^m,^-Jm...^ ^■"'" ^s^/ 
 
 :»■. 
 
 :>"< 
 
«n^i. 
 
 
 The Present Status of Jritejpiiional 
 Arbitration 
 
 WINNING ESSAY 
 
 BY 
 BRYANT SMITH 
 
 IN THE FIFTH 
 
 PUGSLEY PRIZE CONTEST 
 
 Under the auspices of the 
 
 Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration 
 
 1912-1913 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE i'- ^-^^ 
 
 Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration - nn**^ 
 
 Mohonk Lake, N. Y. 
 1913 
 
3X ^"'' 
 
 /':/■■ '^-^(^ 
 
 ,•3 ■ 
 
 'hfi, Ir-F 
 
 'J r\ ~ 
 
 
 ''I. .Ui^^ 
 
 
THE PUGSLEY PRIZE ESSAY CONTESTS 
 
 In igo8, Mr. Chester DeWitt Pugsley, then an undergraduate student 
 in Harvard University, gave $50 as a prize to be oiiered by the Lake 
 Mohonk Conference for the best essay on "International Arbitration" 
 by an undergraduate student of an American college. The prize was 
 won by L. B. Bobbitt, of Baltimore, a sophomore in Johns Hopkins 
 University The following year (1909-10) a similar prize of $100 was 
 won by George Knowles Gardner, of Worcester, Mass., a Harvard 
 sophomore. A like prize of $100 in 1910-1911 was won by Harry 
 Posner, of West Point, Miss., a senior in the Mississippi Agricultural 
 and Mechanical College. 
 
 The prize of 1911-12 of which John K. Starkweather, of Denver, 
 Colo., a junior in Brown University, was the winner, was the first 
 offered to men students only (other similar prizes having been offered 
 to women students) in the United States and Canada. 
 
 In the fifth Pugsley contest (1912-13) the prize was awarded to 
 Bryant Smith, of Guilford College, N. C, a senior in Guilford College, 
 at the same place, whose essay follows. The judges were Chancellor 
 Elmer Ellsworth Brown of New York University, RoUo Ogden, 
 Editor of the New York Evening Post, and Lieutenant General 
 .Nelson A. Miles, U. S. A., retired. 
 
 Each winner is invited to the Lake Mohonk Conference next follow- 
 ing, where he publicly receives the prize from its donor, Mr. Pugsley. 
 
 The winning essays in the first, second and third contests are printed 
 in the annual reports of the Lake Mohonk Conference for 1909, 1910 
 and 1911 respectively, while the winning essay of 1911-12 is printed 
 separately in pamphlet form. 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924009326145 
 
THE PRESENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL 
 ARBITRATION 
 
 Prize-winning Essay in the Pugsley Contest, 1912-13 
 
 BY 
 
 BRYANT SMITH 
 Of Guilford College, N. C, a Senior in Guilford College. 
 
 The first concerted effort looking toward an eventual world- 
 wide peace was the Hague Conference of 1899, where repre- 
 sentatives of twenty-six nations assembled in response to a 
 Rescript from the Czar of Russia, whose avowed purpose, as 
 set forth in the Rescript, was to discuss ways and, if possible, 
 devise means, to arrest the alarming increase in expenditures 
 for armaments which threatened to bankrupt the national govern- 
 ments. 
 
 Unable to accomplish anything definite in this respect because 
 of the vigorous opposition headed by Germany, the delegates 
 turned their attention toward giving official recognition and 
 concrete form to ideas which had already obtained in the settle- 
 ment of international disputes, and toward the formation of a 
 court before which the nations might have their differences ad- 
 judicated. The principles embodied in Good Offices and Medi- 
 ation and Commissions of Inquiry have given gratifying evidence 
 of their efficiency, each in its respective capacity. The original 
 achievement of the Conference, however, was the Permanent 
 Court of Arbitration. The composition of this court was to 
 include not more than four persons from each of the signatory 
 powers, from which panel, in case of an appeal to arbitration, 
 each party was to select two judges, who, in turn, should elect 
 their own umpire unless otherwise provided by the disputants. 
 That it would be subject to criticism might have been expected. 
 That twenty-six nations could unanimously agree upon any 
 court whatever was the real occasion for surprise. The four 
 cases arbitrated during the eight years intervening between this 
 and the Second Hague Conference served to bring out its de- 
 fects, chief of which were its decentralized and intangible nature. 
 Nominally a court, in reality it was but a panel scattered all 
 over the world from which a court could, with great difficulty 
 and expense, be selected. Nominally permanent, in reality it 
 had to be re-created for each case to be judged. 
 
