THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
 
 ENGLAND & BURGUNDY 
 
 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 
 THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 LEONARD V.D.OWEN 
 
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THE CONNECTION 
 
 BETWEEN ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY 
 
 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE 
 
 FIFTEENTH CENTURY 
 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY 
 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 
 THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 THE STANHOPE ESSAY 
 1909 
 
 BY 
 
 LEONARD V. D. ^EN 
 
 Scholar of Kehle College, Oxford 
 
 "Thus muste Flaundres for nede have unite and pease with us, 
 it wolle none other be." — Libel of English Policy 
 
 OXFORD 
 B. H. BLACKWELL, BROAD STREET 
 
 LONDON 
 SIMPKIN, MARSHALL & CO.. LIMITED 
 
 £.V. 
 
THE CONNECTION 
 
 BETWEEN ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY 
 
 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE 
 
 FIFTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The period with which this Essay is to deal unfortu- 
 nately just falls short of comprising the whole of the 
 meteoric course of the Burgundian House, regenerated 
 by the action of John of France in 1363. Fifteen years 
 before the accession of Henry IV. the relations of 
 England and Flanders had expanded into the relations 
 of England and Burgundy by the lapse of the heritage 
 of Louis de Male, Count of Flanders, to Philip the Bold, 
 Duke of Burgundy, who merged the interests of commer- 
 cial and populous Flanders with those of the rest of his 
 dominions. Of such a long period as that involved in 
 the Burgundian policy of Henry IV., Henry V., and 
 Henry VI. it is impossible to treat in so small a space 
 with the adequacy and care which the subject demands. 
 More than that, the spasmodic nature of the negotia- 
 tions at various times necessitates the division of the 
 narrative into parts. The first of these parts deals with 
 the relations of England and Burgundy from the acces- 
 sion of Henry IV. to the death of Margaret of Burgundy, 
 wife of Philip the Bold. The second deals with the 
 
 5 
 
6 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 tortuous diplomacy of John the Fearless down to the 
 death of Henry IV. in 1413. The third follows the 
 career of John of Burgundy until his assassination at 
 Montereau. The fourth part, which is in some respects 
 the most important, stretches from the Treaty of Troyes 
 in 1420 to the Compact of Arras in 1435 ; and the Essay 
 practically concludes with the death of Philip the Good 
 in 1467. The commercial relations of England and 
 Flanders, which were of such vital importance to the 
 English Kings, as well as to the Burgundian Dukes, and 
 which form the one stable motive in the chaos of con- 
 flicting tendencies and emotions, claim a separate dis- 
 cussion for themselves. 
 
 The latter half of the fourteenth century saw an extra- 
 ordinary development in the affairs of the Low Countries. 
 The consciousness of a growing tendency towards 
 Nationalism on the part of the seemingly diverse nations 
 which formed the population of these territories coincided , 
 in a most remarkable manner, with the foundation on a 
 new basis of the House of Burgundy, in the expansion 
 of which they were soon to be merged. The new Valois 
 Dukes of Burgundy formed the natural heads of the 
 Flemish and Wallon movement towards a national 
 independence from the Empire, as well as from France. 
 By the marriage of Margaret of Flanders to Philip le 
 Hardi in 1369 the foundations of a new European 
 power were laid down. A fairly detailed account of 
 the rise of the House of Burgundy from its foundation 
 in 1363 will form, therefore, a necessary preliminary 
 to any consideration of the relations into which its 
 Dukes, secure on their new footing in the Netherlands, 
 entered with the Kings of England. In 1361 the Duchy 
 of Burgundy, which had been governed since 1032 by 
 Dukes who were descendants of Robert the Pious, 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 7 
 
 lapsed to the French Crown by the death of Philip le 
 Rouvre, the last of the old Capetian stock. Two years 
 later the duchy was granted by King John II. of 
 France to his son Philip le Hardi, in recognition of his 
 signal services to the national cause. In accordance 
 with the consistent domain-enlarging policy of the 
 French Monarchy, Philip was married in 1369 to Mar- 
 garet, the only daughter and heiress of Louis de Male, 
 Count of Flanders, and the Count's death in 1384 made 
 the Duke of Burgundy Lord of Flanders in his wife's 
 right. The marriage effected, in addition to the trans- 
 ference of Flanders, Nevers, and Rethel, the union of 
 the Duchy and County of Burgundy, which latter had 
 descended to Margaret from her grandmother, another 
 Margaret, wife of Louis II. of Flanders. The Duke of 
 Burgundy was now established in a firm territorial 
 position in the Netherlands, and from this date onwards 
 he pursued with unfaltering insistence the eastward 
 advance of Burgundy into the provinces of the Empire. 
 Philip le Hardi and his successors, with the full S5mipathy 
 of the inhabitants of their own domains, as well as of 
 those of the Imperial fiefs in the Netherlands, aimed at 
 the establishment of a compact Burgundian kingdom, 
 which was to stretch from the Rhone to the German 
 Ocean. 
 
 It was also a singularly happy circumstance in favour 
 of the Burgundian Dukes that the ancient dynasties 
 which had ruled the Low Countries died out one after 
 another in this momentous second half of the fourteenth 
 century. Hainault, Holland, and Brabant received 
 new lines of Princes, with whom their subjects had little 
 sympathy. The Houses of Wittelsbach and Luxemburg, 
 which now became the rivals of the Burgundian dynasty 
 for the control of the Netherlands, already possessed 
 
8 ENGa-AND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 large territories in Germany, and occasionally strove 
 after the Imperial dignity. Thus the history of the 
 development of the power of the Burgundian Dukes 
 consists of the struggle between the representatives of 
 France and of the Empire for the preponderating in- 
 fluence over the destinies of the Low Countries. While 
 the French Monarchy supported, indirectly with its 
 prestige and directly with its troops, the efforts of 
 Philip le Hardi, the Wittelsbachs and the Luxemburgs 
 failed dismally to extract any assistance from their 
 suzerain, the Emperor, and so the issue of the conflict 
 was never long in doubt. But the French Kings did 
 not, however, realize at this time the colossal mistake 
 which they had made in allowing one of the younger 
 branches of their house to establish a territorial power 
 in the north-east, a state of affairs which was later 
 brought home to them with such bitter emphasis. 
 
 Philip le Hardi, now secure in Flanders, directed his 
 attention to the tottering States on his northern and 
 eastern frontiers. By a series of subtle marriage 
 alliances Burgundian influence was insinuated into 
 Alsace, and Philip took precautions to secure the suc- 
 cession of a member of his family to the Duchy of 
 Brabant, whose Duchess, Jeanne, had not long to live. 
 He defeated the English scheme for a marriage between 
 William, heir-presumptive of Bavaria, with a daughter 
 of John of Gaunt by a double alliance, which was 
 secured by the marriage of his son, John of Nevers, to 
 Margaret of Bavaria, while Philip's own daughter, 
 Margaret, received as her husband William, the young 
 Duke of Holland and Hainault. By such means as 
 these Philip, with the full consent of the Low Country 
 States, worked to secure for his family a compact terri- 
 tory between France and Germany. He died in 1404, 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 9 
 
 leaving three sons : the eldest, John the Fearless, in- 
 herited the united Burgundies, Flanders, and Artois ; 
 the second, Antony, succeeded in 1406, by a previous 
 direction of his mother's niece, the sole heiress of the 
 Duchess Jeanne of Bavaria, to the vast inheritance of 
 that Princess, as well as the Duchy of Limburg and the 
 Marquisate of Antwerp. In 1411, by his marriage with 
 Elizabeth of Goerlitz, he united to his already great 
 titles the additional one of Duke of Luxemburg ; but he 
 was killed at Agincourt, and his two sons died in turn, 
 leaving no issue — one in 1427, and the other in 1430. 
 It is thus to Philip the Good (1419-1467) that the 
 greatest part of the acquisitions of the Dukes of Bur- 
 gundy returns. In 1421 Philip purchased the Marquisate 
 of Namur, and in 1430 he obtained possession of Brabant, 
 Limburg, and Antwerp. In 1433 he joined the Counties 
 of Holland, Hainault, Zeeland, and Frisia to his domains 
 by a forced agreement with his unfortunate cousin, 
 Jacqueline of Hainault. Finally, his entrance into the 
 possession of the Duchy of Luxemburg in 1446 closes 
 the list of his acquisitions in the Low Countries. 
 
 But he had not been idle on the French side of the 
 frontier. In 1419 he seized Boulogne, and in 1423 he 
 obtained, by a grant from Henry VI. of England, the 
 Counties of Ma^on and Auxerre and the castellanies of 
 Peronne, Roye, and Montdidier, which he had already 
 held for five years. By his Treaty of Arras in 1435 with 
 the French King he lost none of the advantages he had 
 gained by the English alliance, but added to his estates 
 the definite possession of what contemporary documents 
 call " the Somme Towns " — St. Quentin, Corbie, Amiens, 
 Abbeville, and the County of Ponthieu. With the 
 acquisitions of Philip's successor, Charles le Tem^raire, 
 we are scarcely concerned ; but the foregoing account 
 
10 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 of the expansion of Burgundy and of the rounding off 
 of the Flemish and Wallon domains is significant of the 
 fact that Imperial investiture was the only thing needed 
 to make Philip the Good King of Burgundy. 
 
 But Philip le Hardi in 1399 could hardly have realized 
 the coming development of the Burgundian power ; he 
 was still a patriotic Frenchman, and, unlike his three 
 successors, regarded England as an irreconcilable enemy. 
 He belonged to a former age in which French patriotism 
 consisted in being anti-English. It was perhaps well for 
 English commercial interests that the term of his life 
 was drawing to its close, and that he was making way for 
 rulers who might appreciate more fully the almost 
 independent position which they had acquired, and who 
 were free in a great degree from the prejudices which had 
 actuated the founder of their line. It cannot be denied 
 that Philip had a real cause for his dislike of England, 
 for the simple reason that English interference, as a 
 result of the revolt of Ghent in 1379, had only narrowly 
 failed, owing to its belated exercise, to assist in the 
 establishment of an independent and republican 
 Flanders in the place of the Countship of Louis de Male, 
 a development which had appeared on the horizon of 
 possibility owing to the semi-independent position, both 
 with regard to their old Counts and to their new Dukes, 
 which the towns of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, together 
 with the so-called " Territory of Franc," had assumed 
 under the title of the " Four Members of Flanders." 
 
 The revolt of Ghent had led in 1382 to the Battle of 
 Roosebec, in which the Flemish, under their demagogic 
 leader, Philip van Artevelde, son of the more famous 
 James of the same name, were almost annihilated by 
 the onrush of the chivalry of France and Flanders under 
 the direction of their future Duke. In the following 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY II 
 
 year occurred the impolitic interference of England in 
 the badly-disguised " Crusade " of Henry Despenser, 
 Bishop of Norwich, a freak of policy which made that 
 warlike prelate an object of suspicion to the Flemish 
 and their Duke for many years to come. This suspicion 
 and dislike of England on the part of Duke Philip 
 militated seriously against the traditional influences 
 which his new acquisition of Flanders tended naturally 
 to exert upon him, and which would sooner or later 
 take effect. Flanders was in the unique position 
 throughout the Middle Ages of being politically French, 
 but economically English, and the Separatist tendencies 
 developed in the Burgundian Netherlands could not 
 long resist the powerful drift towards England which 
 was the result of economic pressure and overwhelming 
 commercial interest. Once Philip le Hardi was dead 
 his Duchess, who was not, owing to her nationality, 
 animated by the same spirit of hostility as her husband, 
 was only too ready to give the Flemish trend full play. 
 She resumed the commercial negotiations which her 
 husband had designedly allowed to prove abortive, but 
 she did not, however, succeed in dissipating the general 
 suspicion of England which Philip had inculcated into 
 the minds of the Flemish, who were, it must be admitted, 
 in this respect of a very receptive turn of mind. The 
 conduct of affairs in the Netherlands devolved upon the 
 Duchess in the absence of her son, John the Fearless, as 
 the result of the campaign of Nicopolis. The first part 
 of the Essay gives a short account of the exhausting and 
 tortuous negotiations which were conducted with the 
 most culpable insincerity by Philip le Hardi and the 
 Four Members, and concludes with the death of the 
 Duchess in March, 1405. 
 
 The period begins in what is practially a state of open 
 
12 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 commercial warfare between England and Flanders — a 
 position of affairs in which the ever-prevalent piracy 
 of the Middle Ages did nothing but assume a more 
 virulent form than usual. The Flemish seem, on the 
 whole, to have been unwilling to come to terms with 
 England. At first, ostensibly, they regarded the posi- 
 tion of Henry IV. as illegal, and as an insult to their 
 suzerain, the King of France — a pretext which gave 
 them the opportunity to indulge in their decided, but 
 often compulsorily latent, proclivities to plunder the 
 ships of various nations with a strict impartiality which 
 would have done credit to a better cause. It is hard 
 to fathom the depths of the Flemish mind, especially 
 after the lapse of several centuries, but there can hardly 
 be any doubt that the piracy which was practised on a 
 wholesale scale during the few years which followed the 
 accession of Henry IV. was secretly connived at by the 
 Duke of Burgundy, and by the Duchess after him, in 
 spite of their indignant denials. It is trite to say that 
 there is always something in rumour, and the report 
 which found credit among the representatives of the 
 King of England in Flanders to the effect that the 
 spoils were shared by the rulers of the Low Countries 
 may very probably have had some foundation in fact. 
 However that may be, the tardy fashion in which they 
 replied to the representations of Henry IV. may perhaps 
 incriminate them to a certain extent ; but the divided 
 state of Flanders between the suzerain and the Four 
 Members must also be taken into account as being in 
 some measure responsible for the continual disappoint- 
 ments which the English deputies had to face. Still, it 
 must not be supposed that the Flemish were the only 
 offenders. Regarded from the standpoint of the free- 
 booter, the English sailors were as pleased with events 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY I3 
 
 as the Flemish, and it required a great deal of effort on 
 the part of the King and his Admiral to keep them in 
 check. But, however profitable such enterprises might 
 be to the persons engaged in them, the loss to the 
 Governments of England and Flanders could not fail 
 to be considerable, and this unfortunate fact at last 
 compelled the rulers of Flanders to attend to the English 
 demands. The foregoing remarks will do something to 
 explain the seemingly suicidal apathy of the Flemish 
 with regcird to the negotiations which cover the first 
 five years of the period with which we have to deal. 
 
14 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 I 
 
 The first phases of the Hundred Years' War were over, 
 but its atmosphere lived on, and the hostility of the 
 French nation to England was reflected in the attitude 
 of Philip le Hardi, Duke of Burgundy. He had been, 
 apparently, opposed to the peace with England, which 
 had been concluded in 1395, which was cemented in the 
 following year by the marriage of Richard H. to Isabella, 
 the seven-year-old daughter of Charles VI. of France — 
 a union which the Duke of Burgundy declared, when he 
 heard of Richard's death, three years later, to have 
 been a farce and a delusion.^ The ill-advised nature of 
 Richard's foreign policy soon became evident ; its main 
 result was his deposition in favour of Henry IV. Mean- 
 while the King and nobUity of France decided with 
 unanimity not to recognize the usurper, a decision which 
 was, of course, endorsed by the Duke of Burgundy, as 
 one of the chief vassals of the French Crown. This 
 meant a tacit declaration of a state of war between 
 France, which included Flanders, and England ; and 
 Burgundy's Flemish vassals were not slow to take 
 advantage of the fact that their suzerain was hostile to 
 English interests. Prominent among the satellites of 
 Burgundy was the Count of St. Pol, who immediately 
 began a series of piratical raids upon English commerce. 
 The English only too readily retaliated, and a condition 
 of affairs resulted which was the necessary consequence 
 of the fact that the predominance of no one country on 
 ' Waurin, Chron. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 15 
 
 the seas was assured. Piracy and rapine rapidly became 
 so common that the seas were turned into hot-beds of 
 crime, and legitimate commerce, difficult enough before, 
 was reduced to an absolute impossibility.' The direct 
 result of all this was that a continuous volume of com- 
 plaints began to reach both Governments,^ and Henry IV. 
 was compelled, in the interests of English merchants, to 
 open negotiations with the Flemish and with the Duke 
 of Burgundy, their responsible head, for the mitigation 
 of these evils, which were injurious alike to the prosperity 
 of both countries. 
 
