CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Cornell University Library 
 JX 1245.SS2 
 
 International law and international rela 
 
 3 1924 007 471 836 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis bool< is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924007471836 
 
INTEENATIONAL LAW 
 
 AND 
 
 INTEENATIONAL RELATIONS. 
 
 AN ATTEMPT TO ASCERTATIS .E BEST METHOD 
 
 OE DISCUSSING TI^ , TieiCS OF 
 
 INTEENATION* ' I.AW. 
 
 . , »" 
 I 
 
 ^ 
 
 BY ~ 
 
 •>"■ ^.f ",11 ■- ■ 
 
 J.' K.' STEPHEl^j.b " 
 
 OF THE IMNEB TEMPLE, BABEISTEK-AT-v^ W. 
 
 HoniJon : 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 1884 
 [The right of Translation and Reproduction is reserved.] 
 
NOTE. 
 
 The following essay is a dissertation which I wrote 
 last year as a candidate for a Fellowship at King's College, 
 Cambridge. Except in so far as it deals with the theory 
 of International Law it is necessarily a mere sketch, as my 
 object was only to state a theory and to give an outline of 
 its application. It has interested some of its few readers 
 silfficiently to encourage me to publish it. I have not 
 amplified it at all Jecs ise I can see no value in any work 
 occupying anihterme, '"^e position between an essay in- 
 tended to eicite intere^ the subject and to indicate 
 what might be done ana i elaborate work on Inter- 
 
 national Law such aa 
 for which much tim^ 
 the same time I h? 
 alterations in it. 
 explained in the ir 
 
 f ji hope to write some day but 
 
 nr would be required. At 
 
 the essay and made some 
 
 J and piu-pose are further 
 
 ioiy letter which was prefixed to 
 
 it in its earlier foj and which I here reprint. 
 
 Nov. 1884. 
 
 
 CORNELL \ 
 UNrVERSlTY 
 LIBRARY 
 
INTEODUCTION. 
 
 TO THE HON. MR JUSTICE STEPHEN, K.C.S.I. 
 
 My DEAK Father, 
 
 I wish to preface this essay by an 
 explanation of the relation of its contents to what 
 you have written on International Law : and I 
 think I can best make such an explanation in the 
 form of an introduction addressed to you personally, 
 and inviting your assent to the application which 
 I have tried to make of your teaching. In the 
 xvith Chapter of the History of the Criminal Law 
 of England you have occasion to deal with the 
 subject of International Law in connection with 
 the places and persons to whom the English 
 criminal law applies. The passage dealing with 
 the application of "International Law " to the case 
 
iv Introduction. 
 
 of E. V. Keyn (vol. ii. pp. 34—37), and the reprint 
 of your separate report on the Fugitive Slaves 
 Commission (pp. 44 — 58), contain the matters to 
 which I particularly refer. They explain and 
 defend two positions : first, that the collection of 
 usage and opinion to which the name " Interna- 
 tional Law" is conventionally applied, is not in 
 fact at all similar to law properly so called : and 
 secondly, that many of the topics of " International 
 Law" are proper subjects for real laws, and that 
 such laws can be enforced by civilised govern- 
 ments in places and agaiast persons outside their 
 normal jurisdiction. The first of these opinions 
 involves disapproval of the usual method of writers 
 on International Law : the second appears to me to 
 suggest an alternative method for the discussion 
 of the same topics. The object of this essay is to 
 show how this alternative method might be applied 
 to the whole subject, and might free it altogether 
 from the theory involved by the use of the term 
 " International Law." 
 
 When we speak of the prohibition of contra- 
 band tfade, or the adoption of the three-mile 
 limit, as instances of municipal legislation, we 
 are confining ourselves to demonstrable facts, 
 and leaving on one side the difficult questions 
 
Introduction. v 
 
 of the effect upon these matters both of abstract 
 morality and of the doubtful usages and opinions 
 denoted by the name '' International Law." Can 
 we not adopt a similar course with regard to 
 those topics of International Law which are not 
 matters for municipal legislation, and which there- 
 fore do not come within the scope of a work on 
 any branch of positive law ? Can we not, that is, 
 see what is the true character of those inter- 
 national relations which are in no way concerned 
 with law, and show that they may be discussed 
 in general terms, and at the same time called by 
 their right names ? 
 
 In the first part of this essay I have criticised 
 at length the use of the expression International 
 Law. Writers on International Law differ very 
 much in their theoretical views and in details of 
 method : but they all agree in the assertion of a 
 common theory which must be used to support 
 any juridical treatise on International Eelations. 
 That theory has often been attacked by those who 
 believe in Austin's analysis of the leading terms 
 of jurisprudence. Whatever else a " rule of Inter- 
 national Law" may be, it is not a command ad- 
 dressed by a political superior to a subject, and it 
 cannot be enforced by any sanction which would 
 
vi Introduction. 
 
 come within the terms of Austin's definition. 
 Austin himself prefers the expression International 
 Morality to International Law: and those who 
 accept his teaching have often expressed dissatis- 
 faction with the current theory of International 
 Lawyers. 
 
 Such attacks however have usually consisted 
 in brief and general denunciations and have not 
 been accompanied by any attempt to show what 
 could be substituted for it. The theory has been 
 constantly adopted even by those who have plainly 
 seen its defects, and the defences put forward on 
 its behalf have been as elaborate as the criticisms 
 against it have been scanty and contemptuous. 
 
 I have attempted to criticise the common 
 theoretical views about International Law with 
 some fulness of detail, and for that purpose I have 
 selected the theoretical part of the writings of 
 two particular authors. I have given the reasons 
 for that selection in the body of the essay. I 
 thought it better to attempt a comparatively full 
 criticism of two representative writers than to 
 give a cursory glance at the theories of many. 
 In the second part I have tried to show how the 
 field of International Law might be adequately 
 covered by a discussion based on a sound theory. 
 
Introduction. vii 
 
 In other worJs, I have tried to find a methodical 
 arrangement for the well-known questions of 
 "international law" according as they are either 
 the subject of positive law, or else the subject 
 of some other kind of sequence and arrangement 
 which can be easily recognised and accurately 
 described. I have not attempted to go into 
 much detail, and I do not pretend to have 
 anything of novelty or importance to say about 
 any of the vexed questions of International Law. 
 I have only tried to give an outline of a book 
 which should deal with the topics of "Inter- 
 national Law" from the point of view of the 
 theory of which I advocate the adoption. This 
 essay is nothing more than the vindication of a 
 theory. Where it is a matter of dispute which of 
 two views of a practical question is correct, I 
 accept one view or the other for the sake of 
 saying how I think it ought to be expressed and 
 where it would find its place in such a work as 
 that of which I am sketching the outline. 
 
 These introductory remarks are addressed to 
 any one who may read my essay : but I have 
 addressed them directly to you for the reasons 
 which I have given. You will, I hope, allow 
 me to consider this introduction as a dedication 
 
viii Introduction. 
 
 also : for I am sure that the value of what follows 
 may be accurately measured by the extent to 
 which it illustrates your opinions or secures your 
 approval. 
 
 I am, 
 
 Your affectionate Son, 
 
 J. K. STEPHEN. 
 
PAET I. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
 
 The object of the first part of this Essay is to 
 criticise in detail the theoretical view which I 
 propose to attack, and to explain the nature of 
 the theoretical view which I wish to maintain. 
 
 International Law is the name which has been 
 given to the science whose expositors have dealt 
 with the alleged rights and duties of States towards 
 other States, with regard to the three conditions of 
 peace, war and neutrality. 
 
 It is approximately possible to give an account 
 of all the conceivable relations between States, 
 which may be spoken of as International Re- 
 lations : to show the principles upon which these 
 relations may be divided into classes : and to 
 establish whether by historical induction or by 
 a priori reasoning the actual nature, the relative 
 importance, and the connection one with another 
 S. 1 
 
2 International Law. 
 
 of these classes. There is therefore a definite 
 sense in which we may speak of a science of In- 
 ternational Relations : and this science may be 
 the subject of investigation and publication. 
 
 Such a science has in fact been put together 
 and enunciated; its text-books circulate widely: 
 it has had professors all over Europe : it has been 
 pursued both inductively and deductively: its 
 students have been numerous, acute, inventive 
 and voluminous. The name which has been given 
 to it is International Law. 
 
 "People have been foimd," an international 
 lawyer will often say with some indignation at the 
 outset of his treatise, " to deny that there is any 
 such thing as international law:" and he proceeds 
 to show that they have come to that conclusion 
 on inadequate grounds, and that a few trifling 
 defects have led them to reject a valuable and 
 beneficent system. But people who deny the 
 existence of international law do not therefore 
 deny the existence of a science of International 
 Eelations. They say that the science has been 
 misnamed : and that this misnomer has had prac- 
 tical effects which are to be regretted; that 
 it has led to the study of international relations 
 on a wrong basis : has led both governments and 
 subjects to look at their neighbours in an artificial 
 light : has needlessly embittered national contro- 
 
International Law. 3 
 
 versies : and has perhaps prevented the establish- 
 ment of a more useful science. 
 
 The object of this Essay is to support the view 
 of those who deny the existence of international 
 law in the sense in which such a denial has just 
 been explained: and to show that the use of 
 elaborate juridical metaphors in the scientific dis- 
 cussion of international relations has been an 
 unfortunate mistake. But this is not enough: 
 the objections to the employment of the terms of 
 private law in a discussion of relations between 
 persons who are subject to no sovereign and liable 
 to no sanction have been often enumerated. But 
 the antagonists of the common method of speaking 
 have too often stopped here. Contented with 
 showing that international relations can only be 
 governed by international morality, they have not 
 gone on to show that international morality is 
 susceptible of really scientific treatment. Those 
 who assert the existence of international law 
 can retort that such criticism is at best purely 
 destructive, and has nothing to offer in the 
 place of what it destroys. They can urge that 
 no human science is absolutely faultless in its 
 method and results : and that in default of any 
 competing system the system known as Inter- 
 national Law should continue to be the standard 
 science of international relations. 
 
 1—2 
 
4 International Law. 
 
 I shall attempt to show in outline how every 
 department of the field of international relations 
 might be adequately discussed in a science which 
 should dispense altogether with juridical metaphor : 
 how an account of these relations might be given 
 in which everything should be called by its right 
 name and where no recourse should be had to un- 
 trustworthy hypotheses. It will be my object to 
 show that the use of the proposed method would be 
 productive of that accurate classification and syste- 
 matic completeness which distinguishes a science 
 from a group of undigested empirical maxims. 
 Such a science would assist the writer or the 
 student of the history of international relations. 
 It would enable any one who was acquainted with 
 it to enter readily and intelligently into the study of 
 a crisis in the relations between the great powers of 
 the present day. In these ways it might perform 
 a function similar to that of the science founded 
 by Adam Smith. It would be full of suggestions, 
 explanations and classifications ; and these would 
 be quite as useful for practical purposes as asser- 
 tions that the nations of Europe are amenable to 
 the jurisdiction of a shadowy tribunal, which ad- 
 ministers a law as distinct as the oracles of Delphi 
 and enforces it with an authority too indefinite to 
 be compared to that of a modern suzerain. 
 
 It is easy to understand why the science of 
 
Iniernational Law. 5 
 
 International Relations has gone by the name of 
 International Law and why its professors have 
 dehghted to talk about legal and illegal, penalty 
 and judgment, or culprit and crime, although there 
 is no tribunal to decide between nation and nation, 
 and no definite penalty for misdeeds except that of 
 war which is not certain to follow and which may 
 prove highly beneficial to the wrongdoer. Hardly 
 any one will deny that there is such a thing as 
 good conduct and such a thing as bad conduct for 
 the governments who act in the name of States : 
 and when international quarrels arise and the 
 world at large begins to question men of science 
 as to the rights of the case it is this aspect of 
 rightness or wrongness which is the most prominent 
 aspect of international relations. When the science 
 of International Relations is popular and commands 
 many students, it is as a science of right and wrong 
 that it wins popularity and attention. Its profes- 
 sors necessarily find themselves imposing duties, 
 asserting rights, defining crimes and assessing 
 penalties. 
 
 Since then national virtue and vice actually 
 exist, it is natural that the temptation to throw 
 the science of International Relations into a 
 legal form and to make it a branch of Jurispru- 
 dence has not been resisted. Among individual 
 men the most effective method of practically 
 
6 International Law. 
 
 repressing crime and encouraging self-restraint 
 and good faith has been the establishment of 
 tribunals: the formation and in some cases the 
 codification of law to be administered by such 
 tribunals: and the elaboration of devices for 
 utilizing the authority of the sovereign or govfem- 
 ment of States on behalf of their decisions or 
 awards. Hence the favourite method of theore- 
 tically discussing any phenomena connected with 
 the Tightness and wrongness of human conduct 
 has been to rely on legal and magisterial imagery 
 for the system on which the science of such phe- 
 nomena may be constructed. This habit has given 
 their character to many religious and to many 
 ethical systems. Accordingly Grotius, impelled 
 to a scientific discussion of international relations 
 by his indignation at particular kinds of national 
 misconduct and by his desire for the establishment 
 of a higher international morality, gave to the 
 science which he founded the legal tone which 
 it has never lost. In the midst of his collection 
 of evidence as to customs, of expressions of personal 
 opinion and quotations of the opinions of others, 
 and of ingenious applications of passages from the 
 Digest or the Code and their commentators, he 
 never loses sight of his central theory on which 
 the whole work depends. This theory is that the 
 nations of Europe are to be regarded as persons 
 
International Laid.. 7 
 
 living together somewhat as men live together in 
 a single nation, subject to the same social instinct, 
 and similarly amenable to law. This idea has 
 struck root firmly among the countless successors 
 of Grotius, has given their tone and shape to the 
 standard works on International Law, has ' been 
 grudgingly accepted by those to whom it is least 
 satisfactory, and is responsible for the fact that 
 some of the latest, most learned, and most elaborate 
 of the scientific treatises on international relations 
 are thrown into the form of a Code. 
 
 If it be granted, as it has been granted for the 
 purposes of this Essay, that international morality 
 exists, there may of course exist, and certainly, 
 no one can absolutely deny that there does exist, 
 an international code : in other words all conceiv- 
 able duties of one State towards another, or the 
 things that a perfectly virtuous government would 
 do or abstain from doing in its relations with its 
 neighbours might be systematically stated for the 
 edification of mankind. It is not particularly 
 likely that such a statement will ever be made : 
 if it were made its identity might not be recog- 
 nised; and if its identity were recognised its 
 precepts might be disregarded. So far the students 
 and professors of International Law have differed 
 widely from one another in their conclusions as to 
 the conduct to be pursued in certain emergencies 
 
8 International Law. 
 
 by the ideally perfect State : and even where the 
 majority of persons interested in international 
 problems do seem to agree that a particular 
 "publicist" has solved a question of international 
 duty, no one would be rash enough to affirm with 
 certainty that the sovereigns of Europe will always 
 do what it has been authoritatively laid down by 
 a gifted author with the applause and consent of 
 a convinced majority that they ought to do. 
 However, doubtful as the actual existence of any 
 of its articles may be, and in spite of the slight- 
 ness of its compulsory power, an undiscovered or 
 partly discovered international code in the sense 
 just given to the words may be said to exist : and 
 as everybody wishes to a greater or less extent 
 that what ought to be done should be done, all 
 students of international relations are more or 
 less actuated by a desire that the international 
 code should be gradually dragged out of obscurity, 
 displayed in its dazzling entirety to the nations 
 of the world, generally and thankfully acknow- 
 ledged to be what it professes to be, and universally 
 obeyed. 
 
 Let it be taken as proved then that our studies 
 if wisely and successfully conducted will lead to 
 the discovery of a code systematically enunciating 
 the rights and duties of nations, and comparable 
 in form to the codes by reference to which govern- 
 
International Law. 9 
 
 ments decide the questions which arise between 
 individual subjects or between themselves and 
 their subjects. Does it follow from this that we 
 ought at once to draw up codes however imper- 
 fect? that we ought to borrow the style and 
 language of legislators and jurists? that where 
 we find a law made by a single State for the 
 government of its subjects or even of persons not 
 its subjects in respect of international relations, or 
 an agreement between several governments on 
 similar topics which is drawn up something like 
 an Act of Parliament, we should incorporate 
 these as they stand into our code of rules regula- 
 ting the mutual relations of nations ? and that 
 any discovery of the real nature and bearing of 
 international morality should be at once utilized 
 as a clause in the international code? Or on 
 the other hand should we merely lay down that 
 such and such feelings are entertained on the 
 subject of particular international relations ? that 
 particular governments have made such and such 
 laws for the international conduct of their subjects 
 and sometimes of other persons? that such and 
 such international agreements have been made 
 from time to time ? and that such and such 
 international effects (which anybody would ap- 
 prove of or which anybody would deplore but which 
 few might at once foresee) will — to judge from 
 
10 International Laul, 
 
 analogy and history — follow such and such inter- 
 national causes ? and shall we, as far as the 
 international code is concerned, confine ourselves 
 to hoping that its nature will be gradually dis- 
 covered, and its objects to some extent secured by 
 such inductive treatment of the science of inter- 
 national relations : just as the actual ethical code 
 may be discovered in time by scientific investiga- 
 tions quite distinct from the temporary codifica- 
 tion of legislatures, which have to meet particular 
 problems in the interim and which are famished 
 for that purpose, as sovereign powers, with a kind 
 of machinery to which nothiag ia the international 
 system at all accurately corresponds ? 
 
 It is the contention of this Essay that the 
 former of these two opposed courses has been 
 erroneously pursued and that the latter of them 
 might be beneficially pursued. 
 
 In order to state the contrast between these 
 two methods it will be necessary to say a little 
 more about the general character of such sciences 
 as deal with any department of human conduct. 
 We have said already that the existence of 
 international morality, or the applicability of the 
 terms right and wrong to the conduct held to- 
 wards each other by the corporations and officials 
 whose duty is to represent nations, may be taken 
 for granted. We may leave to students or pro- 
 
International Law. ll 
 
 fessors of Ethics the definition of the terms 
 right and wrong. We need not inquire into the 
 nature of the standard of right and wrong: nor 
 whether an absolute standard exists. But if and 
 in so far as such a standard does exist we 
 assume that it applies to international conduct. 
 We may go farther and admit that an inter- 
 national "Duty to my Neighbour" might be 
 drawn up : and that if it were of a sufficiently 
 general character its truth would probably be 
 admitted by all civilized nations. But the enun- 
 ciation and general acceptance of the "Duty 
 to my Neighbour " of the English catechism in a 
 highly civilized community would hardly com- 
 pensate for the want of regular civil and criminal 
 law : and a group of individuals might admit its 
 truth and declare conscientiously that their conduct 
 was in conformity with it, and might yet from time 
 to time have recourse to litigation, or in the absence 
 of regular tribunals, to a vindication of their rights 
 by force. The admission that the words good and 
 evil apply to international conduct brings us to 
 a difficulty which must necessarily be faced by 
 the scientific student of international relations. 
 Although there is no necessity for expressing every 
 international relation as nearly as possible in terms 
 of jurisprudence, such as right, duty and law, it is 
 nevertheless impossible to take a comprehensive 
 
12 International Law. 
 
 view of international relations without considering 
 some cases of international conduct in which the 
 moral aspect is more important than any other. 
 We do not admit that all international relations 
 ought to be classified with reference to international 
 right, but we shall have to classify somehow among 
 the rest those relations which spring from inter- 
 national wrong-doing or from international benevo- 
 lence. It would be possible to set before us an 
 object of scientific study International Right and 
 Wrong or the Science of international relations as 
 they ought to be: but we prefer to take as the 
 subject of such study International relations as 
 they are and to speak of International right and 
 wrong incidentally, and in a manner appropriate 
 to the inevitable vagueness and uncertainty by 
 which the topic is surrounded. 
 
 The choice to be made between these two 
 methods of dealing with International law illus- 
 trates the general distinction between the sciences 
 of what is and the sciences of what ought to be. 
 Among the departments of human knowledge 
 which can form the subject of a science there are 
 several which consist in human conduct : and with 
 regard to each of these this distinction is important. 
 Take first the science of human conduct as a whole : 
 it is possible on the one hand to aim at setting out 
 in a scientific classification all the kinds of conduct 
 
International Law. 13 
 
 which exist : to discuss in a scientific spirit all the 
 kinds of things that men have done and what they 
 are likely to do under particular circumstances : 
 it is possible on the other hand to aim at a 
 statement of the standard of right and wrong and 
 at its application to human conduct in general. 
 There are thus possible the two sciences of what 
 is and of what ought to be the behaviour of the 
 human race as a whole. The same distinction 
 exists if we take as the subject of a science 
 not the whole of human conduct but a part of 
 it. For instance we may consider the science 
 of law: the laws which have been observed and 
 enforced from time to time in the world with more 
 or less success are the result of human conduct, 
 either of the declarations of lawgivers, themselves 
 to some extent the agents of public opinion, or of 
 repeated habits and actions of a number of persons 
 which have gradually constituted a custom : and 
 the reaction of laws upon human conduct which 
 created them is their most important and most 
 interesting function. In the scientific study of 
 law then (leaving customary law, which might be 
 considered in the same way, for the moment out 
 of sight) we can ask either what legislators have 
 done, and how their action has affected mankind, 
 or on the other hand what legislators ought to do 
 and how their actions ought to affect mankind. 
 
14 International Law. 
 
 The science of law as it is will facilitate the study 
 of any particular legal system by those who are to 
 practise it : and the science of law as it ought to 
 be will assist the labours of legislatures. Both 
 will of course replace a portion of human ignorance 
 by knowledge. Therefore each of these sciences 
 has its distinct sphere of usefulness: but the 
 science of law as it ought to be has perhaps 
 never been separately and systematically studied : 
 and the science of law as it is, has too often been 
 mixed up with considerations of law as it ought 
 to be. From the time when Ulpian preluded the 
 discussion of the minutiae of Roman law by the 
 statement that a law of nature prescribed the 
 breeding of animals, we have had innumerable 
 treatises on law as it is, or even on particular 
 systems of law, which have been rendered confused 
 and obscure by the introduction of statements of 
 the law of nature or of law as it ought to be — 
 clauses of a code whose complete discovery would 
 be the gradual work of a science which has seldom 
 been systematically pursued from the beginning. 
 
