m8 
 
 CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Date Due 
 
 
 1959 KU 
 
 Cornell University Library 
 arV1138 
 
 The law of love and love as a law: or Ch 
 
 
 3 1924 0-'^i 1Q.'^ 41^1^ 
 
 olir 
 
 ,anx 
 
 
 "^BP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 924031 1 93455 
 
THE LAW OF LOVE 
 AJJTD LOYE AS A LAW; 
 
 OB, 
 
 CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING STRICTURES BY DB. McCOSH. 
 WITH REPLIES. 
 
 BT 
 
 MARK HOPKINS, D. D., LL. D, 
 
 PBBSIDUNT OF WILLIAMS COLLEOB. 
 
 SBVEHTH EDITION. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 SCRIBNER, ARMSTRONG, AND CO., 
 
 SnCCXSSOBS TO 
 
 CaABLES SCKIBNER Am) CO. 
 1874. 
 
Bntered according to Act of Congress, In the year 1870, by 
 
 Mare Hopkins, 
 in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at^Wafihingtont 
 
 /)-?5'6G3{:) 
 
 BIVKBSIDX, OAMBRtDGZ: 
 •IimiOTTPEB AND PRINTED BT 
 
 u. u. hov<3htOn and Company. 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 In publishing a third edition of the following 
 work, some notice of the discussions to which it has 
 given rise seems called for. In these it has ap- 
 parently been forgotten by many how entirely the 
 work is an exposition of that cardinal precept of 
 Christian philosophy, " Thou shalt love the Lord 
 thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as 
 thyself." As imperative there is in that precept 
 Law ; and the one thing required by that law is 
 Love. This gives us " The Law of Love," and 
 that law practically carried out gives us " Love as 
 a Law." With this the doctrine of ends as stated 
 in the "Lectures on Moral Science" is coincident, 
 since the end of love, so far as there is choice in it, 
 and so morality, must be the good of the person 
 loved. 
 
 But while the cardinal precept of Christian phi- 
 losophy is as stated above, that of the prevalent 
 philosophy is, " Do right for the sake of the right." 
 Are these identical ? If so, those that hold to the 
 doctrine of an ultimate right may spare their 
 attacks, for I am substantially agreed with them. 
 
IV PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 If not, it is for them to reconcile their acceptance 
 of the precept with their acceptance of Christianity 
 as a philosophy. What we need is a Christian 
 philosophy. Not that philosophy is to be received 
 on the basis of revelation. To be philosophy it 
 must be received on the basis of reason. But if a 
 revela'tion really from God teach or imply a phi- 
 losophy, it must coincide with that taught by reason, 
 and ought to be seen thus to coincide. If Christen- 
 dom is ever to be a fair exponent of Christianity, its 
 Moral Philosophy must be that of Christianity. 
 
 We need also a philosophy in which the practical 
 shall be drawn from the theoretical part, so that 
 they shall not stand, as in most of our treatises, like 
 the two sides of the Yosemite Valley, with a deep 
 gulf between them. If, as Dr. Wayland says in 
 the opening of his " Practical Ethics," the whole 
 Moral Law is contained in the single word " Love," 
 it would seem self-evident that the theoretical part, 
 the philosophy, must consist of an exposition of Law 
 and Love as they are in themselves, and as related 
 to each other. Such an exposition Dr. Wayland 
 did not attempt, nor can it be successfully at- 
 tempted by any one of his school, or of the school 
 of Right, except as it shall be shown that the two 
 precepts above given are identical. 
 
 That those precepts can be made identical I do 
 not believe. To me they seem to differ both in 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. V 
 
 their sphere and object. The sphere of the one 
 is choice, and its object good. To choose the good 
 of beings capable of good disinterestedly, and as 
 valuable in itself, is the love required. Here tlie 
 sphere is choice without volition or outward action, 
 and the obligation to choose thus is affirmed in view 
 of good as valuable in itself, with no intervention 
 of the idea of right as distinguished from that of 
 obligation. The sphere of the other is volition and 
 outward action, and its object is right, or the right. 
 As commonly defined, and in its only intelligible 
 sense, right is the quality of an action. This makes 
 the right to be an abstraction, a mere intellection, as 
 it is acknowledged to be, which can become a 
 motive to action only as an element is " surrep- 
 titiously " borrowed from the sensibility to combine 
 with it and make it obligation. 
 
 But if the two precepts can be made identical in 
 their material, the whole form and pressure of a 
 system of duty will be different, as the one or the 
 other shall be made prominent. The Ptolemaic and 
 Copernican systems differ, not in material, but in 
 what they made central ; and yet the transition 
 from the one to the other was one of the great 
 steps of progress. And so it is here. Let love be 
 made central, so that in testing actions men shall 
 be compelled to inquire whether they proceed from 
 love, and the moral heavens would come into order 
 
71 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 as a system, and order in society would be the 
 result. The idea of right I accept. I believe in it 
 as obligatory from its relation to good. As thus re- 
 lated and so only, it loses that affinity for fanaticism 
 so conspicuous in its history, and which has made 
 religious wars and persecutions more virulent and 
 cruel than any others. The persecuting Sauls and 
 assassinating Balthazars of all ages have " verily 
 thought that they ought to do " what they have 
 done ; and the step now needed is to preclude, as 
 far as possible, such mistakes by making good and 
 love central, and " The Law of Love " the test of 
 right. 
 
 We also need, in practical morals, to see the 
 guidance which Love may find from the distinction 
 between the susceptibilities and the powers, and 
 from the whole constitution of nature and of man, 
 through the unifying relation of conditioning and 
 conditioned forces and faculties, and the Law of 
 Limitation based on that. Whoever will be at the 
 pains to trace this out, will, I hope, find a system 
 consistent with itself, and in harmony with nature 
 on the one hand, and with the Scriptures on the 
 other. 
 
 For the readier apprehension of the system which 
 involves the step above mentioned, I ask attention 
 to the following propositions, which contain its 
 principal points. 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. vii 
 
 1. Moral philosophy regards man only as choos- 
 ing and acting from choice. 
 
 2. Moral action is rational, as distinguished from 
 instinctive action. 
 
 3. Rational action implies a recognized end. 
 
 4. There can be no conception of an end as a 
 ground of rational action except through a sensi- 
 bility. 
 
 6. The end which man ought to choose is indi- 
 cated by his moral nature, which affirms obligation 
 to choose it ; but it is in his power to reject it. 
 
 6. This end is the good of all beings capable of 
 good, his own included. 
 
 7. .This good has value in itself, absolute value, 
 which makes it the object of rational choice for its 
 own sake. 
 
 8. The choice of this good as the supreme end is 
 the Love required by the Law ; and hence, in Love 
 known as Law, wisdom and virtue are identified. 
 As obedience to moral law it is virtue ; as the 
 choice of good it is wisdom. 
 
 9. When an act of choice alone is required with- 
 out volition or tlie use of means, as in love or good- 
 willing, obligation is affirmed at once without the 
 intervention of the idea of right, and with no place 
 for it unless it be regarded as synonymous with 
 obligation. 
 
 10. The choice of good being thus virtue, action 
 
Vlll PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 from this choice is virtuous action. The good tree 
 makes the fruit good. 
 
 11. Action that would naturally tend to promote 
 this good is right action, and is obligatory from this 
 tendency. 
 
 12. The rejection of the end indicated by the 
 moral nature, and any form of choice incompatible 
 with that end is lawlessness and wickedness. 
 
 13. We have thus Law, and the philosophy of it. 
 But in early life, as preliminary to these, and in- 
 tended to be auxiliary afterwards, we have moral 
 instincts, the action of which is often mistaken for 
 that of conscience, but which may conflict with 
 each other, and which need control, like the other 
 instinctive and impulsive parts of our frame. 
 
 Identifying, as above, wisdom and virtue in Love 
 known as Law, we find a ground of harmony 
 between teleological and intuitive systems. It has 
 not been suflBciently observed that the moral im- 
 perative, in which I believe fully, the affirmation of 
 obligation to love, can be legitimately given forth 
 only in the apprehension of that very good which 
 wisdom would choose for its own sake. This im- 
 perative is not the product of will. It is not, 
 therefore, as the advocates of the theory of right 
 persistently assert, a part of virtue. It is no more 
 a part of virtue than it is of vice, since there could 
 be neither without it. It is the voice of our moral 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. is 
 
 nature made possible and rational by the rational 
 apprehension of good, and can become Law only as 
 that good is the good of all beings capable of good, 
 or, at least, is compatible with that. In this view 
 of it, that " Goodness of Will " of which Kant 
 speaks as " the one absolute good," is not a good at 
 all. It is goodness — goodness because it is the 
 choice of good, and without the idea of that the 
 very idea of goodness had not been possible. 
 
 It is to be added that if the good be disinter- 
 estedly chosen, the fact that it is a good can never 
 make the system utilitarian. That the system is 
 one of Love, the very Love commanded and made 
 Law by God, would, it might have been supposed, 
 be a bar to the charge of utilitarianism. Love 
 cannot be utilitarian. 
 
 It has been objected that the theoretical part of 
 the following work is difficult. From the above it 
 will be seen that the system itself is not so, and I 
 must ask that the distinction be made between that 
 and the attempt to trace its connection with mental 
 science. To do that is difficult, and must be, 
 especially in so brief a compass, and to those not 
 familiar with mental science. The work might 
 doubtless have been better done. Perhaps it was 
 not wise to attempt it, but without that the science 
 cannot be complete. 
 
 In the present edition mistakes have been 
 
X PREFACE TO THE TfflRD EDITION. 
 
 corrected ; the first chapter has been rewritten, and 
 some changes to prevent misapprehension, chiefly 
 with reference to the words " end " and " force," 
 have been made. An Appendix is also added, con- 
 taining the discussion between Dr. McCosh and 
 myself, as published in the New York '' Observer." 
 To insert this was not my suggestion, but I assent 
 to it in the hope that it may elucidate the subject 
 more fully. Dr. McGosh also assents to it, and, I 
 doubt not, for the same reason. Parts of the cor- 
 respondence might be omitted, but it would be 
 difficult to make changes, and, if given at all, I am 
 told it would be more satisfactory, if not more fair, 
 to reproduce it in its original form. 
 Williams College, June, 1870 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 If we accept the principles of classification 
 adopted in the following work, the position of 
 Moral Science as compared with other sciences is 
 either superior or central. It is superior to those 
 sciences, as intellectual philosophy, which are con- 
 ditional for it ; and central for those, as the science 
 of government, which are but an application of its 
 principles. 
 
 It is from this position of the science, together 
 with its unsettled condition, that I have been led of 
 late to devote to its advancement the little time I 
 could spare from my more immediate and pressing 
 duties. That some advancement has been made I 
 am encouraged to hope from the favorable reception 
 of the " Lectures on Moral Science " published by 
 me five years since. In those " Lectures," morality 
 was made rational, both as based on ends and as 
 involving intuitions ; the difierent kinds of ends 
 and of good were distinguished ; the relation of 
 
Xll PREFACE. 
 
 will to ultimate ends was shown ; the law of lim- 
 itation was established ; the faculties were classified 
 from their relation to ends ; and firom that relation, 
 and from their relation to each other, it was shown 
 that the highest end of the whole man was the same 
 with that made known by revelation. (This point, 
 if established, is of the utmost moment, as render- 
 mg religious skepticism rationally impossible.) The 
 relation of virtue to happiness and also to worldly 
 good was shown, and of rights to right. 
 
 As the above points were, for the most part, 
 either new in themselves, or put in new relations, 
 and may not have been always expressed in the 
 best way, it is not strange that they failed to be 
 rightly apprehended by some critics who read the 
 work, as well as by some who certainly did not. 
 Nor is it, perhaps, strange that some who hold 
 strenuously, and as a part of their theological ortho- 
 doxy, that it enters into the " chief end of man " to 
 enjoy God, should have counted the same doctrine 
 an alarming philosophical heresy. In the following 
 work the above doctrines are implied, for further 
 reflection has but confirmed me in them ; but of 
 some of them a fuller exposition is demanded, new 
 points require to be stated, and the principles need 
 to be applied in a practical part. 
 
PREFACE. xiii 
 
 In addition to the above, or if not in each case 
 strictly in addition, yet as requiring ftiUer statement, 
 some of the points which may be thought to justify 
 the publication of another work are the following : — 
 
 1. The making of obligation the moral idea with 
 no necessary intervention of the idea of right, obU- 
 gation to choose the supreme end* and good being 
 immediately affirmed on the apprehension of it, thus 
 placing the primary seat of obhgation in generic 
 choice without volition, and as distinguished from 
 it. 
 
 2. The fact that a Sensibility is a condition for 
 the formation of moral ideas. This was implied in 
 the former work, but not so distinctly stated, because 
 I had not then given the attention they deserve to 
 the very able lectures on this subject of President 
 Finney in his volume on " Systematic Theology," 
 in which this doctrine was, so far as I know, fully 
 stated for the first time. 
 
 3. The distinction between the two forms of spon- 
 taneous activity. This had been made by Dr. 
 Hickock. 
 
 4. The coalescence of the idea of individual and 
 of the general good in the one idea of good on 
 which the law of conscience is based. 
 
 5. The separation of the idea of obligation from 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 authority. This had been done by President Fin- 
 ney, Dr. Hickok, and others. 
 
 6. The distinction between conscience as an im- 
 pulse and as a law. 
 
 7. The mode in which love includes all other 
 duties. 
 
 8. The finding' of a basis for the reconciliation, 
 not of any two opposing systems, but of two classes 
 of systems that have always been opposed. It is 
 quite time this should be done, as it certainly will 
 be at some time, both in Mental and in Moral 
 Science. 
 
 9. The bringing into unity of physical, mental, 
 and moral science through the law of the condition- 
 ing and conditioned, and the law of limitation based 
 upon that. 
 
 10. A classification of duties new as respects its 
 basis ; and the application of the law of limitation 
 to the practical part. 
 
 11. A fuller recognition of the difference be- 
 tween the powers and the susceptibilities, and of the 
 contrasted laws of our fi-ame by which we receive 
 and give. 
 
 12. The doctrine of rights as related to ends. 
 This was seen by Whewell, but not fully applied. 
 
 13. The relation of both rights and ends to the 
 just powers of government. 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 14. The derivation of the right to punish from 
 the violation of rights. 
 
 15. The natural right of man to the Sabbath. 
 Other points might be mentioned. How far any 
 
 of these are absolutely new I do not know, nor is it 
 important ; but the system, taken as a whole, seems 
 to me so far new as to justify its publication. 
 
 When the former work was published it was sup- 
 posed that the doctrine of ends had not before been 
 made thus prominent in a moral system. That is 
 still supposed ; but a legal friend has called my at- 
 tention to a work on " The Civil Law in its Natural 
 Order," by Jean Domat, a French lawyer, in which 
 the course of thought is often strikingly similar to 
 that in the " Lectures." His work was published 
 in Paris in 1674, and repubhshed in this country by 
 Little & Brown, so recently as 1853. If ends 
 hold the place in a Moral System assigned them in 
 the " Lectures," it is obvious they must hold a 
 similar place in the Civil Law, and this was seen 
 and stated with great clearness by Domat. 
 
 As the " Lectures," which were published as a 
 work of original investigation, have been used as a 
 text-book in several of our colleges and seminaries, 
 it is thought best, though the present work is of the 
 same general character, to have seme reference to 
 
XVI PREFACE. 
 
 that in its structure and arrangement. To combine 
 the qualities of a good text-book with original inves- 
 tigation is not easy. In some respects, and for some 
 classes, the processes of original investigation well 
 stated are better than anything else. In other 
 respects, and for other classes, they are not desira- 
 ble. On this point each teacher must judge for 
 himself, and the work will find its place according 
 to its merit and adaptation. As far as possible 
 technical and obscure terms have been avoided, 
 and it is hoped the system has been made too plain 
 to be misapprehended. 
 
 The substance of the following work was deliv- 
 ered the last winter in a course of lectures before 
 the Lowell Institute. In the delivery of them 
 much use was made of the blackboard, whenever 
 ideas were to be traced back to their source, or 
 principles were to be carried out to their residts. 
 This was an experiment, but the results were such 
 as to assure me that the blackboard may be made 
 use of with much advantage in illustrating this and 
 kindred subjects before . popular audiences, as well 
 as before college classes. 
 
 It only remains that I express my obligations to 
 the friends who have aided me in this work by their 
 suggestions. Among these I would particularly 
 
PREFACE. xvii 
 
 mention my early and constant friend, Dr. John 
 Morgan, of Oberlin, to whom I am greatly indebted ; 
 also Dr. Ray Palmer of New York ; and on the sub- 
 ject of suffrage. Judge C. 0. Nott, of the Court of 
 Claims, WashingtCxi. 
 Williams Colleoe, S^ptenbtir, 1868. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 1 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 rAoi 
 DiffiiTent Theoriu .1 
 
 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 Definitions and Pieliminarjr Statements 29 
 
 PART I. 
 
 THE LAW OF love: THEORETICAL MOBALB. 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 OF LAW. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Of Law in Gteneial 84 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Obligation; Moral Ideas : Conditions and Oharacteristics . . 36 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 Obligation: Freedom a Condition 44 
 
 CHAPTER IT. 
 Obligation; an End a Condition 47 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 OUigation; a Good as a Condition . .... 51 
 
XX CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Obligation: Two Forms of Spontaneous Action . • .59 
 
 CHAPTER VU. 
 
 Obligation: Personality a Condition 63 
 
 CHAPTER VIU. 
 Obligation : Necessarily Affirmed 69 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Obligation: Paley: Obligation and Autbority .... 74 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 Ultimate Moral Ideas: Whewell: Theory of Eigbt ... 76 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 Is tlie Affirmation of Obligation Law ? 85 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 Conscience 90 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 OP LOVE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Rational Love: its Characteristics and Sphere .... 99 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 Complacent Love and Righteous Indignntion .... 104 
 
 DIVISION m. 
 
 THE LAW OF LOVE. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 How Lore becomes Law lOg 
 
 CHAPTER U. 
 The Relation of Lore to other Duties 110 
 
CONTENTS. XXI 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 FAOl 
 
 BeooDcilUtion of Systems 114 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 Other Belations of the Sensibility to the Moral Nature . 119 
 
 PART n. 
 
 LOVE AS A law: fractioai. uobals. 
 Preliminaiy Statement 12S 
 
 L 
 Love as a Law distinguished from the Lav of Lore . . . 133 
 
 n. 
 
 Classification of Duties 136 
 
 CLASS I. 
 
 DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 
 I. 
 
 Olassiflcation 140 
 
 DIVISION L 
 The Securing of our Rights 140 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 The Supply of our Wants 142 
 
 DIVISION ni. 
 
 Tha Perfecting of onr Powers . . .... 142 
 
XXU CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Perfecfion as related to Direct Action for Others: of the Body 
 
 of the Mind 143 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Perfection as related to Unconscious Influence .... 156 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Perfection as related to Complacency 158 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Perfection as related to the Glory of God ..... 160 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Perfection as related to Self-Love . . ... 181 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Hahits 163 
 
 CLASS n. 
 
 DUTIES TO OrR FELLOW MEN. 
 PRELIMINARY. 
 Self-Loye and the Love of Others .... . igs 
 
 FIRST GREAT DIVISION. 
 
 DUTIES TO MEN AS MEN. 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 DUTIES EEGAKDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 OfMghtB 170 
 
CONTENTS. xxiii 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 
 rtSM 
 Peraonal Bights: Life and Liberty 179 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 Right to Property 182 
 
 CHAPTER rV. 
 Right to Reputation ..,.,.. , 195 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Bight to Truth . . 199 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 DUTIES REGARDING THE WANTS OP OTHERS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Justice and Benevolence 202 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Supply of the Wants of Others 207 
 
 DIVISION IIL 
 
 PERFECTING AND DIRECTING THE POWERS OP OTHERS. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 Duty of Influence from the Relation of Character to Well-being. 
 — Obstacles to Change of Intellectual State and of Chi^rac- 
 acler ,211 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Scores of Efibrt; Who may labor in them .... 221 
 
XXIV CONTENTS. 
 
 SECOND GREAT DIVISION. 
 
 DUTIES FROM SPECIAI, RELATIONS. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PA9I 
 
 Bights of Persons: Bight and Bights: Special DutieB : The 
 
 Family 223 
 
 CHAPTEE n. 
 Goreniment: Besponsibility: Panishment 233 
 
 CHAPTER m. 
 BeUtionof the Sexes: Chastity US 
 
 CHAPTEB IV. 
 Rights and Duties in Belation to Marriage . . . 349 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 The Law of Divorce 2S7 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Rights and Duties of Parents and Children .... 360 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Bociety and GoTenunent: The Sphere of Govemment: Origin 
 
 of Government: Mode of Formation .... 268 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 BoTemment Representative and Instrumental: The Right of 
 
 Sufirage 282 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Forms of Govemment: Duties of Magistrates and Citizens 397 
 
CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 CLASS in. 
 
 DUTIES TO GOD. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 txet 
 Outies to God defined 804 
 
 OHAPTEE U. 
 Cultivation of a Devotional Spirit 308 
 
 CHAPTEB m. 
 Prayer 814 
 
 CHAPTEB IV. 
 Tlia Sabbath . . «a 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 DIFFERENT THEORIES. 
 
 Morality regards man as active. Hence moral 
 science must imply a systematic knowledge of those 
 powers in man which tend to, or regulate action, 
 as thos^ powers are related to each other, and to 
 the objects that excite their action. These powers 
 are related to each other as a system capable of 
 harmonious action, and of securing through such 
 action the highest good of the individual and of the 
 whole. 
 
 Into the conception of a system of active powers 
 the idea of order, subordination, and of a supreme 
 controlling power must enter ; and that action of 
 such a system which would secure the highest good 
 of the individual and of the whole is right action. 
 Such action must be rational. It presupposes an 
 end good in itself, and known to be good ; but it 
 can be moral only as we have a moral nature 
 affirming obligation to such action. 
 
 Of the nature and foundation of moral obliga- 
 tion which I suppose to be thus affirmed, differenl 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 accounts have been given. This has arisen in part 
 from the ambiguity of language, but more from a 
 partial apprehension and wrong adjustment of the 
 facts and principles of our complex nature. A 
 striking fact, as of association, or a powerful princi- 
 ple, as of self-love or sympathy, is seized upon and 
 made to account for everything. It becomes the 
 centre of a system having in it, perhaps, much that 
 is plausible, and much truth in its details, but as a 
 system wholly false. Such systems are not useless. 
 They insure a careful examination of the facts 
 made central ; the incidental truth involved, as in 
 the treatise of Adam Smith, is often of much value ; 
 and something is done in limiting and exhausting 
 the possibilities of error. 
 
 And not only are different systems produced from 
 Different ^^® above causes, but the moral problem 
 tSi'Tor^ "" ^*®^'f '^ differently stated. By some it is 
 problem. made an inquiry concerning the moral 
 nature; by some, concerning the nature of virtue; 
 by some, concerning the source and nature of right ; 
 by some, after an ultimate rule ; and by some, after 
 the nature and foundation, or ground, of obliga- 
 tion. This last I think preferable. In the fact of 
 obligation all are agreed. All are agreed that all 
 mankind are under obligation to do some acts and 
 to abstain from others. Without obligation there 
 can be no morality and no law, and a statement of 
 the ground and conditions and limitations of obliga- 
 tion, would be a statement of the theory of morals. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 As I propose to use the term, a ground of obli- 
 gation for us must presuppose a moral nature in 
 us ; and the question what that nature is, is entirely 
 different from any that may respect the ultimate 
 ground or reason for its activity. The nature and 
 constitution of the eye are one thing, the nature 
 and constitution of light, without which the function 
 of the eye could not be performed are another. 
 The eye and light are related to each other, and 
 each is so indispensable to vision that either might 
 be said to be at its f' andation. But the questions 
 in optics respecting the eye, and those respecting 
 light, are entirely distinct ; and if the powers of the 
 eye were regarded by one man as the foundation of 
 the faculty of sight, and if the properties of light 
 were so I'egarded by another, and if, because they 
 were using the same word, they were to go on 
 under the delusion that they were treating of the 
 same thing, it is easy to see the confusion that 
 must ensue. In the same way the intellect, with 
 its capacities and laws, is one thing, and truth, the 
 object of the intellect, is another. These so imply 
 each other that without truth the intellect could 
 not act, and either might be said to be the founda- 
 tion of mental activity. Here, also, there would 
 be the same confusion if men were to mistake one 
 for the other, or, without being aware of the transi- 
 tion, were to apply the same terms to both. 
 
 But this is precisely what has happened in specu 
 lations on morals. Men have sometimes spoken of 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the Tarious faculties and powers involved in the 
 moral nature, such as conscience and free will, aa 
 lying at the foundation of obligation; sometimes 
 they have spoken of that ultimate ground or reason 
 in view of which alone the moral nature can 
 legitimately act, and sometimes they have included 
 both. The fact of this confusion is said by Sir 
 James Mcintosh to have been a great, and indeed 
 the main reason of the confusion there has been in 
 the perplexed speculation" on the subject of morals. 
 Speaking of the difference ^-'tween the " Theory 
 of Moral Sentiment," and the " Criterion of Mo- 
 rality," he says : " The discrimination has seldom 
 been made by moral philosophers ; the difference 
 between the two problems has never been uniform- 
 ly observed by any of them ; and it will appear in 
 the sequel, that they have been not rarely alto- 
 gether confounded by very eminent men, to the 
 destruction of all just conception and of all correct 
 reasoning in this most important, and perhaps most 
 difficult, of sciences." 
 
 But this confusion will not surprise us if we ob- 
 serve how the speculations on these different sub- 
 jects imply and almost necessarily run into each 
 other. If we would understand optics, we must 
 understand both the eye and light, and that not 
 merely as they are in themselves, but as they are 
 related to each other. If we would understand 
 moral science, we must understand both the facul- 
 ties which act and that in view of which they act ; 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 bnt we must be carefiil to keep our speculations on 
 the one subject distinct from those on the other. 
 
 If I say that self-interest is the ground of obliga- 
 tion I mean that it is that in view of which obliga- 
 tion is affirmed by a moral agent fully constituted. 
 If, on the other hand, I say that free will is the 
 ground of obligation, I do not mean that it is that 
 in view of which obligation is affirmed, but that it 
 is a power essential to a moral agent, a necessary 
 condition of the affirmation of obligation by such 
 an agent. 
 
 If, again, it be said that self-interest is the ground 
 of obhgation, and we would controvert that, we 
 need to know what other possible grounds there 
 may be ; if there may be what are called a prion 
 grounds we must know that, and be able to state 
 them, and this will involve the question of a priori 
 knowledge and principles of action, and a decision 
 of some of the highest and most disputed problems 
 of mental science. 
 
 Shall we then regard as the foundation of obliga- 
 tion those faculties which are necessary ne ground 
 to constitute us moral beings ; or that in JJaUn^iw 
 view of which, we being thus constituted, obUpiUonU 
 obligation is affirmed ? With given facul- **™^- 
 ties I see a crow flying over my head. In view of 
 that fact I feel no obligation. With the same 
 faculties I see a man in danger of drowning. In 
 view of that fact I do feel under obligation to aid 
 him if I can. Here is a ground pf difference, and 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of obligation. What is that ground ? Is there any 
 ground common to all cases ? Without questioning 
 what others have done, and simply desiring distinct- 
 ness, I prefer to call that the ground of obligation 
 in view of which obligation is aflBrmed. In seeking 
 for this, however, we shall necessarily be drawn 
 into an examination of those faculties and mental 
 products on which moral agency is conditioned, for 
 it must be remembered that that in view of which 
 obligation is afRrmed may itself, like the idea of 
 right, be the product of mental agency. 
 
 Moral philosophers have indeed been divided in- 
 Dependsnce *° ^^^ classes, as they have belonged to 
 on Septal °^^ "'' ^^^ Other of the two great schools 
 loienoe. ^f mental science that have divided 
 thinkers from the time of Plato and Aristotle — in 
 reality, as they have settled in one way or another 
 the great problem of the origin of knowledge. A 
 sensationalist, believing that all our knowledge is 
 from experience, that there are no necessary prin- 
 ciples, or forms of knowledge given by the mind 
 itself, can believe in no a priori principles of moral- 
 ity, and will, almost of course, adopt a low, fluctu- 
 ating, and selfish system of morals. But one who 
 finds in the mind itself as well as in the senses a 
 source of primitive knowledge, given indeed, not 
 without the senses, but on the occasion of them, 
 may consistently, and will naturally, look to the 
 same sourcefor the principles, or elements, or prim- 
 itive facts, or ultimate ideas, or ground, or founda- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 tion, or whatever he may please to call it, of morals. 
 Hence, the great battle of scientific morality is to 
 be fought on the field of mental science. 
 
 On this field some, as those who so make the 
 mind the product of organization as to bring it 
 under the laws of matter and of necessity, and all, 
 indeed, who deny the fact of liberty, so decide 
 mental problems as to make morality impossible. 
 Others necessitate a basis of self-interest, or of 
 mere sentiment, while others still so solve these 
 problems as to admit, in some form, of what may 
 be called a rational system. 
 
 Nor, I may remark in passing, need it discourage 
 those who have not studied mental science formally, 
 that moral problems strike their roots so deeply into 
 that, for on this class of subjects sound judgment is 
 native to the common mind. It is even true that 
 where accurate statement is most difficult, intuition 
 is most certain, and when such statements are maoc 
 they commend themselves with great readiness to 
 the common consciousness. ^ 
 
 With this view of the ground of obligation and 
 of the connection of mental with moral varioue 
 science, we pass to consider some of the '^'■^^^■ 
 systems respecting obligation and its ground which 
 have been adopted by different philosophers. ^ 
 
 Of these the first commonly mentioned, as it was 
 the first in point of time among modern pijst theory; 
 systems, is that of Hobbes. By him the ''°'''^' 
 ground of obligation was found in the authority of 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the Civil Law. According to Hobbes, a regard to 
 personal advantage is the only possible motive to 
 human action. "Acknowledgment of power is 
 called honor." " Pity is the imagination of future 
 calamity to ourselves." " Laughter is occasioned 
 by sudden glory in our eminence, or in comparison 
 with the infirmity of others." " Love is a concep- 
 tion of his need of the one person desired." " Re- 
 pentance is regret at having missed the way." 
 There are no social affections, no sense of duty, no 
 moral sentiments. As a desire for his own pleasure 
 is supreme in every man, it will follow that the state 
 of society is naturally one of war. But as nothing 
 can so interfere with this supreme desire or end of 
 man as war, it becomes obligatory on men to com- 
 bine, by an expression of their common will in the 
 form of law, for the preservation of peace : and as 
 there is no other possible standard, it follows that 
 men must be bound by the behests of law, whatever 
 they may be. 
 
 A system resting on a view of our nature so low 
 and partial, and thus favorable to arbitrary power, 
 was not fitted for permanence among a free people, 
 and had nearly passed from remembrance, except 
 in the schools, when an attempt was made to revive 
 it in connection with the enforcement of the fugitive 
 slave law. This attempt gave rise to the expression 
 so prevalent for a time, of " the higher law ; " and 
 it really seemed at one time that we had a party 
 among us who denied the existence of any such 
 law. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 Of this system it has been well said, that it must 
 either be right to obey the law and wrong to dis- 
 obey it, or indifferent whether we obey it or not. 
 If it be morally indifferent whether we obey it or 
 not, the law which may or may not be obeyed with 
 equal virtue cannot be a source of virtue ; and if it 
 be right to obey it, the very supposition that it is 
 right implies a notion of right and wrong that is 
 antecedent to the law, and gives it its moral effi- 
 cacy. 
 
 A second theory of obligation is that it is based 
 
 on self-interest. Second the- 
 
 Much might be said to show that this interost. 
 was the system of Paley, whose work was formerly 
 taught almost universally, both in England and in 
 this country. Many things in his book are consis- 
 tent with this theory only, while others would seem 
 to imply that of general utility. Probably he did 
 not discriminate sharply between them. 
 
 This system supposes the same low and imperfect 
 view of the facts of our nature as is impUed in the 
 preceding one. It faUs to show the distinction 
 between interest and duty, or why all actions that 
 are for our interest, as a good bargain, are not vir- 
 tuous. It ignores or denies the fact of disinterested 
 affection, contradicting thus the general conscious- 
 ness which attributes merit to actions in proportion 
 as self is forgotten. As that which is the founda- 
 tion of obligation should be supreme in our regard, 
 this system would require us to regard self-interest 
 
10 INTRODUCTION*. 
 
 supremely, and everything else as subordinate to 
 that. It would thus be wrong to love God su- 
 premely and our neighbor as ourselves ; and in- 
 deed any high, or noble, or generous act would, 
 according to this system, be either impossible or 
 wrong. 
 
 The plausibility of this system arises from the 
 fact that self-interest has its place in one that is 
 correct ; and also from the fact that men exalt self- 
 interest so unduly, and do so generally make it 
 practically the centre of their thoughts and actions. 
 
 A third system founds obligation on utility. The 
 Third syB- assertiou is, not only that we are under 
 utiuty. obligation to do those things that are use- 
 
 ful, but that their useftilness is the ground of the 
 obligation. 
 
 To set aside this view it is only necessary to 
 understand the meaning of terms. By a ground of 
 obligation we mean the ultimate reason in view of 
 which it is affirmed. But by its very definition 
 utility cannot be ultimate. " Some things," says 
 Sir William Hamilton, " are valuable, finally, or 
 for themselves — these are ends; other things are 
 valuable, not on their own account, but as condu- 
 cive towards certain ulterior ends — these are 
 means. The value of ends is absolute ; the value 
 of means is relative. Absolute value is properly 
 called a good ; relative value is properly called a 
 utility." Whatever is useful, then, can have value 
 only as it is related to the end which it may be 
 
INTRODUCTION. U 
 
 used to promote. A plough is useful, but only aa 
 it is related to the value of a crop. Unless there 
 be ends that have value in themselves, means can 
 have no value, and so nothing can be useftil. But 
 no one will contend that we can be under obligation 
 to choose that as an ultimate and supreme end 
 which can have no value except as it is related to 
 an end beyond itself. 
 
 The plausibility of this system is from the fact 
 that we are so often under obligation to choose that 
 which is useful, and from a failure, in doing this, to 
 distinguish the ground from a condition of obliga- 
 tion. The absolute value of an end may be the 
 ground of obligation to choose it, but we can be 
 under obligation to choose means only on condition 
 that they shall be useful in attaining the end. Of 
 course a system which should place obligation to 
 choose an end on the ground of an intrinsic value 
 that should have no end beyond itself, and so no 
 utility, could not properly be charged with being a 
 system of utility. 
 
 The word utility expresses a relation — a relation 
 between that which is valuable in itself and the 
 means of obtaining it. A fourth system, ^""J^. 
 that of Dr. Wayland, bases obligation on wayiand. 
 the relations of one being to another. " It is," says 
 he, " manifest to every one that we all stand in 
 various and dissimilar relations to all the sentient 
 beings, created and uncreated, with which we are 
 acquainted. Among our relations to created beings 
 
12 raTBODTOTION. 
 
 are those of man to man, or that of substantial equal- 
 ity,of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient, 
 of husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen 
 and citizen, citizen and magistrate, and a thousand 
 others. Now it seems to me that as soon as a 
 human being comprehends the relation in which 
 two human beings stand to each other, there arises 
 in his mind a consciousness of moral obligation, 
 connected by our Creator with the very conception 
 of the relation." 
 
 Here it will be observed that no enumeration 
 of the relations on which obligation depends is at- 
 tempted. Some are specified, and there are said to 
 be " a thousand others." Nor is any attempt made 
 to show what is common to all these relations in 
 virtue of which they are the ground of obligation. 
 Relations as such cannot be the ground of obliga- 
 tion. Why must these relations be between sensi- 
 tive beings? Why are not all relations between 
 sensitive beings, as those of time and space, the 
 ground of obligation ? The relative height of two 
 men, as tall and short, constitutes a relation, but 
 not a ground of obhgation. In themselves relations 
 have no value, and aside from the beings related 
 they cannot exist. They cannot be made objects 
 of choice or grounds of action. There is in them 
 nothing ultimate. They are simply the occasion or 
 condition of our apprehending a ground of obliga- 
 tion that lies wholly beyond themselves. It is true 
 that whatever we do we must do in some relation, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 18 
 
 and this gives the system its plausibility ; but this 
 incidental connection of relations with grounds of 
 action that lie beyond them can never make them 
 an adequate basis for a moral system. 
 
 Analogous to this system of relations are two 
 others — those of Dr. Samuel Clarke and pitthanj 
 of Wollaston. Of these the first founds tcnis;'»r. 
 obligation on the fitness of things ; and the woiiaaton. 
 second on conformity to truth, or to the true nature 
 of things. A man owes a debt. It is according to 
 the fitness of things that he should pay it, and that 
 fitness is the ground of the obligation. It is true 
 that there is a difference between a man and a tree, 
 and on the ground of this difference there is an 
 obligation to treat them differently. Not to do so 
 would be acting a lie, and so, according to Wol- 
 laston, all immorality is an acted lie. 
 
 Of these systems it is to be said that both fitness 
 and truth, as that is here used, express, not any- 
 thing ultimate, but only a relation. Between the 
 fact of the debt and its payment there is a fitness, 
 but it is not on the ground of its fitness that the 
 payment is to be made. The fitness has no value 
 in itself, and could exist only as the debt has value 
 in some relation to an ulterior good. If there were 
 no good of any kind to be gained by the payment 
 of the debt — no satisfaction of any sentiment — 
 there would be no fitness in paying it. So of 
 truth. It is true that there is a difference between 
 a man and a tree, and that they are to be treated 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 differently, not however on the ground of the twith, 
 which has value only for what it indicates beyond 
 itself, bxit because a man is capable of a rational 
 good and a tree is not. 
 
 It is to be said, also, that both fitness and truth 
 are terms quite too broad to be used accurately as 
 the basis of a system, since there is a large class of 
 fitnesses and of truths that have no relation to 
 morals. To use a pen for writing is according to 
 the fitness of things, and is a practical affirmation 
 of the truth that the pen was made for that, but 
 there may be in it nothing moral. Besides, there 
 is as much fitness in an immoral act to produce evil 
 as there is in a moral act to produce good, and it is 
 as much according to the true nature of things that 
 it should produce evil. It cannot, therefore, be 
 either the fitness or the truth on which the ob- 
 ligation depends. 
 
 The plausibility of these systems is from the fact 
 that all obligatory acts are in accordance both with 
 the fitness and with the true nature of things, 
 though these are not the foundation of the obliga- 
 tion to do them. 
 
 Another system of the same class is that of 
 Seventh Jouffi-ov, which makes order the basis of 
 
 system; , , , ^ ^ 
 
 jouflroy obligation. This was mentioned by me 
 in my former volume, and I have nothing to add to 
 what was then said. Order may be affirmed of 
 mere physical being, in which there can be nothing 
 moral. It expresses a relation, and nothing ultimate. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 15 
 
 It can never be chosen for its own sake. Beings 
 may place themselves in order for the sake of an 
 end beyond, but not for the order itself. At least, 
 such order cannot be obligatory. It would be ab- 
 surd for an army to preserve the order of its march 
 if that would insure its destruction. The order of 
 an army is for its safety and efficiency, and can be 
 obligatory on no other ground. The same princi- 
 ple applies in all cases of order. It can never be 
 so valuable as to become obligatory, except as sub- 
 servient to an end beyond itself. 
 
 From several passages in Jouffroy it would appear 
 that he identified the order of the universe with its 
 end. Doing this, we can readily see how he might 
 have adopted the system, but to do it is simply an 
 abuse of terms. Order cannot be the end of the " 
 universe. That must be some good of the beings 
 that compose the universe, which may or may not 
 be attained by means of order. 
 
 According to an eighth system, the will of God 
 is the ground of obligation. We are, it Eighth sya- 
 
 • 11 IT ? , , temiTrtll 
 
 IS said, under obugation to do whatever of Goa. 
 He commands, simply because He commands it. 
 
 Philosophically this is the same doctrine as that 
 of Hobbes, who referred everything to the will of 
 the lawgiver, or of the law-making power, regarded 
 simply as will, and accompanied by power. The 
 question is, whether the will of any being, regarded 
 simply as will and without reference to the ends 
 chosen, can be the ground of obligation. • It is true 
 
16 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tliat the will of God is an infallible rule, and that 
 we are to do unhesitatingly whatever He com- 
 mands. It is true, also, that this can be said of no 
 other will, whether of an individual or of any num- 
 ber of individuals however organized. It is this 
 fact, that the will of God is to be always and im- 
 plicitly obeyed, that gives the system now in ques- 
 tion its plausibility. But are we to obey his will 
 simplj' because it is his will ? or from faith, that is,, 
 because we have adequate ground for implicit con- 
 fidence in Him that his will will always be deter- 
 mined by wisdom and goodness ? It is precisely 
 here that faith comes in. God commands that for 
 which we can see no good i-eason except that He 
 commands it. He may even command that which, 
 aside from his will, shall seem opposed to all our 
 apprehensions of what is right and best. This ren- 
 ders faith possible, and furnishes it with a distinct 
 field for its conflicts and triumphs. But if his will, 
 simply as will, be the ground of obligation, then 
 faith is impossible, and that great bond and actu- 
 ating principle of the social universe is annihilated. 
 On this supposition all the acts of God would be 
 equally right by a natural necessity, and the appeal 
 of Abraham to God, " Shall not the Judge of all 
 the earth do right ? " was absurd. 
 
 Again, there is nothing ultimate in will whether 
 regarded as choice or as volition. In either case 
 we distinguish between the act and the object. 
 The act is for the sake of the object, and can nevei 
 be an end or object of choice for itself. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 Once more, on this supposition moral science is im- 
 possible. Science supposes uniformity and grounds 
 of certainty. These may be found in those grounds 
 of action which ought to influence a free being, but 
 never in the acts of such a being. The ground of 
 our confidence that a free being will pursue a given 
 course must be faith, and not science. 
 
 This system has been strangely adopted under 
 the impression that it honors God. It renders it 
 impossible that He should be honored. 
 
 The next system we shall consider is that of those 
 who say that right is the foundation of Ninth eys- 
 obligation. According to this, we are to do '™ ' "*''''■ 
 right for the sake of the right. This is, perhaps, 
 the prevalent theory at the present time. 
 
 On the face of it, nothing could seem simpler than 
 this theory ; but the ambiguities of the word right 
 have produced confusion. If we take right as an 
 adjective expressing the quality of an action, and 
 opposed to wrong, it is obvious that it cannot be the 
 ground of obligation, because it expresses nothing 
 ultimate, but only a relation. Used thus, the only 
 conceivable meaning of the word right is either con- 
 formity to a standard or rule, or fitness to attain an 
 end. So it is commonly used by moralists. "Right," 
 says Paley, " means no more than conformity to 
 the rule we go by, whatever that may be." " The 
 adjective right," says Whewell, " means conform- 
 able to a rule." He who solves a sum according to 
 
18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 a rule does it right. In this sense simple Tightness 
 does not even involve a moral quality, and so cannot 
 be the foundation of obligation. "Whence then 
 comes the moral quality ? Here is a right act that 
 has no moral quality. Here is another morally 
 right. Whence the difference ? This can be only 
 from something in the rule, or standard, or end that 
 lies beyond the act ; and if the moral quality come 
 from one or the other of these, the obligation must 
 also. But whatever may be the origin of the moral 
 quality in an action morally right, it is plain that 
 the quality of an action can never be the ground oi 
 an obligation to do that action. Look at this. A 
 man does a wrong action ^ he steals. He does not 
 do this for the sake of the quality of the act»on — 
 its wrongness ; but for the end that lies beyond the 
 action. A man does a right action ; he gives money 
 in charity. He does not do this for the sake of the 
 rightness of the action, but to reheve a case of dis- 
 tress. If he were to do it for the sake of the right- 
 ness of the act, the act would not be right. Think 
 of a man's doing good to another, not from good 
 will, but for the sake of the rightness of his own act. 
 Think of his loving God for the same reason ! Cer- 
 tainly, if we regard right as the quality of an action, 
 no man can be under obligation to do an act morally 
 right for which there is not a reason besides its 
 being right,, and on the ground of which it is right. 
 That reason, then, whatever it may be, and not the 
 rightness, must be the ground of the obligation. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 But are we not under obligation to do what ia 
 morally right? Certainly, always. So are we 
 always under ohligation to do what is according to 
 the fitness of things, and the truth of things, and the 
 will of God ; but these are not the ground of the 
 obligation, and the quality of right in an action 
 neither is, nor can be, the ground of the obligation 
 to do it. 
 
 Is there, then, in morals a right which is not the 
 quality of an action ? Yes ; a man has rights. He 
 has a right to life and liberty. Here the word right 
 is used as a substantive, and means a just claim. 
 This we understand, and the ground of it will be 
 investigated hereafter, but it has no relation to our 
 present subject. 
 
 Is there still another sense of the word right? 
 This is claimed, and in this too it is used as a sub- 
 stantive, and with the article prefixed — "the 
 right." Can we here, as before, gain definite 
 notions ? I fear not. " The term right," says Dr. 
 Haven, in his excellent and popular work, — and he 
 represents a large class of writers, — " expresses a 
 simple and ultimate idea ; it is therefore incapable of 
 analysis and definition." " It expresses an eternal 
 and immutable distinction, inherent in the nature of 
 things." And not only right, but wrong is also 
 such an idea, for he says, " Bight and wrong are 
 distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of 
 things. They are not the creations of expediency 
 nor of law ; nor yet do they originate in the divine 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 character. They have no origin. They are eter- 
 nal as the throne of Deity ; they are immutable as 
 God himself. Nay, were God himself to change, 
 these distinctions would change not. Omnipotence 
 has no power over them, whether to create or to 
 destroy. Law does not make them, but they make 
 law. They are the source and spring of all law and 
 all obligation." ^ 
 
 I am of those who believe that there are simple 
 and ultimate ideas. That of existence, or being, is 
 one. All men have, and must have an idea of 
 something, of themselves, as existing. Here we 
 have the idea, and something actual which corre- 
 sponds to it ; and I understand what is meant when 
 it is said that existence, being, — not the idea, but the 
 thing, — had no origin, and that it may be the source 
 of law. Is then the idea of right such an idea ? 
 Is there anything corresponding to the idea, but 
 different from it, that has existed from eternity ? 
 Is it like space, of which we might plausibly say 
 that it existed independently of God and of all 
 creatures, so that if they were withdrawn the 
 eternal right would still exist? Is this true also of 
 wrong ? If so, we might well, as some do, put 
 right above God, and wrong too. This seems to be 
 claimed, but cannot be, for we are told that " right 
 and wrong are distinctions," not things, but " dis- 
 tinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of 
 things." But what things ? We are told again, 
 
 t Moral Philosophy, p. 47. 
 
INTRODUCTION 21 
 
 " When we speak of things and the nature of things, 
 as applicable to this discussion, we do not of course 
 refer to material objects, nor yet to spiritual intelli- 
 gences, but to the actions and moral conduct of intel- 
 ligent beings, created or uncreated, finite or in- 
 finite." Here, then, we have moral action which is 
 eternal and has no origin ; for if the distinctions be 
 eternal, inhering in the nature of things, the things 
 themselves in which they inhere must also be 
 eternal. But further, if these eternal distinctions 
 inhere in these eternal actions, what is this but to 
 make them qualities of the actions, which, as we 
 have already shown, would preclude the possibility 
 of their being the ground of obligation to do the 
 actions. We have also distinctions in moral actions 
 — actions, observe, already moral, — which are " the 
 spring of all law and all obligation." But is this 
 what the author really means ? Probably not, for he 
 immediately adds, " We mean to say, that such and 
 such acts of an intelligent voluntary agent, whoever 
 he may be, are, in their very nature, right or 
 wrong." This is quite different from the proposi- 
 tions with which we have been dealing. It simply 
 amounts to saying that certain acts, not eternal, but 
 such as you and I maj-- do, are right or wrong, and 
 that no reason can be given for it, except that they 
 are so. Now I believe, and that, I suppose, is the 
 real difference between us, the point on which this 
 whole question turns, that when an action is right 
 or wrong a reason can always be gi ren why it is so, 
 
22 IXTKODUCTION. 
 
 and that in that reason the ground of the obligation 
 is to be found. We are never to do, or to intend 
 to do right for the sake of the right, but we are to 
 intend to do that, the doing of which is right, for 
 the sake of that which makes it right. 
 
 The analogy is often insisted on, it is by Dr. 
 Haven, between mathematical and moral ideas. 
 Mathematical ideas and truths, it is said, are neces- 
 sary and eternal. But how ? Is it meant that 
 either ideas or truths can exist except in some 
 mind? Is it meant that mathematical ideas are 
 any more eternal in the divine mind than any other 
 ideas that are there ? Is anything more meant 
 than that, by the very nature of intelligence it is 
 necessitated, if it act at all as intelligence, to form 
 certain ideas, and also to assent to certain proposi- 
 tions as soon as it understands them ? If this be 
 all, and it could be so understood, it would sweep 
 away much vague, not to say unintelligible phrase- 
 ology. Certainly it enters into our conception of 
 an intelligent being that he must have certain ideas, 
 and into our conception of a moral being that he 
 must have a knowledge of moral distinctions ; and 
 if we suppose an intelligent and moral being to have 
 existed eternally, we must also suppose, according to 
 our inadequate mode of thinking on subjects invol- 
 ving the infinite, that certain intellectual and moral 
 ideas have also been eternal, though in the order of 
 nature the being must have been before the ideas. 
 But this does not make these ideas in any sense in- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 dependent of God, or above him, or a fountain of 
 law, or of anything else. It simply enables us to 
 think of God as having always existed, and as hav- 
 ing always had within himself the conditions of in- 
 telligent, moral, and independent activity, so that 
 he might himself, in his own intelligence and wis- 
 dom, become the fountain of all law. 
 
 When, as in the present case, the existence of a 
 simple and ultimate idea is claimed, the appeal must 
 be directly to consciousness. On this ground one 
 may assert, and another deny ; and there is nothing 
 more to be said. Neither argument nor testimony 
 can avail anything. We can only so appeal to the 
 general consciousness by applying tests as to show 
 what that consciousness really is. 
 
 This system will be referred to again. It is 
 plausible, because every action that is obligatory is 
 also right, as it is also fit, and according to the 
 divine will. ~^-^ 
 
 The only other system of which I shall speak is 
 that of Dr. Hickok. According to him a reason 
 can be given why a thing is right. " The highest 
 good,'' he says — and in this I agree with him — 
 " must be the ground in which the ultimate rule 
 shall reveal itself." This is a great point gained. 
 It concedes that right is dependent upon good of 
 some kind, that is, that a reason can always be given 
 why a thing is right ; and it only remains to inquire 
 what that good is. 
 
 But here, if I understand him rightly, I am still 
 compelled to differ from my able and highly 
 
24 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 esteemed cotemporarj'. That good we are told is 
 " the highest good," " the summum honum." What 
 then is that? Says Dr. Hickok, "The highest 
 good, the summum bonum, is worthiness of spiritual 
 approbation." By this, it would seem, must be 
 meant worthiness of approbation on the ground of 
 the acts, or states, of our own spirits. The doctrine 
 then will be, that the ultimate ground or reason 
 why a man should do a charitable act is not at all 
 the good of the person relieved for the sake of that 
 good, but that he may preserve or place his spirit in 
 such a state as shall be worthy of his own approba- 
 tion. This is stated most explicitly. " Solely," 
 says Dr. Hickok, " that I may stand in my own 
 sight as worthy of my own spiritual approbation, is 
 the one motive which can influence to pure moral- 
 ity, and in the complete control of which is the 
 essence of all virtue." ^ 
 
 To those aware of the endless disputes of the 
 ancients respecting '' the summum bonum," further 
 progress may seem hopeless if we must first decide 
 what that is ; but it will be sufficient for our present 
 purpose if we decide the province within which it 
 is. By " the summum bonum " is generally meant 
 the greatest good of the individual. That, it would 
 seem, must be meant here, because worthiness of 
 approbation can belong only to the individual, and 
 can be directly sought by the individual only for 
 himself. But if this be meant, then the " summum 
 honum," and the end for which man was madei are 
 
 1 Moral Science, p. 60. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 not the same. Man was not made to find the ulti- 
 mate ground of his action in any subjective state of 
 liis own, of whatever kind. He was made to pro- 
 mote the good of others as well as his own, and the 
 apprehension of that good furnishes an immediate 
 ground of obligation to promote it. The good of 
 the individual is too narrow a basis to be the ground 
 of obligation ; and besides, it is not in accordance 
 with our consciousness to say, when we are laboring 
 for the good of others, that the ultimate and real 
 thing we are seeking is our own worthiness of 
 approbation. 
 
 But again, the man is worthy of approbation only 
 as he is virtuous. It is virtue in him that we 
 approve. But virtue is a voluntary state of mind, 
 and that can never be chosen as an ultimate end. 
 By necessity all choice and volition respect an end 
 beyond themselves. But the ground of obligation, 
 as we now seek it, is that ultimate end in view of 
 which the will should act. As ultimate, the reason 
 of the choice must be in the thing chosen, and not 
 in the choosing. It is therefore impossible that any 
 form, or quality, or characteristic of choice, any 
 virtue, or goodness, or holiness should be the ground 
 of obligation to choose. The same thing is to be said 
 of law in every form, and for the same reason. 
 Law can never be ultimate. 
 
 In this case, as in most of the others, a rule may 
 be drawn from that which is assumed as the ground 
 of obligation, because no man can be under obliga- 
 
26 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tion to do anything that is not in accordance with 
 his highest worthiness. This may be a criterion 
 or test, just as the will of God or fitness is, of what 
 he ought to do, but never a ground of the obligation 
 to do it. 
 
 Is it asked, then, what is your own system ? It 
 is imphed in the opening remarks of the chapter, is 
 very simple, and can be stated in few words. 
 
 In seeking the foundation of obligation, I suppose 
 moral beings to exist. As having intelligence and 
 sensibility I suppose them capable of apprehending 
 ends good in themselves, and an end thus good that 
 is both ultimate and supreme. In the apprehension 
 of such an end I suppose the moral reason must 
 affirm obligation to choose it, and that all acts that 
 will, of their own nature, lead to the attainment of 
 this end, are right. 
 
 This puts man, as having reason, into relation to 
 his end in the same way that the brutes, as having 
 instinct, are put into relation to their end, and gives 
 us a philosophy in accord with other philosophies of 
 practical life. What is the philosophy of the eye ? 
 It consists in a knowledge of its structure and use, 
 or end ; and from these, and these only, can rational 
 rules be drawn for the right use of the eye when 
 well, or for its treatment when diseased. Knowing 
 these, we know how we ovight to use the eye. We 
 know the ground of our obligation in reference to 
 it. It is so to use it that the end of the eye may be 
 most perfectly attained. So we ought to use the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 eye, and the ground of our obligation is the fact 
 that the eye has relation to an end that has value in 
 itself. If it had not, we could be under no such 
 obligation. The same is true of every part of the 
 body, and of every faculty of the mind. And if 
 true of these, why not of the man himself? Has 
 he an end valuable for its own sake ? If not, what 
 is he good for ? But if he have such an end, why 
 not, as in case of the eye, find in this end the 
 reason of all use of himself, that is, of all rules of 
 conduct, and also the ground of obligation ? Can 
 there be anything higher or better than that a man 
 should propose to himself and choose the attainment 
 or advancement of the very end for which God 
 made him ? What more can God ask of him — • 
 or man ? What more can he wish for himself? 
 
MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 DEFINITIONS AND PBELIMINART STATEMENTS. 
 
 " Moral Philosophy, or ethics, is that science 
 which teaches men their duty, and the reasons of 
 it." This is Paley's definition ; and no better has 
 since been given. 
 
 Moral Philosophy may also be defined as the 
 science which teaches men their supreme end, and 
 how to attain it. It is thus both theoretical and 
 practical. As theoretical, it explains the ground of 
 obligation. As practical, it teaches what we ought 
 to do. As distinguished from Natural Science, 
 which teaches what is. Moral Science teaches what 
 ought to be. 
 
 All questions under Theoretical Morals may be 
 resolved by an exposition of 
 
 THE LAW OF LOVE. 
 
 And all questions under Practical Morals may 
 be resolved by an exposition of 
 
 LOVE AS A LAW. 
 
30 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Hence, the following treatise will be simply an 
 exposition of these two expressions. 
 
 In analyzing the Law of Love, the order of in- 
 vestigation pursued in the " Lectures on Moral 
 Science " will be reversed. In those, we started 
 with an examination of the constitution of man in 
 the light of ends, and found the Law of Love, 
 thus identifying the law of the constitution with 
 the revealed law of God. In this law, as reqiuring 
 the highest activity of the highest powers upon 
 their appropriate object, we identified the formula 
 for virtue with that for happiness. We found a 
 law in the keeping of which there is, and must be, 
 the great reward. This Law of Love thus found 
 we now assume, and seek its characteristics and 
 conditions, or prerequisites. 
 
PART I. 
 
 THE LAW OF LOVE. 
 
 THEOBETICAL MOBALS. 
 
DIVISION I. 
 
 OF LAW. 
 ♦ 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OP LAW IN GENERAL. 
 
 The term Law is used in two senses : as it is 
 applied to things or to persons. 
 
 As applied to things, it is sometimes used to ex- 
 press a uniform fact, — as when it is said ^^^ „, 
 to be a law that heavy bodies unsup- ''^*'' 
 ported, fall. It is also used to express the rule in 
 accordance with which the force acts that causes a 
 uniform fact, — as when it is said that the force of 
 gravity is directly as the quantity of matter, and 
 inversely as the square of the distance. 
 
 As thus applied, the characteristics of law are uni- 
 formity, and, so far as the human will is concerned, 
 necessity. This kind of law we have in what are 
 called the laws of nature. The term is applied 
 wherever there is uniformity of being through 
 force, or of force itself, with no direct evidence of 
 the intervention of will. 
 
 For law in this sense, the conditional ideas will 
 be : 1. Being. 2. Force. 3. Uniformity. And 
 4, as I think, an end. 
 
 3 
 
84 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Of Law, as thus understood, there are several 
 VMieUesin Varieties: as physical, vital, mental, in 
 "^^ each of which there is a force uniformly 
 
 directed to an end. Up to a certain point, the 
 mind is as much subject to law in this sense as 
 is matter. These laws, or rather the uniformities 
 which are their exponent, are at the basis of expe- 
 rience, are the condition of education, and of that 
 intelligent activity by which means are adapted to 
 ends. 
 
 As applied to persons, law is either Civil or 
 Law of per- Moral. Civil Law has for its object the 
 """■ control of the outward actions of men, 
 
 so far as they relate to the rights of others. As 
 affecting the will it reaches only volitions. 
 
 Moral Law has for its object the control of the 
 will itself in that which is central, — its prefer- 
 ences and choices. This is its great peculiarity. It 
 lays its commands upon allowed preferences and 
 choices, and upon them alone. As doing this, it is 
 spiritual. It designates what is to be done ; but, as 
 no means can be used, it neither does nor can des- 
 ignate how it is to be done. It is thus Law, and 
 not a rule. Volitions, outward acts, rules, may or 
 may not follow. The moral act is completed in the 
 choice, and the character of the act is determined 
 by the end chosen. 
 
 Of Moral Law the conditional ideas are : 1. Be- 
 ing conscious and rational. 2. Free will. 3. An 
 end, which can be known as such only as there is 
 in it a good ; and 4, Obligation. 
 
OF LAW m GENERAL. 35 
 
 Between law as applied to things and to persons, 
 the differences are radical. 
 
 Under law as applied to things, the subject doe 
 not understand the law, knows nothing of 
 
 ... Difference. 
 
 its end, is incapable of choosing it, and is 
 under no obligation to choose it. It is passive, and 
 its movements are necessitated. It is only in an 
 improper sense, or figuratively, that uniform facts, 
 or rules in accordance with which beings thus un- 
 conscious are controlled, can be called laws. 
 
 The law of persons, on the other hand, is obeyed 
 consciously. The subjects of it understand the law, 
 are capable of choosing its end, and, if the law be 
 moral, are under obligation to choose it. Here 
 olligation is the essential thing. Without that there 
 may be an end proposed to choice, and a command, 
 but there can be no law. 
 
 The most striking ground of analogy between 
 law in the two senses specified, and the (j„nn4of 
 basis of their common name, is in their '■^^'^• 
 result. This is order. Uniformity, and thus order, 
 mViit be the result of the first class of laws ; it ii 
 the result of the second when obeyed. , 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 obugatiok: moral ideas: conditions and 
 chaeacteristics. 
 
 Obligation being then the essential element 
 obugattoni in moral law, in all law binding upon 
 itaori^n. moral beings, we next inquire after the 
 origin and nature of that. 
 
 Of obligation we can make no division as of 
 different kinds. Some have indeed spoken 
 
 The concep. ^ 
 
 u^tion"*^ of obligation as perfect and imperfect, 
 simple. meaning by perfect obligation that which 
 can be exactly defined and enforced. But while 
 obligation may respect different persons, may arise 
 in different relations, and may or may not be capa- 
 ble of being enforced by an authority from without, 
 yet the conception of it is an ultimate conception, 
 and the same in all. It supposes a being capable 
 of forming the idea and having the feeling of it, 
 and, if he have a moral nature, so constituted that 
 he must, under certain conditions, form this idea 
 and have this feeling. 
 
 Without this there could not be a moral nature. 
 What we mean by a natural endowment, or a nature. 
 
OBLIGATION. 37 
 
 is a constitution such that under givt-ji conditions 
 certain resuhs will uniformly follow. Thus No moral 
 
 if pain uniformly follow the near approach without 
 
 /■ 11-1 «. 1 • • 1 ">« '*'» "'■ 
 
 to lire, the bemg thus aiiected is said to obugatioD. 
 
 have a sensitive natute. If men uniformly tend 
 to associate with each other, they are said to have 
 a social nature. In the same way, if a being be 
 so constituted that the idea and feeling of obliga- 
 tion will uniformly arise under given circumstances, 
 we say that he has a moral nature. We say that 
 he is endowed not only with Reason., but with 
 Moral Reason. This, and this only, can constitute 
 man a moral being. 
 
 What then is moral reason ? This we shall best 
 learn from what reason is, for that has jj^^, 
 been much more fully investigated. Rea- naTurahest 
 son is that power of the mind by which ftJJS'pa„ 
 it is furnished with those ideas and afEr- "'■''™- 
 mations which are presupposed in all rational think- 
 ing. These ideas are those of being, identity, 
 causation, of space, of time, and others like them, 
 the origin of which is now well understood. These 
 are universal and necessary. The affirmations, as 
 that all changes are in time, that all bodies are in 
 space, and that every event must have a cause, are 
 simply evolutions of these ideas when the occasion 
 for them arises, and so are equally necessary and 
 universal. These ideas and truths are implied in 
 all our conceptions of beings and objects, and are 
 80 immediately and necessarily given that we can- 
 
38 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 not conceive of man as rational without them. As 
 so intimate to ourselves, they were slow in being 
 brought into distinct recognition and statement, but 
 as they are fundamental, such recognition and state- 
 ment are essential to the progress of either mental 
 or moral science. 
 
 Such being the function of reason, that of moral 
 K^Lhow reason should be, and is, analogous. It is 
 analogous. ^^^^ power of the mind by which it is 
 fiarnished with those ideas and regulative principles 
 which are presupposed in all moral action. 
 
 These ideas are those of personality ; of an end 
 Primary including a good and a supreme good ; of 
 m^i"' free-will, and of obligation. These are pre- 
 '^°°' supposed in every moral act, as are those 
 
 of being, time, causation, etc., in every act of com- 
 prehension ; and they have, whenever a moral act 
 is performed, the characteristics given by Kant as 
 distinctive of the others, that is, of imiversality and 
 necessity. 
 
 Of the above, obligation is the strictly moral idea ; 
 but as the others are so dependent upon that that 
 they could not be formed without it, they may be 
 properly said to originate in the Moral Reason. 
 They are primary ideas involved in all moral action, 
 and so conditional for it. 
 
 Thene are other ideas given by the Moral Reason, 
 SecondaiT ^^ those of merit and demerit, which fol- 
 morai** '"^ action, and so may be called second- 
 """" ary. They are all either an immediate 
 
OBLIGATION. 39 
 
 knowledge of the personality by itself; or a mani- 
 festation by it of that which is so inherent and 
 essential to itself that the one cannot be conceived 
 of without the other. 
 
 These ideas hold, indeed, the same relation to 
 the powers of feeling and of will, the Analogy be- 
 
 , , tweeo ideas 
 
 other constituents of our threefold being, "f p"™ and 
 
 O' moral 
 
 that the ideas of simple reason do to the reason- 
 power of thought. We have a power of thought. 
 Involved in this, and so involved that they must 
 be given with it, are the ideas of being, of time, 
 and space, etc. But if there are essential ideas 
 accompanying the revelation to ourselves of our 
 intellectual being, we might well suppose there 
 would be such ideas connected with the revela- 
 tion to ourselves of our emotive and voluntary 
 powers. And so we find it. Involved in the 
 power of feeling is the idea of good; and in the 
 power of will, in the form of choice, is the idea of 
 freedom. These and others of this class, have, as has 
 been said, the same relation to man as active that 
 the ideas of mere reason have to him as contempla- 
 tive. Hence, as man is moral only as he is active, 
 they are said to be the product of the Moral Reason. 
 And again, as man is practical only as he is active, 
 and as these ideas are regulative in practice, they 
 may be called the product of the Practical Reason. 
 This, I suppose, is what was intended by Kant 
 under that name. 
 
 As underlying moral action, the ideas above men- 
 
40 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 tioned have the characteristics of universality and 
 necessity for all moral beings. They are farther 
 distinguished as having in them an element of feel- 
 ing, without which they could not be, as they are, 
 immediately related to action. This some are slow 
 in apprehending ; but it comes from the fact, scarcely 
 recognized as yet, that the Moral Reason is wholly 
 conditioned upon a Sensibility, and that thus the 
 ideas which it gives partake of " the root and fat- 
 ness of the olive " from which they spring. 
 
