be codified, the army to be reorganised, education to 
 be attended to, in fact, every branch of administration 
 called for creation or reconstruction. For the organisa- 
 tion of education Bolivar employed his old tutor Simon 
 Rodriguez, who had at last returned to Colombia, and, on 
 a special invitation from his former pupil, had gone to 
 Lima.i 
 
 Having set all these matters in motion, he entrusted 
 the government, during his absence, to a council consisting 
 of La Mar, Sanchez Carrion, and Unanue, with whom he 
 left full instructions for their guidance. Amongst their 
 duties were promulgation of the constitution and prepara- 
 tion for the elections to the constituent Congress, reform 
 of the army and navy, the remittance of 2,ocX),ooo pesos 
 from the English loan, when received, to Upper Peru, to 
 pay no one before settling the arrears of the army and 
 navy, to send envoys to England and other countries to 
 open relations, and many other matters. 
 
 Bolivar reached Arequipa by land on the 14th May, 
 1825. On the way he heard of the death of Olafleta and 
 the pacification of Upper Peru. Everywhere he was busy 
 with reforms and the redress of grievances, into details of 
 which it is impossible for us to enter. 
 
 Leaving Arequipa on the loth June, he was in Cuzco 
 on the 25th. Wherever he passed on this long journey 
 he was enthusiastically received. At Cuzco, especially, 
 the welcome assumed forms of flattery such as had dis- 
 
 ' In his letter to Rodriguez, dated 24th January 1824, Bolivar fully 
 admits the influence of the tutor in forming his political opinions. 
 
 Rodriguez and Bolivar were both firm believers in the educational system 
 of Joseph Lancaster, which they adopted, and founded normal schools in 
 accordance with it. Of the million pesos voted to him by the Congress, 
 Bolivar sent 20,000 to Caracas for the foundation of schools on this system. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
350 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 gusted the more simple-minded San Martin at Guayaquil. 
 Bolivar's capacity for swallowing such nauseous stuff 
 seemed to be as unlimited as his readiness in making 
 speeches. Here a thousand young women, headed by 
 the prefect's wife, presented him with a golden civic 
 crown. This, however, he destined to Sucre, saying of 
 the Grand Marshal of Ayacucho : " He is the man to 
 whom are due all the honours of Peru ; it is he who is 
 the conqueror of Ayacucho, and the true Liberator of the 
 Republic." One cannot help wondering whether all these 
 demonstrations were purely spontaneous or were, to some 
 extent at least, made to order. From Cuzco, Bolivar 
 continued his progress to Pufto, visited the great lake of 
 Titicaca, and reached La Paz on the i8th September. 
 
 He was now in Upper Peru, the future position of 
 which had been a matter of some anxiety. 
 
 It had become a tacitly recognised principle in the re- 
 volted colonies that the new republics should be based 
 on the divisions of territory recognised in the days of 
 Spanish rule. It was on that principle that Bolivar had 
 treated Quito as part of the late Viceroyalty of New 
 Granada, of which it was certainly an apanage. The 
 province of Upper Peru had occupied an analagous 
 position in the Spanish time towards the Viceroyalty of 
 Buenos Aires. Therefore, on Bolivar's own principle, it 
 should, when liberated, belong to the United Provinces of 
 Argentina. Chile was different, for she had been in- 
 dependent of Peru. 
 
 Sucre's first measure after the death of Olafteta was to 
 order the convocation of a general assembly to decide 
 the destiny of Upper Peru. He set aside the claims of 
 Buenos Aires in a somewhat summary manner which 
 Bolivar disapproved. He told Sucre that, as matters 
 stood. Upper Peru should belong to the Federation of 
 La Plata, just as Quito belonged to Colombia. If it was 
 to be otherwise, that must be the result of negotiations. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN UPPER PERU 351 
 
 Under the circumstances, he considered the unconditional 
 convocation of a popular assembly to be a mistake. All 
 Sucre should do was to maintain a military occupation of 
 the province and await orders. This Bolivar wrote from 
 Lima on the 21st February, adding that he was awaiting 
 the decision of the Peruvian Congress.^ Sucre was some- 
 what offended by these orders, pleading, amongst other 
 things, that he should have had instructions earlier, before 
 he had been compelled by the disturbed state of Upper 
 Peru to convoke the Assembly. 
 
 On the i6th May, at Arequipa, Bolivar was in a position 
 to speak more definitely. In his decree of that date he 
 records in the preamble that the Peruvian Congress, by 
 decree of the 23rd February, had admitted the rights of 
 the Republic of La Plata and the provinces of Upper 
 Peru. That disposed of any claim Peru might have 
 had.^ Bolivar said that he had been officially informed 
 by Arenales that " the executive power of the United Pro- 
 vinces of the Rio de la Plata had informed him that it 
 had granted to the provinces (Upper Peru) the power to 
 pronounce as they should choose on their interests and 
 form of government." He now had a free hand both 
 from Peru and La Plata. He therefore issued a fresh 
 order for an assembly as proposed by Sucre.* Its 
 decisions, however, were to be subject to sanction by the 
 Peruvian Congress of the following year. 
 
 The Assembly of Deputies of Upper Peru met in 
 Chuquisaca* on the loth July 1825. On the 6th August, 
 it declared Upper Peru an independent republic under 
 the title of the " Republic of Bolivar." ^ Bolivar's pro- 
 tection was sought, and the usual honours and flattery 
 were lavished on him. At La Paz he was met by a 
 
 ' O'Leary, ii. 384. 
 
 ^ It could hardly have been a strong one, for it could only be based on 
 the position previous to the creation of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires. 
 
 ' O'Leary, ii. 393«. * Now known as Sucre. 
 
 ^ The name was afterwards changed to Bolivia. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
352 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 deputation of the Assembly, demanding immediate re- 
 cognition by him, on behalf of Peru, of the independence 
 of Bolivia. That, he said, he could not give, but promised 
 to use his influence with the Peruvian Congress, a promise 
 which was recognised probably as tantamount to the 
 grant of their request. He was then invited to draw up 
 a project of constitution for the Republic. Pleading his 
 want of a legal education, he yet agreed to draft a con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Five deputies were then appointed as an advisory council 
 ad interim, the 25th May 1826 was fixed for the meet- 
 ing of the national representatives, commissioners were 
 despatched to request recognition of the new Republic 
 by La Plata, Peru, and Colombia, and then, on the 
 6th October 1825, the Assembly dissolved. 
 
 After setting the administration in order, Bolivar left La 
 Paz, on the 20th September, for Potosf, which he reached 
 on the Sth October. There he was met by a mission from 
 La Plata which was to congratulate him, and convey the 
 recognition by the Republic of the independence of Upper 
 Peru. With this mission there was a great deal of 
 diplomatic fencing over the question of war with Brazil 
 regarding the annexation to the new Empire of the 
 Banda Oriental. Brazilians had invaded the province 
 of Chiquitos in Upper Peru at an earlier date. Sucre 
 had wanted to employ strong measures, but Bolivar wisely 
 offered the Brazilian Government a bridge for retreat by 
 disowning the action of their subordinates. That settled 
 the dispute as regards Upper Peru. 
 
 We cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into wearisome 
 details of the dispute between Buenos Aires and Brazil 
 regarding Montevideo and the Banda Oriental. It seems 
 difficult to resist the conclusion that Bolivar would dearly 
 have loved to intervene — on his own terms — ^just as he 
 had gone to Peru, also on his own terms. But the 
 Buenos Aireans did not see it in this light. They had 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ARGENTINA AND CHILE 353 
 
 long seen that Bolivar's ambition was pushing him on to 
 establish himself as the arbiter of the destinies of the 
 whole of the new Republics of South America. Mitre 
 tells how, at Quito, in 1823, Bolivar had said at a public 
 dinner : " The day is not far distant when I will carry 
 the flag of Colombia triumphant to Argentina." An 
 Argentine officer, who was present with San Martin's 
 contingent, promptly rose to propose a toast, "To the 
 independence of America, and of the Argentine Re- 
 public." ^ Another incident had occurred at Arequipa, 
 when Bolivar again spoke of shortly treading Argentine 
 soil. Again an Argentine officer replied : " My country- 
 men do not welcome Dictators to their soil." Bolivar, in 
 a fury, sprang upon the table, crushing the glasses and 
 plates under his heel, and shouting : " Thus will I trample 
 upon the Argentine Republic." ^ Even if these incidents 
 are exaggerated, there is ample evidence , in the vitupera- 
 tions of the liberal press of Buenos Aires, that Bolivar's 
 advent in Argentina would not be welcomed. He was 
 very cautious at Potosi, and later at Chuquisaca, in 
 dealing with the Argentine envoys, whom he declined to 
 treat with officially, on the ridiculous ground that his 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs was in Lima. Possibly this 
 might have been some excuse in the case of an ordinary 
 President, but it was none with Bolivar. The negotia- 
 tions came to nothing, though at one time there was 
 imminent danger of an armed conflict between Bolivar 
 and Argentina. The Liberator had already tried to 
 take a hand also in Chilian affairs. He had off"ered to 
 help the Chilian Government to expel the Spaniards 
 from the island of Chiloe, which they still held. Chile 
 was willing to accept a subsidy, but did not want 
 Bolivar's soldiers. Nothing came of this, for a subsidy, 
 without his own interference in Chilian aff'airs, was not at 
 all what the Liberator wished to give. 
 
 ^ Pilling, 420. 2 Ibid., 462. 
 
 z 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
354 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Foiled in his desires to impose himself upon Chile and 
 Argentina, Bolivar left Chuquisaca on the loth January 
 1826 for Arica, whence he sailed to Chorillos, reaching 
 Lima on the lOth February. He was still hankering 
 after fresh laurels, and had begun to meditate the 
 liberation of Cuba. He had hoped to find the Cuban 
 Iznaga at Lima, but he was gone before the Liberator's 
 return. 
 
 When Bolivar reached Lima he was greeted with the 
 news of the recent surrender of Rodil at Callao. The 
 place had been blockaded by sea and land for sixteen 
 months, during which time Rodil had shown much 
 activity, and inflicted heavy losses with his guns on the 
 besiegers under Salom. The garrison had been reduced 
 to desperate straits by hunger, but it was only when there 
 was not left another dog, or cat, or rat for food that Rodil 
 would surrender. Further resistance in any case would 
 have been hopeless, as there could be no expectation of a 
 relief expedition from Europe, and the Spaniards had 
 been practically obliterated in South America. 
 
 Bolivar had promised to resign his position once this 
 end had been attained. It is difficult not to agree with 
 Restrepo ^ that he would have acted wisely, both for the 
 country and his own reputation, had he at once left Peru. 
 He had announced, from La Paz, his intention to do so, 
 and had even ordered the return to their native land of 
 some of his Colombian troops. It should have been 
 manifest to him that both he and the Colombian troops 
 would presently wear out their welcome in Peru, and 
 become as hated as they had once been popular. 
 
 But he had stayed on in Upper Peru, carrying on his 
 negotiations with Argentina, and revelling in the incense 
 of flattery which was offered at his shrine. His continued 
 stay was bad for him, and worse for his soldiers, who 
 naturally began to look upon themselves as arbiters of the 
 
 ' iii. 477- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
RETURN TO LIMA 355 
 
 destiny of the country on which they were living. Such 
 ideas they carried back with them when eventually they 
 returned home, and the whole circumstances of their stay 
 in Peru were such as to tend to their corruption and to 
 foster the idea of praetorianism. 
 
 In Peru there had long been a tendency towards 
 monarchical government, the result, doubtless, of its long 
 experience of the splendours of the Spanish Viceregal 
 Court. Some of the more influential people now began to 
 put forward a project for the coronation of Bolivar under 
 the title of " Emperor of the Andes," or of " Emperor of 
 Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia." One cannot altogether put 
 aside the suspicion that the scheme may have been a trap. 
 If it was, Bolivar did not fall into it. Whatever his 
 ambitions may have been, the Liberator was wise enough 
 to see that his whole past career of republicanism was 
 inconsistent with a change of front in the direction of 
 monarchy pure and simple. 
 
 He entered Lima amidst all the usual outward demon- 
 strations of enthusiasm, but these did not represent the 
 real state of affairs. So early as the end of February a 
 plot was discovered to be aiming at the expulsion of 
 Bolivar and his Colombian troops from Peru. In it were 
 involved Necochea, Alvarado, and several other notables. 
 Though the plot was a feeble one, aiming at a definite 
 end without any definite means of attaining it, it should 
 have warned Bolivar that the time for his departure had 
 come. He allowed himself to be deceived by outward 
 demonstrations, and to be lulled into security by the 
 charms of Lima, which to him and his army became a 
 Capua, just as it had been to San Martin and his men. 
 The Congress had assembled, and Bolivar, according to 
 all his promises, was bound to surrender his power as 
 Dictator to it. The deputies began now to enter upon 
 discussions as to the validity of their own election and 
 powers, and Bolivar referred the question to the High 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
356 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Court. Then there was an agitation in favour of the 
 departure of the Liberator and his Colombians from Peru. 
 Annoyed at this, Bolivar, at the end of March, threatened 
 to clear out at once with all his troops. That at once 
 produced an alarm of anarchy, and the Liberator was 
 besieged by deputations begging him to stay. Some of 
 the petitions, notably one presented by fifty-two deputies, 
 proposed the dissolution of the Congress, pending a fresh 
 appeal to the people for an expression of their opinion as 
 to the future government. This met with the approval 
 of Bolivar, who was now intent on introducing into 
 Peru the constitution which he had framed for Bolivia 
 according to the request preferred to him at Chuquisaca.^ 
 This constitution he desired to have adopted not only by 
 Bolivia, but also by Peru and Colombia. As it throws 
 much light on his views of his own future position, it will 
 by well to state concisely the leading provisions of this 
 anomalous constitution. 
 
 The Legislature was to consist of three chambers instead 
 of the ordinary two. They were the chambers of the 
 Tribunes, the Senators, and the Censors. The idea was 
 that the Censors were to act as a sort of referee in cases 
 of difference between the other two. They were also to 
 safeguard the observance of the constitution and to 
 scrutinise the conduct of the superior officials. The office 
 of censor was tenable for life. 
 
 The Tribunes were to initiate financial measures, to fix 
 the strength of the naval and military forces, and vote the 
 budget. They were elected for four years, and half their 
 number retired every two years. 
 
 ' Supra, p. 352. The drafting of the Constitution was really completed 
 before Bolivar left Chuquisaca, but it was only sent to Bolivia in May 1826. 
 It was adopted in the autumn of that year. The life Presidency had 
 been conferred on Bolivar, but Sucre became the first actual President, with 
 powers subject to Bolivar, when the latter should be in Bolivia. Sucre 
 accepted this Presidency for two years only, and that solely on the condition 
 of being allowed to retain in Bolivia 2000 Colombian troops. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION 357 
 
 The Senators, elected for eight years, and half of them 
 retiring every four years, were to initiate measures relat- 
 ing to judicial, ecclesiastical, and commercial matters, to 
 present, for the choice of the Censors, three names of pro- 
 posed officials, judicial and ecclesiastical, and to decide 
 on the choice of subordinate magistrates from amongst 
 the names submitted by electoral colleges. The executive 
 was to consist of a President for life, a Vice-President pro- 
 posed by him to the chambers, and three secretaries of 
 state, appointed and removable by the President. The 
 functions of the President were similar to those of the 
 President of the United States, but he had no judicial or 
 ecclesiastical patronage. He was free from responsibility 
 for the acts of his administration. That rested on the 
 Vice-President or the secretary countersigning an order. 
 In case of death or illness of the President, the Vice- 
 President filled his place. The President could thus 
 practically nominate his own successor. 
 
 The judicial power was entirely independent of the 
 executive. The electorate presented candidates for 
 judicial employment to the Legislature, which selected 
 from the candidates so presented. 
 
 The suffrage was universal manhood, subject to the 
 qualification of being able to read and write, and exercis- 
 ing some science, art, or industry ; one elector was chosen 
 for every ten citizens. The electorate thus included one- 
 tenth of the whole adult male population. The electorate 
 chose the members of the three chambers, and proposed 
 to the executive candidates for the principal offices of the 
 departments, provinces, and cantons. They also pro- 
 posed to these chief officials candidates for the lower 
 offices. To the Senate they proposed candidates for 
 judicial appointments. 
 
 Slavery was abolished, and the press given full liberty. 
 
 This extraordinary constitution was subjected to much 
 criticism in the three republics to which the Liberator de- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
358 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 sired to apply it. It was adopted by Bolivia and Peru, pro- 
 bably under compulsion ; indeed, Mitre says plainly that 
 the Peruvian electoral college voted it " within a hedge of 
 Colombian bayonets." ^ Bolivar and his Colombians had 
 not long left when the Bolivian Constitution was abro- 
 gated in Peru. As we shall see presently, Bolivar was 
 obliged to abandon the idea of forcing it on Colombia, 
 which had already rejected his proposal of a President for 
 life, and was still less likely to accept a constitution under 
 which the Presidency was practically either hereditary or 
 assignable to whomsoever the President might nominate 
 as Vice-President. 
 
 The whole thing was one of Bolivar's dreams, which 
 now began to grow more and more extravagant. Amongst 
 them was that of uniting Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, 
 each with the same constitution, in a confederation of 
 which he himself would be the controlling authority. 
 This idea he presently developed still further. 
 
 There were to be seven states ^ in the Confederation, 
 viz., Bolivia as one state, Peru divided into two, and 
 Colombia into four, again with Bolivar at the head of all. 
 Each of the constituent states would have its life Presi- 
 dent. A treaty was actually signed (iSth November 
 1826) between Peru and Bolivia for the creation of a 
 Federal Congress representing them both. On the death 
 of the Liberator each state was to be at liberty to secede 
 from the union.* Bolivar appears to have expounded 
 these views to Santander in a modified form, without very 
 clearly indicating himself as head of the Confederation. 
 Santander's reply is indicative of the opposition such a 
 scheme was likely to meet with in Colombia. He writes, 
 
 ' Mitre, iii. 132. 
 
 ^ Baralt and Diaz, " Resumen, etc.," ii. 160 and 263. 
 
 * Mitre, iii. 133, etc. Bolivar is said to have remarked, with reference 
 to the end of his personal government, " My obsequies will be as bloody as 
 those of Alexander. " Gutierrez Posada, Memorias, etc., p. 140. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S WILD DREAMS 359 
 
 on the 6th July 1826, in reply to Bolivar's letters of the 
 previous April and May, as follows: "The idea of a 
 federation of Buenos Aires, Chile, and Bolivia is very 
 fine ; but as Buenos Aires and Chile are so little friendly 
 to Colombia, it would be a power always menacing us. 
 The federation of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia seems 
 to me somewhat impracticable. ... I believe that an 
 Empire extending from Potosf to the Orinoco would be 
 very strong and important, and would reconcile us with 
 Europe, though it would be a perpetual germ of war 
 between monarchists and democrats. I am going to 
 speak to you with my heart in my hand, with, all the 
 sincerity and frankness of my character and of your 
 generous friendship. 
 
 " Who is to be Emperor or King in this new Empire ? 
 A foreign prince ? That I do not wish, for I have always 
 been a patriot, and have striven continuously, during six- 
 teen years, for the establishment of a legal Government 
 under republican forms. In my position, and since I have 
 gained some moderate reputation, it would be the greatest 
 iniquity to betray my principles and belie my protests. 
 
 " Is the Emperor to be yourself? I obey willingly and 
 will never be a conspirator, for you are worthy to govern 
 us, because you would always rule us according to the 
 laws, because you would always respect the reasonable 
 opinion of the people, because you are disinterested, 
 philanthropic, etc., etc. 
 
 " And after your death, who is to be your successor ? 
 Paez? Montilla? Padilla? I will have none of them as 
 a crowned supreme chief for life. I would cease to be 
 a Colombian, and would sacrifice all my fortune rather 
 than live under such a rule. ' I will never give my vote 
 for an Empire in your hands, even if you were capable 
 of desiring to be Emperor, because I am not disposed 
 to sacrifice my principles ; but, on account of my devotion 
 to you, on account of the love and gratitude I owe you, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
360 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 and for all the other reasons I have already stated, I 
 
 should be your most faithful subject and servant. 
 
 "I do not believe you capable of entering into such 
 a plan ; for it would be to hold a poor opinion of the 
 greatness, the immensity of your glory and reputation. 
 Moreover, you have told me a hundred times that you 
 would die a republican, and that you would leave America 
 rather than embrace such a part, and I believe it firmly, 
 because no one can appreciate better than yourself all 
 the loss you would, in such a case, suffer in the opinion 
 of the world, or all to which you would expose your 
 unfading glory and your immaculate reputation. Yes ! 
 General ! be ever a republican, the same Bolivar who 
 has given us our country, and you will live for ever in 
 the free hearts of posterity, raised above all the heroes 
 whom history recognises and the world admires."^ 
 
 On the 1st June 1826, Jose Maria Pando, Bolivar's 
 Minister of the Interior, and the backer of many of his 
 chimerical schemes at this time, issued a circular offering 
 to the Peruvian nation, as represented by the electoral 
 colleges, the Bolivian constitution which had just been 
 transmitted to Chiquisaca. 
 
 Meanwhile, Bolivar's unpopularity and that of his 
 troops had been growing, despite the outward mani- 
 festations in favour of him, which were probably 
 engineered by his friends. The arrogance of the 
 Colombian troops, Bolivar's refusal to commute the 
 death sentence passed on Berindoaga and Teron for 
 alleged connivance with the Spaniards in 1824, and 
 many other things, all contributed to this. There were 
 mutterings of complaint at his failure to carry out his 
 promised resignation. Another conspiracy to drive out 
 him and his Colombians, perhaps even for his assassina- 
 tion, was discovered, and followed by executions and 
 other punishments. 
 
 1 O'Leary, Docts., 3, pp. 271, 272. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THE RETURN TO COLOMBIA AND THE 
 SUPPRESSION OF PAEZ 
 
 IN the midst of all these troubles there arrived at 
 Lima, Antonio Leocadio Guzman, father of the 
 well-known Venezuelan President, Guzman Blanco, 
 of our own times. He was the bearer of a letter 
 from Paez, dated ist October 1825, in which the Llanero 
 deliberately proposed that Bolivar, imitating the action 
 of Bonaparte returning from Egypt, should return from 
 Peru to establish a monarchy in Colombia. The situation 
 in Colombia, torn as it was by factions, resembled, accord- 
 ing to Paez, that in France when Bonaparte returned from 
 Egypt in 1799.^ To him Bolivar replied, "Neither is 
 Colombia France, nor am I Napoleon. . . . Napoleon 
 was great, unique, and, moreover, supremely ambitious. 
 Here there is nothing of the sort. I am not a Napoleon, 
 nor do I desire to be ; equally little do I desire to imitate 
 Caesar, still less Iturbide.^ Such models appear to me 
 unworthy of my glory. The title of Liberator is superior 
 to any that have been vouchsafed to human pride : it is 
 impossible for me to degrade it. On the other hand, our 
 population is like the French in nothing, nothing, nothing. 
 The Republic has raised the country to glory and pros- 
 perity, by giving it laws and liberty. The magistrates 
 of Colombia are neither Marats nor Robespierres. . . . 
 I tell you, with all frankness, that this project is suitable 
 neither to you, nor to me, nor to the country. " ^ The 
 ' O'Leary, Docts., 2, p. 57. 
 ^ For a short time Emperor of Mexico. ' Larrazabal, ii. 334. 
 
 361 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
362 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 letter is a long one, but the words quoted contain the 
 gist of it. The Liberator expressed the same horror of 
 monarchy in letters to Sucre and other friends. 
 
 He had been re-elected to the Colombian Presidency 
 on the isth March 1826, by 582 out of 608 votes, and 
 he now once more renounced, for the fourth time, this 
 honour. In a letter to Santander, he says, in the first 
 place, that it would be unconstitutional for him to serve 
 as President for more than eight years,i and in the second, 
 that he does not desire to hold ofifice any longer. He was 
 not born to be a ruler, and his continuation in ofifice would 
 be bad for Colombia, now that he had fulfilled his pro- 
 mised mission. In refusing to have anything to do with 
 Paez's proposals of a crown for himself, Bolivar had been 
 wary enough to avoid a snare, the result of falling into 
 which would probably have involved him in disaster as 
 great as that which had fallen upon Iturbide in Mexico.^ 
 
 In order to understand why Paez was suddenly 
 moved to his advocacy of a monarchy, with Bolivar 
 as its head, it is necessary to give some account of 
 what had been happening in Colombia. It will be 
 remembered that after the victory of Carabobo in 
 1 82 1, Bolivar, in order to conciliate and, if possible, 
 prevent quarrels amongst his turbulent subordinates, 
 divided Venezuela into three military commands. These 
 were given to Paez, Bermudez, and Marino respectively, 
 the first named having the Caracas division. Each of 
 these three men had, at one time or another, played 
 Bolivar false, and all were ambitious. Even with 
 Bolivar himself in Colombia, there was no great security 
 for internal peace ; when he went south to Quito and 
 Peru there was every probability of disturbance. That 
 probability was increased by the fact that Bolivar, 
 
 * See " Abstract of Constitution," supra, p. 267. 
 
 ^ Iturbide, returning from Italy to try and regain his lost throne, was 
 taken prisoner and shot in July 1824. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PAEZ AND SANTANDER 363 
 
 President in name, had to delegate iiis powers, during 
 his absence, to the Vice-President, Santander, an old and 
 bitter enemy of Paez. 
 
 Paez was little more than a barbarian, absolutely un- 
 educated, and unaccustomed to government beyond the 
 rough and ready control of his Llaneros. Naturally 
 he proceeded to apply to the more cultivated in- 
 habitants the rough modes of government which alone 
 had been effectual with the cowboys of the plains. Such 
 methods were, equally naturally, resented openly. Then 
 he fell into the hands of intriguers, who induced him to 
 go to the opposite extreme. 
 
 Paez, being subject to the orders of Santander in 
 Bolivar's absence, writhed under the necessity of obeying 
 them, and proceeded to execute them in such a way as to 
 make odious the name of Santander, their author. The 
 trouble began to be serious in 1824, when Santander 
 issued orders for a general conscription, as there were 
 rumours of a fresh attempt from Spain. The orders were 
 unpopular in Caracas, especially, no doubt, as they came 
 from Bogotd, and Paez suspended them, which he had no 
 possible right to do, though he reported his action to 
 Bogotd. Thence he received a peremptory answer, 
 requiring him at once to execute orders. 
 
 During 1825, Paez enforced them very inefficiently, 
 but suddenly, towards the end of the year, he had a fit 
 of energy, and ordered the assembly of the citizens on 
 two separate dates. Few answered the call, so Paez 
 fixed the 6th January 1826 for assembly. Again very 
 few put in an appearance, the others counting on a con- 
 tinuation of the slackness with which Paez had hitherto 
 enforced the decree. The Llanero chief, offended at 
 what appeared to be a slight on his authority, at once 
 turned out two battalions to scour the streets in parties 
 and bring in every man they found, without regard to 
 age or social status. The orders were executed with 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
364 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 severity and brutality, and for a few hours the whole city 
 was almost in a state of insurrection. Escalona, the 
 Intendant, and the municipality thereupon laid a com- 
 plaint against Paez in the Chamber of Representatives, 
 which indicted him in the Senate. That body ordered 
 his suspension from his functions of Commandant-General 
 of Venezuela, and summoned him to appear and answer 
 the charge in Bogotd (30th March 1826). As might be 
 expected, Paez received this decree with fury. He, 
 indeed, handed over the command of the departments of 
 Venezuela and Apure to Escalona in accordance with 
 the Senate's order, but he absolutely refused to go to 
 Bogotd, and retired to his own house at Valencia, bent 
 upon rebellion. This was soon fomented by his friends, 
 who represented that Venezuela could not do without 
 him. They went about armed at night, committing 
 robberies and other crimes in the streets of Valencia, by 
 way of showing that, without Paez at the head of affairs, 
 the country must relapse into anarchy. At length, the 
 municipality, which had all along favoured Paez, for- 
 mally called upon Penalver, the governor, to restore 
 him to power. Matters were not improved by the 
 arrival at Valencia of Marino and a number of his 
 ofiGcers, who were all in favour of these revolutionary 
 methods. 
 
 Penalver honestly refused to have anything to do with 
 the restoration of Paez, which, as he said, was not his 
 business- Finally, however, Paez was acclaimed by the 
 populace and the troops, and, after some hypocritical 
 pretence of reluctance, accepted the position. This hap- 
 pened on the 30th April 1826, after a specially riotous 
 night in the city. Pefialver was practically compelled to 
 continue in his office of governor. 
 