 A typical instance of the recriminations which now 
 began to fly between England and Flanders is supplied 
 in the first place by the letter^ which the Burgomasters, 
 Eschevins, and Consuls of the town of Bruges sent on 
 August II, 1402, to the Mayor, Aldermen, and Coun- 
 cillors of London, containing the complaint that their 
 previous letters with regard to the acts of piracy which 
 had been repeatedly committed by the English on their 
 ships have been fruitless of result. They particularized 
 the cases of a certain Paul Kenigard, who was kept a 
 prisoner by the Admiral of England at Portsmouth, and 
 of John Willes, a poor fisherman of Ostend, who had 
 been captured and conveyed to Hull, where he was 
 detained with his vessel and tackle. Another letter,* 
 written on the 15th of the same month to the English 
 deputies at Leulinghem, contains a duplicate of these 
 grievances, and urges the necessity of speedy restitu- 
 tion. That grounds for this retaliation on the part of 
 the English were far from being wanting is proved by 
 
 1 Letter of English Ambassadors in Norway and Sweden to 
 Henry IV., " Royal Letters, Henry IV." 
 
 2 Rymer, " Foedera," vii. and viii. 
 
 ' Ibid., viii. 273. * Ibid., p. 276. 
 
l6 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 the writs"^ issued by the King on January ii, 1403, to 
 the Sheriffs of Kent and other maritime counties for the 
 publication of a proclamation to the effect that all 
 persons having any complaints of injuries committed 
 upon them by the Flemings in contravention of the 
 Treaty of 1395 between England and Flanders were to 
 appear to substantiate these charges in the presence of 
 the ambassadors of the " Four Members," now present 
 with the Council at Westminster, bearing the grievances 
 of the Flemish towns. Owing, however, it seems, to the 
 default of the English defendants, who were to act at 
 the suggestion of the King in the additional r6Ie of 
 plaintiffs, and who fail to appear, presumably owing to 
 the difficulties and expense of travelling no less than 
 to their own guilty consciences, the conference which 
 was to have taken place at Westminster was postponed 
 to July I, and the place changed to Calais. A writ was 
 accordingly issued on June 12, 1403,^ to demand the 
 attendance of John Hanley, of Dartmouth, and other 
 sailors and merchants concerned, at the adjourned 
 meeting at Calais. Nor was the Duke of Burgundy 
 idle. He had, apparently, by this time been forced, both 
 by the success of Henry IV. and by the gradual ruin of 
 Flemish commerce, to acquiesce in the usurpation, and 
 to treat with him as King of England. His councillor, 
 John de Saulx, received on April 4, 1403, a safe-conduct 
 for ten weeks. By the commission of June 12 Nicholas 
 de Ryssheton and John Urban had been appointed to 
 act as the representatives of Henry at the coming con- 
 ference. The failure of the Flemish to appear on the 
 appointed day — July i — ^necessitated a further delay 
 until August 29, when the English ambassadors con- 
 tracted with the Flemish envoys a provisional agree- 
 * Rymer, " Foedera," viii. 286. ^ Ibid., p. 303. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY V] 
 
 ment, the basis of which consisted in the maintenance 
 of the Treaty of 1395 in its original form, with a pro- 
 longation of the private truce concluded between 
 Henry IV. and the Flemish deputies, FexmeUis and 
 Scorkin, in March, 1402, until the November following. 
 This agreement was concerned principally with certain 
 goods belonging to English merchants which were 
 detained at Sluys pending inquiries, and with certain 
 prisoners in a similar condition. It was arranged that 
 on November 10 both Burgundy and Henry should 
 despatch deputies to Calais armed with full powers for 
 a final settlement. It is significant of the independent 
 position assumed at this time by the commercial centres 
 of Flanders that the Four Members undertake to send 
 deputies, even though their Duke fails to keep his word.^ 
 Nothing is more remarkable in the history of these 
 relations than the persistent way in which the Flemish 
 seem to have played with the earnest efforts of the King 
 of England. Contrasted with the disheartening defec- 
 tion of the Flemish is the honourable conduct of the 
 English deputies, who stuck to their thankless task with 
 heroic fortitude. Henry IV. himself was far too anxious 
 for the welfare of English commerce to abandon the 
 negotiations in disgust, and the Four Members seem to 
 have been well aware of this, for they, as well as their 
 Duke, ignored November 10 when it came round, 
 making the English justifiably indignant at what they 
 called "the insulting defection of the Flemish." Still 
 there was no alternative but to go on with the negotia- 
 tions, and on December 20, 1403, Henry issued a nev/ 
 commission^ nominating Hugh Luttrel, Thomas Swin- 
 burne, Nicholas de Ryssheton, and John Urban as his 
 representatives. He urged them to agitate for a resump- 
 ' Rymer, " Foedera," viii. 327. ^ Ibid., p. 344. 
 
 2 
 
l8 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 tion of the previous agreement, which had been nullified 
 by the non-appearance of the Flemish on November lo. 
 On December 4, 1403,' the English ambassadors com- 
 plained to the Duke of the repeated infringements by 
 the Flemish of the truce which had been agreed to 
 pending the negotiations. They declared, also, that Bur- 
 gundy's position on the French Council was quite incon- 
 sistent with the hostile attitude of the French fleet. If 
 the French were acting with the connivance of Bur- 
 gundy, as they had heard, it was hardly any use con- 
 tinuing the negotiations, since they would " vex them- 
 selves at great expense to no purpose." The deputies 
 also deplored the conduct of the Duke of Orleans and 
 of the Count of St. Pol, that most enterprising and suc- 
 cessful brigand. The Duke vouchsafed no reply,^ and 
 the delay produced a fresh crop of piracies which rejoiced 
 other hearts than the Flemish. In December the Magis- 
 trates of Bruges wrote to the English ambassadors 
 describing the capture of a vessel of Schiedam by a wax- 
 galley of Calais. They received the comforting reply 
 that the Calais sailors thought that the wine was French, 
 taking refuge under the Flemish flag. 
 
 On January 4, 1404, Luttrel wrote to King Henry 
 describing the manifest chicanery of the Flemings, who 
 now requested a further delay while they, consulted their 
 Duke.' It was the fixed conviction of the English 
 embassy that the Flemish were only playing into the 
 hands of the French, and they were at a loss as to how 
 to proceed.* They found themselves unable to prevent 
 xhe piratical raids of the Flemish or of the now notorious 
 
 ' Rymer, " Foedera," viii. 274 ; " Royal Letters, Henry IV.," 
 p. 270. 
 
 2 "Royal Letters, Henry IV.," p. 186. 
 ' Ibid., p. 200. * Ibid., p. 112. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY I9 
 
 St. Pol, who had long maintained a powerful fleet in 
 Burgundy's own harbour of Gravelines. Sir Richard 
 Aston, Captain of Calais, in a letter written to the Duke 
 himself on March 18, 1404,^ describes the seaboard of 
 Flanders as an armed arsenal for the destruction of 
 English trade ; while the Count of St. Pol had even 
 pushed a plundering expedition into the Isle of Wight. 
 The Count, said Aston, was a vassal of the Duke's, and 
 he was therefore responsible for his actions. He re- 
 minded Burgundy of the reputation of the French Kings 
 as the " lords of an abundant fountain of justice and 
 equity" — a very appropriate hint at a time when 
 Charles VI. was a mere puppet in the hands of Bur- 
 gundy and Orleans. Burgundy's position as Regent of 
 France was full of significance to the English envoys, 
 who informed Henry that he might infer from the corre- 
 spondence of the Flemish " the intentions of the French, 
 though veiled under the title of letters of the Flemish, 
 and declared in their letters with subtlety of words. "^ 
 Later in the same year they sent him news of active 
 preparations on the part of the Flemish and French for 
 the invasion of Wales or some other part of the king- 
 dom. In their opinion the County of Flanders was as 
 much subject to French influence as any part of England 
 was to his own. Such was at least the temporary suc- 
 cess of the French policy with regard to Flanders. They 
 stated, further, that no treaty with Flanders would be of 
 any avail apart from the treaty with France, and urged 
 the speedy conclusion of the latter, owing to the shifty 
 character of the Flemings,^ of whom the same flattering 
 estimate appears in the letter of Sir Richard Aston, a 
 part of which has been cited above. 
 
 1 " Royal Letters, Henry IV.," pp. 213, 214. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 212. ^ Ibid., p. 379. 
 
 2 — 2 
 
20 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 Philip le Hardi died on April 27, 1404, and the conduct 
 of affairs in Burgundy and Flanders devolved, as has 
 been already stated, upon the Duchess Margaret, in the 
 absence of the new Duke. She showed herself in the 
 subsequent transactions far more conciliatory than her 
 late husband. It is a noteworthy fact that both the 
 Duchesses who were called upon to administer the affairs 
 of Burgundy — Margaret, for her son, and afterwards 
 Isabella of Portugal for her husband, Philip the Good — 
 initiated almost a complete reversal of the policy pre- 
 viously pursued. Just at present both the Flemish and 
 their Duchess realized the necessity for humouring the 
 English a little more. The change of opinion in Flanders 
 is attested by the letter of the authorities of Bruges,' 
 written only three days after the Duke's death. They 
 notified the English deputies of the demise of their Duke, 
 and regarded with tears the hostility which had arisen 
 between England and Flanders, which they stated to 
 be the effect of the misdeeds of " certain freebooters and 
 pirates of the sea, Belial's own sowers of tares, and sons 
 of iniquity. " They also declared that as far as Flanders, 
 at any rate, was concerned, the Duchess desired to devote 
 her energies to the restoration of peace. Henry stated 
 that he was cordially of the same opiiiion. He wished 
 to establish anew the old friendly relations with the 
 Four Members, and to avoid for the future the effusion 
 of Christian blood, in spite of the refractory and un- 
 grateful conduct of the Flemish, as contrasted with his 
 own magnanimity and long-suffering.* 
 
 Meanwhile the Duchess had begun to act. Proclama- 
 tions were issued to restrain the piratical exploits of her 
 subjects, with the saving clause inserted, " provided 
 that the English do and cause the like to be done." She 
 
 1 " Royal Letters, Henry IV.," p. 230. * Ibid., p. 230. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 21 
 
 also applifed to the King of France for powers to treat 
 in her own person,^ but even now the correspondence 
 which passed between the two parties demonstrates very 
 clearly the mutual suspicion with which they regarded 
 each other. In spite of continual protestations of good 
 faith on the part of the English ambassadors, the 
 Flemish affected to believe that, under cover of the 
 negotiations, " certain enterprises were to be under- 
 taken in England against the land of Flanders." These 
 preparations, they said, were under the direction of 
 Henry Despenser,^ the bellicose Bishop of Norwich, who 
 has already been mentioned as the leader of the disastrous 
 " Crusade " of 1383. After this slight hitch, the Duchess 
 asked that the envoys should be sent over by July 20 
 (1404),^ but this was regarded as too short a notice. 
 The English ambassadors did not arrive in Calais until 
 August 20.* Even when they did arrive, they took the 
 impolitic course of upbraiding the treachery of the 
 Flemish. This caused another delay of some duration, 
 due ostensibly to the Flemish desire to " ascertain the 
 will " of their Duchess.^ Meanwhile the English em- 
 bassy had been reduced by forced absence and by sick- 
 ness to the single person of the veteran De Ryssheton, 
 who did not forget to inform the King of the condensed 
 nature of the body that represented him in Flanders. 
 In spite of the apparent sympathy of the Duchess, the 
 inaction of the English envoys led to a renewed outbreak 
 of freebooting on the part of the Flemish.* The un- 
 abashed character of these last outrages provoked a 
 personal letter^ from Henry IV. to the Duchess. In 
 addition to a raid upon some English fishing-vessels, the 
 
 1 " Royal Letters, Henry IV.," p. 247. 2 jj,i^^ p 256. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 266. * Ibid., p. 294. ° Ibid., p. 302. 
 
 ° Ibid., p. 309. ^ Ibid., p. 353. 
 
22 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 pirates had seized a ship in which the Bishop of Hereford 
 was proceeding from Middleburgh to England, and after 
 thrusting out all hands into the sea, had detained the 
 worthy prelate for ransom at Dunkirk. The " thrusting 
 of all hands into the sea "is a picturesque touch, and 
 reminds one rather forcibly of Chaucer's shipman of 
 Dartmouth, who sent his prisoners " home by sea to 
 every land," demonstrating the painful fact that " walk- 
 ing the plank " was as popular an institution among 
 medieval pirates as among their successors of later date. 
 Serious as this incident was, it did not interfere materially 
 with the resumption of the negotiations. The Flemish 
 now objected to the English demand that a restoration 
 of the confiscated merchandise should form a necessary 
 preliminary to any discussion. This caused a breach 
 between the Duchess and the Four Members. She 
 decided to cut adrift from them, and to treat with the 
 English through her own representatives only. The 
 complication which ensued necessitated an alteration in 
 the existing arrangements, and the English deputies 
 returned their commission to the Privy Council^ for the 
 necessary alterations, with a request for its immediate 
 return,^ a demand which had to be repeated no less than 
 nine times by special messenger without result. 
 
 While the Council in England deliberated as to whether 
 it was any good continuing the negotiations with so 
 unsatisfactory a party as the Flemish, the ambassadors 
 were fully employed in pleading the cause of the Bishop 
 and the fishermen. The piracy still continued, and the 
 envoys accused the Duchess' of personally examining and 
 distributing the spoils,* an action which they described 
 as " the signal for battle on the part of Your Excellency." 
 
 * " Royal Letters, Henry IV.," p. 335. ^ Ibid., p. 398. 
 ' Ibid., pp. 345, 348. * Ibid., p. 350. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 23 
 
 With regard to the Bishop, they were now treating 
 separately with the Four Members. Unless these wrongs 
 are speedily corrected, they said, " the Commons of the 
 realm will appoint a remedy (which God forbid) ex- 
 ceedingly severe."^ Contemporary events in England 
 rendered this threat extremely impolitic. Trouble was 
 brewing in the North, Owen " Glendower " was in open 
 revolt in Wales, and the Exchequer was empty. It 
 seemed, indeed, that the Flemish held all the cards, 
 and as invasion was threatening from the side of France, 
 the Duchess could afford to laugh at the vain words of 
 the English. She proceeded to use recrimination, and 
 accused the English of similar malpractices, citing 
 specifically a descent upon Sluys on August 14, 1404, 
 when they had dismantled a church and driven off 
 cattle. She was astounded at their effrontery. This 
 mild irony on the part of the Duchess extracted from 
 the English ambassadors a sarcastic comment on her 
 idea of an equivalent. The plunder of a few cattle was 
 a trifle compared with an attack upon and the abduc- 
 tion of a Bishop and six hundred fishermen.^ During all 
 this time the Council had made no progress, and De 
 Ryssheton wrote on October 6 to the Archbishop of 
 Canterbury requesting the immediate despatch of the 
 commission.^ The lethargic attitude of the Coimcil 
 astonished him, considering " the tempests which daily 
 rage more and more against the King and his realm " 
 — an allusion to the threatened French invasion. The 
 Flemish fleet was also being prepared to aid the French 
 to the number of seven-and-thirty ships. On October 14, 
 1404, De Ryssheton wrote again, this time to the Mayor 
 of London,* giving intelligence of the magnitude of the 
 
 ^ " Royal Letters, Henry IV.," p. 359. ^ Ibid., p. 389. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 367. * Ibid., p. 384. 
 
24 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 French preparations at Sluys against England. The 
 English ambassadors now wrote to the Duchess in 
 extreme indignation, but their efforts found no support 
 from the Council.^ They decided to return to England 
 unless the commission arrived before the forthcoming 
 Feast of All Saints. They received no reply, and 
 returned to England. At this point the series of letters 
 relating to Flanders contained in the first volume of the 
 Royal Letters of Henry IV. comes to an end. The con- 
 nection between these letters is admirably set forth in 
 that volume, and it is a pity that we have not a similar 
 edition of the correspondence of the rest of the reign. 
 
 .Twelve days after the return of the ambassadors the 
 long-desired commission was issued by Henry at 
 Coventry.^ He nominated Richard, Bishop of Bangor, 
 Sir Richard Aston, and De Ryssheton with full powers 
 to treat with the Duchess and the Four Members, whose 
 deputies had arrived in Westminster to inquire into the 
 losses which had been sustained by the English. Henry 
 urged his representatives to agitate for a renewal of the 
 truce as it stood on November lo, 1403. These negotia- 
 tions were destined to continue for another sixteen 
 months before any definite treaty was drawn up between 
 England and Flanders ; during this time the commission 
 was twice reissued.^ The Duchess Margaret had died 
 on March 27, 1405, and John the Fearless had assumed 
 control of Flemish affairs. This Duke, surnamed " the 
 Fearless " owing to his rash conduct during the Turkish 
 Wars, was not the only Duke of Burgundy who obtained 
 a misleading title. Not one of the Burgundian Dukes 
 had a character which calls for special admiration, and 
 Jean Sans-peur least of all. He did not lack courage, 
 
 » "Royal Letters, Henry IV.," p. 376. 
 
 * Rymer, " Foedera," viii. 385. ' Ibid., pp. 391, 444. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 25 
 
 but he Wcis shifty, cunning, and unscrupulous. Unlike 
 his father, he was not bound by patriotic ties of a very 
 enduring kind to the French Monarchy — a fact which a 
 representative of that body did not forget. John the 
 Fearless had no definite line of policy ; he judged all 
 men by his own standard of morality, and his consequent 
 cynicism led to an overdone caution which he only once 
 allowed himself to forget. It was the last time. His 
 enemies saw to it that he should have no other chance. 
 At present his assumption of the control of Flemish 
 affairs meant a brighter outlook for the much-tried 
 English ambassadors. An end was put to their labours 
 and sufferings by the Treaty of March, 1406. 
 
