l f-) 3. Conceptions of the feeling of obligation held by those who do not regard it as a distinctive experience. (Note to page 7.) The text of Chapter I. has formulated the criticisms on the conception of the feeling of obligation as elemental and fur- ther indefinable. But moralists who deny altogether the distinctiveness of the consciousness of obligation must, none the less, give some meaning to the terms "ought," "duty," and the like. And as a matter of fact they define obligation, or duty, or right, in whatever fashion they define "the good." To will the good means to them the same as to will the right, that is, duty. Bentham, for example, who is a hedonist identifying the good with pleasure, holds that "an action NOTES TO CHAPTER I. ^ 1 79 ought to be done" when it is "conformable to the principle of utility . . . which approves of every action . . . accord- ing to the tendency which it appears to have to augment . . . happiness." ("Principles of Morals and Legislation," Chap. I., paragraphs X. and II.) Similarly, to John Stuart Mill, another hedonist, "actions are right [and also good] as they tend to promote happiness . . . wrong as they tend to pro- duce the reverse of happiness." ("Utilitarianism," Chap. II., paragraph 2.) To take another example: Westermarck, who is not a hedonist and who defines the good as that which is approved, says: "That is right which tends to rouse moral approval." And Taylor, who conceives the good in similar fashion, describes "the sense of obligation or duty" as a "sense of what is expected of us by our fellow-tribesmen or fellow-citizens." ("The Problem of Conduct," p. 140,^ cf. P- 355-^) 4. Ontheeuolutionof the moral consciousness. (Note to page 8.) Consult C. Darwin, "The Descent of Man," especially Chaps. III.-V.; T. Hiixley, "Evolution and Ethics and other Essays;" E. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas;" W. H. Rivers, "History of Melanesian Society, 1915;" L. T. Hobhouse, "Morals in Evolution;" Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics;" W. McDougall, "Social Psy- chology." 5. The consciousness of obligation as a fusion. (Note to page 10.) The consciousness of obligation is by no means the only instance of a fusion so close that the complex appears elemen- tal. The feeling of familiarity is another example. A person untrained in introspection, challenged to analyze his con- sciousness of the familiarity of a scene, may utterly fail to enumerate the attitudes and elements of consciousness — l8o THE GOOD MAN pleasantness, sense of relaxed muscles, consciousness of oneself as identical with one's past self, and the like — ^which he wUl later acknowledge as constituents of the experience. And, to take a simpler instance, few of us realize that the consciousness of wetness, though seldom analyzed in every day observation, so far from being elemental is a fusion of pressure sensations with the sensation of warmth or of cold. 6. The Moral Law (p. ii). The fact that the feeling of compulsion is so important a factor of the consciousness of obligation in part explains the tendency to identify duty, or obligation, with the "moral law." This doctrine has been needlessly confused on account of the two widely different meanings of the word "law." This term is used, first, to designate scientific law, the ob- served and inferred imiformity in the succession of events; and second, to designate civil law, in the sense of "command" or " imperative" imposed by a person or a group on another person or group. Cf. Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science," Chap. III., "The Scientific Law." The moral com- pulsion exerted by myself on myself is evidently "law" in this latter sense; and the consciousness of obligation is the acknowledgment of this moral law. (Cf. W. G. Everett "Moral Values," Chap. XI., p. 316.) 7. The consciousness of obligation conceived as realized com- pulsion of myself by myself. (Note to page 13.) Implicitly if not explicitly this view seems to be held by many moralists. Thus Kant, though he treats the obligation- consciousness as indefinable, none the less describes it as the authoritativeness of the "noumenal," rational self over the "phenomenal," pleasure-seeking self. The following quota- tions embody this view: "The ought of reason confronts" the volition due to "sensuous impulses." ("Kritik of Pure NOTES TO CHAPTER I. l8l Reason," A, p. 548; B, p. 576.) "Reason issues its com- mands inflexibly refusing to promise anything to the nat- ural desires." (" Metaphysik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., P- 253.) More recent writers formulate this conception very clearly. The following are representative passages from ethical writers who differ very widely on other points: — From Thomas Hill Green: "It is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself." ("Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. IV., Chap. II., Section 324.) From Georg Simmel: "As the social group demands from the individual member of it conduct which is definitely re- lated to the group, so the single conscious experience is sub- ject to an obligation which prescribes to it a definite relation to the whole of the personality." ("Einleitung in die Moral- wissenschaft," I., p. 178. Cf. p. 166 et al.) From G. von Gizycki: "The distinctive mark of the moral law is precisely the circumstance that the agent imposes it on himself." (Moralphilosophie, 4'-^'' Abschnitt, p. 153.) From Sidney Mezes: "The 'I must' is imposed by me on myself and the act is freely performed." ("Ethics," Chap. v., p. 77.) From J. S. Mackenzie: "The 'ought' is . . . the law im- posed by our ideal self upon our actual self." ("Manual of Ethics," Chap. X., p. 173.) This law-giving self is very often conceived as a social self conscious of its interrelation with the community. Thus, Mackenzie supplements the statement Just quoted by the words: "The ideal self ... is not realized in isolation but in a society of human beings." And Leonard Hobhouse holds that "man is boimd by spiritual ties to a community with a life and purpose of its own" and that "the conception of obligation [rests] on the position of each man as a member of the great whole. It is that in him which answers to this l82 THE GOOD MAN position, which realizes however dimly the nature of the whole to which he belongs, which drives him on and impels him even through . . . the ruin of his personal desires to play his part." ("Morals in Evolution," Chap. VII., 4-) To the same purport. Green says, "No individual can make a conscience for himself. ... He always needs a society to make it for him." ("Prolegomena to Ethics," Section 321.) Sunmelalso has this conception of the reahzed relation of individual to community as involved in the "ought." Even Herbert Spencer recognizes in the moral consciousness, in addition to the feeling of coerciveness, what he calls the "idea of author- itativeness." (" Data of Ethics," § 46.) And W. K. Clifford, when he has distinguished "in the mind of each . . . man" something that he calls "the tribal self" from "the individual self," adds: "When the tribal self wakes up the man says 'In the name of the tribe I do not like this thing that I as an individual have done.' This self-judgment, in the name of the tribe," Clifford concludes, "is called conscience." ("On the Scientific Basis of Morals," Lectures and Essays, II., p. 114.) James Martineau has a two-self theory of the obligation- consciousness differing from any of these. He beUeves that the authoritative law-giving self is, and is known to be, none other than God. " If the sense of authority means anything," he says, "it means the discernment of something higher than we. . . . If I rightly interpret this sentiment I cannot stop within my own limits but am irresistibly carried on to the recognition of . . . the Father, of spirits." ("Types of Ethical Theory," Part II,. Bk. I., Chap. IV., p. 104 ^). But this conviction, though it may be capable of philosophical proof, certainly cannot be grounded, as Martineau seeks to ground it, on "the depositions of consciousness." For it is inadmissible to carry over the immediate certainty of one's consciousness of self to one's belief that there exists an NOTES TO CHAPTER I. , 183 authoritative Person external to oneself. Martineau makes the assumption only because he believes that only so can the consciousness of obligation be accounted for. He argues that the conception of the ought-consciousness as recognition of an authoritative self requires the acknowledgment of God since, he says, "no authority of higher over lower . . . could . . . really exist . . . within the enclosure" of a "de- tached personality." On the contrary, as has been shown in the text of this book, there are many recorded instances of the "divided self" in which a man is conscious of a law-giving coercing self as opposing a coerced self. Such a law-giving self may, in truth, be conceived as fundamentally identical with the infinite spirit but may also be regarded as part of the genuinely human self. 8. The self as free to choose. (Note to page 15.) The psychological conclusion that a moral self has a con- sciousness of freedom leaves wholly open the metaphysical question whether he actually is free. For the moral self might well be mistaken in its sense of freedom. To adopt a classic illustration: an arrow coming to consciousness in mid-air might suppose itself free to pierce the target or to miss the mark, yet would inevitably reach