 Paez, having successfully put himself at the head of a 
 military revolution, now assumed the title of " Civil and 
 Military Chief of Venezuela," and, in a letter of the 26th 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PAEZ AND SANTANDER 365 
 
 May 1826, defied the Government at Bogotd, a defiance 
 which he repeated on the i6th July.^ 
 
 Venezuela was divided between the supporters and the 
 opponents of Paez. Of the former, Mariflo was the chief, 
 whilst Peflalver, Mendoza, and Bermudez were the leaders 
 of the latter. Mendoza, arousing the special wrath of 
 Paez, was banished; Peftalver, as already mentioned, 
 saved himself by continuing to act as governor of Valencia. 
 As for Bermudez, he was firmly established in the east, 
 and steadily supported the lawful government, notwith- 
 standing Paez's endeavours to gain him over. Arismendi 
 in Margarita, and Urdaneta in Zulia, were also opposed to 
 Paez. The state of Colombia, driven to a prospective 
 civil war by the indefensible action of Paez, was lament- 
 able. It is easy now to see why Paez displayed such 
 sudden anxiety to get Bolivar back, and to tempt him 
 with the offer of a crown. Had the Liberator accepted, 
 he would have been bound to Paez, and, once that tur- 
 bulent person had succeeded in establishing himself firmly 
 as against Santander, he would, no doubt, have thrown 
 Bolivar over. The latter's letter to Paez, refusing con- 
 sideration of the idea, was dated 26th March 1826, and 
 must have reached its destination some time after Paez's 
 revolt of the 30th April.^ 
 
 In the existing deadlock, both parties, Paez and San- 
 tander, appealed to Bolivar to return and settle affairs. 
 Each, of course, gave his own version, and each averred 
 that Bolivar, the founder of the republic, was the only 
 person to heal its internecine quarrels. The central 
 portions of the republic showed no sympathy with Paez's 
 revolution. In the south, in Quito, Cuenca, and Guaya- 
 quil, there was a movement in favour of reform under the 
 Dictatorship of Bolivar. 
 
 ' Larrazabal, ii. 347. 
 
 ^ Larrazabal (ii. 350) quotes a long letter from Urdaneta to Paez reprobat- 
 ing the idea of a crown for Bolivar. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
366 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 When Bolivar received, on the Sth July 1826, his first 
 fairly full information of the events in Venezuela, he at 
 once decided that he was bound to return to Colombia, 
 whither he had already sent O'Leary on hearing the first 
 news from Guzman. A few days later arrived Santander's 
 letter and envoys begging his return. On the 6th August 
 he publicly announced his intended departure. He was 
 besieged by deputations imploring him to stay, eight of 
 them in all. To each he gave the same reply, that 
 Colombia called him, and he must go. On the 13th 
 August, a great crowd, with bands of music and bearing 
 Peruvian flags, assembled before Bolivar's window and 
 called for his appearance. He was greeted with prolonged 
 cheers, which were followed by a speech of half an hour 
 by the parish priest, begging the Liberator not to leave 
 Peru. Still he refused, on the ground of duty. The same 
 answer was given to the municipality and others. On 
 the 15th, there were more deputations, ending with one of 
 ladies. His flowery and ambiguous answer to the latter 
 for a moment gave rise to an idea that he had yielded, 
 but on this occasion he really meant to go. On the i6th, 
 the electoral college unanimously accepted the Bolivian 
 Constitution. The vote was probably dictated by fear 
 rather than conviction. Bolivar was voted President for 
 life. At first he refused in a half-hearted way, then 
 yielded, and finally, looking to the bad news from Colom- 
 bia, decided to return thither. At last, after many festi- 
 vities, ending with a ball, which was what Bolivar enjoyed 
 more than anything, he left Callao for Guayaquil on the 
 "Congress" on the 4th September 1826, after having bid 
 farewell to the Peruvians on the preceding day in a short 
 proclamation.! 
 
 On the 1 2th September he landed at Guayaquil, having 
 been met the previous day, outside the port, by Tomas 
 C. Mosquera, bearing the news of his election at Guayaquil 
 
 ^ O'Leary, ii. 527. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR LEAVES PERU 367 
 
 as Dictator. At that he professed himself much displeased, 
 and refused the post. Landing at Guayaquil, he announced 
 his arrival to the Colombians by a proclamation, in which 
 he deplored the existing dissensions, regretted not having 
 arrived in time to prevent them, and offered his services 
 in their suppression.^ 
 
 On the 1 8th September, after setting things more or 
 less straight in Guayaquil, he set out for Quito, which he 
 reached on the 28th. There he was enthusiastically 
 received, and on the sth October started for Ibarra, which 
 he reached on the 7th. On the 13th he was at Pasto, on 
 the 23rd at Popayan. After a few days' stay there, he 
 marched across the Cordilleras to Neiva in the Magda- 
 lena valley, where he arrived on the 30th. There he was 
 again begged to take up the Dictatorship, but refused, 
 and continuing his journey, reached Bogoti on the 14th 
 November.2 There he was met by Santander. Mutual 
 compliments of doubtful sincerity marked the meeting. 
 In reply to the greetings of the military officers of the 
 capital, he expressed his pleasure that the army had 
 remained obedient to the law, remarking that such con- 
 duct should always be that of soldiers, " because on the 
 day on which armed force is decisive, liberty will be 
 endangered, and the great sacrifices of Colombia will be 
 wasted."* That day had already arrived. Bolivar re- 
 
 1 Ibid. 671. 
 
 ^ At this point, unfortunately, O'Leary's "Memoirs" abruptly cease. A 
 third volume appears to have been published, which Rojas ("Legendas 
 Historicas," i. I5i«.) says he had seen. He adds that it had been sup- 
 pressed immediately by the Venezuelan Government, for reasons of which he 
 was not aware. He believes that only two or three copies were saved, one 
 of which was lent to him. This third volume is not in the British Museum, 
 and I have been unable to hear of a copy obtainable. The only story I have 
 heard as to the reason of its suppression is that Guzman Blanco's father 
 figured in it, and that in anything but a creditable way. Consequently the 
 son, the "lUustre Americano," who paid for the publication of O'Leary's 
 writings, and the twenty-nine volumes of letters attached to them, destroyed 
 the volume to save his father's reputation. The correspondence is published 
 up to a later date, ' Larrazabal, ii. 368. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
368 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 assumed the executive power temporarily, announcing 
 the fact by a decree dated 23rd November 1826. Two 
 days later, after doing much work in all branches of 
 administration, he once more made over to Santander 
 his authority as President, and started northwards on 
 the 2Sth, taking with him Revenga, the Secretary for 
 Foreign Affairs. At Pamplona he heard that Paez had 
 summoned a Constituent Congress of Venezuela, to meet 
 in Valencia on the iSth January 1827. At La Horqueta, 
 at the junction of the rivers Zulia and Catatumbo, he 
 learnt that there had been bloodshed at Puerto Cabello, 
 which Paez had attacked as a stronghold of the govern- 
 ment's supporters. There had been more fighting in 
 Cumand, and civil war had fairly started. Bolivar had 
 already concluded that he would have forcibly to sup- 
 press revolt in Venezuela, and had demanded reinforce- 
 ments for the purpose. Crossing the Lake of Maracaibo, 
 he reached the town of that name on the i6th December, 
 Thence he issued a proclamation calling upon the 
 Venezuelans to lay aside their arms and listen to him, 
 but continued to demand more troops. The district of 
 Zulia was declared in a state of siege, Urdaneta was 
 appointed to the command of the army now assembling, 
 and the departments of Maturin, Venezuela, Orinoco, and 
 Zulia were placed under Bolivar's direct orders. After 
 two days spent at Maracaibo, he advanced on Puerto 
 Cabello with forces certainly insufficient for the forcible 
 suppression of the revolt, and his hopes of receiving more 
 from Bogotd were not great. Before leaving the capital, 
 he had despatched Ibarra with letters to Paez, which 
 produced no effect on that truculent leader, except to 
 make him issue a proclamation, in which he asserted that 
 Bolivar had come, not to destroy the authority which 
 Paez had received from the people, but to aid by his 
 advice in the reform of the administration. This pro- 
 clamation, reaching Bolivar at Cor(5, drew from him a 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR MARCHES AGAINST PAEZ 369 
 letter (dated 23rd December 1826)1 j-q Paez, which 
 Revenga characterised as a "pearl thrown to swine." 
 In it, the Liberator, professing admiration for the prin- 
 ciples of Paez's proclamation, insisted on his own desire 
 to retire from office. But he denied that he came as a 
 simple citizen, as Paez had said — as such he could do 
 nothing, and he had been summoned by Colombia to her 
 aid. He could not believe Paez would attempt to wrest 
 his authority from him, who had come from Peru to save 
 Paez from the crime of civil war. Paez himself had sum- 
 moned him, yet his proclamation said nothing of Bolivar's 
 authority or mediation. He would not, said the Liberator, 
 oppose a scheme of federation, still less would he insist 
 on the introduction of the Bolivian constitution into 
 Colombia. His only desire was to restore law and order 
 In conclusion, he was going to Puerto Cabello, where he 
 hoped Paez would meet him. 
 
 As Bolivar approached, Paez realised that public 
 opinion in Caracas was turning against himself. He 
 was determined to resist, and endeavoured to raise Apure 
 in his own favour. But, before the magic name of 
 Bolivar, his forces rapidly melted away. His com- 
 manders could do nothing, and he saw the game was up. 
 On the 31st December 1826, Bolivar reached Puerto 
 Cabello, still in ignorance of the favourable turn taken 
 by affairs in Apure, Barinas, and Carabobo. 
 
 The last hours of 1826 found Bolivar in the greatest 
 anxiety, for his position, looking to his ignorance of the 
 revulsion of feeling in his favour, seemed indeed des- 
 perate. On New Year's Day 1827, he tried conciliatory 
 measures by issuing a decree of amnesty, by notifying 
 that Paez would be continued in his office of " Superior 
 Chief of Venezuela," and would exercise civil and military 
 authority. A similar position was recognised for Marino 
 in Maturin. A National Convention, he said, would 
 ' Larrazabal, ii. 373. 
 2 A 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
370 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 be summoned, as he had already promised from 
 
 Maracaibo.^ 
 
 Paez, who had probably by this time begun to tremble 
 for his own fate, eagerly accepted the golden bridge 
 which the Liberator had built for his retreat. He recog- 
 nised Bolivar's authority as President of the Republic, 
 directed that he should everywhere be received with full 
 honours as he marched to Caracas, and annulled his own 
 decree summoning a Congress. Bolivar was delighted 
 with his success, though indeed it was probably very 
 different from what he had hoped for before he had, to 
 all appearance, put his head in the lion's mouth at Puerto 
 Cabello. Possibly he now regretted that he had not 
 been a little firmer, but the danger had been great. 
 
 Then Paez demanded his own trial. His motive in 
 doing so is not very clear. Possibly he hoped that, if he 
 thus appeared as a martyr, the result might be a fresh 
 change of the fickle people of Venezuela in his own 
 favour. If so, he was disappointed, for Bolivar, quoting 
 his own amnesty, refused a trial, and, in replying to the 
 demand, said that Paez had saved the republic and 
 given it new life. That seemed absurd enough, but it 
 was still more absurd when Bolivar repeated the state- 
 ment in more definite terms. " General Paez, far from 
 being culpable, is the Saviour of the country." * The 
 man who had lighted the match was dubbed the saviour 
 of his country because he extinguished the train just 
 before it had burned down to the powder! 
 
 Restrepo emphatically condemns this letter of Bolivar. 
 Even Larrazabal cannot defend Bolivar in this. He 
 attempts to defend him against the charge of weakness 
 in issuing the amnesty, and the confirmation of Paez's 
 authority, on the 1st January; but the defence is very 
 weak. Those orders were, Bolivar believed at the 
 moment, his best hope of getting out of the noose into 
 
 ' Restrepo, iii. 587. "^ Ibid., iii. 589. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
PAEZ SURRENDERS 371 
 
 which he had thrust his head. Had he known how fast 
 Paez's power was slipping from his grasp, it seems ex- 
 tremely improbable that he would have let him off so 
 easily. 
 
 Marching, on the 4th January, from Puerto Cabello 
 for Caracas, Bolivar met Paez at Naguanagua, and both 
 adjourned to the house of the latter at Valencia. The 
 two met as if there had never been a difference between 
 them. But during dinner a petty dispute between 
 Bolivar's chaplain and Paez's chief of the staff nearly led 
 to a fracas. Bolivar, after reminding Paez's man that he 
 had formerly been a Spanish officer, added, in the belief 
 that the offender had acted with the sanction of Paez, 
 " Here there is no authority, no power equal to mine, I 
 am as the sun amongst my lieutenants, making them 
 shine by the light which I lend them." He had but a 
 small following, who were naturally alarmed as to the 
 possible consequences of his words, surrounded as they 
 were by enemies. Nothing happened, which is excellent 
 evidence that Paez felt his position to be desperate, and 
 would have yielded completely had Bolivar been firmer 
 at Puerto Cabello. Arriving at Caracas on the loth 
 January 1827, the Liberator was welcomed with the 
 usual round of banquets and entertainments. For his 
 conduct in 1826 Paez afterwards expressed his regret. 
 In 1837, in a proclamation to his compatriots, he said : — 
 " I have been guilty of a thousand errors, the sad impres- 
 sion of which has been diminished by the indulgence of 
 my compatriots. The events of 1826, to which I was 
 led by an accusation, unjust in itself, and still worse 
 interpreted by some people, fill me still with grief and 
 repentance." ^ 
 
 The relations at this period between Bolivar and 
 Santander were about to become strained in the highest 
 
 ' Dr J. Gutierrez Ponce, "Vida de Don Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara," 
 p. 3CXJ. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
372 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 degree. In examining the causes of this there is much 
 assistance to be derived from a long memorandum written 
 by Colonel Patrick Campbell, the British Minister in 
 Bogota, which forms an enclosure to his despatch to Lord 
 Aberdeen, dated the 4th June 1829.1 
 
 His view is that, whilst Bolivar was away in Peru, 
 Santander, being practically President for the time being, 
 had no reason for opposing the Liberator. On the con- 
 trary, it was his interest to keep Bolivar satisfied and 
 supplied with troops, so as to induce him to stay where 
 he was, leaving Santander to enjoy the sweets and profits 
 of office. According to Campbell, who, it must be ad- 
 mitted, was a strong believer in Bolivar as against San- 
 tander, the administration of the latter was extremely 
 bad during the Liberator's absence. He says that during 
 his term of power Santander " had practised and con- 
 nived at the most scandalous abuses. . . . The facts 
 substantiating this assertion are numerous and notorious ; 
 the jobbing and ruinous contracts, the disposal of the 
 funds of the loan, the pecuniary accommodations made 
 from these funds to his particular friends under pretence 
 of assisting commerce and agriculture, and the glaring 
 partiality shown by his government in the reimbursement 
 of claims originating from bills issued by the government 
 in payment of its creditors and returned protested, defy 
 the refutation of this charge." Santander had so far 
 succeeded in engineering votes of confidence by the Con- 
 gress in himself, which had saved his conduct from in- 
 vestigation, but he was always apprehensive lest Bolivar 
 on his return should eventually unmask him. This 
 apprehension grew stronger when he became convinced 
 that the Liberator had no intention of returning to Peru. 
 Though Santander himself had summoned Bolivar to 
 
 ^ Campbell's correspondence referred to is to be found in the Record 
 Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, Colombia, vols, liv., Ixiv., Ixv., Ixxiii. 
 It has not been published. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SANTANDER'S INTRIGUES 373 
 
 return, he began to dread the consequences of his advent 
 as soon as he was on his way back. Yet, thinks 
 Campbell, he would never have dared to oppose the 
 Liberator, but for the fact that the latter's absence in 
 Peru had undoubtedly weakened his influence in 
 Colombia. 
 
 Before Bolivar got back to Bogotd there commenced a 
 series of veiled attacks on him in the Gazette and 
 other papers under Santander's control. To again 
 quote Campbell, Bolivar " was represented as an angry 
 despot coming to chastise the capital for having been 
 more lukewarm than the other cities of Colombia in its 
 acclamations of joy on the return of the Liberator from 
 Peru." 
 
 Bolivar for long refused to credit what he was told 
 about Santander, and believed him to be too timid and 
 weak to be dangerous. Nevertheless, he treated him 
 coldly when he met him at Bogotd. 
 
 The newspaper attacks ceased whilst Bolivar was at 
 Bogota, and he left for Venezuela under the salute of a 
 flaring panegyric inserted by Santander in the Gazette. 
 As soon, however, as he was well away, abusive articles 
 again began to appear in the Gazette, and in El Conductor, 
 a Bogotd paper controlled by Santander. There was, of 
 course, general satisfaction when it was known that civil 
 war had been averted, but Bolivar's words, styling Paez 
 " Saviour of his country," afforded an excellent peg on 
 which to hang further abuse of the Liberator. 
 
 These are the opinions regarding Santander of an 
 Englishman, whose official position, as representative of 
 his country, placed him beyond suspicion of prejudice in 
 a quarrel which did not personally concern him. In 
 another passage of his memorandum, he briefly estimates 
 the characters of the two leaders. Bolivar, he says, " had 
 in his favour the prestige of his military glory, as well as 
 his generosity, his integrity, his disinterestedness, and his 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
374 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 frankness, which raised him far above Santander, whose 
 avarice and duplicity contrasted with the opposite qualities 
 of Bolivar." Santander's present professions of liberalism, 
 Campbell declares, were belied by his despotic action 
 when in power. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 COLOMBIA AND THE CONVENTION OF OCANA, 
 1827-28 
 
 BOLIVAR was fully occupied for some time at 
 Caracas in restoring order in the neglected 
 administration, and in the finances, which 
 Paez had thoroughly ruined. 
 The 2nd January 1827 had been fixed by the constitu- 
 tion for the assembly of the Colombian Congress, and 
 Bolivar believed it would meet then, or a few days later. 
 
 On the 6th February, he despatched once more his 
 resignation of the Presidency of Colombia. He had, he 
 said, been for fourteen years at the head of the republic, 
 a position which he had been compelled by the needs of 
 the State to hold. There no longer existed any such 
 dangers. " I myself do not feel myself innocent of 
 ambition ; therefore, I desire to save myself from the 
 claws of that madness, in order to deliver my fellow- 
 citizens from anxiety, and to assure after my death a 
 reputation worthy of liberty." ^ Therefore, he insisted on 
 acceptance of his resignation, in order to save him from 
 the necessity of desertion. Santander and the Congress 
 must have got pretty well accustomed to this sort of talk, 
 and to putting but a small valuation on it. It was perhaps 
 getting a little dangerous for Bolivar to tender resigna- 
 tions, unless they were really meant to be accepted, 
 especially looking to the ill-concealed hostility of San- 
 tander, and the spread of a desire in New Granada for 
 
 ' Larrazabal, ii. 395. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
376 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 separation alike from Ecuador and from Venezuela. If 
 that were to occur, Bolivar, as a Venezuelan, would be 
 excluded from the government of New Granada. The 
 desire for separation from New Granada was equally 
 strong with many of the Venezuelans. The two 
 peoples diiifered in many ways from one another, and 
 from the people of Ecuador. Bolivar's dream of a per- 
 petual union of the three territories was really impossible 
 of realisation, as was very soon to appear by the dis- 
 solution of Colombia into its three elements of Venezuela, 
 Colombia (corresponding to New Granada), and Ecuador. 
 Since Bolivar's death they have remained separate states, 
 and there seems not the slightest probability of their ever 
 permanently coalescing again. 
 
 Whilst the Liberator was busy restoring order in 
 Venezuela, he received bad news, not only from Bogota, 
 but also from Peru. A mutiny of the 3rd Colombian 
 division, led by a Granadian named Bustamente, had 
 broken out in Lima at the end of January. The 
 mutineers had seized their officers, thrown them into the 
 dungeons of Callao, and then sent them off by sea to 
 Buenaventura. Bustamente and his followers, professing 
 great admiration for the Colombian constitution, had 
 based their rising on the supposed hostility to it of Lara 
 and other officers, whom they accused of working for a 
 dictatorship. Bustamente was joined by the Peruvian 
 revolutionaries, and together they overthrew the govern- 
 ment as left by Bolivar on his departure. The news of 
 this outbreak was received with rejoicing by Santander 
 and Bolivar's other enemies at Bogotcl. As for Bolivar, 
 when the news of the revolt reached him at Caracas, he 
 remarked — " Colombia has lost a division of troops ; but 
 the Peruvian Republic will relapse into the anarchy from 
 which it was rescued by me and the Colombian army." 
 Later, on hearing of the reception of the news at Bogotd, 
 he added — " Overwhelmed with shame, I know not which 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
REVOLT IN PERU 377 
 
 to consider the more grievous, the crime of the revolt, or 
 the deliberate approbation accorded to it by the govern- 
 ment of Bogotd. How terrible ! How could Santander 
 allow himself to be drawn into such excess of passion ! 
 To ratify the violation of military discipline ! " 
 
 Campbell, in his memorandum already quoted, openly 
 accuses Santander of having fomented this revolt, and of 
 having corresponded with Bustamente. 
 
 In Lima the enemies of Bolivar, headed by Vidaurre 
 and Pando, poured abuse on him and on Colombia. 
 Bustamente and his troops were sent to Guayaquil to 
 gain over that long-disputed department to Peru. With 
 them was sent Lopez Mendez,^ to take over the gover- 
 norship of the three southern departments as soon 
 as they should revolt against Colombia, which it was 
 assumed they would easily be persuaded to do. When 
 the expedition had been ten days at sea, news of its 
 approach was brought to Guayaquil, where T. C. Mosquera, 
 the Intendant, Generals Perez, Valdds, and others pre- 
 pared to resist it. 
 
 Early in April the invaders disembarked, part at 
 Manta under Colonel Elizalde, the rest at Paita under 
 Bustamente, the intention being to march by Loja into 
 the province of Cuenca. They marched to the cry that 
 Bolivar the tyrant had destroyed the law. They equally 
 refused to obey Santander, and said they would desist 
 only when Bolivar should appear as a simple citizen to 
 defend, before the Congress, his atrocious conduct in 
 Peru. They were presently joined by Colonel Delgado, 
 Santander's commandant in Manabi, and the whole then 
 started to march against Guayaquil. At that place 
 Antonio Elizalde^ and others, in the meanwhile, gained 
 
 '■ This was the man who had formerly been Venezuelan agent in London, 
 and who is so strongly denounced as a fraudulent person by Hippisley and 
 others. 
 
 " Brother of the Elizalde who landed at Manta. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
378 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 over the garrison to the cause of revolution. At 2 a.m. 
 on the i6th April 1827 the revolution was effected in 
 Guayaquil, and La Mar, the former commander of the 
 Peruvian troops at Ayacucho, was elected civil and 
 military chief of the place, and a little later President of 
 the Peruvian Republic. He embarked for Callao on the 
 24th July to take up his new office. 
 
 Though Bolivar had sent in his resignation of the 
 Presidency, he now changed his mind, and decided to 
 march to Bogotd and the south, in order to remedy this 
 new disaster. In his proclamation of the 19th June, 
 addressed from Caracas to the Colombians, he explains' 
 the necessity for his intervention, "as citizen, as Liberator, 
 and as President." Later on he adds a significant ad- 
 mission in the words, " The national will is oppressed by 
 these new praetorians, who have taken on themselves to 
 dictate the law to the sovereign whom they ought to 
 obey. They have assumed the sacred right of the nation, 
 they have violated all principles ; in fine, the troops 
 which were the Colombian auxiliaries of Peru have 
 returned to their country to establish a new and foreign 
 government on the ruins of the Republic, which they 
 outrage with greater insults than our oppressors." ^ The 
 reign of praetorianism had begun before this with the 
 revolt of Paez, perhaps even before that. Henceforth it 
 was to be the rule, rather than the exception, in territories 
 in which a long course of ultimately successful war had 
 taught the soldiery to look upon themselves as arbiters of 
 the destiny of governments. 
 
 On the sth July Bolivar sailed from La Guaira for 
 Cartagena, on H.B.M.S. "Druid," in company with Sir 
 A. Cockburn, the British envoy to Caracas. On the 9th 
 Cartagena was reached, and thence Bolivar set out, with 
 such troops as he had collected, for Bogota, marching by 
 Ocafia. 
 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii. 400. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR RETURNS TO BOGOTA 379 
 The news of Bolivar's march to BogotA was extremely 
 unpalatable to Santander and his partisans, who perhaps 
 felt far from secure, seeing how Bolivar's name had 
 hitherto carried everything before it, and feeling, as they 
 must have, that the Liberator had a long account to 
 settle with them. The line taken by Santander was 
 that Bolivar's advance was a distinct threat to liberty. 
 Santander himself was now posing, says Campbell, as the 
 champion of the law, " el hombre de la constitucion " (the 
 man of the constitution). His vehement messages to the 
 Senate gave rise to a discussion in which Doctor Soto 
 and other leaders of the Santander party denounced 
 Bolivar in violent terms, though no definite resolution 
 was passed. 
 
 Then there appeared an article in the Conductor, 
 Santander's organ, urging separation of New Granada 
 from Venezuela, which, of course, implied relegation of 
 the Liberator to his own country. Bogotd was almost 
 in a state of revolution. But for the advice of Soublette, 
 then Minister of War, Santander would have resigned 
 the Vice-Presidency and himself headed the revolution. 
 His chief councillors were Soto and Azuero, the editor 
 of the Conductor. Every device was employed to pre- 
 vent the advance of Bolivar and the other troops 
 which were moving from Ciicuta and Magdalena. San- 
 tander wrote that the expedition to the south was no 
 longer necessary, because Obando had reduced Guayaquil 
 to order ; but Bolivar had later and more accurate news. 
 Then the Vice-President urged the difficulty of supporting 
 the troops near the capital. Then he said that Bolivar 
 had no authority, because he had not taken the oath as 
 President. Whatever there may have been in such a 
 plea, Bolivar was not to be put off by it. Santander, 
 on his part, protested to the Senate that he would not 
 surrender power until Bolivar had taken the oath, and, 
 in his desperation, he even proposed to address a circular 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
38o SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 to the representatives of foreign powers, protesting against 
 Bolivar's action ! 
 
 Then he said that, as the south was for separation 
 from the centre and north, he would go there. His 
 secretaries told him plainly that, if he was afraid of the 
 vengeance of the Liberator, he had much better resign 
 the Vice-Presidency and clear out of the country till the 
 storm had blown over. Probably Santander saw plainly 
 that such a flight would be the end of his reputation and 
 power, so he resolved to brazen it out. 
 
 Soublette, Mosquera, Herran, and others of the party 
 of Bolivar now went northward to meet him, and to try 
 to avert the reprisals which they felt he might justly wish 
 to execute on his enemies at Bogota. From Socorro 
 Herran was sent back to Bogota, whilst the others ac- 
 companied Bolivar to Cipaquiri, the site of the great 
 salt mines, in the plain some 30 miles north of the 
 capital. Thence Mosquera was despatched with letters 
 from Bolivar announcing his intention of assuming the 
 chief authority immediately on his arrival at Bogotd. 
 
 The Congress assembled in the church of San Domingo, 
 ready to receive the President, and to administer the oath 
 of fidelity to the constitution. On the afternoon of the 
 lOth September, Bolivar arrived, and at once took the 
 necessary oath. Santander, in considerable trepidation, 
 awaited his arrival at the Presidential Palace. He found 
 his apprehensions, natural though they were, to be un- 
 founded ; for Bolivar greeted him in friendly terms. 
 The two were then left alone, to confer, and to dine 
 together ! 
 
 As Bolivar entered the capital, Soto, Azuero, and some 
 others of his chief opponents left it. Hearing of this, 
 Bolivar merely laughed, and said they could live in peace 
 and security, since he had no ideas of vengeance against 
 any one. 
 
 He then arranged for a special session of Congress 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE CONVENTION OF OCANA 381 
 to receive his account of his exercise of the supreme 
 power. The situation towards the close of 1827 was far 
 from being satisfactory. Guayaquil had set a bad 
 example by breaking away and setting up as a separate 
 republic ; there was a general tendency towards disorder 
 in Colombia ; the Spanish Governor of Puerto Rico was 
 fomenting rebellion in the province of Caracas; several 
 leaders were trying to collect forces to proclaim the 
 King ; the Indians in the Orinoco valley were giving 
 trouble ; there were symptoms of insurrection in Cor6, 
 Guayana, and Cumand; finally, there was the greatest 
 hostility to Colombia on the part of La Mar and the 
 Peruvian Congress, who were raising forces for the sub- 
 jugation of the southern provinces as far as the Juanambii. 
 Santander and his friends still secretly continued their 
 intrigues against the President, who, however, was sup- 
 ported by the Congress and the more conservative section 
 of the people. A decree was now issued convoking the 
 General Convention of Provincial Deputies to assemble 
 at Ocana on the 2nd March 1828, and rules were issued 
 for the conduct of the elections to it. This Convention, 
 for the reform of the Constitution, had been promised by 
 Bolivar when he marched against Paez. He laid special 
 stress on the necessity for the persons elected being men 
 of enlightenment and devotion to the cause of liberty. 
 
 His thoughts, meanwhile, were devoted to the problem 
 of Guayaquil. On arriving at Bogotd he learned that 
 J. J. Flores had already succeeded in working a counter- 
 revolution in Guayaquil against Lopez Mendez and Bus- 
 tamente. They and others had fled to Peru. Flores 
 had also put down an attempt to proclaim the subordina- 
 tion of Guayaquil to Peru. 
 
