i^ggsBP^tec M 11111™! ^TS PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE PROGRESi -SSS, ^ .■"Hw a, » ■ .'.'•Ji»Ji3^^a;-:^^ via? ■ a:.tai-t,<-:, ■>^Ji.rii— »7;-->,.i?^^ ,:,^^ ;..__■_ „„ , The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://archive.org/details/cu31924030765352 FORTIFICATION: ITS PAST ACHIEVEMENTS, RECENT DEVELOPMENT, FUTURE PROGRESS. Major G.' SYDENHAM CLARKE, C.M.G., ROYAL ENGINEERS. WITH 56 ILLUSTRATIONS. LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1890. ^^ Cornell University Library (^ UG401 .S98 Fortification: olin 3 1924 030 765 352 LONDON : PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS. PREFACE The number of works on Fortification in the English language is small. The sumptuous volumes which annually appear in Paris and Brussels have no counterpart here. The keen discussion, which the subject excites in France and Germany, wakes but a faint echo on this side of the Channel, and an explanation of this marked difference can easily be suggested. Land defence in the British Empire is, perhaps, not seriously regarded, notwithstanding that we have expended large sums upon it. The North-West Frontier is far distant, and its protection may possibly be looked upon as a matter for the Government of India, not for us at home. Coast defence must apparently claim consideration, if only for the purpose of correctly adjusting its scale to the real needs of the Empire. But such things are probably assumed to be exhaustively discussed by experts with whom the uninitiated may not intermeddle. It results that there is no school of thought in regard to Fortification ; that elementary principles are still floating in solution ; and that no approach to a consensus of matured opinion is ever attained. Of mere text-books there are enough ; but such works are apt to be swamped in the dreary morass of technicality. PREFACE. Principles are lost in details, and criticism can have no place where dogma must necessarily reign supreme. Again, text-books tend to repeat each other with remarkable fidelity ; and views, possibly fallacious, receive acceptance after sufficient reiteration. Finally, the text-book cannot well suggest the existence of doubt, may not refer too pointedly to current controversies, and must assume a large measure of certitude. At the present moment, views of all kinds in relation to questions of Fortification are being widely proclaimed abroad ; the old faiths have been rudely shaken ; certitude can no longer be assumed. There is a school which asserts that the elaborate works in which France has sunk vast sums are indefensible, simply because shells carrying a high explosive can now be fired with tolerable safety to the besieger. There is another school which holds, as strongly, that the tendency has been to grossly exaggerate the real requirements of Fortification, and that France on her North- Eastern frontier, and Belgium on the Meuse and at Antwerp, have squandered money in complying with the demands of the merest theory. Amidst so much doubt, and in presence of opinions so conflicting, the views here advanced at least need no apology. For the British Empire, Land defence has only a sub- ordinate importance. Our national existence depends upon "Sea Power," and will end for ever if that Power is once definitely lost. Had the problem of national defence been fully grasped, the costly works at Portsmouth and Ply- mouth would have assumed a very different form. By the PREFACE. sea our forefathers won Empire ; by the sea alone can their descendants lose it. The British Empire demands a certain measure of naval strength as the first condition of security and permanence, and no defences on shore affect the question of this necessary naval strength in the smallest degree. The requisite standard of naval strength having been fixed, the questions arise as to what remains for Fortification to accomplish, and what kind of Fortification is best suited for the purpose. The objects which the writer has kept in view may be briefly summed. It has been sought, in the first place, to arrive at a just estimate of the war-achievements of Forti- fication. Beginning with the sieges of Marlborough and Eugene, the history of Fortification in the Peninsula, the Crimea, the Russo-Turkish campaigns of 1828-9 and 1877-8, the Danish war, the American war of Secession, and the Franco-German war, are sketched in broad outline, and the general results criticized and compared. The evolution of the defence is traced down to the present day, and the many and various recent proposals are discussed in the light of such experience as is available. The principles which it is maintained should guide future progress, in view of the latest developments of arms, are then defined. In the large portion of the work which deals with coast defence, prominence is given to the great practical experi- ment carried out at Alexandria in 1882. No secure basis on which to rest coast defence can be found without a careful study of the capabilities and disabilities of the modern ship of war. The evolution of armoured navies is. PREFACE. therefore, sketched, and a selection of types of British and foreign vessels is given. Appendices are added, in which the principal details of the armoured ships of France and Russia are tabulated. The higher criticism should always be constructive, and it may seem that the present work deals too largely in destruction. This is, however, practically inevitable. Cut and dried systems of Fortification have no longer any place in military science. Judged by the test of war, it is doubtful whether these systems ever possessed any special value ; while it is certain that the homage blindly accorded to them has cramped the views of many generations of engineers and induced a certain disregard of real military requirements. Geometry has its proper sphere ; but, when it is permitted to dominate Fortification, military science and military progress necessarily suffer. In place of the rigid formulas which so greatly simplify the work of the instructor, all that can now be given are broad general principles. We must study carefully the results obtained in war, and correctly analyse their causes. We must as carefully follow the development of modern arms, and from the data afforded by peace experiments, seek to draw sound inferences. Thus only can the progress of Fortification be wisely ordered. A considerable portion of the following pages has already appeared in four papers published by the Royal Artillery Institution. These papers, revised, expanded, and partly rewritten, are now republished with the permission of the Committee, in the hope of aiding the solution of some difficulties, of clearing away some of the cobwebs in which PREFACE. Fortification lies half-smothered, and of attracting a larger class of thinkers to a subject which has no real mysteries. The intelligence with which military questions are publicly discussed has markedly increased of late years, and the more that intelligence can be developed, the less will be the risks of those mistakes of policy for which a nation pays dearly. London, July, 1890. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Introductory . . ..... i CHAPTER II. Sieges of Marlborough and Eugene — Sieges of the Peninsula — Lines of Torres Vedras ... ... 9 CHAPTER III. Wars of Napoleon — -Danzig — -Saragossa — Tarragona — Mainz — Antwerp — Vauban — Montalembert — Carnot — Fortification be- tween Waterloo and Sebastopol — Linz . . . .18 CHAPTER IV. Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29 — -Braila, Varna, Silistria, Schumla — Silistria, 1854 — Sebastopol — Kars ... 27 CHAPTER V. Introduction of Rifled Arms — Comparison of Shell Power — American Civil War — Forts Pulaski, Henry, Donelson, Wagner — Vicksburg — Fort Fisher— Petersburg — Atlanta . 40 CHAPTER VI. Diippel — Franco-German War, 1870-1 — General Results of German siege operations — Paris, Fort Issy, Hautes Bruy^res Redoubt — Belfort — General deductions from the siege operations of the War . ... . .52 CHAPTER VII. Plevna — Kars, 1877— Works constructed in England after 1859 — General Review ......... 69 TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER VIII. PAGE Summary of recent proposals — Colonel Cambrelin — Lieut.-Colonel Schumann — General von Sauer — General Schott — M. Mougin — Lieut.-Colonel Voorduin — " Un Pionnier " — General Brial- mont ........... 84 CHAPTER IX. Effect of Modern Development of Arms — Magazine Rifles — High- Angle Fire — Quick-firing and Machine Guns — Smokeless Powder — High Explosives — Communications — Obstacles — Uselessness of Enceintes and of Eeduits .... 104 CHAPTER X. General requirements of Modern Fortification — Selection of Sites — ■ Employment of Artillery — Planting — Magazines — Range- finding and Observation — Change of Teaching required . . 129 CHAPTER XI. General Principles of Coast Defence— Changes in previous Practice now necessary— Summary of Methods of Mounting Guns . 149 CHAPTER XII. Evolution of Coast Defences— Disappearing Principle — Barbette Principle— Adoption of Breech-loading System— Reduction of Methods of Mounting— General Statement of Problem . 163 CHAPTER XIII. The Fire of Ships — Change of Conditions — Comparison of Weight and Volume of Fire of old and new ships of war — Effect of Range — Sfax — Alexandria — Searching Effect of Shrapnel — Auxiliary Armament of Ships — Machine Gun Fire, Alexandria, Inchkeith — Quick-firing Guns, Inchkeith . . 17, CHAPTER XIV. Effect of introduction of Breech-loading Guns on question of Protection — Barbette Mountings formerly considered in- applicable to New Guns— Invisibility— Overhead Cover- Disappearing Mountings — Portland Experiments — Service Barbette Mountings— High-angle Fire— Quick-firing Guns in Coast Defences — "Balance Pillar" Mountings — Position- finding System— Submarine Mines— The Pneumatic Gun- Dirigible Torpedoes j„7 TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER XV. PAGE Development of Armoured Navies — British Ships — French Ships — Italian Ships — Russian Ships — Unsuitability of Cruisers for Attack on Coast Defences .... . . 216 CHAPTER XVI. Responsibility — Functions of Coast Defence — Armaments of Coast Defences — High-angle Fire — Old Type Guns not Valueless — Quick-firing Guns — Distribution of Armament — Dispersion — Invisibility — Methods of Mounting-Coast Works — Magazines — ■ Parapets — Electric Lights — Dirigible Torpedoes — The Pneumatic Gun— Conclusion . .252 DIAGRAMS. Diagram I. — Angles of Impact of Projectiles from lo-in. R.M.L. Gun .... ...... 274 Diagram II. — Angles of Impact of Projectiles from French 27-cra. Gun ........ 275 Diagram III. — Angles of Impact of Projectiles from i-in. Norden- felt Gun . 276 Diagram IV. — Trajectories of Projectiles from lo-in. R.M.L. Gun, and 9'2-in. B.L. Gun . . . . 277 APPENDICES. A. Summary of Sieges of Wars of Marlborough and Eugene . . 278 B. Summary of Sieges of Peninsula War . . 282 C. Breaches assaulted in Peninsula War . . . 285 D. Escalading operations of Peninsula War . . . . 287 E. Summary of Siege operations of Franco-German War, 1870-1 288 F. Summary of Effect of German Fire on Paris Defences, South Front . ... G. Table of French Ships of War H. Table of Russian Ships of War I. Details of 9" 2-in. B.L. Gun . J. Details of 6-in. B.L. Gun K. Details of 4-7-in. Quick-firing Gun . General Index • ■ 302 296 to face p. 299 299 • 299 • 300 301 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Fortress of Lille . . . . Section Citadel of Belfort .... Defences of Silistria, Arab Tabia (1828) Plan Sebastopol, Redan and Malakofif (Plan and Sections) Sebastopol end of siege ..... Fort Issy (Plan) Hautes Bruy^res (Section) „ Sections Hautes Bruyeres Redoubt (Plan) . Basse Perche Redoubt (Plan and Sections) . Plevna, No. 2 Grivitza Redoubt (Plan and Sections) Roumanian works of attack on No. 2 Grivitza Redoubt Disappearing cupola 12-cm. gun (Schumann) Spherical mortar Disappearing cupola for 53-mm. gun Travelling shield mounting . (Schumann) Typical battery Subterranean Fort (Mongin) Section . Disappearing truck mounting (St.Chamond) Typical Fort (Voorduin) (Plan and Sections) Typical Fort (Un Pionnier) (Plan and Sections) Oscillating cupola (Mongin) Plan of Subterranean Fort (Mongin) Typical Fort, Brialmont (Sections) Typical Redoubt (Plan and Sections) Section of Casemate Battery Section of Open Shielded Battery " C<.llingvvood " mounting adapted for land service (Elswick) Barbette mounting, 9 ■2-inch gun (Elswick) Coast defence mounting, 27-cm. gun (Cai:et). Hydro-pneumatic mounting, 8-inch gun (Elswick) Hydro-pneumatic mounting, 8-in. gun (loading position) PAGE to face p. 5 7 to face p. 30 J) y- ib. to face p. 59 ib. to face p 63 6; « 70 ib. to face p. 86 ,, ib. jj ib. ,, ib. ,, ib. to face p. 88 ib. to face p. 89 „ 90 J 96 102 to face p. 1-3 .. 132 154 157 . to face p. 159 jj 203 1] 402 ;? ib. ib. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE 27-c.m. Mortar on Coast Defence Mounting. Balance pillar mounting, A"J-\n. quick-firing (Elswick) . . . . Central pivot mounting 6-inch gun (Elswick) . . 206 gun to face p. 207 208 1 5-inch pneumatic gun H.M.S. Warrior . . . 213 . 220 „ Achilles . 221 „ Alexandra .... . 222 „ Devastation 224 „ Inflexible „ Nile 225 . 226 „ Hood . . . 227 „ Rupert . . . „ Victoria . . „ Timiraire . . 229 . 230 231 ,, Collingwood . . New Barbette Ship • 232 • 232 Formidable 238 Turenne Furieux .... Grenade .... • 239 . 240 . 241 Ucille . . Sinope . . . . Admiral Nakhivioff 242, 243 • 245 ■ 247 Pamyat Azova . . , . Section of Parapet . , , 248 . 270 FORTIFICATION. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. No science is so delightfully empirical as that of Fortifica- tion. The test of experiment cannot satisfactorily be applied to it ; that of practical experience is uniformly ambiguous. No fad is so unimportant that an instance cannot be found which affects to illustrate its utility ; no office table theory so unpractical, that evidence of some sort cannot be produced for its support. For the data are never scientifically complete, and each successful or unsuccessful attack or defence may generally be traced to any one of a dozen causes in accordance with the personal predilections of the writer. Thus, on the assault of Tel-el-Kebir, may evidently be founded a specious argument in favour of night attacks on fortified positions unprepared by Artillery fire. Plevna may merely serve to point the moral of the necessity for a careful preparation by a competent siege train. Fort Kanly at Kars has been found to indicate the efficacy of an interior " keep." Toul may go to show either that it is desirable to keep trees standing on the glacis, or that it is essential that they should be cut down ; Sedan, that old type continuous enceintes are worse than useless ; Strasburg, that they are by no means to B FORTIFICATION. be despised ; Donelson, that mere earthworks are incapable of resistance ; Sebastopol, Vicksburg, Petersburg and Wag- ner, that they are remarkably efficient. Going still further back, Badajos in 1812 may be assumed to preach the practi- cability of escalade, and in 181 1 its probable hopelessness. Salamanca supplies a strong argument in favour of the employment of watch dogs at night ; and this catalogue of instances might be indefinitely extended without any diffi- culty whatever. The results of peace experiments lend themselves almost more readily to the exigencies of any one possessed by an idee fixe. We can take them literally and enlarge upon the extraordinary destructiveness of modern weapons ; or we may minimise them, applying any corrective factor for service conditions which appears best to suit our individual views. An historical fact may even be suppressed or altered by a partisan writer to fit his thesis ' — a method of procedure which however is not unknown in connection with other of the non-exact sciences. All these conditions tend inevitably to the enunciation of opinions as divergent as they are positive; but they never- theless lend a certain speculative charm to the subject. For- tification is even as the field of metaphysics, where we can roam at will, accepting with contentment the teaching of any one of half-a-dozen eminently respectable coteries of school- men, or seeking the more exciting pleasures of the free lance. The science sadly suffers, however, from the general instability of its data, which tends to make progress slow and often ' Thus a recent writer in the Independence Beige, being sorely in need of an ilhistralion of the efficacy of ditch-flanking arrangements, quotes the repulse of the German attack on the Perches redoubts at Belfort as a case in point. It is needless to say that the ditches of these provisional works had no flankinc arrangements of any kind. INTRODUCTORY. ill-ordered ; while, in England, where there are few or no opportunities for full discussion, that rough average of the opinions of many minds which presumably approximates to wisdom, is never formulated. In the following pages an attempt is made to analyse briefly the results obtained by land Fortification in the past, and to forecast the changes in practice, which appear to be justified by the altered conditions of war. The task has been undertaken with a full realization of the difficulties as well as the temptations above pointed out, and the con- clusions arrived at deserve to be accepted only in so far as the reasoning on which they are based, is able to carry conviction. It is unnecessary to enquire whether the value of Fortifica- tion is greater or less now than formerly. Europe is being fortified to an extent and at a cost undreamed of in the past. The defences of Paris at the present time are on a scale altogether unprecedented. Never were the frontier fortresses of France and Germany in such a high state of technical efficiency and internal organization as now. Austria is com- pleting the defences of her eastern boundary. Antwerp has almost attained text-book perfection. Roumania is seriously engaged in converting Bucharest into a great entrenched camp. Italy has largely developed her coast defences. The defences of the coaling stations of the British empire are nearly completed ; the fortresses at home and abroad are being partially revised ; the protection of the home commer- cial ports is believed to be under consideration ; even London seems about to be fortified in some fashion. The science of Fortification — in the broad sense — has probably justified the great expectations which appear to have been formed of its capabilities. The successes obtained of late years by the defence, qua defence, have certainly been B 2 FORT I PICA TION. far more conspicuous than those won by the attack. Kars perhaps excepted, there is no modern instance of failure where the conditions — from the point of view of Fortification — were moderately favourable. There have been very few cases that can well be regarded as striking technical successes — triumphs over Fortification— on the part of the attack, since the Peninsula War ; and Wellington's successful sieges were remarkable chiefly on account of the miserable appliances with which it was necessary to conduct them, and the great personal gallantry sometimes displayed. The inherent tac- tical and strategic drawbacks of the defence, about which it is perfectly easy to discourse, German-fashion, at any length whatever, have nothing to do with the present purpose. It might have been far wiser for the Russians to have abandoned Sebastopol after the Alma, and for the Turks never to have cut a shelter-trench at Plevna ; but, viewed simply from the Fortification stand-point, the defences of Sebastopol and of Plevna were brilliantly successful. Similarly the siege of Paris, though ending in national disaster for France, can only be regarded as an unbroken triumph won by highly indifferent and thoroughly super- annuated defences. The literature of siege warfare is as rich and varied as that of tactics ; but while the one subject has been discussed till it is nearly threadbare, the other has been scarcely touched. Till a new European war provides fresh matter for analysis, it is hardly possible to add anything new to the sum total of tactical exegesis ; yet no one has yet given us an adequate critical study of the sieges of 1870-71. Permanent Fortification occasionally produced good defen- sive results, before the establishment of the French school, which was destined to exert an influence strongly felt to this day. Long and costly sieges were not unknown. Ostend INTRODUCTORY. 5 held out from 1501 to 1 504, thus rivalling the memorable defence of Gibraltar. Rochelle in 1572 withstood eight assaults, and is stated to have cost the besiegers 20,000 men. Yet, notwithstanding that the conduct of a siege in those days was chaotic, a writer in 1628 thus slightingly summarizes the performance of the fortresses of his time, — " The strongest do not hold out more than six weeks ; the best cannot take care of themselves without an army close at hand." * This is a significant testimony to the general inadequacy of perma- nent Fortification, even at a period before order and science had been brought to bear upon the attack. The 17th cen- tury produced Vauban and his school, in whose hands per- manent Fortification grew to be treated somewhat as a geometrical puzzle — a species of maze designed much on the principles which may have guided Henry's chief engineer in laying out the approaches to Rosamond's bower, and, on the whole, little more successful in keeping out the invader. The surviving examples of this school are dwindling. The land front of Valetta remains, however, as an interesting historical monument ; but, in spite of some undoubted elegance of treatment, does not by any means serve to give a complete idea of the refinements of line and angle, attainable under favourable conditions. The fortress of Lille (Plate I.) is a good example of the defences which sprang up round a large number of the towns of Western Europe, under the auspices or the influence of Vauban, Vast sums were thus entombed, but it is cer- tainly open to question whether the results obtained were proportionate. Of Vauban himself, Marmont writes — " He was more of an engineer than a general, and in making great numbers of fortresses he followed the bent of his own pre- ' Pagan. FOR TIFICA TION. dilections.'' The criticism is not altogether unjust. Vauban's conception of the use of Fortification in relation to strategy, was by no means justified by its results ; while to the science in its narrower aspect, he contributed little that was of real value. By the irony of fate, however, Vauban came to be regarded as the creative genius of the defence, and the great work of his life — the work by which he well merited lasting fame — was half forgotten. The average human mind is naturally impressed more deeply by concrete facts than by abstract ideas, and the great engineer who was the first to reduce the attack to a well-organized system, and himself to demonstrate its success in a long series of sieges, was almost lost in the man who covered France with fortresses, of which about half were unnecessary, if not undesirable.^ The result of this mistaken identity, has unquestionably been to cramp the whole science of Fortification for long years, and the narrowing influence has by no means passed away. The Vauban systems are still regarded, spoken of and taught as the basis of permanent Fortification, which they are not in any sense whatever. Fortification and tactics have but one and the same basis in all times, and that is the power, in the widest possible sense, of the weapons of the attack and defence. Even now, it seems barely possible for a writer treating of the detached fort system, to avoid confusing his subject by saying, — "Thus, the forts are the bastions, etc., etc." The jargon has become familiar. The geometrical basis of the Vauban systems was the bas- tioned trace. Draw a polygon round the area to be defended, make of each side a bastioned front, obtain saliency and a cross fire over the front by ravelins. This was the foundation ' As pointed out by Jomini, France had no less than 40 foitiesscs on one- Ihfril only of her frontier. INTRODUCTORY. to which Vauban in his so-called first system, added little. Supplement this trace by any number of counterguards ; place an independent reduit — in England to be erroneously termed a " redoubt " — in every available angle ; build high cavaliers to give simultaneous lines of fire; retrench every- thing retrenchable ; throw out hornworks, crownworks, tenaillons, demi-tenaillons and what-not to the front, thus indefinitely increasing geometrical possibilities ; finally, build a "citadel" in which most of the above artifices could be repeated inside the main line, and one arrives at a fair idea of what may be termed the linear method of Fortification. The section through the citadel of Belfort on the front selected by the Germans for attack, serves to illustrate very forcibly the practical outcome of linear principles. CITADEL OF BELFORT. Fig. I. Sct7-l& -lE^^C- . Keep. Cavalier. Flank ist Envelope. 2nd Envelope. Ravelin. Covered way Casemates. " Crownwork. When analysed, the ruling idea of the traces of the 17th and i8th centuries appears to be the effort (1st) to obtain flank defence in any degree of imaginable complexity, and (2nd) to provide for a step by step resistance after the crowning of the covered way, intended to entail upon the attack a series of successive breaching operations, and ending only with the fall of the citadel, involving a fresh siege. Cormontaingne and Foucroy, with singular boldness, drew up a species of time-table of the theoretical duration of the defence in various cases,— Vauban's ist system, 19 days ; FORTIFICA TION. 3rd system, 26 days ; Cormontaingne's system, 32 days ; Coehorn's, 21 days, etc., etc. Sorties, mines, counter- approaches, and extemporized entrenchments — everything in fact which did not come within the cognizance of the draw- ing office, — were of course set aside by these ingenious theorists. As Sir J. Jones has pointed out, however, "the powers of defence of any particular trace are scarcely susceptible of nice analyzation," ^ and there is no reason to suppose that any real advance in defensive strength was ever attained by mere complication. 'Journals of the Sieges in Spain.' MARLBOROUGH AND EUGENE. CHAPTER II SIEGES OF MARLBOROUGH AND EUGENE. — SIEGES OF THE PENINSULA. — LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. The sieges of the Wars of Marlborough and Eugene in the early part of the i8th century,^ may be taken as giving a fair index of the resisting power of fortresses at a period follow- ing lavish expenditure on permanent Fortification, and when Vauban's method of formal attack was in full operation. Never before or since have the attack and defence met on more equal terms, and these sieges may almost be regarded as crucial tests of the defensive efficacy of the Fortification of the time. It is freely admitted that in comparing individual sieges, the standard of mere duration cannot be adopted as a measure of the resisting power of respective systems of Forti- fication. No such comparison is ever really possible, or trustworthy, on account of the variety of the conditions, and the impossibility of arriving at a least common denominator. If, however, the average of a number of sieges, at a some- what special epoch in the evolution of Fortification, is taken into consideration, a fair general idea of the value of the systems of the period may surely be arrived at. Here and there doubtless arises an exceptional case. Ulm, in 1706, • All the principal sieges of this period are given in Appendix A., the informa- tion being derived from " The Military History of Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough.'' Claude du Bosc. 1736. FORTIFICATION. for example, surprised by a party of "officers" of whom " the youngest and handsomest were dressed in the habit of women," clearly offers no teaching on vexed questions of trace. And, similarly, the fall of Brisac, possessing probably one of the most elaborate systems of defence ' ever carried into execution, and taken without assault in fourteen days, may evidently be explicable on grounds with which Fortifica- tion has nothing to do. It must nevertheless be admitted, that considered in their broad . aspects, the sieges of the Wars of Marlborough and Eugene give a fair measure of the capabilities of permanent Fortification, in what may be deemed its palmy days. If the French revival, inspired by Vauban, had produced any marked effect ; if the elaboration of trace had proved a pronounced advantage, these sieges must apparently have afforded clear indication of the fact. They do nothing of the kind. Excluding from the list in Appendix A. the cases of Turin and Toulon,^ which were not taken, the average duration of the twenty-nine remaining sieges is under thirty-four days — a period actually less than that of the resistance offered, in some cases, by almost identical fortifications to the German Artillery in 1870-71. Notwithstanding that, in the fortification of this period, special attempts were made by elaborate measures of interior ' Designed by Vauban, who himself directed the attack. ^ Toulon, attacked both by land and sea, made a successful defence of sixty- four days, the siege being then raised. But Toulon was an indifferent fortress at the time, and had apparently to depend to a great extent on field works hastily thrown up. Turin made an altogether exceptional defence of 136 days, before it was relieved ; but this resistance must be ascribed rather to careful preparation, to the works created by the Duke of Savoy, in anticipation, as well in the course of the siege, and to the fact that the communications remained open till a late period, than to permanent fortifications. Turin was, in fact, an i8th century Sebastopol. MARLBOROUGH AND EUGENE. defence, to allow of breaches being defended, it appears to have been very generally admitted that to offer resistance to an assault was a hopeless task involving unjustifiable slaugh- ter. In one case only ' out of twenty-nine sieges does an assault appear to have been awaited, and Marshal Boufflers in 1708, surrendered Lille, the strongest fortress in France, with the full consent of the King, rather than risk assault. The siege of Lille is remarkable, however, for the fact that its citadel — unlike citadels in general — held out after the fall of the town. Regarding the sieges above referred to in the light of such details as are available, it seems clear that in the majority of cases the refinements of detail and trace, to which theory delights to assign disproportionate importance, exercised no influence whatever over the issue. In the remaining in- stances, there is nothing to lead to the conclusion that these refinements produced any real effect, and not one of the twenty-nine sieges enumerated rivalled that of Haarlem in the previous century, defended by works constructed mainly after the arrival of the besieging force. It is worth noting that some of the most protracted defences — Landau (1704), Turin, Toulon — were made by fortresses whose permanent works had been largely supplemented at the last moment. Broad military principles — not the technical niceties so dear to Uncle Toby and Major Dugald Dalgetty — appear to have determined the issue in the sieges of this period. Then, as now and always, events declined to take the course pre- scribed for them. The Peninsula War furnishes another distinctive group of sieges, of which an admirably lucid account has been left us ' Liege, 1702. FOR TIFICA TION. by Sir J. Jones.^ The precis of these sieges given in Appendix B. shews that, out of nine cases, the attack failed in two — Badajos in i8il, and Burgos. Excluding Olivenga left almost without a garrison, Fort Napoleon, Almaraz, which was not actually besieged, Salamanca which cannot be regarded as a fortress, and the Retiro at Madrid, which practi- cally offered no defence, the average duration of the three remaining successful sieges was thirty-one days ; including the first siege of Badajos and that of Burgos, the average duration of the defence of the five fortresses actually besieged was about thirty-three days. On the one hand, the Spanish fortresses were weak and in poor repair, and on the other hand, the resources of the attacking force were generally inadequate. The sieges of the Peninsula deserve special notice how- ever, if only on account of the numerous instances of assault and escalade which they present. It is not unusual to point to these sieges as evidence of the practicability of assault and escalade ; but little reference is generally made to the failures. Statements of the assaults of breaches and of the esca- lading operations of the Peninsula sieges are given in Appendices C. and D. Of twelve assaults, five were success- ful, including that of the great breach at Ciudad Rodrigo, which would have failed but for the success gained at the ' 'Journals of the Sieges in Spain.' Of this almost unique work, "no second edition was allowed to appear " till about 1826 ; because " the attention of those entrusted with regulating the engineers' branch of the army being at the time zealously eng^ed in giving it due organization and efficiency, any further discussion would have been misplaced." In ether words, at a period when the remedying of gross evils was being taken in hand, the publication of the cool observation of the effects of those evils by a practical soldier was deemed inopportune. Meanwhile, however, General Foy was sneering at the poverty of our military literature,— >«!?;(' d ces dernib-es annks pas un auteur national n' avail krit ex professo sur les parties savantes de la gucii-e. THE PENINSULA. 13 little breach.* Of all the breaches independently stormed, that of St. Sebastian only was retrenched. The opinion of Sir J. Jones, that if a breach is well retrenched and provided with obstacles " no conceivable superiority of courage can counterbalance such advantages " appears to be amply justi- fied. Again, of twelve attempts to escalade, six were suc- cessful ; but of these one, St. Roque Lunette at Badajos, was practically unopposed, and three, — Picurina Lunette at Badajos ; Fort Napoleon, Almaraz ; Fort St. Michael, Burgos — were not very serious affairs either as regards the obstacle to be surmounted or the resistance offered. There remain two brilliant examples — the Castle and St. Vicente Bastion, Badajos — as to which Sir J. Jones remarks, "the efforts of British troops occasionally set all calculations at defiance, and when a few years shall have swept away the eye-witnesses of their achievements of this night, they will not be credited." Few, if any, of those eye-witnesses are now left, and the devoted gallantry displayed in the second siege of Badajos can hardly be too often recalled ; but these highly excep- tional successes no more serve to point a moral, in relation to the permanent Fortification of to-day, than the exploits of Horatius and his two companions in relation to the tactics of the defence of bridges. While assault of the breach and escalade were almost unknown in the earlier sieges, every fortress included in Appendix B. was either assaulted or escaladed, or both. The systematic occupation of a breach in accordance with the method laid down by Vauban was regarded as an operation so certain as to justify capitulation in advance. Napoleon has even been blamed for the barbarity implied in his orders ' At the Siege of Tarifa by the French in 1810, a good breach was made ; but the assaulting columns were broken up and dispersed by musketry fire before reaching it. 1 4 FOR T I PICA TION. to the Governor of Antwerp, in 1809: "^ Enfin nous attendons et voulons qu'il courre les hazards d'un assaut pour prolonger la defense et augmenter la perte de lennemi." If, however, retrenchments, permanent or extemporized, have any raison d'itre at all, it must be sought in a prolonged defence after the main line has fallen, whether by escalade or assault of the breach. In the Peninsula sieges, the approaches were so imperfect that the excuse for premature capitulation did not exist, and at the same time urgency dictated assaults. Hence arose one of the chief character- istics of these sieges. The result proves that, under such circumstances, breaches were eminently defensible, only one retrenched breach (St. Sebastian) being successfully stormed, and the issue in this case being determined by the powerful effects of the Artillery fire directed against an adjacent por- tion of the works by which a great mass of combustibles within the lines was ignited. Although the siege train at the disposal of the Duke of Wellington was always inadequate, the available Artillery was much more powerful than that employed in the earlier sieges. Gunpowder had fully doubled in strength, and iron guns had been so much improved as to be greatly superior to those of brass. The results obtained were far beyond anything pre- viously recorded. It was found that an exposed wall could be breached with certainty up to a range of 700 yards. To attempt to breach such a wall even at 1000 yards appeared to be justifiable. Accurate enfilading fire could be carried on up to at least 1500 yards. Smooth-bore siege Artillery had in fact nearly reached its furthest point. The fortresses besieged in the Peninsula were in most respects indifferent, and Badajos, the best of them, had apparently not been revised or restored for more than fifty years ; although in the nine months' interval between the first THE PENINSULA. and siecond sieges, the French considerably improved the defences. Burgos, "a very insignificant fortress," was little more than a mediaeval castle in a strong natural position. At the points breached and assaulted, Ciudad Rodrigo presented a revetment exposed nearly to the foot, an unflanked ditch, and a low fausse braie ; St. Sebastian, a mere town wall, bare to the foot, and supporting a single narrow rampart. Permanent Fortification could not be expected, therefore, to show to advantage in the Peninsula War. Nevertheless, partly on account of the indifferent resources of the besiegers, and partly by reason of the vigorous defence made by the French, the sieges equalled those of the previous century in average duration. As regards Fortification, the principal lessons of the Peninsula sieges seem to be the ease with which a large breach could be formed in an exposed revet- ment and the success with which such a breach could be defended by mere temporary expedients. If ever there was an opening which appeared to lend itself to assault, it was the great breach at Ciudad Rodrigo, thoroughly accessible for lOO feet in breadth, formed at the angle made by an unflanked ditch, not permanently re- trenched, and with a rampart so narrow as to preclude an efficient improvised retrenchment. Accident even favoured the storming party in the premature ignition of the mass of combustibles placed by the defenders at the foot of the breach. Yet it seems clear that the issue was only decided by the success obtained at the Httle breach which was " not obstinately disputed," nor retrenched in any way. Even when allowance is made for the poverty of the resources of the besiegers, it must be admitted that, judged by the standard of the i8th century, the very indifferent fortresses of the Peninsula acquitted themselves creditably. Further, it appeared that their chief weakness was not the 1 6 FOR TIFICA TION. want of elaboration of trace and minor artifice ; but simply the hopeless exposure of revetments and the general ineffi- ciency of the Artillery defence. Given revetments moderately covered, together with a more numerous and better provided Artillery, these sieges would have been materially prolonged. By selecting a suitable incident here and there, deductions can doubtless be made, which, by a strained generalization, may be rendered applicable to any conditions in any age. One writer, for example, finds that the siege of Guisnes in 1558, "brings out very strikingly the value of hidden flanks." The siege of Jericho would probably afford interesting data as to the stability of revetments, if only we were in possession of fuller historical details of the operation. Permanent Fortification obtained one curious success in the Peninsula ; but of an essentially negative character. Campo-Major, a fortress requiring a garrison of 5000 men, " was held against the French by 200 militia and five guns, under Major Tallaia, of the Portuguese Engineers." The permanent defences enabled the real strength of the defenders to be concealed, and the French were actually " induced to sit down regularly before the place with 5000 men, bring up a battering train and open trenches." A breach even was regularly formed, entailing on the French the loss of much valuable time, and Major Tallaia, who must have possessed something of an actor's genius, only marched out two days before the arrival of Sir W. Beresford. This striking instance of passive resisting power should always be remembered to the credit of permanent Fortification. The role played by the Peninsula fortresses was completely eclipsed by that of the provisional defences of Torres Vedras. At the present day, to hold a line of good earth redoubts covering a sea base, would be considered a comparatively obvious and simple operation in the case of a Power pos- TORRES VEDRAS. 17 sessing the command of the sea. If Plevna had been in free and inviolable communication with Constantinople, the Russians might have been in front of it for years. When, however, the Peninsula War broke out it was almost an axiom that " an army receiving battle in position must be beaten," and this like many another axiom equally fallacious, appeared to be capable of historical support. In setting aside such formulas, the Duke of Wellington showed genius of the highest order, and there is nothing in all his career which evinces more independence and originality of military judgment than the conception of the lines of Torres Vedras. If the idea violated some cherished principles, so also did the works. A line twenty-nine miles long was held by a force providing only about 1600 men per mile. Flank defence of ditches attempted in a few of the earlier redoubts, was given up altogether, the traces being based on the ground alone."^ The redoubts did not flank each other, and were in many cases more than a mile apart.. Yet Massena did not even attempt to attack the position, and there can be no doubt whatever that he was right. ' A proposal was recently made to build redoubts "on a bastioned trace" as a defence against Indians armed mainly with bows and arrows. 1 8 FOR TIFICA TJON. CHAPTER III. WARS OF NAPOLEON. — DANZIG. — SARAGOSSA. — TARRA- GONA. — MAINZ. — ANTWERP. — VAUBAN. — MONTALEM- BERT. — CARNOT. — FORTIFICATION BETWEEN W"ATERLOO AND SEBASTOPOL. — LINZ. Except in Spain, the wars of Napoleon were not fruitful in sieges, thus contrasting strongly with those of the Marl- borough era, in which the reduction of fortified places assumed a principal rSle. Napoleon, availing himself to the full of the improved road communications of Europe, sought and obtained success by rapid movements, which procured the fall of the fortresses without tedious siege operations. Thus, in 1800, Marengo gave to the French most of the Austrian fortresses in Italy. Conversely, in 1 813, the French garrisons left in the fortresses of the Elbe and the Oder, surrendered on the advance of the allies to the Rhine. The fortresses at this period appear to have been usually in the wrong place. " France had too many, Germany had too few." ' This, however, is an aspect of the question with which the present work is not concerned. The two sieges of Danzig perhaps deserve special notice. The fortifications consisted of a bastioned enceinte of simple form. The first siege, in 1807, lasted seventy-six days, and was remarkable for the vigour with which the defence was ' The Operation.s of War.' — Hamley. SARAGOSSA. 19 conducted, the length of time during which the besieged were able to hold the field works thrown up in advance of the permanent lines, and the support afforded by the artillery- fire of the fortress. Besieged again in 18 13, Danzig made a defence of more than forty days, preceded by a six weeks' blockade. In neither case can it be said that technical refinements played any determining part whatever, although there has been some attempt to utilise the incident of a blockhouse in the covered way, which was tenaciously held by the defenders in the first siege, for the exaltation of keeps and reduits in general. The French sieges of Saragossa afford a striking proof of the small influence of fortifications as compared with that of the spirit with which a defence is conducted. Saragossa, which might " almost be called an open town," was enclosed by an '" old brick wall ten feet high and three feet thick." ^ The investment was completed on the 27th June, 1808, and the breaches were assaulted on the 2nd July. The attack was repulsed with great loss. On the 31st July, the town and the breaches were again bombarded. The breaches were attacked and carried on the 4th August ; but the Spaniards maintained a house-to-house resistance till the 14th, when the French retired. Thus, this mere walled town withstood "a siege of forty days by 17,000 troops of the most experienced and successful army in Europe," which it triumphantly repulsed. Saragossa was again invested by 38,000 French troops on 19th October, 1809; fresh breaches were made and carried by assault, the attack then proceeding by sap and mine from house to house. Saragossa at last fell, after a heroic resistance of fifty-two days. On the experience 'Annals of the Wars of the 19th Century.'— Cust. C 2 FORTIFICATION. of these two sieges it has been sought to found an argument for " masonry keeps." Tarragona, in 1811, resisted the French for forty-seven days. On the 3rd June, 18 13, a mixed British and Spanish force 14,000 strong, with a siege train of fifty guns, was disembarked before it. The French garrison was inadequate, and two of the outlying forts were taken immediately. The breach in Fort Royal was reported practicable on the 9th ; but the assault twice ordered was twice countermanded, and the siege guns were spiked and abandoned on the 12th, in consequence of the rumoured advance of a relieving force which was at that very moment moving in the opposite direction. The allied force then re-embarked, and the operations, which appear to have been thoroughly mis- managed, ended discreditably.^ Reviewing the sieges above noticed as a whole, it is impossible to draw from them any definite deductions which serve to support the theorising of some of the text-books. An incident picked out here and there may doubtless be utilized in favour of any caprice of the drawing-board, simply because the exact circumstances of the case — all- important in determining scientific judgments — cannot now be ascertained. Certain broad principles, however, stand out clearly enough. Revetments which could be easily breached, even at a dis- tance, bringing down with them masses of parapet, proved unsuitable for purposes of fortification. Long untraversed faces exposed to enfilade fire received practical condemna- tion. The necessity for good and sufficient bomb-proof cover for troops in close proximity to their fighting stations ' "The best of the story was that all parties ran away. Maurice Mathieu mn away, Sir J. Murray ran away, and so did Suchet."—fVi;//mgton Despatches. MA INZ.—ANTWERP^ was universally manifested. A general deficiency in Artillery power and a certain helplessness in handling guns characterised the defence in most instances ; vertical fire in particular was far too little employed. While, thanks to Vauban, the tactical handling of the attack had been reduced from chaos to order, that of the defence was frequently faulty. For the rest, the acute remark of Sir J. Jones, above quoted, was abundantly justified, and the worthless speculations of Cormontaingne and Foucroy were completely falsified. The beauties of trace and petty artifice, on which theory delights to dwell, melted away in the rough crucible of war. Defences were short or long, contemptible or brilliant, in accordance with the spirit of the troops, the genius and readiness of resource of their commanders, the available supply of food and ammunition, and not because the fortress was laid out on simple, or complex lines.^ Within broad limits, the nature of the fortifications mattered exceedingly little ; general tactical conditions decided the event. The lines of Mainz, in 1795, "composed of works of rare perfection — the most considerable of the kind that have been executed in modern times " ^ — and held by 30,000 French troops, fell to the attack of two weak detachments, which " sufficed to create a disorder that nothing could remedy." And later, in 1832, Antwerp, a model stronghold of its day, possessing the advantage of an Artillery of unusual strength relative to that of the attack, made a defence of only twenty-five days, thus falling short of the performance of obsolete Longwy, in face of the German siege guns in 1870-71. The dominant influence of Vauban, which directly ruled ' " En genh-al, ni les fortifications, ni le nombre des soldats defendent une villi " matters greatly. " Tonl depend de la tele plus on mains forte de celui qui y '. According to all correct principles, there- fore, the capture of these fortresses ought to have been a simple matter. Yet the average duration of the three successful sieges was forty-nine days, or sixteen days longer than the Peninsula record, and the weakest of the fortresses, Silistria, with an extremely indifferent garrison, repulsed the Russians altogether in 1828, and was captured in 1829, though held by a better garrison of nearly double strength. What deduction can be drawn from the above facts except that, within broad limits, the nature of the defences matters little, and that sieges, like battles, are decided by general tactical considerations ? The tenacity displayed by the de- fenders in these sieges is no peculiarly Turkish attribute, and was far surpassed by the Spaniards at Saragossa, and rivalled by the Russians at Sebastopol. Nevertheless, the campaigns of 1828-9, and the further experiences of Silistria in 1854, and Kars in 1855, if properly studied, might have saved the Russian general staff from some of the blunders of 1877-8. The war of 1854-S, with which the era of smooth-bore Artillery ended, was an unbroken triumph of Fortification — 30 FORTIFICATION. the Fortification of the soldier, not that of the theorist. The operations all turned practically upon the defence of three entrenched positions, Silistria, Sebastopol and Kars. The enceinte of Silistria, which had distinguished itself so signally in 1828-9, remained unchanged in 1853 ; but the heights commanding the town on the south and east had been occupied by detached works designed mainly by Colonel Grach, a Prussian officer in the Turkish service.' On these detached forts, but more especially on a roughly constructed earthwork, Arab Tabia (Plate II.), the brunt of the attack fell. Towards the end of 1853 the Russians occupied an island in the Danube, from which they freely bombarded the town, " both previous to and during the whole siege, so much so that the sick had to be removed from the town and placed under canvas near Fort Medjidie; yet some of the enemy's shot reached them even there." ^ On the i6th May, 1854, the Russians arrived in front of the place and the first parallel was begun the same night. The garrison of Arab Tabia was a decidedly promiscuous body — " three battalions of Arabs furnished by the Viceroy of Egypt, one battalion of Redifs, one company of newly organized Chasseurs, and about 1000 Arnouts and Albanians." At three A.M. on the 29th May, Arab Tabia was assaulted, the Russians advancing " so rapidly that part of the storming party actually got inside the work, but they were repulsed with considerable loss." The assault was twice repeated and as often defeated, the total loss of the assailants being about 2000 men. The Russians thenceforward avoided assaults, but prosecuted the regular siege of this simple earthwork with much vigour, and fired their first mine on the 2nd June, which, " owing to some ' ' Invasion of the Crimea.' — Kinglake. ^ Major Nasmyth. 'R. E. Professional Papers,' Vol. VI., 1857. ^ ^"^^^'-r=mmfSSif'P''°'>^' SILISTRTA, 1854. 31 mismanagement, exploded backwards." The defenders having no tools were unable to countermine. On the loth June, the Russians fired a mine under Bastion D (Plate II.), and effected an entrance into the retrenchment, only to find an inner line, by the fire from which they were completely repulsed. On the 23rd, "after a tremendous bombardment," the whole besieging force recrossed the Danube and definitely retired. The successful defence of Silistria, and of Arab Tabia in particular, was mainly due to Captains Nasmyth and Butler ; but the whole operation well illustrates the difference between the teaching of theory and that of war. A town, subject to bombardment throughout the siege ; six detached forts of simple design unconnected by trenches ; one advanced work (Arab Tabia), open at the gorge and having a ditch 6 feet 9 inches deep not palisaded ; a motley garrison of about 12,000 men subsequently reinforced by some Bashi-Bazouks — these were the conditions under which an army of 60,000 men was completely repulsed, and the wave of Russian invasion hopelessly broken. The difficulties experienced by Prince Paskievitch's force before Silistria were soon to be painfully realized by the Allies before Sebastopol. This memorable siege has a bearing on Fortification which has never yet been fully recognised, although the magnificent history bequeathed to us by Todleben,^ has enabled the operations to be studied in detail from the side of the defence. Of permanent land defences on the south side of Sebas- topol there were practically none. The project of 1832 had been carried out only in the case of the large barracks which ' La defense de Sebastopol,' 18O3. FORTIFICATION. were intended to form part of the gorges of the principal bastions. In the spring of 1854, steps were taken to protect the town " contre um tentative de descente opir^e par un faible corps de troupes^ Loopholed walls, barricades, and a few simple batteries gradually developed into a vast system of earthworks such as the world had never seen. Plates III. and IV. serve well to illustrate this growth in the case of Bastion No. 3, familiar as the " Redan." By September the defences of the south side mounted 172 guns ready to oppose the 126 guns of the Allies in the first bombardment begun on the 17th of October. It was expected that Sebastopol would fall " after a short cannonade." ^ The siege lasted 349 days, and at its close the Russians opposed 982 guns in first line to about 800 guns of the allies. Given the great resources available at Sebastopol and the decision of the allied generals to sit down before one side of it, there was little reason, judging from the past experience of war, to expect a rapid issue. Improvised defences, held by stubborn troops, had always developed great resisting power. Nevertheless, a resistance of nearly a year could hardly have been anticipated. Nothing in this memorable siege happened quite as it ought to have done, and half the cherished principles of the schoolmen were violated. " Works of field profile ought to be easily stormed ; only scarps thirty feet high gave adequate security against escalade. Even so, the ditches must be well flanked, and there should be no ' undefended space,' or ' dead angles.' The Artillery of the defence ought to be soon silenced by the siege batteries, disposed according to well-established rules." The case of a defender possessing a large reserve of guns, ' ' Campaign of Sebastopol.' — Hamley. Defences of Sebastopol, 25TH September, 1854. Plate III. BASTION No. 3. THE REDAN SECTION 1.1. SECTION 2.2. "MALAKOFF TOWER 3 3 10 o 10 20 30 40 50 SECTION 3.3. Scale for Plans J 00 1 1^0 200 Yards ■ ,°...3.. in 20 Scale for Sections 3P 4£ ^ __7£ 8^ cjoFee^ To face f age 32. Defences of Sebastopol. Bastion No. 3. The "Redan." End of Siege. Plate IV. TofoUmi Plate lit. SEBASTOPOL. 33 and whose operations were directed by a soldier of genius who knew how to employ them, and possessed a free hand, had not been taken into account. Instead of being shut within the line of their works, and merely able to execute occasional sorties, the defenders usurped the recognised pre- rogative of the besiegers as regards trench work, even taking up new ground and commencing such an important advanced work as the Mamelon nearly six months after the siege had begun. The whole proceedings were thus irregular and informal, possessing little in common with the attack as taught in military schools. "In advancing on a regular fortress the works of the besieger are not exposed to the fire of those bastions or salients not attacked, and his attention is directed solely on the two salients before him, and the ravelin or other outwork covering the curtain which connects them, the number of guns in which being determinate, they are always overpowered by the superior number brought against them. The sap proceeds slowly and surely till sufficiently near, when the breaching batteries or the mine open the road through the defences for the stormers." ^ If Sebastopol had only been regularly fortified on some approved system, the course of the besiegers would have been plain. But here " the appellation of siege applied to our operations may almost be considered as a misnomer ; it may rather be said that we were attacking an intrenched position." ^ In any case, the splendid defence which Todleben con- ducted, and the surprising results obtained by mere earth- works steadily developed in the presence of the besiegers, produced a profound impression. It was realized that in a sense, permanent works of the much loved types were 1 'Campaign of Sebastopol. '—llamley. ''Ibid. D 34 FORTIFICATION. discredited, and their champions at once took the field on their behalf. The efficiency of mere field works, which had been demonstrated to an unexpected extent, thus produced the partial paradox of a fresh defence of permanent Forti- fication as its principal literary result. Of the writers who urged this view, none put the case so well as Todleben himself, who pointed out with great force that the plan of defence to which he was driven by stress of circumstances necessitated the daily employment of working parties of from 5,000 to 10,000 men, whose losses were frequently severe. And, further, the want of good casemate cover, which would have enabled strong bodies of troops to be kept close to the points where their presence was required, entailed the constant provision of large reserves in rear who, being more or less exposed, suffered con- siderably. Moreover, such reserves having long distances to traverse, could not always be brought up to the moment, as was proved in the French attack on the Mamelon on the 7th of June. It was impossible to keep an adequate force in the Mamelon under the crushing fire of the siege batteries. The feeble garrison was easily overpowered, and the reserves came up too late to save the work, though in time to hold the Malakhoff", and to capture a number of prisoners. It is quite certain that the defence of Sebastopol supplies no argument for leaving a national arsenal without defences ; but, on the other hand, this great siege, carefully studied, indicates that the necessary fortifications might have been of a very different type from anything that the Professors would have adopted. If the siege of Sebastopol means anything, it is that the vast ditches, the monumental revetments, the clever drawbridges, the fantastic traces, the exaggerated flank defence, all the luxuries of engineering fancy, are SEBASTOPOL. 35 superfluous.^ Had the tactical points of the South front been occupied by strong earth redoubts of the simplest trace, without revetted ditches, but with a liberal provision of efficient obstacles, possessing good bomb-proofs — not barracks with officers' mess rooms and infant schools complete — all the requirements of permanent defence would have been cheaply and effectively fulfilled. Given such strongly built closed works as his key points, instead of being obliged, under fire, to create them gradually and imperfectly in rear of his lines, a lesser genius than Todleben would have made a longer defence with a far less expenditure of life and labour. It is worth noticing that the one completed permanent work on the South side of Sebastopol was the Malakhoff Tower (Plate III.), built by La Marine, at the cost of the merchants of the town. This work, which was altogether inferior in conception to the Linz Towers of much earlier date, proved disadvantageous to the besiegers in all respects. The Malakhoff redoubt, which was fitted round it, suffered in trace. The upper storey of the Tower was speedily cut down by the siege guns of the allies. Even when thus improved by the enemy's fire, the splinters from the truncated wall caused serious casualties to the gunners in the batteries in front. The structure was, however, doubtless dignified with the name of a "keep" — a euphemism applied to similar atrocities of later date. As a keep, it justified its existence by allowing a handful of Russians to hold out uselessly for a few minutes after the French had captured the work. The ' One of the text-books gravely points out— " Still the fact remains that the worlcs which made this memorable defence were never proof against assault." The defences of Sebastopol, in fact, fulfilled the conditions of war, but not those prescribed by theory. Only one of the works in the main line— the Malakhoff— was ever taken, and on the same day the attack on the Little Redan was repulsed with a loss of 4000 men. Yet the little Redan was, of course, " never proof against assault." D 2 36 FOR T I PICA TION. lesson of the Malakhoff Tower seems to be sufficiently clear ; but the traditions of the middle ages are persistent. In a battery at Gibraltar constructed more than twenty years after the siege of Sebastopol, the guns nestle close under a tall stone lighthouse ; while in Landguard Fort the vicious principle on account of which the Russians paid dearly has been faithfully reproduced. The Egyptians — who may be pardoned perhaps — mounted several of their modern guns at Alexandria under the shadow of venerable towers, and suffered accordingly. Other practical lessons may be learned from Sebastopol, however. An indifferent abatis proved the power of an obstacle under musketry fire in resisting an assault. Mines employed on a large scale showed to the best advantage on the side of the defence. Field guns brought up to the parapet at the last moment rendered useful assistance in the repulse of the second attack on the Malakhoff — " avaient effi- cacement contribu^ d neutraliser I'imp^tuositi des assailants." -^ While mere extemporized defences were successfully keep- ing the allies at bay at Sebastopol, similar works were as effectually excluding the Russians from Kars. In 1828, Kars was surrendered by the Turks to Prince Paskievitch after a resistance of three days. Colonel Lake writes — " In the condition in which he found it, it is questionable whether they could have held it for three hours." ^ The exertions of a handful of British and Hungarian officers enabled the place to be held for five months. Kars was never besieged, and such permanent works as it could boast of were never attacked. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be derived which have a direct bearing on Fortifica- tion. The conditions were specially unfavourable for ex- Todleben. Kars, and our Captivity in Russia. — Colonel Atwell Lake, 1856. KARS. 37 temporized defence. The ground was principally rock, and the parapets were made of large stones covered with turf. Timber and brushwood were wanting, and Colonel Lake could not even provide stakes for the trotis de loup, which formed his obstacles. The Turkish force of about 15,000 men, forming the garrison, had been signally defeated at Kuruk-Deri, in the previous year. When the British officers arrived, the greater part of the Infantry was " guileless of all knowledge of drill and discipline," and many of the officers were " ignorant even of the words of command." The men were in rags, and had not received pay for two years. The Artillery alone was fairly efficient. With this garrison. General Williams completely repulsed the determined assault of MouraviefFs fine force of 35,000 men on the 29th September, 1855. The attack began just before daybreak, and the fighting lasted for seven hours. Three small works, not properly garrisoned,^ were carried. " Had they been only ordinarily manned, they would never have been taken." ^ The Russians were completely defeated with a loss of more than 10,000 men, although the whole Turkish force engaged was under 7000, and its loss only 1200. The Artillery of the defence contributed largely to this result. Strange to say, all the rest of the works attacked, though remaining absolutely inviolate, were not theoretically " Sturmfrei" and had neither caponiers nor flanked ditches. And, curiously enough, of the works temporarily captured, because inadequately garrisoned, the only one which was open to the rear "held out long after" the fall of the others, and was only retained " by the enemy for a few minutes." ^ ' Colonel Lake points out that two of them were badly placed. '^ Lake. ^ It would of course be preposterous to claim this fact as an argument in favour of open works ; yet parallel deductions, equally worthless, have been drawn from the accidents of siege warfare. 38 FORTIFICATION. It is worth while to compare the assault of Kars with that of Badajos on the night of the 6th- 7th of April, 1812. With less than 7000 men engaged, Colonel Lake's simple earth- works, constructed in a great measure after the arrival of the Russians, completely repulsed an attack in overwhelming force, inflicting a loss of 10,000 on the assailants. On the other hand, Badajos, the strongest fortress in the Peninsula attacked by the British Army, fell to a combined escalade and assault of the breaches. The strength of the garrison of Badajos was 4071 all told. The whole of it was practically engaged, and the loss inflicted upon the assaulting columns was 3661. At Kars, therefore, the defenders, in field works, inflicted a loss of nearly one-and-a-half per head, and utterly defeated the attack. At Badajos, defended by permanent Fortification, the loss inflicted was nearly one per head of the garrison, and the attack was successful. Comparing the quality of the two garrisons, the advantage should certainly be on the side of the defenders of Badajos, who belonged to the most highly trained army in Europe, and against any moral effect which the loss of Fort Picurina, twelve days previously, and the bombardment, may have caused to the French, must be set the long and weary blockade, the cholera, the actual want experienced by the Turks at Kars. Direct comparisons are never possible ; but the above considerations supply a useful corrective to much that has been written in regard to permanent Fortification, and they should unquestionably inculcate caution in arbitrarily laying down the conditions of storm freedom. " Sturnifrei " defences are after all those which cannot be stormed, and Kars, like Plevna and other roughly intrenched positions all the world over, proves the practical inadequacy of the maxims of the schoolmen. It is quite certain that a Kars, permanently fortified according to the approved methods of KARS. 39 1855, would not have held out one day longer. It is not certain that, in the great assault, a bastioned enceinte of the Badajos standard, would have served the purpose of the defenders so perfectly as did the extemporized defences designed to meet the needs of the moment. With the fall of Kars the age of smooth-bore Artillery and small-arms practically ended. Has the introduction of rifled weapons increased the real requirements of permanent Fortification ? 