the spot at which it had been aimed. The metaphysical problem basal to the psychol- ogy of obhgation is thus the question whether freedom is illusory or vahd, whether, in a word, the good man has real freedom of choice. Preliminary to any discussion of this problem is the careful distinction of freedom in this sense from two other most im- portant senses in which the term is used in ethics, (i) In the first place, freedom is often contrasted with mechanism or determination from without. Freedom, in this sense, characterizes the self — in particular, the active willing self — as opposed to the mere nature phenomenon. This is the sense 184 THE GOOD MAN in which Kant very often, and Hegel almost always, uses the term. So, Hegel says, "Freedom is a basal condition of the will as weight is a basal condition of bodies. . . . The free is the will." ("Philosophic des Rechts," §4, Note. Cf. § 27.) And similarly Kant writes: "We must necessarily attribute to every rational being that has a will the idea of freedom." ("Metaphysik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., p. 296.) Thus conceived, every self is in truth a free self simply in so far as it is a willing self. Freedom in this sense is admitted not only by every ethical system but by every personaUstic philosophy. But this is not the kind of freedom whose reaUty is under discussion. (2) A second kind of free- dom (very like that of the "authoritative self" of Chap. I.) holds an important part in many systems of ethics. It is well defined in the words of Kant: "A free will is the same thing as a will that conforms to moral laws." (" Metaphysik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., p. 295.) This is the free- dom of the man who comes off victor in the moral struggle. It is the freedom from lower impulse, from debasing desire, the freedom which, on its positive side, consists in conformity with law. In this sense, according to many ethical systems, the good but not the bad seK — the positively but not the negatively, moral self — is free; and the service of God is "perfect freedom." (3) The freedom impUed by the con- sciousness of obligation is freedom, in a third sense, freedom of choice, the genuine opportimity to wiU one or another object, the freedom, in Sidgwick's words, "to choose between right and wrong." {Op. cit., Bk. I., Chap. V., § i.) We can not often enough insist that without such freedom, real obligation, duty, would be impossible and the conscious- ness of obligation an illusion. Nor can it be denied that in acknowledging obligation I always recognize freedom. "Du kannst wenn du soUst" we may paraphrase Kant. And Emerson is right when he sings: NOTES TO CHAPTER I. 185 "So nigh is grandeur to our dust, So near is God to man, When Duty whispers low, Thou must, The youth replies, / can." It is this freedom of choice which deterministic philosophers deny and Ubertarians assert. In the opinion, already stated, of the writer of this book the moralist will most wisely hes- itate to raise the metaphysical question at aU. As a practical man he probably finds himself acting as if he were free; as a philosophical thinker he must fight out the battle between libertarian and deterministic philosophy; but as student of ethics he may take his stand on the fact of the consciousness of freedom, flatly refusing to tackle the philosophical problem. 9. The object of the consciousness of obligation. (Note to page 19.) In one portion of his ethical teaching, Kant seems to for- mulate the view that there is no definable object of the con- sciousness of obhgation. He reaches this conclusion as a re- sult of the sharp contrast which he makes between desire and the consciousness of duty. "The simple principle of morality," he says, " consists in independence of all matter of the law — that is, of every object of desire and in the deter- mination of the wUl by the mere luiiversal form of law." ("Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chap. I., Section 8, Hartenstein ed., p. 35.) But it is hard to believe that Kant ever meant to teach the doctrine, imputed to him by most of his critics from Jacobi down, that the moral experience consists merely in willing to do one's duty — ^without any further definition of what, concretely, one's duty is. For Kant has clearly outlined a social conception of duty; and has described the good man as one who treats himianity whether in his "own person or in that of another always as an end, never merely as a means." (" Metaphysik of MoraUty," 1 86 THE GOOD MAN Hartenstein ed., p. 277. For other notes dealing with Kant's ethics, cf. pp. 180 f., 184, 188, 191. For a brief sketch of Kant's ethics, cf. the author's "The Persistent Problems of Philosophy," Chap. VII., pp. 256-266.) Sinunel more miequivocally than Kant teaches that there is no general definition of the object of obligation which, on the contrary, varies endlessly so that the object of duty simply is to follow one's sense of duty. (" Moralwissen- schaft," Bd. II., Kap. V., esp. pp. 2 ff.) The significant and useful part of this doctrine is the following: In crises of moral deliberation when a man faces courses of action in apparently hopeless opposition to each other and when he finds himself unable, by his best reasoning, to adjust their claims, then his only guide is the feeUng of duty which he has no choice save blindly to follow. Simmel argues that such a blind reliance on "conscience" is, in any case, a safer guide than the hed- onistic principle of choosing the greater pleasure. NOTES TO CHAPTER U. 1. The nature of ike willing self. (Note to page 21.) Cf. M. W. Calkins, "A First Book in Psychology," Chap. XII. (and Appendix XII. with bibliographies); or "An Intro- duction to Psychology," Chap. XXL, n. Cf . also T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. II., Chap. II, Sections 143-147, 153. "In wilUng," Green says, a man "carries with him, so to speak, his whole self to the realisation of the given idea." On emotion as distinguished from will, cf. M. W. Calkins, "A Furst Book m Psychology," Chap. XI. 2. The conception of activity. (Note to page 22.) Professor Karl Pearson ("The Grammar of Science," Chap. IV, On Cause and Effect, Sections 2-7) expHcitly argues that force and energy are meaningless terms in physical NOTES TO CHAPTER H. 187 science except as they stand for a certain mathematically stateable order of phenomena. The "superstition" of physical force or energy, in any other sense, he attributes to the "not unnatural" fact that human beings are "impressed at a very early stage with the real, or at any rate apparent, power which lies in their will of originating motion." But the impression of one's own power, apparent or real, is clearly an experience of self -activity. W. Ostwald ("Vorlesimgen uber Naturphilosophie," pp. 153 ff.) says even more definitely: " To gain an idea of the content of the concept of energy, we will start from the fact that we are . . . able through our will to call forth occurrences in the external world." 3. Will and bodily movement. (Note to page 22.) Cf. W. James, "Psychology, Briefer Course," Chap. XXVI, pp. 415-422, or "Psychology," Vol. II, Chap. XXVI., pp. 487 ff.; E. L. Thomdike, "Elements of Psychology," pp. 86 fi.; M. W. Calkms, "A First Book in Psychology," Appen- dix XII., § II., and Supplementary Bibliographies, p. 413. 4. Customary as distinguished from moral conduct. (Note to page 24.) Cf. E. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas," I., Chap. VII; Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," Chaps. II., v., IX. Cf. also Chap. X., p. 153 of this book. 5. Choice with and without effort. (Note to page 26.) Cf. James, "Psychology," II., Chap. XXVI, pp. 528-538, or "Psychology, Briefer Course," Chap. XXVI, pp. 428-442. 6. Ethics as the study of the self who wills the good. (Note to page 29.) This theory of ethics is held by moralists of widely differing schools who diverge sharply in their views of the nature of I 88 THE GOOD MAN the good which is object of the moral self's will. The following quotations are illustrative: — From Kant: "Nothing in the whole world, or even outside the world, can be regarded as good without limitations except a good will. ... A man's will is good not because the con- sequences which flow from it are good but . . . because it wiUs the good." ("Metaphysik of Morahty," I., Harten- stein ed., pp. 241-242.) From Hegel: "The starting-point of the right is the will." ("The Philosophy of Right," § 4.) From Wundt: "The norms of ethics . . . are directly ap- plicable to the free voluntary acts of thinking subjects." ("Ethics," transl. by J. H. Gulliver, Vol. I., p. 8.) From T. H. Green: "The distinction between the good and bad wiU . . . must lie at the basis of any system of Ethics." ("Prolegomena," § 154.) From G. H. Palmer: "Ethics, the science of the will par excellence." ("The Field of Ethics," p. 32I) From L. T. Hobhouse: "The conception of the Good is the central point of Ethics." ("Morals in Evolution," Chap. I., 9.) It should be noted that contemporary descriptions of ethics as a science of values merely substitute the term "value" for the older word "good." Cf. W. G. Everett, "Moral Values," Chap. II., p. 36: "Ethics . . . is a science of values. But value is a word of wide and varied meaning. It may be used both in a positive and a negative sense; posi- tive value will then be the good; negative value the evil." 7. The conception of the moral consciousness as sympathy. (Note to page 29.) Schopenhauer's description of the good man as one to whom "no sorrow is strange" ("The World as Will and Idea," Bk. IV., § 68) is a direct outcome of his conception of Ufe as will, and of will as yearning for the unattained NOTES TO CHAPTER U. 1 89 and discontent with the actual. For, thus conceived, Ufa essentially is misery, and pity is the only rational attitude toward any living being. Cf. A. Sutherland, "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct," 1898, especially Chap. XIV. "Moral conduct," Sutherland says, "is that which is actuated by a wise sympathy." In the eclectic ethical systems of eighteenth century Eng- hsh thought, sympathy is one factor only of the moral expe- rience. (Cf. the following note). 