26 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 II 
 
 The next seven years form an important period in the 
 history of the relations of England and Burgundy. 
 Events within the French kingdom relieved the strug- 
 gling Lancastrian House in England of the one real danger 
 which threatened it, and enabled Henry IV. to enter 
 upon a positive policy with regard to France. The 
 rapid rise of the territorial power of the House of Bur- 
 gundy under the fostering care of Philip le Hardi had 
 excited the jealousy and apprehension of Louis of 
 Orleans/ who had attempted to introduce Orleanist 
 influence into the Netherlands as a counterpoise to that 
 of Burgundy. Added to the fact that Burgundy and 
 Orleans were already engaged in deadly strife for the 
 preponderating position in French internal affairs, the 
 organization of an Orleanist opposition in the Low 
 Countries — a sphere in which the Burgundian Dukes had 
 determined to tolerate no rivals — formed the final incen- 
 tive for the assassination of Louis of Orleans on Novem- 
 ber 23, 1407. Burgundy's action divided France into 
 North and South in the great civil war that ensued. 
 From the start the opposing factions were working for a 
 complete reversal of the relations in which England and 
 France had stood during the first few years of the 
 century. Charles VI. had, as we have seen, refused to 
 recognize Henry IV. as King of England, and had 
 declined without politeness to admit Henry's ambassa- 
 dors to his presence. These insults Henry had been 
 1 Pirenne, " Hist. Belgique," vol. ii.., p. 210. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 27 
 
 forced to endure with as good a grace as possible, and he 
 waited for the opportunity for revenge which fortune 
 placed in his grasp before many years had passed. Both 
 Burgundy and Orleans, as the feud increased in viru- 
 lence, looked across the Channel and began to bid for 
 Henry's support. This fact enabled the English King 
 to pursue an aggressive policy, by means of which, with 
 very little expenditure of money and blood, he reduced 
 the internal affairs of France to a state of absolute 
 desperation, and rendered the realm an easy prey to the 
 ambitious designs of his successor. 
 
 But in 1406 the two parties had not gone to sufifiicient 
 lengths in their feud to make them forget their common 
 patriotism. To Burgundy and Orleans England was 
 still the traditional foe of France, and this sentiment 
 gave rise to the last combined movement of the rivals 
 before they concentrated their forces for the destruction 
 of one another. In March, 1406,' John the Fearless had 
 concluded with Henry IV. a treaty which secured for a 
 time the commercial welfare of England and Flanders.* 
 This agreement took the usual form, and, like all the 
 others, may be summed up in three words — merchants, 
 fishermen, clerks. It was a long-standing grievance, 
 from the English point of view, that merchants settled 
 in foreign parts were in a far inferior position both with 
 regard to status and privileges than alien traders settled 
 in England. Attempts were continually being made to 
 remedy this defect with more or less success. Fishermen 
 were always very great sufferers from a state of war, 
 reed or virtual, and therefore they claimed a prominent 
 position in all the commercial treaties. The sea being 
 so insecure a means of communication, the overland 
 route to Rome was universally favoured in the Middle 
 1 " Foedera," viii. 469. 
 
28 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 Ages, since it offered a slightly reduced catalogue of 
 risks. Over a large part of this route the Duke of 
 Burgundy had control, owing to his territorial position 
 in the Netherlands and in Central France. Therefore 
 each of the Anglo-Flemish treaties contains express 
 provisions for the needs of English clerics on their way to 
 and from the Eternal City. 
 
 The Treaty of 1406^ was, of course, arranged to con- 
 tinue in force in spite of any complications which might 
 arise between England and France, and therefore the 
 existence of the treaty did not interfere with the design 
 of John the Fearless with regard to Calais. In Septem- 
 ber, 1406, the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans, after a 
 reconciliation which was as hollow as anything could 
 well be, determined to make in collaboration an organized 
 attack upon the English possessions in France. Bur- 
 gundy undertook to besiege Calais, while Orleans moved 
 against Bordeaux. John the Fearless, however, delayed 
 his advance so long, owing to his elaborate preparations, 
 that he gave Henry in England and the citizens of 
 Calais ample time to provide for his reception. While 
 he dallied and wavered Heiuy was issuing writs to the 
 sheriffs throughout England and to the Chancellor of the 
 Palatine County of Lancaster — so great was the peril 
 adjudged to be — with instructions to them to be pre- 
 pared with the levies of their respective shires to resist 
 the attack which the Duke of Burgundy intended making 
 upon Calais with the assistance of Flanders and Brabant.' 
 It appears, however, that the Duke's dilatory conduct 
 on this occasion was due in no small part to the action 
 of English emissaries, who had no doubt been sent from 
 Calais. Burgundy had prepared a large array of war- 
 engines and cannon for his enterprise at St. Omer, but 
 
 1 " Foedera," viii. 469. " Ibid., p. 456. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 29 
 
 as he was about to start there arrived letters, ostensibly 
 from the King of France, expressing great disapproval 
 of the expedition and commanding its instant abandon- 
 ment. It is said that the Duke almost wept for annoy- 
 ance at the receipt of these despatches, which were in 
 reality the figment of some of his numerous enemies. 
 Accordingly, he stored his siege-gear in the enclosure 
 of the Church of St. Bertin at St. Omer until he should 
 resume his enterprise. But some traitors of St. Omer 
 sold the means of destroying the tackle to the English. 
 All the engines were burnt, as well as a large part of the 
 Abbey of St. Bertin, an affair which caused great terror 
 throughout St. Omer. But — the chronicler adds with 
 satisfaction — the traitors were detected, and died with 
 great dishonour.*^ 
 
 This was in October, and when the Duke in the follow- 
 ing month appeared before the walls of Calais, the 
 English shire levies were not needed to supplement the 
 effect of the torrential rains and arctic cold upon his 
 half-hearted enterprise. Orleans, with more respect for 
 the contract than his shifty ally, had started long before. 
 He directed his main attack upon the formidable fortress 
 of Bourg, on the Gironde, one of the bulwarks of Bor- 
 deaux. This southern attempt also ended in disaster, 
 and Orleans returned to continue his civil struggle with 
 Burgundy. The same year saw the final blow delivered 
 to any semblance of French unity by the treacherous 
 hand of John the Fearless, who realized that the only 
 way to relieve the pressure of Orleanist territorial 
 aggression was to deprive the rival faction of its head. 
 Louis of Orleans was assassinated by emissaries of the 
 Duke of Burgundy on November 23, 1407, and his death 
 
 1 " Chroniques Beiges Inedites," ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 
 vol. ii., pp. 423, 424. 
 
30 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 made his rival at once supreme in France, since the 
 King was mere clay in the hands of Burgundy. At 
 first John the Fearless appeared the most sincere 
 mourner for the death of Orleans/ but as soon as he 
 had made his position secure he made an open avowal 
 of his complicity in the crime. He was now able to 
 force upon his rivals a formal reconciliation, which took 
 place on March 9, 1409. The Orleanist faction was only 
 waiting for a leader, and the want was soon supplied 
 by the marriage of the young Charles of Orleans to a 
 daughter of Bernard, Count of Armagnac, whose leader- 
 ship and name were adopted for the rejuvenated Orleanist 
 party. The growing unpopularity of John the Fearless 
 supplied the motive-power of the coalition of the French 
 nobility, which was now formed for the suppression of 
 the Burgundian influence at Court. Orleans and 
 Armagnac were joined by the Dukes of Berri, Bourbon, 
 and Brittany. In the strength of this combination 
 Orleans demanded the banishment of Burgundy as the 
 instigator of his father's murder. Civil war ensued, and 
 France was divided into two hostile camps, between 
 which flowed the Loire. 
 
 The Armagnacs depended upon the nobility of the 
 South and West ; the Burgundians looked for support 
 to the burghers of Paris and the Flemish towns ; while 
 both parties simultaneously applied to the English 
 Government for aid. But while the Armagnacs con- 
 tented themselves with the request that no assistance 
 should be granted to their rivals,^ the Duke of Burgundy 
 had the support of the traditional alliance of England 
 and Flanders. There was also the consideration that 
 the Orleanists had always been consistently hostile to 
 
 1 "Chron. de la Pucille," p. 115. 
 ^ " Chron. St. Denys," iv. 475. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 3 1 
 
 England. The way in which the English attitude to- 
 wards the combatants was affected by commercial 
 interest is demonstrated by the politic conduct of 
 Burgundy towards his Flemish subjects. The efforts of 
 Sir Richard Aston' and others to insure the successful 
 maintenance of the existing treaty, and for the establish- 
 ment of a surety system for the keeping of the seas 
 between the harbours of Winchelsea and St. Valery, and 
 towards the north and east of them, had been followed 
 by the issue of a commission on March 8, 1408,^ to the 
 English ambassadors to negotiate the renewal of the 
 treaty for another year. This renewal was accom- 
 plished on the nth of the following June,^ with the 
 additional benefit of security on the seas for English, 
 French, and Flemish. For this latter measure Burgundy 
 himself secured the ratification of the King of France on 
 October 5, 1408.* On May 30, 1409, the English envoys 
 were empowered to treat at Calais with the deputies of 
 the Duke and those of the Four Members, and to arrange 
 for the continuance of the present peaceful relations 
 in the interests of trade and commerce. ° The case of 
 the Bishop of Hereford still dragged on its weary course, 
 and on March 11, 1410, an entirely new set of Commis- 
 sioners was created to investigate his grievances. These 
 Commissioners were given the timely warning not to 
 allow their zeal for justice and impartiality to carry them 
 away so much as to endanger the good-feeling that at 
 present existed between England and Flanders.* 
 That it was easily possible to exaggerate the warmth 
 
 1 Rjrmer, " Foedera," viii. 491. ^ Ibid., p. 511. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 530 ; Proceedings of Privy Council, i., p. 310. 
 
 * •• Foedera," viii. 548. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 589 ; Proceedings of Privy Council, p. 353. 
 
 * Rymer, " Foedera, viii. 627. 
 
32 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 of this entente is amply proved by the frequency of 
 complaints and actions in cases of piracy committed by 
 either side. English and Flemish freebooters adjudged 
 the comparative quiescence a splendid opportunity for 
 occasional pickings. As a result of the complaint of 
 the burgesses of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, King Henry 
 instructed his son Henry,' who was at this time Con- 
 stable of Dover Castle, to investigate the circumstances 
 of a piratical enterprise for which a certain John Prender- 
 gcist was responsible, the proceeds of which had been to 
 Rye to be disposed of. These infringements soon became 
 so common that Thomas Pickworth, Lieutenant of 
 Calais, and other English ambassadors were nominated 
 in March, 1411, to consider in conjunction with the 
 Flemish the losses of both parties, and then to proceed 
 to reparatory measures.^ On the whole the treaty was 
 well kept, and was a source of mutual benefit to both 
 countries. There can hardly be any doubt that con- 
 sideration for these circumstances, as well as the personal 
 inclinations of Prince Henry and the Beauforts, who 
 were at the time in power, directed the English attitude 
 with regard to the simultaneous requests of the hostile 
 French parties. In September, 141 1, the Prince 
 despatched an embassy, consisting of the Earl of Arundel, 
 Francis de Courte, Lord of Pembroke, Hugh Mortimer, 
 and John Catrik,^ to negotiate a marriage between 
 himself and Burgundy's daughter Anne — a step pro- 
 fessedly taken " for the honour of God and the avoidance 
 of Christian bloodshed." The embassy bore the promise 
 of armed assistance against the Armagnacs, and a body 
 of troops under the command of Sir Gilbert Umphraville 
 sailed before the end of the same month. The Parisian 
 
 ' Rymer, " Foedera," viii. 656. 
 
 * Ibid,, p. 677. 3 Ibid., pp. 698, 699. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 33 
 
 populace held out for Burgundy, and had made frequent 
 appeals to the Duke for assistance. The Orleanist 
 coalition had captured St. Denis on October 11, and were 
 blockading the capital. On the 23rd Burgundy joined 
 the Enghsh at Pontoise, and entered Paris with his allies 
 a few days later. On November 8 a force consisting of 
 Burgundians, Parisians, and the whole of the English 
 contingent left Paris by the Porte St. Jacques and 
 attacked the Armagnac entrenchments at St. Cloud- 
 The Orleanists were expelled with the loss of about nine 
 hundred men, and retreated beyond the Loire, leaving 
 Burgundy secure in Paris. The English auxiliaries were 
 dismissed on December 18 with gifts and honours, and 
 retired to Calais. While these events were going on in 
 France the negotiations for the marriage seem to have 
 been allowed to hang fire. In January, 1412, the Duke 
 sent ambassadors to England to continue them, and his 
 action was followed in February by a return commission 
 to the Burgundian Court headed by Thomas, Bishop of 
 Durham. Both these embassies combined business with 
 pleasure by still further emphasizing the need for com- 
 mercial concord.^ 
 
 But just when the Anglo-Burgundian alliance propa- 
 gated by the young Prince Henry was well on its way to 
 completion by the marriage with Anne of Burgundy, a 
 sudden change in the aspect of English internal politics 
 ruined the whole scheme. Bishop Beaufort, on Novem- 
 ber II, proposed to Henry IV. that he should resign 
 the crown on account of ill-health. The King took the 
 suggestion in a very bad grace, and immediately dis- 
 missed Thomas Beaufort from his office of Chancellor 
 and the Prince from the Presidency of the Council, where 
 he was replaced by his brother Thomas, soon to be made 
 1 Rymer, " Foedera," viii. 728. 
 
 3 
 
34 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 Duke of Clarence, while Arundel became Chancellor 
 in the room of Beaufort. It is this sudden change in the 
 position of the English parties more than any fixed 
 design on the part of Henry IV. to act as the balance 
 of power in French affairs that now made the English 
 veer round to the Armagnac side. It was well known 
 that Clarence and Arundel, and perhaps even the King 
 himself, inclined towards the Orleanists, and a distinc- 
 tion was made by a contemporary writer between the 
 embassy which came in 1411 " fro the due of Bourgne 
 unto the prince of England " and that of 1412, when 
 " the due of Orleaunce sent ambassadors into England 
 unto King Henry the iiij,"' in which the Armagnacs, 
 quick to discern the signs of the times, offered the Duchy 
 of Aquitaine as a stimulant to the Arundel clique. On 
 May 18, 1412, a treaty was concluded on these terms 
 with the Duke of Orleans. Burgundy, in high dis- 
 pleasure, seems to have instantly taken aggressive steps, 
 for we find a letter, written on May 16,^ from Henry to 
 the " honourable and prudent burgomasters of Ghent, 
 Bruges, and Ypres, which states that the King has 
 received trustworthy information that the Duke of 
 Burgundy is about to invade Guienne with intent to 
 inflict injury upon " our dear friends the Dukes of Berri, 
 Orleans, and Bourbon, and the Counts of Alengon and 
 Armagnac." This being so, he was anxious to know what 
 steps the Flemish towns intended taking in the matter — 
 whether it was their intention to support their suzerain, 
 or to maintain the treaty which they had made with 
 England in semi-independence of him. In the latter 
 event they were promised cordial reciprocity on his part. 
 The Four Members appear to have given Henry's pro- 
 
 1 Harley MSS. 2248, ff. 278, 279. 
 
 " " Foedera,'' viii. 737 ; Proceedings of Privy Council, ii. 28. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 35 
 
 posals a favourable hearing. On June ii the Captain 
 of Calais was instructed to proclaim the existence of an 
 Anglo-Flemish truce at the request of the States of 
 Flanders.* Similar instructions were issued in the 
 following months to the Lieutenant of Dover Castle, the 
 Warden of the Cinque Ports, and the Mayors of Sandwich 
 and Winchelsea.' By the Treaty of May i8* with the 
 Armagnacs, Henry had undertaken that for the future 
 neither he nor his heirs should make any treaty or 
 alliance with the Duke of Burgundy, his sons, brothers, 
 or any of his German connections whatsoever without 
 the cognizance and consent of the Duke of Orleans. 
 These promises were confirmed personally by the King's 
 four sons, Henry, Thomas, John, and Humphrey, two 
 days later.* The Orleanist connection was, in spite of 
 all this, destined to be of short duration. It was no 
 small score for the Prince of Wales and the Burgundian 
 party in England that the expedition under Thomas, 
 Duke of Clarence, which was sent to the aid of the 
 Armagnacs, proved a decided fiasco. After a few 
 abortive wanderings in Normandy, Clarence found that 
 Orleans, who seems to have been as shifty a character 
 as his rival of Burgundy, was already making overtures 
 to the enemy. The arrangement which the patriotic 
 Dukes finally arrived at was that the party which 
 invited the English into France should purchase their 
 withdrawal. In the following November Clarence 
 withdrew into Aquitaine under these new conditions, 
 which, of course, entirely invalidated the treaty of the 
 preceding March, and rendered a complete reversal of 
 English foreign policy a practical certainty. 
 
 * " Foedera,'' viii. 751. ^ Ibid., p. 765. 
 
 ' Ibid., 739. * Ibid., p. 743. 
 