 Whilst Bolivar confined himself to asking for en- 
 lightened members of the coming Convention, without 
 otherwise interfering with the elections, Santander and 
 the " Liberals " were actively canvassing. " Santander," 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
382 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 wrote Bolivar, " has gone to the length of going out on to 
 the highways to seek partisans, and offering board and 
 lodging to the Deputies who come to Ocana." i 
 
 The press continued its campaign against Bolivar, who, 
 however, refused to muzzle it, as was suggested by his 
 friends. To have done so would have been to play into 
 the hands of his opponents. Just at this moment there 
 was a serious scare in Venezuela, owing to the appear- 
 ance of a Spanish squadron off the coast. Nothing came 
 of it, as the rebels under the guerrilla chief, ArizAbalo, 
 whom it was proposed to help, could not be found. 
 But the appearance of possible invasion gave Bolivar an 
 excuse for once more assuming the extraordinary powers 
 allowed to the President in time of war. He took up 
 these powers on the 13th March 1828, excepting only 
 in the Canton of Ocana, the place of meeting of the 
 Convention. 
 
 Having prescribed orders for the trial of traitors and 
 conspirators, and called in to his aid Urdaneta, Bolivar 
 marched by Tunja for Ciicuta to meet the expected in- 
 vasion. On the road he heard from Paez that the 
 danger had passed ; though about the same time he also 
 heard that General Padilla had revolted at Cartagena, 
 where he assumed control for a few days. Campbell 
 accuses Santander of being at the bottom of this revolt 
 also. Bolivar, who was marching for Venezuela, halted 
 at Bucaramanga. But Padilla, on the 7th March, finding 
 himself deserted by the garrison and the inhabitants of 
 the fortress, had fled, and had sent from Ocana a letter 
 of excuses to Bolivar. The latter ordered the arrest and 
 trial of the rebel under his recent orders for the trial of 
 conspirators. 
 
 Early in March 6y Deputies had assembled at Ocana, 
 
 1 Larrazabal, ii. 417. This is confirmed by Campbell, who says San- 
 tander managed the elections, sent to voters lists of the persons they were 
 to vote for, and arranged to pack the actual voters. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE CONVENTION OF OCANA 383 
 
 and, as they were more than half the total number 
 of 108, the Convention began its sittings on the 9th 
 April. 
 
 Among its members were Santander, Azuero, Soto, 
 Gomez, and other enemies of the President His friends 
 were headed by J, M. del Castillo,^ President of the 
 Assembly, Briceno Mendez, and others. 
 
 There was a third party of " independents," whom both 
 the parties sought to gain over, in order to turn the scale. 
 The Convention was thus a very much divided body. As 
 soon as it was installed, the Presidential message of the 
 29th February^ was read. In it Bolivar once more 
 tendered his resignation of the Presidency, and of his 
 command-in-chief. Then he proceeeded to draw a 
 gloomy picture of the state of Colombia, and to explain 
 what had led to the necessity of reforming the constitu- 
 tion, which, in 1821, and again in writing from Pasto in 
 1822, he had held to be unalterable for ten years. Ac- 
 cording to Campbell, Santander had by the profession of 
 Liberal principles gained much influence amongst persons 
 who were taught to believe that no reforms in the con- 
 stitution could be made before October 183 1. In Bolivar's 
 picture of the woes of Colombia it is impossible not to 
 see a suggestion that in himself alone lay a hope of 
 safety. Though he himself denied this interpretation of 
 his plea for a strong Government, the Convention saw in 
 it clear indications of his ambition. They were bom- 
 barded with petitions from municipalities and others. 
 Those from the centre and south of the Republic urged 
 
 ' Jose Maria del Castillo y Rada, like his namesake Bolivar's enemy, was 
 a native of Cartagena, where he was born in 1776. He was at Bogota when 
 the revolution broke out there in 1810. He succeeded in escaping Morillo 
 in 1816. To his intercession chiefly is attributed the commutation of the 
 death sentence on Santander in 1828. He died in poverty at Bogot£ in 
 1835. He was a man of peace, a " Doctor," not a soldier like the other 
 Castillo. 
 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii. 421. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
384 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 the maintenance of Bolivar in power, and it is at least 
 open to suspicion that his instigation had something to 
 do with them. 
 
 The first act of the Convention was to pass a unani- 
 mous vote that the Constitution must be reformed. Then 
 a deputy proposed the adoption of the federal system. 
 He was supported by Santander's party, though hitherto 
 Santander had been an advocate of a centralised republic. 
 The Convention, however, by a majority, negatived this 
 radical measure. The proposal was clearly aimed at 
 discrediting Bolivar,^ and rendering impossible his posi- 
 tion at the head of the state, for he had throughout been 
 a consistent advocate of a centralised republic. Though 
 it is true that, in his letter of the 23rd December 1826, to 
 Paez, he had said, " I will not oppose federation," yet his 
 views were still hostile to it, as they had ever been. A 
 committee was now appointed for the revision of the 
 Constitution. This was to be done on lines calculated to 
 exalt personal liberty at the expense of rendering the 
 Government almost impotent. Hearing of this, Bolivar, 
 abandoning all hope in the Convention, proposed to 
 betake himself to Venezuela. His friend Castillo, the 
 President of the Convention, proposed that the Liberator 
 should be sent for to Ocafla to assist in the deliberations. 
 This proposal was negatived on the 14th May by 40 
 votes to 28. Naturally, Santander and his friends felt 
 that Bolivar's presence at Ocafla would make an end of 
 their schemes for his overthrow. His personal influence 
 was still immense. To this fact, according to Larrazabal, 
 Santander paid the highest tribute. " Such is his (Bolivar's) 
 influence," said the Vice-President, " and such the secret 
 power of his will, that I myself, on many occasions, have 
 approached him in fury, and, merely on seeing and 
 
 ■^ Larrazabal (ii. 426». ) tells a story of a Deputy who, unable to support 
 the case of federation by argument, clinched the matter with the words, 
 " Anyhow it will serve to overthrow Bolivar, and the rest does not matter." 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE CONVENTION OF OCANA 385 
 hearing him, have been disarmed and have left his 
 presence filled with admiration." ^ 
 
 Two rival schemes of reform were now put forward for 
 discussion— the one drawn up by Santander's friend 
 Azuero, the other by Castillo, the ally of Bolivar. The 
 latter was backed by only twenty-two deputies, and it 
 soon became clear that they had no chance of carrying 
 their scheme. Therefore, on the 2nd June, they decided 
 to abandon the Convention and return home. This 
 decision was temporarily reversed, as the result of nego- 
 tiations with the Santander party, but, as soon as the 
 latter had thus got a chance of taking the initiative, they 
 in turn proposed to secede, saying they could not abandon 
 their liberal principles. Castillo and his friends, naturally 
 furious at being thus jockeyed out of the position taken 
 up on the 2nd June, took themselves off on the loth. 
 That left only fifty-four deputies sitting, and as the 
 presence of at least fifty-five was necessary for amend- 
 ment of the Constitution of 1821, the remainder had no 
 course left but dissolution. 
 
 After they had left, the seceding deputies issued, from 
 Santa Cruz, a justification of their conduct, into the 
 details of which it is not necessary to enter. The 
 Convention of Ocana had ended in a ridiculous fiasco, 
 though Santander and his party represented the result 
 as a victory for themselves, which, indeed, it was. The 
 means by which it was gained are quite another matter, 
 though there seems equally little to be said in favour of 
 the tactics of either side. Neither could have carried a 
 reformed constitution so long as the other was prepared 
 to render dissolution necessary by secession, rather than 
 suffer defeat.^ 
 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii. 427. 
 
 ^ Campbell avers that, looking to its constitution, the Convention was a 
 mere instrument in the hands of Santander. However, looking to the end 
 of it, it seems clear he had not sufficient control over the weapon to be able 
 to use it effectively. 
 
 2 E 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 BOLIVAR AND SANTANDER— THE CONSPIRACY 
 OF 1828 
 
 THE continued session of a Convention, of 
 which the majority was hostile to him, could 
 never have suited Bolivar, and it is per- 
 missible to suspect that he was not altogether 
 a stranger to the action of his friends in reducing it, by 
 their secession, to impotence. It had died without having 
 either accepted or refused his resignation. Probably 
 Santander felt that, with a third party holding the balance 
 between himself and Bolivar, it was not safe to press a 
 decision on the resignation, especially after he had been 
 defeated on the question of federation or centralisa- 
 tion. Even had the resignation been accepted, it was 
 open to Bolivar, at the head of the army, to say that 
 circumstances had changed, and to withdraw it. Looking 
 to what happened afterwards, it is probable that that is 
 the course he would have pursued. As it was, it can 
 hardly be doubted that, whether the dissolution was 
 directly due to his management of his own party or not, 
 he rejoiced inwardly at the course of events. 
 
 Of course, in writing to the Council of Government at 
 Bogoti from Socorro on the I2th June, Bolivar professed 
 regret at the failure of the Convention.^ He invited 
 them to consider what was to be done, but he had 
 probably already decided for himself. On the 13th 
 June a general meeting of the principal inhabitants of 
 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii. 433. 
 386 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE DICTATORSHIP OF 1828 387 
 
 Bogotd was convened by Bolivar's staunch friend Herran, 
 Intendant of Cundinamarca, and by General Cordova, 
 the hero of Ayacucho. They urged that, civil war 
 being clearly imminent, no one but Bolivar was capable 
 of saving the situation. A resolution was carried 
 unanimously calling upon the Liberator to assume the 
 Dictatorship at this critical juncture. The ministers 
 concurred, and that very night messengers were sent to 
 convey the decision of the capital to Bolivar. In reply, 
 he wasted few words on this occasion, merely saying that 
 he would hurry his march to take up the charge imposed 
 upon him by the desire of the capital. He started from 
 Socorro on the 17th June. 
 
 On the 24th June 1828 Bolivar again entered Bogotd, 
 after an absence of three months. He was met outside 
 the city by the Council of Government and the principal 
 officials. After returning thanks in the Cathedral, he 
 was conducted to a canopied pavilion erected for the 
 purpose in the square outside.^ There he received the 
 welcome and congratulations of the Council of Govern- 
 ment, the Judges of the High Court, and others. He 
 addressed the Council, protesting that he was always the 
 defender of public liberty, that the will of the nation was 
 the real sovereign power, and that, whenever the nation 
 should wish to withdraw his powers, he was ready to 
 submit. These latter words were, it will be noticed, 
 considerably different in tone from those of his accustomed 
 resignations, in which he was wont to protest vehemently 
 his desire to retire from public life and become a simple 
 citizen. He had now began to fear that he might be 
 taken at his word. There were several more speeches, 
 by Herran the Intendant, by the commandant-general 
 of the department, and by the rector of the university, 
 to all of which Bolivar replied in the same spirit. Then, 
 
 ' Now the Plaza Bolivar, in the centre of which stands the statue of the 
 Liberator. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
388 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 amidst cheers, he proceeded to the palace close by, where 
 dinner had been prepared by Herran. In toasting the 
 prosperity of Colombia, the Liberator said : " That 
 prosperity, I say, cannot consist in the odious dictator- 
 ship, but in wise laws, in public tranquillity, in the love 
 of the citizens, and in horror of anarchy. Dictatorships 
 are glorious when they close the abyss of revolution, but 
 a misfortune for the people which accustoms itself to live 
 under dictatorial domination." 
 
 On the 2Sth, the archbishop and clergy and other 
 people presented their congratulations. 
 
 Bolivar was anxious to mark time for a little before 
 fully exercising the great powers which had been con- 
 ferred upon him in such a very irregular manner. He 
 wanted some better authority than the vote of a single 
 meeting of the heads of families of one city. Presently 
 he found himself supported by the vote of the depart- 
 ment of Cundinamarca, of cities like Quito, Cartagena, 
 Caracas, Valencia, and Guayaquil, and by the adhesion of 
 many of the military leaders, including Paez, Urdaneta, 
 Marino, Soublette, Arismendi, and Bermudez. Whilst 
 he was waiting, he had ample occupation in restoring 
 discipline in the army, in organising the defence of the 
 Atlantic Coast, and in putting a stop to privateering, 
 which was no longer necessary, by calling in letters of 
 marque and stopping the issue of fresh ones. 
 
 In issuing, on the 27th August, the decree regulating his 
 new powers,^ he was careful to avoid the word " Dictator," 
 and to describe himself as "Liberator-President." He 
 constituted a fresh Council of State, ordered the pre- 
 servation of all personal liberties guaranteed by the 
 suspended constitution of 1821, and offered to convene 
 a fresh Convention, to meet on the 2nd January 1830, 
 for a reform of the Constitution, Baralt says that 
 Bolivar's dictatorship of 1828 was his great mistake. 
 ' Lairazabal, ii. 442. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
THE DICTATORSHIP OF 1828 389 
 
 This Larrazabal combats at considerable length, but he 
 starts with the assumption that the Liberator was in no 
 way responsible for the dissolution of the Convention of 
 Ocafia. As we have already said, Bolivar was probably 
 at the bottom of it ; for, seeing its hostility to himself, 
 he could not tolerate its probable acts. Once the Con- 
 vention was dissolved, it seems certain that there must 
 have been a " pronunciamiento " by some one, and, after 
 all, Bolivar was a better man to have at the head of 
 affairs than Santander or Paez, neither of whom would 
 have tolerated the supremacy of the other. 
 
 As for Santander, Bolivar proposed to get rid of his 
 intolerable presence at Bogotd by sending him as envoy 
 to the United States. Santander accepted, but, as will 
 be seen shortly, the appointment fell through, and his 
 destination was changed. 
 
 The Council of State was appointed on the 30th 
 August, and consisted of thirteen present, and five who 
 were in other parts, including Bermudez and Gual. 
 
 Whilst he was busy trying to improve the administra- 
 tion, Bolivar received news of the invasion of Bolivia by 
 the Peruvian Gamarra, and of La Mar's threatening 
 attitude towards the Ecuadorian provinces. 
 
 Sucre, the President of Bolivia, soon found that his own 
 unpopularity, as a foreigner, was used at once as an 
 excuse for the Peruvian invasion and for opposition to him 
 in Bolivia itself. Disgusted with his treatment, and anxious 
 to leave no excuse for the Peruvian invasion, he resigned 
 his Presidency and retired to join Bolivar in Colombia. 
 He had been wounded in a military outbreak. With the 
 history of Bolivia we need not concern ourselves further. 
 
 On the 25th September, for the second time in his life, 
 Bolivar very narrowly escaped assassination, the first 
 occasion being at Kingston in 1816.^ The plot appears 
 
 ^ There were said to be other plots against his life in Peru, but nothing 
 definite came of them. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
390 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 to have originated in a society of youths, meeting nomi- 
 nally for study under the presidency of a Frenchman 
 named Arganil, an ex-sans-culotU of Marseilles. These 
 meetings took more or less of a political colour, and, 
 moreover, there was another secret society under the 
 same presidency, a sort of inner circle. Among the 
 members of this were another Frenchman, named Hor- 
 ment, Pedro Carujo, an artillery officer, and Florentine 
 Gonzales, the successor of Azuero as editor of the Con- 
 ductor. Campbell says that Horment, though a French- 
 man, was generally suspected of being a spy of the Spanish 
 Government. It is said that Santander protected this 
 society, which was planning the assassination of Bolivar. 
 The first proposal was to carry out the work during a 
 masked ball, at which Bolivar v/as present, on the loth 
 August. But the conspirators were not ready then, as 
 they had not yet succeeded in gaining over any part of 
 the garrison. According to Campbell, this attempt broke 
 down because Bolivar left the ball earlier than was an- 
 ticipated. The next date fixed was the 2ist September, 
 when Bolivar went out to Soacha, a town 14 or 15 miles 
 south of Bogotd. That, too, for various reasons, was given 
 up, and the date was deferred till the 28th October. But 
 there were many in the conspiracy, and some hints of its 
 existence began to leak out. It was necessary to act 
 prematurely, rather than risk discovery and prevention. 
 An abortive attempt to gain over a young officer newly 
 arrived in Bogotd precipitated matters. Orders had been 
 issued for the arrest of the captain who had approached 
 him but found him unyielding. 
 
 As it happened, the man to whom the orders for the 
 arrest were given was Colonel Ramon Guerra,^ himself 
 one of the conspirators, who promptly warned his friends 
 that the secret was out. They at once met at the house 
 
 ■^ Guerra had seen much service in New Granada, chiefly in the republican 
 cause, and had been at Pantano de Vargas and Boyaca. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION 391 
 of Vargas Tejada, which was their regular rendezvous, to 
 settle details of the revolt for that very night— 25th Sep- 
 tember. No open precautions appeared to have been 
 taken by the Government, who were naturally unwilling 
 to alarm the conspirators until they had got hold of the 
 man whose arrest had been ordered, and who might be 
 expected to give valuable information. Being unaware 
 of Guerra's connexion with the conspiracy, they had 
 no reason to suspect him of having already given 
 warning. 
 
 Bolivar had already been told that the " Vargas " 
 regiment was in the plot, but he could hardly believe this 
 of a regiment so devoted to him. He was satisfied with 
 assurances of its loyalty given him by its commandant, 
 and his confidence was not misplaced. It was different, 
 however, with the artillery (about 150 strong), who had 
 been mostly gained over by the conspirators. Their 
 quarters were near the Palace, and it was proposed to use 
 them to overpower the President's guard. 
 
 At 11.30 p.m. Carujo went with some artillerymen, and 
 a few civilians collected by Horment, to the Palace. A 
 watch had already been set on the officers of the battalion 
 "Vargas" and the Grenadiers, who were known to be 
 loyal. With Carujo were Horment, Zulaiver, Gonzales, 
 and a lieutenant of artillery named Lopez, who had recently 
 been degraded for misconduct. Some of the other con- 
 spirators were to attack the quarters of the two loyal 
 battalions, and to set free Padilla, the leader of the late 
 revolt at Cartagena, who was in custody awaiting trial. 
 Carujo and his party surprised the guard at the Palace 
 gate, killed four of them, and hurried towards the Libera- 
 tor's sleeping apartments. On the way they met Andres 
 Ibarra, a favourite aide-de-camp of Bolivar. He was so 
 badly wounded in the right arm by Lopez that it had to 
 be amputated next day. 
 
 Bolivar was in his bedroom with his mistress, Manuela 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
392 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Saenz.i just going to bed, when the noise of the attack 
 on the guard and Ibarra reached his ears. At first he 
 was for resistance, for the cries of " Death to the tyrant ! " 
 warned him of what was happening. Manuela Saenz, 
 however, convinced him that resistance was useless, and 
 pointed to the open window, only a few feet above the 
 street. The assassins were actually at the door when he 
 dropped, half-dressed as he was, from the balcony into 
 the street just opposite the theatre. His butler, who 
 happened to be in the street, recognised and followed 
 his master, as he made for the convent of El Carmen. 
 Changing his mind, Bolivar plunged into the ravine of 
 the San Augustin stream which flows from the mountain 
 behind Bogotd across the city south of the Palace. 
 Here he hid himself under a bridge.^ Meanwhile, when 
 
 ^ Manuela Saenz, a Quitena, married at Quito, in 1817, an English doctor, 
 James Thome. About 1822 they removed to Lima, where Manuela met 
 Bolivar soon after his arrival in Peru. She left her husband to live witlj the 
 Liberator very soon afterwards. She is said to have been very beautiful, 
 though of somewhat masculine habits. She is said to have taken part at the 
 head of a squadron of cavalry in putting down a disturbance in Quito. In 
 1822 she appears in a list of ladies decorated with San Martin's "Order of 
 the Sun." In Lima, when living under the protection of Bolivar, she used 
 to ride about with an escort of Colombian cavalry, herself dressed in a gold- 
 laced scarlet dolman and white breeches. When Bolivar first met her she 
 was about twenty-four or twenty-five years old. The latest record we have 
 of her is Garibaldi's account of a day spent with her in 1851 at Paita, on the 
 Peruvian coast, on his way to Lima. He says of her : "I was hospitably 
 received in the house of a benevolent lady who had been confined to her bed 
 for several years in consequence of a paralytic stroke, which deprived 
 her of the use of her limbs. . . . Dofia Manuelita Saenz was the most 
 graceful and courteous matron I ever saw. Having enjoyed the friendship 
 of Bolivar, she was acquainted with the minutest details of the life of the 
 great Liberator of Central (sic) America. ... I parted from her deeply 
 touched." See Aristides Rojas, " Legendas historicas de Venezuela," p. 140, 
 and Werner's translation of the "Autobiography of Guiseppe Garibaldi," 
 P- S9. 
 
 '' According to Rojas, he was about to cross by the bridge to the left bank 
 of the stream, on his way to the barracks of the loyal battalion " Vargas," 
 when he heard the approach of a struggling crowd of "Vargas" men, his 
 supporters, and artillerymen, his opponents. Unable to make out which 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION 393 
 the assassins broke into his room they saw that the 
 bird had flown, and demanded of Manuela Saenz 
 where he was. She said that he was in the hall of 
 the Council of State, thus managing to throw them 
 off the scent, and to give Bolivar time to get clear 
 away. 
 
 The disappointed assassins, rushing hither and thither, 
 came upon Colonel W. Fergusson, Bolivar's Irish aide- 
 de-camp. He was shot dead by Carujo.^ 
 
 Meanwhile, the attack on the quarters of the " Vargas " 
 battalion had been beaten off, and the rebels pursued in 
 every direction. The party sent to release Padilla had 
 found him in the artillery quarters, sleeping in the same 
 room with his custodian, Colonel Jose Bolivar. The 
 latter was shot, and Padilla, seizing the dead man's 
 sword, went out to put himself at the head of the 
 insurrection. 
 
 Urdaneta and Colonel James Whittle, of the " Rifles," 
 now came on the scene, and the former, taking command 
 of the " Vargas " battalion, made for the Palace. Herran, 
 Cordova, Paris, and other loyalists also joined. There 
 was fighting all over the city, the rebels being everywhere 
 defeated. 
 
 Bolivar, in his hiding-place under the bridge, heard all 
 
 party held the upper hand, he was persuaded by his servant to get under the 
 bridge. After staying there for two hours or so, he sent the servant out to 
 see what was happening. He met a party of the "Var^s" men with 
 several loyal officers at their head. This servant was with Bolivar from 
 about 1821 till his death in 1830. 
 
 From the description given by Cochrane (ii. 24), the President's Palace 
 was a very poor building in Bolivar's time. The window from which Bolivar 
 escaped is still pointed out in the street running east from the south-east 
 corner of the "plaza." The Palace of to-day is a much better building, 
 in a street to the south-east of the cathedral. 
 
 ' William Fergusson, an Irishman, went to Colombia with the Irish 
 brigade. Served in the east in 1819, when he was captured by the Spaniards, 
 but escaped. Was with Montilla at Rio Hacha, and with Bolivar and Sucre 
 in Pasto, Peru, and Bolivia. There he was appointed aide-de-camp to the 
 Liberator. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
394 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 this noise going on over his head, without being able 
 to ascertain which side had the upper hand. At last 
 he learnt, from the shouts of a detachment of " Vargas " 
 men searching for him, that the rebels were beaten. He 
 at once came out and joined the party, to be received 
 with joy by the rest of the battalion and others collected 
 in the great square. 
 
 When it was daylight he returned to the Palace, where 
 he found much damage had been done. Manuela Saenz 
 was safe, though she had been roughly handled by 
 the disappointed assassins, from whom she had saved 
 Bolivar. 
 
 Many of the rebels were arrested in the night, including 
 Horment and Lopez. Guerra coolly appeared on the 
 morning of the 26th, thinking his share in the affair was 
 unknown. He also was arrested. Padilla and Santander 
 were both thrown into prison, the name of the latter 
 having been freely used by the rebels during the 
 disturbance. 
 
 The trials of the rebels were commenced at once. 
 Santander was found guilty as " an instigator and 
 abettor of the conspiracy," and sentenced to be shot. 
 The death sentence was commuted by Bolivar to one 
 of exile from the republic. Several others, including, 
 curiously enough, Carujo,^ the murderer of Ferguson, 
 were pardoned. 
 
 On the 30th September there were executed Horment, 
 Zulaiver, Silva, Galindo, and Lopez. 
 
 Padilla and Guerra were tried together. Colonel Camp- 
 
 ' According to Gutierrez Posada ("Memorias,"etc., p.124), Carujo obtained 
 his pardon in return for a promise of valuable information. Colonel Campbell 
 (Despatch of 12th November 1828) says he got off because, when Santander's 
 sentence had been commuted, it became impossible to execute Carujo and 
 others. All quotations of Campbell's views and statements regarding the 
 conspiracy are from his despatches of 8th October and 12th November 
 1828. He was at Guaduas on the 25th September, but Mr Henderson, the 
 Consul-General, was in Bogota. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SANTANDER AND THE PLOT 395 
 
 bell says that the court-martial was equally divided as to 
 the sentence on Guerra, though they were unanimous as 
 to a sentence of death on Padilla. In Padilla's case it 
 was proved, by the evidence of a sergeant, that he de- 
 liberately allowed the murder of Colonel Bolivar, who was 
 asleep, and then took his sword. As for Guerra, Paris, 
 the president of the court-martial, gave his casting-vote in 
 favour of a sentence of eight years' imprisonment instead 
 of death. Bolivar thereupon dissolved the tribunal, sus- 
 pended Paris, and appointed Urdaneta and Cordova to 
 pass proper sentences on all connected with the revolt. 
 They revised the sentence on Guerra and made it death. 
 Guerra and Padilla ^ were shot on the 2nd October. The 
 last batch of executions took place on the 14th October, 
 the sufferers being P. C. Azuero, Hinistroza, lieutenant 
 of artillery, and a sergeant and four men of the same 
 corps. 
 
 To what extent, if at all, was Santander guilty of 
 complicity in this plot? He himself, writing in 1837,^ 
 denies his connexion with it entirely, and says he had no 
 fair trial. He quotes an official letter from Bogoti to the 
 Colombian Minister in London, which says he was not 
 found guilty of complicity in this plot, but in one which 
 was to be carried into execution after he had left for the 
 United States. He was certainly not convicted of being 
 concerned in the attempt to kill Bolivar. On the other 
 hand, he was certainly anxious for the overthrow of the 
 Liberator, and it is by no means improbable that he 
 should have had some knowledge of a plot directed to 
 that end. 
 
 ' Padilla, a " zambo " (half Indian, half negro), was chiefly employed as a 
 naval officer. He was in the Spanish service at Trafalgar, where he was 
 taken. He served the republican cause in many actions at sea, and on the 
 Orinoco and the Magdalena. His last and greatest achievement was his 
 complete defeat of Morales' squadron on the 24th July 1823 in Lake 
 Maracaibo. 
 
 ^ " Apuntamientos para Memorias Sobre Colombia," pp. 15, 16. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
396 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Writing from the Boca Chica forts at Cartagena, where 
 he was imprisoned for some months, he gratefully acknow- 
 ledges the clemency of Bolivar in commuting the death 
 sentence, which, he says, was unjustly passed upon him. 
 But the letter contains what seems to be a damning 
 admission. It appeals to Bolivar on several grounds to 
 allow him to leave Colombia and go to Europe. As one 
 of these grounds he says : " Do so, at least, as recompense 
 for my opposition to the plan of assassinating your 
 Excellency, and for my having, with tears in my eyes, 
 implored Carujo not to thus vilely repay the services 
 of your Excellency to the country." ^ That admission 
 seems clearly to imply that Santander was cognisant 
 of a plot to overthrow Bolivar, that he did not dis- 
 approve of it except in the matter of the assassination, 
 and that he refused to warn the Liberator, a course which 
 he should, considering the position he had recently held, 
 certainly have followed. Many a man has been shot for 
 less than that. Santander would not even warn Bolivar 
 of his personal danger. Gutierrez Posada * considers it 
 was clearly proved that Santander was aware of the exist- 
 ence of the plot, even giving advice to some of the 
 conspirators, but Qot warning the authorities. He agrees 
 with others in acquitting Santander of direct complicity 
 in the project of assassination. 
 
 Now let us see what Colonel Campbell says on this 
 subject. In his despatch of the 8th October, he remarks 
 that the presumptive evidence of Santander's cognisance 
 of the conspiracy is very strong, and he states the 
 following points : — 
 
 (i) Both Guerra and Silva stated that Santander was 
 aware of the plot. 
 
 (2) It was a notorious fact that all the principal leaders 
 (except perhaps Horment) were in his confidence. 
 
 ^ Letter of i8th December 1828. O'Leary, Docts., 3, p. 393. 
 ^ "Memorias," etc., p. 124. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SANTANDER AND THE PLOT 397 
 
 (3) Vargas Tejada, in whose house the conspirators 
 held their meetings and arranged their plans, had recently 
 been appointed, at Santander's request, secretary to the 
 mission to the United States, of which Santander himself 
 was to be the minister. Tejada had long been in San- 
 tander's confidence, and had supported him at the Con- 
 vention of Ocaiia. 
 
 (4) Gonzales, another conspirator, was also a decided 
 partisan of Santander, and had always lent his name 
 to articles abusing Bolivar in the Conductor and other 
 papers. Of these articles Santander was known to be 
 the author. 
 
 (5) Guerra and Silva were also Santander's par- 
 tisans. 
 