8. Eighteenth Century English moralists. (Note to page 30.) Prominent among those who emphasize approval and dis- approval (among other factors of the moral experience) are the following: Francis Hutcheson (i 694-1 747). His "Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil" begins as follows: — "The Word Moral Goodness in this Treatise de- notes our Idea of some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, attended with Desire of the Agent's Happiness. . . . Approbation and Condemnation are prob- ably simple Ideas which cannot be farther explained." Adam Smith (1723-1790). " Theory of Moral Sentiments." Adam Smith identifies approval with sympathy (op. cit., Pt. I., Section I., Chap. III.) and introduces the conception of the "impartial spectator." David Hume (1711-1775). To Himie the good is that which is useful (that is, agree- able) to a person approved by the morally appraising spec- tator. (Cf. his "Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," Sections I., V., VIII., IX). 9. W estermarck' s and Taylor's conception of the moral expe- rience as constituted by approval and disapproval. (Note to page 30.) igo THE GOOD MAN Both Westermarck, in the first six chapters of "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas," and A. E. Taylor, in "The Problem of Conduct" (pp. 103 ff.) teach that approval-disapproval constitute the moral consciousness. They differ in that Westermarck sharply distinguishes moral from non-moral approval and disapproval whereas Taylor virtually identifies the two. For Taylor, all personal ap- praisal is a moral experience. Westermarck, on the other hand, carefully distinguishes moral from non-moral judgment as disinterested, impartial, and possessed of "a flavor of generality." The two first of these terms he expoimds in the following way : " When pronouncing an act to be good or bad," he says, "I mean that it is so independently of any reference to my own interests . . . [and] of the fact that the person to whom the act is done is my friend or my enemy" (pp. loi^, 103^). The "generality" of the experiences he thus describes: "He who pronounces an act to be good or bad feels that [his judgment] would be shared if other people knew the act and all its attendant circumstances" (p. 105^.) By these statements he certainly distinguishes admirably the univer- sality of a moral estimate from the individuality of an egoistic or altruistic appraisal. But he fails altogether to differentiate the moral from the intellectual valuation. An estimate of the nebular hypothesis or of the De Vries theory of mutations is disinterested, impartial, and truly "flavored with generality," yet it is not an expression of moral approval or disapproval. Thus Westermarck, though he advances on Taylor by admitting a difference between moral and non- moral estimates, yet fails adequately to state the distinction. In truth, Westermarck's adoption of the theory that the moral consciousness consists essentially in approval and dis- approval seems to be due solely to bis mistaken belief that such a doctrine is the only escape from utilitarianism on the one hand and from intuitionism on the other. He himself NOTES TO CHAPTER H. 19I admits that "the only proper object of moral praise and blame is the will; " and this statement indicates the possibility of affiliating his doctrine closely with that upheld in this book. For further criticism of the conception of the moral con- sciousness as approval and disapproval cf. H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. I., Chap. III., § i, end. For an eloquent statement of the truth that moral approval- disapproval have a personal object, cf. J. Martineau, "Types of Ethical Theory," Part 11., Bk. I., Chap. I., Section i. 10. "Good" as "tialued," i. e. as willed or wished. (Note to page 32.) Two contemporary neo-realists, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, oppose this conception, teaching that "goodness is an indefinable quaUty which attaches to things independently of consciousness." (See especially, G. E. Moore, Principia Eihica, 137.) This doctrine is not, however, as yet a foimda- tion stone of neo-realism. R. B. Perry, an ardent neo-realist, imequivocaUy holds that though "the being or nature of things is independent of their possessing value" yet "it is the primary relation of desire that endows a thing with value." (Cf. "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 332 and "The New Realism," p. 141.) 11. The good as personal object which is (and ought to be) ■willed for its own sake: (Note to pages 33 and 34). In this conception of the good, most moralists are also agreed. Even Kant, who is commonly supposed to define the moral consciousness as acknowledgment of objectless obligation, says: "Suppose . . . that there is something the existence of which has in itself absolute value, something which, as an end in itself, can be a ground of definite laws; then there would lie in that, and only in that, the ground of a possible categorical imperative or practical law." (" Meta- 192 THE GOOD MAN physik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., p. 276.) In truth the admittedly great divergences among moraHsts are with reference to the precise nature of this ultimate end — not as regards the ultimateness of it. In the words of J. S. Mac- Kenzie: "Ethics . . . sets itself to consider . . . the su- preme or ultimate end to which our whole lives are di- rected. ... If ethics is to be a strictly exact science we must presuppose that there is such a supreme end." ("A Manual of Ethics," Chap. I., Section i.) The description of the end-in-itself as personal is made on the basis of psychological observation not as the outcome of an idealistic philosophy. As a matter of fact, men do define the objects of their ultimate loyalty in terms of personal expe- rience, their own or other people's — in terms of enjoyment, of knowledge, of benevolence, and the like. 12. The good and the good man. (Note to page 36.) It will be observed that in this book "good" is used both as a noun to designate an object of wUl and as an adjective to describe the man who wills "the good." 13. Ethics, psychology and metaphysics. (Note to page 39.) Ethics is related to the psychology of the willing self much as logic is related to the psychology of the thinking self. Ethics like logic includes its own special part of psychology and is, in so far, a descriptive science. But ethics narrows the psychology of the willing self by studying only the wUl as directed toward the good and the right; just as logic studies thought primarily as true or false. Some writers, of whom A. E. Taylor is a prominent example, conceive ethics as merely a brand of psychology. It is dificult to maintain such a view in face of the fact that actual systems of ethics have always included more than a psychological treatment of conduct. Taylor's position is, in all probability, the result NOTES TO CHAPTER m. 1 93 of an exaggerated reaction against T. H. Green's equally vinjustified conception of ethics as a branch of neo-Hegelian philosophy. The truth is that ethics is neither mere psychol- ogy nor metaphysics. It is a science in that it deals with a well-marked group of phenomena without attempting, after the fashion of metaphysics, to discover by reasoning the ultimate nature of its facts and their ultimate relation to the universe. But ethics, unlike psychology proper and unlike the physical sciences, is a normative science and, as such, sup- plements its psychological study, of the self who wills what he regards as the good, by comparing and estimating the different conceptions of the good, just as logic estimates and criticises judgments in regard to their truth. (It is important to bear in mind that ethics is thus both a descriptive and a normative science. There are, in truth, no purely normative sciences). Cf. Simmel, op. cit., and G. H. Palmer, "The Field of Ethics," I. It is important, however, to note in conclusion that a com- plete metaphysics always must concern itself profoundly with the facts of ethics. In other words, the philosopher must rightly know the moral self and his object, the good, in their relation to the rest of the universe. There is thus a philosophy of ethics, though ethics is science not philosophy. NOTES TO CHAPTER III. I. Egoism and Altruism. (Note to page 40.) Consult: H. Spencer, "The Data of Ethics," Chaps. XL- XIV., especially Chap. XIII.; G. Simmel, op. cit., Chap. II. In this important discussion Simmel argues (i) that the claims of egoism — its claim, for example, to be more prim- itive and more widespread than altruism — are grossly exaggerated; (2) that Darwinism and altruism are not in- compatible; (3) that every self is both egoist and altruist; 194 THE GOOD MAN finally (4) that neither egoism nor altruism is a foundation principle of ethics. 