 3—2 
 
36 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 III 
 
 Henry IV. died on March 20, 1413, and the leader of the 
 Burgundian sympathizers in England became King as 
 Henry V. His father had done the hack-work of a new 
 dynasty, and his son felt himself secure enough on the 
 throne to indulge in vast and definite schemes of foreign 
 conquest, and the acquisition of martial glory which cir- 
 cumstance and temperament had denied his less illus- 
 trious predecessor. In these last, but not the least, 
 glorious days of the fading Middle Ages the character of 
 Henry V. shines forth as the resuscitation of Edward III., 
 the flower of medieval chivalry, and his aspirations 
 turned, like those of his ancestor, to that mirage of an 
 Anglo-French Empire which had been at once the source 
 of so much glory and of so much disaster to the Crown of 
 England. Contemporaneous events within the French 
 Kingdom were clearly offering to the new King of 
 England an opportunity such as his predecessors had 
 never had, and which might never occur again. France 
 was paralyzed by the mania of her King and by the 
 suicidal virulence of factious strife. Henry V. im- 
 mediately made preparations for the final act in the 
 Hundred Years' War.. The Burgundo-Armagnac quarrel 
 had assumed a new phase. In April, 1413, the atrocities 
 of the Cabochien rule, which had been established in Paris 
 by the supporters of the Duke of Burgundy, had led 
 inevitably to a severe reaction, which had enabled the 
 Armagnac Princes to recover possession of the city once 
 more. John the Fearless quickly made his escape to his 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 37 
 
 own dominions, and left to the Armagnac faction that 
 prestige which control over the King's person neces- 
 sarily gave them. These retreats of the Burgundian 
 Duke to his own domains when any crisis in French 
 affairs threatened his person are of more than merely 
 momentary significance. They point to the fact, which 
 was now daily becoming more obvious, that Burgundy 
 was consciously developing into a separate power in 
 Europe.' The position which the course of events in 
 France and the ambition of the Dukes themselves were 
 forcing upon it gave the Burgundian House, secure in 
 the possession of the consolidated Netherlands, the power 
 to exercise a foreign policy which would in any case have 
 been beyond the control of the French Monarchy. 
 Therefore the events of the following score of years must 
 not be regarded entirely in the customary manner, which 
 has persisted in looking upon the Burgundian Dukes 
 merely as unpatriotic Frenchmen working for their own 
 ends at the expense of their country's welfare ; they 
 must be considered as the natural result of the Bur- 
 gundian policy of creating a separate kingdom between 
 France and the Empire. 
 
 The neutrality which was preserved by John of 
 Burgundy during the years which culminated in the 
 Battle of Agincourt does not find, therefore, anything like 
 its principal cause in the desire to promote Flemish 
 commercial interests. There can be no doubt that in 
 the Duke's mind this consideration occupied a position 
 of some importance, but nevertheless it was subsidiary 
 to and resultant upon the central and dominant idea 
 of Burgundian independence. But even so, the bonds 
 which united the Valois Dukes of Burgundy to the 
 interests of the French Monarchy, of which they were a 
 ' Pirenne, " Hist, de Belgique," ii. 220. 
 
38 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 branch, needed something more than a matter of mere 
 political expediency to break them irretrievably. For 
 this cause of rupture the House of Burgundy had not 
 long to wait ; meanwhile Burgundy had to content him- 
 self with waiting to see what were the intentions of 
 Henry V. of England. As we have already noticed, 
 John the Fearless did not make any sign of movement 
 until the result of the Battle of Agincourt marked out 
 for him a more definite course of action. 
 
 At the very beginning of Henry's reign the two French 
 parties had again made overtures to him. It is notice- 
 able that Clarence and the Armagnac party in England 
 still had some weight, as their proposals delayed any 
 decided action on the King's part. The question which 
 seems to have agitated Henry was the difficulty of 
 deciding from which party in France the more advan- 
 tageous terms were to be obtained. Accordingly, nego- 
 tiations were opened with both Burgundians and 
 Armagnacs. Henry himself, supported by Bedford, 
 inclined towards Burgundy, and in July, 1413,' Henry 
 Chichele, Bishop of St. David's, and Richard, Earl of 
 Warwick, were appointed ambassadors to proceed to 
 Burgundy's presence to treat for a renewal of the truce 
 with France, and for an agreement with the Duke with 
 regard to his own dominions. The Burgundians were at 
 this time still supreme in Paris, and after negotiations 
 had been conducted for some time at Leulinghem, near 
 Calais, the envoys returned bearing an extension of the 
 truce for Picardy and Flanders. Contemporaneous 
 negotiations conducted by Edward of York also took 
 place with the Armagnacs for a marriage between Henry 
 and the French King's daughter Catharine, an alliance 
 which was afterwards concluded under the auspices of 
 1 " Foedera," ix. 34, 36. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 39 
 
 the rival faction. The Armagnacs decided to send an 
 embassy to England, and their envoys arrived in 
 London on December 19, 1413.^ The only result of the 
 conference was the conclusion of a truce to last until 
 February, 1415. In the following year embassies again 
 reached England from the rivals, and the favour with 
 which Henry regarded the envoys of Burgundy is evi- 
 denced by the fact that he treated with them in person at 
 Leicester, while the Dauphin's ambassadors were 
 allowed to remain in London. On May 23 Henry con- 
 cluded a secret treaty with Burgundy, which provided 
 for an alliance against the Armagnacs, but with a saving 
 for the French King.^ Following upon this advance, the 
 Duke of Burgundy sent as envoys to England Radulf 
 of Bruges and John of Robais,^ to treat for the mar- 
 riage which Henry had now in view between himself and 
 Catharine, another of Burgundy's daughters. They 
 described in glowing terms the nobility, the beauty, and 
 sound morality of that Princess, and on June 4 Henry 
 commissioned Henry le Scrope and Hugh Mortimer to 
 negotiate for the marriage, and to secure the confirmation 
 of the present friendly relations both in politics and 
 commerce. They were also to use Henry's claim to the 
 throne of France to receive in his name the Duke's 
 homage as his vassal.* The negotiations which were 
 being carried on with the Dauphin's party proved 
 abortive, but Henry was not disappointed. He was 
 playing one party against the other with the greatest 
 success, and was also — more important still — gaining 
 time for the preparations for his coming campaign in 
 France. In these transactions with the Burgundians 
 
 1 " Chron. London," p. 97. 
 
 " Kingsford, " Henry V.," p. 114. 
 
 3 " Foedera," ix. 136. * Ibid., p. 136. 
 
40 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 and Armagnacs it is only fair to state that Henry was 
 as insincere as they were. However, embassies continued 
 to arrive from the Duke of Burgundy,* who seems to 
 have been anxious to complete a provisional settlement 
 on the terms suggested by Henry. But the latter was 
 too busy with the final touches to his preparations for 
 war. He had taken good care to make his terms with 
 the Dauphin so extravagant as to be impossible of 
 acceptance, so that there could be only one result from 
 the tortuous negotiations. On August 7, 1415, Henry 
 embarked in person for the invasion of France and for 
 the recovery of his heritage. 
 
 Even at this time the English King fully recognized 
 the trend of Burgundian affairs, and before he sailed 
 from Southampton Water he despatched Philip Morgan 
 to negotiate with the Duke, who had now sent several 
 abortive embassies into England, for a treaty and 
 alliance with securities against ill-faith on either part.' 
 This was on August 10, and on the next day the English 
 army set saU for Normandy. The details of the 
 Agincourt campaign do not bear upon our subject, but 
 the attitude of the Duke of Burgundy has to be con- 
 sidered. Even in the face of this national peril the 
 French Princes could not act in concert ; the Orleanist 
 party hoped that Burgundy would not interfere in order 
 that they might have the sole credit of annihilating the 
 English. John of Burgundy, pursuing the subtleties of 
 his own schemes, bided his time. He sent explicit 
 instructions to his own vassals that they were to take 
 no part in the coming contest, and saw not without a 
 secret feeling of satisfaction the overthrow of the 
 Orleanist chivalry on the fatal field of Agincourt. This 
 indifference to the fate of France was not, howeveri 
 
 1 " Foedera," ix. 158, 179. " Ibid., p. 304. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 4I 
 
 shared by the immediate relatives of the Duke in spite 
 of the stremious efforts of the head of their House to 
 prevent any aid from reaching the French camp. Two of 
 his brothers, and many gentlemen of Artois and Picardy, 
 joined the French ranks, an example which stirred the 
 martial zeal of John's son Philip, Count of Charolais, 
 who afterwards expressed bitter regret that he had not 
 taken part in the battle, whether for life or for death. ^ 
 The result of Agincourt evidently pleased the Duke of 
 Burgundy, who determined to make full use of the 
 French fiasco. He was, however, slightly embittered 
 against the English owing to the death of his two 
 brothers in the battle. But at the precise moment at 
 which success seemed assured his schemes were ruined 
 by the frantic energy of Bernard, Count of Armagnac, 
 who hurriedly brought up his Gascon levies from the 
 South, and was made Constable by the French King. 
 In December, 1415, matters were complicated by the 
 death of the Dauphin Louis, who was succeeded by his 
 brother John, formerly the protege of the Duke of 
 Burgundy. He had been betrothed to the Duke's niece, 
 Jacqueline of Hainault, who springs into considerable 
 prominence later on. In spite of this opportune event 
 for the Burgundian cause, the Armagnacs continued to 
 govern in the King's name. Burgundy, who saw that 
 his opponents had been too quick for him, continued his 
 negotiations with Henry V., who received into safe- 
 conduct by letters patent on January 15, 1416, the 
 Duke's envoys, Thierry le Roy and George Doonstede, 
 with eight persons of their company.^ A large part of 
 the work of this embassy was concerned with the com- 
 mercial relations of England and Flanders,' and in the 
 
 1 " Chron. St. Remy," i. 239, 240. 
 
 2 " Foedera," ix. 328. ' Ibid., p. 331. 
 
42 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 following June the existing treaty was prolonged for 
 another year.* But the deputations which reached 
 Henry from the Duke did not confine themselves to 
 merely temporal matters. Both John the Fearless and 
 Henry V. were deeply interested in common with the 
 rest of the Princes of Christendom in the deliberations of 
 the Council of Constance, which had been convened by 
 the Emperor Sigismund in November, 1414, and was 
 still in session. Contemporary events in Europe created 
 within the Council itself a replica of the Continental 
 situation of which the struggle between France and 
 England was the visible embodiment. The four 
 " nations " into which the members of the Council had 
 been divided — Italian, French, German, and English — 
 were finally reduced to two opposing forces, Latin 
 against Teuton. It was therefore Henry's main policy 
 to gain the goodwill of John of Burgundy, which would 
 be a factor of no inconsiderable importance to the 
 strength of the Teutonic element in the Council. He met 
 the representations of John the Fearless by appointing 
 the Bishop of Coventry and Richard, Earl of Warwick, 
 to discuss with the envoys of the Duke matters concerned 
 with the Universal Church, and the possibility of com- 
 bined English and Burgundian action.' 
 
 In addition to his strenuous efforts to restore unity to 
 the Church, Sigismund determined, in his capacity as 
 suzerain of Christendom, to devote his energies to the 
 satisfactory conclusion of the French War. Paris was 
 chosen as the seat of the first negotiations ; but Sigismund 
 soon perceived that in the French capital he was not 
 likely to prove successful. He decided to transfer the 
 negotiations to London, and, accompanied by a French 
 embassy, he arrived in England early in May. On the 
 • " Foedera," ix. 354. ' Ibid., p. 374. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 43 
 
 28th of the same month William of Holland came over to 
 England at Sigismund's request to assist in the delibera- 
 tions. The Emperor was, however, as unsuccessful in 
 London as he had been in Paris, and although he had 
 now given up the idea of a peaceful settlement, he con- 
 sented to be present at the conference which was to be 
 held at Calais in August, at which the Duke of Burgundy 
 had also been urged to appear by several requests from 
 Henry, who had commissioned Bishop Catrik to call at 
 the Burgundian Court on his way to Constance to make 
 arrangements for the meeting. The negotiations with 
 the French envoys only resulted in a general truce to 
 last until February, 1417, and this was all that had been 
 expected. The real motive for the conference was the 
 desire of both Henry and the Emperor to come to some 
 definite agreement with the Duke of Burgundy, who 
 arrived on October 3, the very day on which the French 
 envoys departed. Little as Henry trusted the shifty 
 Duke, he realized that his goodwill could at any rate be 
 purchased, and he decided to use this means to bind the 
 Duke to his side. John the Fearless, always prone to 
 judge men by his own standard of fidelity, had at first, 
 acting on the additional suggestion of his Council, who 
 were quite as cynical of human nature as the Duke 
 himself, refused to attend at Calais unless two Dukes and 
 four of the highest Earls in England were offered as 
 hostages.' 
 
 Subsequent negotiations, however, transacted by 
 the Duke's ambassadors in the presence of Henry V. 
 and his Council,^ were attended with such success that 
 John was induced to moderate his demands. Ultimately 
 the King's brother Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester,* 
 
 » Goodwin, " History of Henry V." ' Ibid. 
 
 ^ " Foedera,'' ix. 390. 
 
44 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 agreed to become surety for the safety of the wily 
 Burgundy, and the most elaborate preparations 
 were made at Calais for the arrival of the latter. A 
 residence was also being prepared at St. Omer for the 
 Duke of Gloucester. On October 3 Gloucester rode out 
 of Calais, and stayed at the arm of the sea at Gravelines. 
 Burgundy arrived on the other side, and they rode 
 across, shaking hands in the midst of the water. On 
 his arrival at St. Omer the Duke was well entertained 
 by Burgundy's son, the Count of Charolais. Such is 
 Goodwin's account, following Monstrelet, of the meeting 
 of John the Fearless and Duke Humphrey. Burgundy 
 was met by the Earl of Salisbury, and conducted to his 
 hostel by the Earl of Warwick, the Captain of Calais. 
 On the same day he had a conference with the Emperor, 
 for King Henry had already effected a reconciliation 
 between them. Then followed three days' colloquy in 
 public and four days of secret negotiation, upon the 
 conclusion of which Burgundy left Calais, and his noble 
 hostage was safely conducted back to his countrymen. 
 The secret nature of the business transacted bred in 
 English minds a suspicion of the Duke's intentions, 
 which was intensified by the unflattering estimate 
 circulated with regard to his character generally that 
 " he had two faces, like all Frenchmen.'" It was pal- 
 pably Henry's intention to induce the Duke to join the 
 alliance which had just been cemented between himself 
 and the Emperor. Burgundy, with characteristic caution, 
 declined to take the ultimate step, because he was not 
 prepared at this moment to break irremediably with 
 France ; therefore " he amused the King with fair and 
 ambiguous words." He was proof against the alluring 
 prospects which were dangled before his eyes by the 
 ^ Goodwin, " History of Henry V." 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 45 
 
 equally crafty, but more straightforward, King of 
 England, who offered him a share of the conquests 
 which they would make as allies.* All that the Duke 
 would publicly give his consent to was a prolongation of 
 the truce which had been made for Flanders and Artois 
 in the previous June. 
 
 The secret negotiations also raised suspicions of the 
 Duke of Burgundy on the French side as well, and the 
 Duke determined on this account to make some con- 
 cessions to Henry, who sent accordingly, in April, 1417, 
 an embassy, consisting of Henry Ware, William Bardolf ,' 
 and two others, to effect some definite arrangement 
 with Burgundy. Henry's representations appear to 
 have been conclusive, and the Duke signed at Calais, 
 on May 8, a treaty^ which, if it did not accomplish all 
 Henry would have liked, yet removed, at any rate for 
 a short time, the hovering fear that the scanty French 
 sympathies of the Duke might expand to the extent 
 of his affording assistance to the tottering French 
 Monarchy. But Burgundy's sympathies were regulated 
 by strict considerations of loss or gain, and he was in 
 no hurry to back what might prove to be a losing 
 horse. For the present his actions were merely tenta- 
 tive. He is stated to have acknowledged the legality 
 of Henry's claim to the French throne, but to have 
 decided to defer acting the part of vassal until Henry 
 had given sufficient assurance that he would eventually 
 conquer France from the English Channel to the Medi- 
 terranean. He broke with the traditions of his House, 
 however, in so far as he promised a small amount of 
 assistance in the present. On the whole, it is plain that 
 the Duke's gallant attempt to compromise between the 
 
 1 Monstrelet ; Le Fevre, p. 104. 
 
 2 Ryraer, " Foedera," ix. 449. ^ Ibid., pp. 4S1. 454. 
 
46 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 obvious wishes of Henry V. and the ties, feeble as they 
 were, which still bound him to the French Monarchy, 
 was successful only in gaining him the suspicion of both 
 parties ; but it must be acknowledged that his position 
 was a difficult one. He was the controlling head of a 
 new unit in European politics which was only just 
 becoming conscious of its independent power, and he 
 was being forced to choose a definite policy at a 
 time when he was totally unprepared for so drastic a 
 step. 
 