 Now the science of international relations is 
 but a science dealing with a particular department 
 of human conduct. Therefore the same distinction 
 necessarily exists, and international conduct as it 
 is, and international conduct as it ought to be 
 are alike capable of scientific discussion. It is 
 
International Law. 15 
 
 desirable that statesmen should have access to a 
 compendious summary of the kinds of things that 
 governments have done in their relations with 
 other governments, and of the effects which have 
 followed international causes : and it is also de- 
 sirable if there is an abstract standard of good 
 and evil international conduct capable of enuncia- 
 tion that it should be enunciated and so applied 
 as to make a code. The result of the successful 
 study of both branches of the science of interna- 
 tional conduct might ultimately be their fusion in 
 one. But it is obvious at least that the study of 
 what ought to be the international relations of 
 the nations of Europe is not identical with the 
 study of what their actual relations have been: 
 and although these distinct studies might be 
 expounded in different parts of the same treatise, 
 it is possible that the best and most profitable 
 division of labour would be to assign the absolute 
 duties and rights of nations to the students of 
 the general science of what ought to be done, and 
 to leave as the subject-matter of the science of 
 international relations the actual conduct of na- 
 tions in the past, present, and future, including 
 the feelings likely to be aroused in individuals, or 
 in nations by any particular sort of international 
 conduct. 
 
 Now the study of international relations under 
 
16 International Law. 
 
 the name of International Law, and the adoption 
 of that legal imagery against which this Essay is 
 particularly directed, are liable to this among 
 other objections: — that they have led to a con- 
 fusion of the science of what nations do with the 
 science of what nations ought to do, precisely 
 similar to the confusion which has diminished the 
 value of so many great works of jurisprudence. 
 FoUowiag the example of Grotius, the students of 
 this science have always spoken in the language 
 of jurists : and in so doing they have introduced 
 into their science the greatest error which has 
 befallen the science of law. They have not kept 
 international habits and international duties suffi- 
 ciently distinct. Having by their choice of lan- 
 guage and method had recourse to international 
 laws, international codes, international tribunals 
 and international penalties, so called by analogy 
 to the legal phenomena to which these names 
 have been given, they have added confusion to 
 inaccuracy by mixing up the statement of the 
 customs and facts which they classify by the help 
 of these metaphors, with the items of abstract 
 international duty which would ba better under- 
 stood and explained as the subject-matter of a 
 separate science or of part of a separate science : 
 and just as we have the Roman lawyers mixing 
 together the statement of legal duties which 
 
International Law. 17 
 
 sovereigns have imposed and which courts will 
 enforce, and of moral duties, resulting from the 
 nature of things and perceived by the subtle but 
 fallible ingenuity of the writers themselves ; so we 
 have Hautefeuille' in his works on International 
 Law giving us the Primary Law imposed by God, 
 and engraved on the heart of every human being, 
 side by side with the Secondary Law which con- 
 tains detailed rules extracted from treaties and 
 State papers and a kind of tertiary law which has 
 apparently been engraved particularly clearly on 
 the heart of M. Hautefeuille himself: and con- 
 founding in a common anathema those who have 
 infringed any part of his composite code. 
 
 But it is not necessary to confine our search for 
 these unfortunate results to the works of an author 
 over whom Historicus made merry at the time of 
 the American Civil War and whose a priori 
 assertions will be rejected by the great majority 
 of English readers. It will be better to take 
 some of the best and most established authors on 
 international law and see if the value of their 
 books is not greatly impaired by the adoption 
 of the legal metaphor : both on account of the 
 necessary defects of a metaphor dependent upon 
 so slight an analogy, and because of the par- 
 
 1 Droit Maritime International (2nd edition, 1869) and 
 other works of M. L. B. Hautefeuille. 
 
 s. 2 
 
18 International Law, 
 
 ticular confusion, between rules which are ex- 
 hibited as specimens, and rules which are enun- 
 ciated ex cathedra for the benefit of mankind, — 
 a confusion from which all kinds of legal science 
 have suffered, and to which this particular kind of 
 quasi-law is also liable. 
 
 Let us then first consider the work of the 
 late Professor Bluntschli, which is an example of 
 the best that the theory of " international law" 
 can do for the study of international relations. 
 The third edition of his Oode of International Law 
 was published in 1878: the title of the book is 
 Das modeme VSlkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als 
 Rechtsbuch dargestellt, and it consists of an intro- 
 duction and of 862 short articles with explanatory 
 notes giving shortly and clearly what the Professor 
 considers to be the existing law on almost every 
 international question that can arise. Let us see 
 what Dr Bluntschli has to say in favour of the 
 adoption of the method and language of jurists in 
 the scientific discussion of international relations. 
 
 He sets out, at the beginning of the introduc- 
 tion, by stating that all men who live in intercourse 
 with one another are necessarily gifted both with 
 Mechtsinn and with RechtsgefuhV: i.e. with the sense 
 
 1 I have commented at length on the word Beclit in the 
 text. Rechtsinn appears to mean the capacity of being logically 
 convinced of rules founded on Becht : Eechtsgefuhl an instino- 
 
International Law. 19 
 
 of right and with the instinct of right. When vre 
 consider the wide meaning of the word Becht we 
 must take this to mean that men are necessarily 
 inclined both by reason and instinct to recognise 
 the existence of right and wrong, and also the fact 
 that right conduct is conduct in accordance with 
 some standard which is enunciated in the impera- 
 tive mood by God or by nature or by the human 
 race, and which is capable of similar enunciation 
 by a sovereign legislature. Such being the nature 
 of man as a reasoning and as an instinctive being, 
 it follows that the State also which is a deter- 
 minate aggregate of men is a Rechtswesen, or a 
 being necessarily recognising the existence oiRecht. 
 Volkerrecht then, or the Right which can be ex- 
 pressed in commands addressed to States, is the 
 summary of those duties of which States are 
 cognisant just as individual men are cognisant of 
 the numerous duties more or less adequately 
 asserted by the laws of various States. 
 
 These preliminary assertions then come to no 
 more than a statement of the existence of inter- 
 national morality, connected (by the use of the 
 word Becht) with the fact that morality where its 
 nature is fully understood can be expressed in the 
 
 tive readiness to perceive them. Bluntsohli says that all 
 human beings possess both : but that the former is especially 
 characteristic of men, the latter of women. 
 
 2—2 
 
20 International Law. 
 
 form of commands, and that these commands are 
 of a kind which can, subject to circumstances, be 
 enforced in the shape of laws. 
 
 At this early point in his argument Blunstchli 
 turns aside to deal with those who deny the 
 existence of Volkerrecht (i.e. of International Law 
 in the sense of a standard of international right 
 and wrong which can be legally enunciated). It 
 has been urged, he says, that it is inaccurate to 
 speak of Volkerrecht because there is no Volker- 
 gesetz, and no Volkergericht — i.e. no regularly 
 enacted and promulgated law for the regulation 
 of national conduct and no tribunal for the en- 
 forcement of such law : and because nations are 
 practically living in a state of anarchy, where 
 might is right and the strongest can have his 
 way. Dr Bluntschli admits that this criticism is 
 based oa real and serious defects in International 
 Law : but he does not consider that these defects 
 are at all suflSciently serious to justify the con- 
 clusions drawn from them and he shows their 
 insufficiency by commenting upon them to the 
 following effect. 
 
 When we want to know the law (Eecht) on 
 any question of inheritance &c., says he, we take 
 down a Gesetzbuch — (a Code, a volume of the 
 Statutes, or of the Law Eeports) — and we see what 
 has been enacted or laid down on the subject : 
 
International Law. 21 
 
 and the want of a Oesetzhuch, or absolutely 
 authoritative exposition of Recht in international 
 questions, is considered by some to disprove the 
 existence of Volkerrecht. But in truth, says Dr 
 Bluntschli, Laws {Gesetze) are not the only ex- 
 pression of the Law {Eecht) but its clearest ex- 
 pression : and when any system of Recht is in its 
 infancy (as the private law of every people has 
 been at some period or other) we cannot expect 
 to find this clearest kind of expression, and must 
 be content with something less precise and satis- 
 factory. One difficulty of course is the want of 
 an international legislator ( Oesetzgeher) : but who 
 knows ? the "organisation of the world " is perhaps 
 not so far off as we might think, and in the future 
 mankind will become aware of its existence as a 
 corporate being (Gesammtwesen) and, the world 
 once organised, there will be no further difficulty 
 about the establishment of an authoritative Welt- 
 gesetz, properly enunciated and enforced. But 
 Dr Bluntschli admits that this lofty aim may be 
 regarded as a "beautiful dream" though every 
 improvement in international conduct is a step 
 towards its realisation, and he proceeds to give 
 some more practical answer to the critics who 
 rely on the want of a Gesetzgeber and a Gesetzbuch. 
 Although there be no regular legislator and no 
 authoritative statement of the particular applica- 
 
22 International Lav). 
 
 tions of Volkerrecht, yet there are : — (1) Interna- 
 tional congresses which profess to do something 
 more than make mutual engagements for the 
 regulation of international relations, — i.e. to lay 
 down the true and valid principles which obtain 
 with regard to particular relations, and to enunciate 
 in a legal form the result of the application of 
 those principles. The great powers of Europe do 
 not say, we, A, B, G, D and E will not in making 
 war upon one another employ privateers : but 
 they say "Privateering is and remains abolished:" 
 and if, on a question of this sort any powers refuse 
 at once to conform to the principle laid down, 
 they will soon be shamed into compliance. (2) 
 Codes of particular States for the regulation of the 
 international conduct of their subjects, especially 
 the " Instructions for the Government of Armies 
 of the United States in the Field"' : i.e. law-books 
 or Gesetzbiicher for individual States, which can be 
 referred to by other States as a fairly trustworthy 
 clue to the dictates of true international law 
 [Volkerrecht), (3) Works in which private in- 
 dividuals like Dr Bluntschli himself collect and 
 formulate as much international law or Volkerrecht 
 as they can, and give to the world a Eeclitshuch 
 which approximates very nearly to what the 
 international Oesetzbuch would be if the want of 
 1 See below, p. 122. 
 
International Law. 23 
 
 an international tribunal did not unfortunately pre- 
 vent it from existing. " Animated by the American 
 example," says Dr Bluntscbli, " I have undertaken 
 the task of drawing up such a Rechtsbuch of 
 Volkerrecht. — If my exposition corresponds to 
 the existing Rechtsbewusstsein (conscience in 
 matters of Recht) of the civilised world and serves 
 to explain and enunciate it, the object of this 
 work is fulfilled : if not I only wish that another 
 may soon be more successful in satisfying this 
 reasonable want." And in a note to the second 
 edition he mentions the wide popularity of his 
 work and its translation into six languages as a 
 proof that international law has at least a Rechts' 
 buck which can fulfil some of the functions of a 
 Gesetzbuch. 
 
 As with the want of a Volkergesetz, so with 
 the want of a Volkergericht : it is true that any 
 system of Recht which has reached its highest 
 development will be enforced by a regular tribunal 
 precisely and effectively. But where development 
 is less complete there are other less effective and 
 less precise methods of enforcing Recht. Among 
 the existing means by which the defect of a 
 Volkergericht is supplied Dr Bluntschli mentions 
 two : war and arbitration. While he admits that 
 war is a rough and ready means of settling 
 national disputes and that it is very likely to 
 
24 International Law. 
 
 settle them wrong, lie points out that " it is never 
 a matter of indifference on which side Right is." 
 The belligerent which has right on its side fights 
 with a better conscience and greater belief in its 
 cause, and therefore with a better chance of success 
 than the nation which is in the wrong : those 
 who are in the right have the support and applause 
 of mankind, and those who are wrong meet with 
 general disapproval : and in both these ways war 
 is more likely to serve the good cause than the 
 bad, and is therefore a tolerable substitute for a 
 Volkergericht as an institution by which Volker- 
 recht can be enforced. With regard to arbitration 
 it is an undeniable fact that important interna- 
 tional quarrels have been submitted to arbitration 
 and that the awards of the arbitrators have been 
 accepted by the parties to whom they were un- 
 favourable. 
 
 Dr Bluntschli winds up his answer to those 
 who deny the existence of Volkerrecht by showing 
 that the rule of force among nations is only imagi- 
 nary, and that although violence has necessarily 
 played an important part in European history, yet 
 there has always been a tendency towards quiet 
 and order: peace is now the rule and war the 
 exception, whereas the opposite was once the case, 
 and in war itself humanity and a respect of the 
 rights of private property and of neutrals has 
 
International Law. 25 
 
 taken tlie place of indiscriminate cruelty and ra- 
 pacity. 
 
 The general and particular facts made use of 
 by Dr Bluntschli in the argument just summarised 
 are of course obvious and patent facts in connection 
 with international relations: and it is on them 
 that any argument as to the best theoretical 
 method of treating of international relations must 
 be founded. In trying to show that the facts really 
 lead to a conclusion as to that method quite diffe- 
 rent from that arrived at by Dr Bluntschli we are 
 met at once by a great difficulty. This difficulty 
 is the vague and wide meaning of the word Becht. 
 If we say that such arguments are sufficient to 
 prove that these facts are consistent with the non- 
 existence of international law we may be told that 
 we are only proving the absence of a Volkergesetz 
 which Dr Bluntschli regretfully admits. On the 
 other hand if the word Recht is construed according 
 to another of its possible grammatical meanings, 
 the assertion that Volkerrecht exists is no more 
 than an assertion of the existence of international 
 morality which we have already agreed to take 
 for granted. But notwithstanding the difficulties 
 connected mth this dangerously elastic substan- 
 tive, the point at issue is a real one. In the brief 
 statement that Volkerrecht does exist and in his 
 argument against those who deny its existence, 
 
26 International Law. 
 
 Dr BluntscUi is doing something more than as- 
 serting the existence of international morality. If 
 by the existence of Volkerrecht he does not mean 
 that nations are subject to a law formally enacted 
 and enforced, it is also true that he does not mean 
 merely that it is possible for nations to do wrong 
 in the most general sense of the term. He means 
 at least as much as this : that the conduct of 
 nations is subject to Recht so nearly comparable to 
 the Recht which governs individuals, that it may 
 be most accurately and profitably discussed by. a 
 science which treats international morality as if it 
 had in a perfect form those sanctions and those 
 legislative enactments which it at present lacks : 
 and that the general statement and arrangement 
 of a science of international relations should closely 
 resemble a practical treatise on the law by which 
 any civilised State is governed. Upon this con- 
 struction of Dr Bluntschli's assertion of the exist- 
 ence of Volkerrecht, a construction which is borne 
 out by the actual character of his own book, we 
 proceed to deal with the arguments which we 
 have summarised. 
 
 Congresses certainly meet from time to time, 
 and among other things they make declarations 
 touching the subject-matter of the science called 
 international law. But, although the form of 
 these declarations may vary, and may at times 
 
International Lav). 27 
 
 approximate closely to ttat of legislative fonnulae, 
 they can never in fact be anything but clauses of 
 a treaty to which a greater or less number of 
 powers are parties. Instances can be found in 
 European history to show that treaties are not 
 always binding upon the powers which agree to 
 them. The same treaty of 1856 which is looked 
 upon as the great instance of international legis- 
 lation, contained provisions as to the navigation of 
 the Black Sea which were dispensed with less 
 than 20 years later by one of the contracting 
 parties, on the ground that observance of them 
 was inconsistent with the development of that 
 power. The fact that this step gave rise to another 
 declaration by treaty that declarations by treaty 
 were to be considered binding on those who made 
 them, is at least as good evidence of the weakness 
 as it is of the strength of this species of Volher- 
 gesetze. 
 
 If the binding force of treaties upon those who 
 make them is to be understood to be thus limited, 
 their strength to bind outside powers must be small 
 indeed. Dr Bluntschli speaks of the power which 
 retains an obnoxious usage being ashamed to 
 employ it in warfare against a power which has 
 abandoned it. In Magna Charta it was enacted 
 that foreign merchants who were in England at 
 the outbreak of war should be treated as the 
 
28 International Law. 
 
 English merchants in the foreign country were 
 treated : not that a good example should be set 
 by treating them as friends. And ever since in 
 respect of various kinds of international questions, 
 and especially in the great dispute as to neutral 
 rights which reached its highest point some 80 
 years ago, and which finally took the shape of a 
 competition between England and Napoleon as to 
 which could devise a policy the most oppressive to 
 neutrals, it has been more common for nations 
 to follow a bad example on the principle of re- 
 ciprocity than to persist in setting a good one 
 until it is followed through shame. 
 
 It has yet to be seen whether the privileges 
 obtained by neutrals in 1856 would be safe in 
 a great maritime war. If any of the signing 
 powers broke any of their engagements, the 
 principle of reciprocity would be likely to make 
 itself felt : and it would certainly require a stead- 
 fast and prolonged adherence to the treaty on the 
 part of all the powers who had signed, to make 
 the other powers act from motives of shame as if 
 they had signed too. It is certainly rather san- 
 guine, for instance, to hope that America upon 
 war breaking out would give up privateering 
 because it was " abolished " at the treaty of Paris, 
 and that the English government would then for- 
 bid their ships to take private property at sea. 
 
International Law. 29 
 
 because they would know that the concession 
 about privateering was so very distasteful to the 
 Americans as long as private property at sea was 
 liable to capture. 
 
 The topic of treaties must be generally dis- 
 cussed hereafter: but I have tried to show that 
 the occasional meeting of European congresses 
 which sometimes adopt a legislative style, does 
 not go very far to make up for the want of Volker- 
 gesetze and of a Gesetzgeber. 
 
 The American Instructions for the Government 
 of Armies in the Field are no doubt of great value 
 and importance'. But they only apply to a certain 
 part of international duties : and there is nothing 
 in them to impose a duty upon any other govern- 
 ment to issue a similar set of regulations, or upon 
 the American government to keep in force those 
 which it has issued. An enactment or set of 
 enactments made by any nation for the regula- 
 tion of the conduct of its military and naval officers 
 in time of war may contain provisions which are 
 due to international considerations : but how can 
 we say of any particular provision in such a treaty 
 that it is not due to some purely local and transi- 
 tory motive, which has reference only to the 
 legislating government, and to that only at the 
 present time ? 
 
 1 See a further discussion ot them, p. 128. 
 
30 International Law. 
 
 To consider these Instructions as a substitute 
 for international Oesetze (or laws in the narrowest 
 sense of the word) is to use them for a purpose for 
 which they are incomplete and to neglect, perhaps, 
 another and a sounder use of them, A govern- 
 ment can make laws for its soldiers and sailors as 
 it can for any other section of the community. 
 Such laws, like any other laws, may be made 
 because of any one of an infinite number of motives 
 present to the minds of the legislators. The mo- 
 tives for this kind of legislation will very largely 
 consist in a feeling of humanity towards other 
 nations, in a desire for the establishment of a 
 system of warfare which shall best serve the 
 general interest of mankind, and in fear of the 
 practical consequences of that irritation of other 
 nations to which a harsh and violent method of 
 carrying on war might give rise. But the presence 
 of these motives does not give to this particular 
 class of laws, as compared with laws in general, 
 any special obligation upon the subjects to whom 
 they are addressed, nor does it impose on the 
 legislators who have enacted them any special 
 obligation not to revoke or to alter their own 
 enactments. But if such enactments as the 
 American Instructions are to be looked on as 
 a substitute for Gesetzbiicher as defined by Dr 
 Bluntschli it ought to be either because all govern- 
 
International Law. 31 
 
 ments are under a practical obligation to issue 
 identical instructions, or because the instructions 
 once called into existence and published impose 
 some valid obligation upon individuals apart from 
 any obligation resulting from the sovereign au- 
 thority of the legislative power. 
 
 Finally we have to consider Dr Bluntschli's 
 argument that such works as Ms own, which are 
 Rechtsbucher of international law, can practically 
 supply the defect caused by the absence of Gesetz- 
 bilcher or regular law-books stamped with legisla- 
 tive authority. An ideal law-book has this merit 
 — that it is perfectly definite and unmistakeable, 
 giving the very words in which the legislature or 
 perhaps a high judicial tribunal has expressed 
 itself on the matter at issue and rendering it 
 unnecessary to reopen the question of absolute 
 right : we need only ascertain the meaning actually 
 attached to the words used, for these words were 
 chosen as the best possible expression of the order 
 which the government will enforce. Perhaps it 
 may be said that all the kinds of books which 
 Bluntschli refers to under the head of Gesetzhilcher 
 fall short to some extent of this ideal. But there 
 must be some level at which a book falls so far 
 short of it as not to be suitably comparable to it at 
 all. Such books as Dr Bluntschli's appear to be 
 necessarily below this level. A government is about 
 
32 International Law. 
 
 to do an act on behalf of the nation : the act is 
 one which has an effect upon international relations. 
 Before they have decided whether to do it or not, 
 an influential adviser of the government opens Dr 
 BluntschH's book: he finds a sentence expressed 
 with the utmost precision and in the most definite 
 terms, laying down that such actions as that pro- 
 posed to be done are contrary to international law: 
 he knows that this means that upon consideration 
 of all that has been said and done in connection 
 with the particular kind of conduct, and acting 
 under the influence of his own character, feelings 
 and nationality, Dr Bluntsohli has come to the con- 
 clusion that such conduct is to be disapproved of 
 and condemned. His examination of authorities 
 may not in this particular case have been exhaus- 
 tive: his weighing of the conflicting arguments 
 may have been hasty or inaccurate : some personal 
 characteristic or some of those national preposses- 
 sions from which the gravest and most abstract his- 
 torians are not always free, may have warped his 
 judgment : men of similar qualifications with the 
 same materials at hand may about the same time 
 have come to an opposite conclusion. If for any 
 of the above reasons Dr Bluntschli has come 
 to a wrong conclusion he does not possess that 
 might by which a legislature can make the most 
 wrong-headed and perverse conclusions to be right 
 
International Law. 33 
 
 as far as its subjects are concerned. Taking all 
 these facts into consideration, the adviser of the 
 government will let the dictum of the Professor 
 take its place among the other arguments which 
 he has collected from one source and another, and 
 give a tinge to the advice which he eventually 
 proffers to the government. Perhaps he will 
 advise the government that on the whole he 
 thinks the proposed action morally objectionable, 
 and that he thinks most people will agree with 
 him. But even if he were right in both asser- 
 tions it is possible that particular practical con- 
 siderations might lead the government to take 
 the morally objectionable course, and it is even 
 conceivable that the national prosperity might 
 never suffer on account of their having done so. 
 Is the part played by an international law-book in 
 such a conjuncture much like that played by a 
 statute-book, digest or code to which an individual 
 may refer before doing something which he sus- 
 pects to be in the nature of a crime or of a civil 
 wrong ? Such a man would read in unmistakeable 
 terms that such or such consequences were attached 
 to the act by law : and however much he might 
 disagree with the motives of the legislature, or 
 think that they had misunderstood the question, 
 his knowledge as to whether by doing the act he 
 should become a person punishable by law or 
 s. 3 
 
34 International Law. 
 
 legally liable to pay damages would at once be 
 absolute and complete. The analogy appears to be 
 so slight as to point to the conclusion that the 
 existence of such books as Bluntschli's Itechtsbuch 
 does not supply the defect of regular law-books. 
 