2. The self as inherently a social self. (Note to page 40.) Consult: J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpreta- tions," Chaps. I. and II.; C. H. Cooley, "Human Nature and the Social Order," especially Chaps. I., V.-VI. ; M. W. Calkins, "An Introduction to Psychology," Chap. XXII. 3. Loyalty. (Note to page 42.) Consult: J. Royce, "The Philosophy of Loyalty," especially Lectures I., III., VI.; M. W. Calkms, "A First Book in Psychology," Chap. XIII. NOTES TO CHAPTER IV. I. The individual and the social group. (Note to page 52.) Consult: J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpreta- tions, 1897, Chap. XII.; W. Wundt, "VoLkerpsychologie," Bd. I., Th. I., Einleitung, especially II.; C. A. EUwood, "Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, 1912, Chap. XV.; J. Royce, "The Problem of Christianity," 1914, Vol. I., Lecture II., and Vol. II., Lectiure IX.; R. M. Mclver, "Community: A Sociological Study," 1917, Bk. I., Chaps. I., II.; Bk. II., Chaps. I., II.; Bk. III., Chap. V.; H. T. Laski, "Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty," 1917, Chap. I. The writer of this book has been strongly influenced by Professor Royce's teaching but takes issue with his occasional statements that the community is or may be "in a perfectly literal sense a person" (Letter from Royce to the writer. Philosophical Review, 1916, p. 67.^ Cf. "The Problem of Christianity, I., pp. 62, 67; II., p. 87). For this conclusion Royce argues simply from the fact that we treat a community NOTES TO CHAPTER IV. 1 95 t as if it were an individual — that is to say that we do, as a matter of fact, individualize it. But this is far from proving that a community literally ig a person, in the sense in which the reader is a person; and many facts oppose such a view — notably the mechanical fashion ia which communities in- crease and decrease. From the standpoint of a social ethics it is not, however, essential to decide this question. For, evidently, according to Royce himself, loyalty to a commu- nity is possible — ^whether or not the community is literally a self — whenever people are so vitally and closely bound to- gether, by relations of mutual influence, that they treat their community and feel about it "as if it were" a person. But this notoriously is the attitude of individual self to commu- nity in every reflectively conscious society — wherever, in other words, every individual is aware of himself as closely and complexly related to the other persons of the group, as influenced by them and influencing them, as fellow, or sub- ordinate, or leader, toward a common goal. One need not, in other words, conceive the community as literally a person in order to believe that it is treated as if personal. Thus, Wundt (to whom Royce refers for psychological confirma- tion of his theory), though he speaks of the Gesammtwille, is so far from conceiving the community as a person that he says explicitly {pp. cit., pp. 11-12) "The domain of the voluntary (des willkurlichen) lies outside the phenomena of social psychology {Volkerpsychologie)." And Harold Laski, though widely diverging from Royce in his "pragmatic and pluralistic" method, nevertheless says definitely: "When we take any group of people leading a common life, to whom some kindred purpose may be ascribed we seem to evolve from it a . . . personality, that is beyond the personality of its constituent parts. For us that personality is real." In confirmation, Laski adds: "A man who looks at the battle- field of Europe will assuredly not deny that certain per- 196 THE GOOD MAN sonalities, England, France, Germany, are real to the soldiers who die for them" {op. cit., p. 4). 2. Supernational loyalty. (Note to page 56.) Consult: H. N. Brailsford, "A League of Nations," 1917; J. A. Hobson, "Towards International Government," 1915; H. G. Wells, "What is Coming? A European Forecast," 1 91 6; and the bibliography (compiled by P. K. Angell) in E. G. Balch's "Approaches to the Great Settlement," pp. 346-351- 3. Universal community and world-state. (Note to page 59.) For recent emphasis on the distinction between community and state, cf. Mclver, op. cit., pp. 28 £E. For criticism of the "mystic monism" which represents "a state as a vast series of concentric circles each one enveloping the other, as we move from individual to family, to vil- lage, ... to city, to county, thence to the all-embracing state," for protest against the dogma of the sovereignty of the state so conceived, and for emphasis upon the significance of non-political commimities, churches, corporations, guilds, trade-unions, cf. H. J. Laski, op. cit., especially Chap. I. It is a matter of regret that Laski should inaccurately and irrelevantly identify the doctrine of state sovereignty with metaphysical absolutism and the disavowal of this beHef with metaphysical pluralism. One may be both a metaphys- ical and (as Chap. IV has shown) an ethical monist and yet one may refuse to identify universal community with political state and may lay stress on the individuality of the "constit- uent" persons. 4. Utilitarianism. (Note to page 61.) Cf. E. Albee, "History of English Utilitarianism," for an account of the utilitarians and their systems which goes back NOTES TO CHAPTER IV. , 197 to Cumberland and his "De Legibus Naturae" (1672). Cf. also Note i to Chap. V., below. 5. The individual and the state. (Note to page 62.) Mill's view and Bentham's of the relation of individual to state really is a perpetuation of Locke's doctrine; and Locke's conception is doubly related on the one hand to that of Hobbes, on the other hand to that of Rousseau. Hobbes believes that men to save themselves from the "poor, nasty, brutish, and short life consequent to a time . . . when every man is enemy to every man" have yielded themselves ab- solutely to ruler or to state, whereas Locke does not regard men as purely selfish, warmly maintains the Hberty of the individual, and conceives the relation of subject to sovereign as that of a contract which is terminated when it is broken by either party to it. Yet Locke, like Hobbes, views the individual self as an isolated, independent being who takes on and lays off at will his social and civic relations. Rousseau, on the other hand, with all his emphasis on individual liberty and his conventional adherence to Locke's fiction of a " social contract," none the less reaches the conception — whatever the fluctuations with which he holds it — of each individual self as a vitally related member of society. "Each man," Rous- seau teaches, may so subordinate himself "to all" as to "obey only himself and remain as free as before." The in- dividual will of each man thus becomes a vital factor of " the general will." On all this, see: Hobbes, "Leviathan," Chaps. Xni.-XVIIL; Locke, "Of Civil Government," especially Chap. VIH; Rousseau, "The Social Contract," especially Bk. I., Chaps. VI-VIII; and B. Bosanquet, "The Philosophical Theory of the State," Chaps. IV.-VI. On the relation of individual to state, see also: T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of PoUtical Obligation," Works, Vol. n., pp. 33Sff. 198 THE GOOD MAN On the history of the development of the conception of the state, cf. W. A. Dunning, "A History of Political Theories Ancient and Mediaeval," 1902, and "A History of PoUtical Theories from Luther to Montesquieu," 1905. 6. The nature of individuality. (Note to page 64.) Consult: J. Royce, "The Conception of God," second edition, 1897, Supplementary Essay, Part III.; C. Sigwart, "Logic," Part HI., Chap. II., Section 78; R. Eisler, " Worter- buch der philosophischen Begriffe," articles on Individua- tion, Individuism. 7. Opposition within the community. (Note to page 66.) On relations of opposition existing among the members of a community, cf. J. S. Mill, "On Liberty," Chap. III.; J. Royce, "The Psychology of Invention," Psychological Review, 1898, pp. 113 £E.; E. A. Ross, "Social Psychology," Chap. XXIII. ; W. Fite, "Individualism," Lectures II and IV.; and H. J. Laski, op. cit., especially Chap. I and p. 25: "We shall make the basis of our state consent to disagree- ment. Therein shall we ensure its deepest harmony." NOTES TO CHAPTER V. I. Psychological hedonism. (Note to page 68.) For statement, consult: — ^J. Bentham, "Constitutional Code," Introduction, Section 2 ; J. S. MiU, " Utilitarianism," Chap. IV., paragraphs 8 ff.; Leslie Stephen, "Science of Ethics," 1882, Chap. II., pp. 42 ff. For criticism, consult: H. Sidgwick, op. cit., Bk. I., Chap. IV; T. H. Green, op. cit., Sections 158 ff. Graham Wallas, "The Great Society," Chaps. VII. and XIII. The writer of this book has greatly profited by Professor Mary S. Case's class-outlines on this topic. NOTES TO CHAPTER V. , Ipg 2. Non-moral volitions not directed toward pleasure. (Note to page 70.) Consult the critics of psychological hedonism cited above, and the following: — W. Jjimes, "Principles of Psychology," II., Chap. XXVI., pp. S49 S-, or "Psychology," Chap. XXVI., pp. 444 fi.; N. Ach, "Uber den Willensakt und das Tem- perament," (Leipzig, igro). Dr. Ach conducted an extended series of experiments on the comparative strength of volitions and memory-habits, studying with especial care the reported introspections of his subjects. While many of these observers recorded pleasure in willing not one reported the experience of willing pleasure. 