B /■I. CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM The Sage School of philosophj"- 3 1924 092 280 365 Date Due 1581 '^ t' ifMa* JUL. 2 b i-sivjif j| i Qfi£^ dSSS^DN ** — flCT^a-t-T? Sb« ^CL^^a ami ntJ ni 1 it i^bW'i 1 '^ ri ^ j^P^^ ^^ AUG' J^^^J J^' ^ ■fc^ Cornell University Library The original of this bool< is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924092280365 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Vol. L HISTORY PHILOS'OPHT, FROM THALES TO THE PRESENT TIME. DR. FRIEDRICH TIEBEEWEG, LATE PBOFESSOP. OF FHILOSOPBT IN THE ONIVEBSITI OP KciNIGSBEBa. CransIatcD fcom 0)e JTouctfi ISnman fSBAvitt, BT GEO. S. MORRIS, A.M., PROFESSOB OF PHILOSOPHT IN THE DNITEBSITX OF UICHIOAH. ilim.tl) SStiitEins, NOAH PORTEK, D.D., LL.D., PBESISENTZ OF YALE COLLEGE. With a ^xtim BY THE'EDITORS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAI, AND THEOLOGICAI IIJBEART. VOL. L— HISTORY OF THE ANCIENT AND MEDDEVAL PHILOSOPHY. NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 1891. uis'ivi i;s;n Y ''V. i^.l AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION, REVISED BY THE AXJTHOB. Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 187], By CHABLES SCBIBNBE & ^O., In the OiBce of the Librarian of Congress, at WasbingtoiL Trow's Printing and Bookbindihg Co., printers and bookbinders, 205-213 Jiast 12/A St., NEW YORK. ysu\m;.i.i PUBLISHERS' M)TE. The wide adoption of Uebeeweg's History of Philosophy, as a text book in tlie higher institutions of learning, has induced the publishers to issue the work in this smaller and less expensive form, in order to bring it more generally within the reach of students. As now produced the work contains all the matter of the original edition. PREFACE. Dr. Ueberweg's Grundriss der G-eschichte der PhUosophie, in three parts, was first published at Berlin, 1862 to '66. It met with such approval, not- withstanding the competition with other able compends, that the first part has already reached a fourth edition (1871). Since Tennemann's Manual (1812, 5th edition by Wend, 1829),* no work has appeared so well adapted to meet the wants of students. Indeed, no work on the subject contains such a careful collection of authorities and citations, or so full a bibliograr phical apparatus. The opinions of the various schools and their contrasted principles, as well as the views of individual philosophers, are presented with clearness and precision. This is the great value of the work. It is not writ- ten, like some histories of philosophy, to propound or fortify the special theories of the author. It shows a full mastery of the whole course of philo- sophic thought, with independent investigations and criticisms. The various systems are given, as far as possible, in the phraseology of their authors, and this imparts variety to the style. It is eminently impartial. The undersigned selected it as the best work with which to begin the philo- sophical division of their proposed Library, after a full comparison of it with other works of its class, and upon consultation with those best qualified to judge about its merits. It is more concise than Hitter's General Sistory, and more full and authentic than Schwegler's Outline, which was first pre- pared for an Encyclopsedia. The works of Fries, and Eisner, and Reinhold have been supplanted by more recent investigations. Hitter's Sistory of Civristian Philosophy (1858-'59), though very valuable, covers only a part of the ground, and presupposes some acquaintance with the sources which Ueberweg so fully cites. The well-known Mstory of Morell is restricted to the later European systems. The able critical histories of modern philoso- phy by Erdmann and Kuno Fischer are limited in their range, yet too ex- tended for our object. The work with which we most carefully compared Ueberweg's Treatise, was Professor Erdmann's Compend of the Whole History * Translated by Kev. A. Johnson, revised and enlarged by T. E. Morell, London, 1853. viil PEEFACE. of Philosophy, in two volumes (Berlin, 1866). This is the product of a master of philosophic systems, and it is elaborate in method, and finished in style. •But it is perhaps better fitted to complete than to begin the study of the History of Philosophy. Its refined criticisms and its subtle transitions from one system to another, presuppose considerable acquaintance with recent Ger- man speculations. And Professor Ei-dmaun himself generously expressed to Dr. Schaff his appreciation of the special value of Ueberweg's Manual, say- ing that he always kept it before him, and considered it indispensable on account of its full literature of the subject. This translation of Ueberweg appears under the sanction, and with the aid of the author himself. He has carefully revised the proofs, and given to our edition the benefit of his latest emendations. He did not survive to see the completion of this work; he died, after a painful illness of seven weeks, June 7, 1871, at Eonigsberg, wliile yet in the prime of his career. In re- peated letters to Dr. Schafii who conducted the correspondence with him, he has expressed his great satisfaction with this translation, in comparison, too, with that of his System cf Logic (3d edition, Bonn, 1868), recently issued in England.* His friend. Dr. Czolbe, wrote in behalf of his widow, that, "on the day of his death, he carefully corrected soma of the proof-sheets of this translation, and was delighted with its excellency." The work has been translated from the latest printed editions ; the First Part, on Ancient Philosophy, is from the proof-sheets of the fourth edition, just now issued in German. Por the Second and Third Parts, special notes, modifications, and additions were forwarded by the author. At our suggestion, Professor Morris has, in the majority of cases, trans- lated the Greek and Latin citations ; retaining also the original text, when this seemed necessary. A long foot-note, I 74, on the recent German discus- sions concerning the date and authorship of the Gospels, which was hardly in place in a History of Philosophy, has been omitted with the consent of Dr. Ueberweg. Dr. Noah Porter, President of Yale College, has examined this translation and enriched it by valuable additions, especially on the history of English and American Philosophy. The first volume, now issued^ embraces the first and second parts of the original, viz., Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy; the second and last volume will contain the history of Modem Philosophy, with a full alphabetical index. The sections have been numbered consecutively through both volumes. • System of Logie and History of Logical Doctrines. By Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, Prof, of Phil, in the University of Konigsberg. Translated from the German, with Notes and Appendices, by Thomas M. Lindsay, M.A., F.R.S.B , Examiner in Phi- losophy to the University of Edinburgh. Loudon : Longmans, Green & Co., 1871. PEEFACE. IX Besides this work, and his System of JLogic, Professor TJeberweg was the author of a treatise on ITw J}evelopmeni of Consciousness by Teaclie/rs, a series of applications of Beneke's Theory of Consciousness, in didactic rela- tions (Berlin, 1853) ; Investigations on the brenuineness and Order of the Platonic Writings, including a sketch of the Life of Plato, — a volume crowned by the Imperial Academy of Vienna, 1861 ; De JPriore et Posteriore Forma KantiancB Critices Rationis Pwrm, a pamphlet published at Berlin, in 1862. The later labors of his life were chiefly given to his History of Philosophy. In 1869 he published in J. H. von Kirchmann's Philosophic sche JBihlioiheh, an excellent German translation of Bishop Berkeley's treatise on the " Principles of Human Knowledge," with critical notes and illustra- tions. This was, ia part, the result of an animated metaphysical discussion ; for there are even now German as well as English advocates of the intense Subjectivism of Berkeley. The two chief philosophical journals of Germany have entered into this controversy, which was begun by a work of Collyns Simon, LL.D., entitled The Natm-e and Elements of tlie External World, or Universal Irmnaterialism, London, 1862, in which Berkeley's theory was acutely advocated. Dr. TJeberweg replied to it in Fichte and XJlrici's Zeit- schrift far Philosophie, Bd. 55, and Prof. Dr. von Eeichlin-Meldegg of Heidelberg in the same journal, Bd. 56, 1870. Dr. Simon's rejoinder ap- peared, with comments by Ulrici, in the same volume. In Bergmann's PhUosophische Monatshefte, Bd. v.. May, 1870, Simon, Hoppe, and Schuppe in three articles controverted Ueberweg's positions ; Ids reply ap- peared in August, with a rejoinder by Schuppe, February, 1871. In this controversy Dr. TJeberweg showed a full mastery of the subject. In Fichte's Zeitschrift, Bd. 57, 1870, he continued his investigations upon the Order of the Platonic Writings, by replying to Brandis and Steinhart, who had criti- cised his views.* Such high-toned discussions contribute to the progress of thought and knowledge. Friedrich TJeberweg was bom January 22, 1826, the son of a Lutheran clergyman near SoUngen in Rhenish Prussia. His excellent mother was early left a poor widow, and devoted herself to her only son till her death in 1868. He was educated in the College at Elberfeld and the Universities of Gottin- gen and Berlin, and attained to extraordinary proficiency in philosophy, phi- lology, and mathematics. In 1852 he commenced his academic career as Privatdocent in Bonn, and in 1862 he was called as Professor of Philosophy to the University of Konigsberg. There he labored with untiring industry till last summer, when (in the forty-sixth year of his age) he died in the midst * This essay ia entitled : Ueb^ den Gegensais zwisohen Methodikem und Geneti- kern und dessen Vermittdung bd dem Problem der Ordnung der Schriften Plato's. X PEEFACE. of Kterary plans for the future, leaviag a widow and four children and many friends and admirers to mourn his loss. He was a genuine German scholar j^ and ranked with the first ia his profession. His History of Philosophy and his Logic will perpetuate his name and usefulness.* TJeberweg's History of Philosophy, while complete in itself, also forms a part of a select Theological and Philosophical Library, which the under- signed projected some years since, and now intend to issue as rapidly as is possible with so large an undertaking. A prospectus of the whole accom- panies the present volume. Heney B. Smith and Philip Schaff, New York, Oct. 18, 187L Editors. ' Compare the fine tribute to his memory by his friend, Professor Fr. A. Lange, ol Zurich: Friedrieh Ueberweg, Berlin, 1871. Also Dilthey: Zum Andenken an Fried, Ueberweg, in the " Preuss. JahrbucJier " for Sept. 1871, pp. 309-333 ; and Adolf Lasson : Zum Andenken an F. IT., in Dr. Bergmann's ^'■PhUos. Monatsliefte" vol. vii.. No. 7, and separately published, Berlin, 1871. CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. INTRODUCTION. OF THE OOJfCEPTION, METHOD, AND GENEKAL SOURCES OP THE HISTORY OP PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH THE LITERARY HELPS. PASE § 1. The Conception of Philosophy 1-5 4$ 2. The Conception of History 5 § 3. The Methods of Historical Treatment 5-6 § 4. Sources and Aids 6-13 I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTIQUITY. § 5. General Character of Pre-Christian Antiquity and Philosophy . . . . 1i § 6. Oriental Philosophy 14-17 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. § 7. Sources and Aids for Greek Philosophy 18-24 § 8. Beginnings of Greek Philosophy in Greek Poetry and Proverbial Wisdom . 24^26 § 9. Periods of Development of Greek Philosophy 26-29 FIRST PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. PHE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY, OR PREVALENCE OP COSMOLOGY. § 10. Fourfold Division of the First Period 29-32 PIRST DIVISION: THE EARLIER lONIO NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. § 11. The Earlier Ionic Natural Pliilosophers 32 §12. Thales of Miletus and Hippo 32-35 § 13. Anaximander of Miletus . 35-37 X-1 CONTENTS. PAGE §14. Anaximenes of Miletus and Diogenes of ApoUonia 37-38 §15. Heraolitus of Ephesus and Cratylus of Athens 38-42 SECOND DIVISIOX: PYTHAGOBEANISJI. § 16. Pythagoras of Samos and the Pythagoreans 42-49 THIRD division: THE ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY. § 17. The Eleatio Philosophers 49-51 § 18. Xenophones of Colophon . 51-54 § 19. Parmenides of Elea 54-57 § 20. Zeno of Elea 57_59 § 21. Melissus of Samos 59-eo FOUETH division: LATER NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. § 22. The Later Natural Philosophers . GO § 23. Empedocles of Agrigentum 60-S3 § 24. Anaxagoras and Hermotimus of Clazomena3, Arohelaus of Miletus, and Metrodorus of Lampsacus C3-67 §25. The Atomists: Leuoippus and Demooritus 67-71 SECOND PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. FROM THE SOPHISTS TO THE STOICS, EPICUREANS, AND SKEPTICS, OR PERIOD OP THE FOUND- ING AND PREDOMINANCE OF ANTHROPOLOGY,* THE SCIENCE OF THE THINKING AND WILLING SUBJECT (LOGIC AND ETHICS), ACCOMPANIED BY A RETURN TO PHYSICS. § 26. The Three Divisions of the Second Period 71-72 FIRST DIVISION: THE SOPHISTS. § 27. The Sophistic Philosophy 72-'73 §28. Protagoras of Abdera 73-76 § 29. Grorgias of Leontini 76-77 §30. Hippias of Blis 77-78 § 31. Prodicus of Ceos 78 § 32. The Later Sophists 79-80 SECOND DIVISION: GREEK PHILOSOPHY FROM SOCRATES TO ARISTOTLE INCLUSIVE. § 33. Socrates of Athens 80-88 § 34. The Disciples of Socrates 88-89 § 35. Euclid of Megara and his School 88-91 § 36. Phsedo of Elis, Menedemus of Eretria, and their Schools 91 § 37. Antisthenes of Athens and the Cynic School . 92-t)4 CONTENTS. Xlll PAGB § 38. Aristippus of Cyrono and the Cyrenaio or Hedonie School 95-98 § 39. Plato's Life , . . . . ^ 98-104 § 40. Flato's "Writings • 104-115 §41. Plato's Divisions of Philosophy and his Dialectic 115-123 §42. Plato's Natural Philosophy 123-128 § 43. Plato's Ethics 128-132 § 44. The Old, Middle, and New Academies 133-137 § 45. Aristotle's Life 137-139 §46. Aristotle's Writings 139-151 §41. Aristotle's Divisions of Philosophy and his Logic 151-157 § 48. Aristotle's Metaphysics or First Philosophy 157-163 § 49. Aristotle's Natural Philosophy 163-169 § 50. The Aristotelian Ethics and .iEsthetios 169-180 §51. The Peripatetics 180-185 THIRD division: STOICISM, EPICUBEANISM, AND SKEPTICISM. § 52. The Leading Stoics 185-191 § 53. The Stoic Division of Philosophy and the Stoic Logic . . . . 191-193 § 54. The Physics of the Stoics 194-197 §55. The Stoic Ethics 197-200 § 56. The Epicureans 201-203 § 57. The Epicurean Division of Philosophy and the Canonic of the Epicureans . 203-205 § 58. Epicurean Physics '.'..... 205-208 § 59. Epicurean Ethics 208-212 § 60. Skepticism . . 212-217 § 61. Eclecticism. — Cicero. — The Sextiana 217-222 THIRD PERIOD OP GREEK PHILOSOPHY. THE NEO-PLATONISIS AND THEIE PBEDEOESSOES, OE PBEDOMINANCB OP THEOSOPHT. §62. Divisions of the Third Period 222-223 FIRST DIVISION: JEWISH- ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. §'63. Aristohulus and Philo 223-232 SECOND DIVISION: NBO-PYTHAGOEBANISM AND ECLECTIC PLATONISM. § 64. The Neo-Pythagoreans 232-234 § 65. The Eclectic Platonists 234-238 THIRD DIVISION: NEO-PLATONISM. §66. The Neo-Platonista 238-239 § 67. Ammonius Saccas and his immediate Disciples. Potaiho the Eclectic . . 239-243 XIV CONTENTS. FACE § 68. Plotinus, Ameliiis and Porphyry 240-252 § 69. Jamblichus and the Syrian School 252-254 § 70. The Athenian School and the later Neo-Platonic Commentators .... 255-259 11. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA § Tl, General Character of the Philosophy of the Christian Era 261 g 72. Periods of Christian Philosophy 261-262 FIRST PERIOD.— PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. g 73. Principal Divisions of the Patristic Philosophy 263-271 § 74. The Christian Religion. Jesus and his Apostles. The New Testament . 264-271 §75. Jewish and Pauline Christianity 271-274 FIRST DIVISIO!?: THE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY UNTIL THE COUNCIL OF NICE. S5 76. The Apostolic Fathers 274-280 § 77. The Gnostics 280-290 § 78. Justin Martyr 290-294 § 79. Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Hermias 294-299 15 80. Irenasus and Hippolytus 299-303 §81. TertuUian 303-306 § 82. Monarchianism, Arianism, and Athanasianism . 306-31 1 §83. Clement of Alexandria and Origan 311-319 § 84. Hinutius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius 319-325 SECOND DIVISION: THE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE COUNCIL OF NICE. § 85. Gregory of Nyssa and other Disciples of Origen 325-333 § 86. Saint Augustine 333-346 § 87. Greek Fathers after Augustine's Time 347-352 § 88. Latin Fathers after Augustine's Time 362-355 SECOND PERIOD.— THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. § 89. Definition and Divisions of the Scholastic Philosophy 355-377 FIRST DIVISION: THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHOLASTICISM. § 90. Johannes Scotus (Erigena) 358-365 § 91. Realism and Nominalism from the ninth until near the end of the eleventh century 365-371 § 92. Roscellinus, the Nominalist, and William of Champeanx, the Realist . . 371-:i77 CONTENTS. XV FAUE § 93. Anselm of Canterbury SIT-SSfi § 94. Abelard and other Soholastios and Mystics of the twelfth century . . 386-402 § 95. Greek and Syrian Philosophers of the Middle A^s .... ... 402-405 § 96. Arabian Philosophy in the Middle Ages 405-417 § 97. The Philosophy of the Jews in the Middle Ages 417-428 SECOND DIVISION: THE PULL DETBLOPMEUT AND DOMINATION OP SCHOLASTICISM. § 98. The Revolution in the Scholastic Philosophy about a. d. 1200 . . 429-432 § 99. Alexander ofHales and contemporary Scholastics: Bonaventura, the Mystic 433-463 § 100. Albertus Magnus 436-440 § 101. Thomas of Aquino and the Thomists 44C-452 § 102. Johannes Duns Sootus and the Scotists 452-457 § 103. Contemporaries of Thomas and of Duns Scotus 457-460 § 104. "William of Occam, the Eenewer of Nominalism 460-464 § 1 05. Later Scholastics previous to the Renewal of Platonism 464-467 § 106. German Mysticism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Eckhart, Tauler, and others 467-484 SCPPLEUENT , 485-487 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. INTRODUCTIOl!^. OP THE CONCEPTIOK, METHOD, AND GBNEKAL SOUBCES OP THE HISTOET OP PHILOSOPHY, TOOETHEB WITH THE LITEBAKT HELPS. § 1. Philosophy as a conception, historically, is an advance upon, as it is an outgrowth from, the conception of mental development in general and that of scientific culture in particular. The conception is ordinarily modified in the various systems of philosophy, according to the peculiar character of each ; yet in all of them philosophy is included under the generic notion of science, and, as a rule, is distinguished from the remaining sciences by the specific difference, that it is not occupied, like each of them, with any special, limited province of things, nor yet with the sum of these provinces taken in their full extent, but with the nature, laws, and connection of whatever ac- tually is. With this common and fundamental characteristic of the various historical conceptions of philosophy corresponds our definition : Philosophy is the science of principles. On the conception of philosophy of. the author^s article in the Z&UachHftfS/r J'kilosophie undphiloao- phitehe Kritik, ed. by Imm. Herm. Fiehte, tJIrlcI, and Wirth, New Series, vol. xlii., Halle, 1863, pp. 185-199 ; also, among others, C. Hebler, in No. 44 of Virchow and von Holtzendorf ^s Samm^wng gemeitwerstdnd- licher wUsenach. Vorfy'dge, and "Ed. Zeller^ A&adem. iZee2d, Heidelberg, ISCS. The historical development of the conception of philosophy and the various meanings of the word are specially treated of by E. Haym, . in Ersch and Omber's Mncycl. der Wits. v. KUiute, III. 24, Leipsic, 1348 ; and by Eisenmann in hia Ueber Begriff vmd Bedeutwng der aafiia bit aiif Sokratea, Progr. of the Wilh.-Gymn., Munich, 1869 ; cf. Ed. Albert!, on the Platonic Conception qf Philosophy, in the Zeittchr.f. Fhiloa., New Series, vol. li., Halle, 1867, pp. 29-52, 169-204. Ths word philosophy ((ptXoaojita, love of wisdom) and its cognates do not occur in Homer and Hesiod. Homer uses oo^t)?, the second word in the compound (/i ST. 412) with reference to the carpenter's art. In like manner, Hesiod speaks of one who is vavrM};; acacxjita/iivoc (Op. 651). Later writers use fuv hast traveled over many lands for the purpose of observing ;" ibid. I. 50, ^chiaoipta is applied to the knowledge of the stars. Thucydides represents Pericles as saying in the Funeral Oration (II. 40) : (j>i>MKaXovficv Iter' eire^Ei'ac "«' t^OMao^dv/iEv avev /jaXaKiag, where ^L>uoBotjieiv (philosophizing) Bignifles tho striving after intellectual and, more especially, after scientific culture. Thus is confirmed 'or this period the allegation of Cicero: '' Ommis rerum opUmasrum cogniiio atque in iis exerdtatM pMosophia nominata est." This more general signification, in which the "philosopher " is identified with him who /lerelTiijijie vaiSda^ 6ia6pov ml vepirrf/c, or who is educated above the mass of men, was long afterward retained by the word side by side with that given to it as a term of art. Pythagoras is cited as the first to designate by the word ^iXoaofia philosophy as science. The statement in regard to this point, which wo find in Cicero {Tase. V. 3), Diogenes Laertius (I 12, Till. 8), and others, and which (according to Diog. L. VIII. 8), ■was also contained in a work (StaSoxai), now no longer extant, written by Sosicrates of Alexandria, is derived from Heraelidea of Pontus, a scholar of Plato. Cicero represents Pythagoras as saying, in a conversation with Leon, the ruler of Phlius: " Baros esse quosdam, qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur : hos se appeUare sapienUae studiosos {id est enim philosophos)." Diog. Laert. (I. 12) adds, as the reason given by Heraclides for this designation, " that no man, but only God, is wise." "Whether the narrative is historically true, is uncertain; Meiners [Gesch. der Wiss. in Griech. «. Som,l. 119), and more recently Haym (in Ersch and Giuber's AUgem. Encycl. der Wiss. u. Kunste, Leips. 1848, III. 24, p. 3), Zeller {Philos. der Griechen, 3d ed.. Vol. I., 1856, p. 1), and others have doubted it; probably it is only m Socratic and Platonic thought (see below) transferred by Heraclides to Pythagoras (perhaps as a poetic fiction, which sub- sequent writers took to bo historical). The modest disclaimer of Socrates in regard to the possession of wisdom, and the preference given by Plato and Aristotle to pure theory above all praxis and even above all ethico-political activity, are scarcely in accord with the unbroken confidence of Pythagoreanism in the power of scientific investigation and with the undivided unity of tho theoretical and practical tendencies of that philosophy. The natural philosophers who call the universe Kda/iog (which, according to Diog. Laert. VIII. 48, the Pythagoreans were the first to do), are in Xenophon (Memor. I. 1. 11) called co^mrai, in Plato {Gorg., p. 508a, ed. Steph.), "wise men" {aofof), without the least intima- tion that the Pythagoreans would themselves have desired to be named, not wise, but lovers of wisdom. It is also noticeable, though without demonstrative force, that in tho preserved fragments of the probably spurious work ascribed to Philolaus the Pythagorean and devoted to the description of the astronomical and philosophical knowledge of the order which reigns in the universe, aoipia, not fiTuxroi^ia, is used (Stob. Eel. I. 23 ; cf. Boeckh, Phihlaos, pp. 95 and 102 f.) Socrates calls himself in the Banquet of Xenophon (I. 5) a laborer in philosophy {avrmpyo^ Tijg ^i^m^mf), in contrast to Callias, a disciple of the Sophists. In the Menwra- iilia ao^la is found often, <^iKoao(^ia rarely. According to Xenoph. Merri. lY. 6. 1, atxjiia is synonymous with eirieTii/xi! (science). , Human wisdom is patchwork ; the gods have re- served what is greatest to themselves (ibid, and I. 1. 8). "We may ascribe this thought with all the more confidence to the historical Socrates, since it reappears in tho Apologia cf Plato (pp. 20 and 23 of the edition of Stephanus, whose paging accompanies most later editions), where Socrates says, he may perhaps be wise (Tai to earlier thinkers, the former rather in an ironical sense (especially so, to the Sophists), but the latter more seriously {Apol.^ p. 23). Yet it remains uncertain whether Plato, in his Apologia (which appears to reproduce with fidelity the essential parts of the actual defense of Socrates), confined himself in every particular to the exact form of speech adopted by the historical Socrates. With the disciples of Socrates ^tXoao(pta appears already as a technical designation. Xenophon (Memor. I. 1, 19) speaks of men, who asserted that they philosophized (^daicovTig ao^elv) ; by whom a Socratio school — the school of Antisthenes — is probably to be understood. Plato expresses in various places (P/wEdr. p. 273 d, Conviv. p. 203 e ; cf. I/ysii, p. 218 a, ' ed. Steph.) the sentiment ascribed by Heraclides of Pontus to Pythagoras, that wisdom belongs only to God, while it belongs to man to be rather a lover of wisdom (^(Xduo^of). In the Convivium (and the Lysis) this thought is developed to the effect that neither he who is already wise (ao^6g), nor he who is unlearned (a/JoB^i), is a philosopher, but he who stands between the two. The terminology becomes most distinct and definite in two dialogues of late origin, probably composed by one of Plato's disciples, namely, in the Sophisies (p. 211 a) and tha Politicus (p. 237 a, b), where the Sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher (i ao(ptaT^;, 6 noXiTMdg, and 6 (pMco^oc) are named in the preceding order, as the advancing order of their rank. Wisdom itself (ao(pia.), according to Plato (Theaetet. p. 145 e), is identical with eTtar^/i^ (true knowledge), while philosophy is termed in the dialogue Eathydemus (p. 288 d) the acquisition of such knowledge (/crijmf cvtaT^fiTiq). Knowledge {evtBT^/iJ!) respects the ideal, as that which truly is, while opinion or representation (S6^a) is concerned with the sensuous, as with that which is subject to change and generation (Rep. V. p. 477 a). Accordingly Plato defines (R^. 480b) those as philosophers, "who set their affections on that, which in each case really exists" (roif oiro dpa sicaaTov rb bv anwaZofihovf ^i?Ma6fovg nTitiTeov), or {R^. VI. 484a) who "are able to apprehend the eternal and immu- table" (0iXca in the wider signification (JfetapA. VI. 1, p. 1026 a, 18 ed. Bekker et al.) — for which ao^ia but rarely occurs {Met. IV. 3, p. 1005 b, 1: iari ic ao^ia rig Kal ^ aoao6ia, Met. XI. 4, 1061 b, 25), is in his system that which we now term metaphysics, namely, the science of being as such (rb bv 5 ov. Met. VI. 1, 1026 a, 31 ; cf. XI. 3, 1060 b, 31, and XI. 4, 1C61 b, 26), and not of any single department of being — the science, therefore, 4 THE COXOEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY. which considers the ultimate grounds or principles of every thing that exists (in particular, the matter, form, efficient cause, and end of every thing). Met. I. 2, 982 b, 9: del yap tovty/p (ri/v iwusT^iap/) Tcm irpiiTuv agx^ i^oi alncjv elvai ^eupT/rtK^. In contrast with this " first ■■^jhilosophy," the special sciences are termed (in Met. IT. 1, 1003 a, 22) partial sciences \kT7iaTrifmi iv /ilpei %ey6iun/a.i). The plural t^iTuoampiai is used by Aristotle sometimes in the sense of "philosophical sciences" {Met. VI. 1, 1026a, 18, where mathematics, physics, and theology are named as the three "theoretical philosophies;" cf. Ethic. Nicomach. I. 4, 1096 b, 31, where from ethics another branch of philosophy, cM.ii ^iXoaofm, is distinguished, 'which from the context must be metaphysics), and sometimes in the sense of "phQosophi- cal directions, systems, or ways of philosophizing" (Met. I. 6, 981a, 29: //erd 6i rdf elfyriiiivaQ ^tXoao(j>iag ^ UTiAravog iveyhiero irpayfiOTeia). The Stoics (according to Plutarch, De Plac. Philos. I., Prooem.) defined wisdom {ao^la) as the science of divine and human things, but philosophy (^ih^ao^la) as the striving after virtue (proficiency, theoretical and practical), in the three departments of physics, ethics, and logic. Cf. Senec. .^>is<. 89, 3 : PhilosophiasaplentiaeamoretaffectaUo; ibid.1: phUosophm stadium virtutis est, sed per ipsam, virtwtem. Tlie Stoic definition of philosophy removes the boundary which in Plato separates ideology, in Aristotle " first philosophy," from the other branches of philosophy, and covers the case of all scientific knowledge, together with its relations to practical morality. Still, positive sciences (as, notably, grammar, mathematics, and astronomy) begin with the Stoics already to assume an independent rank. Epicurus declared philosophy to be the rational pursuit of happiness (Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. XI. 169: 'ETTi/cotipof lAeye ttJv ^iTcoatx^iav ivegyeuiv elvai Myoig nai SiaXoyia/ioic riv evdalfiova f3lov Treptirotovaav). Since all subsequent definitions of philosophy until the modern period were more or less exact repetitions of those above cited and hence may here be omitted, we pass on lo the definition which was received in the school of Leibnitz and Wolff. Christian 'Wollf presents (Philos. Bationcdis, IHscPradim,., § 6), the following as a definition originating with himself: (Gognitio philosophica est) cognitio raiionis eorum, qiute sunt vel fiimt, unde intelligatur, ear sint velfiant; (ibid. § 29) : philosophia est sdefniia possHrilium, guaienus esse possunt Tliis definition is obviously cognate with the Platonic and Aristotelian definitions, in so far as it makes philosophy conversant with the rational grounds (ra&>) and the causes, through which existing objects and changes become possible. It does not contain the restriction to first causes, and hence 'Wolfi''s conception of philosophy is the wider one ; but it fails, on the other hand (as do Plato and Aristotle, when they use ft^oaajiia in the broader signifi- cation as synonymous with imar^/i^) to mark the boundaries between philosophy and the positive (in particular, the mathematical) sciences. In this latter particular Kant seeks to Teach a more accurate determination. Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, Doctrine of Method, chap. 3) divides knowledge in general, as to its form, into historical (cognitio ex datis), and rational (cognitio ex principiis), and the latter again into mathematical (rational cognition through the construction of concepts), and philosophical (rational cognition through concepts as such). Philosophy, in its scho- lastic signification, is defined by him as the system of all the branches of philosophical knowledge, but in its cosmical signification, as the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (teleohgia raiionis hwmanae). Herbart (Introd. to Philos., % i f.) defines philosophy as the elaboration of conceptions. This elaboration comprehends the three processes of the analysis, the correction and the completion of tlie conceptions, the latter process depending on the determination of their rank and value. This gives, as the leading branches of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, and iEsthetics. (Under cestTuUcs Herbart includes ethics, as well as testhetios in the nar- HISTUJJICAL METHODS. 5 rower and popular signification of the word. What Herbart understands by sestheties might be expressed by the word Kmology, a term, however, which he never employs.) According to Hegel, for whose doctrine Fichte, jn respect of form, and Schelling, in respect of matter, prepared the way, philosophy is the science of the absolute in the form of dialectical development, or the science of the self-comprehending reason. The definition of philosophy given by us above meets the case even of those sdiools which declare the principles of things to be unknowable, since the inquiry into the eognoscibility of principles evidently belongs to the science of principles, and this science accordingly survives, even when its object is reduced to the attempt to demonstrate the incognoscibility of principles. Such definitions as limit philosophy to a definite province (as, in particular, the definition often put forward in recent times, that philosophy is " the science of spirit "), fail at least to correspond with the universal character of the great systems of philosophy up to the present time, and can hardly be assumed as the basis of an historical exposition. § 2. History in the objective sense is the process by which nature and spirit are developed. History in the subjective sense is the in- vestigation and statement of this objective development. The Greek words iaropla and laropclv, being derived from elSbmi, signify, not history in the objective sense, but the subjective activity involved in the investigation of facts. The German word Geschichte involves a reference to that which has come to pass (das Gesche- hene), and has therefore primarily the objective signification. Tet, not all that has actually taken place falls within the province of history, but only that which is of essential signifi- cauee for the common development. Developmeni may be defined as the gradual realiza- tion, in a succession of phenomena, of the essence of the subject of development. As to its form, development generally begins through the evolution of contraries or oppositions, and ends in the disappearance and reconciliation of these contraries in a higher uuity (as sufficiently illustrated, for example, in the progressive development which shows itself in Socrates, his so-called " one-sided disciples," and Plato). Through the study of history the whole life of the race is, in a manner, renewed on a reduced scale in the individual. The intellectual possessions of the present, like its mate- rial possessions, repose in all eases on the acquisitions of the past ; every one participates, to a degree, in this common property, even without having a comprehensive knowledge of history, but each one's gain becomes all the more extensive and substantial the more this knowledge is expanded and deepened. Only that productive activity which follows upon a self-appropriating reproduction of the mental labor of the past, lays the foundation for true progress to higher stages. § 3. The methods of treatrng history (divided by Hegel into the naive, the reflecting, and the speculative) may be classed as the empirical, the critical, and the philosophical, according as the simple collocation of materials, the examination of the credibility of tradi- tion, or the endeavor to reach an understanding of the causes and significance of events, is made the predominant feature. The philosophical method proceeds by explaining the connection and endeavoring to estimate the relative worth of the phenomena of his- tory. The genetic method investigates the causal connection of phenomena. The standard by which to estimate the relative worth or importance of phenomena may be found either immediately in the mental state and opinions of the individual student, or in the peculiar juature and tendency of the phenomena themselves, or, finally, by reference to the joint development in which both the historical object and the judging subject, each at its peculiar stage, are involved; hence may be distinguished the material, the formal, and the specula- tive estimate of systems. A perfect historical exposition depends on the union of all the methodical elements now mentioned. The later historians of philosophy in ancient times, as also the earliest modern his- torians, contented themselves, for the most part, with the method which consists in merely empirical compilation. The critical sifting of materials has been introduced chiefly in modem times, by philologists and philosophers. From the first, and before any attempts were made at a detailed and general historical delineation, philosophers sought to acquire an insight into the causal connection and the value of the different systems, and for the earliest philosophies the foundation for such insight was already laid by Plato and Aris- totle ; but the completion of the worlc thus begun, the widening and deepening of this insight, is a work, to the accomplishment of which every age has sought to furnish its contribution and to which each age will always be obliged to contribute, even after the great advances made by modern philosophers, who have sought to mal£o the history of philosophy intelligible as a history of development. The subjective estimate of systems, by the application of the philosophical (and theological) doctrine of the historian as the norm of judgment, has, in modem times, been especially common among the Leibnitzians (Brucker and others) and Kantians (Tennemann, notably). The method of formal criticism, which tries the special doctrines of a system by its own assumed principle, and this principle itself by its capacity of development and application, has been employed by Schleiermacher (par- ticularly in his "Critique of Previous Ethics") and his successors (especially by Brandis; less by Eitter, who is more given to " material " criticism), last of all, the speculative method has been adopted by Hegel (in his " History of Philosophy and Philosophy of His- tory ") and by his school. To the oft-treated question, whether the history of philosophy is to be understood from the stand-point of our own philosophical consciousness, or whether, on the contrary, the latter is to be formed, enlarged, and corrected through historical study, the answer is, that the case in question, of the relation of the mind to the historical object of its atten- tion, is a case of natural action and reaction, and that consequently each form of that relation indicated in the question has its natural time and place ; the one must follow the other, each in its time. The stage of philosophical culture, which the individual, before his acquaintance (or at least before his more exact familiarity) with the history of philosophy, has already reached, should facilitate his understanding of that history, while it is at the same time elevated and refined by his historical studies. On the other hand, the philo- sophic consciousness of the student, when perfected by historical and systematic discipline, must afterward show itself fruitful in a deeper and truer understanding of history. § 4. The most trustworthy and productive sources for our knowl- edge of the history of philosophy are those philosophical works whicb SOUECES, AUTHOEITIES, AND AIDS. 7 have come down to us in their original form and completeness, and, next to these, the fragments of such works which have been pre- served under conditions that render it impoisible to doubt their genuine- ness. In the case of philosophical doctrines which are no longer before us in the original language of their authors, those " reports " are to be held most authentic which are based immediately on the writings of the philosophers, or in which the oral deliverances of the latter are communicated by immediate disciples. If the tendency of the author (or so-called " reporter"), whose statements serve us as authorities, is less historical than philosophical, inclining him rather to inquire into the truth of the doctrines mentioned by him than simply to report them, it is indispensable, as a condition precedent to the employment of his statements as historical material, that we carefully ascertain the line of thought generally followed by the author of whom he treats, and that in its light we test the sense of each of the reporter's statements. Kext to the sources whence the "reporter" drew, and the tendency of his work, his own philosophical culture and his capacity to appreciate the doctrines he reports, furnish the most essential criteria of his credibility. The value of the various histories of philosophy as aids to the attainment of a knowl- edge and understanding of that history, is measured partly by the de- gree of exactness shown by each historian in the communication of the original material and his acuteness in their appreciation, and partly by the degree of intelligence with which he sifts the essential from the non-essential in each philosopher's teachings, and exhibits the inner connection of single systems and the order of development of the different philosophical stand-points. On the ]iteratnre of the history of philosophy, compare especially Joh, Jonsins, I>6 Scripforibus His- toriae PMlosopJticae libri quatuor^ Frantf. 165!) ; recogniti atque adpraea&nt&m aetateTn usque perditcti cura, Joh. Chr. Born, Jen, 1716. J. Alb. Fabricius, in the £ibl, Graeca, Hamb. 1705 sqq. Joh. Andreas Ortloff, Jla/ndbucti der Zitteratur der Philosophies 1. Abth. : Die Litteratur der lAti&ra/rge&cMnhte und GeachKJite der PhllosopHe, Erlangen, 1798. Ersch and Geissler, SibHoffrapMaohea JUandhuch der philosopfiiechetb lAUeratv/r der Veutaehen von der Mitte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderta bia auf die neueate Z'At^ 3d ed., Leips. 1850. V. Ph. Gamposch, Die philoaopkiacke Litteratur der Deutachen uon 1400-1850, Eegensbnrg, 1851, pp. 84G-362. Ad. Bilchtlng, BibUoiheca philoaophica^ Oder VereeicJmiaa der von 1857-1867 im deuUchen Buchhandel eracJdenenen philoe. Bilcherund Zeitachriften, Kordhausen, 1367. Cf. the coploas citations of literature in Buhle's Geacldchte der Fhiloa.^ and also in F. A. Ganis^s Ideen ear Qeach. der PMloa,^ Leipsic, 1809, pp. 21-90, in Tenneinann's larger work and in his Mannial of Vie niatory of PMloaophy^ 5th ed., revised by Amadens Wendt, Leipa., 1S29, as also in other works on the history of philosophy ; see also the bibliographical citations in various monographs relating to literary history, such as Ompteda^s on the Literature of International Law, etc., and the comprehensive work of Julius Fetzholdt, BibUotheca Bibliographioa^ Leips, 1866, of which pp. 453-463 are devoted to the history of the literature of philosophy. The writings of the early Greek philosophers of the pre-Socratic period exist now only in frag;ments. The complete works of Plato are still estant ; so also are the most impor- 8 SOTTKCES, ACTHOEITIES, AOT) AIDS. tant -works of Aristotle, and certain others, -which belong to the Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, and Neo-Platonic schools. "We possess the principal -works of most of the philosophers of the Christian period in sufficient completeness. At the commencement of modern times the disappearance of respect for many species of authority, -which had previously been accepted, gave special occasion for historical inquiry. Lord Bacon, who was unsatisfied by the Aristotelianism of the Scholastics and was disposed to favor the pre-Socratio philosophy, speaks of an expose of the placita pMlosophorum as one of the desiderata of his times. Of the numerous general histories of philosophy, the following may here be mentioned: — The Mistory of Philosophy, by Thom. Stanley, London, 1655; 2d ed., 1687, 3d ed., llOl ; translated into Latin by Gottfr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1711 ; also Venice, 1733. Stanley treats only of the history of philosophy before Christ, which is in hia view tlie only philosophy ; for philosophy seeks for truth, which Christian theology possesses, so that with the latter the former becomes superfluous. Stanley follows in his exposition of Greek philosophy pretty closely the historical work of Diogenes Laertiua. Jac. Thomasii (ob. 168i), Schediasma ffistoricum, quo varia discutiwntur ad hist, tarn pliilos., turn ecdesiasticam perlinentia, Leipsic, 1 665 ; with the title : Origines Hist. Philos. at Eccksiast., ed. by Christian Thomasius, Halle, 1699. Jac. Thomasius first recommended disputed questions in the history of philosophy as themes for dissertations. J. Dan. Huetii, Demxmstratio Evangdica; philosophiae veteris ae novae parallelismus, Am- eterdam, 1679. Pierre Bayle, Didionnaire Eistorique et Critique, 1st ed., Rotterd. 1697. [English translftj- tion by Birch and Lockman, London, 1734-35, 2d ed., 1736-38. — Tr.] This very compre- hensive work deserves to be mentioned here on account of the articles it contains on the history of philosophy. Bayle contributed essentially to the awakening of the spirit of investigation in this department of study. Yet, as a critic, he deals rather in a philosophical criticism of transmitted doctrines from his skeptical stand-point, than in an historical criticism of the fidelity of the accounts on which our knowledge of those doctrines is founded. The philosophical articles have been published in an abridged German translation by L. H. Jakob, 2 vols., Halle, 1797-98. The Acta Philosopliorimi, ed. Christ. Aug. Heumann, Halle, 1715 S., contain several valuable papers of investigation on questions in the history of philosophy. Histoire CriMque de la Philosophie, par Mr. D. (Deslandes), torn. I.-IIL, 1st ed., Paris, 1730-36. Includes also modern philosophy. Joh. Jak. Brucker, Kurze Fragen atts der philosophischen Sistorie, 1 vols., Ulm, 1731-36, ■with additions, ibid. 1737. Sistoria Critica Philosophiae a mundi incunaJmlis ad 'nost/ram usque aeiatem deducta, 5 vols., Leips. 1742-44; 2d ed., 1766-67 ; English abridged transla- tion by Wm. Enfield, Lond. 1791. InstituMones hist. phUosophicae, usui acad. jwoentutis odor- natae, 1st ed., Leips. 1747. Brucker's presentation, especially in his chief work, the Bistoria Grit. Philos., is clear and easily followed, though somewhat difiuse, and often interspersed with anecdotes, after the manner of Diogenes Laertius, and too rarely portraying the connec- tion of ideas. Brucker -wrote in the infancy of historical criticism ; still he often gives proof of a sound and sober insight in his treatment of the historical controversies current in hia times ; least, it is true, in what relates to the earlier periods, far more in his exposition of the later. His philosophical judgment is imperfect, from the absence with him of the con- ceptions of successive development and relative truth. Truth, he argues, is one, but errci is manifold, and the majority of systems are erroneous. The history of philosophy shows "infinita falsae philosophiae exempla." Neo-Platonism, for example, Brucker does not understand as a certain blending of Hellenism and Orientalism, with a predominance of the 80UECE8, AUTHOEITIESj AND AIDS. ' 9 form of Hellenism, and still less as a progress from skepticism to mysticism made relatively necessary by the nature of things, but as the product of a conspiracy of bad men against Christianity — "in id conjuravere pessimi homines, ut qmm veritate vincere rum posseni reli- gionem, Christiatiam, fraude impedirent;" — and in like manner he sees in Christian Gnosti- cism, not a similar blending, with a prevalence of the form of Orientalism, but the result of pride and ■willfulness, etc. Truth is, for him, identical with Protestant orthodoxy, and next to that with the Leibnitzian philosophy ; according to the measure of its material accordance with this norm every doctrine is judged either true or false. Agatopisto Cromaziano (Appiano Buonafede), DeUa Istoria e deUa Indole di ogni Mhsqfia, Lucca, 1166-81, also Ten. 1782-84, on which is based the work; DeUa BestauraUone di ogni FOoiofia ne' Secoli XV., XVI., XVII., "Ven. ITSS-SS (translated into German by Carl Heydenreich, Leipsic, 1791). Dietr. Tiederaann, Geiat der spemlativen, Phihsophie, 1 vols., Marburg, 1791-97. By "speculative"' Tiedemann means theoretical philosophy. The speculative element in the newer sense of this word is unknown to him. His work extends from Thales to Berkeley. Tiedemann belongs to the ablest thinkers among the opponents of the Kantian philosophy. His stand-point is the stand-point of Leibnitz and "Wolff, modified by elements from that of Locke. In his interpretation and judgment of the various systems of philosophy, he seeks to avoid unfairness and partisanship. But his understanding of them has, occasionally, its limits. His principal merit consists in his application of the principle of judging systems according to their relative perfection. Tiedemann declares his intention not to make any one system the standard by which all others should be judged, since no one is universally admitted, but " to consider chiefly, whether a philosopher has said any thing new and has displayed acuteness in the support of his assertions, whether his line of thought is marked by inner harmony and dose connection, and, finally, whether considerable objections have been or can be urged in opposition to his assertions." Georg Gustav Piilleborn, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Phihsophie, sections 1-12, ZiiUl- chau, 1791-99. Joh. Gottlieb Buhle, Lehrhuch der Geschichte der Pliilosophie und einer TcriOschen Littera- twr derselben,, 8 vols., Gottingen, 1796-1804; Geschichte der neueren Phihsophie seit der Epoche der WiederhersteUung der Wissenschaften, 6 vols., Gottingen, 1800-1805. Buhle writes as a disciple of Kant, but with a. leaning toward the stand-point of Jacobi. He allows his philosophical stand-point rarely to appear. Buhle evinces groat reading, and lias, with critical insight, instituted valuable investigations, especially in the department of the history of the literature of philosophy. His " Gesdi. der neueren Philosophie " contains many choice extracts from rare works. It forms the sixth part of the encyclo- pedical work: '• GeSch. der KUnate u. Wins, seit der WiederhersteUvmg derseHben bis an das Ende des 18. JaJvrhunderts." Degerando, Histoire Compaarie des Systemes de la Philosophie, Tom. I.-III., Paris, 1804; 2d edit., Tom. I.-IT., Paris, 1822-23. Translated into German by Tennemann, 2 vols., Marburg, 1806-1807. Friedr. Aug. Carus, Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipsic, 1809. Pourth part of his posthumous works. Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Phihsophie, 11 vols., Leipsic, 1798-1819. The work has never been wholly completed. It was to have filled thirteen volumes. The twelfth volume was to have treated of German theoretical philosophy from Leibnitz and Chr. Thomasius down to Kant, and the thirteenth of moral philosophy from Descartes to Kant. Tennemann's work is meritorious on account of the extent and independence of his study of authorities, and the completeness and clearness of his exposition; but it is 10 SOUECESj AUTHOEiriES, AND AIDS. marred by not a few misapprehenaions, moat of which are the result of a one-sided method of interpretation from the Kantian stand-point. In his judgments, the measuring- rod of the Kantian Critique of the Reason is often applied with too little allowance to the earlier systems, although in pruiciple, the idea, already expressed by Kant, of "the gradual development of the reason in its striving after science," is not foreign to him. "Wilh. Gkittlieb Tennemaun, Grundn-isa der GescMchte der Phihsophie fiir den akademischen Unterricht, 1st ed., Leipa. 1812; 5th ed., Leipa. 1829; the last three editions revised by Amadeus Wendt. [Enghsh translation ("Manual of the History of Philosophy,'' etc.), by A. Johnson, Oxford, 1833. The same, revised, enlarged, and corrected by J. B. Morell, London, 1852. — TV.] From this much too brief exposition, it is impoaaible to derive a complete underatanding of the different systems ; nevertheless it is of value as a repertory of notices concerning philosophers and their teachings ; especially valuable are the perhaps only too numerous literary references, in respect to which Tennemann aimed rather at completeness than at judicious selection. Jak. Priedr. Fries, Geschichte der PMlosophie, 2 vols., Halle, 1837-4.0. His stand-point, a modified Kantianism. Friedr. Aat, Gnmd/risd einer Geschichte der Philosophie, Landshut, 1837, 2d ed., 1825. He writes from Schelling's stand-point. Thadda Anselm Rixner, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie zvm Gebrattche seiner Vorlesungen, 3 vols., Sulzbaoh, 1822-23, 2d ed., 1829. Supplementary volume by Victor Phil. Gumpoach, 1850. The stand-point is that of Schelling. Its numerous citations from original sources would render the book an excellent basis for a first study of the history of philosophy, if Rixner's work was not disfigured by great negligence and lack of critical skill in the execution of his plan. Gumposch, who brings the national element especially into prominence, proceeds far more carefully. Ernst Reinhold, Bandimch dsr allgemeinen Geschichte d^r Philosophie, 2 parts in 3 vols., Gotha, 1828-30. Lehrhuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Jena, 1836 ; 2d ed., 1839 ; 3d ed., 1849. Geschichte der Philosophie nach den Havptmomenten ihrer Entwickehmg, 5th ed., 3 vols., Jena, 1858. The presentation is compendious but not sufficiently exact. Reinhold thinks and often expresses himself too much in the modern way and too little in the style and spirit of the philosophers of whom he treats. Heinr. Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie, 12 vols., Hamburg, 1829-53; Vols. I.-IV., new edition, 1836-38. [4 vols, translated. See below, ad % 1. — JV.] The work reaches to and excludes Kant ; the Uebersicht ilber die Geschichte der neuesten deutschen Philosophie seit Kant (Brunswick, 1853), supplements and completes it. Ritter adopts substantially the stand-point of Schleiermacher. His professed object is, while adhering strictly to facts, to present the history of philosophy as " a self-developing whole ;" not, however, viewing earlier systems as stepping-stones to any particular modem one, nor judging them from tho stand-point of any particular system, but rather " frorii the point of view of the general intelligence of the periods to which they belong, respecting the object of tho intellectual faculties — respecting the right and the wrong in the modes of developing the reason." Under Ritter's supervision, the following work of Schleiermacher was published, after its author's death: Geschichte der PhOosophie, Berlin, 1839 (Schleiermacher's Werke, III., 4, a). The work is a summary, drawn up by Schleiermacher for his lectures. It is not founded in aU parts on original historical investigation, but it contains much that is very suggestive. G. W. Hegel, VorUsungen vber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by Karl Ludw. Michelet. 3 vols. {Werke, Vols. XIII.-XV.), Beriin, 1833-36; 2d ed., 1840-42. The stand-point here is the speculative, characterized above, § 3. Yet Hegel, as matter of fact, SOUE0E9, ATITHOEnTES, AND AI0S. 11 has not in detail always maintained the idea of development in its purity, but has some- times unhistorically represented the doctrines of philosophers, whom he esteemed, as approximating to his own (interpreted, e. g., many philosoj^emes of Plato agreeably to iis own doctrine of immanence), and, ignoring their scientific motives, has misinterpreted those of philosophers whom he did not esteem (e. g. Locke) ; still further, he unjustifiably ' exaggerates in principle the legitimate and fundamental idea of a gradual development, observable in the progress of events in general, and particularly in the succession of philosophical systems, through the following assumptions : — a. That every form of historical reality within its historic limits, and hence, in particu- lar, every philosophical system, viewed as a determinate link in the complete evolution of philosophy, is to be considered in its place as wholly natural and legitimate ; while, never- theless, side by side with the historically justified imperfection of individual forms, error aud perversity, as not relatively legitimate elements, are found, and occasion aberrations in point of historic fact from the ideal norms of development (in particular, many temporary reactions, and, on the other hand, many false anticipations) ; b. That with the Hegelian system the development-process of philosophy lias found a^i absolute terminus, beyond which thought has no essential advance to make ; c. That the nature of things is such that the historical sequence of the various philo- sophical stand-points must, without essential variation, accord with the systematic sequence of the different categories, whether it be with those of logic alone, as appears from Vorl. Uber die Gesch. der PhUosophie, Vol. I. p. 128, or with those of logic — and the philosophy of nature? — and mental philosophy, as is taught, ibid, p. 120, and Vol. III. p. 686 ff. G. Osw. Marbach, Ziehrhuch, der Oeschichte der PhUosophie, 1 Abth. : Geschichte der griechischen PhUosophie, 2 Abth. : Gesdi. der PhUosophie des Mittelalters, Leipsic, 1838-41. Marbach's stand-point is the Hegelian ; but he often makes a somewhat forced application of the categories of Hegel's system to material furnished him chiefly by Tennemanu and Eixner — ^though in part drawn from the original sources — and but slightly elaborated by himself The book has remained uncompleted. Jul. Braniss, Geschichte der PhUosophie seit Kant, first vol., Breslau, 1842. The first volume, the only one published, is a speculative survey of the history of philosophy down to the Middle Ages. Braniss owes his philosophical stand-point chiefly to Steffens, Schleier- macher, and HegeL Christoph. "Willi. Sigvrart, Gesch. der PhUosophie, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1854. Albert Schwegler, Gesch. der Philoa. im Vmriss, Hn Leitfaden zur Uebersicht, Stuttgart, 1348, 7th edition, ibid., 1870. Contains a clear presentation of the philosophical stand- points, but is seriously imperfect from the omission of the author to describe with sufficient minuteness the principal doctrines which belong specially to each system and to the subordinate branches of each system, by which means alone a distinct picture can be presented. Schwegler's Compendium has been translated into English, with explanatory, critical, and supplementary annotations, by J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1861 ; 2d ed. 1868. [American translation by J. H. Seelye, If. T. 1856; 3d ed., 1864.— fr.] Mart. V. Deutinger, Geschichte der Philosophic (1st vol. -. Greek Philosophy. 1st div. : Till the time of Socrates. 2d div.: From Socrates till the end of Greek philosophy). Eegensburg, 1852-53. Ludw. Noack, Geschichte der PhUosophie in gedrdngter Uebersicht, "Vfeimar, 1853. "Wilh. Bauer, Geschichte der PhUosophie fur gsbildele Leser, Halle, 1863. r. Michelis, Geschichte der PhUosophie von Thales bis aufunsere Zeit, Braunsberg, 1863. Joli. Ed. Erdmann, Grundriss dsr Geschichte der Philosophic, 2 vols., Berlin, 1866/ 2d ed. ibid. 1869-70. 12 SOtTBCES, AUTHOEITIES, AND AIDS. P. Sohmid (of Schwarzenberg), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic von Tholes Us ScliopenJiaiier, vom speciiUiMv-monotheistischen, Standpunkte, Erlangen, 1867. Conrad Hermann, Gssch. dsr Philos. in pragmatischar Behandkmg, Leipsio, 1867. J. H. Soholten, Gesch. der Rdigion und Philosophie, translated from the Dutch original into French by A. Eeville, Paris and Strasbourg, 1861 ; German translation under the above title by Ernst Eud. Eedepenning, Elberfeld, 1868. E. Diihring, Krit. Gesch. der Philos., Berlin, 1869. Victor Cousin, Introduction d VEisioire de la Philosophie and Cours de VEistoire de la FhHosophie Modeme in the (Euvres de V. O., Paris, 1846-48. M-agments Philosophiques, Paris, 1840-43. Eistoire Gmerale de la Philosophie depuis les temps lesplus reaules jusqu'd la Jin du XVm. siecle, 5e ed., Paris, 1863. J. A. Nourrisaon, Tableau des Progres de la Pensee Eumaine depuis Tliales jusgu^d Leibnitz, Paris, 1858; 2e edition, 1860. N. J. Lafor^t, Eist. de la Philosophie; premiere partie: Philos. Andenne, Brussels and Paris, 1867. Eobert Blakey, Eistory of the Philosophy of Mind, from the earliest period to the present time, 4 vols., London, 1848. George Henry Levires, A Biographical Bistory of Philosophy, from its origin in Greece down to the present day, London, 1846. The Eistory of Philosophy from Tholes to the present day, by George Henry Lewes, 3d edition (Vol. L Ancient Philosophy; VoL IL Modern Philosophy), London, 1866. Ed. Zeller, Vortrage und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Jnhalts, Leipsic, 1865, containing: 1. The development of monotheism among the Greeks ; 2. Pythagoras and the legends concerning him ; 3. A plea for Xanthippe ; 4. The Platonic state in its significance for the succeeding time ; 5. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; 6. 'Wolff's banishment from Halle, the struggle of pietism with philosophy; 7. Joh. Gottlieb Fichte as a political philosopher; 8. Friedr. Schleiermacher ; 9. Primitive Christianity ; 10. The historical school of Tiibin- gen; 11, Ferdinand Christian Baur ; 12. Strauss and Eenan. Of works on the history of single philosophical disciplines and tendencies (from ancient till modern times), the following are specially worthy of mention : — Ad. Trendelenburg, Eistorische Beitrage zur Philosophie, Vol. I. (History of the Doctrine of Categories), Berlin, 1846; Vol. II. (Miscellaneous Essays), ibid. 1855; Vol. III. (Misc. Essays), ibid. 1867. On Eeligious Philosophy: Karl Friedr. Staudlin, Gesch. und Geist des Skeptkismus, vorzilglich in Siicksicht auf Moral und Seligion, Leipsic, 1794^-95; Imman. Berger, Geschichte der Seligionsphilosophie, Berlin, 1800. On the History of Psychology : Friedr. Aug. Carus, Geschichte der Psychologic, Leipsic, 1808. (Third part of the posthumous works.) The same subject, substantially, is also treated of in Albert Stockl's Eie speculat. Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, Vol. T. (" Ancient Times "), "Wurzburg, 1858 ; Vol. II. (" Patristic Period," also under the title of Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen Zeit), ibid. 1859 ; and Geschichte der PhihscpMe des Mittelalters (continuation of the preceding works), Mayence, 1864-65, and in Friedr. Albert Lange'a Geschichte des Materialismus, Iserlohn, 1866. On the History of Ethical and Political Theories : Ohristoph. Meiners, Geschichte der ijlteren und neureren Ethik oder Lebensweisheit, Gottingen, 1800-1801. Karl Friedr. Staud- lin, Geschichte der Moralphilosophie, Hanover, 1823; and Geschichte der Lehre von der Sittlichkeit der Schauspiele, vom Hide, vom Gewissen, etc., Gott. 1823 ff. Leop. v. Henning, Die Principien der Ethik in historischer JEntwickelwng, Berlin, 1825. Friedr. v. Eaumer, Die geschichtliche Entwickdung der Begriffe von Stoat, Secht und Politik, Leipsic, 1826 ; 2d ed. SOTTECEB, AUTHOEITIESj AND AIDS. 13 1832; Sd ed. 1861. Joh. Jos. Eossbach, Die Perioden der Bechtsphilosophie, Kegensburg, 1842; Die Grundrichiungen in der Gesch. der Staatswissenschaft, Erlangen, 1842 ; Gesch. der (?ese&cAa/i!, "Wurzburg, 1868 ff. Heinr. Linte, Entumrf einer Geschichte der Sechtsphihs., Dantzic, 1846. Emil Feuerlein, Die phUosophisdie SittenkJtre in ihren geschichUichsn HaupU formen, 2 vols., Tiibingen, 1867-69. P. Janet, Eisloire de la Philosophie Morale et Politique dans VAntiquite et Us Temps Modemes, Paris, 1858. James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, London, 1830; new edition, ed. by Will. "Whewell, London, 1863. W. Whewell, Lectwres on the History of Moral Philosophy, new edition, London, 1862. [Robert Blakey, History of Moral Science, second edition, Edinburgh, 1863. — Ed.'] Jahnel, De Gonsdentiae Notvme, Berlin, 1862. Aug. Neander, Yorleswngen iiber die Gesch. derchrist Ethik, ed. by Dr. Erdmann, Berlin, 1864. W. Gass, Die Lehre vom Gewissen, Berlin, 1869. On the History of Logic : Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlcmde, Vol. I. (Devel- opment of Logic in Ancient Times), Leipslc, 1855 ; Vols. IL-IV. (Logic in the Middle Ages), ibid. 1861-70. On the History of .3!sthetics : Robert Zimmermann, Geschichte der Aestheiik als philoso- phischer Wissenschaft, Vienna, 1858 ; cf. the historico-critioal portions of Vischer's Aestheiik and Lotze's Gesch. der AesthetHc in Deutschland, Munich, 1868. More or less copious contributions to the history of philosophical doctrines may be found also in many of the works in which these doctrines are systematically expounded, as, for example, in Stahl's Philosophie des liechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht (1 st ed., Heidel- berg, 1830 £f.), of which the first volume, on the "Genesis of the Current Philosophy of Law" (3d ed., 1853), is critico-historical, and relates particularly to the time from Kant to Hegel ; cf. in like manner Immanuel Herm. Kchte's System der Ethik, the first or critical part of which (Leipsic, 1850) is a history of the philosophical doctrines of right, state, and morals in Germany, France, and England from 1750 till about 1850; the first volume of K. HUdenbrand's Geschichte und System der Rechts- v/nd StaatsphHosqphie (Leips. 1860), treats minutely of the history of theories in classical antiquity ; much historical material is also contained in the works of Warnkonig, Eoder, Bossier, Trendelenburg, and others, on the philosophy of law. The works of Julius Schaller ( Gesch. der Ncski/rphilosvphie seit Baco), Rob. v. Mohl (Gesch. u. Lit. der SUzatswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1855-58), J. C. Bluntschli (Gesch. des aUg. Staatsrechts und der Politik seit dem 16 Jahrh. lis zur Gegenwtcri, Munich, 1864, etc.), and some others, relate to modern times. Cf. below, Vol. IL § 1. THE PHILOSOPHY OP AIl^TIQUITT. § 5. The general characteristic of the human mind in ante-Chris- tian, and particularly in Hellenic antiquity, may be described as its comparatively unreflecting belief in its own harmony and of its one- ness with nature. The sense of an opposition, as existing either among its own different functions and interests or between the mind and nature and as needing reconciliation, is as yet relatively undeveloped. The philosophy of antiquity, like that of every period, partakes necessarily, in what concerns its chronological be- ginnings and its permanent basis, of the character of the period to which it belongs, while at the same time it tends, at least in its general and most fundamental direction, upward and beyond the level of the period, and so prepares the way for the transition to new and higher stages. For the solution of the difficult but necessary problem of a general historical and philosophical characterization of the great periods in the intellectual life of humanity, the Hegelian philosophy has labored most successfully. The conceptions which it employs for this end are derived from the nature of intellectual development in general, and they prove themselves empirically correct and just when compared with the particular phenomena of the different periods. Nevertheless, the opinion is scarcely to be approved, that philosophy always expresses itself most purely only in the universal consciousness of the time ; the truth is, rather, that it rises above the range of the general consciousness through the power of independent thought, generating and developing new germs, and anticipating in theory the essential character of developments yet to come (thus, b. g., the Platonic state anticipates some of the essential characteristics of the form of the Christian church, and the doctrine of natural right, in its development since Grotius, foreshadows the constitu- tionalism' of the modern state). § 6. Philosophy as science could originate neither among the peoples of the North, who were eminent for strpngth and courage, but devoid of culture, nor among the Orientals, who, though suscep- tible of the elements of higher culture, were content simply to retain them in a spirit of passive resignation, — but only among the Hellenes, who harmoniously combined the characteristics of both. The Romans, devoted to practical and particularly to political prob- lems, scarcely occupied themselves with philosophy except in the ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHT. 15 appropriation of Hellenic ideas, and scarcely attained to any produc- tive originality of their own. The Bacred writings and poetry of the various Orientay peoples, with their commentaries (T-King, Cho&-King; the moral treatises of Confucius and his disciples ; the Vedas, the code of Many, the Sakontala of the poet Kalidasa, the Puranas ur Theogonies, the ancient commentaries; — Zoroaster'^s Zendavesta^ etc.) ore the original sources from which onr knowledge of their philosophical speculations is derived. Of modern works, treating of the religion and philosophy of these peoples, we name the following : — Friedr. Crouzer, SymboUk und Mythologie der alien V5lker, 4 vols., Leipsic and Darmstadt, 1810-12 ; 2d ed., 6 vols., 1819 if. ; Werke^ L 1-4, ibid. 1836 seq. K. J. H. 'Windischmann, Die Philosophie im Fortgang der ireMfiTtMcAicAie, volume L, ejections 1-4 (on the "Foundations of Philosophy in the East"), Bonn, 1S27-S4. Stuhr, JHe Jieligionasyftteme der heidnischen Volker des Orients, Berlin, 1836-33. Ed. Koth, Geac/iichte -unserer abenVmdiachen Philo8opM&, vol. I., Mannheim, 1846, 2d ed., 1S62. (Bdth''B first volume is devoted to the speculations of the Persians and Egyptians, the second to the oldest Greek philosophy. The book, though written in a lively style, is drawn In large measure from inauthentic sources, and is not jVeo from arbitrary interpretations and too hazardous comparfsons. It contains more poetry than historic truth.) Ad. Wnttke, OescHdUe dea UeidenthumB^ 2 vols., Breslau, 1352-53. J. 0. Bluntschli, AUasiatiache Gottes' und Weltideen in ihren Wirkungen avf das Gemeinleben der Men- SGhen^/'dnf Vortrage, Nordlingen, 1866. Owing to the stability of Oriental ideas, expositions relating to modern times, such as Zes Jieligiona et lea Philoaophiea da/na rAsie centrales par le comie de Gobvneau (Paris, 1S65), may be profitably consulted by students of their earlier history. Cf. the mythological writings of Schwenckand others, and Wolfgang Menzel's Die vorchriatliche Unaterblichkeitslehre (Leipsic, 1870), Max Duncker's GeacJi. der Arier (3d ed., 1867), etc, and numerous articles in the Zeitachrift der deutacJien fnorgmildndiaclien Geaellaclia/t (ed. by L. Krehl), and in other learned reviews. G. Pauthier, Eaquiaae dune Ilistoire de la Philoa, cMnoise^ Paris, 1S44 ; Lea Quatre Zivrea de P.'.ilos. Morale et Politique da la Chiiie^ trad, du Chinois^ Paris, 1868 ; L. A. Martin, Iliatoire de la Morale^ I. ; Za Morale chez lea Chinoia^ Paris, 1862 ; J. H. Plath, Pie PeHgion und der Oultus der alien CMnesen^ in the Tran8.ictions of the Philos.-Philol. Div. of the Bavarian K. Acad, of Sciences, Vol. IS., pt. S, pp. 731-9G3, Munich, 1863; Confudua und aeiner ScliUler Leben und Lehren^ Trans, of the Munich Acad, of Sciences, Xt. 2, Munich, 1867; T. Legge, The lAfe und Writtnga of ConfuduSy tcith crit. and exeget. notes (in the author's " Chinese Classics''), London, 1S67 [New York, ISTO]. Golebrooke, Eaaaya on the Vedaa ; and On the Philoaophy of the ITinduSy in his Miscellaneous Sssaya, 1, pp. 9-113, 227-419, London, 1887; partial translation in German by Poley, Leipsic, 1847; new ed. of the Essays on the liel. and Phil, of th e IT,^ London, 1 358 ; A. W. v. Sehlegel, Phagavad- Giia, i. e , ®etrni(nov /(eAo?, aive Krishnae et Arjwiae colloquium de rebua dvoinis, PharaUae episodium. Texat, rec.^ adn. adj.^ Bonn, 182o; W. v. Ilumboldt, Ueber die unter dem N'amen Phagavad- Giia hekannte Epiaode des Mahabharata, Berlin, 1826. {CJMegeVa article in tho Berlin JahrbUcher^f&r wise. Kritik^ 1827.) Chr. Las- sen, Gymnoaophiata aive Jndicae philoaophiae documentay Bonn, 1832 ; cf. his Ind. AUerthumskundey L-IV.,Leipa. 1847-61; Othm. Yivea^i^ Die PhiloaopMe der Hindu. Vddanta Sara von Sada/aanda, Sanskrit und deutach, Munich, 1835; Theod. Benfey, Indieny in Erach and Gruber's Encycl. Beet II., vol 17, Leips. 1S40; E. Eoer, Vedanta-Sara or Essence of the VedantOy Calcutta, 1845, and Die Lehr^pruche der Vaiceshika- Philosophie von Kan&dOy translated into the German from the Sanptsrit, in tho Zeitaclir der deutachen morgenlilndiachen ^esellschafty vol. XXL, 1867, pp. 809-420; Both, Zur Zttteraiur und Geachichie dea WedayQ essays, Stuttgart, 1846; Alb. Weber, ladiache LiteraturgeacJiichte. Berlin, 1852; Indische Skizzen, Berlin, 1857 : cf. Lidiache Studien, ed. by A. Weber, Vol. 1. seq., Berlin, 1850 seq. ; P. M, MuUer, Beitrdge zur Kenntniaa der indischen Philosqphiey in the 6th and 7th vols, of the Zeitachrift der deutschen morge^ddnd. Geaellsduifty leipsic, 1852-58; cf. his History of Ancient Indian Zit&rature, 2d ed., London, 1860; Max Muller, Chips from a German- Workshopy 'Loud. 1866, N.T. 1867; H. H.Wilson, Essays and Zectwea on the EeUgiona of the HinduSy collected and edited by P. Poaty Lond. 1861-62. Eug. Bnrnouf, Introduction d tUisioire du Bouddhisme indien^ Paris, 1844; C. F. Koppen, iWd Peligion des Pttddha, 2 vols., Berlin, 1857-59; W. Wassiljew, i)er PuddhismuSy seine Dogmeny Gea- ehichte und Ziiteratury transl. into German fr. the Eassian by Th. Benfey, Leipsic, 1860; Barthelemy St. nUaire, Pouddha et aa PeHgioTU, 2e ed.y Paris, 1SC2; Jam. de Alwis, Puddhianiy its Originy IRstoryy and Doctrineay its Scriptures and their Zanguagey London, 1863; Emil Schlagintweit, Ueber den Gottes- legrifder PuddhismttSy In the Eeports of the Bavar. Acad, of Sciences, 1864, Vol. I. 83-102; E. S. Hardy, 25i« Zegends and Tlieoriea of the Puddhists compared tciih History and Scienc6y with Introductory Kotices of the Life and System of Gotama Bnddha, London, 1867. K. E. Lepsins. Pas Todtenbuch der Aegyptery Leips. 1842 ; Pie dgypt. GotterkreisCy Berlin, 1851 ; M. yjYAemanjiyTlvotli Oder die Wiasenschaft der alien Aegyptery 65tUngen, 1855; Aegyptische AlteriliuTna- i;un<:2«, Leipsic, 1857-58; Chr. K, Josias von Bunscn, Aegyptens Stelle in. der Weltgescliiditey Hamburg 16 OEIENTAI, PHILOSOPHY. and Gotha, 1S45-B7. Cf. also, among other works, the article by L. Dleslel, which fa well adapted as ini introduction to the study of early Oriental religions: Set-Typhon, Aeahel mid Satan, ein JBeiirag sur BeUgiormgeschichtt dm Orimts, In the ZeiUehryt fUr hUlorUehe Theologie, edited by Hlcdner, 1S60, pp. 159-217; further, Ollivier Bauregard, Let Divinitea SgypUennea, leur Origine, Uur Oulte et son Expansion dans le Monde, Paris, 1S66. J. G. Ehode, Die lieilige Sage oder das gesammte JleUgionsenjetmi der alien Baktrer, Meder vmd Perser oder des Zendvolles, Prankf. on the M. 1S20 ; Martin Hang, Die filnf 06,tli6!» Oder Sammlwngen von Liedem v,nd SprUe/ien Zarathustra'a, seiner jilnger vnd Nachfolger, Leips. 1868 and 1S60 (in the Transactions of the German Oriental Society) ; Essay on Sacred Language, Writings, and Seligian of the Parseee, Bombay, 1S63. On the religious conceptions of the Jews, compare, among others, G. H. Ewald, in his Oescli. des Voltes Isra'dl bis auf Cliristus, L. Herzfeld in his Oesch. des Tolkea Jisrael v-on der Tollendung des zweiten Tempelshisewr Einsetaung des Mahkabaers Schimon,!Lni Georg Weber in Das Valk Israel in der aUtestamentlicluin Zeit, Lcipsic, 1867 (the first volume of the work by Weber and Eoltzman, entitled : Gescli. des Yolkes Israel ■und der Entstehung des Ohristenthums, 2 vols., Leips. 1S67). Alexander Eohut (among recent writers) treats specially of Jewish angelology and demonology in their dependence on Par- seeism, in the AbhandLfur Knnde des Morgenlandu, ed. by Hcrm. Brockhans; his work also published separately, Leipsic, 18G6. The so-called philosophy of the Orientals lacks in the tendency to strict demonstration, and hence in scientific character. Whatever philosophical elements are discoverabl» among them are so blended with religious notions, that a separate exposition is scarcely possible. Besides, even after the meritorious investigations of modern times, our Itnowl- cdge of Oriental thought remains far too incomplete and uncertain for a connected and authentic presentation. "We omit, therefore, here the special consideration of the various tlieorems of Oriental philosophy, and confine ourselves to the following general state- ments. The doctrine of Confucius (551-4T9 u. c), as also that of his followers (Meng-tseu, born S'll B. c, and others), is mainly a practical philosophy of utilitarian tendency. Its theoretical speculations (which are baaed on the generalized conception of the an- tithesis of male and female, heaven and earth, etc.) are not scientifically wrought out. The rich but immoderate fancy of the Hindus generated, on the basis of a pantheistic conception of the world, a multiplicity of divinities, without investing them with har- monious form and individual character. Their oldest gods — of whom the Vedas treat group themselves about three supreme divinities of nature, Indra, Varuni, and Agni. Later (perhaps about 1300 B. c.) supreme veneration was paid to the three divine beings, which constituted the Hindu Trimurti, viz. : to Brahma, as the original- source of the world (which is a reflected picture in the mind of Brahma, produced by the deceiving Maja), to Visohnu, as preserver and governor, and to Siva, as destroyer and producer. The oldest body of Brahman doctrine is the Mimansa, whicli includes a. theoretical part, the Bralimamimansa or Yedanta, and a practical part, the Karmamimansa. To the (uni- versalistic) Mimansa ("Investigation") Kapila opposed the Sankhya ("Consideration," " Critique " — an individualistic doctrine, which denied the world-soul and taught the existence of individual souls only). We find already in the Sankhya a theory of the kinds and the objects of knowledge. To the autliors of the Ifiaya-doctrine, which subsequently arose, the Syllogism was known. The age of these doctrines is tmcertain. In opposition to the religion of Brahma arose (not far from 650 b. c.) Buddhism, which was an attempt at a moral reformation, hostile to castes, but the source of a new hierarchy. Its followers were required to make it their supreme aim to rise above the checkered world of chan^ng appearance, witli its pain and vain pleasure. But this end was to be reached, not so much through positive moral and intellectual discipline, as through another process, termed "entrance into Nirvana," whereby the soul was saved from the torments of transmigra- tion and the individual was brought into unconscious unity with the All. The Persian reU- OEiEKTAL Philosophy. 17 gion, founded or reformed by Zarathustra (Zoroaster), was opposed to the old Hindu religion, whose gods it regarded as evil demons. Over against the liingdom of light or of good was placed, iu dualistic opposition, the kingdom of darkness or evil ; after a long contest the former was to triumph. The Egyptians are credited wifti the doctrines of the judgment of departed souls and of their transmigration, which doctrines Herodotus (II. 5S, 81, 123) supposes to have passed from them to the Orphists and the Pythagoreans. Their mythology seems scarcely to have exercised any influence, on the Grecian thinkers. Some- what more considerable may have been the influence on the Greeks of the early astronomi- cal observations of the Egyptians, and perhaps also of their geological observations and speculations. Certain geometrical proppsitions seem rather to have been merely discovered empirically by the Egyptians In the measurement of their fields, than to have been scientiflcally demonstrated by them ; the discovery of the proofs and the creation of a system of geometry was the work of the Greeks. The Jewish monotheism, which scarcely exercised an (indirect ?) influence on Anaxagoras, became later an important factor in the evolution of Greek philosophy (i. e, from the time of Neo-Pythagoreanism and in part even earlier), when Je^^s, througli the reception of elements of Greek culture, had acquired a disposition' for scientific thought. 1 L THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. § T. The sources of our tnowledge of the philosophy of the Greeks are contained partly in the philosophical works and frag- ments which have come down from them to us, and partly in reports and occasional allusions. Modem historians have advanced grad- ually in the employment of this material from the method of mere compilation to a more exact historical criticism and a purer and more profound philosophical comprehension. The earlier philosophemes are never mentioned by Plato and Aristotle in the form of mere repetition with historic intent, but always as incidental to the end -of ascertaining philosophical truth. Plato sketches, with historical fidelity in the essential outlines, though with a poetic freedom of execution, vivid pictures of the various philosophies, which had preceded his own, as also of the persons who had been their representatives. Aristotle proceeds rather with realistic exactness both in outline and in details, and only departs occ^ionally from complete historic rigor in his reduction of ea'rlier points of view to the fundameatal conceptions of his own system. The increasing restriction of later classical authors to simple narrative is not calculated in general to impart to their state- ments the advantage of greater fidelity, ^ince they are generally lacking either in accurate knowledge of the proper authorities, or in full capacity for the clear comprehension of earlier philosophical opinions. Plata, characterizes in various dialogues the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of ^mpedocles, Auaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans, of Protagoras, Gorgias, and other Sophists, and especially those of Socrates and of individual disciples of Socrates. Next to him, Xenophon (especially in the MemoraMlia) is the most important authority for Socrates and his teaching. Aristotl e, in all his writings, makes it his principle to consider, first of all, in the discussion of any problem, what results obtained by his predecessors are tenable, and presents, in particular, in the introduction to his "first philosophy " (Meta- physics), a critical review of the principles of all earlier philosophers from Thales to Plato (Met. I. c. 3-10). In many places, also, Aristotle gives Information concerning Plato's " unwritten doctrines," as delivered in the oral lectures of the latter. A number of minor works, in which Aristotle (according to Diog. L., V. 25) had treated of the doctrines of various previous philosophers (irepl rav HvBayopeiuv, nepi t^q 'Apxiirm ijii%oaO(^ia^, irepl T?f Sn-EUffiTTTrou Kol Sevofcpdrovf, etc.) are lost ; we find, however, in the ^Commentators many statements drawn from them. The like is true of the works of T heophrastus on earlier philosophers (n-epJ Tin/ 'Ava^aydgov, Trcpl rCtv 'Ava^i/tivovg, nepi Tim 'Apx^^^<">, Histories of Arithmetic, of Geometry, of Astronomy, Trepi r^g A^/WKpiTov aarpohyyiag, rCm LiaytvmQ cwayuryii, vrepi ''EfiweSoKMovg, MeyopiKof, etc., and his comprehensive work, ^voikcu S6^ai, of which fragments are extant ; an abridgment of this work appears to have been used by later writers as a principal source of information, see Diog. L., V. 42 seq. ; cf. tTsener, GEEEK rHILOSOPnT— SOITECES. 19 Analecta Theophraetea, Leips. 1868). Of Flatoniets, Speusippus (jrepi i^iXoa6^v, IlXaruvo; iyKiJiuov), Xenocrates (irepl ruv nap/ievldov and llv^ayogeia), and Heradides of Fontus (TTfpJ Tuv Tlv^ayopelav, irpof to Ztjvuvoc, 'HpaKXeirov i^tfy^aeig, npbg tov Ari/idxpiTov e^^yijaetiy, auJ, later, notably Clitomachus (about 140 B. c, ve^i rSi alpeaeuv), and of Aristotelians, besides Theophrastus and Eudemus {yeu/ierfiKat ioToplai, apt^/up-iKr/ lanpia, jrcpt rim aorpo- ioyovfiivuv iaTopia), Aristoxeniis (iaropiKa vnofiv^/Mra, jrcpi Tlv&ay6foi> Koi tuv ■yvogi/un> avTov, nXoTuvof pioc), Dicaearch (piog 'EXXdJof, also »rep2 /'''J"), Phaniaa of Lesbos (irepi Tuv ^uKpaTtKov and n-pof Toiig ao^wrriif), Clearchus, Strato, Buris of Samos, the pupil of Theophrastus (about 210 B. c), and others either treated originally of earlier philosophers, or wrote works of more general content, or works pertaining to the history of special sciences, which contained material for the history of philosophy. Also Epicurus (nefl aipiaeav) and his disciples, Hermarohus, Metrodorus, and Colotes (in polemioaT works), and Idomeneus (;repi Tim SuKpariKuv), and the Stoics Cleanthes (On Heraclitus), Sphaerus (On Heraclitus, On Socrates, and On the Eretrian Philosophers), Ohrysippus (On the Early Physiologists), Panaetius (On the Philosophical Schools or Sects, irtpt tuv aipsaeuv), and others wrote of philosophical doctrines and works. Of all these works, which served as authorities for later writers, we possess none. The Alexandrians followed in their works the narratives of the authors above named. Ptolemy Philadelphus (reg. 285-247 B. c.) founded the Alexandrian Library (for whicli preparations had already been begun under his father by Demetrius Phalereus, who came to Alexandria about 296 B. c, and) in which the writings of the philosophers were brought together, though not a few spurious works were included among them. Callimachus of Cyrene (about 294^-224 B. 0.), while superintendent of this library (in which office he suc- ceeded Zenodotus the Ephesian, who lived about 324^246 B. c), drew up " tables " of cele- brated authors and their works (vivaiug t€iv iv iraay rraiSEig dmfia/iipavruv aal av aweypaipav)„ 'Eratosthenes (276-194 B. a), who received from Ptolemy Euergetes {reg. 247-222) the con- trol of the Alexandrian Library, wrote concerning the various philosophical schools (vepi tuv Kara ^ihxio^iav aipeceuv), on which, as it seems, Apollodorus founded his (metrical) chron- icle (composed in the second half of the second century B. c), from which, again, Diogenes Laertius and others drew a large part of their chronological data. Aristophanes of Byzan- tium (born about 264, died about 187 B. c, pupil of Zenodotus and Callimachus, successor, as librarian, of Apollonius, the successor of Eratosthenes, and teacher of Aristarchusi who lived about 212-140 B. c.) arranged most of the Platonic Dialogues in Trilogies, placing the others after them as separate works (a part of his supplement to the wlvoKcg of Callimachus ; see Nauck's Sammlung der Fragmente des Arisloplum.es von Byzanz). Be- sides Eratosthenes, the following persons wrote either expressly or incidentally of the lives and succession of the philosophers and of their works and doctrines : Neanthes of Cyzicus (about 240 B. c, resided at the court of King Attalus I. in Pergamus, and wrote fiovaticd and nepl cvSd^iM) avSpuv), Aniigonus Carystius (about 225, /3/o<, etc.), Hermippus (of Smyrna ? about 200 B. c), the Callimachean (and Peripatetic), who, like Aristophanes of Byzantium in other departments, furnished in his hiographico-literary opuscules, which were only too abundant in fables (ircpt tut aoipCn), ircpt fiayav, Trept Tl.v&ay6pm>, Trtpt 'ApuTToriXotif, ncpl Qeo^paarm, 0ioi), a supplement to the irivaKcg of Callimachus (from which Favorinus and, indirectly, Diogenes Laertius drew largely), Sotion the Peripatetic (about .390 B. C, ircpt StaSoxiM tciv (fitTMad^uni), Satyrus (about 180 B. c, pioc), Apollodorus of Athens (about 144 B. c, a pupil of Diogenes the Stoic, and author of the mythological /3i/3XioS^)cj and of the before-mentioned ;i;po»iKa, and perhaps also of the work nepl rCm dcXoad^iup alplaeuv), and Alexander Polyhistor (in the time of SuUa, SuiSoxal tov ^i^oaSipuni). I^om the Sutioxai of Sotion and the /3iot of Satyrus, Heraclides Lembus (about 150 b. o.), the 20 &BEEE PHILOSOPHY SOUKCBS. son of Seraplon, compUed extracts, which are often mentioned by Diogenes Laertiiis (who distmguishea — ^V. 93, 94 — fourteen persons named Heraclides). Antisthenes of Biiudus (about 150 B. 0.), the historian, and contemporary of Polybius, was probably the author of the ^tAoorf^uv diaSoxai, to which Diogenes Laertius often alludes. Demetrius the Magne- ' sian, a teacher of Cicero, wrote a critical worlt on Homonymous Authors (mpi o/iuvi/aiv voaiTuv ml Bvyypaipiuv), from which Diogenes Laertius, perhaps through Diodes, drew 'many of his statements (cf. Scheurleer, De Semetrio Magnete, diss, inaug., leydcn, 1858). Didymus Chaloenterus (in the second half of the first century B. c.) also labored in the field of the history of philosophy, as a compiler of sentences. Sosicrates wrote diaSoxai, which Diogenes Laertius often mentions. Diocles Magnes, a friend of Epicureanism and opponent of Sotion, the partisan of the philosophy of Sextius, in the time of Augustus and Tiberius, was the author of works entitled P'loi ^t^joao^ and imSpo/i^ tpiTMaoijxjv, from which Diog. Laertius, at least in his account of the Stoics, and most likely also in that of the Epicureans, drew very largely. (According to Nietzsche, Diogenes derived most of his data from Diocles Magnes and Favorinus.) Of the works of the ancients which have come down to us, those specially important for the history of philosophy are the works of Cicero , Lucretiu s, Seneca, Plutarch , the historian and Platonic philosopher, Galenus, tlie physician (bom 131, died after 200 A. D.), gextus the Skeptic (flourished about 200 A. D., a physician of the empirical school, and hence usually named Sextus Empiricua), the historical work (founded largely on the otto- uvJifiovevfuiTa and iravroSav^ laropia of Favorinus) by Diogenes_of Laerta (in CiUcia, about 220 A. D.), and the writings of numerous Neo-Platonists (but Porphyry's ^iXoffo^of iaropin is no longer extant) and commentators of Aristotle ; of similar importance are the works of certain of the Church Fathers, especially those of Justin Martyr (Apolog. and Dialog, cum Hi/phone), Clemens of Alexandria {EzTuirtation to the ffettenes, Paedagogus, Stromata), Origen {Contra Celsum, etc.), and Eusebius (Prayaaraiio Eiangelica), and in part those of Tertullian, Lactantius, and Augustine. Many materials for the history of philosophy are found in Gelliua (about 150 A. s., in his Xoctes Atticae), Athenaeus (about 200, Deipnosophistae), Flavins Philostratus (about 200), Eunapius of Sardis (about 400) Johannes Stobaeus (about 500), Photius (about 886, Lexicon and Sibliotheea), and Suidas (about 1000, Lexicon) • the work irepj Ttiv ev -n-atiei^ 6iaXa/iilmvTuv oo^uv, ascribed to Hesychius of Miletus, appears to be a compilation from Diogenes Laertius and Suidas, datmg from the 15th century (see Lehrs, in the Jiheia. Mus.XYll., 1862, pp. 453-457). Cicero gives evidence in his writings of a tolerably extensive and exact acquaintance with the philosophical schools of his time, but his knowledge of Greek speculation was insuffi- cient. A higher value belongs to most of the Mstorical statements of the commentators of Aristotle, since these were founded on original works of the philosophers, which were ■then extant, or on various reports by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and other authors, which have not come down to us. Cieeronis Historia PhUosophiae Antiqucte ex Omnibus lUivs Scripiis cottegit Fr. Gedike^ Berlin, 1182, 1801, 1814. The works of Plu tarch entitled vepl rem irgannv ipiXoao^ijaavTuv ital tov ojt' oiitSv, jrepi Kvp^aiuv, hkXay^ ^TMaiipum, and orpu/iaTel^ lajopiKot are not preserved. Plutarch's " Moralia " contain valuable contributions to the history of philosophy, especially in what relates to the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines. The work entitled Pint, de Physicis Philo- sophorum Decretis lAbri Quinque (ed. Dan. Beck, Leipeic, 1187, and contained also in Wyt- tenbach's and Dubner's editions of the " Moralia") is spurious. Claud. Galeni Liber nepl t^iXne6(pov laro^ia^ (in the complete ed. of the Works of Galen, ed. Kiihn, vol. XIX.) Tha work is spurious. Leaving out the commencement, it agrees GREEK PHILOSOPHY SOURCES.' 2l, (Uraost throughout with the Pseudo-Plutarchio work above-mentioned, of which it is a recen- sion somewhat abridged. In the genuine writings of Galen, however, there is found, in addition to their medical contents, much that concerns tl)j history of philosophy. Sexti Empirici Opera, Pyrrhoniarmn Institutionwn Libri Tres (wv'p'p6yveioi vTroTviruaetci Skeptical Sketches) ; Contra Mathemalicos sive Disciplin. Professores Libri sex, Contra Philoao- phos libri quinque; the two also together under the title: Adversus Math. Libri XI. (Against the representatives of the positive sciences and against philosophical dogmatists.) Ed. Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Leipsic, 1718; reprinted ibid. 1842. Ex. ree. Imm. Bekker, Berhn,' 1842. Flavii Philostrali Vitae Sophistanim. Ed. Car. Lud. Itayser, Heidelberg, 1838. Opera ed. Kayser, ZQrich, 1844r-46 ; ibid. 1853 ; ed. Ant. "Westermann, Paris, 1849. Athenaei Deipnosophistae. Ed. Aug. Meineke, Leipsic, 1858-59. Diogenis Laertii de Vitis, SogmatCbus et Apophthegmaiibus Clarorum Philosophorum libri decern (nepl jSluv, iuy/mTuv Kal airo^&eyfiaTuv tuv hv i^ikoao^lg evSoKiiojaavTuv pipVia 6eKa). Ed. Hubner, 2 vols., Leips. 1828-31; Commentaries on the same, vols. I. and II., Leips., 1830-33, containing the notes of Is. Casaubonus, Aeg. Menagius and others. The com- mentary of Menagius on Diogenes Laertius appeared first in 1652. Diog. L. De Vitis, etc., ex Italicis codicibus nunc primum excussis recensuit C. Gabr. Cobet. Accedwnt Olympiodori, Ammonii, Jamblichi, Porphyrii et aliorum Vitae Platonis, Aristotelis, Pythagorae, Plotini et Jsidori, Ant. Westermanno, et Marimi vita Prodi, J. F. Poissonnadio edentibus. Graece et Latirie cum indicibus, Paris, 1850. Cf Frdr. Balmach, De Diog. L. Ibntibus, (diss.-inaug. Segimontanensis,) Gumbinnen, 1868 ; Frdr. Nietzsche, De Laertii Diogenis Fontibus, in the Rhein. Museum, new series, XXIII. 1868, and XXIT. 1869. Diogenes Laertius dedi- cated his work, according to III. 47, to a female admirer of Plato. His general attitude is that of an Eclectic, while in the different parts of his work he is influenced by the "character of the sources from which he draws. Diogenes brings the history of Platonism down to Clitomachus, that of Aristotelianism to Lyco, that of Stoicism, in our text, to Chrysippus, though originally (as shown by Valentine Bose in the Hermes, vol. I., Berlin, 1866, p. 370 ff.) it was continued to Cornutus; he names the principal Epicureans down to Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius Laco, Diogenes Tarsensis, and Orion ; only the history of Skepticism is brought down by him to his own time, ». e., till near 220 A. B. dementis Alexandrini Opera. Ed. Reinhold. Klotz, Leipsic, 1830-34. Origenis ^(^oo-j ipov/ieva, in Jac. Gronovii Thesaur. Antiguitatum Graecarwm, torn. X., Leyden, 1701, pp.' 257-292. Compendium Eistoriae Philosophicae Antiquae sive Philosffphumena, quae sui Origenis nomine circumferuntur, ed. Jo. Christoph. Wolf, Hamb. 1706, 2d ed., ibid. 1716;l also in the complete editions of Origen. Qpiyivov; (^TMao^ovfLeva f/ Kara iraadv alplaeav IXe3';ifOf, Origenis Philosophumena, sive Omnium Haeresium Eefidatio, e codice Parisino nunc primum ed. Emman. Miller, Oxford, 1851. S Hippolyti Sefutationis Omnium Haeresium lAbrorum Decern quae supersunt, ed, L. Duneker et F. G. Schneidewin, opus Schneideuiino defuncto absolvit L. Duneker, Gott. 1859, ed. Patricius Cruice, Paris, 1860. Of this work, the first book, which seems to be founded in large measure on the abridgment made in the Alexandrian period, of the nepl ^vouum of Theophrastus, is identical with the ijiiTmio- ijiov/ieva, which is all of the work that was known until recently. Books IV.-X., with the exception of the beginning of Book IT., were found in a cloister on Mount Athos in 1842. That Origen was not the author of the work is certain ; that it was written by the Church Father, Hippolytus, who lived about 220 i.. D., and was a pupil of Irena3us, ia extremely probable. EuSebii Fraeparatio Evangelica, ed. Viger, Paris, 1628; ed. Heinichen, Leips. 1842-43. 23 GREEK PHILOSOPHT SOUECES. Eusebius drawa very largely from Pseudo-Plutarch, de Placitis PhiJosoplwrwm, or more likely from a fuller edition of thai work. EuTiapii Sardiani Vitae PhUosophorum et Sophiatarum. Ed. J. F. Boissonade, Amat. 1822 ; Paris, 1849. ' Jo. Stobaei FlorUegium, ed. Thorn. Gaisford, Oxford, 1822 ; Leipsic, 1823-23 ; ed. Aug. ' 'Meinecke, Leipsic, 1855-5T. Eclogae Physime et EOiicae, ed. Arnold Herm. Lud. Heeren, Gott., 1792-1801; ed. Thorn. Gaisford, Oxford, 1850; ed. Aug. Meineke, vol. I., Leips. 1860, Vol. II., ib. 1864. The Eclogae agree with Pseudo-Plutarch, De Placitis Fhilos., and Pseudo- Galen in those parts which relate to the same topics, but they contain, in passages, fuller extracts from the common source from which each of these writers drew. Many of the statements of the Bishop Theodoret, who died in 451, were drawn from this compilation. Hesychii Milesii Opuscula, ed. Jo. Conr. Orelli, Leipsic, 1820. Simplicii Oomm. ad Arist. Physicas AuscuMatimes. Ed. Asulanus, Venice, 1526. Michael Hissman, in the Magazin far die Phihsophie und ihre Geschichte, 6 vols. Gott. and Lemgo, 17T8-83, brought together a number of essays taken from the Annals of various academies, many of which relate to ancient philosophy. Among these, attention may be directed to the articles on flunks and AnaximaTider by the Abbe de Canaye, on Py- thagoras by De la Nauze and by Preret, on Empedocles by Bonamy, on Anaaagoras by Abb^ le Batteux and by Heinius, on Socrates by Abbe Fraguier, on ArisHppus by Le Batteux, on Plato by Abbe Gamier, on Callisthenes by Sevin, on Euhemerus by Sevin, Fourmont, and Foucher, . on Panaetitis and on Athenodorus by Sevin, on Musonius and on Sextius by De Burigny, on Peregrinus the Cynic by Capperonier, and on Proclus by De Burigny. Christoph. Meiners, Hiatoria Doctrinae de Vera Deo, Lemgo, 1780. Geschichie des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenchaften in Griechenland und Bom, Lemgo, 1781-82. Grundriss der Gesch. der Weltweisheit, Lemgo, 1786; 2d ed. 1789. D. Tiedemann, Griechenlands erste Philosophen oder Leben und Systeme des Orpheus, Phere- cydes, TJidks, und Pythagoras, Leipsic, 1781. Fr. Vict. Lebereoht Pleasing, Eistor. und philos. Untersitchungen iiber die Denkart, Theologie und Philosophie der iiltesien VoUcer, vorzilglich der Griecheu, bis auf Aristot. Zeit, Elbing, 1785; Mnemonium oder Versuche zwr Enthiillung der Geheimnisae des Alterthums, Leipsic, 1787 ; Versuche mr Aufklanmg der Philosophie des aliesten Alterthums, Leipsic, 1788. Wilh. Traug. Krug, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vomehmlich unter Griechen und Romern, Leipsic, 1815; 2d ed., 1827. Zeller writes of what has been done in the department of the liistory of ancient philoso- phy since Buhle and Tennemann, in the JahrbOcher der Gegenwart, July, 1843. Historia philosophiae Graeco-Roma/nae ex fontium locis contexia. Locos coUegerwnt, dis- posuerunt, notis auxerunt H. Ritter, L. Preller. Edidit L. Preller, Hamburg, 1838. Edit. II. recogn. et auxit L. Preller, Gotha, 1856. Ed. III. Gotha, 1864. Ed. IV., 1869. (A val- uable compilation.) ry^ FragTnenta PhUosophorum Graecorum, ed. F. W. MuUach, Paris, 1860-67. Christian Aug. Brandis, Sandbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-RHmischen Philosophie (Part L: Pre-Socratic Philoaophy; Part II., 1st Div.: Socrates, the Imperfect Disciples of Socrates and Plato; Part II., 2d Div.: Aristotle; Part III., 1st Div.: Review of the Aris- totelian System and Exposition of the Doctrines of his Immediate Successors, as transition to the third period of the development of Greek Philosophy), Berlin, 1835, '44, '53, '67, '60. ■ Geschichte der Entwickelungen der griechischen Philosophie und ihrer Nachwirhmgen im romischen Reiche, first half (till Aristotle), Berlin, 1862, second half (from the Stoics and Epicureans to the Neo-Platonista, constituting, with the " Aitsfuhnmgen," which appeared GEEEK PHILOSOPHY S0UECE3. 23 ' in 1866, the 2d division of the 3d part of the " Handbuch") ib. 1864. An extremely care- ful, comprehensive, and learned investigation. The " Geschichte der Entwickdungen " is a shorter and compendious treatment of the subject. ^ Aug. Bernh. Krische, JFbrachtmgen au/dem Gebieie der alien Philosophie. 1st Vol.: DU ■ Oieologisdien Lehren der griechischen Denker, dne Priifang der Darstellung Oicer&s, Gottingen, 1840. Ed. Zeller, Die PhUoaophie der Griechen, eine TJhtersuchung iiber Character, Gavg mid Eauptmomente ihrer Eniwkkelung (Part I. : General Introduction, Pre-Socratio Philosophy. Part II. : Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. Part III. : Post-Aristotehau Philosophy), Tubingen, 1844, '46, '52. Second revised edition, with the title, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer gesch. Eniimckelung dargesteUt. Fart I., Tiib. 1856. Part II. (Socrates and thq Socratic Schools, Plato and the Old Academy), Tub. 1856. Part 11. 2d Div. (Aristotle and the Early Peripatetics), Tub. 1862. Part III. 1st Div. (Post- Aristotelian philosophy), 1st half, Leips. 1865; 2d half, with a Register, ib. 1869. Third Edition, Part I., ib. 1869. ["Socrates and the Socratic Schools " (London, 1868) and " The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics" (Lond. 1869), are translations by Dr. Oswald Reichel from this work of Zeller. — Tr.] This ' woric gives evidence of the most admirable combination of philosophical profoundness and critical sagacity in the author. , The philosophical stand-point of the author is a Hege- lianism modified by empirical and critical elements. Karl Prantl, Uebersicht der griechisch-romischen Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1854; new edition, 1863. A. Schwegler, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, ed. by 0. Kostlin, Tiibingen, 1859; second enlarged edition, i6. 1870 (1869). Ludwig Striimpell, Die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, zur Vebersicht, Repetition umd Orientinmg bei eigenen Studien enlworfen (1st Div. : The Tlieoret. Philoa. of tlie Greeks; 2d Div.: Their Practical Philosophy), Leipsic, 1854-61. Tlie stand-point ia ' Herbartian. N. J. Schwarz, Mawuel de VHistoire de la Philosophie Ancienne, Liege, 1842 ; 2. 6d. Liege, 1846. Ch. Renouvier, Manuel de Philosophie Ancienne, Paris, 1845. Charles LevSque, Etudes de Philosophie Grecque et Latine, Paris, 1864. L. Lenoel, Les Philaso,- phes de VAntiquile, Paris, 1 865. M. Morel, Sist. de la Sagesse et du Gout chez les Grecs, Paris, 1865. Franco Eiorentino, Saggio Storico suUa Filosqfia Greca, Florence, 1865. W. A. Butler, Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, edited by W. H. Thompson, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1856; London, 1866. Lectures on Greek Philosophy, and other Philo- sophical Remains of James Frederick Perrier, ed. by Al. Grant and E. L. Lushington, 2 vols., Edinb. and London, 1866. [Ritter's History of Ancient Philosophy, translated from the first volumes of Ritter's general history, mentioned above, § 4, by Alex. J. W. Morri- son, 4 vols., Oxford, 1838-46. Walter Anderson, The Philosophy of Ancient Greece investi- gated in its Origin and Progress, Edinb. 