 We now come to what Bluntschli calls the 
 second defect of International Law : the absence of 
 a regular tribunal to inflict a penalty for the breach 
 of it or to determine the rights of a disputed 
 question. It may fairly be said that this defect 
 is in fact the same as the first. The reason why 
 there is no authoritative exposition of international 
 law is the absence of any power to decide inter- 
 national questions. Particular views on any ques- 
 tion can be expressed with the utmost precision : 
 but our difficulty is that we do not know which 
 to select among these precise but contradictory 
 assertions. If any of them were enunciated as 
 those which tribunals could enforce the difficulty 
 would be at an end. However Dr Bluntschli has 
 told us that the decisions of Congresses, the 
 American Instructions, and his own paragraphs 
 will do for authoritative expositions : and now he 
 tells us that war and arbitration will do well 
 enough for tribunals. That is to say, that the 
 dicta of the three authorities mentioned are to be 
 interpreted as saying to the world at large, "Do 
 this — or you will probably be beaten in war," and 
 
International Law. 35 
 
 "Abstain from that — or arbitrators will award 
 damages against you." The facts that in Dr 
 Bluntschli's opinion the victors in war are gene- 
 rally in the right, and that on certain occasions 
 governments have submitted to arbitration and 
 have accepted awards, hardly bring the relations of 
 States into close analogy with those of individuals 
 subject to law. The injured State may tamely 
 submit to injury or if it fight it may possibly be 
 beaten. The powerful malefactor may refuse to 
 have recourse to arbitration or may reject the 
 award and leave the matter after all at the discre- 
 tion of that God of battles in whose equitable 
 intervention the Heidelberg professor so devoutly 
 believes. The nation which is defeated because it 
 is in the wrong, or which agrees to arbitration, 
 is not in a position closely analogous to that of the 
 individual who is made to pay damages for breach 
 of contract or for interference with his neighbour's 
 rights by ordinary process of the law. 
 
 The whole matter is summed up by Dr 
 Bluntschli's assertion that whatever things may 
 have been in the past, nations are not now living 
 in a state of anarchy, but in a state of law 
 and order. No theoretical defence of the common 
 method of discussing international relations can 
 dispense with the comparison of individuals to na- 
 tions; and it is implied in this assertion. Several 
 
 S— 2 
 
36 International Law. 
 
 inconveniences must attend a comparison of things 
 in some respect so unlike : but let us make the 
 comparison. We must imagine a continent or 
 large tract of land inhabited by eight or ten 
 individuals, difi'ering greatly in size and strength ; 
 not necessarily mortal though each is liable to 
 fall to pieces, or to be absorbed by or willingly 
 coalesce with another; subject to spasmodic in- 
 crease and decrease, but not growing regularly ; 
 incapable of reproduction or multiplication in 
 the ordinary way, though the partial or complete 
 decomposition of an individual may give rise to 
 the sudden appearance -of one or more new indivi- 
 duals; self-sufficient for the necessities of life, 
 though each can benefit much by dealing with the 
 others. 
 
 The question is whether these eight or ten 
 men are subject to law or in a state of anarchy. 
 It is common ground that the ethical standard, 
 whatever it be, does in fact apply to their conduct. 
 But are they subject to law ? or does the necessary 
 obligation to do good and shun evil possess in their 
 case that subtle analogy with law as ordinarily 
 promulgated and enforced which justifies the use 
 of the substantive Recht? The advocate of an 
 affirmative answer to this question can only say 
 of this little group that a few of them have 
 sometimes met together and emphatically asserted- 
 
International Law. 37 
 
 that when they fight they will not hit each 
 other below the belt, or take the opportunity of 
 picking each other's pockets : that one of the most 
 conscientious of them keeps private memoranda 
 containing more detailed regulations for his own 
 conduct when fighting with his neighbours : that 
 shrewd observers have gone into the matter very 
 carefully and drawn up complete expositions of 
 what seem to them to be the rights and duties of 
 these men towards each other: that when they 
 fight the one who is in the right is for that 
 reason the more likely to win : and that on. some 
 occasions two men who have quarrelled have 
 been known to submit the matter to the arbi- 
 tration of some of the others and to accept their 
 award. 
 
 One may look upon these men as fairly polished 
 and civilised individuals: but one could hardly 
 say that they were living under laws or a Law 
 upon any reasonable interpretation of the word, 
 whether German or English. The reason why 
 they have attained to a higher degree of civilisa- 
 tion than ordinary men do without becoming 
 subject to law, is that they are so very different 
 from ordinary men as to render the whole com- 
 parison ridiculous. We allow that the matters on 
 which we are at issue with Dr Bluntschli may be 
 brought to a point in the question whether nations 
 
38 International Law. 
 
 live in a state of anarchy or not : and we contend 
 that, upon our opponent's own showing, if they do 
 not, no kind of men ever did or can live so : for 
 the word Becht (as an attribute inconsistent with 
 anarchy) must be used in a sense so wide as to 
 include the unspecified and neglected obligations 
 to behave rightly which exist for savages, and 
 perhaps for wild animals. 
 
 Let us now turn to the theoretical views of 
 another expositor of International Law, Mr HalP, 
 Dr Bluntschli is a good example of those who 
 have heartily adopted the common view as to the 
 scientific method of International Law, and have 
 at the same time avoided extravagance and un- 
 necessary sophistries in the use of it, Mr Hall is 
 a good example of another class of writers, — those 
 who adopt the common method to a very limited 
 extent: who even so seem to adopt it reluc^ 
 tantly and 'with, a regretful consciousness of its 
 great defects ; and whose exposition of the actual 
 facts of international relations is so honest and 
 accurate as to display the faultiness of their method 
 at every turn. It will take very little space to 
 show that Mr Hall is no enthusiastic advocate of 
 a theory which he pares down to the utmost and 
 whose defects are apparent throughout his book : 
 
 1 Hall's International Law, Oxford, 1880. 
 
International Law. 39 
 
 but the important question remaining for decision 
 is whether there is any alternative as to the method 
 to be pursued. It is the object of this essay to 
 answer in the affirmative this question to which 
 Mr Hall seems to assume a negative answer. 
 
 " International Law," says Mr Hall, " consists 
 " in certain rules of conduct which modem civilised 
 " States regard as being binding on them in their re- 
 " lations with one another with a force comparable 
 "in nature and degree to that binding the con- 
 " scientious person to obey the laws of his country, 
 " and which they also regard as being enforeible 
 "by appropriate means in case of infringement." 
 And he then explains and defends the opinion 
 that these rules are "a reflection of the moral 
 " development of the external life of the particular 
 " nations which are governed by them." Mr Hall 
 is willing to leave altogether on one side any 
 question as to the absolute standard of Interna- 
 tional right and wrong. He differs emphatically 
 from those who would constantly refer current 
 differences to this standard, and who would at once 
 inscribe new-formed rules in the absolute code in 
 which this standard is universally applied. He says 
 that international law can only grow up as custom 
 changes and as national life developes : that at 
 any given moment it is what the conduct of 
 nations has made it; that it cannot be changed 
 
40 International Law. 
 
 by any legislative decree or prevented from chang- 
 ing by any dogmatic reiteration: and that we 
 must find out how it applies to any particular 
 problem by an examination of international usage, 
 and a very delicate and cautious use of the ma- 
 terials aiForded to us by treaties. 
 
 It may be admitted with Mr Hall that it is 
 desirable to let the absolute standard alone for the 
 present. But it does not necessarily follow that the 
 best way of discussing international relations in a 
 practical spirit, which is in fact what Mr Hall has 
 done, is to write a treatise on " International Law " 
 according to the above definition. 
 
 In the first place it is not easy to say what is the 
 force which binds a conscientious person to obey the 
 laws of his country. A conscientious person differs 
 from other people only by being more awake than 
 they to the promptings of conscience. The diffi- 
 culty of defining " conscience " is great enough to 
 leave us in some doubt if we were told merely that 
 international law consisted of rules which impose an 
 obligation on nations similar to the obligation on a 
 conscientious man to do what his conscience bids 
 him. But we have a more subtle distinction to deal 
 with. What are the promptings of conscience as to 
 the law of the land ? That must depend to some 
 extent on the character of the laws : for of course 
 there may be a law so bad that conscience orders 
 
International Law. 41 
 
 its violation. We must suppose then that in 
 addition to the obvious moral obligation to obey 
 good laws and disobey bad ones conscience imposes 
 upon a man an amount of obligation not definable 
 to obey his country's laws independently of the 
 goodness or badness of particular laws, so that it 
 will want a considerable amount of badness in a 
 law to overcome the conscientious man's inclina- 
 tion to abide by law. But this' obligation, of 
 which the existence may undoubtedly be admitted, 
 would seem upon analysis to depend upon the 
 fact that it is desirable to maintain the adminis- 
 trative system of the country, to give the legisla- 
 ture fair play, and to direct reforming energy into 
 constitutional channels. Therefore the obligation 
 upon a conscientious man, qua conscientious man, 
 to obey his country's laws seems to be intimately 
 connected with those conditions of sovereign power, 
 efficient tribunals, &c., whose absence in Inter- 
 national Law Mr Hall would not deny. From 
 this it seems to follow that governments are not 
 bound to obey the rules of international law, inde- 
 pendently of their actual merit according to a 
 standard whether of morality or of expediency, as a 
 man is bound by conscience to obey the laws of 
 his country : and when Mr Hall says that " civi- 
 "lised States regard these rules as binding on 
 "them with a force comparable in nature and 
 
42 International Lavi. 
 
 "degree" to the obligation whicli we have been 
 discussing, it is no more than a way of saying that 
 there is after all a slight analogy between interna- 
 tional law and private law. 
 
 This is still more evidently the meaning of the 
 statement that "civilised states regard (these rules) 
 " as being enforcible by appropriate means in case 
 " of infringement." Of course, if they were really 
 enforcible and enforced by thoroughly appropriate 
 and efficient rneans, there would be no need for the 
 allusion to the conscientious man. The obligation 
 would be the same as that which binds all men, 
 conscientious or not, to keep their country's laws. 
 At the same time we can hardly suppose that the 
 modem civilised powers are taken to be under a 
 delusion as to the extent to which these appropri- 
 ate means exist. We must conclude that the in- 
 tentional vagueness of the phrase points to the 
 fact that international duties have been from time 
 to time practically enforced : and that upon this 
 side also there is a slight analogy to positive 
 law. 
 
 With very little introductory matter beyond 
 what we have quoted or summarised, Mr Hall pro- 
 ceeds to describe the "modem civilised states" with 
 which he is dealing and then, first generally and 
 afterwards in detail, to give an account of the law 
 governing nations in their normal relations, in the 
 
International Law. 43 
 
 relation of war and in the relation of neutrality. 
 His method is, with regard to each kind of rela- 
 tions, to summarise the past and present usage of 
 nations, showing what is obsolete and what is still 
 authoritative, to analyse carefully the effect of such 
 treaties as have been made touching the matter 
 at issue, and in conclusion to give the existing rule 
 of international law, or the rule, perhaps, which he 
 perceives to be gradually forming ; the rule, that is, 
 which civilised modem nations regard (or soon 
 will regard) as binding upon them with a force 
 comparable in nature and degree to the indefinite 
 inclination of the conscientious man to observe the 
 laws of his country, and which they believe (or 
 soon will believe) to be enforcible by appropriate 
 means, if it should be infringed. When Mr Hall 
 winds up a historical discussion of the " right " to 
 navigate territorial rivers, or to carry enemy's 
 goods under a neutral flag, and ends by enuncia- 
 ting the international "rule" now in force or in 
 process of formation, we must remember the rather 
 elaborate periphrasis implied by the use of the 
 words " right " and " rule ". 
 
 Such books as Mr Hall's may possess great 
 merits as statements of European customs and as 
 commentaries on European treaties : the study of 
 them may throw considerable light on particular 
 international complications. But the merits of 
 
44 International Law. 
 
 such a book belong to it in despite of its tbeo- 
 retical method: and that method itself must be 
 reckoned as a defect. The explanation of the 
 theory on which the author proceeds is only a 
 more or less ingeniously involved statement that 
 international relations are the subject of a con- 
 siderable number of rules which bear a slight 
 analogy to the laws which regulate the conduct of 
 individuals : and that in the absence of any com- 
 peting theory, the existing knowledge on the sub- 
 ject of international relations had better be ar- 
 ranged and expressed in reference to that analogy. 
 In order to meet the arguments by which such 
 writers support their theory we need not enter 
 into a detailed discussion like that demanded by 
 the theoretical views of Bluntschli. We have to 
 disprove not the existence of the analogy insisted 
 upon, but its suitability to form the basis of a 
 discussion of international relations. This will be 
 done if we can show that any arrangement and 
 mode of expression can be contrived resting on a 
 clearer and firmer basis than the analogy of inter- 
 national rules to positive law. 
 
 All writers on International Law who have 
 obtained much credit and authority since its ori- 
 ginal foundation, have made the alleged fact that 
 nations are amenable to law the key-stone of their 
 system. Those among them who have defended 
 
International Law. 45 
 
 the assertion of this fact by elaborate argument 
 can be met by such reasoning as that which has 
 been here employed in criticising Dr Bluntschli: 
 those who have spoken of the fact as a slight and 
 doubtful one which they are constrained to use for 
 want of a better theory on which to base their 
 work can be met like Mr Hall by a demonstration 
 that a scientific discussion of international rela- 
 tions is possible in which international rules are 
 only considered as a particular class of interna- 
 tional phenomena. 
 
 The above criticism of these two representative 
 books arose from the assertion that the adoption of 
 the juridical method must lead to a confusion of in- 
 ternational habits with international duties, or the 
 mixture of the science of international relations as 
 they are with that of international relations as they 
 ought to be. This confusion must exist in both 
 classes of books if these criticisms are sound. For 
 authors of one class assert more than they can prove 
 about the existence of laws or a Law governing the 
 relations of States to one another : and those of the 
 other class set out with assertions which resolve 
 themselves upon analysis into an admission that 
 their science owes its arrangement and expression 
 to the slight analogy existing between the rela- 
 tions of States and those of beings subject to 
 positive law. Both classes therefore will be driven 
 
46 International Law. 
 
 to look at non-juridical facts in a juridical light, 
 and to describe those habits which are only rules 
 in the sense of uniformity as habits which are 
 rules in the sense of enforced uniformity. Ex- 
 ceptional incidents will be looked on as objec- 
 tionable transgressions: and we shall never be 
 certain whether our teachers are the exponents 
 of a science of international relations as they are, 
 or of that part of the science of ethics which 
 refers to the conduct of nations as it ought 
 to be. The alternative course here suggested 
 is to treat of the forms and classes of interna- 
 tional relations as they are, pointing out however 
 that some relations are particularly apt to be 
 looked on from one point of view or another as 
 matters of morality, and that certain opinions as 
 to right and wrong have in fact been maintained 
 by eminent writers, or embodied (as hereafter 
 explained) in municipal laws. 
 
 But we are not concerned only with this parti- 
 cular confusion. Before we pass from a criticism 
 of these theories to a brief sketch of the applica- 
 tion of a different one, we must look again and 
 more generally at the way in which the theoreti- 
 cal views of the two authors who have been men- 
 tioned affect the practical character of their books. 
 By this means we can ascertain more exactly the 
 contrast between them severally and between each 
 
International Law. 47 
 
 of them and the third theoretical stand-poiut 
 which is about to be described. 
 
 That which is to be scientifically treated con- 
 sists in the various international relations of which 
 histories and newspapers give us an account. 
 This account is necessarily in the nature of an un- 
 scientific inventory or catalogue because it follows 
 the order of time and does not concern itself with 
 the arrangement of different classes of relations 
 according to their real nature. How do the theo- 
 ries of these two authors affect the treatment of 
 the material or evidence at their disposal ? 
 
 Bluntschli tells us of great moral principles 
 which every State is morally bound to acknowledge 
 whether it likes or not (§ 3), and which the various 
 States of the world do acknowledge to a degree 
 dependent on the development of their consciences, 
 the development of consciences being the most 
 important result of civilization (§§ 3, 4) : these 
 principles can be accepted by States of any religious 
 views (§ 6) and without interference with national 
 independence and individuality (§ 8) : they cannot 
 as yet be regularly embodied in international legis- 
 lation (§ 10), but the language of the public docu- 
 ments of particular States in their dealings with 
 others, and of the regular legislation of single States 
 on a particular class of subjects (such as the conduct 
 of armies in the field) can be deliberately founded 
 
48 International Law. 
 
 on tHese principles and can help to propagate 
 them (§ 12). The opinion of nations {consensus 
 gentium) (§ 13) though it fluctuates, and the con- 
 duct of nations (§ 14), though sometimes unprin- 
 cipled (§ 15), together with the published views of 
 statesmen and philosophers (§ 16), will afford suffi- 
 cient evidence of the actual nature of these prin- 
 ciples. The historical matter, therefore, which is 
 accessible to scientific inquirers is to be discussed 
 and classified with reference to these principles 
 which are morally binding on the conscience of 
 the whole of mankind : and the result to be aimed 
 at is the assertion of what is the right conduct to 
 be pursued under all circumstances. Such asser- 
 tions must necessarily fall into something like the 
 form in which legislatures lay down what it is 
 right for their subjects to do, in all those emergen- 
 cies upon which the legislature has undertaken to 
 enforce a rule. 
 
 Mr Hall on the other hand does not at all con- 
 cern himself with eternal principles, binding on 
 the human conscience at all times and at all 
 places alike. He says that there are rules to 
 some extent binding on a particular group of 
 nations at the present time : that these rules are 
 the reflection of national custom, with which they 
 vary from time to time: and that they can be 
 collected by a judicious study of national habits 
 
International Law. 49 
 
 as they are and of the expressions given to the 
 opinions by which statesmen believe or wish the 
 nations whom they serve to be actuated. His 
 treatment, therefore, of the material common to 
 all international lawyers is governed by the wish 
 to discover and enunciate the rules at this time 
 vaguely binding the consciences of European and 
 American statesmen in their intercourse with 
 their neighbours : and the method, arrangement, 
 and phraseology of his book are due to the nature 
 of the attempt in which he is engaged. 
 
 The detailed criticism already made on the 
 theoretical reasoning of these two authors is in- 
 tended to justify the opinion that we may fairly 
 take exception to the method and to the language 
 of both. If that criticism is sound we may say 
 with Mr Hall that we are quite willing to admit 
 the existence of such principles as those described 
 by Dr Bluntschli, but that their vagueness and 
 the difficulty of agreeing as to their actual nature, 
 render them unsuitable for the next few centuries 
 at all events as the theoretical groundwork for 
 a scientific study of international relations : but 
 we may in the same way admit that the actual 
 state of custom and opinion does impose an inde- 
 finite moral obligation on European and American 
 statesmen to behave according to rules more or 
 less accurately ascertainable, and at the same time 
 S. 4 
 
50 International Law. 
 
 say that even these rules are of too vague a kind 
 to he set forth dogmatically as the result of a 
 scientific discussion of international relations and 
 therefore to give to such a discussion its tone and 
 its method. 
 
 The unsuitability of the principles of right 
 and wrong or of any kind of human rule, transient 
 or eternal, as the dominant idea of this science 
 appears not only from the vague nature of such 
 principles or rules but also from the fact that 
 some part of the acknowledged subject-matter of 
 the science cannot possibly be put into the shape 
 of rules, or stated at all definitely as an example 
 of the working of a moral principle. Instances of 
 this will be found in the sections where Dr Blunt- 
 schli deals with the difference between the rank 
 of king and emperor or the kind of representatives 
 to which different kinds of states are entitled. It 
 can hardly be an exemplification of an eternal 
 principle that "as a rule Ambassadors are only 
 "sent and received by states of kingly rank" (172). 
 And it would be difficult to illustrate the subjec- 
 tion of nations to Law by quoting provisions that 
 an ambassador has no right to invitations or visits 
 except those of which the absence would constitute 
 an injury to the honour and to the acknowledged 
 rank of his state (190), or that official correspond- 
 ence must not be read by persons to whom it is 
 
International Law. 51 
 
 not addressed (although it has always been found 
 prudent to conduct such correspondence in cipher) 
 (199). 
 