 While the Duke vacillated and wavered, Henry was 
 busy preparing for the invasion of Normandy to all 
 intents and purposes as though the former were in active 
 alliance with England. The French certainly regarded 
 the Duke as a traitor, and this fact had been of immense 
 service to Henry, because the French forces were divided 
 thereby, and left him practically free from serious op- 
 position. The Armagnacs regarded the Duke as the 
 more immediate danger, and concentrated their forces 
 for the defence of the capital, which was naturally the 
 object of Burgundy's attack, while he still protested 
 with his usual duplicity that he was acting entirely on 
 his own behalf, and not in collusion with Henry. But 
 the Duke's vehement denials failed conspicuously to 
 produce the desired effect upon French minds ; his 
 campaign had evidently been arranged in accordance 
 with his concordat with the English King, who landed 
 in Normandy at the very moment when Duke John 
 crossed the borders of Picardy in his march on Paris. 
 While the Burgundians and Armagnacs wrestled for the 
 Isle of France and Paris, Henry continued cheerfully 
 his systematic reduction of the Norman towns. His 
 position was at this juncture further strengthened for 
 the moment by the accession of Isabella, the Queen- 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 47 
 
 Regent, to the Burgundian side ; she was recognized by 
 the partisans of the Duke, who disbanded his troops 
 in December, 1417. But the Parisian revolt against 
 the Armagnacs in the following year, which restored to 
 Burgundy his supremacy in France, initiated a complete 
 reversal of his English policy. The Duke himself 
 entered Paris on June 14, 1418, and his claim to represent 
 in his person the King and Government of France was 
 a declaration of war upon Henry and a repudiation of 
 the Treaty of Calais. He could not in his new position 
 afford the least temporization, and he immediately 
 despatched his chamberlains, Andre des Roches and 
 Antoine de Toulongeon, with 4,000 men to relieve Rouen, 
 which was then hard pressed by the English. The 
 Governor of the citJ^ who was of pronounced Burgundian 
 sympathies, relied entirely on the promise of the Duke 
 to send further help as time went on. Moreover, Henry 
 had undertaken a heavier task than his forces could well 
 accomplish now that Burgundy had gone over to the 
 national side. Slow though the Duke proved in redeem- 
 ing his promises of succour to the devoted garrison, yet 
 in October, 1418, he made extensive preparations for 
 raising the siege. While his levies were assembling he 
 opened negotiations with Henry through the medium of 
 the Bishop of Beauvais, who was empowered to advance 
 offers of a definitive peace. The Dauphin thought he 
 could give better terms than Burgundy, and his envoys 
 reached Henry about the same time as those of the 
 Duke. The King of England saw in this action a 
 glorious opportunity for gaining time to complete the 
 reduction of Rouen, which was now in sore straits. 
 He kept the Bishop busy with pointless discussions, and 
 on November 14, 1418, an English embassy, under the 
 leadership of Henry, Archbishop of Canterbury, was 
 
48 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 appointed to wait on the Dauphin.* The Archbishop 
 had received powers to promise that Henry was willing 
 to bind himself not to make any alliance with the Duke 
 of Burgundy from the present until the Feast of the 
 Circumcision following. This was apparently a more 
 definite offer than the King had been prepared to make 
 on October 26.'' In vol. ii. of the Proceedings of the 
 Privy Council, p. 350, is to be found the article which 
 Henry submitted for the consideration of the Council, 
 and he explains therein the reasons which moved him 
 to take this step. In addition to the motive already 
 noted, there was the anxiety to effect some satisfactory 
 settlement which would obviate the necessity of con- 
 quering the whole of France piecemeal. The state of 
 Normandy also caused him extreme solicitude. Very 
 few of the nobility joined him, and this salient fact had 
 a dangerous effect upon the thin crust of popular loyalty. 
 Since the Duke of Burgundy had failed him, he hoped 
 to obtain an honourable settlement with the Dauphin. 
 He was well aware that the Dauphin would have nothing 
 v/hatever to do with any terms which involved the re- 
 nunciation on his part of the French Crown, and there- 
 fore Henry hoped only for a peace on condition that the 
 English possessions as they stood at the Treaty of 
 Bretigny should be restored, with the addition of that 
 part of Nonnandy which was still unsubdued, Guienne, 
 and the Marches of Calais. The Dauphin, on his part, 
 could not forget that the assistance of the English would 
 enable him to defeat the designs of Burgundy, who now 
 had in his power the King, Queen, and Princess of 
 France. As the reward for giving the Dauphin the 
 controlling voice in French affairs, Henry intended to 
 claim Flanders. Alluring though this prospect was, 
 » " Foedera," ix. 646. 2 Ibid., p. 626. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 49 
 
 provided that the consent of the Dauphin was secured 
 for it, Henry was nevertheless deterred by the con- 
 sideration that by thus joining the Dauphin he would 
 condemn his own pretensions to the throne of France, 
 while he was painfully aware, on the other hand, that 
 this repudiation of his claims would render it impossible 
 for Burgundy to pay him homage for Flanders if that 
 dignitary were to reverse his policy a second time and 
 make overtures to him as King of France. Moreover, 
 he had concluded with the Duke a treaty for Flanders 
 which was to continue until the Easter of 1419, and this 
 agreement precluded definitely any possibility of an 
 invasion of Flanders before that date.' 
 
 While these things were being debated, Burgundy 
 was on the move. He assembled his troops at Beauvais 
 on December 29, 1418. They were a half-hearted con- 
 glomeration, who grimibled at being called out in mid- 
 winter, and seized every opportunity to slip away. This 
 fact also whittled away the determination of the Duke, 
 an eventuality which Henry's astuteness had apparently 
 foreseen, for he simimarily broke off the negotiations 
 with both parties a few days before the expected fall 
 of Rouen. The 2,000 Burgundian troops which 
 finally reached the outskirts of the starving city were 
 easily disposed of, and on December 31 Henry agreed 
 with alacrity to the proposal of the citizens that they 
 should surrender if the Duke sent no aid within the 
 ensuing fortnight. But Burgundy left the city to its 
 fate, and on January ig Rouen fell, and Henry became 
 master of Normandy with little trouble. Secure in 
 Normandy, he reopened negotiations with Burgundy 
 and the Dauphin, but his intentions were sincere only 
 with regard to the former. He was anxious to have 
 ' See Goodwin, " History of Henry V.," pp. 193, 194. 
 
 4 
 
50 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 the commercial treaty between England and Flanders 
 renewed, and was also influenced by the fact that 
 Burgundy had the disposal of the hand of the Princess 
 Catharine. On May 20 Hfenry commissioned William 
 Bardolf to treat for the renewal of the Flemish truce,* 
 and nine days later the King in person met John of 
 Burgundy and Queen Isabella at Meulan. Isabella was 
 accompanied by the Princess Catharine, who had already 
 been promised to Henry by the Duke, along with the 
 territories of 1360. But Henry continually increased 
 his claims, and with tremendous lack of insight refused 
 to guarantee the consent of the English Parliament to 
 the prospective treaty. Burgundy, who thoroughly 
 distrusted Henry, would go no further without this 
 promise. As soon as this deadlock occurred the 
 Dauphin saw his opportunity, and struck hard and 
 immediately. He had conceived the idea of separating 
 Burgundy and Henry for ever by one of the most ruinous 
 diplomatic strokes of which history gives record. He 
 sent to the Duke at Pontoise, and made the alluring 
 offer of the control of the King's Council if he would 
 shake off the English and show himself a true patriot. 
 Burgundy jumped at the proposal. He was utterly 
 sick of Henry's avarice, and leaving his schemes for a 
 general treaty with England'' to take care of themselves, 
 he abandoned the conference and hurried to meet the 
 Dauphin. Prince and Duke agreed to be good and loyal 
 kinsmen, and for the future to act in concert for resistance 
 to the " deminable enterprises " of the English. The 
 Burgundian forces assembled at Troyes, while the 
 Dauphin took up his position at Montereau. The Duke 
 invited the heir of France to visit him, but the Dauphin 
 sent back the request that the meeting should take 
 1 " Foedera," ix. 754. ' Ibid., p. 760 ef seq. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 51 
 
 place in the camp at Montereau. On September 9 
 Burgundy, forgetful of the duplicity of his enemies, 
 which on this occasion excelled even the high standard 
 he maintained himself, met the Dauphin on the Bridge 
 of Montereau. As he knelt to do homage to the future 
 King of France he was struck down. The death of John 
 the Fearless at Montereau made Henry V. Regent and 
 Henry VI. King of France. 
 
 4—2 
 
52 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 IV 
 
 The rash and senseless crime committed by the Dauphin 
 begins a revolutionary phase in the relations of England 
 and Burgundy. The new Duke, Philip the Good, was 
 forced into the arms of the English, and the Anglo- 
 Burgundian alliance, which was the outcome of the affair 
 at Montereau, lasted for fifteen years, during which 
 France Wcis split up a second time into two hostile 
 territories by the line of the Loire. The North was in 
 the hands of the English and the Burgundians, while the 
 South gave a certain amount of support to the Dauphin. 
 The period which extends from 1420 to the Peace of 
 Arras in 1435 is one of extraordinary interest, owing to 
 the fact that in it can be observed one more definite step 
 in the gradual progress of the Dukes of Burgundy from 
 their state of vassalage to the French Monarchy to the 
 acquisition by the last of their line of independent 
 sovereignty in all but name. The career of Philip the 
 Good shows a marked advance in its initial stage, but 
 the central and later years of his reign demonstrate what 
 a long and difficult task it was to withdraw such a state 
 as the Burgundian Dukes were in process of forming to a 
 position outside the radius both of traditional influences 
 and of that feudal magnetism which was still in operation 
 with but slightly diminished power. Although Philip 
 acted during this time practiccdly as an independent 
 sovereign in alliance with the true King of France 
 against the rebel Charles, " the soi-disant Dauphin," 
 still, when the spur of personal advantage had lost its 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 53 
 
 force owing to the simple fact that there was nothing 
 more to be gained on French soil, the Duke was com- 
 pelled slowly but surely to give way to the hereditary 
 and national tendencies which he had kept in the back- 
 ground for so long. 
 
 Philip, Count of Charolais, was at Ghent when the 
 news of his father's assassination reached liim. He gave 
 vent to the most intense expressions of rage and grief, 
 but did not allow his feelings to carry him completely 
 away. A Council was summoned of the most eminent 
 men of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, which were the 
 wealthiest and most important cities under his rule, and 
 it was ominous for the future of France that Philip there 
 and then, without waiting for the consent of his suzerain, 
 the King of France, assumed the dignity of Count of 
 Flanders and Duke of Burgundy.* At Lille, a short time 
 afterwards, he explicitly declared his intention of 
 coming to terms with the English, and at once despatched 
 an embassy to procure a provisional truce for the Bur- 
 gundian domains during the forthcoming negotiations.' 
 The embassy, which consisted of the Bishop of Arras 
 and the Lord de Toulongeon, obtained from Henry, who 
 was then at Rouen, the necessary agreement, while the 
 Dauphin, who appears to have prognosticated with 
 accuracy the future policy of Philip the Good, made use 
 of the lull in affairs to attack the Burgundians at 
 Compiegne,' thus hastening the inevitable end. On 
 October 17 the Duke of Burgundy, accompanied by 
 Sir John de Luxemburgh and several nobles, arrived at 
 Rouen for a short conference with the King of England. 
 Meanwhile the Parisians sent to inquire the intentions 
 of the Duke, and both they and his own nobility ex- 
 
 ^ Monstrelet (Trans. Johnes.), vol. ii., pp. 257, 258. 
 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 258. 
 
54 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 pressed their willingness to support him if he entered 
 into an alliance with the English, since he had now 
 obtained the permission of Charles VI. Burgundy fol- 
 lowed up his efforts by another embassy to Rouen, and 
 the proposals which were advanced apparently gratified 
 Henry, who promised to send his representatives to 
 intervifew the Duke. On St. Andrew's Day following he 
 gave directions to the Bishop of Rochester and the Earls 
 of Warwick and Kent to proceed to Arras to lay his 
 demands before the Duke of Burgundy.' The negotia- 
 tions proved so satisfactory to both sides that King and 
 Duke agreed to a treaty, provided that the King and 
 Ministers of France would become consenting parties.* 
 Meanwhile Philip issued orders to his troops to take no 
 offensive action with regard to the English, but his forces 
 in Artois and Picardy were mobilized under Sir John de 
 Luxemburgh to operate against the Dauphin. He also 
 sent a force to recapture Roye, and was aided in this 
 enterprise by the Earl of Huntingdon with 2,000 English 
 troops. Cordial relations had now been established 
 between England and Burgundy, and a general truce 
 was proclaimed from Paris to Boulogne, and to Troyes 
 in Champagne.^ 
 
 The next step in which the Duke displayed his changed 
 feelings was his siege of Crespy, with a force consisting of 
 Burgundians and a few thousand English who had joined 
 him at St. Quentin.* The culminating point was reached 
 when the Duke met the English ambassadors at Troyes 
 on May 21, 1420, and the celebrated treaty was signed 
 which made France a dependency of the English Crown, 
 with the reservation that Charles VI. was to remain King 
 
 * Monstrelet, ii. 260. ' Ibid., p. 261. 
 3 Rymer, " Foedera," ix. 825, 840. 
 
 * Monstrelet, ii. 267. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 55 
 
 during his life, while Henry assumed the position of 
 Regent. The treaty made Philip virtually a vassal of 
 the King of England. One of the articles of the compact 
 provided that those of the Burgundian party who had 
 suffered by Henry's campaigns in Normandy were to 
 be compensated by the grant of lands to be conquered 
 from " our rebellious subjects,"^ the Dauphin and his 
 adherents. This provision was, of course, meant to 
 conciliate any hostility towards Henry which might still 
 remain in the ranks of the Duke's followers. Further, 
 Henry and Philip undertook jointly to provide for the 
 security and maintenance of Charles VI. according to 
 his dignity, and both swore solemnly never to make any 
 treaty with Charles, the " pseudo-Dauphin." The 
 English deputies delivered a copy of the treaty to Henry, 
 and he set out for Troyes to complete the union of France 
 and England by his marriage with the Princess Catharine. 
 As he approached the town, " the Duke of Burgundy, to 
 show him respect and honour, came out to meet him, 
 and conducted him to his hostel."^ Councils were held 
 for the ratification of the treaty, and the Duke was 
 present at the ceremony which made Catharine Queen of 
 England.' When the festivities were ended, the new 
 allies turned to the serious work of systematically reduc- 
 ing the fortresses which still held out for the Dauphin. 
 Sens and Montereau were first attacked by Henry and 
 Philip in conjunction; but in July, 1420, Henry com- 
 missioned Burgundy to take sole command of the siege 
 of Melun.* After the surrender of that town, Charles VI. 
 and Henry, accompanied by the Dukes of Burgundy, 
 
 1 Monstrelet, ii. 281 ; Cosneau, " Les Grands Traites de la 
 Guerre de Cent Ans," pp. 109, 112, 113. 
 ^ Monstrelet, ii. 277. 3 7j,-^_ 
 
 * Rymer, " Foedera," x. 4. 
 
56 EKGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 Bedford, and Clarence, proceeded to Paris, where they 
 were received by the populace with great demonstra- 
 tions of joy. Charles entered with Henry on his right, 
 while Philip rode on his left clad in deep mourning. A 
 Court of Inquiry was at once instituted to investigate 
 the circimistances of the late Duke's death. Henry 
 and Charles were appointed judges,' and they passed the 
 unanimous sentence that the murderers of John the 
 Fearless were convicted of the crime of Use majeste, and 
 were henceforth declared traitors to the Crown of France. 
 On December 27 Henry left Paris for England, where, 
 according to Monstrelet, he was received like an " angel 
 from God," but in March, 1421, the disaster at Beaug6 
 called him back to give the finishing touches to his life- 
 work. He arrived in Paris in July, and, supported by 
 Burgundy, took the field for his last campaign. After 
 the surrender of Meaux he was overtaken by his mortal 
 illness. He lay for three weeks at Vincennes, and when 
 he perceived that his end was near he summoned his 
 brother Bedford and the other councillors to his bedside 
 to give them his final instructions. Henry was probably 
 aware that at his death his great enterprise would fall to 
 nothing, but he was anxious that the French dominions 
 should remain in English hands for as long as possible. 
 He could not have been blind to the artificial position of 
 the Duke of Burgundy, and for this reason advised that 
 the Regency of France should be offered to Philip. He 
 impressed upon his hearers the supreme necessity of 
 humouring the latter, emd they were finally adjured to 
 make no peace with Charles the Dauphin which did not 
 leave Normandy entirely in English hands. One of 
 Henry's last exhortations was prophetic in the extreme. 
 He was well aware of the character of Hiunphrey of 
 1 Rymer, " Foedera," x. 6. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 57 
 
 Gloucester, and solemnly warned him not to prefer his 
 personal ambitions to the welfare of the nation/ and in 
 the events which ensued his fears were fully realized. 
 The death of Henry V. deprived the English cause in 
 France of that central personality upon which the whole 
 enterprise depended. From this date, in spite of the 
 heroic efforts of the Regent Bedford, and of the victories 
 which seemed to revive once more the days of Henry V., 
 the English rule was doomed. While the obsequies of 
 the dead King were being performed Philip proceeded 
 to Paris. He had only visited the English camp on 
 business, and had no desire to be present at the death 
 scene. He held a short conference with the Dukes, and 
 refused the Regency during the minority of Henry VI. 
 He, however, took a new oath to observe the provisions 
 of Troyes.^ At the very moment when the funeral 
 cortege of Henry V. passed through the gates of Rouen 
 Charles VI. of France entered Paris to die. On 
 October 21, 1422, Henry VI. and Charles VII. became 
 Kings of France. 
 
 There is no necessity in this short treatise to follow the 
 Anglo-Burgundian troops in their sieges, marches, and 
 counter-marches, and alternate defeat and victory. The 
 main point of the period is the gradual return of the 
 Duke of Burgundy to the French side, a development 
 which may almost be said to have begun on the death- 
 bed of Charles VI. From the very day of his accession 
 Charles VII. occupied himself with a consistent effort to 
 separate Philip the Good from the English alliance. 
 The ultimate success of this policy was due in no small 
 degree to the King's mother-in-law, Yolande of Aragon, 
 who concentrated all her diplomacy and persuasive 
 
 * Waurin, Chron., p. 423. 
 