1791. — JV.] Of ancient physical theories, Th. Henri Martin treats in La Foudre, V Electricite, et U Magnetisme chez les Anciens, Paris, 1866. Cf. also Charles Thurot, Recherches Sistoriques sur U Principe d' Archimede (Extrait de la Revue Archeologique), Paris, 1869. On Greek and Roman theories of law and of the state, cf. — beside the work of K. Hildenbrand, cited above, p. 13— A. Veder, Historia Philosophiae Juris apud Vetoes, Leyden, 1832; Herm. Henkel, Lineamenta Artia Graecorum Politicae, Berl. 1847; Studien m einer Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Stoat, in the Phibhgus, Vol. IX., 1854, p. 402 seq.; Zur Geschichte der griech. Staaisunss. (G. Pr.) Salzwedel, 1863 and 1866, Stendal, 1867 and 1869. M. Voigt, Die Lehre vom Jvs Ifaturale, Aequum et Bonum uni Juts Gentium d«r Romer, SA THE EAELY POETS AOT) SAGES. Leips. 1866. (On Greek theories, pp. 81-176.) Cf. also the extensive work of Ihering: Oeist dea romischen Bechts aufden, verschiedenen Stufen eeiner ErUwickelmg, Leips. 1852 seq. Of the relation of Hellenic Ethics to Christianity, Neander treats in his Wiss. AbJiand- hmgen, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851; cf. his above-cited "Vorlesungen uber die Gesch. der chrisUichm Mhik." "W. "Wehrenpfennig {Progr. dea Joachimsthal'schen Gymmsiuira, Berlin, 1856) writes of the diversity of ethical principles among the Hellenes and its causes. Ad, Gamier, De la Morale dans I'Antiquite, Paris, 1865. On ancient JEstheties, see Eduard MiUler, Gesch. der Theorie der Kvmst In den Allen, Breslau, 1834-37. Cf. Zimmermann's Gesch. der Aesthetik and A. Kuhn, Die Idee dee Schonen in ihrer Entwickelvng bei den Alien bis in wnsere Tage, 2d edit., Berlin, 1865. On the doctrine of Unity, see Wegener, De Uno sive Unitak apud Graecorvm Phihsophos., Jkalschtd-Progr., Potsdam, 1863. On ancient views of the Immortality of the Soul, see Karl Arnold, Gymn.-Progr., Straubing, 1864. Of the Philosophy of Language among the ancients, treat Lersch (Bonn, 1841), and H. Steinthal (Geschichte der Sprachwiss. bei dm Griechen wnd Somem, Berlin, 1863-64). Cf. Schomann, Die Lehre von den Redetheilen bei den Alien, Berlin, 1862. ' § 8. The efforts of the poetic fancy to represent to itself the nature and development of things divine and human precede, excite to, and prepare the way for philosophical inquiry. The influence of the theogonic and cosmogonic notions of Homer and Hesiod on the development of the earliest Greek philosophy was only remote and inconsiderable; but perhaps certain Orphic poesies, as also the Cosmology of Pherecydes of Syros (who iirst wrote in prose, about 600 B. c), and, on the other hand, the commencement of ethical reflec- tion, which manifested itself in proverbs and poems, exercised a more direct and essential influence. The numerous -works relating to those phases of intellectual development, which preceded the advent of philosophy, can not here be named with any degree of fullness ; it may suffice only to direct attention to K. F. Nagelsbaoh's Isomer, Theologie (Nuremberg, 1840) and his Naeh!iomeriiiclie Theologie, also to the works of Creuzer and Voss, the first volumes of Grote's Hietory of Greece, the Popttlare Aitfeiitte of Lehrs, the works of Preller and others on Grecian Mythology, and various monographs, such as Camdobr^s Zur Jlomeriachen Effiik (Programm dea Gynrnae, e« Ziineberg), etc. Cf. Lobeck, J>e Carminibue Orphicis, KOnigsb. 1824; J>e Orphei Aetate, ib. 1826; Aglaophamtia a. de T/ieoL Myat. Graecorum Cauaia, 2 vols^ ib. 1Sl9; K. Eichhoff, De Onomacrito Athenienai, Gyrtin.' Progr., Elberfeld, 1840; C. Haupt, Orpheus, IT&tnerua, Onotnacritua ; aive Theologiae et PkUogophiae Jnitia apud Graicoa, Gymn.- Progr., K5nig3berg in Neumark, 1864; J. A. Hartung, Die RetXgion vnd Mytholo^ie der Griechen, Leips. 1865 (Hartung detects in Epimenides, the Cretin, and Onomacritus a confusion in matten of be- lief, due to the introduction of Egyptian, Fhcnician, and Phrygian superstitions) ; P. E. Schuster, De veterit OrpMcae theogoniae indole atque origins, nccedit ITeltanici theogonia Orphica, Leipsic, 1869. On Pherecydes, cf. Triedr. Wilh. Sturz (Gera,17S9; 1798), Leips. 1824; L. Preller, Die TheogoniedeaPh. v. 3. in the Rhein. Mm. f. PliiloL, new series, Vol. I V., 1S46, pp. S77r889, and in Preller's Auagew. Anfe., ed. by R. KShler, Berlin, 1864, pp. .350-361 ; B. Zlmmermann, Ueber die Lehre des Ph. v. S. und Uir VerhiUnis) tu aicaaergriechiachen QUntbenskreiaen, in Fichte's Zettachr. J, Philoa. Vol. 24. Xo. 2, 1854, and Joh. Con- rad, De Pherecydia Syrii Aetate atqne Cosmologia (Disa. JJoimejute),, Ccblentz, 1S56.— Karl Dilthey, , Oriech. Fragmente (Part L : Fragments by the seven wise men, their contemponirieR, and the Pythar' goreans), Darmstadt, 1835; H. 'ffiskemann, De Zacedaemonloncm Philoaophia et Phtlmmplda deque Septan (pios dlcuni SapienOlna, Lac. dtaHpulta et Imitatnribua, Hersfeld, 1840; Otto Bernhardt. Pie iteben Wetaen Oriechenlanda, eymn.-Progr., Soian, 1864; Frc. Aemll. Bohren, De Septem SapleiUibtts, Bonn, 1807. THE EAELT POETS AlTD SAGES. 2S / The Homeric poems seem to imply an earlier form of religious ideas, the gods of which were personified forces of nature, and they recall in occasional particulars (e. g. Jl. Till., 19 sq., myth of the aeiprj xpiveiv) Oriental speculations; Jjut all such elements in them are T7ithout exception clothed in an ethical form. Homer draws thoroughly ideal pictures of human life, and the influence which his poetry in its pure naivete exercised on the Hellenes (as also the less elevated influence of the more reflective poetryof Hesiod), was essentiallj ethical and religious. But when this education had accomplished its work in sufficient measure, the moral and religious consciousness of the race, increasing in depth and finding the earlier stadium insufficient, advanced to a more rigorously polemic attitude, and even proscribed the ideal of the past as a false, misleading, and pernicious agency (Xenophanes, Heraditus, and Plato). After this followed a species of reconciliation which lasted during several centuries before the final rupture, hut rested in part only on the delusive basis of allegorical interpretation. Greek philosophy made incomparably greater advances in that earlier polemic period than after its friendly return to the poetry of Homer and Hesiod. At a later time, when renewed speculation was again inclined to concede to the most ancient poetry the highest authority, the belief of earUer times, that the Homeric poetry was preceded by another of more speculative character, namely, the Orphic, found much credit. According to the primitive legend, Orpheus was the originator of the worship of Bacchus among the Thracians. Cosmogonic poems were early ascribed to him (by Onp- macritus, the favorite of the Pisistratidae, and others). Herodotus says (II. 53) : '• Homer and Hesiod framed the theogony of the Hellenes ; but the poets, who are believed to have lived before them, in my opinion, were their successors;" in II. 81 (cf. 123), Herodotus declares the so-called Orphic and Bacchic doctrines to be Egyptian and Pythagorean. Those Orphic cosmogonies of which we have most precise knowledge date from an epoch much later still, and arose under the influence of the later philosophy. It is, however, susceptible of sufficiently convincing demonstration, that one of the Cosmogonies origi- nated in a comparatively early period. Damascius, the Neo-Platonist, relates (Ds Princ. p. 382), that Eudemus, the Peripatetic, an immediate disciple of Aristotle, reported the substance of an Orphic theogony, in which nothing was said of the intelligible, owing to its being utterly inexpressible — so Damascius explains it from his stand-point — but the beginning was made with Night. We may certainly assume that Aristotle also was acquainted with this theogony (cf. also Plat. Tim., p. 40 e). Now Aristotle says, Metaph., XIV. 4, that the ancient poets and the latest (philosophical) deoTidyot represented (pantho- istieally) what is highest and best as being not first, but second or subsequent in order of time, and resulting from a gradual development ; while those, who (in point of time and in their modes of thought and expression) stood between the poets and the philosophers (oJ fteiuy/ievoi avTov), like Pherecydes, who no longer employed exclusively the language cf mythology, and the magi and some Greek philosophers, regarded (theistically) that which is most perfect, as first in order of time. What " ancient " poets (apxaloc noir/ral, whose time, for the rest, may reach down, in the case of some of them, into the sixth cen- tury B. c.) are here meant, Aristotle indicates only by designating their principles; mov "SiiKTa Koi Ovpavm $ Xdog ^ 'ilKcavdv. Of these Xdof is undoubtedly to be referred to Hesiod (vdvrav /th irp^riara Xaog yher', avrdp -iTreiTa TaV evpiarefyvoi k. t. X. Tlteog. T. 116 sq. ; kK Xdeof (T "EpE(3i5f re idXaiva re Nif kyhimrro, ib. 123), 'ilKeav6g to Homer (SKcavdv re iJe£h> yiveatv Kal /i^ipa Iti&vv, Jl. XIV. 201; 11. XIV. 240: 'il/ceavdf, bajrtp yiveaiq ndvTeam TenicTat), and Nif ml Ovpavdg, therefore, to some other well-known theogony, in all probability to the same Orphic theogony which was described by Eudemus ; and in this case this theogony must have arisen, at the latest, in the sixth century before 28~ PEEIODS OF DEVELOPMKNT. Christ, since Aristotle reckons its author among the "ancient poets" {voivrai apxaiot). But this theogony, and indeed all the theogonies, to which the Aristotelian testimony assigns a comparatively high antiquity, agree substantially, according to the same authority, with the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod in their religious conceptions. Zeus appears as the eternal ruler of all and as the soul of the world, in the following verse, which is, most lilcely, the iraXaib^ Uyog to which Plato refers in Leg., TV. 715e: — Zraf apx^, Zewf /iiaaa, A(df J" i/c iravra rtrvKrat. Pherecydes, of the island of Syros (about 600-550 B. c), wrote a theogony in prose, which is cited under the title of ''Eirrdiaixog, probably from the folds (jaixolQ) of his K6a/io;. Diogenes Laertius cites, as .follows, the opening words of this work (I. 119): Zevg /iev ml Xp6vog eif ael KaX Xdav yv. Xdovi-y 6e miofia iyivero Tij, iweiiij ain-g Zeiig yepag diiol. Tlie cosmologist, Epiinenides, who was nearly contemporary witli Pherecydes, describes the world as coming forth from night and air, and belongs consequently to those whom Aristotle designates as hi vvkto; yemcmre; BeoMyoi. Acusilaus made Chaos first, Erebus and Night being its children. Hermotimus of Clazomenae appears to have been one of the theistical cosmologists (see below, § 24). The so-caUed "Seven Wise Men," Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon; Cleomenes, Myson (or, according to others, Periander), and Chilou (Anacharsis, Epimenides, and others are also named), witli the sayings attributed to them (Thales: " Know Thyself," or, " What is difficult? To know one's self; and what is easy? To advise another;" Solon: "Hold the beautiful and good more sacred than an oath; " "Speak not falsely;" "Practice dili- gently things excellent ; " " Be slow in acquiring friends, but those_ thou hast taken, do not cast ofif; " "Learn to command by first learning to obey; " "Let thy advice be not what is most agreeable, but what Is most honorable;" "Nothing in excess;" Bias: "The posses- sion of power will bring out the man," cited by Arist., Eth. Nic, T. 3, and " The most are bad," etc. ; Anacharsis : " Rule thy tongue, thy belly, thy sexual desires," etc.), are repre- sentatives of a practical wisdom, which is not yet sufficiently reflective to be called philos- ophy, but which may pave tlie way for the philosophical inquiry after ethical principles. In the Platonic dialogue Protagoras (p. 343), the " Seven "Wise Men " are spoken of as exponents of Lacedsemonian culture expressing itself in moral maxims. The Aristotelian Dicaearch {ap. Diog. Laert., L 40) terms these men, with reason, "neither sages nor philos- ophers, but rather men of broad common sense, and lawgivers (oire cro^otif ovre ^i^a6tj}0vg, amsTouQ Si tcvoq xal vo/ioBeTinovf:). Thales, who is occasionally mentioned as the wisest of the seven sages, was at once an astronomer and the founder of the Ionic Natural Philosophy. § 9. Tlie Periods of Development of Greek (and its derivative, Eoman) philosophy may be characterized, in respect of the object of inquiry in each, as follows : 1st Period : Prevailing direction of phil- osophical inquiry toward the universe of nature, or predominance of Cosmology (from Thales to Anaxagoras and the Atomists) ; 2d Period : Prevailing direction of philosophical inquiry toward man, as a willing and thinking being, or predominance of Ethics and Logic — accom- panied, however, by the gradual resumption and a growing encour- agement of natural philosophy (from the Sophists to the Stoics, Epicu- reans, and Skeptics) ; 3d Period : Prevailing direction of philosophical PEEIODS OF GEEEK PHILOSOPHY. 27 inquiry to the subject of the divine nature and the relation of the world and man to it, or predominance of Theosophy, but not excluding physics, ethics, and logic (from Neo-Pythftgoreanism till the exit of ancient philosophy in the Neo-Platonic school). As to the form of philosophy in the successive periods, the first period was charac- terized, in the main, by the immediate direction of thought to things, though not without some attempts at mathematical and dialecti- cal demonstration ; the second, by the introduction of the Definition as an organ of inquiry, and the third by the prevalence of the idea of mystical absorption in the Absolute. The germs of the peculiar con- tent and also of the form of philosophy in each of the later periods are discernible partly at the culmination and partly at the termination of the period in each case next preceding ; tlie most eminent thinkers of the second (in most of its representatives, prevailingly anthropological) period rose nearest to a comprehensive philosophy. In the first period, the persons representing the same or similar types of philosophy were, as a rule (though by no means without exception), of the same race (the earliest natural philosophy having arisen and flourished among the lonians, while Pytliagoreanism found its adherents chiefly among the Dorians). But in the second period philosophical types became inde- pendent of race-distinctions, especially after the formation at Athens of a center of philosophical activity. The home of philosopliy was now coextensive with the Hellenic world, including in the latter those nations subjected to the Macedonian or Eoman supremacy, in which the Hellenic type of culture remained predominant. In the third period, the Hellenic mode of thought was blended with the Oriental and the representatives of philosophy (now become theos- ophy) were either Jews under Hellenic influence, Egyptians and other Orientals, or men Hellenic in race who were deeply impregnated with Orientalism. Diogenes of Laerta (whose arrangement is based on an unintelligent and exaggerated use of the distinction of Ionic and Italic philosophy) repeats (III. 56) an observation, which had been made by others before him, and which is worthy of note, to the effect that the first TJtyo^ of the Greek philosophers was physical, while Ethics was added by Socrates, and Dialectic by Plato. Bruclcer follows substantially the arrangement of Diogenes Laertius, but begins a new period with philosophy under the Romans. In this period he includes, beside the Roman • philosophers, the renewers of earlier schools, especially the Neo-Pythagoreans and the so- called " Eclectic Sect " (so termed by him after Diog. Laert., I. 21, where Potamo is spoken of as founder of an eclectic school), i. e. the Neo-Platonists, and also the later Peripatetics, Cynics, etc., and the Jewish, Arabian, and Christian philosophers down to the end of tho 28 PERIODS or GKEEK PHILOSOPHY. Middle Ages, the restoration of the sciences, and the commencement of modem phi- losopliy. Tennemann divides Greek and Roman philosophy into three periods : 1. From Thaleg to Socrates — ^beginning in fragmentary speculations concerning the external world ; 2. From Socrates to the end of the contest between the Stoa and the Academy — in which period speculation was called off from nature and directed to the human mind as the source of all truth ; 3. From philosophy under the Romans and the New Skepticism of ^nesidemus to John of Damascus — the period of the marriage of the Western with the Oriental mind, when men looked outside of the mind for the source of certitude and declined into syncretism and fanaticism. Similarly, H. Ritter distinguishes three periods of philosophical development : Pre- Socratic Philosophy, the Socratic Schools (among which he includes the earlier Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics) and the Later Philosophy down to Neo-Platonism. The first period includes "the first awakening of the philosophic spirit," the second, "the most perfect bloom of philosophical systems," the third, "the downfall of Greek philosophy." More precisely, the first period is characterized, according to Ritter, by the one-sided scien- tific interest, from which in it philosophical inquiry departs, its variety of direction being determined by variety of race ; the second, by the complete systematic division of philoso* phy (or at least "of that which the Greeks generally understood by philosophy ") into its various branches, the difierent races no longer philosophizing each in its own way, but " this philosophy being brought forth, as it were, from the intellectual totality of the Greek nation;" the third, by the loss of the sense of the systematic order essential to Greek philosophy, although the tradition of it was preserved, and by the decadence of the peculiarity and vigor of the Greek mind, while scientific discipline was gradually covering a greater range of experiences and being extended to a greater number of men. Hitter's classification is based essentially on Schleiermacher's estimate of the philosophical signifi- cance of Socrates, namely, that Socrates, by his principle of knowledge, rendered possible the union of the previously isolated branches of philosophical inquiry in an all-emoracing philosophical system, which union Plato was the first to realize. In accordance herewith, Schleiermacher divides Greek philosophy, in his Lectures edited by Ritter, into two periods, entitled " Pre-Socratic Philosophy," and " Philosophy from Socrates to the Neo- Platonists ;" yet he sometimes himself subdivides the latter period into two periods, one of bloom, the other of decay. Brandis agrees, on the whole, with Ritter in his appreciation of the development of Greek philosophy, yet with the not immaterial differfence, that he transfers the Stoics and Epicureans and the Pyrrhonic and Academic Skeptics from the second period of develop- ment ("the time of manly maturity") to the third (" the period of decline"). Hegel distinguishes three periods : 1. From Thales to Aristotle ; 2. Grecian philosophy in the Roman world; 3. The Neo- Platonic philosophy. The first period extends from the commencement of philosophizing thought till its development and perfection into a scientific whole and into the whole of science. In the second period philosophical science becomes split up into particular systems; each system is a theory of. the universe founded entirely on a one-sided principle, a, partial truth being carried to the extreme in opposition to its complementary truth and so expanded into a totality in itself (systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism, of whose dogmatism Skepticism constitutes the negative face). The third period is, with reference to the preceding one, the affirmative period, in which what was before opposed becomes now harmoniously united in a divine ideal world. Hegel distributes the first period into three sections : a. From Thales to Anaxagoras, or from abstract thought, as immediately determined by its (external) object, PEE-SOPHISTtC PHILOSOPHY. 29 to the idea of thought as determining itself; b. Sophists, Socrates, and disciples of Socrates — thought which determines itself, is apprehended as present, as concrete in mo — principle of subjeotiyity ; u. Plato and Aristotle — thought objective, the Idea, occupies the whole sphere of being (with Plato, only in the form or universality, but with Aristotle, as ■ a fact confirmed in every sphere of real ezistence). Zeller's first period extends from Thales to the Sophists, inclusive. The second includes Socrates and his incomplete disciples, Plato and the Old Academy, Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics. All Post- Aristotelian philosophy is included in the third. In the first period all philosophy takes an immediately objective direction. In the second period the fundamental notion is that of the objectivity of ideas or of thought as per se existing, in which Socrates recognized tho supreme end of subjective endeavor, Plato the absolute, or substantial reality, and Aristotle not simply the essence, but also the forming and moving principle of the empirically real. In the third period all independent speculation centers- in the question of the truth of subjective thought and the manner of life calculated to bring subjective satisfaction ; thought withdraws from the object-world into itself. Even K eo-Platonism, whose essential character is to be sought in the transcendent theosophy' which it embodied and for which Skepticism prepared the way, furnishes, in Zeller's opinion, no exception to the subjective character of the third period, since its constant and all-controlling concern is the inward satisfaction of tho subject. No division can be regarded as truly satisfactory, in which reference is not had, so f4r as practicable, at once to the prevailing object, the form and the geographical localization of philosophy in the different periods. FuRBT (Peevailinglt Cosmological) Period of Geeek Philosopht. PRE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY. § 10. The first period of Greek Philosophy includes, 1) the earlier Ionic Natural Philosophers, 2) the Pythagoreans, 3) the Eleatics, 4) the later Natural Philosophers. The Ionic " physiologists," predisposed thereto by their racial character as lonians, directed their attention to the sphere of sensible phenomena and inquired after the material prin- ciple of things and the manner of their generation and decay ; for them, matter was in itself living and psychically endowed. The Pj'tha- goreans, whose doctrines flourished chiefly among the Greeks of Doric race, especially in Lower Italy, sought for a principle of things which should account at once for their form and substance, and found it in number and figure. The philosophy of the Eleatics turned on the unity and immutability of being. The later natural philosophers were led by the antithesis in which the Eleatic speculation stood to the 30 PEE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHT. earlier natural philosophy, to attempt a mediation ; to this end, they admitted, on the one hand, the Eleatic doctrine of the immutability of being, but affirmed, on the other, with the Pre-Eleatic philosophers, its plurality, and explained its apparent changes as due to the combina- tion or severance of immutable, primitive elements. With the last representatives of natural philosophy and, especially, in the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the independent existence and world- disposing povrer of the divine mind (Noii?), the way was already being prepared for the transition to the following period. Fragmenta PMloaophonim Graeeorum (of the time before Socrates), ed. Fr. 6nil. Mnllach, Paris, 1800, Vol. II., ibid. 1867. II. Ritter, GesdUdUe der loniacJien Philosophies Berlin, 1S21. Chr. A. Brandis, Ueber die lieihen- folge der loniachen Phyeioloffen, in the liltMn. Mus.^ III. pp. 105 fieq. Mallet, IHMoire de la Philoaophie lonienna, Paris, 1S42. K. F. Hermann, De Philoeophoi'wm lonicorwm Aetatibus, Gott. 1S49. Ed. Both, Geachidlite wmerer abendldndiachen PhMosophie, 2d vol. (Oreel^ Fliilosopby. The earliest Ionic thinkers and Pythagoras), Mannheim, 1S53, 2d cd., 1862. Aug. Gladisch, Die Pythagoreer und die Schineeen. Posen, 1S41 ; I>ie beaten und die Indier^ ibid, 1S44; Die Jieligion und die Philoaophie in ihrer weUgesehichiltchen EnUcidcelwng^ Breslan, 1852; EmpedoJcles und die Aegypter^ Leipsic, 1858; Jlerakleitoe und Zoroaster^ Leips. 1859; Anattagoras und die leraeliten, Leipsie, 1854; Die Jlyperboreer und die alien Sddneaen, eine hietoriache Vnternuchung, Lcips. 1866. Max Scbneidewin,' TTefter die Keime erTrenntniaetheoreUscher und effiiacher Philoaopheme bei den vofsokrat, Denkem tfi.-Progr.), Arnatadt, 1868, and in Bergmann'a Philoa. Monatahe/te, Vol. II., Ber- lin, 1869. As a result of the peculiar cosmological principles adopted by the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, Ethics appeared already in germ among the former and Dialectic among the latter. Yet the Pythagorean and Eleatic philosophies are scarcely, for that reason, to be termed (with Schleiermacher) respective!}' ethical and dialectical in their fundamental character. These philosophies are, rather, like the speculation of the lonians, essentially cosmological, and their ethical and dialectical tendencies result only from the manner in which they seek to solve the cosmological problem. The Pythagoreans brought, not ethics, but only the mathematico-philosophical theory of nature under a sdenMfic form, and , the Eleatics produced no theory of dialectics. In his work entitled /"Moioos des Pythagoreers Lehren (Berlin, 1819, p.40 sq.), Boeckl^ compares the different ts^pes of Greek philosophy in the first period with the characteristics of the races, in which the several types were developed, with the following result. In the materialistic view of the principles of things and of the , manifold life and activity of the material elements, as held by the Ionic philosophers, Boeckh finds an expres- sion of the sensuousness of " the lonians, of their attachment to the external, of their sensibility to external impressions, and of their lively, mobile disposition. The Doric character, on the contrary, was marked by that inward depth, from which springs vigorous action, and by a quiet but persistent adherence to fixed and almost indestructible forms. This character manifested itself in tlie tendency to ethical reflection and speculation — although the latter never rose to the form of a developed theory — and more especially in the circumstance, that the Doric thinkers sought to explain the nature of things by adducing, not a material, but a formal principle, a, principle which should account for their unity and order. Thus Pythagoras was said to be the first to call the world Cosmos, and, in conformity with the peculiarity of the Doric character, in conformity oven with the spirit of THE IONIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHEES. 31 the government under which they lived, the philosophy of the Dorians assumed, externally, the form of a confederation or order. Philosophy, says Boeckh, from its sensuous begin- ning among the lonians, passed through the intermediate stage of Pythagoreanism (mathe- matical intuition) to the non- sensuous doctrine of Plato, who had in the Eleatics able but too one-sided predecessors, and who, by the Socratic method of criticism, limiting and correcting not only the Eleatic philosophy, but also the other philosophies, the one by the other, evolved from them the most perfect system which the Hellenic mind was capable of producing. Boeckh draws the following parallel between the successive theories held in regard to the principles of things, and the degrees of the dialectical scale given by Plato (see below, § 41) : the poetic-mythical symbols of the period previous to the exist- ence of pliilosophy proper, correspond with eUaala, the lonians investigate the realm of things sensible, the alaB^a, the Pythagoreans investigate the mathematical order of things, the StavonTa, and the Eleatics the purely spiritual, intelligible, the vo^d. The influence of Eleaticism onthe doctrines of the dater natural philosophers has been espe- cially pointed out by Zeller (who, however, stiE separates Heraclitus from the earlier lonians). To what extent the philosophy of this period (and hence the genesis of Greek philos- ophy in general) was affected by Oriental influences, is a problem whose definite solution can only be anticipated as the result of tho further progress of Oriental and, especially, of Egyptological investigations. It is certain, however, that the Greeks did not meet with fully developed and completed philosophical systems among the Orientals. The only question can be whether and in what measure Oriental religious ideas occasioned in the speculation of Grecian thinkers (especially on the subject of God and the human soul) a deviation from the national type of Hellenic culture and gave it its direction toward the invisible, the inexperimental, the transcendent (a movement which culminated in Pytha- goreanism and Platonism). In later antiquity, Jews, Neo-Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists, and Christians unhistorically over-estimated the influence of the Orient in this regard. Modern criticism began early to set aside such estimates as exaggerated, and critics have manifested an increasing tendency to search for the explanation of the various philoso- pliemes of the Greeks in the progressive, inner development of the Greek mind ; but, in their care not to exaggerate the results of external influences, they have verged perhaps too near to the opposite extreme. The labors of Roth and Gladisch mark a reaction against this extreme, both of them again laying stress on the influence of the Orient But Eoth'S combinations, which by their audacity are capable of bribing the imaginvEion, involve too much that is quite arbitrary. Gladisch concerns hhnself, primarily, rather with the com- parison of Greek philosophemes with Oriental religious doctrines, than with the demon- stration of their genesis ; so far as he expresses himself in regard to the latter, he does not affirm a direct transference of the Oriental element in vhe time of the first Greek philosophers, but only maintains that this element entered into Greek philosophy through the medium of the Greek religion ; Oriental tradition, he argues, must have been received in a, religious form by the Hellenes in very early antiquity, and so become blended with their intellectual life ; the regeneration of the Hindu consciousness in the Eleatics, of the Chinese in the Pythagoreans, etc., was, however, proximately an outgrowth from the Hellenic character itself. But this theory has little value. It is much easier either for those who deny altogether that any essential influence was exerted on the Greek mind from the East, or for those who affirm, on the contrary, that such an influence was directly trans- mitted through the contact of the earlier Greek philosophers with Oriental nations, to explain the resemblance, so far as it exists, between the different Greek philosophies and various Oriental types of thought, than for Gladisch, from his stand-point, to explain th» 32 THALES OF MILETUS AND HIPPO. separate r^odtiction of the latter in the former. For the ethical and anthropomorphitio character impressed by the Greek poets upon the mythology of their nation was of such a character as to efface, not merely all traces of the influence of different Oriental nations in the religion of the Greeks, but all traces of Oriental origin whatsoever. The hypothesis of a direct reception of Chinese doctrines by Pythagoras, or of Hindu doctrines by Xe- nophanes, would indeed belong to the realm of the fanciful. But that Pythagoras, and perhaps also Empedocles, appropriated to themselves Egyptian doctrines and usages directly from Egypt, that possibly Anaxagoras, or perhaps even Hermotimus, his prede- cessor, came in contact with Jews, that Thales, as also, at a later epoch, Democritus, sought and found in Egypt or in Babylonia material for scientific theories, that Heraclitus was led to some of his speculations by a knowledge of Parseeism, and that therefore the later philosophers, so far as they join on to these, were indirectly (Plato also directly) affected in the shaping of their doctrines by Oriental influences, is quite conceivable, and some of these hypotheses have no slight degree of probability. § 11. The philosophy of the earlier Ionic physiologists is Hylozo- ism, i. e., the doctrine of the immediate unity of matter and lifie, according to which matter is by nature endowed with life, and life is inseparably connected with matter. This development-series includes, on the one hand, Thales, Anaxi- mander, and Anaximenes, who sought mainly the material principle of things, and, on the other, Heraclitus, who laid the principal stress on the process of development or of origin and decay. Eud. Beydel, Der ForUdiritt der MetwphyHh tmter den SUesten Joniachen PMloeophm, Lelps. 1861. In justification of the inclusion of Heraclitus in this series, of. below, §§ 15 and 22. § 12. Thales of Miletus, of Phenician descent and born in or about Olympiad 35 (640 b. c), is distinguished by Aristotle as the originator of the Ionic Natural Philosophy (and hence indirectly also of Greek philosophy in general). The fundamental doctrine of his philosophy of nature is thus expressed : "Water is the original source of all things. The later philosopher, Hippo of Samos, or of Ehegium, a physicist of the time of Pericles, also saw in water, or the moist, the principle of all things. Some of the earlier hiBtorisni of philosophy— as Bmcfcer, notably— treat very fully of Thalet, bnt •withont the requisite degree of eriticism. The opuscule of the Abb* de Canaye on Thales may be con- nulted in the Himoirea de LitUrature, t. X., or in German, in Michael Hissman's Magaain, Vol. I., pp. 809-444; cf. further J. H. Mftller (Altd. 1719), DSderlin (1750), Ploncquct (Tub. 1763), Haricsa (Erl»ng.i 1780-84), Flatt (Z)« TJieitmo Thaleti MikHo aljudicando. Tub. 1785), Geo, Fr. Dan. Gooss (i7«J«r den Begriffder GeseliicMe der PMloeophie, vnd ilber daa System dcs Thatea, Erlangen, 1794), and, recently, F. Decker (De T/uilete Milefio, Inaugural Diss., Halle, 1866); cf. also, besides Bitter, Brandis, Zeller, and other historians, Aug. Bemhard Krische, Farechungm aiff dem Gebiete der alien PMloa., I., pp. 84^^. It remained for the most recent investigatora to return to the testimony of Aristotle, and measure hiter testi- mony by his. On mppo, cf. Schlelermaoher (!7««er«ic*«njr aber dM PMloaqphen Mppon, read in the Berlin Acad. THALES OF MILETUS AND HIFPO; 33 of Sciences on the 14th of Febr., 1820 ; published in Schleiermaeher's jSdmmtHche Werk^ Abth. IIL, voL 4 Berlin, 1S85, pp. 408-410), and Wllh. Uhrig {De mppo7i6 Atlteo, Giessen, 184S). For determining the time of Thales' life, a datum is*furnished in the report that ha predicted an eclipse of the sun. which took place in the reign of the Lydian king Alyattes (Herod., I. 74). The date of this eclipse, according to the supposition of Baiiy {Philosophy TraTisacHons, 1811) and Oltmanus {Abh. der Berl Akad. d. Wiss., 1812-13), is September 30, 610 B. 0., but, according to Bosanquet, Hind, Airy {PUhs. Traris., voL 143, p. 179 sq.), and Jul. Z6ch (J, Zech's Astron. Untersitchungen uber die wicktigeren Finst^nisse, wehhe von den SchriftsteUern des class. Alterthums erwdhnt werden^ Leipsic, 1853), May 28, 585 B. c* The latter date is defended by P. A. Hansen [Darlegung der theoret. BerechnuTig der in den Mond- tafeln angewandten Stdrv/ngerij zweite abhandlung, in the 7th vol. of the Abhandlungen der ma{h,-phys. CI. der K. Sachs. Ges. derWiss., Leips. 1864, pp. 379 sq.), "With it agrees also the supposition adopted, according to Diog. Laert. (T. 22), by Demetrius Phalereus in his List of Archons {avaypa^ rem apx6vTuv)j that Thales was named oo({f6g, while Damasias was * Zech and others write 584; but the year denoted In autronomical usage by this number is the same as that designated in the ordinary and approvable practice of historians as 5S5 b. c, i. c, the 535th year before the conventional point of departure of oar chronology, which lies about 13% years before the day of the Emperor Augustus's death (Aug. 19, a. d. 14). Zech follows the custom introduced among astronomers by Jacob Casslni (cf. Ideler^s Ifandbttch der Chronologie^ p. 75, and ZeJirbttch, p. 39 sq.) of designating every year before the birth of Christ by a number one less than the usual one. This mode of designation (which is in so far defensible, as according to it the 25th Dec. of the year d: a is removed by ± a years A*oni the beginning of the era) is, it is true, convenient for the purposes of astronomical calculation, but deviates from historic usage, and is even itself in so far less appropriate, as it (not to mention how few days of the year fall after the 25th of December, which, as the presumptive birthday of Jesus, itself formed the point of departure in the new division of the years, according to the original and in principle unchanged intention) makes the year + 1 the^rsi year c^t&r the beginning of the Christian era, but the year — 1, the aecoTid year before the beginning of this era; in the former every day is distant years and a fraction, but in tho latter I year and a fraction from the commencement of our era. According to this astronomical usage, the year, near the end of which the birth of Jesus is placed, is numbered 0, the whole of it, with the exception of the last days of December, falling before the birth of Christ. According to this reckoning, the year — u Is the year after which, without counting that year itself, a years are counted tilt the birth of Christ; tho year + a ought consistently to be the year, up to which, witbout counting thot year, a years are reckoned team the same date ; and there ought, therefore, to be a year after Christ, which the astronomer is never- theless as far as the historian from positing. The historical usage is . perfectly consequent in making tho year 1 after the birth of Christ follow immediately on the year 1 b. u. as the first year of the era; this uiago we follow here without exception. The above are the Julian dates. It Is customary to extend backward the Julian Calendar and not the Gregorian, in reckoning ancient time. Yet the reduction of all historical dates to Gregorian dates affords the by no means unessential advantage of making the equinoxes and solstices in the earliest historical times fall in the same months and on the same days as now. The historian, at least (who, for the rest, always deviates from the practice of the astronomer in the indication of years and days), ought to give ancient dates according to tho Gregorian Calendar. In order to make the reduction, the provisions which were made at the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar (in 1582, when the 15th of October was made to fallow Immediately upon the 4th) for the future, and with reference to a portion of the past (viz. : that in every 400 years three intercalary days of the Julian Calendar should fall away, namely, in the years whose numbers are divisible by 100 and not by 400 without remainder), must be applied also to the earlier past. For the eclipse of Thales the Gregorian date, thus determined, is May 22, 585 n. c. In like manner tho Jnlian dates in § 89, § 61, etc., should be reduced to the Gregorian. From the Julian date for the years 601 to 601 b. c. G days arc to be subtracted, from 501 to 801 n. o. 5 days, 801 to 201, 4 days, 201 to 101, 3 days, 101 b. c. to a. d. 100, 2 days, a. d. 100 to 200, 1 day. For the years a. d. 300 to 500, ono day Is to be added, 500 to 600, 2 days, etc. Tet it would be, perhaps, still better to carry out Madler'a proposal and modify the Gregorian Calendar throughout, so that at the end of every 128 years an inter- calary day of the Julian Calendar should fall away. The advantage of this reform would be greater exactness in the demarcation of the seasons of the year, less uncertainty In the citation of early historicol dates, and perhaps also n diminution of the difficulty of harmonizing tho Cusso-Greck and occidental calendoTB. 3 34 THALES OF MILETUS AND HIPPO. Archon at Athens (686-5 B. c). ApoUodorus, ia hia Chronicle (according to Diog. Laert, I 37), places his birth in Olympiad 35. 1 (640-639 B. c). It ia possible that Thales had learned of the Saros,, i. e. the period of the eclipses, dis- coTered after prolonged observation by the Chaldeans, and covering 233 synodic months, or 6585^ days, or that he even knew of the greater period of 600 years. Yet on the basis of this Saros, eclipses of the moon only, and not eclipses of the sun, could be foreknown with a sufficient degree of probability, for any determinate locality, and the prediction ascribed to Thales is therefore probably only a legend, which arose perhaps from his Boientific explanation of the eclipse of the sun after it had taken place. Cf. Henri Martin, Swr guelquea predictions cCeclipses mentionnees par des auteurs amdens, in the Sevue Archeo- logique, IX., 1864, pp. llO-igO. Thales belonged (according to Diog. L., I. 22) to the family of the Thelides.(fK tov BtiXiSuv), whose ancestor was Cadmus the Phenician, and who emigrated (according to Herod., I. 146) from Thebes to Ionia. Thales distinguished himself not only in the region of scientific investigation, but also in political affairs ; he is reported, in particular, to have dissuaded the Milesians from allying themselves with Croesus against Cyrus (Herod., X 15; 170; Diog. L., I. 25). The writings which were in later times attributed to Thales {yavTuaj aarpohyyia and others), had (according to Diog. L., I. 23) already been declared spurious by some in antiquity. Aristotle speaks, probably, only from the reports of others, of hia fundamental philosophical doctrine, and only conjecturally of the argumentation by which he supported it. Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 3 : " Of those who first philosophized, the majority assumed only material principles or elements, Thales, the originator of Bueh philosophy (Oa^f 6 T)7f Toiain;; apx^oq 0i^Tep(n> cm^dUuv, Tojf ds ala-^^iKiircpov. Proclus attributes to him, in particular, four propo-i sitions (following, for Nos. 3 and 4, according to his express statement, and probably also for Nos. 1 and 2, the authority of Eudemus, an immediate pupil of Aristotle): 1. That the circle ia halved by its diameter {ib. p. 44) ; 2. That the angles at the base of an isosceles ANAXIMANDEE OF MILETUS. 35 triangle are equal to each other (p. 67) ; 3. That the opposite angles formed by intersecting lines are equal to each other (p. 79) ; 4. That two triangles are congruent, when one side and two angles of the one are equal to the correspondingtiparts of the other (p. 92). The report (Plutarch., Conviv. Septem Sap., c 2), that he taught the Egyptian priests how to measure at any time the height of the pyramids by their shadows presupposes that he was acquainted with the theorem of the proportionality of the sides of similar triangles. According to Diog. 1., I. 24 sq., the proposition, that the angle inscribed in a semicircle is a right angle, was by some attributed to Thales, by others to Pythagoras. On the begin- nings of geometry among the Egyptians, cf. Herod, II. 109; Plat., Phaedr., p. 274; Arist., Metaph., I. 1, p. 981b, 23; Strabo, XVII. 3 (ed. Mein.). The reason, according to Aristotle, why philosophy begins with Thales, is that in his attempt to explain the world, u scieniific tendency is first manifested, in opposition to the mythical form, which prevailed in the works of the ancient poets, and, to a great extent, in those of Pherecydes also. Still, many problems remained too comprehensive for the immediate attainment of a strictly scientific solution. Of Hippo (who, according to a Seholiou to Aristoph., J/a6., 96, — cited by Th. Bergk, Comm. de Seliquiis Comoediae Att., Leips. 1838 — ^was ridiculed by Cratinus in the iravdirTat) Aristotle speaks seldom and not with praise. He calls him a very ordinary man ((popTLniiTepmi, De Anima, I. 2), and says that on account of his shallowness {Sm t^v evTiT^iav avTob Ti7f Stavola^) he can scarcely be reckoned among the philosophers {Metaph., I. 3). § 13. Anaximander of Miletus, born Olymp. 42.2 {— 611 b. c), first, among the Greeks, composed a work " on Nature." He teaches : " All things must in equity again decline into that whence they have their origin ; for they must give satisfaction and atonement for injus- tice, each in the order of time." Anaximander first expressly gave to the assumed original material substance of things the name of prinr- ciple {agx'fi). As such principle he posits a matter, undetermined in quality (and infinite in quantity), the a-rreipov. From it the elementary contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, are first separated, in such manner that homogeneous elements arc brought together. Through an eternal motion, there arise, as condensations of air, innumerable worlds, heavenly divinities, in the center of which rests the earth, a cylinder in form and unmoved on account of its equal remoteness from all points in the celestial sphere. The earth, according to Anaximander, has been evolved from an originally fluid state. Living beings arose by gradual development out of the elementary moisture, under the influence of heat. Land animals had, in the beginning, the form of fishes, and only with the drying up of the surface of the earth did they acquire their present form. Anaximander is said to have described the soul as aeriform. Bcbleiermacher, Ueber ATtaximandros (read In the Berlin Acad, of Sciences, Nov. 11, 1811), in the Abh. der philoe. CI., Berlin, 1818, and in Vol. II. of the 8d Div. of the Complete Works of S., Berlin, 1S38, pp. 171-296. Cf, besides the essay by the Abbe de Canaye (German in Hissmann's Magazin), Kiische's Mortckungen, I., pp. 42-52, and BUsgen, TJtber daa amifoy Anaaimandera (G. Pr.), Wiesbaden, 1867. 36 ANAXIMANDEE OF MILETPS. For determining the time of Anaximander's birth yre have only the statement of Apol- lodorus to rest upon, who says (Diog. Laert., II. 2), that in the second year of the 58th Olymp. (54'7-546 B. c.) Anaximander was 64 years old ; according to this, he must have been born in 01. 42.2 (611-610 B. o.). He occupied himself with astronomy and geography, '^ade a geographical map (according to Eratosthenes, ap. Strabo, I. p. 1) and also an astro- nomical globe {a^alpa, Diog. L., II. 2), and invented the sun-dial (yvay/iav, Diog. L., IL 1), or rather, since this instrument was already in use among the Babylonians (Herod., IL 109), made it known to the Greeks and, in particular, introduced it into Lacedsemon. Prom a work of Ills, the following sentence (probably changed into the oratio dbUqua by the narrator) is preserved (op. Simplicius, In Arist. Phys., fol. 6 a): if dv di ^ yeveaig iari Tol^ oval, Kai TTTv f&opav «£• Tama yiveaSai Kara rb XP^^'"' ^i-^^ai yap aura riciv ml dliaiv rf/i, aSuaag Kara t^ tov xP^"^ to^iv. (Definite individual existence, as such, is represented as an aiiKia, injustice, which must be atoned for by extinction.) With the O7rej/)ov, or "Infinite," of Anaximander are connected several disputed questions. The most important is, whether the aTei-pov is to be understood as a mixture of all distinct elementary substances, from which the various individual things were mechanically- sifted out (Ritter's view), or, as a simple and qualitatively indeterminate matter, in which the different material elements were contained only potentially (as Herbart and the majority of recent historians suppose). The Aristotelian references, taken by themselves, might seem to conduct to the former conclusion. Aristotle says, Phys., I. 4 : oi (P ek too hbi; ivaiaa; raf evavn&rTiTa; CKKpivetrdai (Xtyovaiv), ioairep 'Ava^l/iavSpdg p/ai Kal oaoi cP l» ital ToXKa ij>aai.v civat, aavep 'E/iire6oit7i^g Kal 'Ava^aySpac;. The doctrine with which this is set in contrast, is (that of Anaximenes and other natural philosophers), that the manifold world of things was formed from the one original substance by condensation and rarefaction (Arist., Metaph., XII. 2 : Kal rdvr' earl to 'Ava^aydpov Iv . , .xal 'E/nrs6oK}ieovg t5 fily/ia Kal 'Avof j. /iavdpov). In Metaph., I. 8 (§§ 19 and 20, ed. Schw.), Aristotle seems to attribute the theory of an adpioTov, or an indefinite, unqualified first substance, only to later, Post-Anaxagorean philosophers (with special reference to the Platonists). But the statement of Theophrastus, reported by Simplicius {Arist. Phys., fol. 33), that, provided the mixture asserted by Anax- agoras be conceived as one substance, undetermined in kind and quantity, it forms an aireipov like that of Anaximander (« d6 Tig rifv /u^iv tov diravruv iiro^Apoi fdav elvai dAaiv adpioTov Kal /tar" eliog Kal Kara /liye^og, — ij>aiveTai ra ao/taTiKa oToixeM irapawTijiaiag notin) 'Ava^i/iavdpifi), is decidedly favorable to the second view. And this view alone accords vrith the logical consequence of the system. For the first would require, in addition to the mix- ture, a vovg, or controlling mind, which yet Anaximander does not assume ; unmistakable witness is borne to his Hylozoism by Aristotle, in Phys., III. 4, according to which passage he taught of the ajreipov, that itself was the Divine, and that it embraced and governed all things. It is probable that Anaximander expressed himself with as little distinctness respecting the nature of his aireipov as did Hesiod respecting his Chaos, and that this accounts for the uncertainty in the statements of the different authorities. A second question in dispute is whether or not the aTreipav of Anaximander is a sub- stance intermediate between air and water, as the ancient commentators of Aristotle sup- posed it to be. Aristotle says (De Coelo, III. 5), that all those who assume sucli a substance, represent things as having arisen from it by condensation and rarefaction ; but he denies of Anaximander that he taught this process of evolution {Phys., I. 4) ; hence he can not have regarded the aireipov of Anaximander as such an intermediate substance, and all the less so, if, as shown by the above citation, he supposed it to be only a mixture (uly/ia). Who they are, that assumed a substance intermediate between air and water, and also who are meant by those who, according to Phys., I. 4, assumed one intermediate between fire and ANAXIMENES, DIOGENES OF APOLLCNIA. 37 air, is unknown ; but probably Zeller is right in referring the latter assumption to Jater physiologists, whose doctrine had grown out of that of Auaximenes, or perhaps out of that of Anazimander and of Empedodes. • § 14. Anaximenes of Miletus, younger tlian Anaximander, and perhaps also one of his personal disciples, posits air as the first prin- ciple, and represents fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth as produced from it by condensation (TO/cvufftf) and rarefaction Qidvuai^ or dpaiuaig). The earth, which is flat and round like a plate, is sup- ported by the air. " As our soul, which is air, holds us together, so breath and air encompass the universe." Diogenes of ApoUonia, who lived in the fifth century before Christ, also sees in air the original essence and immanent ground of all things. So also Idaeus of Ilimera. Besides the historians of philosophy, Krische (Forsehunffen^ I. pp. 52-6T) treats especially of Anax- imenes. Schleiermacher, tTeber Diogenea von ApolUmla (read in the Berlin Academy of Sciences, January 2% 1811), in the Abh.derph. Ci, Berl. 1814 ; reprinted in Schleiermaoher's W^lce,Atth. III. vol. 2, Berlin, 1838, pp. 149-170. F. Panzerbieter, De Diogenia A. Vita et Scriptia^ Meiniogen, 1S23; Diogenes Apol- loniaies, Leipsic, 1830. Cf. Krische, ForaaJvungen, I. pp. 1G3-1T7. The birth of Anaximenes is placed by ApoUodorus (Diog. Laert., II. 2) in the 63d Olympiad (528-524 D. c). Tet perhaps here the time of his birth has been confounded with the time when he flourisl^pd or with the year of his death. According to Suidas, ha was living in the 55th Olympiad, in the time of Cyrus and Croesus. Diog. L. terms him (ibid.) a pupil of Anaximander. The dialect of his worit was (according to the same locus) the pure Ionic. Aristotle testifies {MetapTi., 1.3): " Anaximenes and Diogenes hold the air to be prior to water, and place it before all other simple bodies as their first principle.'' But this air, without detriment Jo its materiality, Anaximenes conceived, conformably to his hylozoistio stand-point, as animated. From the work composed by Anaximenes the following sentence is preserved (by Stobseus, Ed. Phys , p. 296) : olov ov diMaKei (or ipiiEi f as we read in Prod., In Plat. Tim., p. 31). ''RnioSav yap av hSlSa^e Kal IlvBaydptiv, aiBig te Sevo^dved re Kal 'BitaTalm. His blame extended even to Homer: "'Homer,' he said, 'ought to have been driven from the lists and flogged, and' Archilochus likewise.' " It is, nevertheless, quite possible that those whom he censures exercised an essential influence on his opinions; at least, Heraclitus agreed with Xe-' nophanes in the hypothesis that the stars were aerial phenomena, constantly being repro- duced, and we might (as Susemihl remarks) suppose the Heraclitean doctrine of the world- and of the fire-spirit related to the doctrine of Xenophanes, distinguishing the world, as something manifold and changeable, from the one immutable God : still the theological doctrines of these philosophers are very unlike, and their points of contact in natural philosophy are few. The surname of Heraclitus, 6 aKoreivS;, "the Obscure," is found first in the Pseudo- Aristotelian treatise Be Mundo (c. 5). Tet we find already in the third book | of the Aristotelian Rhetoric (c. 5) an intimation that the syntactical relation of words in Heraclitus was not always easy to determine, and Timon, the Sinograph (about 240 B. c), I terms him " a riddler " {ahiKT^i). Socrates is reported to have said, that it needed a | Delian (excellent) diver to sound the meaning of his work. Heraclitus flourished, accord- 40 HEEACLITUS OF EPHESUS. iiig to Diog. L., IX. 1 (Diog. probably follows Apollodorus), in the 69th Olympiad (504-600 ■p. c), or, according to another account (given by Eusebius, Chron., ad 01. 80.2 and 8] 2), in Olymp. 80 or 81 ; with this latter account agrees, far better than with the former, the apparently trustworthy report (ap. Strabo, XIV. 1, 25 ; cf. Plin., Sist. Natur., XXXIV. 5, 21), that Hermodorus of Ephesus, the friend of Heraclitus, assisted the Roman Decem- virs in their legislation (about Olymp. 82.1). Epicharmus (whose life falls between 556 and 460 B. c, according to Leop. Schmidt, Quaest. EpicJiarm., Bonn, 1846) notices his doctrine. That Parmenides combats his ideas, and in doing so alludes clearly to speeiflc propositions and words of Heraclitus (in particular, to his doctrine of the coincidence of contraries and of the ebbing and flowing harmony of the world, which Heraclitus compares to the form and motion of the bow and the lyre) has been shown by Steinhart (AUg. Litt. Ztg., Halle, 1 845, p. 892 sq., Plat. WerJce, III., p. 394) and Jak. Bernays {Rhein. Museum, VII., p. 114 sq.), though Zeller (PA. d. Gr., I., 2d ed., p. 495, 3d ed., p. 548 8q.)disputes this. In view of these historical circumstances, the supposition is shown to be improbable, which has been held by some modern investigators, that the doctrine of Heraclitus origi- nated in the endeavor to unite the members of the antithesis : beiTig and non-being, which had been sharply distinguished and separated by the Eleatics (first by Parmenides). It can not be said with truth that the primary conception and the startinf>;-point in the philosophy of Heraclitus was the abstract notion of becoming, as the unity of being and non-being, and that this notion was then only embodied in the concreter form of a physical conception or dogma. Heraclitus is from first to last a hylozoist, fire and soul are for him identical, the dry soul is the best, the moistened soul of the drunken is unwise. Having been first incited by Anaximenes, he then developed his doctrine independently. It is only correct to say that he attaches greater weight to the process of things than his pre- decessors had done, as would be natural, considering the nature of the element which he regarded as the principle of being. The advance of Parmenides to the conception of being, first made it possible to extract the conception of becoming from the Heraditean notion of the flux of things or the transformations of fire. This abstraction is a mental achievement which was first accomplished, not by Herachtus himself, but by Parmenides and Plato, in the critique of his opinions. (For this reason Heraclitus, although younger than Pythagoras and Xenophanes, must be considered in connection with the earlier Ionic natural philosophers, and that as the thinker who gave to' the tendency of their school its most perfect expression.) Aristotle, in his historical survey of the course of development in the earlier Greek philosophy (ifeiaph., 1. 3 sq.), simply places Heraclitus among the earlier lonians, without even noticing the actual diversity in stand-points ; for, after speaking of the principles of Thales and of Anaximenes and Diogenes, he proceeds : 'Iinraao^ 6e irvp i MerairovTivoc koI 'KpaxXeiTo; 6 ''Efiaio;. The triad: fire (including air), water, earth, corresponds with the three "aggregate states" of matter (as they are now called); Empedocles (see below), separating air more distinctly from fire, first arrived at the distinction of the four so-called elements. Plato (or rather soma Platonist) says (Soph., p. 242), after speaking of some of the earlier lonians and of the Eleatics : 'Iddcf ii Kal Sixe^Kai nveg varepov jiovaai. By this he must mean either that the Sicilian doctrine, i. e., the doctrine of Empedocles, was later than the Ionic, i. e., than that of Heraclitus, or (what is less probable) that both were later than the Eleatic ; but in the latter case he could probably only mean : later than Xenophanes' doctrine of unity. The opposition of Heraclitus to the ideas of the masses and of their leaders the poets, probably had principal reference (aside from their political differences) to the popular my- tliology. The multitude know nothing of the one all- controlling divine fire-spirit. ("Ev rd HBEACLITUS OF EPHESUS. 41 Gci(f6v lirioTaa^ai yva/iTpt, ijre oi eyKvjSefmJBEt [fre ol^ Kv^spvS aei t yre oumi^ei t KpaSaivu f ] irdvra Sia jravTuv.) Of this yvufiii, this eternal reason, the mass of men are ignorant [tov Uym Tov^, kovTog aei, a^vverot avQpumot yiyvovraC^ Out of the primitive substance, which Heraclitus (in what is certainly » noticeable coincidence with Parses conceptions, to which Gladisch is right in directing attention) conceives as the purest lire or light, and also as the Good, he represents individual objects as coming forth through the influence of strife or combat (which Homer, therefore, was wrong in wishing to see brought to an end). Thus with him is (Plut., /«. et Os., 48) itdXefWQ waryp wavrmi, "strife the father of all things;" the world is the dispersed deity, the Iv dmfepd/ievov airo airru, but which, like the elastic frame of the bow and the lyre, in going apart comes together again (Plat., Sympos., 187 a; cf. Soph., 242 e). The universe is the elemental fire itself, which is now extinguished and now kindled again (Clem., Str., Y. 699 : Kda/wv tov airrov andvrav oire tic deav ovTE avBpiivuv moiriatv, aW ipi dfi mi iarai irvp asi^uov, dnTdfievov fdrpu ml ajroaPewviievov /drpifi). The double process of the (relative) materialization of the fire- spirit, and the re-spiritualization of earth and water, is constantly going on (irvpog avTaficipsTat iravra koX iriip aTrdiTarv, aaircp xpvoii xp^l^ara Kal xpflf^o-Tov xp^'^^s), water and earth are vvpbt; rpovai, modes of fire ; fire passes over into them in the hdbg kAtu, or " down- ward way," and they pass over into fire in the 66bg avu, the "upward way,'' but both ways are inseparable : oSbg ava naru /iit;. The priests of Ormuzd (as Gladiach remarks) are actively on the side of the good principle, in the contest waged between good and evil ; but Heraclitus, as a thinker, is controlled by a theoretical interest, that of discerning the ground of tlieir antagonism, and this he finds in the nahvTpoiria, the ivnv-ia po^ (Plat, Grot., 413 e, 420 a), the ivavTiorpoTrfj (Diog. L., IX. 1), or havTioSpo/iia (Stob., Bclog., I. 60) of things, the yiveoBat irdvra Kof evavTcdTijra, and says : iraTuvrpoirog dpfwviij Kdcfwv, okquttep , TiiipriQ Koi To^ov (Plut., Is. et Os., 5) ; cf. Arist., Eih. N. Till. 2 : 'Hpd/c/l£jrof rb avrt^om cvpipe- pov Kal SK Tuv dLOtpEpdvTuii koKVlcttp dpfioviav koL rrdvra tear' ^ptv yiyvscdat. In other words, it is a law of the universe that in every thing contraries are united, as life and death, waking and sleeping, youth and old age, and each contrary passes into its opposite. Unexpected things await man after death. Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Sypofyp., III. 230 : ore ph yap ^pelg ^apcv, rag tlruxag ^/low re'Svdvai Hat iv i/plv TeSdfSac brc 6i ijpElg diro&v^aitopev. Tag ijnixdg dvapun/v mi t^ijv, " while we live, our souls are dead and buried in us ; but when we die, our souls are restored to life." When the power of peace and unity prevails in the All, all finite objects resolve themselves into pure fire, which is the Deity; but they come forth from it anew through variance. Schleiermaoher (whom Ritter, Brandis, Bemays, and Zeller contradict in this point, while Lassalle agrees with him) was probably wrong in doubting that the doctrine of the periodical dissolution of the world in fire (kunvpaoig) was held already by Heraclitus (and borrowed from him by the Stoics); Aristotle ascribes it to him {Mdayrol, I. 14, De Coeh, I. 10, Phys., III. 5; cf. Metaph., XI. 10: 'B-paK^iTdg ^rjaiv airavra yiyveedal wotc Jrvp), and it is contained in the more recently dis- covered fragment in Hippolytus, IX. 10 : wdvTa Tb irvp eTrcWbv xpivel Kal KaraTi^ijieTai. In view of the dictum of Heraclitus, " aU things flow,'' Plato (TheaM., 181 a ; cf. drat., p. 402 a : bTi irdvTa X'-'P^'^ *"' o^^^v phei) terms the Sercicliteans playfully Tovg jyiovrag, " the flowing,'' at the same time having in view and censuring their inconstant character, which rendered all serious philosophical discussion with them impossible. Cratylus, a teacher of Plato, weni beyond Heraclitus, who had said that no one could step down twice into the same stream, by asserting that this was not possible even once (Arist., Metaph., lY. 6), — an extreme, as the last logical consequence of which, Aristotle reports that Cratylus thought he ought to say nothing more, but simply moved his finger. The changeable, which, for Heraclitus, is synonymous with the sum of all real things, 42 PTTHAQOEAS AND THE PTTHAGOEEANS. is reduced by Parmenidea to sensuous appearance, and by Plato to the complex of indi- vidual objects subject to genesis and perceptible by the senses. But for the very reason that Heraclitua assumes no second province of reality, his cosmos is not identical with the mere world of the senses of later thinkers. Heraclitus does not distinguish from his cosmos the divine and eternal, as something separable from it. The Myo; or the eternal, all-embracing order (yviifiTj, dUr/, ei/iap/iiv^, to irepiexov ^/lag ^yixov re iv nal fpev^psg, 6 Zeir) is, according to him, immanent, as the fwiiv (icoivSv), or universal principle, in change ttself, and he calls upon each individual to follow in his thought and action this universal reason (Heracl., ap. Sext. Emp., VII. 133 : dio del inw&m Tij> fw^- Toi> Myov 6e iovro; §miov ^aovacv oi ■rro/Jiol djf idlav exovte^ ^pdvr/aLV. Ap. Stob., Serm., III. 84 : fwdv iari iraiTj TO ^povtlv fiv v6u Asyovraf iaxopll^ea^ai Xf"l '''¥ f""^ irdvTiM, OKuawsp v6/i di^doKu; ap. Procl., in Tim., p. 31 : nohifia^lii v6in> oti ipvei). The rule for practical conduct is also contained in the law common to all, proximately in the law of the state, absolutely in the law of nature (Heracl., ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., IV. 418 b: Jim/f ovo/ia ovk av ^deaav, cl Tairra /i^ f/v. Ap. Diog. L., IX. 2: /laxea'&ai XPV ■'"o" ^/iov virip v6p,ov o/cuf iiirip Tclxovg. Ibid. : v^piv xp^ a^evvvtiv fiaMov 7 nvpKairiv. Ap. Stobaeus, Serm., III. 84 : auippovelv aper^ fityicTfi, Kal aoif'ai ah[&ea Tiiyeiv KoX nomv Kara tpvmv CTraiovrac). The doctrine of Heraclitus may be termed monistic, inasmuch as it represents the eternal reason as immanent in the world of individuality and change ; amd hylozoistic, inas- much as it conceives all matter to be animated. Plpto ascribes to the ideal an independent existence, separate from the sensible. Aristotle combats this Platonic x'-'P'Ofoi and affirms the immanence of the universal in the individual, of the ideal in the sensible ; yet he too recognizes for mind (yovg) an existence apart from all matter. Tlie Stoics, in their philoso- phy of nature and in their theology, reproduced the doctrine of HeraeUtus, — ^in which also their ethics, notwithstanding its easentjally Socratic and Cynic origin, found various points of union. § 16. Pythagoras of Samoa, the son of Mnesarchus, was born about 01. 49.3 = 582 b. c. According to some accounts he was a pupil of Pherecydes and Anaximander and acquainted with the doctrines of the Egyptian priests. At Crotona, in Lower Italy, where he settled in 01. 62.4 = 529 b. c, he founded a society, whose aims and character were at once political, philosophical, and religious. All that can be traced back with certainty to Pythagoras himself is the doctrine of metempsychosis and the institution of certain religious and ethical regulations, and perhaps also the commencement of that mathematico-theological form of speculation, which was subsequently carried to a high degree of development. PYTHAGOEAS AND THE PTTHAGOEEANS. 43 r Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, passes for the first Pytha- gorean who made public (in a written work) the philosophical system of the school. Of this work considerable fragments are still extant ; yet it is very doubtful whether the work is genuine or a counterfeit, dating at the latest from the last century before Christ, and only pos- sessing a certain importance as an authority in regard to ancient Pythagoreanism, from its having been partially founded on earlier authorities. Of the earlier Pythagoreans, the most celebrated, beside Philo- laus, were his disciples Simmias and Cebes (who, according to Plato's Phaedo. were friends of Socrates), Ocellus the Lucanian, Timseus of Locri, Echecrates and Acrio, Archytas of Tarentum, Lysis, and Eurytus. Alcmseon of Crotona (a younger contemporary of Pythag- oras), who held with the Pythagoreans the doctrine of contraries, Hippasus of Metapontnm, who saw in fire the material principle of the world, Ecphantus, who combined the doctrine of atoms with the doctrine of a world-ordering spirit, and taught the revolution of the earth on its axis, Hippodamus of Miletus, an architect and politician, and others, are named as philosophers, whose doctrines were related to those of Pythagoreanism, The comic poet Epicharmus, who occa- sionally alludes to disputed questions in philosophy, appears to have come under the influence of various philosophies, and among them, in particular, of Pythagoreanism, The reputed writings of Pythagoras are spnriouB {Cwrm&n Avreum^ ed. K. E. Giinthcr, Breslan, 1516; Th. Galsford, in Poetae Minorea Graeci, Oxford, 1S14-20, Leipslc, 1S23; Schneeberger, Die goldenen Spriiche des Pythagoras — German translation, with introduction and annotations — Milnnerstadt, 1862). Bo also are the worlcs ascribed to Ocellus Lucanus (Z>0 Jierum KaUira^ ed. A. F. Guil. Kudolph, Leips, 1801 ; ed. Mullach, in Ai^tot. de Meliaao, etc., Berlin, 1845) and Timasos Locrus (who is creditt;d with a work irepl ^Xai xdir;iu, which is only an abstract of Plato^s Timaeua^ of la£e origin, ed. J. J. do Gelder, Leyden, 1S36 ; cf. G. Anton, Pe Origine Lib. i-naer. irepi i/rvxas Kotrtuo xal ^vfrew;, Berlin, m52), and, most pr)>bably, also all the philosophical fragments of Archytas of Tarentum {Fragm.^ ed. Conr. Orelli, in the 2d vol. of the Opuscula Graecorum vetemm Sententioaa ei Aforalia, Leipsic, 1829 ; cf. Petersen, Pistor.-Phil. Studien Hamburg, 1832, p. 24; G. Hartensteln, De Archytae TarenMni Fra^mentia Pfuloaophicia, Leipsic, 1S33; Petersen, in the Zeitackr.fUr A2terthu7n»wis8,1SB6, p. 878; O. F. Gruppe, Veber die Fragmenie dea Archy- tae und der dlteren Pyfhagoreer, Berlin, 1840 ; F. Beelcmann, De Pythagoreorum Peliguiia, Berlin, 1844 and '50 ; QuaeatUmea Pythagor., I.-IV., Braunsberg (Lections-Katal), 1S62,'65, '69, "08). The authenticity of the work of Philolans, formerly sometimes questioned, but after Eoeclih's collection of the fragments almost universally conceded, has been anew disputed, as to parts of the work, by Zeller and others, and wholly rejected by Val. Eose. Still more recently Schaarschmidt has undertaken to demonstrate tho spuriousness of the work ; yet cf., per contra, Zeller in the third ed. of Part I. of his Philos. der Oriechm, p. 243 soq. The most complete collection of Pythagorean fragments is furnished by Mullach, in VoL II. of his Fragm. Philoa. Gr., 186T, 1-129. Jamblichns, De Vita Pyfhogorica liber; aceed. Malchua aim Porphyriua, de vita Pyihagorae, ed. Klessling, Leips. 1815-16; ed. Westermann, Paris, 1850. [English transl. of Jamblichns' Id/e o/Pythagoraa, by Taylor, Lond. 1818. " The Life of Pyfhagoraa with hie Golden Feraea, together with tlu Life qf nieroelea and hia CommerUariea vpon the Yeraea " (Engl, transl. from the French of Dader, with th» exception of the Golden Verses, which are translated from the Greek) by N. Eowe, Lond. 1707.— rr.] 44 PTTHAGOEAS AUD THE PYTHAGOEEANS, Of the more modern writers on Tythagoreanism in general and on Individual Pythagoreans, may be mentioned: Clir. Meiners, in his Gesah. der KUnste und Wias. in, Gr. u. Jiom, Tol. I., p. ITS sq. ; Aug. Bocclih, D^. de Flatomco eyatemate coelestium glolorwm et de vera indole attronomiae FMlolaieae, Ileidelb. ISIO, also with additions and supplement In his Kl. Schr., III., Leips. 1866, pp, 206-842 ; rhiloluua des Pythagoreers telwm. nebst den BrucIistOcken seines Werkee, Berlin, 1819 ; J. A. Terpstra, De Sodalitii PyUiag. Origins, CondiUone, et Consilio, TJtreoht, 1824 ; Heinrich Bitter, Gesch.' der Pythagcreisclien PhUose Fin., T. 29, Si): " Aegypium lustravil" For the fact that the mathe- matical sciences originated in Egypt and were there cultivated by the priests, we have Aristotle's testimony {Met, 1. 1). Prom that country Pythagoras, according to the evidence of Callimachus (ap. Diodorus Siculus, in the Vaticamische Excerpte, VII.-X. 35), brought much of his mathematical knowledge and transplanted it into Hellas, while other portions of it were discovered by himself. Among other things, the discovery of the relation be- tween the hypotenuse and the sides of the right-angled triangle is ascribed to him by Diogenes Laertius (VIIl. 12), on the authority of a mathematician named ApoUodorus, Diogenes cites in this connection the epigram : 'HvtKa \[v^ay6pr]^ to TrepiKXee^ eiiparo ypd/iua Kciv', k^' oru itAetMyv r/yaye pavdvaiijv. Whether Pythagoras really traveled in Egypt is a matter not wholly free from doubt. It may, nevertheless, be considered as very probable that he did. Many of the embellish- ments added by later writers to their accounts of the life and journeys of Pythagoras, are easily recognized as fables. Diogenes Laertius relates (VIII. 3), following, apparently, the authority of Aristoxenus, that Pythagoras, hating the tyranny of Polycrates, emigrated to Crotona, in Lower Italy. According to Cicero (Rep., II. 15; cf. Tusaul.,1. 16), Pythagoras came to Italy in 01. 62.4 (529 B. c). He united himself to the aristocratic party in Crotona, where, as we are told, the depression caused by a defeat, suffered not long before in a contest with the Locrians and Rhegians on the river Sagra, had made the population sus- ceptible to moral influences, and he secured that party for his project of an ethical and religious reform. By this means the intimacy of the union of the members of the aris- tocratic party and their power in the state were very considerably increased. The members of the Pythagorean society were subjected to a rigid ethico-religious regi- men (the JlvBaydpeiog rpdirof tov piov, which is mentioned already by Plato, Rep., X. p. 600 b). An examination as to fitness preceded admission. Disciples were bound for a long time to mute obedience, and unconditional submission to the authority of the doctrine pro- pounded to them. Bigorous daily self-examination was required of all ; the propagation among the people of the doctrines (in particular, probably, the theosophic speculations) of the school was prohibited. Further requirements imposed on members were moderation in the use of articles of food and simplicity in personal attire. The use of animal food was permitted, under certain limitations, — a fact attested by Aristotle and by Aristoxenes {ap. Diog. L., Till. 19 and 20); Heraclides of Pontus incorrectly assumes the contrary; but certain Orphists and later Pythagoreans abstained wholly from the use of animal food. Aristoxenus {ap. Gellius, IT. 11) disputes the assertion that Pythagoras forbade the use of beans for food. According to Herod., II. 81, burial in woolen garments was forbidden in the Orphic-Pythagorean mysteries. The democratic party (perhaps also, at times, an unfriendly aristocratic fraction) reacted against the growing power of the society. It is related of Pythagoras that, after having lived in Crotona nearly twenty years, and soon after the victory gained in 510 B. o. by the Crotoniates, on the river Traeis, over the Sybarites, who were living under the monarchical rule of Telys, he was banished by an opposition party under Cylon, and that he removed to Metapontum and soon afterward died there. Pythagoreanism found acceptance among the aristocracy of numerous Italian cities, and gave to their party an ideal point of support. '46 PYTHAGCEAS AND THE PTTHAGOBEAHS. But the persecutions were also several times renewed. In Crotona, as it appears, the partisans of Pythagoras and tlie " Cylonians " were, for a long time after the death of Pj'thagoras, living in opposition as political parties, till at length, about a century later, the Pythagoreans were surprised by their opponents while engaged in a deliberation in the "house of Milo" (who himself had died long before), and, the house being set on fire and surrounded, all perished, with the exception of Archippus and Lysis of Tarentum. (According to other accounts, the burning of the house, in which the Pythagoreans were assembled, took place on the occasion of the first reaction against the society, in the life-time of Pythagoras.) Lysis went to Thebes, and was there (soon after 400 B. c.J a teacher of the youthful Epaminondas. Diog. L. (VIII. 7) ascribes to him the authorship of a worli commonly ascribed to Pythagoras. This work, according to Mullach's con- jecture (Fragm. Ph. Gr., 1. 413), was the " Carmen Aureum," a poem which, however, at least in its present form, is probably of later origin. — Not long after this time all the political consequence and power of the Pythagoreans in Italy came to an end. At Tarentum the Pythagorean Archytas was still at the head of the state in the time of Plato. Among the authorities for the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, the indications furnished by Aristotle are the most important. Of still greater value for our knowledge of the Pythagorean system would be the fragments (collected by Boeckh) of the work of Philo- laus, a, contemporary of Socrates, in case their authenticity were assured. All other pretended philosophical writings and fragments of writings by ancient Pythagoreans, are decidedly spurious. The contents of the fragments attributed to Philolaus agree in many respects quite well with the testimony of Aristotle, and afford besides a much more concrete conception of the Pythagorean system ; yet with them is mingled much that is of extra- neous and later origin, and which is yet scarcely to be placed to tlie account of the authors in whom the fragments are found. Plato and Aristotle seem to have had no knowledge of any other than oral utterances of Philolaus. Only their statements and, in part, those of the earliest Aristotelians, but no later ones, are perfectly trustworthy. Timon the Sino- graph (writer of satires, see below, § 60) says (Gell, Nod. Att., III. 17) that Plato bought for much money a small book, on which he founded his dialogue Timaeus (containing his natural philosophy); but it is very doubtful what work is meant (perhaps a work of Archytas). A spurious letter from Plato to Dio contains the commission to buy Pytha- gorean books. Neanthes of Oyzicus ascribes the first publication of Pythagorean doctrines to Philolaus and Empedocles. Hermippus says that Philolaus 'wrote a book which Plato bought in order to copy from it his Timaeus; Satyrus speaks of three books. The three books, of which the fragments above mentioned have come down to us, are (as Sehaar- Bchmi^t has shown) probably spurious, as also are the alleged writings of other ancient Pytliagoreans and of Pythagoras himself. Charmed by the apodictical nature of that knowledge which we have of the mathe- matical order immanent in things, the Pythagoreans exaggerated the power of the math- ematical principle in their numerical speculation — a speculation which overstepped the limits of exact mathematical science. The principles of numbers, limit and the unlimited, were viewed by the Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle, not as predicates of another substance, but as themselves the sub- stance of things ; at the same time things were looked upon as images of these principles immanent in them. It does not appear that these two statements are to be referred to different fractions of the Pythagoreans ; perhaps the mode of speech of some suggested the one interpretation, that of others the other. Tet the same persons might in a certain sense hold both of these doctrines. It is hardly supposable that any one of the ancient PTTHAGOEAS AND THE PYTHAGOEEANS. 47 jPythagoreana made use of the exact phraseology employed by Aristotla. Aristotle seems, rather, at times to be expressing in his own language conceptions which he only found '.mplied in their doctrines. The scale of created objeqjs was symbolized by the series of .uumbers, the numbers four (rerpaKTvi) and ten (jScnag) playing an especially prominent role. Of the special doctrines of the Pythagoreans, their astronomical and musical doctrines are the most worthy of remark. That the theory of a counter-earth (avrixBiMi) under the earth and the motion of both around a central fire, really belongs to the older Pytha- goreans, we know (apart from the at least doubtful Philolaus-Fragments) from Aristotle (De Codo, II. 13, aaiMetaph., I. 5). Diog. Laert. says (VIII. 85) that the circular motion of tlie earth was first taught by Phllolaus, though others ascribed the doctrine to Hicetas. The doctrine of the earth and tlie oounter-eartli is ascribed to the Pythagorean Hicetas by Pseudo-Plutarch (Plac. FA., III. 9); Cicero (Acad., II. 39) attributes to him, on the authority of Theophrastus, the doctrine that the earth moyes circum axem. The rotation of the earth on its axis is also ascribed (Plac., III. 13 ; Hippol., Adv. Eaer., I. 15) to Ecphantua (according to Boeckh'a supposition, a pupil of Hicetas) who assigned to the material atoms magnitude, figure, and force, attributing their arrangement to God ; also to Plato's disciple, Heraclides of Heraclea on the Euxine, who (according to Stob., Ed., L 440) held the world to be infinite. That the hypothesis of the sun's immobility and of the revolution of the earth around it agrees with the phenomena was shown later, 281 B. c^ by Avlstarohus of Samos, the astronomer ; finally, Seleucus of Selencia on the Tigris, in Babylonia (about 150 B. c), taught the infinite extension of the world and propounded the heliocentric system as his astronomical doctrine. (See Plut., Plac. Phil., II. 1, 13, 24 , IH. iT : Stob., Edog. Phyi>., I. 26 ; cf. Lud. Ideler, Ueber das Verhattniss des Copernicus zum Alterthum. in "Wolf and Butt manu's Mus. f. d. Alterthumswiss., II. 1810, pp. 393-454 ; Boeckh, De Flat. syst. etc., 1810, p. 12 (Kl Schr., III. p. 273), Fhilolaos, p. 122, Das Kosm. System des Flato, p. 122 sq. and p. 142 ; Sophus Hugo, Der ChaMier Seleukos, Dresden, 1865.) Yet accusations of heresy were not wanting even in antiquity for those who held the doctrine of the earth's motion. Wit- ness Aristarchus of Samos, who was charged with impiety by Cleauthes the Stoic, on account of his astronomical opinions. The doctrine of the harmony of the spheres (Arist., De Coeh, 11. 9) was grounded on the assumption that the celestial spheres were separated from each other by intervals corresponding with the relative lengths of strings, arranged to produce harmonious tones. The soul was, according to the Pythagoreans, a harmony ; chained to the body as a punishment, it dwelt in it as in a prison (Plat, Phaedo, p. 62 b). According to the statement of Eudemus, the Aristotelian, in his lectures on Physics (reported by Simplicius, Ad. Arist. Phys., 173 a), the Pythagoreans taught that in varioas cosmical periods the same persons and events return or are repeated : A it rif niaTeiatte Tol^ Tlvffayopeioc^ wf TrdA^v ra avra api$fiu Koytit fivftoTucr/^aa rb pa^dlov i^ow KO&jjfih'ot^ m/ra, Kcl TO aVia Travra 6/ioia; i^ei. (The same doctrine meets us again with the Stoics, but only in combination with the Heraclitean doctrine of CKiriipuai; ■ see below, § 54.) Ethical notions bore among the Pythagoreans a mathematical form, symbols filling the place of definitions. Justice was defined by them (according to Arist., Eth. Nic., Y. 8 ; cf. Mi« Eteaien und die Indier, Posen, 1844; Frid. Gull. Aug. Mullach, Aristotetia de MeUaao, Xenopliane et Gorgia diaputaiionea, cum Eleaticorum. pMloa. frag" mentia, Berlin, 1345, also in Fra-gm.ph. Gv.^ I. p. 101 seq.; E. Reinhold, De genuina Xenophania died- plina^ Jena, 1847 ; TTeberweg, Weber den Maioriaclien Werik der Sckrift de Meliaeo^ Zenone, Gorgia, in the PMlol., VIIL, 18.'5S, pp. 104-112 (where I sought to show that the second part of the work, *. «., chaps. 8 ond 4, does not contain a reliable account respecting Xenophancs, but does so respecting Zeno; now, bowever,_ only my first, or negative, not the second, positive, thesis, seems to me tenable), also iMd. XXVI. 1363, pp. 709-711; E. F. Apelt, Parmenidia et Empedoclia doctrina de mundi atructura, Jena, IS56; Conr. Verraehreu, Die Autorachaft der dem Ariatotelea zugeachriebenen iSeJiri/t n-ept Sevo^avm/^, wept Ziji'iiii'ott vepl Topylov, Jena, 1862 ; Franz Kern, Quaeationum Xenoplianearum. capita duo ^Progr. adutlae Pof" tenaia), Nanmburg, 1SC4: Synibolae eriiicae ad libellum Ariaiotelicum de Xenophane, etc., Oldenbnrg, 1867; ©eoifpacTTou Mpt MeAi(T(row, in the Philologna, XXVI. 1863, pp. 271-289; Theodor Vatke, Farm, Yeliensis doctrina qualiafuerit {diaa. inaug,), Beil. 1864; Ileinrich Stein, Fragm. dea Parmenidea, irepl 0ijcreci)s, in the Symib. pM'ologorum Bonneiiaium in honorem Frid. Ritachelii coll., Leipsic, 1864-67, pp. 768-806; Paul KSlftr, 2)6 ;pA. Xen. Coloph. parte morali. diaa. inaug., Leipsic, 1868; Th. Davidson, 77»« Fragments of Parm., in thtt Journal of Upecul. Philoe., IV. 1, St Louis, Jan., 1870. That the first part (cap. 1, 2) of the treatise De Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia, transmitted to lis among the writings of Aristotle, treats of Melissus and not of Xenophanes, Buhle has already demonstrated in the essay on pantheism above cited. In agreement with him and with Spalding — with whom Fiillehom, who had before been of a different opinion, expresses his accord in his above-cited " Beitrage " — the same is assumed by Brandis and all later investigators, since this result is made perfectly manifest by a comparison of the part in question with the doctrines of Melissus as known to us from other sources. It is uncer- tain to, whom the second part (cap. 3, 4) relates, in the intention of the author, whether to Xenophanes or to Zeno; yet in no case are the contents of' these chapters to be considered as historical.* The last part (cap. 5, 6) treats without doubt of Gorgias. Perhaps this * The view supported by me in one of my earliest essays (" Veber den hiatoriachen WerOi der Schrift de Meliaao, Zenone, Gorgia^ in Schneidewin's PMlologua, VIIl. 1S58, pp. 104-112), that the second part of the work {.cap. 8, 4) relates to Zeno und contains a true report of his doctrines, I am now compelled to abandon, after more thorough comparison and exactor weighing of all tho elements of' the problem (assenting, as I do, substantially to tho argumentation of Zeller in the 2d ed. of tho first part of his Ph.d.Gr., p. 836sq,); I can only hold fast, therefore, to tho negative opinion, that a trustworthy report respecting Xenophancs is not to be found in tho work. Tho teachings there developc untroubled, he moves and directs all things by the power of his thoaght. Xenophanes, according to his own statement {ap. Diog. L., IX. 19), began his wander- ings tlirough Hellas (as rhapsbdist) at the age of twenty-five years, and Uved to be more than ninety-two years old. If (as may be assumed with some probability from one of hiaf fri^raents given by Athen., Deipnosoph., II. p. 54) it is true that he left his native country soon after the expedition of the Persians under Harpagua against Ionia (544 b. c), he must have been born about 5G9 B. c. Apollodorus (ap. Clem. Al., Strom., I. 301 c) gives 01. 40 (620 B. c.) as tlie time of his birth; more probable is the report (ap. Diog. L., IX. 20) that he flourished 01. 60 (540 B. c). He outlived Pythagoras, whom he mentions after th6 death of the latter ; he is liimself named by Heraclitus. In his latter years he lived in Elea ('EX^a, "Cil?!, Telia), a Phocean colony. Fragments of his poems, though only a few fragments of his philosophical poems, are extant. In a fragment of some extent, pre^ served by Athenaeus (XI. p. 462), in which Xenophanes describes a- cheerful feast, he demands first tliat the Deity (termed sometimes &s6g, sometimes Oeol) be praised with pure and holy words, and that the banqueters be moderate and discourse of the proofs of virtue, and not of the contests of Titans and similar fables of the ancients {irUer/iara Tuv TrpoTEpuv) ; in another fragment (Atli., X. p. 413 seq.) he warns men not to think too highly of success in athletic contests, which he deems it wrong to prefer to intellectual culture ((wde dlKatov, TrpoKphuv paifiijv ryq ayafHj^ aOfjiiTjg). That the God of Xenophanes is the unity of the world is a supposition that was early current. We do not find this doctrine expressed in the fragments which have come or the ideal or material nature of the unity of God untouclied, arid said nothing definite concerning his limitation or non-limitation, whereas in ehaps, 3 and 4 of the treatise 2)6 Xeii., etc., it is said, on the one hand, that the Eleate there in question ascribed to God the spherical form, and on' tlie other that he tanght (the antinomy) that God is neither bounded nor unbounded. It is scarcely to be doubted that this latter statement arose from a misunderstanding either of the report of Aristotle or more probably of a similar report by Theophrastus (which Bimplic, In PhyB., fol. 5 b, has preserved for us). Whether the (probably late) author of the vmVi intends to treat of Xenophanes or of Zcno, remains still a matter of d^ubt; the former supposition is. perhaps, attended with fewer difficulties than the latter. The author may have made useof a Pseudo-Xenophanean writing, or perhaps even of an inexact version of the doctrines and arguments of Xenophanes, which had been prepared partly on the authority of the misunderstood passage from Theo- phrastus, partly from other sources. The misinterpretation was most easily possible at a time when such antinomies had already taken the form of philosophical dogmas (of., for example, Plotinus, ihinead, V. 10, 11. who teaches that God is neither bounded nor unbounded). With this problem negative results are reached more easily and with greater certainty than positive ones. 52 XENOPHANES OF COLOPHOK. down to ua, and it remains questionable whetlier Xenophanes pronounced himself posi- tively in this sense, in speaking of the relation of God to the world, or whether such a conception was not rather thought to be implied in his teachings by other tliinkers, who then expressed it in the phraseology given above. In the (Platonic?) dialogue, Sophistes (p. 242), the leading interlocutor, a visitor from Elea, says : " The Eleatio race among us, from Xenophanes' and even from still earlier times, assume in their philosophical dis- courses that what is usually called All, is One" (df hbq ovrof tov ■aavTuv KaXov/ih/av). The " still earlier " philosophers are probably certain Orphists, who glorified Zeus as the all- ruling power, as beginning, middle, and end of all things. Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 5 : "Xenophanes, the first who professed the doctrine of unity — Parmenides is called his disciple — has not expressed himself clearly concerning the nature of the One, so that it is not plain whether he has in mind an ideal unity (like Parmenides, his successor) or a material one (like Melissus) ; he seems not to have been at all conscious of this distinction, but, with his regard fixed on the whole universe, he says only that God is the One." Theophrastus says (according to Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 5 b): Iv to bv ml trav Sevofav7p> mariBetsdatt Timon the Sinograph (Sext. Empir., Bypotyp. Pyrrhon., I. 224) represents Xenophanes as saying, that whithersoever he turned his view, all things resolved themselves for him into unity. The following are all the philosophical fragments which have been preserved from the writings of Xenophanes. Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., T. 601 c, and Euseb., Praepairai. Evang., XIII. 13: Elf iJeof iv Tt ^coim koX av&pinroiai /iiytaro^^ Oire deua^ •&v7jTolatv hfiotioq ovte vStj/jui. Ap. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 144, cf. Diog. L., IX. 19: OvTjig opa, oiAof ia voel, oi^; ie r' aicovec. Ap. Simplic, Ad Arist Phys., fol. 6 a : Alel 6" iv ToiiTp re /livetv Kivoi/ievov ovScv Oiidi /uripxea^ai ftiv imirpcirec a/lAore (or aX7M&a>) o/U.?;. lUd.: 'AW airavev&s irAvoio v6ov Apevl jrdvra KpaiSaivci. Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., V. 601 c, and Euseb., Praepar. Evang., XIII. 13 : 'X7M. ppoTol (hxeovai dcovc ycwaa&ai (edsiv re ?) T^ a^iptjv t' aurSijaiv ixetv (jkjv^ te ii/iog re. 'AW elroi x^'^P^C / clx"'" /So^f V^ Xioi^tf, Kal ypdtjiai ;f£ipE(rm Kal ipya reXelv airsp ivdpe^, "Iirvoc fiiv ^ 'iimoiai, pSc; 6i te povahi i/wiac Koi KE ^edv ISiag iypaijmv Koi ai)/mT' ivoiow loiav^ ol6v nep Kal avTol iSi/utQ elxov eKoaroi. Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom., VII. p. 'Tllb.: wf iiroTiapPdvovai, pij ^prjveiv, el ff av&pmrov, pi) Meiv. [The verse, en ya'uic yap mvra xai ei; y^ Travra reTievrg, cited by Sext. Empir. (Adv. italh., X. 313, but on the authority of others : " Sevajiivi!; ie kot" eviov;,") and by Stobaeus (Eel. Phys., I. p. 294, ed. Heeren) and others, seems to have been erroneously ascribed to Xenophanes. Aristotle testifies {Met., I. 8, p. 989 a, 5) : " No philosopher has regarded earth in the sense in which Thales regarded water, Anaximenes air, and Heraclitus fire, as a unique material principle. Meiners {Hist. Doctr. de Vera Deo, p. 327), and after him Heeren, Karsten, and others, have held this verse to be a forgery.] — Ap. Sezt. Empir,, Adi>. Math., IX. 361; X. 313, and others: Havre; yap yaiti; re Kal vSaro; eKyevdpea&a, Ap. Stobaeus, Fhrileg., XXIX. 41, ed. Gaisf., and Eclog., I. p. 224: OiiTOi air' apxv! iravra ^eoX ^viiroli irapl5ti^a», 'JMa XP^V il^ovvre; i^evpiaitmaiv apeivov. Ap. Plutarch., Sympos., IX. p. 746 b: Taira SeSi^aarat pev ioiK&ra Tdi; Mpotaiv. Ap. Sezt.Bmpir., Adv. Mafh., YII. 49 and 110, YIII. 326, and others: Kal TO pev oiv aa^e; oiri; avijp iiev ovdc Tif larat ^ISiig, apfl ^eav re Kal aeea ^ya nepl navrav Ei yap Kal ri paTuara riixoi rereTieaplvov eliritv, Airdf bpuc OVK aide • ddnof (T enl iraai rlrvKrai. The most noteworthy of the physical theorems of Xenophanes, after his fundamental doctrine, that earth and water are the elements of all created things, is the opinion, com- bated by Empedocles (in the verses cited by Arist., De Coeh, II. 12, p. 204 a, 25: Etjrcp aireipova y^f re 0id>i xal SaijiMg ald^p, uf dm voTlTimv 6ij y^iieari; /nfihrra parala; tKidxyai OTop&rav oUyav tov jravrd; iS6vTcyv), that the earth extends without limit downward, and the air upward ; the verses in which this view is expressed are communicated by Achillea Tatius in his Isagoge ad Araiam {ap. Petav., Docir. limp.. III. 76): Valrj; pev rdde irelpa; &v(j irapa iroaalv iparat Aidipi npoeirX&^ov to k&to & e; hireipov hcavu, TVith this doctrine the assertion, sometimes attributed to Xenophanes (but perhaps only through the false transference to him of a Parmenidean theorem), that the Deity is spherical, does not agree. Xenophanes held the stars (according to Stob., Eel, I. 522) to bo fiery clouds: the rainbow also was termed by him a vio;. Xenophanes (according to Origen, Philoso- phumena, or rather Hippolytus, Adv. BaereKcoa, I. 14) explained the fact that sea-animals were found petrified in the mines of Syracuse, in the marble quarries on the island of Faros, and in many other places both inland and on mountains, by the hypothesis, that 54 FABMENIDKS OF ELBA. the sea had once covered the land ; and this hypothesis was immediately enlarged by him into the theory of a periodical, alternate mixing and separation of earth and water. Xeniades of Corinth is iriBorrectly named (by Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VIII. 53, et al.) as a disciple of Xenophanes. § 19. Parmenides of Elea, bom about 515-510 b. c. (bo that his youth falls in the time of the old age of Xenophanes), is the most important of the Eleatlc philosophers. He founds the doptrine of unity on the conception of being. He teaches : Only being is, non-being is not ; there is no becoming. That which truly is, exists in the form of a single and eternal sphere, whose space it fills continuously. Plu- rality and change are an empty semblance. The existent alone ia thinkable, and only the thinkable is real. Of the one true existence, convincing knowledge is attainable by thought ; but the deceptions of the senses seduce men into mere opinion and into the deceitful, rhetorical display of discourse respecting the things, which are sup- posed to be manifold 9,nd changing. ^ — In his (hypothetical) explanation of the world of appearance, Parmenides sets out from two opposed principles, which bear to each other, within the sphere of appearance, a relation similar to that which exists between being and non-being. These principles are light and night, with which the antithesis of fire and earth corresponds. That Parmenides received through Xenophanes the philosophical impulses which gave direction to his own thinking, we must suppose, even setting aside later evidence, from the following language of the (Platonic?) dialogue Sophistes (p. 242): "the Eleatic race of philosophers dating from the time of Xenophanes (and even earlier)." Aristotle says (Metaph., I. 5) : " Parmenides ia said (TiiyeTai) to have been his (Xenophanes') pupiL" Here XiysTai. is, perhaps, not to be taken as signifying an uncertainty on the part of Aristotle with respect to the personal relation of the two philosophers, but as pointmg to the half- truth of the term "pupil" (/iofli/Tiyf), since Parmenides may have been incited to his enquiries more by the writings of Xenophanes than hy his oral instruction, and since he does not stand merely in the relation of a scholar to his predecessor, having himself first preated the metaphysical principles of Eleaticism. Theophrastus expresses the relation in which Parnienides stood to Xenophanes by the use of the term ciriyevA/i^og (in a passage in the first book qf his Physics, as cited by Alexander Aphrqdia., Schol in Arist., ed. Brandia, p. 536 a, 10 : tovtpd^(i> TtavaiTeidia ^fifiev aTap7r6l>' Oite -y&p av yvoirig to yc fiij kAv (oh yap eil>iKr&v) OvT£ (jipdaaig.* After this appear to have followed immediately the words (cited by Clem. Alex., Strom., VI. p. 627 b, and by Plotinus, Ennead., V. 1, 8) : Th yap avTo voeiv eariv re Kal slvai. J. e. : The predicate being belongs to thought itself; that I think something' and that this, which I think, is (in my thought), are identical assertions ; non-b^ing — that which is not — can not be thought, can, so to speak, not be reached, since every thing, when it is thought, exists as thought ; no thought can be non-existent or without being, for there is nothing to which the predicate being does not belong, or which exists outside of the sphere of being. — In this argumentation Parmenides mistakes the distinction between the Siibjective being of thought and an objective realm of being to which thought is directed, by direct- ing his attention only to the fact that both are subjects of the predicate being. Says Parmenides (ap. Simplio., Ad Phys., fol. 31, in the third line, we write oid' f/v instead of oiidh/, according to Bergk's conjecture, see Ind. Led. Hal., 1867-68) : [* A metrical translation of all the Parmenidean fragments cited in this section may be read in the Journal of Speculative PhUoaophy, St Louis, Jan., 1870, Vol IV., lS,o. 1. Tlie doctrine contained in them >s fally explained in the text.— TV.} OQ FABMENIDES OF EI^EA. Tojirdv i" iart voecv re ml oinieiciv eari v6^/ia' Ov yap avsv rob edvToc, iv ij> iret^TiafUvov iariv, 'Evpijatig rb voeiv oid" ^v yap $ cbtiv ij iarat 'hXha TrapeK tov idvTo^. Not the senses, which picture to us plurality and change, conduct to truth, but only thought, which recognizes the being of that which is, as necessary, and the existence of that which is not, as impossible. Parm., ap.Sext. Empir., VII. Ill : 'A30m ail TijaSf if oiav dii^atoc elpyc v6ii/ia, Mj;6i rf l&OQ iroTiinreipov 66dv Kara Ttpide jiiaa^u, TSa/iav aaxoirov ofi/ia nat ^x^caaav okov^ Kat yXdaaav Kplvai 6e Myi,) iroXidiipiv i^yxo" 'Ef kpi^ev pif&ivra. Much severer still than his condemnation of the naive confidence of the mass of men in the Ulusory reports of the senses, is that with which Parmenides visits a philosophical doctrine which, as he assumes, makes of this very illusion (not, indeed, as illusion, in which sense Parmenides himself proposes a theory of the sensible, but as supposed truth) the basis of a theory that falsifies thought, in that it declares non-being identical with being. It is very probable that the Heraclitean doctrine is the one on which Parmenides thus animadverts, however indignantly Heraclitus might have resented this association of his doctrine with the prejudice of the masses, who do not rise above the false appearances of the senses; the judgment of Plato (Theaet., p. 179) and Aristotle {De Anima, I. 2, p. 405 a, 28 : tv luvijau (T clvai ra'bvra mKelvoq iaro Kai oi voUoi) agrees with that of Parmen- ides with respect to the matter in question. Parmenides says (op. Simplicius, Ad Phys^ foL 19 a and 26 a): Xp? at Xiyeiv re voeiv r" • tim ifipcvai • iari yap eivai, M^ficv iJ* owK ELvai • ra ff* tytji t^pdQea^at avuya, — Ilpwr' of odoii Tavn/c dti^T/awg elpye v6t]iia^ Avrap £77£lt' dnb T^f, y 6^ {ipoTol elddre^ ovdhi IIMf ovTOj S'lKpavoi • a/it/xavi^ yap iv avrav 2T^i>f(T(v 'f&vvei ThiyKTov v6ov, of (ii ^peirvTai Ku^o2 6/tug Tv^hyl te TeiJiy^iSref, OKpira 0v^ Olf ri Tziixiv re Kat oi/c thai tojvtov vcvS/uarat Koi TciiiTdv, TtdvTuv re vaTdvTpoirS; can ici?Lev^o(' Parmenides (in a passage of some length, given by SImpl., Ad Phys., fol. 31 a b) ascribes to the truly existent all the predicates which are implied in the abstract conception of being, and then proceeds further to characterize it as a continuous sphere, extending uni- formly from the center in all directions — a description which we are scarcely authorized in interpreting as merely symbolical, in the conscious intention of Parmenides. That which truly is, is without origin and indestructible, a unique whole, only-begotten, immovable, and eternal', it was not and will not be, but is, and forms a continuum. M6vog (P ETi /jiiJof oiaiio A.EiireTat wf sariv ' ravry ff etti aijfuxf laai IloXXa fioK tif aytvTfrm) ibv Kai av&ikE^pdv iartv, OuAov, /wwoyEvi^ te koI arpc/iE^ ijf arfiiaiTov* Ov Tror" Erp> ovd" iarai, evei vim ianv bfuni irav, "JBv ^VUEXH. • Or oSeijroi', according to Bcrgk^s conjecture. ZENO OF ELBA. 57 For what origin Should it have 1 How could it grow ? It can neither have arisen from the non-existent, since this has no existence, nor from the existent, since it is itself the existent. There is, therefiare, no becoming, and no deo^y (ruf yh'eatQ /tev (miaPearai koX amoTo; o^dpos). The truly existent is indivisible, everywhere like itself, and ever iden- tical with itself. It exists independently, in and for itself {tovtov t" ev tovt^ re /ievav naff cavTo TE Kelrai), thinking, and comprehending in itself all thought; it exists in the form of a well-rounded spliere (^avTodai evKvKhiv CjSo/p^f eva^iyiuov oyKu /icaaddEU iaoTraXi; ttovt^). The Parmenidean doctrine of the apparent world is a cosmogony, suggesting, on the one hand, Anaximander's doctrine of the warm and the cold as the first-developed contraries and the Heraclitean doctrine of the transformations of fire, and, on the other, the Pythagorean opposition of "limit" and "the unlimited" (cmnpmi), and the Pythagorean doctrine of con- traries generally. It is founded on the hypothesis of a universal mixture of warm and cold, light and dark. The warm and light is ethereal fire, which, as the positive and efficient principle, represents within the sphere of appearance the place of being ; the cold and dark is air and its product, by condensation (see Euseb., Praepar. Evang., I. 8, f : Ityu it Tiyv y^ Tab ■kvkvov KaTappvivroi; aepof yeyovevai), eartli. The combining or "mixing" of the contraries is effected by the all-controlling Deity {Aaifiuv i) iravra Kupepvg), at whose will Eros came Into existence as first, in time, of the gods (npuTiarov /liv "Epora BcCiv foirhaTO iravTav, Plat., Symp., 178 b, where, as Schanz has shown, the words from 'HmdJ^ to 6/to7ix>yel, together with of must be placed before ^i;ai; Arist., Metapk., 1. 