 "We may reasonably prefer to take interna- 
 tional relations as they are, and make such a 
 methodical arrangement of them as their nature 
 appears to suggest. If such an arrangement could 
 be made so as to be complete and accurate it would 
 assist every kind of students in their study of the 
 history of international relations. Philosophers 
 would arrive more easily at the great principles 
 underlying international intercourse and national 
 life : and those for whom the comparison of a 
 nation to a particularly conscientious individual 
 is especially interesting could also carry on their 
 researches more expeditiously. All that is now 
 urged amounts to this : that the everlasting prin- 
 ciples on the one hand, and the indefinite tran- 
 sitory obligations on the other are not plain 
 enough to be utilised as the basis of a scientific 
 investigation: and that much of the matter 
 to be investigated has no apparent connection 
 either with the great principles or with the 
 transitory obligations. If this is so, it will be a 
 better employment of time and trouble to devise 
 a scientific arrangement for such facts about inter- 
 national intercourse as are plain and undisputed. 
 Where we find a book which so nearly approaches 
 
 4—2 
 
52 International Law. 
 
 this result as Mr Hall's does, we are inclined to 
 conclude that his insistance on the comparison of 
 a nation to a conscientious individual subject to 
 law, is an accidental result of the traditional 
 method of international lawyers. But however 
 slightly such a comparison be relied on it must 
 impair the value of the book by making its con- 
 tents the subject of dispute by those who differ as 
 to the nature of an obligation which is so much 
 obscured either by human prejudice and short- 
 sightedness or by its own nature. 
 
 It is important to insist on the fact that the 
 objection to basing the Science of International 
 Relations on the idea of a Law of Nations is as 
 much a practical as a theoretical one. The idea 
 that nations are subject to law having been 
 over popularised must lead to other feelings and 
 inclinations besides those originally contemplated. 
 International disputants with the idea of inter- 
 national law in their heads conduct their quarrels 
 in a different spirit from that by which they 
 would otherwise be actuated. They come to look 
 upon the other party to the quarrel not as a 
 community with which they have had a difference 
 of opinion but as a being from whom they have 
 suffered a legal wrong and from whom legal re- 
 dress must be obtained. Hence arises a different 
 aspect and possibly a regrettable embitterment of 
 
International Law. 63 
 
 the quarrel. The ideas of the disputants are 
 carried away from the actual facts of the case to 
 the version of them as they appear in the light of 
 the juridical metaphor. This is one practical 
 objection to the current theory. Another is that 
 the general belief in the existence of International 
 Law is that municipal legislation on international 
 subjects is neglected. It is imagined that the 
 existence of courts whose duty is to administer 
 the "law of nations" will be enough. The provi- 
 sions of that law are allowed to reside " in gremio 
 magistratuum ". Codification by particular nations 
 of their views on what the law of nations is, 
 comes very slowly and in some departments does 
 not come at all. Hence the differences of opinion 
 which exist among different nations are not 
 declared beforehand. They are only declared when 
 an actual quarrel has arisen : and the discovery 
 by a nation that its neighbour differs from it as to 
 what the Law of Nations on some question is 
 comes as an unpleasant surprise to embitter an 
 existing dispute. 
 
 It may be said that any one who talks about 
 a science of international relations is bound to 
 admit the existence of laws which govern those 
 relations, because a science is necessarily concerned 
 with those laws which underlie all growth and 
 govern every cause and effect in nature. To 
 
54 International Latd. 
 
 make a scientific statement is merely to publish 
 a chapter of nature's laws, or to describe various 
 instances of that uniformity by which one phenome- 
 non is invariably connected with another. But it is 
 fair to answer this by saying that the laws of this 
 kind which govern international relations are not 
 demonstrably such laws as Bluntschli declares to 
 be binding on all the peoples of the world, and 
 more or less obeyed by them according as they 
 are more or less civilised: nor such as Mr Hall 
 declares to be binding on the inhabitants of a 
 particular group of nations with a force compar- 
 able in nature and degree to that binding the 
 conscientious man to obey the laws of his country. 
 We may admit that the scientific study of interna- 
 tional relations will show some necessary connec- 
 tions of one thing with another, which could be 
 compared with the so-called " laws " of physical 
 science: but at the same time deny that it has 
 ever been intelligibly proved that a scientific state- 
 ment of the necessary connections between the 
 observable peculiarities of mankind would consti- 
 tute a suitable civil and criminal code either for 
 eternity or for a few generations. 
 
 Having gone through the principal objections 
 which I have to make to the reasoning on which 
 the current theory is founded, and having de- 
 scribed the most dangerous of its necessary evil 
 
International Law. 55 
 
 results, I have now to give a brief account of the 
 method by which I suggest that international 
 relations might be more accurately and more 
 beneficially discussed. 
 
 I propose to discard as a principal and imme- 
 diate end the ascertainment of the moral rules by 
 which nations are bound in their intercourse with 
 one another : and to make the attempt to show in 
 outline how the kinds of relations subsisting 
 between them are a suitable subject for a theo- 
 retical analysis in which the solution of moral 
 problems would hold a subordinate part. The 
 first question which meets us in an attempt to 
 consider the general theoretical characteristics of 
 international relations is that of what we mean 
 when we speak of nations. 
 
 I shall try to describe that one among the 
 current uses of the word nation which is the 
 best suited to bring into the field of international 
 relations the kind of topics which are generally 
 dealt with in works on "International Law". 
 Having ascertained the meaning of the word 
 nation, we shall be brought to consider the 
 general characteristics and the historical career 
 of the bodies of men so designated. We shall 
 then know what are the chief characteristics of 
 the political existence of the great societies with 
 whose mutual relations we are concerned. We 
 
56 International Law. 
 
 shall be led to think of nations rather as a 
 particular class of political communities, to whom 
 the course of history has bequeathed a miscel- 
 laneous collection of characteristics and instincts, 
 than as great beings, into which the human race 
 has been divided by nature for some purposes, and 
 which are similarly subdivided for other purposes 
 into smaller beings called men. Coming to the 
 relations subsisting between nations we shall be 
 occupied by the relations of peace, war and 
 neutrality, and with regard to each of these we 
 shall have to inquire what are the means by 
 which international intercourse is carried on, what 
 direction such intercourse generally follows, and 
 what kind of questions arise between nation and 
 nation. 
 
 Great political societies, independent of external 
 control, possessed of vast wealth and resources, 
 must now and then, in the course of their busy 
 and active careers, be actuated by conflicting 
 interests and view the conduct of one another 
 with mutual disapprobation. The circumstances 
 under which such feelings will arise, the results 
 which will be likely to follow their manifestation, 
 and the conflicting motives by which they are 
 restrained, are all matters for investigation. These 
 topics are none the less interesting because of their 
 wide difference from the corresponding matters 
 
International Law. 57 
 
 among individuals who are subject to the enact- 
 ment and administration of regular law. 
 
 But while nations are not subject to laws 
 from without, they are themselves provided with 
 effective legislative and judicial organs. This 
 fact is productive of many important effects upon 
 international relations. It must therefore receive 
 separate consideration, both in the general dis- 
 cussion of the nature of nations, and in the 
 particular examination of the theoretical aspect 
 of that part of a nation's conduct which affects 
 its neighbours. 
 
 The second part of this Essay consists of a 
 short sketch of the subject-matter of "Inter- 
 national Law" as it would appear if discussed 
 upon the principle here advocated. This sketch 
 differs from what a similar abstract of any of the 
 current books on International Law would be in 
 two respects. First, it differs negatively because 
 the usual ethical dicta as to what is right with re- 
 gard to various international matters, or what the 
 voice of the "conscience of mankind would really 
 say about them, are not to be found in it at all. 
 Secondly, it differs both in the character of the 
 preliminary descriptions of nations and national 
 life, and in the arrangements of the ordinary 
 topics of International Law. I hope that none of 
 the latter are entirely absent, but they are men- 
 
58 International Law. 
 
 tioned in an order which depends on the arrange- 
 ment here advocated, and not on the precedents 
 of well-known text books. 
 
 The 1st, 2nd and 3rd sections state what is 
 meant by those "nations" to which reference is 
 implied by the use of the word "international" 
 in the expression " International relations ". The 
 4th section leads the way to that application of 
 the Austinian conception of positive law to the 
 phenomena of the intercourse of international 
 intercourse which determines the arrangement of 
 what follows. I have referred in the Introduction 
 to that portion of the xvith Chapter of my 
 father's " History of the Criminal Law " in which 
 this way of looking at "International Law" is 
 described. The 5th, 6th and 7th sections deal 
 with the various topics of International Law under 
 the usual heads of Peace, War and Neutrality. 
 Each of these sections is divided into two parts 
 headed A. and B., the former dealing with such 
 topics as are not, and the latter dealing with 
 such as are usually subjects of municipal legis- 
 lation. 
 
 The student of International Law will find 
 the principal topics with which he is familiar 
 mentioned under the following heads. 
 § 3, A, Sovereigns in foreign territory. 
 Commercial Intercourse. 
 
International Law, S9 
 
 Dealings of individuals with foreign 
 governments. 
 
 Diplomatic Intercourse. 
 
 Congresses, etc. 
 
 Treaties. 
 B. " Private International Law." 
 
 Naturalisation. 
 
 Nationality of ships. 
 
 Extradition. 
 
 Libel of foreign Sovereigns. 
 
 Conspiracies to commit crimes abroad. 
 
 Ambassadors and Consuls. 
 
 Jurisdiction and territorial waters. 
 
 " Exterritoriality " of ships. 
 
 Piracy. 
 
 The Slave Trade. 
 
 The right of search. 
 6. A. Retorsion. 
 
 Reprisals. 
 
 Pacific Blockade. 
 
 Intervention. 
 
 Recognition of Independence. 
 
 Declaration of War. 
 
 Obligations of belligerent Sovereign 
 towards hostile individuals and 
 treatment of hostile individuals in 
 belligerent territory at the out- 
 break of war. 
 
60 International Law. 
 
 B. Treatment of occupied territory. 
 
 Regular troops and irregular comba- 
 tants. 
 Treatment of prisoners. 
 § 7. A. Violation of neutral territory. 
 
 Neutral territory used as a base of 
 operations. 
 B. Foreign Enlistment Acts. 
 Contraband. 
 Blockade. 
 
 Enemy's goods in neutral ships. 
 Neutral goods in enemy's ships. 
 Prize Courts. 
 
PART 11. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL EELATIONS. 
 
 § 1. Meaning of the word nation. 
 
 Civilised men are divided into States, and 
 there is a kind of State to which the name 
 Nation may be applied. I use the word state in 
 accordance with a common though not uni- 
 versal practice in a wider sense than nation : I 
 use it as a generic term for independent political 
 societies, and I use the word nation to designate 
 those particular states to which it seems to me 
 historically demonstrable that the applicability of 
 "International Law" is confined. I use the word 
 nation in this restricted sense because such a use 
 of the word, while it can be justified by some 
 among the many conflicting senses in which it is 
 used, is particularly suitable for my purposes as 
 enabling me to make a consistent use of the 
 
62 . International Relations. 
 
 term "International" as an attribute of those 
 relations which I am attempting to classify. 
 
 The scientific or theoretical discussion of inter- 
 national relations might form a branch of the 
 general science of states. It happens to be con- 
 venient to take the relations which exist between 
 nations as a separate subject apart from the internal 
 character of states and from their relations to the 
 individuals of whom they are composed. The fact 
 that this is so is due to the actual history of a 
 particular group of states and to the importance 
 which has been already given to the theoretical 
 or general character of the relations existing 
 between them. 
 
 Nations then are the members of a particular 
 group of states, whose relations it is convenient 
 to discuss as the subject of a separate theory or 
 science. A state is a community habitually sub- 
 ject to the government of a strong and stable 
 sovereign body and practically or usually inde- 
 pendent of external authority. A nation is a state 
 belonging to a particular kind or at least to a 
 particular group of states. The states called 
 nations can be individually ascertained : but they 
 have also, notwithstanding many differences, a 
 general likeness to one another. This likeness is 
 very difficult to describe fully, and can only be 
 inferred from a comprehensive study of the states 
 
International Relations, 63 
 
 which are called nations : but to some extent it 
 depends on the character of the tie by which 
 their members are united. 
 
 The members of a community which forms a 
 state are generally connected by some other tie 
 besides that of submission to a common govern- 
 ment. Community of language, community of 
 religion and the consciousness of or belief in a 
 common descent are among the most important of 
 such ties. The tie which binds together the mem- 
 bers of a nation is almost always compounded to 
 some extent of each of these different ties: but 
 particular importance is generally atached to the tie 
 of common descent. Members of the same nation 
 often recur to the fact that they are descended 
 from the same ancient stock. The belief in such 
 common descent may be greater than the facts 
 warrant : and it is in particular remarkable that 
 members whose ancestors have been very recently 
 transferred to a nation from some neighbouring 
 nation of a different stock, are often enthusiastic 
 believers in their connection with the remote 
 ancestors of those by whom they are surrounded. 
 But the belief in a common descent from those who 
 are perhaps the ancestors of very few of the existing 
 members in a nation, almost always goes side by 
 side with the knowledge of facts which constitute 
 a very strong and very real bond of union. The 
 
64 International Relations. 
 
 members of a nation know that the territory 
 which they now occupy or part of it has been for 
 many generations occupied by persons with whom 
 the existing nation may be practically identified, 
 and from whom it inherits historical traditions 
 and the sense of a continuity of national existence. 
 A new nation may indeed come into existence as 
 did the Dutch Republic and the American Union 
 in the 16th and 18th centuries: but in such a 
 case a nation must model itself in some essential 
 respects on the nations already existing, and must 
 be so placed as to be likely to accumulate the 
 traditions and associations necessary to national 
 unity. Otherwise it would differ so considerably 
 from other nations as not to belong at all to the 
 class of states so named. 
 
 It would not be difficult to enumerate those 
 states which are generally called nations, and to 
 whose relations with one another the method and 
 phraseology of our science must be adapted. The 
 chief ones among them would be the "great 
 powers" of Europe and the Federal State called 
 the United States of America. A complete 
 enumeration of existing nations and some brief 
 separate discussion of each one of them would be 
 a necessary part of a complete theoretical treatise 
 on International Relations. 
 
 As the tie of common descent is the chief 
 
International Relations. 65 
 
 characteristic of a nation, the word nation is often 
 applied to a group of persons similarly descended 
 who do not in fact form a state : and there is an 
 intelligible sense of the word nation in which the 
 Irish at the present time, or the Italians at the 
 time when Italy was a " geographical expression " 
 might be said to form a nation. In the same way 
 some of the very composite states which must be 
 reckoned as nations might be said not to be 
 nations by reason of the obvious want of ethnical 
 unity in their component parts. While admitting 
 the force of such comments we are still at liberty 
 to take that one among the current uses of the 
 word " Nation " which confines it to the descrip- 
 tion of such communities as are certainly states, 
 and among them to those which are so far national 
 in character as to be generally admitted to stand 
 on the same footing with the great states whose 
 " national " character is undoubted. 
 
 The division of states into those which are 
 nations and those which are not is necessarily to 
 some extent an arbitrary division. This fact can 
 hardly be considered as an objection to its employ- 
 ment, since no definite negation is made concerning 
 such states as are not included in the list of states 
 called nations. It is only said that these particular 
 states have so strong a general likeness to one 
 another, and have behaved to so great an extent 
 s. 5 
 
66 International RelationSi 
 
 in the same way and by means of the same organs 
 in their respective historical rdles, that it is worth 
 while to consider them as forming a class whose 
 peculiarities may be the subject of theoretical 
 treatment and of a common method and language. 
 Nothing is denied about other states. The 
 relations of all states with one another have a. 
 moral aspect and are the subject of the same 
 great fundamental principles. Among those states 
 which are not considered to be nations, there are 
 many which share a greater or less number of the 
 characteristics of nations and to which therefore 
 any theory applying to nations would more or less 
 nearly apply. It is not necessary to deny of any 
 single state that all which is said of nations would 
 in fact apply to it also. But international relations 
 is the name given to the relations which have in 
 fact existed between a class of states which the 
 similarity of their development, and the language 
 which is employed about them justify us in 
 treating as a class apart among states. We are 
 in no way concerned with the question whether 
 those states which we call nations are the most 
 important states in the world : or whether the 
 national type is that to which all those states 
 which we do not call nations are gradually ap- 
 proaching. Many European reasoners might take 
 an affirmative answer to this question for granted : 
 
International Relations. 67 
 
 but there are probably intelligent persons differing 
 from Europeans in race, colour, religion and customs 
 to whom the possibility of holding such a view 
 would never occur. 
 
 § 2, Historical Sketch. 
 
 The "nations" of the world then are a 
 particular group of states which we may suppose 
 to have been individually ascertained. But before 
 we could proceed to discuss the relations which 
 arise between nations it would be necessary to do 
 something more than merely to state and apply 
 the tests by which a nation can be known. The 
 use of the word international as an attribute of 
 certain relations implies the acknowledgment 
 that various characteristics are more or less plain- 
 ly to be perceived in the communities between 
 which those relations exist: and the nature of 
 these characteristics can only be ascertained his- 
 torically. All states which are either nations by 
 origin or (so to speak) nations by subsequent 
 adoption into the group so named, owe something 
 of their character to the facts surrounding the 
 origin of nations as factors in the world's history, 
 and to the main current of the events which have 
 formed the history of nations from their first 
 
 5—2 
 
68 International Relations. 
 
 appearance down to the present time. An ever- 
 increasing portion of the world's surface has been 
 covered by communities more or less nearly con- 
 forming to the national type: and the classifi- 
 cation of international relations is intended to 
 apply to relations between those communities, 
 and not to relations to which either or both of 
 the parties belong to the unnationalised com- 
 munities occupying the remaining portion of the 
 world. 
 
 The greater part of the world is now occupied 
 by communities which are not nations, and there 
 is no part of the world which has not been so 
 occupied within historical times. Division into 
 nations is not a necessary attribute of mankind 
 at all times and places: and the necessity of 
 international relations springing up at some time 
 or another among human beings could only be 
 established upon some theory which should em- 
 brace the whole chain of causes and effects which 
 constitutes the history of mankind. 
 
 It would be necessary in such a historical 
 sketch as is here suggested at least to indicate 
 the particular circumstances in which nations first 
 emerged from a system which was not national in 
 character, and the main current of events which 
 transformed nations from their primitive shape to 
 the highly developed and complicated form which 
 
International Relations. 69 
 
 they have now reached. It would require con- 
 siderable if not unusual audacity to go farther 
 and sketch the steps by which in future times 
 the national type may be still further varied and 
 eventually become either universal or obsolete. 
 
 The Roman Empire at the time of its greatest 
 vigour and widest extent was not a nation, neither 
 was it a group of nations. Neither the relations 
 of the Empire with states lying beyond its limits 
 nor the relations existing between the several 
 provinces of the Empire resembled the modem 
 relation properly called international by more 
 than a slight analogy. But the Roman Empire 
 was the origin of the nations of the world. They 
 came into existence as it fell asunder, and many 
 of their most prominent characteristics are due to 
 the influence which it exercised over them at the 
 time of its old age and of their youth. Some 
 account of the character of that Empire, of the 
 circumstances of its gradual decay, and of the 
 political ideas which could not fail to occupy the 
 minds of those who witnessed either its feeble 
 shadow at Constantinople, or the attempts to 
 renew and to reinvigorate it in the West, must 
 form a preface to any attempt to give a clear 
 description of the kind of state which is called a 
 nation. 
 
 But side by side with the Roman polity which 
 
70 International Relations. 
 
 furnished traditions and ideals to the founders of 
 the national group was another great power 
 which imparted many characteristics to the 
 nascent nations of the world. This was the 
 Christian religion. The student of nations is 
 closely concerned with the nature and history of 
 this religion, with the various sects of those who 
 propagated it in Europe with greater or less 
 success, and especially with the connection of 
 Christianity with the political ideas of Kome, and 
 the action and reaction of these two forces on each 
 other. 
 
 At the time then when Europe was occupied 
 by a number of tribes and states from which those 
 nations who have been spoken of as the kernel of 
 the national system were slowly to emerge, there 
 were three great forces at work : the character of 
 the independent races which had surrounded the 
 Koman Empire and occupied its territory, the 
 ideas and traditions of the Roman Empire and 
 the Christian religion. Other influences infinite in 
 number and complexity were also in existence: 
 but it would be impossible to have anything like 
 a complete idea of what sort of states those which 
 we call nations are, without having to some extent 
 studied at least these three great elements of 
 European activity. 
 
 Erom a very early period of European history, 
 
International Relations, 71 
 
 the two forces of imperial unity and of national 
 independence have been at work side by side^ 
 Some parts of Europe have been remarkable for 
 the rapid development of the latter, some for the 
 prolonged vitality of the former force. But on 
 the whole the history of Europe has been that of 
 the development of national independence at the 
 expense of imperial unity. The decisive crisis was 
 passed at the Reformation, when the possibility of 
 the complete independence of some at least of the 
 nations in their religious capacity took the place of 
 a general acknowledgment that Europe was one at 
 all events for religious purposes. The early history 
 of the German Empire and of the Papacy is that 
 of the fluctuations in the vitality and vigour of 
 that spirit of unity whose complete triumph or 
 survival would have so much modified the character 
 of international relations. The real suzerainty of 
 some of the emperors over European kings and 
 the way in which popes like Innocent III exer- 
 cised a practical superintendence over the conduct 
 of kings and the relations of kingdoms, illustrate the 
 results which the realisation of the unity of Europe 
 might have produced. The European Crusades 
 and the idea of a common resistance to Mahometan 
 and other eastern invaders are further illustrations 
 of these results. Though the opposite tendency 
 has proved the stronger, these facts and the 
 
72 International Relations. 
 
 feelings which they have left behind them must 
 be borne in mind in realising the character of 
 nations as contrasted with other kinds of political 
 communities. 
 