3. Ethical hedonism. (Note to page 73.) For statements of the hedonistic argument, consult: — J. Bentham, "Principles of Morals and Legislation," espe- cially Chap. II.; H. Spencer, "Data of Ethics," especially Chap. III.; H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. II. on egoistic hedonism; and Bk. IV., an admirable statement of the argument for universal hedonism. Many arguments for hedonism suffer from the assumption that hedonism is proved when a certain number of other theories are disproved, whereas the eniuneration of these discarded theories is never shown to be complete. Even Sidgwick's argument for universal hedonism virtually assumes that the disproof of intuitionism, in its extreme form, constitutes a proof of hedonism. 4. Epicurus. (Note to page 74.) Cf. the histories of philosophy, and J. Watson, "Hedonistic Theories," Chaps. II. and III.; Wallace, "Epicureanism." 5. Mill's doctrine that pleasures differ, qualitatively, from each other. (Note to page 75.) 200 THE GOOD MAN For Statement, consxilt: Mill, "Utilitarianism," Chap. II., paragraphs 6 ff. For criticism, consult: H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. I., Chap. VII., § 2. (Sixth edition, pp. 94-95.) 6. The good, qualitatively regarded as full and complete desired experience. (Note to page 78.) Note that the qualifying word " desired " means " wished or willed." If is a synonym, therefore, of " valued " — a term to conjure with in contemporary books on ethics and philosophy. Cf. Chap. II., p. 32 of this book. Consult T. H. Green, " Prolegomena to Ethics," §§ 286, 37S; F. Paulsen, tr. by F. Thilly, "A System of Ethics," Bk. II., Chap. II., pp. 270-282; J. S. MacKenzie, "A Manual of Ethics," Chap. XV.; G. H. Pahner, "The Nature of Goodness," II. NOTES TO CHAPTER VI. 1. The utility of the study of ethics. (Note to page 80.) Consult T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. IV, Chaps. I., II., especially Sections 307, 315. 2. The conception of virtue. (Note to page 82.) The theory of virtue which this book upholds is, essentially, that of Aristotle as set forth in the "Nicomachean Ethics," Bks. II., IV.- VII. " Virtue," Aristotle says, is " habit mvolv- ing purpose, in the mean relation to us and determined by reason. ("Ecrrti' apa r] aperr) e^t? irpoaipeTiKrj^ iv fiecroTrjTi, ovaa Tfi ■jrph'^ i?/^*?, oypia-fievrj \6ya>, Bk. II., vi., iio6b). The definition expressly recognizes virtue as a habit of will in- volving thought; and its rather cryptic description of virtue as "in the mean position" is illuminated by the discussion, in the succeeding chapters, of particular virtues. These NOTES TO CHAPTER VI. 20I chapters suggest if they do not prove that, to Aristotle, virtue is "in a mean" in the sense of moderating and harmonizing opposite tendencies of instinctive behavior. 3. Instinct and instinctive tendency. (Note to page 84.) The term "instinct" is used with great variety of meanings: "it stands next only to feeling," Titchener says, "in looseness of usage and multiphcity of appUcation" {op. cit., infra, p. 462 ^). One point of disagreement concerns the relation of reflex to instinct. Most biologists distinguish the instincts from the mere reflexes — such, for example, as sneezing and swallowing — on the ground that the instincts are more com- plex and specialized reactions, "definite responses to par- ticular stimuli." The second dispute concerns the conscious- ness of instinctive actions and the existence of instinctive consciousness. On the one hand "the idea of consciousness" is "rigidly excluded" from the conception of instinct; at the other extreme, McDougall insists that every instinct "de- termines its possessor to perceive ... to experience an emotional excitement . . . and to act in a particular man- ner" {op. cit. infra, p. 29 ^). The moralist need not take sides in either controversy. He may well abandon the term "instinct" to the biologist, adopting in its stead the vague expression "instinctive tendency" which he will use to cover reflexes, instincts in the narrower sense, impulses, and feelings — ^whatever is natural and untaught in human behavior and experience. This is, roughly speaking, the position of C. A. EUwood ("Sociology in its Psychological Aspects," Chap. IX). Con- sult: W. McDougall, "An Introduction to Social Psychology," Chap. III.; E. B. Titchener, "A Textbook of Psychology," §126, pp. 462 fl.; Graham Wallas, "The Great Society," Chap. III.; W. James, "The Principles of Psychology," Vol. n.. Chap. XXTV., or "Psychology, Briefer Course," Chap. 202 THE GOOD MAN XXV.; W. E. Hocking, "Human Nature and Its Remak- ing;" J. R. AngeU, "Psychology," Chaps. XV.-XVI.; T. Veblen, "The Instinct of Workmanship," Chap. I.; British Journal of Psychology, 1910: A "Symposium; " C. H. Parker, " Motives in Economic Life," American Economic Review, 1918, Vol. 8, I, Suppl. pp. 212-231. 4. Virtue as a modification of instinctive tendencies. (Note to page 86.) Most moralists, explicitly or implicitly, conceive virtue as modification of instincts. But the earliest suggestion known to the writer of the fruitful possibiUty of classifying the virtues by following the clue of the instincts is found in a paper by Professor W. K. Wright, "The Evolution of Values from Instincts^" Philosophical Retdew, 1915, pp. 165-183. 5. The inadequacy of the ascetic ideals. (Note to page 90.) Consult Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," Bk. X., 1172a- 1177a; T. H. Green, "Prologemena to Ethics," Bk. IH., Chap, v., Section 262. NOTES TO CHAPTER VII. I. The self-regarding virtues. (Note to page 92.) To the Ust of ' self-regarding ' virtues enumerated in Chap- ter VII., may well be added the virtue parallel to that creative tendency which Veblen calls the instinct of work- manship. (Cf. T. Veblen cited above in Note 3 to Chap. VI.) On the impossibility of exclusively self-regarding virtues, cf. W. K. Clifford, "Lectures and Essays," Vol. II., p. 121 ': "There are no ' self -regarding virtues.' The qualities of pru- dence, courage, etc., can only be rightly encouraged in so far as they are shown to conduce to the efficiency of a citizen." Cf. also E. Westermarck, op. cit.. Vol. II., Chap. XXXVI., NOTES TO CHAPTER VH. 203 pp. 265-2675; "It is undoubtedly true that no mode of con- duct is exclusively self-regarding. No man is an entirely isolated being." 2. Instinctive appropriation. (Note to page 94.) Consult W. James, "Psychology," Vol. II., Chap. XXIV., pp. 422 fE.; W. McDougall, "Social Psychology," Chap. XIV. 3. Thrift. (Note to page 94.) Consult E. Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II., Chap. XXXVI., pp. 268 '-283. 4. The instinctive tendency to reject. (Note to page 99.) Consult W. McDougall, op. cit., pp. 55 ff. 5. Abstinence. (Note to page 100.) Consult Plato, "The Repubhc," Bk. IV., 430 ff.; Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," Bk. III., 1117b ff.; T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. V., Sections 261 ff.; H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. IX.; F. Paulsen (tr. by F. Thilly) "A System of Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. II., pp. 485-490; E. Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. II., Chaps. XXXVII. ff. 6. Courage. (Note to page 102.) Consult Plato, "Lysis" and "The Republic," Bk. IV., 4292.; Aristotle, op. cit., Bk. III., 1115a, ff.; T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. V., Sections 258- 259; H. Sidgwick, op. cit., Bk. III., Chap. X., pp. 332-334. 7. The place of thought in the moral experience. (Note to page 106.) Consult T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. II., Chap. II., Sections 148 ff.; G. Wallas, "The Great Society," Chaps. III., X., XL; C. A. Ellwood, "Sociology in its Psy- chological Aspects," Chap. XI. 204 THE GOOD MAN For vigorous enforcement of the truth that an acquaintance with facts is essential to the moral experience, cf. E. H. Holt, "The Freudian Wish," Chap. III. NOTES TO CHAPTER VIH 1. Chastity, marriage, the family. (Note to page log.) Consult: Durant Drake, "Problems of Conduct," Chap. XVII. with bibliography. 2. Gregariousness. (Note to page no.) Consult: W. McDougall, op. cit.. Chap. III., pp. 84 ff.; C. A. Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 2i9,ff; W. Trotter, "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War," 1916, pp. 11-66 (reprinted from the Sociological Review, 1908, 1909. (Trotter virtually identifies gregariousness with " the social habit.") 3. The truthful man. (Note to page no.) Consult: R. C. Cabot, "The Use of Truth and Falsehood in Medicine: An Experimental Study," in American Medicine, 1903, Vol. v., pp. 344-349; F. Paulsen, "A System of Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. XL; Leslie Stephen, op. cit., pp. 202 £f.; Durant Drake, op. cit.. Chap. XIX. For discussion of "the regard for truth and good faith among savages," cf. E. Westermarck, op. cit., Chap. II. NOTES TO CHAPTER IX. I. Justice as personal approval-disapproval. (Note to page 120.) The frequent identification of the moral consciousness with approval-disapproval is probably due to the confusion of the essentially moral experience, willing the good, with this NOTES TO CHAPTER IX. 205 significant factor of it, the virtue of justice, personal appraisal in furtherance of one's loyalty to the Great Society. 2. History and theory of punishment. (Note to page 123.) Consult: E. Westermarck, op. cit., Chaps. I.