4, 984 b, 26). That which fills space and that which thinks, are the same ; how a man shall think, depends on the " mixture " of his bodily organs ; a dead body perceives cold and silence (Parm., ap. Theophrast., De Sensu, 3, where, however, in the sentence: rb yap jritov iarl vdTi/io, the words to ttUov mean, not the preponderating, but the full, or space which is filled). If the verse in the long fragment, ap. Simplioius, in Phys., f. 31 a, et al. (also ap. Plat., Tli£aM.^ p. 180): olov atdvT^dv r* eftcvaij rut Tavf ovo fi* eaTiVj baaa ^poTol KaTe^svro TTSTrot^dTeg elvac ahi&ij, yiyvw^ai Tt koI oMva-&ai, etc., could be emended (as is done by Gladisch, who seeks in it an analogue to the Maja of the Hindus) so as to read : r^ iravT" ivap cariv, Parmenides would appear as having explained the plurality and change attested by the senses, as a dream of the one true existence. But this conjecture is arbitrary ; and the words cited in the Soph., p. 242 : i>g ivof fivrof tuv ■kovtuv Ka^/ni/iivurv, as also the doctrine of the Megarians concerning the many names of the One, which alone really exists, confirm the reading ovop.' of the MSS. The sense of the passage is therefore: "AH the manifold and changing world, which mortals suppose to be real, and which they call the sum of things, is in reality only the One, which alone truly is." In the philosophy of Parmenides no distinction is reached between appearance, or sem- blance, and phenomenon. The terms being and appearance remain with him philosoph- ically unreconciled ; the existence of a realm of mere appearance is incompatible with the fundamental principle of Parmenides. § 20. Zeno of Elea (bom about 490-485 b. c.) defended the doctrine of Parmenides by an indirect demonstration, in which he sought to show that the supposition of the real existence of things manifold and changing, leads to contradictions. In particular, he opposed to the reality of motion four arguments : 1. Motion can not begin, because a body in motion can not arrive at another place until it has 58 ZENO OF EliEA. passed through an unlimited number of intermediate places. 2. Achilles can not overtake the tortoise, because as often as he reaches the place occupied by the tortoise at a previous moment, the latter has already left it. 3. The flying arrow is at rest ; for it is at every moment only in one place. 4. The half of a division of time is equal to the -whole ; for the same point, moving with tlie same velocity, traverses an equal distance {i. e., when compared, in the one case, with a point at rest, in the other, with a point in motion) in the one case, in half of a given time, in tlie other, in the whole of that time. C. H. E. Lobse, De Arguments, quilma Zeno Eleaies nullum esse motum demonstraijit^ Halle, 1794. Ch. L. Gerling, I>e Zenonis Eleatici paralogismis motum spectanHhus^ Marburg, 1625. Zeno, disciple and friend of Parmenides, is reported (by Strabo, TI. 1) to have joined hia master in hia ethico-political efforts, and at last (by Diog. Laert., IX. 26, and many others), after an unsuccessful enterprise against the tyrant Nearchus (or, according to others, Diomedon), to have been seized and put to death amid tortures, which he endured with steadfastness. In the (Platonic?) dialogue Parmenides, a prose writing (avyypa/i/ia) of Zeno is men- tioned, which was distributed into several aeries of argumentations (Myoi), in each of which a number of hypotheses (viroBiaei;) were laid down with a view to their red^ictio in absv/rdum, and so to the indirect demonstration of the truth of the doctrine that Being is One. It is probably on account of this (indirect) method of demonstration from hypotheses, that Aristotle (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., Til. 1, and Diog. Laert., VIII. 51 ; IX. 25) called Zeno the inventor of dialectic {evprrijv 6takcKTiK^g). If the manifold exists, argues Zeno (op. Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 30), it must be at tlio same time infinitely small and infinitely great ; the former, because its last divisions are without magnitude, the latter, on account of the infinite number of these divisions. (In this argument Zeno leaves out of consideration the inverse ratio constantly maintained between magnitude and number of parts, as the division advances, whereby the same product is constantly maintained, and he isolates the notions of smallness and number, opposing the one to the other.) In a similar manner Zeno shows that the manifold, if it exists, must be at the same time numerically limited and unlimited. Zeno argues, further (according to Arist., Phys., TV. 3 ; cf Simplic, In Phys., fol. 130 b), against the reality of space. If all that exists were in a given space, this space must bo in another space, and so on m infinitum. Against the veracity of sensuous perception, Zeno directed (according- to Arist, Phys., VII. 5, and Simplic. on this passage) the following argument : If a measure of millet-grains in falling produce a sound, each single grain and each smallest fraction of a grain must also produce a sound ; but if the latter is not the case, then the whole measure of grains, whose efiect is but the sum of the effects of its parts, can also produce no sound. (The method of argumentation here employed is similar to that in the first argument against plurality.) The arguments of Zeno against the reality of motion (cited by Arist., Phys., VI. 2, p. 233 a, 21 and 9, p. 239 b, 5 seq., and the Commentators) have had no insignificant influence on the development of metaphysics in earlier and later times. Aristotle answers the two first (ibid. c. 2) with the observation (p. 233 a, 11) that the divisions of time and space are the same and equal (rdf atirdf yafi itai rag Jaof dtatpeau; 6 ;t/>dt yap Trdvra Tzeiriiyaaiv dpfwtr&evTa, Koi ToiiTOig tppovEovac Kal jycJovr' iyd*' aviuvToi. With the philosophemes peculiar to him, Empedocles. united the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls (but modified and adapted to his system in the sense above indicated) and a doctrine similar to that of Xenophanes concerning the spirituality of the Deity (unless the loci in which this is affirmed are taken, say, from a work falsely attributed to Empedocles). § 24. Anaxagoras of Clazomense (in Asia-Minor), l»orn about 500 B. c, reduced all origin and decay to a- process of mingling and un- mingling, but assumed as ultimate elements an unlimited number of primitive, qualitatively determinate substances, which were called by him seeds of things, by Aristotle, elements consisting of homogeneous parts, and by later writers (employing a term formed from the Aris- totelian phraseology) Homoeomerise. Originally there existed, accord- ing to Anaxagoras, an orderless mixture of these diminutive parts : "all things were together." But the divine mind, which, as the finest among all things, is simple, unmixed and passionless reason, brought order to them, and out of chaos formed the world. In the explana- tion of individual existence, Anaxagoras confined himself, according to the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, to the search for mechanicaJ 64 ANAXAGOEAS, HEEMOTIMUS, AND ABCHELATTS. causes, and only fell back on the agency of the divine reason, when he was unable to recognize the presence of such causes. Essentially the same doctrine of the world-ordering mind is ascribed, among earlier philosophers, to Hermotimus of Clazomenae, and among the later, to Archelaus of Miletus (or, according to others, of Athens). Of the legends of Hermotimns of Clazomenae treat Friedr. Aug. Cams, in FuUeborn's BeUrage mr Oeschiclite der Philoa., Vol. III.. Art. 9, 1798, repr. in OaruB' Naetigtl. Werke (Vol. IV. : Ideen eur Geeck der Philoa), Leipsic, 1809, pp. 830-892 ; Ignat Denzinger, De HermoU C'laeomenio comment, Liege, 1S25. On Anaxagoios, cf. Friedr. Aug. Cams, J)e Anax. coamotheologiae fontibus, Leipsic, 1797, and in Cams" Ideen nur Geack. der Philoa^ Leips. 1809, pp. 689-762, Anaxagoraa ana Klazomemi und aHn Zelt- geiat, in FuUeborn's Beitr. eur Geach. der Philoa., Art. 10, 1799, and in Cams' Idem zur Geach. der PMloa., pp. 895-478; 3. T. Hemsen, Anax. Clm., Gott. 1821 ; Ed. Schanbaoli, Anax. Claz. fragm., Leips. 1827; Gail. Sohorn, Anax. Claz. ei Diogenia Appolloniatae fragmenta, Bonn, 1829; F. J. Clemens, y)« phUoaophia Anaxagorae Claeomenii, Berlin, 1889 ; Fr. Breier, Die PMlosophie dea Anaxagoraa von Klazomenae nach Aristotelea, Berlin, 1840 ; Krischo, Forac/iwigen, I. pp. 60-68 ; C. M. Zfeyort, Diaaert. eur la vie ei la doctrine d^Anaxagore, Paris, 1848; Franz HoiFman, Ueber die Gotteaidee dea Anaxagoraa, Sokratea, mid PWoti, Wiirzhurg, 1860 ("Glackwnnsch-Prograinm" to the University of Berlin), cf. Mi- chelet, in "Der Gedanke," Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 83-44, and Hoffmann's reply in Ftehte's ZeiUehrift Jur Ph. V. ph. Kritik, new series. Vol. 40, 1662, pp. 1-48; Aug. Gladisch, Anax. und, die Jaraeliten, Leipsic, 1864, cf. Gladisch on Anase. und die alien laraeliien, in Niedner's Zeiiachr. fur hiator. T/ieol., 1849, Heft 4, No. 14; C. AIcilI, Anax. «. «. Philoaophie, nach den Fragmenten bei SimpUdua ad ArUt (G.-Pr.), Neu-Buppin, 1867; Heinr. Beckel, Anax. doctrina de rebua animatia (diss.), Manster, 1868. Anaxagoras was descended from a reputable family in Clazomenae. From this ciiy he removed to Athens. Here he lived a long time as the friend of Pericles, until, having been accused of impiety on account of his philosophical opinions by the political opponents of the great statesman, he found himself coriipelled to seek safety in Lampsacus, where he is said to have died soon afterward. The chronological data respecting him are in part discrepant. The accusation tools place, according to Diodorus (IX. 38 sq.) and Plutarch (Pericl., c. 38), in the last years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Allowing this date to be correct, it is inadmissible, with K. F. Hermann (De Pfiilos. Ionic, aetatibus, Gott. 1849, p. 13 seq.), to place the birth of the philosopher in Olymp. 61.3 (534 B. c); it is more probable that the version of ApoUodorus (ap. Diog. L., II. 1) is the correct one, and that Anaxagoras was born in Olymp. 10 (500-496). If he lived in all seventy-two years (as Diog., ihid., reports), the dqXe of his death must be Olymp. 88 (for which we read in Diog., 78 — probably an error). In Athens he is said to have lived thirty years; the statement referred (by Diog. L, II. 1) to Demetrius Phalereus, that he began to philosophize in the twentieth year of his life at Athens, while Callias (CaUiades?) wasarehon, probably arose from a misinterpretation of the report that he began to philosophize while Callias was archon at Athens. The statement of Aristotle (Metaph., I. 3), that Anaxagoras was prior to Empedocles in point of age, but subsequent in respect of his (philosophical) per- formances (ry tiiv ifkMiq npdTepnc, Tol; 6' cpyfiig vaTcpog), is probably to be taken purely chronologically, and not as pointing to a relative inferiority or advance in philosophical insight. The difference of age can not have been great. Anaxagoras seems already to have known and to have accepted in a modified form the doctrines of Empedocles. The written work of Anaxagoras {irepl ipvaear) is mentioned by Plato (PJiaedo, p. Ol) and others. In the place of the four elements of Empedocles, Anaxagoras assumes the existence of an infinite number of elementary and original substances. Every thing that has parts ANAXAOOBAS, HEBMOTIMUB, AND ABCHELAUSw 65 qualitatively homogeneous ■with the whole, owes its origin, according to Anaxagoras (aa reported by Aristotle, Met., I. 3), to the coming together (avyKpiaic) of these parts from the state of dispersion among other elements, in which they had existed from the beginning. Tliis combination o£ the homogeneous is, in his view, that which really takes place in what is called becoming or generation. Each primitive particle remains unchanged by this process. In like manner, that which is called destruction, is in fact only separation (SiaKpmtc). Every thing whose parts are homogeneous with the whole (e. g., flesh, blood, bones, gold, silver), Aristotle calls in his terminology ofiotojuptq, in opposition to the avo/wu>iiepig (e. g., the animal, and, in general, the organism as a whole), the parts of which are of diverse quality. The expression to d/ioio/iepig, ra o/ioio/aep^ does not denote originally the homogeneous parts themselves, but tlie whole, whose parts are homo- geneous with each other ; but it can also be applied to the parts themselves as smaller wholes, since in that which has throughout the same quality the parts of every part must be homogeneous with one another. In Metaph., I. 3, Aristotle calls the wholes, whicli, according to Anaxagoras, arise by the mingling together of homogeneous parts, ofwio/iepf/ ; in other places he gives the same name to the parts, c. g., De Coeh, HI. 3 : flesh and bones, etc., consist eC aopdrav ofwiofispuv Tiavrav r/Upoia/iiviM ; cf. De Gen', et Cm-r., I. 1 : Anax- agoras represents those substances which have like parts, e. g., bones, etc., as the ele- mentary substances {to. iftoio/iep^ aroixtia Tifhiaiv, olav harovv Kal aidpica xal fivcUii), Lucretius says (I. 834 seq.) that, according to Anaxagoras, every rerum Jiomoeomeria, e. g., bones, intestines, etc., consists of smallest substances of the same kind. The plural 6/ioi- oftipeiai is used by later writers (e. g., Pint., Pericl., c. 4 ; vow cnroKpivovra rdf ofioco/iepciag) to designate the primitive, ultimate particles themselves (cf. Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., X. 25: oi yap ardfiov^ el-izdv-Eg 7/ ofiowfjispetag 7j byKov^, and Diog. L., II. 8 : a.pxo^ toj oiMttofiepeiag). Anaxagoras himself calls these original constituents of things " seeds " (BTrip/iara), and also less precisely (like the objects which they constitute), " things " {xP'IH-'"''^)- ^ut not every thing which appears to have hke parts is held by Anaxagoras to possess them indeed. It is true that Aristotle in one place, immediately after referring to Empedocles, cites (Met., I. 3) water and fire as examples of substances of homogeneous parts. But where he expresses himself more exactly concerning the opinion of Anaxagoras (De Gen. et Corr., 1. 1 ; 2)e Coelo, III. 3), he says expressly that the latter regarded precisely those substances which with Empedocles passed for elementary, — fire, air, water, and earth, — as not internally homo- geneous, but as compounds of numerous heterogeneous particles. Anaxagoras finds the moving and shaping force of the world neither (with the old lonians) in the nature of the matter assumed as principle itself, nor (with Empedocles) in impersonal psychical potencies, like love and hate, but in a world-ordering mind (voiif). (Anaxagoras, op. Simplicius, in Ar. Phys., fol. 35 a: o/tojo ificXXsv laeadac Kal oKola ^v Kal aaaa vvv icTi Kal oKola iarai, Trdvra SieKdc/iT/ae v6og.) This mind is distinguished from mate- rial natures by its simplicity, independence, knowledge, and supreme power over matter. Every thing else is mixed with parts of all other things besides itself, but mind (viSof) is {)ure, unmixed, and subject only to itself. All minds, whatever their relative power or station, are (qualitatively) alike. The mind is the finest of things (XeirrdTaTov ndvTurv Xpi/idTuv). Matter, which is inert and without order, it brings into motion, and there- by creates out of chaos the orderly world. There is no fate (elfiap/zevrf) and no chance (rvxv). In the primitive condition of things the most heterogeneous substances were, according to Anaxagoras, everywhere intermingled (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in Arist. Phys., fol. 33 b : 6/iov navra ;|fp^/inra ^, ajreipa Kal ■KAijdoQ Kal a/iiKp6T7iTra, the first words of the work of Anaxagoras). When matter had thus remained inert during an indeterminate period, S 66 the Mind worked upon it, communicating to it motion and otder (Arist., Phys., VIII. 1, p. 250 b, 24 : ^i/ot yap hsivoi; ['Avafayrfpafj, 6/iov irdvruv bvTuv nal ^peiuAvruv rbv avctpov Xp/yvov, KivT/aiv iiinoajBat rbv vow Kai Siaicplvat), The Mind first effected a revolving motion at a single point ; but ever-increasing masses were graduall7 brought within the sphere of this motion, which is still incessantly extending farther and farther in the infinite realm of matter. As the first consequence of this revolving motion, the elementary contraries, fire and air, water and earth, were separated from each other. ■ But a complete separation of dissimilar and union of similar elements was far from being hereby attained, and it was necessary that within each of the masses resulting from this first act, the same process should be repeated. By this means alone could things originate, having parts really homogeneous, e. g., gold, blood, etc. But even these consist not entirely, but only prevailingly, of like parts. In gold, for example, however pure it may seem, there are, says Anaxagoras, not merely particles of gold, but also particles of other metals and of all other things ; but the denomination follows the predominant constituent. ■ In the middle of the world rests the earth, which is shaped like a, short section of a cylinder, and is siipported by the air. The stars are material ; the moon is inhabited like the earth; the sun is a glo.wing mass of stone (jivSpoq diawpoc, Diog. L., II. 12), and the stars are of like nature. The moon receives its light from the sun. The sky is full of stones, which occasionally fall to the earth, when the force of iheir revolving motion is relaxed; witness the meteor of Aegospotomos (Diog. L:, II. 8-12). Plants have souls ; they sorrow and rejoice. Plants and animals owe their origin to the fecundation of the earth, whence they sprung, by germs previously contained in the air (Theophragt., Sist. Plant, III. 1, 4 ; De Oausis plantamm, I. 5, 2). In our perception of things by the senses, like is not known by like, but by unlike, e. g., heat by cold, cold by heat; that which is equally warm (etc.) with ourselves, makes no impression on us. The senses are too weak to know the truth; they do not sufiBciently distinguish the constituents of things (Anaxagoras, op. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math. VII. 90 : 'uro cupavporrrroq avTuv ov ivvaToi iofiev Kphiuv rahfii;). By the mind we know the world of external objects ; every thing is known to the divine reason (Anax., ap. Simplig., in Phys., f. 33 : jravro iyvu vaci\ but depend on human institution, is ascribed to Archelaus. Another disciple of Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, interpreted the Homeric poems allegorically ; by Zeus the vovc was to be understood, by Athene art (rixvij). The fine verses, in which Euripides {ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., IV. 25, § 15?), with un- mistakable reference to Anaxagoras, sings the praises of the investigator, may here be cited: iffxs fiaJ&riatVj ft^re •Kohruv irpafeif ipfiav, 0.7JC adavdrov KcSopuv ^vaeac Kdgfwv dyypUj Tt^ re aweanj KOl !mij KOX OTTWf • Toig TotovToi^ ovdiiroT' ataxpf^ epyuv iie'Ketjj^ trpoGi^ct, § 25. Leucippus of Abdera (or Miletus, or Elea) and Democritus of Abdera, the latter, according to his own statement, forty years younger than Anaxagoras, were the founders of the Atomistic phi- losophy. These philosophers posit, as principles of things, the " full " and the " void," which they identify respectively with being and non- being or something and nothing, the latter, as well as the former, having existence. They characterize the "full" more particularly, as consisting of indivisible, primitive particles of matter, or atoms, which are distinguished from one another, not by their intrinsic qualities, but only geometrically, by their form, position, and arrange- ment. Fire and the soul are composed of round atoms. Sensation is due to material images, which come from objects and reach the soul &8 THE ATOMISTS : LEUCIPPtTS AND DEMOCEITITS. through the senses. The ethical end of man is happiness, which is attained through justice and culture. Of Democrltns treat Schleiermacher, Ueber daa Vereeiehnits der Schriftendet Dmwkrit bei DiOB. L, (IX. 45 seq.), read Jan. 9, 1816, and i>rintcd in his Sammil. Werke, 8d div., Vol. 8, pp. 298-806; Geffera, Qitaest Dem., GOtt. 1829 ; J. F. W. Burcliard, DemoeriU philoaopMae de aen^hut /ragmenta, Minden, 1830 ; Fragmente der Moral dea Abderiten Vemokritua^ Minden, 1S84 ; Pupencordt, De atomictyrum doc tHna, Berlin, 1832; Frid. Heimsoeth. DemoeriU de anima doctrina, Bonn, 188S; Krisctie, Foraelimigen, I. pp. 142-168 ; Frid. Gull. Aug. Mnliach, Quaesiionem Democritearum epec I-II., Berlin, 1885-42 ; Demo- eriU operum Jragmenia coll.j rec.^ vertit^ evplic. ac de philosophi 'sita, ecriptie et placiUs commen- iatua eat, Berlin, 1848 ; Fragm. ph. 6r., I. p. 830 seq. ; B. ten Brinlv, Anecdota Epicharmi, Democriti, etc., in the PAilologma, VI. 1851, p. B7T seq. ; DemoeriU de ae ipao teatimmiia, ib. p. 589 seq., VII, 1862, p. 864 seq.; DemoeHti Uber ircpl ivSpCiTtov 4>imn, ibid. VIII., 1858, p. 414 seq, ; £d. Johnson, Der Senaualismtia dea Demokrit (G.-Pr.), Plauen, 1868. Of the age of Leucippus and the circumstances of hia life little is definitely known; it is also uncertain whether he wrote any thing himself, or whether Aristotle and ■ others drew their information concerning his opinions from the writings of his pupil Democriturf. Aristotle commonly names him in connection with Democritus. The statement (Diog. L, IX. 30), that he heard Zeno, the Eleatic, receives confirmation from the character of his doctrine. That the principles of his philosophy were largely derived from the Eleatics is also testified by Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., 1. 8, 325 a, 26. Democritus of Abdera, in his work /uKpig hmnoafio^, said (according to Diog. L., IX. 41) tliat he wrote this work 130 years after the capture of Troy, and that he was forty years younger than Anaxagoras. He must, according to the latter statement, have been born about 4G0 B. c, with which date agrees the statement of ApoUodorus {ap. Diog. L., ibid.), that he was born 01. 80 ; according to Thrasyllus (ibid), 01. 11.Z — 470 B. o. ; but for tlie date of the capture of Troy Democritus appears to have assumed, instead of 1184, the year 1150, whence we derive, as the date of the composition of the work named, the year 420 B. c. He is said to have died at a great age (ninety years old ; according to others, one hundred, or even more). Desire for knowledge led him to undertake extended jour- neys, Egypt and the Orient being among the places visited by him. Plato never mentions liim, and speaks only with contempt of the materialistic doctrine. Plato desired, according to the narrative of Aristoxenus, the Aristotelian (in his ioropiKa iTro/ivr/fiara, see Diog. L,, IX. 40), that the writings of Democritus should be burned, but was convinced by the Pythagoreans Amyclaa and Clinias, of the uselessness of such a proceeding, since the books were already widely circulated. Aristotle speaks of Democritus with respect. Democritus wrote numerous works, among which the /leyac Aiaima/ioc was the most celebrated. His style is greatly praised by Cicero, Plutarch, and Dionysius, for its clear- ness and elevation. The Atomistic system was urged by Democritus, who perfected it and raised it to an acknowledged position, in opposition to the Anaxagorean (in the sense indicated above, at tlie end of § 24). The relation between Leucippus and Anaxagoras is uncertain. Since Democritus is called by Aristotle (Metaph., I. 4) an eralpoc (an intimate companion and disciple) of Leucippus, the difference between their ages can hardly have amounted to forty years, so that Leucippus must have been younger than Anaxagoras. If Anaxagoras did not make himself known by his philosopliioal produttions in early life, it may be that Leucippus (wlio appears to be immediately associated with the doctrine of Parmenides by hi.s polemic against it) preceded him in this respect ; yet this is not very probable, and can by no means be concluded from certain passages of Anaxagoras, in which he combats opinions (in particular the hypothesis of empty inter-atomic spaces) that are, it is true, THE ATOMISTS: LEUOIPPTJS AND DEM00E1T08. 69 found in the writings of the Atomista, but had already been propounded by earlier philos- ophers (especially by Pythagoreans), and had also been, in part, combated by Parmenides and Empedocles. In view of this uncertainty respectingCeucippus and of the undoubted reference which Democritus constantly makes to Anaxagoras, we place the exposition of the Atomistic system immediately after that of the Anaxagorean. Besides, the nature of the doctrine of Homoeomeriae, which is a sort of qualitatiye Atomism, places it in the middle between the four qualitatively different elements of Empedocles and the reduction by Leucippus and Demoeritus of all' apparent qualitative diversity to the merely formal diversity of an infinite number of atoms. In his account of the principles of the earlier philosophers, in the first book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle says (c. 4): "Leucippus and his associate, Bemocritua, assume as elements the full (n-X^pef, arepe&i), vaoTdv) and the void (Kev6v, fiav6y). The former they term being (fiv),-the latter, non-being (ji^ 6v)- hence they assert, further, that non-being exists as well as being." According to another account (Plutarch., Adv. Col., 4), DemoC' ritus expressed himself thus: /iv /laUov ro 6iv ri to fujiiv dvai ("Thing is not more real than no-thing "), expressing by the singularly constructed word, iiv, something (" thing "). The number of things in being (atoms) is infinitely ^reat. Each of them is indivisible (dro/iov). Between them is empty space. In support of the doctrine of empty space, Demoeritus alleged, according to Aristotle (Phys., IV. 6), the follo-»ing grounds : 1. Motion requires a vacuum ; for that which is full can receive nothing else into itself; 2. Rarefac- tion and condensation are impossible without the existence of empty intervals of space ; 3. Organic growth depends on the penetration of nutriment into the vacant spaces of bodies; 4. The amount of water which can be poured into a vessel filled with ashes, although less than the vessel would contain if empty, is not just so much less as the space amounts to, which is taken up by the ashes ; hence the one must in part enter into the vacant interstices of the other. The atoms differ (according to Arist, Meiaph., I. 4) in the three particulars of shape ((7;t7//o, called pva/id; by the Atomists themselves, according to Aristotle), order (rdfif, or, in the language of the Atomists, 6ia6riy^\ and position {diat(. Atomistic rpoTH/). As an example of difference in shape, Aristotle cites the Greek characters A and N, of order or sequence AN and NA, and of the difference of position Z and X. As being essentially characterized by their shape, Demoeritus seems to have called the atoms also iciiof and ax^/MTa (Arist., Phys., III. 4 ; Plut., Adv. Col., 8 ; Hesych., s. v. Wea). These differences are sufficient, according to the Atomists, to explain the whole circle of phenomena ; are not the same letters employed in the composition of a tragedy and a comedy (Arist., De Gen. el Corr., I. 2) ? The magnitude of the atoms is diverse. The weight of each atom corresponds with its magnitude. The cause of the atoms is not to be asked after, for they are eternal, and hence uncaused (Arist., Phys., VIII. 1, p. 252 a, 35 : ArifioKpirog tov ael ovk dftoi apx^ Zn^elv). (It was probably not the Atomists themselves, but later philosophers, who first hypostasized this very absence of a cause into a species of cause or efficient nature, to avTOfiarov.) Demoeritus is said also to have declared the motion of the atoms to be primordial and eternal. But with this statement we find united the other, that the weight of the larger atoms urged them downward more rapidly than the others, by which means the smaller and lighter ones were forced upward, while through their collision with the descending atoms lateral movements were also produced. In this way arose a rotatory motion (<5iVi?), which, extending farther and farther, occasioned the formation of worlds. In this process homogeneous elements came together (not in consequence of the agency of " love " and "hate," or an all-ruling " Mind," but) in obedience to natural necessity, in virtue of which 70 THE ATOMISTS : LETTCIPPUS AND DEMOCEITUS. things of like weight and shape must come to the same places, just as we observe in the winnowing of grain. Many atoms having become permanently united in the course of their revolutions, larger composite bodies and whole worlds came into existence. The earth was originally in motion, and continued thus, while it was yet small and light ; but gradually it came to rest. Organized beings arose from the moist earth. The soul consists of fine, smooth, and round atoms, which are also atoms of fire. Such atoms 'are distributed throughout the whole body, but in particular organs they exercise par- ticular functions. The brain is the seat of thought, the heart, of anger, the liver, of desire. "Wlien we draw in the breath we inhale soul-atoms from the air ; in the expiration of breath we exhale such atoms into the air, and life lasts as long as this double process is continued. Sensuous perception is explained by effluxes of atoms from the things perceived, whereby images (eUaXa) are produced, which strike our senses. Through such eliuXa, says Democritus, even the gods manifest themselves to us. Perception is not wholly veracious ; it transforms the impressions received. The atoms are invisible on account of their smallness (only excepting, perhaps, those which come from the sun). Atoms and vacuity are all that exists in reality; qualitative differences exist only for tis, in the sensuous phenomenon (No/zu yhiicii nal- v6/i^ wiKpov, vofiu 6ep/^6vj v6/i(^ tlnixpov, v6/iij) xpo^V ' erej (5c arofia Kal /{^(iv^Democritus, op. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 135). The asser- tion of Democritus (op. Diog. L., 12. 72), that in reality we know nothing, etc. {trey dh ovdiv iS/isv, iv jivSa yap ij aX^'Scia), must, as employed by him, probably be restricted to the case of sensuous phenomena ; for in view of the assurance with which Democritus professes the doctrine of atoms, this skeptical utterance can not be supposed to bear upon that doctrine itself. Democritus (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 138) also expressly distinguished from sensuous perception, which he called obscure knowledge (aKirrlij), the genuine knowledge (71^0/17) acquired by the understanding through investiga- tion. That kind of philosophical thinking by which Democritus went beyond the results of sensuous perception and recognized in the atoms the reality of things, was not made by him itself a subject of philosophical reflection, and the manner in which such thinking is effected was left by him without special explanation ; it is among the philosophers of the following period (with the earliest among whom Democritus was indeed contemporaneous) that reflection concerning the nature of thought itself begins. Yet it follows from the fundamental principles of Democritus that thought can not be independent of sensation or the voif of the ■^xVi and- this inference was expressly drawn by Democritus (Cia, De Fm., I. 6 ; Plut., De PI. Fhilos., IV. 8 ; cf. Arist., De An., III. 3). The only expression which Democritus appears to have given to his views concerning the origin of true knowledge, is that implied in the principle which he enounced in agreement with Anaxagoras, that we should proceed in our inferences from phenomena ( Saifun/o^). Not the act as such, but the will, determines moral character (ayadhi ov Td /j.^ aitKhiv, aXXa TO fojdi WiXeiv — ;i;a/j«rr«6f oi/c 6 pXmuv Trpbc rf/v aiimpipi, (MC ., 493, says, taught to, r€n> itoTjMv idy/taTa), although many of the Sophists disputed in certain respects the authority of tradition. The Sophists, who cultivated chiefly rhetoric and much more rarely the pseudo-dialectical science of dis- pute ("Eristic"), only prepared the way for the dialectical destruction of n^ve, traditional convictions. It was (as Grote correctly remarks) Socrates and his pupils, who first com- pleted this work of destruction and at the same time undertook to furnish a positive substitute for what was destroyed. If the teaching of the Sophists were only criticism, and had only accomplished the sub- version of cosmological philosophy, we should be obliged to include it (as Zeller and others do) in the first period. But since it is essentially characterized by reflection on certain phases of subjective life, it belongs unquestionably to the second period. Even Zeller, who places it in the first, admits (Ph. d. Gr., II. 1, 2d ed. p. 129 ; cf. also I. p. 725) that " the Sophists first conducted philosophy from objective investigation to ethics and dia- lectic, and transferred thought to subjective ground." The essential point in which the Sophists were innovators was this : that they intro- duced a new kind of instruction, not in any special department, as music or gymnastics, but with a view to the development of a certain universality of culture, a culture which should embrace all the interests of life and which, in particular, should provide the recipients of it with political intelligence ; that, further, this instruction was founded on speculations concerning the nature of human volition and thought, and that by it, rather than by tradition or common opinion, they caused the views and practices of the citizens to be determined. This new branch of instruction was by no means given up by Socrates and his disciples ; it was only expanded and developed by them in another and more pro- found manner, so that, with all their opposition to the Sophists, they nevertheless stand wit^ them on the common ground of subjective philosophical speculation (cf. Plutarch's lAfe of Themistodes, chap. 2). § 28. Protagoras of Abdera (bom about 490), who figured as teacher of rhetoric in numerous Greek cities, especially at Athens, aAd was a contemporary of Socrates, although considerably older than Y4: PKOTACJOEAS OF ABDEEA. he, transferred and applied the doctrine of Heraclitus respecting the eternal flux of all things to the knowing subject, and asserted : Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not. Just as each thing appears to each man, so is it for him. All truth is relative. The existence of the gods is uncertain. Oa Protagoras alone, cf. Gelst, 2)« Frotagora SopTiista, Giessen, 1827 ; Leonh. Spengel, Z>« Protagora rhetore ejuegue ecriptig, in lis J,vvayiayii -rexvuiv, Stuttg. 1828, p. 62 seq. ; Ludw. Ferd. Herbst, Protagorat' Zeben mid SophUtik avs den Qaellen. maammmgesteUt, in Philol.-hUt. SPudien, ed. by Petersen, Ist part, Hamb. 1882, p. SS seq. ; Kriliche, Forachungm, I. pp. 130-142 ; Job. Frei, Quaeationta Protagoreaf, Bonn, 1845 : O. Weber, Qvaeationea Protagareae, Mai'bnrg, 1860 ; Jak. Bernnys, Die Karn^iiAAoiac; da Protagoraa, in the Bhein.Mua. /. Phil., N. 8., VII. 1860, pp. 464-468; A. J. Vitringa, De Proiagorae Tita ef, pliiloaopMa, Groningen, 1858 ; Friedr. Blass, Die cut. Meredaamkeit, Leipsio, 1868, pp. 23-29. Cf. the works cited, ad § 27. Plato states {Protag., 311 c, seq.) that Protagoras was considerably older than Socrates. According to a. statement in the Platonic dialogue Meno (p. 91 e), from which the similar statement of ApoUodorus (ap. Diog. L., IX. 56) seems to have heen copied, he lived about seventy years ; according to another version (op. Diog. L., IX. 55), he lived more than ninety years. Probably he was bom ca. 491, and died ca. 421-415 B. c. He called himself a aoqiujTiii, i. e., a teacher of wisdom (Plat., Protag., p. 316 d: ofioTmya re gix^ust^^ eivai Ktil vaiieveiv avBpairov;). The word Sophist acquired its signification as a term of reproach especially through Aristophanes and afterward through the followers of Socrates, par- ticularly Plato and Aristotle, who contrasted themselves, as "philosophers," with the "Sophists." Sophists like Protagoras stood in high consideration with the majority of cultivated people, as Plato's dialogue Protag. especially attests, although a respectable and Well-to-do Athenian burgher could not himself have been a Sophist (man of letters), and earned money by public lessons. It is well known that at a later time rhetoricians were also called Sophists. Protagoras is said to have prepared the laws for the Athenian colony of Thurii (Heraclides, ap. Diog. L., IX. 50). He was first at Athens between 451 and 445 B. c. (see Frei), next perhaps about 432, and again 01. 88.3 = 422-421 B. c, and shortly before his death. It is probable that Plato in his dialogue Protagoras has with poetic license transferred single circumstances from 422 to 432. On the occasion of his last sojourn at Athens (about 415 ? or 411 ?) he was accused and condemned as an atheist. The copies of his work were demanded of their private owners, and burned in the market- place; he himself perished at sea on his passage to Sicily. The^ supposition of Epicurus, that he had been a pupil of Democritus (Diog. L., IX. 53 ; X. 8), is hardly consistent with the relation between their ages, and is improbable on other grounds. On the other hand, it is even affirmed that Democritus mentioned and opposed Protagoras in his writings (Diog. L., IX 42 ; Plutarch., Adv. Goloten, IV. 2). In the doctrine of Protagoras Plato finds the inevitable consequence of the doctrine of Heraclitus {Theaet, p. 152 seq.). He admits its validity with reference to sensuous percep- tion (iua0?iacg), but objects to any extension of it beyond this province as an illegitimate generalization of the theory of relativity. (For the rest, there is contained in the proposi- tion, that all that is true, beautiful, and good, is such only for the knowing, feeling, and willing subject, a permanent truth. This truth Protagoras only one-sidedly exaggerated by ignoring the objective factor.) According to Diog. L., IX. 51, the original words of the fundamental theorem of Pro- tagoras ("Man the measure of all things") were as follows: navruv xp^f^'^"" /"'^P^ PEOTAGOEAS OF ABDEEA. 75 ovflpuirof, Tcn> /lev uvfuv tif eon, tuv 6i ova ovruv cjf ovk tariv. It remains uncertain how far the manner in which Protagoras established this proposition agreed with that which we find reported in Plato's Theaeietus (p. 152 seq.). Diog. Bt says of Protagoras that " he first showed how theses might be defended and attacked," and " he first said that on every subject contradictory affirmations could be maintained." It is to the equivocal pseudo- dialectical mode of discussion which is implied in these quotations, and which Protagoras seems to have followed in his work 'AvrtTuiyucd, that Plato alludes in terms of censure in Phaedo, p. 101 d, e. Aristotle says (Metaph., III. 2, 32, p. 998 a, 4) : iiairep UpoTaydpcig eXryEV LAeyxf^v Toitg yecifUTpag, ovff ai Ktvijceig kol eTuKeg rov ovpavav ofwiatj ■Kepi o>v tj affrpo- "koyia TToiEtrat rovg Xdyovg^ oxire ra aijfisia roZf aarpoiq Tijv aiiTTjv ex£t fvjtv^ from which it appears that Protagoras sought to meet the objection urged against his senaualistic sub- jectivism on the ground of the universal validity of geometrical propositions independently of individual opinion, by retorting that, in the sphere of objective reality, simple points, straight lines, and geometrical curves nowhere exist. In this he confounded with mere subjective experience, abstraction when employed as a means of confining the attention to special phases of objective reality. In illustration of the fundamental idea of Protagoras, a kindred utterance of Goethe may be compared, which will illustrate as well the relative truth of that idea, as the one- sidedness of disallowing an objective norm. " I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is fruitful for me, which adjusts itself to the general direction of my thought,, and at the same time furthers me in it. Now, it is not only possible, but natural, that such a thought should not chime in with the sense of another person, nor further him, perhaps even be a hinderanoe to him, and so he will hold it to be false ; when one is right tliorougiily convinced of this he will never indulge in controversy" (GoetJie-Zelterscher Briefwechsel, V. 354). Compare further the following in Goethe's Maximen imd Befiexionen: '' When 1 know my relation to myself and to the outer world, I say that I possess the truth. And thus each may have his own truth, and yet truth is ever the same." Protagoras won for himself considerable scientific distinction by his philological investi- gations. He treated of the right use of words (opdosirsia, Plat., Phaedr., 267 c), and he first distinguished the different forms of the sentence which correspond with the moods of the verb (Diog. L., IX, 53 : disi'ks Si rov Xdyov irpuTog eig Terrapa- evx(-'^7v, eparjicm; airdxpimv, evro^Tv). (But the use of the imperative in such passages as Iliad, I. 1 : Myvcv aei6e, fed, wliere not a command, but a request, was to be expressed, threw him into a perplexity, from which he could only rescue himself by censuring the Homeric form of expression ; v. Arist., Poet, c. 19, p. 1456 b, 15). Protagoras also distinguished the genders of nouns. Those who would perfect themselves in the art of discourse were required by him to combine practice with theory (Stob., Floril, XXIX. 80 : Tlpuraydpag eXeyc jiriShi dvai irl/Te rixvrp) avcv fiekiTriq iivre litXerrpi dvra T£;|T«?f). A case, which would otherwise be lost, may be made victorious by the rhetorical art (tov ^ttu Uyov KpuTTu TToieiv, Arist., PheL, II. 24; Gell., N. A., V. 3). This utterance of Protagoras does not imply that the " weaker " side must necessarily be known to be unjust (as Aristophanes presupposes, who falsely attributes the doctrine to Socrates, Nuh., 113). Still, to the prejudice of the moral character of the art of rhetoric, the difierence is left unnoticed which subsists between cases where just arguments, which would otherwise remain unremarked, are brought to light, and cases in which the unjust is clothed with the appearance of justice ; the Protagorean principle of the identity of appearance and reality rendered such a distinction impossible. The sentence: vavruv ;f/ji//jdru)' /icrpov earlv avBpumog formed, according to Sextus Empirious, Adv. Math., VII. 560, the beginning of the work entitled KaTa/3dX^owref (so. 76 GOEGIAS OF LEONTINI. Uyoi). With the same sentence began also, according to Plat., Theaet., p. 161 c, tlje ATi^eta. No work bearing either of these titles is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his list of the works of Protagoras (D. h., IX. 55). "We nrnst, therefore, either assume with Bernays (Rhein. Mus., new series, VII. p. 467), that the 'AvnTuxylai mentioned by Diogenes were identical with the Kara/KaX^ovrec or the 'AM/Oeia, or perhaps regard •Av-i'Aoyiai or Kara/SdAXovTEf as having constituted the general title, while 'AHi6eia was the special name given to the first book. According to the exaggerated and undoubtedly calumniatory expression of the Aristotehan, Aristoxenus— whom Phavormus followed (cited by Diog. L., III. 31 and 57) — Plato drew nearly all the positions of his theory of the ideal state from the 'AvTilayma. I^Avrikoy'uu) of Protagoras. This, while perhaps true of single positions, can not be true of the theory as a whole, owing to the difference of the fundamental principles assumed by Protagoras and Plato. Whether the myth, which Plato puts into the mouth of Protagoras, in the dialogue of the same name (p. 320 c, seq.), really belongs to him, is uncertain, though not improbable. Of the gods, Protagoras (according to Diog. L., IX. 51) affirmed that he did not know whether they existed or not; for many things hindered this knowledge, such as the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life. § 29. Gorgias of Leontini (in Sicily), who came to Athens as embae- sador from his native city in the year 427 b. c, was an elder contem- porary of Socrates, whom he outlived. He taught chiefly the art of rhetoric. In philosophy he held a doctrine of nihilism, expressed in these three propositions : 1) Nothing exists ; 2) If any thing ex- isted, it would be unknowable ; 3) If any thing existed and werfe knowable, the knowledge of it could nevertheless not be communi- cated to others. The following works treat speeinlly of Gorgias : H. Ed. Fobs, De Gorgia LeonUno eommentaiio, intef- poaitua eat AriaioieUa de Gorgut liber 6m«ndaUua editua^ Halle, 1828 ; Leonh. Spengel, J)a Gorgia rhetoric 1S23, in "Sui/ayuyii tcx'^K' Stuttg. 1826 ; Oratorea Attici, ed. J. O, BaiteniaetHerm. Sauppifu,/ias ats Are/^Solog, Bheim. Hub., S. 8., II. IS**, p. 496 seq.; C. Muller, /fipp. Meifragmmta coU., in J*aam«ife aJ«. Bends., Leipi, 1868, pp. 81-88. In the congress of Sophists which Plato represents in his dialogue Protagoras as being held m the house of Callias, shortly before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Hippias appears as a man in middle life, considerably younger than Protagoras. According to Prot, p. 318, lie gave instruction in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Cf. also Pseudo-Plat, Hippias Major, p. 285 c. In Prot, p. 387 c, Plato puts into the mouth of Hippias the doctrine above enunciated: b Si vS/ioc, Tvpamog uv rCyv avdpuwav, TVoTiTia irapa rirv (piiaiv ^lal^tTai. He finds it contrary to nature that differences of country and laws should estrange from each other men of education, who are united by a natural kinship (^aei avyysvtlq). In Xenophon (Memm:, IV. 4) he contends against the duty of respecting the laws by urging their diversity and instability. Yet in his ethical deUverances Hippias seems as little as other Sophists to have placed himself in conscious and radical antagonism to the spirit of the Grecian people ; monitions and rules of life like those which in the dialogue, Hippias Major (p. 286 a), he represents Nestor as giving to Neoptolemus, may have been uttered by him with a fair degree of good faith. § 31. Prodicus of Ceos, by his parenetical discourses on moral subjects (among which " Hercules at the Cross-roads " is the one best known) and by his distinctions of words of similar signification, pre- pared the way for the ethical and logical eiforts of Socrates. Yet he did not go materially beyond the stand-point of the older Sophists. Cf. on Prodicus, L. Spengel, De Prodico Ceo, in " ^vvnyarfii nxvUy," p. 46 seq. ; F. G. Welclter, Prodiioi, der Vorgdnger det Sokrates, in tlie lihein. Mus. f. P!i., I.1S38, pp. 1-89 ami 683-643 (cf. IV. 1886, p. 856 neq.), and in Welcker's £1. Sc/ir., II. pp. 898-541 : HnmmGl,. J)e Prodica eophitta, Leyden, 1847 ; E. Congny, De Prodico Ceio, SoeratU magietro, Paris, 1858 ; Diemer, De Prod. Oeio {G.-Pr.), Oorbnch, 1859; Knifnier, Die Allegorie des Prodikos und der Traum des Liikianos, in the N. Jalirb. f. Ph. v/nd Fad., toI. 94, 1866, pp. 489-443; F. Blass, Die att. Bereds., Leipsic, 1868, pp. 29-81. Prodicus appears from Plato's Protagoras to have been younger than Protagoras, and of about the same age with Hippias. Socrates recommended his instruction in many instances to young men, though, indeed, only to such as he found ill-adapted for dia- lectical training (Plat., Theaet., 151b), and he sometimes terms himself (Plat., Protag., 341a; cf. Charm., 163 d, Crat, 384 b, Meno, 96 d), a pupil of Prodicus, though more sportively than seriously. Plato pictures him in the Protag. as effeminate, and as, in his distinctions of words, somewhat pedantic. Yet his most considerable philosophical merit is founded on his investigations of synonyms. The men of the earliest times, said Prodicus, deified whatever was useful to them, and so bread was venerated as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, fire as Hephaestus, etc. (Cic, De Nai. Deorum, I. 42, 118; Sextus Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 18, 51 seq.). Xenophon {Meimor. II. 1. 21 seq.) has imitated the myth of Prodicus concerning tlie choice of Hercules between virtue and pleasure. Prodicus declared death to be desirable as an escape from the evils of life. His moral consciousness lacked philosophical basis and depth. OTHER SOPHISTS. ^9 § 32. Of the Later Sophists, in whom the evil consequences of granting exclusive recognition to the accidental opinion and ego- tistic will of the individual became more and more conspicuous, the best-known are Pohis the rhetorician, a pupil of Gorgias; Thrasymachus, who identified right with the personal interest of those who have miglit, and the pseudo-dialectical jugglers Euthy- demus and Dionysodorus. Many of the most cultivated men at Athens and in other Greek cities (as, notably, Critias, who stood at the head of the thirty oligarchical despots), favored Sophistic prin- ciples, though not themselves assuming the functions of Sophists., i. e., of instructors in eloquence and polite learning. On the later Sophists, see Leonh, Spengel, De Polo rhetore^ in his "SuFnyioyrj Te^i'wi'," Stnttg. 1S2S, pp. 81-88; Jd. de Thranymacha rhetore, ibid., pp. 93-98; C. F. Hermann, De Thrasymacho Cluilcedmio sopfdata (Ind. led.), Gottingen, 1848-49 ; Nic. Bach, Criiiae Atlteniensis tyranni carminvm alioriemque ingenii mon-miientorum quae snt-pernunt, Leips. 1827 ; Leonh. Spengel, De Critia, in " ^.vvaymyn rexviiv," fctuttff. 1828, p. 120 seq. Cf. also Vahlen, Der Sophist Lykophron, Gorgias ; der RJtetor Polykraiea, in the Bhein itiu., N. S., XXI., pp. 143-148. Onr information concerning the later Sophists is derived mainly from the descriptions of them given by Plato in his dialogues. Polus figures in the Gorgias, Thrasym.nehus in the Republic, and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the Euthydemus. To these sources must be added a few notices in Aristotle and others, c. g., Polit.,in. 10, p. 1280 b, 10, where it is mentioned that the Sophist Lycophron called the law £yyin?Ti^f tuv Autaiuv. Yet in respect to some of tlie more important Sophists, still other accounts and even fragments of their writings have been preserved to us. Critias declared (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 54 ; cf. Plat., Leges, X., 889 e) that the belief in the existence of gods was the invention of a wise statesman, who, by thus disguising truth in falsehood, aimed at securing a more willing obedience on the part of the citizens (AiSccyfmruv apiarov EiaTjyijaaTO, ^Evdsi xaXiJ^af t^ aX^Beiav Tt^dyu). Critias regarded the blood as the seat and substratum of the soul (Arist., Be Anima, I. 2). According to the account given by Plato in the Protag. (p. 314 e, seq.), some of those who composed the circle of educated Athenians who met in the house of Callias, adhered particularly to Protagoras (such as Callias himself, Charmides, and others), others to Hip- pias (viz. : Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others), and still others to Prodieus (Pausanias, Agathon, etc.), although they could not be regarded as, properly spealting, the disciples of those Sophists, or as standing exclusively under their influence. The Sophist Anliphon (apparently to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator) occupied himself with problems connected with the theory of cognition (Trepi aAj/Betai), with math- ematics, astronomy, and meteorology, and with politics (see Arist.. De Soph. El., c. II, p. 172 a, 2; Phys., I. 1, p. 186a, 17; Sauppe, in the Oratores Attici, on the orator Antiphon: J. Bernays, in the BJiein. Mus., new series, IX. 255 seq.). Hippodamus of Miletus, the architect, and Phaleas, the Chalcedonian, also propounded political theories ; see above, § 1 B. Evenus of Paros, a contemporary of Socrates, is mentioned by Plato (Apol, 20 a; Phaedr., 267 a; Phaedo, 60 d) as a poet, rhetorician, and teacher of "human and political virtue." Cf. Spengel, 2way. rexvav, 92 seq. ; Bergk, Lyr. 6r., 474 seq. To the time and school of the Sophists belongs Xeniades of Corinth, whom Sextus Empiricus {Bypotyp. PynJum., II. 18 ; Adv. Math., VII. 48 and 53 ; VIII. 5) classes as a so SOCEATES OF ATHENS. Skeptic, representing that (in liia skepticism) he agreed with Xenophanes the Eleatia Xeniades affirmed (according to Sext., Adv. Math., VII. 63) that all was deception, everj idea and opinion was false (jravr' elvai fevSy, koI naaav (jmvTaaiav koX S6^av ^evdeaBat), and that whatever came into being, came forth from nothing, and whatever perished, passed into nothing. Sextus afBrms {Adv. M., VII. 53) that Demooritus referred to Xeniades in his works. The dithyrambic poet, Diagoraa of Melos, must not be included among the Sophists. Of Diagoras it was said that he became an atheist because he saw that a crying injustice remained unpunished by the gods. Since Aristophanes alludes to the sentencing of Diagoras, — in the "Birds" (v. 1073), which piece was represented on the stage in Olymp. 91.2, — we are led easily to the inference that the " injustice " referred to was the slaughter of the Melians by the Athenians (in 416 B. c. ; see Thuoyd., V. 116); the allusion of Aris- tophanes in the " Clouds " (v. 380) to the atheism of the Melian must, therefore, have been inserted in a second, revised edition of this comedy. Perhaps the prosecutions of religious offenders, which took place after the desecration of the images of Hermes, in the year 415, had some influence in bringing about the punishment of Diagoras. Diagoras is said to have perished by shipwreck, while attempting to escape. § 33. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, was bom in Olymp. 77.1-3, — according to later tradition, on the 6th day of the month Thargelion (hence in 471-469 b. c, in May or June). He agreed with the Sophists in the general tendency to make man the special object of reflection and study. He differed from them by directing his attention not merelj' to the elementary functions of man as a logical and moral subject, viz., to perception, opinion, and sen- suous and egotistical desire, but also to the highest intellectual functions which stand in essential relation to the sphere of objective reality, namely, to knowledge and virtue. Socrates made all virtue dependent on knowledge, i. e., on moral insight ; regarding the fonner as flowing necessarily from the latter. Virtue, according to Socrates, could be taught, and all virtue was one. Aristotle (whose testimony is confirmed by Plato and Xenophon) testifies that Socrates first introduced induction and definition, together with the dialectical art of refuting false knowledge, as instruments of philosophical in- quiry. The foundation of the Socratic Mcdeutio and Irony was dexterity in the employment of the methods of inductive definition in conversations relative to philosophical and, in particular, to moral problems, in the absence of systematically developed, substantive knowledge. The •• demonic sign," which was accepted by Socrates aa the voice of God, was a conviction, resulting from practical tact, with reference to the suitableness or unsuitableness of given courses of action (including also their ethical relations). The world is governed by a supreme, divine intelligence. SOCEATES OF ATHENS. 81 The accusation of Socrates, which took place in the year 399 b. c. (01. 95.1), not long after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, and which was brought forward by Meletus, and silpported by Anytus, the democratic politician, and Lycon, the orator, contained substantially the same charges which Aristophanes had made in the " Clouds." It ran thus : " Socrates is a public offender in that he does not rec- ognize the gods which the state recognizes, but introduces new demo- niacal beings ; he has also offended by corrupting the youth." This accusation was literally false ; but, considered with reference to its more profound basis, it rested on the correct assumption of an essen- tial relationship between Socrates and the Sophists, as evidenced in their common tendency to emancipate the individual, and in their common opposition to an immediate, unreflecting submission to the customs, law, and faith of the people and the state. Eut it mistook, on the one hand, what was legitimate in this tendency in general ; and, on the other, — and this is the principal point, — it ignored the specific difference between the Sooratic and Sophistic stand-points, or the earnest desire and endeavor of Socrates, in distinction from the Sophists, to place truth and morality on a new and deeper foun- dation. After his condemnation, Socrates submitted his conduct, but not his convictions, to the decision of his judges. His death, justly immortalized by his disciples, assured to his ideal tendency the most general and lasting influence. Dan. Heinains, Da doctrina et moribus Socratis, Leyden, 1627. Freret, ObaeroatioTVt aur Isa cauaea et aur quelquea circtmatancea de la condemnation da Socrata^ an essay read in the year 1786, aod published Id the Memairea de VAcademie dea JnacHplAona, T. 47 b, 209 seq. (Combats the old uncritical riew of the Sophists as instigators uf the accusation and sentence of Socrates, and points nut the political causes of these transactions.) Sig. Fr. Dresiz, Epiatola d» Socrale juate damnato, Leips. 173S. (As an opponent of the legally existing democracy, Socrates was justly condemned.) M. C. £. Kettner, Socrat, criminia majeatatia accua. vind., Leipsic, 1738. Job. Lnzac, Oratio da Socrate cive,, hey den, 1796 ; cf. Zect. Atticaa : Da Siyofttif Socratia, Leyden, 1309 (vrbereln the mutual antipathy of the Peripatetics and Flatonists is pointed out as one among other imparo sources of many unfarorable narrations respecting Socrates and his disciples). Georg Wiggers, Sokratea ala Jfenaeh, Biirgar und Philoaoph, P.astock, 1S07, 2d ed., Neustrelitz, ISll. Ludolph Dissen, De philoaopMa morall in Xen^phoniia de Socrate commentariia tradita, 1812, and in D.'s Kleine Schriften, 66tt 1839, pp. 57-88. (Dissen brings together in systematic order the Socratio thoughts contained in Xenophon, but considers the narrative of Xenophon inexact, on account ot bis having unjustly attributed to Socrates his own utilitarian stand-point) f riedr. Schleiermacher, Ueiher den Werth dea Socratea ala PMloaophen, read In the Berlin Akad. der Wiaa, .Jnly 27, 1815, published in the AliJi. der philoa. Claaae, Berlin, 1S18, p. SO seq., and in Schleiermacher's SUmmtL Wer&e, III. 2, 1888, pp. 287-803. (The idea of knowledge, says Schleiermacher, is the central point or the Socratic philosophy ; the proof of this is to be found — in view of the discrepancy between the reports «f the nearest witnesses, the too prosaic Xenophon and the idealizing Plato — in the different character of Greek philosophy befuie and after Socrates. Before him, single departments of philosophy, so far as they 6 82 SOCEATEB OF ATHENS. Tvero at all distinguished from each other, were developed by isolated groups of philosophers ; while after him, Jill departments were logically discriminated and cultivated by every school. Socrates himself must, therefore, while having no system of his own, yet represent the logical piinciple which makes the construc- tion of complete systems possible, i. c, the idea of knowledge.) Ferd. Delbruck, Sokrates^ Cologne, 1S19. W. Savern, V'6l}6r Aristophanes' Wolken, Berl. 1826. (According to Suvera, Aristophanes confounded Socrates with the Sophists.) Ch. A. Brandis, Grundlinien der Lehre des Sokrates, in the BJiein. Mus.^ Vol. I., 1827, pp. 118-150. Herm. Theod. Rotscber, Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter^ Berlin, 1827. (In this work Eotscher pub- lished for the first time in a detailed and popular form— particularly in the section on the " Clouds "—the Hegelian view of Socrates, as the representative of the principle of subjectivity, in opposition to the prin- ciple of " substantial morality,'^ on which the ancient state, according to Hegel, was founded— and of the attack of Aristophanes and the subsequent accusation and condemnation of Socrates, as representing the conflict of these two principles. Eotscher treats the narrative of Xenophon us the most impartial evidence In regard to the original teaching of Socrates. Cf. Hegel, Plumomer-joloyie des Geistes^ p. 560 seq. ; AesVts- Uk^ III. p. 537 seq. ; Vorl uber die Gesch. der Phil., II. p. 81 seq.) Ch. A. Brandis, Ueber die vorgebUche Sub^ectivitdt der SoJcratisehen Lehre, RJiein. Mus., II. 1828, pp. 85-113. (In opposition to the view supported by Eotscher, concerning the stand-point of Socrates and the fidelity of the accounts of Xenophon.) P. "W". Forchhammer, Die Athefier und Sohrates, die Gesetzlichen und der Revolutiona/r^ Berlin, 1937. (Forchhammer goes to an altogether untenable extreme in his recognition of the justification of the Athenians in condemning Socrates, yet his special elucidation of the political circumstances Is a work of merit Cf. in reference to the same subject, Bendixen, Ueber den tleferen Schriftsinn des revolution- iiren Sokrates und der gesetsHchen Athener, Huysum, 1838.) C. F. Hermann, De Socratis magistris et discipUna juvenilis Marburg, 1837. Ph. Guil. van Heusde, Characterismi principwm philosophoruTn vetermn, Socratis^ Platonis^ Aris- totelia, Amsterdam, 1S39. " Oii the Cosmopolitanism of Socrates^'' ^' On Xanthippe^'' " On the Clouds of Aristophanes;'''* in the Verslagen en Ned, of the K. Akad, van IT., IV. 8, 1859; see the articles in the Pkilologus, XVI., pp. 888 seq. and 666 seq. J. "W. Ilanne, Sokrates als Genius der Ilitmajiiiat. Brunswick, 3841. C. F. Hermann, I>e Socratis accwtatoribu^, Gott 1854. Ernst Ton Lasaulx, Des Sokrates Leben, Lehre und Tod, nach den Zeugnissen der Alten dargesiellt, Munich, 1657. [T. P. Potter, Characteristics of the Greek Philosophers^ Socrates and Plato, London, 1345. E. D. Hampden, The fathers of Greek Philosophy (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle — articles reprinted from the Encyclopaedia Britannica), Edinburgh, 1862. E. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, translated from the German by 0. Eeichel, London, 1868.— 7>.] E. A. Alberti, Sokrates, ein Vei'such Uber ihn nach den Quellen, Guttingen, 1869. The political bearings of tho trial of Socrates are very comprehensively and exactly developed in G. Grote's History of Greece, chap. 63 (Vol. VIII. pp. 551-684). Of the numerous lectures and essays on Socrates we name here the following! C, W. Brnrobey, 8.nach. J>log. L., Lemgo, 1800; Friedr. Aug. Carxis, Sokrates, in his Ideen sur Gesch, der Philos., Lelpsic, 1809, ■pp. 514-555; F. L6lut, Du Demon de Socrate, Paris, 1836; Aug. Boeckh, De Socr. rerum physicatiim studio, 1838; H. E. Hummel, De Theologia Socr., Gott. 1839; J. D. van Hoevell, De Socr, philusopMa, Groningen, 1S40 ; Zeller, Zur Ehrervrettung der Xanthippe, in the MbrgenhUUt fUr gebildete Leser, 1S50, No. 265 seq., and in Zeller's Vortrlige und Abhandlungen, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 51-61 ; Hurndall, De philos. mor. Socr., Heidelberg, 1S53 ; C. M. Fleischer, De Socr. guam dicunt utopia, " Progr." of the Gymn. at Clevo, 1855 ; Hermann KSchly, Sokratesund sein Volk, akadem. Vortrag. gehalten 1855, in KSchly's Akad. Vortr. und Eeden, L, Ziirich, 1859, pp. 219-386; cf. the review by K. Lehrs in the K Jahrb. f. Phil v. Pad., Vol. LXXIX., 1859, pp. 555 seq. ; Scibert, Sokr. und Cliristus, in the Pild. Archiv., ed. by Langbeiu, L, Stettin, 1859, pp. 291-807 ; L. Noack, Sokrates und die Sophisten, in Psyche, Vol. II., 1859; G. Mehring, Ueber Sokr., in Fichte's Zeitsclir. f. Pliilos., Yo\. XXXYl., Halle, 1860, pp. 81-119; F. Ueberweg, Ueber Sokr., in Gelzer's Protest. MonaUbl., Vol. XVL, No. 1, July, 1860; SteflFensen, ibid.. Vol. XVII., No. 2; A. Bohringer, Der philos. Standpunkt des Sokrates, Carlsruhe, 1860, Ueber die Wolken des Aristophanes, iittZ., 1868; H. Schmidt, Sokrates, Vortrag gehalten in Wittenberg, Halle, 1860; W. F. Volkmann, Die Lehre des Sokrates in Hirer Mstor. Stellung, in the Abh. der SShm. Ges. der Wiss.. Fifth Serica, Vol. XL, Prague, 1S61, pp. 199-222; Bartelmann, De Socrate (G.-Pr.), Oldenburg, 1S62; Phil. Jab- Ditges, Die epagogisdie oder inductorisclie Afethode des Sokrates und der BeQriff (G.-Pr.), Colopnp, 1364; M. Carriire, S. u. s. Stellung in der Gesch. des mensehl. Geistes, in Westermann's Monatsh., ISM, Ko. 92; Bourneville, Socrate etait-ilfouf reponse d M. Bally, membra de Tacad^txatr. du journal de m4d. mentale, June, 1864 ; Ch. H. Bertram, Der So/crates dsa Xenophon und der des Aristophanes, 800EATES OF ATHENS. 83 (0.-Progr.\ Magdeb. 1865; Franz Dittrioh, De Socratia amtmUa, virtuttm taw acienUam, Index Ltd. Lycei Uoaiani, Braansberg, 1868; Job. Peters, Da Socraie qui eat in Atticorum antiqua comoedia diaput I" Progr." of the Gymn. at Beuthcn), Leipric, 1869 ; E. Chaignet, Tie de 5, Paris, 1869 ; P. Montee, La phUoa. de S., Anas, 1869 ; H. Siebeck (see above, § 27). On the iotellectaal development of Socrates and the relation thereto of Plat., Phaed., 95 e, seq., see Boeclch in the Siunmer Catalogue, Berlin, 1883; Krische, Farachungen, I. p. 210; Susemihl in th« PMlolo- gua, XX., 1863, p. 226 seq. ; Ueberweg, iUd. XXL 1864, p. 20 seq., and Tolqnardsen, Rh. Mua., New Series, XIX. 1864, pp. 505-520. On the "Demon" of Socrates, cf. Xuhner, in his edition of the 3femoraHlia,(B{bt, Graec., cur. F. Jacobs at V. Chr. F. Eost, Ser. Orat. Pet?.,) VoL Till., (Jotha, 1841, pp. 18-25, where other earlier works are cited; of later writers, cf., besides Brandis, Zeller, and others, C. F. Yolquardsen, Daa Dwmoniimi dea Sokratea und aeine Tnterpreten, Kiel, 1862 ; L. Breitenbach, Zeitachriftf. d. Gymnaaialweaen, XTII. 1808, pp. 499-511 ; Chr. Cron, in the Eoa, audd. Z&itachr, filr PHlol. u. Gymnaaialweaen, ed. by L. Urlichs, B. Blark, and L. v. Jan, I., Wttrzburg, 1864, pp. 169-179; P. W. Freymuller, Progr., Metten, 1S64; Fcrd. Fridr. Hugli, Daa Da/monium dea Sokratea, Berne, 1864. For determining the year of the birth of Socrates we find our surest data in the recorded year of his death and the number of years that he is known to have lived. Socrates drank the cup of poison in the month of Thargelion, in 01. 95.1 (= 400-399), hence in May or June, 399 B. c. (on the 20th of Thargelion, ace. to K. P. Hermann, De Theoria Deliaca, in the Index. Lect, Gott. 1846—47). At the time of his condemnation he was, according to his own account in Plat., Apol., 11 d, more than seventy years old (irri yeyova; nTieiu epSo- tir/Kovra). He must, therefore, have been born at the latest in 469, or rather certainly before 469. In the Platonic dialogue Griio (p. 52 e), Socrates represents the laws of Athens as saying to him: "For the space of seventy years you have been at liberty, Socrates, to quit Athens, if you were dissatisfied with us." This also points to an age of more than seventy years. Hence 01. 70.1 or 2 is to be assumed as the year of his birth. (Cf. Boeckb, Corpus Inscript., II. p. 321, and K. P. Hermann, Plat. Philos., p. 666, Mote 522). The statement of Apollodorus (Diog. L., II. 44), that Socrates was bom in 01. 11. i, is accord- ingly inexact. The 6th of the month Thargelion is given (by Apollodorus, ap. Diog. L., ibid., and others) as his birthday, and this day, like the Ith of the same month, as the birth., day of Plato, was annually celebrated by the Platonists. But the immediate succession of these days one after the other, and still more their coincidence with the days on which the Dehans celebrated the birth of (the maieutic) Artemis (6th of Thargelion) and Apollo (Thar- gelion 7th), are enough to make it probable that the birtlidays assigned to both of these philosophers, or at least that of Socrates, are not historical, but were arbitrarily chosen for celebration. The father of Socrates was a sculptor, and Socrates himself followed his father's occu- pation for a time ; in the time of the Periegetes Pausanias (about A. d. 150), a work executed by Socrates (or at least ascribed to him), and representing the Graces attired, was standing at the entrance to the Acropolis. Plato makes him allude to his mother in Tlteaet, p. 149 a, where he calls lumself vibg fiaiag /id?M yemaiag re Kai p?/>avpa.;, iaivapiTT/g, and says of himself that he also practices her art of midwifery, when he entices the ideas of his collocutors into the light of day, and examines whether they are genuine and tenable. Socrates received at Athens in his youth the education prescribed by the laws (Plat., Crito, 60 d), and made himself also acquainted with geometry alid astronomy (Xen., Memor., IV. 1). That he " heard " Anaxagoras or Archelaus is reported only by untrustworthy authorities. Plato accounts (Phaedo, 97 f.) for his acquaintance with the opinions of Anaxagoras by supposing that he had read the work written by that philosopher. Socrates was also familiar with the doctrines of othernatural philosophers (Jfem., I. 1. 14; IV. 1. 6), although he did not accept them ; he read critically (according to Xen., Mem., I. 6. 14 ; cf. IV. 2. 1 and 8) the writings of the early sages (rovg B/jaavpovg tuv i^ahu aofuv avipuv, o8f cKelvoi 84 SOOEATES OF ATHENS. KareXmov h ^ipjioK ypaijiavTec, avcTaTTav Koivff avv Tolq ^'iTioi; Siipxopiai, ml av re opwun. ayaBdv, £K?i£y6/ieda). The meeting with Parmenides, mentioned by Plato, is probably to oe regarded as historic (see above, § 19). A material influence on his philosophical develop- ment was exercised by the Sophists, to whose discourses he sometimes listened, and with whom he often conversed, and to whom, also, he not unfrequently directed others (Piat., T7u!aet., 151b). He sometimes speaks of himself in Plato's works (Frotag., 341a; ct. Meno, 96 d; Charmides, 163 d; Gratyl, 384 d; Eipp. Maj., 282 c) as a pupil of Prodicus, yel not without a shade of irony, aimed especially at the subtle word-distinctions of thai Sophist. A Platonic testimony, respecting the course of the intellectual development ot Socrates may be regarded as contained substantially in Phaedo, p. 95 seq., although the Platonic conception and representation of Socrates is here, as everywhere, influenced by the, not Socratic, but Platonic doctrine of ideas (see Boeckh, in the Sommer-Katalog. der Univ., Berlin, 1838, and my Plat. Untermchutigen, Vienna, 1861, pp. 92-94, and latfc^ works relative to the mental development of Socrates, cited above, p. 83). Plato transfera to Socrates from his own thought only that which (l''^^ *'^® theory of ideas and the ideal Of the state) would naturally follow from the views actually held by the historical Socrates ; Plato can not have ascribed to Socrates the history of his own mental develop&ect, inas- much as it was demonstrably other than that portrayed in the passage in quesiion. Socrates (according to PI, Apot, 28 e) took part in three miUtary campaigns, viz. : in the campaigns of Potidaea (between 432 and 429, cf. PI., Sympos., 219 e, and Charm., inil.), Delium (424, cf. Symp., 221a, Lach., 181 a), and Amphipolis (422). He demonstrated his fidelity to the laws during his life imder democratic and oligarchical rulers (Apol, p. 32), and at last by scorning to save his life by flight (PL, Grito, p. 44 seq.). Beyond thi^ Socrates kept himself remote from political aflairs. His only vocation, as he believed, wa» to strive, by means of his dialectic, to quicken the moral insignt and influence the moral conduct of individuals, as he was convinced that this form of activity was most advau- tageous for hunself and his fellow-citizens (PI., Apol, p. 29 seq.). In the writings of the disciples of Socrates, the latter appears almost always as a man already advanced in years, such as they themselves had known him. In their delineations of his character, the leading feature is the utter discrepancy between the interior and the exterior — which, to the Hellenic mind, accustomed to harmony, was an aronov — his simi- larity with Sileni and Satyrs in personal appearance and the homeliness of his conversa- tional discourses, combined with the most sterling moral worth, the most complete self- control in pleasure and privation, and a masterly lalent in philosophical dialogue (Xen., Jfem., IV. 4. 5 ; IV. 8. H et al.; Sympos., IV. 19; V. 5 ; Plat., Symp., pp. 215, 221). In their account of the life of Socrates, the two principal authorities, Xenophon and Plato, substantially agree, although the Platonic picture is sketched with the more delicate hand. As to their reports of his doctrine, it is, first of all, unquestionably true that Plato in his dialogues generally presents his own thoughts through the mouth of Socrates. But in a certain sense his dialogues can, nevertheless, serve as authorities for the Socratic teaching, because the groundwork of the philosophy of Plato is contained in that of Socrates, and because it is possible, in general, though not in all cases in detail, to discriminate between the Platonic and Socratic elements. Plato took care not to be led by his love of idealization too far from historic truth ; in some of his compositions (in the Apology, in Onto, and in part also in the Protagoras, Laches, etc.) he remains almost entirely faithful to it, and in others puts those doctrines which Socrates could not have professed into the mouth of other philosophers. Xenophon wrote the Mentor, and the Symposium (for the so-called " Apology of Xenophon " is spurious) not so much in the spirit of a pure historian as in that of an apologist ; but his honorable defense of Socrates demands from us full confidence 80CEATE8 OP AlflENB. 85 in his historic fidelity, so far as his intention is concerned. . Bnt it must be acknowledged that as much can not be said of his intellectual qualification for an exact and comprehensive understanding of the Socratio philosophy. Xenophon <(,ppears to attribute too uncon- ditionally to Socrates the tendency, natural to himself, to connect all scientific activity with a practical purpose, and he tlius gives too small a place to the dialectic of Socrates, a.s compared with his ethical teachings. The brief statements of Aristotle respecting the philosophical doctrines of Socrates are very valuable, since they are purely historical, and relate to the most important points of his teaching. "We read in the Metaphysics of Aristotle (XIII. 4), that Socrates introduced the method of induction and definition (which sets out from the individual and ends in the definition of the general notion — rotif r" incKTiKovg Uyovg xai to opi^ecBai Ka667iov). The field of investigation in which Socrates employed this method is designated by Aristotle as the ethical {Metaph., I. 6). The fundamental conception of Socrates was, according to the same authority, the insepardbh union of theoretical insight with practical moral excellence (Arist., Eth. Nicom., VI. 13: XuKpar^g (^pnv^aeig ^tTo dvat ndaac rag aperdf . . . Tidyuvc rag aperag usTO dvat • tmarijiiaQ yap elvai iraaaq, cf Xen., Mem., II. 9. 4 seq.). We find these state- ments fully confirmed by Plato and Xenophon ; only Aristotle may have described Socrates' ideas in more definite, technical language than was used by their author (Xen., Memor., I. 1. 16; avrhg 6e irepl tuv dv&pwjrsiuv av del ^tE^yero, ckottCiv, tI Evas^ig, tI dffe^eg ■ rl Ka?^v, tI alaxp^ ' Ti dtKacov^ tl dStKov ' ri awfpaauv^j tI fw-vla ' tI dvipeia, ri SeiXla ' rl ird'Kig^ ri TToXiTtudg • t'l dpxv dTy&punuv, rig dpxi^og dv&p^irGWj Kai Trepl tuv dXXuv, a Tovg fiev el66rag if/elro KaXotif Kaya&ovg elvai, roif d' dyvoovvTag dvSpaTToSiiieig av SiKa'tag KenMJa^ai. lb. IV. 6. 1: CKOTTojv Giw Toig (TwovGi, ri eicauTov eiTj tuv fivruv, ovSeircyiZof l^tjyev, lb. III. 4, 9 seq. : aoiplav Jf Kal aufpoavvrpf ov thupc^Ev . . , £07 6e Kat riyv 6tKau)(TVV7fv KaX ttjv d7J.7iv TToaav dpETT/v aofiav Elvai). Holding these opinions, Socrates was convinced that virtue was capable of being taught, tliat all virtue was in truth only one, and that no one was voluntarily wicked, all wiclcedness resulting merely from ignorance (Xen., Memorai., III. 9 ; IV. 6; cf. Sympos., II. 12; Plat., Apol, 25 e, Protag., p. 329 b, seq., 352). The good (ayaddv) Is identical with the beautiful (Ka^ov) and the useful (ixjiiXi/iov ■ xpvo^/^o'' — Mem., IV. 6. 8 and 9 ; Protag., 333 d, 353 c, seq.). Better than good fortune (evrvxid), which is accidental, is a correct praxis, arising from insight and self-discipline (ciirpafto, Mem., III. 9. 1/). Self-knowledge, fulfillment of the requirement of the Delphian Apollo, " Know thyself," is the condition of practical excellence (Mem., IV. 2. 24). External goods do not advance their possessor. To want nothing is divine ; to want the least possible, brings one nearest to divine perfection (Xen., Memor., I. 6. 10). Cicero's well-known declaration (Acad, post, I. 4, 15; Fuse, V. 4. 10; cf. Diog. L., II. 21), tliat "Socrates called philosophy down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the cities and houses of men^ compelling men to inquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil," indicates, in terms substantially correct, the progress of philosophy in Socrates from the cosmology and physics of his predecessors to anthropological ethics. Socrates, however, possessed no complete system of ethical doctrines, but only the living instinct of inquiry, and could, therefore, naturally arrive at definite ethical theorems only in conversation with others. Hence his art was intellectual midwifery (as Plato terms it, Theaet., p. 149); he enticed forth thoughts from the mind of the respondent and subjected them to examination. AVith his confessed ignorance, — wluch yet, as reposing on a lively and exact consciousness of the nature of true knowledge, stood higher tlian the pretended knowledge of his collocu- tors, — ^was connected the Socratic irony {upiweia), or the apparent deference of Socrates to the superior intelligence and wisdom o:' others, until these vanished into nothingness before that dialectical testing, in the course o-. which he compared the asserted general ?6 SOCEATES OF ATHENS. oTuth with admitted particular facts. In this manner Socrates exercised the vocation which he beUeved had been indicated for him by the Delphic god, when, in reply to Chaerephon, the oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of men — the vocation, namely,' of eocamming men {i^iraai^, Plat, Apol, p. 20 seq.). He devoted his life especially to the education of youth. For the accomplishment of this end he relied on the aid of cpuf, love, which, without excluding its sensuous element, he refined and utilized as an instru- ment in the conduct of souls and the common development of his thoughts and those of his listeners. Tlie fundamental thought in the political doctrine of Socrates is that authority prop- erly belongs to the intelligent {kmoTajitvo^), to him who possesses knowledge (Xenopli., Memorah., III. 9. 10 ; of. III. 6. 14). The good ruler must be, as it were, a shepherd to those whom he rules (the voifi^ Tmuv, of Homer). His business, his "virtue," is to mak« them happy (rb ASaljiovag iToitlv am av ify^Tai, Mem., III. 2. 4; cf. I. 2. 32). Socrates found fault with the appointment of ofBoers by popular suffrage and by lot {Mem., I. 2. 9; III. 9. 10). The peculiar philosophical significance of Socrates lies in his logically rigorous reflec- tion upon moral questions, his combination of the spirit of research with that of doubt, and his dialectical method of demolishing seeming and conducting to true knowledge. AJut since reflection, from its very nature, is occupied with the universal, while action in pvery specific case relates only to the particular, it is necessary for the existence of prac- lical ability that the habit of reflection should be accompanied by a certain practical insigM ■or tact, which also involves moral tact, although not exclusively, nor even mainly, confined to the latter. This tact respects chiefly the favorable or unfavorable result to be expected from a given action or course of action. Socrates recognized reflection as man's peculiar work; but that immediate conviction of the suitableness or unsuitableness of certain actions, of whose origin he was not conscious, but which he recognized as a sign pointing him to the right way, he piously ascribed, without subjecting it to psychological analysis, to divine agency. This divine leading is that which he designates as his iaifdviov. In the Apology of Plato (p. 31 d), Socrates says: " The reason of my remaining apart from public life is 5rj jioi 6sl6v tl kc'i Sai/idviov yiyverai," and he goes on to explain that from his youth up he had been ever cognizant of a voice, which only warned, but never encouraged him. This voice he terms, in the JPhaedrus, " his demonic and familiar sign " (rb dai/i6vi6v re kcI ri e'luSbg a?ifielov). According to Xen., Memar., XV. 8. 5, this daifiSvwv Interposed its warning when he was about to reflect on the defense he should make before his judges, i. e., his practical tact showed him that it was worthier of him and better for his cause, that he should give, himself exclusively over to the solemn inspiration of the moment, thau by rhetorical preparation to prejudice his hopes of such inspiration. Less exact is the occasional statement of Xenophon, that Socrates was shown by the Sai/i6vtov "what things he ought to do and what not" (a ts xP^ noislv Kal & /17, Mem., I. 4. 15; IV. 3. 12). The power from which this voice emanated is designated as "the God" (i flfdj-, Mem., IV. 8. 6), or "the Gods" {oi Beoi, Mem., I. 4. 15 ; IV. 3. 12), the same Gods who also speak to men by the oracles. Socrates defends the belief in the existence of gods on teleological grounds, arguing from the structure of organized beings, whose parts are subservient to the wants of the whole, and founding his reasoning on the general principle, that whatever exists for a use must be the work of intelligence (ttpLtsi fiiv to. ctt' u^Xelg. yiyv6fisva yvofiij^ Ipya ehai. Memcr., I. 4. 4 seq. ; IV. 3. 3 seq ). The "Wisdom ((ppdvijmg), says Socrates, which is present and rules in all that exists, determines all things according to its good pleasure. It is distinguished from the other gods as the ruler and disposer of the universe (i rbv 0X0' SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 87 K6a/im awriTTav re Kal aw^x""')- The gods, like the human soul, are invisible, but make known their existence unmistakably by their operations {MeTnor., IV. 3. 13). Aristophanes, in the " Clouds " (which were first reprJlented in 423 B. c), attributes to Socrates not only traits of character and doctrines which really belonged to him, but also Anaxagorean doctrines and Sophistic tendencies. The ground of the possibility of this misapprehension (or, if the expression is preferred, of this poetical license) is to be found, ou the part of Socrates, not only in the fact that he stood, as a philosopher, in a certain antagonism to the general popular consciousness, and that the Anaxagorean theology had not remained without a considerable influence upon liim, but more especially in the fact that, as a philosopher whose reflection was directed to the subjective processes and phenomena, and who made action dependent on such reflection, he moved in the same general sphere with the Sophists, being specifically differentiated from them only by tha peculiar direction or kind of his philosophizing. On the part of Aristophanes, it is to b» found in the fact that he, as a poet and not a philosopher, and (so far as he is in earnest ia his representations) as an anti-Sophistical moralist and patriotic citizen of the old school, with his conviction of the immorality and dangerousness of all philosophy, scarcely con- sidered tlie significance of specific differences among philosophers as worthy of his atten- tion, not to say, was unable to appreciate their essential importance. The same opinion respecting Socrates which wo find in Aristophanes, seems also to have been entertained by his accusers. Meletus is described in Plato's Euthyphron (p. 2 b) as a young man, little known, and personally almost a stranger to Socrates. In the Platonic Apologia it is said of him that he joined in the accusation because he felt himself injured by Socrates' demonstration of tlie ignorance of poets respecting the nature of their art ibvip tCiv notT/Tcn' axSifisvog, Apol., p. 23 e). Perhaps he was a son of the poet Meletus, whom Aristophanes mentions in the " Frogs " (v. 1302). Anytus, a rich leather-dealer, was an influential demagogue, who had fled from Athens during the rule of the Thirty, and had returned fighting on tlie side of Thrasybulus ; Socrates says in the Apologia (p. 23 e) that he joined in the accusation as a representative of the tradesmen and politicians iywip ruv iilfuovpyijv Koi tChv Tto'^iTudyv axBd/itvoc), and in the Meno (p. 94 e) it is intimated that he was displeased with tlie depreciatory judgment of Socrates respecting the Athenian statesmen. According to the Apology of Pseudo-Xenophon (29 seq.), he was angry with Socrates because the latter thought his son fitted for something better than the leather business, and had counseled him to educate this son for something higher. Lyoon felt injured by what Socrates had said of the orators (imp tuv pT/rdpav, Apol, 23 e). The accusation ran as follows {Apol, p. 24 ; Xen., Mem., 1. 1 ; Favorinus, ap. Diog. L., II. 40) : ride eypdtpaTO koX avTa/ioaaro Mt-^^of Me/I^tou TltT-Sevg Suiicpdrei Sa^poviaiaw 'A/Mirexf/^sv ' aiucel SuKpaTTii oSf /lev fj 7c6%tq vo/iH^ei ■&eo!bq mi vo/it^uv, erepa 6c Kaiva 6ai/i6vta ela^oiifievog, admei di ml Tabs viovg dmipBeipuv. rifiTijia • ■&a,vaTo(. The ordinary objections against all philosophers were directed against Socrates, without any special investigation of tlie peculiar tendency or aim of his teachings (Apol, 23 d). Tlie particular cliarges which Xenophon (I. ch. 2.) cites and labors to refute, appear (as Cobet, Novae Lectiones, Leyden, 1858, p. 662 seq., seeks to demonstrate — ^yet cf Biichsenschiitz, in the Philologus, XXII., p. 691 seq.) to havo been taken, not from the speeches of the accusers, but from a work by Polycrates, the rlietorician, written after the death of Socrates, in justification of the sentence. The conduct of Socrates is described by Plato with historic fidelity in tlie essential outlines, in the Apol, in Orito, and in the first and last parts of the Phaedo. The Parrhesia of Socrates appeared to his judges as presumptuousness. His philosophical reflection seemed to them a violation of those ethical and religious foundations of the Athenian state, which the restored democracy were endeavoring to re-establish. The former intimacy of Socrates 88 THE DISCIPLES OF BOCEATES. with Alcibiades, and especially with the hated aristocrat, Critias (of. JEschines, AdVL Timarch., § 71), led to a mistrust of his doctrines and purposes. Nevertheless, the con- demnation was voted by only a small majority of voices ; according to Apol., p. 36 a, he would have been acquitted if only three, or, according to another reading, thirty of the judges had been of a different mind ; bo that of the probably 600 or 501 judges, either 253 or 280 must have voted for his condemnation, and 247-248 or 220-221 for his acquittal. But since, after the condemnation, he would not acknowledge himself guilty by expressing an opinion as to the punishment he should receive, but declared himself worthy, on the contrary, of being fed at the Prytaneum as a benefactor of the state, and at last only on the persuasion of his friends agreed to a fine of thirty minse, he was (according to Diog. L., ll. 42) condemned to death by a majority increased by eighty votes. The execution of the sentence had to be delayed thirty days, until the return of the sacred ship, which had been sent only the day before the condemnation with an embassy to Delos. Socrates scorned as unlawful the means of escape which Crito had prepared for him. He drank, the cup of poison in his prison, surrounded by his disciples and friends, with perfect steadfastness and tranquillity of soul, full of assurance that tlie death which was to attest his fidelity to his convictidns would be most advantageous for him and for his work. The Athenians are reported soon afterward to have regretted their sentence. Yet a more general revulsion of opinion in favor of Socrates seems first to have taken place in consequence of the labors of his scholars. That the accusers were, some exiled, some put to death, as later writers relate (Diodorus, XIV. 37 ; Plut., Le Invid., c. 6 ; Diog. L., 11. 43, VI. 9 seq., and others) is probably only a fable, which was apparently founded on the fact that Anytus (banished, perhaps, for political reasons) died, not in Athens, but in Heradea on the Pontus, where in later centuries his tomb was still pointed out. § 34. In the Socratic principle of knowledge and virtue, the prob- lem for the snceessors of Socrates was indicated beforehand. That problem was the development of the philosophical disciplines termed dialectic and ethics. Of his immediate disciples (so far as they were of philosophical significance) the larger number, as " partial disciples of Socrates," turned their attention predominantly to the one or the other part of this double problem ; the Megaric or Eristic school of Euclid and the Elian school of Phsedo occupying themselves almost exclusively with dialectical investigations, and the Cynic school of Antisthenes and the Hedonic or Cyrenaic school of Aristippua treat- ing, in difierent senses, principally of ethical questions. In each of these schools, at the same time, some one of the various types of pre- Socratic philosophy was continued and' expanded. It was Plato, however, who first combined and developed into the unity of a com- prehensive system the different sides of the Socratic spirit, as well as all the legitimate elements of earlier systems. K. P. Hermann, Die phiZoaophiaclie Staiung der dlteren Sokratiktr und ihrer Schiaeti, in lii" Ges. Abhandlrnigeu, Outtingen, 1849, pp. 22T-255. On ^schines, cf. K. F. Hermann, De Aeediinis Socratici reliquiU ditp. acad., Gott. 1S30. On Xenophnn, cf. A. Boookh, De aimuUate, qunm Plato cmn JTenophonie eaeninitae fertvr, Berlin, 1811; Niebuhr, .K7. &Ar(«e», I., p. 4G7 Beq. ; F. Delbrad;, J'enopAon, Bonn, 1829 ; mrachig.De diaeipHnat EUCLID OT MEGAEA AND HIS SCHOOL. 89 Socraticae in viiam et moret antiquorwn 'ei tt egloaoitate, in ZtnophmM» dtetm mine Graeeos ta Ana aattioi in patriam rtdueenlit eremplo mamifttta, in : Symbolae Hit., III., Amsterdam, 1S39 ; J. D. van Hogvell, De Xenophontis philOHOphia, Groning. 1840 ; J. H. Liniemann, Die Lebeneannicht dee JCen.^ C»Ditz,1843; J>ie rei-eittl. Weltaneechauutig dee f/erodot^ Thueydidee ttnd Xenophon^ Berlin, 1S52; P. ■Werner, Xenoph. de rebus pulil. aentent., Breslau, 1851 ; En^el, X. polit, Stellung und Wirkeamkeit, Stargiird, 1858 ; A. Gamier, Uietoire de la Morale ; Xenophon^ Paris, 1?57. Of. also the articles by A. Has, Philol., VII., 1852, pp. 68S-69S; and K. F. Hermann, Philol.. Till., SST seq. ; and the opuscule of Georg Ferd. Bettig, Univ.-Fr., Berne, 1S64, on the mutual relation of llie Xenophontic and Platonic Sj/mposia, and Arn. Hug^s Die Unechthelt der dem Xeiioplwn eugeao/Lriebenen Apologie des Soerates, in Hcrm. Kochly^s Akad. Yortr. it. Jiede?., Zurich, 1S59, pp. 430-439. See also H. Henkel, Xenoplion -und Jeocratee {Progr.\ Salzwedel, 1866 (cf. P. Sanneg, De Sclwla Jaocratea, dies., Halle, 1867) ; and A. Nicolal, Xenophon^e Cyropddie und seine Ansicht vom Stoat (Proffr,), Bernburg, 1867. Xenophon, who was bom about 444 B. c. (according to Cobet, 430), died about 354 B. c, and belongs to the older disciples of Socrates. His Cyropaedia is a philosophical and political novel,'illuatrating the fundamental Socratic principle that authority is the prerogative of the intelligent, who alone are qualified to wield it ; but it is to be confessed that the " intelli- gent " man, as depicted by Xenophon, is, as Erasmus justly says (cf. Hildebrand, Gesch. «. Sysi. d. Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, I. p. 249), '' rather a prudent and skillfully calcu- lating politician than a truly wise and just ruler." Xenophon and .iEschines are scarcely to be reckoned among the representatives of any special philosophical type or school. They belong rather to the class of men who, following Socrates with sincere veneration, strove, through intercourse with him, to attain to whatever was beautiful and good (raz^- icayadia). Others, as, notably, Critias and Alcibiades, sought by association with Socrates to enlarge the range of their intelligence, yet without bringing themselves permanently under his moral influence. Few out of the great number of the companions of Socrates proposed to themselves as a life-work the development of his philosophical ideas. The expression "partial disciples of Socrates," is not to be understood as implying that the men so named had only reproduced certain sides of the Socratic philosophy. On the contrary, they expanded the doctrines of their master, each in a definite province of philosophy and in a specific direction, and even their renewal of earlier philosophemes may be described rather as a self-appropriating elaboration of the same than as a mere combina- tion of them with Socratic doctrines. In like relation stands Plato to the entire body of Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy. While Cicero's affirmation is true of the other companions of Socrates {De Orat, III. 16, 61): "ea; iUius {Socraiis) variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibtis alius aliud apprejiendit," Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismaticaUy broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity. § 35. Euclid of Megara united the ethical principle of Socrates ■with tlie Eleatic theory of the One, to -which alone true being could be ascribed. He teaches : The good is one, although called by many names, as intelligence, God, reason. The opposite of the good is without being. The good remains ever immutable and like itself. The supposition that Euclid, ■without detracting from the unity of the good or the truly existent, nor from the unity of ■virtue, also assumed a multiplicity of unchangeable essences, is very improbable. The method of demonstration employed by Euclid was, like that of Zeno, the indirect. The most noted of the followers of Euclid wei e Eubu- 90 EUCLID OF MEGARA AND HIS SCHOOL. lidea the Milesian, and Aleximis — celebrated for the invention of the sophistical arguments known as the Liar, the Concealed, the Measure of Grain, the Horned Man, the Bald-head ; Diodorus Cronus — known as the author of new arguments against motion, and of the assertion that only the necessary is real and only the real is possible ; and the disciple of Diodorus, Philo, the dialectician (a friend of Zeno of Cittium). Stilpo of Mfegara combined the Megaric philosophy with the Cynic. He argued against the doctrine of ideas. The dialectical doctrine, that nothing can be predicated except of itself, and the ethical doctrine, that the wise man is superior to pain, are ascribed to him. On the Jfegariaru^ cf. Georg Ludvr. Spalding, Vindiaiae phUos. Jifegaricorum, Berlin, 179S ; Ferd. Deyclis, De JUegaricorum dodritm^ Bonn, 1S27; Heinr. Hitter, Bemerk ungen uber die Philoa. der Stega- rischen Scliule^ in the Jihevn. Mus. /. PMlol.^ II. 1828. p. 295 seq. ; Henne, Eeole de Megare^ Paris, 1843 ; Mallet, Ilisioire de VecoU de Megare et den eeoles d^Elis et d'Eretrie, Paris. 1845 ; Hartenstein, Ueber dU Sedeutung der Megariichen Sahulefur die Geftchichte der metajthyitifichen Probleme, in the VerhanUL der sdoha. Oesellscli. der Wins., 1848, p. 190 aeq. ; Pr.intl, Geseh. der Logik, I. p. S3 seq. Of Euclid the Megarian (who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathema- tician, who lived a century later) it is related (Gell., Nod. AU., VI. 10) that, at the time when the Athenians had forbidden the Megarians, under penalty of death, to enter their city, he often ventured, for the sake of intercourse with Socrates, under cover of evening to come to Athens. Since this interdict was issued in Olymp. 87.1, Euclid must have been one of the earliest disciples of Socrates, if this story is historical. He was present at the death of Socrates (Phaedo, p. 59 c), and the greater part of the companions of Socrates are reported to have gone to him at Megara soon afterward, perhaps in order that they tqo might not fall victims to the hatred of the democratic rulers in Athens against philosophy (Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6). Euchd appears to have lived and to have remained at the head of the school founded by him, during several decades after the death of Socrates. Early made familiar with the Eleatic philosophy, he modified the same, under the influence of the Socratic ethics, making the One identical with the good. The school of Euclid is treated of by Diog. Laert., in his Vitae PhUos., II. 108 seq. The author of the dialogue Sophistes mentions (p. 246 b, seq.) a doctrine, according to which the sphere of true being was made up of a multiplicity of immaterial, absolutely | unchangeable forms (nSv\ accessible only to thought. Many modem investigators (in par- ticular Sohleiermsicher, Ast, Deycks, Brandis, K. F. Hermann, Zeller, Prantl, and others) refer % this doctrine to the Megarians ; others (especially Ritter? as above cited, Petersen, in the Zeitschriftfur Alterthumsiuiss, 1856, p. 892, and Mallet, ibid. XXXIV.) dispute this. In- defense of the latter position may be urged the inconsequence which the doctrine would imply on the part of Euclid, if ascribed to him, and also the testimony of Aristotle (Metaph., I. 6 seq. ; XIII. 4), according to which Plato must be regarded as the proper author of the theory of ideas, whence it results that this theory can not have been professed by Euclid under any form. The passage in the Sophistes must, in case Plato was the author of that dialogue, be interpreted as representing the opinion of partial Platonists (of. my Unter- suchimgen iiier die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriftm, Vienna, 1861, p. 277 seq.) But since the dialogue (as Schaarschmidt has shown, cf. TJeberweg in Bergmann's Phi!m Man., III. p. 479) was probably composed by some Platonist, who modified the doctrine c( TMMDO OF ELIS AND HIS SCHOOI,. 91 Plato, the passage in question la rather to be considered as referring to Plato's theory of ideas, or perhaps to an interpretation of it, which the author of the dialogue thought inexact. Cf. Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften^onn, 1866, p. 210 seq. The doctrine of Euclid (as given at the beginning of this section) is expressed by Diog. L., II. 106, in these words : oirof Iv to ayaSbv a7rE jrXeiaruv Seophirp) /iiite fui&ti/MTijv). Pleasure is pernicious. A frequent saying of Antisthenes (according to Diog. L., VI. 3) wsis : navdrpi /laXTuyv tj jiaBdrrv, " I would rather be mad than glad." The good is beautiful, evil is hateful (ibid. 1 2). He who has once become wise and virtuous, can not afterward cease to be such (Diog. L., VI. 105: Tyv aper^v iidaKripf elvat Kal avair6l32;7jTov vizdpx^tv ; also in Xen., Mem., I. 2. 10: bn ovk av '^ars 6 61kcuoq adiKoc yhioiTO K, i. X., the principal reference is probably to Antisthenes). The good is proper to us (oi/criov), the bad' is something foreign {^eviKdv, aXXo-piov, Diog. L., VI. 12; Plat., Conviv., p. 205 e; cf. Charmides, p. 163 c). No actual or possible form of government was pleasing to the Cynic. The Cynic restricts his sage to the subjective consciousness of his own virtue, isolating him from existing society, in order to make him a citizen of the world (Antisthenes, ap. Diog. L., VI. 11: Tov aoibv ov (card Toirf Kei/iivovg v6/iovc iroXirevaeaBac, aXXa Kara rbv tt/q dper^^. Ibid. 12 ; tu bo^ ^hov ovdev 00" airopov). He demands that men return to the simplicity of a natural state. Whether it is to this position of Antisthenes that Plato refers in his picture of a natural political state (Eep., II. 372 a) — which he yet terms a society of swine— and in his examination of the identification of the art of conducting men with the art of the shepherd {Polit., p. 26'7d-275c), is doubtful; perhaps in the latter passage the only seference is (as suggested by Henkel, Zur Gescli. der gr. Staatswiss, II., p. 22, Salzwedel, 94 ASTISTHENES AND THE CYNIC SCHOOt. 