 Besides the original elements of national life, 
 and the great principle at whose expense, but also 
 under whose powerful influence, the nations of 
 Europe have grown up, we must take into account 
 some of the special circumstances which gave 
 some important characteristics to European nations 
 at their first appearance. The complicated system 
 of society called Feudalism not only played' its 
 part in the struggle between national independence 
 and imperial unity, but also bequeathed character- 
 istics to the nations of Europe which had important 
 effects, on the character of international relations. 
 It would be impossible to understand the history 
 of international relations without some know- 
 ledge of the way in which a mediaeval king was 
 looked on as the proprietor of the territory ruled 
 by him and the representative of his subjects : 
 down to a very recent time it was more usual to 
 look upon a man as the subject and therefore almost 
 as the property of a particular prince than as the 
 member of an independent community : and any 
 portion of land would be more naturally spoken of 
 as belonging to a sovereign than as being the 
 home of a nation. On the whole the feudal 
 
International Relations, 73 
 
 system was more adapted to that theory of 
 European unity which did not survive, but of 
 which there were very numerous examples a 
 century ago and of which there are still some 
 illustrations : but although feudalism was opposed 
 to that one of the conflicting principles which was 
 eventually successful, it very considerably modified 
 the workings of that principle. 
 
 But it would not be enough to indicate the 
 leading characteristics of the process by which the 
 nations of Europe — a class of states till that time 
 without precedent in the history of political 
 institutions — grew into existence among the d4bris 
 of the Roman Empire. It is about 400 years 
 since it first became apparent that the mediseval 
 scheme of European politics had failed, and that 
 the principle of the unity of Christendom had 
 definitely yielded to the principle of separate 
 nations, though the power of the Papacy and the 
 authority of the German Empire still interfered 
 greatly with the realisation of the new ideal. 
 Europe was in 1500 divided into nations suf- 
 ficiently similar to the nations of to-day to fall 
 naturally into the same group of political com- 
 munities. Since that time there have been several 
 attempts by powerful individuals to restore Euro- 
 pean unity and to crush national independence. 
 But on the whole the nations of the western 
 
74 International Relations. 
 
 world have become stronger and have acquired 
 a more distinct individuality. The history of 
 Germany, Italy and Greece in the present century 
 strongly exemplifies the persistence and develop- 
 ments of the national type. But during the same 
 period momentous changes have taken place 
 which have modified the idea called up in our 
 minds by the use of the word nation and which 
 have introduced new classes of international re- 
 lations. That is to say that there are new kinds 
 of relations whose existence to a greater or less 
 extent may be presumed between any states 
 which have justified their being reckoned as 
 members of the class called nations. The most 
 important of these great events is the discovery 
 and colonisation of a new continent and of other 
 great tracts of land. New kinds of national 
 ambition, new causes of international quarrels, 
 new modes of thought, and a new type of nations — 
 the imperial nation under whose rule depen- 
 dencies or free colonies are combined into an 
 empire — have come into existence. 
 
 The relations existing between nations and 
 between them and other states more or less nearly 
 conforming to the national type, became far more 
 numerous and complex with the great increase in 
 scientific knowledge and in commercial enterprise 
 which has been characteristic of the last four 
 
International Relations. 75 
 
 centuries : and the new elements of national life 
 took their place side by side with those which 
 were inherited from the Teutonic tribes or from 
 theEomans of the Empire, or which had come into 
 existence owing to the doctrines of feudalism. A 
 new class of international relations grew up in 
 later times from the desire on the part of similarly 
 situated classes in different nations for a more 
 democratic form of government. The rebellion of 
 the Netherlands, the political changes in England 
 in the seventeenth century, the revolt of the 
 American Colonies, and the French Revolution 
 are instances of events in national life which could 
 not fail to modify the character of nations and to 
 give rise to a new class of international relations. 
 A further development of the same kind, attended 
 by similar results, is to be found In the economic 
 theories and especially the schemes of socialism 
 advocated in various nations at the present time. 
 
 The old feudal idea that a king was a proprietor 
 who had accumulated a large family estate and 
 who would act naturally in trying to add yet 
 further to it, did much to give their character to 
 early European wars : and from this class of wars 
 was developed the idea of the Balance of Power, 
 and the leagues formed from time to time for its 
 preservation. The connection of Elizabeth with the 
 Netherlands, or of the United States with Revot 
 
76 International Relations. 
 
 lutionary France, and the proceedings of the Holy 
 Alliance and of those who were opposed to it, 
 illustrate the kind of international relations which 
 originated in the frequent appearance in nations 
 of a party determined to resist by force either 
 arbitrary power on the one hand or popular sedi- 
 tion on the ether. International leagues for the 
 promotion of the interests of the labouring classes, 
 and those for the abolition of all social and 
 political institutions, illustrate different effects 
 upon international relations of more recent kinds 
 of opinions. 
 
 When the American colonies, first of England 
 and afterwards of Spain, attained independence, 
 new states came into existence which sufficiently 
 resembled the European type to be reckoned as 
 nations, and to hold such intercourse with the old 
 nations as made their relations with them amen- 
 able to the same scientific arrangement and 
 phraseology. Some Asiatic communities have 
 shown more or less desire and aptitude for a 
 similar kind of intercourse. It is possible that 
 some day all the known communities of the world 
 may so nearly resemble the same type that all 
 relations between them will be fitly described as 
 international. If this should happen it will be the 
 result of the actual course of European political 
 history and of the tendency of non-European 
 
International Relations. 77 
 
 communities to imitate those nations winch have 
 been directly affected by that history. If such a 
 homogeneous condition of mankind should happen 
 to be brought about, it may subsequently happen 
 to disappear through similar historical agencies : 
 and a new type or new types of communities may 
 occupy the attention of mankind. Meanwhile we 
 are immediately concerned with the national type 
 such as circumstances have made it and in those 
 places to which it has in fact been extended. 
 
 § 3. The Representation of Nations by 
 Governments. 
 
 Having ascertained which among existing 
 states are those called nations, and what the 
 general features of the historical career of that 
 group of states have been, we have to . consider 
 what are the principal national institutions which 
 will be brought into contact with one another so 
 as to give rise to international relations. A great 
 many elements of national life which would be 
 very important if we were discussing political 
 institutions generally, are of a subordinate interest 
 in such an inquiry as this. Those things which 
 may be of the highest importance to individuals 
 as members of any nation, may have no promi- 
 nence at all in the picture of the same individuals 
 
78 International Relations. 
 
 and their institutions as it is presented to mem- 
 bers of another nation : in the same way a man 
 may lead an active and busy life as a public 
 servant or in any other capacity which brings 
 him constantly into contact with the political 
 machinery of his own country, and may yet 
 seldom or never have his attention drawn to the 
 international aspect of the nation, or to those 
 characteristics in it which are the most impor- 
 tant in the eyes of a foreigner. 
 
 The chief principle of international relations 
 is that for all international purposes a nation is 
 completely represented by its government. This 
 is obviously true with respect to that large and 
 important part of international relations which 
 demonstrably consists of relations between one 
 government and another. But it is also true of 
 all really international relations. A member of 
 one nation who is at the moment in any sort of 
 relation with members of another nation, is looked 
 on by them for some purposes as if he were not a 
 foreigner at all : he is also looked on as a person 
 who is considered more or less likely to display 
 the temper, demeanour and habits supposed to be 
 characteristic of his compatriots: but so far as 
 any general rules can be laid down about the 
 peculiarities of relations entered into with such a 
 foreigner, so far that is as those relations can be 
 
International Relations. 79 
 
 distinctly and intelligibly described as inter- 
 national, he is to be considered as a person who is 
 represented and can be supported by a known 
 government having a corporate existence, recog- 
 nised organs for intercourse with other govern- 
 ments, and a character and history which are to 
 some extent matter of public notoriety. Nothing 
 definite can be laid down in general terms about 
 the character of transactions entered into by 
 Frenchmen visiting England with Englishmen 
 there resident, except in so far as such relations 
 can be the subject either of intercourse between 
 the two governments or of rules and systems laid 
 down by the one, and ascertainable by the other. 
 When an Englishman speaks of a Frenchman the 
 use of the word may call up in his own mind and 
 that of his hearers no other idea than that of a 
 man connected with a particular part of the world 
 and a particular set of historical facts, and having 
 his place in a state of society and under a legal 
 and administrative system with which different 
 Englishmen may happen to be more or less ac- 
 quainted. But in this case the use of the word 
 French is not international : if it have any inter- 
 national sense it must bring up in the minds of 
 those who use it, some idea of the French govern- 
 ment, either as capable of entering into relations 
 with their own government and through it with 
 
80 International Relations. 
 
 them, or as the maker and enforcer of laws hy 
 which they may be affected. All the international 
 relations of this country must necessarily be 
 either relations into which the English govern- 
 ment enters with the government of another 
 nation: or relations between English individuals 
 and foreign governments : or relations between 
 the English government and foreign individuals : 
 or relations between English and foreign indi- 
 viduals. And the fact now insisted on amounts 
 to this : that with regard to all the above classes 
 of relations in which any mention is made of 
 individuals, such relations only are truly inter- 
 national as have some connection with the govern- 
 ments by which those individuals can be repre- 
 sented. 
 
 It will then be desirable before proceeding to 
 consider the several classes of international rela- 
 tions to look at some of the characteristics which 
 are common to the group of governments which 
 exist, one of them representing the individuals 
 who compose each of the nations now existing. 
 
 The word government is the most convenient 
 one to employ, because it is in fact the one 
 generally used, for the purpose of designating 
 collectively the body of persons who in fact 
 conduct a part of the internal business of every 
 nation, and who are entrusted vnth the control of 
 
International Relations. 81 
 
 its diplomatic relations and the management of 
 its foreign affairs. 
 
 A "government" in the modern sense of the 
 term is not synonymous with the expression 
 " sovereign " or " sovereign body " in the science of 
 jurisprudence or polities'. In a literally monarch- 
 ical state, where the sovereign is an autocratic 
 individual, the goverimient would consist of a 
 group of ministers, who were entrusted by the 
 monarch with the management of the various 
 departments of public affairs and who were 
 directly responsible to their master. In such a 
 state (if such a one is really possible or even con- 
 ceivable) the actual force supporting legislation, 
 and indirectly such institutions and arrangements 
 as depend on legislation, would be the monarch's 
 will : " the government " would be an intelligible 
 name for the group of officials to whom the 
 monarch must leave a considerable latitude in the 
 interpretation and application of his wishes, if the 
 internal administration of the country, or its 
 diplomatic relations were at all numerous and com- 
 plicated, and if their stability was thought desir- 
 able. In a nation where the sovereign body was an 
 
 1 In accordance with common usage however, and to avoid 
 the constant use of the phrase " sovereign body " the word 
 government is often used in this essay as a synonym for 
 "sovereign body " when the making of laws is being discussed. 
 
 s. 6 
 
82 International Relations. 
 
 assembly representative of all the sane and adult 
 population, the government would in the same 
 way be persons appointed by them, responsible to 
 them, and temporarily armed with their fiill 
 authority, for the purpose of conducting public 
 affairs. In actual nations whose constitution 
 more or less nearly approximates to that now 
 suggested, the government generally includes 
 some executive official, hereditary or elected, who 
 is not a member of the representative assembly. 
 Its chief members are in many nations, mem- 
 bers of that assembly and those upon whom it 
 has informally conferred preeminence. In other 
 nations the principal members of the government 
 are excluded from the representative assembly. 
 There are different kinds of machinery for bringing 
 the wishes of electors, more or less in connection 
 with the personal predilections of individuals dis- 
 tinguished by birth or otherwise, to bear on the 
 nomination of the chief members of the govern- 
 ment. Subordinate members of the government 
 who are almost always excluded from the repre- 
 sentative assembly, may be appointed either by 
 its principal members or by those who appointed 
 them. 
 
 Every existing nation possesses a constitu- 
 tion which comes somewhere between absolute 
 monarchy and absolute democracy : and the variety 
 
International delations. 83 
 
 among these constitutions is sufficiently great to 
 make the characteristics which are common to 
 all national governments rather few in number. 
 The general notion of these characteristics can be 
 gathered from the above summary of the relation 
 between "government" and the actual "sovereign" 
 or " sovereign body " possessing the force by which 
 laws are sanctioned. 
 
 The actual constitution of a nation, or the 
 manner in which the sovereign power is therein 
 owned and exercised is a matter which does not 
 particularly concern other nations. What does 
 concern them is that there should be a recognis- 
 able corporation consisting of officials entrusted 
 by the sovereign body, of whatever kind that 
 body may be, with the duty of representing for 
 the time being the nation and any individual 
 belonging to it whether in an active or a passive 
 capacity, and having control of the national re- 
 sources for the purpose of so doing. 
 
 There is one question of political science 
 which is exceedingly important in connection with 
 our present topic, but of which only a very slight 
 mention can be made here. That is the question 
 of the distinction between the various kinds of 
 federal and confederate governments. This is in 
 fact a question which lies at the bottom of all 
 political theory. No government can be devised 
 
 6—2 
 
84 International Relations. 
 
 ■which can superintend even to the slightest ex- 
 tent every kind of public business ia the state. 
 Every government contents itself with attending 
 to some parts of public affairs and leaving others 
 to be dealt with by practically independent local 
 corporations. Therefore every nation may be 
 looked upon as a community consisting of a 
 number of corporations which manage some of 
 their affairs independently, but which submit to 
 the general control of a common governing body 
 to whom they also entrust the direct superinten- 
 dence of other parts of their affairs. But a federal 
 state is nothing but a community of this kind 
 where the independent corporations are unusually 
 large and the affairs left to the common govern- 
 ment are unusually few. 
 
 Now in most nations which may properly be 
 called federal the duty of entering iuto relations 
 with other nations, whether on behalf of indi- 
 viduals or in any other way, is one of those 
 classes of affairs which is not left to the state 
 or provincial governments, but belongs solely to 
 the imperial or common government. But in 
 some federations, and in composite empires where 
 much freedom of self-government is allowed to 
 parts of the empire, and in those nations which 
 are beyond the line separating the federal state 
 (bundesstat) from the confederation or permanent 
 
International Relatiwis. 85 
 
 alliance of states (statenbund), there may be some 
 purposes for which the subordinate governments 
 are capable of entering into foreign relations and 
 of representing the individuals subject to them in 
 transactions with other governments. Cases of 
 this amount of independence and its various de- 
 grees must be collected by the observation of 
 existing institutions and of constitutional pro- 
 visions on the subject. 
 
 § 4. Laws of International Import. 
 
 The existence and the circumstances of a 
 nation may become interesting to any other nation 
 in as many different ways as there are phases of 
 national activity. The political development, the 
 commercial enterprise, the progress or retrogression 
 in civilisation, the growth of science or literature 
 in one nation may act more or less directly on the 
 corporate life of another nation. But there is one 
 department of national activity in which it is 
 particularly likely that international relations will 
 have their origin. Every nation is not only a 
 community for the furtherance of commercial, 
 agricultural, artistic, literary and other kinds of 
 activity: but also and especially a community for 
 the enactment and enforcement of laws. Among 
 the kinds of international relations to which the 
 
86 International Relations. 
 
 career of civilised mankind has given rise, many 
 have their origin in legislation : and of these no 
 class is more important and more distinct than 
 that which is due to the effect of the laws made 
 and enforced by one nation upon the individuals 
 belongiag to another nation. 
 
 , In" order to form a true idea of this class of 
 international relations it will be necessary, before 
 going at all into detail, to consider briefly what 
 is the nature, origin and effect of laws in general. 
 In every nation the sovereign power resides in 
 some determinate body to whom the whole nation 
 is, in the habit of rendering obedience. Legislative 
 organs are provided by which the sovereign body, 
 or those to whom the authority of that body is 
 periodically entrusted, subject to a more or less 
 definite intermediate control, can enact laws to be 
 observed by all members of the nation. Judicial 
 organs are provided by which the laws so enacted' 
 can be expounded and applied. A more or less 
 elaborate branch of the administrative organisation 
 of the nation is so contrived as to put the force 
 wielded by the government practically at the 
 disposal of the magistrates who apply the law to 
 actual quarrels and misdeeds. A law, in its 
 simplest form, is a command on behalf of the 
 state, to persons subject to the jurisdiction of the 
 legislature, to do or abstain from doing a specified 
 
International Relations. 87 
 
 class of actions, under pain of suffering a specified 
 evil at the hands of the officers of the government. 
 The plainest instance of this is a rule of criminal 
 law by which the members of a nation are laid 
 under a duty to abstain from a particular kind of 
 conduct and a definite sanction is provided to 
 prevent or to punish any violation of that duty. 
 The same elements can be discovered in other laws 
 which are less direct illustrations of the true 
 nature of a law. In laws directing the observance 
 of particular kinds of contracts, and in laws giving 
 a remedy to individuals who suffer particular kinds 
 of wrongs, a duty is laid upon individuals in their 
 relations with other individuals, and such arrange- 
 ments are more or less distinctly made for the 
 enunciation and enforcement of these duties in 
 particular cases as will, in the last resort, if autho- 
 ritative threats prove useless, lead to the forcible 
 intervention of state officials to see that the thing 
 forbidden is not done or that the stipulated repara- 
 tion is made. 
 
 These laws, creating rights and duties under 
 the direct protection of the government, are often 
 made and can most conveniently be made by 
 legislation or the distinct and formal orders of the 
 acknowledged legislature. They can also be made 
 by the tacit acknowledgment of rules said to be 
 founded on ancient custom, and enforced by the 
 
88 International Relations. 
 
 tribunals which are the judicial organs of the 
 sovereign body. A rule which is habitually ap- 
 plied by such tribunals, and in the application of 
 which they are habitually supported by the govern- 
 ment, may possess all the characteristics of a law, 
 though the legislature has not precisely formulated 
 it and though its origin may be plainly traced to 
 the decision of a particular judicial officer. We 
 must not expect always to be able to find the 
 deliberate expression by the legislature of a par- 
 ticular rule : we must sometimes infer their tacit 
 acceptance of it from the fact that it has not been 
 disowned and that the executive authority has 
 been put at the disposal of the tribunals for its 
 enforcement. 
 
 In every nation, then, laws are made, to which 
 the legislative organs of the sovereign body have 
 openly or tacitly expressed their assent, and which 
 owe their legal character to the fact that the 
 executive organs of the sovereign body assist their 
 enforcement if necessary by physical constraint of 
 those who have offended or are likely to offend 
 against the laws. Our object will be to see, in a 
 general way, how the existence of such laws can 
 affect the existing relations or can give rise to 
 new relations between one nation and another. 
 
 A law which is made by the legislature of one 
 country can in no case be necessarily a matter of 
 
International Relations. 89 
 
 absolute and permanent indifference to any other 
 nation. Most laws are made for the regulation of 
 the conduct of persons who are subject to the 
 jurisdiction of the courts of the legislating country. 
 The jurisdiction of particular courts is defined 
 with more or less accuracy by the legislature : and 
 the jurisdiction of a particular court is generally 
 confined to persons within the territory of the 
 country to which it belongs or to some subdivision 
 of such persons. But members of one nation must 
 often find themselves within the territory of an- 
 other nation. During their sojourn there they are 
 subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. They will 
 be practically affected by the laws of that country, 
 whether by the juridical character attached to the 
 acts which they do, or by the interpretation given 
 to the contracts which they make. 
 
 Apart from the question of the international 
 aspect of laws in general and especially of the 
 laws conferring a jurisdiction for particular purposes 
 upon special courts, there are some laws of which 
 the international aspect is obviously and avowedly 
 important. There are firstly laws regulating the 
 ■conduct of the members of a nation or of the 
 government itself, towards foreigners: secondly, 
 laws by which a government directly regulates the 
 conduct of foreigners. 
 
 In the followiQg sections an attempt is mad^ 
 
90 International Relations. 
 
 to indicate tiie principal kinds of legislation which 
 would fall into each of the above-mentioned 
 classes. There are many kinds of laws directly- 
 relating to foreigners which are administered in 
 times of peace: at such times the mutual for- 
 bearaince and recognition of one another's in- 
 dependence which are characteristic of nations 
 in their normal relation, render unlikely any but 
 a very limited indulgence in legislation for 
 foreigners outside the territory of the legislating 
 nation. But some of the laws relating to the 
 relation of war, and especially those which have 
 rfeference to the relations between belligerents and 
 neutrals, are best explained as examples of legisla- 
 tion by the government of one nation for the 
 individuals belonging to another. 
 
 The general function of municipal law (to 
 borrow Blackstone's name for the public law of 
 separate states) with regard to international rela- 
 tions and international morality is exceediagly 
 important. The nations of the world are actuated 
 by all kinds of ambitions and sentiments, they are 
 severe critics of the conduct of their neighbours, 
 they can behave well and they can behave 
 badly. Under all the conflicting motives of pru- 
 dence, benevolence, ambition or jealousy which 
 beset a particular problem of international ethics, 
 a nation has to decide how to act without any 
 
■International Relations. 91 
 
 external compulsory- motives except the fear 
 of the resentment and possibly the forcible re- 
 straiat and retaliation of its neighbours. There 
 is no formal and efiScient international sanction. 
 Morality however is not entirely dependent on 
 formal and efficient law: and as there are many 
 motives which would incline enlightened men to 
 observe regular rules in their mutual intercourse, 
 although there were no legal sanction to compel 
 them to do so, so statesmen are actuated by a desire 
 that their own and other nations should behave to 
 one another with the uniformity and moderation 
 which are expected from men subject to law. 
 Statesmen have therefore often declared their in- 
 tention to abide by the " law of nations " and called 
 upon the governments of other nations to do the 
 same : and solemn promises have been made by 
 treaty to observe specified rules of international 
 intercourse, whether those rules are declared to be 
 a part of the law of nations or are recommended 
 as a salutary deviation from them. But the " law 
 of nations " is only a conventional name for a kind 
 of morality of which the sanctions do not possess 
 that formal and certain character essential to Law 
 proper, but rather resemble the sanctions attaching 
 to ordinary morality unprotected by law : and the 
 promises made by treaty differ in the same way 
 from contracts or promises protected by law in 
 
92 International Relations. 
 
 communities subject to law. It therefore seems 
 that some further guarantee is desirable for 
 statesmen who wish to bind themselves and 
 their successors to follow the dictates of inter- 
 national law. Such a farther guarantee, though 
 not an international sanction, is obtained by 
 means of municipal law. There are many ways 
 in which the regular tribunals of a nation can 
 give effect to a particular view of a question 
 of international morality. The opiaion of a 
 particular legislature on the bearing of "the law 
 of nations'" can be put into the shape of distinct 
 legislation. The promises made by treaties can 
 in the same way be guaranteed by explicit legisla- 
 tion. This is generally done in cases of much 
 complication, and in all cases the courts of a 
 nation will probably take judicial notice of a 
 treaty, should occasion arise. 
 