 Without the requisite conditions no ideas are 
 Moral ideas possiblc, and without a sensibilitv the first 
 
 wholly con- * ^ _ ^ ^ "^ _ 
 
 ditioned condition for moral ideas is not given. 
 
 upon a ^ ^ ^^ 
 
 eensibuity. "We might as Well have the idea of iden- 
 tity, or of resemblance, without that of existence, 
 as to have the idea of benevolence, or of justice, or 
 of right, or of rights, or of obligation, without the 
 action, as a previous condition, of a Sensibility, and 
 the idea of good, enjoyment, well-being originated 
 by such action. How is benevolence possible 
 towards a being that can neither enjoy nor sufier ? 
 How can we be just to one who has no interest to be 
 secured, and who can be neither rewarded nor pun- 
 ished ? 
 Through the It was formerly the doctrine of philoso- 
 
 element of ■ *' ^ 
 
 feeiingmorai phers that reason is a directive, but not a 
 
 Ideas become ^ ^ 
 
 motivea. motive forcc. 
 
 "Eeason the card, but passion is the gale," 
 
 says Pope, and this was the opinion of his time. But 
 since the Reason has been investigated, some have 
 
OBLIGATION. 41 
 
 laid that the ideas furnished by it become motives. 
 Jonffroy says this, but he says it with no discrimina- 
 tion of the different classes of ideas, and no explana- 
 tion of the prevalence, almost universal, of the op- 
 posite opinion. The explanation is to be found in 
 the two classes of ideas just spoken of. Those 
 of the pure reason, primitive and unconditioned, as 
 those of being, of space, and their derivatives, as of 
 identity, and of mathematical relations, can never 
 become motives. Only those ideas can become 
 motives that are conditioned on a Sensibility. These 
 can and do. Thus it is that the idea of obligation 
 becomes a motive, because, being conditioned on 
 feeling, it has an element of feeling in it, while yet, 
 as an idea, it is rational. 
 
 This view of moral ideas precludes the analogy 
 so commonly drawn between them and mathemat- 
 ical ideas regarded as necessary and eternal. 
 
 It is here, in the fact that a Sensibility is the 
 condition precedent of all moral ideas, and j^is ftot 
 so of any manifestation of a moral nature, theiHw?-' 
 that we find the root of those theories of "*°'*''">'y- 
 morals that make happiness or well-being ultimate. 
 In their relation to morals the Sensibility and its 
 products are not to be regarded merely as a utility, 
 or as an object of choice lying before the mind as a 
 motive, but also as lying back of all moral ideas and 
 as their condition. If there were no good to be 
 bestowed and recognized as such within a Sensibihty, 
 there could be no love, and so no holiness. If there 
 
42 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 were no evil that could be suffered, there could be 
 no selfishness or malice. "When, therefore, it is 
 said, as it has been, to be an a priori law that 
 benevolence is right and malice is wrong, it cannot 
 be so a priori and transcendental as to exist till 
 there is a knowledge of what benevolence and 
 malice are, and so of that good and evil without 
 which neither of them could be. 
 
 Nor is there anything anomalous in this relation 
 of a SensibiUty as a condition for moral ideas, since 
 the same is true of a Will. The idea of a "Will in 
 freedom as much underlies all moral ideas as does 
 that of a Sensibility. The truth is that moral ac- 
 tion, as the highest form of our activity, implies the 
 activity and cooperation of the three great depart- 
 ments of our nature — the Intellect, the Sensibility, 
 and theWill, — and can be conceived of only as from 
 a Person fiiUy constituted. The idea of being from 
 the Intellect, of a good from the Sensibility, and of 
 freedom from the Will, must each be a condition of 
 any moral idea. From the Sensibility we have the 
 idea of an essential good, a good in itself. From 
 the Wm as choosing such a good for its own sake, 
 or the reverse, we have the ideas of essential good- 
 ness and essential wickedness, goodness and wicked- 
 ness in themselves. Nothing that proceeds from 
 the Sensibility can be goodness ; nothing that pro- 
 ceeds from the Will can be a good. Thus do we 
 give each element of personality its place ; thus do 
 we discriminate them ; and thus does moral action 
 
OBUGATION. 43 
 
 imply that circle of interdependence among these 
 faculties which we find in the essential functions of 
 all life, where there is, in strictness, no first, and no 
 last. 
 
 From the above it would appear that moral ideas 
 differ from others: first, as conditioned 
 
 . ■! •!• Conclusions. 
 
 upon the previous action of a sensibihty ; 
 second, and because they are thus conditioned, as 
 blended with feeling; third, and as thus blended 
 with feeling, having in them the power both of 
 impulse to action and of causing enjoyment and suf- 
 fering. 
 
CHAPTEE m. 
 obligation: freedom a condition. 
 
 Op the ideas now mentioned, it is with that of 
 obligation, as preeminently the moral idea, and as 
 giving its validity to law, that we are especially 
 concerned ; but as the others are conditions for that, 
 we must, if we would trace its origin, examine them 
 in that relation. 
 
 Clearly the first condition of obUgation is the idea 
 of freedom, or of the power of rational choice. As 
 has been said, the idea of freedom is immediately 
 and necessarily given to us in the knowledge we 
 have of ourselves as possessed of will in the form 
 of choice. It is not a moral idea except as it is a 
 condition for moral action, and is the product of the 
 Moral Reason only as moral ideas furnish the alter- 
 native in kind which makes rational freedom possi- 
 ble. If man were wholly animal, freedom to choose 
 between different degrees or even kinds of animal 
 enjoyment would amount to little ; but as the moral 
 and spiritual differ in kind from the animal, the 
 Moral Eeason furnishes the occasion for the exercise 
 
OBLIGATION, 46 
 
 of the highest possible freedom. When such an 
 alternative is presented, the idea of freedom reveals 
 itself at once as involved in the power of choice, and 
 BO a constituent of that will which is among the 
 central parts of our nature. 
 
 This origin of the idea of freedom must practi- 
 cally remove all ground of dispute about liberty, 
 unless we are prepared for absolute skepticism , 
 for if our primitive and necessary ideas do not rep- 
 resent realities and so furnish a safe basis for action, 
 our nature is false, and all search after truth is 
 hopeless. That such is its origin is evident from 
 the uniformity and tenacity with which men have 
 held to it, notwithstanding dialectical subtleties and 
 apparent demonstrations to the contrary. The 
 power of choice, involving rational freedom, is an 
 original and primary manifestation of our being, 
 just as thought is, and can no more be practically 
 denied than the being itself. 
 
 But this power of choice does not include al) 
 that has been commonly understood by gometMng 
 will. It does not include volition, or the SiSce com 
 putting forth of energy for the attain- derstoo5°iy 
 ment of that which we choose. These 
 have been grouped under the one name Will, or, as 
 Hamilton proposes to call it, the Conative Power. 
 But the movements are distinct, and should be so 
 designated. 
 
 The one is properly the Elective, and the other 
 the Conative Power ; and if this distinction had al- 
 
4:6 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 ways been made it would have saved much confii- 
 
 The elective ^i""" ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ putting forth of energy 
 and the CO- jg jijg more obtrusivc, and has attracted 
 powers. uiore attention, but the elective is the lead- 
 ing power. A generic choice once made and con- 
 tinuing, must be followed by executive volitions, if 
 the means are possessed for attaining the end chosen. 
 If not, the choice will stand alone, and bide its 
 time. 
 
 It is this power of choice that belongs, as an ele- 
 The deepest mentary constituent, to a rational soul, 
 ttj!*^CT ^^^ ^* i^ ^" *^^^ *^** *^® deepest freedom 
 of choice. consists — a freedom which can be taken 
 away only by destroying the soul itself. External 
 obstacles may prevent our attaining, or even strug- 
 gling for, that which we choose. If the choice be 
 not absolute we may be forced, as it is said, to work 
 for an end which we do not choose, and this is sla- 
 very; but still there always remains an absolute 
 power of choice which no weapon can reach and 
 no violence can overcome. Man can always be 
 loyal to God and to duty. 
 
 It is this freedom that is the first condition of 
 obligation. Without the consciousness of a freedom 
 of choice it is impossible that the idea of obligation 
 should arise. Without it man would be a thing. 
 
CHAPTER rv. 
 
 OBLIGATION : AN END A CONDITION. 
 
 The second condition of obligation is the con- 
 ception of an end. This is piiniarily from ^nenda 
 the Sensibility, as that of freedom is from «™'""™- 
 the Will. If there be choice there must be some- 
 thing to be chosen ; the two are correlatives. In 
 all rational action this conception of an end must 
 be as elementary as the power of choice, since 
 without it we can neither conceive of the action 
 nor the choice. 
 
 But there must not only be an end, there must 
 also be a paramount, or supreme end. a supreme 
 There must be something which it is sary. 
 imperative that the man should choose, for if we 
 suppose several ends, and it be indifferent which is 
 chosen, or whether any, there can be no obligation. 
 
 An end may be subordinate, ultimate, or supreme. 
 
 A subordinate end is one chosen for the sake of 
 something; beyond itself. An ultimate end Ends of 
 IS one chosen tor its own sake. A supreme Kinds. ^ 
 end is also ultimate, and is one which, in any con- 
 flict of ultimate ends, ought to be chosen. 
 
48 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 An ultimate end never lies proximate to volition. 
 mtimate VoHtion simply produces action, but ulti- 
 ^ti^?^ mate ends are the results of action, and 
 Stattmto'' depend upon forces over which volition 
 Toution. jj^g ^^ control. If a man would have the 
 effects of light resulting in sight as an ultimate end, 
 he must open his eyes. The opening of them is by 
 volition, the seeing is the result of forces with which 
 volition, except indirectly, has nothing to do. 
 
 For the attainment of most ultimate ends both 
 Vouuon not choice and volition are required, but for the 
 the^ttoi-*" highest end of the individual, if we sup- 
 ^preme"" pose that to be the enjoyment of God, only 
 choice is needed without volition. The 
 choice of Him as a portion without volition is as the 
 opening of the eyes, and the light of his counten- 
 ance irradiates the soul. 
 
 And just here it is that we find the germinant 
 Faith and points of faith and works, those two great 
 workB. forms of activity in all rational life, 
 
 whether Christian or secular. The essential ele- 
 ment of faith, which is not belief from the intel- 
 lect, but confidence or trust from the will, is found 
 in choice ; and the essential element of works is 
 found in volition. These two, choice and volition, 
 have their common root in what we call the will, 
 as the nerves of sensation and of motion have their 
 common root in the spinal cord, and between these 
 the analogy is perfect. As sensation inspires mo- 
 tion, so does choice volition, and faith works ; and 
 as sensation and motion are inseparably united ex- 
 
OBLIGATION. 49 
 
 cept at their very root, so should be choice and 
 volition, faith and works. 
 
 That some ends may be thus attained by choice 
 without volition it is important for us to see, be- 
 cause, as will be shown hereafter, it brings us to 
 the precise seat of responsibility, and simi)Iifies the 
 moral problem. 
 
 That there should be for man a supreme end 
 is essential to his unity, and to any con- . 
 
 •J ^ . A supreme 
 
 ccption of him as made by a wise and *°* essential 
 
 r J for man B 
 
 good being. Without this there could be ^'"^• 
 no unity in the race, no basis for character, or con- 
 sistency of action. 
 
 But that there should le Buch an end is not suf- 
 ficient. For any rational action it is essen- Mm must 
 tial that man should know what the end end. 
 is. This he may do formally, so as to be able to 
 state it, or implicitly, as he knows his own exist- 
 ence, which he may never think of stating, but of 
 which the knowledge is involved in all his actions. 
 
 That he is thus capable of knowing his end is the 
 chief distinction of man. The great dif- g„„hknowi- 
 ference between him and the brutes is '^f*f''^. 
 not that he can abstract and generalize, """''o"- 
 not that he can make his own faculties the object of 
 his study, becoming in recent phraseology both 
 subject and object, but it is that his Maker takes 
 him into his own counsel by revealing to him hia 
 end, and permits him either to choose or reject it ; 
 either to cooperate with or work against Him. 
 
 Without such knowledge of his end man would 
 4 
 
50 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 be in simple bewilderment. This is the turning 
 point between a nature capable of sympathy, coop- 
 eration, friendship, wisdom, and one that is not. 
 So our Savior puts it. " Henceforth," says he, " I 
 call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not 
 what his lord doeth, but I have called you friends, 
 for all things that I have heard of my Father I have 
 made known unto you." A being that can entex 
 into cooperation with God by choice is in a relation 
 entirely new, and must have endowments infinitely 
 higher than those of any being incapable of this. In 
 the sense now specified, all creatures below man, ani- 
 mate and inanimate, are literally and solely servants 
 of God, not knowing what he doeth. Man may 
 not only be a servant, but a friend. It was with a 
 full apprehension of the grandeur of this relation 
 that Abraham was called in the Scriptures, " the 
 Friend of God." That man is not thus his friend 
 is the cause of all the puzzles in moral science. 
 
 It is, too, through this power of choosing a su- 
 preme end that man has character as dis- c^j^t,, 
 tinguished from characteristics. Mere '"iMM^fBu. 
 things and the brutes have characteristics ; i"'™° ™*' 
 man has character, and this is determined by the 
 end chosen. If the supreme end chosen be money, 
 the man is avaricious ; if power, he is ambitious ; 
 if the love and service of God, he is religious, and 
 nothing short of such a supreme choice can make 
 him either avaricious, or ambitious, or religious. 
 This is the point of supreme wisdom and folly, the 
 cardinal point of destiny for every man. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 obligation: a good as a condition. 
 
 We see from the above the necessity of an end, 
 and of a supreme end. But the word ^ ^^^ „ ^ 
 mcludes not merely an idea in the intellect °°'"'''""'- 
 of something that can be comprehended and at- 
 tained by the use of means, there is also in it an 
 element by which it is addressed to our emotive 
 nature. To be chosen by us there must be in it, 
 or seem to be, a good. Tracing it back we shall 
 find that there must be something valuable for its 
 own sake — something good in itself, and recognized 
 as such within a sensibility. 
 
 What then is a good ? Strictly there is no good 
 that is not subjt'.ctive, and so, known as SubjeoUye 
 
 -I . . . . 1 . and objec- 
 
 such Within some consciousness; but it avegood 
 
 diBtin- 
 
 will accord more with the cast of our Ian- guished. 
 guage, and tend to a clearer apprehension of the 
 subject, if we say that all good is either objective 
 or subjective. An objective good is anything so 
 correlated to a conscious being as to produce sub- 
 jective good. Subjective good is some form of en- 
 joyment or satisfaction in the consciousness. 
 
52 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 This subjective good, not our own, but that of 
 iheirreia- ^^^ couscious beings, is so a good and 
 S?° '^""8'' the good that if there were no conscious- 
 °°^*' ness there would be no objective good. 
 
 If there were not a conscious being in the uni- 
 verse, nor could ever be, it would be good for noth- 
 ing. 
 
 As further showing the relation of objective good 
 „. to us, it may be said that that on which 
 
 The supreme ' J 
 
 good'of each *'^® Supreme regard of any one is jBxed, 
 '™ '*"*■ as the source of his subjective good, is his 
 God. 
 
 The objects and beings so correlated to us as to 
 Twociasees producc subjective good ai'e of two classes. 
 
 of objective , , 11- 
 
 good. They are those that cannot produce this 
 
 good voluntarily, and cannot themselves enjoy it ; 
 and those who can produce it voluntarily, and who 
 can themselves enjoy it. 
 
 Those things that can produce subjective good 
 Firstoiass- "^'^'j in Voluntarily are mere things, and 
 meaMof have value in proportion to their power 
 ^°'*' to produce such good. A picture is val- 
 
 uable in proportion to the satisfaction, whether 
 from its intrinsic qualities, or from association, which 
 it is capable of giving. This is true of all mere 
 things. There is here no apprehension of moral 
 qualities, no sense of obligation, no love. All such 
 things are merely things, and the means of good. 
 The good that can come from them is inferior in 
 kind and limited in degree. 
 
OBLIGATION. 63 
 
 The second class of beings who may come into 
 such correlation to us as to produce sub- ge,„nj,„iajg 
 jectivegoodis of those who are capable of ^"^"'if 
 producing it voluntarily, and who are ^°°''" 
 themselves capable of enjoying it. These are per- 
 sons, and that disposition in them which leads them 
 to produce subjective good is called goodness. In 
 doing this they are not simply a condition, or a meang, 
 but are a cause of good. 
 
 There are conditions and means of subjective 
 good, and also causes, and these are to be j,ija„^„n 
 carefully distinguished. The inanimate conduioDs 
 creation, with its laws, is the condition, »°* ■=""«''« 
 not the cause of vegetable life. Vegetables exist 
 only through a force which subordinates to itself all 
 the laws of mere matter, and so could not have 
 been developed from matter and its laws, but must 
 have been superinduced by a cause above them. 
 As thus a condition for vegetables and serving them, 
 mere matter with its laws is lower than they. In 
 the same way vegetables are lower than animals, 
 and animals than man. Always, as is stated in the 
 third Lecture on Moral Science, that which is the 
 condition of another thing, and so serves it, is lower 
 than it. In this upward progress of forces as con 
 Jitioning and conditioned, that which comes last is 
 always the highest. But in thus passing up we ulti- 
 mately reach personality, and in that a true cause. 
 This brings us to the culmination, and we must 
 again go downward. A cause we always conceive 
 
54 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 of as higher than its effects. God, as a cause, is 
 higher than the universe, and so man, as far as he is 
 a true cause, is higher than any effects or results of 
 his activity. When once we have reached a per- 
 sonal cause there is no longer any place for condi- 
 tions, but only for effects, and these must always be 
 lower than the cause. 
 
 If then it be said that holy activity or virtue, or, 
 The erson which is the Same thing, the person acting 
 a cause, not according to his highest law, is a means of 
 
 a means of o o ' 
 
 happiness, happiness, we say that this does not ex- 
 press their true relation. The holiness is not a 
 means of happiness, but the cause. It is the per- 
 son choosing in accordance with the end for which 
 God made him ; and as thus choosing, worthy of 
 respect, of admiration, of approbation, of compla- 
 cent love, of veneration. This is no " dirt-philos- 
 ophy," or " bread-and-butter philosophy," or " util- 
 itarian philosophy." It affirms obligation immedi- 
 ately and necessarily, and if it be in view of a 
 good, — as in view of what else can it be ? — it is 
 in view of good as such ; of the good of others far 
 more than of our own ; and so far as it is our own, 
 a good like that of God himself, as being from the 
 activity of a nature made in his image and con- 
 formed to his will. Who shall say that this is low, 
 or mercenary, or unworthy ? It is the choice of 
 good for the sake of good ; the good of God, and 
 of his universe, and this, if anything can be, is 
 essential goodness. That is, indeed, an utterly 
 
OBLIGATION. 56 
 
 heartless and debasing system, which, instead of 
 the grandeur and play of personalities involving 
 free-will, and high sentiment, and disinterested 
 love, would reduce the universe to a machine, the 
 parts of which are merely utilities, and to be esti- 
 mated too by each one with reference to their effect 
 upon himself. 
 
 But besides being direct causes of good to us 
 there is another relation in which persons Conscious 
 
 1 1 • . 1 mi being to be 
 
 stand to our subjective good. Tliey are loveda 
 
 not only capable of causing subjective '''"■'■''• 
 good in us, but also of enjoying it, and of suffering 
 its opposite, and as such are to be loved with a 
 virtuous love for their intrinsic worth or value 
 as beings. A being with great capacity for sub- 
 jective good has great worth in distinction from wor- 
 thiness, and is to be loved on this ground. The 
 love of being in the abstract, and aside from such 
 capacity, is impossible. Such a being, and especially 
 one capable of virtue, or holiness and the good from 
 that, can not merely become the cause to another 
 of subjective good and so excite gratitude and com- 
 placency, but may become to that other an object 
 of effort, and so call out the activity of his powers 
 in their highest form that there will result to him 
 his own subjective good. 
 
 If we except mere sensitive good, it is indeed 
 only the attributes of personality, imme- attributes 
 diately seen or reflected, that can be the ^t^™°°y 
 direct cause of subjective good to us as snb|^tf„ 
 thev are drawn out in our behalf, or its ^°°^' 
 
56 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 indirect cause as we are active in behalf of 
 others. 
 
 It would appear then, that there are two ways in 
 Subjective which subiective good may come to us 
 
 good comes ^ ^ /. i 
 
 through re- One is throuffh the action of other thmgs 
 
 ceiTiQg and ° ^ 
 
 giying. ^nd pcrsons upon us ; the other through 
 
 the activity of our own powers put forth with 
 reference to them — that is, virtually through re- 
 ceiving and giving. This distinction is radical. 
 It is made in view of the broadest and most fun- 
 damental division of our nature, except perhaps 
 that of soul and body, and one which will be made 
 the basis of a classification of duties in the subse- 
 quent practical part. 
 
 According to this all subjective good is from 
 ThroDKh aetivity either in receiving or in giving, 
 mesand''' ^^^ '*' through the susceptibilities or the 
 powers. powers. Others may exercise goodness 
 towards us and thus be the cause to us of subjec- 
 tive good through our capacity of receiving. We 
 may also exercise goodness towards them, that is, 
 choose and seek to promote their good, and from 
 this activity of the powers in thus giving there will 
 be to us a higher and purer form of subjective good 
 than any other. 
 
 We contemplate others as capable of subjective 
 Relation good. As such we See that they have 
 between the -vsrorth, and lovc them impartially. We 
 oS'^°* see that their good is unspeakably desira- 
 tuedefined. hlc and Valuable for its own sake, a? 
 
OBLIGATION. 67 
 
 much so as our own ; we choose that good for 
 them, we put forth efforts that they may attain it, 
 and in so doing we find the highest form of our 
 own subjective good. This impartial love, this 
 choice of good for others and effort to enable them 
 to attain it, is virtue. Virtue is not the choice or 
 love of virtue, or of right ; it is the love of God 
 and of our neighbor as ourselves — the wilhng of 
 good — the good will. That is virtue, that is right, 
 and it is in the putting forth of this good will that 
 our highest worthiness is found. 
 
 What is, then, the end and good of man ? Objec- 
 tively, God is his end and good. Every g^^ ^^^,, 
 man may properly say that God is his Jweend'aDd 
 good. He made man so that only himself ^°°'*" 
 ean be to him an adequate source of subjective 
 good. Hence his dependence and filial relation 
 forever as made in the image of God. God is 
 such a good that not only all can choose Him and 
 find Him as adequate to each as if no other had 
 thus chosen Him, but that each new choice of Him, 
 both as augmenting his glory and increasing the 
 good of others, augments the joy of those who 
 have already thus chosen. 
 
 And not only must we receive all things from 
 Him, but it is only as we give back to him our active 
 love — as we love Him for his own sake as infinite 
 in being and in excellence — that the highest joys 
 of holiness can come. Those joys are indeed from 
 the very activity that constitutes the holiness. 
 
58 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Whether we regard ourselves then as passive or 
 active, God is our good. " All our springs are in 
 Him." He is our sun. He is to us all that recent 
 research shows the sun to be to the forces of nature, 
 and more than this. 
 
 The subjective end and good of man, on the 
 subjecHTo other hand, will be, subordinately, that 
 Bubordinate ■ ''^hich WO roceive through the action upon 
 «npreme. ^g ^f other things and beings, while our 
 supreme good is the joy from holy activity in the 
 love and service of God. The verj"- highest good 
 is in the putting forth of energy towards God. The 
 happiness from this is no happening. It is the infal- 
 lible outgrowth of our innermost being when we 
 act according to our law. This, with all joys of 
 complacency in others or in ourselves incident to 
 it, is holy happ-Iness, or blessedness. It is the hap- 
 piness that comes from holy activity. 
 
 We have thus a subjective good both from our 
 passivities and our activities, from receiv- 
 ing and from giving. Both of these, and 
 in their order as higher and lower, are expressed 
 by the Scriptures when they say, " In thy presence 
 is fullness of joy ; at thy right hand are pleasures 
 forevermore." The joy is as an aroma from the 
 love, the adoration, and every highest form of vol- 
 untary activity called forth by the immediate be- 
 holding of God. The pleasures forevermore are 
 from the action of the susceptibilities in their adjust- 
 ment to the surroundings of heaven, which are fore- 
 shadowed by so many wonderfiil adjustments here. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 OBLIGATION : TWO FORMS OF SPONTANEOUS ACTION 
 
 But to understand fiilly the relation of our sub- 
 jective good to our freedom and causative j^„ f^^^ 
 power, we need to see the relation of free- ^J^"^ 
 dom to the two forms of spontaneous ac- ''°°' 
 tion. 
 
 There is first a form of spontaneous action that 
 precedes choice, and is conditional for it. nret form 
 The original forms of the activity of our choice, 
 being in its fundamental faculties, and by which 
 men become revealed to themselves, are purely 
 spontaneous, and are the condition of all voluntary 
 activity. We must be, and through a spontaneous 
 activity know ourselves to be, before we can put 
 forth any voluntary activity. Consciousness itself, 
 in which is all subjective good, is from or in an ac- 
 tivity that is wholly involuntary, that commenced 
 and can terminate by no agency of ours. 
 
 There is also a spontaneous activity that suc- 
 ceeds voluntary activity and is consequent Second form 
 upon it. Gaining through consciousness a choice, 
 knowledge of ourselves, and then the control of oui 
 Acuities, we find that each form of voluntary ac- 
 
60 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 tivityis followed — and with a certainty like that of 
 the laws of nature — by results in the consciousness 
 that are from a spontaneous and involuntary ac- 
 tivity. 
 
 The above is true both of the body and of the. 
 nitimatB mind. We put forth voluntary effort in 
 fng'the*"'" g^'ining food, in preparing it, in bringing 
 proamatoto ^^ ^'^ ^^® Hiouth, and in masticating and 
 the will. swallowing it, but all this is only that it 
 may be delivered over to the charge of the in- 
 voluntary activities in tasting, in digestion, and as- 
 similation. No growth, or pleasure, or pain of the 
 body, nothing that is an ultimate end for that, can 
 be directly willed into being. We eat, and pleas- 
 ure and nutrition are the result. We approach 
 too near the fire, and pain is the result. These are 
 from activities, but not from those willed by us. 
 We know them, indeed, not immediately as ac- 
 tivities, but only in growth, and pleasure and pain 
 which are their result. 
 
 And so it is in the mind. We will to lie ; but 
 Dittmate '^^ ^^ ^^^ '^i'^ t^^ shame and tlie remorse 
 notdSf that follow. We love; but we do not 
 w'Ued- -yyiil the joy that is in it, and that cannot 
 
 be separated from it. In no case can we will di- 
 rectly either joy or sorrow, happiness or suffering, 
 or, indeed, any ultimate end. We can only will 
 those acts that are uniformly connected with such 
 an end by our constitution, or, which is the same 
 thing, by the appointment of God. 
 
OBLIGATION. 61 
 
 It is through these results in the consciousness of 
 his creatures that depend on activities not subject 
 to their will, that God governs them. All growth, 
 perfection, and enjoyment, on the one ^^ ^^^^^ 
 hand, and all degradation and suffering on a^°e7^°i'n 
 the other, are the result of spontaneous "f'^"'- 
 action consequent on voluntary action. In these 
 are physical pleasure and pain ; in these joy and 
 sorrow ; in these remorse, misery, the anguish of 
 despair ; • in these is the blessedness of the righteous, 
 the peace that is like a river, the- pleasures that are 
 at God's right hand forevermore. 
 
 But while the agent is thus compelled to work 
 between these two forms of spontaneous Manreapon- 
 
 . . 1-1 1 1111 ... Bible for the 
 
 activity, which may be called the original second fonn 
 
 of activity 
 
 and the secondary, their relation to him only 
 as free and responsible is wholly different. For the 
 first he is in no sense responsible. He is no more 
 responsible for his original faculties and desires, or 
 for any action of them before the possible control 
 of will, than he is for his being itself. For the 
 second he is responsible, because though spontane- 
 ous after the voluntary act, yet the nature of this 
 spontaneous activity will depend on that act. The 
 results are indirectly subject to the will. 
 
 We have thus seen what subjective good is, and 
 how it is related to our powers of agency. ^^ ^^ ^ 
 Being the product of all activity that is ^j^£™ 
 according to its law, the idea of it must °'«°'»'y- 
 run back to the very beginnings of consciousness, 
 
62 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 and enter into our conception of ourselves. Of the 
 three great forms of our activity, knowing, feeling, 
 and willing, that of feeling can, like the others, be 
 known only by its action ; and if good be indeed the 
 product of its first activity, then the idea of it must 
 be as elementary as that of thought, or of feeling 
 itself. 
 
 So far as good and its opposite are the product 
 Good and ^^ ^^r being without our own agency, 
 gtft and in-'° they are the immediate gift or infliction of 
 
 flicHon. f.^^ 
 
 So far as they are the residt of our agency 
 Mdp^sh- t^®y ^^^^ probably intended as reward 
 ment. qj, punishment, as we do or do not con- 
 
 form to the laws of our being. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 OBLIGATION : PEKSONALITY A CONDITION. 
 
 We have now examined all the ideas conditiona] 
 for obligation except that of personality. pg„o„g,jt^ 
 This holds the same place among ideas of »«°'«u««n. 
 the Moral Reason that the idea of being does among 
 those of pure reason; for as all attributes and 
 changes and causations imply being, so do all moral 
 actions imply a person. 
 
 The idea of personality is simple, but it must 
 imply at least Moral Reason and Free-will, idea of per- 
 
 " . . , . 1 . , fonality Sim- 
 
 it must consist m that which, m the p'e- 
 
 upward progress of the creation, is added to the 
 animal nature that it may not only have a home 
 in that nature and govern it, but also govern itself 
 according to its own recognized law. It must con- 
 sist in that which gives its dignity and excellence to 
 our nature, and so its right to govern. This right 
 is from the power of self-government with reference 
 to ends, and so of voluntary cooperation with God, 
 or the reverse. It is in this that the peculiarity 
 and dignity of man and his right to dominion are 
 found. Probably the first apprehension of the 
 person by himself, his first knowledge of himself aa 
 a person, is the consciousness of this dominion, first 
 
64 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 over himself, and then over all that is below him. . 
 " And God said let us make man in our image, 
 after our likeness, and let them have dominion." 
 The right and power of control over that which is 
 below him man could not have if he had not 
 dominion over himself. 
 
 Such prerogatives and powers, if known at all, 
 Beat of re- "lust be known immediately, and in 
 Bponsibiuiy. ]jj,owing ourselves as possessing them : 
 and so, as persons, we reach the centre and seat of 
 responsibility. This is not the reason, the will, the 
 conscience ; it is the person, the self, the Ego, the 
 man, that chooses and is under obligation. 
 
 Is man then a person ? a being whose nature 
 and prerogative it is to know and choose his own 
 end, whatever that may be ? If not, he is not ra- 
 tional. No definition of man as rational can be given 
 as far as his actions tend to ends which he neither 
 knows nor chooses. But if man be a person, then 
 we are prepared to find the point at which obliga- 
 tion arises. 
 
 As physical law always has respect to force act- 
 obiigation iug Uniformly, so does obligation, or moral 
 
 respectfl 111 
 
 choice. law, always have respect to a person hav- 
 
 iiig the power of choice. The science of morals 
 has for its condition and subject a person choosing. 
 Without this as given it is inconceivable. But as it 
 is distinctive of the action of a person that it is de- 
 termined by choice, obligation will respect that. It 
 will be obligation, first to choose some end and good, 
 
OBLIGATION. 65 
 
 and then to act rationally for the attainment of that. 
 It will therefore respect the voluntary, and not at 
 all the spontaneous action of our nature, except 
 as its spontaneous is determined by its voluntary 
 action. 
 
 At this point able men, as Drs. Chalmers and 
 Archibald Alexander, have differed ; Dr. ^^^ ^^^ 
 Chalmers contending that every moral act Tn, Jnatui* 
 is voluntary, and Dr. Alexander, that this °'^„3°^ 
 can be only if the word voluntary be "°''' 
 made to include acts that are spontaneous. " The 
 word necessary," he says, " should never have been 
 applied to any exercises which are spontaneous or 
 voluntary, bocause all such are free in their very 
 nature." 
 
 It would doubtless have been conceded by both 
 that a sense of responsibility, and so of obligation, 
 is impossible with reference to an event like the ebb 
 and flow of the tides, that has no connection proxi- 
 mate or remote with the will. Certainly no one 
 insists more strongly than Dr. Alexander upon 
 freedom as a ground of responsibility. He even 
 says - that he would admit the self-determining 
 power of the will, whether he understood it or not, 
 f that were necessary to establish the doctrine.^ But 
 we have seen above that one form of spontaneous 
 action has no reference to the will. It will not do 
 therefore to say that spontaneous action as such, is 
 free. What then makes the difference ? The tnith 
 
 1 iforal Science, p. 111. 
 5 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
68 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 The difference between the natural and the moral 
 Moral affec- affections is, that the moral affections are 
 
 tioDS as dia- -,,,"-, i • i • /» 
 
 tinguished Conditioned upon the previous choice or 
 natural. a supromc end, and derive their charac- 
 ter from the character of that. 
 
 We thus see the relation of spontaneous to vol- 
 untary action. In no case is spontaneous 
 
 Conclusion. . . . p .. i 
 
 action either tree or responsible except 
 from its relation to previous voluntary action. So 
 far Moral Philosophy goes. It makes freedom a 
 condition of responsibihty, and says there can be no 
 freedom where there is no choice. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 OBLIGATION NECESSARILY AFFIRMED. 
 
 The ideas prerequisite to obligation have now 
 been considered, and we pass to that, itsneceaauy 
 
 a • . 1 , afiflnnatlon } 
 
 And here we are prepared to say that iavoivea 
 
 , ,11 feeling', 
 
 the moment a man conies to the knowl- the uitim»t» 
 
 fact la 
 
 edge of his end, including the true good morals. 
 of his nature as constituted by God, the Moral Rea- 
 son necessarily affirms obligation to choose that end. 
 
 Such an affirmation for the guidance of man 
 analogy would lead us to expect. It is g^j^jj,^ 
 just that for him as rational, that instinct ^go'i°°oT-' 
 is for the brute, except that man, as free, °""'''' 
 has an alternative. The law of instinct is always 
 from the end of the animal, and its impulses are 
 towards that ; and we should expect that the law 
 of the rational being would, in the same way, be 
 from his end, and that, in connection with the pre- 
 rogative of freedom, and for man as rational, there 
 would be both an idea of the end, and an impulse 
 towards it. 
 
 And it is just this that we find. This supreme 
 end need not be, and is not, known in its obiig»Uon 
 abstract and general form, but obligation an^^* 
 
70 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 is affirmed the moment there is furnished an occa- 
 sion for choice in any specific case involving the 
 end. If the end be to love God, or man, then, as 
 soon as we are brought into such relations to them 
 that love is possible, the obligation will be affirmed. 
 It is precisely thus that we judge and work in each 
 particular case under mathematical axioms before 
 being able to state them. 
 
 The affirmation of obligation thus made involves 
 Thisafflr both an idea and a feeling ; and these are 
 
 .mation in- , /> n . . . i . « 
 
 Toivesan SO lu a State ot Tusion that we say mdii- 
 feeuLg. ferently, the idea, or the feeling of obliga- 
 tion. The Moral Reason being conditioned, as we 
 have seen, upon a sensibility, this is true of all its 
 products. Like carburetted hydrogen, they are 
 charged with both light and heat. The product of 
 reason simply, is an idea ; the product of the Moral 
 Reason is an idea and a feeling thus blended, and 
 this is higher. The brutes have feeling, but not 
 reason. Man has feeling and reason separately, 
 and often as opposed to each other, but in his 
 proper personality there is a perfect blending of 
 that part of his nature which feels with that which 
 knows, so that the moving and guiding powers be- 
 come one. " The wheels are full of eyes round 
 about." 
 
 Now let the elective power, not the conative, as 
 Hamilton has it, act in accordance with 
 
 Results. . , PIT. 
 
 the law ot the bemg thus given, and the 
 moral heavens are. set in order for their glad way. 
 
OBLIGATION. 71 
 
 We have now a person under obligation to choose 
 rationally his supreme end, and so under Moral 
 Law. 
 
 Thus do we find law — Moral Law. Moral Law 
 is the affirmation by the Moral Reason of Moral l»w 
 
 T.T i* ,1 n deduced, 
 
 obligation on the part or every man to defined, 
 choose that as his supreme end which God designed 
 him for, and to do whatever would legitimately flow 
 from that choice. If the question respect any infe- 
 rior end we may be governed by inclination, choos- 
 ing it or not, as we please. 
 
 What the end of man is we are to learn as we 
 learn what the end of the eye, or the ear, jj, ^^^^^^ 
 or the hand is. We are to examine his "hatTiid 
 structure, his susceptibilities, his powers •">" learned, 
 physical, mental, moral, and however complex they 
 may be, if there be convergence and unity it can 
 be seen. That there is such convergence and unity 
 was shown in my former lectures. In them the 
 separate systems of which man is composed were 
 examined. Each system has, of course, its own 
 end. The end of the body is to be the home and 
 servant of the mind, and it is most perfect when it 
 most perfectly fulfills that end. The end of the in- 
 tellect is to apprehend all that knowledge of God 
 and his works that will enable man to secure not 
 only his highest, but his whole end. In the same 
 way each of the other systems, as the desires, and 
 the affections, has its end. But when we understand 
 the whole structure of man and his relations, it is 
 
72 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 as obvious, as was formerly shown, that he was 
 made to love God with all his heart and his neigh- 
 bor as himself, as it is that the eye was made to see 
 with, or the ear to hear with. This is his highest 
 end as active — love itself as an activity, and the 
 further activities that spring from love. This is 
 what he was made to do. As capable of enjoyment 
 his highest end is the joy that comes from thus 
 loving. These God has inseparably united. The 
 joy can come only from the love ; the love cannot 
 be without the joy. 
 
 Now what we say is, that no unperverted rational 
 This ncccs- and moral being can be brought into a 
 
 eary afflr- ... i • i i p i • i 
 
 maHon the positiou lu which he must put Torth either 
 
 nltiinate ftict r i mi 
 
 in morals, love — good-will — ou the oue hand, or 
 selfishness or malignity on the other, and not affirm, 
 immediately, and necessarily, obligation to love. 
 This affirmation is altogether peculiar, and is the 
 primaiy, or, if you please, the ultimate fact in mor- 
 als. It is made in view of the end as good — the 
 good of beings capable of good. In it is involved 
 all that we mean by the word ought, which has in it 
 an element both of impulse and of authority. Im- 
 pulse is not law, even that from the moral nature. 
 It never can be. It is only the affirmation, the 
 rational affirmation of obligation that can give 
 binding force to law. We are under obligation — 
 we ought to choose the good and refuse the evil. 
 The good we choose and seek to promote, as good, 
 as having value in itself. The choice is right. 
 
OBLIGATION. 73 
 
 Any impulse from a natural principle of action is 
 an indication that a thing is to be done if i-he sphere 
 there be no counteracting reason ; but °*''™p"''*- 
 lower impulses are to give place to higher, and all 
 others to those from the moral nature. It is the 
 impulses from this that are virtually madu by many 
 the basis of moral science ; but no impulse can be 
 the basis of science, or can have authority as such. 
 Science, and the direct authority of reason as dis- 
 tinguished from that which is indirect through 
 faith, can be based only on insight and comprehen- 
 sion ; and if the reason on the ground of which 
 obligation is affirmed by the Divine Mind is so hid- 
 den from man that he cannot affirm it on the same 
 ground, then science is impossible, and this whole 
 subject must be relegated to the region of faith. 
 
 But if man is capable of seeing in the good of 
 God and his creatures that which has in- c^oi^^, 
 finite worth as valuable in itself, and if he ^°^^^y>j 
 is so constituted as necessarily to affirm '^*«"'- 
 obligation to choose and promote this good, and to 
 see that the principle of action which w^ould secure 
 it is infinitely lovely, then is there upon him from 
 each and all of these the behest of reason, affirm- 
 ing its own authority, requiring him to choose this, 
 and from which he can no more escape than from 
 his being itself. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 OBLIGATION : PALEY : OBLIGATION AND AU- 
 THORITY. 
 
 The above account of obligation is wholly differ- 
 ent from that given by Paley. According to him, 
 to be under obligation and to be obliged are the 
 same thing, and "a man is obliged when he is 
 urged by a violent motive resulting from the com- 
 mand of another." But according to the view 
 above given — no direct command of another is in- 
 volved, and in the sense in which Paley uses the 
 word, the motive need not be violent. 
 
 As obligation is so early and so much connected 
 with the command of others, as of parents, of civil 
 rulers and of God, it is not, perhaps, strange that 
 some should make the obligation dependent on the 
 command. But surely mere will, a command as 
 such, cannot be the foundation of obligation, for 
 what is to legitimate the command ? Either com- 
 mand must be obligatory as such, or there must be 
 some test in a moral being by which it can be de- 
 termined whether a command is a righteous com- 
 mand, and it is only on the supposition of such a 
 test that any being can be " a law unto himself." 
 
OBLIGATION. 75 
 
 But such a test can consist only in a direct affirma- 
 tion of the Moral Reason. Let its grounds be fully 
 set forth and a decision must be given within the 
 consciousness of a moral being from whicli' there 
 can be, /or him, no appeal. The affirmation is that 
 the person is under obhgation, and as long as this 
 continues to be made the man must act in accord- 
 ance with it or disclaim the authority of his moral 
 nature. Refusing to act in accordance with obliga- 
 tion thus affirmed, the purity and dignity and worthi- 
 ness of a moral being would be compromised, and 
 baseness and conscious degradation would be in- 
 curred. There would be the reaction of reason 
 against itself as failing to act reasonably, and so 
 self-condemnation, remorse, the biting back of him- 
 self by a being that condemns himself. So far as 
 we can see, it must pertain to the very nature of a 
 moral being to affirm obligation to choose and pro- 
 mote well-being rather than the reverse, and that 
 the alternative must be either that we do choose 
 this, or that we give ourselves up to be governed by 
 some lower principle of action and so to degrada- 
 tion and self-condemnation. This affirmation and 
 alternative we may reverently say belong to God 
 himself as a moral being. With him there can be 
 no motive from the command of another, and yet 
 there is no being in whom the affirmation is so ab- 
 solute. " Shall not the judge of all the earth do 
 right?' 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 OLTIMATE MORAL IDEA6 : WHEWELL : THEOKT OV 
 RIGHT. 
 
 We are now in a position to see distinctly the 
 iuiatioaof relation to each other of ultimate ideas in 
 
 ultimate i a i* 11 
 
 moral ideas, morals. According to the above state- 
 ments moral action is in two spheres, that of choice, 
 and that of volition or conduct. In the sphere of 
 choice the ultimate conditional idea for a moral act 
 is an end or good ; the ultimate moral idea is obli- 
 gation, or the affirmation of the ought; and the 
 ultimate moral act is choice. Of the obligation to 
 choose one end rather than another the ground 
 must be in the end chosen, since, if two ends be 
 equally valuable, it can make no difference which is 
 chosen. The choice may be right or wrong, but 
 by no possibihty can the obhgation depend upon 
 any quality in the act of choosing. 
 
 In the second, or what I regard as the sub- 
 niumate Ordinate sphere of moral activity, the 
 
 Ideas in , . j- • , . n . . i 
 
 secondary ultimate Conditional idea is a rule or law ; 
 morals. the ultimate moral idea is right, and the 
 ultimate moral act is a volition producing conformity 
 or want of conformity to a rule ; or, if a rule be not 
 admitted, it is doing right because it is right. 
 
OBLIGATION. 77 
 
 Right lias oommonly been supposed to be the 
 altimate, or rather to be the moral idea. Right not 
 It is said, and that is perhaps the popular w™- 
 system now, that right is a necessary and indepen- 
 dent idea ; that the distinctions of right and wrong 
 are inherent in the nature of things in the same 
 way as mathematical ideas are independent and 
 necessarily involved in the relations of space and 
 of quantity. But right and wrong, morally con- 
 sidered, can have nothing to do with any nature of 
 things existing necessarily, as we conceive space to 
 do, but only with the nature of persons, so that no 
 act which may not affect the interest of some per- 
 son can be a moral act. Right and wrong have, 
 indeed, nothing to do with things, but only with 
 actions, and it produces confusion to speak of the 
 nature of things, and of necessity from that when 
 the province of morality is wholly without, or rather 
 above the sphere of things, and when the only 
 necessity there is about it is the necessary affirma- 
 tion by the Moral Reason that a person capable of 
 apprehending good and evil is under obligation to 
 choose the good and reject the evil. 
 
 But if, with Whewell, we make right mean 
 " conformable to a rule," we shall then 
 
 WheweU. 
 
 have obligation as the moral idea, and 
 
 right will be, as it really is, a moral idea only as it 
 
 involves that. 
 
 Many acts having no reference to the supreme 
 end we call right, but they involve no obligation, 
 
78 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 and hence are not moral. In studying it is right to 
 sit or to stand, because the end may be reached equal- 
 ly well in either way. But every ac; bearing upon 
 the supreme end, and because it does thus bear 
 upon it, involves obligation and is thus a moral act. 
 The obligation which is in it, and which makes 
 it a moral act is there from the affirmation of the 
 Moral Reason in view of the good there is in the 
 end. 
 
 The above view provides perfectly for freedom in 
 What this setting obligation and moral law over 
 oiudOTand agaiust all mere impulsion and craving; 
 impues. j|. afgjjds that the ultimate act in morals 
 is generic choice ; that the proper object of choice 
 is good, and therefore that right is not the last worJ 
 that can an(l must be said on this subject. It holds 
 that right is a quality of action, and that action must 
 have some end besides its own quality. It therefore 
 goes back to a good to be chosen for its own sake, 
 and to an ultimate law demanding that it be thus 
 chosen, and makes all morally right action to be 
 right from its relation to that. This generic choice 
 of good it identifies with the love commanded in 
 the Bible, and the choice itself — that is, the choos- 
 ing — with that wisdom which the Bible says is " tlie 
 principal thing." It does not find that the law 
 of God is that we are to do right, but that we are 
 to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and 
 our neighbor as ourselves, and that to do this is to 
 do right. 
 
OBLIGATION. 79 
 
 The contusion from a failure to discriminate the 
 spheres above mentioned may be seen by 
 
 WheweU. 
 
 a reference to the "Elements of Morality " 
 by Whewell. Whewell has just passed away, and 
 is the last eminent English writer on this subject. 
 That I may not misrepresent him, and may the 
 better show the relation of ideas at this point, I will 
 quote him at some length. 
 
 " The adjective right" he says, " signifies conformahh 
 to rule ; and it is used with reference to the object of 
 the rule. To be temperate is the right way to be 
 healthy. To labor is the right way to gain money. In 
 these cases the adjective right is used relatively, that is 
 relatively to the object of the rule. 
 
 " It has been said also that we may have a series ot 
 actions, each of which is a means to the next as an end. 
 A man labors that he may gain money, that he may 
 educate his children : he would educate his children, 
 in order that they may prosper in the world. In these 
 cases the inferior ends lead to higher ones, and derive 
 their value from these. Each subordinate action aims 
 at the end next above it as a good. In the series of 
 actions just mentioned, a man's gain is regarded as a 
 good because it tends to the education of his children. 
 Education is considered as valuable because it tends to 
 prosperity. 
 
 " And the rules which prescribe such actions derive 
 their imperative force and validity, each from the rule 
 above it. The superior rule supplies a reason for the 
 inferior. The rule, to labor, derives its force from the 
 rule, to seek gain : this rule receives its force (in the 
 
80 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 case we are considering) from the rule to educate out 
 children : this again, has for its reason to forward the 
 prosperity of our children. 
 
 " But besides such subordinate rules, there must be a 
 supreme rule of human action. For the succession of 
 means and ends with the corresponding series of subor- 
 dinate and superior rules, must somewhere terminate. 
 And the inferior ends would have no value as leading 
 to the highest, except the highest had a value of its 
 own. The superior rules could give no validity to the 
 subordinate ones, except there were a supreme rule 
 from which the validity of all of these were ultimately 
 derived. Therefore there is a supreme rule of human 
 action. That which is conformable to the supreme 
 rule is absolutely right ; and is called right simply, with- 
 out relation to a special end. The opposition to right 
 is wrong. 
 
 " The supreme rule of human action may also be 
 described by its object. 
 
 " The object of the supreme rule of human action is 
 spoken of as the true end of human action, the ultimate 
 or supreme good, the summum bonum. 
 
 " There are various other ways of expressing the 
 opposition of right and wrong, and the supreme rule of 
 human action ; namely, the rule to do what is right and 
 to abstain from doing what is wrong. We say we ought 
 to do what is right ; we ought not to do what is wrong. 
 To do what is right is our duty ; to do what . is wrong is 
 a transgression, an offense ; a violation of our duty ! 
 
 " The question why ? respecting human actions, de- 
 mands a reason, which may be given by a reference 
 from a lower rule to a higher. Why ought I to be 
 
OBLIGATION. 81 
 
 frugal or industrious ? In order that I may not want 
 a maintenance. Why must I avoid want ? Because I 
 must seek to act independently. Why should I act in- 
 dependently ? That I may act rightly. 
 
 " Hence, with regard to the supreme rule, the ques- 
 tion Why ? admits of no further answer. Why must I 
 do what is right ? Because it is right. Why should 
 I do what I ought ? Because I ought. The supreme 
 rule supplies a reason for that which it commands by 
 heing the supreme rule. 
 
 " Bightness and wrongness are, as we have already 
 said, the moral qualities of actions. The rules which, 
 in subordination to the supreme rule, determine what iS' 
 right and wrong, are moral rules. The doctrine which 
 treats of actions as right and wrong is morality." 
 
 It may seem strange that such a man should 
 come so near the truth and yet miss it, but it only 
 shows hovf difficult it is on subjects of this class to 
 make a step, which yet, being made, will seem per- 
 fectly otvious. Having admitted that the object of 
 the Supreme rule of human action is the true end 
 of human action, no reason can be given why the 
 supreme rule should not hold the same relation to 
 the supreme end or good that any other rule does 
 to its end. That would make all rules, as they 
 obviously are, secondary, and would carry moral 
 action back to the choice of a supreme end. But 
 instead of this he allows of no moral action what- 
 ever with reference to the end, but only with refer- 
 ence to the rule. " The supreme rule," he says, 
 
82 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 " supplies a reason for that which it commands by 
 leing the supreme rule." Rightness and wrongness, 
 which are solely from conformity or want of con- 
 formity to rules, he makes the only moral qualities 
 of actions, and leaves no place for moral action as 
 intrinsically good or evil, and as having reference 
 to that end, which, as he allows, gives to all rules 
 except that which is supreme, their validity. Whe- 
 well perceived the necessity of ends ; he subordi- 
 nated rules to them ; he even subordinated lower 
 ends and rules to those that are higher, though he 
 gave no principle of subordination and no law of 
 limitation. But having done this he stopped short, 
 and made rules, and conformity to them, and right, 
 ultimate, instead of ends, and choice, and obliga- 
 tion. 
 
 Whewell says explicitly that the end of human 
 action is happiness. " The supreme object," says 
 he, " of human action is happiness. Happiness is 
 the object of human action contemplated in its most 
 general form, and approved by reason." ^ And yet 
 he regards himself, and is regarded, as belonging 
 to the a 'priori school, because he stops short in his 
 analysis, and draws all moral conduct from rules. 
 
 The system which makes right the ultimate 
 Theory of moral idea, with no avowed reference to 
 
 right: two 11. 1 
 
 phases. rules, has two phases. 
 
 The first regards the sense, or intuition of right, 
 as immediate and infallible. An action is 
 
 nnt phase. . i i . . . , ■, , 
 
 right because it is right, and there is an 
 
 1 Sec. 573. 
 
OBLIGATION. 83 
 
 immediate intuition of it. This admits not only of 
 no rule as a standard, but of no regard to conse- 
 quences. 
 
 The other phase of this system not only allows, 
 but requires, the use of the intellect in g^^^^ 
 seeking for relations, consequences, utili- ''''^' 
 ties, but says that the sense of right is developed 
 only in connection with the apprehension of these. 
 But it does not tell us what the particular relations 
 and consequences needed for this development are, 
 nor why the sense of right should spring from one 
 more than another. It is, indeed, only the indefi- 
 nite system of relations. It gives a place to wis- 
 dom, but instead of making it the right choice of a 
 supreme end, in which alone is wisdom, or at least 
 without which there can be none, it makes it merely 
 skill, or the means to an end. 
 
 The first phase of the above system is definite 
 and consistent with itself. It speaks of iheflrat 
 " Intuitive Morals." But it tends rather p""*"- 
 to the barren declamation of the heathen philoso- 
 phers about virtue, than to the love of God and 
 man, and would make fanatics. 
 
 The second phase of the above system making 
 right an intuition, but making it depend The second 
 on the perception of relations without ''''*™' 
 defining precisely what those relations are, is too 
 indefinite to be the basis of any system. Practically 
 it would agree with the system which makes good 
 ultimate, and if terms were perfectly understood, it 
 
84 MORAL SCIENCE.. 
 
 might be found that the advocates of the two sys- 
 tems really think alike. 
 
 But if, with Whewell, we make right mean 
 " conformable to rule," we shall exclude 
 
 Goncloflioiifl. ... ... . TTT 1 1- 
 
 mtmtion at this pomt. We have, how- 
 ever, only to make all rules, the supreme rule no 
 less than others, derive their authority from ends, 
 to find room for the moral intuition in connection 
 with the supreme end. It is there that an ultimate 
 analysis would carry it, and it is in connection with 
 that, and with choice as the ultimate action of the 
 will that we find that affirmation of obligation of 
 which we have spoken, and in that Moral Law. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 IS THE AFFIRMATION OF OBLIGATION LAW ? 
 
 But the question now arises, whether the affirma- 
 tion above spoken of would be law. When the 
 Moral Reason affirms obhgation to choose and to do 
 good, and to reject and abstain from doing evil, is 
 that law ? Law, it is said, requires a lawgiver, and 
 a penalty annexed. 
 
 Something will here depend upon definition, but 
 that it is properly law will appear (T) Afflrmaiion 
 
 T, .„ f , , . . . ^ ofobUgation 
 
 Because II it be not so, then it is impos- leiaw. 
 sible that any moral being should be " a law unto 
 himself." 
 
 Animals are a law unto themselves by that un- 
 reflective principle which we call instinct, and which 
 beautifully typifies the operation of the moral na- 
 ture. There is in them force, an end, and guiding 
 power, which, as producing uniformity, must act by 
 some rule, and so is called a law. As guiding it to 
 its end, instinct is the law of the animal ; and, in the 
 same way, this affirmation of obligation to choose 
 and to promote good as his end is properly, and 
 ought to be accepted as, the law of the man. The 
 animal having his end chosen for bim, and having 
 no alternative, knows the law only as an impulse ; 
 
86 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 but man, having comprehension, with a possible 
 alternative, knows the law also as an idea, and the 
 end proposed by it as the proper object of rational 
 choice. This makes the law in man to be that of 
 a person ; it makes it to be moral law ; and we can 
 conceive of no other possible way in which a person 
 can be a law unto himself. 
 
 Moral, as distinguished from positive law, is that 
 Moral law ^°^ wliicli a reason can be assigned aside 
 "''**' from the command. To a rational being 
 
 mere command can never be a reasoh for obedience 
 except through faith. Mere command may appeal 
 to the sensitive nature through fear, but not to 
 reason. For one who could trace no connection 
 between the thing commanded and his supreme 
 end, confidence in the lawgiver as wise and good, 
 and that alone, could make the law obligatory. 
 Ultimate reasons for actions can be drawn only 
 from ends, and the highest reasons from the highest 
 ends. If then we suppose the whole end of a being 
 to be in question, the highest possible obligation 
 will be imposed ; and the affirmation of obligation 
 in view of such an end will be simply the affirma- 
 tion by reason of obligation to act reasonably. 
 What higher end or ground of obligation can there 
 be than the good of all beings capable of good, our- 
 selves included? arul it is the affirmation by the 
 Moral Reason of obligation to choose and to pro- 
 mote this that we call Moral Law. 
 
 If we may venture to speak of God in such a 
 
IS THE AFFIRMATION OF OBLIGATION LAW ? 87 
 
 connection, we can conceive of Him as acting mor- 
 ally in no other way than this. He acts in Goda«t»in 
 view of ends, and so rationally, but if ^«"<>'™d« 
 his reason did not affirm obligation to choose some 
 ends and reject others, we cannot see that He would 
 be a moral being. So is He a law unto himself. So 
 only can He be. So is man, who is made in his im- 
 age, a law unto himself; and it is because man is 
 made in his image that God proposes to him the 
 very same end as a ground of obligation which He 
 himself recognizes. God seeks his own glory, which 
 is simply his perfections manifested in promoting 
 the highest ends. He seeks to promote blessedness 
 unselfishly and impartially. Man is to do the same, 
 and for the same reason. The will of God does 
 indeed come in, and the conscience is so made as 
 to respond to that, but the ultimate ground of obli- 
 gation is not in will as will, but in those ends, hav- 
 ing intrinsic value, which ought to determine the 
 wiU. • 
 
 But (2) Authority is an attribute of law, and 
 obligation as thus affirmed involves that, obligation 
 
 involves 
 
 It is this attribute of authority which authority. 
 Bishop Butler specially claimed as belonging to the 
 moral faculty, and as fitting it to legislate 
 
 , , ■,. n Butler. 
 
 for man. " It is," says he, " by this fac- 
 ulty natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that 
 he is a law to himself; by this faculty, I say, not 
 to be considered merely as a principle in his heart 
 which is to have some influence as well as others. 
 
88 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 but considered as a faculty in kind and nature 
 supreme over all others, and which bears its owU 
 authority of being so." 
 
 And not only is there this inherent authority in 
 the nature of obligation, but, as affirmed obligation 
 by the reason of a creature it implies a ™^necom- 
 divine command. In creating beings in his ""^ ' 
 image, and in placing before them the same ends In 
 view of which He acts, there is implied the whole 
 authority of God as guardian of the universe for the 
 attainment and security of those ends. This it is 
 that makes Him a father, and his creatures children, 
 for in a well-constituted family the father and the 
 children act for a common end, the father from 
 comprehension of the end, tlie children, according 
 to their intelligence, partly from that, and partly 
 from faith ; and no being incapable of acting for 
 the same end as a parent can be properly a child. 
 
 Again, it may be inquired whether all authority 
 does not imply a penalty when the com- obugaaon 
 
 c J r^ J implies » 
 
 mands imposed by it are not obeyed. If penalty. 
 so, then the notion of penalty, which has been 
 thought by many to be essential to that of law, is 
 not wanting here. That a command uttered 
 through the constitution should announce distinc- 
 tively its own penalty, is not, indeed, possible. As 
 fear, when there is danger to the constitution from 
 the violation of physical well-being, does not an- 
 nounce the nature or extent of the penalty, but 
 only the fact that there is one, so we might appre- 
 
OBLIGATION. 89 
 
 hend that there would be, connected with danger 
 to moral well-being, something indicative of pen- 
 alty, " a certain fearful looking for of judgment,'' 
 and this we find there is. 
 
 Thus do we find Moral Law. It is an affirmation 
 through the Moral Reason of obligation to oonoiusion. 
 choose the supreme end for which God between* 
 made us, that is, to choose the good of all ^"^8™* 
 beings capable of good, our own included, ^^' 
 and to put forth all those volitions which may be 
 required to attain or secure that good. Such a law 
 within a man will cause him to be without excuse 
 in the absence of positive law, and will enable him 
 to recognize the sacredness and obligation of a 
 code of moral laws when imposed by another. It 
 makes him a proper subject of moral government. 
 It is from this that the law externally revealed 
 finds a response in every breast, and becomes its 
 own witness that it is from God ; and if it be in- 
 deed the true law of the conscience then can that 
 never be at peace till it and the law are in con^ 
 formity. If we suppose a revealed law to be iden- 
 tical with the Moral Law in its substance, it will still 
 differ from it in emanating from an authority with- 
 out ourselves, and in having annexed to it a positive 
 and specific penalty.^ 
 
 > See Appendix A. 
 
CHAPTEE XL 
 
 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 MoKAL Reason affirms Moral Law. This makes 
 Conscience possible. Conscience is the 
 
 Definition, , ^ • ■ j? z * 
 
 andfuno- moral consctousness oj man m view oj nis 
 own actions as related to Moral Law. It 
 is a testifying state. As the name imports, it is 
 a double knowledge, a knowledge by the man of 
 himself together with a knowledge of the law and 
 as related to that. It involves a recognition by the 
 person of the moral quahty of his own acts, and the 
 feelings consequent upon such recognition. It 
 affirms obligation before the act, approves or dis- 
 approves after the act, and in doing this indicates 
 future reward and punishment. 
 
 As thus defined, Conscience is not the whole of 
 Conscience the moral nature. The Moral Reason rec- 
 wiioie of the oguizes Moral Law, and affirms its univer- 
 ture. sal obligation for all moral beings.' It is 
 
 the office of Conscience to bring man into personal 
 relation to this law. It sets up a tribunal within 
 him by which his own actions are judged, but it is 
 under Moral Reason and not under Conscience that 
 
CONSCIENCE. 91 
 
 we judge of the conduct of others. For such judg- 
 ment there is needed the knowledge of Moral Law, 
 of the moral quality of actions, and the ability to 
 compare the actions with the law. In all this is 
 knowledge involving Moral Reason ; there is the 
 science, but not the cow-science. There is no im- 
 pulse, no testifying state, no self-approval or re- 
 morse, all of which must be regarded either as a 
 part of Conscience, or inseparable from it. 
 
 In Conscience, as affirming obligation in view of 
 good to be attained or promoted by our- congji^nj, 
 selves, there is involved a peculiar motive y™'™ """ 
 to action that is expressed by the word """b'''" 
 ought. This is a motive wholly unknown to any 
 being below man. An animal may be moved by 
 hope, or fear, or desire, or impulse, but we have no 
 evidence that any one ever does an act because it 
 ought. There is no evidence that an animal ever 
 consciously recognizes law of any kind, much less 
 Moral Law. But the peculiar significance and bind- 
 ing force of the word ought is from its relation to 
 Moral Law. There is in it impulse, but also obliga- 
 tion — the felt bond upon a rational creature, as 
 rational, to obey the law of his being. 
 
 It is solely as the interpreter of Moral Law that 
 
 Conscience has authority. From that is its Authority 
 
 '' ^ of Con- 
 
 power to originate the word ought,- and ^j^^^-J^' 
 
 whenever the mandate and impulse in- »"* "'"P"- 
 
 volved in that word are truly derived from the law 
 
 they are to be obeyed at all hazards. It would be 
 
92 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 absurd to say that anything could excuse a man 
 from doing what he ought to do. Moral Law must 
 be supreme. If there be not a faculty in man that 
 recognizes moral law, he is not a moral being ; but 
 if there be, then that law must have authority in 
 virtue of its being law. It must be always obliga- 
 tory and can admit of no exception. Rules, as 
 means to an end, may admit of exception, but the 
 great Law of Love can admit of no exception. 
 
 The word ought, as has been said, implies both 
 Obligation impulsc and obligation. These are to be 
 distin- distinguished ; for while obligation always 
 
 guished. , -. , , , . ■. 
 
 limitation mvolvcs impulsc, there are yet impulses 
 
 of moral i n • i 
 
 impulses. from the moral nature, often too mistaken 
 for conscience, which do not involve obligation. 
 These are moral instincts, and were needed. Com- 
 ing up as man does from entire ignorance, he needed 
 in his moral nature particular tendencies and im- 
 pulses to direct him, in a more special way than 
 could belong to the general command of royal au- 
 thority that must bear sway over all. Accordingly 
 we have special impulses under such limited ideas 
 as justice, mercy, and truth. These afford a pre- 
 sumption in favor of the course indicated, but re- 
 quire regulation precisely like pity, or shame, or any 
 other spontaneous or impulsive part of our frame. 
 Such impulses- may conflict with each other. Pity 
 would relieve all beggars ; benevolence would say 
 no. Justice would often punish when mercy would 
 say no. If there were an absolute justice with no 
 
CONSCIENCE. 93 
 
 limitation from love, mercy would be impossible. 
 Even the impulse to truth is to be so controlled 
 that the truth is not to be spoken at all times. Be- 
 sides, what is to prevent justice from running into 
 revenge, or compassion from becoming weakness ? 
 Plainly we need an authority that shall decide even 
 among the impulses of the moral nature. 
 
 This distinction between impulses towards some 
 particular form of right action, and that impaise 
 
 ■^ . cannot be 
 
 general control of the Moral Reason which i»w- 
 becomes an enlightened conscience when our own 
 actions are concerned, has been too much over- 
 looked. We need to make it because many con- 
 found these particular impulses with Conscience, 
 and great abuses have come from following them 
 blindly. Impulse cannot be law. 
 
 But if impulse be not law, we need to inquire 
 under what conditions the decisions of Con- conscience 
 science must be given so that the impulses ^^ *" 
 connected with them may be safely fol- ^^*^^- 
 lowed. 
 
 In deciding this, we are to remember that the 
 decisions of the conscience no more depend on the 
 will than do those of the intellect. The conditions 
 being given its action is necessitated, and we can 
 control that action only by controlling the con- 
 ditions. If this were not so, man would not have a 
 moral nature. But since he can control the con- 
 ditions, a man may be bound to have right de- 
 cisions of his conscience precisely as he is to have 
 right decisions of the intellect. 
 
94 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Both the intellect and the conscience act in two 
 Analogous different and analogous spheres. The 
 conscience jSrst splierc of the intellect is that of ulti- 
 
 aad Intel- \ . . ^ ., . . . .„ j 
 
 leot. mate intuitions. In this it is unitorm and 
 
 infallible in its judgments. That two paralled lines 
 cannot enclose a space, and that every body must 
 be in space, all capable of understanding the terms, 
 will agree. So the first sphere of the conscience is 
 that of ultimate choices, where the supreme end of 
 man, and essential goodness and wickedness are 
 concerned. Here Conscience is brought face to 
 face with Moral Law, and when this is done it can 
 decide in but one way. It cannot approve the 
 choice of evil as evil. It cannot say, or be made to 
 say, that malignity, which is essential wickedness, 
 is, or can be obligatory. When the law says, 
 " choose the good, reject the evil ; " " love God and 
 your neighbor," Conscience must recognize this as 
 obligatory under all circumstances, because there 
 are no conditions, and no means can come between 
 the conscience and the choosing. Even volition is 
 not needed. The act of choosing is simple and 
 ultimate. No one can teach another how to do it, 
 and if a man do not choose the good, the cause and 
 the fault must be in himself. jA 
 
 But the good which it is the end of man to pro- 
 Conscionce motc is seldom presented thus purelv and 
 
 foUows the . ^ TO 
 
 iuiigment. Simply. Heuce the need of the exertion, 
 often of the strenuous exertion, of every faculty to 
 discriminate it. Hence cases before the tribunal of 
 
CONSCIENCE. 96 
 
 conscience may be like those before a court, re- 
 quiring a careful weighing of testimony and of 
 probabilities. In such cases the question is not, it 
 never can be. Shall we do right? Shall we do 
 what we ought to do ? but, What is right ? What 
 ought we to do? and in deciding this it will be 
 found that we are really inquiring whether the 
 course in question can be brought under the Law 
 of Love. If not, there would be no tribunal. In 
 these cases, and always, the moment we pass beyond 
 the ultimate choice and supreme end to that where 
 means are to be used, there is room for diversity 
 of judgment. Different practices claim to come 
 under this law of love. That claim is denied, and 
 in the ignorance and endless confusions of this worlc 
 it is often difficult to settle questions that thus arise. 
 Is revenge, or polygamy, or the sale of ardent spirits 
 right ? Is war right ? Is it right to deceive an en- 
 emy? Here the conscience may not be fairly 
 brought face to face with the moral law. It must 
 follow the judgment, and that may be wrong fi-om 
 ignorance or prejudice. Are these for the highest 
 good of the community and of those engaged in 
 them ? Are they accordant with the law of love ? 
 This law every conscience will affirm that we ought 
 to obey. Here will be uniformity. But in regard 
 to specific practices the decisions will vary as they 
 are supposed to be, or not to be, in accordance with 
 the law. In this way honest, but partially in- 
 formed persons may differ in regard to many things. 
 
96 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 This will not show a diversity of moral judgment, or 
 in the action of Conscience, but simply that it will 
 follow the judgment. 
 
 But the main cause of the diversity and confusion 
 confuBion ^^ moral judgments among men is the 
 ^dga^ts. stupefying and bewildering effect of the 
 *™° choosing of a wrong supreme end. When 
 
 that is once done principle is abandoned, the guid- 
 ance of Conscience is abandoned, and it immediately 
 becomes the interest of the man to evade fair issues. 
 The end being decided on, irrevocably so, every- 
 thing will be viewed in false relations. The orig- 
 inal question in regard to which Conscience is in- 
 fallible is now put and kept out of sight, and every- 
 thing will be judged of as right or wrong from its 
 relation to the end chosen. In such cases Con- 
 science will still wait on the judgment even though 
 a wrong supreme end has been chosen. It does 
 not approve anything as evU, but the man has said 
 to evil, " Be thou my good," and the conscience is 
 deceived. Thus it is that a man may come to think 
 that he " ought to do many things contrary " to 
 truth and righteousness, and go on acting upon 
 false judgments which a thorough honesty would 
 sweep wholly away. 
 
 Of such honesty, or as some would call it, sin- 
 sincerity cerity, the ultimate point is that a man 
 
 coaditional . « 
 
 foreniight- put himself face to face with the Moral 
 
 ened coa- -*■ 
 
 science. Law, and the whole of it — that, as our 
 Saviour says, he should " come to the light." Let 
 
CONSCIENCE. 97 
 
 this be done, and the moral consciousness will re- 
 spond rightly, and the impulse connected with such 
 response will have legitimate and sovereign author- 
 ity. The simple question is. Has God so revealed 
 the Moral Law in man that he can he a law unto 
 himself? If so, Conscience must be the moral con- 
 sciousness in presence of that law, and all mandates 
 and impulses from that consciousness must be 
 authoritative, or there is, and can be, no law. Such 
 impulses will be rational and moral, and a conscience 
 so acting will be an enlightened conscience. 
 
 But if the moral being, the person, turn wholly 
 from the law, if he choose a wrong su- iiesuit of a 
 
 ' _ ^ ° want of sin- 
 
 preme end, then is the seat itself of author- ««"'y- 
 ity corrupted. He turns from the ark of God and 
 the tables of the law to the worship of idols. There 
 is now no rightful authority. There is anarchy. 
 The law being set aside, the very condition of a 
 right moral consciousness is wanting. " Unto 
 them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing 
 pure ; but even their mind and conscience is de- 
 filed." The man is lost. The light that was in 
 him has become darkness, and " how great is that 
 darkness." If a man would have " a good con- 
 science," he must first be "in all things willing to 
 live honestly." 
 
 What we say, then, on this subject is, — 1st, thai 
 when the conscience is fairly brought face 
 to face with the Moral Law, the great law 
 
98 MOKAL SCIENCE. 
 
 of love, its decisions will be uniform and authorita- 
 tiye. 
 
 2d. That persons may honestly differ respecting 
 the means of fulfilling the Moral Law, one approving 
 as right what another disapproves as wrong. And 
 
 3d. That when once a wrong supreme end has 
 been chosen no consistency or uniformity of judg- 
 ment can be expected. " Even their mind and con- 
 science is defiled." 
 
 We have thus considered Conscience in its double 
 nature, as both rational and impulsive. That it has 
 a nature thus double has always made it difficult of 
 investigation ; but only through such a faculty, con- 
 ditioned on a sensibihty, were moral law and ade- 
 quate motive power possible. 
 
DIVISION n. 
 
 OF LOVE. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 RATIONAL LOVE : ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND 
 SPHERE. 
 
 Having now considered the nature and relations 
 of Law, particularly of Moral Law, we turn to those 
 of Love. 
 
 Like law, love is a term of great breadth and 
 variety in its application ; like that too, it lotb, an 
 
 11... 1 . Inclusivo 
 
 includes m its lowest use mere things term, 
 without sensibility. We are said to love food, 
 money, books, fame. Thus used it includes only 
 the element of desire, which is common to love in 
 all its forms, but does not constitute it. The com- 
 mon element of law is uniformity, produced or 
 commanded. The common element of love is de- 
 sire, and its common result an inclination towards, 
 or complacency in the object loved. In this appli- 
 cation of it moral science has no more to do with 
 love than it has with law as applied to matter. 
 
100 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 There is also an instinctive love, sometimes called 
 Instinctive natural affection. This is common to ani- 
 '°™- mals and to man. It is from the emotive 
 
 nature simply, and so, blind and passionate, not 
 comprehending itself or its object. As instinctive, 
 it is an affection which leads to acts often of great 
 apparent self-denial, which tend to promote or secure 
 the end of the being loved. It tends to secure that^ 
 and not the end of the being putting forth the love, 
 and is thus a beautiful type of a higher rational 
 and disinterested love. This rational love s^lways 
 has its root in a generic choice. It is by having its 
 root in such a choice that rational and moral love, 
 and indeed all rational and moral affections, are 
 distinguished from those that are natural. 
 
 In accordance with the above, rational love pre- 
 Rationai supposes a knowledge of the supreme end 
 '""• of the being loved, and involves the choice 
 
 for him of that end. Its object must be a person. 
 In strictness we desire things, but love only per- 
 sons. It is not properly a disposition, though a 
 disposition and a habit of acting so as to secure 
 the end chosen will be generated by any generic 
 act of choice. Only a rational being can have a 
 supreme end, and the choice by us of that end for 
 another so as to be willing to put forth efforts and 
 mate sacrifices for its attainment is rational love. 
 
 In the whole process and formation of this love 
 BiementBof three things are to be distinguished, 
 rational There is (1) a perception of worth as 
 
RATIONAL LOVE. 101 
 
 distinguished from worthiness. This involves an 
 appreciation of the capahihties, and also of the ha- 
 bilities of the being, and can be, only as we know 
 his end, the desirableness of his attaining it, and 
 the fearfulness of his not doing so. This is rather 
 a condition of love than one of its elements. There 
 is (2) a " propension " of mind, as Edwards calls 
 it, towards the being, and a desire that he should 
 attain his end. This is an indispensable element of 
 love, but not the love itself. It is spontaneous, 
 and may be overcome by other forms of spontane- 
 ous action. That it may become rational love 
 there must be (3) a choice for the being of his end, 
 and such a devotement of ourselves to him — that 
 is, to the attainment by him of his end and good, — 
 that we shall be willing to make sacrifices for it as 
 we would for our own. It is this last only which 
 constitutes the whole process, rational and free, and 
 brings it under the control of Moral Law.^ 
 
 From this general character of rational love we 
 see at once what self-love and benevo- seif-iove 
 lence must be, and their relations to each lence. 
 other. Self-love is the choice by any being of his 
 own legitimate good. It is the choice for himself 
 of the good that must come from the activity of his 
 powers in the pursuit and enjoyment of his supreme 
 end. Benevolence is the choice and will that other 
 beings shall attain their own legitimate good, that 
 is, the good that must come to them from the activ- 
 
 1 See Appendix B. 
 
102 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 itv of their powers in the pursuit of their supreme 
 end. 
 
 In its lower forms benevolence is manifested by 
 so controlling all sensitive beings within our power, 
 and incapable of choosing their end, that that end 
 shall be attained; and in its higher form, by seek- 
 ing to induce all who are capable of choosing their 
 own end to choose it. The measure of benevolence 
 is the amount of effort and self-sacrifice that any 
 one is willing to put forth and endure that others 
 may attain their end. Rational love as a whole 
 will then include a choice by us for all other beings 
 of their end and good, and for ourselves of our own 
 end and good. It will also include the necessary 
 volitions and activities for the attainment of those 
 ends. 
 
 In the above statement it will be seen that the 
 Self-love point of uniou between self-love and be- 
 r^^e'har-"" nevolcncc is the common element of good, 
 moniied. ^jj^^. jg^ ^f |.jjg^^ g^g their object which is 
 
 valuable in itself, and that through this they con- 
 stitute the one whole of rational love. Hence the 
 ground of obligation for self-love and benevolence 
 is the same ; and hence, too, there can never be 
 opposition between them. On the contrary, they 
 are conspiring forces, not only as having a common 
 object, but as mutually contributing to each other. 
 That form of activity by which we promote the 
 good of others, is, more than any other, promotive 
 of our own good. 
 
RATIONAL LOVE. 103 
 
 From a failure to perceive this narmony, or 
 rather unity in the parts of one whole, much use- 
 less discussion and some pernicious systems have 
 arisen. That this union should be seen and acted 
 on is one of the great wants of the world. 
 
CHAPTER n. 
 
 COMPLACENT LOVE AND RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION. 
 
 Befoee leaving the topic of love, it ought to be 
 First indi- ^dded, that, subsequent to rational love, 
 oTraUonai ^^^ made possible by it, are certain indi- 
 '°™- rect results ; and first, the love of compla- 
 
 cency. This is not the love commanded by God, 
 since that includes love to the wicked, and even to 
 our enemies. It is conditioned, not on being as 
 having capacity for good and evil, but as having 
 ■will and choosing rightly. Its condition is moral 
 excellence in the person beloved, and it also implies 
 moral excellence in the person loving. It is not 
 approbation or admiration. These may be felt by 
 the wicked. It is delight and joy in view of the 
 beauty of holiness, and a sympathy with its pos- 
 sessor by which we are united in affection to him. 
 
 This is among the highest and most delightful of 
 the affections, and will be one great element of the 
 joy of heaven, but it differs from rational love in 
 being not so much a choice as an emotion, or rather 
 it is choice in connection with all that makes emo- 
 tion delightfiil. This emotion, which is what is 
 commonly meant by the love of complacency, is 
 (104) 
 
COMPLACENT LOVE AND RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION. 105 
 
 one of those spontaneous and uniform results of 
 generic choice of which I have spoken, which is 
 not the direct product of will, but for which we are 
 responsible. 
 
 And not only are the love of complacency and 
 the affections cognate with that made second indi- 
 possible by rational love, but also right- '*'" """"• 
 eous indignation and the affections cognate with 
 that. These involve no malignity. They are but 
 the necessary evolution of rational love when its 
 ends are imperilled by wickedness. They are neces- 
 sary to the authority of law, and to the guardian- 
 ship of the rights and interests of the universe. 
 The interests at stake in God's universe are un- 
 speakably precious. As these are apprehended and 
 valued, the worthiness and beauty of an impartial 
 and entire consecration to them are more seen, and 
 so also are the unworthiness and baseness of a dis- 
 regard of them, or opposition to them, and just so 
 intense as the approbation and the admiration may 
 be on the one hand, must the condemnation and 
 abhorrence be on the other. It is this double as- 
 pect of love, revealing the whole moral nature, and 
 turning in every way like the flaming sword that 
 kept the way of the tree of life, that is termed 
 holiness. 
 
DIVISION m. 
 
 THE LAW OF LOVE. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 HOW LOVE BECOMES LAW. 
 
 We have thus seen what Moral Law and Rational 
 Love are. Moral Law is the necessary affirmation 
 by the Moral Reason of obligation to choose and 
 promote well-being. If we suppose a choice or an 
 action that can have no bearing upon well-being, 
 it is impossible to conceive of obligation to make 
 the choice or perform the action. Neither can be 
 right or wrong. But if any choice or action will 
 promote well-being, Moral Law will demand that 
 the choice be made or the action done. But it is 
 this very choice that is the central element of the 
 love demanded, for rational love is the choice by 
 us of the supreme end and good of another, invol- 
 ving a readiness to make sacrifices for that end and 
 good as we would for our own. Hence it is that 
 " Love is the fiilfilling of the law," the very thing 
 it requires. 
 
 In this view of it there is a double motive foi 
 (106) 
 
HOW LOVE BECOMES LAW. 107 
 
 the choice of good, one the imperative of law, the 
 other the intrinsic value and attraction „ ., 
 
 Double mo- 
 
 of good. If there were not in this in- "^oi^o*' 
 trinsic value, aside ft om the affirmation of *°°*' 
 obligation, a reas(m why good should be chosen, 
 oWigation must base itself upon nothing, and could 
 not be rationally affirmed. No one can be under 
 obligation to anything for which there is not, aside 
 from the obligation, more reason than there is 
 against it. The thing required is the choice of a 
 supreme end and commitment to it. This may be 
 done from the imperative of law, or from the at- 
 traction of good, or from their combined effect, the 
 whole nature thus conspiring to induce that love in 
 which must be found our own highest good, and 
 through which alone we can do good to others. 
 Being the rational choice of good, love can never 
 become a bondage, though it be required by an im- 
 perative, but it is only when the choice is so abso- 
 lute in view of the good that the imperative comes 
 in bimply as a conspiring force swelling the current 
 and adding the joy of self-approbation, that there 
 is perfect freedom. Let the imperative be in view 
 of an object approved by reason, and attractive of 
 every rational affection, and the consent of the soul 
 will be that of a young heart affiancing itself to the 
 object of its choice. It will be Reason choosing 
 rationally with no disturbing influence, and that is 
 perfect freedom. It is a rational creature putting 
 forth every energy with perfect love under a per- 
 fect law. 
 
108 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Thus it is that love as obligatory is the law of 
 
 Love, the our being. In substance, and as express- 
 imperative ° T • T_ 
 in Gr.d'3 ing his inmost nature, Love is the one 
 
 word and in ° i i /~l j • l 
 
 niiin. imperative word uttered by brod m the 
 
 Bible. It is also the one imperative word uttered 
 jy Him through the constitution and conscience 
 of man, and in the coincidence of these two utter- 
 ances we find a perfect proof that both are from 
 Him. 
 
 Law and Love ! These are the two mightiest 
 • forces in '■he universe, and thus do we 
 marry them. The place of the nuptials 
 is in the innermost sanctuary of the soul. As in 
 all right marriage, there is both contrariety and deep 
 harmony. Law is stern, majestic, and the fountain 
 of all order. Love is mild, winning, the fountain 
 of all rational spontaneity, that is of the spontaneity 
 that follows rational choice. Love without law is 
 capricious, weak, mischievous ; opposed to law, it is 
 wicked. Law without love is unlovely. The high- 
 est harmony of the universe is in the love of a 
 I'ational being that is coincident with the law of that 
 being rationally affirmed ; and the deepest possible 
 jar and discord is from the love, persistent and utter, 
 of such a being in opposition to his law. It is be- 
 cause there is in the Divine Being this harmony of 
 law with love that He is perfect. It is because this 
 harmony is required in the Divine government that 
 that is perfect, and no philosophy for the regulation 
 of human conduct can be both vital and safe in 
 
HOW LOVE BECOMES LAW. 109 
 
 which that same union is not consummated. In 
 our philosophies, generally, this is not done. Let 
 it be done, and philosophy will no longer be com- 
 plained of as inefficient or skeptical ; it will work 
 with power and in harmony with the Bible. Such 
 a union is demonstrably the only condition of per- 
 fection for the individual or for society, and when 
 it sliall be universally consummated, the Millen- 
 niam will have come. 
 
CHAPTER n. 
 
 THE RELATION OF LOVE TO OTHEB. DUTIES. 
 
 Having now seen what the Law of Love is, we 
 Love in- need to see how it connects itself with spe- 
 oiflc duties, cific dutics. Lovc is sometimes said to be 
 the sum of all our duties, and that it does include 
 them in some sense the Scriptures assert when they 
 say that " Love is the fulfilling of the law." 
 
 But how does love include other duties ? Is it 
 by a process of generalization, as we group 
 a great number of individuals under the 
 one term animal? So some think, making each 
 virtue a part of love. Others say that a generaliza- 
 tion so wide as to include under a single name and vir- 
 tue all others, as justice, mercy, truth, temperance, 
 etc., becomes indefinite and valueless ; and besides 
 that we are conscious of other moral ideas, and of 
 judging immediately and intuitively under them in 
 a way to preclude this view. Thus it is said that 
 we are immediately conscious of obligation to tell 
 the truth without conscious or actual reference to 
 any law of love. 
 
 This difficulty we obviate by observing the rela- 
 tion of primitive ideas to our subsequent thinking. 
 
THE RELATION OF LOVE TO OTHER DUTIES. 11] 
 
 As we have seen, moral action implies the activity 
 of each of the three great departments of Difficulty 
 our nature, the Intellect, the Sensibility, o"™"*- 
 and the Will, and each of these fiarnishes an ultimate 
 idea always involved in such action. From the in- 
 tellect, in the form of reason pure, we have the idea 
 of existence, from the sensibility that of good, and 
 from the will that of freedom. 
 
 In the department of intellect we have as the 
 condition of all other ideas, whether intui- in intellect 
 
 . , „ . ,1 • 1 p » conditional 
 
 tional or from experience, the idea or ex- laea. 
 istence. We then have, not as generalized from it, 
 but as conditioned and regulated by it, the idea, let 
 us say, of our personal identity. Involved in this 
 are the two ideas of existence and of time, and 
 wherever the idea of personal identity goes that of ex- 
 istence and of time must go with it. It can no more 
 outrun or transcend them than the shadow can out- 
 run its substance, and yet it has a similar source as 
 an idea of reason, and is, within its sphere, the 
 basis of immediate and necessary judgments. This 
 is true of other necessary ideas, as of causation 
 and resemblance, all of which have their conditions 
 and subordinations. 
 
 And the same is true of moral ideas. The char- 
 acteristic of these is that they presuppose a condi- 
 
 ,, r. . -IP tional idea 
 
 a person capable oi actmg with reterence in morals. 
 to an end that includes a good. They all imply 
 freedom, and a good in some sensibility to be en- 
 joyed. It is the idea, necessarily affirmed, of 
 
112 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 obligation to choose and impartially promote this 
 good that holds the same place among moral ideas 
 that the idea of existence does among those of piire 
 reason. 
 
 The idea of existence is awakened by the first 
 object we know, and enters unchanged into our 
 conception of every new object till we reach that of 
 an illimitable and infinitely diversified universe. 
 This is by no generalization, no gathering of the 
 many into one, but by the transfusion of the one 
 idea into the many. The idea of existence as an 
 idea cannot change, but our conception of actual 
 and possible existence may be illimitably enlarged. 
 
 So it is with the idea of good. It arises from 
 This condi- the first normal activity of the sensibility, 
 
 tional idea ^ ^ , ^ t . . , 
 
 uiatofgood. and travels with us as we discnmmate its 
 various kinds, just as we do the various kinds of 
 existence, till we reach the conception of a perfect 
 and absolute good for God and his creatures. Hav- 
 ing thus the idea of good, and of obligation to love, 
 that is, of the Law of Love, under that, we can then 
 have the idea, let us say of justice, as conditioned 
 upon the idea of that wider obligation, and as al- 
 ways carrying that with it. Entering into it as a 
 conditioning idea, love will be so a part of justice 
 that justice can never go counter to love, or to any 
 other of the virtues, into all of which, as a part, 
 love must thus, and equally, enter. As it is the 
 presence of the idea of being that enables us to 
 assert anything under the ideas of identity or re- 
 
THE RELATION OF LOVE TO OTHER DUTIES. 113 
 
 semblance, so it is the presence of good that enables 
 us to assert any obligation under justice or truth. 
 
 As in this sense under love, and partaking of it 
 as conditioned upon it, there is room for Duties how 
 
 1 p ,n 1 . 1 n deduced 
 
 any number ot specifac moral ideas, as or from love. 
 justice, mercy, veracity, and for the affirmation of 
 immediate obligation under them within their 
 sphere, while yet that obligation will be limited by 
 the conditioning idea that gave to each particular 
 idea its leave to be. The idea of justice is a moral 
 idea. It is an idea of a mode of action in which 
 the interests of persons are involved. It is not the 
 same as the idea of love or of benevolence, nor is 
 it, as some have asserted, an attribute of benevo- 
 lence. It is as independent of love as the idea of 
 identity is of that of existence, but no more ; and 
 the judgments under the one are as immediate as 
 those under the other. Still its very existence and 
 sphere are determined by the wider idea of good 
 and of obligation to choose that ; and though jus- 
 tice must do its " strange work," it will yet cease 
 to be justice and become tyranny if it ceases to 
 have its root in love and its limit from that. 
 
 We thus find provision for that comprehensive- 
 ness of love which is attributed to it in 
 
 in. I 1 i» 1 . Oonclusion. 
 
 the Dcnptures, and also tor those imme- 
 diate impulsions which arise in connection with 
 specific moral ideas, but which are yet to be tested 
 and limited by their relations to the wider law, — 
 to that, indeed, which alone is absolute law 
 8 
 
CHAPTER in. 
 
 RECONCIUATION OF SYSTEMS. 
 
 Feom the general views above given it is obvious 
 how impossible it must be to construct a complete 
 system of morals that is either wholly intuitional, 
 or wholly teleological. Intuitional systems have 
 their basis in the Moral Reason ; teleological sys- 
 tems have their basis in the Sensibility ; but as the 
 products of the Moral Reason are conditioned upon 
 those of the Sensibility, it is clear that the ideas from 
 each must be inseparably intertwined in any system. 
 Failing to see that a theory of action for the whole 
 man — the highest form of his activity, must be 
 based on his whole nature, the advocates of the in- 
 tuitional system have sought to construct a theory 
 from the intellect alone. Finding the ideas of ob- 
 ligation, right, justice, in their place as essential 
 and ineradicable parts of our frame, they have not 
 sufficiently noticed their dependence upon a Sensi- 
 bility, and their nature as involving feeling. The 
 advocates of teleological systems, on the other hand, 
 have often, like Paley, and with the whole school of 
 experience, either denied altogether or questioned 
 the existence of moral intuitions, failing to see the 
 
EECONCILIATION OF SYSTEMS. 116 
 
 impossibility of morality at all without them. But 
 if we admit on the one liand-that a Sensibility, and 
 its products in so?ne form, are the necessary con- 
 dition of moral ideas ; and on the other that there 
 are moral ideas that are regulative in their sphere 
 as tliose of the pure reason are in theirs, we have 
 materials for a system in which the demands of the 
 Reason and of the Sensibility are both met. The 
 Will acting from the combined light and warmth of 
 the two will have both impulse and guidance, and 
 that circle of interdependence heretofore spoken of 
 will be complete. 
 
 It has been supposed that either goodness, or a 
 good — holiness, or happiness — must be ultimate 
 in a moral system. The truth is, each is ultimate. 
 Goodness is wholly from the Will, and ultimate for 
 that. It is the impartial choice of good, and can be 
 goodness only from its relation to that. A good, 
 on the other hand, is wholly from the Sensibility, 
 and is ultimate for that. It can have no moral 
 quality. When we say holy happiness, we simply 
 mean happiness from holiness. Goodness is good 
 in itself — intrinsically so. It is worthy of appro- 
 bation on its own account. It is the only thing 
 that can be commanded or approved. A good, on 
 the other hand, is a good in itself — intrinsically a 
 good. It is valuable on its own account. It is the 
 only thing that has intrinsic value, and all good 
 things are good from their relation to this. We 
 have thus an ultimate goodness, but possible only on 
 
116 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 the condition of an ultimate good. It is the very 
 choice of good by the Will that is inlmediately known 
 as goodnessi It is the blessedness accompanying this 
 choice that is immediately known as a good, and the 
 highest good. Thus is there from the very action 
 of the will the highest form of sensibility. Thus 
 do the Sensibility and the Will each contribute its 
 equally independent and indispensable part to the 
 one moral system. 
 
 In what is said above, goodness is used as synony- 
 mous with holiness. They are the same except 
 that holiness indicates goodness, more especially in 
 its aspect towards wickedness. 
 
 Perhaps the relation of the ideas in question, to- 
 Good and gether with the anlbiguities of the word 
 goodnesa good, as originating both from the Sensi- 
 bility and the Will, may be illustrated thus : — 
 
 {Goodness. Good. — A good man, as choosing 
 good, and producing it volun- 
 tarily. 
 Person = i Sensibility ) A Good. Good.— A good apple, as pro- 
 ( ducing good involuntarily. 
 
 .Intellect Bational Ideas. 
 
 When therefore the Scriptures say, " Acqiiaint 
 now thyself with Him and be at peace : thereby 
 good shall come unto thee ; " they must refer to a 
 product of the Sensibility. When an eminent writer 
 says, " I hold that there is an inherent and essen- 
 tial distinction between good and evil, just as there 
 is between truth and falsehood,"^ he must refer to 
 
 1 Dr. McCosh, Pres. Beview, No. 63, J). 7. 
 
RECONCILIATION OF SYSTEMS. 117 
 
 a product of the Will, and can only mean that there 
 is an inherent and essential difference between 
 goodness and wickedness. 
 
 Moral Science must be based on the facts of our 
 nature. Those facts no man has stated 
 more accurately than Bishop Butler, and 
 the system contained in the present work is that 
 which I suppose those facts, as stated by him, not 
 only justify, but require. Butler stated facts, but 
 framed no system for the reconciliation of those 
 seemingly discrepant. No man asserted more 
 strenuously than he the direct approval by con- 
 science of certain actions irrespective of conse- 
 quences. That he saw as a fact. And yet he 
 says, " It may be allowed without any prejudice to 
 the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of 
 happiness and misery are of all our ideas the near- 
 est and most important to us ; that they will, nay, 
 if you please, that they ought to prevail over those 
 of order, and beauty, and harmony, and proportion, 
 if there should ever be, as it is impossible there 
 ever should be, any inconsistence between them."^ 
 This he saw as another fact, that is, he saw the ex- 
 istence of an ought from this source that must domi- 
 nate over all others, if conflict were possible. Again 
 lie says, " Though virtue, or moral rectitude does 
 mdeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is 
 right and good as such, yet when we sit down in 
 a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this, 
 1 Sennon XI. 
 
118 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it 
 will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to 
 it." 1 These facts involve the relation of virtue to 
 happiness which has always been the insoluble 
 point, or at least the chief point of division, in 
 moral science. The facts Butler saw, but did not 
 attempt to harmonize them into a system, and so, 
 like all broad and fair-minded men thus situated, 
 may be fairly claimed by opposing systems so long 
 as the true system in which these must unite is not 
 seen. Such a uniting system may be found, if we 
 make the Sensibility a condition for moral ideas, 
 and if we make a distinction between conscience as 
 an impulse and as a law ; and I see no other way. 
 
 In speaking of the relation of the Sensibility to 
 the moral nature, we have hitherto re- Good as a 
 garded it chiefly as conditional for the ac- nirortobc 
 tion of that nature. And from this view '^"<^<^- 
 of it, it will follow that the moral nature can never 
 require the sacrifice of good as a whole. Good is the 
 product of the Sensibility, the ultimate idea having its 
 origin in that. If there be nothing good in itself, 
 there can be no ultimate choice, no supreme end, 
 and no obligation. Good being thus the occasion on 
 which obligation is affirmed, it is absurd to say that 
 there can be obligation to obey a law when the 
 result of obedience, as such, would be misery ; and 
 no one can rationally encounter misery in any form 
 except on the faith of an ultimate good. 
 
 I Sermon XI. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OTHER RELATIONS OF THE SENSIBILITT TO THB 
 MORAL NATURE. 
 
 But the Sensibility has other relations to the 
 moral nature, besides being a condition for its ac- 
 tion, and no theory of morals can be complete if 
 these are not understood. 
 
 And first there is a sensibility originating in the 
 activity of the moral nature itself, and, as gj^sjhiuty 
 it seems to us, inseparable fi-om that ac- t^e^"*^* '" 
 tivity. The moral nature would cease to °»'""- 
 be what it is if the fulfirment of obligation were fol- 
 lowed by no complacency, and its violation by no 
 remorse or sense of degradation. It is through this 
 form and kind of sensibility that we are capable of 
 our highest enjoyment and suffering, that indeed 
 which belongs to us as moral beings. Being thus 
 the necessary product of our natures in its modes 
 of voluntary activity, and not directly dependent on 
 the will of another, the enjoyment and suffering 
 coming thus are not properly reward and punish- 
 ment. They are not a bestowment or infliction, 
 but a part of our being in its necessary action as so 
 constituted. It is this relation of a sensibility thus 
 
120 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 originated that gives to the individual his indepen 
 dence of external circumstances, and that lays fullj 
 upon him. the responsibility for his own essential 
 well-being. 
 
 But besides the sensibility thus inherent in a 
 Sensibiuty moral nature, and dependent directly upon 
 Bources. cholce without volition even, there is also 
 a sensibility in a great variety of forms from other 
 sources than the moral nature, and for the gratifica- 
 tion of which most actions are done. From this 
 both good and evil may come to us through our own 
 voluntary actions, through the actions of others, or 
 through dispensations of Providence over which we 
 have no control. As it is not within this sphere 
 that our supreme end lies, and as those only are 
 moral acts which respect the supreme end, we are 
 under no obligation to have any particular amount 
 or kind of good from it, and if this alone be in ques- 
 tion, are free to choose or reject, to exert ourselves 
 or not with reference to it. 
 
 Any sensibility not from the moral nature may 
 This last bscome its adjuvant. Its impulsions and 
 conflict with solicitations may coincide with the require- 
 
 the moral pi^yriT 
 
 nature. monts 01 the Moral Law, and the momen- 
 tum of joyful activity may be thus increased. Any 
 such sensibility may also be used to tempt or to force 
 the will to act in opposition to moral law. Here is 
 the double nature of man, and the ground of the 
 conflict between the flesh and the spirit. He that 
 consecrates himself to the obedience of moral law is 
 of the spirit ; and he that gives himself up to the 
 
OTHER RELATIONS OF THE SENSIBILITY. 121 
 
 control of any impulse or solicitation, or principle of 
 action uncontrolled by moral law, is of the flesh. 
 
 It is also only through a sensibility not from the 
 moral nature that there can be reward in these the 
 
 1 . . . , sanctions of 
 
 and punishment m any proper sense, and government, 
 so government as distinguished from influence. 
 Clearly there can be no government where there is 
 no dependence on the will of another, and no fear 
 from the action of that will in case of disobedience. 
 To some it seems low and mercenary to be influ- 
 enced by this form of sensibility, but it cannot be low 
 or mercenary to be influenced by that which alone 
 can be the sanction of government, and which comes 
 not alone, but as an expression of the approbation 
 or disapprobation of a perfect moral governor. It 
 cannot be low or mercenary to desire and seek for 
 a good that is an end in itself, and that is so in- 
 herent in a sensibility given by God as to be of its 
 very essence when it is in right action. 
 
 I wiU only add that where moral order reigns 
 good from all forms of sensibility is distrib- j^^,^ 
 uted according to character ; that though a ^ygijf°t * 
 man may be called to oppose for a time his *"'y- 
 moral convictions to all that he can suffer through 
 natural sensibility, yet that this cannot be permanent 
 under a righteous moral government ; and that the 
 good of each is so a part of the whole that obligation 
 on the part of any individual to sacrifice his own 
 highest good for the sake of that whole is not only 
 impossible, but, as impairing the very ground on 
 which obligation is affirmed, is absurd. ' 
 
PART n. 
 
 — *— 
 
 LOVE AS A LAW. 
 
 PRACTICAL MORALS. 
 
LOVE AS A LAW. 
 
 PRELIMINAET STATEMENT. 
 
 If we -would conduct life by philosophy, it is not 
 enough to know its law and its end. We must also 
 know how to apply that law, and to reach that end. 
 We need both parts of that perfect wisdom which it 
 is the part of moral science to teach. Perfect wis- 
 dom consists in the choice of the best ends, and of 
 the best means to attain them. What belongs to 
 the first part we have considered. Love is our 
 general principle and primal wisdom ; but specific 
 duties will depend on a knowledge of our nature 
 and relations. If we are to direct forces, or to use 
 instruments, we must know what those forces and 
 instruments are. If there are in us different kinds 
 of powers, or forms of activity, and so, possible forms 
 of good, or if there are limitations within which 
 the powers must act, these we need to know. 
 Hence we proceed to a brief statement of the 
 nature, relations, and limitations of our powers. 
 
 Ist. The Powers. 
 For the purposes of moral science the powers are 
 
126 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 divided into those that are Govekning, and those 
 that are Instrumental. 
 
 The governing powers are those which ought to 
 govern. They are those by which we elect and 
 sanction ends, and through and in the activity of 
 which we find ends beyond which there are no 
 others. They are : — 
 
 Moral Reason, including Conscience, 
 
 The Moral Affections, and 
 
 Self-love. 
 
 By these the man ought to be governed, but in 
 strictness the only governing power is the man 
 himself, the inscrutable Peeson, the being whc 
 wills and acts. 
 
 The Instrumental Powers are : — 
 
 The Instincts, 
 
 The Appetites, 
 
 The Desires, and 
 
 The Natural Affections. These indicate ends. 
 To these we add 
 
 The Intellect, in the light of which we apprehend 
 and pursue ends. 
 
 2d. The Forms of Activity/. 
 Of each class of powers there are two forms of 
 androSin™ activity, the spontaneous and the volun- 
 tt^T tary. The spontaneous activities are the 
 condition of those that are voluntary ; 
 through them we have a knowledge of ourselves ; 
 they give impulse, and their action may become 
 temptation. In its original and pure form sponta- 
 neous action involves no responsibility. It is the 
 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 127 
 
 realm into which rational and voluntary agency 
 is put for its subjugation, direction, and culture. 
 Voluntary activity is choice itself, and all action 
 that is determined by choice. It is the condition 
 of moral quality in acts, and of responsibility. 
 
 There are also two forms of activity as related to 
 good, giving us two forms of that. These snscepa- 
 are indicated by the words susceptibilities powers. 
 and powers, that point to a distinction running 
 through the whole frame, physical and mental. 
 
 In our physical constitution there is a double set 
 of nerves, like the double track of a railway ter- 
 minating in a metropolis. In this< provision is 
 made for action upon us from without inward, which 
 terminates in sensation ; and for action by us from 
 within outwards, which originates in volition. We 
 are thus acted upon and we act ; we receive and 
 we give. We receive first and as a condition of 
 giving, and there is good in that ; but it is higher 
 and more blessed to give than to receive. 
 
 In the upward movement of forces in the uni- 
 verse as conditioning and conditioned those gj^ ^^^ 
 below simply give. They are wholly for "™'^'°8- 
 the sake of those above till we come to organization. 
 In all organization the action is circular. While 
 the higher is built up by the lower, and is sustained 
 by it, as the brain by the stomach, it yet reacts 
 upon that lower, and becomes in its turn essential 
 to that. Any action here, however, from the higher 
 to the lower is simply to sustain the lower in its 
 place and ftmction as tributary, never to elevate it 
 
128 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 out of that place. But when we reach society re- 
 garded as organic, and which an organic bodj 
 typifies, the object of action from above is to ele- 
 vate the lower to an equality with the higher. 
 This may be done selfishly from a perception of the 
 inseparable connection in the divine economy of the 
 welfare of the two ; or it may be done benevolently, 
 and only for the sake of the lower. This is the 
 highest and most blessed form of giving. So God 
 gives. 
 
 Through both these forms of activity there are 
 Pleasure enjoyment and growth. Through both 
 indjoy. ^ distinct form of good. Through the 
 susceptibilities, the passivities, the movement from 
 without inward, we have pleasure ; through the 
 activities, the choices, the volitions, the movement 
 from within outward, we have joy, happiness, 
 blessedness. And as these forms of good are 
 different in their origin, so are they in their 
 quality. By the one we are allied to the animals, 
 by the other to the angels. For the one we are 
 dependent upon circumstances, for the other upon 
 choice. 
 
 It is in this division of our nature and of the 
 Two direo- fonus of good that we find the ground of 
 MtiTity. the two great directions of human activity. 
 The prevalent tendency in men is to remain in in- 
 dolent passivity, enjoying the good there is in- im- 
 pressions from without, or, if they act, doing so for 
 the sake of those impressions. This, with such sur- 
 roundings as may be imagined, would give a Mo- 
 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 129 
 
 Dammedan Paradise. But it is possible for man to 
 subordinate all passive impressions, and all pleasure 
 from them, to some form of the activities. It is 
 possible for him to do this in building up the spirit 
 in greater efficiency in holy activity. In this, with 
 its appropriate conditions and surroundings, is the 
 essential idea of the Christian heaven. 
 
 We have spontaneous and voluntary activity ; 
 we have susceptibilities and powers. From some 
 form and combination of these the good of man 
 must come. Shall they act promiscuously, or is 
 there provision made for subordination and order ? 
 This leads us to consider — 
 
 Sd. The Law of Limitation. 
 
 The basis for such a law is found in that relation 
 of forces and of faculties as conditioning and con- 
 ditioned which gives its unity to the universe, which 
 is always perfectly regarded in nature, and without 
 regard to which by man there can be in his life no 
 harmony. Of this law, which is more ftdly ex- 
 plained in the Third Lecture on Moral Science, 
 only an outline can be given here. 
 
 The great forces of inorganic matter are three : — 
 
 1. Gravitation. 
 
 2. Cohesion. 
 
 3. Chemical Affinity. 
 
 The forms of life, a higher form of force, are 
 three : — 
 
 1. Vegetable Life. 
 
130 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 2. Animal Life. 
 
 3. Rational Life. This brings us to man. In 
 studying him we find that the great divisions of the 
 body, according to its ftinctions, are three : — 
 
 1. Those for building and repairing. 
 
 2. Those for support and locomotion. 
 
 3. Those for sensation and volition. 
 
 The great divisions and functions of the mind 
 are three : — 
 
 1. Intellect. 
 
 2. Feeling. 
 
 3. Will. 
 
 This gives us four groups, and their relation will 
 be best seen if we arrange them in two, thus, put- 
 ting those below which are lower : — 
 
 Rational Life, Will, 
 
 Animal Life, Sensibility, 
 
 Vegetable Life, Intellect, 
 
 Chemical AfSnity, Sensation and Volition, 
 
 Cohesion, Support and Locomodon, 
 
 Gravitation, Building and Repairing. 
 
 In the first double group we have general forces ; 
 in the second we have man ; but in each the lower 
 is a condition for the higher, and this gives us the 
 rank not only of the forces but of their products. 
 In all cases a force, or faculty, or product is lower 
 than another when it is a condition for it. From 
 this the law of limitation is deduced, which is, that 
 no force or faculty may act beyond the point where 
 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 131 
 
 it ceases to be a condition for the best action of 
 that which it conditions, and which is thus above it. 
 This law will hold till we reach the action of the 
 highest power, which, not being the condition for 
 anything above it, has no limit except the capacity 
 of that power. 
 
 From the above law we may readily deduce both 
 the natural and the Christian law of self- Natural and 
 denial. The natural law presupposes ia^"^J'Sf- 
 powers unimpaired, and requires no sup- *'°'*'" 
 pression or limitation in the action of any power 
 that would not interfere with the best action of 
 some power above it. The Christian law pre- 
 supposes moral evil, malady, derangement, but re- 
 quires no suppression or limitation of action which 
 would not interfere with the elimination of evil in 
 ourselves or others, and the restoration of the 
 powers to their normal condition. 
 
 The above distinctions and divisions will be 
 essentially involved in the following practical part ; 
 and as they have not hitherto been distinctly in- 
 corporated into our systems of morals, an explicit 
 statement of them seemed to be required. 
 
I. 
 
 LOVB AS A lAW DISTINGUISHKD FROM THE LAW 
 OF LOVE. 
 
 Having considered the Law of Love and made 
 the needful preliminary statements, we now proceed 
 to love as a law. We inquire what love, working 
 under the law of limitation, would require men to 
 do. According to the Scriptures, " Love is the 
 fulfilling of the law." Hence the Law of Love and 
 of obhgation or duty are coincident. The reason is 
 that love is that which the law requires, and with 
 which, if love be perfect, it is satisfied. 
 
 This is conceded, or at least not denied, by wri- 
 ters on morals ; and yet when specific duties are to 
 be deduced, they either do it wholly from the 
 stand-point of conscience and not of love, or incon- 
 sistently, from love out of regard to the Scriptural 
 law. But accepting the Scriptural doctrine, be- 
 lieving that the Law of Love covers the domain of 
 morals, we proceed to inquire what that law re- 
 quires. 
 
 This inquiry it will be observed is wholly deduc- 
 tive. In all inquiries respecting duties except the 
 highest, there are two orders of questions: The 
 
LOVE AS A LAW. 183 
 
 first asks, What ought to be done ? The second, 
 How ought it to be done ? To the broadest pos- 
 sible " What ? " on this subject, but one answer can 
 be given. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God 
 with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." 
 This is the law of love. As a spiritual act, it is 
 the primal wisdom, and, corresponding to it there is 
 no " How ? " No one can explain to another how to 
 love, because the love is a primitive act, and no 
 means can intervene. 
 
 Thus regarded love is an act and a choice, and 
 as rational must itself have a motive. LoTeasan 
 
 act and aa a 
 
 There must be a reason on the ground motiye. 
 of which love may be demanded by the con- 
 science. That reason, as we have seen, is the 
 worth of being, or its capacity of good and evil. 
 But the act having been done, the generic choice 
 having been made, love becomes a motive in all sub- 
 sequent acts. The first and great question is, What 
 does the law demand ? To this the reply is. Love. 
 The second question is. What does Love demand ? 
 And to every " What ? " here, there is a " How ? " 
 Or, if we please, all questions of this order may be 
 comprised in one, — How shall the demands of love 
 be carried out ? 
 
 It is in morals as in astronomy. In that we first 
 find the law, and then apply it. The law being 
 given, we inquire at what time the sun and moon 
 ought to be in such relation as to produce an eclipse. 
 This inquiry is of a difierent order from those which 
 
134 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 have it for their object to find the law, or the rea- 
 sons of it. If we suppose, with Kepler, each 
 planet to be accompanied by an angel, whose busi- 
 ness it is to see that its radius vector shall describe 
 equal areas in equal times, all the inquiries and 
 efforts of the angel might have relation solely to 
 that result ; but without understanding both the 
 law and the reasons of it, he could know nothing 
 of the philosophy of the heavens. 
 
 Failing to distinguish, at this point, as most have 
 LoTe as douc, between love as an act demanded by 
 
 choice and , , i • m 
 
 as emotion, the consciencc and itselt requirmg a mo- 
 tive, and love as the motive of subsequent sub- 
 ordinate acts and demanding them, we fall into 
 confusion. In the one case we have the law 
 of love ; in the other love as a law. In the 
 first case the main element of the love is choice^ 
 rather than emotion. In the second the choice is 
 implied, but emotion seems more prominent. In 
 the first the choice is like the body of the sun, in 
 itself dark ; in the second it is like the same body 
 with the elements of light and heat and beauty 
 gathered and floating around it. 
 
 Over the subordinate inquiries arising under love 
 Office of ^ * ^^^i the conscience must watch, de- 
 anrSte" manding not only perfect uprightness and 
 "'' candor, but such painstaking in informing 
 
 the judgment as to secure that secondary wisdom 
 which more often bears the name, and by which 
 1 See Bac. Sermon, 1861. 
 
LOVE AS A LAW. 135 
 
 means are adapted to ends. But while the con- 
 science must keep watch of the processes, the pro- 
 cesses themselves are carried on by the intellect. 
 The great work of the conscience is done in an- 
 swering the first question, and in holding the will 
 in the form of choice up to a perfect correspond- 
 ence with the law. Subsequently its work will be 
 to bring subordinate choices and specific volitions 
 into conformity with the generic choice, and in 
 doing so, questions that will be relatively principal 
 and subordinate, the " What? " and the " How ? " 
 will constantly arise. 
 
 Accepting then the law of love, we shall need to 
 inquire, what in the several departments 
 of duty does that law require, and how 
 are those requirements to be carried ont? 
 
II. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. 
 
 In answering the above questions, a classification 
 of duties is needed. 
 
 In this we shall be guided by that principle of sub- 
 Principie of ordinatiou, on which the law of limitation 
 tion. is based, as stated in the third of the 
 
 Lectures on Moral Science. It is as true of 
 duties as it is of forces, faculties, and enjoyments, 
 that those are lower which are conditional for 
 others. 
 
 But are some duties conditional for others ? 
 First de- The Condition of good work is a good in- 
 EoYe. strument, of good fruit a good tree ; and 
 
 of doing good to others, and glorifying God, a good 
 man. 
 
 Our first and lowest duty will then respect* our 
 own state, including both disposition and capacity. 
 The first and imperative demand of love is, that we 
 secure those conditions in ourselves, by which our 
 power to do good will be the greatest. 
 
 We thus reach our first class of duties under 
 oflutier *^® ^^^ °^ love. They are those which 
 ^?eT.' ""'" respect ourselves. They respect either 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. 137 
 
 onr own state or condition ; and till we reach ab- 
 solute perfection, will have for their object a change 
 for the better in one or the other of these. They 
 are not distinctively duties to ourselves, though 
 involving all that has commonly been regarded as 
 such ; but will include everything possible to en- 
 able us to benefit others and glorify God. Hence 
 they will be held as duties, not so much from regard 
 to ourselves, as on other and higher grounds. 
 
 The SECOND CLASS or duties are those to our 
 fellow men. These will have for their ob- second eiass' 
 ject, until they reach perfection, a change ourfeiiOTr 
 for the better, either in their state or condi- '°™' 
 tion. 
 
 That these are lower than our duties to God will 
 probably be conceded, but are they condi- jiiese con- 
 tional for them ? In a sense they are. ^""duuS' 
 Whatever may be said of an innate or '°*'°*' 
 connate idea of God, and of duty to him as all-per- 
 vasive, it is true that practically, and in a normal 
 state, the parent would be known before God, and 
 that God would be known through him. The sig- 
 nificance of " Our Father which art in heaven," is 
 reached only through a knowledge of what a 
 father on earth is ; and our duties to the earthly, 
 typify those to the heavenly Father, and prepare 
 us for them. 
 
 But besides this priority of time, and so a condi- 
 tioning from the order in which the faculties are 
 developed, duties may be so related that one cannot 
 
138 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 be consistently or acceptably performed except on 
 the condition that another has been. One who de- 
 frauds another may not bestow charity upon him. 
 He must be just before he is generous. In the 
 same way immediate duties to God so imply those 
 to men, that a man is in no condition to do the 
 former who has not done the latter. 
 
 This requires attention. It is the essence of 
 No religion superstition, and has been the curse of the 
 morauty. race, to frame something called religion 
 that could be gone through with formally, and be 
 rested on for salvation, to the neglect of the love of 
 man, and the duties from that. Hence we need to 
 emphasize the impossibility of religion without moral- 
 ity. This the Scriptures do both in the Old Testa- 
 ment and the New. " I," says God, " hate robbery 
 for a burnt-offering." " When ye spread forth your 
 hands, I will hide mine eyes from you, yea when 
 ye make many prayers I will not hear ; your hands 
 are full of blood ; wash ye, make you clean, put 
 away the evil of your doings from before mine 
 eyes ; cease to do evil, learn to do well ; seek 
 judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the father- 
 less, plead for the widow." " If," says the Saviour, 
 " thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there re- 
 memberest that thy brother hath aught against 
 thee, leave there thy gift before the altar and go 
 thy way ; first be reconciled to thy brother, and 
 then come and offer thy gift." " If a man say, I 
 love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. For 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. 139 
 
 he who loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, 
 how can he love God whom he hath not seen ? " 
 This view cannot be too strongly enforced, and 
 ought to enter into the substance of every treatise 
 on duty. 
 
 As prior then in time, and as prerequisite for ac- 
 ceptable worship, our duties to our fellowmen are 
 conditional for our duties to God. 
 
 Our THIRD CLASS OF DUTIES will be those to- 
 wards God. 
 
 These are higher than any other because of their 
 object, of the higher faculties involved, ihw class; 
 and because they imply all the others. God. 
 If the love of man be first, as it would be in a child 
 growing up normally, it will be conditional for that 
 of God, which will follow as certainly as the full 
 day follows the morning twilight ; but when once 
 there is the love of God, it will be seen to include 
 or imply the love of his creatures. As man now 
 is, the true relation seems to be, when specific 
 duties are required, the performance first of those 
 toward man as a condition of the acceptable per- 
 formance of those toward God. 
 
 It will be remembered that in classifying physical 
 forces as higher and lower, we begin ci«8siflca- 
 with that which is broadest, and at each ties as 
 
 , , « . ,. higher and 
 
 step m our ascent comprehend rewer mdi- broader. 
 iduals, tUl we reach man ; but in classifying duties 
 we reverse the process ; we begin with that which 
 is narrowest, and as we ascend reach the broadest 
 
140 MOEAL SCIENCE. 
 
 and grandest generality, including not only our 
 duties to all the creatures of God with whom we 
 are in relation, but to God himself. 
 
 CLASS I. 
 
 DUTIES TO OUKSELVES. 
 
 I. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 We now proceed to consider the first class of 
 Conditions di^ies in detail. These will require that 
 thlm^dutiea we secure those conditions in ourselves by 
 ai to ouj dul which we can work most efficiently under 
 
 ties to others, ^j^^ j^^ ^^ j^^g_ 
 
 These conditions are : — 
 
 1. That we secure our rights ; 
 
 2. That we supply our wants ; and 
 
 3. That we perfect our powers. 
 
 Of these each in its order is conditional for the 
 next, and they will include all that we need to do 
 for our own good, and to enable us to do good to 
 others. 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 THE SECURING OF OUR RIGHTS. 
 
 We are to secure our rights so far as they may 
 be a condition to our best working under the law 
 of love. 
 
 The only right that must be secured for the above 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 141 
 
 end is that to life. As long as there is life men 
 may act under this law, in whatever condition they 
 may be. Hence the right to life is more sacred 
 than any other, and hence the right to defend it 
 even by taking the life of another, God has en- 
 dowed men with life, has placed them in their 
 positions here, often with many others dependent 
 upon them, has implanted within them an instinct 
 of self-preservation, has made the life of each as 
 sacred as that of any other, that security of life 
 which the instinct guards is essential both to the 
 well-being of society and of the individual, and if, 
 with these interests in question, life is wrongfiiUy 
 assailed, it not only comes within the law of love to 
 defend it by taking, if necessary, the life of another, 
 but it is an imperative duty. God does not regard 
 life as too sacred to be taken for the violation of 
 natural law, and it is not only by a righteous moral 
 law that life is taken in such cases, but by a natural 
 law implanted in the constitution. 
 
 The right to life must be defended to the utmost. 
 Of the other great rights, as of hberty, property, and 
 reputation, we may be deprived and still work under 
 the law of love. These rights we are to secure as 
 far as possible in compatibility with that law, 
 but as no absolute rule can be laid down, and as 
 the subject of rights will be treated further on, it is 
 not necessary to speak of them more fiilly here. 
 It is only to be said that at each point we are 
 to yield or defend these rights as the law of love 
 wisely interpreted may require. 
 
142 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 DIVISION IL 
 
 THE SUPPLY OF OUR WANTS. 
 
 The second condition of our action under the 
 law of love is the supply of our wants. 
 
 By wants is here meant those things which are 
 necessary for the well-being of the body and the 
 mind. These and nothing beyond are essential to 
 full work under the law of love. To provide these 
 requires toil, and this toil every one not incapacitated 
 by feebleness or infirmity is bound either to undergo 
 himself, or to pay others an equivalent for it. No 
 duty is more strongly insisted on in the Scriptures 
 than this. Not to perform it not only violates the 
 first law of equity, but deprives us of all position 
 and stand-point from which to labor for others. 
 
 DIVISION III. 
 
 THE PBKFECTING OF OUB, POWERS. 
 
 Haying life and having our wants supplied, we 
 are next to perfect our powers. This is the third 
 duty to ourselves under the law of love. It is of 
 much wider scope than those before treated of, but 
 that the law of love requires it will be seen if we 
 look at the ways in which we can minister to the 
 good of others. 
 
 These are three : — 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 143 
 
 1st. By putting forth our energies, physical and 
 mental, directly to that end. Keiation of 
 
 M. Uj exerting over them an uncon- the good of 
 
 . fj others. 
 
 scious mnuence. 
 
 3d. By awakening in them the joy of compla- 
 cency. 
 
 For each of these the one comprehensive con- 
 dition and duty is our own perfection. " Be ye 
 therefore perfect," How is this duty to be per- 
 formed? 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PERFECTION AS RELATED TO DIRECT ACTION FOB 
 others: OF THE BODT: of THE MIND. 
 
 According to the views in the prehminary state- 
 ment, the process in attaining this per- Perfection 
 tection must be one or upbuilding. In ing. 
 the language of the Scriptures, it must be an 
 " edification." This gives us a point of departure 
 and a method, which the term " self-culture " does 
 not. In this view the instrumental powers, the 
 appetites, the desires and natural affections, and the 
 intellect are given us that through them we may 
 build up a perfect body and a perfect mind. These 
 powers we can control in three ways. We can 
 incite, restrain, and guide them, and these we are to 
 do partly from the good there is from their own 
 regulated activity, but chiefly as they are con- 
 ditional for the moral and spiritual nature. Of that 
 nature our perfection would require the fullest pos- 
 sible expansion and activity. 
 
144 MOKAL SCIENCE. 
 
 In building ourselves up then so as to become 
 Physical effective working powers, we begin with 
 Bret. the body. Love would require us to seek 
 
 physical perfection, because this would include 
 strength, beauty, and grace, and each of these would 
 aid in the highest ministries of love. The more 
 strength love has to wield, the more efficient it will 
 be ; the more it is clothed in beauty and in grace, 
 the more satisfaction it will give. 
 
 For the perfection of the body we are dependent 
 To this end on the appctites, the lowest of the instru- 
 
 law of limit- , , . i i 
 
 ationfor mental powers over which we have con- 
 
 the appe- ^ ■.../, 
 
 tites. trol. As lower, they are a condition for 
 
 all that is above them, but their immediate object 
 is the upbuilding and well-being of the body, and the 
 continuance of the race. Through them we appro- 
 priate such things as the body needs, and we have 
 only to say that in doing this they are to be held 
 strictly subject to the law of limitation. By their 
 constitution they are in a measure self-regulating, 
 but must always require rational control with ref- 
 erence to their ends. They may be of any degree 
 of strength, and be indulged to any extent up to 
 the point where they cease to be in the best man- 
 ner a condition for the activity of that which is 
 above them. The stronger they are the better, if 
 their action be for the strength, beauty, and grace 
 of the body, and for the upbuilding of the intellec- 
 tual and moral powers ; and all pleasure through 
 them that is incidental to such upbuilding, or even 
 compatible with it, is legitimate. 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 145 
 
 From the varying relations of the appetites, more 
 precise rules for their regulation cannot be laid 
 down. 
 
 As, however, the evils from the appetites are so 
 areat, we may not pass them without Danger from 
 notice. The first great danger from the «>"»»• 
 natural appetites is, that men will find in. the good 
 from them their supreme end. This multitudes do. 
 Such are sensualists; for the character is always 
 determined by that in which the supreme end is 
 found. Such persons may wallow in gross sen- 
 suality, or seek their gratifications in a refined and 
 fashionable way, but they will belong to the sty 
 of Epicurus, will live unworthily, and will die and 
 be forgotten, leaving the world no better for their 
 having lived in it. 
 
 The second great danger from these appetites, is 
 that those who have higher aims will be constantly 
 allured and seduced by them, so that the whole 
 tone of their life will be lowered. Those are few 
 to whom some soil from sensuality does not cling. 
 " Fleshly lusts " not only injure the body, but 
 " war against the soul." 
 
 The third danger from the appetites is in -the for- 
 mation of those that are artificial. These have noth- 
 ing to do with upbuilding, as the substances on 
 which they fix are all poison and incapable of being 
 assimilated. The pleasure from them terminatei 
 in itself; the tendency to increase the amount of 
 the stimulus is strong ; the nervous system is in» 
 
 10 
 
146 MOEAL SCIENCE. 
 
 paired by them ; habits are formed which hold 
 men iu fearful bondage, and it may be questioned 
 whether the best state of the moral powers and 
 the highest spiritual exercises are compatible with 
 habitual stimulation, either alcoholic or narcotic. 
 If God had judged it best that man should have an 
 appetite for these substances, doubtless He would 
 have implanted it. 
 
 Held in their proper place, the appetites are pro- 
 ductive only of good ; but looking at the history or 
 at the present state of man, we find the'amount of 
 misery and degradation from abuse of the natural 
 appetites, and from artificial ones which are them- 
 selves an abuse, to be appalling beyond description. 
 Of the great corruption of the heathen, one of the 
 most prominent forms is sensuality, their very re- 
 ligion being often but a deification of this. Of coun- 
 tries nominally Christian, especially in their great 
 cities, the corruption is unutterable, and seldom, if 
 ever, has Christianity so pervaded a community as to 
 lift them wholly out of this slough. Hence we 
 raise a warning cry at this point. Hence a right 
 training of the young must involve a control by 
 them of. their appetites, since a failure here is a 
 failure in all that is above them. 
 
 But while the proximate object of the appetites 
 Appetites is the perfection of the body, they alone 
 
 not BUffl- /v. • p 1 -r^ • 1 ■ , 
 
 3ient. are not suihcient tor that. Jb or its highest 
 
 strength, beauty, and grace, there are needed in 
 addition health and physical training. 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 147 
 
 1. Health. This is to the body what virtue is 
 to the soul, its normal state, its good ; and 
 
 tor this, attention is needed, not only to 
 the appetites, but to air, exercise, sleep, and cloth- 
 ing. The care of health through these is a duty, 
 not only from the consequences to ourselves of its 
 failure, but because the power of love would thus 
 be paralyzed, and instead of aiding others we should 
 become a tax upon their energies, if not a burden. 
 Needless ill-health in its myriad forms is an incubus 
 upon society ; and, though it may seem harsh to 
 call it so, it is, as a violation of the law of love, a 
 crime. 
 
 This whole subject is not as yet brought as it 
 should be within the domain of the conscience. 
 The consequences of neglecting the laws of health, 
 of imprudence, and excess, are constantly attributed 
 to a mysterious Providence. They have the same 
 relation to Providence as typhoid fever in the filthy 
 wards of a city. They are visitations under Prov- 
 idence rendered necessary by the neglect and folly 
 of man. 
 
 2. Physical training. Health alone will not secure 
 perfection of form or of power. Espe- ^i^j^^aL 
 cially will it not secure grace, which is '™'''^°8- 
 higher than beauty, and is expressed chiefly 
 through motion. Hence the need of physical 
 training. 
 
 The true subject of education is man in the unity 
 of soul and body. If either factor be neglected, 
 
148 MOKAL SCIENCE. 
 
 the highest results cannot be reached. Hence a 
 well regulated system of physical culture is not only 
 a legitimate part of education, especially of a liberal 
 education, but it is demanded. In this we have de- 
 chne.d from the wisdom of the ancients. 
 
 Physical training may be carried too far ; it may 
 PhvBioai become an end. Not subordinated to a 
 K°^ higher culture, or out of proportion, it is 
 suarded. ^ deformity and a nuisance. It also needs 
 to be guarded against an ambition to perform diffi- 
 cult and dangerous feats. If it can be guarded at 
 these two points, it must become an essential ele- 
 ment in our system of education. 
 
 Strength, beauty, grace, — these are the fruits^ of 
 physical training and health. Of these 
 strength is put forth solely under the di- 
 rection of will, and its exertion for others may im- 
 pose obligation. Beauty and grace, on the other 
 liand, produce their effects without our direct voli- 
 tion. They are as an emanation, a fragrance, a 
 soft green, which we admire and enjoy without feel- 
 ing obligation. 
 
 Are we then under obligation even with regard 
 to the body, to seek not only strength to be used by 
 will for the good of others, but also those perfec- 
 tions and accomplishments even which may become 
 a source of pleasure when contemplated by them ? 
 Yes, even though they are so often sought and dis- 
 played from vanity. By all means let beauty be 
 sought ; beauty of person, and even of dress. This 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 149 
 
 nature teaches. The flowers are not simply becom- 
 ing, they are beautiful. Nor do the Scriptures 
 forbid it. The Apostle Peter, with his quiet and 
 solemn eye, does not condemn outward adorning 
 except as in antagonism to the higher " ornament 
 of a meek and quiet spirit ; " " the plaiting of 
 hair," and " wearing of gold," and " putting on of 
 apparel," are not to be the adorning. Rightly sub- 
 ordinated they may have their place, but are as 
 nothing when compared with the " hidden man of 
 the heart, which is in the sight of God of great 
 price." 
 
 Let grace be cultivated. That costs nothing. 
 But let nothing be done from self as central. Let 
 it be in sympathy with the tendency of every or- 
 ganizing and vital force in nature towards perfec- 
 tion, and as putting us in harmony with the 
 " Kosmos." Above all let it be for others. If 
 vanity could but be exorcised by love, accomplish- 
 ments would at once fall into their place and be- 
 come admirable. The taint which attaches to them, 
 as in the service of vanity and egotism, would be 
 removed, and the social questions which arise 
 concerning them would be easily settled. 
 
 But if we are to seek a perfect body, perfeoaon 
 much more a perfect mind. °' "'''"'■ 
 
 Here again there must be upbuilding. Love 
 being presupposed, its first business will be to put 
 and hold in its place each of the instrumental 
 powers. 
 
150 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Of these the desires are to the mind what the 
 Law of lim- appetites are to the body. They are nat- 
 
 Itationfor , , . • I r x- 
 
 the desires, ural and necessary principles ot action, 
 having no moral character in themselves, but re- 
 quiring control. Like the appetites they are to be 
 governed, not on the principle of repression, but 
 by being made to minister to something higher. 
 Let the desire of life, and of property, and of knowl- 
 edge, and of power, and of esteem, have their full 
 scope, provided they violate no right of others, and 
 that what they appropriate is used in the service of 
 the affections, and under the guidance of conscience. 
 But here, as in the appetites, we must draw atten- 
 Dangere tiou to the great danger there is from 
 
 from the , ., - 
 
 desires. pervcrsion and abuse. 
 
 And here, also, the' first danger is that the object 
 of some one of the desires will be adopted as the 
 supreme end. 
 
 In this case the character formed, and the re- 
 sults, are very different from those when the ap- 
 petites are thus adopted. The appetites have a 
 natural limit. They are satisfied, and cease their 
 craving ; excess in them ultimately and speedily 
 debilitates both body and mind ; the sphere of the 
 sensualist is narrow ; he dies and is forgotten. But 
 the desires have no natural limit. " They grow by 
 what they feed on," and are all absorbing. Hence 
 we have the poltroon when we should have the 
 martyr ; we have the miser, emaciated and cowering 
 over his gold ; we have the pale student outwatcb- 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 151 
 
 uig the stars ; we have the conqueror desolating 
 continents, and the shifting devotee of public opin- 
 ion. These fill the world with their deeds. They 
 trample on appetite, and may seem nobler than its 
 slaves, but are equally in bondage, and some of 
 them beyond comparison more mischievous. 
 
 And here it may be well to state what that is in 
 which the selfishness, and idolatry too, of seiashneso 
 the race consist. It is in adopting as their *"'' '*°'*''^* 
 supreme end the good there is fi-om the activity of 
 some lower part of their nature. This is selfish- 
 ness. Its primary form is not that of enmity to 
 God, or to any one else. There is no conscious 
 malignity. It disclaims this when imputed to it, 
 and says, " Is thy servant a dog that he should do 
 this thing?" Not interfered with, it is good-na- 
 tured, perhaps cultivated and elegant. But let any 
 one, even God, come between it and the end made 
 supreme, and it becomes aversion, enmity, bitter 
 and uncompromising rebellion. In such cases, the 
 form varying with the appetite or desu-e, and scope 
 being given, there is no form of deception, and no 
 extent or refinement of cruelty to which a people 
 civilized, and cultivated through art, will not go. 
 
 This, too, is idolatry. It is the true idolatry of 
 the race, which has always found symbols to rep- 
 resent that which they have made their supreme 
 end, and who have really worshipped their own sel- 
 fish passions as reflected in those symbols. 
 
 It need only be added that those who have chosen 
 
152 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 higher ends are in constant danger through inor- 
 dinate desire, even more than through inordinate 
 Rappetite. 
 
 After the desires, the affections will require at- 
 Thoaffeo- tcution bj onc who would perfect himsclf 
 Sind*" as an agent for doing good. The affec- 
 '""""■ tions are Natural and Moral. The differ- 
 
 ence between these is, that the moral affections are 
 consequent upon acts of will or choice, and derive 
 their character from the character of these acts. 
 The natural affections are found in us acting spon- 
 taneously, like the desires. 
 
 For the most part the natural affections do not 
 require repression. They rather need culture, and 
 under that are capable of expanding into great 
 beauty. Nor is there from them such danger of 
 abuse that attention need be drawn to it here. It 
 is sufficient to say that they are to be developed 
 under the law of limitation. 
 
 The Intel- ^^ ^^^ instrumental powers it only re- 
 
 '"'• mains to speak of the Intellect. 
 
 The necessity of training, and if possible, per- 
 fecting the Intellect if a man would do much for 
 his own good or that of others, is admitted. To 
 this every seminary of learning testifies. Its rela- 
 tive importance is doubtless overestimated, since 
 education has come to mean chiefly the training of 
 the intellect. 
 
 The general statement here is that the law of 
 love requires that every talent and means of in- 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 153 
 
 fluence, wliether general or professicnal, should be 
 cultivated to the utmost. 
 
 Does an artisan fail, as in making a steam boiler, 
 to provide in the best way for the safety and com- 
 fort of the community ; is a physician ignorant of 
 the right remedy, or a lawyer of the precedent on 
 which his case turns; does the clergyman lack 
 quickening and persuasive power ; each is con- 
 demned by the law of love, and responsible for the 
 consequences if the failure could have been avoided. 
 There may be faithfiilness at the moment, — at the 
 bedside, in the court-room, in immediate prepara- 
 tion for the pulpit — but the failure and guilt may 
 lie far back in the indolent self-indulgence and dis- 
 sipation of the years of preparatory study. 
 
 We now pass to the Governing Powers. It is one 
 thing for a person to improve his instru- ooTeming 
 mental powers, as he might his knife or ^°"'"- 
 his reaper, and another to improve those which are 
 more distinctively himself. It is in these that we 
 find the worth and dignity of man, in these the 
 image of God. In these is the germ of immortaUty ; 
 in these the seat of spiritual conflict. 
 
 For the education of these powers there are no 
 institutions, except those of Christianity. imp„,e. 
 The Chui-ch with its Bible, and ministry, '^^l{^. 
 and the Spirit of God pervading all, is '"■ 
 God's institution for the education of these powers, 
 and training them up into the likeness of Christ, 
 and so of God. Nor would human institutions be 
 
154 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 of any avail. ImproTement here must begin in the 
 Will itself, by its submitting itself to the laws 
 of reason and of conscience, and opening the 
 whole man to every high and holy influence 
 which God may bring to bear upon him. All 
 powers are to be improved, and these no less 
 than others, by their being exercised in the sphere 
 and under the conditions appointed for them by 
 God. So only. But the sphere of these powers is 
 to rule. Hence they can be improved only as they 
 are permitted to be active in ruling. But that 
 they should do this nothing can secure but that 
 ultimate act of choice which determines character, 
 and which lies beyond the reach of all institutions 
 and external appliances. If these powers be held 
 in abeyance, their place being usurped by appetite 
 or desire in the form of passion, they will be dwarfed 
 and perverted, and will manifest themselves in 
 every form of superstition and fanaticism. 
 
 Such is the sphere of the governing powers. He 
 who would cultivate, them must permit them to 
 govern, and to govern uniformly. So shall they 
 gain strength, and so shall he walk in increasing 
 light until " the perfect day." 
 
 But the conditions under which these powers are 
 Conditions ^^ ^c*) ^^^ ^^^ helps offered, require to be 
 and helps. Jjuq^h no less than then- sphere. These 
 cannot here be treated of at large, but I desire to 
 advert to the subject of immediate divine aid, be- 
 cause that is so generally regarded as alien to phi- 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 156 
 
 losopliy. It is not so, for the whole philosophy of 
 upbuilding would lead us to anticipate that man in 
 his highest powers would be connected with that 
 which is stiU higher. And in this it is accordant 
 with the voice of heathen antiquity, and of the 
 Scriptures. Always men have spoken of the voice 
 of God within them, and the Scriptures speak of 
 the " light that lighteth every man that cometh 
 into the world." The expressions vary, but the 
 import is that there is a direct access of the Spirit 
 of God to the spirit of man, both for illumination 
 and quickening. For the reception of these the 
 Moral Reason is adapted as the flower is adapted to 
 receive the light and warmth of the sun, and no 
 symbol could be more beautiful than tliat of the 
 flower that turns itself to the sun and foUows it in 
 its course. 
 
 But are we not here in danger of mysticism ? 
 Yes; but only as we are in danger of 
 conflagration from the use of fire. Let us 
 be cautious and encourage no mysticism. Let us 
 also be cautious and neither ignore nor quench any 
 hght offered us by God. This is a vital question in 
 our upbuilding. I hold that this communication 
 and aid are in strict accordance with philosophy, 
 and my conviction is that whoever attempts perfect- 
 ing his directive powers without prayer, and open- 
 ing his mind, by putting away wickedness, to the 
 illuminating and quickening influences of the Spirit 
 of God, will fail of success. 
 
156 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 It is only by thus building up himself through the 
 whole range of his faculties, that man can reach 
 the highest efficiency when he would put forth 
 direct acts of will in the service of love. 
 
 CHAPTEE n. 
 
 PEEFECTION AS RELATED TO UNCONSCIOUS INFI-UENCB. 
 
 The second mode of doing good to others is by 
 unconscious influence or example. 
 
 This, in its highest degree, requires perfection not 
 so much of the powers, as in their control and mode 
 of action. No lower power may act beyond the 
 point at which it becomes a condition for the action 
 of a higher. The appetite for food or drink may 
 not be so indulged as to prevent the fullest activity 
 of the desire of knowledge or of power. The desire 
 of power may not become so engrossing as to dwarf 
 the affections or stifle any claim of justice or of 
 right. Napoleon cared nothing for appetite, but 
 was gluttonous of power. When a man chooses the 
 object of any lower power for his supreme end, that 
 determines his character, his energies are directed 
 to that, his development is around it, and he be- 
 comes unsymmetrical, as a tree whose upward sap 
 is arrested and expands it into a deformity. This 
 most men do.. They lack the controlling and 
 directive power needed to keep the Acuities in 
 subordination, and even if they choose the highest 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 157 
 
 end are long in bringing moral symmetry into their 
 lives. Only when this is done are they in a con- 
 dition to exert the highest unconscious influence 
 over others, and when this is done, this influence is 
 more efficient than any other. 
 
 The direct power of man over nature is slight 
 compared with that which he gains through her own 
 forces. The same ib true of society. As God in- 
 tended man to be a social being, He implanted in 
 him those principles by which he may have a com- 
 mon life, and through which that life may be reached 
 and modified throughout a nation, and for ages. 
 Among these principles is that sympathy and un- 
 conscious imitation by which families and nations 
 are assimilated, and to reach, as it may be done, the 
 common life through this is the sublime st work of 
 man. 
 
 It is in early life that this unconscious imitation 
 is most operative. Every child is a Chinese. Give 
 him a cracked saucer for a model, and he will make 
 a cracked set. The child needs formal teaching by 
 words, but his principles are formed and practical 
 habits moulded chiefly by that action of those 
 around him which expresses their inner life. From 
 this there is a subtle and pervasive influence that 
 no direct teaching can counteract. It is thus that 
 families, neighborhoods, sections of country art 
 reached and assimilated, and to this all contribute. 
 It is through this that great men, men great in 
 character and action, reach their highest influence. 
 
158 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 They are simply set in the firmament of the past, 
 and »Mne. 
 
 Doubtless the power of a book, of the word spoken, 
 of mere teaching, is great, but this silent shining 
 addresses different principles, and under different 
 conditions. Power is from the inner life in its in- 
 tegrity, and this is most perfectly and certainly 
 revealed by action. Hence " Example is better 
 than precept." The word not weighted from the 
 life sounds hoUow. Hence the folly as well as guilt 
 of attempting to substitute anything for that thor- 
 ough sincerity of character from which alone good 
 influences can legitimately flow. 
 
 We here find a special danger to preachers, and 
 to all who teach professionally or formally. They 
 are tempted to " say and do not." There is no 
 surer way to destroy self-respect and bring such 
 teachings into contempt. Against such teachers 
 the Bible denounces its heaviest woes. " Woe 
 unto you Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, for ye 
 devour widows' houses, and for a pretense make 
 long prayers : therefore ye shall receive the greater 
 damnation." 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PEEFECTION AS BELATED TO COMPLAOENCT. 
 
 The third way of benefiting others through a 
 care for our own state, is by awakening in them the 
 joy of complacency. 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 159 
 
 Under the former head we regarded man as 
 active, with powers to be addressed ; under this we 
 regard him as having susceptibiHties. Our object 
 then was action, character ; it is now enjoyment. 
 
 The highest susceptibilities are moral, and it is 
 from manifestations of moral character that we 
 have our highest enjoyment through the susceptibili- 
 ties. Through these we have the love of compla- 
 cency, the sense of moral beauty and grandeur, 
 esteem, veneration, and the emotions which, in 
 their highest form, become worship. 
 
 For the susceptibility to natural beauty and 
 grandeur God has provided. Nature is foil of ob- 
 jects that correspond to this ; it is among our 
 purest and best sources of enjoyment, and is the 
 forerunner and type of the higher enjoyment from 
 the beauty of holiness. But the moral susceptibili- 
 ties can be awakened only by character. For these 
 the great provision is in God himself, whose charac- 
 ter is perfect ; but aside from this, these susceptibili- 
 ties may be drawn out in high activity by human 
 character. If all people were to reflect the image 
 of Christ in their radical character, the ideals of 
 literature and art, or rather something more beau- 
 tifol and better, would live and act before us, and 
 no one can estimate the enhanced joy from moral 
 beauty. 
 
 It is an office of Love to increase material beauty. 
 She smiles upon the marriage of taste with industry. 
 She would esteem it a crime to mar nature ; she 
 
160 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 would, if possible, restore the beauty of Eden. 
 How much more then must Love feel under obliga- 
 tion to increase moral beauty ; how much more a 
 crime to diminish it. In a community whose moral 
 nature is developed, high moral character is the 
 purest, the best, the amplest contribution to mere 
 enjoyment that can be made. It is better than 
 pictures or statues or landscape gardens. Such a 
 contribution every man can make by attending to 
 his own state, and it is among the more imperative 
 obligations of Love to do this. 
 
 That this end of love would be most fully 
 reached by our perfection, is too plain to need 
 enforcement. Everywhere the highest complacency 
 demands perfection. 
 
 CHAPTEB IV. 
 
 PEEPECTION AS BELATED TO THE GLORT OF GOD. 
 
 We have thus seen that our own perfection is 
 a condition of our best ministrations to others in 
 each of the three ways in which it is possible for 
 as to minister to them, and that love would there- 
 fore oblige us to seek that perfection. We are also 
 under obligation to seek it, because it is a condition 
 of our most fiilly glorifying God. 
 
 God is glorified by the manifestation of his per- 
 fections. In the products of his wisdom and power 
 He is glorified, as they are seen to be perfect. He 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 161 
 
 is more glorified as He himself is seen to be perfect 
 in his moral character and government, and as He 
 is loved and obeyed by creatures made in his image. 
 This love and obedience are the sum of human duty : 
 they are perfection. They are also the glorifying 
 of God, and, it may be added, the enjoying of Him. 
 That God should be glorified by us voluntarily, and 
 enjoyed in any other way, we cannot conceive. In 
 this view of it, therefore, perfection can hardly be 
 said to be a condition of glorifying God. It is the 
 glorifying of Him. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PERFECTION AS RELATED TO SELF-LOVE. 
 
 From the above it appears that love to others and 
 to God would require us to seek our own perfection. 
 But this is just what would be required by a reason- 
 able self-love, and is there no place for that ? Yes ; 
 and we here reach the point, not only of the recon- 
 ciliation of self-love with benevolence, but of their 
 convergence. Self-love is legitimate. Our own good 
 is of intrinsic value, and we are especially bound 
 to care for it as it is that part of the universal 
 good which is more especially intrusted to us. God 
 cares for it, and why not we ? In doing this we 
 have reason to believe that we not only work with 
 Him for our own good, but as He himself works, 
 " From hence, also, it is evident," says Edwards, in 
 11 
 
162 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 his " Treatise on the Nature of Virtue," " that the 
 divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must 
 consist principally in love to himself." If this be 
 correct, our virtue will consist in some degree in 
 love to ourselves. While, therefore, we allow self- 
 love a place in prompting efforts for our own per- 
 fection, it is a subordinate one. 
 
 It is worthy of notice that it is no part of the 
 divine law, as directly expressed, that we love our- 
 selves. It is simply implied in the command to 
 love our neighbor as ourselves. The reason 
 doubtless is the deep harmony there is between 
 loving God and our neighbor and loving ourselves. 
 So perfectly coincident are they as reciprocally re- 
 sulting, both and equally, from perfect powers act- 
 ing rightly, that if we love God and our neighbor 
 we do the very thing that self-love would require, 
 and there is no need of enforcing a fiirther law. 
 To love God and our neighbor is the best way of 
 loving ourselves. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 HABITS. 
 
 In speaking of individual upbuilding and perfec- 
 tion, the subject of habits may not be omitted. 
 
 Habits presuppose original faculties and suscep- 
 Habits, ao- tiblHties by which acts are done and im- 
 passive, pressions are received independently of 
 habit. They are formed by repeated voluntary 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 163 
 
 action of the powers, and by repeated impressions 
 on the sensibility. No man, therefore, is bom with 
 habits, but every one has a tendency to form them ; 
 and, according to the distinction just made, they 
 will be either active or passive. 
 
 Active habits are formed by the repetition of 
 voluntary acts. It is an ultimate fact in ^^u^, 
 our constitution, that repetition, practice, '"''"'• 
 use, produces, always facility in doing the acts re- 
 peated, and sometimes, in addition, a tendency to 
 do them. Facility and tendency, — these are the 
 results of acts voluntarily repeated, which required 
 at first carefiil attention and painful eflPort. Both 
 facility and tendency are spoken of as the result of 
 habit, but they need to be distinguished ; and we 
 also need to distinguish a tendency to do a thing in 
 a particular manner, from a tendency to do it at all. 
 By repetition one gains facility in writing his name, 
 and a tendency, if he write it at all, to do so in a par- 
 ticular way ; but he does not gain a tendency to 
 write his name. For doing that a rational motive 
 is required. The same may be said of all acquired 
 skill. This is gained by the repetition of acts 
 giving facility, and a tendency to do the thing in a 
 particular manner. But in some cases a step further 
 is taken, and a tendency is acquired to do the thing 
 itself. This may go so far that habitual action may 
 seem automatic, and not only not to be from the 
 will, but to be in opposition to it. It is this ten- 
 ieincy which is more particularly spoken of as 
 
164 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 " habit." This it is that may need to be guarded 
 against, or to be overcome. 
 
 Of such a constitution the object is evident. It 
 oyeotof is ^^^ to trammel us, or to reduce us to 
 habits. routine, but to enable us so to incorporate 
 
 into our being the results of voluntary action as to 
 avail ourselves of those results with the least pos- 
 sible attention, and so that the mind may be free 
 to enter upon new fields of effort. This it is desir- 
 able to notice, because many writers have enlarged 
 the sphere of habit quite too much. 
 
 Such being the nature of active habits, and the 
 object of that constitution by which they are formed, 
 it is obvious, — 
 
 1. That men must be responsible for their habits, 
 Responsi- and for all acts done from them. Not 
 
 bility for 
 
 habits. only do specific habits originate in the will 
 
 as prompted by original and controlling faculties 
 that act independently of habit, but they can 
 never wholly escape from the control of will. 
 
 2. It is obvious that when men rest in any form 
 Habits con- o^ habitual action, they defeat the end for 
 K^orto which the capacity for habits was given, 
 tiammeius. ^j^jjj^jj jg ^q gjyg freedom to enter upon 
 
 new fields of activity. Habit, as habit, is automatic 
 and mechanical. It is simply conservative, while 
 man never reaches a point where conservatism is 
 not for the sake of progress. Hence, while we are 
 to seek by repetition all possible facility and power, 
 we are to guard sedulously against being brought 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 165 
 
 mto bondage to any tendency. It is sad to see the 
 power of rational will and free choice narrowed 
 down by any blind force, natural or acquired. 
 
 3. It is obvious that bad habits may be formed 
 as well as good ones. In these there is 
 
 a tendency to mcrease m strength m- 
 definitely ; and when we have this accumulated 
 power thus added to the force of original passion, 
 we have a bondage the most fearful known. Hence 
 the wisdom of letting evil alone " before it be med- 
 dled with." 
 
 4. It is a point of wisdom to " set the habits," 
 as Paley says, " so that every change may ihe^jet" 
 be a change for the better." In illustra- »"'»■*"'»• 
 ting this he says that " the advantage is with those 
 habits which allow of an indulgence in the devia- 
 tion from them. The luxurious receive no greater 
 pleasure from their dainties than the peasant does 
 from his bread and cheese ; but the peasant, when- 
 ever he goes abroad, finds a feast ; whereas the 
 epicure must be well entertained to escape disgust. 
 Those who spend every day at cards, and those 
 who go every day to plough, pass their time much 
 alike ; but then whatever suspends the occupation 
 of the card-player distresses him ; whereas to the 
 Jaborer every interruption is a refreshment ; and 
 this appears in the different effects that Sunday 
 produces upon the two, which proves a day of rec- 
 reation to the one, but a lamentable burden to the 
 other." 1 
 
 1 Moral Phihsophy, chap. vi. 
 
166 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Passive habits, as has been said, are fonned by re- 
 PaadTe peated impressions. These, no less than 
 '''*'"'■ active habits, have it for their end to regu- 
 
 late action. This they do by their effect both upon 
 the enjoyment and the suffering caused by impres- 
 sions. The end being action, the means are disre- 
 garded ; and emotions and impressions, both pleas- 
 ant and unpleasant, are moderated by such habits 
 when they would interfere with the best condi- 
 tion for action. The doctrine of Bishop Butler is 
 that, " From our very faculty of habits, passive 
 impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. 
 Thoughts, by often passing through the mind are 
 felt less sensibly ; being accustomed to danger 
 begets intrepidity, — that is, lessens fear ; to dip- 
 tress, lessens the passion of pity ; to instances of 
 others' mortality, lessens the sensible apprehension 
 of our own. And from these two observations 
 together, — that practical habits are formed and 
 strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive 
 impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon 
 us, — it must follow that active habits may be 
 gradually forming and strengthening by a course 
 of acting upon such and such motives and excite- 
 ments, whilst these motives and excitements them- 
 selves are by proportionable degrees growing less 
 sensible, — that is, are continually less and less 
 sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen." ' 
 This shows how needful it is that motives, excite- 
 
 1 Analogy, Part I., chap. v. 
 
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 167 
 
 ments, sympathies, legitimately connected with ac- 
 tion, should be followed by such action, for no one 
 is so hardened and hopeless as he who has become 
 familiar with such motives without corresponding 
 action. " Going," says Butler, " over the theory 
 of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and draw- 
 ing fine pictures of it ; this is so far from neces- 
 sarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it 
 in him who thus employs himself, that it may 
 harden the mind in a contrary course, — that is, 
 form a habit of insensibility to all moral consid- 
 erations." 
 
 But while the above gives us the relation of 
 active and passive habits, and contains Qnaiiflcation 
 
 . 1 1 f. 1 .0' Butler's 
 
 practical truth oi the utmost moment, it doctrine. 
 may be questioned whether the doctrine of passive 
 impressions, as stated, does not require qualification. 
 No proof is given by Butler that " from our very 
 faculty of habits, passive impressions must grow 
 weaker." It is even conceivable that they might 
 grow stronger. The law applies to all that depends 
 on physical organization as now constituted, perhaps 
 goes farther, but is not a necessary law of intellect 
 and sensitive being. Let that on which sensibility 
 depends remain unworn, as surely it may, and there 
 will be no reason why the thousandth impression 
 should not be as vivid as the first. 
 
CLASS II. 
 
 DUTIES TO OUE FELLOW MEN. 
 
 Duties to our fellow men will fall into two great 
 divisions, which we shall treat separately, with 
 livisions under each. 
 
 I. Duties to men as men. 
 
 II, Duties growing out of special relations. 
 
 PRELIMINAEY. 
 
 SELF-LOVE AND THE LOVE OF OTHESS. 
 
 In passing to these we must not omit to say that 
 Beif-iove as love to our fellow men requires atten- 
 
 ftnd loTe of . -,..-. 
 
 others re- tion to our own Condition and state, so 
 
 ciprocally _ ^ , . , , , ^ , 
 
 dependent, seli-love requires attention to their condi- 
 tion and state. If we can hest minister to our fel- 
 low men only as we are perfect, they can best 
 minister to us only as they are perfect. As social 
 beings, our whole interest and enjoyment will de- 
 pend upon the condition and state of others, and 
 the promotion of their well-being is that of our 
 own. So intimate and reciprocally dependent are 
 a rational self-love and a love of others. They are 
 not only not opposites, as some have supposed, 
 
DUTIES TO OUE FELLOW MEN. 169 
 
 but are different phases of one common principle, 
 equally necessary to the common end. 
 
 In our duties to others the law is that we shall 
 love our neighbor as ourselves. We must then 
 do for him as we would for ourselves. But, as we 
 have seen, we are to regard our own rights, to sup- 
 ply our wants, and to perfect and direct our powers. 
 
 If, then, we would love our fellow men as we do 
 ourselves, we must — 
 
 1. Regard, and, if necessary, aid in securing 
 their rights ; — 
 
 2. Supply their wants ; and — 
 
 3. Do what we can to perfect and direct their 
 powers. 
 
 These will include, and in their order as lower 
 and higher, all our duties to our fellow men. 
 
 In these ways we are to " do good to all as we 
 have opportunity." But through rela- Ground of 
 tions established by God, indicating the ana duties, 
 ends not only of the individual, but of the familj' 
 and of society, we are required, while we give to all 
 tlieir rights, to supply the wants and to seek to pei-- 
 fect and direct the powers of some rather than of 
 othei's. To empower us to do these more effec- 
 tually, we may have special rights over persons 
 we may owe them special duties ; and they may 
 have special claims and be under special obligations. 
 This will give us what have been called the " rights 
 of persons " in distinction from the " rights of 
 things," and will require a separate consideration 
 of the rights and duties of the family and of society 
 
FIEST GREAT DIVISION. 
 
 DUTIES TO MEN AS MEN. 
 
 « 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 DUTIES REGAEDmG THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. 
 
 — *—^ 
 
 CHAPTEU I. 
 
 OF RIGHTS, 
 
 We are now prepared to pass to the consideration 
 of rights. 
 
 Of rights the correlative is obhgation, and the 
 obligations corresponding to rights give the lowest 
 form of duty to others. For the most part rights 
 are guarded by negative precepts, the command 
 being " Thou shalt not." They belong to others 
 already, and can be taken or withheld from them 
 only by positive injury. This love can never do. 
 The least that love can do for others is to respect, 
 and concede to them, all their rights ; and no one 
 who violates or withholds the rights of another can 
 consistently claim to be benevolent toward him. 
 That we give to others their rights, is therefore the 
 proper condition of all higher forms of duty. 
 
DDTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. 171 
 
 As actions are right from their relation to an end, 
 80 all rights are founded in the relation of those 
 things to which men have a right, to some ^oondaaon 
 end indicated through our nature, and to "' "**"•• 
 be attained either by ourselves or others. 
 
 For every active principle in man, for every 
 natural desire, affection, or capacity, indicating an 
 end to be attained, there is a corresponding natural 
 right ; and these rights are higher or lower accord- 
 ing to the dignity and sacredness of the end, or, 
 which is the same thing, of that part of our nature 
 in which they originate. Thus there are rights 
 which would secure the attainment by instinct of 
 its ends, and by the appetites of their end. And 
 so of the desires, and of the intellect, and of the 
 natural affections, and of the moral and spiritual 
 nature. Whoever is permitted to pursue unob- 
 structedly all the ends indicated by these several 
 active principles, has all his rights ; and in doing 
 so he has a fight to have and to do everything that 
 will not interfere with the rights of others. If ob- 
 structed on any other ground, he would not have 
 all his rights. Having endowed man with active 
 principles, the purpose of God evidently was to 
 place him in such conditions that he should be in- 
 duced, required, and enabled to secure the ends 
 indicated by those principles ; and when in the 
 pursuit of those ends he is arrested by any mter- 
 ference with such divinely constituted conditions, 
 the indignant protest which arises in the breast of 
 every man is the voice of God in the assertion of 
 
172 MOKAL SCIENCE. 
 
 rights. We are so constituted that, in apprehend- 
 ing the relation between these active principles and 
 their ends, the moral reason necessarily forms the 
 idea of rights. 
 
 Rights, as thus founded, are of several kinds. 
 And 1st, There are what have been called 
 KindB of " rights of things " and " rights of per- 
 '^^*"- sons." This is a radical distinction, and 
 
 needs to be clearly understood. 
 
 Men have a right to things that they may be 
 enabled to attain their own ends. They have 
 rights over persons that they may enable those per- 
 sons to attain their ends. Rights of things are to 
 guard against the encroachment of others, and 
 their sole correlative is obligation on the part of 
 others. From the use of anything to which one 
 man has a right, others are under obligation to ab- 
 stain, and to abstain wholly. Of rights over others, 
 having it for their object to enable them to attain 
 their end, the correlative is still obligation on the 
 part of others ; but they also involve obligation on 
 the part of him in whom the right vests to those 
 others. The parent has a right over the child, and 
 the child is under obligation to respect that right ; 
 but the parent is also himself under obligation to 
 the child to use that right solely for the end for 
 which it was given. 
 
 As rights have their foundation in their relation 
 ^^t^f to an end, so they find their limit in the 
 ^''^^^- same relation. Relatively to others a man 
 
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. 173 
 
 may have a right to do what he will with his own, 
 but in- truth and before God, no man has a right 
 to use anything except for the end for which it was 
 given. No man has a right to destroy his property 
 wantonly, or to use it foolishly, though no other 
 man may have a right to prevent him. 
 
 Here, too, we find not only the foundation, but 
 the limit of all rights of government whether human 
 or divine. If any being be in a position to secure 
 his own ends independently of all others, then no 
 other being can have any rights over him. It is on 
 this ground that any right over God is impossible, 
 and his right over his creatures as moral Governor 
 is not from his relation to them as Creator and Pre- 
 server, as these relations are simply from his power, 
 but it is from his capacity and disposition to do for 
 them what is necessary for the attainment by them 
 of their end. Moral government is by law, and no 
 man will say that it would be right in God to give 
 his creatures a law that would lead them astray in 
 seeking their supreme end. So far as we can un- 
 derstand it the whole end of the moral government 
 of God is to lead his creatures to the attainment by 
 them of that end. If any one should fail of this 
 ultimately and finally, and it should appear that God 
 had not provided conditions by which it was possible 
 for him to attain it, the fault would not be in the 
 creature. But there will be no such failure. No 
 creature shall ever be able to charge such a failure 
 upon God. Hence the righteousness of his govern- 
 
174 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 ment, his right under that government to control 
 his creatures, and the guilt of their rebeUion. In 
 the same way parents and civil rulers, holding rela- 
 tions established by God, through which their aid Is 
 indispensable to others in the attainment of their 
 ends, have rights over them, but only for the attain- 
 ment by them of those ends. If any man make use 
 of another for his own ends simply, he uses him as 
 a ihimg. This, when done by an individual, is 
 slavery ; when done by a government, it is tyranny. 
 
 Rights, again, are natural, and adventitious. 
 Bights Natural rights are both of things and of 
 
 aaT^i-""' persons. They are those which would 
 tious. belong to man if there were no civil 
 
 government. A man has a natural right to those 
 means and conditions of good which God has pro- 
 vided to enable him to secure his end, such as air, 
 light, water, the unappropriated products of the 
 earth and waters, and the fruit of his own labors. 
 Parents have also a natural right to the obedience 
 and respect of their children, and children to the 
 love and care of their parents, because these grow 
 out of natural relations. Adventitious rights are 
 those which grow out of civil society. No man is 
 naturally a ruler, or judge, or sheriff, or legislator. 
 These have rights as such, but they are adven- 
 titious. So also are many of the rights of property. 
 
 Rights are also aKenable and inalienable. Alien- 
 Bights aUen- able rights are those which may be law- 
 auenabie. fully transferred to another. We do not 
 
DUTIES TO UUK FELLOW MEN. 175 
 
 here inquire what others may unlawiully do in de- 
 priving us of rights, which will still be ours and 
 may again be exercised when we have the power, 
 but what we may do in transferring to others rights 
 which will cease to be ours. The ground of this 
 distinction will be found in the ends which these 
 rights respect. All rights from the lower powers, 
 as the desires and natural affections, that do not 
 respect the supreme end, are alienable. A man 
 may transfer to another his property, or his right 
 over his child. But a man has an inalienable right 
 to himself in the use of all those means and condi- 
 tions which are necessary to the attainment of his 
 supreme end. These he cannot alienate, and no 
 one can rightfully deprive him of them. No man 
 may lower his true manhood ; but if, without doing 
 this, he can alienate or part with anything, he is at 
 liberty to do it. 
 
 If the foundation of rights has been correctly 
 stated, it will follow that the rights of all j^^^i 
 men are equal. As rights are founded ^^''"' 
 on ends indicated by active principles, if men have 
 common active principles and a common end, that is, 
 if they are men, they must have common and equal 
 rights. This is the doctrine of the Declaration of 
 Independence, and the foundation of republican 
 institutions. The condition in which men are 
 bom, and their natural endowments, may be of the 
 greatest diversity, but the right of one human being 
 to all the means and conditions given him by God 
 
176 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 for attaining his ends must rest on the same ground, 
 and be as perfect and sacred as that of any other. 
 
 That men have equal rights has been regarded as 
 self-evident, but some confusion has arisen from not 
 distinguishing clearly between the rights of things 
 Rights of and of persons. As regards rights of per- 
 
 thmgs and ^ ^ ^ ° ~ '■ 
 
 persons to soHs a practical evasion has been attempted. 
 
 be distin-. ^ ^ _ -^ _ 
 
 anguished. All children, it is said, are indeed born with 
 equal rights, but, as unable to secare their own ends, 
 they need for a long time to be under guardianship, 
 and if there are persons or races who are under the 
 same need, they may be treated in an analogous way. 
 This is true, but before the desired application of 
 it may be made, it must be shown that such persons 
 are really unable to take care of themselves. There 
 are idiots and incompetent persons who must be 
 thus cared for, but to suppose large classes or races 
 to be left thus and without natural guardianship 
 would be an imputation upon Providence ; there 
 are no such races. It must also be shown that any 
 such assumed guardianship is a rightfiil one, and 
 will secure its legitimate ends. Such a guardian- 
 ship for the ends of those over whom it is assumed, 
 would not be coveted. The law of love would re- 
 quire us first to give all persons their rights, and if, 
 after a fair trial, they are unable to take care of 
 themselves, then to have guardians appointed by 
 lawful authority, and for their good. This would 
 be wholly contrary to the spirit of slavery, -which 
 consists in using persons as things, and for our own 
 ends. 
 
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. 177 
 
 The rights which men, all men, thus have as em- 
 powered of God to secure their own ends, 
 are those of Justice and of Truth, which 
 last is also a form of justice. 
 
 As between man and man, justice consists in con- 
 ceding and rendering to every one all his rights. 
 He who has all his rights has no injustice done him. 
 Divine Justice consists not only in this, but also in 
 rendering to every one his deserts. These two 
 forms of justice are entirely distinct. Desert of 
 punishment depends upon guilt ; but with guilt as 
 such and in distinction from injury to the individual 
 and to society, man cannot deal. That depends 
 upon the heart, which he cannot know and can 
 have no claim to regulate. Man looks on the act 
 and infers the motive. He may not punish ex- 
 cept on the presumption of a bad motive, but his 
 punishment must be graduated, not by the pre- 
 sumed badness of the motive, but by the tendency 
 of the act to injure society. God, on the other hand, 
 looks at the motive and disregards the act. He sees 
 and punishes guilt in intention where there is no 
 outward act. Hence " Vengeance belongs to Him." 
 He only can administer punitive justice. Man may 
 guard rights ; he may prevent any violation of them 
 in the name of justice and within its limits. And 
 the sentiment of justice within him may find satis- 
 faction in such punishment, but the measure of pun- 
 ishment by him must be found in its necessity to 
 guard the rights of society, and not in any satis- 
 
 12 
 
178 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 faction of absolute punitive justice. Any other 
 right can be had only from direct revelation. 
 
 We now pass to consider more particularly the 
 rights which belong to all men. 
 
 But in dojrag this we must notice an element 
 secaritiym ^hich entcTS into our conception of all 
 a^™<=^ rights — that of security. The right to 
 tion of right, security in the possession and use of any- 
 thing rests on the same ground as the right to the 
 thing itself, since the end on which the right is 
 based cannot be fully attained without this. With- 
 out security there is no enjoyment or free use of 
 anything, and perfect security alone gives its fiill 
 value to a possession. This is the element and con- 
 dition in connection with our rights which w€ 
 value more than any other. Hence this element is 
 recognized in law ; and if there be good reason to 
 believe that any one wUl violate the rights of others, 
 he may be bound over to keep the peace. 
 
CHAPTER n. 
 
 PERSONAL eights: LIFE AND LIBERTY. 
 
 Security being thus implied in all rights, the 
 first class which w6 shall notice is those of the 
 Person. 
 
 Every person has a right to life, and to such 
 security and freedom as will enable him to attain 
 the several ends indicated by his active powers. 
 
 On the right to life all others depend. This is 
 the first guarded in the Decalogue. It is ^■^^^^g 
 also the first mentioned in the Declaration "*■ 
 of Independence, where it is said to be inalienable. 
 It is so. It may be forfeited for crime ; it may be 
 surrendered for the sake of principle or of humanity, 
 but cannot be alienated for a consideration. 
 
 How, then, may the right to life be so forfeited 
 tliat others may have the right to take it Howfcr- 
 away ? *■"***• 
 
 This may be done in four ways, and 
 
 1. By attempting the life of another. The right 
 to take life in defending life is recognized by the 
 laws of all countries and by all persons, except a 
 few extreme non-resistants. 
 
 2. The- right to life may be forfeited by attempt^ 
 
180 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 ing house-breaking or robbery in the night. The 
 law properly makes a distinction between such 
 attempts by day and by night, and in the latter 
 case justifies the taking of life. Still every such 
 attempt will not make this morally right, and for 
 such cases no general rule can be laid down. 
 
 3. The right to Hfe may be forfeited by resisting 
 the officers of the law. If officers of the law are 
 resisted in its execution, they have a right, as a last 
 resort, to take life. If a mob which they have 
 been commanded to disperse, will not disperse, they 
 have a right to fire upon it. 
 
 4. The right to life is forfeited by murder, that 
 is, by taking life with maHce aforethought. 
 
 The death penalty was early authorized and de- 
 manded by the Bible, not from cruelty, but on the 
 very ground of the sacredness of human life. 
 " Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his 
 blood be shed, for in the image of God made Me 
 man." The estimate placed by a lawgiver upon 
 any right, can be measured only by the penalty by 
 which he guards it ; and as death is the highest 
 possible penalty, they who impose this show the 
 highest possible estimate of the value of life. That 
 is a sophism by which those who reject this penalty 
 would persuade themselves or the community that 
 in so doing they are more humane than others, or 
 8et a higher value on human life. It is the reverse. 
 
 But the right to take life can depend upon no 
 estimate of its value by us. It must come either 
 directly or indirectly from God, — directly by rev- 
 
PERSONAL RIGHTS : LIFE AND LIBERTY. 181 
 
 elation, and indirectly from its necessity to the 
 ends of government. Government is from God, 
 and has thus a right to do what is essential to its 
 own being and ends ; and if the security which is 
 its great end can be attained only by the death of 
 those who would destroy it, then society may put 
 them to death. Society has thus the right, and 
 must judge how far, in the varying phases of civil- 
 ization and Christianity, it may be necessary to use 
 it. 
 
 The rights of the Person are also infringed by 
 any violence actual or attempted. An assault is 
 violence attempted. Battery is any degree of vio- 
 lence, even the slightest touch in anger, or for in- 
 sult. Violence may also result in wounding or in 
 maiming the person attacked. 
 
 Under rights of the person is also included, — 
 the Right to Liberty. By this is here mghtto 
 meant, not freedom of choice, but the '"'^'*y- 
 liberty of external action in carrying out our choices. 
 It is the right to do whatever any one may choose, 
 provided he does not interfere with the rights of 
 another. 
 
 Liberty to this extent is plainly essential to the 
 end of man as a responsible being, and hence a 
 natural right. It is also inalienable so far as it is 
 necessary to the highest end of any man ; but if 
 by parting with some portion of it, — for even 
 slavery does not wholly take it away, — a man can 
 detter subserve the great ends of love, he is at 
 liberty to do it. 
 
CHAPTER in. 
 
 EIGHT TO PKOPERTT. 
 
 The Right to Property reveals itself through an 
 
 itafoonda- Original desire. The affirmation of it is 
 '^'"^' early and universally made, and becomes 
 
 a controlling element in civil society. 
 
 The sense of this right, thus originally given, is 
 deepened by observation and reflection. Without 
 this society could not exist. With no right to the 
 product of his labor no man would m^ike a tool, or 
 a garment, or buUd a shelter, or raise a crop. 
 There could be no industry and no progress. 
 
 It will be found too, historically, that the general 
 well-being and progress of society has been in pro- 
 portion to the freedom of every man to gain prop- 
 erty in all legitimate ways, and to security in its 
 possession. Let the form of the government be 
 what it may, if there but be freedom of industry, 
 and security in the possession and enjoyment of its 
 results, there will be prosperity. 
 
 The laws of every government relate largely to 
 property. They regulate the modes of its acquisi- 
 tion and transfer, and punish violations of the right. 
 
 The acquisition of property is required by love, 
 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 183 
 
 because it is a powerful means of benefiting others. 
 There is no giving without a previous get- p^perty «» 
 ting, A selfish getting of property, though '»"4'X^ 
 better than a selfish indcJence or wastefalness, is 
 not to be encouraged ;, but the desire of property 
 working in subordination to the affections should 
 be. Most blessed would it be if all the desires 
 could thus work, but especially this. Industry, 
 frugality, carefulness, as ministering to a cheerful 
 giving, would then not only be purged from all 
 taint of meanness, but would be ennobled. " There 
 have," says Chancellor Kent, " been • modern 
 theorists, who have considered separate a;nd ex- 
 clusive property as the cause of injustice, and the 
 unhappy result of government and artificial insti- 
 tutions. But human society would be in a most 
 unnatural and miserable condition if it were pos- 
 sible to be instituted ,or reorganized upon the basis 
 of such speculations. The sense of property is 
 graciously bestowed upon mankind for the purpose 
 of rousing them firom sloth and stimulating them to 
 action. It leads to the cultivation of the earth, the 
 institution of government, the estabhshment of jus- 
 tice, the acquisition of the comforts of life, the 
 growth of the usefiil arts, the spirit of commerce, 
 the productions of taste, the erections of charity, 
 and the display of the benevolent affections." 
 
 Property may be acquired, — 
 
 1. By appropriating so much of those thinga 
 which God has given to all as we need for oui 
 
184 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 own use. Some things which God has given to all, 
 Direct modes as air and sunlight, cannot be appropriated, 
 property. and SO cauuot become property. But 
 the spontaneous fruits of the earth, the products of 
 the waters, and so much land as may be necessary 
 for individual support, and as shall be permanently 
 occupied, may, by appropriation, become property. 
 
 2. Property may be acquired by labor. 
 
 Labor is the chief source of value, and the 
 laborer has a right to the value he creates. This 
 is a natural right resulting directly from a man's 
 right to himself. It may not be easy, it is not, to 
 adjust the questions that arise between the claims 
 of accumulated labor in the form of capital and of 
 labor directly applied, or wages ; but the principle 
 is, that the value created should be shared in pro- 
 portion to the labor represented or applied. 
 
 In the above ways property may be acquired 
 Indirect directly. It may also be acquired indi- 
 ""i™- rectly, and — 
 
 1. By exchange. This may be either by barter, 
 which is an exchange of commodities ; or by bargain 
 and sale, in which the purchaser gives money. 
 
 2. By gift. The right to give away property is 
 involved in the right of ownership. 
 
 3. By will. The right to bestow property by 
 will is admitted in all civilized countries. This is 
 natural and beneficial to society. The right how- 
 ever is not absolute, but may be so limited by law 
 as not to counterwork the general spirit of the in- 
 stitutions of a country. 
 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 185 
 
 4. By inheritance. When persons die intestate, 
 their property is inherited by their relatives in 
 accordance with law. 
 
 5. By accession. " This is the right to all that 
 one's own property produces, whether that property 
 be movable or immovable, and the right to that 
 which is united to it by accession either naturally 
 or artificially. This includes the fruits of the earth 
 produced naturally or by human industry, the in- 
 crease of animals, and the new species of articles 
 made by one person out of the materials of another." 
 " Also title by alluvion, or the deposit of earth by 
 natural causes." ^ 
 
 6. By possession. To prevent litigation the laws 
 properly fix a limit beyond which a man shall not 
 be disturbed in the possession of property, however 
 it may have been acquired. This gives no moral 
 right, but is what is called " right by possession." 
 
 The right of property is exclusive. No man, no 
 state, has the right to take it away without j^^ . ^^ 
 an equivalent, and the owner has a right «"'"«'"■ 
 to put it to any use he may please that is consistent 
 with the rights of others. 
 
 Property may be real or personal. Real estate 
 
 consists of lands and of appurtenances, as Property 
 
 111 1 .1 '™' " I*'" 
 
 houses, trees, shrubs, that cannot be easily sonai. 
 
 moved. AU other property is personal. 
 
 With the exceptions to be mentioned hereafter, 
 
 the right of property is violated if it be taken with- 
 
 1 Kent's Ommtntaria. 
 
186 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 out the free consent of the owner; or if througn 
 This right concealment Or deception the owner fail 
 latsd to have a fall knowledge of the equiva- 
 
 lent oflfered. If property be taken with consent 
 enforced by fear, or by violence without consent, it 
 is robbery. 
 
 If taken by forcibly entering a dwelling in the 
 night, it is burglary. 
 
 If simply taken without the knowledge or con- 
 sent of the owner with no violence, it is theft. 
 
 If property be taken, and through concealment 
 or misrepresentation the owner be ignorant of the 
 equivalent offered, it is cheating. 
 
 If the equivalent offered be a forged papef, it is 
 fraud. The line between fraud and cheating is not 
 sharply drawn. In a large sense they cover the 
 same ground, but while there is fraud in all cheat- 
 ing, yet forgery is a fraud, and not cheating. 
 
 If property be taken with consent obtained by 
 lying or deception without an equivalent, it is ob- 
 taining property under false pretences. 
 
 Of these, robbery, as violating both the rights of 
 person and of property, is the highest crime. As 
 violating both the rights of security and property, 
 burglary comes next. The others are criminal in 
 the eye of tlie law, for that is the only criminality 
 that can here be estimated, as they tend to unsettle 
 the right of property and disturb the order of 
 society, and this tendency may vary with time and 
 circumstances. 
 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 187 
 
 The right of property is exclusive, hut as it is an 
 inferior good, it may not stand in the way q^o^^ of 
 of the great interests of the community, or fereic'e^rith 
 of the life of the individual. Hence the "^ ''*'"• 
 community have the right, provided for and asserted 
 ander all governments, of taking in a legal way, 
 and for a fair equivalent, private property for the 
 convenience and safety of the public. And indi- 
 viduals have the right to take property as food to 
 (preserve life. 
 
 It is commonly said that the right of property 
 precludes the taking of the least thing without the 
 consent of the owner, but consent may sometimes 
 oe presumed. The rule is to take nothing we 
 should not be wilHng the owner should see us take. 
 To take an apple in passing through an orchard is 
 not stealing. 
 
 In the ways above mentioned property is wrong- 
 rally taken. It may be taken rightfully with the 
 iree consent of the owner, whether as a gift or for 
 an equivalent. If for an equivalent, it may be by 
 exchange or by purchase. 
 
 The law of exchange, as already indicated, is 
 that each party should have a full knowl- j^^ ^^ ^^_ 
 edge of that which is offered as an eqvuva- '•""k*- 
 lent. In exchange intrinsic values are not consid- 
 ered, but the convenience or taste of the parties. 
 Hence a fair transaction can require nothing but 
 freedom from constraint, and a ftill knowledge by 
 each party of the equivalent offered. 
 
188 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 The law of exchange by purchase, or of buying 
 and selling, is the same, so far as the seller is con- 
 cerned, as that of simple exchange, except that a 
 trader is bound to ask for that in which he professes 
 to deal, no more than the market-price. A fair 
 transaction requires that there shall be no conceal- 
 ment or deception in the article sold, that no more 
 than the market-price be demanded, and that no 
 improper motive, as vanity, or a depraved appetite, 
 be appealed to. In selling an article in which he 
 does not profess to deal, a man may ask what he 
 pleases. 
 
 Property may be permanently and rightftdly 
 alienated, by gift, by exchange, and by 
 sale. It is also permanently alienated by 
 gambling. This has different forms. In some cases, 
 as in dice and in lotteries, it is simply an appeal to 
 chance. In others, as in cards, there is a mixture 
 of chance and skill. In others, as in betting, of 
 chance and judgment. In all cases the object is 
 gain without an equivalent, an,d while there is such 
 gain on one side there is, on the other, loss without 
 compensation. In legitimate trade both parties are 
 benefited ; in gambling but one. Legitimate trade 
 requires and promotes habits of industry and skill ; 
 gambhng generates indolence and vice, and stimu- 
 lates a most infatuating and often uncontrollable 
 passion. It is wholly selfish, and wholly injurious 
 in its effects upon the community. That a practice 
 thus inherently vicious should be resorted to for 
 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 189 
 
 charitable purposes, does not change its character, 
 but only tends to confound moral distinctions. 
 
 But are all appeals to chance in the distribution 
 of property gambling ? Not necessarily, AUenaaon 
 it we deiine it by its motives and results, by chance 
 
 . . . . p . -vT • T • 1 7 °°' nlways 
 
 A picture is given to a rair. No individual gambung. 
 will give for it its value ; that value is contributed 
 by a number, and the picture disposed of by lot. 
 This differs from an ordinary lottery : 1st, Because 
 there are no expenses, and all that is given goes for 
 an object which the parties are gathered to promote. 
 2d, The prize is given so that nothing is taken for 
 prizes from the amount paid in, but the whole goes 
 for the proposed object. 3d, Tliis may be done 
 from a simple desire that the fair should realize the 
 worth of its property and so benevolently. And 
 4th, Appeals to chance under these conditions are 
 not likely to be so frequent or general as to en- 
 danger the habits of the community. AU this may, 
 and should, in fairness, be said. It should also be 
 said, 1st, That no form of charity should be tolerated 
 for a moment that in the actual state of a com- 
 munity will foster a spirit of gambling. It should 
 be said, 2dly, That any attempt to promote a benev- 
 olent object by an appeal to selfish motives is 
 wrong. Benevolent giving is a means of Christian 
 culture, but selfish giving in the form of benevo- 
 lence is a deception and a snare. If the cause of 
 benevolence cannot be supported benevolently, it 
 had better not be supported at all. Any other 
 
190 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 mode of supporting it will dry up its fountains. 
 While therefore we do not say that all appeals to 
 chance m the distribution of property are gambling, 
 we do say that all combinations and arrangements 
 to cause persons to give money for benevolent ob- 
 jects otherwise than benevolently are wrong, and 
 more especially if they tend to promote a spirit of 
 gambling. 
 
 But not gambling only, speculation also requires 
 
 attention in its relation to morals. In 
 
 some of its forms, as in buying and selling 
 
 stocks, or wheat, when there is no delivery, what 
 
 is called speculation is mere gambling. It is sim- 
 
 whatis ply betting on the question of a future 
 
 called Bpeou- ^ •' ? -r. • i • j- 
 
 laUon. market price, but m speculation, as dis- 
 
 tinguished from gambling, the speculator does not 
 expect to get something for nothing. There is 
 a bargain and a transfer of what each party ac- 
 cepts as an equivalent. Speculation is purchase or 
 sale in the expectation of a change of prices. With 
 fixed prices, which are the basis of ordinary profits, 
 it is impossible. The problem here is to give 
 enterprise and sagacity a fair field without vio- 
 lating the law of love. And 1st, If the ground on 
 which a change of prices is expected is equally 
 known, or accessible to both parties, all agree that 
 the transaction is fair. 2d, If one party has the 
 power to cause fluctuations in price, and buys or 
 seUs with the intention of doing this, all wiU agi'ee 
 that this is swindling. But 3d, If there be a 
 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 191 
 
 certainty that there will be a rise of price in 
 consequence of an event known only to the pur- 
 chaser, then the inquiry is whether he may avail 
 himself of his knowledge. On this opinions differ. 
 It may be said on the one hand that the owner 
 receives full compensation for his property as esti- 
 mated by any price he may have given for it, any 
 labor he may have bestowed upon it, or any expec- 
 tations he may have formed from it, and that if 
 there is to be an increase of value without labor — 
 if somebody is to gain without loss to anybody, it 
 may as fairly be the man who by his enterprise or 
 good fortune has the knowledge as he who has the 
 property. It may be said on the other hand that 
 when a man raises a crop, he does it with the ex- 
 pectation of any advantage that may accrue through 
 unforeseen events, and that for a quicker or more 
 fortunate man who has bestowed upon it no labor 
 at all, to step in and seize an advantage that would 
 have been his in the natural course of events is 
 not strictly honest, to say nothing of the law of 
 love. 
 
 In solving such cases, it may be said that society 
 may be established and exist permanently cosperation 
 
 . . , i n . . *nd compe- 
 
 on two pnnciples — that of competition, ttuon. 
 and that of cooperation. The first has its advantages, 
 and the evils of it are diminished as general intelli- 
 gence is increased. Under it the evils of ignorance 
 are felt peouniaj^ly, and intelligence is thus stimu- 
 lated. Under this system transactions like the 
 
192 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 above would be allowable. It is only transactions 
 based on such a system that human law can regulate. 
 But the principle of cooperation is far higher, and 
 the results would be better. This would require 
 that each man should be made acquainted with the 
 facts, and not only be permitted to act in view of 
 them, but be advised respecting them. 
 
 The above is a common case. There is another 
 less common and diifering from it in one respect. - 
 A man discovers a mine on the farm of another. 
 May he buy the farm and say nothing of the mine ? 
 In the above case advantage would accrue to the 
 holders of the property despite the will of him who 
 had the knowledge, but here the whole increased 
 value comes from the knowledge and is dependent 
 upon it. May not he then who has the knowledge 
 avail himself of the whole of the increased value ? 
 So it would seem, and yet if men had confidence in 
 each other as disposed to act on the principle of 
 cooperation, the owner would be informed of the 
 facts, and would share the profits equally with him 
 who informed him. 
 
 In connection with this subject it should be said 
 that nothing tends more strongly to demoralize a 
 community than unsteady prices. It unsettles in- 
 dustry, and promotes a spirit of gambling ; and any 
 legislation that so tampers with the currency, or 
 disturbs values in any way as to produce this, will 
 aifect disastrously the moral, no les| than the pecu 
 niary interests of the country. 
 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 193 
 
 But property is not only parted with permanently 
 by sale or exchange, but also temporarily Temporary 
 
 » . '■ . alienation 
 
 tor a compensation, it it be money, it of property, 
 is loaned ; if real estate, it is rented ; if a horse, it is 
 let. 
 
 Money differs from other property in being 
 created by law for the public convenience. Hence 
 its amount, the conditions on which it may be 
 issued, and the rate of interest have always been re- 
 garded as proper subjects of legislation. The pub- 
 lic must have a right to prevent that which it creates 
 for its convenience from becoming an injury, but 
 the precise legislation required will be a question of 
 expediency rather than of morals. Where money 
 is abundant, and the amount in a country is large, 
 and especially in a commercial community, it may 
 be wise to permit men to take what interest they 
 can, when under other circumstances it would not. 
 And banks, being created for the convenience of 
 the public, may be restricted in their rate of interest 
 when individuals would not. Their possible com- 
 bination and power to control the currency may 
 require this. The rule is, that all possible freedom 
 compatible with the public interest should be con- 
 ceded in their use of money both to banks and to 
 individuals. This being understood, bargains in 
 regard to interest are to be regulated on the same 
 principles as other bargains. 
 
 When money is loaned, money is to be returned, 
 but when real estate is rented, or when horses and 
 
 13 
 
194 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 carriages are let, the same property is to be re- 
 turned. In the mean time the property may be 
 abused ; and this gives rise to the rule in such cases 
 that it is to be used only for the purpose for which 
 it was rented or let, and that the same care is to 
 be taken of it that a reasonably careful man would 
 take of his own property. If, in connection with 
 such care, the property should be injured by acci- 
 dent in the use contemplated in the bargain, the 
 loss win fall on the owner ; if in any other use, on 
 the person in temporary possession. 
 
 Property is also often lent without compensation 
 simply for the convenience of the borrower. In 
 this case the lender is under obligation not to de- 
 mand it arbitrarily and without reference to the 
 specific use for which it was borrowed. The bor- 
 rower is under obUgation to use the property with 
 care and to return it p'omjptly. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 RIGHT TO REPUTATION. 
 
 The next right that belongs to man is that of 
 Reputation. 
 
 The desire of esteem is as natural as that of 
 property, and is equally the foundation of a right. 
 With most it is a stronger desire, and so the foun- 
 dation of a right that is more precious. If there 
 are those who say with the Roman miser, — 
 
 " Popnlas me sibilat at mihi plaudo, 
 Ipse domi simul ac nnmmos contemplar in area," 
 
 " The people hiss me, but I applaud myself at home, 
 while I gloat over my hoarded riches," — they are 
 but few. In the Scriptures a desire for this is en- 
 couraged, and it is set above property. " A good 
 name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and 
 loving favor rather than silver and gold." With 
 many, reputation is dearer than life, and as society 
 is now constituted, the means of enjoying hfe are 
 even more dependent on this than upon property. 
 If knowledge is power so is reputation, and espe- 
 cially is it power in the form of influence. If then 
 a man have such a possession, we may not detract 
 from it except foi a good reason. 
 
196 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 The most common mode in which the right of 
 This right reputation is violated is by slande,r. The 
 tate4T'°sia,n- esscHce of this hes in diminishing the rep- 
 '*"■ utation of another without good cause, 
 
 whether by truth or falsehood. It was formerly a 
 maxim of law " the greater the truth, the greater 
 the slander." The reason of this was that the 
 truth tended more to injure reputation than false- 
 hood. Now, however, the courts accept the plea 
 of truth in mitigation of damages, and generally in 
 full justification. The malice or the mischief may 
 be as great, or even greater, if only truth be told ; 
 but society is not bound to shield a man by its laws 
 from the natural results of his own acts when fairly 
 made known. 
 
 Slander may be malicious, selfish, or inconsid- 
 erate. It is seldom probably from pure malice. 
 That is not the usual form of human wickedness. 
 But there is scarcely a position or occupation in life 
 in which any considerable reputation will not so bring 
 him who has it into competition with others, that it 
 shall either be, or be supposed to be, for their in- 
 terest to ha've it diminished. And as the facilities 
 for slander are almost unlimited, as the modes of it, 
 by insinuation, hints, injunctions of secrecy, so tend 
 to veil its real nature, as it has so many shades, and 
 as there is not the same danger of legal prosecution 
 as in taking from the property of another, our treat- 
 ment of others in regard to their reputation, when 
 they are in competition with us, becomes one of the 
 most trying tests of character. 
 
EIGHT TO REPUTATION. 197 
 
 The test of character is however scarcely less 
 severe under the temptations in the ordinary inter- 
 course of society to inconsiderate slander. There 
 is here no malice, no competition, no special object, 
 but topics of conversation are needed ; there is 
 excitement in telling news, and words really slan- 
 derous are uttered unmindful of the exaggerations 
 that are sure to follow, and of the deep wounds 
 they may give. In such a case lack of criminal 
 intention is no more an excuse than it would be in 
 a man who should throw the slates of a roof he 
 might be repairing into the street of a city careless 
 of the passers below. 
 
 Against the higher forms of slander a man of 
 average principle would be guarded, but it was 
 probably with special reference to the'se lighter 
 forms that the Apostle James says, " If any man 
 oflfend not in word the same is a perfect man and 
 able to bridle the whole body." Christians are re- 
 quired to lay aside " all evil speaking." They are 
 to be put in mind "to speak evil of no man." So 
 carefully do the Scriptures guard the sacred and 
 precious right of reputation. 
 
 It would appear thus that there are two distinct 
 cases in speaking of others when reputa- KeputaMon 
 tion is in question. In the one an indi- diminishea. 
 vidual has a reputation, and we know of nothing he 
 has done either in gaining it or since it was gained 
 that, if truthfiiUy stated, would diminish it. To 
 diminish reputation in such a case would be to add 
 
198 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 the guilt of lying to that of slander. We have no 
 more right to do it than we have to steal. In the 
 second case an individual has a reputation, but we 
 know things either in regard to his mode of gain- 
 ing it, or that he has done since, which, if truthfully 
 stated, would diminish or perhaps blast it. In this 
 case we are not only permitted to state what we 
 know, but are bound to do it when required to do 
 it by justice, or for the protection of the innocent, 
 or for the good of the offender ; but we are to do it 
 with the temper and limitations required by the law 
 of love. 
 But reputation may be diminished not only by 
 slander, but also by ridicule. The obiect 
 01 this is to awaken contempt. This may 
 be proper when provoked by pretense or affectation, 
 by extravagance or absurdity, perhaps by persistent 
 awkwardness or carelessness, but never to bring 
 into contempt anything that is genuine. The mo- 
 ment this is done, — and it may be done towards anv 
 man, — however keen the wit, or perfect the mimicry, 
 or droll the caricature, we obscure the distinction 
 between that which is reputable and venerable, 
 and that which is contemptible, and thus not only 
 wrong the individual, but undermine those higher 
 sentiments on which the stability of the community 
 depends. Ridicule is an effective weapon, but re- 
 quires care in its use, and out of its sphere is de- 
 moralizing and dangerous. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 MGHT TO TRUTH. 
 
 We have now considered the rights commonly 
 mentioned as belonging to all men, — the general 
 right to security, the right to life, to liberty, to 
 property, and to reputation. I am inclined to say 
 there is still another — the right to truth. 
 
 This has the same foundation as other rights, that 
 is, in its necessity to men for the attainment by 
 them of their ends ; it is often so spoken of as to 
 imply that it is a right, as when one is said to have 
 no right to the truth, and in grave cases men are 
 put under oath and the right is enforced by law. 
 We should hence have naturally expected that it 
 would be regarded as a right and classed among the 
 others. Whewell does, indeed, place the right of 
 contract among the primary rights of men, and 
 bases it on the need of mutual understanding. But 
 in that mutual understanding which is essential to 
 the order of society there is no proper contract. 
 Nor is such understaxiding by any means wholly 
 based on anything that can be called either a con- 
 tract or a promise. Men act on expectation based, 
 either, as in nature, on uniformity of causation 
 
200 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 without reference to obligation; or on confidence in 
 those who have voluntarily excited expectation and 
 who feel, on that ground, bound not to disappoint 
 it. Which then is the prevalent element in the 
 affairs of life ? A man keeps a shop. Do I expect 
 to find it open during business hours because he is 
 under contract, or has promised to keep it open? 
 No, he may shut it up for a holiday, as John Gilpin 
 did his, and break no contract ; or he may shut it 
 up indefinitely and give no notice. My expectation 
 in this, and in a multitude of similar cases, is based 
 on that uniform operation of motives, which, aside 
 from any sense of obligation and in compatibility 
 with freedom, gives stability and consistency to con- 
 duct. It may be difficult, it is, to separate expec- 
 tation thus based from that which rests upon an 
 implied promise. This always exists when expec- 
 tation is voluntarily excited, and carries obligation 
 with it, and it is from the two combined that we 
 feel so secure of the uniform conduct of those 
 around us. So far, however, as a right exists in 
 this case, I should prefer to call it a right to tmth 
 rather than a right of contract, though it is perhaps 
 of little consequence what we call it. 
 
 But such cases are on the same general ground 
 with others, in which there is certainly no contract. 
 All human interests connect themselves with truth. 
 As has been said, men act on expectation, and can 
 act successftiUy only as their expectations are well 
 founded, that is, as they are founded in truth. But 
 
RIGHT TO TRUTH. 201 
 
 God has made men so dependent on each other for 
 information, that neither the ends of the individual 
 nor those of society can be attained unless the repre- 
 sentations which they make to each other are large- 
 ly true, and what I say is, that when any legitimate 
 end of another depends on his being told the truth, 
 he has a right to the truth. It must be so or there 
 are no rights. A traveller asks the right road. 
 He has a right to the truth. A child asks if a berry 
 be poisonous. It has a right to the truth, and such 
 cases are so numerous, that a right to truth seems 
 to me among the most sacred and important of our 
 rights. 
 
 But it may be asked, who shall decide when a 
 man has a right to the truth. In some cases the 
 law decides it. Where it does not, the person of 
 whom it is demanded must decide. Certainly he 
 who asks an impertinent question, or any question 
 not essential to the attainment by himself of some 
 legitimate end, has no right to the truth, though 
 the absence of such right will not justify a lie. 
 
 A right to truth, as stated above, will include 
 that of contract whether express or implied. 
 
 If any say that a right which cannot be en- 
 forced is no right, it is replied that this is enforced 
 every time an oath is taken, for the only object of 
 an oath is to enforce the truth ; and that this right 
 can be enforced quite as fully as the right to repu- 
 tation. 
 
DIVISION II. 
 
 DUTIES EEGAEDING THE WANTS OF OTHERS. 
 
 — • — 
 
 CHAPTER I, 
 
 JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE. 
 
 Having considered Rights, we next pass to the 
 supply of Wants. This is the second great class 
 of duties required hy love as a law. 
 
 The transition here is from the duties of justice, 
 to those of benevolence. Between these there are 
 important differences. These were formerly indi- 
 cated by saying that the obligations and claims of 
 justice were perfect, while those of benevolence 
 were imperfect. But this form of expression was 
 objected to as weakening the force of obligation, 
 and of late the differences themselves have been 
 too much overlooked. 
 
 But it is one thing for a man to ask for the pay- 
 ment of a debt, and quite another, however great 
 may be his need, to ask for charity. In the first 
 case he has a right to the money, and the person 
 owing it is under obligation to pay it on the ground 
 of that right. In the second case the person asking 
 has no right to the money, but it may still be right 
 
JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE. 203 
 
 for the person asked to give it, and he may be 
 under obligation to do so. There may be a claim 
 of humanity, if not of justice, and an obligation on 
 the ground of that claim where there is no right. 
 
 Hence the first diflPerence between the duties of 
 justice and those of benevolence will be that one 
 respects rights, and the other right. These are gen- 
 erally coincident, that is, it is generally right for a 
 man to do what he has a right to do ; but they may 
 be opposed. A rich landlord may have a right to 
 collect his rent from a poor widow upon whom un- 
 expected and unavoidable misfortune has fallen, and 
 take from her her last crust and her last blanket, 
 but it would not be right. The rent might be 
 justly due, the claim might be valid in law, the law 
 might enforce it, and properly, for otherwise there 
 could be no law; but it would not be morally 
 right. 
 
 A second difference, growing out of the first, is, 
 that as rights are capable of definition and precise 
 limitation, the obligations growing out of them may 
 be enforced by human law, whereas that which is 
 right, being incapable of such definition and limita- 
 tion, the obligation growing out of it cannot be thus 
 enforced. Hence the proper business of legislation 
 is to secure to all their rights, and not to oblige any 
 to do right. If there are courts of equity their 
 object is not to compel the doing of right, but to 
 prevent the doing of wrong through the imperfec- 
 tions and under the forms of law. That legislation 
 
204 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 should seek to pass from the guardianship of rights 
 to an attempt to compel the doing of right, is nat- 
 ural ; but this has seldom been done without con- 
 fusion and mischief. 
 
 A third difference between the duties of justice 
 and those of benevolence is, that while rights are 
 the ground of a claim, and he in whom they vest 
 may properly be indignant if the claim be not met, 
 he who asks aid as charity can never make a claim, 
 and has no ground for indignation if his claim be 
 reiused. It may be that the person asked is under 
 obligation to give, but of that he who asks is not 
 to be the judge. If he might be, two spheres 
 totally different would be at once confounded. 
 Goodness must be free to choose its own methods, 
 else it would not be goodness. The rich man who 
 refused all applicants for aid, and lived in odium 
 that he might accumulate enough to supply a city 
 with water, was afterwards justified and lauded. 
 He was under obligation to be beneficent, but was 
 at liberty to choose his own methods ; and even if 
 he had not chosen to recognize the obligation, it 
 was not for those who had no claim on him but that 
 of humanity to call him to account. 
 
 A fourth difiFerence is, that while a fulfillment of 
 the obligations corresponding to rights excites no 
 gratitude, a fulfillment of obligation in doing right 
 by supplying wants, does excite gratitude. No man 
 is grateful for the payment of a debt. It is simple 
 justice, and is, or should be, a matter of course. 
 
JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE. 205 
 
 But if wants are gratuitously supplied, even though, 
 as in the case of the good Samaritan, the benefactor 
 could not fail of supplying them without a violation 
 of obligation, gratitude is felt. The reason is that 
 in the one case the man receives simply what is hia 
 own, what he has a right to, and may claim ; and 
 this is always thus where simple justice is done. 
 The natural order of things, except as provided for 
 by the natural affections, is that every one should 
 have his rights and supply his own wants. In this 
 there would be no call for gratitude, while any 
 interference with this order by an infraction of 
 rights would awaken indignation. But when this 
 natural order has been broken in upon, and there 
 is want or suffering for which he who gives relief 
 is in no way responsible, then the supply of that 
 want, and the relief of that suffering, can come only 
 from simple goodness ; and such goodness manifested 
 in behalf of any individual is the proper ground of 
 gratitude. Be it that the benefactor is under ob- 
 ligation to be good. The action of the moral 
 nature enters into, and forms a part of goodness. 
 But this obligation having been recognized, and 
 goodness, instead of its opposite, having been freely 
 chosen, the exercise of such goodness towards an 
 individual whose rights we have not violated, and 
 whose wants and sufferings are from no agency of 
 ours, is a ground for gratitude, and all the ground 
 there can be. There is no contrariety, as some 
 seem to think, between a pervasive moral nature 
 
206 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 on the one hand, and the utmost freedom of choice 
 and the fullest play of every generous affection on 
 the other. That these affections should have wide 
 scope is right, and if there be obligation it is only 
 to the choice of that which is inherently lovely in 
 the promotion of good. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 SUPPLy OF THE WANTS OP OTHERS. 
 
 With this view of the differences between the 
 duties of justice and those of benevolence we pro- 
 ceed to consider what the law of love would require 
 in the supply of physical wants. 
 
 Give a person all his rights, and it is to be 
 expected that he will supply his own wants. From 
 the feebleness of infancy and of age, and from 
 sickness, this is, however, often impossible ; and 
 then, though there be no claim but that of human- 
 ity, love would require others to supply them. 
 
 Here two propositions are to be established. 
 The first is, that whenever a person has i^„gaa- 
 all his rights, and it is possible for him to ™tou^nt 
 supply his own wants, love not only does '""'"y- 
 not require us to supply them, but positively for- 
 bids it if our doing so would encourage either indo- 
 lence or vice. 
 
 Intelligent activity is the great source of good to 
 man. It is the foundation of self-respect and of the 
 respect of others. Beauty of person and talent we 
 admire, but these are gifts. Will, intelligently 
 exerted for a worthy end, is the only object of 
 
208 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 approval. Mental attainments always, and wealth 
 generally, — the great means of doing good to 
 others, — depend on such activity. There is be- 
 sides, as the inseparable concomitant of such activ- 
 ity, a satisfaction of the highest kind, and that can 
 come in no other way. Of this activity, want is 
 the appointed stiniulus. Opposed to it is indolence, 
 a besetting sin of the race ; the mother, not only 
 of imbecility, but of every vice — and in the stern 
 contest of God's ordinance of want with this sin, 
 love cannot interfere. An apostle commanded, 
 " If any would not work, neither should he eat." 
 The second proposition is that when it is im- 
 whenwMits possible for persons to supply their own 
 Suppiw by wants. Love requires that they be sup- 
 others. p]ig(j by others. 
 
 This impossibility as it appears in infancy, in sick- 
 ness, in disability from accident or sudden calamity, 
 and in old age, is divinely appointed as a part of 
 our condition here ; and over against it we find the 
 promptings and claims of natural affection, of friend- 
 ship, of neighborhood, and of humanity. In the 
 spontaneous play of these, if we could but exclude 
 indolence and vice, we should find an adequate pro- 
 vision for the supply of all wants. The wants and 
 liabilities of each would but tend to the union of 
 the whole, and the burden of their supply, if indeed 
 it would be a burden, would not be greater than 
 the discipline of character would require. No 
 legislation would be needed. But indolence and 
 
SUPPLY OF THE WANTS OF OTHERS. 209 
 
 vice do exist, and from them come want and suffer- 
 ing that assume such proportions as to require 
 legislative action. May not, then, such want and 
 suffering be left to the provision made by law? 
 No ; and this for the sake of both parties. 
 
 Legislation can do much, but when its provisiona 
 are best administered it is impersonal ; Legislation 
 like the laws of Nature, it must go by cienttoBe- 
 
 ^ '' cure this 
 
 general rules, and so cannot touch the supply. 
 heart. It has in it the power of relief, but not of 
 reform. It may reach want, but not character, and 
 till that is reached nothing effectual or permanent 
 is done. The present life is not retributive, but 
 disciplinary, and when the laws of well-being have 
 been so far transgressed as to bring want and suffer- 
 ing that call for charity, these should lead to refor- 
 mation. But this they seldom do. More often we 
 find either a hardened defiance or a languid and 
 hopeless discouragement. What is then needed is 
 such kindness and sympathy as will bring to the 
 poor and suffering and degraded the hope of res- 
 toration to his own self-respect, and to the respect 
 and love of others. This can come only from a 
 manifestation of individual and personal interest. 
 Love begets love, and for all who can love there is 
 hope. If love thus manifested, and seconded by 
 the natural fruits of transgression, will not work a 
 reformation, no human effort can avail. 
 
 Nor will the highest interests of the benefactor 
 himself permit that the relief of want and suffering 
 
210 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 from indolence and vice should be left to legislation 
 alone. If we except the forgiveness of enemies, and 
 kindness to those injurious to us personally, there is 
 no way in which Christ can be imitated so closely 
 as by doing good to the degraded through their own 
 fault, and to those seemingly lost. There is no 
 achievement like that of lifting a man sunk in vice 
 and enchained by evil habits onto the high ground 
 of Christian manhood, and fixing him permanently 
 there ; and the more there is of sympathy, and of 
 effort for this, the more is the character improved. 
 
 For the sake of both parties then, we are for- 
 bidden to remit the care of the poor by their own 
 fault to provision made by law. 
 
DIVISION in. 
 
 PEEFEOTING AND DIRECTING THE POWERS OF OTHERS. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DUTY OF INFLUENCE FROM THE RELATION OF CHAR- 
 ACTER TO WELL-BEING OBSTACLES TO CHANGE 
 
 OF INTELLECTUAL STATE AND OF CHARACTER 
 
 But we are not only to supply the physical wants 
 of men as we have opportunity, we are also to seek 
 to perfect and direct their powers. 
 
 In speaking of our duty to ourselves, nothing was 
 said of directing the powers, because they were sup- 
 posed to be under the direction of the law of love. 
 The inquiry was what love, supposed to exist, 
 would require us to do. But as a condition of well- 
 being, a right direction of the powers, so far as it 
 can be distinguished from perfection, is even more 
 important than that. It is necessary to progress 
 toward perfection. 
 
 There is here a distinction to be made between 
 the intellectual and moral powers. For the im- 
 provement of the moral powers the two conditions 
 of activity, and right direction, are requisite, but 
 activity alone is needed to improve the intellectnal 
 
212 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 powers. The burglar gains adroitness and skill in 
 picking the lock as rapidly as the lock-maker in 
 guarding against him. With given activity it 
 matters little for purposes of skill and efficiency 
 on what objects the intellect is employed, or for 
 what end. But if the moral powers are not em- 
 ployed on right objects and directed to a right 
 end, there is not only perversion but deterioration. 
 The more active they are the more they deterio- 
 rate. If, therefore, we would do the highest good 
 to men we must seek, not only to perfect their 
 powers, but to perfect the moral powers by direct- 
 ing them rightly. Our object must be to produce 
 a change not merely in the condition, but in the 
 state of men ; and not merely in their intellectual 
 state involving acquisitions and capacity, but in 
 their moral state which involves, or rather which is, 
 character. 
 
 And here, in character, whether we would con- 
 Sj'Stor"' s^lt for oui" ^"^^ good, or that of others, 
 tatog"' ^'^ fi"<i that condition of well-being which 
 is to be singled out as " the one thing needful." 
 It is to be distinguished from everything else — 
 from all dispositions and tendencies so native as to 
 be wholly independent of choice, and which, if they 
 lie back of choice, have yet no moral character till 
 they are sanctioned by that. It is to be distin- 
 guished from all characteristics, which are accidental 
 peculiarities ; from acquisitions, which are what we 
 gain, whether of material or of power, character 
 being imphed ; and from all accomplishments, which 
 
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 213 
 
 are acquired perfections in ourselves, and means of 
 pleasing others, if we have a disposition to please 
 them. So far from consisting in any of these 
 things, it is this that controls and directs them all. 
 This can transform and renovate all dispositions, 
 can remedy all infelicities of temperament and of 
 temper. Character can triumph over the most ad- 
 verse circumstances, turning them into means of its 
 own advancement. It can transfigure and glorify 
 the humblest lot. It is the possibility of this in 
 our humanity, and its capacity for it that gives to 
 that humanity its highest value, and it is the higher 
 manifestations of this that give it its dignity. What 
 then is it ? It is the very essence, not of our sub- 
 stantial being as given by God, but of ourselves as 
 having capacity to choose our own ends, and to 
 take our own place in his universe. It is deter- 
 mined by and consists in our radical choice. It is 
 our deepest love. When we know what the su- 
 preme chosen end of any man is, we know his 
 character. This it is that determines his affinities 
 in the moral world where the attractions and re- 
 pulsions are stronger than they are in the physical 
 world. With this, the deepest, central love of its 
 being, right, humanity comes into such a relation 
 to the JLiker and Proprietor of all, that it enters 
 into the possession and inheritance of all things ; 
 with this wrong, it not merely falls away into in- 
 difference to all that is good, but into repugnance 
 to it, and enters a realm of positive evil and suffer- 
 ing corresponding to the good of which it is capable. 
 
214 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 From this relation of character to well-being it 
 must be our duty to do what we can that the char- 
 acter of others should be right; but the intellec- 
 tual acquisitions and power of others, and especially 
 their character, hold a relation to our efforts en- 
 tirely different from the supply of their wants. If a 
 man fail to supply his own wants we can do it with- 
 out his cooperation, or at least, we can so provide 
 for them that his cooperation, unless he may choose 
 to commit suicide, is a matter of course ; but no 
 man can be benefited to any great extent intellec- 
 tually, or at all morally, without his own active co- 
 operation. We have direct power over matter, but 
 can reach mind only by influence. If any one 
 choose he can oppose a barrier to anything we can 
 do that we cannot overcome. 
 
 And not only so, there is a tendency in ignorance 
 _ _, . and vice to erect such barriers. Mind has 
 
 Barriers to 
 
 imomiM ^^® ''*'* inerticB as well as matter. The 
 andTice. ignorant person sees what he sees and is 
 content with it. He is not content with the igno- 
 rance as such, but with knowledge, that is, with what 
 he knows, and every person who is content with 
 what he knows is in the same condition, only he 
 may be a little less ignorant. The man has knowl- 
 edge, it is Mb knowledge ; in the light of it he sees 
 and walks, he sees nothing beyond, and so desires 
 nothing. If this knowledge, however limited, be 
 connected with customs of long standing, so that in 
 the light of it the man walks where his fathers 
 
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 215 
 
 walked, and if enlargement of knowledge would 
 draw after it a change of •associations and habits, 
 and especially if fancied interest from short-sighted 
 views come in, then will new ideas not only not be 
 welcomed, but they will be resisted. And so strong 
 is this tendency that if a people be ignorant there is 
 no hope that enlightenment will spring up from 
 themselves. There is no example of it in history. 
 It must come from above, or from without ; when it 
 does come it will be resisted, and the resistance will 
 be in proportion to the ignorance and the fancied 
 interests in question. 
 
 But if this be true of ignorance, much more will 
 it be of vice. Vice involves habits of action, chosen 
 habits. Its very essence is in these. It relates not 
 merely to associations of thought, to ordinary cus- 
 toms and the routine of life, but to the whole direc- 
 tion and tendency of the man, to the tenor and 
 current of his affections and choices. Vices differ 
 as appetites, desires, passions may be stronger ; but 
 they have a common root in the fact that the man 
 is not lifted from the plane of indulgence in that 
 propensity which is strongest, whatever it may be, to 
 the higher ground of subjugating all propensities 
 and merely impulsive tendencies to the demands 
 of intelligent choice, and the voice of conscience 
 speaking in accordance with that. It makes a 
 radical difference whether the conduct has its root 
 in rational choice and be sanctioned by the con- 
 science, or in blind impulsion of whatever kind. 
 
216 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 In the one case the man is controlled by what In 
 the Scriptures is called, the spirit in opposition to 
 the flesh, and in the other by that which is called 
 the flesh in opposition to the spirit. In its nature 
 all impulsion is blind. Each appetite and desire 
 finds its motive in its own object. In themselves, 
 impulsion, desire, appetite, have no moral character, 
 but the man who gives himself up to the control of 
 any one of these has a moral character. He lays 
 aside his true manhood. He debases himself. 
 Outwardly he may do nothing unseemly, but he 
 permits that to rule which ought to serve. He falls 
 into bondage, and nothing but favoring outward 
 circumstances, or an amiable temper, or a selfish 
 prudence, can stand between him and any crime. 
 In a .sense and to a certain extent the impulsive 
 and the rational powers may be coincident, but they 
 can never act in the same manner, nor have the 
 same end. Impulsion, appetency of every kind, are 
 independent facts in our constitution. They are to 
 control us up to a certain point, and then are to be 
 regulated. Up to the point where they need reg- 
 ulation they may be said to be coincident with the 
 rational power, but they are blind ; they are essen- 
 tially of the nature of servants, and whoever gives 
 himself up to the permanent guidance and control 
 of any one of them, or to be controlled by them in 
 turn as each may be strongest, is in bondage. This 
 bondage may assume a great variety of forms, and 
 be more or less inveterate and debasing, but in 
 
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 217 
 
 every form it is bondage, and more to be dreaded 
 than that which is physical. We call it bondage, 
 and it is so. It is an unnatural position, a degrada- 
 tion. Let the spiritual nature with its powers of 
 comprehension abdicate its seat and work in sub- 
 jection to the lower and blind nature of appetency 
 and impulsion, and the broad wisdom appropriate to 
 that nature degenerates into the cunning of the 
 serpent. Intellectual power becomes a curse, and 
 instead of holding his erect position and communing 
 with the heavens, the man, that which is distinc- 
 tively so, goes upon his belly and eats dust. 
 
 This bondage is felt, but it is chosen, for though 
 it be bondage, there is yet in it a certain freedom, 
 the freedom of abandonment and insubjection. 
 There is in it no trouble or sacrifice of self-denial, 
 for the higher nature, in whose behalf alone self- 
 denial is possible, is set aside. If we add to this 
 the blindness and paralysis that come upon the 
 spiritual powers when they are thus ignored and 
 abused, the light that is within us becoming dark- 
 ness, we shall not wonder that it is so seldom, if 
 ever, that any one who has come under the power 
 of this bondage breaks away from it of his own 
 accord, or by his own strength. 
 
 We have, then, three conditions of humanity in 
 their order as lower and higher, in which ^^^ ^^_ 
 we are required to put forth efforts in its ^'j°"g"" 
 behalf: physical want, ignorance, and I **"'■ 
 will not say vice, but that state in which the ra- 
 
218 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 tional and spiritual powers are in bondage to those 
 that are impulsive. 
 
 Of these, physical want, as producing immediate 
 First phys- suflFering, and as addressing us through 
 leal want. ^j^g genses, makes an appeal that is uni- 
 versally felt. Hence all mankind have a sympathy 
 with the disposition that would relieve such want. 
 From the time of Job, and doubtless from the be 
 ginnmg, men have commended him who has been 
 " eyes to the blind," and " feet to the lame," and a 
 " father to the poor," and who has " caused the 
 widow's heart to sing for joy." Besides, physical 
 suffering is often unavoidable. It may be from 
 hereditary disease, or from misfortune, or accident, 
 and no possible agency, or want of agency, on the 
 part of the sufferer can come in to check our sym- 
 pathy. It is to be said, too, though giving to sup- 
 ply physical suffering often requires deUcacy, yet 
 that we approach in this less near to the centre of 
 personality, and are less in danger of wounding 
 either self-love or a just self-respect. 
 
 But, with the evils from ignorance, all this is in 
 Second and ^ great measure reversed ; and with those 
 noKHi'<»' from spiritual bondage, and from vice, as 
 and Tioe. distinguished from its physical effects, it is 
 wholly so. There is here no immediate suffering ; 
 the senses are not appealed to ; there is nothing to 
 measure the evil, and those who are the subjects of 
 the evil are not conscious of it. Ignorance may be 
 from indolence and neglect, or from mere wilfullness. 
 
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 219 
 
 It is often selfecoraplacent, or perhaps makes itself 
 unconsciously ridiculous and absurd. Still less 
 visibly do spiritual bondage, and vice except in its 
 lower forms, connect themselves with suffering. 
 Around these wealth and learning and accomplish- 
 ments are often gathered ; they array themselves 
 in the fashions and organize the gayeties and pomps 
 of this world. Having their seat within, and being 
 connected with much that is attractive, it is not for 
 one man to say how far they exist in another. As 
 they must be from choice and involve the supreme 
 choice, and are always wrong, whoever seeks to 
 remove them must venture into the very seat of 
 personality, and always with direct or implied cen- 
 sure. It is not therefore to be wondered at that 
 while those who have relieved physical suffering, 
 and those who have enlightened ignorance through 
 the regularly constituted forms of education have 
 been welcomed and commended, those who have 
 sought to enthrone conscience and benefit men 
 spiritually should have been thought intrusive and 
 fanatical, and should have been resisted and per- 
 secuted. The truth is, that over large portions of 
 the earth, this form of doing good has not been 
 attempted. Its necessity has not been recognized. 
 Its very nature has not been understood. Christ is 
 the only person who ever made this his sole aim, or 
 at least, who made all things else subservient to 
 this. Ho alone saw clearly what was the great 
 want of the race. This, we can now see, has its 
 
220 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 foundation in the nature and condition of man, as 
 much so as physical or intellectual want, and also 
 that it should be recognized as furnishing the high- 
 est sphere of labor for the good of man. But this 
 sphere has not been recognized distinctly, and this 
 labor has not been done except where the teachings 
 of Christ have come. He first revealed fully the 
 motives and conditions of successful work, He inau- 
 gurated the system by his own crucifixion, and it 
 has been carried forward since only by the spirit of 
 self-renunciation which He thus illustrated. ». 
 
 In each of the spheres above mentioned, it is 
 more blessed to give than to receive. The reason 
 GMng and ^^5 ^^^^ S'^^^S implies a superiority of the 
 reoemng. gjyer in the possession of the thing given, 
 and also the exercise of faculties capable of confer- 
 ring a higher joy. He who would relieve physical 
 M'ant must have money, or food, or clothing to give ; 
 he who would enhghten the ignorant must have 
 knowledge, and he who would lift another from any 
 form of spiritual bondage or vice, can work efiec- 
 tually only by standing, in some points at least, 
 above him. 
 
CHAPTER IL 
 
 SPHEEES OF EFFORT : WHO MAT LABOB VX 
 THEM. 
 
 But -while there are thus these three great fields 
 of labor, and while it is more blessed in each to give 
 than to receive, the question arises, who may enter 
 in to labor in them. 
 
 In the first, the field of physical want, the ca- 
 pacity, the right, and the obligation have always 
 been supposed to go together. If any man had 
 wealth, and was disposed to employ it in relieving 
 such wants as wealth can directly relieve, no one 
 has objected ; but to labor as teachers, and also for 
 the spiritual interests of men, men have been espe- 
 cially set apart. This has been done for good rea- 
 sons, but I suppose that here also the capacity gives 
 the right and imposes the obligation. For the sake 
 of order , and to guard against error, governments 
 and ecclesiastical bodies have assumed to authorize 
 teachers and those qualified to minister to the spir- 
 itual wants of men, but they have no power except 
 to exclude those who have not the capacity. Ca- 
 pacity is given of God, and no man or body of men 
 has a right to forbid one who has it to do a good 
 
222 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 work to his fellow men. If one who has capacity 
 be thus forbidden, it is still his duty to go on as the 
 Apostles did, doing his work and taking the conse- 
 quences. This may bring on conflicts and turn the 
 world upside down, but any other doctrine would 
 be fatal to progress. 
 
 As referring to distinct parts of our nature, the 
 Three three spheres of beneficence spoken of 
 
 spheres dis- ^ put •■ i 
 
 oriminatod. above need to be carefully discriminated, 
 and in the minds of very many, the third needs to 
 be legitimated. We need not merely to see their 
 limitations, but especially the difficulties and obsta- 
 cles of each. We need also to see their relations 
 as higher and lower, the lower good being a condi- 
 tion for the higher, and the lower work furnishing 
 the best introduction to that which is higher, and 
 the best standing-point for it. He who fails to do 
 good to the bodies of men when that is in his power 
 and they need it, or who fails to enlighten the ig- 
 norant when he can, will enter upon a higher work 
 at a great disadvantage, if indeed he can succeed in 
 it at all. We need, finally, to see, what it has been 
 my general object to impress in these remarks, that 
 each of these spheres is open to all who can enter 
 in, and that the relations of men to each other as 
 men, impose upon all the obligation to do for others 
 in each of these spheres whatever they can. 
 
SECOND GREAT DIVISION. 
 
 DUTIES FROM SPECIAL RELATIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 BIGHTS OF PERSONS : EIGHT AND RIGHTS : SPECIAI 
 DUTIES : THE FAMILY. 
 
 We have now seen that it is our duty to do good 
 to all — 
 
 1. By conceding to them their rights ; 
 
 2. By supplying their wants ; and 
 
 3. By directing and perfecting their powers. 
 But this good is to be thus done to all in their 
 
 simple relation to us as fellow men. As such they 
 stand to us in the relation of perfect equality — not 
 necessarily an equality of condition, But an equality 
 of rights. We have no right over them, they have 
 no claim upon us on the ground of having been 
 in any way specially committed to us. 
 
 But in the relations, constituted by God, of bus- 
 band and wife, and of parent and child, j.o„„^y 
 and others growing out of these, there is of*"^, 
 a commitment of each to each, and of '^e^'^- 
 some to others ; and there is a foundation laid for 
 
224 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 what have been called the rights of persons, with 
 their corresponding" duties, claims, and obhgations. 
 As has been said, the right of parents over the 
 child is from the fact that God has so committed 
 the child to them, that they are either indispensa- 
 ble to the attainment by the child of its end, or can 
 do for it what no one else can. This right, thns 
 founded, involves the duty on the part of the par- 
 ents of doing what they can to enable the child to 
 attain its end. This is the very purpose for which 
 the right over the child was given, and no duty can 
 be more imperative. 
 
 We have thus, in special relations of which those 
 Special '^^ ^^^ family are but an example, an oc- 
 
 auties. casion for special duties. As we pass to 
 
 the consideration of these duties that arise from 
 or under the " Rights of Persons," we make an 
 important transition. We come into a region in 
 many respects new. It is one thing to treat of 
 duty among equals having a common standard, law, 
 or authority, to which they must alike defer, and 
 quite another to treat of it among beings who have 
 reciprocal rights and duties, claims and obligations. 
 In the one case, the standard may be simply imper- 
 sonal law, or what must mean the same thing, — the 
 law of obligation as revealed in each one, and so 
 there be no responsibility except of the being to 
 himself. There could be no government, no obe- 
 dience, no punishment. In the other case, all these 
 will exist, and in treating of these duties, new ques- 
 
EIGHTS OF PERSONS, ETC. 225 
 
 tions and principles must be involved that will re- 
 quire attention. 
 
 And first, it may be well to notice more fully, 
 though it does not belong here exclu- Relation of 
 sively, the relation to each other of Right, Wghta. 
 and of Rights. Neither of these can be, except 
 with reference to an end. The idea of an eternal 
 Right existing in the order of thought before God, 
 or any being who could have the conception of an 
 end, and controlling him, is to me inconceivable. 
 Right relates to what beings are to do ; rights to 
 what they may claim and require others to do. 
 That is the right thing to be done in a fiimily by 
 which the ends of the family as God instituted it 
 would be attained, and a parent has rights that he 
 may cause those ends to be attained. In the im- 
 perfection of human arrangements men may have 
 legal rights which it would not be right to enforce, 
 but it would be a contradiction to say that they can 
 have a right morally to do that which is not right. 
 He who enforces his rights for the end for which 
 they were given, does right ; he who does it foi 
 any other end is a tyrant. 
 
 We next ask attention to the claims of j^^^^q 
 special duties and of the family, out of ^"gJJSSi' 
 which they all grow. "'^^*' 
 
 It is said by some that we are to regard every 
 
 man, and labor for him according to his intrinsic 
 
 worth, irrespective of any special relation to us. 
 
 This has a show of breadth and of liberality, but 
 
 15 
 
226 MOBAL SCIENCE. 
 
 is contrary to nature, and would defeat its own 
 end. 
 
 If there be one set of arrangements more illus- 
 trative than others of the divine wisdom and good- 
 ness, it is that by which the knowledge and strength 
 and affection of the parent — that natural affection 
 which fixes upon the child as his own — is set over 
 against the ignorance and weakness and utter de- 
 pendence of the child. This, if any thing can, in- 
 dicates the ministry to which the child is to be 
 entrusted. Throughout animated nature the good 
 of the whole is reached by specific ministries indi- 
 cated and animated by specific affections. Through 
 them a large part of the good on the earth is con- 
 ferred and enjoyed, and he who would set them 
 aside, would set aside one of the widest and most 
 pervading of all the provisions and arrangements 
 made by God. 
 
 It will follow from what has just been said, that 
 those who thus go contrary to nature must defeat 
 their own end. Is that end the happiness, or the 
 best care of the race ? The race has no existence 
 separate from the individuals of whom it is com- 
 posed, so that what is best for each individual is 
 best for all. But it is found that the happiness of 
 individuals is best promoted by a faithfiil attention 
 to those special duties which are involved in these re- 
 lations which God has established. The children oi 
 each parent are committed to liim. This gives him 
 a specific duty. These are his platoon as an under 
 
EIGHTS OF PERSONS, ETC. 227 
 
 officer in the great army of the race. There may 
 be higher duties in relation to the army and its 
 commander than the care of his platoon. Exigen- 
 cies may occur when this shall be, for no natural 
 affection or impulse can give absolute law, but un- 
 der all ordinary conditions it is the business of each 
 parent to take care of his own children. It is not 
 for him to look the world over and compare his 
 children with those of others and decide on their 
 relative value or worthiness. By the voice of na- 
 ture and of God, as well as by every advantage of 
 labor and of influence, his first duty is to his own 
 children, and as this is the case with every other 
 man, it will follow that in this way all children will 
 be taken care of in the best possible manner. 
 
 And what is thus true of the parental relation is 
 true in its measure of all the relations of kindred, 
 as of brother and sister, and the more distant grades 
 of affinity. It is also true of those to whom we 
 are bound by friendship, of those to whom gratitude 
 is due, of those who stand in the relation of neigh- 
 bors and even of fellow citizens. 
 
 Of course specific affections need regulation. 
 There is danger of excess in them and of absorp- 
 tion by them. They do not give law, but are as 
 much intended to have a^ influence in social life as 
 the instincts are in the control of the body. With- 
 in limits, and under ordinary conditions, a man may 
 rationally yield himself to the guidance of his in- 
 stincts with the conviction that they are the voice 
 
228 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 of a higher reason than his own. Let a man ignore 
 Instinct and Appetite in the care of his animal life, 
 and hand the care of that life over to Reason to be 
 provided for on scientific principles and there will 
 be no longer spontaneity or beauty in that life, and 
 its efficiency will be impaired. In the same way, 
 if we disallow those feelings which naturally spring 
 from the near affinities and proximities of social life 
 we take away its warmth and spontaneity, and sub- 
 stitute the limited and discordant views of individ- 
 uals for the wisdom of God. 
 
 The family is the ordinance of God, and its un 
 derlying idea is religious. It is, indeed, a training- 
 school for the community and the state, but only as 
 preparatory to fitness for a place in that great family 
 above of which the family here is a type, and foi 
 which it should be a preparation. It is the first 
 form of human society, the foundation and source 
 of all other forms, and as that is such will they be. 
 It was because the family is thus the fountain-head 
 of society, and must determine its character, that 
 our Saviour insisted so strongly upon its sacredness. 
 In nothing were his teachings more in opposition to 
 the spirit of his time, or to the general spirit of the 
 world, and nothing in those teachings caused greater 
 surprise to his disciples. Ifut he knew his ground, 
 he abated no jot from the strictness of his require- 
 ments, and the history of the world since shows the 
 wisdom of his precepts. Without this the materials 
 for a fi:ee government never have been fiirnished 
 
KIGHTS OF PERSONS, ETC. 229 
 
 and never can be. This it is, just this, that oui 
 people need not only to see, but to have impressed 
 upon them, for it ia upon the purity, the sacredness, 
 and the well-ordering of families that the perma- 
 nence of our institutions must depend. Have what 
 public schools you will, enlighten the people as 
 you may, and without the family as formative, — 
 formative of habits of obedience and of a temper of 
 mutual forbearance, — and as offering in its spirit 
 the only model of a right government, the perma- 
 nence of free institutions in any such form as will 
 make them a blessing is impossible. 
 
 On this point I feel that I cannot speak too 
 strongly, because we are here at the root. Most 
 questions of what is called social science pertain to 
 the branches, but in this — the right constitution 
 and ordering of families, — is God's social science, 
 and if men will but learn and apply this fiilly, most 
 other questions that now pertain to that science will 
 disappear. Remove the swamp and the malaria and 
 there will be no occasion to discuss the mode of 
 treating the epidemic. 
 
 But while insisting thus upon the claims of the 
 familv, I would not be insensible to those Basiaof 
 or the idea that underlies commumsm. ism. 
 The basis of communism is, for the most part, sec- 
 ular and economic, and its advantages are wholly so. 
 It seeks the best distribution and results of labor. 
 But may not these be as well reached through the 
 femily as in any other way ? If not, it would be a 
 
230 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 strange exception to the law by which that which is 
 lower is best attained by attaining most fully that 
 which is higher. The difficulty has been that fam- 
 ilies have not been so ordered as to attain the higher 
 end, and then, in their isolation and selfishness evils 
 have arisen for which communism has been sug- 
 gested as a remedy. This has been tried with every 
 advantage by earnest, enthusiastic, and cultivated 
 people, but has uniformly failed. It always will. 
 
 But while there will be economic as well as so- 
 cial evils as long as the real end of the 
 
 *"" ""' family in training up children for God is 
 not reached, and while communism, as dispensing 
 with the family, can never succeed, yet another idea, 
 represented by another word, has arisen, through 
 which a measure of success, perhaps a large one, 
 may be hoped. That word is cooperation. To this 
 there is no objection. Through this, in perfect 
 compatibility with family relations and interests, 
 much may be done to diminish labor, to increase 
 production, and to divide more equally, not to say 
 justly, the common results of labor and of capital. 
 How much may be done in this way we do not yet 
 know. The experiment has not been fully tried. 
 Let it be tried. Let whatever can be done in this 
 way be done ; but let us hold fast to God's institu- 
 tion of the family. Let us hold fast to the doctrine 
 of special duties made imperative upon us by our 
 personal relations. Let us not put off work at our 
 own doors for distant work, mistaking indolence, or 
 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ETC. 231 
 
 sentimentalism, or the love of notoriety, or all to- 
 gether, for either philanthropy or religion. Finding 
 a chart laid down for us in the voyage of life, let us 
 follow it, and not venture in seeking the good of 
 the whole to substitute our own wisdom for the 
 wisdom of God. 
 
CHAPTER n. 
 
 GOVERNMENT : KESPONaiBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 
 
 Accepting these special duties, or, indeed, recog- 
 nizing Rights of Persons at all, we reach at once 
 the right of the parent to command, and the corre- 
 sponding obligation of the child to obey; or, more 
 generally, we reach the right of one moral being to 
 govern another, involving both command or author- 
 ity, and obedience ; we reach Faith as the only ra- 
 tional ground of obedience ; we have Responsibihty, 
 both of those who govern for the governed, and of 
 those who are governed to those who govern ; and 
 we have Punishment. These are great ideas in 
 morals ; the larger part of our duties are connected 
 with them, but they can have place only under a 
 system of special relations, and in connection with 
 special rights growing out of the relations and caus- 
 ing the duties to vary endlessly as the relations 
 vary. At these ideas we need to look. 
 
 The foundation of the right of government and 
 Govern- ^^^ limitations as they are related to an 
 ment. gjj^j^ jjg^^g already been referred to. This 
 
 right first appears in the parent. If he is to secure 
 the end of the child, it is indispensable that he 
 
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY: PUNISHMENT. 233 
 
 should have the right to control him. So far as 
 that may be necessary, he has a right to control 
 him physically and by force. Such control in very 
 early years he is bound to exercise. Subsequently 
 he has a right to command, and the child is under 
 obligation to obey. This is properly government — 
 the control of one intelligent and moral being by 
 the expressed will of another. On the one side 
 there is a command, on the other there is obe- 
 dience. 
 
 And by obedience here is not meant conformity 
 to the will of the parent on the ground of 
 
 1 • 1 /. 1 -ii T Obedience. 
 
 perceived reasons aside from that will. It 
 is one thing to appeal to the reason of a child, 
 showing him the reasons why we wish, or command 
 him to do a particular act so that he may do it, not 
 on the ground of the command, but of the reasons ; 
 and it is quite another thing to give the command 
 without reasons, and to be obeyed simply on the 
 ground of the command. Of these only the last 
 is obedience. If the child so sees the reasons for 
 action that he would perform the act on the ground 
 of those reasons without regard to the will of the 
 parent, such an act cannot be in obedience to that 
 will. There are parents who seek to control their 
 children by such presentation of reasons and call it 
 government ; but it is not government. The child 
 may do right, and this may be the best thing for the 
 parent to do, but he should not delude himself with 
 the idea that he governs, or that the child obeys. 
 
234 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 To obey is to do the will of another, simply on the 
 ground that it is his will. He who obeys may see 
 reasons for it, or against it, or see no reasons at all, 
 but he would do the act equally in either case be- 
 cause he was commanded to do it. If that be not 
 the reason, it is not obedience. 
 
 Now it is just this obedience to which the parent 
 has a right, and which the child is bound to yield. 
 But, you will ask, is not the child a rational crea- 
 ture, and is not his reason to be appealed to ? Yes, 
 his reason is to be appealed to, but in so far as he is 
 under government in distinction from influence, 
 that reason is to be exercised, not in an attempt to 
 comprehend the reasons by which the will of the 
 parent is determined, which would be to put him- 
 self upon an equality with him, but in comprehend- 
 ing the reasons for confidence or faith in the parent. 
 
 This brings us to consider the great principle of 
 Principle faith which nnderUes all rational control of 
 of faith. Qj^g being by another. This is a rational 
 principle, wholly so, having two branches as it makes 
 its demands upon the understanding or the will, 
 and is expressed in belief or in obedience. Their 
 common root is confidence. Belief because another 
 says It, is confidence expressed in believing ; obe- 
 dience because another commands it, is confidence 
 expressed in action. This is the great and only pos- 
 sible uniting, elevating, and assimilating principle 
 where an inferior being is to be governed by the 
 will of a superior, that is, to be governed at all ; or 
 
GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITY: PUNISHMENT. 235 
 
 where any one being is to be governed by the will 
 of another. The child, the subject, the being gov- 
 erned, may not know the reason of the command, 
 but he knows that he who gives it is wise and good, 
 and he feels that it is the most rational thing he can 
 do to believe a proposition simply because he says 
 it, and to do an act simply because he commands it. 
 As this rational faith is the sole principle of gov- 
 ernment aside from fear or force, it be- jaithanj 
 comes us to examine it well as needed in e""™™™'- 
 this relation of parent and child, where we first 
 find the need of it. In early life children need to 
 be controlled wholly by their parents, and they are 
 to be so guided that they may pass gradually from 
 that control to a perfect independence of them, and 
 to a wise course of action under the government of 
 God. In this subjection and control there is to be 
 no shade of degradation, no slavish fear, but only a 
 control made necessary l)y the condition of the 
 child, I will not say to the fulfillment of its destiny, 
 but to the attainment of its end. Such control will 
 be reached by a subjection in perfect faith, both of 
 the understanding and the will of the child to the 
 understanding and will of the parent, and in no 
 other way. This will be government ; it will be 
 subjection, but it will be government by one quali- 
 fied both by wisdom and by love to govern ; it will 
 be submitted to in the recognition and fiiU faith of 
 this wisdom and love, and can therefore have in it 
 nothing misleading or degrading. The child simply 
 
236 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 works under the law of love in his peculiar rela- 
 tions as ordained hy God ; and that is all that any 
 creature can do. He is to rise as rapidly as possi- 
 ble to his position of independent action, but in the 
 process of thus rising, his wisdom and duty are to be 
 subject to his parents. If the parent be what he 
 should be, the end will thus be reached perfectly. 
 If he be not wholly what he should be, such sub- 
 jection will still be generally right and best, but if 
 the parent become disqualified by vice or imbecil- 
 ity to direct the child to his end, then the civil law 
 may interfere, or the child may himself seek other 
 protection and guidance. This shows that the duty 
 does not arise from the mere relation. Remove the 
 idea of an end to be attained, and that of duty will 
 also disappear. 
 
 And here we find, not merely the principle of 
 Kesponsi- faith, which, though rational, wholly so, 
 '''"'^" and under the circumstances the only 
 
 rational thing possible, is yet not philosophy at all, 
 any more than instinct is, but we also find the fact of 
 responsibility. This also has two branches. There 
 is both a responsibility for others, and to others; 
 though responsibility for others must, except in God, 
 ultimately resolve itself into responsibility to an- 
 other. This is a great fact in morals, and the 
 ground of it needs to be clearly stated. 
 
 If any hold that the will of another is the ground 
 of obligation, responsibility to him will follow of 
 course. But if a man be under obligation on a 
 
GOVERNMENT ; RESPONSIBILITY ! PUNISHMENT. 237 
 
 ground independent of the will of another, how can 
 he be responsible to that other ? Most philosophers 
 do in fact find a ground of obligation other than the 
 mere will of any being ; but all our duties are so 
 connected with responsibility, and all the duties of 
 every created being must be, that many have not 
 thought of duty as possible without that. Respon- 
 sibility has seemed to them to be involved in the 
 very conception of law, as much so as obligation. 
 And in one sense it is ; but in any sense in which a 
 moral being can be a law unto himself it is not in- 
 volved ; and the question is, how such a being, thus 
 capable of being a law to himself, can, consistently 
 with this, become so subject to another as to be 
 responsible to him. 
 
 This difficulty has been clearly seen by Dr. 
 Hickok, and he sets it aside by saying, that inas- 
 much as positive authority must have other ends 
 than spiritual worthiness, it has nothing to do with 
 pure morality, and pure morality has nothing to do 
 with it except to see that none of its requisitions are 
 opposed to morality. " Pure morality," he says, 
 " in the contemplation of such occasions will not be 
 sufficient to cover all the methods of dealing with 
 human conduct, and thus other systems of motives 
 must be found and classified which do not direct 
 themselves immediately to the end of highest wor- 
 thiness, and thereby other rules of human action 
 must be attained than the ultimate rule of pure 
 morality. But no such motives may be applied, ana 
 
238 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 no such rules adopted contrary to the claims of pure 
 morality." ^ Again, it is said of authority that, " it 
 is introduced as a necessary means of constraint 
 where pure morality will not admit of an appli- 
 cation ; but in no case, and for no reason, may it be 
 used in conflict with morality ; and hence the neces- 
 sity of subjecting all authority to the criterion of a 
 rigid Moral Science by which only can it be known 
 that it is nothing but righteous authority that has 
 been tolerated. Positive authority, thus, must come 
 within the field of a pure moral science. It will not 
 govern by morality, but it must govern in fiiU ac- 
 cordance with morality." ^ 
 
 Here it may be asked, if positive authority does 
 not govern by morality, what it does govern by ; 
 and also how any authority can be a " righteous au- 
 thority " that has no moral quality and is exercised 
 outside of the field of morality. All government, 
 as such, is by authority, and it would seem desirable 
 to find a ground for that by which the government 
 of God may be a moral government, and not simply 
 not immoral. 
 
 The question respecting the ground of responsi- 
 Eighteoua bility then recurs, and an answer to it is 
 authority, suggested in the expression used above, 
 " Righteous authority," that is, an authority having 
 its foundation in Rights. Has the parent a right 
 to govern ? If so, responsibility must follow, for 
 without that there can be no government. This is 
 
 1 Moral Hcimce, p. 146. '^ Ibid., p. 148. 
 
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 239 
 
 self-evident. On what ground then can govern- 
 ment be justified ? Why not leave each moral be- 
 ing to the control of his own moral liatui'e, and to 
 the results of his own action under the guidance of 
 that nature ? There might then be guilt on the 
 violation of obligation, the shock of which would be 
 felt within his own being, but no responsibility to 
 another. This is so with God. He is, and can be 
 responsible to no one ; but the responsibility of crea- 
 tures to Him must follow directly from the posses- 
 sion by Him of the right to govern them. These 
 must go together. To-day a child is at large in the 
 streets. He has no responsibility to any teacher, 
 and no teacher has any right over him. To-morrqw 
 the parent places the child in a school, and now the 
 teacher has rights, and the child is responsible. 
 The teacher not only has the right, but is under 
 obligation to use all legitimate means to attain the 
 ends of the school, and the pupil is responsible to 
 him for that, and only that which would interfere 
 with those ends. Any authority needed to attain 
 those ends is righteous authority, as growing out of 
 his rights, and no other authority is righteous. So 
 th&.responsibility of the child to the parent is directly 
 from the right of the parent to control him, and must 
 be coextensive with that right. But, as we have seen, 
 ihe rights of the parent are from his relation to the 
 end of the child and of the family, which he is under 
 obligation by the affirmation of his own moral nature 
 to take every proper means to secure, and so the 
 child must be directly responsible to him. 
 
240 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 And not only is there responsibility to others, but 
 Respond- also, as has been said, for others. If these 
 others. do ultimately coalesce from the fact of the 
 
 responsibility of all to God, yet this aspect of the 
 subject requires attention. The parent is responsi- 
 ble for the welfare of the family, that is, he is under 
 obligation to God to see that that welfare is guarded 
 and promoted. He not only has a right but is un- 
 der obligation, on the ground of that, to guard their 
 rights. So far as he is able he is bound to see that 
 no selfishness of one shall so encroach upon another 
 as to debar him from the exercise of any natural 
 right or the attainment of any legitimate end. Here 
 again we have the right of government, not mere!y 
 that the end of the individual may be attained, but 
 that the rights of all may be guarded. From his 
 very position the parent must be the guardian of the 
 child if his rights are to be secured, or if his end is 
 to be attained ; and hence we see that rights, gov- 
 ernment, and responsibility have a common ground 
 in their necessity for the attainment of a common 
 end having intrinsic value, and in view of which 
 obligation is immediately affirmed. The child is 
 boimd to have faith in the parent because he has 
 reason to believe that he is wise and good, and will 
 do all things for the ends of the family ; and the 
 man is bound to have faith in God because he has 
 reason to believe that He is wise and good, and will 
 do all things for the ends of his intelligent and 
 moral kingdom ; and so the child and the man can 
 
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 241 
 
 joyfully submit to government, and acknowledge 
 responsibility under it with the conviction that so 
 only can they work for that end in view of which 
 obUgation is affirmed. So only can conduct become 
 rational, so only can we have science in the place 
 of blind impulsions, and unity in the principle of 
 conduct in our various relations. 
 
 There is one point more concerning responsibility 
 It always has respect to some person. A R^sponsi- 
 man may violate obligation as amrmed person, 
 within himself, and it be nothing to another except 
 as a moral being ; but if he be responsible to 
 that other, then a failure to meet that responsibility 
 is a violation of a right that must admit and may 
 demand retribution. If a parent command a child 
 to do an act which he has a right to command, the 
 child is directly responsible to him for obedience. 
 If the child refiise to obey, not only is an ordinance 
 of God that is inwrought into the very structure of 
 society set aside, but the personal rights of the pa- 
 rent are invaded. Not only is obligation violated 
 and guilt incurred, but there is a direct personal 
 affront, an infringement of a sacred right, and the 
 parent is bound to vindicate that right in the only 
 way possible, that is, by punishment. 
 
 We have thus the origin, not only of the right of 
 government, but of punishment, the idea p„nis),Eient 
 and right of which are, indeed, involved "*""' 
 in the very notion of government. The conse- 
 quences within the moral being himself, of violating 
 16 
 
242 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 obligation, the shock that may ensue, whatever that 
 may be, is not punishment. It cannot be. Punish- 
 ment is the vindication by a person, through some 
 positive infliction, of violated rights. In no other 
 way can such rights be vindicated, and rights gen- 
 erally be protected, except possibly by some expres- 
 sion of a displeasure as great as would be manifested 
 by inflicting the punishment. In no other way can 
 the attitude of the person towards his own authority 
 and rights, or towards universal righteousness as- 
 sailed through these, be indicated, and his moral 
 character lie made to appear. Government being 
 by authority, is an expression of Will, and if punish- 
 ment is to sustain government, that too must be, 
 and must be known to be, an expression of the same 
 will. Evil may be suffered and inflicted that is not 
 punishment. Evil from accident, or misfortune, or 
 from the laws of nature regarded as impersonal, is 
 not punishment. Nor is evil inflicted by equals 
 upon equals punishment, nor that inflicted from 
 anger, or malice, or for the sake of discipline. This 
 latter, evil inflicted for the sake of discipline, is gen- 
 erally supposed to be punishment, and parents say 
 to children that they punish them for their own 
 good. But if that be the sole end the infliction of 
 evil has no reference to law, and cannot be properly 
 punishment. Punishment presupposes a law ad- 
 ministered by a personal lawgiver having rights. 
 It presupposes a righteous penalty annexed to the 
 law, and that the law has been violated. These 
 
GOVERNMENT : KESPONSIBILITT : PUNISHMENT. 243 
 
 conditions being given, punishment is the infliction 
 of a previously declared penalty by the will of the 
 lawgiver for the sake of sustaining the authority 
 of the law. That authority can be sustained in no 
 other way. Nothing but a penalty proclaimed, and, 
 if need be, inflicted, can make known and measure 
 the regard of the lawgiver for the law. Hence, as 
 entering into the very conception of government, 
 punishment is justified. It can never be wanton, 
 or capricious, or revengeful, for evil thus inflicted 
 would cease to be punishment, but the extent of it 
 must be measured by its necessity for the attain- 
 ment of the ends of government, and what that 
 extent should be only a righteous and competent 
 lawgiver can judge. Obviously, as proclaimed be- 
 forehand, the penalty must express, and that only 
 can, the estimate by the lawgiver of his own rights, 
 and of the rights of others that are in question, and 
 also his benevolent desire to present the highest 
 moral motives the case will allow to prevent the in- 
 fraction of law. And then, whatever it is right to 
 affix as a penalty beforehand it must be not only 
 right, but necessary to inflict as punishment, else, 
 unless some adequate reason can be given, all gov- 
 ernment must be abandoned. 
 
 In connection with the above, two things are to 
 be noticed. The first is, that the proper violation of 
 eround of punishment under anv govern- proper 
 
 . , • 1 • c "i i" • ground of 
 
 ment is not the violation or obhgation, punishment 
 that is, guilt as such, but only the violation of obli- 
 
244 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 gation, as that violates rights. In human govern- 
 ments this is avowedly so. They do not claim to 
 punish guilt as such, or to measure it except as it 
 violates the rights of the community. Under the 
 divine government it happens, or i-ather it must be, 
 that the violation of obligation and of the divine 
 rights, and so of the rights of his intelligent uni- 
 verse, correspond, but the punishment is not in 
 view of the guilt as such, but as it is guilt that vio- 
 lates the rights of others. There must be guilt. 
 That is the only condition of punishment, but not 
 its ground. If we may suppose guilt that would 
 violate no rights of God, or of any other being, 
 however detestable it might be in itself, or whatever 
 the consequences might be within the being himself, 
 it would be no ground of punishment. There is no 
 abstract inexorable justice that would require it, 
 and hence, even though guilt may have been in- 
 curred, if the rights of all be perfectly preserved 
 and secure, punishment may be righteously omit- 
 ted. It will not be demanded. 
 
 The second point to be noticed in connection with 
 Appealer the above, is that the appeal of penalty 
 
 penalty to , ^'^ . ^ •' 
 
 worthy fear, when threatened, and or punishment, 
 when inflicted, is not primarily to any form of the 
 Sensibility that can be reached through positive in- 
 fliction. This appeal is not therefore to the fear of 
 sufiering as suffering merely, but of suffering as it 
 may be caused by that recoil of personality against 
 aggression upon its rights, which is an inherent and 
 
GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITY: PUNISHMENT. 245 
 
 essential part of righteousness — a fear of suffering 
 as expressing the disapprobation of .the lawgiver, 
 and felt to be deserved. This is no unworthy fear, 
 as some seem to suppose. 
 
 There are three sources of suffering to us as 
 moral beings. The first is, the recoil of ^^ 
 our own moral nature when the law of its moJ^auffer- 
 being is transgressed. This is remorse, in '"''■ 
 which a man constantly accuses and condemns him- 
 self. The second is the expression of disapproba- 
 tion by others without any act of will put forth 
 towards us. They may do, and we may fear, no 
 hostile act, but the look of mingled displeasure and 
 sorrow is felt and remembered with a pang, and 
 this feeling will increase with the excellence and 
 dignity of the being, and if we have wronged him 
 personally, with his kindness and love towards us. 
 A third source of suffering to us as moral beings is 
 from a direct act of will withdrawing from us con- 
 ditions of good, and inflicting upon us positive evil. 
 To avoid each of these, to avoid simple suffering 
 even, would be a suitable motive ; but it is not by 
 the fear of suffering that moral creatures can, or 
 ought to be governed. Not so does God or any 
 wise man seek to govern them, but by the fear of 
 penalty. It is by the moral nature alone that suf- 
 fering can be known as penalty, and hence it is to 
 that nature, and to no ignoble and unworthy fear, 
 that penalty appeals. 
 
CHAPTER in. 
 
 EELATION OF THE SEXES : CHASTITY. 
 
 We have now considered the general topics con- 
 nected with the transition from those duties which 
 we owe to all men, to those special rights and du- 
 ties which are indicated by our special relations, 
 and it will be next in order to consider the rights 
 and duties themselves. 
 
 The special relation on which all others depend 
 is that of the sexes. In connection with this the 
 first general duty is that of Chastity. 
 
 Chastity is a duty of the individual both to him- 
 self and to the community. 
 Effect upon 1st. It is a duty to the individual him- 
 
 the indiTid- 
 
 >ud. self. 
 
 By chastity is meant personal purity, and upon 
 the violation of this, whether by solitary or social 
 vice, God has set the seal of his condemnation by 
 the effects of it upon both the body and the mind. 
 
 All solitary vice tends to weakness and insanity, 
 the extent of both which from this cause is little 
 suspected ; and in connection with the social vice 
 there is a disease, one of the most loathsome and 
 wretched ever known, which seems to have been 
 sent as a special judgment and check upon it. 
 
RELATION OF THE SEXES : CHASTITY. 247 
 
 Nor is the effect upon the mind less debasing. 
 " However it may be accounted for," says Paley, 
 " the criminal intercourse of the sexes corrupts and 
 depraves the mind and moral character more than 
 any single species of vice whatsoever. That ready 
 perception of guilt, that prompt and decisive resolu- 
 tion against it, which constitutes a virtuous charac- 
 ter, is seldom found in persons addicted to these 
 indulgences. They prepare an easy admission for 
 every sin that seeks it ; are in low life, usually the 
 first stage in men's progress to the most desperate 
 villainies ; and in high life to that lamented disso- 
 luteness of principle, which manifests itself in a 
 profligacy of public conduct, and a contempt of the 
 obligations of religion and of moral probity. Add 
 to this that habits of libertinism incapacitate and 
 indispose the mind for all intellectual, moral, and 
 religious pleasures, which is a great loss to any 
 man's happiness." 
 
 2. Obedience to the law of chastity is a duty to 
 the community. From the time of Sodom, Effect upon 
 sins of hcentiousnesss have been the chief munity. 
 cause of the corruption and downfall of nations. 
 There is no ruin and degradation like that which 
 these sins bring upon the woman, and there is no 
 general debasement like that of a great city deeply 
 infected with this class of vices, and those that in- 
 evitably accompany them. If men could be brought 
 to obey the laws of God in regard to chastity and 
 marriage, and also in regard to narcotic and intox- 
 
248 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 icating substances, laws written not only in his 
 Word, but in their physical and moral nature, the 
 great obstacle to the intellectual and moral improve- 
 ment of the race would be removed. Abstinence 
 from these is not virtue. It may give greater skill 
 to fraud, or more power to ambition, but it is a con- 
 dition of virtue. It is in connection with these 
 sins that man is capable of degrading himself below 
 the brutes ; and through them what is called civiliza- 
 tion, that is, skill in literature and the arts, and in 
 producing the elegancies and luxuries of life, may 
 coexist with a state of society to which the savage 
 state would be infinitely preferable. Certainly 
 every one owes it to society to do what he can to 
 relieve it from this incubus. 
 
 In combating this class of sins in ourselves the 
 Theimagi- proper point to guard is the imagination 
 
 nation tobe'^f' ° . =". 
 
 guarded. and the thoughts. This is the citadel. 
 With this sufficiently guarded, we may go anywhere 
 and be subject to any form of outward temptation, 
 for " to the pure all things are pure." But few 
 only can go thus. Against no class of sins do we 
 more need to put up the petition : " Lead us not 
 into temptation." We need to guard the senses, 
 especially as temptation may come through them in 
 the guise of the fine arts, which have often been of 
 great efficiency in corrupting a people. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MABRIAGE. 
 
 After the general duty of chastity it will be in 
 order to consider : — 
 
 1. The rights and duties of the sexes in their re- 
 lations to each other previous to marriage. 
 
 2. The rights and duties, in their relation to each 
 other, of those who are married. 
 
 3. The law of divorce. 
 
 4. The rights and duties of parents. 
 
 5. The duties and rights of children. 
 
 1. Of the rights and duties of the sexes in their 
 relations to each other previous to marriage. 
 These will relate, first, to the period pre- Rights and 
 
 , , , duties before 
 
 vious to being engaged to be married. engagement. 
 
 That is a critical period when young persons first 
 awake to a consciousness of those sentiments which 
 are to unite them so closely, and to affect so nearly 
 their own happiness and that of the coming gener- 
 ations. A new world is opened up to them full of 
 susceptibility, emotion, sentiment, romance, passion, 
 and with capabilities of both happiness and misery 
 unutterable. What shall be done ? Left to them- 
 
250 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 selves, there is clanger of imprudence and misjudg- 
 ment. Controlled by others, there is danger that 
 that which is highest in sentiment and purest in af- 
 fection will he sacrificed to fancied interest, or to 
 ambition. It is not easy for the parties themselves, 
 much less for others, to distinguish the glamour of 
 a transient infatuation from the conscious recogni- 
 tion and opening aflPection of two natures made to 
 supplement each other. In the freshness and glow 
 of such sentiments prudence is spurned, and an ap- 
 peal to duty seems cold and impertinent. Hence, 
 in some countries, in most indeed, young persons 
 have been kept during this period under the strict- 
 est surveillance, and everything pertaining to mar- 
 riage has been regulated by others. Among the 
 Moravians, partners were, until recently, assigned 
 by lot. There are persons living in this country 
 now who obtained their wives in that way. But in 
 this country now it is virtually in the hands of the 
 young people themselves, giving rise doubtless to 
 greater happiness in some cases, but in others to 
 mistakes and scenes both ludicrous and sad. By 
 those who have had opportunity to observe it has 
 been gravely questioned which course is best. In 
 any way there will be persons unmatched and mis- 
 matched. But however this may be, this matter 
 not only now is, but will continue to be chiefly in 
 the hands of those more immediately concerned, and 
 in view of that they have duties whether they will 
 heed them or not. 
 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MARRUGE. 251 
 
 And here the one duty of those whose affections 
 are yet free is to withhold themselves from any at- 
 tempt to awaken affection in another except with a 
 view to marriage. This will be hard where there 
 IS conscious beauty and power ; vanity and pride 
 will plead strongly, and many will go as far as they 
 can or dare. But the existence of an affection that 
 cannot be requited is a great evil, and to awaken 
 purposely, or to seek to awaken such an affection, 
 is a crime. It is trifling with feelings that God in- 
 tended should be sacred, and causes a revulsion that 
 nothing else can. It makes cynics and misan- 
 thropes of the most hopeless kind. One who can 
 thoughtlessly or heartlessly trifle with a true affec- 
 tion, or who mocks at it and treats all claim to it 
 as a pretense, is lost, — is incapable of even conceiv- 
 ing of the great happiness there is in affection with 
 security for its basis, and which God intended should 
 be connected with the marriage state. Only when 
 there is a view to marriage may that more intimate 
 acquaintance be sought which will justify an en- 
 gagement, and when the parties are on this footing, 
 the one duty is frankness in relation to everything 
 that could affect the feelings of the opposite party. 
 
 After an engagement is entered into, the rights 
 and duties of the parties become more lughtsand 
 
 ■I /* - mi • 111 duties after 
 
 definite. The parties are now betrothed, engagemcDt. 
 affianced, engaged to each other by a promise only 
 less sacred than that of marriage. They are, and 
 should be known to be, in such relation to each 
 
252 MORAL SCIKNCE. 
 
 other that it would be criminal in either of them to 
 seek the affection of another, and that it will be 
 criminal in any other to seek the affection of either 
 of them. 
 
 The length of an engagement involves no prin- 
 ciple except that neither party has a right to pro- 
 long the time beyond that desired by the other, 
 without good reason. In general, short engage- 
 ments are best. 
 
 The levity and capriciousness with which such en- 
 gagements are broken are to be deprecated. If it 
 be found that there was concealment or deception 
 in relation to anything material at the time of the 
 engagement, or if there be gross immorality or 
 licentiousness subsequently, the other party will be 
 justified in breaking the engagement. Nothing 
 short of one or the other of these can justify such 
 a step of one party without the consent honorably 
 obtained of the other. An engagement is not mar- 
 riage, but only preliminary to one, the object of 
 which is a happy life in the attainment of the ends 
 of marriage. Incident to an engagement, though 
 not the object of it, is a more perfect acquaintance, 
 and if, in connection with this it should appear that 
 their mutual happiness is not likely to be secured, 
 and this shall be the opinion of each, they are not 
 only at liberty, but are bound to break an engage- 
 ment which they find to have been made under a 
 misapprehension, though, it may be, without fault 
 on either side. 
 
EIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE. 253 
 
 Perhaps it ought to be said, as the affections of 
 ■woman are stronger than those of man, and as she 
 is not allowed the initiative, so that the injury of a 
 broken engagement would be greater to her, it is 
 incumbent on the man to be especially scrupulous 
 on this point. 
 
 The reciprocal rights and duties of husbands and 
 wives grow, like all others, from the law jjig^t, ^^^ 
 of love, but from that law as applied in S^itnL 
 this special and most intimate and sacred '"""^™- 
 relation. With the affection that should form the 
 basis of marriage, the happiness that may flow from 
 it is greater than any other not distinctively religious. 
 It is, indeed, made in the Scriptures a type of that 
 higher happiness which is to flow to the church from 
 her union with Christ. A failure to attain this hap- 
 piness can arise only from ignorance or from a want 
 of right purposes and dispositions. 
 
 There is often ignorance or misapprehension of 
 the reciprocal rights and duties involved in mar- 
 riage. God has indicated in the structure of the 
 physical frame, and in the mental characteristics 
 which correspond, different spheres of duty for the 
 husband and the wife. The adaptation of each sex 
 to its sphere is equally perfect, and as both are parts 
 of one indivisible race, the terms superior and in- 
 ferior are not properly applicable. What is needed 
 is a distinct recognition by, each sex of its own 
 sphere, and a cheerful acceptance of its responsi- 
 bilities and duties. The object is unity through 
 
254 MOKAL SCIENCE. 
 
 diversity, and, within limits, the greater the diver- 
 sity the greater the beauty of the possible unity. 
 If God has made, as He has, by nature and by 
 revelation, the husband the head of the house, then 
 the truest and best happiness of the wife will be 
 found only in recognizing him in that relation. If 
 God has made it the business of the wife to " guide 
 the house," then the husband will find his peace and 
 happiness in giving her the reins ip that depart- 
 ment. Of course there are exceptions, as there are 
 to the command to children to obey their parents. 
 If the parent become imbecile, or intoxicated, or 
 command the child to steal, he is bound not to obey. 
 The relation is changed, and the law of love must 
 be interpreted by the relation. So it is universally. 
 If through ignorance, or inadvertence, or wayward 
 speculations and theories of equality that recognize 
 no difference, the natural relations fail of recognition, 
 the fiill benefits of marriage cannot be realized, 
 though the temper may be right. 
 
 But while ignorance is one cause of failure in 
 Oanwe of married life, the great source of trouble is 
 
 nnhappi- i> • i i t 
 
 neas. a want or right purposes and dispositions. 
 
 It is some form of selfishness on one part, or both. 
 The husband is imperious, exacting, unsympathiz- 
 ing, self-indulgent, perhaps sensual to the extent of 
 vice. The wife is indolent, neglectful, extravagant, 
 does not talk as much as she should. Perhaps there 
 was an original failure of a full commitment of each 
 to each, so that there never has been that conscious 
 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE. 255 
 
 unity ani perfect confidence in which the charm of 
 married Hfe consists, for next to loving with a per- 
 fect love is the happiness of a perfect confidence, 
 and of an assurance that love is returned. The 
 great duty then will be to cherish and cultivate 
 mutual love. 
 
 But can love be cultivated ? On this point there 
 is much misapprehension. Love is radi- cultivation 
 cally an act of will. True, that which "f'"™- 
 leads to marriage is accompanied by admiration, by 
 desire, by sentiment, but these do not become love 
 till the will authorizes them by an act of choice, and 
 this fact gives the wUl an indirect control over all 
 the emotions and feelings connected with it. 
 
 In the first place then, each can cultivate those 
 qualities in themselves that will tend to secure love. 
 Each can seek to become more lovable. A reso- 
 lute purpose and persevering effort in this will work 
 surprising changes, and is far better than complaints 
 of want of affection. Such complaints tend only to 
 aggravate the difficulty. In the second place, hus- 
 band and wife may seek, and are bound to seek, the 
 improvement of each other ; and by this I mean not 
 merely intellectual improvement, but improvement 
 in all that is a ground of esteem and of rational affec- 
 tion. The mode and measure of this will so depend 
 upon their relative age, upon acquirements and 
 temperament, that no details can be given ; but a dis- 
 position to give and to accept aid in this way will 
 greatly tend to mutual love. But in the third place, 
 
256 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 and which is perhaps quite as important as either, 
 we can form the habit of looking at excellences and 
 overlooking deficiencies and even faults. Let each 
 party adopt the spirit of the couplet — 
 
 " Be to her virtues very kind, 
 Be to her faults a little blind." 
 
 and it would, I will not say pour oil upon the 
 troubled waters, but would prevent them from ever 
 becoming so troubled as to "cast up mire and dirt." 
 This I say on the supposition that there are faults 
 to be overlooked and follies to be kind to, but if 
 there are, and I have known such, husbands whose 
 wives have for them no faults or follies, and if there 
 are wives whose husbands have none, these remarks 
 do not apply to them. 
 
 In these ways a vast deal may be done in the cul- 
 tivation of mutual love, and this, as inclusive of all 
 other duties, and sure to draw them after it, and 
 also as being so little understood and appreciated, is 
 the one great duty that needs to be inculcated upon 
 those in the marriage state. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE LAW OF DIVOKCE. 
 
 Maekiagb, as we have seen, involves a union 
 Burednesa altogether peculiar. In its perfection it is 
 of marriago. ^ spiritual union, and only in it does the 
 life of each party become complete. That this union 
 should be, and should be understood to be for life, is 
 essential to the interests of both parties, to the wel 
 fare of children, and to the interests of the State. 
 Only on the condition of such understanding can 
 there be a perfect commitment of each to each, and 
 that perfect community of interest and of life which 
 radically separates marriage from all forms of pros- 
 titution and unlawful cohabitation. As thus pecu- 
 liar and sacred, the original institution of God was 
 that the union should be of one man with one 
 woman, and for life. Under the Mosaic dispensa- 
 tion divorce was permitted on various grounds, 
 but the original ground and sacredness of marriage 
 was not lost sight of. This appears from a remark- 
 able passage in Malachi showing the unreasonable- 
 ness and evils of both polygamy and divorce, and 
 the displeasure of God towards them. " And this," 
 Bays he, " have ye done again, covering the altar of 
 
 17 
 
258 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 the Lord with tears, with weeping, and with crying 
 out, insomuch that he regardeth not the offering any 
 more, or receiveth it with good will at your hand. 
 Yet ye say, wherefore ? Because the Lord hath 
 been witness between thee and the wife of thy youth 
 against whom thou hast dealt treacherously. Yet 
 is she thy companion and the wife of thy covenant. 
 And did not he make one ? Yet had he the residue 
 of the Spirit." He might have made any number as 
 easily. " And wherefore one ? " continues the pro- 
 phet. " That he might seek a godly seed. There- 
 fore take heed to your spirit, and let none deal 
 treacherously against the wife of his youth. For 
 the Lord God of Israel saith that he hateth putting 
 away." What a picture ! Poor wronged women 
 bathing the altar of God with their tears ; those who 
 did the wrong seeking to be religious by offerings 
 while they yet held on to the wrong ; God rejecting 
 their offerings, asserting the law of marriage, declar- 
 ing that He made one woman for a perpetual union 
 with one man that the children might be trained for 
 Himself, and implying that this could be done in no 
 other way. 
 
 The original law of marriage, thus asserted by 
 Malachi, Christ fully restored. This law is based 
 on the very nature of marriage, and is confirmed 
 by the fact that rather more males than females are 
 born, allowance being made for their greater expos- 
 ure to the causes of death. This has been so felt 
 to be a law of nature that among various nations, 
 
THE LAW OF DIVORCE. 259 
 
 the Romans and Scythians, who have not had the 
 light of revelation, marriage has been held sacred, 
 adultery has been punished by death ; and the very 
 law of divorce laid down by Christ has been 
 adopted. Hence it is the duty of Christian States 
 to make this law their standard, and to approximate 
 it as nearly as the state of public sentiment will 
 allow. No doubt there are cases of peculiar hard- 
 ship. Persons of uncongenial temperaments and 
 tempers are united. There will be ill-assorted mar- 
 riages and misadjustments of every degree. There 
 will be vice and abandonment on one part or the 
 other, and such cases are liable to be of peculiar 
 hardship to the woman. But facility of divorce 
 will set back its influence to the very fountain-head 
 of the institution. It will affect the spirit with which 
 marriage is entered upon ; it will generate and mul- 
 tiply the very evils for which divorce is sought. 
 Nothing can so tend to repress petty differences, 
 liable to become exaggerated into permanent feuds, 
 as the consciousness, always felt like a pervading at- 
 mosphere, even when it is not recognized, that they 
 are inseparably united and must be mutually depend- 
 ent. If facility of divorce be sought, as it is, on the 
 ground of cases of special hardship to women, it is 
 to be remembered that the evils of divorce fall 
 with peculiar hardship upon her, and that the purity 
 and general elevation of the sex will always be in 
 proportion to the strictness with which the law of 
 marriage is enforced. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 RIGHTS AND DXJTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDKEN. 
 
 In considering the reciprocal rights and duties of 
 parents and children, we are, as before, to be 
 guided by the Law of Love interpreted by the re- 
 lation. The child is entrusted to the parents by 
 God. In its original weakness, ignorance, and en- 
 tire dependence, the parents have, and must have, 
 the right of entire control. As the child becomes 
 capable of taking care of itself, this right will be 
 modified, till, at length, when the occasion for it 
 shall cease, the right will cease altogether. This is 
 typified by what we see among the' lower animals. 
 They have no knowledge of rights, but the care and 
 control of the young is provided for by an in- 
 stinct which ceases when the young are able to take 
 care of themselves. If the young need no care, 
 there is no instinct, showing how carefully every- 
 thing in nature is furnished and regulated with ref- 
 erence to ends. 
 
 The right of control thus belonging to the parent 
 is to be used, first, to promote the end of the child, 
 and second, of the family. 
 
 The end of the child is not identical with what is 
 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 261 
 
 sometimes caUed, and supposed to be, the good of 
 the child, consisting in his own personal advance- 
 ment or enjoyment, in some " summum honum " 
 that can belong to him alone ; but it is the very end 
 indicated in his constitution, and for which God 
 made him, that is, not merely to be a recipient of 
 good, but an originator and promoter of it, in sym- 
 pathy -with God in his spirit, and in harmony with 
 Hira in his methods. It will thus enter into the con- 
 ception of his end that he should promote the good 
 of the family. 
 
 In marriage and in the birth of children the fam- 
 ily is constituted. This is a divine institution hav- 
 ing an end that can be reached only through all 
 its members; and while the child may not be, aa 
 the ancients supposed, used selfishly, as a thing, for 
 the good of the parent, he may yet be required to do 
 all things that are legitimately for the ends of the 
 family. He may be required to labor for the com- 
 mon support, and it is the duty of the parent so far 
 to control each child that no one shall interfere 
 with the rights of any of the others. 
 
 This right of control may and should be en- 
 forced by physical means if necessary. There is an 
 end to be attained for the child himself It is of 
 the last importance to him that he should be taught 
 obedience and subordination. These are in the or- 
 der of God's providence, and he who does not know 
 how to obey will never know how to rule. The 
 same thing is important to the peace of the family 
 
262 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 and of society, and must be secured by every legit- 
 imate means. Let persuasion be tried. Let reason 
 be appealed to ; but if these will not suffice, the rod 
 should not be spared. Perhaps the rod was for- 
 merly used too much. It will be quite as mischiev- 
 ous in every way to use it too little. The child has 
 a rational nature, but may not be reasonable. He 
 has also an animal nature, and there is no reason 
 why that should not be appealed to. Do you think 
 it degrading to your child to whip him ? You need 
 not do that. "Whip the mule that is in him. If 
 possible whip it out of him, and then you will have 
 a child and not a mule. The less we have of the 
 use of the rod the better, but government, subor- 
 dination, order, must be maintained, and if these 
 cannot be had without the rod, the parent is dere- 
 lict in his duty if he do not use it. 
 
 The rights of the parent are for the sake of his 
 First duty of dutics, and to enable him to perform 
 ^^ot'thy^ them. His first duty is to provide for phys- 
 ical wants, jgj^j ^a,nts, in whole or in part, according 
 to the age of the child, and to make such provision 
 as shall comport with his condition in life. He is 
 bound to provide for his health and physical devel- 
 opment, and to put him to no such employment in 
 kind or degree as shall interfere with these. 
 
 The second duty of the parent is to secure such 
 Second duty intellectual education and such training, 
 ednoation. j^^ g^j^g industrial pursuit, or in some pro- 
 fession, as shall secure his support and his useful- 
 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 263 
 
 ness as a citizen. It might be supposed that nat- 
 ural aflfection would secure this, but in all states of 
 society there are individual cases in which it does 
 not, and it is found that high civilization and aggre- 
 gate labor have hitherto, by some misadjustment, 
 precipitated a stratum of society in which artificial 
 appetite and animal want have so been the prevail- 
 ing element as to subordinate natural affections, 
 making the children mere instruments of selfishness, 
 and dooming them, almost by necessity, to a similar 
 condition. It is this state of things that has justi- 
 fied, and that alone could justify an interference by 
 society with the hours of labor, which, we should 
 naturally suppose, parents would best know how to 
 regulate. It is the duty of the parent to make over 
 to society good material for its upbuilding, and if 
 any class of parents fail to do this, society not only 
 has the right, but is bound in self-defense to inter- 
 fere. 
 
 The third great duty of the parent relates to 
 moral and religious training. " Man does T^irdduty 
 not live by bread alone," nor can the ""jj'*"* 
 child. He is capable of being trained for '^'"''■'e- 
 God, and God has entrusted him to the parent that 
 he may be thus trained. The only effectual way in 
 whicli the parent can do this is himself to be what 
 the child should be. There is in example an im- 
 perceptible and pervading influence that can be had 
 in no other way. Let this be good in principle, and 
 judicious in outward form, and all other good in- 
 
264 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 fluences will, almost of course, fall into its train. 
 Let this be evil, and it will be mainly through this, 
 in connection with physical deterioration, that the 
 miquities of the fathers wiU be visited upon the 
 children to the third and fourth generation. 
 
 But besides this, much may be done in giving 
 direction to reading, in regulating associations, in 
 forming habits. And all this, especially the forma- 
 tion of habits of thought and feeling, as well as of 
 action, is to be begun very early. They will then 
 become incorporated into the life as they will not be 
 likely to be, and perhaps never can be afterwards. 
 In all this there is to be care not to do anything 
 obtrusively or in excess. Much harm has been 
 done by bending the bow too far. It flies back. It 
 may be diflScult in the stress and pressure which 
 active business life, and especially public life, brings 
 upon men to give the time needed for such training 
 of children, but no folly can be greater than that so 
 common in this country, by which parents make 
 themselves slaves to lay up money which, for want 
 of right training and moral qualifications in the 
 children, becomes their ruin. Nothing can be more 
 sad or instructive than the history, in this regard, 
 of many of our wealthy families. It is no less the 
 wisdom of parents, in behalf of their children than 
 in behalf of themselves, to " seek first the Kingdom 
 of God and his righteousness." The highest value 
 of wealth must be to purchase for children, indi- 
 rectly of course, more knowledge, more wisdom, 
 
R GHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 265 
 
 more health, better habits, to give them better facil- 
 ities for usefulness, and more chances of it ; in 
 short, to raise them to a higher manhood. Thus a 
 high manhood, a pure, elevated womanhood, is the 
 end to be reached. If it can be reached, as cer- 
 tainly it may, without wealth, that is of little conse- 
 quence. If wealth becomes obstructive of this, it 
 is a curse. But it need not be thus obstructive. 
 Instead of vanity, pride, dissipation, luxury, effemi- 
 nacy, the result of wealth may be, and should be, 
 the training of families not only in the knowledge 
 and virtues that give dignity to life, but also in 
 every accomplishment that can give it grace. 
 
 We now pass to the rights and duties of chil 
 dren. 
 
 It is sometimes said that a right and an obligation 
 are reciprocal ; that wherever there is a Bights of 
 
 . , , . ,. , ,. . children 
 
 right there is a corresponding obligation, claims. 
 This is not strictly trae. The parent, as a parent, is 
 for the sake of the child. His rights are to enable 
 him to perform his duties, and both are for the sake 
 of the child, and these rights and duties commence 
 before there can be either duties or conscious rights 
 on the part of the child. And when the child be- 
 comes capable of duties and conscious of rights, these 
 have generally no reference to the end of the parent. 
 The rights give no right of control, but are simply 
 claims, and the duties are mostly such as are re 
 quired by the well-being of the child, which is, or 
 should be, the great object desired bj' the parent. 
 
266 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 The duties of children may all be comprised in 
 Dutissof *^^ °"^ word '■'■hmor^'' as that is used in 
 ohudren. ^^ pjf^j^ Commandment. This sentiment 
 of honor towards the parent, expressing itself ir 
 outward act according to the changing relation of 
 parent and child in the progress of the child towards 
 maturity, would hold the parent and child in per- 
 petual harmony, and would secure to both every 
 end contemplated by the parental relation. The 
 child that honors his father and mother will render 
 them implicit obedience in his early years. If, as 
 his power and right of self-control are increased, it 
 should become his duty to differ in any respect from 
 the parent, or even to disobey him, as in rare and 
 exceptional cases it may be, the spirit of the law 
 wUl still be preserved, and all will be done that can 
 be with a good conscience, to meet not only the 
 commands, but the feelings and the wishes of the 
 parent. The temper expressed by this word 
 " honor," is precisely that which is needed to fit 
 the child for his duties towards God and towards 
 society as represented by government. This spirit, 
 extending itself from the parental relation into all 
 others, permeating the character, becomes a foun- 
 tain of courtesy, and makes the difference between 
 a people reverent, mutually respectftil, and capable 
 of self-control, and an irreverent, reckless, profane 
 mass of individuals incapable of self-government, 
 and sure to inaugurate, sooner or later, in the name 
 of liberty, a state of society compared with which 
 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 267 
 
 despotism would be a blessing. So long as children 
 honor their parents in this land, there will be piety 
 towards God, and freedom in the State ; but if these 
 fountains be corrupted, whatever form governments 
 may assume, men will fall off from their allegiance 
 to God, and the spirit and benefits of freedom will 
 depart. 
 
CHAPTER Vn. 
 
 BOCIETT AND GOVERNMENT: THE SPHERE OF GOV- 
 ERNMENT : ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT : MODE OP 
 FORMATION. 
 
 We now proceed to consider Civil Society and 
 Civil Government. 
 
 Government is the agent of society for the ac- 
 Govemmeut complishment of its ends, and like the 
 howdinne. family, is a divinc institution. By a divine 
 institution, we mean one made necessary by God 
 through relations ordained by him for the attain- 
 ment of our end. The fact that food is necessary 
 to sustain hfe, makes the use of it of divine ap- 
 pointment ; and the fact that the end of the child 
 cannot be attained except through control by the 
 parent, gives the parent rights directly from God, 
 and imposes upon the child corresponding duties. 
 No assent or contract on the part of the parent, or 
 of the child, is required to constitute the family so 
 far as to render valid every right and obligation 
 needed for the attainment of its ends. The rights 
 and duties are from the ends. The relations, caus- 
 ing the family to be what it is, indicate those ends, 
 and through them, the will of God. These rela- 
 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 269 
 
 tions and ends man cannot change. He can only 
 act or refuse to act in conformity with, or in refer- 
 ence to them. Acting in conformity with these 
 relations, and with reference to these ends, the 
 blessings intended to flow from the family will be 
 realized, and as there is a failure in this, evil will 
 result. The institution is from God, it cannot be 
 changed by man. All he can do is to conform, or 
 refuse to conform, to the relations it involves, and 
 seek, or refuse to seek the ends indicated by those 
 relations. 
 
 And precisely so it is with Civil Government. It 
 is a divine institution, if not as directly, ^j^j 
 yet as really as is the family. The ^^"™*8h. 
 rights which society has, and which it may *""™- 
 rightfully exercise through some form of govern- 
 ment it has from no contract. Men may, if they 
 choose, express the rights and duties involved in 
 government in the form of a contract, but it is a 
 mistake, and may lead to mischievous consequences 
 to suppose that these rights and duties originate in 
 any form of contract. By the constitution of God 
 the ends of the individual can be attained only 
 through government, and therefore the rights of 
 government and the duties of individuals under it 
 originate in the same way as the rights and duties of 
 parents and of children. The individual is born in 
 society. That is his natural state, and as thus born 
 both society and he have reciprocal rights and duties. 
 These he may recognize and have aU the benefits 
 
270 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 of society and of government, or he may refuse to 
 recognize them and be deprived of these benefits, 
 but the rights and duties exist independently of 
 his will. They exist, and in entering into society, 
 the individual comes under no new obligation, and 
 gives up no right. 
 
 It is said in the Declaration of Independence, 
 that " Governments derive their just powers from 
 the consent of the governed." If, as most have 
 supposed, this refers to the foundation of govern- 
 ment, and not to its form, the above view is opposed 
 to it. Such a doctrine would exclude the will of 
 God as underlying government. It would also take 
 away its authority, for the consent that may be 
 given at will may be withdrawn at will. Besides, 
 the principle would require, not merely the consent 
 of a majority, but of every man.' Such a doctrine 
 may please the popular ear, and be accepted when 
 there is no strain upon the government ; but when, 
 as in our late struggle, there is such a strain, the 
 instinct of the nation sets aside the doctrine of mere 
 contract or consent, and practically asserts an au- 
 thority resting on a deeper basis. Its form of gov- 
 ernment a nation may ordain and change. If that 
 government overstep the limit of just authority it 
 may be resisted, but within those limits its rights 
 are from God. 
 
 The distinction between society and government 
 DiBtiaotion ^^^^ ^^ more prominent if we suppose 
 ^et™an(i°" 6^<^'^ individual composing the society to 
 goTwnment ^^ perfect, that is, to exercise a perfect 
 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 271 
 
 self-government. In that case nothing that could 
 properly be called government would be needed. 
 There might be regulations respecting all matters 
 requiring uniformity and involving no principle, as 
 the age for voting, or the distribution of the prop- 
 erty of one dying intestate. These might be 
 made by the united experience and wisdom of the 
 community, and to them all would conform, not as 
 under government, but as apprehending the rea- 
 son of them, or, at least, the necessity of uniform- 
 ity. We should thus have, with perfect family 
 government, and perfect self-government, which is 
 simply obedience by the individual to the law of 
 God, society without civil government, but capable 
 of being organized into a civil government when- 
 ever the occasion should arise. 
 
 Such occasion can arise only as civil government 
 may be needed to enable individuals to ground and 
 reach their end, and it will have no right ""ei'^ugoT- 
 to do anything which will not contribute «"'°™«"'"- 
 to that. Government can have for a legitimate 
 end only the good of the governed. The object of 
 it is to do that for the individual whereby he may 
 be enabled to attain his end which he could not do 
 for himself. 
 
 What then can government do for the individual 
 which he cannot do for himself? 
 
 To answer this question fully we must contem- 
 plate government in two aspects : 1st, as the indi- 
 vidual may take a part in forming and administering 
 
272 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 it ; and 2(ily, as it is an agency standing apart from 
 the individual and above him for the doing of that 
 which he could not do himself. 
 
 In treating of government it has been this latter 
 Participatioa aspect that has been almost wholly re- 
 BOTemla. garded. If we suppose a despotic govern- 
 ment to do for the people all that it can do, — let it 
 be wholly paternal, — yet the influences under wliich 
 the individual will be formed will be wholly diflPerent 
 from those under a free government where it is the 
 duty of the individual to understand and take part 
 in the formation and the administration of the gov- 
 ernment. Free institutions have their value not 
 merely from their greater tendency to secure the 
 rights of the individual, but also from their educa- 
 ting, formative, developing power. Free institutions 
 tend to become, and will become in themselves, a 
 great university for political education, as well as a 
 sure guarantee that provision shall be made for uni- 
 versal education in other directions. As, therefore, 
 man has a right to the best means of development 
 as well as to the best conditions for action under a 
 government, it may be said that he has a right to 
 free institutions whenever and wherever he is capa- 
 ble of so administering them as to secure their 
 ends. 
 
 But apart from this, regarding government as 
 something already formed, the inquiry arises what 
 it can properly do for the individual which he could 
 not do for himself, for, as self-help is the great con- 
 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 278 
 
 dition of growth, it must dwarf the individual, and 
 deaden enterprise to have the government do what 
 the individual can. 
 
 And here it is to be said that the first and great 
 function of government is to secure to all QoTemiMDt 
 their rights. Of rights we have already J^e'^'i^^'" 
 spoken. They include all that is necessary '"''"■ 
 for the attainment by the individual of his end. 
 Give man his rights in regard to Life, to Liberty, 
 to Property, to Reputation, to Truth, and give him 
 Security respecting all these, and you do for him 
 all that is essential. If, with such conditions, he 
 fail of attaining the ends he ought to attain it must 
 be his own fault. 
 
 It is sometimes said to be a separate office of gov- 
 ernment not only to secure the rights, but QoTemment 
 to redress the wrongs of the individual. dresawroDgs. 
 There is room for this distinction, though the secur- 
 ing of rights and the redress of wrongs are really 
 the same thing viewed in different aspects. If a 
 man has been wronged it is his right to have that 
 wrong redressed if that be possible, and if that be 
 not possible, it is the right of society to demand 
 such punishment as will give them all the security 
 of which the case admits. The great end therefore 
 of a government is to secure promptly and efficiently 
 the rights of all who are under it, and it is a good 
 government in proportion as it does this. This, of 
 course, can be done only as there is perfect equality 
 for all in the eye of the law. It is against the vio- 
 18 
 
274 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 lation of a right as such, of any right, of the right 
 of the humblest and poorest, that the government is 
 to guard, and if any difference be made it should be 
 in favor of the humble and the poor. The prompt, 
 efficient, impartial protection of rights and the re- 
 dress of wrongs, is then the first great office of gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 A second legitimate function of government is to 
 QovernmBnt &^^ facilities, somctimes for individual, but 
 tateontei^'"' more ofteu for associated enterprise. It 
 '"'**• may thus limit and regulate copyrights, 
 
 and patent-rights, and may incorporate companies to 
 enable them to pursue branches of business which 
 could not well be undertaken by individual enter- 
 prise. Whatever individual protection or further- 
 ance any individual may need to attain the ends of any 
 lawful form of industry he ought to have — provided 
 no special privilege be given him, for no partiality 
 or favoritism should be shown in legislation. And 
 in incoi'porations, as of banks, the acts should be 
 passed not at all for the special benefit of those who 
 are incorporated, but of the public. All such acts 
 should either be open to all, or should be Umited 
 solely by a regard to the public good. 
 
 This general head of furnishing facilities opens a 
 field of legislation into which abuses may readily 
 creep ; still it is not only legitimate, but well-nigh 
 indispensable. Government, as the agent of society, 
 may even undertake enterprises in its own name that 
 shall furnish facilities for the people generally, but 
 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 276 
 
 the utmost caution is needed in selecting, and in 
 carrying forward such enterprises. It is a special 
 danger under our form of government that pubHc 
 enterprises will be entered upon for private advan- 
 tage, and that they will be carried forward both 
 wastefully and corruptly. 
 
 These then are the direct objects which a govern- 
 ment may propose to itself, — the protection of all 
 rights, the redress of wrongs, and the furnishing of 
 facilities, without favoritism, for the enterprise of 
 the people. 
 
 There is also an object which must be regarded 
 as legitimate, which largely gives tone to seif-preeer- 
 the measures adopted under every form govemment. 
 of government, and that is its own preservation. 
 Whatever has a right to be has a I'ight to all the 
 means necessary to its permanence and well-being. 
 Hence despotic governments, assuming their right 
 to be, must maintain standing armies. Hence lim- 
 ited monarchies must have an aristocracy to stand 
 between them and the people, and both must exer- 
 cise control over both education and religion. With- 
 out these no monarchy has been permanent, or can 
 be. If, by extraordinary talent and sagacity, a man 
 like Louis Napoleon may seize the reins and hold 
 them for his lifetime, it is yet felt that his govern- 
 ment has no permanent basis. Louis Napoleon has 
 a son who would naturally succeed him, but if you 
 ask a Frenchman what would happen if the father 
 should die, he simply shrugs his shoulders, and says 
 
276 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 nothing. It was the instinct of self-preservation 
 that led Napoleon and the English aristocracy to 
 take part against us in our late struggle, and it is 
 to be expected that every established form of gov- 
 ernment and every invested interest should be gov- 
 erned in the same way. ^ 
 It is on the principle we are now considering that 
 Hence right free governmeuts have the right to pro- 
 mem to vide for and maintain schools instead of 
 
 maintain 
 
 Bciioois. standnig armies, and to restrict the right 
 of voting and of office-holding within such limits 
 as the safety of the Republic may require. The 
 apprehension of these two rights, especially of the 
 right to tax the property of all, whether they have 
 or have not children to educate, has been slow in 
 finding its way into the public mind, and would still 
 be contested even in many parts of our own coun- 
 try, but it rests on solid ground if it can be shown, 
 as clearly it can, that virtue and intelligence are the 
 essential conditions of a free and popular govern- 
 ment. It is only on this ground that this right can 
 rest, for the government can have no right to take 
 property of one man for the benefit of others unless 
 it be essential to its own being or well-being. 
 
 But may not the government promote intelligence 
 LegisiaHon and morality for their own sake ? May it 
 
 not directly i ■ i t i p i • 
 
 for morality, not legislate dircctly tor their promotion 
 as ends ? No. It must protect the rights of all, 
 redress their wrongs and give them facilities such 
 as a government only can give, and leave the pro- 
 motion of virtue and intelligence, except as these 
 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 211 
 
 may be demanded for its own being or efficiency, to 
 individual effort, or to voluntary association. Es- 
 pecially is it to be said that government may not 
 interfere in any way with religion except as such 
 interference may be required by the principles above 
 mentioned. 
 
 But may there not be legislation in favor of tem- 
 perance ? No. The promotion of temperance is 
 no proper object of legislation. Temperance has 
 the same relation to legislation that honesty has. 
 The laws against stealing are not for the promotion 
 of honesty, but for the protection of rights ; and in 
 the same way if the traffic in ardent spirits did not 
 interfere directly or indirectly with the rights of 
 others it would not be a proper subject for legisla- 
 tion. Let those who carry on this traffic guarantee 
 the public against the crime and increase of tax- 
 ation it occasions and there need be no legislation 
 on the subject. But the moment any business can 
 be shown to be the cause of crime on which the 
 courts established by the government must sit, or of 
 taxation which the government must assess and 
 collect, it comes within the range of legislation, and 
 the community have a right to the best legislation 
 that can be devised for their protection. Neither 
 liquor sellers nor liquor dealers have any rights be- 
 yond the point where their acts begin to touch the 
 right of others to property or to security, or even 
 their right to be protected from those moral con- 
 ditions which, as human nature is now constituted, 
 
278 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 will insure the corruption of the young and of the 
 weak through temptations addressed to their senses, 
 and which are obtruded upon them. 
 
 Much has been said of attempts to make men 
 moral by legislation, and of prescribing to men what 
 they shall eat and drink ; but no one who under- 
 stands the proper objects of legislation would think 
 of doing either of these. If morality may be indi- 
 rectly promoted by legislation, so much the better. 
 If, in order to abate taxation and crime and nuis- 
 ances, it may become necessary to render intoxica- 
 ting drinks less accessible than some who might 
 safely use them would desire, this is not the object 
 intended, but only the means necessary for a legiti- 
 mate end. 
 
 It will appear from the above, that in addition to 
 True end of Hieasures needed for its own preservation, 
 goTfrmnent. ^^le cliief function of government is the 
 removing of obstacles. Its end is attained when all 
 the individuals under it attain their end. But this 
 can be done only through the positive exertion by 
 each one of his own faculties, and all that govern- 
 ment can do is to secure favorable conditions for this. 
 The fatal mistake has been, that governments have 
 proposed ends of their own, and in securing these 
 have been utterly reckless of both the rights and 
 the ends of the individual. When this is done in 
 the least degree, it matters not what the form of 
 government may be, — it is a perversion and 
 tyranny. 
 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 279 
 
 We next inquire when, in the progress The origin 
 of the race, civil government becomes ment. 
 necessary. 
 
 If we make, as we must, a distinction between 
 government and society, society being the principal, 
 and government the agent, then government can- 
 not be needed, or possible, till there is society. But 
 as demanding civil government, a single family can- 
 not constitute society. The family has a govern- 
 ment of its own, and suffices for itself. Before 
 there can be civil government, there must be an 
 aggregation of families. Hence it is that the family, 
 and not the individual, is the unit of civil govern- 
 ment. This, in the patriarchal form, would natu- 
 rally grow out of the union of several families hav- 
 ing a common origin ; and this again would naturally 
 extend and consolidate itself in monarchy. This is 
 supposed to have been the actual origin of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 This needs to be fhlly comprehended ; for if society 
 ever consisted of disintegrated individuals, standing 
 on an equality, and an attempt had been made to 
 construct something unknown before, to be called a 
 government, all would have had an equal right to 
 take part in such construction. But consisting as 
 society did of families, and needing only such ex- 
 tension and modification of principles of government 
 already existing as should secure in wider relations 
 the conditions of well-being previously secured in 
 the family, there would be not only a natural right, 
 
280 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 but a necessity, that in the formation of civil govem« 
 ment families should be represented by their heads. 
 Such a work could not have been done by the body 
 of those whose rights were to be secured, and, if 
 formally done, the heads of families would be the 
 divinely appointed representatives to do it. If 
 these were to meet and adopt such a form of gov- 
 ernment as should seem to them best adapted to 
 secure civil liberty, that government would not 
 stand simply as the product of human wisdom and 
 will, but, as growing out of relations divinely consti- 
 tuted, would have divine authority. 
 
 But no such formal meeting was originally held. 
 With no discussion of abstract rights, by a move- 
 ment spontaneous, gradual, self-adjusting, as all 
 primitive movements for the attainment of ends in- 
 dicated by nature are, government would naturally 
 grow out of the union of several families having a 
 common origin, the head and natural representative 
 of each family caring for its interests as occasion 
 might arise. In this way, but for usurpations and 
 abuses, government might have gone on indefinitely. 
 In some cases, as throughout the East, these usur- 
 pations and abuses were such as to crush out liberty, 
 and produce permanent degradation and hopeless- 
 ness among the people. In others they have 
 resulted in agitation, revolution, discussion of rights, 
 and in attempts to found governments on such 
 rights. 
 
 So instinctive, however, has been the tendency 
 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 281 
 
 above indicated to crystallize into governments by 
 an inherent force, that formal declarations jj^^^ ^ 
 of rights had scarcely been thought of Jf™*'^^ 
 till our own revolution, and then their """"• 
 effect was less than has generally been supposed. 
 There was no destruction of old governments, and 
 construction of new ones on the basis of principles 
 formally laid down. The colonial governments 
 were continued. The laws were essentially the 
 same under the Confederation as before, though the 
 seat of sovereignty was changed j and when the 
 Constitution was formed there was simply a new 
 distribution of some of the essential powers of gov- 
 ernment, and a new mode of appointing those by 
 whom the government should be administered. It 
 was not the object to find a new basis of govern- 
 ment, but such a mode of appointing its officers and 
 such a distribution of its functions as should give 
 the best guarantee that its ends should be secured. 
 There had been abuse, and the object was to guard 
 against that. The inquiry then was, and is now, 
 how government may be so guarded from abuse 
 as to secure for all that civil liberty which is its 
 end. 
 
CHAPTER Vm. 
 
 GOVERNMENT KEPRESENTATIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL : 
 THE EIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. 
 
 If we suppose government to have originated as 
 above, spontaneously, formally, or in whatever way, 
 it is plain that those who take part in it, whether in 
 its original formation, or by voting or by holding of- 
 fice, must act largely in a representative capacity. 
 They must act for the children, the sick, the infirm, 
 the insane, the criminal, the absent. If adult women 
 were permitted to vote, there would still remain a 
 large majority who could take no part in the gov- 
 ernment, and whose rights could be secured only 
 as they were thus represented. Hence all con- 
 cerned in government act as trustees and guardians. 
 Government is not an end, it is instrumental. It is 
 as a bridge over which all must pass, and what 
 society cares for is to have a bridge that will carry 
 all safely over. It is in that that essential rights 
 and interests are involved, and society has a right 
 to see that only those are engaged in building the 
 bridge who know how, and are disposed to build it 
 well. 
 
 But if government be thus representative and 
 
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 283 
 
 instiumental, it will follow, since natural rights be- 
 long to all, that the right to take part in jy^jof 
 it, whether by voting or holding office, J^^'oi*" 
 cannot be a natural right ; and also that ™**b»- 
 society will have the right to say who shall exercise 
 that right, and on what conditions. Hence society 
 may rightfully require that voters and office-holdei's 
 shall be above a certain age, shall have a certain 
 degree of education, shall have committed no mfa- 
 mous crime, and the like. 
 
 It also follows from the representative character 
 of voting, that the exercise of the right gufltagoM 
 becomes a duty, and that citizens cannot *"'''■ 
 treat it, as they frequently would, as a personal 
 right or privilege which they may rightftilly at their 
 pleasure forego ; but it imposes a solemn obligation, 
 requiring in the voter the exercise of his intelligence 
 and discretion, if not for himself, at least for the sake 
 of others who cannot take part in the government, 
 and even for the sake of posterity, who will one day 
 inherit his work, and be affected by his care or his 
 neglect. So essential is this that society might com- 
 pel the exercise cf this right, and insist that those 
 to whom it is comn Utted shall not lay it lightly aside, 
 nor be allowed to shield themselves under the idea 
 that it is a personal right and privilege, and thus 
 stand idly by while others inflict an injury on soci- 
 ety ; but might require of them, as of more formal 
 guardians and trustees, that they shall act for the 
 benefit of their wards, though they may not care 
 
284 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 sufficiently for their own rights, as membera of soci- 
 ety, to protect them. h^^t^g,-£.^tx^ ^ / J ^ y ^^ 
 
 But while it is undemable that the right of suf- 
 Eight of frage extends to interests far beyond those 
 conferred. of the individual who may claim to exer- 
 cise it, and hence that no individual can claim to 
 exercise it as a natural right, it still remains a duty 
 for society to confer this right in the most just and 
 secure manner that human wisdom can devise. 
 
 And here it is to be said that there has doubtless 
 been from the first the spontaneous and unconscious 
 operation of a principle which should be a control- 
 ing one, that is, that those should vote on any sub- 
 ject on whom the responsibility with reference to 
 it falls. It has seemed right that those who are to 
 go to war should determine the question of war, 
 and that those who are liable to do military and 
 police duty, and sit on juries, who are to work on 
 the highways and pay the taxes, should vote on 
 those subjects ; that those, in short, whoever they 
 may be, who do the fighting, and the working, and 
 the tax-paying, should also do the voting. It would 
 be quite as unjust that war should be declared 
 through the votes of women and children who could 
 take no part in it, as that men should impose taxes 
 on property which women have acquired. If it be 
 said that the interests of women are as much opposed 
 to war as those of men, and that they would never 
 urge and inaugurate and perpetuate one in oppo- 
 sition to the judgment of the men, this is refuted 
 
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 285 
 
 by what occurred at the South during our late civil 
 war, for it is well known that the war was intensi- 
 fied and prolonged by the spirit of the women, 
 though they had no power to vote. If women and 
 children had taken an active part in the great duties 
 and responsibilities of society, beyond question they 
 would have been allowed to vote. 
 
 But accounting thus for what has been, we inquire 
 what ought to be. On what principle Ba^isorthe 
 
 1 • /. 1 . 1 P 1 . right of 
 
 ought society to conrer the nght oi taking auttrage. 
 part in the government ? 
 
 And here it is plain that no one ought to be ex- 
 cluded arbitrarily, that is, unless such exclusion is 
 required by the ends of government. In this view 
 all agree on two grounds of exclusion. One is in- 
 competence, the other presumed hostility to the 
 government. On these grounds minors, foreigners 
 not naturalized, criminals, and those who have 
 shown hostility to the government, are excluded. 
 This being conceded, and putting aside for the 
 moment the question in regard to women, the one 
 great principle which must be observed by society 
 in conferring the right of suffrage, and which is 
 practically found to be the foundation and safeguard 
 of civil liberty, is that that right should be attainable 
 by all. It is to be something attainable by all, not 
 possessed. Thus society may require that all voters 
 shall have attained a uniform and discreet age, but 
 distinctions may not be drawn between the rich and 
 the poor, the white and the black, the learned and 
 
286 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 the unlearned. To the youth of each of these 
 classes society may rightly say that when they reach 
 such age, and not tUl then, they shall come equally 
 into possession of this right. 
 
 Nor may society impose any condition upon the 
 right of suffrage which the mass of the people can- 
 not comply with. Thus society may not require 
 that voters shall be free from sin, but may require 
 that they shall be free from crime, for a moral life 
 is a condition with which all can comply. Thus 
 society may not limit the right of sufirage to pro- 
 found mathematicians, nor to men learned in the 
 ancient languages, for these would necessitate talent 
 and education not practically within the reach of 
 every youth ; but it may require that every voter 
 shall be able to read the English language, for that 
 is attainable by every American youth, and neces- 
 sary, in the present age, to secure an ordinary intel- 
 ligence. 
 
 Such is the basis on which the right of sufirage 
 should be conferred. Forbidding that the right 
 should be withheld from any race or class as such, 
 and that any part of society should have or exercise 
 the right of excluding any other part, it secures to 
 every person the right to rise. 
 
 But besides the right of suffrage, which is the 
 Right of right to take a part in the affairs of the 
 
 representa. ^ 
 
 don. government, there is a totally distinct right, 
 
 a right of representation. These two are often 
 3onfounded, but are distinct, for those who do not 
 
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 287 
 
 vote are still entitled to be represented. In prac- 
 tical effect, as in theory, the child is represented by 
 the father, and the wife by the husband. All indi- 
 viduals have an interest in government, and where 
 the individual possesses an interest, that interest 
 necessitates and confers a right, for wherever there 
 is a light to govern there must also be a right to be 
 governed rightly. The representative in the legis- 
 lature represents far more than the minority of men 
 who voted for him. He represents their opponents 
 who voted against him, their wives and children 
 who did not vote, and he represents, and is bound 
 to provide for the well-being of even criminals who 
 have forfeited the right to vote. This generality 
 of representation is sought to be secured by what is 
 termed " manhood suffrage," and it is this which 
 must prevent one class from dominating over or ex- 
 cluding another from the substantial right of repre- 
 sentation, and which must secure to all that equal 
 protection and care without which civil liberty can 
 but imperfectly exist. 
 
 There is also a right of representation which in 
 this countrv has received but little favor Representa- 
 
 . , . , . . «on of 
 
 or attention as yet, but which may m time property, 
 be found essential to the existence of popular gov- 
 ernment, and that is the representation of property 
 as distinct from the representation of persons. Mer 
 owe certain common duties to society, and society 
 owes a certain common protection to them, but 
 there are also expenses of government which are not 
 
288 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 drawn equally from all men, but wHch are contrib- 
 uted in different proportions by individuals. This 
 principle is very old, and has borne an important 
 part in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, it hav- 
 ing been enunciated as early as Magna Charta in 
 the declaration that taxes should be laid only with 
 the consent of the taxed given through the " Com- 
 mons " in Parliament ; and again in the Bill of 
 Rights ; and again in the revolution of the Amer- 
 ican colonies, where the principle in question was 
 the power to tax without the consent of the taxed, 
 or without representation. There exists now the 
 case of unmarried women holding property on which 
 the government imposes taxes without affording a 
 correlative right of representation ; and there is also 
 the case of resident aliens whose property is taxed 
 in the same way. This withholding of representa- 
 tion from tax-paying women, and at the same time 
 requiring- them to contribute equally with men to 
 the ordinary expenses of government, already strikes 
 the common mind as injustice ; and it may be that 
 the growing interests of civilization will one day re- 
 quire that these two bases of representation shall be 
 separated, and that one branch of the legislature 
 shall represent property, and be chosen by those 
 who contribute towards the expense of maintaining 
 government, and that all such shall be allowed to 
 take part in the government to that extent, what- 
 ever may be their nationality, race, or sex. Of the 
 equity of such representation there can be no ques- 
 
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 289 
 
 tion. Government is supported wholly by property ; 
 the larger portion of legislation respects property, 
 and it may readily happen in communities like the 
 city of "New York, where irresponsible and destitute 
 foreigners are constantly made voters, that great in- 
 security and oppression should result from subject- 
 ing property to the control of mere numbers. 
 
 We have thus the family as the unit of society. 
 We have government as necessarilv rep- Has woman 
 
 • TTT T . , . „ , aright to 
 
 resentative. We have a right m all the vote, 
 members of society to representation ; to protection 
 in all their rights ; to be governed rightly. We have 
 also the two grounds on which persons have been 
 called on to take part in the government : responsi- 
 bility for personal service, and the support of the 
 government by their property. With these ele- 
 ments we inquire whether the right of suffiage 
 should be extended to woman. The question "is 
 not whether she has a natural right to vote, for 
 none have that, but whether her own elevation and 
 best influence, and the ends of society require that 
 that right should be bestowed upon her. 
 
 This question has been discussed as if the sexes 
 constituted different classes, and as if there were, 
 or could be, in their real interests, a conflict be- 
 tween them. That is a great mistake. A man and 
 his wife are not of a different class ; and their in- 
 terests, together with those of their family, are 
 identical. The very existence of society, indeed, 
 depends on men and women as entering into a special 
 19 
 
290 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 relation which not only unites their interests, as in 
 a partnership, but identifies them, and makes each 
 sex reciprocally the guardian of the other. The 
 cases where this relation does not exist are strictly 
 exceptional, and society is not organized, and does 
 not exist for exceptional cases. 
 
 This question, therefore, should not come in the 
 form of a partisan discussion, but of a mutual in 
 quiry what the rights of woman are, and how she 
 may be elevated to the highest point in culture and 
 legitimate influence. And upon such an inquiry 
 man should enter with no less alacrity and candor 
 than woman, for if there be anything which mus' 
 react with swift retribution upon society, it is any 
 needless ignorance or degradation of its wives and 
 mothers. 
 
 The family, a^ has been said, is the unit of society. 
 This character of it should be, and unconsciously is, 
 one of the most cherished objects of Christian civil- 
 ization, and unhappy will be the nation whose legis- 
 lative mind shall regard society simply as a mass of 
 individuals, and not as a combination of families. 
 The family being regarded thus, as a divine institu- 
 tion sufficing for itself, and society being regarded as 
 combination of families, society will have a double 
 life, or rather, its one life will be within two spheres. 
 There will be the domestic life of the family, and 
 the public life of society. Of these the family is 
 the more important and sacred, and over this in its 
 domestic life, it is the duty and dignity and happi- 
 
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 291 
 
 ness of woman to preside. This is her sphere, not 
 inferior to that of man, but diflFerent from it. Here 
 she has not only a right to vote, but to rule. If, as 
 is to be supposed, she is fitted for her place, nothing 
 will be added to the dignity of the husband or to 
 the happiness of the family by any interference with 
 her where the responsibility properly falls upon her. 
 The sphere of society on the other hand belongs to 
 man, at least it has been hitherto regarded as belong- 
 ing to him. For the support of its institutions and 
 for those duties more immediately required for its 
 welfare he is responsible. Here man has the right 
 to vote, and nothing will be added to the dignity of 
 the wife or to the happiness of society by any inter- 
 ference of the wife where the responsibility properly 
 falls upon the husband. By a natural relation, and 
 so by the appointment of God, the wife is the centre 
 of the domestic circle, the chief source of its happi- 
 ness, and guardian of her husband's interests and 
 rights in all that pertains to it. By a natural rela- 
 tion the husband is the house-hand, the provider for 
 its wants, its defender, and the guardian of the 
 riffhts of the wife as of the children in their relations 
 to society. He is the natural representative of both. 
 The wife is not a child, but according to the Chris- 
 tian conception is nearer than that, is one with her 
 husband, and their interests are one. If we suppose 
 society composed of families alone, and if the rights 
 of wives and children would not be secured by giv- 
 ing to every husband and father a share in the gov- 
 
292 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 ernment, the fault -woulrl not be in the system, but 
 in individual corruption that would work itself out 
 whatever system might be adopted. Women have 
 had wrongs, and so have children. These must be 
 . . dressed, but this will not be done by disregard- 
 ing any relation established by God. If parents 
 and children, and husbands and wives, will act in 
 the spirit of those relations, society will be perfected. 
 If they will not do that, no political relations will 
 avail. The same spirit on the part of men that 
 would concede the right of voting, would concede 
 and secure in a representative capacity every right 
 without that. 
 
 For each of the spheres above spoken of, men 
 and women are fitted respectively by their physical 
 organization and by their mental instincts and ten- 
 dencies, and their relations to the children require 
 that the spheres should be kept separate, it is not 
 that man is not competent to set the table and rock 
 the cradle, or that woman is not competent to vote. 
 It is because the one life of society will work itself 
 out in more perfect results, if these two great but 
 interdependent spheres be left to those who natu- 
 rally have charge of them. 
 
 But while the above is said, society is to hold it- 
 self ready to make any changes which its changing 
 modifications may require. In the primitive stages 
 of society, when the chief business of governments 
 was to carry on offensive or defensive war, women 
 had no desire to take part in government, and their 
 
GOVKRNMENT, ETC. 29S 
 
 presence would have been an inconvenience and 
 injury. But society has now greatly advanced, so 
 that there are many fields, especially that of educa- 
 tion, in which woman may properly act, and in 
 which her aid will be an advantage to society j and 
 it is possible that in a future and higher stage of 
 progress these fields will be increased, and woman 
 be assigned to perform her definite part in the gov- 
 ernment. Yet so long as the sexes remain fused in 
 one common mass, as has always been the case with 
 society, so long the indiscriminate mingling of the 
 sexes, either in the domestic sphere or in the gen- 
 eral management of government, will be found an 
 inconvenience, a source of embarrassment and weak- 
 ness. If, however, it should be found advantageous 
 to society and to woman herself that the number of 
 hei* employments should be increased, and her re- 
 sponsibility to society enlarged, there would probably 
 be no opposition to a corresponding enlargement of 
 the right of suffrage. 
 
 If we adopt this view of the family as the unit 
 of society, and of the natural right of representa- 
 tion, the principle which it contains will harmonize 
 and protect all interests. Let the family be regarded 
 as the unit of society, and the principle adhered to 
 of giving to each unit a single and equal represen- 
 tation, and society may provide for exceptional cases 
 oy general laws. Such cases arise when the chil- 
 dren of a family reach maturity and do not marry, 
 and in the case of widows who are the heads of 
 
294 MOEAL SCIENCE. 
 
 families. For the case of widows no remedy is pro- 
 vided, but in equity there should be. When the 
 Bons of a family reach the age of manhood they go 
 forth and become, in theory as in fact, the stocks of 
 new families, which sooner or later they support, 
 maintain, and represent, and hence they are made 
 responsible for the duties and burdens of society. 
 They may not, indeed, instantly marry and become 
 the heads of new families, but they are preparing 
 for that, and are essentially doing the work of main- 
 taining the future family by the work of preparation. 
 The daughters, on the contrary, remain at home, 
 and are identified in its interests with the old family 
 until they are taken forth to form parts of new fam- 
 ilies. They do not go forth by themselves, nor un- 
 dertake the work of preparation, but stay protected, 
 maintained, and represented in and by the original 
 stock. Perhaps, exceptionally, they may acquire 
 property, and in the contemplation of law, establish 
 for themselves new homes. Society will never fos- 
 ter such a system, for it would be prejudicial to its 
 own ends ; but nevertheless it might protect the in- 
 dividual by allowing her to exercise the sufirage of 
 property representation. The right of personal 
 sufirage she could hardly ask, and society would 
 hardly allow, except as she should be willing and 
 fitted to do the work of the juror, the policeman, 
 the sheriff, the soldier, — except as she should be- 
 come subject to all the duties and responsibilities on 
 which the great interests of society depend. 
 
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 295 
 
 In speaking on this subject nothing has been said 
 hitherto of sentiment and a sense of propriety as 
 distinguished from rights, and nothing need be, ex- 
 cept as those indicate, as natural sentiment always 
 does, what is right. But sentiment depends so much 
 upon custom, and custom is so varied and capri- 
 cious that it is difficult to know what natural sen- 
 timent is. Throughout the East it shocks the sense 
 of propriety for a woman to appear in public un- 
 veiled, or to walk the streets arm-in-arm with her 
 husband, probably even more than it would here for 
 her to vote and take part in the stormy debates of a 
 town meeting. Still, sentiment has a real basis. In 
 reading the account lately given by a missionary of 
 his finding a man in the house knitting and his wife 
 at work in the field, we cannot help feeling that the 
 sense of ludicrous impropriety as well as of indigna- 
 tion is well founded. That there is in the minds of 
 large portions of the people of this country — perhaps 
 stronger among the well educated and refined, and 
 stronger among women than men — a feeling of pro- 
 priety that would be offended by the promiscuous 
 mingling of women with men in the conduct of pub- 
 _lic affairs, cannot be questioned. It is the sentiment 
 which makes woman strong through her weakness. 
 It lay at the foundation of all that was good in 
 chivalry. It has been a strong auxiUary to Chris- 
 tian principle in elevating woman. It sets her apart 
 in many hearts as something sacred, and adds to life, 
 otherwise hard and prosaic, much of its beauty. 
 
296 MORAL SCIEIirCE. 
 
 For this sentiment Americans are distinguished. It 
 should be cherished rather than weakened, and if, as 
 many think, it would be destroyed, or essentially 
 impaired by extending the suffiage to woman, those 
 who wish her elevation will hesitate long before tak- 
 ing such a step. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 FORMS or GOVERNMENT. DUTIES OF MAGISTRATES 
 
 AND CITIZENS. 
 
 After considering elementary points so fiilly, it 
 win not be necessary to spend much time on the more 
 beaten grounds of forms of government, and of the 
 rights and duties of citizens and of magistrates. 
 
 Governments have always been classed as Mon- 
 archies, Aristocracies, and Democracies, !.„„„,„, 
 but substantially they are now, and indeed S^^^™' 
 always have been, either monarchical or ''"• 
 republican. There are indeed privileged classes, as 
 in England, who have an hereditary share in the 
 government, but there is no government that is in 
 fact or in form aristocratic. 
 
 Monarchies are either absolute or limited, as the 
 power rests with one man alone or is divided with 
 others. The monarch may be elective, or heredi- 
 tary, though of an elective monarchy there is now 
 no example. That the monarchy should be hered- 
 itary conduces to the stability of the government, 
 and to peace. 
 
 Democracies, that is governments by the people 
 themselves, instead of by representation, are impos- 
 
298 MOEAL SCIENCE. 
 
 sible except for very small communities. Repub- 
 lican government is representative and elective. 
 There may be a simple independent republic, such 
 as the several States were before the formation 
 of the Federal Union, or there may be a federal 
 republic, with powers divided between the central 
 sovernment and the several states. 
 
 The object of government, that is, security in the 
 enjoyment of every right, may be attained under 
 any form. A monarch may concede every right, 
 and his character may give security, but practically 
 it is found that rights are best secured where a large 
 amount of power is retained in the hands of the 
 people, and where the government itself is one of 
 checks and balances. 
 
 The essential condition of freedom and security 
 is that the three great functions of govem- 
 
 The neces- o o 
 
 separating mcut, the Legislative, the Judicial, and the 
 functioMof Executive, should be kept distinct, and 
 goyemment. gjiould be in different hands. Let the 
 laws be made by one set of men, with penalties fixed 
 before transgression ; let the question of an infrac- 
 tion of law and the declaration of the penalty be in 
 the hands of another set of men, and the execution 
 of the sentence in still other hands, and a good de- 
 gree of security and freedom can hardly fail to be 
 enjoyed. Still, much will depend on the method in 
 which the legislative body and the judiciary are 
 appointed and constituted. The object is the best 
 laws and their perfect administration. Society is 
 
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, ETC. 299 
 
 therefore bound to elect men of wisdom and integ- 
 rity, and laws passed by such men after due deliber- 
 ation will be all that can be reached in the present 
 imperfect state. 
 
 To secure due deliberation and a view of eacli 
 
 subject upon all its sides, tlie legislature Twoieg- 
 
 111 ■ 1 IIP i^"™ 
 
 should consist, and commonly does, ot two bodies. 
 
 bodies. In some cases these are elected in different 
 methods and serve for different periods, and this 
 would seem best adapted to secure the end. It 
 gives opportunity also for the representation of every 
 interest. 
 
 It has been thought in this country that the office 
 of legislation was a right and a privilege notation 
 to be enjoyed in rotation, with httle refer- '" °®™- 
 ence to integrity and wisdom, especially with little 
 reference to any special knowledge of the science of 
 legislation. If the legislative body be numerous, 
 such a theory will be comparatively harmless if a 
 fair proportion of competent legislators be elected. 
 In such bodies the business is really done by a few, 
 and if the numbers that serve simply as ballast do no 
 positive mischief, there is little objection to the prin- 
 ciple of rotation for them. Crude legislation how- 
 ever is too great an evil to be lightly incurred, and 
 too many men may not be set aside just as experience 
 would render their services valuable. Society owes 
 it to itself to see that its legislation moves on in the 
 full light of the experience of the past, and of the 
 best talent and wisdom of the present. 
 
800 MOBAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Laws having been made, and penalties annexed, 
 ihe judi- cases will arise under them, respecting both 
 otory. property and crime, that will require a ju- 
 
 diciary department. The sure and speedy and 
 inexpensive administration of justice is an essential 
 condition of the well-being of a people. The speed- 
 iest and least expensive method of reaching this is 
 by a single judge deciding cases on the spot, or, in 
 cases of importance and difficulty, two others might 
 be added. The objection to this is the danger of 
 passion, prejudice, and corruption. Hence juries 
 and courts of appeal have been introduced. These 
 have guarded against corruption, but have in manj' 
 cases so been the means of delay and expense that 
 the rich could baffle and worry out the poor, and 
 that it is often better pecuniarily to lose a just claim 
 than to contest it in law. Such a state of things 
 is disgraceful to civilization and to Christianity, and 
 should be remedied by an enlightened people. What 
 is needed is an impartial and competent judiciary, 
 through which speedy and inexpensive justice may 
 be reached. This end has been sought not merely 
 through the constitution of the judiciary, but also 
 through the mode of its appointment, and the ten- 
 ure of office. Obviously these should be such as to 
 secure the appointment of the best men, and that 
 the judge himself shall be unaffected in his prospects 
 and private interests by his decisions. That these 
 conditions should be secured by an elective judi- 
 ciary, holding office for a limited and comparatively 
 
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, ETC. 301 
 
 brief time, would not seem possible in the present 
 state of public morals. 
 
 It is the business of the executive to see that the 
 laws are enforced, and that all sentences -oaa- 
 of the judiciary are carried out. The ^'="''™ 
 executive also represents the majesty of the na- 
 tion before other nations, and in all international 
 transactions is the medium of communication with 
 them. The character of these duties demands that 
 they be performed by a single person. If the ex- 
 ecutive have, as he should have, to guard his own 
 prerogatives, a veto power, he is so far a part of the 
 legislature ; but beyond that his sole business is to 
 execute the laws. This he must do, certainly, as he 
 understands them. He must execute a law in what 
 he supposes to be its true intent and meaning, seek- 
 ing, if there be doubt, the best aid from legal ad- 
 visers. But when a law has been passed, having 
 fully the forms of law, he must accept it as such, 
 and may not delay or refuse its execution on the 
 ground of its alleged unconstitutionality, though, if 
 there be doubt, he may take immediate measures to 
 have the constitutionality of the law tested. 
 
 To secure always a suitable executive has been a 
 great problem. In most nations the executive of- 
 fice has been hereditary. This has many advan- 
 tages. It tends to stabihty and a uniform policy, 
 and prevents the excitement and corruption incident 
 to an election. Besides, in many countries an intel- 
 ligent and patriotic election would be impossible*. 
 In this country the executive is elective, virtually 
 
802 MOEAL SCIENCE. 
 
 by the whole people, and hitherto the strain has not 
 been found too great. Whether this will continue 
 to be the case when wealth shall be indefinitely in- 
 creased, and interests shall be extended and compli- 
 cated, is a problem. It can only be as there shall 
 be a virtue and an mtelligence among the people 
 hitherto unknown. Probably the danger would be 
 diminished, if the tenure of office were for six years, 
 with no possibility of a reelection. 
 
 The duties of the citizen are, 1st. To obey the 
 oj » J ., laws so far as his conscience will allow him 
 
 £li8t duty 
 
 cuiSn- *° ^° ^°' ^^ ^^ possible for men to cherish 
 obedience. willfulness and fanaticism under the pre- 
 tense of conscience, and the presumption is in favor 
 of the law as right, and of the obligation of the citi- 
 zen to obey. Still there have been, and are liable to 
 be, under all forms of government, wicked laws, and 
 if, with the best light a man can gain, he shall deem 
 it wrong to obey a law, he is bound to disobey it, and 
 take the consequences whatever they may be. He is 
 bound to obey God rather than men. 
 
 2. The citizen is bound to bear cheerfully his 
 Second doty J share of the burdens of government, and 
 
 BnbmifiBion „ . -rrn 1 11-1 n 
 
 to taxation. 01 socicty. Whether Called upon lor per- 
 sonal service, or for property in the way of taxation, 
 he is to stand in his place and do his part without 
 subterfuge or evasion. 
 
 3. So far as his influence goes he is bound to see 
 Third duty ; that the best men are selected as candi- 
 Buflrage. dates for office, and so to cast his vote 
 as will most benefit the countay. 
 
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, ETC. 303 
 
 4. The citizen is bound to give his aid in all at- 
 tempts to secure the rights of others, and jonrthdnty- 
 to enforce law and order. He may not ^^^^. 
 stand supinely by and see the right of ™™'" 
 property violated. If, through general supineness, 
 the property of individuals be destroyed by a mob, 
 society is bound to make it good. Against the ten- 
 dency of liberty to license, and of license again to 
 despotism, every citizen is to guard. 
 
 If we look at history, or at the state of most 
 countries now, we cannot value civfl lib- ■,, , , 
 
 ' value of 
 
 erty too highly. Hitherto it has existed "'"' '""■'*y 
 but imperfectly, and has reached its present posi- 
 tion only through great sacrifices and struggles. 
 The end of government, as for the individual, the 
 ground of human rights, and the rights themselves, 
 have not been well understood. These are now 
 understood by some, and it has become possible to 
 instruct a whole people in them. Let this be done, 
 and if, in connection with such instruction and the 
 advancing light of science the community may but 
 be so pervaded by the spirit of Christianity that a 
 permanent and constantly advancing civilization 
 may be possible, there will be nothing to prevent the 
 attainment by man of all the perfection and happi- 
 ness of which the present state will admit. The 
 highest earthly conception is that of a vast Christian 
 commonwealth, instinct with order, and with such 
 triumphs and dominion over nature as modem 
 science is achieving, and promises to achieve. >^ 
 
CLASS m. 
 
 DUTIES TO GOD. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DUTIES TO GOD DEFINED. 
 
 Duties to God are distinguished from others by 
 Relation to having God for their object. It is one 
 tho"ne"*'*'' thing for the subject to disregard the sov- 
 great duty, g^eign indirectly by breaking his laws in 
 injuring a fellow subject, it is another for him to 
 meet that sovereign personally and show towards 
 him disregard or contempt. There are accordingly 
 both duties and sins of which God is the immediate 
 object, and which have reference to Him alone. 
 Such are worship, and blasphemy. It is this capacity 
 of coming directly to God that makes man a child, 
 or rather it is the necessary result of his being a 
 child. 
 
 So far as we can separate religion from morality 
 BeUgion religion consists in those duties of which 
 guJsiuMi God is the object. That these cannot be 
 rajity. performed acceptably except on condition 
 
 of performing our duties to our fellow men has al- 
 
DUTIES TO GOD DEFINED. 805 
 
 ready beeti shown. In this sense our duties to our 
 fellow men are conditional for those to God, and so 
 lower. Whether they are also conditional as prior 
 in time is less clear. Many suppose that the moral 
 nature is first called into action towards man, and 
 observation favors this. But the relation of God to 
 the soul as Creator and as all-pervading in his 
 presence, and the necessary idea which, according 
 to some, is formed of Him from the first, has led 
 others to the belief that the moral nature is first 
 stirred towards God, and that there can be no form 
 of duty without some reference to Him. 
 
 But be this as it may, while all must allow that 
 there can be no genuine religion without ^j^^ 
 morahty, it is generally supposed there can JJ^^ 
 be morality without religion. This may ™'»™i^- 
 be differently viewed as we suppose morality to con- 
 sist in outward conduct, or in a state of the heart. 
 There are many reasons why outward conduct should 
 be in accordance with ihe rules of morality, though 
 it may not proceed from love. Doubtless, also, the 
 moral nature, in common with the other parts of our 
 nature, and taking its turn with them, is constantly 
 brought into activity towards men with no conscious 
 reference to God. But if we mean by morality the 
 love of our neighbor as a paramount and controlling 
 principle, and by perfect morahty the love of our 
 neighbor as ourselves, then there is no reason to 
 suppose that it can exist without religion. The 
 principle in each is identical, and supposing God to 
 2C 
 
306 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 be known, they reciprocally imply each other. Cer- 
 tainly this is the only morality that has an adequate 
 basis, or that can be relied on as consistent. 
 
 With this view of the relation to each other of 
 these two branches of duty, we inquire what those 
 duties are of which God is the object. 
 
 And here the first and great duty of every one is, 
 Man's great ^^ ^^'"^ Mmself to Grod. This is the great- 
 *"'^- est and most solemn of all acts. It in- 
 
 volves the highest possible prerogatives of a creature, 
 and is the highest possible privilege as well as duty. 
 The whole wisdom of man lies in his confiding him- 
 self imphcitly to the guidance of the divine wisdom, 
 and to the protection of the divine power. It was 
 by withdrawing himself from this guidance and pro- 
 tection that man sinned originally ; he can be 
 restored only by accepting them anew. 
 
 As Creator, God is the absolute owner of all 
 things. As omnipotent, He can do with them as 
 He pleases. But if He would be a Father and 
 Moral Governor He must have children and subjects 
 in his own image, and with the prerogative of 
 choosing or rejecting Him as their supreme good. 
 Control by force, order by an impulse from without, 
 is the opposite of control by love, and of order from 
 a rational choice, and the highest duty of man is to 
 give himself in the spirit of a child, that is by faith, 
 to God. 
 
 The above will include everything. Whoever 
 holds himself fully and constantly in the attitude to 
 
DUTIES TO GOD DEFINED. 307 
 
 God of a child, does all that he can. This will in- 
 clude love and obedience. Still we need to specify 
 in three particulars — 
 
 1. The cultivation of a devotional spirit ; 
 
 2. Prayer ; and 
 
 3. The keeping of the Sabbath. 
 
CHAPTER n. 
 
 CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIKIT. 
 
 A DEVOTIONAL Spirit may be cultivated — 
 
 1. By the exercise of devotion. This is on the 
 principle that all our active powers are strengthened 
 by exercise. There is no active power that does not 
 gain facility and scope by repeated acts under the 
 direction of will. 
 
 2. A devotional spirit may be cultivated by a 
 right use of Nature. 
 
 The physical universe is but a visible expression 
 of the power and the thought of God. 
 
 This power and thought are seen in the very con- 
 stitution of matter. It was not any matter, but 
 such matter, and in such proportions, that was 
 needed for the forms that we see, and for vital pro- 
 cesses. The varieties and affinities and relative 
 quantities of matter as much show that it was created, 
 and for a purpose, as its forms and movements show 
 that it is used for a purpose. It is therefore the 
 voice of Science as well as of Revelation that He 
 " hath measured the waters in the hollow of his 
 hand, and meted out heaven " — that is the extent of 
 
CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 309 
 
 the atmosphere — " with the span, and comprehended 
 the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the 
 mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance." 
 
 But the more obvious manifestations of thought 
 and power are in form and movement. It is in the 
 forms that we see, so diversified — some changing, 
 some permanent, each adapted to an end — together 
 with those uniform and recurring movements which 
 reveal unlimited force and skill, that what we call 
 Nature consists. Through this we gain our concep- 
 tions of beauty, and of the most perfect adaptation 
 of means to ends. Physical science is but the 
 thought of God expressed through this. Upon this, 
 suspended as it is in immensity, so vast in its magni- 
 tudes, so mighty in its forces, so perfect in its organi- 
 zations even the most minute, so extended yet pre- 
 cise in its periods, no one can look without wonder, 
 unless it be from ignorance or criminal stupidity. 
 
 But all this may be regarded with two habits of 
 mind utterly different. 
 
 Through the element of uniformity in nature it is 
 possible to regard it as having no relation to a per 
 sonal God. Through that element God so hides 
 himself behind his works that very many are prac- 
 tically, and some theoretically, pantheistic or athe- 
 istic. They see nothing in Nature but impersonal 
 forces and fixed relations. 
 
 A devotional spirit is the opposite of this. 
 Through Nature it sees God. It sees, and culti- 
 vates the habit of seeing Him in everything. To 
 
310 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Buch a spirit the earth and the heavens are a temple, 
 the only temple worthy of God. To it the succes- 
 sion of day and night and the march of the seasons 
 are constant hymns. To it, not the heavens alone, 
 but the whole frame-work and structure of Nature 
 with its ongoings " declare the glory of God." 
 
 This is the spirit which it is the duty and happi- 
 iiess of man to cultivate. The highest use of 
 Nature is not the support of man, but to lead him 
 up to God. 
 
 3. A devotional spirit may also be cultivated by 
 observing the Providence of God as it respects 
 Nations, individuals, and particularly ourselves. 
 
 The warp of our earthly life is those uniformities, 
 called laws, without which there could be no educa- 
 tion of the race, and no rational conduct. But these 
 laws mtersect and modify each other. They are so 
 related to the results of human wiU, and the results 
 of different wills apparently unrelated so combine and 
 converge to unexpected ends, as to have produced 
 an impression almost universal that the filling in of 
 those seeming contingencies which go to make up 
 the completed pattern of our lives is controlled by 
 wise design. In this is Providence. This it is that 
 in every age takes Joseph from the pit and makes 
 him ruler of Egypt. Through this it is that the 
 arrow shot at a venture finds the joints of the har- 
 ness. Here, as in Nature, it is possible for men to 
 substitute something else, as chance, or fate, for 
 God ; but those who believe in Him will nowhere 
 
CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 311 
 
 find more striking evidence of a divine hand, and 
 " he who will observe the Providence of God will 
 have providences to observe." 
 
 4. But the main nutriment of a devotional spirit 
 must be found in the Scriptures. 
 
 In the Scriptures we have an unequivocal revela- 
 tion of God as personal, and so of his attributes as 
 moral. It is only in view of personality and moral 
 attributes that devotion can spring up. Sentiment 
 and sentimentalism there may be in view of force 
 regarded as impersonal, but not devotion, not wor- 
 ship. These require a Father in Heaven, an infinite 
 God, universal in his government and perfect in his 
 moral character. Whatever may be said of the 
 truth of the Scriptures, it is demonstrable that the 
 God whom they reveal must call forth the highest 
 possible adoration, and hence that the knowledge of 
 God as revealed in them must, more than anything 
 else can, quicken intelligent devotion. The attri- 
 butes and character of God as made known in the 
 Scriptures hold the same relation to devotion that 
 the infinity of space, and the awful force that sus- 
 tains and moves in it the array of suns and planets, 
 holds to the emotion of sublimity ; and as nothing 
 can supersede infinite space in that relation, so noth- 
 ing can supersede the God of the Bible as the 
 ground and stimulus of the highest possible devo- 
 tion. 
 
 Thus recognizing God in the three great modes 
 in which He is revealed, in Nature, in Providence, 
 
312 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 and in Revelation, we shall cultivate a devotional 
 spirit. 
 
 In contrast with a devotional spirit is 
 
 Pro&neness. 
 
 one that is profane. 
 
 This may manifest itself in action or in speech. 
 The true conception of this world is that of a temple 
 involving both the ownership and the indwelUng of 
 God. As there is nothing that God does not own, 
 any reckless or vicious use of what is his is a form 
 of profaneness. It is a profanation to convert what- 
 God gave for food into a means of gluttony or 
 drunkenness. If travellers were to stop in a cara- 
 vansera, and in the presence of him who built and 
 fiirnished it were to destroy the food and injure the 
 furniture he had provided for all, he would be 
 grieved and justly incensed. It would be an un- 
 grateful disregard of his wishes, and an abuse of his 
 goodness. But this is what men do who pervert the 
 works of God from the end designed by Him, and 
 such conduct toward Him is profaneness. 
 
 But while this is really profaneness, and in an 
 aggravated form, it is not generally so regarded. 
 The term is commonly applied to some form of 
 speech implying disregard or contempt of God, or 
 of the sanctions of his moral government ; and more 
 particularly to an irreverent use of his name. This 
 is an offense that would excite astonishment if it 
 were not so common. It differs from others in be- 
 ing wholly gratuitous, and is thus, perhaps, the most 
 striking evidence of the depravity of the race. The 
 
CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 313 
 
 thief, the sensualist, the ambitious man has a temp- 
 tation that appeals to a natural desire; but that a 
 creature and child of God, supported wholly by his 
 goodness and responsible to Him, should wantonly 
 profane his name, could not beforehand be credited. 
 That there should be in Christian lands communities 
 in which such profaneness is thought an accomplish- 
 ment, and so an evidence of manhood that boys are 
 tempted to it on that ground, shows a standard of 
 manhood that has depravity for its essence. 
 
 Profaneness can be of no possible use to him who 
 indulges in it, or to any one else. If it were not 
 wicked it would be simply superfluous and ridicu- 
 lous. As it is, it is, as Robert Hall said, in allusion 
 to feudal times, merely " a peppercorn rent to show 
 that a man belongs to the devil." So far from giv- 
 ing, as some suppose, assurance of the truth of what 
 is spoken in connection with it, it is the reverse. 
 All observation shows, mine certainly does, what 
 might have been inferred without it, that he who 
 will swear, will lie. Why not? The practice is 
 scarcely less oflFensive to a just taste than to a sen- 
 sitive conscience, and whoever may be guilty of it, 
 deserves to be not only condemned and abhorred, 
 but despised. 
 
CHAPTEB m. 
 
 PKATER. 
 
 The second gi-eat duty which we owe exclusively 
 to God is Prayer. 
 
 Literally, prayer is supplication, it is asking ; but 
 p^ jj as commonly used it includes all that we 
 
 worship. mean by worship. It includes in addition 
 to supplication, adoration, confession, and thanksgiv- 
 ing. To a being like man each of these would seem 
 to be the dictate of nature. What more reasonable 
 than adoration in view of an Infinite Majesty ? 
 Wliat more suitable than confession in view of guilt, 
 or than thanksgiving in view, not simply of good- 
 ness, but of mercy, and of a love unutterable? 
 What more natural than that the creature and 
 child, in view of his wants, should ask the Creator 
 and Owner of all, and his Father, to supply those 
 wants ? That each of these, excepting the last, is 
 not only suitable but a duty is generally conceded, 
 but that man should ask and that God should give 
 because of his asking, has seemed to many incom- 
 patible with the fixed order of nature, and with hia 
 infinite attributes. 
 