1866) to the Homeric idea of the iroi/if/v Tmuv, " shepherd of the people," which appears in various passages of Xenophon'a Memor. and Cyrop. (c£ PoUiicus, p. 301 d, and iSfep., VJI. p. 520 b, with Xen., Cyrop., V. 1, 24, with reference to the comparison of the human ruler with the queen-bee). That Antisthenes can not have anticipated Plato in the doctrine of the community of women and children, follows from Arist., Pol, II. 4, 1, where it is affirmed, that Plato first proposed this innovation. The religious faith of the people, according to the Cynics, is as little binding on the sage as are their laws. Says Cicero {De Nat. Deorum, I. 13, 32): Antisthenes 'in eo libra qui physicus inscribitur, populares decs multos, naturaXem unum esse (dicit). The one God is not known through images. Virtue is the only true worship. Antisthenes interpreted the Homeric poems allegorically and in accordance with his philosophy. Diogenes of Sinope, through his extreme exaggeration of the principles of his teacher, developed a personality that is even comical. He is said himself not to have repelled the epithet "Dog," which was applied to him, but only to have replied that he did not, like other dogs,' bite his enemies, but only his friends, in order that he might save them. He was also called " Socrates raving " (SuKpori/f fiaiv6/isvo(). With the immorality of the times he rejected also its morality and culture. As tutor of the sons of Xeniades, at Corinth, he proceeded not without skill, on the principle of conformity to nature, in a manner similar to that demanded in modern times by Rousseau. He acquired the enduring love and respect of his pupils and of their father (Diog. L., VI. 30 seq., T4 seq.). Diog. L. (VI. 80) cites the titles of many works ascribed to Diogenes, but says that Sosicrates and Satynis pronounced them all spurious. Diogenes designates, as the end to which all effort should tend, evipvxla Kai rdivoq ilmxvQ (in opposition to mere physical force, Stob., FlorHeg., VII. 18). Of the disciples of Diogenes, Crates of Thebes, a contemporary of Theophrastus the Aristotelian, is the most important (Diog. L., VI. 86 seq.) ; through his influence Hip- parchia and her brother Metrocles were won over to Cynicism. Monimus the Syraoiisan' was also a pupil of Diogenes. Menippus of Sinope, who seems to have lived in the third century before Christ, and is mentioned by Lucian {Bin Accus., 33) as " one of the an- cient dogs who barked a great deal " (of. Diog. L., 99 seq.), was probably one of the earlier Cynics. There were probably several Cynics who bore the name Menippus. Cynicism, in its later days, degenerated more and more into insolence and indecency. It became ennobled, on the other hand, in the Stoic philosophy, through the recognition and attention given to mental culture. The Cynic's conception of virtue is imperfect from its failure to determine the positive end of moral activity, so that at last nothing remained hut ostentatious asceticism. "The Cynics excluded themselves from the sphere in which is true freedom " (Hegel). After Cynicism had for a long time been lost in Stoicism — which (as Zeller happily expresses it) " gave to the doctrine of the independence of the virtuous will the basis of a comprehensive, scientific theory of the universe, and so adapted the doctrine itself more fully to the requirements of nature and human life " — it was renewed in the first century after Christ under the form of a mere preaching of morals. But it was accompanied in tills phase of its existence by much empty, ostentatious display of staves and wallets, of uncut beards and hair, and ragged cloaks. Of the better class of Cynics in this later period were Demetrius, the friend of Seneca and of Thrasea Pietus, (Enomaus of Gadara (in the time of Hadrian), who (according to Euseb., Praeparat. Evang., V. 18 seq.) attacked the system of oracles with special violence, and Demonax of Cyprus (praised by Lucian, born about A. i). 50, died about 150), who, though holding fast to the moral and religions principles of Cynicism, advocated them rather with a Socratic mildness than with the vulgar Cynic rudeness. AEISTIPPUS AND THE CTEENAIC SCHOOL. 95 § 38. Aristippiis of Gyrene, the founder of the Cvrenaic or He- donic school, and termed by Aristotle a Sophist, sees in pleasure, which he defines as the sensation of gentle motion, the end of life. The sage aims to enjoy pleasure, witliont being controlled by it. Intellectual culture alone fits one for true enjoyment. No one kind of pleasure is superior to another ; only the degree and duration of pleasure determines its wortli. We can know only our sensations, not that which causes them. The most eminent members of the Cyrenaic school were Arete, the daughter of Aristippus, and her son, Aristippus the younger, Burnamed the "mother-taught" (jiTjrpodidaKTog^^ who first put the doctrine of Hedonism into systematic form, and was probably the author of the comparison of the three sensational conditions of trouble, pleasure, and indifference, to tempest, gentle wind, and sea- calm, respectively ; also Theodoras, surnamed the Atheist, who taught that the particular pleasure of the moment was indifferent, and that constant cheerfulness was the end sought by the true sage, and his scholars Bio and Euhemerus, who explained the belief in the existence of gods as having begun with the veneration of distin- guished men ; further, Hegesias, surnamed the " death-counseling " (TTei(n6dvaTog)j — who accepted the avoidance of trouble as the liighest attainable good, despaired- of positive happiness, and considered life to be intrinsically valueless, — and Anniceris (the younger), who again made the feeling of pleasure the end of life, but included in his system, in addition to idiopathic pleasure, the pleasure of sympathy, and demanded a partial sacrifice of the former to the latter. The Cyrenaics are treated o^ and the fragmentB of their writings nra brought together in Mallach^a Fragm. Pic Gr., II. pp. 897-488. Atnadcns Wendt, De philogophia Cyrenaiaa^ Gott. 1841 ; Henr. de Stein, Be pJtUosopJiia Oyrenaica, Part I.: De vita Aristippi, Gott. 1855 (of. his Geech. det riatonismus, II. G5tt. 1864, pp. 60-64). On AristippuB, cf. C. M. "Wieland, Arif/tipp wnd einige seiner Zeitgenoesen^ 4 vols., Leipsic, 1S00-1S02 ; J F. Thrige, De AriKtlppo philoaopho Oyrenaico aliisgue Cyrenaicii, in his lies Oyreneneiwrn^ Copenh, 1628. There exist early monographs on individual members of the Cyrenaic school, one, in particular, on Arete, by, J. G. Eck (Leipsie, 1776), and another on Hegesias Treio-tdai'aTos, by J. J. Bambach (Quedlin- biirg, 1771). The fragments of the iepa avaypajftij of Eubc^nierus have been collected by Wesscling (in Diod. Sic Bibl. ffist,^ torn. II., p. 623 seq.) Of Euhemerus, with special reference to Ennius, who shared in his views, Krahner treats in his Grwndlinien stir Geach. des Yeifdlle de/r rom. Stttatsreligiaii (G.- Progr.\ Halle, 1687; cf. also Ganas, §«ae«Wone« Euh&nereat (G.-Pr.\ Eempen, 1860, and Otto 6ieroka,i>e Suhemero {Diss. Jnaug.), Eonigsberg, 1869. Aristippus of Gyrene was led by the fame of Socrates to seek his acquaintance, and joined himself permanently to the circle of Socrates' disciples. In criticism of an (oral) utterance of Plato, which he thought to have been too confidently delivered, he is reported to have appealed to the more modest manner of Socrates (Arist., Bhet., II. 23, p. 1398 b, 29: 96 — AKIBTIPPTTS AND THE CTEENAIC BCHOOL. 'kpioTLiTTtoQ Trpof XlXaTuva inayye\Tuai>Tep6v ri e'mdvra (if ijsto • akXa fif/v b •/ halpoq tinuo, ifT/j oiidev -owvtov, Aeyav Tov 'Lunpdritv), Perhaps, before the period of his intercourse with Socrates he had become familiar with the philosophy of Protagoras, of whose influence his doctrine shows considerable traces. The customs of his rich and luxurious native city were most likely of the greatest influence in determining him to the love of pleasure. That ho, together with Cleombrotus, was absent in ^gina at the time of Socrates' death, is remarked by Plato {Phaedo, 59 c), obviously with reproachful intent. Aristippus is said to have sojourned often at the courts of the elder and younger Dionysii in Sicily ; several anecdotes are connected with his residence there and his meeting with Plato, which, though historically uncertain, are at least not unhappily invented, and illustrate the accommo- dating servility of the witty Hedonist, occasionally in contrast - with the tmcompromising Parrliesia of the rigid moralist and idealist (Diog. L., II. 78 et al). Aristippus seems to have taught in various places, and particularly in his native city. He first, among the companions of Socrates, imitated the Sophists in demanding payment for his instructions (Diog. L., II. 65). It is perhaps for this reason, but probably also on account of his doc- trine of pleasure and his contempt for pure scienpe^^that Aristotle calls him a Sophist (Metaph., III. 2). According to the suppositions of H. von Stein (in the work cited above), Aristippus was born about 435 B. c, resided in Athens during a series of years commencing with 416, in 399 was in JP,^na, in 389-388 was with Plato at the court of the elder Dionysius, and in 361 with the same at the court of the younger Dionysius, and, finally, after 356 was, apparently, again in Athens. Ton Stein remarks, however (Gesch. des Platonismus, II., p. 61), on the uncertainty of the accounts on which these dates are founded. According to Diog. L., II. 83, Aristippus was older than ^schines. The fundamental features of the Cyrenaic doctrine are certainly due to Aristippus. Xenophon (Memor., II. 1 ) represents him as discussing them with Socrates ; Plato refers probably to them in iJep., VI. 505 b (perhaps also in Gorg., 491 e, seq.), and most fully in the Philebus, although Aristippus is not there named. But the systematic elaboration of his doctrines seems to have been the work of his grandson, Aristippus firiTpoiiSaKro^. Aristotle names, as representing the doctrine of pleasure {Efh. Nic, X. 2), not Aristippus, but Eudoxus. The principle of Hedonism is described in the dialogue Philebus, p. 66 c, in these words : rayaObv sridero yfiiv jj&ctvijv elvai Trdcav Kal •KavTsXy. Pleasure is the sensation of gentle motion (Diog. L., II. 85 : riAoq a-rre^atve (^ ApiorenTzog) rijv Xeiav Kivrjaiv eif alcOTjCiv ava/lt6c- lihiTjv). Violent motion produces pain, rest or very shght motion, indifference. ' That all pleasure belongs to the category of things becoming {yheai^) and not to that of things being (piiata), is mentioned by Plato in the dialogue Philebus (p. 53 c, cf 42 d) as the correct observation of certain "elegants" (KOfiijmi), among whom Aristippus is probably to he understood as included. Yet the opposing of yheaig to ovaia is certainly not to be ascribed to Aristippus, but only probably the reduction of pleasure to motion (Kivr/at^), from which Plato drew the above conclusion. No pleasure, says Aristippus, is as such bad, though it may often arise from bad causes, and no pleasure is different from another in quality or worth (Diog. L., II. 81 : p-i) Sia^kpuv r/iovyv ijdovfji, cf. Phileb., p. 12 d). Virtue is a good as a means to pleasure (Cio., Oe Offic, III. 33, 116). •' The Socrati-c element in the doctrine of Aristippus appears in the principle of self- determination directed by knowledge (the manner of life of the wise, says Aristippus, ap. Diog. L., 68, would experience no change, though all existing laws were abrogated), and in the control of pleasure as a thing to be acquired through knowledge and culture. The Cynics sought for independence through abstinence from enjoyment, Aristippus through ABI8TIPPUS AND THE CYEENAIC SCHOOL. 97 the control of enjoyment in the midst of enjoyment. Thus Aristippua is cited by Stob. (Flor., 17, 18) as saying that "not he who abstains, but he who enjoys without being car- ried away, is master of his pleasures." Similarly, in Diog. L, II. 75, Ariatippus is said to liave required his disciples "to govern, and not be governed by their pleasures." And, aooordinglj', he is furtlier said to have expressed his relation to Lais, by saying: exu, ovk ixofiai. In a similar sense Horace says (Epist, I. 1, 18): nunc in Aristippi fwrtim prae- c^pta relabor, et mihi res, nonme rebus svbjungere conor. The Cynic sage knows how to deal with himself, but Aristippus knows how to deal with men (Diog. L., TI. 6, 58 ; II. 68, 102), To enjoy the present, says the Cyrenaie, is the true business of man ; only the present is in our power. With the Hedonic character of the ethics of Aristippus corresponds, in his theory of cognition, the restriction of our knowledge to sensations. The Gyrenaics distinguished (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 91) ro n-dfof and to EKTog iiroKei/ievov xal roi) irdflotif TToiriTtK&v (the affection, and the " thing in itseJi'" which is external to us and affects us); the former exists in our consciousness (rb iziBoq iifjlv lari fatv6fievm>); of the "thing in itself," on the contrary, we know nothing, except"that it exists. "VThether the sensa- tions of other men agree with our own, we do not know ; the affirmative is not proved by the identity of names employed. The subjectivism of the Protagorean doctrine of knowl- edge finds in these propositions its consistent completion. It is improbable that the motive of ethical Hedonism was contained in this logical doctrine ; that motive must rather be sought, in part, in the personal love, of pleasure of Aristippus, and in part in the eudse- monistio element in the moral speculations of Socrates, which coutained certain germs, not only for the doctrine of Antisthenes, but also for that of Aristippus (see, in particular, Xenophon, Memorab., I. 6. t, respecting Kaprepelv in immediate connection with the ques- tion, ibid, I. 6. 8 : rov de fif/ dov^xveiv yaaTpt /£ij6e vTrvtfi Kat ^■yvela olei Tt dA^ a'lTUiTepav clvai jj TO Irepa Ixuv tovtuv t/S'liS). The essence of virtue lies, according to Socrates, in knowledge, in practical insight. But it is asked, what is the object of this insight ? If the reply is, the Good, then the second question arises, in what the Good consists. If it consists in virtue itself, the definition moves in a circle. If in the useful, the useful is relative and its value is determined by that for w^hieh it is useful. But what is this last something, in whose service the useful stands 7 If Eudaemonia, then it must be stated in what the essence of Eudaemonia consists. The most obvious answer is : Pleasure, and this answer was given by Aristippus, while the Cynics found no answer not involving them in the circle, and so did not advance beyond their objectless insight and aimless asceticism. Plato's answer was: the Idea of the Good (Rep., VI. p. 505). Later Cyrenaics (according to Sext. E., .ili^i;. Math., VIT. 11) divided their system of doctrines into five parts : 1) Concerning that which is to be desired and shunned (goods and evils, alpera mi ipeuKri) • 2) Concerning the passions (irdfl^) ; 3) Concerning actions (ffpaf eif) ; 4) . Concerning natural causes (alria) ; 6) Concerning the guaranties of truth (Trioreif). Hence it appears that these later Cyrenaics also treated the theory of knowledge, not as the foundation, but rather as the complement of ethics. As the control of pleasure aimed at by Aristippus was in reality incompatible with the principle that the pleasure of the moment is the highest good, some modifications in his doctrine could not but arise. Accordingly we find Theodorus dfleof (Diog. L , II. 91 seq.), not, indeed, advancing to a principle specifically different from pleasure, but yet sub- stituting for the isolated sensation a state of constant cheerfulness (jcapa), as the " end " (riXof) But mere reflection on our general condition is not sufficient to elevate us above the changes of fortune, since our general condition is not under our control, and so Hegcsias iteunOavaToq (Diog. L., II. 93 seq.) despaired altogether of attaining that result. 1 98 PLATO'S LIFE. Anniceris the Younger {ibid. 96 seq. ; Clem., Strom., II. 4lT b.) sought to ennoble, the Hedonio principle, by reckoning among the things which afford pleasure, friendship, thankfulness,, and piety toward parents and fatherland, social intercourse, and the strife after honors ; yet he declared all labor for the benefit of others to be conditioned on the pleasure which our good will brings to ourselves, later. Epicureanism reigned in the place of the Cyrenaio doctrine. Euhemerus, who lived (300 B. c.) at the court of Cassander, and favored the principles of the Cyrenaic school, exerted great influence by his work Upa avaypa^, in which (according to Cic, De Nat. Dem-um, I. 42; Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. IT, and others) he developed the opinion that the Gods (as also the Heroes) were distinguished men, to whom divine honors had been rendered after their death. In proof of this opinion he referred to the tomb of Zeus, which was then pointed out in Crete. It is indisputable that Euhemerism contains a partial truth, but unjustly generalized; not only historical events, but natural phenomena and ethical considerations, served as a basis for the myths of the Gods, and the form of the mythological conceptions of tlie ancients was conditioned on various psychological motives. The one-sided explanation of Euhemerus strips the myths of the most essential part of their religious character. But for this very reason it found a more ready hearing at a time when the power of the ancient religious faith over the minds of men was gone, and in the last centuries of antiquity it was favored by many representatives of the new Christian faith. § 39. Plato, born in Athens (or ^gina) on the Tth of Thargelion, j in the first year of the 88th Olympiad (May 26 or 27, 427 b. c.) or perhaps on the 7tli of Thargelion, Olymp. 87.4 (June 5 or 6, 428), and originally named Aristocles, was the son of Aristo and Perictione (or Potone). The former was a descendant of Codrus; the ancestor of Perictione was Dropides, a near relative of Solon, and she was consin to Critias, who, after the unfortunate termination of the Pelopon- i nesian war, became one of the Thirty oligarchical Tyrants. From Olymp. 93.1 till 95.1 (408 or 407 to 399 b. c.) Plato was a pupil of Socrates. After the condemnation of the latter, he went with others of Socrates' disciples to Megara, to the house of Euclid. From there it is said that he undertook a long journey, in the course of which he visited Gyrene and Egypt, and perhaps Asia Minor, whence he seems to have returned to Athens ; it is possible, however, that previous to this journey he had already returned to Athens and lived there a certain length of time. When he was about forty years old he visited the Pythagoreans in Italy, and went to Sicily, where he formed relations of friendship with Dio, the brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I. Here, by his openness of speech, he so ofifended the tyrant, that the latter caused him to be sold as a prisoner of war in ^gina, by Pollis, the Spartan embassador. Eansomed by Anniceris, he founded (387 or 386 b. c.) his philosophical school in the Academy. Plato undertook a second journey to Syracuse about 367 b. c, after Plato's life, ^99 the death of the elder Dionysius, and a third in the year 361. The object of the second journey was to endeavor, in company -with Dio, to bring the younger Dionysius, on whom the tyranny of his father had devolved, under the influence of his ethical and, so far as circum- stances permitted it, of his political theories. The object of the third was to effect a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. In each case he failed to accomplish the desired results. Henceforth he lived exclusively devoted to his occupation as a philosophical teacher until his death, which took place Olymp. 108.1 (348-347, probably in the second half of the Olympiadic year, near his birthday, hence in May or June, 347 b. c). Data relative to Plato's life were recorded in antiquity by some of the immediate disciples of the philosopher, in particular by Speusippus (JlXdruvos eyxu/tioi', Diog. L, IV. 5; cf. IIAaTwvoff irepiSetwovy Diog, L, III. 2, cited also by Apuleius, J)6 ffahitudine Doctrinaruni Plat.\ Hormodorus (Simplic, Ad Arist PJvys.^ 54b, 56b; of. Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6), Phillippns the Opuntian (Suidas, s. h. «.), and Xenocrates (cited by Simplicius in the Scholia to Aristotle, ed. by Brandis, pp. 470 a, 27, and 474 a, 12)!. AristoxenuB, the Peripatetic, also wrote a life of Plato (DiOR. L., V. 85). Of later writers, Favorinns (in the time of Trajan and Hadrian) wrote irept IIAaTwvos, from which work Diogenes L. drew largely. All these works have been lost. The following are extant : — Apuleius Madaurensis, De doctrina et nativitate Platonis (in the Opera Apul. ed. Ondendorp, Ley-i den, 17S6; ed. G. F. Hildebrand, Leipsic, 1842, 1848). Diogenes Laortius, I>6 Vita et Doctr. Philoa. (see above). Book III. is entirely given to Plato ; SS 1-45 treat of his life. (Mympiodori Vita Platonis (in several of the complete editions of Plato^s works, also in Didot^s edition of Diog. L., and in the B(oypa0o^ ed. Westermann, Brunswick, 1845). This Vita forms the begin- ning of the JIpoXeyofLeva. T^? HXaTuvoi ^lAoo-cM^t'as, ed. K. F. Hermann, in the sixth volume of Hermann's edition of Plato's works. Cf. Theophil Boeper, Zectiones Abulpharagia/nae alterae: de Sonaini^ vt /ertur^vita Platonis (iV.), Dantzic, 1S67. More trustworthy than these and other late and unimportant compilations, is, In general (though not ,in all parts), the seventh of the Letters^ which have come down to ns under the name of Plato, This letter is indeed Inauthentic, like all the others, and perhaps was not even composed by an immediate dis- ciple of Plato ; but it dates from a comparatively early epoch, and was known to Aristophanes of Byzan- tium, by whom it must have been considered Platonic. Of., besides other earlier investi^tions, in particular, Herm. Thorn Karsten, I>6 Platania quaeferuniur^ epiatolia^ praecipue tertia^ aepUma^ octava^ Traj. ad PJieiir,, 1864, with whom, in his rejection of the authenticity of these letters, H. Sauppe agrees, in his review in the Gott. Oel. Anzeigen^ 1866, No. 28, pp. SSl-892. Farther, many passages in Plato's own writings, and in the works of Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, arc important as furnishing data for the biography of Plato. Of modern works on the life of Plato, those most worthy of mention arc : Marsilius Ficinus, Vita Platonis, prefixed to his translation of Plato's writings. Remarks ov\, the Idfe and Writings of Plato^ Fdinb. 1760; German translation with annotations and additions by K. Morgenstern, Leipsic, 1797. W. G. Tenneniann, System, der Platon. Philosophies 4 vols., Leipsic, 1792-95. (The first volume begins with an account of Plato's life.) Friedr. Ast, Plato's ie&cn und ScJiriften, Leipsic, 1816. K. F. Hermann, GeschU^Xe imd JSi/stem der PlatorUsdien Philosophies first part (the only one published), Heidelb. 1889. (Pages 1-126, "On Plato's life and exter;)al relations;" pp. 127-840, "Plato's predecesBors and contempo- raries considered with reference to their influence on bis doctrine ; " pp. 841-718, " Plato's literary works as authorities for the interpretation of his system, sifted and arranged.") Geoi^e Grote, Plat9 and the other Companions of /Socrates, London, 1865, 2d ed. 1867. A critique of the traditional accounts of the life of Plato, in which the same are represented as almost altogether unhistorical, or at least as almost wholly untrustworthy, is given by Heinrich von Stein, in Meben PUchereur Geseli. des Platonismue, Part IL (Gott, 1864), in Section 17, ou "The biographical myth and the literary tradition" (pp. 156-197): Schaarschmidt adopts these results, and goes still farther in his work: Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften, Bonn, 1866, p. 61 seq. On the basis of the transmitted records accepted without critical sifting, £. Welper has written a novel {Plato vm.d seine Zeit, Jiist.-Mograph. Lehensbild, Cassel, 1866^ the com- parison of which with the traditional accounts may assist one to a clearer intelligence of the way in which 100 fLATo's LIFE* given foots are accnstomed to be enlarged npon under the Influence of a too laxnrlant InTentire ftonlt^ and Bo to a more correct estimation of the value of tradition itself. _ (Cf the literature in §S 40 and 41.) That Plato was born in Olymp. 88.1 (427 B. c, when Diotimus was Archon) ia directly affirmed by ApoUodorua, h xp<^ti«>k, op- Diog- L., III. 2 (i. «., if by Olymp. 88 the first year of that Olympiad ia to be understood); cf. alao Hippol., Befut. Haer., I. 8. We are also conducted indirectly to this result by the statement of Hermodorus, an immediate disciple of Plato, given in Diog. L., II. 106, and III. 6,— a statement which gives rise to doiibts in its transmitted form (cf., among others, Schaarachmidt, in the worlc above cited, p. 66), but which is yet the most trustworthy of all the chronological statements relating to this subject, and probably forms the basis of the statement of Apollodorus. The purport of it is that Plato, at the age of twenty-eigh't years, soon after the execution of Socrates, went to Megara, to the house of Euchd. But Socrates dranic the hemloclc in the second half of the month of Thargelion, Olymp. 95.1 (in May or June, 399 B. c). For the year 429 (8T.3, the year when ApoUodorus was Archon) as the year of Plato's birth, we have the evidence of Athenseus (Seymosoph., V. 17, p. 217); for 428, we have the statu- ment in Diog. L., III. 3, that Plato was bom in the same Archontic year in which Pericles died (i. e., in the second half of the arohonship of Epameinon, 01. 87.4 = 429-428, in the first half of which Pericles died), and also the statement (Pseudo- Plutarch., Fit Jsocr„ 2, p.. 836), that Isocrates was born seven years before Plato — assuming it to be established that Isocrates was born in Olymp. 86.1 (436-435 B. c). That Plato was born on the 7th of Thargelion (Diog. L., III. 2) seems likewise to rest on the authority of Apollodorus, eo> that if the celebration of Plato's birth was transferred to this day on account of its being jthe birthday of the Delian Apollo, the change must have been made by the Acadcmios Boon after Plato's death. This day, in the Olympiadic year 88.1, included — if Boeckh is I correct in assuming that the octennial cycle was then in vogue at Athens — the time from the evening of May 26th to the evening of May 27th, 427 B. c. (or, if the Metonic cycle had already been adopted. May 29-30). Plato's birthplace was Athens, or, according to some, .ffigina, whither his father had, gone as a Kleruch (Diog. L., III. 3). The following table represents the genealogy of Plato, so far as it is known to us (see Charm., 154 seq., Tim., 20 d, Apol, 24 a, De Sep., inii., Farm., inii., et al) : — ApuiriSjig, a relative of S67iun>. I 1 'S.aUjuaxpoQ. VinavKuv, 'XpujTokX^C. 'Aw(#5v. KptTiof. XapfiidTic. HepiKTidvTi married 1) with 'Apwmav, 2) with TlvpiUiiini(. r 1 KieifiavToi. IlXdr&iv. VTmvkuv. Tlorinni. SffeiKftirirofi 'Avrt^uv. Plato's life, 10 J, . It should be remarked that the second marriage of Periotione and the existence of Antiphon are facts known only on the evidence of the dialogue Parmenides — whose gemn ineness is, to say the least, very doubtful, and whose hi»torical statements are therefore not to be taken as positively trustworthy — and on that of later writers (especially Plu- tarch), whose only authority was this dialogue. Pyrilampes appears, from Charm., 158 a, to have been an uncle of the mother of Perictione. Plato received his early education from teachers of repute. Dionysius (who is men- tioned in the spurious dialogue Anterastae) is reported to have instructed him in reading and writing ; Aristo of Argos, in gymnastics (Diog. L., III. 4), and Draco, a pupil of Damon, and Metellus (or Megillus) of Agrigentum, in music (Plutarch, De Mus., 17). The report concerning Aristo (who is said to have given to his pupil the name of Plato) seems to b6 historical; the others are more doubtfuh Plato is said to have taken part in several military campaigns. By Athenian law he would be required to perform military service from his eighteenth year (409 B. c). According to Aristoxenus (ap. Diog. L., III. 8) he was engaged at Tanagra, Corinth, and Delium — an account which is unhistorioal if refer- ence is intended to the well-known battles at Tanagra and Delium ; but perhaps it alludes to minor engagements in the years 409-405. In the battle at Corinth (394) Plato may have taken part. Perhaps, like his brothers, he was present and participated in an encounter which took place near Megara in the year 409 (Sep., II. p. 368 ; Died. Sic., XIII. 65). The poetical essays of his youth were discontinued after he became more Intimately acquainted with Socrates. Before that time he had been already instructed in the Heraclitean philosophy by Cratylus (Arist., Metaph., I. 6). The intimacy of Socrates with Critias and Cliarmides may have led early to Plato's acquaintance with him ; the philosophical intercourse of Plato with Socrates began, according to Diog. L. (III. 6), who, perhaps, follows the authority of Hermodorus, in Plato's twentieth j'ear. A young man, endowed with a luxuriant fancy, he received the logical discipline to which Socrates sub.- jected him as a kindness worthy of all gratitude ; the moral force of Socrates' character filled him with awe, and the steadfastness with which he suffered death for the cause of truth and justice, finally transfigured, in his mind, into a pure ideal, the image of his master. "We may assume that, while Plato was associated with Socrates, he also familiar- ized himself with other philosophical systems. But whether he had at that time already conceived the leading traits of his own system, founded on the theory of ideas, is uncer- tain ; certain historical indications are wanting in regard to this subject. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian account of the genesis of the theory of ideas from Heraclitean and Socratie floctrines (see below, § 41) makes it very probable that Plato had this theory already in his mind during the period of his personal intercourse with Socrates; the doctrine of Euclid, the Megarian, may also have had its influence on him at the same period. Re- specting the precise character of the intercourse between Socrates and Plato, we have no specific accounts. Xenophon (who recounts conversations of Socrates with Aristippus and Antisthenes) mentions Plato only once (Mem., III. 6. 1), where he says that for his sake, as also for that of Charmides, Socrates was well-disposed toward Glaucon. According to Plat, Apol., p. 34 a, 38 b, Plato was present at the trial of Socrates, and announced him- self as ready to guarantee the payment of any fine; according to Phaedo, 59b, he was ill on the day of Socrates' death, and was thereby hindered from being present at the last conversations of his master. Plato found his life's vocation, not in participating in the political contests of the parties then existing at Athens, but in founding a philosophical school. This task demanded the unconditional application of his undivided powers, and in the execution of it Plato accom- plished a work infinitely more advantageous for humanity than any which he could have 102 Plato's lifej accomplished if he had chosen rather to exercise the civic virtues of a patriotic popular orator. Plato could consecrate himself to no political activity which failed to correspond with the sense and spirit of his philosophical principles. He could not, like Demosthenes; exhort the Athenians to maintain their democracy and to guard themselves against a foreign monarch, because democracy did not appear to him a good form of government; he could only consent to co-operate for the establishment of an aristocracy or a monarchy ^founded upon the pliilosophical education of the ruling class, for only a political activity directed to this end could seem to him useful or obligatory. A work of this latter kind he did once undertake, when the state of things in Sicily appeared to him (erroneously, it is true) favorable to the solution of the political problem as he conceived it. Cf. Ferd. Del' briick, Vertlieidigung Plato's gegen einen Angriff (Niebuhr's, in the Bh. Mus. fii/r Fliilol, Cfesch. u. griech. Phihs., I. p. 196) o«/ seine Biirgertugend, Bonn, 1828. It is possible that the intercourse of Plato with Euclid of Megara also exercised a considerable iniluence on the formation of his own system. "Whether Plato, after hia sojourn with Euclid, next lived in Athens, and in the year 394 participated in the Corinthian campaign, is uncertain. He is said, when at Cyrene, to have visited Theo.dorus, the mathematician (Diog. L., HI. 6), whose acquaintance he seems to have made at Athens shortly before the death of Socrates {Theaet, p. 143 b, seq.) ; he remained, as we are credibly informed, a certain time at Cyrene, perfecting himself in mathematics under the direction of Theodorus. According to Cic, Be Fin., V. 29, Plato went to Egypt for the purpose of obtaining instruction from the priests in mathematics and astronomy, in which particularhis example was followed by his pupil, Eudoxua, the astronomer, who for a considerable period took up hia residence in Egypt, the land of ancient experiences. It is uncertain whether tlie accounts of Plato's visits to Cyrene and Egypt are historical or legendary. Their only basis may have been Plato's mention of Theodorus (in the Theaetetus) and the references to Egypt in Plato's works {Phaedr., p. 247 c; Rep., IV. 435 ; Tim., 21 e ; Leges, II. 656 d, 657 a, V. 747 c, VII. 799 a, 819 a ; cf. Pol, 264 c, 290 d). But even admitting this, the inference in favor,' at least, of a journey to Egypt, has strong support. Prom the picture given by Plato of the Heracliteans in loma, (Tliead., 179 seq.), Schleiermacher {PI. W., II. 1, p. 185) infers that he had probably been in Asia Minor ; but other evidence for this conclusion is wanting. Plutarch, in the dialogue De genio SocraUs (jzcpi tov ^uKparcm: iai/iovimi), c. 7, p. 579, represents Simmias as saying: "At Memphis, the home of the prophet Xdvovfi^, we remained for a time philosophizing, Plato and 'EX/lomuv and I. "When we had started on our return from Egypt, we were met near Caria by certain Delians, who requested from Plato, as a man acquainted with geometry, the solution of the problem proposed to them by Apollo, viz. : how to double a cubiform altar. Plato indicated as a condition of the solution of the problem, that they must And two mean proportionals, and directed the petitioners, for the rest, to Eudoxus of Cnidos and Helicon of Cyzicum. He also instructed them that the god demanded not so much the altar, as that they should occupy themselves with the study of mathematics." But this narrative can not be regarded as historical; the whole dialogue is interspersed with free inventions from Plutarch's hand. Plato seems to have gone to Italy and Sicily (about 390 ?) from Athens {Epist, VII. p. 326 b, seq.). It is uncertain whether he was at Athens about 394 B. c. and took part in the Corinthian cam- paign. On the occasion of his first arrival at Syracuse, he was, according to the 7th Letter (p. 324 b), about forty years old. Among the Pythagoreans Plato probably sought to acquire, not only a more exact knowledge of their doctrine, but also a view of their scientific, ethical, and ipolitical life in common, and their manner of educating their youth. At Syracuse he won over to his doctrines and to his theory of Iife,( the youthful Dio, then about twenty years old, whose sister was married to Dionysius (the elder) ; but the tyrant himself Plato's life. 103 thought Plato's admonitions " senile " (Diog. L., III. 18), and revenged himself on him by treating him as a prisoner of war. The sale of Plato at jEgina (in case it is historical) mast have taken place shortly before the end of the CoriAliian war, 387 B. c. Anniceria is reported to have ransomed him and afterward to have refused to allow the friends of riato to make up to him the price of the ransom, and so, as the story goes, the sum was applied to the purchase of the garden of the Academy, where Plato united around him a circle of friends devoted to philosophy. His instructions, as we must infer from the form of his writings and from an express declaration in the Phaedrus (p. 275 seq.), were generally con- veyed in the form of dialogues ; yet he seems, besides, to have delivered connected lectures. Nothing but the hope of attaining an important political and philosophical result (Epist, Til., p. 329) could determine Plato twice to interrupt his scholastic activity by journeys to Sicily. The object of Plato in undertaking his second journey to Sicily, not lonof after the accession of the younger Dionysius to power (367 B. c), was to unite with Dio in an attempt to win over the young ruler to philosophy, and to move him to transform his tyranny into a legally-ordered monarchy. This plan was frustrated through the fickle. ness of the youth, his suspicion that Dio wished to get him out of the way in order to possess himself of supreme power, and the counter-efforts of a political p'Jrty, who sought to maintain the existing form of government unchanged. Dio was banished, and Plato was left without influence. He undertook his third journey to Sicily in the hope of effecting a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. Not only did he fail to accomplish this result, but his own life came at last into danger through the mistrust of the tyrant, the intercession of the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum being all that saved it. Dio, supported by friends and pupils of Plato, undertook in Olymp. 105.3 (358-57) a successful expedition to Sicily against Dionysius, but was murdered in 353 by a traitor among his companions in arms, CaUippus (who was himself put to death in 350). Dionysius, who had asserted his power successfully in Loori in Italy, was restored, in 346, to power in Syra- cuse, until, ui 343, he was driven out by Timoleon. Returning to Athena (in 361 or 360), Plato resumed his doctrinal labors both orally and in writing. According to Dionys., De Compos. Verb., p. 208, Plato labored till into his eightieth year in perfecting his writings. An account, perhaps based on numerical speculations, and reported by Seneca (Epist., 58. 31), represents him as having died on his birthday, at the exact age of eighty-one years. Cicero says {De Senect, T. 13) : uno ei octogesimo anno scribens est morimis, by which he may mean that Plato had just entered upon his eighty-first year. He died in the year when TheophUus was Archon (Olymp. 108.1). In his " School of Athens," Raphael (as he ig commonly interpreted — another interpreta- tion is given by H. Grimm, Neue Es-iays, cf. Preuss. Jahrb., 1864, Nos. 1 and 2) represents Plato as pointing toward heaven, while Aristotle turns his regards upon the earth. In the spirit of this representation, Goethe characterizes Plato as follows : " Plato's relation to the world is that of a superior spirit, whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It is not so much his concern to become acquainted with it — for the world and its nature are things which he presupposes — as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with him, and of which it stands in so great need. He penetrates into its depths, more that he may replenish them from the fullness of his own nature, than that ho may fathom their mysteries. He scales its heights as one yearning after renewed participation in the source of his being. All that he utters has reference to something eternally complete, good, true, beautiful, whose furtherance he strives to promote in every bosom. Whatever of earthly knowledge he appropriates here and there, evaporates in his method and in his discourse." Cf. below, § 45, Goethe's characterization of Aristotle. " In Plato's phi- losophy,'' says Boeckh, "the expanding roots and branches of earlier philosophy ar«» 104 Plato's wkitings. developed into the full blossom, out of which the subsequent fruit was slowly brought to maturity." § 40. As works of Plato, thirty-six compositions (in fifty-six books) have been transmitted to ns (the " Epistles " being counted as one) ; beside these, several works, which in ancient times were already designated as spurious, bear his name. The Alexandrian gram- marian, Aristophanes of Byzantium, arranged several of the Platonic writings in Trilogies, and the Neo-Pythagorean Thrasyllus (in the time of the Emperor Tiberius) arranged all those which he considered genuine in nine Tetralogies. Schleiermacher assumes that Plato composed all his works (with the exception of a few occasional com- positions) in a didactic order. This would necessarily presuppose a plan, of which the outlines were conceived and fixed at the begin- ning. Schleiermacher divides the works into three groups: ele- mentary, mediatory or preparatory, and constructive dialogues. As Plato's first composition he names the Phaedrun, as his latest writ- ings, the RepiMic, Timaeus, and the Laws. K. F. Hermann, on the other hand, denies this unity of literary plan, and considers the writings of Plato separately as documents exponential of his own philosophical development. He assumes three " literary periods " in the life of Plato, the first reaching to the time immediately following the death of Socrates, the second covering the time of Plato's resi- dence at Megara and of the joiirneys which he made directly after- ward, and the third beginning with the return of Plato to Athens after his first journey to Sicily and extending to the time of his deatli. The earliest compositions of Plato were, according to him, the shorter ethical dialogues which most bear a Socratic type, such as Hippias Minor, Lysis, and the Protagoras ; in designating the latest he agrees with Schleiermacher. He styles the Phaedrus (with Socher and Stallbaum) the " inaugural programme of Plato's doctrinal activity at the Academy." Ed. Munk judges that Plato intended in his writings to draw an idealized picture of the life of Socrates as the genuine philosopher, and that he indicated their order through the increasing age of Socrates in the successive dialogues. This view is incom- patible with Hermann's principle, but, on the hypothesis of a single plan held in view from tlie beginning, is very plausible, though not the only possible view ; it i?, however, incapable of being maintained throughout without the aid of excessively violent suppositions. In any case, the point of departure in inquiring into the genuine- Plato's weitings.. 105 ness of the Platonic writings must be the passages in Aristotle iii which these are alluded to. Judged by thiswtandard, the works best attested as belonging to Plato are the R&puUic, Timaeus, and tlie Laws, all of which are mentioned in Aristotle by their titles, with Plato's name. Next to these come, judged by the same standard, the Phaedo, the Banquet (cited under the title of " Erotic Dis^ courses"), Phaedrus, and Gorgias, which are mentioned by Aris- totle by their titles, and with evident reference to Plato as their author, although he is not expressly named. The Meno, Hippias (meaning Hippias Minor), and Menexenus (cited as the "Epitaphic" Discourse), are mentioned by Aristotle by their titles as extant, but not, apparently, with unquestionable reference to Plato as their author. Aristotle refers to passages in the Theaetetus and the Phile- bus, Avhich he cites as Plato's works, but without naming these titles ; he also refers to doctrines contained in the Sophistes, but which seem rather to be cited as oral deliverances of Plato or (in some in^ stances) as the doctrines of Plato's disciples. Without naming Plato or the titles, Aristotle appears also to refer to passages in the Polit- icus, the Apologia, Lysis, Laches, and perhaps the Protagoras; possibly also to passages in the Euihydemus and the Cratylus. Pe- specting the time of the composition of the dialogues, only a few data can be found which are fully certain. From an anachronism in the Banquet, it appears beyond question that that dialogue was written after (and probably very soon after) 385 b. c, and it is expressly stated by Aristotle that the Laws were composed later than the Republic. In view of the idealizing character of the Platonic dia- logues, the only natural supposition is that Plato wrote none of them until after the death of Socrates. According to an ancient and not improbable, but also not sufficiently well-authenticated account, the dialogue Phaedrus was the earliest of Plato's compositions. It is a matter of question whether the Protagoras and Gorgias preceded or followed the Phaedrus, but we may assume that tlie Phaedrus was composed before the Banquet. It is most probable that Plato began to write his dialogues in about his fortieth year, on the occasion of the founding of his school in the garden of the Academy, and in the following order: Phaedrus, Banquet, Protagoras, together with a num- ber of shorter ethical dialogues, Gm^gias, and then perhaps Meno; these dialogues were ])erhaps immediately followed by the BepubUc, together with the Timaeus and the Critias fragment, then by the lOS PLATO'e WEITDfOS. Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Philebus, and Laws, which latter Plato is said to have left unfinished. The Apology appears to Lave been written soon after the trial of Socrates and in substantial agreement with his actual defense. The works of Flato were published flrst in Latin in the translation of MarsiliiiB Ficinns, Florence, 14S3-14S4, reprinted at Venice, 1491, etc In Greek, they were first published at Venice, in 1513, by Aldua Manutius (with the co-operation of Marcns Masurus). This edition was followed by the edition of Johannes Oporinus and Simon Grynaeus, Basileae apud Joh. Valderwn^ 1534. Then came the edition BaHleae apud J/enrieum Petri, 1556, and afterward that of Henricus Stepiianus, with the translation of Joh. Serranus, 8 vols.. Par. 1578. The piiging and side-numbers of this edition are printed in all modem editions, and are tliose usually followed in citation. The edition of Stephanus was reproduced at Lyons, 1590, with the translation uf Ficlnns, and also, in Greek alone, at Frankfurt, 1602. Subsequent complete editions are the edition published at Zweibriicken, in 1T81-S7 (instituted by the so-called Bipontines, 6. Ch, Croll, Fr. Chr. Exter, and J. Val. Embser, and to which belong the Argumenta dial. Plat, expos, et iU. a, J). Tiedemanno, Zweibr., 1736), the Tauchnitz edition, edited by Chr. Dan. Beck (Leipsic, 1S18-19, 1829 and 1850), and the editions of Bekker (Berlin, 1816-17, with Commentary and Scholia, iUd. 1823, and Lon- don, 1826), Ast (Leipsic, 1819-32), Gottfr. Stallbanm (Leipsic, 1821-25; 1888 seq., and in one vol., Leipsic, 1850 and 1867), and Baiter, Orelli, and 'Winokelmann (Zurich, 1839-43; 1861 seq.); Greek and German edition, Leipsic, 1841 seq., Greek and Latin edition, ed. by Ch. Schneider and 11. B. Hirschig, Par. 1846-56, Greek alone, ed. K. F. Hermann, Leipsic, 1851-53. Platan's Werlce, by F. Schleiermacher (Translations and Introductions), I. 1 and 2, II. 1-8, Berlin, 1804-10; new and improved edition, ibid. 1S17-24; IIL 1 (Republic), ibid. 182S; 8d ed. of I. and IL and 2d ed. of III. 1, iJnd. 1855-62. \^Sehlei6rmadier's Introdvctiona. to the Dialogues of Plato, translated by W. Dobson, Cambridge and London, 1SS6.— TV.] (Euvres de Platon, French translation by Victor Consin, 8 vols., Paris, 1825-40. Translated into Italian by Bug. Bonghi, Opere di Platone nuoramente tradotte, Milan, 1857. Platan's SdTnmtHche Werke, translated by Hieron. Miiller, with introductions by Karl Stein- hart, 8 vols., Leipsic, 1850-66. (Cf. SteinharVs Apltorismen iiber den gegetvicartigen Stand der PI. For' seklmgen, in the Verh. der 2,5. Philol.-Yers. in Halle, Leipsic, 1868, pp. 54-70.) [There are two complete translations of the works of Plato in English : 77»« Works of Plato (with notes, abstract of Greek Com- mentaries, etc.— nine of the dialogues translati'd by F. Sydenham), by Thomas Taylor, 5 vols., London, 1804 ; and Plato (in Bohn's CLissical Library), translated by Gary. Davis, and Bnrges, 6 vols,, London, 1862 seq ; cf. Summary and Analysis of the Dialogues of Plato, by Alfred Diiy (Bohn's L.), London, 1870.— Tr.] For ancient Commentaries on Plato, sea below §§ 65, 70. Timaei Lexicon voc Platonic., ed. D. Euhnken, Leyden, 1789, it. ed., cur. G. A. Koch, Leipsic, 1823. For the works of Ast and K. F. Hermann im Plato, see above, § 89 ; cf. also Ast's Lexicon Platonicum, Leipsic, 1884-39. Jos. Socher, Ueier Platan's Schriften, Munich, 1820. Ed. Zeller, Platonische Studien (on the Leges, Mcnexenus, Hippias Minor, Por- menides, and on Aristotle's representation of the Platonic philosophy), Tiibingen, 1689. Franz Suseniihl, Prodromus Plat. Fm-schungen {Grelfsw. Hab.-SdiT.), Gott. 1862. By the same. Me genet. Fntwictelmig ier Platon. Philosophie, einleitend dargestellt, 2 parts, Leipsic, 1855-60. Cf his numerous reviews of modern works on Plato, in several volumes of Jahn's Jahrbucher f. Phil. ti. Pad., and his original articles in the same review and in the Philologus, especially his Platonische Forschungen in the second supple- mentary volume to the Philologus, 1868, and in the Philology^, Vol. XX , Gott., 1863, and also the intro- luclionsto histranslations of several of Plato's dialogues. G. F. W. Snckow, Die wiss. und kiimstlerische Form der Platoniaelien Sdiriften in ihrer bisher verborgenen Mgenthiimlic/ikeit dargestellt, Berlin, 1355. Ed. Munk, Die natUrliche Ordnung der Platonisc/ien Sehriftm, Berlin, 1356. Sigurd Bibbing, Venetiskframsidllning af Plato's ideelara jemie Infogndeundevsokningar om de PlatonAa skriftervas ikthet och inbordes sammanhang, Upsaln, 1858, in German, Leipsic, 1S03-64. H. Bonitz. Platan. Studien, i^ols. L and II. (on the Gorg., Tlieaet.. Euthyd., and Soph.), Vienna, 1853-60 ; Friedrich Ueherweg, TJnter- ruchungen iiber die Eehtlieit und Zeiffolge Platonischer Sdiriften und ilber die ITavptmomaite am Plato's Leben, Vienna, 1801 ; and Ueber den Gegensata smiichen Genetikem und JUethodikem md lessen Vennittlung (in the Zeitschr.fur Phil. u. phUos. Krit., vol. 67, Halle, 1870). G. Grote, Plato. tc. (see above, § 89, p. 96) ; 2d edition, Lond., 1867. Cf., on this work by Grote, J. St. Mill, in the Ediv3>. leview, April, 1366; Paul Janet, in the Journal des Sarane, June, 1866, pp. 381-89.5, and Feb., 1867, pp. 14-182; Chnrles de Efimusat, in the Pmue des Deuas Mondes, vol. 73, 1868, pp. 48-77, and D. Peipers, in he Gott. gelehH. Anz., 1869, pp. 31-120, and ibid., 1870, pp. 661-610. Carl Schaarschmidt, Die Summlmf 'er Platmischen Schriften, sur Scheidmig der echten von den nnechten untersucht. Bonn, 1366. Of the numerous editions and translations of and commentaries on single dialogues or collections of Plato's wkitings. 107 lialogaea — all of which can not here be cited (see Enigelmann's Mbliotheca Script. ClasH.^ 5th ed., Leipsic, 858, and also various lists of works in different volumes of the Philologua^ hjni in works on the history f litemtnre) — we may mention here : 1^ JHalogi seleoH cura Ludov. Frid. Reindorfii^ ad apparattim Inman. Bekkeri lect. denuo emend- *hil. Buttmann, Berlin, 1S02-28. Dialogorvm, delectus ex rec. et cum lat. interpret F. Aug. WolJi% Euthypkron, Apologia Crito), Berlin, 1812. Syviposioii^ ed. F. A. Wolf. Leipsic, 17S2. Phaedo^ ed, ). Wyttenbach, Leyden, 1810; Lei[isic, 1824 [T. D. Woolsey], etc. The Republic has been edited by kst, K, Schneider, and others, the Leges by Ast, Schulthess, etc., Eathydeimte and Laches by Badhum, Ten a, 1855. GriecHsche Prosaiker in neuer XJebers. hrsg. von C. 2T. v. Osiander und G. Scliwah (containing ?lato's works, translated by L. Georgii, Franz Susemihl, J. Deuschle, and others), Stuttgart (J. B. Metz- er), 1853 seq. PI. s \yeTke^ transl. by K. Fran tl and others, Stuttgart (Karl Hoffmann), 1854 seq. PVs lusgewuhlte SciJiriften^ f^f den SclLulgebrauch erklart, by Christian Cron and Jul. Deuschle, Leips. 1857 eq. Pl.^s Phaedr^m v/iid Gastmahl^ iibs ^nit einl. Voracort 'oon K. Lehrs, Leips. 1870. The Banquet baa ilso been translated and explained by (among: others) Ed. Zeller (Marburg, 1857), the Gorgias by G. Schnlt- leea (new, revised edition by S. TOgelih, Zurich, 1S57), the lieptihlic by F. C. "Wolf (Altona, 1799), Kleuker Vienna, 1805), K. Schneider (Breslau, 1839), and others, [including Bavies and Vaughan, TAe Republic of I'lato, 4th ed., Cambridge, 1868 ; ct also, W. Whewell, Plaionic IHalog}ie8 for English Readers^ 3 voX, 859-60.— 7>.]. On the Phaedrus compare the introdnctions of the various editors and translators of that dialogue, as Iso the appropriate parts in the comprehensive works of Ast, Socher, F. Hermimn, Bi-andis, Zeller, Si;se- riihl, Munk, Grote, etc., and, in particular, A. B. Krische, Ueber PVft Phaedr.^ Gott. 1848; Jul. Deuschle, 7e6dr den innem Gedanken^us. im PI. Phaedrus^ in the Zeitsckr. f. die Alter thtmisw ins, 1S54, pp. i5-44; Die PI. Mytfien, insbes. der Jfj/thus im Pkaedr.^ Hanau, 1854; Lifike, De Phaedri coiisilio {G.- 'V.). Wesel, 1856; C. E. Volquardson, PL's Phaedrus, PVs erste Schrijl, Kiel, 18G3; F. Breslcr, Ueber den ^l. Phaeilr. {G.-Pr.\ Dantzic, 1867; Rud. Kiihner, PI. de eloqueniia in Phnedro dialogo judicium ((?.- ?r.), Spandau, 1S6S; Carl Schraelzer, Zu PI. Phaedrus (Progr.\ Guben, 1368 ; L. B. Forster, Qtiaestio de ?l, Phaedro, Berlin, 1869. Cf. also Lehrs' Introduction to his translation of the Phaedrus and the Sym- wsion. leipsic, 1860. Of the Platonic Symposion treat (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, etc.) : F. A. Wolf, in his Ver- nischte Schr., pp. 288-339 ; Carl Fortlage, Philosophische Meditationen uber Plato's Sympos., Heidelberg, 335, Fenl. Delbrflck, De Plat. Symposio, Bonn, 18S9: Albert Schwegler, Ueber die Compos, des PI. ^mp., Tubingen, 1848; Ed. Wunder. Blicke in PVs Symp.^ in the Philol., V. pp. 6S2 seq. ; Fi-anz Suse- nihl, Ueber die Co?npos. des PI. Gastmahls, in the Phil^l.^ VL 1851, pp. 177 seq, and Vlll. 1853, pi». ,53-159; Ed. Zeller, in his Translation of the Symp.^ Marbnrg, 1859. On the relation of the Platonic to the Cenophontic Symposion, see Boeckh, Be simultate, guam Plato cum, Xenoplionte exercuisse fertur, Serlln, 1811 (cf. Boeckh, In t. Kaumer's Antiguar. Briefe, Leips. 1851, p. 40 seq.); K. F. Hermann, iVwm P(. an Xenoph. Convivfum suum prius scnpserit^ atque de consilio horuni libellotntm, Marb. 1834; Vermuthung, daas PI. Symposion alter set als das Xcnopliontische^gerechtfertigt, ib. 1841; Zur Frage iber das Zeitverhdltniss der beiden Sympo^en, in the Philol.^ VIII. pp. 329-333. Arn. llug argues on lecisive grounds in favor of the priority in time of the Banquet of Xenophou, in the Philol.^ VII. pp. 158-695; Georg Ferd. Eettig (argues in the same sense). Progr., Berne, 1864. Of the dialogue Protagoras write (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, Susemihl, Grote, etc.) Conr. G. Tohmer, PI. Protag. nach seinem innem Zasammenhang enticickelt {Progr.'), Zeitz, 1839; W. Nntt- nann, De PI, Protag., Emmerich, 1855; Krosehel, Zit den chronol. Verh. des PI. Protag., in the Zeiizchr. ''. d. Gymnasialwesen, XI. 1857, pp. 561-567; Richard Schone, Ueber PI. Protag., ein Beilrag zur Lotmng lerPl. Frage, Leips. 1SG2; Mein.ardns, Wie ist PI. Protag. aufzvfasHcnT {G.-Pr.\ Oldenburg, 1864; Wal- leck. Analyse des PI. Protag. (G.-Pr.), Corbach, 1863. On the order of ideas in the Gorgias tiT\([ the tendency of the dialogue compare, in particular. Job. Bake, % Gorg. PI. consilio et itigenio, in B.''s Scholica JTypomnemata, III. pp. 1-26, Leyden, 1844; Ilerm. loaitz. in his above-mentioned S^tdien ; Ludw. Paul, 1st die Scene fur den Gorg. im House des Eal- iklesf {Feaigruss an rfifi27 P/w^o^.-Fers.), Kiel, 1869. [The Gorgias of Plato^ T. D. Woolsey, Boston, 342, 2d edition, 1848.— TV*.] In regard to the Meno, Euthyphron, Crito, and other minor dialogues, as the Philebua^ Parmenides, ^phistes. etCfl it may suffice here to refer t<> the works of Schaarschmidt and Grote, of whom the former isputes, while the latter defends, the authenticity of all these dialogues. [Recent translations of three of hege dialogues are: Philebua, a Dialogue of Plato, etc., translated by Edward Poste, London, (since) 360; 77i6 Sophisfes of Plato^ translated and preceded by an Intr. on Ancient and Modern Philosophy, by 1. W. Mackay, Lond. 1868 ; Plaid's Meno^ transl. by Mackay, with an Essay on the Moral Education of the Sreeks, London, 1869.— 7>.] 108 Plato's weitings. The principal works relating to the Jiepublic ore cited a<2 § 4S, and those relating to the Thnavus an^ PItaedo, ad § 42. The .spuriousness of all the Letters attributed to Plato has been demonstrated most decisively by Herm, Thorn. Karsten (see above, § 39, p. 99). The Aristotelian citations from Plato form the only sufficient external criterion and certificate of the genuineness of the works of Plato. Every dialogue which is unques- tionably attested as Platonic by Aristotle, must be regarded as genuine, or has at least the most decided presumption in its favor. Of course, the converse is not true, that the silence of Ajistotle proves the spuriousness of a dialogue, although under specific circum- stances this silence is certainly to be considered as an important element in the evidence. The question of genuineness in connection with those dialogues which are not proved authentic by Aristotle's testimony, must be decided mainly on internal grounds. The libraries of Plato's pupils, while sufficient to assure the preservation of all that was genuine among the worlcs attributed to Plato, were insufficient to assure the exclusion of all that was spurious. On the one hand, works published by immediate disciples of Plato (for example. Leges, Epinomis, Sophittes, and Politicus), which were found in the libraries with no exact indication of the name of the author, or the name of th^ author having been lost, were early received as works of Plato : among these were some that were written in the spirit of Plato's doctrine and under his name, being founded on his posthumous literary remains or on his oral utterances; on the other hand, some works, which may have been composed from sixty to one hundred years after Plato's death (for example, a part of the Letters), were received into the Alexandrian Library as works presumably Platonic. Still others of Plato's " Works " are forgeries of even later date. The trilogies, as arranged by Aristophanes of Byzantium are (according to Diog. L., III. 61.) the following : 1) Rep., Timaeus, Critias ; 2) Sophista, Politicus, Cratylus ; 3) Leges, Minos, Epinomis; 4) Theaet., Euthyphro, Apologia; 5) Crito, Phaedo, Epistolae; besides these, there were other dialogues which Aristophanes received as genuine, and enumerated Separately. It is not known which these were. The tetralogies proposed by Thrasyllus were (according to Diog L., 56 seq.): 1) Euthyphron, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo; 2) Cratylus, Theaetetua, Sophista, Politicus; 3) Parmenides, Philebus, Convivium, Pbaedrus; 4) Alci- biades I. and II., Hipparchus, Anterastae ; 5) Theages, Charmides, Laches, Lysis ; 6) Euthyderaus, Protagoras, G-orgias, Mono ; 7) Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, lo, Menexenus ; 8) Clitophon, Eep., Timaeus, Critias; 9) Minos, Leges, Epinomis, Epistolae. As dialogues confessedly spurious, Diog. L. names the following: Mido, Eryxias, Haloyo, eight dialogues witliout an introduction (d/ce^a^of ti^ Sisyphus, Axiochus, Phaeaces, Demodocus, Clielidon, Hebdome, Epimenides. Of these are preserved: 1) Axiochus; 2) Concerning what is just (one of the dialogues without exordium) ; 3) Concerning virtue (ditto) ; 4) Demodocus ; 5) Sisyphus ; 6) Eryxias ; 7) Haloyo (which usually accompanies Lucian's works) ; to these are to be added the Deflnitiones, which are likewise spurious. Schleiermacher places in the first, or elementary division of the Platonic works, as chief works: Phaedrus, Protagoras, Parmenides; as adjuncts: Lysis, Laches, Charmides, Euthy- phron; as occasional writings : Apologia and Crito ; and as semi-genuine or spurious : lo, Hippias Minor, Hipparchus, Minos, Alcibiades II. In the second division, which contains tlie dialogues indirectly dialectical in form, dialogues devoted principally to the explanation of knowledge and of intelligent action, Sclileiermacher classes as chief works : Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Phaedo, Philebus ; as adjuncts : Gorgias, Mono, Euthydemus, Craty- lus, Convivium ; as semi-genuine or spurious : Theages, Erastae, Alcibiades I., Menexenus, Hippias Major, Clitopho. The third, constructive division, finally, contains, according to Plato's weitings. 109 Schleiermacher, as chief works the dialogues: Republic, Timaeus, and Critias; and as an adjunct, the Leges. — Brandis agrees substantially with Schleiermacher, but holds that tlie Protagoras may have been composed before the PhaWrus, and places (with Zeller) Parmenides immediately after Sophistes and Politieus. K. F. Hermann includes in the first of the three development-periods which he ascribes to Plato, the following dialogues: Hipp. Min., lo, Alcib. I., Charm., Lysis, Laches, Protag., Euthyd. The Apol., Crito, Gorgias, Enthyphro, Meno, Hipp. Major belong to a "transition period." In the second, or Megaric period, he places Cratyliis, Theaet., Soph., Politieus, Parmenides, and in the third period, the period of maturity, Phaedrus, Menexenus, Con- vivuim, Phaedo, Phileb., Eep., Tim., Critias, Leges. Steinhart (in his introductions to the Platonic dialogues accompanying Miiller's trans- lation) adopts substantially the arrangement of Hermann, modifying it only in a few minor points. Susemihl, who at first (in his Prodromus Platon. Forschwigen) was more inclined to the view of Schleiermacher, approached subsequently nearer to tliat of Hermann, adopting an intermediate and conciliatory position between them. He holds that a definite plan underlies the Platonic writings, but that this was not wholly developed in Plato's mind at the very beginning of his literary activity. He believes that it was developed gradually, like his philosophy, during the first stadia of his literary activity, becoming constantly clearer and more complete. Susemihl differs from Hermann, in ascribing the development of philosophical doctrine in Plato's mind less to external influences and more to Plato's originality. Susemihl regards the Phaedrus as earlier than the dialogues of Hermann's "Megaric period," or, at least, than a part of them. Munk holds fast to the fundamental idea of Schleiermacher, that all the dialogues of Plato were composed with reference to a determinate plan, but believes that they were nearly all written after the death of Socrates. He emphasizes more the artistic side of this plan than the didactic, and supposes that Plato designed in the succession of his writings to present an idealized portrait of Socrates as the genuine philosopher ; he believes, accord- ingly, that by the chronological succession of the scenes or " situations, " and especially by the increasing age at which Socrates figures in the successive dialogues, Plato indicated the order in which he himself intended them to be studied, and that this order agrees in general with the time of their composition. Munk's theory is an hypothesis worthy of Consideration. Many of the results of special investigation accord very well with it, wliile others seem to oppose it, though without being sufficient to set aside entirely the principle involved. But it is beyond question that the manner in which Munk has carried through and applied his principle in detail, is imperfect, and leaves room for numerous corrections. Munk has neglected the question of the genuineness of the dialogues, and has often either made too light work of the investigation of their chrono- logical succession or conducted it from too exclusive a stand-point. He has, nevertheless, furnished many very valuable contributions to this department of special investigation. He distinguishes three series of writings : I. Socrates' consecration to philosophy and his contests against false wisdom ; time of composition 389-384 B. c. : Parm. (time of the action, 446), Protag. (434), Charm. (432), Laches (421), Gorgias (420), lo (420), Hippias I. (420), Cratylus (420), Euthyd. (420), Sympos. (417). II. Socrates teaches true wisdom; time of composition, 383-370 : Phaedrus (410), Philebus (410), Eep., Tim., and Critias (409, see Munk in Jahn's Jahrb., 79, p. 791). III. S. demonstrates the truth of his teachings by the criticism of opposite opinions and by his death as a martyr ; time of composition, after 370: Meno (405), Theaet. (on the day when the accusation was brought forward by Meletns), Soph, and Politieus (one day later), Euthyphron (the same day with Theaet.) Apolog. (one day after the embassy to Deles), Crito (two days before the death of Socrates), 110 Plato's wEiTmas. Phaedo (on the day of Socrates' death). These writings form, according to Mnnk, a Cyclus complete in itself; they were preceded by a few youthful compositions, viz. : Alcib. I., Lysis, and Hippias 11, and followed by Menexenus (composed after 387) and Leges (begiia in 367). Grote holds that all those dialogues which were considered genuine by Thrasyllus are realiy such, because it is to be presupposed that they were preserved in the Alexandrian Library as Platonic writings (which is, indeed, very probable), and because it is further to be assumed that this Library received them in the beginning from Platonista of the Academy (which is probably true of many of these writings, but scarcely of all), and that these Platonists possessed a complete and correct collection of the genuine Platonic writings. (This latter supposition, however, is very doubtful, and is not proved; for in those early times the productive philosophical interest generally took precedence of the literary and antiquarian ; it is quite conceivable that among Plato's remains, as also in book-collections belonging to Platonists, were included copies of the dialogical writings of Plato's disciples — which, from all the indications, we must suppose to have been very numerous — some of them without precise indications as to their authorship, and that this gave occasion, earlier or later, to errors, and even to imposture. The supposition that a complete collection of the genuine writings of Plato was in the possession of the School, and that this served as the nm-ma for the Platonic canon, would prove too much, since from it would follow the genuineness of the entire collection transmitted ; but surely the genume- ness of all the contents of that collection can not be satisfactorily defended, as, e. g., that of Minos and the Epistles, which are certainly spurious, yet belong to the writings con- sidered genuine by Aristophanes of Byzantium.) Grote assumes, further, that all the dialogues of Plato and those of the other companions of Socrates were composed after the death of Socrates ; he supports this altogether reasonable opinion with the most cogent arguments. Grote rejects the hypothesis of Schleiermacher and Munk, of a didactic or artistic plan comprehending, with few exceptions, all the dialogues; he denies all " peremptory and intentional sequence or interdependence;'' each dialogue, he argues, is the product of the " state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed;" in the com- position of the dialogues of research or inquiry, it is not necessary to suppose that Plato was already in possession of the solutions contained in the constructive dialogues ; the disturbing of prejudices and pointing out of difficulties has in itself a very great worth; "the dialogues of research present an end in themselves.'' Here Grote seems to go too far. That, for example, in the Protagoras, the Platonic Socrates hypothetieally develops opinions which were not held by Plato himself, and that this is intimated by Plato by the early age at which he brings forward Socrates in the dialogue named — thereby suggesting a more advanced and mature stadium in Socrates' life, to be set forth in other dialogues- all this would have to be admitted, even though Schleiermacher's and Munk's view of an artistic and didactic plan underlying all the dialogues, were justly rejected. Grote does not believe that the chronological sequence of most of the dialogues can be determined j he considers them in his work in tlie following order : Apologia (early, and essentially faithful), Crito, Euthyphron, Ale. L and II., Hippias Major and Minor, Bipparchus, Minos, Theages, Erastae, Ion, Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus, Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposion, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Cratylus, Philebus, Menexenus, Clitopho (which Grote defends as genuine, but fragmentary, and first made public after Plato's death), Rep., Tim., and Critias, Leges, and Epinomis. Grote's work is rich in suggestion and instruction; the author of the " History of Greece" maintains here his masterly superiority in historical presentation, but his acceptance as genuine of all the dialogues accredited by Thrasyllus has caused him to lose sight of ths Ill sential unity present in Plato's thought and works, and to admit in its stead a multi- ■iousness abounding in cliange and contradiction. Schaarseiunidt's investigations relate chiefly to the queaKon of the genuineness or spu- usness of Plato's works, and incidentally only to that of their chronological order. The iult he arrives at is, that the authenticity of the following dialogues only is fully assured: laedrus, Protagoras, Banquet, Gorgias, Republic, and Timaeus, Theaetetus, Phaedo, Laws. Plato's genuine works he sees dramatic dialogues, which are not intended to instruct 3 reader in the solution of the fundamental questions of philosophy themselves, but ther from the stand-point of the writer's own experience, to impress in a living, impres- 'e manner on the heart of the reader that the dialectical labor necessary to the solution those questions is the moral concern and duty of every man, and to offer, in the exam- 5 of the most remarkable investigator of ideas, samples of the art by which one elevates mself into the ideal region and in its light contemplates the essence of the soul, the best :m of the state, or even of the cosmos, as the expression of the most perfect harmony, le Socratic dialogue, which with Xenophon and other followers of Socrates served to 3all their late master's discussions concerning ideas, was elevated by Plato, who used the eatest liberty in modifying its content as well as its shape, to a philosophical drama, in lich Socrates and his collocutors acquire a typical character as representatives of various ;ellectual tendencies and ethical states. In all the dialogues of Plato, Socrates appears to such a degree and in such a manner salized, that it is impossible to suppose any of them to have been composed before that ent of Socrates' death, which transfigured the image of Socrates in the mind of Plato, le Apology appears to have been written at an early period by Plato, and to present not srely the sense and spirit, but nearly the very words of Socrates's defense (as Schleier- »cher assumes). Setting aside this dialogue (and the Crito?), the ideal picture of icrates, as presented in those dialogues, in which Plato represents him as a man not t advanced in years, approaches nearest to his historical figure. This is true without ception, if we set aside as spurious the dialogue Parmenides, which treats of the ideas, d the One (iv), which can neither be nor not be. The time of the action of this ilogne is about 450, and in it the early training of Socrates is depicted unhistorically, th a certain ^idealization, as in Phaedo, p. 95 e, seq., not conformable to the tendency, rly characteristic of Socrates, to "examine" subjects dialectically and in their ethical arings, nor in a manner which accords with the Protagoras and the other dialogues, t with a mi.rture of later ideas, and such as were foreign to Socrates. The unjustified preach is here directed against Socrates, that he had in earlier life assumed the ex- enee of ideas, for the purposes of preparatory dialectical exercises (conducted in thq Jthod of two-sided discussions respecting particular conceptions). Socrates appears as a m of middle age, probably not yet forty years old, and forcing the recognition of his istership in philosophy, in discussions with Protagoras, who was by many years his nior (and incidentally also with Hippias and Prodicus), in the artistically very finished dogue Protagoras. The date of this dialogue must be regarded as about 432 B. c, ;hough ij contains portions pointing anachronistically to a later period. It was certainly mposed after the death of Socrates, and perhaps later than the Phaedrus. In the dia- cue Protagoras the relation of virtue to knowledge, the unity or plurality of the virtues, d the cultivation of virtue are made subjects of investigation, and the conceit of the phists, in presuming to be wise and to make others wise, is annihilated by the e^iraaig Socrates, whose dialectic is based on an earnest striving after truth and morality. A ilogue more peculiarly Platonic in content and form is the Gorgias (on the questions : hat is rhetoric? conversation between Socrates and Gorgias, cc 2-15; What worth 112 Plato's wbitings. and what real power does rhetoric possess 7 conversation between Socrates and I'ol'js, ct, 16-36; Is the proper business of life political rhetoric or philosophy? conversation between Socrates and Callicles, cc. 67-83 ; the whole is at the same time a justification by Plato of himself in adopting tho philosopher's vocation). The time at which Plato would represent the conversations as being held, is probably 421 B. c, though anachronistic reference is made in them to events of a later date. In these dialogues, as also in the following, whose authenticity in part is not fully certified. Laches (on Courage), Lysis (on Friendship), Charmides (on Temperance), Eiithyphro (on Piety), Hippias Minor (on Willful Wrong-doing), and in others, which are of very doubtful . authenticity or are decidedly spurious, tho specifically Platonic theory of ideas is contained only by implication, but not formally developed and estabhshed. This may be explained by supposing that Plato in these dialogues intentionally confined himself to mere suggestions or intimations, being guided in this by the didactic principle of a gradual exposition of his doctrines. Or, it may be explained by the hypothesis, that Plato had himself not yet arrived at the theory of ideas in its developed form (according to the principle of gradual development assumed by K. F. Hermann) ; but the circumstance that Plato in the Protagoras and also in Gor- gias (and Laches, etc.) introduces Socrates as a man still in middle age, is decidedly favor- able to the first supposition. The theory of ideas, with all the theoretical positions which it involves, is first expressly set forth in the Phaedrus and the Convivium, though in mythical form — not in the form of dialectical development. The dialogue Phaedrus criticises ostentatious eloquence (that of Lysias in particular) from the stand-point of philosophy, and the false art of instruction and education from the stand-point of that art which is true. It does this flrst by the collocation of discourses concerning love, the first Lysianic, the second in form only, and the third in both form and tendency, Platonic and Socratic, and then by a general ■ consideration, founded on these examples, of the rhetorical and the philosophical or dialectical methods. But the examples, in respect of their subjects, are not arbitrarily chosen. They treat directly of the true end of life and of the way which conducts to it, love, taken in the philosophical sense, being here represented as the united striving of souls to reach the goal of philosophy, j. «., tho knowledge of ideas, and to attain to that practical conduct of life which corresponds with such knowledge; while an nnphilosophical rhetoric is portrayed as pursuing ends alto- gether inferior. The Phaedrus is also a justification of Plato's doctrinal activity as a teacher. In it, philosophical authorship is represented as secondary to, and dependent upon oral schooling in dialectic. It is held that the former should follow the latter only as VTrd/iv^ctc, and is nothing but a Tray/taXiy wmdid, a kind of philosophical poesy (cf Sep., p. 602), not to be compared with the serious earnestness of a life devoted, in common with othitrs, to inquiry and to the work of education (a declaration, which, although its immediate occasion was Plato's poetical imitation of the Socratic dialectic, none the less implies beyond a doubt' the existence already of a circle of companions of like mind with Plato, and also a circle of scholars and co-investigators, who recognized Plato as their leader). Tho Convivium contains a series of discourses respecting love, which set forth tlie various conceptions of the same, ending with the highest pljilosophieal conception of love, as maintained by Socrates, and all in the form of encomia addressed to Kros. At last Alcibiadea steps in, extolling Socrates as one who, in his relations with himself, had exemplified the genuine, pedagogical love in a manner fully commensurate vfith the requirement of philosophy. The Convivium was composed 385-384, or at least not earlier (as appears from an historical allusion contained in it) ; the action falls in the year ill. The relation of this dialogue to the Symposion of Xenophon is discussed on the one side by K. F. Hermann (Progr., Marb. 1841 ; Gott. 1844-45), who considers the Plato's -weitings. 113 Platonic composition the earlier; on the other, by A. Hug (in the Philol., VIL 1852, p. 638 seq., to whicli Hermann responds, ilnd., Vol. VIII.), G. Ferd. Eettig (Progr., Berne, 1864), and Boeckh {De simuUate, qtiam Plato cum Xenophonte exeroldsse fertur, Berlin, 1811, and in V. Raumer's Antiquar. Briefe, Leipsic, 1851, p. 40 seq.). The Phaedrus appears to hayo been written not long before the Banquet ; the time of the action in Plato's intention may be perhaps most surely determined from the circumstance that Isocrates (born 435) is named in it as a young beginner, of whom great expectations might justly be entertained; with this is to be joined the fact that Lysias, who is represented as living at Athens, is known from other sources to have returned thither from Lower Italy in the year 411; yet it is uncertain whether Plato knew and took into consideration this time of the return of Lysias, of which he nowhere makes mention himself. According to Diog. L., III. 38, the Phaednts was Plato's earliest composition ; yet this statement, though possibly correct, is not sufficiently well authenticated. The date of the composition of the Phaedrus falls undoubtedly within the years 396-384 B. c, according to the present state of investiga- tions ; but nearly all the data on which are founded tho various attempts at a more exact determination of it are very uncertain. In case Plato made this dialogue first public on his return after long journeys, and wrote the Protagoras, as also the Gorgias, at a later period, it would seem beyond doubt that in these latter dialogues, which are filled with elementary inquiries in the field of dialectic and ethics, Plato consciously and with artistic intention represented the age of Socrates as such, that notwithstanding their possibly later compo- sition, they could be used as preparatory for the development of ideas contained in the Phaedrus — each of the dialogues, of course, being considered in its relation to the ideal picture of the Platonic Socrates, as presented by all the dialogues taken together. In a letter addressed to me, and which its author has kindly permitted me to publish, S-jsemihl expresses his belief that the date of the composition of the Phaed)-us may be fixed at 389 or 388. He reasons as follows: "Isocrates must have been at that time a well-known author and perhaps also already a teacher of eloquence; but up to 392 he neither engaged in giving instruction as such a teacher, nor in any other occupation except tho composition of judicial discourses, a work which he afterward entirely discontinued ; and since the criticism of Lysias in the Phaedrus turns on one of the ostentatious discourses of that orator, it is hardly possible not to suppose that the Isocrates who is contrasted with him, had already begun to compose such discourses, when the dialogue was written. Now the oldest of these, the Encomium of Busiris, seems to date from 390-389. On the other hand, it is difficult to suppose that long after 390 or 389 Plato ;Bhould not have be- come so undeceived respecting the character and merits of Isocrates, as to render it impos- sible for him still to express himself respecting him in such terms as those here employed by him. Spengel, indeed (Isokr. und PI., p. 15 seq. ; 347 seq.), thinks that when Isocrates composed his work against the Sophists, which is beyond question to bo considered as u sort of inaugural programme of liis course as an instructor, he can have been at the most not more than forty years old, sinco he says in Antid., § 195, that he wrote this work veirTEpo^ and d/t/iafui/; but it is to be noticed, 1) that ho there judges himself (§ 9) Tzpeairvrepoc only at the age of eighty-two years ; 2) that if Isocrates opened his school at Athens as early as 496, ho must at the same time have been writing judicial discourses during a period of at least two years, which contradicts tho express testimony of Aristotle, in Cic., Brutus, 12, 48 {Fragm., 119, Rose)." Of very uncertain authenticity are tho Hippias Major (On tho Beautiful), lo (Concerning Inspiration and Reflection), Meno (Can Virtue be Taught?), and Menexenus (a Tidyog etti- ToAiog on fallen Athenians with Socrates as tho speaker). It is possible that Plato early commenced writing on the dialogue on justice, which he afterward enlarged into the work 8 114 respecting justice in the life of the individual and in the state (The State, Politeia, Eesi- publiea). This work was followed by the Timaeus (containing Plato's natural philosophy, TVith Timseus the Pythagorean as spokesman) and Critias (a fragment of an unfinished work, containing an imaginary political story of the primitive times) ; the time of these dialogues falls in the year 409 B. c. The Phaedo, which presents the dying Socrates demonstrating the immortality of the soul, seems to have been commenced later than the Timaeus and to close up the Cyclus, by showing how the noblest and the abiding good for the immortal soul consists in philosophical knowledge and in action founded on such knowledge (somewhat as in the Banquet, where Plato advances from the praise of Eros to that of the person of the true Erotic). To the dialogues of late com- position, the Theaetetus (which stands in the closest relation to Rep., Y. 414 seq., and Tim., p. 51) seems to belong. In this dialogue Plato shows how knowledge {eTncT^/ai) differs from sense-perception {aladiiaic, cli. 8-30), and from correct judgment or opinion (iSdfo alrfiTjQ, chs. 31-38). The definition of cmarrifz?! as (5ai-g1i, lS61.—Ii:]; Ferd. Christ. Siiw:,I>as ChrietHdie des Platoniamus oder Sokrates imd Christiu, in the Ztschr.fur Tlieol, 183T, No. 8, pp. 1-154, and sepa- rately, T&b. 1837. (Baur shows how the practicable elements in the Platonic ideal state were realized by the Christian church, which result he attributes to the inner relationship of the two, as each recognizing the substantiality of the ideal; but Platonism, he adds, was wanting in the sense of the unity of the divine and the human, in positive or substantial import, and in a recognition of the phenomena of subjective con- sciousness. Baur^s conception of "substantiality," however, wavers between that of unconsciousness [tho ancient conception] and transcendence [a more modern one]. It may well be asked, whether more of **" unity " is not visible in Plato's dialectic than in the dogmas of the church ?) A. Neander, Wiss. Abhand- hmgem, ed. by J. L. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851, p. 169 seq. ; J. Dollinger, Beidemthum, und JudeniJvum^ Regensburg, 1857. p. 295 seq. ; E. Ehlers, J>e vi ae potestate, quamphilosopMa antiqua^ imprimia Plaionica et jStoica, in doetr. apologOarvm saec II. habuerit, Gott, 1859 ; F. Michelis, Die Philotophie Plato's in ihrer innem SevMivng snir geqfferibarten, Wahrkeit^ Miinster, 1859-60; Deitrich Becker, Das phUos, .System Plato's in seMier BaaUhfljung eum cfi/ristlichen Dogm^ Freiburg, 1862 ; Heinr, von Stein, Sieben BUchei mr GeschicMe des Platonismns, Parts I. and It, Gott, 1862-64; Alfred Fouillie, La phUosopMe d» 118 Platon: EXpoaitUm, histoire $t eritiq'ue de la SUorie dea idiei {Ouorage couronmi par VAcad. del Seimcea Morales et PoUUguea), Paris, 1S69. (Cf. the literature to % 43.) Amung the earlier monographs on Plato's theory of ideas may be mentioned those of Jak. Brucker (1T43), Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1TS6), Priedrieh Victor Leberecht Plessinc, Joh. Friedr. Dammann, Th. Fahse (1795) ; among the more recent, those of Joh. Friedr. Herbart (fie PlatomM Systemutts i'vndammto iGott., 1805, reproduced in Vol. I. of Herbart's Kl. Schr., 1842, p. 6T seq., and in Vol. XII. of his Cumpl. Works 1352, p. 61 seq. ; cf. Boeckh, Jmaer IAt.-Zeitung, 1808, No. 224.), Christ. Aug. Brandis (Diatribe Academica de perddtia Ariatotelia libria de Ideis et de Bono, Bonn, 1823), Ad. Trendelenburg (Platorm de Ideia et Nu- meris doctrima ex Ariatotele iOuetrata, Leips. 1826), H. Eichter (De Id. PI, Leips. 1827), Xudolf Wien- borg (De primdtico id. PI. aenau, Altona, 1829), K. F. Hermann (Marb. Lect.'Kat., 1832-1883 and 1839), Herm. Bonitz (ZWsp. Platomicae d-uae; De Idea Boni; De Animae Mimdanae apud Plat. ElemetUia, Dresden, 1887), Zeller (Ueber die Ariatot. Daratellimg der Platon. PhUoaophie, in Z.'s Plat. Studien, Tiib. 1889, pp. 197-800), Franz Ebben (De PI. id. doctrina, Bonn. 1849), J. F. Nourrisson (Quid PI. de ideia sen- aerit, Paris, 1852, Expos, de la Ikiorie platomaienne dea ideea, Paris, 1868), Graser (Torgau, 1861), S. Kib- bing (see abOTC, § 40), Th. Maguire (An Essay on the Platonic Idea, London, 1866), Hei-m. Cohen (Die plat. Ideealehre, psi/chologiaeh entwickelt, in the " ZeitacJiK /wr Yblkerp^diologie und Spradmiaa," eil. by M. Lazarus and H. Steinthal, Vol. IV., Berlin, 1866, pp. 408-464); cf. Max Schncidewin'sDisijuistSiOTiMm philoa. de Platonds Theatetl parte priori apecimen (Inaug.-Dias.), Gottingen, 1865, and other opuscules by the same author on the Theaetetus, Soph., Farm., etc., and Ad. Trendelenburg's i>(M £be7»naass,«in Band der Verwandiacha/t Zwisclien der griecftiachen Arehaeologie -mid PMloaoplvie, Berlin, 18e5. (The rising of the idea above the phenomenal — which is in conformity with the tendency of nature herself— is illustrated by Trendelenburg by an example from the plastic art of the Greeks, where the facial angle of 'Camper exceeds, in its approach to a right angle, the limits actually observed in nature ; in this sense, says T., the idea is *^ the fundamental form or type, elevated above the mutation of phenomena, the arche- type, toward which all things tend.") On the mathematical passages in Plato's writings, Theodorus of Soli (Plutarch, De Def, Orac, ch, 82) and Thco. of Smyrna (rStv Kara /laBijiiaTiKrfv xprjaifuav tis ttiv toO HKdrmvoi avdyvotaLv) in ancient times, and in modern times Mollweide (Gott. 1805, and Leipsic, 1813), C. E. Chr. Schneider (De Ifwnero Plat., Breslau, 1822), J. J. Fries (PVa Zahl [Sep., 546], Heidelberg, 1828), C. F. Wex (De loco maOem. in PlatonAa Menone, Halle, 1826), Joh. Wolfg. MuUer (Commentar iiber swei Stellen in Pl.'a dfeno «. Theaet., Nuremberg, 1797; Prufmig der 'eon Ween versucfiten Erkl., ibid. 1826), C. F. Hermann (De JSumero Platonia, Marburg, 1838), E. F. August (Berlin, 1829 and 1844), and others, have written ; Adolph Benecke appears to have given the correct explanation of the geometrical hypothesis advanced in the Mene^ in the Progr. des Elbinger G-ymn., 1S67. His merits In respect of the advancement of maihematica'bji.'^e been discussed (though, for the most part, without sufficiently critical investigation) by the historians of .mathematics, especially by Montucla, Bossut, Chasles, Arneth, and in the monogra]>h by G. Blass, De Plat, maGieTTuxtico (Dias.-Inaug.), Bonn, 1861 ; cf. also Finger, De pritnordiia geometriae apud Graecos, Heidel- berg, 1831, and Bretschneidcr, in his work on the Geometry of Euclid, Leipsic, 1S70. Of the Platoni o Dialectic treat : Joh. Jac. Engel, Verauclt. einer Methode, die Verrmnftlehre ava PI. Dia- Zogen eu e/ntwickeVn, Berlin, 1780 ; Joh. Jac. Heinr. Nast, De meih. PI. philoa. docendi dialogicae, Stuttgard, 1787 ; Analysis logica dial. PI. qui inscr. Mejio, ibid., 1792-93 ; Jac. Borellus, De methodo Socr. docendi exemplo e dial. Plat, qui vnaer. Eutliyphro illuatrata, Upsala, 1798 ; Fr. Hoffmann, Die DialektUc Pl.'a, Munich, 1832; Karl Kiesel, in Gymn. Programmea, Cologne, 1840, DiisseUlorf, 1S51 and ISCB; Th. Wilh. Danzel (Hamburg, 1841, and Leipsic, 1845), K. Kuhn (Berlin, 1S43), K. Gttntber (In the Philoloffua. V. 1860, p. 86 seq.), Knno Fischer, 2)e Parm. Plat.,&tattg.,lS5l; Karl Eichhoif, Zo^d trima dial. PI. erpKo. (iCfno, Orito, Phaedo), G.-Pr., Duisbnrg, 1854 ; Ed. Albertl, Zur Dial, des PI., vom Theaet. bis sum Patm., Leips. 1866 (from Suppl., Vol. I., to the Jf. Jahrb.f. Phil. v.. Pad.); H. Druon, An fuerit interna a. eao- terica PI, doctr., Paris, 1860; Hiilzer, GrmidsUge der Erkenntniadehre in Plato'a Stofit. (G.-Pr.), Cottbus, 1861 ; C. Martinins, Ueber die Pragestellung in den Dialogm Plato's, in the Zmtedir. /. d. Gymn.- Wesen, Beriin, 1S66, pp. 97-119 and 497-616; End. Alex. Keinhold Kleinpaul, Der Begr. der Erk. in PVa Theaet. (Diss.-Lips.), Gotha, 1867; Josef Steger, Plat. Studien, I., Innsbrnck, 1869 ; W. Weicker, Amor Platonima et diaaerendi ratio Soeratiea qua neceaMudine inter sese contineantwr (G^Pr.), Zwickau, 1869 ; Kari Uphues. Die philos. Vwterauchimgen dee PI. Soph. u. Parm. (Dissert), Mflnster, 1869 ; Elem. der Platon Ph. auf Grund des Soph. u. mit Piiekaiohi aufdie Scholastik, Soest, 1870. On the use of myths by Plato, cf. C. Cromc (Gymn.-Progr., Dflsseldorf, 1S86), Alb. Jahn (Berne, 1839), Sohwanitz (Leips., 1852, Jen.i, 1868, Prankf.-on-the-M., 1864), Jul. Deusohle (Hanau, 1864), Hahn (Diepada- gogiachen Mythen Plato's, G.-Pr., Parchim, 1860), A. Fischer (Diss. Inaug.. KSnigsberg, 1865). On Plato's philosophy of language, cf. Friedr. Michelis (De enmwiationit natura diss.. Bonn, 1849), Jal. Deuschle (Marburg, 1852), Charles Lenormant (Sur le Cratyle de PI, Athena, 1S61) ; of. Ed. Alborti, Die Sprachphiloaop7iie vor Plato, in Philol., XX. G6tt. 1866, pp. 6Sl-70i PLATO'S UIALECTIO. 119 ' The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dialectic (ascribed to Plato by Cic, Acad. Post, I. 5, 19) was first formally propounded (acoor^ng to Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 16) by Xenocrates, the pupil of Plato ; but Plato, as Sextus correctly says, was poten- tially its originator {ivvdfisi apxiyii). Several of Plato's dialogues were devoted to ethics (from the Protag. to the Rep.), one (Timaeus) was devoted especially to physics, and ono (Tlieaetetus, with which Cratylus, on Language, and some other dialogues belong, if genu- ine) to the theory of cognition ; these dialogues were supplemented by oral lectures on the ideas and their elements (arotx^ia), in which were communicated the " unwritten doctrines," which were taken down by Aristotle, Hermodorus, and others, and were prob- ably used by the author of the Soph, and the Pol. Of the genesis of the theory of ideas we find an account in Arist., Met, I. 6 and 9 (cf. XIII. 4 seq.). Aristotle describes this theory as the joint product of the Heraclitean doctrine of the constant flux of things and of the Socratio fondness for definition. The doctrine, says Aristotle, that the sensuous is subject to perpetual change, was derived by Plato from Cratylus the Heraclitean, and was ever afterward maintained by him. Accordingly, when Plato had learned through Socrates of conceptions which, when once rightly defined, remain ever invariable, he believed that their counterparts must not be sought in the sen- suous world, but that there must be other existences which were the objects of conceptual cognition, and these objects he named ideas. The reduction of these ideas to (ideal) num- bers is spoken of in Met, XIII. 4, as a later modification of the original doctrine. — Aristotle here gives to the logical and metaphysical side of the theory of ideas a prominence which belongs equally to the no less essential ethical and JESthetic side ; in this he was undoubt- edly influenced by the prevalent shape assumed by the theory in the later phases of its ■development, in which the idea of that perfection, which transcends all experience, became gradually superseded by the idea of universality — so, already, in connection with the idea of table, in Sep., X. 596. In the Phaedrus of Plato the doctrine of ideas is presented symbolically, and yet in such form that the author of the dialogue must unquestionably have been already in pos- session of the theory in its logical form, although reserving its scientific presentation and demonstration for later dialogues. According to the myth in the Phaedrus (p. 247 seq.), the pure essences, or the ideas, sit enthroned in a place beyond the vault of heaven — ia particular the ideas of justice, temperance, science, etc. They are colorless, without figure, imperceptible by any sense, and accessible only to the contemplative view of the reason (voif). Plato portrays the process by which one rises to the knowledge of the ideas as an upward journey of the soul to the super-celestial region. In the Conviv. (p. 211 seq.) Plato defines the idea of the beautiful in opposition to individual beautiful objects, in a manner which may be taken as descriptive of the relation of each idea to the individual objects corresponding to it. In contradistinction to beautiful bodies, arts, sciences (/caXd aufiara, cTiTTiSebfiaTa, /zadijfiaTa), he terms the idea of the beautiful, the beautiful per se {airb to KaUv), and applies to It the predicates uncorrupted, pure, unmixed (siyuKpivic, KaBap&i', a/iiKTirv). This Beautiful per se is eternal, without origin or decay, neither increasing nor decreasing, remaining absolutely like itself (koto ravra ixov, fumostdcr acl 6v), not in one respect beautiful, but in another ugly; not now beautiful, but at another time not so; not beautiful in comparison with ono object, but, in comparison with another, ugly ; not appear- ing beautiful in one place or to certain persons, but in another place or to other persona ■ ugly. Neither can it be represented by the fancy, as if it were a material thing ; nor is it a (subjective) conception or a form of knowledge (Me rig Aiij-of, ovSe ti( ciriaT^/i^) • it is not in any other object, nor in any living being, not on earth nor in the heavens, but it exists as a substance of and by itself (avro mff aiiro fieff avTov). Every thing else that is beautiful 120 Plato's dialectic. _^ participates in it (cKetvov /lerex^i)- According to ^ep., p. 523 seq., those sensible objects, which appear in one respect small, in another large, etc., and, in short, all those objects to ■which contrary predicates appear applicable, are the occasion of our calling in the aid of reason for their consideration; reason solves the contradiction, hj s^araUng those con- traries whioh appear united (forming a avyKexvfthiov, concretum, a concrete object), conceiving Greatness as an idea by itself, and Smallness, in like manner, as another, and, in general, viewing the opposed- predicates apart (rd 6vo Kc;i;u/)jff//£va). Analogous to this are the explanations given iu the Phaedo (p. 102) : Simmias is large in comparison with Socrates, small in comparison with Phsedo ; but the idea of largeness and also the property of larger ness are never at the same time identical with smallness; on the contrary, the idea remains permanently what it is, and so does the quality, unless it ceases to exist. The idea has with the individual objects corresponding to it a certain community (Komuvia), it is present with them (Tzapavaia) • but the character of this community (which, according to the comparison in the SepuUic between the idea of the Good and the sun, may be con- ceived as analogous to the community between the sun and the earth, through the rays of the former extending to the latter) Plato declines more precisely to define (Pliaedo, p. 100 d: oTi ovK aX/io ri ttoieZ aiirb koaov r) cKeivov tov Ka/xv circ irapovaia elre Kocvuvia [«T£] Off? (J17 Kai birag irpocr/Evo/iEvri, for which irpoayevo/ihov is probably to be read). Tim., p. 51 seq. (of. Rep., V. 474 seq.): If scientific cognition and correct opinion (voif and (Siifa ahjOii^) are two different species of knowledge, then there exist ideas which possess absolute being and are cognizable, not through sense-perception, but only by thought (tliii voov/ieva) • but if, as it appears to some, both are identical, then the talk of ideas is mere talk (Uyo;, or perhaps : ideas are nothing objective, they are simply subjective conceptions), and only the sensible exists. But in fact both are different, both in their origin (through conviction ; — through persuasion) and in their nature (certainty and immutability ; — uncer- tainty and change). There are, therefore, also two different classes of objects : the one includes that which remains perpetually like itself, has not become and can not pass away, never from any source receives any thing into itself, nor itself passes into any thing else {oirre elg iavTo ElaSe^bficvov a2.?M aXXodev, ovte avrb elg dAA5 tto* lav) ; the other class covers the realm of individual objects, which are homonymous (o/iuwfta) with the ideas and similar (a/ioia) to them, which become and perish at definite places, and are always in motion (Tre^pij- jitvov aei). The difference between knowledge, on the one hand, and sensible perceptioi) and correct opinion, on tlie other, is considered at length and demonstrated in the dialogue i^te'"' (6 dii/umfi. yds, the supreme God, the constructor of the world), ayoScj de ovdel; ncpl ovdcvof oiideTron kyyiyverat ip66vog, tovtov d' ekto^ uv navTa bTt fidXiara k^ovX^djj yeviadat irapaTr^J/aia avru. (Cf. also Arist., Metaph., I. 2, p. 983 b, 2. Tet the notion of the envy of the gods, which Plato and Aristotle combat, involves also an ethical and religious element in so far as by " envy " it is intended to indicate the reaction of the universal order against all individual disproportion or excess.) The adaptation and order of the world have their ground in the world-constructing reason ; whatever of blind necessity is manifest in it arises from the nature of matter. Hechanical causes are only ^wairLa (concomitants) of the final causes. When matter (as Se^afievt!, or form-receiving principle) assumed orderly shapes, there arose first the four elements : fire, air, water, and earth. Between the two extremes, fire and earth, of which the former was necessary for the visibility, the latter for the palpa- bility of things, a bond of connection was needed ; but the most beautiful of bonds is pro- portion, which in the present case, where solid bodies are concerned, must be twofold. (In the case of plane figures one intermediate term is sufficient ; the side of a square, whose contents are the double of a given square, is determined by the proportion l:x::x: 2, where x = V2, the side of the given square being = 1 ; and this given square, whose contents = 1 x 1, is to the rectangle, one of whose sides = 1, the other — V2, and whose contents therefore = 1 v yo, as the latter is to the square whose con- tents = 4^2 X ■t/2 = 2. But in the ease of solids, two intermediate terms are necessary; the length of the side of a cube whose contents = 2, is determined by the two propor- tions : \ : x:: x: y, and x:y::y:2, where x = ' V2 and y ;;: ' y 2', and the cube, whose contents = 1 x 1 x 1, is to the parallelepiped, whose contents =: 1 x 1 x ' t/2, as the latter is to the parallelepiped = 1 x ' 4/2 x ' 4/2; and tlie latter again stands in a lilce relation to the cube whose contents = * v'2 x ^ V2 x ' v'2 = 2. Whatever is true, ia this respect, of squares and cubes, is applicable to all mutually similar forms, though only to such. A comprehensive and exact examination and explanation of all these relations is given by Boeckh in the Comm. acad. de Platonica corporis mundani fdbrica conflati ex ekmeniis geometrica ratione concinnatis, Heidelberg, 1809, reprinted in Boeckh's Ges. kl. Schr., Vol. III., pp. 229-252, together with an annexed Excursus, pp. 253-265.) Fire must accord- ingly be related to air, as air to water, and air to water, as water to earth. The distances of the celestial spheres from each other are proportioned to the different lengths of the strings which produce harmonious tones. The earth is at rest in the center of the universe. It is wound around the (adamantine) bar or. distaff (r/J/utoT?), which Plato (according to Grote, doetrinally, according to Boeckh, mythically) represents as extending from one end of the axis of the world to the other ; the sky and also the planets revolve around this distaff once in every twenty-four hours ; but the planets have besides a motion peculiar to themselves, which is occasioned by the aiji6v6vXoi, which lie about the spindle and together constitute the whorl, since tliese, while participating in the revolving motion of the heavens, rotate at the same time, but more slowly, in the opposite direction ; the earth remains unmoved. If the distaff (^TiaKaTj;) of the spindle (arpa/n-of) is conceived as motionless (as it is by Boeckh), the earth is to be regarded as simply rolled mto a ball around it and firmly attached to it ; but if it is included in tlie daily rotation of the heavens, the earth must not be conceived (as it is by Grote) as partaking in this motion, but the (absolute) rest of the earth must be explained by a (relative) motion of the same PtATo's PHYSICS. 