 The importance of this use of municipal law 
 for international purposes is that it affords a 
 sanction applying practically and effectively to 
 individuals, and that it gives precision to the 
 course pursued by one government upon matters 
 which may excite the interest and even the iater- 
 ference of another government. Much of the 
 most important part of international morality 
 relates to the conduct of governments alone, and 
 with regard to this municipal law has no applica- 
 
International Relations. 93 
 
 tion : but the assistance of municipal law is 
 available and desirable wherever international 
 morality is concerned with the conduct or the 
 treatment of individuals. 
 
 § 5. Peace. 
 A. General Characteristics. 
 
 States are naturally self-sufficient and inde- 
 pendent, and if we were concerned with states 
 in general and with the history of the world, 
 we might perhaps arrive at the conclusion that 
 the normal international relation was that of 
 habitual indifference tempered by jealous distrust 
 and frequent violence. But we have to deal only 
 with that particular class of states to which we 
 have restricted the use of the name nation, and 
 we may say of them that they are by no means 
 altogether indifferent to one another; since the 
 attention of each is constantly occupied with the 
 department of national activity consisting in the 
 superintendence of foreign affairs: that unre- 
 strained international violence and rapacity are 
 almost unknown, the definite and regulated forms 
 of violence collectively called War having taken 
 their place: and that the normal relation sub- 
 sisting among them is that of Peace. 
 
 We must set out then by considering the 
 
94 International Relations. 
 
 elements of the condition called Peace and the 
 general attributes of nations living together in 
 that condition. The principal characteristics of 
 this condition consist in the mutual forbearances 
 which it implies. Nations at peace with one 
 another do not consider themselves called upon 
 to interfere, except in cases of extreme gravity, 
 when the administration of the laws of one 
 nation affects in any way the individuals 
 belonging to another. The government of a 
 nation takes a benevolent interest in its subjects 
 wherever they may be, but as a general rule 
 it does not in any way object to the incon- 
 veniences to which they may be submitted by 
 the effects of their temporary subjection to the 
 jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts differently 
 constituted and administering a different law 
 from those of their own country. The applica- 
 tions of its sovereign power which a government 
 makes with impunity to the persons of all who 
 come within its territory are also suffered to go 
 unchallenged to a more or less limited extent 
 with regard to persons on board ships which 
 belong to it, and to persons on board foreign 
 ships in specified portions of the sea. This ex- 
 tensive sufferance by all nations of the exercise 
 of foreign authority by foreign governments over 
 their own subjects is the strongest instance of 
 
International Relations. 95 
 
 the acknowledgment of the sovereignty of one 
 government by another. With respect to the 
 way in which a government treats its own ter- 
 ritory and its own subjects the indulgence of 
 foreign governments naturally goes much further, 
 and is never likely to give place to remonstrance 
 or interference except in very extreme cases. 
 
 But while on the one hand we note the 
 respect for the independence of one nation 
 shown by another, we must on the other hand 
 observe the consideration and hospitality shown 
 by one nation to individuals of another. Among 
 nations a traveller does not come into a foreign 
 land at his own risk but is habitually treated 
 like an inhabitant of the country as far as the 
 general protection and conveniences afforded 
 by the government are concerned. Since na- 
 tions have existed there have been many kinds 
 of modifications in and exceptions to this general 
 hospitality, and there still exist various methods 
 of making a foreigner feel that he is to some 
 extent an object of suspicion and liable to be 
 treated differently from those by whom be is 
 surrounded. But on the whole a foreigner in 
 times of peace may safely reckon on being placed 
 on nearly the same footing as the natives of the 
 country where be is. Various devices have been 
 made by different governments for the complete 
 
96 International Relations. 
 
 absorption of individuals who have been subjects 
 of one government, into the community which is 
 subject to another. This ordinary international 
 hospitality is extended in some cases to the be- 
 stowal of exceptional privileges. Thus a travelling- 
 king or prince, or an ex-sovereign sojourning in 
 a foreign land, is likely to find himself held to- 
 enjoy immunity from some kinds of jurisdiction ; 
 it is for instance possible that a government 
 would even at the present day abstain from 
 prosecuting a travelling ex-Queen who had her 
 prime minister stabbed in her private residence : 
 though it would be unwise to try an experiment 
 so likely to bring the offender within the extreme 
 cases which must form exceptions to any practice 
 of international hospitality. Similar privileges 
 have been allowed in various degrees to am- 
 bassadors and to the less important represen- 
 tatives of foreign states. Foreign ships of war 
 and foreign merchant ships which happen to 
 be in the harbour of a nation enjoy various 
 degrees of immunity from the authority of the 
 government. 
 
 Under the influence of these two national 
 habits, respect for one another's iadependence, 
 and mutual hospitality to individuals, the various 
 relations which make up the condition of peace 
 have greatly increased in number and import- 
 
International Relations. 97 
 
 ance. There are innumerable species of com- 
 mercial relations between the individuals of dif- 
 ferent nations: governments borrow money from 
 foreigners ; individuals contract to work for hire 
 for foreign governments: and every kind of con- 
 tractual relation springs up between members of 
 different nations. These various kinds of inter- 
 national intercourse cannot exist without the 
 necessity for direct intercourse between the seve- 
 ral governments. This direct intercourse is fur- 
 ther necessitated by the conflicting interests of 
 existing nations as to the arrangements which 
 nations may separately make with one another, 
 and as to the general foreign policy which a 
 particular nation may pursue. Accordingly or- 
 gans for such direct influence are provided. 
 Governments address one another through the 
 mouths of their agents or by the publication of 
 state papers, and there is a free interchange of 
 national opinion on events of international im- 
 portance. At great crises the machinery of Con- 
 gresses can be employed. Some instances may 
 be given of the topics which international Con- 
 gresses have discussed, and upon which they have 
 pronounced decisions of a more or less detailed 
 and practical character. They have asserted the 
 sovereign rights of dynasties, and determined the 
 boundaries of contiguous territories: they have 
 s. 7 
 
98 Inte'rnational Relations. 
 
 given to particular nations various degrees of 
 authority over places formerly subject to other 
 nations: they have demanded the toleration of 
 classes of subjects by sovereigns otherwise likely 
 to persecute them : they have made declarations 
 of what they consider to be right and praise- 
 worthy conduct for nations to pursue under many 
 kinds of circumstances: they have given their 
 authority to arrangements for the navigation of 
 specified rivers and inland seas : and they have 
 acted as arbitrators in particular emergencies. 
 
 Besides the Congresses where several nations 
 have jointly discussed international affairs and 
 have arrived at conclusions more or less directly 
 affecting them, there are those more private and 
 personal discussions of two or more nations with 
 one another which result in the formation of 
 treaties. A congress of a considerable number 
 of nations may make a treaty, though it need 
 not necessarily do so; but the arrangement to 
 which the name treaty is naturally applied is 
 one to which the representatives of two or three 
 nations have agreed each on behalf of their own 
 nation. 
 
 A treaty between two nations is a definite and 
 formal declaration that each of the nations which 
 are parties to it will adopt towards the other a 
 particular line of conduct therein set forth, or will 
 
International Relations. 99 
 
 permit the other to act in a specified way. A 
 nation may agree by treaty either to admit or 
 actively to support the right of a particular family 
 to rule over another nation : to allow or actively 
 to assist another nation to annex or absorb terri- 
 tory previously independent or subject to another 
 government: to give upon stipulated conditions 
 certain commercial privileges to the members of 
 another nation : to adopt certain methods of war- 
 fare in any future dispute with another nation, or 
 to allow to its members certain privileges and im- 
 munities if they should bein-a position of neutrals 
 when the nation so agreeing is at war. Treaties 
 may be made for the purpose of enunciating the 
 terms upon which a victorious nation consents to 
 make peace with a conquered nation : or for the 
 establishment between nations which have com- 
 mon interests of an alliance which may be of any 
 degree of closeness between that of a permanent 
 confederacy and that of common but independent 
 exertions for the attainment of a specified object. 
 
 The common comparison of a treaty to a 
 contract between individuals is likely to mislead 
 because of the great differences due to the absence 
 of positive law or anything nearly resembling it to 
 enforce the agreement'. In fact a treaty is no 
 
 1 It has however been abeady explained that though there 
 is no law by which governments are compelled to keep treaties 
 
 7—2 
 
100 International Relations. 
 
 more than a solemn statement by the representa- 
 tives of two nations of the present intention of 
 those nations to do that which they agree to do. 
 Nations are necessarily inclined by moral motives 
 to observe the promises thus made : the breach of 
 a treaty by one party will almost necessarily excite 
 indignation in the other party or parties to it, and 
 may excite indignation in nations not parties to it 
 in a degree depending on the surrounding circum- 
 stances of the case. An agreement into which a 
 nation enters under the fear of instant violence if 
 it refuses, or an agreement to do things which 
 subsequently appear to be incompatible with the 
 national welfare to an extent which neither party 
 had expected at the time of making the treaty, 
 may be violated without incurring great indigna- 
 tion on the part of nations in general. Experience 
 shows that in a time of general war and great 
 international animosities promises made by treaty 
 are often violated recklessly, and the fact of their 
 being so violated attracts slight attention and does 
 not produce the international consequences which 
 follow such conduct in normal times. 
 
 B. Laws of International Import. 
 
 There is no class of laws of which it can be 
 
 there may be laws by which governments compel individuals 
 to act in accordance with their provisions. 
 
International Relations. 101 
 
 certainly said that they will under no circumstances 
 possess international import or give rise to inter- 
 national relations. Upon any matter which is made 
 the subject of legislation a legislature might 
 directly or tacitly lay down rules so affecting an 
 individual habitually subject to a foreign govern- 
 ment, as to lead to remonstrances on the part 
 of that government. A short time ago the 
 criminal responsibility incurred by an English 
 subject who took upon himself public functions 
 in Germany led to diplomatic intercourse on 
 the subject between the two governments : and 
 more recently still we have heard something of 
 the probability of pressure being brought to bear 
 on the English by the American government on 
 account of the alleged hardships inflicted on an 
 American subject by the rules of English criminal 
 procedure. 
 
 But while every part of the legal system of a 
 nation may have an effect upon foreign individuals, 
 and through them upon international relations 
 proper, there are some kinds of laws which are 
 specially likely to affect foreigners. 
 
 Legislation for the protection of native industry 
 and many kinds of laws incidental to the regula- 
 tion of commerce: laws about the interpretation 
 of bills of exchange: laws about the protection 
 given to inventors, to authors of books or works 
 
102 International Relations. 
 
 of art, and to tradesmen or manufacturers who 
 have adopted a particular trade-mark: laws re- 
 lating to the validity of marriage : laws directing 
 particular rules of navigation to be observed at 
 sea, prohibiting various offences under the name 
 of smuggling, regulating the right of fishing in 
 specified places, or dealing with the treatment 
 of wrecks and the pa3rment of salvage : laws 
 giving practical sanctions to international arrange- 
 ments about railways, .telegraphs, or the carriage 
 of letters : laws creating rights or duties in con- 
 nection with the use of passports by travellers : laws 
 making rules, or empowering corporations to make 
 them, about the navigation of rivers : and many 
 other classes of laws which might be mentioned 
 are instances of municipal laws more than usually 
 likely to affect the comfort and well-being of 
 individuals belonging to other nations, and there- 
 fore likely from time to time to attract the atten- 
 tion of the governments by whom those individuals 
 are represented. Statutes dealing with some of 
 the above topics necessarily contain many sections 
 having direct reference to foreigners and to acts 
 done in foreign countries. 
 
 In addition to laws which for one reason or 
 another are likely to affect foreigners as well as 
 the subjects of the legislating government, there 
 are some in which foreign governments themselves 
 
International Relations, 103 
 
 are directly interested and ■which are especially 
 made for their convenience. 
 
 The question of the naturalisation of foreign 
 individuals is one that is very important to foreign 
 governments : the exact manner in which citizen-" 
 ship in a nation can be obtained by forms or 
 ceremonies or is acquired by birth, as well as the 
 circumstances (if any) in which it is held to come 
 to an end, have been the subject of regular legis- 
 lation in all nations, and the sanctions of municipal 
 law are employed to enforce the various systems 
 existing in different parts of the world. The 
 introduction of formal legislation on this subject 
 has been a great boon to nations : for when 
 different nations applied different principles to 
 the question, in virtue of an indefinite common 
 law, alleged to be borrowed from a still more 
 indefinite " law of nations," international disputes 
 about questions of citizenship were more likely to 
 arise and less likely to be easily and finally settled. 
 Legal provisions are in the same way distinctly 
 and definitely, though differently, made by different 
 nations as to the facts which imply a particular 
 nationality in a ship. 
 
 Another topic as to which nations have agreed 
 on the desirability of embodying their intentions 
 in regular municipal laws is that of extradition. 
 Every nation is reluctant to acquiesce in the 
 
104 International Relations. 
 
 impunity of a member who has offended against 
 its criminal law and who has subsequently escaped 
 to foreign territory : at the same time no nation is 
 willing to give up any one accused of any crime 
 without question or delay to a foreign government 
 who asserts that he has offended against its 
 criminal law, nor to give up those whose crimi- 
 nality and allegiance are clearly proved except 
 in the cases where the criminal nature of the act 
 is universally admitted. The effect of these con- 
 flicting sentiments upon the facts of a particular 
 case is a question of international morality or, as 
 statesmen prefer to say, of "international law": 
 and it has often happened, in the absence of 
 previous agreements or of municipal law, that 
 the views of two governments as to the dictates 
 of morality have differed. Many nations have now 
 promised one another by treaty to effect the 
 extradition of criminals, in the case of specified 
 crimes, and under specified conditions. Such 
 treaties are protected by elaborate municipal 
 legislation respecting the procedure to be observed 
 in cases where extradition is demanded : and the 
 existence of such treaties and such laws minimises 
 the evil effects of the doubts surrounding the moral 
 problem. 
 
 But the direct interest of a government in 
 offenders situated in foreign territory is not con- 
 
International Relations. 105 
 
 fined to its own escaped criminals : it is also con- 
 cerned with those who either publish abuse of it or 
 hatch crimes of violence against it in a foreign 
 land. This natural feeling is opposed, at least as 
 strongly as in the case of extradition, by the 
 natural unwillingness of governments to acquiesce 
 in interference or dictation from without. Here 
 too however a compromise between the conflicting 
 sentiments is possible, and it will be all the more 
 satisfactory if it has the precision and effectiveness 
 derived from municipal legislation. Two examples 
 of such laws may be given, one from the common 
 law and one from the statute-book of our own 
 country. They will show in what form laws 
 affecting this particular kind of international 
 relations can be made. Each of them reminds us 
 of a dispute between England and France arising 
 in the conflict of the two sentiments mentioned 
 above and very nearly resulting in war between 
 the two countries. In the case of Peltier, who 
 published violent abuse of Napoleon during the 
 Peace of Amiens in 1802, Lord EUenborough, 
 after referring to some earlier cases of the same 
 kind, said, "I lay it down as the law that any 
 "publication which tends to disgrace, revile and 
 "defame persons of considerable situations of 
 "power and dignity in foreign countries, may be 
 " taken to be and may be treated as a (criminal) 
 
106 International Relations. 
 
 " libel ; and particularly where it has a tendency 
 "to interrupt the amity and peace between the 
 "two countries'." On the second of the topics 
 under discussion, The Criminal Law Consolidation 
 Acts contain provisions for the punishment of 
 any person conspiring to murder, or soliciting, 
 encouraging, persuading, endeavouring to per- 
 suade, or proposing to any person to murder 
 a person not a subject of the Queen, and not 
 within the Queen's dominions''. As in the case 
 of extradition, such laws as these do not en- 
 tirely obviate international difficulties founded on 
 the difficulties surrounding international morality : 
 but their existence and their probable practical 
 efficiency, simplify particular controversies. 
 
 Another subject on which the agency of law 
 is beneficially employed in giving precision to 
 international relations, is the position of ambassa- 
 dors and consuls and the privileges and immu- 
 nities allowed to them. In this country no 
 definite legislative enactment gives a comprehen- 
 sive statement of the rights and privileges of 
 foreign ambassadors : but their freedom and that 
 of their registered servants (unless they are 
 traders) from arrest and other process, are prac- 
 tically guaranteed by statute (7 Anne, c. 12). 
 
 1 Folkard's StarUe on Libel, 670. 
 
 2 Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, p. 154. 
 
International Relations. 107 
 
 Ambassadors' privileges in respect of criminal 
 legislation, and the necessary limitations upon 
 these privileges in extreme cases, form part of the 
 common law (i.e. the view of English judges as 
 to the bearing of the law of nations), and the 
 fewness of the cases which have actually occurred 
 makes it difficult to ascertain exactly what the 
 provisions of the common law are. 
 
 There is no reason why the whole question of 
 the status of foreign ambassadors together with 
 that of foreign consuls, who are in many cases 
 already the subject of consular conventions be- 
 tween different governments, should not in every 
 country be the subject of full and explicit legal 
 provisions, such as would make perfectly plain 
 such differences as exist in the views held by 
 different governments as to the exact effect of 
 morality and expediency upon the matter. In 
 addition to legislation about the ambassadors and 
 other diplomatic agents and the consuls of foreign 
 powers, there is also of necessity some legislation, 
 by statute or by decided cases, about the same 
 ofScers when sent by the legislative power to 
 foreign countries. In the case of ambassadors, &c., 
 such legislation is hardly likely to go beyond 
 settling how they are to be appointed and paid : 
 but as regards consuls the nature of their duties 
 and jurisdiction has often been and must be the 
 
108 International Relations. 
 
 subject of detailed legislation by the power whom 
 they represent. 
 
 Besides the various kinds of substantive law 
 which are specially likely to affect foreigners, 
 there are various laws defining the jurisdiction of 
 particular courts whose provisions have great in- 
 ternational importance. Express or tacit legisla- 
 tion determines in every nation the territorial 
 limits of jurisdiction, and settles what persons 
 shall have access to particular courts and to what 
 extent remedies shall be given in respect of acts 
 done in foreign territory, or regard shall be had 
 to the provisions of foreign laws. Wherever dis- 
 abilities have been attached or are still attached 
 to aliens in the country of their temporary resi- 
 dence, they are to some extent in the form of 
 legal restraints upon their access to civil courts. 
 
 The limits of territorial jurisdiction are a very 
 proper subject for legislation: the difficulties 
 surrounding the question of international morality 
 are very great. All nations are ready to allow 
 the extension of the jurisdiction of a government 
 over the whole of the territory subject to it ; but 
 difficulties have arisen about the question of 
 jurisdiction at sea. Persons on board a merchant 
 ship within a short distance of a foreign coast, 
 or persons on board a ship of war in a foreign 
 harbour, may be said according to one view or 
 
International Relations. 109 
 
 another of international morality and convenience 
 to be in the jurisdiction of the sovereign to whom 
 they are ordinarily subject, or of the sovereign to 
 whose territory they have nearly approached. 
 The weight of the conflicting arguments will 
 appear different to different governments, and 
 each will practically adopt a compromise, giving 
 to itself a control for some purposes over a 
 merchant ship within a specified distance of its 
 coast, and allowing to ships of war within its 
 harbours an immunity from local jurisdiction 
 subject to such limitations in extreme cases as 
 appear to it to be desirable. The Territorial 
 Waters Act of 1878 is an example of this 
 kind of legislation. It professes to be merely 
 declaratory of the Law of Nations, that is of 
 the bearing of international law, on the subject 
 of criminal jurisdiction in territorial waters, and 
 to provide machinery by which that juris- 
 diction shall be exercised : but it is in effect 
 an enactment of the legislature deciding that 
 such jurisdiction shall extend as far as is necessary 
 for the protection and safety of the Queen's 
 dominions, that is at least to the extent of one 
 marine league from the English coast, and farther 
 if there is any justification for such further ex- 
 tension in " international law." The real nature of 
 this enactment is shown by the fact that the law 
 
110 International Relations. 
 
 which it professes to declare was a direct reversal 
 of the law laid down by the majority of the judges 
 in the case of the Franconia. In fact an alteration 
 was made in the law of territorial jurisdiction of 
 England by a regular legislative enactment. There 
 is no reason why the legislatures of all nations 
 should not exactlyand explicitly lay down the extent 
 to which they intend to exercise such jurisdiction, 
 as well as the immunity which they will allow to 
 foreign ships of war whether in their territorial 
 waters or in their harbours. If a dispute arose 
 for decision upon any of these questions it would 
 have to be decided somehow, and the decision 
 would have the regular sanctions attaching to the 
 decisions of a tribunal authorised by a sovereign 
 government. In other words there is necessarily 
 in every nation law, affirming or denying the 
 extension of the whole or parts of the nation's 
 jurisdiction to any given place ; and where there 
 is such law it is capable of distinct legislative 
 expression. If the laws of different nations be 
 found so to conflict as to lead to practical incon- 
 venience, that is a matter for diplomatic discussion 
 between their governments. 
 