 2 Lavisse, " Hist, de France,'' iv. 390. 
 
58 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 power to bring the influence of Amadeus VIII. of Savoy, 
 Burgundy's uncle, as well as that of John V. of Brittany, 
 and his brother Arthur of Richemont, to bear upon the 
 Duke.' Even before the year 1422 had run its course 
 the party of " the King of Bourges " had been holding 
 conferences to form a basis for future negotiations 
 between Philip and his French suzerain. On May 18, 
 1424, exactly a month after the Triple Alliance between 
 Burgundy, Bedford, and Brittany had been established, 
 Queen Yolande arrived at Nantes, and a little later the 
 Duke of Brittany signed a truce with the French King.^ 
 Finally Yolande achieved the complete adhesion of 
 Brittany by conferring upon Arthur of Richemont the 
 sword of Constable. The English and Burgundians were 
 also approached, but the only effect of these negotiations 
 was to bind the allies temporarily still closer together. 
 Thus the diplomacy of Charles VII. was for the moment 
 frustrated, but he had inserted the thin end of the wedge, 
 and the Burgundians, even if their Duke remained 
 obstinate, were bound sooner or later to incline a favour- 
 able ear to his overtures. Charles was assisted by the 
 fact that the Treaty of Troyes had caused an irre- 
 mediable split in the Burgundian ranks, for the sup- 
 porters of the Duke found their views extremely modified 
 by the realization of what they had signed away to the 
 EngUsh. The section that preferred the rule of 
 Henry VI. to that of the Armagnacs was in a decided 
 minority. Most of the Burgundians had hoped that the 
 Treaty of Troyes would set up a government which would 
 prove capable of restoring peace and order in Northern 
 France. What they really obtained was the stringent 
 
 1 Cosneau, " Les Grands Trait^s de la Guerre de Cent Ans," 
 Intro, to Arras. 
 
 2 De Beaucourt, " Hist, de Charles VII.," ii. 353, 356. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 59 
 
 rule of Bedford without any compensating advantages, 
 and their low murmur of discontent was a presage of 
 disaster to come. 
 
 But for the present the sky seemed clear, and the 
 Dukes of Bedford, Burgundy, and Brittany met at 
 Amiens, on April 17, 1424, to seal once more the compact 
 of Troyes.* The Triple Alliance formed between the 
 Dukes has been already alluded to ; they formed an 
 agreement for mutual support, which was consolidated 
 by the marriage of Bedford to Anne of Burgundy and 
 that of Arthur of Richemont to Margaret, another sister 
 of Philip the Good. Burgundy emphasized the sincerity 
 of his intentions by granting to the new Duchess of 
 Bedford as her dowry the County of Artois, which was 
 to devolve upon her issue by the Duke. On the con- 
 clusion of the marriage ceremony Bedford and Burgundy 
 returned to Paris together. But while affairs were 
 progressing so smoothly in France, a cloud came across 
 the horizon, this time blown from the English quarter. 
 Its source was the ill-timed ambition of Humphrey, 
 Duke of Gloucester, to become Duke of Holland and 
 Hainault in the right of his wife, the exiled Countess. 
 Few of the romantic episodes of history are tinged with 
 such pathos as the career of the unfortunate Jacqueline 
 of Hainault. She was the only daughter and heiress 
 of William of Bavaria, Count of Hainault, by his marriage 
 with Margaret, sister of John the Fearless, and had 
 entered into her heritage on the death of her father in 
 1417. Her dominions were coveted by John and his 
 successor, Philip the Good, and while the former con- 
 tented himself with indirect means for the extinction 
 of the House of Hainault, Philip determined to rid him- 
 self of Jacqueline by fair devices or foul. His machina- 
 ^ Rymer, " Foedera," x. 280. Monstrelet, ii. 391. 
 
60 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 tions resulted in the flight of the Countess to England, 
 ever the refuge of the afflicted alien. Henry V. received 
 her favourably, and assigned for her maintenance an 
 income of £ioo, to be paid to her annually from the 
 lands of Joanna, late Queen of England,* a grant which 
 was subsequently renewed by Henry VI. in October, 
 1422. The Countess soon attracted the attentions of 
 Humphrey of Gloucester, who at once formed the idea 
 of marr3dng Jacqueline and claiming her troubled 
 heritage. The Spanish Antipope, Benedict XIII., 
 annulled the marriage of Jacqueline with John IV. of 
 Brabant, and she was married to Gloucester in October, 
 1422.^ A year later she was denizened by Royal 
 Letters,^ at the same time as a similar dignity was con- 
 ferred upon Anne of Burgundy, Duchess of Bedford ; 
 the fine upon these letters was remitted by the command 
 of the King.* By this stroke of policy Gloucester dealt 
 the death-blow to English interests abroad. He now 
 entered deliberately into competition with Philip of 
 Burgundy for the possession of Hainault, a piece of 
 effrontery which Philip regarded as absolutely intolerable. 
 The French rejoiced at the split in the Anglo-Bur- 
 gundian alliance, and letters were forged, probably at 
 the instigation of Arthur de Richemont,* proving that 
 Bedford was really in secret complicity with his brother, 
 and was actually plotting his assassination. Desplanque, 
 in the " Memoires de I'Acad^mie de Bruxelles," pub- 
 lishes these forgeries, which are obtained from the Lille 
 
 * Rymer, " Foedera." x. 134 ; " Wars of English in France " 
 (Rolls Series), i. 381 ; Proceedings of Privy Council, ii. 291. 
 
 2 " Particularites Curieuses sur Jacq. d'Hainault," Mons, 
 p. 58. 
 
 ^ Rymer, "Foedera," x. 311 ; "English in France," i. 399. 
 
 * Ibid. 
 
 * Cosneau, " Arthur de Richemont," pp. 501-503. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 6l 
 
 Archives, and discusses their bearing upon the question 
 whether there was a plot formed between 1424 and 1426 
 by Gloucester, Suffolk, Salisbury, and others, for the 
 assassination of the Duke of Burgundy. The three 
 nobles mentioned were notoriously inimical to the Duke 
 for diverse reasons : Salisbury had a particular grudge 
 against him, excited by the pronounced and compro- 
 mising attentions which Philip had paid to the Countess 
 of Salisbury, Eleanor Holland, at an entertainment 
 given by Burgundy in Artois. Desplanque maintains 
 the absolute reality of the plot, and cites seven docu- 
 ments, amongst them letters purporting to be written 
 by Gloucester to Suffolk, and also the incriminating 
 deposition of a certain William Benoit, a prisoner in 
 Lille Castle. The assertion that Bedford was an accom- 
 plice is palpably ridiculous. No one who considers the 
 consummate intelligence of that distinguished warrior 
 and diplomatist can ever imagine that he would have 
 been a party to such a ludicrous scheme. Moreover, 
 Bedford's personal activities themselves deny the in- 
 sinuation. Although he requested the legitimate Pope, 
 Martin V., to legitimize the marriage, he exhausted him- 
 self in his efforts to restrain the ruinous ambition of 
 his brother. He joined Burgundy in requesting 
 Gloucester to submit to arbitration. 
 
 But while the preparations for mediation were in 
 progress, Humphrey collected a force of 5,000 men, 
 and crossed with Jacqueline to Calais on October 16, 
 1424, for the conquest of Hainault.* A few weeks later 
 he entered his wife's possessions, having taken scrupulous 
 care not to inflict any damage upon the Burgundian 
 domains which he crossed en route. Gloucester even 
 
 * Monstrelet, ii. 430 ; " Wars of English in France," 
 ii. 396. 
 
62 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 issued strict orders to his troops that all provisions 
 obtained on the march should be paid for. By this 
 action he demonstrated the fact that his brother's advice 
 had not been wholly lost upon him. On the arrival of 
 their Duke and Duchess, the principal towns of Hainault 
 paid their fickle homage.^ From Mons Humphrey 
 wrote an indignant letter to the Duke of Burgundy, in 
 which he accuses him of obvious injustice in issuing 
 orders to Sir John of Luxemburgh to support the Duke 
 of Brabant. " Philip's memory was indeed short if he 
 had already forgotten what Gloucester had done for 
 him in times past. The failure of the arbitration was 
 due to the Duke of Brabant, and if proximity of lineage 
 was the plea which Philip advanced for his support of 
 Brabant, it was plainly ridiculous, since Jacqueline was 
 his cousin by two distinct lines. Moreover, the Treaty 
 of Troyes ought to have had more influence over the 
 Duke of Burgundy than appeared by his actions. He 
 was only claiming the heritage that was his by right, and 
 his present war-array was really the result of the offen- 
 sive taken by Brabant. When he gave impartial con- 
 sideration to all the points in his favour, he could 
 scarcely credit the report that Burgundy had issued 
 those instructions to his captain. Personally, he was 
 going to diefend his just rights to the last."* Such were 
 the sentiments expressed in the compilation which 
 reached Philip. 
 
 Burgundy laid the letter before his Council, and after 
 some delay despatched an answer to Gloucester, con- 
 firming officially all the reports which the latter had 
 heard. " The insulting aspersions with which Hum- 
 phrey's letter was so liberally sprinkled he would not 
 tolerate from him or any other person, and to avoid 
 1 Monstrelet, ii. 430. * Ibid., p. 432. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 63 
 
 the necessity of public warfare he was prepared to 
 decide the matter personally in the lists, with the 
 Emperor, or, if Gloucester preferred it, with Bedford 
 as adjudicator."* Meanwhile the Duke of Brabant had 
 taken the field against Gloucester, and had stormed the 
 town of Braine, in Hainault, with the satisfaction of 
 knowing that his cause was supported by the Pope, who 
 denied any confirmation on his part of the marriage of 
 Gloucester and Jacqueline.^ At a meeting with Bur- 
 gundy which took place at Doullens, Bedford dis- 
 claimed any connection on his part or on that of the 
 English Goveriunent with the schemes of Gloucester, 
 and effectually persuaded Philip to abandon his prospec- 
 tive duel.^ The protestations and the unrelaxing efforts 
 of Bedford* were eventually supplemented by the hope- 
 less failure of Gloucester himself. The Hainaulters, 
 cheered by the presence of Brabant, deserted the un- 
 happy Jacqueline in a body, with the exception of the 
 town of Mons, which remained loyal for a short time 
 longer, only to prove ultimately more traitorous than 
 the rest. Gloucester, disheartened by his reverses, 
 returned to England, leaving his wife to the tender 
 mercies of the citizens of Mons, who soon after surren- 
 dered her to the Duke, with whom she was forced to 
 make the Treaty of 1433, which has already been con- 
 sidered.^ 
 
 In this way the cowardly conduct of Gloucester and 
 the mediation of Bedford averted the threatening 
 storm, but the affair had created a breach which at best 
 could only be concealed. The work of Charles VII. was 
 
 * Monstrelet, ii. 434, 437, 439. 
 
 ' Ibid., pp. 441, 444. * Ibid., pp. 450, 253, 256. 
 
 * " Wars of English in France," vol. i., Preface, p. Ixxxii. 
 Vide Introduction, p. 9. 
 
64 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 daily becoming easier. Another outburst on the part 
 of Gloucester now called Bedford over to England. 
 When he left Paris Burgundy had been pacified, but the 
 capture of Le Mans by the Earl of Salisbury on August 2, 
 1425, was the last real conquest made in the name of 
 Henry VI. While Bedford was engaged in mediating 
 between Beaufort and Gloucester in England, the latter 
 made another attempt to revive his claim to Hainault. 
 The small force which was despatched under Lord 
 Fitzwalter was destroyed by the Burgundians at 
 Brouwershaven on January 19, 1426. This feeble 
 enterprise does not seem to have had any effect on 
 Burgundy, who kept up a constant connection with 
 Bedford while he was away from France,^ and the 
 ambassadors received the usual costly presents. On 
 July 14, 1426, the Council determined that they should 
 jointly receive £200, and that each should have of the 
 King's bounty twelve yards of scarlet cloth ; the'deputies 
 of the Four Members were accorded the same liberal 
 treatment.^ Ambassadors also proceeded at intervals 
 from England to keep in touch with Burgundy.^ These 
 marks of favour were needed, as Gloucester was ever 
 on the watch for his opportunity, in spite of his promise 
 to Bedford. On July 9, 1427, the Commons granted 
 a relief to the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester which 
 amounted to 20,000 marks, to be raised from various 
 sources.* The Duke had apparently sent an embassy 
 to Burgundy, then at Arras, to inquire into his inten- 
 tions with regard to Jacqueline, and letters of safe- 
 guard, as distinguished from safe-conduct, were granted 
 
 1 " Foedera," x. 352. 
 
 ^ Proceedings of the Privy Council, iii. 200. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 201. * " Fcedera," x. 374. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE nFTEENTH CENTURY 65 
 
 to the envoys whom Philip sent in return.* The money 
 obtained from Parliament was employed in the reten- 
 tion of men-at-arms for the proposed expedition of the 
 Duke of Gloucester to Holland.'' The significance of all 
 these preparations was "not lost upon Burgundy, and 
 they did little to increase his already none too cordial 
 relations with Bedford. 
 
 Although the latter had been desperately anxious to 
 return to France, he was prevented from leaving England 
 until March, 1427. He at once began to press the 
 French in the South and West. Brittany made peace, 
 but the English now received their first decided check 
 in the crushing defeat of Warwick by the Bastard of 
 Orleans. In August, 1428, they made their last ad- 
 vance. Salisbury moved against Orleans with the 
 ridiculous force of 4,000 men, and partially blockaded 
 the town. The siege dragged on from October, 1428, 
 to April, 1429, when the appearance of Jeanne d'Arc 
 roused the French nation from the apathy into which 
 it had fallen. The tide of success which found its 
 source in the Maid of Orleans had more serious conse- 
 quences for the English cause than at first appeared. 
 The revival of the fortunes of France was the salient 
 fact which impressed itself upon the Duke of Burgundy, 
 and although it was due to his troops that the danger 
 was for a time averted by the capture of the Maid at 
 Compiegne by Sir John de Luxemburgh in May, 1430,^ 
 yet, long before this date, the Duke had been coquetting 
 with the enemy. Bedford had therefore to resort to 
 the ignoble artifice of bribing him to stand fast to the 
 
 ' Proceedings of the Privy Council, iii. 275. 
 ^ Ibid., ii. 276. 
 
 3 Monstrelet, ii. 541 ; Proceedings of the Privy Council, 
 Preface, p. xv. 
 
66 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 English side, a measure which in reality only precipi- 
 tated the defection of the Duke. In July, 1429, Philip 
 concluded a truce with Charles, which was the result of 
 the conferences of Arras and of Compiegne, conducted 
 by the mediation of Amadeus of Savoy, who was sup- 
 ported by Papal influence, as well as that of the Council 
 of Basle.* In October Bedford made over to Burgundy 
 the government of the districts of Melun, Chartres, 
 Amiens, the Vermandois, and Ponthieu, together with the 
 charge of the city of Paris. That part of Champagne* 
 which still clung to Henry VI., as well as the whole of 
 Picardy, were thus ceded to Burgundy. Philip was once 
 more ostensibly a firm ally, and in the following cam- 
 paign his forces rendered signal services in the manner 
 already described. But it appears that he did not 
 forget to charge for them : 25,000 nobles were paid to 
 the Duke for the 1,500 men he had used in 
 various expeditions, while the veteran Burgundian 
 captain. Sir John de Luxemburgh, also benefited 
 considerably.^ 
 
 While Jeanne d'Arc was being tried at Rouen, English 
 and Burgundians were busy in an attempt to stay the 
 French advance, which had resulted upon the enthusi- 
 astic conduct of the Maid. Henry VI. was crowned at 
 Paris on December 6, 1431, but it was significant that 
 very few of the Burgundian nobles were present at the 
 ceremony. A week later the Cardinal of Santa Croce, 
 who had been commissioned by Eugenius IV. to mediate 
 between the conflicting parties, obtained at Lille a 
 truce for six years between the French and Burgun- 
 
 ' Cosneau, " Les Grands Traitfis," Intro, to Arras. 
 
 2 " Foedera," x. 454. 
 
 3 Ibid., pp. 454, 460, 481 ; Proceedings of the Privy Council, 
 Preface, p. xv. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 67 
 
 dians,* but there was some consolation for the English in 
 the fact that scarcely six months of the " peace " had 
 elapsed before they were fighting as hard as ever.* 
 Even in 1433 an impolitic attempt on the part of 
 Charles VII. upon the Burgundian possessions led to a 
 protraction of the English day of grace. Still, it was 
 now only a matter of a very short time at best. The 
 last bond which kept Philip to the English side was 
 snapped by the death of Anne of Burgundy, Duchess 
 of Bedford, on October 13, 1432.^ Her loss was a serious 
 blow to Bedford, who perceived very clearly that her 
 death would be a factor of considerable importance in 
 view of the correspondence which was continually 
 passing between Philip and Charles VII.* Moreover, 
 Philip the Good had now realized that he had obtained 
 all he could reasonably hope for in the way of territorial 
 expansion at the expense of France, and that it was 
 to his own advantage to make peace with Charles on 
 terms which would secure him what he had gained. 
 His inclinations towards France were still further 
 accelerated by what proved to be an exceedingly 
 impolitic act on the part of Bedford. With a view to 
 resuming the personal bond with Burgundy, he married, 
 perhaps too precipitately, Jacquetta of Luxemburgh,' 
 daughter of the Count of St. Pol, and niece of the Bishop 
 of Therouenne, Chancellor for Henry VI. in France, 
 and of the famous Sir John de Luxemburgh. The result 
 of the marriage was the diametrical opposite of what 
 Bedford had hoped. The Duke professed himself dis- 
 
 ' Cosneau, " Les Grands Traites," Intro, to Arras ; Proceed- 
 ings of the Privy Council, vol. iv., Preface, p. Ixxv. 
 '■' Ibid. ' Monstrelet, iii. 51. 
 