127 around the distaff in the opposite direction. If the distance of the mobn from the earth is represented by 1, then that of the sun = 2, that of Tenus = 3, that of Mercury = 4, that of Mars = 8, that of Jupiter = 9, that of Saturn = 27. The inclination of the echptio is explained by Plato as a result of tlie inferior perfection of the spheres underneath the sphere of the fixed stars. According to a statement of Theophrastus (see Plutarch., Flat. Qu., 8, cf. jWitmo, ch. 1 1), Plato in his old age no longer attributed to the earth (but to the central fire probably) the occupancy of the center of the world; this account, in itself alto- gether credible as an oral utterance of Plato, is nevertheless not easily reconciled with the fact that in the Leges — which was written after the liep., and beyond question also after the Timaeus, and that, too, according to late but apparently trustworthy tradition, not by Plato, but by Philip the Opuntian, from a sketch made by Plato— the doctrine contained in the Timaeus is reaffirmed. Cf. Boeckh, Das kosmische System des Plato, Berlin, 1862, pp. 144-150. The soul of the world is older than its body ; for its office is to rule, and it is not fitting that the younger should rule the older. It must unite in itself the elements of all orders of ideal and material existences, in order that it may be able to know and under- stand them (Tim., p. 34 seq.). Plato says (Km., p. 35 seq.), that the Indivisible in the soul enables it to have knowledge of the ideas, while the Divisible mediates its knowledge of sensible objects. The third or mixed element may be considered as the organ of mathe-i matical knowledge (or perhaps of all particular, distinct acts of cognition 7) These cogni- tive faculties pertain exclusively to that part (7ioyiaTui6v) of the human soul which resides in the head. The hypothesis that the human soul has three parts (kiri6v/i7iT[K6v, 6v/ioeuU(, \oyiarm6v) seems to have been framed in intentional correspondence with the natural gradation : plant, animal, man (Tim., 11 b; Rep., IV. 441 b); this distinction, however, of the orders of the natural kingdom was not so distinctly marked or attended to by Plato as by Aristotle. The supremacy of each of these different parts, taken in their order, is illustrated in the gaiu'loving Phenicians and Egyptians, the courageous Barbarians of the North, and the culture-loving Hellenes (Rep., IV. 435 e to 436 a). The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is founded by Plato, in the Phaedrus (p. 245), on the nature of the soul, as the self -moving principle of all motion ; in the Rep. (X. 609), On the fact, that the life of the soul is not destroyed by moral badness, which yet, as the natural evil and enemy of the soul, ought, if any thing could effect this, to effect its destruction ; in the Tim. (p. 41), on the goodness of God, who, notwithstanding that the nature of the soul, as a generated essence, subjects it to tho^ossibility of destruction, can not will that what has been put together in so beautiful a manner should again be dis- solved; in the Phaedo, finally (pp. 62-107), this doctrine is supported, partly by an argument drawn from the nature of the subjective activity of the philosopher, whose striving after knowledge involves the desire for incorporeal existence, i. e., the desire to die, and partly on a series of objective arguments. The first of these arguments is founded on the cosmological law of the transition of contraries into each other, according to which law, just as the hving die, so the dead must return to life ; the second, on the natirre of knowledge, as a species of reminiscence (cf. Meno, p. 80 seq., where the pre-existence of the soul is inferred from the nature of the act of mathematical and philosophical learning, whose only satisfactory explanation, it is argued, is found in the hypothesis of the soul's recollection of ideas which had been perceived by the intellect in a pre-terrestrial life) ; the third, on the relationship between the soul, as an invisible essence, and the ideas, as invisible, simple, and indestructible objects ; the fourth argument, in reply to the objection (of Simmias), that the soul is perhaps only the resultante and, as it were, the harmony of the 128 Plato's ethics. functions of the body, ig based partly on the previously demonstrated pre-existence of ths soul, and partly on the qualification of the soul to rule the body, and on its nature as a sub- stance, so that, says Plato, while one harmony can be more a harmony than another, one soul can not be more or less soul than any other, and the soul, if virtuous, may have har- mony for its attribute ; the fifth argument, finally, and the one which Plato himself deemed decisive, was in reply to the objection (of Cebes), that although the soul perhaps survived the body, it might yet be not absolutely indestructible, and was founded on the necessary participaiion of tlie soul in. Vie idea of life, whence the inference that the soul can never be lifeless, a dead soul would be a contradiction, and consequently immortality and imper- ishableness must be predicated of it. In this argument, it is assumed that that, whoso nature is such that, so long as it exists, it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to exist; this assumption is connected with the double sense in which dSdvarof is employed, a. in the sense, which results from the general tenor of the argument, viz. : not dead ; S. in the sense corresponding to ordinary usage : immortal, § 43. The highest good is, according to Plato, not pleasure, nor knowledge alone, but the greatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good. The virtue of the human soul is its fitness for its proper work. It includes various particular vjrtues, which foiTO a system based on the classification of the faculties or parts of the human soul. The virtue of the cognitive part of the soul is the knowledge of the good, or wisdom {aoic relig. Erziehung des Plat. SttiatsbUrgers, Oldenburg, 1853X Bomback {Enticickelvng der Plat Er^ehungslehrs^ Eottweil, 1864), Vol- qaai-dsen {Plat. Idee des peraorU. Geistes und seine Lehren iih&r Ereiehimg, etc.^ Berlin, 1860), Bannnrd {Qmd ajmd Oraeeos de institutions ptteronmi senserit PlatOy Orleans, 1860), Hahn {Die padagog. Mythen Plato\ Parcbim, 1860), L. Wittmann {Ereieliung imd Unterricht bei Plato^ Gicssen, 1568), Cuera (PI. u. Aria. Ansichten ^ber den pddaffog. JSildungsgehalt der Kunste^ In the N. Jalwh. f. PhUol. vmd P&dag., Vol. 98, 1868, pp. 621-668). The possession of the Good, according to Plato, is happiness (Sympos.j 240 e : KTrjaei yap ayadciv oi evdaifioveg evdalfioveg. Sympos.^ p. 202 e: evSaifwvag Tovg TayaBa Kal kqTm KEKTTffiEvovg, Cf. GoTg.y p. 508 b.: Sucatoavvjjc Kal at^poavvT)^ kttjgel evdaifiovEg ol evdaifiovsg^ Kaidag dk oi aBXiot aOTiioi). Happiness depends on culture and justice or on the possession of moral beauty and goodness {Gorg., p. 470 d), Hep.^ IV. p. 420 b: "Our object in found- ing the state is, that not a class, but that all may be made as happy as possible." The ethical end of man is described by Plato as resemblance to God, the absolutely good, in JRep,^ X. 613 a; Theaet, 176. Through his psychological doctrine of the different faculties or parts of the soul, Plato was enabled to do what for other disciples of Socrates, such as Euclid and Antisthenes, w^as, as it seems, impossible, viz. : to demonstrate a plurality of virtues as comprehended within the one general conception of virtue. The parallel between virtue in the state and in the individual is introduced by Plato with the remark, that in the former we read, as it were, in larger characters the same writing, which in the latter is written in smaller ones {Rep.^ II, p, 368). The Platonic theory of the state borrows many of its special provisions from the Hel- lenic, and especially from the Doric legislation. But its essential tendency is not (as K. P. Hermann and others affirm) toward the restoration and intensification of the Old-Hellenic principle of the unreflecting subordination of the individual to the whole. It is rather an advance upon all Hellenic forms whatever and an anticipation of institutions which were afterward approximately realized, notably in the Hierarchy of the Middle Ages.* * As PIato''s theory of ideas points beyond the sensible pbenomenon and sees the truly real onl^ in absolutely existent essences, exalted above time and space and figured as dwelling beyond the heavens, so Plato's ethlco-political ideal points beyond the terrestrial ends of political society (on which, however, the genesis of the state originally depends, i2e;p., II. p. 369 seq.) to the cognition and realization of a transcend- ent ideal good. The sensible may, indeed, participate in the ideal : the latter may shine through the former and lend it proportion and heoMij (PJiaedr.., Sympo8.)\ but the ultimate and supreme duty of man is, nevertheless, to escape from the sensible world to the ideal (Theaet.^ p. 176 a: ireipatrBai xp^ evBivSev cKcio'e (^eiryni/ ort raxurra, by which is attained 6/i.ot'uher (about 2JS b. c), who mast be distinguished from Endoxus the philosu- 134 THE OLD, MIDDLE, AND NEW ACADEMIES. phor, and who was tho antbor of a v^c vepioSos, as also on Geminns tbe astronomer (about 13T B. a)j cf. H, Brand«s, in the Jahrb. f. Ph., LXIV. 18S2, p. 288 scq., and in the Jahrb. des Vereinsfur Brdkunde m Leipzig, Leips. 1866. On Hermodorufl, cf. Ed. Zeller, J>e Bermodoro Ephesio et Ilermodoro PlatonU dii- dpulo, Marb. 1859. On Grantor: F. Schneider, 1)6 Ot'untoris Solenna pMlw.opJii Academicorw/i philo- sophiae addicH Hbro, qwi n-epi 7rei/dov9 inacribitor coTnmentatio, in the ZeiiKhr.fiir die Alterthnmncvia, !I8S0, Nos. IM, 105; M. Herm. Ed. Meier, Veber die Sclirift des Kravtorvtpi Trei-eovs, Halle, 1840; Prid. Icayser, De Crantore Aaademico dies., Heldelb., 1841. On the later Academics: Fr. Dor. Gerloch, Com- mentatio exhibene Acadeimicomm jimiorwm, iirtpriinie AreesHae aigtte Cameadis de probabilitate disputationet, Gott 1815; I. Kud. Thorbrcke, In dogmatida opjmgnandia nnmqind inter academicoa et tcepUcoB interfuerit, Zwollae Batav., 1820; Eich. Brodersen, De Arcesilao pMlosopko academico, Altona, 1621; Aug. Geirers,Z)«.ilrc««jZa(ff.-iV.). Gott. 1841; Id., DeArcesilae meoeeKoriJm>,ibid.'i946\ cf. Zeller, Ph.d. Gr., 2d ed., III. a, p. 448 scq. ; Bonlez, 7)« Cameade, annal. Gandav., 1824-25: 0. J. Grysar, ZKe Academiker Philo und AnUochuH, Cologne, 1849; C. F. Hermann, IHnputatio de PhiUme Larrvaaeo, Gott. 1861 ; Dieput. altera, ibid. 1855; Krische, in the Gott. Stud., II. 1845, pp. 126-200; Zeller, Fk d. Gr., 2d ed.. III. a, p. 522 ; David d'Allcmand, De Antiocho Aeealotiita, Paris, 1856 ; cf. Krische, Gott. Stwl., II. 160-nO; Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., 2d ed., III. a, pp. 580-540. That Speusippiis was the immediate successor of Plato in the leadership of the Acad- emy is testified by Diog. L., lY. 1. Aristotle not unfreqiiently makes mention of his opinions, especially in the Meiaph., but often without naming him ; he expressly ascribes to him, with the Pythagoreans, a doctrine of pantheistic character (Metaph., XII. T : inoXa/i- fidvovGcv . , . ol Tlu&a'ydpetoc kol ItTzevan^izoQ, to KoTJuarcv koX aptcrov fjij kv apxv "vof, 6m to xal ri>v (jwriiv Kal tuv l^i>uv rdf i-pxaq alTia /lev slvat, to el« /caAov Koi TeWnov h Toif in Toirruv). According to Stob., Ed., I. p. 58, he rejected the (Platonic) identification of the one (rv), the good (ayaBAv), and the reason (vovg). He assumed (like Pseudo-Philolaus, who perhaps followed his example, but who, however, illogically joined the doctrine of this assumption with other heterogeneous doctrines) a rising gradation of existences, positing the abstract as the earliest and most elementary, and the more concrete as later and higher. Aristotle says (Met, VII. 2) that Speusippus, commencing with the " One " {p>\ assumed a greater number of classes of essences than Plato, and that for each class, namely, for numbers, the geometrical figures, and the soul, he posited different principles. Speusippus seems to have denied the existence of Ideas (whereas Senocrates identified them with mathematical objects). The soul was defined by him (Stob., JScl. Phys., I. 1 ; Plut, De Anim. Procr., 22) as extension shaped harmoniously by number, hence, as in some sense, a higher imity of the arithmetical and the geometrical. According to Cic. {Nat. D., I. 1 3) he assumed a vis ani- maMs, qua omnia regantnr. His ethical principle is thus expressed by Clem. Alex. {Strom., ir. 418 d) : llKEvctTTKog rf/v evSai/noviav ^Tjaiv e^cv slvat reXsiav ev roi^ Kara ijnjffLv exovaiv^ t) l^iv ayaSiv. Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396-314 u. c.) distinguished (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., Til. 147) three classes of essences ; the sensible, the intelligible, and the inter- mediate, the latter being the objects of opinion (Sd^a); the intelligible lay beyond the heavens (cxrof ovpavoii), the sensible within the heavens {cvrog mpavov), while the do^acriv, or matter of opinion, was identical with the heavens themselves, since these could be both perceived and scientifically contemplated. (To him are to be referred tho words in Arist., Met., VII. 2 : ivioc 6i ja /jiv ddrj koI tovq api'^/iov^ rrpi avryv ix^iv ^ol (piaiv, ra 6i cAia iX^l^eva, jpafifiag koI eTr'meSa, /lixP' "'pof ■'"y" '""J' cmpavov ovaiav Kal to aiffiSyrd). Out of the "One" and the "Indefinite Duad" he constructed all existences (Theophrast., Met., 3, p. 312). He defined the soul as self-moving number, apiB/idv avrbv if kavrarb Kivobiisvat (Plut., De An. Procr., 1, cf. Arist., De An., I. 2, 4; Analyt. Post, II. 4). In the symbolical line of the names of the gods, Xenocrates indulged in an almost childish play. Happiness was described by him (according to Clem., Strom., II. p. 41 9 a) as resulting from our pos- session of the virtue proper to us (oi/cc/af nper^f) and of power devoted to its service. AND NEW ACADEMIES. 13? Among the earliest disciples of Plato belongs Eudoxus of Cnidus, who was subse- quently distinguished as a mathematician and astronomer (and lived about 406-353 b. c). He heard Plato perhaps about 383, and went to Egypt probtbly about 3f 8 (not first in 362) with a letter of recommendation from Agesilaus to King Nektanebus. ,At Heliopolis he studied astronomy ; at Tarentum, under Archytas, geometry ; and in Sicily, under Philistion, medicine (as Diog. L., VIII. 86, reports, following the nivoKCf of Callimaclius). He after- ward taught in Cyzicus and Athens, and finally returned to Cnidus, his native city, where he erected an astronomical observatory. At Athens Menaechmus and Helicon were among his pupils in geometry ; Helicon accompanied Plato in his third voyage to Sicily (361 B. c; see Pseudo-Plat., Ep., XIII. p. 360 d; Plutarch, Dion., ch. 19). In ethics Eudoxus maintained the Hedonic doctrine (Arist., Eth. N., X. 2, 3). Heraclides of Heraclea on the Pontus, to whom (according to Suidas) Plato intrusted the direction of the Academy during his last journey to Sicily, occupied himself, among other things, with the question thus propounded (according to Simplic, In Arist. De Coelo, f. 119) by Plato (in a form distinguished for its logical merits): rivani ino-eBetnav o/wluv Kai Terayfievav Ktvyaeuv dtaauOy ra irspi rdf tav^asig ruv w^v(,ifi£vcn> tpatvdfisva, or " what uniform and regulated motions can be assumed (to explain the phenomena of the universe), whose consequences will not be in contradiction with the phenomena." The form of this question gives evidence of a consciousness already very highly developed, of the correct method of investigation, and involves only the error of supposing that mathematical regularity as such necessarily belongs to the actual movements of nature, so that the research for real forces, from whose activity these motions arise, seemed unnecessary. Eudoxus is said to have proposed several hypotheses in reply to the above Platonic ques- tion, but decided in favor of the immobility of the earth. Heraclides, on the contrary (with Eophantus the Pythagorean, whom he also followed in his doctrine of atoms), decided for the theory of the revohition of the earth on its axis (Plut., Plac. Philos., III. 13). Hera- clides regarded the world as infinite in extent (Stob., Eel., I. 440). Hermodorus was an immediate pupil of Plato, and we are indebted to him for a number of notices respecting the life and doctrines of his master (see above, § 39, p. 100, and § 41). From his work on Plato, Dercyllides (see below, § 65) borrowed data relative to the Platonic Stoicheiology. Perhaps it was these "unwritten doctrines '' which constituted the Uyot, with which Hermodorus traded in Sicily, whence the saying to which Cicero alludes (Ad Att, XIII. 21 : Uyoiaiv 'Ep/i66upoc kfiTropeveTai). Philip the Opuntian, the mathematician and astronomer (ef. Boeckh, Smnenkreise, p. 34 seq.), is the reputed author of the Epinomis. The revision and publication of the manu- script of the Leges, which was left by Plato unfinished, are also ascribed to him (Diog. L., III. 37, and Suidas sub voce ^Maoijuig). Polemo, who followed Xenocrates as head of the school (314-270), gave his atten- tion mainly to ethics. He demanded (according to Diog. L., TV. 18) that men should exercise themselves more in right acting than in dialectic. Cicero gives (Acad. Pr., II. 43) the following as his ethical principle : honeste vivere, fruentem rebus -lis, quas jyrimas homini natm-a conciliet. To his influence on Zeno, Cicero bears wituess, De Fin., IT. 16, 45. Grantor is termed by Proclus {Ad Tim., p. 24) the earliest expounder of Platonic writings. As the hving tradition of Plato's doctrines died out, his disciples began more and more to consult his written works. Grantor's work on Sorrow (ircpi TrivOovc) is praised by Cicero (Fuse, I. 43, 115 ; cf 111. 6, 12). He assigns (in a fragment, ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., XI. 51-58) the first place among good things to virtue, tho second to health, the third to pleasure, and the fourth to riches. He combats the Stoic requirement that the natural feelings should be suppressed (in accord with Plat., -Bep., 136 THE OLD, MIDDLE, AND NEW ACADEMIES. X. 603 e). Grantor died before Polemo (Diog. Laer., lY. 21). Crates directed the school after Polemo. The successor of Crates was Arcesilas or Arcesilaus, who was born, about 315 B. C, at Pitaiie in ^olia, and had at first attended upon the instructions of Theophrastus, but after- ward became a pupil of Crantor, Polemo, and Crates. Of his habit of abstaining {iTroxi) from judgment and of disputing on both sides, Cicero tells us (Z)e Orat., III. 18 : quern femnt primum insUtuisse, nan quid ipse sentiret osiendere, sed contra id quod quiaque se sentire dmiseet, disputare; cf. Diog. L., IV. 28: irpurof 6i eif cnaTepov ivexeipvon). He is said (Cic., Acad. Post, I. 12) to have taught that we can know nothing, not even the fact of o\ir inability to know. But this (according to Sext. Emp., Ifyp. Pyrrh., I. 234 seq., and others) was only for the discipline and testing of his pupils, to the best-endowed of whom he was accustomed afterward to communicate the Platonic doctrines. Of this explanation'*'(ac- cepted by Geffers, disputed by Zeller) we may admit that, in view of the nature of ths case, it is credible, in so far as a head of the Academy could hardly break at once and completely with the theory of ideas and the doctrines founded on it ; only this explanation does not necessarily imply an unconditional assent to that theory and to those doctrines. According to Cic, Acad. Post, I. 12, Arcesilas combated unceasingly the Stoic Zeno. He contested especially (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 233 seq.. Adv. Math., VII. 153 seq.) the KarakTfilnq and ovyKardBeai^ of the Stoics (see below, § 53), yet recognized tire attainability of the probable {to ei^oyov), and found in the latter the norm for practical conduct. Aristo, the Stoic, parodying Iliad, VI. 181, said (according to Diog. L., IV. 33, and Sext. Emp., Pyrrhon. Hypotypos., I. 232) that Arcesilas was : irpdods nXdrov, birtdsv Tlvppav, fieffffo^ Atddupoc, or, " Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, anrd Diodorus in the middle." Arcesilas was followed in the leadership of the SGhooI,(241 B. c.) by Lacydes, Lacydes (in 215) by Telecles and Evander, the latter by Hegesinus, and ho by Carneades. Carneades of Cyrene (214^129; he came as an embassador to Rome in the year 155 B. c, together with Diogenes the Stoic and Critolaus the Peripatetic) went st-iU farther in the direction of Skepticism. He disputed, in particular, the theses of Chrysippus the Stoic. Expanding the skeptical arguments of Arcesilas, he declared knowledge to be impossible, and the results of dogmatic philosophy to be uncertain. His pupil, Clitomachus (who fol- lowed him in the presidency of the School, 129 b. c), is related (Cic, Acad. Pr., II. eh. 45) to have said : " it had never become clear to him what the personal opinion of Carneades (in ethics) was." Cicero (JDe Orat, I. 11) calls Carneades, as an orator, hominem omnium in dicendo, ut fereiant, acerrimum et copiosissimum. "While at Rome he is said to have delivered on one day a discourse in praise of justice, and on the next to have demonstrated, on the contrary, that justice was incompatible with the actual circumstances in which men live, and in particular to have hazarded the observation, that if the Romans wished to practice justice in their pohtical relations, they would be obliged to restore to the rightful owners all that they had taken away by force of arms, and then return to their, huts (Laetant., Inst, V. 14 seq.). To the doctrine of cognition his most important contribution was the theory of probability (£/z^affjf, TrtBavdrTig). He distinguished three principal degrees of probability: a representation may be, namely, either 1) probable, when con- sidered by itself alone; or 2) probable and unimpeached, when compared with others; or 3) probable, unimpeached, and in all respects confirmed (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., VII. 166), Philo of Larissa, a pupil of Clitomachus, came in the time of the first Mithridatio war to Rome, where Cicero heard him (Cic, Brut, 89). He appears to have given hi« aeistotle's life. 137 attention chiefly to Ethics, and, in treating the subject, to have inclined toward the method of the Stoics, although remaining in general their opponent. Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo's disciple, sought to show (Jiat the chief doctrines of the Stoics were to be found already in Plato (Sext. Emp., Fyrrh. Hyp., I. 235). He differed from the Stoics in rejecting the doctrine of the equality of all vices, and in holding that virtue alone, though producing a happy life, is not productive of the happiest of lives ; in other respects he agreed with them almost entirely (Oic, Acad. Pr., II. 43). § 45.. Aristotle, bom 384 b. c. (Olymp. 99.1) at Stagira (or Sta- Ijeiros) in Thrace, and son of the physician Nicomachus, became in his eighteenth year (367) a pupil of Plato, and remained such for twenty years. After Plato's death (347) he repaired with Xenocrates to the court of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia. He remained there nearly three years, at the expiration of which time he went to Mitylene and afterward (343) to the court of Philip, king of Macedonia, where he lived more than seven years, until the death of that monarch. He was the most influential tutor of Alexan- der from the thirteenth to the sixteenth years of the life of the latter (343-340). Soon after Alexander's accession to the throne, Aristotle founded his school in the Lyceum, over which he presided twelve years. After the death of Alexander, the anti-Macedonian party at Athens preferred an accusation against Aristotle, for which religion was called upon to furnish the pretext. To avoid persecution, Aris- totle retired to Chalcis, where he soon afterward died, Olymp. 114.3 (322 B. c.) in the sixty-third year of his age , On the life of Aristotle, compare Dionys. Tlah, Spiat ad Animaetim, I. 5; Diog. LaSrt., V. 1-85 ; Suidas (tlie worlc edited by Menagius agrees in its biographical part word for word with the 'first and larger part of the article by Snidas; but there is appended to it a list of the writings of Aristotle, which reproducers, with some omissions and some additions, the catalogue of Diogenes Laortius ; cf. Curt Wachsmuth, JDq Fontihus Siiidae^in Symbola philol. JBomiensiiwi, I. p. 18S); (Pseudo-) liesychins; (Pseudo-) Ammonins, Vita Arittt., with which the Vita e cod. Marciano^ published by L. Eobbe, Leyden, 1861, agrees almost throughout; an old Latin work on the life of Aristotle, ed. Nunnez, Barcelona, 1594, Leyden, 1621, 1681, Helmst 1666, is a third reduction of the same Vita. The Biographies of Aristotle by Aristoxenus, Aristocles, Timotheus, Hermippus, ApoUodorus, and others are lost The chronology of Aristotlii's life, as given by Diogenes L., is taken ft'om the xpovuca of ApoUodorus ; Dionys. Halic. appears to have drawn from the same source. J. G. Bnhle, Vita ArintoteMfi per annog digesta, in the first volume of the Bipontine edition of the works of Aristotle. Ad. Stahr, Ariatotelia (Part L, on tho life of Aristotle of Stagira), Halle, 1830. George Henry-Lewes. Aristotle, a Chapter from ilie History of Sdetuie, London, 1S64 (translated into German by Victor Cams, Leipsic, 1866) ; the first chapter is on tho life of Aristotle. Cf. Aug. Boeckh, Hermias von Atarneus, in the Abh. der Akad. der Vise, hist-phil, <:?;, Berlin, 1853, pp. 188-157. On Aristotle's relations with Alexander, cf. K. Zell {Arist, als Leiirer ies Alexander, in: Fericn- tohrtften, Frc-ibnrg, 1826), Frid. Guil. Car. Hegel (De Aristotele et Alexandra magna, Berlin, 1S3T), P. C. Engelbrecht (^Ueber die icichtigsten Lebensumstiinde des Aristotelea vlid sehi Verhdltndss za Alexander dem Grossen, besonders in Sesiehung avf sehm Naturstudien, Eisleben, 1845). Bob. Geier {Aleaxinder und Aristoteles in ihren gegenseitigen Bezielmngen, Halle, 1866), Egger (Aristote coneidire comme jn-ieepteur dCAlexandre, Caen, l^&i, Extrait dea Mim. de VAnad.de Caen), Mor. Cnrridre (vdiajaM- der und AHstotdea, in Westonnann's MonatA., Fcbr., 1S65). £38 akistotle'b lifk. Not only Aristotle's father, but also his ancestors, were physicians ; they traced tlieir pedigree to Machaon, the son of Asclepius. The father, Nioomachus, resided as physician- in-ordinary at the court of the Macedonian king Amyntas at Pella. From a comparison jf the Statements respecting the time of Aristotle's death, and his age at that time, as also respecting the age of Aristotle at the time of his coming to Athens and the date of his con- nection with Plato, it appears probable that his birth occurred in the first half of the Olym- piadio year, hence in 384 B. 0. Soon after the first arrival of Aristotle in Athens, Plato imdertook his visit to Dio and tlie younger Dionysius, from which he returned three years later. Respecting the details of the early education of Aristotle we are not informed/ It is Dasily snpposable that he early, and while Plato was yet living, came to entertain opinions ieviating from those of his master, and that he also gave open expression to them. It \» possible that the anecdote is genuine which represents Plato as having said that Xenocratea needed the spur, but Aristotle the bridle. But it is improbable that Plato was himself tlie author of the comparison of Aristotle to a foal kickmg at its mother ; for Plato was not a partisan of the principle of authority, and was certainly not offended by opposition in argumentation. Plato is said to have called the house of Aristotle the reader's honse, and Aristotle himself, on account of his ready wit, the soul of the school. It is probable that Aristotle did not set up a school of his own during the life-time of Plato. If he had lone so, it is unlikely that he would have immediately afterward given it up. At that time he gave instruction, however, in rhetoric in opposition to Isocrates, and is reported to have said, in parody of » verse of Philoctetus : " It is disgraceful to be silent, and lUow Isocrates to speak " (alaxpov mairgv, 'lacKpan; 6' egv ?.e-yeiv, Cic, De Orat, III. 35 ?t al.; Quinct., III. 1. 14). The stories of an offensive bearing of Aristotle toward Plato xre refuted by the friendly relation which continued, after Plato's death, to subsist be- tween Aristotle and Xenocrates, Plato's devoted disciple, when they went in company to Atarneus, at the invitation of Hermias. Some verses of an elegy by Aristotle on the sarly death of his friend Eudemus are also preserved (op. Olympiodor. in Flat. Gorg., 1G6), in which he calls Plato a man whom the bad might not even praise (avSpof, bv mS ilvslv Tolac KaKoiaL Bcfii^), and who first showed by word and deed, how a man may be at 3nce good and happy (uf ayaB6^ Tt Koi ebdai/juv afia yiverai avrip). After the unhappy snd of Hermias, as n Persian captive, Aristotle married Pythias, the niece (or adopted laughter) of Hermias. He was subsequently married to Herpyllis. As the tutor of a prince, Aristotle was more fortunate than Plato ; it must be confessed, iiowever, that in this capacity he also labored under more favorable circumstances than Plato. Without losing himself in the pursuit of impracticable ideals, Aristotle seems to liave fostered the high spirit of his ward. Alexander always retained sentiments of re- jpect and love for his teacher, although in his last years a certain coldness existed between ;he two (Plut, Alex., ch. 8). Aristotle returned to Athens not long before the entrance of Alexander upon his Asiatic campaign (in the second half of Olymp. 111.2, or the spring of 334), perhaps in tlie fear 335 B. c. He taught in a gymnasium called the Lyceum (consecrated to Apollo S.iiKeioi:'), in whose avenues of shade-trees (irtpmaToi, whence the name Peripatetics) he walked, while communing with his more intimate disciples upon philosophical problems; for more promiscuous audiences he lectured sitting (Diog. L., V. 3). It is possible that lie also again gave rhetorical instruction, as in the period of his first residence at Athens, riellius says {N. A., XX. 5) : c^ureptKa dicehaniur, quae ad rhetoricas meditatitmes faadta- temque argutiarum dviliumque rerum notitiam conducebant ; aKpoariKa autem vocabaniur, in imJms philosophia remotior suUiliorque agitabatur. For his investigations in natural science facilities are said to have been tendered him by Philip and, more especially, by Alexander THE WORKS OF ABI8T0TLE. 139 (A^elian., Vwr. Siat., IV. 19; Athen., IX. 398 e; Plin., Rist. Nat., VIII. 16, 44). The accu- Bation brought against Aristotle was founded on tlie impiety (aaipcia) which his enemies pretended to discover in his hymn in eulogy of Hermiaa ; it jvas designated by them aa a Paean, and its author was charged with having deified a man. But in fact this hymn (which is preserved in Dlog. L., V. 1) is a hymn to virtue, and Hermias, who had suf- fered a death fuU of torments at the hands of the Persians, was only lauded in it as a martyr to virtue. Quitting Athens (late in the summer of 323), Aristotle is related to have said, alluding to the fate of Socrates, that he would not give the Athenians the opportunity of siuning a second time against philosophy. His death was not caused (aa some report) by a self-administered poison nor by his throwing himself into the Euripns (for which no cause existed), but by disease (Diog. L., V,. 10, following ApoUodorus ; the disease appears to have been located principally in the stomach, according to Censorinus, De Die Nat., 14, 16). His death (according to Gell., N. A., XVII. 21, 35) occurred shortly before that of Demosthenes, hence late in the summer of 322 B. c. Goethe {Werke, Vol. 53, p. 85) characterizes Aristotle, in contrast with Plato (ef. above, § 39), in these words : " Aristotle stands to the world in the relation pre-eminently of a great architect. Here he is, and here he must work and create. He informs himself about the surface of the earth, but only so far as is necessary to find a foundation for his structure, and from the surface to the center all besides is to him indiflerent. He draws an immense circle for tlie base of his building, collects materials from all sides, arranges them, piles them up in layers, and so risea in regular form, like a pyramid, toward the sky, while Plato seeks the heavens like an obelisk or, better, like a pointed flame." This charac- terization of Aristotle is, indeed, not so happy as that of Plato, cited above. The empirical basis, the orderly rise, the sober, clear insight of the reason, and the healthy, practical instinct, are traits rightly expressed ; but when Goethe seems to assume that knowledge was of interest to Aristotle only so far as it was of practical significance, he runs counter to the doctrine and practice of this philosopher. Further, the methods both of Plato and of Aristotle include, together with the process of ascending to the universal, the reverse , process of descending by division and deduction to the particular. § 46. The ■writings of Aristotle were composed partly in popular, partly in acroamatic form ; the latter in great part, and a very few fragments of the former, are all that have come down to us. Aris- totle wrote most of the works of the latter class during his last resi- dence in Athens. In point of subject-matter they are divided into logical, ethical, physical, and metaphysical works. Ilis logical works have received the general title of Organon. The doctrine embodied in his metaphysical writings was called by Aristotle First Philosophy {i. e., the philosophy of first or ultimate principles). Of those works which relate to physics or natural science, the Physics {Ausculta- tiones Physicae), and also the Natural History of Animals (a com- parative Physiology), are of especial philosophical importance. Still more important are his psychological works (three books on the Soul and several minor treatises). Among his ethical works the funda- mental one is his Ethics, which treats of the duties of the individual,' I40 THE WORKS OF AEISTOTLE. t and which exists in a threefold fonn : Nicomachean Ethics (Arig. totle's work), Eudemean Ethics (written by Endemiis), and Magna Moralia (consisting of extracts from the two first). Tlie PoUtica is a theory of the state on the basis of the Ethics. The BJietoric and Poetic join on partly to the logical, and still more closely to the ethical works. The works of Aristotle were first printed in a Latin tmnslatlon, togetlier with the Commentnries of lie Arabian philosopher, Avcrroes (about 1180), at Venice, 1489, and afterward, ibid. 1496, 180T, 1688, 1560-42, Basel, 1538, and often iiftcrward ; in Greek, first, Venetiie apud Aldum Manutiwm, 1495-93 ; again, under the supervision of Krasmus and Simon Grynaeus, Basel, 1581, 1539, and 1550 (this third Basel edition is termed the Ittengriniana^ from Isengrin, one of its editors); other, editions were edited by Joh. Bapu CimotiuB, Venetiin apud Aldi Jilioa, 1661-58; Frfedrioh Sylbure, Francf. 1684-87; Isaac Casauboiiuc, Greek and Latin, Lyons, 1590, etc. (1596, 1597, 1605, 1646) ; Dii Viil, Greek and Latin, Paris, 1619. etc. (1629, 1639, 1664); the last complete edition in the ITth century appeared (in Ileted. The first volume contains several essays, which are still of value, particularly as relating tq the various editions of Aristotle and to his Greek and Latin commentators. Until the rise of Cartesianism and other modern philosophies, the doctrine of Aristotle, more or less freely interpreted, it is true, in indi- vidual points, was received as the time philosophy. Logic, ethics, etc., were learned from his writings at Catholic universities throughout the second half of the Middle Ages, and at Protestant universities, almost in the same sense in which geometry was learned from the elements of Euclid. Afterward, Aristotelianism came to be widely considered as a false doctrine, and (after sustaining attacks of constantly increasitig frequency and virulence, beginning ft-om the close of the Middle Ages) became even more and more univer- sally neglected, except where, as at the schools of the Jesuits, tradition retained unconditional authority. Thus the existing editions were quite sufiicient to meet the diminished interest felt in their contents. Leibnitz endeavored especially to appreciate justly the measure of philosophical truth contained in the doctrines of Aristotle, disapproving equally the two extremes of unconditional submission to their authority, and of absolute rejection. But he made of his own monadic doctrine and of his religious convic- tions' too immediate a standiird of judgment (See, among others, the monogntph of Dan. Jacoby, Vt ZeibTiAtii atudiie AristotetidSt inest ineditwtn Leibnitii, J>is8. Inaug.^ Berlin, 1867.) In the last decades of the ^ghtcenth century the historic instinct became more l.nd more awakened, and to this fact the works of Aristotle owed the new appreciation of their great value as documents exponential of the historical de- velopment of philosoithy. Thus the interest in the works of Aristotle was renewed, and this interest has gone on constantly increasing during the nineteenth wntury up to the present day. The most important complete edition of the present century Is that prepared under the auspices of the Academy of Seiences at Berlin, Vols. L and II.. AHstotelee Graece ex ree. Jmm. Bekkeri, Berlin, 1881; Vol. 111., Arintotela Latino interprctUnia variia, ibid. 18.31 ; Vol. IV., Scholia in ArietoMem coUegit Cliritt. Aug. Brandii, ibid. 1636; Bekker's text was reprinted at Oxford in 18-37, and Bekker has himself published the principal works of Aristotle separately, followed, with few exceptions, the text of the complete edition, bat, unfor- tunately, without annexing the Varietas leet. contained in the latter. Didot has published at Paris an edition, edited by Dilbner, Bussemaker, and Heitz (1848-69), which is valuable. Stereotyped editions wore published by Tanchnitz.'at Leipsic. In 1881-82 and 1843. German translations of most of Aristotle's works are contained in Metzler's collection (transLnted by K. L. Both, K. Zell, L. Spengel, Chr. Walz, F. A. Krenz, Ph. H. Kulb, J. Eieckhor, and C. F. Schnitzer), in Ilofi'mann's Library of Translations (translatcil by A. Karsch, Ad. Stahr, and Karl Stahr), and in Engelmimn's collection (Greek and German together). Of the editions of separate works the following may be mentioned :— ArUt. Organon, ed. Th. Waltz, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1844-46. Arist. Categor. gr. cum vertione Arahica IsaaM JToneiniJii., ed. Jul. Theod. Zenker, Leipsic, 1846. Soph. El&ucJti, ed. Edw. Poste, London, 16C6. jlWst MIl Jficom., ed. C. Zell, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1820 ; ed. A. Coray, Paris, 1822 ; ed. Cardwell, Oxford, 1828-80; ed. C. L. Michelet, Berlin, 1829-35, 2d edition, 1848; further, separate editions of the text of Bekker, 1881, 1845, 1861 ; the edition of W. E. Jelf, Oxford and London, 1856, reproducing for the most part Bekker's text; the edition of Eogers, edit, altera, London, 1865, and Tlie Ktliica of Arintotle illuttrated with Eeaaya and Jfotee, by Sir Alex. Gant, London, 1866-68, 2d edition, 1866. Books VIII. and IX. (On THE WOEKS OF ARISTOTLE. 141 Friendship), pnbllBlied separately, Giessen, 1847, edited by Ad. Theod. Herm, Frit8clie» who also pablished na edition of the Ead. Eth.^ Kegensburg, 1S59. Polit.^ ed, Herm. GonriDg, Helmst. 1656, Brunswick, 1730, ed. J. G. Schneider, Frnnkfort-on-the-Oder, 1309; C. Gottling, Jena, 1S24; Ad. Stabr, Leipsic, 1S89 ; B. St. Hilairu, Pucid, 1S3T, 2d cd. 1843; I. Bekker, Berlin (1831), 1S55; Eaton, Oxford, 1855; 1£. Congrere, London, 1855 and 1862; Shet^ ed. Spengel, f Leipsic, 1867. Poet.^ ed: G. Hermann, Leipsic, 1302; Franz Eitter, Cologne, 1839; E. Egger (in his Ussai svr VhUtoire de la critiqiie chez lea Grece, Pans, 1849) ; B. St. Hilaii e, Pni is, 1858 ; I. Bekker {Ar. Jihet et Poet, alt I. B. tertium ed., Berlin, 1859) ; Franz Snseraihl {Poet., in Greek and German, Leipsic, 1365) ; Job. Vahlen, Berlin, 1867 ; F. Ueberweg (with translation and commentary), Berlin, 1S69. The P/iyHcs of Aristotle has been published, Greek and Geruian together, with explanatory notes, by C. Prantl, Leipsic, 1854 ; also the works De Coelo and De ^eneraUone et Comtptione have been edited by the same. Leip8ic,1857. Arist, uber die Farben^ erl. durch eine UeherHcht ubei' die Farhenlehre der Alien, t)on Carl Prantl, Munich, 1849. Meteorolog., ed.'Sul. Lud. Idrler, Leipsic, 1384-36. B. St. Ililaire has edited and published, in Greek and French, and with explanatory notes, the PAi/««ca of Arist., Paris, 18G2 ; tho Meteorolog., Paris, 1367 ; the De Coelo, Paris, 1866 ; De Gen. et Corr.^ togetlier with the work De Melinso^ Xenophane, Gorgia (with an Jntrod. mtr let origines de la philoa. grecque), Paris, 1866. De Animal. Jliator.y ed. J. G. Schneider, Leipsic, 1811. Vier Sucker uber die Theile d&r T/iiere, Greek and German, with explanatory notes, by A »". Frantziua, Leipsic, 1353 ; ed. Bern. Langkavel, Leipsic, 1868. Ueber die Zeugung und Entioickelung der Thiere^ Greek and German, by Aubert and Wimmer, Leipsic, 1560; T/derkwnde, Greek and German, by the same, ibid. 1863. Arist. De Anima libritreft, ed. F. Ad. Trendelenburg?, Jena, 1833; ed. Barth. St. Ililaire, Paris, 1846; ed. A Torstrik, Berlin, 1862 (cf. K. NoetePs review in the Z. f. G. TT., XVIIL, Bi'riin. 1864, pp. 131-144). Arist. Metaph., ed. Brandis, Beriin, 1823; ed. Schwegler, TOb. 1347-48; ed. II. Bonitz. Bonn, 1S4S-49. Afany valuable contributions to the exegesis of Aristotle's works are contained in thusu ancient com^ mentaries and paraphmses which have cume down to us, especially in those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the cxegeie(see below, §51) of Dexippus and Themistius (see below, §69), and of Syrianus, Ammonins Hermiaefiliv^^ Simplicius, and Fhiloponus (see below, § 70); also in the writings of Boethius (i&w^.) and others. Scholia to Aristotle have been published by Brandis, Berlin, 1336 (m Bekker^s edition of the text), to the Metaphysics, by Brandis, 4&i<2. 1837, to the De Aniiha (extracts from an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's De Anima), by Spengel, Munich, 1847, and a paraphrase of the Soph. Mench., by Spcngel, ihid. 1342. An old Hebrew translation of the Commentary of Averroes on the Hhetoric was published by J. Goldenthal, at Lc'lpsic, in 1843. Of modem writers on the works of Aristotle, we name the following: J. G. Bahlc, Commbntaiio de Hbrorum Ariatotelis ditstributione in exotericoe et acroamaticoa, GOtt. 1788 (contained also in the first vol. of Buhle's edition of Aristotle, £ipont% 1791, pp. 105-152), and Ueber die EcJiHieit der Metaph. dea Aristoteles, in the Bibl.f. alie Litt. u. Kunst, No. 4, Gott 1788, pp. 1-42; Ueber die Ordnwig und Folge der Ariatot. Sdiriften ilberhaupt, ibid. No. 10, 1794, 33-47. Am. Jourdain, Pecherchea critiques aur Vdge et Vorigine dea trad/ucUona Iniines d'Aristote et aur lea commentaires grecH ou orabea employia par lea docteura scJiolaatiques, Paris, 1319, 2d ed. 1843. Franc. Nicol. Titze, De Ariatotdia operit/m aerie et distinctione, Leipsic, 1826. Ch. A. Brandis, U^er die Sckicksale der Aristoteliachen BucJier und einige Kriterien ihrer Eclitheit, in the liliein.. Mua., I. 1827, pp. 236-254, 253-236 (cf. Kopp, Nachtrag zu Br. Uvtera. uber die Sdiickaale der Arist. Budier, ibid. III. 1, 1329) ; Uelter die PeiJtenfolge der Bucher dea Arist. Organoris und ihre griee/i. Ausleger, in the Abh. der Berl. Ahad. der Wiaa., 1S3S; Ueber die A}e Berm. Ar. (Inaugural Diss.), Berlin, 1870(cr. §47, below). Of the Metaph/yaica : C. L. Michelet, Sxa^nen critique de Touvrage d'Aristote inUtuU ifetapJiysigw, ouvr. emir, par Vacad. dea aa. mor. et pol., Paris. 18.36; Felix Eavaisson, Enaai aur la MUaphyaiq]it d'Ariatote^ Paris, 1887-46 ; Brnmmerstadt, Ueber JnJialt -wfid Ztiaamnienhang' der metaph. Biicher dee Ariat.., Eostock, 1841; J. C. Glaser, Die Metaph. dea Ariat. nadi CowpoaUion^ JnJialt tmrf MethoUe^ Berlin, 1841 ; Herm. Bonitz, Oba&rv. Oriticae in Ariat. Ubroa metaphyaiaoa, Berlin, 1842 ; Wilfa. Christ, Studia in Ariat. libroa metaph. cullata, Berlin, 1853. Cf. Kriscbe, Forachungen auf dem Oebiete der alien Philoaophie 7, 1640, pp. 263-276 ; and Bonitz and Schwegler, in their commentaries on the ifet. uf Aristotle (cf. below, § 48). Of Aristotle's physical works: C. Prantl, De Ar. libroram ad hiat. animal. pert, ordine atque diipo- aitione, Munich, 1843; Symbolaecriticaeim. Ariat. pJvya. auaeultationea, Berlin, 1848; H. Thiei, 2)e ZooL Ar. I. ordine ac diatrib. (O.-Pr.)., Breslau, 1855; Sonnenburg, Zu Ar. Thiergeachiehte (G.-Pr.), Bonn, 1857 ; Ch. Thurot, Oba. crit. on Ar. De Part. Animalium^ in the Jievne arch.^ 1867, pp. 233-242 ; on the Meteorol., ibid. 1869, pp. 415-420. Cf various works by Barthilemy St. Bilaire, Jessen, and others (see §49, below). Of the Ethica and Poliiiea : Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, £em. Sber die aogen. groaae EUtik iet Ariat.., Erfurt, 1798; F. Schleiermacber, Ueber die griech. Sdiolien zur Ifikom^chiacJten Ethik dee Ariat, (read on May 16, 1816), in S.'s Sammtlic/ie Werke, III. 2, 1888, pp. 809-326; Ueber die ethiachm Wtrla dea Ariatotelea (read December 4, 1817), ibid. III. 8, 1835, 806-838 ; W. Van Swinderen, De Ar. Pol. librii, Groningen, 1824; Herm. Bonitz, Oba. Crit. in Ariat. gnae /ei'untwr Magna - Moralia et Eth. Eudemia^ Berlin, 1844; A. M. Fischer, De Et/ticia J^icom. et Eudem.^ Bonn, 1847; Ad. Trendelenburg, Ueber Stellm in der Nlk.-EULik^ in the Monataher. der BerHner Acad. d. Wiaa., 1850. and in Trendelenburg's Hist. Beitr. eitr P/iiloa., II., Berlin, 1653; Zur Ariat. Ethik, in Iliat Beitr., III., Berlin, 1867; Job. Petr. Nickes,2)« Ariat. PoUtAcorum libria {diaa. inaug.\ Bonn, 1851 ; J. Bendixen, Comm. ds Ethicorum Xicomacheorum integritate, Ploena, 1854; Bemerkungen sum. 7. Biu^ der Nikom^ Ethik, in the Philol., X. 1B55, pfV. 199-210, 268-292 ; UeberauM uber die neueste die Ariatoieliselie Ethih und Politik betreffende Litt. ibid. XI. 1866, pp. 851-378, 644-582, XIV. 1859, 882-372. XVI. 1S60, 465-622; cf. XIII. 1858, pp. 264-801; II. Hampke, Ueber daafilnfte Buck der Mk. Eth., ibid. XVI. pp. 60-84; G. Teicbmil'ilcr, Zvr Frage Wiir die Reihenfolge der Bildier in der Ariat. Politik, ibid. pp. 164-166 ; Christian Pansch, De Ethids Kioom, genuino Arist. libra diss., Bonn, 1883 (cf. Trendelenburg's review of this work, and, in particular, his de- fense Against Pansch of the genuineness of the 10th Book of the Nicom. Et/iiea, in the Jdhrb. fSr wise. Xritik, 1834, p. 858 seq., and Spcngel, in the Abh. der bair. Akad., III. p. 618 seq ); Chr. Pansch, De ir. Eth. Mc., VII. 12-15 and X 1-5 (ff.-Pc), Eutin, 1858 ; H. S. Anton, Quae intercedat ratio inter Eth. Hie VII. 12-15 et X. 1-5, Dantzic, 1858 ; F. Miinscher, Quaeat. crit. et exeget. in Ariat Eth. Ificom., Marbnrg, 1861 ; E. Noetel, Quaeat. Ar. (de libra Y. Eai.Jfic.), (Q.-Pr.), Berlin, 1862; F. Hacker, DasV. Bvcli der NU; Ethik., in the Zeitachr. f. d. &.- W,, XVI. pp. 618-660 ; Beitr. e. Eritik^u. Erkl. dea VJl. Buclies der Mi. Ethik, in the Zeitachr. f. d. O.- W., Berlin, 1809 (cf. 1868) ; H. Eassow, Obaervattonea crilicae in Aiittote- ton, Berlin, 1858; EnundaMonea Ariatoteleae,'Weimwr, 1861; Beitriige eur Erkldrung und Texttritit der NUc. Ethik dea Ariat., Weimar, 1862 and ISGS; Bemerkungen Uber einige Stellen der Po'itik da Ariatotelea, Weimar, 1804; Joh. Imelmann, Oba. cr. in Ar. E. N. (Diss.), Halle, 1864: Moritz Vcrihchrfn, AriatoteUscTie Scliri/tstellen, Heft J. : mr Mkom. Etldk, Leipsic, 1864; W. Oncken, Die Wiederbeletung der Ariat. Politik in der abendldndisdien Leaetcelt, in the Festackrift eur Begrilaaung der 24. Vera deutacher Philol. u. Sc/mlm.. eu Beldelberg, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 1-18; Die Staatalehre dea Ariat.. Leipsic, 1670 ; Susemihl, Zum eraten. eweiten wid vierten Budte der Politik, in the Jahrb. f. Ph. n. Pad., VoL XCIIL pp. 827-838, Rluiii. Miia., S. S., XX. 1865, pp. 604-617 ; XXL 1806, pp. 551-578 ; and Zum 3, 7. ». 8 THE WOEKS OF AEISTOTLE. 143 Sache, in the PfUlalogus, XXV. pp. 835-415; XXIX. pp. 97-119; Be Arist. PoUtieorum Kbrit J. et II.. GreifswaW, 1SG7; Appendix, ihid. 1869; d. n. Lit. z. Ar. Pal, Jahrh.f. Ph., XCIX. pp. 698-610, and 01. (ISiO), pp. 843-850; Ewald Booker, De gitibuadam Pol. Ar. locin (Inaug. Diss.), Greifew. 1867 (cf. below, §50). • To the Poetie and Xhetoric of Aristotle relate (beside the worlis already cited of Spengel, Bernajs, and others) the following: Max Si^binidt, De tempore quo ah Arint. I. de arte rket. ctmscr. et ed. aint^ Halle, 1837; Franz Susemihl, Stvdi&n smr Aristotel. Poetih, in the Hk. Mas., XTIII. p. 866 seq., 471 seq., XIX p. 197 seq., XXII. p. 217 seq.; cf. Jahn's Jahrb., 89, p. 504 seq., and 95, pp. 159-184 and 221-28C; Joh. Vahlen, Zar Krttik ArM. Sdiriften (Poetic and Ehetoric), Vienna, 1861, In the SitzuTigaheridite of the Vienna Acad, of Sciences, Vol. 88, No. 1, pp. 69-148 ; also, Arkt. Lehre von der Rangfolge der Theile der Tragodie, in the " GraiulatAon&chrift^^ entitled &ymbola philologorvm Sorvn&iisiuin in honorem IHd, Pitadielii coUecta, Lcipsic, 1864, pp. 155-184; Beitrdge lur Arist. Poetik, Vienna, 1865-16C7 (from the "Sitzungsberichte" of the Academy); Gnst Teichm511er. AriM. Forschungen, I.: Seitriige eur ErkOlrung der Poetih dea Arist. (Halle, 1867), II.: Arist. Philoa. der Kvnst {ibid. 1869), (cf. below, § 50). Aristotle probably composed a number of works in dialogue during his first residence at Atliens and in the life-time of Plato. Of this class was the dialogue Eudemus, some frag- ments of which are preserved (op. Plutarch, Dio, 22; Consol. ad Apol., ch. 27; Cic, De Div., I. 25, 53, etc.; cf. J. Bemays, in the Rhein. Mus. f. Phil., new series, XVI. 1861, pp. 236-246). Eudemus was a member of the Platonic circle, u friend of Aristotle, and a participant in the campaign of Dio against Dionysius in Sicily, where he fell, 353 B. c. To his memory Aristotle dedicated the dialogue named after him, a work in imitation of Plato's Phaedo ; in it Aristotle presented arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul. The first twenty-seven volumes in tlie catalogue of the works of Aristotle, as given by Diog. Laert., T. 22-27 (of. Anonym. Menag., 61 seq.) are writings in dialogue. They are: On Justice, On Poets, On Philosophy, Politieus, Gryllus, Nerinthus, Sophist, Menexenus, ]<)roticus, Symposion, On Riches, Protreptious, etc. By subsequent writers these works were termed exoteric, and in distinction from them the more strictly scientific ones were termed esoteric. In Aristotle's works the word esoteric does not occur (yet cf. Anah/t. Post, I. 10, p. 'J6 b, 2Y, l> ido Xoyo^ as o iv tq ipvxv, '° opposition to e^a Myog) ; but exoteric is employed in the sense of " outwardly directed, addressed to the respondent (»rpof eTepov)," arguing from what appears to him to be true, in contrast to that which interests the thmker who looks only at the essential (rcj a iaropim, of which the tenth book is spurious), together with certain related worlss on the parts, generation, and locomotion of animals (the Jrepl f^uv Kivfjaeaq is not genuine), is preserved, but the Anatomy of Animals (avarofiai) is lost. To the three books vcpl fvxvc join on the opuscules : Trcpi ala-^ijaeuq koX aia^riTai; ircpl fivri/iTig koX avajivijaea^, nepl invav koI syprj. ySpaeac, Tzepl kwnviuv, Ttepl /iavriK^c TijQ iv rdlg mvotg, -nepl ftaicpopt6T7p-og koI ppaxvjStiniTof, irepl i^aiig Kai ^avarov (with which the iT-epl vtoTT/Tog Koi yr/pug of our editions must ap- parently be classed). The ifmatoyvufwio. is spurious. The collection of Trpo^^/Mra is a conglomerate gradually brought together on the basis of Aristotle's notes (cf. Carl Prantl, Ueber die Prohleme des Arist, in the Abh. der Akad. d. W., Munich, 1850). The mpl Bavfiaaiuv anova/idruv is spurious (cf. H. Schrader, Ueber die Quellen der psetido-ariai Schrift n-. 8. a., in the Jaftrb. f. Phihl u. Pad., Vol. 97, 1867, pp. 217-232); so, perhaps, is also the TTspi ardfiuv ypafifiuv. Three works in our Corpus Aristoteleum treat of ethics in general : 7/61101 JUim/iaxeta in ten books, yBiKa 'Evdiijina in seven books, and ffiiKa jityaXa (perhaps corrupted from rfiiKini Kf^dAaia or from rfiiniyv firyaAm' KefaTMia, according to Trendelenburg's conjecture, Sdt- rage zur Philos., Tol. I[., Berlin, 1855, p. 352 seq.). The three works on ethics corfespond with each otlier in content as follows: £ft. Mc, I., II., III. 1-7, Eth. Eud., I.,' II., Magji. Mor., I. 1-19, contain general preparatory considerations; Eth. Mc., III. 8-15 and IV., Eth. Eud., III., Magn. Mor., I. 20-23, treat of the different ethical virtues, witli the exception of justice ; Eth. Nic., V., with which Eth. Eud., IV., is identical, and Magn. Mor., I. 34, and II., init, relate to justice and equity; ECh. Nic., VI., with which Etii. Eud., V., is identical, and Magn. Mor., I. 35 (cf II. 2, 3), relate to the dianoetio virtues ; Eth. Nic., VII., identical with Eth. Eud., VI., and Magn. Mor., II. 4-7, to continence, incontinence, and pleasure ; Eth. Nic, VTII., IX., Eth. Eud., VII. 1-12 (or 13 init, where there is evidently a gap), and Magn. Mor., II. 11-17, treat of friendship; Eth. Eud., VII. 13 (where the text is full of gaps and alterations) treats of the power of wisdom (fpdvTiaig, practical wisdom) ; Magn. Mor., II. 10, of the signification of bpBbg ^^yoQ, and of the power of ethical knowledge ; Eth. Eud., VII. 14, 15, and Magn. Mor., II. 8, 9, of prosperity and xa^jmayadia (honor, the union of the beautiful and the good); Eth. Nic., X., of pleasure and happiness. That the so-called Magna Moralia, the shortest of these works, is not the oldest of them (as Schleiermacher believed), but that the Nicomachean Ethics (from which the citations in Pol., II. 2, III. 9 and 12, IV. 41, VII. 1 and 13, are made) is the original work of Aristotle, while the Eudemian Ethics is a work of his pupil, Eudemus, based on the work of Aristotle, and that the Magna Moralia is an abstract from both, but principally from the Eudemian Ethics, has been almost universally allowed since Spengel's investi- gation of the subject (see above, p. 141); Barthelemy St. Ililaire, however {kmak d'Aristote, Paris, 1856), sees in the Eudemian Ethics not so much an original work of Eudemus, as rather a mere redaction of a series of lectures on Ethics by Aristotle, e.xe- cuted by one of his auditors (probably by Eudemus, who, it is supposed, wrote them down for his own use, as they were delivered) ; he is inclined to assign to the Magn. Moral, also the same date and kind of origin. But there can hardly be a doubt that this latter work belongs to a later period, such are the marks of Stoic influences in thought and termi- nology which it contains (see Ramsauer, Zur Charakteristik der Magna Moralia [G.-Pr.], Oldenburg, 1858, and Spengel, Arist. Studien, I., Munich, 1863, p. 17, and Trendelenburg, Einige Belege fiir die nacharisl. Abfassungszeit der Magna Mor., in his Histor. Beitr., III. P- 433 seq.); the following citation contained in it (II. 6, 1201 b, 25): uaKcp i^a/itv h rmf avaXvuKolg, is ground for the conjecture, that the author published it under the name of THE WORKS OF AEISTOTLE, 147 Aristotie; still, other Analytica (paraphrases of the Aristotelian work) may be meant. Of the Eudemitm Ethics, Spengel and Zeller, in particular, have shown that the author, though generally following Aristotle, has introduced original matte^ which appears occasionally in the light of an intentional correction of Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics appears to have been published after the death of Aristotle by his son Nicomachus. To which work the books common to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (.Vie., T.-TIL, Ead., IT.-VI.) originally belonged, is a matter of dispute. It may be shown, as well on internal grounds as from references in the Politico, that the first of these books (Eth. Nic., y.^Eth. Eudem., IT.)* was originally a part of the Nicomachean Ethics.f Tlie pres- ent Book YI. of the Nic. Eth. (= B. V. of the Eud.) agrees in many respects better with the books belonging to the Eud. than with those which belong to the Nic. Eth. (of. Alb. Max. Fischer, De Eth. Nic. et Eud., diss, inaug., Bonn, 1841, and Fritzsche in his edition of the Eud. Ethics) ; yet at least a book of essentially similar content must have belonged originally to the Nic. Eth., to which book Aristotle refers in Metaph., I. 1, 981 b, 25. But ttie last of these identical books (Eth. Nic. VII. = Eth. Eud., VI.) belongs very probably either wholly or at least in its last chapters {Eth. Nic., VII. 12-15, which, like B. X. of the Nic, though not altogether in the same sense, treats of pleasure) not to the Nico- machean Ethics, and is also not to be viewed as an earlier draught of Aristotle's, but as a later revision, probably executed by Eudemus. The opuscule nFpl aperHtv koi Kaiuiov is probably spurious. The eight books of the TroAmm join on to the Ethics. According to Barth. St. Hilaire and others the original order of the Books was I., II., III., VII., VIII., IV., VI., V. : yet the theory that Book V. and VI., have been made to exchange places, is improbable ; Hildenbrand, Zeller, and others, oppose, while Spengel, and, in a recent work, Oncken (StaatsL des Arist., I. 98 seq.) defend it. That Books VII. and VIII. should follow immediately after III. is extremely probable, was long ago affirmed, among others, by Nicolas d'Oresmo (died in 1382) and by Conring (who edited the Politics in 1656) to be the order intended by Aristotle. In B. I. Aristotle treats of the household, omitting, however, to give rules for the moral education and training of children, since these depend on the ends pursued by the state. In B. II. he criticises various philosophical ideals and existing forms of the state. In B. III. he discusses the conception of the state, and distinguishes, as the different possible forms of government, monarchy and • With the possible exception of chs. 11, 12, 15. t In the second half the order hue been considerably disturbed. The section, c. 10, p. llS4a, 23-1134a, 15, must be misplaced; Hildenbrand conjectures that it belongs at the end of c. 8. This conjecture is opposed by the expression elprrrai Trpdrepoc, p. 1134 a, 24, -which implies a greater separation from c. 8, and by the general plan evidently adopted by Aristotle in the whole work, in accordance with which thespeeial and particularly the political bearings of each topic are not considered until each topic has been treated of in general terms ; according to this method the passage in question should not come before c. 9, and perhaps not before c. 10. C. 15 must follow immediately after c. 12, and hence Zeller would place this chapter, with the exception of the last sentence, between cc. 12 and 13; but since c. 13 in respect of subject-matter (not formally, indeed; perhaps some words have fallen away from the beginning) joins on to c. 10 (Spengel asserts this conjecturally ; Hermann Adolph Fechntr, Hainpke, and others are more positive), the correct order is i-ather to be res-tored by placing cc 11 imd 12 after 13 and 14. As the correct order, therefore, we would propose the following: cc. 8, 9, 10, excepting the section above indicated, 13, 14, then that section from c 10, and finally 11, 12, 15. The defective arrangement may have arisen from the misplacement of a few leaves in an original codex. Originally, a leaf numbered, e. g.. a, contained say c. 8 post med. to c. 10, p. 1134 a, 23, leaf a +/., c. 10, llSfia, 15 to c. 10,^n., p. 1136.0,9, leaf a + 11., c. 13 .ind 14, p. 1137 a, 4 to n38a,3.1eafa + ///., the passage now standing in c. 10, p. 1184 .a, 23 to 1185 a, 15, leaf a + /F., cc. 11 .ind 18, p. 1136a, 10 to 1137a,4, and, finally, leaf a + K, the conclusion of the whole book, c. 15, p. llSSa, 4 to 1 188 b, 14. The leaves then fell into the false order : a,a -y 111., a +I.,a + IV., a + II., a + V. The anthor of the Magna Moralia seems to have found this arrangement already existing. Perhaps at the place where this confusion arose, two books of the Sud. Ethict were inserted into the Ni*. Eth, A differ- ent order is proposed by Trendelenburg, nivt, £eitr. zur r/dloe.. III. pp. 418-425. L48 THE WOKKS OF AKISTOTLB. yranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, politda (a commonwealth of free citizens) and de- nocracy. He then treats (IIL U-ll) of the first of the above forms, which under jertain conditions is reclsoned by him as the best possible, and (III. 18, and its con- jnuation : Til. and VIII.) of the good state, which is favored in respect of its external •onditions, and is based on the supremacy of the best men, i. e., citizens who are virtuously iduoated. In Boolcs IT. and T. follows the inquiry concerning the other forms of the itate besides monarchy and aristocracy, B. T. being especially occupied with the investi- tation of the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; B. T. thus !outains what, according to IT. 2, was to follow after the characterization and the deserip. ;ion of the genesis of the different forms of the state, viz.: the science of Political Nosology md Therapeutics. In B. TI. Aristotle treats supplementarily of the particular kinds of lemocracy and oligarchy and of the different offices in the state, the discussion having seen very likely originally extended to other topics, including, in particular, the subject >f laws. At least the second Book of the Economics is spurious. The Troli-Elai, a descrip- ;ion of the constitution of some 158 states, is lost. The Poetic (mpi noivriK^^) is inconi- jlete in its present form. The Rhetoric, in three books, has been preserved. The Rhetor id Alex, is spurious (according to Spengel — who edited it in 1844 — Tictorius, Buhle, and sthers, who found tlieir rejection of it on Quintil., III. 4, 9). The chronological order in which the works of rigidly philosopliical form were written ;an be for the most part, though not in all instances, determined with certainty ; tlie nterest belonging to the investigation of this subject is rather one of method tlian of levelopment, since Aristotle seems to have composed these works (except, perhaps, those >n logic) during his second residence at Athens, hence at a time when his philosophical levelopment was already substantially complete. Frequently one work is cited in another. But these citations are in so many cases reciprocal, that it is scarcely possible to infer aDy . ihing from them as to the historical sequence of the works ; such inferences can be drawn witli perfect certainty only when a work is announced as yet to be written. The logical svritings were probably composed the earliest (in Anal. Post, II. 12, anticipatory reference is made to the Physics: fiaXXov 6e ^avepa^ hv toIq KaddXov irspl kivvo£(^^ baov luavij; ixet vp°S ra '^TlTobfj.cva, and ethics (Eth. N., II. 2) is not a purely scientific but a practical doctrine. The Ethics and Politics were followed by the Poetic (to which anticipatory reference is made, Pol, Till. 1), and the Rhetoric (which appears to be referred to, by anticipation, in Eth., II. 7, p. 1108 b, 6); according to ifftei., I. 11, p. 1312 3, 1 ; III. 2, p. 1404 b, 7, the Poefe pre- ceded the Rhetorw. That the Rhet. was composed immediately after the logical works (Rose) is scarcely to be credited ; it must have been preceded not only by the logical but also by the ethico-political works, in accordance with the Aristotelian dicta, Rhet , I. 2, 1356 a, 25, and 4, 1359 b, 9 ; rr/c pr/ropiK^v o'tov napafve^ ti r^f 6mXeieriKf/g ehat KoX Tiji irepi THE W0EK8 OF AEISTOTLE. 149 t4 ijft? itpayuaTeia^ fpi diKoi/ni icrri Trpoaayopcieiv TToXiTtic^j and )} /iiiTopiid; avynetTai Ik re t?"4 avoXuTiKVf iKiOTTifirig Kat r^f izepl -a ffiij iroTuTiKr/;. The works relating to physics were com- posed in the following order : AnscuU. physicae, De Coelo, De ffener. ei Corr., Meieorologica ; tlien followed the works relating to organic nature and psychical life. That the Metaphysics is of later date than the Physics (which Rose incorrectly places after the former) follows with certainty from Phys., I. 9, p. 192 a, 36: t^^ irpintK f consideration. Truth in knowledge is the agreement of knowledge with reality. (Categ., ;. 12; Tu yap uvai to ^pdy/ia }/ /if/ a/.7i^f/( o 7uiyo( fj ipeviSf/g Ah/sTai). This dictum is lius particularized, in Met., IV. 7, with reference to the various possible cases: "Affirming ion-existence of the existent, or existence of the non-existent, is falsehood ; but affirming ixistence of the e-xistent, and non-existence of the non-existent, is truth." As the con- ont, so also the forms of thought are viewed by Aristotle in their relation to reality. The .-arious kinds of words or of expressions, considered apart from all grammatical connection 7-d Kara /ir/ie/iiav avfi'!r?MKf/v Tieyo/isva, De Cat, c. 4), represent so many ways of making 'affirmations concerning the existent," or so many categories (yivj/ tuv KaTTjyopidv, Karri- ropiac Toil ovToc Or Tciv 6vT<^), and denote, accordingly, either 1) substance (ovaia or ri ion), IS examples of which Aristotle mentions man. horse, or 2) quantity (Koadv), e. g., two or hree yards long, or 3) quality (noi6v), e. g., white, grammatical, or 4) relation (jrpdf ti), e. g., louble, half, greater, or 5) place (ttoJi), e. g., in the Lyceum, in the market-place, or 6) time iroTt), e. g., yesterday, last year, or 1) position (KSlaBai), e. g., lies, sits, or 8) possession e;t£ii'), e. g., is shod, armed, or 9) action {noielv), e. g., cuts, burns, or 10) passion (waoxuv), I. g., is cut, burnt. The correspondence of the forms of speech with the forms of being is ixpressly affirmed by Aristotle {Metaph., T. 7 : 6aaxi>i yap Myerai, TocavraxiiQ to emu !i;/iaivEi). The forms of representations (or categories) and the parts of speech being dike conditioned on the forms of existence, the former correspond with the latter. Thus, n particular (according to Trendelenburg), the category of Substance corresponds with the Substantive (bvofia), while the other categories, collectively, correspond with the 'pijlia, in ;he wider sense (of Predicate) in which Aristotle employs this term ; and, more particularly, ;he categories of Quantity, Quality, and Relation with the Adjective and Numeral and certain Adverbs, the categories of place and time with the Adverbs (or Adverbial Exprea- iions) of place and time, the category of Position with the Intransitive Verb, that of Pos- session with the Perf. Pass., that of Action with the Active Verb, and that of Passion with :he Pass. Verb. While, however, this correspondence exists in a measure de /acto/k is osa evi'dent that it was expressly indicated by Aristotle ; least of all is it certain that the A.ristotelian categories arose from the observation of the different parts of speech. Tlie iheory of the parts of speech is in its first beginnings with Aristotle, and was first developed jy later writers; besides, the correspondence in question is not in all respects exact (Zeller, Vh. d. Gr., II. 2, 2d ed., p. 190 seq.). Aristotle seems to have had in view more the parts ■>f the sentence than the different kinds of words, or rather he seems not yet to have distin- ;uished between the two. (Cf., on the relation of the forms of reaUty to the forma of •opresentations and the parts of speech, in the Aristotelian theory of categories. Ueber- iveg, System der Logik, § 47, 2d ed., Bonn, 18G5, p. 92.) In all the works of Aristotle com- iossd after the De Cat. (supposing this to be genuine) and the Topica, the number of categories is reduced from ten to eight, KelcBai and Ix^i-v being omitted, probably because A.ristotle found that both might be subsumed under other categories. So Anal. Post, I. 22, 1. 8?. a, 21 and b, 15 (in which latter passage there can be no doubt that a full enumera- ;ion was intended), Phys. V. 1 (where likewise completeness is necessarily implied), and Het, V. 7. Prantl, in his Gesch. der Logik (I. p. 207), gives a schematized harmony of ali akibtotle's logic. 155 the passages in Aristotle where categories are mentioned. According to Prantl (p. 209), the essential import of the doctrine of categories is perceived, when we regard it, not as a complete enumeration of the forms of existence and thought, b»t as an expression of the truth that substance {ovaia) appears, determined in respect of space and time (irov, Trort) and quality (TO«iv), in the world of things numerable and measurable (iroaov), and that iwithin tlie sphere of manifold existence it shows itself active according to its determinate character (Troitlv, ■Kaaxtiv, izpoQ ti). In Analyt. Post, I. 22, all the other categories are oontrasted with Substance, as accidents (av/ijSep^KOTa). In Met, XIV. 2, p. 1089 b, 23, three classes are distinguished : to fihi yap ovaiai, to 6i ■koBti, to. Si jrpriTopiK3i avriarpoi^f ry 6ia7xKriK% ef Cic, Oat, c. 32: quasi ex altera parte respondens dialedicae; Dialectic teaches i^eraQuv koI inexctv Xdyov, and Rhetoric airoTicryelaBai koX Karriyoptlv). A form of investigation akin to tlie dialectical is the logical, i. e., the investigation of a topic in the light of universal conceptions alone (especially in the light of metaphysical conceptions, or such as belong to "first phi- losophy "), in distinction from that method which looks rather to the particular or to that which is peculiar {oIkbIov) to the subject of investigation, and which, tlierefore, in the depart- ment of physios, " investigates physically " {(pvatKoiQ (^elv. De Gen. et Corr., 316 a, 10, eial), in the department of analytics, " analytically " {avaXmiKog ZlTehi), etc. (See Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, p. 118 seq.) The Middle Term in that syllogism which is most important as an instrument of cognition, corresponds with and expresses an objective cause (Analyt. Post., II. 2: to /ikv yap aiTiov rd fieaov, of. my Syst. of Logic, § 101). In Induction {cTrayuy^, 6 £f mayayijg cv^hyyia/^g) we conclude from the observation that a more gen- eral concept includes (several or) all of the individuals included under another concept of inferior extension, that the former concept is a predicate of the latter {Anal. Pri., II. 23). Induction leads from the particular to the universal (airo tlw KoBiKaara em ra Ka66?im efodog, Top., I. 10). The term cTrayay^, for Induction, suggests the ranging of particular cases together in files, like troops. The Complete Induction, according to Aristotle, is the only strictly scientific induction ; the Incomplete Induction, which with a syllogism sub- joined constitutes the Analogical Inference (irapaSecyfta), is principally of use to the orator. Considered absolutely, the Syllogism proper, which arrives through the middle term at the major term as the predicate of the minor {6 £ia tov /ieaov avTiAoyta/jd;), is more rigorous, prior in nature, and more demonstrative {(jwaei irp&repo^ ml yvapi/iarepo;. Anal Pri., II. 23; ^taartKiiTepm Kal izpbg Totif avTiAayimv^ hepyiarepov, Tiip., I. 12); but the Inductive Syllogism easier for us to understand (i}fuv evapyearepog, Anal. Pri, II. 23 ; vtiiSb- v&Ttpov Koi aa^iarspov koI Kara rf/v alir&tiatv yvupi/iareppv Kai Toif iroXAoif miv6v, Top., I. 12). Universally, "the prior and more cognizable for us" is what lies nearest to the sphere of sensation, but " the absolutely prior and more cognizable " is what is most remote from that sphere (Anahjt. Post, I. 2 : Trpof ;}/udf fihi irpdrepa Ml yvoptpiyrcpa to iyyvrepov rijg ala^^aea^, OTrAuf 6e irpdrepa Kal yvapi/iiirepa ra woppurepav). The limits of knowledge are, on the one hand, the individual, on the other, the most general, In itself it is better^-because more scientific — to pass from the "prior in nature" to the " prior for us," from tho condition to the conditioned ; but for those who can not follow this order, the inverse one must be employed (%»., "VI. 4). The most general principles arc insusceptible of demonstration, because all (direct) demonstration presupposes, as its basis or premise, something more general than that which is to be proved ; and some- aeibtotle's metaphysics. 157 thing, also, which must be at least as obvious and certain, or even more so, than the thing to be proved ; the most general truths, therefore, must be immediately certain (Anal. Fast, I. 2; of. my System of Logic, % 135). The absolutely first truths in science must consist of indemonstrable definitions {to. vpara ipaifwi eaovTai avanoffnuToi, Anal. Post, II. 3). These principles (as they are called, or apxai) are the objects of reason (voijf) ; whatever ia universally and necessarily derived from them is the object of science {emaT^fiTi), while opinion (iMfn), whose characteristic is instability (ape^aiov), is concerned with whatever is subject to variation (Anal. Post., I. 33 ; II. 19). § 48. In the " First Philosophy," or, as it was subsequently termed, the Metaphysics of Aristotle, the principles common to all spheres of reality are considered. The number of these principles, as given by Aristotle, is four, viz. : Form or Essence, Matter or Sub- stratum, Moving or Efficient Cause, and End. The princijjle of Form or Essence is the Aristotelian substitute for the Platonic Idea. Aristotle argues against the Platonic (or, at least, what he held as the Platonic) view, that the Ideas exist for themselves apart from the concrete objects which are copied irom them, affirming, however, on his own part, that the logical, subjective concept has a real, objective correlate, in the essence immanent in the objects of the concept. As the one apart from and heside the many the Idea does not exist ; none the less must a unity be assumed as (objectively) present in the many. The word substance (ovaia) in its primary and proper signification belongs to the concrete and individual ; only in a secondary sense can it be applied to the Genns. But altliough the universal has no inde- pendent existence apart from the individual, it is yet first in wortli and rank, most significant, most knowable by nature and the i)roper subject of knowledge. This, however, is true, not of every common notion, but only of such notions as represent the Essential in the individual objects. These universal notions combine in one whole all the essential attributes of their objects, both the generic and the specific attributes ; they represent the essential Form, to denote which Aristotle employs the expressions elSog, [J-oQ^rj, tj Kara rov Xoyov ovaia and TO Ti ■qv elvat [form, intelligible or notional essence. — Tr.]. The matter in which form inheres is not absolutely non-existent ; it exists as possibility or capacity {dvvafiig, potentia). Form, on the contrary, is the accomplishment, the realization {LvTeXix^ia, Iv^pyeia, actus) of this possibility. Relatively, however, matter may be styled non-existent, in so far as it denotes the as yet uneflTectuated existence of the finished shape or thing (in which form and matter are united). The opposita of entelechy or actuality is deprivation, want, non-possession (tyrepT/crtfj, L58 aeistotle's metaphysicb. No matter exists altogether deprived of form ; the idea of mere mat- ter is a pure abstraction. But there does exist an immaterial form- principle, and tliis principle is the form which has " separable " or independent existence (xupiarov), in distinction from the inseparable forms which inhere in matter. Form, in the organic creation, is at once form, end, and moving cause. Matter is the passive, deter- minable factor, and is the ultimate source of imperfection in things. But it is also the principle of individuation in things, form being not (as Plato asserts) the ground of unity, but only of homo- geneous plurality. Motion or change (Kivrjaig) is the passage of potentiality into reality. All motion implies an actual moving cauee. Now, in the sphere of existence we find included that which is per- petually moved and that which both moves and is moved; there exists, therefore, a tertium qiiid, which is always imparting motion but is itself unmoved. This tertium is God, the immaterial and eternal Form, the pure Actuality in which is no potentiality, the selt- thinking Reason or absolute Spirit, who, as absolutely perfect, is loved by all, and into the image of whose perfection all things seek to come. SclioUa graeca in Ariat. ifetaphyeica e(f., Ch. A. Erandis, Berlin, 1887. AlexandH AphrodiHemit commentarius in lihroa Metaphys. Arist^ rec. Herm. Boiiitz, BerliD, 1847. On the metaphysical principles uf Aristotle, as compared with those of Plato, the following nuthora may be consulted ; Chr. Henn. Weisse, De Plaionis et Aristatelis in conetituendis siimmie philoa. prin- eipHs differentia^ Leipsic, 1828; M. Carri^re, Be AHstotele Flatonis arnica ejusque docirinae justo ceiuore^ GOtt. 1837; Th. Waltz, Plato und Aristoteles, in the Transactions of the 6th Xfeunion of German philologists at Cassel, 1843; F. Michelis, De Aristotele Platonis in idea/rwm. doctrina adtiersatio, Braunsberg, 1864; cf. Ed. Zeller. Plat. Studien (Tub. 1837, pp. 197-800: On Aristotle's account of Plato's Philosophy), Ueberweg, Plafon. Untersv^ihungen (Vienna, 1861, pp. 177-180), and W. Kuscnkranz, Di6 Pint. Jdeenlelvre, nnd ihre Bekwmxifwng durch Aristoteles, Mayence, 1869 (reprinted from Kosenkranz's Wiseenschaft des Winaens^ Mayence, 1868-1869). F. Brentano treats of the various significations of exist- ence according to Ai-istotle ( Von der mannigfaclien Bedeutung de9 Sdend&n nodi A^netotelea^ Freiburg in Breisgau, 1862). G. v. Hertlln;; treats of tho Aristotelian conception of the One (in a Diss. Brl.), Freiburg, 1864. Osc. Weissenfels, De camt- et substantia Arist. (^diea. inaiig.\ Berlin, 18C6. K. G. Michaelis, Z«r Erkld/rung von Arist. Metaph. Z., 9 (G.-Pr.\ Nen-Strelitz, 1866. G. Heyne, Pe Arist. casiu et cmi- tingente (diss. inaii^.\ Halle, 1866. On the form -principle^ see F. A. Trendelenburg (to ivi elvm, to dyado) elvat, TO Tt Tiv elvax hei Aristoteles, In the Phcin. Mus.f. Ph.., II. 1828, p. 457 seq, ; cf. T.'s edition of the Dc Anima, pp. 192 seq., 471 seq. ; Gesch. der Kategoriatlehre, p. 84 seq.) ; see also the works by Bicse, Ileyder, Kfihn, Rassow, Waitz, and Schwegler, already cited (the passages bearing on this subject are indi- cated by Schwegler in his edition of Aristotle's Met. Vol. IV. p. 369 seq.), and C. Th. Anton, De discrminfi i7iter Aristotelicuin n eurt et ri f/v eli-at ( Progr.\ Gorlitz, 1847. A. dc Boaldes, Les Pensevrs dujoiir (^ Aristotele, traiti des Urea substantiels, Meaux. 1S68. On the Aristotelian expression S irore or (wliich points to the substratum, or imoKeifievov, e. g. : b wore ov ^tp6fj.ev6v cori, "whatever it may be [i. «., s^y object, such as a stone, a piece of wood, a point] thot is involved in progressive motion "). see Ad. Torstrik, in the Phein. Mus., new series, XII. 18.'57, pp. 161-178. G. Engel writes of the uAt; cf Arist. In the BheifK Mus.f. Ph., new series, VII. 1860, pp. 891-418. On the Entelechy of Aristotle, see J. P. F. Ancillon, Be- eherches critiques et philotophiques snr Ventilechie d^Aristote, in the Transactions of the Berlin Acoil. of Sciences, Philos. Class, 1804-11. On the Aristotelian doctrine of necessity, works have been pnblitbed by Ferd. Kuttner (Dim., Berlin, 18S8), and Kug. Pappenheim (Diss. Ifalensia, Berlin, 1856). Of his doc- irrne otjlnality treat M. Carriire (Teleohgiae Arist. Hneamenta, Berlin, 1888), and Gustav Schneider Aristotle's metaphysics. 169 (Quae sit causae Jinalis apud Arist. vis atgue natwa^ diss, inaug.^ Berlin, 1864, and more fully in hig Dt Causa fiaali Aristotelea, Berlin, 1865>; cf. Trendelenburg, Log. nrUermdu, ii ed., Leipsic, 1862, II. p. 65 scq. The Theology of Aristotle is discussed by Vater (Vindiciae theoloffiae 'Ari»t.. Halle, 1795), Simon (De deo Arist., Paris, 1S89), Krische iFarsclmiigen, I. pp. 253-311), C. ZoU (D« Arist. patriarum reiiglonum aestiniatore, lleidelb. 184T; Arint. in seinem Verhdltniaa ziir griedi. Staatsreligio-n, in Feriensdiri/ten, new serits. Vol. I., Heidelb. 1S67, pp. 291-892; Z>o» Verlialtniss der Arist. PMlon. sur Jieligion, Mayence, 1303), E. Ecinhold (Arist. theologia contra falsam Ilegelianam interpretation em defenditur, Jena, 1S4S), O. II. Weichelt ( TheologumeTia Aristotelea, Berlin, 1352), F. v. Reinuhl {Darstellung des Arist. QoUeshegrifa und Vergleichung desselben mit dem Platonisclun, Jena, 1354), A. L. Kym (/>i6 Gotteslehre des Arisioteles und das Chrintentlium-. Zurich, 1862), J. P. Bomang (THs Oottesl. des Ar. u. d. Qir., in the Protest. £ir(^tsnseitung, 1862, No. 42), F. G. Starke (Aristotelis de unitate Dei sententia [G.-Pr}, Neu-Euppin, 1864), L. F. Goetz (Der Arist. Goitesbegri_f, contained in Festgabe, den alten Crucianem aur EinweiJmng des neuen Schulgeb. gefwidmei, etc., Dresden, 1S66, pp. 87-67). Other works, both new and old, are cited by Schweglor in his edition cf tho Metaphysics, Vol. IV. p. 257. The P«e7«Zo-Aristotelian work, Theologia, of Neo-Platonic origin, translated in the ninth centnry into Arabic, known to the Scholastics jn a L.atin re-translation, first printed at Borne in J5I0, and included in Da Val's and other editions of Aristotle (1629, II. pp. 1035 seq., and 1639, pp. 603 seq.) is the subject of an essay by Haneberg in the Eeports of the Munich Acad, of Sci., 1SC2, I. pp. 1-12; Ilaneberg treats {ihid. 1862, 1, pp. 861-383) of the book De Causis, included in the early Latin editions of Aristotle ( Yer.et. 1490 and 1550-1552) as a work of Aristotle, but which In reality was extracted from Neo-PlaLonic works, and in particular from the InsUt. Tlieol. of Proclus or one of his disciples. Cf. below, § 97. Reviewing the various orders of human knowledge {Metaph., I., cc. 1 and 2), Aristotle remarks that the experienced man {l/^fnetpo;) is justly considered wiser than he wtiose knowledge is restricted to single perceptions and recollections; the man of tlieorotic knowledge (i TExT'T^i), than the merely experienced; the director of an undertaking involving the application of art or skill, than he who is engaged in it merely as a manual laborer; and, finally, he whose life is devoted to science (which relates to being — ov — as art, Ttx"Vt does to becoming, ycvEOjf, Anal. Pos., II. 19), than he who seeks knowl- edge only in view of its application to practical uses : but in the sphere of scientific knowledge, he adds, that is the highest which respects the highest or ultimate reasons and causes of things : this highest in knowledge is " first philosophy," or wisdom, in the strict and absolute sense of the word (aoiia, see above, § 1, pp. 3 and 4). The four formal principles of Aristotle, form, matter, cfBcient cause, and end, are enu- merated in Met., I. 3 (cf. T. 2 ; YIII. 4 ; Pliys., II. 3), in the following terms : to al-ta ^yeroi TETpax<^Q, oyv fiiav fiEV airlav ipafihv elvai rf/v ovffiav Kal to t'l tjv elvat, . . . erspav 6e Tr/v vkrp) Kal Th vTroKei/ievov, rpirrpi de b-&£v 7 apx^ Ttj^ Kcv^ceti)^, rerdpr^ de tt/v avn- KEtfievTjv atTtav ravrri, to ov Evena Kal Taya-&6v, TsWog yap ycvEaEU^ Kal Ktv^ffsui^ TrdarjQ tovt' EOTiv. The oldest Greek philosophers, as Aristotle attempts in a comprehensive review of their doctrines (Metaph., I. 3 seq.) to demonstrate, inquired only after the mate- rial principle. Empedocle.5 and Anaxagoras, he adds, inquired, further, after the cause of motion. The principle of essence or form was not clearly stated by any among the earlier philosophers, though the authors of the theory of ideas came nearest to it. The prin- ciple of finality was enounced by earlier philosophers only in a partial or comparative sense, and not as a complete and independent principle. Aristotle opposes numerous objections (Metaph., I. 9, XIII. and 2IT.) to the Platonic theory of ideas, some of which relate to the demonstrative force of the arguments for that theory, while others are urged against the tcnableness of the theory itself. The argument founded on the real existence of scientific knowledge, says Aristotle, is not stringent ; tlie reality of the universal does indeed follow from the fact in question, but not its detached existence ; did this follow, however, then from the same premises mucli else would fol- low, which the Platonists neither do nor can admit, such as the existence of ideas of 160 aeistotle's metaphysics. works of art, of the non-substantial, of the attributive and the relative ; for these things, too, possess ideal unity {to vdnfia ev). But if the existence of ideas is assumed, the assumption is useless and leads to the impossible. The theory of ideas is useless; for the ideas are only an aimless duplication of sensible things (a sort of a'tad^a aiiia, eternal sensibles), to which they are of no service, since they are not the causes of any motion in them, nor of any change whatever ; neither do they help things to exist, nor us to know things, since they are not immanent in the common objects of our knowledge. But the hypothesis of the existence of ideas leads also to the impossible. It is affirmed of these ideas that they express the essence of their respective objects; but it is impossible that an essence and that of which it is the essence should exist apart (Jdfe^ev av a6vvaTov, elvac x^P^^ "^^ ovaiav not ov rj ovaia) ■ furthermore, the imitation of the ideas in individual objects, which Plato teaches, is inconceivable, and tlie expression contains only a poetic metaphor ; to which must be added, finally, that since the idea is represented as substantial, both it and the individuals which participate in it must be modeled after a common prototype, c. g., individual men and the idea of man (the avrodvBpavoi) after a third man (rpiroc: avBpuTroc, Met, I. 9 ; Til. 13 ; cf. De Soph. EL, c. 22). The result of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic theory of ideas is, however, not merely negative. Aristotle is not, for example (as used often to be assumed), the author of the doctrine called Nominalism in the Middle Ages, the doctrine which explains the concept as a mere subjective product, and the universal as merely a subjective community in representation and grammatical designation. Aristotle admits that the subjective con- cept is related to an objective reality, and in this sense ho is a Realist; but in place of the transcendent existence, which Plato ascribed to the ideas in contradistinction to individual objects, he teaches the immanence of the essence or the noumencn in the phenomenon. Accordingly he says (Met, XIII. 9, 108Cb, 2-7): Socrates, through his efforts to determine the concepts of things (to define them), led to the creation of the theory of ideas; but he did not separate the universal from the individuals included under it, and in this he was riglit ; for without the universal, knowledge is impossible ; it is only its isolation apart from the world of real things, that is the cause of the incongruities which attach to the theory of ideas. (Cf. A^iak Post, 1. 11: eld^ jiiv oiv elvai f/ ev ti nap a to. voAKa. ovk avayari, cl cnz66eL^iQ earat • elvac iihvroL ev Kara ttoX/mv a^Tf-^eg eltteIv avayiaj, De Anima, III. 4 : ev Tolq ^_;^fOTJffiV vXrpj dwdfiet eKoardv wtl tuv votjtuv. Ibid., III. 8 : iv Tol^ eideai Tol^ aia- ■UriTol^ TO, voT/ra iariv.) More negative is the critique which Aristotle directs against the reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, and against the derivation of them from certain elements (aroixEia, Met, XIT. 1) ; in the efforts to eflect this he finds very much that is arbitrary and preposterous : qualitative differences are construed as resulting from quanti- tative differences, and that which can only be a function or state (irdSog) of another thing, is made the principle or an element of the latter ; thus the quantitative is confounded with the qualitative, and the accidental with the substantial, in a manner which leads to numerous contradictions. The opinion of Aristotle, that the individual alone has substantial existence (as ovaia), the universal being immanent (ewirdpxov) in it, seems, when taken in conjunction with the doctrine that (conceptual or scientific) knowledge is of the ovaia and, more particularly, that definition is a form of cognition of tho ovaia [ovaia^ yvapia/i6(:), to involve the consequence that the individual is the proper object cf knowledge, while in fact Aristotle teaches that not the individual as such, but rather the universal and ultimate, is in logical strictness the object of science. This apparent contradiction is removed, if we bear in mind the distinc- tion between the different meanings of ovaia, viz. : "the individual substance,'' and "the essential." Substance, oiiala, in tho sense of the essential, is termed by Aristotle {Metaph., AEISTOTLe's METAPnTSICS. 161 1. 3 et al.), ?i Kara rhv Uyov ovata, i. e., tlie essence which corresponds with and is cog- nized through the concept ; but ovrtia in the sense of the individual substance is defined {Metaph., V. 8 ; XIV. 5 ei al.) as that which can not be predicated of any thing else, but of which any tiling else may be predicated (namely, as its accident), or as that which exists independently and separately (x(^pi^T&v). In Categ., 5, individual things are called "first substances " {irpCrrat oiiaiat), and species, " second substances " (Se-'urepai ovaim). In Met, YIII. 2, Aristotle distinguishes in the sphere of ovaia aloB^r/ (sensible being) : 1) matter (v^v), 2) form (jiop(pij), 3) the product of both (ij in tovtim\ the individual thing itself as a whole). The individual substance (the rdde ri) is the whole (cnivo?m) resulting from the union of the material substratum (iiroKcipcvov, iiXri) with the ideal essence or form ; it is the subject of mere states (Trdft-/) and relations (7rp elvat, is the Concept, Uyo( (Eth. N., II. 6 : Tin loyot i ijv elvat Uym>Ta), whose content is given in the Definition (o opw/ios, Top., VII. 5 ; leiaph., V. 8). Of the four principles : matter (fi iXrf), form (rb cISoq), moving cause (rd o6ev ^ Kivrjau,), nd end or final cause {rb oh evsko), the three latter, according to Phys., II. 1, are often one nd the same in fact ; for essence (form) and end are in themselves identical, since tlie roximate end of every object consists in the full development of its proper form (i. e., the mmanent end of every object, by the recognition of which the Aristotelian doctrine of nality is radically distinguished from the superficial utilitarian Teleology of later philoso- hers), and the cause of motion is at least identical in kind with the essence and the end ; Dr, says Aristotle, man is begotten by man, and in general one fully developed organism egets another of the same species, so that though the causa effldens is not the form itself fhich is yet to be produced, yet it is a form of similar nature. In the organic creation, lie soul is the unity of those three principles (De An., II. p. 415 b, 9 : oiwiu; 6' ij fv^^ ara rovf diupiafiivov^ rpoirovg rpel^ aiTia' Kol yap b'&EV y KLVTjatq avTTj Kal ov cvc/ca Kal If ovcia Tav kfiijjvxt'^ aufidrcyv i] ^XV clrta). In the case of products, whose causes are xternal to the products themselves (Mechanism), as, for example, in the construction of a ouse, the three causes which stand opposed to matter are distinguished from each other ot only in conception, but in reality. Examined in their relation to the phenomena ot eneration and growth, matter and form are opposed to each other as potentiality {6vvaiu(), nd actuality (or, as Aristotle terms it, " entelechy," hiTtTiEx^^c)- Of entelechy in general, .ristotle distinguishes two species: "first entelechy," by which the state of being com- lete or finished is to be understood, and " energy," which denotes the real activity of liat which is thus complete ; yet in practice he does not bind himself strictly to the bservance of this distinction (cf. Trendelenburg, ad De Anima, p. 296 seq., and Schwegler, let, Vol. IV., p. 221 seq.). Motion or development is the actualization of the possible, qvA ossible (fi roll Smarov, y dwardv evte?^x^'<^ ■ ■ • '^'"V^i iariv, Phys., III. 1). Especially rorthy of notice is the relativity, which Aristotle attributes to these notions, when he em- loys them in concrete cases : the same thing, he says, can be in one respect matter and otentiality, in another, form and actuality, e. g., the hewn stone can be the former in rela- ion to the house, the latter in comparison with the unhewn stone, tlie sensuous side of lie soul (or ■fvx^) can be the former in comparison with the intelligent mind (voic), ilie itter when compared with the body. Thus the apparent dualism of matter and form 2nds at least to disappear in the reduction of the world to a gradaiion of existences. The very highest place in the scale of being is occupied by the immaterial spirit, called rod. The proof of the necessity of assuming such a principle is derived by Aristotle rom the development in nature of objects whoso form and structure indicate design, and is Dunded on Aristotle's general principle, that all transition (Kivr/at;) from the potential to lie actual depends on an actual cause. {Met, IX. 8 : Potentiality is always preceded in time y some form of actuality, ael yap e/c tov dwdpec bvrog ylyverai to kvEpyeia ov vtrb kvEpyeia vTog. De Gen. Animal., II. 1 : baa ^au yiyverai ^ Tix^Vt ^''^ ivepye'uf ovtoq yiyvcTai tK tov mapec bvTog.) Every particular object which is the result of development, implies an actual loving cause ; so the world as a whole demands an absolutely first mover to give form to/ be naturally passive matter wliich constitutes it. This principle, the first mover {■!T-pii-ov^ ivovv) must (according to Met, XII. 6 seq.) be one, whose essence is pure energy, since, if it rere in any respect merely potential, it could not unceasingly communicate motion to all liings ; it must be eternal, pure, immaterial form, since otherwise it would be burdened abistotle's natural philosopht. 163 witli potentiality (ri ri ^v clvat ma Ixci v^fv T& vpuTov • ivrcMx^ui yap). Being free from malter, it is without plurality and without parts. It is absolute spirit (voif), which thinks Itself, and whose thought is therefore the thought of thought Mtjaig vorjatu^). Its agency as the cause of motion is not active and formative, but passive, for it remains itself unmoved ; it acta by virtue of the attraction which the loved exerts upon the loving, for it is the Good per se and the end toward which all things tend (liivel ov Kivov/ievov • . . . luvel u( epiificvov). Xot at any given time did God shape the orderly world ; he conditions and determines the order of the world eternally, in that he exists as the most perfect being, and all things else seek to become like him ; the world as an articulate whole has always existed and will never perish. As being an " actual " principle, God is not a final product of development ; he is the eternal prius of all development. Thought, which is the mode of his activity, con- stitutes the highest, best, and most blessed life (Metaph., XII. 1 : 17 Stapla to ijSiaTcm KaX aptffTov ' . . . Kol l^uTj Si ye kwTrapxet ' rj yap vov evkpyEta ^o>^ • . . . uars C^ Kfli aiiov awEX^C Ka't aiiioi imapxEt tu i5f^). The world has its principle in God, and this principle exists not merely as a form immanent in the world, like the order in an army, but also as an absolute self-existent substance, like the general in an army. Aristotle concludes his theology (Met, XII. lO^^n.) and marks his opposition to the (Speusippic) doctrine of a plurality of inde- pendent and co-existent principles, by citing the following line from Homer {Ilias, II. 204): OvK ayaSov TroTiVKoipaviTj ' clc Koipavog ectu. In essential agreement with this scientific justification of the belief in God's existence, though differing from it in form, was the substance of the popular reflections contained in the third book of the dialogue " Concerning Philosophy." Cicero (De Nat. Deorum, II. 37, 95) has preserved from it a paragraph of some length, translated into Latin, and it may here be cited entire, as furnishing also a specimen of the style of Aristotle in his popular (exoteric) writings (to which is to be referred Cicero's praise in Acad. Pr., II, 119: flumen oraiumis aureum fundms Aristoteles ; cf. Cic, De Oral., I. 49, Top., 1, De Invent, II. 2, Brut, 31, Ad Att., II. 1, 1, De Fin., I. 5, 14; Dionys. Halia, De Verhorum Copia, 241, p. 187 of Reiske's edition, and De Genswra Vet. Script, 4, p. 430): "Imagine men who have always dwelt beneath the earth in good and well-illuminated habitations, habitations adorned with statues and paintings and well furnished with every thing which is usually at the com- mand of those who are deemed fortunate. Suppose these men never to have come up to the surface of the earth, but to have gathered from an obscure legend that a Deity and divine powers exist. If the earth were once to be opened for these men, so that they could ascend out of their concealed abodes to the regions inhabited by us, and if they were to step forth and suddenly see before them the earth and the sea and skies, and perceive the masses or the clouds and the violence of the winds ; and if then they were to look up at the sun and become cognizant of its magnitude and also of its workings, that he is the author of day, in that he sheds his light over the entire heavens ; and if after- ward, when night had overshadowed the earth, they were to see the whole sky beset and adorned with stars, and should contemplate the changing light of the moon in its increase and decrease, the rising and setting of all these heavenly bodies, and their course to all eternity inviolable and unalterable : truly, they would then believe that Gods really exist, and that these mighty works originate with them." § 49. Nature is the complex of objects having a material constitu- tion and involved in necessary motion or change. Change (^erafioXrj) or motion (Kivqaig), in the broader sense, includes, on the one hand, 164 ABistotle's natueal philosophy. origin and decay (or motion from the relatively non-existent to the existent, and conversely) ; and, on the other, motion in the narrower sense, which again is divisible into three species : quantitative mo- tion, qualitative motion, and motion in space; or increase and de- crease, qualitative transformation, and change of place ; the latter accompanies all other species of motion. The universal conditions of all change of place and of all motion, of whatever kind, are place and time. Place (rdnog) is defined as the inner limit of the inclosing body. Time is the measure (or number) of motion with reference to the earlier and later. No place is empty. Space is limited; tlio world possesses only a finite extension ; outside of it is no place. Time is unlimited ; the- world was always, and always will be. The primum motum is heaven. The sphere, to which the fixed stais are attached, has, since it is in immediate contact with the Deity, the best of all possible motions, namely, the motion of uniform circular rotation. Aristotle seeks to explain the movements of the planets by the theory of numerous spheres moved, in various senses, by unmoved, immaterial beings, who are, as it were, a sort of inferior gods. The earth, which is spherical, reposes unmoved at the center of the world. The five material elements — ether, fire, air, water, and earth — occupy in the universe determinate places, suited to their natures. The ether fills the celestial spaces, and of it the spheres and the stars are formed. The other elements belong to the terrestrial world; they are distin- guished from each other by their relative heaviness or lightness, and also by their relative warmth or coldness and dryness or moisture ; they are commingled in all terrestrial bodies. Nature, guided by the principle of finality and proceeding by the way of an ever-increasing subjection of matter to form, produces on the earth a scale of living beings. Each superior degree in this scale unites in itself the charac- ters of the inferior degrees, adding to them its own peculiar and more excellent virtue. The vital force, or the soul, in the widest sense of this word, is the entelechy of the body. The vital force of the plant is nothing more than a constructiiig force ; the animal possesses this, and the faculties of sensation, desire, and locomotion besides ; man combines with all these the faculty of reason. Reason is partly, passive, subject to determining influences and of temporary duration, partly active, determining, and immortal. Aleicandri ApJtrodUi&nsis Quaestionum ^aturaUvm etiloralitmi ad Aristotelia pMloeophiatn ilht* trandam IWri quatiior^ ex recent. Leonh. Spengrel, Munich, 1842. ^ The oonteut of the writings of Aristotle on nulural Gclence is treated of by George Uebry Lewea in h\a ARreXOTLE's NATUBAL PHILOSOPHY 165 Arintotle^ a Cliapter from ffie Uistori/ of Science, London, 1864, German translation by J; V.Carnfi, Leipa 1865;. cf. J. B. Meyer's account of the book in the Gott. gel. Anz.^ 1865, pp. 1446-1474. On the chaiiicter of the Aristotelian PhysicB in general, cf. C. M. Zerort (Paris, 1846), 6arth61eniy SL Ililaire (in the Introd. to his edit of the PJiya.^ Parts, 1862), Ch. L^v^ue {La Phyaique d^ArUtote et la Science CofU&nporaine, Paris, 1S63). On Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world, see the article by II. Slebeck, Z^ischH/t Jur exacte P7iilo8op7de, IX. 1S69, pp. 1-33 and 181-154. On the Arist doctrine of space and time : G. E. Wolter (Bonn, 184S), and Otto Ule, on ArlBtotle''8 and Kant''s doctrines of space (Halle, 1850) ; on the doctrine of time alone {Phya.^ A. 10 seq.) : Ad. Torstrik, Philologits, vol 26, 1S68, pp. 446-523 ; on the doctrine of coniintdty : G. Schilling (Gfesson, 1840). On the maffiematical knowledge of Arist : A Burja (in Mem. de VAcad. de Berlin^ 1790-'91) ; on Lis mechanical problems: F. Th. Foselger (in AM. der BerL Akad.^ 1829), Buelle {Etude aur nn passagt d''Ari8tote relaMf d la mechanique^ in the Beime ArcJieol.. 1857, XIV., pp. 7-21) ; on his meteorology : J. I* Ideler (Berlin, 1832), and Suhle {G.-Pr., Bernb. 1864); on his theory of liglit: E. P. Eberhard (Coburp, 1686), and Frantl (Arist iiber die Parben erla/utirt durch einc UebersicJU iiber die Parbenlehre der Alten^ Manich. 1849); on his geography: B. L. Konigsmann (Schleswig, 1803-1606). On the botany of Aristotle : Hensehel (Breslau, 1S24), F. "Wimmer {Phytologiae Ariel. Fragm., Breslan, 183S). Jessen ( Ueber des Arist. P^amcmcerke, in the Ph. Mus.^ new series, XIV., 1859, pp. 88-101). On the Zoology of A., cf, besides the annotations of J. G. Schneider in his edition of the Iliaioria Animalium. (Leips. 1811). the works of A. Y. A.'Wie^mann {Obaerv. eoologicae criiicae in Arist. histoHam animalium^ Berlin, 1826), Karl Zell {Weber den. Sirvn des GescJimacks, in : Ferienschriften^ 8. -Slimmittw^, Freiburg, 1S83), Job. MuUer {Ueber den glatten ITaidea Arist.^Akad,, 'Berlin^ 1^9), S^vgen Bona Meyer (JDe pHw.- cipiia Ariat. in distribut, animalittm adAifti^, Berlin, 1854; Arist. Thierkund&, Berlin, 1855), Sonnen- biirg {Zu Ariatot Thiergeadiichte^ O.-Pr., Bonn, 1857), C. J. Sundeval {Die Thierarten des Ariatot, Stockholm, 1863), Langkavel {Zu De Part. An.^ G.-Pr.^ Bwlin, 1868), Aubert {Die Cephalopoden dea Ariat, in eoologiacJier, anatomiecher und geschichtlicfier Beaiehung, in the ZeitscJir. f. icisa. Zoologie^ XII., Leips. 1862, p. 372 seq. ; cf. the edition with translation and notes of Aristotle's work on the Genera- tion and Development of Animals, by II. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer, Leipsic, 1S60), Henri Fhilibert (le Prineipe de la Vie ativcant j4W«to^ Chanmont, 1865; Ariat. philosophia eoologica^ thesia Pariaieneia^ Ghanmont and Paris, 1865), Charles Thurot {ObaervaPuma critiques sur le traite d'Ariat De Partiby* Ardmalimn^ in the Remie Cr-lt, new series, 1867, pp. 228-242). The two following authors treat specially of AriBtotle''s doctrines of human a/itatomy and physiology : Andr. We&tphal {De anatomia Ariatotelti, 'imprimis num cada/cera secuerit humana^ Greifswald, 1745), and L. M. Philippson (yivri avSpfairivn, .pars I. : de intemarum. humani corporis partium cognitione Ariatotelis cum Platonis sent^tiia com- parata ; para 11. : philoaophorum veterum uaque ad, Theophraatum doctrtna de aenau^ Berlin, 1831), Of AnBU>t\e'*& physiognomies treat E. Taube {G.