 Criminal jurisdiction must be conferred by 
 every government upon some one or more of its 
 courts with respect to acts done on board its own 
 ships (if it has any) upon the " high seas," where 
 
International Relations. Ill 
 
 no regular territorial jurisdiction exists. In con- 
 nection with this kind of jurisdiction occurs the 
 principal example of anything like criminal law, 
 enacted by each government for all persons in 
 whatever place they may be at the time of doing 
 the criminal act. This example is that of " piracy 
 by the law of nations." This crime is one which 
 our own legislature has frequently had occasion to 
 mention but which it has not thought it necessary 
 to define. It may be said, without any pretension 
 to great accuracy, that piracy is the doing or 
 manifest intent to do acts of violence or robbery 
 in a place where there is no regular national 
 jurisdiction, by those who have the control and 
 management of a ship, under circumstances which 
 do not make the government of any nation re- 
 sponsible for the acts done. Piracy is said to 
 be contrary to the "law of nations": and it 
 cannot be denied that it ought to be condemned 
 and if possible punished upon every ground of 
 morality and expediency. But any punishment 
 inflicted upon pirates is inflicted by particular 
 nations and in virtue of municipal laws. It is a 
 settled part of the law of England that persons 
 belonging to any nation who have committed 
 piracy at sea are amenable to the criminal juris- 
 diction of the Admiral', now exercised by the 
 
 1 Stephen's History of the Criminal Law, ii. 27. See also 
 pages 18—22. 
 
112 International Relations. 
 
 High Court, and there are various judicial dicta 
 giving definitions of piracy by the law of nations, 
 which are to some extent limited owing to the 
 circumstances of the particular cases, but which 
 all point to some variation of the crime described 
 above. The readiness of the English common 
 law to give effect to a wider definition of piracy 
 may be inferred from the mention of piracy as 
 an acknowledged and well-understood pursuit in 
 other statutes referring to .British subjects only. 
 The language of some of these statutes " seems to 
 " imply that a pirate is a known class of persons 
 " like a soldier or sailor, and that a man may be a 
 " pirate though he has never robbed, as he may be 
 " a soldier though he has never fought^" 
 
 The general view of piracy by the governments 
 of existing nations seems to be that it is a crime 
 which is best punishable by those who detect the 
 offenders, and no government authorising the 
 enforcement of a law against piracy is likely to be 
 troubled by complaints of another government 
 whose subject an individual pirate may prove 
 himself to be. The laws of most nations say with 
 more or less distinctness, and those of all might 
 say with perfect distinctness, and with a full 
 definition of the acts or evidence of intention 
 constituting piracy, " All men, of whatever nation- 
 
 ^ Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, p. 73, n. 
 
International Relations. 113 
 
 " ality or allegiance, are forbidden to commit acts 
 " of piracy, under specified penalties." This would 
 be municipal law in each country, subject to 
 municipal sanctions, and it might be beneficially 
 enforced although the exact definition of the crime 
 and the machinery for punishing it might differ in 
 different countries. 
 
 It has been a matter of judicial discussion in 
 this country whether the law authorises the 
 punishment of acts of slave-trading done upon the 
 high seas by persons not subjects of the Queen, and 
 the decision has on the whole been that it does not. 
 The severe laws made by many nations against 
 slave-trading have however possessed great inter- 
 national importance. The great obstacle to enact- 
 ing a general law against acts of slave-trading is 
 that the cai-rying out of such a law involves the 
 search by armed ships of foreign ships in time of 
 peace: if such a search is not allowed, any ship 
 engaged in the slave-trade can protect itself by 
 carrying the flag of a nation at peace with the 
 nation which is hostile to the slave-trade. 
 
 On the whole it has not been found convenient 
 to extend the elaborate regulations of the criminal 
 law on the subject beyond the limits of the 
 ordinary jurisdiction : and it is usual to put down 
 the trade as carried on by foreigners by what are 
 practically acts of war, although it is not generally 
 S. 8 
 
114 International Relations. 
 
 the will or the interest of foreign governments so to 
 regard them, and by means of treaties between 
 the powers who especially desire the discon- 
 tinuance of this traffic. Such treaties contain 
 elaborate provisions as to the way in which ships 
 of the nations who are parties to the treaty shall 
 be dealt with when there is a suspicion that they 
 'are breaking the law of their own nation with 
 regard to the slave-trade. The international 
 aspect of laws against the slave-trade may be 
 thus summed up ; some nations forbid their own 
 subjects by law to engage in this trade, and others 
 do not : many of the nations which do forbid it 
 have promised each other by treaty to cooperate 
 in a specified manner in the execution of their 
 laws: they have further promised in the same 
 way to cooperate in forcibly restraining the subjects 
 of other nations from engaging in the trade. The 
 provisions of such treaties will be judicially taken 
 notice of by the courts of the nations who made 
 the treaties, when occasion arises : and the forcible 
 restraint applied to foreigners is guaranteed by 
 the legal recognition of the validity of captures of 
 slave-traders. 
 
International Relations. 115 
 
 § 6. War. 
 A. General Characteristics. 
 
 The relation of peace is the result of the 
 voluntary renunciation of complete national in- 
 dependence and isolation. The extreme case of 
 the opposite of peace would occur if a nation were 
 to repudiate that revocation and to take up with 
 respect to all or any of its neighbours a position 
 of absolute independence, refusing to recognise 
 their corporate existence, to hold intercourse with 
 their governments, to receive individuals belonging 
 to them with hospitality, or to acquiesce in the 
 application of their law to any of its own subjects 
 under any circumstances. Such an extreme case 
 is not likely to occur; if any nation did adopt 
 such an attitude it would cease to be one of those 
 states to which the name nation should be ap- 
 plied : if the position were long and successfully 
 maintained it would mark the break-up of the 
 national system and the introduction of some new 
 phase iu the history of mankind. 
 
 But it is possible for a nation without re- 
 pudiating the whole to repudiate temporarily 
 some part of the forbearances and concessions 
 essential to the condition of peace, and by so 
 
 8—2 
 
116 International Relations. 
 
 doing to enter into the well-known and easily 
 recognisable relation of war with any other nation. 
 The possible causes of war are ianumerable. One 
 nation may go to war with another from a dislike 
 of the laws which it administers, or from a belief 
 that it administers them unfairly, or because the 
 other nation appears to have shown bad faith in 
 keeping a treaty, or because its government has 
 failed to pay debts due to foreign individuals. 
 War may at any time arise as the sanction ia the 
 last resort where a nation has violated the rales of 
 international morality as they are understood by 
 its neighbour. But most of the great wars which 
 have taken place among nations have arisen from 
 some wider and more general cause than any of 
 these. War was the chief form of national activity 
 which prevailed during the formation of the most 
 ancient of the existing nations, and it received an 
 enormous development at the time when the first 
 great nations were finally launched on their in- 
 dependent careers. The desire for the acquisition 
 of new territory, the desire for the development 
 of commerce, the desire to spread or maintain 
 particular religions, and the desire to increase the 
 wealth and prosperity of the families which 
 furnished the great European sovereigns, were the 
 strongest motives in the minds of influential poli- 
 ticians whether on the throne or in the Council 
 
International Relations. 117 
 
 Chamber. For every one of these ends war 
 seemed a valuable means: and wars were ac- 
 cordingly the most conspicuous form of national 
 life and ranked among the principal objects of the 
 schemes and contrivances of statesmen. 
 
 The character of war, and the purposes for 
 which it was waged, necessarily differed much 
 from what they would have been, if the nations of 
 Europe had come into the world complete, and had 
 not very gradually emerged from the ruins of the 
 Roman Empire., Many characteristics of the great 
 wars from the 15th to the 18th century, especially 
 during the early part of that period, and in those 
 parts of Europe where the feudal system flourished 
 longest, had their origin in the private wars of 
 feudal times. In that pre-national era, war, which 
 among nations is exclusively the concern of inde- 
 pendent sovereign governments, was waged by 
 potentates, and sometimes by lords low down in 
 the feudal scale, who were subject for many pur- 
 poses to political suzerainty. With the advance of 
 time war came to be more and more a form of 
 national activity. National policies and national 
 ambitions became more complex. The idea of a 
 nation as a great people, important from the number 
 and character of its members rather than from the 
 long descent and personal eminence of its ruler, be- 
 gan to exercise a strong influence on the policy of 
 
118 International Relations. 
 
 several nations, The enthusiasm for common an- 
 cestors, common traditions and a common language 
 and literature, took their place as wide-spread in- 
 fluences on the members of nations, and modified 
 the working of motives founded in commercial 
 enterprise or territorial acquisition. To the desire 
 for the propagation of a particular religion was 
 added the desire for the propagation of political 
 ideas or theories. As the life of nations became 
 more complicated, and the threads of national 
 policy more numerous and more tangled, the 
 tendency to, employ war as a means of giving effect 
 to national ambition and increasing the importance 
 of particular nations, did not decrease. The great 
 wars of modem times have mostly resulted from the 
 shock of the conflicting interests of nations, each 
 of which was actuated by a number of ambitious 
 theories and aspirations whose realisation it was 
 the object of its government to achieve. Up to our 
 own time great wars have had their real origin in 
 such causes, and it seems rash to assert, though it 
 has sometimes been asserted, that there will never 
 again be a great war made for the purpose of 
 giving consolidation and unity to a risiag nation, 
 of achieving a position of marked superiority for one 
 of the leading nations of Europe, or of furthering 
 or restraining national schemes of territorial acqui- 
 sition and the instinct of " territorial expansion." 
 
International Relations. 119 
 
 It seems advisable to insist a little on this 
 topic because the students of international rela- 
 tions are so often called upon to consider war as 
 the ultimate sanction employed by a nation which 
 considers that its moral or quasi-legal rights in 
 matters of detail have been violated, that they 
 forget its historical importance as a regular phase 
 of national activity. 
 
 War then is that relation, half-way from peace 
 to barbaric isolation and unregulated violence, 
 which springs up between two nations either 
 because their political ambitions seem to conflict 
 with one another, or because it is proved to the 
 satisfaction of one of them that the derogations of 
 the other from the standard of diplomatic pro- 
 priety amount to a casus belli, or because one 
 nation has made itself intolerably disagreeable to 
 another in one of many possible ways. 
 
 But it is possible for a dispute between two 
 nations to pass beyond the limits of peaceable 
 diplomatic discussion without reaching the con- 
 dition of war. A nation which authorises retor- 
 sion or the application of some harsh and unusual 
 rules to the members of a nation by whom its 
 members have been similarly treated, is already 
 passing from the position of peaceable remon- 
 strance in the direction of war. A more marked 
 instance of the use of violent means of redress 
 
120 International Relations. 
 
 occurs where a nation authorises reprisals, or the 
 violent seizure of a specified amount of property 
 belonging to members of another nation, ia 
 satisfaction of debts or damages alleged to be 
 due from that nation. 
 
 Another means of applying force to a foreign 
 government is the institution of a pacific blockade. 
 This practice consists in forcibly preventing access 
 to the blockaded ports more or less nearly as in 
 time of war, but without doing any other warlike 
 acts or breaking off pacific relations with the 
 power whose ports are blockaded. This practice 
 can be resorted to with success only by a strong 
 maritime power agaiast a weak one: because 
 effective retaliation by the blockaded power is 
 almost certain to lead to a further state of inter- 
 national strife practically indistinguishable from 
 war. 
 
 These various measures of violence falling short 
 of war are similar in principle to intervention by 
 way of threats or compulsory arbitration in the 
 affairs of other nations, or between a foreign 
 government and its temporarily revolted subjects. 
 In all these cases the real nature of the transac- 
 tion is this : a nation, actuated by some motives 
 of policy or sentiment aroused by the facts of a 
 particular case, determines to forego with respect 
 to another nation some particular one or more of 
 
International Relations. 121 
 
 those concessions which go to make up the relation 
 of peace : as for instance it ceases to leave it free 
 to carry on its own commerce unhindered, or to 
 settle questions of internal politics for itself. The 
 means by which such a policy must be carried out 
 do not necessarily go as far as setting up the 
 relation of war : but the relation of war is very 
 likely to come into existence very soon as the 
 direct result of any one of these violent and 
 unusual measures, and this has been found to be 
 particularly true with respect to intervention. 
 
 The strongest possible iastance of measures re- 
 sembling war but to some extent falling short of 
 it, occurs perhaps when a nation gives armed 
 assistance to the sovereign of a revolted district, 
 and puts down a rebellion otherwise likely to 
 siicceed by elaborate "military operations." In 
 wars of colonial disruption or in civil wars where 
 one party stigmatises the other as rebels, the 
 recognition by neutral powers of alleged rebels 
 as regular belligerents does not constitute any 
 departure from the relation of peace, though 
 like many other acts of a perfectly pacific cha- 
 racter it may in particular cases give offence 
 and embitter international relations : on the other 
 hand, the recognition of the complete political 
 independence of alleged rebels who are aiming at 
 such independence but have not fairly established 
 
122 International Relations. 
 
 it beyond all possibility of doubt, is generally 
 considered to be a departure from the respect 
 normally shown to the independence of the 
 government against whom the rebels have risen : 
 such a respect is one of the elements of the 
 relation of peace: and such premature recogni- 
 tion is therefore like a pacific blockade or an 
 attempt at compulsory arbitration, a departure 
 from the usual habits of international intercourse, 
 in the direction of the abnormal relation of war, 
 and. one which is very likely to be followed by the 
 outbreak of war. 
 
 All measures falling short of war but plainly 
 departing from the usages of peace are necessarily 
 liable to strong objections on the score of morality: 
 but the incidents of international intercourse are 
 so various, and. such complicated conflicts of 
 interest and sentiment may arise, that it seems 
 impossible to lay down any general rules of 
 morality, which could never be met by a com- 
 plete answer founded on the facts of a particular 
 case. 
 
 Little need be said about the mutual relations 
 of two nations which are avowedly at war with 
 one another. The relation of peace has been 
 exchanged for one midway between peace and 
 barbaric violence. The elements of that relation 
 can be ascertained with tolerable accuracy from 
 
International Relations. 123 
 
 the study of past wars and of scientific treatises 
 on the nature of war, but information accessible 
 as to what any nation will do when it is at war 
 can be best obtained by the study of the pro- 
 mises it has made by treaty and of the municipal 
 laws which it has enacted with a view to the 
 carrying-on of war. Every nation making war is 
 subject to some extent to the influence of philan- 
 thropists, with whom war is iinpopular for obvious 
 reasons, and to arguments drawn from expediency 
 and morality. At the same time the condition of 
 war is one in which the immediate dictates of 
 ambition and the pressure of mutual exasperation 
 may at any given time outweigh all other motives 
 and lead to the adoption of practices inconsistent 
 with the ordinary conception of war and approxi- 
 mating to those which would mark a period of 
 unrestrained rapacity and violence. Some of the 
 practical sanctions of international morality are 
 necessarily weakened by the existence of war: 
 as those founded on the fear of violence from 
 other nations would necessarily disappear in the 
 extreme case of a nation already waging inter- 
 neciae war with a confederacy embracing all the 
 nations which it had not reduced to complete 
 submission, especially if the nation so situated 
 appeared likely to bring its enterprise to a success- 
 ful conclusion. 
 
124 International Relations. 
 
 For the above reasons the actual elements of 
 war cannot be strictly defined : though the truth 
 as to what these elements ought to be according 
 to the standard of morality has seemed to many 
 writers to be more easily ascertainable. But 
 some general facts about the practical nature of 
 modern war can be safely laid down. It involves 
 the breaking ofif of direct diplomatic intercourse 
 between the belligerent nations, and of regular 
 commercial relations between the individuals 
 belonging to them. The chief object of war is 
 the reduction of the enemy to an attitude of 
 submission. This is effected on land by means of 
 public military expeditions, for the destruction of 
 his military resources, and the temporary occupa- 
 tion of his territory and towns: and at sea by 
 a cooperation with land forces for the above 
 purpose and by the interruption of his commerce. 
 In a summary sketch it is impossible to treat in 
 detail the extent of the common usage of bellige- 
 rent nations with regard to the particular devices 
 by which these processes are carried on, or the 
 points upon which the usages of nations vary and 
 international discussion arises. The nature of 
 some of the questions incidental to such a dis- 
 cussion will appear from the topics of the laws 
 mentioned in the next section ; and some of the 
 most important, and especially the practice of 
 
International Relations. 125 
 
 seizing private property at sea, are more nearly 
 connected with the relation of belligerents to 
 neutrals, than with that existing between belli- 
 gerents. The questions of the circumstances 
 under which a nation will make war, and the kiad 
 of terms which it will exact upon the successful 
 termination of war, are questions of national 
 policy, the decision of which must be regulated 
 in accordance with circumstances of incalculable 
 complexity. As to the amount of publicity to be 
 given to the commencement of war, the treatment of 
 obligations independent of the war itself, and the 
 treatment of individuals belonging to a nation 
 against which war is declared, but temporarily 
 resident in the territory of the nation declaring 
 war, the practice of nations is fairly uniform : it 
 can be ascertained from the observation of actual 
 wars, and is not to any great extent liable to the 
 disturbing influence of novel considerations of 
 policy. 
 
 B. Laws of International Impoi't. 
 
 There is only one class of laws which has direct 
 reference to individuals belonging to foreign nations 
 at war with the legislating nation. It consists of 
 those laws which are made for the guidance of 
 ofScers and soldiers engaged in warfare, in their 
 conduct towards individuals belonging to a hostile 
 
126 International Relations. 
 
 army or to the hostile nation. These laws are 
 exceptional in character not only because they are 
 sometimes practically addressed to persons gene- 
 rally subject to another government, but also 
 because they always refer to the conduct of indi- 
 viduals in places not ordinarily subject to the 
 jurisdiction of the legislating government. An 
 Englishman in France is generally subject to 
 French and free from English jurisdiction. But 
 an English soldier fighting in France is necessarily 
 subject to English jurisdiction because during the 
 continuance of war the jurisdiction and sovereignty 
 of the territory which is the seat of war are habitu- 
 ally disregarded by the enemy. 
 
 Every nation must legislate expressly or tacitly 
 for its soldiers and sailors on service. Such legis- 
 lation creates a jurisdiction in places where there 
 would otherwise be no jurisdiction, and enacts the 
 rules to be enforced by the courts exercising such 
 jurisdiction. In our own country, for instance, the 
 Army Discipline Acts create certain military rights 
 and duties, and the Articles of War, published 
 under the legislative authority of those acts, give 
 the sanction of municipal law to a more elaborate 
 a,nd detailed scheme for the regulation of the 
 •conduct of soldiers. Courts martial for the en- 
 forcement of military law sit under the sanctions 
 ■of municipal law, and any irregularity in the consti- 
 
International Relations. 127 
 
 tution of such a court would be a matter for 
 redress by legal process. Laws can be made 
 authorising military commissions to deal with 
 exceptional questions according to "the law of 
 nations." The constitution of such commissions 
 and the conditions of their efficiency are mat- 
 ters of municipal law, which further attaches a 
 regular sanction, valid against individuals, to the 
 opinion at which they may arrive as to the effect 
 of the uncertain mass of opinion and usage indi- 
 cated by the expression "law of nations." 
 
 In addition to this kind of law it is possible 
 for courts of law to recognise the condition of war 
 and supply their sanction to its effects by giving 
 or refusing redress to persons who have suffered 
 loss at the hands of a military or naval officer, 
 ■sucthxg under the orders of his government. The 
 effect of the English law upon a question of this 
 kind may be seen from the case of Buron v. 
 Denman (L. R. 3 Exch. 167): and any matter 
 which has been the subject of judicial decision in 
 one country might be the subject of explicit legis- 
 lation in all. 
 
 Only part of the regular military law of a 
 nation possesses international import, or has such 
 special reference to foreigners as to make the 
 nature of its contents highly important to them. 
 Pirst, there are laws which in effect direct soldiers 
 
128 International Relations. 
 
 under regular sanctions to observe certain rules in 
 their own behaviour towards the enemy. Secondly, 
 there are laws which relieve from the regular legal 
 responsibility soldiers who, in the course of mili- 
 tary operations, use generally prohibited violence 
 towards enemies who have committed specified 
 offences. To take a rather complicated instance, 
 a law may assert that bombardment without pre- 
 vious notice is not an international wrong: and 
 one effect of this will be that if an enemy chooses 
 to consider it as such a wrong and to retaliate by 
 unusual acts of violence, the law will allow him to 
 be treated in return as a person with regard to 
 whose treatment the usual prohibitions do not 
 apply. Thirdly, there are laws providing for the 
 regular trial and punishment, by the means of 
 specified judicial and executive machinery, of 
 enemies who have committed specified offences. 
 It will suffice to enumerate a few of the topics 
 with which these laws can deal. As an example 
 we may consider the leading provisions of the 
 Instructions for the Qovernment of Armies of the 
 United States in the . Field. These Instructions 
 were published by the supreme government of the 
 United States in 1863: they axe intended to 
 supplement and interpret the laws already exist- 
 ing, whether statute law on military subjects or 
 legislation empowering tribunals to exercise " the 
 
International Relations. 129 
 
 common law of war." The Instructions are in 
 form (except so far as they deal with details of 
 procedure) merely declaratory of a Law said to be 
 universally binding on all the nations of the 
 world. They are however of the nature of mu- 
 nicipal law because they give a version of the 
 common law, or it may be of the law of nations 
 which is absolutely binding on the American 
 courts which they create or to whose existence 
 they refer. Therefore as far as these Instructions 
 are explicit and complete the "law of nations'' as 
 incorporated into the law of America, and so fur- 
 nished with sanctions applicable to individuals 
 within American jurisdiction, has been authori- 
 tatively published. 
 
 The principal topics dealt with are as follows. 
 An army which is in actual occupation of hostile 
 territory is to administer martial law, or martial 
 authority in accordance with the laws and usages of 
 law, by means of organs established by municipal 
 law, so far as such administration is necessary for 
 the safety of the army and the success of its 
 strategic schemes: in other respects the military 
 authorities are to facilitate the administration in 
 the ordinary way of the ordinary civil and penal 
 law of the hostile nation. Kules are laid down for 
 the treatment of consuls and of the diplomatic 
 agents of neutral powers. Authority over the 
 S. 
 