-III.; L. T. Hobhouse, "Morals in Evolution," Chap. III.; S. R. Stein- metz, "Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklimg der Strafe," 1894; G. W. F. Hegel, "PhUosophy of Right," §§99-103; T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of PoHtical ObUgation," Sections 176 S., Works, II., pp. 486 ff.; B. Bosanquet, op. cit., Chap. III. ; T. de Laguna, in Philosoph- ical Essays in Honor of J. E. Creighton, pp. 318-327. The matters of special interest to the student of ethics are the following: — (i) On the historical side, the development of punishment from retaliation through control of instinctive resentment and through recognition of the interest of society in the offense and in the treatment of the offender. It may be noted that the occurrence of punishment, in the fully social sense, among primitive peoples is well established. (Cf. Westermarck, op. cit., I., pp. 170,^ 185,^ with citations.) (2) On the theoretical side, the fact that the three prevalent theories of punishment, though often treated as exclusive, really supplement each other. The deterrent theory con- ceives punishment as a method whereby society protects itself against aggressions. The other two theories take their start from the offender, not from society. The earlier of them, the retributive theory, emphasizes, on the one hand, one of the instinctive roots of punishment, namely, retalia- tion, and stresses, on the other hand, the responsibility of the culprit. The educational theory, finally, insists on the con- sideration of the capacities and the needs of the offender. To show in detail the compatibiUty of these three theories would lead us too far afield, but so much may be said with .confidence: first, that individual resentment is the preciursor 2o6 THE GOOD MAN of punishment and that many penalties of our own age ex- press the degree of public indignation, not the degree of risk to society; second, that the most truly deterrent punishment is the "educative" penalty so administered as to transform lawbreakers into keepers of the law. 3. Spinoza on remorse and self -content. (Note to page 127.) Consult Spinoza's "Ethics," Part IV., Propositions LIII., LIV., LVI.: — "Himiilitas virtus non est, sine ex ratione non ortur; Poenitentia virtus non est . . . sed is, quem facti poenitet, bis miser seu impotens est; . . . Maxima superbia vel abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat." 4. Aristotle's classification of justice. (Note to page 128.) In Book V. of the "Ethics" Aristotle first distingtdshes between (i) justice used in a wide sense as equivalent to "virtue" and (2) justice as a particular virtue. Of justice in this latter sense he names the two forms ordinarily ren- dered as "distributive" and "corrective" justice. Cf. "Nicomachean Ethics," Bk. V., 1130a and 1130b. 5. Property holding. (Note to page 131.) Consult: L. T. Hobhouse, op. cit., Pt. I., Chap. VIII.; E. Westermarck, op. cit., II., Chaps. XXVIII.-XXIX. ; Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., Chap. XXII., § i; G. Wallas, op. cit., Part II., Chap. XII., pp. 291 ff.; W. Fite, "An Introductory Study of Ethics," pp. 349 ff. 6. Socialism and individtialism. (Note to page 139.) Consult: Dewey and Tufts, op. cit.. Chaps. XXIV., XXV.; E. Westermarck, op. cit., II., Chap. XXIX., pp. 70-71; I. B. Cross, "The Essentials of Socialism," 191 2; E. Kelly, "Twen- tieth Century Socialism," 1910; W. E. Walling and others, "The Socialism of To-day, a Source-Book," 1916; H. G. NOTES TO CHAPTER X. 2O7 * Wells, "New Worlds for Old," 1910; A Report on Recon- struction by the Sub-committee of the British Labor Party, in The New Republic for Feb. 16, 1918; C. W. Eliot, "The Conflict between Individualism and Collectivism in a Democ- racy," 1910; Herbert Spencer, " Social Statics; "F.LeDantec, "L'egoisme, seule base de toute soci6t6," igi6. For discussion of socialism and syndicalism, consult J. Spargo, "SjTidicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Social- ism," 1913. NOTES TO CHAPTER X. 1. The nature of sympathy. (Note to page 141.) The conception of sympathy which this book upholds differs in two ways from the popular view of it embodied, for example, in W. McDougall's description of sympathy as "the experiencing of any feeUng or emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion." (" Social Psychology," p. 92.) The first difference is to be found in the teaching that sympathy is not necessarily emotional and that we share the perceiving and thinking as weU as the feeling of other people. The second distinction is the exclusion from sympathy properly so called of "organic sympathy," a suffering which, though due to witnessing the physical laceration of some one else, none the less includes no consciousness of this other person's suffering. 2. Sympathy as instinctive. (Note to page 142.) Consult: C. Darwin, "The Descent of Man," Chaps. III- V.; H. Hoffding, "Outlines of Psychology," VI., pp. 244 ff.; G. W.- Nasmyth, "Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory," 1916, Chaps. III. and IX.; A. Sutherland, "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct," passim; W. Mc- Dougall, op. cit., Chap. IV. 2o8 THE GOOD MAN 3. The virtue of generosity. (Note to page 144.) Consult: Aristotle, op. cit., Bk. IV., Chap. I.; H. Sidgwick, op. cit., Bk. III., Chap. IV.; F. Paulsen, op. cit., Bk. III., Chap. VIII.; E. Westermarck, op. cit., Chaps. XXIII., XXIV. 4. The virtue of sacrifice. (Note to page 147.) The term "sacrifice" is often used, in a sense more pro- found than that of Chapter X., to designate not merely a virtue, one habit of will among others in furtherance of the ultimate end, but the essential subordination in all moral willing, of a "lower" to a "higher" self. Cf. G. H. Palmer, "The Nature of Goodness," VI., especially pp. lygff.; and R. Calkins, "The Christian Idea m the Modem World," III. 5. The virtue of obedience. (Note to page 148.) Consult: T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," in Works, II., pp. 448 ff. 6. "Custom-morality." (Note to page 153.) Consult: E. Westermarck, op. cit., I., Chap. VII.; Dewey and Tufts, op. cit.. Chap. IV. Cf. also Chap. II., p. 24 of this book. 7. The instinct of pugnacity. (Note to page 158.) Consult: W. McDougall, "Social Psychology," Chap. III., pp. 496.; W. James, "Principles of Psychology," Vol. II., Chap. XXIV., pp. 409 f. H. M. Stanley, "Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling," Chap. X. 8. Pugnacity and war. (Note to page 161.) Consult W. James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in "Memories and Studies," pp. 267 ff. and R. Calkins, op. cit., III., pp. 37 £f. An instance of the popular view, which Chap. X combats, that war is the inevitable expression of the instinct of pug- NOTES TO CHAPTER XI. 209 nacity, is found in a speech made by General Leonard Wood on April 3, at Baltimore. "Do not talk," General Wood is reported as sa3dng, " as if this were the last great war. God wUl have to change human nature before we can discuss such a thing." The xmwarranted assumption which underlies this statement is that the instinct of pugnacity and the institution of war are one and the same. NOTES TO CHAPTER XI. 1. Aesthetics and ethics. (Note to page 165.) Consult G. H. Pahner, "The Field of Ethics," Lecture III. with bibliography. 2. The object of the religious consciousness as personal. (Note to page 170.) Cf. G. T. Romanes, "Thoughts on Religion," 4th edition, 1898, Parti., Essay I., pp. 42 £f.: "The distinguishing features of any theory which can properly be termed a religion is that it should refer to the ultimate source, or sources of things: and that it should suppose this source to be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it." For the recently formulated theory of pre-animistic religion, whose object, often known as mana, is conceived as impersonal power, cf. R. R. Marett, "The Threshold of Religion," 1914, I.; E. Durkheim, "Les foimes 6lementaires de la vie reli- gieuse," 1912, especially pp. 2693., 3073., 333f. In opposition to these writers Dr. I. G. Campbell concludes, from a detailed study of field-workers' reports, that "there is no justifica- tion for calling mana an impersonal force." ("Manaism. A Study in the Psychology of Religion," Amer. Journ. of Psychology, 1918, XXIX., pp. i-49> with important bib- liography). 2IO THE GOOD MAN Consult also J. H. Leuba, "A Psychological Study of Reli- gion," Chaps. II., rV.-VI.; M. W. Calkins, "A First Book in Psychology," Chap. XIV. and Journal of Philosophy, 191 1, VIII., pp. 606-608. 3. The privacy of the religious experience. (Note to page 170.) Consult W. James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," Chap. II., pp. 28 ff. and passim. It must be reiterated that this view of religion as conscious relation of individual to divine self is entirely compatible both with the teaching, emphasized by Durkheim, Ames, King, Campbell and others, that religion is social in origin and also with the teaching that the religiously conscious man is, or may be, profoundly aware of himself as one of a great fellowship of worshippers. Pro- fessor Royce seems accordingly, to the writer of this book, occasionally to over-state the contrast between his conception of reUgion as "social experience" and that of James. (Cf. "The Problem of Christianity," Preface, pp. XV.-XVI). For a clear statement of the position taken in this book, cf. C. C. J. Webb, "Theories of Religion and the Individual," 1916, especially Chap. IX. "The present experience of God," Webb says, "can not be admitted to be something which is merely public." 