 The Second Hague Conference, working on a basis of this 
 
 5 
 
short experience, undertook to remedy these inherent defects 
 in the arbitral machinery by leaving the Permanent Court just 
 as it was, and by creating besides an International Court of Prize 
 to serve a special function indicated by its name, a Court of 
 Judicial Arbitration to supplement the work of, if not event- 
 ually to supplant, the former court. To insure greater imparti- 
 ality and also to encourage the weaker powers, the expenses of 
 the new court, instead of falling upon the litigants in each case, 
 were to be prorated among the ratifying powers. To insure 
 greater tangibility and permanency, the new court was to be 
 composed of only seventeen members, each to serve a term of 
 twelve years, at a salary of $2,400.00 per annum, with an addi- 
 tional $40.00 for each day of actual service. Furthermore, 
 the court was to meet once a year and to elect each year la 
 delegation of three of its members to sit at The Hague for settling 
 minor cases arising in the interval between regular sessions, 
 having the power also to call extra sessions of the entire court 
 whenever occasion should demand. To insure a more judicial 
 personnel, the Convention specifies that members shall be quali- 
 fied to hold high legal posts in their respective countries. The 
 method by which members of the court were to be appointed, 
 the one point upon which the delegates were unable to agree, 
 was deferred for subsequent determination. 
 
 This, in addition to the one hundred and fifty odd treaties 
 privately entered into by two or more nations, many of which 
 contain pledges to submit certain classes of disputes to the Per- 
 manent Court, is, in brief, what has been accomplished by way 
 of constructive political organization by the modern peace 
 movement. 
 
 How much does this signify? In view of the present attitude 
 of the social mind, what are we to infer from this as bearing 
 upon the ultimate outcome of international arbitration? It shall 
 be the purpose of this paper to answer that question. 
 
 In an address before the Mohonk Conference of 191 1, Dr. 
 Cyrus Northrup, Ex-President of the University of Minnesota, 
 said: "What is really wanted is not continued talking in favor 
 of peace with the idea of converting the people; for the people 
 are already converted! They are ready for peace and arbitra- 
 tion!" In the October number of the Review of Reviews for 
 1909, Privy Councillor Karl Von Stengel, one of the German 
 delegation to the First Hague Conference, is quoted as follows : 
 "It must be stated emphatically that in its ultimate aims the 
 peace movement is not only . . . Utopian, but . 
 dangerous . . . ." These quotations are given as typical 
 of the attitude manifested by the two extremes, the injudiciously 
 optomistic and the ultra-conservative, toward every social re- 
 form. All true progress pursues a course intermediate to 
 these two. 
 
 The idea entertained by so many enthusiastic peace advocates, 
 
 6 
 
that the world is ready for peace if we but had institutional 
 facilities adequate to carry out the will of the people, is erro- 
 neous. In all democratic states political institutions are but a 
 concrete expression of the social mind, the media created by 
 the people, through which society executes its will. "With a 
 given phase of human character . . . there must go an 
 adapted class of institutions." ^ Therefore, I submit that 
 if the people were ready for peace they could easily provide the 
 means necessary for its accomplishment. 
 
 The first gentleman quoted above drew his conclusion from 
 the indications that of the two million inhabitants of his state, 
 one million nine hundred thousand would favof arbitration as 
 shown by the enthusiasm manifested at a meeting of the State 
 Peace Society a few weeks before. Similar conditions in other 
 parts of the country, he thought, would corroborate the appli- 
 cation of his assertion to the entire country. Such a conclusion 
 is fallacious in that it fails to consider three essential facts about 
 the people of the United States, which largely determine the 
 attitude of any people toward war. First, they have no griev- 
 ance. Second, no appeal is being made to their patriotic bias. 
 Third, their emotions and passions are quiescent. 
 