40 FOR TIFICA TION. CHAPTER V. INTRODUCTION OF RIFLED ARMS. — COMPARISON OF SHELL- POWER. — AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. — FORTS PULASKI, HENRY, DONELSON, WAGNER. — VICKSBURG. — FORT FISHER. — PETERSBURG. — ATLANTA. The introduction of rifled arms inevitably entailed great changes in permanent Fortification ; but it by no means follows that the defence has thereby lost in relative power. Theory seems, however, to have already decided that the engineer is now heavily handicapped, that heroic remedies are re- quired to restore the balance, and that present needs can only be met by extravagant outlay and a large recourse to iron or steel. The teaching of war, so far, points in pre- cisely the opposite direction. The increased range of modern arms has only a subordinate responsibility for the changes that have become necessary. The civil buildings of the fortified towns of the Marlborough era pressed close against the encircling lines. Projectiles from the siege batteries were not necessarily spent when they reached the ramparts, and these towns frequently suffered severe bombardments. In 1792, the Duke of Saxe threw 30,000 hot shot and 6000 shell into Lille in 140 hours, a performance which it would be difficult to surpass to-day.* The 24-pr. S.B. ranged more than 3000 yards, and in 1840, ' During the period of hottest bombardment of Strasburgin 1870, the average rate of fire was about 6000 projectiles in twenty-four hours. SHELL. 41 when the Paris project of defence was under discussion, it was pointed out by General Noizet that the city could be bombarded from the heights of Chatillon, where thirty years afterwards the German siege batteries were actually placed. It is clear, therefore, that the destructive effect of modern fire, rather than its mere range, has expanded the zone of defence. At the same time, a growing humanitarianism tends in the direction of exacting less endurance from a civil popu- lation, and consequently imposes increased demands upon Fortification. The following table, considered in connection with the relatively high remaining velocities and the improvement of fuzes, fully explains the increase of the possible effects of artillery fire : — Bursting Charges of Shells. Smooth-bore Guns. 24-pr. ... . . 13 ozs. i8-pr 10 ozs. 8- in. howitzer . . . . 2J lbs. lo-in. „ . . . . 6i lbs. Rifled Guns. lbs. 64-pr. R.M.L 7| 40-pr. R.B.L 2j 20-pr. ,, ig 8-in. R.M.L. (howitzer) . . 20J iS-cm. B.L. (Krupp) . . . 5J 6-in. B.L 9i 5-in. B.L. (steel) . . . . 1\ l5S-mm. (French) 5 calibres . 22'S 2 1 -cm. mortar (Krupp) . .24-2 Briefly, the changed conditions which Fortification, since Sebastopol, has been called upon to face and to utilize are due to increase in shell-power, range, accuracy and penetra- tive effect, both of artillery and small-arms. More recent 42 FORTIFICATION. progress, while tending to enhance the above attributes, has immensely increased the rate of small-arm fire, and has added machine and quick-firing guns. As regards the design and general conception of land works of defence, the most potent factors are the development of the accurate curved fire of Artillery, the great increase of the rate of fire of small-arms, and the adoption of machine guns. The first is commonly assumed to have conferred preponderating advantage on the attack, and the assumption is true so long as the older ideas of Fortification remain, and the tactical conduct of the defence is neither studied nor systematized. The second has conferred great advantages on the defence, as the experience of war has already proved, even where the trammels of the past were in full force. The third remains as yet practically untested. Railway communication, which, anticipating rifled weapons by a few years only, has developed pari pass?i, constitutes a factor of a different kind, but hardly less important. The first siege operations in which rifled Artillery played any real part took place — not inappropriately — in the New World ; but meanwhile the powers of the early rifled guns were carefully tested in the mock siege of Juliers in i860. This siege of a practicable fortress is thoroughly charac- teristic of the inimitable seriousness of purpose which charac- terizes the German mind, and the experience gained was of much importance at the moment. The results proved the superiority of the new guns for breaching purposes, and showed that a detached wall completely invisible could be brought down with little difficulty by projectiles having a fall of I in 13. The following comparative statement^ ' Editorial note to paper by Lieut. -Colonel A. Robs. — R.E. Corps pa; crs, Vol, X., 1861. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. 43 gives some indication of the advance in the power of artillery : — Experiments. Range. Total weight of projectiles fired. Width of breach. Weight of projectiles per linear foot of breach. yds. lb. feet. lb. 1. Woolwich, 1824. — Independent brick wall 7 ft. thick between piers, 21 ft. high .... 500 660, 100 100 6,601 2. Julias, i860. — Independent counterarched brick wall 3 ft. thick between piers, 16 ft. high 640 3.588 32 III The experiences of the American war are full of interest, and have perhaps received insufficient study. Never before was so much originality displayed during a period of hos- tilities, and Europe owes much to the ingenuity evolved at this time of dire national necessity. The authorship has not in all cases been adequately acknowledged, and we have since re-invented some of the commonplaces of the transatlantic operations.^ While the direct teaching in relation to permanent Fortification is naturally small, the indirect teaching is entirely confirmatory of previous and subsequent experience. Fort Pulaski on Cockspur Island was one of the few per- manent works which came into conflict with the early rifled siege guns. The work was built of brick with one tier of sruns in casemates and another eri barbette. In addition to nature's liberal provision in the matter of water, there was a large wet ditch, doubtless intended to prevent the fort from being -'captured with a rush by a landing party." "The probability of reducing it by the fire of ships was not even if.^-. The gas-check before which fell the barbarous system of studs. 44 FORTIFICATION. discussed;"^ and the work surrendered on the nth April, 1862, after a bombardment of 5275 rounds from thirty-six guns, of which ten were rifled, the heaviest being an 84-pr. The fort was ruined and a breach effected at 1700 yards, the siege guns being served by the Rhode Island volunteers, who had been drilled but " never practised in firing." Into the cases of Forts Henry and Donelson, captured by General Grant in 1862, questions of land Fortification scarcely enter. Fort Henry on the Tennessee was severely bombarded by Commodore Foote with seven gunboats on the 6th April, and surrendered at discretion to the land forces with a garrison of sixty men. " The rest of the garrison had been stationed in the outworks, about two miles off, to avoid the fire of the gunboats ; and before the fight began, Tilgh- man sent them orders to retreat upon Fort Donelson, which they obeyed." ^ Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, was engaged on the 14th April, 1862, by Foote, with six gunboats, which were "so disabled as to be unfit to take any part of importance in the succeeding operations." On the iSth, the Confederate garri- son made an unsuccessful attempt to break through the investing force, which numbered 27,000 men. Donelson surrendered on the following day after a unique council of war, at which the command was successively handed over from Floyd to Buckner and from Buckner to Pillow. Fort Wagner on Morris Island was a provisional work constructed in sand with one bastioned front about 300 yds. long, parapets 16 feet thick, and bombproofs capable of sheltering at least 1500 men. The besieging force was landed in the vicinity. Assaults were delivered on the nth and i8th July, 1863, which were completely repulsed, the Confederates ' Report on siege of Charleston. — General Gillmore. '^ Badeau's Life of Grant. FORT WAGNER. 45 remaining in their extemporized bombproofs to the last, and then manning the parapet and delivering a hot rifle fire. At the time of these assaults, there were no obstacles whatever ; but land torpedoes were subsequently placed 200 yards in advance of the work. A regular siege was then carried on, forty-five guns, of which thirteen were rifled Parrott's (loo-prs., 200-prs., and one 300-pr.i), being placed in battery at ranges of from 820 to 1900 yards. In all, 1173 projectiles, loo-pr. and upwards, struck the bombproof, which was not however opened out, and the effect on the sand parapets generally was very small. High angle fire was employed in these opera- tions, an 8-in. rifled gun, which ultimately burst, being fired at 30° 30' "constant elevation." On account of the narrow fi'ont over which the besiegers were compelled to operate, the siege batteries fired over each other ; but " no such de- moralizing effect on the troops in the advance was experienced as had been anticipated by some," ^ notwithstanding that premature bursts with this virtually experimental ordnance were unpleasantly frequent. In the final bombardment which began on the 5th Sept. and lasted forty-two hours, the New Ironsides "with remarkable regularity and precision kept up an almost incessant stream of 11 -in. shells." The Artillery of the defence was almost useless with the exception of two mortars (8-in. and lo-in. S.B.) which "when earnestly served caused the most serious delay in the progress of our work, and on one occasion suspended it entirely." ^ Fort Wagner ' The heaviest gun ever taken into the trenches. The shell carried a bursting charge of 17 lbs. ^ General Gillmore. ^ General Gillmore- Similar testimony is forthcoming in the case of a single S-in. mortar at York Town. In the battle of Petersburg Mine, ten lo-in. mortars at 800 yards completely silenced a Confederate battery directly the range vfiis. obtained. At Petersburg, also, a 13-in. mortar was fired off a railway platform truck with great effect. The garrison of Fort Issy in 1870 feared the fire of battery No. 23, mounting four 5o-pr. smooth-bore mortars, more than anything else. {Heyde u Froese.) 46 FORT I PICA TION. surrendered on the 7th September after a good resistance of fifty-eight days. The difficulties of the siege, which were considerable, were overcome with a skill and readiness of resource which the most highly trained force in Europe could not have excelled. Vicksburg was defended by a chain of simple field works between seven and eight miles long. A line of rough rifle trench connected the works, which were irregular in trace and closed at the gorge in one case only. Vicksburg, which like Kars in 1877 held a defeated army, was ineflf"ectively bom- barded in June, 1862, by Farragut's fleet in the Mississippi. It was then assaulted on the land side by Sherman on the 29th December, 1862, and by Grant on the 19th and 21st May, 1863, in the latter case, after a heavy bombardment by land and river, lasting till 11 A.M. All the assaults were repulsed with heavy loss. In the second, a few works were captured but could not be held, and the greater part of the attacking force never reached the lines. In the third, the distance to be crossed under fire varied between 80 and 400 yards. On this day, Pemberton had about 18,500 men in his lines, and lost about 800. Grant had about 30,000 men engaged, and his force was almost exactly decimated. A regular siege was begun on the 23rd of May, and mining was attempted on a small scale and without success. The besiegers had 220 guns (mainly field guns) in position ; but the Confederates scarcely used Artillery fire at all, and made little attempt to hinder the trench work. By the 1st July the approaches reached the ditches of some of the works. On the 4th, Pemberton, who had run short of both food and ammunition, surrendered after a memorable defence of 213 days. Fort Fisher, a temporary sand work with guns all mounted eii barbette, but possessing good bomb-proof cover, suffered FORT FISHER. 47 probably the heaviest bombardment on record. On the 24th December, 1864, Admiral Porter shelled the work with thirty- three vessels, the average rate of fire being 115 projectiles per minute. The guns were " temporarily silenced, it being indeed impossible for anything human to stand under the torrent of missiles falling into and bursting over the work." ^ On the 25 th, the fire of the ships re-opened and was con- tinued for seven hours, the fort replying slowly. The Federals then landed a large force and attempted to assault, " the fleet at the same time making a concentrated and tremendous enfilading fire on the curtain." The garrison, however, as soon as the fire necessarily slackened, were able to man their parapets in time to repulse the attack. In spite of this severe hammering, "many engineers and officers report Fort Fisher .... as substantially uninjured as a defensive position." ^ On the 13th January, 1865, Porter again opened " a very rapid severe fire from forty-four ships " which was kept up during the night by the monitors and " New Ironsides." On the 14th, the fire recommenced at one P.M. and was maintained " till long after dark." On the 15th, the bombardment opened at noon and was "kept up furiously all day ; yet the ' Mound Battery ' of the fort could not be hindered from answering most gallantly." Late in the evening, a party of 2000 seamen and marines were landed and assaulted the work on the sea front ; but received a severe repulse. The garrison, however, which had concentrated on the side thus threatened, was surprised and taken in reverse by an attack in force by General Terry's troops, and Fort Fisher fell after severe fighting. The facts above recorded appear to show that the moral eff'ect of Artillery fire is insignificant where adequate cover 1 Coast Defence.— Von Scheliha. ' General Butler. FORTIFICATION. exists, and further, that the fire of ships even under favour- able conditions and in overwhelming force is quite unable to incapacitate an earthwork for Infantry defence. Fort Fisher was specially ill-qualified to resist assault on the land side, since the neighbouring forest had not been sufficiently cleared, while a sand mound provided cover for the attack within a short distance of the parapet. Petersburg, the Confederate Sebastopol, was defended by field works mainly constructed after the arrival of the be- siegers. Telegraphing on the 7th June, 1864, four days after the battle of Cold Harbour, and while the army of the Potomac was still on the north bank of the Chickahominy, General Beauregard alludes to the position as " nearly defenceless," and liable, in the event of a movement against Richmond, to be " captured before it could be reinforced." On the 9th June, Gillmore with 2000 Infantry and Kautz with 1500 Cavalry were sent to attempt to capture the town. Gillmore reported the works " too strong to assault," ^ but Kautz appears to have entered Petersburg on the South side and been then compelled to retire. On the 14th, Grant telegraphed to Washington — " Enemy show no signs of yet having brought troops to the South side of Richmond. I will have Petersburg secured, if possible before they get there in much force." Accordingly Smith with 18,000 men, supported by Hancock with 28,000, was ordered to take the position. Smith's command attacked and carried a portion of the lines on the 15th, before Lee's reinforcements could arrive. The advantage was not followed up. Further attacks took place on the 1 6th, 17th, and 18th, the whole of the 2nd Corps being present. The losses amounted to 6000 men, but the " only result was to force the enemy into an interior line from Bacleau'b Life of Grant. PETERSBURG. 49 which he could not be dislodged." Beauregard had saved Petersburg. A partial investment followed with occasional fighting on a small scale. Meanwhile a siege train of 46 guns (30-prs. and six lOO-pr. Parrott's) with about 60 mortars had been placed in battery. A Confederate work in front of the 9th Corps was mined and blown into the air at 4.30 A.M. on the 30th June,^ and after a heavy bombardment, Meade's troops deli- vered an assault, experiencing some difficulty in getting clear of their own line of abatis. Severe fighting took place in which the Northern force was completely repulsed with a loss of 4400 men and many prisoners, notwithstanding that Grant stated — " such an opportunity of carrying fortifications I have never seen." On the i8th August, the Weldon railway was seized by Warren, thus seriously crippling the sources of supply of Richmond. The works on both sides round Petersburg assumed vast proportions, and by the 25th January, 1865, Grant opposed about 111,000 men to 70,000 Confederates in Petersburg and Richmond.'' On this day Lee attacked Fort Steadman, a small work at a point where the opposing lines were only 150 yards apart. This work, held by a force of garrison Artillery only, was captured, but subsequently re-taken. On the 31st March was fought the battle of Five Forks, brought on by an offensive movement on the part of the Confederates. Early in the evening of the 2nd April a fresh assault was delivered, resulting in the capture of a portion of the lines together with Forts Gregg and Baldwin. The former, with a mixed » The main gallery of this mine, which was driven under many difficulties, was 510 feet long and the charge 8000 lb. of powder. The crater formed was " 150 to 200 feet long, about 60 feet in width, and from 25 to 30 feet in depth, present- ing a serious obstacle to the passage of \.xoo^ir —Report on conduct of the war. 2 According to Badeau ; very different figures have been put forward. E 50 FORTIFICATION. garrison only 300 strong, made a determined resistance against overwhelming numbers ; the latter was evacuated. At the same time, the two attacks made by Miles were totally repulsed. On the following day, Lee abandoned Petersburg and Richmond. The general character of the fighting round Richmond resembled that before Sebastopol, and the differeftce which might have been expected from the substitution of rifled Artillery and small-arms for smooth-bores was not marked. The Artillery at Petersburg played a far less important part than at Sebastopol. The soil was much more favourable for trench work in the former case, which conferred advantages as great on the attack as on the defence. Lee, however, had no Todleben. The possibilities open to good earthworks were again emphasized, and the cni bono in reference to the expensive refinements of drawing-office Fortification irresistibly suggests itself Atlanta, unlike Petersburg, had the great advantage of being carefully fortified before the Northern army arrived, and no attempt to assault the works was ever made. Sher- man with about 80,000 men reached the place on the 22nd July, 1864, and on the 28th the Confederates came out of their works and seriously attacked the investing force, but were repulsed. On the 7th August, Sherman telegraphed to Grant— r" We keep hammering away all the time and there is no peace inside or outside of Atlanta . . . will push forward daily by parallels and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured." " Hood seemed determined to hold his forts," however, and sent out his Cavalry to cut the railway in rear of the besiegers. The siege made little way, and on the 2Sth August, Sherman moved the bulk of his army to the East, cutting the West Point railroad. This turning move- ATLANTA. S' ment caused the evacuation of Atlanta on the 2nd Sep- tember, Hood escaping to the south. The provisional works of Atlanta thus made a resistance of forty-one days and served their purpose as forts, quite as perfectly as the most costly erections copied from Antwerp would have done. E 2 5 2 FOR TIFICA TION. CHAPTER VI. DUPPEL. — FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 187O-I. — GENERAL RE- SULTS OF GERMAN SIEGE OPERATIONS. — PARIS, FORT ISSY, HAUTES BRUY^RES REDOUBT. — EELFORT. — GENE- RAL DEDUCTIONS FROM THE SIEGE OPERATIONS OF THE WAR. The siege of Diippel in 1864 was a particularly easy opera- tion ; since the besiegers were in uninterrupted possession of railway communication with Holstein, and the heaviest siege guns could be brought from the eastern frontier of Prussia and placed in battery before the Danish lines within ten days.^ The defences, on a line 3000 yards long, con- sisted of ten small redoubts, of which three were open to the rear. The largest work had about 14,000 square feet of terreplein. The command was 15 feet; the ditches were palisaded and unflanked. In the gorges were blockhouses of stereotyped pattern, with earth on the roofs, standing well above the crest line, visible for miles, and presenting ideal targets to the enemy's siege guns. The redoubts were con- nected by a rifle trench of slight profile, and a few rifle pits and picquet posts had been established in front. There was a second line of works all open to the rear. The arma- ment, including that of Alsen, consisted of 108 guns, of which ninety-two were smooth-bores, together with a few mortars. The guns fired through cramped embrasures in the redoubts. ' Riistow. DUPPEL. 53 The Prussians invested Diippel on the 12th February, and opened fire on the 14th March from fifty-four guns, of which eighteen were smooth-bores. The first parallel was made at 1200 paces from the lines and the third at 450. By the 13th April, the besiegers had 122 guns in battery, including forty-four smooth-bores. After a severe bombardment on the 17th April, the main line was stormed on the morning of the 1 8th, with a loss of 1188 out of about 16,000 men engaged, and the disorganization produced by the successful assault sufficed to prevent the second line from being held. Evidently, therefore, the experiences of Diippel can be turned to account in the interests of theoretical storm- freedom, high revetments, colossal caponiers, intricate keeps, drawbridges, and what not. And practically this has been the case ever since, notwithstanding that the real lesson is of another kind. The lines of Diippel were stormed with comparative ease because there were very few troops inside them, and under such circumstances most defences can be captured. It was quite impossible to keep men inside the works under the Prussian fire ; but they were fully manned during the night of the i/th-iSth in anticipation of an assault at dawn. The hour fixed for the attack was, however, 10 A.M., and the Danish commander, fearing a resumption of the bombard- ment at any moment, withdrew his garrisons, leaving only small Artillery detachments and weak Infantry picquets. Hence, in some cases, the redoubts were not garrisoned at all at the moment of attack, and in others the Prussians and the Danes arrived together, the former on a broad front by climbing the parapet, the latter through a narrow gorge opening. The lines of Diippel were stormed simply because they 54 FORTIFICATION. violated an elementary law of Fortification dictated by copious experience of the past, and specially emphasized only ten years previously at Sebastopol. The Mamelon fell on 7th June, 1855, for want of defenders. The Redan was found to be unoccupied on the same day and for the same reason. The attacks on the Mamelon and the Malakhoff in the early morning of the i8th June were defeated with heavy loss. Assaulted at noon on the 8th September, the Malakhoff fell, " almost without a struggle." ^ A redoubt, of whatever kind, must either provide cover for its defenders under Artillery fire, or it must have an obstacle which will detain the enemy sufficiently long to enable the garrison, starting from their place of security, to line their parapets. If it were necessary or desirable that the Infantry garrisons should be kept at a considerable distance from their works, then evidently there exists an argu- ment for deep ditches and for caponiers, provided always that picked men under thoroughly trustworthy non-commissioned officers can be spared to man them. The defence of the lines of Diippel practically received no assistance from Artillery fire, for the Danish guns were hopelessly overmatched from the first ; while, in their breech- loading rifle, the Prussians possessed a source of new power. The besiegers had in fact every conceivable advantage on their side. Far better works could have been made in three weeks ; yet the defence lasted sixty-five days, thus easily beating the record of the great majority of the costly pro- ductions of the draughtsman's art. The performance of the Diippel earthworks, bad as they were, compares most favour- ably for example with the forty-five days' resistance of Strasbur^ in 1870, even when it is fully granted that, in the ' Hamley. IVAJi OF 1870-1. 55 latter case, the bombardment of the town hastened the sur- render. The poor Httle Danish redoubts defended by smooth- bores opposed to rifled guns, by muzzle-loading small-arms opposed to breech-loaders, scarcely serve to support extreme views as to the real requirements of Fortification. It is customary to speak somewhat slightingly of the performance of the French fortresses in the campaign of 1870-1. With a few exceptions, they are commonly assumed to have fallen to brief bombardments by field guns, becoming thus available as illustrations of the power of rifled guns over Fortification, and indicating the necessity for armour in various forms, together with other artifices dear to a certain class of mind. On the other hand, the fate of these fortresses has also been regarded as attesting the inefiicacy of Fortifica- tion generally, the uselessness of fortresses in face of the conditions of modern war. Political considerations determined the fatal movement to Sedan. Therefore fortresses exercise a baleful attraction over armies. Metz, a great frontier place of arms, was quite unprovided for a blockade. Therefore fortresses are now easily thus reduced. But for the fortresses, however, the Germans would have swept France clear of all organized bodies of troops within two months of the frontier battles. Had Paris and Metz possessed two months' more food supply the fortunes of the war might have been changed. The French defences suffered from almost every con- ceivable disadvantage. Excluding the unfinished forts of Metz, the newest of the fortresses attacked — Paris — was thirty years old. The average age of the rest must have been more than 1 50 years ! Though initially ill-found in all respects, and almost as completely unprepared for war as our own defences at home, few of these fortresses were improved or strengthened in the available time after the outbreak of 5 6 FOR r I PICA TION. hostilities. Not many things are more difficult than to direct a defence, and, with few exceptions,^ France had not the men for the work. To meet a siege train thoroughly reorganized after the Danish war and brought fully up to date, the fortresses had no armaments worthy the name. A number of men, even of disciplined troops, does not make a garrison, and in most cases the closely knit and carefully organized forces which a good defence requires were not available. Vitry, Toul, Laon, Schlettstadt, Neu Brisac, La F^re, Peronne, and Rocroy, were garrisoned almost entirely by gardes mobiles, who at Vitry had not received their uniforms, and at Schlettstadt were engaged in looting their compatriots when the Germans entered. Add to this that the fortresses were in almost every case mere lines enclosing towns in which the civil population were exposed to the full effect of bombardment, and it seems clear that prolonged defences could scarcely be expected. Judged by past standards, however, these hapless fortresses acquitted themselves creditably. In Appendix E. a precis of the siege operations of the war ^ is given, which brings to light the following facts : — 1. The total number of fortresses detailed is twenty-four, and of these one (Bitsch) was never taken, and six (Lichten- berg, Liitzelstein, Marsal, Vitry, Laon, Sedan) made practi- cally no resistance. 2. The average duration of the defence of the remaining seventeen fortresses was forty-one days. Excluding Paris and Metz, which held French armies, the average resistance of the remaining fifteen was thirty-three days. 3. The Germans employed siege guns in fourteen of • Notably Col. Denfert of Belfort fame. ' The information is taken from Col. von Tiedemann's work. SIEGES OF FRENCH FORTRESSES. 57 the eighteen cases in which alone any resistance was offered. 4. Formal sieges were undertaken only at Belfort and Strasburg ; partial sieges at Paris, Schlettstadt, and Longwy.^ From the above, it appears that the average period of resistance of the French fortresses, excluding Paris and Metz, was the same as that of the fortresses which played a part in the Marlborough wars and in the Peninsula.^ Including Paris and Metz, the era of rifled weapons actually shows an increase of twenty per cent, in the time-endurance of perma- nent Fortification. Granted most freely that a mere measure- ment in days affords no absolute standard of comparison, the striking fact remains that in spite of every sort of disability the French Fortresses, pitted against guns not dreamed of when they were built, acquitted themselves quite as well as the chefs d'ceuvres of the Vauban school in the days of their glory. This affords no proof of the fitness of theoretical Fortifica- tion for the purposes of war at any period ; but it unquestion- ably indicates that, as compared with the past, the defence had lost nothing under the conditions which obtained in 1870. At least the inference is inevitable that, up to this period, there was nothing to cause gloomy forebodings as to the future of Fortification, or to justify such a wholesale recourse to iron as has found advocates. It is willingly admitted that, except in certain cases, the siege operations of the Franco-German war were not pressed with any great vigour. Judging from the experience of Strasburg, however, there is no reason whatever to suppose that more rapid and striking results would have been secured ' In many other cases Siege batteries were built, however, even for field guns. « See p. 12. 5 8 FOR TIFICA TION. by arduous trench work. The very reluctance of the Germans to embark on such measures, even where speedy capture was a matter of great moment, constitutes a strong proof of the existence of a belief that the siege of even an obsolete fortress is no easy task. The siege operations of the 1 870-1 campaign will repay a careful study by all who wish to base Fortification on the experience of war and not on the promptings of the inner consciousness supported by diagrams. The main character- istics on the side of the attack were heavy bombardments, and an excessive reluctance to assault, even in cases where an early capture was extremely important and where the con- ditions were theoretically favourable. A single assault was attempted against the provisional works of Belfort and failed altogether. On the side of the defence, the Artillery was — as usual in the case of permanent Fortification — nearly impotent. The effects of the fire of the attack were uniformly small, except where the design of the works themselves was such as to ensure the maximum advantage to the enemy. Even on the towns, exposed as they were, the effects appear to have been moderate in many cases. In Paris, the total number of killed and wounded is given as 375,^ and the fires which broke out seem to have been easily extinguished. The want of casemate cover was severely felt in numerous instances. Only one case arose (Strasburg) in which mining operations might apparently have aided the defence, and of the possibilities thus offered, the French, unlike the Russians at Sebastopol, took no real advantage. ^ Judging between attack and defence, from the experience of these and the earlier siege operations, it appears that while ' Vinoy. ' Three mines were discovered by the Germans in front of Lunette 53, of which one was charged. Defences of Paris. Fort Issy. (Plan.) Plate V. Scale of Feet O ^OIOO 200 300 400 500 Redoubt des Hautes BRUviRES. (Sections.) SECTION A.B. Scale of Feet 10 5 o 10 zo 30 40 50 60 SECTION CD. 1 .°.. ,5. .? To /ace page 59. ^ a H < C/3 f^ tn n >■ Ul a >— < u Z; H O tq fe Q /^ |!i PARIS. 59 rifled Artillery conferred a certain advantage on the attack, the breech-loading small-arm gave a greater advantage to the defence. This inference would not be a just one, however, since the relative value of modern Artillery in the attack and defence cannot be adjudged until more rationally conceived permanent fortifications have undergone a siege. The operations round Paris are specially instructive, and the attack on the south side may be regarded as typical of the whole. In 1815, Blucher arrived on the heights of Issy and Vanves, and this appears to have determined the positions of the southern lines of forts, although it was pointed out by General Noizet in 1840 that Paris could be bombarded from the plateau of Chatillon with the smooth- bores of the day. An attempt was made to occupy the plateaus of Chatillon, Clamart, and Meudon by provisional works ; but, in the general confusion which followed the defeats on the frontier, these works could not be completed, and were abandoned to the investing army. Fort Issy (Plate V.) may be regarded as a fair type of the detached forts of Paris. The adjacent works of Vanves and Montrouge were precisely similar in conception, but were based upon a square trace.^ Issy, which must be supposed to represent the ideal of the dominant school of thought in France in 1 840, thoroughly illustrates the practical outcome of pure theory. One school had desired to surround Paris with a stupendous bastioned enceinte wandering over hill and dale, ignoring topography and the elementary principles of tactics- alike. This scheme, however, appearing either too evidently preposterous, or more probably too expensive for practical realization, the detached • By which the evils of the bastioned system were aggravated. This system however found a surviving advocate in Col. Prevost in 1872. 6o FOR TIFICA TION. forts won the day. The result is a curious study. Deprived of half the fascinating possibilities of the Vauban era, the French engineers appear to have conceived nothing more original than to take a purely geometrical form and apply a bastioned trace to it, adding as many rudimentary organs as possible. Thus the tennaille reappears, but covers only a limited portion of the curtain wall of the scarp {see Section / K, Plate VI). The lost ravelin is permanently repre- sented by the excrescence in the covered way, and provision- ally reproduced in the palisade enclosure X} Even the so-called "redoubt of the covered way'' has its expression. The work is treated similarly on all the faces, otherwise the symmetry and the general appearance of the design would have been marred ; yet it is not easy to understand how Fort Issy could have been attacked by an enemy occupying a position between it and the enceinte of Paris. The elaboration accorded to the rear faces was scarcely needed as a protection against parties of Infantry, which might have succeeded in passing between adjacent works, and even smooth-bore field guns once established in rear could have easily trundled their round shot into the dwelling casemates. The revetments were hopelessly exposed, and a siege train of the type employed in 1812 by Wellington at Ciudad Rodrigo, twenty-eight years before Fort Issy was built, would have breached them with ease. In 1824, important experiments had been carried out at Woolwich with smooth-bore howitzers and carronades fired at elevations of 10° to 21°, by which a screened wall was successfully breached. To build revetments thus exposed in 1840 was, therefore, doubly inexcusable. The teaching of the past had in fact been all forgotten in the fascinations of mere tricks of trace ' This appears to be better suited to the purposes of a village pound than those of fortification. PARIS. 6 1 and detail. The result was a costly work, mounting sixty- guns which may have flanked everything flankable, but were utterly unable to cope with siege batteries, on which a mere fraction of them could be brought to bear. Further, the work exposed long faces to enfilade fire,^ very few traverses having been provided." Rather more than three-fifths of the whole of the enclosing rampart was taken in reverse ! ' Such were the conditions created by a subordination of the experience of war to mere geometry. Immediately after the Danish campaign, the Germans had adopted the high carriage, and it was against siege guns thus mounted that the ordnance of the forts firing through narrow embrasures, dating back for more than 200 years, and con- demned by Morla in 1796, were forced to contend. Thus arose the obvious anomaly that Artillery brought hundreds of miles in winter and placed in rough batteries built in the field, was not only far better protected, but secured a much wider field of action than guns mounted in costly forts built with all deliberation in time of peace. Under such conditions it is easy to understand that the silencing of the forts was a matter of no great difficulty, and that the " annex batteries," and the works built after the investment, alone gave any real trouble to the attack* The "Park Battery" of Issy, for example, was found particularly difficult to hit, and every- ' The flanks being so short two whole fronts were practically liable to be enfiladed each by a single siege battery. * Traverses were subsequently added as shown in Plate VI. Among curious relics of the past is the mode of palisading the covered way. (See Section IK.) The futility of this particular measure had been pointed out in von Moltke's account of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-9. ' The rear faces were in fact practically breached by reverse fire. * One mortar battery behind the railway embankment between Forts Issy and Vanves could not be silenced at all, and the "annex batteries" of Vanves and Montrouge were never more than temporarily held in check. Belagerung von Paris. — Heyde u Froese. 62 FOR TIFICA TION. where guns fortunate enough to be posted outside of the expensive positions specially built for their accommodation, enjoyed comparative immunity. The guns of the defence, posted haphazard and served by men in no sense organized for the duty, were evidently unfit to compete on equal terms with a well-appointed siege train ; and the want of any clear ideas as to how fortress Artilleiy should be handled, combined with the very in- different shooting of the French gunners, serves to explain the fact that for about 60,000 rounds fired on the south front, the German loss was 50 killed and 281 wounded, an average of 181 rounds to each man hit. On the other hand, in spite of many advantages, the Artillery of the attack apparently developed little man-killing power. Vinoy gives the following as the average daily loss of the forts named, and their satellite works during the twenty-two days' bombardment, viz. : — Fort Issy ..... 8 ,, Vanves . . . . .5 ,, Montrouge . . . 8' The summary of damage caused to these works (Appendix F.) serves to illustrate well the difference between siege operations and target practice. If the results due either to initial errors of Fortification, or merely to the superannuation of the forts are subtracted, and if a further correction is made on account of the bad mounting and equally bad handling ^ of the French ' Admiral de la Rondure gives the total loss in Montrouge as 29 killed and 137 wounded. = There was "an inexcusable waste of ammunition, apparently according to no pre-arranged plan and without skilful supervision." " The Garrison Artillery paid not the slightest attention to watching their fire for the purpose of fixing its elevation and direction ; similarly they appeared to profit but little by the great advantage they had on their side of being able to ascertain the distances accurately." — Col. von Tiedemann, HAUTES BRUY6.RES. 63 guns, it will be evident that works well conceived and well fought have extremely little to fear in an Artillery contest. In spite of their innumerable defects, the Paris defences, built before the revolution in Artillery, won an unexpected triumph for Fortification. They answered their purpose in 1870-1, as well as they would have done thirty years previously. Nor can there be much doubt that works could have been executed at about one-fifth the cost, which would have given even better results. No teaching in regard to assaults is to be gained from Paris. Advantageous as it would have been to the Germans to occupy the line of the southern forts which lay only 2000 yards from the enceinte, no regular attempt was ever made to breach the exposed revetments. The French works were well supplied with obstacles ; but the amount of "undefended ground," represented by the profusion of quarries in front, was calculated to unhinge any well regulated mind.* In strong contrast to the costly permanent works of Paris is the Hautes Bruy^res redoubt (Plate VII.), an advanced work on the South-East of Fort Bicetre. This work, copied from a German design, was begun about the 4th Sep- tember,^ and not completed till some time after the invest- ment. It provided safe bomb-proof cover for 500 men crowded, and when surrendered at the capitulation had an intact armament of thirteen guns and two mortars. One bomb-proof only showed signs of injury. The embrasures ' An interesting pre-historic monument in front of the Cottonera Lines at Valetta, has been lost to the archaeologist for ever. These few stones might possibly have sheltered four or five men, but in accordance with the high standard of preparation for war maintained in our works of defence, their removal was necessarily a matter of urgency. ^ Geldern. Defences of Paris, 1870. Redoubt des Hautes Bruyeres. Plate VII. (N.B.— For Sections, see Plate V.) To /ace page 63. 64 FOR TIFICA TION. had all been repaired, and the work generally had received little or no damage. A continuous enceinte of old type was regularly besieged at Strasburg only. The covered way was crowned in due form, descents into the ditch were made, a bridge of casks was built leading to one of the advanced lunettes. Orthodox breaches were effected, and altogether the operations re- sembled those of the preceding century — even to the surrender previous to assault. The Artillery of the defence was hopelessly overpowered, and of the total German loss of 866, only 389 casualties were due to Artillery fire.^ The defenders had ninety-two guns dismounted ; but the mortars, of which little use was made, remained uninjured. The breach in bastion No. 1 1 could have been defended with little difficulty, and the works generally were still defensible when surrendered. The fall of the fortress was doubtless accelerated by the heavy bombardment of the town and by the insufficiency of casemate cover for the garrison in the vicinity of their lines. Notwithstanding all disadvantages, however, Strasburg, judged by the standards of the past, made a good defence. The siege of Belfort presents some special points of interest. Belfort possessed the almost unique advantage of a commandant who understood the nature of the task which devolved upon him. Moreover, Col. Denfert not being invested till the 3rd November, had a long period for preparation, which he was well qualified to utilize. Outside an enceinte of most elaborate description ^ there were on the North-East side two permanent forts, la Miotte and la Justice, designed by Haxo ; and on the west, a large work of recent construction, des Barres. The South side. Von Eriinner. Principally Vauban's 31-d and worst system. i^See Figure, page 7.) Plate VIII. Defence of Belfort, 1870. Redoubt Basse Perche. Scale for Plan 10 o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 go 100 Yards "NTT^W^CT-QT 'ifrw^TWr; SECTION A. B. SECTION CD. Scale for Sections 20 30 40 Feet To face Page 65. BELFURT. 65 which was chosen for the attack, was closed by two provisional redoubts — Haute Perche and Basse Ferche (Plate VIII.) — and one mere field work, Bellevue, the respective intervals being 700 and 1700 paces, and the distance from the enceinte 1200 paces. The villages of Danjoutin and Bavilliers, about 1500 paces in advance of this line, were held by the French ; but, pro- bably on account of the great amount of other necessary work, were not placed in a satisfactory state of defence. Bavilliers, which was weakly occupied, was surprised by a night attack ; but Danjoutin repulsed the first attack on the night of the I4th-I5th December, and was only captured on the night of the Sth-gth January after a siege-gun bombard- ment. A systematic attack was then directed against the Perches redoubts, supported by a siege train of 268 guns and mortars, of which ninety-six (including forty long 24- pounders) directed their fire on the Perches and Bellevue, armed each with eight to ten field guns only. The defenders, however, handled their Artillery with remarkable vigour, fre- quently moving their guns and employing high- angle fire against the siege works. "There were many pressing reasons " * for ending the siege, and an assault on the Perches took place on the evening of the 26th January. The right column attacking Haute Perche had the advantage of ground which " screened it from the defenders' view during the greater portion of the advance ; but beyond this point it was checked by the heavy fire of the enemy." ^ The men of the left column directed on Basse Perche (Plate VIII.) succeeded in descending into the ditch, where they were ' Col. von Tiedemann. ^ Col. von Tiedemann. This repulse has been attributed to a rough entanglement formed between the stumps of the trees cut down. — (Geldern.) Tliere were no other obstacles. 66 FORTIFICATION. caught by French reserves, and nearly all captured or killed. " The assault, therefore, completely failed," and the saps were pressed on to the ditches. On the 8th February, the Haute Perche was surprised by the Germans, who found only a guard of ten men ensconced in the gorge bomb-proof. The Basse Perche was captured almost at the same moment, and offered slight resistance. The heights thus occupied were rapidly turned into a formidable Artillery position for sixty guns, and the enceinte and citadel did not await the opening of fire. Belfort, on the front attacked, thus presents the case of a stupendous enceinte protected by provisional works. The latter answered their purpose remarkably well ; the former, qud enceinte, proved absolutely worthless, as soon as the provisional works had fallen. The design of the Perches redoubts possesses no merit of any kind ; but the steep rock-cut ditches proved an efficient obstacle. The trace is only interesting from the Darwinian point of view, the little one-gun projections in the flanks being specially remarkable. While, however, Belfort made a good defence, it must not be forgotten that the difficulties of the besiegers were great. Their position was threatened by Bourbaki's army till after the fighting on the Lisaine. The ground was rocky and frozen, which made the siege works hard to carry out. Much sickness appeared among the troops. Per contra the nature and state of the ground was equally disadvantageous to the defence, and it should be remembered that on the 3rd December the commandant was called upon to deal with a partial insurrection in the city. The teaching of the siege operations of the 1 870-1 campaign may be briefly summed as follows : — I. The introduction of rifled weapons has not necessarily SIEGES OF 1870-1. 67 led to a diminution of the resisting power even of fortresses designed to oppose smooth-bores. 2. The real successes of the siege Artillery were obtained against civil buildings, and properly designed works have little to fear from its effects. In most cases, smooth-bore guns would have been able to deliver an equal number of projectiles into the towns, and the greater effect, if any, of the modern weapons was due to increased shell-power and ac- curacy, not to range. 3. The older methods of mounting fortress guns are hope- lessly obsolete — a fact which the adoption of the high siege carriage by the Germans in 1865 might have rendered sufficiently evident. 4. The handling of the Artillery of the defence was almost uniformly faulty, and no satisfactory conception of its powers can be formed until the proper employment of this arm is understood, and the organization necessary for the full de- velopment of its action has been applied to war. 5. The French fortresses were, almost without exception, defended by the rifle alone. 6. The siege of Paris serves, as pointed out in 1874/ to kill reduits. 7. None of the superfluous technicalities with which the heads of cadets are uselessly crammed, and by which an erroneous conception of Fortification is impressed upon them, perhaps for life, proved to have the smallest value. 8. Within broad limits, the nature of the works of a fortress is subordinate to tactical conditions and the conduct of a defence, the degree of preparation for war, with other matters effectually obscured by the fog in which theory has ' Belagerung von Paris. Jleyde u Froese. No such happy result has followed, however — vide ' ' La Fortificatioii du Temps present ^^ F 2 68 FOR TIFICA TION. enveloped the science of Fortification, will mainly rule the issue of the siege operations of the future. 9. The low command and comparative invisibility of the works constructed at Paris after the investment gave them great advantages over the permanent forts.'' • Von Tiedemann mentions the attempt made to conceal the siege batteries before Longwy. " A peculiar method of construction was adopted to obtain more cover and to reduce the chances of discovery, and this consisted in making the flanks vfith gentle slopes vchich could scarcely be discovered at a distance." Similar measures had been previously adopted at the siege of Fort Wagner, ■where " great care was taken not to disturb any of the natural features of the landscape.'' (Gillmore). PLEVNA. 69 £ CHAPTER VII. PLEVNA. — KARS (l 877).— WORKS CONSTRUCTED IN ENGLAND AFTER 1 859. — GENERAL REVIEW. Plevna, when Osman Pasha's advanced guard from Widdin arrived there about the i6th July, 1877, was an open Bul- garian village lying in a hollow with rolling hills around it. Nicopolis having been taken on the 14th, Schilder-Schuldner, with between 8000 and 9000 men and forty-six guns, was ordered to occupy Plevna, then defended by a few trenches only. The position was attacked on the 20th, and part of the force reached the outskirts of the village, only to be defeated with a loss of about 2900 — more than one-third of its strength. From this day the strength of the place steadily grew, and when attacked on the 30th July by Krudener and Schackoffskoi with about 30,000 men and 176 guns, the defences were by no means to be despised. The utter defeat of this second assault with a loss of about 7300 — one-fourth of the attacking force — changed for the time the whole aspect of the campaign, and rendered the position of the Russian army in Bulgaria temporarily precarious. The Roumanian contingent having been brought across the Danube, and Russian reinforcements having arrived, the total force before Plevna reached a strength of about 75,000 Infantry, with 9500 Cavalry, 364 field guns, and 24 siege guns. On the nth September, a general assault was delivered, preceded by a three days' bombardment, but was repulsed with a loss of about 17,500, amounting to 31 per cent. 70 . FOR TIFICA TION. of the troops engaged, and 23 per cent, of the total strength before Plevna. No. I Grivitza redoubt alone remained in the hands of the Allies. On the i8th July, the Roumanians made an attempt on No. 2 Grivitza redoubt (Plate IX.), which was repulsed with a loss of about 400 men. On the 28th September, Todleben arrived, and a systematic investment was resolved upon. By the 24th October, the communications of Plevna were completely cut, and the capture of Telische by Gourko on the 28th swept away the last Turkish force on the Plevna-0rchani6 line, and enabled the Russians to close in upon Plevna on the west side. On the 1 6th November, Gourko started for Orchani^ and the investing force remaining before Plevna consisted of 5000 Cavalry, 107,000 Infantry, 40 siege guns, and 510 field guns.^ During the investment the Roumanians carried on a sys- tematic attack (Plate X.) against No. 2 Grivitza redoubt, and on the 19th October delivered two assaults, their trenches being then within about thirty yards of the ditch. These assaults were repulsed with a loss of over 900 men. On the Green Hills, Skobeleff seized and entrenched a position within a short distance of the Turkish works. With the above exceptions, the operations were limited to a close blockade varied only by occasional Artillery fire upon the Turkish works. The Russo-Roumanian forces entrenched themselves strongly round the place and awaited the end. On the loth December, Osman Pasha, whose resources of food and ammunition were nearly exhausted, made a gallant but hopeless attempt to cut his way out to the West, and Plevna fell after a resistance of 142 days. ' Todleben. Plate IX. Defences of Plevna, 1877. Roumanian Attack on No. 2 Grivitza Redoubt. A A 1st Parallel. BB 2nd Parallel. CC 3rd Parallel. DD 4th Parallel. E 5th Parallel. F 6lh Parallel. GG Trench Cavaliers. H Mortar Battery. I Battery against the town. J Battery against Bucova. KK Junction with the parallel of the 3rd Division. LL Batteries. aa Traverses. bb Turkish trench. CC Old Turkish covered way between the redoubts. course of con- dd Brow of hill. e Trench. ff Trenches ir struction. gg Mine galleries. X Covered way leading to Turkish works of Bucova. /85 Fougasses. To face page 70. Defences of Plevna, 1877. No. 2, Grivitza Redoubt. Plate X. Scale for Plan 50 10 20 2^ 40 50 60 70 G-H go 100 Feet ■^"sSTTflX? Scale for Sections ■i....? 30 40 _SpFcct To follow Plate IX. PLEVNA. 71 Thus, like Sebastopol, Plevna grew into a fortress under the eyes of the besieging force ; but the two cases present numerous points of difference. At Sebastopol, the line held by the Russians, about 4^ miles in length, was very short in comparison with their numerical strength. The resources of the defenders were enormous, and in the number of their guns they always possessed a superiority. On the other hand, the Allies in 1854 brought up an immense siege train as compared with the forty siege guns employed at Plevna. From the first bombardment of the 17th October, the combatants were always face to face, and no such withdrawal of the besieging force took place as occurred at Plevna after the failure of the attack of the 30th July. Again, the communications of Sebastopol, although practically inferior to those of the Allies, remained open till the last. Plevna was isolated after the 24th October. Finally, the soil round Plevna was extremely favourable to trench work on both sides. At Sebastopol, as at Kars, the natural difficulties were great. Thus, although the conduct of the operations and the results from the point of view of Fortification bore strong points of resemblance, no direct comparison is possible. We, sitting here at home, can demonstrate to our own satisfaction how easily Sebastopol and Plevna might have been taken under arrangements which we are ready to detail ; but the fact remains that, under very different conditions, these two extemporized fortresses served the general purpose of Fortifi- cation, as the costly ideals held up for the perversion of our aims have almost uniformly failed to do. There was no magic about the Plevna redoubts, and no special excellence of design ; but the Turks, probably because they were not hampered by theoretical considerations, grasped and applied some great principles, winning corresponding 72 FOR TIFJCA TION. advantages. Plate IX. shows No. 2 Grivitza redoubt, which may be regarded as fairly typical. The existence of this little work was not known at the time of the great assault of the nth September; because it was effectually masked by maize, which ought to have been cut down so as to give a free field of fire for whatever number of yards the text books may agree to lay down. The result of this neglect to " clear the foreground " was that the 3rd Roumanian Division, told off to assault No. i redoubt from the north, after making its way with difficulty up a steep slope covered with brushwood, came unexpectedly upon No. 2, and were repulsed with heavy loss. Further, the capture of No. I redoubt, the so-called key of the position, at an immense sacrifice of life, proved practically valueless. Against the little No. 2 Grivitza redoubt on a square of forty-six yards side and commanded at 300 yards by No. i redoubt, an elaborate formal attack was carried on (Plate X.), ending in the establishment of mines under the parapet. These operations may appear at first sight necessarily super- fluous ; but that similar instances are recorded even before the era of the breech-loading rifle. At Cassel in 1762, a little earthwork was regularly besieged, and at Colberg in 1807 a small detached field redoubt made a resistance of forty-four days. In 1870, the Perches redoubts at Belfort were honoured by systematic approach. The Plevna works are easy to criticise. The square trace, almost universally adopted, gives large " dead angles." " Un- defended space," existed to a surprising extent. The relative traces of adjacent works were often guiltless of any mutually flanking purpose. One important group of works was completely commanded by a ridge which appears to tower over it. The ditches had no flank defence of any kind. " PLvery (provisional) fort should be provided with a keep," PLEVNA. 73 says one of our text books.^ No work at Plevna had any- thing of the sort ; nor was there room for it. While, however, in these and other respects, the Plevna defences were theo- retically deficient, the Turks appear to have fully realized certain principles of far greater importance in war. Plevna was to be defended with the rifle mainly, and scope must therefore be allowed for its use.^ A long line of defence had to be held. Closed redoubts on the tactical points, supplemented by numerous light trenches on front and flanks met the case, providing for a great development of rifle fire ; while, at the same time, the temporary loss of portions of these trenches mattered little. The Russians had an immense superiority in Artillery, and would be able to render the manning of the redoubts scarcely practicable under fire. The garrisons must therefore be close at hand and able to occupy their stations at short notice. This condition was fulfilled, not only by liberally providing cover in the works themselves {see Plate IX.), but by siting them in some cases so that the ground fell immediately in rear, thus greatly facilitating the protection of the reserves. This tendency to draw back the works from the positions in which we are accustomed to place them was based on a correct instinct. With an excellent breech-loader and plenty of ammunition, the distance required to repulse an assault is comparatively short. The principal defect of the Plevna defences was the com- ' Written some time after the siege of Paris, whicli in the opinion of other authorities (Heyde and Froese) sufficed to kill the reduit. ' In an elaborate design for a large permanent fort, the cost of which would be at least jf 60,000, the two front faces have forty-two yards of infantry parapet, and there is no covered way. The front face of No. i Grivitza redoubt provided thirty-two yards and the covered way eighty-five yards more. As regards frontal development of rifle fire at long range, therefore, the little work thrown up in the field far surpassed the costly permanent fort. At close quarters, the advantage would be only four to three in favour of the latter. 74 FORTIFICATION. plete absence of all obstacles, for the construction of which there was no suitable material at hand. The sides of the ditches stood at steep slopes ; but the degradation of the parapet under the heavy Artillery fire to which the works were subjected somewhat facilitated assault. The addition of good obstacles would not only have saved No. i Grivitza redoubt from capture, but may fairly be set off against the tactical errors committed by the Russians. Plevna, like Sebastopol, supplies , no argument against permanent works built in peace time ; but, in common with all the experience of war, it distinctly proves that the Forrifi- cation which has been arrived at in defiance of the law of the survival of the fittest ^ may be safely relegated to the domain of abstract speculation. While Tewfik's extemporized place of arms was holding the Russians completely at bay in Bulgaria, the far more ambitious fortress of Kars fell into their hands for the third time. Kars, taken in three days in 1828, was only starved into surrender in 1855 after a splendid resistance of five months, having previously inflicted crushing losses on the besiegers. Permanent defences having been added, the fortress was stormed on the night of the ly-iSth November, 1877, with a loss of 2273 all told, having made a resistance of about thirty days. On the 15th October, Moukhtar Pasha's army had been utterly routed on the Aladja Dagh, "nearly half of it being destroyed." ^ Moukhtar himself reached Kars during the night of the isth-i6th October "in the midst of the disorganized panic-stricken fugitives." "Taking 2800 men who were in a reasonable state of organization," he ' The evolution of Fortification appears to have proceeded under an arbitrary and artificial selection akin to that which has given to us the pug dog and the lop-eared rabbit. 2 Russian army and its campaigns.— Greene. KARS (i8;7). 75 abandoned Kars to its fate. The fortress had twelve de- tached forts and a citadel, nearly all built since the Crimean War. The weight of the assault fell upon three works in the plain to the South-East of the town — Hafiz, Kanly, and Souvari. Hafiz was a square redoubt on a side of 400 yards with bastions at the angles, traversed parapet, ditch twelve feet broad and six feet deep, with a three-storied casemated. barrack at the gorge. Kanly consisted of two square redoubts on a side of 150 yards, with a lunette in rear, having bastioned faces and a two-storied casemated barrack closing the gorge. Souvari was a simple lunette and, in common with several of the remaining works, had no ditch. The works generally had no secure casemate cover and no water supply ; Hafiz and Kanly alone had traverses, and earth for repairs was not available. Kars was invested shortly after the battle on the Aladja Dagh, and a bombardment from forty-eight siege guns was opened on the ilth November. The results appearing to be small, it was determined to assault. A moonlight night was chosen in order to surprise the garrison, and at the same time avoid the ample chances of disaster, which operations under- taken in the dark necessarily involve. The Turks appear to have been entirely unaware of impending danger. Fort Souvari was completely surprised, and captured without firing a shot. The two columns of ten battalions told off to attack Fort Kanly were checked under fire by some trous de loiip in front. The eastern redoubt was however stormed and the western redoubt turned without much difficulty ; but the work in rear offered considerable resistance. The reserves were brought up and both flanks were turned, a portion of the garrison still holding out in the casemated barrack till threatened with dynamite. In front of Fort Hafiz also the attacking force of five battalions was discovered before it 76 FORTIFICATION. could close, and about 2500 men swerved to the right to attack some trenches on the Karadagh. Hafiz was ultimately- assaulted in front simultaneously with a flank attack from Fort Kanly, and was carried. The Turks endeavoured to shelter themselves behind the casemated barrack which had been ruined by the Russian Artillery fire, but were caught, and " annihilated." ^ Fort Karadagh was an earth bank laid out on the bare rock with a bastioned trace in front. There were neither ditches nor traverses, and the barracks with which the gorge was to have been closed were unfinished. There was however an interior cavalier forming a sort of keep. The Russian force diverted from the attack on Fort Hafiz succeeded in entering Fort Karadagh and followed the Turks into their interior work. The loss of the four forts above named sufficed to procure the surrender of the citadel and all the works on the left bank of the Kars River. While, however, the Russians achieved an almost unbroken success on the right bank, the assault of Fort Tchim and an unpremeditated attack on Fort Tekmass resulted in complete failure. Fort Tchim, the nearest work to Souvari on the other side of the river, a mere lunette with a closed gorge, but without ditches or traverses, was surprised and attacked in rear by the three battalions which had captured Souvari ; but the Russians were repulsed. A little later an independent attack was delivered in front by one battalion which did not even succeed in reaching the work. Fort Tekmass, a weak edition of Fort Kanly, having no outworks or casemate barracks, was attacked by three battalions, who were so much cut up as to be " practically of no more use during the night." Kars in 1877 clearly made a poor defence, although the ' Report of Grand Duke Michael. KARS (1877). 77 respective strength of the garrison and of the attacking force was curiously similar to that of the combatants of 1855 (see p. 37). Though faulty in many respects, the defences in 1877 were of a much higher technical order than Colonel Lake's works, mainly built of piled up stones collected after the arrival of the besiegers. Moreover, cholera had not appeared in Hussein Pasha's camp. There is little to learn from the third siege of Kars, which furnishes further proof however of the small influence of the so-called technical qualities of Fortification in comparison with general tactical conditions. You cannot make an indifferent and badly handled force safe with all your money and art. Given a sufficiency of supplies and ammunition, almost any rationally conceived defences are sufficient for the purpose of steady troops ably commanded. The barrack in the gorge of Fort Kanly which appears to have accidentally escaped destruction by the Russian Artillery fire, to which it was fully exposed, has proved a perfect godsend to the advocates of keeps, reduits, citadels, &c. General Brialmont ^ welcomes this " exemple remarquable de rutilit^ des reduits" as a support to an excessively thin argument in which the entire question is begged at an intermediate stage by the assumption that keeps " double the moral force of the garrison " and allow its strength to be diminished. The case of Fort Kanly simply goes to show that, if a redoubt presents no obstacle whatever to assault, and can in addition be turned without difficulty, an intact loopholed building will afford a temporary refuge to such of the defenders as can manage to escape into it — more than 500 Turks were killed in the outside work. This must have been a sufficiently evident proposition at all periods ; but the ' La fortification du temps present. 