130 International Relations. 
 
 taxation and the police of the occupied territory 
 is to be assumed as far as is required for the 
 safety and efiSciency of military operations. The 
 regular means of carrying on war is to be by the 
 destruction of the regular combatants of the enemy 
 and by the starvation of enemies armed or unarmed 
 and by the siege and bombardment of towns. 
 Reasonable humanity must be used in the em- 
 ployment of these means. Retaliation against an 
 enemy carrying on war by methods herein declared 
 to be contrary to the " law of nations" is permissi- 
 ble in extreme cases. Rules are next laid down 
 as to the extent to which the public property of 
 the enemy is to be the subject either of permanent 
 sequestration or temporary appropriation of the 
 occupying army, and in particular with reference 
 to charitable a,nd scientific buildings. The military 
 authorities are to make such arrangements as are 
 practicable about the further employment and pay- 
 ment of the public officials of the occupied territory. 
 Specified offences by American soldiers against 
 the inhabitants of the occupied territory are to be 
 punished by the military authorities. A slave 
 escaping to an occupying army is to be considered 
 as a slave escaping to the territory of the nation 
 to which the army belongs. Detailed regulations 
 are made as to who may become prisoners of war, 
 what are to be the incidents of that condition of 
 
International Relations. 131 
 
 captivity, and how far the captors can take notice 
 of previous offences committed by those who become 
 prisoners. The circumstances under which the 
 killing of prisoners or the refusal of quarter is 
 criminal or justifiable are specified. Distinctions 
 are made as to acts of legitimate deceit and acts 
 of perfidy: and it is laid down that an enemy 
 guilty of an act of perfidy may be made the 
 subject of otherwise illegal violence with impunity. 
 Elaborate provisions are made as to the treatment 
 of enemies who occasionally take part in the 
 war, without regularly belonging to the army 
 of the enemy. An enemy who does acts of war 
 without satisfying the conditions laid down as to 
 sufiicient enrolment or a distinctive dress is made 
 liable to specified punishment at the hands of the 
 army against whom he offends. The offence which 
 consists in acting as a spy is defined and the 
 punishment of death imposed upon those who are 
 convicted of it. The whole subject of friendly 
 intercourse between hostile armies is also the 
 subject of detailed regulations. The proper em- 
 ployment of flags of truce, the conditions on which 
 temporary truces or armistices are to be made, the 
 validity of safe-conducts, and the means to be em- 
 ployed for the exchange or release of prisoners of 
 war, are all guaranteed by legal rules bearing 
 directly on American officers and soldiers and 
 
 9—2 
 
132 International Relations. 
 
 more or less indirectly on the individual enemies 
 who take part in these transactions. 
 
 With regard to the various topics of which 
 mention has been made it may be impossible to 
 say what are the exact dictates of morality. Some 
 of the questions of detail are of a very difficult 
 nature, and they are not all of a character which 
 all nations are likely to approach from exactly the 
 same stand-point. But the value of more or less 
 directly legal enactments on these topics consists 
 in showing us what are the views of the legislating 
 government as to the moral aspect of these ques- 
 tions, or at all events as to the particular modifica- 
 tion of the moral doctrine which they propose to 
 enforce by effectual means, against individuals 
 who are subject to their control, or to that of the 
 armies who recognise their authority. 
 
 § 7. Neutrality. 
 
 A. General Characteristics. 
 
 A nation is neutral in respect of any war in 
 which it does not take part. The importance at- 
 tached to the condition of neutrality has increased 
 and the complicated nature of its elements has 
 appeared owing to the multiplication of the com- 
 mercial relations subsisting between members of 
 different nations and to the fact that war has 
 
International Relations. 133 
 
 become a well-understood relation of which the 
 general results upon the belligerents can be pretty 
 accurately foreseen. 
 
 The object of a neutral government is to keep 
 its relations with the belligerent nations as nearly 
 as possible undisturbed by the existence of the 
 war. The object of a belligerent government 
 is to secure the perfect impartiality of neutral 
 powers and to be as little hampered as possible 
 by neutrals in carrying on the recognised opera- 
 tions of warfare. 
 
 A neutral government is likely to resent any 
 use for purposes of war of its territory, or of that 
 part of the sea which it treats as part of its terri- 
 tory for military purposes : and it wishes as far as 
 possible to continue in safety its commercial 
 dealings with either belligerent. A belligerent 
 government is likely to resent any use by the 
 enemy of neutral territory, men or materials for 
 military purposes, and to object to any support 
 being given by neutrals to the enemy either 
 directly or by assistance to their commercial enter- 
 prises. 
 
 Belligerents and neutrals, being actuated by 
 such conflicting motives, have often quarrelled 
 about the conduct which they ought to pursue 
 towards one another. Such quarrels have taken 
 every form, from the slightest to the most severe, 
 
134 International Relations. 
 
 of international remonstrance and strife. When 
 such difficulties have been avoided it has been 
 owing to the adoption by the two parties of some 
 compromise which strikes an average between 
 these conflicting interests, or leans more nearly 
 to one or the other according to the, comparative 
 strength at the time of belligerents and neutrals. 
 A belligerent government is pretty sure to 
 excite resentment in a neutral government, and 
 to meet with the general disapproval of nations, 
 if the public forces under its control actually 
 carry on military operations on the territory or in 
 the territorial waters subject to the authority of 
 the neutral government : the same result will 
 follow any attempt by a belligerent government 
 to interfere with persons or property on board 
 a neutral ship under circumstances other than 
 those specified in the following section, or the 
 adoption by a belligerent government of unusually 
 harsh and stringent rules in its relations with 
 neutral individuals. A neutral government will 
 incur similar resentment and disapprobation if it 
 allows its territory to serve as a base of operations 
 against a belligerent, if it encourages or entirely 
 fails to restrain or discountenance expeditions 
 organised by its subjects for the purpose of 
 assisting a party to the war, or if it allows its 
 subjects to supply material of war upon a large 
 
International Relations. 135 
 
 scale to one of the contending parties. It is 
 impossible to ascertain the exact point at which 
 such a contribution of materials would be con- 
 sidered to be on a sufficiently large scale to lead 
 to the neutral government being held responsible : 
 but it is unquestionable that circumstances of 
 this kind can arise which would lead to a quarrel 
 between the belligerent government and the 
 neutral government. The history of the Alabama 
 claim, the arguments on which the decision of the 
 arbitrators on that occasion was based, and the 
 language employed by a great number of writers 
 on international relations in the discussion of this 
 topic, show that a very strong body of opinion 
 would support a belligerent government com- 
 plaining against a neutral government for allow- 
 ing or not preventing the supply of warlike 
 materials on a large scale, and especially the 
 building, arming and sending out of ships 
 intended to take part in the war. Another 
 ground of complaint by a belligerent against a 
 neutral government would be the refusal by the 
 latter to acquiesce in the application by the 
 former of such laws as it may have more or less 
 formally enacted to prevent or punish assistance 
 given on a comparatively small scale by neutral 
 individuals to the enemies of the belligerent 
 government. 
 
136 International Relations. 
 
 With the above exceptions the relation of 
 neutrality is not likely to lead to differences or 
 complications between neutral and belligerent 
 governments: but it leads to many kinds of 
 questions between belligerent governments and 
 neutral individuals, which are the subject of laws 
 and which therefore belong to the next section. 
 
 B. Zaws of International Import. 
 
 There are two kinds of legislation of inter- 
 national import having special reference to the 
 relation of neutrality. Members of a nation are 
 restrained from taking part in a war to which the 
 nation is not a party, first, by laws enforced by 
 the sovereign power to which they are subject: 
 secondly, by laws enforced against them by the 
 foreign belligerent government. 
 
 A legislature which has the condition of neu- 
 trality in view may make laws to restrain its 
 subjects from any one of those kinds of conduct 
 which constitute an interference in war at the 
 expense of a foreign belligerent. In practice such 
 legislation has only recently been known among 
 nations to at all a large extent: and it is now 
 confined to a very few of the possible ways of 
 assisting a belligerent. In the case of England, 
 for instance, the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818 
 made it a punishable offence for a British subject 
 
International Relations. 137 
 
 to accept a commission from a foreign government 
 in time of war or to take part directly in such a 
 war in various other ways. The Foreign Enlist- 
 ment Act of 1870 renews this prohibition with 
 greater stringency and elaboration, especially as to 
 the fitting out of ships intended to be used in a 
 foreign war. Such legislation as this is due to 
 the anxiety of the legislating government' either 
 to restrain its subjects from a course which it 
 holds to be of that kind of immorality which 
 may be properly made illegal, or to avoid the 
 resentment of belligerent powers whose enemies 
 have employed the services of neutrals as soldiers 
 or ship-builders, and the important practical results 
 of such resentment. Laws of various kinds may 
 be enacted in different nations to secure the objects 
 aimed at by the Foreign Enlistment Acts : but it 
 is not usual, though it would be perfectly possible, 
 for governments to forbid their subjects to mini- 
 ster to the requirements of belligerents by means 
 other than the supply of men or ships. 
 
 These other matters are generally the subject 
 of the second class of laws of which we have 
 spoken : laws enforced by a belligerent government 
 against individuals subject to a foreign government 
 and within foreign jurisdiction at the time of doing 
 the acts prohibited. These laws deal principally 
 with assistance given to an enemy who is being 
 
138 International Relations. 
 
 attacked through his commerce. They embrace 
 such matters as the carriage of enemy's goods 
 iu neutral ships, the supply of contraband of war, 
 and the breach of blockade. 
 
 These matters have sometimes been the subject 
 of unmistakable legislation, as by the ordinances 
 on maritime law of the early Italian republics and 
 of the French kings. In England and the United 
 States, the two nations whose policy with respect 
 to neutral rights has perhaps had the widest 
 importance, owing to the strength of their mari- 
 time position, the fact that municipal laws have 
 been laid down and enforced for the regulation of 
 the conduct of foreigners has not been generally 
 admitted either by writers on international rela- 
 tions or by the courts which have themselves 
 enforced those laws. It might however be shown 
 that the English and American prize courts, in 
 dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals 
 have in fact administered English and 'American 
 law. Like other parts of the common law of Eng- 
 land, the law administered by the English prize- 
 court judges during England's great maritime wars 
 was not to be found in any definite enactments 
 of the legislature; but it was law because the 
 authority of the executive could be utilised for its 
 enforcement, so that it was tacitly accepted by 
 the sovereign authority. It is true that the judges 
 
International Relations. 139 
 
 of the prize courts often stated that it was their 
 duty and their intention to administer not the 
 law of England but the general law of nations. 
 At the same time there are passages in their 
 judgments which show that they did sometimes 
 look upon themselves as administering English 
 law. They explicitly asserted with respect to some 
 topics that the law of nations was to such or such 
 an effect : and that the law of England was that 
 the law of nations should be followed, except in 
 cases where it was to be modified on account of 
 particular treaties of which the court took judicial 
 cognisance, or by the fact that the government 
 whose subjects were at the moment before the 
 court was in the habit of applying to English 
 subjects some rule different to that of the Law of 
 Nations. This seems to be the true view of the 
 nature of prize courts. It is possible to collect 
 from the decisions of judges what is the law which 
 they in fact administer with the assistance of the 
 sovereign authority of their own nation. The 
 reason of their adoption of the rules which they 
 administer is in many cases a belief that these 
 rules are in fact part of the universal law of 
 nations. But the actual nature of the alleged law 
 of nations has always been a matter of uncertainty: 
 and in times of great European discord belligerent 
 nations and neutral nations have differed as to its 
 
140 International Relations. 
 
 actual contents, partly on account of interested 
 motives from which even judges are not wholly- 
 free. The shortest and plainest way of summing 
 up the matter seems to be as follows : in time of 
 war it is usual for nations to give to courts of their 
 own, jurisdiction over the captors and owners of 
 neutral ships and propierty taken at sea. These 
 courts apply to the question of th& validity of any 
 such capture practical rules of law which can be 
 ascertained from the study of their decisions. 
 There is no reason why these rules should not 
 be formulated and, if it were thought wise, a- 
 mended by means of regular municipal legislation : 
 and if this were done it might increase the sim- 
 plicity of the laws of different nations on these 
 subjects, and tend to produce uniformity. 
 
 Assuming then that the law administered by 
 prize courts is of the nature of municipal law, we 
 may briefly summarise the principal kinds of laws 
 which can be made by a belligerent government 
 and administered against neutral individuals. 
 
 In the first place laws have often been made 
 for the forfeiture of contraband of war. Under 
 this name it has been usual to include all such 
 merchandise being conveyed to a belligerent 
 port as is obviously and necessarily intended to 
 be used as munition of war and such other kinds 
 of merchandise as appear, owing to the particu- 
 
International Relations. 141 
 
 lar circumstances of a war or of any phase of a 
 war, to be likely to be used for military pur- 
 poses. It has been found exceedingly difficult 
 to draw up an accurate list of the kinds of mer- 
 chandise which are contraband: and in this, as 
 in other matters, courts determined to adopt or 
 incorporate the " Law of Nations " have differed 
 considerably as to what is the actual view of that 
 law on the question. On this, as on all the 
 kindred topics, courts of law have incorporated 
 and enforced the rules laid down by treaty to be 
 observed towards particular states except when 
 the treaty is of very old date or has been frequently 
 disregarded by the other power or powers agreeing 
 to it. The public ships of belligerent governments 
 have generally been allowed to bring in ships 
 containing any contraband cargo to a port of the 
 belligerent nation, in order to have the legal 
 question decided by a prize court : and such part 
 of the cargo as is declared to be contraband has 
 been forfeited to the captors. Laws allowing the 
 forfeiture of the ship and of the innocent part of 
 the cargo have been rare and unpopular. 
 
 A second instance consists in the laws on the 
 subject of blockaded ports. The laws enforced by 
 most nations on this subject have proceeded on 
 the general principle that where a ship belonging 
 to a neutral attempts to enter a harbour which is 
 
142 International Relations. 
 
 practically and undoubtedly invested by belligerent 
 ships with a view to depriving the town of supplies 
 and so forcing it to surrender, the ship and cargo 
 are both forfeited to the captor. Laws have also 
 been made enforcing some lighter penalty. But 
 the great difference between the laws of different 
 nations on the subject of blockade has been as to 
 what facts constitute a blockade in the legal sense. 
 Some nations have acted on the view that there 
 is always a blockade when certain conditions are 
 fulfilled, as for instance that there shall be not 
 less than a specified number of ships stationary 
 during a given time within a given distance of 
 the entrance to the harbour. Others have main- 
 tained that general rules are impracticable, and 
 that it is a question for the court upon every set 
 of facts that may arise whether the principle of 
 sufficient investment is or is not satisfied by those 
 facts. The question of blockade is one with re- 
 gard to which it is specially true that the law, 
 whether as practically administered or as explicitly 
 enacted in a particular nation, may develope 
 rapidly in the direction of severity under the 
 pressure of a prolonged war and of the mutual 
 exasperations inherent in its progress. There is 
 a tendency at such times to extend the practical 
 results of blockade to cases in no way falling 
 under the general principle usually governing the 
 
International Relations. 143 
 
 matter. The strongest instance of this is to be 
 found in Napoleon's celebrated decree by which 
 the British isles were declared to be in a state of 
 blockade, and all neutral commerce with them 
 was forbidden. This is a strong instance of what 
 may always happen in this kind of legislation at 
 unusually troubled times. A nation which believes 
 or professes to believe that it has to deal with an 
 enemy of the human race, and which occupies an 
 unusually favourable position for the enforcement 
 of its will against its neighbours, is likely to 
 administer a different law from that which it has 
 enacted and enforced in quieter times. When 
 the Scandinavian powers were the only neutrals 
 in Europe they truly complained upon several 
 occasions that the members of the coalition against 
 Napoleon were dealing out a different measure to 
 neutrals from that which they had previously 
 declared to be the '' Law of Nations " : and they 
 were met by an answer which amounted in sub- 
 stance to this — that the powers which had formerly 
 incorporated what they believed to be the " Law 
 of Nations " into their own laws, were now com- 
 pelled by unprecedented circumstances, which 
 made the very condition of neutrality immoral, 
 to adopt in place of that portion of their laws 
 something which differed from the "Law of 
 Nations." 
 
144 International Relations. 
 
 A subject on which the laws, explicit and 
 tacit, of different nations have varied considerably 
 from one another is that of the treatment of 
 hostile cargo on board neutral ships, " The fluc- 
 tuations of legislation on this topic cannot be 
 here traced. It will be sufficient to say that in 
 most great maritime wars the belligerent powers 
 have adopted the rule that enemy's property on 
 board hostile ships is liable to capture : but that 
 at the present time the principal nations have 
 promised each other by treaty to treat such 
 property (where there is no question of contra- 
 band or of blockade-running) as free from capture, 
 and that prize courts would probably give a 
 practical effect to a rule that this promise should 
 be observed, unless their attitude and policy were 
 changed by exceptional international aggravation 
 or other disturbing circumstances. 
 
 A kindred subject of legislation has been the 
 treatment of neutral goods found on board hostile 
 ships : on this subject the more tolerant view has 
 been accepted and enforced by the courts of 
 nations generally the least favourable to neutrals, 
 but the opposite view has also found judicial and 
 legislative support. 
 
 In nations where there has been a great 
 quantity of judge-made law on international 
 topics, very elaborate rules and subtle distinctions 
 
International Relations. 145 
 
 have been constructed as to the exact meaning of 
 the expressions "enemy's ship" and "enemy's 
 goods" and as to the evidence which will establish 
 the hostile character of a ship or cargo and the 
 acts of fraud or bad faith which will give rise 
 to a presumption of hostility. The rules which 
 different nations have enforced on these very 
 delicate questions, and on the exact results which 
 follow upon the proof of the various kinds and 
 degrees of hostility, can only be ascertained from 
 a careful and detailed examination of judicial 
 dicta and decisions, precisely similar to that by 
 which the more difficult problems of the English 
 common law and on the interpretation of statutes, 
 must be decided. 
 
 Various rules have at different times been 
 laid down or suggested for the forfeiture or ap- 
 prehension of goods or of individuals under the 
 control of neutrals, when the carriage or protec- 
 tion of them seemed to be especially calculated 
 to assist one belligerent at the expense of the 
 other, although the particular case might not fall 
 under any of the recognised heads of blockade, 
 contraband, hostile merchandise, etc. But the 
 kinds of legislation above summarised are those 
 which have appeared the most frequently and 
 regularly and which have had the greatest im- 
 portance. 
 
 s. 10 
 
146 International Relations. 
 
 The laws concerning this class of international 
 relations cannot be carried out without the visi- 
 tation and more or less formal search by the 
 public ships of belligerents of the private ships 
 of neutrals. The public ships of neutrals have 
 generally been held exempt from such search. 
 A rule commonly enforced, but which has given 
 rise to considerable complaints and to diplomatic 
 difficulties, sanctions the capture and entire for- 
 feiture of such private ships as, under any cir- 
 cumstances, resist such visitation or refuse to 
 give the desired information to the public ships 
 of belligerents. 
 
 A rule of law at one time enforced in the 
 English courts, but which it would now most 
 likely be impossible to support successfully, was 
 that which treated as hostile, and therefore liable 
 to capture, any neutral vessel which engaged in 
 the coasting trade of the belligerent, or in trade 
 with the colonies of the belligerent if such trade 
 was forbidden to foreigners in ordinary times and 
 only thrown open to them under the pressure of 
 the war. 
 
 In addition to the questions arising between 
 a belligerent government and neutral individuals 
 there are certain questions arising between a 
 belligerent government and the members of a 
 nation allied to it in time of war, which, are the 
 
International Relations. 147 
 
 subject of laws. The most important of these is 
 the question of the length of time which renders 
 capture of the ally's ship by the enemy complete, 
 so as to give to a subject of the other ally who 
 rescues the captured ship a good title against the 
 original owner; and in close connection with this 
 is the amount of salvage due to the rescuer in 
 cases where the captured ship is returned. Most 
 nations have some definite law to determine the 
 length of the period and the amount of the 
 salvage among their own subjects : and the com- 
 monest rule as to allies is that which applies 
 that law, whatever it is, to the rescued ships 
 of allies, unless the ally has observed a different 
 rule towards the subjects of the legislating 
 nation. 
 
 It will be observed that all the kinds of law 
 relating to neutrality which have been mentioned 
 refer to neutral individuals taking part directly or 
 indirectly in a war. Of course this subject, 
 whether from the harsh nature of the laws of 
 a particular nation or from any other reason, 
 may lead to diplomatic disputes, changes of 
 policy, and war. The other kind of breaches of 
 neutrality, where a belligerent trespasses on neu- 
 tral territory for the purposes of the war to the 
 prejudice of the neutral, are not so often the 
 subject of legal redress and are more likely to 
 
148 International Relations. 
 
 lead to directly international complications. But 
 when such violations of neutral territory are made 
 the subject of legal proceedings, application of 
 forcible restraint by the neutral, the municipal 
 character of the law administered is obvious, as 
 the offence then dealt with is a breach of the 
 peace withia the ordinary jurisdiction of the 
 neutral. The commonest way, however, in which 
 law has been brought to bear on violations of 
 neutral territory is by the refusal of a belligerent's 
 prize court to give practical validity to the 
 capture of hostile ships within neutral territory. 
 The part of a neutral government upon such 
 an occasion is confined to diplomatic representa- 
 tions and the assertion of particular views on the 
 question of morality, with the usual threats. 
 
 A neutral government may give oifence to 
 a belligerent government by not strictly enforcing 
 those of its laws against breaches of its neutrality 
 of which the violation injures the belligerent : but 
 such grievances, being against a foreign govern- 
 ment, are generally the subject not of law but 
 of diplomatic remonstrance and more or less 
 declared hostility. 
 
 CAMERIDGE : PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. & SON, AT THE UNIVEKSITY rRESS.