 The first of these needs only brief mention. No people in 
 this enlightened age wishes to fight as a matter of course, re- 
 gardless of any reasonable pretext. If nations never had any 
 personal interests involved, there would, of course, be no more 
 war. In this respect the people of the United States are not 
 ahead of the other parts of the civilized world. Disinterested 
 parties have been in favor of peace for two thousand years. 
 
 The other two facts deserve more extended consideration. 
 
 The disposition in individuals to pluck motes out of their 
 neighbors' eyes and leave beams in their own, in the nation 
 becomes what Herbert Spencer calls the bias of patriotism. 
 According to him patriotism is but an extended self-interest. 
 We love our country because our own interests and our country's 
 interests are one. Unable to view international afifairs apart 
 from national interests, we are handicapped in making those 
 balanced judgments necessary to judicial arbitration. An act 
 reprehensible under the Union Jack becomes patriotic under the 
 Stars and Stripes. At both Hague Conferences all the powers 
 were seemingly in favor of curtailing expenditures for arma- 
 ments. The unprecedented increase in expenditures which 
 followed bespeaks their sincerity, or, rather, bespeaks each 
 nation's mistrust of the sincerity of others. A number of years 
 ago the Farmers' Alliance, organized in some of the Southern 
 tobacco states, voted to reduce the acreage of tobacco for a given 
 year in order to raise the price. So many members tried to 
 profit by this opportunity to realize a high price for a big crop 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology. 
 
 7 
 
that there was a greater acreage planted that year than ever 
 before. Can we expect better of groups than of the individuals 
 of which the groups are composed? Most nations question 
 the justice of Russia's policy leading up to the War with Japan, 
 England's course in South Africa, and America's attitude to- 
 ward the Philippines; yet the body of citizens of each of these 
 three countries, while concurring in the general opinion con- 
 cerning the other two, justifies its own government's actions 
 with patriotic pride. 
 
 The chief respect in which this bias interferes with the pro- 
 gress of international arbitration is in restricting the scope of 
 general arbitration treaties, the average formula of such treaty 
 excluding all questions which involve "national honor and vital 
 interests." A greatly modified survival of the spirit which in 
 primitive peoples regarded the tribe over the mountain or 
 across the stream as a fit object of hatred and fear, the objection 
 to a judicial settlement of such questions assumes that a nation's 
 honor and vital interests are goods peculiar in that they may 
 be inconsistent with justice. The attitude of the United States 
 toward the recently proposed treaty between England and Ameri- 
 ca may be taken as typical of the attitude which prevails on this 
 subject generally. The formulators of the treaty took an 
 advanced step in that, instead of reserving questions of national 
 honor and vital interests, they provided for the arbitration of all 
 differences which are "justiciable in their nature by reason of 
 being susceptible of decision by the application of principles of 
 law or equity," thereby recognizing the judicial nature of 
 arbitration. The action of the Senate, however, which sus- 
 tained the opinion of the JMajority Report of the Senate Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Relations, objecting to the last clause of 
 Article III. of the treaty, would indicate that the significance 
 of a general arbitration treaty attaches not so much to the 
 definition of its scope as to who shall determine what cases 
 conform to the definition. It would seem that the nature of the 
 reservation is relatively unimportant so long as its interpre- 
 tation devolves upon the parties at variance. The Majority 
 Report, objecting to the delegation to the Joint High Commission 
 of the power to determine the arbitrability of cases in terms of 
 the treaty, contains this statement in which the Minority Report 
 likewise concurs: "Everyone agrees that there are certain ques- 
 tions which no nation . . . will ever submit to the de- 
 cision of anyone else." As cases of this nature it enumerates 
 territorial integrity, admission of immigrants, and our Monroe 
 Doctrine. The significance of this insistence upon a means of 
 evasion is evident. There is not yet enough international con- 
 fidence. The powers are not yet ready to submit to unlimited 
 arbitration. 
 