78 FOR TIFICA TION. further step — the acceptance of the reduits proposed by General Brialmont, which are inside a deep and over-flanked ditch, and which moreover would be practically valueless if the real line of defence had fallen — does not by any means follow therefrom. The works constructed in England after 1859 were specially favoured by circumstances, as was pointed out by Lieut- Colonel (now Lieut-General Sir T. L.) Gallwey, R.E. — " We as a nation may consider ourselves fortunate that the defence of our principal ports has been postponed to the present time." With few exceptions, these works were constructed after rifled ordnance had unmistakably proved its powers. The evidence given before the Royal Commission which reported on the 7th February, i860, is conclusive on this point, and the certain supercession of smooth-bore guns was thoroughly recognized by all the most competent witnesses. Thus, Captain Hewlett, R.N., stated : — " I need not say how impor- tant it is that Armstrong's guns should be substituted as soon as possible for the common ones in the defence of our arsenals." General Sir J. Burgoyne spoke of " five mile weapons," and added " not only Armstrong's but any rifled gun will do the same thing." Sir W. Armstrong testified : — "the extreme range I have reached is 9175 yards; at a distance of 8000 yards, I think that an object occupying an area of ground 100 yards by 50 yards width would receive about one-third of the shells fired at it from land batteries ; " and he further expressed the opinion that " it would be very unsafe to presume that guns of equal power may not be brought against us during the next two or three years." As regards high-angle fire, Sir W. Armstrong was equally clear that rifled ordnance would entirely supersede smooth-bore mortars, and he informed the Commission that he had obtained the "greatest results at 35°," significantly remarking FORTIFICA TION IN GREA T BRITAIN. 79 — " that you can strike a wall .... firing with low charges at a rapidly descending angle, is certain." Similariy, the Committee, of which H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge was president, reported on the 22nd February, i859) that the guns of the day "even at their present ranges (and there is every prospect of their being further increased) will require that an enemy be kept at a distance of gooo yards." Obviously, therefore, any notion that the danger of long range bombardment to fortresses is the direct result of the new type guns recently introduced is entirely fallacious. The danger existed and was completely foreseen thirty- one years ago. The conditions under which the greater part of the de- fences of England and of the four Imperial fortresses abroad were designed, were thus far more favourable than those which faced the designers of the Paris forts of 1840. A revolution in arms had already taken place, and the best minds of the day had fully grasped its portents. A further advantage existed, however, in the rich experience gained at such heavy cost in the Crimea, which had made a pro- found impression on all who were able to grasp its meaning. A detailed examination of the designs of the works in question with a view to ascertain how far they conformed to the conditions of the day, and how far mere theory was permitted to over-ride the teaching of war, though specially instructive from the present standpoint, would be manifestly inexpedient. The works are large, elaborate and costly. The bastioned trace to which the French engineers had clung with so much wasted affection was happily superseded ; its place being taken by caponiers, occasionally of monumental proportions. The single line of fire of the flank was replaced by two or three tiers in the caponiers. The high scarps with the disadvantages subsequently demonstrated were retained ; 8o FORTIFICATION. notwithstanding that Sir W. Armstrong's evidence, taken in conjunction with the results obtained in the experiments carried out with smooth-bore ordnance at Woolwich sixteen years previously, and with light rifled guns at Juliers in i860, supplied a strong argument for the Carnot detached wall. Theory appears to have determined that the latter provided special facilities for escalade — a mere delusion which experi- ment would have dispelled.^ The result was in some cases a revetment barely able to sustain its normal load. The principal characteristics of these works are large size, high command, broad and deep ditches, tall caponiers. The trace is fairly simple, though the interior arrangements are some- times complicated. There are keeps in some cases, and two- storied casemate barracks are to be found. Unlike the Paris forts of 1840, the gorges are specially treated. It was considered that only Infantry would be able to penetrate between adjacent works, and thus, concurrently with a gorge provided with a deep ditch, a three-storied caponier, and a drawbridge, may be found a main magazine offering a 3-ft. 6-in. vertical wall to any projectile arriving with a fall of two or three degrees. The dwelling casemates also are similarly exposed, and it is clear therefore that the works were regarded as unassailable in rear by Artillery fire, or by long range Infantry fire, even in the absence of an enceinte. • The only comparative experiment to which the writer is able to refer is recorded by von Briinner. I. Scarf yjft. high, Counterscarp lift. high. The time, from the arrival of the escalading party at the top of the counter- scarp to the moment when 20 men had climbed the parapet, was 8J mins. 2. Detached wall 20 ft. high. Counterscarp IT ft. high. Time, also 8J mins. Assuming parallel conditions to have been secured, the detached wall proved to be the best physical obstacle, for it was little over half the height of the competing scarp and was combined with a counterscarp 5 ft. lower. The increase of the obstacle to escalade secured by the adoption of the detached wall is now recognized in our text books. • FOR T I PICA TION IN GREA T BR IT A IN. 8 1 Taken as a whole, the guiding principle of these works seems to have been to provide large enclosures secure against assault — so long as they were not subjected to the fire of siege guns. As fighting positions, many of these forts cannot be either described or criticised ; since as regards the essentials of such positions, judged by the experience of Sebastopol, they remain to be completed. The measure of security against assault — not preceded by an Artillery attack — reaches the highest standard which the most exacting theory would be likely to demand ; but this ideal was only attained by an expenditure so heavy as to cause a reaction which prevented the defences themselves from being properly completed. In matters of Fortification the experience of war sometimes reverses the order of importance which theory prescribes, and a parapet composed mainly of large, hard and sharp stones would perhaps prove to be a greater practical disadvantage than a caponier of only one storey, or even the absence of a drawbridge. Reviewing the development of Fortification as dealt with thus far, it appears impossible to escape the inference that the teaching of war had been too frequently neglected, and that mere theory was permitted to run rampant. The best Fortifi- cation, judged by results, has been that improvised by stress of circumstance, unspoiled by the debasing influence of the text-book, and not demoralized by the technical possibilities opened out by large expenditure. In the works constructed within the past thirty years at our home ports and fortresses abroad, no sufficient indication of the results of the experience obtained in the Peninsula, the Crimea, and the American civil war, can be traced. Some of these works might have been designed by clever cadets, quick to recognize the niceties of technical artifice; but unable, from sheer immaturity of thought and want of study, to grasp the broader aspects of 82 FORTIFICATION. the science in its relation to war. It is nevertheless evident that the rich and varied war experience available was fully appreciated by many minds, and that but for the want of all real organization of scientific thought, the progress of Fortifi- cation would have been more wisely ordered. Illustrations of the way in which the science has lagged behind its leaders could be multiplied indefinitely. To take one simple specific instance ; as has been pointed out above, the embrasure was roundly condemned in 1796. In 1839, Smola^ pointed out that high carriages were essential. In the judgment of the Prussians, Diippel killed the low carriage and embrasure for siege batteries ; a fortiori both ceased at the same time to be applicable to the front faces of land works, and Colonel (now General Sir L.) Simmons stated in 1865 — "I think it is very doubtful if we should use embra- sures at all." ^ The siege of Paris might surely have served to remove any lingering doubts on the subject ; yet, more than three years later, haxo-casemates, infinitely more ob- jectionable than embrasures, were being erected on the front faces of a land work, and the same anachronism was perpe- trated even as late as 1883. Precisely similar evidence is forthcoming in relation to coast batteries. Sir J. Jones significantly recorded the experience obtained in the naval attack on the Castle of Scylla in 1806, where it was " altogether surprising to observe the mischief which had been produced by shot which had deflected from the cheeks of the embrasures and entered the casemates." ^ Sir J. Burgoyne, in a paper written in 1849, stated — "Among the inconveniences apprehended to coast batteries are the openings of embrasures in masonry by which shot that would ' Handbook for k.k. Artillerie Offiziere. ^ R.E. Professional Papers, Vol. XIV. ' Peninsular Sieges. HEIGHT AND DISPERSION OF GUNS. 83 otherwise have turned without injury .... are deflected on to the gun and into the battery." ^ This principle, so clearly recognized, has been widely ignored. Not to allude to other cases, the splayed vertical walls 10 ft. high, which effectually neutralize the value of the guns in Fort San Leonardo at Malta, sufficiently prove the divorce between theoretical Forti- fication and the teaching of war. Again, about forty years ago. Sir H. Jones wrote : — " It becomes the duty of the engineer charged with the defences of a maritime fortress so to arrange his batteries that the defence may be from several points distant from each other .... on commanding situations, and not a fleiir d'eau which has here- tofore generally been the case .... for the principal defence, height must be attained." ^ Sir J. Burgoyne at nearly the same period, held that " the best disposition for guns against shipping is to disperse them very much." ^ The experience of Sebastopol fully bore out the above views, and Todleben enforced the lesson with the weight of his great authority, supported by the results obtained by the fire of the Telegraph and Wasp batteries. The results of this plain teaching are not specially apparent. Sure and certain progress in Fortification can be attained only by a careful study of the war experience of the past, combined with the indefinable faculty which can grasp, retain and apply great principles without being either swayed by the spurious authority attaching to formulas oft repeated, or led astray by the Will of the Wisp lights of mere coloured instances. Is there any guarantee in recent writings that such sure and certain progress is now in operation ? ' Coast Batteries. R.E. Professional Papers. 1849-50. ' Peninsular Sieges. Editor's note. ' Coast Batteries. R.E. Professional Papers, 184.9-50. 8+ FORTIFICATION. CHAPTER VIII. SUMMARY OF RECENT PROPOSALS. — COLONEL CAMBRELIN — LIEUT.-COLONEL SCHUMANN. — GENERAL VON SAUER. — GENERAL SCHOTT. — M. MOUGIN. — LIEUT.-COLONEL VOORDUIN. — " UN PIONNIER." — GENERAL BRIALMONT. General Brialmont has, with much courage, adopted as a title for one of his recent works "Za Fortification du Temps Present. " It is, however, extremely difficult to say what the Fortification of the present time may be. The number of schools is large ; their conviction is pro- found, and their views differ alike in principle and in detail. The following are a few contemporary suggestions as to the ways in which the science is to be brought into harmony with modern requirements : — I. Colonel Cambrelin of the Belgian Army proposes ^ a curious combination of- earth and iron. His forts are of two forms only — redans with closed gorges, and redoubts, each on a side of 200 m. They are to have iron escarps constructed either on the " tubular " or the " arcade " principle. Iron cupolas protect the guns on the ramparts. Turtle-back caponiers and iron casemates flank the ditches. Loop-holed shields are provided for the infantry, and these with other details appear to be patented. Colonel Cambrelin addresses himself to the question of " Forts of position," which he would substitute for "secondary fortresses," and his works seem to be designed to resist the 12-cm. gun only. ' La Fortification de I'Avenir ' i8 RECENT PROPOSALS. 85 2. The late Lieut-Colonel Schumann, of the Prussian En- gineers, the designer of many of the structures made by the Griison firm at Buckau, held that " armour-plated fortification is really advantageous only when it is applied without stint. If combined with defence a del ouvert the advantages diminish " — a proposition which is unexceptionable from the manufac- turer's point of view. The armour is not to be applied to forts of the conventional type, since it is preferable " deployer toute la vigueur de la defense sur une ligne simple de coupoles cidrassies." The i2-cm. gun (Plate XL) is adopted as bei^ig the heaviest type capable of being mounted in a disappearing cupola. Each gun is supplemented by two I2-cm. (or 15-cm.) mortars, also clothed in armour. In some cases the 21 -cm. mortar would be employed. (Plate XII.) The close defence is provided for by quick-firing guns, partly 53 mm. in dis- appearing cupolas (Plate XIII.), and partly 37 mm. on " travelling shield mountings." (Plate XIV.) Plate XV. shows a typical Schumann battery.^ The trace is an arc of a circle, along which are distributed six S3-mm. quick- firing guns {b, b . . . .) mounted in disappearing cupolas (Plate XIII.) Between the cupolas, are small shelters for the gun detachments as shown in the section EF. In front is a para- pet en glacis and an abatis {see section AB). On the flanks are wings, each mounting seven 37-mm. quick-firing guns on travelling shield mountings. At a is a disappearing cupola containing one 12-cm. gun (Plate XI.), and close in rear of this cupola are two mortars, mounted as shown in Plate XII. In an advanced position in front of the battery, are seven addi- tional 37-mm. quick-firing guns mounted in the same way as those on the wing parapets. The several modes of mounting the armament are shov/n ' Taken from ' Les Affuts Cuirasses.'— Julius von Schiiiz. 86 FORTIFICATION. in Plates XI. to XIV. The i2-cm. gun (Plate XI.) is placed in a cupola, which, when raised to the firing position, just allows the muzzle to clear the parapet. When the cupola is eclipsed, the turtle-back shield SS closes the opening at the top, like a valve upon its seating. An arrangement of levers and counterpoises allows the cupola to be raised and lowered at will. There is no means of laying the gun except by directions received from an observing station outside, and all the operations of loading, &c., must be performed by lamplight. The disappearing cupola for the S3-mm. quick-firing gun (Plate XIII.) is similar in general arrangement. Little sight- holes are, however, provided in the side armour ; so that, by raising the cupola, a view of the field of fire can be obtained. Fire is directed from the outside, and " si la voix du comman- dant _ n'est pas suffisante, on transmet signaux a I'aide du petit cornet suisse!' The " travelling shield mounting," or portable cupola (Plate XIV.) is a cylindrical iron box furnished with a turtle-back armoured roof which revolves about a central spindle. By means of a pair of wheels and shafts, the whole structure, which weighs \\ ton without ammunition, can be transported by horse draught, and placed against a bank natural or artificial, or buried in the ground up to the level of the lower edge of the roof shield. The shield and gun rotate together, enabling the latter to be fired all round the circle. A sight-hole is provided ; but the fire must apparently be mainly directed by word or signal from the outside, since the field of view at any given position of the cupola is extremely limited, and a small amount of smoke would obscure vision. The mortar (Plate XII.) is of spherical form, the muzzle and breech having a small protrusion as shown. The spherical portion is made to fit a circular opening in the top of a riatc XI. DisArrEARiNG Cupola for one i2-c.m. Gun. (Schumann.) ±S- Scale 40" 4 3 ^ oFeet Thickness of roof in two plates (a), each 2'36-inch W.I. Thickness cf sides, b 3'9-inch steel. Total weight with glacis plates, about 52 tons. Details of Gun, etc. Length, 22"4 calibres. Weight, 22J cwt. Maximum elevation, 25°. ,, depression, 1°. Charge, 77 lbs. Muzzle velocity, 1476 f.s. Projectiles, weight of common seell, 45'86 lbs. ; bursting charge, 2-42 lbs. ; Shrapnel contains 58J balls. N.B. —The gun, which is not allowed any recoil, is muzzle - pivoted and counter-balanced by the weight c. The cupola and gun are just over- balanced by the counter-weight d. A second counter-weight f- is pro- vided by which the motion is brought under control. It is in- tended that the shock of recoil shall free a detent holding up the cupola, and allow it to drop automatically. To face page 86. Plate XII. 2I-CM. Spherical Mortar, Shielded. (Schumann.) Details of Mortar, etc. Length, 6'5 calibres. Weight, about 5-3 tons. Maximum elevation, 60°. Minimum ,, 30°. Charge, 7I lbs. Muzzle velocity, 702 fs. Projectile, common shell, weight, 176 lbs. ; bursting charge, 7f lbs. EFfective range about 4000 yards. N.B. — No recoil is provided for, the spherical surface strikes against the glacis plates and the structure then recovers itself. Detachment, 3 men. To follow Plate XI. Plate xrn. Disappearing Cupola for 53-mm. Q.F. Gun. (Schumann.) Scale 40 Dktatls of Gun, etc. Length, 24'4 calibres. Weight, 330 lbs. Rate of fire, 12-15 rounds per minute. Maximum elevation, 18°. „ depression, 15° Charge, I2| oz. Muzzle velocity, 1492 f.s. Projectile, weight of common shell, 5i lbs. ; bursting charge, 2J oz. ; case contains 80 balls. Thickness of roof plate a 3'9-inch W.I. ,, side ,, b do. Total weight with glacis plates, about I2| tons. N.B. — The cupola is just over-balanced by the counterweight c. By pulling up the bar (/, the structure is made to descend, and is held by the catch e. On freeing the catch, the cupola as- cends. The firer sits on a seatyand traverses the cupola by placing his feet on the spokes of a vertical wheel q. To/ollmv Plate XII. Plate XIV. "Travelling Shield Mounting." (Schumann.) Scale 40 3 4 5^ 8 Feet Details of Gun, etc. Length, 22 calibres. Weight, 8i| lbs. Rate of fire, 20 rounds per minute. Maximum elevation, 10°. ,, depression, 5°. Projectile, weight of common shell, I lb. ; bursting charge, f oz. ; case contains 21 balls. Charge, 2| oz. Muzzle velocity, 1332 f.s. Thickness of front plate a 2-inch W.I. ,, shield b ij-inch steel. Weight of mounting and gun, ij ton. Magazine holds 400 rounds. Detachment to work gun, 2 men. To follow Plate XIII. ^ s to b/) '-a u^ s o^ o> < s s s <1 K LO ro £ 1 1 8- ri •a o g a, u S S V " T T W CI RECENT proposals: 87 domed chamber formed by four chilled iron plates. The mortar itself rests upon a pillar partly formed of wood, and capable of rotating about its vertical axis. The recoil is taken upon the chilled iron plates in rear of the position in which the mortar is fired. There is no light in the chamber, and all laying is performed by signals from an outside observing station. A similar form of mounting is provided for a 12-cm. spherical mortar, but the cast-iron dome is replaced by a brick and concrete chamber covered with a horizontal shield. 3. General von Sauer of the Bavarian Artillery regards detached forts of the accepted type as useless, and would employ a line or lines of two-gun cupolas, which are to play the rSle of the famed towers of Linz. Each cupola consti- tutes an admirable observing station, and its armament can only be silenced by the heaviest siege artillery at ranges not exceeding 1000 m. Allowing an interval of 600 m. for a single line of cupolas, or 1200 m. if there are two lines arranged chequer-wise, a total of 100 cupolas is required for a peri- meter of 60 km., and their garrisons would amount only to 2000 men. Thus, economy in men and in the cost of the works is claimed. 4. General Schott would fortify as few positions as possible, and would minimize the inducements to bombard by placing all military stores outside the town to be defended. His main line of defence consists of lengths of " detached fronts " 700 m. long, mounting fifty to sixty guns, and protected on the flanks by strong works, each provided with twelve machine guns capable of a total delivery of 28,000 bullets per minute. The detached fronts have a ditch 4 m. deep with obstacles, and the flank works have deep revetted ditches. In advance of the main line are placed Schumann cupolas. There is no enceinte. FORTIFICA TION. 5. M. Mougin.i ^ director of the St. Chamond firm, is the inventor of a cupola, and of a new system of Fortification. His fort is simple in conception, consisting of a huge block of concrete (Plate XVI. and Figure 2, p. 102) buried in the ground, and carrying on the top three cupolas {a, a, a), each mounting two 15-cm. guns. Four disappearing cupolas {b, b, b, b), each containing two machine guns, complete the armament. Observing stations, electric lig'hts, ventilating fans, and all the resources of science are included in the block of con- crete, which is to be garrisoned by thirty or forty skilled mechanics. The subterranean maze is entered by a well, cunningly guarded and closed by an iron armour plate, raised and lowered by a hydraulic ram. " The portier only sets the lift in action when he has heard the countersign and when the tourelle d. klipse de garde has recognized the arrivals." In the tunnel below the lift, " a number of chicanes analogous to those which the engineers of the Middle Ages " delighted to employ, are provided for the annihilation of an enemy who has gained admittance by stratagem. There is no ditch, and the self-defence of the fort depends upon the, eight machine guns. To defend the intervals and supplement the Artillery fire of the forts, a double line of railway is pro- vided encircling the position, and covered by a rough parapet planted with shrubs. Trucks carrying guns on hydro-pneu- matic mountings (Plate XVII.) run on the outer line, and being provided with a double set of wheels, can be transferred to branch lines at right angles. Thus this movable armament can be brought into action at any position along the line of rail and can be rapidly concentrated ; while, by means of cross lines, individual guns can be transferred to the inner line of railway and moved along the rear of other guns in action. Great economy is claimed for this system, which is ' ' Les nouveaux explosifs et la Fortification.' 1887. o o s d m I20-MM. Gun on Truck Disappearing Mounting. (St. Chamond.) Plate XVII. To follow Plate XVI. 90 FOR TIFICA TION. of the supplementary guns completing the war armament A railway runs along the rear of the fighting line, and disappear- ing guns on trucks (Plate XVII.) are freely employed. The armament intended for indirect fire is placed in a second line. About 600 yards in rear of the fighting line, and apparently on the reverse slope of the position, is the " ilhnent passif" i.e., a group of bomb-proofs to accommodate stores and to shelter one-third of the garrison. The rest of the barrack accommodation is provided for by dispersed buildings not bomb-proof, and placed near the lines of railway. The powder magazines also are to be dispersed, and to hold not more than twenty tons each. Special attention is to be given towards securing the invisibility of the works. The estimated armament of such a group of " elements '' is sixty guns, and the garrison 750 men. 8. General Brialmont ^ practically retains the familiar type of detached fort with great command, but since " I'emploie des batteries cuirasshs s'impose d la defense," cupolas are inter- polated both on the ramparts and in the reduit. The cupolas are to be protected by bonnettes of earth which are to be cut down as the enemy approaches. Rifled mortars are employed in conjunction with the cupolas "pour riposter ^ Fennemi." Every fort liable to systematic attack is to have a reduit, and every fortress an " enceinte de siiretf capable apparently of resisting a second siege, and provided with armour-plated batteries running on a line of railway. The forts have all the usual artifices, caponiers " A oreilles de chat" machicoulis, &c. A minimum height of seven metres is prescribed for escarps ; but railings are elsewhere commended, ^nd it is not by any means clear what is really considered the best treatment of the ditch. " The most redoubtable " mode of attacking a fort ' 'Lai Fortification du Temps Pr&ent.' iS Typical Diagram of a Fort. (Un Pioxxier.) Plate XIX. tj!Ui^_n_,. \ } Peace barracks, StoreSf I I Workshops, etc. SECTION. Depot ■ Fighting Line ^,^^§S¥^"''W:-i-'^' - -— =^ rr:" ■t^t//«/i'V''^%^'"'' a. Batteries for permanent armament b. mr Emplacements for indirect fire c. nrrninniiT Emplacements for war armament d. □ Shelters for men e. rs infantry works /• B Bomb proofs S- n Cartridge Stores h. ■ Stores Line of epaulement and Accessory defence' ,^^ Line of Railway I. O Obseruatories To face page go- RECENT PROPOSALS. 89 to cost from one-third to one-half the sum required to create a fortress of existing type possessing equivalent resisting powers. 6. Lieut-Colonel Voorduin of the Dutch Engineers • pro- poses a novel combination of concrete and iron. His forts, 2200 yards apart, consist of a long mass of concrete covered in front by an earth parapet. (Plate XVIII.) Over the centre of the rear line of this mass is mounted a two-gun cupola, and protruding to the rear immediately behind this cupola is a casemated shielded caponier battery mounting three guns on each face by which the intervals between adjacent forts are flanked. The form of the fort is simply a parapet broken slightly outwards at the centre, and in rear a second nearly parallel, but considerably lower parapet forming the gorge. There is thus, practically, no interior space, and the garrison are housed in the rear caponier battery, and in casemates built into the concrete mass. A wet ditch surrounds the work flanked in rear by the caponier battery but not in front. The main Artillery defence is entrusted to concealed batteries placed between the forts. This system is, of course, only applicable to flat, featureless sites, such as those of Holland. 7. " Un Pionnier"'^ abandons works of existing type altogether, and disbelieving the theory of complete protec- tion, advocates the decentralization of the fort and its replace- ment by a group of batteries, Infantry trenches, &c., provided with an encircling belt of permanent entanglement 100 feet wide. Plate XIX. shows the general idea of this defence by "dispersed elements." The fighting line contains eight batteries {a, a, a . . . ), each of four guns. Between these batteries, there are simple lunettes {e, e, e . . .) for Infantry defence and the available space permits of the establishment • ' Projet d'un Fort satisfaisant aux exigences actuelles.' 1887. s ' Les Forts et la Melinite.' 1888. RECENT PROPOSALS. 91 is said to be the employment of " ponts volants',' ^ but even this danger can be met by providing cotcpoles d dclipse, which are accordingly favoured. The book abounds in apparent contra dictions and instances of special pleading. In a later work ^ General Brialmont discusses the effect of the introduction of large shells, charged with a high explosive, upon Fortification generally, and gives modified designs of forts. There are more cupolas, and the bomb-proofs are strengthened. Cotipoles d Mipse figure largely, and there are various alterations in detail, but in general conception the works remain practically unchanged. From the above it will be evident how greatly the doctors differ. There is certainly a clear majority in favour of putting the Artillery of the defence behind armour ; but in other respects, the divergence of opinion is bewildering. Pre-- sumably the several authors quoted have had access to the same historical and experimental data. It would be unchari- table to suppose that they had not exhaustively studied those data. The respective deductions serve, however, principally to illustrate the constructive versatility of the human mind, and, evidently. Fortification is anything but an exact science. All the authorities cited agree that changes are needed and, with one exception-, all advocate considerable innovations. General Brialmont, however, practically contents himself with sprinkling cupolas over his plans, and retains all the ob- jectionable features of the stereotyped fort. In his view, the advances in the power of weapons merely call for increased protection. He accepts with effusion the designs of the ironmasters, and superimposes them upon all the ' The "pont volant" of the French army is a harmless portable gangway used for the entrainment of horses and military carriages. ^ ' Influence du tir plongeant et des obus torpilles sur la Fortification.' 1S88. 92 FORT I PICA TION. tricks of drawing office fortification in its most aggravated form. The new ironmongery is in fact to be an addition to old methods, and cannot be trusted sufficiently to form the basis of a new system. On the other hand, General von SaUer, Lieut.-Colonel Schumann and M. Mougin have borne testimony to the courage of their convictions by frankly accepting the cupola and founding their projects upon it. " Un Pionnier," alone of the authorities cited, rejects the fascinations of iron Fortifica- tion, and, selecting M. Mougin's preposterous artificial moun- tain defended by mechanics, for special condemnation, easily succeeds in demolishing the " gigantesque bloc en b^ton," which General Brialmont regards as " excellent " in conception. There appears to be no present chance of anything approaching to a consensus of opinion as to the Fortification of the future. The projects of the various schools above referred to cannot all be subjected to the only real test — that of war — and experiments which vitiate all service conditions are necessarily capable of widely different interpretations. It is of importance to know that, at Bourges, the dreaded " obus torpilles" gave craters 30 cm. (about 12 in.) deep in concrete ; but, when it is added ^ that from six to eight such shells must fall on an area from i to 2 m. square in order to breach a thickness of i * 50 m., a fresh set of considerations is introduced, which can be subjected to the test of target practice. During the long and costly experiments carried on at Bucharest in 1885-6, 164 rounds were fired from the Krupp 21 cm. mortar at targets of about forty square metres area without obtaining any hits whatever. The range was 2700 yards, the targets were towers built upon a level plain ; the ' Influence du tir plongeant, ' &c. CRITICISM OF RECENT PROPOSALS. 93 shooting conditions were ideal, and the fall of each shell was telephoned back to the firing point ; yet it must have been evident to the least instructed observer that to attempt to group six or eight shells on an invisible area two metres square would have been perfectly ridiculous. Superadd siege conditions, and the utter futility of the data, on the strength of which General Brialmont appears to provide all his casemates with vaulting from 2-50 to 3 m. thick, and actually gives seven feet six inches of concrete under nine feet of earth to the counterarches of a counterscarp, will be sufficiently evident. Careful analysis would probably show that the basis of much of the disagreement of the Professors lies in their varying appreciation of the significance of target practice. For the purposes of Fortification, however, it is the probability of being hit which alone has to be considered, and while it is always interesting to know the maximum possible effect of individual projectiles, this information may have no bearing whatever upon the question of design. Supposing that, by any process of enchantment, a soldier's body could be rendered impervious to shot and shell save for an area of three or four square inches, he would move about under fire with remarkable equanimity. He may be killed, but his chances of escape are considerable. The relative immunity from danger which Mr. Jorrocks claimed for hunting as contrasted with war would be reversed. Provide a hundred-fold such chances for a gun, a casemate, a cart- ridge store, and the faculty will, nevertheless, condemn your project in unmeasured terms. Erect a target on the further side of a belt of wood, and a person of the dullest imagination standing beside a gun on the near side will rise to a conception of the futility of shooting. The conditions are changed, however, when a map 94 FORTIFICATION. or a chart is under consideration on an office table, and the well-trained theorist will detect with triumph a patch of water — perhaps within a few yards of a dangerous reef — whence a vessel can fire a shell which may enter at the rear of a perfectly invisible emplacement and may render its gun hors de combat} The fact that, in accordance with the ordinary laws of probability, the ship might fire into the air for several years before such a hit could be looked for is ignored, and even the elementary principles of ballistics are sometimes set aside. The chances of dismounting the same gun by direct fire may be infinitely greater ; but they will seem relatively trifling to a mind imbued with an indiscrimi- nating dread of being " taken in reverse." And similarly, to assert that a few yards of parapet can be " enfiladed " is frequently considered as conclusively damnatory of a design. It is, of course, disastrous under certain conditions to be either taken in reverse or enfiladed ; but the sole measure of the danger is the probability of being hit, or in other words, the practicability from the enefliy's point of view of carrying on more than mere blind fire. The complaint of the author of " The Campaign of Sebastopol " ^ that Todleben's defences were not laid out on approved patterns, by which the course of the besiegers would have been rendered much simpler, well expresses one im- portant aspect of the matter. In considering the effects of Artillery fire upon works of defence it is the probabilities of hitting which alone need be taken into account. Blind fire into the unknown, and all fire which cannot be regulated by observation are as useless against land Fortification now as always. This fundamental ' This is no mere imaginary case. ' Hamley. {See p. 33.) THE CUPOLA. 95 principle, too little recognised, is capable of a far wider extension. It is the reasonably probable strength of attack which alone should determine the standard of defence of a fortress or a coaling station. The relative probability of obtaining hits under different circumstances, upon which many of the questions of Fortifica- tion necessarily depend, is unfortunately difficult to determine. Experiment would go far to settle differences of opinion ; since the cardinal objection to all peace practice as a basis on which to build deductions applicable to war, ceases to exist when it is sought to arrive merely at relative probabilities. The needed experiments are, however, never likely to be carried out, and speculation will remain unchecked by fact until the history of fresh sieges has been written. To the mind of General Brialmont, the cupola appears to be a sufficient solution of most of the difficulties of land Fortification. " Uemploie des batteries cuirass^es s impose a la defense." This sweeping assertion is supported by strange statements, scarcely calculated to carry conviction. A 15-cm. gun is said to be capable of firing one round a minute when mounted in a cupola, but to require " three or four minutes " ^ if mounted in the ordinary manner. Similarly, the cupola is regarded — for reasons not assigned — as possessing a great superiority over an open battery when the target is a moving object. Either of these advantages would suffice to confer attraction upon the cupola ; but neither is in accordance with fact, and when General Brialmont goes on to advocate a covering bonnette which is to have an interior slope of 5° 32' when the enemy is at a distance of 3000 m., reduced gradually ' 'La Fortification du Temps Present.' The 15-cm. gun, or at least the service 6-in. gun which is more powerful, can fire one round per minute without difficulty from an over-bank or even a hydro-pneumatic mounting, and requires Li considerably less strength of detachment than is entailed by a cupola. 95 FOR TIFICA TION. to 3° 9' when the target approaches to 2000 m., it is difficult to believe that he has ever attempted to realize siege conditions, or had an opportunity of seeing an earthwork which has been subjected to Artillery fire. The Bucharest experiments clearly showed that a cupola is capable of taking a large amount of punishment. The St. Chamond turret received seventy-two hits, the Griison structure ninety-seven, neither being rendered hors de combat; but the main attack was carried out against the rear plates only, and the armaments of both would have been repeatedly disabled under service conditions. These experiments practi- cally provided no data as to the real resisting power of the cupola, and their principal result has been to render the spherical form of shield universal in later designs of non- disappearing type. The most recent project, which is now under construction by the St. Chamond firm at Langonand, is shown in Plate XX.^ In order to give complete protection to the gun-ports, the cupola is made to oscillate about a horizontal axis o, the whole weight being transferred from a rounded knife edge working into an inverted saddle carried upon a turntable a. An opening is made through the centre of the whole system up which passes a vertical pillar serving as a guide to an ammunition lift worked from the chamber below the gunfloor, and conveying two projectiles and two cartridges to the guns at each ascent. The whole cupola is equilibrated by two trains of powerful Belleville springs, S, which are neither extended nor compressed when the centre of gravity of the oscillating mass is vertically over the axis of oscillation. Rotation is effected by means of a hand-winch carrying a chain, of which one end is attached to the gunfloor, the ' Taken from ' Le Genie Civil. P.ate XX. Oscillating Cupola for Two 150-MM. Guns. (MOUGIN.) Half- Plan at A B. Half-Plan, Shield Removed. To face page 96. THE CUPOLA. 97 other to the turntable below, Belleville springs being em- ployed at each attachment to deaden shock. In the firing position, the cupola is tilted up till the leg c rests upon the rail d. The leg contains strong Belleville springs under permanent compression, which receive the whole shock of recoil. The two 15 -cm. guns are independently counterpoised by weights, which allow them to be easily depressed, or elevated. Traversing is performed by a winch in the chamber below, which turns a spindle carrying a pinion gearing into a -toothed arc surrounding the turntable. The ideal of the many cupola designers is complete protection to guns and men, except at the instant of firing and this ideal appears almost to have been attained in the oscillating structure above described, as well as in the disappearing cupola (Plate XX.). The one exposes merely a port a few inches in diameter for a short period before firing, and is nearly invulnerable to direct fire at all other times ; the other is altogether invisible and unattackable by direct fire except for a few moments before and after each round. At first sight, these modes of mounting may appear to possess a certain fascination. To be able to fight in safety has obvious advantages. The cupola guns, we are told, will be available to the last stages of a siege. The besiegers will be driven to put special ordnance into the trenches, or bring up shells of vast capacity charged with high explosives. This, and more, is claimed, and to some minds the arguments in favour of the cupola in one or other of its many forms appear conclusive. There are, however, other aspects of the matter which are frequently overlooked. By accepting the cupola, the guns are tied down to fixed positions, which immensely simplifies the difficulties of the siege train. If the high angle fire, against which General Brialmont provides some 9 feet of H 98 FORTIFICATION. concrete over his casemates, is ever to find a favourable opportunity, it will surely be against a cupola which must be in a fort, and the site of which can generally be exactly determined. To jam these machines, it will not be by any means necessary to cut through a great thickness of concrete, and the besiegers' howitzers would be able to deliberately shell a cupola without any possible reply from its direct firing guns. It is recognised as necessary, therefore, to provide mortars to protect the cupolas, one section of the fortress armament being thus employed in guarding another. Unless steam power is brought into play, the cupola guns must necessarily be weak, those of the disappearing structure (Plate XI.) being especially feeble, judged by modern standards. At Bucharest, the accuracy of the fire from the cupola was by no means satisfactory for reasons easily under- stood. The guns would have shot far better and far more rapidly from ordinary siege mountings. The disappearing and the oscillating systems appear unlikely to give results equal to those obtained at Bucharest. Again, there are grave disadvantages in tying down the best portion of the direct fire armament of a fortress to observing stations and telephones, or electric dials. If the observer is killed, or the observing station wrecked, or if communication is interrupted, the cupola becomes helpless unless provided with sights and a manhole in the shield, which its partisans warmly repudiate. A gun which can be aimed only so long as telegraphic communication with an outside observer exists, loses much of its value. The indirect fire armament of a fortress must of necessity depend for its accuracy upon observing stations ; but can at need be con- trolled by visual signals. Every direct firing gun ought to be able to be laid by sights. Finally, difficulties both of lighting and of ventilation, easily obviated in peace experi- THE CUPOLA. 99 ments,^ may assert themselves unpleasantly in actual war. While, therefore, guns mounted in cupolas are subjected to some grave disabilities, it is by no means clear that the real protection gained at much sacrifice is as great as is claimed. It may well be doubted whether the armament of a cupola of the non-disappearing type would survive either a gun on a hydro-pneumatic mounting carefully concealed, or an over- bank gun capable of being readily moved from one emplace- ment to another. Even if relative immunity from danger is conceded to the cupola gun, other considerations arise, of much importance in comparing rival modes of mounting. " The cost of the French turret (at Bucharest) was about ;^I0,000 exclusive of its armament, and for this sum about six movable overbank guns of greater power could be provided."^ Unless siege warfare is to be regarded in the light of a mere duel on the backwoods principle between guns in fixed positions, all tactical handling of the defence being put out of sight, it may well be doubted whether a movable armament of equivalent cost would not be infinitely more effective from the defender's point of view. The great advantage possessed by the attack in all ages has been the employment of a mobile Artillery against armaments cribbed, cabined, and confined by Fortification. Is it necessary to perpetuate this advantage ? In order to protect his cupolas, General Brialmont provides rifled mortars encased in armour (Plate XII.), and if mortars are • The St. diamond turret at Bucharest, which had no man-hole in the roof shield, was extremely defective in these respects notwithstanding that the chamber immediately below the gun platform had a large doorway opening directly into the air instead of being sunk below ground. 2 Official Report by Major D. O'Callaghan, R.A., and Captain G. S. Clarke, R.E. H 2 FOR TIFICA TION. to be placed in the target forts proposed by the author of " La Fortification du Temps Present," there may conceivably be some grounds for this ant-lion form of mounting. Other- wise, there appears to be no justification whatever for the great expense and the other drawbacks involved. The disappearing cupola, which General Brialmont appears to regard as the antidote to the "font volant " — some resus- citated expedient of the middle ages — and which he proposes to render capable of resisting guns of '^calibre moyen " in the second artillery position, is a creditable manufacturer's pro- duction. Two or three men buried in a subterranean chamber lighted by a lantern, are at the right moment to raise their cupola and deliver an overwhelming fire in the right direction. The mechanical principles are apparently sound ; the arrangement will probably work so long as it is not hit by anything heavier than a rifle bullet. The price is satisfactory — to the makers — and purely military considera- tions are of small account. On these machines it has been sought by some authorities to base the Fortification of the future, but there is no indi- cation of any attempt to show how the defence is to be carried on. Take the typical battery, Plate XV., in which one officer, six N.-C. officers, and seventy-five men are locked up by twos and threes in iron boxes, and distributed from 450 to 1000 yards apart, some partially, the rest wholly buried in the ground. Endeavour to lay down some mode of controlling the defence as a whole, or of giving any sort of direction to the fighting. The difficulty will be apparent to anyone accustomed to consider tactical questions. Let it be remembered further that the defenders practically see nothing of what is going on around them, except through little loop- holes, which, in the case of the disappearing cupolas, are buried till the moment comes to emerge. THE CUPOLA. Given a dead level, featureless plain, or a uniform glacis, and an enemy who will attack in broad daylight on a given line with a front of given breadth, a plan of action can be conceived. The ground over which the attack is to take place might be divided up among the different cupolas, the correct orientation of each laid down and marked on the arcs accordingly, and the necessary elevation of the guns for a grazing fire ascertained. At the sound of the bugle, the disappearing cupolas rear their heads, and the whole collec- tion of pepper-pot lids twist themselves into position and come into blind action till the " cease fire " is sounded. With a well-exercised garrison, this would perhaps be practicable ; although, in the excitement of the action, many of the corn- batants would lose their nerve, forget their chalk marks, and fire far over the enemy's heads. Men who would distinguish themselves for bravery if their comrades were within sight, would unquestionably disappoint expectation if thus buried alive in dispersed iron boxes completely hidden from their officer's eye. The assumptions above made are, however, precisely those which could not occur, and it requires little imagination to picture the wild confusion which an attack in the grey dawn would create in defences of this nature applied to ordinary topographical conditions. No one would know what was happening, or from what side the danger was coming. There would be no command, no unity of purpose. The cupolas would raise themselves prematurely and disappear when their fire was most needed. The combat would be more unequal than that between good modern cavalry and the ironclad knights of the middle ages, who would be ridden through and through and rolled over like so many helpless nine- pins. Since the Bucharest trials, a long series of experiments with FORT I PICA TION. gun cupolas was carried out at Chalons. The results have been carefully guarded and the armour plates were even buried. These experiments can hardly have been altogether favourable to the cupolas, since the French, who previously possessed about twenty-five in all, appear disinclined to add to the number, and the Germans, who have never adopted them for land defence, make no sign. Belgium, however, has given large orders, and Roumania, under General Brialmont's advice, is providing cupolas for the defences of Bucharest. The portable cupola (Plate XIV.), on the other hand, appears to have found some measure of favour in Germany, where about fifty have been ordered, and seems likely to make way also in France. The new defences of Foksani, in Roumania, will depend largely upon these structures. Fig. 2. — Foundation Plan. aa. Gun Cupolas. lb. Machine Gun Cupolas. ( . Observing Station. dd. Electric Lights. THE CUPOLA. 103 M. Mougin's typical fort (See Fig. 2 and also Plate XVI.) is practically a mastless turret ship buried up to the deck-level in the ground, and manned by mechanics. Difficulties and inconveniences of all kinds have to be accepted when a fort is made to steam across the seas ; but to gratuitously adopt them in an extremely aggravated form on land appears to be madness. War will never be carried on by machinery, nor can forts be defended by " mkaniciens" Machinery can aid Fortification, but only within limits. An accident to the dis- appearing observing station by day, or a temporary failure of the electric light by night — a contingency not altogether unknown — would render this subterranean fort helpless Strong field works, and a field force calculated on the usual basis, would be needed to guard it, and would, at the same time, render it practically superfluous. Tactical principles and human nature are practically the same in all ages, and in them alone can a solid basis be found for systems of Fortification. 1 04 FOR T I PICA TION. CHAPTER IX. EFFECT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS. — MAGAZINE RIFLES. — HIGH ANGLE FIRE OF RIFLED HOWITZERS AND MORTARS.— QUICK-FIRING AND MACHINE-GUNS. —SMOKELESS POWDER. — HIGH EXPLOSIVES. — COMMU- NICATIONS. — OBSTACLES. — USELESSNESS OF ENCEINTES AND OF REDUITS. Among the developments of modern arms there are two which in a special degree affect the defence : — I. The magazine rifles with which the armies of all great Powers will shortly be armed possess an effective range of about 2000 yards, a maximum range of about 3200 yards, and a continuous speed of fire averaging at least fifteen aimed rounds per minute. An assaulting force when in movement cannot deliver an effective fire, and cannot move without exposing a full length target to an antagonist who shows head and shoulders at most. This condition has obtained ever since the introduction of firearms. It is a constant factor in dealing with questions of attack and defence. Now that the effective range of the Infantry weapon has been multiplied by about twenty, and its rate of fire by at least fifteen, an immense power has been conferred upon the defence, which no Artillery progress has neutralized. Plan your assault as you will, there comes a stage at which the advance has to be made without any support from Artillery fire. When the small arm was capable of being fired only about once a minute, this zone could be crossed THE MAGAZINE RIFLE. 105 with comparatively little difficulty. The Artillery of the attack would endeavour to keep the defenders from their parapets until the last moment, and during that last moment the fire of the defence was necessarily weak. Hence arose the vast ditches, the elaborate arrangements of flank defence the caponiers, counterscarp galleries, &c., of the various systems of Fortification. The modern rifle has rendered all these expedients absolutely unnecessary in the future. The intensity of fire which a single line of men can now deliver upon a given area exceeds enormously the maximum formerly attainable by the combination of every conceivable system of cross-flanking. The Infantry garrisons can be kept under cover till the last moment, and during the final rush which must be made without support, the deadly effect of the magazine rifle will have full scope. To guard against surprise, and to give that sense of security which is necessary even to the best troops acting on the defensive, an effective obstacle is necessary, which in some cases may be a ditch, but which can be better provided in other ways. A revetted ditch appeals to the imagination more powerfully than a sunk iron fence and a broad belt of entanglement or abatis under modern rifle fire, and this is a consideration which should not be forgotten ; but, as an effective obstacle, the latter is infinitely superior. A line of steady troops covered by a parapet, protected by such an obstacle under its fire, and amply supplied with ammunition, is now unattackable by direct assault. Further, the minimum field of fire necessary to shatter an attack has been immensely reduced. These are axioms frequently stated, but their logically inevitable significance in relation to Fortification has never been adequately recognised. There is no arm so potent in its influence on all questions of land defence, as the magazine rifle. io6 FORTIFICATION. 2. 'Artillery fire has immensely increased in range and accuracy.' This is a military common-place so often repeated that it is frequently accepted without further consideration. As regards direct fire, it would probably be more correct to say ' the range of accurate fire has immensely increased.' Accurate direct fire has long been attainable provided that the range was sufficiently short, and the distinction is some- what important. As regards indirect fire, however, the case is different. The mortar fire of the Sebastopol era was inaccurate at all ranges, and the realization of this inaccuracy has proved an almost insuperable bar to the adequate recog- nition of the great possibilities opened out by the modern howitzer and rifled mortar. Minds which were plastic in the Sebastopol days, have retained only too faithfully the im- pression of the inaccuracy of the old mortar, and generalizing therefrom, have found difficulty in realizing that accurate high-angle fire is now possible. Even the remarkable practice carried on under unfavourable conditions from a g-inch R.M.L. polygrooved gun at Warden Point, and from an improperly mounted 38-ton gun at Sheerness, have failed to secure adequate recognition of the importance of modern high-angle fire in relation to Fortification. The accuracy attainable by this class of fire, even at consider- able ranges, has been immensely increased since 1855. Thus the Krupp 24-cm. mortar, weighing about 33^ cwt., is stated to give a probable rectangle of 11 m. by 0"5 m. at a range of 3314 m.-^ ; and the 15-cm. mortar, weighing about I3j cwt., a rectangle of 1 5 m. by 5 m. at 2000 m.^ For some unknown ' 'Bulletin de la Reunion des Ofificiers.' ^ ' Recherches tactiques sur les formes nouvelles de la Fortification.' — General von Sauer. The 15-cm. mortar, or some equivalent high-angle piece, is well suited to accompany a field army in all cases where fortified positions may have to be HIGH-ANGLE FIRE. 107 reason we have hitherto declined to adopt the rifled mortar ^ in spite of the almost unanimous decision of the Great Powers of Europe, and at present we do not possess any service ordnance suited for real high-angle fire. Good results have, however, been obtained with the 8-in. R.M.L. 70-cwt. howitzer, but at comparatively low angles ; the probable rectangles being as follows :^ — Charge. Angle of Rectangle. Range lbs. Descent. Yards. Yards. 1\ ■ 12° 30' 2 1 • 2 by I • 1 2 2000 >» 20° 42' 29-^ „ 2-04 3000 )» . 31° 42' 38-0 ,, 3-60 4000 5^ ■ . 19° 17-0 „ I'52 . 2000 >» . 36° 42' 24-1 „ 2-44 . 3000' Greater accuracy will, doubtless, be obtained with the new breech-loading howitzers when more experience has been gained in their use. While the idea of breaching hidden casemates by planting shells successively on a few square yards of area may be altogether dismissed, it is evident that, where the target is as large as that presented by a siege battery, convergent high-angle fire is capable of obtaining great results. The accuracy of this fire will depend, however, solely on the results of observation ; but inasmuch as all the high-angle guns of the defence can be so screened as to be secure against everything except mere chance shots, their accuracy of fire should approach more nearly to the standard attacked. At Plevna, for example, it would have been infinitely more effective than the siege guns of far greater weight brought up by the Russians, who have since adopted a field mortar. ' Experimental mortars will probably be constructed shortly. ^ Using larger charges and lower elevations, the length of the rectangle is somewhat greater and the breadth less. ^ This appears to compare very unfavourably with the results obtainable by the 24-cm. Krupp mortar of less than half the weight and firing a much more powerful shell. I o8 FOR T I PICA TION. of peace practice than is possible in the case of guns firing direct. Knowing every inch of the terrain, occupying in most cases the commanding points, and being easily able to use balloons and other artificially elevated observing stations, the defence ought unquestionably to have the advantage in the effective employment of high-angle fire. If, for example, the high- angle guns of a fortress are concealed behind a belt of wood, it is hopeless for the attack to attempt to silence them. On the other hand, the defender is not constrained to have a wood within effective range, and his whole high-angle Artillery is available for action against the first siege battery, which is visible from any of his observing stations. Moreover, the defender is in full possession of his position, has his guns in battery ready for action when the besieging force arrives in his front, and can, if he chooses, have a per- fected system of communication between observing stations and guns. This constitutes a further distinct advantage for the neglect of which there is no possible excuse. Finally, overhead cover, i.e. cover against high-angle fire, is precisely the kind of protection which the besieger finds most difficulty in providing. On the above grounds, it may fairly be claimed that high- angle fire can be employed to the best advantage by the defence, and that its increase of accuracy is a definite gain which it should be one of the first objects of any rational system of Fortification to turn to the utmost account. From the point of view of the defence, the development of rifled howitzers and mortars is second in importance only to the introduction of the magazine rifle. As regards the employment of direct fire, the conditions are more evenly balanced. On the one hand, it is usual to claim for the defence the power of employing heavier DIRECT FIRE. 109 ordnance, of mounting it more efficiently, and now, of being able to protect it with iron. On the other hand, the besieger has generally been gratuitously provided with ideal targets, laboriously constructed at vast expense, and as he offers in exchange mere low earthworks scarcely visible even in the open at moderate ranges, a definite advantage remains to him. Moreover, the besieger has sought and obtained far greater latitude of action. He can modify the form of his operations to suit the circumstances, moving his Artillery as he chooses, and concentrating its fire at will upon a given portion of the defence ; while the besieged, fettered at every turn by arrangements pre-ordained by the Professor sitting at his drawing board, loses all initiative from the first and succumbs to superior tactical elasticity. Given a force commanded by a soldier with whom tactical considerations are paramount, opposed to another force placed in a straight jacket by "un Moricien .... qui ne se rend pas compte exactement de la maniire dont se passent leurs combats" ^ the issue is pre- determined. It is easy to understand why, in all ages, such brilliant defences have been made by mere earthworks con- structed by soldiers for soldiers, the theorist having been fortunately left in his office. Fortress Artillery mounted in permanent defences has never yet been permitted to fight on equal terms, and has usually been overpowered with comparatively little difficulty for that reason. Where, as at Paris, guns were employed outside the expensive positions specially provided for them, they secured relative immunity ; where, as at Belfort, they were frequently moved, they contributed valuable aid to the defence. The Fortification of the future must secure for ' Bulletin de la Reunion des Officiers.' FOR TIFICA TION. fortress Artillery the power which it has a right to claim, and the artilleryman must insist on obtaining adequate recognition of the tactical requirements of his arm. The quick-firing gun will exercise comparatively small influence upon land defences. In the larger calibres, 6-pr. and upwards, it is practically a field gun with accelerated speed of fire ; but all field guns will before long be of the quick-firing class, and the change will not affect the relative conditions of attack and defence. A light quick-firing gun, however, such as the 3-pr., on a carriage capable of being quickly withdrawn under cover, will be specially effective against sap heads up to the last stages of an attack, if, indeed, a direct advance by sap is any longer possible except under cover of darkness. "^ The lighter quick-firing guns will be comparatively ineffective against men, except perhaps on rocky ground where the peicassion fuse will tell. Their shrapnel is weak, and time fuses can only be employed at a great sacrifice in rate of fire. Their case has little range and much dispersion, so that even at close quarters it is far inferior to the stream of bullets from the rifle calibre machine gun. The latter is, practically, the equivalent of a certain number of Infantry whose fire is all under the control of a single selected man. If mounted on a light travelling carriage, and capable of being rapidly brought into action in any direction at short notice and as quickly withdrawn, it is obviously a most powerful weapon in the hands of the defence. So long as it is employed with judgment, it may be rendered available to the last, and in the final stage of an assault, during which no support can be given to the attacking Infantry, the machine ' The Lydd experiments of 1884 and 1885 (see R.E. Professional Papers Vols. X. and XI.) throw great doubt on the possibility of all except deep sap, and even this ought to be impracticable by daylight under the fire of light rifled mortars. The Germans, many years ago, abandoned altogether the sap-roller which, with other anachronisms, still figures in our text books. THE MACHINE GUN. gun should prove of great value. Too much stress has been laid upon its peculiar suitability for flanking purposes, and it is frequently forgotten that the perfection of the automatic principle has conferred equal advantage upon the gun for frontal fire. The fire of the Maxim gun, delivering about 700 bullets per minute, can be entirely directed by one man, who need not show more than his head (easily shielded) above the parapet, the feed being tended by another man completely covered. The gun may even be controlled by signals given from an observing station to a man completely covered. In the special qualities of the automatic gun, there is a distinct advantage to the defence, arising from the fact than an intense frontal fire can be suddenly developed by a few sentries, without waiting for the complete manning of the parapets by the garrison of a work sheltered in their casemates. As against surprise or night attack, this is clearly a new weapon in the hands of the defender of which it is necessary to take account. Under some conditions also the machine gun can be effectively employed by the defence for fire at long distances. If the ground has been fully studied before- hand, and the system of observation perfected, it should be possible to inflict loss on troops moving in the open within range of the gun, provided that they can be seen from any observing station. As movements within a fortified position will usually be more difficult to detect than those of the besieging force, there will be a certain measure of advantage to the defence in this use of the gun. The machine gun, on account of its unique power of instantly bringing a heavy continuous fire, controlled by a single brain, upon a given target, will prove specially effective by night against working parties, and the defence can employ 1 1 2 FOR TIFICA TION. the electric light with little difficulty, while the attack will generally be restricted to the use of star shell, or some similar illuminant. Land Fortification should thus relatively benefit. The extreme mobility of the machine gun will enable it, if well handled, to obtain great results in each of the modes of employment above referred to, and the necessity for shutting it up, in a fixed position where it may be disabled before firing a round, and where the man who fires it can never really know what he is shooting at, can rarely exist. The introduction of smokeless powder is sooner or later inevitable, and here again arises a source of advantage to the defence. As between two combatants, the tactical effect of smoke may be felt in three ways : — - a. The attacking force may find a local or a general advance facilitated by the visual cover afforded by the smoke of its own fire. b. The defender may be shrouded in his own smoke at a moment when a well-directed fire is specially needed. c. Smoke reveals to either combatant the positions held by the other ; and, in particular, defines more or less exactly the number and sites of guns. Suppress smoke and it will be evident that the balance of advantage should lie with the defender in cases {a) and (i^) ; since his main object is usually to obtain the maximum effect of fire delivered from a fixed position, and smoke introduces variable and uncertain conditions which may aid the attack. In its absence, the advantage lies with the best covered force, which, moreover, not being affected by the disorder incidental to movement under modern fire, ought evidently to be under more effective control. In case {c) the advantage is perhaps less direct. In the Artillery fight, the besieger has hitherto benefited by the comparative invisibility of his works. The suppression of the smoke which marks the gun positions HIGH EXPLOSIVES. 