4. The object of religion as superhuman. (Note to page 171.) Cf. Wimdt, "Volkerpsychologie, Mythus u. Religion," 3ter Teil, p. 751: "Die [Wurzelj der Religion ist die . . . Idee des Uebersinnlichen; die der Sittlichkeit liegt zimachst in den sinnlichen Affekten." 5. Morality as fused with religion. (Note to page 174.) Cf. H. G. Wells, "God the Invisible King." The closing words of Chapter XIII. are quoted from Wells, op. cit., p. no. SUBJECT INDEX (See also Table of Contents, pages ix-xx.) Abstinence, 99 £f., 203. Activity, 21 S., 186 f. Acquisitiveness, 85, 94. See Ap- propriativeness. Aesthetic Experience, distinguished from the moral, 165 ff. See The Beautiful. Aesthetics and Ethics, 209 Aggressiveness. See Pugnacity, Rapacity. Altruism. Fundamental sense of, 40. Ethical altruism, 42 £E.: argiunents for, 42 f., 47 f.; ob- jections to, 43 f., 46 f., 48 f.; in relation to justice, 124 f. Spen- cer and Simmel on, 193 f. Analysis. See Thought. Animal behavior and experience, 94, 99, 102, no, 142 f., 158 f. Anti-hedonism, 76 ff. Approach, 85, 102. Approprialiveness, 94 ff., 131, 145, 203. Approval — Disapproval, lq con- sciousness of obligation, 16 f.; natture of, 30 ff., 120, 189; not constitutive of the moral ex- perience, 31 ff., 189-191; basis of justice, 120 ff. Ascetic ideals, inadequate, 90, 202. Bad, I, 37. See Immoral. Beautiful, The, distinguished from the good, 34, 165 ff. Chastity, 108 f., 204. Choice, 25 ff., with and without effort, 26 f., 187. Church, The, S4 f • Communicativeness, 85, 108, no. Community. See Universal Com- munity. Comparison. See Thought. Concealment (Secretiveness), 85, 108, no f. Conformity (Obedience), 148 ff.; 208. Forms: moral, 150 ff .; non- moral: habitual, 153, forced, 153 ff.; immoral, 156. Contrariness. See Opposition. Country, The, 53 ff. Courage, 102 ff., 203. Forms: courage, in face of physical dan- ger, 103 f.; in face of pain, 104; in face of toil, ridicule, etc., 104. Cowardice, 88, 105, 156. Crossness. See Irascibility. Cruelty, 87. Curiosity, 102. Custom-morality, 24, 153, 187, 208. Daring. Instinctive, 36, 102, 105. Deceit, 114 ff. Forms of, 114; problem of justifying, 114 ff. Desire, 200. See Value. Disapproval. See Approval. 212 SUBJECT ESTDEX Disliking. See Liking. Duty. See Obligation. Egoism. Fundamental sense of, 40. Ethical egoism, 41 ff.: argu- ments for, 41, 43 f., 46; objec- tions to, 42 f., 48 f.; in relation to justice, 124. Spencer and Simmel on, 193 f. Emotion, 21, 24; aesthetic, 167. Envy, 146. Ethical Hedonism. See Hedonism. Ethics. Nature of, 2, 39, 187 f., 192 f. Utility of, 80, 200. Evolution of morality, 8 £f., 179. Expediency, Consciousness of, 3. Familiarity. Feeling of, 179 f. Family, no, 204. Fear, 85, 103 f. Flight. See Withdrawal. Following. See Imitativeness. Freedom and Consciousness of Free- dom: in the sense of authorita- tiveness, 11 £E., 184; as freedom to choose, 13 ff., 184 f.; in the sense of willing, 183 f. Fusion, 10, 179 f. Generosity, 141 flE., 208. Giving (Surrender), 85, 108, 144. Good, I, 32, 191. See Value. Good, The, 2, 20, 32 ff., 44 ff., 75 ff., 191 f. Distinguished from 'good,' 32 f.; from relative end or means, 33 f. Object of con- sciousness of obligation, 20; of virtuous will, 82 f., 98, et al. Defined as supreme, or self- sufficient purpose, 33 ff., 44 ff., 75 f., 187 f.; as personal, 34, 192. Variously conceived as egoistic, 41 ff., as altruistic, 42 ff., as universal, 48 ff,; as mere pleas- ure, 75, as excluding pleasure, 77, as complete object of desire, 78 f., 200. Great Community and Great Society. See Universal Community. Greed, 96, 146. Gregariousness, 85, 108, no f., 204. Habit. Defined, 83. Forms: un- willed, 24, 83, 153; of will, 27 82 f.; resulting from will, 27. Hedonism. Psychological, 68 ff., 198; Ethical, 73 ff., 199. Uni- versal, 73 ff. Humility, 127, 206. Hypocrisy, 114, 118. Imitativeness, 85, 108, 153, IS7- Immoral, The, 35 ff., 39, 156. Impersonal object: of aesthetic con- sciousness, 166; of thinking, 166. Improvidence, 95, 97. Inciting {urging) instinctive ten- dencies, 88 ff. Indiscretion, in. Individuai., The. Not isolated but unique, 64 ff. Vitally re- lated to the community (social group), 66, 194. Wrongly con- ceived, by utilitarians, as op- posed to community, 64 ff., 197 f. Individualism. Compatible with objective ethics, 38 f. ; with con- ception of loyalty to universal community, 60 ff., 197 f. In opposition to socialism, 139, 206 f. Individualizing. A factor of wUl, 23 f., of emotion, 24, of justice, 122 f. SUBJECT INDEX 213 Initiation, 144, 169. Instinct and instinctive tendency. Nature of, 84, 201 f.; enumera- tion, 85, 93, 108 f.; virtuous control of, 86 S. Internationalism, 57. Intuitionism, 4 f., 177 f. Irascibility, 159 f. Justice, 119 £f., 204 f. A fimda- mental virtue, 119. Basis: ap- proval-disapproval, 120, 204 f.; important characters: S3Tn- pathy, 121 f., individualizing, 122, thought, 123 f.;obstacles to: undue egoism, 124, and altru- ism, 124 f. Forms of: basal appraising justice, egocentric and aliocentric, 125 f., concrete and abstract, 125 f.; distributive justice, 128 ff., involving com- parison, 129; its secondary ob- ject, property, 130 ff. Aris- totle's classification of, 206. KaXoKayaOw., 165. Leaders, 151 i. League of nations, 57. Liking and disliking: instinctive tendencies, 85, 108 f.; basis of approval-disapproval, 3 1 , 1 20 ff.; basis of justice, 1 20 ff . Loyalty, 28 f., 42, 49, 51 ff., 55 ff., 66, 194. Supernational, 196. Marriage, 109, 204.^ Mating Instinct, 85, 108 f. Mean, Aristotelian, between two vices, 90 et ai. Metaphysics, as related to ethics, 192 f. Militant Virtue, 109, 158 ff. Miserliness, 88. Modification of instincts, 89 et al. Moral consciousness, Evolution of, 8 ff., 179. Moral Law (Moral Imperative), II, 180. Non-conformity, log, 156 ff. Non-hedonistic theories, 76 ff. Non-moral, The, 19, 24, 35 f., 39, 153 ff-. IQ9- Obedience. See Conformity. Obligation. Consciousness of, Conceived as elemental, 3 ff., 178; objections to this concep- tion, 5 ff., 178 f. Conceived as distinctive complex, 10, i. e. as the experience of self-compul- sion, 10-13, 180-183; not ele- mental, 15 f.; a fusion, 179 f. Implies consciousness of freedom to choose, 13, 183-185. A sig- nificant but not a constant factor of the moral experience, 17 f. Its object: willing the good, 19 f-, i8S f- Occupation, 131 ff, effortless, 131 f., 137 f.; through effort, 132, 138 f. Opposition (Resistance), 66, 148 f., 157, 198. Organic sensations, in conscious- ness of obligation, 16. Ought. See Obligation. Parental authority, 153 ff. Justi- fication of, 154. Risks of, 154 ff. Parental Instincts, 85, 108 f. Parental Virtues, 109. Personal object: of moral will, 34, 169 f., 192; of religion, 169 f., 209 f. Pleasure, conceived by psycho- logical hedonist as invariable 214 SUBJECT INDEX object of will, 68 ff., 198 f., by ethical hedonist as identical with the good, 73 ff.; conceived as factor of the good, 78 f. Primitive and savage conduct and experience, $ f., 8 ff., 123, 132, 143 f., 169, 179, 209. Property, 131 ff. Instinctive basis of, 131; sources and forms of, 131 ff.; just distribution of, 132 ff., 206 Prudence, 93, 105 f. Psychological Hedonism. See He- donism. Psychology, as related to ethics, 39, 192 f. Pugnacity (Aggressiveness), 85, 109, 14s, 158 ff., 208; as related to war, 161 ff.; 208 f. Punishment: deterrent, 122 f., 205 f. educative, r23, 205 f.; retributive, 205 f. Pusillanimity, 145. Rapacity, 146. (See Pugnacity.) Reasoning, 106. Recklessness, 105 f. Reflexes, 27, 201. Rejection, 85, 93, 95, 99, 203. Religion, distinguished from moral ity, 168 ff. As private exper- ience, 169, 170 f., 210. Object of, personal, 169 f., 209; super- human, 171, 210. Fused with morahty, 173 f., 210. Remorse, 127, 206. Repressing (or suppressing) irir- stinciive tendencies, 88 ff.: indi- rectly, 88 f.; by willing the oppo- site instinct, 89; by combination of instinctive tendencies, 89 f. Resistance (opposition), 85, 109. Resolution of instinctive tendencies, go. Sacrifice, 146 ff., 208. Savage. See Primitive. Secretiveness. See Concealment. Self, total and partial, 12 f.; com- pelling and compelled, 13 ff., 180 ff.; free, 13 ff., 183 ff.; will- ing, 21 ff., 186; social, 40, 194. Self-content, 127, 206. Shyness, 85, 108. Socialism, 139 f., 206 f. Subjective (or individual) ethics, vii., 38 f. Supernationalism, 56, 196. Surrender. See Giving. Sympathy, nature of, 141 f., 207; as instinctive, 142 ff., 207. Taboos, 169. Tenacity, 94, 131. See Appro- priativeness. Thought, in moral experience, 26, 106, 203 f. A character of jus- tice, 120, 123: analytic thought, ro6, 123; comparison, 106, 129. Thrift, 93 ff., 203. Timidity, 105. Totemisiic riles, 144, 169. True, The, distinguished from the beautiful, 34. Truthfulness, no ff., 204. Univbesal Community (Universe of Selves, Great Community, Great Society), 49 f., 51 ff., r94- 196. Conceived as totality of sentient beings, 49 f., 55, 58, 60, 194-196; compared with coun- try, S3 f-. church, 54 f., with League of Nations, 56; distin- SUBJECT INDEX 2IS guished from coimtry, church, world-state, etc., 57 f., 196. Answers to criticisms: the uni- versal community not an ab- straction, 52; loyalty to the universal community psycho- logically possible, 52 S., com- patible with regard for the in- dividual, 60 fif., 197 f. Universe of sdiies. See Universal Community. Untruthfulness, in ff. Universal Hedonism. See Hedon- ism. Utilitarianism, 61 flF., 