 The other enemy to rational judgment, — and rational judg- 
 ment must be the only basis of arbitration, — is the danger of 
 
 8 
 
emotionalism. The average man is yet largely irrational. When 
 cool and self-possessed, and when his prejudices and traditions 
 do not interfere, he can pass rational judgment upon questions 
 in which his own interests are not concerned; but when his 
 passions are aroused he dispenses with any effort to reason 
 and acts in obedience to blind impulse. He knows that it is 
 expensive to fight, that it is dangerous and that it is wrong; 
 but when he is provoked, he fights. The characteristics of the 
 average man are the characteristics of society. We have not 
 yet outgrown the mob. 
 
 Interwoven with this impulsive temperament and associated 
 with some of the most cherished affections of the human heart, 
 is the spirit of war, developed by thousands of generations of 
 ancestral conflict and passed on to us as an heritage to be rooted 
 out of our nature before we shall realize in its fulness the ideal 
 for which we strive. Mortal conflict sanctified by religion, de- 
 vastation idealized by literature, pillage justified by patriotism, 
 fellow-destruction ennobled by self-sacrifice, — these form a 
 complex of contradictory emotions from which men are as yet 
 unable to unravel the one essential characteristic of war, namely ; 
 the attempt to dispense justice in a trial by battle, and make it 
 stand out in its revealed inconsistency, dissociated from its tra- 
 ditional concomitants of which it is neither part nor parcel. The 
 romance of knighthood and chivalry still appeals to the human 
 heart, notwithstanding the fact that war, love and religion, the 
 knight's creed, are an inconsistent combination. Most men can 
 be made to see this in their minds, but cannot be made to feel 
 it in their souls. Many old Civil War veterans, who would 
 not consent for their sons to volunteer in the Spanish-American 
 War, would have gone themselves had they been able. Some 
 did go. To men so disposed it is useless to talk of the horrors 
 of war. Give us a just grievance; let some competent enthu- 
 siast inflame this passion with a war cry like "Remember the 
 Maine," "Fifty-four forty or fight," "Uberty or Death," and 
 reinforced by the animal inherent in man, it will arouse popu- 
 lar demonstrations devoid of all reason, creating a force that 
 cannot be controlled by a cold, calculating intellect. Can you 
 listen to a bugle call on a clear still night without a quickening 
 of the pulse as there flashes through your soul a suggestion of 
 all past history with its marshalling hosts and heroic deeds ? Can 
 you see a military parade without a suggestion of Dixie and 
 The Star Spangled Banner, or feeling your bosom swell with 
 patriotic pride? This association may be, and doubtless is, a 
 delusion, but it is a delusion developed and fortified by thousands 
 of years of custom and precedent and it would be contrary 
 to the history of human progress if man should become dis- 
 illusionized in one generation. It may take centuries. If we 
 are to have international arbitration in the near future, we must 
 have it in spite of this spirit of war rather than by destroying 
 
the spirit. In fact, the only practical way to destroy it is to 
 let it, like vestigial organs of which biologists tell us, degenerate 
 from disuse. This inherited emotional tendency remains as a 
 threat with which we, as exponents of arbitration, must reckon 
 before we are justified in saying that the world is ready for 
 peace. 
 
 Because of these two social characteristics, the patriotic bias 
 which perverts judgment, and uncontrolled passions which sub- 
 merge reason, the educational propagandists still have a task 
 to perform. 
 
 Let us now examine the stand-pat idea that unlimited arbi- 
 tration is but a dream as expressed in the quotation from Privy 
 Councillor Stengel. This is further from the truth than the 
 other extreme just discussed. He who will, with an unpreju- 
 diced mind, examine cross-sections of history at widely separ- 
 ated stages, cannot fail to see that along with the growing ten- 
 dency of reason to predominate over passion, superstition and 
 custom, has been a parallel tendency to restrict militarism as a 
 social activity. From war conceived as religion to war as 
 patriotism, then war as commercialism and the tool of ambition, 
 man is now coming to the more rational conception of war 
 as the despoiler of nations. David speaks of the "season of 
 the year" when nations went forth to battle. Fifteen hundred 
 years later, governments pretended at least to justify their mili- 
 tary operations on rational grounds. Today war is the last 
 resort, and even its most ardent defenders do not attempt to 
 justify it except in disputes which involve national honor and 
 vital interests. 
 
 In view of the foregoing facts, it is evident that the modern 
 peace movement has by no means the whole of the task to 
 perform. Rather, we can almost justify ourselves in the as- 
 sumption that war is not long to remain one of our social in- 
 consistencies and that it is now making its last, and, therefore, 
 most determined, stand on questions of national honor and vital 
 interests. 
 
 Among the numerous forces contributing to this evolution 
 of international peace, the chief agencies have been, and still 
 are, moral and industrial. These same forces are working today 
 with cumulative effect. 
 
 Warfare is becoming more and more inconsistent with the 
 ethical spirit of the times. Men may talk of the expenses, hor- 
 rors, and devastations of war as paramount causes for the 
 tendency to substitute arbitration ; but antedating all other causes, 
 underlying and strengthening all others, is the slowly changing 
 social conscience which, as each generation passes, appreciates 
 more fully warfare's inconsistency with justice and antagonism 
 to right. This same cause found civilized society taking keen 
 delight in the heathen barbarity of a gladiatorial combat, and 
 has transformed and lifted it up to where it is horrified at a 
 
 10 
 
bull-baiting or a prize fight. It found human beings with abso- 
 lute power of life and death over other human beings and has 
 evolved the view that all men are created free and equal. It 
 found individuals settling questions of honor by a resort to arms, 
 and has substituted therefor a judge, council and a jury. These 
 three institutions, gladiatorial combats, slavery and dueling, were 
 no more regarded in their day as only temporary phenomena 
 of social evolution than is war so regarded by military sympa- 
 thizers of today, yet these have one by one been eliminated, and 
 war is fast becoming as much out of harmony with the ethical 
 spirit of this age as was each of the above out of harmony with 
 the spirit of the age which dispensed with it, and the effort 
 to demonstrate that war is just as dispensable is meeting with 
 success. The teachings of Christ, who two thousand years ago 
 announced the doctrine of human brotherhood and surrendered 
 his life to make this doctrine effective, have slowly but surely 
 wrought their leavening influence upon the source of all war, 
 namely, the hearts of men. Warfare has for centuries been 
 gradually yielding to this deepening consciousness and that it 
 must eventually, if not soon, take its place beside the long dis- 
 carded gladiatorial profession, the outlawed slave trade, and the 
 discountenanced custom of the duelist, must be evident to any- 
 one who takes more than a superficial view of the great determin- 
 ing forces which shape human progress. 
 
 Besides moral forces, industrial forces were mentioned as a 
 factor tending to the adoption of arbitration. During recent 
 times, under the impetus caused by the relatively modern inno- 
 vations of steam, electricity and the press, this class of causes 
 has been unusually effective. Industry has overstepped inter- 
 national boundary lines. Through the division of labor we are 
 passing from the independence of nations to the interdependence 
 of nations. International banking, transportation, and com- 
 merce, by establishing communities of interest in all parts of the 
 world, are binding the peoples of the earth into one great in- 
 dustrial organization. As striking evidence of this development, 
 more than one hundred and fifty international associations and 
 more than thirty-five international unions of states have been 
 formed. The modem intricate system of communication is a 
 veritable nervous system which, in the event of any local 
 paralysis or upheaval, informs the entire industrial organism. 
 The figure is no longer the "shot, heard round the world," but 
 becomes the "pulse-beat, felt round the world." If Spencer's 
 definition of patriotism, that is co-extensive with personal mter- 
 ests, is correct, the bias of patriotism cannot retard the progress 
 of arbitration much longer ; for patriotism will be a world-wide 
 feeling, since personal interests are no longer restricted to nation- 
 ality. 
 
 No, Herr Stengel, each passing year finds the causes which 
 make for war weakened and the causes which make for ar- 
 il 
 
bitration proportionately reinforced. The skeptics are the 
 dreamers and the peace workers are the practical men of affairs. 
 
 From the foregoing synopsis of the technical accomplishments 
 of the modem peace movement to date, and from the effort to 
 interpret their significance in the light of fundamental social 
 characteristics and the present social attitude, I trust three things 
 have become evident. 
 
 First. The movement for international peace through ar- 
 bitration, far from being a mere bubble on the surface of society 
 to be burst by the first war cloud which appears on the horizon, 
 is a movement, centuries old, coincident with social evolution, 
 deep-rooted in the very nature of a developing world-wide civil- 
 ization. 
 
 Second. International peace through arbitration is not to be 
 a ready-made affair, coming in on the crest of some wave of 
 popular enthusiasm as was expected by many in 1899. 
 
 Third. Being an outgrovrth of the natural laws of human 
 development, a result so much deeper and more fundamental 
 than political laws can produce, international peace through 
 arbitration may be furthered, but cannot be accomplished, by 
 legislation; may be delayed, but cannot be prevented, by the 
 neglect to legislate. To undertake to hasten arbitration by 
 forcing legislative proceedings beyond what the people will in- 
 dorse, would be as futile as to turn up the hands of the clock 
 to hasten the passage of time. 
 
 To those who can appreciate these facts there is no occasion 
 for discouragement in the suspicious attitude manifested by the 
 powers toward any definite step in the direction of unrestricted 
 arbitration, apparently so inconsistent with their general pacific 
 professions. "Rapid growth and quickly accomplished reforms 
 are necessarily unsound, incomplete, and disappointing."- 
 
 With the truth of these deductions granted, it would seem 
 safe to assume that the institutions for the settlement of inter- 
 national difficulties will develop in much the same way as have 
 the institutions for the settlement of difficulties between individ- 
 uals. It should be profitable, therefore, to compare the present 
 growth of arbitration with the evolution and decay of the various 
 modes of trial as the idea of judicial settlement diffused itself 
 through the mind of the English people causing established forms 
 to give way to something better. Dispensing with the Blood 
 Feud, which hardly deserves the name of trial, the oldest form 
 of such institution was Trial by Ordeal which, according to 
 Thayer in his Evidence at the Common Law, seems tO' have 
 been "indigenous with the human creature in the earliest stages 
 of his development." This form gradually fell into disuse be- 
 fore the more rational form of Compurgation introduced into 
 Teutonic Courts in the fifth century. In 1215 it was formally 
 abolished. Compurgation was abolished in 1440 as its inferi- 
 
 " F. H. Giddings; The Elements of Sociology. 
 
 12 
 
ority to Trial by Witnesses became fully recognized. In the 
 latter form, instituted early in the ninth century, when the wit- 
 nesses disagreed, the judicial talent of the day conceived of no 
 other method of decision than to fight it out. Thus we have 
 Trial by Witnesses and Trial by Battle developing concurrently, 
 although they were recognized as distinct forms. After two 
 centuries of effort to abolish it, Trial by Battle was made illegal 
 in 1833, the last case recorded as being so decided occurring in 
 1835. Out of the Trial by Witnesses has evolved our modern 
 Trial by Jury, at first limited to certain unimportant cases, then 
 having its sphere extended as its superiority became more evi- 
 dent, until finally it superseded all other forms and today is 
 the accepted mode of settling even questions of honor. 
 