113 would, therefore, appear to confer a fresh advantage on the attack. On the other hand^ the advantage of the comparative invisibility of works may be secured by the defence, once the old ideals are abandoned ; and, if the smoke factor is expunged, the balance must sway to the side of the force best able to carry on effective and well organized obser- vation. A further change is in progress in the introduction of high explosives for shells, which has apparently raised an un- reasoning panic in some quarters.^ The French are manu- facturing in large numbers the long shells intended for mdinite ; but it is by no means certain that they have overcome the difficulties which surround the use of this material, and they probably trust to being able to fall back upon powder. The Germans appear inclined to adhere to gun-cotton. Explosives of this class would doubtless be disastrous in the cage of many existing works, which would be quite as little able to resist modern howitzer shells charged with powder ; but the whole of the experience gained at Lydd points to the fact that no increase of results against earthworks can be thus obtained. High explosives produce great local destructive effect against masonry, and possibly great shock effect against men, though this is less certainly known. The splinters formed are, however, very small, and their radius of action is therefore strictly limited. While works of the type to be subsequently advocated have little to fear from the introduction of high explosives, the latter may nevertheless be utilized to the fullest extent by giving to the defence a few heavy permanently mounted howitzers or mortars capable of firing large, shells of greater power than any which the besieger can employ. The transport of large ' Thus a recent speaker at the R.U.S. Institution appeared to contemplate the practicability of ' clearing the Channel by picrates.' I 114 FORTIFICATION. numbers of the heavy long shells will necessarily offer great difficulties to the besieger, and the defence should relatively benefit. Siege warfare is, in a sense, a combat between weapons employed under different conditions, and a mere discussion of the respective capabilities of these weapons will not suffice for the purposes of Fortification. Tactical considerations, which have the object of enabling the combatants to make the best use of their arms, should take precedence of all others. A fortified place should be, before all, a fighting position, and to the neglect of recognizing this axiom may be traced the relative failure of the performance of permanent Fortification as compared with that of rough defences rapidly created to meet special needs. In the one case, tactical considerations were unfettered ; in the other, the fascination of tricks of detail and the charm attaching to a science which it has been sought to represent as intelligible only to the few, have produced their inevitable results. And, further, the temptation to monumentalism has been occasionally too strong to resist. A large building is a more specious advertisement of the genius of its architect than the most cunningly devised piece of landscape gardening. Even works so inherently vicious as Picklecombe and Garrison Point still perhaps convey a powerful impression to the lay mind affected mainly by size and apparent massiveness. Political Fortification, of which there have been numerous examples here and elsewhere, would, therefore, naturally tend to take the form of an appeal to the uninstructed instincts of the many. So long as Fortification is regarded as a species of cult, a thing apart from the ordinary rules of war and common sense, no real progress is possible. While the besieger has derived full advantage from superior mobility, the defender has been locked in the toils imposed by TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS. 115 the engineer, with the inevitable disabilities they entail. An anchored ship, even if possessing superior armour protection, would clearly be heavily handicapped in an engagement with inferior vessels under-weigh. To hold a fortified position may imply strategic immobility ; but, from a purely tactical point of view, the advantage of ease of movement within the opposing lines should evidently rest with the defender, whose interior communications may be perfected in peace time. The lateral communications of the besieger are, at the outset, such only as the defender has chosen to accord to him. All the rest he must make for himself, and make under fire, except where they are so far in rear as to be beyond the possibility of observation from balloons, raised observatories, or advanced posts. The defender can, at leisure, create a system specially designed to meet all requirements, fully screened from view, and protected from fire. For radial communications, the besieger must rely mainly on the roads and railways converging upon the position, which may be interrupted in various ways before the invest- ment. The defence, on the other hand, may possess a ready- made system conforming precisely to its tactical needs, effectively linking the main line to the dep6ts of supply, and conferring upon the Artillery a mobility with which the besieger cannot attempt to compete. Communications are, however, less showy than towering scarps, appeal less to the non-military eye, and have con- sequently been frequently neglected in favour of matters infinitely less important. In the Fortification of the future, roads and railways, permitting the free and rapid movement of men, guns, and stores within the line of defence, must receive a prominent place. Thus will the defender be able to gain and retain to I 2 Missing Page Missing Page ii8 FORTIFICATION. while impassable and Inaccessible under the rifle fire of the defence can be provided without difficulty. Natural obstacles, formidable both to forward and to lateral movement, can be grown in profusion. Land mines can be freely utilized, and are capable of producing both moral and material effect. All these things are much more than mere adjuncts to Permanent Fortification. They are of its very essence, and will be realized as such, if once the older ideals can be rele- gated to the history of evolution. , Ditches and caponiers are now no longer required to enable an assault to be repulsed with ease. They can play no defensive part till the last stage of a formal attack, and so soon as the besieger has established himself securely on the glacis and can begin mining, they are worse than useless. Counter-mining actively carried on may delay him for weeks ; ditches and caponiers, however heavily clothed in iron, will scarcely trouble him at all. Perhaps no one has more effectually discredited the caponier than its warmest admirer, General Brialmont, who, while at one moment discussing at inordinate length the very unimportant question of ditch flanking, and evolving elaborate designs saturated with the spirit of the drawing office, alludes elsewhere to the sorties which the defenders are to make into the ditch " at the moment of assault." ^ In this case, of what conceivable use is the caponier " cl oreilUs de chat ? " A large number of the continental writers have, however, given up the caponier and ditch flanking altogether, and we may well be content to follow them. Turning to the more special features of Fortification proper, certain changes appear inevitable. Permanent enceintes may surely be consigned to the limbo of the past. There is no place for them in the land Fortification of the future. ' ' La Fortification du Temps Present.' ENCEINTES. 119 When arguing for some trick of detail, having no relation whatever to the requirements of war, General Brialmont enormously exaggerates the powers of siege Artillery acting under service conditions. When, however, he desires to make out a case for the construction of an elaborate enceinte, the possible effects of shell fire are at once minimized. The bombardment of a town is a mere trifling inconvenienccy unless it can be simultaneously shelled in every portion, because " la population se rifugi^ra dans celui oil les bombes ne iomberont pas." ^ This mode of reasoning, of which there are other examples, possesses obvious advantages— for the theorist — and General Brialmont is thus enabled to make out a siege to be an operation of stupendous difficulty one moment, and comparatively easy the next, or to assume simultaneously the practical hopelessness of direct assaults, and their possibility,, with the aid of the redoubtable pottt volant. Antwerp is, however, the only " grand pivot stratigique" built since the introduction of rifled guns, which has received this so-called " complement de defense" and outside of Belgium there is no probability of its perpetuation. Two distinct roles have been claimed for enceintes. In the first place, they are supposed to prevent the rush of an enemy through the intervals in a hne of forts and the capture of the interior of the position by a coup-de-main. In the second place, they are to serve the purpose of a retrenchment, prolonging the defence after the main line has been breached by the fall of one or more of the detached forts. Military history and common sense support neither view. No army has ever yet penetrated between the intervals of a proper line of properly defended forts, or ever will. When in i860, the question of connecting Forts Tregantle and ' La Fortification ciu -Temps Present.' FORTIFICA TION. Scraesdon at Plymouth by a permanent line was raised, Sir J. Burgoyne was asked by Mr. Ferguson* — "Do you not think there is a great danger of the enemy rushing between them and occupying the ground in rear ? " The answer is significant, and well worth recalling — *' It would be a very desperate undertaking, and what could they do when they got there ?" Here, in a nutshell, is the contrast between the views of the soldier and the " tk^oricien." ' It has sometimes been gratuitously assumed that the enceintes of Paris and Metz alone prevented the Germans in 1870 from passing the forts; notwithstanding that to have involved an army in street fighting with a line of intact positions in its rear would have been simply suicidal. A curious light is thrown upon the real raison dHre of the enceinte of Paris in "The Memoirs of Count von Beust,"^ where it is stated that in 1840, M. Guizot demanded and received " large concessions from the Chamber for the purpose of surrounding Paris with a number of forts, to which a" circular wall, an ' enceinte continue ' had to be added that it might not appear to the people that Paris was to be bombarded during a riot." Thfs was certainly political Fortification in an extreme form, and the Nemesis of history followed thirty years later in the bitter and stubborn resistance which the Commune was able — thanks to M. Guizot's enceinte — to offer to the troops of Versailles. The utter futility of an emeinte as a practical retrenchment is well illustrated by the case of Belfort. Here was an enceinte on Vauban's third system, a veritable triumph of ' Evidence given before the Royal Commission of 1859. ' The term is, here at least, used in no derogatory sense, for Fortification owres much to Mr. Ferguson, whose views were, in many respects, in advance of those of the professional experts. ' Edited by Baron H. de Worms. 1887. ENCEINTES, 121 the draughtsman's art, defended by two rough and ready redoubts, Les Perches} The fall of the latter involved the surrender of Belfort A line of permanent forts can be rapidly retrenched by field redoubts as soon as the front of attack is declared, and, given supplies and morale the defence can thus be prolonged ; but no enceinte can now hope to offer any "further resistance on its own account.' Capture the outer works, drive the defenders into the town, depriving them of the open ground necessary to movement in organized masses, and a S6dan inevitably follows. The enceinte in the modern sense has, in fact, arisen from a misinterpretation of the evolution of Fortification. As soon as Artillery received real development, the occupation of a hill commanding a town and its defences became desirable. The primaeval wall no longer sufficed in such a case, even when it had been exchanged for one of Vauban's terraced mazes. Hence, at an early period, arose detached forts stich as Christoval at Badajoz, and St. Michael at Burgos. The introduction of the rifled gun necessitated a pushing out of the line of defence. Common sense, the principles of tactics, and considerations of expense, dictated a chain of detached forts for the extended line, although the building of a Chinese wall as the main line of defence of Paris found advocates in 1840, and the same principle was again put forward in this country so late as 1 880.' The chain of forts was, however, in numerous cases applied to encircle towns already possessing venerable enceintes, and the latter thus easily came to be regarded as an integral part of systems of defence. The ' See Plate VIII. ^ Pace General Brialmont who states : — " il faut que I'enceinte puisse se defendre successivement." ' See a Paper by Major Parnell. — ' R.E. Occasional Papers,' Vol. IV. 1 22 FOR TIFICA TION. chance of extending their realm was not to be lost, and to evolve from the turbid depths of their inner consciousness reasoning suitable to the matter was not difficult to the Professors. In some places, as at Gosport, a new town has grown up close around an enceinte which has become utterly useless. The land front of Valetta retains two elaborate enceintes, of which the inner is wholly valueless, if not disadvantageous to the defence, and the outer would be much strengthened by being simplified and shorn of all its adornments together with three-quarters of its area. Practically, however, although for various reasons there has been a reluctance to destroy them, permanent enceintes are now an anachronism, and General Brialmont, who bases his opinion upon the sieges of Jerusalem, Syracuse, Rhodes, Candia, and Stockholm, is almost alone in asserting their claim to be still regarded as a part of a system of Fortification. A similar influence to that which causes the retention of the enceinte in text books has operated in the conservation of the reduit as a necessary or desirable adjunct to a detached fort. The fortified towns of the Marlborough period almost invariably possessed a citadel ^ in which the garrison, having abandoned all that the works claimed to defend, were to lock themselves up and either stand a second siege, or, having refreshed and reorganized themselves, to sally forth and retake the town. Although, for obvious reasons, this plan of defence rarely or never succeeded, the diagrammatic possibilities which the citadel suggested were too fascinating to resist, and the reduit — its lineal descendant — was imposed upon the detached fort, and soon came to be preached as a necessity. The result has been occasionally ridiculous ; the keep. ' .y^i? plan of Lille, Plate I. % \\ cc, r"'ni ^ \° ►J ^-, << H ►J fl-( o O ^Jg pq S/^ h-1 .rPj < s "S f^i p 1 *!^V Ui o < o I o o cc I H Z o I- o UJ CO s^ 'i? KEEPS. 123 originally intended to be the last resource of the defence, being designed — at Fort Tregantle, Plymouth, for example — so as to ensure priority of destruction from the Artillery of the attack. Once permit a principle of art to pass into a convention and the grbtesque is quickly evolved. General Brialmont appears to be one of the few remaining champions of the reduit, and his arguments carry their own refutation. " We believe that we have shown that every fort liable to systematic attack ought to have a reduit," ' is his summary of the situation. The verdict of anyone who has studied the historical evidence which he alleges, will however be emphatically "not proven," and an examination of the reduits, with which he saddles his hapless forts, serves to condemn them sufficiently. Fig. 2, Plate XXL, is a section through one of the keeps proposed. This keep is simply a symmetrical mound culminating in a single cupola, surrounded by an Infantry parapet, and enclosed by a circular ditch, with both scarp and counterscarp galleries supplemented by a caponier A surmounted by a mediaeval guerite tower. The chemin des rondes B, carried all round the keep, appears to be peculiarly useless. The mound itself is a species of ant heap, containing casemate accommodation, magazines, and stores. Conceive such a fort subjected to heavy shell fire for days. After a few hours' bombardment, this so-called keep would, without any doubt, become a shapeless mound of earth, the section taking the form shown by the dotted line. The Infantry parapet would be levelled, and the garrison ensconced below would, if they ventured to emerge by their trap door C find no cover and reap no advantage whatever. The temptation to emerge, in order to spread out over a tumbled slope turned towards the enemy, would not be specially ' La Fortification du Temcs Preaent.' T24 FORTIFICATION. strong, and nothing could suit the purposes of that enemy so well as to find the greater part of the garrison buried in underground chambers, with few points of egress, which could be effectually sealed by two or three men with revolvers. Even assuming that the singlfe cupola remained intact, and could fire a round every three minutes, it would be utterly incapable of clearing the main work. If this is really the best form of keep open to us, we may well follow the French manual and condemn it, accepting the view of von Sauer and other German writers that the siege of Paris alone served definitely to kill this survival of the past. The drawbacks involved— complication, size, the undesirable depth of the work, bad interior communications and expense — are evident. The first requisite of a fighting position is simp'icity of conception, and the vagaries of drawing office Fortification constitute a positive danger in many cases. The section shown in Fig. i, Plate XXL, is that proposed for the front faces of one of General Brialmont's works, and is objectionable in all respects. The two-decker arrangement, with the Artillery in the upper tier, precludes the manning of the lower Infantry line while the guns are in action. The ■|-slope close in the rear of the Infantry line D would render it untenable under Artillery fire, since all fairly accurate shell would be caught and burst at the men's backs. This species of trench, to which the whole of the effective Infantry defence of the fort is confined, would be partially filled in and wholly knocked out of shape (as shown by the dotted line) by the shell fire of the attack, and would require constant recon- struction. To work on a slope turned towards the enemy is a hazardous operation even by night, while the cessation of the Artillery fire of the upper rampart would be further en- tailed. Finally, it appears that the only access to the Infantry line — about 120 yards long for each face— is at the salient. ASSAULTS. r25 The time and difficulty of filing the men out of narrow and dark underground passages, and spreading them along the line that they are intended to hold, or of getting them under cover again when the besieger's Artillery opened fire, may easily be iniagined. All such considerations, however, have little weight in the drawing office, where symmetry of plan counts for more than military fitness. One of the most important considerations with respect to a fort — regarded as a fighting position and not as a geometrical puzzle — is the necessity for simplicity of arrangement and conception. The first military essential is the possibility of retaining some hold over the garrison, of being able to get them rapidly into position when and where wanted, and of duly supervising them, especially under fire. Notwithstanding that the inadequacy of systems of Forti- fication into which iron protection does not largely enter is loudly proclaimed by a certain school, regular sieges are regarded with growing disfavour. The speed of the progress of events in modern war is incompatible with a Sebastopol, almost with a Plevna ; Paris and Metz only needed resources to have resisted indefinitely. Modern impatience of results is staggered by the prospect, and hence, naturally, there has arisen a school in Germany which loudly demands assaults de vive force. The French fortresses of to-day are a formid- able fact which cannot be ignored in any future Franco- German war, although some French writers appear to be so far afflicted with milinite on the brain as to decry the defences on which such vast sums have been spent. Pro- vided that these fortresses are properly found, that proper garrisons are available, and that officers qualified to command exist— all of which conditions were wanting in 1870 — great and costly efforts, implying a gain of invaluable time to the Republic, would be necessary for their capture. The vive 1 26 FOR TIFICA TION. force school proposes therefore — on paper— to shell them heavily and then storm, trusting to incomplete organization and general unpreparedness. There is little or nothing in military history to bear out the views of this school, and modern experience is entirely against them. Only one such attempt was made in 1870-1 — against the highly indifferent provisional works of Belfort ^ — and this failed completely. If, however, such a method of avoiding the delays occasioned by a siege is ever to prove successful the forts proposed by General Brialmont are well calculated to facilitate it A work designed on the principles of the Roman catacombs is suited only for the dead in a literal, or in a military sense. The vast system of subterranean chambers and passages is capable of entombing a brigade ; but denies all necessary tactical freedom of action to a battalion. The mere lighting of the underground communi- cations throughout a long period will be a serious, matter. To maintain any proper grip over the garrison will be practi- cally impossible, and unless it is composed of heroes, the difficulty of getting the men to the front when wanted will prove almost insuperable. No conditions can be more utterly unsuitable to short service armies. Even with supreme discipline and long and careful training, it is no easy matter to retain full hold over a ship's company in action ; but a ship, as a fighting position, is a simple affair compared to one of General Brialmont's forts, which conform as little to the requirements of war in conception as in detail. The "rare perfection" of the lines of Mainz in 1795, affords ample explanation of the fact that a garrison of 30,000 French troops surprised by two weak detachments was thrown into a " disorder that nothing could remedy." ^ ' Les Perches Redoubts^ See Plate VIII. ^ See p. 21. GARRISONS. 127 If these lines had conformed to the primary conditions of a fighting position, which they probably might have done at one-tenth the cost, the weak detachments would, doubtless, have been annihilated. The garrison was lost by its own defences. It is surely better to face a mad dog in the open than to encounter him in the Hampton Court Maze, and it is conceivable that a half company led by some Dundonald could secure the easy capture of one of these masterpieces of pure theory. The defences of the future must, on every ground, conform to tactical requirements in the smaller as well as in the larger sense. One point remains to be noticed. It is sometimes assumed that by the mere elaboration of defensive works, or by splitting up the garrisons into little driblets and putting them behind armour, a great saving in personnel may be effected ; and, further, that by increased expenditure upon fortification, inferior and half-organized troops may safely be employed. These, are merely specious pleas in vindication of technical extravagances. The necessary strength of garrison is ruled mainly by the length of line to be defended. The figures arrived at by Major Lewis, R.E.,^ on rational grounds go far to prove this proposition. For a perimeter of 45,000 yards defended by nine forts, ^;he estimated garrison is about 28,000 men, exclusive of the garrisons of the forts. It will be evident, therefore, that the permanent defences play a rela- tively small part in the calculation, and this must always be the case. The long lines of defence, which are necessitated by the conditions of modern war, are responsible for the large garrisons required, and all the cupolas in the world, all the elaborations of General Brialmont's fancy will not enable us to reduce them. ' ' R. E. Occasional Papers,' Vol. I., 1877. 128 FORTIFICATION. Nor is the garrison of the entrenched camp of to-day really greater than that of the old Vauban fortress. Plevna, it may be said, made a memorable defence in spite of its extem- porized works, because it held a Turkish army ; but Osman Pasha's garrison provided less than one man per yard of the whole perimeter, and not more than three men per yard were available for the defence of the front of 74- miles attacked by the Russo- Roumanian army on the nth September, 1877. Strasburg, with a full equipment of ditches, ravelins, counter- guards, &c., had in 1870 a garrison providing about \ man per yard for the whole perimeter, and 3-^ men for the front attacked. Thionville, with an elaborate bastioned mceinte by Vauban and Cormontaingne, had a garrison of |- man per yard and made a resistance of eleven days. Paris, in Sep- tember, had about 3^ men per yard (later about seven), Metz 5-^ per yard, and either would have made a far better defence if its garrison had been reduced by more than one half On the other hand, Badajoz in 1812 had about one man per yard and made a resistance of thirty days. : It is fully admitted that these figures give no really satis- factory standard of comparison where other conditions neces- sarily differ ; but they inculcate caution in assuming that mere technical refinements of Fortification can be substituted for troops. Even if M. Mougin's preposterous subterranean fort is accepted as the basis of the permanent defences of the future, it will be found that the total garrison required for an extended position thus defended will not be much affected by the courageous substitution of thirty engine drivers for a half battalion. If the standard of Fortification adopted is such as to render an assault hopeless — and this standard is now easily attained — no further elaboration of design, no extrava- gant employment of armour will enable a reduction of garrison to be made. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS. 129 CHAPTER X. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF MODERN FORTIFICATION. — SELECTION OF SITES. — EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY. — PLANTING. — MAGAZINES. — RANGE - FINDING AND OBSERVATION. — CHANGE OF TEACHING REQUIRED. The ground has now been cleared for the foundations of the Fortification of the future. No attempt will be made to lay- down rigid types, or to dilate upon the technicalities which, although generally within the comprehension of the most ordinary mind, are sometimes treated as the arcana of a cult. The principles of Fortification are simple ; their application is capable of being understood by any educated soldier. By exaggerating the mysteries of the science, the sense of pro- portion is dulled, and real military requirements are obscured in futile tricks of design. No other explanation can be suggested which will account for the failure, under the test of war, of elaborate fortification as compared with rude defences conforming more nearly to tactical needs ; for the obvious shortcomings which any careful examination of most of the costly works of the schoolmen discloses ; or for the fact that, after vast sums have been swallowed up in excavations and brickwork, all the essentials of a fighting position have been frequently found wanting. Organization, capable com- manders, efficient armaments, adequate supplies, matured preparations, well arranged communications — these things constitute the essence of the defence ; these determine the K 1 30 FOR T I PICA TION. resisting power of Land Fortification. Within broad limits the details of design are of relatively small account. The general principles which it has been sought to establish may be briefly summed as follows : — I. The basis of the defence of a position should be redoubts designed for Infantry and machine guns, supported by a powerful Artillery kept altogether outside of them, and sup- plemented by a field force carrying on the outpost duties and manning field defences guarding the intervals. Thus, unless siege trains are doubled, the Artillery combat must be entirely divorced from the attack of the Infantry positions, and the besieger, assuming him to have silenced the guns of the defence, will then have to recommence action against the redoubts. The latter alone, in conjunction with the field defence of the intervals, will amply suffice to render the position incapable of being taken by assault, while the function of the defender's Artillery will be twofold — ist, to effectually counteract the fire of the besieger preparatory to an assault ; 2nd, to delay the operations of a formal siege indefinitely, or to prevent them altogether. The assumption involved is that a position held by strong permanent redoubts supplemented by field defences can now fully guarantee the safety of the guns, which, therefore, can be allowed a freedom of action and of choice of site hitherto denied them. This assumption appears to be abundantly justified by the experience of war. 2. The Infantry redoubts should be of the simplest form compatible with fulfilment of the following conditions : — a. Full development of lifle and machine gun fire. b. An efficient obstacle. INFANTRY REDOUBTS. 131 c. Shelter for the whole garrison, which should not exceed a half battalion ; such shelter implying pro- tection against the heaviest projectiles capable of being fired from siege ordnance, but not contempla- ting the fall of successive shells on the same spot. In cases, such as the defences of the North-West frontier of India, where a heavy siege train of the European standard could not possibly be employed, the amount of protection to be provided can be proportionately reduced. d. Unimpeded interior communication, allowing the garrison to man the works in the shortest time. e. Invisibility. Under the directions of Major-General Sir A. Clarke, then Inspector-General of Fortifications, a redoubt was constructed in 1886 as part of the defences of Chatham, in which these conditions have been fulfilled to a great extent. This work, which includes casemates built in concrete, was completed by contract labour in thirty-one working days. The time could have been considerably reduced, and the cost of such a work, constructed under pressure for a garrison of 200 men, would be less than ^^3000. The existing redoubt is completely in- distinguishable from its surroundings at moderate range, and, as subsequent experiments at Lydd have proved, it would require a prohibitory expenditure of ammunition to cause any great damage to it by Artillery fire. 3. Full development of rifle fire implies the abolition of traverses (which in works of the type advocated ai-e practically useless), and the employment of machine guns on light carriages which can be rapidly run into position. Although K 2 132 FOR TIFICA TJON. the machine gun is generally regarded as specially suitable for the armament of the flanks of a work, it should be capable of being used at any point along the whole line of parapet. The power of employing field guns on the flanks of a redoubt should also be retained. Traversed flanks are quite un- necessary where there is no permanently mounted armament ; but to ensure the greater invisibility of the flank regarded as a possible mark for the besieger's artillery, the front face or faces might perhaps be prolonged as shown in Fig. 4, Plate XXII. The obstacle can be carried on in front of the pro- longation of the faces, the command of these prolongations being gradually reduced so as to secure the invisibility of the work, and avoid masking the flank, the parapets of the prolongations being abandoned before the fire of the flanks came into play. The eff'ect of this arrangement would be that the flank as a possible target for the besieger's Artillery fire must practically cease to exist ; while the absence of all per- manent armament will leave little inducement to employ such fire against the work. The trace of the redoubt is a matter of small moment provided that the maximum of shallowness compatible with sufficient fire from the flanks is secured. No advantage whatever is gained by laying out the trace of any permanent work in straight lines. In field works, rectilinear traces are justified by their greater ease of execution where time is an object. Curved traces, or at least well-rounded angles, should be employed in all permanent defences. 4. An unclimbable sunk fence and a strong permanent entanglement combined with a parapet en glacis as shown in Fig. I, Plate XXII., constitute the most formidable obstacles which can be created. Assuming the invisibility of the work to have been properly secured, such an obstacle is practically unattackable by Artillery fire, and could be counted upon k OBSTACLES. i33 until the last stages of a formal attack. If the belief in a revetment, as the only efficient obstacle, is too deeply rooted to be abandoned, the section shown in Fig. 2, Plate XXII., might be adopted. Land mines can be employed at the foot of this counterscarp, or a suitable growth of low prickly shrub might suffice. These forms of section will not, however, suit all sites, and a ditch of the ordinary form may have to be employed. Such a ditch should be narrow and the parapet sloped as evenly as possible down to the cordon of the escarp (Fig. 3, Plate XXII.), which need not be more than 9 feet high. The exterior slope should be as fiat as possible, and be planted with any strongly growing shrub which does not easily catch fire. Such a revetment can, of course, be breached — theo- retically — but if the invisibility of the work has been secured the task will become extremely difficult ; while the besiegers' Artillery will find sufficient employment for its full activity in endeavouring to keep down that of the defence, before commencing to attempt to injure the works. A good obstacle should be placed on the top of the counterscarp, covered by the glacis. A strong hedge cut down to a level slightly above the crest of the glacis, as shown, would be very effective. An advanced glacis covering another line of obstacles can be employed if the ground admits. The glacis should be planted with trees, which can be felled when required and interlaced to form abatis, while the roots and stumps will effectually impede sapping. The bottom of the ditch should be planted, paths being left to enable the growth to be clipped and kept under control. Sub-tropical plants, such as the prickly pear and Spanish bayonet, are admirably adapted for this purpose. Hand grenades charged with a high explosive may form part of the armament of the re- doubts where an ordinary ditch is employed. It need hardly 1 34 FOR TIFICA TION. be pointed out that all attempt to equalize diblai and remblai in accordance with the principles laid down in the text books should be abandoned in the case of these redoubts. There is no necessity whatever to exaggerate the ditch in order to procure earth which can be more economically obtained by scraping any adjoining field. Among the lessons which may be drawn from the series of experiments annually carried on at Lydd, two stand out in strong relief, ist. For all works exposed to shell fire, sand or light soil should be employed as much as possible. This is a venerable precept thoroughly established in the American War,' strikingly reaffirmed at Alexandria, and now perhaps beginning to receive general acceptance. 2nd. Flat slopes oifer marked advantages, especially in resisting fire at comparatively low angles. These practical lessons should be applied as far as possible. 5. Casemates should be provided under 2. parados, as shown in Fig. I, Plate XXII., or may be in part placed under the front parapet as shown in dotted lines. In either case, ample means of quick access to the front parapet must be pro- vided. Arches, with about 4 feet of concrete under 4 feet of earth, will suffice for security against individual shells ; or a flat concrete roof may be formed upon railway bars or steel decking.^ A greater thickness of earth favours shell effect ; a less thickness does not smother splinters so effectually.^ The • See ' Report on Siege of Charlestown,' by General Gilmore. 2 Splinters liable to be detached after the roof has been severely shaken, are thus prevented from falling and the concrete is better held together. (See Lydd Experiments of 1888.) ' It is probable that greater protection may be obtained by disposing the concrete in two layers with an intervening stratum of sand, the upper layer serving to break up and burst common shell. Experiments on this point are still wanting, raninly on account of the difficulty of obtaining hits in target practice. CASEMATES. i35 rear of the casemates should be closed by splinter-proof walls only. The Lydd experiments clearly show that such case- mates would require an immense expenditure of ammunition to breach them even under the conditions of target practice. The real protection of the casemates, lies, however, in the Artillery fire of the defence, and in the extreme difficulty of carrying out aimed fire against them. Each casemate should have its own exit closed by a bullet-proof door, and it is advisable that the casemates should communicate with each other along the front. All attempt at placing barracks in the redoubts should be given up. A fort is solely a place to fight in, and discomfort must be accepted. Provided that the casemates are dry, and that sufficient water-storage, as well as cooking facilities are provided, the remaining conveniences of the barrack can be dispensed with, especially since the garrisons would be kept outside of the redoubts as much as possible. No special magazines need be built in the redoubts, the small-arm and machine gun ammunition being divided among the casemates and the recesses. 6. The line of parados containing the shelter casemates will follow that of the front parapet. The foot of its front slope should be planted with a thick hedge, which will to some extent prevent the earth being thrown forwards by bursting shells. A central covered communication, provided with an exit on each side, should lead to the front parapet. This will facilitate the relieving of sentries, and shorten the time required by the garrison issuing from their shelters to man the work. This covered communication will also serve for bringing up machine guns to the front parapet if required. In rear, between the gorge and the casemates, there should be sufficient space to parade half the garrison. The gorge entrance may be simply treated as shown (Fig. 4, Plate XXII.) 1 36 FOR TIFICA TION. It must admit of carts being brought along the line of the rear of the casemates, and of field guns being brought up to the flanks if desired. 7. Invisibility ^ will be secured by the low command, by absolutely I'ejecting the smoothly turfed slopes to which we have become accustomed, and by carefully arranging that the extremities of the works, seen from the front, do not clearly mark its position as is usually the case. Further, in the absence of a suitable natural background, the planting of a belt of trees at a short distance in rear of the work will greatly promote its invisibility and also serve to conceal movements of troops and stores within the defender's lines. 8. The parapet of the redoubt should have a concrete revetment 2 ft. high (Fig. i, Plate XXII.), to which a 2 ft. 6 in. concrete banquette should be added. The low revetment will serve to mark out the trace of the work after bombardment, to provide numerous recesses for small-arm ammunition and to act as a base for bullet-proof shields if employed. The small banquette will assist in preserving the level of the parapet, when repairs due to bombardment are being carried out. On the flanks, the banquette can be sunk slightly so as to give to the Infantry the usual 4 ft. 6 in. of cover, while preserving the necessary level of the gun terreplein. 9. In choosing sites for the redoubts, all idea of securing ' In 1884, during the operations in Madagascar, the French in Tamatave fort intermittently shelled the Hova camp, doing " little damage to the defences. On one occasion only, where a Hova officer, when constructing a new work, exposed its situation by carelessly clearing the trees and exposing the newly turned soil of the exterior slope, did the French obtain the correct range for their shell fire. T/ie officer who committed this fault was placed in arrest and degraded in rank " (Captain Oliver). Similar treatment of the authors of self-advertising works in other countries would have conferred a great boon upon Fortification. INTERVALS. i37 good Artillery positions should be abandoned, the object being merely to select points where purely Infantry keeps would be most advantageously posted. An extended field of fire in front of the redoubt is not essential, and in many cases the sites might, as at Plevna, be drawn back from the brow of a hill. Provided that the slope in front can be well observed from some other portion of the line of defence, the Artillery will effectually take charge of it, even in the event of a formal attack. lO. The Infantry redoubts proposed must generally be more numerous than the detached forts of the usual types. The present average intervals are as follows : — Strasburg ...... 3S40 metres Cologne ...... 3600 „ Verdun 4500 „ Toul 5000 ,, Epinal ...... 4500 >> With the intermediate spaces defended by field works (mainly constructed as part of the preparation of the fortress for defence and held by the field force), the intervals of the proposed Infantry redoubts may be about 2500 yards, but will necessarily depend principally on the conformation of the ground. Where there are good Artillery positions falling within the sphere of protection of the Infantry keeps, larger intervals will be permissible. Thus, in the case of very extended lines where the ground ofiers marked tactical features — ^as round Paris — the defences would lose the character of a continuous chain, and consist of detached groups of Infantry i-edoubts guarding strong Artillery posi- tions. The principle of Fortification advocated is therefore a greater dispersion of the defence, thus following the analogy of field tactics, with less practical objection. 1 38 FOR TIFICA TION. 1 1. The Artillery of the defence should be entirely movable, with the exception of a proportion of heavy howitzers or mortars constituting the only permanently mounted armament. It should be sought to overpower or exhaust the Artillery of the besieger by superior mobility, better observation and range-finding, more highly matured organization, and greater power of tactical surprise, rather than by superiority of shell power. At the same time, full advantage should be taken of the possibility of employing a few heavy, permanently mounted howitzers or mortars in concealed positions. The heaviest ordnance for direct fire would, therefore, consist of 5-inch breech-loading guns, or a more powerful wire gun of about equal weight. Simplicity of armament being a matter of great importance, it is advisable to employ only two types of gun, merely supplementing the heavier weapons by field Artillery. The latter will before long be of the quick-firing class, and no advantage will be gained by employing in addition any other gun, except in order to gain a definite increase in mobility. The 3-pr. quick-firing gun or some equivalent piece may, however, be added, and retained in reserve for use in the later stages of a formal attack. For indirect fire, three types of ordnance should be employed. («.) A permanently mounted lo-in. or i2-in. mortar; {b) The heaviest howitzer or mortar which can be easily moved about ; (iT.) A light quick-firing riflied mortar of about A\'^^- calibre. The two former would be the mainstay of the Artillery defence, and, if properly handled, should remain nearly intact to the last. The latter would be available against an assault, and also to act against the approaches of a regular siege. 12. The guns of the defence having been freed from their ill-assorted union with the detached fort, it becomes possible to select the Artillery positions with considerable latitude of ARTILLERY ARMAMENT. 139 judgment. For the direct fire section of the armament, visual conditions and conformity to the general line of defence adopted impose certain limitations of site, but leave a wide margin of choice. On the other hand, for the indirect fire armament, observing stations which can be held to the last are the main necessity, and there remains a still wider field of selection — more especially since the fortress can employ captive balloons without difficulty. The Infantry redoubts may in many cases serve as observing stations for the Artillery of the defence, but will require to be supple- mented in accordance with the conditions of the ground. 13. The employment of advanced defences of field type, which is now more than ever important to the defence, is at the same time more than ever practicable. Thanks to the modern rifle and machine gun, the self-defence of such out- lying defences can be rendered so strong that preliminary siege operations will have to be undertaken against them. They can be utilized as observing stations by which the scope of action of the indirect fire of the defenders can be widely extended ; while they can, by this means, be provided with powerful Artillery support. The portable cupola (Plate XIV.) armed with a Maxim machine gun may find useful employ- ment in such advanced defences, since it possesses the advantage of protecting its personnel from all small arm and shrapnel fire from the works in rear. Finally, if the high-angle armament of the defence is raised to the standard now necessary, and if the organization necessary to its full action has been properly carried out, the occupation of these advanced defences by the besieger should be almost impracticable. They have, in fact, become at the same time more difficult to capture and far less likely to be valuable when captured, and they may, therefore, be employed 1 40 FOR TIFICA TION. without regard to some of the restrictions which formerly existed. This is a distinct tactical advantage, which the defence can derive from a practical recognition of the possi- bilities of modern high-angle fire. 14. A ceinture railway connecting the redoubts, and at the same time serving as a continuous Artillery position for guns mounted on trucks, is an ideal arrangement worth bearing in mind, but frequently impracticable. Railway lines may, nevertheless, be utilized with great advantage in order to increase the mobility of the heavier portion of the armament. Where the lie of the ground permits, a group of Artillery positions may well be thus connected. The guns should be mounted on travelling carriages capable of being transported on trucks. A disappearing mounting (Plate XVII.), permitting the guns to be fired from a truck, presents some attractions, but involves certain draw- backs. The employment of the disappearing principle has the double advantage of rendering the gun invisible except at the moment of firing, and of rendering the recoil more gentle in its effects upon the mounting. On the other hand, the guns are tied down to the railway and could not be used except in positions to which the latter admits of movement. The only ordnance at present tried with this mounting appears to be a weak 1 20-mm. gun, but there is no doubt that a piece of such high power as the S-inch can be thus mounted and that the necessary stability can be obtained, even without the employment of special methods of laying the rails and special holdfasts. The conditions become somewhat more difficult to fulfil if it is attempted to fire the gun from an ordinary travelling carriage mounted on a truck, since the recoil is more difficult to deal with. On the whole, however, it would seem best to use the railway for transporting ARTILLERY POSITIONS. 141 purposes only, and to lay the line close up to the rear of the emplacement, adjusting the levels so that the gun can be run off and placed in battery in a few minutes. The railway can then be laid in the simplest way, and its repair is an easy matter, while guns thus treated need not be confined to permanent emplacements, but can be mounted anywhere as circumstances require. 1 5. The best Artillery positions for direct fire having been selected, good road communication connecting them with each other and with the interior of the fortress should be made. Where the ground allows, railway lines should be added, duplicating the principal roads. These lines will convey the guns direct into certain selected positions, whence they can be run off the trucks into the emplacements pre- pared for them. If the ground prohibits anything of the nature of a ceinture railway, the guns might still be run into selected emplacements on lines radiating from the centre of the position, and each emplacement thus approached by railway would be the centre of a group of emplacements communicating by road, so as to allow of a rapid change of position of the guns. Where railway lines cannot be employed, the communications will all be by road, and the guns must be transported into position on their travelling carriages. 16. The main principle guiding the Artillery arrangements should thus be a liberal provision of alternative emplace- ments both for the heavy movable armament mounted on high carriages and also for field guns. The main security of the fortress Artillery must be sought in invisibility and change of position. The road or railway following the general line of the Artillery position should be sunk sufficiently to conceal all movements completely. A thick hedge will materially 142 FORTIFICATION. assist in securing invisibility ; but, in the close vicinity of the emplacements, it may be necessary to provide more than visual protection to enable the guns to be withdrawn for a time into comparative safety if they have attracted a con- vergent fire. The front of the Artillery positions should be protected by entanglements, and a parapet en glacis, organized for Infantry defence and to be manned at need by the field force, must also be provided in the more exposed portions of the position between or on the flanks of the gun emplace- ments. This parapet will also assist in covering the lateral lines of communications. Machine guns will be specially valuable in aiding the protection of the Artillery position at a great economy of persomiel. The more important emplace- ments and the communications should be made as part of the permanent defences of the fortress, and the lines of hedge should be planted. The Artillery platforms should be kept in store to be laid when required, but holdfasts should be fixed. In addition to the gun positions thus provided for, the defence should be prepared to make a large use of temporary emplacements in the event of attack. Such em- placements would be of siege type, but would have the great advantage of permanent communications and, in some cases, of a covering mass ready to hand. The result of this treatment of fortress Artillery must be to transfer to the besieger some of that bewilderment which has hitherto been the prerogative of the defender. As the Artillery positions need rarely be fully completed until the fortress is prepared for defence, the besieger will be unable to commence operations with any definite plan of action. The forts, the usual objectives, will be so no longer. It will need a vast expenditure of ammunition to injure them, and if the siege batteries are laid out with this object, the fortress Artillery will find the game their own. TREES. 143 17. The indirect fire armament would be mainly kept in second line, and, as a rule, need have no protection other than that offered by invisibility and the power of movement along good communications. Concealment will be sufticiently secured by the features of the ground and by belts of trees. The heavy permanently mounted howitzers or mortars might be posted in rear but outside of the flanks of the Infantry redoubts which would serve as their main observing stations. 18. Belts of trees, planted at 200 or 300 yards in rear of the general line of the position, will not only supply a back- ground both to the Infantry redoubts and the Artillery positions, immensely enhancing their invisibility, but will effectually conceal the interior of the defenders' lines. Pro- vided that good through communications are made, such belts will not impede offensive action, while their outer edge can be rapidly prepared for defence, and held by the field force as a second line if required. It is obviously undesirable and wholly unnecessary to girdle the position with a continuous line of obstacle. Wide openings must be left to facilitate offensive action. Belts of trees will, however, effectually conceal the positions of such openings from the front. In advance of the line of defence, trees should be planted wherever they would impede the occupation of ground which cannot well be embraced by the observing stations and brought under fire, direct or indirect. Admitted that they will provide the besieger with useful firewood, they will, nevertheless, if cut down to a height of 2 or 3 feet above the ground and entangled with wire, entail much labour in clearance. The glacis of all the Infantry redoubts and of the intermediate lines should be thickly planted with trees. 1 44 FOR T I PICA TION. to be cut down when the fortress is prepared for defence, thus ensuring a great impediment to sapping, and providing the materials for a strong advanced obstacle. 19. The main magazines should be placed outside of the town, on the radial lines of communication, and behind the line of defence, concealed by natural cover if possible. De- centralization being desirable, a large accumulation of powder in one spot should be avoided, and the more carefully the communications have been laid out, the greater may be the dispersion. The magazines should correspond to the sections into which the defences are divided for purposes of command, and be placed upon the lines — rail or road — of radial com- munication. Cartridges packed in damp-proof cases can be stored anywhere. Expense cartridge stores for the Artilleiy positions would, therefore, take the form of mere recesses, permanent or temporary, in the vicinity of the emplacements. Accommodation for at least two days' heavy firing should thus be provided for, and the replenishment of the recesses by night would offer no difficulty if the system of communi- cations has been perfected. Shell would be always kept filled when the fortress was prepared for defence, and stored in the open. 20. Range-finding and observation are vitally important to effective Artillery action, and provided that the organization has been perfected they combine to confer a definite advan- tage upon the defence. By means of back-laying, the principles of position-finding can be applied to guns on travelling carriages as easily as in the case of racers and graduated arcs. Good maps and a liberal supply of range boards prepared on some simple plan, such as that proposed FORTS D'ARRtT. i45 by Lt.-Col. O'Callaghan, R.A./ must be provided. Careful study of the ground will enable the sites of the observing stations corresponding to the several Artillery positions to be selected. Where it is desirable to maintain a station in advance of the line of defence, one of the portable cupolas (Plate XIV.), modified by the provision of openings affording a good field of view, might be employed. It could easily be rendered inconspicuous, and if armed with a Maxim rifle- calibre machine gun, would be able to defend itself to a certain extent, while effectually protecting its inmates from the rifle and machine-gun fire of the works in rear. The more impor- tant observing stations should be connected with the Artillery position by telephone wires laid underground. The telephone is, however, open to some objections, and a dial arrangement indicating yards "over," "under," "right," "left" might be provided, which would satisfactorily meet the requirements. 21. In the above paragraphs, the case of fortresses or places of arms which can be surrounded by a ring of defences has been dealt with. The general principles advocated will, however, be applicable to Forts d^arrit. It may occasionally be necessary to occupy an isolated hill-top — to create an Ehrenbreitstein or a Fort Bard. Even so, unless the site is exceptionally restricted, a decentralization of the defence, the divorce of the Artillery positions from the Infantry keeps, and a full utilization of high-angle fire should be striven for. In place of a single elaborate and expensive fort, two or three small Infantry redoubts guarding the Artillery position ' Lt.-Col. O'Callaghan proposes to use a map mounted on a board with a radial arm carrying a scale, pivoted at the point corresponding to the gun emplacement. On the map all prominent objects visible from the position are dravpn as actually seen. This plan appears admirably adapted to fortress range- finding. L 1 46 FOR TJFICA TION. will usually suffice. If the site is very restricted, and can be surrounded so that the garrison is chained to its works, more extensive casemate accommodation will be required, with greater thickness of over-head cover. The shallow trace must be modified, and a continuous ring of good obstacles will be needed. The principles above laid down remain unchanged, however, while the Fort cfarrit will frequently have the advantage that its neighbourhood offers few good Artillery positions for the attack, that formal siege operations are Impracticable, and that heavy howitzers or mortars need not be provided against. 22. If land Fortification is not an absolute anomaly in England, since the command of the sea implies, now as always, security from invasion, and must be retained on peril of national effacement, at least the problem of defence is greatly simplified. The standard above laid down is un- necessarily high. The great siege trains of the Continent, which railways alone can transport and feed, have not to be reckoned with. Much may safely be left for execution until the emergency arises, and an organization carefully matured in peace would suffice to render any extensive creation of permanent works completely superfluous. The time has surely arrived for definite decisions upon the principles which are to rule the land Fortification of the future. Vagueness of thought is to be avoided, if only on account of the mental demoralization it induces. We must make up our minds ; and, as a first step, a revolution in the teaching of the science is essential. In a course of study in steam engineering, a reverential allusion to " Puffing Billy " and the " Rocket " is a natural concession to the claims of history — but it suffices. The INSTRUCTION. H7 student is not called upon to learn the fortuitous dimensions of these elementary machines, nor expected to draw them from memory. They are not put before him as ideals, but as mere links in the chain of scientific evolution. Instruction in Fortification — ironically so-called — sometimes proceeds on opposite lines. The cadet is brought up to regard the so- called Modern French and Polygonal systems as the basis of Fortification, the ideals to which the science must conform as nearly as possible under the altered conditions of war. He ought to be strictly forbidden to waste his time in learn- ing useless forms, proportions, and dimensions. He actually finds a whole examination paper monopolized by them.^ As a result, his conception of Fortification is vitiated at the outset, and bastioned fronts, machicoulis, &c., arise by the banks of the Nile. Teaching must be based on tactical principles alone, and the cadet must be taught to regard the masterpieces of Vauban as mere special applications — be- lieved to be satisfactory in their day — of those principles. When this is done, there will be every hope of sound progress, and of reaching a fair general concensus of matured opinion. The principles which it has been sought to lay down require in their practical application a higher standard of organization both of men and materiel than has usually been accorded to the defence. Fort building is not necessarily Fortification, and lavish expenditure upon non-essentials can never atone for the absence of real preparation for war. The very elaboration and cost of the conventional defences have tended to induce neglect of real requirements, and to foster the dangerous belief that any troops, commanded in any fashion, will suffice as garrisons. While, therefore, the tactics ' e.g. an examination of July, 1887, at the Royal Military Academy, and others. L 2 1-48 FORTIFICATION. and organization of the attack have received much study, the conduct of the defence has been too generally left to chance, and the opinion of Frederick the Great,- that everything depends upon the genius of the commander, rarely finds practical recognition. It is necessary to withdraw Fortification from the dim realms of occultism into the light of common sense ; to fling mere theory to the winds, and to seek a basis in the teaching of war alone. Then will the science emerge from the clouds of uncertainty which have too long obscured it. The principles which it has been sought to lay down may be expressed in few words. The Fortification which has given the most brilliant results in the past has been that of the soldier, not the Professor. Take the best of that Fortification, and carefully preserving all that conferred such great advantages upon it, add everything which time, both for labour and for thought, renders possible. A Plevna thus completed, properly armed and fully organized, will fulfil all the requirements of defence ; and, whatever may be the advances in the weapons of attack, can never become either so hopelessly inadequate, or so difficult to renovate, as now are most of the masterpieces of the schoolmen. ' &^ footnote, p. 2r, COAST DEFENCE. 149 CHAPTER XI. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COAST DEFENCE. — • CHANGES IN PREVIOUS PRACTICE NOW NECESSARY. — SUMMARY OF METHODS OF MOUNTING GUNS. Coast defence involves two distinct sets of considerations which should be kept entirely separate. In the first place, it is necessary to lay down the required standard ; the number and maximum calibre of the guns ; the strength of garrison required to resist probable attack. Into this question a variety of matters enter, of which by far the most important is the relative naval strength of the Power to be defended by coast works, with respect to that of the Power, or combination of Powers, to be met. The primary datum can, therefore, be fixed only by responsible statesmen : it is a political rather than a naval or military matter. To an empire constituted as is our own, naval supremacy is the first condition of existence, and if this condition is not fulfilled, coast defences are practically useless. They may postpone for a brief period ; they cannot avert the final catastrophe. The whole teaching of war clearly proves that serious naval operations against an enemy's coast — blockades, the movement of expeditionary forces across wide tracts of sea, the deliberate attack of fortified ports — are practicable only to the Power which holds and can retain the command of the sea. It follows that the necessary standard of the coast defences of a great Naval 1 50 FOR TIFICA TION. Power differs widely from that entailed upon a nation which must contemplate decided naval inferiority in war. In 1870-71, for example, the coast defences of France were absolutely useless. From the very nature of the case they could play no part whatever. If, however, Italy were to base her war preparations on the probability of a single-handed struggle with France, she would evidently be justified in adopting a high standard of coast defence. Many other considerations are involved in the fixing of the standard. The power of fleets in relation, to coast batteries can only be estimated correctly on the condition of careful study of the teaching of the past, a thorough grasp of the fighting poten- tiality of modern ships of war, as well as of their disabilities, a wise reading of the real significance of peace experiments, and the possession of the indefinable quality which can justly appreciate the value of diverse factors and deduce sound generalizations. Even when a general standard has been laid down, geographical considerations remain, in the varying distances of ports from the possible enemy's base. It would evidently be irrational to place the harbours of Australia on the same footing as Hong Kong, or to create a Malta at Table Bay, or Esquimalt. A standard having been laid down, it is necessary, in the second place, to consider how to mount the required arma- ment to the best advantage ; and, while conferring the fullest scope of action upon Artillery fire, to protect the guns themselves and the personnel as far as possible. Of these two distinct sets of considerations, the first is of national importance, since a mistaken standard means either a great waste of public money on the one hand, or risks which no great nation should accept, on the other. The second, which comes more properly under the head of Forti- fication, is dealt with in the following pages. CHA NGES IN CO AS T DEFENCE. 