 * Cosneau, " Les Grands Traites," Intro, to Arras. 
 
 * Monstrelet, iii. 58. 
 
 5-2 
 
68 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 pleased at the match, presumably because he had not 
 been consulted, or because he regarded as insufficient 
 the interval which separated the marriage from his 
 sister's death. But it was evident that he had long been 
 searching for some tangible excuse for turning his back 
 on the English, and this is the only reasonable explana- 
 tion of the attitude which he assumed. 
 
 In May, 1433, Burgundy had given unmistakable 
 signs of his approaching defection. After Bedford's 
 marriage, efforts to conciliate him were vain. The two 
 Dukes agreed to meet at St. Omer to discuss the situa- 
 tion. When they arrived, and were preparing for the 
 conference, a singular outburst of petulance on the part 
 of Burgundy resulted in the abandonment of the inter- 
 view, in spite of the energetic efforts of Cardinal Beaufort 
 and the nobles.* The ambassadors of Charles VII. made 
 good use of their opportunities, and on September 17, 
 1434, they concluded a truce with Burgundy at Ham.^ 
 Bedford, who had made one more visit to England, now 
 returned to Paris. His presence was badly needed, for 
 the English troops stood alone against the French, and 
 Paris itself was longing for the re-entry of the army of 
 Charles VII. In February, 1435, the removal of the 
 English headquarters to Rouen was a confession of 
 failure, while Philip delivered to the English Council a 
 direct intimation that he had agreed to arrange a settle- 
 ment with the French. In the previous month he had 
 met the envoys of Charles VII. at the conference of 
 Nevers, and had committed himself to use his efforts to 
 secure a general peace. If the English continued 
 obstinate. Burgundy would have no alternative but to 
 desert them. As his reward, he was to receive " the 
 
 1 Monstrelet, iii. 59- 
 
 2 Cosneau, "Les Grands Traites," Intro, to Arras. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 69 
 
 Somme Towns," with Montreuil and Doullens, a grant 
 which meant the severance of practically the whole of 
 Picardy from the French Crown. In order to impart an 
 air of legality to his actions Philip conducted his negotia- 
 tions quite openly, and invited the English authorities 
 to send representatives to the Conference, which was 
 to take place at Arras in the following July. His efforts 
 were seconded by the Pope and the Council of Basle. 
 In May, 1435, Burgundy despatched Sir Hugh de Lannoy 
 and the Provost of St. Omer to inform Henry of the 
 proximity of the Conference,' and as he could not 
 reasonably refuse to hear the terms of the general peace 
 which it was fervently hoped would ensue, Henry 
 nominated as ambassadors Cardinal Beaufort, Kemp, 
 Archbishop of York, the Earls of Suffolk and Huntingdon, 
 and the Counts of St. Pol and Ligny,'' as well as the 
 Duke of Burgundy himself, who was expected to consider 
 the honour as binding him to the English side of the 
 question. 
 
 The Convention at Arras has been described with truth 
 as one of the most celebrated in history, both from the 
 number of the dignitaries who were present and from 
 the tremendous issues which were at stake. The English 
 Government appears to have been genuinely anxious to 
 come to some terms with Charles VII. It had become 
 painfully apparent that, unless some settlement were 
 made, the English could not remain much longer in 
 France, and the English leaders were willing to accede 
 to any agreement which would leave in their hands at 
 any rate the greater part of what they had won. As a 
 further inducement to the French King, Cardinal 
 Beaufort was empowered to treat for the marriage of 
 
 * Proceedings of the Privy Council, iv. 301. 
 2 " Foedera," x. 611; Monstrelet. 
 
70 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 Henry VI. with the eldest or any other daughter of 
 Charles VII.* July was drawing to a close when the 
 deputies of the Pope, the Kings of England, France, 
 Norway, Denmark, Sicily, and several other States — 
 such was the universal interest in the issue of the 
 deliberations — arrived at Arras, and found the Duke of 
 Burgundy ready to receive them, surrounded by the 
 regal magnificence of his Court.* The French made up 
 for their comparative feebleness in the wars by an in- 
 herent capacity for the art of diplomacy, and they were 
 not long in bringing the powerful influence of common- 
 sense to bear upon the wavering Burgundian party. 
 A merely accidental observation of a Burgundian knight 
 is stated to have been responsible for the sudden 
 awakening of his countrymen to the full realization of 
 their anomalous position.' French and Burgundians 
 now strdned every nerve to effect a full reconciliation^ 
 and the former made good use of the festivities which 
 preceded the serious business of the Conference in 
 cultivating the favour of the Duke. The confidence 
 with which Burgundy's attitude towards their advances 
 inspired the French contrasted sharply with the uneasy 
 conduct of the English.* The appearance of Beaufort 
 on August 19 failed to create any marked improvement, 
 and a few days later the Conference was opened by the 
 Cardinal of St. Croix, who delivered with great eloquence 
 and fervour an oration in favour of peace. On one point, 
 however, the English were determined to make no con- 
 cession. They refused with emphasis the French 
 demand that Henry VI. should relinquish the title of 
 King of France. The dead-lock resulted in the with- 
 
 ' " Foedera," x. 633, 634. 
 
 2 Proceedings of the Privy Council, vol. iv., Preface. 
 
 * Monstrelet, vol. iii. * Ibid. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 71 
 
 drawal of the English ambassadors with the full con- 
 viction that Burgundy would not be much longer the 
 ally of England. There has also been an attempt to 
 explain the hasty departure of the English as being the 
 result of a rumour that a secret conspiracy had been 
 formed against them. 
 
 The fears of the English were very soon realized. 
 Bedford's death on September 14, 1435, removed the 
 last of Burgundy's scruples, and about a fortnight later 
 he definitely threw over the English alliance. On 
 September 23, 1435, he broke the oath which he had 
 sworn at Troyes by his peace with Charles VII. He 
 added insult to injury by despatching two heralds to 
 England a few days later to announce the satisfactory 
 conclusion of the Franco-Burgundian treaty, and to make 
 an attempt at inducing Henry to follow his example. 
 The English King refused to receive the Duke's am- 
 bassador into his own presence or that of the Council. 
 Popular fury blazed so strongly in support of the action 
 of the Government that the Burgundian envoys were 
 glad to escape from London with their lives. It was a 
 matter for remark that the Duke's letters no longer 
 styled Henry King of France nor acknowledged him as 
 Sovereign. Their contents excited the profound aston- 
 ishment of the Council, and brought tears to the eyes of 
 the over-susceptible monarch. Throughout England the 
 actions of the Duke were regarded as nothing short of 
 rank treason, and the storm of indignation which was 
 aroused vented itself upon the Flemish merchants 
 settled in London, many of whom were murdered. The 
 Council met to discuss the situation, and it was decided 
 to vouchsafe no reply to the Duke, who was informed 
 by his envoys of the sentiments of the English Govern- 
 ment and people, as well as of the fixed intention of 
 
72 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 the King, with God's permission, soon to provide a 
 remedy.^ While England was in a turmoil, Philip and 
 Charles were busy with the final touches to their new 
 alliance. Philip was fully prepared for consequences 
 of his defection, and he made active preparations to 
 begin the war which was to drive the English out of 
 France. The ignoble disaster which attended Philip's 
 chemes removed a powerful ally from the French camp, 
 but once the Burgundian balance of power had dis- 
 appeared, the English chances, poor enough before, 
 became absolutely hopeless. The Treaty of Troyes had 
 consolidated the edifice of English empire in France ; 
 at the Peace of Arras it crumbled into ruins. 
 
 ^ Proceedings of the Privy Council, Preface, vol. iv. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 73 
 
 Philip of Burgundy had doubtless intended, after the 
 conclusion of the Treaty of Arras, to retire altogether 
 from the Anglo-French dispute, in order to pursue the 
 easy course of a profitable neutrality. He was aware 
 of the fact that he had too long neglected the internal 
 affairs of his heterogeneous domains, and had deter- 
 mined to devote the rest of his time to the consolidation 
 and administration of Burgundy. He was still conscious 
 and proud of his connection with the French Monarchy, 
 and regarded himself in the last resort as a vassal of the 
 French Crown, an attitude in which he stands in sharp 
 contrast to his more spirited successor, Charles le 
 T6m&aire. But whatever Philip's intentions were in 
 1435, the English people did not mean to leave the issue 
 of his action at Arras long in doubt. He was forced 
 against his will into war with England, and his warmest 
 supporters were, logically enough, the inhabitants of the 
 Flemish towns, whose representatives in England had 
 suffered so severely at the hands of the infuriated 
 Londoners. After a short period of activity, in which 
 he suffered a demoralizing defeat, Philip retired to the 
 accomplishment of his original ambition. The restora- 
 tion of the old commercial siaius quo between England 
 and Flanders could not have been delayed for long, and 
 at the end of our period we fall back again upon the 
 condition of affairs with which the reign of Henry IV. 
 concluded — a pmrely commercial relationship between 
 England and the Flemish portion of the Burgundian 
 
74 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 domains. The two outstanding features of these last 
 years of the period are the Siege of Calais by Philip the 
 Good, and the new commercial alliance established by 
 the mediation of Isabella of Portugal, Duchess of 
 Burgundy. Isabella had been married to Philip of 
 Burgundy early in 1430. She was a daughter of King 
 John I. of Portugal,* and cousin to Henry VI., whom 
 she visited while on her way from Portugal to Flanders. 
 Henry received her with great favour, and the sum of 
 ^100 was apportioned by the Council for the expenses of 
 attending her to her destination.' She exercised, as 
 Margaret of Flanders had done before her, a tremendous 
 influence upon Burgundian affairs, and owing to her 
 Anglo-Portuguese extraction, inclined towards alliance 
 with England. To her was due almost solely the recon- 
 ciliation between England and Flanders, which meant 
 so much for the trade and prosperity of both countries. 
 The first duty which claimed Philip's attention after 
 Arras was an affair of conscience. That the oath to 
 which he and the rest of the Burgundian nobles had sub- 
 scribed at Troyes weighed heavily upon them is con- 
 clusively testified by the statement made by a Bur- 
 gundian knight named De Lannoy to the effect that 
 during the course of the war no less than five truces had 
 been sworn to, none of which had been kept. He, how- 
 ever, now swore a doubly solemn oath that this last one 
 made at Arras should be kept to the letter.' Both 
 
 * John of Gaunt = Blanche of Lancaster. 
 
 i 
 Philippa=John I. of Portugal. 
 
 Isabella s= Philip the Good. 
 
 ' Proceedings of the Privy Council, vol. iv.. Preface, p. iii. 
 ' Monstrelet, ii. 119, ed. 1809. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 75 
 
 Philip and the rest of his party had been solemnly 
 absolved from the promises made at the Treaty of 
 Troyes by the Cardinal of St. Croix, but this wholesale 
 absolution must have appeared most superficial and 
 reprehensible even to those persons who presumably 
 benefited by it. Henry, it appears, had been long 
 apprehensive of some such attempt as this to absolve 
 the Duke from his allegiance, and had already made 
 inquiries at the Papal Court. He received on July 16, 
 1435, a reassuring letter from Eugenius IV.,' who stated 
 that no attempt had yet been made to obtain freedom 
 from his oath for Philip, and that none had been granted 
 to him. It is to be remarked that Henry's appeal to 
 Rome was made when Philip of Burgundy was still 
 acting to all intents and purposes as the Ambassador 
 of the King of England at the Conference of Arras. 
 This general freedom pronounced by proxy was therefore 
 looked upon in England as in no way valid, and the Duke 
 and his supporters were regarded as black traitors to 
 their lawful Sovereign, Henry VI., King of England and 
 France. Philip himself was quite unsatisfied with his 
 position, and his letters to Henry contain palpable con- 
 fessions of guilt. The high-handed action of the English 
 Council, which was to some extent justifiable, irritated 
 the Duke, and war was now inevitable. But still, even 
 in the early days of 1436, Burgundy's Ministers con- 
 sidered the prevention of hostilities expedient, if possible. 
 Louis de Luxemburgh, Archbishop of Rouen, one of the 
 Duke's principal advisers, proceeded to London, and at 
 first it really seemed as though his mission would be 
 successful. But his request for Philip's consent to 
 accede to the conditions proposed by the English Council 
 was answered by the statement that the English had 
 * " Foedera," x. 620, 625. 
 
76 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 forfeited all claim to consideration by their attack upon 
 the town of Ardres,' while the so-called " declaratory 
 letters " which were sent by Burgundy to Henry, 
 containing a catalogue of the unpardonable acts of 
 hostility committed by the English in Flanders,'' clearly 
 demonstrated the fact that war was unavoidable. 
 
 The Duke of Burgundy had already begun his prepara- 
 tions, and had reinforced the troops stationed on his 
 frontiers. Henry strenuously denied the charges which 
 Philip brought up with such assiduity to justify the 
 step he was about to take. Amongst the crimes com- 
 mitted by the English, Philip laid emphasis on the 
 alleged incitement to rebellion issued by the King of 
 England to certain of the towns of the Low Countries. 
 In contradiction of this statement Henry cited his own 
 letter to the Mayor and inhabitants of Zurick Zee, which 
 had merely contained the inquiry as to what the inten- 
 tions of the latter were with regard to the approaching 
 crisis. It had been written purely in the interests of 
 commerce.^ 
 
 In the case of the alleged piracy committed by 
 Englishmen who were called " Captains," measures had 
 already been taken for the arrest of the criminals. 
 Instead of the Duke of Gloucester having received any 
 of the plunder, it was well known that he had ordered 
 as much of it as possible to be restored to its rightful 
 owners, and the King had offered to do all justice to the 
 aggrieved burgomasters of Bruges. To the Duke's 
 additional complaint that Henry meditated an alliance 
 with the Emperor which would be prejudicial to Biu"- 
 gundian interests, the King replied that all the world 
 
 1 Monstrelet, ii. 125, ed. 1596. 
 
 2 Proceedings of the Privy Council, vol. iv., Preface. 
 
 3 Monstrelet, vol. ii. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 77 
 
 knew that such a treaty was already in existence, and 
 that it had been conscientiously observed since it was 
 made with Sigismund by Henry V. The observation 
 was then made that His Majesty of England, in common 
 with his ancestors, had always considered himself free 
 to enter into alliances with whomsoever he would, and 
 if it pleased God, would always do so in time to come. 
 Finally, the Duke's complaints were so obviously unjust 
 and unusual that it would be inconsistent with honour 
 and dignity to take any notice of them. All Philip's 
 pretences were thus cruelly disposed of, while the attitude 
 assumed by the English Government on the one side, as 
 well as that of the Flemish towns on the other, com- 
 pletely prevented any chance of the modification of 
 Philip's position. War was the one and only vent for 
 the situation. In March, 1436, Burgundy officially 
 declared war upon England, and openly showed his 
 intention of capturing Calais.^ In order to give still 
 more colour to his actions, he claimed the town as 
 belonging to his own County of Artois. Calais was an 
 exceptionally important position, both politically and 
 commercially. It was the gateway into France and the 
 Continent for English troops and English commerce. 
 England possessed in Dover and Calais fortresses which 
 commanded the Narrow Seas, and the maritime trade 
 between Flanders and the West of Europe and the 
 Mediterranean. This lever on the inclinations of the 
 Flemish England was not prepared to lose without a 
 struggle, and the popular interest which the Siege of 
 Calais aroused in English minds is attested by the 
 enormous number of rhymes and songs to which the 
 incident gave rise. It is extraordinary how often 
 
 ^ "Political Poems and Songs" (Rolls Series), ii. 152, 156; 
 Rymer, " Foedera," x. 646. 
 
78 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 Flanders figures in the English popular songs during this 
 period. As an instance of earlier productions may be 
 cited a poem written in the year 1419, which is entitled 
 " A Remembrance of Fifty-two Follies." This pro- 
 duction enumerates the stultities of the Flemish, who 
 are alleged to have deserted a real friend (England) for a 
 stranger's sake, and the writer seems to exult in the 
 misfortunes which have overtaken them.* A much 
 longer commercial theme is, of course, the " Libel of 
 English Policy." 
 
 With regard to the Siege of Calais, however, these 
 political songs demonstrate the fact that Englishmen 
 were slowly becoming alive to the absolute necessity of 
 obtaining and of keeping the command of the seas. 
 The Siege of Calais in 1436 was therefore a circumstance 
 which brought indirectly incalculable benefit to England* 
 The contemporary ballads blend with much sound 
 commercial advice expressions of scorn and detestation 
 directed against the traitor Philip ot Burgundy, and 
 remind him of the numerous kindnesses which he had 
 received from Henry V., and of the fealty which he had 
 sworn to him and to his successor. All the Duke's 
 subjects had embarked upon the enterprise with great 
 zeal, and none were keener than the inhabitants of the 
 Four Members and of the other towns of Flanders. The 
 siege began on July 19, 1436. The " Song of the Siege of 
 Calais " relates that " the Duk of Burgeyne off grete prid 
 mad gret assembilM in landes wyd."* A satire written 
 at the same time gives an account of the disgraceful 
 exhibition of cowardice given by the men of Grave- 
 
 * " Twenty-six Poems from the Oxford Manuscripts," Digby 
 102, leaf 115, and Douce 322, ed. Dr. J. Kail (Part I.), Early 
 English Text Society. 
 