 The growth and extension of international arbitration has not 
 been dissimilar to this. Six cases were arbitrated in the 
 eighteenth century, four hundred and seventy-one in the nine- 
 teenth, while more than one hundred and fifty cases have been 
 arbitrated during the first thirteen years of the twentieth century. 
 Between the First and Second Hague Conferences only four 
 ■cases were submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
 Since the Second Conference, notwithstanding the unsatisfac- 
 tory disposition of the Venezuelan affair, eight cases have been 
 tried, a ninth is pending, a tenth will soon be docketed if the 
 United States is not to act the hypocrite in her international rela- 
 tions by refusing to submit to England's request to arbitrate the 
 question as to whether or no we exempt our coastwise vessels 
 from toll duty through the Panama Canal. Defects have been 
 detected in the Permanent Court of Arbitration and we are well 
 on the way toward a better court. Representatives of only 
 twenty-six nations took part in the deliberations of the First 
 Hague Conference; representatives of forty-four nations took 
 part in the deliberations of the Second Hague Conference. Wars 
 of aggression and conquest, though not formally outlawed, are 
 effectively so, and arbitration for the recovery of contract debts 
 is now practically obligatory. As time passes and its feasi- 
 bility gains credence, arbitration, like the jury trial, will extend 
 its sphere of usefulness until it too settles questions of honor. 
 Nor need we imply from this analogy that it will take such an 
 age to accomplish this result. Because of the increased mobility 
 of society, resulting from the greater like-mindedness and con- 
 sciousness of kind incident to our modern communities of inter- 
 ests and systems of communication, and from our greater sus- 
 ceptibility to rational rather than traditional appeals, a reform 
 can be wrought more easily and the people can adjust themselves 
 to the change far more readily than several centuries ago. 
 . Bearing in mind, then, our attempted analysis of counter social 
 forces at work, our deductions from this analysis, and the fore- 
 going analogy whose significance grows out of the truth of these 
 deductions, let us conclude with a suggestion as to what the 
 
 13 
 
next Hague Conference should attempt. It should, of course, 
 like the former Conferences, extract as many teeth as possible 
 from war. As to improving our arbitration facilities, its first 
 task evidently should be to determine some method whereby 
 members of the Judicial Arbitration Court shall be apportioned 
 and selected. If, as has been suggested, it is decided to use the 
 same scheme of apportionment as that for the International 
 Court of Prize, the provision that each party to a case shall 
 have a representative on the bench should be changed so as to 
 provide that neither party shall have a representative on the 
 bench. If this court is not to be a misnomer like the Permanent 
 Court of Arbitration, its rulings must be in accord with the 
 principles of jurisprudence rather than with the spirit of compro- 
 mise such a provision would tend to produce. With this ac- 
 complished and the Judicial Court of Arbitration put in prac- 
 tical working order "of free and easy access" to the powers, it 
 may be doubted whether anything further can be done. If the 
 powers can be made to agree to submit to the court all cases 
 growing out of the disputed interpretation of treaties, a great 
 advance will have been made, but it is doubtful whether the 
 present state of public opinion would indorse such a progressive 
 step. These international legislators can do no more than pro- 
 vide channels through which the spirit of international peace 
 can exercise itself as it expands, and the Judicial Court of Arbi- 
 tration, at the optional use of the nations, conforms admirably 
 to this requirement. The delegates should, therefore, avoid the 
 universal tendency of such bodies to legislate too much. None 
 of these Hague Conferences can alone accomplish the ultimate 
 purpose of the so-called dreamers, but each Conference may be 
 a landmark on the upward journey toward that consummation, 
 anticipated by Utopians from the earliest times, foretold by 
 prophets from Micah and Isaiah to Robert Burns and Tennyson, 
 labored for by practical statesmen from Hugo Grotius to 
 William H. Taft, when each man shall be a native of his state 
 and a citizen of the world. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 For Acts and Conventions of Hague Conferences : 
 
 Texts of the Peace Conferences by James Brown Scott. 
 
 For Data Concerning Proposed Treaty with England: 
 
 Text of Treaty and Majority and Minority Reports of Senate Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Relations. 
 
 For Statistics of Arbitration Treaties: 
 
 Revised List of Arbitration Treaties, compiled by Denys P. Myers. 
 
 For Development of Trial by Jury: 
 
 Evidence at the Common Law by Thayer. 
 
 14 
 
Cornell University Library 
 JX 1963.S64 
 
 The present status of international arbi 
 
 3 1924 009 326 145 
 
u 
 
 )ti-.f, .>??% '»l(fp 
 
 ■r^"3Ki