1 5 1 The science of coast Fortification may perhaps be defined as that of distributing and mounting guns of various natures to the best advantage, in securing which a compromise has to be effected between two somewhat antagonistic conditions : — 1st, the offensive power of the gun should have its fullest scope ; and, the protection given to the gun and detachment should be the maximum, compatible with the first condition, and with reasonable economy. These are no new principles ; yet, in applying them in future, wide deviations from previous practice are necessary. Great coast forts, such as South Hook, Popton, Hubber- stone, Carlisle and Camden, covering a considerable area, and provided with barrack accommodation of every kind, will hardly be repeated in Great Britain at least ; while interior keeps, certain to be the first portion of the works to suffer under fire, will certainly be omitted. Future coast defences will take the form of dispersed batteries or emplacements, either provided with comparatively slight gorge defence, or protected by a field or provisional redoubt commanding their dispersed emplacements. The reasons for the change are mainly two ; — ist, the breech-loading rifle, aided by the machine gun, has rendered comparatively slight earth- works, when supplemented by obstacles, eminently defensible against a ship's landing party ; 2nd, the modern war ship has few men to spare, and operations ashore involving great risks are now less likely to be undertaken than formerly, while landing under fire is one of the most formidable of military operations. Coast batteries can rarely be required to stand a land attack of the nature of a siege, and have, in fact, seldom been so designed. A force provided with siege guns would have made short work of South Hook, even when it was new ; while the vast ditches of Carlisle and Camden are calculated 1 5 2 FOR TIFICA TION. to resist an attack the very possibility of which implies the previous loss of all that these forts are intended to defend. In any case, the gorge of an independent coast battery must either be defended, directly or indirectly, against the attack of a mere landing party unprovided with siege Artillery, but possibly disposing of light field guns ; or it must be made as strong as the front of a land work. No intermediate measure of protection appears logical. A Power which contemplates a position of decided naval inferiority in war must protect its more important harbours against an expedition equipped for operations ashore ; and such harbours should have land defences, permanent or provisional, on which their sea defences would ultimately depend. The coast batteries of the future will, therefore, as a rule, have comparatively little permanent gorge defence, and less barrack accommodation. In this there is a simplification of the problem of coast defence, which is much more apparent than real. Of pure Fortification, in the old sense, there is little left ; but, in the many complications of Artillery detail, yearly increasing ; in the adjustment of the delicate compromise between mutually incompatible advantages ; and in the adaptation of works to sites with a view to obtain concealment, there remains an ample field for genius. Moreover, with the increase of range in attack and defence, and the great diversity in draught, armour, armament, and general fighting capabilities of modern vessels of war, there has come increased difficulty in siting coast guns to the best effect. The chart must be studied more carefully, and it is more than ever necessary for the engineer to be able to look at questions of coast defence from the purely naval point of view. After a step by step advance, dating from the introduction of rifled guns, Artillery has taken a decided leap in the intro- METHODS OF GUN MOUNTING. 153 duction of the long breech-loader, which all the Great Powers are manufacturing at a rapid rate. A large revision of the defences of the Empire at home and abroad has thus become necessary. The fortifications of the more important coaling stations are nearly completed ; those of the commercial ports cannot be long delayed, while the fortresses and naval Ports are undergoing a partial rehabilitation and rearmament. It will not be out of place, therefore, to consider the question of the protection of heavy guns in the light of such experience as is forthcoming. All methods of gun mounting, existing or proposed, may be classed under three heads : — 1. Complete material protection, limited only by the size of a port, to detachment, and to gun during loading. 2. Varying protection against direct fire. No bomb- proof overhead cover. Detachment more or less protected from machine gun and shrapnel bullets in various ways. 3. Gun completely protected during loading by being lowered. The following is a brief statement of the advantages and disadvantages of the methods severally included in the above groups. Examples of their practical application are instanced ; — Group i. a. Shielded Casemates. — Two tiers, Picklecombe, Garrison Point. One tier (see Fig. 3), Bovisand ; Thames and Medway defences ; Hurst Castle ; Seaforth ; Forts Tigne and Delimara, Malta. V »5i FORTIFICATION. Scale aV inch = I foot. Fig. 3.— Section of Casemate Battery. Single Tier. Advantages. Complete protection to mounting and detacliment against tlie heaviest projectiles, limited only by the thickness of shield adopted, the strength of the masonry in which the shield is fixed, and the size of the port. Complete protection against high-angle fire. Perfect -protection against machine-gun fire and shrapnel, except at the port. Disadvantages. Cost entails crowding, of guns, which is inadvisable in several respects. Always offers an ideal target, especially in the case of a two-tier work. Target increased by massive overhead protection which is not required, and by pre- senting a vertical face to front attack ensures the maximum effect to projectiles. Liable to cumu- lative damage at long range. Is most effectively attacked by the same projectiles which the ship requires to engage armour afloat. Port usually limits elevation of guns. (At Garrison Point the heaviest guns have the least range.) Lateral range of individual guns limited. Field of view restricted for aiming purposes. Difficulties arise from powder smoke. May now be regarded as obsolete, b. Curved Front Shielded Casemates. Gibraltar, Sliema Fort, Malta. King's Bastion, Advantages. See above. Large field of fire ; curved form incidentally unfavour- able to penetration, except to nearly direct hits. Shield provides uni- Disadvantages. See above. The port which is not in use is a source of weakness. A single shell entering thej'e would almost certainly disable the gun. METHODS OF GUN MOUNTING. 155 form protection to casemate except Time is lost in traversing from on the flanks where it is set in port to port, and, consequently, masonry. there is difficulty in following a moving object. c. Continuous Iron Front. — Two tiers, Horse Sand and Neman's Land, Spithead. One tier, Spitbank, Plymouth and Portland Breakwater Forts ; Fort Cunningham, Bermuda. Advantages. Complete and uniform protec- tion, except at port, against pro- jectiles of all sorts, limited only by thickness of armour adopted. Over- head protection. Closest approxi- mation to a broadside ironclad. Disadvantages. Costly ; crowding of guns there- fore inevitable. Usually a con- spicuous target. Elevation and training limited. Field of view restricted for aiming purposes. If penetrated, it is possible that two guns could be disabled by a single projectile. Practically a copy of a "broadside ironclad, lending itself therefore to attack by the same projectiles. d. Gruson Battery. — Langliitjensend, German defences oft Baltic and North Sea. Advantages. Protection ver)- complete. Curved form favourable to deflection of projectiles. Economy overwrought- iron or compound armour claimed, but possibly not sufficiently estab- lished. Requires the occurrence of several hits in a small area to pro- duce much result. Port reduced to a minimum.^ Disadvantages. Costly. Guns necessarily crowded, thus giving to the attack a con- siderable margin in direction of fire. Individual segments proved to be capable of being broken up by repeated hits. Probably some- what cramped. Lateral range of individual guns limited. Field of view restricted. e. Non-recoil Gun. — System tried by Krupp in 1877-78 with guns of 15 and 15 '5 cm. Never adopted in this form ' The Griison system of mounting with a muzzle pivot is probably applicable to any form of turret or cupola, and is a matter altogether apart from the question of cliilled cast-iron armour. 156 FORTIFICATION. Advantages. Perfect protection (except to muzzle of gun) limited only by thickness of armour adopted. Disadvantages. Inapplicable to heavy or high- powered guns. A single hit at or near muzzle would jam gun. Whole weight ha.s to be lifted or lowered in aiming. Training limited. f. Turret. — Dover, sole English example ; Fort Milutine at Kronstadt. Advantages. Complete protection, limited only by thickness of armour and size of port. Curvature unfavourable to penetration. Relatively small tar- get. All round fire. Two guns combined in one protection. Over- head protection against shrapnel and splinters. Conning tower affords wide field of view for aiming purposes. Proved to work satis- factorily on board ship. g. Cottipound arnioured Cupola. 1885-6. Advantages. See Turret. Conical curvature specially unfavourable to penetra- tion. Can be worked by hand power (12 men in the case of the 10 •4-inch gun used at Eastbourne.) Lends itself to dispersion. or Possi- Disadvantages. Excessively costly. Steam hydraulic power required. Pc bility of jamming perhaps not yet fully realized. Not well suited to colonial conditions generally. Somewhat conspicuous. -Tried at Eastbourne in Disadvantages. See Turret. Some difficulty in rapid fine laying, if traversing is done by men at a distance. In- terior space much cramped. Some- what conspicuous as a target. Il- logical, unless affording protection against a single hit from the most powerful gun likely to be brought against it ; in this case, probably requires steam power for working. h. Griison Turret. — German defences in the Baltic and North Sea. Defences of Holland. Spezzia. Advantages. See Turret. Cast iron allows any curvature of form. Economy claimed. Disadvantages. See Turret. A segment several times hit will break up ; the de- struction of a segment would seriously affect whole turret. Some- what conspicuous. METHODS OF GUN MOUNTING. 157 Group 2. a. Open Battery with Shields (see Fig. 4). — New Tavern Fort. Some works at Gibraltar. Scale ^ inch = i foot. Fig. 4. — Section of Open Shielded Battery with Overhead Covers. Advantages. Great front protection, as merlon can have unlimited thickness of earth. No exposed masonry re- quired. Can be rendered fairly inconspicuous. Disadvantages. Difficulty in affording adequate support to the shield, which can have only side and bottom abut- ments, while the top is unsup- ported. Angle of training limited. Elevation to some extent re- stricted. No proper overhead cover, since the latter as usually pro- vided, is probably useful against shrapnel and splinters only, and by adding to the height of the target increases the danger from heavy common shell. Now obsolete. b. Open Battery with Earth Embrasures. — South Hook, Milford Haven. Defences of Marseilles. All the heavy gun batteries at Alexandria except Meks. Advantages. Cheap. Lends itself to disper- sion. Can be rendered very incon- spicuous as a target. Fair protec- tion against machine-gun fire, at least till much of embrasure is destroyed. Protection easily cap- able of repair. Great flank pro- tection can be given. Disadvantages. Embrasure necessarily weak at the neck. If gun is on a low carriage, detachment exposed to shrapnel and machine-gun fire after neck is destroyed. Hori- zontal angle of fire limited. '58 FORTIFICATION. c. Barbettes. — For breech-loading guns (see Plate XXIV.). Stone-cutters Island, Hong Kong. For old type guns, with bonnettes. Isle of Grain Fort ; without bonnettes, Inchkeith, Harding's Fort and Europa Hutment, Gibraltar. Advantages. Angle of fire unlimited unless bonnettes are employed. Lends itself well to dispersion. Can be rendered inconspicuous as a target, if properly treated. Well suited to breech-loading guns on moderately high sites, or where ships cannot close. Cheap. Disadvantages. Gun itself necessarily more or less exposed. If not bonnetted, specially exposed on flanks, where it offers a broadside target. In the case of low sites, under-cover loading almost absolutely essential, in order to give protection to detachments against machine-gun fire ; but very difficult to arrange in the case of larger natures of R.M.L. guns. In sideloading, there is a considerable expenditure of power in traversing the gun, and when traversed, the latter proffers a broadside target. d. Light Cupolas. — Practically a barbette mounting on a turntable, and provided with shrapnel and machine gun protection. Never adopted. Advantages. All round fire. Good protection against shrapnel, splinters, machine-gun fire. and Disadvantages. Armour probably sufficient to catch and burst shell which would otherwise be harmless. Crest pro- tection to glacis equal to that of a turret probably required to lessen risk of jamming. Cramped interior space. Applicable only to B.L. guns. Possible difficulties as to sighting. Untried at present. e. Breech Hoods with Barbette Guns. — Hoods are being provided for upper deck guns on board ship. No present example on coast defences. Bullet proof shields of various forms are, however, being provided for barbette guns (see Plate XXIV.). 5 METHODS OF GUN MOUNTING. 159- Advantages. See Barbettes. Good front pro- tection against machine-gun fire and shrapnel to loading numbers and breech action. Possibly ad- ditional protection against a hit by a heavy projectile at a small angle. Disadvantages . See Barbettes. Applicable only to B.L. guns. Lateral protection nil, unless angle of training is com- paratively small. Shell otherwise harmless, may be burst by the hood. Untried at present for land service. f. Barbettes, with turntable and horizontal splinter proof shield ; loading performed at elevation, the breech being depressed through an opening in tJie shield — (Plate XXIII.) Adopted for H.M.S. Collingwood, and more recent barbette ships. No example in the case of shore guns. Disadvantages. Requires power to raise breech into firing position. Muzzle and chase of gun always exposed. Untried at present for land service. Advantages. Excellent protection to loading numbers. Gun offers a small mark diuring loading. Can be rendered fairly invisible. Protection equal to that of a turret, obtained at much less cost. Comparatively small weight to be moved for traversing. All round fire. Group 3. a. Moncrieff Counterweight Carriages. — Flatholme, Laver- nock, Popton, Hubberstone, Newhaven, Carlisle, Camden. Advantages. Excellent protection to gun and detachment, except to former at moment of firing. Laying per- formed under cover. Can be ren- dered absolutely invisible except for the short time the gun is up. Probably highly economical when range of fire and degree of protec- tion are considered. b. Hydro - pneumatic Carriage. — Successfully tried with 6-inch, 8-inch (Plates XXVI. and XXVII.), 9-2-inch, and Disadvantages. Unsuitable to new type guns.. Carriage necessarily somewhat complicated. Weight increases rapidly with that of gun. Possibly inapplicable to larger guns than lo-inch M.L. of i8 tons. Has been applied to no gun heavier than 9-inch of 12 tons. i6o FORTIFICATION. lo-inch B.L. guns in this country, and with a 13* 5-inch gun in Italy. Largely adopted in new coast works. Advantages. See Counterweight Carriage. Addition of a horizontal or turtle- back shield confers great overhead protection. Well suited to guns on low sites. Practically unattackable by ship's fire. c. Counterbalanced Disappearing Carriages. stantine at Kronstadt. Disadvantages. Requires special care in main- tenance. Difficult to repair. Fort Con- Advantages. See a and b above. Gun can be sunk as low as desired below crest of parapet. Gun can be worked simply en barbette if desired. Disadvan tages. Both gun and platform have to be raised and lowered. Steam power essential for rapid firing. Probably costly and somewhat complicated. At present apparently applied to ii-inch B.L. long guns. Not much known as to success of working. d. Floating Platform. — Tried with 6-inch B.L. gun at Trow Rock, Tynemouth, in December 1887. Not adopted. Advantages. Invisible and well protected in loading position. Cost would prob- ably increase in a low ratio as the weight of gun increased. Gun can be worked simply en barbette if desired. Disadvantages. Very costly in the case of light guns. Slow in action, entailing long periods of exposure. Com- plete circular pit essential. Over- head splinter-proof shield cannot be applied. Injury to crest of pit would probably suffice to disable the working. Apparatus incapable of being used in cold climates. e. Balance Pillar (Plate XXVI 1 1.). — Constructed at Elswick, and successfully tried with 1 2-pounder quick-firing gun. Advantages. Disadvantages. Gun completely hidden from Somewhat costly. Probably in- view and well protected till re- applicable to guns heavier than the quired. Easily raised and lowered. 4^7 Q.F. EXPERIMENTS WITH ARMOUR. i6i Other methods of protection might have been instanced, but the above may perhaps be accepted as a complete cate- gory of types under which all mountings adopted, or likely to come into use, may be classed. The methods of iron protection above enumerated can scarcely be said to have as yet stood the test of war, The shielded casemates, cleverly extemporized during the American war, cannot be taken as fair specimens of their class, nor can the experience gained with the American monitors be considered of value in estimating the effective protection conferred by a modern turret or cupola. The 5j-inch armour of the Huascar's turret was, however, hit three times by 9-inch Palliser shell in her action with the Blanco Encalada and Almirante Cochrane. The turret was twice penetrated, and a shell burst on the deck below without preventing it from revolving. Further, there have been few experiments made under even approximately service conditions, with the exception of those carried out at Shoeburyness against two shielded casemates in 1865, and against two iron-fronted casemates in 1868.' Important trials of experimental shields were also made in 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870. Three shots were fired at the turret of the Royal Sovereign in 1867, and two shots at the Glattons turret from the Hotspur in 1872. The guns employed against the shielded casemates were lo-inch of 12 tons, 9-22 inch of the same weight, 8-inch and 7-inch ; against the iron-fronted casemates 12-inch of 25 tons, lo-inch of 18 tons, 15-inch S.B. of 19 tons ; against the Royal Sovereign 9-inch ; and against the Glatton 12-inch of 25 tons ; so that as indications of what might be effected by the far more powerful guns now afloat, the results of these experiments need much qualification. ' See a paper by Colonel Inglis, R.E., ' Professional Papers,' Second Series, Vol. XVIII. M 1 6 2 FOR T I PICA TION. The maximum effect of a projectile of given weight, material, and velocity, against a wrought-iron plate, can be predicted with some accuracy. The effect on compound or steel plates is less certainly known. Of all methods of pro- tection, the continuous iron front perhaps lends itself best to the test of piecemeal experiment. Whether the armour can keep out a given projectile can be ascertained by the experi- ence gained with individual plates, and there remains only some uncertainty as to the effect of a heavy shell striking just at the edge of the port, while the result which could be obtained by a shell after penetration, is more or less a matter of conjecture. All the other cases — masonry and iron case- mates, open shielded batteries, turrets, cupolas — present certain doubtful features. Any one might chance to receive a hit, the effect of which cannot with certainty be predicted. On the other hand, earth batteries have been tried over and over again in the past, were frequently tested under the fire of heavy smooth-bores and rifled guns in the American war,' and have recently been severely tried at Alexandria under conditions extremely favourable to the attack. With respect to works of this class, therefore, we occupy a somewhat different position, and possess fairly satisfactory data from which to form conclusions. As to all other methods of protection we are still more or less in the dark. Reasoning cannot well be divorced from mere speculation, and in some respects it would be extremely useful to make a few practical experiments. Such experi- ments would be necessarily costly, however, and some- what dangerous from the exaggerated deductions to which they may give rise, while the great difficulty of keeping the results secret in England is possibly a further argument against them. ' At Fort Fisher most especially (see p. 47). EVOLUTION OF COAST DEFENCES. 163 CHAPTER XII. EVOLUTION OF COAST DEFENCES — DISAPPEARING PRIN- CIPLE — BARBETTE PRINCIPLE — ADOPTION OF BREECH- LOADING SYSTEM — REDUCTION OF METHODS OF MOUNTING — GENERAL STATEMENT OF PROBLEM. Passing over the period when the early guns were mounted in castles, such as St. Mawes at Falmouth, and active defence had not begun to assert itself, the earliest form of coast battery was probably a low barbette, the guns simply firing over a wall or bank. Examples of such batteries are still scattered round our coasts, and are occasionally used for saluting purposes. The invention and development of shell fire soon tended to produce a higher front protection, and the embrasure both in earth and masonry arose, the latter usually involving a stone or brick fort, with casemates such as those largely constructed in the United States. The fort, trying to compete with the ship in volume of fire, would some- times have two, three, or four tiers. The Spithead forts were originally designed for four tiers, and were also intended to mount guns on the top, while thei'c is an existing three- tier stonework at Kronstadt.^ Great crowding of armament thus arose. The development of penetrative power which the rifled gun attained, led naturally to the adoption of iron shields. ' The Russians appear to have been the greatest exponents of this system, and the Sebastopol woilcs probably exercised a definite influence over our own later coast defences. M 2 1 64 FOR TIFICA TION. and works of the Bovisand, Popton, Hubberstone, Hoc and Darnet type were constructed, the double tier being retained in some cases, as at Picklecombe and Garrison Point. The desire to imitate the ship further, gaining still greater protection and this of a more uniform nature, produced the continuous fronts at Spithead, Plymouth, and Portland. Finally, still following the ship, a cramped advanced site, exceptionally heavy guns, and the desire to realize complete protection combined with an all round fire, produced the Dover turret. Meanwhile, however, the expense and other disadvantages of the stone and iron method naturally directed attention to alternative modes of protection. As early as 1835, Colonel de Russy of the U.S. Army, invented a carriage in which the gun was rolled to the rear on eccentric wheels and lowered. In 1868, Major King, U.S. Engineers, invented a counter- poise carriage which was successfully tried with a 15-inch gun firing a 450-lb. projectile with loo-lb. charge. About 1871, Colonel Moncrieff also reduced the disappearing principle to a practical shape, and succeeded, in 1873, in overcoming great difficulties with rare energy and mechanical genius. In spite of the highly favourable report on the counterweight carriage for the 9-inch gun of 12 tons, this mounting can hardly be said to have been introduced into the service — there are only two existing examples ^ — and practically the principle is restricted to guns not heavier than the 7-inch of 7 tons. The best example of the application of this principle is at Flat- holme (Severn defences), where the emplacements are fairly dispersed, and well concealed. These emplacements are, as far as protection is concerned, quite as satisfactory as when they were first built. The worst instances are at Popton and ' At Newhaven. EVOLUTION OF COAST DEFENCES. 165 Hubberstone (Milford Haven), where the pits are built up in a row on the top of stone and iron casemates, and at Newhaven, where one of the 9-inch guns is mounted in a species of demi-Martello tower. In these cases, the value of the Moncrieff system has been gratuitously reduced to a minimum. The rapidly increasing cost of this mounting in the case of larger guns led Colonel Moncrieff to the design of hydro- pneumatic carriages, which are represented in principle by the disappearing mountings constructed at Elswick, and suc- cessfully applied to 6-inch, 8-inch (Plates XXVI. and XXVII.), 9" 2-inch lo-inch and 13 • 5-inch B.L. guns. Up to a certain point, therefore, the maximum possible of material protection appears to have been the object aimed at in gun mounting. At the same time, the great cost of invul- nerability of this class rendered other modes of protection necessary under a variety of circumstances, and open batteries and barbettes have not only never altogether disappeared, but have been largely constructed. The French who have never been committed to wild expenditure on coast defences, have steadily abstained from constructing armoured casemated batteries, and the great majority of their guns are mounted en barbette. For fairly elevated sites, this form of mounting, on account of its rela- tive cheapness and wide angle of fire, has always found favour, and the application of this principle in all ^ the French battle-ships and armoured cruisers, in the Italia, Lepanto and three subsequent Italian vessels, as well as in our Im- p&ieuse, War spite and the Admiral class of battle-ships,^ ' Except the Hoche ; the eight remaining turret vessels of the French Navy are classed as "Coast Defence " ships. In the Italian Navy, the Duilio and Dandolo are the only turret ships. '^ Of the eight new battle ships under construction only one is to have turrets. i66 FOR TIFICA TION. certainly points to this method of mounting as Httle Hkely to be abandoned in the future. In the T^m&aire, England took the lead in applying the disappearing principle to a ship of war. The rapid development of machine and quick-firing guns has tended to increase the minimum of height above the sea-level prescribed for barbettes, to add to the height of front parapet, and to bring methods of undercover loading into prominence. The heaviest English guns mounted — the lOO-ton R.M.L. at Gibraltar and Malta — are in barbettes, fire over a high parapet, and have a complete system of under-cover loading, so that the gun alone is exposed to direct fire. The breech-loading system is now an accepted necessity, and it is to the tardy recognition of this necessity that England owes much of the difficulty which has beset her Artillery progress. It is a necessity brought about by the demand for length of bore, and is practically one of the direct results of the great advance in the manufacture of gunpowder. Breech-loading, originally condemned on the grounds of com- plication, and because an unsatisfactory breech action had unfortunately been adopted, "■ is now virtually the simpler system in the case of the larger guns ; since the difficulty of providing an effective and convenient under-cover loading arrangement for long muzzle-loaders will hardly be overcome. It is doubtful whether any better system can be devised than the so-called " protected ^«rfe«^" applied to lO-inch R.M.L. guns in New South Wales, as well as to the only two long M.L. guns^ which will ever be built; but the inherent objections to this system are sufficiently apparent. ' The Krupp system with no great modification has, in Germany, held the field for thirty years. ^ io'4-inch M.L. proposed to be mounted in the Isle of Wight. OLD TYPE R. M. L. GUNS. 167 Although no more heavy R.M.L. guns will now be built, the great number in the service cannot be expended, and the time at which all these guns will have been eliminated certainly does not fall within the range of necessary prevision. Under special circumstances, the muzzle-loader may even be claimed as the most suitable weapon, and although it is impossible to admit that the handling of the breech-loader is beyond the powers of local or coloured troops, it may never- theless prove, that in certain distant tropical stations where no Imperial troops are maintained, the new type breech- loading guns will require an amount of care and attention to ensure efficiency, which they cannot with certainty receive. Moreover, there will be a gradual withdrawal from the Navy of R.M.L. guns which, if they are polygrooved and mounted so as to elevate up to about 25°, will be sufficiently powerful to warrant their adoption for land service in many cases where very accurate long range fire is not required. The same guns, if utilized for high- angle fire up to 70°, will form a most valuable adjunct to modern coast defences. In this country, when once the pendulum has been started its swing is always apt to be too violent, and the contempt with which the old muzzle-loading guns are sometimes regarded, has no foundation in fact or reason. At the ranges at which ships can effectively engage coast defences, these guns are still efficient, as Alexandria would have shown, if there had been any artillerymen capable of handling them properly.^ The disabilities of the old type armaments arise principally from the difficulty of giving cover to the personnel ' Of about seventy-five hits received by tlie ships only five can be with certainty attributed to the rifled guns, thirty were due to smooth bores, and not one of the remaining forty hits may not have been similarly obtained. The Egyptians were in fact unable to secure any real advantage from their heavy guns, and appear to have fought the action mainly with smooth bores, which were not even provided with sights or elevating screws. 1 68 FOR TIFICA TlON. and from the misconceived works to which some of the guns have been condemned. Looking to the future, it seems clear that the number of possible methods of mounting may be much reduced. After the results of the experiments carried out at Shoeburyness in May and September, 1884, it is certain that stone and iron casemates will never be repeated. As regards existing works of this nature, the main question now is whether they can be rendered moderately efficient at a reasonable cost ; or whether they should not be swept away bodily in order to render good sites available for batteries fulfilling modern conditions. Open shielded batteries (see Fig. 4, p. 157) are certainly obsolete ; since it is clear that a heavy shell striking, as shown, would bring down the " over-head cover " on the gun, and that, in the absence of this protecting mass, such a shell might be harmless. The counterweight principle is inapplicable to long breech-loaders. The protection of new heavy guns in coast defences may at once be reduced to the continuous armoured front, Griison battery, turret or cupola, barbette of some form, disappearing mounting, or open battery with earth embrasures. Under exceptional circum- stances, such as the very high sites available at Gibraltar, guns may be mounted practically in the open. The general problem is somewhat complex, and may be stated as follows : — The maximum present power, offensive and defensive, of the attack may be assumed as known. This power, in the immediate future, may be foreseen with toler- able accuracy. The geographical position of a given port with respect to an enemy's possible base of operations may place certain limits upon the attack, and thus materially affect the scale of necessary defence. Considerations more or less speculative, indicate the minimum number and powers of the shore guns required to successfully resist an attack of GENERAL CONDITIONS. 169 given strength. Economical considerations, more or less in- exorable, usually tend to reduce that minimum. A study of the chart shows the water over which the fire must be distri- buted, and enables some judgment to be formed of the probable tactics of an attacking squadron. How are shore guns to be sited, and how protected so as to give the maximum offensive power combined with the minimum of vulnerability ? There are here a sufficient number of unknown factors. Relative vulnerability is excessively difficult to determine, and is, to some extent, a matter of pure conjecture. More- over, vulnerability, in itself dubious, has to be balanced against offensive power, also in many aspects a matter of debate. The possibilities of the future must not be left out of account, nor can local considerations be altogether neglected. At a station far beyond the reach of telegraph — Diego- Garcia for example — where the advent of a roving squadron would perhaps be the first announcement of the outbreak of hostilities, it is evidently necessary so to mount guns that they are sure to be available at the shortest notice, and a steam-driven turret would here, at least, be clearly inadmissible. The complication of the problem is, however, not fully stated yet. Submarine mines have grown up as an adjunct — virtually an excrescence — of harbour and river defence. There has been no real attempt to assign their proper relative position in a scheme of defence. Opinion differs widely as to their value and fitness for the requirements of the ports of a great naval Power. It might be argued with some force that, granting time for laying them out, mines would in certain cases permit a reduction of heavy gun-power. At least, it seems rational to suppose that, if mines have the value which is sometimes ascribed to them, their presence or absence 1 70 FOR TIFICA TION. must have some influence upon the necessary strength of armaments. In addition to fixed mines, fast torpedo boats constitute a factor of which the attack must take account, at least in night operations ; while locomotive torpedoes have almost passed the experimental stage, and submarine boats are making progress. Finally, the Zalinski pneumatic gun, firing large charges of high explosive will probably supersede all locomotive torpedoes at present designed, and may in many cases replace submarine mines with obvious advantage. Were expense a matter of indifference, a continuous armoured front, or a Griison battery, for guns needing only a small angle of training, and a turret or cupola for all- round fire might seem to leave nothing to be desired. In the first place, however, it is not certain how much protection of this class would have to be provided. Improvements in powder and projectiles may give to the guns of the future greater penetrative and destructive power than could now be obtained with the same weight. It is in the direction of greater penetrative power (i.e., of offensive power against protection of this class), that gun progress is obviously moving. To oppose to the ship shore defences as closely as possible resembling herself, is in one sense to favour the attack, since the same guns and projectiles which the ship must carry, in view of a naval action, will be precisely the kind best suited for dealing with such shore defences. It is clear that we cannot build such batteries every ten years on all the more important sites, and it would probably be im- possible to strengthen a Griison battery subsequently, and difficult to add to the armour of a turret or cupola. What measure of strength shall we decide upon ? Moreover, to limit the range of our guns in future by the size of a port is not to be thought of; small ports and muzzle TURRETS. 171 pivoting become inevitable, nearly the whole weight of the gun must be lifted or lowered in laying, and steam or hydraulic power soon becomes necessary. With a turret or cupola, the necessity for driving power is still sooner reached. There is, perhaps, no insuperable objection to thus following the example set in the modern ship of war, which has been committed to exaggerated guns. But to do so clearly intro- duces a new set of risks, inevitable for the ship until more rational views as to necessary gun-power prevail, but which should be avoided in the shore battery as long as possible. As long as a gun can possibly be worked by hand, there is evidently a powerful argument against further complications of any kind. Turret or cupola must be full of machinery which a single man who chanced to lose his nerve might damage beyond the possibility of immediate repair. There is also a certain measure of a risk of the turret or cupola being jammed by a lucky shot, for although the Hotspur failed against the Glatton's turret in the round fired with this object, the vagaries of a fired projectile, with the high velocities now attainable, defy calculation, and it would be unwise to assume complete immunity from this risk on the grounds of a single experiment.-'- It would hardly have ' On this question Colonel Inglis pertinently remarks, referring to one round fired at a turret target at Shoeburyness — " The projectile, -which struck close to the bottom of the target, turned in the direction in which it felt least resistance, and passed vertically down into the earth. It is probable that a similar result, which would threaten fatal injury to a turret, was just avoided in this trial (that of the Glatton) by the graze on the glacis giving the shot such direction as disinclined it to turn downwards on entering the armour." .... " To have made the experiment at all complete, the turret ought to have received a shot directed at a point on its side some few feet away from the centre as viewed from the gun." Until this and other points "have been more thoroughly tried, it cannot be said that our information on the subject of either land or ships' turrets is as complete as it ought to be." (' R. E. Corps Papers,' Vol. XXI., 1873.) It is to be feared that our knowledge on these points is still decidedly imperfect. It is perhaps worth noticing that Mr. Anderson, C.E. 172 ' FORTIFICATION. been expected that a lo-inch Palliser shell striking the un- armoured portion of the Inflexible at Alexandria, would turn straight up and pass out through the deck. The chances were apparently much greater that this projectile would turn down and pass through the ship's bottom. Further, there must always, especially at distant foreign stations, be a certain amount of danger of these elaborate fighting machines being found wanting at the critical moment from carelessness, ignorance, or neglect. A turret or any gun worked by power must, practically, be always in commission, and cannot come home periodically for repairs and inspection like a Benbow. Again, the seaman-gunner lives in close proximity to his gun and learns to know it thoroughly ; while every ship of war carries a highly-trained staff of engineers and artificers. These conditions are always difficult to fulfil on shore, and impossible in the case of an Artillery possessing an organization so radically defective as our own. Practically, however, expense is anything but a matter of indifference, and although Italy has provided a huge Griison turret for the defence of Spezzia, we certainly shall not adopt similar measures. Nor are they necessary, or even desirable. (now Director-General of Ordnance Factories), stated (R. U. S. Institution, 25th April, 1884), " My belief is that the turret (Dover) would be so damaged by a single 16-inch shell, that it would be impossible to work it any more." " The energy of one of the bolts of the Inflexible striking, say, at 2000 yards range, would be represented by the whole of the Dover turret, which weighs 750 tons, rising i5 feet into the air. Is it conceivable that no derangement would result from such a blow ? " FIRE FROM SHIPS. 173 CHAPTER XIII. THE FIRE OF SHIPS— CHANGE OF CONDITIONS— COMPARI- SON OF WEIGHT AND VOLUME OF FIRE BETWEEN OLD AND NEW SHIPS OF WAR — EFFECT OF RANGE — SFAX — ALEXANDRIA — SEARCHING EFFECT OF SHRAP- NEL — AUXILIARY ARMAMENT OF SHIPS — MACHINE- GUN FIRE, ALEXANDRIA, INCHKEITH — QUICK-FIRING GUN, INCHKEITH. The whole question of the choice of modes of protection will be found, on consideration, to be closely bound up with the views which may be taken as to — 1. The probable accuracy and volume of fire of ships. 2. The probable effect of shrapnel and common shell. 3. The probable effect of the fire of quick-firing and machine guns. In adopting the barbette, open battery with embrasures, or the disappearing principle, certain risks are obviously accepted. Is it worth while for the sake of some great advantages to accept these risks ? To this very important question different answers will doubtless be forthcoming, since few agree on the measure of the risk, and the three points above-mentioned, invite speculation. If a ship can, at frequent intervals, hit a barbette gun, or plant a shell faii'ly in the neck of an embrasure at moderate ranges ; if every heavy projectile which strikes a parapet 174 FORTIFICATION. will plough its way through and burst in the battery, barbettes and embrasures stand condemned. If the ship can drop the bullets of heavy shrapnel at a considerable angle of descent over the crest of a battery, overhead cover of some sort is universally indispensable. If she can, with reasonable cer- tainty, throw common shell which, striking a little short of the crest at a descending angle, will blow in the retaining wall on the gun and detachment, iron protection in some form would seem to be inevitable. If, guided by a momen- tarily defined smoke-puff, she is easily able to land shells on an invisible horizontal target, the range of which cannot be exactly ascertained, the disappearing principle becomes ques- tionable. Finally, if the ship cannot do these things now, is there any reasonable probability that she will shortly be able to do so ? Here is evidently a wide field for speculation. The record of ship's practice is carefully kept ; but the enormous target employed for prize-firing (40 feet by 15 feet), while possibly representing an obsolete fort, precludes the formation of any real idea of the chances of hitting dispersed and well-con- cealed guns. The maximum range also is only 1600 yards, so that the fact of such a target being ever missed with the accurate guns of the present day sufficiently proves the difficulty under which the ship labours. In practice from similar guns on shore, these conditions would be ridiculous. Experimental firing against targets bearing any resemblance to well-designed shore batteries is unfortunately rare. We have practically only the experience of Alexandria on which to build, and the easy victory obtained by the ships, makes it all the less likely that the lessons of the action will ever receive sufficient attention. There are some essential differences between a naval attack on shore defences now and at the time of Algiers. FIRE FROM SHIPS. 17S Then the vessel enormously outmatched the shore batteries. A line-of-battle ship, with sixty-six guns to her broadside, was superior to almost any single battery. A fleet was immensely superior to a fortress. Where the coast works were open, the ships could pour in an almost continuous hail of shot and shell. There was room for plenty of wild shoot- ing, and yet there would be plenty of hitting, while the continuity of fire was demoralizing in the extreme."^ Even in much later days the United States Fleet poured 45,000 shot and shell into Fort Fisher in two successive bombardments, the rate of fire on the first occasion being given as 1 1 5 projec- tiles per minute. It is not surprising that the return fire was very ineffective, and soon practically ceased, notwithstanding that the damage caused to the Fort was comparatively trifling. Again, in the days of wooden ships the ranges were com- paratively short.^ At Acre, the ships were quietly allowed to take up their assigned stations at from 600 ta 700 yards from ' Even thus the ships did not invariably show a marked superiority over coast works unless the ranges were short. Such facts as the following are not without significance at the present day. In July, i8o5, Sir Sidney Smith, "with the Pompie, an 80-gun ship, the Hydra, Captain Munday, and another frigate, anchored about 800 yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and protected from assault by a tower in which were twenty-five French soldiers." " The line of battle ship and the frigate fired successive broadsides till their ammunition was nearly expended, the battery continually replying with slow but destructive effect. The FoiiifA; at which ship alone it directed its fire, had about 40 shot in her hull ; her mizt-n topmast carried away ; a Lieutenant (Slessor), a midshipman, and live men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer .... capitulated. It then appeared that the carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure, so that in fact the attack of an 80-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single piece of ordnance."— 'Journal of Sieges in Spain,' Major-General Sir J. Jones, R.E. ^ At Copenhagen it was a matter of complaint that the pilots would not accept the responsibility of taking the ships nearer than 400 yards. 176 FOR TIFICA TION. the defences " before a shot was fired from the garrison." At Algiers, the Quee7t Charlotte, bearing Lord Exmouth's flag, was brought within 50 yards of the mole, and here also the enemy made the extraordinary blunder of allowing the ships to take up their fighting positions unmolested. The days of short range were advantageous to the ship, inasmuch as the details of the work attacked could be well made out, the damage being inflicted was better seen, and the fire could be better directed. Moreover, mines and fast torpedo boats were non-existent, and, if a ship could be laid alongside a shore battery — a course our naval commanders always strove to adopt — she could crush the latter by sheer superiority of metal and rapidity of fire. Conditions are now completely changed. The single ship will rarely have a real preponderance of armament over the modern first line battery. The fortress will far more nearly approach the fleet in weight of metal. Thus, the Dup^rr^ carries only four 46-ton guns in her barbettes, and fourteen broadside J-i-inch guns utterly unprotected. The Inflexible has but four 80-ton guns and eight 20-prs. These two ships together would hardly be a match for Fort Milutine at Kronstadt. The whole fleet engaged at Alexandria opposed eighty heavy guns to thirty-six on shore : but, on the one hand, the shore guns could not all be simultaneously em- ployed, while, on the other hand, the actual gun power of the broadside iron-clads must be halved. Compare the broadsides of the Inflexible and an old three- decker. With four 80-ton guns and four 20-prs., the former ship can deliver 6,880 lb. of iron at a single discharge. With forty-eight 32-prs., seventeen 8-inch guns, and one 68-pr., the latter delivered 2,556 lb. The 80-ton guns require five minutes to load, and the 20-prs. perhaps half-a-minute, the broadside of smooth-bores could be delivered in about one COMPARISON OF SHIPS' FIRE. ijl minute. Thus in five minutes the Inflexible fires 7,600 lb. of iron ; the wooden ship could fire 12,780 lb. The total number of projectiles in this time is, for the Inflexible, forty-four, and for the wooden ship 330, Dealt with in this way figures are not, perhaps, particularly valuable, and the above estimate is highly favourable to the Inflexible, since, the 20-pr. of to-day possesses much less relative value than the old 32-pr., and would have little chance of disabling a properly mounted heavy gun, while the Inflexible' s 20-prs. could not be served in face of moderately accurate shrapnel or machine-gun fire from the shore. . Omitting them, the proportionate rate of fire. between the two ships is as I : 82-5.^ Taking a. more modern ship, the Victoria^ launched in i887,' carries two i lo-ton guns in a turret, one lo-inch 32-ton gun, ^nd two 6-inch 5-ton guns, all unprotected. As minor arnia- ment she has twelve 6-pr. and nine 3-pr. quick-firing guns. Thus her total delivery of metal on the broadside in five, minutes amounts to 19,150 lb. ; or, omitting guns which are quite unprotected, only 3600 lb. The total delivery of pro- jectiles in the same time is about 584, including the small quick-firing guns which are effective only at moderate ranges. Excluding them, the total is thirty-four as compared with forty-four of the Inflexible, and 330 for the line-of-battle ship, but the former has four .well-protected guns, the Victoria two only. In any case, the importance of individual rounds is now enormously increased ; but it may fairly be doubted v/hether the possible destructive effect of a single projectile on well > Captain Fisher, C.B., R.N., basing his calculations on tonnage, and otnitting the 20-prs., arrives at the conclusion that it is now necessary to be 620 times as good a shot with the Inflexibl^s guns as with those of a line-of-battle ship ; or, in other words, that a miss is enhanced by this number as a multiplier. N 178 FOR TIFICA TION. designed works has been materially augmented. It is con- ceivable that a single lucky 8- inch spherical shell might have dismounted a single shore gun and killed or wounded all its detachment. A modern 1 6-inch shell can do no more in a properly traversed battery, may even effect less, since a modern gun and its carriage is a very substantial traverse against splinters, while it is open to question whether a line- of-battle ship, with sixty-six guns to her broadside, engaged at 500 or 600 yards, had not a decidedly better chance of obtaining such a hit than a first-class ironclad of to-day at 2000 yards. Comparing gun with gun, the accuracy of fire has immensely increased. Comparing ship with ship, the chances of hitting have probably diminished, notwithstanding that naval gunnery has greatly improved in the last thirty years. The ranges at Alexandria were somewhat long — less than half those adopted by the French at Sfax, however — but it is not certain that ships will gain a balance of advantage in future by closing with good shore batteries properly manned. They will, it is true, be able to bring their machine guns into action ; but the effect of the latter will be neutralized, in the case of breech-loading guns, by the protection provided, and by the fire of far better protected machine and quick-firing guns on shore. If the shore batteries consist of well-designed and dis- persed barbettes, with good cover for the detachments, the effect of the fire of the ship will in some respects actually diminish as she reduces her range. The chances of causing any injury to the interior of an emplacement will be much reduced ; the projectiles will arrive with no drop, so that all searching power is lost, and shrapnel becomes useless. The drawbacks to the ship will be the more pronounced as the elevation of site of the battery increases. Her one con- COMPARATIVE TARGETS. i79 siderable advantage is that being nearer, she has a better chance of picking out and inflicting a direct hit on the shore guns themselves. But a shore gun offers a very small front target, and if the guns support one another well, the ship will be unable to get a broadside shot at one barbette gun: without laying herself open to the close unreturned fire of another. The comparative targets of the single ship and single gun are enormously against the former, although the fact is far too little realized, especially by naval officers who have been accustomed to connect coast defences with target forts. If, however, the shore guns are properly dispersed, it is indi- vidual guns which the seaman-gunner must pick out and hit, in order to obtain any real result. In other words, if he is engaging the heaviest gun which need ever be mounted on shore, his whole target is much less than 07ie square yard in area ; if he is able to take the shore gun completely in flank, his target is considerably less than six square yards. If ships were occasionally practised at targets of these dimensions, the difficulty of silencing barbette guns would be more easily understood, and the Alexandria experience would need no explanation. In return for such an insignificant target as this, a first-class battle ship such as the Formidable (see Fig. 1 8, p, 238) offers on a broadside a target of more than 400 square yards, all absolutely vulnerable to any projectile capable of reaching her. No superiority in gunnery can possibly compensate for such odds as these, which moreover are greatly increased to the disadvantage of the ship by the perfect system of range finding now at the disposal of coast defences, and by the relative invisibility which can be con- ferred upon the insignificant target which guns on shore present. Practically, the ship will in some cases have little option N 2 1 8o FOR TIFICA TION. in the matter of range, on account of submarine mines and the possible action of fast torpedo boats ; while, in most cases, it is possible for the designer of the shore battery to fix the minimum range at which a vessel of given type can engage it. If the tactics adopted by the French at Sfax — boats at " a few hundred yards," gun-vessels at about 2,300 yards, ironclads at 7,000 to 4,300 yards — were tried against well-armed and well-fought shore batteries, the course to be followed by the latter is clear. First dispose of the boats with machine-gun fire and case, then sink the gun- vessels with common shell, treating them simultaneously with shrapnel, finally commence deliberate fire with armour- piercing projectiles and common shell at the ironclads. The three operations can be successively carried on with con- siderable security. It will need a vast number of rounds from the gun-vessels before a shore gun is grazed, and the ironclads will do no harm whatever to the defences. At Sfax, after a remarkably deliberate fire of 2,002 projectiles delivered under peace practice conditions, the " defensive power " of the place is , reported to have been " practically uninjured." Some facts drawn from the Alexandria action throw a strong light on the question of the accuracy of fire to be expected from ships. Meks Fort, a pre-historic work, armed with five heavy R.M.L. guns, nine S.B. guns, and five mortars, was engaged by the Monarch, Petielope, Invincible, and Thn^raire, for about three and a half hours. During one hour the Inflexible contributed a portion of her fire. The ranges of the three first-named ships varied from about 1,200 to 1,000 yards, that of the Thn^raire was 3,500, and of the Inflexible 3,800 yards. The Invincible and Thneraire were anchored throughout the affair. The guns of Fort Meks were practically all en barbette, the three heaviest of them firing ALEXANDRIA. i8t over a parapet 4 feet 8 inches high.^ During the action not a single gun was dismounted or disabled, and two only were touched by heavy projectiles, which just grazed them, leaving indents i;^-inch deep. One gun was knocked over by an 8-inch Palliser shell from the Penelope, fired at short range after the work was silenced ; when, therefore, there was no return fire, and no smoke enveloping the battery. The two grazes may of course have been similarly obtained. Altogether about 580 heavy and 340 light projectiles were fired at Fort Meks. Theoretically, of course, this work should have been silenced in ten minutes by the machine guns of the in-shore squadron alone. That Fort Meks was able to reply for more than three hours to the overwhelming fire poured into it, clearly shows that low-level barbette batteries, if properly built, can still be fought. If this particular work had been constructed in accordance with the most elementary principles of defence ; if the Egyptian gunners had been able to handle the rifled guns as well as they did the smooth-bores ; ^ and if the armament had been supplemented by a few machine and quick-firing guns on the flanks and in Fort Namusia above, the ships would have been defeated without any difficulty. Again, the Inflexible, at about 3,500 yards, partly at anchor and partly under weigh, engaged two " most troublesome " 8-inch guns in Fort Oom-Kabebe for about four and a half hours. She was simultaneously engaged with Fort Ras-el- Tin. The two Egyptian guns fired over 4-feet 3-inch sills in a straight parapet 5 feet 6 inches high, and were 36 feet apart without any intervening traverse. The whole sea- ' The parapet was not finished, and the interior wall projected nearly 2 feet above the existing level of the sand protection, thus making the conditions as unfavourable as could be conceived. ^ The Invincible was hulled fiiteen times, and the Penelope eight, in addition to receiving a round shot in one of her ports. 1 8 2 F€R TIFICA TION. front parapet of the work was hit nine times, the top of the counterscarp or glacis three times. The extreme hits were 120 yards apart. The face containing the two 8-inch guns was hit four times, three hits occurring on the superior slope, and one on the cordon of the scarp. The three hits on the superior slope made large craters, the shells bursting well.. One of theni blew in the revetment wall between the guns for a length of 1 2 feet and a height of 3 feet. Neither gun was touched except by masonry splinters. If these guns had been 9-inch or lo-inch old type muzzle loaders, manned by European gunners, the unarmoured portions of the Inflexible as well as her personnel would have suffered most severely, and her return voyage to port would have been extremely precarious. The cost of mounting these guns, including the thickening of the old parapet, may have reached ;£'ioo. In the whole action, in spite of the many advantages on the sides of the ships, the total number of hits on the parapets of all the works — i.e., on the superior and exterior slopes — was about one in nineteen rounds, excluding shrapnel and segment. Considering that a large proportion of these hits were on exterior slopes, and were practically thrown away, while the average was certainly improved by some short range practice after the works were silenced, the risk of a direct hit incurred by a barbette gun certainly does not appear to be excessive at moderately long ranges. In many respects the action at Alexandria supplies a wholesome corrective to views, based mainly on too wide a generalization from unsuitable data. Far too much accuracy has been expected from the fire of modern ships of war, and the expectation has been derived from practice at Shoebury- ness, and from the results obtained in experiments with siege guns. It would not have been impossible to cany out a ALEXANDRIA, 183 series of experiments in which ships should fire at extem- porized shore batteries under conditions as far as possible assimilated to those of service, the results being carefully- noted ; but such experiments were wanting, and exaggerated expectations were inevitable. The standard of accuracy attained at Alexandria was quite as high as there was any right to anticipate. Had the action been postponed one day, or had the ships been seriously injured, as they ought to have been if the Egyptians had understood how to use their rifled guns, there would have been a marked falling off in accuracy. Had the designs of the Egyptian works conformed to modern requirements, the results obtained would have been trifling in comparison to the number of rounds fired. The Alexandria aff"air teaches another lesson, extremely important to the defence. It is quite useless for ships to engage earth batteries by circling in front of them. They must either anchor or steam up to a buoy to fire, and the elliptic courses, which theory has delighted in prescribing, must be utterly given up where coast defences cease to proffer a target Turning to the question of the employment of common shell against earthworks, Alexandria also affords subject for reflection. Probably the most destructive result which can be obtained by common shell is a hit delivered with a descending angle a little short of the crest of a battery, blowing it in on the gun and detachment, and thus practically adding a shrapnel effect to that of common shell. At Alexandria altogether eleven such hits were obtained out of 1,620 rounds, 7-inch and upwards ; but many of these did not occur in front, or nearly in front, of guns, and in a well traversed battery would have been quite ineffective. With proper dispersion of guns — even without dispersion, if the batteries are well traversed — the chances of such a hit are 1 84 FOR TIFICA TION, simply insignificant, even at moderate ranges. Where the guns have a good command, such a hit can — as will be noticed hereafter — ^^only be obtained at very long range. Very effective results against men can be obtained by a shell which, with a descending angle (the larger the better), just skims the crest and bursts on it or a few feet in rear. Are the risks of such a hit excessive ? Large descending angles mean extreme ranges. -If a time fuze is used, the accuracy required is measured in hundredths of a second. If a per- cussion fuze is used it must be delicate and instantaneous, with a view of bursting on the crest, in which case it will be perfectly useless for purposes of weakening a parapet. If it does not graze the crest, it will, with all ordinary angles of descent, burst on the ground beyond too far away to produce any effect. This, of course, presupposes that the emplace- ment is open to the rear, as it should be wherever possible. A heavy common shell just clearing the crest of a complete circular pit' would catch the wall beyond and burst, probably kijling every man of the gun detachment, and unquestionably so blocking the emplacement that it might take hours to clear the gun platform. In numerous existing cases, guns have been inexcusably mounted close in front of walls admirably placed for increasing the dangerous target. Again, to burst a common shell in the air in front of an earth battery with embrasures, or a barbette with a high parapet, is practically useless. This was fully recognized in Admiral Porter's orders before the attack on Fort Fisher : — " All firing against earthworks when the shell bursts in the air is thrown away "...." A shell now and then exploding ' At Inchkeith, the back wall is actually heightened on the very centre line of the emplacement, thus greatly increasing the chances of such a hit. At Landguard Fort also the conditions are almost equally unfavourable to the defence. Complete circular pits unfortunately still appear to find admirers. PENETRATrON- OF PROJECTILES. 185 over* a gnn en barbette, may have a good effect, but there is nothing like lodging a shell before it explodes." It is doubtless an excellent thing to burst a shell directly over, a gun, but it would be interesting to know how many a ship would have to fire before obtaining such a result' Tables of penetration into earth and sand have found their, way into various text books with no words of qualification. It is hardly too much to assert that they are totally mislead- ing. Whatever may be the penetration attained in specially constructed butts, or arrived at by calculation open to objec- tion, it is now sufificiently established that parapets of earth or sand with exterior slopes will not hold projectiles so as to enable them to penetrate properly, At Alexandria the penetrations, judged from a large number of examples' were extremely slight The shells turned up at once and either ricochetted high over the works or were stopped and lay "on the superior slope, base to the front A l6-inch shell from the Inflexible, fired at under 2,000 yards range, was thus stopped after penetrating less than 20 feet of sand. As might be expected, this tendency to be immediately deflected is still more marked in the case of the new B.L. guns. At Eastbourne, an 8-inch B.L. Palliser shell fired at 1,193 yards gave a penetration of only 6 feet into a loam parapet with an exterior slope of one in two. At Lydd, the effect of three 9 •2-inch B.L. Palliser shells, fired at 1,200 yards against a similar parapet, was almost nil. It may be laid down, therefore, as an axiom, that the fire of a ship is altogether unable to breach or seriously damage a properly constructed parapet ; that exaggerated estimates of penetration must be modified, and that in works not liable to a land seige nothing is gained beyond a certain point by adding earth protection. The Eastbourne experiments further go to prove that shells bursting on a superior slope 1 86 FOR TIFICA TION. and causing craters which do not extend to the crest, effect no damage whatever in the interior of an emplacement. Shrapnel has proved to some minds a species of bugbear. The real effect of the 417 shrapnel and segment fired at Alexandria is difficult to estimate. Information from the Egyptian side could alone clear up the point. One gun and carriage received forty-nine shrapnel bullet hits, all apparently inflicted by a single 1 1 -inch shell from the Thniraire, the head and base of which were picked up in front This gun peered through an embrasure, the neck of which had been previously ruined by the fire of the Inflexible. Moreover, it is probable that the hit was delivered the day after the action. The remaining shrapnel hits on guns and carriages might have been counted on the fingers, but it is of course possible that very oblique grazes might not have left a distinguishable mark. Some of the naval ofliicers engaged at Alexandria were im- pressed by the good results of their shrapnel fire, but these results would be considerably enhanced by the defects of the Egyptian works. In estimating the Alexandria results, it is particularly necessary to separate those which the short- comings of the works rendered inevitable. The fact that a ship could silence the fire of the saluting battery on the Line Wall at Gibraltar with shrapnel would not be a convincing argument of the efficiency of the latter against coast defences generally. At Meks — a work almost dfleur d'ean — there was hardly a place where the head of an ordinarily tall man would be covered even if he stood close to the parapet. The Inchkeith experiments, carried out in August, 1884, throw a certain light on the performance of shrapnel at Alexandria. In all, thirty rounds were fired from the lo-inch R.M.L. guns at ranges varying from 850 to 3,500 yards, the average being about 2,330 yards. The conditions so far as the SHRAPNtlL FIRE. 187 ship was concerned were ideal. The sea was calm ; the ranges could be obtained with great nicety ; the firing was by single rounds and excessively deliberate ; undivided attention could be given to each round ; there were no elements of disturbance ; the Inchkeith gun presented an excellent target. On the first day, out of fifteen rounds fired with battering charges, one ball found its way into the emplacement. On the next day, full charges were used and two good bursts were obtained in fifteen rounds. Four dummies were hit ; six balls struck the gun, six balls and three splinters the carriage and platform. In addition, one of the elevating wheels was broken and the traversing gear placed at the rear of the platform was disabled by splinters. The target gun could still have been worked without any difficulty. The spread of shrapnel bullets from heavy R.M.L. guns has not been experimentally ascertained. For present pur- poses, therefore, it is assumed to follow the same law as that enunciated in the case of field guns by Colonel Nicholson, R.A.^ Taking the lateral velocity as constant and equal to 90 f s.,^ the semi-angle of spread calculated as tan — ^, where v is the velocity of the shell at the moment of burst, agrees in the case of the 64-pr. exactly with the result actually obtained at Dungeness. In the case of the lo-inch R.M.L., the spread similarly calculated varies from 3|° at the muzzle to 5;^° at 4,000 yards. With this gun, therefore, in estimating the searching effect of shrapnel, it will probably be sufficiently accurate to add S° to the angle of descent, unless the shell is burst so far short of the object that the increased curvature of the trajectories of the bullets 1 "Shrapnel tire." ° Calculated by Captain T. S. Jackson, R.N. 1 88 FOR TIFTCA TION. becomes of practical importance. In the case of some new B.L. guns, the angle of opening of shrapnel has been experi- mentally determined, and found to be as follows :t— Gun.. 12-inch B.L. Mark I. . \ 9-2-iiich B.L. Mark IIL . Range. Semi-angle yds. of opening. 2000 4° 34' 3000 ' .4° 40' 1.665 ,5° 0' 1 100 5° 10' 20C0 5- so' 3000 r 0' 4-inch The possible searching effect will of course vary much with the height of the shore gun, and the appended diagrams, drawn up by Captain T. S. Jackson, R.N., are extremely valuable in enabling a correct estimate to be formed of the great importance of height in regard to the possible effect of common shell, shrapnel, and machine-gun fire from a ship. Thus with the service lo-inch R.M.L. gun (Diagram I.), using the 70-lb. charge, a ship must beat 1,750 yards distance to obtain a horizontal trajectory at the crest of a battery 300 feet high, while to obtain an angle of descent of 6° she must move to 3,350 yards. If the crest of the battery is 100 feet high, the corresponding ranges are 1,050 and 2,950 yards. A. common shell arriving at an emplacement with a hori- zontal trajectory, can do little injury to the revetment wall. Striking only a few feet short of the crest, it will be deflected up, unless the burst is instantaneous, in which case (as proved at Eastbourne) the splinters all clear the emplacement. Practically, therefore, to be really dangerous, the shell must burst exactly at the crest, which means hitting a target a few inches high, as well as securing an instantaneous burst. Supposing a lo-inch R.M.L. shrapnel to be burst in the most favourable position possible, the bullet.s, in the case of a crest 100 feet above the ship's guns, will at 1,000 yards have a drop SEARCHING EFFECT. of less 11°, and at i6 feet from an 8-feet parapet would be still 5 feet above the ground level. A just appreciation of the above facts will render apparent the difficulties under which the ship labours in delivering a searching fire, and perhaps serves to explain why the French ships do carry shrapnel for heavy guns. These difficulties are materially increased by the introduction in the case of new type guns giving higher velocities. For example, the height of the new emplacements for B.L. guns on Stone Cutters Island, Hong Kong, is about 210 feet. At this level, projectiles from the French 27-cm. gun (Diagram 2) with a muzzle velocity of 1,664 f.s. will have a horizontal trajectory at 1,750 yards, and a fall of 6° (or i in 9"7) only at 4,000 yards. In the case of a higher-powered gun, such as our 9 •2-inch, Mark III., with a muzzle velocity of 2,065 f.s., the correspond- ing ranges would be about 2,100 and 4,800 yards. The searching power of the fire of modern ships is, there- fore, strictly limited, and the difficulty of killing men behind a high parapet by shrapnel fired from high-velocity guns has been insufficiently appreciated ; while the danger to the revetment in front of a barbette gun, or to the crest of a pit cannot be regarded as serious.^ As regards searching effect, ships are now in a worse position than they were fifty years ago, and when re-armed with new guns their power will in this respect be still further diminished. It has been suggested that, in view of the difficulty above pointed out, a complete or partial return to short guns and low velocities is to be expected. It appears doubtful, how- » General Sir L. Simmons stated in 1870, "What is the chance of a shot fired from an unstable platform, like the deck of a ship, striking a battery at 1,600 or 1,800 yards, so near the crest as to do any injury to it ? I believe myself it would be absolutely throwing away ammunition to attempt it." (' R. E. Corps Papers,' Vol. XVIII.) High-velocity guns, in spite of their greater accuracy, have certainly not injreased the chances of such a hit. 1 90 FOR TIFICA TION. ever, whether our possible enemies, having arrived, after great efforts and vast expenditure, at remarkably straight-shooting long-range "guns will abandon them for relatively inaccurate weapons. This has certainly not been the practice in the past, and the resuscitation of smooth-bores — also at one time prophesied — is about an equally probable contingency. Again, though the value of curved fire of heavy shell from the coast battery against the ship is only now receiving general recognition, the use of howitzer fire from the ship supplies a ready argument against open batteries and dis- appearing guns. For several reasons, the result of the prac- tice carried out from H.M.S. Hercules off Shoeburyness in August, 1 886, was inconclusive. The fact nevertheless remains, that though the ship was anchored in smooth water, such an excellent high-angle gun as the 8-inch 70-cwt. howitzer was unable to plant a shell within 20 yards of a conspicuous target flag at only 1,500 yards, and that two rounds fired with the same elevation and charge, on the same day, gave a difference in range of 370 yards. The admirable practice obtained at Lydd with this howitzer at 2,400 yards was due to back-laying and careful observation. Howitzer vessels will have to engage at ranges not less than 4,500 yards, or be quickly put out of action. It has yet to be shown how back-laying is to be carried out on board ship, how under ordinary conditions the clinometer is to be employed unless the ship is aground, and how at long ranges observation from the tops is likely to succeed. The normal target offered by a disappearing gun is a completely invisible horizontal circle, some 10 yards in diameter. The chances of hitting it may be imagined. Some stress has been laid on the results which a modern ironclad might obtain from her auxiliary armament. Thus the Diiph'7-^ carries fourteen 5^-inch guns of new type and INJURY TO MOUNTINGS. 191 twelve Hotchkiss machine guns, in addition to her heavy armament. This auxiliary armament adds considerably to her total rate of fire, which, however, will still be inferior to that of a small frigate of old type. To use these guns, how- ever, the Dup&r^ must fight broadside on, and as they have no armour protection, they would be in the same position, as far as protection is concerned, as the guns of a wooden frigate opposed to modern heavy shell fire. If the shore guns were even moderately well handled, and especially if they were supplemented by a proportion of quick-firing guns, it might fairly be expected that this auxiliary armament would be very soon put out of action with a heavy loss in men ; and it might be by far the best policy for such a ship to fight end on, using only her barbettes, and — except in the case of a battery of a high site — minimizing her target. As regards the possibility of injuring the carriages of guns in shore batteries, the experiences of Alexandria were pro- bably unexpected. Out of thirty-five R.M.L. guns under fire, there were, in addition to the dismounted guns, only two cases of injury of a damaging nature to carriages — a com- pressor arc broken and a front truck cut away by shell splinters. Neither injury sufficed to disable the gun. The case of a small unfinished two-gun battery in Ras-el-Tin Lines, heavily shelled by the Ittflexible and Thndraire, is somewhat remarkable. The embrasures in front were almost destroyed and the guns bared, yet both carriages were per- fectly serviceable and were subsequently mounted at Ramleh. On the other hand, in the case of the guns dismounted by the fire of the ships, the carriages were either totally wrecked or injured beyond the possibility of temporary repair. The Alexandria affair thus seems to indicate clearly that, to dis- able a gun, a direct hit is necessary, and that gun and mounting starid or fall together. The provision of spare iga fortification: heavy guns for coast defence without corresponding spare mountings would, therefore, be useless. ' . As to the probable effect of machine-gun fire, the data, if not altogether complete, are extremely suggestive. Machine guns, such as the multiple barrel Catling, Hotchkiss, Norden- felt, Gardner, and the automatic single barrel Maxim, are capable of delivering a very rapid fire of bullets or small shells. At Alexandria, the fleet carried about seventy i-inch 4-barrel Nordenfelts, and expended more than i6,ooo bullets. The expenditure of Gatling ammunition was only 7,000 rounds, and of Martini bullets 10,000. As to the results obtained, opinions have differed. The number of hits on the Egyptian guns and mountings must, however, be taken as affording some indication of those results. The hit of a Nordenfelt bullet on iron is generally unmistakable; but it is evidently possible that grazes at a very acute angle might have escaped observation. The total number of hits on guns and carriages was seven, and even this moderate number requires qualification. One hit was on the liberal target offered by the bracket of the Moncrieff carriage. This carriage stood upon the shore, the formality of building up protection round it having been omitted. The gun was of course never fired, and the natural fondness of the bluejacket for a good upstanding target can alone account for its being fired at.* The high exposed scarps of Forts Ras-el-Tin, Adda, and Pharos, distinctly showed every Nordenfelt hit, but the total number of such hits was quite insignificant. It is stated that at the Ingogo action, where the Artillery suffered severely from rifle fire, the guns were actually whitened by bullet splashes. A fair inference seems to be that, at Alexandria, ' At least four heavy projectiles were also fired broadside on at this carriage, which received one splinter hit only. MA CHINE- G UN FIRE. 1 9 3 the vast majority of the 16,000 bullets fell short ; or, as was actually the case at Meks, flew well over the battery. Captain Fisher, C.B., R.N., states — " Most of our ships used their Nordenfelt machine guns, but nothing is known as to the effect produced. The bullets were found far and near, so it is to be feared the fire was not very accurate. It is difficult, indeed almost impossible, to see where the comparatively small Nordenfelt bullet hits." The conditions at Alexandria were not unfavourable to machine guns. The ranges of the inshore squadron were moderate. The tops of the ships were above the level of the guns in Meks Fort,^ which was so designed as to give every advantage to the attack. Great possibilities are sometimes claimed for these guns, one writer going so far as to state — " It might be quite possible for a boat armed with a machine gun to keep a heavy gun silent, that is, if the boat could manage to begin." ^ It is not easy, however, to see why a boat firing at the water level should succeed, while the machine guns in the tops of the Penelope and Invincible failed for three-and-a-half hours ; and this opinion can only be regarded as the outcome of specula- tion uncorrected by actual experience, and unsupported by ballistic laws. The explanation of the apparent failure of the machine gun at Alexandria is, doubtless, that the average range was too great for accurate practice under service conditions, and that, even at the less ranges, the smoke of the guns of the attack and defence, together with the sand thrown up and smoke caused by the bursting shells utterly obscured the effect of ' Of all the works at Alexandria mounting rifled guns Meks was the worst. The Egyptians intended to remodel it entirely and the proposed design was picked up in a casemate near. Had the changes been carried out, the difficulty of silencing the work would have been greatly increased. ^ ' R.E. Occasional Papers,' Vol. VII. 194 FORTIFICATION. the small Nordenfelt bullets, so that the men who served them had no idea where their bullets were going. Diagram 3 shows the influence of high sites in modifying the searching power of the i-inch Nordenfelt gun. A fall of 2° (i in 28) at a crest 100 feet high, can only be obtained at 1,040 yards. In the case of the Hong Kong emplacements above referred to, this angle of descent is unattainable at a less range than 1,260 yards. The experiments carried out at Inchkeith, where H.M.S. Sultan, under the conditions stated on p. 187, concentrated her fire on a single remarkably conspicuous shore gun, form an interesting comparison with the Alexandria results. The total number of machine-gun rounds fired was 15,210, by which 15 dummies were hit. In the first four series, 1,541 rounds were fired with the result of hitting one dummy. In the other series 4 Gardners and 2 Gatlings on deck fired 2,815 rounds, obtaining three hits on dummies. In another, 13 machine guns fired 3,874 rounds, hitting two dummies. This was target practice, and the dummies remained fixed in the most exposed positions which the loading numbers could occupy.^ Making the most moderate correction for the complete difference of conditions under which an action would have to be fought, it does not appear that even a barbette gun has much to fear from machine-gun fire, and the Alexandria results seem to be fully explained. Machine guns on board ship have their uses, but during an Artillery engagement between ships and coast defences, they cannot play any real ' Nos. 2 and 3 stood always on the loading stage, about half their bodies being fully exposed. No. 5, who was supposed to serve the muzzle derrick — a duty he could have performed with a boat hook from the loading-way in perfect security — stood actually on the platform girder, and was exposed down to his knees. INCHKEITH EXPERIMENTS. 195 part on either side. The men serving the machine guns on board ship will at most have bullet-proof protection. The gunners in an open barbette battery, even on a low site, will be completely protected by the parapet against all bullets except those arriving with a considerable drop, and a shield (see Plate XXIV.) will almost completely obviate the small risks from long range fire. It will be practically useless to fire at a battery on a moderately high site, and against shore guns on disappearing mountings (Plates XXVI. and XXVII.) the machine gun is worthless. On the other hand, for the self-defence of the coast battery against the attack of a landing party, such a machine gun as the Maxim would be invaluable, and the operation should be almost impossible. As to the performance of the 6-pr. quick-firing gun also, the Inchkeith experiment affords some teaching. In forty-eight rounds, at ranges from 1,500 to 1,900 yards, one dummy was hit. On the other hand, in five subsequent rounds the target gun — turned broadside on — was hit three times ; but since, in this case, 13 machine guns were simultaneously in action, the effect on the dummies cannot be stated. This excellent result shows the kind of target practice of which the 6-pr. is capable ; but it may fairly be questioned whether its intro- duction has not conferred superior advantages on the defence. Against the unarmoured portions of a ship it will prove extremely effective ; and to keep the crews behind armour, and the officers shut up in conning-towers, will be an immense o-ain. In the case of many existing ships the crews cannot be thus sheltered, even on condition of abandoning un- protected guns, and they would be at the mercy of the quick- firing gun if engaging within its effective range. Recent battle ships, such as the Nile and Trafalgar, carry a portion of their auxiliary armament behind 3 inches O 2 196 FORTIFICA TION. of armour, but the limits of armour - bearing capacity are quickly reached ; and the above protection, which would be worse than useless against even the 6-inch gun on shore at comparatively long range, can be obtained only at a sacrifice in other directions and with vessels of great size. It is difficult, therefore, to believe that the quick-firing gun will make up the deficiency in volume of fire from which the modern ship suffers, and if coast defences are properly provided with these new weapons, the balance of advantage to be derived from their use will certainly not be on the side of the ship. NEW TYPE B.L. GUNS. 197 CHAPTER XIV. EFFECT OF INTRODUCTION OF BREECH-LOADING GUNS ON QUESTION OF PROTECTION. — BARBETTE MOUNTINGS FORMERLY CONSIDERED INAPPLICABLE TO NEW GUNS. — INVISIBILITY. — OVERHEAD COVER. ■ — DISAPPEARING MOUNTINGS. — PORTLAND EXPERIMENTS. — SERVICE BARBETTE MOUNTINGS. — HIGH-ANGLE FIRE.— QUICK- FIRING GUNS IN COAST DEFENCES. — "BALANCE PILLAR " MOUNTINGS. — POSITION-FINDING SYSTEM. — SUBMARINE MINES. — THE PNEUMATIC GUN. — DIRIGIBLE TORPEDOES. The introduction of heavy breech-loaders for land service has affected the question of protection in the following ways. The length and comparative weakness of the chase are somewhat unfavourable. Even with the otherwise complete protection promised by a casemate, cupola, or turret, the great protrusion of the gun will render it liable to a hit which might easily disable it. At Eastbourne, the shell of a 6-pr. Hotchkiss quick-firing gun striking the chase of a 10 •4-inch B.L. gun, penetrated into the bore. At Shoeburyness, a steel shell from the same quick-firing gun, striking the chase of a 9 • 2-inch B.L. gun at 150 yards, raised a bulge 0*4 inch high in the interior. The precise effect of such an injury cannot be stated. A portion of the chase of the damaged gun would obviously be blown off by the next round fired, and more serious conse- quences are evidently possible. The effect of a projectile FORTIFICATION. from the quick-firing gun striking the face of the muzzle of a heavy gun has not been ascertained. Again, a single shell from a 6-inch B.L. cut off 2 feet 4 inches of the chase of the io'4-inch B.L. gun, and even the 5-inch B.L., or the new 4* 7-inch quick-firing gun, which delivers about eight aimed rounds per minute, is probably capable of inflicting serious injury at a range of at least 2,000 yards. To chase injuries, guns en barbette are little more liable than those in turrets ; while long guns in casemates may evidently be seriously damaged by medium guns outside their arc of possible reply. In one sense, therefore, the introduction of long guns has reduced the value of front armour ; since there is a partial anomaly involved in providing a mass of iron which, after all, leaves the weakest portion of the gun it affects to shield exposed to injury from light projectiles. A breech-loader eii barbette, however long, can be loaded while offering a minimum target to front fire of all kinds, and the actual loading numbers are well protected against all except curved fire — which the ship is incapable of delivering. Unless, there- fore, the fire of more than one ship can be concentrated upon individual guns, which with dispersion, and careful choice of sites, will not be easy to effect, the protection of the personnel will prove to have gained considerably by the introduction of the breech-loader ; while the great disadvantage attached to side loading in the caseofM.L. guns— the presentation during considerable periods of a broadside target — will be obviated. On the other hand, the breech mechanism brings a new source of danger. A mere burring up of the breech-screw, or the cutting away of the locking lever by a shell splinter, might suffice to silence the gun for a long time. These risks can, however, be met by a steel shield protecting the breech, or by special steel protection to individual points of weakness. BARBETTE BA TTERIES. 199 Von Scheliha, in his treatise on ' Coast Defence,' says, — " guns mounted en barbette may always be disabled by an ironclad." The remark might with advantage have been made more general. All guns, however mounted, may be disabled by an ironclad, and the question is merely one of comparative risk. The Griison plates of the great Spezzia cupola, 4 feet 2 inches thick, and each weighing nearly 9 1 tons , provide no protection whatever for the long weak chases of the two 16-inch guns, which could be disabled by a chance projectile from a 5-inch gun carried on board ship. A barbette gun cannot well be disabled except by a direct hit, and the vulnerable target presented to frontal fire is insignificant.^ The admitted drawbacks to this mode of mounting are two — exposure of the gun, especially on the flanks, and the absence of complete over-head cover for the detachment. The risks implied by the former must be accepted, but can be modified in various ways. Dispersed guns offer very small marks to the ship, and if really representative targets were occasionally fired at, the difficulty of obtaining hits would be far more widely realized than is at present the case. To many minds the expression " open batteries," means a work hardly equal to the badly designed defences of Alexandria. With a little care and thought, however, coast works can be rendered almost invisible, and the position of guns need not be defined except by their flash. This invisibility materially affected the accuracy of fire of the fleet at Alexandria ; but it was purely the accident of circumstances. The Egyptians had only sand to work with, and they did not attempt to advertise their batteries by well-kept turfed slopes, because grass would not grow. A far higher order of invisibility is ' See p. 179. FORTIFICATION. ctipable of being realized, and the diflficulties of accurate fire will be proportionally increased.^ The special exposure of the barbette gun on the flanks is of importance only in the case of very salient sites. Moreover, the angle through which the gun can be attacked may be limited at pleasure, while the practical carrying out of systematic cross firing from ships will not be quite so easy as it appears on paper. The ship may be expected to show a natural tendency to concentrate her fire on the guns which are hitting her ; and if the Inflexible, at Alexandria, had been hulled every other minute from Fort Ras-el-Tin, she would not, in all probability, have divided her fire so impartially between this work and Oom Kabebe. The want of complete over-head cover is of small account, since the fire of a modern ship has extremely little searching power at practicable fighting ranges. Such over-head cover as has been provided in certain cases (see Fig. 4, p. 157), merely adds considerably to the risks of the gun. A shell arriving, as shown in the figure, would be caught and burst, bringing down the cover on to the gun and its detachment, who would thus be destroyed by their protection. A few years ago it was asserted that the new type guns could not be mounted in open batteries, and must be weighted down by ponderous turrets and cupolas, or cramped by cum- brous " yokes." This unfortunate delusion, which served to delay the progress of our gun-mounting for about two years, never extended to other Powers,^ and has now been entirely abandoned. ' The new works at Singapore are admirably masked and the guns practically invisible at moderate range. ^ At the exact period of the enunciation of this dogma, the Spaniards mounted a lO-inch breech-loading gun en barbette at Cadiz, while a 12-inch 43-ton gun was successfully tried shortly afterwards on a similar carriage. PORTLAND EXPERIMENTS. Of all methods of mounting yet proposed, the disappearing principle offers the greatest advantages, and provided that the mechanical difficulties can be overcome, this method will receive a wide adoption. The gun, laid under cover by a position-finder, will be vulnerable only for a few seconds before each round. Its exact position can only be identified during the brief period of visibility. There appears to be no satisfactory mode of attacking it. The experiments carried out at Portland Bill in November, 1885, give some idea of the difficulty a ship will experience in dealing with a gun of this class. The dummy — a wood and canvas model of a lo-inch R.L. gun — appeared and dis- appeared on the natural surface of the bluff, working up and down through an opening in a wooden shield at the ground level. The period of visibility laid down by the conditions of the trial was half a minute in every three minutes, and a small charge of powder was fired electrically at the moment of dis- appearance to represent the discharge of the gun. H.M.S. Hercules, at ranges varying from 750 to 950 yards, fired 6,910 rounds in ten minutes from i-inch and rifle calibre machine guns, and 29 rounds from the 6-pr. Hotchkiss quick-firing gun. The whip used for hauling down the dummy unfortunately broke at the end of the seventh minute. For the three following minutes, therefore, the dummy was exposed and, as the ship continued her fire after the bearing laid down had been passed, a broadside target was secured. Notwithstanding that the dummy was exposed more than twice as long as it was intended to be, and about four times as long as a real gun need have been, it received only 16 direct and 9 splinter hits. The horizontal wooden shield showed four scratches, and one Nordenfeit bullet dropped into the gun pit. It would, of course, be perfectly useless to employ machine-gun fire at a disappearing gun ; but the above result supplies an interesting FORTIFICATION. comparison with that obtained by a similar armament at Inchkeith. To halve the number of hits obtained at Portland, so as to correct for the unfortunate accident to the whip, is more than fair, since the greater portion of these hits were undoubtedly obtained when the gun had ceased to be dis- appearing and presented a broadside. Accepting this cor- rection, the comparison of hits on the guns at Inchkeith and Portland is about 12 to i, although the average ranges in the two cases were as 1,000 to 825 yards respectively. In addition, 15 rounds of lo-inch common shell and 13 rounds of lO-inch shrapnel were fired at the Portland dummy at ranges from 2,200 to 2,845 yards without any result whatever. In the common shell series, the error in range varied from 300 yards short to 300 yards over, and the horizontal dispersion from 120 yards left to 150 yards right, showing clearly the difficulties of practice against such a target. The above experiment, although not completely satisfactory from the point of view of either attack or defence, serves nevertheless to fully substantiate the advantages claimed for the disappearing system. These advantages can obviously be reduced to a minimum, however, by applying that system as at Newhaven, Popton, Hubberstone and Corradino Lines, Malta. Practically the mounting of guns for coast defence may now be reduced to two types, barbette and disappearing. In the excessively rare cases in which it can ever be desirable to mount guns on such a site as the end of Dover Pier which can be swept by the sea, the expense and drawbacks of the turret may still be accepted ; but such cases must be most exceptional. If Dover presented a tabula rasa for the engineer to-day, a much cheaper and more effective defence could be devised without pushing guns far out to sea. In all ordinary cases, no form of mounting should ^\' \\\ ^ \\4\ A-% ' \\\ W o m o r> n, fx3 H T. C) S PS t t BARBETTE MOUNTINGS. 203 be adopted for coast defence which cannot be worked by hand.^ The form of barbette mounting designed at Elswick for the 9-2-in. B.L. gun is shown in Plate XXIV. Unless applied to sites a fleur d'eati, this mounting gives good cover to the gun detachment. The parapet is 7 feet 6 inches high, and the projectile can be rammed home by men standing on the floor of the emplacement, the gun being elevated as shown. The shield will keep out all machine-gun bullets, and the machine-gun fire from ships is never likely to be really effective, and ought to be quickly silenced by the return fire. The duel is hopelessly unequal, for the ships' machine guns have little or no protection, while all such guns on shore can be well covered. Except at considerable ranges, at which even moderately accurate shooting from ships cannot be obtained, the drop of the projectiles of modern guns is very small, so that practically a direct hit, or a common shell bursting just at the crest of the emplacement in front, is required to disable the barbette gun. This risk need not cause much apprehension, when the enormous vulnerable target presented by the modern ship (see App. G and H) is taken into consideration. The Elswick mounting of the lo-in. B.L. gun, also adopted into the service, is very similar. That of the 6-in. is at present only applied for the defence of Port Durban, Natal. The 6-in. mounting is extremely neat, simple, and handy in working. No B.L. gun larger than the 1 0-inch has been thus mounted in this country, but there would be no real difficulty in the case of the 12-inch gun. ' The only guns mounted in the British Empire at present which cannot be worked by hand are the two 80-ton R.M.L. guns at Dover, and four 100-ton R.M.L. guns, two at Gibraltar and two at Malta. The cost of the Dover turret has been very great, and the experience of the Malta and Gibraltar guns has been anything but satisfactory. 204 FORTIFICATION. The French have at present solely adopted the barbette system for their coast defences, and the design of the mount- ing for a 27-cm. (10 -5) gun, made by the Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterran^e for the War Department, is shown in Plate XXV. It appears to be in some respects superior to our own type (Plate XXIV.), and it is stated to be cheap. The French 27-cm. gun is somewhat less powerful than the service lo-in. B.L. ; but there would be no difficulty in adapting the features of this design to the latter gun.^ M. Canet has also designed a mounting for the 32-cm. (12 '6 in.) gun on similar principles. In adopting the disappearing principle, England has taken the lead, although Italy has, in a certain sense, passed her, in obtaining from Elswick one such mounting for a 68-ton gun.^ France appears inclined to adopt the principle, at least for medium guns, and a very neat mounting for a 155-mm. gun, designed by M. Canet, was exhibited at the Paris Exhibition of 1889. At present the disappearing principle has been applied in England to no gun heavier than the lo-inch B.L., the trial of which, at Harwich, was remarkably successful. The Elswick mounting for the 8-inch gun is shown in Plates XXVI. and XXVII. Those for the 6-inch, 9-2-inch, and lo-inch guns are similar. Disappearing mountings have been largely adopted in the coaling-station defences, and in the Australasian Colonies, which have had a considerable number of guns thus mounted for some years. For the purposes of coast defence, this form of mounting is ideal in conception. Provided that the hydro-pneumatic arrangement is in good working order, there is practically no ' In the Elswick 6-inch mounting above referred to some of these features are represented. ^ This mounting has very recently been tried with entire success. Considering that, in going from a 32-ton to a 68-ton gun, a great leap has been taken, this appears to be a remarkable achievement. Coast Defence Mounting 27c. M. (I0-5-INCI-I) Gun. (Canet.) Plate XXV. ELEVATION PLAN Scale of Feet a.a. Traversing Handle b.b. Elevating Handle c. Projectile Lift d.d. Clipps e.e. Shield To face page 204. ^ n ^ Ph 6 Q K Z; o O 1-3 pq X u z (5 HIGH-ANGLE FIRE. 205 hope of silencing guns thus mounted by the fire of ships. Their positions can be rendered absolutely indistinguishable from the surroundings, if a little care has been bestowed upon the works. They need be exposed only for a brief period before the moment of firing. The experience both of Victoria and New Zealand proves that these mountings can be worked and kept in order by Colonial troops. That they require care, intelligent handling, and special technical knowledge is undeniable ; but, in view of the great advantages they offer, these conditions appear worth fulfilling, and an Artillery force incapable of satisfying such conditions could only be regarded as indifferently organized or trained. No service mounting for high-angle fire at present exists. The adaption of the old R.M.L. guns for this purpose first took a practical form in 1884. The original experiments made with a 9-inch polygrooved gun were remarkably successful, and proved that, thanks to the position-finder, it would be impossible for a ship to anchor at 8,000 yards from such guns without receiving frequent deck hits of a dangerous nature. Even against a ship in motion, the chances of obtaining such hits are considerable, and it may be taken as established that no vessel afloat would dare to remain under the fire of small groups of these guns. Subsequent experiments entirely confirmed the original results ; but up to the present time no type of mounting has been decided upon, although a cheap converted mounting appears to be applicable to fire- up to about 8,000 yards range. Meanwhile, the Italians have wisely made great progress in this direction, and most of their coast defences possess large numbers of high-angle guns which would prove most formidable to ships, even although they would not have the advantage of a position- finding system comparable to our own. The French and the Russians also have fully recognized 206 FORTIFICATION. the great importance of high-angle fire, and are mounting a considerable number of guns for the purpose. The design adopted by the French Government for the io'5 inch mortar is shown below. This design appears some- FiG. 5. — 27 -CM. (io'S-inch) Mortar on Coast Defence Mounting. (Canet.) what barbarous, since the recoil, except at the lower angles, must be borne almost entirely upon the mounting and platform. Fifty of these mountings are, however, being supplied by the Forges et Chantiers alone. They are extremely cheap, and are stated to answer. In process of time, we shall doubtless be in possession of a better design ; but meanwhile other Powers secure the advantage of having guns available for practical purposes. The introduction of quick-firing guns is extremely impor- tant from the point of view of coast defence. These guns, ranging from the 3 pr. to the 6-inch, which is probably the largest calibre to which the principle is capable of being advantageously applied, are being provided in large numbers on board all the later ships of war. It is claimed for them that they will materially aid in the attack of coast defences ; but the advantage to the ship exists only where the defences are not similarly provided. Not only is the pro- tection which can be given to the quick-firing gun on shore Plate XXVIII. Balance Pillar Mounting for 47-iNCH Q.F. Gun. (Elswick.) Scale of Feet ? J t J ? i 9 5_ PLAN To face page 207. QUICK-FIRING GUNS. 207 far superior to that which is practicable on board ship ; but, in the former case, the gun has for its target the whole of the unarmoured portion of the ship, throughout which it is capable of inflicting much destruction. To the ship, the shore gun should present an almost indistinguishable target a few square feet in area. Quick-firing guns require only two or three men, who can be protected by a bullet-proof shield, to work them ; and their chief characteristics are great speed of fire and extreme ease in training. As an auxiliary armament for coast defences, these guns will prove extremely valuable. They will effectually silence similar guns on board ship, clear the tops and upper deck, and search all the unarmoured portions ; while the larger calibres will also be able to inflict loss and damage to gear in naval barbette towers, and to penetrate light armour. Disappearing mountings of the ordinary type are obviously inapplicable to these guns, which must as a rule fire over- bank. The effective range even of the 4 •/-inch gun (firing ten aimed rounds per minute) does not greatly exceed 2,400 yards, however, and, as it is evidently desirable to avoid exposing a gun to the chance of being placed hors de combat by fire to which it is unable to reply, the " balance pillar " mounting, shown in Plate XXVI II., offers certain advantages. The gun is mounted on a cylinder which telescopes into a larger cylinder, and is counterpoised by a weight suspended by six chains passing over pulleys. By means of a ratchet lever A, the gun is lowered into a recess C in the parapet, or after being swung round to the rear of the emplacement. It can thus be kept under cover of the parapet and quickly raised when the time of effective employment arises. Loading is performed from a movable stage B running on racers. The balance pillar mounting has at present been successfully 2o8 FORTIFICATION. tried with the i2-pr. gun, and there is every reason to believe that the design for the 4* 7-inch will prove satisfactory. In the case of the 6-inch gun (firing six aimed rounds per minute) the balance pillar mounting would be somewhat cumbrous and expensive ; while it is not needed, since the gun is effective at all practical fighting ranges. The only mounting at present constructed in this country for the 6-inch Q.F. gun is shown in Plate XXIX., and is that adopted for the armament of the Piemonte cruiser, built at Elswick for the Italian Government. This mounting could be easily adapted for coast defence purposes, or some other barbette form might be utilized. The lighter guns, such as the 6-pr., can be placed upon a special travelling carriage, enabling them to be quickly brought into position when and where required. With the development of Artillery have come new facilities for directing fire. The ideal arrangement would evidently be that an observer, hidden from view and safe from all disturbing influences, should be able to direct guns at a distance. This ideal is all but attained in the Depression Position Finding System perfected by Major Watkin, C.B, R.A., by which all earlier methods have been com- pletely superseded. This system, which has been kept strictly secret, enables an observer many hundred yards distant to communicate automatically to a gun emplacement both the range of a ship and the training necessary in order to strike it. He can further direct the laying of a gun, or small group of guns, upon a point on the course of a vessel in motion, and himself fire the guns when the vessel reaches that point. Three advantages of the utmost importance to coast defence are thus secured : — («.) The accuracy of fire is greatly increased. THE POSITION FINDER. 209 (^.) High-angle fire, even against a moving ship, is rendered possible, the shore guns themselves being completely hidden from view and perfectly safe. (c.) A general control over the fire as a whole is rendered possible. In place of each gun or battery acting according to the lights of its com- mander who may not be fully aware of what is occurring, the whole coast armament of a fortress can be divided up into groups, each under an officer who is capable of a real control, while the group commanders can be directed by a central authority. Thus the whole of the fire can be inspired by a definite purpose. The guns of any group, or aggregate of groups, can all be directed upon an individual ship, and this without any chance of mistake or confusion. In the battery, there is nothing to be done but to load and lay the guns in accordance with the figures shown on a dial. The rest is all in the hands of the observing officer in a concealed cell, away from noise, smoke, and danger. This admirable system has been tested with the most re- markable results ; but the ease and simplicity of its working have to be seen to be adequately realized. It will be widely employed in our defences at home and abroad, and will immensely increase the efficiency of their fire. Various proposals have been put forward for enabling the observer himself to lay the guns in communication with his station. Little real advantage would thus be gained, how- ever, and much complication is necessarily involved. The most recent arrangement provided by Major Watkin enables all movements of the gun in elevation or training to be r FORT I PICA TION. translated to a dial. Thus no figures have to be read off at the gun, and one source of possible error is eliminated altogether. Improved range finders will doubtless be provided for naval use ; '■ but the position-finding system is, and must always be, inapplicable on board ship, and " director firing," which is sometimes confounded with it, is relatively a bar- barous method. Major Watkin's invention is thus a distinct and unbalanced gain to the defence,^ and, if its potentiality were more fully realized, the wild ideas as to the power possessed by ships in relation to modern coast works which frequently find expression would be effectually re- pressed, while more moderate estimates of real requirements would be formed. It is the position-finding system which has opened out vast possibilities to high angle fire — possibilities early fore- seen in this country, but at present unrealized in a practical form. Small groups of old type guns converted for high angle fire,^ mounted in the open behind any ground which effec- tually screens them from view, will prove extremely formid- able to any ship afloat at ranges up to io,000 yards. If, however, elaborate batteries are provided in cases where they are absolutely unnecessary, considerations of economy will limit the application of this most valuable adjunct of defence. ' An electrical naval range finder invented by Lieut. Fiske, U.S-N., has lately been introduced, and appears to give excellent results. '' One remarkable result of the introduction of the position-finding system is the rehabilitation, within limits, of the monumental works of casemate type. These works, always liable when they were built to be rendered useless by a little smoke hanging in their front, can now be fought, and smoke has become their best ally, conferring upon them a protection which they sorely need. ° The cost of the conversion is only ;^3oo in the case of the g-in. R.M.L. retubed and polygrooved ; but by boring out these guns to a higher calibre, and re-rifling, the cost of conversion becomes even more moderate. SUBMARINE MINES. 211 In the case of direct firing guns, the power of laying by sight should always be retained,^ but the high-angle-fire armament should rely upon the position-finder alone. The large question of the suitability of submarine mines for employment - under varied conditions cannot be here discussed. Mines, if kept within proper limits, and utilized only with due regard to their special characteristics and to the real needs of the position to be defended, may be serviceable allies. In the absence of full discussion of their real uses and their proper functions in schemes of defence, they are liable to drift into the narrow waters of mere technicality, and become a costly incubus in peace, and a dangerous impediment in war. Three cases in which mines on a moderate scale might find useful employment may be here mentioned : — («.) Where a channel easy of navigation requires to be barred against ships which could pass it at speed and gain clear manoeuvring water, not commanded by fire, beyond. It would, however, be a neces- sary condition in many cases that traffic should in no way be impeded at a time when the rapid entry of vessels might be all-important. {b^ When any channel can be barred absolutely in war to friend or foe. In such a case, necessarily rare in the British Empire, Artillery defence might probably be dispensed with altogether, a few rifles sufficing to protect the mine-fields. ' Although the sight should be retained, no permanently mounted guns should now be laid for elevation by visual line. The sight should be modified so as to allow of visual laying for direction only, elevation being given by graduated arc alone. One important element of personal error can thus be avoided, and the operation of laying is simplified. P 2 FORTIFICA TION. {c.) Where manoeuvring waters, the use of which would confer a definite advantage on an enemy, can be denied to him by mines. In this case, as in (a), it would be a necessary condition that the mines should not impede friendly navigation in any way. As, however, it is now certain that ships in motion cannot hope to silence well-con- ceived defences, this possible use of mines becomes of less importance. Among the latest additions to the many keen weapons of coast defence is the pneumatic gun which, starting from some crude experiments carried out by Mr. Mefford in 1883, has now been brought into a thoroughly practical form by the energy of Captain E. L. Zalinski of the United States Artillery. The United States Government have made an appropriation of $400,000 for these guns, which will probably be expended in the defence of New York and Boston. The Italian Government has ordered one of them, and one has also been bought by the Government of Victoria, and will be subjected to careful experiment at Shoeburyness this year. The pneumatic gun possesses some remarkable features. Air propulsion entails low velocities and high-angle fire ; but, as it is far more uniform in action than any explosive agent, great accuracy was naturally to be expected, and has been fully realized in actual practice. Moreover, the mere rapid adjustment of a valve allows the range of the gun to be altered at will. The electrical fuze arrangements, which are extremely ingenious, allow the bursting charge of the shell to be ignited either on direct impact with a vessel's deck or side, or under water after suitable delay, if a direct hit is not obtained. The 15-in. gun (Plate XXX.) which has been adopted by THE PNEUMATIC GUN. 213 the United States Government for coast defence can fire a maximum projectile containing 600 lbs. of blasting gelatine, and any smaller size (sub-calibre) shell can be used. The ranges attainable with this gun using projectiles of different weights are at least as follows : — 55 lb. bursting charge 5000 100 „ „ „ 4500 200 „ „ „ 4000 600 „ ., „ 2000. Adequate data for estimating the effect, which these charges would produce if burst under water within a short distance of a ship are not available. Disablement to machinery and even to men by the sharp concussion due to the high explosive are highly probable, even if close contact is required for sending a ship to the bottom. The Silliman, a small schooner utilized for experiment outside of New York harbour on the 20th September, 1S87, was destroyed by the first shell intended to hit her, and the fact that an iron water- tank in the hold was driven up through the deck shows that the charge acted from below. The best result which can possibly be obtained is to disable a ship, not to sink her ; but until an engined vessel has been subjected to experiment it is impossible to speak with certainty as to the practical radius of effect — in this sense — of a given charge. It is scarcely conceivable, however, that 200 lbs. of high explosive detonated under water within 20 feet of the side of any vessel would not dislocate her machinery. If this proves to be the case, the vulnerable horizontal target of such a vessel as the Formidable (see Fig. 18, p. 238) has an area of fully 4,400 square yards. Even with a less accurate weapon than the pneumatic gun has proved to be, it would not be difficult to place a very large percentage of rounds on such a target at ranges up to 4,000 yards, and 214 FORTIFICA TION. it is to be remembered that the is-inch gun can fire one round per minute. For coast defence, it will be merely necessary to mount the gun in a sunken emplacement completely hiding its position. There is no smoke to reveal its whereabouts, and the ship would be powerless to injure it. The position-finding system lends itself exactly to the requirements of the pneumatic gun, and thus equipped the latter becomes, at least up to a range of 4,000 yards, one of the most formidable opponents which the ship can possibly be called upon to face. No dirigible torpedo yet invented, or likely to be invented, appears comparable in power to the " torpedo gun," and there is scarcely any function claimed for submarine mines which this new weapon cannot far more effectively perform. In place of laboriously strewing the water approaches of a port with 200-lb. mines which require a large trained personnel, cannot be laid out in many cases if bad weather chanced to prevail, and may impede navigation, it is now possible to provide a gun discharging 200-lb. mines, at the rate of one per minute, with great accuracy, within a range of 4,000 yards. Up to the range of 2,000 yards — stated by one authority to be the practical limit of mines fired by observation — the gun can deliver 600-lb. bursting charges, and might probably replace a large number of such mines with economy. By night the difficulty in employing the pneumatic gun is no greater than that attending the use of all ordnance; while the chances of obtaining an effective hit with the " aerial torpedo " are certainly greater on account of the large area of the vulnerable horizontal target presented even by a moderate-sized vessel. Dirigible torpedoes of a variety of forms have been pro- posed for coast defence. Great Britain has adopted the Brennan. The French have obtained the Patrick. The DIRIGIBLE TORPEDOES. 215 United States have carried out experiments both with the Patrick and the Sims-Edison, and have recently purchased a few of the latter. Turkey has had trials of the Lay. With the exception of Great Britain, however, no Government can be said to have definitely adopted any dirigible torpedo, or to have spent any considerable sum upon it. The Germans and the Italians have adopted submerged batteries of Whitehead torpedoes in certain cases. It appears probable that the pneumatic gun will ultimately supersede all expedients of this class ; but the dirigible torpedo has one characteristic which may serve to secure its permanence in some form. If, like the Patrick, it can be moved about and employed at any point along a channel of approach, it can claim the advantages which attach to surprise. 2 1 6 FOR TIFICA TION. CHAPTER XV. DEVELOPMENT OF ARMOURED NAVIES — BRITISH SHIPS — FRENCH SHIPS — ITALIAN SHIPS — RUSSIAN SHIPS — UN- SUITABILITY OF CRUISERS FOR ATTACK ON COAST DEFENCES. The standard of the sea defence of a port, i.e. the number and nature of its guns, depends solely upon the armament and degree of protection of the ships from which attack can reasonably be expected. There is, therefore, no possibility of arriving at any proper decision on questions which vitally affect the cost of coast defences, without a thorough grasp of the capabilities and disabilities of modern ships of war and the possibility of employing them in given waters. The neglect of these considerations has been the great stumbling- block of coast defence, the cause of numerous blunders, and much waste. On the one hand, the engineer has not sufficiently studied the progress of naval architecture and the limitations imposed upon steam ships ; on the other hand, it is not the business of the sailor to lay down rules for the guidance of the engineer. Moreover, the sailor, with charac- teristic pride in his fighting machines, and the elation which naturally attaches to the exponent of attack, occasionally lays claim to capabilities opposed to every inference from history and wholly beyond the regions of practical possi- bility. When the United States Board on Fortifications put forward INSTABILITY OF JUDGMENT. 217 a demand of more than five-and-a-half millions sterling ^ for the defences of San Francisco alone ; when a huge estimate is gravely propounded for (say) the Falkland Islands ; when, at another British colony, a plea for the establishment of a 23-ton gun capable of penetrating nearly 19 inches of iron armour at a thousand yards is based upon the advent of a foreign gunboat ; when Port Phillip, about 9,500 miles from Toulon, receives an armament considerably more efficient than that of Malta at only 600 miles ; it is evident that there is extremely little stability of judgment in such questions. The reasons of this instability of thought arise from the fact that, as pointed out above, the science of coast defence falls between two stools. Complete unanimity of opinion resting on a defined scientific basis may perhaps be unattain- able ; but startling anomalies, of which almost any number might have been adduced, should at least be impossible. It is difficult to see how San Francisco could be attacked at all, except by a small squadron of cruisers.^ A single cruiser represents the maximum probable force of attack at such a point as the Falklands, which possess landlocked harbours, affording ideal conditions for a simple and cheap defence. The gunboat referred to could be put out of action by a single field-gun. The only hostile vessels which could operate against coast defences in Australia are incapable of engaging the most moderate armaments on shore, even in the absence of the dominating naval force which Great Britain possesses in these waters. The old wooden ships were, in one sense, admirably adapted for dealing with the contemporary works on shore. ' Including floating batteries and torpedo boats. ^ Attack by Great Britain is not taken into consideration, since, apart from the extreme improbability of war between the two kindred nations, San Francisco would be the last conceivable objective. 2 1 8 FOR TIFICA TION. Their volume of fire (see p. 176) was so great that the coast battery, at least, on a low site, might be overwhelmed and, as in the designs of these batteries, most of the drawbacks inherent to the ship were reproduced with great fidelity, they were placed at a disadvantage which favourable circumstances, or a great inadequacy of attacking force, could alone neutralize. When the relative conditions differed somewhat, as in the cases of the action off Cape Licosa (see p. 175), the original Martello Tower ^ in the Gulf of San-Fiorenzo, Corsica, and the Telegraph and Wasp batteries at Sebastopol, the results were of another kind. There was no special merit in the Martello Tower, and the results obtained were not due to the tower form in any way, although this accident led subse- quently to a great expenditure on such structures round our coasts. On the other hand, the plain teaching of the Telegraph and Wasp batteries was practically ignored in the wave of expenditure on coast defence which swept the country soon after the Crimean war. While the wooden ship was necessarily built and armed to fight at sea, it was nevertheless fairly well adapted for fighting the coast defences of the day, and only needed to be ' This tower, " named Martello after its inventor,'' was attacked by Commo- dore Linzee with the Lowestoffe and Nemesis frigates, in September 1793, and taken without difficulty after a short bombardment. On the 1st October a "redoubt" in the neighbourhood repulsed three line-of-battle ships (Alcide, Courageux, and Ardent) with loss. The same tower was attacked again by sea and land on the 8th February, 1794. The bombardment made no impression, and the Fortitude and Juno hauled off, the former with a loss of 62 men and on fire. The fire from the guns established on shore was equally unsuccessful till a red hot shot set fire to the "bass-junk with which to a depth of 5 feet the immensely thick parapet was lined." The garrison, numbering only 33, with two l8-prs. and one 9-pr., then surrendered. — James' ' Naval History.' On this slender basis apparently rests the great expenditure incurred upon Martello towers in Great Britain. The more important fact that a small redoubt repulsed three line-of-battle ships appears to have escaped notice. MODERN WAR-SHIPS. 219 supplemented by mortar boats, rapidly built and armed, when an operation of the nature of a naval siege was contemplated. The war-ship of the present day is also built and armed solely to fight other ships on the sea. In the development of shipbuilding, however, and the progress of gun-power, the ship has grown steadily less fitted for engaging properly conceived defences on shore. This is an all-important factor too frequently forgotten in dealing with questions of coast defence, and its full significance can be realized only by seeking to understand what the modern ship of war really is. To the uninstructed eye, each such ship, with its low black mass of hull, appears the very embodiment of irresistible strength and indestructibility. The term " iron-clad," which originally possessed a definite meaning, has now none what- ever ; and, loosely used as is frequently the case, it serves merely to create and maintain illusion. Completely armoured ocean-going vessels have not been built for some years, and if now constructed would be vulnerable to comparatively light modern guns, the effect of whose projectiles would be greatly enhanced by the wreck of the protecting wall. Armour was the direct result of the development of shell fire, and is in no sense due to the rifled gun. At Sebastopol, six British ships were driven out of action by the shell fire of a few guns on shore ; but, if the Russians had possessed good percussion fuzes, the injury both to the personnel and the materiel of the allied squadrons would have been immensely increased. The experience of the Crimean war, however, sufficed to give the first real impetus to iron protection,^ and the French employed three armoured batteries at Kinburn ; • The first design of an armoured vessel appears to have been made in 1812 by John Stevens of New Jersey, and experiments were tried in England in 1827 and 1840 which, however, led to unsatisfactory results. FORT I PICA TION. while, before the close of the war, Great Britain also had such batteries afloat. Armoured vessels were thus the direct result of experience gained in action against coast batteries armed with smooth-bore guns, and were originally intended for this purpose, thus clearly indicating the existence of a belief that the wooden ship, even at this period, was unable to engage coast defences on equal terms. It appears certain that improvements in shells and fuzes would have driven the naval architect to a liberal use of armour even if the rifled gun had never arisen to change still further the relative capabilities of the ship and the coast battery. After the Crimean war, many experiments were carried out with armour plates, and "in 1858, the first squadron of sea- going armoured frigates — Gloire, Normandie, Invincible, and Couronne — were commenced in France, and scarcely were their keels laid when England responded to the advance with the Warrior (Fig. 6), the Black Prince, the Defence, and Resistance " ^ (1861). Fig. 6. 1 D □ Q_ HiiHIiKJBi'oirFiDi'a ||iil|Jl'''i'/:_ a a: a :D,M:a|i|:|ii Warrior. The French vessels were completely protected ; but their British rivals carried only a strip of side armour (4i-inch) over slightly more than half their length, rendering them impenetrable to the projectiles of smooth-bore guns, over the limited area thus covered. Such vessels would necessarily have suffered severely in an action with coast defences, as their large unprotected areas could be shattered, and if rolling even slightly in a sea-way, they would become liable to ' Armour and its attack by Artillery.' Capt. C. Ord. Browne, 1887. BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. dangerous under-water hits over nearly two-thirds of their length. On the other hand, the " armoured middle " conferred upon the greater part of the armament of the ship security- superior to that provided in most of the coast defences of the day ; so that, comparing battery with battery and putting aside the large unprotected ends, the ships possessed the advantage. In the Hector and Valiant (1863), the 4i-inch side armour was extended, covering the whole armament, but leaving the ends of the vessel without water-line protection. In the Achilles (1863) (Fig. 7), the water-line protection (4^ inches of iron) was extended from end to end, and the whole of the battery (more than one-half the length) was Fig. 7. yiia||aii'^''aiiHiiiiBiiti|||||j||i|||ji|pi|ijy||| Achilles. similarly protected. The Minotaur (1864) and the Agincourt (1865) have protection (5^ inches armour) to the entire water- line, and also to the battery, which extends the whole length of the ship with the exception of a small portion at the bows. The Northumberland (1866) carries Sj inches of iron over her whole water-line, and also over her battery, which extends nearly half her length. So long as these vessels were impervious to projectiles at fighting ranges, they were formidable to coast defences. They could not be seriously damaged by direct fire. They protected their whole arma- ments, their vitals and their crews. Their one disadvantage was that their guns all fired through ports, by which the field of view is necessarily restricted ; but this disadvantage was shared by all casemated batteries. Even at the present day, such vessels are by no means to be despised. For such an operation as the silencing of the forts of Alexandria, the FOR TIFICA TION. Agincourt or Minotaur would have been well suited. The Egyptians were able to make little or no effective use of their rifled guns, and to the smooth-bores, which they handled with some dexterity, these vessels would have been impervious. The demand for increased protection produced a class of broadside ships, in which the battery, reduced in length, stands upon a continuous water-line belt. In this class are the Bellerophon (1865) with 6 inches armour on belt and battery ; the Penelope (1867) with 6 inches and 5 inches on her sides, and 4^ inches on the bulkhead of the battery, which extends about one-third of her length ; the Hercules (1868) with 9 inches on the belt, and 8 inches to 6 inches on the battery; the Sultan (1868), similar to the Hercules, but provided with an upper battery mounting two guns ; the Invincible and Iron Duke (1869), Audacious, Swiftsure, and Triumph (1870). The Alexandra (1875) (Fig. 8) carries a 12-inch to lO-inch belt, and an upper and lower battery with six guns on each broadside and four ahead and astern, all Alexandra. Lower Deck behind 8 inches of armour. The Superb (1875) has a 12-inch belt and a battery in one story (9-inch), and containing six lo-inch R.M.L. (18-ton) guns in each broadside. All these vessels would, within the limits of their armour, be effective in attacking coast defences, since their armoured area is considerable and they protect their water-line, arma- BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. 223 ment, and crews. The armour of such vessels as the Alexandra and Superb would keep out common shell from new type guns, and with their own relatively large armaments thus secured, they would not only be better able to silence coast defences, but would themselves suffer less than the latest and most powerful battle-ships which still usurp the title of " ironclad." The evolution of the broadside ships thus followed the following lines. The " origin of the species " was the desire to obtain protection against shell fire from coast defences, and the Warrior and her sisters are practically old type frigates patched with iron on their sides. The struggle for existence, as gun-power steadily developed, produced first the con- tinuous belt and armoured battery, then the central battery, which, after having shrunk in the Bellerophon and Penelope, was expanded and subdivided in "C^q Alexandra ; while the total area and armament protected by armour tended to diminish, the proportion of weight of armour to displacement rose from I :6"38 in the Warrior to i :4 in the Alexandra. The gun still acquiring greater power, the attempt to give complete protection to water-line and armament was abandoned as hopeless, and the era of the broadside ironclad passed away. Meanwhile, the difficulty of providing adequate protection for the broadside vessel had given rise to another method of shipbuilding which developed on parallel lines. The exigencies of the American war produced the Monitors, which proved remarkably efficient within the limits of their requirements. The belt and turret thenceforth assumed prominence, and the problem of applying them to a sea-going ship was undertaken and solved. The Monarch (1868) has a 7-inch to 5-inch belt, a central casemate 7-inch armour about one-third of her length, with 224 FOR TIFICA TION. two turrets (lo-inch armour) on the top. The bow and stern are also armoured. She has thus five guns on her broadside. The Devastation (1871) (Fig. 9) and the Thunderer (1872), have completely armoured sides (12-inch to lo-inch) except above water forward, and a casemate not extending across the _z^^IISZ/^S33zi?^ Devastation. whole beam, and mounting two turrets carrying 14 inches of armour. In the Dreadnought (1875) the side armour is 14-inch to lo-inch, and the casemate extends across the beam carrying two turrets. The Glatton, Cyclops, Gorgon, Hecate, Hydra, coast-defence vessels, are all of similar build, but with a much lower free-board. The first named has only one turret. So far as the protection of this class of vessel goes, it is singularly complete, and coast batteries on shore, unless armed with guns capable of easily penetrating their armour, would be able to inflict little damage on them by direct fire, and would have to rely mainly on high-angle guns or mortars.^ On the other hand, their gun-power is not formidable on account of its small volume. It is a vast descent from the broadside even of a frigate of the Sebastopol era, to the four guns of these turret ships, and weakness in volume would render their fire less effective ^ than that of the Superb. The latter vessel could fire on a broadside ' Against high-angle fire these vessels are wholly unprotected. ^ The experience of the American War clearly proved the superiority of the New Ironsides to the monitors in dealing with coast defences. BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. 325 about twenty-four rounds in five minutes, the Thunderer barely eight. Gun-power, in the sense in which it is most formidable to coast defences, has thus been entirely sacrificed to armour protection. The evolution of shipbuilding had thus far proceeded smoothly on the two parallel lines above described ; but great changes were to follow. The gun was still growing in power and weight ; the results obtained upon targets at Shoeburyness appeared to be appalling ; the ship must be loaded with more armour, and must carry the heaviest guns available. In the Inflexible (1876) (Fig. 10) the side armour (20-inch, 24-inch and 16-inch) was concentrated in a central citadel extending less than one-third the length, and carrying two Fig. 10. Inflexible turrets (16-inch). An armoured deck (3-inch) was provided over the citadel, and below the water-line of the unprotected portions. Opinions have differed as to the fitness of the Inflexible for a fleet action ; but there can be no question of her unsuitability for the attack of coast defences. Con- siderably more than two-thirds of the broadside area is liable to be destroyed by any guns that can reach her. If rolling, she is liable to under-water hits over more than two-thirds of her length. Even if engaging end on, she proffers a target about 75 feet by 10 feet. Finally, her whole protected armament consists of four guns which require about five minutes for each round, and are absolutely dependent upon machinery for their working. Q 226 FORTIFICA TION. In compensation for these disabilities, the Infiexible carries four 1 6-inch R.M.L. (8o-ton guns), and her turrets and citadel would probably keep out the projectile of the 23-ton 9-2-inch gun at 2,000 yards. The weight of her armament would, however, tell extremely little in engaging well-designed coast defences, since a direct hit upon the shore gun is what is needed, and far lighter projectiles than those of the Inflexible will suffice to disable any guns. The Agamemnon and Ajax (1879) are really smaller Inflexibles with 18 inches and 15 inches of armour on the citadels, and carrying 12 • 5-inch (38-ton) muzzle-loading guns in their turrets. To make up for the deficiency of fire, which is a marked characteristic of the earlier turret ships, two unprotected 6-inch guns were added as auxiliaries. The Colossus and Edinburgh (1882), are of precisely similar type, but are armed with 1 2-inch B.L. guns. The auxiliary armament is increased to five 6-inch B.L. guns, all un- protected. The Nile (Fig. 11) and Trafalgar (1888), which appear to be developments of the Dreadnought, are belted (20-inch at water-line) for 230 feet of their length. Above the belt stands a large central citadel (18-inch to 16-inch on sides, 8-inch curved bulkheads at ends) on which are placed two Fig. II. Nile turrets, one at each end, over the centre line of the vessel. On the top of the citadel and between the turrets is a BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. 227 " central box battery " with armoured bulkheads 5-inch, and sides 3-inch. Each turret has two 13- 5-inch B.L. (67-ton) guns, and the auxiliary armament in the box battery consists of eight 4* 7-inch quick-firing guns. Fighting end on, these vessels can make use of only two heavy guns ; but the end on protection is very complete. By engaging broadside on, four heavy guns are available, and at ranges not exceeding 2,000 yards, four 4 •7-inch guns also; but the box battery, having only 3-inch side protection, could be rendered untenable at about 3,000 yards by the 6-inch B.L. gun, and, at 1,000 yards, even by 6-pr. guns capable of firing ten rounds per minute. In the latest designs (1889) for the turret ship Hood, (Fig. 12) the general features of the Nile and Trafalgar are followed. The belt (18-inch maximum) runs two-thirds of the length and ends in armoured bulkheads. The central citadel is divided into two so-called "redoubts" (17-inch), one at each end of the belt, protecting the bases of the turrets. Fig. 12. .^rdnroSZ ta..-.. Hood. The side space between the redoubts is armoured nearly up to the level of their tops with 5 -inch steel. Oblique armoured bulkheads join this lightly armoured citadel on to the redoubts. On the two decks above the citadel is the whole auxiliary armament consisting of 6-in. B.L. guns, of which four are in casemates with 6-inch armour. As regards suitability for engaging coast defences, the Hood will resemble the Nile and Trafalgar, except that when fighting end on the bases of the turrets are far better protected. The Q 2 FOR TIFICA TION. auxiliary armament will be more powerful, but can be fought only on a broadside, and the four casemates are vulnerable to the 6-inch gun at about 3,000 yards. The evolution of the two-turret battle-ships from 1876 to 1889 has been traced above, and starting with the abrupt change from Dreadnought to Inflexible, now shows a curious tendency to revert to the earlier type. The principle of the discontinuous belt eked out with an under-water armoured deck runs through all ; but the side armour has increased in length, reaching a maximum in the Nile and Trafalgar, and ending in a compromise — two strong redoubts and a weak central citadel in the Hood. The heavy broadside armament consists of four guns in each case, but the fore and aft fire — four guns in the diagonal turret ships Inflexible, Agamemnon, Ajax, Colossus, Edinburgh — is reduced to two only in the later ships. The growth of the auxiliary armament, neces- sitated by the slow rate of fire practicable with the heavy machine-worked guns, shows a marked increase, but is available against coast defences on^y by fighting -nearly on a broadside and exposing every man in the auxiliary battery. All the above vessels are eminently unsuited for engaging in a contest with shore batteries, in which they could expect to gain little and must count on heavy structural damages, irreparable without a return to port, and calculated to render them unseaworthy. On condition of abandoning their auxiliary armaments, they possess, nevertheless, the great advantage of being able to protect their whole crews — an advantage practically abandoned in other so-called " iron- clads." In view of the rapid development of quick-firing guns, of which even the lighter class (6-prs.)^ are capable of ' Handled as easily as a rifle and firing nearly as rapidly. BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. 229 riddling the unarmoured portions of a ship up to a range of 2,000 yards, this advantage is of great importance. The evolution of the single turret class of ship was marked by no break of continuity until the appearance of the Victoria and Sanspareil. The Hotspur (1870) has a continuous belt (ii-inch to 7-inch) and a citadel (8-inch) carrying a front turret (lo-inch to S^-inch). The armament consists of two ii-inch (25-ton) R.M.L. guns in the turret, and two auxiliary 6-inch B.L. guns unprotected. The Rupert (Fig. 13) is larger and has thicker armour. Rupert. The Conqueror (1881) and Hero (1885) have belts (12-inch to loj-inch) continuous except for a short length at the stern, where they are continued by an armoured deck. The citadels are shorter than that of the Hotspur, and the end bulkheads are both curved. The turrets (12-inch) contain two 12-inch B.L. (45-ton) guns, and the auxiliary armaments consist of four 6-inch B.L. guns unprotected. The armour is all compound. In the Victoria (Fig. 14, p. 230) and Sanspareil (1887) the belt (18-inch) extends over less than half the length, and is prolonged by a 3-inch under-water deck. Above the forward end of the belted portion is a "redoubt" (18-inch), on which stands the turret (i 8-inch) mounting two i6' 25-inch B.L. (no-ton) guns. For stern fire, a lo-inch B.L. gun (un- protected) is provided on the upper deck. The auxiliary 230 FORTIFICA TION. armament consists of twelve 6-inch B.L. guns, which are protected in front by splayed bulkheads (6-inch), the battery being also divided by a screen (3-inch). The six guns abaft Fig. 14. 340 o Victoria. this screen thus receive increased front protection. The whole auxiliary armament is protected on the broadside only by 3-inch armour, and is therefore completely vulnerable to the 6-inch at all practicable ranges. Unless able to engage end on, vessels of this class would suffer severely in an engagement with coast defences ; but this involves the non-employment of their auxiliary arma- ments, and consequently a very slow rate of fire. The 16 • 25-inch B.L. (iio-ton) guns of the Victoria and Saiispareil would be little more effective than the 12-inch guns of the Conqueror and Hero, but the former ships are exposed over 430 square yards of their total side target to the full effects of common shell from any class of guns on shore. If engaging broadside on, therefore, or taken in flank by one shore battery while engaged with another, they would be liable to most serious structural injuries, while their personnel also would suffer severely. Comparing the single and double turret classes, it is remarkable that, in the former, the tendency has been to BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. 231 diminish the side armour, in the latter to increase it. Both classes show a steady growth in the auxiliary armament. Side by side with the turret ships another type has developed. The Temeraire (1876) (Fig. 15), the first of the barbette vessels, and the link which connects the whole series with the casemate broadside ships, has a continuous belt (11 -inch to lo-inch), a divided central battery (8-inch) -with four lo-inch R.M.L. (18-ton) guns and two ii-inch (25-ton) Fig. 15. Temeraire. guns in angle ports. There are also two barbette towers (lO-inch to 8-inch) built upon the upper deck, with armoured (7 J-inch) ammunition hoists carried below the line of the belt. Each barbette mounts one ii-inch R.M.L. (25-ton) gun on the disappearing principle. The Temeraire was followed by the whole Admiral class ; Collingwood, Anson, Howe, Catnperdown, Rodney, and Ben- bow. The Collingwood (Fig. 16) is belted (18-inch) for about one-third of her length to a height of 2 feet 6 inches above the water-line. The two barbettes (14-inch and 1 2-inch) are built upon the upper deck outside the belt, but communicate with the protected parts by armoured ammuni- tion hoists (12-inch and 10-inch). The ends of the belt are connected by cross bulkheads (i6-inch), and above the level of the belt are splayed bulkheads (6-inch) meeting the barbette towers and protecting the portion of the main deck between them from raking fire. Each barbette mounts two 232 FOR TIFICA TION. 12-inch B.L. guns, and the auxiliary armament consists of six 6-inch broadside guns all unprotected except from end on fire. The armour is compound. Fig. i6. COLLINGWOOD. All the vessels of this class are similar in arrangement ; but the Benhow has a larger and higher belt, carries a i6* 25- inch B.L. (no-ton) gun in each barbette, and is provided with an auxiliary armament of ten 5-inch guns. The design (1889) for the seven new barbette battle-ships (Fig. 17) now under construction closely resembles that of the Hood. The belt extends over 60 per cent, of the length. The redoubts stand upon the belt, are higher than those of the Fig. 17. EW Barbette Ship. Hood, and form the barbette towers. Between the redoubts there is a citadel on the lower deck level with 5-inch side BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. 233 armour standing upon the belt. Each barbette will mount two 13" 5-inch B.L. (67-ton) guns, and the auxiliary armament will probably consist of 6-inch quick-firing guns, of which a certain number will have 6-inch protection. For engaging coast defences, the barbette vessels are pre- eminently unsuited. The Admiral class may conceivably be well adapted for a fleet action ; but they reproduce the disabilities of the Inflexible, and add others of their own. Not merely is there a large area of unprotected side vul- nerable to every projectile, but the supports of the heavy towers have no protection whatever, either from beam or raking fire. The barbettes expose their guns when in the firing position to somewhat dangerous hits from batteries on high sites. Again, the citadels of the Inflexible and similar ships provide protection for a large number of men on the main deck. Against a beam fire, the Admirals provide no main deck protection whatever, and moderately accurate practice from coast batteries would render the greater part of these vessels untenable. In the latest design, the protection is increased in extent as against the lighter nature of guns on shore ; but the whole of the broadside target, with the exception of the belt and redoubts (about 470 square yards) will be vulnerable to the 6-inch gun at about 2,500 yards, and of this large target only 100 square yards have 5-inch armour, the rest (370 square yards) being vulnerable to the 6-inch gun at all ranges. Armour will unquestionably prove a more effective pro- tection in action than Shoeburyness experiments may seem to indicate. The principal feature of most modern battle- ships is, however, that they have extremely little armour, and in a large number of cases can scarcely be said to protect their crews at all, except on condition of being able to engage end on without liability to beam attack. For vessels 234 FORTIFICATION. able to protect their crews effectively against direct fire, it is necessary to go to the Devastation class, and even such vessels are liable to deck attack by high-angle fire from which their crews have little or no protection. The grave exposure of personnel in modern ships of war will be severely felt in the first action between a fleet and properly designed and well-fought coast defences. The modern coast battery provides nearly complete protection even for men serving the guns, and absolute protection for all others. The ship, unless the auxiliary armament is abandoned, must expose the greater part of the crew not engaged in serving the few protected guns. In a fleet action, this exposure may be of less consequence, since the enemy must be equally circumstanced ; so that the ship best handled and manned by the crew possessing the highest training and morale, will have the chances in her favour. At least the combat is on fair and equal terms. In engaging coast defences, however, the relative conditions differ absolutely, and as far as the greater proportion of its broadside area is concerned, the battle-ship is now in a worse position than was the wooden frigate. It is fully admitted that these ships effectively protect their so-called " vitals," and that it would be extremely difficult to sink a well-belted vessel. To sink a vessel or disable her engines is not essential, however. To cause a heavy loss in personnel will amply suffice for the purpose of coast defences, and the position of a modern ship at a long distance from her base, with her unarmoured portions riddled, and half her crew hors de combat,'- will be ' The Buascar, in her action with the Almirante Cochrane and the Blanco Encalada, appears to have received oniy nine projectiles in board, excluding those which destroyed the wealc conning tower. More than one-third of her crew were killed and wounded. The Cochrane was hit above the belt by a projectile which passed through both sides without bursting, but killed and wounded ten men, besides inflicting much damage. BRITISH WAR-SHIPS. 235 eminently precarious. From this point of view the armoured belt will be of little service to the ship in an action with coast defences, but by keeping her afloat may lead to her capture by an inferior vessel. If armour is likely to prove largely delusive as a practical protection to the battle-ship in an action with coast defences, the disabilities of the so-called " protected cruiser " class will be far more pronounced. In this class are such broadside vessels as ih& Nelson {i?>77), Northampton (1877), and Shannon (1875). The two former are belted (g-inch and 6-inch) over about 180 feet out of a total length of 280 feet, and have bulkheads (9-inch, 8-inch, 6-inch). In the bulkheads there are angle ports on the main deck, protected with 8 inches of iron. The armament consists of four lo-inch R.M.L. (18-ton) guns in the angle ports, and four 9-inch R.M.L. (12-ton) guns on each side. Thus, if able to engage end on, these vessels can fight two 10-inch R.M.L. guns behind armour penetrable by a 6-inch B.L. gun at about 2,000 yards. Of the total broadside target of about 600 square yards, only one-tenth has any protection. The Shannon is belted (9-inch to 6-inch) from the stern to within about 60 feet of the bows, and has a forward bulkhead only, with two armoured (8-inch) angle ports on the upper deck. She can be completely raked from the stem to this bulkhead. These three vessels provide no protection for their crews in action, except on condition of being able to avoid all fire on the broadside. The armoured cruisers Imperieuse (1883) and Warspite (1884) are belted (lO-inch compound) over 140 feet of a total length of 315 feet, and carry four barbette towers (8-inch compound) on the upper deck, each mounting a 9 •2-inch B.L. gun. The towers are placed two on the centre line fore and aft, and two amidships ; thus three protected guns can 236 FORTIFICATION. be fired fore and aft, or on either broadside. In addition, there are six 6-inch guns unprotected. The ammunition hoists below the towers have only 3 inches of armour, and there are no bulkheads above the belt. The vitals of these ships may be well-protected ; but the fighting crews, except the detachments in the barbettes, have no protection whatever. A single well-mounted 6-inch gun on shore ought to be able in a short time to put one of these ships out of action by destroying her crew. The Aurora class have a belt (lO-inch) extending 194 feet out of a length of 300 feet. The armament — two 9" 2-inch B.L. and ten 6-inch B.L. guns — is all on the upper deck and unprotected. The Leander class have a ij-inch steel deck over the engines, curving down below the water-line. The whole armament, and even the steering gear, is unprotected. The Mersey and Severn have a 2-inch steel deck inclined down and increased to 3-inch at the sides. Cruisers are constructed only to fight similar vessels on the high seas, and their principal qualifications are speed and coal endurance. Where, as in the case of the Nelson, North- ampton, Shannon, Imperieuse, Warspite, they carry protected guns, they would be able to fight these guns under certain limitations ; but, their crews being fully exposed, the coast battery will not concern itself with their armour, and will employ common shell, which would quickly convert them into slaughter-houses. Except for a great and definite end, it would be criminal to pit such vessels against moderately armed coast defences. The evolution of the French ships has proceeded on different lines from our own. There is far less diversity of type, and the vessels fall easily into groups. The belt has been persistently retained, and vessels of the Inflexible and FRENCH WAR-SHIPS. 237 Admiral class have no counterparts. The turret (except the case of the Hoche) has been applied to coast defence vessels only, and the barbette tower, adopted at an early- period, has become universal. The following will serve to show the chain of evolution : — Heroine, Provence (1863) completely armoured sides (6-inch on belt, 4i-inch above). Wooden vessels. Belliqiieuse (1865), belt (6-inch), casemate (4|-inch), con- taining six guns on each broadside. Wooden vessel. Ocean (1868), belt (8-inch), casemate (6^-inch), carrying an unarmoured barbette over each angle. Wooden vessel. Richelieu (1873), similar to Ocean, but with slightly thicker belt (8^-inch), and four armoured barbettes (6i-inch) above casemate. Wooden vessel. Colbert (1875) and Trident (1876) ; belt (S^-inch), case- mate (6|-inch), with three broadside ports. Wooden vessel. Redoubtable (1876), belt (14-inch), casemate (gi-inch), with two broadside ports ; two unarmoured barbettes above casemate. Thitis (1877), belt (6-inch), casemate (4-f-inch), with two broadside ports ; two armoured side barbettes (4-inch) above casemate. Devastation (1879), belt (l4f-inch), extending to within a short distance of stern, casemate (gi-inch), with four guns in angle ports ; two unarmoured side barbettes above case- mate, and one aft on midship line. Turenne (1879), (Fig. 19, p. 239), belt (lo-inch to 6-inch), four barbettes (8-inch) on upper deck, two in midship line, two on the sides forward. Duguesclin (1883), arrangement similar to Turenne, belt (9|-inch), four towers (7|-inch). Formidable (1885), (Fig. 18, p. 238), belt (rg-inch to 14- 238 FORTIFICA TION. inch), three towers in midship line (i5f-inch), communicating tubes (151-inch). Hoche (1886), belt (i/f-inch to 9|-inch), two turrets (151-inch) fore and aft in midship line, two side barbettes (i5|-inch) amidships, unarmoured central battery. The sequence has thus been : — (a) the completely armoured side ; (^) the belt and casemate ; (c) the addition of four, two, or one armoured or unarmoured barbettes above the Fig. 18. Formidable - Battle Sh/p. _£. t;o Fast Scale for Fren:h vessels. casemate ; (d) the suppression of the casemate and the establishment of independent armoured barbettes standing on the upper deck ; (e) the addition of strongly armoured ammunition hoists ; (/) a combination of turrets and barbettes. The barbette towers at first placed upon the casemates have become detached in later designs, and with the suppression of the casemates, armoured bulkheads have ceased to be provided. The area vulnerable to even light FRENCH WAR-SHIPS. 239 shell fire is, therefore, very large. In the non-casemate vessels, the supports of the barbette towers are liable to be destroyed by common shell, and these vessels can be raked from end to end. The mode in which the barbette guns are mounted causes them to be much exposed, and the sole protected armament is thus specially liable to disablement in engaging coast defences on moderately high ground. In the Formidable'^ (Fig- 18). which represents the most powerful type of battle-ship, the total unprotected area of the broadside target is more than 400 square yards. Over this great area, all projectiles would be effective, and large shell bursting below the barbette towers might disable their armament. Engaging end on, the Formidable can only bring one protected gun to bear, and her vulnerable target is even then more than 80 square yards, over the whole of which she can be raked. The barbette towers give little or no protection against fire from a moderately high site. It would Fig. 19. TURENNE - Armoured Cruiser. be almost useless to fire armour-piercing projectiles at such a ship, as the armoured target is so small that it is unlikely to be hit. On the other hand, every hit from common shell The Amiral Baudin is almost precisely similar. 24° FORT I PICA TION. would be effective. For engaging coast defences, the For- midable is eminently unsuited. The Turenne (Fig. 19), classed as an armoured cruiser, is really a second-class battle-ship, capable of going any\vhere within the limits of her coal supply, and has been employed on the China station. She has only four protected guns, of which two can be fired directly forward and three on a broadside. Her disabilities are those of the Formidable in an aggravated form. The armour of her barbettes is penetrable at 2,000 yards by the 6-inch gun. She has no armoured ammunition hoists, and it is difficult to see how she could be fought at all under moderately accurate fire from coast defences. The Fiirieiix (1883) (Fig. 20) represents the latest type of coast defence vessel, and would be employed only in European Fig. 20. Armoured Deck ail ouer FURIEUX- Coast Defence Ironclad. waters. She exposes a large vulnerable broadside target, and engaging end on, can use only one gun. Such a vessel may be well suited for harbour defence, but is utterly unfitted for engaging shore batteries. The Grenade (1888) (Fig. 21) is an armoured gunboat FRENCH WAR-SHIPS. 241 with one protected gun. If engaging end on she is well protected ; but the barbette principle of mounting, at all times unsuited for dealing with coast defences, appears Fig. 21. ELEVATION upper deck plan Grenade (Armoured Gun Boat) specially disadvantageous in the case of a vessel with such a low freeboard. The Cecille (1888), first-class cruiser (Fig. 22), has no armour protection except the deck. Such a vessel could not engage properly handled coast defences without losing the greater part of her crew in the course of a few minutes. Taken as a whole, the French vessels are decidedly less fit for action against coast defences than our own. In all cases where the shore gun has a decided command over the ship, the barbette principle has certain disadvantages ; but the method of mounting adopted in our Admiral class (Plate XXIII.) is infinitely superior to the steel breech hoods of the French vessels as regards protection both to guns and crew. The belt, on the distribution of the armour of which much care, has been bestowed, is of comparatively little importance. The exposure of the crews, and the absence of armoured bulkheads would tell heavily against the French 242 FORTIFICATION. vessels, and even the coast-defence class appear less suited for coast attack than our own. There are no ships in the French navy so well able to take punishment from coast z < _l a o o LU Q o CC UJ Q. Q. 3 k batteries as the Devastation and her two sisters. The For- midable and Amiral Baudin compare unfavourably with the Nile and Trafalgar ; the Diiperre appears inferior to ITALIAN WAR-SHIPS. 243 the citadel class, on account of the greater exposure of personnel. The development of the Italian vessels presents a remark- able feature in the suppression of side armour in battle-ships. The Duilio (1876) and Dandolo (1878) are practically the same in general arrangement as the Inflexible. In the Italia (1880) and Lepanto (1883), however, there is no side armour ; and the oval redoubt (19-inch inclined at 23°), in which the two barbettes are placed, is all on the upper deck, communi- SECTION A. Cellulose Caissons B. Coffer Dam C. Cells D. Double Bottom Cecille. eating by armoured ammunition (hoists 19-inch to isf-inch) with the protected under-water deck. These vessels can thus fire four 103-ton B.L. guns ahead, astern, or on either broad- side. As their crews are unprotected against the lightest guns on shore, they are debarred from engaging coast defences, except on condition of not being frequently hit, and may be put out of action by any guns which can reach them. In the Riiggiero di Lauria (1884), the Andrea Dorea, and R 2 244 ^OR TIFICA TION. the Francesco Morosini, there is a return to side armour, a partial belt (174-inch) supporting an oval redoubt (l5f-inch) in which the armament of four lo6-toh guns is mounted in two barbettes. In the Re Umberto, vertical armour is again entirely dis- pensed with except round the funnels. The auxiliary armaments of all these vessels is unprotected, and the craze for enormous guns has resulted in a type alto- gether unfit to engage properly mounted 6-inch guns oa shore. The earlier vessels, Palestro (1871), Principe- Amedeo (1872), are built of wood, and have continuous belts (Bf-inch) sup- porting casemates (6-inch) at the bows and sterns. The forward casemate is in two stories, and has one 11 -inch R.M.L. gun (2S-ton) above, and two lo-inch R.M.L. (18-ton) below, in angle ports. The after casemate has four lo-inch R.M.L. guns, two of which are in angle ports. These ships can thus fire three protected guns ahead and on the broad- side, and two astern. Within the limits of their armour, their end-on protection is good, but nearly two-thirds of the main deck, and almost the whole of the upper deck, have no side protection whatever. Russia has seven battle-ships afloat, of which five are com- pleted ; three more are building. The Kniaz Pojarsky (1867) is belted (4i-inch) with a case- mate battery (4i-inch) mounting eight 8-inch guns. She carries only 350 tons of coal, and is inferior in all respects to the Achilles. The Peter the Great (1872) has a complete belt (14-inch to lo-inch), a citadel (14-inch) extending right across the beam, and supporting two turrets (14-inch) in midship line, each mounting two 12-inch gims. She has no other protected guns, and carries only a minor armament on the upper deck. RUSSIAN WAR-SHIPS. 245 The Catherine II. (1886) is the first of a type special to the Russian navy. She has a continuous belt (16-inch to 8-inch), a central citadel (12-inch sides), lo-inch and 9-inch bulkheads, supporting an upper pear-shaped redoubt (12-inch), containing three barbettes, each with two 1 2-inch guns on hydraulic disappearing mountings. The auxiliary armament is seven 6-inch unprotected guns on the main deck. The Tchesma (1886) and the Sinope (Fig. 23) (1887) are practically the FlTr. 23. Sinope (First CSaRS Battle Ship) Scale for Russian Vessels 50 100 «so feet same, but have thicker armour (14-inch) on the redoubts ; and in the Sinope the disappearing mountings appear to have been abandoned. The Emperor Alexander II. (1887) is of a different type. She carries a belt (14-inch to 6-inch), a redoubt (i 2-inch) for- ward, supporting a low barbette tower, containing two 12-inch guns, apparently on breech disappearing (Plate XXIII.) mountings, covered in by a 3-inch hood. The redoubt con- tains two 6-inch guns in angle ports which can fire straight forward. From the sides of the redoubt are splayed bulk- heads (6-inch) protecting the central battery from raking 246 FOR TIFICA TJON. fire, and two 9-inch guns are mounted in angle ports firing through these bulkheads. There is a cross bulkhead (6-inch) aft, with 9-inch guns in angle ports. The central battery- contains two 6-inrh guns, unprotected on each broadside, as well as the four 9-inch guns in the angle ports, which have only 3-inch side protection. The Alexander II. can thus fire six guns right ahead (two 1 2-inch, two 9-inch, two 6-inch), all protected, eight on the broadside (two 1 2-inch, two 9-inch, four 6-inch), of which two 12-inch and one 6-inch are well protected, two 9-inch have 3-inch only, and the rest are unprotected. The distinctive features of the Russian battle-ships are complete belts, and the pear-shaped redoubt, of which there are three examples. Within the limits of their armour protection, these three vessels, Catherine II., Tckesma, Smofe, as well as the Peter the Great, are well fitted to engage coast defences. They protect their crows well, can fire four heavy guns in any direction, and appear capable of taking much punishment. The later Alexander II. seems decidedly inferior from this point of view, unless able to engage without exposing her sides. The Kniaz Pojarsky can be penetrated anywhere by the 6-inch gun up to at least 4,ocx) yards. Compared with the French battle-ships, the few Russian vessels appear to be better fitted for fighting coast defences ; but the hooded barbettes render the guns and their gear specially exposed to the fire of batteries on high sites. In restricting their armaments to the 12-inch gun the Russians appear to have shown sound judgment. In the coast defence class, the Russians have twenty-four vessels, mostly low free- board monitors, with 4-i-inch to S-inch armour. The best protected vessel is the circular Admiral Popoff, which has 16-inch. These vessels are hardly sea-going, and could RUSSIAN WAR-SHJf'S. 247 scarcely be brought so far as Malta without risk. The Admirals Lasarejf (4-i-inch), Spiridoff {6-\nch sides, 7-inch turrets), and Tchitchagoff (6-inch sides and turrets), could apparently take the sea, but have little coal capacity (300 tons), and are unlikely to be employed outside of European waters. In the cruiser class, Russia has only seven vessels with any side armour, and in addition three with merely protected decks. In the first category, the only ship which has any armour protection to her guns is the Nakhimoff (1885), (Fig. 24), now on the China station. She is similar in arrangement to our Warspite and Imperieiise, but carries two 8-inch guns in each barbette in place of one 9 •2-inch Fig. 24. Admiral Nakhimoff (I?* Class Armoured Cruiser) gun. With a large unarmoured side target, no main-deck bulkheads, and only 3-inch protection to ammunition hoists, the Nakhimoff could not engage well mounted guns on shore with any prospect of success, and would suffer most severely in a short action. The Pamyat Azova (1888), (Fig. 25), is the finest vessel in the belted category. She has no protection to either armament or crew, and could only engage coast defences on condition of receiving very few hits. 248 FORT I PICA TION. The Russians could, apparently, attack coast defences at a distance from their ports only by employing their few battle-ships, which they would find the greatest difficulty in coaling. Fig. 25. PAMYAT AZOVA (Belted Cruiser) Tables are given (Appendices G and H) showing the principle characteristics, from the coast defence point of view, of all the sea-going French and Russian vessels which could well be regarded as possible antagonists of coast defences. The inevitable inference from the above analysis of naval development is, that the progress of gun-power, and the necessity for building ships to fight other ships, has resulted in types of vessels which become less and less qualified for engaging coast defences with any chance of success. In war- ships of the ordinary type, the so-called "vitals" — boilers, engines, and steering gear — are generally well protected ; and the reason is obvious. Most naval officers regard ramming as likely to play an important part in future actions, and to prove the surest road to brilliant successes. Given an intact conning tower, and motive power unimpaired, a chance of ramming will always remain ; and the silencing of the guns, whose smoke might prove eminently embarrassing, would probably facilitate the handling of the ship, and thus enhance the prospects of the ram. EXPOSURE OF PERSONNEL. 249 In engaging coast defences, however, this powerful weapon disappears, and the task must be accomphshed by the gun alone. It is for this reason that the exposure of the per- sonnel of "the modern ship becomes a factor of the first importance. The crews are, in this case, the real '' vitals " of the ship, and to inflict heavy loss upon them will suffice for all purposes. Belts and armoured decks are therefore of extremely little value to the ship in an actual contest with well-mounted guns on shore. They will, however, serve to ke_ep her afloat, and give her the power to decline further combat, as soon as she has received damage in structure or personnel calculated to imperil her return to the base. The unarmoured ships, which form the larger portion of the ocean-going navies of the world, are disqualified from engaging any modern coast defences manned by the troops of civilized Powers. This fact is, however, very imperfectly realized in some quarters, where an iron ship is usually con- founded with an ironclad. It would probably be considered lunacy to pit a wooden frigate against 6-inch guns on shore ; but such a vessel as the" protected C^cille (Fig. 22, pp. 242, 243) would suffer even more severely. The damages inflicted in iron are extremely serious in themselves, and could not be repaired at sea. The splinters created in an iron vessel are highly dangerous. An armour-piercing projectile would pass clear through the sides of a wooden frigate. There will be plenty of objects on board the C^cille quite capable of turning it down, in which case it would probably pass through the bottom, unless stopped in the engine room. Imagine every part of the Cicille above the protective deck to be transparent, so that all her crew are visible at their guns — like bees in a glass hive. The madness of attempting to fight coast defences under such conditions will at once be 2 5 o FOR T/FICA TION. apparent. But the conditions are, for the Ckille, much worse than this, since her sides will suffice to burst all common shell, and to add liberally to their splinters ; while, as a target, she would be rendered almost invisible at a moderate range by this imagined transparency. Special vessels fitted for dealing with coast defences can still be built, but if of sea-going type would require at least two years to build ; and if of the small monitor class, would not be sea-going, and could not be employed at a distance from their base except by a Power possessing the command of the sea. From the above it will be evident that comparatively few ships exist which are capable of engaging coast batteries armed with the 6-inch gun. Some battle-ships and some "coast defence" vessels are suited for the purpose; but the cruiser class, as a whole, and all vessels of European Powers likely to be found across the Atlantic, in the Pacific, in Indian or Cape waters, are disqualified from fighting any defences properly conceived and organized. Such vessels as the belted Pamyat Azova, and the " pro- tected " Ckille can scarcely be viewed in the light of possible antagonists ; and the fact that the scare created by such ships as the armed merchantmen of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, is largely responsible for exaggerated estimates of the requirements of coast defence in some of the Australian colonies, shows how necessary it is to arrive at a clearer idea of the primary conditions of the contest between the ship and the coast battery. . Modern field guns, well posted behind extemporised cover, would suffice to drive off any one of the ships referred to with much damage and heavy loss. As a rule, the last object of the shore battery, in dealing with modern ships, should be to penetrate armour of which, if it is not a danger rather than a ARMOUR PENETRATION. 251 protection, there is relatively little.* The first object is to hit the unarmoured portions^ as frequently as possible by common shell which will burst inside. The mania for armour pene- tration has effectually obscured the real issue. Even now doubts appear to exist as to whether armoured decks can be penetrated with certainty by high-angle fire ; and tedious experiments are carried out to settle the point. Everything that it is necessary to destroy, however, is above the armoured deck ; and if it were desired to kill men crowded in an iron- floored room, by dropping a shell through the ceiling, the most obvious policy appears to be to burst the shell on the floor, not to penetrate it. Some measure of knowledge of what modern ships of war really are, is the first qualification necessary in fixing the scale and nature of the armaments of the various ports of the Empire. ' To attempt to pierce the armour of the Dandolo and Duilio or of our Inflexible class would be a pure waste of ammunition, considering that any of these vessels might be put out of action in half an hour by well handled medium guns. * Thin armour is obviously included. Light plates which will not keep out common shell merely serve to increase the danger to men behind them. 25 2 FOR TIFICA TION. CHAPTER XVI. RESPONSIBILITY. — FUNCTIONS OF COAST DEFENCE. — ARMAMENTS OF COAST DEFENCES. — HIGH-ANGLE FIRE. — OLD TYPE GUNS NOT VALUELESS. — QUICK- FIRING GUNS. — DISTRIBUTION OF ARMAMENT. — DIS- PERSION. — INVISIBILITY. — METHODS OF MOUNTING. — COAST WORKS. — MAGAZINES. — PARAPETS. — ELECTRIC LIGHTS. — DIRIGIBLE TORPEDOES. — THE PNEUMATIC GUN. — CONCLUSION. The chain of responsibility in regard to the defence of British harbours at home and abroad is easily defined. It rests with the Cabinet alone, and in a special sense with the Prime Minister, to lay down the Power, or combination of Powers, against which the defences of the Empire must be prepared. Until this has been done, there is no basis on which to ixst the general standard of our preparations for war. A further datum is however needed, which also can only be laid down on the authority of the Cabinet, acting after full consultation with real experts of both services. In a certain sense, the functions of the Navy may be said to overlap, or include those claimed for coast defence. It is evident that, in the extreme case, such a naval strength may be conceived as to render all coast defences superfluous. It is also evident that, although beyond the little rayon of their guns coast defences are useless, their existence gives time REQUIREMENTS OF COAST DEFENCE. 253 for naval combinations, and, in this sense, reduces the number of ships which it would be necessary, in their absence, to maintain in given waters. To an Empire scattered in fragments over the world, linked by ocean roads alone, and dependent for existence upon trade, a certain minirmim naval strength is absolutely neces- sary. Failing the minimum necessary to protect commerce and- keep open sea communications, coast defences are of little or no use. The following questions thus arise. At what point, under _ the above conditions, does it become economical to employ coast defences 1 If the minimum naval force — necessary on other grounds — is maintained, what is the precise nature of the functions which then remain to coast defences ? In one form or another these questions are being debated even at this late hour. The interest the controversy excites is possibly gratifying ; but no country which has not fully made up its mind on these points is in a position to lay down the standard of its coast defences. Waste of national resources must be the inevitable result of failure to lay down an authoritative standard, and such waste is not incompatible with inefficiency and unfitness for the needs of war. The general standard, in the above sense, having been clearly laid down, the next question which arises is that of the positions which it is necessary to defend,^ having regard to the requirements of naval strategy on the one hand and local requirements on the other. Once the positions are decided, their geographical position with respect to the possible bases of the Power or Powers against which the country is to be defended, is defined. It becomes -possible to lay down for each port the most probable form and ' These positions were authoritatively laid down, so far as the British Empire abroad is concerned, by Lord Carnarvon's Commission only eight years ago. 254 FORTIFICATION. strength of attack, the nature of vessels likely to be employed, the number and nature of the guns needed, and the suitability of submarine mines to the local conditions. These questions can only be properly treated by naval experts accustomed to deal with considerations of this class. It is for naval officers alone to say whether the lo-inch gun capable of piercing 20 inches of wrought iron armour at 1,000 yards is required (say) for the defences of Port Phillip, Victoria ; or whether a minefield is desirable at a great commercial port offering such peculiar conditions as (say) the Mersey. Only when the above questions have been decided do the functions of the soldier begin. The probable strength and form of attack having been laid down, he is able to fix the necessary strength of the garrison. The nature of gun being determined, he can arrive at the best distribution and the most suitable method of mounting. Finally, it is his business to design the necessary works and lay down the organization required to render them efficient for war. The above process appears logically inevitable if questions of coast defence are to be scientifically treated ; but it has rarely been followed, with the result that first principles are still, apparently, regarded as matters of debate, and that no stability of opinion seems to be attainable. In the absence of authoritative data, recourse must be had to private judgment, and the following conclusions are there- fore merely those to which the writer has been led by the light of such experience as war and peace experiment provide. No attempt has been made to lay down hard and fast rules. A " typical defence " cannot be formulated, since the ruling conditions, hydrographic and topographic, differ widely, and each case must be considered on its own merits. Principles only can be laid down, and their application to FUNCTIONS OF COAST DEFENCE. 255 individual ports must be left to officers possessing an adequate mental training combined witli experience. The functions which coast defence are capable of perform- ing are of three kinds : — 1. To prevent the use of a harbour by an enemy for the purpose either of shelter or of landing troops. 2. To bar a harbour or channel of approach and exclude an enemy from the inner waters. 3. To prevent the bombardment of a dockyard, town or arsenal. Of the above (2) always includes (i) ; (2) and (3) may be combined (Plymouth, Malta) ; or (2) may practically include (3) (Glasgow, Port Philip) ; (3) involves denial of adjacent waters to an enemy (Gibraltar). Guns will in most cases best fulfil the conditions of (i). Submarine mines, supported by quick-firing guns capable of dealing with boats might seem capable of performing (2) ; but in the case of almost every port of the empire, the unrestricted entry of friendly vessels is of the first im- portance, and unless it can be shown that no dangerous restrictions are involved in the use of mines, guns must be provided. Guns will in all cases be necessary for (3) ; but may, subject to the condition above stated, be combined with mines. In every case. Infantry defence, of strength varying accord- ing to circumstances, will be required. Coast defence guns can rarely be self-defensible, and if unsupported by Infantry, are liable to capture, as the French wars proved. The technical problem of Coast Fortification thus generally consists in distributing guns of a given nature to the best advantage, in so mounting these guns as to obtain the maximum of effect with the minimum of risk, and in pro- viding adequately for the Infantry defence of the position. 256 FORTIFICA TION. The nature of the armament required depends upon the following considerations : — The guns of the defence must be of sufficient power to deal effectively with such vessels as are likely to be brought against them. The enemy's ships must not be able to effectively engage the defences at ranges to which the latter are unable to effectively -reply. The question therefore arises as to whether ironclads are likely to be employed against the defences in question, and if so^ what would, be the amount of their probable protection and the nature of its distribution ? Further, is the attack of the armour of such vessels likely to prove the best policy to adopt ? These questions can only be authoritatively answered by naval officers, and the writer can only briefly state his own views, arrived at in accordance with the considerations presented in the preceding Chapters. Except in the case of certain exceptional ships, which in foreign navies are mostly classed as coast defence vessels, the penetration of thick armour is the last object which coast defence guns should seek to attain. Such exceptional ships are not likely to be met with in distant waters. In most other cases, the penetration of thick armour is not only not required, but is the least likely result to be obtained by coast defence guns ; since, in the first place, armour will unquestionably prove far more effective than Shoeburyness experiments indicate, and, in the second place, the disproportion of armoured to unarmoured area is so great (see Appendices G and H) that the chances of hitting the former are relatively small. The attack of the deck by high-angle fire is necessarily dangerous to all ships, and as the armoured deck is usually at or below the water-line, shell bursting 011 this deck are much more likely to be dangerously effective against the COMMON SHELL. 257 personnel than those which penetrate it. To destroy the personnel, to make large wounds in the unarmoured portions, and to attack the armament — completely exposed in barbette ships — should therefore be the main objects of the coast defence gun. The unarmoured vessels, of which the cruiser fleets of the world are almost entirely composed, even if pro- vided with protective decks, cannot stand against any guns which can reach them, and mere water-line belts ^ are more likely to secure the capture of an enemy's ship, by keeping her afloat, than to save her from being quickly put out of action by loss in men and by structural injuries, dangerous in proportion to the distance from the nearest repairing base.^ Common shell is, therefore, the principal weapon of coast defences, and the lighter types of gun, on account of their advantage in ease of handling and rate of fire, appear certain to prove the most formidable antagonists of the ship.^ Finally, the difficulty any Power would find in moving armourclads to a great distance during war with Great Britain is far more serious than is usually appreciated. It follows from the above that the 6-in. B.L. gun will amply suffice as the maximum for all the requirements of Australasian defence, and also for the West Indies, Bermuda, Halifax and Esquimalt.* The general capabilities of this ' Such as that of the Admiral Mikhimoff [see Fig. 24, p. 247). ^ Thus La Galissonih-e made at once for Hong Kong in consequence of a single hit received in a brief engagement with Chinese gunners in the Min Forts. ' Tlie relative unimportance of penetrating armour as compared with the effects of common shell is recognized in the small proportion of armour-piercing projectiles proposed to be supplied to new-type guns ; but the logical deduction, that very heavy guns are not needed for coast defence, does not appear to have been grasped. ■" The requirements of these stations would however be changed if the United States becomes a strong naval power, and if it were necessary at this period lo include the Great Republic amongst our possible enemies, a contingency which is hardly conceivable. S 258 FOR TIFICA TION. gun are shown in Appendix I. For such a position as the Falkland Islands, and in all cases where cruiser attack only has to be provided against, and bombardment is not in question, the 4" 7-inch quick-firing gun (Appendix K) would meet every need. In the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, Ceylon, the Indian Ports, Aden, Mauritius, the Cape and Sierra Leone, the provision of a proportion of heavier ordnance may be desir- able ; but the 9* 2-inch gun (see Appendix J) represents the maximum required. Gibraltar may be placed in the same category on account of the exceptional advantages given by the high sites available. Malta, by reason of its distance from England and prox- imity to the naval bases of possible enemies, occupies a some- what special position. Moreover, the possession of this island base is essential to the full development of British naval strength in the Mediterranean ; while the withdrawal of the fleet for some special service, involving the isolation of Malta for a time, might conceivably occur. For these reasons, the armament of Malta should include a few of the heaviest guns capable of being worked by hand. The 12-inch gun fulfils this condition, but might probably be improved.'' The cases of the Home naval ports vary somewhat. At Portsmouth, the 1 2-inch gun would suffice as the maximum armament; at Plymouth the lo-inch or even the 9"2-inch; at Portland and Pembroke the 9* 2-inch. None of these Ports are ever likely to be attacked except as part of a scheme of attempted invasion, possible only to an enemy who had ' The Mark V. 12-inch gun fires a 340-lb. charge with a 714-lb. projectile, giving a muzzle velocity of 2063 fs., or 1915 at 1000 yards. The penetration of wrought iron at 1000 yards, 22J inches. The common shell carries a bursting charge of 31 lb. 9 oz. The Russian 12-inch gun is longer, weighs 55 '8 tons, and tires a 999-lb. projectile. DECK ATTACK. 259 succeeded in obtaining and retaining full naval command in home waters. Long and cramped tidal channels such as the Thames are only liable to aggression on condition of the collapse of the British Navy, and for the commercial ports generally the 6-inch gun will fully suffice.^ In all cases, the 6-inch gun should form the principal portion of the arma- ment ; and if the quick-firing type proves successful, without entailing a loss of power, it should unquestionably be adopted. The deck attack is so extremely formidable, and the facilities provided by the position-finding system are so remarkable that high-angle fire must necessarily be a most important element of coast defence. In the case of straight channels offering no difficulties of navigation and capable of being passed at speed, this nature of fire appears unsuited. Such cases are not common, however, and the presence of a few observation mines,^ whose efficiency could be depended upon, would prove a sufficient deterrent to such tactics. Ships intended to engage coast works with any probability of success must anchor or steam up to a buoy to fire, thus offering an admirable opportunity for high-angle ordnance. To keep an enemy's vessels in motion will thus be an im- portant function of high-angle fire. Although long range bombardments of coast works are perfectly useless, the bom- bardment of a town or a dockyard having a large area, might be carried out at fully 8,000 yards by ships in movement. Even in this case, high-angle fire will be effective against vessels in slow movement. Finally, high-angle guns can be ' Against this view may possibly be quoted the proceedings of the Collingxaood and Anson in 1889 ; but it may be pointed out tliat these vessels must be regarded as subsequently sunk or captured. That an enemy would thus detach his battle- ships is in the highest degree improbable. Moreover, 6-in. guns are quite capable of dealing with the above ships. '' In weather so thick as to prevent the use of these mines, most such ports are quite secure against attack.* S 2 26o FORTIFICA TION. utilized to render the inner watens of a port untenable by an enemy, without sacrificing their exterior range. In most cases, therefore, the addition of such guns will be an ex- tremely valuable adjunct of coast defence. The 9-inch R.M.L. gun if polygrooved is remarkably accurate up to ranges of at least 8,000 yards, and as the available number of these guns is large they may probably be taken as the standard armament. For high-angle fire (35°-70°) it is proposed to employ a projectile weighing 360 lb., and the bursting charge of the common shell is 10 lb. If bored up to lo-inch, the gun would throw a common shell of 410 lb., with a bursting charge of 23 lb. 8 oz. The gun can be easily handled, and appears quite sufficiently powerful for the purpose. Since the introduction of the long breech loader, the old type guns have fallen into disrepute,^ not entirely merited. At the longer ranges their shooting is necessarily less accurate than that of the new ordnance ; but, considering the size of a .ship's target, the difference at moderate range is not strongly marked, as shown by the following comparative table.^ Gun. Range. Elevation. 50 per cent, of rounds would fall within. Length. Breadth. Height. 8-m. B.L. . 9-in. R M.L. yards. 1500 1500 I" 29' 2° 8' yards. T7 21 yards. 0-28 0'72 yards. o'lg 3 "46 8-in. B.L. . g-in. R.M.L. 2000 2000 2° 4' 3° 3' II-8 23 0-43 I -co 0-49 4-S 8-in. B.L. . 9-in. R.M.L. 2500 2500 2° 40' 4° 2' 167 24 0-63 i"3 I 'OO 6-5 ' In the Australian Colonies, for example, tlie muzzle loader appears to be regarded as practically valueless. ^ The advantage of the B.L. shows greatest in the height of the probable rectangle ; but the freeboard of ocean-going ships is so considerable that up to 2,500 yards at least this advantage is not of great importance. OLD TYPE GUNS. 261 In all cases where very accurate fire at long range is not required, the old guns must still be regarded as effective,' and their disadvantage is not so much inaccuracy as the difficulty of providing adequate cover to the loading numbers, and defective mountings generally. On account of some curious misconception, the range of these guns in open battery mountings was arbitrarily limited to that which the requirements of a casemate appeared to entail, notwith- standing that it is the obvious policy of the coast battery to open fire at any range at which a hit is obtainable. The polygrooved 9-inch gun (Mark VI.) has been tried with a modified mounting allowing elevation up to 35°, and gave excellent results up to 9,000 yards range. For direct fire, it is proposed to use a common shell weighing 256 lb., and carrying a bursting charge of 14 lb. 8 oz. Old type guns may, therefore, still be regarded as useful for direct fire, more especially when their position can be well masked. When employed for high-angle fire — a case which should be clearly distinguished — they can always be com- pletely hidden, and worked by means of the position-finder, thus becoming practically secure from the fire of ships. The large number of quick-firing guns carried by modern vessels of war renders the provision of a similar armament desirable for coast defence. The quick-firing guns of the ship are not, however, except in rare cases, carried behind armour,^ and as has been pointed out (p. 206), the conditions of the combat are hopelessly unequal. The great value of the quick-firing gun on shore is its power of searching out and ' The shooting of all these guns is greatly improved by the adoption of studless projectiles and gas-checks. If polygrooved, their accuracy is still further increased. ''■ In the case of the Nile and Trafalgar and Vutoiia, a portion of the quick-firing armament is protected by 3 inches of steel. 262 FORTIFICATION. rendering the unarmoured portions of a vessel untenable, of acting against the guns and gear in barbette towers, of destroying bullet-proof protection, and generally of increasing the average rate of fire which would otherwise be slow. For the above purpose the 6-pr. quick-firing gun appears to be the minimum calibre which it is desirable to provide ; and where there is free manoeuvring water at a greater range than about 1,500 yards, the calibre should be increased to 4 • 7 inch.^ (See Appendix K.) Where a mine-field exists it may occasionally be desirable to provide special protection. For dealing with counter- mining boats, the 3-pr. quick-firing gun, aided by the rifle- calibre machine gun, will generally suffice ; but as the attack of a mine-field is an excessively unlikely event, and on account of the large amount of preparation it entails, could not occur without ample warning, guns intended for mine- field defence should be capable of movement, so that they may not be restricted to their least probable function. Ex- tended mine-fields may well be dispensed with in favour of the pneumatic gun, which possesses their powers, adds others, and is open to far less objection. In the case of narrow channels, however, such as the entrance to Port Royal, Jamaica, a few observation mines will meet all requirements and offer economical advantages. A restricted mine-field of this nature can be very easily defended. In distributing guns for coast defence, the main conditions to be fulfilled are as follows : — I. To bring the most effective fire upon the water of approach, at the position where the difficulties of navigation are greatest for the ship. ' In the case of ports exposed only to attack by cruisers the 4-7-111. gun would in some cases suffice as the maximum standard of armament (p. 258). BOMBARDMENT. 263 2. To cover with effective fire all water from which the ship would be able to inflict damage, either upon the defending works, or upon the dockyard, town, or shipping which it is intended to protect. These two conditions may in some cases be combined, but in others will be incompatible, in which case the first must evidently yield to the second. The fulfilment of either con- dition demands careful study of the chart, and full knowledge of the draught and general capabilities of the vessels likely to be employed, as well as of the inevitable restrictions which rule navigation, and which the landsman is apt to ignore.* Against a town of large area, it may be practicable to direct fire on a compass bearing, and this contingency should be taken into account, even though a serious bombardment, thus carried on, is out of the question. On the other hand, it is perfectly useless for the ship to fire at a small target, such as a gun emplacement or battery, unless her guns can be laid by sight. This is an elementary axiom not yet universally recognized. Naval bombardment is a newspaper bugbear, to which the naval manoeuvres of 1889 unfortunately appear to give countenance.^ Threats to bombard may very possibly form a feature of future wars, but exasperation is the only pro- bable result of carrying them out. Considering the small amount of ammunition carried by modern ships of war, and the moderate effect likely to be obtained, serious bombard- ments of undefended ports, more especially if at a distance ' It is, for example, idle to assume that a ship will be placed close to a dangerous reef in order to bring her fire to bear upon a totally invisible target. ^ Some French writers, apparently forgetting the possibility of reprisals, affect to regard bombardments as a probable feature in future wars. War, however, tends more and more to be carried out upon business principles, and expensive operations which could not affect the main issue, and have obvious drawbacks, will not possess great attractions. 264 FOJi TIFICA TION. from an enemy's base, are not likely to be carried out. It may be taken as certain, however, that bombardment will not be attempted from ships themselves under effective fire. Hence security will be attained if an enemy's vessel at 9,000 yards ' from a port is under direct fire at a range not greater than 3,000 yards. High-angle fire alone could not be trusted to meet this requirement in a case where free manoeuvring water exists. The water over which fire is required having been decided upon, it becomes necessary to distribute the guns accordingly. The great amplitude of lateral range allowed by modern methods of mounting will generally serve to permit a wide margin of choice. Dispersion of guns, both horizontally and vertically, is always desirable, since it increases the difficulty of accurate fire, and distracts the attention of naval gunners. Questions of site, of tactical handling, and of security from attack, limit the practicable dispersion in many cases. The position-finding system, however, enables scattered guns to be directed from a single observing station, and thus facilitates dispersion. It is always desirable to mount guns upon high sites when possible. The teaching of the Wasp and Tele- graph batteries at Sebastopol was sufficiently clear ; but, on account of some strange misunderstanding of ballistic laws, this teaching is only now beginning to bear fruit. Further considerations arise respecting the background of individual emplacements, especially in the case of barbette guns. Steep ground in rear of guns should always be avoided. Seen against the sky line, a gun always offers a good mark on which to lay ; but, on the other hand, errors of excess in elevation are not visibly recorded. The best background is ' It is curious that, as previously pointed out (p. 79), the minimum range of 9,000 yards was laid down by a Committee which reported more than thirty-one years ago. METHODS OF MOUNTING. 265 ground sloping upwards at a distance of not less than 200 yards in rear of the gun ; but trees in rear of a battery also promote its invisibility. Great latitude as to choice of site is generally practicable in the case of the high-angle fire armament, which merely requires to be completely hidden by the features of the ground, and directed from an observing station fully commanding the water to be defended. It may be necessary to duplicate the observing station in order to fulfil this condition. No object is gained by dispersing high-angle fire guns, which should be mounted in small groups not exceeding four. Such a group can be supervised by a single officer, and controlled by a single position-finding instrument. For reasons previously given, methods of mounting may practically be reduced to a simple alternative — the barbette, or the disappearing principle. The former has the advantage of economy, and of requiring less skill for its efficient main- tenance. The protection of the gun detachment is consider- able, and although the gun is always exposed to be dis- mounted or injured by a direct hit, the target proffered is very small, and can be made almost indistinguishable at moderate range. The disappearing principle is ideal in conception, and provided that skilled supervision is available, these mountings ought to be easily kept in a serviceable condition. Defective packing causes the air-pressure to be quickly lost, and the gun cannot then be used till after pumping. The advan- tages this method of mounting offers — complete invisibility until the moment of firing, and practical immunity from all danger to the gun's crew — can scarcely be over-estimated. Against disappearing guns, the armament of a ship is powerless. Where the local conditions lend themselves to invisibility, 266 FORTIFICATION. where a steep background rising close in rear can be avoided, and in all cases where the height of the gun above the water line exceeds 150 feet, the barbette mounting, on account of its relative cheapness and easy maintenance, should be adopted. In such a case also as the Back Beach, Port Durban, where the deep water lies at some distance from the battery, the disappearing principle need not be employed. Formal coast batteries should now be carefully avoided, and the fascinations of geometrical symmetry must be resisted. In every case invisibility should be carefully striven after. The main object is to hide the positions of guns and of Infantry defences from view to the utmost possible extent — not to advertise them, as has frequently been done in the past. Various ways of rendering guns invisible — painting, planting, leaving a rough natural foreground, the avoidance of clean-cut edges and well-trimmed turf — are open to the Engineer who will study a position from the sea at various ranges and in various lights, in place of contenting himself with the purview of the drawing office.^ The most important general rule is to interfere with the natural ground as little as possible ; and the best coast defences are those which least advertise their presence. Artillery and Infantry Defence may be combined in a single work, or an Infantry keep may be provided affording protection to a group of dispersed gun emplace- ments. Where the site is restricted, the former arrangement becomes necessary. The Infantry defence should be of the simplest character. A low parapet and a good obstacle, such as a sunk fence or an entanglement, will meet all the require- ments of a work not required to resist a siege. In an isolated ' See "Invisibility" by the writer. R. E. Corps. Papers, No. VII., Vol. XI., 1885. Attempts in the direction of diminishing the visibility of exist- ing works have since been made, with much success. INFANTRY DEFENCE. 267 position, where it would be necessary to keep the Infantry garrison inside a work during a fleet attack, shelters must be built ; but as the high-angle fire of howitzers or mortars has not to be provided against, only moderate protection is required. All attempt to combine barracks, intended for peace habi- tation, with coast defences required solely for war, should be given up. The " keep " principle, which played a consider- able part in the French wars, is equally valuable at the present day ; and there are advantages, both in Coast and Land defence in separating the fighting positions of Infantry and Artillery. A small redoubt commanding a group of gun emplacements will replace the towers which figured on the coasts of France, Italy and Corsica, and prove an effectual deterrent to the operations of a ship's landing party.i As- saults, always dangerous, become specially so in face of magazine rifles and machine guns, when they have to be undertaken, without effective preparation, by a force com- pletely en I'air. Where a considerable number of troops are available, as, for example, at some of the Australian ports, Infantry defences of a permanent nature may generally be dispensed with altogether, and mere fieldworks thrown up when required. In all cases, the provision of rifle calibre machine guns, easily transported, is most desirable, both to enable a landing party to be opposed on the water, and to save personnel. The design of gun emplacements offers no difficulty, and is in a great measure determined by the requirements of the class of mounting adopted. While wide arcs should be given to all guns, closed pits should be carefully avoided. Free access to the guns at all times is essential, and mere ' To create a fort, mounting a single gun, at a short distance from a considerable permanent work in ii place Uke Malta, containing a large garrison, is, therefore, wholly superfluous. Missing Page Missing Page 2/0 FORTIFICATION. wall up to the level of the top of the parapet, the chances of a crest hit being relatively trifling. Fig. 26. Section of Pakapet. Night attacks upon coast defences must necessarily be rare. The ship has two classes of risk to face — Artillery fire and shoal water. She is little likely to be voluntarily exposed to dangers of navigation, since once aground under Artillery fire she is lost. The development of the electric light has not merely caused night operations to be regarded in a far more serious aspect than they deserve, but threatens to create an exaggerated demand for this new adjunct of defence. The fire of ships, whether against coast works, or for bom- barding distant dockyards or shipping, cannot be effective by night. Channels, such as " The Narrows " at Bermuda, which are not navigated by night in peace time, will certainly not be so navigated in war. Small harbours, such as Singa- pore, whose inner waters are commanded by guns, will cer- tainly not be entered at night by an enemy, who would merely find himself in a trap, and taken at a disadvantage as soon as daylight returned. In such cases, electric lights, with the heavy expense they entail, may well be spared. Channels in which it is possible to blink the leading lights ELECTRIC LIGHTS. 