 * " Political Poems and Songs," ii. 152. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 79 
 
 lines/ Bruges, Ghent, and Picardy at the siege. The 
 Graveliners come in for an especial share of contumely, 
 since they are stated to have behaved like " Lions of 
 Cotswold " — a burlesque name for sheep. In the " Song 
 of the Siege of Calais," to which allusion has already 
 been made, the story of the siege is told in mock-heroic 
 style, and it is affirmed that the Flemish brought 
 9,000 cocks to crow them on to victory at night, and 
 8,000 cressets to give them light. Of the Siege of Calais 
 there is not much to relate. The town was vigorously 
 defended by the Earl of Mortain, Sir John Ratcliff, and 
 the Baron of Dudley. The women even worked in the 
 defence, and the French and Flemings were frequently 
 forced to retreat to their own lines closely pursued by the 
 defenders. Burgundy was compelled to raise the siege 
 in less than a week. He retired from Calais on July 25, 
 before the Duke of Gloucester, who had been appointed 
 Captain of Calais, could arrive with reinforcements for 
 the relief of the town. The hurried departure of Philip 
 the Good was due mostly to the astonishingly fickle and 
 craven character of the Flemish levies, whose intense 
 ardour had been completely evaporated by six days' 
 fighting. They melted away without waiting for the 
 permission of their Duke, and their ignominious retreat 
 was followed by the devastation of Western Flanders as 
 far as Poperinghe, Bailleul, and St. Omer by the Duke 
 of Gloucester, who was not, however, equipped for a 
 prolonged foray,^ and returned home immediately after 
 this signal success. It is noticeable, with regard to this 
 eventful time, that some communications which had to 
 do with the intended Siege of Calais seem to have passed 
 between Burgundy and James I. of Scotland, who had 
 
 * Archieologia, vol. xxiii. 
 ._ , » "Foedera."x. 648,651. 
 
80 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 already been involved in negotiations with the French. 
 This correspondence provoked intense indignation in 
 England/ and in the war which followed James was 
 decisively overthrown by the Percies and Nevilles on the 
 Border. 
 
 The conduct of the Duke of Burgundy was consistently 
 regarded in England as that of a vassal who had turned 
 traitor, and he was now officially treated as such by 
 Henry VI. as King of France. Philip was solemnly 
 declared to have forfeited the possessions which he held 
 of the Crown of France, and Henry considered himself 
 free to dispose of them as best suited his inclination. 
 The County of Boulogne was granted to the Lord de 
 Beaumont on July 27, 1436, only two days after Bur- 
 gundy's retreat from before Calds,' and on the 30th of 
 the same month Hvmiphrey of Gloucester was created 
 Count of Flanders.^ How these extensive diminutions 
 of his estates affected the peace of mind of Philip the 
 Good we have no means of ascertaining, but it is certain 
 that the new owners were far from being in a position to 
 make good their claim to the dignities which had been 
 bestowed upon them. Henry VI., however, did not 
 forget to maintain friendly relations with those of the 
 dependents of the Duke of Burgundy who had declared 
 themselves neutral. One of these was Arnald, Duke of 
 Gueldres. Henry's policy in this respect was solely due 
 to commercial motives. He was extremely anxious to 
 conciliate all the Low Country powers who could exert 
 any influence in trade matters. In a letter* written to 
 the Duke on July 13, 1435, Henry disclaimed any 
 
 1 " Political Poems and Songs," ii. 150. 
 
 '^ " Foedera," x. 652. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 652. 
 
 * " Correspondence of Bishop Beckington," i. 104, 105. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 8l 
 
 knowledge of certain letters which were supposed by the 
 Duke to implicate him in the Siege of Calais. The King 
 assured him that, even if any such report had been circu- 
 lated, he would not have believed it. He accepted as 
 genuine the assurances of friendship that the Duke had 
 made to his uncle, the Cardinal, at Arras. 
 
 We have now arrived at the last occasion upon which 
 Philip the Good had any relations with England which 
 were of more than momentary significance. The 
 attempt to reinstate the former commercial concord 
 with England was almost exclusively due to the good 
 offices of the Duchess Isabella, who apparently viewed 
 with great consternation the animosity cherished by 
 the Flemish towards the country which her hereditary 
 associations had taught her to regard with respect and 
 affection. She immediately took steps to remedy a 
 situation which must also incidentally have been instru- 
 mental in producing no smdl deficit in the Burgundian 
 exchequer. On November 23, 1438, Henry VI. con- 
 sented, at the request of the Duchess, to send ambas- 
 sadors, who were to effect, in conjunction with the 
 representatives of Philip of Burgundy, a restoration of 
 the commercial relations which existed between England 
 and Flanders before the breach which took place at 
 Arras.' The embassy was placed under the control of 
 Heiury, Cardinal of England, and at the same time a 
 deputation, consisting of Nicholas Byllesdon, Dean of 
 Salisbury, Thomas Rempton, and others, wag despatched 
 to ascertain the sentiments which prevailed in Holland.^ 
 The first-named commission was renewed for John, 
 Archbishop of York, in the following year.' The 
 negotiations appear to have been slow and difficult, but 
 
 1 " Foedera," x. 713. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 714. ^ Ibid., p. 730. 
 
 6 
 
82 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 they were in able hands ; while the fact that Philip had 
 entrusted Isabella with the sole conduct of the affair 
 could not fail to prove an important factor in their 
 ultimate success. Embassies were continually passing 
 to and fro between Henry and Isabella/ and at length 
 a provisional truce was brought about by the efforts 
 of the English deputies, Stephen Wilton and John 
 Church, which was confirmed by Henry on July 12, 
 1440 f but the settlement provided was so unsatisfactory 
 to both parties, and the infringements upon it so fre- 
 quent, that the Duchess entered into a fresh series of 
 negotiations for a definite treaty, in which enterprise 
 she was assisted by envoys from Holland.' On April 23, 
 1443, the long-desired definitive settlement was success- 
 fully negotiated with Richard, Duke of York, Henry's 
 Lieutenant and Governor-General in France. The 
 agreement included in its provisions, as well as England 
 and Flanders, Ireland, Guienne, Anjou, Maine, the 
 Marches of Calais, and all the other dominions of the 
 King of England. The treaty was to take effect in part 
 upon the 15th of the following June for as long as the 
 contracting parties should desire its continuance, with 
 the stipulation that three months' notice was to be 
 given by either side in case of intended withdrawal. 
 The agreement was, however, not to affect Burgundy 
 and Guienne until October i, 1443, nor was it to over- 
 ride the already existing truce which had been made 
 for Calais. Conservators of the Peace were elected on 
 both sides. The actual wording of the treaty contains 
 the usual provisions dealing with the reciprocal privi- 
 leges to be granted to merchants and merchandise, the 
 settlement of infringements and disputes, the security 
 
 '^ " Foedera," x. 800, 808, 810 et seq. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 791. ^ Jbid., xi. 4, 20, 24. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 83 
 
 of the fisheries, and of the communication with the 
 Continent. This treaty was maintained by a system 
 of renewals right down to the end of the reign of PhiUp 
 the Good, whose time, until his death in 1467, was spent 
 in reducing the domains of Burgundy to something more 
 than a nominal unity. 
 
 On his father's death in 1467 Charles le T^m^raire 
 succeeded to the duchy, for which he hoped before long 
 to obtain the tardy Imperial recognition as a kingdom. 
 The new Duke was a man of a very different calibre 
 from that of his cautious and somewhat narrow-minded 
 predecessors. Ambition held him as it had them, but in 
 his case it was effectually and finally freed from the 
 centripetal spirit of the feudal age that had prevented 
 John the Fearless and Philip the Good from assuming 
 an independent and national position. In Charles the 
 Bold the old bond had been broken. But even if there 
 had been any lingering remnants of this sentiment in 
 the mind of Charles le Tdmeraire, the character and the 
 policy of Louis XI. of France would have effectually 
 dispelled the illusion. The glittering career of the last 
 of the Burgundian Dukes is unhappily outside the pre- 
 scribed period, but it must be noticed here that his 
 accession revived the violently English policy which 
 had characterized the first years of Philip the Good ; and 
 just as the Burgundian alliance appeared to Henry V. 
 to have placed within his reach the coveted prize of 
 the Crown of France, so did the attitude of Charles le 
 Temeraire conjure up before Edward IV. a similar 
 alluring prospect of easy conquest. But in the case of 
 Edward disillusionment was quick and easy. Louis XL 
 was not another Charles VI., and the Peace of Pecquigny 
 ended for ever all hopes of English dominion in France. 
 Nevertheless, the Anglo-Burgundian alliance remains 
 
 6—2 
 
84 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 one of the striking facts of the fifteenth century and in 
 the history of Europe, and the spirit of this connection 
 lived on when all that had engendered it was buried in 
 the oblivion of centuries. The work of the Burgundian 
 Dukes exists to-day in the little buffer States of Holland 
 and Belgium, which keep apart the mighty forces of 
 Latin and Teuton, and safeguard by their comparative 
 impotence the position of London as the centre of the 
 tommerce of the world. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 85 
 
 VI 
 
 GENERAL FEATURES OF THE TRADE 
 
 CONNECTION BETWEEN ENGLAND 
 
 AND FLANDERS 
 
 The political connection of England and Burgundy 
 found its source and strength in the traditional com- 
 mercial relations which had existed for centuries between 
 England and Flanders. Just at the time when Philip 
 le Hardi entered into possession of Flanders, industry 
 and commerce were in a deplorable state owing to the 
 six years of war that had preceded 1384. The Han- 
 seatic League had removed their centre from Bruges 
 to Dordrecht, Ghent had lost the better part of its 
 burgher population, and Ypres was in ruins. Fifty 
 years of the sympathetic Burgundian rule restored the 
 Low Country towns to their former position as the 
 wealthiest municipalities in Europe.^ Parallel with their 
 efforts to produce an approximation to political unity 
 in their domains was the introduction of a system of 
 economic reform which went far to effect a remedy for 
 the industrial disunion of the Low Countries, a blemish 
 which found its origin in a diversity of monetary systems 
 and the absence of internal free trade. By the energetic 
 action of the Dukes these obstacles to prosperity were 
 removed. Flanders especially deserved their attention ; 
 it was the most important part of their vast domains, 
 
 1 Pirenne, " Hist. Belgique," ii. 381 et seq. 
 
86 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 and the wealth of the towns of Flanders added a financial 
 basis of no mean order to the already great territorial 
 claims of the Burgundian House to monarchical 
 dignity. The towns of Flanders depended for their 
 prosperity upon the pastures of England. Wool 
 was the " sovereign treasure " wherewith England 
 in the Middle Ages was said to keep the whole 
 world warm. 
 
 The chief English exports which found their way to 
 Flanders were wool, wool-fells, and hides.' It was 
 found necessary, both for thfe convenience of the mer- 
 chants and for the collisction of dues, that certain towns 
 should be appointed as centres for the export trade in 
 wool and the other commodities. Successive series of 
 staple towns were designated for this purpose, but the 
 staple which concerns this period is the one which was 
 fixed at Calais in 1348, and remained there until the re- 
 capture of the town by the French in 1558. For two 
 hundred years the commercial history of Calais is practi- 
 cally the commercial history of England.^ With regard 
 to the fishing industry, which was the cause of endless 
 disputes between English and Flemish, Calais was of 
 extreme importance, since it provided a convenient 
 base of operations. It was there, also, that the newly- 
 invented salting process was carried on, which enabled 
 the fish to be sold far away from the scene of its capture. 
 The commercial importance of Calais traced its origin 
 to the doctrine that " all goods must first touch at 
 Calais," a proviso which was always attached to the 
 concession of free intercourse between the merchants 
 of England and Flanders. Another curious limitation 
 
 1 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of Richard II., pp. 378, 
 
 580. 
 ^ Sandeman, " Calais under the English," p. 58. 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 87 
 
 consisted in ordinances to the effect that merchants 
 should always leave behind them in their ships their 
 arms, artillery, and other " invasibles." There was 
 always the mutual and oft-recurring complaint among 
 the English and the Flemish that their merchants lived 
 on less favourable terms in the one country than in 
 the other. It is certain that racial jealousy was respon- 
 sible for innumerable crimes, as the Calendar of the 
 Patent Rolls' plainly demonstrates ; but on the 
 whole it seems that the balance of favours was fairly 
 even. 
 
 Calais, being the staple town, was always badly 
 maimed by any dispute which arose between England 
 and France or Flanders. Early in 1408 the English 
 Council was forced to recognize this by the appeal from 
 the merchants of the staple that the truce made in 1406 
 should be renewed at once to avoid any break whatever.' 
 We have already noticed some of the subsequent re- 
 newals which took place under John the Fearless and 
 his successor. The staple system, like all others, became 
 in time subject to abuses, and the Calais staple justifiably 
 incurred the reproach of being the ruin of the English 
 wool trade.^ So much wool found its way to Calais that 
 it became a glut upon the market, and prices began to 
 fall heavily, and thus the staple system, which had been 
 instituted to break the Flemish monopoly, recoiled upon 
 England. The communication by land between Calais 
 and the Flemish towns was always the subject of extreme 
 solicitude. The road between Calais and Gravelines finds 
 a place in several treaties. It is ordained that this 
 highway shall be made large and wide, and adequately 
 
 ' Calendar of the Patent Rolls, v. 194, 282 et seq. 
 
 2 Proceedings of the Privy Council, i. 305. 
 
 ' Armstrong, " Staple and Commodities of the Realm." 
 
88 ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY DURING THE 
 
 safeguarded and marked for the convenience of mer- 
 chants.' 
 
 The rise of the English cloth industry was another 
 feature which marked the commercial connection 
 between England and Flanders. From being merely 
 the producer of the raw material which supplied the 
 looms of Flanders, we can trace the gradual growth of 
 the industrial power of England. This expansion began 
 under Edward III., who introduced Flemish weavers 
 into the English towns. Although at first intended 
 only for home consumption, English cloth is soon found 
 competing with the produce of Flanders in the markets 
 of Europe, and even of Flanders itself.^ The realization 
 of this fact naturally introduced a war of prohibitions, 
 which was partially mitigated by the agreements made 
 with regard to Flanders by the Tudor monarchs. The 
 cloth export trade also produced the association of 
 English merchants known as the " Merchant Adven- 
 turers," a body which received its first authoritative 
 licence from Henry IV. The society claimed, however, 
 a much earlier origin, and privileges were granted to its 
 members by the Counts of Flanders during the fourteenth 
 century, while Edward III. had fixed upon Bruges for 
 its port. Constitutionally the association was a 
 " regulated company " as opposed to the " joint-stock '' 
 corporations. In a regulated company each merchant 
 acted independently of the rest, and was responsible 
 for the sale of his own goods. The great rival of the 
 Merchant Adventurers was naturally the Hanseatic 
 League, which had previously controlled most of the 
 English export trade. It is to be noted both with 
 regard to imports and exports .that the Flemish them- 
 
 1 Rymer, " Foedera," viii. 476. 
 ^ Vide " Intercursus Magnus." 
 
FIRST HALF OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 89 
 
 selves possessed a large and increasing carrying trade. 
 The Calendar of the Patent Rolls teems with instances 
 in which English, Scotch, and Welsh merchants embark 
 their goods in " crayers of Flanders " for transporta- 
 tion.^ There are frequent incidental instances of English 
 hostility to Scottish commerce. As an example may be 
 cited the royal licence granted on August 23, 1379,^ 
 to the merchants and burgesses of Newcastle-upon- 
 Tjoie " to buy and take to that place and thence export 
 to Flanders, wool, hides, and wool-fells to the amount of 
 a thousand sacks of English wool, reckoning a last of 
 hides to two sacks and from 200 to 140 wool-fells to one 
 sack of wool, pa5dng custom therefor as at Calais, viz. 
 ig pence a sack, allowing none others the benefit of this 
 licence and doing their utmost to prevent English grown 
 wool from being fraudulently exported to Scotland." 
 
 It was also a practice among the English Kings to 
 bribe the authorities of the Flemish towns to look after 
 English interests. A grant of £20 per annum which 
 was made to a certain Simon Braeme, burgess of Ghent, 
 for the term of his life, on consideration of his becoming 
 the faithful liege of His Majesty King Richard II.,' we 
 find to have been confirmed by an inspeximus of 
 Henry IV. on March 16, 1400.* This delicate method 
 of pulling the wires appears to have been in great vogue, 
 but the appeals of the Flemish burghers to the successors 
 of the Kings who had made the grants were not always 
 attended with equal fortune. The rise of competitive 
 English industries must have rendered the task of 
 maintaining a cordiality of commercial relationship in- 
 
 1 Calendar of the Patent Rolls (Richard II. to Henry IV.), 
 pp. 51, 361, 424 et seq. 
 
 2 Ibid. (1378), p. 580. 5 Ibid. {1389), p. 153. 
 * Ibid. {1400), p. 24. 
 
go ENGLAND AND BURGUNDY 
 
 creasingly difficult ; but on the whole the arrangements 
 which were made, in spite of mutual recrimination and 
 infringements, satisfied the ends for which they were 
 created, and carried England and the Low Countries 
 on to the final struggle for commercial supremacy which 
 was decided by the Navigation Laws of the Protector 
 Cromwell. 
 
 BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD.