. .MAMENTS •vRBITRATION \,T. MAHAN BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF Henrg M, Sage 1891 Av^tfAsn^ idt JX1953.Rl52r"""'""""-""'^ Armaments and arbitration; or Tiie place o 3 1924 007 373 560 The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924007373560 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION OR THE PLACE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF STATES BY A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D. CAP'fAIN, U. S. N. (RETIRED) 4.UTHOK OF "the INFLUENCE OF SBA referring to the rumor, condemns British apathy in the Pacific in the past, and urges that the Commissioner for Australia, resident in London, be instructed to protest to the imperial government against such a cession. 79 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION I guard myself from implying any share in the apprehension concerning the effect upon the United States of a transfer of Tahiti to Germany. When the Caroline and Ladrone Islands were about to be ceded to Germany by Spain, after our war with Spain in 1898, 1 received more than one letter urging me to use any influence I could exert to induce our government to resist the step. My reply was that, besides having no influence, I saw no sufficient reason for our opposition. But, waiving this per- sonal explanation, in what matter of principle does the objection of New Zealand and of Australia differ from the assured objection of the United States to the acquisition by Germany from Denmark of an island in the West Indies ? The reason is the same — namely, the wish to avoid "a storm center at our very doors." But upon what basis of legal right can this be -founded? Upon none. How shall a law be imposed making such a sale not legal? The London Times, commenting on the New Zealand proposition, said: "Insufficient regard seems to have been paid to the fact that French property, whether in the Pacific islands or elsewhere, is at the sole disposal of France." That is, as regards legal right. Great Britain had no ground for inter- ference. This is substantially what I have said in my second article of this series. Translated into terms of our Monroe Doctrine, the Times comment would read, "Insufficient regard seems to be paid to the fact that Danish property, whether in the LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS West India Islands or elsewhere, is at the sole dis- posal of Denmark." There is no legal ground for objection, and a tribunal could decide only that the transfer would be lawful and valid. The maintenance of policies such as the Monroe Doctrine must rest upon diplomacy, and its instrument, armament; not upon law. Such special cases afford no reason for changing the general law of nations, which permits the transfer of national territories under many forms. The British Prime Minister had indicated already in the British Parliament the qualification which policy imposes upon assent to a legal transaction. Any bargain between France and Germany was beyond the scope of British interference, whether by word or deed, unless it should lead to arrange- ments prejudicial to British interests. In such event, he said, intervention might become "our duty in defense of British interests directly affected by further developments." In other words, the legal right of one country, or of two countries, may so far contravene the natural — ^that is, the moral — aright, the essential interests, the imperative policy, of a third, that resistance wotdd be necessary, and therefore justifiable. Diplomacy then enters, and armament is simply an incident of diplomacy; just as, in an arrangement between two contest- ants in private life, the fighting power of each, the relative positions of advantage as concerning the matter in dispute, affects the process of the dis- Qussion ^nd the ultimate arrangemeiit. ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION Another curious illustration concerning the Medi- terranean has been voiced in Austria by an ex- tremist; who, however, has been elected recently president of the Austrian Chamber, as representa- tive of the strongest parliamentary group, and who consequently is a man with a following. We Austrian Getmans wish to bring about harmony between the Mediterranean Powers. I am coining, perhaps for the first time, an idea. . . . That idea is, the Mediterranean for the Medi- terranean Powers. This is directed especially against a Power which^has its hands in all the afiairs of the world and wants to drive back Germanic Germany .^ This is merely individual, without backing in official expression; but, taken in connection with the very large proposed increase in the Austrian navy, offi- cially adopted, and officially designated for Medi- terranean service only, the utterance is not without significance; just as Jefferson's early utterance, in some sense comical, seeing his unwillingness to develop force — ^to back diplomacy with armament — "We begin to broach the idea that all within the Gulf Stream is neutral (*. e., American) waters" was a kind of precursor of the Monroe Doctrine — ^America for the Americans. The point I wish to make, however, is that the Monroe Doctrine is a moral question, based upon considerations substantially just, one of natural right, of policy, not of legal right; that a legal stand- ing for it cannot be established by a general code » The Mail, August 4, 191 1, p. 3, 83 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS of law, though it may by specific treaty agreements; and that in these respects it does not stand alone, but is reproduced where similar conditions obtain, though not necessarily with equal imperativeness.^ It is the reflex, as against distant outsiders, of the instinctive impulse toward self-preservation, and as such represents natural right — ^which is moral right — ^as opposed to legal. In international affairs this is home rule versus centralization, the latter of which is the goal of unlimited arbitration. If we are to think accurately concerning the sphere of Arbitration, as propounded by its extreme and most logical advocates, we must recognize that the object of their attack necessarily is not arma- ment, but diplomacy. The attempt is to carry all cases into cotut instead of arranging them out- side by compromise or adjustment. It is true that as the case stands the proposition is diplomacy first, arbitration only in case of diplomacy failing; but diplomacy wUl fail more readily when one of the parties thinks that it wUl gain substantially by in- sisting on arbitration — going into court. For in- stance: if Germany desired to obtain a West India island by purchase from some present owner, and the United States should object, it would be a de- cided advantage to Germany to transfer the matter from usual diplomatic procedure to a court, con- trolled in its action by the principles of international law. Consequently, a treaty of general arbitration which enabled her so to do, in case of diplomatic 83 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION failure to agree, would undoubtedly incline her to persist in disagreement; whereas if the alternative were not a court, but war, many concurrent con- siderations enter and might inchne to agreement. Between individuals, compromises or adjustments are the equivalents of diplomatic negotiation, and proceed, necessarily, partly on grounds of right, partly on groiinds of expediency, which recognizes the presence of power — otherwise of force. Each party possesses certain elements of claim, either rightful or plausible, can give a certain amotmt of trouble, or exercise a certain pressure, or propose a certain equivalent. It is a case of attack and de- fense quite as really as a military operation, from which it differs exactly as diplomacy, when success- ful in its normal processes, differs from war. That is, the force is there, is recognized, and is operative. If collision — ^law-suit — can be avoided, so much the better; but the force has counted all the same. I refrain, of course, from quoting again the in- stances cited in previous articles in which diplomacy within recent years has effected adjustments, with- out war, through silent force; which force has been simply the expression of national power and ad- vantage, used in the instances cited, of Austria and Bulgaria, for ends morally right, but not sus- tainable in law. National power is surely a legiti- mate factor in international settlements; for it is the outcome of national efficiency, and efficiency is entitled to assert its fair position and chance of ex- 84 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT S ercise in world matters. It should not be restricted unduly by mere legal tenures dependent for their ex- isting legality upon a prior occupancy; which oc- cupancy often represents an efficiency once existent but long since passed away. The colonial empire of Spain, unimpaired a bare century ago, now wholly disappeared, is a familiar instance. The empire of the Turks is another. The present intervention of Italy in Tripoli is but a further step in a process of which Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, are merely the most recent examples. The supplanting of preceding dynasties in India by Great Britain, and her supervision over administration in Egypt, are again illustrations. By what system of law is pro- vision to be made for solving such questions? Can that which has just been said be condemned fairly as simply a less bald way of affirming that might makes right? No; although certainly it does affirm that the existence of might is no mere casual attribute, but the indication of qualities which should, as they asstiredly will, make their way to the front and to the top in the relations of states. Once Prussia counted for less than Holland in international balances. Such qualities, capa- bilities, not only confer rights, but entail duties, none the less real because not reducible to legal def- inition; such as the interference of the United States and of Great Britain in 1823 on behalf of South American independence, and of the United States alone, backed by the silent arms of Great Britain, 85 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION in Cuba in 1898. The competition of such na- tional efficiencies makes for the soundness and equity of the whole international community. It is only when the might of some one state, or ruler, the symbol of its efficiency, becomes uncon- ditioned by opposition, through the exhaustion or recreancy of other nations, that the national effi- ciency, not meeting competition, tends to abuse and decay like all uncontrolled power. Rome and Car- thage, Louis XIV., Napoleon, are familiar instances. Great Britain after Trafalgar illustrated the same vmcontroUed power on the seas; but she was saved from decay by the necessity of meeting the opposing forces of the Continent. The Monroe Doctrine itself is such an instance of national force opposing the intrusion of other force in settlements such as have been cited. It is local power asserting that it will withstand the beginnings; will not permit distant power, perhaps mightier than itself, to be established at its very doors in a position involving national danger. This also illustrates the safe- guard against the consequences which might be in- ferred from the proposition that national power, being essentially national efficiency, is entitled to claim its sphere of extension and of opportunity. The co-ordination and balance of international factors — of which the Balance of Power in Europe is the familiar example — ^like the balances of powers in a Constitution, secure a firmer basis of general welfare than mere legal adjudication, which can 86 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS be only partially applicable to the community of nations. It is perhaps a sense of this bearing of the Monroe Doctrine that, in the public discussions of the treaties of general arbitration with Great Britain and France, while pending, caused the doctrine to be characterized as a matter of "domestic policy." I presume the expression must have proceeded from some fairly representative American quarter, as I find it in the Washington correspondence of the London Times,^ the excellence of whose foreign cor- respondence is known. The correspondent scarce- ly evolved it from his own inner consciousness. To describe the action of the United States in forbid- ding one European state to purchase from another European state a piece of its American property — say a West India naval station — as a measure of "domestic" poUcy has a slightly humorous aspect; and indeed is so characterized by another English paper. Yet in a sense the definition is accurate, because such transfer does affect vital interests as by us conceived, and these may be described in- f erentially as a matter of domestic policy. Although a case tmder the Monroe Doctrine is susceptible of legal adjudication by what may be styled the com- mon law of international usage, in no American quarter is there any proposition to submit it to arbitral decision, or even to throw it open to dis- cussion as to its legaUty ; for, as affirmed in its earliest 'August 4, 1911. 7 87 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION formtdation, it is essential to a sound American pol- icy by a necessity which neither knows nor admits external law. Curiously and interestingly, simultaneous with the framing of the treaties of general arbitration, in the brief interval between their final conclusion and the signature in Washington, the British govern- ment, dealing with the current dispute between France and Germany about Morocco, found itself compelled to a most deUberate and formal pro- nouncement of its purpose, in aU events, to protect "vital interests and national honor," by force if necessary, although the case might present no legal ground for such contingent action. The representative of the government selected to make this important announcement was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd-George, who cannot be suspected of militarism or of extrava- gant imperialism. Although a principal member of the same Cabinet, the difference of view in such matters between himself and the Premier, Mr. Asquith, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, is sufficiently known. It is difficult to be- lieve that there was not deliberate purpose in choosing for the mouthpiece of the government a person so identified with opposition to war, and with expenditures upon social reform which a war would postpone indefinitely. The significance of the oc- casion was enhanced by the ready extempore speaker reading the carefully worded sentences of his speech. 88 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS After expressing, incidentally, his satisfaction at the prospect of a happy issue to the negotiations for a treaty of general arbitration with the United States, Mr. Lloyd-George continued : But I am also bound to say this — ^that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the World. Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed Continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from over- whelming disaster and even from national extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that noth- ing would justify a disturbance of international good-will except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation should be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests are vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. National honor is no party question.* The phrases "vital interests" and "national honor," carefully excluded from the recent treaties of general arbitration — the exclusion of which was indeed a chief object of the treaties — appear here again in terms and in full force; not by mere im- plication, but in distinct assertion relatively to a pending political situation unsettled at the moment of speaking. Nor this alone. Equal stress is laid ' The Mail, July 24, 191 1. My italics. 89 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION upon the right of the nation to play its part in the world, to assert itself as a factor in international re- lations; to sustain by force, by national efficiency, its "position," its "prestige," and its influence among States; to assert the qualities which entitle it to a place in the front; all which are attributes distinct from, and in excess of, such simply inherent rights as vital interests and national honor. No inefficient state could take the same position. The incident is the more significant in that, so far as the public knows, the initiation of the treaties with the United States was due to a member of the same govern- ment, Sir Edward Grey, speaking upon the naval ship-bmlding competition between Great Britain and Germany in March, 191 1; taking up then and indorsing President Taft's suggestion in the pre- vious December that all questions, including vital interests and national honor, should be submitted to judicial arbitration, where such was applicable. Sir Edward Grey's utterance then, being in Parlia- ment, was of course the utterance of the cabinet. That of Mr. Lloyd-George, though not in Parlia- ment, was made under conditions equally responsible. It appears then that though the phrase "vital interests" may be abandoned, the idea is retained; and not the idea only, but the claim to enforce it beyond all power of interference by any arbitral tribunal. This seems somewhat to illustrate the quaint French proverb, "The more it changes, the more it is the same thing." 90 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS Whether named or not, vital interests remain. That is a quality necessarily inherent in vitality; and a nation may refuse to arbitrate them even if it abandons the phrase in a treaty. In our latest treaty with Japan the previous exclusion of Japanese labor immigration was abandoned in terms, but it was well understood that it was to continue in effect; otherwise the treaty could not have been negotiated. Against an immigration distasteful to a large section of its territory the country is now guarded by no legal pronouncement, to which an appeal could be made in court, but simply by an adjustment which neither refers to nor depends upon promulgated law; because such law — ^which the previous obnoxious treaty represented— would quicken international irritation which simple silence allows to remain dormant. The adjustment is one of diplomacy, which law by interference would merely dislocate. In view of the various incidents cited here and before, it is apparent that while vital interests and national honor may be submitted at times to judicial arbitration, the field for such submission is greatly limited by specific conditions not amenable to classi- fication. This is the more so, because there are ques- tions, probably many, which, while susceptible of judicial decision because applicable law exists, never- theless contain chances so contrary to the public interest, to domestic policy, to- natural right, one's own or another's — as Cuba in 1898 — ^that reservation of them must be made. Such cases are more easily 91 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION adjusted by the flexibility of diplomacy than by the rigidity of law. The solid basis upon which general arbitration may produce beneficial results was well expressed in another speech of Sir Edward Grey's.^ In this, without formal definition, he indicates the limits which Great Britain feels that expediency places upon treaties having this object in view. Anything like war between the United States and the British Empire would be so violently opposed to the deepest sentiments and feeUngs of the people in both countries as to be unthinkable. This made the ground between the two nations especially favorable for an arbitration treaty of an extended kind. If they wished to build a house which was to be secure, he imagined that they would choose to build it on a site which was not liable to earthquakes. There were political as well as territorial earthquakes, but the respecUve national policies of the two countries made it certain that they were not liable to political earthquakes; that there was no conflict of national policy. In the United States they had no intention of disturbing existing British possessions. They had a policy associated with the name of Monroe, the cardinal point of which was that no European or non-American nation should acquire fresh territory on the continent ' of America. If it be, as I think it must be, a postulate of any successftd arbitration treaty of an extended kind that there should be no conflict or possibility of conflict between the na- tional policies of the nations which are parties to it, this con- dition is assured between us. In like spirit the London Spectator ^ comments : The United States is the one country in the world our dif- ^ The Mail, May 24, 191 1. My italics. 'It is perhaps well to interpose that the American objection goes beyond the continent, and includes islands geographically American. 'August 19, 191 1. 92 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS ferences with which we can commit to arbitration without any reserve or misgiving, because she is the only country besides our own which is content with the status quo. Most Americans -will gladly accept this hopeful prognostic concerning the future relations of the two nations; yet Sir Edward Grey's speech by its reservations sufficiently shows that in his judgment the General Arbitration Treaty between Great Britain and the United States cannot safely be ac- cepted in Great Britain as a type for all occasions and all nations. As to Great Britain herself, it may be well to remember a recent very distinct divergence of political view, in which the Senate of the United States prevented the nation from committing itself to a treaty which might have proved extremely awkward at the present mo- ment. In 1900 the Executive of the day concluded the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, by which the long-standing Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was modified and the par- ticular interest of the United States in the Panama Isthmus and Canal recognized. The Senate, in ratifjTing, did not insist upon the right to fortify; but it introduced three changes in the treaty, one of which provided that nothing in the text should be construed to "apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defense of the United States and the maintenance of public order." That is, the proviso reserved the right to defend, but not 93 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION the right to prepare for defense by erecting forti- fications. Great Britain refusing to accept the changes, negotiation was resumed, and in the second draft the clause forbidding fortification was omitted; Great Britain thus assenting by silence to their erection, and, as the diplomatic correspondence shows, with full understanding that she thus did concede the right to fortify. This is the treaty which now fixes the relations of the two countries with reference to the Panama Canal. If the first treaty had been accepted as it stood when signed, the United States would have been bound by it as part of the law of the land; and as part of the law of nations so far as the relations of the United States and Great Britain are concerned. The Executive of 1900 was willing then to abandon a claim upon which the Executive of 191 1 strongly desired to act, and is acting, with the support of Congress. The Senate of 1900 saved the situation for 191 1. A treaty is for the period of its duration a law; and the two situations, prior and subsequent to the acquisition of the Canal Zone, show the de- ficiencies of law as 'an instrument in international adjustments through its tmsuitableness to a future and changed condition. The lesson, indeed, is not that treaties should never be made, but that they should be entered upon cautiously, and should con- tain reasonable provision of time expiry, so as not indefinitely to fetter national action. Although the site of the proposed fortification has now become 94 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS United States territory, which in 1900 it was not, the first treaty, if ratified, would have afforded at least a basis for opposition by Great Britain to the legality of fortification; and there is also no certainty that her silence on the matter even under the second treaty proves consent, as a legal proposition, then or now. Subsequent cession does not relieve territory from previous liens upon it of a third party, just as the sale of a house does not invalidate a pre- existing mortgage. ' Even under all existing condi- tions the right to fortify has been disputed by emi- nent authority in the United States. If a treaty of general arbitration had been in force when the decision to fortify was reached, what — ^under the first treaty at least — ^would there have been to pre- vent Great Britain demanding arbitration, and in- sisting that in its judgment the question was open to legal adjudication because of the treaty; although since its ratification the Canal Zone, the site of the fortifications, has become United States territory? Only the postulate stated by Sir Edward Grey — the absence "of conflict between the national policies." Referring to general arbitration, the Chancellor of the German Empire, whose position corresponds to that of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, as nearly as the very different political constitutions of the two countries admit, said in the Reichstag r^ As regards the clause about honor and vital interests, I am convinced that the abolition of the clause does not create peace, 1 The Mail, March 31, 191 1. 95 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION but merely constitutes an assertion that a serious occasion for a breach of the peace between the two nations concerned is un- thinkable. An unlimited arbitration treaty merely puts the seal upon a state of things already existing de facto. Let this state of things change, let there arise between the two nations , an- tagonisms which touch their vital interests, then I would like to see the arbitration treaty that does not bum like tinder. . . . The condition of peaceableness is strength. These words reproduce essentially the quali- fications expressed by Sir Edward Grey two months later, and they are emphasized by the antagonism — the "change in the state of things " — ^which has grown up between Germany and Great Britain within a gen- eration. From the coincidence of opinions between two statesmen in such eminent position, reinforced by the pronouncements of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd-George already quoted, which applied directly to a country between which and Great Britain the friendliest relations existed up to less than thirty years ago, there can be inferred not only the transi- toriness of international relations, but the insecurity of treaties of general arbitration when situations undergo radical alteration. Otherwise, the legal bond of treaty, far from ameHorating conditions, would have tended only to exasperation. This was abundantly shown by the increasing irritation in the United States over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty during the two or three decades preceding its supersession. Historical illustration, which is simply the citation of cases and precedents, amply proves the insufficiency 96 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS of law as an instrument in composing differences. By insufficient I do not mean that it is not sufficient in many instances, possibly in a majority; but that the exceptions are so numerous that legal classifica- tion cannot fully embrace them, and therefore an- other instrument than law, than arbitration, is in such cases required. In the matter of instruction, no theoretic discussion, however ample and lucid, affords a substitute for historical illustration. Several such illustrations of very recent date have been adduced in this and previous articles. One much more ancient, yet entirely analogous, and demonstrative that the instrument used must be adapted to the end in view, is afforded by the his- tory of liberty in England. The early Stuart kings, notably Charles I., with great care based their oppressive actions upon law; upon law obsolete, in the sense that the progress of the nation had ren- dered inapplicable methods which in previous years had been applicable, but still law existing unrepealed. International law, as law, has similarly to treat as legal a claim which may have issued in intolerable conditions. Claims of such character could have been alleged for the forcible retention of the Amer- ican colonies by Great Britain, and of the Spanish colonies by Spain, up to and including the deliver- ance of Cuba; and such law must govern any tri- bunal. The judge decides what the law is, not what it should be. Concerning the Stuart oppression, the latest and 97 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION most distinguished historian of the period, Dr. Rawson Gardiner, after remarking that "it was im- possible to allow any mere interpretation of the law to decide the question at issue" between King and Parliament, used an illustration which in the light of the events of the year 191 1 is singularly striking. Suppose it should happen that the House of Lords placed it- self in deliberate opposition to the House of Commons, even after a general election had shown that the House of Commons was in accord with the feeHngs of the constituencies. Suppose that the House of Lords rejected every bill sent up to it by the Commons. What would be the use of applying to the judges as arbitrators? They could but decide that the Lords were legally in the right. They could^not decide whether they were politically in the right. Since Dr. Gardiner wrote, the imagined case has occurred, not in all particulars, but in substance. The inadequacy of the law has been recognized; and the British government of to-day has obtained by political action, of the nature of threatened consti- tutional violence, the result to which law, as an in- strtiment, proved inadequate. A political instrument was employed when the legal instrument — ^recourse to a court — coxild not but fail. In the case of the Stuarts the political instrument used was armed resistance. The recent result to the House of Lords is a warn- ing to conservative forces everyTvhere, national and international, to recognize betimes the need of spe- cific changes in law, which shall adapt it to those shiftings in social and other conditions that con- flict with and defy particular legal enactments; or 98 LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS to international situations which have become ob- solete, or are becoming so. A danger in the path of arbitration, of legal decisions as opposed to diplo- matic arrangements, is that existing political dif- ferences will be brought to the bar, not merely of laws applicable but outworn, but of legal tenures based on antiquated or obsolete conditions formerly- suitable to times and circumstances but which no longer are so. Law lacks elasticity, not merely because of the time needed to pass new legislation, but because it itself, at least in international rela- tions, may be correct as a general proposition, yet cannot always be applied satisfactorily to a partic- ular case. In such instances a different instrument is required. A political impasse must be met by a special provision, by measures which shall proceed on a basis not of strict legality, but of evident necessary expediency; in short, by diplomacy rather than bylaw. In the intercourse of nations diplomacy is the analogue of the discussions out of Parliament which preceded the recent use of force by one party to this dispute. In the one kind of contention, as in the other, recognized force lay in the background. It is in neither a principal; in both it is an agent. The positiveness inherent in the very idea of law, its lack of elasticity, renders it too frequently inade- quate to the settlement of certain classes of disputes, because in them an accepted law exists, decision in accordance with which would simply perpetuate injustice or sustain intolerable conditions. 99 THE PLACE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS In the preceding articles of this series, the attempt has been to sustain the thesis that the interrelations of independent states are not susceptible of ftdl establishment, nor of all necessary adjustment from time to time, upon- a basis of law. This is partly because law, whatevei — the method of its development, whether by custom or statute, cannot be so systematized beforehand as to cover all cases; partly because unforeseen conditions arising, or gradual changes of conditions evolving, existing law is by them outgrown. Thus la3s_j^ten^kgs behind conditions, and often overlives them. In either case "^ere^ results an inapplicability, from which the attempt to decide by law would work actual injustice. The Monroe Doctrine, frequently cited because peculiarly American, illustrates both phases. Dur- ing our colonial era, and for thirty years after the adoption of the constitution, European powers colonized, conquered, exchanged territories in the American hemisphere, without eliciting from the United States serious opposition based upon a rec- lOO FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS > ognized principle. Throughout the period named the conditions which gave origin to the doctrine were tin- foreseen. These conditions were^ the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies, involving a future in- dependence of a large part of the American con- tinents, and the intention of the so-called Holy Alliance of European continental states to reduce them to their former allegiance by force of arms. In resistance to this attempt Great Britain and the United States acted in common, though not in con- cert, and with distinct purpose to use force, if needed. The purpose of the Holy Allianc^ was not in con- travention of law as law then was, nor, as far as I know, as law now is; but in more than one point it traversed the policy of the United States and of Great Britain as determined by the changed condi- tions. That policy was partly one of particular national interest, as understood jby each of the pro- testing nations; partly one of icommon sympathy with peoples struggling for relief from a very real oppression. There can be little doubt on which side law lay, nor on which justide was. Right was sustained by policy and by a coriviction of rightful- ness ; the instrument of suetainment being diplomacy through its ordinary channels, backed by force. ^ The unforeseen conditions which diplomacy and force met thus successftdly, and to which law as it then stood was inadequate, were followed by gradual changes. These changes were chiefly in the growing population and wealth of the United States, and lOI ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION in the recognition by her people of the expediency of excluding European quarrels from_piX)-pagation-fee- this hemisphereroBrthe'sarne principle that a man is disinclined to see a fire spread in the direction of his own house. As remarked by a New Zealand paper quoted in the fourth of these articles, wej^pb- jected to "storm centers at our doors." fUpon this view, at the very moment of pronotmcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we based the assertion that the American continents were not in future to be open to ftulher European colonization. This determina- tion to maintain the status quo of the moment re- ceived gradual extension afterward. The denial of i colonization was advanced to the denial of the/ appropriation of American territory in any manner; by conquest in war, or by sale, or by exchange — a| further change of conditions. Each of these proc-j esses of transfer is a common international transac-i tion, and perfectly lawful by to-day's accepted stand- ards of international law; fW!tnessed,~for~iH§tance, by such recent events as o^r own purchase of the PhiHppines, the conquest of Algiers by France, her military occupation of Morocco, and, incident to the latter, the exchange of African territories between her and Germany. La. America conditions continued to change. At- the first Great Rritahl had rejected the pronomjce- ment against colonization. Hence the coincident action of the two governments against the Euro- pean aUiance had been merely one of momentary I02 FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS expediency, based on divergent motives. British opposition to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine continued, and was protracted throughout the dura- tion of intestinal strife over slavery. This weakened the vigor which otherwise might have been shown by the United States, in virtue of her steady increase in power and of her favorable geographical position. Of this instability of policy the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 was in its day the exponent. Not till the national unity had been consolidated, by the results of the War of Secession, was the diplomatic contest with Great Britain maintained with a res- olution which issued in the formal supersession of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by that of 1901, known as the Hay-Pauncefote. Doubtless changing conditions in Europe as well as in America, and changing phases of national senti- ment, inclining the English-speaking peoples more toward co-operation and less toward opposition, had their part in the general result, favoring the long- established poHcy of the United States which has been considered. j'The course of events has beeii thus summarily outlined, not to revive old an- tagonisms, but to illustrate that the happy issue has been reached by diplomacy, which deals in arrange- ments, not by law, which dictates by decisions; and that Jaw throughout was incompetent to deal wit situations as tney changed. ITiis has be5i~ioTi^' cause there was no law, nor at present does there exist any law, to which the United States could 8 103 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION have appealed in support of a position she was- de- termined to maintain. All precedent, all the general •-custom of- nations, has been and is against a course which undoubtedly has contributed to the quietness of the Western World; because it has settled that it is useless for either of two European belligerents to seize an American dependency of the other, unless prepared to encounter also the armed resistance of the United States. _ In this particular, the law of nations had over- lived the conditions of colonial America and those of the fiirst forty years of national existence of the United States. Conditions had changed, and law had not kept pace with them. Only by specific treaty, accepting the doctrine as binding on both parties, could it be given a statutory position rec- ognizable as determinative by an arbitral court. But no such treaty has been made, nor at the critical moments could have been negotiated. Whether a long-continued acquiescence, or at least absence of contestation, and if so, how long, could be construed by such a court to constitute an established custom equivalent to a law, I am unable to say, and I fancy the court itself would be puzzled to decide, in view of the correspondence on the Venezuela boundary in 1895. Even if such a point has been reached now, which is more than doubtful, it certainly had not during by far the greater part of the period of dispute. The final adjustments have been by diplomacy, vm- aided by law, yet influenced by force. 104 FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The Mo nroe Doctrine is a policy, nat^a. ^a;w^ and b^imdjt^^s atmays-JaiiL„fcace, not the less real because not flaunted. The most characteristic illus- ^tration of this was in 1866, when the hundreds of thousands who had fought the War of Secession were still in the prime of their vigor and experience. Then the United States compelled Napoleon III. to evacuate Mexico, but without moving a soldier or^ expressing a menace. Indeed, force is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished. Of this . General Schofield's mission in 1865-66 afforded an interesting illustration. The object was "to see if the French Emperor could not be made to imderstand the necessity of withdraw- ing his army from Mexico, and thus save us the necessity of expelling it by force." ' The intimation was conveyed, and the result obtained; but in a man- ner so void of offense that the ultimate agent, force, can scarcely be said to have appeared. It is often asserted that the existence of the armed forces of Europe, one over against the other, is provocative of war. They might be, they probably would be, if during negotiation or in a moment of excitement they were paraded in threatening manner. Sensible men, however, know well that other sensible men will avoid a known danger, unless circumstances are such that avoidance may be taken to show a yielding to fear; and therefore, unless desiroiis of collision for specific reasons, as Bismarck was in . ' Schofield's Forty-Six Years in the Army, p. 382. ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION 1870, they prefer to carry their point by discussion, in which the factor of force is ignored yet under- stood. — Can then force, broadly considered, be regarded as an inevitable factor in international adjustments and in the maintenance of the general international balances? The point is interestingj^jespedally at" this present iHonreirt;^ wteTOEeTapp^^^ of~'puBIic" "sentiment throughout that which we esteem the civilized world, the world of the highest development in material progress and in artistic and literary culture, is tending toward the elimina- tion of that active display^ of force which we call Agar. May it not be that in confotmding force with "war we are simply ignoring a fact of not only gen- eral but universal existence? ' Law itself, which its^ extreme advocates desire to see installed in place pf war, is, in last analysis, simply force regulated — a most desirable end — ^but inadequate for the very reason that it is only one manifestation of a power which is manifold in its exhibition. Not only doe^ law for its efficacy depend upon force, as is shown "by the entire paraphemaHa of justice from the single poUceman to the final court of appeal, but imder law and within law force continually controls. In this country we have recently been passing through, and have not yet emerged from, a period in which force, astutely managed and directed, has largely controlled the business relations of the en- tire commtinity. The force of concentrated capital 106 FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS is as real and as material as the force of an organized army, and it has the same advantage over a multi- tude of unorganized competitors that an army has over a mob. At times weU within memory the con- test has narrowed down to a conflict almost per- sonal, at times quite personal, between concentrated financial powers, ending at times in a disabling reverse or disastrous overthrow to one or the other. As the disadvantage of such contests has become apparent to the greater competitors, there has suc- ceeded a disposition to co-operation, corresponding to alliance between political entities for their mutual benefit. Coalescence of force dominates more and more, until the mass of individuals constituting the community realize that such force menaces their independence and must be opposed by other force; the force of money by the force of votes expressing itself in legislation. This is the condition to-day — the condition of regulation. Yet it is reaUzed that for the benefit of the whole the force of concentrated capital must be permitted free play within certain limits, which are fixed by the opposing forces of the ballot-box. \i The states of the world of European civilization, in which America is included, in their organized national activities represent among themselves an intematiQAal community of competing business or- ganizations. They recognize that the general bene- fit depends ultimately upon the welfare of each and all; but nevertheless the aim of each is tp comt ^°1 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION pass for itself— that is, for its people— the utmost preponderance of advantage possible to be secured. Of this aim and effort, Protection, technically so called, is the most evident and the crudest mani- festation. Protection is simply the use of force, of national power recognized as legal, to secure com- mercial advantage; but it becomes immediately ap- parent that, so far as the system is economically sound, the greater the area that can be embraced within it — ^that is, the larger the concentration — the more effective is the operation. Hence resttlts inevitably the attempt to enlarge the national boundaries, in order to include and tq administer to • the national advantage as much territory at least as can be securely held and prof-! itably exploited. The motives thereto, though not purely economical, are largely so; but undoubtedly there does co-operate the perfectly human and universal motive of enjoyment in mere possession, and in the activities of administration and exploita- tion. These must be taken into accotmt as real and influential national factors. It is a mistake tq argue that because nations and peoples are largely animated by self-interest, self-interest alone moves them; and it is a blimder to infer that there is in- consistency in maintaining the predominance of interested motive, and at the same time affirming the existence of other and competing imptilses. Both classes exist. If there be inconsistency here, as is sometimes asserted, the inconsistency is not in the ip8 FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS statement, but in the human nature concerning which the statement is made. The wars of the past half-century bear witness to this; for it may safely be affirmed that self-interest, especially of the pecuniary order, bore in them a relatively small part. The American War of Seces- sion was with both parties one mainly of sentiment ; on the one side the objection to see its cotmtry dis- membered, on the other the instinct of self-preser- vation, as misunderstood, and of independence as essential to self-preservation. Bismarck's wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 were motived, doubtless, by the interest of Germany; but they embraced a con- ception of German racial vmity consolidated into political tmity which, while assuredly a utilitarian end, was certainly not devoid of a lofty nobleness to which German sentiment responded with an exalta- tion that ennobled the wars themselves. The war of Russia against Turkey, in 1877, no doubt took account of Russian ambitions concerning Constan- tinople; but the determining impulse, which con- strained even the autocratic Tsardom, was popular sentiment inflamed by sympathy with the oppires- sion of near-by kindred peoples. A similar impulse dictated the war between Spain and the United States; the transfer of the Philippines, the chief material gain, if so it can be called, not only was not an object of the war, but was accepted with reluc- tance, under an unwilling sense of duty, as one of its unfortunate results. Various motives, some of 109 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION them sordid, may have entered into the transactions preceding the war between Great Britain and the Boer repubHcs; but the shuiHing, invidious handling of the Uitlander franchise by the Boer government was the predominating factor. The author of The Great Illusion shows clearly enough that much is now done in South Africa contrary to the views of the British government, an inevitable result of local self-government, especially where there is a color question; but the constitution of South Africa establishes equality of suffrage, in its basis and]in its exercise, among all adult white males. This did not exist in the Transvaal before the war, of which it is one of the great gains. Union and equality are thus the outcome of war. The war between Japan and Russia I believe to have been felt by Ja- pan one of national self-preservation. That sentiment prevailed among her people, and not without reason. It is, I believe, the cardinal mistake of the author of The Great Illusion that nations now go to war, or are preparing for war, under the impression that there is financial profit in injuring a neighbor. His other proposition, that the extension of national territory — ^that is, the bringing a large amount of property under a single administration — ^is not to the financial advantage of a nation, appears to me as illusory as to maintain that business on a small capital is as profitable as on a large. It is the great amount of unexploited raw material in territories poUtically backward, and now imperfectly possessed no FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS by the nominal owners, which at the present moment constitutes the temptation and the impulse to war of European states. The difficulty of the situation, from the point of view of the advocate of disarma- ment, is that law is not competent to the solution, while diplomacy is; and tiiat in diplomacy force] is always a factor. / The recent difficulty between' France and Germany, and its method of solution — ^in fact, the whole Morocco question during the past ten years — ^illustrate this series of propositions. As the motives of the several wars cited rose far above a mere financial advantage, so their results have been beneficial from a nobler point of view. The preservation of the North American Union, with the abolition of the degradation of mankind in slavery, and of the disastrous economical condition of slave labor; the welding of the German race into the German nation, followed by the great industrial and economic advance, which only a unified ad- ministration could have insured; the detachment of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria from the rule of Turkey, the benefit to the inhabitants of those prov- inces, attested by the restilts and newly witnessed to in recent years by the miseries of Albania un- der continued Turkish rule ; the advantage to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines from the substitu- tion of American influence, or American control, for that of Spain; the opportunity of Japan, and her national security, purchased by the successes in Manchuria at a money cost far exceeding in pro- ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION portion that of any of the other wars named — all these are instances of benefits secured by war, and which could not have been secured by law, for in no one of the cases was there a law which could have accomplished the specifip result. Law could not have abolished slavery; could not have given the impetus which achieved German unity; could not have dispossessed Turkey of her misgoverned territories, nor Spain of hers; could not have extorted fjrom the Kruger regime fair treatment for the foreigner, nor established equal rights in South Africa as it was ; could not have vindicated the natural rights of Japan against the encr oachmen ts of Russia in the Far EastrJ' Diplomacy using force accomplished in these instances results to which law was unequal, and could not but be; while diplomacy not actually using force, but holding it always in reserve, is continually effecting adjust- ments where law cannot pronounce decisions. Trea- ties, conventions, diplomatic agreements of every kind, are of the nature of lawmaking, of constituting for present conditions a formula which shall have the force of law; but lawmaking is a different thing from a legal decision. Lawmaking is the function of diplomacy; legal decision that of arbitration. The great objection to law, however, is not merely that it is inadequate, but that inxnost-of-the-above -eases it would have been inequitable — ^wotild have perpetuated injustice by sanctioning outworn condi-| tions or inapplicable principles. 1X2 FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The extension of national control in order to further national advantage, or to flatter national self-esteem, is a nattiral outcome of Protection. That the same disposition is observed in the great non-protectionist state — Great Britain — shows how deeply the fundamental idea of Protection is rooted in htmian nature. But here enters that other universally recognized factor — ^that forces take the line of least resistance. Probably no state in' Europe at the present time seriously contemplates the acquisition by force of the European territory of a rival. In this assumption I do not reckon Turkey as European. Alsace and Lorraine are probably the last examples of such transfer. The reason is plain. Such acquisition cannot be so valuable industrially as to compensate for the ex- pense of the conquest. The armaments of European states now are not so much for protection against conquest as to secure to themselves the utmost possible share of the unexploited or imperfectly exploited regions of the world — the outlying markets, or storehouses of raw material, which under national control shall minister to national emolument. The case is much like that of the ownership of ore-fields by the Steel Trust, of which we have heard so much; the natural, and certainly not unwise, wish of the manufacturer to command his own sources of fuel and raw materials. But while the scene of such acquisition is else- where than in Europe, it is in Europe that the battle "3 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION is fought. The whole dispute about Morocco is one about colonial empire, as contributory to the ad- vantage of the nations concerned. The solvent is force, because there is no basis of law upon which the question can be settled. As regards the ad- ministration of Morocco, the only law applicable is 'that of the right of the present possessor, which, if capable of maintainment, would simply relegate the territories in dispute to the barbarous anarchy and inutihty which has been their lot for centuries past. The redemption to mankind of Algiers, Egypt, India, is the warrant in equity for the forcible sup- pression of those who previously occupied and con- trolled, but failed to justify their possession by re- sults. "Cut it down. Why cumbereth it the ground?" Even the author of The Great Illusion holds that co-operation in the subjugation of the planet, the utilization of its resources, is the true warfare 'of man, and, if I rightly understand him, admits that communities which do not contribute to this may be taken in hand gently and adminis- tered temporarily to that end.^ But what decides which among several competitors shall be the ad- ministrator? Force simply; not only the militar^ force, of organized armies and navies, but force of position, or of previous incidents which have given/ one or another a certain priority of intervention, or) advantage of neighborhood, as of France against') Germany in the Morocco imbroglio. In the adjust- ' The Great Illusion, p. 247. 114 ••ORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ments which take place, armed force, and that in dis- tant Europe itself, has the casting vote either to maintain or to reverse; and in Europe, not in the remote dependency, would collision take place. The " Open Door," a modem phrase, is another out- come of this desire to increase area in order to gain economic advantage. The Open Door is the reply of other parties to the intervener and appropriator, and the open door depends for maintenance upon force. The open door might be defined briefly as the international retort to protection. Equality of opportunity is demanded; but the demand rests upon force — ^force possessed with the purpose to use it, if necessary. It is to be noted in this connection that the out- ward impulse of the European nations results nat- urally from the internal competitions of Europe itself; from the settled conditions of political owner- ship, and from the overtaking of resources by popula- tion through a diminution of the one and an increase of the other; both of which are the inevitable result of continued peace and industrial advance. The very high development of corporate efficiency char- acteristic of Christian civUization as a whole, an efficiency partly political, partly industrial, partly, it is probable, composed of some third factor not so easy to name or define, not only requires ampler fields, but is from its own very nature impatient of surrotmding inefficiencies, and disposed to disregard such figments as legal right, based upon mere useless IIS ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION prior occupancy, to territory which there is neither the intention nor the political capacity to utilize. ; In short, competition for control is extending its sphere from the scene of European civilization to that of extra-European, and exists not only between the European peoples themselves in these exterior regions, but between the present occupants and the intruders. It is there a competition not merely of nations, as in Europe and in America, but of civiliza- tions, and of the religions which have stamped their essential characteristics upon the nations professing them. Of the Christian religion the great constituent is power; which in another shape, easily assumed, becomes force. Force is power in action. We are prone to assume that, because the personal ideal of the individual Christian, exemplified above all in the Master, is abnegation of self, therefore power and force are alien from the Christian scheme of character. The history of the Master Himself refutes this. The distinction between the Christian conception and that of its strongest rival in the out- side world — Islam — ^is that of the entrance of the human wUl into the Divine accomplishment. The conception of Christianity is not the arbitrary will of the Creator, the kismet of the Mohammedan, but the ptirpose of the Creator conditioned by man's energy in willing co-operation. Abnegation of self evidently finds its correlative in social imptilse. The one implies the other. Hence the co-operative impulse, the disposition to ii6 FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS efRcient organization, proceeds logically from the conception of man's part in the regeneration of the world. This tendency to efficient organization is a faculty wholly distinct from the personal qualities of the individual members of certain races which do not show the same capacity for organization; such as the Chinese or the Turks. To right what is amiss, to convert, to improve, to develop, is of the very essence of the Christian ideal. Without man's re- sponsive eflEort, God Himself is — not powerless — but deprived of the instrument through which alone He wills to work. Hence the recognition that, if force is necessary, force must be used for the bene- fit of the community, of the commonwealth of the world. This fundamental proposition is not im- paired by the fact that force is best exercised through law, when adequate law exists. Except as the ex- pression of right, law is an incubus. Hence much of the present magnification of law is the mere worship of a fetich. To such a view aggression, in its primary sense of onward movement, is inevitable. Those who will not move must be swept aside. They may be drawn into the movement by moral forces, as Japan has been; but if not, they must be brought despite them- selves into external conditions favorable to their welfare and the general good, as has been done in India, in Egypt, and in the Philippines. As toward conviction of the intellect, upon which religion de- pends, force is inoperative and the use 6f it there- 117 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION fore wicked. Christianity as a religious system rests, consequently, upon a different power — a spir- itual. But to Christianity as a political system, force, the sword if necessary, is incumbent, if re- quired to remedy environment, to amend external conditions; just as the force underlying law is used to ameliorate social evils. Recent organized attempts to convert the Church of Christ in the United States into a political engine for control of political results, in a reported difference of opinion between the Executive and the Senate, call for some plain speaking as to the attitude of Jesus Christ toward the use of force for the remedy of evUs. The question is thought to be decided by the application to Him of the title "Prince of Peace." This is a pure begging of the question. Not only is there much imagery associating Him with actual force, even with war, but the phrase cited occurs but once in the Bible, in a Jewish prophecy which the Church has delighted to apply to Christ; but the context shows that the person to whom the words immediately refer is a deliverer whose justice re- poses upon power, and by whom, or for whom, a forcible deliverance has been wrought from the yoke of an oppressor. Moreover, this understanding of the prophecy dominated the thought of the Jews who accepted it. The peace of Jesus Christ, as He dis- tinctly said, is not as the world giveth. It is the inward peace of the individual resting upon God. This He called emphatically "My peace." The ii8 FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS sway of this will be co-extensive with any community so far as the individuals thereof seek it; but in the presence of evil the genius of Christianity is aggres- sive. The progress of the changes which the impact of Christianity on the world produces will probably be gradual. It has been so in the past, little by little, with a recent accelerated pace; conditioned by the vis inerticB of the exterior peoples, by the active opposition aroused in them, and by the contemporary rivalries within the Christian commonwealth. Two principal influences will characterize the movement, as they have from the beginning: the influence of ideas and the influence of force. In broad generaliza- tion, the Christian Church falls within the first cate- gory, the Christian state within the second. Mis- sionary effort is the exponent of the one, armament of the other. The two organizations, church and state, and their several offices, are too easily con- fused in discussion, particularly of the philanthropic order. Their spheres are different; and when the church, as church, interferes with the state, as state, whether in men's thoughts or in their acts, evil follows. The people of the United States scarcely realize what a potent political agency a church may be made; and the Christian Church scarcely realizes the injury it will do itself by diverting any of its none too great activity from spiritual ministration to political agitation. In the past, in other lands, the church not infre- 9 "9 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION quently has evoked the sword of the state. To-day she seeks to shatter it. In either case she errs. The present discipline of the sword in international relations keeps alive armament and the organization of force — ^the power of the sword — which alone cen- turies ago checked and rolled back the Saracenic and Turkish invasions. Upon this depends the ability to use force in the great conflict with the powers of political evil in the external world. In days not long past I have written of this as prospec- tive. To-day it is upon us. In it the disarmament of the states of Eiuropean civilization, the abandon- ment of the energies of force, will mean the downfall of that civilization. VI "the GREA.T illusion" In the early months of the year 1911 appeared a book called The Great Illusion,^ which attracted at the time much attention and approval, which it probably still commands. I have read the book twice attentively. Owing to the number of topics incidentally discussed, I have fotmd difficulty in realizing to myself the pre- cise thread of the argument. The author, however, in two instances at least has defined the purpose of the work in words of his own. I say in words of his own, because he has chosen, not unwisely, to preface his conception of "the great illusion," which he thinks prevails widely, by numerous illustrative quotations from others, whom he constitutes his antagonists in idea. Based upon these citations, 1 It may be said, in explanation of this article, that the book with which it deals, The Great Illusion, by Norman AngeU, was published in the early months of 191 1. My criticism of it appeared in The North American Review of March, 1912, and Mr. Angdl's "Reply," in the same magazine, in the following June. As the article now stands, it contains additional remarks, which on accoimt of space were omitted from the first publication, together with some com- ment elicited by Mr. Angell's "Reply." 121 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION he then summarizes (p. 29) the illusion which he detects in them as being one of the universally accepted axioms of European politics — namely, that a nation's financial and industrial stability, its security in commercial activity — ^in short, its prosperity and well- being—depend upon its being able to defend itself against the aggression of other nations, who will, if they are able, be tempted to coimnit such aggression because in so doing they will increase their power, and consequently their prosperity and well-being, at the cost of the weaker and vanquished.' Again (p. 336) : At the root of the whole armament difficulty lies the theory that economic advantage goes with the exercise of military force; in other words, armaments exist as the logical outcome of that illusion with which this book deals. I believe that the thesis thus defined is erroneous in at least two particulars. First, as a matter of fact, economic advantage frequently has accom- panied the use of military force, and resulted from it. Two conspicuous instances of this afforded by history are: the supremacy of Great Britain as a financial and industrial community, due mainly to the predominance of her military sea power during the eighteenth century to the fall of Napoleon in 1815, and the economical development of Germany following upon the war with France in 1870-71. Second, the purpose of armaments in the minds of those maintaining them is not primarily economical advantage, in the sense of depriving a neighboring 'Italics here are the author's, not mine. 122 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" state of its own, or fear of such consequence to itself through the deliberate aggression of a rival having that particular end in view. The object is the asser- tion of right in doubtful questions which are con- tinually arising, largely from the progressive ex- ploitation of unutilized regions of the world. In, illustration, it is necessary only to cite, as very recent or still pending, the questions of Tripoli, Morocco, and China, with the open door. Between the states of European civilization these are not questions of legal right and wrong; because no law exists, no valid title. Titles are being made by international agreements, but the agreements themselves, in the process of development and at the moment of making, are conditioned by force. In connection with these, disputes are continually arising which more than once have led close to war. It is true that, should war come, the scene would be chiefly in Eiu-ope, and that provision against financial and economical dangers thence arising is one principal motive to armament; but it is not true that aggression upon the financial and economical system of another state is the motive for armament any- where. The particular point of view of the book, which has led both to the selection of the quotations from opponents (pp. 17-28), and also to the definitions of The Great Illusion, just cited in the author's words, is further illustrated by two passages. Thus (p. 77): "The real basis of social morality is self- 123 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION interest": that is, as the proverb more tersely puts it, "Honesty is the best poKcy." Again (p. 370): Is not the root of the profound distrust of, and hostility to, the peace man, that his plea has been made rather on the basis of altruism than of interest, on morality rather than of policy? The man in the street is firmly convinced that he is being asked to surrender some solid interest in favor of morality — senti- ment, as he would call it. It may be said, then, that the main argument of the book proceeds on the basis that the soUd bottom fact in international relations is regard to material self-interest, and that "the great illusion" is that material self-interest can be advanced by the use of force — either by fighting, or by the armaments which, by showing force at hand, prevent fighting yet compass desired ends. These remarks and quotations can be taken to define the general topic of the book. Before pro- ceeding to discuss it, and to comment upon certain particularities, or details of the argument, it may be best to state at once the very different point of view from which the present writer approaches the matter. I hold that the interest of the nation is indeed the business of the government, but that the danger of war proceeds mainly from the temper of the people, which, when roused, disregards self- interest. In every country the government, in that guardianship of the interests of the state which we call policy, pursues a certain line of conduct. 124 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" This results in friction with the policy of another country. As discussion proceeds, each government, deeply conscious of the evUs of war, endeavors to reach a solution of peace ; but to the people the matter gradually assumes the aspect of a right and a wrong, and popiilar feeling, disregardful of that particular self-interest which peace, represents, is wrought up to a pitch of supporting by arms its asserted right — ^that other self-interest which is commonly de- fined as self-respect, or honor. The history of the year 191 1 illustrates these positions. It has been apparent that the governments of France, Germany, and Great Britain have earnestly striven for peace; that their several stands were taken rather on the ground of national right than of immediate economic advantage ; and that the moods of the several peoples answered more readily to the feeling of national honor at stake than to any supposed material self- interest. [This paragraph met by anticipation the allegation of an inconsistency on my part, made by the author of The Great Illusion in the opening pages of his "Reply." ^ The policy of governments, now as al- ways — ^now as when Washington penned the re- mark — ^must be dictated by the interests of the na- tion. This is an entirely different proposition from that of The Great Illusion, that the purpose of arma- ments to-day is primarily a supposed economical advantage, either by deliberate aggression upon the 1 The North American Review, June, 1912. 125 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION possessions of another state or from fear of such aggression on the part of a rival.] In short, the inciting causes of war in our day are moral; a statement which includes of course immoral, as both adjectives, though opposite in meaning, as are "good" and "bad," belong to the same cate- gory of motives. The war of the United States against Spain is held by some Americans to have been unjust, and therefore immoral; by others, among whom myself, to have been illustriously moral ; but by neither, I apprehend, can it be seriously maintained to have been inspired by material self- interest. The American government tried earnestly to avoid it, believed that it could be avoided; de- ceived therein, I think, by failure to appreciate Spanish diplomatic methods as illustrated by his- tory. The people forced the issue. In the fifth article of this series I have cited seriatim the principal wars of the last half -century as proceeding demon- strably from motives essentially moral. Even where material self-interest is at the bottom of the trouble, as possibly in the present state of feeling between Germany and Great Britain, it is less the loss en- dured than the sense of injustice done, or appre- hended, that keeps alive the flame. I believe, therefore, that the fundamental proposi- tion of the book is a mistake. Nations are tmder no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war in itself; but they recognize that different views of right and wrong in international transactions may provoke 126 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" collision, against which the only safeguard is arma- ment. Unarmed, or inadequately armed, the na- tion is exposed to the perils of commercial disinte- gration and consequent popular suffering, depicted in the quotations from the advocates of armament upon which the author bases his case. No one imagines that fire insurance and the police are otherwise than unremunerative expenses, unless fire or breaches of the peace occur. The illustra- tions are time-worn, perhaps a little shop-worn; but they can never be outworn, because the nature of the provision made in police and insurance is exactly that of armament. The new French ministry, just constituted as I write, with the experience of the Morocco controversy fresh in mind, affirms its faith that a strong army and navy are the best guarantee of peace; yet we know that its predecessor labored for peace, and that war was averted by diplomatic action, in which armament assuredly counted. The War of Secession stands as a perpetual beacon against disarmament. Never were two antagonists less armed. A distinct preponderance of armament on one side or the other, or such a common readiness as would have indicated devastating hostilities, might have held the hands of both. Certainly, had the material superiority of the North been or- ganized in armies and navies, there could have been no four years of war. In this connection it may be interesting to re- call the observation of the late Mr. Carl Schurz, 127 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION that in his wide experience of political speaking he had always found "the people" responsive to moral appeals when plainly set forth, even when the result traversed what appeared to be their self-interest. Mr. Schurz was a hater of war; but still, as he looked with emotion upon the heaped-up dead at Gettys- burg, the War of Secession justified itself to his mind through the moral motive, the extinction of slavery. The two motives, moral and interested, will co-exist ; but self-interest, even when recognized^ does not possess the impelling power which is supplied by the sympathies, or by the sense of right and wrong. "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just." Self-interest is also less easily perceived by the mass, because its connection with a dispute is often in- direct. Bismarck may have engineered the wars of his day with a sole view to the material interests of Germany, but the force behind him was the pas- sions and enthusiasm of the people. The difference between Mr. Angell's conception and my own of the motives which move nations is illustrated by his comment upon a passage of mine quoted by him: That extension of national authority over alien communities which is the dominant note in the world poKtics of to-day dignifies and enlarges each state, and each citizen that enters its fold. . . . Sentiment, imagination, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational and moral faculties in some object better than bread alone, all must find part in a worthy motive. Great and beneficent achievement ministers to worthier contentment than the filling of the pocket. 128 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" Upon this Mr. Angell's comment (p. 309) is: Have we not come to realize that this is all moonshine, and very mischievous moonshine? Let us examine it a little. A man who boasts of his possessions is not a very pleasant, ad- mirable tjrpe, but at least his possessions are for his own use and do bring a tangible satisfaction, materially as well as senti- mentally. He is the object of a certain social deference by rea- son of his wealth — a deference which has not a very high motive, but the outward and visible signs of which are pleasing to a vain man. But is the same in any sense true, despite Admiral Mahan, of the individual citizen of a big state as compared with the individual citizen of a small? Does any one think of passing deference to the Russian moujik because he happens to belong to one of the biggest empires territorially? Does any one think of despising an Ibsen or a Bjomsen, or any educated Scan- dinavian, or Belgian, or Hollander, because they happen to belong to the smallest nations of Europe? The thing is absurd, and the notion is simply due to inattention, etc., etc. This quotation, pursued, illustrates not only a dogmatic rudeness frequent in Mr. Angell's pages, but inattention or inaccuracy on his part; and also how completely his prepossession with material interest, as the great and almost sole cause of na- tional action, dominates his power even to under- stand another's words. He Ukens the idea pre- sented by me to the self-satisfaction of a man elated with his social position and wealth. My words, which for present convenience I have italicized, show clearly enough a wholly different ideal — ^that of the use of power for beneficent ends; a moral purpose, certainly. I personally am proud, as an American, of what America has accomplished in the late Span.' 129 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION ish possessions and in the Panama Canal Zone; and if I were a Briton, I should feel a like pride in the benefits done to India and to Egypt. I will cite, in support of this simple idea of pride in country, words of the present Mr. Charles Francis Adams, who wiU not be suspected of jingoism by any who know either himself or his writings. Speaking of the sanitation triumph at the Isthmus, he says, "Assuredly the world has seen nothing like it before; and, standing face to face with it, is not the American justified in a certain access of race pride?" This I conceive is precisely the gratification indicated in my words criticized by Mr. Angell — ^national esprit de corps, a moral force, the power of which is everjrwhere recognized. Argument must proceed necessarily upon the recognition, illustrated by the instances cited, that with nations, as with men, absolute singleness of motive is rarely found. Mixed motive is the rule, not the exception. Mr. Angell is inclined somewhat to make merry with opponents of his thesis, because at one time they allege self-interest, at another moral motives, as the spring of impulse to war. The inconsistency of this is not in the argument, but in the complex material dealt with — ^human nature. Bronze is copper and bronze is tin. Noth- ing is gained, but much is lost, by ignoring duplexity of characteristic. Nothing too will be gained, only time lost, by dis- puting the conclusion elaborated at great length by 130 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" Mr. Angell, that in the close interrelations of modem states injury done to the commercial or financial stability of one reverberates throughout the entire community, returning in due force upon the victor. His theory concerning war, and its incident arma- ment, is founded upon the conception that both are the outcome of supposed material self-interest. Upon this basic assumption he erects the super- structure of argument that, by recognition of the fact that such self-interest does not gain by war, but loses, the motive to war and to armaments will be attenuated and ultimately will expire with the illusion which now fosters it. His premise is, I think, his own great illusion. To regard mankind, in individuals or in states, as so dominated by ma- terial self-interest that the appeal of other motives — ambition, self-respect, resentment of injustice, sympathy with the oppressed, hatred of oppression — ^is by it overbalanced and inoperative, is not only to misread history, but to ignore it. Almost every war of the past half -century contradicts the asser- tion. Nations will fight for such reasons more readily than for self-interest. Even on the ground of self-interest only, the argu- ment appears overstrained. That war between two great nations injtires both, and that the injury is felt by the whole international community, has become a commonplace of modem political thought, testified almost yearly by the anxiety of govern- ments to localize disputes by confining them within 131 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION a given area. This anxiety is probably the largest constituent factor in the Monroe Doctrine, which seeks to localize non-American disputes by excluding their intrusion into the regions to which the doctrine applies. But when the conclusion is pressed to the point of maintaining that a disproportion between the welfare of two states may not be produced by war, to the permanent advantage of one, so that it may even advance to a position of economic su- premacy, the proposition appears contestable. I had occasion several years ago to look somewhat extensively into the economical and financial condi- tions of Great Britain toward the end of the Napole- onic wars. They were dismal ; but it is true none the less that those of the Continent were so much worse that Great Britain owed the long start which she held and kept to this cause largely, though of course not solely. A single reason rarely accounts for all the phenomena of a social order. Great Britain owed her superiority then to the armed control of the sea, which had sheltered her commercial and industrial fabric from molestation by the enemy; while by the same means she crushed the prosperity of France, disabling her from utiliz- ing her rich resources in the processes of commer- cial exchange. The latest Encyclopedia Britannica (1910) says: The commerdal supremacy of England was due to a variety of causes, of which superior intelligence, in the ordinary business sense, was not the most important. Her insular position, con - 132 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" tinuity of political development, and freedom from domestic broils played an important part in bringing about a steady and continuous growth of industry and manufactures for several gen- erations before the modem era. The great wars of the eigh- teenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century gave Eng- land the control of the markets of the world. When peace was restored, England had something in the nature of a monopoly. Progress of this kind, which may not reach supremacy but simply modify the relative condi- tions of the states concerned, may be brought about either directly or indirectly. As the result of the war between France and Germany in 1870, Germany acquired territory and a huge indemnity. These were direct results. She received also the final impulse to national unity, consummated in the for- mal institution of the German Empire. The Great Illusion considers the territory and the indemnity to have been necessarily of doubtful benefit ; but the argument is not convincing. The statement (p. 94) that prices go up as money becomes abundant is obvious, but it is difficult to understand why loans bearing interest may by good administration produce advantage to a nation — or a firm — ^whereas a stmi bearing no interest must be a detriment. As a matter of fact, Germany was handicapped by lack of capital; due to her late entry into the industrial race and to the severe competition of neighboring rivals of longer industrial antecedents and conse- quent larger accumulations — of France, Great Bri- tain, Holland, Belgium. A close and extensive student of German conditions writes of 187 1, "Ma- 133 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION terial enterprise of every kind was fertilized by the capital which now became loosened, and sought new and larger channels of employment."' The capital drawn from France could scarcely have come amiss to such conditions, though it is certain that sudden easy money causept wild speculation, with attendant disasters, as it always does. On the other hand, German national unity has assured, throughout the countries thus confederated into one empire, the development of an economical and industrial system which, among other effects, has resulted in reducing emigration from some 200,000, in 1879, to 25,000 yearly now; although, coincident with this diminution, the population is increasing by 800,000 annually. This is indirect result. Moreover, that 25,000 outgo does not de- note a surplus of unemployed, as former conditions did. On the contrary, Germany receives at certain seasons of the year a large influx of labor from sur- rounding districts; so that the claim has been ad- vanced that she is now an immigrant country, not- withstanding the annual natural increase of nearly a million — aggregating fifty per cent, since 1870. In connection with this result, from the political union of several communities previously separated, . may be noted the confident assertion of The Great Illusion (p. 45) that enlargement of territory does not connote increase of financial prosperity. It is said, let Germany annex HoUand, and not an in- ' W. H. Dawson, The Evolution 0} Modern Germany, p. 38. 134 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" dividual German or Dutchman will be a penny the richer. There appears here the fallacy that the administration of a large capital cannot be made more productive proportionally than that of a small- er. Granting equal efficiency of administration, the proposition seems to contravene experience. When the scale of increase is as small as in this instance, the population of the Netherlands being less than one-tenth that of Germany, effect, even ultimate effect, may possibly be slight. Nevertheless, it would be there; while in the consolidation of the German states into the German Empire, or of the thirteen American States into the American Union, with its subsequent expansions, the consequences have been notorious. Both these political measures conduced to great economic advantage, and both were enlargements of territory. The same is true of the unification of Italy; where also there was a first period of great distress, followed by sustained pro- gress. The degree to which such consolidations are beneficial depends upon whether they are natural — correspond to fundamental facts — or artificial. In the one case a nation is formed, in the other merely a political entity — ^like Turkey — ^not homogeneous. The effect, when real, is to extend the area of assured peace for the communities concerned, and also to strengthen them as competitors in the markets of the world. Concerning Alsace-Lorraine, a much smaller area than Holland, it has been noted that 10 I3S ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION not only did the annexation add to the industrial power of the empire by the manufacturing es- tablishments there existing, but also that these, being brought within the industrial system of Ger- many, competing on equal terms, forced a higher standard upon German manufacturers as the only way to meet these new and better-equipped rivals in the home market.^ But it may be urged that these instances — Eng- land after the Napoleonic wars and Germany after and since the war with France — if conceded applicable at all, relate to conditions which have now passed away to return no more. Much of the argument of The Great Illusion turns upon the allegation that the past is in many respects so wholly past that argu- ments based upon its experiences are no longer valid. In his "Reply" in The North American Review for June, 191 2, the author of the work says that I "have rejected this part of his thesis, because I revert to facts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." The opening words of this paragraph, which were in my article as first published, show that I have not overlooked this position. The years from 1870 to the present can scarcely be called the early part of the nineteenth century; but, waiving that, it is true that I do not consider that "the respective weight of factors in interna- tional development have changed radically," in ' Howard, Recent Industrial Progress in Germany, p. 29. (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1907.) 136 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" Mr. Angell's sense that force — armament — does not and will not play a prominent part among such factors. I hold that it does and must continue so to do. It happens that we are now in the midst — perhaps, indeed, no further than at the entrance — of an era wherein is foreshadowed clearly a future class of great issues, which in some instances have already taken concrete form. Upon these I have touched frequently in previous articles of this series. In restating the facts, I am glad to avail myself of certain phrases and expressions used in a late number of The Spectator (December 30, 191 1) by a corre- spondent of the paper and criticized in the editorial columns : "The instability of the present mapping-out of the earth's surface"; "the resettlement to be ac- complished"; "the capacity to govern well native populations," in whose hands vast territories now lie useless; "the capacity to bring into use material resources which lie undeveloped." "Are the British four and a half millions which alone now occupy Australia in effective occupation" of the vast con- tinent? "Can we wonder if Germans ask them- selves whether there would be ftmdamental iniquity if they took in hand the development of the Amazon Valley?" The recent Morocco question was only a particular instance of this class of disputes. It must be re- membered that it was not merely between France and Germany; that among its antecedents had been arrangements between France and Great Britain, 137 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION and France and Spain. The process of readjust- ments is going on before our eyes with the rapidity of a kaleidoscope; Morocco, Tripoli, Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia, with Turkey in general — ^where the recent attempt at better government appears to have broken down — Persia, China, the Open Door. Our Monroe Doctrine stands, succinctly, for our in- tention that the like readjustments shall not take place at the expense of America; and this position may possibly be resented as a contravention of in- ternational common law. Amid all this Germany stands observant and equipped, with administrative and industrial efficiency fully demonstrated, con- vinced that she has not yet received her fair share of the world's activities, yet unable to find a suitable entrance to play the part to which she is equal, and, knowing herself to be, is determined to have. We know that this sentiment is prevalent. The Chan- cellor of the empire very recently said: For months past we have been living, and we are living now, in an atmosphere of passion such as we perhaps have never before experienced in Germany. At the root of this feeling is the determination of Germany to make its strength and capa- bility prevail in the world. {The Fortnightly Review, January, 1912, p. 147.) Not to quote again the very similar utterance of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer already given,^ the British head of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, in May, 191 2, two months after ^Ante, p. 89. 138 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" this article was first published (March, 191 2), spoke to the same effect as the German Chancellor: In the circumstances amid which we find cmrselves, the study of absolute force for its own sake is perhaps not altogether un- worthy of those who are called upon to take a share in the coun- sels of a free people. For what lies on the other side? What lies behind this development of force and war power? Behind it lies all our power to put our own characteristic and distinctive mark upon the unfolding of the civilization of mankind. So long as the quality of our civilization, so long as the patriotism and organization of our country, is suJffidently high to enable us to produce the maximum of force at a particiilar point, there is no reason why we should not hand on undiminished to those who come after us the great heritage we have received from those who have gone before. . . . For the rest, the best way to make war impossible is to make victory certain.' In the face of such representative utterances, it would seem impossible to deny that something more and higher than the mere pecuniary profit, which is the exponent of material self-interest, enters into the recognized motives of the nations which are engaged now in actively exploiting the as yet unim- proved regions of the world. In a reply* to this present article as first pubUshed, Mr. Angell writes: The national future and welfare of France would not have suffered one whit had Morocco passed under the administration of Germany. Germany's real expansion, the activities by which her people gain their livelihood, have not in the past and will not in the future depend upon the acquisition of tropical colonies. The prosperity of Italy, if the experience of France, the most 1 The Mail, May 6, 1912. ' The North American Review, June, 1912, p. 76^. ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION successful African colonizer in Europe, is any guide, will not be advanced by the conquest of Tripoli. . . . Both Italy and Ger- many are trsdng to follow in the African footsteps of France. Mr. Angell says "these assertions may sound dogmatic, but they are bome out by facts from which there is no escape." They are dogmatic; and Mr. Angell is little, if not dogmatic in all things. He proceeds at once with "the facts from which there is no escape"; illustrating his statements by Ttinis, which has been in French occupation for thirty years, but making no mention of the results in Algeria at the end of eighty. In this period France has so developed Algeria that from a trade of less than a nullion dollars it now has one of two hundred millions, five-siKths of which is with France. Such results are commonly called suc- cessful. The name Algeria is not even mentioned by him; yet as an illustration it is far better in one way than Tunis in another, considering the time ele- ment in all exploitation. Finis coronal opus. It happens, however, that in Tunis also the indications are as favorable as in Algeria. Since the "pro- tectorate " in 1881, the commerce of the district has risen from eight million dollars to forty millions. As an evidence of the beneficent activities which un- derlie such progresses, it may be cited that in the same period the French have constructed two thou- sand miles of good road. What roads mean to peace and order, as well as to trade, is known by all. But granting — what I do not grant — that in such 140 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" precedents there is no promise of success to similar operations in Morocco — and in Tripoli — ^may it not be believed that the French government and people with their experience are quite as capable of rec- ognizing the fact as is the sole perspicacity of Mr. Norman Angell? Further, if there can be no material advantage, as Mr. Angell affirms, it is clear that persistence of effort in a line so long fol- lowed unsuccessfully must be due to some other incentive, such as that named by the British and German officials cited; namely, the ambition to bear a racial and national share in the shaping of the world's advance. To this,, which is simple human, nature, public and private, and not merely to the illusion, on the pre-eminence of which The Great Illusion bases its case, must be ascribed the repeti- tion of the same course by France in Morocco, Italy in Tripoli, and Germany elsewhere. In the face of the utterances quoted, and of the external conditions noted, which cover almost the whole globe outside of Europe and North America, The Great Illusion presses its theory of self-interest, as resulting from the economic interdependence of civilized states, to the extent of asserting a present progressive decay among them of the principle of nationality, which for the past four hundred years has been the dominant factor in the development of Europe. It urges that the interlacing of business relations, and of class interests, are sapping already the bonds of nationality. Without denying a ten- 141 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION dency, it may be permitted to believe that the expectation of such immediate restilt is premature; that with so much to be done by Rations, as nations, the instrument of nationality, hard won through cen- turies, will not be dropped as outworn. Through it in the past discordant provinces have coalesced into unities, which may be compared accurately to personalities; an analogy which the book ex- plicitly denies. Thence has followed the beneficial effect already noted in the case of extensions of territory by consolidation. It is just as this proc- ess and the sentiment of national imity have taken place, that advance has been made or retarded. France and Great Britain, the United States, Spain in her day, have shown the benefit; Germany and Italy, the imification of which is a matter of yester- day, testify to the injury of protracted division. Prolonged absence of the sense of nationality has been the cause of the embarrassing situation in which both these states now find themselves, and consequently is also the cause of much of the disquiet of the world resultant from their seeking to retrieve their past. It is doubtless true that an effort is being made, notably by Socialism, to break down national bound- aries and to substitute for them class lines. These, The Great Illusion claims, would cut across and ignore national divisions. It may be that the future has in store the wreck of nationalities, and the agglomeration of peoples in the way described; but the period of transition, like that from handi- 142 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" craft to factory system, will be one of disorganiza- tion which will leave Europe — and America — ^weak- ened for the collision between European and Asiatic civilizations. This not only impends, but has begun, and in it the strength of Europe is the principle of nationality, developed as it now is. For it should be noted that this array of class against class im- ports the substitution of internal — civil — struggle for foreign, and a dissolution of social order, re- sembling the petty states of the middle ages which gave place to the nations of to-day. As said be- fore, however, it seems probable that the old weapon of nationality will not b6 discarded in face of the re- mapping of the world; for the people that does so will find itself hopelessly weak in the conflict, which will remain international. Recent observers of present currents of opinion in Germany note in to-day's Socialists a very distinct departure from the ultra international and non-military standards of twenty years ago, and a movement toward na- tionalism. It is said also that many who vote the Socialist ticket do so as the readiest means of com- bating the unpopular tendencies of the government, not because of sympathy with sociaKstic ideals.* By latest advices the same result is noticeable in Italy since the war in Tripoli. The national feeling aroused affects also Socialists, and is causing social- ism to recede before the spirit of nationality, ^The Fortnightly Review, January, 1912, p. 144. The Times, January 9, 1912. ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION How strong the feeling of nationality still is may be illustrated by one of the comparisons adverse to it used in The Great Illusion. It is urged that a British noble would marry a noble woman of some other country rather than a peasant girl of his "own. Probably; but if a working-man of British blood, or of British citizenship, be maltreated in another country, the noble and his class would resent the injury with vehemence, whereas the same treat- ment of a foreign noble would be viewed with in- difference, or at least with no more than common human sympathy in any case of oppression. Again, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Jews as a race are not sympathetic to American feeling; yet only a few months ago Americans have been roused to strong national action, and still stronger excite- ment, by the particular conduct of a foreign state toward a certain class of Jews, simply because they were of American nationaUty, even though of foreign birth. "As one man" is the familiar expression for such national arousing; a stronger simile of personality, or illustration of the strength of na- tionality, could scarcely be devised. In the recent European crisis Britons and Germans have thus stood opposed, as man to man, and the French have stood in the same way; each people, as a per- son, protecting his own. It is quite true that within each people there have been discordant voices; but most men — ^individuals — ^have experi- ence within their own personality of similar gon- 144 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" flict of considerations, even where there is a clear predominant impulse. In pursuit of the thesis that self-interest is the fundamental factor in international relations, and that no advantage to self-interest is obtainable by- military force; or, as it is put, that "armaments exist [only] as the logical outcome of the illusion with which this book deals," The Great Illusion is led to disparage size, miKtary power, and the senti- ment of nationality, as elements of national well- being. Here, in passing, comment is necessary upon the remark that small, undefended states, such as Belgium and Switzerland, are equally pros- perous, or more prosperous than certain large ones. These states are not wholly tmdefended in them- selves; but their security depends upon the main- tenance of the Balance of Power, which the great armed states conceive essential to their own well- being. Under the aegis of this mutual jealousy, reinforced by a moral indisposition to conscious wrong-doing, such as the wanton annexation of a weak neighbor would be, the smaller states prosper in peace, and are spared the expense of armament in great part. Their fire insurance, or war risk, is paid by other states. If a more powerful neighbor covet possession, its ambition is held in check by the motives stated, if not by others. The Turkish Empire is kept in existence by these mutual jealousies; but owing to its gross maladministration the moral deterrent from aggression has disappeared, I4S ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION Piece after piece, each exceeding the area of Bel- gium or Holland, and much exceeding Alsace- Lorraine acquired by Germany in 1870, has been sliced away, as pretext has offered; nor is the moral sense of the world greatly shocked by processes such as now in Tripoli, which even if illegal are not inequitable, viewing the benefits which have followed invariably upon the displacing of Turkish rule. The explanation of these conditions by The Great Illusion (p. 44) is given otherwise, "On what does the evident security of the small state rest? On the simple fact that its conquest would assure to the conqueror no profit." The German Empire is the most conspicuous instance of the recent constitution of a great nation, territorially extensive, equipped with great military force. It is also seemingly the most aggressive of the large European states; because, being narrowly circumscribed by land and by sea, owing to its geo- graphical position and past history, it has the poorest present opportunity for expansion. From its military characteristics it is chosen by The Great Illusion for frequent animadversion, being cited as an instance of non-achievement of national ends as compared with smaller communities. Thus it is stated (p. 38) that Norwegian three and a half per cents stand at 102, the German three per cents at 82. As an exhibition of financial standing this has some weight, although, with the respective rates of interest, the difference is less than the first glance indicates; 146 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" but as regards national well-being as an object of government, it is not mentioned that of the Nor- wegian two and a half million souls 20,000 emigrate annually, of Germany's sixty-five million only 25,000, though the population increases by 800,000 annually. Comparison is instituted also between the funds of "powerless" Belgium and "powerful" Germany, 96 to 82; but the modem prosperity of Belgium antedates by nearly two generations (18 15- 1870) the constitution of the German Empire, with which began the great industrial advance of Ger- many. Again, it is urged (p. 100) that the standard of comfort among French people is higher than among Germans, despite the industrial and commercial development of the latter, which is styled a "sen- sational splash." To which nation, however, shall be attributed the greater virility? to the one which, far overweighted, has done so much in a generation and at the same time increased its numbers fifty per cent., or to the one which, repressing natural growth, has thereby augmented mere material well- being? Unless a corresponding physical degenera- tion can be shown among Germans, there can be but one reply. The period of distress in Germany following 1871 is attributed (pp. 95-100) freely to the indemnity of a thousand million dollars taken from France, showing, as it is claimed, the unprofitableness of indemnities; but it is not mentioned that, apart 147 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION from the period of speculation unhappily excited, Germany then was passing through the transition period from an agrictiltural and handicraft system to the modem industrial, the same process which had been attended ' in other cotmtries, notably Great Britain, with equal if not greater agitation and suffering. By writers who have not a thesis to maintain I find the indemnity considered an aid. Being so much capital, it helped the transition; which in itself was a stage toward the development that now makes Germany one of the commercial powers of the world. That in the use of the in- demnity convulsions occurred, a period of specula- tion, does not impeach the capital, but the manage- ment. What great industrial enterprise is under- taken without an accumulation of capital assured to it? How shall a country transform its industrial system without similar aid? Again, in the same line of depreciation of Germany, it is said (p. 38, note) that in the small cotmtry Holland the wealth of the individual Dutchman averages sixteen thousand francs, while the German averages but nine thousand ; but it is neglected to observe that Germany up to the middle of the last century has been an agricul- tural coimtry — ^in 1871 three-fourths of the popula- tion was rural — capital scarce; whereas Holland, favorably situated for commerce and driven upon the outside world for employment, had long been a capitalistic country with big accumulations. A hundred years ago the Dutch did a large banking 148 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" business, while the inland rural military monarchies depended upon British subsidies. It was the divi- sions of Germany which principally prevented her economic progress — state working against state. Consolidation into a great community gave internal peace and industrial development; but for the accumulations which constitute capital time is needed for nations as well as for an individual. To evidence the prosperity of small countries, Norway's merchant shipping is cited as thrice that of Great Britain in proportion to population; but it is not noted that, in the same proportion, the total tonnage entered and cleared with cargoes in the United Kingdom is double that of Norway. That is, in proportion to population, there is double the commercial movement. The average size of the vessels employed is also significant of the nature of the trade, as is the proportion of sailing-vessels to steamers. The steam tonnage of Great Britain is to the sail as ten to one ; while in Norway, omitting motor-boats, the two are nearly equal, steam being to sail as 1.2 to I. So also Spain's management of the war of 1898 is compared (p. 222) with that of the United States, in order to show the superiority, even in military management, of a commercial coun- try over one essentially military. This is, perhaps, the most extreme disregard of notorious conditions. The inefficiency of Spain is notorious in civil as well as military matters. Does any one suppose that the United States would have had a like walk-over if 149 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION opposed to the military state of Germany? The trouble with Spain was not that she was military, but that she as a nation was incapable, and had been for over two hundred years. Amid many suggestive remarks, Mr. Angell's treatment appears vitiated by failure to appreciate these and other qualifications which make against his thesis. I do not attach great importance to such oversights, except as showing the disposition common to most to press into argument all that favors a point of view, while overlooking the per contras. But where omission is frequent it tends to impeach either the comprehensive knowledge or the judicial fairness of the author. Instances occur not only in the book, but in the "Reply" ^ to my article as the latter was originally published. The citation of Tunis and silence as to Algeria, al- ready noted, is paralleled by an incidental illus- tration in the "Reply," drawn from early Chris- tianity.* To base on Simon Stylites and his admirers an assertion as to the prevalent early Christian ideas of merit, ignoring wholly the very dif- ferent standards set and followed by the Apostles and Christ Himself, as well as the activities which revolutionized Europe, penetrating to all quarters, is precisely that kind of exaggeration of a part with reference to the whole in whidi caricature consists. Yet it is advanced as a sober and just illustration. » The North American Review, June, 1912. 'Ibid., p. 758. ISO "THE GREAT ILLUSION" That attention has not been drawn — ^perhaps it has — to these flaws in the argtiment of The Great Il- lusion is surprising; the more so that it seems, upon the whole, characteristic of the general argument — the countenance, so to say, of the work — ^as well as of particular features.^ The unquestioning accept- ance of the book in so many quarters testifies either to mental indolence to analyze, or to the fact of its appearance at what the phrase of the day calls a psychological moment, when the shibboleth "Disarmament" gave free course to all who pro- novmced it. Insistence upon details, however, rather obscures than elucidates, and the author's presentation of his case stiffers from this, as also, especially in the latter part of the book, from unbecoming superciliousness of tone. But the fundamental, decisive, error (how- ever) is the conception that nations maintain arma- ments with a ATiew to aggression in behalf of self- interest, measured in speedy returns of dollars and cents. This view dominates the entire book, despite a timely caution conveyed by a prominent interna- tional banker (p. 135, note): Though the economics of your book are unchallengeable, it is futile for the simple reason that it deals with material interests , and people to-day do not go to war about business or material > See, in this connection, Modern Wars and War Taxes by W. R. Lawson, just published. (Wm. Blackwtod & Sons, Edinburgh, 1912.) This contains a criticism of the argument of The Great Illusion on the financial side, which is beyond my own competency to discuss. " 151 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION interests. I do not know what they go to war about, but I am quite sure it is not about business. In the past, when governments were little respon- sible to the people, wars were made irrespective of popular feeling from motives of advantage purely. To-day all recent history shows that governments are reluctant to go to war ; but they recognize, and the people sustain them, that war may come, and that if it does it will expose the nation to vital injury to its "financial and industrial stability." This is quite different from the apprehension that the reason of an enemy for declaring war is to inflict such in- jury. The causes of quarrel now are quite otherwise than the barefaced robbery which marked the career of absolute monarchs like Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. The motives now are rarely simple, usually complex; but historically they have not been "to increase power and prosperity at the cost of the vanquished." Those who remember the War of Secession know how power- fully the sentiments phrased by the words "The Union" on one side, and "Independence" or "State Rights" on the other, outweighed any thought of interest. The German people rose as one man to support Bismarck, because the quarrel appealed mightily to the nascent sentiment of racial unity. Russia attacked Turkey in 1877 because of the wave of intense popular sympathy with peoples under- 152 "THE GREAT ILLUSION" going cruel oppression — a sympathy widely felt else- where, but in Russia only transmuted into act. •The South African war illustrated what the author of The Great Illusion (Spectator, January 6) thinks impracticable for the most part — ^namely, the pro- tection by force of the citizens of one state in the territory of another. The British government scarce- ly expected to increase its prosperity or financial sta- bility by aggression upon the Transvaal Republic. It stood to lose money, not to gain. The whole question turned upon the treatment of British sub- jects during the interval between immigration and naturalization; and the motive drew in not the British Islands only, but the English race in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as well. A mature consideration of the wars of the past sixty years, and of the occasions also in which war has seemed imminent but has been averted, will show that the motives to war have not often been "aggression for the sake of increasing power, and consequently prosperity and financial well-being." The impulses, however mistaken they are thought by some, or actually may have been, have risen above mere self-interest to feelings and convictions which the argument of The Great Illusion does not so much as touch. The entire conception of the work is itself an illusion based upon a profound mis- reading of human action. To regard the world as governed by self-interest only is to live in a non- existent world, an ideal world, a world possessed by I S3 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION an idea much less worthy than those which man- kind, to do it bare justice, persistently entertains. Yet this is the aspect under which The Great Illusion avowedly regards the world that now is. It matters little what the arguments are by which such a theory is advocated, when the concrete facts of history are against it. VII THE PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC Unless present expectation be greatly deceived, within two decades two events will have altered very materially the territorial conditions which underlie the capacity of the United States to exert power at sea. Such changes on land influence materially the subsequent dispositions of the navy, enabling it to be more effectively utilized. One of these events will be the opening of the Panama Canal. The other, already past, has been the war with Spain, issuing in the independence of Cuba from European control and in the territorial acquisitions of the United States resulting from the war. From a military point of view, these acquisitions have advanced the southern maritime frontier of this country from the Gulf coast to a line coincident with the south shore of Cuba, prolonged to Porto Rico; throwing into the second line the Gulf harbors, from Key West to the Mississippi. These are re- duced thus to the order of purely defensive ports, in- stead of the primary rank of naval bases for ojffensive operations held by them twenty years ago — a change to which have contributed also the hydrographic ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION difficulties of entrance and exit consequent upon the greatly increased size of battle-ships. This new condition is summarized in, and effected by, the ces- sion of Guantanamo as a naval base; provided, of course, that due measures are taken for the security of the base, so that ships may not be tied to the de- fense of a position the one value of which will be that the fleet can depend upon it for supplies and repairs, yet leave it for a measurable time to its own pro- tection, sure of finding it and its resources safe upon return. The occupation of the Canal Zone tmder condi- tions of complete sovereignty (with qualified ex- ceptions in the cities of Colon and Panama) may be^ regarded accurately, from the military point of view, as a most helpful modification of our proper coast- line, making it, by the interposition of Guantanamo, practically continuous for a fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It will be continuous because pos- sessing throughout adequate points of support — the one service which, from the military point of view, the land renders to the sea. To secure this condi- tion, however, the Canal, like Guantanamo, must be fortified. There is, unhappily, much exaggerated talk on one side and the other as to the relative ad- vantages of navies and fortifications for purposes of defense. Neither is secure without the other. As I have said, a fleet must be able to go away for a calculated time, with a reasonable prospect of finding its ports unsurprised, still its own, when it iS6 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER returns. The port must be able to spare the fleet for a similar period, confident that it can look out for itself till reinforced or supplied. The analogy is that of an army in campaign, which is crippled in movement if it has to cover its bases as well as to carry on other necessary operations. A number of eminent citizens, more actuated by a commendable desire for peace than instructed in military considerations, not long ago put their names to a paper directed against the fortification of the Canal. In this they say, among other things, "With aU the fortifications possible it is still apparent that ... in time of war a guard of battle-ships at each of its entrances would be an absolute necessity, and equally apparent that with such a guard the forti- fications would be unnecessary." I fear some naval officers, at home and abroad, dubbed in England the Blue Water School, are partly responsible for this popular impression of the need of the constant pres- ence of battle-ships. It is precisely in order that a constant guard of battle-ships may not be neces- sary that fortifications are requisite. Fortifications liberate a fleet for action whenever elsewhere re- quired; and, by preserving the Canal for use as a bridge between the two oceans, render less im- perative the maintenance of a big fleet in both. The maintenance of the Canal in effective opera- tion is one of the large elements in the future develop- ment of sea power in the Pacific. No other nation has in the Canal the same interest of self-preserva- IS7 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION tion that the United States has. Not only is this true as regards the Panama Canal, but no similar condition of dependence upon a canal exists anywhere else to near the same degree. The closest parallel is Suez, as compared with the Cape of Good Hope. Suez offers Great Britain an inside route to her great Australasian colonies, as well as to India; but the existence of the British Empire does not de- pend upon that route as vitally as the ability of our thickly settled Atlantic coast to come to the aid of the Pacific depends upon Panama, as compared with Magellan. This necessity is so urgent as to make the Canal, as before said, es- sentially a part of the coast-line of the United States. The primary object of the Canal may have been commercial, or it may have been military. I doubt whether many of those conspicuous in its advocacy and inception analyzed to themselves which of these two obvious features was chief in their individual estimation. From either point of view, and from both, the opening of the Canal will conduce decisive- ly to influence the development of sea power upon the Pacific. Its effect will be much the same as that of the construction of a new railroad judiciously planned, which opens out the new country through which it passes, or to which it leads, and thus not only renders it available to commerce, but by per- petual interaction of population and production in- creases both. More people, more wants; more IS8 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER people, more production. Both wants and pro- duction mean increased transportation. This effect of the Panama Canal upon sea power will have two principal aspects — one civil, one mili- tary. The civil effect will be the more rapid peopling of the Pacific coasts of North and South America, with consequent necessary increase of commerce. The military effect will be the facility with which the navy of the United States, and that of the govern- ment controlling Canada, can pass from one side to the other, in support of either coast as needed. I say somewhat generally, but advisedly, the govern- ment controlling Canada; for, while Canada is a part of the British Empire, and therefore will receive the support of the British navy where its interests are concerned, and while Canada also, taken as a whole, is for the time present attached to the British connection, as the Thirteen Colonies were from 1732 to 1770, it is difficult, in view of current political dis- cussions in Canada, especially those touching the question of support to the empire, not to feel that the preponderant tone there does not in this respect reflect that of Australia, New Zealand, or even of South Africa. The strong opposition in the French provinces to the government proposals for the de- velopment of a Canadian navy, the apologetic de- fense of the measure by the then premier. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, himself a French Canadian, in which the assertion of Canadian independence of action is more conspicuous than that of devotion to imperial in- IS9 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION terests, tend to prove a looseness of allegiance, which already simulates the independence of separation and may issue in it. After these words were written, the inference contained in them received support from the reported effect produced upon imperialistic sen- timent in Great Britain by the Reciprocity agreement with the United States framed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government. In short, there does not appear to be between Canada and Great Britain that strong de- pendence of mutual interest in defense, of which the British navy is the symbol and the instrument, and which binds together the other self-governing com- munities. I regret this, because I believe it the ad- vantage of the United States that Great Britain, by her relations to Canada, should be strongly com- mitted to the naval support of the north Pacific coasts. The ultimate issue wiU manifestly affect the question of sea power in the Pacific, according as it involves the British navy or only a Canadian. Meantime, tinder present conditions, the opening of the Canal will bring the British navy six thousand miles nearer the Pacific coast of Canada. The greatest factor of sea power in any region is the distribution and numbers of the populations, and their characteristics, as permitting the formation and maintenance of stable and efficient govern- ments. Such stability and efficiency depend upon racial traits, the distinguishing element of which is not so much the economical efficiency of the in- dividual citizen as his political capacity for sustained 160 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER corporate action — action which, however marked by internal contentions, is in the main result homo- geneous and organic. As a matter of modern his- tory, so far, this capacity has been confined to na- tions of European civilization, with the recent ex- ception of Japan. At times, it is true, great masses of men have for a period moved in unison, as by in- stinct, with an impetus that nothing for the moment could resist. The Huns, the Arabs, the Turks, are instances in point; but none would cite either the peoples or their governments as instances of political efficiency. At other times great personages have built up an immense sway upon their own personality alone; but the transiency of such is too proverbial for indication. The political aptitudes of the average citizen, steadied by tried political institutions, are the sole ground of ultimate national effectiveness. The most immediate, the foremost, question of the Pacific, as affecting sea power, therefore, is the fiUing-up of the now partly vacant regions, our own Pacific coast, with that of the British Empire in Canada and in Australasia, by a population of European derivation. It is most desirable that such immigration should be from northern Europe, be- cause there is fotmd the stock temperamentally most consonant to the local institutions; but, from whencesoever coming, immigrants to all the regions named will find awaiting them settled forms of govern- ment, differing from one another much in details and somewhat in views, but all derived ultimately i6i ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION from the traditional ideals which we call Anglo- Saxon, to which we who have inherited them are apt to attach peculiar value and virtue. Let us not forget that the roots can be traced to the old days when the Angles and the Saxons really dwelt on the east side of the North Sea, before they found a new home in England. Thus long continuity of existence, power of development, faculty to adapt themselves to many differing circumstances of en- vironment, as well as to absorb and to assimilate alien elements, have given a proof of their excellence more decisive than the perhaps too partial estimate of those who hve under them. That the Panama Canal can affect the rapid peopling of the American Pacific coasts is as evident as it is to be desired. That a ship-load of immi- grants can be carried through relatively quiet seas direct to the Pacific ports, without the tiresome and expensive transcontinental journey by rail, will be an inestimable contribution toward overcoming the problems of distribution and of labor. It wiU dis- perse also the threatenkig question of Asiatic im- migration to the northern Pacific coasts by filling up the groimd — ^the only perfectly soimd provision for the future. No European labor element thinks of emigrating to Asia, for the land there is already overcrowded. Were conditions reversed, Asiatic governments and working-men would feel the same objection as is now felt throughout the American Pacific to an abundant influx of laborers of wholly 162 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER different traditions, who do not assimilate socially and cannot be assimilated politically. Here is no question of superiority or inferiority of race, the in- trusion of which simply draws a misleading trail across the decisive reason, which is the fundamental distinctions of origin and of historical development. Already, scarcely a month after the new treaty with Japan was confirmed, the attempt has been again made thus to confuse the issue, if the quotation from a Japanese periodical is to be accepted.^ The question is one of age-long differences, proceeding from age-long separations, producing variations of ideas which do not allow intermingling, and conse- quently, if admitted, are ominous of national weak- ness through flaws in homogeneity. The radical difference between the Oriental and the Occidental, which is constantly insisted upon, occasions in- compatibility of close association in large numbers for the present, and for any near future. The existing tendency of immigration to seek our Pacific coast is seen from the recent census, which shows that those States have progressed in popula- tion to a greater extent, proportionately, than most other parts of the cotmtry. WhUe, however, such ' The Japanese American Commercial Weekly, quoted in the New York Tribune, March 27, 191 1. " The present understanding with regard to Japanese inunigration will be adhered to by the Japanese government with all its sincerity. Yet there is no denying the fact that the Japanese people in general are not satisfied with the arrangement. They cannot help feeling that they are not receiving fair treatment from the American government; that the exclusion agreement stamps upon them the stigma of inferiority." (My Italics.) 163 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION result is indicative of tendency, it must be remem- bered that ratio of increase does not prove corre- sponding absolute gain; fifty per cent, on one thou- sand only equals twenty-five on two thousand. The Pacific coast States are still scantily peopled. Thus Washington contains 17 persons to the square mUe, Oregon 7, California 15; whereas New York has 191 and Ohio 117.^ The result of such condi- tions, where no artificial obstacle intervenes, is seen in Hawaii. These islands geographically be- long to the American continent, being distant from it only 2,100 nules, whereas they are 3,400 from Japan, the nearest part of Asia; yet a plurality of the pop- ulation is Japanese, from an immigration which began only forty years ago. The political — inter- national — ^result may not improbably be traced in the well-known intimation of the Japanese govern- ment to that of the United States in 1897 that it could not see without concern the aimexation of the islands. If the local needs which caused this condi- tion had occurred after the opening of the Canal, the required labor could have been introduced from southern Europe,^ which is now furnishing an ex- cellent element to Cuba. In such case Hawaii as a naval base would have received a reinforcement of military strength, in a domiciled poptilation of European derivation and traditions. The Hawaiian group is an outpost of the United > Census of 1910. •As it is, there are over 15,000 Portuguese in the islands. 164 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER States of first importance to the security of the Pacific coast; but its situation is one of peculiar exposure. During the eighteenth century Great Britain at Gibraltar held the entrance of the Medi- terranean successfully against all comers; but in the same period she twice lost Minorca, an outpost lijse Hawaii, because the navy was too heavily en- gaged in the Atlantic, and the land forces elsewhere, to afford relief. In case of the fall of Pearl Harbor, where the defense of Hawaii is concentrated, an enemy temporarily superior to the United States in local naval force would become possessed of a forti- fied permanent base of operations withinhalf-steaming distance of the Pacific shore. On that shore, infurther- ance of his designs, he could establish temporary de- pots for coaling and repairs; as Japan in the recent war did at the Elliott Islands, sixty miles from Port Arthur, then the decisive objective of her military and naval operations. Such advanced temporary positions need a permanent base not too far distant, such as the Japanese home ports Sasebo and Kure afforded the EUiott Islands, and as Pearl Harbor in the instance considered would to a navy resting upon it. But if Pearl Harbor should hold out successfully, a superior American fleet on arrival finds there a secure base of operations, which with its own com- mand of the water, due to its superior strength, enables it to neutralize and tiltimately to over- throw any system of operations or attack resting on i6s ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION improvised bases and inferior fleet force. One has only to imagine the effect upon the Japanese land operations in Manchuria if Rozhestvensky had de- stroyed Togo's fleet and so established control of the water between Japan and Manchuria. The same line of reasoning applies to Corregidor Island, in Manila Bay, qualified by the greater distance of the Philippines from America. The Pacific coast of America is less thickly popu- lated, less extensively developed, than the Atlantic. Labor there is dearer, and the local coal as yet dis- tinctly inferior for naval purposes to Eastern coal, necessitating sending fuel there. All upon which a fleet depends for vitality is less abundant, less cheap, and therefore more remote. These economical rea- sons, until qualified by military urgency, render ex- pedient the maintenance of the fleet in the Atlantic. Division of it is forbidden by military considerations, in that it is too small; the half is weaker than any probable enemy. At present, not less than four months would be required for the battle-fleet to reach Pearl Harbor in effective condition. With the Canal, less than four weeks would be necessary. These considerations affect the time that Pearl Harbor needs to hold out, and illustrate the military gain from the Canal; but they do not affect in any sense the necessity for a superior navy. Canal or no canal, if a fleet be distinctly inferior, it can pro- tect the coast committed to its charge only to a limited degree and for a limited time, tmless it can i66 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER reverse the balance by professional skill. The pro- fessional skill may be forthcoming — it is the affair of the commander-in-chief — ^but real naval security is original superiority of force, and that is the affair of the nation represented in Congress. The great English-speaking colonies of Australia and New Zealand will be less immediately and directly affected as to populating by the Panama Canal; but its influence upon Pacific America, in- cluding Hawaii, cannot be a matter of small im- portance to communities which share with equal fervor the determination that their land shall be peopled by men of Etu-opean antecedents. This identity of feeling on the subject of Asiatic immigra- tion between Australia and the North American Pa- cific, both inheritors of the same political tradi- tion, is certain to create political sympathies, and may drag into a common action the nations of which each forms a part. This particular determination, in the midst of that recent prevalent unrest which is called the Awakening of the East, is probably the very largest factor in the future of the Pacific, and one which eventually will draw in most of the West- European nations in support of their present posses- sions in the East. Immediately north of Australia, barricading it, as it were, from west to east, is a veritable Caribbean of European tropical posses- sions — Sumatra, Java, to New Gtiinea — distributed between Germany, Great Britain, and Holland; while immediately north of them again come the 12 167 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION Philippines under American administration. It is needless to say that support to such distant de- pendencies means military sea power; but it is less obvious, tmtil heeded, that the tendency will impart a common object — a solidarity of interest — ^which may go far toward composing present rivalries and jealousies in Europe. To none, however, can this interest be so vital as to Great Britain, because Australasia is not to her a dominion over alien races, as India is, and as are most European possessions in the East. The Australians and New-Zealanders are her own flesh and blood; and, should the ques- tion of support to them arise, the Panama Canal offers an alternative route not greatly longer to east- em Australia, and shorter by over twelve hundred miles to New Zealand. It is, however, in the de- veloped power of Pacific America, including Canada, that Australia in the future will find the great signifi- cance of the Panama Canal. The question of immigration is now engaging the aroused attention of the new ' ' Labor ' ' government in Australia. Equally with otu: own Pacific slope, peopling will be there a large influence in the sea power of the Pacific. The question is felt to be urgent, because much of the vast territory of Aus- tralia is empty. Excluding aborigines, the popvda- tion is less than two to the square mile. In New Zealand the proportion is only nine. The huge tropical district in Australia known as the Northern Territory, with an area of 523,620 square miles, con- 168 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER tains but one thousand whites. After a seeming attempt to coddle the labor question, to sustain high wages by discouraging immigration, Australia is awaking to the untenable and perilous situation in which a people is placed when seeking to hold a great inheritance which they neither occupy nor by ntimbers can develop. It matters not for the moment whence the danger may come. From some quarter it will, soon or late— probably soon. Over- crowded millions not far off wiU not look indefinitely upon open pastures denied them only by a claim of pre-emption. An abundant population in pos- session is at once a reason and a force. To those who do not follow passing events which seem remote from ourselves, it should be of interest to recall — ^for it is cognate to our subject — ^that the still recent year 1910 witnessed the visit to Australia and New Zealand of Lord Kitchener, the greatest military organizer and most distinguished British soldier now in active service. The object desired by the colonial governments was that a scheme of defense based upon territory, poptdation, and resources should be devised, after personal examina- tion, by the man who, as commander-in-chief in India, had recast comprehensively the military sys- tem upon which rests the defense of three hundred millions of people, and of a territory which in area is a continent. The broad details of his recom- mendations have been made known ' through the press, but are not here material. It is sufficient to 169 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION say that, since his departure, a new "Labor" government of the commonwealth has come into power, and in all decisive particulars has adopted his plan. The nature of the popular preponderance behind this government is suflficiently indicated by the name — Labor. It is the first since the organiza- tion of the Commonwealth — ^the union of the several states — that has possessed a homogeneous working majority; and it is significant of the future that the first care of a labor ministry has been to provide an efficient military organization, and to entertain meas- ures for the development of a railway system which shall minister not only to economical development, but to national military security. In introducing the necessary legislation the Min- ister of Defense, after fully adopting Lord Kitchen- er's scheme, "attacked those who placed faith in arbitration." He declared "that Australia would refuse to arbitrate about Asiatic exclusion, and must be prepared to maintain its own laws against attack. If any one asked why the Labor party was especially keen on military matters, the answer was that the proposed social and industrial reforms of the party required freedom from disturbance, which they must effectively secure."^ In the Australian press of the following day, quoted in telegrams to the London Times, no dissent from this speech is noted. ' ' The reception accorded to the bill indicates a complete severance of the question from party 1 The Mail (tri-weekly London Times), August 19, 1910. 170 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER politics. It is assured of an vintroubled passage through both houses."^ It is not difficult here to note the identity of tone with that of the Pacific slope of the United States and of Canada, to the frequent embarrassment of both central governments. It is increasing in im- perativeness in British Columbia, is extending thence eastward to Alberta and Saskatchewan, and is felt even as far as Winnipeg. Use the phrase "national honor," "vital interests," or what you will, there are popular sentiments and determinations which defy every argument but force. It is the failure to note these which vitiates much of the argument for arbitration. Such sentiments, on both sides, are large factors to be taken into account in the forecast of the future of sea power in an ocean one of whose shores is Asiatic, the other European in derivation. The Panama Canal will tend to link the several English-speaking communities affected by these feelings, and to emphasize their solidarity; not least by the greater nearness which it will give the North American districts to the more thickly settled, and consequently more 'powerful, Atlantic regions with which they are politically united. Debatable grotmd, undeveloped occupation, such as exists in them all, is from this particular point of view an especial source of weakness. In none of them, and especially in Australia and New Zealand, is the population proportionate to the soU. The garrison is not 1 The Mail, August 22, 1910, 171 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION commensurate to the extent of the walls. Hence immigration becomes a pressing question; and in Australia radical land legislation to break up huge unimproved holdings, and so to facilitate agricul- tural immigration, is a prominent feature in pros- pective legislation. This state of things is a matter of constmimate moment, and will compel the sympathy of American Pacific communities with peoples who discern a common danger, and who share a common political tradition. This weakness explains also the evident closer attachment of Australasia than of Canada to the mother-country. Not only is there no alien element, like the French Canadian, but there is far greater exposure and sense of dependence, such as our own ancestors felt when Canada was French. Here enters the sea power of Great Britain into the Pacific with an urgency even greater than that of commercial gain. It is there a question of keeping her own. So far as Australia is weak in numbers, she is proportionately dependent upon power at sea to prevent those numbers from having to encounter overwhelming odds on shore. In this, her case re- sembles that of the British Islands themselves. She has shown sense of that dependence by the adop- tion of naval measures much more virile than those which in Canada are meeting opposition; but at best her resoturces are not sufficient, and dependence on the mother-cotmtry will be for a long time in- evitable, 173 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER The appositeness of these preparations of Aus- tralia — and of New Zealand — ^has been emphasized recently by the resolute persistence of Germany in augmenting materially her naval programme. The latest measures voted, May, 191 2, add three heavy battle-ships to the projected total, making forty-one in aU; raise the number in active commission from sixteen to twenty-five; and increase the personnel by over fifteen thousand men, which when realized will give a total of over seventy-five thousand. Lord Kitchener is quoted' as saying: "It is an axiom of the British government that the existence of the empire depends primarily upon the main- tenance of adequate and efficient naval forces. As long as this condition is fulfilled, and as long as British superiority at sea is assured, then it is an accepted principle that no British dominion can be successfully and permanently conquered by an or- ganized invasion from oversea." The remark was addressed to Australia specifically, and accompanied with the admonition that a navy has many preoc- cupations; that it may not be able immediately to repair to a distant scene of action; and that therefore the provision of local defense, both by forts and mobile troops, is the correlative of naval defense. This impedes and delays an invader, lessens his ad- vance and the injury possible, and so expedites and diminishes the task of the navy, when this, having established preponderance elsewhere, is able * The Mail, April 18, 1910. ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION to appear in force upon the distant waters of a re- mote dependency. It will be recognized that the result here stated is that predicated from the arrival of a superior Amer- ican fleet at Hawaii. What is true, of a territory so distant from Great Britain as Australia is doubly true of the relations of the American navy to its two coasts, the Pacific and the Atlantic, of which the Gulf coast in this connection may be regarded accurately as an extension. In the eye of the navy the three are parts of one whole, of which the link, the neck of the body, will be the Canal — as Australia is not merely a remote dependency, but a living member of the British Empire. There is, however, a vital difference between a member and the trunk. Ampu- tation of the one may consist with continued life, as Great Britain survived the loss of her Amercan colonies; but the mutilation of the tnink means, at the best, life thenceforward on a lower plane of vigor. The military, or strategic, significance of the Panama Canal, therefore, is that it will be the most vital chord in that system of transference by which the navy of the United States can come promptly to the support on either coast of the local defenses; which it is to be presumed will be organized as Australia contemplates, even though the presump- tion be over-sanguine, in view of our national ig- norant self-complacency. With a competent navy, and with the Panama Canal secured, not merely as to tenure, but with guns of such range as to insure J74 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER deployment in the open sea at either end — a necessary condition of all sea-coast fortification — ^invasion will not be attempted, for it can lead to no adequate results. It is continually asserted that no invasion of the United States will ever be attempted, because con- quest is not possible. Conquest of a fully poptilated territory is not probable; but dismemberment, such as the instance of France deprived of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany, or more recently of Bosnia and Herzegovina taken from Turkey by Austria, is possible. In the latter case, Turkey, Russia, and all Europe were silenced by arms two years ago. What is more within the scope of possibility is the exaction from defeat of terms well-nigh unendurable. An Australian^ has recently said, "We recognize well that if the British navy be once overthrown, a condi- tion of peace will be that its present power shall not be restored." Vae victis. Defeat of the Amer- ican navy, followed by a prolonged tenure of parts of American territory, which would then be feasible, might be followed by a demand to give up the Monroe Doctrine, to abandon Panama, to admit immigration to which either our government or a large part of our population objects, and on no ac- count to attempt the re-establishment of a military or naval force which could redeem such consequences. So Rome forever disabled Carthage in the conflict between those two alien and rival civilizations. ' Sir George Reid, the High Commissioner for Australia in Great Britain. The Mail, July 8, 1910. ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION So much for national defense, the first of military objects because it is the foundation on which na- tional action securely depends. But in actual war- fare the defensive in itself is ineffectual, and use- ful only as the basis from which the offensive, technically so styled, is exerted. So in a general scheme of national poUcy, assured security at home is above all valuable by enabling a government to be effectively firm and influential in its support of its external commercial interests, of its necessary poUcies, and of its citizens abroad. The frequent impatient disclaimer of such interests, of such pol- icies, and of the necessity of power — ^not necessarily the use of force — ^to insure them, simply ignores, not the past only, but current contemporary history. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs has spoken recently, in a public utterance, of "the ever-increas- ing part which diplomacy is called upon to play in the commercial activity of nations." American enterprise and American capital are seeking every- where lawful outlets and employments. There are many competitors from many other nations; and all governments make it now part of their business to insist on the lawful admission of their own people, and in many cases to obstruct the intrusion of rivals. The Pacific in its broad extent and upon its coasts contains some of the most critical, because least settled, of these questions. Besides the ancient Asi- atic peoples on its western shores, all the principal European states possess therein colonies and naval 176 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER stations; consequently are possible parties to the as yet remote final adjustments. America in the Phil- ippines has in the Pacific that which she may not call her own possession, but has recognized as her especial charge. The Panama Canal will be the gateway to the Eastern Pacific, as Suez is to the Western. It will lie in territory over which the United States has jurisdiction as complete^ except in the cities of Colon and Panama, as over its other national domains. It is entitled to protection equally with all others; and far more than most, not on its own account chiefly, but because of its vital consequence to all three coasts, and to their communications. This consequence rests upon its being the only link be- tween them, enabling the United States to concen- trate the fleet with the greatest rapidity upon any threatened or desired point. In nothing is general importance, national importance, as contrasted with local, more signally illustrated than it is in the Canal and in the navy. Nowhere are considerations of local advantage more out of place and discred- itable than in dealing with these two great factors of national security and dignity. Their combined effect, so essential to defense, is no less important to the influence of the country throughout the Pacific Ocean. I say, influence ; not supremacy, a word which my whole tone of thought rejects. How large a part China, for instance, has played in our international policy of the last decade is easy to recall ; nor is there 177 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION room to deny ovir interest in her, or her look toward us and toward others at the present moment. Even in Great Britain, by formal treaty the ally of Japan, and now in entente with Russia, anxiety concerning the future in Korea and Manchuria is shown, and not without cause. In brief conclusion. Sea Power, like other elements of national strength, depends ultimately upon popula- tion — ^upon its numbers and its characteristics. The great effect of the Panama Canal will be the indefinite strengthening of Anglo-Saxon institutions upon the northeast shores of the Pacific, from Alaska to Mexico, by increase of inhabitants and consequent increases of shipping and commerce. To this will contribute that portion of present and future local production in the North American continent which will find cheaper access to the Atlantic by the Canal than by the existing transcontinental or Great Lakes routes. An official of the Canadian Pacific Railway has stated recently, before the London Chamber of Commerce, that even now British manufactures find their way to British Columbia by the Suez Canal ; how much more by Panama, when that canal becomes available! If manufactures, then immigrants; and equally, for it is facility of transportation which determines both. The effect, he estimated, would extend inland to the middle of Saskatchewan, seven or eight hundred miles from the Pacific coast; and his plea was for British immigration as well as for British trade, to offset the known inrush ^8 PANAMA CANAL AND SEA POWER from the western part of the United States. Whether American or English, there will be increase of Euro- pean population. This development of the northeast Pacific will have its correlative in the distant south- west, in the kindred commonwealths of Australia and New Zealand; the effect of the Canal upon these being not direct, but reflected from the increased political force and military potentiality of com- munities in sympathy with them on the decisive question of immigration. The result will be to Europeanize these great districts; in the broad sense which recognizes the European derivation of American poptilations. The Western Pacific will remain Asiatic, as it should. The question awaiting and approaching solution is the line of demarcation between the Asiatic and European elements in the Pacific. The considera- tions advanced appear to indicate that it will be that joining Puget Sound and Vancouver with Australia. It is traced roughly through intervening points, of which Hawaii and Samoa are the most conspicuous; but there are outposts of the European and American tenure in positions like the Marshall and Caroline Islands, Guam, Hongkong, Kiao Chau, and others, just as there are now European possessions in the Caribbean Sea, in Bermuda, in Halifax, remains of past conditions. The extensive district north of Australia, the islands of Sumatra, Java, Borneo, New Guinea, and others, while Asiatic in popula- tion, are, like India, European in political control. 179 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION During the period of adjustment, needed for the de- velopment of Pacific America and Australasia, naval power, the military representative of sea power, will be determinative. The interests herein of Great Britain and of the United States are preponderant and coincident. By force of past history and pres- ent possessions the final decision of this momentous question will depend chiefiy upon them, if concurring. Meantime, and because of this, the American navy should be second to none but the British. To this the American may properly cede superiority, because to the British Islands naval power is vital in a sense in which it is not to the United States. VIII WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL ? In approaching the question of fortif3dng the Panama Canal it is well to remember at once that the Canal Zone, with the qualified exceptions of the cities of Colon and Panama, is United States terri- tory. In the treaty of cession there is a clause pro- viding for the extradition of offenders between the Zone and the Republic of Panama. Being, there- fore, territory rather than property, to ask guaran- tees of neutrality from foreign states is to constitute a kind of protectorate over ourselves. This would contravene also our traditional policies, by inviting the participation of non-American states in the as- suring of American conditions; a lapse the more grievous when it is remembered that the Zone has become ours by acquisition from another American commonwealth. How strenuously the nation re- sented co-partnership in the affairs of the Isthmus is testified by the whole history of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty; a resentment which verged so closely on bitterness during the final twenty years of the discussion as to be a warning against any recon- stitution of similar conditions. We should have i8i ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION perpetual discussions with foreign nations about American affairs, such as have enlivened, and not sweetened, much of Great Britain's occupancy of Egypt. It is also to be remembered that, besides being American soil, the Panama Canal Zone cannot be looked upon as an isolated position such as the Philippines. The loss of the Philippines by war, as a material result, would be to us like the loss of a little finger, perhaps of a single joint of it. The Philippines to us are less a property than a charge. The Canal Zone, on the contrary, must be regarded in its geographical and military relations — ^the two adjectives are in this connection almost identical — ^to the United States as a whole and to other specific American stations. In discussing the question of the advisability of fortifying the Zone, and especially the two entrances, or exits, it is to be said at once that I represent only myself. I speak for the opinions of no one else. I am entirely aware that there is a school of naval opinion, respectable in numbers as in other qualities, though I believe a minority, which so subordinates the question of fortification to that of the numbers of the fieet as to assert practically the needlessness of fortification. I myself have been taxed by a promi- nent exponent of this school in Great Britain with derehction from my own position as an advocate of sea power, because of my strong insistence upon the general necessity for fortified seaports, as es- 182 WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL? sential to the fleet's freedom of movement. What- ever dereliction there may seem to have been was coincident with the first formtolation of my views upon sea power. Full twenty years ago I wrote, and I repeat with the conviction of the years since past: "Navies do not dispense with fortifications nor with armies; but, when wisely handled, they may save their country the strain which comes when these have to be called into play."^ Upon the general question of sea-coast fortifica- tion, as distinct from the special question of fortify- ing the Panama Canal, the reasons why fortification is an essential complement of a navy are twofold. Sea-coast fortification supplies a navy with fortified bases, strictly analogous to the fortresses which are the home bases, or to the temporarily fortified posi- tions, which are the advanced bases, of an army in campaign. To argue the advantage — ^nay, the need — of these would be to discuss military art from its foundation. It is sufficient to say that aU military history testifies to it. One of the most distinguished of the opponents of the first Napoleon said, "An army which has to insure the protection of unfortified bases is crippled in all its movements." In a naval cam- paign the navy is the mobile army — ^in the field. It, too, requires bases concerning the sectirity of which it need feel no apprehension. The second office of sea-coast fortification is that * The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire. Vol. I, p. 341. 13 183 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION of simple protection. It is gravely argued that, because a recent international stipulation provides that unfortified seaports shaU not be bombarded, therefore protection is unnecessary and even in- expedient. I prestune the stipulation applies to all forms of military protection — submarine-mines, and so forth; and it is a natural deduction that it similarly applies to any form of military force oppos- ing possession. That is, a hostile navy, or expedi- tion, may not bombard an unprotected port, but it may take possession of it ; and if the act be resisted, or recovery attempted, all military rights revive — bombardment included, if necessary. If this be so, and it seems strictly logical, the neglect to fortify can apply only to those points the occupation of which by an enemy is a matter of indifference to the country. There doubtless are many such. It is the province of a scheme of sea-coast fortification imder joint army and navy supervision to deter- mine which these are, and the relative claims of those where defense is needed. An undefended neu- trality of the Canal Zone would forbid an enemy's bombarding; but it would not deter him from oc- cupying if at war with the United States, because the position is too valuable not to be secured, if possible. To apply these general considerations to the specific case of the Panama Canal. What will be the value of the Canal to the United States, and, in- cidentally, to the United States navy? Primarily, and above all, it will be the most important link in 184 WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL? the line of communications between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts. There is throughout the whole length and extension of our sea-coast, from Maine to Puget Sound, no single position or reach of water comparable to Panama in this respect. Communica- tions, the free access to an army to its source of supplies — or, rather, the free passage of supplies to it — ^and the ability of one part of the army to reach the other for material support, or of the whole to move to any particular point of a theater of war — communications, in this sense, are the most impor- tant factor in war. Communications dominate war in all its aspects. On a battle-field the con- nection of the several divisions of an army must be such that an enemy cannot break through. Ad- vancing in campaign, the relations of army corps to each other must be such that they can unite before the enemy attacks either in force. Concentration, of which we hear so much, and so justly, means simply communications so preserved as to enable the whole to Uve and the parts to unite betimes. What is the meaning of the well-known urgency of the Pacific coast population that the government divide the battle-fleet, sending one-half to that coast? This would be the most entirely suicidal act that could be contemplated. The wish proceeds from an uneasy sense that the whole may not be able to reach the Pacific betimes, in case of the sudden outbreak of a Pacific war. In other words, they are tmeasy about the commvmications, although very possibly the word i8s ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION in that sense is as foreign to them as is any reasoned knowledge of warfare. The absence of such knowl- edge is evident in this desire for division, which ignores the recent destruction in detail of the Rus- sian navy in the war with Japan. The question of fortifying the Canal, therefore, is the question of preserving an essential line of naval communications. But, it will be replied, you beg the question; the navy wtU protect its own com- munications, the Canal not least. WiU, then, the navy be tied to the Canal, or will it protect it by a big detachment, by dividing its numbers while the bulk of the fleet goes to some other assigned duty? Yes, it is replied, the money spent for fortifications, which are immobile, will be given to ships, which, though mobile, will remain for defense of the Canal, and yet, if required, can go to reinforce the fleet. Just so; if required, they will go away. One ad- vantage of fortifications is that, being estabUshed in moments of calm consideration, they cannot be moved in moments of real or panicky pressure. A primary charge of Nelson for the naval defense of Great Britain, when invasion was feared, was that the "block ships," floating forts, established on a reasoned scheme, should on no account be moved in an apparent emergency. He recognized the danger which permanent fortification obviates. Moreover, to use active vessels for stationary defence is to lock up mobile force in an inferior effort. "To decrease oiu: cruisers at sea by commissioning vessels for i86 WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL? harbor defense," said St. Vincent, second only to Nelson, "will be a step that can lead only to otir ruin." It is often argued that, because an enemy intend- ing the invasion of a country situated as the United States is must primarily possess a competent navy, therefore, the best defense against invasion on either large or small scale is a mobile navy. This is perfectly true, and applies with equal or greater force to the maintenance of oversea dependencies, such as Hawaii, Guantanamo, the Philippines, and the Canal Zone. A navy at least equal to that of the enemy is essential to their preservation, but it does not foUow that the navy must be immediately present at either or all. A navy does not protect by local presence, but by action upon the lines of communication; that is, upon the sea. Hence fallacy enters with the further assertion that all money spent on fortifications had better be spent on ships. The question is one of proportion. Coast fortification may be pushed, at times has been pushed, to an extravagant extent. But for the defense of points the tenure of which is essential to military operations — ^the operations of a fleet — ^fixed works are better than floating because they secure the same aggregate gtm defense at much less cost ; or, if you prefer it so stated, much greater defensive strength for the same cost. In addition to the fact that they cannot be moved under popular apprehension, — such as kept the Flying Squadron in Hampton Roads during the war with Spain, a meas- 187 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION ure which would have cost the country dear with a more active enemy, — ^gims in forts cost far less, under normal conditions, than those in ships. Forts need no floating power, no motive machinery, no long storage of fuel. Moreover, they are less vulnerable; for the solidity of the ground permits the accumula- tion of armor or other protective covering, ind they have not to dread the submarine or the floating mine. Gtms on board ships are also necessarily massed within the length of the ship, presenting a concen- trated target; whereas on shore they may be dis- persed indefinitely, and largely concealed, which is the modem practice. For such reasons, whUe ves- sels have usually been able to run by forts through an unobstructed channel, the same amount of artillery in ships has rarely been able to stand up against forts. Even with superior fire, ships have been able to dominate landworks only under peculiar conditions, which the all-big-gun ship does not pos- sess; namely, the conditions of very rapid fire from very numerous pieces at very close range. No one is going to take a ten-million-dollar battle-ship over an unexplored mine-field to get near the same nimiber of guns ashore ; nor will it be attempted to engage at a distance, because the ship is much more open to fatal injury by a chance shot than a landwork is. Besides the two Japanese battle-ships destroyed by Russian mines, a third, the Asahi, very narrowly escaped being struck by a shell which might well have caused serious i88 WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL? injury. The forts were not seriously hurt by naval bombardment; and it may profitably be remembered that the work of repairing the battle-ships injured by the first torpedo attack was carried on in Port Arthur during the period in which the Japanese naval bom- bardments occiirred. Granting, then, that the United States intends to make sure of the use of the Canal in war, fortification wiU insure that especial end more cheaply, with less danger of losing the position, than the same amoimt of money expended in war-ships, unless there are abnormal peculiarities of the ground of which I have not heard. President Taft, in a public speech, has stated that the estimated cost is $12,000,- 000 — ^less than that of two completed battle-ships. It is to be taken for granted that the Board of Forti- fication, checked as it should be by a naval repre- sentation, win not pile Ossa on Pelion in needless multiplication of defenses, but will have a due re- gard to the fundamental fact that the defenses exist for the Canal, and not the Canal for the sake of being defended. That is, it will be remembered that from the broad military point of view, which includes the entire military estabHshment of the country as a composite whole — ^army, navy, coast defense — the value of the Canal is not its impregnability as a position, but its usefulness to the navy as the offen- sive defender of the whole national coast-line — Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific. Some fifteen or twenty years ago the then senior 189 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION British naval officer at Gibraltar said to me, laughing : "The army fellows boast that they have so fixed things that the place cannot be taken; but I tell them, what does it matter whether Gibraltar be taken or not, unless its docks, stores, and anchorage are equally secured for the fleet?" Nothing what- ever; it would be a barren possession. Yet its his- tory from its capture in 1704, then merely for a naval base, to the present day has demonstrated that the fortified impregnability of the Rock of Gibraltar has been a main factor in that supremacy of the British navy in the Mediterranean which has largely shaped modem history. The Panama Canal has a still closer relation to the Pacific, the history of which is yet to make. Mere defense is a poor thing; it is chiefly as con- ducive to liberating the offensive arm that it has military value. If ports are reasonably secure, the navy acts freely; if not, or if the people think not, a clamor wiU arise, as during our war with Spain, for ships to be scattered everywhere to de- fend; emasculating or neutralizing the fleet. The Panama Canal duly fortified wiU be a defensive provision which wiU permit the American navy to leave it to itself for a measurable period — ^as the British fleet historically has left Gibraltar and Malta. It also will enable the fleet to issue upon either ocean in effective order. It is to be remembered that one of the requirements of a fortified port is that it should cover the fleet while going out, through the always 190 WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL? critical period during which it has to pass from the order imposed by the narrowness of a channelway to that which it wishes to assume for action. This corresponds to the deployment of an army from the relatively narrow roads, over which it has been advancing, into the alignments of an estabUshed order of battle that may extend over many features of country impracticable for marching. In column, undeployed, the fleet, if handicapped by the ground, as is usual near ports, has but partial use of its guns, and the rear vessels support the leaders imperfectly, or not at all. Under such circumstances an equal enemy is for the moment superior, and momentary superiority properly improved becomes permanent. This is the art of war in a nutshell. Guns on *shore either will prevent the enemy from improving such an opportunity, or at least will impose such caution and such distant fire as greatly to reduce it. No fleet will readily encounter shore guns when it expects immediately afterward to meet an equal of its own kind. This consideration applies also in measure to the maintenance of the neutrality of the Canal, which the United States guarantees. Our possession ex- tends over the conventional three-mile limit to sea- ward. Within that distance the United States is responsible to any belligerent which may be at- tacked there by its opponent. We may, of course, "take it out of" the aggressor by any retaliation we please, up to and including making war upon him; 191 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION but our responsibility to the sufferer is not thereby removed. In these days of excessive long range the temptation to a fleet lying outside the three- mile limit to open upon one changing its array within it may transcend control. The knowledge that in such case shore guns could open would be a de- terrent. Men are too prompt to assume scrupulous respect for neutrality. That it wiU be disregarded is — ^has been — ^asserted to be "unthinkable." As a matter of fact, the temptation to shave the line exists in this as it does in matters of more strictly legal obligation; and it is well known what shaving the line too often ends in. Under temptation, neutrality undefended has fared no better. A fleet lying at anchor may be respected; but, when coming out, is a change of order to one for battle to be con- sidered a belligerent act justifying attack? How will it appear to the judgment of the outside com- mander? Certainly the one inside will not cross the three-mile limit undeployed, if he can manoeuver within. At this moment the proposed fortification of Flushing by Holland is accotmted for in the public opinion of Europe only by the purpose of preventing a British force, naval or military, from proceeding up the Scheldt, the entrance of which would thus be commanded. This would close the easiest route by which Great Britain could maintain the neutrality of Belgium, as she is bound by guarantee to do. It has been said that the Panama Canal Zone is not to be looked upon as isolated, but in its re- 192 WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL? lations to other American conditions. This is true in any scheme of coast defense, and emphatically in that of a country with two sea frontiers as widely separated from each other as our Atlantic and Pacific, The primary value of Panama is that already indicated, of a connecting-link. In this sense it falls rather under the head of defensive ports; the preservation of the Isthmus as a link being precedent in importance to operations based upon it as a position. It is only in case of war simultaneously in both oceans that it woidd receive peculiar offensive value. As an offensive base Panama is less eligible than Guantanamo, which is at present one of the most valuable strictly military positions in the possession of the United States. New York, Guantanamo, and the Canal, analyzed severally and collectively from the military point of view, present a very notable triad of positions. Should a nation having a navy somewhat superior to the American desire, in case of war, to obtain the Isthmus — ^a wish in no wise "imthinkable," seeing the value of the position, seeing also that Great Britain did seize and still retains Gibraltar, and Germany did compel the cession of Kiao Chau — if the Canal Zone be properly fortified it will be bet- ter defended by an inferior navy at Guantanamo than at the Isthmus; because Guantanamo as a position flanks all communications to the Isthmus through the Caribbean Sea, while also covering those of the Gulf of Mexico and, in measure, those of the 193 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION Atlantic coast. In a foreign attempt to reduce the Canal Zone, an inferior American fleet at the Isthmus would be like the Russian at Port Arthur, where, being retained close to the central effort of the war, the Japanese main fleet readily checked Russian naval movements by occupying a position in which it at the same time covered the operations and communications of the Japanese armies in Manchuria and before Port Arthur. At Guantanamo an equivalent Amer- ican fleet would be as the Russian if it had been concentrated at "Vladivostok. There the Japanese navy could have checked the threat to Japanese sea communications only by removing bodily to the neighborhood of the port, thus exposing the mari- time communications of their armies to harassment by cruisers acting singly or in small squadrons. It remains true, however, that while such would be the better position for a navy sUghtly inferior, permanent inferiority means inevitably ultimate defeat, which fortification can only delay., Gibraltar itself was saved only by the British navy maintain- ing its communications; but its fortifications ob- tained time to act for the navy, handicapped by many other calls to many other quarters, in some of which it was often inferior. Not five years have elapsed since the "unthinkable" — ^in the eyes of many — has occurred in Europe; a treaty directly disregarded on the dictates of a pressing emergency and dis- cussion of the action refused. If the United States desires peace with security — security for its out- 194 WHY FORTIFY THE PANAMA CANAL? Ijdrig possessions like the Canal Zone, and for great national policies like the Monroe Doctrine — ^it must have a navy second to none but that of Great Britain; to rival which is inexpedient, because for many- reasons unnecessary. IX THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE In military activities the question of the utiliza- tion of the armed forces is the most critical and the most vital that confronts a nation. Utilization in war is the final stage of a progress which begins with the driU-ground, where the raw recruit is fashioned into the finished soldier, and with the workshops where crude material is converted into weapons of war. Utilization presupposes all the successive processes of organization and equipment; whereby, step by step, out of individual men are built up huge military vmits, army and army corps, battle-fleet and battle-ship, as individual in their power of intelligent corporate action as is the one man in his single existence. Thus, assuming the foundations upon which action rests, the directing authority dis- misses them out of mind, concentrating attention purely upon the problem how best to use those en- tities which organization and equipment have sup- plied. It is to a similar concentration I would here invite readers, asking them also to dismiss from their minds, as not tmder consideration, all thought of the material of war, of the antecedent processes 196 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE by which a national fleet or national army is built up; to accept each and both as being ready, with only the one question remaining: how they, or either of them, is to be used to the best advantage in war? The methods by which this result is to be reached are divided naturally tmder three heads. These, in the order of time sequence, are Movement, Strategy, and Tactics. The first of these comprises not only motion, but all the dispositions for marches and transportation of supplies which make possible the transference of armies over ground, in advance or in retreat. This function of moving armies and their trains has received the technical name Logis- tics. Various derivations have been assigned for this term; the one now generally accepted is from a Greek word, the root idea of which is "calculation." It is not necessary to enlarge upon the complications of detail involved in moving huge bodies of men, with their supply-trains, by calculated progress, stage by stage; including each day's march, each day's halt, each day's meals, over roads in any case re- latively narrow. All this may be assumed, or left to the imagination. But it should be observed that the special characteristic of this class of operations is movement, pure and simple. The movement, it is true, is minutely organized in many intricate particulars, and therefore is truly a work of military art; but withal it is not accompanied by those par- ticular directive ideas which in strategy and tactics make movement subordinate to action, in which 197 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION movement is in itself merely contributory. In short, in logistics movement is the principal; whereas in strategy and tactics it is only an agent. In sea warfare the analogue of logistics is found, but much simplified in conception by that quality which is the distinguishing characteristic of sea forces — ^mobility. Mobility facilitates supply, as it does the movement of the fleet itself. The narrow strip of marching surface afforded even by the great- est highways is superseded by the broad bosom of the deep. The ocean presents no natural impedi- ments, few obstacles. Each ship carries stores for weeks; and at night there is no halt, no wait for food- supplies. The vessels move straight on for their goal with unwearied crews. The necessary train of supply-ships, repair-vessels, colliers, all have mobility like to that of the fleet itself. But there remains a counterbalancing factor affecting the ques- tion of sea logistics : that of sustained movement and maintenance during a campaign. Fleets more often than not operate remote from home. Consequently, the chief items of supply must traverse long sea dis- tances, under conditions of exposure exceeding the corresponding chain of supplies of an army, which in their approach are secured in large measure by the interposition of the army itself between them and the enemy; a safeguard expressively phrased in the words "covering the communications." In such case land communications may stiifer by a raid, imexpectedly and momentarily; but raids by land 198 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE are restricted in time and space by the imperfect mobility inherent in land conditions, whereas the mobility which is the prerogative of the water makes sea communications much more liable to successful harassment. It will be recognized, therefore, that the determin- ing the places of rendezvous for coal and other sup- plies, the protection of the routes, the whole question of keeping the holds and coal-bunkers full, and the several ships in best steaming condition, is a big administrative calculation and co-ordination, which is an instance of logistics because it directly affects the fleet's power of action. Nelson, by diligent watchfulness, always dtuing his last great campaign had his ships stored full for three months; usually for five. That is, the movement of his fleet, wherever he would, was assured for those periods. Wrote a contemporary to him: You have extended the powers of human action. After an tinremitting cruise of two long years in the Gulf of Lyons, to have proceeded, without going into port, to Alexandria [in Egypt], from Alexandria to the West Indies, from the West Indies back again to Gibraltar; to have kept your ships afloat, your rigging standing, and your crews in health and spirits, is an eflEort such as never was realized in former times. You have protected us for two long years, and you saved the West Indies by only a few days. This was an achievement of logistics, of movement constant and unimpaired, because of diligent pre- vision. No fighting; yet it underlay Trafalgar. 14 199 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION Yet it is very diflEerent from the battle Trafalgar, which illustrates tactics; different also from the various movements of the British and hostile fleets in the half-year before Trafalgar, in which there was abundance of motion directed toward specific points and with specific aims, covering both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The general conceptions underlying such specific aims are known as strategy; the movement of ships in furthering them was merely a contributory agent, which resulted in bringing the fleet to the scene of action. In Uke manner the movement of the ships in the battle was merely contributory, to carry out the tactical conception of the method of attack. From the outline sketch of logistics here presented it is evident that it is an immense administrative function, covering many details and requiring much system and prevision, justifying the derivation from ' ' calculation. ' ' In management, however, it is some- what deliberate, and should fall mainly upon men subordinate in office to those who guide the great military conceptions of strategy and tactics. Logis- tics is dwelt upon first because, while as vital to military success as daily food is to daily work, yet, like food, it is not the work. In this paper attention is to fasten upon the work. Like organization and equipment, logistics tmderlies achievement; but while nearer the field of battle than those are, and coincident and contemporary with the action of the field, logistics yet is not, so to say, on the fighting-line, 200 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE nor has it to do with the direction of those move- ments upon which success and victory immediately hinge. Evidently the management of such a system of movement and supply requires much experience, and also that training or instruction which in most professions precedes experience and facilitates its acquisition. Similarly, training and experience are requisite in the more advanced stages of the art of war; in strategy and tactics. And it is to be noted closely, as weU as clearly, that the object of training and instruction is not merely to mold the individual, but to impress upon each a common type, not of action only, but of the mental and moral processes which determine action; so that within a pretty wide range there will be in a school of officers a certain homogeneousness of intellectual equipment and con- viction which will tend to cause likeness of impulse and of conduct tmder any set of given conditions. The formation of a similar habit of thought, and of assurance as to the right thing to do under particular circumstances, reinforces strongly the power of co- operation, which is the essential factor in military operations. Combination and concentration, two leading ideas and objects in war, both indicate tmity of energy produced by the harmonious working to- gether — co-operation — of many parts. Obviously such harmony is not best when merely mechanical, for a mechanical mind is easily deranged in presence of the unexpected. It is the inspiration 20I ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION of common purpose and common understanding which, when the unexpected occurs, supplies the guiding thought to meet the new conditions and bend them to the common end. If this condition be ade- quately attained, the mind of the commander-in- chief will be omnipresent throughout his command; the most tmexpected circumstances will be dealt with by his subordinates in his spirit as surely as though he were present bodily. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of such a result. The captains of individual battle-ships, the commanders of the several corps of an army, have it in them to make or to mar the ptirposes of the commander-in-chief; not by disaffection, but by lack of comprehension. Lord Howe's entire plan of battle in 1794 was thus wrecked, as was Rodney's on an earlier occasion, by incapacity which previous training should have obviated. In land warfare the twin battles of Gravelotte and St. Privat, in the Franco-German War, gave illustration, one of a subordinate fully comprehending, and consequently not only executing his general's full conception, but developing it even further as opportunity arose; whereas the other, by failure to comprehend, effected merely confusion and disorder, without result. It is to supply such common understanding and inspiration that war colleges have been instituted. Those who receive the training go forth inbued with a common mode of thought, which latterly has re- ceived the name of " Doctrine." There is about this 202 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE word a suggestion of pedantry which impels to a justification for the use of it. In military operations doctrine, if not given the name, has always existed. When Nelson took his first independent command, three months before the battle of the Nile, he sum- moned his captains frequently on board his own ship, where he explained to them his proposed methods of action under many possible conditions. This was his doctrine. When the battle came off, each captain understood what he was to do and what the others were to do; and that not mechanically, but with a general idea applicable to all probable circumstances. "I should never have dared to attack as I did without knowing the men, but I was stire each would find a hole to creep in at." Each captain was possessed with the spirit and-vmder- standing of Nelson himself. In like manner before Trafalgar, the Nelson touch of which he spoke exultingly was the Nelson doctrine, imparted to the captains severally and col- lectively, and by them received enthusiastically. "It was my pleasure to find it not only generally approved, but clearly perceived and understood." Collingwood's impatient remark when Nelson made his famous last signal, "I wish Nelson would stop signaling, for we all know what we have to do," is an affirmation of "doctrine" understood. An im- perfect comprehension of Rodney's doctrine by the captain whose ship was the pivot of the operation lost the admiral what he considered the greatest op- 203 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION porttmity of his life. The aiasence of "doctrine" is shown by his words subsequently: I gave public notice that I expected implicit obedience to every signal. made. My eye on them had more dread than the enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal. In spite of themselves I taught them to be what they had never been be- fore — oflBcers. It is to be observed that the eye of the admiral had to be everywhere, just because there was among the officers no spirit of doctrine on which he could rely. The French word doctrinaire, fully adopted into English, gives warning of the danger that attends doctrine; a danger to which all useful conceptions are liable. The danger is that of exaggerating the letter above the spirit, of becoming mechanical instead of discriminating. This danger inheres es- pecially in — ^indeed, is inseparable from — ^the at- tempt to multiply definition and to exaggerate pre- cision; the attempt to make a subordinate a machine working on fixed lines, instead of an intelligent agent, imbued with principles of action, understanding the general character not only of his own movement, but of the whole operation of which he forms part; capable, therefore, of modifying action correctly to suit circumstances. "When I tell Lord Howe to do anything," wrote his senior, "he never asks how it is to be done, but goes and does it." This illus- trates the proper relation of a superior to a subor- dinate. It is not only generous, but sagacious. Hence, in the instruction of war colleges great stress 304 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE is laid upon the formulation of orders; in the par- ticular respect that while they are to convey lucidly to the subordinate the general aim of the operation, and his own specific share, with such collateral factors as are necessary for his understanding of the situation, the guidance is left in his hands. He is to be told what is to be done, not hampered with directions how to do it; because the "how" may not fit a condition he finds before him, but even more because his own power of independent initiative is too valuable a military asset to be so repressed. A curious illustration of the existence of a doctrine, among seamen not usually suspected of theorizing but considered specifically practical, is found two hundred years ago in the express order of the British Fighting Instructions that an attacking fleet was first to form on a line parallel with the enemy and then to steer down upon him, all ships together; the van to engage the enemy's van, the center the center, the rear the rear. It was a very bad doctrine ; not least bad in that it took all discretion away from every one. The one saving clause — ^unexpressed — was that a man who fights will always be approved. Contrast this with Nelson at St. Vincent. It is true he had received no doctrine from his commander- in-chief, but he had the equivalent — ^he perceived his senior's plan; and, seeing it about to fail, he broke out of the order and thwarted the enemy's attempt. Brilliant as this was in an exceptional man, it is much better that the average man should be equipped 20S ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION with the tmderstanding which would reach the same restdt through comprehension. Collingwood, a dis- tinguished example of the average man, was on this occasion close behind Nelson, in the order most favorably situated to imitate him; but he had no doctrine by which to overpass the signals. It seems self-evident that if a doctrine, as des- cribed, is to be valid to the ends of a common spirit and to foster individual power of initiative on cer- tain broad common lines, it must be not only a general principle, or set of such principles, but must be assimilated mentally through ntimerous illustra- tions. In other words, it must be based on antece- dent experience. Formulated principles, however excellent, are by themselves too abstract to sustain convinced allegiance; the reasons for them, as mani- fested in concrete cases, are an imperative part of the process through which they really enter the mind and possess the will. On this account the study of military history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice. It therefore is the basis, the corner-stone, upon which the instruc- tion of a war college rests. Historical occurrences, analyzed and critically studied, have been the curriculum through which great captains have trained their natural capacity for supreme command. They correspond to the legal cases and precedents which embody and illustrate principles, and so govern legal argument and judicial decision, the struggle and the victory of a court of law. 206 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE It is evident on consideration that military pre- cedents derived from history are chiefly valuable as embodying principles, which are to be elicited and then to be applied in circumstances often very dif- ferent. They are not mere models for a copyist. Two battles will rarely be fought on the same ground ; and were the ground the same, the constitution and numbers of the opposing forces wiU vary. A leading feature in war-college instruction, therefore, neces- sarily is the constitution of new cases, problems, hypothetical but probable, to the solution of which are to be applied the principles derived from military history. The applicatory system, as it is fitly called, is thus the superstructure, raised upon the basis of experience as embodied in historical military events. It is to be observed that this system, though artificial, reproduces closely the conditions under which mili- tary decisions have to be reached in actual war. Each situation that arises in the course of a campaign is a new case, to which the commander-in-chief ap- plies considerations derived from his own experience or from his knowledge of history. It is not meant that these applicatory processes in the field are always conscious efforts of memory, although Napoleon has said that on the field of battle the happiest inspira- tion is often only a recollection. The exercise of the functions of a trained mind is instinctive, as well in such recollection as Napoleon cited as in decisions which seem wholly personal. Said the great Aus- trian general, the Archduke Charles: 207 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION A general often does not know the circumstances upon which he has to decide until the moment in which it is necessary to proceed at once with the execution of the necessary measures. Then he is forced to judge, to decide, to act with such rapidity that it is indispensable to have the habit of embracing these three operations in a single glance. But that piercing percep- tion which takes in everything at a glance is given only to him who by deep study has sounded the nature of war; who has, so to speak, identified himself with the science. This is a tribute to the methodical training of facul- ties. Such trailing is the peculiar object of the applicatory system — ^to identify the mind and its habit of action with the art of war, by continuous exercise in dealing with numerous varied instances; a process of repetition which cannot but have the effect that habit always has upon conduct and character. The statement of this effect appeals to the experience of every one. All know how in- evitably and unconsciously one repeats the same action under similar circumstances — ^the "second nature" of the proverb. When this result has been produced in a number of men who act together, there wiU extend throughout the entire command a unity of purpose and of comprehension which to the utmost possible extent will insure co-operation, be- cause it has already insured a common understand- ing and habit of action. Thus of the renowned Light Brigade of the Peninsular War, formed under the still more renowned Sir John Moore, it is said that "the secret of its efficiency lay in inculcating correct habits of command in the regimental officers." 208 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE The system of discipline, of instraction, and of command formed in the persons of their company oflScers a body of intelli- gent and zealous assistants, capable of carrsring out the plans and anticipating the wishes of their seniors; not merely a body of docile subordinates capable of obeying orders in the letter, but untrained to resolute initiative. The most marked charac- teristics of Sir John Moore's officers were that when left alone they almost invariably did right. They had no hesitation in assuming responsibility. They could handle their regiments and companies, if necessary, as independent units; and they consistently applied the great principle of mutual support. A convenient, because recent, instance of an actual case, which might very well have been constituted as suppositive by an instructor, may be found in the circumstances and conditions of the respective military and naval forces of Japan and Russia before their still recent war. The Japanese authorities had before them the positions of the Russian prin- cipal army in Manchtiria, the fortified port of Port Arthur, the actual or estimated numbers in the field and in the garrison, the Russian main fleet in Port Arthur, the powerful detachment in Vladivostok, the Russian vessels on the way east at various points; probably also the two or three at Chemulpo, the separation of which at a moment evidently critical indicated an incaution which was doubtless re- sponsible for the exposure also of the main fleet to torpedo attack. Such observed incaution is itself a valuable factor in a military decision. The various facts here given, with the corresponding elements on the Japanese side, stated in a succinct, orderly man- ner, constitute a problem of exactly the character 209 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION hypotheticaUy assumed in a war-college problem. When stated, the query follows: Estimate the situa- tion; decide your course of action, which is styled, technically, the Decision; and for its execution for- mulate your orders to subordinates. The orders to each subordinate will state clearly the situation, the part assigned to himself, with as much informa- tion concerning the movements of others engaged in the general operation as will, or may, enable him to act intelligently. What the subordinate is to accomplish — ^his Mission — ^is made perfectly clear. How he is to do it is left to his own judgment, partly because the circumstances under which he may have to act can rarely be foreseen, chiefly because re- liance can be felt that men brought up with a com- mon vision will do the right thing. At the war college, the propounding such a problem as the one just cited has been preceded by a course of lectures by men whose previous study and ex- perience have constituted them experts. Each officer under instruction submits two papers: (i) Estimate of the situation, deduced from all the fac- tors, at the close of which is formulated a proposed course of action, which is called the Decision; (2) an order, or set of orders, for putting the decision into execution. The estimate of the situation in- volves, as a factor, a determination of the proper strategic end to be accomplished; the ultimate achievement of which end, whether at once or later, is styled the Mission. Upon this follows considera- 210 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE tion of the numbers and disposition of the enemy's forces, and of one's own, as modifying the possi- bility of immediately accomplishing the mission. Thus Mission defines the end; Decision, the practi- cable first step. If objection be taken to terms such as mission and decision — or doctrine — ^the reply is that in all technical treatment technical terms are necessary; and that, when once comprehended, they facilitate discussion, exactly as each foreign word acquired facilitates conversation. For executing the decision, orders are addressed to each subordinate for his particular part in the combination which the decision requires. Both estimates and orders are then reviewed by the in- structor, with criticism and suggestion. Ultimately there is a general discussion among all in full con- ference. Besides the elucidation which any matter receives from the deliberation in common of several minds, this discussion reacts upon the men engaged. It tends to correct errors, yes; but the great advan- tage is that principles and illustrations enter into the mind more and more through repetition, not only in the particular discussion of the varied phases of a single case, but by reiteration in many dis- cussions of many cases. For a principle, if correct, cannot but recur repeatedly, steadily deepening its grip. Similarly, reiterated instances of disaster from specific dispositions emphasize warning and give security against errors of like general character. The value of such a study as that suggested above 211 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION for the Japanese is still more recognizable, if we imag- ine it undertaken by the Russian staff a year be- fore the war began. This will illustrate the vital connection between national poUcy and military preparation. Upon this the war coUege strongly insists, and most properly has embodied in its course. International policies is one of the subjects of study. In the United States people are singularly oblivious of the close relation between peace and preparation. Outside of a few officials of the Navy Department, public opinion about naval development does not take into its reckoning any digested consideration of our international exposures. Granting that the Russian officials kept such account as they should of Japanese military and naval preparation, they would have in hand a year before the war the follow- ing data: The size, constitution, and disposition of the Japanese army; the numbers and character of the Japanese fleet; the means of transportation available to Japan. As matters of serious dispute existed, these data constituted elements in the prob- lem: how to follow the national policy and yet maintain peace? The Japanese maritime trans- portation was a large part of the logistics of Japan, as the Siberian Railroad was of that of Russia. The data mentioned, together with the numbers and dis- position of the Russian fleets and armies, formed the elements of a problem; to be formulated by a clear and succinct statement of each and all of the factors named. The same demand follows: estimate the 212 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE situation; formulate your measures to assure peace or to encounter war (which in such a case are iden- tical) ; issue the orders necessary to execute the meas- ures. If the estimate of the situation had been undertaken by officers with a competent doctrine, the Decision must have been to strengthen the fleet in the Far East; not by vessels proceeding singly — ^as was done — ^but by a division as strong as the Baltic ports could send. An estimate of the situation could not but have shown that, although the Russian navy in the aggregate was superior, the division in the Far East was not as strong as, for security, it should be. The whole navy had been divided injudiciously ; the first requisite was to reunite it by measures strategically sound, which the despatch of a string of single ships proceeding out was not. The strong naval conviction prevailing in the United States against dividing our battle-fleet between the Atlantic and the Pacific was derived from the war games of the college, testing the strategic situations resulting from such division. The war game, which has been used for many years at the war college, attacks the same class of problems as does the written "estimate of the situa- tion" and formulation of measures just described. In it the men who write the "estimates," etc., are pitted one against the other as opponents. Similar data are furnished to each : a statement of the condi- tions as far as known to his superiors — ^namely, the disposition of the forces on his side, and such ac- 213 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION count of the enemy's as may be reasonably assumed to be ascertained, but necessarily less ftiU than that of one's own. Each receives also, as from a national government, general instructions, indicating the particular service expected of his command. This is his "mission": what he is to do, not how to do it. The place of a chess or backgammon board is taken by a large map embracing the scene of operations, upon which are arranged and moved tokens, repre- senting the positions held by both sides, as well as the numbers and successive dispositions of the various forces. The game thence proceeds, move by move. The two contestants occupy separate rooms, while in a third is an umpire who pronotmces on each move ; whether, by the experiences of war, it is feasible and so permissible. Within a certain range he de- cides by his own judgment and accimiulated ex- perience, while in other cases there are fixed rules and fixed values assigned to different forces and to different situations. Doubtful cases are under cer- tain conditions submitted to the decision of the dice; thus recognizing Nelson's saying that some allow- ance must be made for chance, and Napoleon's that war cannot be made without running risks. The game as described embraces all the operations of a campaign, from the start from the base to the collision of the fleets. It thus opens with strategy, which embraces the whole field; narrows gradually till the fleets feel each other's proximity, and are, as it were, manoeuvering for advantage on the field, 214 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE a phase called stratego-tactical; finally, there are the sighting each other and the manoeuvers of battle, technically styled tactical. In these last, on the game-board, the rules governing "values" are grounded entirely on the scheme of battle exercises of the battle-fleet in April, 191 1; a circumstance illustrating the interconnection between fleet and college, which it may be hoped will be continually greater. If a nation possesses military positions abroad, many cases in war, and many hypothetical cases at a war college, will present situations which involve both land and sea forces. This added condition constitutes a more intricate problem; but the method of dealing with it, whether by written estimates and subsequent discussion, or by war game, is the same. Owing to more numerous data, the condition is more complex ; but the manner of solution will be like. It will also readily occur that in every war college — and many nations now possess them — the scenes chosen for hypothetical cases to be discussed and solved will be primarily the regions in which general national policies, or particular international rela- tions, make military or naval operations most prob- able. Historical incidents, wherever occurring, are profitable for instruction, for the elucidation or confirmation of the great universal principles of military action; but, for application of those prin- ciples, the scenes first to be selected are those where the national forces are most likely to act. 15 21S ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION The treatment, purposely discursive because in- tended to be popular, has made mention of logistics, strategy, tactics, and national policies, giving at greater or less length the character of the subjects thus named, their relation to the purpose of the Naval War College, and the method of treatment; empha- sizing the great object of evolving a common mode of thought, and a common appreciation of proper military conduct, among all the of3ficers of a navy. There remains one other subject, International Law. In a country fuU of lawyers and politicians, with a government possessing a President, Secretary of State, and a large corps of ambassadors and foreign min- isters, it may be asked doubtfully why naval officers should give time to international law. The reply is that in this extensive system of functionaries the naval admiral or captain is incidentally one; and that, in international law, as in strategy and tactics, he must know the doctrine of his country. In emergencies, not infrequent, he has to act for his superior, without orders, in the spirit and manner his superior would desire. If in war, the war may be complicated by a dangerous foreign dispute arising from action in- volving neutral rights; or, on the other hand, a neutral tmright may be tolerated to the disadvantage of the national cause. In peace, injudicious action may precipitate hostilities; or injudicious inaction may permit infringement of American rights, of persons or of property. The treatment of inter- national law, consequently, is the same as of the more 216 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE distinctively military subjects — a competent lecturer and lecture system, the posing of problems, their solution by the student, comment and criticism by the teacher, discussion in tnO. conference. WAS PANAMA "A CHAPTER OP NATIONAL DISHONOR"? In November, 1903, following promptly upon the final rejection of the Hay-Herran Convention by the Senate of the Republic of Colombia, an uprising against the central government of the Republic took place in what was then the Department of Panama. The actual rejection of the treaty was notified to the United States Government by the Colombian Minister to the United States on August sad, but the Colombian Senate remained in session until October 31st considering the general question of a canal treaty. On that date it adjourned, having taken no step toward a fiirther treaty, but post- poning all consideration of the subject to the next meeting of its Congress a year later, October 31, 1904. On November 3d came the Panama revolt. The day before this occurrence, November 2d, the United States Government, which had abundant warning that an outbreak was imminent upon the rejection of the treaty, had telegraphed its naval oflficers on both sides of the Isthmus to maintain free and un- interrupted transit; to occupy the line of the rail- road, if necessary; and to prevent the landing of any 218 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" armed force, government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama. On November 6th the Republic of Panama, having been declared inde- pendent by the insurgents, was recognized as an independent state by the Government of the United States. On November 13th the minister by it ap- pointed was received officially by President Roose- velt; and on December i8th was signed a new Canal Treaty with the new state. This treaty fol- lowed the main lines of that which Colombia had rejected; but the Canal Zone was widened from six miles to ten, and the powers of the United States within it were enlarged. The course of President Roosevelt in these transac- tions not only was marked by a rapidity and decisive- ness which might be characterized as outwardly pre- cipitate, but it secured results extremely advantageous to the United States. Naturally, therefore, the imme- diate impression produced was equally precipitate, and such as commonly follows where action unusual in kind and seemingly hasty coincides with self-interest. The act was looked upon as dictated only by con- siderations of profit, and as such was weighed in the balance of untested first impressions as to legality and obligation. The prepossessions thence arising have continued to prevent a clear and unprejudiced weighing of the arguments of legal and illegal; or of those of right and wrong, which do not always coin- cide with law. Yet an act profitable to one's self may be not only upright, but proper. 219 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION In such cases, however, there is an evident neces- sity that a due respect to the opinions of mankind should lead to a cogent exposition of the reasons for the action taken. Such an exposition was given by President Roosevelt in his annual message to Con- gress of December 7, 1903, and in a special message of January 4, 1904. A similar exposition was given by Mr. John Hay, then Secretary of State, in his correspondence with General Reyes, the envoy sent by Colombia to remonstrate against the whole course of the United States attendant upon the Panama revolt. It is to be observed that Mr. Hay, while undoubtedly' approving of the President's action, was in no official sense responsible for it. All executive responsibility centers in the President, and in him alone. The approval of Mr. Hay, there- fore, carries with it the full weight of his known char- acter for probity, moderation, and ability, undimin- ished by the element of self-defense inseparable from personal accountability. This is the more important to be observed because the strenuousness of Mr. Roosevelt's character com- municates itself to his speech and writings; the vigor of which, when exerted in necessary self-justifica- tion, tends rather to confirm the first impression of indefensibleness, produced by the transaction as simi- marized above. This, undoubtedly, has intensified an opposition which has assumed itseH to be dis- tinctively and exclusively moral; which has repudi- ated as impossible any other standards than its own; 220 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" and by confident asseveration has succeeded in de- termining a very general attitude of the public, as indicated in the press, at the mouth of which most men take most of their opinions irrefiectively. It seems, therefore, not unfit to subject the matter anew to an analysis based mainly upon the official papers, which probably few have read and fewer studied. This is the more desirable because Mr. Roosevelt's action has been condemned recently and tmquali- fiedly by so respectable a citizen as Dr. Leander Chamberlain,^ whose article I have occasion to think was considered unanswerable by an eminent lawyer. Dr. Chamberlain's paper may be described as an impassioned arraignment of the United States, con- centrated upon the person of Mr. Roosevelt. It must be remembered that while the nation and its President are separate entities, and while the action of the one may be censiirable in the same instance that that of the other is correct, it nevertheless re- mains true that the responsibility of the Chief Executive devolves upon the people, if by them his act is approved, explicitly or implicitly. Upon this it follows that examination must extend not only to the immediate steps and reasons of the national government in the particular instance, but also to such other facts as may or should condition the entire subsequent attitude of the nation. Nothing ' The North American Review, February, 1912. 