 In his subsequent despatch (12th November), Campbell 
 reports the conviction and sentence on Santander, who, in 
 addition to banishment, was prohibited from alienating 
 his real property in Colombia. This was meant to prevent 
 his using it to supply funds to his party. The British 
 Minister holds that Santander " was privy to the con- 
 spiracy from first to last, if not the author of it ; that strong 
 reasons exist for supposing him to have instigated the 
 conspiracy (Padilla's) in Cartagena, as well as the military 
 insurrections in Lima and Bolivia." It was pretended 
 that Santander had not been executed because "enough 
 blood had already been shed," but Campbell points out 
 that, excepting Guerra and Padilla, most of those who 
 had been shot were only minor persons. He adds that 
 Vergara, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had incautiously 
 divulged to him that one of the motives for clemency 
 was Santander's connexion with Bolivar's friend Justo 
 Briceno.^ 
 
 This evidence, which is all we have so far been able to 
 
 ' They were brothers-in-law. See letter from Bricefio, dated Cartagena, 
 i8th December 1828, forwarding Santander's of same date from Boca Chica. 
 O'Leary, Docts., 3, p. 392. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
398 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 discover, certainly seems to show that Santander had 
 
 little cause to complain of his punishment.^ 
 
 ' Mr Bingham refers to the existence in Bogota of " a large part of the 
 correspondence of Santander," which might quite possibly throw some light 
 on the relations of Santander and Bolivar. The present writer was also told 
 a short time ago that such papers existed. Whether it is possible to utilise 
 them seems by no means certain. Mr Bingham was promised a sight of them 
 the day before he left Bogota, but " the committee who have them in charge 
 were not able to meet, and the president of the bank where they are deposited 
 was not to be found " (" Caracas to Bogota," pp. 246, 248). There may 
 have been perfect readiness to show the papers, but one cannot help re- 
 marking that untoward obstacles are apt to arise, both in South America 
 and the East, when for any reason it is desired to avoid a particular action 
 without deliberately refusing to perform it. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 WAR WITH PERU— THE DISSOLUTION OF 
 COLOMBIA— BOLIVAR'S RETIREMENT AND DEATH 
 
 AFFAIRS in the south now demanded 
 Bolivar's earnest attention. He had sent 
 his aide-de-camp, O'Leary, to endeavour to 
 patch up matters with Peru, but the envoy, 
 being refused a passport, had to return. La Mar declared 
 a blockade of the Pacific ports of Colombia, and pro- 
 ceeded to Piura to place himself at the head of an 
 expeditionary force. At the same time, the standard of 
 revolt against Bolivar was raised in Popayan by J. M. 
 Obando and H. Lopez, using as their battle-cry the 
 restoration of the constitution of 182 1. This is another 
 of the revolts of which Colonel Campbell accuses San- 
 tander of being the instigator. Pasto, too, always ready 
 for revolt, joined in. The rebels of Popayan and Pasto, 
 standing as they did across the line of communication 
 between Bogotd and the south, had first to be disposed 
 of. During December 1828, Bolivar collected in Bogotd 
 a force of 1500 men. Simultaneously, he was busy re- 
 forming the courts of justice and other matters, issu- 
 ing a decree summoning a new Constituent Congress 
 for the 2nd January 1 830, and laying down rules for the 
 elections to it. Leaving the Council of Ministers in 
 charge of affairs at Bogotd during his absence, Bolivar 
 started, on the 28th December, with his troops to descend 
 into the Magdalena valley, thence to cross over the 
 desolate " paramos " of the Central Cordilleras into the 
 
 399 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
400 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Cauca valley. The immense labours, physical and 
 mental, of the last eighteen years were now telling seri- 
 ously on the health of the Liberator. Long marches, no 
 longer endured with the ease of the days of 1819, left him 
 prostrated with fatigue, and he was actually ill in body 
 and harassed in mind.i The revolt of September had 
 gone far to break his spirit, and to warn him that his 
 personal influence was no longer what it had been. 
 Threatened on all sides, with but few really trusty friends 
 left, suffering in health, he was at last beginning to 
 despair. Yet he held on gallantly. He would willingly 
 have avoided the war with Peru, and again endeavoured 
 to negotiate through O'Leary, but in vain. He would 
 have been glad, as appears from Campbell's despatches, 
 to enlist England's influence in effecting a settlement. 
 Sucre, too, now entrusted with the command in the 
 southern provinces, was no more successful in his en- 
 deavours to reduce La Mar to reason by pacific methods. 
 In January 1829, La Mar, with 8400 men, occupied 
 Guayaquil, and was well received in Loja. Sucre had 
 not more than 6000 men in Cuenca. He had received 
 orders from Bolivar to avoid a decisive battle, and to 
 remain on the defensive until the road by Popayan and 
 Pasto was again opened for the Liberator's advance to the 
 assistance of his lieutenant. Sucre, always loyal, would 
 have carried out his orders, but, as at Ayacucho, he found 
 himself forced to fight. At Saraguro on the 12th Feb- 
 ruary, and again at Tarqui on the 26th, he heavily defeated 
 La Mar, who lost 2500 men, and was driven back in dis- 
 order. Sucre at once offered to accept a capitulation, under 
 which La Mar would be allowed to withdraw the reniains 
 of his army. A Peruvian council of war, recognising 
 defeat, urged La Mar to accept, and a treaty was signed 
 at Jiron on the 28th February 1829, the principal terms 
 
 1 He had been declining in health for years past, and now two hours on 
 horseback fatigued him. Gutierrez Posada, " Memorias," etc., p. 140. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
WAR WITH PERU 401 
 
 of which were limitation to 3000 men each of the frontier 
 forces of Peru and Colombia, settlement of the frontier 
 by commission, abstention of either State from inter- 
 ference in the domestic affairs of the other, surrender by 
 Peru of the corvette " Pichincha," payment of 1 50,000 pesos 
 for debts due by the Peruvian army and fleet in Col- 
 ombian territory, and evacuation by the Peruvians, within 
 twenty days, of all Colombian territory, including 
 Guayaquil. 
 
 The relics of the Peruvian army (2500 out of 8400) 
 began their retreat on the 2nd March. 
 
 Whilst Sucre had thus been disposing of La Mar, 
 Bolivar had reached the Cauca valley and called on the 
 various rebels to submit quietly. In this he was backed 
 by a pastoral letter issued by the Bishop of Popayan, and 
 by the influence of the clergy. Envoys were sent to 
 Obando and Lopez, who thought it more prudent not 
 to fight, and even the turbulent Pastusos submitted without 
 opposition. From Popayan the Liberator moved on to 
 Pasto. At Cumbal, on the 12th March, he received the 
 news of Sucre's successes and of the convention of J iron. 
 On the 17th he was in Quito, where he was met by Sucre, 
 who presented the trophies of his victories over La Mar. 
 
 All seemed well, especially as news arrived from 
 Venezuela that Paez had publicly condemned the Bogotd 
 plot of September 1828.^ Possibly he was moved to his 
 strong expressions of indignation largely by his personal 
 enmity for Santander, and by satisfaction at his banish- 
 ment. 
 
 But La Mar had nbt honestly carried out the Con- 
 vention of Jiron, and more trouble was brewing in 
 the south. He had sent secret orders that Guayaquil 
 was not to be surrendered. For this he had no better 
 excuse than objections to Sucre's official report of the 
 Battle of Tarqui, which he held to be insulting to Peru, 
 ' Larrazabai, ii. 474. 
 
 2 C 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
402 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 and to the proppsed erection by the Colombians of a 
 
 commemorative pillar on the battlefield. 
 
 There was some talk of getting the United States to 
 arbitrate, but, in the end, Bolivar, deciding that there was 
 nothing for it but to reconquer Guayaquil by force of 
 arms, issued a proclamation, dated 3rd April 1829, 
 announcing this.^ 
 
 On the 26th June 1829, after vainly trying to bring 
 La Mar to reason by peaceable methods, Bolivar was 
 close to Guayaquil when, at the last moment, a peaceful 
 solution was arrived at. La Mar's enterprises against 
 Colombia had never been popular in Peru, defeat had 
 rendered them still less so. On the 3rd June, General 
 A. G. de Lafuente, at the head of the troops at Lima, 
 deposed the Vice-President and declared himself at the 
 head of affairs. At the same time, at Piura, Gamarra 
 deposed La Mar from his military command, and shipped 
 him off to Guatemala. He died shortly afterwards in 
 exile in Costa Rica. 
 
 With the new government of Peru, Bolivar was soon able 
 to arrange terms. Guayaquil was reoccupied by Colom- 
 bian troops, and peace was signed with Peru in October. 
 
 At Guayaquil, Bolivar was extremely ill ; on the loth 
 August, he was almost on the brink of the grave. The 
 horrible climate of the place in the rainy season was 
 almost too much for the constitution of the Liberator, 
 enfeebled as it was by years of almost superhuman 
 exertion. At the end of August he went to the island of 
 Santay for a few weeks to recover. Thence he issued a 
 circular, which seems to point to the despair which was 
 beginning to settle down on him when he considered the 
 circumstances of the country which he had so strenuously 
 sought to liberate and to endow with a decent govern- 
 ment. In it he says he has no personal views as to the 
 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii., 477, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR IN GUAYAQUIL 403 
 
 most desirable form of government, and that he is ready 
 to receive with equal openmindedness all suggestions, 
 however extravagant they might seem, provided only 
 they were stated with moderation, and were not mani- 
 festly opposed to liberty and national independence. 
 That is quite a different tone from that of the Liberator 
 of a few years back, ever ready to tell the people that 
 federation was ruin, and that salvation was to be found 
 only in centralisation. The results of the circular were 
 disastrous, as will be seen presently. 
 
 Again the Sisyphean task of controlling his subordinate 
 commanders oppressed the Liberator with an intolerable 
 burden. No sooner was one insurrection put down than 
 another sprang up, often led by the last man" who could 
 be suspected of turning against the Liberator. There 
 was no stability, but an overflowing abundance of 
 ambition and desire of power. The revolt of Obando 
 and Lopez had only been put down a few months before 
 rumours reached Bolivar of the disloyal conduct of 
 Cordova, the divisional general who had led the attack 
 at Ayacucho. He had approached T. C. Mosquera with 
 proposals that he himself should become Supreme Chief, 
 with Mosquera as Secretary for War. The other chief 
 appointments were mapped out as Cordova proposed 
 them. New Granada was to be separated from Vene- 
 zuela on the one hand and Ecuador on the other. The 
 Liberator was getting old (in years he was only 46) and 
 must be ousted from the command. " And when," asked 
 Mosquera, "do you propose to assemble the national 
 representation?" Cordova's reply showed what he was 
 really thinking of. " What representation ? " he said. 
 " No representation for me. Such things are folly. It is 
 decided to do away with the lawyers. Our Republic 
 must be military." Mosquera would have nothing to do 
 with such a scheme. 
 
 Bolivar sent for Cordova, and, though thinking his 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
404 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 manner rather brusque, was satisfied that he meant no 
 harm, or pretended to be so. " What shall we do," he 
 wrote at the end of September, " with these conspiring 
 generals? If I suppress them, I am called a tyrant; if I 
 wait till they rebel to punish them, I am a cruel assassin. 
 What shall we do ? " Cordova returned from his inter- 
 view with Bolivar only to carry on again his conspiracy, 
 and already, on the I2th September, had raised the 
 standard of insurrection in Antioquia, himself taking the 
 title of " Commander-in-Chief of the army of Liberty," 
 demanding the constitution of 182 1, and the blood of the 
 tyrant Bolivar. 
 
 The Liberator, who had reached Quito again on the 
 20th October with partially restored health, had appointed 
 Flores to the southern command, and now sent his own 
 aide-de-camp, O'Leary, with a force for the suppression 
 of Cordova. That general had a very poor following, 
 the only persons of importance who joined him being, 
 according to Campbell, his brother and his brother-in-law, 
 the latter being governor of Antioquia. 
 
 O'Leary, marching from Bogotd across the Magdalena, 
 met Cordova, whose forces were in every way inferior, 
 high up in the Central Cordilleras, at El Santuario.^ 
 Cordova displayed very poor generalship, for he fell 
 into the very ancient trap of a feigned retreat by the 
 Bolivarites, and, when he had sent his last reserves in 
 pursuit, was fallen upon and utterly routed by O'Leary. 
 The whole rebel force was but 500 men, and O'Leary 
 had 2000 or more. Cordova, with 20 officers and men, 
 barricaded himself in a house, determined to fight to the 
 death. O'Leary, who is said to have been ignorant of 
 Cordova's presence in the house, after calling in vain on 
 the garrison to surrender, ordered the house to be 
 stormed. The garrison was destroyed, and Cordova him- 
 
 ' El Santuaiio is not marked on the map. It is a little east by south of 
 the Antioquian capital, Medellin, close to Maimilla. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S VIEWS ON MONARCHY 405 
 
 self, mortally wounded, died a few minutes after the fall of 
 the house.^ 
 
 Thus perished miserably, the victim of his own treachery, 
 a man who had shown himself, at Ayacucho and else- 
 where, to be a brave soldier, and who, only so recently as 
 September 1828, had been supposed to be a staunch 
 supporter of Bolivar. At the time of the conspiracy of 
 1828 he was believed to be quite loyal to Bolivar, but 
 Campbell, writing after his defeat, says it was then well 
 known he had been concerned in the conspiracy. 
 
 About this time, the idea of creating a constitutional 
 monarchy with Bolivar at its head was again broached as 
 the only means of preserving the state. The proposal was 
 fostered by De Bresson, the agent of Charles X. of France, 
 and met with support in many quarters, even as high as the 
 Council of Ministers in Bogota. When, at last, Bolivar 
 was informed of what was going on, he wrote a sharp 
 reprimand, dated Japio, i8th December 1829, to his 
 ministers, in which he said plainly he would not be false 
 to his republican principles, and that, if it suited Colombia 
 to set up a throne, the Liberator was not the man who 
 would occupy it. In consequence of this, Castillo, 
 Restrepo, Urdaneta, and Vergara resigned their port- 
 folios, and were succeeded in the Ministry by Caicedo, 
 Mdrques, Herran, and Osorio. The new Ministry posed 
 as opponents of the monarchical scheme. 
 
 That is Larrazabal's account of this affair. Mitre's is 
 very different. According to him, Bolivar, before leaving 
 for the south, had. suggested confidentially to some of his 
 friends, " that Colombia and the whole of Spanish 
 
 ^ According to Restrepo, Cordova's insurrection was the result of Bolivar's 
 leanings towards a constitutional monarchy, to be mentdoned just now. 
 He also says Cordova was assassinated after he had surrendered, covered 
 with wounds. 
 
 Campbell, on the other hand, says: "General Cordova, when prisoner, 
 after receiving his mortal wound, expressed to General O'Leaiy his regret, " 
 etc. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
4o6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 America had no means of escape from the anarchy which 
 was devouring her but the establishment of constitutional 
 monarchies, and that, if Colombia decided for this form 
 of government, and called to the throne a foreign prince, 
 he himself would be the first to submit to the prince's 
 authority and to support him with his influence. "^ 
 
 He was still more explicit with Colonel P. Campbell, 
 the British Minister at Bogoti, to whom he wrote regard- 
 ing the project of monarchy in Colombia, that, "given 
 the very grave difficulties in the way of organising a 
 republic, perhaps the only means would be the establish- 
 ment of a monarchy, calling in a foreign prince professing 
 the Catholic religion ; but for this it was necessary to be 
 able to reckon on the aid of a great power, such as 
 France or England, which would defend Colombia against 
 the attacks of the other American republics." ^ This letter, 
 Campbell was told, he might use as he thought best. It 
 was in consequence of these expressions of opinion that 
 Bolivar's ministers, in his absence, entered upon negotia- 
 tions with Campbell and De Bresson. They kept the 
 Liberator informed of what was going on, but he main- 
 tained silence for six months. At last, on the 3rd 
 September 1829, he wrote scouting the idea of a 
 monarchy, and revealing what he called his secret. He 
 proposed to keep New Granada and Quito united, but 
 entirely separate from Venezuela. For the two united 
 provinces there should be " the best government, which 
 would be a President for life with a hereditary Senate, 
 as he had proposed in Guayana in 1819."^ As usual, 
 
 ^ Restrepo, iv. 207. 
 
 ^ Hid. , p. 228. Mitre, in a note, says the letter reached Campbell in Septem- 
 ber iS^g. Clearly, from the context and the sequence of events, he meant 
 rSsS. The references to Restrepo are those of Mitre. I have unfortunately 
 been unable to find a copy of vol. iv. of Restrepo (1858). The 1858 
 edition is not in the British Museum at all, and the copy which I was able 
 to borrow was short of vol. iv. 
 
 ' Hid., p. 229. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S VIEWS ON MONARCHY 407 
 Bolivar proclaimed his earnest desire to surrender autho- 
 rity, and to act merely as mediator between the two 
 states. When the Council of Ministers received Bolivar's 
 letter of reproach for their conduct in negotiating for a 
 monarchy, Restrepo, himself one of those ministers, says : 
 "When the Liberator's letter had been read through, 
 there was only one sentiment amongst the Council of 
 Ministers — indignation. They believed themselves sacri- 
 ficed to the popularity of Bolivar, and that, regardless of 
 their great and faithful services to the government of 
 Colombia and the independence of the country, he had 
 left them to tread a dangerous path." ^ 
 
 We have carefully perused Colonel Campbell's des- 
 patches with a view to checking this story. In the long 
 memorandum enclosed in the despatch of the 4th June 
 1829, the question of Bolivar's views on a monarchy is 
 fully gone into. " I shall," says Campbell, " now proceed 
 to detail what I have been able to ascertain regarding the 
 ideas of General Bolivar as to the form of government 
 judged by him to be the best for the country." Bolivar's 
 views as to the form of government had never really 
 varied. " He has ever felt and expressed the difficulties 
 which attended the task of giving a stable and good form 
 of government to his country, and which arose as well 
 from the habits under which this people had been brought 
 up under the Spanish colonial system, as from the hetero- 
 geneous mass of which the population of the country is 
 composed." Bolivar was always a believer in British 
 institutions and an opponent of Federal government as 
 in the United States. He could not, indeed, understand 
 how that form of government had lasted so long even in 
 North America. 
 
 " I cannot," says the memorandum, " therefore su\ oose 
 that he (Bolivar) would be an obstacle to the erectioii of 
 Colombia into a constitutional monarchy ; but I do not 
 ^ Restrepo, iv. pp. 244-45. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
4o8 ' SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 think that he would himself, under any circumstances, 
 accept the crown. He has ever been most susceptible, 
 and even over-sensitive, in regard to public opinion in 
 Europe, and the fear that, should Colombia be erected 
 into a monarchy, it might be supposed to have been from 
 his influence, and from personal ambition, would, of itself 
 alone, prevent his accepting the crown. . . . From the 
 opinions of General Bolivar it may, therefore, fairly be 
 inferred that the active part taken by him in the late war 
 of this revolution, and his increasing efforts during the 
 whole course of it, were chiefly directed to obtain the 
 independence of his country by throwing off the yoke of 
 Spain ; and the only form of government which could, at 
 that moment, and for that j^urpose, be adopted was that 
 of a republic. But the wishes and opinions of Bolivar 
 have ever been opposed to pure republicanism, conceiving 
 that it would only lead to anarchy, and that its lasting 
 adoption was impossible in this country, where the only 
 established religion was the Roman Catholic, existing with 
 all the pomp of a rich and powerful hierarchy. . . . The 
 existence of the Liberator is the only present guarantee 
 to the peace and tranquillity of Colombia, . . . nothing 
 will probably transpire respecting Bolivar's sentiments 
 or views until after his arrival here." There is throughout 
 this long memorandum no allusion whatever to the letter 
 Bolivar is supposed by Mitre to have written to Camp- 
 bell before he started for the south in the end of 1 828. 
 If Campbell had ever received such a letter, with per- 
 mission to use it, he would undoubtedly have quoted it 
 straight off, instead of exercising his ingenuity in inferring 
 what Bolivar's views were. Nor would he have said 
 Bolivar's ideas would not be known till he returned to 
 Bogota. He had no objection to quoting Bolivar's 
 private letters to him, for he does quote a passage from 
 one dated Quito, 27th April 1829, though it does not refer 
 directly to the question of monarchy. We may take it 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S VIEWS ON MONARCHY 409 
 then as proved that, if ever the letter quoted by Mitre 
 was written, it certainly never reached Campbell. 
 
 A later despatch (7th September 1829) says that Ver- 
 gara (Minister for Foreign Affairs), after approaching the 
 British Minister through a subordinate, had officially 
 broached the subject of monarchy. When asked what 
 Bolivar's opinions were, Vergara had replied that the 
 Liberator's admiration for the British Constitution as a 
 model were well known, but that, on the present occasion, 
 he had declined to give an opinion, merely stating his 
 willingness to follow the national will. Vergara's ofificial 
 letter to the British Minister (dated 6th September) states 
 the proposal thus : Bolivar to remain in power for his life, 
 with the title of " Liberator," not of " monarch," which 
 neither would the Congress grant him, nor would he 
 accept. After his death, whoever was chosen as his suc- 
 cessor, and a European prince was indicated, might have 
 the title of " monarch." 
 
 In his earlier despatch Campbell had said that the 
 vague discussions of the last six months regarding 
 monarchy had crystallised on the arrival of De Bresson, 
 which was supposed to point to the idea of a French 
 prince. Also, that the feeling in favour of monarchy was 
 stronger in the south than in New Granada, and that 
 Sucre was in favour of monarchy as the only remedy for 
 anarchy. The members of the government were strongly 
 monarchical. Soublette, whose father was French, had 
 told De Bresson that even Paez would support a monarchy ; 
 and that Montilla, in Cartagena, was of the same way of 
 thinking. 
 
 Bolivar, hastening back from Quito, in order to be at 
 Bogotd for the opening of Congress on the 2nd January 
 1830, was only able to arrive there on the 15th, when he 
 found that a quorum of the Congress was not yet assem- 
 bled. The total number of members being sixty-seven, the 
 session could only open when forty-five (two-thirds) were 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
4IO SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 present On the 20th January, a bare quorum of forty- 
 seven being got together, the session opened in presence of 
 Bolivar. Sucre was elected President of the Assembly, 
 J. M, Esteves, Bishop of Santa Marta, Vice-President. 
 Bolivar withdrew after a brief address, in which he told 
 the Congress that the nation looked to them for the pre- 
 paration of a good fundamental law. 
 
 Once more he tendered his written resignation of the 
 Presidency, inviting the Assembly to appoint some one 
 else to the office. In a proclamation to the Colombians, 
 also dated the 20th January, he said that he resigned in 
 order that none might be able to point to him as an 
 obstacle to the constitution of the republic on a sound 
 basis. He protested vigorously against the calumniators 
 who had represented him as even desiring a crown. He 
 had no such aspirations. Colombia must now look to the 
 Constituent Congress. He ended with the words : " Com- 
 patriots ! hear my last word on the termination of my 
 political career. In the name of Colombia I beg, I pray 
 you to remain united, in order not to become the assassins 
 of your country, and your own executioners." ^ 
 
 Meanwhile, Bolivar's circular of the 31st August 1829, 
 inviting suggestions for the future government of the 
 country, had reached Paez at Valencia. That chief at once 
 seized upon it as an excellent opportunity for urging his 
 views in favour of the separation of Venezuela from New 
 Granada. He incited Caracas and other cities, by circular, 
 to pronounce in favour of separation and the ostracism of 
 Bolivar. The movement began in Valencia, where Paez's 
 influence was supreme. That city was followed by Cala- 
 bozo and Puerto Cabello. Caracas was easily persuaded 
 
 ' Bolivar's message, dated 20th January 1830 (as published in Bogota in 
 that year), concludes thus : — 
 
 " Fellow Citizens ! I blush to say it, independence is the only benefit we 
 have gained, at the cost of everything else. But it opens the gate to us for 
 the re-conquest of the rest under your sovereign auspices, with all the 
 splendour of glory and liberty." This passage is not quoted by Larrazabal. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
SFXESSION OF VENEZUELA 411 
 
 to fall in with Paez's desires, to resolve that he himself 
 should be head of the seceding departments, and that 
 Bolivar's authority should no longer be recognised. There- 
 upon Paez went to Caracas, approved the resolution, and 
 ofifered to maintain by arms the separation from New 
 Granada of Venezuela, which was henceforth to become a 
 sovereign and independent state. He appointed ministers, 
 convoked a Congress to meet in Valencia, and demanded 
 the means necessary for the war against Bolivar, to whom 
 he wrote affirming the final decision of Venezuela in favour 
 of separation, and warning him that he would be destroyed 
 if he attempted to attack the new state. 
 
 Thus was an end finally put to Bolivar's dream of a 
 united republic embracing an area (Venezuela, New 
 Granada, Ecuador) about twice the size of France, Ger- 
 many, and Spain combined, with a population less than 
 half that of Belgium of the present day. Nor was there 
 any homogeneity of populations. The Venezuelans and 
 the New Granadians especially were always antagonistic 
 and jealous of one another, and, if the separation had not 
 come before Bolivar's death, it must inevitably have come 
 immediately after it. It was only his own great personal 
 influence that had held the states together, after a fashion, 
 so far. As for the south, there had all along been a ten- 
 dency to go over to Peru rather than to New Granada, 
 especially in Guayaquil. The latter years of Bolivar's life 
 had been spent mainly in New Granada and Quito, except 
 when he was in Peru. But for this. New Granada would 
 probably have separated sooner, for Santander was as 
 eager for separation as Paez, and the mutual hatred of 
 these two was great. Bolivar's influence in Venezuela, as 
 a native of Caracas, was great even in his absence. In 
 Colombia, his influence was diminished by his foreign 
 origin. It was only the fact of his presence in the country, 
 or within reach of it, that enabled him to maintain himself 
 there. He now found himself bitterly opposed by the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
412 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 parties of Paez in Venezuela and of the banished Santan- 
 der in New Granada. 
 
 Congress, on receiving Bolivar's resignation, refused it, 
 saying that, if it were accepted, the State would be left 
 without a head, whilst the new fundamental law and the 
 new institutions were being worked out, with the result 
 that anarchy would be inevitable. Bolivar was reminded 
 that he had promised to retain power till the constitution 
 was promulgated and the new magistrates appointed. 
 
 Without making much difficulty, he agreed to remain 
 on, on these grounds, temporarily, vowing that, whatever 
 happened, nothing would induce him to remain in power, 
 even as constitutional President, once the constitution 
 was settled. 
 
 On the 27th January, he informed the Congress that he 
 proposed, with their consent, to go to Venezuela, in the 
 hope of arranging matters there, and that he had already 
 invited Paez to meet him with this object. He proposed 
 to leave Castillo in charge during his absence. 
 
 The proposal was discussed by the Congress, who 
 finally replied that such a matter was beyond their 
 jurisdiction, that they would endeavour to frame a con- 
 stitution maintaining the integrity of the Republic, but 
 that they deprecated the Liberator's absence at this 
 juncture. On receiving this answer, and on hearing 
 further of the progress of events in Venezuela, Bolivar 
 abandoned the proposed journey. He was convinced by 
 this time that it would be futile, and that Paez was not 
 in the least likely to respond to the invitation to an 
 interview. 
 
 The Congress had at once appointed a committee for 
 the preparation of a draft constitution, and the general 
 bases had been fixed. They now proposed to send two 
 members on a mission of peace to Venezuela, bearing 
 with them this outline, by way of reassurance to the 
 Venezuelans. Sucre and Esteves were selected for the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR AND THE CONGRESS 413 
 mission. The former, after reading his instructions, said 
 plainly that, looking to the proposed basis of negotiation 
 and the condition of afifairs in Venezuela, he had little 
 or no hope of success (17th February). However, the 
 Congress insisted that he and Esteves must go, and 
 elected a new President and Vice-President of the 
 Assembly in their place. 
 
 The Congress had now definitely adopted the following 
 principles for the new Constitution :— 
 
 1. The Republic to be single, with a popular elective 
 
 representative Government, holding office for 
 eight years. 
 
 2. The legislative power to be divided between the 
 
 Senate, the Chamber of Representatives, and the 
 Executive. 
 
 3. The President, responsible only in the case of 
 
 treason, to be assisted by a Council of State. 
 Responsibility to devolve on his secretaries. 
 
 4. Creation of local chambers for local affairs. 
 
 5. Securities for personal liberty. 
 
 6. The Roman Catholic Church to be that of the 
 
 State, the patronage being exercised by the 
 
 President, who was to allow no other public 
 
 form of worship ! 
 
 These bases were published, with an address to the 
 
 Colombians, by order of the Congress, on the 20th 
 
 February 1830. 
 
 About this time, also, Bolivar saw fit to exercise 
 clemency in the case of the conspirators of September 
 1828. Those who had been banished were allowed to 
 return, and those in prison were let out, and ordered to 
 go abroad, or allowed to return to their families, accord- 
 ing as their guilt was greater or less. 
 
 Having done this, Bolivar sent a fresh message to the 
 Congress, announcing that, in the weak state of his 
 health, it was no longer possible for him to retain the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
414 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 executive power. As Castillo, who, being President of 
 the Council of Ministers, would in ordinary course succeed 
 him ad interim, was a member of the Congress, they were 
 requested to elect someone else. They decided that 
 that was Bolivar's function, not theirs, and accordingly 
 the Liberator, on the ist March 1830, appointed General 
 Domingo Caicedo to be temporary President of the 
 Council of Ministers, in place of Castillo. Making over 
 to Caicedo the charge of the executive, Bolivar withdrew 
 to his country villa, near Bogotd, to recruit his health. 
 
 Sucre and Esteves had gone on their mission as far as 
 Ciicuta, and had started for Merida, when they were met by 
 the commandant of La Grita, who informed them that Paez 
 had issued orders forbidding the entry into Venezuelan 
 territory of any mission from Bogotd. Protesting against 
 such orders, the envoys pushed on to La Grita, where, on 
 the 20th March, they received orders so peremptory as to 
 leave them no option but return to Ciicuta. On their 
 way they received a copy of Paez's proclamation of the 
 2nd March, in which he expressed his determination to 
 maintain the separation of Venezuela from New Granada, 
 and that any attempt to reverse it by force should be 
 resisted. Paez was already on the march, not only to 
 sustain Venezuela, but also, as he said, to liberate New 
 Granada from the dominion of Bolivar. The envoys 
 naturally saw that that made an end of all negotiations. 
 Bolivar's distress, on hearing this news at his villa, was 
 augmented by a report of an insurrection in Casanare, 
 fomented by the Venezuelans. 
 
 When he returned to Bogotd, his friends were anxious 
 that he should resume the supreme authority, which 
 seemed to them the only remedy for the ills of Colombia. 
 But the Liberator, fast declining in health, saw death 
 approaching. He felt he had no longer the strength left 
 to comply, and, moreover, he had lost spirit in the hope- 
 less struggle. He Summoned his ministers to a con- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR RESIGNS THE PRESIDENCY 415 
 sultation, but nothing was decided. The city was now 
 torn by factions. A few of the deputies wished to elect 
 Bolivar to the constitutional Presidency, but the opposi- 
 tion was too strong. Many of his friends, Caicedo 
 included, deserted the Liberator, who felt that nothing 
 was left for him but to finally resign and quit the country. 
 It is hardly possible to doubt that he knew a vote for his 
 re-election would be lost. In his proclamation of the 
 27th April to his fellow-citizens, he says : " Venezuela, in 
 order to effect her separation, has alleged ambitious views 
 on my part ; presently she will allege that my re-election 
 is an obstacle to reconciliation and, finally, the Republic 
 would have to suffer either dismemberment or civil war. 
 On the day of its installation, I laid other considerations 
 before the Congress, and these, joined to many others, 
 should contribute to persuade the Congress that its most 
 urgent obligation is to give to the people of Colombia 
 new magistrates, possessed of the high qualifications 
 demanded by the law and by the public welfare. I pray 
 you, fellow-citizens, to receive this message as a proof of 
 my most ardent patriotism, and of the love which I have 
 always borne towards the Colombians." 
 
 The Congress, now satisfied that they were quit of the 
 Liberator, did not stint their compliments. In their 
 answer to him, they lauded his patriotism, and said : 
 "Whatever lot Providence may prepare for the nation 
 and for yourself. Sir, the Congress hopes that every 
 Colombian sensible of honour and a lover of his country 
 will look upon you with the consideration and respect due 
 to the services which you have performed for America, 
 and will take care that your name shall pass to posterity 
 with all the ^clat due to the founder of the independence 
 of Colombia." 
 
 To his resolve to quit Colombia he still adhered, not- 
 withstanding a flattering invitation, signed by the bishops 
 and many of the principal inhabitants of Quito, begging 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
41 6 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 him to take up his residence there. The 4th May was 
 fixed for the election of the chief magistrates, and on that 
 day Joaquin Mosquera became President and Domingo 
 Caicedo Vice-President. Not a vote was cast for Bolivar. 
 As Mosquera was absent in Popayan, the Presidential 
 duties were taken over, for the time being, by Caicedo. 
 
 Bolivar was then politely informed of the election, and 
 that his organic decree of the 27th August 1 828,^ under 
 which he exercised his powers, had ceased to be operative. 
 To the deputation which made this announcement he said, 
 after congratulating the Congress : " I am now reduced to 
 the private life I have so greatly desired, and if the 
 Congress asks any special proof of my blind obedience to 
 the constitution and the laws, I am ready to give what- 
 ever it demands." ^ 
 
 Bolivar, now nothing but a simple citizen, left the 
 Palace, and went to stay with his friend Herran. On the 
 8th May the Liberator, escorted beyond the city by the 
 ministers and many others, left Bogota for the last time to 
 retrace the well-known road to Cartagena. He left the 
 capital, which he had liberated, with all outward signs of 
 respect, but from all sides of the vast but now dissolving 
 Republic there resounded the imprecations of his enemies, 
 of the few who honestly believed him to be a danger to 
 his country, or too worn out to control it longer, of the 
 many more hungry ofSce-seekers, who saw in the fall of 
 Bolivar, and the dissolution of the Republic, a chance of 
 advancing their own claims to a power which in him they 
 reprobated. It was in this month (May 1830) that Quito 
 and Guayaquil broke away from Colombia and set up as 
 the separate Republic of Ecuador, with Flores as first 
 President. 
 
 Bermudez had styled Bolivar "a despot, a faithless 
 idolater of republican principles, an aspirant for monarchy, 
 a man of criminal designs and of the vilest ambition." 
 
 ^ Supra, p. 388. ' Larrazabal, ii. 539. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
BOLIVAR'S TROUBLES AND DESPAIR 417 
 Arismendi hurled at him the epithets of "tyrant of 
 Colombia, ungrateful Caraqueno, man of iniquitous 
 designs," whilst Paez said that " the existence of Bolivar 
 is ominous for the Republic, and his name should be 
 condemned to oblivion." These utterances were of a 
 time when Bolivar's continuation in power was still 
 possible, if not probable. Now that he really seemed to 
 be gone for good, the Congress, on the day after his 
 departure, proceeded to pass a decree of which the 
 articles provided for, (i) the tribute of the gratitude and 
 thanks of the nation, (2) the rendering to Bolivar, where- 
 ever he might be within the Republic, of the consideration 
 and respect due to "the first and best citizen of Colombia," 
 (3) the assignment to him of a pension of 30,000 pesos 
 per annum.^ 
 
 The last clause was unfortunately very necessary 
 to Bolivar, though it would very probably have proved 
 a disappointment to him had he lived, unless, indeed, he 
 were very much more fortunate than the other creditors 
 of the Republic. He had begun life in the service of his 
 country as a rich man, now he was a poor one. He had 
 already had to raise money by the sale of his silver 
 dinner service for about ;^SOO.^ He had tried to sell his 
 copper mines at Aroa, but an interminable lawsuit was 
 not likely to leave much out of their price for him. 
 Regarding this suit he wrote, amongst other things, to 
 his nephew by marriage, Gabriel Camacho, from Guaduas 
 on the road from Bogotd.' Though he begs his corre- 
 spondent to plead his claim for justice only with Paez, he 
 clearly has not much hope of it. Nor does he trust much 
 in the pension voted by Congress, for he writes : " I can- 
 not reckon on this favour, for no one knows what may 
 happen hereafter, or who will take command." 
 
 The whole of this long letter breathes despair and dis- 
 
 1 Larrazabal, ii. 541. * Ibid., 541. ^ Ibid., 542. 
 
 2 D 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
41 8 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 trust. Speaking of his demand of ordinary justice from 
 Paez, he writes : " I have served Venezuela well, and am 
 owed much by all her children, still more by the head of 
 her Government. Consequently, it would be the greatest 
 and most scandalous wickedness if I am to be persecuted 
 as a public enemy." Later, he writes that he knows not 
 whither he will go, whether to Curasao to await the result 
 of his lawsuit, or to Jamaica. Europe was too expensive 
 at present, but he was determined to leave Colombia. 
 " Anyhow," he writes, " I am determined never to return, 
 nor to again serve my ungrateful countrymen. Nothing 
 short of desperation can make me change this resolve. I 
 say desperation at seeing myself detested, persecuted, and 
 robbed by the very people for whom I have devoted my- 
 self to twenty years of sacrifices and dangers. Neverthe- 
 less, I say that I do not hate them, I am far from feeling 
 the desire for vengeance ; my heart has pardoned them, 
 for they are my beloved compatriots, and above all, 
 Caraquefios." 
 
 It was the 25th May 1830 when Bolivar reached 
 Turbaco in the low hills, a few miles south of Cartagena, 
 where the heat is a little less oppressive than on the 
 sea coast. Staying there a month, he went down to 
 Cartagena on the 24th June, with the intention of 
 embarking on an English passenger vessel. But there 
 was no room available on the boat. His small funds 
 soon began to run out, for he was as generous as 
 ever. At last the British frigate " Shannon " appeared in 
 the harbour, and it was proposed he should get a passage 
 to Jamaica in her ; but she was under orders to do some 
 surveying on the Venezuelan coast, and Bolivar had to 
 await her return from La Guaira. That was about the 
 last place he wished to go to, and probably the captain 
 of the " Shannon " would have felt it very inconvenient 
 to have him on board in a Venezuelan port. By 
 her, however, the Liberator sent renewed demands to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
MURDER OF SUCRE 419 
 
 Camacho for the remittance of a part of the price of his 
 estates. 
 
 The " Shannon " was away longer than was expected, 
 and Bolivar began almost to suffer want. He knew not 
 where to go, for he did not wish to land in Europe or 
 North America as a pauper. South American presidents 
 of our own times have a habit of laying up a nest-egg 
 in the Old World against the day when revolution may 
 drive them from their own conntry. All honour to Bolivar 
 that it was not he who set the example in this respect. 
 
 Whilst he was still in Cartagena he received letters 
 from Venezuela informing him of a rising in the central 
 provinces in favour of re-union with Colombia, acknow- 
 ledgment of the Constituent Congress of Bogota, and 
 of Bolivar as head of the State. On the 29th June he 
 passed on the information to the Bogotd Government, 
 and, at the same time, warned his Venezuelan friends 
 against the evils which must inevitably result from civil 
 war. It is clear that before this he had recognised that 
 the separation of Venezuela from New Granada was 
 irrevocable. 
 
 On the 1st July he was^living in a little house half a 
 mile from the walls of Cartagena, at the foot of La 
 Popa, the isolated hill which towers 500 feet above the 
 city. Here there fell upon him another heavy blow in 
 the news of the assassination of his old friend and most 
 faithful supporter, Sucre, Grand Marshal of Ayacucho. 
 "Good God!" he cried, "they have shed the blood of 
 Abel!"i 
 
 ' Sucre had been sent to the south to try and arrange affairs there, which 
 were in a critical condition. On the 4th June 1830 he had sent forward 
 most of his companions, and was himself following them, with only a single 
 servant, into the gloomy mountains of Pasto. In the narrow pass of 
 Beruecos lay waiting for him a party of assassins. As he arrived within 
 point-blank range of them, the cowards fired a volley. He had hardly 
 time to utter an exclamation when he fell dead. The body was found 
 by a sergeant who ran up on hearing the shots. 
 
 That the crime had been pre-arranged by his enemies is proved by El 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
420 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Meanwhile affairs had been going badly between 
 Venezuela and New Granada. The Congress of Venezuela, 
 which Paez had assembled at Valencia, was bitterly 
 hostile to Bolivar. After the proposal of resolutions 
 which went so far as to contemplate his outlawry, it was 
 finally resolved that " Venezuela ought not to enter into 
 relations of any sort with BogotA, so long as General 
 Bolivar was on her (New Granada's) territory." ^ When 
 this resolution was received by President Mosquera at 
 Bogotd he transmitted a copy to Bolivar at Cartagena. 
 It was yet another stab in the heart of the unfortunate 
 Liberator. 
 
 Mosquera's government had been injudicious, and was 
 daily falling into greater disrepute in Bogotd. The 
 President himself was not strong enough for his place, 
 and presently, feeling the burden to be beyond his 
 powers, he betook himself to Anolaima, on the slope of 
 the mountains between Bogota and the Magdalena. 
 Caicedo took over his work, but a military revolution 
 broke out against him and Mosquera, They attempted 
 
 Democrata, a Bogota newspaper, which, on the 1st June, three days before 
 the assassination, wrote : "It may be that Obando will do with Sucre what 
 we did not do with Bolivar." 
 
 Thus perished miserably perhaps the best, most upright, and most 
 honest of the Colombian patriots, certainly the only man among them who 
 had any pretensions to the name of general. To him alone was due the 
 victory of Ayacucho, which not only ended the struggle in Peru for emancipa- 
 tion from Spain, but finally put an end to all hope of recovery of her dominion 
 by the mother country. 
 
 That Bolivar felt his death deeply, and regarded with dread the probability 
 of more such assassinations, is shown by a letter which he addressed, on 
 receiving the news, to Flores, then commanding in Quito. He had really 
 become the first President of Ecuador, but that item of news had not yet 
 reached Bolivar. In 1842 Colonel Apolinar Morillo was executed as the 
 actual perpetrator of this crime, of which he confessed his guilt, and accused 
 J. M. Obando of being the instigator of the conspiracy. The three soldiers 
 who were with Morillo are said to have died of poison. Obando, whether 
 guilty or not, was never punished. (Dr J. Gutierrez Ponce, " Vida de 
 Don Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara," pp. 313, 314, 373, 374.) 
 
 ^ Larrazabal, ii. 551. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
OVERTHROW OF MOSQUERA 421 
 
 resistance, but their troops were defeated by Florencio 
 Jimenez, and Mosquera and Caicedo, throwing up the 
 sponge, fled — the former to the United States, the latter 
 to his farm. 
 
 The " pronunciamiento " of the praetorians had declared 
 Bolivar Head of the Republic, with Urdaneta as locum 
 tenens during his absence. On the S^h September 
 Urdaneta assumed office as " charged provisionally with 
 the Executive Power." He organised a ministry, and 
 sent envoys to Cartagena to fetch Bolivar, if he would 
 accept office in response to the general demand. 
 
 The news of events in Bogoti and its neighbourhood 
 gave rise to a similar movement in Cartagena, where 
 Montilla assembled the military leaders. Their resolu- 
 tion in favour of Bolivar's assumption of command of the 
 army was followed, next day, by the assent of the principal 
 inhabitants. 
 
 Bolivar resisted for a time the request both of the 
 Cartagenians and of Urdaneta's emissaries, but finally 
 consented to return to power, provided he was assured 
 of a majority in the country generally. To Urdaneta 
 he wrote privately that the vote of two municipalities 
 (Bogoti and Cartagena) was not sufficient guarantee. 
 What security was there that Mosquera might not find 
 supporters elsewhere and raise a civil war ? What about 
 Lopez and Obando in Popayan ? ^ 
 
 From another letter, written to Vergara a week later 
 (2Sth September 1830),* it appears that Bolivar had the 
 gravest doubts as to the stability of the new regime. 
 He had heard bad accounts of its prospects, even from 
 Santamaria, one of Urdaneta's envoys. He had no 
 desire, he said, to return to the Presidency, certainly 
 none in the present insecurity of affairs, and with the 
 possibility of another military revolt, which was not 
 improbable, if he was rightly informed as to the doubtful 
 ' Larrazabal, ii. 556. ^ Ibid., 557. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
422 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 steadfastness of some of the new troops and their officers. 
 Finally, he was ill, and was going in a few days to 
 Santa Marta, in the hopes of improvement in a better 
 climate. From all this Larrazabal infers that Bolivar 
 was steadfast in his resolution never to return to power. 
 To us it seems to point rather to the desire to return, 
 provided he could be sure of full support, and to his 
 hesitation being due chiefly to fear that the recent 
 " pronunciamiento " was purely praetorian, and liable to 
 reversal at any moment. 
 
 He would have done better to have refused absolutely, 
 for he was fast descending into the grave, and there 
 could be little hope of his ever reaching Bogota alive. 
 Leaving Cartagena, as he had said he intended, he spent 
 the months of October and November at Baranquilla, 
 then but a small place near the mouth of the Magdalena, 
 now the principal business centre of the Atlantic coast 
 of Colombia. 
 
 He was borne down by sickness, by disappointment, 
 and by the frequent blows inflicted on his pride by the 
 news of the general hatred of him in Venezuela.^ He 
 
 1 The author has been lent a little book, entitled, " Proclamations of 
 Bolivar." Unfortunately it has neither the name of an editor, nor even 
 of a printer, or the place of publication. Undoubtedly most of the 
 proclamations are genuine, but, under the circumstances, it is hardly safe 
 to quote the book as authoritative. At the end of the proclamations are 
 given two "prognostications" of Bolivar, which, if genuine, throw a 
 terrible light on his views of the state of South America. The first 
 purports to be taken from " A View of Spanish America," by Bolivar, 
 published in Cuenca in 1828. It begins thus : " There is no good faith 
 in America, whether between individuals or between nations. Treaties 
 are mere papers, constitutions nothing but books, elections are combats, 
 liberty is anarchy, and life is a torment." 
 
 The second, which we give in full, bears date the 9th November 1830, 
 thirty-eight days before Bolivar's death. It runs thus: "America is un- 
 governable. Those who have served the revolution have ploughed the sea. 
 The only thing to be done in America is to emigrate. These countries will 
 inevitably fall into the hands of an uncurbed multitude, to pass later into 
 those of petty tyrants of all colours and all races. Devoured by every crime 
 and extinguished by ferocity, they will not be worthy of conquest by 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DEATH OF THE LIBERATOR 423 
 
 had caught a bad cold on the night of the ist July, 
 which, being neglected and acting on an enfeebled con- 
 stitution, had ended in consumption. At the end of 
 November he writes to a friend : " I have scarce breath 
 enough left to carry me through the last days which 
 remain to me for my mortification." He was referring 
 to the insults to his name which reached him from 
 Venezuela. 
 
 As he felt his strength failing at Baranquilla, he 
 decided to move to Santa Marta, where were his friends 
 Montilla, Esteves, the bishop, and others. He reached 
 Santa Marta by sea on the ist December, suffering 
 much, and so weak that he had to be carried ashore. 
 There he was visited by the French Doctor Reverend, 
 who was able to give some relief to his cough and the 
 pain in his chest. There was also there the surgeon of 
 a U.S.A. gunboat.^ 
 
 It was too late really for doctors to do anything more 
 than render the end as easy as possible. Bolivar, stifled 
 by the close air of the town, begged to be taken to the 
 country. On the night of the 6th December he was 
 moved to the villa Pedro Alejandrino, the property of 
 Senor Joaquin de Mier, two or three miles out in the 
 country. Here he gradually became worse, and his brain 
 began to be affected, though, on the 8th, he dictated 
 a letter to Bogotd, saying he felt better, and added a 
 postscript with his own hand. On the loth the last 
 rites of the Catholic Church were administered to him 
 
 Europeans. Were it possible that a part of the world should lapse into 
 primeval chaos, that would be the last state of America." 
 
 This is also quoted by Gutierrez Posada ("Memorias Historico-Politicas," 
 p. 287). Both papers are printed as bearing the signature of Bolivar. 
 
 ^ For most of this account of Bolivar's last illness and death, see A. P. 
 R^v^rend, "La ultima enfermedad, etc. , de Simon Bolivar." R6virend, a. 
 Frenchman, born in 1796, served in Napoleon's army of 1815. In 1824 he 
 went to Santa Marta, where Montilla found him installed as medical officer 
 of the municipality. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
424 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 by his friend the bishop. He was still sensible, able 
 to dictate his will and his last farewell to Colombia. 
 The last words of it were : " Colombians ! my last wishes 
 are for the welfare of the Fatherland. If my death 
 contributes to the cessation of party strife, and to the 
 consolidation of the Union, I shall descend in peace 
 to the grave." ^ Immediately afterwards he dictated 
 one more letter to Justo Briceno. That was his last 
 rational act, for he soon began to wander. So he lingered 
 on till the 17th, when the early advent of death was 
 clear. At i p.m. on the 17th December 1830 the troubled 
 soul of the Liberator passed away. 
 
 He died aged a few days short of 47J, young in years, 
 but worn out by a life of almost constant and most 
 strenuous exertion, both physical and mental, a disap- 
 pointed, miserable wreck. 
 
 Four hours after death a post-mortem examination of 
 the body was made by Dr R6v6rend, who reported that 
 the illness, commencing with a chill on the lungs, had 
 developed into tubercular phthisis. In the last stages 
 there were many complications, perhaps the most painful 
 being neurosis of the digestive organs, evidenced by an 
 almost continuous hiccough. 
 
 Of the proclamations of Montilla, Urdaneta, and others 
 of the Liberator's friends, announcing to Colombia the 
 death of the man who had played so great a part in her 
 liberation, it is unnecessary to speak. 
 
 His remains were buried, for the time being, at Santa 
 Marta ; the time had not yet come for the fulfilment of 
 his desire that they should rest in his native city. Twelve 
 years later, his enemy Paez, then at the head of affairs in 
 Venezuela, attempted to atone for his treatment of 
 
 ^ According to Mitre, when the words were read over to him he added in 
 a hoarse voice, ' ' Yes ! to the tomb, to which I am sent by my fellow- 
 citizens : but I forgive them. Oh ! that I could take with me the consola- 
 tion of knowing that they will keep united." The farewell is given in full 
 in Larrazabal, ii. 564. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
DEATH OF THE LIBERATOR 425 
 
 Bolivar by causing the body to be removed to Caracas 
 and buried with great honour in the Cathedral there ^ ; 
 but the heart was left, preserved in an urn, in the Cathedral 
 at Santa Marta. In 1852 the body was once more re- 
 moved, to be finally deposited in the National Pantheon ^ 
 in a tomb surmounted by a statue of the Liberator, 
 erected by Guzman Blanco, the Venezuelan President, 
 the man who, with boundless vanity, placarded himself 
 on every possible occasion as the " Illustrious American, 
 Regenerator of the Republic." 
 
 Bolivar's will, dictated a few days before his death, may 
 be briefly referred to. He notes that his wife brought 
 him no property on his marriage. Of all his great wealth 
 and possessions he had nothing left but his lands and 
 mines at Aroa, and a little personal property. His debts 
 were mainly to Messrs Martin and Powles, whom he 
 desired to be reimbursed, as far as possible, from his 
 property. To the University of Caracas he bequeathed 
 two books, formerly the property of Napoleon, the 
 " Contrat Social " of Rousseau, and Montecuculi's " Art 
 of War." He desired that his remains should be buried 
 in his native city, Caracas. His thanks he desired to be 
 conveyed to Sir Robert Wilson, in acknowledgment of 
 the services of his son. Colonel Belford Wilson. There 
 were a few more bequests; 8000 pesos to his servant 
 Jose Palacio^; the sword presented to him by Sucre 
 was to go to that general's widow, in token of the 
 Liberator's afifection for her husband ; the medal pre- 
 
 1 Paez gives an account of this translation of the remains in his "Auto- 
 biography," vol. ii., p. 370, etc. Also Dr Reverted in his " Ultima 
 enfermedad, etc." 
 
 " The Pantheon, built on the model of that in Paris, covers the bodies of 
 many of the heroes of Bolivar's time. Miranda, vcho died in prison in 
 Cadiz, is not there ; nor is Sucre, who was murdered near Pasto (not, as 
 Professor Bingham erroneously says, in Bolivia). "Caracas to Bogoti," 
 p. 14. 
 
 ' The man whom he had met in the street at Bogota when he jumped 
 from the Palace window to escape the assassins in 1828. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
426 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 sented to him by the Congress of Bolivia to return to 
 
 that State. 
 
 As residuary legatees he named his two sisters, and 
 the children of his deceased brother, Juan Vicente 
 Bolivar. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 AN ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 
 
 WITH the main facts of the Liberator's career 
 before us, we are now in a position to 
 attempt an estimate of the man, the 
 soldier, and the statesman. The task is 
 peculiarly difficult, for the strong personality of Bolivar 
 has, as in the case of Napoleon, given rise to the most 
 opposite estimates of him by his friends and his enemies. 
 On the one hand, he has inspired the deepest affection 
 and the highest admiration ; on the other, there are those 
 of his contemporaries to whom he stands for all that is 
 mean and contemptible. The one side look upon him as 
 the purest of patriots, who had no thought but for the 
 welfare of his country ; the other sees in him an ambitious 
 self-seeker, looking upon the liberation of South America 
 merely as the stepping-stone to his own glory. On the 
 whole, his admirers, both his contemporaries and those 
 who wrote after his death, predominate over his de- 
 tractors. Larrazabal is perhaps his most fanatical 
 adulator. In his eyes, Bolivar was incapable of wrong, 
 and no action of his is indefensible. Ducoudray-Holstein, 
 on the other hand, has hardly a good word to say of him, 
 nor has Hippisley. Both, however, had causes of personal 
 resentment against him which warped their judgment, 
 and in the case of Ducoudray-Holstein, it is impossible 
 not to feel a great contempt for the writer himself, or to 
 think of him as anything but a vain and incompetent 
 adventurer, whose main object is self-glorification. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
428 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 O'Leary, an Irishman who came into contact with Bolivar 
 under circumstances somewhat similar to Hippisley's, un- 
 doubtedly tries to hold the balance fairly, but is sometimes 
 carried away by his personal afifection and admiration 
 for his master. There are a few, but very few, of the 
 Liberator's acts for which he is obliged to admit that there 
 is no defence. Of Bolivar's own countrymen, Restrepo is 
 perhaps the fairest ; of the Englishmen who came under 
 his command, the most moderate judgment of him is that 
 of Miller. Amongst the later writers, Mitre sees much 
 that is great in him, but is inclined to be prejudiced 
 against him by admiration for the rival hero, San Martin, 
 and by sympathy with the opposition to Bolivar of 
 Argentina and Chile. Between all these conflicting 
 opinions let us try to steer a middle course, rejecting, on 
 the one hand, the extravagant panegyrics of Larrazabal, 
 and, on the other, the obvious prejudices of Ducoudray- 
 Holstein. 
 
 There is one point on which all are agreed — the 
 generosity of Bolivar, his carelessness of money and his 
 financial uprightness. Few men ever had greater oppor- 
 tunities of enriching themselves ; still fewer more honestly 
 refused to take advantage of their opportunities. He 
 commenced life as a rich man, he died almost a pauper. 
 Peru offered him a million of " pesos," which he refused 
 for himself, though he accepted it for the benefit of his 
 native city. He renounced the endowments which his 
 country proposed to confer on him. Perhaps they were 
 not worth very much in hard cash ; still he refused to 
 accept them or to burden the impecunious State with 
 obligations in his own favour, until absolute want com- 
 pelled his acceptance of the pension of 1830. 
 
 Unlike the South American President of modern 
 days, he laid up no nest-egg in the Old World to pro- 
 vide for the time when his position in his own country 
 should be no longer tenable. Avarice may at once 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 429 
 
 be disregarded as one of the spurs which stimulated 
 Bolivar. 
 
 Vanity and ambition are alleged as his chief motives 
 by his enemies. Vain he certainly was, like all his race ; 
 the complacency and avidity with which he absorbed all 
 the flattery which was offered to him is enough to prove 
 that. From the earliest days of his successes, in 181 3, he 
 was eager for compliments and demonstrations of every 
 sort. His power of swallowing flattery in its most shame- 
 lessly open form reached its maximum in Peru, and in 
 the progress through that country and Bolivia. This 
 inhalation of the incense of flattery had long ere that 
 become a regular habit with the Liberator, so much so, 
 that he probably encouraged the similar demonstrations 
 at Guayaquil towards San Martin, believing that they 
 would be as acceptable to that leader as to himself. But 
 in the Protector of Peru the grossness of the flattery 
 produced a feeling of disgust which, perhaps, helped to 
 increase the repulsion which he felt for the person of the 
 Liberator when he first met him. It would be absurd 
 to deny that ambition had a great influence on Bolivar's 
 career. Yet it seems to us that a great injustice is 
 done to him by those who assert that personal ambition 
 was the sole, or even the chief, motive power which drove 
 him forward in his great task of liberating South America 
 from Spanish rule. The idea of the struggle for the 
 liberation of a down-trodden people seems to have grown 
 in the mind of the young Bolivar quite independently of 
 any thoughts of his own personal advancement. It was 
 implanted in him by the teachings and companion- 
 ship of a dreamer, Simon Rodriguez, and what he saw in 
 Europe seems to have convinced him that South America, 
 free of Spain and endowed with a republican government, 
 must follow the example of France. What he did not 
 altogether realise then was the immense difference be- 
 tween the homogeneous, civilised, and cultivated people of 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
430 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 France, and the backward, almost uncivilised, and hete- 
 rogeneous peoples of South America, whose education 
 had been for centuries carefully repressed by the 
 governing power. 
 
 Bolivar certainly started as an ardent and whole-hearted 
 republican, whose conscience was shocked by the ambition 
 of Napoleon, overturning the French Republic and raising 
 himself to supreme power on its ruins. Yet it may be 
 noted, with reference to Bolivar's later ideas, that it was 
 not the Consulate but only the Empire which turned him 
 against Napoleon. 
 
 That he placed the good of his country and its libera- 
 tion far in advance of his own ambition is shown by the 
 very fact of his importation of Miranda in 1810. That 
 leader had already acquired a European reputation which, 
 if not very high in itself, promised to place him on a 
 pedestal in South America, where there was certainly no 
 one who had had his experience of war or of republican 
 government, both in North America and in Europe. Had 
 Napoleon been in Bolivar's position, the last thing he 
 would have thought of would have been to call in a man 
 to whom he must, for the moment at least, play second 
 fiddle. 
 
 Miranda, it is true, belied his reputation. He was 
 worn out, and broke down completely in every way. But 
 Bolivar had no reason to anticipate that, and there is no 
 ground for believing that he hoped to play the leading 
 part when Miranda was in Venezuela. Nor did he 
 attempt to do so. 
 
 The rapid growth of Bolivar's ambition may be dated 
 from the fall of Miranda. He had by this time gauged 
 the weakness of the leading men in his own country, and 
 realised his own superiority to the rest. His observations 
 in Europe and the United States had shown him the 
 unsuitability to the circumstances of his own countrymen 
 of the Federal form of republic which had been set up in 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 431 
 
 Caracas, against the opinion of Miranda and himself. He 
 had seen that, in a country like Venezuela, where all 
 political energy was centred in a few towns, federalism 
 must inevitably lead to speedy disruption of the union. 
 New Granada had tried the same plan, and was already 
 involved in civil war and dissolution into weak states. 
 The United States of North America ^ had been taken as a 
 model by the South American republicans, who failed to 
 perceive the vast differences between the circumstances 
 and character of the British American colonists and those 
 of the subjects of the Spanish oversea dominions. Bolivar 
 saw that possible safety lay only in centralised republics, 
 in which the " sovereign and independent state " did not 
 hold out a perpetual threat of separation from the union. 
 Miranda had failed, and had disappeared from the scene 
 to languish in the dungeons of Cadiz. Bolivar, no doubt, 
 saw in himself the one man fit to carry through the part 
 which he had formerly marked out for Miranda. He 
 began to look upon himself as the predestined saviour of 
 his country, the one man on whom everything depended. 
 He had weighed his countrymen and found them wanting 
 as leaders, in political as well as in administrative know- 
 ledge and capacity. As time went on, he appears to have 
 become more and more impressed with the belief that he, 
 and he alone, was absolutely essential to the liberation of 
 South America, and his ambition for supreme power 
 grew accordingly. That he was ambitious he himself 
 admitted.* 
 
 Though we believe that a genuine love of his country, 
 and a desire for her freedom and prosperity, were the 
 original mainsprings actuating Bolivar, there were cer- 
 
 ' Even there the War of Secession has shown what dangers threaten a 
 Federal Republic. Only recently the difficulty of controlling the Anti- 
 Asiatic legislation of the Western States has brought a new danger into 
 prominence. 
 
 ^ In his letter tendering his resignation on the 6th February 1827. Supra, 
 
 p. 375- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
432 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 tainly occasions when he allowed personal considerations 
 to take precedence of a whole-hearted patriotism. 
 
 The first of these was when, in 1815, he persisted in 
 pursuing his quarrel with Castillo at Cartagena, and 
 setting the terrible example of civil war, when the safety 
 of New Granada was menaced by the approach of Morillo. 
 There seems to be no possible defence for either Castillo 
 or Bolivar in this shocking affair of the first siege of Car- 
 tagena. Had they united to defend the place against 
 Morillo, it seems by no means impossible that his army 
 might have been wrecked in its attempt to capture it. 
 
 \A^hen the Liberator came into contact with San 
 Martin, his determination to assert his own superiority, 
 and his practical refusal to aid Peru against Spain, except 
 on his own terms, threatened disaster. Fortunately, San 
 Martin was a more genuine patriot than Castillo, and 
 effaced himself for the benefit of his country, when he 
 saw that Bolivar was determined not to do so, and would 
 see Peru perish, rather than act under, or in concurrence 
 with the Protector. 
 
 The successes in Peru and Bolivia mark the' point at 
 which Bolivar's schemes and aspirations began to exceed 
 the bounds of reason. The Liberator, at this period, 
 suffered from megalomania of a very pronounced type. 
 He had already undertaken what was really impracticable 
 in his decision to unite Venezuela, New Granada, and 
 Quito in one vast republic of Colombia ; he now con- 
 templated a close federation including Colombia, Peru, 
 and Bolivia. He had wanted to sweep Chile and Argen- 
 tina into the sphere of his own supreme influence, but 
 those countries were determined not to take the same 
 position as Peru, and the Liberator had to abandon these 
 schemes. His still greater idea of the Congress of 
 Panama was hopelessly premature and incapable of 
 execution. If a Pan-American Congress is ever to 
 become a reality, the prevailing influence must be that of 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 433 
 
 the North, not of the divided South. What was thought 
 of Bolivar's schemes in Colombia, at any rate by some of 
 the more important leaders, is shown by the passage we 
 have quoted from Santander's letter of the 6th July 1826.1 
 
 This letter gives an idea of the opposition that his 
 supposed schemes were likely to encounter. From others, 
 such as Paez, the opposition would probably have been 
 cruder and more decided. Santander's subsequent conduct 
 showed that he was not likely to give even the limited 
 acquiescence he promises in Bolivar's supremacy. 
 
 The title of Emperor was probably not sought by the 
 Liberator; but, nevertheless, he aimed at what was 
 Empire in all but name. Mitre has coined the term 
 " monocracy " for his aspirations. Nor is it to be believed 
 that in his later days, when he realised the hopelessness 
 of a union of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, he contem- 
 plated a Colombian crown for himself When San 
 Martin proposed the erection of South American mon- 
 archies under princes of the royal families of Europe, 
 Bolivar nailed his republican colours to the mast. When 
 he returned to Colombia in 1826, to find even that 
 comparatively moderate-sized republic on the point of 
 dissolution, owing to Paez's revolt, he seems to have 
 reluctantly begun to modify his views on this subject. 
 The question of the monarchical movement of 1829 has 
 been fully discussed already. Bolivar may be acquitted 
 of designs for a crown for himself, designs which he had 
 persistently disavowed throughout his career. He pro- 
 bably saw clearly that his assumption of a royal or 
 imperial title would be such a flagrant violation of all his 
 past professions of republicanism as to be certain to 
 discredit him for ever in the eyes of his countrymen, and 
 to be destructive of his real power. 
 
 There were two alternatives open to him. He might 
 aim at the retention for his lifetime of actual supreme 
 Sufra, p. 3S9. 
 2 E 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
434 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 power under some such title as Liberator-President, or 
 President for life. In such a position he would have 
 been a king to all intents, but without, as he himself 
 expressed it, " a seat on the four crimson covered planks 
 which are styled a throne." In that case, what was to 
 happen on his death, which he must have felt to be a not 
 very remote contingency? He had no heirs, and no 
 understudy fit to take his place. 
 
 On the other hand, he might elect to play for an 
 immediate constitutional monarchy, the sovereign being 
 selected from one of the reigning houses of Europe, other 
 than that of Spain, In that case, he must himself retire, 
 or, at the most, remain as the power behind the throne — 
 an impossible position for such a man. 
 
 The scheme propounded by Vergara to Campbell was 
 a sort of compromise. Bolivar was to remain in power 
 for life, with a constitutional monarch in the background 
 ready to succeed him. Even the monarchical party did 
 not venture to suggest the title of King for Bolivar. 
 
 As for the Liberator himself, he was always alive to the 
 great difficulties of a European prince, or indeed of any- 
 one, in accepting such a throne as could be offered him. 
 The country, whatever its natural wealth, must remain for 
 many years poverty-stricken, until its natural resources 
 could be developed, A century has not sufficed to attain 
 that end, hardly even to make a commencement. The 
 sovereign's court, consisting as it must of paupers, would 
 be a mockery, and his own position, surrounded by in- 
 triguers of the type of Santander, Paez, and many others, 
 would be almost impossible. He would have neither the 
 means nor the surroundings to establish any real influence 
 or prestige. 
 
 The whole of Bolivar's career was a gradual disillusion- 
 ment. Year after year he became more and more con- 
 vinced of the utter unreliability of the men and the 
 machinery for administration. None of his subordinates 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 435 
 
 was a trained administrator, nor was he one himself. His 
 attempts at administrative improvement were mere make- 
 shifts, which broke down in the hands of others, the 
 moment his back was turned. Campbell draws a 
 wretched picture of the corruption and abuses of San- 
 tander's rule during Bolivar's absence in Peru. He gives 
 instances of jobbery and fraud committed with the 
 knowledge and connivance of Santander himself, and 
 the judicial officers were as bad as the financiers. As for 
 Paez, he was so totally uneducated as to be entirely in 
 the hands of the intriguers who surrounded him. It is 
 impossible to be serious when one reads some of the 
 letters appearing over his signature, full of learned 
 references to the heroes of Greece and Rome, of whom 
 we may be quite certain Paez had never heard. 
 
 All through the Liberator's later correspondence there 
 resounds the bitter cry of the disillusioned man, despair- 
 ing of his country's future. We have already quoted his 
 two so-called "prognostications" without attributing 
 authenticity to them. But there are many letters of 
 Bolivar of undoubted authenticity which are very nearly 
 as strongly expressed. We will only add to the quota- 
 tions already given, one from a letter written by Bolivar 
 to Campbell on the 27th April 1829, and transcribed in 
 the despatch of the 4th June 1829. Bolivar says: "I 
 believe that, without much exaggeration, this hemisphere 
 may be called that of anarchy. ... I have no doubt but 
 this mass of disorders will contribute to open the eyes of 
 the incredulous (ilusos), and give cause to our friends in 
 Europe to see all clearly, convincing them at the same 
 time that my conduct and principles are too moderate to 
 be able to govern this country." 
 
 Perhaps the most remarkable characteristics of Bolivar 
 are the immense personal influence he succeeded in estab- 
 lishing over every one he came in contact with, and the 
 indomitable courage and hopefulness which he displayed, 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
436 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 almost to the end of his career, even in the most ap- 
 parently desperate circumstances. 
 
 Personally he was not popular. His manners were 
 often harsh and unpleasant, and his language violent. 
 His irascible temper was not in his favour, though, accord- 
 ing to Miller, it appears to have been superficial and to 
 have calmed down when he was not irritated by opposi- 
 tion. Yet he clearly had a wonderful power, when he 
 chose to exert it, of overcoming opposition and winning 
 over even those who entered his presence in the most 
 hostile frame of mind. We have seen what Santander 
 said on this subject, and Santander was certainly not pre- 
 judiced in his favour. Men who were very brave in their 
 actions, and still more so in their professions, when the 
 Liberator was far away, collapsed ignominiously when he 
 appeared in person on the scene. In his earlier days he 
 was sometimes resisted to his face by men like Arismendi, 
 Marino, or Bermudez, but, as time went on, his influence 
 increased. When Paez had allowed himself to be set up 
 by Wilson as supreme chief on the Apure, he gave in at 
 once on the approach of Bolivar. It was the same on 
 Bolivar's arrival at Maracaibo in 1827. Santander, as he 
 himself confesses, could not resist the Liberator to his face, 
 however bold he might be when he was far away. Even 
 then, a firm letter from Bolivar was sometimes sufficient 
 to bring him to heel, as in 1823. San Martin himself 
 could not stand against the masterful personality of 
 Bolivar, and it was he who had to give way after the 
 Guayaquil interview. In his later years the Liberator's 
 nerve seems to have failed to some extent. That was the 
 cause of his treatment of Paez in the beginning of 1827, 
 when, had he been the Bolivar of former days, he would 
 probably have completely suppressed the Llanero leader, 
 instead of granting an amnesty, and eventually even 
 praising Paez's rebellious attitude, and calling him the 
 "saviour of his country." Perhaps that was the most 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 437 
 
 remarkable exhibition of weakness he ever displayed. 
 No misfortune, however great, seemed to daunt Bolivar 
 in his early days. It is hardly possible to conceive any 
 situation more desperate than his position after his defeat 
 at La Puerta in 1814, or in Jamaica in 181 5-16. All 
 seemed lost after the defeat of El Semen in 18 18, yet 
 very soon after this Bolivar was writing and talking as if 
 victory was assured. The buoyancy of his spirit is illus- 
 trated by his proclamations before and during the passage 
 of the Andes in 1819. His situation was depressing 
 enough after his Pyrrhic victory of BombonA, and in the 
 struggle against Peruvian apathy in 1824. Yet he never 
 for a moment lost hope, or the confidence of eventual 
 success. It was only after he left Peru that despair of his 
 countrymen, and of the future of South America, settled 
 on his spirit like a gloomy cloud. He saw all his visions 
 of a great confederacy melting away ; his back was hardly 
 turned when both Peruvians and Bolivians rejected his 
 favourite Bolivian constitution, which they had accepted 
 when he was still amongst them to enforce his wishes. 
 He saw Sucre forced to leave Bolivia, and Peru preparing 
 for war against himself. Then the revolt of Paez clearly 
 foreshadowed the dissolution of the greater Colombia, 
 which, at least, he had hoped to preserve intact. All his 
 later correspondence is tinged with the melancholy of a 
 profound despair. His circular inviting suggestions for 
 the constitution of the government shows that he had lost 
 confidence in himself and his power. His letter about the 
 rebellious generals furnishes yet further evidence of his 
 abandonment of hope. Yet, even to the very last, he still, 
 at times, hoped for a revival of his prospects. Mitre says 
 that a very few days before the acceptance of his final 
 resignation, in May 1830, he still had hopes of re-election. 
 The fall of Mosquera and Caicedo, before the military 
 revolution of Urdaneta and Jimenez, once more revived 
 the hopes of the dying man, and, had he but felt that 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
438 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 there was any real stability in the troops, he might still 
 
 have tried to return to Bogota and power. 
 
 Bolivar has been compared to Washington and to 
 Napoleon ; indeed Larrazabal would have us put him 
 above the North American hero. Any such comparisons 
 seem to us inappropriate. If it be said that Bolivar 
 was as far above the men amongst whom he worked as 
 Napoleon was above his surroundings, there may be some 
 sense in the comparison. But then we must remember 
 the enormous gulf between South America and Europe, 
 in civilisation, in education, and in almost every other 
 quality. The Liberator certainly had neither the military 
 nor the administrative ability of the great Corsican, and 
 on moral grounds, as well as others, he cannot be com- 
 pared to Washington. Is it possible to imagine Wash- 
 ington declaring the war to the death, or massacring the 
 800 prisoners of Caracas and La Guaira ? What would 
 he have said to the fulsome adulation of Peru and 
 Bolivia ? Such things are not conceivable even in the 
 case of Napoleon. Bolivar had not the chances of 
 either of these two ; for, if ever a man had to face the 
 problem of making bricks without straw, that man was 
 the Liberator. Not only had he to drive out the 
 Spaniards with very insufificient means, but, when he 
 had destroyed the old government, he was faced by the 
 task of reconstructing an administration for peoples 
 whose past had fitted them for nothing but despotic rule. 
 He had no one to help him in this, for he was surrounded 
 by men whose practical acquaintance with the art of 
 government was even less than his own. 
 
 Had he succeeded, in the face of all these difficulties, in 
 leaving behind him a South America, or even a Colombia, 
 united and well-governed, no name in history would have 
 been too great to compare him with. But he failed, and 
 left, as he foresaw must be the case, a century of revolu- 
 tion and misrule to follow him. 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 439 
 
 He was perpetually reforming or reconstructing the"^ 
 administration, but nothing stable ever came of it. No- 
 thing more could be expected from one who had had no 
 administrative training and no reliable tools with which 
 to work. All who might have been able to help him had 
 necessarily disappeared with the rule which they repre- 
 sented. The Spaniards alone were acquainted with the 
 machinery of their government, such as it was, and, from 
 the very nature of the case, it was impossible for them to 
 serve on under the revolutionary government. Even 
 Napoleon, administering a conquered country, largely 
 employed the former functionaries, and he had always 
 at hand an excellent staff of trained administrators to 
 supervise them. 
 
 In the drafting of constitutions Bolivar displayed a 
 curious energy, and, all things considered, it is wonderful 
 that he, devoid as he was of legal education, should have 
 been able to turn out two such productions as the Con- 
 stitutions of Cucuta and of Bolivia, which were apparently 
 entirely his own handiwork. The latter was a somewhat 
 strange piece of patchwork, made up from the British 
 Constitution, tempered by that of the United States, and 
 with an admixture of ancient Greek and Roman ideas. 
 The whole thing, with its Presidency for life and its 
 hereditary Senate, certainly smacked more of a constitu- 
 tional monarchy than of a republic. 
 
 The comparison of Bolivar with Napoleon as a military 
 genius is absurd. He had no military education, either 
 practical or theoretical, and if we may infer, from his 
 special bequest of Montecuculi's " Art of War," that he 
 pinned his military faith on it, it may be remarked that 
 it was hardly the best course of study for the waging of 
 war in the days of Napoleon. Mitre has characterised his 
 system of warfare as a sort of mixture of the warlike pro- 
 pensities of the indigenous races with European disciplirie. 
 Knowing little of tactics and less of strategy, he gained 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
440 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 his victories by audacity, by impetuosity in attack, and 
 by unfailing constancy in defeat. With this estimate of 
 the Liberator's military qualifications there is not much 
 fault to be found. In the domain of strategy he did 
 well in 1813 when, dropping from the mountains of 
 Merida into the very midst of the scattered Spanish 
 forces, he defeated them in detail. But there seems no 
 reason to suppose that his finding himself in a position 
 to do so was due to anything but chance. The way 
 in which he soon afterwards scattered his own army 
 in different directions, instead of keeping the main body 
 together to be hurled alternately against Boves, Ceballos, 
 Monteverde, and Yanez, is certainly not indicative of any 
 high strategical conception. He never seems to have 
 realised that in war it is impossible to be too strong at 
 the decisive point. Bolivar's first really good strategical 
 move was his transfer of the base of operations from 
 Northern Venezuela to Guayana, but it was Piar's idea 
 rather than the Liberator's. Even when he decided on it, 
 he committed the grave blunder of leaving the unfortunate 
 Freites to certain destruction at Barcelona. When he 
 found himself in possession of Guayana, his letter to the 
 Marquis de Toro shows that he appreciated its advan- 
 tages, but, as we have said, the credit for initiation of the 
 movement must go to Piar. 
 
 The one great strategical idea for which the credit is 
 solely due to Bolivar is the march to Bogota in 18 19, which 
 resulted in the liberation of New Granada. Its execution 
 was admirable, and it may safely be said that few other 
 leaders would have dared to attempt it. The passage of the 
 Andes has been compared to the passages of the Alps by 
 Hannibal and Napoleon. Its actual physical difficulties 
 were probably greater than either of these encountered, 
 but it must be remembered that, whilst they carried with 
 them large armies of disciplined troops, Bolivar's force 
 was not more than about 2500 half-disciplined men at the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 441 
 
 outside. He reached the highlands without a single horse 
 or gun and with his troops in a state of dissolution which 
 would have rendered them an easy prey to the Spaniards, 
 had they been within reach during the first few days. 
 Bolivar's achievement was certainly a great one, but hardly 
 greater than San Martin's in the Chilian Andes. His 
 concentration on the Cerro de Pasco before Junin was 
 also admirable in its execution. 
 
 Turn now to Bolivar's tactics. We have seen the 
 class of troops he had to lead, often men whose 
 want of training rendered manoeuvring out of the 
 question. Most of the Liberator's battles were mere 
 hammer - and - tongs affairs, decided by a bayonet 
 charge, and they rarely amounted to anything greater 
 than a combat between the equivalent in numbers of a 
 European brigade on either side. As an instance of 
 Bolivar's tactical incapacity, take Carabobo. He decided, 
 correctly enough, to turn the Spanish right flank ; but 
 when it came to execution, he carried out the whole of 
 his turning movement in full view of the enemy, whom he 
 made no effort to hold in front during its execution. 
 Consequently, the Spaniards were able to send reinforce- 
 ments to the threatened wing without any hindrance, and 
 two-thirds of Bolivar's little army idly watched the 
 struggle of the rest against greatly superior numbers. 
 The eventual victory was due to the dogged valour of the 
 British troops, holding on without reinforcements, and 
 almost without ammunition for a long time. 
 
 At Bomboni Bolivar seems to have appreciated the 
 necessity of a frontal attack, in order to save the flank 
 attack on the slopes of Pasto from annihilation by 
 superior forces. Junin was a purely cavalry action, for 
 the initiation of which Bolivar was personally responsible. 
 With the whole field spread out under his eyes, the 
 Liberator deliberately sent his cavalry to pass through a 
 dangerous defile and to deploy beyond it, with the 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
442 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Spanish cavalry so close as to be able to fall upon the 
 republicans as they debouched. The result must have 
 been defeat, but for the happy accident of Suarez's 
 squadron being in reserve, and the mismanagement of 
 the Spanish cavalry in the pursuit. Bolivar himself 
 clearly thought the day was lost when he galloped off to 
 draw up his infantry in rear. 
 
 Such instances as these suffice to show that Bolivar's 
 military notions were excessively crude. The fact is, the 
 whole struggle rarely rose above the level of guerrilla 
 warfare, and it is ridiculous to compare the leader of 
 guerrillas with Napoleon, or even with Washington. 
 Bolivar was never opposed to a commander of the second, 
 or even of the third rank. Monteverde, Boves, Morales, 
 and Yanez were amateurs in the art of war like himself; 
 Morillo, Canterac, La Torre, and the other professional 
 soldiers on the Spanish side were men who had gained 
 no reputation worthy of mention, and never displayed 
 any remarkable military talent in South America. Of the 
 commanders on both sides Sucre was perhaps the only 
 one who showed signs of real military aptitude. 
 
 Wellington is said to have spoken of Bolivar as a 
 "remarkable commander," which is just the cautious 
 sort of remark which might have been expected from the 
 Duke in regard to a man as to the details of whose 
 military conduct he probably did not know very much. 
 Bolivar's great merit as a leader, under the peculiar cir- 
 cumstances in which he commanded, lies in his firmness 
 and constancy in defeat, which never allowed him to 
 despair, and which inspired him with ideas of such bold- 
 ness as the march on Bogota, and the advance into the Andes 
 of Peru against the superior forces of La Serna. Napoleon 
 himself was hardly more successful in exacting from his 
 men the uttermost farthing of exertion and devotion. 
 
 Bolivar may fairly enough be styled a Napoleon or a 
 Washington when judged by South American standards 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 443 
 
 only, but there is nothing whatever to show that he was 
 capable of playing the part of either of those great men 
 in the surroundings in which they lived and acted. 
 
 From beginning to end his career was one long 
 struggle, not only against the Spaniards, but also against 
 the disloyalty and the incompetence of the men who 
 professed to work with him. Of all the leaders, Sucre, 
 Urdaneta, Salom, and Mariano Montilla, after the recon- 
 ciliation, were almost the only ones on whom he could 
 really rely. Marino, Bermudez, Paez, Piar, Arismendi, 
 Ribas — all, at one time or another, turned against him ; 
 some of them were in revolt on several occasions. 
 Cordova, Padilla, Santander, Obando, and Lopez all 
 conspired against him. Paez and Santander were his 
 bitterest enemies, though each of them publicly testified 
 to the merits of the Liberator. Nothing can show more 
 clearly how far above them he admittedly stood than 
 some of the letters and proclamations of these two. 
 
 Paez was perhaps more a tool in the hands of cleverer 
 men, and was personally a less dangerous enemy than 
 Santander. The latter, when Bolivar went to Peru, was 
 virtually President of Colombia, and it became his in- 
 terest to keep the Liberator from returning to supersede 
 him. It would have suited him perfectly if Bolivar had 
 abandoned Colombia for good, and set himself up as 
 President of Peru and Bolivia, an office to which he was 
 elected for life, and could perhaps have held so long as 
 he remained in the country, backed by his Colombian 
 troops. It was on them really that he had to rely, a 
 fact which was emphasised by Sucre's acceptance of the 
 Bolivian Presidency, only on condition of his being 
 allowed to retain 2000 Colombian soldiers. 
 
 Washington's character is stained by no such dark 
 blots as disfigure the career of Bolivar. We have already 
 discussed his action in the arrest of Miranda in 1812. 
 Notwithstanding his profession of purely patriotic motives 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
444 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 in this matter, it is difficult to doubt that the fate of the 
 unfortunate old man, which was due to Bolivar's action, 
 should have weighed heavily on his conscience. 
 
 The declaration of war to the death was a piece of 
 barbarism which, however much in accord with the spirit 
 of both sides in this fierce war, can only reflect discredit 
 on a man who, at least, had had opportunities of knowing 
 how war is conducted amongst civilised peoples. Such a 
 declaration Washington could never have made, and even 
 Napoleon's bitterest enemies would hardly accuse him of 
 contemplating such atrocities. Though, as we have said, 
 Bolivar showed symptoms, very soon after the declaration, 
 of regret for it, he undoubtedly enforced it on many 
 occasions with the utmost rigour. His own report on the 
 massacres during his advance on Caracas in 1813, and 
 the horrible slaughter of prisoners in February 18 14, are 
 enough to prove this. The declaration has not even the 
 excuse of referring to combatants only, for it was levelled 
 at every Spaniard, combatant and non-combatant alike, 
 and was actually executed against innocent persons who 
 had taken no part in military operations. The whole 
 spirit of the revolutionary armies favoured merciless 
 massacres, and, up to 1820, Bolivar did nothing to check 
 it. The murder of the missionaries in Guayana was un- 
 punished, so was the massacre of the exhausted prisoners 
 on the road from Bogotd to the Magdalena in 1815. 
 Bolivar was not responsible for the murder of Barreyro 
 and his companions in 1819, and he expressed horror at 
 it. But he did nothing to punish Santander. Indeed, 
 looking to his own past record, he could not consistently 
 do so. His admirers produce in his defence certificates 
 of his general humanity. If he was as humane by nature 
 as they represent him, the obvious reply is that he 
 sacrificed his principles for what he considered to be 
 expediency. 
 
 In blaming Bolivar for sanctioning such barbarities 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 445 
 
 there is no excuse to be made for his opponents. Men 
 like Boves, Morales, Yafiez, Rosete, and innumerable 
 others were at least as atrocious savages as their 
 republican opponents. All that can be said is that one 
 party was as bad as the other, and perhaps the example 
 was originally set by the royalists. The methods of the 
 war on both sides, up to 1820, relegate it to a level with 
 the combats of uncivilised savages. 
 
 The execution of the unfortunate Piar is a favourite 
 charge of the enemies of Bolivar. The mulatto was 
 certainly a dangerous intriguer, and, as we have said, 
 perhaps the most alarming feature in his insurrection was 
 his attempt to work upon race feeling. Had he suc- 
 ceeded in introducing that element into the war, it might 
 possibly have taken an even more sanguinary aspect. 
 Still, there is always a suspicion that Bolivar was anxious 
 to get rid of one whom he felt to be a more dangerous 
 rival than men of the stamp of Marino and Bermudez. 
 Of Bolivar's conduct in his siege of Cartagena, and in his 
 dealings with San Martin, enough has already been said. 
 It is curious how differently he has been estimated in the 
 matter of frankness — San Martin thought him cold and 
 calculating, the very reverse of frank ; Colonel Campbell^ 
 not to mention the Liberator's avowed admirers, attributes 
 frankness to him as one of his virtues. 
 
 Of his conduct in Peru, and in his dealings with Chile 
 and Buenos Aires, it is difficult to speak with certainty. 
 There is another side to the story which, from the point 
 of view of those countries, throws a less favourable light 
 on Bolivar's actions than is reflected in the writings of 
 the Colombian authors. It would appear that he had by 
 this time become so puffed up with his successes that he 
 looked upon himself as the predestined arbiter of the 
 destinies of all Spanish America. He was checked in 
 some of his wildest schemes by the clearly expressed 
 refusal of Buenos Aires and Chile to submit to his 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
446 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 domination. He saved Peru and Bolivia from the con- 
 tinued rule of Spain, but the hollowness of his power in 
 those countries was shown by the collapse of his institu- 
 tions almost immediately after his departure. Yet his 
 services to the cause of independence are acknowledged 
 to this day in Peru and Bolivia. For his own sake, for 
 the sake of Peru, and for that of Colombia, the Liberator 
 would have done far better to have left Peru immediately 
 after the destruction of the Spanish power at Ayacucho. 
 Sucre could have settled affairs in Upper Peru, as he 
 actually did, and Callao might safely have been left to 
 fall, as it was bound to do when hope of relief from out- 
 side was gone. 
 
 It seems strange that Bolivar, who was always alluding 
 to the heterogeneous character of the peoples of the 
 JSpanish colonies, should have failed to see the great 
 differences between the Venezuelans, the Granadians, the 
 Ecuadorians, and the Peruvians, and the impracticability 
 of a federation of all these countries. If federation for 
 Venezuela alone implied dissolution, still more did it 
 imply the same for the larger federation. He apparently 
 looked upon himself as capable of holding the whole 
 together from above. Had that been possible, the state 
 of affairs would, in many ways, have resembled what 
 it was in the colonial days. Bolivar himself would have 
 occupied a position analogous to that of the King of Spain 
 in former days. At Panama or Caracas he would have 
 been in touch with Venezuela and New Granada, but he 
 would have been almost as far in time from Buenos Aires 
 or Chile as Spain. Success seems to have turned his 
 head, and it was only when he got back to Colombia that 
 he began to realise that his vast schemes were chimeras. 
 For a time he still hoped to hold together the greater 
 Colombia, but, at the end, he realised the impossibility 
 even of this. 
 
 On the whole, the revolting colonies were inclined to 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 447 
 
 maintain the long-recognised divisions of Spanish rule, 
 and to create new nations, each covering what had for- 
 merly been a Spanish Viceroyalty or Captain-Generalcy, 
 an area the inhabitants of which had long been accus- 
 tomed to look for government from a common centre. 
 Bolivar's attempt to obliterate the old Spanish frontiers 
 was bound to be the failure it proved to be. 
 
 In contemplating Bolivar personally, one cannot help 
 looking upon him as in a perpetual state of isolation, with 
 no real ties binding him to anyone. After his wife's 
 death he had practically no family life. His brother and 
 sisters never appear on the scene, nor even do his mis- 
 tresses. The only substitute for a family was his personal 
 staff, for several of whom, notably Belford Wilson, O'Leary, 
 Moore, and Andres Ibarra, he seems to have entertained 
 feelings of friendship which were fully reciprocated. He 
 could never really trust men like Santander, Paez, Marino, 
 or Bermudez. Of his colleagues and subordinates few 
 indeed were trustworthy or constant. Urdaneta, Mariano, 
 Montilla, Salom, and Sucre were almost the only excep- 
 tions amongst the principal leaders. 
 
 Amongst the many accusations levelled at him was one 
 of personal cowardice. That we cannot believe to have 
 been well-founded. When men of the stamp of Bermudez 
 hurled at him the epithet of coward, the case seems to be 
 that of the little boy who shouts the term at another as a 
 term of vulgar abuse, rather than as a deliberate accusa- 
 tion. As for Ducoudray-Holstein's stories, we believe 
 them to be the fabrications of a malevolent enemy. 
 Perhaps the action which lends most colour to the charge 
 was Bolivar's flight from Ocumare, when he left MacGregor 
 and the rest of the troops to their fate, in circumstances 
 which subsequent events proved to be by no means 
 desperate. The facts, however, are somewhat obscure, 
 and MacGregor himself does not appear to have impugned 
 the Liberator's courage. There certainly is some resem- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
448 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 blance between his conduct on that occasion and that of 
 Napoleon in quitting the shattered army of Russia. In 
 both cases the leader could do better elsewhere than with 
 the remnants of an army. Bolivar's flight before the 
 assassins of September 1828 seems to have been the 
 only course open to him. To stay and face them would 
 have been to sacrifice his life uselessly. His whole conduct, 
 throughout his career, seems to us to belie the charge. 
 
 The enormous physical energy of the man cannot fail 
 to command admiration. Napoleon in his best days 
 never showed greater activity than did Bolivar in the 
 campaign which ended with Boyacd, or in the rapid 
 journeys which he made from Bogotd to Angostura, 
 from Angostura to Ciicuta, from Bogotd again to Popayan, 
 to Quito, and to Guayaquil. Towards the end the feeble 
 body was fast failing, yet the Liberator carried out marches 
 which would have tried most men. 
 
 The figure of the worn-out Liberator, suffering in mind 
 and body, deserted by all but a few, reviled by the 
 majority of those who owed everything to him, is one 
 of the most pathetic in history. 
 
 His life is the history of a great success and a 
 great failure. He succeeded in throwing off for ever 
 the yoke of Spain, which had pressed for three 
 centuries on the shoulders of South America ; he 
 failed to set up, in place of Spanish dominion, 
 anything resembling a stable, free, and popular govern- 
 ment. Bolivar's success marks him out as the greatest 
 man South America has produced, one to whom the 
 title of " El Illustre Americano " might have been more 
 properly given than to Guzman Blanco, whose vanity 
 prompted him to assume it. His failure hardly detracts 
 from his greatness, for the task of making a great nation 
 out of the materials he had to work with was an im- 
 possible one. He had to deal with peoples depraved by 
 centuries of bad government. The mass of the popula- 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR 449 
 
 tion, sunk in superstition, servility, and ignorance, was 
 without initiative or capacity. The majority of its leaders 
 were either as ignorant as the rest, or else had been 
 .endowed by the Spanish system with a narrow literary 
 and legal education, which turned them into professional 
 intriguers, and fostered their innate vanity. 
 
 With such materials Washington could never have 
 evolved the United States, and Napoleon could never 
 have conquered the greater part of Europe. 
 
 Bolivar, looking to his opportunities, his upbringing, 
 and the people he had to work with, was, we think, a very 
 remarkable man. What he might have attained to in 
 Europe or North America, had his lot been cast there, it 
 is as idle to consider as it would be to speculate as to 
 the part Caesar would have played had he been in the 
 place of Napoleon. 
 
 2 F 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abascal, Viceroy of Peru, 295 
 
 Acasta, H.B.M.S., 41 
 
 Aldao, Venezuelan commander, III, 
 
 136 
 
 Alvarado, General, 310, 311, 355 
 Alvarado, F. A., 311 
 Alvarez, M. B., 151, 152 
 Alzuru, Deputy, 179, 239, 240 
 Amador, J. de D. , of Cartagena, 1 54 
 Amar, Viceroy of New Granada, 74, 75 
 Ambato, 29, 277 
 Andes, mountains, 25-29, 85, 86, 227, 
 
 279. 328, 329 
 Angostura, 182, 188, 190, 200, 209, 
 
 215-221, 239 
 Antioquia, province of, 78, 165, 235, 
 
 243. 404 
 Antonanzas, General, 61 
 Anzoategui, General, J. A., 177, 193, 
 
 227, 233, 238 
 Apure, river, 96, 182, 183, 201, 208, 
 
 222, 223 
 Aragua, valley of, 26, 32, 34, 36, 41, 
 
 177, 202 
 Aragua de Barcelona, 140, 177 
 Aramendi, Francisco, 201, 202 
 Araure, 60 ; battle of, 114 
 Arequipa, 349, 351 
 Argentina ; see Buenos Aires 
 Arismendi, J. B. ; early career, 126, 
 
 141, 142; surrenders Margarita, 159; 
 
 revolts again, 171-173; recalls 
 
 Bolivar, 180 ; in Guayana, 189 ; 
 
 Vice-President of Colombia, 238, 
 
 239 ; opposes Paez, 365 ; revUes 
 
 Bolivar, 416 
 Aroa, 32, 132 
 Assassination, attempted of Bolivar, 
 
 169, 389-398 ; of Monteagudo, 346 ; 
 
 of Sucre, 419 
 Asuncion, 159, 173 
 Audiencia Real, 15, 16 
 Aury, Commander, 170, 171 
 Aux Cayes, Haiti, 169, 170, 180 
 Ayacucho, battle of, 337-341 
 
 Aymerich, President of Quito, 275, 
 
 277, 278, 280, 282, 286, 287, 290 
 Azuero, P. C, 379, 380, 383, 385, 
 
 390. 39S 
 Azuola, General, 258 
 
 Babahoyo, 278 
 
 Banco, 83 
 
 Barbula, battle of, 107 
 
 Barcelona, 138, 140, iSo-183, 265 
 
 Barinas, 91, 95, 96, 105, 122, 203 
 
 Barquisemeto, 57, 59, 97, 112 
 
 Barranca, 82, 155 
 
 Barranquilla, 247, 422 
 
 Barreyro, Colonel, 229-233, 236, 237 
 
 "Batallon sin nombre," 115 
 
 Beauharnais, Eugene, 39 
 
 Bello, Andres, 34, 45 
 
 Berindoaga, minister, 325, 327, 360 
 
 Bermudez, J. F., expedition from 
 Trinidad, 93, 94; opposes Bolivar 
 in 1814, 140, 143, 145 ; at Carta- 
 gena, 159, 161 ; and Bolivar in 
 1816-17, 170. 176, 179. 181, 193 ; 
 defeated at Fuerta de la Madera, 
 209; takes Caracas in 1821, 264, 
 265 ; opposes Paez in 1826, 365 ; 
 turns against Bolivar, 416 
 
 Bianchi, Italian Adventurer, 142 
 
 Blanco Encalada, 293, 304 
 
 Bobare, battle of, 111 
 
 Bocachica, battle of, 131 
 
 Boca Chica, forts, 161-164, 396 
 
 Bocon6 de Trujillo, 95, 256 
 
 Bogota, or Santa F^ 14, 28 ; first 
 revolt, 75, 76 ; reduced by Bolivar, 
 151-153 ; reconquest by Morillo, 
 164, 165 ; fireed after Boyaca, 234, 
 235 ; capital of Colombia (1821), 
 268-270; Bolivar leaves in 1821, 
 
 278, 279; he visits in 1826-27, 
 367. 378, 379, 382; the plot at, 
 389-398; events at, in 1830, 409, 
 412-416 ; taken by Urdaneta, 421 
 
 Bolivar, Colonel Jos^, 393, 395 
 
 451 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
452 
 
 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Bolivar, Juan Vicente I., 32 
 
 Bolivar, Juan Vicente II., 33, 34, 
 426 
 
 Bolivar, Simon I., 32 
 
 Bolivar, Simon, the "Liberator," 3, 
 24-26 ; ancestry, 32 ; youth, 33, 
 34 ; first visit to Europe, 35, 36 ; 
 married life, 36 ; second visit to 
 Europe, 37-40 ; return to Venez- 
 uela, 40-44 ; mission to England, 
 45, 46 ; relations with Miranda, 
 47-49. 55. 60. 62, 63, 65, 66; 
 released by Monteverde, 70 ; his 
 personality, 71-74; at Cartagena, 
 80, 81 ; campaign in New Granada, 
 82-87 ; declares " war to the death," 
 91, 92 ; advance to Caracas, 99- 
 iio; campaign of 1813-14, III- 
 122 ; against Boves, 123-125 ; 
 massacres, prisoners, 125-128; at 
 San Mateo, 128-130 ; joins Marino, 
 132 ; battle of La Puerta, 135 ; 
 "emigration of 1814," 137-140; 
 disputes in East, 141-143 ; at Carta- 
 gena, 150; reduces Bogota, 151- 
 153 ; quarrel with Castillo, 153- 
 155 ; besieges Cartagena, 155-157 ; 
 in Jamaica, 167; escapes assassina- 
 tion, 169 ; in Haiti, 170, 171 ; at 
 Margarita and Barcelona, 171-174 ; 
 at Ocumare and Guiria, 175, 176, 
 179 ; returns to Haiti, 179 ; lands 
 in Venezuela, 180 ; Bermudez and 
 Mari&o, 181 ; marches to Guayana, 
 183; operations there, 184-190; 
 execution of Piar, 191-193 ; ad- 
 ministrative measures, 194, 195 ; 
 joins Paez, 199-202 ; battle of El 
 Semen, 204 ; Rincon de los Toros, 
 206 ; reorganises Government, 209, 
 210 ; march westward and return, 
 211 ; speech in Congress, 215-220 ; 
 elected President, 220; campaign 
 of 1819, 222 ; passage of Andes, 
 223-229; campaignof Boyaca, 229- 
 234; at Bogota, 234-236; returns 
 to Angostura, 236-240 ; back to 
 New Granada, 242 ; negotiates 
 with Morillo, 247-249 ; treaty, 
 armistice, and meeting of Santa 
 Ana, 249-251 ; troubles with Con- 
 gress, 258, 259 ; resumes hostilities, 
 259, 260 ; battle of Carabobo, 261- 
 263 ; military division of Venezuela, 
 265 ; elected President, 269 ; 
 marches south, 279-282 ; battle of 
 
 Bombona, 282-284 i Pa^to and 
 Quito, 288-292 ; Guayaquil, 292- 
 294 ; meets San Martin, 299-307 ; 
 early proceedings in Peru, 319- 
 326 ; marches against La Sema, 
 327 ; victory of Junin, 330, 331 ; 
 return to Lima, 332-349 ; tour in 
 Peru and Bolivia, 349-352 ; Ar- 
 gentina and Chile, 352-354 ; return 
 to Lima, and events there, 352- 
 356; Bolivian constitution, 356-358; 
 extravagant schemes, 358-360, 432, 
 433) 445) 44^ > S°^ from Peru to 
 Bogota, 366, 367 ; marches against 
 Paez, 368 ; surrender of Paez, 369- 
 371 ; troubles with Santander, 371- 
 374 ; at Caracas and Bogota, 375- 
 380; Convention of Ocana, 381-385; 
 marches north, 382 ; recalled to 
 Bogota, 387 ; Dictatorship of 1828, 
 388-389 ; plot to assassinate him, 
 389-398 ; marches to Quito, 399 ; 
 his views on monarchy, 405-409, 
 433) 434 ; meets Congress at Bogota, 
 410-414; resigns office, 414-415; 
 retirement and death, 415-426 ; 
 character, etc., 427-449 
 Bolivia, republic, 30, 295, 351, 352, 
 
 356-35,8. 389 
 
 Bombona, battle of, 282-284, 289 
 
 Bonpland, traveller, 38 
 
 Boves, Benito, 308 
 
 Boves, Tomas, early history, 1 18-120 ; 
 defeats Montilla, 11 1, 122 ; defeated 
 at Mosquitero, 112, 122 ; defeats 
 Campo Elias at La Puerta, 123 ; 
 attacks Victoria, 124; at San 
 Mateo, 128-130 ; Bocachica and 
 Valencia, 131 ; defeats Bolivar at La 
 Puerta, 135 ; captures Valencia and 
 Caracas, 136, 137 ; last campaign 
 and death, 138, 139, 144 ; character 
 and anecdotes, 120, 121, 144 
 
 Boyaca, battle of, 233, 234 
 
 Branding irons, 125 
 
 "Bravos de Apure," 260, 261 
 
 Brazil, 352 
 
 Briceao, A. N., "El Diablo," 90, 
 
 91 
 
 Briceno, Justo, 206, 397, 424 
 Briceno Mendez, P., 270, 314, 383 
 Brion, Luis, 1 68, 1 70, 180, 1 87- 1 89, 1 94 
 British Contingents, 212-214, 229, 
 
 243, 261-263, 271, 287 
 Bruix, Colonel, 328 
 Buen Aire, island, 176 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Buenos Aires, 296, 353, 359 
 Bustamente's revolt, 376, 377 
 
 "Cabildos," nature of, i6 
 
 Cachiri, battle of, 165 
 
 Cadiz, 14, 37, 242 
 
 Caicedo, Domingo, 414, 419, 420 
 
 Cajamarca, 323 
 
 Cajigal, J. M., S9. I04, "8, 131, 
 
 133. 134. 137, 138 
 Calabozo, 61, 105, I22, 200, 202 
 Cali, 279 
 Callao, fortress, 297, 298, 316, 317, 
 
 319. 325, 326. 335. 341, 342. 354 
 Calzada, Spanish General, 122, 123, 
 
 I34^ 137, 164. 165. 23s, 244, 273 
 
 Camacho, J., 164 
 
 Campo Elias, Colonel, 110-112, 123, 
 124, 129 
 
 Cantaura, battle of, 238 
 
 Canterac, General, 185, 298, 325, 329, 
 330. 332, 340-342 
 
 Captains-General, 14, 15 
 
 Carabobo, first battle of, 133, 134 ; 
 second battle, 261-263 
 
 Caracas, described, 27 ; Bolivar's 
 birthplace, 33 ; first revolt, 41-45 ; 
 declaration of independence, 50 ; 
 Miranda at, 51, 52 ; earthquake at, 
 56-58 ; Monteverde at, 65, 68, 69 ; 
 Bolivar leaves, 70, Jl ; under 
 Bolivar in 1813-14, 99-103, 109, 
 115-117, 123, 126, 133; evacuated 
 by Bolivar and occupied by Boves, 
 137-139 ! Morillo reaches, 159 ; 
 taken by Bermudez, 264 ; Bolivar 
 there in 1821, 265, 266; Paez's 
 government, 369 ; return of Bolivar, 
 371, 375 ; pronounces for Paez and 
 secession, 410 
 
 Carache, battle of, 96 
 
 Cartagena, 28 ; first revolt, 75, 76, 
 78 ; Bolivar at, in 1812, 80, 81 ; 
 votes union with Venezuela, 133 ; 
 Bolivar reaches, in 1814, 150 ; his 
 siege of it, 155-158 ; siege by 
 Morillo, 160-164 ) surrenders to 
 Montilla, 271 ; Fadilla seizes it, 
 382 ; Bolivar retires to, 418, 419 
 
 Cartagena Gazette, 141 
 
 Carujo, Pedro, 390, 391, 394 
 
 Cariipano, 141, 142, 158, 174 
 
 Casacoima, creek, 189 
 
 " Casa de Contratacion," 14 
 
 Casas, Juan de, 41 
 
 Casas, M. M., 66, 67, 70 
 
 INDEX 453 
 
 Castillo, J. P. del, 280, 301 
 
 Castillo, Manuel, 85, 88, 89, 150, 
 153-155. 160, 164 
 
 Castillo, Ruiz de, 74, 75, 77 
 
 Castillo Rada, J. M., 270, 383, 385, 
 414 
 
 Cauca, river and valley, 28, 77, 279, 
 280 
 
 Ceballos, Spanish general, 59, 1 11, 
 112, 114, 131, 134, 137, 138 
 
 CedeSio, patriot general, 129, 132, 
 143, 174, 192, 207, 208, 263 
 
 Chaguaramas, 177 
 
 Chile, 3, 15, 30, 297, 352, 353, 359 
 
 Chitagd, battle of, 165 
 
 Choco, district, 165 
 
 Choroni, 175, 176, 178 
 
 Chuquisaca (Sucre), 351, 354 
 
 Church, condition of, in colonial 
 times, 10 
 
 Clarines, 181 
 
 Cochrane, Lord, 297 
 
 Cojedes, battle of, 208 
 
 Commercial policy of Spain, 1 2 
 
 Congresses and Conventions ; of 
 Venezuela (1811), 49, 50, 52, 55; 
 of Bogota (1810), 76; of New 
 Granada, 82, 89, 150, 151, 153, 
 165 ; Mari&o's at Cariaco, 187 ; of 
 Angostura, 210, 211, 215-221, 242, 
 243, 247 ; of Ciicuta (1821), 258, 
 259, 267-270 ; of Peru, 319, 320, 
 326, 343, 346-348, 355 ; Colombian 
 (1824), 333 ; Convention of Ocafia, 
 380-385 ; of Bogota (1830), 409-417 
 
 Constitutions; of iSii, 52-54; draft 
 of 1S19, 218-221 ; of Cucuta(l82l), 
 267, 268; Bolivian, 352, 356-358, 
 366 ; project of, in 1830, 413 
 
 Cordova, J. M., sent to Antioquia, 
 235 ; to Mompox, 243 ; at battle 
 of Pichincha, 287 ; at Ayacucho, 
 337"339 > t'iss conspirators in 
 Bogota, 395 ; revolt, defeat, and 
 death, 403-405 
 
 Cor6, province and town, 56, 59, 61, 
 133, 272, 273 
 
 Corrales de Bonza, action of, 229 
 
 Correa, Ramon, 84, 87, 205, 259 
 
 Correo del Orinoco, newspaper, 
 209 
 
 Cortes de la Madariaga, J., 43, 44 
 69, 187 
 
 Council of the Indies, 13, 14 
 
 Creoles, 7-10, 16-22 
 
 Cvlcuta, 84, 87, 224, 267-269 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
454 
 
 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Cuenca, 28, 29, 286 
 
 Cumana, 95, 140-142, 159, 193, 209, 
 
 272 
 Cura9ao, 80, 176 
 Cuzco, 29s, 34S, 349, 350 
 
 Declarations of Independence ; of 
 
 Caracas, 50 ; Quito, 77 ; New 
 
 Granada, 75, 76 ; Cartagena, 76 ; 
 
 Peru, 29S 
 
 D'Elhuyar, patriot leader, 107, 108, 
 
 113, 131, 139 
 Devereux, Jolin, 213, 240, 243 
 Divina Fastora, massacre at, 186, 187 
 Ducoudray-Holstein, General, 170, 
 171, 172 
 
 Earthquake, of 1812, 56-58 
 
 Echeverria, Tiburcio, 255, 270 
 
 Ecuador ; see Quito 
 
 Education, 20, 34, 292, 349 
 
 El Alacran, battle of, 78 
 
 El Chaparro, 140, 184, 186 
 
 El Conductor, newspaper, 373, 
 
 379 
 
 El Diamante, passage of Apure, 201 
 
 El Juncal, battle of, 178 
 
 EI Fe&ol, camp at, 285 
 
 El Rastro, 205, 207 
 
 El Santuario, battle of, 404 
 
 El Semen, battle of, 204 
 
 El Sombrero, battle of, 202 
 
 Elizalde, Peruvian colonel, 377 
 
 Elizalde, Antonio, 377 
 
 " Emigration of 1814," 139 
 
 Emparan, Vicente, 42-44 
 
 " Encomiendas," 13 
 
 England ; mediation in 1810, 46; re- 
 cognises Colombia, 290 ; Bolivar 
 on her policy, 315 ; and Panama 
 Congress, 347 
 
 English, Colonel, 213, 214 
 
 Enrile, Pascual, 159, 160 
 
 Escalona, patriot, 49, 136, 364 
 
 Esmeraldas, port, 29, 279, 292 
 
 Espalia's plot, 23 
 
 Esteres, Bishop of Santa Marta, 410, 
 412-414, 423 
 
 Federalism, 52 ,54, 55, 76, 78, 82, 115, 
 
 309> 369. 384 
 Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 19, 21, 
 
 35. 41, 44. 75. 158, 241, 255, 318 
 Fergusson, Colonel W., 393 
 Fierro, Governor of Caracas, 99, 102 
 Fitzgerald, 190 
 
 " Flechera," described, 189 
 Flores, J. J., 317, 404, 416, 420 
 Freites, Antonio, 134, 136 
 Freites, P. M., 183, 184 
 
 Gabazo, Spanish admiral, 145 
 
 Gamarra, Peruvian leader, 389, 402 
 
 Gameza, 229, 230 
 
 Garcia, Basilio, 282-284, ^88, 298 
 
 Gazette, of Bogoti, 373 
 
 Girardot, Colonel, 96, 99, 107, 108 
 
 Gonzales, Spanish colonel, 136-138 
 
 Goyeneche, Viceroy of Peru, 295 
 
 Guachi, battle of, 275 
 
 Guadalito, 91, 96 
 
 Guaitara, river, 281 
 
 Guayana Vieja, fortress, 188-190 
 
 Guayaquil, 15, 29 ; excluded from 
 armistice, 254 ; revolt in 1820, 
 275-278; Bolivar occupies (1822), 
 292-294 ; meeting of Bolivar and 
 San Martin, 299 ; votes union with 
 Colombia, 308 ; Bolivar at, 310, 
 367 ; invaded by Peruvians, 377, 
 378 ; regained by Bolivar, 402 ; 
 secedes from Colombia, 416 
 
 " Guerra a Muerte " ; see " War to 
 the Death " 
 
 Guerra, Ramon, 390, 391, 394, 395 
 
 Guzman, A. L., 361 
 
 Guzman Blanco, 361, 367, 425 
 
 Heres, Tomas, 319, 323, 327 
 
 Herran, 380, 393 
 
 Honda, 153 
 
 Horment, conspirator, 390, 39 1, 394 
 
 Huaqui, battle of, 295 
 
 Humboldt, A. von, 38 
 
 Ibarra, battle of, 318 
 
 Ibarra, Andres, 391 
 
 Ibarra, Diego, 278 
 
 India, British, 8, 20, 54 
 
 Indians, South American, 5, 6, 11, 
 
 16, 17, 20 
 Infante, rescuer of Bolivar, 207 
 Inquisition, 21, 160 
 Intrepido, Spanish ship, 172 
 Iturbe, Francisco, 70, 99 
 Izquierdo, Spanish general, 97, 98 
 
 Jalon, Republican chief, 105, 106, 
 
 109, 134-136 
 Jamaica, 167, 168 
 Jiron, convention of, 400, 401 
 Juanambd, river, 281, 282 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
INDEX 
 
 45S 
 
 Juan Griego, 172 
 
 Junin, battle of, 330, 331 
 
 "Junta," revolutionary, of Caracas 
 (1809), 43, 44, 49 ; of Quito (1809- 
 iz), 74 ; of Cartagena, 75 ; of Bogota, 
 75; of Guayaquil, 275, 276, 278, 
 293. 294 
 
 Labatut, French adventurer, 71, 79, 
 81-84 
 
 La Cabrera, 51, 61, 123, 175, 203 
 
 La Fuente, A. G. de, 322, 402 
 
 La Grita, 89, 90, 414 
 
 La Guaira, 25, 27, 49, 64-66, 69, 99, 
 100, 106, 125, 126, 139, 264 
 
 La Hogaza, battle of, 200 
 
 La Mar, General Jos^ 278, 292, 298, 
 311, 328, 338-340, 389, 400-402 
 
 Lamprea, republican colonel, 113 
 
 La Paz, 295, 350 
 
 La Popa, hill of, 155, 161, 162, 419 
 
 La Puerta, battles of, 123, 135 
 
 Lara, General, 338, 340 
 
 La Serna ; elected Viceroy, 298 ; puts 
 down OlaSieta, 332 ; advance from 
 Cuzco, 335 ; defeat and capture at 
 Ayacucho, 336-341 
 
 La Torre, Miguel ; march on Bogota, 
 164, 165 ; defeated by Fiar at San 
 Felix, 186 ; evacuates Angostura, 
 190 ; defeated by Paez at Mucuritas, 
 198 ; defeats Zaraza at La Hogaza, 
 200 ; defeated by Bolivar at Ortiz, 
 205, 206 ; succeeds Morillo, 254 ; 
 and breach of armistice, 255-257 ; 
 defeated at Carabobo, 259-264 ; 
 blockaded in Puerto Cabello, 264 ; 
 succeeded by Morales, 272 
 
 Las Trincheras, battle of, 108 
 
 Leon's revolt, 22 
 
 "Liberator," title of, 100, 109, 235 
 
 "Liberators," order of, 109, no 
 
 Lima, 14, 298, 319, 320, 326, 327, 
 
 335. 343. 346-349. 354-356. 366 
 "Llaneros," 119, 120, I2z, 182, Z02, 
 
 265 
 Lopez, H., 399, 401 
 Lopez Mendez, Luis, 45, Z14, 377 
 Lopez, Rafael, 177, 178, 206 
 Los Horcones, battle of, 97 
 Los Taguanes, battle of, 98 
 Lozano, Doctor, 76 
 
 MacGregor, Sir Gregor, 171, 174-178 
 Madison, President, U.S.A., 179 
 Madrid, J. F., 165 
 
 Magdalena, river, 28, 83, 156 
 
 Maipii, battle of, 297 
 
 Mallo, Manuel, 35, 36 
 
 Manchester, Duke of, 167 
 
 Manrique, Colonel, 114 
 
 Maracaibo, province, lake, and city, 
 49, 266, 272, 368 
 
 Margarita, island of, 141, 158, 159, 
 171, 180, 191 
 
 Marimon, 155, 156, 170, 171 
 
 Mariao, Santiago ; invades Eastern 
 Venezuela, 93, 95 ; proclaims him- 
 self "Dictator of the East," 104; 
 Bolivar appeals to him, iii, 122; 
 marches westwards, 124 ; defeats 
 Boves at Bocachica, 131 ; joins 
 Bolivar, 132 ; defeated at Aroa, 
 132 ; second in command to Bolivar, 
 134; disaster of La Puerta, 135 ; 
 with Bolivar at Cumana, 141 -143 ; 
 sails to Cartagena, 1 50 ; sails from 
 Haiti, 170, 171 ; goes to Guiria, 
 174; opposes Bolivar, 179; marches 
 to his rescue, 181 ; again deserts 
 him, 184, 185 ; his Congress at 
 Cariaco, 187, 188 ; goes to Mar- 
 garita, 193; defeated at Cumanacoa, 
 209 ; again defeated, and super- 
 seded, 211 ; victory of Cantaura, 
 238; intrigues at Angostura, 238; 
 appointed to military division, 265 ; 
 supports Paez's revolt, 365 
 
 Marti, Spanish general, 95, 96 
 
 Martinez, minister, 194 
 
 Mata de la Miel, battle of, 197, 223 
 
 Maturin, 94, 174, 211 
 
 Merida, 25, 90, 95 
 
 "Mestizos," 7, 10 
 
 Mexico, 3, 35, 171 
 
 Miller, General W., 31, 328, 330, 
 
 338. 339. 341 
 Mina, Spanish patriot, 179 
 Miranda, Francisco de ; early career, 
 
 40, 47, 48 ; in Caracas, 49-52, 55, 
 
 60-63 ; surrenders to Monteverde, 
 
 64, 65 ; arrested by Bolivar, 66, 67 ; 
 
 captivity and death, 68 ; letter to 
 
 " Audiencia," 69 
 Miyares, Captain-General, 59 
 Mompox, 83, 156, 160 
 Monagas, Jos^ Tadeo, 143, 174, 178, 
 
 206, 259 
 Monet, Spanish general, 335, 338 
 Montalvo, Viceroy, 154, 156, 166 
 Monteagudo, Peruvian minister, 292, 
 
 303. 346 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
456 
 
 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Monteverde, Domingo ; advance from 
 Cor6, 59-63, 65 ; in Caracas, 68-70, 
 87, 88 ; beaten by Marifio, 94, 95 ; 
 driven into Puerto Cabello, 99 ; 
 refuses to ratify capitulation, loi- 
 103; attacked by Bolivar, 105, 106; 
 defeated and wounded at Barbula 
 and Las Trincheras, 107, 108 ; end 
 of career, 118 
 Montilla, Francisco, 105, iii 
 Montilla, Mariano ; at San Mateo, 129; 
 in Cartagena, 155; in Haiti, 170, 
 171; reconciled to Bolivar, 240; 
 sent to Rio Hacha, 243 ; mutiny of 
 Irish Brigade, 271 ; takes Cartagena, 
 272 ; with Bolivar at his death, 423, 
 424 
 Montilla, Tomas, 66, loi, 105, 155 
 Montdfar, Carlos, 42, 76, 77, 152, 164, 
 
 166 
 Moquehua, battle of, 310, 311 
 Morales, Tomas ; on Orinoco plains, 
 109, III ; under Boves, 121 ; at 
 Valencia, 137 ; attacks Aragua de 
 Barcelona, 140 ; succeeds Boves, 
 144, 145 ; at Carupano, 159 ; 
 marches on Cartagena, 1 60 ; attack 
 on Tierra Bomba, 162 ; massacre at 
 Boca Chica, 163, 164 ; defeats Sou- 
 blette at Ocumare, 175 ; defeated at 
 El Juncal, 178; at battle of El 
 Semen, 204 ; defeats Cedefio, 208 ; 
 succeeds La Torre, 272 ; expedition 
 from Puerto Cabello, 272 ; surren- 
 ders to Padilla, 273 
 Morillo, Pablo, Count of Cartagena ; 
 commands Spanish expedition of 
 181S, 158 ; lands in Venezuela, 158 ; 
 subdues Margarita, 159 ; sails for 
 Cartagena, 160 ; besieges Carta- 
 gena, 160-164 ; marches On Bogota, 
 165; his conduct there, 166; at 
 Calabozo, 200 ; defeated by Bolivar 
 there, 202 ; at Valencia, 203 ; 
 wounded in gaining victory of El 
 Semen, 204, 205 ; campaign con- 
 tinued, 208 ; Queseras del Medio, 
 222, 223 ; negotiates armistice and 
 treaty, 244-250 ; meets Bolivar, 250, 
 251 ; recalled to Spain, 251 ; his 
 character, 252, 253 
 Mosquera, Joaquin, 414, 420, 421 
 Mosquera, T. C., 403 
 Mosquitero, battle of, H2, 122 
 Moxo, Captain-General, 172, 174, 
 181, 184 
 
 Mucuritas, battle of, 198 
 Mulattoes, 7 
 
 Murgeon, President of Quito, 277, 
 279, 280, 286 
 
 Naguanagua, 107, 371 
 
 Napoleon, 20, 21, 23, 36, 41, 46, 295 
 
 Narino, Antonio; plot of 1794, 23; 
 fights Congress of New Granada, 
 76, 77 ; defeated and taken by 
 Spaniards, 78 ; appointed Vice- 
 President of Colombia, 258 ; de- 
 feated by Santander for Vice- 
 Presidency, 269, 270 
 
 Narvaez, F. M. de, 32 
 
 Necochea, Mariano, 327, 328, 330, 
 
 33'. 3SS 
 Neiva, 367 
 New Granada, 3, 4, 14, 15, 27, 28, 
 
 75-78, 82-87, 150-153, 164-166 
 Niquitao, battle of, 95, 96 
 Nogueras, Augustin, 211 
 " Numancia " battalion, 115, 165, 257, 
 
 277, 308 
 Nutrias, 96, III, 223 
 
 Obando, Antonio, 243, 280, 291, 308 
 Obando, Jos^ Maria, 280, 399, 401, 420 
 Oberto, Spanish general, 97 
 Ocafia, 83, 85,150, 154, 160, 381-385 
 Ocumare, 123, 124 
 Ocumare de la Costa, 175 
 O'Higgins, Bernardo, 297, 304, 307, 
 
 321 
 Olaneta, 3 1 7, 332, 345 
 O'Leary, Daniel Florencio, 214, 366, 
 
 399. 400 
 Olmedo, J. J., 276, 293 
 Orinoco, river, 104, 182-184 
 Ortigosa, S. G. de, 102, 109 
 Ortiz, battle of, 205 
 Ospino, 122, 123 
 
 Padilla, General, 273, 382, 391, 393- 
 
 395 
 
 Padilla, Jimenez de, bishop of Popayan, 
 281, 291, 401 
 
 Paez, Jos6 Antonio ; early life and 
 character, 196-199; recognises Boli- 
 var's authority, 199, 200 ; joined by 
 Bolivar, 201 ; crosses Apure, 201 ; 
 returns to S. Fernando, 202, 203 ; 
 on the Pao, 208 ; acclaimed chief, 
 209, 211, 212; submits to Bolivar, 
 212; at Queseras del Medio, 222, 
 223 ; ordered towards Cdcuta, 224 ; 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
campaign of Carabobo, 260-263; 
 military commandant of Caracas, 
 etc., 265; revolt in 1825-26, 361- 
 36s; suppressed by Bolivar, 368- 
 371 ; condemns Bogot4 plot, 401 ; 
 procures secession of Venezuela, 
 410-412; reviles Bolivar, 417; 
 translates Bolivar's remains, 424, 
 425 
 
 Palacios, Leandro, 125 
 
 Pamplona, 75, 151, 368 
 
 Panama, 78, 267, 271, 347 
 
 Pando, J. M., 360 
 
 Pantano de Vargas, battle of, 231 
 
 Paramo de Pisba, 227 
 
 Paris, Joaquin, 283, 395 
 
 Pasio, Cerro de, 29, 328, 329 
 
 Pasto, 7S, 78, 281, 28s, 288-291, 308, 
 309, 318, 401 
 
 Patia, river, 281 
 
 Pativilca, 324 
 
 Paya, battle of, 226 
 
 Penalver, governor of Valencia, 364, 
 
 36s 
 Pereira, surrenders after Carabobo, 264 
 Peru, 3, 14, 29, 74, 295-298, 310, 311, 
 
 377. 399, 400, 401 
 Potion, Alexandre, 169-171 
 Pezuela, Peruvian Viceroy, 297, 298 
 Piar, Manuel; with Mariao in 1813, 
 93, 94 ; blockades Puerto Cabello 
 by sea, 122; in the East in 1814, 
 140, 142, 145 ; in Haiti, 1 70 ; sent 
 to Maturin, 174 ; with MacGregor, 
 178 ; in Guayana, 184, 185 ; victory 
 of San Felix, 186; his intrigues, 
 189 ; revolt, trial, and death, 191- 
 
 193, 445 
 
 Pichincha, battle of, 287 
 
 Pineres, brothers, 154, 155 
 
 Plaza, Colonel, 260, 263 
 
 Popayan, 77, 78, 152, 165, 280 
 
 Population of Spanish colonies ; its 
 origin and character, 5-9 ; general 
 loyalty to Spain, 19, 20 ; numbers, 
 30, 31 
 
 Port au Prince, 169, 178 
 
 Port of Spain, 93, 94 
 
 Potosl, 345, 352 
 
 Praetorianism, 355, 367, 378, 421 
 
 Puerto Cabello, lost by Bolivar, 62, 
 63 ; Monteverde blockaded in, 99, 
 101, 102, 105, 106, 113, 115, 122, 
 132, 133 ; siege raised, 136, 137 ; 
 siege and capture by Paez, 272-274 ; 
 Bolivar at, in 1826, 368, 369 
 
 INDEX 4s; 
 
 Puerto de la Madera, battle of, 209 
 Puerto Santo, 158 
 
 Quebrada Honda, battle of, 177 
 
 Quero, Venezuelan renegade, 138, 
 I77i 178. 200, 203 
 
 Queseras del Medio, battle of, 222, 
 223 
 
 Quiamare, Bolivar's escape at, 184 
 
 Quiroga, Antonio, 241, 242 
 
 Quito, province and city, 14, 15 ; 
 described, 28 ; first revolts, 74, 75, 
 77, 7^ > excluded from armistice, 
 254 ; Aymerich at, in 1821, 275, 
 277 ; capture by Sucre, 287-289 ; 
 Bolivar enters, 291 ; again visits, 
 310, 318, 367, 401,404; secession 
 from Colombia, 416 
 
 Range], Colonel, 224, 264 
 
 Real, Pascual, 181, 182, 184, 244 
 
 Renovales, Tomas, 206, 207 
 
 Restrepo, J. M., 270, 405 
 
 Revenga, J. R., 255, 270, 368, 369 
 
 Reyes Vargas, 59, 105, 106 
 
 Reyes, Lake of, 329 
 
 Ribas, J. F., 85, 89, 95, 97, 123, 124, 
 
 140, 142, 145 
 Ribas, F., 184 
 Ricaurte, Antonio, his self-sacrifice, 
 
 130 
 Riego, Rafael, 242 
 Rincon de los Toros, Bolivar's escape 
 
 at, 206 
 Riobamba, Sucre at, 286 
 Rio Hacha, 77, 78, 152, 243 
 Riva Aguero, Jose de la, 311, 314, 
 
 319, 321, 322 
 Roads, 85, 86, 139, 154, 225, 281 
 Rodil, Spanish commander, 326, 335, 
 
 342, 354 
 Rodriguez, Simon, 33, 34, 39, 40, 
 
 349 
 Rondon, J. J., 231 
 Rook, Colonel, 224, 226, 231 
 Roscio, German, 43, 69, 240, 247, 258 
 Rosete, Spanish commander, 109, 
 
 123-125, 129 
 
 Saenz, Manuela, 392 
 Salabarrieta, Polycarpa, 166 
 Salazar, emissary of San Martino, 
 
 278, 292 
 Salazar de las Palmas, 86 
 Salom, Bartolom^, 177, 266, 270, 
 
 293 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
458 
 
 SIMON BOLIVAR 
 
 Salomon, Colonel, 106-109, I'S 
 
 Simano, Viceroy, 78, 166, 224, 234, 
 23s, 240, 244 
 
 Samborondon, 276 
 
 San Antonio, 87 
 
 San Carlos, 97, III, 114, 132, 260, 
 261 
 
 San Cayetano, 87 
 
 Sanders, Arturo, 283 
 
 San Diego de Cabrutica, 177, 200 
 
 San Felix, battle of, 186 
 
 San Fernando, 96, iii, 201, 202, 208 
 
 San Jos^ de Ciicuta, battle of, 87 
 
 San Juan de Payara, 201 
 
 San I^renzo, 178 
 
 San Martin, Jos^ de ; views on 
 government, 24 ; endeavours to 
 annex Guayaquil to Peru, 276, 278, 
 292 ; sketch of his career, 296-298 ; 
 meeting with Bolivar, 299-307 ; 
 leaves Peru, 310, 311 ; eulogised 
 by Bolivar, 321 
 
 San Mateo, 34, 128-130 
 
 Santa Ana, meeting of, 250, 251 
 
 Santa Cruz, Andres, 285, 311, 317, 
 328 
 
 Santa F^ ; see Bogota 
 
 Santa Marta, 28, 77-79, 82, 83, 152, 
 IS4, 272. 273. 422, 423 
 
 Santander, Francisco de Paula ; sup- 
 ports Castillo against Bolirar, 90 ; 
 resigns in favour of Paez, 197 ; goes 
 to Casanare, 209 ; in Boyaca cam- 
 pa^n, 227, 233, 234, 236; his 
 administration in Bogota, 242 ; 
 Vice-President of Colombia, 269, 
 270; undermines Bolivar's power, 
 333. 334; his letter to Bolivar 
 regarding Empire, 358-360; his 
 quarrel with Paez, 363, 365 j meets 
 Bolivar at Bogot4, 367, 368; in- 
 trigues against Bolivar, 371-374, 
 379, 380, 383, 384; his connexion 
 wUh the plot of 1828, 386-398 
 
 Sapphire, H.B.M.S., 65, 67 
 
 Saraguro, battle of, 400 
 
 Sena, Garcia de, 105, to6, iii, 122, 
 136, 197 
 
 Serpent, French ship, 41 
 
 Serviez, Manuel de, 152, 165, 197 
 
 Shannon, H.B.M.S., 418, 419 
 
 Silva, Colonel, 322 
 
 Sipesipe, battle of, 295 
 
 Slaves and slavery, 7, 9, 32, 52, 105, 
 119, 171, 174. 219. 357 
 
 Socha, 228, 229 
 
 Sociedad de Lautaro, 296 
 
 Sociedad Patriotica, 50 
 
 Socorro, 22, 175 
 
 Sogamoso, 229 
 
 Soto, 379, 380, 383 
 
 Soublette, Carlos, 177, 206, 235, 258, 
 259. 265 
 
 Spanish colonies ; acquisition of, 3, 4 ; 
 legislation by King, 4, 5, 13, 14; 
 treatment of Creoles, 9, 10, 17-20 ; 
 of Indians, 1 1 ; commercial policy, 
 12; machinery of administration, 
 14-17 ; educational policy, 20 ; com- 
 parison with India, 20 ; military 
 forces, 21 ; causes of submission, 21, 
 22 ; early revolts, 22, 23 ; question 
 of ripeness for revolt and indepen- 
 dence, 23, 24 ; population, 30, 31 
 
 Spanish Cortes, 42, 55, 56 
 
 Spanish Regency, 44, 45, 46 
 
 Suarez, Captain, 331, 442 
 
 Sucre, A. J. de ; at Trinidad, 193 ; 
 ordered to Guayaquil, 254 ; his 
 conduct there, 275-277 ; marches 
 on Quito, 285, 286; victory of 
 Pichincha, 287, 288 ; subdues Benito 
 Boves at Pasto, 308, 309 ; in Peru, 
 316, 317; Bolivar's letter to him, 
 325 ; commands patriot army, 332, 
 333 ; advance from and retreat to 
 Ayacucho, 335-337 ; battle of Aya- 
 cucho, 337-342 ; conquest of Upper 
 Peru, 345 ; political measures there, 
 350. 351 i resigns Presidency of 
 Bolivia, 389 ; defeats La Mar, 400- 
 401 ; President of Colombian Con- 
 gress, 410 ; mission to Venezuela, 
 412-414 ; assassination, 419 
 
 Tamaleque, 83 
 
 Tarqui, battle of, 400, 401 
 
 Tebar, A. M., loi, 136 
 
 Tenerife, capture of, 83 
 
 Tizcar, Spanish general, 92, 95, 96 
 
 Tolra, 286 
 
 Toratd, battle of, 310, 31 1 
 
 Torellas, Andres, 59, 105 
 
 Torices, Doctor, 79, 81, 84, 164, 166 
 
 Toro, Marquis de, 36, 51, 188, 189, 334 
 
 Torres, Camilo, 75, 77, 78, 82, 85, 
 
 IIS, 151, 164, 166 
 Torres, General, 283, 285 
 Torres, Governor of Cartagena, 247, 
 
 271 
 Torre Tagle, Marquis de, 298, 317, 
 
 319, 321, 325, 327 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Trinidad, 23, 93, 94 
 Troops, republican, 145-149 
 Trujillo (Venezuela), 25, 91, 95 
 Trujillo (Peru), 319, 326 
 Tumusla, battle of, 345 
 Tunja, 82, 150, 152, 232 ,243 
 Tupac Amaru, I. and II,, II, 22 
 Turbaco, 155, 160, 247, 418 
 Tuy, river, 26, loj 
 
 United States of America, 8, 24, 179, 
 
 290. 347 
 
 Urdaneta, Rafael, in New Granada in 
 181 3, 89 ; at Barbula, 107 ; in cam- 
 paign of 1813-14, 111-113, 13I1 
 133 ; retreat on New Granada, 150, 
 151 ; joins Mar^o, 185 ; Carabobo 
 campaign, 260 ; opposes Paez, 365 ; 
 the Bogota plot, 393, 395 ; over- 
 throws Mosquera, 421 
 
 Urreiztieta, governor of Margarita, 
 171, 172 
 
 Ustiriz, F. J., 52 
 
 Valdfe, Manuel, 93, iii, 243, 283, 
 284 
 
 Vald6s, Spanish general, 316, 317, 
 322, 33S. 336. 339 
 
 Valencia, 26, 50, $5, 6'. 98, "3. "S. 
 131. 133. 137. 371 
 
 Valle de Upar, 83, 243 
 
 Venezuela ; described, 25, 26, 27 ; 
 confederation of, 1811, 52; seces- 
 sion of, 1830, 410 
 
 INDEX 4S9 
 
 Vergara, minister, 409, 421 
 Viceroys and Viceroyalties, 13-IS 
 Victoria, 62, 63, 65, 99, 123, 124, 
 
 203 
 Vigirima, battle of, 1 13 
 Villa Lobos, General, 335, 338 
 Villapol, Colonel, 129 
 Villavicencio, Antonio, 42, 76 
 Vinoni, Francisco, 62 
 
 Warleta, Spanish commander, 165 
 " War to the Death," 91, 92, 97, 98, 
 
 173. 174 
 Wellesley, Marquis, 45, 46 
 Wellington, Duke of, 80, 442 
 Wilson, Colonel, of Red Hussars, 211, 
 
 212, 214 
 Wilson, Colonel Belford, 66, 425 
 
 Yaguachi, battle of, 277 
 
 YaSez, Spanish general, 91, 95, 96, 
 
 105, 109, III, 112, 114, 115, 122 
 Yaritagua, battle of, ill 
 
 Zambos, 7 
 
 Zaraza, General, 143, 174, 200, 203, 
 
 206 
 Zea, F. A., 170, 171, 187, 194. 209, 
 
 221, 237-240, 270, 290 
 
 Zerberiz, Spaniard, 98 
 Zuazola, 105, 106 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
82* 
 
 80- 
 
 78- 
 
 J2- 
 
 10' 
 
 76" 
 
 74' 
 
 72- 
 
 P 
 
 Bol-S^. 
 
 c 
 
 J , A R R ® W S M I T 
 
 
 
 Smme„ii^ 
 
 iP;a>m<.L,^ 
 
 i'i<<^ 
 
 ^<^A^Z 
 
 ■j>^' 
 
 ^jwr 
 
 „jiritait»K*aiif ^ 
 
 i<*-pf 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^^i^^ 
 
 \-^ V'fli'-'Oy , '■a^JJ^S^Jp'^^ai™/.!-?? I. Pr Jr.. Consul,? ■R'?^' 
 
 fimlrer*' 
 
 \Parita' 
 
 
 
 ..^.^..is.-^' .1 - 5,fr, ^A^P!Mala 
 
 f'Marwt" -— 
 
 ^! 
 
 i*^ Carthcotes 
 
 
 j Rdwren Cupirii -t Ai* ]^apipi 
 I thrt^ ret/ tif fulU hiti-rvaw 
 
 Kl Vail'- de 0.TOJ- IJ juo; i.Viii-^i -■ t'r, 
 
 j <ZojtaL,cir ra/Jia- H/ivin.^ of hn.'fiafiurti . 
 
 I "ho"^ IJ no tvatrr cunanunurition. howem 
 , tfl« htad. wfUa-e of thr ILjltralfi ■i' ttutxi' 
 \ tjffhe,ILS^[u^m , fap^t'^.Q>drra/ir pur- 
 
 tviilaiii,' hx^ftied. this isth/nuj .1'" tiytmit 
 ' -th^ dhrtanir, irirm anr. .etrfaTn to the cthrr 
 
 
 Mnipdjol. 
 
 TLSaniio ' 
 
 RT-n-'^' 
 
 j Ji.r'n.pu 
 
 p. ChirfiTuhtrv 
 
 R.S..Iuatt' 
 IPitlmns 
 
 
 
 
 LGcraotm p 
 
 Sierra, {ruaiuiau i.f alivat/.r r-jrvire/i with Ice 
 The Indians carry it to The mnrket or Fopaif. 
 to Ic* (yearn. Atjt . 
 
 F^Mtaufhire^ 
 
 E q u a t o 
 
 C.SXorenzo ^^^U 
 
 X^ 
 
 
 
 C.&B 
 
 Clksado C^"' 
 
 
 SahmgoLltFi) ;i- jj^_^"y 
 
 \ •" Sanhoi 
 _^^ 7>ai' 
 
 
 „„;^.«.»X': #'#) Paramo de Pii 
 
 
 
 
 
 J^fSaHna^t 
 
 
 
 ^.»" {^■■■S-: tx >v,.... "u^v ■!,.'::™o»'' \^ K._\^ 
 
 '!^"r' 
 
 
 % 
 
 ,-"<,/ .'7 1 
 
 J,,.!.../-- f f I 
 
 Ooyaca , 
 
 
'■y^^a,i„u^- ■■■•j<,,jfo«,«iJ' 
 
 vUraba ot- 
 
 'S^AiO' tfr 
 
 -yBuenAyre 
 
 >"''^^ - losKoq ui^a 
 
 
 Blanquilla 
 
 Agundn\^ .jOrtfwiUa. 
 :LotSer 
 
 S.Geanft^ 
 
 
 Granada 
 
 lO" 
 
 h,^ih..l. II, Ir, ,-, ,;-(',„■/;.,/,„ 
 
 framo de Pisba 
 
 K. -"Ill I,,, in- 
 
 
 SKETCH MAP 
 
 FOR 
 
 Bolivars operati 
 
 IN Peru. 
 
 ONS 
 
 _^i9 
 
10 
 
 DEDICATED TO 
 
 7 / 
 
 J. A R R © W SMITH. 
 
 "^.. '^■^:2^C%i?s;?^.*^^i^ 
 
 ■*™>nA,« 
 
 
 
 L-trfPSavamlla' 
 
 B.ot' Zanba 
 
 f ii,:g22S'(( 
 
 j«t<^* 
 
 RosarLt Ji. == 
 
 
 jiatatoKt&Uf''^ 
 
 1/ 
 
 /^^?5<^^ 
 
 fr?! 
 
 fV' 
 
 
 •^;c<^^/^ 
 
 
 . "^.^ 'T i? 
 
 Af 
 
 O'* 
 
 <'. 
 
 G.rfMor,.o,,„.j 
 
 'J'ilU'S 
 
 
 ,. _ %^ PiAriol^n^r ^'■•*-!f 
 
 *♦ ITi/fre 
 
 
 FLintt.n. 
 Cot" Parita 
 
 Stcai 
 
 
 
 
 V Parita I 
 
 
 I 1 1Jqvuuul 
 
 '^'~^''hin., ^A^ PI Mala 
 rMarW"' „s 
 
 
 P^EsconJiiV?^ 
 
 F'TTi). 
 
 F'i'Tambo' 
 ( '..^J'rtiTic'iSnlajui C ^ 
 
 thrcf tftt trf hJUj inti-j-taw 
 
 
 
 j i2ajiaL^r ra/Jia- Rtn-ijifi oflin.rp<i(itim ■ 
 
 ' llurt. it twwatiT ■y/mntumr.aliijn hfttvrfrt 
 
 , ijt'ihf ILS^fij.irt . CiipU'-^S.Ci.'i'hrtaii' par- 
 tirtilarlv ir,^-pfr1xd this isthtnii.t .i' ti-nnJ 
 
 the dii-t/iiiir, trifin anr. .tirf/un ti thf Cthrr 
 
 ■ R.O.np.d..\ 
 
 Maipitlo I . 
 
 ,yf 
 
 yy. 
 
 *=^i 
 
 ■Ak^^. 
 
 
 MARACAYBO 
 
 ilopanr or Tar, 
 
 Git 
 
 
 
 
 Bay- of CHDCfi l/^iSj-'*' \ -1 
 
 
 Sifrra tiualtoirij i.t i^woi/s rr-v^reri wi'rh Jcf 
 I Thf Indiana carry ir to rhf market at fopaiiart 
 I toJif creajn *<- . 
 
 rtiascamaf- 
 
 '^'P^'uitaiv "^l"*^** 
 
 E q II a t o : 
 
 
 ijir'i^fi^Ajj_ 
 
 4' 
 
 C .S ior enzo 
 
 
 /.alio 5^ — , w ty^ 
 
 iapa. { 
 
 Sahui^ol.i-Pt 
 
 RSi:iena 
 
 Cilnnco 
 
 CJarma< 
 
 6o/a'<i^ ^j^iijrrMt' 
 
 .Ji'lllJC 
 
 
 
 ".Lanero 
 
 Costa Mala 
 
 Combita 
 
 /"'Ml//,, 
 
 Venta Quemada 
 
 SKETCH FOR 
 
 Bolivar's Passage of the Ande 
 
 ^ 
 
 1819. 
 
 jQ: 
 
 76- 
 
 74- 
 
 72- 
 
 wtSk 
 
 XcQijdfai: JoiruXanc 
 
•,v^^,. -ys^a. /■ fSlgr:i,,„,^^ri5'<;r ^■*-^"~^ ^f^ iSu^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -^W 
 
 ^v^ 
 
 
 
 Tortn^ 
 
 
 ^i. ""^ 
 
 ^.^;£L#; -%5„cr*» 0_?W .f^ iv^^?\l%^^^iCL,.^tm 
 
 i 
 
 / <^ . 
 
 J-in/^de^Moi^^ 
 
 ^KSJ'^ipc 
 
 L.MARACAYBO 
 
 
 Gibr, 
 
 -aJ!^ 
 
 A-.«^ '5vS^'*'- 
 
 ''u. 
 
 ofeV.--?^ 
 
 ^^■-J"")^ 
 
 \%\'i ■^'^'3 
 
 ^ 's; 
 
 
 ^<^ 
 
 y^iu^ipi^ 
 
 
 
 ^*Piy 
 
 
 'edra^aV 
 
 
 
 
 m^^^^fh:s. 
 
 
 ^ Ti "> 
 
 
 
 
 ji a W'j r'fXi co to s - 
 
 '^ ^^f^^ '■ 
 
 A 
 
 
 J'aimJf'^j 
 
 °^:i^j/fy ■?™^''^"^. 
 
 :v;#^ 
 
 
 
 r^/J 
 
 ) 
 
 t.ruil:^!. IW« . ^;, ,; - ,<,„ i)..„v^ 
 
 CtitilLui .■/- 'yriiTrwn Spiuiijih Li-^i^iit.--. 2f>" ; = ( *7(<r 7'rrfr<r<: 
 
 S"% 
 
 K::^'""-"'"''^ 
 
 
 s 
 
 SKETCH MAP 
 
 FOR 
 
 Bolivars operations 
 
 N Peru. 
 
 e- 
 
 i9 
 
 jif ^' / Paramo de Pisba 
 
 1*.^ ^'*^. *>X''* -'"I'll,!- 
 
 i FOR 
 
 ; OF THE Andes, 
 
 \Pahyilca , J^Cerrode Pasco t 
 
 %-C>"V'> „ 1 ^ 
 
 -o 
 
 ?<///£» i'?K 
 
 
 <^ 
 
 
 %iii 
 
 ^.'''»'' ^«*-« 
 
 -;' 
 
 0- 
 
 72- 
 
 70' 
 
 I Xandan: JolniXaDe 
 
 £8- 
 
 f^lgifi^pf^ l^y l\^;r^^Mrsf tfm W^ii^ 64- y.»t of toe^««A 
 
 62- 
 
 ^tan/ardi (Seog': EstaKImda 
 
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1806-1807. 
 By F. LORAINE Petre. A Military History of 
 Napoleon's First War with Russia, verified from 
 unpublished official documents. With Maps and 
 Plans. New Edition. Demy 8vo, 12s. 6d. net. 
 
 *,* To the English soldier and the student of military history, 
 dependent on information written in his own language, the campaign 
 described was almost unknown previously to the publication of 
 the first edition of this work. The campaign of 1806-7 '^"•f ^*^'» 
 appropriately selected, on the occasion of its centenary, by the 
 Army Council as a subject for the examination in Military 
 History for admission to the Staff College in August 1907. This 
 circumstance, coupled with the fact that there is still no ether 
 complete and accurate account of the campaign in the English 
 language, seems clearly to indicate this work as one the study of 
 which is absolutely necessary for all candidates. 
 
 Times. — "From every point of view it is difficult to overpraise 
 Mr Petre's work. It is evidently the work of laborious study, and 
 all authorities are judicially weighed. The references and copious 
 footnotes are admirable. . . . The maps are clear and excellent. 
 . . . And the descriptions of the more striking episodes are as 
 picturesque as they are vivid and lucid." 
 
 Contemporary Review. — " I do not know whether Mr Petre has 
 had actual experience of war, but his battle-pieces are singularly 
 graphic, the description of the Battle of Eylau, in particular, 
 being almost as good as the masterpieces of Carlyle and Tolstoi. 
 . . . The work is a valuable addition to the histories of the 
 Napoleonic wars." 
 
 Army and Navy Gazette. — "We have read his book with 
 extreme interest, and have a very high opinion of the masterly 
 way in which he has assembled his materials, the skill with which 
 he has balanced the opinions of various writers, and the ability with 
 which he has brought out his conclusions.'' 
 
 Athenaum. — "The military student will be well repaid by a 
 perusal of this excellent narrative of one of the greatest schemes in 
 the history of warfare." 
 
 Digitized by Microsoft® 
 
■^mt K' 
 
 Digititm bywiGrdson^