-Pr.^ Gleiwitz, 1866), and J, Henrychowski {Diss. Inaug.^ Breslau, 1868). The following authors treat of the PsycJiology of Aristotle : Job. Heinr. Deinhardt {Der Begriff der Seele mit Rucksicht auf Ariatoteles^ Hamburg, 1840), Gnst. Hartenstein {De paychol. vulg. orig, ■ ab Aristotele repetenda, Leipsic, 1840), Car. Phil. Fischer (De principiis Ariatotelicae de anima doctf^t- nae diss., Erlangen, 1845), B. St Hilaire (in his edition of the De Anima, Paris, 1846), Wilh. Schrader {Ariat de 'oolimtate doctrina, Progr. des Brandenb. Gymn., Brandenburg, 1647, and Die UnsUr- blieJikeiUlehre dea Aristoteles, in AT. Jahrb. f. Philol. u. Pad., Vol. 81, 18C0, pp. 89-104), W. Wolff ( Von d-em Begriff dea Arl^. iiber die Seele vnd deaaen Anicendung aufdAe hetttige Peycfwlogie, Progr., Bayreuth, 1845), Gsell-Fels (Paychol. Plat, et AT'iat, Progr.. 'Wurzhurg, 1854), Hugo Anton (Dodrina de nat. horn, ab Arist. in scripUs etJiids j^ropositu, Berlin, 1852, and De hominia habitu naiurali quam Arist, m Mil. Nic. proposuerit doctrinam, Erfurt, 1S60), W, F. Volkmann (Die GrundeUge der Ariatoteliachen PaycJiologie, Prague, 1858), Hemi. Beck (Ariat. de aenauum actions., Berlin, 186?), Pansch (De Ariatotelis animae deJ^Uitme diaa., Greifswald, 1861X Wilh, Biehl (Die Ariat. Definit. der Seele, in Verli. der Augabv^ger Phiiologen- Vera, for the year 1862, Leipsic, 1863, pp, 94-102), J. Freudentbnl ( V^er den Begriff des Wortes fj>avraa-ia bei Arist., Gfittingen, 1868), A. Gratacap (Ariat. d^ aenaibua doctrina, diss, ph., Montpellier, 1866). Leonh. Schneider (Die Unterblidikeiialehre des Ariatoteles, Passau, 1867), Eugen Eberhard (Die Ariat. De^niUon der Seele und ihr Werth fUr die Gegenwart, Berlin, 1868), [George Grote, in the Supplement to the third edition of Bain's Senses and ths Intellect, London, 1869.— TV.] Aristotle's doctrine of the vovs is discussed In works by F. G. Starke (Neu-Euppin, 1888), F. H. Chr. Bibbentrop (Breslau, 1840). Jul. Wolf (Ariat. de intelleciu agente et patiente dodrina, Berlin, 1844), and others, and, recently, by WUh. Biel (Gymn.-Pr., Linz, 1664), and Franz Brentano (Die Paychologie des Ariatotelea, insbesondere seine Lehre vom vous nonrriKoi, nebst einer Beilage Uber das Wirken des AriM. GoUea. Mayence, 1867). Cf., also, Prantl, Geeeh. d. Log., I. p. 108 eeq., and F. F. Kampe, J)i# J^kewntniaslehre des A., Leipsic, 1870, pp. 3-60. '166 aeistotle's natueal philosophy. Aristotle designates {Phys., II. 1) as the universal character of all which is by naiwe, that it has in itself the principle of motion and rest, -while in the products of human art there is no tendency to change. All natural existences {Ve Coelo, I. 1) are either them- selves bodies, or have bodies or are principles of things having bodies (e. g., body; man; 'Isoul). The word motion (liiviiatg) is sometimes used by Aristotle (e. g., Phys., III. 1) as laynonymous with change (jisTafioXn); but, on the other hand, he says (Phys., V. 1), that though all motion is cliange, yet the converse is not true, all change is not motion, such changes, namely, as affect the existence of objects, i. e., generation and decease {yeveai^ and ^opd) are not motions. Motion proper exists in the three categories of quantity (Kara to woadv or Kara fiiyeBo^), quality (nara to ■koUxv or Kara TrdSof), and place (/ccTii to iroi or kcitK t6kov): in the first case it is increase and decrease (av^t/ac^ nai ipBiaii)- in the second, alteration (o^Xo/umf) ; in tlie third, change of place (^opd). Aristotle defines rdirof* (Phys., IV. 4, p. 212 a, 20), as the first and unmoved boundary of the inclosing body on the sids of the inclosed (to tov TrspdxovTog wipag axlvriTov wpCiTov). T&irog may be compared to an unmoved vessel, containing the object whose rdn-of it is. Aristotle understands, therefor^ |)y T<57rof, not so much the space through which a body is extended, as, rather, the limit bj which it is bounded, and this conceived as fixed and immovable ; his chief argument for the non-existence of an unfilled rdnoc and for the non-existence of a tSitoc outside of tlie Tvorld, is founded on the above definition, in accordance with which no void within or region without the world is possible. All motion must, according to Aristotle, take place in a plenum by means of an exchange of places (avTinepiaraaig). The motion of the world, as a whole, is not an advancing, but simply a rotary motion. The definition of time [re- cited above] is worded as follows (Phys., IV. 11, pp. 219 b, 1, 220 a, 24) : 6 xpo^o^ api6p6i ioTi Kiy^aeug kotu rd wpdrtpov koI varepov. For the measure of time the uniform circular motion is especially appropriate, since it is most easily numbered. Hence time is repre- ' sented (ch. 14) as connected with the motion of the celestial spheres, since by these all other motions are measured. But time is (ch. H, p. 219 b, 8) the number which is reck- oned, not that by means of which we reckon. Without a reckoning soul there would be no number, hence no time, but only motion, and in it an earlier and later. All motion in nature is directed to an end. " God and nature do nothing in vain " (6 Beb; leal fi ^vaig oidev ftdrj/v woiovciv, De Coelo, I. 4). Nevertheless, a certain room is left by Aristotle (Phys., II. 4-6) for the play of the accidental (aiiToparov) or the advent of results, ■ which were not intended, in consequence of some secondary effect following from tlie means used to bring about another end; under the avTd/iaTm falls, as a concept of nar- rower extension, chance ()J rlixv), the emergence of a result which, was not (consciously) intended, but which might have been intended (e. g., the finding of a treasure while plowing the ground). Nature does not always attain her ends, on account of the obstacles offered by matter. The degree of perfection in things varies according as they are more op less removed from the direct influence of God (cf. § 48). God acts directly on the firmament of the fixed stars, which he touches, without being touched by it. (The notion of contact (d^), which Aristotle (Phys., V. 3) defines as the juxtaposition of aicpa or (De Gen. et Coir., * [Tiiiros ts the Greek word for space. It signifies, properly, however, rather ] lace than space, and this is the signification which it has with Aristotle. Aristotle's conception of space is not that of indeflnite eictonsian. lie disallows the idea of unfilled space, and as nothing can occupy space but the world, and as the world Is, in Aristotle's view, a bounded sphere, it foUoiTS that space in general must be the "place" occupied by the worid, and that Its limits are the limits of the worid. Aristotle remarks, however, that not the world, but only its parts, are in space— which follows from his definition. The place of any thing. h« defines, is the inner surface of the body surrounding It that surfocc being conceived ns fixed and immoTO- ble. As nothing exists outside of the worid. except God, who is pure thought and not in space, the world naturally can not le in space, i. e., its "place" can not be dcflneil.— TV.] aeistotle's natural philosophy. 167' I. 6) eara^o, is here intermediate in signification between contiguity in space and ideal affection.) God moves tlie world from its circumference. The motion of the heaven of the fixed stars is better than tliat of the planetary spheres^ the obliquity of the ecliptic tnarks an imperfection of the lower regions ; less perfect still are the motions which are accomphshed on the earth. Each motion of a surrounding sphere is communicated to the spheres included in it, so, in particular; that of the sphere of the fixed Stars to all the rest ; when this effect ought not to be produced, as in fact it is not by the planetary spheres on those still inferior, retroaoting spheres, or spheres with a counter-motion, are requisite. The whole number of spheres assumed by Aristotle is 47, or accor(Ung to another con- struction, 55 (Met., XII. 8). The nature of the Ether (which extends from the heaven of the fixed stars down to the moon. Meteor., I. 3) adapts it especially for circular motion ; to the other elements, the upward motion (i. e., from the center of the world toward its circumference) or the downward (t. e., from the circumference to the center) is natural. Of these other elements, earth is the one to which the attribute of heaviness belongs, and its natural place in the world is, consequently, the lowest, viz. ; the center of the world ; fire is the light element, and its place is the sphere next adjoining the sphere of the ethor. Fire is warm and dry, air is warm and moist (fluid), water is cold and moist (fluid), and earth is cold and dry. Ether is the first element in rank (Meteor., J. 3 ; De Coelo, I. 3 ; cf. De Gen. An., II. 3); but if we enumerate, beginning with the elements directly known by the senses, it is the fifth, the subsequently so-called we/iirrov aroixeiov, quinia essentia. In all organic creations, even in the lowest animals, Aristotle (De Part. An., I. 5) finds something admirable, full of purpose, beautiful and divine. The plants are less perfect than the animals (Phys., II. 8); among the latter, those which have blood are more perfect than the bloodless, the tame than the wild, etc. (De Gen. An., l\.l; Pol.,l.S). The lowest organisms may arise by original generation (generatio spontanea sive aequivoca, i. e., by " generation " only homonymously so called [o/iuvi/iuf], and consisting in evolution from the heterogeneous). But in the case of all higher organisms, like is generated by like ; in those which have attained their full development, the germs of new organisms of the same name and species are developed (Metaph., 211. 3 : enaarTi ha awuvvfiuv yiyverai ij ovaia . . . avBpumoc yap avdpairov yewg). In the act of generation Aristotle teaches that tlio form-giving or animating principle proceeds from the male, and the form-receiving or material principle from the female. The two general classes in which Aristotle includes all animals, namely, animals having blood and bloodless animals, correspond with what Cuvier termed the "Vertebrates and the lavertebrates. The latter are classified by Aristotle as either Testacea, Crustacea, MoUusks. or Insects; and the former as Pishes, Amphibious Animals, Birds, and Mammalia: the ape is viewed by him as an intermediate form between man and other viviparous animals. Aristotle founds the division of his anatomical investigations on the distinction of avo/jom/iep^, i, e., organs, whose parts are not like the organs themselves (e. g., the hand ; the hand does not consist of hands), and o/ioco/iep^, i. e., substances, whose parts are like the substances themselves (e. g., flesh, blood ; the parts of a piece of flesh or of a mass of blood are like the wholes to which they belong). Aristotle had a far more exact knowl- edge of the internal organs of animals than of those of the human body. The (physio- logical) work on the Senses and the work on the Generation and Development of Animals are followed in the " History of Animals " by a, collection of observations on the habits of life, and, in particular, on the psychical functions of the different classes of auimals. J68 ^EISTOTLe's NATUKAL PHILOSOPHY- ; Aristotle defines the soul as the first entelechy of a physical, potentially living and brganic body (De Anima^ II. 1 : egtIv ovv "^xV cvreTJ^eia y npCiTTi aufiaro^ fvaiKov Cwr)v ixaVTOf iwa/ttr toiovtov (Je b av y epyavinov). "First entelechy" is related to "second," iSS knowledge (itrtaT^/iri) to speculation (Beapslv). Neither is mere potentiality ; botharo ■realized potentialities ; but while knowledge may be ours as a passive possession, specula- tion is, as it were, knowledge in activity, or knowledge put to its most characteristic use ; *o the soul is not (like the divine mind) always engaged in the active manifestation of its .own essence, but is always present, as the developed force capable of such manifestation. ■As the entelechy of the body the soul is at once its form {prineipmm formans), its prin- / ciple of motion and its end. Each organ exists {De Part. An., I. 5) in view of an end, and ithis end is an activity; the whole body exists for the soul. The vegetable soul, i. e., the vital principle Of the plant, is (according to Z>e An., II. I et al.) a nourishing soul, to ■OpcTTTUidv, the faculty of material assimilation and reproduction. The animal possesses in ■addition to this the sensitive, appetitive and locomotive faculties (ra m6^fjriK6v, rh 'apeKrinov, tro lUvrjTuwv Kara tottov). The corporeo-psychical functions of animals (at least of the ■more highly developed animals) have a common center (jieadr^g), which is wanting in ■plants ; the central organ is the heart, which is viewed by Aristotle as the seat of sensa- tion, the brain being an organ of subordinate importance. Sens\ious perception (aiaBriain is the result of qualities which exist potentially in the objects perceived and actually in the -perceiving being. The seeing of colors depends on a certain motion of the medium of .vision (air or water). With sensuous perception are connected imaginatiye representation (^vraaia), which is a psychical after-efiect of sensation (De An., III. 3), or a sort of weak- •oned sensation (.RAet, I. 11, 13T0 a, 28), and also (involuntary) memory {/iv^pr/), which is ."to be explained by the persistence (/iovf/) of the sensible impression {De Memor., ch. 1 ; Anal. ■ .Post., II. 19), and (voluntary) recollection (av&pivijciQ), which depends on the 'co-operation of the will and implies the power of combining mental representations {De Memor., ch. 2). .Out of these theoretical functions, combined with the feeling of the agreeable and the i disagreeable, springs desire (opcf jf ) ; whatever, says Aristotle, is capable of sensation, is ralso capable of pleasure and pain and of the feeling of the agreeable and disagreeable, and ■ whatever is capable of these, is capable also of desire (DeAn., II. 3, p. 414 b, 4). The human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a . Microcosm {De An., III. 8). The faculty by which it is distinguished from those orders is reason (voiif). The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence perishable {De An., II. 2) ; but the voiif exists before the body, into which it enters from without as Boraetliing divine and immortal (i)« Gen. Anvmal., 11 3: Xewcrai tov vovv povav ■ BvpaSev, ineieihai Kal Oclov elvai jiiwov). -But the concept or notion is impossible withOOt the representative image {^dvraapa). This stands to the concept in a relation similar to ■ that in which the mathematical figure stands to that which is demonstrated by means of it, and only by the aid of such an image, joined with the feeling of the agreeable or dis- agreeable, can the reason act upon the appetitive faculty, i. c, become practical reason {DeAn., III. 10). The votif, therefore, in man, has need of a 6bvafuc, or what may be called an unfilled region of thought, a tabula rasa, before it can manifest its form-giving activity {De An., III. 4 : [voiif iart] ypa/ifidrsuyv, u pT/^ev imapxu evepyeig yeypa/ipivov). Accord- . ingly, a distinction must be made between the passive reason (vovf i^aBrfnud^), as tlie form- . receiving, and the active reason (voiif Troo/rj/cdf ), as the form-giving principle ; substantial, eternal existence belongs only to the latter {De Anima, III. 5 : 6 voii? x'^P"'^"^ ""' aTO"''/? Kal dpcyiiz ry ovaig av ivepyetp, . , . o (!e iroiJj/rjKof vovq ip^aprog). How the active reason ; is related, on the one hand, to individual existence, on the other, to God, is not made per- fectly clear; a certain latitude is left for a naturalistic and pantheistic or. for a more jlribtotle's ethics and aesthetics. 169 'Spiritualistic and theistic interpretation, and eacli of these interpretations has found numerous representatives both in ancient and later times; yet it is scarcely possible to develop either of them in all its consequences, without runiftig counter to other portions of AristStle's teaching. § 50. The end of human activity, or the highest good for man, is happiness. Tliis depends on the rational or virtuous activity of the soul throughout the whole of" its life. With activity pleasure is joined, as its blossom and natural culmination. Virtue is a pro- ficiency in willing what is conformed to reason, developed from the state of a natural potentiality by practical action. The development of virtue requires the existence of a faculty of virtue, and requires also exercise and intelligence. All virtues are either ethical or dianoetic. Ethical virtue is that permanent direction of the will (or state of mind), M'hich guards the mean proper for us, as determined for us by the reason of the intelligent ; lience it is the subordination of appetite to reason. Bravery is the mean between cowardice and •temerity ; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid indifference ; generosity, the mean between prodigality and parsimony, etc. The highest among the ethical virtues is justice or righteous- ness. This, in the most extended sense of the word, is the union of all ethical virtues, so far as they regard our fellow-men ; in the Tiarrower sense, it respects the equitable (laov) in matters of gain or loss. Justice in this latter sense is either distributive or commuta- tive ; the former respects the partition of possessions and honors, the latter relates to contracts and the reparation of inflicted wrongs. Equity is a complementary rectification of legal justice by reference to the individuality of the accused. Dianoetic virtue is the correct functioning of the theoretical reason, either in itself or in reference to the inferior psychical functions. The dianoetic virtues are reason, science, art, and practical intelligence. The highest stage of reason ahd science is wisdom in the absolute sense of the term, the highest stage of art is wisdom in the relative sense. A life devoted only to sensual enjoyment is brutish, an ethico-political life is human, but a scientific life is divine. Han has need of man for the attainment of the practical ends of life. Only in the state is the ethical problem capable of solution. Man is by nature a political being. The state originated for the protection of life, but ought to exist for the promotion of morally upright living ; its principal business is the development of moral 170 aeistotle's ethics and esthetics. capacity in the young and in all its citizens. The state is prior ta the individual in that sense in which in general the whole is prior to the part and the end prior to the means. Its basis is the family. He who is capable only of obedience and not of intelligence must be a servant (slave). The concord of the citizens must be founded on unanimity of sentiment, not on an artificial annihilation of individual interests. The most practicable form of the state is, in general, a governihent in which monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic ele- ments are combined ; but in all individual cases this form must be accommodated to the given circumstances. Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Timocracy (or a Kepublic) are, under the appropriate circum- stances, good forms of government ; Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny are degenerate forms, of which the latter, as being the cor- ruption of the most excellent form, is the worst. The distinguishing mark of good and bad forms of government is found in the object pursued by the rulers, according as this object is either the public good or the private interest of the rulers. It is right that the Hellenes should rule over the barbarians, the cultured over the uncultured. Art is of two kinds, useful and imitative. The latter serves three ends : recreation and (refined) entertainment, temporary eman- cipation from the control of certain passions by means of their excita- tion and subsequent subsidence, and, last and chiefly, moral culture. Of the ethics of Aristotle In general wrlto Chr. Gnrve ( Ueiera. tmd Erlant, Berlin, 1798-1802), Schleier- macher (in various passages of bis Grundlinien einer KriHk. der bisherigen Sittenlehre^ Berlin, 1SC8 ; cf. Ueber die tcis8. Behandlwig des Tugendbegriffs^ in the Abh. der Acad.^ Berlin, 1820), K. L. Michelet (Dte Ethik dee Ariftt. in Virem Verhciltniee zicm tSj/fttem der Moral, Berlin, 1827; cf. his Syst. der philos. Moral, 1328, pp. 195-237), Hartcnstein ( Ijeber den wise. Wcrth der Arist, Kihik, in the Bericlde uber die Verhandhtngen der K, Siiche. Gesellech, der Wise, su Leipeig, pMlol.-Mst. cL, 1859, pp. 49-107, and in n.'s Ifist-philoa. Abh,, Leipgic, 1670), Trendelenburg (Ceber I/erbarfg prakiiecJte Philoe. und die EVtik der Alien, in the Abh. der Berl Akad., 1860; cf, the 10th essay in T.'b Hist. £eiir. eur Fhilo)., Vol. IL, Berlin, 1855, Ueber einige Stellen im 6 v.. 6, Buche der Nikomach. Ethik, and the 9th article in Vol. III. of the same, Berlin, 1SC7 ; Zttr Arist. Ethik., pp. 899-444), Dielltz (^Quaeetiones Aristateleae, Progr. of the jSophien-gymn, Berlin, 1SC7). Of the relation of Aristotlc^s ethics and politics to the corresponding doctrines of Plato, and of ArlB< totle's critique of the latter, treat Pinzger (Leipsio, 1822), H. W. Broccker (Leipsic, 1824), W. Orges (Berlin, 1843), St. Matthics (Grcifswald, 1S4S), A. J. Kahlert (Czernonitz, 1854), TV. Pieison (in (ho Jtheiii. Mve.f. Ph., new series, XIII., 1S5S, pp. 1-iS ond 209-247) ; also, I'r. Guil. Engelhardt, Loot- Platonid, gvonim Aris- totelee in conscribendie PoHticie Bidettir memor fame, Dantzic, 1858 ; Siegfr. Lommatzseh, Quomodo Plato ef Arist. religionia et reip. principia conjwnxerint, Berlin, 18GS; C. W. Schmidt, Ueber die Eifi- wUr/e dee Arist. in der Mk. EtliW gegen Plat. Lehre von der Lust (G.-Pr.), Bunzlan, 1864; Kalmns, Ar. de vobtpt. doatr. (G.-Pr.), Pyritz, 1S62; Eassow, IHe Pep. des Plato -und der bests Staat des Arist., Weimar, 1866. Cf. the dissertations by Gust. Goldmann (Berlin, 1868), and Adolf Ehrlich (Halle, 1S68). and the opuscule of Hcrm. Henkel on Plato's Zoies and ike, Politics of Aristotle (Gi/m.-Progr^), Scehauser, 1869. On Kant's Ethics o« compared with Aristotle's, see Trnug. BrBckner, De tribua ethiceit loeis, gviJm, differt Xantiui ab Aristotele, dies, inavg., Berlin, 1866, and Trendelenbur?, Der Widerstreit swisclim ilant und Arist. in der Ethik, lo his Hiator. BeUrdge xur Philoaophie, Vol. III., 1867, pp. 171-314. 'Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 171' Ch. E. Latbart; Die EtMk dea ArUt. in ihr&m Untersdtied von der 3foral des CJii^t&nthvma, Leipslc, 1S69. Wilb. Oncken, Die Staatnlekre des Arist. in hiit-pol Umriaaen^ Loipsic, 1870; Ar. u. s. L.v. Staat, la Vii'chuw ADd Uoltzendorff *B Sammlung gemeinverstdndliche wUa. Vortrdge, No. 103, Berlin, 1S7U. Of the ethical and political principles of Aristotle treat Starke (N^-Kuppin, 1S33 and 1850), Holm (Berlin, 1858)s Ueberweg {Das Ariat^ KantUdte mid Herbartaehe Moral-princip,, in Fichte's Z., Vol. 24, Halle, 1854, p. 71 seq.); on the method and the bases of Aristotle's Ethics, cf. Rud. Eucken (tf.-iV., Frank- ifort-iin-the-Maln. 1870); on points of contact between the Ethics and Politics, J. Mnnier (tf.-iV., Mayence, 185S), Scbutz (Potsd. 1860) ; on the Highest Good, Kruhl (Breslan, 1832 and 1SS3), Afzelius (Holiniue, 1S38), Axul Nybliius (Lund, 1868), Wenkel {Die Lehre dea Ariit. ilber das kbckate Gut oder die Gluck' sdigkeU^ G.-Pr., Sundershausen, 1864) ; on the Eudaemoma of Arist, Hyrm. Hanipke (De MtdaemoniOy Arlat moralia diadplinae principiOt diaa. inaug. Berol.^ Brandcnb. 1858). G. TL'ichmiiller {Oie M7iheU der Ar. Eudamonie, from the Melangea graeco-roimdna, I., II , St. l*etersburg, 1859, in the Jhilletin Jiist-pfiil., t XVI., of the Imperial Acad, of Sciences, ibid. 1859). E. Laas {Diaa. Drl., 1859), Chr. A. Ttiilo (in the Zeitachrift fur exacte Philoa.^ Vol. II., Leipsic, 1S61, pp. 271-803), Karl Knappe {GrundzUge der Ariat Lelire iJo» der Euddm.^ G.-Pr.^ Wittenberg, 1864-66) ; oh A.'s conception of virtne, Nielander •{O.'Pr.^ Herford, 1861); on the theory of Duties, Carl, Aug. Mann {Diaa. inaug.-, Berlin, 1867): on the conceptions fteo-orrif and 6p0b? Ad^o?, G. Glogau (Halie, 1869); on the place of Sensation in Aristotlu's doctrine. Roth (in Theolog. Siudien und Krit^ 1850, Vol. I., p. 625 seq.)-. on Justice, A. G. Kastner (Leipsic, 1787), C. A. v. Droste-Hulshoff (Bonn, 1826), Herm. Ad. Fechner {Bt-ealauer IHaa., Leipsic, 1855), Freyschmidt {Die Ariat Lehre von der GerechUgkeit und daa modeme Staatarecht, G.-Pr.^ Berlin, 3367), and Trendelenbui^ (in the above-cited works); cf. also the articles of H. Hampke (in Pkilol.^ XVL 1860, pp. 60-84) and F. Hacker (in Miitzell's ZeiUchr. fUr daa Gymnialivesen, Berlin, 1862, pp. 518- 560) on the fifth book of the JTicom. Ethica, which treats of justice; on the place given to practical prudence in A.'s doctrine, Ludke (Stralsund, 1862) ; on the principle of division and arranfrement followed in the classification of moral virtues in the Mc. Eth.., F. Hiicker {Progr. dea Coin. Real.-Gymn.^ Berlin, 1863, and in Mutzeira Z^tachr fur xal wf hv 6 ^pmipo^ opiaeiev. Virtue is a Efjf [usually translated liabilus in Latin and fmbitude in English], and the latter is to ShvafUQ [power, potentiality] as proficiency is to endowment ; the ethical Svvafut; is originally undetermined and may be determined in either of the two opposite moral directions ; its actual development must take place in a definite direction, and the ef/f then has the corresponding character. (According to the Aristotehan defini- tion^ — from which the subsequent definition of the Stoics deviated — all efeif were aLso duxOiaac, but not all diadiaei^ were efeif, Categ., 8, p. 9 a, 10 ; iiaStctq is defined. Met, V. 19, as rm exovToc /iipii rd^i^, f/ Kara t6wov $ /card dvvaptv rj na-' «(!of ; the £f«f is changed with difficulty, while those iiaHiaeic, which are pre-eminently so-called and are not cfe(f, such as warmth, coldness, disease, health, are easily changeable, according to Categ., ch. 8, p. 8 b, 35. Cf. Trendelenburg, Gesch. der K ttegorienlehre, p. 95 seq., and Comm. ad De Anima, II. 5, 5.) The "tfif npoaipsTut^," direction of the will or the disposition. The function of the reason in connection with the desires, which are prone to err through excess or omission {imepfioA^ and lXA.enjjig), on the side of the too much or the too little, is to determine the right proportion or the mean (jieaorriQ) ; in tliis connection Aristotle himself (Eth. Kic., II. 5) recalls the Pythagorean doctrine (which was also adopted by Plato in another reference) of limit and the unlimited (jrepac and avecpov). In enumerating the particular virtues, Aristotle follows the order of the rank or dignity of the functions to which they have reference, advancing from the necessary and useful to the beautiful (ef. Pol, Til. 14, p. 1333 a, 30). These functions are 1) physical life, 2) sensuous, animal enjoyment, 3) the social life of mau in its various relations (possession and honor, social community in word and action, and, above all, political community), 4) the speculative functions. The etliical virtues are courage, temperance, liberality and magnificence, liigh-minded- ness and love of honor, mildness, truthfulness, urbanity and friendship, and justice [Eth. Nic, II. 1 ; cf. the less rigorous exposition in Rhet., I. 9). Courage (avipeid) is a mean between fearing and daring (jieadrrK irepl i^dfimi; ml Bap'pri); but not every such mean is courage, at least not courage in the proper sense of the term. In the strict sense, he only is courageous who is not afraid of an honorable death (6 irepj rbv koaov Bavarov aSef/Q, III. 9), and, in general, he only who is ready to face danger for the sake of the morally beaiitiful (liaUv, Etli. Nic., III. 10, p. 1115 b, 12: if Sci 6e Kal ), but proceeds by arithmetical and not by geometrical proportion, since it regards not the moral worth of the persons involved, but only the advantage gained or injury suffered by them ; commutative justice removes the difference between the original possession and the diminished (or increased) possession, as occasioned by loss (or gain), by causing an equal gain (or loss), tho latter increasing (or diminishing) the amount of the possession by so much as the first loss (or gain) diminished (or increased) it. The amount as thus restored (undiminished and unaugmented) is a mean be- tween the less and the greater according to arithmetical proportion (a — y: az= a: a + y). In connection with this doctrine of Aristotle, cf. Plato, Leges, TI. p. 157, where the geo- metrically proportional is recognized as the principle of political justice, but the arithmeti- cally proportional, as a political principle, is rejected : it is this arithmetical equality whose place in the economy of trade is justly vindicated by Aristotle. (Trendelenburg directs attention to this difference. Das Ebenmaass, etc., p. 17.) Equity (to iirieiicig) is a species of justice, no1j mere legality, but an emendation of legal justice, or a supplementing of the law, where the latter fails through the generality of its provisions (eTravdpBa/m v6fwv ^ i)i?j!t77Ei 6ia to Kad6?Mv). The provisions of the law are necessarily general, and framed with reference to ordinary circumstances. But not every particular case can be brought within the scope of these general provisions, and in such instances it is the part of equity to supply the deficiencies of the law by special action, and that, too, in the spirit of the lawgiver, who, if he were present, would demand the same action. The dianoetic virtues are divided by Aristotle into two classes. These correspond with the two intellectual functions, of which the one exercised by the scientific faculty (rb eTiBTji/iuviKdv), is the consideration of the necessary, and tho other, exercised by the faculty of deliberation (to ^ytaTiKov), is the consideration of that which can be changed (by our action). The one includes the best or the praiseworthy £f«f of the scientific faculty, the other includes those of the deliberating faculty. The work of tho scientific faculty is to search for the truth as such; the work of the practical reason (Sidvota), which subserves the interests of practical action or artistic creation, is to discover that trutli, which corresponds with correct execution. The best i^ei; or virtue? 176 AEISTOTLE's ethics and ^STHETICSi of each faculty are therefore those, through Which we approach nearest to the trath. These are — A. With reference to that which is capable of variation: art and practical wisdom (rexi"? and 178 Aristotle's ethics amd esthetics. practical life. Imitative art supplies a refined amusement (dtdyay^) and recreation {aveatc, T^f awToviag avdjravaig); it emancipates (Kodapaig) the soul from the pressure of pent-up feelings, through a harmless (and in other respects positively beneficial) excitation of them {Pol, Tin. 1). 'By mBapatg (purification) is not to be understood a purification of the feelings from the bad that is in them, but rather the temporary removal, discharge, nullification of the feelings or passions themselves (of. Pol., II. 1261 a, 5-7, where the satis* faction of a passionate desire is represented as producing a "healing effect"). While the representation draws to its artistic conclusion, the feelings excited in the susceptible spec- tator and auditor become, by a corresponding and natural movement, stilled. "Worlts of art, in which subjects of more than ordinary beauty or elevation are imitated, may serve as a means of ethical culture (jraideia, /laOr/ai;); so, in particular, certain kinds of music and painting, and, unquestionably, certain descriptions of poetry also. Art attains its ends by imitation (/ii/i7iaic). That which it imitates, however, is not so much the particular, with which the accidental is largely connected, as, rather, the essence of its particular object, and, as it were, the tendency of nature in its formation ; in other words, art must idealize its subjects, each in its peculiar character. When this requirement is rightly met, the Resulting work of art is beautiful, although the object imitated may be not (as in the case of the Tragedy) more beautiful and noble than ordinary objects, but (as in the case of the Comedy) only equal or even inferior to the latter in these respects. The good; when as such it is also agreeable, is beautiful (Rhet., I. 9). Beauty implies a certain magnitude and order (Poet., ch. 7). ' The Tragedy is defined by Aristotle as the imitative representation of a weighty; finished, and more or less extended action, in language beautified by various species of ornamentation [meter and song], which are distributed separately to the different parts of the work [the dialogical and choral], acted and not merely recited, and, by exciting pity and fear, purging the mind of such passions* (iarw oiv rpayijiSia /li/xiiBig irpafeuf (nrovdam; K(ii re^EiOf, fjiye&og kxohcriQ, f/dva/iivm their influence ; yet I would not define It, more specifically (with Bemoys), as a relief from permanent emotional tendencies (fearfUlness, sym- patheti6 disposition, etc.), obtained by giving way to them for the time, nor (with Heinrich Weil, who regards tCiv toioutwc n-nflijjuaTbii' as the subjective Gonitive, with man understood as the object) as merely a deliverance from the uneasiness which attends the want of, or the exhaustion which follows, emotional ex- citement, but rather (as shown by me in FIchte's ZeitmArift, Vol. 86, 1S60, nnd in an article on Aristotle's doctrine of the nature and eflect of art, ibid.. Vol. 50, 1867, and also by A. Doring, who nr^ues from the medical use of the term, in the PhUol., XXI. 1664), as a temporary removal, elimination, nullification of the emotions themselves. In Plato, Phaedo, p. 69 c, Kaffapirw rlav yi^vStv = a deliverance (of the BOul)/rs Toiovrovt aint^ xaipous xpijcrreoi', cv ot; ri ffeiapta KaOaptriv tia\koy Rvvaral tj tii9ritnv. 11}. 7, 1841 b, 36 ; ^aiiiv Si ov /ita? cveKCP toi^eAetac t^ fiovautri ;^p^(rdat 8eti', dAAa Kat irAetoiHiil' x^P'**' Koi yap nai&eiiK iveKev koI Ka0apo'eii>$, — TpiTov Se irpo^ Siaytayiiv, irpb; ai'eirii' re ical irpitt Ttv t^9 ovvTonat ' di/ii7ravf jcal rous oAus (oAuic rou??) iradijrtKouf, tou« 2d aAAouc KaO' 070v en-ijSoAAet tup roiovTitiv €KaaTta Kai iraaL yivtaOai rica Ka9apisa. GbtUng., Berlin, 1S6T). Somo of the works of Alexander of Aphrodiatas were printed in the 3d volume of the Aldine editloa f Aristotle, Venice, 1495-98. Alexandri Aplirodisierms de amma, de/aio, iu Themiet. opera, Venet. 534 : Defato, ed. Orelli, Zurich, 1824 ; Quaest. nat. et mor., ed. L. Spengel, Munich, 1842 ; Comm. in Aria, letaph., ed. H. Bonitz, Berlin, 1847. On Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Usener (Alex. Aphr. gnaeferuntur iroblemat. lib. III. et IV., Programm of the Joaahimtth. Oym. of Berlin, 1869), and Nourisson (De la, iberte et du haeard, eat. mi/r At. d^Aphr., auim du traite dv, deetin et du Hire pomioir, trad, en Jr., 'aris, 1870). Aristotle is reported (by Gell., N. A., XIII. 5), shortly before his death, to have etumed to the question, whom he considered worthy to succeed him in the office of [istructor, tlie allegorical answer, that the Lesbian and Ehodian wines were both excel- 3nt, but that the former was the more agreeable {r/Siaii 6 Af e Nat. Dear., I. 13. 35; Acad. Pr., II. 38. 121). Cicero names as other and later Peripatetics : Lyco, the pupil of Strato, Aristo of Ceos, the pupil of Lyco, Hieronymus, Critolaus, and Diodorus {De Fin., V. 5), but does not attribute to them any great significance. A disciple and heir of Aristo of Ceos was Aristo of Cos (Strabo, XIV. 2. 19). Callipho, also, whom Cicero {De Fin., Y. 25), men- tions as older than Diodorus, appears to have been a Peripatetic, who tauglit in the second century B. c. Besides these may be mentioned the more erudite than philosophical Alexandrians : Hermippus (perhaps identical with the Hermippua of Smyrna, mentioned ■ by Athenseus, Til. 327 ; cf. A. Lozynski, Hermippi Smyrnaei Peripatetici Fragmenta, Bonn, 1832; Preller, m Jahn's Jahrh., XVII. 1836, p. 159 seq.; UulleT, Fragm. Hist. Cr., III. 35 seq.), whose Bioc appear to have been composed about 200 B. 0. ; Satyrus, who likewise wrote a collection of biograpliies ; Sotion (of whom Panzerbieter treats in Jahn's Jahri., Supplemenibd. V., 1837, p. 211 seq.), the author of the Aia6oxai rCni (^i2x>a6^av, of which Diog. Laertius made much use (date, about 190 B. c), and Heraclides Lembus (see Miiller, III. 167 seq.), who, about 150 B. c, compiled a book of pxtracts from the Bi'oi of Satyrus and the Aiadoxai of Sotion. To the first century B. c. belong Staseas of Naples (Cic, De Fin., V. 25 ; De Orat., I. 22), and Cratippus, who tauglit at Athens (Cic, De Off., I. 1 et al.). Andronicus of Rhodes, the (above-mentioned, p. 149) editor and expositor of the Aris- totelian writings (about 70 B. c), Boethus of Sidon (together with Sosigenes, the mathema- tician, of the time of Julius Caesar), and Nicolaus of Damascus (under Augustus and Tiberius) were particularly influential in promoting the study and intelligent under- standing of the works of Aristotle. Andronicus arranged the works of Aristotle and 1^4 THE PEEIPATEUCSr rheophrastua according to their siibject-matter (Porphyr., Vita Flotim, 24: 'Xv5p6vmo^ 3 lepiirarriTiicdc: ra 'AptaToriXovg ml QaKppaarov eif wpayfmTeiag iielXe rdf o'lKeiag imoBecti^ if TavTov amayayav). In his exposition of the doctrine of Aristotle (according to the testi- nony of the Neo-Platonist, Ammonius) he set out with logic, as the doctrine of demonT' itration (aTrdfcfif, or that form of philosophizing which is employed in all systems of )liilosophy, and must therefore be first known, ef. Arist., Met., IV. 3, 1005 b, 11); the iustomary arrangement of the works of Aristotle (which in all probability originated with lim), following this principle, begins with the Logic (Analytics) or "Organon." His )upil, Boethus (among whose friends belonged Strabo the geographer, an adherent of Stoicism), judged, on the other hand, that Physics was the doctrine most closely related to IS and most easily understood, and maintained, therefore, that philosophical instruction ihould tommence with it. Each of them held fast to the axiom, that the Trpayfiarclat complexes of related bodies of investigation, hence separate bodies of philosophical doc- rine, branch-sciences of philosophy) wore to be arranged according to the principle of an idvance from tho Trpdrepov Trpof 7]/idg (the prior for us) to the 'rrporepov i^cu (the prior by latiire). Diodotus, tho brother of Boethus, was also a Peripatetic philosopher (Strabo, XVI. !. 24). Boethus seems, at least in some respects, to have been followed by Xenarchus, vho taught at Alexandria, Athens, and Rome. Nicolaus of Damascus set forth the Peri- )atetic philosophy in compendia, following in the Metaphysics a different order from that bllowed by Andronicus in his edition of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Alexandrian Pert- )atetic, Aristo, who lived at about this same time, seems to have occupied himself chiefly vith logic and physics. Apuleius (De Dogm. PI, III.) ascribes to him a computation of he syllogistic figures, and he may also have been tlie author of an exegesis of the Categories, which is mentioned by SimpliciuSi as also of a work on the Nile, mentioned by strabo (XVII. 1, 5), and with which was connected a dispute between this Peripatetic and he eclectic Platonist, Eudorus, on a question of priority (see below, § 65). In many of the Peripatetics of this later period we find an approximation toward Stoicism, — so in particular in the author of the work De Mmido (mpl K6a/iov), which con- ains many doctrines taken from the Stoic Posidonius, and was probably composed in the irst century B. c, or near the time of the birth of Christ; and so, also, in other regards, n the work of Aristocles of Messene (in Sicily), the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. fhrough this sort of Eclecticism tho way was prepared for the later blending together of he leading systems in Neo-Platonism. The principal merit of the Peripatetics of the times of the emperors rests on their !.xegesis of the works of Aristotle. Explanatory notes to the Categories, as also to the Ve Goelo, were written both by Alexander of jEgse, who was one of Nero's teachers, and by ispasius, and by tho latter, also, to the De Interpretatione, the Physics, the Metaphysics, and he Nicomachean Ethics. Adrastus wrote concerning the order of tho works of AristotJe irepl T^g ra^eug tov ' ApioroTihivt: cvyypa/jftdTuv), and an exposition of Aristotle's Categories ind Physics, as also of the Tima-ms of Plato, and perhaps of the Ethics of Aristotle and Cheophrastus ; also a work on Ba/rmonics, in three books, and a treatise on the Eun, vhich may have constituted a part of the astronomical work from which Theo's Astrcno- ny (see below, § G5) was, for the most part, borrowed. Herrainus wrote commentaries m the Categories and other logical writings of Aristotle. Aristocles wrote an historico- Titical work on philosophy. Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, expounded the 'eripatetic philosophy at Athens, from the year 198 to 211, in the reign of Septimus Severus. He was a pupil of Herminus, of Aristocles of Messene, and of Sosigenes, tho r'eripatetic (not to be confovmded with the astronomer of the same name, of the time of Tulius Caesar). He distinguished in man a material or physical reason (voif Wwcof or •I'HE MOST EMINENT STOICS. ISS' ^WHtdf), and an acquired or developed reason (yov; iiriiiTrjTo^ or vovq Koff i^iv), biit identi- fied the voiif Trm^Tj/cdf (the " active intellect "), through whose agency the potential intel- lect in man becomes actual, with God. Of Alexander's Commentaries there are still extant the Commentaries on Book I. of the Analyt. Priora, the Topics, the Meteorology, the De Senm, and Books L-T. of the Metaphysics, together with an abridgment of his commenjtary on the remaining books of the Metaphysics ; his commentaries on several of the logical and physical works, and on the Psychology of Aristotle, are lost. Of his other writings the following are preserved: nrpi <^vxni, ^epl elimp/iivri;, (j/volkuv koI TfiiKuv aKopiCni Koi ^vaeiM, vspl /li^eag. The " Problems " and the work " On Fevers," are spuri- ous. Some other works by him have been lost. § 52. Zeno of Citium (on the island of Cyprus), a pupil of Crates, the Cynic, and afterward of Stilpo, the Megarian, and of Xenocrates and Polemo, the Academics, by giving to the Cynic Ethics a more elevated character, and combining it with an Heraclitean physics and a modified Aristotelian logic, founded, about 308 b. c, a philosophical school, which was called, from the place where it assembled, the Stoic. To this school belonged Zeno's disciples : Perseeus, Aristo of Chios, Herillus of Carthage, Cleanthes, Zeno's successor in the office of teacher and one of his most important disciples, and also Sphaerus, from the Bosphorus, a pupil of Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, who suc- ..ceeded Cleanthes as teacher of the school, and who first brought the Stoic doctrine to a state of complete systematic development, Zeno of Tarsus, the successor of Chrysippus, Diogenes the Babylonian, An- tipater of Tarsus, Pansetius of Ehodes, who was the principal agent in the propagation of Stoicism at E,ome, and Posidonius of Rhodes, a teacher of Cicero. Of the Roman Stoics may be mentioned : L. An- nseus Cornutus (first century after Christ) and A. Persius Flaccus, the satirist, L. Annasus Seneca, C. Musonius Rufus, the slave Epicteti:s of Phrygia, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in the second century after Christ, and others. ■Writers on the Stoic PMloaophy in general, are Justns Lipsins (^ManuducHo ad Stoicam phitoso- phiam, Antw. 1604, and later), Dan. Hrinsius (in his Orat., Leyden, 1627), Gatalicr (Dc diaciplina Stoiea cum aectia atiis collata, prefixed to his edition of the worlvS of Antoninus, Cambridge, 1658), and others, of whom the most important is Dietr. Tiedeinann {Systetn der staisc/ien PMloAophie, 3 vols., Leips. 1776). A Purvey of the whole historical development of Stoicism is given by L. Noaclc (Aua der Stoa sum Eaiae?-- thum, ein, Bliel: auf den WeUlavf der stoischen P/iilosophie, in the Pmjclie, Vol. V., n0 1. 1862. pp. 1-24). Of. D. Zimmermann, Quae ratio pMlosophiae Stoicae ait cmn retigitme liowatia, Erlangen, 1S58; L. t. Arren, Quid ad informandoa moi-ea valere potuerii priornm St. doctrina, Colmar, 1S59 ; F. Kaviiisson, Baaai aur le Staficiame^ Paris, 1856; F. Leferri6re. Memmre concernant Vinflueiice du Stoiciame atir la doctrine dea juriaconanliea romaina, VariB, 1860: J. Dourif, Iht Stowisvie et du Cliristiaviarhe congi- derda dava leura rapports, leure differencea et Vivifvence reapective quila out exfrcee tntr lea niaem^a, Paris, 1868. The most thornuffh investigation of the snbji ct of Stoicism and its representatives. Is that of Zellcr, P'l. d. Gr., 2d ed.. III. 1, 1865, pp. 26-840. 498-522, 606-684. [Sec The Stoiea. Bj/ieureana, and Skeptics, translated from Zeller's Philoa. der GriecJien, by O. Eeichcl, Loudon, 1869.— TV.] 1.8.6 .THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. Zcno's works (on the State, the Life according to Nature, etc.), a list of which is fonrd in Diog. Iji«rt, Til. 4, have all been lost Of Zeno treat Heitiingius Forcllus (Upsala, 1700), and G. F. Jenichcn (Leips. 1724) ; on his theology, cf. Krlsche, Forachungen^ I. pp. 865-404. There exist dissertations on ArUto of Chios, by G. Buchner (Leips. 1725), J. B. Carpzow (Lelps. 1742), and J. F. Hiller (Titeb. 1761), and a more recent one by N. Saal (Cologne, 1852) ; on his theology, &e« Krischc, Forschungen, I. pp. 404-415. On Ilerillns, cf. W. Tr. Krug (Ilerilli de mmmo tmto eententia exploga, nam explodenda. In Snjmh. ad /list. pMlos., p. III., Leips. 1822), and Saal (De Aristone Oiiio et Herillo CarOiaginienm, Cologne, 1S52). On Persosus, see Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 436-443. The hymn of Cleanthcs to the supreme God has been edited by H. H. Clndins (Oott. 1786), J. F. H. Schwabo (Jena, 1819), Petersen (Kiel, 1825), Sturz and Merzdorf (^cleanihia hyfnrma in Jovem^ ed. Sturz, Leips. 1785, ed. nov, cur., Merzdorf, Leips. 1885), and others. The other works of Cleanthes (the titles of which are given by Diog. L., VII., 174 seq ) have been lost. Cf. Gottl. Chr. Friedr. Mohnike (KlearUhea der Stoiher, Vol. I., Greifswald, 1814), Wllh. Triingott Krng (De Oleanihe dveinitaHa aseertort ac predicatore, Leipsic, 1819) ; Krische, Foraclmngen, I. pp. 415-436. On Chrysippus have written F. N. G.Bagnet (Louvain. 1S22), Chr. Petersen (P/«7. Chrys. fundamenta, Altona and Hamb. 1827 ; cf. Trendelenburg's review in the Beirl. Jahrb. f. uiss. KritUc, 1S27, 217 seq.), Krische (Farachungen, I. 443-481), Th. Bergk (De Chryaippi liiria irepl air<»t>ai/Ti«ui/, Cassel, 1841), and Nicolal (De logieia Chrysippi libris, Quedlinburg, 1859). The titles of the works of Chrysippus are recorded in Diog. Laert, VII. 169 seq. On Diogenes the Babylonian, cf Krische, Foree7mngen, I. ■p^.4S2-iSl; on Antipater of Tarsus: A. WaiUot (Leodii, 1824), and F. Jacobs (Jena, 1827); on Panietius: C. G. Ludovoci (Leips. 1734), and also r. G. van Lyndon (Leyden, 1802), whose work is the more complete of the two. The fragments of Posi- donius have been edited by J. Bake (Leyden, 1810), and C. Miiller (in Fraffm. J/iat. Gr., IH. Paris, 18 '9, p. 245 seq.). Paul Topelmann (in his Diss. .Bonn., 1867), and R. Schtppig (Z)ePomcZo»io 4po»»e««,«™M, gentium, terrarmm seriptore, Berlin, 1870) treat of Posidonius. Of Stoicism among the Pomans, Ilollenberg (Leips. 1793), C. Aubertin (De aap. docf(yribua. qui a Cic. m&rte ad Iferonia princ. Jiomae vig., Paris, 1857), and Ferraz (De Stoica diaciplina, apud poetaa So- ma/noe, Paris, 1663) have written. Cf. also, C. Martha, Lea Moraliatea aovs Pempire Romain, philoaophu etpoetea, Paris, 1664, 2. ed., 1866; P. Montfee, le Stmcieme a Itome, Paris, 1665; Franz Knickenberg, De roHone Stoica in Peraii aatir-ia apparenie, di*a.pMl., Milnster, 1867 ; Herm. Schiller, Die atoiadie 02ypo- sUum miter jrero('' Vrogramm^ of the Wertheim Lyceum), Wertheim, 1867; Lud. Borctmrt, }fum Anii a- tiua Labeo, atujtor acJiolae TroeuManoruvi, Stoicae philoa. fuerit addictua (Dies, inaug.jur.), Berlin, 1869. Of the philosophical writings of L. Anna^us Seneca, the following are extant: Quaeationum Natu- raZiv/m Libri VII, and a series of moral and religious treatises, De procidentia, De hrevitate vitae, and consolatory writings addressed ad Ilelmam matrem, ad Marciam and ad Polyhium; also De vita beata, De otio aut aeceaau aapientia, De animi tranquillitate, De conaianiia, De ira, De dementia, De benejidia, and the Epiatolae ad Lucilium. Editions of them by Gronovius (Amsterdam, 1662), Euhkopf (Leips. 1797-1811), Sohweighauser (Zweibruoken, 1809), Vogel (Leipsic, 1829), Fickert (Leipsic, 1842-45), Haase (ibid. 1S52-53), and others. Cf. E. Caro (Quid de beata vita aenaerit Seneca, Paris, 1852), Werner (De Senecae philoeopUa, Breslau, 1825), WolfBin (in the Philologua, Vol. VIII., 1853, ji. 184 seq.), II. L. Lehmann (L. Armaeua Seneca imd. aeine philoa. Schri/ten, PMlologva, Vol. VIII., 1858, pp. 309-828,\ F. L. Bohm (Annaeua Seneca wnd sein Werth audi fUr uneere Zeit, Progr. of the Fr.-Wilb.-Gymn. of Berlin, 1856), 0. Aubertin (Siir lea rapports auppoaea entre Seneqtie etSt. Paul, Paris, 1857andl869), Fickert (ff.-iV., Breslau, 1867), H. Doergens (Antonin. cum Sen. ph. compar., Leips. 1867), Baur (Seneca vnd Paulns, das VerhaHmas des Stoidamua snim. CViristenthum nach den Schriften Seneca^s, in the Zeitschr. /. iciaa. Tlieol., Vol. I., 1653, Nos. 2 and 8X Holzherr (Der Philoaopli Annaeua Seneca, ^'Paatatter Sdiulprogr.," Tilb. 1S68 and '59), Eich. Volkmaun (Zur Geach. der Beurtheilung Seneca's, in Pad. Ardiiv., 7, Stettin, 1855, pp. 689-610). W. Bernhardt (Die Anschammg des Seneca vom Univeraum, Wittenberg, 1861X Biedlcr (Die religioaaiUlidie WcUanachaunng dea Philoaophen Ludua Annaena Seneca, " Sdivlpr.,'" Fraustadt, 1808). Cf. Bemhardy, Onmdr. der rdm. Litt., 4th ed., p. 611 seq.; Octav. Groard, De Utteria ei Utterarvm studio quid cenenerit Seneca (Diaa.), Paris, 1867; Ed. Gogae\,Sineque, Strasbourg, 1868. L. Annaei Phv/mutl (Cornuti), De 7iaiura deorum I. (irepl Tf)s rl^v OeStv (^u'creus), ed. Frid. Osann ; adj. ent. J. de Villoison, De fheologia phyaica Stoicorum conim&ntatio, Gott. 1844. Cf^ Martini, De L. An/naeo Conmio, Leyden, 1825. C. 3Iiiaonii Ruji reliquiae et apoplithegmata, ed. J. Venhuizen Pcerlkamp, Hiirlem, 1822, pra«c«/. Petri Sieuwlandii diss, de Mus. Pv/o (which appeared first in 1788). Cf. Moser, in Daub and Creuzer's . {ftudien, VI. 74 seq.. Biibler in the iK Schweiiseriachee ifiiaeum, IV. 1, 1864, pp. 23-37 ; Otto Bernhardt, 2u J/m.^7?«/™ ((?.-i>r.), Sorau, 1866. THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. 187 The teachings of Epictetua (recorded by Arrlnn) in the Aiarpi^ot and the Enchetridion have heen edited by Joh. Sohweighiuser (Leips. 1199) ; the same, together with the commentary of tiimplicius on tlie EnelitiridioTi, ibid. 1800. German translations of the Conversations of Epictetus liave been made by J. M. Schullz (Altona, 1801-8), and K. Enk (Vienna, 1866) ; Enk has also trai^lated Simpllcius' commentary on the Manual, Vienna, 1867 (1866). [TlieWorka of Spictetun, Engl, transl. by T. W. Uigginson, founded on Mrs. Carter^s version, Boston, 1865. — TV.] Works on Epictetus have been written by Beyer (Marburg, 1795), Perlett (Erfurt, 1798), Spangeuberg (Hannu, 1849), Winnefald (in the ZeitseJir, /. PhiloB., ni'w sei-iea, Vol. 49, 1866, pp. 1-32 and 193-226), and Gnst. Grosch (/«« Sittenlelire dea Epiktet, G.-Pr., Wernigcrode, ■ 1867). With the Encfieiridiem, a work entitled Tabula (n-tVaf ), falsely attributed to the Ccbes, who appears in Plato's Pfiaedo, but in reality a product of the later Eclectic Stoicism, has often been published (by Schweighauser, Leipsic, 1798, and others). The work entitled ra ei; icayrov, by the Emperor Mare, Aurclins Antoninus, has been edited by J. M. Schiiltz (Schleswig, 1802), and others. Cf. N. Bach, De M. Aurel. Ant. unperatore philosopkante, H. Doer- gens (see above, ad Seneca), F. C. Schneider's translation of the MediUliionfi (Broslau, 1857, 2d ed., 1865), M. E. de Suckau, Etiule sur Marc Aurele. sa vie et sa doctHne (Paris, 1S5S). M. Noel dos Vergci-s, Essai sur Marc-Aitrele (Paris, 1860), Max Konigsbeck, De Stoicismo Marci Antonini (Konigsberg, Pr., 1861), Ell. Zeller, Marcua Aiireliua Antoniniis (in Zcller's Vortr. w. Abh., Leips. 1805, pp. 82-107), Am. Bodek, ' M. Aur. Ant. ala Freund und Zeitffenoaae dea Jiabbi Jehttda lut-Naai (Leips. 1868), and J. Schuster, Etkicea Stoicae apud M. Aur. Antfivndamenta (in the Sehrift&n der Univ. zit Kiel aua dem Jahre 1868, Vol. XV., Kiel, 1869). [Engl, translation of the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelins, Boston, 1864.— 75-.] Besides the works nnd fragments of works by the Stoics themselves, the statements of Cicero, Plu- tarch. Diog. L. (Book VIL), Stobseus, and Simplicius, arc especially useful as aids to the knowledge of Stoicism. The Stoics classed themselves among the followers of Socrates ; and they were, ia reality, so nearly related to Socrates in their doctrines and their theory of life, and were to such a degree mere continuators of previous types of thought, that, although they may he distinguished from the previous schools, they can not be regarded as introducing a new period in Greek philosophy. "Socrates sat for the portrait of the Stoic sage ; tiie Stoics strove earnestly to build up their inner man after the pattern of the virtuous wise man, whose lineaments they borrowed from the transflgured and lofty form of Socrates " (Noack, Psyche, T., 1., 18C2, p. 1.^). The productive element in tho Stoic philosophy is indeed not to be deemed insignificant, especially in the field of ethics, where tlieir rigorous discrimination and severance of the morally good from the agreeable, and the rank of indifference to which they reduced the latter, mark at once the merit and the onesidedness of the Stoics. But this element is less characteristic of their philosophy as a whole, than is the fact that in the latter those elements of humane culture were conserved, which were bequeathed to the Stoics by their predecessors, and by their agency these elements gained a wider range of influence. The modifications introduced by tho Stoics into the form and content of phi- losophy were, for the most part, only such as grew out of their tendency to philosophize for the inany. But the extensive diffusion of a philosophy, together with the modifica- tions of doctrine involved in such diffusion, is insufBciont, when taken in connection with an inferior activity in tho development of philosophic thought, to authorize us in regarding that philosophy as inaugurating a new period. The life of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, falls nearly between 350 and 258 B. c. ; for the exact determination of the dates our authorities are too contradictory. A son of Mnaseas, who was a merchant of Cittium (an Hellenic city, but inhabited partly by Phenicians), he too was occupied in his early life (according to Diog. L., Til. 1 seq., until his 30th, or, more likely, according to Persasus as cited by Diog. L., A''II. 28, until liis 22d year) in commerce. A shipwreck ia said to have been the occasion of his residing for a while at Athena. The reading of works written by the disciples of Socrates (especially the reading of Xenophon's Memorabilia and the Platonic Apology, see Diog. L., yil. 3, and Themist., Orat. 23, p. 295 e) filled him with admiration for the strength of cha:fact(3r disL* 188 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. played in Socrates, and in Crates the Cynic he thought he had found the man who, of all men then living, most resembled Socrates. Aceordmgly, he joined himself to. Crates as his pupil. It is said that the writings of Zeno, especially the earliest of them, contained ideas which savored of the harshness and coarseness of Cynicism and for which later Stoics (probably Chrysippus, in particular) sought to substitute others more mild and refined. Of Zeno's work on the State, it was said (Diog. L., VII. 4) that he wrote it firi t^ nv TODof oipdf. Not deriving permanent satisfaction from the Cynic philosopher, he is said to have addressed himself to Stilpo, from whom Crates in vain sought again to tear him away (Diog. L., Til. 24); then he heard Xenocrates, and after the death of the latter (Olymp. 116.3 = 314 B. c), Polemo. Not long after 310 B. c. he founded his own philo- sophical school in the Irda noMiXr/ (a portico adorned with paintings of Polygnotus), whence the school received the name of Stoic. According to ApoUonius (op. Diog. L., Vll. 28), lie taught 58 years, which agrees with the statement that he lived 88 years ; but according to the testimony of Persfcus (ibid.) he died at the age of 72 years (for which Zumpt reads 92, in view of Diog. L., Vll. 9, where Zeno in a letter to Antigonus calls himself 80 years old). The Athenians held Zeno in high respect, and honored liim (accord- ing to Diog. L„ VII. 10) with a golden chaplet, a tomb built at the public expense, and (Diog. L., VII. 6) also with a monument of brass, on acconnt of the virtue and temperance of which he gave proofs in his doctrine and life, and to the practice of which he directed the young. The titles of Zeno's works are cited in Diog. L , VII. 4. Cleanthes of Assus in Troas was (according to Diog. L., VII. 168) originally a pugilist, and, while in attendance on the instructions of Zeno, earned his living by carrying water and kneading dough in the night. He grasped philosophical doctrines slowly and with difficulty, but held faithfully to that which he had oneo taken in, whence Zeno is said to have compared him to a hard tablet, on which it was difficult to write, but which retained permanently the characters once inscribed on it. According to Diog. L. (VII. 116), he remained nineteen years the pupil of Zeno, whom he then succeeded as director of the school. For the titles of his written works, see Diog. L., VII. 174, 175. Noteworthy pupils of Zeno, besides Cleanthes, were Persreus of Cittium, to whom we owe several valuable literary notices (he repaired in 278 b. c, with his pupil Aratus of Soli, from Athens to the court of the Macedonian king Antigonus Gonatas) ; Aristo of Chios, who undervalued the theoretical, rejected logic as useless, and physics as a science beyond the reach of man, and declared all things except virtue and vice to be indifferent; and Herillus of Carthage, who, on the contrary, defined the chief business of man as knowledge (imaH/fiij), but recognized besides it another secondary end (turore/U'f, Diog. L., VII. 165): according to him, the gifts of fortune are treasures of the unwise, but the highest good of the wise man is knowledge. Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus in Oicilia (282-209 B. c), the successor of Cleanthes, became, through his elaboration of the system on all its sides, a sort of second founder of the Stoic school, so that it was said (Diog. L., VII. 183) that "without Chrysippus, the Stoa had not existed " (Ei fir/ yap rpi Xpiiannrog, ova hv fjv Iroa). Yet in his works he was very diffuse. He is said to have written daily five hundred lines, and to have composed seven hundred and five books, which were largely filled with citations from other authors, especially from poets, and with numerous repetitions and corrections of what had gone before (Diog. L., VII. 180 seq.) ' After Chrysippus, Sphserus from the Bosphorus was one of the niost celebrated of the disciples of Cleanthes. The Stoic Boethus appears to have been a contemporary and condisciple of Chrysippus (as may be inferred from Diog. L., VII. 54). The successors of Chrysippus were Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes the Babylonian (from / THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. 189 Seleiicia on the Tigris), of whom Crates of Malloe, perhaps also Aristarchus and certainly Apoilodorus, the author of the Xpavtica (written after 144 B. c.) and other worlcs, were pupils. Tlie next leader of the school after them was Antipater of Tarsus. Diogenes went (accord- ing to Gell., N. A., XY. 11) in the year 155 B. c, together with Carneades, the Academic, and Critolaus, the Peripatetic, to Rome, as an embassador of the Athenians, commissioned to procure the reinission of a pecuniary fine which had been laid upon them. Through tUo public discourses of these philosopliers Greek philosophy was first made known at Rome; but it was unfavorably received by the Senate. "The Peripatetic, Critolaus, fascinated the Roman youth by the cleverness and aptness of his style ; the Academic, Carneades, by his forcible delivery and brilliant acuteness ; the Stoic, Diogenes, by the mild and tranquil flow of his discourses." (On the sending of these men to Rome in the year 155 B. c, cf. "Wiskeman, G.-Pr., Hersfeld, 1867.) The elder Cato was unwilling that the public policy of Rome, which for the Roman youth was the supreme norm of judgment and action, and was possessed of unconditional authority, should, through the influence of foreign philosophers, become subordinated in the consciousness of these youth to^a more universal ethical norm. He insisted on the earliest possible dismissal of these embas- sadors. In his view, the condemnation of Socrates, as the author of such corrupting speculation, was just and was well done. A decree of the Senate, in the year 150 B. c, ordered the banishment from Rome of all foreign philosophers and teachers of rhetoric. Panaitius of Rhodes (about 180-111 B. c), a disciple of Diogenes, won over to Greek philosophy such members of the Roman aristocracy as laslius and Scipio (the latter of . wliom, according to Cic, Acad., II. 2. 5, el al., he accompanied on his diplomatic journey to Alexandria, 143 B. c). He toned down the harsher elements of the Stoic doctrine (Cic.,. De Fin., TV. 28), aimed at a less rugged and more brilliant rhetorical style, and, in addition to the authority of the, earlier Stoics, appealed also to that of Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and Dicsearch. Inclined more to doubt than to inflexible dogmatism, he denied the possibility of astrological prognostications, combated all forms of divination, abandoned the doctrine of the destruction of the world by fire, on which Boethus and other Stoics had already had doubts, and with Socratio modesty confessed that he was still far from having attained to perfect wisdom. His work wcpl tov icaBriKovTog forms the basis of Cicero's De Offieiis (Cic, De Off., III. 2 ; Ad Att., XVI. 11). With him begins the leaning of Stoicism toward Eclecticism (a change largely due to Roman influences). Among the disciples of Pansetius were the celebrated jurist and Pontifex Maximus, Q. Miieius Scaevola (died 82 B. c), who distinguislied three theologies : the theology of tho poets, the theology of the philosophers, and the theology' of statesmen. The first was anthropomorphic and anthropopathic, and therefore false and ignoble. Tho second was rational and true, but impracticable. The third, on which the maintenance of the estab- lished cultus depended, was indispensable. (Of a similar nature were the opinions of II. Terentius Varro [115-25 B. c], who, educated by Antiochus of Ascalon, the Academic, was, like the latter, an eclectic in philosophy, but interpreted the religious myths allo- gorically, as did the Stoics, and conceived God as the soul of the universe.) Posidonius of Apamea (in Syria), whose school was located at Rhodes, — where,among others, Cicero and Pompey heard him, — was a disciple of Panaetius, and was regarded as the man of the most comprehensive and thorough learning {■Trohi/mBiararoc and hivicrqiiovmij- TOTof) among all the Stoics. He returned again toward dogmatism, blended Aristotelian and Platonic with Stoic doctrines, and took such pleasure in high-sounding discourse, that Strabo (III. p. 147) avers he was "inspired with hyperboles." About the same time lived the Stoic Apoilodorus Ephillus, or, rather, Ephelus (o ifn'^i, lentigiiiosm). : The Stoic Atheuodorus of Tarsus was superintendent of the Pergamean Library, and 190 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. afterward a companion and friend of the younger Cato {ffticensis),' who approved the Stoic principles by his life. Besides him, Antipater of Tyre, who died at Athens about 43 B. c, was also a teacher of the younger Cato. Tlie Stoic Apollonides, a friend of Cato, was with the latter during his last days. Diodotus was (about 85 b. c.) a teacher of Cicero, and afterward (until his death, about 60 B. c.) a member of his family and his friend. Athenodorus, the son of Sandon, and perhaps a pupil of Posidonius, was (together with Arius of Alexandria, who is probably identical with the eclectic Platonist, Arius Didymus) a teacher of Octavianus Augustus. The Stoic Heraclitus (or Heraclides), the author of the "Homeric Allegories" {ed. Mehler, leyden, 1851), seems to have lived near or in the time of Augustus. Under Tiberius, Attalus, one of Seneca's tutors, taught at Rome. An instructor of Nero was Chseremon,' who appears afterward to have presided over a school at Alexandria. L. Annajus Seneca, born at Cordova (in Spain), was the son of M. Annjeus Seneca, the rhetorician, and lived a. d. 3-65. In philosophy, his attention was mainly directed to Ethics, which science, however, assumed in his hands rather the form of exhortation to virtue than that of investigation into the nature of virtue. Seneca resembled the Cynics of his time in the slight worth which he attributed to speculative investigations and systematic connection. The conception of earnest, laborious inquiry, as an ethical end possessing an independent worth in itself, is absent from his philoeophy ; he knows only the antithesis : facere docet philosophia, non dicere ; philosophiam oikctamentum facere, qwim remedium sit, etc., and thus illustrates the Stoic distaste for the Aristotelian conception of' philosophizing, carried to its extreme. By his hopeless complaints over the corruptness and misery of human life, and by his indulgent concessions to human frailty, he is far removed from the spirit of the earlier Stoa. L. Ann^us Cornutus (or Phurnutus) lived about A. D; 20-66 or 68 at Rome. Se wrote in the 6reek language. A. Persius Flaocus, the satirist (a. d. 34-62), was his pupil and friend. M. Annaeus Lucanus (39-65), the son of Seneca's brother, was also among his scholars. To the Stoic circle belonged, further, the well-known Republicans Thrasea Paetus (Tac., Ann., XVI. 21 seq.; Hist., IV. 10, 40) and Helvidiua Priscus (Ann., XVI. 28-35 ; Hist, IV. 5 seq. ; 9, 53). C. Musonius Rufus of Volsinii, a Stoic of nearly the same type as Seneca, was, with other philosophers, banished from Rome by Nero (Tacitus, Annal., XV. 71). He was afterward recalled, probably by (ialba. When Vespasian ordered the banishment of all philosophers from Rome, Musonius was allowed to remain. He stood also in relations of personal intimacy to Titus. His pupil PoUio (perhaps, according to Zeller, III. 1, 1865,' p. 653, identical with Valerius Pollio, the grammarian, who lived under Hadrian) wrote a'^fo/ivij/iovev/iaTa Moviruviov, from which, probably, Stobseus drew what he communicates respectitig his teachings. Musonius reduced philosophy to the simplest moral teachings. One of his finest sayings is : "If thou doest good painfully, thy pain is transient, but the good will endure ; if thou doest evil with pleasure, thy pleasure will be transient, but thef evil will endure.'' Epictetus of Hieropolis (in Phrygia) was a slave of Epaphroditus, who belonged to tlie body-guard of the Emperor Nero. He was afterward set free, became » disciple of Musonius Rufus, and was subsequently a teacher of philosophy at Rome, until the proscrip- tion of philosophers throughout Italy by Domitian in the year 94 (Gell., K A., XIV. 11 ; cf. Suet., Domit., 10), after which ho lived at Nicopolis in Epirus. There ho was heard by , Arrian, who recorded his discourses. Epictetus emphasizes chiefly the necessity of holding i' the mind independent of all external goods, since these are not imder our control. To this end we should bear and forbear (nv^jou KaX air^x'"')- Man should invariably strive to find THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. 19l til his goods in himself. He should fear most of all the god (fedf or dal/itm) within hiB own breast. The Sentences of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius are founded largely on those of Epic- tetus. His predilection for solitary contemplation, "in which man is alone in the presence of his Genius," gives to his views a certain relationship with the Neo-Platonio philosophy, which was soon afterward to arise. § 53. The Stoics make Logic and Physics in reality ancillary to Ethics, although they generally ascribe to Physics (including The- ology) a higher rank than to Ethics. Under Logic many of the Stoics include Dialectic and Khetoric. The Stoic Dialectic is a theory of cognition. It is founded on the Analytics of Aristotle, which it sup- plements by certain investigations respecting the criterion of truth, the nature of sensuous perception, and certain forms of the syllogism (the hypothetical syllogism, in jDarticular). Its changes in terminology, however, mark no scientific progress, their only use being perhaps to facilitate the work of elementary instruction ; greater intelligihility was not unfrequently purchased at the cost of profundity. The fun- damental criterion of truth, with the Stoics, is sensuous distinctness in the mental representation. All knowledge arises from sensuous perception ; the soul resembles originally a piece of blank paper, on which representations are afterward inscribed by the senses. In place, of the Platonic theory of ideas and the Aristotelian doctrine of the conceptual essences of things, the Stoics teach the doctrine of subjec- tive concepts, formed through abstraction ; in the sphere of objective taality only concrete individuals exist. Eor the ten categories of Aristotle the Stoics substitute four class-conceptions, to which they attribute the highest generality, viz. : Substratum, Essential Attri- bute or Quality, Condition, and Eolation. The Stoic conception of irpdAiji/ttc is treated of by Koorda (Leyden, 1S23, from tlio Annates Aoa^. Ziug- dun., 1822-28), the Stoic doctrine of categories by Trendelenburg {^Geach. der Katefforienle/ire, Berlin, 1846,. pp. 217-282); of. Prantl, in his Gesch. d. Logik, Zeller, in his Ph. d. Gr., etc., also, J. H. Eitter, Z>e St. dactr. prucs. de eorvm. logica, Brealau, 1849, and Nicolai, De Log. Ohrya. libriii, G.Fr., QucdI. 1859. The three parts into which philosophy was divided by the Stoics corresponded with the three species of virtue (dper^), which, according to them, the philosopher must seek to acquire, namely : thoroughness in the knowledge of nature, j^^fnoral culture, and in logical discipline (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., I. Proem : apcrSf rdf yevucardTai rp^"' fo&ixipi, ifdudpi, ioyiiditi). .The Stoics employed the term Logic to denote the doctrine of MyoiQ, i. e., of thought and discourse, and divided it into Dialectic and Rhetoric (Diog. L., VII. 41 :• to ii MfytKov fikpoQ tpaalv evtot elf dvo diatpeio'&ai k-Triar^fiagj eig priTopu^ Kal ctf dtn?,EKTtK^). Cleantlies enumerated six divisions of philosophy: Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Pliysics, and Theology ; he does not appear to have reduced these, in ahy case, to the ■ three above-named. To illustrate the nature and mutual relation of logic, ethics, and 192 THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. physics, the Stoics (according to Diog. L., VII. 40, and Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 11 seu.) compared the first to the bones and sinews of the body, the shell of an egg, or the fence inclosing a garden ; ethics, to the flesh of the body, the white of the egg (and the trees in the garden ?) ; and physics (especially when viewed as theology), to the soul, the yolk of the egg (and the fruits of the garden ?) ; some, however (e. g., Posidonius), preferred the comparison of physics to flesh, the white of the egg, and the trees in the garden, and ethics to the soul, the yolk of the egg, and the fruits of the garden. In Dialectic the Stoics included the doctrine of language (grammar), and the doctrine of that which language expresses, representations and thoughts (theory of cognition, includ- ing the Aristotelian Logic as modified by them). In Grammar the Stoics accomplished very meritorious results, but these are in part of more significance for the history of positive philological inquiry than for the history of philosophy. Cf. the above-cited works of Lerseh and Steinthal (p. 24). ' The fundamental question in the Stoic theory of cognition relates to the means by which truth is to be known as such (KptTr/ptov). A similar question was not unknown to Aristotle (Mttaph., TV. 6 : r/f o Kpivuv rbv vycaivovra ml oXiuc tov nepl eKoara Kptvovra opiS-iif;), but he classed it with such idle questions as whether we are now awake or asleep. With the Stoics, on the contrary, and in Post-Aristotelian philosophy generally, the question as to the criterion of truth acquired a, constantly increasing importance. The theories of the earliest Stoics respecting the conditions of the veracity of our cog- nitions, are rather indefinite. Zeno (according to Cic, Acad., II. 47) likened perception to the outstretched fingers, assent (ovyKaToBeatg) to the hand half closed, the mental apprehension of the object itself (KaTa?.iifi;) ' to the hand fully closed (the fist), and knowl- edge to the grasping of the fist by the other hand, whereby it was more completely and surely closed. "With this accords the Stoic definition of knowledge as the certain and incontestable apprehension, through the concept, of the thing known (Kard^^Y"? oaMyusiioX avairSSeiicroi), in which the Major Premise ^^^t|la) posited two terms as either standing or falling together, while the Minor Premise (T/KiffX^if) categorically affirmed or denied one of these terms, and the Conclusion (enuj>opd) stated what then resulted for the other term. Cf. Prantl, Gesch. der Log., I. pp. 461-406; Zeller, Philos. der dr., 2d ed., III. p. 98 sec(. 13 194 V THE PHYSICS OF THE 8X0:^38. § 54. Physics, with the Stoics, includes not only Cosmology, but also Theology. The Stoics teach that whatever is real is material. Matter and force are the two ultimate principles. Matter isper se motionless and unformed, though capable of receiving all motions and all forms^ Force is the active, moving, and molding principle. It is inseparably joined with matter. The working force in the universe is God. The world is bounded and spherical. It possesses a general unity, while containing the greatest variety in its several parts. The beauty and adaptation of the world can only have come from a thinking inind, and prove, therefore, the existence of Deity, Since the world con- tains parts endowed with self-consciousness, the world as a wholej which must be more perfect than any of its parts, can not be uncon- scious ; the consciousness which belongs to the universe is Deity. The latter permeates the world as an all-pervading breath, as artistically creative lire, as the soul and reason of the All, and contains the rational germs of all things (/Idyot anepfiariKoi). The formation of the world takes place by the transformation of the divine original fire into air and water ; of this water, one part becomes earth, another part remains water, and a third part is changed by evaporation to air, which, again, is subsequently rekindled into fire. The two denser elements, earth and water, are mainly passive ; the two finer ones, air and fire, are mainly active. At the end of a certain cosmical period all things are reabsorbed into the Deity, the whole universe being resolved into fire in a general conflagration. The evolution of the world then begins anew, and so on without end. The rise and decay of the world are controlled by an absolute necessity, which is only another expressioa for the subjection of nature to law or for the divine reason ; this necessity is at once fate (eljuipfiivri) and the providence (Trpdvoto); which governs all things. The human soul is a part of the Deity, or an emanation from the same ; the soul and its source act and. react upon each other. The soul is the warm breath in us. Although it outlives the body, it is yet perishable, and can only endure, at the longest, till the termination of the world-period in which it exists. Its parts are the five senses, the faculty of speech, the generative faculty, and the governing force (t6 fiye(ioviK6v)^ which is situated in the heart, and to which belong representations, desires, and under- standing. Of the natural philosophy, psychologj', and theology of the Stole?, treat Justus Llpslus {Phytiologia Staiconim, Antw. 1610), Jao. Thomaslns (/)« Stoic mrnicli tsmttione, Leipsic, 16T2), Mich. Sonntag (fl« palingmtiia Stoic, Jenn, 1700), Joh. Mich. Eern {Stoioanim Dogmata de Deo, Gott. 1T61), Oh. Meincra THE PHYSICS OF THE STOICS. 195 I /omm. de Stoicorum aenienfia de animorum pout mortem statu et fittis^ in his Verm, p7iilo9. Sdiriften^ A^ips. 1775-76. Vol. XL, pp. 265 seq.). Tb. A. Suabediesen {Cur pavci semper fuerint phyaiologia^ Stoi- wrajm sedatorea, Oassel, 1818), D. ZimmermaQn (Quae ratio phUoaophiae Sttdcae sit cum reliffione lio- inuTiu^ Erlangen, 1858), K. Eblers (Vis acpoteaUia^ qitam philoaophia fmtiqua, imprimia Platonica et Stoica^ in doctr. apologeiarum see 12. /labuerit, GOtt. 1859), O. Heine (Stoicorum de/ato doetrina^ anmn. PorteiiMa, Nuremhei^. 1859) — ct,0.'E.&\m (Stobaei Ectog.locinonnulli adSt.phUoa.pertin. emeTid., G. Pr«, Hirscliberg, 1869) — C. Wacliamutli {Die Ansiohten, der Stoiher uber Mantik und Vdmonen^ Berlin, 1860), F. Winter {i)toicoru7n pantheiamua et priticipia doctr. et/iicae qu&modo aint inter ae apta ac con* utsxa, e.-Pr,, Wittenberg, 1S6S). Theology and all other doctrines which Aristotle included under metaphysics, were assigned by the Stoics, for whom every thing real was material, to physics. But although they accorded to physics, as comprehending speculative theology, the highest rank among the philosophical disciplines, yet it was cultivated by them in fact with less zeal than was ethics. This is specially evidenced by the fact that they proceeded more independently in logic and ethics than in physics, for which they went back substantially to the Heraclitean natural philosophy. Instead of the four Aristotelian apxai or principles (matter, form, working cause, and final cause, which, indeed, Aristotle had himself already reduced, in a certain aspect, to two), the Stoics name two principles: to iroiom and to ndaxov, or the active and the passive principles. These principles are regarded by them as inseparably united in all forms of existence, including the highest. Hence they conceive the human and even the divine spirit, not as immaterial intelligence (vovg), but rather as force, embodied in the finest and highest material substances. The Stoics, therefore, differ from Aristotle, as Aristotle differed from Plato, and as Theophrastus (in a measure) and more especially Strato of Lampsacus and his followers differed from Aristotle, namely, in the increased tendency which tliey manifest to substitute the idea of immanence for that of transcendence. According to Diog. L., VII. 134, the Stoics defined the passive principle as unqualified substance (awoiog oiaia) or matter (v^v), and the active principle as the reason immanent in matter (o ev avT^ Myoc;) or Deity (6 fledf). The former is the constituent, the latter the formative principle of things (Senec, Epist, 6a. 2 : dicunt, ut scis, Sioici nostri, dut esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiaint, causam et materiam. Mxteria jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat. Causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumgue mUt, versat; ex ilia varia opera producit. Esse debet ergo, unde oMquid flat, deinde, a quo fiat: hoc catisa est, illud materia). The highest rational force dwells in the finest matter. The principle of life is heat (Cic, De Nat. Deorum, II. 9 : [according to the doc- trine of the Stoics] omne quod vivii, sive animal, sive terra ediium, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. Ex quo intelligi debet, earn, caloris naturam, vim, habere in se vitalem per mnnem, mundum pertinentem). This vital heat the Stoics derived from to mieijia 'S^irjuov it' oTiov Kittfuw (the spirit that pervades the whole world) or to vvp TexyiK&v (the artistically crea- tive or forming fire, in distinction from fire that consumes). Says Plutarch (De Stoic. Repugn., 41) : " Chrysippus teaches, in the first book of his irepl irpovoiac, that at certain periods the whole world is resolved into fire, which fire is identical with the soul of the world, the gov- erning principle or Zeus ; but at other times a part of this fire, a germ, as it were, detached from the whole mass, becomes changed into denser substances, and so leads to the existence of concrete objects distinct from Zeus." Again (ibid. 38) : " There was a beginning to the existence of the sun and moon and the other gods, but Zeus is eternal." That part of the ^Deity which goes forth from him for the formation of the world, is called the A6yo; OTrep/M- TiKof, or " seminal reason " of tlie world, and is resolved into a plurality of Uyot OTrepjiaTtKnl (Seit. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 101 ; Plutarch., Flac. Ph,, I. V). That the Stoic Boethus, and also Panaetius and Posidonius, abandoned the dogma of the burning up of the world, and 196 THE PHYSICS OF THE STOICS, J affirmed its imperishability, and that Diogenes, the Babylonian, in his old age, advanced at least so far as to entertain doubts of that dogma, is asserted by the author of the work which goes under the name of Philo, and is entitled ircpl cMapaia^ nda/uw, pp. 497 (ed. Mangey) and 502 (pp. 492-497 stand, in the manuscripts and published editions of the ■work, by several leaves too near the beginning, as is shown by J. Bernays in the Monaisber. der Berliner Akad. d. W., 1863, pp. 34-40; this section should be advanced to p. 502). Diog. L. (VII. 140) mentions, as doctrines of the Stoics, the unity, finitenesB, and pphericity of the world. Beyond the world exists an unlimited void. Time {ibid. 14]) is the extension of the motion of the world (StdoTTifia r^g Toi K6a/wv iavT/ae, 'Kanog yevS/ievo^j m)6ht ^ttov eipo/Ku, Chrysippus sought (according to Cic, De Fato., 18), by distinguishing between "prin- cipal" and "auxiliary" causes, to maintain the doctrine of fate, and yet to escape from that of necessity, asserting that fate related only to auxiliary causes, while the appeHtui remained in our own power. The human soul, as defined by the Stoics, is an inborn breath (Diog. L., Til. 156: to ovii^i; Tjiilv nveii/ia), or, more explicitly, an inborn breath extending continuously through the whole body (Chrysippus ap. Galen.j H.- et Plat. Flac., ed. Kuhn, Vol. V., p. 287 : nvev/ui o'u/iv7/r' cvl yalav, Tu ae KoSvfiviiau, mii ami Kparog alev aeiau. 2)o( 67) TTOf ois K6a/iog i^,iaa6/ievoc Trepl yalav Xlei'SeTai 5 Ksv ayyg /cat i/ciw inb aeio KpaTelTot, lolov exstg imoepyw OKiv^oig ivl x^fx'"', 'AfUpr/KTi, nvpdevTo, aei ^aovra Kepamdv, Tot) yap iTrS wXiiy^g piiaeu; nam' kp^iyaaiv. 'Qt ail Karev&vveiQ -koivov Myav, 8f dcd iravrotv ^irg /uyvv/tevo; . /i£y62oiQ lUKpdiq re ^dcaatv, "Of Tiaaog yeyaijg iiKaTo; paaiXEvg 6ia navrdg. Oiiii Ti yiyvsTai ipyov CTrt x^ovl aov Slxa, daifiov OvTS /cot' al-&epiov iJ«ov TrdXov, oir' em irovri^, nX^v imiaa pe^ovai Kami Oiperepriatv avo'uug, 'AMa av /cat rd vepiaaa. ewlaraaai apria ^eivat, Kal Koafietg rd axoa/ia, xal ov ipi^ia aot ^ila iariv. 'QJe yap e'lg en dwavra am^p/iOKag ia'S/ia KaKo'iatv, *i2ffi?' eva yiyvea&at iravruv Xoyov alev edvTa^ 'Ov ipevyovTeg euatv baoi iJvyruv Kami elaiv, Ava/iopoij oi r* dya^Civ fiht del kt^oiv Tro^iovreg Oit' eaoptoai '&eov koivov vdfiov, ovre KXvtyvatv^ 'S2i Kmi irec&d/ievoi aim vCi piav ea&Xov exoiev. AvToi (T aW oppiuaiv dvev KaTtmi a/Ouoc iir' aUa, Oi phi imp 66^rig avovStp} Svaipiarm) exovreg, Oi (T £7rt nepSoavvag Terpa/i/iivoi oiSevl xia/tiji, "AXXot e Errwilt^ti StoicmniTn in FhiloB. M<»'al% Halle, 16y5-96), C. A. Heuinimn i^De avroxnipia Philosophorum^ •maaimi iSioiayrum, Jena, 1708), Job. Jnc Dornfi^ld {De fine lumiims Stoico^ Leipbic, 1720), Christuph Meiners {^Ueber die Apathie der Staiker, in hia Verm, philos. Schrift&n^ Leips, 1775-76, 2d part, p. 180 seq.)) Joh. Neeb i^Verluiltniea der Stoiichen Moral zur Seligion^ Mayence, 1791), C. Ph. Conz (Abhandlungen aber die GescJdGhte und das MgenthilinlicfLe der spdteren sioiechen Philosopfiie^ nebet einem Vertrucfie iiher chrisUi^he^ JCtivtische imd Stoiaclie Morale Tub. 1794), J. A. L. Wcgschneider {Eihices Stoicorum recen- tionun /undamenia cum principiis etMces Kantianae compar.^ Hamb. 1797), Ant Kress [De Stoicontm supr&ino ethitio prindpio, Witt., 1797), Christian Garve (in the Introductory Essay prefixed to his transl. of Aristotle's Ethics, Vol. I.. Brcslau, 179S, pp. M-S9), E. G. Lilie {De Stoicorum philoaopMa monili, Altona, ISOO), Wilh. Traug. Krug {Zeiionis et Epicuri de summo bono doctrina cum KanHana contp.^ Wittenb., 180(1), Klippcl (Doctrlnae Stoicorwn etlmoae atgue Christ, eapoeilio, Cott 1828), J. C. F. Meyer {Stoicontm doctrvna eth'ica cum Christ, comp.^ Gott. 1828), Deichmnnn {De paradoseo Stoicorum^'omnia peccata paria esse., Marb. 1883), Wilb. Traug. Krug (De /ormulis^ quibus philosophi St&ici aummum bonum definierunt, Lcips. 1884), M. M. a Banmhauer (irepi t^9 evAoyou efoLYWT^s, veterttm pMIos.^ prae- cipue Stoic, doctrina de morie vohintaria, Utrecht, 1642), Mundlng {Die Grundsdtee der stoitehen Moral, Eottweil, 1S46, " Programm"), F. Eayaisson {De la morale des St., Paris, 1850), Guil. Gidionsen {De eo quod Stoid naturae conAjenienier vivendum esse principium ponvmt, Leips. 1852), M. Heinze {&oi- corum de affecKhus doctrina, Berlin, 1861, Stoicorum ethica ad origines suas relata, Kanmhurg, 16C2), Winter {Stoicorum. panllieism/us et principia doctrinoe ethicae quomodo sint inter se apta et cormecca, G.-Pr., Wittenb. 1868), Kuster {Die OrundsUge der stoiachen Tugendlelire, Progr. of the Werder-Gymn., Berlin, 1864). According to Stob., Eel, n. p. 122, the ethical end, as defined by Zeno, was Urmonv with one's self (rb 6fio7i.tyym/xhag tijuv T^;/ipiaEag atpopfiag), and Posidonius required men to live, having in view the true nature and order of all things (ro f^ S-eupovura t^v tuv Wmv afi^tuiv Kal rdfiv). Seneca was of opinion that the simple 6fw?ioyov/dvag was suffi- cient, since wisdom consisted "in always willing and rejecting the same things," and that the limitation "rightly" was also unnecessary, since "it was impossible for one to be always pleased with any thing which was not right." The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but self-conservation (Diog. L., VII. 85, expressing the doctrine of the first book of the Trtpi TeTuJv of Chry- sippus : npCirov otKeiov eivai iravTt ^6(f) rsyv avTov avcraaiv nal Tipi ravnjg awEiSriaiv). Plea- sure is the natural result {iTnyhwiJiia) of successful endeavor to secure what is in harmony with our nature. Of the various elements of human nature, the highest is reason, through' which we know the all-controlling law and order of the universe. Tet the highest duty' of man is not simply to know, but to follow obediently the divine order of nature. Chry- sippus (op. Plutarch., De St. Repugn., ch. 2) censures those philosophers who regard the speculative life as having its end in itself, and af&rms that in reality they practice only a finer species of Hedonism. (This only proves that to Chrysippus, as to the most of his contemporaries, the earnest labor of purely scientific investigation had become imfamiliar and incomprehensible.) Nevertheless, the Stoics affirm' that the right praxis of him, whose life is conformed to reason {fiiog T^oyiKdg), is founded on speculation (Beapia) and intimately blended with it (Diog. L., VII. 130). Virtue (^ecta ratio, Cic, Tmc, IV. 34) is a SidBccL^, i. e., a property in which (as in straightness) no distinction of more or less is possible (Diog. L., VII. 98 ; Simplia, in Ar. Cat., foL 61 b). It is possible to approximate toward virtue ; but he who only thus approximates is as really unvirtuous as the thoroughly vicious ; between virtue and vice (dp£T7 Kal xaKia) there is no mean (Diog. L., VII. 12'7). Cleanthes (in agreement with the 200 THE ETHICS OF THE STOICS. Cynics) declared that virtue could not be lost (avairdpi-VTOv), while Chrysippus affirmed the contrary {axojSljir^, Bipg. L., VII. 121). Virtue is sufficient for happiness (Cic, Faa-ad., 2 ; Diog. L., VII. 121), not because it renders us insensible to pain, but because it makes us superior to it (Sen., Ep., 9). In his practical relation to external things, man is to be guided by the distinction between things to be preferred {irpmryiJ-^va) and things not to be preferred (aTTponporiy/j,ha, Diog. L., VII. 105 ; Cic, Se Fin., III. 50). The former are not goods, but things possessing a certain value and which we naturally strive to possess ; among these are included the primary objects of our natural instincts (prima naturae). In our eflforts to obtain them we are to be guided by their relative worth. An action (ivkpyriim), which is conformed to the nature of the agent and which is therefore rationally justifiable, is befitting (icaBijKov) ; when it results from a virtuous disposition or from obe- dience to reason, it is Kadf/Kov in the absolute sense, or morally right action (Kardpdu/iaf Diog. L., VII. 101 seq. ; Stob., Scl, II. 158). N'o act as such is either praiseworthy or disgraceful ; even those actions which are regarded as the most criminal are good when done with a right intention; in the opposite .case they are wrong (Orig., c. Ce&, IV. 45; correct, by this passage in Origen, the statements of Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 190; Pyrrh. Myp., III. 245). Since life belongs in the class of things indifferent, suicide is per- missible, as a rational means of terminating life (ei/loyof ifayuj^; cf. Cic, De Fin., III. 60; Sen., Ep., 12; De Frov., ch. 6 ; Diog. L., VII. 130). All virtues were reduced by Zeno to (jip6miai^, practical wisdom, which, however, took in various circumstances the form of (distributive) justice, prudence, and courage (Plut., De Stoic. Repugn., 1; Plut., Viri. Mor., ch. 2: 6pit^6fimo^ tt/v ippdvjjaiv hv /isv anove/iTirioig Smai- offvv?;v, ev dt alpereoi^ (xafpouuv^, sv ds vTro/iEvsTeocg av5piav). Later Stoics, adopting the Pla- tonic enumeration of four cardinal virtues, defined moral insight as the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent; courage as the knowledge of things to be feared, of things not to be feared, and of things neither to be feared nor not to be feared ; prudence (self-restraint) as the knowledge of things to be sought or avoided, and of things neither to be sought nor avoided ; and justice as the distribution, to every person of that which belongs to him (swan cuique tribuens). In every action, of the sage all virtues are united (Stob., Eel, II. 102 seq.). The emotions, of which the principal forms are fear, trouble, desire, and pleasure (with reference to a future or present supposed evil or good), result from the failure to pass the right practical judgment as to what is good and what evil ; no emotion is either natural or useful (Cic, Fuse., III. 9, and IV. 19 ; Sen., B^., 116). The sage combines in himself all perfections, and is inferior to Zeus himself only in things non-essential. Seneca, De Frov., 1 : Bonus ipse tempore iantum a Deo differt. Chry- sippus (according to Plut, Adv. St., 33) : " Zeus is not superior to Dio in virtue, and both' Zeus and Dio, in so far as they are wise, are equally profited the one by the other." The fool should be classed with the demented (Cic, Faradox., 4; Tusc, HI. 5). 'WithOHt prejudice to his moral independence, the sage is a practical member of that community, in which all rational beings are included. He interests himself actively in the aflairs of the state, doing this with all the more willingness the more the latter approximates to the ideal state which includes all men (Stob., Ed., II. 186). The distinction between the wise and the unwise was conceived most absolutely by Zeno, who is said to have divided men peremptorily into two classes, the good (airovdaiot) and the bad ($ p', la, in SirculanmH'um volv/minutn quae sicpersimt, torn. II., Naples, 18C!>; torn. X., 1S50. Epicwri fragmenta librormn XI. et XL de natura^ voluminiMiB papyraceis ex Uerculano erutie reperta. ex torn, 11. volwrn. Hercul. etnendati^ia^ ed. J. Conr. Orcllius, Leips, 1S18. New fragments from tlie same work (which serve in part to correct and complete passages of Book XL, previously pnb- liahed) are contained In the sixth volume of the llercul. voll. collectio altera, of which the iirst part ap- peared at Naples in 1866. Metrodori Epicurei de 8en8i07iilyus c&mm.. In the llercid. voll., ITeapol., torn. YL, 1839. Idomenei LaTnpeaceni fragmenta, in Fragm.. hist. Graec, yol. II,, Paris, 1S48. IIoAvtrTpaTow Trepi oKiymt Karai^povriaeioi (in part well preserved) in the Hercul., Vol. IV., Naples, 1832. Phaedri Epicurei, mdgo Anonymi Merculanevsie, De l^atura Detyncm /rag^ientum, ed. Brummond {IJereu^ lanensitt, London, 1810); ed. Petersen, Hamburg, 1S8S. (The title should bo, rather: tfjtKoS^ixov vepi eutAo5^/Aov wept KoKtiav, 'AvtovvijLov wept opyri^, etc, in the UerculanenHum voluminum, p. I., II,, Oxford, 1824-25, Leonh. Spengel, Dae vierte Buch der liJietorih dee Philodemua in den IlercidaneneiBchen liollen, in tbo Trans, of the Bavarian Academy (philos. CI.), Vol. III., 1st div., p, 207 seq., Munich, 1840. Philodemi jrept KaKiiav liber dedmue, ad vol. llercul. exempla yeapolitanum et Oxonienee distinait, eupplevit, explicavit Herm. Sanppe, Leips. 1853, Philod. Abh. Uber den llochrmith and Theophr. Ilaiteh. u. CharakterbUder ; Greek text and German translation by J. A. Hartung, Leips. 1357, llerculanen«ivjm voluminvnn quae superewnt colleeUo altera. Tom. J. seq. : PMlode/mi irepl Kaxiuv Kdit. rZiv kvuK^iiLivtav kptrutv, et : jrepl opy^?, etc,. Nap, 1861 seq, Philodemi Epicurei deiraliber,epapyro Hercul. ad Jidem exemplorum Oteoniensis et Keapolitani, ed. Theod, Gomperz, Leips, 1864, Uercu- lanische Siudien, by Theod, Gomperz, First Part: Philodem Hber l7iduction^acIili28se (^lAofiiJ^oi/ n-epi ff»j/xctW Kdi c- mann (8clbedia*ma d6 ^pievH, ilisologia. md. acJwl.., Greifswald, 1864) ; his doctrine of the mortality nf the soul, by Joa. Beisacker (Der Todeageclavke hei dm, Griechen, eine hiatoHsdM Eniwi(skel'mig,mit tmonderer Ruckeicht avf Epieur wnd den rdmitchen Dichter J/iicres, G.-Pr., Trier, 1862). Of., also, F. A. Lange^s GeechicMe dee Materialiamue and hiu J/. Beitrage sfur Oesch. des Mat,^ Wiuterthur, 186T. At the head of his physios Epicurus places the principle : " Nothing can come from nothing,'' together with its correlate: " The existent can not become non-existent " {mdh yiverai in. tov /i^ bvTof, and oviev ^^eiptrai eig rd fj.^ bv, Ep., ap. Diog. L., X. 38). Of things corporeal, some are composite and some (all others) are the constituent parts of which the former are compounded (i6., 40 seq.). Continued division of the composite mnst at last bring us to ultimate indivisible and unchangeable elements (aro/ia Kal a/ieraph/ra), unless every thing is to be resolved into the non-existent. All these indivisible and primi- tive elements are indeed of various magnitudes, but they are too small to be separately visible. They have no qualities beyond magnitude, shape, and gravity. Their number is infinite. Farther, if that which we call vacuum and space or place did not exist, there would be nothing in which bodies could exist and move. Whatever is material has three dimensions and the power of resistance (rd rpixy dtaaraTbv ftera avrtrmia^, Sext. Emp, Adv. Math., I. 21 et al.); empty space is intangible nature (0« Epicurus, in order to explain how the atoms first came in contact with each other, ascribes to them a certain power of individual or arbitrary self- determination, in virtue of which they deviated slightly from the direct line of fall (Lucret, II. 216 seq. ; Cic, De Fin., I. 6, De Nat Dear., I. 25, etc.). He thus attributes in some sort to atoms that species of freedom (or rather that independence of law) which he attributes to the human will. ' The motion of the atoms is not directed by the idea of finality. The Empedoclean opinion (Arist., Phys., II. 8, De Part. Anim., I. 1), that among >»the numerous fortuitous creations of nature which first arose, only a few wei'e capable of prolonged life and con- served their existence, while the rest perished, was renewed by the Kpicureans. Lucretiug Bays (De Rerum Nat., I., 1020 seq.): THE EPIOUEEAS PHYSICS. 207 Nam certe neque consilio primordia reru/m Ordine se qwaeque atque sagaci menie loca/nmt, Nee quos quaeque darent motus pepigere profecto: Sed quia multa modis muUis mutata p^ omne Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis, Omne germs mottts et coeius experiv/ndo. Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras, Quaiiints haec rebus consistit summa areata. The theory of a iivine guidance of the affairs of nature was also expressly denied by Epicurus himself. Says Epicurus (op. Diog. L., X. T6 seq.): "It must not be supposed that the motions of the stars, their rising and setting, their eclipses and the like, are effected and regulated, or that they have been once for all regulated by a being possessing at the same time complete blessedness and immortality ; for labor and care and anger and favor are not compatible with happiness and self-sufficiency." A world {xdafioc) is a section of the infinite universe, containing stars, an earth, and every variety of phenomena {izeptox^ rcg ovpavov^ aarpa re kol yijv Kat rravra rd ipatvdfieva mpiixavaa, iiroro/i^v exovaa awo tov atreipov, Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 88). The number of such worlds is infinite ; they are not eternal ab initio, nor will tBey endure forever (ibid. 88, 89). The real and apparent magnitudes of the sun and the other heavenly bodies are the same ; for if the effect of distance were to reduce (apparently) their (real) magnitude, the same must be true of their brilliancy, which nevertheless remains evidently undiminished. The gods of the popular faith exist, and are imperishable and blessed beings. We possess a distinct knowledge of them, for they often appear to men and leave behind representa- tive images {rrpoXr/Tpeig) in the mind. But the opinions of the mass of men respecting the gods are false assumptions {mokfyijiet^ ipEvdelc), containing much that is incongruous with the idea of their immortality and blessedness (Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 123 seq. ; Cic, Be Nat. Dear., I. 18 seq.). The gods are formed of the finest of atoms, and dwell in the void spaces between the different worlds (Cic, De Nat. Dear., II. 23 ; De Div., II. 17 ; Lucret., I. 59; III. 18 seq.; V. 141 seq.). The sage finds his motive for revering them, not in fear, but in admiration of their excellence. The Soul is defined by Epicurus (ap. Diog. L., X. 63) as a aa/ia ^tTrrofispic Tnp' oAov t4 i8pou7/ia Trapsa-rrap/ihov (see above, p. 206). It is most similar in nature to air ; its atoms are very different from those of fire ; yet in its composition a, certain portion of warm substance is united with the aeriform. In death the atoms of the soul are scattered (Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 64 seq. ; Lucr., III. 418 seq.). After this resolution of the soul into its constituent atoms, sensation ceases ; the cessation of which is death (aTspJiaig aladT/aeu^). When death comes, we no longer exist, and so long as we exist, death does not come, so that for us death is of no concern (6 BdvaroQ ovShv npoQ rijia^, Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 124 seq. ; Lucret., III. 842 seq.). Nothing is immaterial except empty space, which can effect nothing ; the soul, therefore, which is the agent of distinct operations, is material (Epic, Olid. X. 67). The doctrine of material effluxes from things and of images (elSuXa), which were sup- posed necessary to perception, was shared by Epicurus with Democritus. These images, types (riijroj), were represented as coming from the surface of things and making their way through the intervening air to the visual faculty or the understanding (eif riyv ir^iv ^ riyv iiavotav; Diog. L., X. 46-49; Bipimri fragm. libr. II. et XL, de natura, Lucret., IT. 33 seq.). There is no fate (eifmpidvij) in the world. That which depends on us is not subject to 208 THE EPICUBEAH ETHICS. the influence- of any external power (ro nap' ^/ilv aiiairorov), and it is our power of free self-determination which maltes us proper subjects of praise and blame (Epic, ap. Diog. L, X. 133; cf. Cic, Acad., 11. 30 ; Oe Fato, 10. 21 ; Be Nat. Deorum, I. 25). The interest of Epicurus in his natural philosophy turns essentially on the disproof of theological explanations and the establishment of tlie naturalistic principle, and not on the determination of completed scientific truth. § 59. The Epicurean Ethics is founded on the Ethics of the Cyre- niaics. In it the highest good is defined as happiness. Happiness, according to Epicurus, is synonymous with pleasure, for this is what every being naturally seeks to acquire. Pleasure may result either from motion or from rest. The former alone was recognized by the Cyrenaics ; but this pleasure, according to Epicurus, is only necessary when lack of it gives us pain. The pleasure of rest is freedom from pain. Pleasure and pain, further, are either mental or bodily. The more powerful sensations are not, as the Cyrenaics affirmed, bodily, but mental ; for while the former are confined to the moment, the latter are connected with the past and future, through memory and hope, which thus increase the pleasure of the moment. Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, others natural but not ne- cessary, and still others neither natural nor necessary. Not every species of pleasure is to be sought after, nor is every pain to be shunned ; for the means employed to secure a certain pleasure are often followed by pains greater than the pleasure produced, or involve the loss of other pleasures, and that, whose immediate efiect is pain- fiil, often serves to ward ofi^ greater pain, or is follow.ed by a pleas- ure more than commensurate with the pain immediately produced. Whenever a question arises as to the expediency of doing or omit- ting any action, the degrees of pleasure and pain wliich can be foreseen as sure to result, whether directly or indirectly, from the commission of the act, must be weighed and compared, and the question must he decided according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the f()reseen result. The correct insight necessary for this comparison is the cardinal virtue. From it flow all other virtues. The virtuous man is not necessarily he who is in the possession of pleasure, but he who is able to proceed rightly in the quest of pleasure. But since the attainment of the highest possible amount of pleasure in connection with the smallest possible amount of pain, depends on a correct praxis, and since the latter, in turn, is dependent on correct insight, it follows that the virtuous man alone is able to attain the end de- scribed ; on the other hand, the virtuoiiB man will attain it without THE EPICUKEAN ETHICS. 209 failure. Virtue, then, is the only possible and the perfectly sure way to happiness. The sage, who as such possesses virtue, is consequently always happy. Duration of existence does notiaffect the measure of his happiness. The Moral Philosophy of the Epicureans is specially treated of by Des GontnreB (Paris, 1685, another edition, enlarged by Kondel, Hague, 16S6), Batteux (Paris, 1T58), and Garve (in connection with his transl. of Aristotle's Ethics, Vol. I., Brcslan, 1798, pp. 90-119); cf., also, E. Platner, Ueher die atoiache imd Epi- kureiacht Srkldrtmg vom VrspruTig de» Vergniigmi, in tho ^eue Bibl. der echoiien Wiai., Vol, 19. Epicurus' own declarations respecting the principles of ethics may be read in Book X. of Diogenes L., especially in the letter from Epicurus to Menceceus (X. 122-135). Exact- ness in definition and rigid deduction do not there appear as arts in which Epicurus was pre-eminent. He utters his ideas loosely, in the order in which they occur to him, and with all the indeterminateness of iinelahorated thought. He takes no pains to be exact and systematic, his only aim being to provide rules of easy practical application. The principla of pleasure comes to view in the course of the progress of his discussion in the following terms (X. 128): fj6ov^ '"■PXVV "O' tOm^ ^yo/iEV elvat tov /lOKaplug l,fp/, and in defense of it Epicurus adds (X. 129), that in pleasure we are cognizant of the good which is first among all goods and congenial to our nature (iya^im irpCyrav xm avyyevtiM), the beginning of all our choosing and avoiding, and the end of all our action, sensation being the criterion by which we judge of every good. But previously to the formulation of this doctrine, many rules of conduct are given, the various species of desires are discussed, pleasure and freedom from . pain are discoursed upon, and, in particular, the principle, by which we are to be guided in our acts of choice or avoidance, is defined (X. 128) as health and mental tranquillity (i/ Toii aa/iaTo; iyteta mi ij T^g inixw aTapa^ia), in which happiness becomes complete (iirri Toiro TOW ftaicapiui ^Tjv iart re/lof). Epicurus nowhere states in the form of a definition what we are to understand by pleasure (j/tSov^), and what he says of the relation of posi- tive to negative pleasure (as the absence of pain) is very indefinite. In tlie letter referred-^ to, after an exhortation to all men to philosophize in every period of life, to the end that fear may be banished and happiness (t^ evSai/ioviav) attained (X. 122), follows, first (123- 127), instruction respecting the gods and respecting death, and then (127) a classification of desires {iiri8v/iiai). Of the latter, we are told that some are natural (ijwaiKai), others empty (xevai). Of the natural desires, some are necessary (avayxaiai), while the others are not necessary (fvaiKai /i&vov). Those which are natural and necessary, are necessary either for our happiness (sr/iof evSai/ioviav, which is obviously taken in a narrower sense than before), or for the preservation of the body in an untroubled condition (n-pof t^v tov ■ aaiiaTQi aoxMiaiav), or for life itself (ffpof avrb rb f^v). (In another place, Diog. L., X. U9, -the desires are classified simply as either natural and necessary, or natural and not necessary, or neither natural nor necessary : desires of the first class aim at the removal of pain ; those of the second at the diversification of pleasure ; and those of the third at the gratification of vanity, ambition, and empty conceits generally. This classification is criti- oiaed with unjust severity by Cicero, /JeJi*., 11. oh. 9.) Proper attention to these distinc- tions, according to Epicurus {ap. Diog. L., X. 128), will lead to the right conduct of life, to health and serenity, and consequently to happiness (jiamplac fyv). For, he continues, the object of all our actions is to prevent pain either of the body or of the mind (oirt P^Te a^yiiptv, fi^re rap^a/iev). We have need of pleasure (^dov?!) then, when its absenc* brings us pain, and only then. Pleasure is, therefore, the starting-point and the end of piness. (How the two statements : " Pleasure is the ethical principle " and " We 14 210 THE EPICUEEAN ETHICS. have need of it only when its absence brings us pain," can be reconciled, or how one ii the consequence of the other, it is difficult to say ; for if really the end of all our actioa is only to secure our freedom from pain, and if we have no need of pleasure except when its absence would be painful, pleasure is obviously not an end but a means.) After the (above-given) brief justification of the hedonic principle (X. 129), Epicurns labors to disprove the mistaken idea that all kinds of pleasure are worthy to be sought after. He admits that every pleasure, without distinction, is a natural and therefore a good thing, and that every pain is an evil, but demands that, before deciding in favor of a given pleasure or against a certain pain, we weigh its consequences {av/i/iirp^ai^), and that we then adopt or reject it according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the result In the light of this principle, Epicurus then recommends, with special emphasis, modera- tion, the accustoming of one's self to a simple manner of life, abstinence from costly and intemperate enjoyments, or, at most, only a rare indulgence in them, so that health may be preserved and the charm of pleasure may remain undiminished. To give greater force to his recommendations, he returns to the proposition, that the proper end of life is freedom from bodily and mental suffering (ji^re aXyelv Kara cdjia, fiiiTz rapd-Teadai Kara ijwx^). Right calculation is the essence of practical wisdom, which is the highest result of phi- losophy and the source of all other virtues (Diog. L., X. 132). It is impossible to live agreeably (^iJeuf) without living prudently, decently, and uprightly (e Notione atque Indole &epUoismi, nominaUm Pyrrhonismi, Altd. 1796), E. Brodereen (De philoe. Pyrrlwniis, Kiel, 1 819), J. E. Thorbecke '{Quid inter academ. et ecept inter/. ^ Leyden, 1821); on Timon, see Jos. F. Langheim-ich (ZJms. tree de Timone eiilograptio^ ace. ^usdemfraffnwtita^ Leips. 1720-24), and, of more recent writers, Wachsmuth {De limone PMuMio ceterixqiie sillographis Graecie, Leips. 1869); of., respecting the general subiect of Sllloi among the Greeks, Franz Anton Wolke ( Wnrschau, 1820), and Friedr. Paul (Berlin, 1821). Fragments of the writings of Timon are found in the Anthology published by F. Jacobs, from the Palatine Codex (Leips. 1813-17). C£ D. Zimmermann, Ifaratellun^ der Pyrrh. Ph.., Erl. 1841 ; Veber Urspr. u. Bedeutwng der Pyrrh. P/t.,'ib. 1843; Commentatio^ qua Timonis Pliliasii aiUorum reliquiae a Sexto Empirieo traditae empltmantiir {G.-Pr.\ ib. 1865. Saisset treats of .^nesidemus, in Le Scepticieme: Aenesideme, Pascal., £ant, 2d ed., Paris, 1S67. For the literature relating to the Middle Academy, see above, § 44, p. 134. For the editions of the two works of Sextus Empiricus {Pyrrhon. Institvt. JAhr. II I. ^ and Confy-a MatJiematicos Libri XI,\ see above, § 7, p. 21. Cf. L. Kayser, Ueber Sextue Empir. Sdirift Trpoy Aoyticouf, in the Rhein. Miie. f. Ph., new series, VIL 1860, pp. 161-190 ; C. Jonrdain, Sexi. Empir. et la PhUoHophie Scolastique, Paris, 1858. Cf. Tafel, Oeecli. dee Skepticiemite, T&bingen, 18S4 ; Norman Maccoll, The Greek Skept^jcafrom Pyrrho to Sextue, London and Cambridge, 1669. Pyrrho of Blis (about 360-270 B. c.) is said (Diog. L., IX. 61, cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math., Til. 13) to have been a pupil of Bryso (or Dryso), who was a son and disciple of Stilpo; yet this statement is very doubtful, since Bryso, if he was really a son of Stilpo, must have been younger than Pyrrho ; according to other accounts, Bryso was a disciple of Socrates or of Euclid of Megara, Socrates' disciple. Perhaps this Bryso, disciple of Socrates, was the Bryso of Heraclea, from wliose dialogues, according to Theopompus, ap. Athenseus, XI. p. 608, Plato was said to have borrowed considerably (perhaps, in particular, in the Theae- 214 BKEPnCISM. tetua ?). He seems to have thought highly of the doctrines of Demooritiis, but to have hated most other philosophers, regarding them as Sophists (Diog. L., IX. 67 and 69). He accom- panied Anaxarohus, the Democritean, of the suite of Alexander the Great, on his military campaigns, as far as India. He became of the opinion, that nothing was beautiful or hate- ful, just or unjust, in reality (tj aXiy&ip, Diog. L.,, IX. 61, for which we find ^ei, ib. 101, and in Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., XI. 140) ; in itself every thing was just as much and just 'as little (ouSev fiaUov) the one as the other ; every thing depended on human institution and custom. Hence Pyrrho taught that real things were inaccessible to human knowledge or incomprehensible {aKaTahi^ia), and that it was our duty to abstain from judging {eKoxi). The external circumstances of human hfe are all indifferent (adia^pov) ; it becomes the wise man, whatever may befall him, always to preserve complete tranquillity of mind, and to allow nothing to disturb his equanimity (arapa^la, Diog. L., IX. 61, 62, 66-68; cf. Cic, De Mn., II. 13 ; III. 3 and 4 ; IT. 16 : Pyrrho, qui viriute amstituta, nihil omnvno quod appetendum sit, relinquat). The Pyrrhonists were termed (according to Diog. L.. IX. 69) doubters (airopttTiKoi), skeptics (ffKETrriKoi), suspenders of judgment {e(peKnKol), and inquirers {i;vTTrnKol). Pyrrho himself developed his views only orally (Diog. L., Proem, 16; IX. 102). It was thus easy for his name to become -^ typical one, and for many views to be ascribed to him b;' later disciples and writers, which were only the views of the school. The most correct reports of his doctrines are those which are derived from the writings of Timon, his disciple (termed by Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., I. 53 : 6 jrpo^yTT/f Tim Uippauot X6yuv). As immediate disciples of Pyrrho, Diog. L. (IX. 67, 69) names, among -others, Philo of Athens, Nausiphanes of Teos, the Democritean, who afterward became a teacher of Epi- curus, and, as the moat eminent of all, Timon of Phliua. Timon (born about 325, died about 235 B. c), whom (according to Diog. L., IX. 109) Stilpo, the Megarian, had instructed before Pyrrho, was the author of satirical poems, 'Z'M.ot, in three books, in which he treated and reviled as babblers all the Greek philosophers, except Xenophanes, who, lie said, had sought for the real truth, disengaged from useless subtleties, and Pyrrho, who found it. In opposition to the assertion, that the truth was known through the co-opera- tion of the senses and the intellect, Timon, who held both to be deceptive, repeated the verse: "Attagas and Nuraenius" (two notorious cheaters) "came together" (arv^/Sev 'Arrayof re koX Noji/i^(Of). According to Aristocles {pp. Euseb., Praepar. Evang., XIV. 18), Timon appears to have developed the main thesis of skepticism in the following manner : He who would attain to happiness must consider- three things : 1) the nature of things, 2) how we are to conduct ourselves with reference to them, 3) the (theoretical and prac- tical) result flowing from this conduct. There exist no fixed differences among things; all things are unstable and can not be judged of by us. Owing to tlie instability of things our perceptions and representations are neither true nor false, and can therefore not be relied upon. Adopting this view, we become non-committal (we decide, say nothing) or free from all theoretical bias (a^aia), and thus secure imperturbableness of mind, (arapa^ia). This state of mind follows our suspension of judgment (inoxv) as its shadow (oKiai rpdirov, Diog. L., IX. 107). The subject of doubt is not what appears (the phenomenon), but what is. Says Timon (ap. Diog., IX. 105): "That a thing is sweet I do not affirm, but only admit that it appears so." In his work entitled HiBiM, Timon (according to Diog. L., IX. 76) explained his expression, ov6ev lioAkcrv, as equivalent to firi&hi ipiZeiv or airpoaBerelv (we determine nothing and assent to nothing). The grounds for every proposition and its contradictory opposite show themselves equally strong QaooBheia rav /u6yov). Another expression for the skeptical withholding of one's judgment Is a'pfis-pia, or equilibrium (ihid. 74). The ovdcv fiaXTiov is intended by the Skeptics to be taken, not in the positive SKEPTICISM. 215 sense of asserting real equality, but only in a privative sense (oh BeuKug, aW avaipenKin), aa when it is said, "Soylla exists no more than the Chimaera," i. e., neither exists {Had. 15). All these principles, after being first applied against the assertions of the dogmatists, were finally to be applied to themselves, in order that in the end not even these prin- ciples should retain the character of fixed assertions ; just as every other /■(ij'Of, or asser- tion, could be met by a contradictory assertion, so also could these (ib., 16, given, apparently, as an affirmation of Timon). In this position, obviously, Skepticism, carrying its own prin- ciple to the extreme, at last destroys itself; besides, the Slteptics, while arguing against the force of logical forms, could not but employ them themselves, thus conceding to them in fact the force which their theory denied them (except, of course, in so far as the employ- ment of them from the Skeptical stand-point was declared to be merely hypothetical, and Intended merely to show that if they were valid they might be turned against themselves, and were thus self-destructive). The later Skeptics, who styled themselves Pyrrhonists, were accustomed to define the difference between the members of the Middle Academy (see above, § 44) and the Pyrrho-. nistio doubters, by saying that the Academics of the schools of Arcesilas and Carneades asserted that they knew only one thing, viz. : that nothing was knowable, while the Pyr- rhonists denied even this one supposed certainty (Sext. Emp., Hypotyp. Pyrrhon., I. 3, 226, 233 ; ef Gell., N. A., XI. 6, 8). But this appreciation is incorrect in what concerns tho Academics ; for neither Arcesilas (Cic, Acad. Post, I. 12, 45) nor Carneades (Cic, Acad. Pr., II. 9, 28) ascribed to the theses of Skepticism complete certainty. It is correct, only to say, in general, that the Skepticism of the Academics was less radical than that of the Pyrrhonists, but not for the reason above cited, but because it admitted a theory of proba- bility (against which Sext. Emp. contends, Adv. Math., VII. 435 seq.), and, in what con- cerns Arcesilas, because this philosopher (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I.. 234, and others) employed his method of negative criticism only as a preliminary to the com- munication of Plato's teachings (provided, for the rest, that this statement is exact or referred to the right person). There existed besides a very important difference between the Academic and the Pyrrhonic Skeptics, in that the latter only, and not the Academies, saw in ataraxy the supreme end of philosophy. After that the Academy (in the persons of Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, and their successors) had gone over to an eclectic dogmatism, the Skeptical doctrine of Pyrrho was renewed, especially by .lEnesidemus. .^nesidemus of Cnossus appears to have taught at Alexandria in the first century after Christ. He wrote nyppcweiav My(jv bicTto jSi^Ua (Diog. L., IX. 116), of which Photius {Bibl. cod., 212) prepared an abridgment, which is still extant, but is very brief. His stand-point is not that of pure Skepticism, since he proposed, by the employment of the skeptical principle, to lay the foundation for a renewed Heraclitism. He proposed (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 210) to show first that contradictory predicates appeared to be applicable to the same thing, in order to break tho ground for the doctrine that such predicates were in reality thus appli- cable. With him doubt was not doctrinal, but directive (ayu)'^). The ten ways (rpoKoi) of justifying doubt, which, according to Sext. Empir., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 36, were traditional among the earlier Skeptics (n-apd roZf apxaioTipm^ (nceirriKol^), appear to have been first enumerated in his work, and not in that of Timon ; Sextus treats Agrippa as the first of the "Later Skeptics." The ten tropes (otherwise termed Uyoi or Td-KOi) were, according to Sext. Empir. (Byp. Pyrrh., I. 36 seq.) and Diog. L. (IX. 19 seq.) severally as follows : The first was derived from the difierent constitution of the various classes of animated beings, resulting in differences in their modes of apprehending the same objects, of which modes it was impossible to decide which, if either, was correct ; the second was drawn 216 SKEPTICISM. from the different constitution o. different men, whence the same result as hefore ; thei third, from the different structure of the several organs of sense ; the fourth, from the variability of our physical and. mental conditions; the fifth", from the diversities of appear- ance due to position, distance, and place ; the sixth, from the fact that no object can be perceived by itself alone, apart from all others ; the seventh, from the various appearance of objects as determined by quantity, size of parts, and the like ; the eighth, from the gen- eral relativity of all our knowledge (and this, as is correctly remarked by Sext. Kmpir. [Syp. Pyrrh., I. 39 ; cf Gell., XI. 5, 1], is the substance of all skeptical tropes) ; the ninth, from the variations in our notions of objects, according as we perceive them more or less frequently; and the tenth, from diversities of culture, customs, laws, mythical notions, and philosophical theories. The later Skeptics, beginning with Agrippa (the fifth, successor of ^nesidemus), and in- eluding Sextus, the empirical, or, as he preferred to be called (see Byp. Pyrrh, I. 236 seq.; Adv. Math., VIII. 321), the methodical physician (about 200 A. D.), and his pupil Saturninna (Diog. L., IX. 116), and others (with whom, among others, Favorinus of Arelate, the gram- marian and antiquarian, who lived at Rome and Athens under Hadrian, and was the teacher of A. Gellius, seems to have agreed), enumerated, as reasons for "eirox'^," or the suspen- sion of judgment, five tropes (see Sext. Emp., Byp. Pyrr., I. 164 seq. ; Diog. L., IX. 88 seq.). The first of these was founded on the discrepancy of human opinions respecting the same objects ; the second pointed to the regress in infinitum involved in proof, since whatever is proved, is proved by that which itself needs proof, and so on without end ; the third was taken from the relativity of things, all of which vary in appearance according to the con- stitution of the percipient and according to their relations to other things with which they are combined ; the fourth called attention to the arbitrariness of the fundamental prin- ciples of the dogmatists, who, in order to avoid the regressvs in infinitam, set out in their proofs from some pre-supposition, , whose truth they illegitimately assumed ; the fifth pointed out the usual circle in demonstration, where that on which the proof rests must itself be established by that which is to be proved. According to Sext. Empir., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 118 seq., still later Skeptics maintained the two following tropes: 1) Nothing is certain of itself, as is proved by the discrepancy of opinions concerning all that is per- ceptible or thinkable ; and, therefore, 2) nothing can be made certain by proof, since the latter derives no certainty from itself,' and, if based on other proof, leads us either to a regressus in infinitum, or to a circle in demonstration. To disprove the possibility of demonstration, Sextus advanced a series of arguments, of which the most noticeable was this {Syp. Pyrrh., II. 134 seq.), that every syllogism moves in a circle, since the major premi.se, on which the proof of the conclusion depends, depends for its own certainty on a complete induction, in which the conclusion must have been already contained. (Cf. Hegel, Log., II. p. 151 seq.; Encyd., § 190 seq., and the remarks in my System of Logic, under § 101.) Of special interest and importance are the skeptical arguments against the validity.of the notion of causality, reported, apparently after ^nesidemus, in Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 207 seq. A cause is a relativum, for it is not to be conceived without that which it causes ; but the relative has no existence {oiix impxet) except in thought^eiriroeiTat /idvai'). Turther, in each case cause and effect must be either synchronous, or^e former must pre- cede or follow the latter. They can not be synchronoijs, for ttien cause and effect would as such be indistinguishable, and each could with equal reason be claimed as the cause of the other. Nor can the cause precede its effect, since a cause is no cause until that exists of which it is the cause. Lastly, the supposition that the cause follows its effect is without sense, and may be abandoned to those fools who habitually invert the natural ECLECTICISM. OICEEO. ^THE SEXTIANg. 217 order of things. Other arguments against causality are. also adduced by Sextns; the characteristic fact in connection with them is that that argument is not included among tliem, which in modern times (since Hume) has had most \i^ight, namely, that the origin of the notion of causality can not be so accounted for, as to justify our relying upon it as a form of cognition. (Of Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., 1st ed.. III. p. 474 ; 2d ed., III. b, p. 38 seq.) Theology, also, and especially the Stoic doctrine of providence, were among the objects ofSlteptioal attaclc in the later period of Slceptioism. The arguments employed in this connection were derived especially from Carneades (Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 131 seq.: Byp. Pyrrh., III. 2 seq.), and were drawn principally from the evil in the world, which God either could not or would not prevent, both of which suppositions were incompatible with the idea of God. Tet the Skeptics explained that thgir intention was not to destroy the behef in the existence of gods, but simply to combat the argumsnts and the pretended knowledge of the dogmatic philosophers. § 61. A tendency, more or less decided, toward Eclecticism, is manifest in all the dogmatic philosophy of the later portion of an- tiquity, and especially in the period of tlie propagation of Greek philosophy in the Roman world. The most important and influen- tial representative of this tendency is Cicero, who, in what pertains to the theory of cognition, confessed his adhesion to the skepticism of the Middle Academy, took no interest in physics, and in ethics wavered between the Stoic and the Peripatetic doctrines. The school of the Sextians, who flourished for a short time at Eome, about the beginning of the Christian era, seems to have occit- pied a position intermediate between Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism. Edward Zeller (in No. 24 of the first series of the Sanvmhing g&meinverstdndllicher wiea. Vortraffe., od. by Eud. Virchow and Fr. v. Holtzendort^ Berlin. 1866) treats of religion and philosophy nmon^ the Ramana. Amon^ the earlier treatises on the pliilosophy of Cicero may be mentioned those of Jason de Nores {Cic. Philna. de Vita et Moribue, Padua, 1597), Ant. Bucher (Ethiaa Oieeroniana, Hamb. 1610), J. C. Wal- din (De philosophia Oiceronia Platonica, .Jena, 17.^), Chr. Meiners (Orat. de philoe. Ciceronia. ejuaque in wniversam philoa. meritia, in his Verm. pMloa. JSchr., Vol. I,, 1775, p. 274 seq.), H. C. F. HQlsemann (De indole pMloaophica Ciceroni^, Luneb. 1799), Gedlke's Collation of those passages in Cicero which relate to the history of philosophy (Berlin, 1782,1801, 1814)— which is more Taluablo as an expoae of Cicero's philosophical conceptions, than as a contribution to the history of philosophy — .and the annotations and dis- cuBslons appended by Christian Garve to his translation of the Z>6 Ojfficiia (Breslau, 1783, 6th ed., ih. 1819), as also Krische's Forachungen (Gott. 1840, see above, p. 23) and^Eitter's minute exposition of the phi- losophy of Cicero in his Geach. der PMloa., IV. pp. 106-176 [Morrison's English translation of E.'s //iat. of Philna, London, 1846, Vol. IV., pp. 99-160.— TV.] More recent works worthy of menlion are those of J. P. Horbart ( Ueber die Philoa. de.a Oic., Werke, Vol. XXL, pp. 167-1 82), Karl Salom. Zachari.ic (Stnatauwaen- adui/Uiclie Betrachtungen iiber Cicero'a wiedergefundmea Werk mm Staate, Ileidclb. 1S23), Lotheisen iOicero'a Grundaatae und Beurtheihmg dea Sclionen. Brieg, 1825). Eanh. Kuhncr (if, Tvlii Ciceronit in pMloaopMam ejiuque partes merita, Hamburg, 1826), J. A. C. van Heusrte (M. Tulliua (Hcero (fnAon-AaTcoi', Traj. ad, Jihen. 1836), Banmhauer (2)6 AristoteMa m in Cie. acripUa. Utrecht, 1S4I), C. F. Hermann (Z>« interpretatlone Timaei dialogi a Cic relicta, Progr., Gott. 1842), .J. Klein {Defontilma Topicorum Cice- ronia, Bonn, 1844), Legeay (jV. TulUvi Cicero pkiloaophiae hiatnricua, Leyden, 1846), C. Crume ((>«id Graecui Cicero in philoanphia, quid aihi debuerit, G.-Pr., Dusseldorf, 1865), Havestadt {De Cic. primia prinoipiis philoaophiae moralia, G.-Pr., Emmerich, 1857), A. Desjardins (Z)e acientia cvnili apud Cic, Beauvais, 1857), Burmcister (Cie. ula Neu-Akademiker, G.-Pr., Oldenburg, 1860), Hofig (Cicero'a Anaicht ton der Staaiereli.gion, G.-Pr., Krotoschin, 1868), C. M. Bernhardt (De Cicerone Graecae philoaopliia 218 BCLEOTIOISM. CICEEO. THE SEXHANS. tvterpreU, " Progrr of the rr.-Wllh.-Gymn, Berlin, 18«5), F. Hosier (JTeber dae YerluiUnim der held, machen und ckriatliehen EtMh avf Gnmd einer Vergleichimg det (Xairmiianitelien Bushes De OffleiU tnit dem gleUihntmvigen des lieUigen Ambronius, Munich, 1S66), G. BarzelottI {Pelle dottrine JiloBqfieiU t)H Lihri dt Oicerani, Florence, 1867). J. Walter (D« An. Immort. quae pracc. Oic trad., Prague, 1867), G. Ziotschinann (De Tmc. qu. ftmtibue, Dim., Halle, 1S6S). The inaugural dissertation of Hugo Jentscli (Arisiotelis ex arte rhetoriea quaeritur quid hdbeat Cicero, Berlin, 1866) contains noteworthy contriblr tions to the solution of the question, to what extent Cicero had read and understood Aristotle. On the philosopher Sextlns, see De Barigny (Memoirea de TAmd. des Inncript, XXXI.), LaateTrif (SenteiiceH de Sesetiris, Paris, 1842), and Meinrad Ott (Character mid Vr«prv7ig der SprUche dea PhUotut p'len Seatiua, 6.-Pr., Rottweil, 1861, and Die ayrischen *^ auaerleaenen Spruche dea B&rm Xiatut BiacJiofd von Hom.^^ nicht eine XisPuaaohrift, aondem e4ne uberarheitete Sextiuaaahr^, G.-Pr., Bottweil and Tubingen, 1S62 and 1863). \ / When criticism had demonstrated the presence of untenable elements in all the great systems, the ineradicable need of philosophical convictions could not but lead either to the construction of new systems or to Eclecticism. In the latter it would necessarily end, if the philosophizing subject retained a naive confidence in his own " UnbefcmgenlieU," i. e., in the directness of his natural perceptions of truth or in his sagacious tact in the ap- preciation of philosophical doctrines, while yet lacking the creative power requisite to the founding of a system. In particular, Eclecticism would naturally find acceptance with those who sought in philosophy not knowledge as such, but rather a general theoretical preparation for practical life and the basis of rational convictions in religion and morals, and for whom, therefore, rigid unity and systematic connection in philosophical thought were not unconditionally necessary. Hence the philo-sophy of the Romans was almost universally eclectic, even in the case of those who professed their adhesion to some one of the Hellenic systems. The special representative of Eclecticism is Cicero. M. Tullius Cicero (Jan. .?d, 106 — Dec. 7th, 43 B. c.) pursued his philosophical studies especially at Athens and Rhodes. In his youth, he heard, first, Phjednis the Epicurean and Philo the Academic, and was also instructed by Diodotus the Stoic (who was after- ward, with Tyrannio, an inmate of his house, Tusc, T. 39, JSpist, passim). He after- ward heard Antiochus of Askalon, the Academic, Zeno the Epicurean, and lastly (at Rhodes), Posidonius the Stoic. In his latter years Cicero turned his attention again to philosophy, especially during the last three years of his life. Fuse, T. 2 : PhUosophiae in sinum quum a primis temporibus aetatis nostra voluntas stvidiumque nos compulisset, his gravissimis casibus in ewndtm portum, ex quo eiamus egressi magna jactati tempestate cm- fugimiis. Cicero gives a list of his philosophical writings in De Div., II. 1. In his work entitled Mortensius, he had, as he here says, urged the study of philosophy ; in the Academics he had indicated what he considered the most modest, consequent, and elegant mode of phi- losophizing (namely, that pursued by the Middle Academy) ; in the five books De Mnibus Donorum et Malorum he had treated of the foundation of ethics, the doctrine of the highest good, and of evil, after which he had written the five books of Tusculan Disputations, in which he had shown what things were necessary to the greatest happiness in life ; then had followed the three books De Natura Deorum, to which were to be joined the then unfinished work De Divinatione and the projected work De Faio. Among his philosopliical works were also to be reckoned the six books De RepubUca (previously composed) and the works entitled Consolatio and De Senectute; to these might be added his rhetorical writings : the three books De Oratore, and Brut-its (De ClaHs Oratoribus), constituting a fourth, and the Orator, constituting a fifth book on the same general topic. Cicero composed the work De Rep. (in six books) in the years 54-52 B. c. About the third part of it has come down to us, most of which was first published by A. Mai, from ECLECTICISM. CICEEO. THE SEXTIAITS. 219 the Palimpsest in the Tatican (Rome, 1st ed., 1822); a part of Book "VI., the dream of Scipio, is preserved in Maorobius. Complementary to this work was the De Legibus, begun in 62 B. c, but never finished, and now extant only in^ fragmentary form. Pos- sibly as early as the beginning of the year 46 b. c, but perhaps later, Cicero wrote th« small work called Faradoxa, which is not mentioned by him in De Div., II. 1. The Con- solatio and Hortensius were composed in 45 B. c, of both of which only a few fragments remain to ua ; in tlie same year the Academics (now incomplete) and the De FinHms (which we possess entire) were written, and the Tuscukun. Disp. and the De Nat. Dear, were begun ; the two last-named works were not completed till the following year. The date of the Caio Major sive De Senectute falls in the beginning of 44 B. c. ; that of the De Dimnatione (above-cited, intended as a complement to the work on the Nature of the Gods) falls in the same year, as also do the De Fato (which lias not come down to us entire), the lost work De Gloria, and the extant works: Laelius s. De Amicitia and De Offidis; the treatise De Vvrtiitibus (not extant) was probably composed immediately after the De Offidis. Among the youthful works of Cicero were the translations (now lost) of Xenophon's (Economicvs and Plato's Protagoras (which latter was still existing in the times of Prisoianus and Dona- tus) ; but his translation of Plato's Timaeiis, of which a considerable fragment is preserved, was written, after the Academica, in 45 (or 44) b. c. Of the rhetorical works, which are classed by Cicero himself with his philosophical works, the De Oraiore was written in the year 55, and Brutus and the Orator in 46 B. c. That Cicero in his philosophical writings depended on Grecian sources appears from his own confession, since he says of the former {Ad Atticum, XII. 52) : arroypa^ sunt, minore laborefiunt, verba tantum affero, guibus abundo (yet cf. De Fin., I. 2. 6; 3. 7 ; De Off., I. 2. 6, where Cicero alleges his relative independence). It is still possible to point out the foreign sources of most of his writings (generally by the aid of passages in these writings themselves or in Cicero's Epistles). The works De Rep. and Di^ Legibus are in form imita- tions of the works of Plato bearing the same names ; their contents are founded partly on Cicero's own political experiences and partly on Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrines, and, to a not inconsiderable extent, on the writings of Polybius. The Faradoxa discuss cer- tain well-known Stoic principles. The Consolatio is founded on Crantor's work irepl ttctSoiv, the (lost) Hortensius, probably on the Uporpe-KTiKo;, which Aristotle had addressed to Themi- aon, king in one of the cities of Cyprus (see Bemays, Die Dialogedes Arist, p. 116 seq.), or, it may be, onihe Proirepticus of Philo of Larissa, the Academic (see Krische, Veber Cicero's Aca- demica, Gott. Studien, II., 1845, p. 191); the De Fmibits {the best of the extant philosophical writings of Cicero), on the works of Phsedrus, Chrysippus, Carneades, Antiochus, as also on the results of the studies pursued by Cicero in his youth, wlieu he listened to lectures and engaged in philosophical discussions; the Academica, on the writings and in part also on the discourses of the more distinguished of the Academies ; the Tusc. Disp., on the works of Plato and Crantor, and on Stoic and Peripatetic writings ; the first book of the De Natura Deorum, on an Epicurean work, which has been discovered in the Herculanean Rolls, and was at first considered to be a treatise of Phiedrus n-cpj deuv, but has now been recognized as the work of Philodemus irepl evaejieia; ; Cicero's critique of the Epicurean stand-point is founded on a work by Posidonins the Stoic ; the second book of the De Nat. Deor. is founded particularly on the works of Cleantlies and Chrysippus ; the third, on those of Carneades and Clitomachus, the Academics ; the first of the two books De Dimnatione is based on Chrysippus' work Trepl XPVI'-'^, on the Trepl /rnvrtic^^ of Posidonius, and on works com- posed by Diogenes and Antipater ; the second book, on the works of Carneades and of Pana3tius the Stoic ; the treatise De Fato, on writings of Chrysippus, Posidonius, Cleanthes, and Carneades ; and the Cato Major, on writings of Plato. Xenophon, Hippocrates, and 220 ECLECTICISM. CICEEO. THE SEXTIAN8. Aristo of Chius. The Laelitis of Cicero reposes eepeciaUy upon the work of Theophrashig on Friendship, and also on the Ethics of Aristotle and the writings of Chrysippus; the two first books of the De Officiis were drawn principally from Panaetius; the third, from Posi- donius ; but besides the writings of these men, those of Plato and Aristotle, and also those of the Stoics, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tyre, and Hecato, were employed in the composition of the De Officiis. From Skepticism, which Cicero was unable scientifically to refute, and to which he was ever being invited by the conflict of philosophical authorities, he was disposed to take refuge in the immediate certainty of the moral consciousness, the amstnsus gentium and the doctrine of innate ideas {ruitiones immiae, natwa nobis insitae). Characteristic are such decla- rations as tlie following from the Z>e Legibus, I. 13 : Paturbatricem autem harum omnium reruvi Academiam hanc ab Arceaila et Carneade receniem exoremus ut sUeat, nam si invaserit in haec, quae satis scite nobis instrucia et composita videniur, nimias edet ruinas; quam quidem ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo. In physics Cicero does not advance beyond the stadium of doubt ; still he regards the field of physical investigation as furnishing agreeable " pastime " for the mind, and one not to be despised (Acad., II. 41). That which most inter- ests him in natural science is its relation to the question of God's existence. The following noticeable passage is directed against atheistic atomism ifie Nat. Deor., II. 31) : Hoc (viz., the formation of the world by an accidental combination of atoms) qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabUes unius et viginii foimae litterairum vel aureae vel quales libet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annates Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effiei. Cicero would have mythology purged of every thing unworthy of tlie gods (the story of the abduction of Ganymede, for example, Tusc, 1. 26; IT. 33), but would, as far as possible, hold fast to that in which the beliefs of different peoples agree {Tusc, I. 13) ; he is particularly attached to the belief in providence and immortality {fuse., I. 1. 2 seq, ; 49 et a/.),.but.is not altogether free from uncertainty on these subjects, and with dispassionate impartiality allows the Academic philosopher, in his De Nabira Deorum, to develop the grounds of doubt with the same minuteness and thoroughness with which the Stoic develops his arguments for dogmatism. Cicero defines the morally good (honestum) as that which is intrinsically praiseworthy {De Fin., II. 14 ; De Off., 1. 4), in accordance with the etymology of the word, which to him, the Eoman, represents the Greek mXiv. The most important problem in ethics with him is the question whether virtue is alone sufficient to secure happiness. He is inclined to answer this question, with the Stoics, in the affirmative, though the recollection of his own weakness and of the general frailty of mankind often fills him with doubts;. but then he reproaches himself for judging of the power of virtue, not by its nature, but by our effeminacy {Tusc, V. 1). Cicero is not altogether disinclined {De Fin., T. 26 seq.) to the distinction made by Antiochus of Aska- lon between the vita beata, which is made sure under all circumstances by virtue, and the tita beatissima, to which external goods are ■ necessary, although he entertains ethical and logical scruples respecting it, and elsewhere {Tusc, V. 13) rejects it; but he contents him- self with the thought that all which is not virtue, whetlier it deserves the name of a good or not is at all events vastly inferior to virtue in worth, and is of vanishing consequence in comparison with it {De Fin., T. 32 ; De Off., III. 3). From this point of view the difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines sinks, in his view, to a mere difference of words, which Carneades (according to Cic, De Fin., III. 12) had already declared it to be. Cicero is more decided in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, that virtue requires the reduction of the ?raft? (translated by Cicero perturbaiiones) to their right proportions ; he demands, with tlie Stoics that the sage should be without nadr/. But he makes his demonstration easier, by including in the concept irdOor (peiiurbatio) ^the mark of faultiness {Tusc, V. 6 : aversa a ECLECTICISM. CICEEO. THE SEXTIAN8. 221 rtcta ratione animi commotio), so that, in fact, he only proves what is self-evident, viz. : that that which is faulty is not to be suffered; but he misses the real point in dispute (Tusc, IV. 17 seq.). In another particular, also, he stands on the sii^ of the Stoics, namely, in regarding practical virtue as the highest virtue. Cf. De Off., I. 44 : omne cffieium, quod ad conjunctionem, hominum, et ad societatem tuendam valet, anteponendum, est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia continetur. lb., 45 : agere considerate pluris est, quam cogitan prudentur. Cicero's political ideal is a government made up of monarchical, aristocratic, and demo- cratic elements. He finds it realized approximately in the Konian state (De Rep., I. 29 ; II. 23 seq.). Cicero approves of auguries and the like, as an accommodation to popular belief, as also of deceiving the people by allowing them only the appearance of political liberty, since he regards the mass of men as radically unreasonable and unfit for freedom [De Nat Dear., III. 2 ; De Divinat, II. 1 2, 33, 12 ; De Leg., II. 7 ; III. 12 et al.). Cicero is moat attractive in those parts of his works, in which in an elevated rhetorical style, and without touching upon subtle matters of dispute, he sets forth the truths and .sen- timents which are universally affirmed by the moral consciousness of man. His praise of disinterested virtue, for example (De Fin., II. 4 ; Y. 22), is very successful ; so, in particular, is the manner in which the idea of the moral community of mankind (on which idea, taken by Cicero from the spurious letter of Archytas, Plato founds in the Hep. his demand that phUosophers should enter practically into the affairs of the state) : non, nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amid, etc. (De Off., I. 7 ; cf De Mn., II. 14), and the Aristotelian doctrine of man as a " political animal " (De Fin., T. 23) are presented. And, again, in his Tusculan Disp's, the wealcness of Cicero's argumen- tation and the dullness of his dialectic, especially as compared with the Platonic dialectic which he makes his model, are not more marked than the rhetorical perfection of the pas- sages in which he discourses of the dignity of the human mind (Tusc, I. 24 seq. ; cf De Leg., I. 1 seq.). So, too, his enthusiastic panegyric of philosophy (Tusc, V. 2 : vitae phi- losophia dux! virtutis indagatrix expuWnxque vitiorum, etc. ; cf. De Leg., I. 22 seq. ; Acad., I. 2 ; Tusc, I. 26 ; II. 1 and 4 ; De Off., II. 2) contains much that is felicitous in thought and expression (e. g., est autem unus dies bene et ex praecepUs tuis actus peccanti immortalitati ante- ponendus, etc.) ; and although it is somewhat defaced by rhetorical exaggeration, it was inspired by a conviction which was deeply rooted in Cicero's mind at the time when he wrote the works just cited. Seneca (Nat. Quaest, VII. 32) says of the school of the Sextians, that after having com- menced its existence with great eclat, it soon disappeared. Q. Sextius (born about 70 B. c.) was the founder of the school, and Sextius, his son, Sotion of Alexandria (whose instruc- tions Seneca enjoyed about 18-20 A. D.), Cornelius Celsus, L. Crassitius of Tarentum, and Papirius Fabianus, are named as his disciples. Q. Sextius and Sotion wrote in Greek. Sotion inspired his pupil, Seneca, with admiration for Pythagoras (Sen., F}p., 108); absti- nence from animal food, daily self-examination, and a leaning toward the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, are among the Pythagorean elements in the philosophy of the Sextians. Their teaching seems to have consisted principally of exhortations to moral excellence, to energy of soul, and to independence with reference to external things. The sage, says Sextius, goes through life armed by his virtues against all the contingencies of fortune, wary and ready for battle, like a well-ordered army when the foe is near (Sen., Ep., 59). Tirtue and the happiness which flows from it are not ideals without reality (as tliey had come to be regarded by the later Stoics), but goods attainable by men (Sen., Ep., 64). (The collection of aphorisms, which has come down to us in the Latin translation of Rufinus, is the work of a Christian, who wrote not long before x. D. 200. It is first cited 222 PBINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF THE THIRD PEEIOD. ^ by Orig., c. Cdsum, VIII. 30, under the title : H^tov yva/uu. A Syriao version of it exist* and is published in the Analecta Syriaca of P. de Lagarde, Leipsic, 1858. It appears to be founded on a few of the authentic sayings of Q. Sextius.) Thied (Peevailinglt Theologicai.) Pebiod of Geeek Philosophy. THE NEO-PLATONISTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN THEOSOPHICAL SPECULATION. § 62. To the Third Period of Greek philosophy, or the period of the predominance of theosophy, belong: 1) the Jewish-Greek phi- losophers, 2) the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Pythagorizing Platon- ists, 3) the Neo-Platonists. The Jewish-Greek philosophers sought to blend Judaism with Hellenism. The philosophy of the Neo- Pythagoreans, Pythagorizing Platonists, and Neo-Platonists was theosophic. To this the previous development of Greek ])hilosophy itself was alone sufficient to conduct them, when physical and mental investigation had ended in Skepticism and Eclecticism. This state of Greek philosophy (especially, in view of the close contact in this period of the West with the East) could not but induce a greater susceptibility to Oriental influences than had hitherto existed, and Buch influences did operate, in no insignificant measure, to determine the form and substance of the speculation of the period. On the Gre^ philosopherB of this period, cf. the first section of E. W. Moller^s GescMchte der Kotemo- logie in der griechiadien £irche bU auf Origvnee^ Halle, 1S60 (pp. 5-111). The influence of the Orient was an important co-operating factor in determining the character of the philosophy of this period (see Eitter, History of Philosophy, IV. p. 330 seq.) ; but there were also internal causes — to which Zeller rightly directs attention (Ph. d. Gr., 2d ed., Vol. III. b, pp. 56 seq., 368 seq.) — which produced a leaning toward a mythical theology. " The feeling of alienation from God and the yearning after a higher revelation ere universal characteristics of the last centuries of the ancient world ; this yearning was, In the first place, but an expression of the consciousness of the decline of the classical nations and of their culture, the presentiment of the approach of a new era, and it called into life not only Christianity, but also, before it, pagan and Jewish AJexandrianism, and oiher related developments." But this same feeling of exhaustion and this yearning after extraneous ^d, accompanied, as they were, by a diminished power of original thought, led, in religion, to the adoption of Oriental forms of worship and Oriental dogmas, and, above all, in speculation, to sympathy with the Oriental tendency to conceive God as the tran- scendent rather than as the immanent cause ef the world, and to regard self-abnegation as THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHIL08OPHT. 223 the essential form of morality, while, under the same influence, special emphasis was placed on the kindred elements in Greek, and especially in the Platonic philosophy. Neo- Platonism is a philosophy of syncretism. Its elements are^partly Oriental (Alexandrian- Jewish, in particular) and partly Hellenic ; its form is Hellenic. The religious philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews and the Gnosis of early Christianity are products of the same ele- ments, but under an Oriental form. Robert Zimmermann rightly remarks (Gesch. der Aesthetih, Tienna, 1858, p. 123), that Plato's attempt to translate Oriental mysticism into scientific speculation, ends in Neo-Platonism with a re-translation of thought into images. The traits common to the speculations of the Jewish-Greek philosophers and the Heo- Pythagoreans, the later Platonists and Neo-Platonists, are aptly enumerated by ZeUer {PhSoB. der Griedien, 1st ed., III. p. 566 seq., 2d ed.. III. b., p. 214) as follows : "The dualistio opposition of the divine and the earthly ; an abstract conception of God, excluding all knowl- edge of the divine nature ; contempt for the world of the senses, on the ground of the Pla- tonic doctrines of matter and of the descent of the soul from a superior world into the body; the theory of intermediate potencies or beings, through whom God acts upon the world of phenomena; the requirement of an ascetic self-emancipation from the bondage of sense, and faith in a higher revelation to man, when in a state called Enthusiasm." From Plato's own doctrine these later forms of Greek philosophy, notwithstanding all their intended agreement with and actual dependence on it, are yet very essentially distinguished by the principle of revelation contained in them. To the Neo-Platonista tlie writings of Plato, the "God- enlightened" (Procl., Theol. Plat., I. 1), became a kind of revealed record. The mosi obscure and abstruse of them (e. g., the Pseudo-Platonic Parmenides, with its dry schema- tism and its sophistical play with the conceptions of One and Being) were to many of these philosophers the most welcome, and were regarded by them as the most sublime docu- - menta of Platonic theology, because they offered the freest room for the play of their unbridled imaginings concerning God and divine things. Granting that theosophical speculation, in comparison with the investigation of nature and man, may appear as the higher and more important work, still Neo-Platonism remains decidedly inferior to its precursors in the earlier Greek philosophy, since it did not solve its problem with the same measure of scientific perfection with which they solved theirs. § 63. There is as yet no distinct evidence of a combination of Jewish theology with Greek philosophemes in the Septuagint, or in the doctrines of tlie Essenes. Such a combination existed, possibly, in the doctrine of the Therapeutes, who held certain doctrines and usages in common with the Pythagoreans, and certainly in the teachings of Aris- tobulus (about 160 b, c), who appealed to (spurious) Orphic poems, into which Jewish doctrines had been incorporated, in support of the assertion (in which he agrees with Pseudo-Aristeas), that the Greek poets and philosophers borrowed their wisdom from a very ancient translation of the Pentateuch. The biblical writings, says Aristo- bulus (who interprets them allegorically), were inspired by the Spirit of God. God is invisible ; he sits enthroned in the heavens, and is not in contact with the earth, but only acts upon it by his power. He formed the world out of material previously existing. In d©- 224 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDBIAN PHILOSOPHY. fending the observance of the Sabbath, Aristobulus employs a P.ytha> gorizing numerical symbolism. The personification of the 'wisdom of God as an intermediate essence between God and the wOrid, and pre-existing before the heavens and the earth, seems to have begun already with him. In the Book of Wisdom (of Pseudo-Solomon) ■wisdom is distinguished from the divine essence itself, as the power of God which works in the world. But Philo (born about 25 b. o.) was the first who set up a complete system of theosophy. With him the expounding of the books of the Old Testament is synonymous with the philosophy of his nation ; but in his own exposition he alle- gorically introduces into those documents philosophical ideas, partly derived from tlie natural, internal development of Jewish notions, and partly appropriated from Hellenic philosophy. He teaches that God is incorporeal, invisible, and cognizable only through the reason ; that he is the most universal of beings, the being to whom alone being, as such, truly pertains ; that he is more excellent than virtue, than science, or even than the goodie/* se and the beautiful per se. He is one and simple, imperishable and eternal ; his existence is absolute and separate from the world ; the world is his work. God alone is free ; every thing finite is involved in necessity. God is not in con- tact with matter ; If he were he would be defiled. He who holds the world itself to be God the Lord has fallen into error and sacrilege. In his essence, God is incomprehensible ; we can only know that he is, not what he is. All names which are intended to express the separate attributes of God are appropriate only in a figurative sense, since God is in truth unqualified and pure being. God is present in the world only by his operations, not by his essence. The Logos, a being intermediate between God and the world, dwells with God as his wisdom {ooe hibliomm text, orig.^ teraionibua, etc., ibid. 1T05), Nic. do Nourry (Paris, 1703), Ant van Dale (Amsterdam, 1705), Ludov. Casp. Valckenaer, De Ariatobulo Judaeo pHloaopho Peripatetico Alexandrino, ed. Jo. Luzac, Leyden, 1306 ; cf. Lobeck, Aglaopliam-ua, I. p. 447; Matter,.S)«ai histor. aur Veeole d'Alexandrie, Paris,1820, vol. XL p. 121 seq. ; cf, also, the works of GfrOrer (IL 71 seq.) and Dahne (II. 73 seq.) cited beloM' ; Georgii, in Illgen's Zeitachrfft /. Mat. Tlieol.y 1839, No. 3, p. 80, and Eob. Binde, Arigtobulische Studien (Gymn. Progr.\ Glogau, 1869, On Paeudo-PJuicylidea (a poem of Jewish origin, devoted to moral philosophy), cf. Jak. Bernays, JJeber daa Phoki/HdeiachetxGedichty eiii Beitrag zur hellenistisdten Liit.^ Berlin. 1356 ; Otto Goram, De Paeudo- Phocylide, in the Philol, XIV, 1669, pp. 91-112; Leopold Schmidt, in Jahn's Jahrb., Vol. 75, 1357, p. 610 ■eq. where Schmid seeks to point out separately the Hellenistic or Jewish-Alexandrian and the purely Jewish elements in the piincipal passage of the poem, and e.\cludes all but the last-named as interpolated. Philo's works have been edited by Thorn. Mangey (London, 1742), A. P. Pfciffcr (Erlangcn, 1786-92, 2d ed , 1820), and 0. E. Kichter (Leips. 1828-30), among others ; a stereotyped edition was published at Leipsic in 1851-53 ; Philo's book on the creation of the world has been published, preceded by a careful intro- duction by J. G.Maller (Berlin. 1841); PhiUmea^ed.C. Tischendorf, Leipsic, 1S06. On Philo's doctrine, cf., especially, August Gfrorer, Philo -and die alexandriniache TJieuaophie^ Stuttgart, 1881 (also under the title: KritiacJie GesdiicJite dea (yiriatenthuma, \o\. I.); Aug. Ferd. Dahne, Geachiditlicke DarsteUuvg der jUdiaefi-alexandriniachen PeligfonapJiiloaopIue^ Halle, 1834. See also Chi-istian Ludw. Georgii, Ue?>er die neueaten Gegen^aize in Avffaasiing der Alexandriniachen Jleligionnphiloaophie^ inabeaondere des jUd. Alexandrinimina, in lUgen's Zeitachrift f. hUt. Tlieol., 1839. No. 3. pp. 3-98, and No. 4, pp. 8-98. Gross- man has written a number of works on Philo (Leips. 1829, 1830 seq.); other writers on the same subject are H. Planck (De interpr. PMl. alleg., Gott. 1307), W. Scheffer (Quaeat. Philon., Marburg, 1329, 1881), Fr. Creuzer (in Ullman and Umbreit's Tlieol. Stud. u. Krit., Jahrgang Y.. Vol. I., 1682, pp. 3-43, and in Crou- zer's work, Zwr Geacli. der grlech. v.. rbm. Litt, Darmst and Leips. 1847, pp. 407-440), F. Keferstein (Ph.'a Lehre V071 dent gottl. Mittebceaen, Leips. 1846), J. Bucher (Philoniach^ Studien, Tiib. 184S), M. Wolff (Di» PhUonieche Pkiloaophie, etc., Leips. 1849 ; 2d ed., Gothcnbnrg, 1356), L. Noack (Psyche, Vol. IL, No. 5, 1S59), z. Frankel (Zur ElMk dea Philo. in the Monatschr. flir Geacli. u. Wiaa. dea Judenthuma, July, 1667X and Ferd. Dclaunay (Pliilon d'Alexandrie, Paris, 1867). 15 226 THE JEWISH-ALEXAlfTDEIAN PHILOSOPHY. For us, the earliest document of Jewish-Alexandrian culture is the Septuagint. Th» oldest parts of it, among which the translation of the Pentateuch belongs, reach back into the earliest period of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelplms (who was king from 284 to 241 B. c). Aristobulus says {ap. Eusebius, Praepar. Evang., XIII. 12, in a fragment of his dedicatory epistle to the king, who — according to Euseb., Praepar. Ev., IX. 6, with whicli Clem. Alex., Strom., I. p. 342, is to be compared — was Ptolemy Philometor), that before the time of Alexander, and also before the supremacy of the Persians in Egypt, the four last books of the Pentateuch had been already translated, Demetrius Phalereua taking tlie lead in the matter. According to a statement of Hermippus the CaUimachean (Diog. L., v. 78), Demetrius lived at the court of PtolemsEua Lag! only, but under Philadelphus was obliged to avoid the country. This account is not in contradiction with that of Aris- tobulus (and E. Simon, Hody, and others, are consequently at fault in arguing from the supposed contradiction, that the fragments of Aristobulus are spurious) ; we may, rather conclude from the two reports that preparations were made for the translation by Demetrius during the life of Ptoleniseus Lagi (but probably not till the last part of his reign), and that it may have then been begun, but that it was principally accomplished under Philadelphus; Josephus {Ant., XII. 2) places the commencement of the translation in the year 2^5 B. o. "Whether certain parts of the Pentateuch were really translated into Greek still earlier is doubtful, but they were certainly not translated at so early an epoch as that named by Aris- tobulus. The translation of the principal canonical writings may have been completed under Ptolemy Euergetes, the successor of Philadelphus, soon after his accession to the throne .(24'7). Parts were added to the Hagiographa at least as late as 130 B. c. (according to the Prologue of Siracides), and without doubt also very much later. Dahne (II. pp. 1-72) pro- fesses to have discovered in the Septuagint numerous traces of the Jewish- Alexandrian philosophy, which was subsequently more fully developed by Philo ; according to him, the authors of this translation of the Bible knew and approved the principal doctrines of this philosophy, contrived to suggest them by apparently insignificant deviations from the original text, and, foreseeing the method of allegorical interpretation, which was subse- quently to be adopted, endeavored by the construction of their translation to facilitate it. But the passages on which Dahne founds his argumentation by no means force us to this very doubtful hypothesis (see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., Ist ed.. III., pp. 569-573, 2d ed., Ill.b., p. 215 seq.) ; we find only that, as a rule, the notion of the sensible manifestation of God is suppressed, anthropopathic ideas, such as the idea of God's repenting, are toned down in their expression, the distance between God, in his essence, and the world, is increased, and the ideas of mediating links between the two (in the form of divine potencies, angels, the divine 66^a, the Messias as a heavenly mediator) appear more fully-developed than in the original text. In these pecuharities germs of the later religious philosophy may undoubt- edly be seen, but not as yet this philosophy itself. It is scarcely necessary, either, to see in them a union of Greek philosophemes with Jewish ideas. Such a union is first discoverable with certainty in the fragments of Aristobulus, the Alexandrian, who (according to Clem. AI. and Eusebius) was usually styled a Peripatetic. The passages in Eusebius, cited above, establish beyond a doubt that he lived under Ptole- mseus Philometor (181-145 B. c), notwithstanding several evidently erroneous authorities, which place him under Ptol. Philadelphus. Ho wrote a commentary on the Pentateuch, and dedicated it to Ptolemy (Philometor). Fragments of the same and of the dedicatory epistle , are preserved in Clem. Alex., Strom., I. (12 and) 25; (V. 20:) TI. 37, and in Euseb., Praepar. Ell., VII. 13 and 14; VIII. 6 and 10; IX. 6, and XIII. 12. In the fragments furnished us by Eusebius, Aristobulus cites a number of passages purporting to have been taken from the poems of Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and Linus, but which were evidently brought mto the THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAK PHILOSOPHY. 227 form in which they are cited by some Jew, and perhaps by Aristobulus himself. (Yet of. Jost, Gesch. des Judenthums, I., p. 369 seq., who disputes the latter supposition.) The moat extensive and important fragment is one which purports to be taken from the iepo.g Xdyof of Orpheus (Eus., Praep. £v.,XllI. 12); the same fragment, in another form, has been preserved by Justin Martyr, De Monorchia (p. 37, Paris edition, 1742), so that it is still pos- sible to point out precisely the changes made in it by some Jew. The main doctrines of the poem are thus recapitulated by Aristobulus : All created things exist and are upheld by divine power, and God is over all things (SiaKpaTeladai dela Swdjiu ra iravra koI yevrjra iirap;if£(v KoX fjrt ■aavTuv thai tov 8e6v). But in the God who accomplishes and rules over all things (xSafioio tvtcut^; . . . avroi (T vtto Trdvra Te?Lelrai, cv & avrolg ci-of ircpiviaaeTai.)^_^ Aristobulus recognizes not, with the Grecian poets and philosophers (especially the Stoics), the Deity himself, but only the Divine potency (iiiva/iig), by whom the world is governed ; God himself is an extra-mundane being; he is enthroned in the heavens, and the earth is under his feet; he is invisible, not only to the senses, but to the eye of the human soul — the voiig alone perceives him (oude rt^ aiirov europd^ tltvxf^v dvTjruVj vu 6* etaopdaTat'j. In these theological and psychological propositions it is possible to discover a reversion to the Aristotehau doctrine and a modification of the Stoic, and, in so far, a justification of the denomination Peripatetic as applied to Aristobulus ; but they bear, at least to an equal extent, the impress of the religious faith of the Jewish nation. In interpreting the seven days' work of creation, Aristobulus interprets, metaphorically, the light, which was created on the first day, as symbolizing the wisdom by which all things are illumined, which some of the (Peripatetic) philosophers had compared to a torch ; but, he adds, one of his own nation (Solomon, Prov. viii. 22 seq. ?) had testified of it more distinctly and finely, that it existed before the heavens and the earth. Aristobulus then endeavors to show how the whole order of the world rests on the number seven : (!(' tjidofidSav 6i Kal irdf o Koc/iog KvxTiclTai (Aristob., op. Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 12). Aristeas is the nominal author of a letter to Philocrates, in which are narrated the circumstances attending the translation of the sacred writings of the Hebrews by the seventy (or seventy-two) interpreters (ed. Sim. Schard, Basel, 1561; ed. Bernard, Ox- ford, 1692, and in the editions of Josephus ; also in Hody, De Bibl. Text. Orig., Oxford, 1705, pp. i.-xxxvi.). The letter states that Aristeas had been sent by the king of Egypt to Eleazar, the high-priest, at Jerusalem, to ask for a copy of the law and for men who would translate it. The letter is spurious, and the narrative full of fables. It was probably written in the time of the Asmoneans. In this letter, a distinction is made between the power (diwa/Mc) or government (Swaareia) of God, which is in all places ((Ud Trdvrurv kariVj ndvra T6nov n^ripdi), and God himself, the greatest of beings (jiiyiaroi), the lord over all tilings (4 Kvpieinjiv cmdvruv 6e6(), who stands in need of nothing {ampoaSerjg), and is enthroned in the heavens. All virtue is said to descend from God. God is truly honored, not by gifts and ofierings, but by purity of soul {^ifrnxvi Ka6api.&njTt). — The allegorical form of interpreta- tion appears already brought to a considerable degree of perfection in Pseudo- Aristeas. In the Second Book of the Maccabees (ii. 39) — which is an extract from the history of the Syrian wars, written by Jason of Cyrene — the distinction made between God himself, who dwells in the heavens, and the divin» power, ruling in the temple at Jerusalem, recalls the similar Alexandrian dogma. Non- Alexandrian, on the contrary, are the belief in the resurrection, by divine favor, of the bodies of the just (vii. 9-14 ; xiv. 46), and in creation out of nothing (vii. 28), if, indeed, the latter doctrine is to be understood here in its strict dogmatic sense. Some have attempted, further, to point out analogies with Alexandrian doctrines in the third and fourth Books of Maccabees, in the third Book of Ezra, in the Jewish portions of the SiOylUnes, naa in the Wisdom of Siracides. The Pseudo-Solomonio THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOSOPHY, JBooh of Wisdom, which appears to have heen composed before the time of Philo, describe* wisdom as the reflected splendor of the divine light, as a mirror of the divine efficiency, an efflux of the divine glory, and as a spirit diftused through the whole world, fashioning ai; things with art and uniting itself to those souls who are pleasing to God. The pre- exlstence of individual souls is tauglit (i. 20, in the words: hyaBb^'uv fiTSov elq au/ia a/iiavrov) ; the resurrection of all men, of the good to blessedness and of the bad to judg- ment, is taught, and men are referred for happiness to the future life. God created the world from a pre-existing matter (xi. 1 8). At what time the society of Essenes arose in Palestine and of Therapeutes in Egypt, is uncertain. Josephus first mentions the Essenes in his account of the times of Jonathan the Maccabean (about 160 B. c); there existed, he says, at that time, three sects (alpean^) among the Jews, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes {Ant., XIII. 5). It seems necessary to regard the name of the Essenes as derived from chaschah, to be silent, mys. terioua (conservers of secret doctrines, mystics). They sought to attain to the highest de- gree of holiness by the most rigid abstemiousness (after the example of the Nazarites), and transmitted to their successors a, secret doctrine respecting angels and the creation (from which, as it appears, the Cabbala subsequently arose ; cf. below, § 97). The Thers- peutes (who were more given to mere contemplation in monastic retirement) sprung from the Essenes (rather than the latter from the former). The doctrine of the Therapeutes was related to the Pythagorean, and more especially to the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine. That the body is a prison for the (pre-existent and post-existent) soul — also the doctrine of con. traries which are everywhere present in the world, are tenets belonging to ancient Pytha- goreanism ; not so the Therapeutic inhibition of the oath, of bloody offerings, and of the use of meat and wine (at least, according to the testimony of Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, not the earliest Pythagoreans, but only the Orphists and a part of the Pythagoreans of the fifth and fourth centuries B. c, abstained from the use of meat), and the recommendation of celibacy, the doctrine of angels (demons), magic, and prophecy — traits which reappear in Neo-Pythagoreanism, and are unmistakably of Oriental origin. It is conceivable that (as Zeller assumes) these doctrines and customs were derived from the East by the Orphists and Pythagoreans, that before the time of the Maccabees they passed from the latter to the Jews in Palestine (the Essenes), and that the latter again delivered them to the Jews in Egypt (the Therapeutes). Still, it is improbable that Pythagoreanism, at a time when it had become nearly or quite extinguished (cf. Zeller, J., 2d edition, p. 2 1 5, 3d edition, p. 251), could have exerted so powerful influence on a portion of the Jewish nation, and it is niore natural to suppose (with Hilgenfeld) that the Therapeutic doctrine of abstinence was transmitted without Grecian intervention from the Parsees — after they, for their part, had submitted in their doctrine to a Buddhistic influence — to the Jews of Palestme and from the latter to the Egyptian Jews. The existence of the Therapeutic sect may, however, on its part, have been among the causes which induced the rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism at Alexandria. Philo the Jew lived at Alexandria, which he calls "our Alexandria'' (fmeripa 'Ale^av- dpsia) in his work De Legatione ad Cnjv/m (ed. Mangey, vol. II. b&J). According to Josephus (Ant, XVIII. 8 ; XX. 5), he was descended from one of tlie most illustrious families of the country; Eusebius (Hist. Ecd., II. 4) and Hieronymus (Calal. Scriptorum Mccles.) report that he belonged to a sacerdotal family. His brother held the office of AlaJiarches (superinten- dent of the Jews at Alexandria).- In the first half of the year 40 Philo was at Rome as an ambassador from the Alexandrian Jews to the Emperor Cains ; he was then already ad- vanced in years (De Legat. ad Cajum, ed. Mang., II. 592), and at the period when he wrote his account of this embassy — probably soon after the death of Oaius (A. d. 41) and during the THE JEWISH-ALEXANDBIAN PHILOSOPHT. 229 reign of Claudius — ^he classed himself among the old men fyepovreg). His birth falls, con" sfcquently, in the third decade before Christ. The allegorical method of interpreting the sacred Scriptures, which had long prevailed among the more cultivated of the Alexandrian Jews, was a(lbpted by Philo without restric- tion. His principle, that the prophets were only involuntary instruments of the spirit which spoke through them, was favorable to the freest use of this mode of exegesis. Philo criticises the attitude of those who merely hold fast to the literal sense of Scriptures as low, unworthy, and superstitious ; he denies, in opposition, obviously, to a claim of the orthodox, that this is "unvarnished piety without ostentation" (aKaTMinurrov evaipeiav litra aTv airoSei^ct), but by an immediate subjective certainty (ivapysia, De post. Gaini, 48, p. 258 Mang.). Still, a certain kind of knowledge of God, which, however, is only second in rank, results from the aesthetic and teloologioal view of the world, as founded on the Socratic S30 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOBOPHT. principle that " no work of skill makes itself" (ovdh> Tim Texyuuiiv ipyav airavTO/tari^er^ God is one and simple : 6 6eoc /idvo; eart Kat ev, oh airyKpt/ia, ijwaiq airTiij . . . TeTOKTiu ovt 6 Beo; Kara to tv Kal tt/v yuovdcja, lioXKov di Kal fi /wvdf Kari Thv eva Oe6v (Legis Alleg., II. ; ed. Mang., I. 66 seq.). God is the only free nature {^ fiimj eTievBepa fiim;, Be Sonini, .II.), fall of himself and sufficient to himself (oiro iavrov nlfipeq Kal iavr^ IxavSv, Be Norn. ■Mutat., I. 582). Notwithstanding the pantheistically-sounding neuters which Philo applies to God, he ascribes to Mm the purest blessedness; "He is without grief or fear, not subject to evils, unyielding, pamless, never wearied, filled with unmixed happiness" (Be Cherubim, I. 154). God is everywhere by his power (rdf Swa/isic aiirov 6m yij; aal vSaro^, kkpof Ts Kal ovpavov reivof), but in no place with his essence, since space and place ■were first given to the material world by him (De Lingvarvm Conf.. I. 425). Speaking figuratively, Philo describes God as enthroned on the outermost border of the heavens in an extra-mundane place (rdTrof /teraKda/uog), as in a sacred citadel (Genes., 28. 15 ; iJe Vit. Mos., II. 164, etc.). God is the place of the world, for it is He that contains and encom- passes all things (Be Somniis, I.). In creating the world, God employed as instruments incorporeal potencies or ideas, since he could not come in contact with polluting matter (ef eKdvT/g (njj ovaiac;) iravr' iyhvrioev 6 6e6g, ovk i^VT6jj,evog avrSg- ov yap i}v de/ii; cnreipov Kal ire^p/ievjic Wijf ^aiieiv Tov Iduova Kal ftoKaptov' aXXd ralg aauuaToig dwdjiEmv, uv ervftov dvofia ai Idiai^ KaTExpv('aTo irpbs to yhoQ tKacTov ttjv dp/idrrovaav Xaftelv fiop^rlp). Be SacrificanUbus, II. 261). These potencies surround God as ministering spirits, just as a monarch is sur- rounded by the members of his court. The highest of the divine potencies, the creative (voaiTtKij), bears also, according to Philo, in Scripture the name of God (fedf) ; the second or ruling (paaAiKT/) potency, is called Lord (xiipioq. Be Vita Mosis, II., 150 et al.). These are followed by the foreseeing potency, the law-giving, and many others. They are all ) conceived by Philo, not only as of the nature of divine qualities, but also as relatively independent, personal beings, who can appear to men and who have favored some of them (e. g., Abraham) with their more intimate intercourse (Be Vita Abrdh., II. IT seq.). The highest of all the divine forces is the Logos (Word). The world of ideas (i ek tuv idedv Kdap-oi) has its place (riJTrof) in the divine Logos, just as the plan of a city is in the soul of the master-builder (Be Mundi Opificio, I. 4). Philo also uses sometimes the name Sophia (Wisdom), which with Aristobulus and other earlier speculators was the name for the highest of the potencies intermediate between God and the world (e. g., Legis Alleg., II. : aj Tov Beov uotpia, jjv aKpav Kal npioTiimp' ETSfiev aTto tuv eovtov dvvdfiELni), but Logos is the term more commonly employed by him. Sometimes he seems to conceive Sophia as the highest of the potencies into which the Logos is divided, and as the source of all the rest For the Logos is two-fold in its nature, and that, too, in man as well as in the All. In man there is a J.6yoQ cviiddeToc and a Myog trpo^opiKdg ; the former is the reason which dwells in man, the latter is the spoken word ; the former is, as it were, the source, the latter the out- flowing stream. (Of. Plat. ? Soph., 263 e : Sidvoia is the interior discourse of the mind , and Arist. : i eau Uyoq, see above, p. 143.) But of the Logoi which belong to the All, the one which corresponds with the EvdidBeTog in man, dwells in the incorporeal and archetypal ideas of which the intelligible world consists ; the other, corresponding with the 7rpo0opi/ci5f in man, is diffused in the form of germs (the Adyof OTrfp/iaruciif) in the things •which are seen, and which are imitations and copies of the ideas, and constitute the world of sensuous perception (Be Vita Mosis, III., ed Mang., II. 154). In other words: in God dwells reason, thought (iwoia as evawoKEi/isvji vS^aic), and its expression (6iav6^is as vor/aeo; Hie^oSo; or p^ua Bcov, Quod Bens sit immut., I. 278, ed. Mang., in commenting on Genesis, vi. 6). This reason is God's wisdom (Sophia). Yet, in other passages, Philo THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOSOPHY. 231 Oills Sophia the mother of the Logos (De Profugis, 562, Mang.). He sees the symbol of the two-fold Logos in the double breast-plate {dmimw Tvoyeioni) of the high-priest. Ordi- narily, however, he speaks ouly of the divine Logos without qualification or distinction, styling him Son and Paraclete, the Mediator between Go * and man, etc. {De Vita Mosis, II. 155, ed. Mang. ; Quis Serum Dimn. Haeres sit, I. 501 seq., et pass.). The creation of the world was due to God's attribute of love. He created it, through the instrumentality of the Logos, out of unqualified matter, which is therefore of the nature of the unreal (6 fieof alrtov, ovk opyavtyv, rb 6e ytyvdpLEvov 6C bpyavov fiev, vtto 6^ Tov aiTuw TrdvTu^ ytyvtrai ' evfeijaei^ alrtov tov K6afiov Tbv 6e6v, opyavov 6e "kdyav deoii, v^^ de Ta TETTapa aroixela). The business of man is to follow and imitate God {De Caritate, II. 404, et pass.). The soul must strive to become the dwelling-place of God, his holy temple, and so to become strong, whereas it was before weak, and wise, whereas before it was foolish {De Somn., I. 23). The highest blessedness is to abide in God {Kepag eviaifioviac to aiAivaQ Kal ap/iETTuf Iv fiovu 6eu ar^ai). Philo traces the doctrine of ideas back to Moses : Muvaia^ iarl to idy/ia rnvro, ovk i/i6v ; for, he says, Moses teaches {Gen., i. 27) that God created man in the image of God, and if this is true of man, it must certainly be true also of the entire sensible cosmos {Dt Mundi Opiflcio, Mang., I. 4). Obvious as are the signs of Platonic influences in Philo's doctrine of ideas (Philo himself names Plato, and testifies his esteem for him), and of Stoic influence in his Logos-doctrine, yet in fact the transformation of the ideas mto divine thoughts, having their seat in the Logos of God, is an outcome of Philo's religious concep- tions, and the doctrine, thus transformed, may therefore be said to come from " Moses." (This transformation of the Platonic theory of ideas not only exercised a controlling influ- ence on the philosophy of later thinkers, but it has also interfered with the correct his- torical comprehension of Platonism even down to our own times.) As in what he says of the ideas and forces generally, so also in his utterances respect- ing the Logos, Philo wavers between the attributive and substantive conception of it ; the latter, according to which the Logos is hypostatized to a person, is already developed in his doctrine to too firm a consistency for us to suppose that the personification was for Philo's own consciousness a mere poetic fiction (all the more, since in Plato the ideas are not mere attributes, but possess an independent and almost a personal existence), and yet not to a consistency of so absolute a character that Philo could be interpreted as teaching, as a positive doctrine, the existence beside God of a second person, in no way reducible to a mere attribute or function of the first person. Tet so far as Philo personifies, whether it be poetically or doctrinally, he owns to a certain subordinationism. The Logos is for him, as it were, a chariot-driver, whom the other divine forces {dmafieig) must obey ; but God, as the master of the chariot, prescribes to the Logos the course which is to be maintained. Philo vacillates consequently between the two conceptions, the analoga of which reappear later in the Christian church in Monarchianism and Arianism ; but a doc- trine analogous to Athahasianism ' is entirely foreign to him, and would contradict his religious as well as his philosophical consciousness. It was impossible that he should conceive of the Logos as incarnated, on account of the impurity of matter in his view — a consideration revived at a later epoch by the Docetans — and for this reason, if for no other, it was impossible for Philo to go farther and identify the Logos with the expected Messias, to which course, nevertheless, he was powerfully moved by the practical and spiritual interest connected with redemption through the Messias. The incarnation of the Logos in Christ forma the fundamental speculative, as the invalidity of the positive Mosaic law and the new commandment of love form the fundamental practical, doctrine by 232 THE NEO-PTTHAGOEEAN8. which Christianity separated from Alexandrian theosophy. The representatives of this the'osophy being, for the most part, men of more theoretical culture than force of will, could not accept the doctrine of the incarnation without a sense of their infidelity to their prin- ciples, and dill not possess the martyr's courage — which is rarely developed in the lap of material and intellectual wealth — necessary for the practical renunciation of the ceremonial law, although this course was demanded as a logical consequence of their own views. § 64. Cicero names as the first renewer of Pytbagoreanism, P. Nigidius Pigulus, who appears to Jiave lived in the first half of the last century before Christ, at A lexandria. In the time of Augustus there originated several works falsely attributed to the earlier Pytha- goreans, but containing Neo-Pythagorean ideas. About the same time Sotion, the disciple of Sextius, the Pythagorizing Eclectic, lived at Alexandria. The chief representatives of Neo-Pythagoreanism are Apolionius of Tyana, in the time of Nero, Moderatus of Gades, also in the time of Nero, and Nicomachus of Gerasa, in the time of the Antonines. Also, Secundus of Athens (under Hadrian) appears to be by his own doctrine not far removed from this group of philoso- phers. To Neo-Pythagoreanism relates In fact the greater part of the literature cited above^ad- § 16, pp. 48 and 44. Of. flluo Hieron. Schellberger, Die ffoldenen Spriiche dee Pyfh. itCs Deutsdie Hberiragen mit EinL u. Anm. {G.-Pr.\ Milnnerstadt, 1S62, and, respecting the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, in general, Vermehren, Die pyth. Zahlen^ Gibitrow, 1863. Zeller, in Ph. d. 6r.^ III.. 2d edition, p. 86 seq., gives a summary of the pseudonymous literature (after Beckmann, Mullach, and Orelli). On the subject of the general revolution of philosophy among the Greeks in this period flrom Skep- ticism to Mysticism, cf. Heinr. W. J. Thiersch, PoUUk wnd PMlosophie in ilirem Verhdltniss sfur IteUgion vaiter Trajanue^ Badrianus und den heiden Aittoninen. Marburg, 1863. and Zeller, as cited above, ad % 62. Lutterbeck {JXe neutest Lelirhegriffe^yv>\. I., 1862, p. 870 seq.) treats of Nigidivs Figulits and the Neo- Pythagorean school. Of. also Bucheler, in the Hh. Mtia.^ new series, XIH., p. 177 seq., and Klein, Diet.., Bonn, 1861. PhUoetratorvm. quae sapergunt ommia : vita Apolloitii TyanenaU^ etc, Accedtmt Apoflonii 7)/an. epistolaet J^usebti liber adv. Hierocl&n, etc.^ ed. Godofr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1709 ; ed. C. L. Kayser, Zurich (1844, 1846), 1863 ; ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1 848. Iwan Muller, Com«i., gva de PkUoeti: in compo7ienda m&noria ApoUonii T. fide guaeritur, Zwcibrucken, 1868-60. Of Apolionius treat : J. C. Herzog (Leips. - 1719), S. G. Klose (Viteb. 1728-24), J. L. Mosheim (in his Comment, Hamb. 1751, p. 847 seq.), J. B. Liider- ■wald (Halle, 1798), Pcrd. Chr. Baur (Apollonive vnd- CKrietve, TUbivger ZeitKchrift fUr TlieoL, 18S2),,_A. Wellaur (in Jahn's .^rvj/iit?. Vol. X., 1844, pp. 418-467); Noandcr (Gench. der Cliristl Seligim, Theil 1., p. 172), L. Noack (in his Psyche, Vol. 1., No. 2, Giessen, 1858), P. M. Mcrvoyer (Etude eur A. de T., Paris, 1862), A. Chassang (Ze merveillevx done rantiqniti, A. de 7"., sa vie, ses voyages, »eaprodigte,par Phi- lostrate, et sea lettres, ouvrages traduita du grec, avee introduction, notes eticlairciseements, Paris, 1662, 2d ed. 1864) ; cf. Iwan Miiller (Zur Apolloni/us-Litteratur, in the Zeitachr. flir Inth. TheoU «. Kirht, ed. by Delitzsch and Guericke, Vol. 24, 1866, pp. 412-428 and p. 692). Nicomaohi Geraa&ni arithweiicae, Uhr. JI., ed. Frid. Ast, iu his edition of Jantblichi ChaJcidensis theologumena aritlimeticae, Leips. 1817. (An earlier edition of this work, Nuco^dxov Ttptunjvoi aptdMi)* TiK^9 fiifi\ia Svo, was published at Paris in 1688.) JiiKOfidxpv PepatnifoQ llvSayopiKou apttffii^TtK^ eitTayntyi}, 2/icomachi Geraaeni PytJmgoret in^oductioiiia ariVvmeticae libr, 11. rec. Ricardua lloche, accedvnt codiais Cizenaia problemota arithm. Leips. 1866. 'Iwai'i'ov 'ypa^^iaTiKou 'AKefavBpfui (toC ^i^oitovov) «is Til irptitrav t^s Vucofiaxov ap^B|t.^yr^K1^i titrayiay^, Prim'wm ed. Eich. Hoche, Leipsic, 1864; in libr. JI Mc. intrfd, arithm. ed. idem (G.-Pr.), Wesel, 1867. Tho 'Eyxopiiiov dpfioKui^; of Nicomachns has been edited by Mcibcim in his Murici Graeci. In the lUbl. of Fhotius (cod. 187) there is an extract from a work purporting to have been written by him, and entitled " neologumena Artth." THE NEO-PTTHAGOEEANS. 233 Srcundi (AthtniensU Sop/iiatae) SenUntiae, ed. Lncas HolsteDins, together with the Sentence* ol Pemnphilus and Demtmrates, Leyden, 1689, p. 810 seq. ; ed. J. A. Schler (together with the Bios 2eic. ^lAo- (Toi^ou), in Demophili, Democr. et Sec. Sent., Leijis., 1754. p. 71 seq. ; Gr. et. Lat„ ed. J. C. Oielli, in Ojnie- eulu Oraecormn vet. eenientiona et moralia, Leips. 1819-21, Vol. I., p. 208 seq. Tischendorf has reeopnized a part of the Bioq XtKovvSov ^tAoo-d^iov on a sheet of papyrus discovered in Egypt, and belonging, as T. sup- poses, to the second, or, at the latest, to the third century of the present era ; cf. Hermann Sauppe, in the Pfiitol, XVII., 1861, pp. 149-1&4 ; Eud. Reicke has puhlished on old Latin translation of this Life, from a Codex in the Eonigsberg Library, in the Philologue, Vol. XVIII., 1862, pp. 528-534. The return to older systems was, at Alexandria, a result in part of the learned investiga- tions carried on in connection with the Library, and in this respect Neo-Pythagoreanism stands side by side with the renewal at Alexandria of the Homeric form of poetry. A consideration of more essential significance is, that a philosophy which conceived the divine under the form of the transcendent (or which at least admitted this conception side by side with the conception previously prevalent and gave to the former a constantly increasing weight) corresponded far better with the autocratic form of government and the Oriental conception of life than did the systems of the period next preceding, systems which presuppose a certain freedom in social and political life, and which at the time now under consideration had already been shaken to the foundation, even in their merely theoretical bearings, by the spirit of doubt. The satisfaction which was not found either in nature or in the individual subject, was now sought in an absolute object, represented as beyond the spheres of both. But for the purposes of this search, Pythagoreanism and also Platonism offered the appropriate points of support. Added to this, finally, was the infiiience of Oriental religious ideas, Egyptian, Chaldaic, and Jewish (the influence of the latter being the most important) arising through the meeting of various nationalities at the same place and in the same political union. Of P. Nigidius Figulus, who was also a grammarian (Gell., K A., XIX. 4), Cieero tells us (Tim., 1) that he renewed the Pythagorean philosophy; but he cannot have exerted a very considerable influence, since Seneca (Quaest. Sat, VII. 32) knew nothing of the existence of a Neo-Pythagorean School. The school of the Sextians has been already mentioned (§ 61). That the predilection of the Libyan king lobates (probably Juba II. of the time of Augustus) for Pythagorean writings gave occasion to forgeries, is reported by David the Armenian (Schol. in Arist, p. 28 a, 13). Philo cites, iJready, the work attributed to Ocellus Lucanus. The work entitled irpof roif imexoiitvov^ tuv aapxCiv mentioned by Porphyry and written by Sextius Clodius, the teacher of Marcus Antonius the Triumvir, seems to have been directed against those Neo-Pythagoreans who abstained from the use of meat (see Jae. Bernays, Theophr. Schrift iiber Frihnmigkeit, Berlin, I860, p. 12). • A fragment from the work of ApoUonius of Tyana on Sacrifices is preserved in Buse- bius {Praep. Ev., IV. 13). In it ApoUonius distinguishes between the one God, who sxists separate from all things, and the other gods ; to the former no offerings whatever should be brought, nay, more, he is not even to be named with words, but only to be apprehended by the reason. All earthly things are, on account of their material constitution, impure, and unworthy to come in contact with the supreme God. To the inferior gods ApoUonius seems to have required the bringing of bloodless offerings. The work on ApoUonius of Tyana, written by Flavius Philostratus (at the instance of the Empress Julia Domna, the wife of Septimius Severus), is a philosophico-religious romance, in which the Neo- Pythagorean ideal is portrayed in the person of ApoUonius, and is claimed to be superior to that of other schools and sects (referring especiaUy to Stoicism, and, as it would appear, to Christianity). Moderatus of Gades, who was nearly contemporaneous with ApoUonius, sought to 234 THE ECLECTIC PLATONISTS. justify the incorporation into Pythagoreanism of Platonic and neo-theological doctrineB, through the hypothesis that the ancient Pythagoreans themselves intentionally expressed the highest truths in signs, and for that purpose made use of numbers. The number one vas the symbol of unity and equality, and of the cause of the harmony and duration of all things, while two was the symbol of difference and inequality, of division and change, etc. (Moderatus, ap. Porphyr. Vit. Pythag., 48 seq.). Niooraachus of Gerasa. in Arabia, who seems to have lived about 140 or ISO A. D, teaches (in Arithm. Iniroduct, I. 6) the pre-eristence of numbers before the formation of the world, in the mind of the Creator, where they constituted an archetype, in conformity with which He ordered all things. Nicomachus thus reduces the Pythagorean numbers, as Philo reduces the Ideas, to thoughts of God. Nicomachus defines number as definite quantity (n-^Sof upuj/ihov, 1.1). In the Qh^ayoi/ieva apiBfirp-im, Nicomachus, accord- ing to Photius, Cod., 187, expounded the mystical signification of the first ten numbers, according to which the number one was God, reason, tjie principle of form and goodness, and two, the principle of inequality and change, of matter and evil, etc. The ethical problem for man, he teaches, is solved by retirement from the contact of impurity and reunion with God. To Secundus of Athens, the silent philosopher, who lived under Hadrian, are ascribed (in the Vita Secundi, a work of the second century after Christ, much read in the Middle Ages) certain answers (which he is reported to have made in writing) to philosophical questions raised by the Kmperor, answers conceived in an ascetic and fantastic spirit^ which is akin to the spirit of Neo-Pythagoreanism. § 66. Among the Pythagorizing and Eclectic Platonists, who, through their renewal and farther development of the Platonic prin- ciple of transcendence, in especial opposition to Stoic Pantheism and Epicurean Naturalism, became the precursors of Neo-Platonism, the best-known are Eudorns and Arius Didymus (in the time of Au- gustus), Dercyllides and Thrasyllus (in the time of Tiberius), Theon of Smyrna and Plutarch of Chaeronea (in Trajan's time), Maximus of Tyre (under the Antonines), Apuleius of Madaura (in Numidia), Alcinous, Albinns, and Severus (of nearly the same epoch), Calvisins Taurus and Atticus, Galenus, the physician (131-200 a. d.), Celsus, the opponent of Christianity (about 200 a. d.), and Numenius of Apa- mea (toward the end of the second century of the present era). On Endorns, ct K6per, in the Pkiloloffus, VII., 1852, p. 584 seq. ; on Arius Didymus. Meineke, in Mut- zeM'B Zeiteo/ir. fSr du» Oymih-W., Berlin, 18S9, p. ^68 seq. ; on Thrasyllus, S6vin (Mem. de Faoad. da inacript, torn. X.\ K. F. Hermann (Ind. Seliol., Gfltt. 1853), and Mtlller (Fragm. hist. Gr., III. 601); on Plutarch, among others, K. 'EiehhoS (Gymn.-I^ogr., Elberfeld, 1883). Theod. Hilmar Schreiter {Dodr. Flu- tarchi el theologica et vtoraiia. in Illgen^s Zeitsohr. fiir Met. Theol., Vol. VI., Leips. 1886, pp. 1-162), Ed. Mailer (in his Gesclt. der Tluorie der Kunet bei den, Alien, Vol. II., Berlin, 1887, pp. 807-294), 6. W. Nitzsch (/?mZ. Leaf., Kiel, 1849), Pohl (Die DSmmwlogie dee PIvtarch, G.-Pr., Breslau, 1861), Bazin (i>« PliOarcho Stoicorum Adversario, TheeU Parieienait, Nice, 1S66), O. Or^ard (De la Morale de Plutarguf, Paris, 1367) Eich. Vollvmann (Leben, Schriften wnd Philot. dee Plutarch, 2 parts, Berlin, 1869); on Apnleiua, Prontl (Geech. der Logik, I., pp. 578-691). Editions of Albinns' work on Plato have been jinbliBhed by Schneider (Ind. Lect., Breslau, 1853), and K. F. Hermann (in Vol. VI. of his edition of the works of Plato) and editions of Alcinons' work on the same by Orelli (In Alex. Aphrod. de Fato, etc., 1824), and K. F. Hei> mann (in Vol. VI. of Plato's works). The phlloBopblcal treatises of Flntarob, Apnleins, and Galen are found THE ECLECnO PLATONISTS. 235 fn the complete editions of their worfes^ PlntnrcVs M&raUa in Didot's collectfon, edited by Dubner, Pnris, 1S41 (as Vols. III. and IV. of his works), and separately, ed. Wyttenbnch (Oxford, 1795-1880, Leips. 1796- ISW). On GalTisins Tauras, cf. Bezier, La PMlosophie de Taitrwt^ Havre, 1S69. On the pliilusophical opinions of Galen, cf. Kurt Spcngel, Seitr. zur Geack. der Medecin.l. 117-195. On Gelsns, the opponent of Christianity, cf. F. A. Fhilipp!, I>6 Celai, advermrii CJirUHa^^ruTti, pJiHoaopftandi genere, Berlin, 1336, C. W. Bindemann, Uel/er Celtms und seine Schrift gegen die CJiristen, in the Z&itscJir. fur Jiist. TheoL, 1842, G-. Banmgarten-Crusius, De Scriptoribus saeculi, IL p, clir.^ qui n&cam reHffionem impug- mirunt, Meissen, 1845, Eedepennlng, Orig., Vol. II., Bonn, 1846, pp. 180-156, F. Chr. Biiur, Dae CliriBten- t'lum in den drei eraten Jahrh., pp. 866-395, and Von £ng:e1hardt, Cf-lsue Oder die tUteete kritik bibZ. &69di. u. chrietl. Lehre vom Stamdpvnkte dee Ileidenihums, iu the Dorpater Zeitsohr, f. Tk, u, Kirehe, Vol. XI. 1869, pp. 2S7-344. Eudorus of Alexandria (about 25 B. c.) wrote commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato and also on works of Aristotle, and a work on the Parts of Philosophy (Siaipcaig tov Kara fiXoaoifiav Uyov), in which (as in the Pseudo-Plutarchio Placita Philos., a work founded, as is likely, in part on the works of Eudorus and Arius) the views of different philosophers on the various problems (Trpo/SX^/iora) of philosophy are brought together (Plutarch, De Anim. Procreat., 3 ; Simpllc, Ad Arist. Categ., SchoL, ed. Br., p. 61 a, 25 et al. ; Stob., Ed., II. 46 seq.). This Platonist wrote also concerning the Pythagorean doctrine (Simplic, tn Phys., S9 a, where, notwithstanding the duality of the elements assumed by the Pytha- goreans, namely, the number One and the "indefinite duad," the doctrine is ascribed to them that the One is the principle of all things). Arius Didymus, a learned Academic of the time of Augustus and a pupil of Antiochus of Asoalon, wrote jrepl tChv apeoK&vTuv TlXaTuvi and other works (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XL 23 ; XT. 15 seq.). Stobaeus cites (Florileg., 103. 28) " from the Epitome of Didymus,'' a pas- sage concerning the Peripatetic doctrine of Eudaemcmia, and his account of the Peripatetic Ethics (Ed., II. pp. 242-334), in which this passage is again cited, and also his account of the Stoic doctrine, and other things, which were probably taken from the Epitome of Arius (see Meineke, as above cited, and Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III. a, 2d ed., 1865, p. 546). In this account the Peripatetic Ethics is assimilated to that of the Stoics, in the same manner in which, according to Cicero, this was done by Antiochus of Ascalon. Didymus wrote also irepi Jh^ayopiKijq fjtiAoffo^la^. Thrasyllus, known as the arranger of the Platonic dialogues, was a grammarian, who lived in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, and died a. d. 36, while holding the office of astrologer to the latter. He combined with Platonism a Neo-Pythagorean numerical speculation and the practice of magic, after the manner of the Chaldeans. Schol. in Juven., VI. 576: Thrasyllus muttarv/m a/rtimn sdentiam professus postremo se dedit PlaUmicae sectae, et deinde mathesi, qua praecipne viguil apud Tiberiv/m. The mathesis here spoken of was a superstitious, mystical doctrine, founded on speculations with numbers, and combined with astrology. Albinus (Introd. in Platan. Dialogoa, ch. 6), names, besides Thrasyllus, Dercyllides, as one of the authors of the division of the Platonic dialogues into Tetralogies ; the first tetralogy, at least (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo), was arranged by Dercyllides. Ac- «!0rding to Porphyry, ap. Simplic. ad Arist. Phys., f. 54 (Schol., ed. Brandis, p. 344 a), Dercyl- lides composed a work on Plato's philosophy, in the eleventh book of which he cited, from Hermodorus on Plato, a passage representing that Plato reduced matter, and the infinite or indefinite, to the More and Less (Magnitude and Smallness, etc.). The problem here discussed relates to one of the most important points of contact between Platonism and Pythagoreanism. Theon of Smyrna (in the second century A. D.) wrote a work, which is still extant, explaining the mathematical doctrine of Plato (ed. BuUialdus, Paris, 1644; ed. J. J. de Gelder, Leyden, 1827; ejusdem Mi. de Asironomia, ed. Th. H. Martin, Paris, 1849). He 236 THE ECLECTIC PLATONISTS. was more a matliematioian than ■- philosopher. His astronomical doctrines were for the most part borrowed from a work by Adrastus the Peripatetic. Plutarch of ChiEronea (born about 50, died about 125 A. D.), a pupil of Ammonius of Alexandria, wlio taught at Athens under Nero and Vespasian, developed his philosophical opinions in the form of an exposition of passages from Plato. In this exposition he be- lieved that he had reproduced Plato's meaning, and only that, just as subsequently the Neo-Platonists believed in regard to their work ; but his doctrines are far less removed from pure Platonism than theirs. He opposed the monism of the Stoics, and had recourse to the Platonic hypothesis of two cosmical principles, namely, God, as tlie author of all good, and matter, as the condition of the existence of evil. For the formation of the world it was necessary, he taught, that the "monad" duovof) should be combined with the " indefinite duad " ((SiMf aiSpiffrof), or the form-giving with tlie form-receiving principle. The Ideas, according to him, were intermediate between God and the world ; matter was the chaotic substrate of creation, the ideas were the patterns and God the efScient cause {fi fihv ovv v7\,7j TL)v VTOKStfievav aTaKrdrardv ecTiv • ?} (T iJea ruv napadetyfidToyv KdA7uGTov ' 6 di iJeof Tuv alrliM apiarov, Quaest. Conv., VIII. 2. 4). God's essence is unknown to us (De Pyth. Orac, 20) ; he sees, but is not seen {De Js. et Osir., '75), he is one and free from all differentiation (erepoTTi;), he is the existent (6v), and has no genesis (De EI apud Delph. 20 ; Be Is. et Osir., 78). Only God's workings can be known by us. In itself matter is not bad, but indifferent ; it is the common place for good and evil ; there is in it a yearning after the divine ; but it also contains another principle, the evil world-soul, which coexists with the good one, and is the cause of all disorderly motions in the world {Be Is., 45 seq. ; Be An. Procreat., ch. 6 seq.). The gods are good. Of the demons (who are necessary as mediators between the divine and human), some are good and others are evil; in the liuman soul both qualities are combined. Besides the one supreme God, Plutarch recog- nizes as real the popular divinities of the Hellenic and Non-Hellenic faiths. The moral element in Plutarch is elevated and without asperity. Maximus of Tyre, who lived about one half-century after Plutarch, was more favorable to Syncretism in religion and to a superstitious demonology. Apuleius of Madaura, born probably between 126 and J32 A. D., taught that, besides God, the Ideas and Matter were the original principles of things. He discriminates as belonging to the sphere of the supra-sensible, or truly existent, God and his reason, which contains the ideal forms, and the soul : from these are contradistinguished all that is sen- sible or material. The belief in demons receives the same favor from him as from Maxi- mus. The third book of his work Be Bogmate Plaionis contains logical theorems, in which Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are blended together. Marcianus Capella, who between A. D. 330 and 439 (and probably between 410 and 439) wrote a manual of the " seven liberal arts " (edited by Franz Eyssenhardt, Leipsic, 1866), also Isidorus, (see below, § 88), borrowed much from this work of Apuleius. Alcinous, who lived probably at about the same time with Apuleius, likewise names in his outline of the Platonic teaching (elg to tov IlKdTon/ug 66y/.iaTa e'taayay^), God, the ideas, and matter as the first principles. He uncritically mixes Aristotelian and Stoic with Platonic opinions. Albinus (whose instruction Galenus sought at Smyrna, in 151-152 A. D.) wrote an in- troduction to the Platonic Dialogues, which is of little value, and also commentaries on some of the works of Plato. Cf Alberti, Ueber dea Alb. Isagoge, in the Rh. Mas., new series, XIII. pp. '!6-110. Severus, from whose writings Eusebius (Pr. Ev., XIII. 11) has preserved us a frag- ment, combated single doctrines of Plato. In particular, he denied tlie genesis of the world THE ECLECTIC PLATONISTS. 237 (Prod in Tim., II. 88), and affirmed the soul to be simple, like a mathematical figure, anc not compounded of two substances, the one capable the other incapable of being acted upon. With his Platonism were blended Stoic doctrines. Calvisius Taurus (who taught at Athens about 150 a. d.) wrote against the Stoics and on the difference between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (A. Gellius, N. A., XII. 5 ; Suidas, s. v. Toipof). Gellius (born about 130), who was his pupil (in about the year 160), often mentions him. Atticus (said to have flourished about 176 A. r.) opposed the combination of Platonic with Aristotelian doctrines, and disputed violently against Aristotle (Euseb., Praep. Ea., XI. I et cU.). He held to the literal sense of the Timaeiis (especially as to the doctrine of the temporal origin of the world). In his interpretation of the ethics of Plato, lie seems to have assimilated it to that of the Stoics. A pupil of Atticus was Harpocration (Procl., in Tim., II. 93 b). Claudius Galenus (in the second half of the second century), the well-known teacher of medicine, cultivated also philosophy, and occupied himself with the minute exposition of works of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Chrysippus. Galenus extols philosophy (which with him is identical with religion) as the greatest of divine goods (Protrept., eh. 1). In logic he follows Aristotle.. The fourtli syllogistic figure, named after him, was not first brought to light or " discovered " by him, but was obtained by a repartition into two figures of the modes included by Theophrastus and Eudemus in the first figure. In meta- physics, Galenus added to tlie four Aristotelian principles, matter, form, moving cause, and final cause, a fifth principle, namely, the instrument or means (SC ov), which by (Plato and) Aristotle, as it appears, had been subsumed under the concept of the moving cause. "With all his inclination to assent to the Platonic views respecting the immateriality of the soul, he was unable, in regard to this question, and, in general, in regard to all questions which conduct beyond the limits of experience, to overcome his tendency to doubt. The thing of principal importance, in his estimation, was to have a religious conviction of the existence of the gods and of an over-ruhng providence. Celsus (perhaps about 200), the opponent of Christianity, whose arguments were con- troverted by Origen, was a Platonist ; he cannot have been an Epicurean. He does not deny the influence of the gods on the world, but only that God works directly on the world of sense. In antagonism to the divine causality stands that of matter, which latter is the source of an irresistible physical necessity. From this Celsus is to be distinguished the Epicurean of the same name, who lived about 170 A. D., and is mentioned by Lucian in the PseudmnanUs. Numenius of Apamea in Syria, who lived in the second half of the second century after Christ, combined Pythagorean and Platonic opinions in such manner that, while him- self conceding to Pythagoras the highest authority and asserting that Plato borrowed the essential parts of his teachings from him, he made in fact the Platonic element predominant in his doctrine. Numenius traces the philosophy of the Greeks back to the wisdom of the Orientals, and calls Plato an Attic-speaking Moses (Muva^c arriKK^uv, Clem. Alex., Strom., 1. 342 ; Euseb., Praep. Ev., XI. 10). He was without doubt well acquainted with the doctrines of Philo and with the Jewish- Alexandrian philosophy in general. He wrote, among other things, vcpl tuv UlaTuvo^ anoppr/Tuii, nepl rayaOov, and n-cpi Tjjg rav 'AKaSri- fiaUuv Trpof TlTiarcnia diaaraaEug (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 5; XIV. 5). The most note- worthy deviation of Numenius from Plato (but which was not recognized by him as such) consists in this: that he (following, perhaps, the precedent of the Christian Gnostics, eepe- cially the Valentinians, and indirectly influenced by the distinction made by the Jewish- Alexandrian philosophers between God himself and his power working in the world, th» 238 NEO-PLATONIC SCHOOLS. Logos) distinguished the world-builder {Siifumpy6q) as a second God, from the highest deity. The first God is good in and through himself; he is pure thought-activity (vovi;) and the principle of being (ovaiag apxv, Euseb., Pr. Ev., XL 22). The second God (o devrepo^ 6e6(; 6 Sriiiiovpyb^ fleiSf) is good by participation in the essence of the first (jierovaia Tcfb Trpurou); he looks toward the supersensuous archetypes and thereby acquires knowledge {iiriaTJjiiTi) • he works upon matter and thus forms the world, he being the principle of genesis or becoming {yeveceu; apx^l). The world, the production of the Demiurgos, is the third God. Numenius terms the three Gods, respectively, father, son, and grandson (vaimoq, iK-yovoc, and OTrdyovof, ProcL, in Plat Tim., IL 93). Numenius ascribes this doctrine not only to Plato, but also even to Socrates (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIV. 5). The descent of the soul from its incorporeal pre-existent condition into the body implies, according to him, pre- vious moral delinquency. Cronius, who is often named in connection with Numenius, and is described by Porphyry {De Antra Nymph,, 21) as his friend {eralpof), seems to have shared with him in his opinions. He gave to the Homeric poems an allegorical and mythi- cal interpretation. Harpocration also followed Numenius in his doctrine of the three highest gods. The writings of the pretended Hermes Trismegistus (ed. Gust. Parthey, Berlin, 1854: cf., respecting him, Baumgarten-Crusius, Progr., Jena, 1827; B. J. Hilgers, Bonn, 1855, and Louis Menard, Hermes Trismegiste, traduction complete, precedee d'une etude sur forigine des livres hermetiques, Paris, 1866, 2d ed., 1868), which in religious and philosophical regards bear an entirely syncretistic character, belong to the time of Neo-Platonism. § 66. Among the adherents of Neo-Platonism, a system founded on the principle of the transcendence of the Deity, and in which, not- withstanding its filiation upon Plato, the whole of philosophical science was brought under a new systematic form, belong, 1) the Alexandrian- Koman school of Animonius Saccas, the originator of the whole Neo- Platonic movement, and of Plotinus, who was the first to develop the system on all its sides, 2) the Syrian School of Jamblichus, who fa- vored a fantastical theurgy, 3) the Athenian school of the younger Plutarch, and of Syrianus, and of Proclus and his successors, — in whose doctrines the theoretical element became again predominant, — together with the later Neo-Platonic commentators. On Neo-PUtonlBm in general may \te compared the essays or works of G. Olearins (annexed to his translation of Stanley's ffutory of Philosophy, Leips. 1711, p. 1205 Beq.), J. A. Dietelmaier {Programma^ quo seriem veterum in echcla AlexandriTui dootm-um evponit, Altd. 1746). the Histoire critique de Fecleeti- ci^me oil des nouveax Piaiondciena (Avign. 1J€6), Meiners (Leaps. 17S2), Keil (Leips. 1786). Oelrichs (Mavb. 17S3), Fulleborn (in £6itr. arur Oeach. d. Ph., III. S. p. 70 seq.). I. H. Fichte (Be Philos, Novae Flaton, Origvnt, Berlin. ISIS), F. Boutcrwtk i^Philosoplioruni Alexar^rinorwm ac J^eoplatonicorum recemdo aecitratior, in Comm. Soc. Jieg. Ootting, rec,, vol, V., pp. 227-258, Gottingen, 1821). Tzschirner (Dcr fall dee JJeiden- Viums, Leips. 1S20), K. Vogt {A'eoplatonismus und OiristenOtum, Berlin, 1S86), Matter (Svr Peeole d'Altx- arulrle, Paris, 1820, 2d ed., 1840-48). Jules Simon (Ilistoire de FecoledTAl,, Paris, 1S43-45, cf. Emile Snisset in Revue dee Deiixr. Mondes, Sept. 1, 1S44), J. Barth61emy St. Hiiaire (^Sur le coneours' mirert par CAead, des sciences morales et poHtigues eur Vecole d^Alescandrie, Paris, 1846), E. Vacherot {IThtoire critigne de Vecole d^Al,, Paris, 1S46-51), Steinhart {Neuplat, Philosopkie, in Pauly's Real-emcycl. des class. After- ihums). Of., also, Heinr. Kellner, IIeUeni»rmis und ChristentMtm Oder die geiattiche Reaction des nntiken neia&nthtims gegen das Ohrist&rUhiim, Cologne, 1866, and Franz Hipler, yeuplaton, Studien, In the Viertdjahrschr, fur kath, Tlieol, Vienna, 1868 (and separately). AMMOSnrS SACCA8 AND HIS PUPILS. 239 It will scarcely be necessary to remark that the Neo-Platonic philosophy, although it sprung up after Christianity, belongs in its characteristics to the pre-Christian era. § 67. The founder of Neo-Platonism was Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus. Ammonius expounded his doctrine only orally, and its exact relation to that of Plotinus cannot be determined with certainty. The affirmation that no essential difference existed be- tween the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle is referred to him ; yet the correctness of this reference is also uncertain. Of the disciples of Ammonius, the most important, after Plotinus, are Origen the Neo-Platonist, Origen Adamantius the Christian, Erennius, and Longinus the philologist. DebAut, Fssai hiatorique swr la vie et la doctrine d* Ammonius Saccas^ Brussels, 1S36. G. A. Heigl, ])er Beridit deti PorpTvyrius Uber Origenes, Begensburg, 1885. JHonye. Longinus : Be Sublimitate, ed. S. r. N. Moras, Leips. 1769, ed. B. Weiske, Leips. 1809. Longi7i.i vel Dionysii irept vi/rou? ed. L. Spengel, ia Xhetores eraeci, I, Leips. 1858; ed. Otto Jahn, Bonn, 18CT. Longini quae mpermnt, ed. Weiske, Oxfovd, 1820; ed. A. E. Egger, Paris, 1637; Dav. Buhnken, Diss, de Vita eiscripiis Longini^ Leyden, 1776, .ilso in hia Opiuc, Leyden, 1S07, pp. 806-S4T. E. Egger, longin est-il ■niritaUr.ment Fautmr du traite du aublimef~\n Egger's Sssai aur riiistoire de la criUque chez les Grece, Paris, 1S49, pp. 524-583 Lonis Vauclier, Etudes critiques sur le Traite du IStibUme^ Geneva, 1851 Emil Winkler, De Lon^ini qui /ertur liiello ir.v., Halle, 1870. Ammonius, who lived about lt5-250 A. D., was brought up by his parents in the belief of Christianity, but returned afterward to the Hellenic faith (Porphyr., ap. Eustb. Mist. Ecd., VI. 19: 'Afi/iaviog jxhi yap Xpiariavos iv Xpumavolg avarpafdi Toi; yovcvaiv, ore Tov ippovEtv Kal T^g tpiAoaotpiag ^Tparo^ svdvg -rrpdg tijv Kara vopovg iroXiTEiav fiEre^d/iETo). The surname 2o/tKdf (the sack-bearer) was derived from the occupation by which Ammo- nius originally gained his living. Later writers (notably Hierodes) gave him the surname BeodiSoKToq (divinely taught). The report that he declared the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines essentially identical, originated with Hierodes (op. Phot, Bill. Cod., 214, p. 172 a, 173 b; Cod. 251, p. 451a, Bekk.); Hierodes belonged to the Athenian school of Neo-Plato- nists, who, perhaps, only imputed to Ammonius their own desire to reconcile the teachings of the two philosophers. Nemesius (De Kat. Mom., ch. 2) makes some statements con- cerning the doctrine of Ammonius respecting the immateriality of the soul : still, it may be questioned whether he has not ascribed to Ammonius opinions held by others. Whether the doctrine that the One, the absolutely Good, is exterior to the world of Ideas and the divine understanding — a doctrine of fundamental importance in the system of Plotinus — was already enunciated by Ammonius, is uncertain. It was (according to Prod., Theol. Plat., II. 4, init.) not held by Origen, the condisciple of Plotinus ; what was the position of Longinus on this point cannot be determined, since the point disputed between him and Longinus, whether the Ideas subsist outside the Nous, is not necessarily connected with the one now in question. That Origen the Christian is to be distinguished from Origen the Neo-Platonist (although G. A. Heigl asserts their identity), is beyond doubt; for the works of the Chris- tian Church-Father were known by Porphyry (Euseb., Mist. Ecd., VI. 19), who complains of his adherence to Christianity in spite of his Hellenic education I^Qpiyh^c Si 'Eaatv iv 'EXX^fft iratSev6tig \6yotq irpog to ^dppapov c^ukci^ rdTi/iri/ia), and yet says of Origen the Platonist, that (apart from his commentary on the Prooemium of the Platonic Timaeus, 240 PLOTINUS, AMELroS, AND POEPHTET. which Proclus mentions, ad Flat. Theol., II. 4) he wrote only on the two following subjects : nepl Sai/idviM and oti fidvog iroaiT^^ i paat^evg (Porphyr., Vita Plotini, ch. 3). The lattef work treated, it is most probable, of the identity of the world-builder with the supreme God. (Cf. G. Helferich, Untera. aus dem GeUet der class. Alterthumswiss. G.-Pr., Heidel- berg, 1860.) Origen the Christian (185-254 A. D.) appears to have attended the school of Ammonius in about the year 212. Porphyry relates (JTita Plotini, ch. 2) that "Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus made a mutual promise not to divulge the doctrine of Ammonius ; but, Erennius having broken this agreement, Origen and Plotinus felt themselves also no longer bound by it; still, Plotinus wrote nothing till quite late in life." Of Erennius, tradition says that he explained the term " metaphysics " as denoting what lies beyond the sphere of nature (see Brandis in the AWi. d. Berl. Akad., 1831, p. 34 seq.), Longinus (213-273 A. D.), known as a grammarian and writer on aesthetics, upheld, in opposition to Plotinus and his followers, the doctrine that the ideas exist separate from the Nous. Porphyry also, who was for a time a pupU of Longinus. sought, in a work directed against Plotinus, to demonstrate the same doctrine (bri tju rov vm iijiiBTJiKt to voi/rd), but was afterward led by Amelius to abandon it, whereupon he was attacked by Longinus (Porphyr., Vit. Plot, ch. 18 seq.). At a still later period Plotinus admitted that Longinus was still the ablest critic of his times (Vita Plot, ch. 20 : tov /caiJ' ij^df KpiriKurdTov ■ysvofdvov) ; but lie contended (perhaps because Longinus, in opposition to him, insisted on the — real or supposed — literal sense of the Platonic writings) that he was only a philol- ogist and no philosopher (op. Porphyr., Vita Plotin., ch. 14 : oM?,o-yoi: fih 6 Koyylvof, ^Maoipo; 6e ovSa/iac). This judgment was, at all events, too severe. It is true that Lon- ginus did not, like Plotinus, contribute to the positive development of theosophy. But he participated, nevertheless, in the philosophical investigations connected with this subject, and really enriched the science of iesthetios by his work on the Sublime (irepl irfovt), which is full of fine and just observations. § 68. Plotinus (204-269 a. d.), who first developed the Neo- Platonic doctrine in systematic form, or, at least, was the first to put it in writing, was educated at Alexandria under Ammonius Saceas, and afterward (from a. d. 244 on) taught at Rome. His works were revised in point of style by Porphyry, and published in six Enneads. Plotinus agrees with Plato in the doctrine of " sensibles " {ala- drjTo) and " intelligibles " (vot/to) and intermediate or psychical na- tures. But he difiers from him radically (though unconsciously— for Plotinus believed that his own doctrine was contained in Plato's writings), inasmuch as he teaches that the One or the Good, which with Plato was the highest of the Ideas, is elevated above the sphere of the Ideas and above all the objects of rational apprehension, and , that the Ideas, to which Plato ascribed independent existence, are emanations from this " One," the soul an emanation from the Ideas, and so on, the Sensible being the last in the series of emanations ; he difi"ers from him, further, in teaching that the Ideas- are in the JS^ous, while Plato in the Timaeus, with a phraseolqgy which indi- PLOTINCS, AMELIUS, AND POEPHYET. 241 cates a wavering between the tendency to poetic personification and the dogmatic, doctrinal tendency, styles the Ideas gods and the highest Idea the Idea of the Good, the high^t god ; and the author of the Sophistes ascribes to them, in unqualified, dogmatic form, mo- tion, life, and reason. The primordial essence, the original unity, the One (tv) or the Good {ayaOdv)^ is neither reason nor an object of rational cognition (neither vov^ nor votjt6v), because excluded, by virtue of its absolute unity, from and exalted above both the terms thus contrasted. From the excess of its energy it sends forth an image of itself, in like manner as the sun emits rays from itself. This image, turning with an invol- untary movement toward its original, in order to behold it, becomes thus Nous, mind (vovg). In this Nous the Ideas are immanent, not however as mere thoughts, but as substantially existent and essential parts of itself. They constitute in their unity the Nous, just as the theorems of a science constitute in their unity that science. It is to them that true being and life really belong. The same ideal reality is thus at once the truly existent or the true object of knowledge, and knowing subject or Reason ; in the former aspect it is considered as at rest, in the latter, as in motion or active. The Nous in turn pro- duces as its image the soul, which exists in it, as itself exists in the One. The soul has aflSnities both for the ideal and the sensible. The body is in the soul, and depends on it ; but the soul, on the contrary, is absolutely separable from the body, not only in respect of its thinking power, but also in its lower faculties, memory and sensuous perception, and even in the formative force through which it molds and builds up its material environment. It precedes and survives the body. The matter, which is in the objects of sensuous perception, is only generically similar to the matter, which is in the Ideas (i. e., both fall under the same general concept of matter) ; but the former is specifically difierentiated from the latter by the attributes of extension in space and solidity. The former is ju^ 6v, non-existent, essenceless, and can only be reduced to form and order by higher forces, non- derivable from itself. The forms and the formative forces, the powers of nature (Adyot), which enter into it, come from the Ideas, or the Nous. The same categories are not applicable to the ideal and the sensible. The business of man is to return to God, whom he, as a sensuous being, has estranged from himself. The means by which this return is to be accomplished are virtue, philosophic 16 242 PLOTINTTS, AMELIUS5 AND POEPHTET. thought, and, above all, the immediate, ecstatic intuition of God and the becoming one with Him, Of the disciples of Plotinus, the most noteworthy are Amelius, one of his earliest disciples, and Porphyry, the reviser, arranger, and editor of his works. The works of PIotinuB were first published in the Latin translation of Morsfliua Ficlnus (Floreneef 1492 ; Saltgniaci, 1540 : Basel, 15S9), and then in Greek and Latin (Basel, 1580, 1615) ; editions with the trnne- lation of Ficinus annexed have been published by Dan. Wyttenbach, G. H. Moaer, and Fr. Crcuzer (Ox- ford, 1835), by Creuzer and Moser (Poris, 1855), and by A. Eirchhoff (Leips. 1856). Plotinus' treatises on the virtues and against the GnosticB were edited and published by Eirchhoffin 1847, and the latter of those works, by Heigl (Eegensb, 1882). Mm. I. 6, has been published separately by Creuzer r PloHni Lib. (U Pulchritudine^ Heidelb. 1814. The eighth book of the third Ennead (concerning nature, contemplation, and the One) has been translated and explained by Creuzer (inDaubundCrenzer's;Sl*wrfien, Vol. I,, Heidelb. 1805, pp. 23-lOS), the first Ennead, by J. G. V. Engelhardt (Erlangen, 1820). Parts of Plutinus* works havo been translated into English by Th. Taylor (London, 1787, 1794, 1817), and all have been translated into French and provided with a commentary by Bouillet (Paris, 1857-60), Of modern works on Plotinus we name those of Gottl. "Wilh. Gerlach (IHsp. de differentia^ quae infer Plotini et SchelliTigii doctrinatn de numiiu summo intercedit^ Witt,, 1811), Lindeblad {Plot de PulchrOy Lund, 1830), Steinhart {De dial. Plotini ratiofie^ Halle, 1829; MeUtemata Plotiniana^ diss. Ptjrt, Nanm- burg, 1840; and Art. Plotln^ in Pauly's Real-enc. d. cl. Alt.\ Etl. Mullor (in his Gesch. der Theorie der Kii/iiHt bet den Altera, II., pp. 236-315, Berlin, 1887), J. A. Neander {XJeber JSnnead. II. 9: Gegen die Gncstiker^ in the Abh. der Bert. Akad.^ Berlin, 1843, p. 299 scq.), F, Creuzer (in the Prolegom. to the Paris edition of the works of Plotinus), Ferd. Gregorovius (in Fichtc's Zeitschr.f. Ph^ XXVI., pp. 112-147), Rob. Zimmermann {GescK der Aesth., Vienna, 1858, pp. 122-147), C. Herm. Eirchner (Die PhilonopJiie des Plotin^ Halle, 1854), Starke {Plotini de amore sententia^ Neu-Euppin, 1854), E. Volkmann {Die JIoH der antiken Aesthetik^ oder Plotinus Abh. torn. Sdioneji, Stettin, 1860), Emil Breaming. {Die^ Lehre vom SclMnen bei Plotin, im Zusamm&nhange seines Sf/stems darge^tellt, ein Seitrag eitr Gesdiichte der Aesthetik^ Guttingen, 1864), A. J. Vitringa {De egregio quod in rebus corporeis convtituit Plotinvs pvlchri principio^ Amst. 1864), Valentiner (Ptoim und seine E^neaden nebet Uebersetsung von JEnn. JI. 9., in S^dien und Kritiken^ 1864, p. 118 seq.), Arthur Eichter {Keuplat. Studien ; Heft 1 ; uberLeben, itnd Geistesentwickelung des Plotin; IIeft2: Plotin's Lehre vom ieiii und die metaphyn. Grwndlage seiner PMlosopMe ; Heft 8 : die Jlteologie wtid Physik des Plotin ; I/e/t 4 : die Peycliologie des Plotin ; Jleft 5: die Ethik des Plotin^ Halle, 1864-07), Herm. Ferd. Miiller {Ethices Ploiinianae lineamenta Diss.^ Berlin, 1867), E.Grucker {De Plotinianis lihris^ qui inscribvntur irepi tow koAoS ei irepi tou votjtou ledAAous, Diss., Strasbourg and Paris, 1866). / Porphyrii Vita Plotini^ composed in 803, oppeared first in connection with the Basel editions of the Snneads in 1580 and 1615, then in Fabric. Mbl Gr., IV. 2, 1711, pp. 91-147, and in the Oxford edition of the Enneads in 1835, but not in the Paris edition, again in Eirehoff 's edition, LeIps. 1856, and in Cobefs Diog. Lasrt., Paris, 1850, append, pp. 102-118, ed. Ant. Westermann. Porphyrii Vit. PyVi. ed. Eiessling, in the ed. of Jambl. de Vit. Pytliagorica-, Leips. 1815-16; ed. Westermann, in Cobet's D^iog, Z., Paris, 1850, app. pp. 87-101. Porphyrii a^ofnitu. irpbi ra vorird^ ed. L. Holstenius. with the Vita Pytfiag., Kome, 1630, and in the Paris edition of Plotinus (1855). Porphyr. Epist de ZHis Da&monibus ad Anebonem^ in cnnnection with f/iMnftZ. (?6 J/ysi., Venice, 1497, and in Gale's ed. of the same work, Oxford,. 1678. Por- phyr. de quinqu^vocibus sive in categor, AristoteUs introditctio^ Paris, 1543 ; the same is prefixed to most editions of the Organon, and is published in Vol. HI. of the Berl, Akad.^B edition of Aristotle. Porphyr. de ahstinentia ab esu animaUvm. I. quatuor, ed. Jac. de Ehoer, Utrecht, 1767. Porphyr. epist ad Marcel, lam^ ed. An gel us Mains, Milan, lS16andl831, 0e2. J. C. OreIlius,in Op%(sc. Graec. Se7itentioa« Porphyr in Plat, Tim, commeniario,, Diss,,, Bonn, 186S). Porphyr von der EnOuMsamkeit, a. d, Orieeh, m, Anm., by £. Baltzer, Nordhauneu, 1869. The native city of Plotinus was Lycopolis in Egypt (Eunap., Vit Soph,, p. 6, Boiss. et ai,). He himself was unwillmg even to name his birthplace or his parents, or the time of his birth, for, says Porphyry, his disciple ( Vit. Plot, ch. 1), he despised these as terres- trial matters, and he seemed to be ashamed of being in the body. Porphyry states {ibid., eh. 2) that Plotinus died near the end of the second year of the reign of Claudius (269, assuming, as we may, that the year of his reign began with the civil year ; otherwise, 270), and that (according to information given to Eustoehius, his own fellow-disciple) he was then sixty-six years old; from these data Porphyry derives 204 (205?) as the birth-year of Plotinus. In his twenty-eighth year Plotinus applied himself to philosophy, and listened to the instructions of the men then famous at Alexandria, but none of them was able to satisfy him, till at last he came to Ammonius, ih whom he found the teacher he had sought. He remained with Ammonius till the year 242 or 243, when he joined himself to the expedition of the Emperor Gordian against the Persians, that he might learn the Persian philosophy. He was prevented from accomplishing this purpose by the unfortu- nate issue of the expedition, and was obliged to flee for his life to Antioch. The inference of some historians (Brucker, for example, see above, p. 27) that Plotinus was a disciple and adherent of the Potamo who is mentioned in Diog. L., I. 21, as the founder of an eclectic sect, is incorrect. Suidas says (s. -a. JloTa/iav) : Hot. 'AjiE^avdpcvg yeyovijg trpo Avyovarov nal /xst' aiirov, " Potamo, the Alexandrian, living before and after the time of Augustus," and he adds that he was the author of a commentary on Plato's Sepvilic. If the statement of Suidas is correct, Diogenes Laertius must simply have copied the words of his authority (Diodes) without thought, and the reference in the words JTpd oTiiyov xal in^KTix^ ri; alpeaig eia^x^V i"''o JloTdfiavog must be to the time of Augustus. This Potamo appears to be identical with the person mentioned by Plutarch {Alex,, 61) as "Potamo the Lesbian," one of the teachers of Sotion the Sextian. At the age of forty years (243 or 244 A. D.) Plotinus went to Rome (Porphyr., Vit, Plot,, ch. 3). He succeeded there in finding disciples, and, later still, he won over to his doctrine the Emperor Gallienus, as also his wife Salonina, so that he ventured to entertain tlie idea of founding, with the approval and support of the Emperor, a philosophers' city in Campania, which was to be called Platonopolis, and whose inhabitants were to live ac- cording to the Laws of Plato. He proposed to live in it himself, with his disciples. Gal- lienus was not indisposed to grant the philosopher the desired permission, but he was dissuaded from so doing by his counselors, and the plan remained unexecuted. Plotinus remained in Rome till the first year of the reign of M. Aurelius Claudius (268 A. D.), and then retired to Campania, where he died in the year 269, near Minturnae, at the country- seat of Castricius Firmus, his admirer. It is evident from his writings that Plotinus had obtained an exact knowledge of the doctrines of all the philosophical schools of the Greeks, by reading their principal works ; that, in particular, he had studied Aristotle with scarcely less zeal than he had studied Plato, is expressly certified by Porphyry ( Vita Plot, ch. 14). The works of Numenius exerted a powerful influence on him. Porphyry recognizes in Numenius a forerunner of Ammonius and Plotinus, but agrees with Amelius and Longinus in repelling the charga raised by some against Plotinus, that he merely reproduced the teachings of Numenius; 244 PLOTINUS, AMELICS, AND POEPHTET. 6a the contrary, he says, Plotinus developed the Pythagorean and Platonic principles with far greater exactness, thoroughness, and distinctness, than any one of liis predecessors ( Vita Plot., chs. 17 seq. ; 20 seq.). At the Synousiai Plotinus caused not only the writings of the Platonists Severus, Croniua, Xumenius, Gaius, and Atticus, but also those of the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander (of Aphrodisias ?), and Adrastus, to be read, and with these he connected his own speculations (Porphyr., Vit. Plot, ch. 14). Plotinus began the written exposition of his doctrines in his fiftieth year (253 A. d.). His manuscript was revised after his death and given to the public by his disciple Por- phyry ; yet a few copies made from the original had previously come into the hands of his more familiar disciples. There existed also in ancient times an edition by Eustochms, respecting which the notice has come down to us that in it the psycholo^cal investigatioEs contained in Ennead. IV. 3-5, and which belong together, were divided otherwise than in the Porphyrian revision, the third chapter coming nearer the commencement of the Er nead in the former than in the latter edition. All the manuscripts now extant are based on the edition of Porphyry. The worl£3 of Plotinus laels the artistic form of the Platonic Dialogues, and still mora their dialectical force ; yet they possess a certain attractiveness from the earnest self-abar.. donment of the writer to his thought and the unction of his style. Porphyry ascribes Hi the Plotinic diction terseness and wealth of ideas {avvTcrvoQ mi itoTwvoui) and sees in many parts rather the language of religious inspiration (rd ttoAao ivBrnaiCiv Koi CKiraBug ApdCui) than the tone of instruction. Longinus, who combated many of the doctrines of Plotinus, confesses, nevertheless (in a letter to Porphyry, given in the latter's Vita Plotin., ch. 19) hi« high appreciation of the Plotinic style of thought and expression (tov 6i rimou r^j ypaf^f Kai Tuv iwoiov Tavipoc ryv trvuvdryra mi to (juTidao^mv T^grinr (timfiaTuv dtoBiaeag irrep. fiaMAvTog aya/iat xal ^ cm-eZevKTaL to vtniTdv). But duality implies unity, and this unity we must seek to discover (fl Si ivo, iel to wpb tuv 6vo T.a^F.iv). The Nous cannot itself be the unity sought, since it is necessarily subject to the duality above pointed out. Separate the Nous (intellect) from the vot/tAv (intelligible) and it will no longer be Nous. Hence that which is prior to duality is above and beyond the Noiis (to irpdrepov tuv Siio Tovrav eTTEKetva 6ei vov e'lvac). The One can no more be vorfTov than Nous ; for the vor/rov is also inseparably united with the Nous. If, therefore, it can neither be Nous nor vojir6v, it must be that from which each alike is derived. It is not, however, for this reason irrational, but supra-rational or transcending reason {iirepPcjlTiKnc Tifv vov n image (elfii>v) of the former. As the product of the One, the image turns toward the One in order to grasp and comprehend it, and through tliis very turning (inwTpo^)\t be- comes Nous (reason), for all theoretical comprehension is either alafl^aif or voif (sense-peri ception or rational apprehension) ; it is the former only -when tlie object of comprehension is sensible, hence when this object is supra -sensible it is loif. The Nous is in distinction from the One subject to differentiation (eTtpdri/f ), in that the duality of knowing and known is inherent in it ; for even when both these terms are, in fact, identical (in self-knowledge), the ideal difference remains. The Nous includes in itself the world of Ideas (Ennead. III. 9 ; V. 5). The Ideas have their material constitution, but it is a supra-sensible nature (Eur nead. TV. 4.4: £t 6e Itop^ii, cotl naX rb iMp^iimm, vtpl o ij iiwpopa, icm ipa - whcre wbatwas probably In the beginnings poetic personilication has already become a matter of doctrine- motion, life, animation, and reason are ascribed to the Iileas. eo that their relation to the Nous is neither that of Immanence nor that of transcendence, hut the Nous Is immanent in them. That the Ideas transcenll the human Nous la justly recognized as Pinto's doctrine both by Plotinus and Longinus. U followed ob- viously from the argument of Plotinus. that he moat cither refuse to man a knowledge of the Ideas or else maHe them also immaneiit in the human Nous. PLOTINUS, AMELIUS, AND POEPHTET. 249 harmony, nor the entelechy of the body and inseparable from the latter, since not only th« Nous, but also memory, and even the faculty of perception and the psychical force, which molds the body, are separable from the body (Plotin., ap. Easeh., Praepar. Ev., XV. 10). There exists a real plurality of souls; the higliest of all is the soul of the world; but the rest are not mere parts of the world-soul {Ennead. IV. 3. 1 ; IV. 9). The soul permeates the body as fire permeates air. It is more correct to say that the body is in the soul than tliat the soul is in the body ; there is, therefore, a portion of the soul in which there is no body, a portion to whose functions the co-operation of the body is unnecessary. But nei- tlier are the sensuous faculties lodged in the body, whether in its individual parts or in the body as a whole ; they are only present with the body (napclvai, irapovaia), the soul lending to each bodily organ the force necessary for the execution of its functions {Ennead. IV. 3. 22 and 23). Thus the soul is present not only in the individual parts of the body, but in the whole body, and present everywhere in its entirety, not divided among the dif- ferent parts of the body; it is entirely in the whole body, and entirely in every part. The soul is divided, because it is in all the parts of its body, and it is imdivided, because it is entirely in all parts and in every part {jiepiBTij, on iv Tram /lEpeai rov h ijj ea-tv, a/jcpiaro; di, bri 6X7 ev Tvdai Koi sv 6t. 0; I. 8. 5). That material bodies possess a substratum (iraoKei/ievov), which, itself unchanged, is the subject of manifold changing forms, is inferable (as Plato teaches) from the transition of various kinds of matter into each other, whereby it is made obvious that there are no determinate forms of matter which are original and unchangeable, such as, for example, the four elements of Empedocles, but that all determination arises from the union of form (jiopflj) and unqualified matter (vT^tj). Matter, in the most general sense of the word, is the basis or "depth" of each thing (rb paBoc; imarov r/ iiXri). Matter is darltness, aS the Logos is light. It has no real being (it is fiy ov). It is the qualitatively indeterminate' (oTTEipov), which is rendered determinate by the accession of form ; as deprived of form it is evil (KaKdv), as capable of receiving forms, it is of an intermediate nature between good and bad (jiiam ayadov koI Kanov). But the matter in the ideas is only in so far simi- lar to that which is in sensible objects, as both fall under the general designation of " the darlc depth ; " in other respects, the difierence between these two kinds of matter is as great as that which exists between ideal and sensible form (Sianp6v ye fii/v to cmrnvbv 76 7£ EV Tolq voTfToiQ TO TE EV Toli; aXodTjroi^ vTapxav, 6mipop6g TE ii v2.7j, baov Kal rb elSoc TO ETziKEi/iEvov a/itjidlv 6ia(j>opov) ; as that form (/iop(p7/) which is perceived by the senses is only an image (eUuTmv) of ideal form, so also the substratum of the sensible world is only an image or shadow of the ideal substratum ; this latter has, like the ideal form, a true existence, and is rightly called ovala, substance, while the designation of the substratum of sensible things as substance is incorrect (Ennead. II. 4). Plotinus subjects the Aristotelian and also the Stoic doctrine of categories to a minute criticism of which the fundamental idea is that the ideal and the sensible do not fall under the same categories. He then offers, himself, a new doctrine of categories. In agreement with the (Platonic ?) Dialogue Sophistes (p. 257 seq.), lie designates 03 funda- mental forms of the ideal r being, rest, motion, identity, and difference (ov, OTacti, KivT/m;, 250 PLormus, amelius, and poephtet. -oirdri/f, and hepdrr/g). The categories which apply to the sensible world, taken in the sense here given to them, are not the same with those of the ideal world, yet they are not entirely different; they are homonymous with the latter, but are to be understood only in an analogous sense ((5« . . . TaiiTa avoKoyiq. koI o/icym/iia Tia/i^aveiv). Plotinua seeks to reduce the Aristotelian categories to these analoga of the ideal categories (Eanead. VI. 1-3). The essence of beauty consists not in mere symmetry, but in the supremacy of the higher over the lower, of the form over matter, of the soul over the body, of reason and goodness over the soul. Artistic representation imitates not merely sensible objects but in its highest development, the ideas themselves, of which sensible objects are images. In consequence of their descent into corporeality, the souls of men have forgotten their divine origin and become unmindful of the Heavenly Father. They wished to be inde- pendent, rejoiced in their self-lordship (tu avTE^ova'u^), and fell constantly farther and farther from God, forgetting their own dignity, and paying honor to that which waa most contemptible. Hence the need of man's conversion to that which is the more excellent (Ennead. T. 1. 1). Man has not lost his freedom ; the essence of freedom— says Plotinus, in agreement with Aristotle— is the absence of constraint, combined with knowl- edge C"^ pi? iJ-era Tab eldevai, Ennead. VI. 8. 1). Some men remain buried in the sen- suous, holding pleasure to be the only good and pain the only evil ; they seek to attain the former and to avoid the latter, and this they regard as their wisdom. Others, who are capable of rising to a certain point, but are yet unable to discern that which is above them, become only virtuous, and devote themselves to practical life, aiming merely to make a right choice from among those things, which are after all only of an inferior nature. But there is a third class of men of divine nature, who, gifted with higher power and keener vision, turn toward the radiance which shines from above and rise into its presence ; they rise above the region of obscuring mists and, despising all that is of the earth, sojourn there, where is their true fatherland .and where they become partakers of true joy (Ennead. V. 9. J). Virtue is defined by Plotinus, with Plato, as resemblance to God (Sew 6/xoio6^m, Ennead. I. 2. 1), and sometimes, also, 'as activity conformed to the nature of the agent (ivepyelv Kara ttjv ovaiav), or obedience to reason (inatav Myov), definitions which recall the doctrines of Aristotle and the Stoics. Plotinus distinguishes between civil and purifying virtues and virtues which render their possessor like God. The civil vii'tues (n-o/UTifcai apcrai) are practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, the latter in the sense of " attention to one's own business, whether as a ruler or a subject " {piKuinrpayia apxvc 'rcpt Kal tov apxeaOat) ■ the purifying virtues (imBapasig) deliver man from all sin (dfiapria), by making him to flee from whatever pertains merely to sense, while the third class of virtues end, not in deliverance from sin, but in identification with God (oi/£ cfu dfiapTia; etvai, a?.?.a iJeov eivai). In the virtues of the last class those of the first are repeated in a higher sense (// dixauimv^ y fisO^uv to Trpbg vovv kvepyuv, to 6k ffQ^povstv Tj elffot Trpdg vovv OTpo^^ ij 6e avdpeia cnradeia Kofi* d/xoioatv tov trpoq o pXeweij a-n-aBic bv Tf/v ipvctv, . . irpo; vovv ?/ bpnai; ao(pia Kal fpSvj/aic, Ennead. I. 2). The last and highest end for man is ecstatic elevation to the one truly Good. This elevation is not effectuated by thought, but by a higher faculty; the intellectual cognition of tlio Ideas forms to it only a stepping-stone, which must be passed and left behind. The highest point which can be reached or aspired to is the knowledge of, or rather contact with, the Good itself {?/ tov ayaSov eItc yvaaig ilre maf^); for the sake of this the soul despises even thought itself, which she yet prefers to all things except this ; thought is a form of motion (juvr/ciiQ), but the soul desires to be unmoved, like the One itself {Ennead. VI. 7. 25 and 26). The soul resembles God by its unity {Ennead. III. 8. 9) and by its pos- PLOTLNUS, AMELIUrS, AND POKPHTEY. 251 session of a centre {rb ipvxyc otov luvrpov, Ermead. VI. 9. 8), and hence arises the possi- bility of its communion with the One (Ermead. VI. 9. 10). When we look upon God we have reached our end and found rest, all disharmony is removed, we circle around God in tlie movements of a divinely-inspired dance (xopeia evfleogf and behold in him the source of life, the source of the Nous, the principle of being, the cause of all good, the source and principle of the soul, and we enjoy the most perfect blessedness {Ennead. VI. 9. 8 and 9). Yet this is not a beholding (0ca/ja), but another manner of knowing ; it is ecstasy, simpli fication, contact with Good (E/nrramf, airMiaif, d(p^, Ennead. VI. 9. 11). Not always are we able to abide in this blessed state ; not yet completely loosed from the bonds of the earthly, it is only too easy for the earthly to win back our regards, and only rarely does the direct vision of the supreme God fall to the lot of the best of men, the virtuous and wise, the god-like and blessed I Ennead. VI. 9. 10 and 11). According to the testimony of Porphyry, his disciple, Plotinus attained to this unifica- tion with God only four times in the six years which Porphyry spent with him (Porphyr., Vit. Plot., c. 23). One of the earliest disciples of Plotinus at Rome (246 seq.) was Amelius (Gentilianus, the Tuscan, from Ameria), who at the same time allowed also great authority to Nume- nius. He distinguished in the Nous three hypostases, which he styled three Demiurges or three kings : tov ovra, rbv cxovra, rbv opiivra. Of these the second participated in the real being of the first, and the third in the being of the second, enjoying at the same time the vision of the first (Procl., in Plat. Tim., 93 d). Amelius maintained the theory (opposed by Plotinus) of the unity of all souls in the world-soul (Jamblich., ajp Stob., Eel, I. 886 ; 888 ; 898). The most important of the disciples of Plotinus was Porphyry. Born at Batanea, in Syria, or perhaps at Tyre, in the year 232 or 233 a. d., he received his education at Tyre. His original name was Malclius, which Longinus, whose pupil he was for a time (252-262), is said to have translated into Porphyrins (Eunap., Vit. Soph., p. 7, Boiss.). At Rome, in the year 262, he became a pupil and follower of Plotinus, and here, after having passed the years 267-270 in Sicily, he is said to have lived and died (about 30-t A. D.). Porphyry lays claim less to the rank of an originator in philosophy than to that of an expositor and defender of the doctrine of Plotinus, wliich he regards as identical with that of Plato and substantially also with that of Aristotle. Porphyry wrote a work in seven books, entitled ffept Tov fiiav elvac ryv UTiaTuvog Kot ^AptGroT£?iXjvg alpeffiv (according to Suidas, s. v. llopfupiog), and also expositions of Plato's Timaeus and Sophistes and of Aristotle's Categoriae and De Interpretatione, and the still extant Elaayoiyf/ el; rag (^ ApiCToriXov;) Karrrynpia; (vrepi yhov; not d6ttv; Kal Aa^opdf koX ISiov Koi avppelijiKdTor), which is usually printed in the beginning of the Organon. An epitome, by Porphyry, of the Plotinic system, expressed in » series of aphorisms, is likewise now extant. Besides these. Porphyry wrote a number of original works. Eunapius (Vita Porphyr., p. 8, Boiss.) ascribes to Porphyry, as his principal merit, that by his perspicuous and pleasing diction he brought within the range of the understanding of all men the doctrine of Plotinus, which in the language of its author had seemed difficult and obscure. The doctrine of Porphyry is, however, distinguished from that of Plotinus by its more practical and religious character ; the end of philoso- phizing, according to Porphyry, is the salvation of the soul (?) r^f i'l'XVi aurijpia, Porphyr., ap. Euseb., iV. Ev., IV. 7, et al.). The cause of evil is to be found in the sonl, in its desires after the low and base, and not in the body as such (Ad MarceUam, c. 29). Tlie means of deliverance from evil are self-purification (mBapai;) through asceticism and the philosophical cognition of God. To divination and theurgical initiations Porphyry con- cedes only a subordinate significance ; in his later years, especially, he was instant in 252 JAMBLICHUS AND THE STEIAN SCHOOL. ■warning his followers against their misuse (see, in particular, his epistlu to Anebo, the Egyptian Priest). Porpliyry recommends abstinence from animal food on religious grounds (see Bernays, Theophr. Schr. uber Frommigkeit, mil kr. u. erkl. Bern, zu Porph. Schr. uber Enthait, pp. 4-35). Porphyry appears to have taught (in his six boolcs mpi ih/c) more distinctly than Plotinus the doctrine of the emanation of matter from the snper- sensuous (and proximately from the Soul; Procl., in Km., 109, 133, 139; Simplic, inPlnjs., f. 50 b). The doctrine that the world is without beginning in time was defended by Por- phyry against the objections of Atticus and Plutarch (Procl., »» Tim., 119). During liis residence in Sicily, Porphyry wrote a work /card xpi-'^fi-avCyv^ distributed into fifteen Boolis, in which he attacked the doctrines of the Christians, and especially the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus. This work is often mentioned by tlie Church Fathers (Euseb, Hist. Ecdes. VI. 19; Demoiistr. Evang., III. 6; Augustin., Civ. Dei, XIX. 23 et al). In the twelfth book Porphyry declared the prophecies in the Book of Daniel (which appears to have been composed about 164 or 16.'i B. c.) to be prophecies after the event (vaticinia ex evenHt). Methodius, Eusebius of Cassarea, ApoUinarius, and Piiilostorgius wrote works in reply to Porphyry's. But neither these works, nor the work of Porphyry (which was burned by order of the Emperor Theodosius II., in the year 435) have come down to us. Cf. J Bernays, Theophr., etc., p. 133 seq. § 69. Jamblichus (died about 330 A. d.), a native of Chalcis in Coele-Syria and pupil of Porphyry, employed the IS^eo-Platonic phi- losophy simply as a means for confirming the polytheistic cultus. He attempted the speculative justification of superstition. He imitated Pythagoras more than Plato, his philosophy resting rather on mystical speculations with numbers, than on Platonic ideas. In his system not only did all the gods of the Greeks and Orientals (excepting the Christian God) and the gods of Plotinus find a place, but he also took a quite peculiar pleasure in adding to the number of superior divini- ties from the resources of his own fancy. For the disciples of Jamblichus, chief among whom were .^desins, Chrysanthius, Maximus, Priscus, Eusebius, Sopater, Sallustius, and Julian the Apostate (who was Emperor from December, 361 , to June, 363), and others, the practice of theurgy had in general more interest than philosophical speculation. Theodorus of Asine, one of the ear- liest of the disciples of Jamblichus, is the only one who labored for further development of the system. The immoderate and even deify- ing veneration of the heads of schools, and especially of Jambliclms, increased in proportion as the philosophic achievements of their dis- ciples became more insignificant. Those in this period who did most for philosophy were the commentators of the works of the ancient philosophers, Themistius being the most noteworthy among them. JamblicJii Cfialddenaia de Viia Pythagor-ica Ziber, ed-. Theoph. Klessllng; accedimt Porphyr. it vita Pythag., etc., Leijis. 1815-10. Jamil, de Pythagorica Vita, ed. Ant. Westermimn, PdriB, IfBO. in Cobft's editiun uf Diogenes Laertiua. Jamil. Adhortatio ad Philoaophiam, ed. Klessllng, Leips. 1818. JAMBLICHUS ANB THE SYEIAN SCDOOL. 253 Jatnbl. irept T^s KotvQC /xadijfiartK^s en-Limifi^s Aoyos TpLxoff (in Tilloi8(>n*3 Anecd. Graec, II., pp. 139 seq., Venice. 1181). Jambl. Tkeolognmena AritAmetieae ,■ ncctdunt Meomadd Geraseni Arit/imaUcae LViri IL. at. F. Ast, Lelps. 1817. (Jambiiclii t) de Mynleriis Uber, ed. Gust. Parthey, Berlin, 1857. G. E. Ilnben- etreit (in De JdmOliclU, pIMotophi Sj/ri, doctrina Ohritticmue retifp-oni, quam imituri studtt, noxia, Lelps. 1764) treats of the doctrine of Jamblichns. Of the author of the Be JUyateriU jEgyptiorvm trtat Uelnors (in the Comment. Soc. Gotting.^ IV. p. 50 seq., 1782), Harless {Das Buck von den dgyptiftchen Mynterien^ Munich, 1858), and Heinr. Kellncr (^Analyse der Schrift dee Jamhliditts De Mysteriie^ aU einea Verituehei^ eine vnsa. Thedlogie dee Ileidentkume hersustellen^ in the Tlieol. Quartalac/ir., 1867, No. 3, pp. 859-896). Drenffippi in Arist. categoriaa dubitationee et aolutionee primum, ed. Spenge], Munich, 1659. Mafi/iov ^lAocrw^ou irepl KaTap\5}v. ed. Gerhai'diuB, Lcips. 1820. Jtiliani Imp. Opera, ed. Petrus Petavlus and Car. Cantoclnrus, Paris, l.'iSS {ed Dion. Petavltis), Paris, 1680; ed. Bpanheim, Leips. 1696. Mbaniua, cn-irai^ios cir 'lovAiavw, in Lib. Op.^ed. Beislte, Altenburs 1791-97. Epistolae. ed. L. H. Heyler, Mayeccc, 1828. Of modern writers on Julian m.iy be mentioned Gibbon (chaps. XXII.-XXIV. of his History), Aug. Neander ( Uebcr den Xaieer Julian und eein Zeitalter^ Leipslc, 1812). 6. T. Wlggers (Dejul. Aposi., Dies.. Koetock, ISIO, and in Illgen's Zeitsdir. f. hist. Tlieol., Leips. 1S87), H. Schuize (Progr., Strals. 1689), Tcuffel {Diss., Tiib. 1844), D. F. Strauss (Jul. der AbtHln- nige. der Bomnntiker uuf dem TJtron der Casaren, Mannheim, 1847), Auer (Kaiser Julian der Abir., Vienna, 1866), Wilh. Mangold (Jul. der Abtr.,Vortrag, gehalten in Marburg, Stnttg. 1802), Carl Semisch (■/ul. der Abtr., ein Chnrakterbild, Breslau, 1862), Fr. Liibker (K. Julians Kampf und £nde. Hamburs, 1364), £og6ne Talbot (Julien, CBUvrea completes, traduction nouvelle accompagnee de sommaires, notes, eelaircissementa, etc., Paris, 1S68), Baur (Die chnsil. Sirche vom 4.-6. Jahrh., pp. 17-48), and Philip Schaff (History of the Ancient Church, New York, 1859-67, German edition, Leipslc, 1867, §§ 186 and 141, and in the Zeitscli.r. f. hist. Th., h. x. Kahnis. 1867, pp. 408-444. SaUustii philoeophi de diis et mundo lib. ed. Leo Alatius, Eomc, 1638; ed. J. C. Orelli, Zilrich, 1S21, T7u7iiistii opera omnia ; paraphrases in Arigtot. et orationes, cum Alexandri Aphrodisiensis libris de anima et de fato ed. Vict. THncavellus, Venice, 1584. T7iem. paraphrases Arisi. lihrorvm, quae supersunt ed. Leon. Spcngel, Leipslc, 1866. Cf. Valentin Bose. on a supposed pamphra.se by Themistius (yiKr/, chs. 31—38). All reality is subject to this law of triadic development. But the oftener the process is repeated the less perfect is the result. What is first is highest, the last is the lowest in rank and worth. The devel- opment is a descending one, and may be symbolized by the descending course of a spiral line (while the Pythagorean and Speusippic development, and in modern times the Hege- lian, is an ascending one). The primordial essence is the unity, which lies at the foundation of all plurality, the primal good, on which all good depends, the first cause of all existence (Instit., ch. 4 seq.). It is the secret, incomprehensible, and inefiable cause of all things, which brings forth all things and to which all tend to return. It can only be defined by analogy; it is exalted above all possible affirmation or negation ; the conception of unity is inadequate fully to express it, since it is exalted even above unity, and so also arc the conceptions of good and of cause (it is avatriag alTurv; Plat. Tlieol., III. p. 101 seq.; In Farm., YI. 81; In Tim., 110 e ; it is ■Kaatig aiy^g apjijp'&Tepov koX ivdaT/g iiTrdpfcuf a-jvaaTdrepov, Plat. Tlieol., II. p. 110). Out of this first essence Proclus represents, not (with Plotinus) the intelligible world, nor (with Jambliohus) a single One, inferior to the first, but a plurality of unities (ha6c() as issuing, all of them exalted above being, life, reason, and our power of knowledge. The precise number of these unities (ivdrfcf) is not given by Proclus, but they are less numer- ous than the Ideas, and they so exist in each other as, notwithstanding their plurality, to constitute together but one unity. "While the absolute, first essence is out of all relation to the world, these unities operate in the world ; they are the agents of providence (Intt 258 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATOES. Theol., 113 seq.). They are the gods (Beoi) in the highest sense of this word {ibid., 129). The rank of the dift'erent unities is determined according to tlie greater or less nearness in •which they stand to the first essence {Iiist, 126). The unities are followed by the triad of the intelligible, intelligible-intellectual, and intel- lectual essences {to vorirdv, to votjtov afjixi Koi voep6v, to voepov, Plat. Theol, III. 14). The first of these falls under the concept of being {ovaia), the second under that of ]ife(f6«7), the third under that of thought {/nit., 103 and 138; Plat. Theol, III. p. 127 seq.). Between these three essences or classes of essences there exists also, notwithstanding their unity, an order of rank ; the second participates in the first, the third in the second {Plat. Theol., IV. 1), The Intelligible in the narrower sense of the term, or Being {mala) includes three triads, in each of which the two first terms are " limit " {vepai) and " illimitation " {aireipov), the third terms being, in the first triad, the " union " of the two first, or " being " {/uKriv or ovaia), in the second, "life" (f(J^), and in the third, "ideas," or "that which has life iil itself" l^iSiai or aMi^uov). In each of these triads, the first or limiting term is also denominated by Proclus (who follows in this particular the precedent of Jamblichus) "Father" {narijp), tlie second or unlimited term is called "Power" (<5iva//if), and the third or mixed term, "Reason" (voif). The intelligible-intellectual sphere, falling under the concept of life (fu^), contains, according to Proclus, feminine divinities, and is subdivided into the following triads : One, Other, Being .{ev, crepov, bv), the triad of original numbers ; One and Many, Whole and Parts, Limit and Illimitation, the triad of " gods who hold together " {awenTiKoi 6eoi) ■ and )} ra iaxara exovaa idtoTti^, ij Kara -o TiXciov and ri mrra to ax^H-", the triad of " perfecting Gods " {TcTtzaimipyol Seoi, Prod., In Tim., 94 ; Theohg. Plaion., IT. 31). The inteUectval essences, lastly, falling under the concept of reason (voif), are arranged according to the number seven, the two first terms in the triadic division, or the terms which correspond respectively with Being and Life, being each subject to a threefold subdivision, while the third term remains undivided. By a further, sevenfold division of each of the seven terms (or "Hebdomas ") thus obtained, Proclus obtains seven intellectual Hebdomades, with the members of which he connects by allegorical interpreta^ tion some of the deities of the popular faith and certain Platonic and Neo-Platonic fictions, e. g., with the eighteenth of the forty-nine members, which he calls the " source of Hfo " {iTTiyfl ijmxuv), the mixing-vessel in the Timaeus of Plato, in which the Demiurgos com- bines the elements of the substance of the soul with each other. The Psychical emanates from the intellectual. Every soul is by nature eternal and only in its activity related to time. The soiil of the world is composed of divisible, indivisible, iand intermediate substance, its parts being arranged in harmonious proportions. There exist divine, demoniacal, and human souls. Occupying a middle place between tlie sen- suous and the divine, the soul possesses freedom of will. Its evils are all chargeable upon itself. It is in the power of the soul to turn back toward the divine. Whatever it knows it knows by means of the related and corresponding elements in itself; it knows the One through the supra-rational unity present in itself. Matter is in itself neither good nor evil. It is the source of natural necessity. "When the Demiurgos molds it according to the transcendent, ideal prototypes, there enter into it forms which remain immanent in it (Xdyoi, the Uyoi oTrep/iaTiicoi of the Stoics, Prod, in Tim., 4 c, seq. ; In Parmen., IT. 152). Proclus only repeats here the Plotinic doctrines. Under Marinua (of Flavia Neapolis or Sichem in Palestine), the successor of Proclus, it is related that the Neo-Platonic school at Athens sunk very low (Damasa, Vila Isidori, 228). Marinus seems to have occupied himself with theosophical speculations less tl)an Proclus, but more with the theory of ideas and with mathematics {ibid., 275). Con- disciples with Marinus were Asolepiodotus, the physician, of Alexandria, who afterward AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATOKS. 259 lived at Aphrodisias, and the sons of Hermias and ^desia, Heliodorus and Ammonliis, who afterward taught at Alexandria; such also were Severianus, Isidorua of Alexandria, Hogias, a grandson of Plutarch, and Zenodotus, who taught with Marinus at Athens. Isidorus, who had also heard Proclus and who became the successor of Marinus in the office of Scholarch, paid greater attention to theosophy, hut soon gave up hia office and returned to Alexandria, his native city. The next Scholarcli at Athens was Hegias, and tl>e next after Hegias and the last of all was Damaacius of Damascus (from about 520 on). The special object of the speculation of Damascius respecting \\\e firbt essence was to show (in agreement with Jamblichus and Proclus) that the same was exalted above all those con- traries which inhere in the finite. Damascius did not long enjoy the liberty to teach. The Kmperor Justinian, soon after his accession to the throne (a. d. 527), instituted a persecution directed against heretics aad non-Christians, and in 529 forbade instruction to be given in philosophy at Athens, and confiscated the property of the Platonic school. Soon afterward (531 or 532) Damas- cius, Siraplicius of Cilicia, the industrious and exact commentator of Aristotle, and five other Neo-Platonists (Diogenes and Hermias of Phoenicia, Eulamius or Eulalius of Phrygia, Priscianus, and Isidorus of Gaza) emigrated to Persia, where, from the traditions of tho country, they hoped to find the seat of ancient wisdom, u people moderate and just, and (in King Kliosroes) a ruler friendly to philosophy (Agathias, De Jiebus Justiwiani, II. ch. 30). Undeceived by sorrowful experiences, tliey longed to return to Athena, and in the peace concluded between Persia and the Roman Empire in the year 533, it was stipulated that they should return without hindrance and retain complete liberty of belief; but tlie prohibition of philosophical instruction remained in force. The worka of the ancient thinkers never became entirely unknown in Greece ; it is demonstrable that, even in tho period immediately following, Christian acholars of the ai-ies Kberales at Athens studied also philosophy ; but from this time till the renaissance of classical studies, Hellenic phi- losophy (except where, as in tlie case of Synesius and Pseudo-Dionysiua Areopagita, it assumed a Christian exterior) remained scarcely more than a subject of mere erudition (as in the cases of the Christian commentator of Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who was nearly contemporaneous with Simplicius, and David the Armenian, who flourished about BOO A. D. ; see below, § 96) ; gradually it, and especially the Aristotelian philosophy, won a growing influence on the scholastic and formal treatment of Christian theology, and in part also on tho substance of theological doctrines. One of the last Neo-Platonists of antiquity was Boethius (410-525, educated at Athens, 480-498), who, through his Consolatio, as also through his translation and exegesis of some of the logical writings of Aristotle and through his annotations to his own translation of the Isagoge of Porphyry and to that of Marius Yictorinus (a rhetorician and grammarian, who lived about 350), became the most influential medium for the transmission of Greek philosophy to the Occident during the first centuries of the Middle Ages. His Consolatio is founded on the Platonic and Stoic idea, that the reason should conquer the emotions. " Th, quoqw si via lumine da/ro cernere vemm tramite recto carpere callem ; gavdia pelle, pelle timorem spemgue fugato ne dolor ad^it: NubHa mens est vinctaque frenis, haectibi regnant I" (Of. below, § 88). PAET II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHEISTIAN ERA. INTRODUCTION. § 71. The religious facts, ideas, and doctrines of Christianity gave a new impulse to philosophical investigation. The philosophic thought of Christian times has been mainly occupied with the theo- logical, cosmological, and anthropological postulates of the biblical doctrine of salvation, the foundation of which is the consciousness of the law, of sin, and of redemption. On the whole philiisophy of Christian times, ^ee Heinrich Ritter, Die chriatZiche Pliilosophie, 2 vols., Gottinsen, 1S5S-59; cf. the more minute exposition in Hitter's Geschidtte der Philosophies Vol. V. aeq, Hamburg, 1S41 seq., as also the volumes relating to this subject in the works of Brucker, Bnhle, Tenne- mian, Hegel, and others mentioned above, p. S seq. J. G. Mussman's GrundrisS'Jler nllg. Gencli. tier cJirieU. PhilosopMe (Halle, 1S30) may also be mentioned here. Ferd. Eanr, in Vol. V. of the Theolog. Jahrb. (Tii- hingen, 1S46, pp. 29-115 and lSS-238) treats in a very comprehensive manner of the nature of Christian philosophy, and of the principal stages in the history of its development, Tvith special reference to the opinions of Eitter; cf, per contra, Ileinr. Eitter, in Tlieol. Studien u. Kritiken^ Jakrg. XX., Vol. 2, 1S4T, pp. 557-643. Cf, also, the works on ecclesiastical history and the history of dogmas, cited below, S 73, p. 263. § 73. The primitive creative epoch in the history of Christianity was followed in the Middle Ages by a period especially characterized by the evolution of the consciousness of opposition between God and the world, priests and laity, church and state, and, in general, between the human spirit, on the one hand, and God, the liuman spirit itself and nature, on the other, and hence by the evolution of the sense of the limitation and bondage of man. The period of Modern Times, on the contrary, is marked, in the main, by the development of the consciousness of restored unity, and hence of the reconciliation and freedom of the human spirit. In the patristic period, philosophic thought stands in the closest union with theological speculation, and co-operates in the development of Christian dogma. In the Scho- lastic period it passes into the service of theology, being employed merely to reduce to scientific form a body of dogmatic teaching for 262 PEEIODS OF CHEISTIAIf PHILOSOPHT. the most part already at hand, by introducing a logical arrangement and bringing to its support philosophical doctrines from ante-Chris- tian antiquity. In Modern Philosophy it gradually acquires, with reference to Christian theology and ancient philosophy, the character of an independent science, as regards both form and content. Rightly to discriminate between that which belongs to the history of philosophy and that which belongs to the history of theology, in the Patristic and Scholastic periods, is a work of uo little diffioilty. The same difficulty also arises in attempting to distinguish between what pertains to the history of philosophy and what to the history of the natural sciences in modern times, when these sciences are so closely interwoven with philosophy. Yet the definition of philosophy as the science of principles furnishes a sufficiently accurate criterion. It is necessary that the exposition of the philosophy of early Christian times should be preceded and introduced by a consideration of the religious and theological bases on which society then newly reposed, and the presentation of the beginnings of Christian philosophy itself must necessarily include fundamental portions of the history of dogmas, unless the living organism of the new development of religious thouglit introduced by Christianity is to be arbitrarily dealt with, by separating, as was afterward done, a "theo- logia naturalis " from " theologia revelata.'' It is only thus that an insight into the genesis and connection of Christian ideas becomes possible. The dogmas of the Church were developed in the course of the contest waged by its defenders against Jews and Greeks, against Judaizers, Gnostics, and heretics of all sorts. To this development philosophical thought lent its aid, being employed before the Council of Nice in elaborating and perfecting the fundamental doctrines, and subsequently in ex- panding them into a comprehensive complex of dogmas. Whatever was new and peculiar in the doctrine of Augustine was the result of the contest in which he was engaged, either inwardly or outwardly against the doctrines of the Manicheans, Neo-Platonists, Donatists, and Pelagians. But when the belief of the Church had been unfolded into a complex of dogmas, and when these dogmas had become firmly established, it remained for the School to systematize and verify them by the aid of a corresponding reconstruction of ancient philosophy ; in this lay the mission of Scholasticism. The distinction between the Patristic and tlie Scholastic philosophy is indeed not' an absolute one, since in the Patristic period, in proportion as the dogmas of the Church became distinctly developed, thouglit was made subservient to the work of arranging and demonstrating them, while, on the other hand, in the Seiiolastic period, these dogmas, not having previously become com- pletely determined in every particular, received a certain additional development, as the result of the then current theologico-philosophioal speculation. Still, the dose relation of the two periods does not set aside the diflerence between them, but only serves to demonstrate what is found to be verified in detail, namely, that the beginnings of tlie -scholastic manner of philosophizing recede into the time of the Church Fathers (witness Augustine, who in several passages of his writings enunciated the Scho- lastic principle that that which faitli already holds to be certain should also be compre- hended, if possible, by. the light of the reason, while, in the work De Vera Rdigione, he asserts the unity of philosophy and true religion, and in none of his writings excludes reason as a way to faith), and that, on the other hand, the most important Scholastics may, in a certain, though inferior, measure, be regarded as fathers of the Church and of its doctrines (some of which men have indeed received from the Church this title of honor ; cf. below, § 76). PEINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF THE PATKISTiq PHILOSOPHY, 263 FlEST PeBIOD OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ChEISTIAN EeA. PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. § 73. The Patristic Period is the period of the genesis of Christian doctrine. It may be regarded as extending from the time of the Apostles to that of Charlemagne, and may be divided into two Sec- tions, separated by the Council of Nice (a. d. 325), The first section includes the time of the genesis of the fundamental dogmas, when philosophical and theological speculation were inseparably interwoven. The second covers the period of the further development of the doc- trines of the Church on the basis of the fundamental dogmas already established, in which period philosophy, being used to justify these dogmas and co-operating in the further development of new ones, begins to assume a character of independence with reference to the dogmatic teaching of the Church, The works of certain of the Chiircb Fathers were among the earliest books printed. Desideriiis Kras- mns (lived 1467-1536), especially, did a service to Patrolngy by his editions (published at Basel) of Hierc)- nyinus, Hilarins, Ambrosias, and Augustine. Afterward, mostly upon the initiative of Ecclesiastical Orders, complete editions were set on foot, the earlier of which contained, for the most part, only the works of comparatively little magnitude, while in the later editions greater completeness was oonstontly aimed at, "We may mention here the editions of Margarinus de la Bigne (Paris, 15T5-79; 6th ed. 1654, 17 vols, fol.), Andr. Gallandins (Venice, 1765-71, 14 vols, fol.), and J. P. Migne (Patrologia* Cursuft Oomplet2ifi, Paris, 1840 seq.). The edition of Grabe {Hpicilegium Fatrum et IJaereticorum eaec, L-IIT^ Oxford, 1698), and Bnnsen^s ^naZec^ Ante-H'icaena (London, 1854) are confined to the works of the first three centnrieH. Compare, farther, the Corpits scriptoriim eccl. Latinorum ed. consilio et impensia academiae litt^ Caesareae Vindobonensts (Vol. I.: Sulpicius Seoerus exrec. C. HaXmiij Vienna, 1866; Vol. II.: Mimiciug Felix et Firmicus JfatemuA, ex rec C. Balmil, ibid. 1867). Extracts and chrestomathies have been published by Eosler {Bihliothek der Kirc/ienvdier, 10 vols., Leips. 1776-86), Augusti {Chrestomathia Pa~ trifitica^ Leips. 1812), Gersdorf {BihL pair. eccl. Lot. aeL, Leips. 1S35-47), and others. A German transla- tion of numerous works of the Church Fathers has been published at Kenipten, 1830 seq. Ante-Nicene Christian Library: translations {into English] of the writings -of the'Fathers down to a. d. 325, Edinburgh, T. «k T. Clark, 1867 on ; New York, Scribner. Bnsse^ Gmndrisa d^r ciirist ZitteraUir^ MiinBtec, I82S. -J. G. Dowling, Xotitia scriptorum S. Pa- trwni alioruwg^e -Beteris eccleHae mo7ntvientarum^ qtiae in coUectionihus anecdotorum post annutn chr. MDCC. in hicem editis continentur^ Oxford, 1839. MoWer's Patrologie^ Vol. L (first three centuries), ed. by F. X. Eeithmayr, Eegensburff, 1840. Jnsti- tu^lonea Patrologiae concinnaTit Jos. Fessler, Insbruck, 1850-51 (to Gregory the Great). Deutinger,* Geist d-er christl. XJeberlie^erung^ Eegensburg, 1850-51 (to Athanasius). C. "Werner, Getch. der apolo- geti^chenundpolemiHcJien Litter atur der christl. 7%eo/., Pchaffhausen. 1S61 seq. Job. Alzog, Orundrisa der Patrologie oder der dltem ckrisil. lAtterargeach.., Fieiburg in Br., 1S66. Of. the works on the his- tory of doctrines and ecclesiastical history by Munscher, Augusti, Neander, Gieseler, Baumgarten-Crnsiiis, Hase, Klee, Hagenbach, Baur, Niedncr, Bohringer, etc., Dorner's ^nticickduvgageach, der Lehre von der Person Christi, Stuttgart, 2d ed., 1845-53; Baur's ChrUtlicJie Gnosis, Tubingen, 1835, Christliche Lehre Ton der Versoknwn^, ihid.^ 1838, and Christl. Lehre ton der Dreieinigkeit und Menschicerdung Goitee ibid., 1S41-43, and many other theological writings. Alb. Stock], GeiKh. der PhUomphie der patrietischen Zeit^ Wurzbni^, 1859. Job. Haber, Die Philos. der KirchtnvUter^ Munich, 1S59. 264 JES08 AND HIS APOSTLES. § 74. Of all the nations of antiquity, the religions sense of the distinction and antagonism between holiness and sin was nnost promi- nent among the Hebrews. The ethical ideal of the Hebrews was, however, inseparably connected with their ritual law, and the revela- tion of God was supposed by them to be confined to the chosen people of the children of Israel. The Alexandrian philosophy, which arose through the contact of Judaism with Hellenic culture, prepared the way for tlie breaking down of the barriers which restricted the moral and religious life of the people, and Christianity completed the work. At the time when Greek culture had destroyed the intel- lectual exclusiveness, and the Roman Empire had annihilated the political independence of the nations, there arose in Christianity, in opposition to the reality of the kingdom of the world, the idea of a kingdom of God, founded on purity of heart. The expectation of the Messiah among the Jewish people was spiritualized, repentance and moral improvement were recognized as the condition of the sal- vation of the soul, and the principle of all commandments was found in the law of love, whence the ceremonial law, and with it all national, political, and social distinctions lost their earlier positive significance ; to the poor the gospel was preached, participation in the kingdom of heaven was promised to the oppressed, and the conscious- ness of God as the Almighty Creator, the holy law-giver, and just judge was completed by the consciousness of redemption and divine sonship, through the working and indwelling of God in Christ and in the community of believers. For the literature of this topic we niDBt here refer particntorly to the theological znanuiils. Of.— hcsldti the Introductions to the Biblical writingfs hy De Wette, Hag, Beuss, etc. — especially, Carl Angnst Oredner'a Getic/dchte dea n^uteatameiitlicheti Kantm^ ed. by G. Volkmar, Berlin, 1860, and Adolf Hilgenfeld'a Der Kanon und die Kritik des Neuen Tentamenta in ihrer f/eacJiichtHchen Ausbiidung'und Geataltung^ Uslle, 1S63 ; and, on the other hand, the nnmerone works on the didactic forms and the logical doctrines ' of the New Testament, as also monographs like those of Carl Niese on the Johannean Psychology (Progr. of the '^ LandesschuU" at Pforta, Nanmburg, 1865), and E. Eohricht, Zur johanneUdiim Zogoalehre, in TlieoL Siudien u. KriUken, 1S6S, pp 299-814. Neander {Ohristl. Sogmengesch., ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1857, and often in others of liis ■writings; of., also, Neander, Ueber das VerhiiUniss der hellenischen Ethik zum Christen- thum, in his Wissensch. Abhandlungen, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851), consciously adopting the views of Schleiermacher and not uninfluenced, whether consciously or not, by Hegelian conceptions, sees the peculiarity of Christianity .in the idea of "redemption, the conscious- ness of the unification of the divine and human," and remarks with reference to the relation of Oliristianity to Judaism and Hellenism {ibid., p. 36) : " The religious stand-point of Juda- ism represents in general the positive consciousness of alienation from God and of the schism in man's nature, while Hellenism, on the contrary, is the embodiment of youthful natural life, as yet unconscious of its opposition to God. For those occupying the former JESUS AKD HIS APOSTLES. 265 stand-point Christianity aims at removing the sense and the fact of opposition and discord, through redemption : for those occupying the stand-point of Hellenism, it first brings to consciousness the sense of discord, and provides for the communication of divine life to humanity, through the removal of this discord." (In the s£Bne place Neander designates as the fundamental trait of Orientalism, in the Hindoo and other natural religions, the "schism and unrest of the human mind, as manifested in the language of sorrow and melancholy, in view of the limits of human nature, and in uncontrolled longings after the infinite and for absorption into God.") Cf above, § 5. In his own teaching, which was expressed especially in aphorisms and parables, Jesus laid chief emphasis on the necessity of rising above the legal righteousness of the Pharisees (Matt. v. 20) to the ideal completion of the law through the principle of love, and to the real fulfillment of the law as thus completed. The commandments and prohibitions of Moses (including those of the ceremonial law), and even many of the injunctions of his successors, were thus left substantially untouched (although in the matter of things purely external and of no Immediate ethical or religious significance, such, in particular, as the observance of the Sabbath and various forms of purification and sacrifice, actual observance was made by the Messiah no longer obligatory for the subjects of his " kingdom of God, " Mark ii. 23-28 ; vii. 14-23, etc.) ; but that which Moses had allowed on account of the hardness of heart of his people remained no longer lawful, but was to be regulated in accordance with the ideal ethical law, which took cognizance of the intentions of men. Thus the peremptoriness of the requirements of ethics was made to appear not in the least relaxed, but rather increased. (Hence the declaration in Matt. v. IS — true, of course, only in a figurative sense — that till the end of the world no jot or tittle of the law should be abrogated, if indeed this verse, in the form here given, is authentic and has not been em- phasized by the reporter, in opposition to a party of Pauline or ultra-Pauline Antinomians, so as to make the declaration more positive than it was as delivered by Jesus, and more in accordance with the sentiment of the Jewish Christians, who required that even the Mes- sias should keep the whole law.) It is not that Moses had given only a ceremonial law and that Christ had recognized only the moral law ; the law of love was taught, although in more limited form, already by the former (Lev. xix. 18; cf Dent. vi. 5, xxx. 16, on love to God, and such passages as Is. Iviii. 1, in the writings of the prophets who foreshadowed and prepared the way for the ideality of the Christian law), and the ritual retains a certain authority with the latter (at least, according to the Gospel of Matthew ; Mark and Luke do not affirm the continuing authority of the Law). But the relative importance of the two elements becomes reversed in consequence of the radical significance attached by Christ to the law of love (Matt. xxii. 34 seq. ; Mark xii. 28 seq. ; Luke x. 25 seq.) and also in conse- quence of the name of Father, by which he (in a manner at most only suggested in the Old Testament) indicated that the relation of man to God should be one of friendly intimacy. Sometimes Jesus appeals directly to passages of the Old Testament (such as 1 Sam. xv. 22 and xxi. 6, Hos. vi. 6, in Matt. ix. 13, xii. 3) ; the prophetic picture of the Messianic kingdom, in which peace and joy were to reign, and strife should no longer dwell (Is. ix. et al), involved the idea of actualized, all-embracing love ; the l^^azarite's vow of the Old Testament implied the insufficiency of common righteousness and the necessity of ex- ceeding it by the practice of abstinence ; and perhaps also the principles and regimen of the Essenes exerted (through John the Baptist) some influence on Jesus (cf. A. Hilgenfeld, Der Essaismus und Jesus, in the ZeiUchr. f. wiss. Theot, X. 1, ISet, pp. ST-lll). Jesus, the disciple of John, feeling himself, from the time of his baptism by John, the herald of the Messiah, to be himself the Messiah, not inferior even to Moses in dignity (according to Deut. iviii. 15), and intrusted by God with imperishable authority and an eternal king- 266 JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES, dom (Dan. vii. 13, 14), believed himself called and had the courage to found a kingdom of God, to gather about him the weary and heavy-laden, to advance beyond all established forma, and to teach and live rather in accordance with the suggestions of his own moral consciousness and the wants of the people, with whom he was in sympathy, than accords mg to traditional institution. The principle of pure love to man prevailed over conceptions of Oriental derivation and in spite of the lack of developed notions of labor, and of inde- pendence, property, right, and state, as reposing on labor. In the love with which he worked for his friends, in his unconditional opposition to the previous leaders of the people and to all other hostile powers, and in his death thus brought about, yet willingly accepted in the confident expectation that he should return, and while fearlessly avowr ing, in the face of death, his Messianic authority, the hfe of Jesus appears as a picture of perfect righteousness. His prayer that God might forgive his judges and enemies involved the unshakenconvictiou of his absolute right, and the same convictioa continued after his death among his disciples. In the kingdom of God founded by the Messiah, blessedness was to dwell together with holiness. Jesus prayed that God's name might be sanctified, his kingdom come, his will be done, and that earthly need might be re- moved, together with sin. To the weary and heavy-laden relief was promised through the removal of the weight of external tyranny and of personal poverty, sickness, and sinfulness, and through the confirmation in the relation of sonship to God and in the hope of eternal blessedness of all such as belonged to the kingdom of God. Jesus pre- supposed for those, to whom his preaching was addressed, the same immediate possibility of elevation to purity of heart and to moral perfection, i. e., to the image of the perfect God, the Heavenly Father, of which he was conscious in his own case. The moral doctrine and life of Jesus involved, as logical consequences, the obsolescence of the Mosaic law of rites, and with this the overthrow of the national barriers of Judaism, These consequences were first expressly enunciated by Paul, who in proclaiming them was always conscious of his dependence on Christ (" not I, but Christ in me," Gal. ii. 20). On the ground of his own personal experience, from which he dogmatically drew general .conclusions for all men, Paul declared that the power necessary for the fulfillment of the purely moral law and the way to true spiritual freedom were to be found only in faith in Christ. Paul denies the dependence of salvation on law and nationality or on anything whatever that is external (liere "there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female," Gal. iii. 28; cf vi. 15: oiire irepiTa/irj ovf aKpopvaria, aMa Kotf^ /cTifftf, and also Rom. x. 12 ; 2 Cor. v. It). Positively, he makes it dependent on the free grace of God, the appropriation of which on the part of the individual is effected through faith in Christ as the Redeemer. The law was the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ {iraidayayo; e'tg XpiarSv, Gal. iii. 24). Through faith the inner man is built up (o iaa avBpuiro^, Rom. vii, 22; Ephes. iii. 16; cf Rom. ii. 29 ; 1 Pet. iii. 4; cf also 6 cvrbg Mpumoc in Plat., Bep. IX., p. 589 a — where, however, this expression is based on a developed comparison — and i iao A(iyof in opposition to ffu Uyo; in Arist., Analyt. Post, I. 10). The law furnishes no deliverance from the schism between the spirit, which wills the good, and the flesh, which does what is evil ; but through Christ this schism is removed, the impotence of the flesh is overcome by his Spirit dwelling in us (Rom. vii. and viii.). Faith is reckoned to man by God as righteousness, and by making man a recipient of the Spirit of Christ, it restores to him the power, lost since the time of Adam's fall, truly to fulfill the moral law. With con- secration to Christ, the Redeemer, there arises, in place of the servile condition of fear in view of the penalty threatened against the transgressor of the law, the free condition of Bonship, of communion with God in love, the state of justification by faith. The believer, ■ays Paul, has put on Christ in baptism; Christ is to be formed in him ; as Christ descended JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. 267 _into death and rose again, so the believer, by virtue of his union with him, dies unto sin, cruujfies the iiesh, vith its lusts and desires, and rises to a new moral life in the spirit, the fruits of which are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance (Gal. ii. 17; iii. 27; iv. 19; v. 24-24; Rom. vi. 1; viii. 12 seq. ; xiii. 14). But the believer has in this life only the first-fruits of the Spirit (aizapx?! ■roii miev/MTo^, Eom. viii. 23) ; we are indeed saved, but only in hope, and we walk in patience (Horn. viii. 24 seq.) ; we walk still by faith, not by sight (6ia mmeljQ jreptiraTov/xeVj oil fiaToq avrov) have all we received, and grace for grace." Yet, however weighty and pregnant may have been the conceptions which Christ's immediate and indirect disciples may have formed of his person, it is, nevertheless, not true that " the proper basis and the vital germ of Christian doctrine " are to be sought in them (see Huber, in his excellent work entitled PMlosophie der Kirchenviiter, Munich, 1859, p. 8 ; on p. 10 Huber affirms, adopting the sentiment expressed by Schelling in his Philos. der Offenbarmig, Werke, IT. 4, p. 35, that " Christ was not the teacher and founder, but the content of Christianity ") ; this basis and this germ are contained rather in Jesus' ethical requirement of inward righteousness, purity of heart, and love, and in his own practice of " the things he required (and Huber, on p. 8 of the work cited above, justly acknowledges that the source of those conceptions [of Christ's person] was the life and doctrine of Jesus — ^which acknowledgment, however, involves an essential limitation of Huber's assent to Sehelling's doctrine). Without prejudice to the essential originality and independence of the principles of Christianity, it must be admitted that previous to their formal enunciation they had been foreshadowed and the ground had been prepared for them partly in the general principles of Judaism, and partly and more particularly in connection with the attempt among the Jews to revive the ancient gift of prophecy (a movement to which Parsee influences con- tributed, and which lay at the foundation of Essenism) and (after the time of Paul and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and especially after the first development of Gnosticism and the production of thsTourth Gospel) in the religious philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews, which arose through the contact of Judaism with Hellenism. The essential object of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture and of theosophy was to spiritualize the ideas con- tained in the Old Testament. The sensible manifestations of God were interpreted as manifestations of a divine power distinct from God and operating in the world. As in Aristobulus and in the Book of Maccabees (iii. 39) the power {Sbvafu^) of God, which dwells in the world, is distinguished from God in his extra-mundane, absolute existence, and as in the Proverbs (viii. 22 seq.) and the Book of Wisdom (vii. seq.) the Wisdom of God is distinguished from God himself, so Paul proclaims ' Christ as the power and wisdom of God (1 Cor. i. 24 : KTipiiaaoficv Xptarbv Qeov Avva/iiv Koi Qeov So(j)iav). Philo terms God the cause (alriov) of the world, by (yirb) whom it had its origin, distinguishing from him the Logos, through ( against the latter. IS ''27i THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. ■JB mentioned, the only condition to which Paul could assent without favoring a relapg^ into the legality against which he made war). Tlie milder fraction, which granted tolera- tion to the Gentile Christians, had in the time of Justin already sunk to the condition of a tolerated party (Bial. c. Tryph., ch. 47). The more exacting fraction lost its hold in propor- tion as the antagonism between Christians and Jews became more pronounced. The decree issued after the suppression of the rising under Barltochba (135 A. D.), which forbade the Jews to remain in Jerusalem, excluded also all Jewish Christians living accord- ing to Jewish law from this center of Christendom, and permitted only a Christian com- munity which had renounced the Mosaic law to exist there, under a bishop chosen from among the Gentile Christians; and finally the primitive Catholic Church, whose consti- tution was effected with the recognition of a complete apostolic canon (about 175 A. D.), excluded from Its fold all Jewish Christians as heretics (so that henceforth they continued to exist only as a sect), while it rejected, on the other hand, as false, a one-sided, ultra- Pauline Antinomianism and Gnosticism, which threatened to lead to the destruction of morality itself and to the dissolution of the connection of Christianity with its Old Testa- ment basis. These differences among the early Christians were among the causes which led to the beginnings of Christian philosophical speculation (for which reason they could not remain nnmentioned here); FIRST SECTIOIT. PaTEISTIC PhILOSOPHT TILL THE TiME OF THE CoUXCIL OF NiCE. § 76. Among the teachers of the Church who were received as immediate disciples of the Apostles, and were called Apostolic Fa- thers, Clement of Rome, who was probably the author of the first of the two Epistles to the Corinthian Church, which have come down to us under his name, and the authors of the Epistles ascribed to Barnabas, to Ignatius of Antioch, and to Polycarp of Smyjiia, as also the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, represent Grentile* Christianity at the time of its development into the eA-ly Catholic Church. Th* Shepherd of Heriilas bears a very un-Panline character, and is by no means free from Judaizing elements. The work entitled Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs represents the doctrines of the milder frac- tions of Jewish Christians. A Jewish-Christian stand-point is appa- rent in the pseudo-Clementine Hecognitions and Homilies. In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers we see, principally, the fundamental doctrines, theoretical and practical, of Christianity being developed in the struggle with Judaism and paganism, the distinction between Jewish and Gentile Christianity gradually disappearing, and each THE APOSTOLIC FATHEES. 275 extreme becoming constantly more and more separated from the Church, as the latter becomes united on the basis of the equal author- ity of all the Apostles (including Paul). * Patrum Apottolieorum Opera, «f. Gotelier, Paris, 1672, ed. JI., «(t CleiicuB, Amsterdam, 1724, since reproduced by Gallandius and by Migne ; ed. Gar. Jos. Hefele, Tubingen, 1889, etc. ; ed. Albert Dreesel, Leipe. 1857, 2d ed., 1868. Novum Testamentum extra Cartonem receptimi (V Clem. Bom. Epitit., 2. Bar- nabaK, 8 ffermas, 4. Mbrorum Depei-d. Fragmenia: Eo. sec Eebr.^ see. Petrum, aec Aegyptioe, JUai- thiae tradit., Petri et PauU praedicationia et actwwm, Petri apocaVypeeoe, etc., quae 8uper»une\ ed. Ad. Ililgenfeld, Leips. 1S66. dementis Bomani gvOA ferwiMir Bomiliae. Textum recoguovit, versionem lai. Ooteierii repet. pass, emend., aelectas Cotelerii, Davisii, Clerici atque suas atmoiationes addidit Albertus Schwegler, Stnttgart, 1S47. Clem. Bom. quae feruntur JJomiliae viginti nunc primum inte- grae, ed. Dressel. Gott 1853. Clementina, ed. Paul de Lagarde, Leipsic, 1865. S. Ignaiii quae feruntur Epist. una cum e^usdeni Martt/rio, ed. Jut., Petermann, Leipaic, 1S49, Of. Bich. Bothc, TTeber die Ecbtheii der ignatianischen Briefe, in the Supplement to bis work on the Beginnings of the Christian Church, Yol. I., Wittenberg, 1837; Ad. Schliemann, Die Clementi-nen, Hamburg, 1844; Ad. Hilgenfeld, Die ClementinAschen Becogniiionen ujid RomiUen, Jena, 1848, and 2)ie apost. Vdter, Halle, 1853 ; 6. Ublbom, Die nom» u. Becogn. des Cleinens Bomanus, Gottingen, 1854; also Banseu^s, Baur% Alb. Kitscbrs, Yolk- mar^s and others^ investigations. The "Apostolic Fathers" begin the list of "Church Fathers" in the wider signification of this expression, i. e., of those ecclesiastical writers who, next to Christ and the Apostles, were most influential in establishing the doctrine and constitution of the Church. (The expression is founded on 1 Cor. iv. 15.) As " Church Fathers" in the narrower sense, the Catholic Church recognizes only those whom she has approved as such on account of the pre-eminent purity in which they preserved the faith of the Church, the erudition with which they defended and established the faith, the holiness of their lives, and their (rela- tive) antiquity. In respect of time, three periods are generally assumed in the list of Church Fathers, the first extending to the end of the third century, the second to the end of the sixth century (or, more exactly, to the year 604, in which Gregory the Great died, and in the Grecian Church perhaps to the time of John of Damascus), and the third either extending to the thirteenth century or limited only by the duration of the Church itself. Among its " Fathers " the Catholic Church has especially distinguished with the name of Soctores Ecdesiae, in the Eastern Church the following: Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Chrysostom, and also John of Damascus ; and in the Westerh Church (by a decree of Pope Boniface VIII. in the year 1298): Ambrosius, Hieronymus, Augustine, Gregory the Great ; at subsequent epochs, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura ; and finally Saint Bernard and Hilarius of Poitiers were raised by Papal bulls to the rank of Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Those men who do not fully meet the require- ments of the above criteria (and especially that of orthodoxy) are called, not Patrea, but simply Sariptores Ecdesiastici. Among these are Papias, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, TertuUian, Eusebius of Csesarea^ and others. In regard to the person of Clement of Rome (who must be distinguished not only from Clement of Alexandria, but perhaps also from the Clement of Philippi, mentioned in Phil, iv. 3, with whom Origen, Eusebius, Hieronymus, and others identify him) accounts are con- tradictory. According to the Pseudo-Clementine Secognitions, Clement was the son of a well- bom Boman named Paustinianus; that he might become acquainted with the Christian doc- trine, he made a journey to Caesarea in Palestine, where he found Peter, and was instnicted by him in the principles of Christianity. According to the spurious Epistle of Clemens to the Apostle James, Peter chose him as his successor in the chair of the Roman Bishop. Ac^ cording to TertuUian, he was the immediate successor of Peter in that ofiBce ; according to 276 THE AFOBTOLIC FATHEES. Irenseua, Eusebius, Hieronymus, and others, he was the fourth Roman Bishop, Linus arid Anieetus having occupied that office between Peter and himself. Eusebius and Hierony- mus represent him as at the head of the Roman Church from A. u. 92 to 100. "With tin Slavius Clemens, of consular ranis, who was executed under Domitian in the year 95 as a Judaizing atheist (probably, therefore, as a Christian), tradition has not identified him. A division, which had arisen in the Church at Corinth (in the time of Domitian, according to that Hegesippus who lived in the middle of the second century, see Euseb., K H.^ ilL 16), is represented as the occasion of the letter, written in the name of the Roman Church, which has come down to us as the first (probably genuine, though revised, yet in YoUsmar's opinion spurious) BpisUe of Clemens (composed about A. D. 125). The ideas expressed by Clemens are those contained in the Pauline Epistles and in the Epistle to the Hebrews. We are made righteous, he says, not by ourselves, nor by our wisdom, knowledge, piety, or works, but by faith. But we are not for that reason to be slow to good works, nor to abate our love, but we must accomplish every good work with joyful zeal, just as God himself, the Creator, rejoices in his works. Where love reigns, no divi- sions can continue to exist. Have we not one God and one Christ and one Spirit of grara, which is poured out upon us, and is there not one calling in Christ ? Christ was sent by God, and the Apostles were sent by Christ ; filled with the Holy Ghost by the resurreotiou of Christ, they proclaimed the coming of the kingdom of God, and ordained the first be- lievers as overseers and ministers (imaKdirov; xal SmK&vovq, cf. Phil. i. 1) of the rest. To the overseers we owe obedience; to those who are most aged, reverence. Clemens defends the incipient Christian hierarchy by pointing to the orders of the Old Testameni, the symbolical understanding of which he calls yvCiai^ (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 8 ; Heb. v. and vi.). He seeks to silence the doubt of many as to the second coming of Christ and the resurret^ tion, by adducing natural analogies, such as the succession of day and night, the growth of the seed sown in the earth, and the (supposed) revivification of the bird Phcenix. Th« second Eipistle, in which teachers are admonished to walk worthily of their vocation, as also the Epistles to Virgins (ascetics of both sexes), which Wettstein first discovered in a Syriac version, and published in 1T52, are probably spurious. The Apostolic Constitutions and Canons, which were ascribed to Clemens Romanus, date in their present form from the third and fourth centuries after Christ, though some parts are older. The so-called Recognitions and Homilies of Clemens were composed under his name by Jewish Christians. The Recognitions, founded on an older Judaizing work, the " Kerygma of Peter," and written about 140 or 150 a. d., though in their present form probably of later date, combat Gnosticism, as represented by Simon the Magian, and defend the iden- tity of the Creator of the world with the only true God; but they distinguish from Him (after the manner of Philo) the Spirit, as the organ through which he created, the Only- begotten, of whom he himself is the head. The true worshiper of God is he who does His will and observes the precepts of the law. To seek after righteousness and the king- dom of God is the way in which to arrive in the future world at the direct vision of the secrets of God. The written law cannot be righily understood without the aid of tradi- tion, which, starting from Clirist, the true prophet, is carried forward by the Apostles and teachers. The essential part of the law is contained in the ten commandments. The Mosaic institution of oflferings had only a provisional significance ; in its place Christ has instituted the ordinance of baptism. For the non-Jews who beheve in Christ those com- mands are binding which were laid on the proselytes of the gate. The Jews must believe in Christ, and the Gentile who believes in Clirist must fulfill the law in its essential and permanent requirements {Recogn., IV. 5 : debet is, qui ex geniibus est et ex Deo habet ut dili- gat Jesum, proprii habere propositi, ut credat et Moysi; et rursus Eebraeus. qui ex Deo hdbet. THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. 277 «; credat Moysi, habere debet et ex proposito euo, ut credat in Jesum). The Homilies, Which are probably a revision of the Recognitions, made about 170 A. D., represent in general the same stand-point with the Recognitions, teaching that the fundamental doctrines of Christ, the true prophet, who was God's Son, but not God, are, that mere is one God, who made the world, and who, because he is just, will give to every one according to his works ; yet ihey contain a greater number of speculative elements than the Recognitions. Their fundamental theoretical principle is, that God, the One, has arranged all things according to contraries. God stands to his wisdom, the creatress of the All, in the double relation expressed by avaroA.^, in virtue of which he forms with it a unity (jiova;), and eKTaaic, in virtue of which this unity is separated into a duality. The contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, form the basis of the four different elements, into which God divided the originally simple mat- ter of which he made the world. Man alone is endowed with freedom of will. The souls of the godless are punislied with annihilation. The true prophet has appeared at various times, under different names and forms, first in Adam, last in Christ. Through Christ the Gentiles have become participants in the benefits of the revelation of God. That part of the law which he abrogated (in particular, the requirement of offerings) never really be- longed to it, but arose from the corruption which the genuine tradition of the revelation made to Moses underwent on the occasion of its being written down in the books of the Old Testament. He who believes in but one of the revelations of God is well-pleasing to God. Christianity is the universal form of Judaism. When he who was born a Gentile fulfills the law in the fear of God, he is a Jew, otherwise he is a Gentile ("EXaj/v). — The chronological relation between the Recognitions and the Homilies is a matter of dispute. Ulilhorn, among others, holds the Ebmilies to be the earUer work, Hilgenfeld, tlio Recogni- tions; the former is supported by P. Nitzsch, among others, in his History of Dogmas, I. 49 ; but Nitzsch admits that, in the Recognitions (composed at Rome), certain parts of the traditional material common to both works appear in a simpler and more primitive form than in the Homilies. There exists also an Epitome of the Homilies, which has been several times edited (most recently by A. Dressel, Leips. 1859). The work entitled " Testaments oftlie Twelve Patriarchs,^' which may here be mentioned with this pseudonymous literature, was probably written near the middle of the second century. Its author belonged to that Jewish-Christian party which did not demand that the Gentile Christians should be circumcised. In it the Epistles of Paul and also the Acts of the Apostles are reckoned among the Holy Scriptures. It teaches that the high- priesthood of Christ completed and replaced the Levitical service of the temple ; that the Spirit of God descended on Jesus at his baptism, and wrought in him holiness, righteous- ness, knowledge, and sinlessness ; that the Israelites who were scattered abroad are to be gathered together and converted to Christ, and that the fear of God, with prayer and fasting, is a shield against temptation, and gives strength for the fulfillment of the divine commands. Tlie work entitled " The Shepherd," purports to have been written in the time of Bishop Clement. It was probably composed about the year 130, and is ascribed to one Hermas, who is described in the Muratori-Fragment as the brother of Pius, tlie Bishop of Rome from 140 to 152. lu any case, it cannot have been the work of the Hermas in Romans xvi. 14. The work contains a narrative of visions vouchsafed to Hermas. A guardian spirit in shepherd's clothing, sent by an adorable angel, communicates to him certain commandments for himself and his Church, and interprets parables for him. The purport of the commandments is that they to whom they are addressed should believe ni God and walk m the fear of Him. The Old Testament law is not mentioned, but the pre- cepts which are given respecting abstinence, fasting, etc., betray simply the legal stand- 278 THE APOSTOLIC FATHBES. point, and even the doctrine of supererogatory works is put forward. After baptism a second opportunity is allowed for repentance. Christ is styled the first-created angel, who was from the beginning only the organ of the Holy Ghost. God is compared to the master of a house, the Holy Ghost to his son, and Christ to the most faithful of his servants. Hermas, having acquired perfection through repentance and good works, is surrounded by twelve ministering virgins, who represent the various powers of the Holy Ghost. He is made a building-stone in the edifice of the Church. The date of the so-called Epistle of Barnabas, is, according to Hilgenfeld (Das XJrchris- tenthum, p. 77, and Nov. Test, extra Can. rec, II., p. xiii.), A. D. 96 or 97. Volkmar, reason- ing from the passage in ch. 16, on the restoration of the temple by the aid of the Romans, concludes with greater probability that it was written in 118-119, by some one who was not a Jew but who was familiar with the Alexandrian philosophy (ch. 16: ^ ij/iuv ro KUTocKT/T^piov T7/g Kap6iag ir^^psg sliuhiyiaTpeicu:), and whose intention was perhaps to write in the name and according to the doctrine of Barnabas, as of one whose doctrine was the same with Paul's. But where Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews recognize two covenants, objectively distinct (the iraXnta and the Kaiv^ diaO^ia/), the author of the Bpistle of Barnabas sees rather only a subjective difference between successive modes of apprehending the divine revelation. The Jews, he says, through their devotion to the letter, failed to perceive the true sense of God's covenant-agreement with them and by iheir sins forfeited salvation ; for this they were reproved by the prophets, who taught that obedience was better than sacrifice ; the Christians have entered into the inheritance originally intended for the Jews and have become the true covenant people ; their work is to fear God and keep his commandments, not the ceremonial law, but the new law of Jesus Christ (nova lex Jesu Oliristi), which requires the self-consecration of man to God (cf Rom. xii. 1), and does not impose a, yoke of bondage (cf. Gal. v. 1). Insight into the true sense of Scripture, attained by the aid of the allegorical method of interpretation, is termed, in the Epistle of Barnabas, yvuaig, knowledge (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 1 seq. ; Hebr. v. vi.), which is related to faith (n'asTt^) as higher to lower. Tet no aristocratic separation from the church is to be allowed on the part of those who have risen to this higher attain- ment (cf. Hebr. x. 25). The (Judaistic) opinion, that the Testament of the Jews, as under- stood by them, is also of authority for Christians, is denounced by the author of the Epistle of Barnabas, as a very great error; he warns; Iva /i^ TrpoacpxtJ/ieBa