221 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION has been done by the country to redress or atone for the alleged wrong to Colombia. Therefore — ^not Mr. Roosevelt alone, but — the nation is at the bar; and the matter for examination is not only the spe- cific step taken and reasons given by the Executive of the day, but also the actual conditions of every kind at the moment of action. These should influ- ence the decision of the nation now as to its re- sponsibility for existing conditions, and as to any reparation assumed to be due. It is not my intention to take toward Dr. Cham- berlain's article the defensive attitude of replying seriatim to his successive contentions. I shall adopt the more direct method of stating positively the justifying points of the case for the United States. It is, however, essential to note and to subject to brief comment three propositions which Dr. Cham- berlain calls fundamental. Certain fundamental considerations must be taken into ac- count in any worthy discussion of the conduct of governments. First, that diplomacy now stands committed to "the extending of the empire of law and the strengthening of an appreciation of public justice." Second, that "international jurisprudence is based on the moral law and embodies the consensus of civilized peoples with regard to their reciprocal rights and duties." Third, that "all nations stand on an equality of rights — the old and the new, the large and the small, monarchies and repubhcs." It is, accordingly, in view of these considerations that the Panama imbrogHo of 1903 is to be judged. As regards these positions, any one conversant with the general subject wiU recognize that they bristle PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" with controversial points and definitions. The third is a commonplace, though necessary to be affirmed. As a sovereign state Colombia is the peer of the strongest and richest. Equally, however, she is liable, like the strongest, to be dealt with according to her deserts. As to the other two — that "diplo- macy stands committed, etc.," and that "inter- national jurisprudence is based on the moral law, etc." — the reply is that the basis of international legal decisions is not the ideal that this or that man or men may cherish, but the existing status of law in universal, or at least general, acceptance. The legal basis of judgment is what the law is, not what it ought to be. We long for universal peace, we aim at it and strive for it ; but in the present distress we base our preparations upon the serious fact that war, as a means of maintaining international bal- ances, has not been disavowed, and that there is no present prospect of such disavowal. In short, the legaUty and the morality of the action of the United States are two separate factors, to be separately considered. The legaKty depends upon the actual state of international law, not on any theory of its derivation or basis. The morality of the transaction is to be treated upon moral grounds. In treatment the two must not be confused by passing loosely from one to the other. If illegal, the fact may impugn the morality of a measure; but the ques- tion of legaUty is separate, and should be kept so. 223 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION The present writer has no personal record here to defend, unless it be the imputation likely to be made of a perverted moral twist of intellect and of con- science in believing the course of Mr. Roosevelt vindicable in international law; and stiU more justi- fiable in natural equity, as applicable either to the commtmity of states embraced under the domain of that law, or to those nations and populations which StiU lie without its pale. In general discussion, most dealings with this subject have proceeded on the fadle assumption that relations between states not only can hereafter become a matter of purely legal determination — ^which, being a matter of. prophecy or speculation, may be left to one side — ^but that they actually now are so determinable. This is not the case. In the conflicting relations of independent states a particular action may be lawful — ^legal — yet not expedient; it may be both lawful and ex- pedient; or it tnay not square with exact law, yet be essentially just because possessing the highest degree of expediency, that, namely, of doing es- sential justice between all the parties concerned. In the case before us the Senate of Colombia had an indisputable legal right to reject the treaty. The question must, therefore, be treated whether the United States had a strict legal right to take the precise steps it did when the Panama revolt affected the status quo. It will be similarly necessary to examine and adduce in due course both the legal and moral aspects, recognizing that a transaction 224 PANAMA: '.'A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" may be justifiable from the one or the other stand- point, while not necessarily so from both. As far as has come under my observation, the entire incident is treated as between Colombia and the United States only. The interest of Panama is never mentioned. This is much as if the inter- vention of the United States in Cuba, in 1898, should be regarded as a matter between the United States and Spain alone; and from conversation I am inclined to believe that this is the lawyer's point of view, so far as justification of our action is con- cerned. Yet it is notorious that the suffering of Cuba was a very large factor not only in deter- mining otur intervention, but in justifying it. Now,' there certainly was not in the Panama district any suffering precisely comparable to that in Cuba; but there was and for three years had continued to be the distraction, misery, and prostration inci- dent to civil war, concerning which the Colombian envoy to Washington, General Reyes, alleged " the weakness and ruin of my country after three years of civil war scarcely at an end." ^ Of this war the Isthmus was a principal scene, the motive being resistance to the central government. The territory of Panama, said General Reyes again, "forms the most important part of the national wealth." ^ Yet, having this importance, it was really an outlying department, separated by long distance from the ' A Digest of International Law, by John Bassett Moore, vol. iii, pp. 90, 82, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1906. 22s ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION central government at Bogotd and accessible only by sea, like Cuba. "It is known," wrote Reyes, "that there is no overland way to reach Panama with troops from the interior of Colombia." * This, in truth, was the sting of Mr. Roosevelt's order for- bidding troops of either party to land within fifty miles of Panama. The measure was decisive. Was it also justifiable? This is, perhaps, the crucial point; for, given the rightfulness of the order, the rest follows up to the recognition of the new state, which must be defended or impeached on other grounds. In the three preceding years the Isthmus had been constantly the scene of fighting. In 1900 there was continuous fighting about Panama, and British marines had to be landed to protect for- eign interests. In 1901 severe fighting took place about Colon; both that city and Panama were seri- ously threatened by insurgent forces which in No- vember captured Colon. It then became necessary to land American, British, and French naval forces at Colon, which finally was recaptured by the Colombian government.^ All this imperiled the transit, for which the United States had made itself responsible, and for the security of which it had become necessary at times to acquiesce in the intervention of European force, contrary to the known policy of the nation. These circumstances ' Moore's Digest, vol. iii, p. 83. ' Encyclop(Bdia Britannica, Ed. 1910-11, vol. vi, p. 712. 226 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" involved the United States directly in the troubles of Colombia; and if a new ownership of Panama would increase its security from disturbance, it would also affect favorably the treaty burden rest- ing upon the United States. Therefore, the con- tingency of such occasion arising entered fairly into the contingent policy of the United States; the more so that the imminent probability of a revolt became known to it soon after the adverse action of the Colombian Senate upon the treaty was taken. From this precedent knowledge it has been loosely inferred that the United States was in collusion with the authors of the revolt. It is well, therefore, to quote here Mr. Hay's explicit and categorical denial of such an insinuation made by General Reyes : Any charge that this government or any responsible member of it held intercourse, whether official or unofficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia is utterly without justification. Equally so is the insinuation that any action of this government prior to the revolution in Panama was the result of compUcity with the plans of the revolutionists. The Department sees fit to make these denials, and it makes them finally." ' Even without this evidence, the prior knowledge of the United States Government, and the measures taken to be ready at once to meet a probable emer- gency in which its own interests or those of its citi- > A Digest of International Law, by John Bassett Moore, vol. iii, p. 91. 227 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION zens might be affected, could not fairly be con- strued as action accessory to the foreseen revolution. Through officials of its own, that Government had ample information beforehand of the critical condi- dition of affairs at the Isthmus, as well as elsewhere in Colombia. It would have been culpably remiss if it had not taken precautionary steps to be pre- pared immediately to protect American interests, shotild such be imperiled, and flagrantly short-sight- ed, if it had failed to predetermine its own course in the event of such possible contingencies as could be anticipated. Orders consequently were sent to sev- eral vessels of war to go to various points where they would be at hand if needed. As far back as 1856 President Pierce took similar contingent action. " I have deemed the danger of the recurrence of scenes of lawless violence in this quarter so immi- nent as to make it my duty to station a part of our naval force in the harbors of Panama and Aspin- wall."^ It is a frequent anticipative measure. Mr. Hay's denial is conclusive. The United States was not a participant, direct or indirect; but if trouble arose it would be a directly interested party, not merely an intervener from outside. It was inter- ested, not only as formal guarantor of a security which Colombia had repeatedly failed to sustain, but also by an avowed national poUcy familiarly summarized as the Monroe Doctrine. Further, this national policy had introduced the * Moore's Digest, vol. iii, p. 37. 228 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" whole family of European states as parties Inter- ested in the canal treaties and in the situation con- stituted by the rejection of the Convention. Grad- ually, step by step, the United States had advanced from a position of joint guarantorship with Great Britain, of any canal at the Isthmus, to that of claiming and demanding sole guarantorship for itself; and from an avowed willingness to see the enter- prise aided by foreign capital to an equally avowed determination that only the United States should undertake the construction. Such exclusion of other nations by force — ^for force it was — ^necessarily entails an obligation to them that that which we forbade their undertaking for the general benefit should by us be accomplished without avoidable delay. How admirably this obligation has been discharged since the authority to do so was ob- tained from the new Republic of Panama is now a matter of history; not yet wholly finished, but al- ready with a record which will remain historical. It is possible that the full development of this particular element of the situation, which was con- stituted by our obligation to the other Powers of the world, may not have passed through the mind of President Roosevelt, although in his messages there is clear recognition of an international obliga- tion. But however partially or completely he may have worked out this specific conclusion, it is valid for the consideration of the nation in reviewing its own responsibility now for the action of its Chief 229 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION Executive then. A right action may be doubly- right for reasons which may not at the moment have occurred to ^he agent. From what has been written, it appears to follow that the transactions, November 2-10, 1903, were no simple matter between Colombia and the United States, but complex* They involved our relations to other nations of the world and to the population of Panama as third parties. Panama was entitled to consideration as really as was Cuba in 1898. She was so entitled, partly because, although the United States was not under treaty obligation to repress domestic disturbance at the Isthmus, Pan- ama was a principal sufferer from the conditions of disquietude whieh affected the transit; partly be- cause Panama bore to Colombia much the same relation as Cuba to Spain — ^namely, that of an out- lying possession rather than a contiguous and con- tinuous territory. The impossibility of invasion except by sea substantiates this fact ; and it is known that Bogota is the capital because in the districts surrounding the city — ^in the highlands of the in- terior — ^is to be found the bulk of the white popula- tion, which at an early date withdrew thither from the hot and unhealthy cUmate of the coast. In that isolation they have preserved the language, man- ners, and physical characteristics of their Spanish ancestry, with aU its defects and virtues, with less variation than any other Spanish- American state; and thence they governed the remote district of 230 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" Panama. It is needless to remark how adverse to the interests of any community is administration by one so distant in time and difficult of access, as well as differing in racial characteristics. Whether or no such considerations were elaborated in the minds of President Roosevelt and his eminent Sec- retary of State, they remain factors for consideration by the people of the United States in estimating now the essential rectitude of a transaction for which they have become responsible by the ap- proval of tacit sanction. With this prelinoinary statement of facts and fac- tors, I address myself now to the question of the technical legal correctness of the action of the United States Government — of President Roosevelt — ^in forbidding the landing of Colombian armed forces, whether of the government or of the insur- rection, within fifty nules of Panama. This was un- doubtedly decisive of the issue of the insurrection. It need not have been followed by recognition of the new state. It was open to the United States to say to Panama: "We have insured quiet by ex- cluding national troops. Now we require you to admit them peaceably and to recognize the author- ity of Colombia." By the exclusion the United States held the whole matter in its hands and stood between the parties as umpire. The intervention — of the fifty-mile order — ^and the recognition are separate facts; and though in near sequence are not linked. i6 231 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION In a complicated transaction questions of expe- diency and of legality blend and affect one another practically; but logically they are different, and in discussing either it is necessary to exercise so much mental effort as to exclude for the moment the one not immediately under consideration. As a matter of legal interpretation, under international law, for- cible intervention in another country or between two contestant states is a legal right, in the sense that the nation exercising it contravenes no dictum of international law. Abstention from intervention in strictly domestic conflicts is the recognized rule; but it is equally recognized that it is a rule which may have exceptions. The act may be morally right or wrong; it may be expedient or inexpedient; but it is not illegal. By accepted law in this, as in declaring war, the state is its own judge of right. This is the present status of international law. It is evi- dent that, if a state is its own judge as to declaring war, it must be so in any minor exercise of force, al- though it equally has no legal right to interfere except that of force; the independence of each state forbidding by accepted principle the intrusion of other authority than its own, except that of force. Such a step, however, may become illegal in special cases where the intervening state by treaty has given up its general right in the specific instance. Barring treaty, the United States had a perfect legal right to intervene by force for Panama against Colombia; still more to intervene, in such measure 232 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" as she deemed necessary, to preserve quiet in a transit in which she was nationally interested. The question remains, Had she by treaty abandoned this right? The allegation is that she had done so by the treaty of 1846, in the thirty-fifth article of whidi occur the words now to be quoted, which I believe contain all the stipulation bearing upon this question of legality. The United States, in order to secure to themselves the tran- quil and constant enjoyment of these advantages [before stipu- lated] atid as an especial compensation for the said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of this treaty, guarantee, positively and effica- ciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the mew that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed'- in any future time wHle this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the same man- ner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.^ It will be observed that these words contain two guarantees from the United States to Colombia (at that date called New Granada): (i) the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus; (2) the rights of sov- ereignty and property which Colombia possessed over it. It must be remembered again that we are dealing now with dry legal construction, not with the morality of any transaction whatever. Legal construction involves the interpretation of phrase- 1 These words are italicized as showing the particular object, mo- tive, and reason of the treaty. 2 Moore's Digest, vol. iii, p. 6. 233 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION ology; and where that is doubtful — ^where the nego- tiators have failed clearly to express their meaning — their purpose, when it is known or can be reason- ably inferred, is a determining factor in reaching decision. Now, as Mr. Hay argued, the purpose of the United States in the treaty, in guaranteeing transit and in guaranteeing possession, had refer- ence solely to the need of the United States to use the Isthmus for transit in its broadest sense. The need had been brought closely home to our national consciousness in 1846 by the war -mth. Mexico, in the course of which troops for the Pacific coast had to be sent by sailing-vessels around Cape Horn. General Sherman was one who made this trip, and was by it determined in favor of a canal. For the above reasons the phraseology of the treaty where equivocal must be brought to the bar of this well-ascertained purpose of the United States, which entered the treaty with the express object of sectiring transit for herself and, though incidentally only, for aU other commtmities. Doubt as to the extent of the guarantee of neutrality did arise long antecedent to 1903. Colombia, in 1865, had raised the question whether it extended to domestic insur- rection, and whether in such case she could demand assistance to maintain neutrality. The United States decided in the negative. Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, wrote: The purpose of the stipulation was to guarantee the Isthmus against seizure or invasion by a foreign power only. It could not 234 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" have been contemplated that we were to become a party to any civil war in that country by defending the Isthmus against an- other party. As it may be presumed, however, that our object in entering into such stipulation was to secure the freedom of transit across the Isthmus, if that freedom should be endangered or obstructed, the employment of force on our part to prevent this would be a question of grave expediency, to be determined by circumstances.'- This is a case of interpretation, which not only implies doubt but explicitly rejects a meaning which the words nevertheless might bear. The interest of the United States being one of transit only, not in Colombia as a nation, she was prepared to intervene against domestic seizure only when the security of her transit was endangered, of which she was the judge; the question being one of expediency, not of obligation. This conclusion is based upon the evi- dent purpose of the United States in the negotia- tions. It is to be noted also that such intervention is not by Mr. Seward's words conditioned by a request from Colombia. The right of originating intervention is preserved by them. So Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State to President Cleveland, tele- graphed in 189s, "If for any reason Colombia fails to keep transit open and free, as that Government is boimd by treaty of 1846 to do, United States are authorized by same treaty to afford protec- tion." 2 The question immediately arises whether the « Moore's Digest, vol. iii, pp. 37-38. My italics. ' Ibid., p. 43. 23 s ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION phraseology of the other guarantee, that of "rights of sovereignty and property," is open to the same construction, as confined to foreign interposition. "Seizure" of territory is a violation of "rights of sovereignty and territory." It will be observed that in the clause of the thirty-fifth article quoted above, the words ' ' in the same manner ' ' occur. The United States guarantees the rights of sovereignty and prop- erty in the same manner as it guarantees neutrality of the Isthmus. The words therefore are not to be pressed beyond the interpretation that the object of this guarantee, Hke that of the other, is security of transit for the United States, which might be en- dangered or interrupted by conquest or attack of an external enemy, American or European. Under these conditions the United States in 1903 saw impending again the danger of the renewal of the civil war which, only recently ended, had for three years distracted Colombia and affected transit. This had necessitated frequent interposition of the United States for the seciirity of transit; and had occasioned just that kind of national anxiety and possibility of poKtical entanglements that arise from intestine quarrels in ill-organized countries with which a close political connection exists, whether the connection be of geographical nearness — as recently in Mexico — or of treaty, or of commercial rela- tions. The Eastern question and the Cretan ques- tion may be cited appositely as illustrating the same kind of problem in Europe, with consequent inter- 236 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" national solicitudes; and also as accounting for the fixed policy of the United States that such ques- tions in America shall not be permitted insensibly to draw in European states as active parties to the controversy of the Isthmus, a result to which frequent disturbances tend. The case of 1903 having arisen, by the well-ascer- tained fact that preparations for revolt were being made upon the Isthmus if the Hay-Herran Conven- tion were rejected, the question follows. Did the treaty of 1846, because guaranteeing Colombia's rights of sovereignty and property against foreign invasion, also bind legally the United States not to exercise her general international rig^t of armed interference on behalf of her threatened interests ? There was ample precedent for saying that she was not so bound, but was at liberty to act for the se- curity of transit, which was her one specific interest in Colombian territory, to safeguard which the treaty had been made. The occasion not being one of foreign invasion, but of domestic disturbance, the treaty guarantees of enforcing the neutrality of the Isthmus or of resisting a seizure did not apply. This position had been decided nearly forty years before by Mr. Seward. But if the treaty did not apply — ^in other words, was non-existent as regarded the case in hand — ^then the general right of international law sanction- ing forcible intervention remained ; to be determined, as Mr. Seward had said, by considerations of grave expediency governed by circumstances. 237 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION In other words, the treaty of 1846 not being ap- plicable, the United States possessed an unimpaired international right to act as her interests demanded. A measure which should whoUy bar all access by sea to the Isthmus was entirely within her legal com- petence. She had a legal right even to take a side if she chose. She did not take a side, because neither Colombian nor Panama forces were to be permitted to land within fifty nules of Panama. Certainly the particular circumstances caused this provision to strike the Colombian forces harder than the in- surgents; yet it is quite conceivable that the latter might have received help from beyond sea, for the same has often occurred in similar rebellions. The obligations of neutrality, when they exist, concern only the action taken, not the results of the action. For example, a neutral state forbids its ports to furnish coal to either belligerent. Evidently the effect is worse to the one not possessing coaling- stations near by than to the one which may have such, but this result does, not impeach the neutrality of the action. The order to the United States naval officers not to permit a landing within fifty miles of Panama was, therefore, wholly within the legal competence of the United States. It insured the neutrality of the Isthmus; an expression which means simply that the territory shall not be permitted to be a scene of war. The result was that the insurrection was successful and that the independence of the district of Panama 238 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" was proclaimed by its people — ^that is, there was no resistance to the measure by the inhabitants of the district; neither by arms nor by protest. There was no apparent division of sentiment, such as ex- isted in many of the seceding states of our Union in 1861; and it was natural that there shotild be none, because great interests of the residents were involved in a favorable solution of the canal question, which the action of the Colombian Senate, though perfectly legal, had postponed indefinitely. The declaration of Panama independence could not but remain effective as long as the United States persisted in its fifty-mile order. Upon this order, in the judgment of the United States, depended the maintenance of tranquillity; so often disturbed of late years that it may fairly be said that a perpetual expectation of disturbance was the normal condi- tion. The question then arises, How far was the United States legally debarred by the treaty guar- antee from recognizing a de facto situation, dependent upon an attitude she was determined to maintain? The treaty of 1846 stipulated that the United States guarantees the rights of sovereignty and property of Colombia in the Isthmus "in the same manner" — "positively and efficaciously" — as it guaranteed the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus. Here again Mr. Seward, in 1865, writing with no faintest prevision of the conditions of 1903, but envisaging an en- tirely different problem, expressed the understanding of the United States as to the obligations of the 239 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION treaty. Mr. Seward's words were based upon the opinion of the then Attorney-General, which Seward adopted. Neither the text nor the spirit of the stipulation in that article, by which the United States engages to preserve the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, imposes an obligation on this government to comply with a requisition [Uke that referred to above]. The purpose of the stipulation was to guarantee the Isthmus against seizure or invasion by a foreign power only} Mr. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, in 1871 expressed a similar opinion: A principal object of New Granada in entering into the treaty is understood to have been to maintain her sovereignty over the Isthmus against any attack from abroad. That object has been fully accompUshed. No such attack has taken place, though this Department has reason to believe that one has upon several occasions been threatened, but has been averted by warning from this Government as to its obligation under the treaty." In the face of these utterances, it seems evident that there is no ground whatever for the assertion upon which Dr. Chamberlain rests his impeachment of the action of 1903. Dr. Chamberlain writes: Since the paramount issue in the case of both the neutrality and sovereignty which the United States guaranteed was the safeguarding of the transit, there was a valid implication that the United States, on due occasion and especially at New Gra- nada's request, would give aid against transit interference from any source whatever, whether foreign or domestic.' ' Moore's Digest, vol. iii, p. 48. My italics. ' Ibid., p. 27. My italics. ' The North American Review, February, 1912, p. 150, 240 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" So far from a valid implication, there was, on the part of the United States, an explicit repudiation of such obligation; and as Colombia during the years since 1865 had acquiesced in this interpretation, by not denouncing the treaty, the understanding be- tween the two Governments was complete in this particular. The seizure of the Isthmus in 1903 was not the act of a foreign Power, but of Colombian citizens; and the proclamation of independence was by the same body that effected the seizure. The seizure clearly was not of the character against which the United States by long precedent pronouncement had confined its guarantee; for it was not by foreign act, but by domestic. The sovereignty of Colombia had disappeared de facto before a domestic insur- rection. The legal question then remaining was whether such act should be recognized by foreign states, and when. Recognition by a foreign state undoubtedly gives moral help to an insurgent, and it therefore should not be given lightly; but it is not legally operative between the parties at strife. In fact, recognition, as distinct from active aid, is not operative at all in establishing the independence of a new state, either legally or effectually. The United States dates its independence, not from the recognition by France and Spain in 1778, but from its own declaration, in 1776, as the legal origin. Great Britain did not acknowledge this independence nor cease from her efforts to subdue the United 241 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION States because of the recognition by France and Spain; and these countries did not effect indepen- dence by recognition, though they subsequently did so by anned intervention in the quarrel. By international law recognition by a foreign state is legally discretional with that state — a matter of national policy and of national determination as to time and circumstances. Ordinarily the decision rests upon the establishment of a de facto govern- ment, ascertained to be so by organization and con- tinuance; but there is no constraint in law that these two indications must be exacted, or that a de jure fact of the wishes and rights of the people may not determine the action of foreign states. The status of Crete since 1897 — ^not political independence, but political autonomy under the nominal suzerainty of Turkey — ^is due to the action of the great Powers expelling the Turks; after a series of revolts, as in Panama, had demonstrated that quiet could not otherwise be had. I have trie4 so far to confine my consideration to the strict letter of the law; to obligation, positive and negative, as involved in the treaty of 1846. Neither by temperament nor by conviction am I inclined ordinarily to exact the strict letter of the bond. I could not have sided decisively with either Shylock or Portia in their Uteral interpretations. But as the subject under discussion presents itself to me, the question is whether the United States, by the specific undertakings of the treaty of 1846, 242 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" had divested itself of its general rights under inter- national law. The frequent assertion that the re- lations of states are as susceptible of legal definition and enforcement as those of individual men appears to me extravagant, as to both fact and reason; but I do hold that a treaty is a promise, and that its ascertained stipulations are obligations not only legal, but moral, having the force of promise. In such case the determination of action depends upon ascertainment of the thing promised. No question of expediency, however plausible, not even of the welfare of a third party, is to me admissible, vmless imder circumstances so exceptional that none such occurs to me now. I certainly do not hold that any advantage to the United States or to Panama could be advanced to justify the action of 1903, if certainly in contravention of the treaty. If not in contravention, then the United States had liberty to take any action she saw fit under her general international legal rights as a State. The question then was not one of law, but of morals; and, except in case of absolute right and wrong, morals in the case of nations — ^less frequently in that of individuals — is often a matter of expediency. "The greatest good of the greatest number" is a moral aim, to be guided by considerations of morality and of expediency. The right to property is not an ab- solute right; it is not unconditioned, but conditioned. Municipal