 By asking is here meant, not simply desire ex- 
 
PEATER 316 
 
 pressed, but paramount desire. There must be 
 a desire for the thing asked greater than Prayer is 
 for anything else that would be incom- deaiw. 
 patible with it. This is prayer, and nothing else is. 
 If a man may have either an estate or so much 
 money for the asking, but cannot have both, how- 
 ever much he may desire the estate he cannot 
 really ask for it, unless he desires it more than the 
 money. And so, whatever desire a man may have 
 of heaven, or of the presence with him of the Spirit 
 of God, yet if he have a stronger desire for any form 
 of worldly good, any form of expression that he 
 might use in the guise of prayer would not be ask- 
 ing. It would be hypocrisy to the omniscient eye. 
 It is only a paramount desire presented to God with 
 the submission becoming a creature, that is prayer, 
 and the question is whether, in consequence of such 
 prayer, man will receive what he would not with- 
 out it. 
 
 On this point the Bible expresses no doubt. 
 There is in that no recognition of the dif- jesamonr 
 Acuities raised by philosophy. It teaches »'">«»""» 
 us how to pray ; it commands and exhorts us to 
 pray ; it gives us examples in great number and 
 variety of direct answers to prayer ; it makes prayer 
 an essential element of a Christian life ; it says ex- 
 plicitly, " Ask and ye shall receive." It would be 
 impossible that the duty and efficacy of prayer 
 should be taught more clearly than they are in the 
 Bible. 
 
316 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 These teachings of the Bible are confirmed by 
 tlie analogy of our earthly life, and by the instinct 
 of the race. 
 
 From his infancy the child asks and receives. 
 Asking is one of the two legitimate ap- 
 pointed ways in which his wants are to be 
 supplied. For some things, and at some times, it is 
 the only way. It is just an expression of that de- 
 sire and dependence which are appropriate to the 
 relation of parent and child. Without recognized 
 dependence in the way of expressed desire on the 
 one hand, and an ability and willingness to supply 
 wants thus indicated on the other, the chief beauty 
 and significance of the parental relation would be 
 gone. Can it be then that we have a Father in 
 heaven, and yet that the very feature which gives 
 warmth and beauty and value to the earthly relation 
 should be wanting ? Without this the name would 
 lose, in its transference to God, its chief significance, 
 and Christ would not be the benefactor He is sup- 
 posed to have been in teaching the race to say, 
 " Our Father." 
 
 On this point too the instinct of the race has been 
 Voice of manifested unequivocally. Universally, or 
 Instinct. nearly so, when, as the Psalmist says, men 
 "draw near unto the gates of death," when " they 
 that go down to the sea in ships " " mount up to the 
 heaven," and " go down again to the depths," " and 
 are at their wits' end," " then they cry unto the 
 Lord in their trouble." Not only speculative ques- 
 
PRATER. 317 
 
 tioners of the efficacy of prayer, but professed athe- 
 ists have often been brought to extremities in which 
 this instinct has so asserted itself that they have 
 cried unto God. 
 
 It may also be doubted whether the highest bless- 
 ings can be received except on the condition of 
 asking. Health, rain, a prosperous journey, may 
 come to men whether they ask or not. But the 
 highest blessings are from the direct communion of 
 man with God. This is the great distinction of man, 
 that God himself may be his portion and good. To 
 be enjoyed, this blessing must be desired and sought 
 for, and it can be sought for only by asking. To 
 obtain the larger number of blessings we need, we 
 must not only ask, but put forth active exertion ; but 
 here the only active exertion possible is the asking. 
 Nor would it seem fit that God should bestow this 
 blessing on any other condition. Other things may 
 come alike to all, but it might have been anticipated, 
 even if He could do it otherwise, that God would 
 give his Holy Spirit, as a sanctifier and comforter, 
 only to those who siiould ask Him. 
 
 Not only from the Bible, then, but from the anal- 
 ogy of our earthly life, from our whole nature as 
 practical, and from its necessary relation to our 
 highest wants, should we infer the efficacy of asking. 
 
 The question then recurs whether, in objecaon 
 the light of a philosophy that apprehends ^"utobu- 
 immutable law and the infinite attributes '*y ""»■''• 
 of God, all this be not a mere seeming and delusion. 
 
318 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 To the efficacy of asking for the Holy Spirit, oi 
 for any direct agency of God upon our minds, there 
 can be no objection from the immutability of phys- 
 ical law, since that can have no relation to what is 
 done immediately by a personal being. From this 
 highest region and sphere of prayer, therefore, no 
 cavil about fixed law can debar us. Nor, on the 
 view of the immutability of law (the only correct 
 one), taken by the Duke of Argyle in his " Reign 
 of Law," can any valid objection lie against the effi- 
 cacy of asking, for example, for rain. " There are," 
 says he, "no phenomena visible to man of which 
 it is true to say that they are governed by any inva- 
 riable force. That which does govern them is 
 always some variable combination of invariable 
 forces. But this makes all the difference in reason- 
 ing on the relation of will to law — this is the one 
 essential distinction to be admitted and observed. 
 . In the only sense in which laws are 
 immutable, this immutability is the very charac- 
 teristic which makes them subject to guidance 
 through endless cycles of design. It is the very 
 certainty and invariableness of the laws of Nature," 
 — that is, of each individual law taken separately — 
 " which alone enables us to use them, and yoke them 
 to our service." If, as some suppose, man can cause 
 rain by the firing of cannon, then it may be obtained 
 by asking it even of him. In such a case there 
 would be simply a different adjustment of invariable 
 laws ; and if results may be thus produced to some 
 
PRATER. 319 
 
 extent by the intervention of human will without a 
 miracle, it cannot be irrational to suppose they may 
 be thus produced to any extent by the divine will. 
 The arrow shot at a venture that finds the joints of 
 the harness, is governed by ordinary laws. Nothing 
 but their nice adjustment is needed to carry it pre- 
 cisely there. The intervention of will is supposed, 
 but in no other relation to fixed law than that of the 
 human will when it causes ice by a freezing mix- 
 ture. This removes a difficulty which has weighed 
 heavily on many minds. 
 
 There remains the objection from the ohieotion 
 infinite attributes of God. SiZito *'° 
 
 As infinite in knowledge, God knows »'"^''"*™- 
 what we need before we ask Him. We can tell Him 
 nothing new. He also knows what events are to 
 be, therefore they cannot be changed. As infinite 
 in goodness, He will do for us what is best whether 
 we ask Him or not. 
 
 In obviating these difficulties, we may say — 
 
 1. That no one can read the speculations of such 
 men as Spinoza, Kant, Cousin, and Hamilton, upon 
 the Infinite, without feeling that they are dealing 
 with a subject which they do not fully grasp ; and 
 that it can never be wise to set the results of such 
 speculations in opposition to the practical principles 
 of our nature. The apparent contradictions result- 
 ing from these speculations were such that Kant 
 felt obliged to recognize or invent what he called a 
 Practical Reason, as the only basis of rational 
 conduct. 
 
820 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 2. The objection so makes God infinite as really 
 to limit Him, and virtually to deny his personality. 
 It makes it impossible for Him to be a Father, or 
 moral Governor. Prayer is an act of choice and 
 free will. So is murder. And if, because God is 
 infinite, and knows what is to be, and will do what 
 is best, it can make no difference with a man 
 whether he prays or not, for the same reason it can 
 make no difference whether he murders or not. It 
 will follow that God will do what He will do, with- 
 out reference to human conduct, which is subversive 
 of moral government, and a practical absurdity. If 
 we regard God as a person, and man also, the pos- 
 sibility of such direct intercourse as prayer involves 
 must be allowed ; nor can we conceive of a being, 
 especially of an Infinite Being, having fiilly the 
 attributes of personality, that is, being really God, 
 to whom It would be impossible to answer prayer. 
 Why not say that the immutable God immutably, 
 that is always, answers prayer ? The difficulty lies 
 in connecting personality with infinite attributes, 
 and those who deny that prayer may be efficaciouis, 
 really deny the personality and fatherhood of God. 
 
 It is to the fatherhood of God that we cling. To 
 that we turn with infinite relief, from those limitless 
 and dreary abstractions, which philosophy calls the 
 Infinite and the Absolute. Without that, we are 
 orphans : virtually, all is Fate. With that, nothing 
 can rationally prevent the child fi-om coming to the 
 Father, or even the sinner, when he sees evidence 
 
PRATER. 821 
 
 of placability, from coming " boldly unto the throne 
 of grace, that he may obtain mercy, and find grace 
 to help in time of need." 
 
 With this view of the nature and reasonableness 
 of prayer, it only remains to say that its •^gt^^m 
 fortn is of little consequence. Prayer is "' r^y"- 
 more than desire — more than sincere desire. It 
 is paramount desire offered to God with a filial 
 spirit. Of necessity this will be both reverent and 
 importunate. Such prayer, whether repeated from 
 memory, or read from a book, or, as would seem 
 most natural, uttered directly from the promptings 
 of the heart, is always heard. 
 
 21 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SABBATH. 
 
 The last duty to be considered is the keeping of 
 the Sabbath. 
 
 To man, originally, the Sabbath must have come 
 as a positive institution, since he could have seen 
 no reason for it, aside from the divine command. 
 It has since been commonly regarded as partly pos- 
 itive and partly moral. Now, however, as a reason 
 can be assigned for it, and even for the proportion 
 of time designated, it may be regarded as wholly 
 moral. 
 
 In considering the Sabbath, we shall first treat of 
 the Religious, and then of the Civil Sabbath. 
 
 By the Religious Sabbath, we mean a day set 
 apart by God himself for his own worship, and to 
 secure, in connection with that, the religious cul- 
 ture and final salvation of men. 
 
 By the Civil Sabbath, we mean a day made 
 " non-legal," in which public business shall be sus- 
 pended, and in which all labor and recreation shall 
 be so far restrained, that the ends of a religious Sab- 
 bath may be secured by those who wish it. 
 
THE SABBATH. 328 
 
 In treating of the religious Sabbath, we naturally 
 consider, first, its origin and history. 
 
 Concerning these, the points which the fiiends of 
 the Sabbath accept and regard as estabUshed are 
 the following : — 
 
 1. That the Sabbath was given to our first par- 
 ents in Eden, according to the account in Genesis 
 ii. 2, 3 ; and that it was intended for the race. 
 
 2. That we find unmistakable indications of the 
 Sabbath, both in the Scriptures and in heathen liter- 
 ature, between the original command and the giving 
 of the Law. 
 
 3. That when the Law was given, the command 
 to hallow the Sabbath was made conspicuous, as 
 one of the ten commandments. That it has the 
 same rank as the other commandments, all of which 
 are moral in their character, and universally binding. 
 
 4. That during the subsequent history of the 
 Jews the Sabbath is referred to by the prophets in 
 a way to show that they classed it with the other 
 commandments, and that they regarded its obser- 
 vance as intimately connected with the prosperity of 
 the nation. 
 
 6. That at the time of our Saviour the Sabbath 
 was observed with great strictness ; that the people 
 assembled regularly for public worship, and that 
 Moses and the prophets were read in the syna- 
 gogiifes every Sabbath-day. Also, that this worship 
 was attended by our Saviour, and that while He re- 
 proved the superstitious observances and over- 
 
324 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 scrupulousness that had crept in, He yet recognized 
 the Sabbath as a divine institution, and as " made 
 for man." 
 
 6. That after the resurrection of Christ the day 
 was changed, and that the Christian Sabbath, with 
 substantially the same ends, has been perpetuated 
 till the present time. 
 
 These points have been amply discussed by many 
 writers, and as they belong to history rather than 
 to philosophy, they will not be further noticed here. 
 We proceed to inquire what may be known of the 
 origin of the Sabbath, from the character and condi- 
 tion of man. 
 
 And here we observe that the religious Sabbath 
 authenticates itself as from God. This it does in 
 various ways. 
 
 1. Regarding man as sinful, taking him as we 
 now find him in every country where the Sabbath 
 is unknown, the very conception of a holy Sabbath 
 would have been impossible. There could have been 
 nothing within him or without him to suggest it. 
 
 2. Regarding men as selfish, the rich and the 
 powerful would never have originated an institution, 
 or consented to it, which would not only free laborers 
 and dependents and slaves from labor one seventh 
 of the time, but would require that time for the 
 service of another. 
 
 3. As the Sabbath corresponds with no cycle or 
 natural division of time, it must have been impos- 
 sible for any man, or number of men, to single out 
 
THE SABBATH. 826 
 
 one day, and set it apart authoritatively. Man could 
 neither have decided rightly the proportion of time 
 to be set apart, nor have guarded the sanctity of 
 the day by penalties. If the division of time into 
 weeks were wholly unknown, it would be impossible 
 that it should be introduced by man. 
 
 4. Man could not have so associated the Sabbath 
 with the grandest ideas made known by revelation, 
 or possible to thought, as the creation of the world, 
 the resurrection of Christ, the outpouring of the 
 Spirit, and the rest of a holy heaven. He could 
 not have made it span the arch from the beginning 
 till the consummation of all things. 
 
 5. The Sabbath authenticates its divine origin 
 not only as it thus blends with the highest ideas and 
 interests of man, as connected with the past and the 
 future, but by its analogy with the works of God as 
 simple, and at the same time touching the interests 
 of the present life at so many points. In this it is 
 like the air and the water, which seem so simple, 
 yet subserve so many uses. 
 
 As thus impossible to have been originated by 
 man, as connected with the creation of the world, 
 with the resurrection of Christ, with the outpouring 
 of the Spirit, and with the rest of heaven ; being 
 analogous to nature, and promoting every interest 
 of time, we say that the religious Sabbath comes to 
 man bearing its own credentials as from God. 
 
 From the origin of the Sabbath we TheSabiwa 
 turn to its necessity for man. for man. 
 
 I. Of its necessity for man as an individual. 
 
326 MORAi SCIENCE. 
 
 Of this the first ground is the necessity man is in 
 For reugions °f religious instruction. The religion of 
 
 toBtraction. jj^g gj^g Jg jj^j. g^ f^j^ ^j^^^ (.a„ i,q gone 
 
 through with mechanically, or a superstition that 
 can he inherited, or imposed upon ignorance. It is 
 a religion of light. This is its glory. But rational 
 ideas of God and of his worship, and of the duty 
 and destiny of man as a religious being, can no more 
 be reached without instruction than similar ideas of 
 civil society. Upon such instruction the Bible in- 
 sists, both in the Old Testament and in the New, 
 and for this, if it is to be made general, the Sabbath 
 is indispensable. 
 
 But it is not simply instruction that man needs. 
 Eorpereua- ^^ uceds pcrsuasion. Indifference and 
 ^o"- aversion are to be overcome. Men are 
 
 tempted to forget God, to neglect prayer, and make 
 light of accountability. They are tempted to live, 
 and most men do live, for this world alone. Here 
 is the great need of a Sabbath. There is need of 
 time and opportunity to persuade men ; to go, if need 
 be, " into the highways and the hedges, and compel 
 them to come in." 
 
 But again, if we suppose an individual intelli- 
 For culture g^^^ly rcligious, the Sabbath would be 
 and growth, needed for his culture and growth. Were 
 men open every day to the calls of society, and sub- 
 ject to the pressure of competition in business, the 
 tide of worldhness would become resistless. The 
 Sabbath brings the world to a solemn pause, aa 
 
THE SABBATH. 327 
 
 under the eye of God. It enables man to subordi- 
 nate sense to faith, and hfts him up to the power of 
 Hving for the unseen and the future. 
 
 Again, man cannot reach his end as isolated. 
 He is social, and needs public and social jor social 
 worship, as well as instruction, and for •"*'■ 
 these the Sabbath is indispensable. The Sabbath, 
 the pulpit, the Sabbath-school, and the social meet- 
 ings appointed on the Sabbath and revolving about 
 it, are inseparable. Withdraw these, and it is 
 doubtful whether the Church itself would survive. 
 The pulpit, in connection with the Sabbath, is the 
 only institution ever established on earth for the 
 general diffusion of religious instruction, and for 
 securing a form of social worship that should bring 
 all men together in equality and brotherhood before 
 God. 
 
 II. The Sabbath is needed not only for the indi- 
 vidual, but for the family. 
 
 The Sabbath and the family were instituted in 
 Paradise — these only, and they natu- j.^, ,,,, 
 rally support each other. Where there is S^J^J"" 
 no Sabbath, the domestic relations are not *'""y- 
 held sacred, and where the domestic relations are 
 not held sacred, there is no Sabbath. Let but 
 these two institutions, the family and the religious 
 Sabbath, be sustained in their integrity, and every 
 interest of the individual and of the iamily will be 
 Bocured. 
 
 III. The Sabbath is essential to the state, if free 
 government is to be maintained. 
 
328 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 No people ever have been, or ever can be, raised 
 to a point of knowledge and virtue that would en- 
 ' able them to maintain permanently a free govern- 
 ment, that is, self-government, without that circle of 
 agencies of which the Sabbath is an essential part. 
 
 Without the Sabbath and the Bible there has 
 The Sabbath been no such difiusion of kno'vsfledge 
 goTernment. among a wholc peoplc as would qualify 
 them for liberty. It was among those who most 
 highly esteemed the religious Sabbath, and were 
 persecuted for maintaining it, that the idea of edu- 
 cating the whole people first arose and was made 
 eflScient. The idea had its germ in that estimate of 
 man as man, which underlies the whole system of re- 
 ligion of which the Bible and the Sabbath are a part. 
 
 But knowledge is not sufficient for freedom. 
 There must also be virtue, principle, and a right 
 social state. Outward forms and amenities must 
 spring from good will, and love as a law must be 
 applied in the relations of life as it never has been, 
 or can be without the Sabbath and its teachings.-' 
 
 IV. We next observe, that man needs the Sab- 
 
 1 As the capacity of man for ftee government is now on trial, and 
 especially in this country, this point is of special interest to the patriot 
 as well as to the Christian, and has attracted no little attention. Two 
 years since, at the request of the New Tork.Sabbath Committee, a 
 paper was read by me before the National Sabbath Convention, held at 
 Saratoga, in which it was maintained: — 
 
 1. " That a religious observance of the Sabbath would secure the 
 permanence of free institutions." 
 
 2. " That without the Sabbath religiously observed the permanenot 
 of free institutions cannot be secured; " and — 
 
THE SABBATH. 329 
 
 bath as a physical being, and not he alone, but the 
 animals that are subjected to labor by him. It is 
 worthy of notice that cattle are especially mentioned 
 in the fourth commandment. 
 
 If this be so, it is a fact of high import, not only as 
 showing the wide relations of the Sabbath, but the 
 subordination of physical to moral ideas in the whole 
 structure of the present system. 
 
 The question is, Will man and animals do more 
 work, do it better, have better health, and pij-gj^j 
 live longer by laboring six days and rest- 5,^^,,*^ 
 ing the seventh, than by laboring seven 8»'''"'"»- 
 days in the week? This question can be decided 
 only by facts, and by a wide and care&l induction. 
 
 On this point extensive observations have been 
 made by cautious men, and facts like the following 
 are stated : " The experiment was tried on a hun- 
 dred and twenty horses. They were employed for 
 years seven days in a week. But they became un- 
 healthy, and finally died so fast that the owner 
 thought it too expensive, and put them on a six 
 days' arrangement. After this he was not obliged 
 to replenish them one fourth as often as before. 
 Instead of sinking continually, his horses came up 
 again, and lived years longer than they could have 
 
 3. " That the civil as based on the leligioas Sabbath is an institntioD 
 to which society has a natural right, precisely as it has to property." 
 
 These propositions, it is believed, can be established, and if so th« 
 Sabbath mast be from God. 
 
 The paper referred to having been published by the Sabbath Com- 
 mittee and extensively circulated, it is, perhaps, sufficient to refer to it 
 here. 
 
330 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 done on the other plan." Nnmerous cases of this 
 kind are stated by Dr. Justin Edwards in his " Sab- 
 bath Manual." 
 
 A friend writes me that when the extensive stable 
 of the 3d Avenue Railroad, in New York, was com- 
 pleted, he was invited to inspect it ; and noticing that 
 the stables were arranged in groups of seven, he 
 found on inquiry " that the object was to have a 
 gang or team of horses together ; that each car re- 
 quired three pair of horses per day, each pair going 
 about twenty-four miles ; but that this was not 
 enough, for that a horse, no matter how well fed 
 and cared for, required rest, and that the only way 
 to give it to him and still keep the car running was 
 to have an odd horse which should come in and take 
 his turn at the work." This gave each horse a 
 seventh part of the time for rest. " It had been 
 tried, the superintendent said, with less, and with 
 more, but that it took just about seven horses to run 
 the car all the time." My friend adds : " This re- 
 sult had apparently been reached through pure 
 experience, but however reached, it had not been 
 founded upon any Scriptural reason ; and I have no 
 doubt but that the superintendent and directors were 
 entirely unconscious of the fact that they were fol- 
 lowing a divine precept." 
 
 In view of facts like the above, Dr. Edwards felt 
 authorized to say of laboring animals that " when 
 employed but six days in a week, and allowed to 
 rest one, they are more healthy than they can be 
 
THE SABBATH. 331 
 
 when employed during the whole seven. They do 
 more work, and live longer." 
 
 And what is true of animals is true of man. 
 From extensive inquiries, from reports made by 
 government commissioners, and from the opinion of 
 many scientific physicians, Dr. Edwards concludes 
 that "men who labor six days in a week, and rest 
 one, can do more work in all kinds of business, in 
 all parts of the world, and do it in a better manner 
 than those who labor seven." Also, "that it is 
 now settled by facts that the observance of the 
 Sabbath is required by a natural law, and that were 
 man nothing more than an animal it would be for 
 his interest to observe the Sabbath." ^ 
 
 The above refers to physical labor ; but as the 
 power of vigorous and persistent mental The mental 
 
 5^ Pill- po'®™ nwi 
 
 labor depends on the state of the body, it » Sabbath. 
 will follow that more such labor can be done, and 
 better done by those who keep the Sabbath, than by 
 those who do not. This is confirmed by facts, 
 beginning with the testimony of Sir Matthew Hale, 
 which seems to have first called attention to the 
 subject. He said : " If I had at any time bor- 
 rowed from this day any time for my secular em- 
 ployment I found that it did further me less than if 
 I had let it alone, and therefore, when some years' 
 experience, upon a most attentive and vigilant 
 observation, had given me this instruction, I grew 
 peremptorily resolved never in this kind to make a 
 1 See Sab. Doc. No. 1, p. 41. 
 
832 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 breach upon the Lord's day, which I have now 
 strictly observed for more than thirty years." On 
 this point more recent testimony is abundant, but 
 need not be added. 
 
 The views above presented rest on their own 
 basis, though they could never have been reached 
 without revelation, and they justify us in calKng 
 special attention to the saying of our Saviour, that 
 " the Sabbath was made for man." Viewing him 
 in whatever aspect, whether as a physical, an in- 
 tellectual, or a moral and religious being ; whether 
 in his domestic, his social, or his civil relations, we 
 see that the Sabbath is an integral and essential 
 part of the divine arrangement for his training and 
 well-being. 
 
 If the preceding views are correct, and also the 
 Man's right doctrine of rights already considered, it 
 Sabbath. will follow that man has a right to the 
 civil Sabbath, on the same ground that he has a 
 right to property, or to anything else ) and that it 
 belongs to legislation to secure him in the enjoy- 
 ment of that right. 
 
 Rights are from the necessity of those things to 
 which man has a right, to secure the various ends 
 indicated by the active principles of his constitution, 
 and they vary in importance and sacredness accord- 
 ing to the importance and sacredness of the end. 
 But the highest end of man is a rehgiously social 
 end. His most sacred right must therefore be to 
 the requisites and conditions for attaining that end, 
 
THE SABBATH. 333 
 
 and he will have a right to demand of society what- 
 ever legislation may be required for that. The 
 civil society which does not afford to every man the 
 most favorable conditions for the attainment of the 
 ends for which God made him, needs modification, 
 and if it would render such attainment impossible, 
 it needs reconstruction. 
 
 In saying the above we disclaim any purpose to 
 make men moral or religious by legislation, or to 
 interfere with any liberty that would not trench 
 upon rights. Give us our rights, give us the still- 
 ness and quiet needed for the religious impression 
 of the Sabbath, for the instruction of families, and 
 for public worship, and we are content. To these, 
 as needed for the attainment of our highest ends, we 
 have a right. 
 
 " It may also be said that society, as being from 
 God, has a natural right to anything necessary to 
 secure its own ends. If, therefore, it can be shown, 
 as it can be, and has been, that those ends cannot 
 be secured without the Sabbath, then society has, 
 on this ground also, a right to legislate in favor of 
 the civil Sabbath." ^ 
 
 It only remains to speak of the manner in which 
 the Sabbath should be kept. 
 
 How the Sabbath must be kept must Manner of 
 be determined in part from its origin, but dete^ed 
 chiefly from its end. y i en • 
 
 A.S associated with great and joyftil events in the 
 
 1 See Sabbath and Free ItutUutions, p. IT. 
 
334 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 past, the Sabbath is of the nature of a festival, aii6 
 should be a day of joy. As calling us to cease from 
 the toil imposed by the primeval curse, and to lay 
 aside its soiled garments, the Sabbath is a day of 
 release and of refreshment. As pointing to a rest 
 of holy activity, in which the curse of toil shall be 
 wholly lifted from us, the Sabbath is a day of de- 
 lightful anticipation, and of earnest preparation. 
 To one acquainted with its origin, and sympathizing 
 with its end, the whole tone and aspect of the day 
 must be bright, and its spirit free ; but, as has been 
 said, the manner of keeping the day, its duties and 
 employments, must be mainly determined by its 
 end. 
 
 Is the end of the Sabbath physical ? Then it is 
 to be spent in physical culture. Is it intellectual ? 
 Then the schools, and lyceums, and libraries should 
 be opened and thronged. Is the end sesthetic? 
 Then we are to listen to fine music, and view works 
 of art. Is it social ? Then we are to make calls, 
 and attend dinner parties. Is the end communion 
 with nature, or with the God of nature, distinc- 
 tively ? Then we are to walk in the fields and 
 woods, and go on excursions. Is the end of the 
 Sabbath religious? Then it is to be kept holy. 
 Then are we to bring ourselves by every method of 
 his appointment, into immediate and conscious re- 
 lation to God as a holy God, and our end will be 
 the promotion of holiness in ourselves and others. 
 This is the end designated by God, the only worthy 
 
THE SABBATH. 385 
 
 end, the only end, even, in connection with which 
 any other can he fiilly secured. 
 
 But while the above is the end, it does not follow 
 that it is the only end ; for here, as else- Higher &nd 
 where, we find higher and lower ends, i"""™**- 
 and here, too, the law of limitation holds. Every 
 lower good may be promoted, and should be, but 
 only so far as it is a condition for one that is higher. 
 Holiness is the supreme end. So far as that wUl be 
 promoted by physical rest and " bodily exercise," 
 by study, or art, or social intercourse, or commun- 
 ion with nature, these will be in place, but no further. 
 " The Sabbath was made for man," and whatever 
 labor or service his good may require us to perform 
 on that day, we are to do — all works of necessity and 
 mercy. But we are to remember that it was made 
 for man especially as a religious being, and as his 
 great need is conformity to God, if the Sabbath be 
 not so kept as to promote that, it fails of its chief 
 end. It fails to be properly a Sabbath. But let it 
 be kept so as to promote this end, and every inferior 
 good will follow. There will be physical rest. There 
 will be that study of the Word of God and that 
 meditation which give light and depth to the intel- 
 lect. There will be sacred song, with so much of 
 art as higher ends may demand or permit. There 
 will be that family worship which hallows the home, 
 and that public and social worship which at once 
 humbles and exalts men, and brings them together 
 as one family before God. Man will have sympathy 
 
836 MOBAL aCIENCE. 
 
 with nature, not merely as expressing the natura 
 attributes of God, but as the basis and frame-work, 
 and in some of its aspects, the silent prophecy of a 
 higher moral and Christian system. All this he 
 will have under the law of limitation, and in addi- 
 tion, the limitless good that comes from conformity 
 to God, and direct communication with Him. 
 
 Such a law of the Sabbath is as precise as can be 
 given and not keep men children, or make them 
 machines. It avoids all precisionism, allowing each 
 one to decide for himself, whether or not he may 
 pluck the ears of corn as he passes through the field, 
 and rub them with his hands. 
 
 The requirement to keep the Sabbath holy places 
 HoUness i* '^^ * peculiar position, as making holi- 
 SrighToii^' ^^^^ necessary to the right keeping of it. 
 Berrance. j^ jg sclf-evideut that the religious Sabbath 
 must be kept religiously, and that only a relig- 
 ious man can do that. Here is the great difficulty 
 with the Sabbath ; but it is only the same as with 
 the service of God in any form. " Ye cannot," said 
 Joshua to the Israelites of old, " serve the Lord, for 
 He is a holy God." The very reason why they 
 should do it was the reason why they could not. 
 The faculties can act with alacrity only with ref- 
 erence to a congenial end. Let a man " hunger 
 and thirst after righteousness," and all opportunities 
 and means of attaining it wUl be welcomed and im- 
 proved. This alone can free the Sabbath from that 
 impression of negation and vacuity and i:est>:aint. 
 
THE SABBATH. 887 
 
 which they must feel who are brought up to keep 
 it strictly, but have no sympathy with its ends as 
 religious. Restrained by conscience or by custom 
 from employments and pleasures that are congenial, 
 and with no taste for the proper business and enjoy- 
 ments of the day, it will be " a weariness," and they 
 will say, as was said by men similarly' situated three 
 thousand years ago, and has been ever since, " When 
 will the Sabbath be gone, that we may set forth 
 wheat ? " For this irksomeness of the Sabbath 
 there are but three possible remedies. One is that 
 God should change his law ; one that men should 
 obey it ; and the third, that they should disregard 
 and pervert it by spending the day in business or 
 pleasure. 
 
 The observance of the Sabbath has been supposed 
 to be peculiarly a guard against crime. ^^ 
 It is so because it is more purely than any- ™'\^"* 
 thing else a test of regard to the authority ''"™- 
 of God. As no time is intrinsically holy, and 
 nothing but the command of God can make it so, 
 the observance of a specified time on that ground is 
 almost sure to be connected with the fear of God in 
 other things. Hence, of 1232 convicts in Auburn 
 State prison, only 26 had conscientiously kept the 
 Sabbath ; and of 203 who were committed in one 
 year, only two had conscientiously done so. For 
 the same reason, desecration of the Sabbath is often 
 the beginning of a course of vice and crime. As of 
 old with the Israelites, the Sabbath seems to be set 
 
 22 
 
338 MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 as a sign between God and men, and when they dis- 
 regard that, all fear of Him departs. It is, there- 
 fore, ominous of every form of evil when a young 
 person begins to disregard the Sabbath. Tell me 
 how the Sabbath is spent, and I will give you a 
 moral history of the rest of the week. 
 
 It has also been supposed that something of dis- 
 ProTidence criminatiou, enough to show which side 
 Sabbath. Qod is ou, may be discerned in special 
 evils which follow Sabbath desecration. It is said 
 by careful observers, and confirmed by striking 
 facts, that those who seek to obtain their own ends, 
 whether of business or pleasure, by appropriating 
 God's time for them, often find themselves strangely 
 thwarted, sometimes by seeming accidents and sud- 
 den events, and sometimes in the long lines of God's 
 providence. This may well be, for if the law of 
 the Sabbath be the law of God, we may be sure 
 that there is no such infiexibility of natural forces 
 that they cannot be brought to conspire with it, and 
 that in some way it will ultimately vindicate itself. 
 " Who hath hardened himself against Him, and 
 prospered ? " 
 
 The religious Sabbath has been dwelt upon thus 
 at length, from the conviction that it is 
 
 Conclusion. .,.,..,,. in-. 
 
 Vital to individual piety, to the family, and 
 to our free institutions ; and also that it can be sus- 
 tained only by a clear apprehension of its grounds, 
 and by vigilance and struggle. To a perverted 
 Sabbath, a day of amusement, spectacles, idleness, 
 
THE SABBATH. 339 
 
 and consequent vice and degradation ; despotism, in- 
 fidelity, and formalism have no objection. Sucli a 
 day is their surest means of undermining everything 
 opposed to them. It is the temple of God become 
 a den of thieves. It is a holy Sabbath that is the 
 point of their common attack, and this it is that the 
 friends of an enlightened Christianity, and of free 
 institutions, are called upon to sustain. 
 
 The fourth and the fifth commandments stand 
 together in the centre of the Decalogue ; and as it 
 is through these that there is a connection between 
 the two tables of the divine Law, so it is through 
 the Sabbath that a divine influence passes into the 
 family, and through that into society. This is the 
 divine order — the Sabbath and the family mutu- 
 ally supporting each other ; and God, through 
 them, working out a perfect society. It remains 
 to the Christian and the patriot to accept this order, 
 and w ork together with Him. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 Having reached this point, it may be serviceable to 
 some if, as I was urgently requested, I indicate the 
 method in which the processes we have gone over were 
 presented on the blackboard. 
 
 The first word taken was " Law." It being pre- 
 sumed that each hearer had some notion in his mind 
 corresponding to the word, the audience were requested 
 to make that notion definite, and to state to themselves 
 what must have been in their minds before they could 
 have had it. The word was then written in front of a 
 vertical line, and each one requested to think what must 
 have lain back of it, and proximate to it. When the 
 first word had been fixed on, the next was sought, and 
 so on, till the process was completed. When this was 
 done the order was as in the text, but the numbers 
 were reversed. Thus — 
 
 4 3 3 11 
 
 Being. Force. Uniformity. An End. ; ^^'^• 
 
 It was then read backwards, thus ; Being, originating 
 force, uniformly, so as to accomplish an intelligible end, 
 gives us the conception of law. 
 
 This applies to physical law, though even with refer- 
 ence to that all might not be agreed. That, however, 
 is of no consequence here, the object being simply to 
 show the method. After Law, Moral Law and Obli- 
 gation were investigated in the same way, though the 
 process was much more extended. Attention was thus 
 concentrated, and ideas and their relations were made 
 more definite. It is obvious that the method admits of 
 wide application. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 To show to the eye how inclusive the word " Love " 
 is, as ordinarily used, the following scheme was placed 
 on the blackboard. In this as in all cases of develop- 
 ment, the word is placed on the left side of the line. 
 
 UlT«Of 
 
 Complacency, or com- ) Spontaneous 
 placent Love. ) after choice. 
 
 i Rational. 
 Good in itself. 
 
 f Natoial Affections. 
 
 Ooi. 
 
 Oar Neighbor. 
 
 Self. 
 
 Brothers, etc. 
 
 Children. 
 
 Parents. 
 
 Esteem. 
 
 Power. 
 
 Knowledge. 
 
 Property. 
 
 Ufe. 
 
 food uul Drink. | Appetites. 
 
 Spontaneoni 
 befoiv chdee. 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 HOPKINS'S "LAW OF LOVE AND LOVE ASA LAW.' 
 
 BT THE REV. JAMES MOCOSH, LL. D., D. D. 
 
 In the summer of 1866 I found myself wandering 
 among the limbs of the Green Mountains, and it oc- 
 curred to me that I ought to find my way to Williams- 
 town and its college. One end I had in view was to 
 see more of the grand scenery — the lovely forests and 
 towering mountains, by which the region is character- 
 ized. I was certainly not disappointed in the situation 
 of the town. It is placed on a knoll in the heart of a 
 capacious hollow, surrounded with imposing mountains. 
 It struck me as a spot at which the Last Judgment 
 might be held, with the universe assembled on the 
 slopes of the encircling hills. But I had another object 
 on which I had set my heart still more earnestly, and 
 this was to make the acquaintance of the President of 
 the college, whose works I had read in my own country, 
 and whose character I had been led to revere by the 
 accounts given me by those who knew him intimately. 
 And if I was not disappointed with the scenery, I was 
 still less so with Dr. Hopkins, whom I found a man 
 stalwart and elevated like the mountains among which 
 he lives and muses, and yet adorned withal with graces 
 as lovely as the foliage of the spruce hemlock which 
 there clothes the scenery. Since that time I ever place 
 him before me, in imagination, seated under a tree in 
 the heart of the mountains, pondering some deep theme, 
 seeking light for himself, and wishing to impart it to 
 others. 
 
344 APPENDIX C. 
 
 In the book before us he has given us the result of 
 his thoughts on no lower a subject than Law and Love 
 and the relation between them. And surely these two 
 must be intimately connected, and this whether we are 
 able to express it in categorical form or not. There 
 can be no moral excellence wiihout love ; but just as 
 little can there be without a rule, without obligation. 
 The two seem to be inseparably joined in the nature of 
 things, as they certainly are in the revelation which 
 God has given of duty in the Word, — " For this is the 
 sum of the Ten Commandments, to love the Lord thy 
 God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy 
 strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as 
 thyself." 
 
 Jonathan Edwards used to ponder this profound sub- 
 ject. Francis Hutcheson, the founder of the Scottish 
 School of Philosophy, had labored to prove that virtue 
 consists in benevolence. Edwards saw the defect of this 
 theory, as omitting love to God and justice, which are 
 virtues quite as much as benevolence. So amending the 
 theory of Hutcheson, Edwards makes the bold attempt 
 to resolve all virtue into love, in love to being as being, 
 and. distributed to beings as they have claims upon us. 
 But, with all his acuteness, he failed to see that in this 
 resolution he had unwittingly introduced another idea 
 besides love — that of claim or ohligation — the claim 
 of being as being, the separate claims of different beings, 
 say of God, of father and mother, of husband and wife, 
 of brothers and sisters, of rulers and subjects, of friends 
 and foes. That being has claims upon us — that dif- 
 ferent beings, such as God and our neighbors, have 
 separate claims upon us, — this turns out to be an ulti- 
 mate truth, which cannot be resolved into anything 
 inferior to itself. Why ought I to love my fellow-men ? 
 Why ought I to love God, and to love him more than 
 
APPENDIX C. 345 
 
 I love even my fellow-men ? To us, whatever there 
 may be to higher intelligences, there can be no answer 
 bnt one, and that is, that I ought to do so. And if 
 any one puts the other question, How do I come to 
 know this ? there is but one answer, and this is, that 
 it is self-evident. And this leads me to remark that 
 there is a great defect in the prevailing doctrine of our 
 day among metaphysicians — a doctrine introduced by 
 Kant into Germany and by Sir W. Hamilton among 
 English-speaking nations — as to what are the proper 
 tests of first truths : these are represented as necessity 
 and universality. The primary mark of first truths was 
 seized by Locke with his usual sagacity : it is self-evi- 
 dence. We regard God as having a claim upon our 
 love, not because we are necessitated to love him, or 
 because all men love him, but because it is right, and 
 men see it to be so at once ; and it is because they 
 see it to be so that the necessity and universality arise. 
 Edwards has succeeded in showing that love is an essen- 
 tial element in virtue ; but he has not succeeded in 
 proving that to us there is no other element. In par- 
 ticular, there is a binding obligation to love God and 
 man, and not only so, but to discountenance and punish 
 sin and to countenance and encourage moral excellence. 
 
 And now we find a thinker of this century, and liv- 
 ing in much the same parts, trying to solve the same 
 problem of the relation of law to love, and love to law, 
 and thinking he has solved it. The following is his 
 noble language : ^ — 
 
 " Law and love ! These are the two mightiest forces 
 in the universe, and thus do we marry them. The 
 place of the nuptials is in the innermost sanctuary of 
 the soul. As in all right marriage, there is both con- 
 trariety and deep harmony. Law is stern, majestic, and 
 the fountain of all order. Love is mild, winning, the 
 1 Page 108. 
 
346 APPENDIX C. 
 
 fountain of all rational spontaneity — that is, of the 
 Bpontaneity that follows rational choice. Love without 
 law is capricious, weak, mischievous : opposed to law it 
 is wicked. Law without love is unlovely. The highest 
 harmony of the universe is in the love of a rational 
 being that is coincident with the law of that being 
 rationally affirmed ; and the deepest possible jar and 
 discord is from the love, persistent and utter, of such a 
 being in opposition to his law. It is because there is in 
 the Divine Being this harmony of law with love that 
 He is perfect." 
 
 It is a curious circumstance that Dr. Hopkins does 
 not examine, or even refer to the attempt made by Ed- 
 wards. Indeed it is one of the peculiarities of our 
 author — under one aspect an excellence, under another 
 a defect — that, like Edwards, he is largely a " self-con- 
 tained" thinker. The reading of the one, as of the 
 other, seems confined, and confined to rather common- 
 place works. This circumstance imparts a freshness and 
 an independence to their thinking, but at times it keeps 
 them from seeing certain aspects of their theme which 
 others have noticed and brought out to view. 
 
 Dr. Hopkins, as every one who knows his spirit 
 would expect, has a great aversion to ancient Epicure- 
 anism and modern Utilitarianism. He speaks with 
 great contempt of " the sty of Epicurus," " the dirt phi- 
 losophy" and "the bread and butter philosophy." On 
 the other hand, he is not prepared to give his adherence 
 to the counter doctrine of intuitive morals. Avoiding, 
 as he reckons, the errors of both extremes, he is striving 
 to construct a theory of his own, and he defends it with 
 able arguments and acute distinctions. I am not sure 
 whether he has been successful any more than Edwards 
 was in a like attempt. WhOe evidently and strongly 
 aiming at something higher, I fear that, without meaning 
 
APPENDIX C. 347 
 
 It, he has landed himself logically in Eudaimonism, or in 
 making enjoyment the supreme end of man and of 
 virtue. 
 
 He admits fully that there is in the mind of man 
 original and fundamental ideas : " I am one of those 
 who believe that there are simple and ultimate ideas." ^ 
 He gives existence as an example : " That of existence, 
 or being, is one. All men have, and must have, an 
 idea of something, of themselves as existing." But 
 then he will not allow that an idea, which seems to 
 me to be as much entitled to be regarded as simple 
 and original as any other we could name, is of that 
 description. I refer to our idea of Right. He insists 
 that there is, that there must be, an ultimate end to 
 which everything else is subordinate. But he denies 
 that doing right, as right, can be that end. What, then, 
 is the ultimate end, according to Dr. Hopkins ? It 
 comes, in the end, to be a " form of enjoyment or satis- 
 faction." He says it is " the good." But what is the 
 good ? The following is his answer : " An objective 
 good is anything so correlated to a conscious being as to 
 produce subjective good. Subjective good is some form 
 of enjoyment or satisfaction in the consciousness." He 
 tells us that " strictly there is no good that is not sub- 
 jective." ^ This is explicit enough. Commonly he speaks 
 of the ultimate end in virtuous conduct as being " the 
 good " or " well being." But then the phrases " good " 
 and " well being " are ambiguous ; they may mean 
 pleasure, or they may mean moral good and moral 
 well being. I am not sure whether Dr. Hopkins is 
 not kept at times, by the amphiboly of these phrases, 
 from seeing the full consequences of his theory. Let 
 him, or let his readers, substitute " some form of enjoy- 
 ment or satisfaction in the consciousness " for " good " 
 and " well being," and what the precise doctrine is, and 
 1 Page 20. 2 Page 51 
 
348 APPENDIX C. 
 
 must be, will at once become patent. He tells ua 
 again and again : " It is an affirmation, through the 
 moral reason, of obligation to choose the supreme end 
 for which God made us — that is, to choose the good 
 of all beings capable of good, our own included, and put 
 forth all those volitions which may be required to attain 
 or secure that good." ^ This sounds well, and is in entire 
 accordance with the impression which Dr. Hopkins means 
 to leave. But substitute for " good " " some form of 
 enjoyment or satisfaction in the consciousness," and it 
 comes to this, logically — that the supreme end of man 
 is to choose the enjoyment of all, including, so far as I 
 see, the enjoyment of the Supreme Being. 
 
 He is careful to explain, in thus speaking of good as 
 " some form of enjoyment or satisfaction," that he does 
 not mean our own good, but " that of all conscious 
 beings." But whether he means it or no, whether he 
 wishes it or no, whether he sees it or no, this is in the 
 end the utilitarian or "greatest happiness principle." 
 This is the logical consequence, and if not drawn by 
 himself it will be drawn by othei's ; and the history of 
 philosophy and theology shows that what follows log- 
 ically will, in fact, follow chronologically, when the sys- 
 tem has had time to work and show its effects. 
 
 And, after all, Dr. Hopkins cannot get rid of an ulti- 
 mate principle of i-ight. For why am I or any other 
 man required to look after the good ? — meaning the en- 
 joyment of all conscious beings — is the question that 
 ever comes up. Why am I bound to look after any 
 one's enjoyment but my own ? The answer to this 
 question by such a man as Dr. Hopkins must be, Because 
 it is right, which right is discovered by the moral reason, 
 and is an ultimate idea and an ultimate end. Right 
 thus comes, like love, to be an end in itself, inferior to 
 no other, subordinated to no other. 
 1 Page 99. 
 
APPENDIX C. 349 
 
 He cannot avoid this conclusion by the distinctions 
 which he draws. He tells us '' that holiness is not a 
 means of happiness but the cause," and " that a cause 
 we always conceive of as higher than its effects,'' and 
 gives, as an illustration, " God as a cause is higher than 
 the universe." True, God as a cause is higher than 
 any creature effect, or, we may add, any creature cause. 
 But as to creature causes and effects, 1 am not sure 
 that the cause is always higher thun its effects. These 
 late discussions as to the nature of causation have 
 shown that all physical causes are composed of more 
 than one agent, and tliat all effects are capable of be- 
 coming causes which may or may not be greater than 
 the effects. I am not sure that the causes which led to 
 the abolition of slavery in the United States were higher 
 than the effect — the abolition of slavery. But grant- 
 ing his doctrine to be true, that holiness is greater than 
 happiness because it is the cause of happiness (it is 
 sometimes, also, in our world the cause of suffering), 
 then it surely follows that holiness, which is the higher, 
 and not happiness, ought to be the ultimate end. 
 
 The following is evidently the difficulty which Dr. 
 Hopkins feels in making right the end of moral action : 
 " It is plain that the quality of an action can never be 
 the ground of an obligation to do that action." " Think 
 of a man's doing good to another, not from good will, 
 but for the sake of the Tightness of his own act. Think 
 of his loving God for the same reason. Certainly, if 
 we regard right as the quality of an action, no man can 
 be under an obligation to do an act morally right for 
 which there is not a reason besides its being right, 
 and on the ground of which it is right." ^ This is 
 pointedly put. But it is possible to meet it. The 
 difficulty arises from a confusion of idea into which we 
 are apt to fall when we think or speak of ultimate 
 1 Pages 18, 19. 
 
350 APPENDIX C. 
 
 Ideas or ends. We talk of them as having a reason, 
 but then we are apt to forget that this reason is not out 
 of themselves but in themselves. It, lies in the objects 
 contemplated, and is seen to be so by the ba^-e contem- 
 plation of the objects, that is by self-evidence, which is 
 the primary mark of intuitive truth. All that passes 
 under the name of love is not virtuous. Certainly our 
 love is not always virtuous when we contemplate some 
 form of enjoyment or satisfaction to ourselves or others. 
 But when we love God and our fellow-men in a truly 
 virtuous manner, we feel that love, that this love, is due 
 to them. In this, as in all cases of moral excellence, 
 the ought, the due, the obligation, comes in along with 
 love, and is an ultimate end inferior to no other. 
 
 Dr. Hopkins sees that utilitarianism has a truth in it. 
 The truth lies in this, that we are bound by ultimate 
 moral principle to promote the happiness of mankind. 
 Or, to give a deeper and juster account, we are bound 
 not only to do good to all conscious beings, we are 
 bound to love them. Viewed under this aspect, the 
 principle of virtue is not beneficence, but love. Had 
 Dr. Hopkins, with his clinching power and high moral 
 aims, brought out these two truths more fully than intui- 
 tive moralists have done, he would have done essential 
 service to ethical science, which has sometimes given 
 morality a repulsive aspect, by exhibiting law as sepa- 
 rated from love. But this is not the way in which Dr. 
 Hopkins " marries " the parties. He thinks he has done 
 great service to ethics by showing how fensibility, pleas- 
 ure, enjoyment, or satisfaction is a condition of moral 
 good. "A sensibility is the condition precedent of all 
 moral ideas." I am not sure that he is absolutely right 
 here. We may put the case that God creates an angelic 
 being with high intellectual endowments, but without 
 sensibility. Is not that angel bound to be grateful to 
 
APPENDIX C. 351 
 
 God, from the very relation in which he stands to his 
 Creator, and apart altogethei' from sensibility on his 
 part or the part of God ? In following out this princi- 
 ple, I hold that man is bound to love God, apart alto- 
 gether from this love producing any enjoyment on God's 
 pan or on man's part. Dr. Hopkins is obliged, in 
 effecting his reconciliation, to give a very inadequate 
 view of law. " The object of law is the control of force 
 by direction and regulation with reference to an end." 
 Surely, the deepest idea of a moral law is here lost 
 sight of, which is obligation to cherish the affection or 
 do the deed as being right. 
 
 But while I take objection to the very peculiar theory 
 advocated as to the ground of morality, I am bound to 
 speak in highest terms of the ability and high moral 
 purpose displayed throughout the volume. Except in 
 regard to the special theory in the first part, I have 
 nothing to say against the work, and much to say in its 
 favor. Of the second, or practical part, I have to speak 
 only in highest commendation. Take the following as 
 a specimen, selected at random, of the clear discrimina- 
 tion and admirable judgment everywhere displayed. 
 
 " Property may be permanently and rightfully alien- 
 ated by gift, by exchange, and by sale. It is also per- 
 manently alienated by gambling; this has different forms. 
 In some cases, as in dice and in lotteries, it is simply an 
 appeal to chance. In others, as in cards, there is a 
 mixture of chance and skill. In others, as in betting, 
 of chance and judgment. In all cases, the object is 
 gain without an equivalent, and while there is such gain 
 on one side, there is, on the other, loss without compen- 
 sation. In legitimate trade both parties are benefited ; 
 in gambling, but one. Legitimate trade requires and 
 promotes habits of industry and skill ; gambling gener- 
 ates indolence and vice, and stimulates a most infatuating 
 and often uncontrollable passion. It is wholly selfish, 
 
352 APPENDIX C. 
 
 and wholly injurious in its effects upon the community. 
 That a practice thus inherently vicious, should be re- 
 sorted to for charitable purposes, does not change its 
 character, but only tends to confound moral instructions. 
 But are all appeals to chance in (he distribution of prop- 
 erty gambling ? Not necessarily, if we define it by its 
 motives and results. A picture is given to a fair. No 
 individual will give for it its value ; that value is con- 
 tributed by a number and the picture disposed of by lot ; 
 this differs from an ordinary lottery : 1st, Because 
 there are no expenses, and all that is given goes for an 
 object which the parties are gathered to promote. 2d, 
 The prize is given, so that nothing is taken for the prizes 
 from the amount paid in, but the whole goes for the 
 proposed object. 3d, This may be done from a sim- 
 ple desire that the fair should realize the worth of its 
 property, and so, benevolently. And all appeals to 
 chance under these conditions are not likely to be so 
 frequent or general as to endanger the habits of the 
 community. All this may, and should, in fairness, be 
 said. It should also be said, 1st, that no form of 
 charity should be tolerated for a moment that in the 
 actual state of a community will foster a spirit of gam- 
 bling. It should be said, 2d, that any attempt to 
 promote a benevolent object by an appeal to selfish mo- 
 tives is wrong. Benevolent giving is a means of Chris- 
 tian culture, but selfish giving in the form of benevo- 
 lence is a deception and a snare. If the cause of 
 benevolence cannot be supported benevolently, it had 
 better not be supported at all." 
 
 I commend all intelligent readers to buy this book 
 and read it with care, and they will find themselves 
 travelling in the company of a man of high and inde- 
 pendent soul, who expresses his thoughts in brief and 
 weighty sentences, and imparts much moral instruction 
 of a lofty order. 
 
APPENDIX C. 353 
 
 ANSWER TO EEV. DE. McCOSH. 
 
 BY EET. MARK HOPKINS, D. D. 
 
 In reviewing " The Law of Love," in the " Observer '' 
 of April 15th, Dr. McCosh speaks of his visit to Wil- 
 liamstown and to myself. That visit is among my 
 most pleasing recollections. It was during the summer 
 vacation ; the weather was fln'e, and we were quite at 
 leisure to stroll about the grounds and ride over the 
 hills. 
 
 Riding thus, we reached, I remember, a point which 
 he said reminded hira of Scotland. There we alighted. 
 At once he bounded into the field like a young man, 
 passed up the hillside, and, casting himself at full length 
 under a shade, gave himself up for a time to the asso- 
 ciations and inspiration of the scene. I seem to see 
 him now, a man of world-wide reputation, lying thus 
 solitary among these hills. They were draped in a 
 dreamy haze suggestive of poetic inspirations, and from 
 his quiet but evidently intense enjoyment, he might 
 well, if lie had not been a great metaphysician, have 
 been taken for a great poet. And indeed, though he 
 had revealed himself chiefly on the metaphysical side, 
 it was evident that he shared largely in that happy 
 temperament of which Shakespeare and Tennyson are 
 the best examples, in which metaphysics and poetry 
 seem to be fused into one and become identical. 
 
 As befitted the season, our conversation was in the 
 light and aroma of those great truths in which we were 
 agreed, without any attempt to go down to their roots. 
 As, however, I was meditating my book, I went so far 
 as to ascertain from him more fully what I knew be- 
 fore from his writings, that he held to an ultimate right, 
 and would not agree with me. My ground on that 
 23 
 
854 APPENDIX C. 
 
 point was therefore not hastily taken, and while I ac- 
 knowledge fully the want of reading referred to by Dr. 
 McCosh, and regret it, I may be permitted to Buy that 
 on this subject he has presented no point that I had 
 not seen, and has raised no objection that I had not 
 considered. 
 
 That the foundation of obligation should be gener- 
 ally understood is most desirable, and as the subject so 
 appeals to the common consciousness that every intel- 
 ligent man can understand it, I cannot but think that 
 Dr. McCosh has done a public service in bringing it 
 thus prominently before the wide circle reached by the 
 " Observer." Thanking him, therefore, for this, as well 
 as for his courtesy and kind words to myself, I will en- 
 deavor to do something to aid the object he thus evi- 
 dently had in view. 
 
 In doing this, I propose, since the book reviewed 
 has probably not been seen by one in fifty of the read- 
 ers of the " Observer," 1st, to make a condensed statement 
 of the system it contains ; 2d, to inquire whether that 
 system is one of utilitarianism or eudaimonism, which 
 is the thing objected against it ; and 3d, to inquire 
 whether Dr. McCosh can hold his system in consistency 
 with the Scriptures, or with himself. 
 
 " Morality regards man as active." It asks, " What 
 ought to be done ? " " Why ought it to be done ? " 
 " How ought it to be done ? " How shall we answer 
 these questions ? The method adopted in my books 
 is so simple and obvious that nobody but a philosopher 
 could ever have missed it. It assumes that all moral 
 action is rational action, and that all rational action 
 must not only have an end, but must find its occasion 
 and reason in that end. 
 
 This being assumed, the next st«p is, and must be, 
 to inquire what the end of man is. This is the un- 
 
APPENDIX C. 355 
 
 derlying question of all philosophy of action for man. 
 This we may know, or suppose we do, because we are 
 told it ; or we may know it by investigating the struc- 
 ture of man in connection with his position, just as we 
 do that of a locomotive standing on a railway track. 
 In the first case, we should know the end by faith ; 
 in the second, by philosophy. The faith may be ra- 
 tional, wholly so. That will depend on the ground of 
 our confidence in him who tells us. But it will not 
 be philosophical. Both methods are legitimate, but 
 must ultimately coincide. It would not do . for any- 
 thing claiming to be a revelation to say that the chief 
 end of a locomotive was to stand still and scream 
 through the steam whistle, and no teaching could stand 
 that should go clearly against the end as revealed in 
 the structure. 
 
 Of the above methods, the Westminster divines, 
 whose earnest minds were instinctively led to the ques- 
 tion of an end, adopted the first. But, adopting a 
 right method, they regarded man solely as under a 
 remedial system, of which philosophy can know noth- 
 ing, except, indeed, as it may become a test of anything 
 claiming to be such a system. The end, however, as 
 stated by them, I adopt fully, while Dr. McCosh, as I 
 understand him, adopts it only in part. According to 
 him, " man is bound to love God apart altogether from 
 this love producing any enjoyment on God's part, or 
 on man's part." This must mean that enjoyment ought 
 to be no part of the end in any moral action. That is 
 the principle of it. Would Dr. McCosh say so? 
 Would he say that virtuous love to God, which must 
 consist in good-will, or the willing of good, would be 
 possible if God were as incapable of enjoyment as a 
 rock? To me, the conception even of such love is 
 impossible, and yet the statement of Dr. McCosh would 
 
356 APPENDIX C. 
 
 eeera to require it. But, however this may be, what 
 we need is no mere statement based on faith, but a 
 philosophy of action, and for me this is possible only 
 from a knowledge of the end of man as revealed in his 
 structure. 
 
 Let us then take man as we would a locomotive, 
 and see if we can, as we could in that, find his end 
 from his structure. This is no question of words and 
 subtle distinctions that two hair-splitting philosophers 
 may fall to loggerheads about. It is a great problem 
 which I .have hoped by my books, and hope by this 
 paper, to set many at working out. This we are to do 
 independently of revelation. I would do it cautiously 
 and reverently, but I would do it. We are, indeed, 
 bound to do it for ourselves, and not to leave it to be 
 done by infidels, and then weakly quarrel with the 
 results. 
 
 In doing this we shall find aid in observing all lower 
 forces that work towards ends. These we find ar- 
 ranged in a beautiful gradation as conditioning and con- 
 ditioned, and so higher^ and lower ; thus giving, as I 
 have shown, a law of limitation for the regulation of 
 all forces and faculties except the highest. In observ- 
 ing these forces the point to be noticed is, that in pass- 
 ing upward nature reaches points where she does not 
 proceed by gradations that pass into each other, but 
 by leaps. This she does when she passes from inor- 
 ganic to organic being ; when she passes from vegetable 
 to animal life ; and again, when she passes from animal 
 to rational and spiritual life. In each case we get some- 
 thing diflPerent, not in degree merely, but in kind ; and 
 in stepping across these gulfs we are to notice that 
 while we carry with us everything on the side we leave, 
 it yet falls into subordination to the new force, which 
 will work by its own laws, and cannot be safely rea- 
 
APPENDIX C. 367 
 
 Boned about from the old analogies. A tree is the 
 product of a force that acts in opposition to gravitation 
 and to all the cohesions and chemical affinities of inor- 
 ganic matter, and he would be seeking the living among 
 the dead who should carry the laws of inorganic being 
 over to account for the phenomena of vegetable life. 
 
 In each case, in passing over, we need a test of the 
 presence of the new power. The test of the presence 
 of vegetable life is organization ; of animal life it is 
 sensation, and of rational life it is the power to choose 
 its own end with an alternative iu kind. Reaching this 
 point we pass out of the domain of mechanical forces 
 acting from without, and of instinctive and impulsive 
 forces acting from within, into a region higher and en- 
 tirely new, of comprehension and of freedom. " Up to 
 man," as I have said elsewhere, " everything is driven 
 to its end by a force working from without and from 
 behind, but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts 
 itself in front, and he follows or not as he chooses." 
 
 As I view it, it is only after passing this gulf that 
 we find moral phenomena. But at this point there is 
 a difference about the very nature of those phenomena ; 
 and if we could always tell which side of the gulf men 
 are on, if they would not sometimes be on one side, 
 and sometimes on the other, and sometimes astride it, 
 often not seeming to know where they are, it would 
 prevent immense confusion. " Holiness," says Dr. 
 Thornwell, "is a nature." Then, it may be created, 
 but cannot be commanded. Where he was when he 
 said this we cannot doubt. The same I suppose would 
 be said, — it ought to be, — by the writer of a recent 
 article on morals in the " Princeton Review." By this 
 class of thinkers God is conceived of as an essence in 
 which love and wrath inhere as qualities, and mani- 
 fest themselves independently and necessarily ; whereas 
 
358 APPENDIX C. 
 
 others conceive of him as a person, rational and free, 
 and as a consuming fire only because lie is love. Of 
 these, Dr. McCosh is among the latter. He has passed 
 this gulf. For him " moral good " (goodne.^s ?) " is a 
 quality of certain actions proceeding from the will." 
 Saying thus, he must, with us, develop moral phenom- 
 ena from the point of freedom as manifested in choice. 
 
 What, then, are moral phenomena? They are those 
 revealed from a moral nature, and are immediately 
 known as moral, as intellectual phenomena are revealed 
 from an intellectual nature, and are immediately known 
 as intellectual. A man and a brute are moved equally 
 by appetite to eat; but the man can, and the brute can- 
 not be induced to eat that which is distasteful out of 
 regard to a higher good. Here is an alternative in 
 kind, possible for man, impossible for the brute ; and 
 when this is presented the moral reason comes at once 
 into action, and affirms obligation to choose the higher 
 good, just as natural reason affirms personal identity 
 when the occasion arises for that. This will be re- 
 peated, as alternatives of higher and lower good are 
 presented, till we reach the supreme good, and then we 
 shall have moral law, and a basis for conscience both 
 as an impulse and as a law. Whoever will ask him- 
 self what he means by an enlightened conscience will 
 find the meaning and necessity of a supreme end and 
 good. 
 
 In a being willitig to come to the light the affirma- 
 tion of obligation will be made impartially, whether the 
 good be our own or that of another. It will be made 
 in view of good as such, and valuable in itself, whether 
 it be our own, or that of our fellow creatures, or of God. 
 
 What then have we here ? We have, 1st, good. 
 This is wholly from the sensibility, and is the condition 
 for any affirmation of obligation, and of any moral idea. 
 
APPENDIX C. 359 
 
 We hare, 2d, the affirmation of obligation to choose 
 the good. Ill tliis we find moral law. Here we find 
 the " claim " spoken of by Dr. McCosh, what he calls 
 the " ought," the " due," the " obligation," which it 
 might be inferred from his review that I ignore. It is 
 indeed strangn that in reviewing a book, one third of 
 which is occupied in sliowing the precise origin and 
 nature of obligation, it should be quietly taken for 
 granted that it is ignored. I do not ignore it, but 
 affirm it as strongly as he does ; but I do not say, as 
 he does, that this affirmation of obligation to choose an 
 end " is itself an ultimate end inferior to no other.' 
 " The ought, the due, the obligation,'^ he says, " comes in 
 along with the love, and is an ultimate end inferior to 
 no other." This I do not say, because obligation must 
 be obligation to choose some ultimate end, and how a 
 man can choose as an ultimate end his obligation to 
 choose some other ultimate end, I do not well under- 
 stand.^ But be this as it may, this affirmation of obliga- 
 tion is no part of virtue. It is not only not an ulti- 
 mate end, but it cannot be an end of any kind. It is 
 necessitated. If it were not, we should not have a 
 moral nature. Without it man would be incapable 
 of either virtue or vice, but it is no part of either. 
 Through it we simply have law, that by which a man 
 " is a law unto himself," but the question of obedience 
 and disobedience, in which virtue and vice consist, re- 
 mains. 
 
 Having now the idea of good from the sensibility, 
 and of obligation from the moral reason, we come to 
 the action of the will, the man, the voluntary agent, 
 the CAUSE, higher than any effect he can produce. It 
 is in his power as a cause, as well as in his nature as 
 rational and moral, that man is in the image of God ; 
 and only as he is a cause is he either responsible oi 
 
360 APPENDIX C. 
 
 respectable. As a cause it is obvious that man may 
 assume one of three positions in regard to good. He 
 may choose it unselfishly and impartially for himself 
 and all who are capable of it — that is, he may love 
 God with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself; or 
 he may choose his own good selfishly, regardless of 
 that of others ; or he may be malignant, and wish to 
 destroy good, and to cause positive misery. 
 
 Taking the first of the above positions, the man ac- 
 cepts the Law of Love as the law of his being. It is 
 law because obligation is affirmed. It is the Law of 
 Love because love is the thing, and the only thing com- 
 manded. " And thus do we marry them," — " Law and 
 Love, the two mightiest forces in the universe." The 
 command comes with immediate and " self-evidence " of 
 its authority, on the apprehension of good as valuable 
 in itself to God, to our fellow-creatures, and to our- 
 selves. Choosing thus, the man has done no outward 
 act, and yet he has virtually done all good acts. Noth- 
 ing remains but to carry out this choice in executive 
 volitions, according to the circumstances and relations 
 of life. In making this choice, and thus carrying it 
 out, the man will fulfill obligation, will be virtuous |_ 
 and in so doing there will be developed a sensibility 
 of the moral nature giving a satisfaction higher than 
 any other. This form of voluntary action would be 
 moral goodness, and the enjoyment from it would be 
 moral good. This is holy happiness, or happiness from 
 holiness, or blessedness. It can come only from holiness, 
 and is as much higher than animal enjoyment as an an- 
 gel is higher than an animal. Becoming conscious of 
 this, the man is fully in possession of himself, with all his 
 possible forms of activity and their results. He knows 
 himself now through and through, as he might know 
 a locomotive. And now, retaining his generic choice 
 
APPENDIX C. 361 
 
 to cause good, his action must take one of two forms. 
 He must either seek to cause good directly, or to lead 
 others to cause it. He must seek to cause a change 
 either in the condition or the character of men. In 
 thus laboring to cause well being directly, and to cause 
 it indir-ectly by laboring for holiness, man finds his true 
 end.\ rrhus does he glorify God ; thus does he do the 
 greatest possible good to his fellow-creatures ; thus 
 does he find his own highest enjoyment; thus does he 
 reveal the highest beauty, and so become an object of 
 complacency. What more can we ask for man as ac- 
 tive ? Let him become thoroughly subject to the Law 
 of Love, and we ask nothing more. 
 
 But what of right, and righteousness, and justice ? 
 Nothing has been said of these. "We have now reached 
 the point at which moral philosophies generally begin. 
 They generally begin by inquiring about right, and 
 obligation as from that. It will be seen from the fore- 
 going statements what I would say of theni. Let a 
 man adopt the Law of Love, and then seek to apply love 
 as a law in practical life, and he will need to ask con- 
 stantly what is right ; he will always be under obliga- 
 tion to do it; and the doing of it will be righteousness. 
 Then also will the idea and sense of justice be revealed; 
 but there is no more an eternal right, or an eternal 
 justice, independent of good and of love as possible 
 through that, than there is an eternal tree independent 
 of existence. Existence is the conditioning idea with- 
 out which that of a tree could not be, and good and 
 love are conditioning ideas without which those of right 
 and justice could not be. A justice that should have 
 no reference to the good of any being would not be 
 justice, but a blind instinct. But, having its basis and 
 conditioning idea in love, it justifies itself to itself even 
 in becoming " indignation and wralh." These must be 
 
362 APPENDIX C. 
 
 developed from love, which thus becomes holiness, when 
 selfishness and malignity would defeat its ends. Some- 
 thing aiialogiius to this is seen even in instinctive love. 
 Tlie fury of the eagle is never so greiit as when it re- 
 veals itself as an expression of love for its young. And 
 nothing can be so dreadful as the wrath of Infinite 
 Goodness, not as a blind fury, but because it is Infinite 
 Goodness. That there are what may be called ra- 
 tional instincts and impulses connected with our moral 
 nature, and which some have mistaken for conscience 
 and so have become fanatics, I believe ; but I also be- 
 lieve that there can be no law of the conscience except 
 in the presence of the supreme good. 
 
 Of this system it may be said, 1st, that it is in 
 harmony with the Scriptures. It was a great satisfac- 
 tion to find that the law of the Constitution was the 
 law of the Bible. Let that be shown and we shall 
 have an argument for the divine origin of the Bible 
 that cannot be gainsaid. 2J, By making the idea of 
 good the condition of obligation, or goodness, or virtue, 
 the system shows just how that "absolute assurance" 
 comes, " that happiness must be the accompaniment or 
 end of holiness," which the " Princeton Review " says is 
 " graven on man's soul." How this comes the advo- 
 cates of an ultimate light have never attempted to 
 show. Let them attempt it, and they will find the 
 need of changing their system. 3d, It connects man 
 with all that is below him, and all that is subordinate 
 in him with that which is higher, thus bringing him 
 int,o unity with his surroundings and with himself, and 
 making the same law of limitation that we find in na- 
 ture a law to him. 4th, It gives a basis out of whicii 
 the practical part grows, so that it is not mere precept. 
 
 Such is the system. We now inquire, as was pro- 
 posed, is not this utilitarianism ? Of this there seems 
 
APPENDIX C. 363 
 
 to be a superstitious horror in some quarters, and the 
 idea is hardly better defined than that of a ghost. Dr. 
 McCosh says there is a truth in it, but what that 
 truth is, as he states it, if it be not precisely my doc- 
 trine, I am unable to make out. It is the only part 
 of his review that puzzled me. I have supposed that 
 utility involved a tendency to some good, and that the 
 choosing of a thing because of its tendency to a good, 
 or as a means of good, was a different thing from the 
 choice of a good that is good in itself and that has 
 nothing to do with tendency. I must think these are 
 wholly different. But as some do not see this, I will 
 simply say, leaving out definitions, that as objectionable, 
 nothing can be utilitarianism that does not either op- 
 pose self to love, or happiness to duty. To this all will 
 agree. 
 
 But so far from opposing self to love, the system is 
 one of disinterested and impartial love — the " love of 
 God with all the heart and of our neighbor as our- 
 selves." It has nothing to do with means or utilities, 
 but chooses an end for its own sake, that is, not good 
 in the abstract, but the good of beings capable of good ; 
 and this choice is love. It fixes on good as that, and 
 that alone, which renders virtuous love possible. We 
 have, then, no possible taint of utilitarianism here. 
 
 Nor, again, does this system oppose happiness to 
 duty. It affirms, with Dr. McCosh, the " self-evidence " 
 of obligation, and that duty is to be done at all hazards. 
 Speaking of conscience in its relation to moral law, I 
 say ^ " From that is its power to originate the word 
 ought, and whenever the mandate and impulse involved 
 in that word are truly derived from the law they are 
 to be obeyed at all hazards. It would be absurd tc 
 fcay that anything could excuse a man from doing what 
 he ought to do. Moral law must be supreme." Nothing 
 1 (Page 91 of The Law of Love.) 
 
364 APPENDIX C. 
 
 surely, can be stronger than this. There is no taint of 
 utilitarianism here. 
 
 But though the book so proclaims love and law sep- 
 arately as to preclude utilitariauism, is il not inconsis- 
 tent with itself, and does it not, in marrying the two, 
 give an opportunity for this subtle and terrible enemy 
 to slip in ? Again, No. if utilitarianism cannot be 
 compatible with either separately, much less can it be 
 with the two united. As I understood the contract, it 
 was that law was so to remain law and love love, as to 
 exclude utilitarianism. The two must be united in 
 some way. They belong to each other by a preor- 
 dained affinity, and the deepest laws of thought, and 
 the necessities of moral government ; and if they can- 
 not be united by making good from a sensibility the 
 condition of obligation, then how ? This does, indeed, 
 and that is one advantage of it, retain the truth which 
 Dr. McCosh admits is in utilitarianism — just that, and 
 nothing more. Tiie question here is not at all about un- 
 compromising obedience or duty, when that is made 
 known, but whether the very idea of duty is possible 
 except through that of a good from the sensibility, and 
 so of a possible love. The truth is, that the advocates 
 of an ultimate right are so afraid of soiling virtue by 
 some contact with happiness as to exclude the possibil- 
 ity of it altogether. This Dr. McCosh seems to me to 
 do when he speaks of obligation to love a being with- 
 out regard to his happiness. If there may be the love 
 of complacency without regard to happiness, there can 
 no more be virtuous love than there can be pity with- 
 out regard to distress. 
 
 The system, then, is not one of utilitarianism. It has 
 no tendency towards it, and nothing could be more un- 
 founded than such a supposition. If, indeed, there be 
 any two things more opposed to utilitarianism than law 
 
APPENDIX C. 365 
 
 and love, of which, in their true nature and relatious to 
 each other, this system is simply an exposition, T do 
 not know what they are. 
 
 But if the system he not utilitarianism, is it not " eu- 
 daimonisin, or the making of enjoyment the supreme 
 end of man and of virtue ? " If we would clear this 
 subject up fully, we must understand each other here. 
 We must understand what is meant when it is said 
 that there is some other good besides happiness. 
 
 Looking at man in his complex nature, — as physical, 
 intellectual, moral, spiritual, — we see that he is capa- 
 ble of various forms of activity from without and 
 within, and that these are accompanied with certain 
 forms of feeling. This capacity of feeling is called the 
 sensibility ; and the feeling may be one of pleasure or 
 pain, of joy or of sorrow. Now we need a word which 
 shall express unequivocally the whole range of feeling 
 as it gives satisfaction, pleasure, joy, happiness, blessed- 
 ness. Unfortunately we have no such word. Happi- 
 ness is often used, but in many minds its associations 
 are with the lower forms of enjoyment. Blessedness, 
 which is from the moral and spiritual powers, and can 
 be only as they act normally, will not do, because it 
 excludes the lower forms of enjoyment. Hence the 
 difficulty of finding any one word that will express the 
 whole end of man ; but that that end is in ihe sensibil- 
 ity, and so in it that witliout that the very conception 
 of an end would he impossible, I have no doubt. To 
 avoid ambiguity and put it in the broadest way, my 
 statement is, " that a sensibility is the condition prece- 
 dent of all moral ideas." Of course it must be the con- 
 dition of all moral action. Is this denied ? To deny 
 it would be to deny the universally received doctrine 
 of which my position is but an instance, that there is 
 uo action of the will except from the sensibility. Dr, 
 
366 APPENDIX c. 
 
 McCosh does, indeed, attempt to deny it, but m doing 
 so he makes a supposition that I m.irvel at ; one indeed 
 that looks so much like an absurdity, that if it had been 
 made by any one else, I am not quite sure but I might 
 have taken it for one. He puts " the case that God 
 creates an angelic being with high intellectual endow- 
 ments, but without sensibility," and then affirms, and 
 founds a principle ou it, that such a being would be 
 under obligation to be grateful to God, while yet grati- 
 tude is a form of the sensibility, and obligation itself 
 caimot be conceived of without it. " Si naturam furca 
 expellas" etc. Let the advocates of an ultimate right 
 be explicit on this point. If they say there is any good 
 not from sensibility, let them tell us what it is. If not, 
 let them say so, and accept the consequences. So far 
 as I can see, no one can any more, except by a juggle 
 of words, deny that all good is from a sensibility than 
 he can deny his personal identity. 
 
 The view presented above is said by Dr. McCosh to 
 be a " very peculiar theory." By others it is said to 
 be the view long held by a large class of writers. This 
 is of little consequence. In the materials of the system 
 there is nothing new. They are the same old ideas. 
 So the needle and thread were the same old materi- 
 als. But as a simple change in the manner of thread- 
 ing the needle led to a wide range of new combinations 
 and revolutionized a whole branch of industry, so a 
 simple adjustment or two here, with very little that is 
 new, may disentangle thought at this knotty point, and 
 change our whole mode of conceiving of this subject. 
 
 It remains to say something of the system held by 
 Dr. McCosh. Dr. McCosh agrees with me in accepting 
 the law of love as given in the Scriptures ; and also 
 obligation as " self-afflrmed." What I venture to doubt 
 is, whether, in holding the system he does, he is consis- 
 tent with the Scriptures, or with himself. 
 
APPENDIX C. • 367 
 
 And here, us we are to speak of love, I must call 
 attention to two different meanings, an "amphiboly " of 
 that word. It may be a love of benevolence, as a man 
 may love bis enemy, including good-will, or the willing 
 of good ; or it may be a love of congruity, as a man 
 may love art or poetry, in which there is no good-will. 
 The first is virtuous love, the second is not. There 
 is no virtuous love that is not either the willing of good 
 to some being capable of good, or that does not, like 
 the love of complacency, proceed directly or indirectly 
 from that. 
 
 With this in mind, and remembering that we are 
 seeking for the ultimate thing on which the mind rests 
 when obligation is affirmed, let us take the Law of Love 
 as given in the Scriptures : " Thou shnlt love (he Lord 
 thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thy- 
 self." Here God is presented to be loved for his own 
 sake, and there is nothing more ultimate, tlie idea of 
 good coming in simply as rendering love possible. The 
 love is to he a simple primitive act in view of the object 
 as worthy of love. But Dr. McCosh is not satisfied 
 with this. He says, " We regard God as having a 
 claim upon our love because it is right, and men see it 
 to be so at once." I venture to say that men do not 
 see it to be so at all. It may be true that men see at 
 once that they are under obligation to love God ; it is 
 right that they should love him ; but it is not true that 
 they are under obligation to love him because it is 
 right, and of course they do not see that they are. I 
 have said that "No man is under obligation to do an 
 act morally right for which there is not a reason be- 
 sides its being right, and on the ground of which it is 
 right." In accordance with this, the reason of our love 
 to God, its ultimate ground, is the worth and worthi- 
 ness of God, so that we do not love him because it is 
 
368 . APPENDIX C. 
 
 right, the rightiiess being as Dr. McCo-^h allows, a 
 mere quality of our love, but because lie is worthy of 
 our love. In the one case the last thing seen as the 
 ground of obligation is God in his worth as capable of 
 good, and in his worthiness as seeking to promote it ; 
 in the other it is — right. This is an " ultimate idea," 
 absolutely ultimate, observe, with nothing beyond it ; 
 " an end in itself, inferior to no other, subordinate to 
 no other." This puts right above God. We are to 
 love God, not for his sake, but for the sake of the 
 right; or, as was said to me recently, we are to love 
 God because we love virtue, as if the love of God were 
 not virtue. In the same way we are to love our fel- 
 low-men, not for their sakes, but for the sake of the 
 right. We are to love the right supremely, and to 
 love God because we love the right. Nor can it be 
 said that the love of God and of right are the same, for 
 good-will towards an "ultimate idea " is impossible. I 
 have seen quite enough of this abstract, hard, godless, 
 loveless love of right and virtue, instead of the love of 
 God and of men. It is nearly as bad on the one side 
 as utilitarianism is on the other ; and " whether " Dr. 
 McCosh " means it or no, whether he sees it or no, this 
 is, in the end, the " ultimate right " principle." " This 
 is the logical consequence, and if not drawn by him it 
 will be drawn by others ; and the history of philosophy 
 and theology shows that what follows logically" (ex- 
 cept when men receive a system, as most men do this, 
 in words only) " will follow chronologically when the 
 system has had time to work and show its effects." 
 Accordingly, we find that wherever this system has 
 been fully received it has tended to fanaticism. No 
 man can adopt right as an ultimate end with no regard 
 to good — and if it be ultimate it must be so adopted 
 — without this tendency ; nor can any man adopt as 
 
APPENDIX C. 369 
 
 altimate anri supreme the Scriptural Law of Love, the 
 very nature of love making the good of being its end, 
 and at the same time consistently adopt right as " an 
 ultimate end," " an end in itself, superior to no other, 
 subordinate to no other." 
 
 It is to be observed, also, that the Scriptures nowhere 
 command men to do right because it is right, but that 
 their whole tenor is opposed to this form of teaching. 
 
 But if the theory held by Dr. McCIosh be not con- 
 sistent with the Scriptures, can he hold it, and be con- 
 sistent with himself? I am not sure, indeed, whether 
 Dr. McCosh has not been led to adopt and retain the 
 system by the " amphiboly " of the cardinal words 
 which we are obliged to use on tliis subject, such as 
 "end," and "right," and "love," and "good." He 
 speaks of right, and love, and obligation, and holiness, 
 as being ultimate ends. So far as appears, there may 
 be any number of these in his system ; nor does he 
 seem to recognize the necessity of a supreme end, or 
 the distinction insisted on by me, between ends as ulti- 
 mate and supreme. 
 
 But what does Dr. McCosh mean when he speaks 
 of these — of love, for example — as an end ? Love 
 is an act ; and we do not commonly speak of an act 
 as an end, but as done for some end. Anything purely 
 spontaneous, as an emotion, that may be called love, 
 would have no moral character ; but if love be a ra- 
 tional and moral act, as most people suppose, then it 
 must have some object or end beyond itself, for it is 
 difficult to see how a rational action, involving the 
 choice of an end, can be its own end. 
 
 What, again, does he mean when he speaks of right 
 as an end ? What is right ? Is it, as some say, some- 
 thing out of the mind, having an independent exist- 
 ence, like space ? That Dr. McCosh denies. Is it the 
 U 
 
370 APPENDIX C. 
 
 quality of an action ? Most men tliink so. But the 
 moral quality of an action can exif-t only in view of 
 the end to be chosen, and therefore cannot be that end. 
 Is right, as I suppose it is, equivaleut to the " recti- 
 tude " of the " Princeton E«view " ? ^ Then it is " a 
 simple quality" — " undefinable," "absolute," "eternal," 
 "unchangeable" — having itself for its own standard ; 
 as high as God, for there can be "nothing higher," 
 as pure as God, for there can be " nothing purer," 
 as authoritative as God, for there can be " notliing 
 more authoritative." " It is underived," '• ultimate," 
 " supreme," " elementary," " uncompounded." Yes ; a 
 " simple quality " is elementary and uncompounded ! 
 and yet it is not simple, for " it carries in itself the 
 idea of obligation." This same "simple quality" is, 
 moreover, " moral goodness," and " is the original 
 supreme excellence of God and all moral creatures.'' 
 Whether this " simple quality " originally inhered in 
 God's essence or in his acts, we are not told, though we 
 should be glad to know. Probably in both, for we are 
 told that it is both " in man's soul, and in its acts." Is 
 it tliis " simple quality," thus simplified and made per- 
 fectly intelligible, the doctrine of which " may be called 
 the catholic Christian doctrine of the ultimate moral 
 idea,'' that Dr. McCosh would make an end ? If s*), I 
 have nothing to say ; for a simple quality capable of all 
 that is thus attributed to this, may doubtless become an 
 end, or, at least, I should be unwilling to say what it 
 may not become, whether an end or an elephant. Prob- 
 ably this is the very quality spoken of by the Teutonic 
 theosopber, quoted by Campbell, when he announces 
 that " all the voices of the celestial joyfulness qualify, 
 commix, and harmonize in the fire that was from etermty 
 in the good quality." 
 
 Take again obligation, to which I have already re- 
 
 1 See p. 1S2. 
 
APPENDIX C. 371 
 
 ferred. There may be obligation to choose an end, but 
 as I understand it, obligHtion itself cannot be an end. 
 And yet Dr. McCosh says that it is an " ultimate end, 
 inferior to no other." Obligation an ultimate end ! And 
 one, too, not inferior to the good of God and his uni- 
 verse ! There must lurk here somewhere — and the 
 public must judge where — that " confusion of idea into 
 which," lis Dr. McCosh says, " we are apt to fall when 
 we speak or think of ultimate ideas or ends." 
 
 But again : take love in the two meanings explained 
 above, and the confusions from it are endless. What 
 do the advocates of the ultimate right theory mean by 
 the love of right, and of the right ? A virtuous love ? 
 I suppose so. If a man is to do riglit because it is right, 
 which is what Dr. McCosh would call virtue, it must be be- 
 cause he loves the right, else there is a virtue without love, 
 which neither Dr. McCosh nor the Bible allow. But is 
 the love of right, or of the right, or of virtue, virtuous 
 love ? No ; because neither right nor virtue can be ob- 
 jects of good-will. There is no willing of good to them, 
 and so no more virtue in loving them than in loving 
 poetry, except as such love may imply a previous love 
 that did involve good-will. 
 
 But perhaps the most misleading ambiguity of all, is 
 that of '' good " as derived — sometimes from the sensi- 
 bility and meaning enjoyment, and sometimes from the 
 will and meaning goodness. Of this, however, I have 
 spoken so fully in the work reviewed, that I will not 
 dwell on it here. 
 
 On other points I should be glad to touch, particularly 
 those of cause and law. But enough has been said. For 
 the first time in my life I have noticed what has been 
 said of my writings. If I have spoken plainly, it is not 
 in a spirit of controversy, for I have no little fort to de- 
 fend, but with a desire to aid Dr. McCosh in his evident 
 
372 APPENDIX C. 
 
 purpose of awakening a more general interest in this 
 great subject, and to add my mite towai'd the displace- 
 ment, sure to come, of a traditional philosophy based on 
 the inadequate and radically false method of construct- 
 ing a system of conduct on a purely abstract idea. 
 Williams College, May 1, 1869. 
 
 ANSWER TO REV. DR. HOPKINS. 
 
 BT JAMES MoCOSH, D. D., LL. D. 
 
 Dk. Hopkins's letter is worthy of the man, in respect 
 both of the ability and the kindly spirit displayed in it. 
 No evil can arise from a controversy so conducted. On 
 the contrary, I expect good to spring from it. It bears 
 on a question second to no other in philosophy, and it 
 admits of applications to the justice of God, the punish- 
 ment of sinners, and the atonement for sin. 
 
 But we, the controversialists, must, for our own sake 
 and that of our hearers, take care that we keep the point 
 at issue clearly before us. It is a very simple one : 
 What is the chief end of man ? Is it or is it not some 
 form of pleasure, happiness or enjoyment ? 
 
 With much that Dr. Hopkins has said I concur. I 
 agree with what he says as to the importance of looking 
 to ends in determining -what " good " is. This has been 
 done more or less by moralists since the days of Aristotle, 
 who begins his Nicomachean Ethics with an inquiry 
 into ends, and has teen followed by the Stoics, and by 
 Cicero in his treatise De Finihus. The question is, What 
 is the end and the supreme end of man ? Again Dr. 
 Hopkins and I are agreed as to the manner in which tMs 
 question is to be settled ; that is, by an inquiry into our 
 moral nature — in the manner of Bishop Butler. The 
 
APPENDIX C. 373 
 
 question here is, What saith our moral nature as to the 
 final aim of man ? Dr. Hopkins's answer to the ques- 
 tion is stated clearly in a passage which I have quoted 
 before, and which I must quote again. What then is 
 the ultimate end according to our author? He says it 
 is " the good." But what is the good ? He answers,^ 
 — " An objective good is aiiytliing so correlated to a 
 conscious being as to produce subjective good. Subjec- 
 tive good is some form of enjoyment or satisfaction in 
 the consciousness." He tells us that " strictly there is 
 no good that is not subjective." In his review in the 
 " Observer " he says there is " a difficulty of finding any 
 one word that will express tlie whole end of man ; but 
 that end is in the sensibility." " The capacity of feeling 
 is called the sensibility, and the feeling may be one of 
 pleasure or pain, of joy or of sorrow." This is the 
 point at which we come into collision. My remarks 
 will be confined to it. 
 
 We are agreed as to the way in which the point is to 
 be settled. It is by an appeal to our moral nature. To 
 that moral nature I appeal with confidence, as deciding 
 in my behalf. An intelligent being receives favors from 
 God ; say lofty reason, fine fancy, rich emotions, and a 
 capacity of distinguishing between right and wrong. 
 What is the affection which he should cherish towai'd 
 this his benefactor ? Our moral nature replies on the 
 instant, — gratitude and love. And we do not require 
 to consider whether this gratitude adds to the enjoyment 
 of God or the enjoyment of him who cherishes it. It 
 is the same with moral evil as with moral good. Ten 
 lepers are healed by our Lord. Nine of them give him 
 no thanks. In condemning their conduct we do not stop 
 to inquire whether it is fitted to give pain to the .sensi- 
 bility of the Saviour or their own. On the bare con- 
 templation of 'he act we declare it to be evil. The act 
 
 1 Page 51. 
 
374 APPENDIX C. 
 
 is not wicked because it grates on the sensibility of the 
 Saviour, or is fitted to inflict sorrow on those guilty of 
 it. On the contrary, it offends our Lord and is fitted to 
 bring down judgments on the offending parties because 
 it is evil. 
 
 Dr. Hopkins is shut up to this conclusion by his own 
 statements. Enjoyment is represented by him as the 
 end of moral action. But what enjoyment? Enjoy- 
 ment as enjoyment? Every kind of enjoyment? En- 
 joyment of passion, of sensual pleasure ? No, says Dr. 
 Hopkins ; only enjoyment of a certain kind. He says 
 expressly that good does not consist in happiness but " a 
 holy happiness," " happiness from holiness,'' " it can 
 come only from holiness." Does not this show clearly 
 that in the moral end holiness requires to be looked at 
 with the happiness ? Does it not prove that there is a 
 higher end than enjoyment, and to which enjoyment 
 must give way because enjoyment is the inferior ? With- 
 out contradiction, it is the less that yields to the greater,, 
 and happiness, as the lower, must give place when holi- 
 ness requires it. Holiness, then, and not mere happiness, 
 thus comes to be the higher, the supreme end. 
 
 It cannot be proven by an appeal to our moral na- 
 ture that sensibility is a necessary condition of virtue. 
 I acknowledge that it is presupposed in the exercise of 
 certain virtues. It is our duty, so far as within us lies, 
 to promote the general happiness — this is the truth in 
 utilitarianism ; but ii i-i a truth which embraces more 
 than mere sensibility — it embraces " duty " as well as 
 happiness. Again, it is true that one ground of our re- 
 garding God as good is, that he delights in the happineps 
 of his creatures ; another reason always being that he 
 delights in their holiness. All this shows that whUe 
 man should look to pleasure and pain, he should also 
 look to something higher. The brutes have no other 
 
APPENDIX a 375 
 
 end than enjoyment. But as nature rises — as Dr 
 Hopkins shows in one of the fine passages of his paper 
 — from lower to higher, from inorganic to organic 
 from phmt to animal, and from irresponsible animal t< 
 responsible, so the end of each being rises in the sam 
 way ; the end of the organic is higher than that of the 
 inorganic ; tlie end of man is higher than tliat of the 
 brute. Moral and accountable man is bound, wliile he 
 does not overlook enjoyment, to look beyond to the law- 
 fulness or unlawfuhiess of the enjoyment as determined 
 by moral law. Moral good does not consist in any case 
 in the promotion of mere enjoyment, such as may be 
 accomplished by a fine piece of furniture, a fine flower, 
 or a fine animal, but by something different and higher, 
 by the love which knowingly contemplates and promotes 
 the enjoyment. Nor does it consist in every sort of love, 
 but in love that is due and right. As we mount up in 
 this way, we rise to the contemplation of a love, and a 
 holiness, and a justice above all gratification of the sen- 
 sibility. We clothe the Divine Being with these per- 
 fections, and we believe that in the exercise of them he 
 will regard the happiness of his creatures ; but that he 
 will also, and for a higher end, promote their love and 
 thek holiness. 
 
 Dr. Hopkins is still perplexed with the difficulty, — 
 " The moral quality of an action can exist only in view of 
 the end to be chosen, and, therefore, cannot be that end." 
 I endeavored to remove that difficulty in my review, and 
 I must try to do it again in a few words. The difficulty 
 arises entirely from a misapprehension of the nature 
 of the first truths of the intellect, and of the ultimate 
 ends of our moral constitution. The reason of first truths 
 is to be found, not in anything out of themselves, but 
 in themselves and the objects contemplated. We are sure 
 that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, not because 
 
376 APPENDIX C. 
 
 we can give any reason for it out of ilie things and out 
 of ourselves, but because in contemplating two straight 
 lines, we see that they are such in their nature that they 
 cannot inclose a space. So it is with final moral ends — 
 ends iu themselves. When we love God in such a «ay as 
 to constitute this a moral act, we see that there is an ob- 
 ligation in the very act ; and this not our own enjoyment, 
 or that of God, but because the act is right in itseU'. 
 He says, " If love be a rational and moral act, as most 
 people suppose, then it must have some object or end be- 
 yond itself, for it is difficult to see how a rational action, 
 involving the choice of an end, can be its own end." 
 But does not Dr. Hopkins see that in affirming our own 
 existence and identity, which is a rational act, we have 
 reason not " beyond," but in the thing ? In like man- 
 ner, when we love God, we are made to feel that this is 
 due to God. Dr. Hopkins acknowledges everywhere — 
 which the Utilitarians do not — the existence of moral 
 reason, deciding what ought to be done. His confusion 
 arises from his not giving that moral reason the right 
 place. He makes it, as I understand him, come after 
 the end, after the end has been chosen. The correct 
 statement is that the moral reason is implied in the very 
 choice of the virtuous end. He says, " The affirmation 
 of obligation is no part of virtue." The abstract affir- 
 mation may not, but the intuitive concrete conviction 
 is. We love God, not as being a mere sensitive en- 
 joyment to ourselves, or as adding to the enjoyment of 
 God, but as fit, proper, and due. Dr. Hopkins has 
 hit the truth for once, when he says, " The love is 
 to be a simple primitive act in view of the object as 
 worthy of love." • This seems to me to be the correct 
 expression. " The love is a primitive act in view of the 
 object ; " he adds, "as \vorthy of love ; " and I say, the 
 worthiness is proclaimed by the moral reason " in view 
 
APPENDIX C. 377 
 
 of the object," and has a place in the motive leading 
 us to perform the act. This is the element wliich dis- 
 tinguishes a virtuous love from other love which may 
 not be virtuous, which may be positively sinful. 
 
 I am surprised to find Dr. Hopkins laying tbat " the 
 Sonptiires nowhere command nieu to do right because it 
 id right, but that their whole tenor is opposed to this 
 form of teaching." Does not Paul say (Eph. vi. 1), 
 " Children obey your parents in the Lord, for this is 
 right " — just, due ? And is not the whole teuor of 
 Scripture on this wise : " Love God, obey his command- 
 ments, for this is right ? " 
 
 The question at issue has many applications. John 
 Foster, in a well-known letter, proceeding on the doc- 
 trine that it is the highest end of God and man to pro- 
 mote happiness, argues with immense power that there 
 cannot be eternal punishment under the government of 
 God. 1 am obliged to say that if I grant his premises, 
 1 cannot avoid his conclusion. I can stand up for eternal 
 separation of the wicked from God only on the principle 
 that ingratitude, that ungodliness, are sins in themselves, 
 and ought to be punished. 
 
 I have not before me the means of ascertaining Dr. 
 Hopkins's view of the nature of the atonement. I hold 
 that in the Divine nature there is an essential justice 
 which leads Him not only to promote enjoyment, but 
 punish sin. I hold that the atonement has a reference 
 not merely to the general happiness of mankind, but the 
 holy perfections of God, and that Christ's sufferings were 
 a real substitution and a satisfaction to Divine justice. 
 It is only thus I can understand the strong language 
 employed everywhere in Scripture about Jesus suffering 
 and dying in our room and stead. I mention these things 
 merely to show that this discussion has extensive bear- 
 ings, but I believe it would weary the readers of a popu' 
 lar newspaper to dwell on it. 
 
378 APPENDIX C. 
 
 And so I must conclude by saying that I do not be- 
 lieve that Dr. Hopkins has been able to buUd a half- 
 way house, likely to stand, between the two contending 
 armies. Our author has evidently a great aversion to 
 utilitarianism. But if the end of virtue be enjoyment, 
 everything must be subordinate to it, and we are landed 
 logically, whether we see it or no, in the greatest hap- 
 piness theory. We can avoid this only by falling back 
 on that moral reason which Dr. Hopkins acknowledges, 
 and by giving it, which Dr. Hopkins does not, a place in 
 determining the supreme end, which we will then see, 
 not to be mere happiness, but holiness. 
 Fbincbion, June 14, 1869. 
 
 DE. HOPKINS'S REJOINDER TO DR. McCOSH. 
 
 The subject of discussion between Dr. McCosh and 
 myself not being of transient interest, I have not been 
 in haste to reply to his second papei'. I do it now, not 
 as thinking my positions endangered, but in the interest 
 of a subject too much neglected. Literally and figura- 
 tively, deep ploughing is good husbandry. Only as the 
 community shall be pervaded by a deeper knowledge of 
 nature, and especially of man, can the best fruits of liv- 
 ing be expected. 
 
 " The point at issue," says Dr. McCosh, " is a very 
 simple one — What is the chief end of man ? " I had 
 supposed it to be, What is the foundation of obliga- 
 tion ? but accept this, since he prefers it. I am indeed 
 pleased that he is so far a convert to the doctrine of 
 ends as to be willing to substitute an end to be chosen 
 for the abstract idea of right. ■ Eegarding man only as 
 active, the science of morals requires this ; but it will 
 be fatal to his system. 
 
APPENDIX C. 379 
 
 But, simple or not in the point it makes, the above 
 question underlies practical philosophy. This is coming 
 to be more and more recognized. The difficulty with 
 the French was said by Jouffroy to be that they did not 
 know what the end of man is ; and in the last number 
 of the " North British Review " there is an article hav- 
 ing this for its title and subject, in which it is said that 
 ■' The theoretical solution of this question would be the 
 answer to a fundamental problem in ethics ; its practi- 
 cal realization would be the ideal of a perfect life." 
 
 What the end of man is, Dr. McCosh says, is to be 
 ?ettled " by an inquiry into our moral nature, in the 
 manner of Bishop Butler. The question here is, What 
 saith our moral nature as to the final aim of man ? " lu 
 this I regret not to agree with Dr. McCosh, especially 
 as he says I do. As rational, we have the power to 
 overlook and comprehend our whole being as we would 
 a locomotive, and I suppose the question must be de- 
 cided by our doing this. It must, if it is to be decided 
 by philosophy at all. This is not to be done by the 
 moral nature alone. On the contrary, that nature is to 
 be compared with the other parts of oiir complex being, 
 the proper functions and relations of each are to be de- 
 termined, and thus the end of the whole. This was " the 
 manner of Bishop Butler." Making this comparison, 
 he says, as quoted in " The Law of Love," ^ " It may 
 be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue 
 and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery 
 are, of all our ideas, the nearest and most important 
 to us ; that they will, nay, if you please, that they ought 
 to prevail over those of order, and beauty, and harmony, 
 and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is impossi- 
 ble there ever should be, any inconsistence between 
 them." Here we have the highest English authority in 
 morals not only making the comparison I advocate, but 
 1 Page 117. 
 
880 APPENDIX C. 
 
 affirming that our ideas of happiness and misery ars 
 nearer and more important to us than any others, and fo 
 than that of holiness itself, which Dr. McCosh makes 
 supreme. Butler, however, and I agree with him, does 
 not, like Dr. McCosh, — who says that " happiness must 
 give place where holiness requires it," — allow that there 
 can be an " inconsistence " between holiness and happi- 
 ness. He believed in a deep harmony of the constitu- 
 tion, insuring the harmony of the two ; and that harmony 
 is in the fact that " a sensibility," and so the possible en- 
 joyment and suffering of some being, " is the condition 
 precedent of all moral ideas." 
 
 Nor, I may remark here, is Butler alone among those 
 of the intuitional school in his estimate of happiness in 
 its relation to virtue. Whewell, who has stood shoulder 
 to shoulder with Dr. McCosh in opposing Mill, says, 
 " Happiness is the object of human action in its most 
 general form as including all other objects, and approved 
 by reason." Edwards says,^ ■' Agreeable to this the ffood 
 of men is spoken of as an ultimate end of the virtue of 
 the moral world;" and quotes Scripture to prove it. 
 And Robert Hall himself, in opposing Edwards, siiys, 
 " Let it be remembered we have no dispute respecting 
 what is the ultimate end of virtue, which is allowed 
 on botli sides to be the greatest sum of happiness in the 
 universe." 
 
 But, authority aside, if we compare the different con- 
 stituents of our being, we find that the end of the intel- 
 lect is to know ; of the sensibility, to feel ; and of the 
 will, to choose and act. As rational, we can feel only 
 as we know, and can choose and act only as ends are 
 presented through the sensibility. If we suppose the 
 sensibility excluded, the conception even of an end ia 
 impossible. Aside from the products of this, nothing 
 can be a good, or have value. Except as we and others 
 
 1 See 6tli page of God's Chief End. 
 
APPENDIX C. 381 
 
 are possessed of this, neitlier love, nor hatred, nor obliga- 
 tion, nor right, nor wrong, nor virtue, nor vice, is possi- 
 ble. Finding thus the end in tlie sensibility, so far at 
 least that without that there can be no end, I accept the 
 statement of the Westminster divines that " The chief 
 end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." If 
 any inquire how this is to be done, I reply that it is to 
 be done by knowing, loving, and obeying God. This is 
 the whole of religion, and the whole duty of man. It 
 may all be comprised in loving God, since to be loved, 
 he must be known ; and if loved, he will be obeyed. 
 This brings into requisition ihe intellect, the sensibility, 
 and the will ; and from the right action of these, with 
 God for their object, there must be an enjoy uent of 
 him forever. Anything involving this T accept, and 
 nothing short of it. I cannot. I do not wish to exclude 
 from my conception of the end of man that '• fullness of 
 joy " which is in the presence of God, and those •• pleas- 
 ures which are at his right hand forevermore." But 
 while I accept the above statement, perhaps a plainer 
 one may be, that the chief end of man is "lo promote 
 blessedness impartially and in the highest degree." 
 Blessedness, then, is the supreme end — the blessedness 
 of God and of his rational universe ; and that form of 
 activity by which this is chosen and voluntarily caused, 
 is holiness. 
 
 Having thus stated my views positively, and I hope 
 clearly, in this aspect of the subject, I proceed to some 
 positions of Dr. McCosh in his second letter to which I 
 do not assent. 
 
 The first in logical order is, that there may be vir- 
 tue without sensibility. Strange as it may seem. Dr. 
 McCosh reaffirms this position. •' It cannot," he says, " be 
 proven by an appeal to our moral nature " — and of 
 cotirse he means that it cannot be proved at all — " that 
 
382 APPENDIX C. 
 
 sensibility is a necessary condition of virtue." " I ac- 
 knowledge," he continues, " that it is presupposed in the 
 exercise of certain virtues." Indeed ! Then have we 
 need of a new division of the virtues into those that can, 
 and those that cannot exist without sensibility. And 
 this is said by Dr. McCosh while he allows that all vir- 
 tue may be included in love ! It would be interesting 
 to hear him give the constituents of a love that has no 
 sensibility. It would be interesting to hear him enu- 
 merate those virtues that presuppose no feeling, or 
 power of feeling, either in those who exercise them, or 
 those toward whom they are exercised. I would not 
 be too positive here ; but through what medium, or from 
 what angle, Dr. McCosh can be looking when he speaks 
 of such virtues, I cannot conjecture. For myself, I am 
 free to say that I have no conception of any such virtue, 
 and must venture humbly to question whether any one 
 else either has or can have. 
 
 The second position of Dr. McCosh that I would call 
 in question is, that " holiness is the supreme end." As 
 stated above, holiness is that form of voluntary activily 
 by which blessedness is chosen and intentionally caused. 
 The objection to making this the supreme end is, that it 
 makes the activity its own end. If holiness be the su- 
 preme end, and holiness or virtue consists in choosing 
 the supreme end, then holiness must consist in choosing 
 holiness. This difficulty must always arise when any 
 form of activity of the will, and so of virtue, is made the 
 ultimate end. Rational activity can never be for the 
 sake of the activity itself, but must always be for the 
 sake of some result of the activily ; for some good, satis- 
 faction, enjoyment, blessedness, — either of the being 
 acting, or of some other being. The activity is virtue, 
 the result is blessedness. The virtue is from the will, 
 the blessedness from the sensibility. 
 
APPENDIX C. 383 
 
 Another position from which I dissent, if indeed it bo 
 another, is, that the moral quality of an action can be its 
 end ; or that the quality of an action may be the ground 
 of obligation to do that action. It is said in the " Law 
 of Love " to be plain that this cannot be. Dr. McCosh 
 and others say it is plain it can be ; and it is in conceiv- 
 ing how it can be, that the difficulty arises with which 
 " Dr. Hopkins is still perplexed," and I fear always 
 will be. 
 
 But how is this in other cases ? Can the bravery or 
 tlie generosity of an act be the reason for doing it ? 
 Yes, if it be done ostentatiously ; but no true man ever 
 did a brave act because it was brave, or a generous act 
 because it was generous. But for an underlying sensi- 
 bility, the idea of bravery would be impossible ; and if 
 the exposure to danger, in which the bravery consists, 
 were not for an end beyond the exposure itself, it would 
 be mere ostentation and fool-hardiness. It is the same 
 with generosity. Both are praiseworthy and pleasing, 
 and men may be so exhorted to cultivate them for their 
 own sakes as to think them ultimate ; but the qualities 
 themselves are possible only on the ground of interests 
 lying beyond themselves, and can never be the chief 
 legitimate motive for those actions in which they inhere. 
 But if right and holiness be allowed to be the qualities 
 of actions, no reason is seen why the same is not true 
 of them. A man loves his enemy. This he does, not 
 from any worthiness in him, but because of his worth as 
 having capacity for good. In view of this he subdues 
 his resentment, and makes sacrifices for the good of his 
 enemy as he would for his own. This is a riglit and 
 holy act. Is it done because it is so, or does it become 
 so from the end for which it is done ? The questions 
 answer themselves. 
 
 Dr. McCosh says my difficulty " arises entirely from 
 
384 APPENDIX C. 
 
 a misapprehension of the nature of the first truths of the 
 intellect, and of the ultimate ends of the moral constitu- 
 tion.'' " The reason of first truths," he adds, " is to be 
 found, not in anything out of themselves, but in them- 
 selves and the objects contemplated." " Does not Dr, 
 Hopkins," he asks triumphantly, " see that in afiirming 
 our own existence and identity, which is a rational act, 
 we have the reason, not beyond, but in the thing ? " 
 Tes ; and admitting the parallelism here assumed, does 
 not Dr. McCosh see that it makes against him? The 
 reason for afiirming the truth is not in the act afiirm- 
 ing it, or in any quality of the act, but " in the objects 
 contemplated ; " it should follow, therefore, that the rea- 
 son for choosing an end is found, not in the act of choos- 
 ing, or in any quality of the act, but in the end ; and 
 that is just what I say. But I do not admit the paral- 
 lelism. It seems to me that the processes of the mind, 
 in dealing with first truths where there is no choice, and 
 with ends where there is, are wholly different. With 
 what he says of first truths I agree ; but the moment 
 he passes to ends, I seem to find confusion both in 
 the thought and in the language. " So," he says, "it is 
 with final moral ends — ends in themselves. When we 
 love God in such a way as to constitute this a moral act, 
 we see that there is an obligation in the very act ; and 
 that not our own enjoyment, or that of God, but because 
 it is right in itself." Concerning this extraordinary 
 passage, which contains the gist of what he says, I in- 
 quire, 1st. Whether any " final " end be not an end in 
 itself, whether moral or not? 2d. Whether a " moral" 
 end means anything more than an end that we are 
 under obligation to choose? 3d. Whether it be pos- 
 sible to love God so that it shall not be a moral act ? 
 And 4th. Whether Dr. McCosh means to say that we 
 do not see that there is an obligation to love God before 
 
AFPEKDIX C. 385 
 
 we love him ? His language implies this. He eajs, 
 " When we love him, we see that there is an obligation 
 in the very act." If it be " in the very act," it could not 
 exist before that, and so a man who had never loved 
 God could be under no obligation to love him. This 
 consequence must follow every attempt to make, as Dr. 
 McCosh does, obligation, or the sense of it, a part of 
 virtue. The obligation is " not our own enjoyment, or 
 that of God ; " but it may be affirmed in view of the 
 capacity of God and of other beings for enjoyment, and 
 not because " it is right in itself," aside from all relation 
 to enjoyment ; and this I suppose to be the truth. I 
 suppose the moral reason afiSrrns obligation to choose, 
 not goodness, but good as good in itself. This, I sup- 
 pose, is ultimate, and that a reason for every right act 
 may be found in its relation to this ultimate good. 
 
 And here I must notice a misapprehension of Dr. 
 McCosh respecting the place assigned by me to the 
 moral reason. He says my "confusion arises from 
 making the moral reason come after the end, after the 
 end has been chosen." I not only do not do this, but it 
 never occurred to me as possible that any one should. 
 As I understand it, the moral reason has a place in 
 determining the supreme end by affirming obligation to 
 choose it, but it is no part of the end ; nor is the ob- 
 ligation a part of the act or choice. The choice, the 
 love, I make " to be a simple primitive act in view of 
 the object as worthy of love." In this. Dr. McCosh is 
 so obliging as to say that I have " hit the truth for 
 once ; " and yet he says that " the intuitive, concrete 
 conviction of obligation " is a part of the love, thus mak- 
 ing it complex. Certainly I recognize the love as " fit, 
 proper, and due ; " but I also say that the love itself is 
 impossible, except through a capacity for enjoyment. 
 This makes " a sensibility the condition precedent of all 
 25 
 
386 APPENDIX C. 
 
 moral ideas," and is fatal to the theory of an eternal 
 right, or that anything is right in itself apart from all 
 relation to enjoyment. 
 
 On the Scriptural question, I have only to repeat 
 what I liave already said. The passage quoted by Dr. 
 McCosh is the only one in the Bible that seems to say 
 that we are " to do right because it is right ; " but that 
 does not say it, and scarcely seems to. If it said that, 
 no further question could be asked. The theory of 
 morals would be settled. What it does say is, that 
 children should obey their parents because it is right, 
 and that leaves the question, Why is it right to obey 
 parents ? whei'e it was before. I " am surprised " that Dr. 
 McCosh should think this a text in point. It is, indeed, 
 worthy of notice how little is said of " right " in the 
 New Testament. The word is used but thirteen times 
 in all, and only ten times as an adjective. Of these, the 
 word Slkmov, translated right in the passage quoted, 
 is used but five times ; the proper meaning of it is not 
 right, as that term is used in this discussion, but just ; 
 and in no other case can it be tortured into a support of 
 the theory of Dr. McCosh. 
 
 Of " the whole tenor of the Scripture " on this point, 
 I am content that any one should judge, as between Dr. 
 McCosh and myself, who has not a theory to support. 
 Our Saviour opened the Sermon on the Mount, and 
 every beatitude, by speaking of blessedness. In the 
 same connection, he spoke of the " great reward in 
 heaven." The general doctrine of the Scriptures is, 
 that men shall be rewarded according to their works. 
 The " good and faithful servant " is to enter into the 
 joy of his Lord. Tlie righteous are to inherit eternal 
 life, and the wicked to go into " everlasting punishment." 
 It was for the "joy that was set before Him that the 
 Saviour himself endured the cross, despising the shame." 
 
APPENDIX C. 887 
 
 Dr. McCosh refers to the theological bearings of the 
 point in question. Those I might discuss if there were 
 Bpace and a call for it ; but there is neither. Let the 
 question be decided on its merits. That is the only fair 
 way ; and to aid our readers in doing that has been my 
 endeavor in the preceding discussion. 
 
 Mark Hopkins. 
 
 WnxiAMs College, July 24, 1869. 
 
 DR. MoCOSH'S SUMMATION 
 
 or THB COI7TROTESSY BETWEEN HIM AND DB. HOFEIHg. 
 
 The discussion between Dr. Hopkins and myself 
 must sooner or later come to an end, and I do not see 
 why it should not now close. I fear the readers of the 
 " Observer " will complain if we protract it much longer. 
 We have both had an opportunity of stating our views, 
 and the public must judge for themselves. Intelligent 
 readers have already before tliem the means of coming 
 to a decision, and will not thank us for falling, as we 
 might be tempted to do, into miserable wrangling. I 
 am in this paper to take up no new topic. I am simply 
 to sum up what I believe to be the substance of the dis- 
 pute. 
 
 (1.) Dr. Hopkins tells us, in language which cannot 
 be too often quoted, that the final end of man is " some 
 form of enjoyment or satisfaction in the consciousness." 
 "That end," he says, is "in the sensibility,'' and "the 
 capacity of feeling is called the sensibility, and the feel- 
 ing may be one of pleasure or pain, of joy or of sorrow." 
 He says in his last paper, " If we suppose the sensibility 
 excluded, the conception even of an end is impossible." 
 Now this is the point which I controvert. I maintain that 
 
388 APPENDIX C. 
 
 we ought to look to something higher, and that all truly 
 good action has a higher reference. I have to complaijl 
 that in explaining and defending his peculiar theory, 
 Dr. Hopkins changes " form of enjoyment " and " sen- 
 sibility " into " good " and " blessedness." In this way 
 I believe he ^deceives himself, and would hide from 
 others the sensational character of his system. If by 
 " good " is meant " moral good," I agree with him ; but 
 then it is a departure from his fundamental principle, — 
 that man's end is some form of enjoyment. He is able 
 to give his theory a plausible appearance and a lofty 
 moral tone only by passing from the one to the other. 
 If we substitute for " the good," wherever it occurs, " the 
 feeling of pleasure and pain," we see how bare and 
 earthly the system is. In his last paper, he tells us that 
 "blessedness is the supreme end." This sounds well, 
 and if it be properly explained, the view is correct. But 
 the " blessedness " which has thus come in surrepti- 
 tiously in the defense of his theory is not the same as 
 " the enjoyment " of his primary principle. There may 
 be an " enjoyment in consciousness " which is not blessed- 
 ness ; and there is a blessedness which is not enjoyment, 
 as when a man suffers pain and reproach in a good 
 cause. He speaks of the supreme end being " blessed- 
 ness, the blessedness of God and of his rational uni- 
 verse." Substitute for " blessedness " " sensitive enjoy- 
 ment," the sensitive enjoyment of God, and the doctrine 
 jars upon us offensively. Surely the supreme end of 
 man is not to promote the enjoyment of God. I insist, 
 then, that he stick to the one or other, either the enjoy- 
 ment or the blessedness. If he adhere to the enjoy- 
 ment, his theory becomes the utilitarianism which ho 
 repudiates. If he insist on bringing in blessedness, he 
 has introduced, whether he sees it or no, a new and fer- 
 ther element, and is driven, logically, to a very, different 
 
APPENDIX C. 389 
 
 theory. Whichever horn he takes, he is in difficulties 
 in this middle position which he has chosen to occupy. 
 When, our Lord says, '* Blessed are they who mourn," 
 he includes vastly more than mere sensitive enjoyment. 
 If Dr. Hopkins means by " blessedness " a " holy enjoy- 
 ment," I believe that this is a supreme end ; but it is so 
 because holiness is a constituent. 
 
 (2.) I am sorry to find that he and I do not agree, as 
 I thought at one time that we did, a& to the way of set- 
 tling the question between us. As a question of mental 
 philosophy, I presumed that it was to be determined by 
 an inquiry into our mental and moral nature. It turns 
 out that Dr. Hopkins does not admit this. I am not 
 sure what is the way in which he would settle it. He 
 says, " As rational, we have the power to overlook and 
 comprehend our whole being as we would a locomotive, 
 and I suppose the question must be decided by our do- 
 ing this." I accept his illustration. We determine the 
 end of a locomotive by looking at its structure and its 
 relation to other things in the uses to which it is turned. 
 It is thus we are to determine the end of man's existence, 
 as a question in philosophy. We look at man's nature, 
 especially his higher nature, his moral nature, his moral 
 I'eason, or conscience ; and we find it to declare that 
 there is something higher than mere enjoyment, and to 
 which enjoyment should be subordinated, if the two 
 come in collision. I am sorry to find him, in his last 
 paper, falling into the omission of Professor Bain, and of 
 the sensational and utilitarian school generally, and rep 
 resenting the original constituents of man's end to be 
 " intellect to know, sensibility to feel, and will to choose 
 and act." In doing so, he has left out as an independ- 
 ent element the Moral Power, Moral Keason, or Con- 
 science, which, looking to an action, declares it to be 
 good or evil, to be chosen and done as being good, or to 
 
890 APPENDIX C. 
 
 be avoided as being evil. This moral power in mao 
 declares, if we listen to it, that there is a higher end 
 than the mere securing or promoting of enjoyment, and 
 that this is an end which man should set before him. I 
 am amazed to find him declaring that, apart from sensi- 
 bility, " the conception of an end is impossible." The 
 Moral Faculty points to a higher end, and it is easy to 
 form a conception of it. I hold, then, that our moral 
 nature settles the question in my favor, and I do not al- 
 low a loose appeal to any supposed " rational " or " over- 
 looking " or " comprehending " power capable of deter- 
 mining the question without looking at the decisions of 
 conscience. 
 
 (3.) He gives a place to the Moral Reason, but it is 
 not, 1 think, the proper place — it is a confused place. 
 He tells us that " Moral Reason has a place in deter- 
 mining the supreme end by affirming the obligation to 
 choose it, but is no part in the end." In discussing this 
 subject, he puts a number of questions to me which I 
 could easily answer, but the questions and the answers 
 would only conduct us into a miserable chop-logic no 
 way fitted to lead to a solution. Whenever the Moral 
 Reason looks at a moral act, — say justice, or love to 
 God, or love to man, — it declares it to be binding. It 
 declares it to be so beforehand and behindhand, as Dr. 
 Hopkins seems to admit. But I go a step further, and 
 affirm that the moral power declares the act to be good 
 at the very time we do it ; that is, cherish the affection, 
 or do the deed that is virtuous. I hold that not only be- 
 fore we love God and after we love God, but when we 
 love God, we see that there is obligation in the act. 
 This makes the sense of duty to enter into the virtuous 
 act and to become part of the end. This does not make 
 the act complex, any more than water is complex, as 
 containing two elements — oxygen and hydrogen ; any 
 
APPENDIX C. 891 
 
 more than any other actual state of the mind ig com- 
 plex — all operations of the mind being concrete. Upon 
 my statement that when we love God, we see that there 
 is an obligation in the very act, he comments in a way 
 scarcely worthy of him : " If it be in the very act, it 
 could not exist before that, and so a man who had never 
 loved God, could be under no obligation to love him." 
 Surely a thing may be in the act, and yet exist before 
 the act. The truth is, that if the obligation did not 
 already exist, man could not see it by the Moral Reason. 
 As the obligation exists, the Moral Reason may per- 
 ceive it beforehand and behindhand, but also in the very 
 act. 
 
 (4.) On another • important point we differ. He de- 
 nies, and I affirm, that the quality of an action may be 
 the ground of an obligation to do that action. When I 
 affirm this, I do not mean that an abstraction is the 
 ground of obligation, but that the concrete action is good 
 as possessing that quality — that is, is done because it 
 is right. This, I think, can easily be decided. I am 
 tempted, let me suppose, to tell a lie, to say that I did 
 not commit an act which I did commit. But in looking 
 at and considering the act thus suggested, I see that it is 
 evil in itself, and I decline doing it. It is clear to me 
 that in such a case we are led to refuse to do the deed 
 because of the sinful quality of the act, and not because 
 we look to some form of enjoyment. It is the same 
 with injustice, with ingratitude, and other sins. I avoid 
 them, or should avoid them, not simply because they 
 may deprive me or others of enjoyment, but because they 
 are inherently evil. It is in the same way that we are 
 led, or should be led, to do a good act, say to cherish 
 gratitude or godliness: we see 'the essential excellence 
 of the affections. Even in love the same element enters 
 when the feeling rises to the rank of a virtue ; for all 
 
392 APPENDIX C. 
 
 love is not virtuous. We have to distinguish between 
 a holy love and an unholy ; and a holy love, fay love 
 to God or love to man, is cherished as being right, 
 proper, due, and not from any enjoyment to be thus de- 
 rived by God or by ourselves. 
 
 (5.) I allow that in many virtues, pleasure and pain 
 enter into our view. We are bound as much as within 
 us lies to promote the happiness of all beings capable of 
 joy or of sorrow. But even here, let it be observed, a 
 moral element enters : we are hound to do this. All 
 our higher moralists maintain that justice, which looks to 
 what is right in itself, is a virtue quite as much as be- 
 nevolence is. Dr. Hopkins argues that in loving God 
 we do so " in the view of the capacity of God and other 
 beings for enjoyment." I am not prepared to uphold 
 such a statement ; for my moral nature, as interpreted by 
 my consciousness, does not seem to me to sanction it. 
 We love God as being our Creator and Benefactor, and 
 as possessed of all perfection. 
 
 I am not to enter on new subjects, and so will not 
 review the statement which he gives of the doctrines 
 of certain philosophers. It could easily be shown that 
 neither Butler nor Edwards lend any sanction to the 
 very peculiar ethical theory of Dr. Hopkins. I need to 
 touch only on one other point. 
 
 (6.) The Bible happily is not a metaphysical work, 
 and I am not very willing to use its simple statements 
 to settle philosophic questions. But it seems to me that 
 the Word of God, in its spirit and its letter, opposes that 
 theory which makes man's highest end to be enjoyment. 
 Everywhere God is represented as a Being of whose 
 character holiness is as essential an attribute as even 
 benevolence. Sin is spoken of as an evil in itself, and 
 'equiring atonement to be made for it. We are taught 
 to do this, and avoid that, not merely that we may 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 avoid sensitive pain, and gain sensitive enjoyment, but 
 because God has commanded it, and because we are 
 bound to obey God. Our chief end is to glorify God, 
 and in this, and under this, enjoy Him forever. 
 
 I began this discussion with a profound veneration 
 for the character and abilities of Dr. Hopkins, and I 
 close it with the same sentiment. 
 Pbihckton, N. J., Sept. 13, 1869. 
 
 REV. DR. HOPKINS'S CONCLUSION. 
 
 Dh. McCosh thinks it time the discussion between 
 him and myself should close. I agree with him. He 
 says, " We have both had an opportunity of stating our 
 views," and that "intelligent readers have already be- 
 fore them the means of coming to a decision." So I 
 thought, and was content. Hence anything further, 
 and especially a rediscussion of the whole matter in 
 the form of a summing up, was unexpected by me. 
 Under these circumstances it is with reluctance that 
 I say a word more ; but from his fame and position 
 the words of Dr. McCosh fall with weight, and I am 
 unwilling that some statements and representations in 
 his last paper should pass without notice. 
 
 On the first point taken up by Dr. McCosh, I am 
 happy to say that, in my opinion, we are more nearly 
 agreed than he seems to suppose. I cannot but think 
 that much of our seeming difference arises from the 
 different meaning we give to the word "sensibility," 
 and hence to "blessedness." By the sensibility, I 
 mean, in common, as I suppose, with philosophers gen- 
 erally, the capacity of feeling in its whole range, as re- 
 vealed, not only through the activity of the senses, but 
 
894 APPENDIX C. 
 
 of every mental and moral power ; and did not suepeci 
 the possibility of my being supposed to mean anything 
 else. According to this, blessedness would be a form 
 of enjoyment, and, except in and through the sensibil- 
 ity, would be impossible. But Dr. McCosh cannot 
 mean this, for he says " there is a blessedness which 
 is not enjoyment," and calls ou me to " stick to the one 
 or the other." He says that if I adhere to enjoyment, 
 my theory becomes utilitarianism ; if I insist on bring- 
 ing in blessedness, I introduce a new element, whether 
 I see it or not : and so he makes two horns of a dilem- 
 ma where I see no horn at all. He says that the end 
 of man is not in the sensibility, and yet says that 
 " blessedness," " properly explained," " is the supreme 
 end." He says that "holy enjoyment is a supreme 
 end," — that is, the supreme end, for there can be but 
 one. But this is precisely what I have said from the 
 beginning,^ and whoever says this, explain it as he 
 may, must agree with me substantially in my whole 
 theory, " whether he sees it or not." I congratulate 
 Dr. McCosh, or rather myself, on his coming to this 
 result ; but what meaning he can attach to the word 
 " sensibility " in his process of doing so, is inscrutable 
 to me. With the above meaning, I still say that " if 
 we suppose the sensibility excluded, the conception even, 
 of an end is impossible ; " and I cannot but think that 
 my readers, and even Dr. McCosh will agree with me. 
 As I have said from the first, a being with no capac- 
 ity of feeling of any kind not only could form no con- 
 ception of an end, but would lack the very condition 
 that would enable him to form moral ideas or to form- 
 ulate a moral law. 
 
 Under his second head, again, I think we should be 
 substantially agreed but for the same difficulty. Dr 
 McCosh accepts my illustration of the mode in which 
 
 1 See Moral Science, lect. viii. 
 
APPE^fDIX c. 895 
 
 the question between us is to be settled. He says, 
 " "We determine the end of a locomotive by looking at 
 its structure and its relation to other things in the uses 
 to which it is put. It is thus that we are to determine 
 the end of man's existence as a question of philosophy." 
 This is just what 1 say; and also that it (bllows that 
 as we do not determine the end of a locomotive by 
 inquiring " what saith our moral natuie," so neither do 
 we determine thus the end of man ; whereas Dr. Mc- 
 Cosh says, after saying what I have quoted above, that 
 the end of man is to be determined by his conscience. 
 As I think, we judge that the end of man is to be 
 gained by obeying his conscience by comparing that 
 faculty with others, but that judgment and comparison 
 are not the work of the faculty itself. In this there 
 is a slight difference on another ground ; but now comes 
 that again from our not understanding alike " sensi- 
 bility " and its cognates. Dr. McCosh is " sorry to 
 find me falling into the omission of Professor Bain, and 
 of the sensational and utilitarian school generally,' — an 
 omission, by the way, fallen into by Ktmt and Hamil- 
 ton and every distinguished intuitional philosopher who 
 has written since, — " and representing the original 
 constituents of man's end [being?] to be intellect to 
 know, sensibility to feel, and will to choose and act." 
 In so doing, he says I have " left out, as an independent 
 element, the IMoral Power, Moral Reason, or Con- 
 science." He is "amazed to find me declaring that 
 without a sensibility the conception of an end is impos- 
 sible." He holds that "the moral power in man de- 
 clares that there is a higher end than the mere securing 
 or procuring of enjoyment," and that "it is easy to 
 form a conception of it." Here it is, in all this, that 
 we feel the need of that inscrutable meaning of the 
 word " sensibility " of which I have spoken. For with- 
 
896 APPENDIX C. 
 
 out it what have we ? "We have a part of man's na- 
 ture, and that the highest, which neither consists, uoi 
 is employed, in knowing, or feeling, or willing ! What 
 else is possible ? We have an end without a sensibility, 
 easy to be conceived of, higher than any other, and yet 
 the pursuit of which would neither secure nor promote, 
 at least intentionally, the enjoyment of anybody. I 
 am curious to know what such an end may be, espe- 
 cially in the view of one who holds that " the supreme 
 end is blessedness (properly explained) or holy enjoy- 
 ment." 
 
 Under his third head Dr. McCosh says that I " give 
 to Moral Reason a place, but a confused place." What 
 I say is, that moral reason recognizes moral quality, 
 and affirms obligation to choose ends. He, as I sup- 
 pose, says the same, and also makes this affirmation of 
 obligation, or sense of duty, a- part of the end. He 
 says, " This makes the sense of duty to enter into the 
 virtuous act and to become part of the end." I say 
 it enters into the act to give it quality, but not as a 
 part of the end. The end, I suppose, must be known 
 before the sense of duty can be originated. Whether 
 this more complex view gives moral reason a less "con- 
 fused place,'' I leave others to judge. That a moral 
 act may be binding, both beforehand and at the time 
 when it is done, I agree fully with Dr. McCosh ; but 
 am not sure that I understand what is meant by its 
 being binding " behindhand." 
 
 On the question under his fourth head, we seem to 
 be in direct opposition. Dr. McCosh affirms, and I 
 deny, that the quality of an act can be the ground of 
 obligation to do that act ; and yet I am not sure that 
 we are looking at precisely the same point when we 
 thus affirm and deny. I agree that the quality of an 
 act may be assigned as the reason for doing it. A man 
 
APPENDIX C. 397 
 
 may be exhorted to do a just act because it is just, or 
 he may say he did it because it was so. This is con- 
 venient, and often sufficient, and language has accommo- 
 dated itself to it as it has to the apparent motion of 
 the heavens ; but it would be mere trifling to assign 
 the fact of the justice of an act — that is the quality of 
 justice in it — as the ground of the obligation to do 
 justice. We here seels what is ultimate, the real na- 
 ture of things ; and what I say, and have said, is that 
 without an underlying sensibility and its products in 
 the consciousness, the quality itself of justice could not 
 exist — that nothing could be either just or right. He 
 and his school say that an action is right because it is 
 right, and that is the end of it. I say that a reason 
 can always be given why an action is right, and that 
 without a sensibility, the quality of right in an action, 
 regarded as moral, could not exist. 
 
 Under his fifth head Dr. McCosh allows that "in 
 many virtues pleasure and pain enter into our view." 
 " We are bound," he says, " as much as in us lies, to 
 « promote the happiness of all beings capable of joy or 
 of sorrow. But even here, let it be observed, a moral 
 element enters : we are bound to do this." Of course 
 we are. Who ever thought otherwise ? I agree with 
 Dr. McCosh perfectly, that when beings capable of joy 
 or of sorrow are in question, we are as much, or at 
 least nearly as much, bound to exert ourselves for them 
 as if they were capable of no such thing. I agree 
 with him that justice is quite as much a virtue as be- 
 nevolence,^ only I do not think that "justice looks to 
 what is right in itself" independently of benevolence, or 
 that it could exist without it. I think benevolence its 
 condition, but no more think the idea of justice a part 
 of that of benevolence than I do the idea of identity 
 a part of that of being. 1 think also that if God were 
 1 See Law of Love, p. 113. 
 
898 APPENDIX C. 
 
 as incapable of sensibility as a rock, and so incapable 
 of enjoyment, it would be impossible for us to love 
 Him with the love of benevolence, the only love com- 
 manded. 
 
 Respecting the Bible, Dr. McCosh says, under his 
 sixtli head, that he is " not very willing to use its sim- 
 ple statements to settle philosophic questions." I am. 
 Let the Bible state anything Mmply and explicitly, and 
 1 have no philopophy to oppose to it. I said that the 
 Bible nowhere commands us to do right because it is 
 riglit. Dr. McCosh was surprised, and undertook to 
 show that it did, by quoting the only passage he could 
 find that seemed to say so, though it did not. He now 
 simply says that it seems to. him "that the Word of 
 God in its spirit and letter opposes that theory which 
 makes man's highest end to be enjoyment," quoting no 
 text, and implying, in the form of his statement, that 
 I hold that the end of man is his own enjoyment. I 
 have nowhere said that. What I say is, that the high- 
 est end of man is to cause blessedness " properly ex- 
 plained." In immediate connection, Dr. McCosh speaks « 
 of sensitive pain and sensitive enjoyment as if they were 
 the basis of my system. I trust I have snid nothing 
 to justify this. I am no sensationalist, but a believer 
 in the highest form of intuitional and spiritual philoso- 
 phy. I am no utilitarian. I believe in a good that 
 is good in itself, and to be sought for its own sake ; 
 and in disinterested love of beings who are capable of 
 happiness, quite as much, too, as if they were not. In 
 my two books, 1 have examined the constitution of 
 man in its relation both to nature and to the Bible. I 
 have found from that, that the law of the constitution 
 is the law of the Bible. That law — the Law of Love 
 — I accept and endeavor to enforce — simply that. I 
 build no " half-way hou^e." I bring in nothing " sur- 
 
APPENDIX C. 399 
 
 reptitiously." I steal no element. I do not subordi- 
 nate virtue to happiness, but find a harmony between 
 them. I do not say as Dr. Lord, in his letter to the 
 graduates of Dartmouth, taking the representation of 
 Dr. McCosh, represents me as saying, that I am bound 
 to glorify God " because my faculties are adapted to 
 that duty, and in .performing it my faculties will be in 
 harmony, and I shall be happy." I simply find the 
 moral law — the one law for myself and for all others 
 — impersonal and impartial, and have as little to do 
 with this teiTible enjoyment as is possible under a law 
 that requires me to promote it in its purest form and 
 in the highest degree. 
 
 But enough. All metaphysical points lie within a 
 narrow compass, and it is both amusing and annoying 
 to me to see what a fog of discussion, and often nimbus, 
 will gather around them. Those involved in this dis- 
 cussion seem to me simple and luminous. Most of the 
 difficulty in making them Appear so to others arises 
 from the imperfection of language. This lias seemed 
 to me so great, that for years I was deterred from 
 attempting anything. I saw so much on those subjects 
 of mere logomachy. This lias been a difficulty between 
 Dr. McCosh and myself. We evidently do not always 
 attach the same shade of meaning to the same word. 
 If we could do that, I am confident it would bring us 
 nearer together than we have seemed, for not only are 
 the intuitions of all men on these subjects alike, but he 
 and I belong to the same general school of thought, 
 and are substantially working together. 
 
 I close by reciprocating the kind expressions of re- 
 gard by Dr. McCosh. It was a great pleasure to me 
 to welcome him in this country. I rejoiced in the 
 eclat with which he was received at Princeton, and in 
 the favor and endowment which his coming brought 
 
400 APPENDIX C. 
 
 to that College. I trust the favor will continue, and 
 the endowment increase ; and can only say that if 
 another such man could be found who would come to 
 this College and bring equal favor and endowment, es- 
 pecially, just now, the endowment, I would resign 
 to-day. 
 
 WlIXIAMS COLLEQE, Sept. 2Sth, 1369.