271 necessary for navigation, may be regarded as secure by night. When there is light enough for navigation without leading lights, the requirements of Artillery fire will generally be satisfied. The main question, as to whether the electric light is needed in a given case, can therefore be decided only by naval experts. Experiments have been recently carried out with electric lights in the Needles Channel, Isle of Wight, where they do not appear to be greatly needed, and elsewhere. A certain amount of information has thus been obtained, which is useful as far as it goes. Smoke has been found to interfere greatly with the beam ; but, on the other hand, a ship while firing, or if steam is being blown off, quickly reveals her position. The light appears to be useful up to a range of 2,500 yards. The unregulated employment of search lights would unques- tionably be ineffective, one beam interfering with another, and producing confusion. Some central control is essential, and the best arrangement appears to be to place the search light in communication with the position-finding station. Although the fire of a ship directed against the light has little chance of success, the range not being exactly known, and no means existing of correcting the shooting, it would be inadvisable to place the projector close to the observing station. More- over, a low site appears to possess advantage, as the water can be swept by a simple movement of the beam. Where a line of mines is employed to guard a channel which can be navigated by night, a beam thrown across in front of them should enable small craft to be seen in the unlikely event of an attack. It may be advisable to permit this beam to have a motion in rear of the line guarded, so that machine or quick-firing guns employed to protect the mines (where such protection is required) may be able to follow any boat that may be discovered. A light thus employed should not, how- 272 FOR TIFICA TION ever, be allowed to usurp the functions of the search lights, which are mainly required for Artillery purposes, and should be solely in Artillery charge. The balance of advantage in employing the electric light seems to lie with coast defences. The fact that the Suez Canal is now navigated by its means proves nothing what- ever as regards ordinary channels, and from the point of view of navigation in the case of such a passage as (say) the Needles, the ship appears to have gained nothing. While coast defence has, therefore, become liable to no new risks, it is probable that good Artillery practice can be made by coast batteries employing the light in connection with the position-finding system, or even with a depression range- finder. It is possible also that fair practice might be made from the shore at a ship showing her light. In any case, the light, if kept upon the ship, may render steering extremely difficult. Dirigible torpedoes cannot be regarded as necessary where mines are employed. The question between these two weapons of defence is, therefore, one of relative economy. If an effective dirigible torpedo can be provided, whose arrangements are as secure from fire as those of mines, it would be a formidable antagonist to vessels attempting to pass a channel at speed. If, further, it can be moved, so that its position cannot be ascertained by an enemy, or if it can be made to lie upon the bottom and rise at will ; then, within visual limits, and subject to favourable conditions, it will necessarily be a dangerous weapon. The pneumatic gun is about to enter into competition with both mines and dirigible torpedoes, while at the same time opening out new possibilities of attack against the former. It possesses the great advantages of invisibility, range, and speed of fire. Within the limits of its action, the chances of CONCLUSION. 273 obtaining an effective round appear greater than in the case of a powder gun (p. 213), while the effect of a hit would probably be disastrous to the ship. The appliances at the disposal of coast defences are thus many and powerful. Recent Artillery progress, and in a special sense the perfection of the position-finding system, have told heavily against the chances of the ship. Meanwhile the ship herself has grown less capable of attacking coast defences, unless specially constructed for the purpose, and even then her protected armament is numerically weak. By far the greater portion of the navies of the world is practically disqualified from a combat with well-mounted guns on shore. Attacks on the defended ports of civilized powers have never figured largely in naval warfare. The experience of the American war showed clearly that the co-operation of a land force was practically essential to success ; and purely naval operations against coast works are little likely to be undertaken in the future, unless there are special reasons to doubt the efficiency of the organization and resources of the defence. While, however, science has conferred great benefits upon coast defences, it has made new demands upon the defenders. To control and direct to the best advantage the various elements which go to the modern defence of a port is no easy task. An organization carefully developed in peace- time, and a training at once thorough and all-embracing, are more than ever needed. Failing such organization and training, the full use of the powerful weapons which scientific progress has placed at our disposal is not merely debarred, but in the complication of these weapons themselves there lies danger. The fighting organization of the port must be as complete as is that of the ship of war. DIAGRAM 1. Angles of Impact of PROjiiCTiLES from io-Inch M.L.R. Gun. Charge, "jo lbs. Muzzle Velocity, \,Tfnf.s. (For Uniurst Shell.) Height in feet of object above Gun Hange IjiyardaBOO 1/ / / ' / 7^ f ; -t 1 t 1 t t t 4 i t t t -T J^ 4 t t J~ J^ t % % i t coo J^lljtltt ittt-it^ir t -T 4 ' t 4 -i 4 ^ t t 1 t t 7 t t -1 -1 t -, ' t t inn ' J. J- -I L J. — 1^^^-ttt-. t 2 2 k^ t ' i 4 ^ f t M t 1 t t ^i^i ji '£: ^j ^/ _ i , /L son ■"' f^ '^^ 2 siL :2>' Jd- s, —e 2 f "2 t Ij 1 t V s. ' J' J~ 1- t L _r t L 7ZZ ' -T -1 2 ^ 1 t-t^ .^ J t t t 4 I / / / ^ / 100 -^ J- L, -^ ^ -4 -. + 2-/ V Z V '^ t ^ -1 -72 -7 /- 2 7 -/ t t 1--, 7. /^ J fit ,00 -ft I / J 2 -7 -7 4 ' IJ 4 / 7^ t 2 2- 4 74 4 ^ ^^ 2 1 t t V^ y^ ^^ -t 2 -1 -7 T^y. .--^ 7^ t J t t ot^- ^'^ lift EXPLANATION. Diagram i gives approximately the angles with which a projectile from the lo-inch R.M.L. gun will arrive at the crest of the parapet of a coast battery at a given height above the gun and at a given range. On the curves, the sign + signifies that the projectile is rising, - that it is falling. The diagram can thus be used in three ways, viz. : (a) Given the height of the crest of the battery and the range of the ship, to determine the angle at which the projectile will arrive. Examples. — If the crest is 340 feet above the ship's gun and the range is 1,400 yards, the projectile will arrive with a trajectory ?-«Vz«^ at an angle of 2°. If the crest is 200 leet high and the range 3,750 yards, the projectile will have ^falling trajectory of 8°. (b) Given the height of the crest ; to determine at what range the projectile will arrive with a given angle of rising or falling. Examples. — If the crest is 380 feet above the gun, the projectile will arrive with a rising angle at 1,200 yards range ; horizontal at 1,950 yards ; falling at an angle of 6° at 3,450 yards. ( . / 1 I t t 1 t t- / I -. f t 7 ^ I t ^ ,^ J J. J -J ^ I I 1 t t _f/ t 2 - .J ^J- .V ^ --n'^- t ± Ti BOO «/ V "y °'' y '^ ""y *i - "'^ 2 i/ SZ jr n t 1 J ' / ^ 2 ' H t J^ 2 J V J~ X J t -. - ^ ^ I / z . t. a ^- t i y— "" z- -j-f -/——/- - I- --- f--_-_ - -J-- :::?::: ~,\,^ ^ '^ / -t t I 17 1^ V t ^ 1 V / 7 ^7 t .It ,00 L^ Z ^^ 2 2 L_ iV ^^ y' ' / , 4 1 - J^ y' ,'■ /'^ ^ t t V^ ^^ / 4 4Z -1 ^t-- -^ -i L ZZZ ZKZ t o^i— -'- -'' . _. .. / / HangeinyardsSOO WOO 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 NOTE.THE CURVES SHEW THE /mOLE AT WHICH A PROJECTILE WOULO STRIKE AN OBJECT on A HIGHER LEVEL THAN THAT OF THE GUN ■^SleNIFIES THAT THE SHELL IS RISING -THAT IT IS FALLING ON IMPACT EXPLANATION. This Diagram is drawn in precisely the same way as Diagram I, but for the French 27-cm. gun. See explanation under Diagram i. T 2 2/6 FORT I PICA TION. DIAGRAM 3. Angles of Impact of Projectiles fkom i-Inch Nordenfelt Gun. Weight of Shot, T2^ oz. Muzzle Velocity, 1,417 /J. Height in feet of object above Gun Range in Yards 600 -1 1 ^— 1 T I _-: ^ j^ 1 1 z J 4^ t It ' -t -, y -t 4 ' 1 ^ t 2 7 t ly 7 , J / ' J -t t -t- t i 7 t t y i^ L "' " " 4 J J 4 1 y 4 -T ^ J J JX^ Tyt ^ 7 7 777 7 L t y y t J -i ^ 400 7- f ' t 7 1 t -1 / z 7 tL y 1 yr i IT Z » / y y 7^ 4 y\- t to/ !>7I y ^/ l' j--.^y J ocr, "it ic y ^ 7 i^' '7 c J r 1 SOO / ^ ^ ^ ^ aI .yr t 4 y z / M t TJ ^ , , z y z y y y t I M ^'^ / z y y yy x ' t y pnn V ^ -y y 7 t 7 y M- ~y A^ y ^ ^ / / ' ' y y y y / J 4 ^ -V y y y y / 7 Lit A y y y y y 4 t t ^ / t -t y y^^^ ^^ ^■^^ 7 ^ y 4 t t yy y y t / ^ ^"^ -^ "^ y y 2 t -t ~P ^ ^ ^'^ -"^"^ ^"^ y / J~ i odigi^ -" y . y 1 '^_ too 600 ■ SOO 1000 1200 1400 1600 NOTE, THE CURVES SHEW TKE AHQLE AT WHICH A PROJECTILE WOULD STRIKE AN OBJECT ON A HIGHER LEVEL THAN THATOFTHE GUN ^SIGNIFIES THA T THE SHELL IS RISING -THAT IT IS FALLING ON IMPACT EXPLANATION. This Diagram is drawn in precisely the same way as Diagrams i and 2, but for the i-inch Nordenfelt gun. See explanation under Diagram i. DIAGRAM 4. Trajectories of- Projectiles Fired from io-Inch R.M.L. Gun (Horizontal AND WITH 5° & io° Depression). Charge, 70 lbs. M.V., 1,364/.^. Also of Shell from 9-2-Inch B.L.R. Gun with 5° Depression. Weight of Shell, ^So Ids. M.V., i,goo/.s. Jiange in Yards £00 ' ' ' WOO 1500 2000 Figures In Braoketa ahoui the angles of tangent to trajectory with horizontal line EXPLANATION. Diagram 4 gives approximately the trajectories of the lo-inch R.M.L, gun fired point blank and at angles of depression of 5° and 10°; also that of the 9'2-inch B.L. gun fired with a depression of 5°. The diagram can be used in three ways, subject to the conditions stated above, viz. : (a) Given the height of a battery and the range of the ship ; to determine at what angle of descent the lo-inch R.M.L. gun fired point blank, or at a depression of 5° or 10°, or the 9-2-inch B.L. gun fired at a depression of 5° will strike the deck of the ship. Examples. — If the battery is 100 feet above the ship, the lo-inch R.M.L. gun fired point blank will strike the ship's deck at an angle of between 3° and 4° descent at 1,100 yards. If the height is 400 feet, the g-a-inch B.L. gun fired at 5° depression will strike the ship at an angle of a little over 7° at 1,250 yards. (b) Given the range and the angle at which the ship's deck is to be struck ; determine what must be the height of the gun. Examples. — At 1,950 yards with the lo-inch R.M.L. gun firing point blank and intending to hit the ship at an angle of descent of about 7°, the height of the battery must be 340 feet. At 1,100 yards, with the 9-2-inch B.L. gun firing at a depression of 5° and intending to hit the ship at an angle of descent of about 7°, the height of the battery must be also 340 feet. (c) Given the angle at which it is desired to hit the ship at the height of the battery ; to determme the necessary range. Examples. — If it is desired to hit the ship at an angle of descent of 6° from a battery 260 feet high with the lo-inch R.M.L. gun firing point blank, the range must be 1,700 yards. If it is desired to hit the ship at an angle of descent of 13° from a, battery 560 feet high with the lo-inch R.M.L. gun firing at 10° depression, the range must be about 920 yards. 278 FORTIFICA TION. N M & H Q z; J2 (3 2 s ^-o S s^» ^ '^ '^ u nri ^-< — ■ 'S £ o " OJ (L» (rt *J s- C 1-. u i4 ^5 c3^ 3 u 3 'S. o ^ M o S '■2 ^- >'S< Sen OJ o '%^ o B > ■^ ^ O J ^ ^ r^ t->. 1^ APPENDIX A. 279 •9 a I w w o D w a z; < o o Pi o X p p-i ,S ■- _S 'CI 0'5 B S F*^ oj o tu o g-o t; § a ,0 m B j> ■— Qj 3 OJ rn ?>(/:'*-. D £ 3 ° ■3.2 ^ M^f ■ji; " "^ tu ,, ^ "-= £.g S3 a S a O OJ O g T3 ■2 S3 3 M tn , "■■; o D E se 3 H fin ■Ml >£ T3 .a j3 li< ^ n ^ > a a i>^^ f^i tXTJ '6.-3 iirS O !5 5^ iJ 3 S J < " &'.a ■" g S 3 5 Spa M,, -1 1* _ frt a.^ja j= ■" d n. n! -C ■" fied in sue ce appears ege was h'. s with sup re. The g citadel, w e siege of S g'=5 iJ 3 ?JJ3 ja *• fc-'S^ S " Od ere no tire in nged t i°3M ■S-jJ g ^-« " ^ I ■^ 3 .2 (u) S ^ S i ^C O. 3 OJ^ G 0) S] JJ .1:. -S *" i: O cj.S fc^isju !^ o t; U bfl n C5 :3 fc- -rt > ^ 2So FORTIFICA TION. s I W O 2; < w o o o 05 <: CO I w < „ u t^i 0) -3 ^ c (J QJ 4) ■^ ^ o ^ '§ m 4> OJ f^ pc OJ > "o I rt = OJ rt c ^ 1 4J O OJ rt o tuO bJD 41 S rt s rt (U O c o 1-1 a CJ a rt 1% o >-H rt 4J S >% (n ^ S < E 3 fcjO rt 'rt 1 ■ij > :; C E^ 4) O o ^ o ■y o ^1 < < o a M ri QJ rt w bjO o 4) O flj J3 1-1 ^ aJ a OJ o g S 5-'S rJ= > 4) rt - ri S bb o t/5 w ";3 ■3 a 3 C O S g at Ji ^1 'S) 'En ^ rt CJ t)J3 _4J "55 1^ 13 o ^ o r^ ^% o A o ^6 2 ^ -C o o CJ o CJ 4) t> "1 rt H " 'ri c^"^ C/2 t/1 > -^3 -o -d TJ T3 13 ■a '6 T3 13 'd d (U OJ QJ 4) 4J -i! rt rt rt ^ ^ _rt "rt ^ rt _ri rt ^9 's "^ '9 5 5 3 S s "9 5 ^ O D- a. E^ cu Dh cu O. a. &■ CL CIh w rt rt rt' rt ri rt rt rt rt rt ri CJ o CJ CJ CJ o U U U U U la SK >,ij-, 00 N \o Tl- 00 U1 !>. !>.. \o VO rf « M li-l -* lO M li-1 3w- XI P° * >, o rt C 0) > -S >. t^ .S 3 o rt s O 'ri § Q § OJ QJ "rt 1 o c iS O CJ o ri 13 C rt ^ 00 o> o o O o ^ ^ « « rn rt o o > r^ t^ t->. !>. t^ r^ r^ t^ 00 ON o ^ M fO ■^ li^ vO r^ ■^ ^ M W « n c» c^ M M APPENDIX A. O M O O W Q Z «! W O & O oi O <: I Q Z W P-i PL, ■£ * ^% ^-^ O tqv. X rJ=i td rt rt C dj S ra o- ^ a 2 " a-2 c Q. ■S 8 „ .s «-^ W) res 13 00 I u " o (ao I °^ 4) J- 8 ■S S Oh « ,9 o > d - en „ CD _G U to a J^ § „ , p. 5 ■" ■5 a s 'B > 3 "So 52 § (D dj V- OJ ^ j-1 .-; « o ^ _i i; cu d K ^ u rs ^"^ tU 3 ^H |i • . - p! - ii T? ni -5 -73 fl 53 ^ ^ ri " !^5 2 o - o w .^ ?> ■^ .2 ^ ^g-.S j! ;s *^ s <3 s > —5 O Q- nj -S bfl b fcfl ; j-t -."' ^ ^ C OJ ^ -J^! ^ 1^ _■ ^ QD "XJ O -J^ rt i; oj d 3 col — . m o ■3 *^,a « 'a-a S S S S . DC j-i IT rt u7 rt O S 1-^ •Ml) ^ o s g ■i Ji o „i-i i; c "" TH 2 i ^ § ■S -d "^ o "^ r^ fi ^ in xfl *-• -, t-* *j ^ ^ w «J d o 1^ ti/1 p o'i=-;n ° = a S-oS 2J o ..c^- g c __ — o s S t^ I ci -H u a; ,__, o oj rt .ti 52 2j: "-z; =^-0 « 9.2? S.S'^ ^ ■r- , QJ ^ C VO C - ,-5.-S "Bs Tl n1 ■a 3'a u p4 fq APPENDIX B. 283 I PL, I m X t— I Q P-i bona _H tU S *j ;r; o P rt ,0 o ^ '♦^ ■a >^ : <; ~ >, ^ J! &■ c P? ■ *^ CO C c; r-j J, 3 o o .-a o o- >. I (3pq ■U O ^ KS ^ ^ c ,, C1.2 '- d u ■£ fi § <; r -s 3 . > 'S <; hV (^ S a 2 - i ° - H ?- s c 4; ^-^ «) o -S S ° §-^> ^ ■s 2 S-3 rt O ^ o MS .S o ■a ^ II fe.O C ^•-§" " c ^ tu J 2j3 ■SiJ m O P-.T3 ^JrC! ii; te ■{;! O 5J2^oSS-o> •JJ S o i 'r -iii rj tujcJ _ '- ij ,^ -' •-' J- rt cu tn u, U rt d M a S Ti d -a Sr „ S ., . ■ad S,^ o. fe'g O rt -3 G t^ S l^ -3 S-i2 ■B fe . .- ^ S^ j2 •°T3o?!Sd aj i: -T^ cl *" ^3 « -i ^ jS 5 d •" 'S T3 .S g ui 3 ^_ d > ° d O: ?r3 g 2 >. .2 OJ . CO M ^— 5 2 >- ii n^ : d ii 2 ci. S "J O rt u ^ l> o M 2S4 F.ORTIFICA TION. ►J g I m" X I— I Q Ph fl 4) O tio 3 >..§ _CB ,13 ^-• 0) oj d ■ g S3 ■" ^ "I- '^ u^ TO 1. . o y S S 53 "Sid 'S o go o A > c ^ T3 a fe (L> ^ O ri t4 C -1-1 (U W C J5 - ««•■ -O^ e-T^ ^■5 '^ ^ S o c^ 'ij s t!J3(/J 13 B c "3 . fi T3ri^ 1=1 ri rQ M'S'- hi S '='1 iu w o fl >> ^ ><3: N t^ CU 1J g h rt tH „ 53 o) _JJ ^ m _ QJ 1:1 , 3 tl B "1 2 2^ "^ &H aj ^ „ S § 5^-3 S B o o o, ■^ S fe g « ^T3 Si's C 2 o -^■^ APPENDIX C. 28; o H 1-1 < K o < pq M I Q w Oh OJ CO '> Si ^ t3 O OJ ^t "^i ^s " o ^ «i « B."'2 3 S c 3 S g .^ o -t-* +J »- QJ rt .^ u rt (« " o^ao s « s ■" fi tj i^ (A tn Q Ih . — I U OJ rt ^C 13^ := ". ri bXi ■4 ^ r^ O c o SI C JJ T3 - « CD O ^ " C rC P- . OJ OJ )-i g '^ (U 73 Si =^ b;3^ ^ ""' C rt s jj o ■— . tJ o -M "ti 1J OJ K |Z! M rt ■a SE S-^ :; v2 ^ -° K TJ c cu O g o ^ - ca .a - C " >- iJ ^ "^ .b ■" rt *^ -o 3J 'd Jli W OJ r= OJ (^ «i c ^ OJ 3 OJ -rj 2 H SS 4> '^ CJ J2 pi O .St S S d- S 1- O c5 OJ *J S § B ^ S 1'^ S S^Qgl ^g gen « ^ ^"5 T3 >^ .is 0) i^ ctf 2 >,.S j^ I ^ I i: iH o _, cj ^ S=3 ■C „ si . o j; si, ■" w 2 M"" (/) H ■5 .a CM c«; ■ iLV.~ 5 6 e ^§ qj en o 73 i= T3 ^ j3 d < d " . rt 4-. OJ Ul (U O tH (3 ^ S o "^a 9 Q ■S oJ ^-s c K ■" 2-5 8 d i3 7;k« 3-0 cJ 1=1 ■^ S rt Ph m 6 s: 5 286 FORTIFICATION. I Q W < ^r 'd; o< J3 > .y >- 1" 13 ^ 'C rt 'JU :3 t3 *^ •A -3 IM "2 ^ l-ss P- 5" J) ic tuO ^■^ - .s 0^ 5: g +-I (U -6 a^ o (U tfl ■fl "1 • "3 II fl" ^«g OJ i3 §^t ^ ^ ^rJ3 u JH d ri ^ rf OJ OJ (U 1-1 OJ iM w fq.>;M H 13 q3 QJ Ji u "H i^ 3 3 d ?J r— 1 •'S U P^ OS 1^ C/2 tuO •irJ rt U (!) u 'h3 ^S6 5 1^ « ■S ^ u 00 W hi < s s S s> = - We- rt .5 OJ S. -^ . 13 -§ s "^--^ ■5s is ^ ^ «; B- !>i " >^ S -5^ SB 3 -u j^ i^ ^H E" '^ )A <2 a Pi m g'S >-9 P^ ^§ = s rt •-• ^5 &. ^ C •" M t^ ^ ^ fi « "Td --- c rt 0^ 1) z, s-S '^5 OJ ^ t>^ CJ TS (U -*-• TS h^ S P^ 8 QJ 3 Ph « *j <1J ;3 3 d ^ 1 « . ■^ > OJ qi ri r1 CO 2 -r. Pi ^'S'T^ TO " LJ wis ^ *^ T3 qj g ctJ c5 S §■" Oh2 as 3 J ^1 l-]flH O OJ cj ti/] OJ S i=i = o 2 1§ s^ rt E> w ^ (1) •T3 t- O 13 tUD ^ G S ^^ ^ ■4-1 T3 r—. ^ u-o S -^ >■ *" 2 c S j> o grSts p. s- a e H ^ c3 IS rG +-• ■'-' I-. fls 13 > o - ^ b *. s^ (UP," nj -. rt S s p. '- 1- " ^ C3 C " f^ u 2: in O) C/3 *3 QQ P Phi-1 u 00 rt ci3 4) so o ^^• 00 4^"^ J- " J3 o -S ^a ^ i2 < 2S 2 " G "■£ p. 1&-0 NC/3 FORTIFICATION. < z <: O (5 < 'A W Ph Oh > ■43 c: - 1^ S ^ -"if £^| '" c s -, 0^ " .3 "^ c2- •2 ■■a t; E .2i ^ o tJ „^ 5 S "> c„ O 3 tn C C M C — ^ rt e-O 'M'S rt M'^ rt rt i: oT "^ C ) bjo oj o ■ 3 T3 rt •a 5 8"° Tl -t-f 1- .•^_^1 Si"" Sl^ ■^ 5 o » C i, :5'_g g i>,g ■" > «- £ t« rC ^. u rt CU^ 5 SCo -O S 3 o ■£ *- - 3 ,° c £ WJ C fl ■ [Ih , 3 S f?„'3 ■* -c . "So f x; rt .^ --^ ;rj Q rt • rtJ)>-lajii--3"r' ■3 "^rt'Sl^SS-, c (U *^ i3 ^'t: D-O '^ £-55^ •i5 5 > " S > c WJ ^ ■a 3 c „• rt °J0 O 3 etc 2 APPENDIX E. C3 I < OS Q PL, < ■a § = o c C >-4 ^ > " P o . o 3 c o i2 t3 _■ o ~ - - " T^ ^^ 7^ O C O 'O N -T3 !!!( X "J PT) s -J S.p "i ■i-^ §■£ l'^ 11 tJ c ii § rt a s M 5 U2 ^5^ _ S'S >,,J ■2 ^ ..a £^ a c m ►H " ■-'5 •4- P T^ -" - .-, ^ o P +j '1^ M CO !> (« G riJ .^l « >:, ^ ' 03 - " -o a ■" . -g 5 i4 " g ^ t; « pC„Ji-"°6"iS^T3Ma«'" ■ypgcc*^c^'''acs!§"j=i rtaj-Z!^=:S'^3gaj6jJ„ s eg § X § i^ S r^ f^ 2 c eg 13 fiS fl S OJ « d rt 3 -a ; c . i>..p'a ^ d rt 3 -a 3 g o S M <; g >< p-H o OJ HO) 290 FOR T I PICA TION. 7, < s o < Q w Cli us O S s S " S O >^= ^ 'oJ tl gel A 8 ^- m C W w 5j >^ o =^ ^ « O c .*i pq ^ ■^ o H •35 c S <" 1- Pi 6 J3 cS c O '^^ S ^ 3 OJ c3 ■ '^ J! -S 3 • 3 "1 .a ^ y S r^ '^ T3 tn S ° t- V O I gOOH S S . S s 4^ CLi O 4J * t- ^ rrj *J rj W rrt Ph i 3 g, pre yc J^"J= o - ° S S R^S o§S." ■'l:^ e-3 rt 3- J Mcfi^^ ii.2 g.j,.- ..^ Sg-5^ .3^3.. o-sg'^j; H .a *"■" "3 ^ • ^ - r,B •" -■ ■g S a -S * M bo'^ o 'S a ■ ■a fc- a " § rt k7=3 P 8j t! 5 JJ •^■c .■S>MOj;^3«Hg3Ng CT\.'2 P=^ APPENDIX E. 291 < ■<: •s. Bi W O z [4 W -A 1—1 Q W Oh PL, i - ^, g c -" s — ^ go C S 2 ra « (U g S-s S q « a. 3-S S c M p, " 7: . ■^ S o w '^ .2 >^ U »^ wj T-H 4_i p/ g . S t; « o s ""^ S o g o S ^ .3 S g-^ Si .So 3 >-• ,^ ui O dJ 3 in iE S >"S y , >^ 2,2 o a S 5".o 3 "t; ■" w i! an 2 2 S a O-S ^ 2 tl 3 n -^ ttH "^ S a .£ r. .i_i ^'^ m " t« o S w rt "S I:! O Vh rt t3 "S - M a O- Cl< J?, S2 rt S "^ 3 rt o pq . OJ VJ t/1 tu ;5 S c a 6-.^11 O 3 rt O 10 ,rt rt rt bIl,J2 li! « vo O 1-1 "P "2 ~ >- 3 CI rt rt g •Sum 3 CU) !£ ^ a^ nj ;2 )^ > g QJ §sg. ■Sirl! c 5; t>) o Sg 3 6 ■» a Ti) d rt (D rt c! •2 g w wort O >^ = ^ 292 FORT I PICA TION. I U O a <: a ;x( z O < O 1—1 Q w Ah f5 S'2 a a Oj2 rt SfO^ s S „ "^ j3 « d ° c S > * o g c -a '^ ".S ^^ bj!)0 . <" rt 3^ £ .• ^s 'm O 3 O 0^ g -S. i S -^ o 3 S 8u£§ s. t„ 'O "* *> W "^ rd •^ O , 3 p g (u « ^■"-i J3 O u S S3^fe.52_-.b -«8 •g O ^-l ^ 'C ^. q_ m ■2 g'S O £ O O (U rt U CL.U Z rt O ..S-2 S ° ^ O sSSas^g* -*-! U3 "^ rt p -^ ^ 3 -Ti O ►-I C O rH ^ S 5-(^' o , : ,j3 "- M -" 3 'Hi c rt rt g ?^2 ;.i2 ii o b rt 2.S iO 'n-9 o ti ■-■ O a Ul O _Q ^ r^ C O u c o o -n c g » « tfl K* cj J^ (U ■JD ■^^ O >^ !U -5 "^ TZi ^ CO -^ .>■ ^ . T3 S t^ ^ M ; T5 O ^ >,T3 t>^ rt '"' ■" dj O f1 QJ '-' ^ - p s'^.^'S'S «0alr-'O,~;5C -T3 N g O E rt rt l-I 294 FORTIFICATION. 1 § Ul ■s t> y. « Q ^ U-. \- w Cl, p t -< 5j Sou: e Cfl - o>.a _■ -a " 5i S «J 00 , O C 3 3 O OJ ^ g- 3 2 ""H U= o £^t3 3 M ^ -n ■" '— 'S o « § oM- > e « C -*-■ rJ i_7 ^ ^ "^ >-i J^ M N 5; & ;^ « .« g o K ■^T3 3 g'C "^ S ^ QO _2 '^ o ^ ^ M "> S ^ g, 3 3 ^* - (U ?^ 3 d T3 3 Qj rJ-l ;:r 3 3 O ;" ,2 cr* d '4:; C/3 *j -^ ^•^ g >: g "" .2 « .XI u. a 13 ,"o r^ 3 d rt !/) _ P iT o "^ OJ o a 00 3 p ^ 3 5 « 3 '^ U O 8 -Q.- ia 3 2 '^ g - 3 2 ■£ d ^ al S « ° m 0) 3 3 OJ O nd HM d J2 i-I •nV 3 "J o fl S.si' w^ APPENDIX E. 29s .s < z s oi w O fc I P a H p-l <1 ii " rt sr ■ " n" -^ ■* S "' -^K^ o j; ex,'" ^ »-" ~s . •« s .j5 o ^-^ § ^ -S-o o '0 > " a 6 o w. S"^ e^o ■+- u OJ li P3^ « K ^ P5 u^ ■^ g ^ ^ '(U 6 w 2; w Pi 296 . FOR T I PICA TION. APPENDIX F. Effect of German Fire on Paris Forts on South Front, &c.^ Permanent Works. Issy. — Of the four barracks in the interior, three were burnt and one was breached and rendered uninhabitable. The two old powder magazines were not breached, but the arch was bared in one place. Of 19 casemates in S.W. curtain five were breached and the rest injured by the fire of the short 24-prs. This damage was due to random shots, and systematic breaching operations were " not attempted." The following guns were dismounted : — 2 . . 16 cm. rifled. 5 . . . 24-prs. „ 4 . . . l2-prs. „ 4 . . . i6-prs. smooth-bore. 2 . . .22 cm. smooth-bore Howitzers. Total . 17 The embrasures were soon obliterated. The maximum loss in one day was three killed and eight wounded, but men deserted on account of the painful discomfort. Vanves. — Two barracks were breached and rendered uninhabitable. Two powder magazines in the interior of the fort were also breached. The casemates were penetrated in many places, and the parapet much damaged. The rear face suffered severely from reverse fire. The following guns were dismounted : — 2 . . .16 cm. rifled, 7 . . . 24-prs. „ 2 . . . i2-prs. ,, I . . . j8-pr. smooth-bore. Total Monfrouge. — Less injured generally, but gorge more severely damaged by reverse fire than that of Vanves. The debris fell into the ditch and formed an almost practicable breach. ' Extracted from ' Belagerung von Paris,' Heyde " Froese, and notes by Lieut. Fiasei, R.E., in 'Corps Papers,' Vol. XX., 1S72. APPENDIX F. 297 Bidtre and Ivry seem to have escaped injury. Enceinte. — " The damage done was chiefly confined to the neighbourhood of the Point du Jour and the bastions near the river on the Vaugirard side." " The guns here had apparently been dismounted and the embrasures had been much injured." " The curtain was covered with shot niarks, but not breached." " The salient at the Point du Jour, though well traversed, was reduced to a nearly shapeless mass of earth." " The large hollow traverses on the terre- plein were in nearly every case intact, and the excellent temporary cover under them was in every case quite so." Temporary Works. Hautes Bruylres Redoubt " but little damaged ; " all the embrasures had been repaired, and only one of the bombproofs showed signs of injury. The following guns were found intact in this work : — 5 . . .16 cm. rifled. 8 . . . 24-prs. „ 2 . . -27 cm. mortars. Park Battery of Issy /' very little damaged." Kirchoff Battery showed no signs of injury, but had probably been repaired. Chamart Station Battery had two 'guns dismounted out of six. Mortar Battery behind embankment intact. Spur Battery west of Vanves, batteries east of Vanves and battery between Vanves and Montrouge had two guns dismounted only. Five other temporary batteries merely showed a few shell marks. Annex Battery west of Montrouge suffered considerably having neither traverses nor bombproofs. General. The damage to parapets, with the exception of embrasures " amounted to little furrows at the crest and inconsiderable craters in the exterior slope." ^ The effect of enfilade fire on the forts was considerable. Traverses rising 6 feet above the crest line gave security to one gun only. ' Geldern, 1S72. Ve /. 298. TSIDE OF European Waters. 1 Name. [nerable to all Guns. Remarks. Heroine (iron) deck only. Broadside vessel (obsolete). Savoie (wood) deck only. Broadside vessel (obsolete). Revanche (wood) . deck only. Broadside vessel (obsolete). I. Ocean (wood) )ve belt (3 ft. above except battery. Casemate vessel with four un- armoured half barbettes at angles. 2. Marengo (wood) ive belt (3 ft. above except battery. Casemate vessel with four un- armoured half barbettes at angles. 3. Suffren (wood) 3ve belt (3 ft. above except battery. Casemate vessel with four un- armoured half barbettes at angles. Barbettes have wing shield | in- 4. Friedland (iron) bove belt (I ft. fater-line) except attery. Four half barbette towers above angles of battery casemate. 5. Richelieu (wood) . bove belt (I ft. water-line) except ittery. Four half barbette towers above angles of battery casemate. 6. Colbert (wood) ibove belt (I ft water-line) except Ittery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 7. Trident (wood) bove belt (i ft. water-line) except ittery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 8. Redoubtable (steel and iron) . ove armoured deck mall battery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 9. Devastation (steel iron) 3ve armoured deck mall battery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 10. Amiral Duperre (steel and iron) . 5ve armoured deck >ette towers, the which can be des- Four armoured barbettes. N.B, Guns in bar be 'emselves are, however, \ )ractically without any protection. APPENDIX G.— FRANCE. Vessels classed as "Cuirasses d'escadre" and very unlikely to be Employed against Coast Defences outside of European Waters. /. 298. Name. Date of Launch. Draught. Guns. Protection. Side Target Vulnerable to all Guns. Remarks. Protected. Unprotected. Sides. 1 Guns. Bulkheads. | Deck. Heroine (iron) 1863 feet ins. 27 6 eight 24-cm. six 19-cm. four 14-cm. Belt 6 in. Battery deck 4J in. 4iin. nil. nil. Upper deck only. Broadside vessel (obsolete). Savoie (wood) 1864 27 6 eight 24-cm. three 19-cm. four 14-cm. Belt 6 in. Battery deck 4J in. 4iin. nil. nil. Upper deck only. Broadside vessel (obsolete). Revanche (wood) . 1865 27 eight 24-cm. three 19-cm. four 14-cm. Belt 6 in. Battery deck 4J in. 4i ill- nil. nil. Upper deck only. Broadside vessel (obsolete). I. Ocean (wood) 1868 29 9 four 24-cm. four 24-cm. eight 14-cm. Belt 8 to 7 in. Battery 6J in. ejin. 6i in. (?) nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. above water-line) except battery. Casemate vessel with four nn- armoured half barbettes at angles. 2. Marengo (wood) . 1869 29 6 four 24-cm. four 24-cm. eight 14-cm. Belt 8 to 7 in. Battery 6| in. 6|in. 6i in. (?) nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. above water-line) except battery. Casemate vessel with four un- armoured half barbettes at angles. 3. Suflfren (wood) 1870 29 9 four 24-cm. four 24-cm. eight 14-cm. Belt 8 to 7 in. Battery 61 in. 6iin. 6i in. (?) nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. above water-line) except battery. Casemate vessel with four un- armoured half barbettes at angles. Barbettes have wing shield | in- 4. Friedland (iron) 1873 28 6 six 27-cm. two 27-cm. eight 14-cm. Belt 8 to 7 in. Battery 6J in. 6i in. 6J in. (?) nil. Everything above belt (I ft. 9 in. above water-line) except battery. Four half barbette towers above angles of battery casemate. S. Richelieu (wood) . 1873 28 6 six 27-cm. four 24-cm. one 24-cm. eight 14-cm. Belt 8^ to 7 in., Battery 6| in. Barbette 6J in. 6iin. 6^ in. (?) nil. Everything above belt (I ft. 9 in. above water-line) except battery. Four half barbette towers above angles of battery casemate. 6. Colbert (wood) 187s 28 six 27-cm. two 27-cm. two 24-cm. six 14-cm. Belt 8i to 7 in., Battery 61 in. ejin. forward 5 in. aft 4I in. nil. Everything above belt (I ft 9 in. above water-line) except battery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 7, Trident (wood) 1876 29 six 27-cm. two 27-cm. two 24-cm. six 14-cm. Belt 8-7 to 7 in.. Battery 6i in. 6iin. forward 5 in. aft 4i in. nil. Everything above belt (i ft. 9 in. above water-line) except battery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 8. Redoubtable (steel and iron) . 1876 25 9 four 27-cm. four 27-cm. six 14-cm. Belt 14 to 8J in., Batteries 9I in. 9* in. 92 in. 2jin. Everything above armoured deck except small battery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 9. Devastation (steel iron) 1879 26 four 32-cm. four 27-cm. six 14-cm. Belt 15 to 10 in.. Batteries 9J in. 9jin. gj in. battery I if in. end of belt aft. 2j in. Everything above armoured deck except small battery. Two unarmoured half barbettes. 10. Amiral Duperre (steel and iron^ , 1879 28 four 34-cm. one i6-cm. fourteen 14-cm. Belt 2ii to 10 in.. Barbettes lif in. Ammunition hoists 4 in. Ill in. nil. 2j in. Everything above armoured deck except barbette towers, the supports of which can be des- troyed. Four annoured barbettes. N.B. Guns in barbettes are here counted as "protected," as their gear, etc., is well covered, except for projectiles arriving with a large angle of descent. The guns themselves are, however, practically without any protection. /. 298 a. Vessels classed as "CuiRASsfe APPENDIX G.— continued. D'ESCADRE " AND VERY UNLIKELY TO BE EMPLOYED AGAINST COAST DEFENCES OUTSIDE OF EUROPEAN WATERS. Name. Date of Launch Draught. Guns. Protection. Side Target Vulnerable to all Guns. Remarks. Protected. Unprotected. Sides. Guns. Bulkheads. Deck. II. Terrible . 1881 feet ins. 28 two 42-cm. four lo-cm. Belt 19! to 10 in., Barbettes I7i in. Ammunition hoists 8 in. I7iin. nil. 3iin. Everything above the armoured deck except the barbette towers, the supports of which can be destroyed. Two armoured towers. 12. Courbet . 1882 25 four 34-cm. four 27-cm. Belt 15 to 10 in., Batlery 9"S in. 9-S in. Battery 9-5 in. 3s in. Everything above belt except battery. Battery guns in angle ports. Two side barbettes unarmoured. 13. Indomitable 1883 24 two 42-cm. four lo-cm. Belt 12 to 8 in., Barbettes 17! in. Ammunition hoists 8 in. Compound. I7i in. nil. 3iin. Everything above belt except bar- bette towers, the supports of which can be destroyed. Two armoured barbettes. 14. Admiral Baudin 1883 27 three 37-cm. four lo-cm. Belt 21J to 13! in., Barbettes 15! in. Ammunition hoists 16 in. (steel) iSi in. nil. 4 in. and 3 in. Everything above belt except bar- bette towers, the supports of which can be destroyed. Three armoured barbettes. 15. Formidable 1885 27 three 37-cm. four lo-cm. Belt2iJ to 13! in., Barbettes 15! in. Ammunition hoists 16 in. (steel) ISi in. nil. 4 in. and 3 in. Everything above belt except bar- bette towers, the supports of which can be destroyed. Three armoured barbettes. 16. Caiman . 1885 24 two 42-cm. four lo-cm. Belt I9i to 8 in., Barbettes 17! in. Ammunition hoists 7I in. Compound I7im. nil. 3lin. Everything above belt except bar- bette towers, the supports of which can be destroyed. Two armoured barbettes. 17. Requin . 1885 24 two 42-cm. four lo-cm. Belt I9i to 8 in.. Barbettes 17! in. Ammunition hoists 7f . Compound 1 71 in. nil. 4 in. Everything above belt except bar- bette towers, the supports of which can be destroyed. Two armoured barbettes. 18. Heche . 1886 27 3 two 34-cm. two 27-cm. fourteen 14-cm. Belt i6J to 9f in.. Turrets 15! in. Barbettes 15! in. Turrets 15! in. Barbettes 15I in. nil. 4 in. All main deck and battery. Two turrets fore and aft. Two armoured barbettes amidships. 19. Marceau . 1887 28 four 34-cm. seventeen 14-cm. Belt I7i to 9 in.. Barbettes 15} in. Ammunition hoists 9 in. Compound iSiin. nil. 3|in. Everything above belt except the barbette towers. Four armoured barbettes ; • two fore and aft, two midships. 20. Neptune . 1887 27 6 four 34-cm. seventeen 14-cm. Belt 17J to 9 in.. Barbettes 15! in. Ammunition hoists 7I in. Compound I5i in. nil. 3-6 in. Everything above belt except the barbette towers. Four armoured barbettes : two fore and aft, two midships. 21. Magenta . •• 27 6 four 34-cm. seventeen 14-cm. Belt 17J to 9 in., Barbettes 15J in. Ammunition hoists 8 in. (steel) 15I in. nil. 3-7 in. Everything above belt except the barbette towers. Four armoured barbettes : two fore and aft, two midships. 22, Brennus . 26 6 three 34-cm. ten i6-cm. (behind 4-in. plate) Belt 15I to (?), Turrets 17 J in. Ammunition hoists (?) 19! in. turret 4 in. battery ? 2 J in. Everything above belt except turrets. Light protection only to battery. Two turrets fore and aft, former mounting two guns. N.B.— The preceding ships (22) constitute the battle-ships of the French navy. APPENDIX G.— continued. Vessels classed as Coast-Defence Armourclads (Gardes-cotes cuirasses), unlikely to be employed outside of European waters. p. 298 b. Date of Launch. Draught. Guns. Protection. Target Vulnerable to all Guns. Kemarics. Protected. Unprotected. Sides. Guns. Bulkheads. Deck. Onondaga (iron) 1863 ft. in. 12 6 four 24-cm. nil. belt 5 J in., turrets II in. II in. nil. I in. nil. Low freeboard monitor (obsolete). Taureau (wood) 186s 18 one 27-cm. nil. belt 6 in., barbette 4! in. 4iin. nil. 2 in. Everything above belt except bar- bette tower and ammunition hoist. One barbette forward (obsolete). Belier (wood) 1870 19 two 24-cm. nil. belt 8 J in., turret 7 in ammunition hoist 4 in. 7 in. nil. I in. Everything above belt except turret and ammunition hoist. Single turret forward (obsolete). Tigre (wood) 1871 19 two 24-cm. nil. belt 8§ in., turret 7 in. ammanition hoist 4 in. 7 in. nil. I in. Everything above belt except turret and ammunition hoist. Single turret forward (obsolete). Bouledogue 1872 19 two 24-cm. nil. belt 85 in., turret 7 in. ammunition hoist 4 in. 7 in. nil. I in. Everything above belt except turret and ammunition hoist. Single turret forward (obsolete). 1. Tonnerre (steel) 187s 21 6 two 27-cm. nil. belt 13 to 10 in., redoubt 13 in. turret 12 in. 12 in. nil. 2 in. at belt line throughout. Very small. One turret forward. 2. Tempete (steel) 1876 17 two 27-cm. nU. belt 13 to 10 in., redoubt 13 in. turret 13 in. 12 in. nil. 2 in. at belt line throughout. Superstructure only. One turret forward. 3. Fulminant (steel) 1877 21 6 two 27-cm. iour lo-cm. belt 13 to 10 in., redoubt 13 in. turret 12 in. 12 in. nil. 2 in. at belt Une throughout. Superstructure only. One turret forward. 4. Vengeur (iron and steel) 1878 17 two 34-cm. nil. belt 13 to 10 in., redoubt 13 in. turret 13! in. 13I in. nil. 2 in. Superstructure only. One turret forward. 5. Tonnant (iron and steel) 1880 17 6 two 34-cm. nil. belt I7f to 13J in. barbette towers I4f in. 14I in. nil. 2 in. Everything above armoured deck except barbette towers and ammunition hoist. Two barbettes fore and aft on midship line j J in. shields over guns. 6. Furieux (iron and steel) 1883 22 two 34-cm. nil. belt I7i to 13 in., barbette 17! in. ammunition hoist 12 in. I7i in. nil. 3Jin. Everything above armoured deck except barbette towers and ammunition hoist. Two barbettes fore and aft on midship line ; J in. shields over guns N.B. Guns in barbettes are here counted as " protected," as their gear, etc., is well covered, except from projectiles arriving with a large angle of descent. The guns themselves are, however, practicilly without any protection. /, 298 c. APPENDIX G— continued. Vessels classed as Armoured Cruisers (Cuirasses de Croissi^rr) and capable of being employed in any waters. Date of Launch. Draught. Guns. Protection. Target Vulnerable to all Guns. Remarks, Protected. Unprotected. Sides. Guns. Bulkheads. Deck. Thetis (wood) 1867 ft in. 23 six 19-cm, four 14-cm. belt 6 in., battery 4i in. barbettes 4 in. 4f in. 4f in. nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. 6 in. above water line) except small maindeck battery. Casemate vessel, two barbettes, with great overhang on the side (obsolete). Montcalm (wood) . 1868 24 6 six 19-cm. four J4-cm. belt 6 in., batte'ry 4! in. barbettes 4 in. 4f in. 4iin. nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. 6 in. above water line) except small maindeck battery. Casemate vessel, two barbettes, with great overhang on the side (obsolete). La Galissoniere (wood) 1872 24 6 six 24-cm. six 14-cm. belt 6 in., battery 4f in. barbettes 4I in. 4|in. 4f in. nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. 6 in. above water line) except small maindeck battery. Casemate vessel, two barbettes, with great overhang on the side (obsolete). Victorieuse (wood). 1875 23 six 24-cm. one 19-cm. four 14-cm. two lo-cm. belt 6 in., battery 4! in. barbettes 4! in. 4f in. 4iin. nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. 6 in. above water line) except small maindeck battery. Casemate vessel, two barbettes, with great overhang on the side (obsolete). Triompliante (wood) 1877 24 6 six 24-cm. one 19-cm. eight 14-cm. one I2-cm. belt 6 in., battery 4I in. barbettes 6 in. 4f in. 4iin. nil. Everything above belt (3 ft. 6 in. above water line) except small maindeck battery. Casemate vessel, two barbettes, with great overhang on the side (obsolete). I. Turenne (wood) 1879 25 6 four 24-cm. two 19-cm. six 14-cm. belt 10 to 6 in., barbettes 8 in. 8 in. nil. 2 in. Everything above belt (4 ft. above water line), except barbette towers. Ammunition hoists. Two barbettes aft on midship line, two forward on sides with large overhang shields to guns § in. 2. Bayard (wood) 1880 25 6 four 24-cm. two 19-cm. six 14-cm. belt 10 to 6 in., barbettes 8 in. Sin. nil. 2 in. Everything above belt (4 ft. above water line), except barbette towers. Ammunition hoists. Two barbettes aft on midship line, _ two forward on sides with large overhang shields to guns J in. 3. Vauban (steel sheathed with wood) z88o 25 6 four 24-cm. one 19-cm. six 14-cm. belt 10 to 6 in., barbettes 8 in. Sin. nil. 2 in. Everything above belt (5 ft. above water line), except barbette towers. Ammunition hoists. Two barbette towers aft on mid- ship line, two forward on sides with large overhang shields to guns J in. 4. Duguesclin (steel sheathed with wood) 1883 25 6 four 24-cm. one 19-cm. six 14-cm. belt to in. to 6 in., barbettes 8 in. 8 in. nil. 2 in. Everything above belt (5 ft. above water line), except barbette towers. Ammunition hoists. Two barbette towers aft on mid- ship line, two forward on sides with large overhang shields to guns 1 in. N.B.— Excepting the obsolete Thetis and Montcalm the abov Guns in barbettes are here counted as "protected; [ » aTfhpir^'aSr ^°°''^7^^s^)^ might be found in any waters, and are the most powerful ships hkely to be able to act from bases outside of Europe at the , OS uieir gear, etc., is well covered, except from projectiles arriving with a large angle of descent. The guns themselves are, however, practically w outset of war. , practically without any protection. APPENDIX Q— continued. Vesssls classed as First-class Armoured Ounboats. p. 298 (/. Name. Date of Launch. Draught. (juns. Protection. Tatget Vulnerahle to all Gnns. Remarks. Protected. Unprotected. Sides. Guns. Bulkheads. Deck. - I. Acheron (steel) 188s ft. in. 12 one 27-cm. two lo-cm. belt 8 in., turret S in. (com- pound) ammunition hoists 7iin. 8 in. nil. 2 in. Everything above deck (l ft. 6 in. above -water line) except turret and hoist. Conical turret forward. 2. Cocyte (steel) . 1887 12 one 27-cm. two lo-cm. belt 8 in., turret 8 in. (com- pound) ammunition hoists 7iin. 8 in. nil. 2 in. Everything above deck (I ft, 6 in. above water line) except turret and hoist. Conical turret forwards , 3. Phl^geton (steel) ■• 12 one 27-cm. two lo-cm. belt 8 in., turret 8 in. (com- pound) ammunition hoists 7iin. 8 in. nil. 2 in. Everything above deck (i ft. 6 in. above water line) except turret and hoist. Conical turret forward. 4. Styx (steel) . ■• 12 one 27-cm. two lo-cm. belt 8 in., turret 8 in. (com- pound) ammunition hoists 7i i°' Sin. nil. 2 in. Everything above deck (I ft. 6 in. above water line) except turret and hoist. Conical turret forward. Vessels classed as Second-class Armoured Gunboats. I. Fusee (steel and iron) 1884 10 6 one 24-cm, one 9-cm. belt 9 J to 4 in. (steel), bar- bette 8 in. and 4I in. (steel) 8 and 4! in. nil. 2 in. Everything above armoured deck except tower. Single barbette tower forward. 2. Flamme (steel and iron) 1885 10 6 one 24-cm. one 9-cm. belt gi to 4 in. (steel), bar- bette 8 in. and 4I in. (steel) 8 and 4I in. nil. 2 in. Everything above armoured deck except tower. Single barbette tower forward. 3. Mitraille (steel and iron) 1886 10 6 one 24-cm. one g-cm. belt 9 J to 4 in. (steel), bar- bette 8 in. and 4! in. (steel) 8 and 4J in. nil. 2 in. Everything above armoured deck except tower. Single barbette tower forward. 4. Grenade (steel and iron) l888 :o 6 one 24-cm. one 9-cm. belt gj to 4 in. (steel), bar- bette 8 in. and 4J in. (steel) 8 and 4 J in. nil. 2 in. Everything above armoured deck except tower. Single barbette tower forward. N.B. — The whole of the above coastguard armourclads and gunboats are most unlikely to be employed outside of European waters. The coast-defencevessels would probably be unsafe in bad weather. In peace-time, during good weather, any of these vessels < ould be despatched to distant bases, and might act within a short distance of their bases, within the limits of their seaworthiness. In war, it would be practically impossible to send them to distant stations under any circumstances. Guns in barbettes are here counted as " protected," as their gear, etc., is well covered, except from projectiles arriving with a large angle of descent. The guns themselves are, however, practically without any protection. Vessels classed as Cruisers, possessing great speed and coal endurance, and able to go to ^ll parts of the world. I. Dupuy-de-Lome (steel) •• 26 two 19-cm. six i6-cm. sides 47 in., redoubts 4lin. (steel) half towers 4 in. 4 in. steel nil. 2-35 in- The whole to 6-in. gun. Two 19-cm. in two half towers in sponsons amidships ; six 16-cm guns 3 forward and 3 aft. 2. Sfax (steel and iron, wood sheathed) 1884 25 6 nil. six 16-cm. ten 14-cm. nil. nil. nil. 2-36 in. Everything. 3. Tage (steel) . 1 886 25 nil. six i6-cm. ten 14-cm. nil. 3 '54 in. (against raking fire only.) 3-54 in.to battery '2-25 in. maximum (curved below water line). Everything. Six 16-cm. guns on upper deck in sponsons ; 14-cm. guns in, maindeck batteries with 3|-in bulkheads only. 4. Cecille (steel) . i888 22 6 nil. six 16-cm. ten 14-cm. nil. nil. nil. 2-25 in. steel and 4 in. steel Everything. Six 16-cm. guns on upper deck ; four in side sponsons ; one bow and one stern ; bullet-proof shields ; 14-cm. guns main- deck broadside. N.B.-A11 the above vessels are disq.iahfied from engaging among modern coast defences ho» ever moderately armed. The rest of the French cruiser fleet have been omitted as having no protection whatever except mere light shields to the giin-mountmgs m certain cases. = ■- r b " aiutiu:> 2>. 298 e. APPENDIX H.— RUSSIA. Russian Vessels classed as "Battle Ships," and unlikely to be used for attack of Defences outside of European Waters. Date of Launch. Draught feet. Guns. Protection. Area of Side Target. Remarks. Name. Protected. Unprotected. Sides. Guns. Bulkheads. Deck. Protected sq. yds. Unprotected sq. yds. I. Kniaz Pojarsky 1867 24 eight 8-inch two 6-inch Belt 4j in., Casemate 4J in. 4jin. 4J in. ? nil. 224 193 Broadside ship. 2. Peter the Great 1872 24i four 12-inch Beh 14 in., Redoubt 14 in. 14 in. 14 in. ? 3 in., I J in. 228 117 Two turrets. 3. Catharine II. . 1886 26J six 12-inch* six 6- inch Belt 16 in. to 8 in., Citadel 12 in. Redoubt 12 in. 12 in.* 10 in., 9 in. 2j in., ij in. 258 357 Three barbettes. 4. Tchesma 1886 26i six 12-inch* six 6-inch Compound. Belt 16 in. to 8 in. Citadel 12 in.. Redoubt 14 in. Compound 14 in.* Compound 14 in., 12 in. 3 in., 2 in., if in. 258 357 Three barbettes. • 5. Sinope . 1887 26i six 12-inch* seven 6-inch Compound. Belt 16 in. to 8 in. Citadel 12 in., Redoubt 14 in., 12 in. Compound 14 in.* Compound 14 in., 12 in. 3 in., 2 in., ijin. 258 357 Three barbettes. 6. Alexander II. . 1887 24 two 12-inch* four 9-inch two 6-inch four 6-inch Compound. Belt 14 in. to 6 in. Compound 12 in. 6 in.,* on barbette ; remaining guns, 3 in. Compound 6 in. 3 in. 79 770 One barbette. 7. Nikolas I. 1889 •• two 12-inch* four 9-inch two 6-inch six 6-inch Compound ? Belt 14 in. to 6 in. Barbette 12 in. to 10 in. Compound 12 in. 6 in.,* on barbette ; remaining guns, 3 in. Compound ? 3 in. Probably the same as above. Probably the same as above. One barbette. 8. Twelve Apostles 26 four 9-in. turret four 9-in. battery Belt 14 in. to 6 in.. Turrets 12 in. to 10 in.. Citadel 12 in. to 10 in. Turrets 12 in. to 10 in. Battery 6 in. •• 2^ in., 2 in. •• Two turrets in midship Une. 9. Hangb-Udd . •■ ■• •• .. .. • • Laid down 1889. 10. Sviatitelya • • •• •• •• •• •• ■• •• Probably just commenced and to be like Sinope. NoTE.-jThe ahove vessels could be employed outside of European waters if their coal supply is assured ; but to detach them for this purpose would greatly weaken the Russian fighting strength, and such a course appears hiehly improbable. Ijuns in barbettes are here counted as ' protected," as their gear, etc., is well covered, except from projectiles arriving with a large angle of descent. The guns themselves are, however, practically without any protection. Russian Vessels classed as "Coast Defence," but which might apparentiy be employed for attack or defence in any waters provided their coal supply could be ensured. I. Pervenets 1863 i6'6 six 8-inch six 6-inch three 6-in. 4|in. 4im. nil. nil. 226 103 (upper deck only) Broadside vessel. 2, Natron Menya . 1864 i6-6 twelve 8-inch two 8-in. 4iin. 4^ in. nil. nil. 330 82 (upper deck only) Broadside vessel. 3. Kreml 1865 17-3 twelve 8-inch two 8-in. belt 4J in. battery 5^ in. 5} in. 4J in. ? nil. 187 100 Broadside vessel. 4. Admiral Lazareff 1867 20-5 three II -in. nil. belt 4J in. turrets 4J in. 4jin. (?) nil. 160 93 Three turrets. 5. Admiral Greig . 1868 20-5 Similar to Admiral Lazareff. 6. Admiral Tchitchagoff 1868 18-9 two 1 1 -in. nil. belt 6 in. turrets 6 in. 6 in. (?) nil. Similar to Admiral Lazareff. Two turrets. 7. Admiral Spiridofl 1S68 19 two 1 1 -in. nil. belt 6 in. turrets 7 in. ? 7 in. ? (?) nil. Two turrets. Not :.-All the other Russian " Coast Defence " vess els are of the small Mr,„;t„, ,1,„ :_„i;.. APPENDIX tl.—contimted. Russian Vessels classed as "Cruisers" which might be employed in any waters. /. 298/. Date of Launch. Draught feet. Guns. Protection. Area of Side Target. Remarks. Protected. ■Unprotected. Sides. Guns. Bulkheads. Deck. Protected sq. yds. Unprotected sq. yds. I. General Admiral . 1873 24-2 nil. six 8-inch two 6-inch belt 6 in. and 5 in. nil. nil. I inch 60 344 Belted cruiser. 2. Minin . 1874 2S'3 nil. four 8-inch twelve 6-inch belt 7 in. and 6 in. nil nil. I inch 100 Sio Belted cruiser. 3. Duke of Edinburgh 187s 23 nil. four 8 -inch four 6-inch belt 6 in. and 5 in. nil. nil. I inch Proportions similar to Minin, but total area somewliat smaller. Belted cruiser. 4. Vladimir Monomakh 1882 25 nil. four 8-inch twelve 6-inch belt 6 in. and 4J in. (compound) nil. 4 in. ? 3 inch ? 83 632 Belted cruiser. 5. Dimitri Donskoi . 1S83 25-9 nil. two 8-inch fourteen 6-inch belt 6 in. and 4J in. (compound) nil. nil. 3 inch ? Similar to Monomakh. 6. Vityaz 1884 18 nil. ten 6-inch nil. nil. nil. ij in. curved over engine and boilers only nil. 440 Protected cruiser. 7. Rynda . 188s 18 Same in all respects as the Vityaz. 8. Admiral Nakhimoff 1885 25-9 eight 8-inch.* ten 6-inch belt (147 ft.) 10 in. and 6 in. barbettes 8 in. ammunition hoist 3 in. (compound) 8-in.* (Com- pound.) 10 in. and 6 in. at end of belt. 3-inch 76 i 726 Armoured cruiser. Four barbettes, two on sides, two in midship line. 9. Admiral Korniloff . 1887 22-9 nil. fourteen 6-inch nil. nil. nil. 2j inch Total area larger than Nakhimoff. Protected cruiser. 10. Pamyat Azova 1888 25 nil. two 8-incb. twelve 6-inch belt (278 ft.) 6 in. and 4 in. nil. 4in.(?)com pound at end of belt 3 in. and 1 in. 77 878 Belted cruiser. Note. — All the other Russian cruisers have no protection of any kind, and are therefore excluded. * Guns in barbettes are here counted as " protected," as their gear, etc., vs well covered, except from projectiles arriving with a large angle of descent. The guns themselves are, however, practically without any protection. APPENDIX I. 299 APPENDIX I.— Details of 6-in . B.L. Gun. Gun, &^c. Weight of gun ..... . 5 tons. ,, charge ..... . 45 lb. Prism' black. ,, projectile .... . 100 lb. „ bursting charge, common shell . . 9 lb. 13 oz. Cost of gun ...... • ;f 1,030 ,, spare parts .... 250 ,, equipment and stores . 360 ,, ammunition per 100 rounds 640 Total . ■ ^2,280 Mountings, Barbette (Elswick). ,, weight ..... 9 tons 4 cwt. ,. cost . C^^l- Central pivot (Vavasseur). ,, weight . 6 tons 7 cwt. >i cost ■ ;f843. Disappearing (Elswick). weight .... 19 tons 10 cwt. ,, cost • ;^i,650. „ cost of spare parts 100. Rate of fire about one round per minute. RANGE TABLE.*— Mark V. Gun. Range. Elevation, Angle uf desLent. Remaining velocity. 50 per cent, of rounds should fall within. Penetration of wrought ircn. Length. Breadth. Height. yards. deg. n in. deg. mm. ft. sec. yards. yards. feet. inches. 1000 36 55 1649 18 0-30 I'O 9-8 2000 I 31 2 91 1409 19 o'69 2-0 8-3 3000 2 42 4 36 I2I0 21 I- 10 4-6 7-0 4000 4 9 5 81 1062 26 I -60 9"4 6-0 5000 5 50 8 26 975 31 2-24 i6-o 5-6 6000 7 47 II 40 903 36 3'02 24-6 5-2 7000 10 3 15 18 842 •• •• 4-9 8000 12 32 19 30 788 •• 4-7 * Based on practice from Elswick hydro-pneumatic mounting. 300 FORTIFICATION. APPENDIX J.— Details of 9 • 2-IN. B.L. Gun. Gun, dr'f. Weight of gun .... . 23 tons. ,, charge . , . . . 166 lb. Prism' brown. ,, projectile . 3801b. ,, bursting charge, common shell. • 33 lb. Cost of gun ..... • ;f4.320 ,, spare parts 290 „ equipment and stores . . 800 ,, ammunition per loo rounds. 1,75° Total . ^7,160 Mountings. Barbette (Elswick). ,, weight . . . . . 27 tons 9 cwt. ,, cost . . . . • /i,740- , , cost of spare parts . . /112. Disappearing (Elswick). weight . . 51 tons cwt. „ cost. . • A, 500- Rate of fire about one round in 2j minutes, RANGE TABLE.— Mark V. Gun. Range. Elevation. Angle of descent. Remaining velocity. SO per cent, of rounds should fall within. Penetration of wrought iron. Length. Breadth. Height. yards. deg. min. deg. m'n ft. sec. yards. yards. yards. inches. 1000 41 44 1889 19 25 0-2I i8-8 2000 I 27 I 38 1732 19 OS 0-48 17-2 3000 2 22 2 51 1585 19 0-85 0-84 15-6 4000 3 21 4 20 1450 20 i"3 1-36 14-1 5000 4 28 5 46 1327 24 1-9 2-34 12-8 6000 5 46 8 15 I219 28 2-6 4" 16 II-6 7000 7 14 10 51 II28 •■ • • IO-7 8000 8 57 14 7 1055 •• •• ■• 9-9 9000 10 51 17 43 1005 •• •• 9"4 I0,CXX3 12 55 21 45 964 •• •• •■ 8-9 APPENDIX K. 301 APPENDIX K.— Details of 4-7-IN. Q.F. Gun. Gun, f^c. Weight of gun .... 2 tons I cwt. ,, charge .... . . 12 lb. S.P. ,, projectile . 45 lb. ,, bursting charge, common shell , 2 lb. 6 oz. Cost of gun ..... . £(>AO „ spare parts . 20 ,, ammunition per 100 rounds . • 287 Total . • /940 Mountings. Central pivot naval (Elswick). weight . 3 tons 2 cwt. ,, ,, „ cost . • . /600. ■ Balance Pillar (Elswick). ,, „ weight . . 13 tons 3 cwt. „ „ cost .... • . ;^S6o. Rate of fire about 8 rounds per minute. (14 rounds per minute have been fired.) RANGE TABLE. Range. Elevatiun. Angle of descent. Remaining velocity. 50 per cent, of rounds should fall within. Length. Breadth. Height. yards. deg. min. deg. min. ft. sec. yards. yards. yards. 1000 I 3 I 6 1440 12 0-4 0-3 2000 2 16 2 43 1 168 14 0-8 0-7 3000 3 47 5 S 1003 19 i'3 1-6 4000 5 41 8 2 902 25 1-8 3-S 5000 7 S3 II 26 818 34 2-5 6-9 6000 10 19 15 II 748 45 3-3 12-2 7000 13 17 19 9 689 60 4'5 20-5 ( 302 ) INDEX. Achilles, the, 221 Acre, attack on, 175 Aden, requirements of, 257, Admiral class of ships, 165, 231 Advanced defences, 1 39 Agamemnon^ the, 226 Agincourt, the, 221 Ajax, the, 226 Alexander II., the, 245 Alexandra, the, 222 Alexandria, accuracy of fire at, 180, 182, 183 , injury to armament of, 191 -, machine gun fire at, 192 , penetration obtained , shrapnel fire at, 186 Algiers, attack on, 174, 176 Almirante Cochrane action with Huascar, 16 1 American War, sieges of the, 40-51 Ammunition, storage of, 268 Andrea Doria, the, 243 Anson, the, 231 Antwerp, defences of, 3 , orders of Napoleon to Governor, 13 , siege of, 21 at, 185 Arab Tabia, siege of, 30 Armament for coast defence, 256 land defence, 138 Armour for land defence, Brial- mont, 95 Armour for ships, growth of, 223 Artillery fire, development of, io6 , direct, 106 , indirect, 106 Artillery for land defence, 138 positions, selection of, 138 Armstrong, Lord, evidence of, 78 Assault of breaches, 13, App. C. Atlanta taken by Sherman, 50 Attacks, night, 270 Aurora class, 236 Badajoz, compared with Kars, 38 , garrison of, 128 , siege of, 12, 13 Balance pillar mounting, i6o Barbettes, 158, 165 Barbette, "protected," 166 mounting, Elswick, for B.L. guns, 203 , French, 204 Barbette, von Scheliha, as to, 199 Bastioned trace, base of Vauban's system, 6 applied at Paris, 26 Batteries, earth, 162 BavilUers, capture of, 65 Beauregard, General, saves Peters- burg, 49 Belfort, citadel of, 7 , siege of, 64-6 Bellerophofi, the, 222 Belliqueicse, the, 237 Benbow, the, 231 Bermuda, requirements of, 257 INDEX. 303 Black Prince, the, 220 Blanco Encalada, action with Huascar, 161 Bombardment, naval, 263 Bourges, experiments at, 92 Braila, siege of, 27 Breaches, assault of, 12, 13 Breaching experiments (1824-1860), 43 power of S.B. Ordnance, 14 Brialmont, General, criticism of designs of, 124 ■ , opinion as to Fort Kanly, 77 -, proposals of, 90 Brisac, fall of, 10 Bruyferes H antes redoubt, 63 Bucharest, defence of, 3 , experiments at, 92, 96 Burgos, siege of, 12, 13, 15 Burgoyne, General Sir J., as to dis- persion, 83 , as to em- brasures, 82 , evidence of, 78 Butler, Captain, defends Silistria, 31 Cambrelin, Colonel, proposals of, 84 Camden, Fort, 151 Camperdown, the, 231 Campo-Major, defence of, i6 Canet, M., designs of mountings of, 204, 206 Cape, requirements of, 258 Caponiers, exaggeration of, at Posen, 24 , now unnecessary, 105, 118 -, resuscitation of, 24 Carlisle, Fort, 151 Carnot, 22, 23 Casemate batteries, 153 Catherine II., the, 245 Cicille, the, 241, 242 Ceylon, requirements of, 257 Chatham, redoubt at, 131 Chatillon, heights of, 41 Ciudad Rodrigo, siege of, 12, 15 Clarke, Major-General Sir A., 131 Coast defence, changes in, 151 , functions of, 255 , principles of, 149 , vessels, 224, 246, 250 Colbert, the, 237 Colossus, the, 226 Colling-wood, the, 231 " CoUingwood " mounting, 159 Commission, Royal, of 1859, 78 Committee of 1859, 79 Concrete, penetration into, 92 Conqueror, the, 229 Cormontaingne and Foucroy time table, 8 Counterbalanced carriage, 160 Counterscarp galleries now un- necessary, 105 Counterweight carriage, Moncrieff, Couronne, the, 220 Cruisers, protected, 235 , Russian, 247 Cupola, criticism of, 97-103 , disappearing Schumann, 85,86 , Eastbourne, 156 , light, 158 -, oscillating, St. Chamond, 96 , portable, 86 Cyclops, the, 224 Danjoutin captured, 65 Danzig, sieges of, 18, 19 Deck attack, 259 Defence, the, 220 304 INDEX. Defence, advanced, 139 Denfert, Colonel, defends Belfort, 64 Devastation, the (British), 224 ■ — ■ (French), 237 Diego Garcia, 169 Dirigible torpedoes, 272 Disappearing mountings, 204 , Mougin, 88 Disappearing principle, Moncrieff, 164 ■ , advantages of, 201, 265 Dispersion of guns advocated by Sir J. Burgoyne, 83 Ditches not now required, 118 Donelson, Fort, 2 taken by Grant, 44 Dover, turret at, 156, 164, 202 Dreadnought, the, 224 Duilio, the, 243 Duguesclin, 237 Duperri,xi\s., 176 Diippel, siege'of, 52-4 Earthworks, effect of fire upon Alexandria, 183 Eastbourne, penetration obtained at, 185 Edinburgh, the, 226, Electric Ught, 27 1 Embrasures, condemned by Sir J. Burgoyne, 82 Sir H. Jones, 82 : Morla, 61 ■ Sir J. L. Simmons, 82 Emplacements, designs of, 267 Enceintes now useless, 118 England, defences after 1859, 78 , criticism of, 79, 80 Escalade, experiments as to, 80 Escalading in Peninsula, 13, App. D. Esquimalt, requirements of, 257 Falkland Islands, defences of, 217 , requirements of, 258 Farragut, Admiral, bombardsVicks- burg, 46 Fisher, Captain R. N., as to Nor- denfelt fire, 193 , Fort, bombardment of, 175 , siege of, 46, 47 Fire of ships, 173 Flatholm, defences, 164 Floating platform, 160 Foreground, preparation of, 116 Forges and Chantiers, mountings made by, 204, 206 Formidable, the, 179, 213, 237, 238 Foucroy (and Cormontaingne), time table, 8 Francesco di Morosini, the, 244 Franco-German War, lessons of, 66-68 , sieges of, 55- 68, App. E. French fortresses, 1870-1, 55 of to-day, 125 ships, 236 , evolution of, 238 compared with British 241 -Russian, 246 Furieux, the, 240 Gallwey, Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. L., opinions as to defences, 78 Garrison Point Fort, 114 Garrisons, estimates of, 127 German system, 25 Gibraltar, battery at, 36 INDEX. 305 Gibraltar, requirements of, 258 Gillmore, General, attacks Peters- burg, 48 Glation, experiments with, 161 — , the, 224 Gloire, the, 220 Gorgon, the, 224 Gosport, enceinte of, 122 Grach, Colonel, designs defences of Silistria, 30 Grant, General, takes Vicksburg, 48 Forts Donel- son and Henry, 44 Grenade, the, 240, 241 Grivitza redoubt, siege of, 70-72 Griison batteries, 155 turret, 156 Guisnes, siege of, 16 Guns for coast defence, 257, App. I, J,K. , B.L., effect of introduction of, 197 , distribution of, 262, 264 , R.M.L., uses of, 167, 260 Haarlem, siege of, 1 1 Hafiz Fort, attack of, 75 Hahfax, requirements of, 257 Hamley, Lieut-Gen. Sir E., on siege of Sebastopol, 33 Haxo - casemates constructed in England, 82 Hecate, the, 224 Hector, the, 221 Henry, Fort, taken by Grant, 44 Hercules, the, 222 , experiments at Shoebury- ness, 190 Portland, 201 Hero, the, 229 Heroine, the, 237 Hewlett, Captain, R.N., evidence before Royal Commission, 78 High-angle fire, experiments at Shoeburyness, 190 against ships, 205, 259, 260 — , Canet mounting for, 206 High explosives, effect of, 113 ■ sites, advocated by Todleben, 83 Sir H. Jones, 83 Hoche, the, 238 Home naval ports, requirements of, 258 Hong Kong, requirements of, 258 Hood, the, 227 Hotspur, the, 229 , experiment with, 161 Howe, the, 231 Howitzer, 8-in R.M.L., accuracy of, 107 Huascar, action fought by, 161 Hubberstone Fort, 151, 165 Hydra, the, 224 Hydro-pneumatic mounting, 159, 204 Imperieuse, the, 165, 235 Inchkeith, experiments at, 186, 194, 195 Indian ports, requirements of, 258 Infantry defence of coast works, 266 redoubts, requirements of. 130 , intervals between, 137 Infiexible, the, 172, 181, 225 , comparison with old ship, 176 Instruction, changes required in, 146 Invincible, the (British), 222 (French), 220 X 3o6 INDEX. Invisibility, means of obtaining, 136, 265 of Alexandria works, 199 Jron Duke, the, 222 Issy Fort, 59 , damage to, App. F. , losses in, 62 Italia, the, 165, 243 Italian ships, 243 Jackson, Captain, R.N., diagrams prepared by, 188 Jones, Sir H., as to high sites, 83 , Sir J., as to embrasures, 82 , opinion as to assaults, 13 -, " sieges in Spain," 12 -, views as to trace, 8 Juliers, mock siege of, 42, 43 , breaching experiments at, 43 Kanly Fort, I , attack upon, 75 , General Brialmont's opinion of, 77 Karadagh Fort, attack upon, 76 Kars (1855), defence of, 36 , defence of (1877), 74 compared vi^ith Badajoz, 38 Kinburn, attack of, 219 King, Major, counterpoise carriage, 164 Kniaz Pojarsky, the, 244 Kronstadt, works at, 163 Krupp mortar, accuracy of, 106 , experiments with, 92 non-recoil gun, 155 Lake, Colonel Sir A., on defence of Kars, 36, 37 Landau, siege of (1704), 11 Landguard Fort, 36 Lazareff, the, 247 Leander class, the, 236 Leonardo, Fort San, 83 Lepanto, the, 165, 243 Lewis, Major, estimate of garrisons, 127 Licosa Cape, action off, 175 Lights, electric, 27 1 Lille, defences of, 5 , shelled by Duke of Saxe, 40 , surrendered (1708), 11 Linz, towers of, 25 , Marmont's opinion as to, 26 Locomotive torpedoes, 170, 214 Longwy compared with Antwerp, 21 Lydd, experiments at, 112 , penetration obtained at, 185, 269 Machine-guns for land defence, no gun fire at Alexandria, 192 194 Inchkeith , Portland, Magazine rifle, the, 104, 105 Magazines, for land defence, 144 Malakoff, the, 35 Malta, defence of, 217 , requirements of, 258 Mamelon, the, 33 Mainz, surprise of, 21, 126 Marlborough (and Eugene), sieges of, 9-1 1, App. A. Marmont, opinion of Vauban, 5 — as to Linz de- fences, 26 Martello Tower, the original, 218 Mauritius, requirements of, 258 Maxim machine gun, in Maximilian, Archduke, fortifies Linz, 25 Meks Fort, attack on, 180, 186 INDEX. 307 Melinite, introduction of, 113 Mersey, the, 236 Mine at Petersburg, 49 Minefields, defence of, 262 Minotaur, the, 221 " Modern French " system, 24, 146 Monarch, the, 223 MoncriefF, Colonel, counterweight carriage, 159 '- , disappearing principle, 164 Monitors, the, 223 Montalembert, 22 Montrouge Fort, losses in, 62 , damage to, App. F. Morla condemns embrasures, 61 Mortar, Krupp, accuracy of, 106 , experiments with, 92 , spherical, 85, 86 Mougin, M., proposals of, 88 , subterranean fort, 88, 102, 128 Moukhtar Pasha abandons Kars, 74 Mountings of guns for coast de- fences, 153 Mouravieff, General, attacks Kars, 37 Nakhimoff, the, 247 Namusia, Fort, 181 Napoleon's orders to governor of Antwerp, 13 wars of, sieges, 18-21 Nasmyth, Captain, defends Silis- tria, 31 Needles, the, experiments at, 271 Nelson, the, 235 Newhaven Fort, 164 " New Ironsides " attacks Fort Wagner, 45 Nicholson, Colonel, shrapnel fire, 187 Night attacks, 270 Nile, the, 195, 226 Noizet, General, as to defence of Paris, 41 Normandie, the, 220 Northampton, the, 235 Northumberland, the, 221 Observation of fire, importance of, 144 Obstacles, importance of, 117 , nature of, 132 O'Callaghan, Lieut.-Col., proposal of, 145 Ocdan, the, 237 Oom Kabdb^, Fort, 181 Open batteries, 157 shielded batteries, 157, 168 Organization, necessity of, 273 Palestro, the, 244 Pamyat Azova, the, 247 Paskievitch attacks Silistria, 31 Parapet of Infantry redoubt, 136 Paris, defences of (1870), 59-63 (1870) garrison of, 128 Pembroke, requirements of, 258 Penelope, the, 222 Peninsula, sieges of, 11-17, App. B. Penetration in earth, 185 Perche Basse Redoubt captured, 65 Peter the Great, the, 244 Petersburg, 2 , siege of, 48-50 , compared with Sebas- topol, 50 Picklecombe Fort, 114 PiUar, balance mounting, 160 " Pionnier Un," proposals of, 89 Plevna, attack upon, 69, 70 , compared with Sebastopol, 71 , defences, criticism of, 72, 73 , garrison of, 128 Plymouth, requirements of, 258 Pneumatic gun, Zalinski, 170, 212, 272 X 2 3o8 INDEX. Popoff, the, 246 Popton Fort, 151, 164 Portland, experiments at, 201 , requirements of, 258 Port Phillip, defences of, 217 Porter, Admiral, bombards Fort Fisher, 47 — , orders of, 184 Posen, defences of, 23 Position-finding system ,Watkin's, 208 Powder, smokeless, effects of, 112 Principe Ainedeo, the, 244 Provence, the, 237 Pulaski, Fort, siege of, 43 Queen Charlotte, the, at Algiers, 176 Quick-firing guns for land defence, no , Inchkeith experi- ment, 195 ment, 201 207, 261 -, Portland experi- • for coast defence, Railway, ceinture, use of, 140 Ram, the, 248 Range-finding, importance of, 144 Ras-el-Tin Fort, 181 Lines, effect of fire upon, 191 " Redan," the, 32 Redoubtable, the, 237 Reduits, evidence afforded by Fort Kanly, 'J^ Resistance, the, 220 Responsibility as to defences, 252 Re Umberto, the, 244 Richelieu, the, 237 Rochelle, siege of, 5 Rodney, the, 231 Royal Sovereign, experiment with, 161 Ruggiero di Lauria, 243 Rupert, the, 229 Russian ships, 244 compared with French, 240 Russo-Turkish War (1828-9), sieges of, 27-29 Russy de. Colonel, carriage invented by, 164 St. Mawes Castle, 163 St. Sebastian, breach at, 13 St. Vicente Bastion, Badajoz, esca- lade of, 13 Salamanca, siege of, 2, 12 San-Fiorenzo, action in Gulf of, 218 San Francisco, defence of, 217 Sanspareil, the, 229 Saragossa, sieges of, 19 Sauer, General von, proposals of, 87 Saxe, Duke of, shells Lille, 40 Scheliha, von, as to barbettes, 199 Schott, General, proposals of, 87 Schumann, Colonel, proposals of, 85,86 Schumla, sieges of, 29 Sebastopol, 2 , compared with Peters- burg, 50 , compared with Plevna, -, defences of, in 1854, -, shell fire at, 219 Sert Mahomed surrenders Silistria, 28 Severn, the, 236 Sfax, ranges at, 180 Shannon, the, 235 Shells, comparison of bursting charges of, 41 71 31 INDEX. 309 Sherman, General, attacks Atlanta, 50 Ships, Russian, 244 , French, 236 , Italian, 243 , British, 220 , armoured, introduction of, -, barbette, 23 1 -, broadside, 223 -, modern, 219 -, turret, 223 -, unarmoured, disqualified for engaging coast defences, 249 -, wooden, 217 Shoeburyness, experiments at, 161 Shrapnel fire at Alexandria, 186 , Col. Nicholson, 187 , angles of opening, 188 Sierra Leone, requirements of, 258 Silistria, siege of (1828-9), 28 — (1853), 30 Silliman, experiments, 213 Simmons, General Sir L., condemns embrasures, 82 Singapore, requirements of, 258 Sinope, the, 245 Sites of Infantry redoubts, 136 Smokeless powder, effect of, 112 Smola demands high carriages, 82 Sohman Pasha surrenders Braila, 27 South Hook Fort, 151 Souvari Fort, attack upon, 75 Spezzia turret, 172, 199 Spiridoff, the, 247 Spithead Forts, design of, 163 Standard of defence of ports, 216 Steadman, Fort, attacked by Lee, 49 Stonecutter Island battery, 189 Strasburg, siege of, 64 , garrison of, 128 Submarine boat, 170 ■ mmes, ic Submarine mines, employment of, 211 Subterranean fort, Mougin, 88, 102, 128 Sultan, the, 222 Superb, the, 222 Swiftsure, the, 222 Tallaia, Major, defends Campo- Major, 16 Target, prize firing, 174 Targets, comparative, 179 Tarragona, siege of, 20 Tchesma, the, 245 Tchim Fort, attack of, 76 Tekmass Fort, attack of, 76 Telegraph battery, teaching of, 83, 218 Tel-el-Kebir, assault of, I Thndraire, the, 166, 231 Thionville, garrison of, 128 Thimderer, the, 224 Thdtis, the, 237 Todleben invests Plevna, 70 , views of, 34 , views as to coast bat- teries, 83 Torpedoes, locomotive, 170, 214, 272 Torres Vedras, lines of, 16, 17 Toulon, defence of, 217 , siege of, 10, 11 Trafalgar, the, 195, 226 Travelling carriages for land de fences, 140 Trees, uses of, 143 Trident, the, 237 Triumph, the, 222 Trow Rock, trial at, 160 Turenne, the, 237, 239 Turin, siege of, 1 1 Turret, Dover, 156, 164 , Griison, 156 , Spezzia, 172 310 INDEX. Turret, disadvantage of, 171 , experiments with, i6i Ulm, surprise of, 9, United States Board on fortifica- tion, 2l6 Valetta, land front of, 122 , defences of, 5 Valiant, the, 221 Vanves Fort, losses in, 62 , damage to, App. F. Varna, siege of, 27 Vauban, basis of system of, 6] , influence of, 21 , Marmont's opinion of, $ , school of, 5 Vicksburg, 2 , siege of, 46 Victoria, the, 229 Victoria, the, comparison with old ship, 177 Voorduin, Colonel, proposals of, 89 Wagner, Fort, 2 , siege of, 44 Warrior, the, 219 Warspite, the, 165, 235 Wasp battery, teaching of, 83, 21 & Watkin, Major, position-finding system, 208 Wellington, Duke of, siege train, 14 , Torres Ve- dras, 17 West Indies, requirements of, 257 Woods, use of, 117 Woolwich (1824), breaching experi- ments at, 43 Zalinski, Captain, pneumatic gun, 170, 212 LONDON : PRINTED BY WM. CLOWKS AND 60NS, LIMITED, STAUtuiCU STltEET AMD CUXKING CKUS6. IN V \