law, therefore, permits deprivation of property for the good of the community. The meas- 243 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION ures of the United States caused Colombia to lose property. If the action which so resulted was legal, its rectitude otherwise is to be judged by moral considerations; and these are to be applied not to the facts of the moment only, but also to those anterior, if furnishing a continuous, consistent record. The good of the United States; the national self-interest, which singularly enough is considered by many the sole justifying reason for national inter- ventions; the good of Panama; the good of foreign states, American or non-American; the good — or evil — ^to Colombia herself; the obligations following upon a systematic policy pursued by the United States in years past, which not only reserved the canal control to herself alone, but insistently ex- cluded all other Powers capable of such control; all these factors enter as considerations in deciding whether the course of the United States was proper. It is always to be remembered, as before said, that the question now is no mere criticism of a past action of a single man, but a determination whether the United States people have been and still are the perpetrators of an unatoned wrong. Positions Hke the Isthmus of Panama cannot be considered on a footing merely of uni-state property. They belong essentially to the world, because the world has need of them. The accident of possession tmdoubtedly gives particular claims to consideration and remuneration; and both consideration and re- muneration were tendered and accepted by the Hay- 244 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" Herran Convention. To this the Colombian Senate opposed the Colombian Constitution as forbidding cession of sovereignty over national territory. Mr. Hay replied that the Convention actually secured such sovereignty, conceding to the United States only a limited control for police and sanitation, in- dispensable to the construction and management. The clause in the Convention to this effect quoted by Mr. Hay runs : The United States freely acknowledges and recognizes this sovereignty [of Colombia] and disavows any intention to impair it in any way whatever, or to increase its territory at the expense of Colombia. In short, the United States required, not political sovereignty, but the administrative control of the ground to be occupied by a great industrial enter- prise undertaken by it, just as any business corpora- tion requires control of its own grounds. This does not impair the rights Of sovereignty, any more than a lease impairs the property rights of an owner. In any case the constitution of a country is valid to itself alone; it is not a reply in international contentions. When Italians were executed by pop- ular uprising in New Orleans, it was no reply to Italy that the Constitution of the United States left the central Government no power to punish a crime committed in Louisiana. A street for the world needed to be opened through Colombian prop- erty; and Colombia could not present her constitu- 245 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION tion as a valid bar. Had immediate steps been taken to remedy the difficulty, something might be said for delay; but the Colombian Congress, without providing any bases for the reopening of negotia- tions, adjourned for a year, during which time the matter was "hung up." Not even a beginning at amendment would be made. Under such circtmi- stances the "to-morrow" of Spanish tradition be- came portentous, and is a fair matter for present consideration as to the present accountability of the American people. I refrain from considering the grosser pecuniary motives alleged to have influenced the Colombian Senate. That such were existent and operative will, I think, be the conclusion of those who will read attentively the messages of President Roose- velt and the correspondence of Mr. Hay and Gen- eral Reyes. Though not necessarily determinative of moral judgment, because possibly not morally wrong in men making a bargain for their country, even if evidently narrow and shortsighted, the facts have a sinister appearance and bear upon the gen- eral verdict touching the moral propriety of the United States' action. But there is another alle- gation; not against the Colombian Senate, but against the Executive which arranged the Hay- Herran Convention and submitted it as signed for the approval of the Senate. This I quote textuaUy from Mr. Hay. After stating at length certain actions of the Colombian Government, which he 246 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" claimed were in direct contravention of agreements in the treaty, which agreements had been accepted after ftill discussion of the points involved, Mr. Hay wrote : This state of affairs continued until General Fernandez, in charge of the Ministry of Finance [that is, Secretary of the Treas- ury to the Colombian Government], issued, more than a month before the Congress was convoked [in special session] and more than two months before it met, a circular to the Bogotd press, which, as Mr. Beaupr^ ' reported, "had suddenly sprung into ex- istence," inviting discussion of the convention. The circular in substance stated, according to Mr. Beaupr6's report, that the [Colombian] Government "had no preconceived wishes for or against the measure"; that it was "for Congress to decide," and that Congress would be largely guided by "public opinion." In view of what the government had already done, it is not strange that this invitation to discussion was followed by violent attacks upon the convention, accompanied by the most extravagant speculations as to the gains which Colombia might possibly derive from its rejection.' In brief, the Colombian Executive, having after prolonged discussion entered into an agreement with the United States, sought itself to overturn this in popular opinion, as conducive to rejection by the Senate. In this it succeeded. A public act of a Secretary of the Treasury is the act of the Govern- ment of which he is part, unless by it repudiated. Although this measure in itself would not affect the moral obligation of the United States to act with due consideration of all interests concerned, it did effectively dispose of any claim of Colombia to special consideration as especially affected. Mr. ' The American Minister to Colombia. ' Moore's Digest, vol. iii, p. 98. 17 247 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION Hay's comment on this transaction will commend itself, I think, to most men: Treaties are not definitely binding till they are ratified; but it is a familiar rule that, unless it is otherwise provided, they are binding on the contracting parties [in this case the two governments] from the date of their signature, and that in such case the exchange of ratifications confirms the treaty from that date. This rule necessarily implies that the two governments, in agreeing to the treaty through their duly authorized repre- sentatives, bind themselves, pending its ratification, not only not to oppose its consummation, but also to do nothing in contra- vention of its terms.' What would the British or French governments or our own people have thought if, after the Arbi- tration Treaties of 191 1 were signed, the United States Government had proclaimed to its public, through the general press, that it invited discussion of the points to which the Senate afterward refused consent, and was indifferent whether they were accepted or not. In conclusion, it is beneficial to observe that the stmimary ejectment of Colombia from property which she could not improve herself, and against the improvement of which by another she raised friv- olous obstacles, is precisely in line with transactions going on all over the world; to the great distress of many worthy people who think that law should, or can, settle all matters, binding nations in links of iron. India, Egypt, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, * Moore's Digest, vol. iii, p. 96. 248 PANAMA: "A NATIONAL DISHONOR?" Morocco, all stand on the same general basis as Panama. The world has needed them ; and technical possession by legal prescription has fallen, still falls, and should continue to faU, before the advance of the world when the owners are imable or unwilling to improve, or to confer security. Law is a valuable instrument; invaluable is a more fitting word. But it is only an instrument, it is not a principal. It is a contrivance, a means, not an end. Man is not for law, but law for man. That Prance in eighty years' occupancy has raised the commerce of Algiers from one million dollars to two hundred millions; that in Tunis in thirty years the increase is from eight millions to forty millions, and that in the same time two thousand miles of good road have been built; the benefits done by Great Britain to Egypt; all these do not so much justify the new administrators in their original action as condemn the old as worthless cumberers of the ground, and therefore rightfully dispossessed. The horrified plea of legal possession violated is in such cases a mere figment of law. It illustrates what has been already said: that Law is a means, not an end; a good servant, but a bad master. So in Panama. Not even the consummate results of the American occu- pation, in sanitation, in maintaining order, in ad- vancing the canal, with its promise to the world's future, are so complete a justification for the action taken as is the miserable and barren record of the former owner, the Republic of Colombia. ,' 249 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION It is sometimes urged: Would the United States have acted thus in the case of a strong state? The question posed by the word "strong" is one not of right, to which this discussion is Hmited, but of expediency. In 191 1 France, Germany, and Great Britain, all strong states, maintained severally what each considered right; but their course was modified by expediency, formulated by diplomacy, and based upon armament. The reply to the query, however, is that necessity for such action rarely arises with strong states, if the word "strong" be correctly de- fined. A strong state is one that maintains habitu- ally peace and security within its borders and im- proves its possessions. Turkey, exclusive of nominal dependencies, has 27,000,000 people. Is Turkey a strong state? Holland has under 6,000,000, Belgium little over 7,000,000. Who ever thinks of controlling their domestic concerns? Yet even Belgium has had occasion to notice that if sovereignty be abused in a matter of world concern — ^as in the Congo Free State — ^the world will call her to account, just as Peru is now being stunmoned to account for the rubber atrocities, though Peru is a weak state. The Isthmus of Panama, because of its interoceanic pos- sibilities, was and is a world concern in so far that if maladministrated the world will interfere. If the United States do not give good administration and security she will hear from the world, though she is a strong state. INDEX Algiers, ii, 102, 114, 140, 248. Arbitration, International: pos- sesses principle of develop- ment, I J tendency to become comptdsive and to undermine nationality, i, 7; originally an instrument of diplomacy, to be used at will, 2; analogy of, to Socialism, 5, 10; query as to powers of a tribunal of, 6; defect in present powers of tribunal, yet danger in in- crease of powers, 7; prepon- derant aim of, is merely to escape the material losses of war, 8; contrast between, and natural forces, illustrated, 8, 13; force and, opposite in idea, but not mutually destructive, 10; armaments and, contrasted methods, 11, 13; law, ultimate expression of, 12; antecedent rejection of, by Australia, 25, 170; unlimited, between United States and Great Britain, men- tioned, 15, 29, 30-32, 87, 88, 90; distinction between diplo- macy and, 36; inadequacy of judicial, in questions of na- tional policy, illustrated, 39- 45; dangers of usurpation by a Court of, 48-53; inferior ef- ficacy of, as compared to force, in certain cases, 50-54, 64-66, and in history of United States, 54-56; not adequate to all diplomatic settlements, 78, as illustrated by Monroe Doc- trine, 79-80, and by Panama Cansil Zone, 93-95; essentially opposite to (Mplomacy in idea and methods, 83; "vital in- terests" and "national honor" reserved from, 88-90; essential element in treaties of general judicial, 91-93; utterance of German Chancellor concern- ing general, 95; other instru- ment than judicial required, 97-99; outworn laws a danger in, 99; as also inadequately developed law, 100, iii, 112, 114, 123; illustrated by con- ditions preceding Monroe Doc- trine, and by development of the Doctrine, 100-105; func- tion of, is legal decision, 112; as to exclusion of Asiatics, re- fused by Australia, 1 70-1 71; armaments and, chapter i. Armament, and Armaments: the ultimate expression of natural forces, 8; and the embodiment of national power of self- assertion, 9, 137, 139; effect of suppression of, 10; notably in War of Secession, 127; rep- resents aggregation of the national powers of every kind, II, 124; effect in maintaining peace, 13, 127; dependence of European civilization upon, 14; increase of German, 15-18, 22 (and note), 58, 62, 173; increase of British, 20, 21; illustrations of effect of British 251 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION naval, 23, 26, 27; purpose of German naval, 29, 32, 57, 62, 63, 69; increase of Austrian naval, 22, 28, 82; onerousness of, but contemporary ability to bear, 33-35; economic view of, 37; questiori for United States, as regards naval, 67, 70-72, 76, 77; an incident of diplomacy, 81; of European countries, less for self-pro- tection than to insure exterior rights, 113, 116, 123; thesis of The Great Illusion concerning, 122, 124, 131; attitude of Canada toward, 159, 172; and of Australia and New Zealand, 1691 I73i 175; utilization of, the most vital of military questions, 196; and the special study of War Colleges, 196- 215. Australia, 73i 79i 80, 153, 158, 159, 161, 167-175, 179, 180. Austria-Hungary, annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by, 6, 64-66, 85, III, 175; naval development in, 22, 28, 82; territorial advance of, east of Adriatic, 24. ■Balance of Power in Europe, 23,24,25,86,115,145. Bees-Republics, attempted rec- ognition of, at first Hague Conference, 52-54. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 6, 64, 66, 85, III, 175. Bulgaria, 6, 66, 85. Canada, 31, 73, 153, 159-161, 168; strong opposition to de- velopment of navy in French provinces of, 159; naval effect upon, of Panama Canal, 160; inferior attachment of, to imperial connection, as com- pared with Australia, 160, 172; feeling in, as to Asiatic immigration, 171; commercial relation of, to Panama Canal, 178. Chamberlain, Dr. Leander, con- demning action of United States in Panama (1903), 221, 222, 240. Chancellor of the German Em- pire (von Bethmann Hollweg), 29; quoted, 95, 138. Christian, Church and Civiliza- tion, characteristics of, I15- 120, 150; separate spheres of Church and State, 118, 119. Churchill, Winston, British First Lord of the Admiralty, quoted, 139- Civilization, principle of nation- ality has played great part in history of European, i; con- stitutional basis of European, is the sovereignty of the state, 2, 4, 5; contrasted powers of European and non-European, 8-10; rivalry internal to Euro- pean, gage of, II; dependence of European, upon the energy of which armaments are an essential element, 14; conse- quences of slackening of such energy, 14, 35; tendency shown toward such slackening, 106; states of European, are a com- munity of business organiza- tions, 107; American, derived from European, 107, 179; outward impulse of European, results from internal competi- tions, 115-119; disarmament of European, means its down- fall, 120; between states of European, questions of Tripoli, Morocco, etc., are not legal in character, 123; results of European, in Algiers and Tunis, 140; European, will be weak- ened by decay of sentiment of nationality, 143; eflSciency for corporate action confined most- 252 INDEX ly to European, i6i; effect of Panama Canal upon spread 'Sf European, in Pacific, 159-164, 167-172, 175, 179. College, the Naval War, Chapter ix. Colombia, Senate of, rejects Hay-Herran convention, 218, 224; relation of, to Panama, 2i8, 225-230; characteristics of inhabitants of, 230; treaty of 1846 between United States and, 232-237, 239, 240-242; legal right of United States to intervene in 1903, 232; action of Executive of, while Hay- Herran convention pending, 246-248. Conference, the First Hague, 50-54- Crete, and Cretans, 6, 7, 64, 65, 66, 236, 242. Cuba, 45-48, 55. 86, 97, iii, 155, 164, 225, 226, 229, 230. "Decision," technical military term, defined, 210, 211. Defense, British Committee on Imperial, 73-77; Council of National, proposed for United States, 76, 77. Diplomacy, Arbitration an in- strument of, 2; force at basis of combinations of, 29, 32, 36, 63, 65, 66, 81, 84; international adjustments the work of, 36; obstacles to substitution of judicial arbitration for, 42; illustrated, 42-54; arranges and adjusts, where a tribunal can only pronounce, 66; in this more efficacious than law, as an instrument of policy, 66, 84-86, 91, 92, 96, 97, 99, lOI, 103, 104, III, 112; possesses an elasticity which Law lacks, 78; Armament an instrument of, 81 ; is the real object of at- tack by advocates of un- limited arbitration, 83; Gen- eral Schofield's mission of, 105; law-making a function of, 112; increasing part played by, in commercial activities of nations, 176; and Arbitration, Chapter ii. "Doctrine," technical military term, defined and illustrated, 202-206, 211. Pish, Hamilton, Secretary of State, quoted as to Treaty of 1846 with Colombia, 240. Force, and Forces, influence of, in promoting arbitration, 8; of European civilization, as a whole, dependent upon com- petition between forces of the several states, 9-10, 114-116, 120, 123, 142, 143; arbitration and, opposite in idea, but not mutually destructive, 10; re- sults from natural, more per- manent than from artificial regulation, 13; possession of military, does not necessarily imply war, 16, 63-66; German dependence on military, 29, 32; possession of, a national responsibility, 30; War is ul- timate expression of, 37; under- lies Diplomacy, 36, 63-68, 72-77, 81, 84, loi; underlies Law, and progress, 39, 51, 54. 56, 97-99. 106, 118, 138- 142; a legitimate factor in international settlements, 84- 90; lies behind Monroe Doc- trine, 86, 105; an inevitable factor in international balances, 106; of concentrated capital as real as that of armies, 107; part of, in civil affairs, 107; "Protection" is simply the use of, 108, 113; achievements of, by war, 109-110; or Otherwise, III, 112, 114; in international matters takes line of least 253 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION resistance, 113; underlies de- mand for Open Door, 115; is Power in action, 116; not un- christian in conception, or in use, 1 16-120; best exercised through Law, when adequate law exists, 117; influence of, and of ideas, exemplified in the Christian State and the Christian Church, 119; eco- nomic advantage has accom- panied use of military, 122, 132-137, 146-148; population a chief element of, 160-164, 167-165, 171, 172, 178; ijlace of, in international relations. Chapter v. Fortification, relation between navies and, 156, 157, 165-167, 173 (Lord Kitchener on), 174- 175, 1-82-184, 187, 188; ques- tion of, as to Panama Canal, 93-^95, 184-190; necessary to maintain neutrality of Canal, 1 91-192; reasons for, at Pana- ma Canal, Chapter viii. France, question in, as to chief station of navy, 28; in North Africa, 11, 114, 139-141, 249; faith in, in armament as guar- antee of peace, 127; part played by diplomacy in commercial activities, 176. Germany, increase of army in, 15; of navy, 17-20,22; charac- teristic of naval legislation in, 19; policy of, as to naval de- velopment, 27, 32, 57-60, 62, 68, 69; dependence of, upon supremacy of force, 29; sug- gested sale of Danish West India islands to, 40-42, 44, 80, 83; attitude of, toward Monroe Doctrine, 42, 43, 83; motives of, in wars of 1864, 1866, 1870, 109, 128, 152; economical development in, after 1870, 122, 133-136, 146- 149; determination of, to share in world's activities, 137, 138. Great Britain, expected strength of navy, in 1514, 18; modifica- tion of position of, in Medi- terranean, 20, 21; deduction from influence formerly ex- erted by naval supremacy of, 23-26, 37, 122, 132; effect of naval power of, in Russo- Japanese War, 26; exposure of Empire of, 27; dispute be- tween Boer Republics and, 52-54, 153; unsteadiness of naval policy in, 60-62; Com- mittee of Imperial Defense in, 75; attitude of, in dispute between Prance and Germany concerning Morocco, 81, 88- 90; attitude of, as to Monroe Doctrine, 42, 92, 101-104; as to fortification of Panama Canal, 93-95; specific value of Suez Canal to, 158; of Panama Canal to, 160; Lord Kitchener on relation of Brit- ish navy to empire of, 173; specific value of Gibraltar to, 190. Gresham, W. Q., United States Secretary of State, quoted as to Treaty of 1846 with Colom- bia, 235. Grey, Sir Edward, British Sec- retary for Foreign Affairs, quoted on burden of arma- ments, 35; on Monroe Doc- trine, 43, 92 (and note); on arbitration treaties, 3, 15, 29, 90, 92, 93. Hawaii, 164-167, 174, 179, 187; -utility of, to Umted States naval operations, 165; ex- posure of, illustrated by Mi- norca when in British posses- sion, 165. Hay, jfohn, United States Secre- 2S4 INDEX tary of State, quoted, 46, 220, 227, 233, 245, 246, 247. Illusion, The Great, no, 114; Chapter vi. Immigration, Asiatic, inevitable result of, if allowed in America, 8; settlement of question of Japanese labor, 91, 163; Aus- tralia's attitude toward, 170. Italy, in Tripoli, 12, 85, 123, 138, 139-141, 146; consumma- tion of unity of, 24, 51, 135, 142; the Papacy and, 50-52; subjects of, executed in New Orleans, 245. Japan, adoption of European civilization by, 9, 117, 161; in- demnity demanded from Rus- sia by, 21; benefit to, from British alliance, 26; present position of, in Manchuria, 32; immigration from, to United States, 91, 163 (and note); mo- tives of, in war with Russia (1904), no. III, 112; in Hawaiian Islands, 164; > war with Russia, 165, 166, 186, 189, 194, 209, 210. Law, principles of, sought to be imposed upon arbitration, 3, 8, 31, 83; arbitration im- plies, II, 12; frequent inap- plicability of, to disputes, 12, 13. 31, 32. 33. 39-42. 45-48, 50-55. 65, 66, 78, 79-83, 86 97-99, 100-103, 123; essential opposition of method between Diplomacy and, 36, 83, 84, 92, 98, 99. 103, 104, in; force underlies, 39, 106, 107; Mon- roe Doctrine does not rest upon, 39-42, 79-83. 87, 88, 100-103; Doctrine is a policy, not a, 105; qualifications im- posed upon, by national policy, 81, 88-90, 139, 194; in inter- national effect, may be ex- asperating rather than con- ciliatory, 96, and in national, 97-99; lacks elasticity neces- sary to adjustments, 99; in- adequacies of, 112, 114-116, 146; an incubus, except as, 117; may become a fetich, 117; international, reasons for place of, in courses of the Naval War College, 216; is a valuable instrument, but not a principal; a means, not an end, 249; deficiencies of, as an in- strimient in International Ad- justments, Chapter iv. Lloyd-George, Mr., quoted, on "vital interests," "national honor," and "prestige," 89. Logistics, military term, de- fined and illustrated, 197-201 ; derivation of, 197; Japanese and Russian, in war of 1904-05, 212. "Mission," technical military term, defined, 210, 211. Monroe Doctrine, mentioned, 24, 175, 195, 228; a matter of policy, not of law, 32, 39-42, 82, 87, 100-105; attitude of Great Britain toward, 43, 92, 93; of Germany, 40-43; specffic danger to, if Germany should acquire naval base in Carib- bean, 44; claim founded only on national security, 67; is a formulated principle, 68, 102; successive developments of, are applications of a principle, 68, 101-103, 228, 236, 244; illustrates deficiencies of Law, 79-81 ; analogous doctrines elsewhere, 79-82; is an in- stance of local power resisting intrusion of distant power, 86; characterized as a "domes- tic" policy, 87; applies to isl- ands geographically American, 2SS ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION 92 (note); General Schofield's foreign mission, 105; an object of, to localize non-American disputes by excluding from America, 132, 138; succinct purpose of, 138. Morocco, 4, 10, II, 79, 102, III, 114, 123, 127, 137-139. 141, 248. Nationality, and Nationalities: principle of, has played great and beneficent part in his- tory of European civilization, I, 48, 141-144; sentiment of, is a conservative force, 2; sentiment of, exemplified in course of United States Senate upon treaties of arbitration, 3, 4; Socialism logically op- posed to, 5; armaments the embodiment of the spirit of, 9, 127; compulsory arbitration win destroy spirit of, 10; strong prepossessions of, in inter- national disputes, 31, 95^96, 124-126; tendency of arbitra- tion to trench upon, 48-50; illustrated at First Hague Con- ference, 50-54; competition between, makes for soimdness of the international commu- nity, 84-86, 145; assertion of British, by Mr. Lloyd-George, 89, and by Mr. Winston Churchill, 139; exemplified in "Protection," 108, 113; effect upon sentiment of, produced by external effort, 128-130; results from establishment of German, 133-135. 146-149. and of Italian, 135; Turkey not a, 135; in the Morocco question, 138; assertion of German, by Chancellor of the Empire, 138; weakening of, in Europe, vnU. weaken Evuropean civilization for collision, with Asiatic, which impends, 143; 256 present strength of sentiment of, 144, 163 (and note); senti- ment of, in war, 153; effect of sentiment of, in future of Pacific, 161-164, 167-172; as- serts itself in commercial de- velopment, 176. Navies as International Factors, Chapter iii. Navy, and Navies: increase of German, 17-20, 22 (and note), 57-59. 173; effect of German increase of, upon Great Brit- ain, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28; a good foundation of financial credit, 21; increase of Austro- Hungarian, 22-23, 28; effect of superiority of British, a century ago, and consequent maxim thence deduced, 23-25; effect of British, in Russo- Japanese and Boer wars, 26; dependence of Australia upon, 26; determinate principle un- derlying increase of German, 57, 61--63, 69; principle under- lying British increase of, is vague, 61-62; no recognized principle governing increase of, in United States, 59, 63; national and international functions of, 66; numbers and constitution of, should be determined by international considerations, 67; supreme international question con- cerning, for United States, 67; could become a settled policy Uke Monroe Doctrine, 68, 69; instructed public opinion neces- sary for continuous policy as to, 69; strength of, not a purely naval question, but chiefly one of foreign policies, 69; appropriate function of Naval Committees as to, 70; function of Foreign Affairs Committees, and of Executive, as to, 71-74; proper organiza- INDEX tion of a Commission, or Council, of National Defense, 74-77; effect of British, upon national economical progress, 122, 132; effect of war with Spain, and of Panama Canal upon United States', 155; re- ciprocal relations of fortifica- tions and, 156-157. i73i i74. 182, 183, 187-90, 192, 194; Canadian ' hesitancies as to building, 159, 160, 172; effect of Panama Canal upon United States', 157, 164-167, 177, 182, 184-186, 192-195, and upon British, 160; Australian meas- ures as to, 172; Lord Kitchener on primary relation of British, to security of the Empire, 173; should not be the sport of local politics, 177; of United States, should be second in force only to that of Great Britain, 180, 195; determina- tive effect of, in development of Pacific, 180; impolicy of dividing United States', be- tween the two oceans, 185-186, 213; permanent inferiority of, means ultimate defeat, 194; mobility, distinguishing char- acteristic of, 198. New Zealand, 73, 79, 80, 153, 159. 167-175, 179. 180. Open Door, the, analysis and definition of, 1 15; mentioned, 123, 138, Panama, and Panama Canal Zone, 4, 12, 13, 32, 50, 56, 67, 93, 94. 95, 130, 155; peculiar interest of Umted States m, 157; contrasted with interest of Great Britain in Suez, 158; essentially part of United States coast-line, 158; twofold effect of, upon sea-power in 2S7 Pacific, 159, and following; Uke Suez, gateway to Pacific, 177; is now United States territory, 181; not to be re- garded as an isolated position, but in relation to other con- ditions, 182, 192-193; revolt of, against Colombia, 218, 224; Republic of, recognized by United States, and Treaty with, 219; effect upon, by con- tinual civil commotion, 225- 227; interest of European states in, 228, 244, 250; right of United States to intervene in, 229-237; Isthmus of, can- not be regarded merely as property of a single state, 244, 248, 250. Panama Canal and Sea Power in Pacific, Chapter vii. Panama, "A Chapter of Na- tional Dishonor?", Chapter X. Papacy, the, at the First Hague Conference, 50-52. Philippines, 13, 49, 109, ill, 166, 168, 177, 182, 187. Pierce, Franldin, President United States, quoted as to precaution of force at Isthmus of Panama, 228. Policy, national, naval, and mili- tary : German, 15, 16, 19, 22 (and note), 32, 57-59, 65, 96, 173; British, 20, 23, 27, 62, 89, 92- 93, loi ; British, accepts Mon- roe position, 43, 92; effect of Arbitration Treaties upon, 29; Monroe Doctrine a national, 32, 41, 42, 68, 81, 82, 87, loi- 104, 105, 132, 181, 195; as affected by party government, and where Executive pre- ponderates, 60-63; annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, 64-66, 84; United States naval, dependent upon what can be willingly conceded ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION by national, 67, 68; affected by Panama Canal and Hawaii, Chapter vii; naval and mili- tary, should reflect national, 67, 69, 212; in United States, close connection of naval and foreign, with inference, 68-72, 180, 195; illustration of this from Imperial Conference in Great Britain, 73, 74; co- ordination of army, diplomacy, and navy, essential in, 74; a mixed Commission, or Coun- cil, desirable, for formulating, 74-77; contemporary, of Eu- ropean civilization, 107, 108, 113, 115, 123; dependent often upon sentiment rather than interest, 108-110, 123, 125, 128, 152-153; primary object of contemporary naval and military, 113-115, 127; theory of contemporary, stated by The Great Illusion, 122, 124; mixed motives usual in na- tional, 130, 131; as involved in present unstable conditions of world, 137-141; popula- tion as a factor in, 160-165, 166, 168, 170-172, 175, 178; assured security at home the primary, yet subsidiary, object of, 176; commercial benefit an ever-increasing object in, 176; Panama Canal, in United States national and naval, 181-182, 184, 190-193; Guan- tanamo in same, 194; utiliza- tion of force, the ultimate end of naval and military, 196; connection between national, and miUtary preparation a subject of study at War College, 212, and illustrated from war between Japan and Russia, 209-212. Prime Minister of Great Britain (H. H. Asquith), on qualifica- tions imposed by national policy on an international transaction, 81, 96. "Protection," as a system, is the use of force, 108, 113. Roosevelt, President, Inter- vention of, at Panama in 1903, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 230, 231, 246. Russia, motives of, in war with Turkey in 1877, 109; war with Japan, 112, 186, 189, 194, 211, 212. ScHOFiELD, General, mission to France in 1865, 105. SociaUsm, tendency of, toward abolition of nationality, 5, 14; disastrous effects of such re- sult, 120, 143; great modifica- tion in exhibition of, in Ger- many and Italy, 143. Seward, W. H., Secretary of State, quoted as to Treaty of 1846 with Colombia, 234, 235, 237, 239. Strategy, technical mihtary term, I97> 198, 201; defined, 200. Tactics, technical military term, 197> 198, 201 ; defined, 200. Treaty, and Treaties: of general arbitration, between Great Britain and United States, 15, 29, 30-32, 43 ; Clayton-Bulwer, 93, 96, 103; Hay-Pauncefote, 93-95; of 1846, with Colombia, 232-237, 239, 240-243; Hay- Herran, with Colombia, re- jected by Senate of Colombia, 218, 224, 236; did not impair sovereignty of Colombia, 244- 245; action of Colombian Gov- ernment concerning, 246-248; between United States and Republic of Panama, 219. Tripoli, 4, 10, 12, 85, 123, 138, 140, 141, 146, 248. 258 INDEX Tunis, II, 140, 248, 249. Turkey, and Turks: 10, 64-66, 85, 109, 111-113, 117, 120, 138, 145. 146, 152. 161, 175, 242, 250. United States, expected strength of navy in 19 14, 18; effect upon, of a German naval base in West Indies, 43, 44; demands of, upon Spain in 1898, 45-48, 126; merits of wars of, since independence, 54-56, 126; imminent question for, as to naval development, 67 ; expediency for, of a Council of National Defense, 70-77; as to fortification of Panama Canal, 93-95, Chapter viii; origin and development of Monroe Doctrine in, 100-105, 138, 228, 236, 244; motives of War of Secession in, 109, 128, 152; naval power of, affected by war with Spain and by Panama Canal, 155, 159; special importance of Canal to, 157-159. 162, 171, 174. 182- 186, 233; of Hawaii to, 164- 166; navy of, should be second only to British, 180, 195; essential relation of Philippines to, 182; responsibility of, for neutraUty of Panama Canal, 191, 226, 227, 228; action of, in Panama revolt of 1903, 218, 219; challenged by Dr. Cham- berlain, 221, 222, 240; legality of said action, 224, 230-242; morality of the act, 243-248; results of the action, 229, 249; question whether action of, would have been the same in case of a strong state, con- sidered, 249-250. War, finds its origins in, 5, 137- 141; wish to escape material damage of, the chief element in arbitration, 7; "Law in place of," phrase considered, 12, 36, 78; organization of military force does not neces- sarily mean, 16; illustrated by Germany, and by War of Secession, 16, 17; war without bloodshed, 16, 56, 63-66, 85- 86, 101-105 ; indemnities as a result of, 21 ; Boer, results of, 26-27, 53. 153! between Great Britain and United States, improbable, 30; military prep- aration less costly than, 34; peculiar hatred of, by econo- mists, 37; financikl and in- dustrial gains from, 37, ill, 112, 114, 122, 128-130, 132, 134. 135. 140-142, 146; is an effect rather than a cause, an agent rather than a principal, 39; beneficial political results from, 44, 48, 55, III, 112, 120, 133, 146; legal right of a state to declare, 45; last argument of diplomacy, 48, 56; alleged possibility to avoid all, in which United States has been engaged, discussed, 54-56; ma- terial self-interest a relatively small factor in, 109-112, 126, 130, 145, 151, 153; danger of, proceeds mainly not from governments, but from na- tional temper, 125, 152; in- citing causes of, mainly moral, 126-128, 152, 153; injurious materially to both belligerents, and to community of states, 131; contemporary govern- ments reluctant to go to, 152; effect of , with Spain, on sea pow- er of United States, 155-156; utilization of armed forces in, 196; Combination and Con- centration, leading objects in, 201; training and experience needed for, 201; "Doctrine," 259 ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION in, defined and illustrated, 202-206; value of .history in preparation for, 206; applica- tory system in training for. 207-209; game, 213-215; Chance and Risk, as factors in, quotations from Nelson and Napoleon, 214. THE END