196 f. Cf. Universal Hedonism. Value, 32, 191, 200. Vices, go, 95, 100, iii, 156, 159. VntTCES, 82 ff., 200-201, 202. Nature: habits of will, 82, 83; controlling instincts, 82, 84 ff., in furtherance of the good, 82, 86 et al. Forms, 93, 108 f.: self- regarding, 92 ff., 202 f; social, basal, 108, iioff., 204 ff.; sym- pathetic, 108, 141-156, 208; non-sympathetic, 156-164, 208. War, moral problem of, 161 ff.; its instinctive basis, 161 f.; alhed with diverse instincts, 162: of aggrandizement, of protection, of defense, 163. Will: characters of, 21 ff.; forms of, 25 ff. WiU and bodily move- ment, 22 f., 187. Withdrawal (cf. flight), 85, 105. Workmanship, 202. World-state, 58, 196. INDEX OF AUTHORS (Referring to cited and to quoted authors.) Ach, N., 199. Albee, E., 196. Ames, E. S., 210. Angell, J. R., 202. Angell, P. K., 196. Antin, M., 54, 66. Aristippus, 74. Aristotle, 33, 80, 83, 87, 90, 103, 200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 208. Balch, E. G., 196. Baldwin, J. M., 194. Bentham, J., 61, 74, 178 f., 197, 198, 199. Berkeley, G., 22. Bosanquet, B., 197, 205. Brailsford, H. N., 196. Browning, R., 37. Butler, J., s, 177. Cabot, R. C., 115-117, 204. Calkins, M. W., 178, 186, 187, 194, 210. Calkins, R., 208. Campbell, I. G., 209. Case, M. S., 198. Clarke, S., 177. ClifEord, W. K., 182, 202. Cooley, C. H., 194. Cross, I. B., 207. Cumberland, R., 61, 197. Darwin, C, 5, 9, 143, 179, 207. Dewey, J. and Tufts, J. H., 25, 131, 132, 134, 179, 187, 206, 208. Dickens, C, 130. Drake, D., 178, 204. Dunning, W. A., 198. Durkheim, E., 209, 210. Eisler, R., 198. Eliot, C. W., 207. Ellis, H., 80. EUwood, C. A., 194, 201, 203, 204. Emerson, R. W., 184 f. Epicurus, 74, igg. Everett, W. G., 180, 188. Fichte, J. G., 171. Fite, W., 198, 206. Freud, S., 13. Gizycki, G. von, 4, 181. Green, T. H., 65, 181, 182, 186, 188, 193, 197, 198, 200, 202, 203, 205, 208. Gulliver, J. M. (translator), 188. Guyau, M. J., 11. Hegel, G. W. F., 28, 184, 188, 205. Hobbes, T., 62, 197. Hobhouse, L. T., 179, 181 f., 188, 205, 206. Hobson, J. A., 196. Hocking, W. E., 202. Hoffding, H., 207. Holt, E. H., 25, 88, 90, 204. Hugo, v., 130. Hume, D., 30, 61, 189. Hutcheson, F., 30, 189. Huxley, T., 179, 217 2l8 INDEX OF AUTHORS Hyder, J., 136. Jacobi, F. H., 185. James, W., 26, 122, 187, 199, 201, 203, 208, 210. Kant, I., 4, 13, 77-78, 180 f., 184, 185-186, 188, 191. Kelly, E., 207. King, I., 210. Laguna, T. de, 205. Laski, H. T., 66, 194, 195-196, 198. Le Dantec, F., 207. Leibniz, G. W. von, 22. Leuba, J. H., 210. Locke, J., 62, 138, 197. McDougall, W., 102, 143, 179, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208. Mclver, R. M., 194, 196. Mackenzie, J. S., 181, 192, 198, 200. Marett, R. R., 209. Martineau, J., 5, 182-183, 191. Meredith, G., 142. Mezes, S., 181. Mill, J. S., 62, 63, 74-75, 179. 197. 198, 199-200. Moore, G. E., igi. More, H., 177. Munsterberg, H., 161. Nasmyth, G. W., 207. Nietzsche, F. W., 41, 77. Ostwald, W., 22, 187. Pahner, G. H., 65-66, 147, 188, 193, 200, 208, 209. Parker, C. H., viii., 202. Paulsen, F., 200, 203, 204, 208. Pearson, K., 22, 180, 186. Perry, R. B., 191. Plato, 78, 129, 165, 203. Pratt, J. B., 168. Rashdall, H., 9, 177. Rivers, W. H., 179. Romanes, G. T., 209. Ross, E. A., 198. Rousseau, J. J., 197. Royce, J., 54, 55, 194-19S, 198, 210. Russell, B., 191. Schopenhauer, A., 30, 77, 158, 188. Shaftesbury, A., 30. Shakespeare, W., 22. Sidgwick, H., 4, 14, 75, 132, 177, 184, I9r, 198, 199, 200, 203, 208. Sigwart, C, 198. Simmel, G., 4, 139, 181, 182, 186, 193- Smith, A., 30, 189. Spargo, J., 206. Spencer, H., g, ir, 17, 42, 43, 44, 63, 182, 193, 199, 207. Spinoza, B. de, 80, 206. Stanley, H. M., 208. Steinmetz, S. R., 205. Stephen, L., 198, 204. Sutherland, A., 189, 207. Taylor, A. E., it, 30, 179, 189- 190, 192. ThiUy, F. (translator), 200, 203. Thomdike, E. L., 187. Titchener, E. B., 201. Tolstoy, L. N., 148. Trotter, W., 204. Tufts, J. H., Of. Dewey, J. Veblen, T., 202. Vries, de, H., 190. Wallace, W., 199. Wallas, G., 198, 201, 203, 206. WaUing, W. E., 207. Ward, J., 22. Watson, J., 199 INDEX OF AUTHORS 210 Webb, C. C. J., 210. Wood, L., 209. Wells, H. G., 174, 196, 207, 210. Wordsworth, W., 13. Westermarck, E., 10, 30, 31, 131, Wright, W. K., 202. 143, 144, 179, 187, 189 S., 202, Wundt, W., 188, 194, 19s, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208. 210. Piintsd in the Utited States of America ' I 'HE following pages contain advertisements of books by the same author or on kindred subjects BY THE SAME AUTHOB An Introduction to Psychology Cloth, Svo, sog pages, $2.00 First Edition, igoi; Second, Revised Edition, igoj " The reader of this book is impressed, first of all, by the wide range of topics discussed. Most of the text-books on psychology do not attempt to cover more than one phase of the subject. If they treat of the normal consciousness of the developed adult, they do not attempt to do more than refer to the phenomena of abnormal mental life, or to the facts of undeveloped child life, or to the still more remote facts of animal consciousness. Miss Calkins, on the other hand, has given to all of these subjects a sufficient degree of attention to justify the statement that the book is a general text-book, covering all departments of this now complex science of psychology. " In the second place, the reader will find in this book a very great deal of atten- tion given to what may be called the social phases of mental life. It is not merely the analysis of one's own mental experiences, nor merely the explanation of one's own ideas that we find here undertaken ; there is also a full discussion of the ' rela- tions between selves,' or, to put it in other terms, of the facts and results of social interaction, and social consciousness." — Professor CHARLES H. JUDD, in the Journal of Pedagogy, A First Book in Psychology Cloth, ismo, 424 pages, %i.6o First Edition, igio; Fourth, Revised Edition, zgzs This book is intended as a simple and direct approach to psychology. It aims on the one hand to be rid of unnecessary abstractions and to study the actual experiences of everyday life, and on the other hand to aid the student by close, though provisional, definition and by consistent and convenient grouping of the facts actually observed. " The one thing the author never forgets is that the first duty of a teacher is to be understood." — Boslon Transcript. " An introductory treatise which sets forth facts and theories about mental life in the perfect style of an essay, with the first-hand vividness of a human document, and yet true to the scientist's conscience. . . . Miss Calkins orders her topics admirably. She winnows the abstruse and the problematic out from the mass of simple certainties and settles them, together with physiological ex- cerpts and a rich store of bibliographical notes, in an appendix. " — The Nation. PUBLISHED BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 64-66 Fifth Avenue, New York BY THE SAME AUTHOR The Persistent Problems of Philosophy First Edition, igoj. Fourth, Reoised Edition, igij Cloth, 577 pages, 8vo, $2.50 Combines the essential features of an Introduction to Meta- physics with those of a History of Modem Philosophy. Exposi- tions are supported by exact quotations from philosophical texts. The classification of philosophical systems has been simplified by the careful distinction between "quaUtative" and "numerical" forms of monism and pluraUsm. The concluding chapter, on Contemporary Philosophical Systems, with the corresponding part of the Appendix, offers a useful siunmary of the doctrines of writers so recent that they are not considered in most text-books of modem philosophy. In the foiurth revised edition, the description of the self and the discussion of freedom have been rewritten, additional bibho- graphical references made, and other minor changes introduced. THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York Introduction to the Science of Ethics By THEODORE DE LAGUNA Professor of Philosophy in Bryn Mawr College Cloth, crown 8vo, 414 pp., $1.75 "The title of this book is intended to be fairly descriptive of it. It treats of ethics as a science, which if not wholly inde- pendent of metaphysical consideration — and of no science can that be said — is sufficiently independent to permit of separate positive treatment. And under the broad hcence of an 'intro- duction' it presents not only an outhne of the science as we find it to-day, but some accoxmt of the past which has made it what it is. . . . "In Part III a positive treatment of moral problems is pre- sented in connection with the elements of the general theory of values. So far as I know, this is the first attempt at an ele- mentary presentation of any of the newer phases of the latter subject. Not that the theory of values as such is new. It is as old as ethics itself. But in recent years it has undergone a great development, however, which has remained buried in mono- graphs and treatises that are wholly inaccessible to the under- graduate student as well as to the educated pubUc gener- ally." . . . From the Author's Preface. "Among recent text-books on ethics this is, perhaps, easily the most progressive and radical. This remark refers particu- larly to part three. . . . On the whole the treatise seems to possess great value ... a strong stimulant to thinking, and will prove a valuable text book in the hands of any instructor who is ahve to real problems of ethics." — Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York